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UNIV.OF 
TORONTO 
LIBRARY 


THE 

Psychological  Bulletin 

EDITED    BY 

ARTHUR  H.  PIERCE,  SMITH  COLLEGE 
HOWARD  C.  WARREN,  PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY  (Index) 

JOHN  B.  WATSON,  JOHNS  HOPKINS  UNIVERSITY  (Review)  AMD 

JAMES  R.  ANGELL,  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  (Monograph) 

WITH  THE   CO-OPERATION  Of 

J.  W.  BAIRD,CLARK UNIVERSITY;  MADISON  BENTLEY,  UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS;  E.  F 
BUCHNER,  JOHNS  HOPKINS  UNIVERSITY-  ;  H.  A.  CARR,  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO;  KNIGHT 
DUNLAP,  JOHNS  HOPKINS  UNIVERSITY  ;  E.  B.  HOLT,  HARVARD  UNIVERSITY  ;  J.  H. 
LEUBA,  BRYN  MAWR  COLLEGE;  MAX  MEYER,  UNIVERSITY  OF  MISSOURI;  ROBERT 
MAcDOUGALL,  NEW  YORK  UNIVERSITY  ;  G.  H.  MEAD,  UNIVERSITY  OK  CHICAGO  ;  R.  M. 
OGDEN,  UNIVERSITY  OF  TENNESSEE  ;  W.  D.  SCOTT,  NORTHWESTERN  UNIVERSITY  ;  E. 
J.  SWIFT,  WASHINGTON  UNIVERSITY;  M.  F.  WASHBURN,  VASSAR  COLLEGE;  R.  S. 
WOODWORTH,  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


VOLUME  IX,  1912 

Containing  the  Literature  Section  of  the  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW 


PUBLISHED   MONTHLY   BY   THE 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW  COMPANY 

NORTH  QUEEN  ST.,  LANCASTER,  PA., 

AND  PRINCETON,  N.  J. 

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CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  IX 


i 


ALPHABETICAL    INDEXES    OF    NAMES    AND    SUBJECTS   WILL   BE    FOUND 

END  OF  THE  VOLUME 

ORIGINAL  CONTRIBUTIONS,  REPORTS    GENERAL 
REVIEWS  AND  SUMMARIES 

Psychological  Progress  in  1911:    EDWARD  FRANKLIN  BUCHNER 

Historical  Contributions:  I.  WOODBRIDGE  RILEY 

Mind  and  Body:  H.  A.  OVERSTREET  . 

Consciousness  and  the  Unconscious:  H.  W.  CHASE 

The  Self  in  Recent  Psychology:  M.  W.  CALKINS        '. 

Analyses  of  Some  of  the  Higher  Thought  Processes:  W.  F.  BOOK    30 

Terminology:  H.  C.  WARREN 3- 

Bibliographical:  H.  C.  WARREN          .        .      *  . 
Dreams:  BORIS  SIDIS          ....  ~£ 
Report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  American  Psychological  Associ- 
ation: W.  V.  BINGHAM 4! 

Report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Southern  Society  for  Philosophy 

and  Psychology:  W.  C.  RUEDIGER 46 

Abstracts  of  Papers 47 

Sensation  (General):  MADISON  BENTLEY 97 

Vision — General  Phenomena:  H.  S.  LANGFELD  ....  99 
Vision — Peripheral,  Foveal,  etc.:  C.  E.  FERREE  .  .  .  107 

Vision — Color  Defects :  S.P.HAYES. 112 

Hearing:  R.  M.  OGDEN 116 

Pathopsychology  and  Psychopathology :  ADOLF  MEYER  .  .129 
Experimental  Psychopathology:  S.  I.  FRANZ  ....  145 
Conscious  and  Unconscious  Mentation  from  the  Psychoanalytic 

Viewpoint:  TRIGANT  BURROW     ....  .  154 

The  Present  Status  of  the  Binet  Scale  of  Tests  for  the  Measure- 
ment of  Intelligence:  E.  B.  HUEY        .  •  160 
Cutaneous,    Kinaesthetic    and    Miscellaneous    Senses:     R.    P. 

ANGIER •  173 

Synaesthesia:  A.  H.  PIERCE         .  •  J79 

Affective  Phenomena— Experimental:  J.  F.  SHEPARD.  .  181 


111 


iv  CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  IX 

Affective  Phenomena — Descriptive    and    Theoretical:     H.    N. 

GARDINER 186 

Attention  and  Interest:  W.  B.  PILLSBURY  .....  193 
Time  and  Rhythm:  KNIGHT  DUNLAP  .  .  .  .  .  197 
Psychophysical  Measurement  Methods:  F.  M.  URBAN  .  .  209 

Tests:  F.  N.  FREEMAN 215 

Correlations:  J.  B.  MINER 222 

Reaction  Times :  V.  A.  C.  HENMON 232 

Apparatus:  C.  E.  SEASHORE 235 

Report  of  the  Clark  Meeting  of  Experimental  Psychologists: 

H.  P.  WELD 236 

Visual  Space:  G.  M.  STRATTON 249 

Auditory  Space:  DANIEL  STARCH 254 

Tactual  and  Kinsesthetic  Space:  R.  P.  ANGIER  .         .         .         .255 

Space  Illusions:  HARVEY  CARR 257 

Values:  W.M.  URBAN 260 

Psychology  of  Testimony  and  Report:  G.  M.  WHIPPLE      .         .  264 

Suggestion:  W.  D.  SCOTT 269 

Psychotherapy:  H.  M.  JOHNSON 271 

Recent  Literature  on  the  Behavior  of  the  Lower  Invertebrates: 

A.  S.  PEARSE 281 

Recent  Literature  on  the  Behavior  of  the  Higher  Invertebrates : 

C.  H.  TURNER 290 

Recent  Literature  on  the  Behavior  of  the  Vertebrates:    MAR- 
GARET F.  WASHBURN 300 

Memory,    Imagination,    Learning,    and    the    Higher    Mental 

Processes  (Experimental):  J.  W.  BAIRD        ....  321 
Memory,  Concept,  Judgment,  Logic  (Theory):  W.  C.  GORE       .  337 

Graphic  Functions:  JUNE  E.  DOWNEY 342 

Vocal  Functions:  W.  V.  BINGHAM 347 

The  Recent  Literature  of  Mental  Classes:  WARNER  BROWN       .  361 

Folk-Psychology:  A.  A.  GOLDENWEISER 373 

The  Primitive  Races  in  America:  F.  G.  BRUNER  .  .  .380 
Individual  and  Group  Efficiency:  J.  E.  W.  WALLIN  .  .  .  390 

National  Psychology:  R.  S.  WOODWORTH 397 

Volition  and  Motor  Consciousness — Theory:    E.  B.  DELABARRE  409 

Reflex  Action :  C.  S.  YOAKUM 413 

Fatigue:  F.  L.  WELLS 416 

Psychological  Aspects  of  Drug  Action:  H.  L.  HOLLINGWORTH  .  420 
Valuation  as  a  Social  Process:  C.  H.  COOLEY  ....  441 
Criminal  Psychology:  H.  W.  CRANE 451 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  IX  v 

SPECIAL  REVIEWS 

Psychology  of  Advertising:  W.  D.  TAIT     .  12± 

Mental  Measurements :  F.  M.  URBAN         .  12e 

Bleuler's  "Dementia  Praecox":  AUGUST  HOCH  .        .  .  ifo 

The  Origins  of  Music  (Stumpf) :  R.  M.  OGDEN  .  .  2oo 

Ladd  and  Woodworth's  Elements  of  Physiological  Psychology: 

V.  A.  C.  HENMON 239 

Myers'  Text-Book  of  Experimental  Psychology:   H.  S.  LANG- 
FIELD    242 

Wirth's  Psychophysik:  F.  M.  URBAN 245 

Angell's  Chapters  from  Modern  Psychology:  H.  S.  LANGFELD.  275 
Flournoy's  La  Philosophic  de  William  James:  E.  B.  HOLT.  .  276 
Holmes'  The  Evolution  of  Animal  Intelligence:  R.  M.  YERKES.  314 
Thorndike's  Animal  Intelligence:  Experimental  Studies:  S.  J. 

HOLMES 318 

Laughter  (Bergson):  H.N.GARDINER 354 

The  Study  of  Primitive  Races  (Thurnwald,  Tschermak,  etc.): 

A.  T.  POFFENBERGER,  JR 4OO 

The  Mind  of  Primitive  Man  (Boas) :  T.  L.  BOLTON    .  .  404 

Individual  Psychology  (Toulouse) :  H.  L.  HOLLINGWORTH  .  .  424 

Applied  Psychology  (Scott) :  E.  K.  STRONG  .  429 

Esthetics :  KATE  GORDON  .  .  -43° 

Anthropology:  WARNER  BROWN  .  43 l 

The  Association  Experiment:  F.  L.  WELLS  .  435 

Goldenweiser's  Totemism:  E.  SAPIR  .  •  454 
Ellwood's  Sociology  in  its  Psychological  Aspects:  J.  H.  TUFTS  .  461 

Stratton's  Psychology  of  the  Religious  Life:  E.  S.  AMES  .  .  465 
Kemmerich's  Prophezeiungen :  J.  PACHEU  . 

Mosiman's  Das  Zungenreden:  J.  PACHEU  .  •  4^9 
Pacheu's  L'Experience  Mystique  et  1'Activite  Subconsciente 

H.  DELACROIX      . 
Hocking's  Mysticism  as  Seen  through  its  Psychology: 

PRATT  . 

Mysticism  (Picavet,  True):  J.  H.  LEUBA    . 
Leuba's  Origins  of  the  Ideas  of  Unseen  Personal  Beings,  and 

Varieties,    Classification,    and    Origin    of   Magic 

CHAMBERLAIN 

Warfield's  On  Faith  in  its  Psychological  Aspects:  J  I: 
Religious  Psychology  in  Current  Periodicals:  J- H.  LEUB 
Busch's  William  James  als  Religionsph.losoph :  J.  B.  F 


vi  CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  IX 

Armstrong's  The  Idea  of  Feeling  in  Rousseau's   Religious  Phi- 
losophy: H.  N.  GARDINER 483 

DISCUSSIONS  AND   CORRESPONDENCE 

Reactions  to  Visual  and  Auditory  Stimuli:  G.  R.  WELLS     .         .127 
The  Psychology  of  Advertising:  H.  L.  HOLLING WORTH       .         .  204 

A  Note  on  Apparatus:  C.  A.  RUCKMICH 247 

A  Correction:  M.  F.  WASHBURN 438 

MISCELLANEOUS 

Books  Received  .         .     93,  128,  207,  248,  279,  358,  407,  439,  484 
Notes  and  News          .       40,  95,  128,  208,  280,  359,  407,  440,  486 

Announcement    . 360 

Indexes 487 


Vol.  JX.  No.  i.  T 

January  15,  J9I2< 


THE 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN 


GENERAL  REVIEWS  AND  SUMMARIES 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  PROGRESS  IN  1911 

BY  PROFESSOR  EDWARD  FRANKLIN  BUCHNER 

Johns  Hopkins  University 

The  year  just  closed  presented  a  variety  of  events  and  results 
which  show  a  steadily  increasing  vitality  in  the  science  of  psy- 
chology. Wearying  of  "the  patient  search  and  vigil  long"  in  the 
quest  of  the  true  object  of  their  ceaseless  inquiries,  some  psycholo- 
gists would  have  us  modify  our  intentions  by  such  definition  as  will 
make  the  object  unquestionably  clear  and  certain.  The  term  "con- 
sciousness" seems  to  face  the  dangers  which  years  ago  routed  the 
terms  "soul"  and  "mind"  from  our  vocabulary.  The  philosophers, 
too,  seem  so  to  weight  their  current  problems  in  terms  of  realism, 
humanism  and  "  Bergsonianism,"  as  to  let  the  metaphysical  gravi- 
tation of  consciousness  move  it  out  of  the  system  of  the  empirical 
relations  which  are  of  right  preempted  by  and  for  the  scientific 
methods  of  psychology.  The  focalized  expression  of  this  tendency 
appeared  among  American  psychologists  by  whom  the  use  and 
meaning  of  the  terms  was  especially  discussed  at  the  Minneapolis 
meeting  in  1910.  In  its  place  it  is  proposed  to  substitute  the  term 
"behavior,"  as  is  done,  for  example,  by  Pillsbury  (15)  in  his  defi- 
nition of  psychology  as  "the  science  of  human  behavior."  This 
is  proposed  in  the  interest  of  the  permanent  objectivity  of  the  facts 
of  the  science.  The  argument  of  Singer  (20)  is  positive  that  "con- 
sciousness is  not  something  inferred  from  behavior,  it  is  behavior." 
The  dangers  of  an  ambiguity  in  speech,  of  the  elimination  of  all 
introspection  and  of  the  study  of  the  psychology  of  animals,  and 
the  narrowing  of  experience  to  a  possible  single  mode  of  movement 
do  not  seem  to  be  effective  as  checks  in  the  adoption  of  the  sub- 

i 


3  EDWARD  FRANKLIN  BUCHNER 

stitute.  Tawney  (21)  is  more  temperate,  but  not  less  deviating, 
in  his  expression  of  a  pedagogically  felt  need  for  a  reconstructed 
science  that  will  develop  without  serious  break  into  the  correlated 
disciplines.  While  "it  is  all  very  well  to  write  psychology  for  the 
sake  of  psychology,  and  to  work  steadily  under  the  lead  of  facts,  .  .  . 
we  need  a  psychology  of  human  conduct  to  supplant  the  psychology 
of  consciousness." 

In  his  criticism  of  psychology  as  experimental,  Kostyleff  (7), 
upbraids  it  as  lacking  system  in  its  methods  and  objects  of  research, 
presenting  too  much  variety  and  planlessness  in  its  investigations, 
and  exhibiting  individuals  who  follow  masters  rather  than  attack 
fundamental  problems.  While  its  measurements  and  graphs  and 
laws  may  be  interesting,  they  cannot  become  explanations,  but 
remain  only  questions.  This  criticism  entirely  forgets  that  scien- 
tific experimentation  is  fruitful  because  the  analysis  of  any  partic- 
ular phenomenon  is  never  carried  to  completion.  Progress  is  possi- 
ble only  on  condition  that  this  is  not  done.  Complete  treatment, 
in  requiring  unending  time  and  effort,  would  preclude  all  attempt  at 
hypothesis  and  explanation.  Braunhausen  (2)  offers  as  a  refuta- 
tion of  this  criticism  a  brief  and  richly  compacted  review  of  the  work 
and  results  of  modern  psychology. 

The  first  answer  to  these  and  similar  doubts  as  to  the  worth 
of  psychology  is,  however,  to  be  found  in  the  revision  of  Ladd's 
Elements  of  Physiological  Psychology,  the  appearance  of  which  is 
the  most  interesting  single  event  of  the  year  (8).  The  first  edition 
of  this  classic  appeared  in  1887,  and  passed  through  ten  reprintings. 
That  the  work  is,  after  nearly  a  quarter  of  a  century,  subject  to 
such  a  wide  revision  as  to  incorporate  the  neurone  theory,  the  facts 
of  the  evolution  of  the  brain,  and  the  latest  experimental  data  with- 
out losing  its  original  identity,  even  as  to  the  number  of  chapters 
and  pages,  is  probably  the  best  evidence  our  literature  has  given  us 
of  the  inner  vitality  of  psychological  methods,  and  the  clear  per- 
spective of  the  safe  direction  its  researches  have  been  taking.  It 
presents  our  best  survey  of  the  varied  material  in  the  organizing 
and  reorganizing  fund  of  knowledge  which  psychology  can  now 
claim  as  its  own.  A  comparison  of  the  revised  edition  with  the 
original  shows  exactly  the  advancement  in  the  experimental  and 
objective  character  of  this  knowledge,  at  once  an  answer  to  the 
critic  and  an  indication  of  the  progress  for  which  he  should  be  in- 
quiring. From  these  points  of  view  this  work  becomes  historically 
more  interesting  than  the  famous  Grundzuge,  the  completion  of 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  PROGRESS  IN 


1911 


whose  sixth  edition  was  chronicled  one  year  ago.  The  appearance 
of  second  editions  of  the  manuals  by  Myers  (14)  and  by  Toulouse 
and  Pieron  (23)  is  further  indication  of  the  sufficiency  of  exact 
methods  and  a  welcome  sign  of  the  seriousness  in  English  and  French 
experimental  psychology. 

The  spread  of  experimental  technique  over  the  field  of  the 
thought  processes  was  the  most  considerable  and  daring  advance 
made  in  the  first  decade  of  this  century.  Now  a  similar  attempt 
at  controlled  introspection  is  passing  over  into  the  field  of  volun- 
tary phenomena,  and  happily,  with  a  fair  degree  of  assurance  that 
the  results  are  reliable.  Continuing  the  work  begun  by  Ach  and  by 
Bovet,  and  reaching  results  partly  agreeing  and  partly  disagreeing 
with  ^  theirs,  Michotte  and  Prum  (13)  used  reaction  methods  in 
securing  their  contribution  to  the  descriptive  psychology  of  will. 
They  aimed  to  bring  out  in  relief  the  problems  of  motivation  and 
determination.  In  the  final  stage  of  the  latter,  the  observers  found 
the  phenomenon  of  choice  to  be  a  consciousness  of  doing,  but  not 
as  a  content  alongside  of  other  contents.  Now  that  the  initial 
difficulties,  interposed  by  logic,  ethics,  and  the  earlier  conclusions 
of  psychology  precluding  these  fields,  have  been  overcome,  it  is  hoped 
that  future  progress  will  not  be  hindered  by  the  controversial  side- 
issues  of  misunderstanding. 

The  renewed  efforts  of  recent  years  to  make  the  technique  of  the 
science  definitive  and  applicable  in  the  measurement  of  individuals, 
both  in  particular  processes  and  as  a  whole,  have  been  fortunately 
advancing  towards  at  least  working,  if  not  assured  results.  The 
excellent  contribution  of  Whipple  last  year  is  now  followed  by  the 
report  of  the  special  Committee  of  the  American  Psychological 
Association  (18)  and  the  spreading  interest  in  trying  out  the  Binet- 
Simon  scale  for  measuring  intelligence  and  its  development.  As  early 
as  1896  the  American  Psychological  Association  made  its  first  effort 
to  standardize  mental  tests,  which  did  not  get  beyond  the  statement 
of  the  general  problem.  The  work  of  the  permanent  Committee  of 
1906,  which  is  ripening  slowly,  becomes  peculiarly  serviceable  by 
bringing  the  different  methods  of  procedure  together  in  such  a  way 
as  to  be  mutually  corrective.  A  fresh  and  potent  incentive  is  now 
at  hand  for  re-experimentation  by  psychologists  in  these  newly 
charted  fields.  As  if  by  common  consent,  the  other  line  of  cooperative 
work  is  being  done  in  the  sudden  spread  of  interest  in  the  applicability 
and  validity  of  the  scale  of  intelligence.  Meumann  (12),  in  specifying 
the  four  aims  to  be  realized  by  these  tests,  viz.  the  psychiatric,  the 


4  EDWARD  FRANKLIN  BUCHNER 

tests  to  determine  the  limits  of  abnormality  and  the  typical  intelli- 
gence disorders  in  childhood,  tests  to  analyze  the  normal  adult,  and 
also  normal  children,  raises  as  a  new  problem  the  question,  to  what 
extent  may  an  individual  (especially  a  child)  deviate  mentally  from 
the  normal  average  for  a  given  age  and  still  be  normal?  Bobertag 
(i)  has  reviewed  the  work  done  in  1910.  Binet  and  Simon  (3)  have 
extended  and  simplified  their  1908  order  of  tests  so  as  to  include  the 
fifteen-year-olds  and  over,  and  to  measure  each  year  (except  the 
fourth,  which  has  four  questions),  with  five  tests.  Goddard  (4),  in 
trying  the  tests  on  a  homogeneous  group  of  two  thousand  normal 
children,  reaches  the  conclusion  that  we  have  now  "a  mathematical 
demonstration  of  the  accuracy  of  the  tests,"  particularly  for  the 
ages  of  five  to  twelve  years.  In  the  "  Symposium  on  the  Binet  Tests  " 
in  the  Psychological  Clinic  (16),  Terman  presents  the  results  obtained 
from  four  hundred  non-selected  children.  The  organization  of  com- 
mittees and  institutes  in  Europe  to  promote  further  investigations, 
mentioned  below,  indicates  an  unusually  serious  belief  in  the  value 
of  standardized  mental  tests. 

The  phenomena  of  dreams  have  long  been  a  region  of  opinion  and 
superstition.  One  may  now  ask,  with  some  hope  of  an  affirmative 
answer,  whether  this  field  shall  finally  yield  to  sound  theory.  The 
continued  development  of  the  method  of  psychoanalysis  and  the 
extension  of  Freud's  theories  to  the  explanation  of  traits  recorded  in 
biography  is  a  matter  of  importance  in  spite  of  its  lack  of  general 
acceptance.  Void  (24)  was  probably  the  first  to  apply  the  methods 
of  careful  control  and  comparison  to  dreams,  this  strange  material 
of  experience  which  seems  to  be  beyond  all  control.  In  attempting 
to  determine  dreams  experimentally,  by  tightly  placed  bands  chiefly 
on  the  lower  limbs,  he  found  for  example,  in  tests  on  nineteen  sub- 
jects, experimental  dreams  contained  two  and  a  half  times  the 
elements  recallable  in  ordinary  dreams.  It  also  appears  that  motor 
ideas  are  most  frequently  aroused  in  controlled  dreams,  ideas  of 
pressure  and  temperature  only  slightly  so.  Hollingsworth's  observa- 
tions on  the  transition  state  between  waking  and  sleeping  may  lead 
to  a  further  inquiry  into  the  psychology  of  dreams  (6). 

From  the  abundance  of  other  expressions  of  tendencies  and  ad- 
vances, mention  may  be  made  of  the  following  fruits  of  the  year. 
Continuing  the  American  pedagogical  practice  of  demonstrating  a 
position  by  constructing  a  text-book,  Yerkes  (25)  has  issued  a  clear 
call  to  the  science  to  hark  back  to  the  importance  of  introspection  and 
to  a  recognition  of  psychical  causation.  His  exhibition  of  the  gen- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  PROGRESS  IN 


i9II 


°* 


eralization  of  the  science  (part  IV  )  is 
extensive  scientific  claims  it  ^ 

projection  method  for  studying  Lagery 
demonstr     on  of  th  ^  ^  ^  rf 

(9,  10),  the  range  of  poss.ble  improvement  in  methods  is  indicated 
A  new  meanmg  of  comparative  psychology  is  given  in  thc  Z2J 
study  by  Harmlton  (5)    whose  subjects  were  eleven  hum.?,    fiv 
monkeys,  s.xteen  dogs,  five  cats,  and  one  horse.    The  reprinting 
the  papers  by  Thorndike  (22),  who  first  made  the  experiment, 
attack  on  the  problems  of  animal  psychology  over  a  decade  aKc 
affords  an  opportunity  to  note  the  general  soundness  of  his  inter- 
pretations, as  well  as  a  basis  for  estimating  the  progress  in  technique 
and  theory  which  may  have  been  made  in  the  meantime  in  this 
branch  of  the  science. 


1909 

1910 

No.  of 
Titles 

Rubric 

No  of 
Titles 

Rubric 

739 
512 

Genetic,    individual    and    social 
psychology. 
Philosophical   implications   of 
psychology. 

712 

587 

Genetic,    individual    and    social 
psychology. 
Sleep,  trance  and  pathology. 

512 

Sleep,  trance  and  pathology. 

471 

Sensation. 

358 

Sensation. 

417 

Philosophical  implications  of  psy- 

chology. 

322 

General. 

292 

Anatomy  and  physiology  of  thc 

277 

Anatomy  and  physiology  of  the 

248 

nervous  system. 
General. 

nervous  system. 

128 

Conation  and  movement. 

171 

Conation  and  movement. 

122 

Cognition. 

169     Cognition. 

69 

Conditions  and  relations  of  con- 

86 

Conditions  and  relations  of  con- 

sciousness. 

sciousness. 

28 

Affection. 

33 

Affection. 

3,067 

3,186 

As  a  helpful  sign  of  the  high  level  of  activity  in  psychology  one  can 
read  the  indications  in  the  record  of  publications  to  be  found  in  the 
Psychological  Index  for  1910  (17).  That  the  science  is  "established" 
beyond  all  peradventure  may  be  gathered  from  the  striking  steadiness 
of  its  literary  output.  The  growth  of  the  Index  is  approaching  the 
limits  which  may  result,  as  announced,  in  reducing  the  space  given  to 
philosophy.  The  total  entries  for  1910  were  3,186,  by  two  thousand 
five  hundred  and  fourteen  authors.  This  total  is  over  ten  per  cent, 
less  than  that  of  1908,  but  four  per  cent,  increase  over  that  of  1909. 
Last  year  seven  topics  showed  an  increase,  and  three  a  decrease,  in 


6  EDWARD  FRANKLIN  BUCHNER 

the  number  of  contributions.  The  largest  gain  is  one  hundred  and 
thirteen  on  sensation,  the  greatest  loss  is  ninety-five  on  the  conditions 
and  relations  of  consciousness.  The  slight  displacement  in  rank 
shown  by  sleep,  trance  and  pathology,  the  philosophical  implications, 
general,  and  the  anatomy  and  physiology  of  the  nervous  system, 
do  not  effect  the  general  significance  of  the  table  above.  The  fact 
that  the  field  of  genetic,  individual  and  social  psychology  has  steadily 
held  the  first  place  during  the  past  four  years  should  be  highly 
instructive  to  one  seeking  for  indications  of  the  positive  directions 
being  taken  by  psychological  inquiry. 

A  more  striking  illustration  of  the  enormous  range  of  activity  in 
the  science  may  be  found  in  the  year's  history  of  the  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
BULLETIN.  In  1911  this  journal  inaugurated  a  new  and  helpful 
plan  for  reporting  the  literature  of  psychology.  In  addition  to  its 
reports  of  the  proceedings  of  four  psychological  congresses  or  annual 
meetings,  and  the  special  reviews,  eleven  issues  were  given  to  general 
reviews  and  summaries  of  the  work  of  the  year  1910  (including  some 
reference  to  the  results  of  1909  and  1911).  These  were  grouped  under 
forty-seven  topics;  and  while  they  aggregated  over  seven  hundred 
references,  they  numbered  less  than  one  fourth  the  number  recorded 
in  the  Index  for  the  same  year! 

The  ability  of  psychology  to  maintain  its  scientific  and  educational 
interests  in  America,  at  least,  is  shown  in  the  annual  record  of  the 
bestowal  of  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy  by  American  uni- 
versities which  is  being  kept  by  Science  (19).  Psychology  is  one  of 
the  seventeen  natural  and  exact  sciences,  in  which  two  hundred  and 
thirty-nine  degrees,  and  one  of  the  thirty-four  subjects,  in  which  four 
hundred  and  thirty-seven  degrees  were  conferred  in  1911.  Twenty- 
three  degrees,  a  number  greatly  above  the  average  (15.8)  for  this 
science  since  1898,  were  conferred  upon  candidates  presenting  dis- 
sertations on  psychological  subjects.  Twenty  of  these  were  conferred 
by  four  universities,  Clark  (seven),  Chicago  (six),  Columbia  (four), 
and  Pennsylvania  (three).  Psychology  also  continues  to  rank  fourth 
among  the  twenty  sciences,  and  seventh  among  the  thirty-seven 
subjects  which  are  credited  with  the  doctorate  of  American  uni- 
versities. The  same  record  shows  that  education,  as  a  subject,  was 
credited  in  1911  with  twenty-three  degrees,  and  calls  attention  to  the 
impossibility  of  picking  out  the  psychology  that  may  have  crept 
into  education,  and  vice  versa. 

During  the  year  the  channels  of  publication  in  psychology  have 
shown  interesting  development.     The  activities  of  investigators  in 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  PROGRESS  IN 

all  the  clearly  differentiated  branches  of  the  science  are  increasing 
rapidly.  We  have  come  to  the  happy  state  where  each  aspect  i! 
having  its  own  periodical.  The  beginning  of  the  year  saw  the  appear- 

TV  °*/v  }?  °f       imd  Behavi°r>  Under  the  edito"*l  direction 

of  R.  M.  Yerkes  and  an  editorial  board,  and  its  series  of  The  Behavior 
Monographs,  edited  by  J.  B.  Watson.  Another  sign  of  rapidly  «- 
tending  investigations  is  found  in  the  two  additional  outlets  for 
extensive  material  opened  in  1911  in  the  Beihefte  of  the  Zeitschrift 
fur  angewandte  Psychologic  und  psychologist  Sammelforschung,  now 
m  its  fifth  volume,  and  in  the  series  of  monograph  supplements  to  the 
British  Journal  of  Psychology,  in  its  third  volume.  W.  Specht  is  the 
editor  of  the  new  Zeitschrift  fur  Patho-psychologie  appearing  in 
Munich.  The  new  Zeitschrift  fur  pddagogische  Psychologie  und 
experimented  Pddagogik,  under  the  editorial  care  of  Meumann  and 
Scheibner,  is  a  combination  to  continue  the  interest  in  the  fields 
hitherto  cultivated  by  the  older  Zeitschrift  fur  pddagogische  Psy- 
chologie (since  1899)  and  the  younger  Zeitschrift  fur  experimented 
Pddagogik  (since  1905).  The  first  volume  of  the  institute  for  experi- 
mental pedagogy  and  psychology  of  the  Teachers'  Association  of 
Leipzig,  the  Pddagogisch-Psychologische  Arbeiten,  aims  to  bring  the 
achievements  of  experimental  psychology  to  the  acquaintance  of 
students  of  education.  That  exact  methods  of  inquiry  in  this  field 
are  beginning  to  receive  some  attention  in  England  is  shown  by  the 
new  Journal  of  Experimental  Pedagogy  and  Training  College  Record, 
edited  by  J.  A.  Green,  of  Sheffield  University. 

The  associational  interests  of  psychology  continued  to  exercise 
the  diverse  activities  of  former  years.  The  stated  meetings  of 
national,  sectional  and  local  organizations  offered  the  usual  oppor- 
tunities for  expressions  in  general,  experimental,  educational,  com- 
parative, and  abnormal  psychology.  Besides  these  efforts,  several 
events  of  unequal  significance  for  progress  may  be  chronicled.  The 
Fourth  International  Congress  of  Philosophy,  held  at  Bologna  in 
April,  devoted  one  of  its  eight  sections  to  philosophy— an  indication 
that  the  divorce  of  the  two  subjects  remains  to  be  made  final.  The 
American  Psycho-analytic  Association  was  organized  at  Baltimore, 
in  May,  under  the  presidency  of  J.  J.  Putnam,  and  in  affiliation  with 
the  International  Psycho-analytic  Association.  Renewed  efforts  to 
bring  together  the  results  of  scientific  child  study  led  to  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  First  International  Congress  of  Pedology  held  at  Brussels, 
in  August,  under  the  presidency  of  M.  C.  Schuyten.  In  the  following 
month  was  held  the  international  Verein  for  medidal  psychology  and 
psychotherapy  in  Munich. 


8  EDWARD  FRANKLIN  BUCHNER 

The  year  also  brought  forth  a  number  of  instances  of  organized 
efforts  to  further  the  movement  of  the  application  of  psychology, 
particularly  to  education.  In  Berlin,  teachers  and  psychologists 
united  in  the  organization  of  a  Verein  fiir  pddagogisch-psychologische 
Statistik,  which  aims  to  keep  foremost  the  use  of  methods  of  investiga- 
tion of  a  scientific  character.  Teachers  are  also  to  be  immediate 
beneficiaries  of  psychology  in  the  Institute  for  Pedagogical  Psychology 
established  in  Munich  under  Fischer  and  in  the  Pedagogical  Institute 
at  the  University  of  Tubingen  under  Deuchler,  while  in  Breslau 
special  study  of  intelligence  tests  is  being  carried  on  by  the  new 
committee  organized  for  work  in  educational  psychology.  The  more 
permanent  establishment  of  the  science  and  its  further  extension  and 
application  are  evidenced  in  the  gift  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
marks  by  Professor  Hans  Meyer  to  the  University  of  Leipzig  for  an 
institute  of  experimental  psychology,  in  the  fund  of  one  hundred  and 
twenty  thousand  roubles  by  an  anonymous  donor  for  the  building 
and  equipment  of  a  psychological  institute  at  the  University  of 
Moscow,  and  in  the  Gatzert  Foundation  for  child  welfare  in  the 
University  and  State  of  Washington,  to  direct  which  a  psychologist, 
S.  Smith,  has  been  appointed.  The  varied  services  of  "applied" 
psychology  found  a  new  direction  in  the  appointment  of  a  psycholo- 
gist, L.  R.  Geissler,  for  special  research  in  the  physical  laboratory  of 
the  National  Electric  Lamp  Association,  in  Cleveland. 

The  deaths  of  Alfred  Binet,  of  France,  Sir  Francis  Galton  and 
John  Hughlings  Jackson,  of  England,  W.  A.  Nagel,  of  Germany, 
Angelo  Mosso,  of  Italy,  and  Henry  P.  Bowditch,  of  America, 
remind  us  of  the  distinctive  services  in  specializing  problems  and 
devising  techniques  for  their  solution  which  may  come  from  physiolo- 
gists and  neurologists  as  well  as  from  psychologists.  Binet  was 
director  of  the  laboratory  of  physiological  psychology  at  the  Uni- 
versity of  Paris,  founder  of  the  Uannee  psychologique,  and  a  special 
student  of  child  psychology,  whose  collaboration  in  the  tests  of 
intelligence,  familiarly  known  by  his  name,  promises  to  be  directive 
of  numerous  inquiries  in  the  years  to  come.  Galton's  wide  range 
of  scientific  interest  gave  to  psychology  a  new  era  by  his  statistical 
methods  and  his  approach  to  the  problems  of  special  traits  and 
mental  heredity.  Each  of  the  four  physiologists  left  his  impress  at 
some  point  in  psychology.  Jackson  nearly  a  generation  ago  worked 
out  the  suggestion  of  the  widely  serviceable  generalization  of  evolu- 
tionary levels  in  brain  function,  by  showing  wherein  higher  functions 
become  specific  and  the  structures  supporting  them  become  more 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  PROGRESS  IN  1911  9 

complex.  Nagel's  interest  as  a  physiologist  in  psychology  became 
fixed  in  his  contribution  to  the  advancement  of  the  theory  of  color- 
blindness and  his  devices  of  test-cards  and  apparatus  for  light-trans- 
mission. Mosso  invented  the  ergograph,  and  largely  fashioned  the 
important  field  of  fatigue.  Bowditch  advanced  our  knowledge  of 
the  physiology  of  vision  and  the  knee-jerk,  and  filled  with  permanent 
suggestiveness  his  anthropometric  work  on  the  growth  of  children. 

REFERENCES 

1.  BOBERTAG,  O.     Zsch.  f.  angew.,  PsychoL  u.  psych.  Sammelforschung,   1911,  5, 

105-203. 

2.  BRAUNHAUSEN,  N.      Eine  Krisis  der  experimentellen  Psychologic?    Arch.  f.  d. 

ges.  Psych.,  1911,  21,  4.     Literaturbericht,  i-io. 

3.  BINET,  A.  and  SIMON,  T.     Le  mesure  du  developpement  de  1'intelligence  chez  les 

jeunes  enfants.  Bull  de  la  soc.  libre  pour  r  etude  psych,  de  V enfant,  1911,  n, 
187-248. 

4.  GODDARD,  H.  H.    Two  Thousand  Normal  Children  Measured  by  the  Binet 

Measuring  Scale  of  Intelligence.     Ped.  Sem.,  1911,  18,  232-259. 

5.  HAMILTON,  G.  V.     A  Study  of  Trial  and  Error  Reactions  in  Mammals.    Jour,  of 

Animal  Behavior,  1911,  i,  33-66. 

6.  HOLLINGWORTH,  H.  L.     The  Psychology  of  Drowsiness.     Amer.  Journ.  of  PsychoL, 

1911,  22,  99-111. 

7.  KOSTYLEFF,  N.     La  crise  de  la  psychologie  experimental.     Le  present  et  favenir. 

Paris:  Alcan,  1911.     Pp.  176. 

8.  LADD,  G.  T.   and  WOODWORTH,  R.   S.    Elements  of  Physiological  Psychology. 

Thoroughly  revised  and  re-written.  New  York:  Scribner's  Sons,  1911.  Pp. 
704. 

9.  MARGIS,  P.     Das  Problem  und  die  Methoden  der  Psychographie.    Zsch.f.  angew. 

PsychoL,  etc.,  1911,  5,  409-451. 

10.  MARGIS,  P.     E.  J.  A.  Hoffmann:  Ein  psychographische  Individualanalyse.  Leipzig, 

1911.    Ibid.,  Beiheft,  No.  4. 

11.  MARTIN,  L.  J.    The  Projection  Method.    PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN,  1911,  8, 

36-37  (abstract). 

12.  MEUMANN,  E.     Der  gegenwartige  Stand  der  Methodik  der  Intelligenzpriifungen. 

Zsch.f.  exper.  Pad.,  1910,  n,  68-79. 

13.  MICHOTTE,  A.  and  PRUM,  E.     Etude  experimentale  sur  le  choix  volontaire  et  ses 

antecedents  immediats.     Arch,  de  psychol.,  1910,  10,  113  ff. 

14.  MYERS,  C.  S.     A  Text-Book  of  Experimental  Psychology,  with  Laboratory  Exercises. 

2d  ed.,  Pt.  L  and  II.     New  York,  1911. 

15.  PILLSBURY,  W.  B.     The  Essentials  of  Psychology.    New  York:  Macmillan,  1911- 

Pp.  362. 

16.  Psychological  Clinic,  1911,  S,  199-238. 

17.  Psychological  Index,  No.  17,  for  the  Year  1910.    PSYCHOL.  REV.  Publ.,  1911. 

1 8.  Report  of  the  Committee  of  the  Amer.  Psych.  As  soc.  on  the  Standardizing  of  Procedure 

in  Experimental  Tests:  PILLSBURY,  W.  B.,  SEASHORE,  C.  E.,  ANGELL,  J.  R. 
PSYCH.  REV.  MON.  No.  53,  Dec.,  1910.  Methods  of  Studying  Piston  in  Ani- 
mals, R.  M.  YERKES  and  J.  B.  WATSON.  Behavior  Monographs,  1911,  Vol.  I, 
No.  2. 


io  I.   WOODBRIDGE  RILEY 

19.  Doctorates  conferred  by  American  Universities.     Science,  1911,  34,  193  ff. 

20.  SINGER,  E.  A.,  Jr.     Mind  as  an  Observable  Object.     /.  of  Phil,  Psychol.,  etc.,  1911, 

8,  1 80  ff. 

21.  TAWNEY,  G.  A.     Consciousness   in  Psychology  and   Philosophy.     /.   of  Phil., 

PsychoL,  etc.,  1911,  8,  197  ff. 

22.  THORNDIKE,    E.    L.     Animal    Intelligence.    Experimental    Studies.     New    York: 

Macmillan,  1911.     Pp.  297. 

23.  TOULOUSE,  E.  and  PIERON,  H.     Technique  de  psychologic  experimentale.     2d  ed. 

2  vols.     Paris,  1911. 

24.  VOLD,  J.   M.     Ufbfr  den    Traum:   Experimental-psychologischf    Untersuchungen. 

(Posthumous.)     Edited  by  O.  KLEMM.     Vol.  I.     Leipzig,  1910.     Pp.  435. 

25.  YERKES,  R.  M.     Introduction  to  Psychology.    New  York:  Holt  &  Co.,   1911. 

Pp.  427. 

HISTORICAL  CONTRIBUTIONS 

BY  PROFESSOR  I.  WOODBRIDGE  RILEY 
Vassar  College 

The  year  is  signalized  by  two  important  histories  of  psychology. 
Of  these  Dessoir's  (3)  has  the  wider  sweep,  attempting  to  give,  from 
direct  sources,  the  fundamental  lines  of  ancient  and  modern  thought, 
and  especially  to  present  the  advance  made  in  the  development  of 
this  discipline.  The  three  roots  of  psychology  are  the  religious, — 
the  phenomena  of  dreams  and  death  giving  us  occult  psychosophy; 
the  individual, — with  the  localization  of  the  soul  in  the  heart  and 
midriff;  the  social, — with  its  linguistic  and  poetic  implications. 
These  three  roots  may  be  traced  through  classical  antiquity,  the 
temperamental  school  of  Galen,  the  introspective  Alexandrians  to  the 
Renaissance  itself.  The  latter's  psychognosis  splits  into  the  genetic- 
individual  psychology  of  quietism  and  the  temperamental-racial 
which  began  with  Gracian  and  ended  with  Chamfort.  Here  the 
French  studies  are  made  responsible  for  a  double  development  of 
Humanism:  on  the  one  hand  arising  a  decadent  dissection  of  character 
by  Rousseau,  on  the  other  the  more  healthy  self-portraiture  of  Goethe, 
Maine  de  Biran,  Maurice  de  Guerin.  This  extremely  interesting 
study  of  the  psychology  of  comparative  literature  is  succeeded  by 
another  on  the  ancient  conception  of  the  life  of  the  soul.  This  in- 
cludes the  background  of  folk-lore,  and  the  esoteric  Orphic-Pythag- 
orean cult  as  to  the  soul's  two-fold  relation  to  the  spirit  world  and  to 
physical  nature.  Next  come  the  Pre-Socratics  proper,  Platonism  as 
a  combination  of  the  mystical  and  mechanical,  the  Aristotelian  genetic- 
rational  views,  the  variants  among  the  Epicureans,  Stoics  and  Neo- 


HISTORICAL  CONTRIBUTIONS  n 

platonists,  and  the  neglected  opinions  of  the  Patristics.  In  the 
Middle  Ages  psychology  becomes  a  history  of  the  activities  of  the 
soul  under  Roman-Germanic  Christianity.  After  the  brief  career 
of  the  Arabian  physiological  psychology,  high  Scholasticism  is  over- 
thrown by  new  empirical  and  mystical  doctrines  from  Roger  Bacon 
to  Tauler.  With  the  founding  of  constructive  psychology  under 
Vives  and  Lord  Bacon  there  arises  the  connection  with  mathematics, 
utilized  by  Descartes,  despite  his  adoption  of  the  Augustinian  ego', 
by  Hobbes,  and  even  by  Malebranche  in  his  heuristic  principle  of 
parallelism*  but  less  successfully  by  Spinoza  who  leaves  the  connection 
between  psychologv  and  epistemology  to  be  made  clearer  by  Locke, 
by  Hartley  and  his  associationism,  and  by  the  analytics  Hume,  Reid, 
and  Tetens.  With  Leibniz  and  Wolf  begins  the  German  faculty 
psychology.  This,  being  criticized  by  Kant,  eventuates  in  the  self- 
determining  systems  of  Fichte  and  Schelling,  the  vague  spiritism 
of  Hegel,  and  the  animism  of  Herder.  With  the  more  exact  methods 
of  Schubert,  Carus  and  Burdach  come  the  opponents  of  the  dialectical 
school  Fries  and  Beneke,  the  eclectics  Tiedemann,  Reinhold  and 
Scheidler.  At  this  point  historic  proportion  is  lost.  Ten  pages 
are  devoted  to  Herbart  and  his  school  while  less  than  two  are  granted 
to  the  French  founders  Condillac,  Cabanis,  and  Destutt  de  Tracy; 
there  is  an  interesting  paragraph  on  Gall  but  nothing  or.  Spurzheim; 
in  the  rubric,  but  not  in  the  text,  Hazard  and  James  are  put  among 
the  English  psychologists,  and,  in  conclusion,  but  twelve  pages  are 
devoted  to  German  psychology  since  1850.  The  work  is,  however, 
notable  for  tracing  the  golden  thread  of  continuity,  and  especially 
interesting  in  its  account  of  the  primitives  in  Hellenism  and  the 
Renaissance. 

Klemm  (4)  presents  a  history  of  the  problems  of  psychology  much 
as  Janet  and  Seailles  have  done  in  philosophy.  Besides  tracing  the 
development  of  the  past  he  attempts  to  define  the  limits  of  modern 
psychology  as  a  separate  discipline,  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  dis- 
ciple of  Wundt.  The  work  ranges  from  the  beginnings  of  intro- 
spection in  the  occult  sciences  to  present  applications  in  pedagogy, 
jurisprudence  and  psychiatry.  Under  the  heads  of  metaphysical 
psychology  we  have  spiritualism  proper,  and  materialism  in  its  atomic, 
mechanical  and  psychophysical  varieties,  and  under  empirical  psy- 
chology the  associational,  comparative  and  experimental  varieties. 
This  first  division  on  the  common  aims  of  psychology  is  followed  by 
a  second  on  the  development  of  fundamental  concepts  such  as  con- 
sciousness, the  contents  of  consciousness,  psychological  method, 


12  /.   WOOD  BRIDGE  RILEY 

and  psychological  measurements  as  presented  by  Weber,  Fechner 
and  G.  E.  Miiller.  The  last  division  offers  a  highly  interesting  his- 
tory of  the  most  important  theories  regarding  not  only  the  general 
problems  of  sensations  of  sight  and  hearing,  but  also  special  problems 
of  space,  such  as  Miiller's  nativistic,  Helmholtz's  empirical,  and 
Herbart's  genetic  hypotheses.  The  thoroughness  of  Klemm's  work 
is  evidenced  in  the  last  chapter  with  its  theories  of  feeling  subdivided 
into  the  phenomenal,  psycho-mechanical,  physiological,  and  psycho- 
physical;  and  its  theories  of  the  will  into  the  intellectual,  absolutistic, 
heterogenetic,  and  emotional.  We  note,  in  conclusion,  the  names  of 
nine  American  psychologists  from  Edwards  to  James. 

Boutroux  (i)  in  his  beautifully  written  monograph,  makes  James 
an  opponent  both  of  the  actualists  and  the  substantialists,  since  the 
former  are  too  atomistic,  the  latter  too  remote  from  reality.  Intro- 
spection shows  the  reality  to  be  rather  the  stream  of  consciousness. 
Here  psychophysical  parallelism  has  a  new  meaning  because  the  nerve 
centers  are  to  be  considered  partially  spontaneous  and  intelligent. 
In  this  way  the  principles  of  science  tend  to  become  transfigured  by 
the  contact  of  physiology,  their  materialism  being  sublimated,  their 
mechanism  animated,  their  determinism  rendered  more  supple. 

Cushman  (2)  continues  his  treatment  of  last  year's  volume,  com- 
menting succinctly  on  the  psychology  of  the  modern  philosophers 
from  Hobbes  to  Herbart.  To  his  chapter  on  the  Enlightenment  he 
adds,  without  comment,  one  group  of  associationist  psychologists 
from  Peter  to  Thomas  Brown,  and  another  of  "associationist  psy- 
chologists and  related  philosophers"  from  Kruger  to  Sulzer. 

Levy-Bruhl  offers  an  appreciation  of  Cournot  on  the  occasion  of  a 
reprint  of  his  Traite  de  V  enchainement  des  I  dees  fondamentales,  which 
has  remained  almost  unknown  because  of  the  original  opposition  of 
Comte  and  Renouvier. 

REFERENCES 

1.  BOUTROUX,  E.     William  James.     Paris:  Colin,  1911.     Pp.  142. 

2.  CUSHMAN,  H.   E.     A  Beginner's  History  of  Philosophy.     Vol.   II.     New  York: 

Houghton  Mifflin  Company,  1911.     Pp.  v  +  377. 

3.  DESSOIR,  MAX.      Abriss  einer  Geschichte  der  Psychologic.    Heidelberg:  Winter, 

1911.     Pp.  viii  +  272. 

4.  KLEMM,  OTTO.     Geschichte  der  Psychologic.     Berlin :Teubner,  1911.     Pp.  x  +  388. 

5.  LEVY-BRUHL,  L.    Une  reimpression  de  Cournot.    Rev.  de  met.  et  de  mor.,  1911,  19, 

292-295. 


MIND  AND  BODY  ,3 

MIND  AND   BODY 

BY  PROFESSOR  HARRY  ALLEN  OVERSTREET 
College  of  the  City  of  New  York 

Noteworthy  in  the  discussion  of  this  problem  during  the  year  is 
a  searching,  but,  in  result,  considerably  diverse  attempt  to  define 
mind  or  consciousness.  Oesterreich  (28),  resting  his  case  on  self- 
observation,  which,  according  to  him,  discovers  a  not-further-reduc- 
ible "I-moment,"  argues  that  the  "I"  is  not  a  complex  of  phenomena 
which  singly  do  not  contain  it  but  is  a  phenomenon  of  a  special  kind. 
On  the  contrary,  Gross  (17),  while  dissatisfied  with  the  bundle  theory 
of  consciousness,  agrees  with  Hume  that  we  do  not  actually  find 
the  self  as  object.  Nevertheless  he  holds  that  our  introspection  is 
accompanied  by  the  conviction  that  there  was  something-more-than- 
that  present  in  the  feeling- willing-judging  experience  than  we  ac- 
tually have  in  the  object  of  introspection.  This  "more-than"  we 
express  metaphorically  as  "center,"  "focus,"  etc.  Martius  (24)  re- 
jects the  substance  view  of  mind,  which  Schwartzkopf  (29)  on  the 
contrary,  and  by  appealing  to  introspection,  accepts.  The  latter, 
however,  attempts  to  substitute  a  living  substantiality  for  the  static 
substantiality  of  older  thought.  Schwartzkopf  argues  that  I  am  not 
the  mere  sum  of  my  life  experiences;  they  belong  to  me  as  "mine." 
Sichler  (31),  on  the  contrary,  maintains,  with  Wundt,  the  conception 
of  the  soul  as  pure  activity,  arguing  that  the  conception  of  the  soul 
as  doer  of  its  deeds  or  carrier  of  its  qualities  is  due  to  the  transference 
of  the  "thing"  concept  to  the  soul.  "It  is  asked  that  the  act  be 
referred  back  to  an  acting  subject.  But  the  act  itself  is  primary. 
The  division  of  act  and  acting  subject  is  a  play  with  concepts  of 
reflection,  which  we  first  distinguish  as  subject  and  object  and  then 
proceed  to  separate  into  independent  realities."  He  holds  likewise 
that  the  introspected  consciousness  has  not  the  constancy  requisite 
for  the  concept  of  substantiality.  Singer  (32),  too,  rejects  the  sub- 
stance view,  explaining  it  as  due  to  the  satisfaction  of  treating  any 
complex  thing  as  an  additive  result.  Consciousness  is  not  something 
to  be  inferred  from  behavior  ("an  eject  forever  veiled  and  hidden  in 
a  land  beyond  experience");  it  is  behavior.  Or,  more  accurately, 
our  belief  in  consciousness  is  an  expectation  of  probable  behavior 
based  on  an  observation  of  actual  behavior,  a  belief  to  be  confirmed 
or  refuted  by  more  observation,  as  any  other  belief  in  a  fact  is  to  be 
tried  out.  Miller  (26)  questions  the  correctness  of  this  view.  Con- 


1 4  HARRY  ALLEN  OVERSTREET 

sciousness,  to  him,  appears  to  be  a  "field,"  or  at  least," the  relation 
of  conjunction  between  the  components  of  the  field."  "It  is  these 
pools  of  conjoint  phenomenality  that  Mr.  Singer  completely  ignores." 
Joseph  (20)  objects  to  the  prevalent  psychological  manner  of  treating 
the  soul  or  mind  mechanically.  "  I  do  not  say  that  we  cannot  to  some 
extent  assign  the  conditions  psychical  or  physical  under  which  [think- 
ing and  knowing]  occur  in  the  individual  mind.  .  .  .  But  such  obser- 
vations do  nothing  to  explain  the  process;  the  whole  process  still 
remains,  as  something  which  has  an  intelligible  nature  of  its  own,  not 
mechanical."  Cotlarciuc  (10)  holds  the  view  of  the  soul  as  a  bearer 
of  its  qualities.  D'Istria  (12)  recounts  the  important  work  of  Cabanis 
in  leading  French  philosophy  away  from  Condillac's  view  of  the  self. 
Bergson  (3,  4,  5)  repudiates  the  notion  of  a  substantial  ego.  The 
moi  (jui  dure  is  ceaseless  change.  There  is  no  permanent  substrate. 
Ladd  (21)  rejects  "the  distinction  between  the  'phenomenal  ego' 
and  the  real  mind,  if  by  the  former  we  mean  the  one  subject  to  which 
we  attribute  all  the  characteristics  of  doing  and  suffering  that  make 
themselves  known  as  consciousness.  .  .  .  This  subject  of  states  is 
the  reality."  Bode  (7)  passes  in  review  the  newer  realistic  concep- 
tions of  consciousness,  approving  them  as  a  protest  against  subjec- 
tivism and  transcendentalism,  but  discovering  in  them  inherent 
weaknesses  in  so  far  as  they  aim  to  be  rival  doctrines.  McGilvary 
(25)  would  describe  consciousness  not  as  a  relation  of  meaning  nor  as 
a  way  of  appropriation  of  past  experiences,  but  as  a  "way  of  being 
felt  together."  Dewey  (n)  maintains  that  as  long  as  perceptions 
are  "regarded  as  cases  of  knowledge,  the  gate  is  opened  to  the  ideal- 
istic interpretation."  They  should  be  conceived  as  pure  natural 
events.  "Knowing  is  something  that  happens  to  things  in  the 
natural  course  of  their  career,  not  the  sudden  introduction  of  a 
' unique*  and  non-natural  type  of  relation." 

On  the  question  of  the  homogeneity  or  heterogeneity  of  the 
physical  and  the  psychical,  Oesterreich  (28)  takes  firm  stand  for  the 
latter  alternative.  All  attempts,  he  holds,  to  treat  the  psychical 
processes  as  complexes  of  natural  processes  fail.  It  is  the  "I"  char- 
acter of  all  psychical  facts  which  places  the  subject-matter  of  psy- 
chology in  complete  contrast  to  that  of  the  physical  world.  Martius 
(24),  although  differing  from  Oesterreich  in  his  view  of  the  nature  of 
consciousness,  holds  similarly  that  consciousness  is  not  part  of  the 
physical  series.  Two  facts,  according  to  him,  substantiate  this:  the 
discontinuity  of  physical  and  psychical  with  regard  to  stimulus  and 
result;  the  well-nigh  mechanical  self-sufficiency  of  certain  chains  of 


MIND  AND  BODY  15 

psychical  processes.  Rejecting  parallelism  as  contrary  to  introspec- 
tive analysis  and  as  requiring  a  mass  of  accessory  hypotheses,  and 
the  energy  theory  as  employing  a  concept  too  narrow  to  include  the 
psychical,  he  describes  the  relation  between  mind  and  body  as  a 
teleological  one,  in  the  sense  that  the  physical  world  is  a  means  to 
the  realization  of  the  psychical.  A  teleological  view  is  necessary,  he 
holds,  by  reason  of  the  abstract  one-sidedness  of  the  sciences  and  the 
inability  of  the  causal  series  to  explain  themselves.  Schlegel  (30), 
on  the  contrary,  supports  the  view  that  consciousness  is  a  form  of 
energy.  Henry  (18,  19)  works  out  in  elaborate  detail  a  description 
of  psychical  facts  in  terms  of  energy.  Franken  (15)  approaches  the 
problem  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  question  whether  a  universal 
psychology  is  possible,  or  whether  such  .psychology  must  not  in  fact 
be  merely  a  physiology  of  the  nervous  system.  In  the  course  of  his 
negative  answer  to  the  latter  alternative,  he  rejects  the  energy  con- 
cept as  inadequate  to  express  psychological  processes;  he  likewise 
rejects  the  identity  theory,  showing  that  it  is  based  upon  a  spatial 
metaphor — inner  and  outer.  He  asks  why  reality,  possessing  the 
aspects  inner  and  outer,  might  not  possess  innumerable  others.  He 
sees  no  excuse  for  parallelism;  its  fear  of  a  causal  interchange,  he 
holds,  is  due  to  a  confusion  of  "causality"  with  "energy."  If 
causality  means  invariable  sequence,  interaction  (causal  relation) 
need  not  mean  the  intrusion  of  energy  from  the  psychical  into  the 
closed  world  of  physical  energy.  He  concludes,  holding  this  sole 
legitimate  meaning  of  causality,  that  the  physical  and  psychical  are 
related  by  way  of  interaction.  The  psychical  is  the  principle  of 
organization  or  equilibrium.  Psychical  processes  are  of  such  a 
nature,  always,  that  the  result  is  a  total  impression,  a  higher  unity, 
a  kind  of  equilibrium.  Disturbances  of  this  unity  call  forth  processes 
for  the  restoration  of  the  original  unity  or  the  achievement  of  a  new 
one.  In  this  sense,  the  psychical  (i.  *-.,  the  totality  or  equilibrium 
principle)  is  prior  to  the  parts  and  ideologically  related  to  them. 
Becher  (2)  likewise  finds  no  incompatibility  between  psychophysical 
interaction  and  the  principle  of  conservation  of  energy,  (i)  Every 
measurement  of  energy  transformations  fails  of  complete  agreement 
with  the  conservation  principle.  This  discrepancy  may  actually  be 
due  to  the  intrusion  of  the  psychical.  (2)  The  psychical  may  itself 
be  a  form  of  energy.  (3)  In  so  far  as  there  are  even  physico-chemical 
influxes  which  bespeak  no  increase  or  diminution  of  energy,  the 
same  may  be  true  of  psychical  influxes.  Mackenzie  (23)  attempts  to 
remove  the  difficulty  by  finding  it  unnecessary  "to  assume  that  the 


16  HARRY  ALLEN  07ERSTREET 

amount  of  energy  in  the  physical  system  is  in  any  way  interfered  with 
by  the  presence  of  conscious  processes.  It  is  enough  if  we  may 
suppose  that  its  form  is  in  some  way  affected."  Cohn  (9),  on  the 
other  hand,  rejecting  both  interactionism  and  parallelism,  regards 
the  physical  and  the  psychical  as  differently  characterized  but  in  fact 
identical  processes  of  the  one  world.  Singer  (32)  contents  himself 
with  the  view  that  life  and  consciousness  are  aspects  of  a  body's 
behavior  from  which  other  aspects  may  be  distinguished,  but  which 
may  not  be  regarded  as  separable.  Sichler  (31)  upholds  Wundt's 
monistic  view  of  body  and  mind,  declaring  however  that  this  view 
was  for  Wundt  a  hypothesis  solely  of  heuristic  worth.  Stout  (33), 
announcing  a  radical  change  in  his  view,  maintains,  with  the  new 
realists,  that  "what  is  existentially  present  in  consciousness  in 
sense-perception  is  matter  directly  apprehended  as  it  is  in  itself." 
Only  it  is  and  is  thought  as  being  partial  and  fragmentary.  "For 
thought,  it  signifies  its  own  continuation  and  completion  in  a  whole 
which  transcends  and  includes  it."  Mitchell  (27)  holds  that  con- 
sciousness and  material  processes  imply  each  other  with  logical 
necessity,  consciousness  being  the  inversion  or  reciprocal  aspect  of 
organic  activity,  i.  e.,  virtual,  in  distinction  from  externalized  or 
real,  activity. 

On  the  closely  related  problem  of  the  relation  of  life  to  the  bodily 
processes,  Lovejoy  (22)  attempts  to  define  three  possible  positions 
of  vitalism:  (i)  That  organisms  have  unique  laws;  (2)  that  these 
laws  cannot  be  stated  in  terms  of  the  number  and  arrangement  of 
the  organism's  physical  components;  (3)  that  there  are  special  forces 
or  agents  as  causes  of  these  peculiar  modes  of  action.  The  presump- 
tion he  holds  to  be  in  favor  of  (2).  In  any  case,  the  hypothetical 
"forces"  or  "causes"  would  not  constitute  the  basis  of  an  irreducible 
minimum  of  vitalism.  Briot  (8)  defends  a  vitalistic  view  of  biology. 
Driesch  (14)  presents  a  new — a  logico-metaphysical — basis  for 
vitalism.  Becher  (2)  shows  that  the  conflict  between  mechanism 
and  vitalism  is  one  with  the  conflict  between  parallelism  and  interac- 
tionism, and  holds  with  the  latter  pair  of  alternatives. 

Differing  considerably  from  these  attempts  is  the  attitude  of 
"interested  ignorance"  of  Yerkes  (34).  "Instead  of  working  on  the 
presupposition  that  mind  causes  body  or  that  body  causes  mind,  we 
may  more  profitably  admit  to  ourselves  that  we  do  not  know  whether 
a  causal  relation  exists  between  the  two  sets  of  phenomena.  Thus 
we  should  be  free  to  work  toward  a  solution  of  the  problem  without 
the  encumbrance  of  a  philosophical  system  or  of  prejudicial  assump- 


MIND  AND  BODY  !7 

tions."  Yerkes,  like^Becher,  supports  "psychical  causality,"  in  so 
far  as,  to  him,  there  is  as  much  orderliness  in  mental  as  in  physical 
events.  "What  psychology  needs  is  more  extensive  and  accurate 
information  concerning  the  sequences  of  its  phenomena.  Too  long 
the  notion  has  held  sway  that  psychical  events  are  wayward,  un- 
caused, etc.  ...  or  that  their  true  causes  are  not  other  mental 
events  but  bodily  events.  This  last  view  and  no  other  in  my  opinion 
has  so  retarded  the  development  of  real  psychological  insight  and 
information."  Hence  he  advises  the  study  of  (i)  the  facts  of  con- 
sciousness in  their  mutual  relations;  (2)  the  facts  of  bodily  life  in 
their  relations;  (3)  the  correlation  of  the  two  series  of  events. 

Becher  (2)  notes  the  tacit  assumption  of  many  scientists  that 
causality  has  no  place  in  the  psychical  sphere,  but  is  present  solely 
in  the  sphere  of  the  physico-chemical.  To  this  unwarranted  assump- 
tion, he  holds,  is  largely  traceable  their  unwillingness  to  permit  any 
manner  of  psychophysical  interaction. 

Except  for  Franken's  (15)  rather  obscure  view  of  the  psychical 
as  "equilibrium  principle,"  the  one  view  which  departs  in  a  marked 
manner  from  the  conventional  modes  of  treatment  of  the  problem  is 
that  of  Bergson  (3,  4,  5,  6).  The  novelty  of  his  view  is  due  to  his 
thought  of  perception  as  a  means,  not  to  knowledge,  but  to  action. 
Hence  the  initial  separation  ordinarily  made  between  a  subjective 
knower  and  an  objective  known  is  not  permitted.  Perceptual  ac- 
tivity is  essentially  the  activity  of  an  object  in  and  with  the  world  of 
objects.  It  differs  from  other  activity  solely  in  degree.  All  life  is 
reactive.  Perceptive  life  is  distinguished  simply  by  a  greater  power 
to  postpone  reaction  and  by  a  larger  range  of  reactive  possibilities. 
Matter  is  the  totality  of  images;  perception  is  a  selection  from 
matter,  a  selection  necessitated  by  motor  needs.  The  reactive  organ- 
ism cannot  respond  to  the  total  world;  its  selected  world  of  response 
therefore  is  matter  transformed  into  perception.  Perception,  in  this 
sense,  is  not  a  "looking  at"  a  world  outside;  it  is  simply  a  selective 
mode  of  activity  in  and  upon  the  world.  "Whereas  matter  is  the 
whole  sum  of  images,  such  portions  of  the  latter  as  are  related  to  the 
possible  actions  of  my  body  constitute  perception,  which  is  then  a 
selected  portion  of  matter." 

Such  selective  activity,  which  divides  the  world  into  mutually 
exclusive  images,  Bergson  regards  as  due  to  the  arrest  of  the  vital 
impulse.  "Matter  is  ...  an  inverse  motion  which  runs  counter  to 
the  vital  impulse,  or,  what  is  declared  to  be  the  same  thing,  an  inter- 
ruption of  the  latter.  The  creation  of  matter  is  a  simple  arrest  of 


i8  HARRY  ALLEN  OFERSTREET 

the  action  which  generates  life,  just  as  an  interruption  of  the  act  of 
creating  a  poem  spreads  it  out  into  sentences  and  words.  As  a 
result  we  have  matter  and  intellect,  always  correlatives,  which  thus 
are  both  a  checking  of  the  vital  impulse,  a  constrained  pause  in  its 
spontaneous  flow.  The  tension  of  duration  is  relieved,  and  quality 
becomes  quantity"  (13).  "Apparently,"  says  Dolson,  "not  only  is 
the  inverse  motion  equally  primitive  with  that  which  it  opposes, 
but  matter  and  intellect,  though  neither  is  founded  upon  the  other, 
yet  become  progressively  so  adapted  to  each  other,  that  they 
sometimes  seem  like  different  aspects  of  the  same  thing."  In  his 
Birmingham  address,  Bergson  casts  further  light  upon  the  func- 
tion of  matter:  "When  setting  one  against  the  other,  we  examine 
consciousness  and  matter  in  their  mutual  reactions,  we  have  the 
impression  that  matter  plays  at  first  the  part  of  an  instrument  that 
cuts  it  up  in  order  to  bring  about  a  greater  precision.  A  thought 
only  becomes  precise  when  it  is  divided  into  words" — a  process  which 
costs  eflort.  "Now  this  effort  would  not  have  been  put  forth  without 
matter,  which  by  the  unique  nature  of  the  persistence  it  opposes  and 
the  unique  nature  of  the  docility  to  which  it  can  be  brought,  plays 
at  cne  and  the  same  time  the  role  of  obstacle  and  stimulus,  causes 
us  to  feel  our  force  and  also  to  succeed  in  intensifying  it."  Finally 
he  relates  consciousness  and  matter  to  duration  as  follows:  "Sensa- 
tion, which  is  the  point  at  which  consciousness  touches  matter,  is 
.  .  .  the  condensation  ...  of  a  history  which  in  itself — in  the  world 
of  matter — is  something  infinitely  diluted  and  which  occupies  enor- 
mous periods  of  what  might  be  called  the  duration  of  things.  •  On  the 
one  hand,  matter  subject  to  necessity,  a  kind  of  immense  machine, 
without  memory,  or  at  least  having  only  just  sufficient  memory  to 
bridge  the  interval  between  one  instant  and  the  next,  each  of  the 
states  of  the  material  world  being  capable,  or  almost  so,  of  mathe- 
matical deduction  from  the  preceding  state,  and  consequently  adding 
nothing  thereto;  on  the  other  hand  consciousness — that  is  to  say, 
on  the  contrary,  a  force  essentially  free  and  essentially  memory,  a 
force  whose  very  character  is  to  pile  up  the  past  on  the  past,  like  a 
rolling  snowball,  and  at  every  instant  of  duration  to  organize  with 
this  rast  something  new  which  is  a  real  creation.  That  these  two 
forms  of  existence,  matter  and  consciousness,  have  indeed  a  common 
origin,  seems  to  me  probable.  I  believe  that  the  first  is  a  reversal 
of  the  second,  that  while  consciousness  is  action  that  continually 
creates  and  multiplies,  matter  is  action  which  continually  unmakes 
itself  and  wears  out."  The  view  stated  in  the  last  sentence  is  one 
deveVpcd  with  some  poetic  power  by  Auerbach  (i). 


MIND  AND  BODY  19 

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de  mor.,  1911,  19,  177-198. 

13.  DOLSON,  G.  N.     The  Philosophy  of  Henri  Bergson.     Phil.  Rev.,  1910,  19,  579- 

596;  1911,  20,46-58. 

14.  DRIESCH,  H.     Zwei  Vortrdge  zur  Naturphilosophie.     I.  Die  logische  Rechtfertigung 

der  Lehre  von  der  Eigengesetzlichkeit  des  Belebten.     II.  Ueber  Aufgabe  und  Begrifi 
der  Naturphilosophie.     Leipzig:  Engelmann,  1910.     Pp.  iii  +  38. 

15.  FRANKEN,  A.     Moglichkeit  und  Grundlagen  einer  allgemeinen  Psychologic,  im 

besonderen  der  Tierpsychologie.     Zsch.  f.  Phil.  u.  Pad.,  1910,  17,  313-325; 
361-374;  425-448;  489-502;  538-549. 

16.  GAULTIER,    P.     La   pensee   contemporaine:  les  grandes   problemes.     (La   vie   in- 

terieure.)     Paris:  Hachette  et  Cie,  1911.     Pp.  62-92. 

17.  GROOS,  K.     Bemerkungen  zum  Problem  der  Selbstbeobachtung.     Zsch.  f.  Phil. 

u.  ph.  Kr.,  1910,  137,  76-81. 

18.  HENRY,  C.     Psycho-physique  et  energetique.     Bull.  inst.  gen.  psychol.,  1909,  9, 

3-25- 

19.  HENRY,  C.     Psycho-biologic  et  energetique.     Bull.  inst.  gen.  psychol.,  1909,  9, 

25-236;  317-319- 

20.  JOSEPH,  H.  W.  B.     The  Psychological  Explanation  of  the  Development  c 

Perception  of  External  Objects  (III.).     (Reply  to  Prof.  Stout.)     Mind,  1911, 
78,  161-180. 

21.  LADD,  G.  T.     The  Ontological  Problem  of  Psychology.     Phil.  Rev.,  1911,  20, 

363-385- 

22.  LOVEJOY,  A.  O.     The  Meaning  of  Vitalism.     Science,  1.911,  33,  61 

23.  MACKENZIE,  J.  S.     Mind  and  Body.     Mind,  1911,  80,  489-506. 


20  H.  W.  CHASE 

24.  MARTIUS,  G.     Leib  und  Seele.     Kiel:  Lipsius  und  Tischer,  1910.     Pp.  26. 

25.  McGiLVARY,  E.  B.     Experience  as  Pure  and  Consciousness  as  Meaning.     /.  of 

Phil.,  PsychoL,  etc.,  1911,  8,  511-525. 

26.  MILLER,  D.  S.     Is  Consciousness  "a  Type  of  Behavior"?     /.  of  Phil.,  PsychoL, 

etc.,  1911,  8,  322-327. 

27.  MITCHELL,  A.     The  Logical  Implication  of  Matter  in  the  Definition  of  Conscious- 

ness.    /.  of  Phil.,  PsychoL,  etc.,  1911,  8,  561-565. 

28.  OESTERREICH,  K.     Die  Phdnomenologie  des  Ich  in  ihrer  Grundproblemen.     Leipzig: 

Barth,  1910.     Pp.  vii  -f-  532. 

29.  SCHWARTZKOPF,  Prof.  Dr.     1st  die  Seele  eine  Substanz?     Zsch.f.  Phil,  und  ph.  Kr., 

1909,  134,  88-102. 

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1911,  8,  180-186. 

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427. 

CONSCIOUSNESS    AND  THE  UNCONSCIOUS 

BY  PROFESSOR  H.  W.   CHASE 

University  of  North  Carolina 

Of  recent  books  dealing  with  the  problems  of  consciousness  those 
by  the  following  authors  may  be  noted.  McCabe  (16)  attempts  to 
synthesize  data  from  a  group  of  related  sciences  in  such  a  way 
as  to  give  a  history  of  the  development  of  mind.  Consciousness 
is  not  present  everywhere  in  the  animal  series,  but  first  appears  when 
a  certain  degree  of  nervous  complexity  is  reached,  surely  in  the  mam- 
mal, perhaps  before.  As  to  the  exact  moment  of  its  appearance,  all 
proposed  criteria  are  inadequate;  the  answer  must  be  deferred  until 
we  know  more  of  the  nervous  system  than  at  present. 

Fite,  in  his  "Individualism"  (8),  sets  an  ethical  problem  which 
requires  for  its  solution  a  theory  of  consciousness.  For  the  author, 
the  true  nature  of  consciousness  is  unity  in  diversity.  From  the 
mechanical  point  of  view,  the  universe  shows  irreconcilable  opposi- 
tions, which  it  is  the  function  of  consciousness  to  resolve  through 
higher  syntheses.  Just  in  proportion  as  action  is  fully  conscious, 
it  harmonizes  opposing  phases  of  experience.  The  relation  between 
the  self  and  the  object  is  always  present  in  consciousness,  self-  and 
object-consciousness  developing  together  in  the  individual. 

Oesterreich  (23)  postulates   the  existence  of  a  permanent  ego  as 


CONSCIOUSNESS  AND  THE  UNCONSCIOUS 


21 


the  principle  of  unity  of  conscious  contents.  The  opposition  between 
the  self  and  the  object  is  always  given  in  experience.  Feelings  form 
a  truer  groundwork  for  personality  than  do  the  organic  sensations. 
Various  abnormal  phenomena  are  discussed,  and  the  ego  is  shown  to 
be  permanent  amid  all  pathological  changes  of  personality. 

Titchener  (30)  rejects  the  definition  of  consciousness  as  "the 
mind's  awareness  of  its  own  processes."  For  him,  it  is  the  "sum- 
total  of  mental  processes  occurring  now,  at  any  given  present  time." 

Miss  Calkins  (4),  defining  psychology  as  "the  science  of  the  self 
as  conscious,"  holds  that  "in  being  conscious,  I  am  always  conscious 
(even  if  vaguely  conscious),  of  myself  as  related  either  to  an  object 
or  to  that  totality  of  objects  which  I  call  my  environment." 

Recent  papers  dealing  with  consciousness  approach  the  subject 
from  both  psychological  and  philosophical  points  of  view.  For  the 
psychologists,  Judd  (13)  argues  that  an  adequate  explanation  of 
human  life  in  biological  terms,  without  use  of  the  concept  conscious- 
ness, is  impossible.  Consciousness  has  "solved  the  age-long  opposi- 
tion between  individual  and  environment,"  by  literally  "taking  up 
the  environment  into  the  individual  and  there  remoulding  the  ab- 
sorbed environment  in  conformity  to  individual  needs."  The  indi- 
vidual thus  comes  ultimately  to  live  in  an  inner  world  with  laws  of 
combination  differing  wholly  from  those  of  the  outer  world. 

Weyer  (32)  thinks  that  psychology  needs  a  unit  concept  more 
psychical  than  that  of  the  physiological  reflex  arc.  The  essential 
characteristic  of  consciousness  is  found  in  "complexity,  differentiated 
in  clearness  as  opposed  to  sensory  intensity."  For  Pikler  (27),  con- 
sciousness arises  from  purely  objective  and  physical  tendencies  to 
repetition.  It  first  appears  as  the  result  of  resistances  aroused  by 
the  excitation  of  opposed  tendencies  of  such  a  nature.  Abolition  of 
resistances  between  related  systems  forms  the  higher  levels  of  con- 
sciousness, which  give  rise  to  voluntary  action.  Dodge  (7)  regards 
consciousness  as  a  form  of  organization,  to  which  the  concept  of 
apperception  in  Erdmann's  sense  is  the  key.  It  thus  shows  the  same 
sort  of  organization  as  its  contents. 

The  experimental  study  of  Ordahl  (25)  finds  both  conscious  and 
unconscious  factors  involved  in  learning.  Associations  are  fixed  and 
variations  crop  out  unconsciously,  consciousness  being  a  "corrective 
agent."  While  learning  is  possible  when  neither  the  end  nor  the 
fact  of  learning  is  conscious,  attention  gives  more  marked  results. 
Experiments  undertaken  to  determine  whether  material  present  but 
not  conscious  was  more  easily  learned  later  proved  inconclusive. 


22  H.  W.  CHASE 

A  group  of  papers  deal  with  special  phases  of  the  question. 
Miiller-Freienfels  (21)  discusses  states  of  consciousness  of  heightened 
intensity.  He  finds  them  characterized  by  alterations  of  the  emotive 
life,  and,  on  the  intellectual  side,  by  increased  clearness,  with  a 
telescoping  of  the  "transitive  parts."  Levy-Suhl  (14)  makes  the 
Einstellung  a  general  capacity  of  all  organized  matter,  and  points  out 
its  importance  both  in  normal  and  abnormal  consciousness.  Oester- 
reich  (24)  distinguishes  three  phases  of  disturbance  of  function  of 
consciousness,  depersonalization,  successive  alterations  of  self-con- 
sciousness, and  splitting  of  consciousness. 

Three  papers  deal  with  consciousness  under  anesthesia.  Hill  (10) 
finds  the  waning  of  consciousness  under  chloroform  characterized  by 
no  sharply  marked  stages,  motor  ability  being  the  last  to  leave,  the 
affective  state,  pleasant.  On  recovery,  sensory  phenomena  and  emo- 
tional tone  were  reversed,  and  there  was  later  amnesia  for  a  partially 
rational  period.  Walker  (31)  notes  especially  a  sense  of  loss  of  individu- 
ality at  the  beginning  of  recovery  from  ether.  Jacobson  (n),  from  an 
experience  with  nitrous  oxide,  concludes  that  higher  functions  may 
remain  when  lower  have  gone,  and  that  subsequent  amnesia  may  not 
mean  unconsciousness  in  the  patient  at  the  time  of  operation.  The 
suggestion  to  remember  might  be  effective  here. 

Of  the  philosophical  writers,  Bawden  (2)  regards  mental  phe- 
nomena as  "vicarious  substitutes  for  physical  phenomena  when  the 
latter  are  for  any  reason  inadequate."  Mind  is  but  "the  machinery 
by  which  the  content  of  experience  undergoes  metamorphosis  into  a 
different  mode."  Behavior  is  here  central. 

Bode  (3)  criticizes  the  definitions  of  consciousness  offered  by  the 
realistic  movement.  The  instrumentalism  of  Professor  Dewey,  pos- 
tulating that  consciousness  is  merely  "a  name  for  'sensations,'  'states 
of  consciousness'  or  'psychic  elements'  which  emerge  as  the  results 
or  products  of  the  psychological  investigation,"  with  no  proper  exist- 
ence elsewhere,  offers  at  least  a  working  program. 

Tawney  (29)  argues  that  functional  psychology  has  failed  to 
bridge  the  gap,  created  by  modern  science  and  philosophv,  between 
inner  and  outer  experience.  Woodworth's  definition  of  consciousness 
as  relation  seems  promising.  A  psychology  based  on  "immediate 
values"  is  needed. 

McGilvary  (18),  while  expressing  his  sympathy  with  relational 
theories  of  consciousness,  considers  that  the  peculiar  sort  of  relation 
which  constitutes  consciousness  is  neither  to  be  found  in  the  appro- 
priation bv  the  present  of  past  experience,  as  James  would  hold,  nor 


CONSCIOUSNESS  AND  THE  UNCONSCIOUS  23 

in  the  meaning  relation  assumed  by  Woodbridge.  Consciousness, 
while  relational  in  character,  is  characterized  by  "a  unique  way  of 
togetherness,  distinct  from  all  other  ways  of  togetherness,"  which 
"must  be  taken  at  its  face  value,  neither  less  nor  more."  His  other 
paper  (17)  is  a  protest  against  Dewey's  identification  of  consciousness 
with  the  "organic  releases  .  .  .  which  are  the  conditions  of  aware- 
ness." Such  a  position  is  hardly  distinguishable  from  that  of  the 
realists,  and  still  leaves  untouched  the  whole  problem  of  consciousness. 

Miller  (19)  criticizes  Singer's  statement  that  "consciousness  is 
not  something  inferred  from  behavior,  it  is  behavior."  Conscious- 
ness implies  a  peculiar  conjunction  of  objects  in  its  field  at.  any  mo- 
ment, a  sort  of  togetherness  which  the  realist  ignores.  Mitchell  (20) 
considers  that  consciousness  and  matter  imply  one  another  as  truly 
as  convexity  and  concavity.  The  argument  directed  against  parallel- 
ism and  based  on  the  denial  of  such  implication  thus  loses  its  force. 

Recent  literature  in  the  field  of  the  "unconscious"  or  "subcon- 
scious" has  at  least  served  to  emphasize  the  existing  confusion.  The 
earlier  symposium  on  this  topic  in  the  Journal  of  Abnormal  Psychology 
appears  in  book  form  (22).  The  article  by  Hart  (9)  which  is  added 
to  the  former  symposium,  distinguishes  between  marginal,  co-con- 
scious, subconscious  in  the  sense  of  Janet,  and  the  conceptual  ex- 
planatory construction  of  Freud.  Whether  the  facts  are  interpreted 
in  mental  or  physical  terms  is  of  small  consequence;  the  conception 
of  the  subconscious  itself  has  the  same  pragmatic  justification  as  the 
ether  of  the  physicist. 

Abramowski  (i),  as  the  result  of  an  experimental  study,  argues 
for  a  subconscious  which  is  a  creative  stratum,  showing  various 
degrees  of  organization,  and  the  content  of  which  tends  either  to 
enter  or  to  recede  from  consciousness.  Patini  (26)  attempts  another 
classification  of  observed  facts.  Consciousness  involves  awareness  of 
self.  The  apsychic  are  twilight  states  without  this  criterion.  The 
unconscious  is  inactive  and  latent;  the  subconscious,  active,  but 
subliminal.  Mackenzie  (15)  points  out  the  possibility  of  other  inter- 
pretations of  the  facts  observed  in  the  Beauchamp  case.  Chase  (5) 
summarizes  critically  Freud's  theories  of  the  unconscious. 

A  symposium  on  the  subject  at  the  Geneva  conference  was  opened 
by  Dessoir  (6),  who  would  make  the  subconscious  differ  from  con- 
sciousness, not  in  content,  but  in  a  less  close  organization  of  its 
elements.  There  is  no  water-tight  compartment  between  the  two, 
the  marginal  zone  being  of  especial  significance  in  phenomena  of 
dissociation.  Janet  (12)  again  expresses  his  desire  to  limit  the  use 


24  H.  W.  CHASE 

of  the  term  "subconscious"  to  split-off  systems  which  function  in 
diseases  of  personality.  Prince  (28)  regards  the  unconscious  as  in- 
active memory-dispositions.  Co-consciousness  is  preferred  as  a  term 
for  active  processes  outside  of  consciousness.  The  Freudian  con- 
ception of  the  mechanism  of  the  unconscious  is  criticized  in  that 
psychoanalysis  shows  origins  and  not  actual  mechanisms. 

REFERENCES 

1.  ABRAMOWSKI,  E.     Dissociation  et  transformation  du  subconscient  normal.     Rev. 

psychoL,  1910,  3,  63-80,  187-209. 

2.  BAWDEN,  H.  H.     Mind  as  a  Category  of  Science.     PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN, 

1910,  7,  221-225. 

3.  BODE,  B.  H.     Realistic  Conceptions  of  Consciousness.     Phil.  Rev.,  1911,  20,  265- 

279. 

4.  CALKINS,  M.  W.     A  First  Book  in  Psychology.    New  York:  Macmillan,  1910. 

Pp.  viii  -f  4*9- 

5.  CHASE,  H.  W.     Psychoanalysis  and  the  Unconscious.     Ped.  Sent.,  1910,  17,  281- 

327. 

6.  DESSOIR,   Max.     Das   Unterbewusstsein.     Proc.   Flme   Cong.  Int.   de   PsychoL , 

tenu  a  Geneve,  1909.     Geneva,  1910,  37-56. 

7.  DODGE,  R.    A  Working  Hypothesis  for  Inner  Psychophysics.     PSYCHOL.  REV., 

1911,  18,  167-185. 

8.  FITE,  W.     Individualism.     New  York:  Longmans,  1911.     Pp.  viii  +  301. 

9.  HART,  B.     The  Conception  of  the  Subconscious.     /.  of  Abnorm.  PsychoL,  1910,  4, 

3SI-37L 

10.  HILL,  Prof,  and  Mrs.  D.  S.    The  Loss  and  Recovery  of  Consciousness  under 

Anesthesia.     PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN,  1910,  7,  77-83. 

11.  JACOBSON,  E.     Consciousness  under  Anesthetics.     Amer.  J.  of  PsychoL,  1911,  22, 

334-345- 

12.  JANET,  P.     Les  Problemes  du  Subconscient.     Proc.  VIme  Cong.  Int.  de  PsychoL, 

tenu  a  Geneve,  1909.     Geneva,  1910,  57-70. 

13.  JUDD,  C.  H.     Evolution  and  Consciousness.     PSYCHOL.  REV.,  1910,  17,  77-97. 

14.  LEVY-SUHL,  M.     Ueber  Einstellungsvorgange  in  normalen  und  anormalen  Seelen- 

zustanden.     Zsch.  f.  Psychother.  u.  med.  PsychoL,  1910,  2,  141-164. 

15.  MACKENZIE,  W.  L.     Observations  on  the  Case  of  Sally  Beauchamp.     Mind,  1910, 

19,  1-29. 

16.  McCABE,  J.     The  Evolution  of  Mind.     London:    Black,  1910.     Pp.  xvii  -f-  287. 

17.  McGiLVARY,  E.     Prof.  Dewey's  "Action  of  Consciousness."    J.  of  Phil.,  PsychoL, 

etc.,  1911,  8,458-460. 

1 8.  McGiLVARY,  E.     Experience  as  Pure  and  Consciousness  as  Meaning.    /.  of  Phil., 

PsychoL,  etc.,  1911,  8,  511-525. 

19.  MILLER,  D.  S.     Is  Consciousness  a  Type  of  Behavior?    /.  of  Phil.,  PsychoL,  etc., 

1911,8,  322-327. 

20.  MITCHELL,  C.    The  Logical  Implication  of  Matter  in  the  Definition  of  Conscious- 

ness,    y.  of  Phil.,  PsychoL,  etc.,  1911,  8,  561-565. 

21.  MtiLLER-pREiENFELS,  R.    Zur  Psychologic  der  Erregungs-  und  Rauschzustande. 

Zsch.  f.  SinnesphysioL,  1910,  57,  161-194. 


THE  SELF  IN  RECENT  PSYCHOLOGY 


25 


22.  MUNSTERBERG,  H,  RlBOT,  P.,  JASTROW,  J.,  HART,  B.,  PRINCE,  M.      Subconscious 

Phenomena.     Boston:  Badger,  1910.     Pp.  141. 

23 .  OESTERREICH,  K.     Die  Phdnomenologie  des  Ich  in  ihren  Grundproblemen      Lei™* 

1910. 

24.  OESTERREICH,  K.     Das  Selbstbewusstsein  und  seine  Storungen.    Zsch.f.  Psycho- 

ther.  u.  med.  Psychol.,  1910,  2. 

25.  ORDAHL,  L.  E.     Consciousness  in  Relation  to  Learning.     Amer.  J.  of  Psychol 

1911,  22,  159-213- 

26.  PATINI,  E.     Coscienza,  Subcoscienza,  Incoscienza,  ed  Apsychia.    Riv.  di  psicol 

appl,  1910,  6,  24-45. 

27.  PIKLER,  J.     Die  Stelle  des  Bewusstseins  in  der  Natur.     Leipzig:  Earth   1910     Pp 

34- 

28.  PRINCE,   M.     The   Subconscious.      Proc.    VI 'me  Cong.   Int.  de  Psychol.  tenu  a 

Geneve,  1909.     Geneva,  1910,  71-97. 

29.  TAWNEY,   G.  A.     Consciousness   in  Psychology  and  Philosophy.    /.  of  Phil., 

Psychol. ,  etc.,  1911,  8,  197-203. 

30.  TITCHENER,  E.  B.     A  Text-Book  of  Psychology.    New  York:  Macmillan    1910 

Pp.  ix  +  558. 

31.  WALKER,  H.     Record  of  an  Experience  while  under  the  Influence  of  Ether. 

/.  of  Phil.,  Psychol.,  etc.,  1910,  7,  437. 

32.  WEYER,  E.  M.    A  Unit  Concept  of  Consciousness.    PSYCHOL.  REV.,  1910,  17, 

301-318. 

THE   SELF  IN  RECENT  PSYCHOLOGY 

BY  PROFESSOR  MARY  WHITON  CALKINS 

Wellesley  College 

Professor  Titchener  has  made  a  notable  contribution  (3)  to  the 
discussion  of  the  self  in  psychology  by  collecting  from  thirteen  grad- 
uate students,  all  of  them  "trained  in  introspection"  and  six  of  them 
with  "unusually  thorough  training,"  answers  to  the  following  ques- 
tions: 

I.  "  'I  am  always  inattentively  or  attentively  conscious  of  my- 
self.' ...  Is   this   statement  true,  as  a  matter  of  experience,   (a) 
in  everyday  life,  (b)  in  the  introspective  exercises  of  the  laboratory?" 

(P-  542). 

II.  A  question  calling  for  a  description  of  self-consciousness  made 
"as  definite  as  possible"  (p.  545). 

III.  A  question  addressed  only  to  those  who  had  answered  I.  (a) 
in  the  negative,  pointing  out  "that   this  answer  implies   that  self- 
consciousness  is  intermittent.     Under  what  circumstances,  then,  is  it 
likely  to  appear?"  (p.  548). 

In  reply  to  the  first  question,  two  of  Titchener's  thirteen  subjects 
assert,  but  "with  qualification"  that  they  are  always  conscious  of 


26  MARY  WHITON  CALKINS 

self,  the  "center  of  material,  psychical,  social  relations"  as  one  of 
them  calls  it.  Four  declare  that  they  are  conscious  of  self  during 
laboratory  introspection.  All  assert  or  imply  that  they  are  some- 
times conscious  of  self.  The  descriptions  of  self-consciousness  called 
for  by  question  II.  are  summarized  in  the  following  rough  list: 

"Organic  complexes,  12.  Visual  imagery,  10.  Affective  processes,  8  (implied  in 
4  other  cases).  Kinsesthetic  complexes,  8  (probably  in  other  cases  merged  in  organic). 
Conscious  attitudes,  4  (those  of  responsibility,  recognition  of  ownership  of  intro- 
spections, ownership  of  experience,  and  activity  in  the  background  of  consciousness" 
(p.  551,  slightly  condensed). 

The  "one  outstanding  result"  of  the  answers  to  question  III.  is 
"that  the  experience  of  self  is  preponderantly  a  social  matter.  .  .  . 
Next  in  order  comes  the  unusual  or  novel  situation"  (p.  551). 

From  the  answers  to  question  I.  Titchener  concludes  that  "self- 
consciousness  is,  in  many  cases,  an  intermittent  and  even  a  rare 
experience"  (p.  550);  and  he  explains  the  persistence  of  self-conscious- 
ness in  the  four  cases  by  "the  hypothesis  of  individual  difference." 
With  the  fairness  which  characterizes  his  entire  discussion,  he  none 
the  less  admits  that  "it  is  possible  that  the  two  groups  of  observers 
[those  who  assert  and  those  who  deny  the  persistence  of  the  con- 
sciousness of  self]  may  have  understood  the  question  differently  and 
are  therefore  talking  of  different  things."  My  own  reading  of  the 
records — which  is  colored,  of  course,  by  previous  conclusions  pre- 
cisely opposed  to  Titchener' s — is  that  the  two  groups  of  observers 
have  indeed  understood  the  question  differently  and  that  those  who 
answer  in  the  negative  deny  the  persistence,  not  of  self-consciousness 
as  such  but  of  some  particular  stage  or  phase  of  it.  The  study  of 
the  records  of  introspection  seems  to  me  to  bear  out  this  conclusion. 
It  is  to  be  regretted  that  five  of  the  eleven  who  answered  I.  (a)  in  the 
negative  and  three  of  the  nine  who  answered  I.  (b)  in  the  negative 
neglect  to  supplement  their  bare  "No"  by  any  introspective  detail. 
From  the  remaining  records  I  quote  the  following  indications  of  what 
seems  to  me  a  misapprehension  of  the  meaning  of  self-consciousness: 

"Btm.  'No.  In  seeing  a  play  I  am  often  another  person,  portrayed  by  the  actor, 
and  do  not  realize  that  I  am  a  spectator  until  my  neighbor  speaks'"  (p.  542,  end). 

But  self-consciousness  is  surely  present  when  a  man  seems  to 
himself  "a  person"  even  though  "another  person."  B.  is  uncon- 
scious, in  the  experience  which  he  describes,  of  circumstances,  of 
surroundings,  of  the  past,  but  not  of  self. 

In  the  following  case,  that  of  an  observer  who  changes  an  origi- 


THE  SELF  IN  RECENT  PSYCHOLOGY          27 

nally  affirmative   to  a   negative   reply,  the  consciousness  of  self  is 
evidently  confused  with  what  is  merely  a  common  constituent  of  it: 

"Am.  'No.  ...  Self-consciousness  carried  kinsesthetically  with  possible  visual 
images  occurs  comparatively  seldom'"  (p.  544). 

But  the  answers  to  question  II.  have  made  clear  that  self-con- 
sciousness need  not  always  include  kinaesthetic  and  visual  imagery. 

The  other  negative  experiences  are,  to  say  the  least,  entirely 
compatible  with  the  hypothesis  that  those  who  deny  the  persistence 
of  self-consciousness  confuse  "self"  with  some  prominent  aspect  of 
it.  I  am  unquestionably  more  attentively  conscious  of  myself  in 
novel  situations  and  in  social  relations  than  in  perception  and  in 
thought.  In  fact,  the  very  word  "  self-consciousness  "  very  commonly 
means  "embarrassment"  or  "shyness."  Thus,  these  observers  when 
they  deny  self-consciousness  except  in  experiences  of  "shame," 
of  "being  watched,"  of  "appearing  before  some  personage  of  im- 
portance" may  well  have  overlooked  the  ever-present  self-conscious- 
ness precisely  because,  being  always  present,  it  does  not  draw  or 
hold  their  attention. 

Every  psychologist  should  read  for  himself  these  records  of 
introspection  with  Mr.  Titchener's  discussion  of  them. 

It  would  probably  be  unreasonable  to  demand  that  every  one  of 
us  should  read  entire  two  German  works,  issued  late  in  1910,  which 
consider,  critically  and  historically,  the  psychological  doctrine  of  the 
self.  And  yet  each  of  them  well  repays  study.  In  the  first  of 
these  (i),  Dr.  Kafka  examines  contemporary  conceptions  of  the  7 
under  three  headings,  "  metaphysical,"  "  empirical,"  and  "  epistemo- 
Ibgical"  conceptions.  He  treats  Bergmann  and  Drews  as  representa- 
tives of  writers  of  the  first  type  and  Rickert  as  upholder  of  the  empir- 
ical theory.  The  empirical  group  is  subdivided;  Spir  and  Busse  are 
name  as  examples  of  the  intellectualistic  tendency,  Wundt  and 
Miinsterberg  as  voluntarists,  Lipps  as  emotionalist,  James  and 
Avenarius  as  holding  the  sensationalistic  empirical  conception,  and 
finally  Schubert-Solden  and  Schuppe  as  teaching  that  by  "7"  is  meant 
merely  the  total  content  of  consciousness.  The  possibility  of  such  a 
classification  is,  of  course,  open  to  some  question.  Kafka  himself 
indicates,  in  the  course'of  his  careful  analysis,  that  Miinsterberg,  though 
a  voluntarist,  does  not  treat  the  7  as  content,  that  Lipps  recognizes 
a  real  as  well  as  an  empirical  self,  and  that  James  tends  sometimes 
to  an  epistemological  and  somtimes  to  a  voluntaristic  theory. 

Kafka  criticizes  in  great  detail  the  views  which  he  summarizes 


28  MARY  JVHITON  CALKINS 

under  all  these  heads,  and  reaches  the  following  results:  (i)  The  con- 
ception of  the  /  as  substance  behind  phenomena  is  meaningless;  and 
the  arguments  adduced  for  the  conception  are  either  invalid  or  else 
they  establish  the  existence  of  an  /  of  a  different  sort.  (2)  Most 
"  empirical"  theories  agree  in  regarding  the  /  as  content  of  conscious- 
ness (Bewusstseinsinhalt)  either  complete  or  partial.  Theories, 
whether  intellectualistic,  voluntaristic,  emotionalistic,  or  sensation- 
alistic,  which  conceive  the  /  as  partial  content  must,  one  and  all, 
be  rejected  on  the  ground  that  no  one  of  them  justifies  the  conclusion 
that  volitions,  feelings  or  sensations  are  to  be  distinguished  from 
the  other  psychic  phenomena"  (p.  109)  as  constituting  the  self.  It  is 
equally  impossible,  Kafka  continues,  to  regard  the  /  as  total  content 
(Gesamtbewusstseinsinhalt) — and  for  two  reasons.  In  the  first  place, 
such  a  hypothesis  leaves  unacccounted  for  the  contrast  actually  made 
between  7  and  not-I.  And,  second,  the  very  existence  of  a  content 
presupposes  the  existence  of  that-of-which-it-is-content,  and  the 
experienced  (das  Erlebniss)  must  be  experienced  (erlebt)  by  some  sub- 
ject (p.  233).  But  the  7,  or  subject,  is  that  whose  nature  we  are  dis- 
cussing. It  would  be  meaningless  to  call  it  both  subject  and  object 
for  that  would  be  to  do  violence  to  its  unity.  Or,  to  parapharse 
another  of  Kafka's  statements  of  this  difficulty,  the  content  of  con- 
sciousness is  related  to  its  subject,  and  neither  term  of  a  relation  can  be 
identical  with  the  other  term  or  with  the  relation  (p.  234  et  aL). 
Thus,  Kafka  reaches  the  epistemological,  or  Kantian,  conception  of  an 
7  which  is  subject,  not  object,  of  consciousness,  which  is  not  "  found" 
or  "  experienced"  but  which  must  be  assumed  to  exist  as  "  necessary 
common  point  of  relation  of  all  contents  combined  in  the  unity  of  one 
consciousness"  (p.  233).  Such  an  7,  Kafka  says,  is  perfectly  empty, 
has  no  predicates,  is,  indeed,  mere  relation.  To  this  conclusion,  it 
must  be  added,  Kafka  does  not  himself  consistently  hold,  for  in 
many  passages  he  attributes  to  the  7  the  character  of  being  unique 
as  well  as  that  of  being  relation  (pp.  225,  233  et  at.). 

The  difficulties  of  this  conception  are  obvious.  How  can  one 
insist  that  it  is  necessary  to  assert  the  existence  not  of  the  merely 
unexperienced  but  of  that  which  it  is  logically  impossible  to  experi- 
ence? If  consciousness-as-content  exists  and  if  a  content  can  exist 
only  as  content  of  a  subject,  or  7  (and  Kafka  makes  both  these  asser- 
tions), then  the  experiencing  self  must  exist  by  the  same  right  as  the 
experienced  content. 

Not  merely  a  solution  but  an  explanation  of  the  origin  of  this 
problem  of  subject-objectivity — the  problem  which  Kafka,  as  has 


THE  SELF  IN  RECENT  PSYCHOLOGY  29 

been  indicated,  vainly  tries  to  solve  by  the  Kantian  expedient— is 
offered  in  Oesterreich's  volume  (2).  Part  II.  of  this  book1  is  a  detailed 
study  of  cases  of  dissociated  personality,  and  concludes  that  in  all 
these  cases  the  essential  unity  of  the  self  remains  unaffected.  Part 
I.  embodies  a  careful  study,  comparable  with  that  of  Kafka,  of 
the  fundamental  problem  of  the  nature  of  the  self.  Oesterreich's 
definition  of  the  /  as  "that  whose  states  are  the  feelings  and  which 
in  each  of  us  remains  ever  identical  with  itself"  (p.  8)  suggests  both 
the  weakness  and  the  strength  of  his  theory.  In  so  far  as  he  con- 
ceives the  /  as  preeminently  or  exclusively  an  emotional  /,  he  lays 
himself  open  to  Kafka's  criticism,  already  summarized,  of  emo- 
tionalistic  empiricists — in  other  words,  he  shows  no  adequate  reason 
why  the  7  should  be  described  as  an  emotional,  and  not  also  as  a 
thinking  and  a  willing  self.  But  more  to  be  noted  than  this  in- 
adequacy in  his  doctrine  is  Oesterreich's  teaching  that  the  /  is  di- 
rectly experienced,  not  as  a  substance  behind  phenomena  nor  as  a 
mere,  abstract  "  content" — sensation  or  thought,  emotion  or  volition, 
or  all  combined — but  as  a  feeling,  willing,  perceiving  and  thinking  7. 
Kafka's  logical  difficulty — that  the  7  as  subject  is  related  to  its 
content  or  object  and  therefore  distinct  from  it — is  traced  by  Oester- 
reich  to  the  unjustifiable  effort  to  apply  the  subject-object  categories 
to  an  experience  wholly  fundamental  to  them. 

Oesterreich,  like  Kafka,  is  to  be  commended  for  the  thorough  and 
careful  way  in  which  he  sets  forth  the  views  of  other  psychologists. 
His  exposition  and  criticism  is  less  systematic,  but  he  quotes  where 
Kafka  cites  and  summarizes,  referring  to  a  greater  number  but  treat- 
ing only  a  few  in  detail.  Neither  author  takes  adequate  account  of 
the  contributions  by  English  and  American  writers  to  the  discussion 
of  their  problem. 

My  present  concern  being  with  psychology,  I  pass  over  certain 
recent  philosophical  discussions  of  the  self  and  close  with  the  mention 
of  the  early  chapters  of  Yerkes's  recently  issued  Introduction  to 
Psychology  (4).  They  are  well  worth  reading  by  teachers  of  psy- 
chology for  their  vigorous  suggestion  of  points  of  view  and  of  methods. 
In  my  opinion,  they  are  written  from  the  standpoint  of  an  implicit 
"self-psychology."  "Each  one  of  us,"  Professor  Yerkes  says, 
"must  start  in  his  study  of  consciousness  by  looking  inward,  by 
observing  the  self"  (p.  15). 

1  A  more  extended  review  of  the  book,  by  the  writer  of  this  notice,  appears  in  the 
Philosophical  Review,  1911,  20,  636-641. 


30  WILLIAM  FREDERICK  BOOK 

REFERENCES 

1.  KAFKA,  G.     Versuch  einer  kritischen  Darstellung  der  neueren  Anschauungen  iiber 

das  Ichproblem.     Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  Psychol.,  1910,  19,  1-241. 

2.  OESTERREICH,  K.     Die  Phdnomenologie  des  Ich.     Leipzig,  1910.     Pp.  532. 

3.  TITCHENER,  E.  B.     A  Note  of  the  Consciousness  of  Self.     Amer.  J.  of  Psycho!., 

1911,  22,  540-552. 

4.  YERKES,  R.  M.     Introduction  to  Psychology.     New  York,  1911.     Pp.  427. 

ANALYSES  OF   SOME  OF  THE  HIGHER 
THOUGHT  PROCESSES 

BY  PROFESSOR  WILLIAM  FREDERICK  BOOK 

University  of  Montana 

Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  a  few  psychologists  still  regard 
any  attempt  to  determine  the  psychic  factors  involved  in  such  com- 
plex processes  as  behavior  and  thought  as  a  kind  of  useless  mental 
gymnastic  and  the  result  of  such  analyses  as  a  sort  of  "introspective 
mythology,"  interest  in  the  psychology  of  the  higher  thought  proc- 
esses has  continued  to  increase  during  the  year.  In  fact  the  studies 
made  have  contributed  very  materially  to  the  belief,  already  held 
by  some,  that  these  studies  are  making  an  epoch  in  psychological 
history  and  mark  a  turning  point  in  our  psychological  interests  and 
methods. 

The  studies  published  during  the  year  range  all  the  way  from 
those  which  attempt  to  determine  the  psychic  factors  involved  in 
such  mental  processes  as  conscious  attitudes,  belief  and  doubt, 
meaning  and  understanding,  and  the  process  of  abstraction  on  the 
one  hand,  and  such  complex  tasks  as  determining  the  psychological 
processes  involved  in  learning  to  shoot  with  a  rifle  on  the  other  (4), 
it  being  suggested  by  the  author  of  the  latter  study  that  a  complete 
psychological  history  of  the  learning  process  involved  in  becoming 
an  expert  marksman  was  necessary  to  make  the  training  of  the  soldier 
rational  and  economic.  These  studies  are  all  interesting  and  im- 
portant not  merely  because  of  the  specific  results  obtained,  but 
because  of  the  bearing  which  these  results  have  on  current  psycho- 
logical discussions  and  because  of  the  problems  and  refinements  of 
method  which  they  suggest.  Not  all  of  the  studies  published  during 
the  year  can  be  mentioned  or  reviewed. 

Okabe  (6)  tried  to  analyze  and  describe  in  analytic  terms  the 
belief  and  doubt  consciousness,  or  certainty  and  uncertainty  exper- 
ience. He  presented  to  experienced  observers  statements  calculated 


ANALYSES  OF  HIGHER  THOUGHT  PROCESSES  31 

to  arouse  belief  or  disbelief  in  their  validity  and  "upon  the  appear- 
ance of  either  type  of  consciousness  the  observers  closed  their  eyes 
and  dictated  to  the  experimenter  a  full  account  of  the  consciousness." 
Single  sentences  and  mathematical  expressions  were  first  presented, 
then  sentences  arranged  for  comparison.  A  summary  account  of 
the  observers'  reports  was  afterwards  submitted  to  each  subject  for 
correction  and  verification.  Many  of  the  conditions  under  which 
belief  and  disbelief  arose  in  consciousness  were  thus  determined.  It 
was  found  that  belief  might  occur  "in  terms  of  a  general  kinsesthetic 
attitude,  as  internal  speech  and  localized  kinaesthesis,  or  as  the 
result  of  the  mental  relations  of  visual  images.  It  might  also 
be  bound  up  with,  or  incorporated  in,  a  particular  consciousness, 
verbal  or  visual."  "Like  intention,  assurance,  and  volition,  belief 
may  be  bound  up  with,  incorporated  in,  a  sequence  of  mental  proc- 
esses which  proceed  under  determination,  though  there  is  nothing 
specific  in  these  processes  to  serve  as  a  vehicle  of  that  meaning. 
These  processes  go  on  in  a  certain  way,  under  the  instructions  given, 
and  their  going  on  in  that  way  constitutes  them  will,  recognition  or 
belief."  It  would  have  been  interesting  to  determine  by  a  genetic 
method  of  observation  just  how  such  conscious  patterns  were  actually 
formed  or  developed,  a  procedure  which  might  have  thrown  much 
light  on  the  nature  and  present  constitution  of  the  belief  conscious- 
ness, but  this  was  not  done.  The  author  also  concludes  that  the 
belief-disbelief  consciousness  is  not  of  common  occurrence  in  everyday 
life  and  that  it  is  not  necessarily  or  regularly  an  emotional  conscious- 
ness. 

Jacobson  (3)  tried  to  analyze  the  consciousness  involved  in  the 
perception  of  single  letters  and  the  understanding  of  words  and 
sentences.  From  his  results  it  appears  that  meaning  is  chiefly 
carried  by  representative  processes,  i.  e.,  processes  representative 
of  the  content  of  the  sentences  or  words.  When  these  appeared,  the 
sentences  or  words  at  once  had  a  meaning,  though  the  meaning  some- 
times arose  when  these  representative  processes  seemed  to  be  absent. 
The  meaning  tendency  does  not,  however,  always  rise  promptly  in 
consciousness.  A  word  or  sentence  may  be  perceived  without  it  and 
different  meanings  may  be  attached  to  the  same  objective  stimulus. 
The  particular  meanings  actually  attached  to  his  words  and  sentences 
were  psychological  rather  than  logical.  They  were  in  general  "par- 
tial meanings,  particular  exemplifications,  or  what  not,  touched  ^off 
under  the  given  instruction  by  the  habit  or  momentary  disposition 
of  the  observer."  "The  same  stimulus-sentence  gave  rise  to  different 


32  WILLIAM  FREDERICK  BOOK 

meanings  for  the  same  observer  so  that  it  was  not  enought  for  him 
to  say  that  he  understood  it;  he  must  be  asked  to  specify  precisely 
what  he  understood." 

Moore  (5)  attempted  to  determine  experimentally  the  mental 
processes  involved  in  abstraction.  He  sought  to  discover  how  general 
ideas  actually  formed  and  developed  in  a  given  case.  His  method 
consisted  of  presenting  to  his  subjects  a  series  of  geometrical  figures 
so  drawn  and  arranged  that  a  common  element  constantly  recurred 
in  $ach  group  of  figures  while  the  other  figures  of  the  group  were 
constantly  varied.  As  soon  as  the  common  element  was  discovered 
the  exposure  apparatus  was  stopped  and  the  subject  required,  on 
the  basis  of  his  introspective  analysis,  to  state  how  the  common  ele- 
ment in  the  group  had  been  isolated  and  perceived.  He  tried  by 
this  means  to  determine:  (i)  How  the  group  of  figures  containing  the 
common  element  was  actually  broken  up  and  the  common  element 
selected;  (2)  how  the  process  of  perceiving  or  apprehending  the 
common  element  actually  took  place;  (3)  how  it  was  held  in  mind  until 
recognized  as  having  occurred  before;  (4)  how  this  state  of  recognitive 
certainty  was  formed  or  developed.  The  analyses  of  these  several 
steps  were  not,  however,  carried  to  the  point  of  detailed  certainty 
because  of  failure  to  make  the  observations  sufficiently  detailed  and 
directed.  Perhaps  the  most  significant  conclusion  arrived  at  in  the 
study  is  that  the  final  recognition  of  the  common  element  depended 
upon  appropriate  mental  categories  which  represented  compound 
psychical  processes  entirely  distinct  and  different  from  imaginal 
processes  or  feelings.  These  mental  categories  were  acquired  through 
the  past  experience  of  the  subjects  and  were  aroused  in  this  case  by 
the  sensations  set  up  by  the  common  element.  The  fact  that  these 
mental  categories  were  not  more  minutely  and  carefully  observed  and 
described  and  their  true  nature  or  constitution  determined,  keeps 
the  study  from  making  an  important  contribution  to  the  psychology 
of  imageless  thought.  So  far  as  the  author's  analyses  go  they  support 
the  contention  that  non-imaginal  processes  exist. 

Two  studies  on  Conscious  Attitudes  have  appeared.  Miss  Clarke 
(2)  sought  to  arouse  conscious  situations  in  which  various  attitudes 
would  be  likely  to  become  operative.  Single  letters,  written  in  blind 
point  style,  were  given  to  her  subjects  to  be  perceived  tactually  and 
the  observers  instructed  "to  give  complete  introspections."  The 
time  required  to  recognize  the  letters  was  taken  but  no  use  was  made 
of  this  reaction  time  in  the  treatment  of  results.  A  list  of  all  the 
attitudes  noted  by  the  observers  is  given  and  each  attitude  briefly 


ANALYSES  OF  HIGHER   THOUGHT  PROCESSES 


33 


described.  The  attitudes  which  often  recurred  in  the  course  of  the 
experiment,  surprise,  uncertainty,  hesitation,  doubt,  etc.,  were 
analyzed  in  detail.  A  few  attitudes  recurred  often  enough  to'enable 
the  experimenter  to  determine,  in  part,  their  development  or  genetic 
history  from  the  observers'  introspective  accounts.  Woodworth's 
method  of  studying  the  relational  consciousness  was  repeated,  in 
part,  with  the  result  that  all  the  relational  processes  observed*  by 
Miss  Clarke's  subjects  were  carried  in  imaginal  terms.  Her  results 
did  not  fit  Woodworth's  four  ways  of  perceiving  relations.  His 
fourth  class,  where  "the  relation  was  present  in  consciousness  but 
not  analyzable  into  sensory  or  affective  terms"  was  not  paralleled. 
Miss  Clarke,  therefore,  concludes,  on  the  basis  of  the  attitudes  de- 
scribed in  her  experiments,  which  she  believes  to  be  fairly  repre- 
sentative, "that  all  conscious  attitudes  can  be  analyzed  into  sensa- 
tions, images  and  feelings,  or  traced  genetically  to  such  analyzable 
complexes;  that  the  conscious  attitudes  do  not  warrant  the  assump- 
tion of  an  additional  conscious  element." 

The  most  suggestive  section  of  the  study  is  the  part  dealing  with 
the  genesis  and  development  of  these  attitudes.  "The  introspections 
of  any  one  observer  show,"  she  says,  "different  stages  of  clearness 
and  intensity  of  imagery,  which  allow  us  to  connect,  by  graded  series 
of  intermediate  steps,  a  complex  of  vivid  and  explicit  imagery  with 
a  vague  and  condensed  consciousness  which  we  suppose  to  represent 
what  is  called  imageless  thought."  A  number  of  attitudes  were 
shown  to  be  capable  of  actual  development,  by  a  process  of  change 
through  mechanization,  ranging  from  states  which  were  clearly 
complex  and  rich  in  imagery  to  a  state  of  vague  and  condensed 
consciousness,  reached  by  a  dropping  out  of  the  former  imaginal 
content. 

Her  conclusions,  therefore,  verify  the  results  and  conclusions 
reached  by  Book  in  his  study  of  the  "Genesis  and  Development  of 
Conscious  Attitudes"  reported  some  four  months  before  (i).  He 
showed,  by  tracing  the  development  of  certain  specific  attitudes  in 
the  same  mind,  that  the  attitudes  developed  in  his  experiments  were 
in  reality  the  developed  form  of  certain  specific  imaginal  processes 
present  in  earlier  stages  of  his  experiment;  that  the  specific  attitudes 
which  guided  the  fingers  and  hands  in  manipulating  a  typewriter 
in  the  expert  stages  of  skill  were  in  reality  the  developed  forms  of 
certain  clear  and  definite  imaginal  processes  used  to  guide  the  fingers 
and  hands  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  learning.  Every  step  or  stage 
in  this  process  was  here  followed  in  the  same  mind  and  the  develop- 


34  WILLIAM  FREDERICK  BOOK 

ment  traced  from  a  stage  of  vivid  imagery  to  a  point  where  the  con- 
scious processes  used  to  direct  the  fingers  and  hands  became  free  from 
all  imaginal  elements.  It  was  also  determined  that  there  was  a  marked 
tendency,  as  this  expert  stage  was  approached,  to  revert  to  the  former 
type  of  conscious  direction  and  control  of  the  fingers  and  hands,  when- 
ever particular  difficulties  occurred  or  when  fatigue  set  in.  There 
was  a  continual  slipping  back  into  a  method  of  control  where  the 
consciousness  involved  was  rich  in  representative  processes  which 
promptly  disappeared  again  when  the  higher  method  of  control  was 
used.  The  fact  that  the  exact  nature  and  final  constitution  of  the 
attitudes  formed  in  these  experiments  were  not  more  minutely  de- 
scribed is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  results  were  incidentally  obtained 
in  an  experiment  made  for  an  entirely  different  purpose. 

These  studies  of  conscious  attitudes,  like  the  attempted  analyses 
of  the  other  thought  processes  mentioned  above,  therefore,  suggest 
some  important  refinements  in  our  methods  of  psychological  ob- 
servation. A  genetic  method  of  observation  must  be  used  whereby 
these  thought  processes  may  be  observed  at  all  stages  of  their  for- 
mation and  development  so  that  any  change  or  changes  which  may 
occur  in  these  conscious  states  from  stage  to  stage,  as  mechanization 
takes  place,  may  be  accurately  determined  and  described.  Further- 
more, the  observations  must  be  more  sharply  directed  and  the  cross- 
section  analyses  repeated  often  enough  for  the  true  nature  and  con- 
stitution of  the  processes  studied  to  be  determined.  Such  a  method 
of  determining  the  facts  would  doubtless  reveal  the  true  nature  and 
constitution  of  these  higher  thought  processes  and  settle  some  or 
all  of  the  current  disputes  about  imageless  thought  and  conscious 
elements.  These  studies  clearly  indicate  the  need  of  much  careful 
and  patient  experimental  work  and  the  necessity  of  carefully  refining 
and  modifying  our  introspective  methods. 

REFERENCES 

1.  BOOK,  W.  F.    On  the  Genesis  and  Development  of  Conscious  Attitudes.     PSYCHOI.. 

REV.,  1910,  17,  381-398- 

2.  CLARKE,  H.  M.     Conscious  Attitudes.     Amer.  J.  of  PsychoL,  1911,  22,  214-249. 

3.  JACOBSON,  E.     On  Meaning  and  Understanding.     Amer.  J.  of  PsychoL,  1911,  22, 

553-577- 

4.  MEYER,  H.     Experimentelle  Analyse  psychischer  Vorgange  beim  Schiessen  mit 

Handfeuerwaffe.     Archiv  f.  d.  ges.  PsychoL,  1911,  20,  397-413. 

5.  MOORE,  T.  V.    The  Process  of  Abstraction.     Univ.  of  California  Pub.  in  PsychoL, 

1910,  i,  73-197. 

6.  OKABE,  T.     An  Experimental  Study  of  Belief.     Amer.  J.  of  PsychoL,  1910,  21, 


TERMINOLOGY  AND  BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  35 

TERMINOLOGY 

BY  PROFESSOR  HOWARD  C.  WARREN  J 

Princeton  University 

Dunlap  (i)  suggests  a  uniform  system  of  compound  words  for  the 
various  sensations.  The  Greek  roots  are  recommended,  with  pre- 
fixes a-,  para-,  hypo-,  hyper-,  and  the  suffixes  -meter,  -ic,  modified 
according  to  the  regular  laws  of  euphony.  For  example,  hearing 
would  be  acusia,  with  the  compound  forms  anacusia,  paracusia, 
hypacusia,  hyperacusia,  acumeter,  and  acusic.  The  system  is  ex- 
tended to  senses  whose  Greek  names  are  not  in  common  use,  and 
several  other  suggestions  of  form  are  made,  such  as  myope  and 
chromopsia. 

Attention  should  be  called  to  the  new  French  philosophic  vocabu- 
lary in  course  of  compilation  by  the  Societe  francaise  de  Philosophic 
(2),  containing  a  number  of  psychological  definitions.  The  present 
installment  (No.  13)  includes  L  and  M  to  Metaphysique.  We  note 
the  words  liminal,  localisation,  signes  locaux,  ludique  (as  an  adjective 
for  play),  marginal,  memoire,  mental,  and  many  terms  on  the  border 
line  between  philosophy  and  psychology. 

German  terminology  is  represented  by  a  new  edition  of  Kirchner 
(3),  which  has  been  again  revised.  Little  appears  to  have  been  done 
during  the  past  year  in  the  field  of  psychological  terminology. 

REFERENCES 

1.  DUNLAP,  K.    Terminology  in  the  Field  of  Sensation.    Amer.  J.  of  PsychoL,  1911, 

22,444. 

2.  LELANDE,  A.,  etc.     Vocabulaire  technique  et  critique  de  la  philosophic.     Bull.  Soe. 

franc.,  de  phil.,  1910,  13,  159-212. 

3.  MICHAELIS,  C.     Kirchner's  Worterbuch  der  philosophischen  Grundbegriffe.     (6. 

Aufl.)     Dritte  Neubearb.     Leipzig:  Meiner,  1911.    Pp.  vi  +  1124. 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL 

BY  PROFESSOR  HOWARD  C.  WARRENJ] 

Princeton  University 

It  is  interesting  to  note  a  movement  towards  compilation  of 
complete  bibliographies  of  the  works  of  individual  writers.  The  list 
of  William  James's  writings  (4)  has  been  compiled  with  great  care 
and  contains  204  titles.  Titchener  and  Geissler  (2)  give  another 
supplementary  list  of  the  writings  of  Wundt,  completing  1910  and 


36  BORIS  SIDIS 

including  a  partial  list  for  1911;  three  popular  articles  published 
1 861-2,  and  two  more  recent  translations  are  also  included. 

Claparede  (i)  discusses  systematic  abbreviation  of  the  titles  of 
magazines,  and  advocates  a  set  of  rules  for  abbreviation  in  reference 
work  which  are  nearly  identical  with  those  already  adopted  by  the 
Psychological  Index  and  this  BULLETIN.  The  editors  of  the  Zsch.  f. 
angew.  Psychol.  publish  (3)  a  list  of  abbreviations  for  magazine  titles 
which  are  much  more  condensed.  To  this  plan  the  objection  is  raised 
by  Claparede  that  no  ready  clue  is  afforded  either  to  the  actual  title 
of  the  periodical  or  to  the  language  of  publication. 

The  announcement  is  made  (5)  that  the  annual  psychological 
bibliographies  published  by  the  Zsch.  f.  Psychol.  and  the  Psychol. 
Index  have  adopted  a  uniform  scheme  of  classification  and  will  in 
future  be  practically  identical  in  material  and  arrangement,  the  chief 
point  of  difference  being  in  the  language  of  the  section  headings. 

REFERENCES 

1.  CLAPARfeDE,  E.     L'abreviation  des  titres  des  publications  periodiques.     Arch,  de 

Psychol.,  1911,  u,  114-117. 

2.  TITCHENER,  E.  B.,  and  GEISSLER,  L.  R.     A  Bibliography  of  the  Scientific  Writings 

of  Wilhelm  Wundt.     Amer.  J.  of  Psychol.,  1911,  22,  586-587.     (cf.  1908,  19, 
541-556;  1909,  20,  570;  1910,  21,  603-604.) 

3.  [ANON.]     Abkiirzungen.     Zsch.  f.  angew.  Psychol.,  1911,  5,  630-634. 

4.  [ANON.]     A  List  of  the  Published  Writings  of  William  James.    PSYCHOL.  REV.,  1911, 

18,  157-165. 

5.  [ANON. |     Editorial  Note.     PSYCHOL.  BULL.,  1911,  8,  334. 

DREAMS 

BY  DR.  BORIS  SIDIS 
Sidis  Psychotherapeutic  Institute,  Portsmouth,  N.  H. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  much  is  written  on  dream  states  their 
psychology  is  still  in  deep  obscurity.  Dr.  P.  Meunier  (10)  advances 
the  view  that  dreams  occur  during  transitional  states  from  waking 
to  sleep  or  from  sleep  to  waking.  Dreams  are  a  form  of  hypnagogic 
states.  In  this  respect  he  agrees  with  Sidis  (17)  that  dreams  occur 
mostly  in  the  hypnoidal  state  which  is  the  transitional  state  between 
waking  and  sleeping.  Dreams  which  do  not  occur  during  the  inter- 
mediary state  Meunier  regards  as  abnormal.  The  causation  he 
ascribes  to  mental  disturbances  and  to  external  and  internal  stimula- 
tions. The  pathological  dream  is  of  ccenesthetic  character  and  points 
to  a  diseased  organ.  The  dream  may  thus  be  utilized  for  clinical 


DREAMS  yj 

purposes.  In  his  larger  work  Meunier  (n)  maintains  the  same  thesis 
Dreams  are  of  the  character  of  hypnagogic  hallucinations.  An  halluci- 
nation is  an  isolated  fact  or  percept,  the  dream  is  a  continuous  whole, 
an  episode,  a  drama.  A  large  part  of  the  work  is  devoted  to  an 
interesting  clinical  study  of  dream  consciousness. 

Dr.  Bernard  Leroy  (9)  in  his  study  of  dreams  comes  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  final  stimulus  which  causes  awakening  is  not  identical 
with  the  original  stimulus  which  causes  the  dream.  The  original 
sensory  stimulus  is  forgotten  in  the  total  memory  of  the  dream 
episode. 

An  excellent  work  carried  out  for  a  number  of  years  in  a  true 
experimental  scientific  way  is  that  on  dreams  by  Professor  J.  Mourly 
Void  (19).  The  main  thesis  is  that  dreams  are  brought  about  by 
the  positions  of  the  bodily  organs  during  sleep  and  in  general  by 
kinsesthetic  sensations.  This  is  the  best  scientific  study  of  dreams 
that  has  thus  far  appeared  on  the  subject  of  dream  consciousness. 
The  work  should  be  closely  studied  by  those  who  wish  to  undertake 
an  investigation  of  the  psychology  of  dreams. 

Dr.  Edmond  Cramaussel  (2)  studies  variations  of  sleep  of  an 
infant  by  observing  the  modifications  of  respirations. 

Dr.  Waterman  (20)  makes  a  short  study  of  dreams  as  a  cause  of 
various  symptoms  in  psychopathic  maladies.  He  finds,  as  many  psy- 
chopathologists  have  shown  before  him,  that  dreams  may  give  rise 
to  psychopathic  disturbances.  The  dreams  themselves  are  based  on 
experiences  of  waking  life.  This  corroborates  the  work  in  psycho- 
pathology  carried  out  by  Janet,  Prince  and  Sidis.  What  is  question- 
able is  the  symbolism  of  the  dreams  under  investigation. 

Havelock  Ellis  (3)  gives  a  popular  account  of  dream  life.  Dr. 
Ellis  accepts  the  division  of  dreams  into  two  groups,  presentative 
and  representative.  The  presentative  group  may  be  subdivided  into 
two  subgroups,  "  according  as  they  refer  to  external  stimuli  present  to 
the  senses  or  to  internal  disturbances  within  the  organism.  The 
representative  group  falls  into  two  subdivisions  according  as  the 
memories  are  of  old  or  of  recent  date."  He  also  is  of  the  opinion, 
now  current,  that  "the  internal  or  external  stimuli  which  act  upon 
sleeping  consciousness  are  not  part  of  that  consciousness,  nor  in  any 
real  sense  its  source  or  its  cause."  Representative  elements,  memory 
images,  constitute  the  content,  the  make-up  of  dream  consciousness. 
Inattention,  lack  of  mental  synthesis,  disturbance  of  apperception, 
emotion,  dissociation,  fatigue  are  the  factors  of  dream  life.  The 
theory  advanced  can  be  put  in  a  nutshell:  Sensations  and  perceptions 


38  BORIS  SIDIS 

(under  perceptions  Ellis  also  includes  memory  images,  ideas  or  what 
he  prefers  to  describe  as  "internally  aroused  perceptions — memories") 
"are  not  properly  apperceived"  (Ellis's  italics).  This  generalization 
gives  rise  to  a  speculative  theory  on  paramnesia.  In  discussing 
dream  symbolism  he  tells  dogmatically  that  "there  can  be  no  manner 
of  doubt  that  our  dreams  are  full  of  symbolism."  Under  the  com- 
prehensive term  of  symbolism  he  includes  language,  music,  art,  the 
phenomena  of  synsesthesia,  the  theory  of  perception  and  hallucina- 
tion in  regard  to  the  nature  of  secondary  sensory  elements,  in  fact 
all  forms  of  association  of  elements  of  one  sense  with  those  of  another. 

The  psychoanalytic  school  is  specially  prolific  in  the  number  of 
articles  on  dreams.  The  quantity  unfortunately  predominates.  Dr. 
Ernest  Jones  (6,  7),  an  earnest  follower  of  the  school,  gives  a  resume 
of  Freud's  work  on  dreams  (4).  There  is  a  latent  content  and  there 
is  a  manifest  content  and  four  mechanisms:  condensation,  displace- 
ment, dramatization  and  secondary  elaboration.  Consciousness  acts 
as  the  censor  that  suppresses  and  alters  the  latent  content.  The 
groundwork  of  every  dream  is  infantile  and  sexual  and  is  of  high 
personal  significance.  Dream  analysis  helps  to  penetrate  into  the 
depths  of  the  unconscious.  The  biological  function  of  the  dream  is 
to  lull  consciousness  to  sleep  like  a  nurse  telling  a  story  to  a  child  to 
make  it  go  to  sleep.  "When  however  the  activity  of  the  endopsychic 
censor  is  insufficient  to  keep  back  or  alter  materially  the  thoughts  of 
the  latent  content,  then  we  have  a  nightmare."  To  get  at  the 
symbolic  meaning  of  the  latent  content  is  supposed  to  be  the  task 
of  psychoanalysis.  The  paper  is  illustrated  by  a  few  short  examples. 

Dr.  Alfred  Rubitsek  (16)  analyzes  Egmont's  dream.  Symbolism 
characteristic  of  decadent  thought  and  the  stronghold  of  Freud's 
psychoanalytic  method  is  naively  employed  as  is  the  case  with  all 
adherents  of  the  school.  The  symbolism  reminds  one  of  the  mediaeval 
symbolic  interpretation  of  the  Holy  Scriptures.  Freud's  writings  form 
the  psychoanalytic  Bible  and  are  quoted  with  reverence  and  piety. 

Dr.  Otto  Rank  (14)  makes  a  long  psychoanalytic  study  of  a  girl's 
dreams,  with  notes  and  footnotes,  along  Freud's  lines.  The  inter- 
pretation is  ingenious  and  full  of  that  rank,  sexual,  artificial  symbolism 
for  which  the  school  is  so  notorious.  The  painstaking  studies,  the 
loyalty,  the  devotion  to  the  master's  great  discoveries  are  worthy  of 
a  better  cause  and  remind  one  of  the  disciples  of  Mrs.  Mary  Baker 
Eddy.  Dr.  Rank  (15)  also  discusses  a  couple  of  dreams  which  he 
traces  to  an  "incest-complex" — Eifersucht  auf  die  Mutter  und 
Zartlichkeit  gegen  den  Vater. 


DREAMS  39 

Dr.  Sig.  Freud  (5)  gives  a  few  examples  of  interpretation  of  dream 
symbols  in  a  few  of  his  cases.  The  interpretation  is  full  of  Talmudic 
casuistry  in  regard  to  the  sexual  meaning  of  certain  dream  visions. 
Dr.  Alfred  Adler  (i)  gives  the  analysis  of  a  false  dream  of  one  of 
his  female  patients  as  an  illustration  of  the  mechanism  of  deception 
in  neurosis.  The  psychoanalysis,  as  usual  with  the  Freudist,  discloses 
sexual  experiences,  "psychic  hermaphroditism,"  as  the  basis  of  the 
neurosis. 

Dr.  Morton  Prince  (12)  in  his  investigation  of  dreams  does  not 
find  any  of  the  elaborate  machinery  claimed  by  the  psychoanalytic 
school.  Prince  finds  that  in  his  cases  symbolism  plays  an  important 
role.  He  finds  that  dream  material  is  derived  from  a  variety  of 
conserved  memories  and  from  ideas  phantasmagorically  running 
through  the  mind  during  the  presleeping  state.  In  this  he  agrees 
with  Meunier  and  Sidis  as  to  the  relation  of  the  hypnagogic  and 
hypnoidal  states  to  the  content  and  mechanism  of  dreams.  Prince 
lays  stress  on  subconscious  motives  round  which  the  dream  activity 
plays  symbolically.  Dr.  Prince,  however,  unlike  the  Freudists,  in- 
sists that  this  symbolism  and  motivization  are  present  only  in  some 
special  cases.  Dr.  Prince  is  very  careful  not  to  make  sweeping 
generalizations  and  as  such  his  study  is  important  both  from  psycho- 
logical and  psychopathological  standpoints. 

Dr.  E.  Jones  (7)  sharply  criticizes  Dr.  Prince's  work  for  calling  in 
vain  the  name  of  the  master's  method.  To  which  Prince  (13)  rightly 
replies  that  it  makes  no  difference  what  the  name  of  the  method  is 
provided  the  method  is  correct,  the  facts  are  true  and  the  work  is 
well  done. 

Dr.  C.  G.  Jung  (8)  undertakes  in  a  patronizing  way  to  give  what  he 
regards  as  the  real  psychoanalysis  of  Prince's  dream  cases  which 
Yung  claims  have  been  inefficiently,  insufficiently  and  inadequately 
studied  by  Prince.  Yung's  psychoanalysis  is  full  of  unconscious 
sexual  humor.  Dr.  Stekel  (18),  who  is  understood  to  have  used 
psychoanalysis  on  tens  of  thousands  of  dreams  and  whose  name  may 
be  regarded  as  a  symbol  characteristic  of  his  own  psychoanalysis, 
presents  a  short  communication  of  a  dream  study  which  as  to  mechan- 
ism, symbolism  and  cabalistic  interpretation  well  illustrates  the 
elaborate  artificiality  of  Freudian  dream  psychology  and  ingenious 
triviality  of  symbolic  sexual  psychoanalysis. 

REFERENCES 

1.  ADLER,  A.     Ein  erlogener  Traum.     Zentrb.  f.  Psychoanal.,-1.  Jahrg.  H.  3,  1910. 

2.  CRAMAUSSEL,  Ed.    Le  Sommeil  d'un  petit  Enfant.     Arch,  de  Psychol.,  1910,  9, 

172-181. 


,40 


NOTES  AND  NEWS 


3.  ELLIS,  H.     The  World  of  Dreams.     Boston,  1911.     Pp.283. 

4.  FREUD,  SIG.     Die  Traumdeutung.     Leipzig,  1909. 

5.  FREUD,  SIG.     Nachtrage  zur  Traumdeutung.     Zentrb.  f.  Psychoanal.,  I.  Jahrg.  H.  5 

and  6,  1911,  187-192. 

6.  JONES,  E.     Freud's  Theory  of  Dreams.     Amer.  J.  of  Psycho!.,  1910,  21,  283-308. 

(See  author's  abstract  in  /.  of  Abnorm.  PsychoL,  1910,  5,  211-214.) 

7.  JONES,  E.     Remarks  on  Prince's  "The  Mechanism  of  Dreams."     /.  of  Abnorm. 

PsychoL,  1911,5,328-336. 

8.  JUNG,  C.  G.     Morton  Prince.     Eine  kritische  Besprechung.     Jahrb.f.  psychoanal. 

u.  psychophys.  Forsch.,  I.  Halfte,  1911. 

9.  LER.OY,  B.     Sur  1'inversion  du  temps  dans  le  reve.     Rev.  phil.,  1910,  69,  65-69. 

10.  MEUNIER,  P.     La  Valeur  semeiologique  des  reves.     /.  de  psychol.  norm,  et  path., 

1910,  7- 

11.  MEUNIER,  P.     Les  Reves.     Paris,  1910.     Pp.  198. 

12.  PRINCE,  M.    The  Mechanism  and  Interpretation  of  Dreams.     /.  of  Abnorm. 

Psychol,  1910,  5,  I39-I95- 

13.  PRINCE,  M.    A  Reply  to  Dr.  Jones.    /.  of  Abnorm.  PsychoL,  1911,  5,  337~353- 

14.  RANK,  O.     Ein  Traum  der  sich  deutet.     Jahrb.  f.  psychoanal.  u.  psychophys. 

Forsch.,  II.  Halfte,  1910,  465-540. 

15.  RANK,  O.     Beispiel  eines  verkappten  Oedipustraumes.     Zentrb.  f.  Psychoanal., 

I.  Jahrg.  H.  4,  1911,  167-170. 

16.  RUBITSEK,  A.     Die  Analyse  von  Egmont's  Traum.    Jahrb.  f.  psychoanal.  u. 

psychophys.  Forsch.,  II.  Halfte,  1910,  451-464. 

17.  SIDIS,  B.     An  Experimental  Study  of  Sleep.     Boston,  1909. 

18.  STEKEL,  W.     Zur  Symbolik  der  Mutterleibsphantasie.     Zentrb.  f.  Psychoanal.,  I. 

Jahrg.  H.  3,  1910,  102-103. 

19.  VOLD,  J.  M.     Der  Traum.     Leipzig,  1910. 

20.  WATERMAN,  G.     Dreams  as  a  Cause  of  Symptoms.     /.  of  Abnorm.  PsychoL,  1910, 

5,  196-210. 


NOTES  AND  NEWS 

AT  the  recent  meeting  of  the  American  Psychological  Association 
at  Washington,  D.  C.,  Professor  E.  L.  Thorndike  (Teachers  College) 
was  elected  president  for  the  coming  year.  Professor  W.  V.  Bing- 
ham  continues  as  secretary-treasurer. 

THE  Southern  Society  for  Philosophy  and  Psychology  has  elected 
the  following  officers  for  the  year  1911:  President,  Professor  R.  M. 
Ogden  (Tennessee);  vice-president,  President  H.  J.  Pearce  (Brenau); 
secretary-treasurer,  Professor  W.  C.  Ruediger  (George  Washington). 

THE  American  Philosophical  Association  has  elected  Professor 
Frank  Thilly  (Cornell)  president  and  Professor  Norman  K.  Smith 
(Princeton)  vice-president.  Professor  E.  G.  Spaulding  continues  as 
secretary. 


-I 

Vol.  IX.  No.  2.  February  15,  191 2. 


THE 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  TWENTIETH  ANNUAL  MEETING 
OF  THE  AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION 
AND  THE  SEVENTH  ANNUAL  MEETING  OF  THE 
SOUTHERN  SOCIETY  FOR  PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSY- 
CHOLOGY, WASHINGTON,  D.  C,  DECEMBER  27,  28 
AND  29,  1911 

REPORT   OF   THE   SECRETARY   OF  THE  AMERICAN   PSYCHOLOGICAL 

ASSOCIATION 

The  twentieth  annual  meeting  of  the  American  Psychological 
Association  was  held  in  Washington,  D.  C.,  on  Wednesday,  Thursday 
and  Friday,  December  27,  28  and  29,  1911,  in  affiliation  with  the 
Southern  Society  for  Philosophy  and  Psychology  and  the  American 
Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science. 

Professor  Carl  E.  Seashore,  Dean  of  the  Graduate  School  of  the 
University  of  Iowa,  was  the  presiding  officer.  His  presidential 
address  Thursday  evening  pointed  out  the  possibilities  of  applied 
psychology,  using  as  a  typical  illustration  the  psychological  measure- 
ments of  a  singer  which  the  consulting  psychologist  of  the  future 
will  make  when  aiding  a  young  person  to  decide  whether  or  not  to 
devote  himself  to  a  musical  career.  Many  papers  throughout  the 
three  days'  sessions  made  strikingly  evident  the  fact  that  psychology 
in  America  is  seeking  to  find  itself  in  various  fields  of  application, 
as  well  as  in  the  realm  of  pure  psychology. 

The  meetings  were  held,  with  one  exception,  in  the  main  building 
of  the  George  Washington  Medical  School.  Two  assembly  halls 
were  provided  for  the  formal  sessions  and  two  rooms  were  devoted 
to  a  large  exhibit  of  both  new  and  standard  forms  of  apparatus. 
About  eighty  members  were  in  attendance. 

The  program  began  Wednesday  morning  with  a  symposium  on  the 
demarcation  of  the  distinct  differences  between  "Instinct  and  In- 

41 


42  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

telligence."  Four  formal  papers  provoked  a  lively  discussion,  which 
made  evident  most  clearly  the  need  and  importance  of  much  patient, 
detailed  observation  and  investigation  of  instinctive  behavior.  The 
opening  of  the  apparatus  exhibit  Wednesday  afternoon  was  followed 
by  a  double  program.  In  one  section  the  papers  on  mental  tests  were 
presented,  and  in  another,  the  experimental  contributions  to  the  study 
of  animal  behavior.  Double  programs  were  also  necessary  on  Thurs- 
day and  Friday  afternoons  to  make  possible  the  reading  of  the  large 
number  of  papers  submitted.  Two  of  these  programs  were  made  up 
of  reports  of  research  in  experimental  psychology.  Paralleling  them 
were  a  program  of  general  and  theoretical  papers,  and  a  joint  session 
with  Section  L  devoted  to  educational  psychology. 

The  program  which  attracted  widest  interest  was  that  of  Thursday 
forenoon,  at  which  time  the  Associations  met  at  the  Government 
Hospital  for  the  Insane.  A  conference  had  been  arranged  on  the 
relations  of  psychology  and  medical  education;  and  the  interest  in 
the  papers  which  had  been  prepared  showed  the  timeliness  and  im- 
portance of  the  subject.  Several  eminent  psychiatrists  and  repre- 
sentatives of  medical  faculties  were  present  to  share  in  the  informal 
discussion,  and  although  there  were  extreme  divergences  of  view 
regarding  the  type  of  psychology  which  ought  to  be  taught  and  re- 
garding the  place  in  the  curriculum  where  it  ought  to  be  introduced, 
there  was  marked  unanimity  of  opinion  regarding  the  need  of  psy- 
chology. It  is  expected  that  the  proceedings  of  this  meeting  will  be 
printed  in  full  in  the  Journal  of  the  American  Medical  Association. 

Following  this  session  the  two  societies  and  their  guests  were 
entertained  at  luncheon  by  Professor  Franz.  On  that  same  evening 
Professor  Franz  and  Professor  Ruediger  were  the  hosts  at  a  joint 
smoker  which  proved  in  many  ways  to  be  one  of  the  most  delightful 
occasions  of  the  week,  for  during  the  festivities  the  members  had  the 
privilege  of  hearing  anecdotes  and  reminiscences  of  the  early  days 
of  the  Psychological  Association  narrated  by  President  Stanley  Hall, 
the  first  President  of  the  Association,  Professor  Ladd,  who  cooperated 
with  President  Hall  in  getting  the  Association  organized,  Professor 
Cattell,  a  member  of  the  first  council,  and  Professor  Miinsterberg, 
who,  having  just  come  from  Germany  to  America,  was  present  at  the 
first  annual  meeting,  held  in  Philadelphia  nineteen  years  ago. 

At  the  annual  business  meeting  of  the  Association  Friday  morning, 
Professor  E.  L.  Thorndike  was  elected  President  of  the  Association 
for  the  ensuing  year.  Professor  Margaret  F.  Washburn  and  Pro- 
fessor Max  Meyer  were  elected  to  membership  in  the  council  for 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  43 

three  years,  to  succeed  President  Sanford  and  Professor  Thorndike. 
Professor  C.  E.  Seashore,  the  retiring  president,  was  elected  to  rep- 
resent the  Association  on  the  Council  of  the  A.  A.  A.  S. 

The  following  persons,  having  been  recommended  by  the  Council, 
were  elected  to  membership  in  the  Association :  Jasper  Converse  Barnes' 
Ph.D.,  Maryville  College;  Frederick  Stephen  Breed,  Ph.D.,  Univer- 
sity of  Michigan;  Lucy  Hoesch-Ernst,  Ph.D.,  Milwaukee,  Wis.;  Mabel 
Ruth  Fernald,  Ph.D.,  Chicago  Teachers  College;  Samuel  Weiller 
Fernberger,  A.M.,  University  of  Pennsylvania;  Joseph  Wanton 
Hayes,  Ph.D.,  University  of  Chicago;  Mrs.  Mary  Holmes  Stevens 
Hayes,  Ph.D.,  University  of  Chicago;  Samuel  J.  Holmes,  Ph.D., 
University  of  Wisconsin;  Herbert  Sidney  Langfeld,  Ph.D.,  Harvard 
University;  Henry  C.  McComas,  Ph.D.,  Princeton  University;  John 
Moffatt  Mecklin,  'Ph.D.,  Lafayette  College;  Ethel  Chamberlain 
Porter,  Ph.D.,  East  Orange,  N.  J.;  W.  H.  Pyle,  Ph.D.,  University 
of  Missouri;  Carl  L.  Rahn,  Ph.B.,  University  of  Minnesota;  Christian 
A.  Ruckmich,  A.B.,  Cornell  University;  William  T.  Shepherd,  Ph.D., 
Washington,  D.  C.;  H.  Douglas  Singer,  M.D.,  Illinois  State  Psycho- 
pathic Institute;  Raymond  H.  Stetson,  Ph.D.,  Oberlin  College; 
Elmer  Ernest  Southard,  M.D.,  Ph.D.,  Harvard  University;  Edward 
K.  Strong,  Ph.D.,  Columbia  University;  J.  E.  W.  Wallin,  Ph.D.; 
Clara  Jean  Weidensall,  Ph.D.,  New  York  State  Reformatory  for 
Women,  Bedford  Hills;  Harry  Porter  Weld,  Ph.D.,  Clark  University; 
Edward  Moffat  Weyer,  Ph.D.,  Washington  and  Jefferson  College; 
Mary  T.  Whitley,  Ph.D.,  Teachers  College,  Columbia  University. 

The  determination  of  the  time  and  place  of  the  next  meeting  was 
left  to  the  Council,  with  power  to  act.  A  cordial  invitation  had  been 
received  to  come  to  Western  Reserve  University,  Cleveland,  where 
the  American  Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science  will  meet 
next  December.  But  a  meeting  at  this  time  was  of  course  deemed 
inadvisable  if  the  International  Congress  of  Psychology  is  to  be  held 
in  New  York  and  Boston  at  Easter,  in  the  spring  of  1913. 

The  advisability  of  undertaking  to  hold  this  Congress  in  America 
as  originally  planned  has  been  brought  into  question  by  certain 
members  of  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Congress,  who  have 
found  a  lamentable  lack  of  interest  in  the  Congress  abroad.  Other 
members  of  the  committee  have  felt  that  it  is  important  not  to  aban- 
don the  project  in  spite  of  the  attitude  of  European  psychologists 
and  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  holding  a  successful  congress  of 
really  international  character.  On  motion  of  Professor  Cattell,  the 
Secretary  was  instructed  to  secure  by  mail  from  the  members  of  this 


44  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

Association,  the  Southern  Society,  and  the  North  Central  Association, 
an  informal  expression  of  opinion  regarding  the  desirability  of  having 
the  congress  in  America. 

(Since  the  above  was  put  into  type,  word  has  been  received  from 
the  officers  of  the  Congress  that  the  project  of  holding  the  Congress 
in  America  in  1913  has  been  definitely  abandoned.  The  next  meeting 
of  the  Association  will,  then,  be  held  next  December  in  Cleveland. 
This  central  location  will  make  possible  a  splendid  "get-together" 
meeting  of  eastern  and  western  members  on  the  occasion  of  the 
twentieth  anniversary  of  the  founding  of  the  Association.) 

The  Council,  having  for  some  years  back  experienced  frequent 
difficulty  in  securing  adequate  information  regarding  applicants  for 
membership  in  the  Association,  made  public  the  following  announce- 
ment: "The  Council  requests  that  all  recommendations  for  member- 
ship in  the  Association  be  submitted  to  the  Secretary  at  least  a  month 
in  advance  of  the  time  of  election,  and  that  these  recommendations 
be  accompanied  by  a  statement  of  the  candidate's  professional  posi- 
tion and  by  copies  of  his  published  researches." 

On  recommendation  of  the  Council  it  was  voted  that  a  com- 
mittee of  three  be  appointed  by  the  President  to  study  and  report 
on  the  relations  of  psychology  and  medical  education,  and  to  confer 
on  behalf  of  this  Association  with  other  bodies  interested  in  these 
problems.  (Professor  W.  D.  Scott,  Professor  E.  E.  Southard  and 
Professor  J.  B.  Watson  were  appointed.)  The  Council  was  empowered 
to  authorize  the  expenditure  of  a  sum  not  to  exceed  $50  for  the  ex- 
penses of  this  Committee. 

Professor  Angell  reported  the  completion  of  the  investigations 
heretofore  planned  by  the  Committee  on  the  Standardization  of 
Mental  Tests,  and  announced  in  a  general  way  the  plans  of  the 
Committee  for  the  immediate  future.  On  recommendation  of  the 
Council  it  was  voted  that  the  Committee  be  continued;  that  the  prin- 
ciple of  rotation  of  one  member  per  year  be  adopted;  that  the  order 
of  rotation  be  determined  by  the  Committee;  and  that  the  new 
member  be  chosen  by  the  Council  upon  nomination  of  the  Committee. 
$250  was  appropriated  for  the  publication  of  reports  of  this  Com- 
mittee during  the  present  year,  the  conditions  of  publication  to  be 
subject  to  the  regulation  of  the  Council.  It  was  the  general  senti- 
ment of  those  participating  in  the  discussion  that  this  appropriation 
should  be  renewed  annually  as  needed. 

It  was  also  voted,  on  recommendation  of  the  Council,  that  the 
Committee  on  Tests  be  requested  to  hold  itself  ready  to  examine  and 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS 


45 


report  upon  the  relative  merit  of  different  forms  of  apparatus  de- 
signed to  serve  the  same  general  purpose.  In  explaining  the  object 
of  this  resolution,  one  of  the  speakers  cited  the  desirability  of  a  body 
which  would  be  prepared  to  undertake  investigations  of  the  relative 
merits  of  the  various  forms  of  esthesiometers,  tachistoscopes,  etc. 
The  committee,  of  which  Professor  Angell  is  Chairman,  will  welcome 
suggestions  as  to  possible  lines  of  usefulness. 

Professor  Whipple  made  a  report  of  the  work  undertaken  by 
the  Committee  on  Teaching  Experiments.  It  was  voted  that  this 
committee  be  continued.  The  Association  also  authorized  the  ex- 
penditure of  a  sum  not  to  exceed  $50  to  meet  necessary  expenses  of 
the  committee. 

Professor  Warren  presented  a  report  for  the  Committee  on 
Periodicals.  It  was  voted  that  this  committee  be  continued,  with 
power  to  add  to  its  membership.  It  at  present  consists  of  represen- 
tatives of  each  of  the  psychological  journals,  but  it  was  deemed  desir- 
able to  have  a  representative  for  the  readers  and  contributors,  as 
well  as  for  the  editors. 

A  sum  not  exceeding  $25  was  voted  to  meet  necessary  expenses 
in  connection  with  the  apparatus  exhibit,  and  the  expenditure  of  a 
similar  sum  next  year  was  also  authorized. 

The  following  recommendation  of  the  Council  was  adopted; 
"The  Council,  believing  that  the  members  of  the  Association  should 
consider  exercising  a  more  direct  control  over  the  choice  of  its  officers, 
recommends  the  appointment  of  a  committee  of  three  to  consider 
this  question  and,  in  the  event  of  their  approving  a  change  in  the 
present  arrangements,  to  submit  to  the  next  annual  meeting  the 
necessary  amendments  to  the  constitution."  (Professor  Aikins, 
Professor  Minor,  and  Professor  Pierce  were  appointed  to  this  com- 
mittee.) 

The  Association  voted  a  most  cordial  expression  of  appreciation 
of  the  courtesies  extended  by  the  officers  of  the  George  Washington 
Medical  School  and  the  Government  Hospital  for  the  Insane,  with 
special  thanks  to  Professor  Franz  and  Professor  Ruediger  for  their 
generous  hospitality. 

REPORT  OF  THE  TREASURER  FOR  THE  YEAR  1911 

DR. 

To  Balance  from  previous  year £3,077.69 

Dues  received  from  members 243-3S 

Interest  from  July  I,  1910,  to  July  I,  1911 99-72 

Receipts  from  sales  of  Psychological  Monographs  No.  51  and  No.  53.  .          95-89 

33,516.6s 


46  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

CR. 

Stationery  and  printing  ..................................  $75-25 

Traveling  expenses  (1910  meeting)  ........................  86.16 

Clerical  assistance  .......................................  IS-7S 

Postage  .........  .......................................  56.5  1 

Express  and  telegrams  ...................................  6.91 

Printing  and  distribution  of  Proceedings  ...................  8.37 

Appropriation  toward  printing  and  distribution  of  report  of 

Committee  on  Standardization  of  Tests  ................  150.00 

Appropriation  toward  printing  and  distribution  of  report  of 
sub-committee  on  Standardization  of  Methods  of  Studying 

Color-vision  ........................................  200.00 

Miscellaneous  ...........................................  3-83 

Unexpended  petty  cash  ..................................  10-65           613.43 

Balance  in  Union  Dime  Savings  Institution  .................  #2,772.99 

Balance  in  Fifth  Avenue  Bank  ............................  130.23         2,903.22 


W.  V.  BlNGHAM, 

Secretary  and  Treasurer 
HANOVER,  N.  H., 

December  20,  1911. 

Audited  by  the  Council 


REPORT  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  THE  SOUTHERN  SOCIETY 
FOR  PHILOSOPHY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY 

The  Seventh  Annual  Meeting  of  the  Southern  Society  for  Philos- 
ophy and  Psychology  was  held  at  Washington,  D.  C.,  on  Wednesday, 
Thursday,  and  Friday,  December  27,  28,  and  29,  1911,  in  conjunction 
with  the  American  Psychological  Association  and  the  American 
Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science.  The  meetings  were 
held  in  the  George  Washington  University  Medical  School,  President 
Shepherd  Ivory  Franz  presiding.  The  programs  for  December  27 
and  28  were  arranged  jointly  with  the  American  Psychological  Asso- 
ciation. Following  the  joint  meeting  on  Thursday  afternoon  came 
the  president's  address  on  "  New  Phrenology."  On  Thursday  evening 
the  members  of  both  societies  were  entertained  at  a  smoker  held  at 
the  New  Fredonia  Hotel  by  Professors  Franz  and  Ruediger. 

The  following  items  were  passed  upon  at  the  business  meeting 
held  on  Friday  morning,  December  29. 

1.  The  proposed  amendment  to  Art.  II.,  Sec.  3,  of  the  constitution 
was  adopted. 

2.  It  was  resolved  that  the  existing  arrangement  with  the  Psy- 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  47 

chological  Review  Publishing  Company  be  continued  as  optional  to 
the  members  of  the  Southern  Society  and  he  handled  as  hitherto  by 
the  secretary  of  the  society.  In  the  future,  however,  this  option 
is  available  only  to  members  residing  in  the  southern  territory,  but 
it  is  no  longer  restricted  to  those  who  are  new  subscribers.  Notice 
of  the  above  arrangement  is  to  be  printed  after  the  constitution  on 
the  membership  list. 

3.  The  secretary  was  authorized  to  drop  the  names  of  members 
after  one  year  of  delinquency. 

4.  The  determination  of  the  time  and  place  of  the  next  meeting 
was  left  in  the  hands  of  the  Council. 

5.  The  treasurer's  report  was  audited  by  the  Council  and  showed 
a  balance  on  hand,  December  23,  1911,  of  $65. 64. 

6.  The  following  officers  were  elected  for  the  year  1912:  President, 
Robert  Morris  Ogden,  University  of  Tennessee;    Vice- President,  H.  J. 
Pearce,  Brenau  College,  Gainesville,  Ga.;  Secretary-Treasurer,  Wil- 
liam Carl  Ruediger,  The  George  Washington  University;  Council  for 
3  years,  Shepherd  Ivory  Franz  and  John  Brodus  Watson;   Council 
for  i  year,  W.  B.  Lane. 

7.  The  following  persons  were  elected  to  membership:  Samuel 
Claman,   Howard   University;  H.    E.    Cunningham,   Lookout  Mt., 
Tenn.;  Gardner  C.  Basset,  Johns  Hopkins  University;  Williston  S. 
Hough,  George  Washington  University;  Edmund  B.  Huey,  Johns 
Hopkins  University;  Herbert  Charles  Sanborn,  Vanderbilt  Univer- 
sity. 

8.  Votes  of  thanks  were  extended  to  Dean  W.  C.  Borden  for  the 
use  of  the  George  Washington  University  Medical  School  and  to 
Professors  Franz  and  Ruediger  for  the  smoker. 

W.  C.  RUEDIGER,  Secretary 

THE  GEORGE  WASHINGTON  UNIVERSITY, 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 


ABSTRACTS  OF  PAPERS 
The  Measure  of  a  Singer.     Address  of  the  President  of  the  American 

Psychological  Association.     CARL  E.   SEASHORE,  University  of 

Iowa. 

(This  address  is  published  in  full  in  Science,  Feb.  9,  1912,  Vol. 
XXXV,  p.  201.) 
New  Phrenology.     Address  of  the  President  of  the  Southern  Society 

for    Philosophy    and    Psychology.     SHEPHERD    IVORY    FRANZ, 

Government  Hospital  for  the  Insane. 


48  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

An  examination  of  the  system  of  Gall  shows  that  the  basis  for 
his  conclusions  was  an  artificial  division  of  the  mind  into  elements 
which  differ  from  one  another  in  degree  or  in  kind.  Gall  attempted 
to  correlate  these  divisions  with  divisions  of  the  brain,  assuming  that 
the  mental  processes  were  localized  in  certain  areas  of  that  organ. 

Although  this  view  has  been  attacked  from  time  to  time,  it  has 
left  its  impress  upon  anatomists  and  clinicians.  Broca  had  a  view 
of  mental  and  brain  relations  somewhat  similar  to  that  of  Gall,  and 
this  view  was  amplified  by  Wernicke  and  others. 

The  schematic  subdivisions  of  the  mind  were  combated,  but 
numerous  attempts  from  the  clinical  and  anatomical  standpoints 
have  been  made  to  uphold  the  doctrine.  In  this  class  belong  the 
studies  of  Flechsig,  and  the  more  recent  studies  of  the  histological 
localization  of  function. 

Histologically  the  cerebral  cortex  can  be  divided  into  a  number  of 
areas,  which  have  the  same  fundamental  characteristics  of  cells  and 
fibers  arranged  in  more  or  less  definite  layers,  but  which  differ  from 
one  another  in  the  special  arrangements  of  these  elements.  Because 
of  these  differences  it  has  been  assumed  that  the  areas  have  different 
mental  functions. 

The  direct  relation  of  the  so-called  sensory  and  perceptive  areas 
to  mental  states  has  not  been  proven.  The  histologists  have  not 
been  able  to  give  any  good  explanation  for  the  differences  in  the 
so-called  motor  areas,  of  which,  clinically  and  physiologically,  we 
have  more  information  than  of  other  parts  of  the  cerebrum. 

Many  clinicians  refer  to  the  localization  of  aphasias  as  evidence 
for  the  localization  of  mental  processes,  but  even  as  clinical  mani- 
festations the  disorders  of  speech  cannot  be  said  to  be  associated  with 
definite  parts  of  the  brain. 

Another  principle  of  histological  localization  is  that  of  definite 
functions  for  the  different  layers  of  the  cortex,  but  there  are  no  facts 
which  warrant  a  localization  of  definite  mental  states  in  the  indi- 
vidual layers. 

It  has  been  assumed  that  the  principle  of  localization  has  been 
settled,  but  this  cannot  be  accepted,  because  there  is  dispute  whether 
mental  states,  clinical  phenomena  or  cells  are  localized.  There  is 
some  doubt  about  the  exact  localizations  of  cell  groups  in  the  cere- 
brum; there  is  more  doubt  regarding  the  relation  of  clinical  mani- 
festations to  the  injury  of  certain  areas,  and  there  is  no  evidence  to 
warrant  a  psychic  localization. 

All  that  can  be  concluded  at  the  present  time  is  that  the  mind 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  49 

is  associated  with  brain  activity.     We  are  unable  to  say  that  the 
activity  of  the  cerebrum  alone  is  the  concomitant  of  mental  processes. 

Instinct  and  Intelligence.     HENRY  RUTGERS  MARSHALL,  New  York 

City. 

We  avoid  confusion  by  considering  activities  from  the  subjective 
and  objective  standpoints  separately. 

Objective  View. — Activities  increase  in  variety  part  passu  with 
increase  of  complexity  of  animals'  structure. 

The  most  striking  characteristics  of  activities  of  animals  of  lowest 
and  highest  complexity  are  as  follows: 

Class  A.  Activities  in  simplest  animals  display  (i)  Evident 
biologic  value.  (2)  Directness.  (3)  Immediacy.  (4)  "Perfect 
very  first  time."  (5)  Non-modifiable.  (6)  Innate. 

Class  B.  Activities  in  complex  animals  display  (i)  Often  no 
evident  biologic  value.  (2)  Indirectness.  (3)  Hesitancy.  (4)  Not 
"perfect  very  first  time."  (5)  Highly  modifiable.  (6)  Not  evi- 
dently innate. 

But  in  complex  animals  we  discover  certain  activities  of  class 
A.  These  we  call  "instinct-actions."  The  nearer  an  animal  ap- 
proaches to  simplicity  of  organization  the  closer  do  its  activities 
approach  the  ideal  of  "instinct-action."  The  "instinct-action"  of 
the  simple  cell  may  be  assumed  to  reach  this  ideal.  The  character- 
istics of  varied  activities  of  complex  animals  may  then  be  conceived 
of  as  due  to  the  "instinct-actions  "  of  cells,  or  minor  systems  of  cells, 
in  a  highly  complex  system.  Hence  the  varied  activities  of  complex 
animals  may  be  stated  in  terms  of  cell  "instinct-action,"  which  may 
be  looked  upon  as  the  biologic  unit. 

Subjective  View. — But  these  varied  activities  (class  B}  are  what 
we  ourselves  know  as  intelligent  activities;  hence  we  may  argue  that 
intelligence  is  statable  in  terms  of  "instinct-feelings,"  the  psychic 
correspondents  of  "instinct-actions,"  "instinct-feeling"  being  the 
psychic  unit. 

This  view  is  corroborated  by  introspection,  the  distinguishing 
marks  of  intelligent  acts  appearing  to  be  due  to  the  emphasis  of  the 
correlated  "instinct-feelings"  involved.  If  we  could  grasp  the  full 
psychic  significance  of  an  "instinct-feeling,"  by  slowing  down  the 
process,  we  should  find  in  it  all  the  essentials  of  intelligence;  and  if 
intelligent  acts  could  be  made  immediate  they  would  appear  objec- 
tively as  "instinct-actions,"  and  subjectively  as  "instinct-feelings." 


50  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

Instinct  and  Intelligence.     C.  JUDSON  HERRI  CK,  University  of  Chicago. 

The  term  instinct  as  popularly  used  is  incapable  of  accurate  sci- 
entific definition  for  it  is  commonly  applied  to  behavior  complexes 
including  variable  proportions  of  structurally  predetermined  innate 
action  and  intelligent  action.  I  would  replace  the  terms  instinct 
action  and  intelligent  action  of  Marshall  by  innate  action  and  indi- 
vidually variable  action,  and  I  maintain  that  these  two  types  of 
action  are  separate  biological  functions,  both  of  which  are  exhibited 
in  some  measure  by  all  animals,  and  that  they  are  independently 
variable. 

Innate  action  includes  the  fundamental  physiological  properties, 
tropisms,  taxes,  reflexes,  compound  and  chain  reflexes  and  the 
inherited  elements  of  all  higher  behavior  complexes.  These  actions 
are  common,  within  narrow  limits  of  variation,  to  all  members  of  a 
race  or  species.  And  they  are  developed  in  accordance  with  the  same 
evolutionary  laws  (natural  selection,  etc.)  as  are  the  other  stable 
elements  in  the  action-system  which  is  typical  for  each  species. 
Individually  variable  action  includes  all  non-heritable  acquired 
behavior  from  simple  physiological  modifications  resulting  from 
practice,  at  the  lower  extreme,  to  learning  by  experience  and  the 
higher  intelligent  adaptations,  at  the  other  extreme.  Individually 
acquired  automatisms  are  derivatives  of  individually  variable 
actions. 

A  special  mechanism  has  been  differentiated  for  the  higher  forms 
of  individually  variable  action,  viz.,  the  association  centers  of  the 
brain,  whose  highly  developed  mnemonic  functions  are  derived  from 
the  simple  "physiological  memory"  of  ordinary  protoplasm,  and 
whose  connections  are  such  as  to  facilitate  functional  associations 
independently  of  immediate  sense  stimulation. 

Instinct  and  Intelligence.     ROBERT  M.  YERKES,  Harvard  University. 

Instinct  and  intelligence,  physiologically  considered,  are  two 
functional  capacities  or  tendencies  of  organisms.  Neither  has 
developed  from  the  other:  each  is  a  fundamental  organic  capacity. 
Now  the  one,  now  the  other  tendency  predominates  in  the  life  of  the 
individual  or  of  the  species. 

Instinctive  activities  are  practically  serviceable  on  first  appear- 
ance; strikingly  perfect  in  important  respects;  predictable;  heritable 
in  definite  form;  and  suggestive  of  experiences,  and  results  thereof, 
which  the  organism  has  not  had.  Intelligent  activities,  by  contrast, 
are  serviceable  as  the  result  of  trial;  practically  unpredictable;  not 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  51 

definitely  heritable;  and  suggestive  of  experiences  which  the  organism 
has  had. 

No  organism  lacks  either  the  instinct  capacity  or  the  intelligence 
capacity.  Instinct  means,  first  of  all,  conservation— the  holding  to 
that  which  has  been  tested  and  found  good  by  previous  generations. 
Intelligence  means  progress— the  blazing  of  new  paths. 

It  is  through  the  study  of  the  behavior  of  activities  in  inheritance 
that  we  may  hope  for  the  solution  of  our  most  important  questions 
concerning  the  relations  of  instinct  to  intelligence. 

Intelligence    as    Distinguished  from    Instinct.     CHARLES    H.    JUDD, 

University  of  Chicago. 

The  discussions  of  the  relation  between  instinct  and  intelligence 
are  very  much  clearer  in  their  definitions  of  instincts  than  they  are 
in  their  definitions  of  intelligence.  Intelligence  is  commonly  defined 
by  saying  that  it  is  merely  the  outgrowth  of  instinct,  and  is  like 
instinct  in  form;  or,  if  a  discrimination  is  made,  intelligence  is  de- 
scribed in  negative  terms.  It  is  that  which  is  not  inherited.  It  is 
not  a  fixed  type  of  behavior. 

The  importance  of  intelligence  in  human  life  justifies  the  demand 
that  we  give  a  positive  definition  of  its  characteristics.  In  the  process 
of  organic  adaptation  there  is  evolved  in  the  individual  the  power  of 
initiating  activities  from  inner  motives.  This  is  shown  by  the  delay 
which  appears  when  one  of  the  higher  animals  is  stimulated,  and 
reacts  only  after  a  long  series  of  internal  processes.  The  internal 
processes  in  this  case  are  more  significant  in  determining  action  than 
is  the  external  stimulus.  Furthermore,  the  sequences  of  external 
stimuli  do  not  determine  the  sequences  of  activities.  Within  the 
complex  individual  new  types  of  relationship  are  established  between 
the  impressions  that  come  from  the  outer  world.  Thus  the  individual, 
instead  of  reacting  upon  objects  which  stand  near  to  each  other  in 
nature,  is  able  to  bring  together  objects  that  in  nature  are  remote 
from  each  other.  This  bringing  together  of  remote  objects  is  the 
result  of  inner  processes  of  comparison  or  association.  The  power 
of  making  independent  associations  or  comparisons  is  the  highest 
outgrowth  of  the  evolutionary  process.  It  is  superior  to  memory, 
which  merely  retains  external  impressions.  It  gives  to  the  individual 
a  power  over  his  environment  which  he  could  not  have  if  he  merely 
followed  the  dictates  of  the  environment. 

Such  statements  as  the  foregoing  make  it  clear  that  intelligence 
is  that  characteristic  whereby  an  individual  becomes  superior  to  his 


52  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

environment,  and  capable  of  modifying  what  he  finds  in  the  environ- 
ment. In  man  this  ability  to  modify  environment  is  the  characteristic 
power  which  differentiates  him  from  the  lower  organisms.  Man 
has  gone  so  far  as  to  evolve  certain  forms  of  activity  which  are  em- 
ployed chiefly  in  planning  and  preparing  for  changes  in  his  environ- 
ment. Language  is  a  form  of  behavior  of  this  indirect  type  which 
man  works  out  as  a  means  by  which  he  can  ultimately  react  upon  his 
environment.  Language  is  first  envolved  as  a  means  of  reacting  to 
the  social  environment,  as  distinguished  from  the  physical  environ- 
ment. After  language  is  produced  through  social  intercourse,  it 
becomes  an  instrument  of  inner  planning  and  comparison,  and  as 
such  promotes  the  further  evolution  of  a  higher  form  of  reaction, 
namely,  intelligent  reaction. 

Any  organism  which  is  characterized  by  a  type  of  behavior  so 
remote  from  the  lower  forms  of  behavior  must  be  described  as  having 
reached  a  higher  stage  of  evolution.  This  statement  should  not  be 
interpreted  to  mean  that  there  is  any  breach  in  evolutionary  con- 
tinuity, but  it  certainly  does  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  evolution 
has  progressed  to  such  a  point  that  continuity  is  not  the  most  im- 
portant phase  of  the  matter. 

Imitation  and  Animal  Behavior.     M.  E.  HAGGERTY,  University  of 

Indiana. 

Advance  in  the  experimental  analysis  of  behavior  tends  to  make 
psychological  concepts  inadequate.  Many  of  the  concepts  of  com- 
parative psychology  are  of  the  relative  unanalyzed  sort,  which  indi- 
cates that  in  this  field  we  have  not  pushed  our  experimental  analysis 
to  the  end.  Imitation  is  a  case  in  point.  One  reason  why  we  have 
not  made  more  progress  in  our  study  of  imitative  behavior  is  that  the 
concept  of  imitation  has  been  hampered  by  its  classification  into 
instinctive  and  voluntary.  These  adjectives  when  used  with  imita- 
tion are  intended,  not  as  descriptive  of  objectively  observed  behavior 
but  as  explanatory,  i.  e.,  they  are  intended  to  indicate  the  non- 
observed  processes  antecedent  to  such  behavior.  Yet  instinct  and 
volition  when  taken  concretely  in  the  behavior  of  mammals  have 
the  most  uncertain  significance,  and  instead  of  being  explanatory 
they  really  obscure  the  great  variety  of  imitative  behavior.  If  we 
are  not  to  give  up  the  category  of  imitation  in  comparative  psychology 
and  to  withdraw  from  the  experimental  study  of  imitative  behavior 
we  must  have  a  reworking  of  the  concept  itself.  This  reexamination 
of  the  concept  must  be  made  independently  of  the  ideas  of  instinct 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  53 

and  volition  and  be  based  on  objectively  observed  facts,  i.  e.,  upon 
facts  which  have  been  experimentally  determined.  There  are  not 
enough  such  experimentally  determined  data  for  an  adequate  re- 
organization of  the  concept,  but  the  recent  work  on  rats,  cats,  birds, 
monkeys  and  apes  gives  some  basis  upon  which  to  work.  Such  a 
reorganization  must  take  account  of  all  the  factors  that  determine 
attention  and  also  of  the  various  levels  of  accuracy  and  complexity 
in  the  imitative  behavior.  We  may  for  a  time  be  compelled  to  have 
a  different  grouping  for  different  species  of  animals. 

The  Discrimination  of  Articulate  Sounds  by  Cats.     W.  T.  SHEPHERD, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

The  paper  is  a  report  of  experiments  which  were  made  with  cats 
to  determine  their  ability  to  discriminate  articulate  sounds.  The 
major  part  of  the  work  of  the  experiments  was  done  by  the  writer's 
wife,  Mrs.  Barbara  Shepherd. 

One  of  the  animals  used  in  the  experiments  was  seven  months 
old,  the  other  about  three  years  old.  The  younger  cat  had  not 
previously  been  given  any  name,  and  had  no  training  in  the  dis- 
crimination of  words.  The  other  animal  had  previously  been  given 
a  name,  different  from  that  given  it  in  the  experiments.  Both 
were  gray  house-cats,  and  both  were  females. 

The  experimeter  called  the  name  given  the  animal  and  also 
other  words  in  conjunction.  The  cat  was  to  show  its  discrimination 
of  the  name  given  it  from  the  other  words  used  by  appropriate  motor 
reactions  to  its  name,  such  as  rearing  up  in  the  cage  and  looking 
for  food  to  be  given  it  when  its  name  was  called,  and  by  not  so  re- 
sponding when  the  other  words  were  called.  Suitable  control 
tests  were  employed. 

The  younger  cat  began  to  show  indications  of  forming  the  proper 
association  on  the  third  day.  On  the  thirteenth  day  it  had  perfected 
the  association.  The  older  cat  first  showed  indications  of  discrim- 
ination on  the  tenth  day.  On  the  twenty-fifth  day  of  the  experi- 
ments it  properly  responded  nineteen  times  in  twenty  trials. 

The  writer  concludes  from  the  experiments  that  cats  are  able 
to  discriminate  articulate  sounds.  The  younger  animal  took  150 
trials  of  each  auditory  stimulus  to  perfect  the  association,  the  older 
cat  490  trials,  the  younger  of  the  two  individuals  learning  much 
more  rapidly.  In  rapidity  in  forming  the  association,  these  two  cats 
showed  a  rough  correspondence  to  ability  in  raccoons,  in  similar 
tests,  to  discriminate  words. 


54  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

Some  Experiments  on  the  Brightness  Value  of  Red  for  the  Light- 
Adapted  Eye  of  the  Rabbit.  M.  F.  WASHBURN,  Vassar  College. 
In  order  to  eliminate  the  brightness  error  in  experiments  on 
color  vision  in  animals  it  is  not  sufficient  to  show  that  the  animal 
tested  can  distinguish  a  color  from  the  gray  that  a  color-blind  human 
being  would  see  in  place  of  the  color,  but  the  animal  must  be  proved 
capable  of  discriminating  the  color  from  all  grays.  The  present 
experiments  attempted  to  find  whether  any  one  of  a  series  of  gray 
papers  was  indistinguishable  from  the  Bradley  saturated  red  paper 
to  the  light-adapted  eye  of  the  gray  rabbit.  An  error  mentioned 
by  Watson  as  incidental  to  the  use  of  colored  papers,  namely,  that 
when  pasted  on  surfaces  they  show  irregularities  that  would  serve 
to  distinguish  them  was  eliminated  by  pinning  the  papers  on  the 
two  doors  of  a  food  box,  and  pinning  them  on  freshly  for  each 
experiment.  Food  was  in  both  compartments  of  the  box.  The 
doors  could  be  pushed  open  by  the  rabbit,  but  the  door  carrying  the 
gray  paper  was  always  bolted  on  the  inside.  The  gray  paper  was 
sometimes  on  one  door  and  sometimes  on  the  other.  Fresh  red 
papers  were  used  in  each  test,  to  eliminate  a  smell  error.  To  avoid 
the  possibility  that  the  rabbit  might  distinguish  the  red  paper  from 
the  gray  by  smell,  in  many  of  the  tests  gray  paper  was  put  under 
the  red  and  red  under  the  gray,  a  narrow  slit  being  cut  in  the  upper 
paper  at  about  the  level  of  the  rabbit's  nose.  This  mixture  of  the 
two  smells  never  had  any  effect  on  the  discrimination.  To  show 
that  the  animals  were  not  guided  by  differences  in  the  surfaces  of 
the  two  papers,  red  and  gray  velvet  were  substituted  occasionally 
for  the  papers,  without  at  all  interfering  with  the  discrimination. 

The  five  rabbits  tested  were  all  able  to  discriminate  the  red 
papers  from  Hering  grays  number  6,  7,  15,  and  24;  but  all  failed  to 
discriminate  red  from  the  very  dark  gray  number  46,  and  from  the 
black  paper  supplied  by  the  Stoelting  Company.  Red  would  thus 
appear  to  have  a  low  stimulating  power  for  the  light-adapted  eye 
of  the  rabbit.  The  experiments  were  performed  in  collaboration  with 
Miss  E.  Abbott. 

Modifiability  of  Behavior  in  the    Earthworm   Allolobophora  fcetida. 

ROBERT  M.  YERKES,  Harvard  University. 

By  means  of  a  T-shaped  glass  labyrinth,  in  one  arm  of  which 
were  placed  a  strip  of  sandpaper  and  a  strip  of  blotting  paper  mois- 
tened with  NaCl(8N)  earthworms  have  been  tested  for  modifications 
of  behavior. 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS 


55 


The  following  results  are  presented,  subject  to  revision  in  the 
light  of  further  observations: 

1.  The   worms   have  not  acquired   a  definite  habit  of  turning 
directly  to  the  open  arm  of  the  T  and  thus  escaping  to  a  moist  dark 
tube. 

2.  Certain  modifications   have   appeared   during  daily   series   of 
trials. 

3.  There  are  indications  of  tracking. 

4.  The    animals    rapidly    fatigue.     Five    trials    per    day    prove 
more  satisfactory  than  ten,  fifteen,  or  twenty. 

5.  In  so  far  as  the  worms  learn  to  follow  a  direct  path   through 
the  T,  they  do  so  apparently  by  the  use  of  certain  cutaneous  sense 
data  rather  than  by  inner  kinesthetic  data. 

6.  The  first  trial  each  day  almost  invariably  presents  numerous 
mistakes. 

7.  There   are   some   indications   that   the   sandpaper  becomes  a 
"warning"  against  the  salt  which  lies  beyond  it  in  the  arm  of  the  T. 

The    Nervous    and    Non- Nervous    Reactions   of  Actinians.     G.   H. 

PARKER,  Harvard  University. 

When  the  column  of  a  sea-anemone  (Metridium  marginatum)  is 
touched  gently  or  otherwise  stimulated,  the  animal  responds  in  a  few 
seconds  by  contracting  the  longitudinal  muscles  of  its  mesenteries 
whereby  the  oral  disk  is  withdrawn.  This  reaction  is  better  elicited 
from  the  oral  or  aboral  edge  of  the  column  than  from  the  middle  of 
the  column.  If  a  crystal  of  magnesium  sulphate  is  allowed  to  dissolve 
on  a  spot  on  the  aboral  margin  of  the  column,  that  spot  in  a  few 
minutes  becomes  insensitive  to  stimulation  though  the  adjacent 
margin  may  retain  to  the  full  its  sensitiveness.  Since  the  mesenteric 
muscles  are  situated  far  from  the  point  of  stimulation,'  the  reaction 
in  question  is  undoubtedly  nervous  in  character. 

When  the  equatorial  region  of  the  column  of  the  sea-anemone  is 
stimulated  mechanically,  there  follows  in  the  course  of  half  a  minute 
or  so  a  circular  constriction  of  the  column  due  to  the  contraction  of 
the  circular  muscles.  This  constriction  occurs  with  regularity  even 
after  this  region  has  been  anesthetized  with  magnesium  sulphate. 
It  is  therefore  probably  non-nervous  in  character  and  dependent 
upon  the  direct  stimulation  of  the  circular  muscles. 

Thus  *ea-anemones  possess  not  only  muscles  controlled  by  nerves 
such  as  are  seen  in  the  higher  animals,  but  probably  also  muscles 
that  are  directly  stimulated,  such  as  have  been  observed  in  the  more 
primitive  metazoans,  the  sponges. 


56  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

Seventeen  Different  Definitions  of  the  Term  "  Tropism"  as  Applied  to 

Reactions  in  Organisms.     S.  O.  MAST,  Johns  Hopkins  University. 

The  term  "tropism"  was  first  used  by  Decandolle  (1832)  in  the 
study  of  reactions  of  plants  to  light.  He  prefixed  "helio,"  thus 
making  "heliotropism"  and  used  this  term  in  a  very  definite  sense, 
indicating  merely  the  fact  that  plants  bend  toward  the  light.  But 
the  term  "tropism"  soon  came  to  signify  not  only  bending  toward 
but  also  the  processes  involved  in  bending,  both  real  and  imaginary, 
and  since  then  it  has  been  applied  to  almost  every  conceivable  sort 
of  reaction.  I  have  collected  seventeen  different  definitions  of  this 
term,  varying  in  meaning  from  the  practically  all-inclusive  one  of 
Willey  (1910) — "The  word  tropism  means  the  tendency  to  react  in  a 
definite  manner  towards  external  stimuli" — to  the  all-exclusive  one 
of  Torrey  (1907), — "In  heliotropism  as  well  as  in  galvanotropism, 
the  oriented  organism  is  in  a  condition  of  physiological  stimulation, 
and  .  .  .  the  response  to  stimulation  is  local." 

In  nearly  all  of  the  definitions  orientation  is  implied  as  one  of  the 
distinguishing  characteristics  of  "tropisms,"  and  some  use  the 
term  merely  to  indicate  orientation,  but  if  nothing  more  than  this 
is  implied  it  would  certainly  be  much  less  confusing  to  use  "orienta- 
tion," which  has  a  definite  meaning. 

About  one  half  of  the  definitions,  including  three  different  ones 
by  Loeb,  contain  the  idea  that  "tropisms"  are  orienting  reactions 
caused  by  the  continuous  action  of  the  stimulating  agent,  i.  e.,  that 
the  stimuli  resulting  in  orientation  are  not  due  to  change  of  intensity 
but  to  "constant  intensity."  As  Loeb  puts  it,  "they  are  a  function 
of  the  constant  intensity"  (ital.  mine).  The  only  trouble  with  defini- 
tions implying  this  is  that  there  is  no  conclusive  evidence  indicating 
that  orientation  in  any  organism  is  ever  due  to  continuous  action  of 
the  external  agent,  while  it  has  been  demonstrated  to  be  due  to  change 
of  intensity  in  a  number  of  cases.  There  is  not  the  slightest  evidence 
that  "tropisms"  as  defined  by  Loeb  form  a  class  of  specific  reactions 
essentially  different  from  other  reactions  as  he,  Bonn  and  others 
maintain. 

As  matters  now  stand  it  is  utterly  impossible  to  know  what  is 
meant  by  "tropisms"  unless  it  is  first  definitely  stated  according  to 
which  of  the  17  or  more  definitions  the  term  is  used. 

Behavior  of  Fire-flies  (Photinus  ardens  ?)  with  Special  Reference  to 
the   Problem  of  Orientation.     S.  O.  MAST,  Johns  Hopkins  Uni- 
versity. 
The  fire-flies  studied  are  found  in  dark  crevices  or  under  ground 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  57 

during  the  day.  In  the  evening  when  it  is  still  light  enough  to  read 
they  come  out;  the  females  crawl  to  the  tips  of  grass  or  other  objects 
and  remain  quiet;  the  males  fly  about  and  glow  fairly  regularly  at 
intervals  of  about  five  seconds.  The  females  do  not  glow  unless 
light  from  the  males  or  from  some  other  source  is  flashed  on  them. 

When  a  female  glows  in  response  to  the  glow  of  a  male,  the  male 
ordinarily  turns  directly  toward  her.  This  is  repeated  until  the  two 
come  together,  after  which  copulation  takes  place.  If  a  female  is 
held  near  a  male  he  pays  no  attention  to  her  unless  there  is  actual 
contact,  showing  that  neither  objective  vision  nor  smell  is  functional 
in  mating. 

The  males  do  not  orient  when  exposed  to  continuous  illumination. 
They  respond  only  to  flashes  of  light  and  do  not  react  until  after 
the  light  has  disappeared.  Thus  orientation  may  take  place  in  total 
darkness,  and  it  is  surprising  how  accurately  these  animals  turn 
through  the  proper  angle  in  the  total  absence  of  the  stimulating  agent 
that  caused  the  response.  Here  we  have  a  case  in  which  it  is  clearly 
demonstrated  that  light  does  not  act  continuously  in  the  process 
of  orientation  as  demanded  by  Loeb's  theories,  a  case  in  which  it  is 
also  clearly  demonstrated  that  continuous  stimulation  is  not  necessary 
to  keep  the  organism  oriented. 

No  difference  could  be  detected  between  the  glow  of  females  and 
that  of  males  either  in  quality  or  quantity  of  light  emitted  and  yet 
males  rarely  if  ever  respond  to  the  glow  of  other  males,  shbwing  that 
in  some  way  they  distinguish  between  the  flashes  of  light  produced 
by  opposite  sexes.  It  was  demonstrated  that  this  is  not  due  to  pos- 
sible minute  differences  in  color,  form  or  intensity  of  the  glow.  The 
glow  of  a  female  in  response  to  a  male,  occurs  shortly  after  that  of 
the  male,  while  among  the  flashes  of  different  males  there  is  no  such 
time  relation.  The  sequence  in  the  time  of  glowing  is  undoubtedly 
an  important  factor  in  the  process  in  question,  but  many  observations 
indicate  that  it  is  not  the  only  factor,  although  no  others  were  dis- 
covered. 

A  Critique  of  the  Discrimination  Test:  a  Study  in  Animal  Behavior. 

JEAN  WEIDENSALL,  State  Reformatory,  Bedford  Hills,  N.  Y. 

Taking  the  black-white  discrimination  test  as  typical  of  the  dis- 
crimination method,  we  proposed  to  investigate  the  relative  efficiency 
of  the  black  and  the  white  after  and  during  learning  in  such  a  test. 
We  suspected  that  of  the  two  or  more  stimuli  presumably  involved 
in  learning  the  ordinary  test  of  this  kind  only  one,  as  a  matter  of 


58  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

fact,  might  be  used.  This  suspicion  was  based  upon  the  fact  that 
previous  experiments  have  proceeded  as  though  but  one  discrimi- 
nation were  necessary — that  of  the  two  stimuli  from  each  other — 
whereas  three  discriminations  are  essential.  Until  each  quality  is 
first  discriminable  from  its  background,  the  two  cannot  be  discrimi- 
nated from  each  other.  Any  conclusions,  therefore,  stated  in  terms 
of  the  discriminability  of  the  two  qualities  are  unfounded  so  long  as 
we  continue  to  display  the  stimuli  against  the  unknown  background 
of  our  various  problem  boxes  over  against  which  one  or  both  of  the 
stimuli  may  be  inefficient  'throughout  the  entire  test,  or  unequally 
efficient  at  different  stages  of  the  learning  process. 

Our  conclusions  based  upon  a  series  of  five  carefully  controlled 
experiments  with  36  rats  were: 

1.  Black  and  white  are  both  visible  against  the  background  of  our 
box;  but  they  are  not  equally   so.     Their  effectiveness   varies   as 
1:2::  white  :  black.    That  is,  it  takes  twice  as  long  to  learn  the  problem 
of  following  black  alone  as  it  does  to  follow  white  alone.     Wherefore, 

2.  When  the  two  stimuli  are  supposedly  involved  only  the  white 
is  used  because  the  black  is  so  much  more  difficult  to  perceive.     And 
after   learning   the   typical   discrimination   test,   only   the   white   is 
efficient.     Thus  the  standard   discrimination  method  in   a   typical 
instance  has  reduced  itself  to  one  of  simple  recognition. 

Since  the  standard  discrimination  test  is  one  whereby  the  existence 
of  differing  sensory  qualities  are  determined  in  terms  of  their  efficiency 
in  conduct,  since,  that  is,  we  say  that  two  qualities  are  discriminated 
because  they  call  out  different  reactions,  it  is  a  serious  criticism  if 
the  conditions  of  our  experiments  have  not  been  such  that  both  the 
stimuli  are  inevitably  involved  and  that  the  chances  for  their  effi- 
ciency are  equal. 

The  second  half  of  the  paper  concerned  itself  with  an  investigation 
of  the  relative  efficiency  of  quality  and  position.  Previous  tests  have 
isolated  each  in  turn,  series,  form,  intensity,  and  extensity,  but  so 
far  as  we  know  quality  and  position  have  not  been  isolated.  Yet  in 
all  these  tests  the  quality  of  the  stimulus  and  its  "thereness"  are 
independent  variables;  for  the  position  of  the  quality  and  the  position 
of  the  food  bear  a  fixed  relationship  or  set  of  relationships.  There 
is  nothing,  accordingly,  to  prevent  the  animal  from  learning  in  terms 
of  the  "thereness"  of  the  stimulus  rather  than  in  terms  of  its  specific 
quality.  Had  the  two  been  varied  independently  either  one  or  the 
other  might  have  proved  to  be  of  relative  or  absolute  efficiency. 
The  results  on  this  point  will  be  published  later  in  detail.  We  found 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  59 

that  the  variation  of  position  was  a  confusing  factor  and  that  though 
the  complete  abstraction  of  quality  from  position  is  entirely  possible 
for  us  it  is  extremely  difficult,  if  at  all  possible,  for  the  rat. 

Some  Experiments  on  Pitch-discrimination  in  Dogs.     H.  M.  JOHNSON, 

Johns  Hopkins  University. 

A  preliminary  report  was  presented  of  work  begun  in  April,  1910, 
on  two  blind  dogs,  in  an  attempt  to  test  by  a  better  method  the  work 
of  Kalischer,  Rothmann  and  others  on  pitch-discrimination  in  the 
dog,  and  localization  of  the  center  for  pitch. 

The  dogs  were  taught  to  react  in  one  way  to  middle  C  and  in 
another  to  the  G  above  sounded  on  tuning  forks,  and  learned  the 
problem  in  285  and  405  trials  (19  and  27  days)  respectively.  When 
Stern  variators  were  substituted  for  the  forks,  the  number  of  trials 
necessary  to  complete  recovery  from  disturbance  was  respectively 
120  and  90.  When  forks  and  variators  were  used  indifferently  in  a 
given  series  the  number  of  trials  required  was  respectively  150  and 
600.  (An  accident  producing  considerable  emotional  disturbance 
accounts  for  the  longer  learning  time  of  the  second  animal.)  When 
the  problem  of  discriminating  between  chords  containing  one  or  the 
other  stimulus  tones  was  set,  the  learning  time  was  respectively  615 
and  660  trials,  but  the  daily  percentage  of  error  seldom  exceeded  20. 

When  last  summer  the  same  dogs  were  given  the  problem  of  dis- 
criminating between  middle  C  and  the  E  above  and  made  to  work 
at  the  problem  with  the  operator  removed  from  the  room,  the  problem 
was  yet  unlearned  after  505  trials  each.  On  suspicion  that  the 
mode  of  reaction  chosen  was  not  sufficiently  definite,  and  that  enough 
attention  had  not  been  given  to  the  factor  of  "delayed  reaction," 
a  special  stimulus  box  was  constructed,  forcing  the  animal  to  turn 
at  right  angles  right  or  left  toward  the  food  box  chosen,  and  per- 
mitting punishment  to  be  given  in  case  of  incorrect  choice.  The 
stimulus  was  given  by  the  Helmholtz  method  of  "tandem-driven" 
forks  equipped  with  Konig  resonators,  giving  practically  pure  tones 
with  widely  variable  intensity.  Two  normal  dogs  were  introduced 
as  a  control.  After  300  trials  punishment  was  introduced  for  in- 
correct choice.  The  problem  is  yet  unlearned  after  about  1,000 
trials  each. 

These  results  indicate  that  neither  in  Kalischer  and  Rothmann's 
work  nor  in  the  former  part  of  this  experiment,  were  the  animals 
certainly  reacting  to  tone  at  all;  and  that  our  anatomical  conclusions 
to  be  reliable  must  be  supported  by  better  behavior  results  than 
have  yet  been  obtained. 


60  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

The  Use  of  the  Maze  in  Comparative  Psychology.     EDWIN  G.  BORING 

and  LUCY  M.  DAY,  Cornell  University. 

In  the  study  of  the  animal  mind  comparative  psychology  must 
always  make  reference,  either  implicitly  or  explicitly,  to  human 
consciousness  under  similar  conditions.  It  is  this  reference  that 
distinguishes  comparative  psychology  from  the  study  of  animal  be- 
havior. In  such  a  complex  experience  as  the  learning  of  the  maze 
the  reference  must  be  fully  explicit.  Hence,  as  a  preliminary  to  the 
use  of  the  maze  with  animals,  there  should  be  made  a  thorough 
analysis  of  human  consciousness  under  as  similar  conditions  as 
possible. 

Such  an  analysis  has  been  undertaken  by  Miss  Lucy  M.  Day  and 
the  writer  at  Cornell  University.  We  present  herewith  a  preliminary 
report  on  the  work. 

The  Watson  circular  maze  was  duplicated  on  a  large  scale. 
Sixteen  observers,  most  of  them  trained  in  introspection,  learned  the 
maze,  giving  full  introspective  reports.  The  reports  were  independ- 
ently analyzed  by  the  two  experimenters  to  obtain  a  numerical  esti- 
mate of  the  processes  involved  in  making  the  turns.  The  two 
estimates  showed  an  agreement  of  85  per  cent. 

The  analysis  shows  that  the  maze-learning  consciousness  con- 
sists of  three  phases:  (i)  Determination  of  direction  after  making 
the  turns,  (2)  guidance  within  the  passages,  and  (3)  location  of  the 
turns. 

The  determination  of  direction  after  the  turns  involves  five 
factors — attitudinal,  verbal,  visual,  kinesthetic,  and  automatic. 
Each  of  these  follows  a  definite  course  throughout  the  learning 
process,  although  the  course  varies  somewhat  with  the  ideational 
type  of  the  observer.  The  attitudinal  factor  is  of  importance  in 
only  the  first  two  or  three  trials.  The  verbal  factor  reaches  its 
maximum  very  early,  the  visual  slightly  later.  They  both  give  place 
to  kinesthesis,  which  in  turn  is  resolved  into  a  somatic  automatism. 

Moreover,  the  course  of  learning,  with  regard  to  the  first  phase, 
naturally  falls  into  three  periods.  In  the  first  period,  attitudes  and 
verbal  and  visual  imagery  are  advantageous  to  learning,  while  the 
introduction  of  motor  imagery  is  disadvantageous.  In  the  second 
period,  kinesthesis  becomes  favorable,  while  attitudes  and  verbal 
and  visual  imagery  become  unfavorable.  In  the  third  period,  autom- 
atism predominates,  and  learning  is  retarded  by  the  introduction  of 
any  form  of  imagery. 

With  respect  to  the  other  two  phases  of  the  learning  process,  our 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  61 

analysis  is  not  yet  complete.  So  far  as  our  results  go,  however,  they 
indicate  that  vision  is  most  important  for  guidance  within  the 
passages,  and  that  both  motor  and  visual  factors  are  involved  in  the 
location  of  turns. 

An  Experimental  and  Introspective  Study  of  the  Human  Learning 
Process  in  the  Maze.  F.  A.  C.  PERRIN,  University  of  Chicago. 
Two  types  of  maze  were  employed  in  this  experiment  —  the  pencil 
maze,  and  a  maze  through  which  the  subject  walked.  In  either  case 
the  subject  was  blind-folded,  and  learned  the  route  by  trials.  The 
time  and  error  curves  obtained  were  quite  comparable  with  the  curves 
based  upon  the  records  of  the  white  rat  in  the  maze,  (i)  The  intro- 
spections, however,  brought  out  the  fact  that  it  was  essentially  a 
human,  and  not  an  animal,  learning  process,  inasmuch  as  it  was 
conscious  learning  and,  as  such,  had  involved  in  it  the  rudiments  of 
the  higher  cognitive  activities.  The  various  subjects  built  up  and 
employed  ideational  controls  for  the  maze.  In  doing  so,  they  em- 
ployed in  a  rudimentary  way  at  least  the  processes  of  attending,  dis- 
criminating, judging,  inferring,  reasoning.  It  was  the  human  mind 
at  work,  not  the  animal  mind.  (2)  While  the  rational  element  was 
necessarily  present,  the  actual  method  was  distinctly  that  of  trial  and 
error.  Some  special  mazes,  designed  to  give  the  maximum  oppor- 
tunity for  reasoning,  failed  to  call  forth  any  other  method. 

The  rational  element  was  necessarily  present.  It  was  not  only 
present  but  it  was  effective,  and  not  merely  accessory.  This  fact 
suggests  the  question  of  its  relative  efficacy.  The  adult  human,  in 
learning  a  maze,  does  not  improve  upon  the  time  and  error  records 
of  the  white  rat  in  any  pronounced  way,  but  he  is  decidedly  at  an 
advantage  in  tests  that  call  for  an  application  of  the  learning  expe- 
rience to  modified  conditions,  such  as  is  represented  when  the  maze 
is  altered  in  size,  or  rotated. 

Memory  versus  Imagination — an  Experimental  Critique.     LILLIEN  J. 

MARTIN,  Stanford  University. 

The  paper  gives  an  account  of  an  experimental  examination  which 
the  writer  had  made  at  Bonn  and  Stanford  Universities  of  the  results 
of  Mrs.  Perky 's  experiments  ("An  Experimental  Study  of  Imagina- 
tion," Amer.  J.  of  Psychol.  21,  422)  on  the  differences  between  visual 
memory  and  imagination  images. 

As  the  differences  between  the  two  kinds  of  images  which  Mrs. 
Perky  had  found  were  not  present  in  the  writer's  results,  she  looks 


62  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

upon  Mrs.  Perky's  results  as  having  only  an  individual  character, 
and  considers  it  therefore  a  mistake  to  assign  to  them  that  general 
character  which  has  been  done  in  a  recent  textbook. 

Literary  Self -projection.     JUNE  E.  DOWNEY,  University  of  Wyoming. 

In  connection  with  an  extensive  study  of  the  imagery  aroused  by 
reading  poetic  fragments,  observations  were  made  as  to  the  frequency 
and  kinds  of  self-projection — self-projection  being  defined  as  any 
form  of  explicit  self-reference — in  order  to  determine  the  significance 
for  the  psychology  of  self-consciousness  of  the  various  forms  of  self- 
projection  and  their  function  in  esthetic  appreciation. 

The  discussion  concerned  itself  chiefly  with  the  forms  assumed  by 
the  visual  and  kinesthetic  self-projection  and  with  the  relations 
subsisting  between  them. 

It  was  shown  that  the  different  reagents  saw  themselves  with 
varying  frequency  as  actors  in  or  spectators  of  a  visualized  scene. 
The  visual  self  might  appear  as  a  vague  figure  or  in  considerable 
detail.  Again,  the  orientation  of  the  visual  self  might  be  vague  or 
exceedingly  precise.  A  double  visual  self-projection  was  not  unusual. 

Kinesthetic  or  organic  self-reference  was  found  to  occur  frequently 
and  to  assume  the  following  forms:  (i)  Objectified  and  fused  with 
the  visual  self;  (2)  oscillating  with  the  visualized  self  and  localized 
in  the  body  of  the  subject;  (3)  objectified  and  fused  with  a  visualized 
object  or  a  visualized  person  other  than  the  self;  (4)  abstracted  from 
all  visual  content  and  objectified  or  not. 

Relative  to  the  esthetic  value  of  self-projection,  a  distinction  was 
made  between  an  emphatic  and  non-emphatic  self-projection  and  the 
question  raised  as  to  the  significance  of  the  latter  mode  of  self- 
projection,  particularly  in  the  form  of  the  visualized  self.  The  possi- 
bility, however,  of  an  Einfuhlung  mediated  by  a  purely  visual 
objectification,  without  organic  resonance,  was  recognized. 

The    Nature   and    Limits   of  Introspection.     R.    DODGE,    Wesleyan 

University. 

Introspection  is  not  only  an  instrument  of  psychological  investiga- 
tion, it  is  also  itself  a  psychological  process  or  group  of  processes,  and 
as  such  must  be  capable  of  psychological  analysis.  Such  an  analysis 
should  furnish  data  for  the  evaluation  of  the  products  of  introspection, 
for  an  estimate  of  its  reliability  as  an  instrument,  and  for  an  estimate 
of  the  factors  of  mental  life  that  it  is  best  calculated  to  disclose. 

Lacking  a  sense  organ,  introspection  is  analogous  to  sense  per- 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  63 

ception  only  in  the  processes  of  apperceptive  integration.  While 
sense^objects^are  integrated  as  a  world  of  things,  the  objects  of  intro- 
spection are  integrated  as  a  unitary  experience. 

Dependence  on  apperceptive  systems  and  actual  noetic  patterns 
gives  rise  to  gross  sources  of  error,  limits  its  application,  and  prevents 
the  disclosure  either  of  mental  elements  or  the  fundamental  processes 
of  mental  life.  The  phenomena  of  introspection  are  not  final  facts 
of  mental  life,  but  like  the  phenomena  of  sound  are  indicators  for 
scientific  construction. 

Emotivity  and  Emotion  in  their  Relations  with  Adaptation.     E.  B. 

HUEY,  Johns  Hopkins  University. 

Emotivity  is  a  psycho-organic  disposition  to  interrupt  adapta- 
tions felt  to  be  called  for,  and  for  which  the  organism  has  at  least 
partial  resources,  displacing  these  with  derivative  phenomena  char- 
acterized by  disorder  and  misfit.  The  ensemble  of  phenomena  char- 
acterizing such  interruption  of  adaptation  is  properly  termed  emotion. 

Clinical  observation  reminds  us  that  psychology  tends  to  fixate 
on  a  few  "classical"  emotional  expressions,  the  vasomotor  and  vis- 
ceral (Lange-James  Theory),  the  sentimental  (heart,  tears,  etc.). 
Clinical  observation  shows  almost  equal  involvement  of  all  organs 
and  functions,  and  shows  opposite  disturbances  for  emotions  of  the 
same  name  and  almost  identical  disturbances  for  emotions  of  opposite 
names,  the  only  common  and  essential  feature  being  the  break  in 
adaptation,  with  disorder  and  misfit  derivative  functionings. 

Emotional  expression  depends  on  (i)  what  functionings  are  called 
for  by  the  situation;  (2)  what  functionings  happen  to  be  in  use  at 
the  time;  (3)  early  acquired  habits  of  reacting  in  a  given  manner  to 
a  given  emotional  situation;  (4)  what  organs  or  functions  are  most 
enfeebled,  these  being  affected  preferably;  (5)  occurrence  of  misfit 
instinctive  functionings  of  possible  utility  in  race  experience;  (6) 
functionings  suggested  to  the  individual  in  the  fatigue  of  emotion, 
by  social  custom  or  contagion  or  by  auto-suggestion. 

Intellectual  and  linguistic  disturbances  in  emotion  have  been 
especially  neglected,  and  are  prominent  and  representative  of  the 
emotions  of  many  persons.  The  brain  itself  may  be  as  basal  an 
organ  of  emotion  as  the  heart  (Janet),  and  for  many  persons  dis- 
turbances of  the  pharynx,  bladder,  genitals,  or  skin  "mirror  the 
soul"  more  closely  than  do  the  heart  or  blood  vessels. 

The  real  cause  of  emotion  is  a  failure  in  the  mechanics  of  brain 
tegration,  immediately  occasioned  by  the  occurrence  of  factors, 


64  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

inner  and  outer,  that  are  too  difficult  of  synthesis  under  the  given 
conditions  and  to  whose  action  the  organism  may  be  abnormally 
sensitive.  An  instinct  only  becomes  an  emotion  when  it  is  mal- 
apropos or  when  it  occasions  complexity  and  strain  too  great  for 
synthesis  and  for  satisfaction  of  its  intent. 

Of  theories  of  emotion,  the  present  presentation  owes  almost 
everything  to  the  clinics  and  lectures  of  Professor  Pierre  Janet. 

Organic  Sensation  and  the  Symbolic  Imagery  of  Thought.     (By  title.) 

ELSIE  MURRAY,  Wilson  College. 

The  term  organic  is  here  limited  to  the  awareness  of  general 
organic  reaction,  internal  or  external,  as  distinguished  from  the 
awareness  of  specific  bodily  movements. 

The  object  of  this  paper  is  to  emphasize  the  role  of  this  organic 
factor  in  the  consciousness  of  meaning,  and  to  urge  an  adoption  of 
terms,  and  an  introspective  training  which  will  enable  the  average 
observer  to  detect  and  name  this  component  when  present. 

The  attention  of  the  writer  was  first  attracted  to  this  phase  of  the 
problem  through  certain  introspections  on  the  words  beauty  and 
beautiful,  in  which  the  meaning  of  these  words  appeared  in  conscious- 
ness not  in  illustrative  but  in  reactive  terms,  in  the  guise,  that  is,  of 
the  actual  or  imaged  recall  of  the  total  organic  set  characteristic  of 
the  esthetic  mood.  Systematic  investigation  of  this  linguistic 
peculiarity,  its  relative  frequency  and  importance,  seemed  at  first 
impracticable,  owing  to  the  difficulties  inherent  in  the  technique  of 
organic  introspection.  Recent  observations  have,  however,  thrown 
a  new  light  on  the  problem.  The  use  of  an  extended  imagery  ques- 
tionnaire in  an  introductory  class  of  forty-five  has  brought  emphat- 
ically to  notice  the  fact  that  organic  attitudes  as  wholes  are  accessible 
to  the  introspection  of  the  relatively  untrained  observer.  Through 
the  use  of  stimulus  words  such  as  expectancy,  impatience,  fright, 
surprise,  relief,  etc.,  the  possession  of  a  fairly  wide  range  of  definite 
organic  imagery1  was  roughly  demonstrated.  The  spontaneous  func- 
tioning of  this  imagery  was  then  tested  as  follows.  A  list  of  abstract 
and  general  terms,  such  as  mental,  delicate,  difficult,  mistake,  pos- 
sible, etc.,  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  student,  with  instructions 
to  state  in  what  terms  the  meaning  of  each  word  seemed  to  present 
itself.  In  the  results  organic  and  motor  imagery  claim  at  least  an 
equal  prominence  with  visual  and  auditory,  though  the  preceding 

1  The  question  as  to  the  central  or  peripheral  nature  of  the  recall  is  here  irrelevant, 
since  the  accessibility  of  organic  reactions  to  introspection,  and  the  richness  of  sub- 
jective revival,  is  alone  at  issue. 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  65 

tests  and  questions  had  indicated  the  special  vividness  of  visual 
imagery. 

The  results  of  later  and  more  accurate  tests  are  not  yet  available. 
The  writer  feels,  however,  sufficient  assurance  to  prophesy  that  a 
similar  preliminary  training,  and  the  adoption  and  rough  definition 
of  a  uniform  set  of  terms  for  felt  organic  attitudes,  such  as  excitement, 
stimulation,  depression,  irritation,  etc.,  would  enable  many  now 
reporting  their  ideation  as  purely  verbal  to  detect  a  concrete  conscious 
content.  The  value  of  a  certain  measure  of  such  organic  ideation 
hardly  requires  emphasis.  The  relative  simplicity  of  the  organic 
attitude,  its  vital  relevancy  to  the  total  meaning,  its  status  as  the 
natural  center  of  a  system  of  irradiating  associations,  give  it  an 
intrinsic  representative  value  far  above  that  of  the  arbitrary  verbal 
symbol,  or  the  "pure  thought"  element  of  the  imageless  thinkers. 

A  Study  of 'Meaning  as  Inferred  from  the  Methods  of  Attacking  Mathe- 
matical Problems.  (By  title.)  JOSEPH  PETERSON,  University  of 
Utah. 

This  study  was  made  on  sixteen  high  school  students  throughout 
the  second  half  of  their  first  year's  work  in  algebra.  The  investigation 
was  carried  on  by  the  writer,  who  used  every  means  possible,  without 
interfering  with  the  students'  whole-souled  attack  on  the  problems, 
of  obtaining  the  mental  content  involved  in  the  operations.  A  special 
method  was  that  of  comparing  the  work  of  the  best  with  the  poorest 
students  and  of  ascertaining  as  far  as  possible  in  what  specific  ways 
this  difference  in  mathematical  ability  manifests  itself. 

As  a  rule  the  poor  students  fumbled  on  their  problems,  treating 
the  algebraic  expressions  not  as  symbols  representing  experiences  or 
relations  beyond  themselves  but  rather  as  things-in-themselves. 
They  worked  too  much  in  terms  of  percepts  rather  than  concepts. 
Frequently,  in  operations  for  which  the  general  formula  to  be  fol- 
lowed was  well  known,  they  failed  because  of  not  seeing  in  the 
problem  the  general  principles  represented  by  the  formula;  that  is, 
they  failed  to  isolate  the  essentials  of  the  solution  and  were  conse- 
quently bound  to  treat  each  case  as  a  "law  unto  itself,"  as  one  would 
treat  a  puzzle.  This  was  especially  noticeable  in  cases  where  certain 
"ear  marks"  would  be  altered,  as  the  interchange  of  terms  in  an 
equation;  or  where  an  equation  to  be  solved  lacked  a  term,  i.  e.,  had 
a  zero  coefficient.  In  general  the  weakness  displayed  by  some  of  the 
students  was  one  of  failure  to  isolate  essentials  and  to  hold  them  in 
mind  when  once  recognized.  The  stronger  students  were  keener  in 


66  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

the  perception  of  the  general  direction  that  a  solution  must  take  and 
in  recognizing  the  larger  aspects  of  problems,  the  principles  involved 
in  them.  These  students  profited  more  by  experience  because  they 
attended  particularly  to  the  aspects  common  to  many  problems. 

The  difference  is  one  of  the  degree  of  meaning  perceived  in  the 
problematic  situations  presented.  Meaning  is  a  sort  of  disposition 
toward  activity  in  which  certain  fundamental  qualities  of  experience 
are  singled  out,  or  abstracted,  and  thrown  into  the  foreground  to 
guide  action.  The  meaning  of  anything  is  determined  not  only  by 
past  experience  with  that  thing  but  also  by  its  particular  relation  to 
its  present  purpose.  Is  meaning  merely  a  composite  of  sensory 
images?  If  so,  what  holds  these  images  together  and  gives  them 
relation  in  any  situation? — more  images?  If  images  only  constitute 
meaning,  and  if  two  images  may  suffice  to  make  meaning,  one  symbol- 
izing or  "meaning"  the  other,  how  can  one  tell  which  is  which,  without 
some  larger  emotive  background  or  motor  attitude  giving  trend  to 
experience? 

The   Role  of  Attention  in   Advertising.     EDWARD   K.  STRONG,  JR., 

Columbia  University. 

The  first  function  of  an  advertisement  is  to  force  itself  upon  our 
attention.  Why  certain  advertisements  fail  in  this  respect  and  why 
certain  others  arouse  our  interest  so  that  we  read  them  clear  through 
is  the  problem  of  my  research. 

In  taking  up  this  work  three  problems  of  method  have  been  first 
attacked.  The  results  of  the  first,  which  is  now  practically  com- 
pleted, indicate  that  the  method  of  simultaneous  presentation  of 
many  advertisements  gives  no  valid  results,  while  the  successive 
presentation  of  this  same  material  gives  surprisingly  constant  results 
from  different  subjects.  The  second  problem  as  to  whether  a  constant 
rate  of  presentation  or  a  rate  varied  by  the  subject  at  his  pleasure 
gives  results  more  comparable  with  the  actual  conditions  of  the 
casual  reader  is  still  to  be  determined.  And  the  third,  as  to  whether 
experimental  results,  when  the  subject  knows  he  is  being  tested, 
check  up  with  the  actual  impressions  received  by  the  casual  reader, 
is  still  not  settled,  although  enough  data  have  been  obtained  to 
indicate  pretty  strongly  that  relatively  the  results  are  the  same. 

But  we  are  interested  not  only  in  learning  why  certain  advertise- 
ments are  noticed  but  also  in  studying  the  differences  between 
advertisements  which  are  remembered  for  themselves  and  those  which 
make  memorable  instead  the  commodity.  There  is  a  great  difference 
here,  but  the  factors  comprising  it  have  not  yet  been  made  clear. 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  67 

There  have  been  so  far  several  by-products  of  this  investigation 
of  considerable  interest  to  psychology.  Two  might  be  mentioned. 
The  first  is  that  there  is  no  indication  of  the  potency  of  either  primacy 
or  recency  when  more  than  ten  advertisements  are  shown  successively 
and  then  tested  for  attention-value  and  memorability  by  the  recogni- 
tion method.  And  secondly,  it  seems  conclusive  that  advertisements 
are  as  "simple"  psychically  as  nonsense  syllables,  at  least  as  far  as 
attention  and  recognition  enter.  This  points  to  an  important  im- 
plication psychologically.  Is  it  not  true  that  because  of  the  insistence 
on  the  use  of  so-called  simple  physical  objects,  psychological  investiga- 
tions, such  as  in  the  field  of  esthetics,  have  been  falling  off  since  the 
.physically  simple  material  has  been  studied  ?  Now  the  use  of  adver- 
tisements has  shown  that  those  that  obey  the  canons  of  art  are  the 
best  attended  to  and  remembered.  Why  can  they  not  be  used  then 
in  more  wide-reaching  esthetic  studies?  Is  it  not  time,  indeed,  for 
an  advance  from  the  "simple"  experimental  material  to  that  more 
related  to  experience? 

A  New  Method  of  Studying  Mediate  Associations.     M.  F.  WASHBURN, 

Vassar  College. 

The  term  mediate  association  is  taken  in  the  following  sense:  A 
process  A  is  followed  in  consciousness  by  an  apparently  unassociated 
process  C;  later  it  appears  that  the  connection  was  made  by  means 
of  the  process  B  formerly  associated  with  both  A  and  C  but  not  in 
the  present  instance  appearing  in  consciousness.  The  method  used 
to  study  mediate  associations  thus  defined  was  as  follows:  the  observer 
was  given  a  stimulus  word  and  instructed  to  react  with  another  word 
which  should  be  wholly  unassociated  with  the  stimulus  word.  The 
method  offered  a  good  opportunity  to  study  the  effect  of  a  definite 
task  or  Aufgabe  set  the  observer.  A  number  of  typical  mediate 
associations  resulted  in  the  course  of  the  662  experiments  performed. 
The  instructions,  which  inhibited  ordinary  associative  processes, 
allowed  the  following  processes  to  occur: 

Sound  associations:  the  instructions  diminished  attention  to  the 
meaning  of  the  stimulus  word  and  thus  strengthened  sound  associa- 
tions. 

Perseverations  from  recent  experiences  of  the  observer. 

Perseverating  reaction  and  stimulus  words,  but  not  those  used  in 
the  experiment  immediately  preceding. 

Words  associated  with  perseverating  reaction  or  stimulus  words. 

Words  of  meaning  directly  associated  with  the  stimulus  word,  the 


68  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

fact  of  the  association  being  overlooked  through  the  tendency  of  the 
instructions  to  direct  attention  away  from  the  meaning  of  the  stimulus 
word. 

Mediate  associations. 

The  actual  experiments  were  carried  on  under  the  author's  di- 
rection by  her  pupil,  Miss  V.  Atherton.  The  paper  appears  in  full  in 
the  January  number  of  The  American  Journal  of  Psychology. 

The  Effect  of  Adaptation  on  Temperature  Discrimination.     E.  ABBOTT, 

Vassar  College. 

After  simultaneously  adapting  the  right  and  left  hands  to  tem- 
peratures with  a  difference  of  five  degrees,  discrimination  for  tem- 
peratures slightly  warmer  was  tested.  Adaptation  to  moderate 
temperatures  had  more  effect  than  to  extreme  temperatures. 

The  Relation  of  Reaction  Time  to  the  Duration  of  Auditory  Stimulus. 

GEORGE  R.  WELLS,  Johns  Hopkins  University. 

Five  lengths  of  stimulus  were  used,  viz.,  7<r,  300-,  510-,  760-,  and 
1060-.  No  characteristic  difference  was  found  in  the  reactions  to 
these  different  stimuli.  When  a  subject  was  given  a  long  pre- 
liminary training  in  reacting  to  a  stimulus  of  one  of  the  above  lengths 
and  was  later  presented  with  series  of  stimuli  of  varying  durations, 
he  reacted  to  them  all  in  the  same  way,  including  the  one  to  which 
he  had  been  "trained."  And  when  a  subject  was  "trained"  to  one 
duration  of  stimulus  and  then  reacted  to  another  stimulus  of  very 
different  length,  no  difference  was  found  in  the  reaction  times  of 
the  two  series. 

A  Pigment  Color  System.     ALBERT  H.  MUNSELL,  Boston. 

This  system  aims  to  classify  and  visualize  color  relations  in 
pigment  form.  It  is  built  up  experimentally,  with  the  help  of  a 
photometer,  Maxwell  discs  and  the  trained  capacity  of  the  painter, 
using  the  consensus  of  many  individuals.  Charts  and  models  present 
the  measured  image,  while  decimal  notation  and  a  score  provide  for 
graphic  records. 

This  classification  depends  on  the  recognition  of  three  color 
dimensions — value,  hue  and  chroma — arranged  spatially  as  follows. 
A  central  vertical  axis  represents  changes  in  value  (painter  term  for 
luminosity)  from  black  at  the  bottom  to  white  at  the  top,  the  pro- 
gression being  logarithmic  to  follow  the  Weber-Fechner  law.  The 
value  of  every  point  on  this  axis  determines  the  level  of  every  possible 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  69 

color  of  equal  value.  Vertical  planes  intersecting  in  this  axis  repre- 
sent particular  hues,  the  opposed  portions  being  complementary  in 
hue.  Any  three  planes  separated  by  120°  form  a  complementary 
trio,  etc.  Thus  the  angular  position  of  any  hue  is  determined. 
Chroma  (intensity  of  hue  or  "saturation")  is  measured  by  the  per- 
pendicular distance  from  any  point  to  the  vertical  axis,  its  progression 
being  arithmetic.1 

Thus  is  constructed  a  solid  in  which  every  horizontal  plane  corre- 
sponds to  one  and  only  one  value;  every  radial  plane  contains  colors 
of  but  one  hue;  and  the  surface  of  each  cylinder  concentric  with  the 
axis  contains  colors  of  equal  chroma.  Each  point  in  this  solid  stands 
for  one  and  only  one  color,  and  when  these  three  dimensions  of  a 
color  have  been  measured,  its  position  in  the  solid  is  obvious. 

The  system  begins  with  central  gray — the  balancing  point  for 
pigment  mixture  as  white  light  is  for  spectral  hues.  No  regular  solid 
portrays  the  unequal  degrees  of  pigment  value  and  chroma  disclosed 
by  measurement,  but  the  sphere  suggested  by  Riinge  (1810)  is 
a  convenient  model  for  establishing  balanced  relations.  The  spherical 
equator  comprises  ten  equal  hue  steps  arranged  as  five  complementary 
pairs,  all  of  equal  chroma  to  accord  with  equal  departure  from  the 
neutral  center,  and  of  middle  value  to  accord  with  their  level.  Rota- 
tion causes  retinal  fusion  of  this  hue-circuit  in  neutral  gray.  Zones 
lighter  to  white  and  darker  to  black  are  similarly  established.  At 
high  speed  the  sphere  reproduces  the  white-black  axis.  A  certain  low 
speed  presents  these  balanced  color  zones  to  the  eye  at  such  rate  that 
their  vividness  is  almost  prismatic. 

Stronger  chroma  in  various  pigments  projects  beyond  the  sphere 
describing  an  irregular  solid  or  color  tree,  whose  trunk  is  the 
white-black  axis,  with  branches  extending  to  the  maxima  of  red, 
yellow,  green,  blue  and  purple.  The  tree  is  a  quantitative  and  quali- 
tative statement  of  all  pigment  mixtures.  These  are  displayed  in  a 
color  atlas2  whose  charts — horizontal,  vertical  and  oblique — are 
worked  out  in  matt  color  to  satisfy  the  three  scales  of  measure. 

The   Retina  and  Righthandedness.     H.   C.   STEVENS,  University  of 

Washington. 

Measurements  of  the  space  sense  of  the  retina  for  symmetrical 
extents  upon  the  same  retinal  meridian  were  made  by  that  form^of  the 
method  of  average  error  which  Miiller  calls  the  determination  of 

1  Color  Notation,  Munsell,  Boston,  1905.     PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN,  1909,  6,  238 

2  Atlas  of  the  Munsell  Color  System,  Wadsworth  Rowland  &  Co.,  Inc.,  Boston. 


70  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

equivalent  stimuli  by  means  of  the  method  of  limits.  The  standard 
extents  were  40,  80  and  200  mm.  There  were  four  observers  each  of 
whom  made  1,920  observations.  The  constant  error  for  each 
standard  was  determined  in  4  meridians  of  the  field  of  vision,  viz., 
the  vertical,  horizontal  and  right  and  left  oblique  meridians.  The 
apparatus  consisted  of  a  black  velvet  disc  61  cm.  in  diameter.  The 
center  fixation  point  served  as  the  middle  point  between  two  adjacent 
extents.  The  outer  limits  of  the  extents  were  marked  by  white 
spots.  One  of  these  spots  was  carried  upon  a  movable  radius  which 
permitted  the  variable  extent  to  be  made  larger,  smaller  or  equal  to 
the  standard  extent.  Observations  were  made  with  the  right  and 
left  eyes  separately.  The  results  may  be  stated  as  follows:  (i)  In 
the  horizontal  meridian,  the  right  half  of  an  extent  in  the  field  of 
vision  is  overestimated.  (2)  This  overestimation  holds  true  for  both 
right  and  left  eyes.  (3)  The  extent  which  is  overestimated  forms  its 
retinal  image  upon  the  left  corresponding  halves  of  the  two  retinas. 
(4)  The  left  corresponding  halves  of  the  retinas  are  connected  exclu- 
sively with  the  left  hemisphere  of  the  cerebrum.  (5)  By  reason  of 
the  fact  of  a  marked  difference  in  the  space  sense  of  the  two  halves  of 
the  retina,  those  objects  in  the  right  half  of  the  field  of  vision,  by 
appearing  larger,  attract  the  visual  attention  which  in  turn  leads  to 
grasping  movements  of  the  right  hand.  The  hand  thus  favored  by 
earliest  experience  acquires  a  special  skill  which  causes  it  to  be  used 
in  all  manual  acts  requiring  the  greatest  precision. 

The  Determination  of  the  Sensitivity  of  the  Retina  to  Colored  Light  in 

Terms  of  Radiometric   Units.     (By  title.)     C.  E.  FERREE,  Bryn 

Mawr  College. 

About  a  year  ago  the  writer  undertook  to  determine  the  relative 
and  the  absolute  sensitivity  of  the  retina  to  colored  light  in  terms 
of  units  that  can  be  compared.  Since  several  years  will  be  required 
to  complete  this  work,  he  has  thought  it  best  to  publish  a  preliminary 
note  showing  briefly  the  purpose  and  scope  of  the  investigation. 
The  following  points  will  serve  to  indicate  what  is  being  attempted 
in  this  study. 

I.  All  measurements  of  sensitivity  will  be  made  in  terms  of  the 
number  of  radiometric  units  required  to  arouse  color  sensation.  This 
will  give  an  expression  of  the  sensitivity  of  the  retina  in  units  that 
can  be  compared.  At  present  we  have  no  estimate  of  the  comparative 
sensitivity  of  the  retina  to  the  different  colors  further  than  is  expressed 
by  the  relative  width  of  the  collimator-slit  that  has  to  be  used  to 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  71 

arouse  color  sensation  when  a  light-source  of  a  given  candle-power  is 
used.  This  kind  of  comparison  is  obviously  unfair,  because  such  dif- 
ferent amounts  of  energy  are  represented  from  point  to  point  in  the 
spectrum  that  a  given  width  of  slit  would  admit  many  times  the 
amount  of  energy  to  one  part  of  the  spectrum  that  it  would  to  another. 
In  short,  no  proper  estimation  of  the  sensitivity  of  the  retina  to  color, 
relative  or  absolute,  can  be  made  with  the  methods  now  in  use. 

2.  The  limits  of  the  color  zones  will  be  determined  with  colored 
lights  representing  an  equal  number  of  units  of  energy.  In  color 
theory  a  great  deal  has  been  made  of  the  relative  limits  of  color  sen- 
sitivity. Hering's  theory,  for  example,  demands  that  the  boundary 
of  the  zone  for  red  must  coincide  with  the  boundary  for  green,  and 
the  boundary  for  blue  with  the  boundary  for  yellow.  The  final 
answer  to  this  question  cannot  be  given  until  an  investigation  is  made 
with  colors  equalized  in  energy. 

We  began  a  quantitative  study  of  the  factors  that  influence  the 
sensitivity  of  the  retina  to  color  three  years  ago.  With  the  control 
of  factors  we  had  at  that  time,  we  could  not,  for  example,  duplicate 
by  several  degrees  at  any  two  consecutive  determinations  the  limits 
of  the  zone  of  sensitivity  to  any  color.  The  result  of  our  study  has 
been  that  we  are  now  able  with  a  given  light-source  to  duplicate  within 
a  degree  the  results  obtained  at  a  previous  sitting.  We  can  also 
duplicate  almost  as  closely  the  threshold  values  or  the  amounts  of 
light  required  to  arouse  color  sensation  in  the  more  sensitive  parts 
of  the  retina.  Details  of  this  work  are  given  in  a  series  of  papers 
to  be  published  in  the  course  of  the  present  year,  beginning  with  the 
April  issue  of  the  American  Journal  of  Psychology. 

Visual  Sensations  Caused  by  Changes  in  the  Strength  of  a  Magnetic 
Field.  C.  E.  MAGNUSSON,  University  of  Washington. 
The  paper  gives  experimental  data  on  the  following  points:  (a) 
Verifying  the  observations  made  by  S.  P.  Thompson  and  Knight 
Dunlap.  (b)  Ascertaining  that  the  magnetic  field  induced  while 
making  and  breaking  a  direct  current  gives  a  visual  sensation,  (c) 
Determining  the  threshold  of  the  sensation  in  terms  of  ampere  turns. 
(d)  Determining  the  dependence  of  the  sensation  upon  the  frequency 
of  the  current,  (e)  No  sensation  other  than  the  visual  was  noticed 
by  any  of  the  observers.  No  after  effects  appeared.  For  stronger 
fields,  care  should  be  exercised,  as  the  sensations  are  of  considerable 
intensity. 


72  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

Local  Signature  and  the  Extensity  of  Sensation.     WILLIAM  C.  RUE- 

DIGER,  The  George  Washington  University. 

The  different  theories  that  are  advanced  to  account  for  the 
ability  to  localize  points  on  the  skin  or  in  the  visual  field  may  ap- 
parently all  be  classified  under  three  heads.  These  are  (i)  the 
kinesthetic  theory,  (2)  the  sensational-element  theory,  and  (3)  the 
sensational-complex  theory. 

According  to  the  kinesthetic  theory,  localizations  are  made  reflexly 
by  the  child,  and  the  accompanying  kinesthetic  sensations  give  the 
needed  data  to  consciousness  for  making  localizations  later.  Ac- 
cording to  the  sensational-element  theory,  every  elemental  visual 
and  skin  sensation  has  an  inherent  characteristic  that  varies  with 
the  particular  end  organ  that  is  stimulated.  According  to  the 
sensational-complex  theory  the  sensations  received  from  the  elemental 
sense  organs  in  the  skin  or  retinas  would  be  alike  and  the  differences 
in  local  signs  that  we  feel  or  see  would  be  due  to  different  combinations 
or  complexes  of  these  homogeneous  elemental  sensations. 

The  kinesthetic  theory  alone  appears  clearly  inadequate  (see 
Myers,  Experimental  Psychology,  p.  239),  and  this  leaves  the  choice 
to  lie  between  the  other  two.  The  experiments  that  I  have  per- 
formed appear  to  point  to  the  truth  of  the  sensational-element  theory. 
I  have  performed  experiments  with  the  Bloch  instrument  on  the 
forearms  of  four  subjects,  using  I  gram  of  pressure  in  one  series  and 
10  grams  in  another,  and  applying  the  pressures  respectively  to  a 
vein  and  to  the  skin  where  no  vein  was  in  evidence. 

Localization  was  just  as  accurate  with  one  gram  of  pressure  as 
with  ten,  and  it  was  even  more  accurate  on  a  vein  than  on  the  skin 
where  no  vein  was  evident.  This  is  contrary  to  what  one  would 
reasonably  expect  according  to  the  sensational-complex  theory. 

If  it  is  true  that  there  are  innate  differences  in  sensations  corre- 
sponding to  the  points  of  the  skin  or  retinas  stimulated,  the  develop- 
ment of  space  perception  may  be  readily  accounted  for.  The  assump- 
tion of  sensational  extensity  seems  entirely  unnecessary.  Further- 
more, this  assumption,  while  insistently  made  by  many  psychologists, 
is  not  used  by  these  psychologists  in  explaining  or  developing  space 
perception. 

Two   New  Sphygmo  graphic  Instruments.     R.  DODGE,  Wesleyan  Uni- 
versity. 
The  first  is  a  pneumatic  photographic  recorder  of  extremely  low 

latency  and  high  sensitivity.     Used  in  connection  with  any  good 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  73 

microscope,  it  records  vibrations  of  over  1,000  per  second,  shows 
overtones  of  vowels  and  heart  tones,  and  gives  pulse  waves'  of  any 
desired  amplitude  without  changing  its  latency  or  other  constants. 
Suitable  for  class  lantern-demonstrations  of  pulse  and  plethysmcH 
graphic  changes,  it  is  durable  and  practically  fool-proof,  at  least  for 
anyone  who  can  use  a  microscope. 

The  second  instrument  cannot  be  shown  in  action.  Used  with  a 
string  galvanometer,  it  registers  the  pulse  of  a  distant  subject  who  is 
not  hampered  in  his  activities,  provided  he  remains  connected  with 
the  binding  posts. 

Some  Recently  Discovered  Physiological  Changes  Attending  Fear  and 

Rage.     W.  B.  CANNON,  Harvard  Medical  School. 

A  close  relation  exists  between  adrenalin  and  the  sympathetic 
system.  The  adrenal  glands  are  caused  to  secrete  when  the  sym- 
pathetic is  stimulated,  and  adrenalin  affects  all  structures  innervated 
by  the  sympathetic  as  if  they  were  receiving  sympathetic  impulses. 

Major  emotional  disturbances  (fear,  rage)  indicate  the  dominance 
of  sympathetic  impulses.  In  the  cat,  for  example,  fear  or  rage  pro- 
duces dilatation  of  the  pupils,  inhibition  of  the  stomach  and  intestines, 
rapid  heart,  and  erection  of  the  hairs  of  the  back  and  tail.  Tests 
with  excised  intestinal  strips  (sensitive  to  adrenalin  I  to  20,000,000) 
prove  that  fear  or  rage  causes  also  the  adrenal  glands  to  pour  an 
increased  secretion  into  the  blood. 

The  persistence  of  the  excited  state  of  the  body  may  therefore 
be  due  to  chemical  stimulation  which  continues  the  changes  started 
by  nervous  impulses. 

Injected  adrenalin  mobilizes  sugar  in  the  blood  and  results  in 
glycosuria.  Fear  or  rage  has  the  same  effect,  if  the  adrenal  glands 
are  present.  Emotional  glycosuria  can  be  evoked  in  a  cat  by  per- 
mitting a  dog  to  bark  at  it  at  close  range. 

Fear  is  related  to  the  instinct  to  flee,  rage  with  the  instinct  to 
fight  (MacDougall).  Possibly  in  the  wild  state  emotions  are  useful 
in  providing  sugar  as  a  source  of  energy,  and  adrenalin  as  a  means  of 
offsetting  fatigue,  in  excessive  muscular  exertion. 

Electrical  stimulation  of  nerves  innervating  the  adrenal  glands, 
while  a  muscular  fatigue  curve  is  being  written,  increases  (in  some 
cases  more  than  one  hundred  per  cent.)  the  height  of  the  curve. 

A  Contribution  to  the  Physiology  of  Kinesthesia.     (By  title.)     GEO. 
V.  N.  DEARBORN,  Tufts  College. 
From  an  experimental  study  (begun  in  1909)  of  the  voluntary 


74  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

(new  and  unrhythmic)  movements  of  more  than  forty  intelligent 
subjects  (varying  in  age  from  fourteen  to  sixty- two,  of  both  sexes, 
some  blind  and  some  with  normal  vision)  the  following  conclusions 
issue,  and  they  are  supported  by  sundry  outside  evidence  set  forth 
in  the  paper  itself: 

1.  Aside  from   the  more  or  less  passive  indication  of  posture, 
resistance,  equilibrium,  vibrations,  etc.,  the  function  of  the  conscious 
movement  sensations  is  inhibition,  the  deliberate  active  restraint  of 
tendencies  to  inaccuracy  in  voluntary  action  otherwise  actuated. 

2.  Save  in  some  "motiles,"  a  series  of  voluntary  movements  per- 
ceived only  kinesthetically  is  promptly  visualized  and  then  forms  the 
conscious  phase  of  the  motor  idea  for  the  series'  repetition.     The 
motor  idea  of  a  truly  deliberate  movement  is  given,  then,  in  visualizers 
as  a  partly  conscious  visual  (aut  al.)  image  in  inseparable  association 
with  actuating  kinesthetic  coordinations  wholly  unconscious,  which, 
lacking  a  better  name,  may  be  termed  spinal  kinesthesia.     This  motor 
idea  is  in  practical  opposition,  in  a  sense,  with  the  conscious  kines- 
thesia, but  the  two  may  be  fused  by  habitual  effort. 

3.  The  voluntary  action  of  blindfolded  "motiles"  is  like  that  of 
blind  people,  both  having  comprehensive  conscious  kinesthesia  but 
usually  at  the  expense  of  the  accuracy  of  the  general  motor  idea  in 
visual  and  spinal  kinesthetic  terms. 

4.  The  direction  of  a  voluntary  movement  has  no  advance  repre- 
sentation in  the  conscious  kinesthesia  and  must  therefore  be  deter- 
mined in  the  combined  visual  and  spinal-kinesthetic  motor  idea. 

5.  The  extent  of  a  movement,  likewise,  probably  determined  by 
the  muscles  and  felt  there,  is  presumably  a  function  of  the  unconscious 
spinal    kinesthesia.     Hence    Hollingworth's  scepticism  as  to  judg- 
ments of  extent,  and  one  or  two  of  Woodworth's  conclusions. 

6.  Motor  skill,  neurally  speaking,  consists  especially  in  the  power 
and  habit  of  fusing  in  running  control  these  two  phases  of  kinesthesia 
— the  actuating  (unconscious)  and  the  conscious  inhibitory  impres- 
sions on  the  voluntary  cerebral  resultant. 

7.  Voluntary  movement  as  such,  new  and  personal  and  difficult, 
is  inherently  an  inhibitory  process. 

The  products  of  this  experimental  study  appear  to  make  easier 
of  understanding  the  duality  of  the  pathway  between  the  posterior 
lateral  gray  cord  and  the  great  cortex,  one  "kind"  of  kinesthesia 
(the  inhibitory)  going  apparently  with  relative  directness  via  the 
lemniscus,  the  other  (the  hereditary,  spatial,  impersonal,  actuating 
influences)  through  the  cerebellum,  etc.  These  results  seem  also  to 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  75 

reconcile  and  help  explain^certain  illusions  and  seeming  inconsistencies 
in  the  relations  of  consciousness  to  various  aspects  of  a  voluntary 
movement. 

The    Value  of  Sublimating  Processes  for  Education  and  Reeducation. 

ERNEST  JONES,  University  of  Toronto. 

The  process  denoted  by  the  term  "sublimation"  is  defined  by 
Freud  as  "the  capacity  to  exchange  an  original  sexual  aim  for  another 
no  longer  sexual  aim,  though  a  psychically  related  one."  It  has  long 
been  empirically  recognized  that  undue  sexual  excitation  can  be 
relieved  by  diversion  of  the  person's  interests  into  other  directions, 
such  as  those  of  sport,  etc.,  and  also  that  energy  thus  derived  furnishes 
a  not  inconsiderable  contribution  to  artistic  and  other  social  impulses. 
Two  matters  not  generally  recognized  in  this  connection  are  these: 
What  happens  is  not  so  much  a  replacement  of  one  interest  by  another 
totally  different  one  so  much  as  the  displacement  of  a  given  conative 
trend  from  one  aim  to  another,  more  suitable  one;  the  original  trend 
or  desire  does  not  die,  but  undergoes  a  transformation  in  finding  a 
different  mode  of  expression.  It  is  possible  that  the  law  of  conserva- 
tion and  transformation  of  energy  holds  as  well  in  the  mental  sphere 
as  in  the  physical.  Further,  the  diversion  of  normal  sexual  desire 
constitutes  only  a  small  part  of  what  is  included  under  the  term 
"sublimation."  Sublimation  is  more  concerned  with  the  socially 
useless  and  primitive  components  of  the  sexual  instinct  from  which 
the  adult  form  of  sexuality  is  only  a  residuum  left  after  an  extensive 
process  of  repression  of  the  rest.  Accompanying  this  repression  is 
the  process  of  sublimation,  which  therefore  is  mainly  a  question  of 
early  childhood  life.  These  discarded  desires  form  the  basis  of  many 
of  our  later  acquired  interests  and  activities,  and  it  is  maintained  that 
a  fuller  knowledge  of  them  would  be  of  the  greatest  value  to  education 
by  indicating  the  most  fruitful  paths  along  which  sublimation  could 
take  place.  It  is  at  present  to  a  great  extent  left  to  chance  for  a 
given  educational  topic  to  find  some  already  existing  potential  interest 
in  the  child  to  which  it  can  make  an  appeal,  whereas  if  these  potential 
interests  were  investigated  and  the  nature  realized  of  the  energy 
which  is  at  our  disposal  for  educative  purposes,  then  we  should  be 
in  a  position  to  apply  them  in  the  most  profitable  directions  and  thus 
make  the  best  use  of  them  for  social  purposes. 

Several  matters  in  connection  with  the  reeducation  of  criminals, 
perverts,  neurotic  and  insane  patients  are  dealt  with,  and  stress  is  laid 
on  the  application  of  the  foregoing  principles  to  the  treatment  of 


76  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

advanced  cases  of  dementia.  Psychologically  such  patients  are  in  a 
state  of  early  childhood,  and  their  activities  are  often  confined  to 
seeking  long  past  sources  of  bodily  pleasure.  These  activities  should 
be  correlated  with  the  corresponding  ones  of  infantile  life,  and  the 
attempt  to  divert  them  into  more  suitable  directions  should  be 
guided  by  a  knowledge  of  the  evolution  they  undergo  in  the  normal 
child. 

Apropos   of  the   Doctrine   of  Reserve    Energy.     TOM   A.   WILLIAMS, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

Using  the  conception  of  the  subconscious  as  applying  to  a  special 
series  of  nerve  processes,  energizing  independently  of  those  which  are 
the  bases  of  the  thoughts  of  everyday  life,  a  psychological  theory 
has  arisen  that  these  subconscious  processes  constitute  energies  which 
may  be  regarded  as  a  reserve  susceptible  of  being  utilized  by  means  of 
special  associationizing  processes.  On  this  basis  a  therapeutic 
method  is  employed. 

This  theory  depends  upon  the  postulate  that  the  threshold  of 
excitation  is  somewhat  inversely  proportionate  to  the  richness  in 
associations  of  the  constellation  to  be  excited.  This  postulate  regards 
the  inhibition  of  energy  as  synonymous  with  its  storage,  forgetting 
that  inhibition  itself  is  a  greedy  consumer  of  energy.  So  that  the 
absence  of  manifestation  of  energy  to  a  superficial  examination  at 
least,  does  not  connote  its  storage  on  reserve  on  these  grounds  at  least. 

Nor  is  the  fact  that  useful  work  is  not  done  by  any  means  an 
index  that  energy  is  not  expended;  for  a  very  little  observation  shows 
that  it  is  extended  in  fatuities  and  sterile  activities. 

So  that  for  the  principle  of  reserve  energy  would  be  more  correctly 
substituted  the  principle  of  channeling  energy  in  fruitful  directions. 
The  results  of  what  is  called  training,  that  is,  technical  methods, 
clearly  show  this  difference.  The  trained  man  may  spend  less  energy 
than  the  untrained  man,  but  his  work  is  more  effective  in  result 
because  more  wisely  expended. 

The    Psychological   Analysis   of  So-called    Neurasthenic   and   Allied 
States.     TRIGANT  BURROW,  Johns  Hopkins  University. 
Etymologically,   of   course,   neurasthenia   means   an   exhaustion 
of  the  nerve  structure.     It  is  a  fatigue-state  constituted  of  chemical 
or  molecular  alterations  of  the  substance  of  the  neurones.     Neuras- 
thenia is  then  essentially  an  anatomical  process.     But  is  this  definition 
of  neurasthenia  appropriate  to  the  various  aberrant  states  which  are 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  77 

at  present  universally  subsumed  under  this  generic  head?  Ought 
we  longer  to^be  satisfied  with  the  prevailing  static,  neurological  con- 
ception of  this  widely  variable  disease-complex,  or  ought  we  rather  to 
press  for  a  more  restricted,  individual,  dynamic  interpretation  such  as 
may  be  yielded  through  a  psychological  analysis  of  the  particular 
case  ? 

Cases  of  neurasthenia  present  symptoms  which  are  noteworthy 
in  respect  to  two  important  features:  First,  because  of  the  lack  of 
coherence  and  systematization,  such  as  we  are  wont  to  demand  in 
the  recognized  clinical  disease-entities;  and  second,  because  of  the 
'absence  of  the  objective  morphological  findings,  such  as  might  bear 
out  the  patient's  subjective  complaints. 

In  such  a  pass,  we  are  clearly  confronted  with  an  apparent  dis- 
crepancy, and  in  strict  observance  of  established  medical  precepts, 
the  neurasthenic  ought  accordingly  to  be  excluded  from  the  interest 
of  the  average  physician. 

To  escape  this  alternative,  neurology  has  invoked  the  conception 
of  functional  changes  having  their  basis  in  disintegrations  occurring 
within  the  elements  of  the  nervous  system,  presumably  so  minute 
as  to  be  impalpable  to  ordinary  objective  tests.  The  conception 
affords  us  a  comforting  subterfuge,  but  this  is  an  insincere  lodging  of 
issues,  unworthy  of  the  scientific  ideal. 

Experience  afforded  by  the  use  of  the  psychoanalytic  method 
compels  the  recognition  of  important  affective  trends,  such  as  seem 
ever  insatiably  pressing  for  satisfaction,  and  it  would  appear  that  in 
the  event  of  obstruction  to  the  natural  course  of  such  instinctive 
tendencies,  there  occur  vicarious  gratifications  in  unconsciously 
motivated  reactions,  such  as  are  allied  with  the  former  through  what 
may  be  called  somatic  associative  connections.  It  is  precisely  such 
somatic  associations  that  constitute  in  this  view  the  so-called  symp- 
toms of  the  patient. 

The  phenomenon  furnishing  strongest  support  for  this  interpreta- 
tion of  many  so-called  neurasthenic  states  is  the  persistent  reiteration 
of  one  and  the  same  unconscious  trend  throughout  a  patient's  dreams, 
as  revealed  upon  analysis,  and  the  very  striking  analogy  between 
the  psychological  imagery  of  the  patient  as  presented  in  his  dreams 
and  the  organic  imagery,  as  presented  in  his  symptoms. 

Considering  the  trend  of  these  observations,  are  we  not  justified 
in  bringing  into  question  the  prevailing  neurological  conception  of 
so-called  neurasthenic  and  allied  states,  and  in  view  of  the  parallelism 
here  indicated  between  the  content  of  the  patient's  dreams  and  the 


78  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

content  of  his  objective  symptoms,  may  we  not  regard  the  latter  as 
also  answering  the  purpose,  as  it  were,  of  a  physiological  charade  and 
as  constituting  like  the  dreams  an  associative  or  symbolic  representa- 
tion of  an  inherent  biological  trend,  to  which  external  circumstances 
have  denied,  perhaps,  a  normal  fruition  and  which,  therefore,  seek  an 
outlet  in  such  unconscious,  surrogate  issues  ? 

The  Influence  of  Caffein  on   Mental  and  Motor  Efficiency.     H.  L. 

HOLLINGWORTH,  Columbia  University. 

Report  of  an  elaborate  experiment  on  16  subjects  for  a  period 
of  40  days,  under  controlled  conditions  of  life,  administration  of 
doses,  etc.  The  effect  of  single  doses  was  traced  for  72  hours 
after  administration.  The  tests  used  were  steadiness,  rate  of  tap- 
ping, visual-motor  coordination,  typewriting  (speed  and  accuracy), 
color-naming,  naming  opposites,  calculation,  size-weight  illusions, 
cancellation,  discrimination  and  choice  reaction  time,  quality  and 
amount  of  sleep.  Motor  tests  show  quick  and  transient  stimulation. 
Association  tests  show  stimulation  which  comes  more  slowly  and 
persists  longer.  Tests  of  discrimination  and  coordination  show 
similar  stimulation,  which  may  be  preceded  by  retardation  due  to 
false  reactions  and  consequent  caution.  No  sleep  disturbance  for 
doses  smaller  than  4  or  6  gr.  of  pure  caffein  alkaloid.  The  magni- 
tude of  the  caffein  influence  varies  inversely  with  body  weight,  is 
reduced  and  delayed  when  the  dose  is  taken  along  with  food  sub- 
stance, and  is  relatively  slight  when  the  dose  is  taken  in  the  morning. 
There  is  absolutely  no  evidence  of  any  secondary  depression  or 
retardation  following  upon  the  stimulation.  Full  reports  of  the 
investigation  appear  in  the  January  numbers  of  the  American 
Journal  of  Psychology,  the  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  the  Thera- 
peutic Gazette,  and  in  the  Archives  of  Psychology,  Columbia  Con- 
tributions to  Psychology,  No.  21. 

A  Kinetic   Will   Test.1     GUY  G.   FERNALD,   Concord   Reformatory. 

In  selecting  and  devising  psychological  tests  to  be  applied  in  the 
differentiation  of  defectives,  especially  among  delinquents,  it  is 
important  to  test  the  ability  to  endure  for  the  sake  of  achievement. 
This  function  complex  may  be  measured  in  terms  of  fatigue  in  units 
of  time. 

Fatigue  is  naturally  and  rapidly  induced  in  a  subject  who  stands 
with  heels  about  I  cm.  off  the  floor.  Incentive  to  endure  is  sup- 

lfThis  test  is  to  be  known  henceforth  as  "An  Achievement  Capacity  Test." 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS 


79 


plied  in  the  stimulus  and  in  visualizing  the  degree  of  elevation  of 
the  heels  by  means  of  a  delicately  energized  indicator  on  a  dial 
before  the  subject's  eyes  which  faithfully  magnifies  the  amplitude 
of  the  fluctuations  of  the  heels. 

This  test  has  been  applied  to  116  Reformatory  prisoners  and  to 
12  Manual  Training  school  students.  The  disparity  of  lowest 
and  highest  scores  is  remarkable— i.  e.,  2%  and  52%  minutes  in  the 
former  group  and  12  minutes  and  2^  hours  in  the  latter — and  the 
difference  of  the  average  and  median  for  these  two  groups  is  35 
minutes,  about  twice  the  average  of  the  Reformatory  group. 

It  is  essential  that  the  limit  of  mental  persistence  be  reached 
before  the  limit  of  muscular  resistance  is  encountered,  and  experi- 
ence shows  that  this  form  of  the  test  realizes  that  desideratum. 
No  subject  involuntarily  rested  his  heels  while  still  striving;  but 
each  decided  to  yield.  This  was  the  universal  observation  both 
objective  and  subjective. 

The  disturbing  elements  of  varying  training  and  body  weight 
are  almost  nugatory,  as  in  male  subjects  of  nearly  uniform  age  the 
coefficient  of  correlation  of  the  development  and  strength  of  the 
musculature  involved  to  the  body  weight  would  be  direct  and  very 
high. 

The  Adaptation  Board.     HENRY  H.  GODDARD,  Vineland  Training 

School. 

The  ability  to  adapt  one's  self  to  changed  conditions  is  something 
that  comes  with  developing  intelligence  and  young  children  possess 
it  only  in  a  slight  degree  or  not  at  all.  Feeble-minded  persons  who 
are  arrested  in  their  development  so  that  they  have  the  mentality 
of  young  children  of  various  ages,  show  markedly  this  lack  of  power 
of  adaptation.  In  order  to  measure  if  possible  this  lack,  the  Adapta- 
tion Board  has  been  devised. 

It  consists  of  a  board  a  centimeter  thick,  22  X  28  cm.  with 
four  holes  placed  near  the  corners,  three  of  these  being  63  mm.  in 
diameter  while  the  fourth  is  65  mm.  A  circular  block  is  provided 
large  enough  to  just  fill  the  largest  hole,  therefore  too  large  to  be 
placed  in  either  of  the  others. 

The  Test. — It  will  be  noticed  that  the  difference  in  the  size  of 
the  holes  is  too  slight  to  be  detected  by  the  eye. 

The  board  is  placed  in  front  of  the  child  in  such  a  position  that 
the  hole  into  which  the  block  will  fit  is  in  the  upper  left  hand  corner. 
The  child  is  then  made  to  discover  which  is  the  only  hole  into  which 


8o  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

the  block  will  fit.  After  trying  this  several  times  until  he  can  show 
without  hesitation  the  correct  answer  to  the  question,  "which  is 
the  only  hole  into  which  the  block  fits,"  he  is  given  the  block  and 
told  to  watch  what  happens.  The  board  is  then  turned  over  from 
his  left  to  his  right  and  he  is  asked  then  to  put  the  block  into  the 
only  hole  into  which  it  will  fit.  The  child  of  sufficient  intelligence, 
of  course,  puts  it  in  the  upper  right  hand  hole;  if  of  lower  intelli- 
gence, he  tries  it  still  in  the  upper  left  hand  hole  because  that  was 
what  he  had  learned  and  he  has  not  been  able  to  adapt  himself  to 
the  changed  condition,  even  though  he  was  watching  the  change. 

For  the  second  part,  the  board  is  now  placed  in  its  original  posi- 
tion and  the  child  shown  again  that  now  it  is  in  the  position  where 
the  block  fits  the  upper  left  hand  hole.  He  is  then  told  to  watch. 
The  board  is  now  inverted,  the  edge  farthest  from  him  being  brought 
toward  him,  and  he  is  now  asked  to  put  the  block  into  the  only 
hole  into  which  it  will  fit. 

Here  are  shown  at  once  three  types  of  children.  The  intelli- 
gent child  places  it,  of  course,  in  the  lower  left  hand  hole;  while 
the  child  who  is  totally  unable  to  adapt  himself  or  to  learn,  tries  it 
still  in  the  upper  left  hand.  There  is,  however,  an  intermediate 
group  of  children,  who,  while  not  able  to  adapt  themselves  to  the 
exact  condition,  remember  that  on  the  former  occasion,  after  being 
told  to  watch  what  happened,  the  block  went  into  the  upper  right 
hand  hole,  and  they  therefore  now  try  to  put  it  there. 

Report  of  Experiments  at   Bedford  Reformatory,   1910.     (By  title.) 

E.  H.  ROWLAND,  Mt.  Holyoke  College. 

Nine  psychological  tests  of  reaction-time,  memory,  attention, 
and  suggestion,  were  performed  on  35  women  in  the  N.  Y.  State 
reformatory  at  Bedford.  The  object  of  these  tests  was  to  find  out 
whether  the  resulting  grades  would  be  an  index  of  the  ability  of  the 
subjects,  and  whether  those  failing  to  pass  a  certain  number  of  the 
experiments  could  be  fairly  judged  as  unable  to  earn  their  own 
living  after  their  term  was  over.  Failure  in  6  out  of  9  tests  was 
called  sub-normality.  Eleven  of  the  thirty-five  failed  to  reach  this 
standard.  These  already  comprised  the  list  of  those  graded  by 
the  superintendent  as  sub-normal  and  incapable  of  honest  freedom, 
with  the  addition  of  two  more  who  failed  only  in  5  tests. 

The  experiments  were  later  tried  upon  Mt.  Holyoke  and  Amherst 
students.  No  student  failed  in  6  tests. 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  81 

The    Present   Status   of  the    Binet-Simon    Tests.     J.    E.   WALLACE 

WALLIN. 

The  reader  discussed  four  methods  by  means  of  which  to  check 
up  the  accuracy  of  measuring  scales  of  intelligence:  (a)  Extensive 
surveys  of  normal  children  in  each  age  by  a  wide-range  system  of 
testing,  to  ascertain  whether  the  age  norms  are  correct,  as  deter- 
mined by  the  percentage  of  passing  and  the  size  of  the  MV's;  (b) 
annual  tests  of  the  same  groups  of  normal  children,  to  determine 
whether  the  amount  of  actual  growth  corresponds  to  the  growth 
norms  laid  down  in  the  scale;  (c)  the  plotting  of  curves  of  frequency 
for  homogeneous  groups  of  individuals,  to  determine  whether  the 
curves  assume  the  normal  shape  for  chance  distributions;  and  (d) 
the  plotting  of  efficiency  or  capacity  curves  for  each  age  for  the  various 
traits  tested  in  the  scale,  or  for  traits  tested  independently  of  the 
scale,  to  determine  whether  the  capacities  increase  in  strength  with 
age  and  whether  they  vary  within  the  limits  of  the  maximal  permis- 
sible norm  of  variation. 

An  analysis  by  these  methods  of  the  available  experimental  data 
of  various  workers  in  different  countries  indicated  that  there  are 
various  inequalities  and  imperfections  in  the  1908  Binet-Simon  scale, 
both  in  respect  to  the  placement  of  a  considerable  number  of  indi- 
vidual tests  and  the  correctness  of  several  collective  age  norms. 
But  it  also  appeared  that,  in  spite  of  obvious  inequalities,  the  scale 
possesses  considerable  value  as  an  instrument  for  gauging  mental 
station  and  classifying  groups  of  mental  defectives.  Several  objec- 
tions to  the  1911  scale  were  offered,  and  a  plea  was  made  for  more 
extensive  wide-range  try-outs  of  the  1908  scale  by  uniform  and 
standardized  methods  on  normal  school  children,  before  any  American 
revisions  should  be  attempted. 

The  Status  of  the  Binet  Tests  to  Date.    HENRY  H.  GODDARD,  Vineland 

Training  School. 

The  a  priori  arguments  against  the  tests  were  considered,  and  some 
cautions  noted. 

A  summary  of  the  results  of  their  use  brought  to  light  these  facts: 
The  results  of  the  tests  applied  to  400  feeble-minded  children  agree 
perfectly  with  long  experience  in  institutional  life.  A  second  testing 
on  the  same  group  shows  remarkable  agreement  with  the  first. 
2,000  normal  children  tested  by  this  method  show  the  remarkable 
curve  of  distribution;  and  the  results  agree  very  closely  with  the 
experience  of  the  teachers.  1,000  of  these,  retested  a  year  later,  again 


82  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

show  considerable  correlation  with  the  earlier  test,  but  with  marked 
and  peculiar  differences  which  must  be  explained.  A  test  of  56 
delinquent  girls  in  Boston  shows  52  of  them  mentally  defective 
according  to  the  scale.  These  are  the  girls  that  have  given  the  most 
trouble  to  the  probation  officers.  100  Juvenile  Court  children  in  the 
Detention  Home  in  Newark,  N.  J.,  show  66  per  cent,  feeble-minded 
according  to  scale,  and  only  one  of  normal  intelligence.  100  children 
admitted  to  the  Rahway  Reformatory  in  New  Jersey  show  26  per 
cent,  feeble-minded.  The  test  of  an  entire  private  school  in  Penn- 
sylvania showed  results  agreeing  strongly  with  the  experience  of  the 
teachers  with  one  or  two  striking  exceptions. 

Feeble-minded  children  tested  from  two  to  seven  times  show 
remarkable  uniformity  in  the  results,  largely  regardless  of  the  experi- 
ence and  personnel  of  the  examiner.  Some  tests  of  the  insane  have 
shown  that  the  method  is  of  remarkable  value  in  these  cases,  the 
difference  in  the  results  being  that  whereas  normal  and  feeble-minded 
children  nearly  always  answer  all  the  questions  up  to  a  certain  point 
and  then  stop,  the  insane,  on  the  contrary,  miss  the  questions  in 
earlier  years  and  do  those  that  are  for  older  people,  indicating  that 
the  disease  has  destroyed  certain  processes  without  producing  a 
leveling  down  of  the  whole  intelligence.  The  same  thing  has  been 
discovered  from  the  use  of  the  tests  on  epileptics  at  Skillman,  N.  J., 
indicating  that  epilepsy  is  a  degenerative  process. 

Conclusion. — The  tests  go  a  long  way  toward  giving  us  what  we 
want.  They  are  accurate  far  beyond  belief.  While  it  is  true  that 
they  need  supplementing  and  improving,  yet  it  is  quite  possible  that 
this  supplementing  will  have  to  be  in  the  nature  of  a  consideration  of 
individual  cases  and  special  tests  for  special  children.  It  is  a  problem 
that  may  well  occupy  the  attention  of  psychologists,  but  no  one 
should  attempt  to  criticize  the  tests  until  he  has  used  them  on  some 
hundreds  of  children. 

The  Application  of  Experimental  Psychology  to  the  Problem  of  Voca- 
tional Guidance.     HELEN  THOMPSON  WOOLEY,  Cincinnati. 
The  present  paper  reports  an  attempt  which  is  being  made  to 
test  the  usefulness  of  a  psychological  laboratory  as  a  part  of  a  voca- 
tional bureau.     The  bureau  is  established  in  connection  with  the 
office  which  issues  working  certificates  to  children  in   Cincinnati. 
The  general  plan  of  research  is  to  follow  for  five  years  the  careers  of 
a  thousand  or  more  children  who  have  left  school  at  the  age  of  fourteen 
to  go  to  work,  and  to  compare  them  with  a  corresponding  series  of 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  83 

children  who  stay  in  school.  The  records  cover  the  child's  school 
career;  his  physical  condition;  his  home  conditions;  his  industrial 
history,  including  a  study  of  the  places  of  occupation;  and  his  mental 
state  as  determined  by  the  psychological  examinations. 

The  considerations  which  guided  the  selection  of  tests  were  the 
following:  (i)  a  series  suited  to  the  capacity  of  14-year-old  children 
who  have  completed  at  least  the  fifth  grade;  (2)  a  series  which  would 
help  to  analyze  the  fundamental  aptitudes  of  the  child;  (3)  a  series 
which  could  be  administrated  in  about  an  hour's  time;  (4)  tests 
which  could  be  quickly  evaluated;  (5)  a  series  in  which  the  disturbing 
effects  of  communication  between  children  who  have  been  tested  and 
those  who  have  not,  can  be  minimized,  partly  by  selecting  tests  which 
are  very  little  modified  by  previous  knowledge  of  their  nature,  and 
partly  by  selecting  those  whose  form  can  be  changed  without  changing 
their  value;  (6)  tests  requiring  only  inexpensive  apparatus. 

The  series  now  in  use  is  the  following.  (A)  For  Sensation:  (i) 
Visual  acuity  taken  with  the  Snellen  Chart,  and  (2)  auditory  acuity 
taken  with  the  tick  of  a  stop  watch.  These  tests  reveal  nothing  more 
than  the  presence  of  abnormalities  which  might  have  a  hampering 
effect.  (B)  For  motor  ability:  (i)  The  strength  of  the  hand  taken 
with  an  adjustable  dynamometer,  (2)  the  rapidity  of  movement  in 
tapping,  (3)  the  rate  of  fatigue  in  tapping,  (4)  the  steadiness  of  the 
hand,  taken  with  the  apparatus  described  in  Whipple,  page  124,  and 
(6)  coordination  as  tested  by  card  sorting.  (C)  For  perception:  The 
quickness  and  accuracy  of  perception,  as  revealed  in  the  A  test. 
(D)  For  the  higher  mental  faculties:  (i)  Immediate  memory  for 
digits,  (2)  learning  power,  taken  with  a  special  form  of  substitution 
tests,  (3)  the  use  of  language,  and  range  of  ideas,  tested  by  association 
of  opposites,  and  by  completion  of  sentences,  (4)  ingenuity  taken  with 
a  form  board  test.  The  speaker  discussed  the  exact  method  of 
giving  each  test,  and  of  evaluating  results. 

An  Objective  Measurement  of  Handwriting,     D.  STARCH,  University 

of  Wisconsin. 

The  proposed  method  of  measuring  handwriting  consists  in 
measuring,  by  means  of  a  celluloid  graphometer,  the  mean  variation 
of  the  slant  of  letters  and  their  mean  deviation  from  the  base-line. 
These  two  measures  are  reduced  to  the  same  units  of  linear  distance 
and  averaged.  In  this  manner  all  the  samples  in  Thorndike's  scale 
were  measured  which  showed  that  the  uniformity  of  letters  regularly 
decreases  as  the  quality  of  the  writing  decreases.  Measurements 


84  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

of  other  specimens  of  writing  made  by  this  proposed  method  and 
by  the  method  of  direct  comparison  with  standard  specimens  showed 
that  the  former  method  is  considerably  more  accurate.  The  applica- 
tion of  this  graphometer  scale  to  various  problems  of  research  was 
illustrated  in  the  measurement  of  a  considerable  number  of  specimens 
of  writing  from  pupils  in  the  second  grade  to  the  last  year  in  the 
high  school.  This  yielded  a  curve  of  learning  reaching  its  maximum 
point  of  excellence  in  the  seventh  grade. 

Relative    Time  and  Accuracy   in   Adding    Upward  and  Downward. 

(By  title.)     L.  W.  COLE,  Boulder,  Colorado. 

Measured  by  averages,  twenty-nine  out  of  a  group  of  thirty 
persons,  selected  at  random,  added  the  same  problems  more  rapidly 
and  less  accurately  when  adding  upward  than  when  adding  downward. 
Counting  to  the  left  was  also  slower  and  more  accurate  than  counting 
to  the  right.  This  is  apparently  due  to  a  habit  acquired  by  reading 
from  right  to  left.  In  both  experiments  the  factor  of  habit  seemed 
to  produce  a  saving  of  time  at  the  expense  of  accuracy.  The  subjects 
of  the  experiments  were  persons  of  average  practice  in  adding. 
Probably  a  very  great  amount  of  drill  in  addition  (perhaps  more  than 
a  school  program  could  allot  to  it)  would  be  required  before  a  different 
type  of  results  would  emerge  and  the  adding  process  become  both 
mechanical  and  accurate.  This  paper  will  be  printed  in  the  Journal 
of  Educational  Psychology,  Vol.  III.,  No.  2,  February,  1912. 

Montessori's  Method  of   Teaching  Writing  and  Reading.     HOWARD 

C.  WARREN,  Princeton  University. 

The  Casa  dei  Bambini  is  an  important  modification  of  the  Kinder- 
garten originated  by  Maria  Montessori  in  1907.  The  pupils  range 
from  3  to  7  years  of  age. 

Besides  sensory  and  intellectual  training  the  program  includes 
lessons  in  deportment  and  self-help,  gymnastics,  manual  training, 
play,  and  nature  study.  The  scheme  of  studies  is  founded  on  an 
unusually  correct  appreciation  of  the  child's  mental  processes.  Motor 
habits  are  developed  from  instinctive  motor  tendencies;  habits  of 
thought  are  built  up  by  association.  The  theory  of  discipline  is 
novel:  the  children  are  subject  to  no  drill;  and  there  are  no  extrinsic 
rewards  or  punishments.  A  cardinal  principle  in  the  method  is  the 
brevity  of  the  instructions  given. 

Writing  and  reading  are  the  culmination  of  a  long  series  of  sensory 
and  muscular  training.  Touch  and  the  kinsesthetic  sense  are  em- 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  85 

phasized.  The  child  learns  to  distinguish  blind-folded  between  silk, 
velvet,  satin,  wool,  cotton,  and  linen,  and  between  different  grades 
of  texture  in  each.  The  sense  of  form  is  taught  in  the  same  way. 

The  teaching  of  writing  falls  into  three  stages:  practice  in  holding 
and  wielding  the  pen;  exercises  in  associating  the  tactual-motor  form 
of  a  letter  with  its  name  and  visual  form;  and  combining  of  letters 
into  syllables  and  words.  On  account  of  the  careful  preliminary 
training  in  the  motor  equivalents  these  children  form  letters  more 
accurately  at  5  and  6  than  the  ordinary  child  of  10  or  12  who  has 
learned  to  write  by  imitating  visual  copies. 

In  the  new  system  reading  follows  writing  instead  of  preceding  it. 
The  children  already  know  how  to  read  detached  words;  but  ac- 
cording to  Montessori  this  is  not  really  "reading."  They  are  first 
trained  to  recite  in  unison  sentences  written  on  the  blackboard. 
At  length  something  is  written  which  involves  action.  When  the 
children  understand  and  obey  the  directions,  reading  attains  its  true 
value.  It  is  no  longer  merely  mechanical  expression,  but  a  means  of 
acquiring  ideas.  The  change  comes  when  the  impulse  to  read  aloud 
is  checked. 

The  program  and  methods  of  these  schools  challenge  our  entire 
system  of  both  primary  and  secondary  education.  They,  indicate 
that  the  present  curriculum  needs  thorough  revision.  It  is  founded 
on  a  faulty  psychology;  it  does  not  consider  what  a  child  is  fitted  to 
assimilate  at  any  given  stage  of  mental  development.  Montessori's 
system  is  based  on  a  study  of  precisely  these  problems. 

(This  paper  will  appear  in  full  in  the  March  number  of  the 
Journal  of  Educational  Psychology.) 

The  Relation  between  Amount  to  be  Learned  and  Retention.     V.  A.  C. 

HENMON,  University  of  Wisconsin. 

Ebbinghaus,  in  the  widely  quoted  results  on  the  relation  of  the 
length  of  series  to  the  number  of  repetitions  required  for  learning, 
found  that  the  number  of  repetitions  increases  at  first  with  very 
'  great  rapidity  and  then  less  rapidly  and  that  the  increase  in  repetitions 
is  relatively  greater  than  the  increase  in  the  length  of  series.  A  sys- 
tematic investigation  of  the  problem  in  learning  nonsense-syllables, 
poetry  and  prose  has  failed  to  confirm  the  law.  On  the  contrary, 
there  is  a  relative  decrease  in  the  number  of  repetitions  as  the  length 
of  series  increases  and  an  increase  in  retention  after  an  interval  of 
time.  This  result  holds  not  only  for  practiced  but  also  for  un- 
practiced  subjects  and  is  most  marked  with  sense  material. 


86  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

The  Relation  of  Facility  in  Learning  to  Tenacity  of  Impression.     E.  A. 

McC.  GAMBLE,  Wellesley  College. 

Question  I. — Do  the  persons  who  learn  with  the  greater  facility 
retain  for  a  given  time  the  larger  fraction  of  the  material  severally 
mastered?  The  results  in  point  have  been  obtained  with  series  of 
words,  letters  and  figures,  by  the  method  of  retained  members,  from 
about  350  college  students.  Tenacity  was  gauged  by  the  number  of 
series  members  which  could  be  produced  without  a  fresh  presentation 
of  the  series,  with  a  single  presentation  and  after  several  presentations. 
The  results  show  no  correlation,  either  positive  or  negative,  between 
facility  and  tenacity. 

Question  2. — In  the  case  of  individual  subjects,  does  the  rate  at 
which  material  is  presented  affect  the  fraction  of  the  initial  learning 
time  which  is  saved  in  relearning? 

Question  3. — When  the  learning  time  is  lengthened  by  the  difficulty 
of  the  material  is  the  relearning  time  relatively  short  or  relatively 
long?  The  results  bearing  upon  these  two  questions  have  been  ob- 
tained from  trained  subjects,  with  normal  series  of  nonsense  syllables, 
by  the  method  of  complete  memorizing  and  with  aural  presentation. 
When  series  are  learned  and  relearned  at  the  same  rate  of  presentation, 
the  fraction  of  the  learning  time  saved  in  relearning  is  greater  if  the 
presentation  rate  is  neither  very  slow  nor  very  fast.  When  the  series 
are  learned  at  different  presentation  rates  but  relearned  at  the  same 
rate,  the  fraction  of  the  learning  time  saved  is  greater  for  the  series 
which  were  originally  learned  at  the  slow  rate  of  presentation,  unless 
the  absolute  learning  time  of  the  "slow  series"  is  very  small.  Series 
which  are  hard  to  learn  are  more  often  hard  than  easy  to  relearn. 

Question  4. — How  may  retention  best  be  gauged?  The  method 
of  reproduction  without  fresh  presentation  is  unsatisfactory  because 
it  reveals  only  the  strongest  of  the  original  impressions,  the  "supra- 
liminal  associations."  The  method  of  relearning  is  unsatisfactory 
because  in  relearning  it  is  impossible  to  distinguish  facility  in  forming 
fresh  associations  from  retention  of  subliminal  associations.  The 
method  of  reproduction  after  a  single  presentation  is  perhaps  most 
satisfactory.  The  small  amount  of  work  done  on  this  plot  in  the 
field  of  memory  investigation  may  be  due  to  its  hedge  of  experi- 
mental difficulties. 

The  Relation  of  the  Quickness  of  Learning  to  Retentiveness.     DARWIN 
OLIVER  LYON,  Columbia  University. 
Do  those  who  learn  quickly  remember  the  longest?     Those  who 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  87 

have  attempted  to  answer  this  question  experimentally  have  obtained 
results  that  do  not  agree.  Close  inspection  proves  the  problem  to 
be  a  very  elaborate  one,  for  the  results  depend  upon  nature  and 
length  of  material  used  as  well  as  on  age,  sex,  condition,  etc.,  of  the 
subject.  Most  important  of  all  is  the  method  used  in  ascertaining 
the  subject's  "  retentiveness "  after  the  lapse  of  the  time  interval 
chosen.  Roughly  speaking  we  may  say  that  those  who  learn  quickly 
remember  longest  where  the  material  used  is  "logical"  or  "meaning- 
ful" in  character,  but  forget  quickest  where  the  material  is  such  as 
involves  the  memorizing  of  motor  associations,  which  is  generally 
the  case  with  digits,  words,  and  nonsense  syllables.  We  can  state 
quite  positively  that  the  amount  of  difference  in  retentiveness  between 
the  fast  learner  and  the  slow  learner  is  much  less  than  is  generally 
believed. 

Plateaus  in  Simple   Learning.    JAMES  E.  LOUGH,  New  York  Uni- 
versity. 

The  present  study  deals  with  the  determination  of  the  habit 
curve  in  the  field  of  a  simple  visual  association.  The  material  for  the 
test  consisted  of  3  sheets:  (i)  A  test  sheet  with  10  lines  of  letters  in 
mixed  order;  (2)  a  key  sheet,  in  which  20  letters  used  in  the  test 
sheet  are  arranged  in  a  vertical  column  and  opposite  each  is  printed 
some  other  letter;  (3)  a  record  sheet.  The  method  has  been  de- 
scribed in  detail  in  my  previous  reports  and  in  Kirkpatrick's  "  Studies 
in  Learning,"  Archives  of  Psychology,  1909.  I  have  used  this  method 
since  1902  as  a  class  test  and  as  an  individual  test,  and  have  collected 
over  500  records  including  adults  and  children.  Some  of  these  tests 
were  made  as  home  tests  and  some  as  laboratory  experiments  under 
carefully  controlled  conditions.  No  difference  can  be  observed  in 
the  results  of  tests  made  under  these  two  conditions. 

These  tests  are  made  in  order  to  study  habit  formation  as  affected 
by  (i)  practice,  (2)  fatigue,  (3)  distribution  of  repetition,  (4)  diurnal 
efficiency,  (5)  changing  keys,  (6)  sex,  (7)  age,  (8)  ability,  and  (9) 
individual  variation.  I  expect  shortly  to  publish  with  Dr.  P.  R. 
Radosavljevich,  under  the  title  "Habit-Formation  in  the  Light  of 
Experimental  Investigation,"  a  detailed  report  of  this  study.  At 
this  time  I  wish  to  say  only  a  few  words  with  reference  to  the  problem 
of  plateaus  as  indicated  by  my  experiments. 

As  it  is  known  Bryan  and  Harter  were  the  first  who  found  in  their 
study  one  or  more  special  periods  of  delay  in  progress,  so-called 
"arrest  periods,"  "critical  stages,"  or  periods  of  "incubation,"  giving 


88  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

a  "plateau"  or  two  in  curve,  where  certain  elementary  habits  make 
substantial  gains,  preparatory  to  their  organization.  In  my  tests 
in  simple  associative  learning,  where  only  one  or  a  simple  group  of 
special  associations  are  formed  no  "plateaus"  occurred.  The  prac- 
tice period  in  these  tests  lasted  from  20  to  90  days. 

The  habit  curves  all  agree  in  type;  showing  (i)  a  more  or  less 
concave  form;  (2)  general  increase  of  quickness  of  response;  (3) 
certain  irregularities.  These  irregularities,  however,  are  not  plateaus 
but  are  normal  small  irregularities  due,  as  introspection  proves,  to 
regular  and  irregular  fluctuations  in  attention  and  effort,  to  fatigue, 
to  "breathing"  factors,  or  to  some  inner  or  outer  incident;  the  second- 
ary causes  of  these  irregularities  are  in  some  cases  the  time  of  day, 
weather,  temperature  changes,  etc.  The  majority  of  subjects  claim 
that  those  irregularities  are  due  to  fatigue,  because  even  in  a  single 
test  (10  trials  in  each  group)  in  the  5th  and  yth  trial  there  is  usually 
little  or  no  gain,  and  sometimes  a  loss. 

The  nature  of  learning  in  these  experiments  is  much  simpler  than 
in  the  experiments  of  Bryan  and  Harter,  Swift,  and  Book,  and  my 
failure  to  discover  plateaus  would  seem  to  indicate  that  this  feature 
of  the  learning  process  is  confined  to  the  more  complex  activities. 

Some  Experimental  Evidence  on  the  Transfer  of  Training  in  Memory. 

E.  E.  RALL,  University  of  Tennessee. 

This  is  a  report  of  experiments  with  44  students  at  the  University 
of  Texas  in  1909  and  1911.  A  memory  test  on  lines  from  "Evan- 
geline"  and  nonsense  syllables  was  given  for  three  days  before  and 
after  a  training* period  which  lasted  four  weeks  and  averaged  20 
minutes  a  day.  The  training  material  was  varied  for  different 
individuals,  and  included  poetry  and  prose  in  English  and  foreign 
languages,  irregular  verbs  and  vocabularies.  The  time  for  the  first 
three  and  the  last  three  days  of  the  training  period  was  used  to 
measure  improvement  or  loss,  the  same  amount  having  been  mem- 
orized each  day.  Parallel  control  experiments,  involving  28  ob- 
servers, were  carried  on  in  both  years,  using  only  the  tests. 

The  results  showed  wide  variations :  4  out  of  44  lost  in  the  training, 
one  lost  in  the  "Evangeline"  tests  and  6  out  of  34  in  the  nonsense 
syllable  tests.  In  the  control  series  4  out  of  28  lost  in  "Evangeline," 
3  out  of  1 6  in  nonsense  syllables.  In  the  training  22  improved  more, 
20  less  than  in  the  "Evangeline"  test;  2  improved  the  same  in  both, 
and  23  out  of  34  improved  more  (or  lost  less)  and  n  improved  less  in 
the  training  than  in  the  nonsense  syllable  tests. 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  89 

Taking  the  average  of  all  gains  and  losses,  the  25  observers  in  1909 
gained  32.5  per  cent,  in  training,  26.9  per  cent,  in  "  Evangeline," 
24.5  per  cent,  in  nonsense  syllables;  while  the  20  control  observers 
gained  17.8  per  cent,  in  "Evangeline"  and  12  per  cent,  in  nonsense 
syllables.  Deducting  the  amount  of  gain  in  the  control  observers 
from  that  shown  in  the  practiced  group  and  calculating  the  percen- 
tages on  the  basis  of  the  amount  of  material  learned  in  a  given  time 
it  appears  that  there  was,  on  an  average,  21  per  cent,  transfer  in 
"Evangeline"  and  36  per  cent,  in  the  nonsense  syllables.  A  smaller 
percentage  of  transfer  is  shown  in  the  1911  series. 

CONFERENCE  ON  THE  RELATIONS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  MEDICAL 

EDUCATION 

1.  The  Present  Status  of  Psychology  in  Medical  Education  and  Prac- 
tice.    S.  I.  FRANZ,  Government  Hospital,  Washington,  D.  C. 
Psychology  has  recently  grown  in  favor  in  connection  with  medical 

affairs.  This  has  been  due  to  the  realization  of  the  importance  of 
psychiatry,  and  of  the  success  of  non-medical  healers.  In  present- 
day  medical  education,  psychology  has  a  place  in  few  departments  of 
medicine,  but  in  most  schools  psychological  matters  are  discussed  in 
the  courses  in  physiology,  psychiatry,  neurology  and  medicine. 

All  physicians  depend  upon  the  account  of  mental  processes  for 
diagnostic  information  and  for  the  estimation  of  the  effects  of  re- 
medial agents.  In  the  consideration  of  mental  diseases  psychology  has 
its  greatest  value  to  the  physician,  both  in  diagnosis  and  treatment. 
The  general  conceptions  of  the  latter  are  inadequate,  and  usually  too 
exclusive. 

Psychology  has  value  in  research  in  psychiatry  and  neurology, 
and  its  principles  have  also  been  applied  in  pharmacological  studies. 

Technical  psychology  and  its  terms  have  been  criticized  by 
physicians,  and  it  has  sometimes  been  assumed  that  no  special  in- 
struction is  necessary,  but  if  its  general  relations  are  to  be  understood 
some  special  attention  to  it  is  needed. 

2.  The    Value  of  Psychology  in  Psychiatry.    ADOLPH  MEYER,  Johns 
Hopkins  Medical  School. 

It  is  necessary  to  consider  the  fields  of  both  psychiatry  and  of 
psychology  as  open  to  expansion.  There  is  a  psychology  which  will 
cope  not  only  with  the  problems  of  introspection,  but  also  with  the 
other  problems  dealing  with  the  biological,  physiological  and  even 
anatomical  conditions  of  mental  life.  Who  but  the  psychologist 


90  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

would  be  qualified  to  deal  with  the  broad  field  between  the  physiology 
of  special  organs  and  the  behavior  of  personalities  ?  Psychiatry  has 
at  all  times  tended  to  share  the  prevailing  psychological  attitudes. 
It  inevitably  has  common  ground  with  psychology,  and  to  agree  on 
the  common  ground  or  even  on  how  we  should  want  to  characterize 
it  is  a  vital  issue  for  a  discussion  of  the  mutual  value  of  two  fields  of 
work. 

Psychiatry  is  forced  to  deal  with  psychological  material  and  the 
more  satisfactorily  it  does  it,  the  better  for  both  psychiatry  and  psy- 
chology. It  determines  mental  facts  partly  as  symptoms  of  diseases 
back  of  the  conditions  and  partly  as  biological  reactions  of  the  type  of 
mental  integration,  which,  like  suggestion,  once  induced,  play  a  more 
or  less  well  defined  dynamic  role. 

The  first  task  is  to  describe  critically  the  plain  events  of  abnormal 
reactions  and  conduct,  as  experiments  of  nature  for  the  conditions 
under  which  they  occur,  the  subjective  and  objective  characteristics 
which  allow  us  to  differentiate  the  reactions  from  one  another,  the 
events  and  results  in  the  conduct  and  life  of  the  person,  the  dynamic 
factors  and  their  modifiability,  the  time  and  influences  needed  for  a 
readjustment  of  a  state  of  balance.  With  this  rule  of  formal  tech- 
nique and  logical  arrangement  of  the  inquiry  we  are  bound  to  get 
sound  common  ground  for  a  psychiatry  which  aims  merely  at  the 
identification  of  given  conditions  with  accepted  disease-processes 
and  also  for  a  dynamic  pathology  which  gives  psychobiological  data 
a  dynamic  position. 

With  regard  to  the  program  developed  by  Dr.  Prince,  I  feel  that 
the  college  curriculum  should  not  preempt  the  field  of  psychopathol- 
ogy  unless  it  has  clinical  material  on  which  to  work  and  on  which  to 
obtain  the  facts  under  discussion.  Common-sense  psychology  offers 
enough  problems  for  sound  psychology  at  that  stage.  In  the  medical 
curriculum  he  would  expect  the  program  of  Dr.  Watson  (including 
the  study  of  instincts,  work  and  fatigue  and  sleep)  to  be  added  to  the 
physiology  course  in  the  second  year  (or  the  first  year  if  the  physiology 
of  the  nervous  system  can  be  made  to  precede) ;  the  course  of  pathology 
would  then  have  to  give  space  to  the  elements  of  psychopathology 
(effects  of  drugs,  of  glandular  action,  hypnotism  and  the  collisions  of 
attitudes  and  emotions,  and  their  effects  on  memory).  The  third 
year  would  extend  into  the  field  of  substitutions  of  the  hysterical 
and  psychasthenic  type,  and  simpler  psychotic  reactions,  and  to  the 
aphasia-apraxia  group.  The  fourth  year  would  then  be  prepared  to 
cover  psychopathology  and  psychiatry  as  it  appears  in  the  clinical 
work  and  in  clinical  research. 


OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATIONS  91 

3.  Psychopathology  and  Neuropathology:  The  Problems  of  Teaching 
and  Research  Contrasted.  E.  E.  SOUTHARD,  Pathologist  to  the 
Massachusetts  Board  of  Insanity. 

The  ideas  that  I  wish  to  bring  to  this  symposium  are  few,  and  I 
hope  not  too^  unorthodox.  How  shall  research  psychology  and 
research  medicine  come  together,  on  what  ground,  and  to  what  ends? 
I  wish  (i)  to  insist  strongly  on  the  unique  value  of  the  pathological 
method,  not  merely  for  the  diagnostic  and  therapeutic  purposes  of 
medicine,  but  for  biology  as  a  whole  and  for  the  most  vital  of  biological 
sciences,  psychology.  I  wish  (2)  to  point  out  how  pernicious  in 
research  may  be  the  dogmatic  insistence  on  the  doctrine  of  psy- 
chophysical  parallelism  in  medical  or  premedical  courses  in  psychol- 
ogy, pernicious  because  it  inhibits  the  free  interchange  of  structural 
and  functional  concepts  and  the  passage  to  and  fro  of  workers  in 
the  several  sciences.  I  wish  (3)  to  show  that  psychology  and  phys- 
iology have  more  in  common  than  either  has  with  such  structural 
sciences  as  anatomy  and  histology,  and  that  the  main  common  ele- 
ment of  both  mental  and  cerebral  processes  is  the  time-element  as 
against  the  space-element  of  the  structural  sciences.  On  this  ground 
(4)  I  conceive  that  the  mind  twist  and  brain  spot  hypotheses  for  the 
explanation  of  certain  forms  of  mental  disease  are  entirely  consistent 
with  each  other,  since  from  a  different  angle  each  is  dealing  with  the 
same  facts.  (5)  Above  all  let  us  not  divide  up  the  tasks  of  research 
as  we  divide  up  the  tasks  of  teaching,  since  research,  looking  to  the 
future,  defies  the  compartments  of  the  past. 

4.   Content  of  a  Course  in  Psychology  for  Medical  Students.    JOHN  B. 

WATSON,  Johns  Hopkins  University. 

The  proposed  course  should  concern  itself  largely  with  the  ob- 
jective material  of  psychology.  It  should  include  a  brief  course  in 
visual  and  auditory  sensation,  thorough  tests  and  applications  of 
the  Binet-Simon  system,  and  work  in  mental  and  muscular  fatigue. 
The  greater  part  of  the  time  in  the  course  should  be  devoted  to  ex- 
perimental studies  in  the  acquisition  and  retention  of  skillful  acts, 
since  this  type  of  experimentation  will  show  the  methods  and  the 
different  stages  of  acquiring  accommodations,  the  distribution  of 
effort  in  learning,  short  cuts  in  learning,  etc.  Such  experiments  pave 
the  way  for  the  normal  understanding  of  lack  of  interest  at  certain 
stages  of  development,  as  shown  in  "resting  places"  and  "plateaus"; 
the  understanding  of  "bungling"  and  "conflicts";  the  stamping  in 
and  retention  of  wrong  methods  of  response  and  the  effect  of  emotional 
states  upon  the  acquisition  and  exercise  of  habit. 


92  PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  WASHINGTON  MEETINGS 

This  work  on  habit  formation  should  be  followed  by  a  study  of 
the  normal  process  of  association,  memory,  and  retention.  These 
studies  should  be  purely  objective.  Definite  tasks  should  be  set; 
words,  phrases  and  various  other  material  presented,  then  the  time 
of  learning  under  ordinary  conditions  and  under  conditions  of  ex- 
citement, obtained  by  rushing,  interruption,  etc.,  should  be  taken. 
The  student  will  see  that  the  rate  of  learning  and  the  errors  in  learning 
can  be  measured  as  any  other  biological  function  can  be  measured. 
Memory  in  the  narrower  sense  ("associations"  with  time,  place, 
and  emotional  setting)  can  very  easily  be  tested  by  the  picture  method 
or  by  the  method  of  presenting  concrete  situations,  now  largely  used 
in  Germany  in  the  psychological  training  of  students  of  law. 

This  work  on  memory  in  the  narrower  sense  may  be  greatly  sup- 
plemented by  the  introduction  of  Jung's  association  method. 

It  is  the  view  of  the  writer  that  the  course  should  contain  several 
lectures  and  experiments  upon  normal  reaction  time.  It  is  unsafe 
and  unwise  to  put  a  stop-watch  in  the  hands  of  the  medical  student 
without  at  the  same  time  telling  him  a  little  about  the  factors  which 
influence  reaction  times,  their  normal  variability  especially  in  un- 
trained subjects  and  the  individual  peculiarities  of  different  subjects 
in  this  and  other  respects. 

By  these  lectures  and  experiments  upon  the  above  subjects  it 
is  thought  that  the  student  will  be  prepared  to  enter  the  clinic,  where 
he  should  find  the  means  of  broadening  his  knowledge  of  hypnotism, 
multiple  personalities,  suggestion,  aphasia.  Only  in  the  clinic  can  be 
obtained  the  material  for  such  study.  Without  the  individual  study 
of  cases  all  lecture  work  is  unavailing.  It  is  the  psychopathologist's 
function,  and  not  the  psychologist's,  to  teach  such  subjects.  The 
study  of  the  "subconscious"  should  be  excluded;  nothing  is  gained 
by  this  concept.  The  visible  and  tangible  effects  of  suppressions, 
tangles,  conflicting  habits  and  the  like,  may  be  studied  without  posit- 
ing a  subconscious.  Such  a  concept  is  as  detrimental  to  the  advance- 
ment of  psychological  analysis  as  is  the  discussion  of  those  philosophical 
remnants — psychophysical  parallelism  and  interaction. 

The  course  might  be  given  as  an  elective  in  the  second  or  third 
year  of  the  medical  work.  Two  laboratory  periods  of  two  hours 
each  and  one  lecture  should  be  given.  A  thorough  course  in  ele- 
mentary psychology  is  presupposed  as  a  part  of  the  student's  pre- 
medical  training. 


BOOKS  RECEIVED 


BOOKS  RECEIVED  FROM  NOVEMBER  TO 
JANUARY 

SCOTT,  W.  D.  Increasing  Human  Efficiency  in  Business.  New 
York:  Macmillan,  1911.  Pp.  v  +  339.  $1.25  net. 

[ANON.]  Life,  Love  and  Light.  New  York:  Macmillan,  1911.  Pp. 
viii  -f-  177.  $1.10  net. 

BERGSON,  H.  Laughter.  An  Essay  on  the  Meaning  of  the  Comic. 
(Authorized  trans,  by  C.  Brereton  &  F.  Rothwell.)  New  York: 
Macmillan,  1911.  Pp.  vii  +  200.  $1.25  net. 

ROYCE,  J.  William  James  and  Other  Essays  on  the  Philosophy  of 
Life.  New  York:  Macmillan,  1911.  Pp.  ix  +  301.  $1.50. 

BARRETT,  E.  B.  Motive-force  and  Motivation-tracks.  London:  Long- 
mans, Green,  &  Co.,  1911.  Pp.  x  +  225.  7/6  net. 

McDouGALL,  W.  Body  and  Mind.  London:  Methuen  &  Co., 
1911.  Pp.  xix  +  384.  10/6  net. 

EULENBURG,  A.  Sadismus  und  Masochismus.  (2.  Aufl.)  Wiesba- 
den: Bergmann,  1911.  Pp.  106.  Mk.  2.80. 

FRIEDMANN,  M.  Ueber  die  Psychologic  der  Eifersucht.  Wiesbaden: 
Bergmann,  1911.  Pp.  vii  -f-  112.  Mk.  3. 

URTIN  H.  U  Action  Criminelle.  Etude  de  philosophie  pratique. 
Paris:  Alcan,  1911.  Pp.  268.  5  fr. 

HOLMES,  S.  J.  The  Evolution  of  Animal  Intelligence.  New  York: 
Henry  Holt  &  Co.,  1911.  Pp.  296. 

BOTTI,  M.     U Infinite.     Genova:  Formiggini,  1912.     Pp.  529. 

EUCKEN,  R.  Life's  Basis  and  Life's  Ideal.  The  Fundamentals  of  a 
New  Philosophy  of  Life.  (Widgery,  A.  G.,  trans.,  introd.) 
London:  A.  &  C.  Black,  1911.  Pp.  xix+377.  $2.50  net. 

BALDWIN,  J.  M.  Thought  and  Things.  A  Study  of  the  Development 
and  Meaning  of  Thought  or  Genetic  Logic.  Vol.  III.  New  York: 
Macmillan,  1911.  Pp.  xvi-f-284.  $2.75  net. 

ROUSTAN,  D.  Lemons  de  philosophie.  L  Psychologie.  Paris:  Dela- 
grave,  1911.  Pp.  520.  5  fr.  50  net. 


94  BOOKS  RECEIVED 

STERN,  W.  Die  differentielle  Psychologie  in  ihren  methodischen 
Grundlagen.  Leipzig:  Earth,  1911.  Pp.  xi  +  5O3.  Mk.  12 

NEIL,  T.  F.  Whence  and  Whither  or  The  Evolution  of  Life.  Altoona, 
Pa.:  Mirror  Printing  Co.,  1911.  Pp.  62. 

HENRY,  M.  C.  Sensation  et  Energie.  Paris:  Hermann,  1911.  Pp. 
iii  +  296.  8  f r. 

HENRY,  M.  C.  Memoire  et  Habitude.  Paris:  Hermann,  1911.  Pp. 
iii+  116.  3  fr. 

FICHTE,  J.  C.  Die  Amueisung  zum  seligen  Leben.  Leipzig:  F. 
Eckardt,  1910.  Pp.  xii  +  205.  2  Mk.  50. 

OEHLER,  R.  Nietzsche  als  Bildner  der  Personlichkeit.  Vortrag  gehalten 
am  1 6  Oktober  1910  im  Nietzsche-Archiv  zu  Weimar.  Leipzig: 
F.  Meiner,  1911.  Pp.  31.  60  Pf. 

BUSSE,  A.  Aristoteles  Ueber  die  Seele.  Leipzig:  F.  Meiner,  1911. 
Pp.  xx  +  120.  2  Mk.  20. 

WALLIN,  J.  E.  W.  A  Practical  Guide  for  the  Administration  of  the  Binet- 
Simon  Scale  for  Measuring  Intelligence.  (Reprint  from  The  Psy- 
chological Clinic.  Obtainable  from  the  author.)  Pp.  22.  1 5  cents. 

ANGELL,  J.  R.  Chapters  from  Modern  Psychology.  New  York,  Long- 
mans, Green,  and  Co.,  1912,  Pp.  vii  +  308.  $1.35  net. 


NOTES  AND  NEWS  95 


NOTES  AND  NEWS, 

DR.  EDMUND  B.  HUEY,  ^who  has  for  some  time  been  making 
examinations  of  defective  children  and  of  aphasic  patients  at  the 
Johns  Hopkins  Hospital,  has  been  appointed  lecturer  on  mental 
development  in  the  Johns  Hopkins  University  and  assistant  in 
psychiatry  in  the  Phipps  Clinic  of  the  Johns  Hopkins  Hospital. 
From  January  to  June,  1912,  Dr.  Huey  will  give,  at  the  university, 
a  series  of  weekly  public  lectures  and  clinics  on  the  subject  of  back- 
ward and  feeble-minded  children,  and  on  related  phases  of  clinical 
psychology. 

PROFESSOR  S.  P.  HAYES,  of  Mount  Holyoke  College,  has  been 
granted  leave  of  absence  and  will  spend  the  coming  semester  in 
England. 

PROFESSOR  R.  S.  WOODWORTH,  of  Columbia  University,  is  plan- 
ning to  spend  a  semester's  leave  of  absence  in  visiting  the  Psycho- 
logical Institutes  of  England  and  Germany. 

PROFESSOR  HUGO  MUNSTERBERG,  of  Harvard  University,  is  giving 
a  course  of  eight  lectures  at  Union  College  as  incumbent  for  1912  of 
the  Ichabod  Spencer  Lectureship  in  Psychology. 

THE  following  items  are  taken  from  the  press: 

DR.  G.  STANLEY  HALL,  president  of  Clark  University,  delivered 
the  address  at  the  inauguration  of  Dr.  George  E.  Myers,  principal  of 
the  State  Manual  Training  Normal  School  at  Pittsburg,  Kansas. 
The  subject  of  the  address  was  "  Educational  Efficiency."  During 
the  month  of  January  President  Hall  gave  a  course  of  six  lectures  on 
"  The  Founders  of  Modern  Psychology  "  at  Columbia  University. 

IT  is  stated  in  the  Journal  of  the  American  Medical  Association 
that  Professor  Theodor  Ziehen,  director  of  the  psychiatric  and  neuro- 
logic clinic  in  Berlin,  will  resign  his  position  at  the  end  of  the  winter 
semester  and  discontinue  all  medical  work,  in  order  to  devote  himself 
exclusively  to  research  in  psychology.  For  this  purpose,  he  will  re- 
move to  Wiesbaden,  where  he  will  erect  for  himself  a  private  psy- 
chological laboratory. 

DR.  ALEXANDER  F.  CHAMBERLAIN,  hitherto  assistant  professor, 
has  been  promoted  to  a  full  professorship  in  anthropology  at 
Clark  University. 


96  NOTES  AND  NEWS 

• 

PROFESSOR  J.  McKEEN  CATTELL,  of  Columbia  University, 
addressed  the  Huxley  Society  of  the  Johns  Hopkins  University  on 
December  20,  his  subject  being  "  Some  Problems  of  University 
Administration."  On  the  morning  of  January  19  he  gave  the  founda- 
tion address  at  Indiana  University.  In  the  afternoon  he  spoke  before 
the  faculties  on  "  Grades  and  Credits,"  and  in  the  evening  addressed 
the  Society  of  Sigma  Xi.  On  January  22,  he  gave  an  address  before 
the  faculties  of  the  University  of  Illinois  on  "The  Administration  of 
a  University."  On  January  5,  Professor  Cattell  gave  an  address  at 
Lehigh  University  and  in  the  evening  addressed  the  faculties  of 
Lehigh  University  and  Lafayette  College. 

A  NEW  psychological  review,  Psiche,  has  been  launched  in  Italy 
with  Professor  Enrico  Morselli  of  Genoa,  Professor  Sante  de  Sanctis 
of  Rome,  and  Professor  Guido  Villa  of  Pavia  as  directors,  and  Dr. 
Roberto  Assagioli  of  Florence  as  editor-in-chief.  The  directors  aim 
to  make  the  new  review  different  from  previous  reviews  in  certain 
respects,  one  of  which  will  be  the  devotion  of  each  number  to  a  par- 
ticular topic.  It  is  planned  to  publish  six  numbers  of  not  less  than 
sixty-four  pages  each  in  the  course  of  the  present  year.  The  sub- 
scription price  is  L.  8  for  Italian  and  L.  10  for  foreign  subscriptions. 
Single  Cumbers  will  cost  L.  2.  Communications  may  be  addressed 
to  Via  degli  Alfani,  46,  Florence. 


.  IX.  No.  3.  March 


THE 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN 


GENERAL  REVIEWS  AND  SUMMARIES 
SENSATION  (GENERAL) 

BY  PROFESSOR  MADISON  BENTLEY 

Cornell  University 

Minkowski  (5)  denies  the  validity  of  Miiller's  law  of  specific 
sense  energies.  He  finds  that  the  law  is  inconsistent  with  the  concept 
of  the  adequate  stimulus,  and  that  it  fails  also  to  allow,  if  taken  in 
strictness,  the  attribution  of  qualitative  differences  to  the  world  of 
objects.  Moreover,  he  finds  Miiller  inconsistent  in  applying 
the  law  to  the  modalities  of  sense  while  conceding  that  stimulus 
may  condition  the  individual  qualities  (colors,  tones,  etc.)  within  a 
single  modality.  Minkowski  brings  the  argument  from  phylogeny 
to  show  that  nervous  system  and  end-organ  have  grown  up  under  the 
influence  of  the  environment  and  that  they  have  been  moulded  in 
conformity  to  the  properties  of  stimulus.  The  specificity  of  response 
he  refers  to  Nagel's  "specific  disposition"  which  tunes  the  sensory 
apparatus,  from  the  start,  to  a  particular  form  of  stimulation.  A. 
Schonberg  (6)  thinks,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  doctrine  of  specific 
energies  may  be  retained  by  assuming  a  relatively  small  number  of 
nervous  elements  which  respond  differently  under  different  intensities 
of  stimulus.  From  the  observation  that  strong  taste  stimuli  often 
yield  not  one  but  two  or  three  taste  qualities,  he  draws  the  wide 
inference  that  "with  every  quantitative  change  of  stimulus  there 
is  correlated  a  qualitative  change  in  sensation."  Schonberg  cites 
other  sense  modalities,  too;  but  he  quite  fails  to  support  his  gen- 
eralization. Structures  found  within  several  of  the  sense-organs  and 
known  to  the  histologists  as  "secondary  sense-cells"  are  thought  by 
Botezat  (i)  to  be  of  a  glandular  nature  and  to  facilitate,  by  their 

97 


98     _:  MADISON  BENTLEY 

secretions,  the  excitatory  functions  of  the  end-organ.  Botezat  calls 
them  "sensory  gland-cells"  (Sinnesdrusenzellen).  He  includes  the 
auditory  cells  of  the  labyrinth,  rod-cells  of  the  taste-buds,  the  cells 
in  the  rod-cone  layer  of  the  retina,  and  other  similar  structures. 
Upon  his  view,  the  stimulus  sets  these  cells  secreting,  and  their 
products  act  chemically  upon  the  nervous  substance.  By  treating 
the  stimulating  agents  in  an  animal's  environment  under  the  principle 
of  the  parallelogram  of  forces,  Szymanski  (7)  seeks  to  work  out  the 
relative  physiological  values  of  light,  heat,  etc.,  as  these  stimuli 
simultaneously  affect  the  organism.  The  rate  and  direction  of  move- 
ment under  combined  stimuli  are  regarded  by  his  method  as  resultants 
to  be  factored  into  stimulus-moments.  From  a  brilliant  series  of 
experiments  under  the  method  of  training  (Dressurmethode),  Kalischer 
(3)  concludes  (i)  that  the  labyrinth  is  not  an  organ  of  analysis,  (2) 
that  the  vestibule  possesses  auditory  functions,  and  (3)  that  the 
cortex  is  not  the  sole  seat  of  auditory  and  visual  processes.  Kalischer 
trained  dogs  to  associate  the  taking  of  food  with  certain  tones,  odors, 
and  colors.  When  the  association  had  become  fixed,  the  animal 
suffered  an  operation  (such  as  the  removal  of  the  labyrinth  or  of  the 
temporal  or  occipital  lobes).  From  the  subsequent  retention  or  loss 
of  the  trained  response  the  experimenter  drew  his  inferences  regarding 
the  psychophysical  processes  involved.  The  brief  account  of  the 
experiments  leaves  one  in  doubt  whether  sufficient  precautions  were 
taken  against  secondary  cues.  The  method  of  training  has  for  some 
time  been  used  in  this  country  by  S.  I.  Franz  (2)  in  his  study  of 
cerebral  functions. 

REFERENCES 

1.  BOTEZAT,  E.    Ueber  Sinnesdrusenzellen  und  die  Funktion  von  Sinnesapparaten 

Anat.  Anz.,  1910,  37,  513-530. 

2.  FRANZ,  S.  I.    On  the  Functions  of  the  Cerebrum:  Concerning  the  Lateral  Portions 

of  the  Occipital  Lobes.    Amer.  J.  of  Physiol,  191 1,  28,  308-3 17. 

3.  KALISCHER,  O.    Weitere  Mitteilung  iiber  die  Ergebnisse  der  Dressur  als  physio- 

logische  Untersuchungsmethode  auf  den  Gebieten  des  Gehor-,  Geruchs-  und 
Farbensinns.    Arch.f.  Physiol.,  1909,  303-322. 

4.  MACH,  E.     Sinnliche  Elemente  und  naturwissenschaftliche  Begriffe.     Arch.f.d.ges. 

Physiol.  (Pfluger),  1910, 136,  263-274. 

5.  MINKOWSKI,  E.    Zur  Mullerschen  Lehre  von  den  spezifischen   Sinnesenergien. 

Zsch.f.  SinnesphysioL,  1911,  45, 129-152. 

6.  SCHONBERG,  A.     Bezichungen  zwischen  der  Quantitat  des  Reizes  und  der  Qualitat 

der  Empfindung.     Zsch.  f.  SinnesphysioL,  191 1,  45,  197-203 . 

7.  SZYMANSKI,  J.  S.     Ein  Versuch,  das  Verhaltnis  zwischen  modal  verschiedenen 

Reizen  in  Zahlen  auszudriicken.    Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  Physiol  (Pfluger),  1911,  138, 
457-486. 


VISION— GENERAL  PHENOMENA  99 

VISION— GENERAL  PHENOMENA 
BY  HERBERT  SYDNEY  LANGFELD 

Harvard  University 

In  his  experiments  upon  the  retinas  of  frogs,  Bauer  (i)  found 
strong  evidence  that  an  assimilating  as  well  as  a  dissimilating  process 
takes  place  in  the  visual  purple  in  daylight  vision  and  that  the  assimi- 
lating process  increases  with  increasing  intensity  of  light  up  to  a 
certain  maximum  intensity.  Upon  first  submitting  the  purple  to 
strong  light,  it  pales,  but  gradually  adaptation  takes  place  and  the 
assimilating  process  overtakes  and  often  exceeds  the  dissimilating 
process.  In  the  latter  case  the  purple  returns  to  the  original  dark 
color.  Absence  of  change  in  the  color  of  the  purple  does  not  mean 
that  there  is  no  retinal  process  in  progress,  but  that  the  assimilating 
process  is  equal  to  the  dissimilating.  These  facts  seem  to  support 
the  theory  of  Hering  as  against  that  of  v.  Kries.  The  visual  purple  of 
the  rods  not  only  functions  in  daylight  vision  but  it  is  only  then  that 
it  reaches  its  full  activity.  Siven  (17)  thinks  the  following  facts 
point  to  the  possible  functioning  of  the  rods  for  blue- violet  perception: 
first,  the  spectrum  at  low  intensities  is  not  colorless  but  bluish; 
second,  the  Purkinje  phenomenon  takes  place  in  the  region  of  the 
rods;  third,  violet  blindness  during  santonin  poisoning, — since  san- 
tonin affects  the  rods;  fourth,  the  yellow  perception  during  jaundice 
caused  by  affection  of  the  rods;  fifth,  blue-blindness  during  hemeral- 
opia;  sixth,  the  results  of  the  experiments  of  Hess  on  the  color 
vision  of  night  and  day  animals.  The  experiments  which  Bruckner 
made  upon  the  blind  spot,1  in  which  he  found  a  contrast  effect  of  the 
surrounding  field  upon  the  blind  spot,  leads  him  to  conclude  (3) 
that  the  physiological  processes  underlying  the  phenomenon  of 
contrast  take  place  not  in  the  retina,  but  in  the  corpus  geniculatum 
externum  or  in  the  visual  cortex.  In  a  preliminary  report  of  experi- 
ments upon  after  images,  Ferree  and  Rand  (9)  state  that  the  results 
so  far  obtained  indicate  that  the  influence  of  brightness  upon  color 
excitation  takes  place  posterior  to  the  level  usually  ascribed  to  the 
paired  processes. 

The  experiment  of  S.  P.  Thompson,2  in  which  a  sensation  of  light 
is  caused  by  subjecting  the  head  to  the  influence  of  a  magnetic  field, 

1  Briichner,  A.     "Ueber  die  Sichtbarkeit  des  blinden  Fleckes."    Arch.  f.  d.  ges. 
Physiol.  (Pfluger),  1911,  136,  610-658. 

2  Thompson,  S.  P.     "A  Physiological  Effect  of  an  Alternating  Magnetic  Field." 
Proc.  Roy.  Soc.,  1910,  82,  396-398. 


100  HERBERT  SYDNEY  LANGFELD 

was  repeated  by  Dunlap  (8)  in  order  to  determine  if  the  phenomenon 
was  not  "due  to  idio-retinal  light  under  the  suggestion  of  the  hum  of 
the  coil  due  to  the  alternating  current."  The  transformer  was  placed 
on  a  table  near  the  coil  "so  that  the  loud  noise  of  the  former  com- 
pletely drowned  the  hum  of  the  latter"  and  the  sensation  still  per- 
sisted. Dunlap  therefore  concludes  that  "the  phenomenon  was 
really  a  matter  of  visual  sensation."  Of  special  interest  is  the  fact 
that  the  sensation  is  strongest  when  the  head  is  so  turned  in  the 
magnetic  field  that  the  general  direction  of  the  optic  pathway  is 
parallel  to  the  lines  of  force.  Dunlap  thinks  rather  that  the  alter- 
nating current  alternately  intensifies  and  inhibits  a  process  already 
in  progress,  such  as  idio-retinal  light,  rather  than  that  it  arouses  a 
visual  sensation,  but  he  hesitates  to  decide  definitely  from  the  present 
data.  Swinton  (19)  some  fifteen  years  ago  observed  this  phenomenon 
of  visual  sensation  due  to  the  effect  of  the  electric  current.  His 
method  was  to  employ  a  continuous-current  magneto  generator,  one 
terminal  of  which  was  held  in  one  hand,  while  a  wire  from  the  other 
together  with  a  wet  sponge  was  held  by  the  other  hand  to  the  side  of 
the  head.  The  frequency  of  the  flicker  increased  with  the  speed  of 
the  generator.  Swinton  adds  that  this  method  also  precludes  the 
possibility  of  suggestion  being  the  cause  of  the  flicker. 

One  of  the  reasons  given  by  Edridge-Green1  in  explanation  of  the 
fact  that  Lord  Rayleigh's  threshold  for  change  in  the  hue  of  yellow 
(D)  light  was  so  much  lower  than  the  threshold  he  obtained  by  his 
method,  namely,  because  of  the  admixture  of  white  light  in  Rayleigh's 
experiment,  has  been  proven  false  by  a  series  of  experiments  con- 
ducted by  Watson  (21).  By  means  of  the  Abney  double  spectrum 
apparatus,  two  fields  of  light  of  the  same  wave-length  were  projected 
side  by  side  on  a  magnesium  carbonate  screen  and  one  field  changed 
in  wave-length  until  the  difference  in  hue  was  quite  distinct.  A  dif- 
ference of  I.4M/X  was  detected,  while  Edridge-Green's  monochromatic 
patch  measured  4.5  MM-  Watson  then  found  that  additions  of  small 
amounts  of  white  light  made  no  change  in  the  threshold.  The  dif- 
ference in  the  results  of  Edridge-Green  and  Rayleigh  seems  to  be 
caused  by  a  difference  in  the  method  of  presenting  the  change,  namely, 
whether  two  monochromatic  patches  are  used  or  a  single  patch  in 
which  the  hue  changes  gradually  from  one  side  to  the  other. 

A  comparison  of  the  effect  of  the  exposure  of  the  eye  for  ten  seconds 
to  a  continuous  stimulation  of  light  with  that  of  a  like  exposure  to  an 

1  Edridge-Green,  F.  W.  "The  Discrimination  of  Colour."  Proc.  Roy.  Soc.,  1911, 
B.  84,  116-118. 


VISION— GENERAL  PHENOMENA  101 

intermittent  stimulation,  upon  the  subsequent  process  of  adaptation, 
was  made  by  Schneider  (16).  The  rate  of  alternation  of  light  and 
darkness  was  varied  as  well  as  the  relative  amount  of  light  to  darkness 
in  a  given  period.  The  intensity  of  the  continuous  light  was  so  chosen 
that  the  brightness  produced  was  equal,  according  to  the  Talbot  law, 
to  the  brightness  of  the  compared  intermittent  light.  It  was  found 
that  the  two  adaptation  curves  approached  one  another  under  the 
following  conditions:  first,  by  increasing  the  rapidity  of  alternation 
of  the  intermittent  light;  second,  by  increasing  the  difference  between 
the  exposure  time  for  light  and  for  darkness;  third,  by  increasing  the 
mean  intensity  of  the  intermittent  light.  These  results  were  con- 
sidered the  more  significant  in  that  the  above  conditions  are  the 
same  as  those  found  by  Marbe1  to  be  most  conducive  to  an  elimination 
of  flicker. 

Behr  (2),  in  his  article  upon  the  relation  of  dark  adaptation 
to  certain  pathological  conditions,  includes  the  interesting  fact  that 
if  one  eye  is  exposed  to  light  while  the  other  is  being  dark  adapted,  the 
latter  after  three  quarters  of  an  hour  is  only  half  as  sensitive  to  light 
as  it  would  have  been  if  both  eyes  had  been  dark  adapted.  He  con- 
cludes from  this  that  the  action  of  the  rods  and  the  visual  purple  are 
in  direct  relation  to  a  higher  process.  Dufour  (4)  has  made  some  ob- 
servations upon  the  after-images  of  motion  of  the  Plateau  spiral  as 
well  as  upon  those  of  the  motion  of  translation.  He  found  that  if 
the  motion  was  observed  monocularly  a  negative  after-image  could 
be  obtained  from  the  eye  which  had  been  closed. 

A  preliminary  study  has  been  made  by  v.  Liebermann  (n)  of 
the  rate  of  rotation  necessary  for  the  fusion  of  different  pairs  of  colors. 
No  definite  results  were  obtained,  but  the  methods  used  and  the  pre- 
cautions observed,  as  well  as  some  of  the  difficulties  of  the  problem 
discovered,  are  of  interest.  Dufour  and  Verain  (7)  explain  a  simple 
method  of  obtaining  the  threshold  for  the  perception  of  flicker, 
namely,  by  placing  a  disk  of  n  white  and  black  sectors  upon  a  larger 
disk  of  n  +  I  white  and  black  sectors.  Dufour  (6)  has  observed 
the  same  laws  of  fusion,  flicker,  etc.,  to  hold  in  movements  of  transla- 
tion of  bands  as  in  rotatory  movement  of  disks.  He  also  describes 
(5)  a  simple  device  for  obtaining  these  movements  of  translation. 

A  method  of  obtaining  the  time  that  it  takes  for  a  sensation  of 
light  to  reach  its  maximum  brightness  has  been  devised  by  Stigler 
(18).  The  instrument,  which  he  calls  a  chronophotometer,  permits 

1  Marbe,  K.  "Tatsachen  und  Theorien  des  Talbot'sch'en  Gesetzes."  Arch.  f.  d. 
ges.  Physiol  (Pfliiger),  1903,  97,  335~393- 


102  HERBERT  SYDNEY  LANGFELD 

the  successive  exposure  of  two  neighboring  fields  of  the  same  or 
different  intensities  of  light  and  the  regulation  and  measurement  of 
the  exposure  time  as  well  as  the  interval  between  the  two  exposures. 
If  the  first  sensation  does  not  reach  its  maximum  intensity  at  the 
time  of  exposure  of  the  second  stimulus,  it  will  never  reach  it  in  that 
part  of  the  field  adjacent  to  the  second  field,  owing  to  the  contrasting 
effect  of  the  latter.  By  regulating  the  exposure  times  and  the  inter- 
vals between  the  two  stimulations  and  comparing  the  intensity  of 
all  parts  of  the  two  fields,  the  approximate  time  necessary  for  the 
first  sensation  to  reach  its  maximum  intensity  may  be  ascertained. 

The  phenomenon  of  brightness  contrast  has  been  used  by  Revesz 
(15)  as  a  basis  for  a  new  method  of  measuring  the  brightness  of  colors 
of  different  hues.  The  maximum  saturation  of  a  color  can  be  obtained 
by  gradually  increasing  the  brightness  of  a  contrast-producing  field 
until  the  white  (W-Valenz)  of  the  color  is  entirely  compensated.  It 
follows  that  if  two  colors,  for  example  red  and  green,  both  reach 
their  maximum  of  saturation  with  the  same  increase  of  brightness  of 
the  contrasting  field,  they  may  be  considered  to  contain  the  same 
amount  of  white.  The  relative  amount  of  white,  which  different 
colors  were  found  to  contain  by  this  method,  coincides  with  the 
relative  brightness  of  the  colors  as  determined  both  by  the  direct 
method  of  measuring  brightness  at  the  fovea,  and  by  the  method  of 
indirect  vision.  The  author  finds  theoretical  support  for  his  method 
in  G.  E.  Miiller's  theory  of  vision. 

One  of  the  most  suggestive  books  of  the  year  is  that  by  Katz  (10). 
He  has  given  us  the  result  of  five  years  investigations  of  the  various 
characteristics  of  colors  and  especially  of  those  changes  in  these 
characteristics  brought  about  by  experience.  He  has  displayed 
much  ingenuity  in  the  methods  of  his  countless  experiments  and  in 
the  variation  of  the  conditions,  as  well  as  a  keen  power  of  analysis 
and  an  appreciation  of  the  relation  of  his  results  to  the  more  general 
problems  of  vision.  It  is  only  possible  here  to  mention  some  of  the 
most  important  facts.  As  regards  the  localization  in  space,  idio- 
retinal  light  is  characterized  by  an  indefiniteness  of  localization. 
The  more  vivid  (eindringlicti)  an  after-image  is,  the  nearer  it  appears. 
What  is  meant  by  vividness  of  colors  may  be  understood  if  one  fixates 
the  middle  of  a  larger  white  surface;  it  will  then  be  observed  that  the 
color  gradually  lessens  in  vividness  towards  the  periphery.  Idio- 
retinal  light  shows  the  lowest  degree  of  vividness.  The  darker 
colors  seem  nearer  than  the  lighter. 

There  are  three  forms  in  which  colors  may  appear:  first,  as  sur- 


VISION-GENERAL  PHENOMENA  103 

face  colors  (Oberfldchenfarben),  that  is,  the  surface  of  an  object 
seems  to  have  a  certain  color;  second,  as  surfaces  (Flachenfarben), 
that  is,  the  colors  are  perceived  in  two  dimensions  and  without  any 
reference  to  an  object;  third,  as  transparent  colors  in  three  dimen- 
sions. The  last  two  may  be  reduced  to  surface  colors  by  observing 
them  through  the  small  aperture  of  a  screen.  It  is  in  perceiving 
colors  as  surface  colors  that  the  results  of  experience  play  a  role. 
It  is  then  that  we  abstract  as  far  as  possible  from  the  existing  condi- 
tions of  illumination  and  see  the  color  as  it  would  appear  under 
normal  conditions.  The  conditions  may  be  considered  normal 
when  the  objects  are  seen  most  sharply  defined  and  outlined.  These 
conditions  may  be  obtained  in  the  open  air  and  under  a  slightly 
clouded  sky. 

If  we  look  at  a  gray  disk  placed  some  distance  behind  a  revolving 
black  episkotister  through  a  small  hole  in  a  screen  in  front  of  the 
instrument,  and  notice  that  the  episkotister  is  cutting  off  some  of  the 
light,  we  abstract  from  its  effect,  and  see  the  gray  in  its  normal 
color,  that  is,  brighter  than  it  appears  when  the  conditions  behind 
the  screen  are  concealed  from  us.  Vividness,  however,  is  not 
affected  by  psychological  factors,  for  vividness  depends  upon  the 
absolute  amount  of  light  falling  on  the  retina.  Neither  do  psycho- 
logical factors  influence  the  difference  threshold  for  brightness  nor 
the  absolute  threshold  for  the  normal  adapted  eye.  But  the  Talbot 
law  does  not  hold  for  brightness  under  the  above  conditions,  the 
variations  from  the  law  becoming  greater  the  more  vivid  the  psycho- 
logical factors  become.  As  might  be  supposed  from  the  above,  the 
Talbot  law  does  hold  for  the  vividness  of  colors. 

If  it  is  seen  that  a  paper  is  darkened  by  a  shadow,  it  appears 
lighter  than  when  this  fact  is  concealed  from  the  observer.  The 
relative  brightening  of  the  paper  by  psychological  factors  is  greater 
the  deeper  the  shadow.  Individual  differences  are  greater  when  the 
psychological  factors  are  most  influential.  Katz  does  not  call  these 
phenomena  illusions,  since  attending  to  them  does  not  entirely 
eliminate  them.  The  longer  one  observes,  the  stronger  is  the  effect 
of  the  psychological  factors,  but  even  in  a  very  short  exposure  they 
are  influential.  Hering's  memory-color  (Geddchtnisfarben)  theory 
only  applies  to  objects  with  which  we  are  very  familiar.  Hering 
explains  phenomena  similar  to  the  above  through  adaptation  and 
other  physiological  causes.  Such  physiological  explanations  are 
considered  by  Katz  secondary  to  a  psychological  explanation.  Also 
the  fact  that  colored  papers  illuminated  by  colored  light  are  seen  in 


104  HERBERT  SYDNEY  LANGFELD 

their  original  colors  is  explained  by  Katz  through  psychological 
factors  as  against  Hering's  physiological  explanation.  On  the  other 
hand,  Katz's  results  agree  with  Hering's,  that  contrast  depends  upon 
the  intensity  and  quality  of  the  retinal  processes  and  not  upon  psycho- 
logical factors.  From  the  experiments  on  dark  adaptation,  Katz 
comes  to  the  conclusion  that  the  psychological  factors  only  alter 
those  sensations  depending  upon  processes  in  the  cones.  Many 
interesting  references  are  also  made  to  the  influence  of  psychological 
factors  similar  to  the  above  in  the  effect  of  works  of  art. 

Tucker  (20)  has  made  a  series  of  tests  on  the  color  vision  of  sixty- 
three  girls  and  sixty-four  boys  of  the  English  schools,  in  order  to 
compare  their  color  sense  with  that  of  primitive  peoples.  In  the 
color  discrimination  test  with  Holmgren's  wools,  in  the  case  of  all 
the  children  "blue  and  violet  tend  to  be  confused.  Then  the  images 
with  green  extend  their  range  and  finally  those  of  pink,  red  and 
yellow."  In  the  color  nomenclature  test,  similar  mistakes  were  made. 
The  names  included  a  wide  range  of  hues.  These  results  coincide 
with  those  obtained  with  primitive  peoples.  Tests  for  the  threshold 
for  red,  yellow,  and  blue  were  also  made  and  it  was  found  that  the 
threshold  for  colors  rose  as  the  age  decreased,  but  that  the  ratio  of 
the  threshold  of  one  color  to  the  other  remained  unchanged  both  in 
the  tests  on  children  and  those  on  adults.  Since  these  quantitative 
results  show  that  the  relative  threshold  for  blue  did  not  change,  and 
the  qualitative  results,  that  the  children  made  the  same  mistakes  in 
color  discrimination  as  primitive  races,  the  author  thinks  that  the 
latter's  confusion  of  colors  can  hardly  be  explained  satisfactorily 
through  a  weakness  for  blue  due  to  a  greater  yellow  pigmentation  of 
the  macula  lutea  among  dark-skinned  races.  Her  conclusions  are 
rather  that  there  are  two  causes  for  the  peculiarity  in  color  confusion 
among  primitive  people;  the  one,  psychological,  "depending  on  the 
stage  of  the  development  of  the  powers  of  observation  and  thought 
leading  to  mistakes  similar  to  those  made  by  European  people,"  the 
other  physiological,  depending  on  the  stage  of  the  development  of 
the  sense  organ. 

Leob  (14)  in  his  experiments  upon  the  memory  for  colors 
used  the  Asher  color  mixture  apparatus  and  allowed  from  five 
minutes  to  several  days  to  intervene  between  the  exposure  of  the 
color  and  the  reproduction.  Loeb  concludes  from  the  fact  that  the 
m.v.  for  the  eleven  trials  made  in  the  reproduction  test  for  each  color 
was  less  for  blue  and  yellow  than  for  red  and  green,  that  the  precision 
of  reproduction,  and  with  it  the  actual  memory  for  colors  for  the 


VISION— GENERAL  PHENOMENA  105 

former  pair,  is  greater  than  for  the  latter,  although  the  colors  repro- 
duced were  further  from  the  original  in  the  case  of  blue  and  yellow 
than  in  that  of  red  and  green.  This  latter  result  he  considers  to  be 
caused  by  the  conditions  of  his  method  and  not  to  be  contradictory 
to  the  results  of  L.  v.  Kries  and  E.  Schottelius1  whose  order  of  accuracy 
of  reproduction  was  the  same  as  his  order  of  precision.  He  is,  how- 
ever, hardly  justified  in  deducing  an  accuracy  of  memory  from  a 
small  m.v. 

Luckiesh  (12)  has  measured  the  difference  in  visual  acuity  in 
monochromatic  light  and  in  light  having  an  extended  spectrum. 
To  quote  from  the  author's  summary  in  this  journal:2 

"The  green  line  of  the  mercury  vapor  spectrum  was  isolated  and  used  as  a  mono- 
chromatic source.  This  line  was  matched  in  hue  by  light  having  an  extended  spectrum 
obtained  by  filters  used  with  the  tungsten  lamp.  These  two  green  colors  could  easily 
be  matched  for  brightness  without  any  of  the  difficulties  which  would  obtain  if  they 
differed  in  hue. 

"A  printed  page  of  type  of  such  size  that  at  a  distance  of  I  meter  it  was  just 
readable  in  monochromatic  light,  was  arranged  in  a  photometer  so  that  two  adjacent 
patches  were  illuminated  respectively  by  the  two  green  lights  of  different  spectral 
character.  For  the  same  ease  in  reading  it  was  found  that  the  illumination  having  an 
extended  spectrum  must  be  increased  75  per  cent,  over  the  monochromatic  illumination. 
This  result  was  substantiated  by  other  experiments.  Later  the  Ives3  acuity  test 
object  was  used  and  by  this  more  sensitive  method  it  was  found  that  for  two  observers 
the  illumination  having  an  extended  spectrum  must  be  five  times  greater  than  that 
of  the  monochromatic  illumination  for  the  same  visual  acuity.  Another  observer 
required  an  increase  of  only  33  per  cent.  It  was  shown  that  there  was  rio  movement  of 
the  pupil  when  alternately  subjected  to  the  two  lights." 

Luckiesh  (13)  has  also  investigated  the  relation  between  visual 
acuity  and  wave-length.  The  influence  of  brightness  differences 
was  as  far  as  possible  eliminated.  He  found  that  "the  extremes 
of  the  visible  spectrum  show  a  lower  defining  power  than  the  middle 
region,  the  maximum  acuity  appearing  to  be  in  the  yellow  region." 

Two  essays,  one  by  Woodworth  (22),  and  the  other  by  Yerkes  (23), 
embodying  the  facts  of  the  sensation  of  light  most  important  for 
illuminating  engineering,  have  appeared. 

REFERENCES 

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ges.  Physiol.  (Pfliiger),  1911,  141,  479~496- 

1  v.  Kries,  L.,  und  Schottelius,  E.     "Beitrage  zur  Lehre  vom  Farbengedachtnis." 
Zsch.  /.  SinnesphysioL,  1907-8,  42,  192-209. 

2  Luckiesh,  L.      "Monochromatic  Light  and  Visual  Acuity."     PSYCHOLOGICAL 
BULLETIN,  1911,  8,  404. 

3  Ives,  H.   E.     "A  Visual  Acuity  Test  Object.    Description  of  a  Composite 
Object  Composed  of  Superposed  Gratings."    Elec.  World,  1910,  55,  939^94°- 


106  HERBERT  SYDNEY  LANGFELD 

2.  BEHR,  C.     Der  Reflexcharacter  der  Adaptationsvorgange  inbesondere  der  Dunkei- 

adaptation,  und  deren  Beziehungen  zur  typischen  Diagnose  und  zur  Hemeral- 
opie.     Arch.f.  Ophthalmol.,  1910,  75,  201-283. 

3.  BRUCKNER,  A.     Zur  Lokalisation  einiger  Vorgange  in  der  Sehsinnsubstanz.     Arch. 

f.  d.  ges.  Physiol.  (Pfliiger),  1911,  142,  241-254. 

4.  DUFOUR,  M.     Sur  la  spirale  de  J.  Plateau.     C.  r.  soc.  de  biol.,  1911,  70,  151-152. 

5.  DUFOUR,  M.    Un  appareil  permettant  de  faire  certaines  experiences  d'optique 

physiologique.     C.  r.  soc.  de  biol.,  1911,  70,  295-297. 

6.  DUFOUR,  M.     Sur  quelques  phenomenes  d'optique  physiologique.  II.,  III.     C.r. 

soc.  de  biol.,  1911,  70,  485-487;  886-888. 

7.  DUFOUR,  M.,  and  VERAIN,  L.     Sur  quelques  phenomenes  d'optique  physiologique. 

IV.     C.  r.  soc.  de  biol.,  1911,  71,  289-290. 

8.  DUNLAP,  K.    Visual  Sensations  from  the  Alternating  Magnetic  Field.     Science, 

1911,  33,  68-71. 

9.  FERREE,  C.  E.,  and  RAND,  M.  G.    An  Experimental  Study  of  the  Fusion  of 

Colored  and  Colorless  Light  Sensation:  The  Locus  of  the  Action.     /.  of  Phil. , 
Psychol.,  etc.,  1911,  8,  294-297. 

10.  KATZ,  D.    Die  Erscheinungsweisen  der  Farben  und  ihre  Beeinflussung  durch  die 

individuelle  Erfahrung.     Zsch.  f.  Psychol.,  Ergbd.  7,  1911.     Pp.  xviii  +  425. 

11.  v.   LIEBERMANN,   P.    Vcrschmelzungsfrequenzen   von   Farbenpaaren.     Zsch.  f. 

SinnesphysioL,  1910-11,  45,  117-128. 

12.  LUCKIESH,  M.    Monochromatic  Light  and  Visual  Acuity.    Elec.  World,  1911, 

58,  450-452- 

13.  LUCKIESH,  M.    The  Dependence  of  Visual  Acuity  on  the  Wave-Length  of  Light. 

Elec.  World,  1911,  58,  1252-1254. 

14.  LOEB,  S.    Ein  Beitrag  zur  Lehre  vom  Farbengedachtnis.     Zsch.  f.  Sinnesphysiol.y 

1911,  46,  83-128. 

15.  REVESZ,  G.    Ueber  eine  neue  Methode  der  heterochromen  Photometric.     Ber.  IV. 

Kongress  f.  exper.  Psychol.,  1911,  217-219. 

16.  SCHNEIDER,  S.    Die  Helligkeitsadaptation  bei  kontinuierlichen  und  diskontinuier- 

lichen  Erregungen.    Psychol.  Stud.,  1911,  7,  196-228. 

17.  SIVEN,  V.  0.    Die  Stabschen  als  Farbenperzipierende  Organe.     Klin.  Monatsbl. 

f.  Augenheilkunde,  1911,  49,  531. 

18.  STIGLER,  R.    Chronophotische  Untersuchungen  iiber  den    Umgebungskontrast. 

Ber.  17.  Kongress  f.  exper.  Psychol.,  1911,  279-281. 

19.  SWINTON,  A.  A.  C.    Visual  Sensations  from  the  Alternating  Magnetic  Field. 

Nature,  1911,  86,  143. 

20.  TUCKER,  A.  W.    Observations  on  the  Colour  Vision  of  School  Children.     Brit.  J. 

of  Psychol.,  i9ii,4,33-43- 

21.  WATSON,  W.    Note  on  the  Sensibility  of  the  Eye  to  Variations  of  Wave-Length. 

Proc.  Roy.  Soc.,  1911,  84,  118-120. 

22.  WOODWORTH,  R.  S.    The  Psychology  of  Light.     Trans,  of  the  Illuminating  Engi- 

neering Soc.,  1911,  6,  437-471. 

23.  YERKES,  R.  M.     The  Psychological  Aspects  of  Illuminating  Engineering.     (Lec- 

tures on  Illuminating  Engineering,  Vol.  11.)     Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins  Press, 
1911.    Pp.  575-604. 


VISION— PERIPHERAL,  FOVEAL,  ETC.  107 

VISION— PERIPHERAL,   FOVEAL,  ETC. 
BY  DR.  C.  E.  FERREE 

Bryn  Mawr  College 

The  year's  work  in  this  field  is  comprised  in  four  articles. 

A.  Pick  (4)  gives  a  clinical  report  on  cases  of  functional  narrowing 
of  the  visual  field.  He  concludes,  in  contradiction  to  the  commonly 
accepted  view,  that  in  these  cases  the  patient  is  just  as  much  aware 
of  his  defect  as  is  the  patient  who  suffers  the  contraction  from  organic 
causes.  Two  circumstances  he  thinks  have  led  to  the  false  conclusion 
by  previous  writers,  (i)  The  patient  has  not  been  carefully  ques- 
tioned with  regard  to  what  he  sees.  (2)  The  examiner  has  been 
influenced  by  certain  objective  signs  which  have  not  been  studied 
with  sufficient  care.  For  example,  it  has  been  claimed  that  no 
disturbance  of  orientation  is  suffered.  The  patient  must,  therefore, 
not  be  aware  of  the  defect  in  his  visual  field.  But  Pick  and  many 
others  have  found  that  disturbances  in  orientation  do  occur.  They 
last,  however,  only  a  short  time  after  the  contraction  has  begun.  The 
patient  soon  adapts  to  his  changed  condition  of  seeing  and  recovers 
his  power  of  orientation.  This  is  what  happens  in  every  case  of 
sudden  loss  of  visual  acuity.  It  also  happens  when  the  field  is  nar- 
rowed from  organic  causes.  Such  evidence  therefore,  argues  Pick, 
should  not  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  patient  suffering  from 
functional  contraction  is  less  aware  of  his  defect  than  the  patient  with 
organic  disease. 

Pick  supports  his  position  by  the  direct  testimony  of  his  patients. 
He  wishes,  moreover,  to  emphasize  the  importance  of  carefully 
questioning  the  patient  in  making  diagnoses.  The  testimony  of 
the  patient  is  necessary  to  diagnosis  and  it  can  not  be  assumed  that 
he  can  and  will  tell  of  his  own  accord  all  the  diagnostician  needs 
to  know. 

Edridge-Green  (2)  describes  some  visual  phenomena  connected 
with  the  yellow  spot.  The  article  consists  of  a  statement  of  the 
observations  of  previous  writers  on  the  following  points  supple- 
mented by  some  observations  of  his  own:  various  appearances  in  the 
field  of  vision  due  to  peculiarities  of  the  yellow  spot;  entoptic  appear- 
ance of  the  yellow  spot  and  the  blood  vessels  of  the  retina;  currents 
seen  in  the  field  of  vision  not  due  to  circulation;  and  appearances 
due  to  the  pigment  cells  of  the  retina.  The  third  of  these  topics 
alone  contains  sufficient  new  material  to  warrant  mention  in  this 
review.  This  topic  is  of  particular  importance  to  Edridge-Green 


108  DR.  C.  E.  FERREE 

because  of  its  bearing  on  his  theory  of  vision.  He  assumes  that  all 
visual  sensations  are  caused  by  the  decomposition  of  the  visual  purple. 
This  decomposition  sets  up  electrical  impulses  which  travel  along  the 
optic  nerve  to  the  brain.  These  impulses  he  believes  are  wave- 
like  and  periodic  in  nature.  Each  wave-length  of  light  sets  up  an 
impulse  different  from  that  set  up  by  every  other  wave-length.  A 
physiological  basis  is  thus  laid  for  the  different  visual  qualities.  The 
visual  purple  is  generated  in  the  rods,  hence  there  is  none  in  the  fovea. 
But  it  is  necessary  to  foveal  vision  hence  it  must  be  supplied  from 
the  extra-foveal  retina.  It  is  the  streaming  of  the  visual  purple 
from  the  peripheral  retina  to  the  fovea  that  constitutes,  he  thinks, 
the  currents  seen  in  the  field  of  vision  not  due  to  circulation.  He  is 
able  to  see  these  currents  under  the  following  conditions:  with  one 
eye  partially  covered;  with  one  or  both  eyes  open  at  full  illumina- 
tion; with  the  eyes  open  in  the  dark-room;  with  a  field  of  vision 
given  by  looking  through  a  yellow-green  glass;  and  with  an  inter- 
mittent stimulation  by  light  produced  by  rotating  a  disk  composed 
of  white  and  black  sectors.  There  are  four  main  stream  channels 
which  are  fixed  in  position.  These  four  channels  end  in  the  fovea 
and  form  a  figure  closely  resembling  the  written  letter  X.  On  exam- 
ining the  retina  of  a  monkey  he  finds  four  shallow  channels  leading 
to  the  fovea  which  correspond  roughly  to  the  stream  channels  seen 
by  him  entoptically.  Between  the  fixed  stream  channels  indefinite 
streaming  movements  are  observed. 

The  streaming  has  a  characteristic  effect  on  visual  sensation. 
The  stream  currents  carry  the  visual  quality,  color  and  brightness, 
of  the  region  from  which  they  come  into  the  after-image.  They 
also  tend  to  move  the  after-image  towards  the  center  of  the  field 
of  vision.1 

1  Ed  ridge-Green  seems  inclined  to  identify  this  phenomenon  with  the  streaming 
phenomenon  described  by  the  writer  in  1908.  The  writer  is  strongly  impelled  to 
question  the  propriety  of  this  identification  because  of  the  obvious  disagreement  of 
the  phenomena  in  so  many  important  particulars,  (i)  Even  a  casual  comparison  of 
the  drawings  representing  the  two  phenomena  shows  many  differences  that  are  char- 
acteristic and  essential.  In  fact  not  even  a  general  similarity  is  found  between  the 
stream  patterns  and  the  appearance  and  behavior  of  the  streaming  material  in  the  two 
cases.  (2)  The  descriptions  of  the  phenomenon  given  in  the  two  cases  are  even  more 
incompatible.  If  there  is  one  thing  above  another  that  is  characteristic  of  the  "  stream- 
ing phenomenon"  as  it  was  observed  and  described  by  the  writer,  it  is  just  the  absence 
of  any  fixed  channel  or  path  of  movement.  There  is  a  general  tendency  for  the  streams 
to  move  towards  the  center  of  the  field  of  vision  but  that  movement  may  occur  along 
any  possible  meridian  in  the  field  of  vision.  Very  frequently  also  the  stream  is  de- 
flected from  its  course  before  it  reaches  the  center  of  the  field  of  vision  or  even  that 


VISION-PERIPHERAL,    FOVEAL,  ETC.  109 

Haycraft  (3)  reports  work  on  the  color  sensitivity  of  the  retina 
immediately  surrounding  the  blind  spot.  In  mapping  the  blind 
spot  with  a  colored  stimulus  in  1907,  he  noticed  that  when  the  stim- 
ulus fell  just  within  the  blind  spot  a  slight  movement  caused  it  to 
be  seen  as  gray  while  a  greater  movement  caused  it  to  be  seen  in 
its  proper  color.  This  led  him  to  investigate  the  relative  sensi- 
tivity of  the  margin  of  the  blind  spot  to  colored  and  to  colorless 
light.1  The  investigation  was  conducted  by  means  of  a  scotometer. 
The  scotometer  consists  of  a  head-rest,  a  projection-screen,  and  a 
supporting  base.  The  projection-screen  is  provided  with  a  fixa- 
tion point,  a  movable  stimulus,  and  a  frame  fastened  immediately 
behind  the  movable  stimulus  to  hold  the  paper  on  which  the  outline 
of  the  blind  spot  is  to  be  traced.  The  movable  stimulus  is  fastened 
on  the  front  end  of  a  plunger  which,  when  pushed  in,  punches  a  hole 
in  the  paper  in  the  frame  behind.  A  line  connecting  these  holes 
marks  the  outline  of  the  blind  spot.  The  stimulus  is  moved  by 
means  of  two  screws  one  of  which  gives  it  a  motion  in  the  vertical 
plane  and  the  other  in  the  horizontal  plane.  By  means  of  this 
adjustment  the  position  of  the  stimulus  can  be  changed  by  small 
and  definite  amounts,  a  feature  of  particular  advantage  in  the  tech- 
nique of  the  problem.  Red,  green,  blue,  yellow,  and  gray  stimuli 

part  of  the  field  corresponding  to  the  "external  fovea."  This  deflection  is  often  trace- 
able to  an  involuntary  eye-movement  and  can  generally  be  caused  by  a  sharp  voluntary 
movement  executed  at  the  right  time.  Space  will  not  be  taken  here  to  enumerate  other 
numerous  and  important  points  of  difference.  The  points  of  similarity  can  be  pointed 
out  more  briefly.  Both  are  subjective  movement  phenomena  not  caused  by  the  cir- 
culation of  the  blood,  and  the  tendency  of  movement  in  both  cases  is  towards  the  center 
of  the  field  of  vision.  (3)  Characteristic  differences  are  also  found  in  the  effect  on 
visual  sensation.  Edridge-Green  says  the  currents  described  by  him  carry  the  visual 
quality,  color  and  brightness,  of  the  region  from  which  they  come  into  the  after-image. 
They  also  tend  to  move  the  after-image  towards  the  center  of  the  field  of  vision.  No 
further  details  are  given.  If  one  be  permitted  to  infer  details,  it  is  obvious  that  the 
effect  of  streaming  on  the  fluctuation  of  after-images  described  by  the  writer  could 
not  be  compatible  with  a  streaming  system  in  which  the  distinctive  and  definite  stream- 
ing is  limited  to  four  narrow  channels.  The  writer  is  forced  to  conclude,  then,  that 
either  Edridge-Green  and  he  have  not  observed  the  same  phenomenon,  or  that  they 
have  differed  widely  in  their  descriptions  of  its  essential  features. 

1  That  there  is  a  color-blind  area  around  the  blind  spot  has  been  mentioned  by 
Johansson  (Upsala  Ldkareforenings  Forhandlingar,  1884,  19,  491-493),  Ovio  (Annali 
di  Ottalmologia,  a,  1906,  36),  and  Polimanti  (Jour,  de  PsychoL,  1908,  5,  298).  That 
the  order  of  loss  of  sensitivity  in  passing  from  the  surrounding  retina  into  the  blind 
spot  is  the  same  as  it  is  in  passing  from  the  center  towards  the  periphery  of  the  retina 
was  mentioned  by  the  present  writer  in  a  paper  read  before  the  meeting  of  experimental 
psychologists  held  at  Princeton  in  April,  1909. 


IIO  DR.  C.  E.  FERREE 

were  used  in  mapping  the  blind  spot.  The  brightness  of  the  colors 
was  in  each  case  made  equal  to  the  brightness  of  the  yellow  by  the 
method  described  by  Abney  (Philos.  Trans,  of  Royal  Soc.,  1886 
and  1892).  Several  observers  were  used  and  some  variation  was 
found  in  the  order  of  loss  of  sensitivity  for  the  different  observers. 
In  Haycraft's  own  case,  as  the  blind  spot  was  approached  from  any 
direction,  sensitivity  was  lost  in  the  following  order:  red,  green  and 
yellow,  blue,  and  gray.  Using  the  same  stimuli  to  map  the  sensi- 
tivity of  the  retina  as  a  whole,  he  found  the  same  order  of  loss  of 
sensitivity  as  the  stimuli  were  moved  from  the  center  towards  the 
periphery  of  the  retina. 

A.  Bruckner  (i)  publishes  concerning  "Die  Sichtbarkeit  des 
blinden  Fleckes."  Both  the  experimentation  as  it  is  described 
in  the  article  and  the  conclusions  seem  to  the  writer  to  be  in  some 
measure  open  to  question.  Extended  criticism,  however,  will  not 
be  attempted  in  this  brief  review. 

Three  explanations  have  been  given  for  the  absence  of  a  gap 
in  the  monocular  field  of  regard:  Weber's  theory  of  shrinkage, 
DuBois-Reymond's  and  Volkmann's  theories  of  associative  filling- 
in,  and  Tschermak's  theory  of  physiological  induction.  Bruckner 
decides  against  the  theories  of  shrinkage  and  associative  filling-in, 
and  accepts  the  theory  of  physiological  induction.  The  gap  is 
filled  in  either  by  irradiation  or  by  simultaneous  contrast.  It  is 
filled  in  most  frequently  by  irradiation.  This  is  why  in  ordinary 
monocular  vision  we  are  not  conscious  of  the  blind  spot. 

Bruckner  is  not  the  first  to  claim  that  visual  sensations  may  be 
referred  to  that  part  of  the  field  of  vision  usually  called  the  blind 
spot.  Prior  mention  has  been  made  by  Purkinje,  Heinrich  Muller, 
Meissner,  Aubert,  Charpentier,  Woinow,  Helmholtz,  Finkelstein, 
Zehender,  Tschermak,  Czermak  and  others.  Bruckner  aims 
merely  to  verify  the  observations  of  his  predecessors  and  to 
extend  the  conditions  under  which  the  phenomenon  may  be 
observed,  (i)  With  the  eye  thoroughly  dark-adapted  the  blind  spot 
may  be  seen  as  a  dark  disk  surrounded  by  a  light  halo,  immediately 
following  a  quick  pressure  of  the  front  of  the  eye-ball  through  the 
closed  lids.  The  phenomenon  lasts  only  a  fraction  of  a  second. 
This  observation  has  been  previously  made  by  Aubert  and  Finkel- 
stein. (2)  The  blind  spot  may  be  seen  by  the  method  used  by 
Purkinje  to  demonstrate  the  Aderfigur.  This  observation  has  been 
made  by  Heinrich  Muller,  and  Tschermak.  (3)  When  one  looks 
with  one  eye  at  a  uniform  field,  for  example,  the  sky  at  twilight,  one 


VISION— PERIPHERAL,  FOVEAL,  ETC. 


Ill 


sees  the  blind  spot  as  a  dark  disk  surrounded  by  a  light  halo.  Obser- 
vations of  this  kind  have  been  made  by  Helmholtz,  Woinow,  Zehender, 
Charpentier,  and  Tschermak.  Bruckner  extends  the  observation 
to  fields  of  white,  of  black,  and  of  color.  On  white  paper  he  sees  the 
blind  spot  as  a  shadowy  spot  surrounded  by  a  light  halo;  on  black 
paper  as  a  spot  of  more  intensive  blackness  surrounded  by  a  light 
halo;  on  a  field  formed  by  looking  at  a  neutral  surface  through 
colored  glass  as  a  dark  spot  surrounded  by  a  halo  of  the  color  comple- 
mentary to  the  field.  (4)  When  the  field  is  formed  of  black  and 
white  paper  with  their  line  of  junction  passing  vertically  through 
the  blind  spot,  the  part  of  the  field  towards  the  center  of  the  retina 
is  seen  as  bulged  out  to  fill  the  area  of  the  blind  spot.  Thus  when 
the  white  field  is  towards  the  center  of  the  retina,  the  blind  spot  is 
filled  in  with  white;  and,  commonly,  when  the  black  field  is  towards 
the  center  of  the  retina,  the  blind  spot  is  filled  in  with  black.  In  each 
case  the  bulging  portion  is  surrounded  by  a  halo  of  antagonistic 
quality.  The  bulging  is  due  to  irradiation  from  the  stronger  field 
and  the  halo  is  due  to  marginal  contrast.  In  using  colored  fields 
he  finds  that  the  law  of  irradiation  from  the  stronger  field  does  not 
always  hold.  The  weaker  field,  i.  e.,  the  field  beyond  the  blind  spot, 
sometimes  fills  in  the  gap.  (5)  An  after-image  may  be  gotten  of  the 
visual  quality  filling  in  the  blind  spot.  When  one  with  a  thoroughly 
dark-adapted  eye  looks  for  a  moment  at  the  sky  at  twilight  and 
then  closes  the  eye,  he  sees  at  first  a  black  disk  with  a  halo  in  a  light 
field  which  soon  gives  way  to  a  light  disk  with  a  black  halo  in  a  dark 
field.  This  observation  has  been  made  by  Charpentier  and  Tscher- 
mak. (6)  At  the  make  and  break  of  an  electric  current,  sent  through 
the  head  by  means  of  two  electrodes,  one  applied  to  the  middle  of 
the  forehead  and  the  other  to  the  back  of  the  neck,  the  blind  spot 
is  seen  sometimes  as  a  light  and  sometimes  as  a  dark  disk.  This 
phenomenon  has  been  reported  by  Tschermak  and  others. 

In  general  Bruckner  is  inclined  to  attribute  the  visibility  of  the 
blind  spot  with  the  dark-adapted  eye  to  contrast,  and  with  the  light- 
adapted  eye  to  irradiation.  He  gets  into  difficulty,  however,  in 
attempting  to  apply  this  principle  of  explanation  in  detail,  (i)  When 
the  field  is  white  and  the  blind  spot  is  seen  as  a  dark  disk  surrounded 
by  a  light  halo  on  a  white  ground,  he  explains  the  quality  of  the  disk 
as  due  to  contrast  from  the  surrounding  field.  For  the  halo  he  gives 
the  rather  remarkable  explanation  that  it  is  due  to  marginal  contrast 
between  the  two  fields,  one  of  which  he  has  already  explained  as  a 
contrast  effect  due  to  the  other.  When  the  field  is  black  and  the 


112  SAMUEL  P.  HAYES 

blind  spot  is  seen  as  a  disk  of  more  intensive  blackness,  he  offers  no 
explanation,  yet  as  before  the  observation  was  made  with  a  dark- 
adapted  eye.  When  the  field  is  colored  the  blind  spot  is  almost 
invariably  seen  as  a  dark  disk  instead  of  in  the  color  complementary 
to  the  field.  The  halo  in  this  case  is  of  a  color  complementary  to 
the  field.  He  attempts  to  explain  the  failure  of  the  blind  spot  to 
appear  in  the  complementary  color  as  due  to  the  extreme  suscepti- 
bility of  the  blind  spot  to  fatigue.  The  contrast  color  is  of  such 
short  duration  it  can  not  be  observed.  This  explanation,  however, 
can  hardly  be  accepted  as  satisfactory.  In  the  first  place  no  reason 
is  given  why  the  blind  spot  should  fatigue  so  easily  to  color  and 
apparently  not  at  all,  within  the  limits  of  the  observation,  to  bright- 
ness; and  in  the  second  place,  according  to  the  writer's  experience, 
the  tendency  of  color  contrast  within  limits  is  to  grow  with  prolonged 
observation  rather  than  to  disappear.  (2)  In  case  the  field  was  half 
white  and  half  black  with  the  line  of  junction  passing  vertically 
through  the  blind  spot,  the  observation  was  also  made  with  a  dark- 
adapted  eye.  Yet  in  this  case  Bruckner  says  the  blind  spot  is  filled 
out  by  irradiation  from  the  stronger  half  of  the  field. 

REFERENCES 

1.  BRUCKNER,  A.    Ueber  die  Sichtbarkeit  des  blinden  Fleckes.     Arch.  f.  d.  gfs. 

Physiol.,  1910,  136,  610-658. 

2.  EDRIDGE-GREEN,  F.  W.    Visual  Phenomena  Connected  with  the  Yellow  Spot. 

/.  of  Physiol.,  1910,  41,  263-275. 

3.  HAYCRAFT,  J.  B.    The  Color-blind  Margin  of  the  Blind  Spot,  and  the  Scotometer. 

/.  of  Physiol.,  1910,  40,  492-497. 

4.  PICK,  A.    Zur  Psychologic  des  konzentrisch  eingeengten  Gesichtsfeldes.     Arch.  /. 

d.  ges.  Physiol.,  1910,  136,  101-106. 

VISION— COLOR  DEFECTS 
BY  PROFESSOR  SAMUEL  P.  HAYES 

Mt.  Holyoke  College 

It  has  long  been  known  that  red-green  blindness  is  inheritable 
and  that  it  occurs  more  frequently  among  men  than  among  women. 
As  early  as  1876  Homer  (6)  formulated  a  law  of  descent,  that  color- 
blindness is  ordinarily  transmitted  to  males  through  unaffected 
females.  In  a  number  of  recent  books  on  heredity  the  attempt  has 
been  made  to  explain  the  transmission  of  color-blindness  by  Mendel's 
law.  Bateson  (i)  considers  color-blindness  to  be  a  sex-limited  unit 
character,  dominant  in  males  and  recessive  in  females.  "Color- 
blindness is  not,  therefore,  as  might  have  been  imagined,  a  condition 


VISION— COLOR  DEFECTS  113 

due  to  the  omission  of  something  from  the  total  ingredients  of  the 
body,  but  is  plainly  the  consequence  of  the  addition  of  some  factor 
absent  from  the  normal.  We  can  scarcely  avoid  the  surmise  that 
this  added  element  has  the  power  of  paralyzing  the  color-sense,  some- 
what as  nicotin-poisoning  may  do."  Bateson's  views  find  expression 
in  the  recent  books  of  Punnett  (9)  and  Doncaster  (4).  The  latter 
puts  the  matter  briefly  as  follows:  "Color-blindness  is  dominant  in 
males,  but  recessive  in  females,  but  at  the  same  time  an  affected 
man  transmits  the  *  factor'  for  color-blindness  only  to  his  daughter 
so  that  while  his  sons  and  their  descendants  are  free,  his  grandsons 
through  his  daughters  may  be  affected"  (p.  84).  Castle  (2)  and 
Davenport  (3)  also  regard  color-blindness  as  sex-limited  in  descent, 
but  consider  the  defect  to  be  caused  by  the  absence  of  a  "factor" 
necessary  to  normal  vision,  a  position  more  consistent  with  psycho- 
logical theories  of  color-vision,  and  apply  to  the  problem  the  recent 
cytological  theory  of  sex-chromosomes.  Castle  (p.  180)  says:  "A 
color-blind  man  does  not  transmit  color-blindness  to  his  sons,  but 
only  to  his  daughters,  the  daughters,  however,  are  themselves  normal 
provided  the  mother  was;  yet  they  transmit  color-blindness  to  half 
their  sons.  A  color-blind  daughter  may  be  produced,  apparently, 
only  by  the  marriage  of  a  color-blind  man  with  a  woman  who  trans- 
mitted color-blindness,  since  the  daughter  to  be  color-blind  must  have 
received  the  character  from  both  parents,  whereas  the  color-blind 
son  receives  the  character  only  from  his  mother.  Color-blindness  is 
apparently  due  to  a  defect  in  the  germ-cell — absence  of  something 
normally  associated  there  with  an  JF-structure,  which  is  represented 
twice  in  woman,  once  in  man." 

The  assertion  is  often  made  that  dichromates  equal  or  surpass 
persons  of  normal  color  vision  in  discrimination  of  small  differences 
in  color  tone.  The  only  experimental  work  upon  the  question,  that 
of  Brodhun,  showed  the  deuteranope  tested  (Brodhun)  to  be  more 
sensitive  to  difference  in  color  tone  in  the  more  refrangible  part  of 
the  spectrum  than  were  two  normal  observers  (Konig  and  Uhthoff). 
This  superiority  was  most  marked  in  the  region  of  the  neutral  band. 
Liebermann  and  Marx  (8)  report  an  experimental  investigation  of  the 
question,  with  a  protanope  and  a  normal  person  as  subjects.  The 
Helmholtz  color-mixing  apparatus  was  used,  and  tests  made  with  a 
longer  list  of  lights  than  Brodhun  tried,  including  among  others  a 
non-spectral  purple  formed  by  the  mixture  of  red  and  blue  light, 
which  appeared  colorless  to  the  protanopic  subject.  The  results 
showed  the  protanope  clearly  inferior  to  the  normal  subject  in  dis- 
tinguishing differences  in  color  quality,  throughout  the  whole  series 


114  SAMUEL  P.  HAYES 

of  colored  lights,  thus  directly  contradicting  Brodhun's  results.  The  au- 
thors do  not  think  it  justifiable  to  assume  that  this  difference  is  to  be 
accounted  for  by  the  difference  between  protanopes  and  deuteranopes. 

Kollner  (7)  shows  how  acquired  color-blindness  may  be  distin- 
guished from  congenital  protanopia  and  deuteranopia  by  psychological 
tests,  without  reference  to  its  accompanying  physiological  symptoms 
— lowered  visual  acuity,  abnormal  condition  of  the  retina,  etc. 
Acquired  red-green  blindness,  like  congenital  red-green  blindness,  is 
a  two-color  system  with  a  neutral  zone  in  the  green-blue  region.  In 
the  acquired  form,  however,  we  find  no  division  into  distinct  groups 
like  protanopia  and  deuteranopia  without  transition  forms,  but, 
rather,  a  fairly  definite  condition  of  dichromatic  vision  which  appears 
regularly  at  a  certain  stage  in  progressive  tabetic  atrophy  of  the 
optic  nerve  and  in  chronic  alcohol  poisoning.  It  is,  further,  a  quan- 
titative reduction  from  the  normal  condition,  with  color-memories 
intact,  rather  than  a  qualitative  simplification  of  normal  color-vision 
with  dichromatic  color-memories.  By  means  of  Nagel's  color-mixing 
apparatus  and  anomaloscope,  Kollner  finds  that  in  acquired  red- 
green  blindness  the  subjects  see  colors  at  a  very  low  saturation  (as 
they  would  appear  to  a  normal  person  through  a  thin  white  veil). 
As  a  result  of  this,  it  is  especially  difficult  to  determine  exactly  the 
limits  of  the  neutral  zone,  faint  colors  from  the  warm  end  of  the 
spectrum  which  would  appear  yellowish  to  the  congenital  color-blinds 
being  seen  as  white  by  the  acquired  color-blinds.  Moreover,  the 
stage  of  the  progressive  defect  can  be  determined  by  finding  which 
colors  are  equivalent  to  white,  since  they  fade  out  in  the  following 
order:  green,  yellow,  red,  blue.  Ordinarily  red  appears  of  about  the 
same  brightness  to  the  acquired  color-blind  as  to  a  deuteranope, 
about  the  same  amount  of  yellow  being  needed  in  both  cases  to  make 
the  red-yellow  equation.  In  two  out  of  about  100  cases,  the  subjects 
showed  the  protanopic  lowered  sensitiveness  to  the  red  end  of  the  spec- 
trum, but  in  both  cases  there  is  considerable  reason  for  assuming  that 
congenital  protanopia  existed  before  the  acquired  defect  developed. 

Hayes  (5)  examines  the  evidence  for  the  common  assumption 
that  all  typical  cases  of  partial  color-blindness  are  dichromates — 
see  only  yellow  and  blue — and  presents  the  results  of  a  series  of 
experiments  upon  19  new  cases,  one  of  whom  is  a  woman  color-blind 
in  one  eye  only.  He  feels  that  theoretical  bias  has  prejudiced  the 
interpretation  of  the  facts  in  many  of  the  published  articles  on  color- 
blindness; and  upon  the  basis  of  his  own  historical  and  experimental 
work  he  concludes  that  dichromacy  is  not  a  typical  but  an  extreme 
condition  of  partial  color-blindness  connected  with  normal  vision  by 


VISION— COLOR  DEFECTS  115 

a  series  of  intermediate  forms  showing  greater  or  less  deficiency  in  red 
and  green,  but  not  totally  lacking  red  and  green  sensations.  Five 
lines  of  evidence  are  considered,  (i)  Opposed  to  the  testimony  of 
various  color-blinds  (Dalton,  Pole,  etc.)  that  they  see  only  blue  and 
yellow,  Hayes  presents  the  testimony  of  five  of  his  subjects  that  red 
and  green  are  specifically  different  color  qualities  from  yellow  and 
gray.  This  claim  is  further  supported  by  a  study  of  the  color-con- 
fusions made  by  these  observers.  (2)  Dichromates  should  accept 
mixtures  of  blue,  yellow,  black  and  white  as  matches  for  all  colors. 
But  when  Hayes  presented  reds  and  greens  to  his  observers  under 
favorable  conditions — high  saturation,  large  area,  bright  illumination 
— no  equations  could  be  made,  oftentimes,  without  the  addition  of 
red  or  green  to  the  dichromate  mixture.  (3)  Hayes  presents  no  new 
data  upon  acquired  color-blindness,  and  thinks  it  unsafe  at  present 
to  claim  analogies  between  the  acquired  and  congenital  forms.  The 
findings  of  other  investigators,  however,  raise  a  significant  question, 
whose  ultimate  solution  promises  support  to  the  thesis  of  his  paper. 
If  sensitivity  to  green  may  lapse  before  sensitivity  to  red  is  lost,  and 
if  transitional  forms  between  trichromacy  and  dichromacy  occur  in 
acquired  color-blindness,  what  theoretical  warrant  can  there  be  for 
refusing  to  believe  that  an  analogous  series  of  transitional  forms 
occurs  in  congenital  color-blindness?  (4)  To  meet  the  claim  that 
colors  appear  to  the  partially  color-blind  as  they  do  to  normal  persons 
stimulated  in  the  blue-yellow  zone  of  the  eye,  Hayes  quotes  Baird's 
conclusion  that  retinal  function  in  the  periphery  lapses,  when  it 
does  lapse,  in  a  gradual  and  not  in  an  abrupt  fashion,  a  conclusion 
which  supports  his  own  conclusion.  (5)  A  review  of  the  experiments 
performed  upon  the  7  historical  cases  of  monocular  red-green  blind- 
ness shows  little  evidence  of  strict  dichromacy  except  in  the  case 
reported  by  von  Hippel,  while  the  new  case  extensively  studied  by 
Hayes  gives  undoubted  evidence  of  the  appreciation  of  green  as  a 
distinct  color  quality.  In  general,  then,  as  there  seems  to  be  so  large 
a  mass  of  evidence,  direct  and  indirect,  for  the  presence  of  sensations 
of  red  or  green  in  the  color-systems  of  the  partially  color-blind,  Hayes 
thinks  we  should  regard  dichromacy  as  an  extreme  form  of  partial 
color-blindness,  and  class  as  partially  color-blind,  also,  all  mild  cases 
of  color  deficiency  in  which  an  equation  can  be  formed  between  an 
unsaturated  blue-green  or  green  and  an  unsaturated  blue-red  or  red. 

REFERENCES 

i.  BATESON,  W.    MendeVs  Principles  of  Heredity.    New  York:  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons, 
1909.     Pp.  396. 


Il6  ROBERT  MORRIS  OGDEN 

2.  CASTLE,  W.  E.     Heredity:  Its  Relation  to  Evolution  and  Animal  Breeding.     New 

York:  D.  Appleton,  1911.     Pp.  184. 

3.  DAVENPORT,  C.  B.    Heredity  in  Relation  to  Eugenics.    New  York:  Henry  Holt 

and  Co.,  1911.    Pp.298. 

4.  DONCASTER,  L.     Heredity  in  the  Light  of  Recent  Research.     New  York:  G.  P. 

Putnam's  Sons,  1910.     Pp.  140. 

5.  HAYES,  S.  P.    The  Color  Sensations  of  the  Partially  Color-Blind,  a  Criticism  of 

Current  Teaching.    Amer.  J.  Psychol,  1911,  22,  369-407. 

6.  HORNER.    Die  Erblichkeit  des  Daltonismus.     Ophth.  Klinik.,  1876. 

7.  KOLLNER,   H.     Beitrage   zur   Pathologic   des    Farbensinnes.     Ueber   die   Unter- 

scheidung  der  erworbenen  Rotgriinblindheit  von  der  angeborenen  Protanopie 
und  Deuteranopie.     Zsch.f.  Augenhk.,  1910,  23,  97-111. 

8.  LIEBERMANN,  P.  v.,  und  MARX,  E.    Ueber  die  Empfindlichkeit  des  normalen  und 

des   protanopischen   Sehorgans   fur  Unterscheide   des    Farbentons.     Zsch.  /. 
SinnesphysioL,  1911,  45,  103-108. 

9.  PUNNETT,  R.  C.    Mendelism.    New  York:  Macmillan  Co.,  1911.    Pp.  192. 

HEARING 
BY  PROFESSOR  ROBERT  MORRIS  OGDEN 

University  of  Tennessee 

The  year  1911  has  brought  us  no  very  exhaustive  or  systematic 
research  in  the  field  of  hearing.  Pear  (7)  has  published  some  results 
obtained  in  the  Wiirzburg  laboratory  which  tend  to  substantiate 
experimentally  the  difference  in  degree  of  fusion  which  is  usually 
admitted  to  exist  between  major  and  minor  chords.  He  worked  with 
both  musical  and  unmusical  observers,  testing  their  respective  abilities 
along  this  line  (8)  by  means  of  the  analysis  of  intervals,  the  differential 
limen  for  pitch  and  a  "singing"  test  in  which  they  were  required  to 
imitate  notes  given  at  random.  He  also  made  a  "consistency"  test 
on  the  basis  of  eleven  musical  intervals,  varying  from  the  octave  to 
the  minor  second,  by  comparing  each  of  these  intervals  with  every 
other  one  four  times. 

The  principal  experiments  were  made  with  the  Appunn  tonometer. 
The  method  was  that  of  "paired  comparisons,"  the  observer  being 
required  to  judge  by  direct  impression  which  of  two  tri- tonal  chords 
possessed  the  greater  degree  of  fusion.  The  extreme  notes  in  the 
chords  compared  remained  constant,  and  included  the  intervals  3  :  5, 
2  :  3,  i-:  2,  2  :  5,  i  :  3,  and  I  :  4.  The  middle  tone  was  shifted  so  as 
to  produce  in  each  experimental  comparison  two  chords  of  three  con- 
stant intervals,  the  smaller  of  which  was  placed,  now  between  the  lower 
and  the  middle  tone,  now  between  the  middle  and  the  higher  tone. 

His  results  substantiate  the  assumption  that  "the  degree  of  fusion 
of  a  chord  varies  with  the  position  of  its  constituent  degrees  of  fusion 
within  the  tonal  scale,  decreasing  when  the  worse  degrees  are  the 


HEARING  117 

lower,  and  increasing  when  they  are  the  higher."  The  degree  of 
fusion  "increases  when  the  interval  possessing  the  greater  frequency- 
ratio  (i.  e.,  the  'greater  interval'  in  the  musical  sense)  occupies  the 
lower,  and  decreases  when  it  occupies  the  higher  position."  The 
same  is  true  for  intervals  of  "  greater  frequency-difference  (i.  e.,  the 
'greater  interval'  in  the  physical  sense)."  These  conclusions  are  in 
accord  with  the  assumption  that  chords  possessing  greater  indirect 
clang  relationship  are  more  highly  fused  than  those  possessing  greater 
direct  relationship.  Meyer's  tentative  assumption  that  "the  fusion 
of  a  chord  of  three  clangs  is  the  higher,  the  simpler  the  ratios  of  its 
frequencies,  whether  the  chord  be  considered  as  a  whole  or  the  tones 
be  taken  in  pairs"  is  also  substantiated.  Finally,  the  experiments 
seem  to  show  that  these  conclusions  have  a  more  general  significance 
than  the  mere  differentiation  of  major  and  minor  chords  in  music, 
since  they  apply  to  "unmusical"  as  well  as  to  "musical"  chords. 

Stumpf  (12)  takes  up  some  of  the  criticisms  which  have  been 
urged  against  his  explanation  of  consonance.  After  defining  fusion 
as  a  uniformity  rather  than  a  unity  of  effect,  and  contrasting  it  with 
similarity,  which  increases  with  the  decrease  in  an  interval,  he  pro- 
ceeds to  warn  against  the  correlation  of  fusion  with  physical  pitch, 
since  the  pitch  of  a  tone  is  known  to  vary  with  its  distance  from  the 
ear.  He  concludes  that  the  degree  of  fusion  is  a  function  of  two 
physiological  pitches,  and  that  it  is  impossible  for  the  same  pair  of 
tones,  thus  considered,  to  fuse  in  different  degrees.  Consonance  and 
dissonance  exist  only  between  two  simultaneous  tones;  successive 
tones  reveal  the  phenomena  of  relationship.  As  long  as  we  deal 
with  sense  impressions,  consonance  and  dissonance  exist,  not  in 
specific  degrees,  but  in  gradual  differentiations.  In  dealing  with 
music,  however,  we  have  passed  beyond  simple  sense  impression. 
Our  music  is  based  upon  a  tri-tonal  chord,  either  major  or  minor. 
This  chord  is  determined  rationally  by  the  greatest  number  of  tones 
within  an  octave,  all  of  which  are  mutually  consonant  in  such  a 
manner  that  in  passing  from  the  lower  to  the  higher  tones  in  succes- 
sion, we  pass  from  the  stronger  to  the  weaker  degrees  of  consonance. 

Stumpf  regards  the  major  and  minor  as  fundamentally  equal. 
The  musical  scale  is  built  up  by  the  derivation  of  successive  tri-tonal 
chords  of  the  sort  mentioned,  the  so-called  "dissonant"  tones  which 
thus  come  in  are  all  indirectly  related  to  the  fundamental.  In  this 
system  concords  consist  in  any  three  principal  tones,  either  major  or 
minor,  but  they  must  contain  a  fifth  or  fourth,  and  a  third  or  sixth. 
All  remaining  chords  are  discordant.  Concordance  and  discordance 
are  thus  very  much  more  complex  than  are  consonance  and  dis- 


Il8  ROBERT  MORRIS  OGDEN 

sonance,  although  they  are  based  upon  these.  Accordingly,  the  same 
consonant  pair  may  be  judged  as  concordant  or  discordant  by  virtue 
of  the  chord  to  which  it  is  conceived  to  belong.  The  consonance  of 
the  pair  is  in  no  wise  affected,  but  its  concordance  is.  Musical 
thought,  based  upon  this  system  of  major  and  minor  chords,  is 
responsible,  in  the  varying  attitudes  which  are  aroused  in  us,  for  the 
acceptance  or  rejection  of  single  intervals.  This  accounts  for  the 
seeming  contradiction  which  has  been  noted  to  exist  at  times  between 
consonant  pairs  and  musical  practice. 

In  a  critical  article  directed  against  Kriiger's  reply  to  Stumpfs 
original  strictures  upon  the  derivation  of  consonance  from  the  effects 
of  difference  tones  in  the  total  complex,  the  Berlin  psychologist  re- 
turns (13)  to  his  contention  that  the  interval  800  :  1,100  ought,  on 
Kriiger's  hypothesis,  to  be  completely  consonant,  because  no  beats  or 
mean-tones  are  present  among  the  difference  tones  aroused.  Kriiger 
having  since  responded  that  the  large  number  of  difference  tones  in  this 
and  similar  cases  affords  a  complex  clang  which  is  disadvantageous  to 
consonance,  Stumpf  answers  that  it  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  the  mere 
aggregation  of  tones  should  have  any  such  result,  since  no  such  effect 
is  apparent  in  the  addition  of  successive  tones  in  the  octave  relation. 

With  regard  to  certain  other  "critical  intervals"  which  Stumpf 
had  pointed  out,  Kriiger  has  contended  that  the  "sonance"  character 
of  intervals  extends  only  to  the  approximate  limits  of  the  human 
voice,  80-1,024  vib.,  beyond  this,  the  intervals  all  tend  to  become 
neutral.  This  Stumpf  denies,  claiming  that  musical  practice  shows 
that  a  limit  cannot  be  set  under  4,000  vib.  In  Stumpfs  opinion,  then, 
Kriiger's  theory  contradicts  itself,  even  if  we  assume  the  five  difference 
tones,  the  existence  of  which  Stumpf  has  experimentally  tested  and 
largely  disproven.1  One  consequence  of  Kriiger's  theory  would  be 
that  the  intervals  of  the  third  and  fourth  accented  octaves  should  be 
the  strongest  and  clearest  in  their  consonant  effectiveness,  because 
here  the  difference  tones  are  strongest  and  clearest.  Yet  in  this 
range  appear  the  "critical  intervals"  which  in  consequence  of  such  a 
theory  should  be  completely  consonant,  yet  they  are  not. 

Goebel  (4)  has  made  an  interesting  observation  which  he  believes 
to  be  in  substantiation  of  the  Helmholtz  theory  of  consonance.  A 
tone  of  sufficient  intensity,  he  finds,  is  accompanied  by  a  second  tone 
whose  pitch  is  one  octave  lower.  When  two  weak  tones  in  the  octave 
relationship  are  presented  simultaneously,  one  to  each  ear,  there 
appears  to  be  no  unity  in  the  effect.2  If,  however,  the  higher  of  the 

1  Cf.  "Summary  on  Hearing,"  this  journal,  1911,  8,  93  ff. 

2  An  analogous  phenomenon  has  been  observed  by  Ebbinghaus  (cf.  Grundziigf, 


HEARING  ng 

two  tones  be  intensified,  the  unity  is  at  once  established,  since  the 
lower  tone  is  then  present  in  each  ear.  The  author  assumes  that 
different  cells  in  the  same  cross-section  of  the  cochlea  must  be  speci- 
fically sensitive  to  octaves.  The  assumption  provides  that  the  outer 
cells  in  a  given  cross-section  may  function  for  the  higher  tone,  the 
inner  cells  for  the  lower  tone,  although  in  man,  where  the  number  of 
cells  is  small,  the  differential  effect  may  be  centrally  produced.  With 
the  exception  of  very  low,  and  perhaps  also  of  very  high,  tones  the 
author  concludes  that  the  intensification  of  any  single  tone  is  effective 
in  exciting  certain  cells  which  produce  an  additional  tone  one  octave 
lower  than  the  objective.  This  may  be  offered  in  explanation  of 
certain  cases  of  fusion  among  pure  tones  in  the  octave  relationship 
where  over-tones  are  not  objectively  present  to  make  the  Helmholtz 
explanation  of  identical  over-tones  applicable. 

In  a  combined  report  with  v.  Hornbostel  made  before  the  Fourth 
Congress  for  Experimental  Psychology  (n),  Stumpf  refers  to  the 
collection  of  phonograms  of  exotic  music  which  has  been  in  progress 
since  1904  at  the  Berlin  Institute.  He  also  indicates  two  interesting 
points  in  connection  with  the  study  of  non-European  musical  systems. 
First,  it  has  been  found  from  examination  of  xylophones  and  metallo- 
phones  that  the  Javanese  have  a  scale  of  seven  equal  intervals,  and 
the  Siamese  a  scale  of  five  equal  intervals.  The  equality  of  the 
relations  of  adjacent  tones  is  so  exact  that  we  must  assume  for  these 
people  a  sense  for  equality  of  interval  which  we  apparently  have  lost 
in  the  harmonic  development  of  our  music.  Wundt's  explanation 
that  the  intervals  have  been  determined  by  a  mechanical  process  of 
making  the  instrument  mathematically  correct  as  to  the  relative 
lengths  of  the  bars  of  wood  or  metal  is  not  substantiated  by  an  ex- 
amination of  the  instruments  themselves.  They  reveal  both  a  crude 
manufacture,  and  also  filing  and  weighting  for  the  evident  purpose  of 
tuning  them  after  completion  to  the  exact  intervals  required.  The 
second  point  has  reference  to  the  appearance  of  simultaneous  octaves, 
fifths  and  fourths  in  primitive  choral  singing.  Stumpf  assumes  that 
this  must  have  resulted  from  a  selection  based  upon  unitary  effective- 
ness, and  thus  reveals  the  universality  of  the  principle  of  fusion.  He 
believes  it  probable  that,  prior  to  such  selection,  primitive  melodies 
arose  from  the  use  of  arbitrary  small  intervals  which  were  quite 
unrelated. 

In  his  portion  of  the  report,  v.  Hornbostel  describes  another  way 
L,  2d  ed.,  pp.  345-346)  in  substantiation  of  his  theory  of  "undertones"  as  the  expla- 
nation for  tonal  fusion.  It  may  be  further  suggested  that  Goebel's  observations  can 
be  quite  readily  adapted  to  the  Ebbinghaus  theory. 


120  ROBERT  MORRIS  OGDEN 

in  which  polyphony  may  have  arisen.  In  passing  from  a  solo  to  a 
choral  part,  the  second  party  may  start  too  soon.  This  would  result 
in  simultaneous  tone  effects  some  of  which  are  perpetuated  in  practice 
because  of  their  fundamental  fusion.  The  usage  of  simultaneous 
major  seconds,  however,  which  he  has  found  to  be  frequent,  remains 
unexplained.  The  author  makes  a  second  point  with  regard  to  the 
very  high  development  of  rhythm  in  exotic  music.  The  fact  that 
uncivilized  folk  do  not  count  the  beats,  as  we  are  apt  to  do,  probably 
explains  their  greater  capacity  for  rhythmical  groups  and  variations. 
It  is  interesting  to  study  the  complexity  of  their  rhythms  in  combina- 
tion with  a  melody.  The  rhythmic  accompaniment  often  shows  a 
relatively  independent  structure  with  accents  which  vary  considerably 
from  those  of  the  melody. 

Hermann  (6)  returns  to  the  substantiation  of  his  theory  of  the 
"formant"  as  the  basis  of  vowel  sounds.  Experiments  with  the 
microphone  method  show  the  production  of  formants  whose  perio- 
dicity is  uninfluenced  by  the  note  on  which  the  vowel  is  sung.  How- 
ever, as  soon  as  the  vowel  note  exceeds  noticeably  the  pitch  of  the 
formant,  the  vowel  is  no  longer  heard.  The  formant  is  therefore  a 
fixed  tone  which  characterizes  the  vowel.  It  is  produced  by  a 
blowing  process,  with  the  mouth  cavity  as  a  resonator.  This  is  quite 
different,  however,  from  the  Helmholtz  notion  of  the  resonance  effect 
produced  by  this  cavity  in  intensifying  characteristic  overtones. 
These  tones  would  often  be  altogether  too  weak  for  such  a  purpose, 
as,  for  instance,  i  on  a  bass  note  would  depend  upon  the  2ist-29th 
partials.  Resonators,  according  to  Hermann,  behave  differently 
when  they  are  blown  and  when  they  respond  sympathetically.  It  is 
in  the  former  case  that  vowels  result  from  "anaperiodic"  blowing  of 
the  mouth  resonator  in  the  period  of  the  voice  vibration.  Whether 
the  mouth  tone  is  harmonic  or  inharmonic  to  the  voice  note  is  of  no 
importance.  Hermann  replies  briefly  to  Kohler's  experimental  at- 
tempt to  disprove  the  formant  theory,  but  aside  from  indicating  that 
Kohler  has  misapprehended  the  nature  of  the  relationship  existing 
between  the  vowel  tone  and  the  formant,  or  vowel  quality,  he  does 
not  enter  upon  a  critique  of  Kohler's  interesting  results.1 

In  reply  to  certain  experiments  by  Fredericq  which  seemed  to 
show  that  the  speed  of  a  phonograph  has  no  influence  upon  the  vowel 
sounds  produced  by  it,  Hermann  (5)  adds  that  the  vowel  character  is 
not  exclusively  dependent  on  pitch,  which,  is  of  course,  altered  with 
varying  speed  of  the  phonograph.  It  depends  also  upon  other  things, 
as  the  manner  in  which  the  formant  vibration  is  spread  over  the 


HEARING  I2i 

period.  For  each  vowel,  too,  the  formant  may  vary  over  a  certain 
range:  a  from  e*  to  a2,  e  from  c4  to  d$*.  Certain  facts  are  not  yet 
explained,  as  the  passage  of  high  tones  into  a  sounds,  and  the  passage 
of  e  into  o  and  i  into  u  when  the  speed  of  the  phonograph  is  increased. 
It  may  be  that  e  and  i,  which  according  to  Helmholtz  find  their 
characteristic  in  the  fourth  accented  octave,  possess  also  a  deeper- 
lying  formant  to  which  they  are  driven  by  the  increased  pitch,  and 
thus  they  approach  o  and  u  of  the  lower  register. 

Sander  (9)  experimented  upon  the  effect  of  duration  on  the  inten- 
sity of  tones.  He  used  two  successive  stimuli  furnished  by  tuning 
forks  and  conducted  to  the  ear  by  means  of  telephonic  connection. 
One  of  these  was  given  with  a  constant  full  intensity,  but  with  varying 
durations  in  the  different  experiments.  The  other,  by  which  the 
subjective  intensity  of  the  first  was  measured,  had  a  constant  duration 
and  an  easily  variable  intensity.  Reproduction  of  the  same  stimulus, 
after  an  interval  of  three  seconds,  was  marked  by  an  increased  inten- 
sity of  4  per  cent,  to  5  per  cent.  The  apparent  rising  intensity  of  a 
tone,  for  all  degrees  of  pitch  and  objective  intensity,  is  rather  rapid 
at  first  and  then  more  gradual.  The  point  of  time  at  which  the 
stimulus  first  reaches  its  tonal  maximum  cannot  be  exactly  deter- 
mined, but  with  the  author  it  lies  always  between  615  and  925*. 
The  remission  of  intensity  began  for  a  tone  of  218  vib.  after  i,uoe; 
with  the  weaker  tones  384  and  640,  there  was  no  remission  indicated. 
With  more  intensive  stimuli  the  tone  rises  more  rapidly,  yet  it  is 
doubtful  if  the  maximum  is  reached  more  quickly.  Increase  in  vibra- 
tion rate  plus  increase  in  intensity  effects  a  still  quicker  arousal.  It 
is  impossible  to  alter  the  quality  with  a  constant  intensity  since  the 
two  factors  operate  together. 

Urbantschitsch  (14)  reports  a  few  preliminary  experiments  to 
prove  that  reflex  movements  are  occasioned  by  sound  stimuli.  He 
had  ten  observers  read  aloud  while  various  tones  and  noises  were 
sounded.  They  were  instructed  to  pay  no  heed  to  the  sounds.  In  all 
cases  speech  was  interfered  with.  Reflexes  were  called  out  particu- 
larly in  the  regions  of  the  neck  and  breast.  The  reflexes  were  found 
to  vary  in  different  persons,  but  no  very  exact  correlations  were  noted. 
The  results  appear  to  be  rather  slight  for  supporting  the  contention 
that  sounds  occasion  definite  reflex  responses. 

With  reference  to  the  physiology  of  hearing,  Shambaugh  (10) 
makes  an  interesting  plea  that  more  consideration  be  given  ^the 
tectorial  membrane  in  the  functioning  of  the  Corti  organs.  He  points 
out  the  anatomical  fact  that  in  all  three  organs  of  the  labyrinth 


122  ROBERT  MORRIS  OGDEN 

hair-cells  are  to  be  found  in  contact  with  a  fine  membrane.  Whereas 
it  is  generally  admitted  that  the  stimulations  of  the  semicircular  canal 
and  the  vestibule  are  mediated  by  reciprocal  effects  of  the  hairs  and 
the  membrane  above,  the  tectorial  membrane  of  the  cochlea  is  over- 
looked in  favor  of  the  basilar  membrane.  It  is  impossible,  the  author 
thinks,  that  the  basilar  membrane  should  be  adequate  to  the  function 
of  hearing,  since  it  is  subject  to  a  varying  blood  pressure  which  can 
not  but  affect  its  vibratory  capacity.  The  reciprocal  effects  between 
the  hair-cells  and  the  tectorial  membrane  are  not  complicated  by  such 
disturbances.  Although  it  is  impossible  to  demonstrate  the  manner 
in  which  this  delicate  membrane  might  behave  under  stimulation, 
we  may,  perhaps,  assume  that  different  regions  respond  with  different 
tones,  the  high  tones  being  produced  near  the  base,  the  low  tones 
near  the  apex.  We  should  thus  be  able  to  accommodate  for  the 
pathological  "tone-islands,"  and  the  facts  of  tonal  analysis. 

Ewald  (2)  criticizes  certain  results  supposedly  in  confirmation  of 
the  Helmholtz  theory,  obtained  by  Wittmaack  and  Yoshii.  They 
worked  (separately)  on  guinea-pigs,  and  brought  about  the  destruction 
of  certain  regions  of  the  Corti  organ  by  stimulation  with  tones  of 
varying  pitch.  Ewald  shows  that  the  regions  destroyed  were  not 
definitely  in  accord  with  the  theoretical  location  of  the  particular 
tones  in  question,  and,  furthermore,  that  the  areas  were  much  too 
large  to  be  accommodated  to  the  Helmholtz  theory.  Ewald  has 
noticed  with  his  "camera  acustica"  that  small  bubbles  appearing 
on  the  membrane  in  the  water  are  driven  forward  with  great  force 
by  sudden  intensive  tones.  It  is  in  accordance  with  this  analogy 
that  he  would  explain  the  results  of  the  two  investigators  named. 

Frey  (3),  having  demonstrated  in  many  cases  anchylosis  between 
the  malleus  and  incus,  and  furthermore,  that  this  is  in  no.  case  a  true 
joint,  concludes  that  there  is  no  displacement  here  during  the  act  of 
hearing,  and  that  the  protection  of  the  conducting  apparatus,  which 
was  supposed  to  be  effected  by  the  movements  of  these  bones,  may 
and  must  be  explained  by  other  factors,  as  the  various  ligaments 
involved. 

In  an  interesting  volume  Dupre  and  Nathan  (i)  have  sum- 
marized the  principal  results  thus  far  obtained  in  the  study  of  musical 
defects  in  various  types  of  mental  disturbance.  After  an  intro- 
ductory chapter  in  which  the  psychology  of  language  in  general, 
and  the  musical  language  in  particular,  is  described  in  a  simple,  and 
also  somewhat  naive,  manner,  the  authors  proceed  to  the  consider- 
ation of  sensory,  psychic  and  motor  disturbances  among  aphasic, 


HEARING 


123 


psychopathic  and  insane  individuals.  The  origin  of  partial  amusia 
is,  they  believe,  dynamic,  the  organic  cases  being  invariably  complex 
or  total.  They  find  no  necessary  parallelism  between  amusia  and 
aphasia,  and  a  precise  cortical  localization  for  the  disturbances  in 
musical  language  is  not  evident.  In  dementia  musical  capacity 
suffers  along  with  the  other  mental  activities,  but  somewhat  more 
slowly.  An  interesting  critical  study  of  the  psychoses  of  great 
musicians  leaves  little  support  for  the  contentions  of  Lombroso  and 
Grasset  that  these  individuals  are  peculiarly  susceptible  to  insanity. 
A  consideration  of  melotherapy  brings  the  conservative  conclusion 
that  it  has  no  great  virtue  as  a  cure  for  the  insane.  With  psycho- 
and  neuropathic  cases  its  influence  is  at  times  undeniable,  yet  even 
here  it  is  entirely  conditional  on  the  individual  musical  capacity 
and  interests  of  the  subject  treated. 

REFERENCES 

1.  DUPRE,  E.,  et  NATHAN,  M.     Le  Langage  Musical    Paris:  Alcan,  1911.    Pp.  vii 

+  195- 

2.  EWALD,  J.  R.    Ueber  die  neuen  Versuche,  die  Angriffsstellen  der  von  Tonen 

ausgehenden  Schallwellen  im  Ohre  zu  lokalisieren.    Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  PhysioL, 

1910,  131,  188-198. 

3.  FREY,    H.     Die    physiologische    Bedeutung    der    Hammer-Ambossverbindung. 

Arch.f.  d.  ges.  PhysioL,  1911,  139,  548-561. 

4.  GOEBEL,  — .     Ueber  die  Ursache  der  Einklangsempfindung  bei  Einwirkung  von 

Tonen,  die  im  Oktavenverhaltnis  zueinander  stehen.  Zsch.  f.  SinnesphysioL, 
1911,45,  109-116. 

5.  HERMANN,  L.     Der  Einfluss  der  Drehgeschwindigkeit  auf  die  Vokale  bei  der 

Reproduktion  derselben  am  Edison'schen  Phonographen.  Arch.  f.  d.  ges. 
PhysioL,  1911,  139,  1-9. 

6.  HERMANN,  L.     Neue  Beitrage  zur  Lehre  von  den  Vokalen  und  ihrer  Entstehung. 

Arch.f.  d.  ges.  PhysioL,  1911,  141,  1-62. 

7.  PEAR,  T.  H.     The  Experimental  Examination  of  some  Differences  between  the 

Major  and  the  Minor  Chords.     Brit.  J.  of  PsychoL,  1911,  4,  56-88. 

8.  PEAR,  T.  H.    The  Classification  of  Observers  as  "Musical"  and  "Unmusical." 

Brit.  J.  of  PsychoL,  1911,  4,  89-94. 

9.  SANDER,  P.    Das  Ansteigen  der  Schallerregung  bei  Tonen  verschiedener  Hohe. 

PsychoL  Stud.,  1910,  6,  1-38. 

10.  SHAMBAUGH,  G.  E.    Die  Frage  der  Tonempfindung.    Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  PhysioL. 

1911,  138,  155-158. 

11.  STUMPF,  C.,  u.  HORNBOSTEL,  E.  v.    Ueber  die  Bedeutung  ethnologischer  Unter- 

suchungen  fur  die  Psychologic  und  Aesthetik  der  Tonkunst.  Bericht  uber  den 
IV.  Kongress  f.  experim.  PsychoL  in  Innsbruck,  1910.  Leipzig:  Earth,  1911. 
Pp.  256-269. 

12.  STUMPF,  C.     Konsonanz  und  Konkordanz.    Zsch.  f.  PsychoL,  1911,  58,  321-355- 

13.  STUMPF,  C.    Differenztone  und  Konsonanz.     (Zweiter  Artikel.)    Zsch.  f.  PsychoL, 

1911,  59,  161-175- 

14.  URBANTSCHITSCH,    V.    Ueber   den    Einfluss    von    Schallempfindungen    auf   die 

Sprache.     Arch.f.  d.  ges.  PhysioL,  1911,  137,  422~434- 


SPECIAL  REVIEWS 
PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ADVERTISING 

The  Relative  Merit  of  Advertisements.     EDWARD  K.  STRONG.     New 

York:  The  Science  Press,  1911.     Pp.  81. 

Strong  set  out  to  compare  advertisements  as  to  "pulling  power," 
"attention  value,"  "persuasiveness,"  etc.  In  the  main,  his  subjects 
were  college  students,  but  in  certain  experiments  individuals  from 
other  classes  of  society  were  included.  His  materials  were  piano, 
soap,  breakfast  food  and  vacuum  cleaner  advertisements.  A  special 
study  was  made  in  the  case  of  fifty  Packer's  Tar  Soap  advertise- 
ments. 

The  following  are  the  chief  results  which  may  be  gathered:  An 
advertisement  should  be  half  picture  and  half  copy.  Direct  appeals 
are  better  than  indirect  appeals.  The  strongest  appeals  are  those 
which  are  strictly  relevant  and  then  come  more  general  appeals  to 
instincts  and  habits  of  life.  College  students  represent  the  educated 
classes  of  the  community,  but  do  not  represent  the  smaller  towns 
and  farming  districts. 

The  prominence  given  to  the  purely  mathematical  part  of  the 
work  has  rather  overshadowed  the  remainder,  or,  to  put  it  otherwise, 
qualitative  distinctions  have  been  sacrificed  to  quantitative  distinc- 
tions, a  procedure  which  is  always  detrimental  to  good  psychology. 
The  comparison  between  two  experiments  by  using  the  mean  in  one, 
and  the  median  in  the  other,  is  not  even  good  statistics. 

The  following  statement  occurs  in  connection  with  the  Packer 
advertisements:  "Take  for  granted  that  each  advertisement  repre- 
sents a  different  make  of  soap."  It  is  submitted  that  such  inhibition 
is  impossible  except  in  a  specially  trained  subject  and  even  then  not 
always,  as  the  maker's  name  is  prominent  on  each.  Any  detailed 
introspection  is  lacking,  so  that  the  very  characteristic  of  a  psy- 
chological experiment  is  lacking. 

Taking  Strong's  study  or  procedure  as  typical  rather  than  specific, 
attention  may  be  drawn  to  some  work  which  is  being  called  "psy- 
chology of  advertising." 

Even  if  done  in  a  psychological  laboratory,  such  investigations 
are  not  psychological,  for  they  tell  us  nothing  about  the  psychological 
124 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF   ADVERTISING  125 

factors  which  make  an  advertisement  good  or  bad.  It  is  cheerfully 
admitted  that  such  a  line  of  investigation  gives  many  useful  facts. 
The  method  used  here  was  the  rough  comparison  of  advertisements 
according  to  "attention  value,"  "pulling  power,"  etc.  A  glance  at 
the  results  shows  that  many  of  them  are  already  known  or  are  of  such 
a  nature  as  can  be  ascertained  without  any  previous  training  in 
psychology. 

When  we  compare  a  series  of  advertisements  and  place  "relia- 
bility first"  "cleanliness  second,"  etc.,  as  the  case  may  be,  we  are 
not  contributing  to  the  psychology  of  advertising.  To  do  that,  we 
must  ascertain  why  such  terms  take  first  or  second  place.  These 
terms  are  not  psychological  and  instead  of  being  put  down  as  results, 
they  should  be  the  objects  of  inquiry. 

Take  "attention  value."  Strong  has  given  no  hint  as  to  any 
measure  or  criterion  and  at  best  it  seems  but  the  vague  opinion  of  the 
observer,  which  in  the  case  of  the  "negro  elevator  man"  cannot  be 
credited  with  the  superlative  of  accuracy. 

By  a  conglomeration  of  vague  preferences,  under  still  vaguer 
headings,  we  can  never  reach  the  psychological  bases  of  appeal. 
A  psychology  of  advertising  can  only  be  realized  by  a  keen  analysis 
of  the  conditions,  not  by  a  mere  catalogue  of  those  conditions. 

WILLIAM  D.  TAIT 

McGiLL  UNIVERSITY 

MENTAL  MEASUREMENTS 

The   Essentials  of  Mental  Measurement.     WILLIAM  BROWN.     Cam- 
bridge: University  Press,  1911.     Pp.  154. 

The  book  consists  of  two  parts,  the  first  dealing  with  psycho- 
physics  and  the  second  with  the  use  of  the  theory  of  correlation  in 
psychology.  Part  II.  is  a  reprint  of  the  author's  doctorate  thesis 
and  was  reviewed  in  the  January,  1911,  number  of  the  American 
Journal  of  Psychology.  Part  I.  begins  with  a  discussion  of  the  possi- 
bility of  mental  measurement  and  the  author  states  the  reasons  why 
he  believes  that  such  measurement  is  possible.  Then  follows  a 
description  of  the  different  psychophysical  methods.  The  method 
of  constant  stimuli  is  described  in  some  detail  and  with  great  clearness. 
There  is  a  misprint  in  the  observation  equations  on  p.  30,  where 
only  one  side  of  the  equations  is  multiplied  with  the  coefficient  of 
weight.  Curiously  enough  the  same  misprint  occurs  in  Titch- 
ener's  Manual,  Vol.  II.,  Part  L,  p.  102.  Brown  gives  Miiller's 
table  of  weights  as  well  as  mine,  which  is  inconsistent,  since  only  one 


126  REVIEWS 

of  the  tables  can  be  correct.  It  may  be  mentioned  in  this  place  that 
many  of  the  values  in  Miiller's  table  are  incorrect,  since  they  are 
out  by  the  unity  or  more  of  the  last  decimal  place.  The  connection 
between  the  method  of  constant  stimuli  and  the  method  of  just 
perceptible  difference  is  made  by  my  formulae. 

The  last  part  of  the  chapter  on  psychophysics  is  easily  the  most 
interesting.  Brown  proposes  to  apply  Pearson's  general  formulae  to 
the  study  of  the  distribution  of  the  threshold.  This  idea — though 
very  obvious  to  any  one  acquainted  with  Pearson's  work — is  new  and 
it  ought  to  be  tried  on  a  large  and  trustworthy  empirical  material. 
Such  an  investigation  is  bound  to  give  interesting  results  and  it  is 
to  be  hoped  that  the  author  may  soon  supplement  his  book  by  some 
such  work.  It  is  very  important  to  see  how  an  idea  works  out  in 
practice  and  it  also  is  important  to  know  how  much  work  the  practical 
application  of  a  method  requires.  For  this  purpose  all  the  necessary 
calculations  ought  to  be  given  in  detail. 

F.  M.  URBAN 

UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA 


DISCUSSION 
REACTIONS  TO  VISUAL  AND  AUDITORY  STIMULI 

In  his  summary  of  the  work  of  Dunlap  and  Wells1  on  "Reactions 
to  Visual  and  Auditory  Stimuli,"  Dr.  Herbert  Woodrow  mentions  the 
fact  that  while  in  the  case  of  simple  sensory  reaction  to  visual  and  to 
auditory  stimuli  the  former  were  found  to  be  the  longer,  it  was  also 
found  that  reactions  to  sound  and  flash  simultaneously  presented 
(the  reaction  being  to  the  flash,  and  the  attention  being  concentrated 
on  it  exclusively  during  the  preparatory  interval)  were  almost  as 
short  as  simple  sound  reactions. 

Dr.  Woodrow  says  that  this  circumstance  naturally  indicates  that 
when  the  reaction  was  ostensibly  to  the  flash,  it  was  actually  to  the 
accompanying  sound  simply,  and  adds  the  bare  statement  that  the 
authors  did  not  accept  this  explanation. 

In  the  paper  in  question,  our  reasons  for  not  accepting  the  simple 
explanation  were  definitely  assigned  (p.  328),  being  based  on  a  second 
set  of  experiments  which  was  planned  to  throw  light  on  the  results 
of  the  first  set.  The  results  of  this  second  set  are  fully  given  in  the 
paper  in  question. 

The  reactions  in  the  second  set  were  with  discrimination.  In  one 
group  the  reactions  were  to  flash  plus  sound,  flash  attended  to  (Fs) 
discriminated  from  sound  alone  (s).  In  another  group  the  reactions 
were  to  flash  alone  (F)  discriminated  from  sound  alone  (s).  In  each 
series  the  numbers  of  both  kinds  of  stimuli  were  equal,  and  the 
sequence  in  the  series  was  determined  by  the  order  of  a  well-shuffled 
pack  of  cards.  In  these  series  it  was  found  that  the  reaction  to  Fs 
was  considerably  shorter  than  the  reaction  to  F,  although  the  dis- 
crimination control  rendered  it  out  of  the  question  that  ostensible 
Fs  reactions  should  really  be  S  reactions. 

While,  as  we  pointed  out  in  the  paper,  the  results  of  these  experi- 
ments are  meager  from  the  numerical  point  of  view,  and  do  not  war- 
rant even  a  provisional  positive  conclusion,  they  are  of  sufficient 
importance  to  prevent  acceptance  of  the  simple  explanation  above 
mentioned,  and  to  point  out  a  line  for  research. 

GEORGE  R.  WELLS 

THE  JOHNS  HOPKINS  UNIVERSITY 

1  PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN,  1911,  8,  387-390. 

127 


BOOKS  RECEIVED  DURING  FEBRUARY 

MACVANNEL,  J.  A.  Outline  of  a  Course  in  the  Philosophy  of  Edu- 
cation. New  York:  Macmillan,  1912.  Pp.  ix  +  207.  $.90  net. 

HORNE,  H.  H.  Free  Will  and  Human  Responsibility.  A  Philo- 
sophical Argument.  New  York:  Macmillan,  1912.  Pp.  xvi  +  197. 
$1.50  net. 

BOSANQUET,  B.  The  Principle  oj  Individuality  and  Value.  London: 
Macmillan,  1912.  Pp.  xxxvii  +  409.  $3.25  net. 

WIRTH,  W.  Psychophysik.  Darstellung  der  Methoden  der  experi- 
mentellen  Psychologie.  Leipzig:  Hirzel,  1912.  Pp.  viii  +  522. 
Mk.  1 8,  geb.  Mk.  20. 

BODEN,  F.  Die  Instiktbedingtheit  der  Wahrheit  und  Erfahrung. 
Berlin:  L.  Simion,  1911.  Pp.  80.  Mk.  2.50. 

Jubilaums '  Katalog  der  Verlagsbuchhandlung  Wilhelm  Engelmann 
in  Le'pzig,  1811-1911.  Leipzig:  Breitkopf  &  Hartel,  1911.  Pp. 
iii  +  447. 

DAWSON,  JEAN.  The  Biology  of  Physa.  (Behavior  Monographs,  I, 
No.  2.)  New  York:  Holt,  1912.  Pp.  120. 


NOTES  AND  NEWS 

PROFESSOR  JOHN  B.  WATSON,  of  the  Johns  Hopkins  University, 
has  recently  been  granted  a  three  years'  appointment  as  a  research 
associate  of  the  Carnegie  Institution  of  Washington.  In  this  capa- 
city he  will  study  the  migratory  and  other  instincts  of  the  sea-gulls 
of  the  Tortugas,  Florida. 

DR.  BIRD  T.  BALDWIN,  now  professor  of  education  at  the  Uni- 
versity of  Texas,  is  to  have  charge  of  the  new  department  of  psy- 
chology and  education  which  is  to  be  established  next  year  at 
Swarthmore  College. 

128 


Vol.  IX.  No.  4.  April  I5 

THE 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN 


GENERAL  REVIEWS  AND   SUMMARIES 

PATHOPSYCHOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 

BY  DR.  ADOLF  MEYER 
Johns  Hopkins  Hospital 


The  last  year  has  brought  to  us  the  emphasis  of  a  new  contrast 
in  our  field,  viz.,  the  opposition  of  pathopsychology  and  psycho- 
pathology. 

A  mere  creation  of  contrasts  not  infrequently  helps  in  bringing 
otherwise  vague  perspectives  to  clearer  attention,  especially  so  in 
the  discussions  of  broader  issues.  Often  enough  the  generalities  are 
of  a  kind  which  need  not  touch  the  genuine  worker  who  can  readily 
leave  them  to  the  time  when  enough  facts  are  available  to  make  a 
conclusion  easy,  and  who  in  the  meantime  trusts  the  sound  trend  of 
the  day  or  the  vogue  of  the  programs  of  our  scientific  societies.  At 
the  same  time,  if  a  beginner  or  the  average  worker  has  the  chance  to 
grasp  clear  starting  points  and  perspectives,  he  is  bound  to  be  better 
off  than  if  he  moves  in  a  groove  made  by  others  or  yields  to  tempta- 
tions which  may  unnecessarily  check  or  side-track  his  soundest 
instincts  of  reaction  to  the  world  of  facts.  And  where  a  branch  of 
science  is  just  beginning  to  shape  itself,  the  neighbors — in  our  special 
case,  the  psychologist  and  the  physician — will  be  better  able  to  appre- 
ciate the  attitude  of  new  departments  in  a  measure  as  there  is  clear- 
ness about  the  starting-point  and  perspectives;  for  to  take  success 
as  the  only  test  merely  opens  the  door  to  the  deplorable  flood  of  un- 
critical psychopathologies  which  struggle  for  the  supremacy  in  the 
public  eye,  not  without  effects  upon  the  more  scientifically  minded 

workers. 

129 


130  ADOLF  MEYER 

In  previous  numbers  of  the  BULLETIN  an  effort  has  been  made  to 
review  especially  those  topics  which  promised  to  have  an  influence 
upon  the  geographical  and  political  map  of  systematized  science  and 
what  we  might  call  the  interstate  relations:  psychopatholqgy  as 
nosology  and  as  non-dogmatic  pathology  in  1904;  then  the  evolution 
of  a  possible  dynamic  standpoint;  the  development  of  the  association- 
experiment,  and  of  the  interpretation  of  cerebral  integration  in 
aphasia  and  apraxia;  the  psychological  experiment  in  psychopathol- 
ogy,  and  more  special  problems,  such  as  the  feeling  of  reality  (1905); 
aphasia,  and  the  relation  of  emotional  and  intellectual  functions  in 
paranoia  and  obsessions,  and  the  psychopathological  development  in 
association  studies  (1906);  next  the  psychogenic  factors  in  the  devel- 
opment of  psychoses,  and  misconceptions  of  a  dogmatic  "medical 
psychology"  and  the  "revisions"  of  aphasia  (1907);  and  finally  the 
criticism  of  nosology  and  mental  dynamics  in  1908,  and  in  1910  the 
Freudian  psychology.  These  were  the  leading  topics  discussed  by 
the  contributors  of  the  psychopathological  numbers  of  the  BULLETIN. 
Today  we  are  confronted  with  a  double  current  manifested  in  the 
assertion  of  autonomy  of  introspective  psychology  and  also  the 
creation  of  a  contrast  of  pathopsychology  and  psychopathology, 
which  may  or  may  not  complicate  the  already  complex  path  of  the 
domain  of  concern  to  us.  The  latter  comes  out  most  strongly  in  the 
new  Zeitschrift  fur  Pathopsychologie,  edited  by  Wilhelm  Specht;  and 
I  also  wish  to  discuss  in  this  connection  some  reflections  on  the  kin- 
dred current  in  recent  psychology,  as  far  as  it  is  apt  to  influence  the 
worker  in  mental  disorders. 

II 

In  his  preface,  Specht  urges  that  the  way  from  psychiatry  to 
psychology  must  necessarily  pass  through  philosophy.  The  chief 
factor  of  retardation  of  psychiatry  is  the  materialistic  dogma  of 
the  epiphenomenal  nature  of  "psychics"  (des  Psychischen).  Psy- 
chiatry must  learn  to  surrender  its  one-sided  focusing  upon  the 
brain  and  must  learn  to  apply  psychological  methods  to  mental 
diseases.  On  the  other  hand  psychology  must  accept  the  wealth  of 
opportunities  and  the  kind  of  broadening  out  which,  in  its  way, 
pathology  has  given  to  physiology.  English  and  French  philosophy 
(Maudsley,  Taine  and  Ribot,  and  lately  also  Bergson)  has  long  appre- 
ciated the  importance  of  pathology  for  psychology;  Stoning  and 
Oesterreich  and  others  have  created  psychological  studies  in  pathology 
in  Germany;  a  few  alienists  have  at  least  developed  a  psychologically 


PATHOPSYCHOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOPATHOLOGY  131 

more  refined  symptomatology,  and  others  promoted  a  deeper  psycho- 
logical understanding  of  diseases.  But  "in  psychiatric  circles  not 
even  the  essential  difference  between  mere  clinical  experimental 
psychology  and  pathopsychology  is  clearly  grasped."  To  them  to 
speak  of  function  is  merely  an  admission  of  insufficient  anatomical 
knowledge-.  Thus  it  happens  that  a  reduction  of  the  facts  to  terms 
of  function  in  a  truly  psychological  sense  is  only  in  its  beginning. 
With  his  Zeitschrift  he  wishes  to  give  the  study  of  mental  diseases 
a  new  foundation  by  bringing  the  psychologist  and  psychiatrist 
together  in  the  work  of  pathology  of  mental  life  on  a  really  psycho- 
logical foundation,  in  a  pathopsychology,  dealing  with  the  pathology 
of  the  individual  consciousness,  and  also  with  the  psychology  of 
abnormal  conditions  and  creations  of  society. 

On  pp.  4-49  Specht  gives  a  full  discussion  of  the  program  of 
pathopsychology.  He  shows  how  a  careful  description  and  analysis 
of  the  pathological  phenomena  in  mental  diseases  are  possible  only 
through  penetration  into  the  mental  mechanism  of  the  disorders. 

Without  wanting  to  discuss  why,  with  all  its  productivity,  "psy- 
chology as  developed  under  the  leadership  of  Wundt  does  not  seem 
to  succeed  in  establishing  theses  which  would  be  teachable  and 
generally  acceptable,"  and  without  taking  sides  in  the  recent  disputes 
concerning  the  experimental  method,  Specht  wishes  to  show  first 
wherein  the'  pathological  method  is  preferable  to  the  experimental 
method.  He  concedes  to  such  a  philosophical  critic  as  Husserl 
(Logos,  I,  Heft  3,  1910-11)  a  whole  range  of  problems  (the  essence 
of  psychics,  the  nature  of  our  understanding  other  minds,  the  rela- 
tion of  psychics  to  a  self,  the  question  of  the  independent  exist- 
ence of  thought  or  of  degree  of  consciousness,  etc.);  they  cannot, 
he  thinks,  be  settled  by  observation  or  experimentation;  "they 
belong  to  the  epistemology  of  psychics  and  precede  inductive 
psychology  as  philosophical  propaedeutics  of  psychology  or  as  the 
phenomenology  of  psychics";  but  he  finds  an  ample  field  for  the 
experimental  method  in  the  search  for  lawfulness  wherever  the  task 
is  one  of  the  inductive  science  of  psychology,  whether  it  does  or  does 
not  turn  its  attention  especially  upon  the  introspective  issues. 

The  aim  of  all  experimentally  modified  introspection  is  to  single 
out  or  to  eliminate  certain  components.  In  the  normal,  this  is  only 
approximately  possible;  perceptive  and  recognitive  functions  cannot 
be  dissociated  in  the  normal;  nor  can  a  somatic  memory  of  Bergson 
be  completely  cut  off  from  the  representative  memory  in  the  normal. 
Pathology  however  furnishes  exactly  such  dissociations.  Only 


132  ADOLF  MEYER 

pathology  knows  of  states  in  which  a  hand  although  anaesthetic  may 
nevertheless  recognize  an  object;  or  in  which  recognition  may  be 
eliminated  while  perception  and  memory  are  preserved;  or  in  which 
objects  given  to  external  perception  give  up  their  claim  to  be 
present;  or  in  which  the  realization  of  a  motor  intention  becomes 
dependent  upon  actual  concepts  or  memories  of  motion;  or  in  which 
(as  in  hallucinations)  the  meanings  are  no  longer  founded  on  sensory 
contents,  but  where  an  already  prepared  intention  of  meaning  seems  to 
slip  in  between  sensation  and  content.  Normal  psychology  can  at 
best  come  near  such  an  elimination,  or  solution  of  continuity,  or  per- 
version of  functions,  but  it  never  can  realize  them  completely.  For 
some  reason  Specht  is  however  exceedingly  cautious  about  his  appli- 
cations and  somewhat  arbitrary.  "There  follows  from  this  a  negative 
and  a  positive  rule  concerning  the  significance  of  pathology  for  psycho- 
logical science.  Wherever  there  are  phenomena  which  only  occur 
in  pathological  conditions,  an  immediate  application  of  pathology 
to  psychology  is  not  admissible."  Hallucinations  for  instance  are 
considered  as  strictly  pathological  phenomena,  devoid  of  all  transition 
through  illusion  to  normal  perception.  "Similarly  it  is  pathological 
when  volitional  intention  requires  motor  images  for  the  realization 
of  its  content."  The  phenomenon  of  the  positive  after-image  has 
been  too  rashly  used  for  false  theories  of  sense-perception  and  even 
for  metaphysical  theories  on  the  subjectivity  of  the  contents  of  per- 
ception. The  association  psychology  should  not  appeal  directly  to 
the  findings  in  mania  and  in  intoxication;  and  the  doctrine  of  the 
mind-substance  should  not  be  considered  as  refuted  by  the  dissocia- 
tion of  the  ego  in  hysteria,  lest  one  ignore  the  fact  that  these  condi- 
tions are  abnormal  and  "  that  there  are  also  occasional  thinking,  non- 
intoxicated  and  non-hysterical  personalities."  The  physiologist 
would  err  in  a  similar  manner  if  he  described  the  elimination  of 
albumen  as  a  function  of  the  kidney  and  not  merely  a  function  of  the 
diseased  kidney. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  Specht  is  justified  in  drawing  the  attention 
to  the  necessity  of  reserve.  It  is  necessary  to  check  the  uncritical 
and  to  cultivate  a  certain  respect  for  the  concrete  situation  of  any 
special  type  of  occurrence  as  opposed  to  the  license  of  untrammeled 
generalization.  Passing  to  the  positive  rule,  Specht  shows  how  the 
perception  of  things  by  an  anaesthetic  hand  endorses  Kiilpe's  re- 
habilitation of  the  inner  sense  and  how  it  warns  against  sensualistic 
generalization  which  minimizes  the  difference  between  recognizing 
the  thing  and  recognizing  the  tactile  sensations.  Or  (p.  14)  he  shows 


PATHOPSYCHOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOPATHOLOGY  133 

how,  notwithstanding  preserved  capacity  of  perception  and  of  re- 
membrance of  previous  perception,  recognition  can  be  lacking;  and 
that  abolition  of  visual  memory  does  not  entail  mind-blindness,  so 
that  Bergson's  contrast  of  memory  for  motor  utilizations  and  of 
independent  memories  is  more  justified  than  the  current  explanations 
such  as  those  of  Lehmann  (Phil.  Stud.,  Vol.  V.).  This  does  not  call 
for  a  wholesale  transfer  of  conceptions  from  pathopsychology  to 
psychology;  it  is  a  broadening  of  the  world  of  facts  on  which  general 
theories  should  be  brought  to  a  test.  In  my  own  mode  of  expression 
I  should  have  to  emphasize  the  respect  for  the  concrete  situation  and 
the  mistrust  of  any  "absolute"  generalization  which  would  want  to 
be  anything  more  than  a  more  or  less  comprehensive  simplification 
of  our  concrete  picture  of  the  world  and  our  experience.  If  we  bear 
this  in  mind,  some  of  the  points  specified  above  as  warnings  may  not 
have  to  be  brushed  aside  in  as  final  a  fashion  as  Specht  seems  to 
feel  obliged  to  do,  as  with  regard  to  the  hallucinations  and  the  artificial 
reproduction  of  "flight  of  ideas,"  etc.  They,  like  the  favored  in- 
stances of  acceptable  generalization,  will  stand  or  fall  according  to 
whether  they  will  stand  the  tests  of  repeated  experimentation  and 
analytical  penetration. 

Pathology  adds  to  our  knowledge  not  only  by  eliminating  certain 
connections,  but  by  the  independent  variation  of  various  functions 
(or,  as  I  should  put  it,  of  various  integrated  factors).  It  does  for  us 
what  caricature  and  the  experiment  do,  and  it  suggests  new  channels 
of  work  and  new  viewpoints.  Specht  certainly  makes  plain  "the 
value  of  pathology  as  shown  by  elimination  of  functions"  and  "the 
narrowness  of  the  thesis  that  normal  mental  life  should  not  be  ex- 
plained from  the  pathological  side." 

Specht  (p.  1 6)  next  passes  to  the  question  of  what  role  can  patho- 
psychology play  in  the  business  of  psychiatry  (which  is  the  "  discrimina- 
tion and  cure  of  mental  diseases").  With  the  dogmatic  assurance 
shared  by  Miinsterberg,  Specht  claims  that  medicine  ceases  to  be  a 
medical  science,  if  it  ceases  to  prove  that  a  patient  asking  for  treatment 
has  this  or  that  disease;  the  knowledge  of  the  "disease"  and  the 
knowledge  of  the  causes  calls  for  the  baths,  medicaments,  psycho- 
therapy, etc.  Psychiatry  thus  must  make  it  its  business  to  recognize 
and  cure  mental  diseases. 

Specht  accepts  the  establishment  of  absolutely  distinct  disease 
entities  as  achieved  (?),  and  also  the  demonstration  of  some  definite 
etiologies;  but  he  deplores  the  hopelessness  and  dogmatic  pessimism 
which  spurns  the  psychological  concepts  even  in  the  functional  dis- 


134  ADOLF  MEYER 

eases  and  there  can  reckon  merely  with  "brain  diseases  in  which  we 
are  still  ignorant  of  the  lesion,"  and  which  is  apt  to  see  only  in  these 
"physical"  processes  realities,  even  though  they  may  be  merely 
hypothetical,  while  the  psychic  facts  figure  as  mere  epiphenomena; 
so  that  the  psychiatrist  maintains  a  passive  attitude  wherever  he 
does  not  find  a  point  of  attack  upon  the  gross  or  molecular  changes  in 
the  brain.  In  the  mind  of  the  "psychiatrist"  even  mental  influences 
can  have  a  beneficial  effect  only  through  the  influence  on  the  molecular 
conditions  with  a  secondary  effect  on  the  mental  state  (Specht 
illustrates  this  position  by  Kraepelin's  attitude).  In  contrast  to 
this,  Specht  wants  to  restore  their  reality  to  the  psychic  data,  and  he 
does  not  want  to  wait  for  the  day  when  a  drug  will  be  available  to 
counteract  a  melancholia  as  a  drug  counteracts  constipation;  he 
wants  to  recognize  mental  diseases  as  mental  diseases  and  study 
them  for  psychical  causes  (if  they  exist)  and  a  corresponding  therapy, 
or  for  physical  causes  when  physical  causes  exist;  and  he  wants  to 
distinguish  brain  diseases  and  mental  diseases  (rather  than  "organic" 
and  "  functional "  diseases) .  "  Brain  diseases  "  and  "  mental  diseases  " 
are  not  altogether  synonymous  with  "exogenous"  and  "endogenous" 
disorders;  but  in  the  one,  therapy  attacks  the  brain,  in  the  other  it 
attacks  the  mind  (in  which  I  should  emphasize  conduct  and  behavior). 
Only  experience  and  the  facts  will  decide  which  conditions  belong 
to  the  one  and  which  to  the  other  group.  While  nobody  would 
exclude  the  possibility  that  some  day  a  drug  might  affect  the  brain 
in  exactly  the  necessary  way  to  bring  about  even  the  mental  changes 
required,  a  study  of  the  psychogenic  mental  disorder  from  the  mental 
side  in  the  meantime  is  to  say  the  least  absolutely  justified,  even  if, 
as  in  dementia  prsecox,  the  deterioration  speaks  definitely  for  an 
involvement  of  the  brain  tissue  in  the  decline. 

Lack  of  space  forces  me  to  give  only  a  limited  summary  of  the 
well  written  arguments  of  pp.  16-49.  They  form  a  counterpart  to 
my  own  statements  in  earlier  years  of  this  BULLETIN.  Specht  gives 
a  very  lucid  discussion  of  the  necessity  of  a  more  plastic  and  func- 
tional conception  of  "disposition"  which  makes  different  persons 
react  differently  to  the  same  difficulty  (as,  e.  g.,  different  women  would 
react  differently  to  marital  infelicity),  and  he  formulates  the  treatment 
as  an  attempt  to  make  the  patient  see  things  in  a  wholesome  light — 
not  through  blunt  arguments  but  through  helps  which  help.  He 
appeals  to  the  psychiatrist  to  approach  his  work  free  from  all  dog- 
matic presupposition  and  to  depend  on  what  he  finds  by  experience, 
to  recognize  psychogenic  and  non-psychogenic  disturbances  and  with 


PATHOPSYCHOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOPATHOLOGY  135 

this  the  existence  of  mental  causes,  seen  both  in  the  production  and 
in  the  remedial  modification  of  disease.  It  is  quite  characteristic 
that  he  harks  back  to  some  psychiatric  voices  of  sixty  years  ago, 
before  the  anatomical  fascination  created  the  doctrine  of  exclusive 
salvation  in  putting  all  psychopathology  in  terms  of  hypothetical 
brain-changes. 

Specht  errs  if  he  claims  that  Freud's  somewhat  over-systematized 
psychopathology  is  the  only  attempt  in  this  direction  in  modern  psy- 
chiatry. He  is  not  informed  of  the  work  in  the  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
BULLETIN.  And  I  must  confess  that  the  recent  discussion  of  the 
introduction  of  psychology  in  the  medical  curriculum  shows  a  broader 
and  freer  development  than  the  one  under  which  Specht  feels  justified 
to  introduce  his  new  journal.  He  certainly  does  not  make  clear  how 
he  promises  help  to  the  psychiatrist  who  should  find  his  way  to 
psychology  "through  philosophy."  Will  that  become  clear  through 
his  philosophical  contributor? 

Ill 

Miinsterberg  ("Psychologic  und  Pathologic,"  pp.  50-66)  takes 
up  the  methodological  issues.  He  complains  of  the  continual  careless 
intermingling  of  the  two  expressions,  psychopathology  and  patho- 
psychology  (or,  he  might  possibly  have  said  more  justly,  of  the 
promiscuous  use  of  the  word  psychopathology  where  M.  would  prefer 
the  adoption  of  the  term  pathopsychology).  An  investigation  may 
be  of  importance  to  both  psychology  and  to  pathology,  but  it  naturally 
is  logically  differently  focused  according  to  whether  it  aims  to  serve 
a  knowledge  of  the  mental  phenomena  or  of  the  diseases.  He  per- 
emptorily assumes  that  qua  pathology  any  mental  disorder  must  be 
viewed  as  "symptom  of  some  definite  disease,"  while  qua  psychology 
it  is  treated  as  a  variation  of  other  similar  mental  variations. 

Pathopsychology  at  once  appears  under  two  sets  of  conditions. 
Psychology  may  be  furthered  in  its  intrinsic  problems  by  studying 
the  abnormal  states  and  processes  beside  those  of  normal  life;  on 
the  other  hand  it  may  draw  in  pathology  (I  should  say  nature's 
experiments)  for  the  purpose  of  interpreting  normal  mental  life  (I 
should  say  mental  life  in  general).  "In  the  one  case  the  relation  to 
pathology  yields  a  special  group  of  problems;  in  the  other  case  a 
special  method  for  psychology.  Both  result  in  a  gain  of  purely  psycho- 
logical knowledge  and  therefore  constitute  pathopsychology;  but  they 
form  two  different  fields  of  work  which  coincide  only  in  certain 
points,"  very  much  as  the  psychology  of  normal  life  and  experimental 


136  ADOLF  MEYER 

psychology.  The  same  kind  of  contrasts  can  be  made  in  animal 
psychology  and  in  physiological  psychology  (and  M.  might  say  also 
in  pathology  itself  when  it  studies  constitutions  as  well  as  the  specially 
definable  processes  or  "diseases,"  or  when  we  compare  its  descriptive- 
analytical  part  and  the  experimental  pathology). 

Pathopsychology  thus  studies  the  mental  processes  occurring  in 
disease  not  as  symptoms  of  diseases  but  as  deviations  from  the  normal 
course  of  mental  life  and  for  the  gain  of  purely  psychological  knowl- 
edge, partly  to  broaden  the  field  of  facts  (a  special  group  of  contents) 
and  partly  to  explain  normal  mental  life  (as  a  counterpart  of  experi- 
mental psychology  in  a  new  field,  or  as  a  special  method).  M.  urges 
the  verbally  plausible  contrast  between  an  extension  of  matter  and 
an  extension  of  method. 

By  giving  up  the  concept  of  disease  and  morbidness, pathopsy- 
chology  according  to  M.  "encounters  considerable  methodological 
difficulties."  The  contrast  of  health  and  disease  is  logically  simple. 
Health  and  disease  necessarily  refer  to  biological  conditions  and  are 
concepts  borrowed  from  general  pathology,  which  is  based  on  diseases 
of  the  body;  a  special  adaptation  to  the  psychical  conditions 
is  therefore  not  necessary  for  the  concept  of  "disease."  Whatever 
damages  the  self-preservation  of  the  organism  is  morbid  whether  it 
shows  in  the  purely  physical  domain  or  in  part  also  in  the  mental 
field.  "Hence  the  concept  of  what  is  pathological"  remains  abso- 
lutely dependent  on  the  vital  conditions  of  the  physical  body  even 
when  we  are  concerned  with  psychology,  and  it  does  not  require  any 
special  adaptation  out  of  consideration  for  psychics.  (The  reader 
will  see  that  all  this  resolves  itself  to  the  traditional  conception  that 
there  are  no  mental  "diseases"  but  only  physical  "diseases"  and  to 
M.'s  views  concerning  causality.) 

In  the  mental  domain  proper  we  can  only  speak  of  normality  and 
abnormality,  i.  e.,  reference  to  mere  averages  (which  would  be  lowered 
in  case  of  increase  of  insanity)  or  to  an  ideal  of  harmony  of  the  mental 
forces.  Abnormality  and  disease  are  not  parallel  concepts:  a  genius 
is  abnormal  but  not  pathological;  from  a  teleological-psychological 
standpoint  dreams  should  be  looked  upon  as  abnormal  and  yet 
not  a  pathological  symptom,  but  on  the  contrary,  with  some  psycho- 
pathologists,  a  really  important  help  to  the  normal  organic  function- 
ing; whereas  the  euphoria  of  the  consumptive  may  be  pathologically 
part  of  the  disease  but  is  psychologically  normal.  In  "suggestion" 
the  abnormal  begins  "where  the  hypnotic  influence  sets  in,"  or  in 
blindness  or  deafness  "where  they  modify  a  mental  life";  yet  neither 


PATHOSPYCHOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOPATHOLOGY  137 

of  these  abnormal  states  turns  on  the  notion  of  disease.  "Patho- 
psychology  will  attempt  to  explain  the  whole  range  of  the  abnormal 
with  the  helps  of  the  normal  psychology,"  and  by  using  its  knowledge 
of  memory,  of  attention,  of  feelings,  of  volition.  To  all  this  we  might 
say  that  to  the  psychologist,  as  to  the  scientist  generally,  normality 
and  abnormality  can  no  longer  be  a  primary  scientific  issue.  Science 
must  generalize  the  venerable  declaration  of  breadth  in  "Nihil 
humani  a  me  alienum  puto,"  and  it  must  accept  the  fact  that  this 
broadening  out  is  to  be  allowed  without  a  priori  restrictions — for  who 
knows  what  the  investigator  may  find  and  what  he  must  be  ready 
to  meet.  At  this  point,  M.  properly  criticizes  the  use  of  the  term 
"applied  psychology"  for  pathopsychology,  which  would  be  as  in- 
appropriate as  calling  the  psychology  of  myths,  of  morals,  and  of 
languages,  applied  psychology.  So  much  for  M.'s  discussion  of 
pathopsychology  as  "psychological  penetration  of  the  abnormal  psy- 
chological phenomena." 

M.  next  takes  up  pathopsychology  as  determined  by  the  methodo- 
logical viewpoint.  "  It  is  the  entire  psychology  as  far  as  it  is  fur- 
thered by  the  study  of  abnormal  and  especially  pathological  phe- 
nomena," especially  where  clinical  observation  gives  insight  into 
the  psychical  mechanism.  But  M.  evidently  still  assumes  that  what- 
ever mental  phenomena  occur  in  disease  must,  in  pathopsychology, 
be  viewed  as  an  exaggeration  or  a  reduction  of  the  "normal." 

Psychopathology  is  "quite  different";  according  to  M.  it  turns 
absolutely  on  the  concept  of  "disease."  As  far  as  it  studies  special 
contents,  it  takes  up  the  special  mental  symptoms  in  specifically 
mental  diseases  and  also  in  other  diseases.  As  far  as  it  takes  the 
methodological  viewpoint,  it  deals  with  the  entire  domain  of  human 
diseases  as  far  as  its  study  can  be  furthered  by  the  consideration  of 
mental  facts  and  psychological  knowledge.  "Here  then  the  normal 
mental  attitude  is  the  real  starting  point.  We  may  take  as  an 
instance  the  much-disputed  mental  tests  which  try  to  elucidate  a 
pathological  behavior  in  the  domain  of  a  simple  measurable  activity 
by  comparing  it  with  the  normal  typical  condition,"  etc. 

The  four  fields  are  further  complicated  by  the  physiopsychological 
and  psychophysiological  correlations  and  substitutions  which  must 
be  made  problems  "clearly  kept  apart." 

M.  next  turns  from  the  theoretical  field  to  the  union  of  psychology 
and  pathology  for  practical  results  in  the  service  of  hygiene  and 
pedagogy,  in  psychodiagnosis  and  psychoprognosis,  or  in  the  diagnosis 
of  mental  states  by  non-psychological  means,  or  with  the  help  of 


138  ADOLF  MEYER 

normal-psychological  demonstrations  (as  in  the  disorders  of  intelli- 
gence). Even  for  the  study  of  peripheral  and  spinal  diseases  psycho- 
logical methods  (tests  of  sensibility  or  motility)  may  be  used.  Even 
broader  is  the  field  of  therapy  in  the  form  of  "psychiatry"  and 
"psychotherapy."  Psychiatry  may  use  baths  and  non-psychological 
helps;  psychopathology  uses  mental  influences  against  mental  and 
physical  disorders  (such  as  digestive  disorders,  etc.).  As  a  specially 
promising  category  M.  suggests  the  psychological  experiment  on  the 
normal  in  the  interest  of  psychology  but  under  the  direction  of 
pathology.  Kraepelin  did  the  reverse;  now  should  come  the  turn  of 
the  use  in  the  normal  of  what,  for  instance,  special  studies  of  amnesia 
have  suggested. 

"It  would,  however,  be  methodological  confusion  to  expect  that 
pathological  observation  could  throw  any  light  on  the  fundamental 
questions  of  psychological  conceptions."  The  experience  with  sug- 
gestion could  not  possibly  further  the  theory  of  the  relation  of  mind 
and  body;  of  a  great  share  (?)  of  Freudian  literature  he  claims  that  it 
is  pervaded  by  the  thought  that  psychoanalysis  furnishes  evidence 
of  a  causal  action  of  psychics  "independent  of  brain-processes,"  and 
that  for  this  reason  it  vainly  assumes  that  the  psychophysical  parallel- 
ism is  overcome.  It  is  also  futile  to  expect  that  one  could  in  any 
way  justify  the  psychological  concept  of  the  unconscious  by  facts 
in  pathology,  or  a  decision  on  whether  psychological  analysis  finds 
merely  elements  of  content  or  also  elements  of  function,  or  whether 
there  are  various  degrees  of  consciousness,  etc.  Not  one  of  these 
questions  can  even  be  touched  by  any  pathological  study  as  little  as 
by  the  normal  psychological  experiment.  All  this  can  be  as  little 
a  problem  within  psychology  as  the  problem  of  time  and  space  can 
be  a  problem  of  physics. 

To  an  active  investigator  in  psychopathology,  these  discrimina- 
tions may  be  pleasing  if  he  agrees  with  the  dogmatic  foundations 
from  which  Miinsterberg  chooses  to  start.  If,  however,  he  should 
have  relegated  the  concept  of  a  "disease"  to  the  category  of  mere 
convenient  medical  logic  in  nosology,  while  at  bottom  in  his  pathology 
he  only  recognizes  conditions  and  factors  at  work  in  experiments  of 
nature  and  reaction-types  worth  defining  (see  PSYCH.  BULL.,  1908,  5, 
245-261),  he  may  easily  come  to  feel  obligatory  nosological  assump- 
tions a  hindrance  or  at  least  an  encumbrance  of  doubtful  value, 
something  needing  more  help  itself  than  it  can  possibly  give  in 
pathology.  With  a  profound  respect  for  the  helps  of  logic  and  critical 
definition  of  problems  and  epistemology,  I  do  consider  it  essential 


PATHOPSYCHOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOPATHOLOGY  139 

that  the  first  thing  to  aim  at  is  sufficient  accuracy  and  clearness  of 
work,  just  as  we  demand  it  (together  with  rigid  clearness)  as  we  embark 
on  a  bacteriological  or  chemical  analysis  or  a  logical  elaboration  of 
data.  For  all  this  a  first-hand  familiarity  with  the  facts  and  with  the 
fundamental  methods  in  use  must  precede  whatever  subsequent 
philosophical  consideration  one  wants  to  introduce.  Only  if  that  is 
granted  does  the  help  and  critical  training  of  the  philosopher  come 
in  good  stead;  otherwise  its  contrasts  smack  of  word-play  and  logo- 
machia. 

The  psychologist  and  the  pathologist  who  take  up  the  study  of  a 
depression,  or  of  an  hysterical  repression,  or  a  psychasthenic  rumina- 
tion will  do  well  to  ascertain  the  facts,  determine  their  actual  inter- 
relation in  a  chain  of  causes  and  effects  (i.  e.,  in  terms  of  an  experi- 
ment of  nature),  and  then  they  analyze  the  relative  role  of  each  link 
and  the  modifiability  of  the  links  and  of  the  whole  chain — and  all  this 
can  be  done  without  speaking  of  "symptoms  of  a  disease"  or  a  dis- 
cussion of  what  is  "normal."  Fundamentally  both  the  psychologist 
and  the  pathologist,  if  there  are  such  in  pure  culture,  must  take  all  the 
facts  into  consideration  to  be  on  a  strictly  scientific  basis;  the  dif- 
ference will  only  show  in  the  emphasis  on  various  groups  of  facts  and 
their  interrelation,  and  in  the  grouping  of  the  material;  and  the  value 
of  the  one  or  the  other  emphasis  and  method  can  only  be  an  issue 
of  economy  and  accuracy  in  the  procedure,  but  not  something  radi- 
cally different,  unless,  of  course,  we  start  out  with  a  psychologist  who 
knows  of  no  causality  in  his  realm,  and  a  pathologist  who  treats 
psychics  by  elimination.  The  very  transformation  on  this  point  is 
the  fruit  of  work  with  facts  and  the  adaptation  is  far  from  being 
aprioristic,  as  Miinsterberg  seems  to  demand.  It  is  after  all  the 
facts  which  call  for  the  making  of  categories  or  for  their  simplifica- 
tion or  readjustment,  and  the  preliminary  result  next  may  call  for 
logical-philosophical  sifting. 

The  discussion  is  given  so  much  space  here  because  it  makes  one 
long  for  the  passing  of  aprioristic  specialism.  First-hand  work  must 
more  and  more  become  the  condition  for  the  whole  range  of  verbal 
and  conceptual  permutations  of  psyche,  pathos  and  logos,  and  the 
ramifications  will  be  considered  safe  or  in  need  of  more  or  less  modesty 
and  reserve,  according  to  the  extent  of  a  writer's  first-hand  mastery  of 
work  in  the  integrated  fields— biology,  physiology,  psychology,  logic 
and  what  not.  I  feel  that  I  must  be  in  perfect  harmony  with  M.  on 
this  point:  that  it  will  be  considered  more  and  more  hazardous  and 
dilettantic  to  make  claims  in  psychology  or  in  pathology  without  a 


140  ADOLF  MEYER 

fair  working  knowledge  of  the  working  elements  of  both.  As  long, 
however,  as  the  working  knowledge  is  safe,  we  can  trust  continued 
work  better  than  the  continual  creation  of  methodological  contrasts. 
Where  does  the  system  of  logical  permutation  lead  us? 

The  claim  of  Specht  that  the  way  from  psychiatry  to  psychology 
must  necessarily  pass  through  philosophy,  receives  a  peculiar  illustra- 
tion in  M.'s  essay,  and  it  makes  one  ask  seriously:  Is  it  not  chiefly 
a  warning  against  mere  philosophical  method  and  against  too  much 
awe  of  accepted  philosophical  rules  that  is  needed  in  this  field  ? 

IV 

Oswald  Kiilpe,  who  deplores  the  lack  of  support  for  psychology 
as  an  independent  science  and  department  in  German  universities, 
offers  a  practical  contribution  in  an  article  entitled  "Psychologic  u. 
Medizin"  in  the  second  number  of  the  Zeitschrift  (Vol.  I.,  pp.  187- 
267).  He  brings  very  pertinent  criticisms  of  methods  and  results  in 
recent  studies  in  psychopathology  by  Isserlin,  Binet  et  Simon, 
Oesterreich,  Liepmann's  study  of  flight  of  ideas,  the  problem  of  mind- 
blindness,  and  a  program  for  the  examination  of  mind-blindness.  It 
shows  what  a  wealth  of  detail  is  suggested  by  the  systematic  and 
critical  consideration  of  the  introspective  material.  It  also  shows  the 
distance  between  the  naive  medical  attempts  and  the  searching 
demands  of  the  psychologist  who  is  experienced  in  what  we  might 
call  psychohistology;  but  also  the  interesting  limitation  of  non- 
mental  issues  in  his  considerations. 

Another  study  of  a  more  concrete  character  is  that  of  Pick,  who 
presents  a  most  interesting  case,  showing  the  role  of  the  relation  of 
perception  to  the  self — a  patient  who  went  through  attacks  in  which 
he  saw  the  city  as  he  used  to  know  it  and  experienced  peculiar  panics 
during  the  conflict  of  the  hallucinations  and  the  real  perception  of  the 
city  as  it  stood  before  him,  when  he  could  bring  himself  to  help  his 
vision  by  touch  or  by  rapping  a  gate  or  a  building  with  his  stick. 
From  very  interesting  records  of  the  introspection  of  the  patient  he 
shows  how  important  in  the  conflict  between  obsessive  visual  mem- 
ories or  hallucinations  and  real  perception  of  the  real  outside  world 
the  activations  of  other  sense-mechanisms  (and  we  might  also  add  the 
motor  mechanisms)  become. 

These  studies  plainly  concern  themselves  with  only  a  limited 
field  of  what  psychology  will  meet  in  abnormal  situations.  They 
do  not  come  out  plainly  as  a  new  and  exclusive  method,  but  as  more 


PATHOPSYCHOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOPATHOLOGY  141 

conscientious  and  well-considered  efforts  to  do  justice  to  introspective 
material,  such  as  must  also  appeal  to  one  who  strives  for  precision 
in  a  non-dogmatic  attitude  concerning  psychology  and  its  relation  to 
science.  The  last  two  years  have  however  emphasized  more  pro- 
nounced types  of  reemancipation  of  psychology  into  a  strictly  autono- 
mous position. 

One  of  the  ablest  German  psychologists,  Narziss  Ach,  of  Konigs- 
berg,  says  at  the  end  of  a  discourse  "Ueber  den  Willen":  "Die 
experimentelle  Psychologic  selbst  ist  zwar  keine  Naturwissenschaft, 
denn  den  Gegenstand  ihrer  Untersuchung  bilden  die  geistigen  Vor- 
gange,  aber  sie  benutzt  naturwissenschaftliche  Methoden  zur  Festle- 
gung  der  Gesetze  dieser  geistigen  Vorgange,  etc." 

This  is  the  German  version  of  the  attitude  most  emphatically 
voiced  by  Yerkes  in  this  country.  In  his  analysis  of  the  replies  of 
physiologists  and  biologists  on  the  relation  of  psychology  to  biology 
(/.  of  Philos.,  Psychol.,  etc.,  i,  113-124)  and  in  his  Introduction  to 
Psychology,  Yerkes  feels  forced  to  assert  what  I  might  call  an  overcor- 
rection  of  the  ordinary  training  which  tends  to  disquality  the  average 
person  for  a  naive  and  direct  use  of  the  introspective  material  of 
experience.  Yerkes,  from  conviction  or  for  didactic  reasons,  is  intent 
on  making  the  student  cultivate  the  view  of  a  world  divided  into  two 
distinct  aspects,  psychics  and  physics;  to  both  of  which  he  can  apply 
the  fundamental  methods  of  the  natural  sciences.  Observation  under 
natural  and  experimental  conditions,  quantitatively  accurate  and 
verifiable  description,  and  causal  explanation. 

In  my  own  words,  without  a  radical  division  of  psychics  and 
physics,  psychology,  in  the' normal,  or  the  abnormal,  aims  at  suffi- 
cient differentiative  description  of  these  events,  determination  of  the 
conditions  under  which  they  arise  and  the  conditions  the  events  lead 
to  and  the  law  of  their  modifiability;  in  other  words  a  reduction  to 
experimental  terms  or  to  experimental  function.  Psychology  as  a 
study  of  events  would  then  be  opposed  to  the  consideration  of  merely 
logical  or  at  least  adynamic  relations,  and  will  have  to  deal  also  with 
non-introspective  material.  Any  such  effort  necessarily  presupposes 
sufficiently  organized  living  beings  in  action,  and  as  long  as  the 
reactions  have  dynamic  factors  involved,  they  can  be  studied  in  terms 
of  experiments  (not  merely  in  experimental  situations) ;  if  the  dynamic 
factors  are  eliminated,  a  chiefly  logical  treatment  begins,  hence  the 
view  maintained  by  Miinsterberg  that  psychology  knows  only  of 
purposive  relations,  while  the  causal  chains  are  observable  only  in 
the  physical  side  of  the  events,  which,  of  course,  leaves  psychology, 
as  he  conceives  it,  in  clear  opposition  to  Naturwissenschaft. 


142  ADOLF  MEYER 

It  is  of  course  conceivable  to  think  of  the  states  of  various  degrees 
of  abnormal  synthesis  in  the  same  terms  as  of  those  of  normal  and 
not  further  conditioned  mental  life,  purely  in  terms  of  relational  and 
logical  sequences  or  in  the  mode  of  psychologizing  of  common-sense 
when  it  leaves  outside  of  the  sphere  of  discussion  the  non-mental 
series  of  physiological  or  biological  events  or  integrated  material. 
One  might  go  so  far  as  to  make  sure  that  the  differences  in  the  time- 
relationships  which  evidently  characterize  the  different  physiological 
states  in  a  general  way,  should  be  expressed  in  terms  of  "psychological 
time"  and  create  a  picture  of  a  world  of  pure  introspection.  This 
might  be  a  natural  extreme  of  consistency  for  the  psychologist  who 
enters  psychology  from  the  philosophical  camp;  but  for  one  who 
approaches  it  from  the  field  of  direct  objective  as  well  as  subjective 
experience,  without  going  through  the  phase  of  "secondary  naivety" 
of  the  philosophical  standpoint,  this  temptation  is  assigned  a  secondary 
place  and  the  emphasis  is  put  upon  whatever  standpoint  gives  us 
the  best  definition  of  the  conditions  under  which  the  matters  under 
discussion  occur,  and  under  which  we  can  study  them  as  modifiable 
factors  of  experiments. 

I  cannot  help  referring  here  to  an  exaggerated  instance  of  a 
pathopsychological  study,  the  quaint  book  of  M.  Herz  (Kritische 
Psychiatrie.  Kantische  Studien  uber  die  Storungen  der  reinen  specu- 
lativen  Fernunft.  Wien,  1895).  Oesterreich's  Phaenomenologie  des 
Ich  would  form  a  more  modern  type,  and  also  an  illustration  of  a 
tendency  which  insists  on  the  "total  heterogeneity  of  psychics  as 
opposed  to  the  processes  of  external  nature." 

On  the  other  hand,  I  am  tempted  to  interweave  here  a  brief 
abstract  of  what  I  should  call  the  direct  and  naive  call  of  a  physician 
for  a  psychology  which  he  can  grasp  and  which  is  part  of  his  practical 
and  theoretical  world.  In  the  main  his  contentions  can  readily  be 
compared  with  Specht's  appeal  for  a  psychopathology  which  recog- 
nizes causal  chains  among  and  within  the  mental  events. 

Koertke  (Somatische  Medizin  und  Psychologie  in  der  Psychiatrie. 
Mitteil.  aus  d.  Hamburgischen  Staatskrankenanstalten,  1910,  n, 
1-17)  reviews  the  uncertainties  of  psychiatrical  nosology,  cerebral 
histopathology,  the  insufficiency  of  psychological  and  histological 
correlations,  the  improbability  of  getting  far  with  the  mere  concept  of 
cerebral  localization.  He  analyzes  especially  the  supposed  parallelism 
between  general  paralysis  and  dementia  prsecox,  and  the  preponder- 
ance of  a  kinship  with  hysteria  and  absence  of  a  progressive  condition 
describable  in  neurological  terms  in  dementia  prsecox;  the  need  of  a 


PATHOPSYCHOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOPATHOLOGY  143 

special  accounting  for  the  mental  symptom-complexes  even  in 
general  paralysis,  and  the  dreary  effects  of  formal  routine  diagnoses  of 
dementia  prsecox  which  prejudice  the  physician  against  the  case  and 
throw  the  patient  into  the  ranks  of  mere  inmates.  He  urgently  calls 
for  a  psychological  penetration  of  the  cases,  points  to  the  advantages 
of  the  association-method,  not  only  for  the  study  of  hysteria  and 
neurotic  states,  but  for  a  more  intimate  knowledge  of  any  case.  The 
psychiatrist  cannot  afford  to  be  a  one-sided  physician  but  must  also 
be  a  psychologist. 

This  is  in  many  respects  a  trend  of  thought  akin  to  that  developed 
in  the  decennial  lecture  at  Clark  University,  or  the  dynamic  inter- 
pretation of  dementia  prsecox  (Amer.  J.  of  Psychol.,  21,  385-403)  in 
which  von  Voss  sees  merely  Freudian  speculations  and  a  one-sided 
psychological  interpretation  of  the  disease,  "unintelligible  considering 
the  great  number  of  physical  manifestations,"  as  if  the  habit  conflicts 
referred  to  were  one-sidedly  psychical  unless  one  expurgates  the  whole 
mass  of  incidental  and  absolutely  intrinsic  motor  and  vasomotor  and 
glandular  functions  and  perversions  involved  (Jacobsohn's  Jahres- 
bericht,  14,  1054).  Who  can  blame  a  critic  who  only  knows  the 
orthodox  tenets  of  a  psychology  without  a  body? 


The  appearance  of  pathopsychology  is  a  somewhat  surprising 
secession  and  declaration  of  independence  of  psychology  in  the  field 
in  which  the  possibility  of  a  blending  of  natural  science  and  psychology 
into  a  really  unitary  science  had  seemed  most  promising.  With  all 
the  recognition  of  discontinuity  and  pluralism  which  cold-blooded 
criticism  has  to  face  in  a  systematic  account  of  experience,  there  is  no 
doubt  about  convergence  and  growing  harmony  of  perspectives  in  the 
direction  of  experimentation  as  the  fundamental  trait  of  modern 
science.  It  is  not  the  essence  of  the  objects  of  study  but  their  sufficient 
differentiation  and  what  they  do,  i.  e.,  the  role  in  chains  of  cause  and 
effect,  that  goes  at  the  core  of  what  we  long  for.  For  a  long  time 
psychology  had  to  assert  itself  against  aggressive  and  sometimes 
brutally  crude  types  of  materialism,  and  the  safest  way  was  the 
complete  retirement  behind  a  partition  furnished  by  the  parallelistic 
dogma.  Today  psychology  is  in  great  demand  to  fill  gaps  which  the 
coarse  materialism  has  failed  to  touch,  and  it  is  called  upon  to  bring 
lawful  order  into  our  knowledge  of  and  experience  with  a  great  and 
important  field  of  human  interests,  not  only  abstract  introspection, 


144  ADOLF  MEYER 

but  the  world  of  conduct  and  behavior.  Those  who  approach  it  from 
biology  and  pathology  naturally  bring  a  strong  interest  in  the  con- 
ditions on  which  certain  reactions  depend  for  their  very  occurrence. 
Some  of  these  conditions  lie  in  the  outside  world,  others  in  the  organ- 
ism of  the  individual  and  for  some  of  the  conditions  we  can  point  to 
states  or  events  expressible  only  in  terms  of  the  symbols  characteristic 
of  conscious  or  mental  reactions.  The  question  then  arises  whether 
the  biologically  trained  workers  must  be  told  that  they  either  must 
change  their  faith  or  remain  in  the  cold  world  of  "matter,"  excluded 
from  "psychics,"  or  whether  they  are  allowed  to  take  with  them  the 
interests  in  the  objective  as  well  as  in  the  subjective  data  of  the  science 
of  conduct  and  behavior,  and  the  privilege  of  using  them  according 
to  the  accuracy  needed  or  the  connection  in  which  the  facts  appear 
in  the  chains  of  cause  and  effect.  It  may  be  that  for  reasons  of 
simplicity  we  should  favor  the  categorical  separation  of  the  facts  by 
the  maintenance  of  a  rigorous  parallelism.  But  if  the  simplicity  leads 
to  undue  restrictions  or  to  undesirable  licenses  of  imagination  such  as 
the  neurologizing  tautologies  criticized  in  previous  articles,  we  are 
willing  to  accept  more  complex  rules  of  procedure  and  a  freer  range 
to  our  common-sense  way  of  dealing  with  conduct  and  behavior  and 
its  metabolism  or  inner  mechanisms  manifested  in  introspection  and 
its  exteriorization.  Instead  of  dividing  the  world  of  facts  and  of 
workers  into  a  long  series  of  contrasting  types,  we  specify  the  rules  of 
the  special  procedures  and  keep  them  subordinated  to  the  main  facts 
and  interests  without  any  partitions  such  as  the  cumbersome  division 
of  the  world  of  experience  into  psychics  and  physics,  or  into  patho- 
psychology  and  psychopathology,  and  similar  contrasts. 

Psychology  as  the  science  of  conduct  and  behavior  and  its  mechan- 
isms as  a  natural  science  and  branch  of  biology,  deals  with  that  range 
of  facts  which  can  in  many  conditions  leave  the  substrata  or  the  strata 
of  lower  integration  as  "taken  for  granted,"  or  as  sufficiently  con- 
sidered, as  long  as  the  data  of  the  psychological  strata  and  of  the 
external  stimuli  are  taken  conscientiously.  But  as  soon  as  we  leave 
the  simplest  situations,  as  in  the  variations  of  the  mental  level  in 
conditions  of  fatigue,  sleep,  intoxications,  brain-disease  or  even  emo- 
tional conflicts,  etc.,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  command  the  facts 
concerning  the  entire  integrative  material,  mental  and  non-mental. 
Facts  which  also  can  be  studied  apart,  as  functions  of  independent 
organs  (such  as  the  brain)  or  mechanism  (such  as  the  polyglandular 
system  of  regulations),  must  then  be  open  to  study  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  broader  functions  of  the  individual  as  a  whole,  and  he 


PATHOPSYCHOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOPATHOLOGY  1 45 

will  be  the  conqueror  who  commands  the  whole  hierarchy  of  sciences 
—from  physics  and  chemistry  to  the  biological  sciences  (including 
the  science  of  conduct  and  behavior)  and  to  logic  or  the  science  of 
relations;  from  the  dynamic  sciences  with  its  world  of  cause  and 
effect  to  the  philosophy  of  which  Specht  and  Miinsterberg  say  that 
it  is  needed  to  pass  from  psychiatry  to  psychology — or  we  might  say, 
to  the  philosophy  which  reflects  the  manner  in  which  a  worker  passes 
from  psychiatry  to  psychology.  For  it  does  seem  after  all  as  if  the 
connection  of  the  two  called  for  a  recasting  of  the  rules  of  intellectual 
procedure  and  a  recasting  of  important  assumptions,  too  often  shirked 
under  the  excuse  of  aversion  to  metaphysics,  i.  e.,  to  the  formulation 
of  systematized  logical  consequences.  Whether  or  not  experience 
with  psychopathology  will  ever  touch  or  throw  any  light  on  funda- 
mental psychological  conceptions  can  safely  be  left  to  the  future 
and  to  the  workers  who  have  to  shape  their  fundamental  conceptions 
in  keeping  with  growing  experience. 

EXPERIMENTAL  PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 

BY  PROFESSOR  SHEPHERD  IVORY  FRANZ 
Government  Hospital  for  the  Insane,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Much  has  been  written  during  the  past  few  years  concerning  the 
mutual  relations  of  psychology  and  medical  science.  The  establish- 
ment of  laboratories  of  psychology  in  hospitals  for  the  insane,  in 
institutions  for  the  feeble-minded,  and  in  universities  for  the  examina- 
tion of  abnormal  children  has  resulted  in  a  wider  and  more  general 
appreciation  of  the  possible  advantages  which  may  accrue  to  both 
psychology  and  medicine  by  the  combination.  This  interest  has 
been  shown  to  some  extent  by  various  attempts  to  give  names  to 
each  new  application  or  junction  of  psychology  with  one  of  the  medical 
disciplines,  and  at  present  we  have  to  deal  with  abnormal  psychology, 
psychopathology,  pathopsychology  and  clinical  psychology.  Many 
other  divisions  are  made,  and  the  extremes  to  which  this  attempted 
division  may  go  is  well  illustrated  in  Wallin's  article  (14),  where  we 
find  the  terms  "clinical  psychology,"  "psycho-clinical,"  "medical 
psychology,"  and  "medico-clinical"  as  well  as  psychopathology.  In 
many  instances  the  reader  is  left  to  judge  whether  or  not  each  term  is 
to  designate  something  different  from  the  others. 

A  practical  distinction  which  may  be  made  and  held  to  is  that 
when  an  investigator  is  concerned  chiefly  with  the  general  course  of  a 


146  SHEPHERD  IVORY  FRANZ 

disease  and  its  treatment  his  interests  are  in  psychiatry,  but  when  his 
chief  concern  is  the  investigation  of  the  development  or  interrelations 
of  mental  symptoms  his  interests  are  in  psychology,  and  the  emphasis, 
either  on  the  psychological  or  the  pathological  aspect,  makes  his  work 
either  pathopsychological  or  psychopathological.  This  distinction  is 
well  brought  out  in  the  work  of  Gregor  (5).  In  this  book  Gregor, 
like  his  predecessor  Stoning,  gives  a  general  account  of  the  mental 
processes  in  a  variety  of  diseases.  Although  it  can  not  be  said  to  be 
a  complete  exposition  of  all  forms  of  abnormal  mental  conditions,  the 
book  gives  a  better  view  of  the  present  status  of  psychopathology 
than  any  other  single  work.  Here  one  may  find  a  summary  of  many 
of  the  experimental  results  in  psychopathology  which  are  scattered 
throughout  psychiatric  and  psychological  journals,  but  there  is  a 
Germanic  exclusiveness  which  slightly  mars  the  work  as  a  whole. 
Many  of  the  chapters  dealing  with  psychopathology  have  companion 
chapters  dealing  with  the  normal  psychology  of  the  processes  under 
consideration  which  serve  to  bridge  the  gap  between  normal  psy- 
chology and  psychopathology  and  also  to  introduce  the  physician 
to  general  and  experimental  psychology.  The  material  included  in 
the  book  is  mostly  two  or  more  years  old,  so  that  our  review  precludes 
the  possibility  of  much  more  than  mention  of  the  titles  of  the  chapters, 
which  are  as  follows:  psychology  and  psychiatry;  psychopathology 
of  time  sense;  reaction  experiments;  pathology  of  apprehension; 
association  reactions;  association  experiments  with  the  insane; 
methods  of  testing  memory;  pathology  of  memory;  psychology  of 
evidence;  experiments  on  the  psychology  of  evidence  of  the  insane; 
psychology  and  pathology  of  attention;  methods  of  testing  atten- 
tion; experimental  testing  of  movement;  bodily  changes  accom- 
panying mental  states;  mental  work;  methods  of  testing  general 
intelligence. 

A  notable  omission  is  that  of  the  sensory  equipment  of  the  insane, 
but  this  defect  is  not  due  solely  to  the  author  but  to  the  great  body 
of  those  who  investigate  the  abnormal.  It  is  strange  that  although 
psychologists  have  devoted  much  time  to  the  investigation  of  sensa- 
tion, little  or  no  work  of  this  character  has  been  published  regarding 
the  sensory  equipment  of  the  abnormal.  Psychiatrists  have  dealt 
with  conduct  (or  movement,  if  you  will)  to  the  exclusion  of  sensation 
except  in  as  far  as  the  latter  topic  bears  directly  upon  hallucinations 
and  illusions.  They  criticize  the  psychologists  for  their  analytic 
sensation  work  and  demand  the  investigation  of  "conduct,"  showing 
thereby  a  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  fact  that  "conduct"  is  a  complex 
depending,  in  part  at  least,  upon  sensations. 


EXPERIMENTAL  PSYCHOPATHOLOGY  147 

In  some  respects  the  book  of  Whipple  is  an  equally  notable  con- 
tribution to  general  psychopathology  (15).  Here  psychiatrists  may 
find  details  of  more  exact  methods  of  testing  patients  than  have 
usually  been  employed  by  them,  but  which  for  them  have  hitherto 
not  been  available  in  simple  form,  or  which  have  been  grouped  in 
college  text-books  or  scattered  through  many  psychological  journals. 
The  partial  limitation  of  the  object  of  the  book  to  the  study  of  children 
prevents  a  full  consideration  of  it  from  a  psychiatric  (i.  e.,  psycho- 
pathological)  point  of  view,  but  many  of  the  methods  should  prove 
useful  to  those  who  wish  to  examine  the  mental  states  of  the  insane  in 
ways  more  exact  than  those  usually  employed.  From  personal  expe- 
rience, the  writer  is  inclined  to  doubt  the  psychiatric  (i.  e.,  the  psycho- 
pathological)  value  of  some  of  the  methods  advocated,  and  certain 
matters  have  not  been  taken  up  which  have  great  value  for  the 
psychologically  inclined  psychiatrist.  Many  of  the  methods  can  be 
used  with  the  insane  only  as  research  methods,  others  are  very  simple 
and  of  great  practical  value  but  are  parts  of  the  general  equipment 
of  those  who  have  to  deal  with  the  insane,  e.  g.,  tests  for  heterophoria 
et  al.  Because  the  general  character  of  the  tests  which  are  recom- 
mended is  simple,  Whipple's  book  is  much  more  useful  to  those  who 
deal  with  the  insane  than  most  other  works  dealing  with  experimental 
method,  and  in  this  connection  mention  may  be  made  of  the  report 
of  the  special  committee  of  the  American  Psychological  Association 
on  the  standardization  of  experimental  procedure  in  tests  (12).  The 
committee  apparently  had  in  view  the  application  of  the  methods 
they  advocate  solely  to  the  normal.  Few  of  the  methods  recom- 
mended are  useful  in  the  examination  of  the  insane,  and  it  is  to  be 
regretted  that  the  part  of  the  committee  which  has  already  reported 
has  apparently  neglected  to  deal  with  certain  practical  relations  of 
psychology  and  has  restricted  its  report  largely  to  the  consideration 
of  the  testing  of  normal  individuals.  Two  of  the  topics  discussed 
in  the  report  may,  it  is  true,  have  only  a  limited  bearing  upon  prob- 
lems of  psychopathology,  but  that  of  mental  imagery  may  be  impor- 
tant in  the  consideration  of  the  types  of  reaction,  of  hallucinations, 
or  delusions,  etc.,  of  the  abnormal. 

Although,  as  indicated  above,  experimental  psychologists  have 
devoted  a  large  part  of  their  time  to  the  investigation  of  sensations, 
Gregor's  work  passes  over  sensation  disturbances,  and  Whipple's 
book  fails  to  give  indications  of  methods  of  testing  some  of  the  sensa- 
tions which  at  times  are  much  altered  in  the  insane  and  other  abnormal 
classes.  Thus,  we  find  no  discussion  of  methods  of  testing  taste, 


148  SHEPHERD  IVORY  FRANZ 

smell,  temperature  and  the  threshold  of  touch.  It  may  also  be  noted 
that  in  general  Whipple's  tests  of  movement  are  directed  towards  the 
testing  of  motor  equipment  as  such,  rather  than  to  the  sensations  of 
movement,  which  are  also  often  disturbed  in  pathological  conditions, 
not  only  in  the  insane  but  also  in  the  feeble-minded.  Recent  personal 
work,  not  yet  published,  indicates  that  the  sensory  equipment  of 
the  insane  and  of  other  abnormal  classes  must  be  investigated  as  of 
equal  importance  to  the  motor  or  conduct  sphere,  and  that  there 
are  as  many  sensory  disturbances  or  deviations  in  the  abnormal  as 
there  are  motor  or  conduct  disturbances.  It  is  surprising  that 
psychiatrists  and  psychopathologists  have  not  investigated  the 
sensory  equipment  of  their  patients,  but  part  of  their  failure  to  do 
so  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  they  have  been  unable  to  obtain 
from  the  normal  psychologists  data  suitable  to  compare  with  their 
own.  It  is  largely  because  of  the  necessity  of  having  data  on 
untrained  subjects  that  some  psychopathologists  have  been  com- 
pelled to  devote  a  large  part  of  their  time  to  experiments  on 
normal,  but  psychologically  untrained,  subjects  so  that  a  direct  com- 
parison with  similar  results  on  abnormal,  but  equally  psychologically, 
untrained  subjects  may  be  made.  This  is  what  the  writer  has  been 
compelled  to  do  in  his  work  on  the  sensations  mediated  through  the 
skin  and  the  underlying  tissues  (3),  for  he  has  found  no  available  data 
for  purposes  of  comparison.  The  methods  can  usually  not  be  as 
fine  as  those  used  in  a  purely  psychological  research,  in  other  words 
they  must  be  clinical.  The  results  from  this  work  may  be  little 
different  from  those  on  trained  subjects  with  finer  methods,  and 
perhaps  no  great  amount  of  material  for  theoretical  psychology  may 
accrue  from  the  work,  but  it  is  needed  for  purposes  of  comparison 
as  practical  psychological  standards.  If  we  are  to  have  much  advance 
in  our  understanding  of  the  abnormal  and  any  advance  in  the  under- 
standing of  the  normal  from  the  study  of  the  abnormal,  many  tests 
must  be  devised  and  applied  to  a  number  of  normal,  but  untrained, 
subjects  and  the  same  tests  applied  to  the  numerous  abnormal  classes. 
For  example,  the  usual  procedures  of  reaction  time  experiments  can 
be  applied  to  only  a  very  small  percentage  of  the  abnormal. 
Sommer's  tridimensional  analyzer  can  be  used  with  normal  subjects 
but  can  not  be  used  with  many  abnormal.  Much  simpler  instruments 
and  methods  may  be  devised  to  make  tests  of  a  similar  character 
and  have  wide  applicability  and  give  valuable  results. 

Largely  on  account  of  the  value  association  tests  have  for  diag- 
nosis, the  number  of  researches  on  the  association  of  ideas  in  the 


EXPERIMENTAL  PSYCHOPATHOLOGY  149 

insane  is  more  than  on  any  other  topic.  Some  of  the  more  important 
of  these  are  worthy  of  even  more  extended  consideration  than  can  be 
given  in  this  review.  Of  the  greatest  value  is  that  of  Kent  and 
Rosanoff  (7).  These  investigators  obtained  100  free  associations  from 
each  of  1,000  normal  subjects  and  have  carefully  tabulated  the  results 
according  to  their  frequency  values,  so  that  the  results  of  any  ab- 
normal subject  may  be  directly  compared  with  those  of  the  1,000 
normal  subjects.  The  grouping  of  the  normal  reactions  resulted  in 
the  formulation  of  a  table,  or  tables,  of  actual  facts  without  the  ex- 
tended consideration  of  the  logical  characters  of  the  reactions,  as  has 
been  done  by  many  previous  investigators.  Since  this  review  is  con- 
cerned mainly  with  pathological  advances  and  methods,  we  must 
pass  over  the  normal  results  and  consider  only  the  results  on  the  250 
insane  patients.  The  results  on  108  cases  of  dementia  praecox  showed 
a  larger  number  of  "individual"  reactions  than  the  normal  or  than 
any  other  form  of  insanity  studied;  of  33  cases  of  paranoic  conditions, 
a  heterogeneous  group,  many  showed  no  departure  from  the  normal, 
and  only  a  few  cases  closely  allied  to  the  dementia  prsecox  group  gave 
evidence  of  great  abnormality;  24  cases  of  epilepsy  showed  many 
repetitions  and  many  particles  of  speech  as  association  reactions,  and 
it  is  worthy  of  note  that  these  cases  were  mostly  in  a  state  of  advanced 
dementia;  32  cases  of  paresis  gave  varying  reactions,  those  "pre- 
senting no  considerable  dementia  or  confusion  and  cases  in  a  state  of 
remission"  gave  practically  normal  reactions,  and  those  showing 
mental  deterioration  showed  many  repetitions,  associations  to  pre- 
vious reactions,  etc.;  32  cases  of  manic-depressive  insanity  showed 
slight  variations  from  the  normal,  although  there  was  a  number  of 
"sound  reactions,  word  complements,  and  particles";  in  8  cases  of 
involutional  melancholia  no  evident  abnormality  was  observed;  6 
cases  of  alcoholic  dementia  showed  no  evidence  of  abnormality;  and 
only  one  of  the  4  cases  of  senile  dementia  showed  more  than  the  usual 
number  of  individual  reactions. 

In  this  connection  the  works  of  Klepper  (9),  of  Kilian  (8)  and  of 
Nathan  (10)  deserve  mention.  Klepper  investigated  the  associations 
of  epileptics  and  katatonics,  which  types  of  cases  sometimes  have  a 
somewhat  similar  symptomatology  and  which  are,  therefore,  difficult 
to  differentiate.  The  characters  of  the  associations  differ  in  the  two 
types  which  were  investigated.  Without  going  into  the  enumeration 
of  the  logical  differences  in  the  types  of  reactions  it  is  evident  that 
there  are  sufficiently  well  marked  differences,  and  these  are  so  great 
that  the  author  concludes  that  he  is  able  to  differentiate  one  type 


150  SHEPHERD  IFORY  FRANZ 

from  the  other  by  the  association  tests  alone,  without  having  any 
history  or  case  record.  Kilian  tested  the  associations  of  a  case  of 
manic-depressive  insanity  over  a  period  of  five  months,  during  which 
there  was  a  return  to  the  normal  condition.  He  found  a  gradual 
decrease  in  the  number  of  klang  and  non-understandable  reactions,  a 
decrease  in  a  number  of  perseverations  of  the  associations,  but  there 
was  a  greater  tendency  to  repetition  of  the  stimulus  words.  Nathan 
worked  on  a  case  of  imbecility,  investigating  principally  the  so-called 
senseless  reactions,  and  found  that  many  of  these  are  due  to  sense 
impressions  obtained  or  received  immediately  before  or  during  the 
course  of  the  experiments,  others  were  due  to  ideas  present  in  the  mind 
of  the  subject,  which  were  more  or  less  stable  and  apparently  personal, 
and  some  others  were  reactions  to  stimulus  words  given  in  previous 
tests.  This  study  is  of  great  psychological  interest  on  account  of  its 
analysis  of  the  senseless  reactions,  for  these  are  more  frequent  than 
is  commonly  believed,  and,  as  the  writer  has  pointed  out  in  another 
place,  they  can  not  be  considered  to  be  senseless  for  the  subject,  but 
senseless  only  as  far  as  the  logical  beliefs  of  the  experimenter  are 
concerned. 

The  attempts  to  explain  some  symptoms  in  abnormal  cases  by 
tests  of  the  effects  of  drugs,  a  method  with  which  the  name  of  Kraepe- 
lin  is  closely  associated,  have  been  continued  in  the  Munich  clinic. 
The  work  of  Schnidtmann  (13)  is  an  account  of  an  effort  to  discover 
the  reason  for  certain  prolonged  association  reactions  in  certain 
pathological  cases.  Seven  subjects  were  given  from  40  to  50  c.c.  of 
alcohol,  and  their  associations  tested  before  and  after  its  ingestion. 
One  of  the  subjects  gave  shortened  times  after  the  taking  of  the 
alcohol,  and  the  other  six  gave  normal  or  lengthened  times.  The 
quality  of  the  associations  differed  in  the  individual  cases,  but  these 
are  impossible  to  summarize  in  a  few  words.  Another  series  of  tests 
to  determine  the  effects  of  alcohol  had  its  origin  in  the  Munich 
laboratory.  Goring  (4)  tested  the  effect  of  similar  doses  of  alcohol 
on  muscular  force,  apprehension,  and  the  ability  to  add  in  18  cases 
(n  men  and  7  women).  Preliminary  series  of  tests  were  made  and 
the  testing  series  were  begun  20  minutes  after  the  ingestion  of  the 
alcohol.  The  tests  of  muscular  force  were  the  last  of  the  series  and 
these  were  usually  begun  42  minutes  after  the  taking  of  the  dose  of 
alcohol.  All  subjects  showed  less  ability  to  apprehend  after  the 
taking  of  the  alcohol,  for  there  were  more  mistakes;  some  were  un- 
able to  add  as  many  figures,  although  there  were  marked  deviations 
both  up  and  down;  and  the  muscular  force  varied,  sometimes  being 


EXPERIMENTAL  PSYCHOPATHOLOGY  151 

greater  and  sometimes  less  after  the  alcohol.  The  seven  women  were 
given  different  amounts  of  alchool,  and  it  is  not  possible  to  make  a 
full  comparison  with  the  men,  but  in  general  it  may  be  concluded  that 
the  women  showed  more  effects  from  their  doses  than  did  the  men, 
and  the  author  believes  they  are  less  resistant,  probably  being  less 
accustomed  to  the  drug.  In  neither  of  these  two  experiments  (Goring 
and  Schnidtmann),  although  valuable  in  themselves,  can  it  be  said 
that  all  the  precautions  were  taken  that  should  be  taken.  Rivers 
has  shown  that  alcohol  when  taken  and  not  recognized  does  not  have 
the  marked  effect  that  Kraepelin  and  his  pupils  attribute  to  it,  and 
the  excellent  method  of  Rivers,  or  a  similar  one  which  would  give  as 
good  control,  should  have  been  used  in  these  experiments  if  the  results 
are  to  be  accepted  as  they  stand.  No  account  of  Rivers'  work  has 
been  taken,  or  at  least  the  later  work  of  Rivers  is  not  mentioned,  and 
since  we  know  from  that  work  how  great  an  influence  upon  the  re- 
actions "knowledge"  may  have,  we  are  not  justified  at  present  in 
concluding  that  the  results  of  the  work  of  Schnidtmann  and  Goring 
are  more  than  suggestive. 

The  application  of  psychological  methods  to  the  investigation  of 
therapeutic  procedure  has  been  made  in  the  work  of  Busch  and 
Plaut  (2),  who  investigated  the  effect  of  continuous  warm  baths  upon 
pulse  rate,  on  temperature,  on  blood-pressure,  on  muscular  force, 
on  associations,  on  choice  reaction  time,  on  apprehension,  and  on 
addition  ability.  Baths  of  two  hours'  duration  were  taken  and  the 
effects  of  these  were  investigated  in  relation  to  the  above  mentioned 
processes  in  3  normal  subjects  and  2  hypomaniacal  subjects.  In 
general  there  was  a  slight  increase  in  temperature,  no  noticeable 
change  in  the  pulse  rate,  and  a  slight  decrease  in  the  blood  pressure. 
The  results  with  the  ergograph  (muscular  force  experiments)  were 
varied,  sometimes  a  greater  force  than  normal  was  obtained,  and 
sometimes  the  force  was  less  than  normal.  The  choice  reaction  time 
was  varied  but  little,  if  at  all;  the  accuracy  of  apprehension  was 
increased  about  2  per  cent,  after  the  bath;  the  ability  to  add  was 
also  slightly  increased;  the  character  of  the  associations  is  difficult 
to  estimate  and  to  summarize.  All  the  results  are  within  the  normal 
variation,  and  since  this  is  so,  the  effects  of  prolonged  baths  on  normal 
and  slightly  abnormal  individuals  may  be  judged  to  be  insignificant. 
That  such  therapeutic  measures  have  a  quieting  effect  upon  certain 
excited  cases  there  can  be  no  doubt,  and  the  present  work  is  of  value 
in  that  it  gives  a  basis  for  comparison  with  the  more  disturbed  of  the 
psychiatric  cases. 


152  SHEPHERD  IVORY  FRANZ 

The  results  of  Ranschburg's  study  of  memory  (u)  are  of  im- 
portance for  normal  and  pathological  psychology.  The  method  used 
in  the  work  is  that  of  word  pairs,  the  subject  being  given  pairs  of 
words  in  a  series,  and  after  the  series  is  completed  is  given  the  first 
word  of  each  pair  and  asked  to  supply  the  second  word.  Five  series 
were  made  with  6,  6,  9,  9,  and  9  pairs  respectively.  There  were 
calculated  the  percentages  of  words  retained  immediately,  the  time 
of  reproduction,  the  percentages  of  words  retained  after  24  hours, 
and  the  characters  of  the  mistakes.  Normal  children  reproduced 
correctly  from  75  to  100  per  cent,  immediately  and  about  80  per  cent, 
after  24  hours.  The  average  time  for  the  reproduction  was  2  sec. 
for  children  from  6  to  12  years  of  age,  and  1.2  sec.  for  those  between 
12  and  19.  There  was  only  about  25  per  cent,  correct  immediate 
reproduction  in  the  feeble-minded  from  6  to  12  years,  and  only  60 
per  cent,  for  those  between  the  ages  of  12  and  19;  there  was  a  much 
greater  deviation  from  the  normal  after  24  hours.  The  time  for 
reproduction  was  from  I  to  losec.  The  general  paralytics  were  poor 
memorizers;  only  2  reproduced  correctly  as  much  as  75  per  cent, 
immediately,  and  19  of  the  total  number  averaged  only  7  per  cent. 
Fifteen  neurasthenics  showed  normal  memory.  Although  Ranschburg 
uses  his  results  as  indicators  for  diagnosis  and  prognosis,  this  is  suc- 
cessful only  in  certain  specially  selected  cases  and  in  groups,  but  not 
for  each  individual  case  in  any  special  type  of  psychosis. 

Many  tests  for  the  estimation  of  the  general  intelligence  of  abnor- 
mal subjects  have  been  devised,  and  Becker  (i)  discusses  some  of  these 
in  relation  to  paranoia  and  to  dementia  prsecox.  The  method  used 
by  him  was  a  series  of  questions  which  called  forth  observations  or 
statements  from  the  patients.  Following  are  two  examples  of  the 
type  of  questions  which  he  used:  (i)  "Which  is  heavier,  a  pound  of 
lead  or  a  pound  of  feathers?"  (2)  "Herodotus  says:  A  lioness 
can  bear  only  one  young,  because  at  its  birth  the  cub  destroys  the 
womb  of  the  lioness.  Why  is  this  statement  false?"  Results  of 
these  tests  can  be  interpreted  only  in  an  indirect  fashion,  and  at 
times  no  interpretation  is  possible.  Much  depends  upon  the  pre- 
vious education  and  training  of  the  individual  subject  and  much 
more  upon  his  cooperation  in  the  test.  At  the  same  time  such  tests 
can  be  used  only  for  large  groups  if  they  are  intended  to  have  any 
diagnostic  value. 

Numerous  insane  patients  show  no  reaction  to  stimuli,  and  casual 
observation  would  tend  to  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  stimuli 
were  not  apprehended.  Some  of  these  cases  return  to  a  more  normal 


EXPERIMENTAL  PSYCHOPATHOLOGY  153 

condition  and  can  recount  much  that  occurred  during  the  period 
when  they  did  not  respond.  The  stimuli  were  apprehended,  but 
the  reactions  were  inhibited.  That  these  patients  may  appreciate 
stimuli  has  been  shown  by  the  galvanic  reactions  obtained  from  some 
of  them  by  Wells  and  Forbes  (16).  One  of  their  cases  of  catatonic 
stupor  "  showed  no  evidence  whatever  of  consciousness,"  but  reacted 
galvanically  to  all  forms  of  stimuli  which  were  applied.  One  case 
of  senile  dementia  showed  no  marked  deflections,  which  would  indi- 
cate that  the  stimuli  had  been  appreciated. 

Miss  Kent's  work  on  the  formation  of  simple  habits  in  cases  of 
dementia  praecox  (6)  is  of  great  interest  for  it  gives  a  scientific  basis 
for  the  work  of  training  of  these  cases  which  has  been  lacking.  It  is 
well  known  that  many  of  these  patients  may  be  made  very  useful 
about  an  institution,  but  there  are  large  numbers  which  are  not  trained 
because  it  appears  on  the  surface  that  it  would  take  too  long  a  time  to 
get  them  to  acquire  proper  habits  of  work.  The  results  of  this  work, 
however,  show  that  it  is  a  comparatively  easy  matter  to  get  almost  any 
case  of  dementia  prsecox  trained  to  perform  simple  series  of  movements 
which  are  useful.  Some  of  these  patients  who  are  normally  (sic) 
destructive  and  filthy  may  be  taught  such  movements  that  the  old 
destructiveness  and  filthy  habits  are  replaced.  One  of  the  most 
important  variables  in  the  work  was  the  cooperation  of  the  subjects, 
but  the  tests  which  were  used  were  of  such  a  character  that  they 
were  not  directly  appealing  to  the  subjects  and  they  could  not  be 
taken  as  the  best  possible  conditions  for  the  production  of  coopera- 
tion. In  general  the  curves  of  training  resemble  those  of  animals 
and  the  method  used  by  the  subjects  were  mostly  those  of  trial  and 
error,  although  in  certain  cases  the  methods  were  unlike  those  of 
animals  and  those  of  normal  subjects.  Continuation  of  this  work, 
especially  in  regard  to  the  factors  influencing  the  method  of  work,  are 
urgently  needed,  both  for  psychopathology  and  for  its  applications  in 
psychiatry.  Here  should  come  tests  of  the  effects  of  punishments, 
and  of  rewards. 

REFERENCES 

1.  BECKER,  W.  H.    Zu  den  Methoden  der  Intelligenzpriifung.    Klinik  f.  psychische 

u.  nervb'se  Krankh.,  1910,  5,  I-I2. 

2.  BUSCH,  A.,  and  PLAUT,  F.    Ueber  die  Einwirkung  verlangerter  warmer  Bader  auf 

einige  korperliche  und  geistige  Funktionen.    Psychol.  Arbeiten,  1910,  5,  5°$- 

3.  FRANZ,  S.  I.    Touch  Sensations  in  Different  Bodily  Segments.    Goo/.  Hasp,  for 

the  Insane,  Bull.  No.  2,  1910,  60-72. 

4.  GORING,  H.    Vergleichende  Messung  der  Alkoholwirkung.    Psychol.  Arbeiten, 

1911,  6,  261-299. 


154  SHEPHERD  IVORY  FRANZ 

5.  GREGOR,  A.     Leitfaden  der  experimentellen  Psychopathologie.     Berlin:  S.  Karger, 

1910.      Pp.  222. 

6.  KENT,  G.  H.     Experiments  on  Habit  Formation  in  Dementia  Praecox.     PSYCHOL. 

REV.,  1911,  18,  275-410. 

7.  KENT,  G.  H.,  and  ROSANOFF,  A.  J.     A  Study  of  Association  in  Insanity.     Amer. 

Jour,  of  Insan.,  1910,  67,  37-96;  317-390. 

8.  KILIAN,  K.     Zur  Untersuchung  der  Assoziationen  bei  Maniakalischen.     Klinik 

f.  psychische  u.  nervose  Krankh.,  1911,  6,  28-82. 

9.  KLEPPER,  G.    Die  Unterscheidung  von  epileptischen  und  katatonischen  Zustan- 

den,  speziell  aus  den  Assoziationen.  Klinik  f.  psychische  u.  nervose  Krankh., 
1911,6,  1-27. 

10.  NATHAN,  E.  W.    Ueber  die  sogenannten  sinnlosen  Reaktionen  beim  Assoziations- 

versuch.     Klinik  f.  psychische  u.  nervose  Krankh.,  1910,  5,  76-82. 

11.  RANSCHBURG,   P.    Ueber  Art  und  Wert   klinischer  Gedachtnismessungen   bei 

nervosen  und  psychischen  Krankheiten.  III.  Die  diagnostische  und  prognostische 
Verwertbarkeit  von  Gedachtnismessungen.  Klinik  f.  psychische  u.  nervose 
Krankh.,  1910,  5,  89-194. 

12.  PILLSBURY,  W.  B.,  SEASHORE,  C.  E.,  and  ANGELL,  J.  R.     Report  of  the  Committee 

of  the  American  Psychological  Association  on  the  Standardization  of  Procedure 
in  Experimental  Tests.  PSYCHOL.  REV.  MONOG.,  No.  53.  Pp.  108. 

13.  SCHNIDTMANN,  M.    Der  Einfluss  des  Alkohols  auf  den  Ablauf  der  Vorstellung. 

Psychol.  Arbeiten,  1911,  6,  300-338. 

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of  Educ.  Psychol.,  1911,  2,  121-132;  191-210. 

15.  WHIFFLE,  G.  M.     Manual  of  Mental  and  Physical  Tests.    Baltimore:  Warwick  and 

York,  1910.    Pp.  534. 

16.  WELLS,  F.  L.,  and  FORBES,  A.     On  Certain  Electrical  Processes  in  the  Human  Body 

and  their  Relation  to  Emotional  Reactions.  (Archives  of  Psychol.,  No.  16.) 
New  York:  The  Science  Press,  1911.  Pp.  39. 


CONSCIOUS    AND    UNCONSCIOUS     MENTATION    FROM 
THE    PSYCHOANALYTIC   VIEWPOINT 

BY  DR.  TRIGANT  BURROW 

Johns  Hopkins  University 

The  recent  writings  of  Freud  and  Jung  have  a  special  interest 
and  importance  because  of  their  concern  with  the  biological  founda- 
tions on  which  the  Freudian  psychology  rests.  We  are  led  back  to 
the  secure  ground  of  first  principles  from  which  we  may  set  out  anew 
to  reconstruct  with  the  raw  materials  of  primal,  rudimentary  psy- 
chogenic  processes. 

Freud  rallies  attention  first  of  all  to  the  element  of  disunity  which 
is  the  central  and  inseparable  factor  in  the  production  of  the  neuroses. 
It  is  this  element  of  disaffection  in  the  life  of  the  individual — this 
inherent  revulsion  to  the  existence  of  things  as  they  actually  are 


CONSCIOUS  AND  UNCONSCIOUS  MENTATION  155 

and  the  substitution  of  a  fanciful  portrait  of  things  as  they  might 
have  been — which  constitutes  the  basis  of  the  neurotic  diathesis. 

A  neurosis  presupposes  then  to  a  greater  or  a  less  degree  a  with- 
drawal from  the  world  of  reality.  It  becomes  in  its  essence  a  sinister 
evasion  of  actual  issues.  Janet  recognized  this  hall-mark  of  these 
disorders  and  aptly  characterized  it  as  the  loss  of  the  "fonction  du 
reel."  It  remained  to  Freud  to  trace  the  phenomenon  to  its  genetic 
source.  Through  his  psychoanalytic  researches  Freud  has  brought 
to  light  the  existence  of  the  essential  factor  in  the  causation  of  this 
recessive,  infolding  tendency.  He  has  unearthed  a  hidden  wherefore 
in  the  situation.  Abandoning  the  prevailing  static,  mechanically 
deterministic  conception  of  neurotic  disorders,  he  has  removed  these 
processes  from  the  place  they  had  formerly  occupied  in  the  sphere  of 
brain  disease  states  and  placed  them  upon  a  dynamic,  conative, 
biologically  purposive  footing. 

Positing  the  existence  of  a  primary  matrix  of  unconscious  proc- 
esses as  the  background  of  mental  life,  Freud  describes  it  as  con- 
sisting throughout  of  a  homogeneous  pleasure-pain  principle  (Lust- 
Unlustprincip)  or  briefly  pleasure-principle.1  It  is  precisely  this 
"pleasure-principle"  belonging  to  the  embryonic  psychic  organism 
and  actuating  it  to  resist  the  invasions  of  outer  actuality  which 
represents  the  point  of  departure  in  Freud's  psychoanalytic  method 
of  interpretation.  The  mechanism  whereby  the  primitive,  elemental 
organism  seeks  to  preserve  its  even  tenor  and  to  repel  the  encroach- 
ments of  reality  Freud  has  called  the  process  of  repression  (Ver- 
drangungsprozess).  This  repressive  mechanism  with  its  entail  of 
conflicts  is  the  central  point  in  Freud's  psychological  system. 

Upon  the  assumption  of  this  primary,  fundamental,  self-sufficing 
pleasure-principle  to  which  the  claims  of  reality  are  essentially 
opposed  we  come  to  feel  the  justification  of  such  conceptions  as 
appear  to  regard  neurotic  conditions  in  the  light  of  a  commodity 
rather  than  an  affliction.  Accordingly  are  made  light  usages  which 
were  dark;  such  for  example  as  the  reference  Freud  makes  to  "the 
choice  of  a  neurosis"  or  "the  retreat  into  the  psychosis"  wherein, 
contrary  to  the  prevailing  view,  these  disorders  are  represented  as 
rather  of  the  nature  of  a  deliverance  than  a  disease. 

Freud  regards  this  pleasure-principle  then  as  primary.  It  is  the 
elemental  psychic  principle,  constituting,  as  it  were,  the  menstruum 
of  consciousness.  Originally  in  a  state  of  quiescence  its  equilibrium 

1  FREUD,  S.,  Formulierungen  ueber  die  zwei  Prinzipien  des  psychischen  Geschehens. 
Jahrbuch  fur  psychoanalyt.  u.  psychopathol.  Forschungen,  III. 


156  TRIG  ANT  BURROW 

is  first  disturbed  through  the  functional  demands  of  the  organism. 
"In  this  case,"  says  Freud,  "what  was  thought  (i.  e.,  wished)  was 
simply  hallucinated,  just  as  happens  later  nightly  in  our  dreams." 
It  is  only  when  the  required  satisfaction  is  no  longer  to  be  had  through 
the  process  of  hallucination,  that  the  psychic  organism  is  forced  to 
yield  to  the  importunities  of  reality.  Thus  is  thrust  in  upon  the 
psyche  the  recognition  of  a  stern  outer  reality  in  contradistinction 
to  the  benign  inner  world  of  fancy.  And  thus  is  introduced  over 
against  the  primal  pleasure-principle  the  principle  of  reality. 

With  the  entrance  of  the  reality-principle  a  whole  system  of 
adaptations  is  demanded  of  the  psychic  organism — adaptations 
with  which  we  are  familiar  in  the  various  activities  of  consciousness; 
as  for  example  the  adjustments  of  attention  and  observation;  memory; 
the  purposeful  motor  innervations;  and  the  higher  intellectual  proc- 
esses. Meanwhile  there  is  preserved  still  the  original  pleasure- 
principle  which  in  its  antagonism  to  the  reality-principle  has  estab- 
lished a  mode  of  psychic  activity  all  its  own — das  Phantasieren  or 
phantastic  thinking  "which  begins  with  the  play  of  children  and, 
continued  later  as  day-dreams,  tends  to  release  our  contact  with 
objective  reality." 

The  gradual  infringement  of  the  elements  of  the  reality-principle 
upon  the  pleasure-principle  does  not  take  place  uniformly  through- 
out. This  is  notably  illustrated  in  regard  to  the  sexual  trends  which 
are  tardiest  in  the  process  of  transformation.  So  that  while  the 
other  trends  of  the  ego  are  responding  in  a  measure  to  the  behests  of 
the  reality-principle,  the  sexual  trend,  remaining  in  arrears,  continues 
still  under  the  sway  of  the  primary  pleasure-principle.  Thus  sexual- 
ity being  in  the  beginning  autoerotic  tends  to  remain  in  this  phase, 
and,  because  of  the  possibilities  it  is  afforded  in  the  direction  of  auto- 
erotic  satisfactions,  the  sexual  trend  is  in  consequence  bound  up  for 
a  proportionately  longer  time  with  the  pleasure-principle;  in  which 
phase  indeed  it  is  in  many  individuals,  through  the  process  of  repres- 
sion, delayed  throughout  life.  In  consequence  of  these  relations  there 
is  established  a  closer  connection  between  the  sexual  trend  and  the 
sphere  of  the  phantastic  on  the  one  hand  and  the  remaining  trends 
of  the  ego  and  the  conscious  activities  on  the  other.  "  In  the  sphere 
of  the  phantastic,  repression  remains  supreme;  so  that  it  comes  to 
pass  that  images  in  statu  nascendi,  if  their  cognition  can  give  rise  to  a 
painful  affect,  are  blocked  before  they  may  reach  consciousness." 

It  follows  then  that  an  essential  part  of  the  psychic  disposition  to 
the  neurosis  lies  in  the  retarded  evolution  of  the  sexual  trend  in  its  rela- 


CONSCIOUS  AND  UNCONSCIOUS  MENTATION  157 

tion  to  reality.  The  pleasure-ego  desires  merely  the  immediate  satis- 
faction, however  transient  and  unstable;  while  the  reality-ego  seeks 
the  ultimate  and  permanent  good.  The  former  seeks  satisfaction  in 
chimerical  illusions,  the  latter  in  scientific  reality.  So  that  education 
is  in  truth  nothing  else  than  the  progressive  displacement  of  the 
pleasure-  by  the  reality-principle. 

As  an  interruption  (through  unconscious  repression)  in  the  course 
of  readaptation  of  these  two  basic  trends — the  egoistic  and  libidinous 
— may  occur  at  any  stage  of  the  developmental  process,  it  follows 
that  the  character  of  the  resulting  neurosis  is  dependent  upon  or 
rather  is  concomitant  with  the  (unconscious)  choice  of  the  phase  of 
retardation  and  that  therefore  the  character  of  a  neurosis  should  be 
studied  in  relation  to  the  genetic  mode  in  which  the  above-mentioned 
developmental  arrest  takes  place. 

In  the  chapter  "Ueber  die  zwei  Arten  des  Denkens"1  of  his 
"Wandlungen  und  Symbole  der  Libido"  Jung  enters  upon  a  more 
detailed  discussion  of  the  theme  unfolded  by  Freud  in  his  paper  on 
the  "Zwei  Prinzipien,"  namely,  that  of  the  essential  distinction  be- 
tween the  characters  of  the  psychological  processes  involved  in 
conscious  and  in  unconscious  mentation. 

Setting  out  with  the  empirically  manifest  phenomenon  of  symboli- 
zation  presented  in  dreams,  Jung  enters  directly  in  medias  res  with 
the  pertinent  psychological  inquiry  as  to  "whence  it  comes  that 
dreams  are  symbolic."  The  more  dynamic  problem  involved  in  the 
question  "wherefore  are  dreams  symbolic?"  is  left  aside  because 
involving  issues  no  less  extensive  than  the  Freudian  system  of  psy- 
chology itself. 

He  first  calls  attention  to  the  characteristic  absence  of  symbolism 
in  the  type  of  psychic  activity  we  know  as  conscious  thinking,  such 
psychic  processes  for  example  as  are  brought  to  bear  upon  the  solution 
of  a  given  problem,  and  says  how  upon  scrutiny  it  becomes  manifest 
that  this  species  of  mental  activity  invariably  depends  upon  verbal 
imagery — that  in  reality  words,  or  their  motor  equivalents,  are  the 
indispensable  medium  of  thought. 

Thinking  then,  i.  *.,  directed,  purposeful  thinking,  tends  to  expres- 
sion, to  communicable  form.  It  seeks  to  address  itself  outwardly  and 
to  conform  to  reality;  in  other  words  it  tends  to  reflect " the  succession 
of  objectively  real  things."  So  that  biologically  stated  conscious 
thinking,  like  every  vital  function,  is  an  adaptation  to  environment. 

1  JUNG,  C.  G.,  Wandlungen  und  Symbole  der  Libido.  Jahrbuch  fur  psychoanalyt- 
u.  psychopathol.  Forschungen,  III. 


158  TRIG  ANT  BURROW 

Jung  recalls  to  mind  the  biological  rudiments  of  speech  which 
consist  "of  a  system  of  emotional  and  imitative  sounds"  as  attested 
today  in  the  onomatopoeic  vestiges  of  current  usage.  "  So  that  speech 
is  originally  and  essentially  nothing  else  than  a  system  of  signs  and 
symbols  which  indicate  real  processes  or  their  reverberation  in  the 
human  soul"  and  "howsoever  abstract  a  system  of  philosophy,  it 
yet  represents  in  regard  to  end  and  means  nothing  else  than  the  most 
highly  elaborated  combination  of  primordial  sounds." 

Adaptation  to  the  natural  sequence  of  outward  phenomena — 
imitation  of  and  conformity  to  reality — is  characteristic  of  con- 
scious, directed,  verbal  thinking.  It  is  the  progressive,  social,  exter- 
nally assimilable  type  of  psychic  activity. 

Contrariwise,  thinking  which  is  not  conscious  proceeds  aimlessly, 
intransitively,  unproductively.  Its  flow  runs  without  fixed,  pre- 
determined course.  It  is  restricted  by  no  anterior  design.  It  is 
subjective  and  automatic,  image  succeeding  image  in  passive  obedi- 
ence to  unpremeditated  quests.  Unconscious  thinking  being  un- 
purposive  soon  leads  away  from  reality  into  phantasies  of  past  and 
future.  It  does  not  reflect  things  as  they  are  but  decks  them  out  in 
fanciful  array.  Thus  it  represents  what  is  wished  in  contradistinction 
to  what  is.  Because  of  its  likeness  to  the  psychic  processes  familiar 
to  us  in  the  phantasmagoria  of  sleep,  it  is  the  custom  to  give  to  this 
manner  of  thinking  the  name  of  "dreams." 

Comparably  with  all  phenomena  in  the  scale  of  evolution  these 
two  types  of  psychic  activity  have  their  ethnic  as  well  as  their  indi- 
vidual aspect — conscious  thinking  being  represented  in  its  ethnic 
phase  in  the  practical  system  of  organized  scientific  ratiocinations 
characteristic  of  our  own  adult  age,  while  das  Phastasieren  is  repre- 
sented in  the  phantastic,  bizarre,  mythological  vagaries  through  which 
the  childhood  of  the  race  was  wont  to  seek  appeasement.  Thus 
the  forward,  scientific  trend  of  thought  of  the  present  age  is  the 
phylogenetic  correlate  of  individual  consciousness  as  presented  in  the 
ontogenetic  series  and  correspondingly  the  illusory,  visionary,  unreal 
constructions  belonging  to  the  psychic  infancy  of  the  race  find  their 
genetic  analogy  in  the  phantastic,  "play"  creations  characteristic  of 
the  psychic  life  of  individual  childhood.  The  analogy  here  indicated 
is  nothing  else  than  the  mental  concomitance  of  the  familiar  corre- 
spondence stage  for  stage  in  the  historic  development  of  individual 
characters,  as  shown  in  the  comparative  study  of  anatomical  and 
embryological  evolution.  "The  myth,"  says  Karl  Abraham,1  "is  a 

1  ABRAHAM,  KARL.     Traum  und  Mythus.     1909. 


CONSCIOUS  AND  UNCONSCIOUS  MENTATION  159 

vestigial  remnant  of  the  psychic  infancy  of  the  race  and  the  dream  is 
the  myth  of  the  individual."  But  in  the  phantasies  entering  into  the 
psychic  life  of  the  normal  individual  of  modern  times  there  is  lack 
of  conscious  indorsement,  while  the  phantasies  belonging  to  an  antique 
cultural  period  were  elevated  to  a  conscious  social  plane  and  given 
the  significance  of  national  credence.  This  is  especially  illustrated  in 
the  phantasies  occurring  within  the  sexual  sphere.  "The  symbolism 
relating  to  the  instrument  of  coitus  was  an  inexhaustible  topic  for 
the  fancies  of  antiquity."  So  that  there  arose'  extensive  cults  of 
phallic  worshippers.  The  phallic  symbols  appeared  in  countless 
forms,  e.  g.,  as  the  bird,  the  fish,  the  snake,  etc.,  and  there  existed 
national  theriomorphic  representations  of  the  sexual  trend,  com- 
parable to  the  theriomorphic  symbols  of  sexuality  which  the  psycho- 
analyst meets  anew  in  the  dreams  of  the  neurotic. 

"Viewed  from  this  standpoint,  the  symbolism  which  Freud  has 
discovered  is  seen  to  be  an  expression  (limited  to  the  dream,  the 
symptom-act  and  to  mental  aberrations)  of  thought  processes  and 
psychobiological  trends  which  once  exerted  a  most  powerful  influence 
over  past  cultural  epochs." 

The  type  of  thinking  we  call  unconscious,  uncontrolled,  sub- 
jective, tending,  as  it  does,  to  elude  the  rigid  causality  of  outer  reality, 
is  therefore  essentially  infantile,  for  it  belongs  to  the  infancy  of  the 
individual  and  of  the  race. 

"It  would  seem  then  that  the  psyche  possesses  an  historical 
stratification  in  which  the  oldest  strata  correspond  to  the  uncon- 
scious." So  that  when  in  later  life  there  occurs  an  introversion  (in 
the  sense  of  Jung),  it  consists  of  a  harking  back  to  regressive, 
reminiscent,  infantile  material  of  the  individual's  (ontogenetic)  past, 
but  when  a  yet  further  regression  takes  place  (as  in  the  introversion 
psychosis — skizophrenia)  "there  are  presented  outspoken  traces  of 
an  archaic  mentality  which  under  circumstances  can  extend  backward 
even  to  the  revivification  of  psychic  processes  which  have  now  become 
wholly  archaic." 

The  philosophical  discussion  the  trend  of  which  is  here  but  briefly 
indicated  is  the  preamble  to  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  unconscious 
material  presented  in  a  publication  of  a  Miss  Frank  Miller  under  the 
title  "Quelques  faits  d'imagination  creatrice  subconsciente,"  in  which 
Jung  traces  the  thread  of  unconscious  symbolism  running  through 
them  and  points  out  the  interesting  correlation  between  the  symbol- 
isms in  Miss  Miller's  poesie  and  the  symbolism  .contained  in  the 
legends  of  an  early  mythology.  To  follow  the  author  into  the  inter- 


160  EDMUND  B.  HUEY 

esting  inductions  he  draws  from  the  analysis  of  Miss  Miller's  pictu- 
resque phantasy  would  be  however  to  infringe  the  limits  of  the  present 
review. 

THE  PRESENT  STATUS  OF  THE  BINET  SCALE  OF  TESTS 
FOR  THE  MEASUREMENT  OF  INTELLIGENCE 

BY  DR.  EDMUND  B.  HUEY 

Johns  Hopkins  Hospital 

In  1905,  Professor  Binet  published  in  /' Annee  psychologique  (4) 
a  tentative  scale  of  some  thirty  tests  for  the  measurement  of  intelli- 
gence, these  tests  being  arranged  in  order  of  difficulty,  beginning 
with  the  very  simplest  kinds  of  mental  adaptation.  In  r  Annee  for 
1908  (5),  Binet  and  Simon  published  the  new  and  much  improved 
scale  which  has  become  the  basis  of  world-wide  discussion.  The 
tests  of  this  scale,  about  fifty  in  number,  had  been  carefully  applied 
to  some  two  hundred  normal  Paris  children  of  the  poorer  quar- 
ter, as  well  as  to  many  defective  children.  There  are  from  three 
to  eight  tests  for  each  year  from  three  to  thirteen  inclusive,  and  these 
groups  of  tests  are  given  as  norms  for  children  of  these  ages  and  of 
corresponding  social  and  industrial  rank.  The  scale  appeared  almost 
simultaneously  with  a  law  providing  for  the  establishemnt  of  special 
classes  for  defective  children  in  the  schools  of  France.  In  a  little 
volume,  Les  Enfants  Anormaux  (3),  Binet  and  Simon  give  illustra- 
tive directions  for  the  use  of  the  scale  in  selecting  the  children  to  be 
placed  in  special  classes. 

In  April,  1911,  these  authors  published  (6)  a  revision  of  the  scale 
embodying  the  results  of  its  further  application  by  themselves  and 
others.  Five  tests  are  assigned  to  each  year,  except  for  the  fourth 
year.  A  test  was  ranked  as  normal  to  a  given  age  when  75  per  cent, 
of  the  children  of  that  age  passed  it.  Above  the  ten-year  level, 
tests  are  not  given  for  other  levels  than  12  years,  15  years,  and 
"adult"  (used  for  "above  15  years"). 

In  P Annee  for  1911  (2),  Binet  and  Simon  present  this  revised 
scale  with  an  extended  discussion  of  their  experiments  and  of  the 
criticisms  that  have  been  made  of  the  scale,  particularly  by  experi- 
menters in  Belgium,  England,  and  America.  This  article  is  worthy  of 
note  as  being  Prof.  Binet's  final  word  about  the  scale  before  his  death, 
which  occurred  in  October,  1911.  It  seems  due  to  these  authors 
that  we  sketch  here  their  own  very  candid  review  of  the  "  Binet 
literature": 


PRESENT  STATUS  OF  THE  B1NET  TESTS  161 

Decroly  and  Degand  (8)  applied  the  1908  scale  to  43  normal  girls 
and  boys  in  a  private  school  in  Brussels.  The  parents  were  physi- 
cians, lawyers,  professors,  etc.,  of  very  much  higher  station  than  the 
poor  Parisian  working-people.  The  classes  were  small  (8-10  pupils), 
and  the  instruction  highly  individualized.  Binet  and  Simon  obtained 
these  experimenters'  notes  of  their  tests  and  review  them  in  detail. 
The  Belgians  were  found  to  be  more  indulgent  that  the  French  in 
giving  the  tests.  The  Belgian  pupils  tested  in  advance  in  the  tests 
requiring  attention,  language,  and  "family  lessons,"  and  were  behind 
in  the  six  tests  which  depend  partly  on  "school  exercises."  On  the 
average  they  tested  a  year  and  a  half  in  advance  of  the  Paris  children, 
which  in  Binet's  opinion  illustrates  the  difference  in  intelligence  level 
and  in  language  between  children  of  the  poor  and  of  the  rich.  The 
Decroly  and  Degand  results  do  not  therefore  call  for  a  revision  of  the 
scale.  Tests  in  Paris  show  a  decidedly  higher  level  of  intelligence 
(%  year),  in  children  of  a  well-to-do  quarter  over  those  in  a  poor 
quarter,  though  this  difference  does  not  hold  for  rich  and  poor  taken 
from  the  same  school. 

Miss  Katherine  Johnston  (14)  applied  the  tests  to  two  hundred 
pupils  of  the  schools  in  Sheffield,  England.  Binet  and  Simon  ex- 
amined the  notes  of  these  tests.  They  find  that  the  tests  were 
applied  to  some  schools  of  the  rich  and  to  others  of  the  extremely 
poor,  and  that  "these  heterogeneous  results  are  confounded  in  the 
averages."  Irregular  variations  from  the  Paris  norms  are  thus  to  be 
expected,  as  found,  according  as  the  children  were  of  different  social 
and  industrial  stations.  The  count  was  not  made  according  to  the 
method  proper  to  the  scale.  Properly  counted,  and  allowing  for  the 
admitted  fact  that  in  the  1908  scale  "the  tests  for  n  and  12  years 
are  much  too  severe,"  Binet  and  Simon  conclude  that  "the  results 
of  Miss  Johnston  are  in  perfect  accord  with  ours." 

Binet  and  Simon  do  not  accept  the  opinion  of  Whipple  (24)  and 
others  that  the  tests  are  too  easy.  They  consider  that  Whipple's 
substitutes  for  the  supposedly  "cruel"  nonsense  statements  "cannot 
be  accepted  before  being  tried  experimentally.  There  is  nothing  to 
prove  that  they  present  a  difficulty  of  comprehension  equal  to  that 
of  our  own."  The  "cruelty"  of  these  sentences  does  not  affect  the 
Paris  children  unfavorably.  They  "laugh  at  them." 

Binet  and  Simon  urge  as  a  lesson  that  they  have  long  been  learning 
and  as  profoundly  important,  that  intelligence  and  other  mental 
functions  are  to  be  measured  by  what  children  do  for  a  variety  of 
different  tests  and  not  for  any  one.  When  correlations  of  intelligence 


1 62  EDMUND  B.  HUEY 

with  other  functions  are  to  be  determined,  it  is  these  resultants  that 
are  to  be  dealt  with.  "A  particular  test,  isolated  from  all  the  rest, 
is  not  worth  much,"  and  is  "subject  to  errors  of  all  sorts,"  especially 
if  it  is  rapid.  One  could  almost  say,  "the  tests  matter  little  if  they 
are  only  numerous  enough."  For  almost  any  series  of  tests  the 
number  to  which  replies  are  satisfactory  "grows  regularly  enough 
with  age." 

As  to  the  general  employment  of  the  scale  by  teachers,  these 
authors  call  the  scale  a  "Methode  de  luxe,"  which  like  the  vernier 
and  microscope  secure  a  fineness  of  estimate  not  necessary  for  most 
teachers,  who  are  too  busy  to  employ  it  and  do  not  need  to  employ  it. 
It  is  a  method  which  requires  "apprentissage,"  to  be  employed,  like 
the  microscope,  in  "une  etude  soigneuse." 

Leaving  at  this  point  the  review  by  Binet  and  Simon,  we  find  that 
the  tests  have  had  much  further  discussion,  of  which  but  partial 
report  can  be  made  in  this  article. 

Whipple  includes  in  his  Manual  (24)  descriptions  of  the  1905  and 
1908  scales  with  directions  for  their  use,  and  summarizes  the  criti- 
cisms of  Decroly  and  Degand. 

Goddard  (9,  10)  applied  the  1908  scale  throughout  the  New 
Jersey  Training  School  for  feeble-minded  children,  at  Vineland,  and 
finds  that  results  for  the  400  children  "agree  perfectly  with  long 
experience  in  institution  life,"  and  a  second  testing  "  shows  remarkable 
agreement  with  the  first."  Goddard's  tests  of  1,547  normal  children 
in  the  first  six  grades  show  that  the  largest  number  test  just  to  their 
age,  while  successively  smaller  numbers  test  to  higher  or  lower  age 
levels,  these  numbers  arranging  themselves  in  a  normal  curve  of 
distribution.  (Criticism  of  this  curve,  by  Terman  and  by  Ayres,  will 
be  noted  later.)  Seventy-eight  per  cent,  of  these  children  test  to 
their  age  or  within  a  year  above  or  below  it.  However,  certain  tests 
seemed  to  be  wrongly  placed,  particularly  for  the  latest  years;  and 
in  view  of  these  and  other  tests  of  normal  children  and  of  Binet's  own 
revision,  Goddard  has  published  (n)  a  revised  scale  on  the  general 
plan  of  Binet's  revision,  but  giving  tests  for  n  years  and  placing 
some  of  the  other  tests  differently.  After  one  year  Goddard  re- 
tested  1,000  of  the  normal  children,  and  states  that  the  results  "show 
considerable  correlation  with  the  earlier  test,  but  with  marked  and 
peculiar  differences  which  must  be  explained."  He  finds  that 
"feeble-minded  children  tested  from  two  to  seven  times  show  remark- 
able uniformity  in  the  results,  largely  regardless  of  the  experience 
and  personnel  of  the  examiner." 


PRESENT  STATUS  OF  THE  BINET  TESTS  163 

Beginning  with  the  autumn  of  1909,  Huey  (13)  has  used  the  Binet 
scale  continuously  with  defectives,  at  the  Illinois  state  institution  at 
Lincoln  and  later  at  the  Johns  Hopkins  Dispensary.  The  results 
published  for  the  Lincoln  work  state  that  the  scale  has  been  indis- 
pensable in  this  actual  work  with  cases,  without  attempting  criticism 
which  the  author  believes  should  be  based  on  the  examination  of 
normal  children.  Huey's  statement  of  the  scale  incorporates  the 
revision  of  Goddard,  and  gives  the  directions  most  necessary  for  the 
employment  of  the  tests. 

Walli'n  (23),  as  psychologist  to  the  New  Jersey  State  Village  for 
Epileptics,  at  Skillman,  has  likewise  found  the  scale  a  routine  necessity 
in  his  examinations,  but  suggests  certain  revisions.  He  prints  a 
complete  set  of  detailed  directions  for  giving  the  1908  scale. 

Kuhlmann  (15)  has  found  the  scale  of  great  practical  service  in  his 
work  as  psychologist  to  the  Minnesota  state  institution  for  the  feeble- 
minded, and  has  used  it  in  the  examination  of  more  than  1,300 
children.  He  publishes  a  condensed  and  partial  translation  of  the 
1908  scale,  from  the  original  article  of  Binet  and  Simon.  He  presents 
the  tests  and  the  directions  and  comments  of  their  authors,  with  such 
adaptations  as  are  necessary  for  American  practice. 

Bobertag  (7)  had  already  reported  the  Binet-Simon  tests  in  the 
Zeitschrift.  In  the  article  here  referred  to  he  publishes  the  results 
obtained  in  applying  the  1908  tests  to  355  normal  children  of  the 
schools,  of  the  ages  5  to  12  years;  and  to  80  Hilfschule  children  of 
8-14  years,  all  in  the  schools  of  Breslau.  He  gives  a  full  and  pains- 
taking account  of  his  method  of  applying  each  test,  with  statement  of 
his  results,  comments,  and  criticism.  He  suggests  many  changes, 
especially  the  amelioration,  since  made  by  Binet  and  Simon,  of  the 
too  severe  tests  for  n,  12,  and  13  years.  No  one  who  purposes  mak- 
ing a  revision  of  the  scale  should  neglect  to  review  this  discussion  of 
the  tests  by  Bobertag. 

Lawrence  (17)  tested  784  public  school  children,  of  all  the  grades 
from  6  to  13  years,  with  Binet' s  definition  tests  (use,  superior  to  use, 
difference  between  paper  and  cloth,  etc.,  meaning  of  charity,  etc., 
difference  between  poverty  and  misery,  etc.).  The  teachers,  inde- 
pendently of  these  tests,  sent  in  estimates  of  the  scholarship  of  these 
pupils.  In  these  definition  tests,  435  pupils  tested  to  age  or  not  more 
than  a  year  below;  140  were  in  advance  and  209  were  retarded. 
Seventy-five  per  cent,  of  the  pupils  pointed  out  by  these  tests  as 
behind  their  age  are  so  recognized  in  the  teachers'  independent 
estimate  of  scholarship,  while  seventy-nine  per  cent,  of  those  marked 


164  EDMUND  B.  HUEY 

"good"  or  "excellent"  in  scholarship  tested  to  age  or  above  it. 
Seventy-five  per  cent,  of  the  school  "laggards"  "were  found  by  the 
tests  to  be  mentally  retarded  one  year  or  more,"  while  the  same 
per  cent,  of  those  who  are  advancing  in  school  more  rapidly  than  the 
rank  and  file  are  found,  as  above  indicated,  to  be  advanced  a  year  or 
more  mentally."  The  8-year  test  was  "decidedly  too  easy"  and  the 
"  13-year  decidedly  too  hard." 

Terman  (20),  in  giving  his  impressions  after  testing  90  children 
and  supervising  the  testing  of  about  40x3,  says  that  "by  far  the  most 
important  result  was  a  decided  conviction  that  measuring  scales  of 
this  general  type  are  feasible,  and  that  when  corrected,  extended, 
and  multiplied,  they  will  prove  of  great  practical  and  theoretical 
value."  He  finds  that  "the  scale  originally  offered  by  Binet  is  in 
general  far  too  easy  at  the  lower  end,  while  in  the  upper  ranges  it  is 
too  difficult.  .  .  .  However,  in  spite  of  the  many  imperfections  and 
inadequacies  of  the  revised  scale  I  believe  that  by  its  use  it  is  possible 
for  the  psychologist  to  submit,  after  a  4<>minute  diagnostication,  a 
more  reliable  and  more  enlightening  estimate  of  the  child's  intelligence 
than  most  teachers  can  offer  after  a  year  of  daily  contact  in  the  school- 
room." He  believes,  nevertheless,  that  "tests  of  intelligence  stand 
in  serious  need  of  further  attention  before  we  undertake  to  determine 
standards  of  performance  in  the  different  branches  of  the  curriculum." 

In  a  later  article  Terman  and  Childs  (21)  while  further  eulogizing 
the  plan  and  usefulness  of  the  scale,  urge  the  need  of  its  revision  and 
extension.  Their  results,  for  the  tests  referred  to  above,  show  that 
on  the  average  their  California  children  of  4-6  years  tested  to  nearly 
ij^  years  above  their  chronological  age,  while  the  children  of  ii}/£ 
to  I3 %  years  tested  from  one  to  two  years  below  their  chronological 
age.  Goddard's  table  of  distribution  (10,  p.  234)  for  each  age  really 
shows  much  of  this  same  tendency,  particularly  for  the  latest  years. 
Terman  considers  that  Goddard's  curve  of  distribution,  "lumping  all 
the  ages  together  conceals,  of  course,  the  very  facts  we  wish  to  know. 
From  the  above  (Goddard's  curve)  it  is  seen  that  the  number  of 
younger  pupils  testing  ahead  is  about  balanced  by  the  number  of 
older  ones  testing  behind.  What  we  want  to  know  is  how  nearly 
accurate  the  scale  is  at  every  point."  Of  course  it  is  to  be  remembered 
that  the  1911  revisions  of  the  scale  are  in  the  direction  of  remedying 
the  errors  noted  for  the  later  years.  Terman  and  Childs  have  been 
trying  out  some  additional  tests  along  with  those  of  Binet  and  Simon, 
-and  plan  to  publish  a  revised  scale  on  the  basis  of  their  work. 

Without  having  used  the  scale  to  any  extent  with  cases,  Ayres  (i) 


PRE  SENT  STATUS  OF  THE  BINET  TESTS  165 

presents  certain  criticisms  of  it:  (i)  The  tests  are  largely  tests  of 
language  ability.  (2)  Five  depend  on  recent  enivronmental  in- 
fluences. (3)  Seven  depend  on  reading  and  writing.  (4)  The  ability 
to  repeat  words  and  numbers  is  given  too  much  importance.  (5)  The 
same  is  true  of  "puzzle  tests"  and  definition  of  abstract  terms.  (6) 
The  tests  do  not  sufficiently  test  native  ability,  but  rather  scholastic 
and  other  attainments.  (7)  Due  account  is  not  taken  of  the  emo- 
tions, habit,  etc.  He  admits  that  Binet  and  Simon's  "  application  of 
tests  to  a  definite,  universally  understood  scale  .  .  .  constitutes  so 
important  a  contribution  that  its  excellence  outweighs  the  short- 
comings of  the  tests  themselves."  Ayres  reaffirms  and  illustrates 
Terman's  criticism  of  the  fallacy  in  Goddard's  distribution  curve. 
He  urges  that  an  improved  scale  be  worked  out  by  coordinating  the 
work  of  a  large  number  of  experimenters,  "by  some  central  agency  or 
agencies,"  to  develop  a  scale  that  will  "  really  measure  native  ability." 

Kuhlmann  in  a  later  article  (16),  after  using  the  scale  in  testing 
1,300  feeble-minded  children,  replies  seriatim  to  the  criticisms  of  Dr. 
Ayres,  considering  most  of  these  to  be  erroneous  and  to  "come  largely 
from  a  misunderstanding  as  to  what  the  different  individual  tests 
aim  at,  and  of  the  mental  processes  involved  in  them.  The  former 
might  have  been  largely  obviated  by  a  more  careful  consideration 
of  the  author's  original  publications,  and  the  latter  by  a  careful  and 
extensive  use  of  the  tests  themselves.  There  is  especially  a  general 
impression  that  the  authors  meant  that  the  results  with  each  indi- 
vidual test  will  always  come  out  just  right,  which  impression  Dr. 
Ayres  seems  to  share  somewhat.  If  this  degree  of  perfection  were 
attained,  only  one  test  of  mental  age  for  each  chronological  age  would 
be  necessary,  where  the  authors  use  from  four  to  eight,  and  besides 
point  out  that  this  or  that  individual  test  often  gives  wrong  results. 
Probably  not  a  single  test  in  the  whole  system  is  free  from  such 
objection.  In  general  this  article  reminds  one  that  it  is  easy  to  make 
criticisms  and  difficult  often  to  clearly  disprove  them.  But  even  so, 
the  validity  of  merely  possible  objections  is  not  thereby  established." 

Clara  Harrison  Town  (22),  in  an  especially  timely  article  apropos 
of  the  present  popularization  of  the  scale,  says:  "Accustomed  to 
the  complicated  apparatus  of  a  psychological  laboratory,  the  laity 
were  pleased  to  find  it  unnecessary,  and  overlooked  entirely  the  fact 
that  the  psychologist  himself  was  not  unnecessary."  She  quotes 
Binet's  own  warnings  that  "It  is  not,  in  spite  of  appearances,  an 
automatic  method,  comparable  to  a  scale  which,  when  one  stands  upon 
it,  throws  out  a  ticket  on  which  one's  weight  is  printed.  It  is  not  a 


i66  EDMUND  B.  HUEY 

mechanical  method,  and  we  predict  to  the  busy  physician  who  wishes 
to  apply  it  in  hospitals,  that  he  will  meet  with  disappointments. 
The  results  of  our  examinations  are  of  no  value  if  they  are  separated 
from  all  commentary;  an  interpretation  is  necessary.  .  .  .  The  idea 
that  a  method  of  examination  can  be  made  precise  enough  to  be 
trusted  to  every  one  must  be  abandoned;  all  scientific  procedure  is  but 
an  instrument  which  requires  the  direction  of  an  intelligent  hand.  .  .  . 
Any  one  can  use  it  for  his  personal  satisfaction  or  to  obtain  an  approxi- 
mation evaluation  of  the  intelligence  of  a  child;  but  for  the  result 
of  this  method  to  have  a  scientific  value,  it  is  absolutely  necessary 
that  the  individual  who  uses  it  should  have  had  an  apprenticeship  in 
a  laboratory  of  pedagogy  or  possess  a  thorough  practical  knowledge 
of  psychological  experimentation." 

Dr.  Town,  who  is  herself  having  extensive  experience  in  the  use 
of  the  scale  at  the  Illinois  state  institution  at  Lincoln,  reminds  us 
that  Dr.  Ay  res'  "whole  critique  is  based  on  the  1908  series  of  'tests, 
which  has  since  been  revised  and  greatly  altered  by  Binet  himself"; 
and  also  that  many  of  his  criticisms  rest  on  a  misunderstanding  of 
these  tests  themselves  or  of  the  manner  in  which  they  are  actually 
given  and  scored.  In  general  Dr.  Town  believes  that  "the  result 
which  is  threatening  is  a  wholesale  use  of  the  scale  in  an  unscientific 
manner,  which  will  do  nothing  but  postpone  the  time  of  its  real 
usefulness — that  time  when  it  will  be  applied  by  experts  along  the 
four  practical  lines  indicated  by  Binet  himself — the  grading  of  normal 
and  backward  children  in  the  schools,  the  diagnosis  and  classification 
of  abnormal  children,  the  arrangement  of  school  curricula,  and  in  the 
courts  of  law." 

Meumann  (18)  makes  a  condensed  but  keen  analysis  of  tests  of 
the  intelligence,  outlining  their  present  status  and  attempting  a  con- 
structive interpretation  of  the  principles  involved. 

Seashore  (19)  urges  briefly  that  "retardation  does  not  follow  a 
common  flat  level  any  more  than  growth  does,  nor  even  nearly  so 
much."  We  "should  not  be  satisfied  with  a  flat  mental  age"  except 
for  rough  classification,  as  in  determining  whether  a  child  is  feeble- 
minded. A  child  may  be  at  the  mental  age  of  six  in  one  capacity 
and  twelve  in  another,  and  "the  important  thing  to  know  about  the 
individual  is  this  difference  and  direction  of  unsymmetrical  develop- 
ment." He  thinks  the  Binet  tests  should  be  developed  to  measure 
relative  rank  or  age  "of  more  specific  capacities  and  powers,  such  as 
reasoning  ability,  sensory  observation,  memory,  imagination,  initia- 
tive, emotional  control,  self-control,  etc." 


PRESENT  STATUS  OF  THE  BINET  TESTS  167 

The  present  writer  has  elsewhere  (12;  13,  Chapter  VII.)  urged 
such  an  extension  of  the  principle  of  the  scale  to  other  and  more  specific 
mental  functions,  and  believes  that  this  may  be  a  source  of  most  fruit- 
ful development  in  genetic  psychology. 

In  general  the  scale  of  Binet  and  Simon  has  interested  us  all  in 
making  more  methodical  study  of  the  intelligence.  It  has  been  of 
immediate  and  valuable  service  to  psychologists  in  making  exami- 
nations of  defectives,  and  it  gives  promise  of  being  developed  to 
a  scale  which  will  render  much  service  in  the  classification  and  study 
of  normal  pupils.  It  is  hoped  that  psychologists  will  prove  them- 
selves clinically  vigorous  enough  to  use  the  present  scale  as  a  means 
of  growth  to  the  far  better  ones  that  Binet  himself  foresaw. 

As  for  the  many  non-psychologists  who  have  to  make  estimates 
of  intelligence,  an  investigation  by  Binet  himself  showed  that  in 
making  these  practical  estimates  the  appeal  is  regularly  to  tests,  to 
try-outs  of  the  individual  in  one  or  another  way.  Such  persons  will 
at  least  find  the  Binet  and  other  series  of  tests  an  enrichment  of  their 
stock  of  home-made  devices,  often  economical  of  time  and  giving  a 
glimpse,  at  least,  of  mental  efficiency  in  more  varied  and  representa- 
tive directions.  Each  will  makes  these  tests  somewhat  in  his  own 
fashion,  inevitably,  and  the  results  will  by  no  means  match  the 
standardized  results.  It  will  be  a  try-out  with  a  series  of  test-groups 
that  are  progressively  more  difficult,  to  see  how  far  the  individual 
can  go  with  them.  The  more  intelligent  individuals  will  be  found 
to  go  the  further,  case  will  be  compared  with  case,  and  thus  if  each 
will  give  the  tests  somewhat  uniformly  for  his  own  cases,  they  may 
be  made  the  means  of  building  up  a  more  methodical  and  correct 
procedure  in  making  estimates  of  mental  efficiency.  The  tests  will  not 
displace  the  practical  judgment,  but  may  be  of  great  assistance  in 
forming  and  improving  it.  And  even  the  trained  clinical  psychologist, 
with  the  scale  at  its  best,  will  doubtless  have  to  "set"  it  somewhat 
differently  for  various  social  and  industrious  classes,  and  will  make 
various  allowances  for  local  circumstances,  even  if  not  for  his  own 
"  personal  equation." 

REFERENCES 

1.  AYRES,  L.  P.    The  Binet-Simon  Measuring  Scale  for  Intelligence:  Some  Criticisms 

and  Suggestions.    Psych.  Clinic,  1911,  5,  187-196. 

2.  BINET,  A.    Nouvelles  recherches  sur  la  mesure  du  niveau  intellectuel  chez  les 

enfants  d'ecole.     V  Annie  psychol.,  1911,  17,  I45-201- 

3.  BINET,  A.     Les  enfants  anormaux;  guide  pour  V admission  des  enfants  anormaux 

dans  les  classes  de  perfectionnement.     Paris:  A.  Colin,  1.907. 

4.  BINET,  A.,  et  SIMON,  TH.    Du  niveau  intellectuel  des  anormaux.    UAnnee  psychol., 

1905,  n,  191-244. 


1 68  EDMUND  B.  HUEY 

5.  BINET,  A.,  et  SIMON,  TH.     Le  developpement  de  1'intelligence  chez  les  enfants. 

UAnnee  psychoL,  1908,  14,  1-94. 

6.  BINET,  A.,  et  SIMON,  TH.     La  mesure  du  developpement  de  1'intelligence  chez  les 

jeunes  enfants.     Bull,  de  la  soc.  libre  pour  V etude  psych,  de  V enfant,  Avril,  1911, 
187-248. 

7.  BOBERTAG,  O.      Ueber  Intelligenzpriifungen  (nach  der  Methode  von  Binet  und 

Simon).     Zsch.  f.  angew.  PsychoL  u.  psych.  Sammelforschung,  1911,  5,  105-203. 

8.  DECROLY,  O.,  et  DEGAND,  MLLE.  J.    La  mesure  de  1'intelligence  chez  des  enfants 

normaux  d'apres  les  tests  de  Mm.  Binet  et  Simon.      Arch,  de  psychoL,  1910, 
9,  81-108. 

9.  GODDARD,  H.  H.     Four  Hundred  Feeble-Minded  Children  Classified  by  the  Binet 

Method.     J.  of  Psycho- A  sthenics,  15. 

10.  GODDARD,  H.  H.    Two  Thousand  Normal  Children  Measured  by  the  Binet  Meas- 

uring Scale  of  Intelligence.     Ped.  Sem.,  1911,  18,  232-259. 

11.  GODDARD,  H.  H.     The  Binet-Simon  Measuring  Scale  for  Intelligence.    Revised  ed., 

1911.     Pp.  16.     Vineland,  N.  J.:  The  Training  School. 

12.  HUEY,  E.  B.    Retardation  and  the  Mental  Examination  of  Retarded  Children. 

/.  of  Psycho- A 'sthenics,  15. 

13.  HUEY,  E.  B.     Backward  and  Feeble-Minded  Children.    Baltimore:  Warwick  and 

York,  1912.     Pp.  221. 

14.  JOHNSTON,  K.  L.    Binet's  Method  for  the  Measurement  of  Intelligence. — Some 

Results.     The  Journal  of  Experimental  Pedagogy  and  Training  College  Record, 
1911,  i,  24-31. 

15.  KUHLMANN,  F.     Binet  and  Simon's  System  for  Measuring  the  Intelligence  of 

Children.     /.  of  Psycho- A sthenics,  1911,  15,  79-92. 

1 6.  KUHLMANN,  F.     Dr.  Ayres'  Criticism  of  the  Binet  and  Simon  System  for  Meas- 

uring the  Intelligence  of  Children — a  Reply.    /.  of  Psycho-Asthenics,  1911, 
16,  58-67. 

17.  LAWRENCE,  ISABEL.    A  Study  of  the  Binet  Definition  Tests.     Psych.   Clinic, 

1911,  5,  207-216. 

1 8.  MEUMANN,  E.    Der  Gegenwartige  Stand  der  Methodik  der  Intelligenzpriifungen 

(mit  besonderer  Riicksicht  auf  der  Kinderpsychologie).     Zsch.  f.  exper.  Pceda- 
gogik,  1910,  pp.  68-79. 

19.  SEASHORE,  C.  E.    The  Binet-Simon  Tests.    /.  of  Ed.  Psych.,  1912,  3,  50. 

20.  TERMAN,  L.  M.    The  Binet-Simon  Scale  for  Measuring  Intelligence;  Impressions 

Gained  by  its  Application.     Psych.  Clinic,  1911,  5,  239-244. 

21.  TERMAN,  L.  M.,  and  CHILDS,  H.  G.    A  Tentative  Revision  and  Extension  of  the 

Binet-Simon  Measuring  Scale  of  Intelligence.     Part  I.     /.  of  Ed.  Psych.,  1912, 
3,  61-74. 

22.  TOWN,  CLARA  H.    The  Binet-Simon  Scale  and  the  Psychologist.    Psych.  Clinic, 

1912,  5,  239-244. 

23.  WALLIN,  J.  E.  W.    A  Practical  Guide  for  the  Administration  of  the  Binet-Simon 

Scale  for  Measuring  Intelligence.     Psych.  Clinic,  1911,  5,  217-238. 

24.  WHIPPLE,  G.  M.     Manual  of  Mental  and  Physical  Tests,  pp.  473-517.     Baltimore: 

Warwick  and  York,  1910. 


SPECIAL  REVIEWS 
DEMENTIA  PR^COX 

Dementia  Praecox  oder  Gruppe  der  Schizophrenien.     BLEULER.     Leip- 
zig und  Wien:  Franz  Deuticke,  1911. 

Of  a  comprehensive  work  on  psychiatry,  the  "Handbuch  der 
Psychiatric,"  edited  by  Aschaffenburg,  there  have  been  published 
thus  far  two  parts,  one  on  manic-depressive  insanity  by  Stransky, 
and  one  on  dementia  prsecox  by  Bleuler.  The  latter  work,  a  book  of 
some  400  pages,  takes  up  the  study  of  this  important  disorder  in  a 
very  comprehensive  manner.  The  purpose  of  the  present  writer  is 
to  give  here  a  brief  review,  not  of  the  clinical-nosological  part  of  the 
work,  but  of  the  psychological  portion  entirely.  It  is,  however, 
necessary  to  state  that  Bleuler  comprises  in  his  book  a  great  many 
cases  which  others  would  not  include  in  the  group  or  groups  of  de- 
mentia prsecox,  so  that  his  analysis  refers  in  reality  a  great  deal  to 
the  symptomatology  of  the  functional  psychoses. 

What  characterizes  the  manifestations  of  dementia  prsecox  are: 
a  more  or  less  marked  disorder  of  the  train  of  thought,  sometimes 
spoken  of  as  scattering  of  ideation  with  bizarre  turns,  fragmentary 
thoughts,  and  so  on;  frequently  a  lack  of  harmony  of  affect  and 
intellectual  content;  an  absence  of  correlation  of  mental  contents; 
various  interferences  with  the  train  of  thought  in  the  form  of  sudden 
stoppage  of  a  topical  nature,  or  of  diffuse  inhibition  of  mental  opera- 
tions [termed  blocking  of  thought  (Sperrung)] ;  the  frequent  appear- 
ance of  impulses  opposite  to  what  the  circumstances  would  demand,  or 
a  warding  off  of  all  interferences,  diffuse,  or  under  certain  situations 
only  (negativism) ;  a  general  tendency  to  shut  out  the  world  of  reality 
(by  Bleuler  called  "autism");  an  affective  deterioration;  and  finally 
such  symptoms  as  hallucinations,  delusions,  impulsive  acts,  peculiar 
mannerisms,  and  the  like. 

Bleuler  gives  an  excellent  and  extensive  description  of  all  these 
symptoms,  and  also  makes  an  attempt  at  a  psychological  explanation 
which  he  admits  frankly  to  be  tentative,  yet  which  to  the  psychiatrist 
is  of  great  value  and  represents  a  splendid  attempt  at  clarifying  the 
mechanisms  in  a  disorder  which,  at  best,  is  complex  and  difficult  to 
understand.  Bleuler  has  proposed  to  give  to  dementia  praecox  the 

169 


170  REVIEWS 

name  schizophrenia,  because  a  great  deal  in  the  symptomatology 
refers  to  a  tearing  asunder  of  normal  mental  cohesions.  This  he  pro- 
ceeds to  analyze  more  in  detail.  He  assumes,  first  of  all,  a  primary 
diffuse  "association  disorder,"  which  he  seems  to  consider  not  further 
reducible,  and  which  he  attributes,  therefore,  directly  to  a  physical 
disease  process.  This  he  admits  to  be  problematical.  The  associa- 
tion disorder,  therefore,  represents  an  ultimate  defect,  very  much  in 
the  same  way,  I  take  it,  as  the  loss  of  memory  represents  an  ultimate 
defect  in  the  organic  disorders.  He  refrains,  however,  from  any 
correlation  with  anatomical  changes.  This  primary  disease  process 
he  attempts  to  support  by  some  other  phenomena,  notably  physical 
ones,  an  attempt  which  is  not  especially  convincing.  The  primary 
association  disorder,  he  conceives  as  a  sort  of  leveling  down  of  normal 
associative  affinities,  which  leads  in  itself  to  elisions  and  fragmentary 
mental  products  but  which,  above  all,  forms  the  fundamental  defect 
upon  which  develop  the  other  symptoms.  This  is  possible,  particu- 
larly, owing  to  the  fact  that  the  affects  can  then  exert  a  much  greater 
influence  than  normally;  in  other  words,  the  symptomatology  is 
largely  determined  by  the  affectivity,  through  mechanisms,  some  of 
which  Freud  has  taught.  Bleuler  therefore  shows  how  affective 
complexes  are  at  the  bottom  of  a  great  deal  in  the  manifestations  of 
dementia  prsecox,  and  how,  in  addition  to  primary  splitting,  there  is 
an  extensive  secondary  splitting  produced  by  the  affects;  thus  he 
admits  the  great  importance  of  psychogenesis  in  dementia  prsecox, 
but  he  confines  this  action  to  the  secondary  symptoms,  which  repre- 
sent more  or  less  plain  evasions  of  difficult  situations. 

The  psychology  of  dementia  prsecox  cannot  be  understood  unless 
we  accept  the  importance  of  unconscious  trains  of  thought  which  fol- 
low in  many  ways  the  same  laws  as  conscious  thinking,  and  which 
manifest  themselves  through  Freudian  mechanisms.  But  this  in- 
fluence is  a  much  more  extensive  one  in  dementia  prsecox  than  in  the 
normal,  or  in  hysteria,  for  example.  The  affects  produce  much  more 
profound  dissociations.  The  influence  of  reality  is  much  more  ex- 
excluded.  We  might  almost  say,  the  individual  manifestations  stand 
in  the  mind  much  more  like  foreign  bodies.  We  have  attempted  to 
account  for  this  largely  by  the  shut-in  tendencies,  which  probably 
must  be  referred  to  more  fundamental  defects  in  make-up  and  which 
manifest  themselves  more  or  less  early  in  tendencies  to  live  in  a  world 
apart  where  the  correcting  influence  of  reality  is  more  or  less  excluded. 
Bleuler  attributes  all  this,  the  shut-in  tendencies  included,  to  his 
primary  association  disorder,  which,  as  we  have  said,  in  turn,  gives 


DEMENTIA  PRAECOX  171 

the  affects  greater  sway.  Whereas  the  logical  train  of  thought  follows 
paths  established  by  experience,  the  affects  direct  the  train  of  thought 
according  to  desires  and  aversions.  In  the  normal  they  are  respon- 
sible only  for  the  general  direction  of  action,  and  the  logical  operations 
are  not  falsified  except  in  realms  where  subjectivity  is  generally  per- 
mitted to  guide  us,  as  in  matters  of  taste,  for  example.  In  dementia 
praecox  the  affects  disturb  even  otherwise  well-grounded  associations. 
Through  this  greater  influence  of  the  affects,  the  possibility  of  a 
more  or  less  complete  exclusion  of  all  that  does  not  harmonize  with 
the  affective  complexes  is  also  possible,  so  that  these  assume  more  and 
more  a  certain  autonomy,  and  can  manifest  themselves  without  there 
being  any  attempt  at  correlation. 

The  remarkable  affective  deterioration  is,  according  to  Bleuler, 
a  secondary  phenomenon.  He  justly  points  to  the  fact  that  normal 
affects  can  be  produced  in  dementia  praecox  patients  when  they  are 
forced  to  think  of  their  complexes;  he  shows  how  in  the  beginning  of 
the  disorder,  the  affective  deterioration  is  by  no  means  general  but 
refers  to  certain  topics  only  (affective  complexes),  and  also  that  cases 
with  apparent  affective  deterioration  sometimes  get  well.  Hence  he 
assumes  not  a  loss,  but  a  repression  of  affects.  These  repressed  affects 
manifest  themselves  in  various  ways  but  also  inhibit  other  affects. 
This  is  not  unlike  what  we  see  in  normal  individuals  who  are  preoc- 
cupied with  an  affectful  experience.  In  addition  to  this,  the  autism 
and  the  splitting  off  of  affective  complexes  have  their  share  in  the 
production  of  the  general  indifference. 

The  normal  individual  includes  in  his  logical  operations  more  or 
less  everything  in  his  past  and  present  experience,  which  has  a  bearing, 
irrespective  of  its  emotional  value;  the  fundamental  shizophrenic 
disorder  on  the  other  hand  makes  the  exclusion  of  external  and  inter- 
nal facts  possible,  and  permits  the  natural  tendency  to  live  in  fancies 
to  flourish.  Bleuler  speaks  of  this  as  autistic  thinking,  and  of  the 
general  tendency  to  turn  away  from  reality  as  autism,  making  it 
dependent,  therefore,  upon  his  primary  association  disorder.  In 
attempting  to  make  negativism  comprehensible,  he  points  in  the  first 
place,  to  the  fact  that  every  impulse  is  closely  associated  with  its 
opposite,  which  he  looks  upon  as  a  sort  of  protective  mechanism  and 
which  he  designates  ambivalence.  This  assumes  pathological  pro- 
portions in  dementia  praecox.  But  this  negativism,  of  course,  is  also 
closely  related  to  autism  and  further  accentuated  by  it,  and  other 
factors  also  contribute  to  the  prominence  which  this  symptom  may 
attain  in  dementia  praecox,  such  as  a  certain  sensitiveness  and  an 
instinctive  desire  on  the  part  of  the  patient  to  protect  himself  against 


172  REVIEWS 

actual  or  possible  irritation  of  "mental  wounds,"  also  an  opposition 
to  the  more  or  less  hostile  attitude  of  the  environment,  and  very 
likely,  not  infrequently,  a  certain  difficulty  in  thinking  and  acting. 

What  we  term  "blocking"  is  undoubtedly  an  exaggeration  of  that 
which  we  normally  know  as  repression,  and  whenever  the  symptom  was 
analyzed  in  cases,  it  could  be  traced  to  the  influences  of  complexes. 
But  Bleuler  also  refers  some  general  reductions  of  activity,  or  some 
more  or  less  pronounced  conditions  of  inhibition  of  mental  operations 
to  the  same  principle,  because  this  can  be  seen  at  times  to  develop 
out  of  more  topical  blocking;  and  he  likens  this  to  the  so-called 
emotive  stupor  seen  in  normal  persons;  at  the  same  time  the  tendency 
to  stereotypy  of  impulses,  and  the  tendency  to  generalization  seen 
in  dementia  prsecox,  as  well  as  the  lack  of  interest  and  the  difficulty 
in  mental  operations,  may  also  contribute  to  the  full  development  of 
this  blocking.  Stupor  or  stupor-like  reductions  may  also  be  due 
to  hallucinations  and  other  causes,  e.  g.,  a  certain  cerebral  torpor 
conceived  by  Bleuler  as  the  direct  outcome  of  the  disease  process. 
Catalepsy,  though  difficult  to  explain,  seems  at  least  in  part  accounted 
for  by  a  certain  dearth  of  ideas  which,  in  other  conditions,  is  also 
found  to  be  associated  with  it. 

Many  symptoms,  such  as  delusion,  hallucinations,  and  odd  acts, 
are  direct  intrusions  into  consciousness,  of  subconscious  complexes, 
and  represent  wishes  and  fears,  often  symbolized  and  only  compre- 
hensible when  the  possibility  of  symbolism  is  fully  recognized.  They 
are  often  difficult  to  analyze  because  they  may  be  distorted  by  sub- 
stitutions or  gradual  metamorphoses.  The  peculiar  disharmony 
between  affects  and  ideas  is  certainly  often  explained  by  the  fact 
that,  just  as  in  the  case  of  dreams,  the  ideas  stand  for  something 
else  than  what  they  appear  to  represent. 

An  important  part  of  the  work  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that 
Bleuler  clearly  demarcates  the  disorders  found  in  dementia  prsecox 
from  those  of  the  organic  mental  disorders,  and  justly  shows  that  an 
elementary  memory  and  apprehension  defect,  as  well  as  primary 
motility  symptoms,  are  foreign  to  the  symptomatology  of  dementia 
praecox. 

Such  a  short  review  cannot  do  justice  to  a  work  which  contains 
so  much  that  is  valuable.  A  thorough  study  of  it  will  repay  every 
one  interested  in  normal  and  abnormal  psychology  and  in  the 
analysis  of  the  most  complex  pathological  phenomena,  in  which 
constant  reference  is  made  to  normal  processes. 

PSYCHIATRIC  INSTITUTE,  AUGUST  HoCH 

WARD'S  ISLAND,  N.  Y. 


Vol.  IX.  No.  5.  May 


THE 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN 


GENERAL  REVIEWS  AND  SUMMARIES 

CUTANEOUS,   KIN^ESTHETIC  AND  MISCELLANEOUS 

SENSES 

BY  ROSWELL  P.  ANGIER 

Yale  University 

Cutaneous  Sensation. — So  far  as  the  literature  of  the  year  1911 
has  been  accessible  to  the  reviewer,  perhaps  the  most  significant 
piece  of  work  on  cutaneous  sensation  is  that  by  Kiesow  (10).  It 
concerns  the  observation  of  E.  H.  Weber  (published  in  1846)  that  a 
given  object  (German  Thaler)  felt,  on  the  skin  of  the  forehead,  when 
cooled,  heavier  than  when  warmed.  The  problem  rouses  a  somewhat 
livelier  interest  because  of  the  observations  of  Szabadfoldi  (1865), 
apparently  contradictory  to  those  of  Weber.  Szabadfoldi  found  that, 
of  two  discs  of  hard  wood,  one  warmed  to  50°  or  more  and  the  other 
of  indifferent  temperature,  the  warmer  disc  felt  the  heavier,  even 
though  actually  smaller  than  the  other,  but  that  the  character  of 
the  results  was  somewhat  dependent  on  the  diameter,  thickness  and 
absolute  weight  of  the  discs  utilized. 

Kiesow,  in  his  own  tests,  verifies  Weber's  results,  even  if  the 
warmer  object  has  a  temperature  as  high  as  50°,  provided  that  the 
other  gives  a  manifest  sensation  of  cold.  Szabadfoldi  is,  however, 
confirmed  when  a  disc  of  50°  is  compared  with  one  of  indifferent  or 
slightly  warm  temperature.  Diameter,  thickness,  or  absolute  weight 
have,  furthermore,  no  special  influence  on  the  result.  Nor  have 
such  different  substances  as  copper,  silver  and  nickel  coins,  cork, 
gypsum,  cardboard,  paper,  etc.  It  was  found,  finally,  that  a  cold 
stimulus  as  such  may  give  an  impression  of  weight  (evaporating  ether 
from  a  saturated  disc  of  filter-paper  as  compared  with  a  similar  disc, 

173 


174  ROSWELL  P.  ANGIER 

not  etherized  and  tactually  unfelt).  The  best  results,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  earlier  experimenters,  were  obtained  on  the  forehead.  Other 
facts  observed  by  Kiesow  were  that  the  cooler  object  appears  to 
have  the  greater  area  and  to  lie  deeper  in  the  skin  than  the  warmer. 

As  for  explanation  of  the  main  phenomenon,  Kiesow  offers  the 
following  (p.  85):  Es  "kann  als  sicher  gelten,  dass  die  Erregimg  der 
Tastorgane  eine  Funktion  des  an  ihrem  Orte  herrschenden  Druck- 
gefalles  ist,  und  es  kann  weiter  als  wahrscheinlich  angenommen 
werden,  dass  hierbei  Konzentrationsanderungen  der  Zellflussigkeit 
auftreten,  die  direkte  Erregung  der  Tastorgane  durch  Anderungen 
des  osmotischen  Drucks  verursacht  wird,  im  letzten  Grunde  also 
eine  chemische  ist.  Dies  vorasugesetzt,  .  .  .  diirfte  die  Annahme 
berechtigt  sein,  dass  auch  der  Kaltereiz  im  Innern  der  Haut  Ver- 
anderungen  hervorruft,  die  den  durch  mechanische  Einwirkungen 
erzeugten  Deformationen  analog  sind.  Durch  diese  wiirde  unter 
den  genannten  Voraussetzungen  dann  ebenfalls  eine  Stoning  des 
chemischen  Gleichgewichts  herbeigefuhrt  werden,  die  ihrerseits 
wiederum  auf  die  Enden  der  Tastnerven  einwirken  muss.  .  .  .  Dass 
bei  Einwirkung  von  Kaltereizen  Kontraktionen  der  einzelnen  Ge- 
websteile  auftreten  miissen,  ist  eine  Tatsache,  die  ausser  allem 
Zweifel  steht.  .  .  .  Dass  solche  Kontraktionsvorgange  weiter  Ver- 
schiebungen  der  Gewebsflussigkeit  und  demzufolge  auch  wohl 
Konzentrationsanderungen  der  Zellflussigkeit  nach  sich  ziehen 
mussen,  diirfte  somit  nur  eine  berechtigte  Folgerung  sein."  The 
warmer  object,  furthermore,  feels  lighter  than  it  normally  would  feel 
because  the  heat,  causing  expansion  of  the  tissue  or  of  the  cell  fluids, 
exerts  a  stimulus  on  the  touch  organs  in  a  direction  contrary  to  that 
given  by  its  weight,  so  that  the  latter  cannot  have  the  full  effect  that 
it  would,  acting  alone,  possess.  If  the  object  is  further  warmed, 
the  expansion-effect  outbalances  the  antagonistic  pressure-effect  and 
one  observes  Szabadfoldi's  phenomenon — the  warm  object  appears 
heavier  than  one  of  indifferent  temperature — since  a  pressure  organ 
mediates  the  same  kind  of  sensation  whatever  the  direction  in  which 
the  stimulus  acts.  The  forehead,  finally,  is  the  most  favorable  field 
for  tests,  since  the  sensitivity  to  pressure  is  great,  the  pressure  spots 
thicker  together  and  the  skin  thin.  Other  parts  of  the  body  with 
these  characteristics  also  give  the  phenomena,  although  less 
pronounced. 

v.  Frey  (7)  gives  simply  a  preliminary  report  of  experiments  made 
with  H.  D.  Cook  on  the  influence  of  different  pressure-stimuli  on 
one  another.  So  far  as  tactual  sensation  is  concerned,  it  was  found 


CUTANEOUS  AND  ALLIED  SENSES  175 

that  the  stimulation  of  two  points  on  the  skin  yields  mutual  facili- 
tation (two  simultaneous  impressions,  either  alone  subliminal,  rising 
above  the  threshold)  and  that  this  is  in  dependence  on  their  distance 
apart  and  their  relative  intensity.  Of  three  equally  intense  stimu- 
lations, for  instance,  two  near  together  are  subjectively  more  intense 
than  a  third  more  distant,  v.  Frey's  results  apparently  contradict 
those  of  Heymans,  who  found  that  tactual  stimuli  have,  in  proportion 
to  their  proximity,  a  mutually  inhibitory  effect.  One  awaits  with 
interest,  therefore,  the  full  report  of  v.  Frey's  work. 

Siebrand  (18)  concerns  himself  with  differential  sensitivity  to 
cold  stimuli.  The  areas  tested  were  on  the  ball  of  the  thumb  and  the 
volar  forearm.  The  results  were  as  follows:  (i)  Stimulation  of  a 
given  cold  spot  at  various  stimulus  temperatures,  with  a  constant 
area  of  contact,  showed  marked  individual  differences, — .4°  C.  for 
one  subject,  3°  C.  for  another;  (2)  increasing  the  area  of  stimulation, 
although  on  but  a  single  cold-spot,  increased  discriminability; 
(3)  increase  in  the  number  of  cold-spots  stimulated,  with  constant 
temperature  and  area,  increased  felt  intensity  of  cold,  the  same 
results  obtaining,  too,  if  the  area  was  enlarged  but  the  number  of 
spots  stimulated  constant;  (4)  a  single  cold-spot,  if  thickly  set  with 
others,  gave  a  lower  threshold  than  one  more  isolated. 

Barnholt  and  Bentley's  experiments  (4)  concern  the  problem  of 
the  effect  of  areal  or  numerical  increase  of  thermal  stimulus  on  sensory 
intensity.  On  chosen  surfaces  (palm,  volar  forearm)  70  per  cent,  of 
the  observations  of  three  subjects  gave  in  tenser  cold  with  the  larger 
area.  Less  sensitive  areas  were  then  compared  with  more  sensitive, 
the  smallest  stimulus  area  being  used  for  the  latter  and  all  other 
areas  for  the  former.  A  large  less  sensitive  area  may  thus  report 
intensities  equal  to  a  small  area  of  greater  sensitivity.  Tests  of 
another  sort  showed,  however,  that  the  intensity  of  a  temperature 
sensation  is  determined  by  the  most  sensitive  area  in  the  excited  com- 
plex. The  high  intensity  of  a  large  area  is  doubtless  due  in  part  at 
least  to  the  better  conditions  afforded  by  a  stimulus  of  great  area 
for  conduction  to  the  true  temperature  organs.  These  results  may 
be  profitably  compared  with  those  of  Siebrand. 

The  clinical  interest  in  tactual  sensation  is  represented  by  the 
articles  of  Baglioni  and  Pilotti  (2),  Minor  (13),  and  Maloney  and 
Kennedy  (12) .  The  first  of  these,  on  the  effects  of  stovaine  injections, 
duplicates  an  article  in  German,  by  the  same  authors,  and  already 
reviewed  in  the  BULLETIN  last  year  (p.  152).  Minor  offers  a  con- 
venient thermosesthesiometer  for  psychiatric-clinical  use  by  means 


1 76  ROSWELL  P.  ANGIER 

of  which  the  temperature  difference  between  two  stimulus  tubes, 
filled  with  water,  may  be  quickly  reduced.  Maloney  and  Kennedy 
tested  the  pressure  sense  about  the  face  in  a  number  of  cases  with  well- 
defined  lesions  of  the  fifth,  seventh  and  twelfth  cranial  nerves,  in  an 
attempt  to  determine  the  functional  distribution  of  these  nerves. 
It  is  impossible  to  enter  into  the  details  of  their  discussion.  Of  general 
interest  to  psychologists  is  their  statement  that  after  removal  of 
the  Gasserian  ganglion  (origin  of  the  fifth  nerve),  the  areas  of  the 
face  anaesthetic  to  light  touch  are  identical  with  those  lacking  deep 
sensibility.  It  will  be  remembered  that  Head  and  Sherren  found, 
for  lesions  to  the  radial  nerve,  that  the  former  extended  beyond  the 
latter.  Maloney  and  Kennedy  believe  the  apparent  greater  circum- 
scription of  the  areas  of  loss  of  deep  sensibility,  in  their  tests  on 
the  face,  to  be  due  to  the  tension  effect  of  the  heavier  stimulus  on 
the  normal  tissue  bordering  the  anaesthetic  area.  This  can,  in  the 
reviewer's  opinion,  scarcely  explain  the  findings  of  Head  and  Sherren, 
since  the  area  of  loss  for  light  touch  often  went  far  beyond  that  for 
pressure.  Certain  of  the  authors'  further  conclusions  are  (i)  that 
the  fifth  nerve  is  the  essential  path  for  pressure-touch  impressions 
in  the  face;  (2)  that  the  seventh  nerve  in  the  Fallopian  canal  is 
associated  with  fibers  mediating  pressure-pain  from  the  skin  muscles 
and  bones  of  the  facial  muscular  apparatus  up  to  pressure  of  about 
four  kilos  (low  threshold  mechanism);  (3)  that  the  peripheral  twelfth 
subserves  no  sensory  function  for  the  tongue;  and  (4)  that  the 
sympathetic  mediates  a  crude  pressure-pain  sensibility  for  pressure 
upwards  of  four  kilos  (high  threshold  mechanism),  a  mechanism  less 
sensitive,  therefore,  than  that  of  the  fifth  or  seventh  nerves. 

The  interest  of  the  work  of  Willis  and  Urban  (22)  with  weights 
lies  in  the  sphere  of  psychophysical  methods  and  need  not  here  be 
considered.  Their  article  is  supplementary  to  a  previous  publication.1 
Ziehen  (23)  argues  for  the  method  of  right  and  wrong  cases  in  investi- 
gations of  the  kinaesthetic  sense,  especially  in  its  development  and 
in  that  of  kinsesthetic  space  in  children.  Incidentally  he  states  his 
belief  that  what  one  really  investigates  is  not  kinaesthetic  sensations, 
but  a  fusion  of  mechanical  stimulations  in  the  joint,  muscles  and 
tendons  felt  as  an  indeed  very  indefinite  Beruhrungsempfindung,  with 
ideas  of  movement,  the  latter  being  normally  visual  but,  for  the 
blind,  tactual.  What  is  really  investigated  is,  therefore,  ideas  of 
movement  evoked  by  kinaesthetic  sensations. 

1  Urban,  F.  M.,  "Die  psychophysischen  Massmethoden  als  Grundlagen  em- 
pirischer  Messungen,"  Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  PsychoL,  1909,  15,  264-267. 


CUTANEOUS  AND  ALLIED  SENSES  177 

Kunz  (n)  returns  to  a  polemic  (Cf.  Zsch.  f.  pad.  PsychoL,  1909, 
Vol.  9)  on  the  nature  of  distance  "sensation"  or  "feeling"  as  distinct 
from  orientation,  maintaining  his  previous  conclusions,  that  this 
sense,  localized  on  the  skin,  is  indeed  of  tactual  and  not  auditory 
origin. 

Organic  and  Other  Sensations.— Physiologists  and  clinicians  return 
again  and  again  to  the  problem  of  the  sensibility  of  the  inner  organs. 
Neumann  (15),  in  a  series  of  articles  scattered  through  the  volume, 
gives  a  comprehensive  historical  review  of  work  up  to  1910.  In 
another  series  (16)  he  reports  certain  experiments  on  the  frog.  Un- 
covering and  stimulating  the  various  inner  organs  (pinching  with 
forceps,  faradic  stimulation,  hot  glass  rod,  etc.)  he  secured  from 
most  of  them  a  peculiar  reaction — a  stretching  and  backward  bending 
of  the  back,  slow  and  quite  distinct  from  the  jerky  defense  reactions. 
In  other  experiments,  conclusions  concerning  the  functional  distri- 
butions of  nerves  were  reached. 

Hertz  (9),  in  three  lectures,  partly  historical  and  critical,  partly 
based  on  his  own  experiments  on  direct  stimulation  of  the  alimentary 
canal  of  human  beings  and  on  inferences  from  the  symptomatic  pains 
of  typical  alimentary  diseases,  gives,  among  manifold  other  con- 
clusions, the  following:  (i)  "The  mucous  membrane  of  the  alimentary 
canal  from  the  upper  end  of  the  oesophagus  to  the  junction  of  the 
rectum  with  the  anal  canal  is  insensitive  to  tactile  stimulation. " 
(2)  "The  mucous  membrane  of  the  oesophagus  and  the  anal  canal  is 
sensitive  to  thermal  stimulation,  but  that  of  the  stomach  and  in- 
testines is  insensitive.  (3)  The  only  immediate  cause  of  true  visceral 
pain  is  tension;  this  is  exerted  on  the  muscular  coat  of  hollow  organs 
and  on  the  fibrous  capsule  of  solid  organs.  .  .  .  Pain  in  diseases  of 
the  alimentary  canal  is  most  frequently  true  visceral  pain;  it  is  some- 
times due  to  spread  of  the  disease  to  surrounding  sensitive  structures 
or  to  tension  exerted  on  the  peritoneal  connexions"  (p.  1193).  Mit- 
chell (14)  concludes  from  a  series  of  correlations  between  accounts  of 
pains  of  his  patients  before  abdominal  operations  and  his  findings  on 
operating  that  the  parietal  peritoneum,  and  consequently  the  organs 
involved  with  it,  is  sensitive  to  pain,  but  that  the  visceral  peritoneum 
with  its  abdominal  organs  supplied  only  by  the  sympathetic  system 
is  not  sensitive.  This  result  supports  in  general  the  views  of  Lenn- 
ander  (1901).  Dana  (6)  gives  an  entertaining  discussion  of  the 
possible  correlations  between  types  of  pains  and  types  of  psycho- 
neuroses. 

Two  papers,  one  by  Alexander  (i),  the  other  by  Barany  (3),  on 


178  ROSWELL  P.  ANGIER 

the  functions  of  the  inner  ear  deserve  passing  mention.  Alexander's 
is  a  succinct  and  comprehensive  review  of  the  facts  and  theories 
concerning  the  functions  of  the  vestibular  apparatus.  Barany's  is  a 
brief  summary  of  his  theoretical  position  discussed  in  extenso  in 
another  article.1 

Oppenheim  (17)  describes  and  discusses  cases  met  with  in  his 
practice  of  permanent  dizziness  not  assignable  to  objective  causes. 
It  differs  from  either  cerebellar  or  vestibular  dizziness  and  always 
begins  with  a  marked  attack,  resists  treatment,  especially  psycho- 
therapeutic,  and  is  probably  not  in  the  psychiatrical  sense  a  mental 
trouble,  but  is  rather  dependent  on  some  still  undiscovered  irritation 
in  the  central  nervous  system.  Friedlander  (8)  reports  a  case, 
however,  manifestly  hysteric  in  origin,  but  showing  the  same  stubborn 
permanent  dizziness  already  described  by  Oppenheim.  Cruchet  and 
Moulinier  (5)  gives  merely  a  brief  description  of  symptoms  of  aviator 
sickness. 

Finally,  Sternberg  (19,  20),  recurs  anew  in  two  articles  to  his 
already  much  exploited  doctrines  of  the  nature  and  functions  of 
appetite.  A  third  article  (21)  gives  another  of  his  remarkable  dis- 
cussions on  tickling  feelings.  He  attempts  to  define,  chiefly  on  the 
basis  of  philological  usage,  the  meaning  and  function  of  tickling 
in  general  and  in  particular.  When  philological  analysis  has  done 
its  best  "erst  dann,"  he  thinks,  "wird  man  zur  Feststellung  des 
Begriffes  der  Kitzelgefiihle  und  zur  Einsicht  in  das  Wesen  des  Kitzels 
gelangen"  (p.  109).  Bis  dahin — Geduldl 

REFERENCES 

1.  ALEXANDER,  G.     Die  Funktionen  des  Vestibularapparates.     Ber.  IV.  Kongress 

f.  exper.  Psychol.,  1911,  74-94. 

2.  BAGLIONI,  S.,  &  PILOTTI,  G.     Recherches  dans  la  rachiostovainisation  humaine. 

Arch.  ital.  de  biol.,  1911,  55,  82-90. 

3.  BARANY,  K.     Zur  Theorie  des  Bogengangapparates.     Ber.  IF.  Kongress  f.  exper. 

Psychol.,  1911,  250-252. 

4.  BARNHOLT,  S.  E.,  &  BENTLEY,  M.    Thermal  intensity  and  the  area  of  stimulus. 

Amer.  J.  of  Psychol.,  1911,  22,  325-332. 

5.  CRUCHET,  R.,  &  MOULINIER,  — .     Le  mal  des  aviateurs.     C.  r.  acad.  d.  sci.,  1911, 

152,1114-1115. 

6.  DANA,  C.  L.    The  interpretation  of  pain  and  the  dysesthesias.    /.  of  the  Amer. 

Med.  Assoc.,  1911,  56,  787-791. 

7.  FREY,   M.  VON.     Die   Einwirkung  einfacher   Druckempfindungen   aufeinander. 

Ber.  IV.  Kongress  f.  exper.  Psychol.,  1911,  233-236. 

8.  FRIEDLANDER,     A.       Bemerkungen  zu  Oppenheim's  Arbeit:     "Ueber     Dauer- 

schwindel."    Neur.  Cenibl.,  1911,  30,  1162-1164. 

1  Zsch.  f.  Sinnesphysiol.,  1910,  45,  63-68. 


CUTANEOUS  AND  ALLIED  SENSES  179 

9.  HERTZ,  A.  F.    The  sensibility  of  the  alimentary  canal  in  health  and  disease. 
Lancet,  1911,  180,  1051-1056;  1119-1124;  1187-1193. 

10.  KIESOW,  F.    Ueber  die  Versuche  von  E.  H.  Weber  und  M.  Szabadfoldi,  nach 

welchen  einer  Hautstelle  aufliegende  Gegenstande  von  gleicher  Grosse  nicht 
gleich  schwer  empfunden  werden,  wenn  ihre  Temperaturen  gewisse  Unter- 
schiede  aufweisen.  Nach  einer  zum  Teil  von  Dr.  Leopold  Chinaglia  ausge- 
fiihrten  Untersuchung.  Arch.f.  d.  ges.  PsychoL,  1911,  22,  50-104. 

11.  KUNZ,  M.    Zum  "Ferngefuhl"  als  Hautsinn.    Zsch.  f.  pad.  PsychoL,  1911,  xa, 

621-634. 

12.  MALONEY,  W.  J.,  &  KENNEDY,  R.  F.    The  sense  of  pressure  in  the  face,  eye  and 

tongue.     Brain,  1911,  34,  1-28. 

13.  MINOR,    L.      Ein    neuer   Thermoasthesiometer   mit   Mischvorrichtung.      Neur. 

CentbL,  1911,  30,  1037-1041. 

14.  MITCHELL,  J.  F.     Sensibility  of  the  peritoneum  and  abdominal  viscera.    /.  of 

the  Amer.  Med.  Assoc.,  1911,  57,  709-712. 

15.  NEUMANN,  A.    Ueber  die  Sensibilitat  der  inneren  Organe.     CentbL  f.  d.  Grenzgeb. 

d.  Med.  u.  Chir.,  1910,  13,  iff. 

16.  NEUMANN,  A.     Zur  Frage  der  Sensibilitat  der  inneren  Organe.    Zentbl.f.  Physiol., 

1911,  24,  1213-1217;  1217-1219;  25,  53-56. 

17.  OPPENHEIM,  H.    Ueber  Dauerschwindel  (vertigo  permanens).    Monat.  f.  Psy- 

chiat.  u.  Neur.,  1911,  29,  275-293;  Neur.  CentbL,  1911,  30,  290-296. 

1 8.  SIEBRAND,  — .     Untersuchungen  iiber  den  Kaltesinn.    Zsch.  f.   Sinnesphysiol., 

1911,45,204-216. 

19.  STERNBERG,  W.    Das  Appetitproblem  in  der  Physiologic  und  in  der  Psychologic. 

Zsch.f.  PsychoL,  1911,  59,  91-112. 

20.  STERNBERG,  W.    Der  Appetit  in  der  exakten  Medizin.    Zsch.  f.  Sinnesphysiol. , 

1911,45,433-459. 

21.  STERNBERG,  W.    Die  Physiologic  der  Kitzelgefuhle.    Zsch.  f.  PsychoL,  1911,  60, 

73-109- 

22.  WILLIS,  C.  A.,  &  URBAN,  F.  M.    Ein  Beitrag  zur  Kenntnis  der  psychometrischen 

Funktionen  im  Gebiete  der  Gewichtsempfindungen.  Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  PsychoL, 
1911,22,40-46. 

23.  ZIEHEN,  T.     Die  Methoden  zur  Priifung  der  Kinaesthetischen  Empfindungen. 

Zsch.f.  Pad.  PsychoL,  1911,  12,  216-225. 

SYN^STHESIA 

BY  PROFESSOR  A.  H.  PIERCE 
Smith  College 

A  full  and  detailed  account  of  the  case  of  colored  gustation 
reported  in  outline  last  year1  is  now  available  (i).  It  is  abundantly 
shown  that  the  subject— a  young  man  of  college  age— has  a  defective 
sense  of  taste.  Tastes  seem  to  be  recognized  largely  by  tactual 
accompaniments  and  discriminated  by  their  "feel"  and  by  the  color 
induced.  Substances  as  different  as  cayenne  pepper  and  quinine 

1  Cf.  PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN,  1911,  8,  158. 


i8o  A.  H.  PIERCE 

(both  in  solutions)  are  indistinguishable,  both  producing  the  same 
"feel"  on  the  tongue  and  both  inducing  the  same  color — a  dull 
orange-red.  Furthermore,  the  behavior  of  the  induced  color  is  at 
times  dependent  upon  the  temperature  of  the  solution.  Plugging 
the  nostrils  reduced  the  intensity  and  persistence  of  the  taste-colors. 
A  reasonably  definite  correlation  between  taste-color  tones  and  taste 
qualities  was  made  out. 

The  genuineness  of  the  synsesthesia  and  the  sensational  (rather 
than  imaginal)  value  of  the  taste-colors  is  attested  by  (i)  the  con- 
stancy of  the  correlation  just  referred  to,  (2)  the  persistence  of  the 
induced  color  (sometimes  for  more  than  ten  minutes),  (3)  its  locali- 
zation (in  the  mouth),  (4)  its  independence  of  the  subject's  volition, 
and  (5)  the  feelings  of  tension  and  dizziness  when  simultaneously 
experiencing  a  taste-color  and  fixating  a  colored  surface. 

The  case  of  colored  audition  reported  by  Myers  (3)  is  peculiar 
first  in  the  fact  that  colors  are  induced  only  by  tones, — timbre,  in- 
tensity, and  the  pitch  of  the  foregoing  tone  being  conjointly  influential. 
Tones  below  600  vibrations  per  second  give  brown  and  orange  colors; 
those  between  600  and  12,000  give  blue,  changing  to  green;  and  those 
above  12,000  give  a  colorless  gray.  The  subject  is  a  man  of  thirty, 
unmusical. 

This  case  stands  in  marked  contrast  with  that  summarized  above, 
the  induced  color  being  neither  sensory  nor  imaginal  in  character. 
The  subject  "insisted  that  his  imagery  was  verbal  or  more  often  that 
his  thoughts  were  entirely  imageless."  As  a  believer  in  "imageless 
thought"  Myers  finds  no  difficulties  here. 

The  subject  himself  "regards  his  synsesthesia  as  the  result  of 
some  'sympathy'  existing  in  him  between  auditory  and  visual 
experiences."  Myers  interprets  this  as  analogous  to  the  tendencies 
by  which  we  speak  of  tones  as  "heavy,  rounded  or  dull";  and  in  the 
fact  that  synsesthesias  are  more  common  among  children  he  sees 
grounds  for  the  view  that  "their  origin  may  perhaps  be  ascribed  to 
the  persistence  of  a  primitive  stage  in  the  differentiation  and  elabora- 
tion of  sensations  and  in  the  development  of  their  functional  inter- 
relation." Strong  tendencies  to  association,  combined  with  the 
"sympathy"  referred  to,  would  then  be  favorable  to  the  formation 
of  synsesthesias. 

The  paper  by  Medeiros-e-Albuquerque  (2)  is  weak  and  uncon- 
vincing, with  a  quite  unjustified  title.  The  author  finds  that  those 
who  think  only  in  Portugese  associate  the  u  of  that  language  with  the 
color  black.  This  arises  from  the  fact  that  u  is  the  accented  vowel  of 


SYNASTHESIA  jSi 

the  majority  of  Portugese  words  signifying  black  objects  or  ideas 
•elating  to  black.  This  association  is,  admittedly,  no  true  synaes- 
thesia,  but  the  author  believes  that  it  is  only  a  matter  of  degree 
between  these  logical  and  spontaneous  associations  and  genuine 
cases  of  colored  audition. 

REFERENCES 
DOWNEY,  JUNE  E.     A  Case  of  Colored  Gustation.     Amer.  J.  of  Psychol    ion    « 

S28-S39. 
MEDEIROS-E-ALBUQUERQUE.     Sur  un  phenomene  de  synopsie  presente  par  des  millions 

de  sujets.     /.  de  psychol.  norm,  et  'path.,  1911,  8,  147-151. 
MYERS,  C.  S.     A  Case  of  Synsesthesia.     Brit.  J.  of  Psychol.,  1911,  4,  228-238. 

AFFECTIVE  PHENOMENA  —  EXPERIMENTAL 

BY  PROFESSOR  JOHN  F.  SHEPARD 

University  of  Michigan 

Three  articles  have  appeared  from  the  Leipzig  laboratory  during 
the  year.  Drozynski  (2)  objects  to  the  use  of  gustatory  and  olfactory 
stimuli  in  the  study  of  organic  reactions  with  feelings,  because  of  the 
disturbance  ot  breathing  that  may  be  involved.  He  uses  rhythmical 
auditory  stimuli,  and  finds  that  when  given  at  different  rates  and  in 
various  groupings,  they  are  accompanied  by  characteristic  feelings 
in  each  subject.  He  records  the  chest  breathing,  and  curves  from  a 
sphygmograph  and  a  water  plethysmograph.  Each  experiment 
began  with  a  normal  record,  then  the  stimulus  was  given,  and  this 
was  followed  by  a  contrast  stimulus;  lastly,  another  normal  was 
taken.  The  length  and  depth  of  breathing  were  measured  (no  time 
line  was  recorded),  and  the  relation  of  length  of  inspiration  to  length 
of  expiration  was  determined.  The  length  and  height  of  the  pulse- 
beats  were  also  measured.  Tabular  summaries  are  given  of  the 
number  of  times  the  author  finds  each  quantity  to  have  been  increased 
or  decreased  during  a  reaction  period  with  each  type  of  feeling.  The 
feeling  state  accompanying  a  given  rhythm  is  always  complex,  but  the 
result  is  referred  to  that  dimension  which  seemed  to  be  dominant. 
Only  a  few  disconnected  extracts  from  normal  and  reaction  periods 
are  reproduced  from  the  records. 

The  author  states  that  excitement  gives  increase  in  the  rate  and 
depth  of  breathing,  in  the  inspiration-expiration  ratio,  and  in  the  rate 
and  size  of  pulse.  There  are  undulations  in  the  arm  volume.  In  so 
far  as  the  effect  is  quieting,  it  causes  decrease  in  rate  and  depth  of 


1 82  JOHN  F.  SHEPARD 

breathing,  in  the  inspiration-expiration  ratio,  and  in  the  pulse  rate 
and  size.  The  arm  volume  shows  a  tendency  to  rise  with  respiratory 
waves.  Agreeableness  shows  an  increase  in  rate  of  breathing,  the 
inspiration-expiration  ratio,  and  size  of  pulse;  and  a  decrease  in  depth 
of  breathing  and  pulse  rate.  There  is  a  tendency  for  the  volume  to 
rise  with  respiratory  and  other  waves.  Disagreeableness  is  accom- 
panied by  increase  in  rate  of  breathing  and  pulse,  decrease  in  depth  of 
breathing  and  height  of  pulse.  In  the  arm  volume  there  are  falls 
and  undulations.  Strain  causes  generally  faster  and  shallower 
breathing,  faster  and  stronger  pulse,  and  a  rise  of  arm  volume  with 
respiratory  waves.  Relaxation  shows  slower  and  deeper  breathing, 
slower  and  stronger  pulse.  When  excitement  is  combined  with  the 
others,  it  seems  to  dominate  in  the  organic  expression.  Each  feeling 
has  its  characteristic  expression-valence.  There  are  many  exceptions 
to  all  correlations.  A  given  feeling  may  show  itself  in  only  part 
of  the  expressive  reactions  at  once.  The  author  considers  the 
breathing  the  most  reliable  index  of  feeling. 

One  criticism  especially  must  be  passed  upon  this  and  many  other 
works  of  the  kind.  It  is  necessary  that  sufficient  data  he  reproduced 
in  some  complete  and  accurate  form  that  the  reader  may  judge  for 
himself  whether  physiological  matters  have  been  adequately  con- 
sidered, whether  the  reactions  are  significant  and  whether  he  agrees 
with  the  author's  interpretation.  Otherwise  one  need  not  place  much 
confidence  in  the  conclusions.  This  article  does  not  fulfill  such 
requirements. 

The  second  article  from  Leipzig  is  by  Rehwoldt  (5).  He  recorded 
curves  from  five  pneumographs,  two  on  the  chest  and  three  on  the 
abdomen,  and  from  a  sphygmograph.  After  the  apparatus  was 
adjusted,  the  subject  gave  a  signal  when  he  had  succeeded  in  placing 
himself  in  an  indifferent  condition  and  a  normal  record  was  taken. 
The  subject  then  aroused  an  affective  state  by  reproduction  of  an 
experience  or  idea.  He  gave  a  signal  when  he  had  succeeded  in  this 
and  a  reaction  record  was  taken.  From  two  to  six  affective  states 
were  thus  studied  in  an  hour  and  finally  another  normal  curve, 
modified  perhaps  by  resonance  of  the  preceding  feelings,  was  taken. 
The  subject's  report  was  recorded  after  each  normal  or  reaction  curve. 

For  each  normal  record  the  average  length  of  breath  and  length 
of  pulse  and  the  amplitude  of  movement  in  each  respiratory  curve 
were  determined  in  millimeters  and  tabulated.  The  inspiration- 
expiration  ratio  is  also  given.  For  each  reaction  record  the  inspira- 
tion-expiration ratio  and  the  ratio  of  the  other  quantities  to  the 
similar  measurements  in  the  corresponding  normal  record  are  given. 


AFFECTIFE  PHENOMENA-EXPERIMENTAL  183 

The  feelings  obtained  were  always  complex.  The  author  found  a 
clear-cut  expression  for  quiet,  excitement,  and  strain  only.  With 
quieting  conditions,  the  inspiration-expiration  ratio  was  less  than  one 
and  the  breathing  tended  to  be  abdominal.  Excitement  gave  an 
inspiration-expiration  ratio  which  was  greater  than  one  in  the  chest 
and  tended  to  be  greater  in  the  chest  than  in  the  abdomen.  There 
was  a  dominance  of  chest  breathing  and  the  rate  of  breathing  was 
sometimes  increased,  sometimes  decreased.  Strain  showed  an 
inspiration-expiration  ratio  which  averaged  about  one  and  the  rate 
of  breathing  was  increased.  There  was  no  certain  correlation  between 
agreeableness  and  decreased  heart  rate. 

Stefanescu-Goanga  (6)  studied  the  affective  states  caused  by 
colors,  and  the  organic  expression  of  these  affective  states.  Light 
from  a  projection  lantern  was  passed  through  colored  gelatine  and 
thrown  upon  a  white  screen  in  a  darkened  room.  In  the  greater 
part  of  the  experiments  a  single,  isolated  stimulus  was  used.  The 
subject  was  asked  to  describe  the  affective  state,  and  was  helped  by 
questions  from  the  experimenter.  In  part,  the  method  of  paired 
comparison,  both  successive  and  simultaneous,  was  used.  The 
chest  and  abdominal  breathing,  and  a  sphygmographic  curve  were 
recorded.  A  normal  period,  a  stimulus  period,  and  a  recovery  period 
constituted  a  test. 

The  length  of  breaths,  the  depth  of  chest  and  abdominal  breathing, 
the  inspiration-expiration  ratio,  the  depth  at  the  middle  of  inspiration 
and  that  at  the  middle  of  expiration  compared  with  the  total  depth, 
and  the  pulse  length  were  determined  by  measuring  the  curves  in 
millimeters.  Tabular  summaries  give  the  number  of  cases  and  direc- 
tion of  change  which  the  author  finds  in  each  of  these  quantities 
when  the  reaction  period  is  compared  with  the  normal  period. 

The  colors  are  found  to  cause  strong  affective  states  which  must 
be  classified  first  of  all  under  the  heads  of  excitement  and  rest  or 
depression.  Excitement  is  the  most  constant  and  dominant  feeling 
with  red,  orange,  yellow  and  purple;  rest  or  depression  is  foremost 
with  green,  blue,  indigo  and  violet.  Combinations  with  agreeable- 
ness  or  disagreeableness  are  variable.  Excitement  and  rest  are  not 
simple  feeling  qualities,  but  rather  feeling  dimensions,  each  one  of 
manifold  varieties. 

The  author  decides  that  the  organic  expressions  indicated  by  the 
results  are  as  follows:  Excitement  causes  faster  breathing  and  in- 
creased depth  of  breathing  especially  in  the  chest.  The  inspiration- 
expiration  ratio,  the  pulse  rate  and  size  of  pulse  are  increased.  The 


184  JOHN  F.  SHEPARD 

form  of  the  curve  shows  a  forceful  beginning  of  inspiration.  Rest  or 
depression  gives  opposite  reactions.  Agreeableness  shows  a  tendency 
toward  decreased  chest  and  increased  abdominal  breathing.  The 
length  and  size  of  pulse  are  increased.  With  disagreeableness  the 
opposite  pu^e  reactions  are  found.  In  the  breathing  changes, 
agreeableness  approaches  rest,  disagreeableness  approaches  excite- 
ment. 

As  nearly  as  one  can  judge  from  measurement  of  the  curves 
published,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  majority  show  no  definite  reaction 
in  pulse  rate,  and  No.  4  gives  a  result  opposite  to  that  assigned  to  it. 
It  is  noticeable  that  these  articles  from  Leipzig  all  insist  that  we  must 
find  a  basis  in  organic  expression  for  the  tridimensional  theory  of 
feeling;  but  they  differ  as  to  the  details  of  such  reactions,  and  differ 
markedly  from  the  statements  of  others  who  have  tried  to  defend  the 
same  theory  in  the  past. 

Leschke  (3)  gives  a  very  interesting  and  useful  critical  discussion 
of  work  that  has  been  done  on  organic  accompaniments  of  mental 
processes.  I  may  take  this  occasion  to  say  that  an  attempt  to  use 
related  methods  caused  me  to  be  much  more  skeptical  than  Leschke 
seems  to  be,  of  the  results  from  the  "inner  plethysmograph"  and 
balance-board  of  Weber. 

Wells  and  Forbes  (9)  give  evidence  which  tends  to  show  that 
electromotive  changes  and  especially  resistance  changes  in  the  psycho- 
galvanic  test  are  due  to  sweat-gland  activity.  Atropine,  which  tends 
to  paralyze  the  sweat  glands,  obliterates  the  response  with  stimuli. 
When  the  fingers  used  in  a  cell  current  were  coated  with  paraffin,  both 
the  original  deflection  and  the  emotional  reaction  were  small.  When 
the  paraffin  was  scraped  from  the  finger-nails  only,  the  original 
deflection  was  much  increased,  but  emotional  reactions  remained 
very  small.  When  the  remainder,  of  the  finger  was  bared,  the  original 
deflection  was  somewhat  further  increased,  the  emotional  reaction  was 
relatively  greatly  increased.  They  find  that  the  use  of  a  cell  current 
will  give  more  uniform  and  reliable  results  in  the  study  of  emotional 
reactions  than  the  use  of  the  body  current.  The  latter  would  merely 
give  the  difference  between  the  action  of  the  sweat-glands  at  the  two 
electrodes,  while  the  former  would  depend  upon  the  lowered  resistance 
from  the  combined  action  at  the  two  electrodes. 

In  a  series  of  experiments  stimulus  words  were  given  and  the 
association  times  were  recorded  along  with  the  amount  of  deflection. 
The  subjects  classified  the  degree  of  emotion  called  out  as:  "(A) 
strongly  emotional,  (E)  rather  emotional,  (C)  rather  unemotional, 


AFFECTIVE  PHENOMENA— EXPERIMENTAL  185 

(F)  practically  devoid  of  emotion."  On  the  whole  the  results  show  a 
relationship  between  the  degree  of  emotion  and  the  amount  of  electri- 
cal change.  But  this  does  not  hold  in  individual  cases,  especially 
with  grades  below  A.  There  is  no  such  correlation  between  the 
association  time  and  either  the  introspection  or  the  electrical  change. 

A  few  experiments  with  abnormal  patients  suggest  that  the 
failure  of  ordinary  motor  response  in  catatonic  stupor  "  resulted  rather 
from  inhibition  of  reaction  than  from  failure  to  apprehend."  This 
was  DeBruyn's  conclusion  from  vasomotor  tests. 

Cannon  and  de  la  Paz  (i)  tested  the  blood  from  the  adrenal  veins 
of  a  cat  before  and  after  the  animal  had  been  frightened.  They 
found  that  the  emotion  caused  an  increased  adrenal  secretion.  The 
persistence  of  the  emotional  state  may  be  due  to  this  greater  supply 
of  adrenal  secretion  in  the  blood. 

Miss  Washburn  and  co-workers  (7)  compared  colored  paper 
squares  5  cm.  a  side  with  others  25  cm.  a  side.  They  found  that 
saturated  colors  are  preferred  in  the  smaller  area,  except  saturated 
red;  the  larger  area  of  tints  and  shades  is  preferred. 

When  colors  are  fixated  for  one  minute  the  arousal  of  associations 
and  adaptations  may  change  the  affective  value  (8).  Associations 
have  little  influence  on  saturated  colors.  What  they  have  is  favor- 
able. Adaptation  is  favorable  to  violet,  blue  and  green,  unfavorable 
to  yellow  and  red.  Associations  were  favorable  to  the  tints  and  to 
the  shades  of  violet,  green,  orange  and  red.  Adaptation  was,  on  the 
whole,  unfavorable  to  tints  and  shades. 

Prandtl  (4)  investigated  the  question  whether  the  feeling  content 
of  consciousness  has  an  influence  on  the  time  of  reading  and  the 
accent.  He  found  that  serious  passages  were  read  more  slowly  than 
light  ones  and  stimulating  articles  were  read  more  slowly  than  restful 
ones.  With  passages  which  might  be  either  serious  or  light,  according 
to  the  point  of  view,  it  was  found  that  the  subject  read  them  more 
slowly  when  made  to  think  of  them  as  serious.  In  reading  serious 
or  stimulating  texts  or  those  considered  so,  more  accents  were  used 
and  more  and  longer  pauses  were  made,  than  in  reading  other  texts. 
Even  if  the  extra  time  occupied  by  accents  and  pauses  were  sub- 
tracted from  the  total,  the  reading  time  for  the  serious  and  stimulating 
passages  would  still  be  relatively  long. 

REFERENCES 

1.  CANNON,  W.  B.,  &  DE  LA  PAZ,  D.     Emotional  Stimulation  of  Adrenal  Secretion. 

Amer.  J.  of  PhysioL,  1911,  28,  64-70. 

2.  DROZYNSKI,  L.    Atmungs-  und  Pulssymptome  rhythmischer  Gefiihle.    PsychoL 

Stud.,  1911,  7,  83-140. 


1 86  H.  N.  GARDINER 

3.  LESCHKE,  E.     Die  korperlichen  Begleiterscheinungen  seelischer  Vorgange.     Arch. 

f.  d.  ges.  Psychol.,  1911,  21,  433-463. 

4.  PRANDTL,  A.    Experimente  iiber  den  Einfluss  von  gefiihlsbetonten  Bewusstseinslagen 

auf  Lesezeit  und  Betonung.     Zsch.  f.  PsychoL,  1911,  60,  26-45. 

5.  REHWOLDT,  F.     Uber  respiratorische  Affektsymptome.     Psychol.  Stud.,  1911,  7, 

141-195- 

6.  STEFANESCU-GOANGA,  F.     Experimentclle  Untersuchungen  zur  Gefiihlsbetonung 

der  Farben.    Psychol.  Stud.,  1911,  7,  284-335. 

7.  WASHBURN,  M.  F.,  CLARK,  D.,  and  GOODELL,  M.  S.    The  Effect  of  Area  on  the 

Pleasantness  of  Colors.     Amer.  J.  of  Psychol.,  1911,  22,  578-579- 

8.  WASHBURN,  M.  F.  and  CRAWFORD,  D.     Fluctuations  in  the  Affective  Value  of 

Colors  During  Fixation  for  One  Minute.     Amer.  J.  of  Psychol.,   1911,   22, 
579-582. 

9.  WELLS,  F.  L.  and  FORBES,  A.     On  Certain  Electrical  Processes  in  the  Human  Body 

and  their  Relation  to  Emotional  Reactions.     (No.  16  of  Archives  of  Psychology). 
New  York:  The  Science  Press,  1911.     Pp.  39. 


AFFECTIVE  PHENOMENA  —  DESCRIPTIVE  AND 
THEORETICAL 

BY  PROFESSOR  H.  N.  GARDINER 
Smith  College 

Fundamental  questions  are  discussed  systematically  by  Rehmke 
(18)  in  a  second  edition  of  a  well-digested  treatise,  a  characteristic 
feature  of  which  is  its  attempt  to  relate  feeling,  emotion  and  mood. 
Feeling  (Gefiihl)  is  defined  as  a  Bestimmtheitsbesonderheit  des  zustand- 
lichen  Bewusstseins.  Consciousness  being  conceived  as  the  individual 
soul,  its  state  is  assumed  to  be  at  any  given  moment  simple  and 
unique;  hence  the  momentary  feeling  is  always  one  of  pleasure  or 
displeasure,  never  "  mixed."  It  is  determined,  not  by  any  one,  but 
by  the  totality  of  the  objective  factors,  those  being  massgebend  which 
are  in  the  focus  of  attention.  A  "  feeling,"  in  the  ordinary  sense,  is  a 
complex  of  the  affective  state  and  the  "determining"  and  "accom- 
panying" objective  components,  the  "determining"  objects  of  at- 
tention giving  the  kind  of  feeling,  the  "accompanying"  organic 
sensations  being  mainly  responsible  for  its  obscure  "coloring"  and 
its  degree.  Mood  (Stimmung)  appears  in  a  certain  contrast  to 
"feeling"  in  that  in  it  organic  sensation  is  the  "determining"  factor 
and  no  particular  object  occupies  the  focus  of  attention.  Emotion 
(Affekt}  is  not  contrasted  with  "feeling,"  but  is  "feeling"  charac- 
terized by  the  intensity  of  the  "accompanying"  organic  sensations, 
which  are  rightly  included  in  the  emotion;  we  must  not,  however, 
confuse,  with  James  and  Lange,  the  bodily  changes  which  give  rise 


AFFECTirE  PHENOMENA— THEORETICAL  187 

to  these  sensations  and  those  bodily  movements  which  follow  on  the 
emotion  and  express  it. 

A  novel  point  of  view  for  the  conception  of  feeling,  as  of  many 
other  mental  phenomena,  is  proposed  by  Watt  (22).  Feeling  for 
him  is  neither  a  sensation,  nor  an  attribute,  nor  a  unique  element, 
but  an  experience  of  a  mode  of  the  integration  of  elements.  Pleasure, 
e.  g.,  may  be  the  result  of  the  mutual  harmony  of  integrations.  The 
theory  most  nearly  resembles  activity  theories  of  feeling.  Watt 
has  no  difficulty  in  meeting  the  most  obvious  objections  to  the 
general  principle,  but  admits  that  the  specific  integrative  basis  of 
feeling  is  still  to  seek.  Titchener's  criterion  of  feeling,  lack  of  clear- 
ness, explained  (21)  as  meaning,  not  that  feeling  is  dim,  but  that  it  is 
non-clear  in  the  same  way  that  it  is  non-spatial,  is  criticised  by 
Watt  (23),  who  finds  a  state  that  lacks  clearness  as  unintelligible  as 
a  state  that  lacks  duration.  The  real  question  appears  to  be  whether 
feeling,  as  such,  is  a  possible  object  of  attention.  The  difficulty 
comes  up  in  another  form  in  the  dispute  as  to  the  content  of  feeling. 
The  common  opinion  that  the  esse  of  feeling  is  sentire  and  therefore 
indubitable  is  called  in  question  by  Joachim  (17),  who  contends 
that  there  is  a  distinction  between  "feeling"  and  "felt"  analogous 
to  that  between  "perceiving"  and  "perceived"  and  that  accordingly, 
since  everywhere  "experiencing"  and  "what  is  experienced"  are 
mutually  determining  correlatives,  pleasures  and  pains  are  not 
self-identical  qualities  attached  only  in  varying  degrees  to  intellectual 
contents,  but  differ  internally  and  may  be  more  or  less  illusory. 
Tassy  (20)  refers  feelings  in  general  to  a  twofold  origin,  one  con- 
stituante,  or  primary,  the  other  de  specialisation,  the  source  of  their 
intellectual  meaning.  He  conceives  the  "intelligence"  as  constituted 
by  the  association  of  several  relatively  autonomic  functions,  desig- 
nated respectively  as  "psychic"  (directly  implicating  personal 
interest),  "mental"  (pure  ideation)  and  "organic."  Some  feelings 
originate  in  the  mechanism  of  the  mental  activity  and  are  then 
individualized  in  the  psychic;  others  depend  on  organic  activity  and 
derive  their  specific  character  from  the  mental  or  psychic  mechanism. 
In  connection  with  a  speculative  construction  of  their  neurological 
basis,  the  author  traces,  rather  obscurely,  the  origin  and  compli- 
cations of  certain  feelings  under  the  above  three  heads. 

Claparede  (10)  finds  in  the  discussion  of  affective  memory  a 
double  source  of  confusion,  disagreement  as  to  the  criterion  of  memory 
and  misunderstanding  of  the  James  theory  of  emotion.  The  only 
indubitable  form  of  affective  memory  is  that  constituted  by  recog- 


1 88  H.  N.  GARDINER 

nition,  but  that  does  not  necessarily  include  an  "image"  of  the 
object,  nor  is  there  any  proof  of  the  representation,  or  reproduction, 
of  an  affective  state  except  through  the  intervention  of  organic  proc- 
esses. But  these  on  the  James  theory  are  the  causes  of  actual  emo- 
tion. To  prove  affective  memory  in  Ribot's  sense  we  should  have 
to  show,  what  in  the  author's  opinion  has  not  been  done,  either  (a) 
that  the  James  theory  is  false,  or  (b)  that  in  affective  memory  the 
organic  processes  follow  the  conscious  affective  phenomena,  or 
(c)  that  these  processes  are  entirely  wanting.  The  improbability 
of  affective  memory  is  further  argued  from  the  utility  of  the  ideal 
representation  of  objects  not  present,  whereas  there  is  no  such  evident 
need  of  the  ideal  revival  of  what  we  can  actually  experience  as  our 
own  state.  Apart  from  this  theoretical  discussion,  which,  of  course, 
does  not  deny  that  we  remember  in  some  sense  our  affectively  colored 
experiences,  the  question  has  been  raised  whether  we  do  not  tend  to 
forget  the  disagreeable.  Henderson  (15)  adduces  facts  and  con- 
siderations which  point  to  the  negative.  The  different  question, 
whether  we  tend  to  banish  disagreeable  memories,  receives  a  qualified 
answer:  we  always  strive  to  banish  disagreeableness,  and  disagreeable 
thoughts  which  do  not  lead  to  efficient  action  probably  tend  to 
disappear;  on  the  other  hand  disagreeable  memories  are  important 
factors  in  learning  by  trial  and  error  and  in  leading  to  the  reconstruc- 
tion of  experience. 

Several  writers  treat  specifically  of  the  theory  of  emotion  and  other 
complex  affective  phenomena.  Binet  (3,  4),  taking  as  his  point  of 
departure  the  recent  demonstration,  as  he  considers  it,  of  imageless 
thought,  puts  forth  the  hypothesis  that  the  whole  of  psychology  is 
summarized  in  two  "elements,"  sensations  and  motor  attitudes. 
Emotion  and  thought  are  both  attitudes,  the  attitude  in  the  former 
being  accompanied  by  strong  organic  sensations,  in  the  latter  by  a 
minimum  of  subjective  sensations  and  a  maximum  of  objective 
sensations  or  images.  This  distinction,  however,  is  supplemented 
and  qualified  by  consideration  of  the  coordination  of  acts  expressed 
by  the  attitude.  The  more  organized  the  attitude,  the  more  pro- 
nounced, other  things  being  equal,  will  be  its  intellectual  character; 
the  less  organized,  the  more  the  phenomenon  is  one  of  pure  emotion. 
This  hypothesis  is  regarded  by  its  author  as  including,  while  making 
more  definite,  the  explanations  of  the  same  facts  by  unconscious 
action,  central  adjustment,  etc.,  and  as  constituting  a  veritable 
revolution  by  introducing  into  psychology  the  conception  of  dynam- 
ism as  opposed  to  sensationalism.  Brown  (6)  defines  "passion"  as 


AFFECTIVE  PHENOMENA-THEORETICAL  189 

an  uncontrollable  emotion  or  system  of  emotional  tendencies  and 
criticizes  Shand's  suggestion  of  "sentiment"  for  the  latter  on  account 
of  the  literary  associations  with  that  term  of  weakness  and  placidity. 
The  identification  of  "tender  emotion"  with  the  parental  instinct 
is  criticized  on  the  ground  that  it  is  also  found  in  the  pathos  of  many 
aesthetic  emotions.  Shand's  working  out  of  a  "sentiment"  like  love 
as  an  organized  system  of  emotions  and  desires  is  made  the  basis  of 
Caldecott's  thesis  (7),  illustrated  by  the  case  of  St.  Catherine  of 
Genoa,  that  a  central  emotion  can  so  organize  the  feelings  as  to  make 
them  constitutents  of  a  healthy  ideal  of  life.  Two  papers  on  emotional 
expression  read  at  the  last  meeting  of  the  American  Psychological 
Association  deserve  mention.  Cannon  (8)  reported  experiments 
which  showed  increased  secretion  of  adrenalin,  followed  by  glycosuria, 
in  fear  and  rage  in  cats,  suggesting  that  in  the  wild  state  these  emo- 
tions might  be  useful  in  providing  sugar  as  a  source  of  energy  for 
flight  or  attack.  Huey  (16),  emphasizing  the  incoordination  charac- 
teristic of  emotion,  laid  special  stress  on  the  intellectual  and  linguistic 
disturbances.  The  real  cause  of  emotion,  he  held,  is  a  failure  in  the 
mechanics  of  brain  integration  occasioned  by  factors  too  difficult  of 
synthesis  under  the  given  conditions.  The  organic  theory  of  emotion 
is  accepted  in  a  qualified  way  by  Chabrier  (9),  who  criticizes  James 
and  Lange  for  not  sufficiently  allowing  for  the  representative  factor. 
Ideal  processes,  he  maintains,  determine  the  bodily  and  are  essential 
to  explain  the  complexity,  extent  and  delicacy  of  the  emotion.  But 
they  are  only  affective  in  so  far  as  they  act  more  or  less  directly  on 
the  organic  function. 

To  the  descriptive  psychology  of  aesthetic  experience  Geiger  (14) 
contributes  a  finely  discriminating  study  of  Stimmungseinfuhlung. 
Experimenting  first  with  simple  colors,  he  found  that,  e.  g.,  the 
cheerfulness  of  the  color  was  uniformly  experienced  as,  in  some  sense, 
a  quality  of  the  color,  not  as  a  feeling  of  the  subject.  The  relation  of 
the  subjective  mood  to  this  objective  character  was  shown  by  further 
experiment  to  vary  considerably;  hence  differences  in  the  total 
feeling  in  consciousness.  Both  have  the  same  tone  of  feeling,  but 
that  of  the  mood  seems  more  external  to  the  object,  to  overlay  and 
suffuse  it.  The  apprehension  of  the  object  was  found  by  analysis  of 
the  author's  own  experience  to  involve  four  distinct  kinds  of  appre- 
hensive attitude,  marked  off  by  abstraction  as  the  objective-passive, 
the  stellungnehmende,  where  the  relation  between  the  object  and  the 
subject  is  reciprocal,  the  sentimental,  in  which  the  distinction  between 
my  experience  and  the  feeling-character  of  the  object  is  obliterated  in 


190  H.  N.  GARDINER 

a  still  higher  degree,  and  the  einfuhlende,  in  which  there  is  a  more  or 
less  complete  absorption  of  the  object's  character  in  my  mood  or  of 
my  mood  in  the  object.  Abramowski  (i),  whose  work,  in  Polish, 
is  known,  however,  to  the  writer  only  from  a  French  review,  sug- 
gestively applies  to  the  interpretation  of  certain  aesthetic  and  other 
experiences  the  conception  of  generic  feelings  or  sentiments  derived 
from  past  experiences  and  surviving  the  loss  of  their  original  presenta- 
tive  elements.  The  existence  of  such  feelings  is  held  to  be  experi- 
mentally demonstrated.  According  to  Abromowski  such  feelings 
greatly  influence  the  appreciation  of  beauty  and  artistic  creation 
arises  from  the  impulse  to  give  to  them  a  relatively  adequate  repre- 
sentative embodiment.  Mystical  experience  shows  analogous  phe- 
nomena. Among  the  forgotten  experiences  which  furnish  such 
generic  feelings  the  author  mentions  those  of  infancy,  dreams,  un- 
noticed impressions,  hereditary  memories  and  telepathy.  We  have 
here,  perhaps,  a  clue  to  the  psychological  origin  of  Plato's  doctrine 
of  the  reminiscence  of  Ideas. 

The  symptoms  of  many  conditions  of  mental  distress  are  described 
by  Baker  (2)  in  an  article  whose  main  purport  is  a  plea  for  their  more 
adequate  recognition  as  mental  rather  than  as  bodily.  He  tells  the 
pathetic  story  of  a  lady  afflicted  with  Parkinson's  disease  who,  with 
infinite  patience,  succeeded  in  the  course  of  two  years  in  spelling  out, 
by  means  of  children's  blocks,  a  brief  account  of  her  mental  state. 
Francia  (n)  reports  the  sorrows  of  a  nervous  little  girl  and  describes 
the  process  of  their  alleviation.  One  important  conclusion  is  that 
the  series,  sorrow — immediate  reaction — substituted  mental  state, 
must  be  supplemented  by  an  obscure  sense  of  vitality  at  the  decisive 
moment.  Special  interest  attaches  to  the  discussion  before  the 
American  Pathological  Association  (19)  as  indicating  the  trend  of 
opinion,  at  least  in  America,  regarding  the  pathogenesis  of  emotional 
states  of  recurrent  fears,  phobias  and  anxiety.  Much  of  the  dis- 
cussion dealt  with  the  two  Freudian  doctrines,  (a)  of  a  distinct 
anxiety-neurosis,  as  over  against  phobias,  and  (b)  the  sexual  origin 
of  the  former.  False  abstraction  was  charged  against  the  first  of 
these  doctrines,  hobby-riding  against  the  second,  both  being  defended 
by  Jones  and  Putnam.  Sidis  regarded  anxiety  as  simply  the  working 
of  the  instinct  of  fear,  the  obsession  of  which,  conscious  or  uncon- 
scious, he  held  to  be  the  tap-root  of  every  functional  psychosis. 
Prince  traced  the  mechanism  of  recurrent  psychopathic  states  mainly 
to  the  automatism  of  the  "neurograms"  established  by  residua  of 
past  experience  combined  with  the  fear  instinct  operating  by  auto- 


AFFECTIVE  PHENOMENA— THEORETICAL  191 

suggestion.  The  original  attack  always  arises,  he  thinks,  in  some 
psychical  trauma.  There  is,  however,  an  incomplete  type  of  attack, 
identical  with  Freud's  anxiety-neurosis,  where  the  fear  (anxiety) 
is  expressed  in  the  appropriate  physiological  symptoms  without 
specific  ideas  to  which  it  attaches  itself.  Prince  thinks  that  in  such 
cases  the  ideas  are  unconscious  or  co-conscious.  The  explanation 
varies  with  the  cases.  There  is  no  fear,  he  thinks,  apart  from  some 
experience  suggesting  danger.  But  in  some  cases  the  fixed  ideas 
are  mere  cat's-paws  made  use  of  by  the  neurographic  residua  of  other 
past  experiences  functioning  in  an  unconscious  process.  The  psy- 
chasthenia  to  which  these  states  are  commonly  referred  may  itself, 
he  thinks,  be  a  consequence  of  other  unconscious  factors.  Southard 
contributed  a  possibly  important  suggestion  by  distinguishing  three 
types  of  etiology  for  these  cases,  vestigial  (hereditary),  residual 
(ontogenetic)  and  neoplastic  (formed  independently  in  the  course 
of  the  disease). 

Two  authors  treat  at  length  of  specific  passions.  De  Fursac  (13) 
brings  together  into  a  book  the  articles  noticed  here1  a  year  ago  on 
avarice,  with  an  added  chapter  on  pseudo-misers  and  a  conclusion. 
He  believes  the  vice  incurable  in  the  individual,  but  thinks  that 
social  changes  are  likely  to  greatly  diminish  in  the  future  the  number 
of  its  victims.  Friedmann  (12)  gives  what  is  probably  the  most 
exhaustive  study  of  jealousy  in  scientific  literature.  Largely  owing 
to  the  influence  of  Shakespeare,  whose  Moor  of  Venice  is  taken  as  the 
type  of  jealous  passion,  the  term  "jealous"  has  tended  among  our- 
selves to  be  conceived  too  narrowly  and  to  lose  connection  with  the 
etymologically  identical  term  "zealous."  Friedmann  shows  im- 
pressively the  wide  range  of  the  passion,  not  only  in  love,  but  in 
every  kind  of  competition  in  the  family,  in  office  and  calling,  in  art, 
in  science,  in  public  life,  between  nations  as  well  as  between  individ- 
uals. Its  essential  elements  are  the  feeling  of  disturbed  excitement 
in  contemplating  a  rival  and  the  impulse  to  drive  him  from  the  field. 
These  are  complicated  and  strengthened  by  feelings  of  fear,  envy  and 
wounded  amour  propre.  The  probable  basis  of  the  feeling  is  found  in 
the  rmpulse,  prominent  in  sport,  to  actively  participate  in  what  we  see 
another  doing  when  we  ourselves  are  prepared  by  habit  and  strong 
feelings  of  pleasure  to  do  the  same.  The  passion,  which  the  author 
regards  as  one  of  the  greatest  of  evils,  is  richly  illustrated  by  facts 
from  the  animal  world,  by  a  survey  of  its  manifestations  among 
different  peoples  and  different  stages  of  civilization  and,  as  might 

1  PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN,  1911,  8,  166. 


1 92  H.  N.  GARDINER 

be  expected  from  a  specialist  in  nervous  diseases,  by  pathological 
facts,  some  of  which  are  of  a  rather  startling  character 

Finally,  reference  may  be  made  to  Bridou's  work  (5)  on  the  edu- 
cation of  the  sentiments,  which  is  based  on  the  conception  of  a  law  of 
functional  subordination  and  directed  especially  against  the  imper- 
fections and  narrowness  of  French  education. 

REFERENCES 

1.  ABRAMOWSKI,  E.    Les  sentiments  generiques  en  tant  qu'elements  de  1'esthetique 

et  du  mysticisme.  Przeglad  filozoficzny,  1911,  14,  156-185.  Reported,  /.  de 
psychol.  norm,  et  path.,  1911,  8,  368-371. 

2.  BAKER,  S.    The  Relative  Importance  of  Mental  Pain.    Pop.  Sci.  Mo.,  1911,  79, 

3SS-368. 

3.  BINET,  A.     La  nature  des  emotions.    /.  de  psychol.  norm,  et  path.,  1911,  8,  258  f. 

4.  BINET,  A.    Qu'est-ce  qu'une  emotion?    Qu'est-ce  qu'un  acte  intellectuel?     Annee 

psychol,  1911,^17,  1-47. 

5.  BRIDOU,  V.     UEducation  des  sentiments.    Paris:  Doin,  1911.     Pp.  403. 

6.  BROWN,  W.     Emotion  and  Morals.    Reported,  Nature,  1911,  86,  125  f. 

7.  CALDECOTT,  A.     Emotionality:  a  Method  of  its  Unification.    Proc.  Arist.  Soc.t 

1911,  n,  206-220. 

8.  CANNON,  W.  B.     Some  Recently  Discovered  Physiological  Changes  Attending 

Fear  and  Rage.     Reported,  PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN,  1912,  9,  73. 

9.  CHABRIER  (DR.)     Les  emotions  et  les  hats  organiques.    Paris:  Alcan,  1911.     Pp. 

159- 

10.  CLAPAREDE,  E.    La  question  de  la  "memoire"  affective.     Arch,  de  psychol.,  1911, 

10,  36I-377- 

11.  FRANCIA,  G.     Sul  meccanismo  dell'   auto-consolazione.     Riv.  di  psicol.   appl., 

1911,  7,  105-144. 

12.  FRIEDMANN,  M.     Ueber  die  Psychologie  der  Eifersucht.    Wiesbaden:  Bergmann, 

1911.     Pp.  vii  +  H2. 

13.  FURSAC,  J.  R.  DE.     U  Avarice:  Essai  de  psychologie  morbide.     Paris:  Alcan,  1911. 

Pp.  185. 

14.  GEIGER,  M.    Zum  Problem  der  Stimmungseinfuhlung.     Zschr.  f.  Aesth.  u.  allg- 

Kunstw.,  1911,  6,  1-42. 

15.  HENDERSON,  E.  N.     Do  We  Forget  the  Disagreeable?    /.  of  Phil. ,  Psychol.,  etc., 

1911,  8,  43*2-437- 

16.  HUEY,  E.  B.     Emotivity  and  Emotion  in  their  Relations  and  Adaptation.     Re- 

ported, PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN,  1912,  9,  63. 

17.  JOACHIM,  H.  H.    The  Platonic  Distinction  between  "True"  and  "False"  Pleasures 

and  Pains.     Phil.  Rev.,  1911,  20,  471-497. 

18.  REHMKE,  J.     Zur  Lehre  vom  Gemut.    2te  umgearb.  Aufl.     Leipzig:  Diirr,  1911. 

Pp.  viii  +  115. 

19.  Symposium  and  Discussion  on  the  Pathogenesis  of  Morbid  Anxiety  at  the  Meeting 

of  the  American  Pathological  Association  in  Baltimore,  May  10,  1911,  together 
with  the  President's  Address  on  this  and  related  topics.  /.  of  Abnorm.  Psychol., 
1911,  6,  81-181. 

(1)  JONES,  E.    The  Pathology  of  Morbid  Anxiety. 

(2)  SIDIS,  B.     Fear  Anxiety  and  Psychopathic  Maladies. 


ATTENTION  AND  INTEREST  193 

(3)  DONLEY,  J.  E.     Freud's  Anxiety  Neurosis. 

(4)  PRINCE,  M.    The  Mechanism  of  Recurrent  Mental  States,  with  Special 

Reference  to  Anxiety  States. 

(5)  Discussion  by  J.  J.  PUTNAM,  T.  A.  WILLIAMS,  J.  H.  CORIAT  and  others. 

20.  TASSY,  E.      Essai  de  classification  des  etats  affectives.     Rev.  phil.,  1911,  71, 

690-704;  72,  72-89. 

21.  TITCHENER,  E.  B.     Feeling  and  Thought:  a  Reply.    Mind,  1911,  20,  258-260. 

22.  WATT,  H.  J.    The  Elements  of  Experience  and  their  Integration:  or  Modalism. 

Brit.  J.  of  PsychoL,  1911,  4,  127-204. 

23.  WATT,  H.  J.     Feeling  and  Thought:  a  Restatement.     Mind,  1911,  20,  402-404. 

ATTENTION  AND   INTEREST 

BY  PROFESSOR  W.  B.  PILLSBURY 

University  of  Michigan 

Grass!  (6)  measured  the  effect  of  concentrated  and  dispersed  or 
well-directed  and  misdirected  attention  upon  reaction  times.  The 
experiments  consisted  in  comparing  the  touch  reactions  to  contact 
upon  parts  of  the  body  where  the  stimuli  were  expected  with  those 
to  stimuli  upon  unexpected  places.  Three  degrees  of  preparation 
were  distinguished.  In  the  first  the  stimuli  were  all  on  the  same  part 
of  the  body,  to  which  attention  was  directed  in  advance.  In  the 
second  the  stimuli  were  given  alternately  on  each  of  two  parts  of  the 
body  for  which  preparation  was  had  in  advance.  In  the  third  touches 
upon  unexpected  parts  of  the  body  were  interspersed  irregularly  in  a 
series  of  the  first  sort.  It  was  found  that  times  increased  from  one  to 
three  for  each  sort  of  attention.  Even  longer  times  were  found  when 
the  subject  was  surprised  by  the  contacts.  The  writer  explains  the 
increased  times  for  the  less  prepared  spots  as  an  expression  of  the  time 
required  to  adjust  the  mental  gaze  to  the  new  spot. 

Jacobson  (7)  extends  the  experiments  of  Heymans  on  inhibition 
of  liminal  stimuli  to  supraliminal  values.  He  compared  weights  and 
sounds  with  each  other  when  other  weights  or  sounds  were  also 
acting  simultaneously  and  found  that  simultaneous  stimuli  always 
exerted  an  inhibitory  effect.  The  weight  or  sound  seemed  less 
intense  if  another  stimulus  were  given  with  it  than  if  it  were  present 
alone.  Similar  diminution  of  intensity  was  observed  if  attention  were 
relaxed  on  one  stimulus.  It  was  also  found  that  the  inhibiting  effect 
of  one  stimulus  upon  another  might  be  overcome  by  increased 
attention.  He  makes  no  attempt  to  connect  the  decrease  in  intensity 
with  the  decrease  in  clearness  reported  by  other  authors. 

McComas  (9)  tests  the  methods  of  determining  types  of  attention. 


194  PROFESSOR  W.  B.  PILLSBURY 

The  work  grew  out  of  the  statement  of  Stern  and  Meumann  that  it 
was  possible  to  divide  individuals  into  well  marked  classes  on  the 
basis  of  widely  or  narrowly  distributed  attention.  He  correlated  the 
span  of  attention  for  words  and  colors,  the  span  for  auditory  im- 
pressions, the  ability  to  concentrate  against  distraction  (inhibition) 
both  in  auditory  and  in  visual  attention,  and  the  correlation  of  all 
with  the  type  of  imagery.  Some  of  the  more  important  conclusions 
are  that  there  is  a  broad  and  a  narrow  spanned  type  of  attention,  and 
a  close  correlation  between  the  span  for  auditory  and  visual  attention. 
There  is  also  an  active,  alert  attention  and  a  sluggish  attention; 
the  former  is  broad  spanned.  The  ability  to  concentrate  and  inhibit 
and  the  dexterity  of  attention  seem  to  have  no  close  correlation  with 
other  qualities.  Of  the  ideational  types  the  visual  has  a  broad  span 
for  both  visual  and  auditory  impressions,  while  the  auditory  has 
marked  ability  to  inhibit  sound  and  a  large  span  for  visual  and  audi- 
tory impressions  given  simultaneously.  The  motor  type  shows  no 
marked  correlations.  There  are  a  large  number  of  incidental  points 
that  we  have  no  space  to  mention,  but  which  are  of  importance  for 
other  problems  in  attention. 

Prager  (10)  studies  the  relations  between  defects  of  attention  and 
control  of  associations.  He  raises  two  questions:  (i)  Does  a  dis- 
turbance of  the  function  of  association  accompany  disturbances  of 
attention  (Merkfahigkeit)t  (2)  Is  it  possible  to  discover  in  associa- 
tion tests  any  phenomenon  that  is  directly  connected  with  disturb- 
ances of  attention?  The  questions  are  answered  in  the  light  of  associ- 
ation tests  on  four  patients  who  suffered  from  impairment  of  attention. 
The  first  is  answered  in  the  affirmative.  All  the  patients  showed 
lengthened  reaction  times  and  a  tendency  to  the -sentence  form  of 
association.  The  associations  took  the  form  of  explanation,  descrip- 
tions and  egocentric  responses  toward  the  stimulus  word.  To  the 
second  question  an  affirmative  answer  is  also  given.  Successive 
responses  to  the  same  word  by  the  Pappenheim  method  showed  no 
great  shortening  of  the  reaction  time  and  little  tendency  to  repeat  the 
response.  Both  course  of  association  and  immediate  retention  are 
impaired  with  degeneration  of  capacity  for  attending.  Another  study 
of  attention  in  pathology  is  by  Franchini  (5).  His  experiments 
consisted  of  a  measure  of  the  simple  reaction  times  of  patients.  In 
general  it  is  found  that  reaction  times  are  slow  and  irregular  and  that 
there  is  a  marked  tendency  to  fatigue  for  all  pathological  mental 
states.  Imbecility,  dementia  precox,  the  alcoholic  and  involution 
psychoses  are  marked  mainly  by  the  two  former  symptoms,  the  circu- 


ATTENTION  AND  INTEREST  195 

lar  insanity  by  the  quick  onset  of  fatigue.  In  one  article  D'Allonnes 
(2)  gives  the  results  of  a  conceptual  analysis  of  the  attention  processes 
as  they  are  found  in  the  insane.  He  insists  that  we  must  distinguish 
four  varieties  of  attention,  the  momentary  and  the  prolonged,  the 
spontaneous  and  the  provoked,  and  that  these  are  present  in  different 
degrees  and  in  different  combinations  in  different  cases.  In  order  of 
disappearance  they  run  from  the  light  cases  to  the  severe,  the  pro- 
longed and  provoked,  the  prolonged  and  spontaneous,  the  momentary 
and  spontaneous,  and  the  momentary  and  provoked,  if  we  couple  the 
forms  as  they  are  likely  to  be  found  in  actual  cases.  He  gives  a  long 
list  of  the  symptoms  under  each  of  eight  stages  in  the  degeneration  of 
attention.  Much  of  it  must  however  be  largely  hypothetical  and 
no  two  men  would  agree  on  the  details.  In  another  paper  (i)  he 
reports  a  new  and  simple  method  of  measuring  disturbances  of 
attention  of  momentary  duration.  The  apparatus  or  device  is  a 
square  with  five  divisions  on  each  side,  numbered  vertically  up  to 
five  and  with  five  horizontal  columns  headed  by  the  vowels.  The 
problem  is  to  point  to  the  intersection  of  a  line  headed  by  a  vowel  and 
a  line  designated  by  a  number.  Thus  a  patient  is  asked  to  point  to 
03  and  the  time  required  to  find  it  is  measured.  It  was  found  that 
the  time  was  increased  for  cases  of  dementia  and  mania  over  that 
required  by  normal  individuals  and  that  the  more  severe  the  case  the 
longer  the  time. 

A.  Busch  (3)  has  conducted  a  long  series  of  experiments  upon  the 
effect  of  alcohol  upon  attention.  Three  measures  were  used;  two 
upon  attention  proper  and  one  of  simple  visual  acuity.  First  the 
distribution  of  attention  was  measured  by  a  device  similar  to  Wirth's. 
This  indicated  that  the  more  important  effect  was  to  narrow  the  field 
of  attention.  The  figures  in  the  periphery  of  the  field  of  vision  were 
very  much  more  likely  to  be  overlooked  after  a  dose  of  30  c.c.  of 
alcohol  than  when  normal.  The  central  region  is  also  affected  in 
some  degree,  but  not  so  noticeably.  The  second  experiment  con- 
sisted in  measuring  the  apperception  of  letters  by  the  Finzi  method. 
This  showed  the  same  effect  in  more  marked  degree.  A  third  series 
tested  visual  acuity  under  alcohol  and  found  that  it  was  either 
practically  unaffected  or  increased.  The  effects  noted  are  to  be 
referred  to  the  effects  of  alcohol  upon  the  central  processes,  in  spite 
of  the  increased  efficiency  of  the  peripheral  nervous  system.  The 
effects  could  be  noted  at  least  twenty-four  hours  after  the  dose  and 
were  cumulative. 

Dearborn  (4)  gives  a  summary  of  the  bearing  of  attention  in  its 
different  aspects  upon  exercise  and  physical  education  in  general. 


196  W.  B.  PILLSBURY 

He  combines  a  vasomotor,  with  a  nervous  coordination  theory.  It  is 
valuable  largely  for  its  practical  suggestions  to  the  teacher  of  physical 
education. 

Two  papers  of  a  more  theoretical  character  have  appeared. 
Rignano  (u,  12)  in  an  article  published  both  in  French  and  in 
German  advances  the  theory  that  attention  arises  from  a  conflict 
between  two  affective  inclinations.  In  the  second  part  of  his  work 
he  argues  that  intensity  and  choice  of  memories  really  depend  upon 
this  affective  element,  that  associations  alone  will  not  really 
explain.  On  the  nervous  side  he  explains  these  processes  by  the 
interaction  of  different  nervous  processes  either  in  harmony  or  in 
opposition.  He  does  not  make  very  clear,  however,  the  exact  rela- 
tion between  sensation  and  affection  or  between  the  affective  elements 
and  the  nervous  currents.  Liidtke  (8)  traces  the  history  of  the  word 
apperception  from  Leibniz  to  Lipps  and  Jerusalem  in  German  psychol- 
ogy. He  points  out  the  different  meanings  that  it  has  had  for 
different  men  and  the  inconsistencies  in  use  by  different  men,  particu- 
larly by  Wundt,  and  ends  with  a  plea  that  it  be  discarded  from  the 
psychological  and  philosophical  vocabulary. 

REFERENCES 

1.  D'ALLONNES,  G.  R.     Recherches  sur  Pattention.     Rev.  phil.,  1911,  71,  285-312; 

494-520. 

2.  D'ALLONNES,  G.  R.     Precede  clinique  pour  mesurer  la  rapidite  de  1'attention. 

J.  de  psychol.  norm,  et  path.,  1911,  8,  47-51. 

3.  BUSCH,  A.    Ueber  den  Einfluss  des  Alkohols  auf  Klarheit  und  Umfang  des  op- 

tischen  Bewusstseins.    /./.  Psychol.  u.  Neur.,  1910,  17,  63-82;  1911,  18,  36-71. 

4.  DEARBORN,  G.  V.  N.    Attention:  Certain  of  its  Aspects  and  a  Few  of  its  Relations 

to  Physical  Education.    Amer.  Phys.  Educ.  Rev.,  1910,  15,  559-571;  637-650; 
1911,  16,  26-40;  125-143;  186-199. 

5.  FRANCHINI,  G.     Le  graphique  psychometrique  de  1'attention  dans  les  maladies 

mentales.     Arch.  ital.  de  biologie,  1911,  54,  267-277. 

6.  GRASSI,  ISABELLA.     Einfache  Reaktionszeit  und  Einstellung  der  Aufmerksamkeit. 

Zsch.f.  Psychol.,  1911,  60,  46-72. 

7.  JACOBSON,  E.     Experiments  on  the  Inhibition  of  Sensations.     PSYCHOL.   REV., 

1911,  18,  24-53. 

8.  LUDTKE,  F.     Kritische  Geschichte  der  Apperzeptionsbegriffe.     Zsch.  f.  Phil.    u. 

phil.  Krit.,  1911,  141,  41-135. 

9.  McCoMAS,  H.  C.    Some  Types  of  Attention.    PSYCHOLOGICAL  MONOGRAPHS, 

1911,  13,  whole  No.  55. 

10.  PRAGER,  J.  J.     Experimented  Beitrag  zur  Psychopathologie  der  Merkfahigkeits- 

storungen.     /. /.  Psychol.  u.  Neur.,  1911,  18,  1-22. 

11.  E.  RIGNANO,  E.    De  1'attention.     I.  Scientia,  1911,  10,  165-190.     II.  1912,  u, 

71-87. 

12.  RIGNANO,  E.    Von  der  Aufmerksamkeit.     Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  Psychol.,  1911,  22,  267- 


TIME  AND  RHYTHM  197 

TIME  AND  RHYTHM 

BY  KNIGHT  DUNLAP 

The  Johns  Hopkins  University 

Easier  (i),  from  a  very  few  observations  with  excellent  apparatus, 
concludes  that  two  tactual  stimuli  on  the  same  area  fuse  when 
separated  by  an  interval  of  about  50  a,  or  less,  on  ringer  tip,  and  by 
longer  intervals  on  other  parts  of  the  hand.  He  points  to  the  differ- 
ence between  such  intervals  and  the  intervals  found  adequate  by  other 
observers  with  serial  stimulations — from  a  few  c  to  less  than  one  a. 
In  his  second  paper  (2)  Easier  reports  a  similar  peculiarity  of  light 
stimuli.  The  maximal  interval  permitting  fusion  between  two  stimuli, 
produced  by  revolving  sector,  was  83  o-,  whereas  the  maximal  interval 
for  flicker  was  330-. 

Brewer  (3)  and  Stratton  (10)  determined  the  thresholds  of  dura- 
tion between  two  successive  visual  stimulations  on  different  retinal 
areas,  and  the  thresholds  for  movement-duration.  Brewer,  with 
five  subjects,  using  an  exposure-pendulum  which  gave  two  points 
of  light  or  a  moving  point,  found  thresholds  of  from  2  cr  to  58  <r  for 
discrete  succession  merely,  19  a  to  76  a  for  motion  merely,  22  a  to 
61  a  for  order,  and  19  a  to  76  a  for  direction.  The  differences  due 
to  angular  separation  and  length  of  movement  are  inconsiderable. 
Stratton,  with  two  subjects,  using  the  pendulum,  and  a  wheel- 
pendulum,  exposing  successively  the  two  halves  of  a  streak  of  light, 
or  equivalent  motion  of  a  half,  obtained  thresholds  of  16.4  a  and  14.8  a 
for  mere  succession  and  31.5  a  and  13.8  <r  for  mere  motion.  Both  ex- 
perimenters used  the  method  of  serial  groups  which  in  the  reviewer's 
estimation  detracts  from  the  significance  of  the  definite  values  of  the 
thresholds,  but  does  not  diminish  the  general  importance  of  the 
results. 

Pauli  (9)  investigated  the  temporal  relations  of  two  visual  stimuli, 
one  foveal  and  one  peripheral.  He  worked  with  two  small  surfaces 
illuminated  by  Geissler  tubes,  controlled  by  the  time  attachment  to 
the  Zimmermann  kymograph.  He  found  that  of  two  simultaneous 
stimuli,  the  foveal  was  sensed  first,  the  peripheral  stimulus  needing 
to  be  advanced  50  a  to  100  a  to  make  the  two  appear  simultaneous. 
The  differential  increased  with  the  angular  separation  of  the  stimuli, 
and  with  the  intensity  and  area  of  the  foveal  stimulus;  it  was  greater 
for  the  temporal  field.  The  direction  of  attention  had  no  influence 
(Dvorak  and  Bethe  had  reported  such  influence).  In  this  part  of 
the  work  Pauli  apparently  took  no  account  of  eye-movement. 


198  KNIGHT  DUN  LAP 

The  phenomenon  observed  by  Mach  from  which  these  experiments 
grew — the  green  appearence  of  a  momentary  red  light  in  peripheral 
vision — was  also  found  to  be  unaffected  by  the  direction  of  attention. 

Pauli  also  attempted  to  measure  the  rapidity  of  change  (spatial) 
of  visual  attention,  using  a  method  suggested  by  Kiilpe:  to  find  the 
time  interyal  between  two  stimuli,  10°  to  60°  apart,  which  brings  the 
second  just  as  the  attention  is  ready  for  it.  This  time,  80  a  to  170  <r, 
Pauli  thinks  to  be  not  a  function  of  eye-movement,  because  similar 
experiments  with  voluntary  eye-movements  gave  a  much  longer  time. 

It  would  seem  remarkable  that  the  significant  American  work  in 
eye-movement  should  be  so  neglected  by  the  Germans,  were  it  not 
that  they  seem  to  be  unaware  of  progress  in  many  other  lines  also. 

Gildmeister  (7)  remarks  on  a  difficulty  he  finds  in  counting  repeti- 
tions of  a  given  process  (pulse,  etc.),  and  recommends  the  use  of  some 
melody  involving  an  eight-rhythm  (4/4  or  2/4) :  the  observer  need  only 
notice  the  tone  on  which  the  observation  ends;  computing  the  number 
subsequently;  or,  after  habituation,  obtaining  it  directly  from 
association  with  the  note.  This  method  should  be  useful  to  any  one 
afflicted  as  Gildmeister  is. 

For  estimating  a  time  interval,  in  default  of  mechanical  aids, 
Gildmeister  finds  it  useful  to  run  over  a  melody  in  march  tempo; 
with  a  certain  melody  he  is  able  to  come  within  10  per  cent,  of  120 
measures  to  the  minute.  Hence,  he  needs  to  note  only  the  number 
of  repetitions  and  point  of  ending  in  the  final  repetition. 

Dunlap,  in  his  first  article  (5),  argues  for  the  explicit  consideration 
of  rhythmic  grouping  as  a  function  of  the  specious  present.  In  his 
second  article  (6)  he  gives  the  results  of  experiments  undertaken  with 
this  consideration  in  view.  The  threshold  of  difference  for  rate  of 
discrete  auditory  stimulation  (50  per  cent,  discrimination  in  the 
author's  tables  and  charts,  which  is  the  same  as  75  per  cent,  right 
judgment  by  the  traditional  method)  is  lower  with  rhythmic  grouping 
than  without;  while  not  appreciately  higher  for  series  with  irregular 
intensities  and  durations  of  stimuli  than  for  regular  series.  The 
difference-thresholds  for  time-intervals  corresponding  to  the  rates 
used,  were  appreciably  higher.  Experiments  with  two  intensities  of 
auditory  stimuli,  and  others  with  two  modes  (auditory  and  visual), 
give  results  which  the  author  thinks  speak  for  strain-sensations  as 
time-content. 

Brown  (4)  reports  mean  variations  of  the  measurements  of  force 
and  time-relations  of  rhythmic  tapping;  of  rhythmically  vocalized 
syllables;  and  of  a  mother  goose  jingle.  The  mean  variation  for  the 


TIME  AND  RHYTHM  199 

force  of  the  foot  or  foot  element  is  from  2  to  4  times  as  large  as  the 
mean  variation  of  the  duration  of  the  same.  This  is  an  indication 
that  the  time  element  is  more  fundamental  than  the  accent  in  rhythm. 

Landry  (8),  in  a  volume  which  he  opines  "n'est  que  trop  succinct," 
presents  the  results  of  some  measurements  of  the  rhythm  and  tempo 
of  French  verse  and  prose  declaimed  by  various  persons  ranging  from 
Bernhardt  and  Mounet-Sully  to  illiterates.  Considerable  space  is 
given  to  a  very  good  discussion  of  the  psychology  of  rhythm,  which 
however  does  not  seem  to  advance  the  subject;  and  there  is  also  a 
discussion  of  the  rhythmic  peculiarities  of  spoken  French  which  is 
certainly  interesting  and  informing,  although  the  reviewer  makes  no 
pretense  of  being  able  to  judge  of  its  accuracy.  One  point  is  however 
made  quite  clear  (particularly  by  Livre  II.,  Chap.  I.):  in  these 
matters  no  foreigner  need  hope  to  do  more  than  accept  the  opinion 
of  the  Frenchman  whom  he  believes  to  be  the  most  competent 
authority. 

The  two  important  indications  in  Landry's  results  are  (i)  that 
the  rhythmic  divisions  are  controlled  but  slightly  by  the  significance 
of  the  word-groups,  and  not  at  all  by  logical  word-relations,  and 
(2)  that  increase  in  emphasis  of  an  element  increases  its  duration; 
but  these  are  not  new  discoveries. 

REFERENCES 

1.  BASLER,  A.    Ueber  die  Verschmelzung  zweier  nacheinander  erfolgender  Tastreize. 

Pfluger's  Arch.,  1911,  143,  230-244. 

2.  BASLER,  A.    Ueber  die  Verschmelzung  zweier  nacheinander  erfolgender  Licht- 

reize.     Pfluger's  Arch.,  1911,  143,  245-251. 

3.  BREWER,  J.  M.    The  Psychology  of  Change;  on  Some  Phases  of  Minimal  Time  by 

Sight.     PSYCHOL.  REV.,  1911,  1 8,  257-261. 

4.  BROWN,   W.    Temporal   and   Accentual   Rhythm.    PSYCHOL.  REV.,    1911,    18, 

336-346. 

5.  DUNLAP,  K.     Rhythm  and  the  Specious  Present.    /.  of  Phil.,  PsychoL,  etc.,  1911, 

8,  348-354. 

6.  DUNLAP,  K.     Difference  Sensibility  for  Rate  of  Discrete  Impression.    PSYCHOL. 

REV.,  1912,  19,  32-59- 

7.  GILDMEISTER,  M.     Ueber  Zahlen  und  Zeitschatzen.     Zsch.  f.  biol  Techmk  u. 

Methodik,  1911,  2,  49-52. 

8.  LANDRY,  E.      La  theorie  du  rythme  et  le  rythme  du  fran(ais  declame.      Paris:  Cham- 

pion, 1911.     Pp.  427. 

9.  PAULI,  R.    Ueber  die  Beurteilung  der  Zeitordnung  von  optischen  Reizen  in 

Anschluss  an  eine  von  E.  Mach  beobachtete  Farbenerscheinung.    Arch.  f.  d. 
ges.  PsychoL,  1911,  21,  132-218. 

10.  STRATTON,  G.  M.    The  Psychology  of  Change;  How  is  the  Perception  of  Movement 
Related  to  That  of  Succession?     PSYCHOL.  REV.,  1911,.  18,  262-293. 


SPECIAL   REVIEWS 
THE  ORIGINS  OF  MUSIC 

Die  Anfdnge  der  Musik.     CARL  STUMPF.     Leipzig:  J.  A.  Barth,  1911. 

Pp.  209. 

In  this  interesting  little  book  the  author  draws  in  a  simple  and 
popular  manner  the  conclusions  which  may  be  reached  from  recent 
studies  of  primitive  music.  It  should  perhaps  be  noted  at  once  that 
the  use  of  the  term  primitive  is  to  be  taken,  relatively,  not  literally. 
Careful  study  of  the  structure  of  exotic  melodies  usually  reveals  the 
fact  that  they  represent  a  considerable  degree  of  cultural  evolution. 
Only  by  reference  to  relative  simplicity  of  structure  may  we  approach 
a  conception  of  the  beginnings  of  music. 

The  book  deals  first  with  certain  recent  theories  as  to  the  origin 
of  music.  The  Darwinian  theory  is  characterized  by  the  phrase: 
"Im  Anfang  war  die  Liebe."  Here  it  is  noted  that  Darwin's  attempt 
to  derive  music  from  sexual  selection  gives  no  adequate  explanation 
of  the  unique  ability  to  recognize  and  transpose  melodies.  So  far 
as  we  yet  know  animals  have  no  capacity  of  this  order.  Bird  songs 
seem  to  depend  upon  absolute  pitch,  whereas  human  music  is  based 
upon  a  recognition  of  tonal  relations  which  involves  a  capacity  for 
abstraction  which  the  animal  does  not  appear  to  possess.  Spencer's 
theory  is  characterized  by  the  phrase:  "Im  Anfange  war  das  Wort," 
indicating  a  derivation  from  accent  and  tonal  variations  in  speech. 
But  music  differs  essentially  from  singing-speech  in  the  use  of  fixed 
intervals.  In  speech,  on  the  contrary,  it  has  been  shown  that  the 
sounding  of  a  single  syllable  shows  great  variation  in  pitch.  Simi- 
larly the  view  that  music  finds  its  origin  in  rhythm,  as  characterized 
by  Hans  v.  Billow's  phrase:  "Im  Anfange  war  der  Rhythmus," 
is  equally  unsuited  to  explain  the  facts,  since  the  problem  of  definite 
intervals  remains  unsolved.  Rhythmic  expression  may  involve 
differences  in  intonation,  but  it  makes  no  demand  for  consonant 
intervals.  Furthermore,  the  most  primitive  songs  known  to  us 
evidence  a  regard  primarily  for  musical  composition,  rather  than  any 
definite  aim  or  requirement  of  rhythmic  expression.  The  oft-cited 
rhythmic  accompaniment  of  work  done  by  a  group  in  unison  is  not 
found  among  the  most  primitive  tribes,  but  seems  to  indicate  a  stage 
in  cultural  evolution  beyond  that  at  which  music  appears. 
200 


THE  ORIGINS  OF  MUSIC  201 

To  explain  the  origin  of  music  we  must  have  in  mind,  not  merely 
tonal  expression  of  any  arbitrary  sort,  but  the  use  of  tones  in  definite 
relationships.  The  explanation  for  this  phenomenon  finds  its  basis 
for  Stumpf  in  the  inherent  capacity  to  recognize  tonal  fusion.  He 
therefore  characterizes  his  own  explanation  by  Goethe's  phrase: 
"Im  Anfang  war  die  Tat."  The  problem  is,  how  did  primitive  man 
discover  this  natural  capacity?  Stumpf  believes  that  the  essential 
facts  were  first  brought  to  his  notice  through  the  use  of  vocal  signals. 
In  signalling  the  production  of  an  intense  and  relatively  fixed  high 
tone  is  demanded.  The  duplication  of  this  tone  by  men,  women  and 
children,  whose  vocal  register  naturally  varies,  brings  about  the 
expression  of  similar  tones  which  appear  to  be  identical  because 
they  fuse.  Thus  in  the  attempt  of  voices  of  different  range  to  produce 
the  same  tone,  we  see  the  first  use  of  the  consonant  intervals  of 
octave,  fifth  and  fourth  which  furnish  the  framework  for  all  music. 
Little  by  little  these  intervals  are  recognized  as  such,  even  when  the 
absolute  pitch  varies. 

The  first  melodic  phrases  may  be  due  to  the  filling-in  of  the  interval 
of  the  fourth,  say,  with  arbitrary  tones.  Brief  phrases  constructed 
from  such  tones  are  well  adapted  to  use  as  signal  calls,  and  it  is  noted 
that,  among  the  most  primitive  songs  recorded,  the  fourth  and  fifth 
represent  the  greatest  intervals  used,  indeed  they  often  limit  the 
total  range  of  the  melody.  Thus  we  see  that  although  the  steps  in 
primitive  music  are  often  arbitrary  and  sometimes  variable,  they  are 
nevertheless  constrained  by  the  limit  of  a  consonant  interval.  The 
evolution  of  music  is  dependent  upon  the  reconciliation  of  these  small 
steps  with  the  consonant  intervals  which  furnish  the  framework  and 
basis  of  transposition.  Polyphony  is  found  very  early  in  parallel 
passages  where  various  members  of  a  family  may  duplicate  the  melody 
simultaneously  in  octaves,  fifths  and  fourths.  The  use  of  the  falsetto, 
which  is  very  frequent,  also  indicates  an  attempt  to  imitate  the  precise 
register  of  a  certain  individual. 

From  primitive  instruments  we  may  learn  much  concerning  the 
origins  of  music,  although  it  is  well  to  remember  that  many  very 
simple  forms  of  instrument  now  in  use  probably  represent  a  retrograde 
development  from  forms  originally  much  more  complex.  Pipes  are 
among  the  most  ancient  instruments  of  which  we  have  knowledge. 
The  introduction  of  holes  to  produce  a  variety  of  tones  was  doubtless 
determined  at  first,  not  in  accordance  with  musical  principles,  but 
by  external  conditions.  For  instance,  the  rings  of  the  bamboo,  and 
the  use  of  three  or  six  fingers  seem  to  have  been  prominent  factors. 


202  REVIEWS 

Pipes  of  varying  length  are  combined  in  the  Pan's-pipes  which  may 
follow  one  another  in  pitch,  or  form  groups,  sometimes  even  giving 
a  definite  melody.  We  are  not  to  conclude  from  this,  however,  that 
the  intervals  used  by  a  people  are  entirely  arbitrary,  varying  from 
individual  to  individual.  On  the  contrary,  even  though  the  scale 
contains  not  a  single  pure  consonance,  the  relation  of  the  intervals  is 
fixed  and  duplicated  with  remarkable  exactness  in  all  the  instruments 
of  a  tribe. 

Among  some  of  the  wind  instruments  there  occurs  the  possibility 
of  blowing  higher  tones  (Uberblasen),  thus  producing  harmonics  in 
definite  consonant  relationship  to  the  fundamental.  This  may  be 
considered  as  a  contributary  cause  for  the  use  of  consonant  intervals. 
It  is  not  a  primary  cause,  however,  for  these  intervals  are  quite  as 
well  known  among  people  who  have  no  such  instruments.  String 
instruments  appear  to  have  their  origin  in  a  modification  of  the 
hunter's  bow.  The  musical-bow,  much  used  by  primitive  people, 
is  a  single  stringed  bow  which  indicates  this  analogy  clearly.  Drums 
are  found  in  great  variety  with  varying  tones,  but  no  consonant 
effects.  The  xylophone  and  metallophone  are  among  the  most 
interesting  of  exotic  instruments,  since  with  their  aid  we  can  study 
most  exactly  the  scale  of  intervals  in  use.  Here,  as  with  the  Pan's- 
pipes  we  learn  the  exactness  with  which  unmusical  intervals  are 
employed. 

The  pleasure  in  manifold  combinations,  developments  and  reso- 
lutions of  accords  is  a  modern  invention.  Primitive  music  is  essen- 
tially homophonic;  dissonances  without  resolution  are  frequent. 
The  use  of  polyphony  is  quite  different  from  that  which  we  make  of  it. 
Aside  from  the  parallel  passages,  already  noted,  the  repetition  of  a 
fixed  tone  is  often  met  with,  similar  to  the  drone-bass  or  bourdon. 
However,  if  polyphony  is  undeveloped,  rhythmic  accompaniment 
has  evolved  to  a  point  quite  beyond  our  ordinary  capacity.  This  is 
due  primarily  to  the  lack  of  polyphony,  which  requires  for  its  per- 
formance relatively  simple  rhythms.  The  rhythmic  accompaniments 
to  the  songs  of  primitive  peoples  are  often  extraordinarily  complex, 
and  we  find  that  five-  and  seven-part  measures  are  not  at  all  excep- 
tional. The  rhythmic  setting  is  also  characterized  by  a  frequent  and 
complicated  shifting  from  one  tempo  to  another. 

The  appearance  of  a  fixed  scale  indicates  the  usage  of  five  and 
seven  intervals  within  the  octave  as  the  most  common  divisions. 
Two  methods  of  development  may  be  distinguished:  (i)  the  construc- 
tion of  a  scale  by  reference  to  the  consonant  intervals  of  fourth, 


THE  ORIGINS  OF  MUSIC  203 

fifth,  and  later,  the  third,  with  a  more  or  less  arbitrary  filling-in  of 
the  larger  steps;  (2)  the  construction  of  a  scale  by  a  purely  arbitrary 
division  into  five  or  seven  steps  of  equal  intervals,  as  may  be  found 
in  the  Siamese  and  Javanese  scales,  respectively.  Even  in  this  case, 
however,  the  limiting  interval  is  the  octave,  so  we  may  say  that  all 
scales  in  their  development  are  in  some  measure  limited  by  the 
principle  of  consonance. 

An  interesting  polyphonic  orchestral  usage  among  certain  Asiatic 
peoples  is  noted.  The  principle  of  these  compositions  is  a  more  or 
less  independent  elaboration  and  variation  upon  a  central  melodic 
theme,  which  is  carried  out  in  unison  by  the  different  instruments  of 
the  orchestra.  The  effect  upon  our  ears,  trained  to  harmonic  combi- 
nations, is  very  strange,  but  to  a  people  whose  musical  development 
has  been  strictly  homophonic,  the  effect  is  apparently  agreeable. 
Stumpf  proposes  to  call  this  form  of  composition  heterophony,  a  term 
which  he  derives  from  a  passage  in  Plato  which  describes  what 
appears  to  have  been  a  similar  practice  among  the  Greeks. 

The  second  part  of  the  volume  consists  of  a  series  of  transcriptions 
of  exotic  melodies,  largely  derived  from  the  phonogram  archives  of 
the  Berlin  Laboratory,  with  a  running  commentary  on  varying 
peculiarities  and  principles  of  construction.  The  examples  include 
melodies  from  the  Wedda  of  Ceylon — the  most  primitive  forms 
of  music  which  we  now  know, — the  Andamanese,  the  Kubu  of  Su- 
matra, Australian  aborigines,  South  American,  Mexican  and  North 
American  Indians,  the  Eskimos,  Greenlanders  and  the  African 
Negroes.  There  are  also  appended  eleven  plates  illustrating  primitive 
musical  instruments. 

R.  M.  OGDEN 

UNIVERSITY  OF  TENNESSEE 


DISCUSSION 
THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ADVERTISING 

A  recent  review1  of  Strong's  The  Relative  Merit  of  Advertisements 
displays  so  inadequate  an  appreciation  both  of  the  problem  of  that 
suggestive  monograph  and  of  the  tendencies  of  modern  experimental 
psychology  in  general  that  I  am  impelled  to  call  further  attention  to 
the  work.  It  is  much  to  be  regretted  that  this  book  should  have  been 
reviewed  by  one  who  failed  to  discriminate  between  a  personal  point 
of  view  and  the  total  content  of  a  large  and  growing  science;  between 
individual  inclination  for  certain  species  of  problem  and  "the  very 
characteristics  of  a  psychological  experiment." 

From  the  fact  that  the  mathematical  portion  of  the  work  in 
question  may  have  been  puzzling  to  the  reviewer  it  does  not  at  once 
follow  that  a  search  for  exact  measurement  of  complex  mental 
processes  is  "detrimental  to  good  psychology."  There  are  indeed 
psychologists  who  are  temperamentally  disposed  to  be  equally  short- 
sighted and  to  assert  that  it  is  just  the  "detailed  introspection"  and 
the  "qualitative  distinctions"  that  get  nowhere.  The  fact  is,  how- 
ever, that  qualitative  distinction  and  quantitative  analysis  are  both 
needed  in  a  psychology  that  is  "good." 

Two  further  things  are  also  true.  The  first  is  that  a  piece  of  work 
which  emphasizes  the  latter  type  of  inquiry  reflects  the  trend  of  by 
far  the  greater  part  of  current  investigation  and  interest.  One 
familiar  with  the  contents  of  current  periodicals  and  recent  treatises 
will  require  no  proof  of  this  fact.  The  second  truth  is  that  a  large 
body  of  students  and  teachers  have  been  convinced  that  a  psychology 
which  refuses  to  be  both  sterile  and  unstimulating,  but  which  aspires 
to  be  adequate  and  serviceable  in  its  treatment  of  conscious  indi- 
viduals, must  busy  itself  with  outcome,  conduct  and  behavior  as 
much  as,  if  not  even  more  than,  with  mere  content  and  qualitative 
elements  and  patterns. 

As  the  writer  has  already  insisted:  "A  psychology  which  aims  to 
be  an  account  of  behavior  cannot  go  far  without  making  a  careful 
study  of  more  complex  judgments  such  as  those  of  appeal  and  interest. 
Especially  will  this  be  true  of  a  psychology  which  aspires  to  be  con- 

1  PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN,  March  15,  1912,  p.  124. 
204 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ADVERTISING  205 

cretely  serviceable.  Such  a  psychology  will  find  but  little  use  for 
the  introspective  method.  It  will  be  interested,  not  in  the  momen- 
tary content  of  a  conscious  moment;  nor  in  the  descriptive  character 
of  the  sensory  fragment  which  may  at  the  moment  be  the  bearer  of 
meaning;  nor  in  the  instrument,  criterion  or  vehicle  of  an  act  of 
apprehension,  a  comparison,  a  feeling  or  a  choice.  It  will  be  most 
of  all  interested  in  the  outcome  of  this  moment  in  the  form  of  behavior, 
an  act,  a  choice,  a  judgment,  and  in  the  character,  reliability,  con- 
stancy and  significance  which  the  outcome  of  such  a  mental  operation 
bears."1 

To  return  to  the  review  in  question,  the  paragraph  presented  by 
Mr.  Tait  as  embodying  the  "chief  results"  quite  ignores  the  real 
problem,  which  was  the  measurement  of  the  relative  strength  of 
various  appeals  and  interests,  and  the  determination  of  the  depend- 
ence of  these  measurements  on  such  factors  as  commodity,  sex,  class 
and  copy  differences.  The  paragraph  cites  only  certain  interesting 
facts  which  came  out  as  by-products  in  the  course  of  the  inquiry. 

Not  until  the  importance  of  this  type  of  study  is  fully  realized 
shall  we  possess  a  body  of  principles  that  will  really  convey  infor- 
mation concerning  human  nature  and  human  behavior,  a  knowledge 
which  the  psychology  which  Mr.  Tait  seems  to  have  been  taught  has 
so  far  failed  to  deliver.  If  a  personal  opinion  be  permitted  by  way 
of  contrast  with  that  of  the  reviewer,  the  writer  would  like  to  express 
his  conviction  that  pure  qualitative  and  introspective  distinctions 
fall  as  far  short  of  an  adequate  psychology  as  the  conversational 
description  of  a  stomach-ache  falls  short  of  being  a  complete  account 
of  the  laws  of  digestion. 

It  is  however  not  clear  what  the  reviewer  means  by  saying  "any 
detailed  introspection  is  lacking."  The  determination  to  introspect 
and  to  report  the  introspections  as  such  was  purposely  avoided,  and 
with  good  reason.  But  the  determination  to  introspect  and  to  report 
is  apparently  not  a  sufficient  criterion  of  introspection.  Indeed  one 
of  the  foremost  exponents  of  the  introspective  methods  has  remarked: 
"After  all,  therefore,  it  is  not  so  absurd  as  at  first  thought  it  seems, 
to  say  that  we  require  the  animal  and  society  and  the  madman  to 
introspect.  ...  All  three  may  attend;  all  three  may  report  their 
experiences."2  Is  a  report  any  the  less  introspective,  in  the  final 
sense,  because  it  is  expressed  by  gesture,  by  behavior  or  by  arrange- 
ment or  indication  of  stimuli,  rather  than  vocally  or  graphically? 

1  Judgments  of  Persuasiveness.     PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  July,  1911. 
*TITCHENER,  A  Text-Book  of  Psychology,  p.  35. 


206  DISCUSSION 

The  reviewer  was  quite  right  when  he  remarked,  "By  a  con- 
glomeration of  vague  preferences  under  still  vaguer  headings,  we 
can  never  reach  the  basis  of  appeal."  But  Strong  seems  to  have  fully 
realized  this  even  before  he  set  about  his  investigation.  It  was  just 
this  conglomeration  which  the  psychology  of  appeal  had  previously 
contained,  and  for  which  "The  Relative  Merit  of  Advertisements" 
suggests  the  substitution  of  definite  judgments  and  weighted  com- 
parisons, quantitatively  as  well  as  qualitatively  expressed. 

Whether  this  type  of  work  is  or  is  not  to  be  called  "psychological" 
depends  of  course  on  the  idiosyncrasies  of  one's  vocabulary.  A 
study  of  the  relative  strength  of  appeals  and  interests,  of  the  certainty 
and  constancy  of  the  judgments  passed  upon  them,  of  the  possibilities 
of  the  exact  measurement  of  the  relations  to  be  found  among  such 
complex  stimuli,  and  of  individual,  sex  and  class  differences  in  these 
respects,  may  not  fall  within  that  field  of  psychological  inquiry  which 
happens  to  be  the  most  interesting  to  one  or  to  several  particular 
individuals.  But  the  science  is  surely  larger  than  any  one  set  of 
interests.  Let  us  not  quibble  over  the  use  of  a  word.  Even  a  quibb- 
ler  should  observe  that  the  subtitle  of  the  monograph  in  question 
includes  both  its  psychological  and  statistical  aspects. 

My  purpose  in  writing  is  not  to  defend  either  the  matter  or  the 
method  of  this  pioneer  work  in  the  application  of  exact  method  to  a 
phase  of  applied  psychology  which  has  hitherto  been  satisfied  with 
mere  generalities.  These  features  are  amply  justified  by  the  immedi- 
ate results  of  Strong's  work.  My  purpose  is  to  put  on  record  the 
conviction  of  many  BULLETIN  readers  that  human  nature  is  larger 
than  any  one  personal  point  of  view,  and  that  any  attempt  to  extend 
the  problems,  methods  and  applications  of  psychological  investigation 
should  be  both  welcomed  and  encouraged. 

H.    L.    HOLLINGWORTH 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


BOOKS  RECEIVED  DURING  MARCH  AND  APRIL 

SCHILLER,  F.  C.  S.     Formal  Logic.     A  Scientific  and  Social  Problem. 

London:  Macmillan,  1912.     Pp.  xviii  +  423.     $3.25  net. 
STUMPF,  C.     Die  Anfdnge  der  Musik.     Leipzig:  J.  A.  Barth,  1911. 

Pp.  209.     Mk.  6.60;  geb.  Mk.  7.50. 
LEE,  V.,    and   ANSTRUTHER-THOMSON,    C.     Beauty   and    Ugliness. 

And  Other  Studies  in  Psychological  ^Esthetics.     London  and  New 

York:  John  Lane  Company,  1912.     Pp.  xiii  +  376.     $1.75  net. 
RICE,   D.   E.     Visual  Acuity  with  Lights  of  Different  Colors  and 

Intensities.     (No.  20  of  Archives  of  Psychology.)     New  York: 

The  Science  Press,  1912.     Pp.  59. 
BEAN,   C.  H.     The  Curve  of  Forgetting.     (No.  21  of  Archives  of 

Psychology.)     New  York:  The  Science  Press,  1912.     Pp.  45. 
HODGE,  F.  A.     John  Locke  and  Formal  Discipline.     Lynchburg,  Va. : 

J.  P.  Bell  Co.,  1911.     Pp.  31. 
LEVI,  A.     Studi  Logici.     II.  II  trascendentalismo  logico.     Firenze, 

1911.  Pp.  34- 

LEVI,    A.     La    Filosofia    dell'    Esperienza.     II.    La   Filosofia   dell9 

Intuizione  primitiva.     Bologna,  1911.     Pp.  31. 
HARTENBERG,   P.     Traitement  des  neurastheniques.     Paris:  Alcan, 

1912.  Pp.  346.     3  fr.  50. 

MEYERSON,  E.  Identite  et  realite.  (2d  ed.)  Paris:  Alcan,  1912. 
Pp.  xix  +  542.  10  fr. 

DUNLAP,  K.  A  System  of  Psychology.  New  York:  Scribner,  1912. 
Pp.  xiv  +  368. 

JOHNSTON,  C.  H.  High  School  Education.  New  York:  Scribner, 
1912.  Pp.  xxii  +  555. 

PERRIER,  L.  Le  Sentiment  Religieux  a-t-il  une  origine  patho- 
logique?  Paris:  Fischbacher,  1912.  Pp.  63. 

[ANON.]  Sixty-fourth  Annual  Report  of  the  Trustees  of  the  Massa- 
chusetts School  for  the  Feeble-Minded  at  Waltham  for  the  year 
ending  November  jo,  ipn.  Boston:  Wright  &  Potter  Pr.  Co., 
1912.  Pp.  48. 

DORSEY,  J.  O.,  &  SWANTON,  J.  R.  A  Dictionary  of  the  Biloxi  and 
Ofo  Languages.  Bureau  of  American  Ethnology,  Bulletin  47. 
Washington:  Gov.  Printing  Co.,  1912.  Pp.  340. 

207 


NOTES  AND  NEWS 

THE  Ninth  Annual  Meeting  of  the  Experimental  Psychologists 
was  held  at  Worcester,  Mass.,  April  15-17. 

PROFESSOR  LILLIEN  J.  MARTIN,  of  Stanford  University,  gave 
an  address  entitled  "Ueber  die  Lokalisation  optischer  Vorstellungs- 
bilder"  at  the  V.  Kongress  fur  experimentelle  Psychologic,  held  in 
Berlin,  April  15-19. 

AT  the  National  University  of  Mexico  Professor  J.  M.  Baldwin 
is  delivering  the  second  half  of  the  two  years'  program  of  lectures 
on  psychosociology.  In  addition  to  these  lectures  a  course  in  the 
history  of  psychology  is  also  announced. 

A  NEW  periodical,  Imago,  is  announced  from  Vienna,  edited  by 
Professor  S.  Freud  and  published  under  the  direction  of  Otto  Rank 
and  Dr.  Hanns  Sachs.  It  is  to  be  devoted  to  the  application  of 
psychoanalysis  to  the  entire  field  of  the  mental  sciences. 

THE  April  number  of  the  BULLETIN,  dealing  with  psycho- 
pathology,  was  prepared  under  the  editorial  care  of  Dr.  Adolf  Meyer, 
of  the  Johns  Hopkins  Hospital. 

THE  following  items  are  taken  from  the  press: 

DR.  J.  E.  W.  WALLIN  has  been  appointed  assistant  professor  of 
educational  psychology  and  director  of  the  recently  established 
department  of  clinical  psychology  in  the  school  of  education  of  the 
University  of  Pittsburgh. 

THE  coming  session  of  the  Dartmouth  Summer  School  will  be 
in  charge  of  Dr.  W.  V.  D.  Bingham,  director  of  the  psychological 
laboratory,  and  professor  of  psychology  and  education. 

DR.  GEORGE  H.  MOUNT  has  resigned  his  position  as  instructor 
in  psychology  in  the  Northern  Michigan  State  Normal  School  to 
accept  an  assistant  professorship  in  the  Iowa  State  Teachers' 
College. 

DR.  ARTHUR  HOLMES,  assistant  professor  of  psychology  at  the 
University  of  Pennsylvania,  has  accepted  the  post  of  dean  of  the 
faculties  of  Pennsylvania  State  College. 

DR.  WILHELM  WUNDT,  professor  of  philosophy  at  Leipzig,  has 
been  made  a  knight  of  the  Prussian  order  "pour  le  merite." 
208 


/ 


Vol.  IX.  No.  6.  June  15,  1912. 

THE 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN 


GENERAL  REVIEWS  AND   SUMMARIES 
PSYCHOPHYSICAL  MEASUREMENT  METHODS 

BY  PROFESSOR  F.  M.  URBAN 

University  of  Pennsylvania 

Blondel  and  Rey  (i)  raise  the  question  as  to  the  dependence  of 
the  threshold  for  light  stimuli  on  the  intensity  and  duration  of  the 
stimulus.  They  come  to  the  conclusion  that  Bloch's  law  which 
makes  the  threshold  depend  on  the  quantity  of  illumination  (the 
product  of  optical  energy  times  duration)  holds  for  stimuli  of  com- 
paratively high  intensity  only.  The  following  argument  is  of  con- 
siderable theoretical  interest  to  psychophysics.  Ribiere  made 
experiments  on  the  distance  inside  of  which  a  light  of  given  intensity 
but  variable  duration  could  be  seen.  It  was  found  that  this  distance 
increased  constantly  with  duration  of  the  light  stimulus  between  the 
limits  0.25  to  1.78  seconds  without  attaining  the  distance  at  which  a 
constant  light  could  be  seen.  From  this  it  follows  that  the  so-called 
minimum  stimulation  is  well  defined  only  with  reference  to  a  certain 
duration.  The  absolute  minimum  stimulation  would  be  the  one 
produced  by  a  liminal  stimulus  after  an  infinite  duration. 

Wm.  Brown  (2)  undertook  to  write  a  short  text-book  for  the  use 
of  the  student  of  quantitative  psychology,  which  is  a  wider  field  than 
psychophysical  investigation.  The  first  chapter  contains  a  pres- 
entation of  the  methods,  which  is  perhaps  a  little  short  but  presents 
the  methods  of  constant  stimuli  and  of  just  perceptible  differences 
in  some  detail.  The  reader  will  be  pleased  to  find  a  new  idea.  Brown 
proposes  to  apply  Pearson's  theory  of  the  curves  of  distribution  to 
the  study  of  psychometric  functions.  The  difficulties  of  this  promis- 
ing enterprise  are  by  no  means  small,  but  they  may  be  overcome. 

209 


210  F.  M.  URBAN 

P.  Desroche  (3)  made  observations  on  the  influence  of  the  distance 
of  a  constant  source  of  light  on  the  phototropic  reactions  of  Chlamy- 
domonas  Steinii.  The  animals  were  first  attracted  to  one  side  of  a 
drop  by  a  light  placed  at  a  certain  distance,  and  then  the  drop  was 
turned  by  180°  so  as  to  attract  the  animals  to  the  other  side.  The 
speed  of  this  movement  was  determined.  In  the  study  of  the 
influence  of  the  distance  of  the  light  on  the  speed,  one  has  to  dis- 
tinguish two  cases.  If  several  hundred  of  these  animals  are  placed 
in  the  drop  the  distance  of  the  light  influences  their  speed  in  a 
way  closely  resembling  the  law  of  Fechner.  If  a  single  animal 
is  experimented  on,  one  finds  that  its  speed  is  uniform  and  does  not 
depend  on  the  distance  of  the  light.  If,  however,  the  distance  of  the 
light  increases,  the  animal  does  not  move  straight  towards  the  light 
and  it  indulges  in  frequent  stops.  Desroche  believes  that  the 
similarity  of  his  results  with  the  law  of  Fechner  is  the  result  of  the 
compound  influence  of  the  individual  movements  of  the  animals 
which  become  more  irregular  the  greater  the  distance  of  the  light. 

R.  Dodge  (4)  raises  the  question  whether  introspective  facts  are 
the  only  mental  reality,  or  whether  there  are  other  real  indicators 
of  mental  life.  Rejecting  the  first  view  he  welcomes  every  fact,  no 
matter  whether  its  source  is  pathology,  neurology,  introspection,  or 
the  observation  of  animal  behavior,  as  long  as  it  is  capable  of  throwing 
some  light  on  human  psychology.  There  are  certain  facts  like  fatigue, 
or  mental  work,  which  are  not  accessible  to  introspection,  but  which 
are  nevertheless  as  valid  indications  of  mental  facts  as  any  result  of 
introspection.  Experimental  evidence  that  certain  mental  capacities 
undergo  measurable  objective  changes  is  as  true  a  psychological  fact 
as  anything  discovered  by  introspection.  Introspection  is  a  real  and 
important  factor  in  certain  fields  of  work,  but  is  only  one  among  many. 

Chas.  Henry  (5)  attempts  to  apply  mathematical  methods  to  the 
general  problems  of  biology,  an  enterprise  for  which  he  is  doubly 
qualified  as  the  author  of  a  text-book  on  mathematics,  and  the  director 
of  a  physiological  laboratory.  His  problem  is  to  study  sensitivity 
and  muscular  irritability  as  dependent  on  the  intensity  and  duration 
of  the  stimulus.  He  studies  particularly  the  sensations  of  light 
produced  by  a  variable  optical  energy  of  constant  duration  and  those 
produced  by  constant  energy  of  variable  duration.  He  tries  to 
determine  the  character  of  this  dependence  and  finds  that  it  is 
identical  with  the  so-called  photographic  function,  which  gives  the 
amount  of  silver  reduced  by  a  variable  intensity  of  light  of  constant 
duration.  It  is  likely  that  the  curve  of  photographic  action  also  gives 


PSYCHOPHYSICAL  MEASUREMENT  METHODS  211 

the  process  of  nervous  excitation  produced  by  a  variable  optical  energy 
of  constant  duration.  Only  a  certain  part  of  this  curve,  however, 
corresponds  to  conscious  processes;  the  rest  of  it,  from  a  certain 
point  of  inflection  on,  represents  the  course  of  nervous  excitation 
not  accompanied  by  mental  processes.  The  entire  curve  is  called  the 
psychophysical  curve,  and  the  author  believes  that  its  nature  very 
likely  remains  the  same  for  different  kinds  of  sense  perception.  From 
this  one  would  have  to  conclude  that  the  processes  produced  by  differ- 
ent stimulations  resemble  each  other  to  a  high  degree. 

Studying  the  excitation  of  the  muscle  the  author  assumes  that  it 
is  directly  proportional  to  the  duration  of  the  effort.  The  dependence 
of  these  two  quantities  can  be  expressed  in  a  myophysical  law  and 
can  be  studied  by  the  self-registering  ergograph  for  the  total  work. 
The  curves  obtained  in  this  way  closely  resemble  the  curve  of  sen- 
sations. The  author  then  proceeds  to  show  that  the  form  of  the 
functions  for  the  irritability  of  the  senses  and  the  muscles  do  not 
differ  much  from  those  for  the  change  in  the  weight  of  cells  placed  in 
a  medium  where  the  products  of  dissimilation  accumulate,  provided 
that  assimilation  diminishes  in  the  course  of  time.  These  con- 
siderations show  the  possibility  of  connecting  the  psychophysical 
and  myophysical  laws  with  those  of  physical  chemistry  and  of  finding 
the  principles  of  a  general  mathematical  theory  of  irritability. 

The  second  part  of  the  book  is  very  curious.  The  author  assumes 
a  certain  general  principle  from  which  he  deduces  the  laws  for  the 
variations  in  the  apparent  size  of  straight  lines  and  the  wave-lengths 
of  complementary  colors.  Short  mention  is  made  of  my  demon- 
stration that  the  arithmetic  mean  of  a  group  of  observations  is  the 
most  probable  value  if  these  observations  are  made  systematically. 

E.  Jacobson  (6)  studied  the  interference  of  qualitatively  different 
stimuli.  The  technique  of  this  kind  of  experiments  is  not  very  well 
developed  and  its  methodology  is  still  untouched  by  modern  refine- 
ments. The  author  did  not  feel  called  upon  to  comply  with  the 
requirements  of  psychophysical  experimentation,  and  the  outcome 
is  that  there  is  hardly  one  result  in  his  paper  that  would  stand  a 
thorough  test. 

P.  Lasareff  (7)  studies  the  influence  of  the  size  of  the  visual  field 
on  the  threshold  of  sensations.  He  represents  his  results  by  the 
formula  of  Helmholtz  who  modified  the  psychophysical  formula  of 
Fechner  by  taking  into  consideration  the  illumination  of  the  retina. 

W.  Reimer  (8)  studied  the  history  of  the  notion  of  intensity  with 
special  reference  to  the  applications  which  this  notion  has  found  in 


212  F.  M.  URBAN 

psychology.  This  historical  sketch,  however,  does  not  include  the 
most  recent  researches  in  this  field. 

F.  H.  Safford  (9)  took  up  the  rather  technical  question  as  to  the 
number  of  decimal  places  to  be  retained  in  the  numbers  of  relative 
frequency  and  in  the  coefficients  of  the  equation  of  the  psychometric 
functions  set  up  by  Lagrange's  formula.  He  concludes  that  the 
relative  frequencies  in  my  monograph  on  statistical  methods  should 
be  cut  to  three  instead  of  four  decimal  places,  and  that  the  number 
of  figures  retained  by  me  in  Lagrange's  formula  is  entirely  too  large. 
He  also  criticizes  my  expression  of  treating  the  data  without  a  definite 
hypothesis  about  the  psychometric  functions. 

Sanford's  variation  of  the  method  of  just  perceptible  differences 
is  dealt  with  in  (10).  There  exists  some  diversity  of  opinion  as  to 
the  real  value  and  significance  of  this  variation.  It  is  shown  that  it 
does  not  change  the  final  outcome  of  this  method  and  that  it  has  the 
character  of  a  precaution  in  so  far  as  it  enables  us  to  discover  gross 
mistakes. 

My  paper  (n)  is  a  reply  to  (9).  It  is  pointed  out  that  Lagrange's 
formula  is  merely  an  artificial  construction  for  the  representation 
of  the  data  of  observations,  and  the  coefficients  in  the  equation  set 
up  by  this  formula  have  no  immediate  physical  significance.  If  a 
smaller  number  of  figures  is  retained  in  the  calculation  of  the  co- 
efficients, the  equation  does  not  represent  the  empirical  data  at  all 
and  becomes  useless.  The  phrase  "treating  the  data  without  a 
definite  hypothesis  on  the  psychometric  functions"  merely  implies 
that  the  hypothesis  used  for  the  purpose  of  computation  is  so  in- 
different that  one  could  not  possibly  mistake  it  for  a  final  solution 
of  the  problem. 

A  further  paper  (12)  is  of  indirect  importance  for  the  problems  of 
psychophysics.  A  new  definition  of  the  notions  of  chance  and 
probability  is  given  which  is  based  on  the  modern  theory  of  classes. 
It  is  shown  that  the  notion  of  logical  chance,  that  is,  the  relation 
between  the  general  and  the  particular,  is  the  only  one  used  for 
defining  the  notion  of  mathematical  probability.  The  calculus  of 
probabilities  does  not  make  use  of  events  which  are  not  causally 
necessitated.  This  is  shown  by  several  examples  of  events  which  are 
the  objects  of  the  calculus  of  probabilities  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
there  does  not  exist  any  doubt  as  to  the  causes  which  necessitate  them. 
The  demonstration  is  carried  as  far  as  the  deduction  of  the  two 
fundamental  propositions  of  the  calculus  of  probabilities  (the  theorem 
of  addition  and  the  theorem  of  multiplication),  because  all  the 


PSYCHOPHYSICAL  MEASUREMENT  METHODS  213 

remaining  propositions  can  be  deduced  from  these  two  by  purely 
logical  processes.  Psychophysics  makes  very  wide  use  of  the  notion 
of  probability  in  so  far  as  the  method  of  just  perceptible  differences  as 
well  as  the  method  of  constant  stimuli  are  built  up  on  this  notion. 
The  passing  of  a  judgment  under  well-defined  conditions  is  regarded 
as  a  chance  event,  and  the  question  naturally  arises  whether  we  should 
favor  the  idea  of  these  events  not  being  fully  determined  by  their 
antecedent  causes,  or  whether  we  should  form  an  idea  about  them 
which  is  more  in  agreement  with  the  principles  of  physical  science. 
The  paper  shows  that  the  use  of  the  calculus  of  probabilities  does  not 
deny  the  causal  connections  between  events  and  it  is,  therefore, 
advisable  to  favor  the  view  that  the  passing  of  a  judgment  is  an 
event  causally  fully  determined  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  we  are  at 
present  unable  to  follow  up  these  connections. 

C.  A.  Willis  and  the  present  writer  (13)  worked  out  some  experi- 
mental data  on  lifted  weights.  The  results  show  the  influence  of 
variations  of  the  standard  stimulus  on  the  constants  of  the  psycho- 
metric functions.  The  standard  stimuli  of  100,  125,  150,  175,  200, 
225  grammes  were  compared  with  appropriate  comparison  weights, 
and  the  results  worked  out  by  the  method  of  constant  stimuli.  It  was 
found  that  the  constant  h  decreased  constantly  with  increasing  inten- 
sity of  the  comparison  stimulus,  while  c  remains  more  or  less  constant. 
These  results  are  in  agreement  with  those  obtained  in  working  out 
the  data  of  acoumetric  experiments.  No  well-pronounced  regularity 
corresponding  to  the  so-called  law  of  Weber  was  found. 

W.  Wirth's  Psychophysik  (14)  is  doubtlessly  the  most  significant 
publication  of  the  year.  The  book  is  divided  into  two  parts,  the 
first  of  which  contains  the  mathematical  methods,  and  the  second 
the  experimental  arrangements  used  in  psychophysical  investigations. 
It  is  not  possible  to  give  a  full  statement  of  the  contents  of  this  book, 
and  we  shall  call  attention  to  two  significant  facts  only.  The  first 
is  that  WTirth  defines  psychophysics  so  as  to  let  it  comprise  all  the 
methods  of  experimental  psychology.  In  this  sense  one  may  say  that 
the  book  contains  a  new  program  for  psychophysical  investigation, 
and  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  majority  of  workers  in  this  field 
will  welcome  this  new  definition  of  psychophysics.  The  next  obser- 
vation refers  to  Wirth's  treatment  of  the  so-called  psychophysical 
methods.  He  recognizes  one  genuine  psychophysical  method  only, 
namely,  the  one  based  on  the  notion  of  the  psychometric  functions, 
the  theory  of  which  he  himself  has  cultivated  with  great  success. 
The  old  methods  of  psychophysical  measurement  are  mentioned  on 


214  F-  M-  URBAN 

account  of  their  historical  interest  and  because  they  frequently  enable 
one  to  find  a  rough  and  ready  result,  the  exact  determination  of  which 
would  require  a  considerable  amount  of  work.  We  lastly  mention  as 
significant  the  fact  that  the  book  appeared  as  part  of  a  text-book  on 
the  methods  of  physiology,  thereby  procuring  to  psychophysics  the 
standing  of  a  recognized  auxiliary  science  of  physiology.1 

Wirth's  paper  (15)  contains  a  criticism  of  the  present  writer's 
treatment  of  the  method  of  just  perceptible  differences  and  of  G.  F. 
Lipp's  use  of  the  equality  judgments.  He  emphasizes  the  hypo- 
thetical nature  of  the  threshold,  and  insists  that  it  cannot  be  defined 
in  terms  of  the  result  of  the  method  of  just  perceptible  differences. 
He  furthermore  tries  to  show  that  the  result  of  the  method  of  just 
perceptible  differences  does  not  coincide  with  that  of  the  method  of 
constant  stimuli  unless  one  introduces  some  special  hypothesis  in 
regard  to  the  nature  of  the  psychometric  functions.  The  appendix 
of  the  paper  contains  an  interesting  discussion  of  one  of  the  series 
of  my  experiments  on  lifted  weights.  He  calculates  the  arithmetical 
means  of  the  limits  and  of  their  standard  deviations  in  groups  of  50 
experiments,  and  tries  to  show  that  a  definite  eifect  of  practice  can  be 
found  in  these  results.  It  would  not  seem  very  surprising  that  such 
an  influence  of  practice  should  have  taken  place,  but  it  is  doubtful 
whether  Wirth's  numbers  definitely  establish  the  existence  of  this 
factor. 

REFERENCES 

1.  BLONDEL,  A.  and  REY,  J.     Sur  la  perception  des  lumieres  breves  a  la  limite  de 

leur  portee.     C.  R.  de  I'  Academie  des  Sciences,  1911,  153,  54-56. 

2.  BROWN,  WILLIAM.      The  Essentials  of  Mental  Measurement.     Cambridge:  Uni- 

versity Press,  1911.     Pp.  154. 

3.  DESROCHE,  P.     Sur  une  interpretation  de  la  loi  de  Weber-Fechner.     C.  R.  de 

la  Societe  de  Biologie,  1911,  70,  571-572. 

4.  DODGE,  R.    The  Theory  and  Limitations  of  Introspection.     Amer.  J.  of  PsychoL, 

1912,  23,  214-229. 

5.  HENRY,  CHARLES.     Sensation  et  energie.     Paris,  1911.     Pp.  296. 

6.  JACOBSON,  E.     Experiments  on  the  Inhibition  of  Sensations.     PSYCHOL.  REV., 

1911,  18,  24-53. 

7.  LASAREFF,  P.     Studien  xiber  das  Weber-Fechner'sche  Gesetz.      Arch.  f.  d.  ges. 

Physiol.  (Pfliiger),  1911,  142,  235-240. 

8.  REIMER,  W.     Der  Intensitatsbegriff  in  der  Psychologic.      Vjsck.  f.  wiss.   Phil, 

1911,  35,  277-339- 

9.  S AFFORD,  F.  H.     Precision  of  Measurement  Applied  to  Psychometric  Functions. 

Amer.  J.  of  Psychol.,  1911,  22,  94-98. 

IO.  URBAN,  F.  M.     Eine  Bemerkung  iiber  die  Methode  der  ebenmerklichen  Unter- 
schiede.     Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  Psychol.,  1911,  20,  45-51. 

1  See  special  review  on  p.  245,  below. 


TESTS  215 

11.  URBAN,  F.  M.    A  Reply  to  Professor  Safford.     Amer.  J.'of  Psychol.,  1911,  22, 

298-303. 

12.  URBAN,    F.   M.    Ueber   den   Begriff   der   mathematischen   Wahrscheinlichkeit. 

Fjsch.f.  wiss.  Phil.,  1911,  35,  1-49;  145-185. 

13.  WILLIS,  C.  A.  and  URBAN,  F.  M.     Ein  Beitrag  zur  Kenntnis  der  psychometrischen 

Funktionen  im  Gebiete  der  Gewichtsempfindungen.     Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  Psychol., 
1911,  22,  40-46. 

14.  WIRTH,  W.     Psychophysik.     Darstellung  der  Methoden  der  experimented  Psy- 

chologic.    Leipzig,  1912.     Pp.  522. 

15.  WIRTH,  W.     Zur  erkenntnistheoretischen  und  mathematischen  Begrundung  der 

Massmethoden  fur  die  Unterschiedsschwelle.     Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  Psychol.,  1911, 
20,  52-100. 

TESTS 

BY  DR.  FRANK  N.  FREEMAN 

The  University  of  Chicago 

The  field  of  tests  has  broadened  out  so  that  it  now  includes  several 
types  of  investigation  which  do  not  in  all  cases  closely  resemble  one 
another.  The  first  group  of  investigations  which  may  be  regarded 
as  being  included  in  this  topic  deal  with  the  development  of  methods 
of  [testing  single  mental  processes.  The  purpose  of  these  investi- 
gations is  to  determine  the  best  method  of  procedure  to  be  followed. 
There  have  thus  far  been  published  under  the  direction  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Tests  of  the  American  Psychological  Association  reports 
by  Angell  (2)  upon  Mental  Imagery;  by  Pillsbury  (29)  on  Tests  of 
the  Intensity  of  Sound;  by  Seashore  (31)  on  Pitch  Discrimination; 
by  Woodworth  and  Wells  (42)  on  Association;  and  by  Yerkes  and 
Watson  (43)  on  Vision  in  Animals. 

Angell  describes  the  methods  which  have  been  used  to  test 
imagery,  classifying  them  into  objective  and  subjective  methods. 
The  objective  methods  in  general,  which  exclude  introspection,  are 
held  to  be  unreliable  as  methods  of  determining  the  type  of  mental 
imagery.  The  author  chooses  the  tests  which  he  has  found  to  be 
most  reliable  and  forms  two  series,  adding  suggestions  regarding 
the  grading  of  the  results.  Pillsbury  criticises  in  detail  the  methods 
for  testing  intensity  of  sound,  and  selects  the  telephone  as  the  one 
to  be  most  highly  recommended  from  the  point  of  view  of  accuracy, 
but  recommends  the  tuning  fork  from  the  point  of  view  of  conven- 
ience. Seashore  not  only  recommends  the  most  reliable  apparatus 
for  testing  pitch  discrimination,  but  also  goes  into  some  detail  in 
giving  directions  for  the  conduct  of  the  tests  and  interpretation  of  the 
results,  and  discusses  their  practical  application.  Woodworth  and 


216  FRANK  N.  FREEM4N 

Wells  have  made  an  elaborate  study  of  methods  of  testing 
association,  for  the  purpose  not  so  much  of  comparing  the  various 
methods  which  are  in  use  as  of  working  out  a  standard  method  of  each 
type  of  testing,  and  of  describing  the  methods  in  sufficient  detail  so 
that  they  may  be  followed  by  other  investigators.  Yerkes  and 
Watson  give  a  very  detailed  description  of  the  methods  and 
apparatus  which  are  used  for  testing  the  light  and  color  vision, 
and  the  size,  form,  and  distance  perception  in  animals,  and  recommend 
the  most  reliable  forms.  A  short  article  by  Kirkpatrick  (20)  consists 
mainly  in  the  criticism  of  the  Betts  test  for  the  vividness  of  imagery. 
The  study  of  Whitley  (40)  was  undertaken  for  the  purpose  of  investi- 
gating the  reliability  of  certain  of  the  Columbia  tests  of  simple  mental 
processes,  and  other  tests  which  are  added  to  these.  As  a  result 
of  the  investigation,  certain  of  the  tests  were  found  to  be  more 
reliable  than  others  and  were  selected  for  recommendation.  The 
investigation  concludes  with  a  study  of  the  practice  curve. 

The  second  group  of  tests  to  be  considered  deals  with  single 
mental  processes  or  groups  of  the  mental  processes  for  the  purpose  of 
determining  their  value  as  a  means  of  diagnosis.  The  diagnosis 
may  be  of  general  capacity  or  general  ability  or  of  mental  derange- 
ment or  retardation,  or  of  some  special  condition  such  as  fatigue. 

Healy  and  Fernald  (17)  have  collected  a  series  of  tests  which 
they  have  found  useful  in  diagnosing  the  mental  capacity  of  children 
in  the  Juvenile  Court.  The  same  tests  are  applied  to  the  children  of 
all  ages,  and  are  for  the  purpose  not  of  rating  the  children  quantita- 
tively, but  of  classifying  them  into  one  of  a  number  of  groups,  such  as 
superior  mental  ability,  average  mental  ability,  dull,  etc.  The  aim 
in  choosing  the  tests  was  so  far  as  possible  to  bring  out  the  capacity 
of  the  child  for  dealing  with  practical  situations  of  life  rather  than 
for  meeting  the  demand  of  the  school  room. 

Another  group  of  tests  has  been  tried  out  by  Abelson  (i)  upon  a 
group  of  backward  children,  of  a  mean  age  of  n.  The  tests  dealt 
partly  with  simple  motor  or  perceptual  processes  and  partly  with 
higher  mental  processes.  The  author  found  that  the  tests  on  the 
whole  correlated  well  with  the  teacher's  estimates,  but  that  a  single 
test  taken  alone  was  not  reliable.  The  tests  of  higher  mental 
processes  did  not  seem  to  be  better  than  the  tests  of  the  simpler 
processes. 

Descoeudres  (n)  investigated  various  tests  upon  a  very  small 
group  of  fourteen  backward  children.  The  main  purpose  was  to 
compare  the  reliability  of  the  different  tests  used,  and  this  was  done 


TESTS  217 

by  finding  the  correlation  between  the  rank  of  the  children  in  each 
individual  test,  and  in  the  average  of  all  the  tests  together.  The 
author  concluded  that  tests  of  reasoning  were  the  best,  tests  of 
imagination  next,  and  tests  of  attention  and  memory  of  the  least 
value. 

In  order  to  determine  whether  certain  criticisms  which  have 
been  made  of  the  value  of  the  teacher's  estimate  are  well  founded, 
Gilby  (15)  and  Waite  (38)  compared  the  order  in  which  school 
children  are  placed  in  the  estimate  of  the  teacher,  and  the  order  in 
which  they  are  placed  by  their  grades  on  examination  or  in  their  class 
work.  On  the  basis  of  the  correlation  which  was  found  between  these 
two  methods  of  ranking,  both  investigators  concluded  that  the 
teacher's  estimate  of  the  children  was  as  reliable  as  their  school 
grades.  A  comparison  of  the  results  of  testing  memory,  and  the 
ability  to  apprehend  abstract  relations  by  giving  opposites  to  such 
words  as  "but"  and  "although"  with  the  rank  in  class  in  logic  and 
psychology  was  made  by  Marvin  (24).  The  author  found  that 
there  was  a  correlation  between  the  standing  in  class  and  in  the 
tests,  and  that  the  correlation  between  memory  and  psychology  was 
somewhat  closer  than  that  between  memory  and  logic. 

Immediate  memory  was  used  as  a  test  of  fatigue  in  school  children 
by  Winch  (41).  He  investigated  the  relative  improvement  in  mechan- 
ical memory  which  was  made  by  a  group  of  children  who  were  tested 
in  the  morning,  and  a  parallel  group  tested  in  the  afternoon.  The 
average  difference  was  found  to  be  small,  amounting  to  2  per  cent, 
in  one  case  and  to  5  per  cent,  in  the  other.  The  result  may  be  inter- 
preted as  indicating  either  that  immediate  memory  is  not  a  good 
test  for  fatigue,  or  that  there  was  not  much  fatigue  present  in  the 
case  of  these  children. 

The  use  of  Kraepelin's  reckoning  test  in  psychiatry  is  recom- 
mended in  the  article  by  Maloney  (22).  The  author  describes  the 
test  and  the  manner  in  which  it  may  be  used  for  the  purpose  of 
diagnosing  mental  derangement. 

The  same  general  purpose  which  underlies  the  tests  of  the  pre- 
ceding group  underlies  also  another  group  of  tests,  which  are  arranged 
in  series  of  ascending  difficulty.  The  series  may  contain  tests  which 
correspond  to  the  different  ages  as  do  the  Binet  tests,  or  may  merely 
be  arranged  in  groups  as  are  the  De  Sanctis  tests. 

The  Binet  tests  have  received  much  attention  during  the  past 
year,  and  have  been  subjected  to  many  experiments.  These  experi- 
ments have  been  described  for  the  most  part  in  the  article  by  Huey 


2i8  FRANK  N.  FREEMAN 

(19).  It  will  not  be  worth  while  to  duplicate  either  his  reviews  or  his 
bibliography.  The  reader  is  therefore  referred  to  Huey's  article  for 
the  literature  upon  the  Binet  tests.  A  few  articles  that  Huey  has 
not  referred  to  may  be  mentioned. 

Descoeudres  (12)  has  attempted  to  determine  how  accurately  the 
Binet  scale  distinguishes  bright  from  dull  pupils,  and  how  uniform 
it  is  throughout  its  range.  The  1908  series  was  used.  The  tests  were 
applied  to  two  bright  and  two  dull  pupils  (each  pair  consisting  of  a 
boy  and  a  girl)  from  each  of  six  classes,  the  ages  ranging  from  7^  to 
13  years.  The  author  found  that  of  all  the  correct  responses  which 
were  made  the  bright  pupils  made  57  per  cent,  and  the  dull  pupils 
43  per  cent.  Some  of  the  tests,  however,  distinguished  the  bright 
from  the  dull  pupils  much  better  than  others.  The  author  agrees 
with  the  other  investigators  who  have  used  the  Binet  scale,  that  the 
tests  for  the  early  vears  are  too  easy,  and  the  tests  for  the  later  years 
too  difficult.  Gilford  and  Goddard  (14)  used  the  Binet  scale  in  the 
examination  of  defective  children  in  the  Juvenile  Court,  and  found 
more  or  less  mental  retardation  in  every  case  but  one  out  of  100 
children.  Hill  and  Goddard  (18)  tested  fifty  delinquent  girls  by  means 
of  the  Binet  scale  and  concluded  that  all  but  four  were  mentally 
defective.  McDonald  (21)  says  in  a  communication  that  he  regards 
the  Binet  scale  as  of  value  in  testing  senile  dementia,  paresis  and 
moral  imbecility. 

An  article  by  De  Sanctis  (10)  discusses  the  theoretical  basis  for 
test  series  and  reproduces  his  own  scale,  which  has  been  described 
elsewhere  by  Goddard  and  Whipple.  De  Sanctis  distinguishes  two 
levels  of  mental  processes,  the  level  of  lower  and  higher  ideation. 
Development  proceeds  from  one  level  of  intelligence  to  another,  and 
hence  series  of  tests  may  be  devised  to  determine  the  level  of  experi- 
ence or  the  maturity  of  individuals.  De  Sanctis  does  not  accept  the 
hypothesis,  however,  that  intellectual  defect  in  defective  children 
and  dements  corresponds  "to  the  degrees  of  intellectual  development 
in  the  ages  of  growth." 

An  entirely  different  type  of  test  has  to  do  with  accomplishment 
rather  than  with  native  ability,  and  seeks  to  measure  the  result  of 
educational  effort.  One  form  of  test  of  this  sort  consists  in  standard- 
ized tests  in  particular  school  subjects.  Pearson  (28)  describes  a 
method  by  which  the  results  of  work  in  spelling  may  be  scientifically 
tested.  His  method,  however,  is  not  standardized  in  the  sense  that 
the  results  found  by  different  investigators  may  be  compared. 
Courtis  (9)  describes  briefly  his  elaborately  standardized  tests  in 


TESTS  219 

arithmetic  and  discusses  the  need  of  such  tests  for  purposes  of  com- 
parison and  of  guidance  in  teaching.  Courtis  (8)  gives  in  another 
article  illustrations  of  tests  in  writing,  arithmetic,  spelling,  history 
and  English  in  order  to  show  the  value  and  possibility  of  standardized 
tests.  Bliss  (6)  describes  a  method,  which  he  has  used  for  some 
years,  of  testing  deficiency  in  English  teaching  by  means  of  the 
"reproduction  story."  A  story,  according  to  this  method,  is  read 
to  the  pupils,  which  they  are  then  required  to  reproduce.  Though 
not  permitting  of  strictly  comparable  results  on  account  of  the  lack 
of  a  standardized  method  of  grading,  the  author  believes  the  test  to 
be  of  value  as  an  aid  in  supervision. 

Thorndike  (35,  36)  describes  the  method  of  construction  of  a 
scale  which  is  intended  to  serve  as  a  means  for  grading  in  English 
composition.  The  purpose  is  to  make  comparable  grading  of  compo- 
sitions by  different  persons  and  in  different  places,  and  to  enable  the 
investigator  to  determine  not  merely  the  relative  rank  of  different 
specimens,  but  also  the  amount  of  difference  in  excellence  between 
them. 

Ayers  (3)  describes  the  derivation  of  a  scale  for  the  measurement 
of  the  legibility  of  handwriting  and  submits  the  scale  which  was 
constructed  on  a  basis  of  the  investigation.  The  scale  was  con- 
structed upon  the  basis  of  the  time  taken  by  ten  investigators  to 
read  a  large  number  of  samples  of  writing  of  school  children.  Free- 
man (13)  describes  the  procedure  by  which  the  teacher  or  supervisor 
may  test  the  legibility  and  speed  of  writing  in  order  to  obtain  stand- 
ardized results. 

School  and  college  grades  may  also  be  regarded  as  tests.  Smith 
(32)  and  Steele  (33)  urge  the  adoption  of  systems  of  grading  which 
are  based  upon  the  normal  distribution  of  traits.  Steele  suggests 
that  teachers  be  led  to  see  the  importance  of  a  rational  system  by  a 
demonstration  of  the  lack  of  uniformity  in  their  own  marking,  and 
gives  an  illustration  of  the  means  by  which  this  may  be  done. 

Strayer  (34),  Ayers  (4),  and  Thorndike  (37)  discuss  in  general 
the  importance  of  quantitative  measurements  of  the  results  of 
educational  effort.  Gulick  (16)  discusses  the  same  topic  in  relation 
to  school  hygiene. 

Another  purpose  for  which  tests  are  employed  is  the  characteri- 
zation of  an  individual  in  order  to  determine  his  relationship  to  other 
individuals  or  to  a  norm  in  respect  to  his  general  mental  type.  Margis 
(23)  describes  various  more  or  less  unsatisfactory  methods  by  which 
this  determination  may  be  made — the  intuitive-descriptive  method, 


220  FRANK  N.  FREEMAN 

the  classification  method,  etc., — and  describes  in  some  detail  the 
analytic  method  as  advocated  by  Stern  and  employed  in  the  Institut 
fur  Angewandte  Psychologic  and  Psychologische  Sammelforschung. 
This  method  consists  of  a  thorough  investigation  of  the  individual 
by  means  of  a  carefully  worked  out  questionnaire. 

Miinsterberg  (26)  discusses  with  some  illustrations  the  use  of  tests 
in  vocational  guidance,  and  Seashore  (30)  describes  an  elaborate 
method  for  determining  the  qualification  for  singing  possessed  by  an 
individual. 

The  theoretical  principles  which  underlie  mental  tests  are  dis- 
cussed by  Betz  (5)  and  Brown  (7).  Both  of  these  authors  treat  at 
some  length  the  mathematical  principles  by  which  correlation  may 
be  determined  and  give  particular  attention  to  the  work  of  Galton, 
Pearson  and  Spearman  in  this  connection.  They  also  discuss  criti- 
cally the  investigations  which  have  been  carried  on  and  the  methods 
which  are  employed.  Betz  concludes  that  it  is  futile  to  attempt  to 
determine  general  intelligence,  but  holds  that  the  mental  processes 
are  more  specialized  than  such  a  concept  would  assume.  Brown 
concludes  by  describing  the  results  of  his  investigations  into  the 
correlation  of  various  mental  processes.  He  concludes  that  certain 
tests,  as  that  of  Ebbinghaus,  correlate  better  with  general  intelligence 
than  others,  but  that  there  is  much  less  correlation  between  processes 
which  we  regard  as  similar  than  we  should  expect. 

Weiss  (39)  suggests  a  new  method  of  ranking  individuals  by 
comparing  the  performance  of  the  various  members  of  a  group  with 
the  average  performance  of  the  group.  The  method  in  short  is  to 
determine  the  deviation  of  a  particular  individual  from  the  mean  of 
the  group  to  which  he  belongs. 

Myers  (27)  in  a  critical  article  points  out  the  dangers  of  the 
unsuccessful  use  of  mental  tests,  or  of  hasty  and  ill-advised  con- 
clusions drawn  from  their  interpretation. 

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Psychol.  u.  exper.  Pad.,  1912,  13,  I. 

27.  MYERS,  C.  S.    The  Pitfalls  of  "Mental  Tests."     Brit.  Med.  J.,  1911,  i,  195-197. 

28.  PEARSON,  H.  C.    The  Scientific  Study  of  the  Teaching  of  Spelling.    /.  of  Educ. 

Psychol.,  1911,  2,  241. 

29.  PILLSBURY,  W.  B.    Methods  for  the  Determination  of  the  Intensity  of  Sound. 

PSYCHOL.  MONOG.,  1910,  13  (53),  1-20. 

30.  SEASHORE,  C.  E.    The  Measure  of  a  Singer.     Science,  1912,  35,  201. 

31.  SEASHORE,  C.  E.    The  Measurement  of  Pitch  Determinajtion.     PSYCHOL.  MONOG., 

1910,  13  (53),  21-60. 


222  JAMES  BURT  MINER 

32.  SMITH,  A.  G.    A  Rational  College  Marking  System.    /.  of  Educ.  Psychol.,  1911, 

a,  383-393- 

33.  STEELE,  A.  G.     Training  Teachers  to  Grade.     Fed.  Sem.,  1911,  18,  523-532- 

34.  STRAYER,  G.  C.     Measuring  Results  in  Education.     /.  of  Educ.  Psychol.,  191 1,  2,  3. 

35.  THORNDIKE,  E.  L.     A  Scale  for  Merit  in  English  Writing  by  Young  People.     /.  of 

Educ.  Psychol.,  1911,  2,  361-368. 

36.  THORNDIKE,  E.  L.    A  Method  for  Grading  Excellence  in  Composition.     Science, 

191 I,  33,  935-938. 

37.  THORNDIKE,  E.  L.    The  Measurement  of  Educational  Products.     School  Review, 

1912,  20,  289. 

38.  WAITE,  H.     Estimation  of  the  General  Intelligence  of  School  Children.     Bio- 

metrika,  1911,  8,  79-93. 

39.  WEISS,  A.  P.     On  Methods  of  Mental  Measurements,  Especially  in  School  and 

College.     /.  of  Educ.  Psychol.,  1911,  2,  555~563- 

40.  WHITLEY,  M.  J.     An  Empirical  Study  of  Certain  Tests  for  Individual  Differences. 

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42.  WOODWORTH,  R.  S.  and  WELLS,  F.  L.     Association  Tests.     PSYCHOL.  MONOG., 

1911,  13  (57)-    Pp-  85- 

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Behavior  Monographs,  1911,  i,  No.  2.     Pp.  90. 


CORRELATION 

BY  PROFESSOR  JAMES  BURT  MINER 

The  University  of  Minnesota 

The  publication  during  1911-12  of  many  important  papers  on 
correlation,  its  interpretation,  methods  and  applications,  affords  an 
unusual  opportunity  to  introduce  a  general  review  on  this  topic. 
Contributions  by  Pearson,  Hart  and  Spearman,  and  Winch,  if  they 
stand  the  test  of  criticism,  will  remain  fundamental  in  this  field. 
Betz  with  his  monograph  Uber  Korrelation  (4)  publishes  a  bibli- 
ography of  1 02  titles,  most  of  which  are  dated  within  the  last  ten  years. 
He  presents  a  complete  and  critical  treatment  of  the  subject,  devoting 
chapters  to  the  methods  for  determining  correlation,  the  correlation 
investigations  of  psychological  problems,  the  recent  publications  of 
the  Galton  Eugenics  Laboratory  and  the  correlation  work  done  upon 
ability  in  mathematics.  In  the  chapter  on  methods,  besides  explain- 
ing Pearson's  fundamental  product-moment  formula  he  gives  Shep- 
pard's  formula  for  correction  of  cr  if  the  distribution  is  not  symmetrical. 
He  also  devotes  sections  to  non-linear  correlations,  the  probable 
errors  of  the  coefficients,  correlations  by  rank,  the  four-fold  method, 


CORRELATION  223 

multiple  correlation,  Spearman's  correction  formulae,  and  spurious 
correlation,  giving  briefly  the  standard  treatments  of  each  of  these 
topics.  The  criticism  of  Spearman's  correction  formula  by  Pearson 
and  Brown  is  reviewed  and  approved.  It  is  contended  that  the  as- 
sumption that  the  errors  of  observation  in  the  different  series  are  not 
correlated  does  not  hold  in  specific  cases,  Brown  claiming  .66  corre- 
lation in  one  case.  It  should  not  be  expected  to  hold  under  the 
usual  experimental  conditions.  This  difficulty  is  not  avoided  in 
Spearman's  modification  of  his  formula.  Furthermore  Betz  believes 
that  it  is  not  clear  whether  Spearman  would  not  eliminate  gross  true 
fluctuations  of  activity  along  with  slight  chance  errors  of  observation. 
The  high  coefficients  in  sensory  discrimination  obtained  by  Spear- 
man are  more  likely  to  show  the  ease  in  which  the  different  children 
followed  the  instructions.  The  evidence  of  a  central  factor  is  not 
convincing.  The  "hierarchical"  ordering  of  abilities  might  be 
produced  by  a  general  cause  of  error.  The  evidence  at  present  is 
against  a  general  pronounced,  easily  apparent  intelligence.  Were 
it  not  for  our  prejudice,  we  should  be  surprised  that  the  correlations 
of  intellectual  activities  are  so  high  rather  than  that  they  are  not 
higher. 

The  eugenics  researches  are  most  important  indirectly  to  psy- 
chology in  forming  a  general  point  of  view  because  they  show  that 
factors  like  alcohol  and  housing  which  were  thought  to  be  of  enormous 
importance  are  found  to  be  of  minimal  effect.  This  is  at  present 
determined  for  only  a  few  characteristics  but  it  is  very  conceivable 
that  it  holds  generally. 

In  conclusion  Betz  emphasizes  that  correlation  alone  does  not 
demonstrate  a  functional  connection.  Moreover,  if  changing  one 
variable  necessarily  changes  the  second  it  is  not  shown  that  the 
converse  is  true;  not  all  functional  connections  are  reversible.  An 
inventory  of  correlations  cannot  disclose  psychological  secrets  unless 
supplemented  by  an  understanding  of  mental  facts.  Correlations 
serve  two  purposes  in  psychology:  (i)  mass-studies,  in  which  traits 
are  described  in  popular  terms,  to  aid  in  the  educational  or  social 
description  of  groups;  (2)  the  discovery  of  functional  connections 
by  using  the  greatest  care  in  analysis  and  experiment  with  small 
groups.  In  another  brief  paper  (5)  Betz  shows  with  actual  examples 
how  to  prepare  a  correlation  table,  compute  the  product-moment 
coefficient,  the  correlation  ratio  and  test  for  linearity. 

Pearson  (20)  grasps  and  sets  forth  correlation  and  contingency 
in  their  ultimate  significance.  His  wider  outlook  regards  the  universe 


224  JAMES  BURT  MINER 

as  "a  complex  of  contingent,  not  causally  linked  phenomena."  "The 
aim  of  science  ceases  to  be  the  discovery  of  'cause'  and  'effect';  in 
order  to  predict  future  experience  it  seeks  out  the  phenomena  which 
are  most  highly  correlated.  .  .  .  From  this  standpoint  it  finds  no 
distinction  in  kind  but  only  in  degree  between  the  data,  method  of 
treatment,  or  the  resulting  'laws'  of  chemical,  physical,  biological, 
or  sociological  investigations.  .  .  .  No  phenomena  are  causal; 
all  phenomena  are  contingent,  and  the  problem  before  us  is  to  measure 
the  degree  of  this  contingency,  which  we  have  seen  lies  between  the 
zero  of  independence  and  the  unity  of  causation."  Pearson  is  to  be 
thanked  for  clearly  showing  how  easy  it  is  and  how  useful  to  science 
to  conceive  causation  as  a  specific  limited  form  of  contingency. 
For  understanding  the  assumptions  underlying  the  correlation  ratio 
and  the  coefficient  of  contingency  this  new  chapter  is  the  clearest 
brief  statement  t;o  be  found  anywhere.  Students  of  correlation  will 
undoubtedly  get  much  joy  out  of  the  statement  of  this  leader 
that  a  contingency  table  is  "the  numerical  syllogism  of  observational 
science,  which  replaces  for  all  its  purposes  the  barren  syllogism  of  the 
old  Aristotelian  logic.  We  do  not  say,  'Some  B  is  A*  but  we  state 
numerically  how  much  of  each  class  of  B  is  associated  with  each  cate- 
gory of  A."  Pearson  promises  that  much  is  to  be  added  to  the 
chapters  on  living  forms  when  these  appear  in  Part  II.  of  the  new 
edition. 

Pearson  (21)  derives  a  formula  for  determining  whether  small 
values  of  the  correlation  ratio  are  significant.  He  also  contributes 
further  (22)  to  the  discussion  of  the  Law  of  Ancestral  Heredity 
and  reiterates  his  former  conclusions  that  "the  theory  of  multiple 
correlation  is  the  natural  manner  in  which  to  approach  the  theory  of 
ancestral  inheritance."  "The  fact  that  Mendelian  gametic  corre- 
lations approach  in  some  respects  those  found  by  observation  on 
populations,  is  not  a  justification  of  Mendelism." 

An  astonishing  paper  on  the  interpretation  of  psychological  corre- 
lations, if  we  may  accept  its  basic  presupposition,  is  that  which  has 
appeared  very  recently  under  the  joint  authorship  of  Spearman  and 
Hart  (15).  The  article  claims  to  demonstrate  conclusively  by  means 
of  a  correlation  criterion  which  they  propose  as  crucial  that  "corre- 
lation arises  through  performances,  however  different,  depending 
partly  on  a  'General  Common  Factor.'"  They  offer  also  a  new 
interpretation  of  this  source  of  correlation  which  in  one  form  or 
another  has  been  the  favorite  explanation  of  Spearman  for  some  time. 
This  view,  called  "unifocal,"  they  contrast  with  the  "non-focal" 


CORRELATION  225 

view  of  universal  independence  of  mental  processes  drawn  from 
Thorndike's  earlier  writings,  and  Thorndike's  later  view  of  levels 
as  well  as  those  other  "multifocal"  interpretations  which  attribute 
correlation  to  correspondence  of  type  or  faculty.  "Every  perform- 
ance depends,  not  only  on  this  General  Factor,  but  also  in  varying 
degree  on  a  factor  specific  to  itself  and  all  very  similar  performances." 
The  General  Factor  is  not  any  special  sort  of  process,  such  as  "intelli- 
gence" or  "synthetic  power,"  nor  is  it  to  be  identified  with  attention. 
It  is  "some  common  fund  of  energy,"  characterized  on  the  mental 
side  as  "intellective  energy."  On  the  physiological  side  every 
intellectual  act  involves  "both  the  specific  activity  of  a  particular 
system  of  cortical  neurons,  and  also  the  general  energy  of  the  whole 
cortex."  Every  such  performance,  therefore,  inhibits  quite  different 
simultaneous  ones,  any  kind  of  non-mechanical  process  competes  for 
this  fund  of  energy.  As  evidence  of  this  conception  the  authors  point 
to  "the  larger  correlations  usually  produced  by  the  operations 
demanding  attention,  the  reduction  of  correlation  as  the  performances 
tend  to  become  mechanical,  and  the  large  correlations  shown  by  even 
the  simplest  performances  of  the  mentally  defective."  The  recent 
"surprising  regeneration  of  *  mental  tests'"  they  attribute  to  "both 
their  purpose  and  method  having  been  transformed  in  accordance  with 
the  theory  of  a  General  Factor." 

The  proposed  correlation  criterion  which  the  authors  suggest  as 
the  conclusive  mathematical  test  of  their  "unifocal"  theory  is  too 
complex  to  set  forth  here.  The  authors  believe  that  it  is  decidedly 
better  than  the  "hierarchy"  of  coefficients  heretofore  used.  Apply- 
ing this  criterion  to  the  results  of  fourteen  different  series  of  corre- 
lation experiments  by  men  of  all  the  different  faiths,  they  find  the 
surprising  result  that  in  every  case  the  correlations  are  +.73  or  over 
and  the  median  almost  complete  +  1.00,  the  value  demanded  by  their 
theory  and  as  far  as  possible  from  the  values  of  o  and  —  i.oo  which 
they  contend  is  demanded  by  the  other  theories.  They  also  use  their 
criterion  to  controvert  Brown's  criticism  of  their  "hierarchical" 
arrangements  of  coefficients.  The  paper  disclaims  any  opposition 
to  Thorndike's  work  on  specific  abilities,  the  correlations  of  which 
may  be  superposed  upon  correlations  of  a  more  general  character. 
"Still  less  is  it  in  opposition  to  his  work  on  'formal  training.'  .  .  . 
Variation  of  training,  within  normal  limits,  appears  to  have  no 
appreciable  influence  on  the  General  Factor,  but  only  on  the  specific 
ones."  Spearman  (24)  presents  a  new  form  of  his  correction  formula 
for  eliminating  chance  errors  of  observation,  which  had  been  published 


226  JAMES  BURT  MINER 

also  in  the  Brit.  ].  of  PsychoL,  1910,  3,  271-295.  It  is  based  on 
dividing  the  measurements  of  each  individual  into  two  or  more  groups 
in  such  a  way  that  the  average  of  each  group  may  be  considered  alike 
except  for  these  chance  observational  variations.  Spearman  (25) 
also  replies  to  the  criticism  of  Brown  and  Betz  concerning  his  former 
correction  formulae.  He  contends  that  only  computation  can  deter- 
mine how  far  chance  errors  are  to  be  guarded  against.  The  careful 
arrangement  of  the  research,  which  his  critics  advise,  is  insufficient. 
Brown's  mathematical  and  empirical  criticisms,  he  claims,  are  both 
faulty.  Betz  (6)  answers  this  reply  of  Spearman  and  remains  un- 
convinced about  the  usefulness  to  psychology  of  Spearman's  formulae 
for  eliminating  accidental  errors. 

Abelson's  research  (i),  carried  out  under  the  direction  of  Spear- 
man, afforded  part  of  the  data  on  which  the  interpretation  of  the 
General  Factor  was  based.  Nine  specially  devised  tests  were  tried 
on  88  girls  and  43  boys  from  London  schools  for  defectives,  10-12 
of  each  sex  of  the  highest  grade  pupils  in  each  of  eight  schools.  The 
coefficients  were  computed  by  Spearman's  "foot-rule"  method  for 
the  boys  and  girls  separately  in  each  school  and  then  averaged. 
The  tests  were  repeated  two  or  more  times  until  a  reliability  of  .70 
or  more  was  reached.  Tables  give  the  intercorrelations  of  each  test 
with  the  others  and  with  the  average  of  the  others.  Corrections  for 
differences  in  age  and  for  chance  errors  he  has  calculated  in  part  and 
estimates  that  they  will  not  affect  his  conclusions.  The  tests  may  be 
regarded  "as  almost  independent  and  about  equally  accurate  measure- 
ments of  *  general  ability.'"  On  this  assumption  Spearman  devised 
formulae  for  estimating  how  much  any  number  of  tests  pooled  together 
will  differ  from  the  result  of  an  infinite  number  of  tests  pooled. 
Pooling  tests  very  greatly  increases  their  trustworthiness  in  estimating 
"general  ability."  The  correlation  between  all  the  tests  pooled 
together  and  estimates  of  "practical  intelligence"  was  .60  for  the 
girls  and  .56  for  the  boys. 

In  a  paper  outlined  before  the  joint  meeting  of  the  British  Psycho- 
logical Society,  the  Mind  Association,  and  the  Aristotelian  Society, 
Winch  (29)  with  hesitation  sets  forth  a  "modified  faculty  doctrine," 
which  is  based  mainly  on  determining  the  functions  thus  to  be 
regarded  as  associated  by  discovering  their  correlations  and  measuring 
the  transfer  of  training  under  improved  methods.  He  emphasizes 
especially  his  method  of  "steadying"  a  group  by  repeating  the  tests 
until  succeeding  tests  correlate  highly.  This  should  be  done  before 
one  kind  of  test  is  correlated  with  another.  It  is  to  be  remembered, 


CORRELATION  227 

however,  that  "high  correlation  sets  us  a  problem  of  connection.  It 
does  not  ipso  facto  enable  us  to  conclude  that  a  relation  of  inter- 
dependence exists."  Low  correlation  between  traits  measured  for 
groups  of  individuals  may  even  go  with  functional  connection  of  the 
two  traits  in  the  same  individual.  "Brown's  capacity  may  be  big 
in  one  direction  and  small  in  another  as  compared  with  that  of  Smith  and 
Robinson,  but  an  alteration  in  one  of  his  functions  may  produce 
some  alteration  in  the  other.  To  find  the  connection  of  functions 
within  the  same  mind,  would  it  not  be  best  to  get  a  number  of 
measures  for  the  same  individual  and  correlate  these?"  In  deter- 
mining whether  training  of  one  function  transfers,  we  should  use  his 
method  of  "equal  groups,"  chosen  after  "steadying."  "The  mental 
functions  thus  connected  will,  I  believe,  give  'groupings'  or  'faculties' 
rather  unlike  those  of  early  psychology."  In  order  to  justify  formal 
training  "we  should  need  to  show  that,  by  the  formal  training  of 
function  a  we  can  produce  a  transferred  improvement  in  function  /3 
which  we  could  not,  with  equal  work,  produce  by  training  function 
/3  itself,"  or  that  "that  function  may  not  be  accessible  to  direct 
attack." 

Woodworth  (30)  introduces  a  new  quick  method  of  computing  r 
which  he  believes  is  "worthy  to  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  best  ab- 
ridged or  'foot-rule'  methods."  He  also  develops  simplified  formulae 
for  computing  r,  the  average  correlation  within  any  number  of  tests, 
and  for  the  Spearman  correction  for  attenuation,  when  the  original 
measurements  have  been  reduced  to  terms  of  the  standard  or  the 
average  deviation.  He  advocates  this  method  of  reduction  whenever 
several  tests  on  the  same  individuals  are  either  to  be  combined  or 
correlated.  It  is  the  only  way  to  preserve  the  refinement  of  the 
original  measurements.  The  reduction  of  the  measurements  also 
allows  one  to  show  the  success  of  each  individual  in  relation  to  the 
tests  taken  as  a  whole.  With  nine  tests  for  logical  relationships 
applied  to  thirteen  individuals,  he  finds  that  those  who  ranked  high 
were  more  consistent  than  those  who  ranked  low.  The  Pearson 
coefficient  between  standing  and  consistence  was  .72.  He  suggests 
that  the  standard  variability  of  the  average  standing  of  the  individuals 
is  a  new  measure  of  the  agreement  of  several  tests  which  has  certain 
advantages  over  the  Av.  r.  Woodworth  and  Wells  (31)  utilize  the 
method  of  correlating  the  average  standing  of  each  subject  with  his 
standing  in  each  test,  after  reducing  the  tests  to  equivalence,  and 
thus  determine  the  relative  value  of  certain  association  tests. 

Yule   (32)  gives  us  a  text-book  on  statistics  which  devotes  eight 


228  JAMES  BURT  MINER 

chapters  to  association  and  correlation  methods  and  is  adapted  to 
those  who  have  a  limited  knowledge  of  mathematics.  Written  pri- 
marily for  students  of  economics  and  vital  statistics,  it  aims  also  to 
be  of  use  to  biologists  and  others.  The  text  is  the  most  compre- 
hensive simple  treatment  of  correlation  to  be  found.  Two  of  the 
formulae  suggested  in  the  text — the  Coefficient  of  Association  and  the 
Correction  Coefficient  for  a  two-  X  two-fold  table  are  emphatically 
attacked  by  Heron  (16)  both  as  to  their  derivation  and  the  results 
obtained  by  their  use.  Stern  (26)  devotes  a  chapter  to  the  statistical 
methods  of  correlation  and  two  other  brief  chapters  to  the  concept 
of  correlation  and  the  aims  of  research  in  this  line.  Brown's  book  on 
Mental  Measurement  (8)  is  written  primarily  for  the  psychologist, 
who  will  find  it  perhaps,  the  handiest  manual  of  the  recent  correlation 
formulae.  It  follows  Pearson  closely.1 

In  two  researches  the  teacher's  estimate  of  intelligence  is  empiri- 
cally defended  from  Yule's  belief  "that  unless  they  are  very  carefully 
controlled,  the  teacher's  judgments  are  relatively  as  well  as  absolutely 
valueless."  Gilby's  study  (14)  is  authoritatively  prepared  with  the 
assistance  of  Pearson.  The  judgments  of  36  teachers  in  eight  schools 
on  1,725  boys  in  which  they  graded  intelligence  on  the  scale  of  five 
categories  defined  by  Pearson,  it  traced  in  interrelations  with  order 
in  examination,  percentage  of  marks,  age,  standard,  school,  and 
clothing,  the  latter  defined  in  five  grades.  Correlation  of  general 
intelligence  and  order  in  examination  for  constant  age  and  constant 
standard  was  .671.  The  places  in  marks  and  examination  were 
settled  by  headmasters  independently  of  the  class  teachers.  The 
correlation  between  clothing  and  intelligence  for  constant  age  and 
constant  standard  is  .22.  "There  can  we  think  be  little  doubt  that 
the  evidence  of  clothing  is  roughly  a  measure  of  home  conditions." 
There  is  very  little  relation  between  age  and  order  in  class  or  age  and 
intelligence.  The  other  research  by  Waite  (27)  presents  similar  results. 
"No  single  psychological  test  or  complex  of  tests  is  in  the  least  likely 
to  replace  our  present  method  of  judging  general  efficiency  for  public 
or  other  service."  The  correlation  between  age  and  intelligence  in  the 
same  "form"  is  either  negligible  or  negative.  In  both  papers  the 
work  is  very  carefully  done  from  the  statistical  point  of  view,  full 
correlation  tables  are  given,  various  methods  tried,  and  linearity 
estimated. 

Correlation  has  been  used  extensively  by  Whitley  (28)  as  a  method 
for  evaluating  various  tests  for  similar  functions  and  for  determining 

1See  special  review  in  this  BULLETIN,  1912,  9,  125-126. 


CORRELATION  229 

the  relationship  of  various  scores  for  tests  involving  practice.  About 
45  different  tests  were  repeated  on  from  three  to  seven  subjects  and 
occasionally  checked  by  a  larger  group.  The  tests,  grouped  around 
each  of  six  types  (association,  memory,  perception,  discrimination, 
discrimination  and  motor,  motor),  were  each  correlated  with  the 
average  records  in  that  group,  the  test  showing  the  highest  correlation 
being  regarded  as  the  best  representative  of  that  type,  although  it 
might  be  less  valuable  from  other  points  of  view.  In  the  second  part 
of  the  study  perhaps  the  most  striking  result  is  the  high  negative 
correlation  between  the  position  at  the  start  and  either  gross  or 
percentile  gain  with  practice.  Five  of  the  ten  coefficients  are  over 
—  .90.  "  Individuals  with  low  standing  can  and  do  improve  the  most, 
judging  objectively."  The  relationship  of  the  position  at  the  start 
with  the  average  of  the  whole  series  is  closer  than  between  it  and  the 
position  at  the  finish.  "  Fewer  tests  each  administered  oftener  would 
give  a  truer  estimate  of  an  individual  and  a  better  basis  for  comparison 
and  correlation."  "The  criticism  that  giving  only  a  few  trials 
measures  not  the  mental  process  supposedly  tested  but  merely 
adaptability  to  strange  conditions  such  as  apparatus,  instructions, 
working  for  speed,  and  the  particular  requirements  of  the  test  is 
seldom  of  weight." 

The  first  published  results  of  the  Anthropometric  Laboratory  at 
Oxford  (23)  include  16  physical  measurements  and  one  mental  test, 
McDougalPs  spot  pattern.  Twenty  correlations  are  given  for  the 
physical  measurements  for  each  of  the  ages  from  18  to  22,  with  95  to 
330  cases  at  the  different  ages.  The  table  is  thus  the  most  complete 
for  any  of  the  college  data  on  the  subject.  The  correlations  between 
the  possession  of  a  scholarship  or  exhibition  and  the  spot  pattern 
test  which  McDougall  thinks  measures  concentration  is  small,  .22 
on  the  average  for  all  grade  groups,  and  about  the  same  for  this  test 
and  "class  in  final  schools." 

In  a  preliminary  report  of  an  important  study  to  be  published  by 
the  Bureau  of  Education  Baldwin  (2),  as  the  result  of  successive 
measurements  on  the  same  group  of  350  boys  and  435  girls  taken  for 
periods  of  from  3  to  n^£  years  indicates  that  there  are  different 
correlations  for  growth  in  height  and  weight  for  those  above  the 
median  than  for  those  below.  Those  above  begin  and  end  their 
various  periods  of  acceleration  and  retardation  earlier.  Curves  for 
52  individuals  show  that  correlations  in  weight  do  not  follow  those 
for  height  in  detail. 

Boyce   (7)   correlates   the  estimates  of  27  superintendents   and 


230  JAMES  BURT  MINER 

principals  as  to  the  rank  of  their  high  school  teachers  in  various 
traits  bearing  on  teaching  efficiency,  and  finds  that  general  merit  had 
little  or  no  relation  to  sex,  to  general  appearance  .36,  to  instructional 
skill  .90,  to  stimulation  of  pupils  .85,  to  stimulation  of  individuals  .85. 
These  three,  with  intellectual  capacity  .71  and  discipline  .67,  are  the 
qualities  deemed  most  important.  Descoeudres  (n)  gives  corre- 
lations between  15  tests  (six  taken  from  the  Binet  series)  and  her 
estimate  of  intelligence  for  14  deficient  children  from  6  to  14  years. 
For  the  separate  tests  the  coefficients  run  from  .509  to  .878.  The 
correlation  with  the  average  rank  in  all  is  .991.  No  correction  was 
made  for  differences  in  age.  Norsworthy  (19)  finds  the  correla- 
tions of  the  rate  of  learning  German-English  word  associations  with 
immediate  memory  to  be  .41  and  with  memory  after  30  days  to  be 
.50;  between  immediate  and  this  later  memory  .60.  The  tests  were 
on, 83  college  students  and  disprove  the  theory  of  "easy  come,  easy 
go,"  at  least  for  this  group.  Lobsein  (17)  and  Erler  (12)  get  opposed 
results  on  the  problem  whether  memory  for  numbers  correlates  with 
ability  in  the  simple  arithmetical  operations.  Busemann's  and  Bell's 
aims  are  shown  in  the  title  of  their  papers  (9)  and  (3).  Lipmann's 
paper  (18)  is  a  review  of  that  field.  Cohn  and  Dieffenbacher's 
correlation  results  (10)  are  probably  affected  by  neglect  of  age 
differences  in  their  groups.  Forsyth  (13)  found  slight  correlation 
between  ages  and  grades  with  college  students. 

REFERENCES 

1.  ABELSON,  A.  R.    The  Measurement  of  Mental  Ability  of  "Backward"  Children. 

Brit.  J.  of  Psychol.,  1911,  4,  315-341. 

2.  BALDWIN,  B.  T.     Individual  Differences  in  the  Correlation  of  Physical  Growth. 

of  Elementary  and  High  School  Pupils.     /.  of  Educ.  Psychol.,  1911,  2,  150-152. 

3.  BELL,  JULIA.     On  Pulse  and  Breathing  Rates  and  their  Relation  to  Stature. 

Biometrika,  8,  232-236. 

4.  BETZ,  W.    tjber  Korrelation.     Zsch.f.  angew.  Psychol.,  1911,  5  (Beih.  3). 

5.  BETZ,  W.     Rechenbeispiele  in  Erganzung  zu  Beiheft  3,  tJber  Korrelation.     Zsch. 

f.  angew.  Psychol.,  1912,  6,  65-73. 

6.  BETZ,  W.  Erwiderung  auf  den  vorstehenden  Aufsatz  von  Spearman.     Zsch.  f. 

angew.  Psychol.,  1912,  6,  77-78. 

7.  BOYCE,  A.  C.    Qualities  of  Merit  in  Secondary  School  Teachers.    /.  of  Educ. 

Psychol,  1912,  3,  I44-I57. 

8.  BROWN,  WILLIAM.     The  Essentials  of  Mental  Measurement.     Cambridge  Univer- 

sity Press,  1911.     Pp.  vi+154. 

9.  BUSEMANN,   A.     Die  individuellen   Korrelationen  zwischen   den  Leistungen   in 

Gedachtnisexperimente  und  denen  im  Unterrichte.     Zsch.  /.  angew.  Psychol., 
1911,  5,  341-344. 
10.  COHN,  J.  and  DIEFFENBACHER,  J.    Untersuchungen  iiber  Geschlechts-,  Alters- 


CORRELATION  231 

und  Begabungs-Unterschiede  bei  Schulern.     Zsch.  f.  angew .  Psychol.,  1911,  5 
(Beih.  2).     Pp.  vi+214. 

11.  DESCOEUDRES,  ALICE.     Exploration  de  quelques   tests   d'intelligence  chez  des 

enfants  anormaux  et  arrieres.     Arch,  de  Psychol.,  1911,  xi,  351-375. 

12.  ERLER,  O.     Zahlengedachtnis  und  Rechenfertigkeit.     Zsch.  f.  pad.   Psychol.  u. 

exper.  Pad.,  1911,  12,  294-295. 

13.  FORSYTH,  C.  H.     Correlation  between  Ages  and  Grades.     /.  of  Educ.  Psychol., 

1912,  3,  164. 

14.  GILBY,  W.  H.,  with  the  assistance  of  PEARSON,  K.     On  the  Significance  of  the 

Teacher's  Appreciation  of  General  Intelligence.     Biometrika,  1911,  8,  94-108. 

15.  HART,  B.  and  SPEARMAN,  C.    General  Ability,  its  Existence  and  Nature.     Brit. 

J.  of  Psychol.,  1912,  5,  5I-84- 

1 6.  HERON,  D.    The  Danger  of  Certain  Formulae  Suggested  as  Substitutes  for  the 

Correlation  Coefficient.     Biometrika,  1911,  8,  109-122. 

17.  LOBSEIN,    M.     Korrelationen   zwischen   Zahlengedachtnis    und    Rechenleistung. 

Zsch.f.  pad.  Psychol.  u.  exper.  Pad.,  1911,  12,  54-60. 

1 8.  LIPMANN,   O.     Die   experimentelle   Untersuchung   der   Rechenfertigkeit.     Zsch. 

f.  angew.  Psychol.,  1911,  5,  3^9-399- 

19.  NORSWORTHY,  NAOMI.     Acquisition  as  Related  to  Retention.    /.  of  Educ.  Psychol., 

1912,  3,  214-218. 

20.  PEARSON,  K.     The  Grammar  of  Science,  Part  I. — Physical,  third  edition,  revised 

and  enlarged.     London:  Adam  and  Charles  Black,  1911.     Pp.  xx+394- 
2.1.  PEARSON,  K.     On  a  Correction  Needful  in  the  Case  of  the  Correlation  Ratio. 
Biometrika,  1911,  8,  254-255. 

22.  PEARSON,  K.     Further  Remarks  on  the  Law  of  Ancestral  Heredity.     Biometrika, 

1911,8,  239-243. 

23.  SCHUSTER,    E.     First   Results    from   the   Oxford    Anthropometric   Laboratory. 

Biometrika,  1911,  8,  40-51. 

24.  SPEARMAN,    C.     Eine   neue    Korrelationsformel.     Ber.   IV.    Kongress  f.   exper. 

Psychol.,  1911,  189-191. 

25.  SPEARMAN,    C.     Der    Beobachtungsfehler    in    der    Korrelationslehre.     Zsch.  /. 

angew.  Psychol.,  1912,  6,  73-77. 

26.  STERN,  W.     Die  Di/erentielle  in  ihren  methodischen  Grundlagen.     Leipzig:  J.  A. 

Barth,  1911.     Pp.  v+5<D3. 

27.  WAITE,  H.    The  Teacher's  Estimation  of  the  General  Intelligence  of  School 

Children.     Biometrika,  1911,  8,  79-93. 

28.  WHITLEY,  MARY  T.     An  Empirical  Study  of  Certain  Tests  for  Individual  Differ- 

ences.   Archives  of  Psychology,  No.  19.     New  York:  The  Science  Press,  1911. 
Pp.  146. 

29.  WINCH,  W.  H.    The  Faculty  Doctrine,  Correlation,  and  Educational  Theory. 

/.  of  Phil.,  Psychol,  etc.,  1911,  8,  337~348;  372-384- 

30.  WOODWORTH,  R.  S.     Combining  the  Results  of  Several  Tests:  a  Study  in  Sta- 

tistical Method.     PSYCHOL.  REV.,  1912,  19,  97~I23- 

31.  WOODWORTH,  R.  S.  and  WELLS,  F.  L.     Association  Tests.     PSYCHOL.  MONOG., 

1911,  8,  No.  5.     Pp.85. 

32.  YULE,  G.  UDNY.     An  Introduction  to  the  Theory  of  Statistics.    London:  Charles 

Griffin  and  Company,  1911.     Pp.  vi+376. 


232  V.  A.  C.  HENMON 

REACTION  TIMES 

BY  PROFESSOR  V.  A.  C.  HENMON 

University  of  Wisconsin 

The  studies  of  the  year  have  been  concerned  with  questions  of 
technique  and  the  effect  of  direction  of  attention  on  reaction  time. 
Breitwieser  (i)  attacks  again  the  old  problem  of  sensory  and  motor 
reactions.  Eleven  subjects  gave  an  average  excess  of  sensory 
reaction  time  to  auditory  stimuli  over  motor  reaction  time  of  180-, 
the  excess  ranging  from  8.90  to  440-.  Series  were  then  obtained 
from  two  trained  subjects  without  instructions  as  to  direction  of 
attention.  Sensory,  motor,  and  normal  reactions  were  introspectively 
noted  and  the  number  reported  as  motor  or  sensory  was  about  equal. 
The  times  were  the  same  as  when  the  attitudes  were  voluntarily 
assumed.  In  reactions  with  artificial  direction  of  attention  the 
attempt  was  made  to  devise  an  objective  method  of  insuring  the  type 
of  attention,  motor  by  varying  the  resistance  of  the  key,  sensory  by 
variation  in  the  clang  character  of  the  auditory  stimuli.  The  times 
for  the  "induced"  sensory  and  the  voluntary  sensory  reactions  are 
about  the  same.  The  times  for  the  induced  motor  and  the  voluntary 
motor  are  very  different  and  the  attitudes  in  the  two  cases  are  differ- 
ent. The  voluntary  motor  reaction  involves  merely  the  preparation 
to  react,  the  voluntary  sensory  reaction  involves  both  the  preparation 
to  observe  and  to  react,  the  interference  between  the  two  adjustments 
being  reflected  in  the  lengthened  time  for  sensory  reactions. 

Breitwieser  next  applied  the  reaction  time  method  to  a  study  of 
fluctuations  of  attention,  by  varying  from  one  to  ten  seconds  the 
intervals  between  the  ready  signal  and  the  stimulus.  The  results 
with  eighteen  subjects,  contrary  to  those  reported  by  Delia  Valle, 
showed  no  rhythmic  variations.  The  number  of  reactions  with  each 
subject  is  too  small  and  the  variability  too  great  for  the  effects  to  be 
shown  with  any  reliability.  The  most  favorable  interval  for  audi- 
tory stimuli  is  apparently  2-3  sees,  and  for  visual  stimuli  3-4  sees. 
Detailed  studies  with  two  trained  subjects  showed  considerable 
regularity  as  to  favorable  and  unfavorable  intervals,  but  there  was  no 
evidence  of  rhythmic  fluctuations  in  the  reaction  times. 

The  last  chapter  is  concerned  with  the  effect  of  varying  the 
resistance  of  the  reacting  key.  The  times  are  lengthened  progress- 
ively as  the  resistance  is  increased,  hence  the  necessity  of  indicating 
the  resistance  of  the  key  when  the  downward  pressure  type  of  move- 


REACTION  TIMES  233 

ment  is  used.  The  time  of  reaction  with  the  release  type  of  movement 
is  independent  of  the  resistance.  The  excess  of  force  expended  varies 
independently  of  the  resistance  and  tends  to  decrease  with  practice. 

The  purpose  of  Grassi's  (3)  experiments  was  to  determine  the 
effect  of  change  in  the  direction  of  attention  on  sensory  reactions  to 
tactual  stimuli  of  constant  intensity.  Comparisons  were  made 
between  reactions  (i)  when  the  area  stimulated  is  constant,  (2)  when 
the  area  is  varied  with  each  stimulation — points  on  the  left  side 
of  the  body,  face,  forearm,  leg  and  back — (3)  when  the  area  is  varied 
periodically,  after  from  seven  to  fourteen  reactions  with  a  constant 
area.  The  experimenter  found  considerable  variation,  curiously 
enough,  in  reaction  times  from  day  to  day  and  from  forenoon  to 
afternoon,  so  that  comparisons  between  reactions  with  constant 
stimulus  points  and  the  "transition"  reactions,  with  which  the  study 
is  mainly  concerned,  are  based  on  reactions  made  at  one  sitting. 
The  rather  unusual  diurnal  variations  do  not  appear  to  be  a  matter 
of  practice.  However,  the  experiments  are  chiefly  on  one  subject 
and  no  measure  of  variability  is  given.  The  variability  appears 
to  be  too  great  for  the  results  to  have  much  significance.  The  most 
important  point  of  the  study  is  the  comparison,  in  the  series  with 
periodic  variation  in  the  points  stimulated,  between  the  reactions 
with  constant  stimulus  points  and  the  "transition"  reactions.  The 
"transition"  reactions  are  longer  by  from  140-  to  550-,  depending  on 
whether  the  transition  is  made  from  one  area  to  another  or  from  one 
point  to  another  point  within  the  same  area. 

Giinther  (4)  reexamines  in  detail  the  processes  of  reaction  in 
recording  stellar  transits  and  the  differences  between  reactions  to 
sudden  stimuli  and  reactions  to  transits.  In  reactions  to  transits 
the  conditions  in  the  fore-period  between  the  emergence  of  the 
stimulus  into  the  field  of  vision  and  the  transit  give  rise  to  two  forms 
of  reaction,  the  anticipating  and  the  complete.  Just  as  in  reactions 
to  rhythmic  stimuli  the  reactions  come  to  coincide  in  time  with  the 
stimulus,  so  in  recording  transits  the  observer  tends  to  anticipate 
the  stimulus.  The  effect  of  such  anticipation  and  its  relation  to 
methods  of  registration  are  now  under  investigation  in  the  Leipzig 
laboratory.  Giinther's  problem  is  the  complete  reaction  and  the 
conditions  affecting  it.  Even  in  the  complete  reaction  sensory  and 
motor  attitudes  complicate  the  problem.  The  motor  reaction  tends 
to  become  anticipating  or  at  any  rate  there  is  no  real  apperception  of 
the  stimulus  preceding  the  reaction.  In  reactions  to  transits  it  is 
peculiarly  difficult  to  resist  the  tendency  to  premature  and  abbre- 


234  V.  A.  C.  HENMON 

viated  reactions  and  they  are  likely  to  become  ultimately  anticipating 
reactions.  Introspective  testimony  as  to  the  nature  of  the  reaction 
is  unreliable  and  some  objective  control  is  necessary.  This  was 
done  by  conducting  practice  experiments  where  the  stimulus — 
artificial  star  on  a  kymograph — was  arrested  just  before  it  reached  the 
meridian.  Such  series  were  continued  until  the  proper  adjustment  of 
attention  was  developed  and  were  repeated  at  intervals  to  insure  the 
maintenance  of  the  attitude. 

Experiments  were  made  with  five  subjects  and  with  six  rates  of 
movement  of  the  stimulus,^,  1.5,  I,  .75,  .37,  .19  cm.  per  second.  The 
average  reaction  times  for  these  rates  are  2i6<r,  2040-,  205 <r,  2090-, 
2250-,  and  2490-  respectively.  That  the  attitude  in  the  complete 
reaction  can  be  developed  and  maintained  is  shown  by  the  close  agree- 
ment in  the  length  of  the  times  by  the  different  subjects  and  by  the 
uniformity  of  the  distribution  about  the  mode,  which  is  greater  than 
that  shown  in  Alechsieff's  results.  It  is  shown  also  in  the  relatively 
slight  influence  of  variations  in  rates  of  transits.  Contrary  to 
Alechsieff,  Giinther  recommends  the  complete  reaction  as  the  best 
and  most  reliable  method  in  recording  transit  observations,  on  the 
ground  that  the  adjustment  of  attention  is  more  readily  controlled 
and  that  individual  differences  are  less  in  evidence. 

Dunlap  (2)  finds  that  a  source  of  error  in  time  measurements  with 
the  Hipp  chronoscope,  due  to  the  effects  of  use  and  temperature  on 
the  armature  spring,  may  be  eliminated  by  removing  the  spring  and 
making  the  necessary  readjustments  in  the  counterpoise  and  circuit 
arrangements.  For  the  technical  details  reference  must  be  made  to 
the  original  article. 

Marie  and  Nachmann  (6)  describe  briefly  the  arrangement  for 
measuring  with  the  d'Arsonval  chronometer  reaction  times  to  visual 
stimuli — seven  colored  lightfc — and  to  olfactory  stimuli — odorous 
liquids.  The  arrangement  for  olfactory  stimuli  is  ingenious. 

REFERENCES 

1.  BREITWIESER,  J.  V.     Attention  and  Movement  in  Reaction   Time.     (Archives  of 

Psychol.,  No.  18.)     New  York:  The  Science  Press,  1911.     Pp.  49. 

2.  DUNLAP,   K.    The  Hipp  Chronoscope  without  Armature  Springs.     Brit.  J.  of 

Psychol.,  1912,  5,  1-7- 

3.  GRASSI,  ISABELLA.     Einfache  Reaktionszeit  und  Einstellung  der  Aufmerksamkeit. 

Zsch.f.  Psychol.,  1911,  60,  46-72. 

4.  GUNTHER,  F.     Reaktionsversuche  bei  Durchgangsbeobachtungen.     Psychol.  Stud.y 

1911,  7,  229-283. 

5.  MARIE,  A.  and  NACHMANN,  L.     Considerations  sur  les  donnees  obtenues  avec 

1'appareil  chronometrique  enregistreur  d'Arsonval  au  sujet  de  1'ouie  et  du  tact. 
Arch.  int.  de  neur.,  96  S.,  1911,  2,  364-371. 


APPARATUS  235 

6.  MARIE,  A.  and  NACHMANN,  L.  De  nouveaux  dispositifs  simples  s'adaptant  au 
chronometre  du  professeur  d'Arsonval  pour  enregistrer  les  temps  de  reaction 
visuelle  et  olfactive.  Comptes  rendus  de  la  Soc.  de  Biol.,  1911,  71,  661-663. 

APPARATUS 

BY  PROFESSOR  C.  E.  SEASHORE 

University  of  Iowa 

Crehore  and  Meara  (i)  describe  an  instrument  which  records 
the  microscopic  movements  of  a  diaphragm  by  means  of  light 
interference.  It  works  on  the  principle  of  the  tambour,  and  the 
record  is  made  by  means  of  interference  bands  obtained  by  a  mercury 
vapor  lamp.  The  registration  may  be  made  by  direct  reading  or  by 
a  photograph.  The  instrument  seems  to  be  capable  of  exceedingly 
fine  and  accurate  registration.  The  article  contains  a  number  of 
illustrations,  the  records  of  physiological  events  showing  the  regis- 
tration of  sound  waves,  including  those  from  the  human  voice. 

Dunlap  (2)  gives  a  report  of  a  careful  experimental  investigation 
of  the  errors  in  the  fall-hammer,  the  reliability  of  the  break  spark 
in  chronoscopic  records,  the  latency  of  the  magnetic  markers,  the 
effect  of  the  reversal  of  the  current  in  the  Hipp  chronoscope,  and 
other  features.  Suggestions  are  made  for  improvements  in  these 
instruments. 

Ponzo  (3)  describes  a  new  two-point  sesthesiometer,  which  is 
designed  to  secure  simultaneous  and  equal  pressure  of  the  two  points, 
and  furnishes  a  convenient  means  of  adjusting  the  distance.  It  may 
be  obtained  from  E.  Zimmermann,  Leipzig,  Germany. 

REFERENCES 

1.  CREHORE,  A.  C.  and  MEARA,  F.  S.    The   Micrograph.    Jour,   of  Exper.   Med.y 

13,  616-625. 

2.  DUNLAP,  K.     The  Fall-Hammer,  Chronoscope,  and  Chronograph.     Brit.  Jour. 

of  Psychol,  4,  44-55- 

3.  PONZO,  M.    Ueber  einen  neuen  Zirkel  fur  die  Bestimmung  der  simultanen  Raum- 

schwellen  der  Korperhaut.     Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  Psychol.,  22,  390-394. 


REPORT  OF  MEETING 

THE  CLARK  MEETING  OF  EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOLOGISTS 

The  ninth  annual  meeting  of  experimental  psychologists  took 
place  in  the  Psychological  Laboratory  of  Clark  University,  Monday- 
Wednesday,  April  15-17.  Twenty-four  experimental  psychologists 
were  present  representing  the  laboratories  of  Columbia,  Cornell, 
Clark,  Dartmouth,  Harvard,  Hobart,  Pennsylvania,  Princeton, 
Wesleyan,  and  Yale. 

The  program  of  Monday  afternoon  consisted  of  two  papers  on 
Inhibition,  the  first  presented  by  Dr.  H.  S.  Langfeld  (Harvard), 
and  the  second  by  Dr.  E.  Jacobson.  Dr.  Langfeld  reported  upon 
further  investigations  into  the  nature  of  the  negative  attitude  and 
the  act  of  suppression.  Two  methods  of  experimentation  were 
employed.  The  one,  which  consisted  in  guiding  a  stylus  down  the 
groove  of  a  modified  Whipple  tracing  board,  was  used  to  determine 
what  processes  are  involved  in  the  suppression  of  movement.  Series 
of  trials  were  made  both  under  positive  instruction,  i.  e.,  to  go  down 
the  center,  and  under  negative  instruction,  i.  e.,  not  to  touch  the 
sides.  As  yet  there  have  been  too  few  trials  to  permit  of  deductions 
from  the  quantitative  results,  but  the  introspection  in  some  instances 
showed  imagery  corresponding  to  a  negative  attitude.  It  was  also 
found  that  when  the  left  hand  was  used,  it  was  more  difficult  to  hold 
the  instruction  in  mind.  The  other  method  was  to  instruct  the 
subject  to  recite  the  alphabet  or  the  numbers  from  one  to  thirty 
omitting  certain  letters  or  numbers.  In  the  fore-period  visual  and 
auditory  imagery  predominated.  The  negative  was  generally 
expressed  solely  in  the  auditory  image  of  the  instruction,  but  instances 
of  visual  imagery  of  the  negative  were  discovered.  In  the  main- 
period  the  words  to  be  suppressed  appeared  in  consciousness  at 
times  as  auditory-kinsesthetic  imagery.  In  several  cases,  however, 
introspection  found  no  trace  of  these  words.  Dr.  Jacobson  reported 
three  series  of  experiments  on  Inhibition,  which  were  carried  out  at 
Cornell  University.  In  the  first  the  effect  of  strong  sound  sensations 
on  simultaneous  odors  was  tested.  The  results  were  negative.  On 
the  supposition  that  these  negative  results  might  be  due  to  added 

236 


MEETING  OF  EXPERIMENTALISTS  237 

effort  of  attention  to  the  odors  in  order  to  overcome  the  distraction, 
passive  and  effortless  attention  was  cultivated.  The  figures  showed 
some  difference  from  those  of  the  first  series,  indicating  that  the 
abandonment  of  effort  had  had  some  effect,  but,  in  general,  inhibitions 
still  failed  to  appear.  Finally,  the  observers  were  trained  to  give 
strongest  attention  to  the  sound,  and  it  was  then  found  that  the 
intensity  of  the  odor  sensations  was  markedly  diminished.  Many 
introspective  analyses  were  made  of  inhibition  and  attention.  The 
meeting  then  adjourned  to  the  home  of  President  and  Mrs.  Sanford 
who  entertained  at  tea.  Later  in  the  afternoon  Professor  J.  P.  Por- 
ter exhibited  a  trained  dog  whose  behavior  is  under  investigation. 

The  evening  session  was  devoted  to  reports  of  investigations  in 
progress  in  various  laboratories.  The  reports  from  the  laboratories 
of  Teachers  College  and  Columbia  were  given  by  Professor  E.  L. 
Thorndike,  of  Harvard  by  Dr.  H.  S.  Langfeld,  of  Pennsylvania  by 
Professor  F.  M.  Urban,  of  Princeton  by  Professor  H.  C.  Warren,  of 
Wesleyan  by  Professor  R.  Dodge,  and  of  Yale  by  Dr.  E.  P.  Frost. 
Both  the  reports  and  the  discussions  which  followed  were  informal. 

The  session  of  Tuesday  morning  was  opened  by  Mr.  C.  A.  Ruck- 
mich  (Cornell),  who  discussed  the  History  and  Status  of  Psychology 
in  America.  Dr.  L.  R.  Geissler  (Physical  Laboratory,  National 
Electric  Lamp  Association)  read  a  paper  on  The  Introspective  Study 
of  Mental  Functions.  A  systematic  functional  psychology,  he  said, 
has  yet  to  work  out  its  own  methods  and  terminology.  Its  subject- 
matter  may  be  divided  into  (a)  extrinsic  relations,  existing  between 
mental  and  non-mental  facts  and  including  the  cognitive,  adaptive, 
and  organic  relations  of  mind  to  its  corresponding  physical,  biological, 
and  physiological  determinants;  (b)  intrinsic  relations,  occurring 
between  attributes  of  the  same  mental  process,  or  between  simulta- 
neous and  successive  processes,  or  between  individual  processes  and 
mind  as  a  whole;  and  (c)  mental  activities,  considered  as  structural 
changes  in  consciousness  viewed  in  the  light  of  the  completed  mental 
product  or  result  accomplished.  Introspection  seems  adequate  to 
the  problems  under  (b),  but  may  require  supplementary  methods  such 
as  biological  reflection,  neurological  and  pathological  observations, 
systematic  study  of  human  and  animal  behavior,  etc.,  for  the  problems 
under  (a)  and  (c).  A  confusion  of  the  structural  and  functional 
aspects  of  mind  may  perhaps  account  for  the  recent  controversies 
over  imageless  thought,  relational  elements,  and  the  distinction 
between  mental  act  and  content.  Mr.  K.  M.  Dallenbach  (Cornell) 
followed  with  a  paper  on  Blindfold  Chess  Playing.  The  final  paper  of 


238  MEETING  OF  EXPERIMENTALISTS 

the  morning  was  presented  by  Professor  Dodge,  who  reported  the 
results  of  an  investigation  on  mental  work.  Three  students  were 
required  to  write  examination  papers  of  various  degrees  of  difficulty, 
and  a  record  of  the  rate  of  heart-beat  was  obtained  by  a  device  which 
successfully  registered  the  heart-rate,  yet  at  the  same  time  permitted 
bodily  movements  on  the  part  of  the  observer.  Mental  work  is 
believed  to  be  physical  work,  and  the  rate  of  heart-beat  is  taken  to  be 
a  reliable  indicator  of  the  degree  of  mental  work. 

The  afternoon  session  was  devoted  to  a  general  discussion  of  the 
experimental  investigation  of  thought:  methods,  results,  applications. 
The  discussion  was  introduced  by  Professor  Titchener  who  was 
followed  by  President  Hall,  Dr.  Geissler,  Professor  Dodge,  Professor 
Urban,  President  Sanford,  Professor  Warren,  Dr.  Jacobson,  Professor 
Thorndike  and  Professor  Baird.  Professor  Titchener  then  sum- 
marized the  discussion. 

The  evening  session  was  held  at  the  home  of  President  G.  Stanley 
Hall.  Professor  J.  P.  Porter  read  a  paper  reporting  an  investigation 
by  Professor  B.  N.  Gates  (Mass.  Agricultural  College)  on  Color 
Discrimination  in  Bees.  Yellow,  white,  and  crimson  paper  flowers 
were  used,  and  it  was  found  that  the  bees  went  to  the  flowers  even 
when  they  were  sealed  in  glass  tubes  and  when  they  were  reflected  in 
a  mirror.  Although  brightness  was  not  altogether  eliminated,  the 
results  so  far  appear  to  be  positive.  Further  experiments  are  con- 
templated. Dr.  Geissler  gave  an  informal  report  of  the  laboratory 
maintained  by  the  National  Electric  Lamp  Association,  and  of  the 
several  investigations  in  the  psychology  of  light  and  vision  which  are 
in  progress  under  his  direction.  The  remainder  of  the  evening  was 
given  over  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  hospitality  extended  by  President 
Hall. 

The  concluding  session  of  the  meeting  was  held  on  Wednesday 
morning,  when  reports  were  heard  from  the  Clark,  Cornell,  and 
Dartmouth  laboratories.  Mr.  J.  M.  Fletcher,  Mr.  E.  O.  Finken- 
binder,  and  Dr.  H.  P.  Weld  reported  on  investigations  which  are 
practically  completed,  and  Professor  Baird  reported  on  investigations 
in  progress  in  the  laboratory  of  Clark  University.  Professor  W.  V. 
Bingham  gave  an  account  of  the  work  at  Dartmouth  and  Mr.  C.  A. 
Ruchmich  and  Professor  Titchener  reported  on  the  investigations 
in  progress  in  the  undergraduate  and  graduate  laboratories,  respec- 
tively, at  Cornell. 

It  was  agreed  to  hold  the  tenth  annual  meeting  at  Wesleyan 
University.  H.  P.  WELD 

CLARK  UNIVERSITY 


SPECIAL  REVIEWS 

PHYSIOLOGICAL  AND   EXPERIMENTAL  TEXTS 

Elements    of  Physiological  Psychology.     GEORGE   TRUMBULL   LADD 

and  ROBERT  SESSIONS  WOODWORTH.     New  York:  Charles  Scrib- 

ner's  Sons,  1911.     Pp.  xix  -f-  704. 

Ladd's  Elements  of  Physiological  Psychology  was  first  published 
in  1887.  For  many  years  it  has  served  as  the  standard  reference  work 
in  English  on  physiological .  and  experimental  psychology  and  its 
influence  on  the  development  of  the  science  in  this  country  has 
undoubtedly  been  very  great.  Many  of  the  younger  psychologists 
got  their  first  introduction  to  and  interest  in  the  experimental  study 
of  mental  processes  through  its  pages  and  to  them  a  new  edition  will 
be  especially  welcome. 

The  extensiveness  of  the  revision  which  the  book  has  undergone 
at  the  hands  of  the  author  and  Professor  Woodworth  and  which  was 
found  necessary  in  order  to  make  it  adequately  representative  of  the 
present  status  of  the  science,  is  a  striking  testimony  to  the  vigor  with 
which  research  has  been  carried  on  in  psychology  and  its  most  closely 
related  sciences  during  the  intervening  twenty-four  years.  To 
incorporate  the  wealth  of  material  that  has  accumulated,  every 
chapter  has  been  rewritten  and  new  chapters  have  been  added.  The 
changes  in  data,  in  the  arrangement  for  systematic  presentation,  and 
the  shiftings  of  emphasis  are  so  great  that  one  who  wishes  to  compare 
in  detail  the  treatment  in  the  two  editions  has  difficulty  in  finding  his 
way  about. 

The  general  plan  of  the  new  volume  is  the  same  as  that  of  the 
earlier  edition.  In  details  of  logical  arrangement  the  new  edition  is 
superior  to  the  old.  Part  I.  gives  a  lucid  exposition  in  292  pages  of 
the  development,  anatomy,  chemistry,  and  physiology  of  the  nervous 
system.  This  part  opens  with  two  new  chapters  on  The  Place  of  the 
Nervous  System  in  the  Animal  Kingdom  and  on  The  Development  of 
the  Nervous  System  in  the  Individual.  These  chapters  strike  the 
reviewer  as  the  best  in  the  entire  book  and  as  most  likely  to  be  widely 
used  by  students  of  psychology.  The  clearness  of  the  presentation 
of  the  typical  stages  in  the  evolution  of  the  nervous  system  from  the 
amoeba  to  man,  and  of  the  growth  of  the  nervous  system  in  embryonic 

239 


240  REVIEWS 

life  and  childhood  is  an  evidence  of  the  skill  of  the  writers  in  exposition 
and  an  impressive  indication  of  the  progress  of  neurological  research. 
The  substantial  gains  to  our  knowledge  in  these  fields  make  possible 
precision  of  statement  and  detail  in  description  that  are  noteworthy. 
This  is  especially  shown  by  a  comparison  of  Chapter  VI.  in  the  old 
edition  on  the  development  of  the  nervous  system  with  the  corre- 
sponding chapter  in  the  new  edition.  They  are  so  radically  different 
that  the  latter  may  fairly  be  called  new. 

The  succeeding  chapters  on  the  gross  and  minute  anatomy  of  the 
nervous  system  incorporate  goodly  portions  from  the  first  edition 
with  the  inevitable  result  that  repetition  and  references  back  to  the 
earlier  chapters  occur  with  great  frequency.  Thirty-seven  figures, 
for  the  most  part  new,  richly  illustrate  and  illumine  the  text.  The 
chemistry  of  the  nervous  system  is  briefly  treated  in  a  special  chapter, 
and  two  chapters  are  given  to  nervous  conduction  and  the  reflex 
functions. 

The  chapter  on  the  end-organs,  or  receptors,  of  the  nervous  system 
is  the  only  rather  disappointing  chapter  in  Part  I.  It  has  undergone 
less  change  than  any  other.  The  psychologist  would  surely  hope  to 
find  in  a  book  of  this  character  a  full  and  adequate  discussion  of  the 
anatomy  and  physiology  of  the  sense-organs.  One  is  inclined  to 
regret  the  space  given  to  the  gross  anatomy,  and  particularly  the  59 
pages  given  to  the  metaphysics  of  the  relation  of  mind  and  body,  when 
one  reads  the  sections  on  the  muscle  sense,  the  effects  of  light  on  the 
retina,  the  semicircular  canals,  and  the  end  organs  of  motion. 

The  two  chapters  on  the  cerebral  hemispheres  and  the  localization 
of  cerebral  functions  have  been  transferred  to  Part  I.,  where  they 
logically  belong.  Many  admirably  selected  illustrations  of  locali- 
zation and  of  the  histological  structure  of  the  cortex  accompany  a 
remarkably  clear  and  critical  review  of  the  complex  and  conflicting 
literature  on  cerebral  physiology.  These  two  chapters  alone  make 
the  book  a  necessary  addition  to  the  psychologist's  library. 

Part  II.  summarizes  in  328  pages  the  main  results  of  the  qualitative 
and  quantitative  experimental  study  of  sensation,  perception, 
memory,  thought,  feeling,  movement,  and  the  time-relations  of 
mental  phenomena,  and  the  correlations  of  mental  processes  with 
nervous  processes.  While  this  part  does  not  purport  to  review  the 
whole  field  of  experimental  psychology,  it  is  nevertheless  perhaps  the 
best  general  treatment  we  have.  In  the  main  the  substance  and 
arrangement  of  the  chapters  on  the  quality  and  quantity  of  sensations, 
presentations  of  sense,  and  reaction  time  are  unchanged.  Practically 


PHYSIOLOGICAL  PSYCHOLOGY  241 

every  section  has  been  rewritten  and  such  additional  data  as  are  at 
hand  have  been  added.  It  is  a  gratifying  evidence  of  scientific 
productivity  in  this  country  to  find  that  these  data  can  be  drawn  as 
largely  as  they  are  from  investigations  by  American  students. 

The  application  of  experimental  methods  to  the  feelings  and  to 
the  higher  mental  processes  has  necessitated  three  practically  new 
chapters,  the  first  on  feeling,  emotion,  and  expressive  movement, 
including  also  a  brief  discussion  of  fatigue;  a  second  on  memory  and 
the  process  of  learning,  which  reviews  not  only  the  results  of  the 
experimental  study  of  memory  and  the  acquistion  of  skill  in  man  but 
also  learning  processes  in  lower  animals;  and  a  third  on  the  mechanism 
of  thought,  including  a  brief  discussion  of  attention.  The  chapter  on 
memory  and  learning  is  especially  valuable. 

The  chapters  in  this  part  are  not  of  equal  completeness  and  value. 
While  twenty-nine  pages  are  given  to  reaction  time,  undoubtedly 
the  best  summary  of  the  literature  obtainable,  seven  pages  each  to 
fatigue  and  attention  do  not,  of  course,  adequately  represent  the 
relative  amounts  of  experimental  works  in  these  fields.  It  is  perhaps 
ungracious,  however,  to  mention  such  a  point  when  one  reflects  upon 
the  labor  already  involved  in  canvassing  and  critically  evaluating  a 
literature  which  covers  practically  the  whole  field  of  experimentation 
in  psychology,  and  in  preparing  a  compendium  of  facts  which  puts 
every  psychologist  under  a  debt  of  gratitude  to  the  authors. 

Part  III.,  abridged  in  the  new  edition  to  59  pages,  treats  of  the 
Nature  of  Mind  and  the  metaphysical  conception  of  the  relation 
of  mind  and  body  to  which  the  results  of  physiological  psychology 
point.  This  part  could  have  been  omitted  without  great  loss,  and 
the  space  devoted  to  a  fuller  discussion  of  physiological  and  experi- 
mental problems.  The  closing  chapter  of  Part  I.  and  sections  14-34 
in  the  last  chapter  of  Part  II.  set  forth  clearly  the  limits  of  present 
scientific  knowledge  concerning  psychophysical  correlations.  They 
hardly  furnish  evidence  either  for  or  against  the  "common-sense" 
dualism,  which  is  maintained,  and  the  discussion  of  the  problem 
might  well  have  been  left  to  philosophy  to  which  in  the  Preface  it  is 
relegated. 

The  "controlling  purpose"  of  the  book  is  to  present  an  adequate 
summary  of  "what  modern  science  knows,  or  reasonably  conjectures, 
about  the  correlations  existing  between  the  nervous  mechanism  and 
the  mental  life  of  man."  The  erudition  of  the  authors,  combined 
with  a  keen  critical  judgment  and  exceptional  skill  in  presentation, 
leads  to  a  realization  of  this  purpose  in  a  high  degree.  The  book  is 


242  REVIEWS 

again  one  that  the  student  of  physiological  and  experimental  psychol- 
ogy cannot  well  be  without. 

V.  A.  C.  HENMON 

UNIVERSITY  OF  WISCONSIN 

A  Text-Book  of  Experimental  Psychology  with  Laboratory  Exercises. 
CHARLES  S.  MYERS.  Second  Edition.  Cambridge:  The  Uni- 
versity Press;  New  York:  Longmans,  Green,  and  Co.,  1911. 
Part  /.,  Text-Book.  Pp.  xiv  +  344.  Part  II.,  Laboratory 
Exercises.  Pp.  v  +  107. 

The  author  tells  us  in  his  preface  that  the  work  has  been  thor- 
oughly revised.  It  is  now  published  in  two  volumes,  the  laboratory 
exercises  being  bound  separately  from  the  text-book.  This  is  in 
some  respects  an  advantage.  It  is,  however,  regrettable  that  the 
text-book  cannot  be  obtained  separately  if  so  desired. 

The  recent  work  of  Dr.  H.  Head,  especially  the  material  of  the 
Croonian  Lectures1  has  inspired  most  of  the  important  changes  and 
additions.  It  is  interesting  to  note  the  influence  of  these  physio- 
logical investigations. 

In  the  paragraph  on  The  Two  Systems  of  Cutaneous  Sensibility, 
which  has  been  partially  rewritten,  Myers  says  (p.  13)  that  there  is 
no  evidence,  at  present,  that  two  separate  systems  of  peripheral  nerve 
fibers  correspond  to  the  two  systems  of  cutaneous  sensibility.  In  the 
first  edition,  we  were  told  that  the  work  of  Head  and  his  collab- 
orators compel  us  to  assume  the  existence  of  these  two  systems. 
The  title  of  Chapter  XVI.  has  been  changed  from  "On  Weight"  to 
"Muscular  Effort"  and  the  last  part  upon  effort  (pp.  213-217), 
which  is  now  called  an  experience  and  not  a  "sense,"  has  been 
partially  rewritten  and  enlarged.  The  efferent  impulses  influence 
our  perceptions.  For  example,  they  are  responsible  for  the  dis- 
placements in  localization  in  case  of  paralysis  of  the  eye  muscles. 
There  is  no  necessity  to  adopt  the  hypothesis  that  the  motor  impulse 
is  directed  toward  some  cortical  sensory  center.  It  is  probable  that 
volitional  movements  effect  a  disturbance  in  various  systems  of 
unconscious  dispositions  which  Head  calls  "schemata"  upon  which 
is  based  our  awareness  of  spatial  relations.  Not  only,  however,  does 
Myers  assume  an  effect  of  volition  upon  unconscious  dispositions, 
but  also  a  consciousness  of  the  effort,  which  he  describes  as  "the  '  act ' 
that  is  inherent  in  every  conative  experience."  This  latter  assump- 

1  These  lectures  appeared  in  the  34th  volume  of  Brain  and  not  in  the  33d  volume, 
as  Myers  undoubtedly  thought  they  would. 


EXPERIMENTAL  PSYCHOLOGY  243 

tion  is  not  clearly  stated  here,  but  the  reference  to  Ach's  experiments 
on  page  332  more  fully  explains  it. 

In  the  paragraph  on  the  Histological  Basis  of  the  Spatial  Thresh- 
old it  is  stated  (p.  223)  that  the  spatial  threshold  may  be  impaired 
in  regions  where  tactual  sensibility  is  normal.  This  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  impulses  concerned  with  spatial  discrimination  do  not  cross 
until  they  reach  the  medulla  oblongata,  while  the  impulses  concerned 
with  tactual  sensibility  cross  already  in  the  cord.  In  the  paragraph 
on  Relative  and  Absolute  Localization  on  the  Skin,  we  learn  (p.  224) 
that,  due  to  a  similar  difference  in  the  place  of  crossing  of  the  impulses, 
localization  may  be  present  with  an  absence  of  kinaesthesis,  although 
normally  kinaesthesis  aids  localization.  Before  describing  Lotze's 
and  Hering's  theory  of  local  signs  M.  says  (p.  225):  "Introspection 
and  the  study  of  abnormal  states  show  that  the  ability  to  distinguish 
a  double  from  a  single  touch  is  something  different  from  the  ability 
to  ascribe  to  the  two  touches  definite  and  different  localizations." 

At  the  beginning  of  the  chapter  On  Sensibility  and  Sensory 
Acuity,  we  find  that  lesions  of  the  sensory  cortex  destroy  the  power 
of  discrimination  and  thus  affect  sensory  acuity,  and  the  chapter  on 
Identity  and  Difference  begins  with  a  paragraph  on  The  Influence 
of  the  Sensory  Cortex. 

At  the  end  of  Chapter  XXIV.  (p.  313)  there  is  an  interesting 
description  of  the  effect  of  thalamic  lesion  on  feeling.  The  most 
significant  change  is  a  decided  increase  in  the  amount  of  pleasure 
or  displeasure  produced  by  a  given  sensation. 

Among  the  other  changes  and  additions,  we  note  (p.  33)  a  descrip- 
tion of  the  vowel  quality  of  pure  tones  as  discovered  in  the  recent 
investigations  of  W.  Kohler.  In  the  paragraph  on  Theories  of 
Consonants,  reference  is  made  to  Liebermann  and  Revesz's  article 
"Ueber  Orthosymphonie"  (pp.  54  and  55). 

In  discussing  adequate  and  inadequate  stimuli  (p.  in),  electrical 
stimuli  have  been  omitted  from  the  list  of  inadequate  stimuli  for 
pain,  heat,  cold,  or  pressure. 

In  the  chapter  on  Size  and  Direction,  it  is  stated  (pp.  282-283) 
that,  although  a  perception  of  distance  does  not  consciously  affect 
that  of  size,  yet,  primarily,  size  must  depend  on  distance.  An 
appeal  is  made  to  unconscious  dispositions  as  a  possible  explanation 
of  the  relation  of  apparent  distance  to  the  apparent  size  of  objects. 

Presumably  in  consideration  of  the  work  in  the  Cornell  laboratory 
on  attention,  the  doubt  expressed  as  to  the  possibility  of  measuring 
attention,  which  ended  the  chapter  on  that  function  in  the  first  edition, 
has  now  been  omitted. 


244  REVIEWS 

An  additional  chapter  on  Thought  and  Volition  has  been  added. 
It  seems  to  the  reviewer  that  the  book  would  be  better  without  it, 
the  more  in  that  it  does  not  fit  into  the  general  scheme  of  the  book, 
there  being  no  experiment  in  the  second  volume  corresponding  to 
this  chapter.  It  is  vague  in  its  descriptions  and  contains  statements 
which  are  bound  to  give  the  student  a  distorted  idea  of  the  present 
situation  in  regard  to  the  question  of  imageless  thought.  Surely  a 
search  through  the  literature  will  fail  to  find  "a  general  agreement 
that  in  addition  to  the  objects  thought  of,  in  addition  to  feelings,  there 
is  a  specific  act  of  thinking,  which  is  totally  devoid  of  sensory  content" 
(p.  327),  nor  can  the  view  that  "there  can  be  no  doubt  that  among 
the  more  cultured,  especially  among  those  who  are  practiced  in 
abstract  thinking,  imageless  thought  is  very  common"  (p.  327)  be 
entertained  by  a  number  of  psychologists  whom  the  author  would 
undoubtedly  place  in  this  favored  class.  The  description  of  the 
genesis  of  the  experience  of  awareness  of  meaning  is  difficult  to  follow. 
"  Doubtless  in  the  development  of  species,  meaning  is  prior  to  thought. 
In  the  development  of  the  individual,  thought  is  doubtless  prior  to 
language;  infants  being  capable  of  rudimentary  thought  before  they 
have  acquired  internal  speech.  It  is  therefore  not  surprising  that 
imagery,  which  plays  so  important  a  part  in  the  mental  life  of  children 
and  in  that  of  adults  who  encourage  its  use,  may  yet  fall  away  under 
certain  conditions  and  in  certain  individuals,  leaving  recognizable 
only  what  can  be  expressed  as  'awareness'  of  meaning."  If  meaning 
is  prior  to  imageless  thought,  is  not  this  statement  against  rather 
than  for  his  theory?  We  are  also  told  that  usually  there  is  no  diffi- 
culty in  separating  the  content  of  thought  from  the  act  of  thinking. 
The  part  of  the  chapter  on  volition  follows  closely  the  experiments  of 
Ach. 

In  Part  II.,  the  experimental  portion,  the  experiment  on  the  after- 
sensations  of  tones  is  omitted.  The  experiment  on  The  Distinction 
between  Cutaneous  and  Motor  Sensations  is  also  omitted  and  two 
experiments  upon  the  labyrinthine  sensations  substituted.  A  brief 
description  of  experiments  on  testimony  has  been  added  to  the 
experiment  on  association  reactions. 

The  book  is  very  solidly  written  and,  in  most  instances,  a  rare 
discrimination  has  been  used  in  the  selection  of  the  important  facts 
of  psychology.  It  remains  one  of  the  best  text-books  we  have  and  it 
is,  therefore,  more  the  pity  that  the  author  is  not  as  clear  in  his 
exposition  as  he  is  thorough  in  his  thought.  So  many  facts  are  con- 
tained in  so  small  a  space,  that  the  connecting  links  have  had  to  be 


PSYCHOPHYSICS  245 

omitted  and  the  reader  is  compelled  to  fill  in  between  the  lines.  This 
makes  it  very  difficult  reading  for  the  beginner  and  robs  the  book  of 
much  of  its  usefulness. 

HERBERT  SIDNEY  LANGFELD 
HARVARD  UNIVERSITY 

Psychophysik.  Darstellung  der  Methoden  der  experimentellen  Psy- 
chologie.  W.  WIRTH.  (R.  Tigerstedt's  Handbuch  der  physi- 
ologischen  Methodik.  Vol.  3,  Abt.  5.)  Leipzig,  1912.  Pp.  522. 
The  scope  of  this  book  is  similar  to  that  of  Titchener's  Quantitative 
Manual  or  of  G.  E.  Miiller's  Gesichtspunkte,  in  so  far  as  it  aims  at  a 
presentation  of  the  present  status  of  psychophysics.  It  differs 
radically  from  its  predecessors  in  that  historical  discussions  and 
controversies  are  almost  totally  absent.  The  reason  seems  to  be  that 
psychophysics  has  found  its  bearings  since  the  publication  of  the 
Manual  and  that  most  of  its  problems  are  beyond  the  controversial 
state.  Titchener  (loc.  cit.,  p.  174)  quotes  Lipps  as  expressing  the 
desirability  of  finding  a  new  foundation  for  the  psychophysical 
measurement  methods,  but  Wirth  has  no  doubt  as  to  this  point  and 
his  book  shows  clearly  that  psychophysics  reaches  as  far  as  the  field 
of  experimental  psychology,  a  view  already  expressed  by  the  reviewer 
on  several  occasions. 

Experimental  psychology  is  a  part  of  general  psychology  and 
though  finding  its  immediate  material  within  individual  consciousness 
only,  it  is  to  be  defined  as  the  study  of  consciousness  in  general.  In 
such  a  study  one  has  to  consider  all  the  phenomena  of  the  organism 
connected  with  the  changes  of  consciousness.  Constant  progress 
in  scientific  observation  can  be  obtained  only  by  applying  the  experi- 
mental method.  A  psychological  experiment  does  not  make  intro- 
spection superfluous,  but  gives  it  objectivity,  because  the  experiences 
of  different  people  under  the  same  conditions  can  thus  be  observed. 
Furthermore,  introspection  may  aid  in  securing  the  correct  per- 
formance of  the  experiments,  the  subject  actively  cooperating  in 
assuming  and  maintaining  not  only  a  certain  position  of  the  body,  but 
also  a  certain  "inner  adjustment"  essential  for  the  outcome  of  the 
results.  On  the  other  hand,  the  objective  data  furnish  the  means  of 
controlling  introspection. 

The  general  purpose  of  psychological  experimentation  is  to  find 
relations  between  psychical  events  so  as  to  link  them  with  the  general 
causal  connection  of  phenomena.  The  ideal  -of  such  a  mutual 
dependence  is  its  expression  in  the  form  of  a  mathematical  function. 


246  REVIEWS 

It  is  not  indispensable  for  this  purpose  that  both  cause  and  effect  be 
measurable,  but  the  expression  of  such  regularities  is  much  simplified 
if  one  or  both  can  be  expressed  quantitatively. 

Most  experimental  investigations  deal  with  sensations,  and  the 
problem  arises  to  represent  sensation  as  function  of  the  stimulus. 
Every  functional  relation  which  we  have  found  may  be  used  for  the 
purpose  of  indirect  measurement,  which  has  the  formal  character  of  a 
relation  between  purely  physical  quantities  but  which  really  is  a 
symptom  of  a  psychological  relationship.  Such  relations  are  of 
special  interest,  because  they  show  the  mind  in  relation  to  the  objects 
which  surround  us  and  thereby  show  the  basis  for  the  purposeful 
adaptation  of  our  will  reactions. 

All  measurements  are  affected  by  errors  and  the  most  exact 
physical  determinations  are  no  exception  to  this  rule.  Psychology 
differs  in  this  respect  only  gradually  from  the  more  favored  sciences. 
These  errors  are  due  to  the  fact  that  every  event  depends  not  only  on 
its  known  causes  alone  but  also  on  an  indefinite  number  of  influences 
which  escape  our  notice  and  our  control.  A  repetition  of  the  measure- 
ment of  a  quantity  implies  the  supposition  that  this  uncontrollable 
complex  of  causes  has  remained  constant.  These  variations  are  very 
large  in  the  biological  sciences  which  deal  with  processes  subject  to 
many  strong  influences,  and  for  this  reason  it  is  necessary  to  treat 
the  data  of  observation  according  to  the  rules  of  the  theory  of  dis- 
tributions (Kollektivmasslehre).  The  variations  of  the  results  in 
human  psychology  do  not  seem  to  be  quite  as  large  as  those  of  animal 
psychology,  because  the  voluntary  control  by  the  introspection  of  the 
subject  eliminates  some  sources  of  variability. 

Wirth  explains  the  principles  of  the  theory  of  distributions  and 
gives  the  formulae  for  the  direct  treatment  of  the  results,  for  the 
application  of  the  formula  of  Gauss  and  of  the  series  of  Bruns.  In  his 
treatment  of  the  theory  of  psychophysical  measurement  the  method 
of  constant  stimuli  and  its  generalizations  stand  in  the  foreground 
of  the  interest,  as  is  seen  from  the  large  amount  of  space  given  to  the 
discussion  of  this  method  and  its  problems.  We  call  particular 
attention  to  the  formulae  for  the  direct  treatment,  some  of  which  are 
of  Wirth's  own  invention  and  bid  fair  to  be  of  great  practical  use.1 

Wirth  gives  the  weights  of  the  observation  equations  in  the  method 
of  constant  stimuli,  calculated  by  my  formula  as  well  as  by  those  of 
Miiller.  W.  Brown  in  his  book  on  Mental  Measurement  does  the 
same  without  giving  any  reasons,  while  Wirth's  suggestion  that 

1  Cf.  Arch.f.  d.  ges.  Psychol.,  20,  1911,  pp.  1-8  of  the  Literaturbericht. 


NOTE  ON  APPARATUS  247 

Miiller's  solution  is  especially  simple  is  obviously  wrong.  It  seems 
curious  that  both  authors  should  have  overlooked  the  fact  that  both 
formulae  cannot  be  correct. 

In  a  complete  presentation  of  the  theory  of  distributions,  Pearson's 
views  ought  not  to  have  been  omitted.  It  is  true  that  they  have  not 
been  applied  to  psychology  until  now,  but  practically  the  same  remark 
may  be  made  in  regard  to  the  series  of  Bruns.  There  may  be  some 
doubt  as  to  whether  this  lack  of  success  of  Bruns  and  Pearson  is 
due  to  the  inherent  difficulties  of  their  methods,  or  to  certain  defi- 
ciencies of  their  presentation.  Pearson's  papers  are  not  easy  reading 
and  Bruns's  book  is  such  that  it  ought  to  be  given  to  senior  wranglers 
only.  The  second  edition  of  Czuber's  textbook  of  the  calculus  of 
probabilities  has  made  Bruns's  views  a  little  more  accessible,  but 
psychologists  will  be  grateful  to  Wirth  for  his  trouble  in  presenting 
the  theory  and  practice  of  the  series  of  Bruns. 

It  is  not  possible  to  give  here  even  a  brief  survey  of  the  rich  experi- 
mental material  embodied  in  this  book.  We  merely  mention  pres- 
entations of  the  methods  for  studying  attention,  memory,  time 
perception,  feelings,  and  voluntary  reactions.  Some  of  the  investi- 
gations, as,  e.  g.,  those  on  the  influence  of  sounds  of  different  pitch 
on  attention,  or  the  one  on  the  decimal  equation,  have  not  been 
reported  before,  and  there  are  only  few  chapters  where  Wirth  can- 
not refer  to  his  own  investigations.  The  general  purpose  of  the 
investigation,  however,  remains  the  same  everywhere:  the  goal  is  to 
arrive  at  as  exact  an  understanding  of  the  mental  processes  as  possible; 
the  psychophysical  methods  are  the  most  indispensable  tools  for 
this  purpose,  but  they  are  not  more  than  tools. 

F.  M.  URBAN 

UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA 

A  NOTE  ON  APPARATUS 

A  SIMPLE  BLIND  FOR  THE  EYES.  An  inexpensive  type  of  motoring- 
goggles  (procurable  at  five-and-ten-cent  stores  for  ten  cents)  is  in  use 
in  the  laboratory  as  a  blindfold  for  light  and  dark  adaptation.  For 
the  latter  purpose,  a  heavy  black  paper  is  inserted  in  the  eye-pieces 
and  kept  in  place  by  means  of  a  steel  wire  spring  bent  to  fit  the  inside 
of  the  eye-piece.  This  has  proved  to  be  a  very  satisfactory  way  of 
excluding  light  stimuli  of  even  the  greatest  degree  of  intensity.  For 
light  adaptation,  the  pieces  of  black  paper  are  replaced  with  a  set 
of  translucent  discs  cut  from  architect's  paper.-  Finally,  in  experi- 


248  BOOKS  RECEIVED 

merits  upon  color-adaptation,  the  goggles  furnish  a  convenient  sub- 
stitution for  the  ordinary  colored  glasses.  In  this  case,  gelatin  papers 
of  various  colors  are  available  for  insertion  in  the  eye-pieces.  Since 
the  goggles  cover  virtually  the  whole  field  of  vision,  they  afford  an 
excellent  opportunity  for  producing  general  as  well  as  local  adaptation 

to  color. 

CHRISTIAN  A.  RUCKMICH 
CORNELL  UNIVERSITY 


BOOKS  RECEIVED  DURING  MAY 

WITHERSPOON,  J.     Lectures  on  Moral  Philosophy.     Princeton:  Univ. 

Press,  1912.     Pp.  xxix  +  144.     $1.50. 
STUMPF,    C.     Beitrdge    zur    Akustik    und    Musikwissenschaft.     VI. 

Leipzig:  Earth,  1911.     Pp.  165.     5.  Mk. 
VOLD,  J.  M.     Ueber  den   Traum.     Bd.   II.     Leipzig:  Barth,   1912. 

Pp.  vi  +  449-879.     ii.  Mk. 
HOLLINGWORTH,   H.   L.     The  Influence  of  Caffein   on  Mental  and 

Motor    Efficiency.     (Columbia    Contributions    to    Psychology.) 

New  York:  Science  Press,  1912.     Pp.  v  +  166. 

RAND,  B.     The  Classical  Psychologists.     Selections  Illustrating  Psy- 
chology from  Anaxagoras  to  Wundt.     Boston,  New  York,  Chicago: 

Houghton  Mifflin  Co.,  1912.     Pp.  xxi  +  734.     #3.50. 
DOWNEY,  JUNE  E.     The  Imaginal  Reaction  to  Poetry.     The  Affective 

and  the  ^Esthetic  Judgment.     (Bulletin  No.  2  of  the  Department  of 

Psychology  of  the  University  of  Wyoming.)     Laramie,   Wyo., 

1912.     Pp.  56. 
ELLIOT,  H.   S.   R.     Modern  Science  and  the  Illusions  of  Professor 

Bergson.     London,  New  York,  etc.:  Longmans,  Green,  and  Co., 

1912.     Pp.  xix  +  257.     #1.60  net. 
Contributi  Psicologici  del  Labor atorio  di  Psicologia  Sperimentale  della  R. 

Universitd    di    Roma.     Vol.     I,    1910-1911.     Roma:    Presso    il 

Laboratorio  di  Psicologia. 
AUERBACH,  F.     Die  Grundlagen  der  Musik.     Leipzig:  J.  A.  Barth, 

1911.     Pp.  vi  +  209.     Geb.  Mk.  5. 
PYLE,  W.  H.     The  Outlines  of  Educational  Psychology.     Baltimore: 

Warwick  and  York,  1911.     Pp.  x  +  254.     $1.25. 

RIGNANO,  E.     Essais  de  Synthese  Scientifique.     Paris:  Alcan,  1912. 
Pp.  xxxi  +  294. 


Vol.  IX.  No.  7.  July  15,  1912, 


THE 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN 


GENERAL  REVIEWS  AND  SUMMARIES 
VISUAL  SPACE 

BY  PROFESSOR  G.  M.  STRATTON 

University  of  California 

The  tendency,  in  explaining  our  perception  of  depth,  to  make 
light  of  the  peculiarly  binocular  factors  continues  as  in  the  year 
preceding.  Jaensch,  in  an  elaborate  work  (7)  which  merits  a  fuller 
account  than  can  here  be  given,  dwells  upon  a  number  of  facts  which 
tell  against  the  importance  of  retinal  disparity.  For  him,  attention, 
especially  the  changes  and  sweep  of  attention  which  go  with  certain 
eye-movements,  are  particularly  emphasized,  after  recounting  a 
range  and  variety  of  his  own  experimental  findings.  In  several 
regions  he  discovers  apparent  shifts  of  depth  with  no  change  of  the 
binocular  situation.  He  brings  his  theory  into  connection  with  visual 
art  by  experiments  on  the  perception  of  intervening  illuminated 
media — colored  fluids,  and  the  like — and  believes  that  the  peculiar 
effects  which  are  observable  in  momentary  observation,  especially 
the  peculiar  character  of  the  attention-process  then,  help  to  explain 
the  contributions  of  impressionistic  painters.  Not  only  is  the  mode 
of  observing  which  such  painters  employ  peculiarly  successful  in 
detecting  "atmosphere,"  but  it  also  brings  in  other  influences  which 
heighten  the  aesthetic  effect.  Finally  he  divides  the  truth  which 
nativist  and  empiricist  each  claim  entire,  assigning  a  part  to  each. 

Other  experimenters  continue  this  process  of  subtracting  from  the 
supposed  binocular  influence.  Schubotz  (17)  repeating  Hillebrand's 
" Alice"  experiment  finds,  as  did  Hillebrand,  a  curvature  in  the  line 
of  objects  which  apparently  form  straight  rows  of  receding  equal 
lateral  extents;  the  direction  of  the  curvature,  .however,  sometimes 

249 


250  G.  M.  STRATTON 

departs  from  that  found  by  Hillebrand.  He  then  simplified  Hille- 
brand's  procedure,  by  arranging  receding  objects  into  a  single  row, 
instead  of  double  rows,  apparently  straight,  and  having  them  not 
simply  to  left  and  to  right,  but  also  above  and  below  the  line  of  sight. 
He  finds  curvature  in  all  these  cases;  in  the  vertical  plane,  where 
binocular  parallax  does  not  hold,  as  well  as  in  the  horizontal  direction 
where  it  does.  Hillebrand's  insistence  here  upon  the  importance  of 
binocular  parallax  is  therefore  unwarranted.  Especially  important 
is  the  fact  that  actual  curvature  occurs  in  these  apparently  straight 
lines  with  not  only  binocular,  but  also  with  monocular  observation, 
when  Hillebrand's  factor  is  absent.  Such  curvature,  he  holds,  is  an 
original  property  of  visual  space.  He  experimented  also  upon  the 
"stereoscopic  zone" — that  is,  the  range,  fore  and  aft,  of  a  given 
fixation  point,  within  which  there  is  noticeable  plastic  effect  without 
double-images;  upon  the  over-estimation  of  verticals,  finding  a 
difference  in  its  amount  according  as  the  line  is  observed  with  one 
or  with  two  eyes — a  result  which  does  not  exactly  tally  with  that 
since  reported  by  Valentine.1  This  overestimation  also  he  regards 
as  an  original  property  of  visual  space. 

Poppelreuter,  in  a  briefer  (14)  and  a  longer  (15)  report  upon  the 
same  topic,  likewise  attacks  Hillebrand's  conclusions  from  the 
"Alice"  experiment.  He  repeats  the  experiment,  with  various 
modifications,  finding  that  the  arrangement  which  produces  the  effect 
of  equal  amounts  of  increase  of  depth  is  actually  neither  a  series  of 
equal  binocular  disparities  nor  of  equal  differences  of  visual  angle, 
but  a  series  approximately  one  of  arithmetical  differences.  The 
"Alice"  curve  is  very  irregular,  especially  as  it  approaches  the  ob- 
server. The  arrangement  arrived  at  monocularly  differs  but  slightly 
from  that  reached  binocularly — thus  agreeing  with  the  findings  of 
Schubotz,  as  above.  Binocular  parallax  therefore,  as  against  Hille- 
brand, cannot  be  the  decisive  factor  in  such  depth  arrangements;  it 
but  intensifies  and  makes  more  impressive  and  stable  the  relief- 
effect  already  present  in  monocular  vision.  For  unless  "empirical" 
factors  for  the  production  of  relief  are  present  abundantly,  monocular 
depth  tends  to  fade  out,  especially  with  inattention,  and  repetition. 
Poppelreuter,  besides  arguing  against  Hillebrand,  opposes  Hering's 
contention  that  there  is  a  specific  depth  sensation.  Hering's  theory 
of  depth,  in  so  far  as  it  attributes  importance  to  a  physiological 
mechanism,  he  believes  to  be  sound  for  the  apparent  direction  of 
depth  changes,  but  not  for  their  apparent  amount.  In  an  appendix 

1  Brit.  J.  of  PsychoL,  1912,  5,  8-35. 


VISUAL  SPACE  251 

to  his  article,  Poppelreuter  describes  several  pieces  of  apparatus  for 
the  study  of  visual  space. 

Mampell's  dissertation  (9),  which  is  wholly  theoretical  and  does 
not  appear  to  have  taken  any  sufficient  account  of  the  literature  of 
the  subject,  surveys  various  theories  of  visual  space,  concluding  that 
extension,  depth,  and  direction  are  directly  given  as  sensuous  proper- 
ties of  the  visual  impression.  The  precise  localization  of  the  im- 
pression as  regards  distance,  whether  monocular  or  binocular,  is 
determined  by  experience.  Monnet  (10)  presents  with  true  Gallic 
clearness  certain  matters  of  depth-perception  that  have  long  been 
common  property. 

The  depth-effect  of  ordinary  single  photographs  is  considerably 
heightened,  according  to  Ponzo,  by  a  device  which  he  describes  (13). 
His  is  a  very  simply  apparatus  by  which  the  light  from  the  photo- 
graph is  twice  passed  through  a  convex  lens  and  is  reflected  in  a 
mirror  before  coming  to  the  observer's  eyes.  The  disturbance  due 
to  the  surface  of  the  photograph  itself  is  thus  doubly  reduced,  and  a 
vivid  plastic  effect  is  said  to  result  both  for  binocular  and  monocular 
vision.  Pigeon  (n)  describes  a  stereoscope  so  constructed  that  the 
picture  for  the  one  eye  can  be  shifted  vertically  and  for  the  other  eye 
horizontally, — a  device  applicable  not  only  to  the  study  of  binocular 
vision,  but  to  the  treatment  of  various  abnormalities  of  the  external 
optic  muscles.  Special  devices  add  to  its  value  for  the  medico-legal 
examination  of  disturbances  of  vision,  real  or  simulated.  Chaveau 
(3)  likewise  deals  with  stereoscopic  vision,  seemingly  having  redis- 
covered the  fact  of  retinal  rivalry.  The  dominance  of  the  image  in 
the  one  eye  over  that  in  the  other  is  aided  by  unsymmetrical  images, 
by  difference  of  acuity,  and  differences  of  brightness  and  distinctness 
in  the  opposing  images. 

The  changes  of  apparent  depth  in  the  well-known  figures  of 
ambiguous  perspective  is  studied  by  Benussi  (2).  With  catholic 
temper  he  accepts  the  entire  list  of  factors  urged  in  rival  theories  of 
these  phenomena — the  importance  of  changes  of  the  point  of  ocular 
fixation,  of  the  direction  of  attention,  of  the  readiness  of  certain  ideas 
to  arise,  of  the  different  relation  of  the  figure  to  the  surface  upon 
which  it  might  rest.  Each  and  all  of  these,  he  believes,  play  a  part. 
His  experimental  contribution  is  chronometric:  he  timed  the  appear- 
ance of  the  perspective  with  different  positions  of  a  given  figure;  and 
found  the  proportion  of  successes  and  failures  in  arriving  at  any 
perspective  when  the  exposure-time  is  reduced.  He  finds  that  the 
time  between  the  beginning  of  the  exposure  and  the  rise  of  perspective- 


252  G.  M.  STRATTON 

effect  is  about  three  times  as  great  when  the  position  of  the  drawing 
is  such  as  to  prevent  a  normal  rest  and  stability  of  the  object.  For 
each  position  of  the  drawing  there  is  a  preferred  perspective.  The 
reduction  of  the  exposure-time  reduces  the  number  of  cases  where 
perspective  appears.  Repetition  does  not  regularly  reduce  the  time 
of  appearance  of  the  perspective — a  fact  which  Benussi,  I  think 
unwarrantably,  believes  should  make  us  cautious  in  explaining  here 
by  empirical  and  associational  factors.  The  stages  by  which  the 
perspective  arises  are,  according  to  Benussi,  these:  the  sensory  im- 
pressions from  line  and  ground  are  first  worked  up  mentally  into  a 
two-dimensional  form;  and  only  upon  this  form  as  a  basis,  and  not 
directly  upon  the  impressions  themselves,  does  the  plastic  effect  arise. 

Passing  now  to  a  group  of  articles  dealing  with  the  perception  and 
the  after-effect  of  motion,  Dufour  (4,  5,  6)  describes  an  apparatus  for 
the  study  of  the  after-effect  of  visual  movement — an  apparatus  in 
principle  such  as  has  long  been  familiar  in  this  country.  For  Plateau's 
spiral  he  substitutes  a  belt-surface  with  alternate  parallel  stripes 
of  black  and  white  set  at  a  right-angle  to  the  direction  of  motion. 
He  finds  transfer  of  after-effect  from  stimulated  and  unstimulated 
eye — a  finding  which  he  seems  not  to  be  aware  had  long  ago  been 
noted  by  other  observers — even  with  motions  of  translation  (instead 
of  rotation),  for  which  alone  he  claims  his  observations  to  be  novel. 
Easier  (i)  measures  the  interval  between  the  close  of  the  motion 
which  serves  as  visual  stimulus  and  the  beginning  of  the  after-motion 
in  vision,  and  finds  it  to  be  0.5-0.8  sec.  This  interval  does  not 
seem  to  be  affected  either  by  the  speed,  the  direction,  or  the  intensity 
of  the  stimulating  movement.  Stratton  (18)  finds  that  rapid  motion 
in  vision,  if  it  is  to  be  perceived  as  motion,  must  occupy  a  time  that 
is  approximately  the  same  as  that  of  the  least  succession  which  we 
can  notice;  and  this  fact,  conjoined  with  his  earlier  finding  that  the 
least  extent  within  which  motion  is  observable  is  approximately  the 
same  as  the  just-noticeable  difference  of  visual  points  in  space,  takes 
away  all  ground  for  supposing  that  the  visual  experience  of  motion 
is  something  unique  and  elemental  and  independent  of  our  experience 
of  space  and  of  time. 

Regnault  (16)  notes  a  number  of  widespread  divergences  between 
the  representation  of  movement  visually  and  the  form  of  the  actual 
movement  as  revealed  by  instantaneous  photography.  From  the 
art  of  the  Bushmen  to  that  of  the  Greek  sculptors  there  are  certain 
universal  exaggerations  of  the  spread  of  the  legs  in  running,  the  rise 
of  the  body  above  the  ground,  as  well  as  in  certain  "dyschronisms," 


VISUAL  SPACE  253 

i.  <?.,  where — as  in  the  discus  thrower,  and  in  the  representation  of  the 
running  of  animals  and  of  men — phases  of  movement  actually  distinct 
in  time  are  seen  and  represented  as  though  simultaneous.  Ponzo  (12), 
observing  "  motion-pictures,"  has  noted  a  number  of  interesting 
fusions  from  sources  outside  of  vision — as  when  he  seems  to  hear  the 
visible  water-fall  or  carriage,  smell  the  new-mown  hay,  or  feel  the 
coolness  of  the  sea.  Usually  he  is  able  to  find  something  in  the  actual 
impressions  from  these  non-visual  senses  that  give  a  sensory  basis  for 
the  fusion — impressions  that  would  be  quite  unnoticed  if  they  did 
not  happen  to  fit  into  the  total  visual  object.  But  such  fusions 
occur  for  him  only  when  he  does  not  aim  to  observe  them;  when  he  is 
off  his  guard. 

Evidence  is  tellingly  arrayed  by  McDougall  (8),  in  a  mass  and 
detail  impossible  here  to  reproduce,  that  corresponding  retinal  points 
are  not  connected  with  a  common  cortical  center;  at  the  central  parts 
immediately  connected  with  consciousness  the  paths  taken  by  the 
excitation  from  corresponding  points  are  anatomically  distinct. 
Yet  there  is  an  intimate  functional  relation — now  a  reciprocal 
inhibition  and  now  a  reciprocal  reinforcement  of  the  processes  arising 
from  such  points.  The  anatomical  separation  of  the  centers,  Mc- 
Dougall feels,  works  against  Bering's  theory  of  color,  and  in  favor 
of  the  Young-Helmholtz  theory.  An  interesting  though  incidental 
feature  of  the  paper  is  McDougalPs  adoption  of  the  idea  that  instead 
of  looking  for  a  special  cause  of  fusion  in  things  mental,  fusion  is  the 
fundamental  and  inevitable  process  and  to  be  taken  for  granted 
wherever  there  is  no  special  cause  working  for  discrimination.  The 
impressions  from  points  in  the  two  eyes,  therefore,  must  always  be 
seen  singly  unless  there  be  a  special  motive  for  distinguishing  them — 
either  a  different  quality  or  a  different  motor  tendency  in  the  two 

impressions. 

REFERENCES 

1.  BASLER,  A.    Ueber  das  Sehen  von  Bewegungen.    VI.  Mitteilung.    Der  Beginn  des 

Bewegungsnachbildes.     P finger's  Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  Pkysiol.,  139,  611-622. 

2.  BENUSSI,  V.    Ueber  die  Motive  der  Scheinkorperlichkeit  bei  umkehrbaren  Zeich- 

nungen.     Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  Psychol.,  20,  363-396. 

3.  CHAVEAU,  A.     Phenomenes  d'inhibition  visuelle  qui  peuvent  accompagner  la 

reassociation  des  deux  images  retiniennes  dissociees  par  les  prismes  du  stereo- 
scope. Conditions  et  determinisme  de  ses  phenomenes.  Comptes  Rendus  des 
Seances  de  I1  Academic  des  Sciences,  152,  481-487. 

4.  DUFOUR,  M.     Sur  la  spirale  de  J.  Plateau.     Comptes  Rendus  des  Seances  de  la 

Sociele  de  Biologie  (Paris),  70,  151-2. 

5.  DUFOUR,  M.    Un  appareil  permettant  de  faire  certaines  experiences  d'optique 

physiologique.     Ibid.,  70,  295-6. 


254 


DANIEL  STARCH 


6.  DUFOUR,  M.     Sur  quelques  phenomenes  d'optique  physiologique  (Deuxieme  note). 

Ibid.,  70,  485-487. 

7.  JAENSCH,   E.   R.    Ueber   die   Wahrnehmung   des   Raumes.     Zsch.  f.    Psychol., 

Erganzungsband  6.     Pp.  488. 

8.  McDouGALL,  W.     On  the  Relations  between  Corresponding  Points  of  the  Two 

Retinae.     Brain,  33,  37i~388. 

9.  MAMPELL,  H.     Zur  Theorie  des  rdumlichen  Sehens.     (Dissertation.)     Strassburg, 

1909. 

10.  MONNET,  R.     La  perception  de  la  troisieme  dimension.    /.  de  psychol.  norm,  et 

path.,  8,  104-127. 

11.  PIGEON,  L.     Sur  un  stereoscope  a  coulisses.     Comptes  Rendus  des  Seance s  de  I'Aca- 

demie  des  Sciences,  152,  1111-1114- 

12.  PONZO,  M.     Quelques  observations  psychologiques  faites  durant  des  representa- 

tions cinematographiques.     Arch.  ltd.  de  Biol.,  56,  81-86. 

13.  PONZO,  M.    Un  appareil  pour  la  vision  plastique  du  photographies.     Ibid.,  56, 

125-126. 

14.  POPPELREUTER,  W.     Beitrage  zu  einer  Theorie  der  scheinbaren  Grosse.     Bericht 

iiber  den  IV.   Kongress  fur  experimented  Psychologie   (in  Innsbruck,    1910). 
Leipzig,  1911,  269-270. 

15.  POPPELREUTER,  W.     Beitrage  zur  Raumpsychologie.     Zsch.  f.  Psychol.,  58,  200- 

262. 

16.  REGNAULT,  F.     Le  mouvement  dans  le  photographic  et  dans  1'art.     Comptes 

Rendus  des  Seances  de  la  Societe  de  Biologic ,  70,  342-343. 

17.  SCHUBOTZ,  F.    Beitrage  zur  Kenntnis  des  Sehraumes  auf  Grund  der  Erfahrung. 

Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  Psychol.,  20,  101-149. 

18.  STRATTON,  G.  M.    The  Psychology  of  Change;  How  is  the  Perception  of  Move- 

ment related  to  that  of  Succession?     Psychol.  Rev.,  1911,  18,  262-293. 


AUDITORY  SPACE 

BY  PROFESSOR  DANIEL  STARCH 

University  of  Wisconsin 

Very  little  work  has  been  done  on  auditory  space  during  the  past 
year.  M.  Truschel  (2)  briefly  reports  some  experiments  to  determine 
the  factors  concerned  in  detecting  the  presence  of  objects  by  the 
blind.  The  head  of  a  blind  subject  was  shielded  in  various  ways 
while  a  piece  of  cardboard  suspended  from  the  end  of  a  stick  was 
moved  about  and  placed  in  various  positions  to  see  how  accurately 
the  subject  could  detect  its  presence  and  location.  M.  Truschel 
concludes  that  the  chief  factor  is  the  localization  of  the  noises  reflected 
from  the  objects  and  that  odor,  air  currents,  and  temperature  stimuli 
are  entirely  secondary. 

M.  Pouget's  (i)  article  has  only  very  indirect  bearing  on  auditory 
space.  He  describes  a  test  employed  in  Prof.  Siebenmann's  clinic 


TACTUAL  AND  KINASTHETIC  SPACE  255 

in  Basel  for  measuring  auditory  acuity.  It  is  the  well  known  method 
of  comparing  the  length  of  time  that  a  tuning  fork  can  be  heard  by  a 
normal  ear  and  by  the  ear  to  be  tested.  This  method  has  been  found 
satisfactory  for  diagnostic  purposes. 

REFERENCES 

1.  POUGET,  R.  J.     Determination  du  champs  auditif.     Arch,  de  laryng.,  ot.,  rhin.t 

1911,32,470-475. 

2.  TRUSCHEL.     Contribution  a  1'etude  du  sens  de  la  direction  chez'les  aveugles.     C. 

r.  acad.  d.  sci.,  1911,  152,  1022-1024. 


TACTUAL  AND   KIN^STHETIC   SPACE 

BY  ROSWELL  P.  ANGIER 

Yale  University 

Cook  and  v.  Frey  (2)  studied  the  influence  of  the  intensity  of 
stimulation  on  the  values  of  simultaneous  spatial  thresholds  of  the 
skin,  using,  as  the  area  of  stimulation,  the  volar  surface  of  the  left 
forearm.  Two  sorts  of  apparatus  were  employed,  by  means  of 
which  stimuli  of  graded  intensities  and  limiting  different  extents 
on  the  skin  could  simultaneously  be  applied  under  admirably  uni- 
form conditions.  Between  any  two  applications  of  stimuli  there 
was  usually  an  interval  of  30  seconds.  It  was  found  that  the  spatial 
discrimination  of  two  intenser  stimuli  was  consistently  easier  than 
that  of  two  weaker,  and  this  with  a  range  of  stimulation  from  just 
perceptible  to  nearly  painful  intensities.  The  forearm  threshold 
sank,  indeed,  to  2  cm.  or  less  with  intenser  and  rose  to  6  cm.  or 
more  with  weaker  stimuli.  Exceedingly  important,  however,  for 
exact  results,  was  a  preliminary  subjective  equation  o'f  the  sen- 
sations from  the  points  stimulated,  an  equation  that  had  occasion- 
ally to  be  repeated  during  the  course  of  the  experiments.  Under 
the  most  favorable  conditions  attainable  (intense  stimuli  subjec- 
tively equated  on  pressure  points  mediating  similar  sense-qualities), 
the  absolute  values  of  the  simultaneous  two-point  threshold  varied, 
with  four  subjects,  from  1.5  to  3.0  cm.  With  unequal  intensities 
of  the  two  stimulations  the  threshold  became  greater^  rising  even 
to  8  cm.  This  influence  of  unequal  intensities  comes  out  with 
great  clearness  if  two  unequal  extents,  determined  by  three  limiting 
points  in  a  straight  line,  are  compared;  if  points  I  and  2  limit  the 
shorter  extent,  and  points  2  and  3  the  longer,  an  increase  of  the 
intensity  of  point  3  will  make  extent  2-3,  even  if  objectively  twice 


256  ROSWELL  P.  ANGIER 

as  long  as  1-2,  seem  the  shorter.  It  appears,  indeed,  that  two 
simultaneously  given  stimuli  exert,  in  a  spatial  sense,  an  attraction 
effect  on  each  other,  for  a  comparison  of  extents  occurs  with  greater 
certainty  if  given  successively  (i  sec.  interval).  The  attraction 
is  a  function  of  intensity  in  the  sense  that  the  point  less  intensely 
stimulated  appears  displaced  towards  that  more  strongly  stimulated. 

Chinagli  (i)  discovered  that  if  a  circle  of  wood  or  other  ma- 
terial, 5  mm.  thick,  and  with  any  diameter  smaller  than  35  mm., 
is  placed  on  the  skin — preferably  of  the  forehead — it  is  felt  as 
a  filled  disc.  Similarly  with  triangles,  squares,  etc.  Further- 
more, if  a  point  within  the  circle  was  touched,  verbal  localization 
placed  it  outside  the  circle,  but  pointing  localization  within  the 
circle. 

Ponzo  (3)  gives  a  summary  of  articles  by  him  already  published 
in  the  Memorie  deW  Accad.  delle  Scienze  di  Torino^  serie  2,  t.  LX., 
1909,  and  t.  LXL,  1910,  on  the  localization  of  tactual  and  pain 
sensations  on  the  skin.  Twenty-five  different  areas  of  the  body 
were  examined,  in  each  of  which  ten  specially  sensitive  points  were 
marked  and  tactually  stimulated  with  v.  Frey's  sesthesiometer. 
After  each  stimulation  the  subject  pointed  with  a  rod  to  the  point 
stimulated,  the  extent  and  the  direction  of  error  being  recorded. 
The  error  of  direction  was  determined  with  reference  to  a  constant 
axis.  For  pain  Kiesow's  sesthesiometer  was  used.  It  was  found 
that  the  errors  differed  in  both  size  and  direction  in  the'various  areas, 
but  were  fairly  constant  for  a  given  area.  There  was  no  stable 
relation  between  threshold-value  and  accuracy  of  localization,  nor 
any  decrease  in  accuracy  with  lower  intensities  of  stimulation. 
Maximal  accuracy  appeared  on  the  tip  of  the  tongue,  the  cushion 
of  the  index  finger  and  the  middle  of  the  lower  lip;  minimal  accuracy 
in  the  costal  region.  The  extent  of  the  tactual  errors  corresponded 
well  with  those  given  by  Weber.  The  accuracy  of  localization  of 
painful  stimuli  proved  to  be  as  great  as  that  for  tactual.  Finally, 
the  results  showed  that  for  all  the  regions  investigated  most  of  the 
errors,  as  well  as  the  greatest  mean  errors,  were  in  the  longitudinal 
direction. 

Ponzo  also  reports  two  new  instruments  for  cutaneous  investi- 
gation. One  (4  and  5)  is  a  simple  arrangement  for  investigating 
simultaneous  spatial  thresholds.  It  secures,  particularly,  quick 
variation  or  equalization  of  pressures  and  involves  a  device  for 
registering  any  time  differences  in  the  applications  of  the  two  stimuli. 
With  it  the  author  secured  average  differences  of  less  than  3  sigma. 


SPACE  ILLUSIONS  257 

The  other  apparatus  (6  and  7)  is  likewise  simple  and  is  designed  to 
secure  rapid  measurement  of  the  extent  and  direction  of  errors  in 
the  localization  of  cutaneous  sensations. 

REFERENCES 

1.  CHINAGLIA,  L.      Riempimento  soggettivo  di  spazi  vuoti  nel  campo  delle  sensazion 

cutanee.     Riv.  di  Piscol.,  1912,  8,  133-135. 

2.  COOK,  H.  D.,  &  FREY,  M.  v.     Der  Einfluss  der  Reizstarke  auf  den   Wert   der 

simultanen  Raumschwelle  der  Haut.     Zsch.  f.  Biol.,  1911,  56,  537-573. 

3.  PONZO,  M.     Recherches  sur  la  localisation  des  sensations  tactiles  et  des  sensations 

dolorifiques.     Arch.  ltd.  de  biol.,  1911,  55,  1-14. 

4.  PONZO,  M.     Sur  un  nouveau  compas  pour  mesurer  les  perceptions  d'espace  dans 

le  champ  des  sensations  cutanees.     Arch.  ital.  de  biol.,  1911,  56,  139-144. 

5.  PONZO,  M.     Ueber  einen  neuen  Zirkel  fur  die  Bestimmung  der  simultanen  Raum- 

schwellen  der  Korperhaut.     Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  Psychol.,  1911,  22,  390-394. 

6.  PONZO,  M.     Sur  un  appareil  pour  la  determination  facile  et  precise  de  la  grandeur 

et  la  direction  des  erreurs  de  localisation  dans  le  champ  des  sensations  cutanees. 
Arch.  ital.  de  biol.,  1911,  56,  148-150. 

y.  PONZO,  M.  Ueber  einen  Apparat  zur  Bestimmung  der  beim  Lokalisieren  von 
Hautempfindungen  begangenen  Fehler  und  deren  Richtungen  (Dermolokali- 
meter).  Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  PsychoL,  1911,  22,  105-107. 


SPACE  ILLUSIONS 

BY  PROFESSOR  HARVEY  CARR 

University  of  Chicago 

Ponzo  in  his  two  papers  (5,  6)  gives  a  restatement  of  some  facts 
and  apparatus  which  he  has  previously  published  in  other  journals, 
and  which  were  reviewed  in  last  year's  report.  Schmidt  (7)  gives  a 
translation  and  commentary  of  a  lately  discovered  Latin  manuscript 
of  Kant  which  consists  mainly  of  notes,  partly  disconnected,  used  in 
a  disputation.  His  various  arguments,  possessing  but  little  psycho- 
logical interest,  are  directed  against  the  thesis  of  his  opponent  that 
the  sense  illusions  and  the  dominance  of  the  perceptual  furnish  the 
clue  for  the  interpretation  of  much  in  the  literature  of  early  peoples. 

Benussi's  work  (i)  on  solidity  reversals  of  ambiguous  figures  was 
instigated  by  that  of  Becher  and  de  Boer  reported  last  year.  The 
time  of  cognition  reactions  for  the  perception  of  solidity  was  taken 
for  one  observer  for  four  positions  of  a  cube.  One  type  of  solidity 
prevailed  for  each  position.  The  reaction  times  varied  greatly  for 
the  four  positions.  Practice  decreased  the  times  but  in  an  irregular 
manner.  Tachistoscopic  exposures  with  many  subjects  for  two 
intervals  demonstrated  that  the  frequency  of  the  solidity  perception 


258  HARVEY  CARR 

was  related  to  the  length  of  the  exposure,  though  generalizations  are 
regarded  as  unsafe  because  of  the  presence  of  after-images.  The 
most  important  facts  are  those  derived  from  introspective  observa- 
tions: Sides  differ  in  apparent  size  as  well  as  apparent  depth,  though 
there  is  no  correlation  between  the  two,  as  reversals  in  depth  occurred 
without  any  change  in  relative  size.  The  solidity  often  appears  to 
have  a  reference  to  a  vertical  plane  as  its  base  and  not  to  a  horizontal 
plane.  Lines  non-essential  to  solidity  were  often  unnoticed.  The  eye 
movement  and  fixation  hypotheses  are  discarded;  motives  of  "Boden- 
standigkeit"  are  not  always  available;  reproductive  processes  are 
not  the  exclusive  factor,  as  practice  does  not  decrease  the  reaction 
times  regularly.  Certain  arrangements  of  plane  lines  are  associated 
with  a  definite  type  of  solidity,  and  reversals  are  due  to  the  fluctuating 
dominance  of  these  plane  patterns. 

Hofmann  (2)  in  studying  the  relation  between  the  apparent  direc- 
tions of  the  horizontal  and  vertical  noted  that  he  invariably  gave 
them  both  an  anti-clockwise  twist  from  their  true  positions.  He 
normally  holds  his  head  inclined  to  the  right  and  his  tests  indicate 
that  this  head  inclination  is  due  to  an  asymmetrical  ocular  tension, 
and  that  this  tension  is  responsible  for  the  deviation  of  the  apparent 
direction  of  the  two  lines. 

The  article  of  Pieron  (4)  consists  mainly  of  an  excellent  digest  of 
the  literature  on  the  Miiller-Lyer  illusion.  His  tests  are  supple- 
mentary to  previous  experimentation.  He  maintains  that  the 
illusion  is  based  upon  a  double  mechanism,  i.  e.,  two  theories  are 
applicable.  In  momentary  exposures,  estimation  is  inaccurate  and 
the  illusion  persists  with  practice;  these  facts  are  explicable  in  terms 
of  the  Einthoven  conception.  With  prolonged  exposure,  eye  move- 
ments are  regarded  as  the  effective  factor. 

Tichy  (9)  worked  with  the  Poggendorff  illusion  on  eight  subjects 
using  a  variety  of  methods.  His  results  disagree  with  Wundt's 
statement  that  a  reversal  of  the  illusion  occurs  for  the  horizontal 
position  when  the  intervening  space  is  composed  of  a  series  of  vertical 
lines.  He  found  that  the  "continuation  line"  is  invariably  located 
in  the  direction  of  the  obtuse  angle.  There  is  not  even  a  diminution 
of  the  illusion  for  the  horizontal  position.  The  illusion  does  not 
depend  upon  binocular  vision,  freedom  or  fixity  of  fixation,  knowledge 
or  ignorance.  Its  size  varies  directly  with  the  size  of  the  intervening 
space  and  inversely  with  the  size  of  the  angle.  The  facts  lead  him  to 
reject  the  Wundtian  motives  and  to  accept  an  explanation  in  terms 
of  a  tendency  of  the  eyes  to  cross  the  intervening  space  by  as  short 
a  line  as  possible. 


SPACE  ILLUSIONS  259 

Lewis  (3)  and  Valentine  (10)  continue  the  Cambridge  work  with 
the  tachistoscopic  projection  method.  Valentine  attacks  the  theories 
of  Lipps  and  Kiilpe  as  to  the  vertical-horizontal  illusion.  The 
indefiniteness  of  the  Lippsian  concept  does  not  render  it  subject  to 
conclusive  experimental  disproof  and  the  author  does  not  regard  his 
tests  as  final.  In  opposition  to  the  theory  of  Kiilpe  that  the  contour 
of  the  visual  field  produces  the  illusion  by  contrast,  he  finds  that  the 
value  of  the  illusion  is  greater  for  monocular  vision  where  there  is  less 
disparity  between  the  vertical  and  horizontal  diameters  of  the  visual 
field.  Significant  facts  noted  are:  Practice  increased  the  illusion 
with  three  subjects;  the  value  of  the  illusion  differs  for  the  two  eyes; 
and  there  is  some  indication  that  a  maximum  value  is  correlated  with 
a  definite  length  of  line.  No  theory  is  advanced.  Lewis  worked  with 
filled  and  unfilled  visual  extents  and  found:  The  illusion  is  largest 
with  momentary  exposure;  its  size  does  not  vary  directly  with  the 
length  of  the  line;  there  is  a  maximal  effect  with  a  certain  degree  of 
filling;  prolonged  exposure  and  a  minimum  of  filling  produce  under- 
estimation; prolonged  exposure  and  unsymmetrical  filling  diminish 
the  illusion;  and  practice  destroys  the  effect  very  quickly.  The 
effective  factors  are  thus  duration  of  exposure,  practice,  amount  and 
arrangement  and  nature  of  the  filling.  The  Wundtian,  Hering  and 
all  physiological  theories  are  discarded  and  an  appeal  is  made  to  the 
judgmental  aspect  of  perception. 

Schubotz  (8)  seems  to  be  mainly  interested  in  a  comparison  of 
monocular  and  binocular  space.  He  has  constructed  a  very  compli- 
cated and  interesting  apparatus  which  will  not  allow  of  a  brief  de- 
scription. He  deals  with  four  problems,  (i)  In  the  vertical- 
horizontal  illusion  as  exemplified  in  the  square,  he  finds  no  correlation 
between  its  size  and  the  distance  from  the  observer  with  varying 
convergence.  With  fixation  beyond  the  square,  overestimation 
increases  with  decrease  of  depth.  Its  size  varies  somewhat  directly 
with  the  size  of  the  square.  There  was  no  maximum  value  as  found 
by  Valentine.  He  agrees  with  Valentine  that  monocular  vision  gives 
the  largest  illusion.  (2)  By  a  transparent  mirror  he  superimposed 
extents  monocularly  perceived  upon  those  binocularly  seen.  There 
was  no  difference  with  prolonged  exposure.  With  some  conditions 
of  observation,  a  slight  binocular  underestimation  was  correlated  with 
a  nearer  depth  location.  (3)  He  determined  the  form  of  apparent 
straight  lines  extending  in  the  third  dimensional  direction.  Such 
apparent  straight  lines  are  really  straight  when  located  at  the  height 
of  the  eyes.  Lines  above  and  below  the  eyes  are  curved  in  the  middle 


260  WILBUR  M.   URBAN 

down  and  up  respectively.  The  construction  of  two  such  lines  makes 
the  curvature  greater  and  opposite  to  that  which  would  occur  for 
one  line.  The  results  are  similar  with  monocular  vision.  (4)  He 
attempted  to  determine  the  scope  or  range  of  binocular  unitary  vision. 
The  near  range  is  less  than  the  far  range.  The  lateral  and  the  depth 
ranges  are  intimately  connected.  The  depth  range  is  greater  for 
points  adjacent  to  the  median  line;  it  is  increased  by  a  multiplicity 
of  objects  in  the  field,  and  decreased  when  the  fixation  is  lateral  to 

the  median  plane. 

REFERENCES 

1.  BENUSSI,  V.    Ueber  die  Motive  der  Scheinkorperlichkeit  bei  umkehrbaren  Zeich- 

nungen.     Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  PsychoL,  1911,  20,  363-396. 

2.  HOFMANN,  F.  B.     Der  Einfluss  schrager  Konturen  auf  die  scheinbare  Horizontale 

und  Vertikale.     Ber.  IF.  Kongress  f.  exper.  PsychoL,  1911,  236-239. 

3.  LEWIS,  E.  O.    The  Illusion  of  Filled  and  Unfilled  Space.     Brit.  J.  of  PsychoL, 

1912,  5,  36-50- 

4.  PIERON,  H.     L'illusion  de  Miiller-Lyer  et  son  double  mecanisme.     Rev.  phil., 

1911,  71,  245-284. 

5.  PONZO,  M.     Sur  une  nouvelle  illusion  dependant  du  croisement  des  doigts.     Arch. 

ltd.  de  bioL,  1911,  56,  127-128. 

6.  PONZO,  M.     Sur  quelque  illusions  dans  le  champ  des  sensations  tactiles.     Arch.  ital. 

debioL,  1911,  55,  20-34. 

7.  SCHMIDT,  B.  A.     Eine  bisher  unbekannte  lateinische  Rede  Kants  iiber  Sinnes- 

tauschung  und  poetische  Fiktion.     Kantstud.,  1911,  16,  5-21. 

8.  SCHUBOTZ,  F.    Beitrage  zur  Kenntnis  des  Sehraumes  auf  Grund  der  Erfahrung. 

Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  PsychoL,  1911,  20,  101-149. 

9.  TICHY,  G.    Ueber  eine  vermeintliche  optische  Tauschung.     Zsch  f.   PsychoL, 

1912,  60,  267-279. 

10.  VALENTINE,  C.  W.     Psychological  Theories  of  the  Horizontal-Vertical  Illusion. 
Brit.  J.  of  PsychoL,  1912,  5,  8-35. 


VALUES 

BY  PROFESSOR  WILBUR  M.  URBAN 

Trinity  College 

The  history  of  Value-theory  for  1911  is  to  be  found  more  in  its 
enrichment  of  other  fields  of  inquiry  than  in  any  noteworthy  additions 
to  the  psychological  and  technical  side  of  the  subject.  The  "trail" 
leads  one  to  chapters  on  the  Consciousness  of  Value  in  books  on 
religion  (7),  to  studies  of  the  psychology  of  value  in  books  on  eco- 
nomics (i)  and  indeed,  as  will  appear,  to  strictly  philosophical  trea- 
tises themselves.  As  a  preliminary  to  this  review,  however,  the 
pronouncement  of  that  veteran  of  the  subject,  Meinong  (10),  on 


VALUES  261 

fundamental  questions,  deserves  the  first  place.  Prepared  by  special 
invitation  of  the  ethical  section  of  the  Bologna  Congress  for  1911, 
this  discussion  of  the  vexed  question  of  psychology  and  "  Psychologis- 
mus"  in  the  theory  of  value  justifies  in  every  way  his  colleagues' 
expectations  of  authoritative  treatment.  His  survey  of  the  situation 
results  in  the  conclusion  that  "the  psychological  study  of  values 
which  has  hitherto  not  been  without  results,  must  continue  to  go 
its  way  untroubled."  "Zu  fehlerhaften  Psychologismus  wiirde  solche 
Psychologic  aber  werden,  wenn  man  sich  um  ihretwillen  der  Anerken- 
nung  und  Wiirdigung  der  Thatsachen  unpersonlichen  Wertes  iiber- 
heben  zu  diirfen  meinte." 

Of  the  many  fruitful  contacts  of  the  subject  with  the  social 
sciences  two  may  be  noted  here.  Durkheim's  paper  (4)  also  read 
before  the  Bologna  Congress,  and  which,  we  are  told,  made  a  profound 
impression,  explicitly  defines  sociology  as  a  science  of  values,  attempt- 
ing to  show  how  it  may  make  values  its  subject-matter  and  yet 
remain  a  science,  how  it  may  conceive  them  as  the  products  of  social 
life  without  treating  them  as  merely  natural  phenomena.  As  an 
attempt  to  deal  with  very  delicate  questions,  to  avoid  the  difficulties 
both  of  naturalism  and  transcendentalism,  and  to  make  values  the 
objects  of  description  without  robbing  them  of  their  character  as 
values  and  ideals,  the  paper  deserves  close  attention. 

Anderson's  book,  favorably  received  in  many  quarters,  seeks  a 
reconstruction  of  economic  theory  in  the  light  of  an  adequate  concept 
of  "social  value."  Criticizing  the  "faulty  presuppositions"  of  eco- 
nomic theory,  "avowed  or  implicit,"  he  attempts  "to  reconstruct 
them  in  the  light  of  later  epistemological,  psychological  and  socio- 
logical doctrine."  In  this  development  of  "a  truly  organic  doctrine 
of  social  value"  he  makes  extended  use  of  the  psychological  studies  of 
Meinong,  Tarde  and  Urban,  and  is  influenced  throughout  by  the 
epistemological  conceptions  of  Dewey.  He  concludes  that  "value  is 
a  quantity,  socially  valid,  not  logically  dependent  upon  exchange, 
but  prior  to  it."  "The  determinants  of  value  include  not  only  the 
highly  abstract  factors  that  the  value  theories  criticized  have  under- 
taken to  handle  arithmetically,  but  also  all  the  other  volitional 
factors  in  the  inter-mental  life  of  men  in  society."  Above  all,  he 
stresses  the  "presuppositions"  of  economic  value,  ethical  and  legal. 

In  his  study  of  James's  Religious  Philosophy,  K.  A.  Busch  says: 
"One  thing  he  as  well  as  others  has  brought  to  light:  the  final  phi- 
losophy must  be  a  theory  of  value."  Again  in  reporting  the  Bologna 
Congress  for  the  Revue  Philosophique,  M.  Rey  tells  us  that,  as  the 


262  WILBUR  M.   URBAN 

Heidelberg  Congress  had  been  preoccupied  with  pragmatism,  so  that 
of  1911  was  concerned  primarily  with  the  problem  of  values,  in  the 
domains  of  science,  religion,  art,  and  morals.  The  former  statement 
may  be  but  an  obiter  dictum,  as  the  latter  is,  perhaps  an  exaggeration; 
yet  it  is  in  this  spirit  that  many  are  working.  As  indicative  of  the 
interest  in  these  problems  one  may  note  such  papers  as  those  of 
Mauge  (9)  and  Gillett  (5).  In  Germany,  two  books  by  Liidemann 
(8)  and  Pfordten  (12)  also  continue  the  discussion  of  the  fundamental 
epistemological  and  philosophical  value-problems.  The  first,  by  a 
professor  of  theology,  is  an  acute  polemic  against  any  deduction  of 
existential  from  value-judgments,  and  is  valuable  for  its  critical 
account  of  the  use  of  value-judgments  in  both  philosophy  and 
theology.  The  second  breathes  the  spirit  of  the  so-called  Freiburg 
school,  but  is  distinguished  in  an  interesting  fashion  by  a  realistic 
activistic  note.  Conceptual  constructions  have  normative  value 
when  they  permit  of  "ein  Wirken  auf  ein  Werden." 

Whether  or  not  a  final  philosophy  must  be  a  theory  of  value, 
recent  developments  seem  to  indicate  that  the  value-concept  is  at 
least  a  temporary  preoccupation.  The  discussions  between  Mr.  J.  E. 
Russell  and  Mr.  Quick  (13,  16,  17)  if  they  have  not  settled  the 
question  of  the  priority  of  truth  or  value,  have  at  least  shown  that 
value  so  dogs  the  steps  of  truth  as  to  be  inseparable  from  it.  This 
form  of  the  "ego-centric  predicament,"  if  it  be  such,  is  likely  to 
continue  to  give  trouble.  Significant  from  this  point  of  view  are 
Bosanquet's  Gifford  Lectures  for  1911  (3).  A  distinct  attempt  to 
rewrite  absolute  idealism  from  the  point  of  view  of  value,  it  is  not 
surprising  that,  for  its  author,  "logic  is  the  spirit  of  value."  Notable 
for  the  proof  it  gives  of  how  the  permanent  insights  of  this  way  of 
thinking  may  be  illuminated  and  clarified  by  the  value-concept,  the 
unfortunate  results  of  an  apparent  disdain  of  the  technical  discussions 
of  the  subject  are  evident.  The  most  unsatisfactory  part  of  the 
book  is  the  discussion  of  the  value-concept  itself  in  Chapter  VII. 
As  a  contribution  to  this  rewriting  of  idealism,  Rubenstein's  paper 
(15)  is  also  worth  noting. 

It  has  been  charged  that  "every  idealistic  theory  of  the  world 
has  as  its  ultimate  premise  an  unsupported  judgment  of  value." 
This  is  no  less  true  of  realism.  The  last  chapter  of  Perry's  new  book 
(n),  a  chapter  entitled  "A  Realistic  Theory  of  Life,"  is  at  least  an 
explicit  recognition  of  this,  realism's  most  pressing,  problem.  If  it 
is  the  least  satisfactory  chapter  of  an  interesting  book,  it  is  still 
sufficient  to  show  how  far  the  "  new  realism  "  is  from  any  ade- 
quate solution  of  its  problem. 


VALUES  263 

Fully  one  third  of  Baldwin's  new  book  (2)  is  taken  up  with  what 
may  be  called  the  "logic  of  valuation."  For  him,  value  represents 
a  distinct  and  specific  mediation  of  the  real,  to  be  put  side  by  side  with 
the  mediation  of  thought  and  logic.  "Both  are  vital  approaches  to 
the  real,  since  each  is  an  essential  movement  in  the  commerce  of 
thought  with  things."  It  is  only,  he  holds,  by  a  complete  understand- 
ing of  both  these  types,  with  their  presuppositions  and  immanent 
conditions,  that  we  reach  a  higher  immediacy  that  includes  them 
both — for  him  the  aesthetic.  A  somewhat  similar  view,  arrived  at 
also  by  an  analysis  of  valuation,  is  presented  by  H.  M.  Kallen  in  a 
recent  article  (6). 

That  the  present  realistic-idealistic  impasse  in  philosophy  is  to 
be  broken  through  only  by  becoming  more  and  more  conscious  of 
the  unsupported  value  presuppositions  of  both,  is  becoming  more  and 
more  clear.  The  important  paper  of  Rickert  (14)  is  doubtless  no 
final  solution  of  the  problem,  but  it  is  at  least  suggestive  in  its  insist- 
ence that  the  true  boundary  line  (in  contrast  to  the  various  oppositions 
in  philosophy,  of  which  the  idealistic-realistic  is  perhaps  the  most 
pronounced)  does  not  run  within  existence,  between  the  subjective 
and  objective  halves  of  reality,  but  between  the  total  existence, 
whether  subjective  or  objective,  and  that  sphere  that  lies  beyond 
them  both,  that  is  the  sphere  of  values." 

REFERENCES 

1.  ANDERSON,  B.  M.,  JR.     Social  Value.     A  Study  of  Economic  Theory,  Critical  and 

Constructive.     Houghton  Mifflin  Co.,  1911.      Pp.  xviii-f-2O4. 

2.  BALDWIN,  J.  M.     Thought  and  Things.     Vol.  III.    London:  Allen;  New  York: 

Macmillan,  1911.     Pp.  xxi+284. 

3.  BOSANQUET,  B.     The  Principle  of  Individuality  and  Value.     Macmillan  &  Co., 

1911.  Pp.  xxxvii+4O3. 

4.  DURKHEIM,  E.     Jugements  de  valeur  et  jugements  de  realite.     Rev.  de  Met.  et  de 

Mor.,  1911,  19,  437-453- 

5.  GILLETT,  M.  S.     Les  jugements  de  valeur  et  la  conception  positive  de  la  morale. 

Rev.  des.  Sci.  Phil,  et  Theol.,  6,  5-31. 

6.  KALLEN,  H.  M.     Beauty,  Cognition  and  Goodness.     /.  of  Phil.,  PsychoL,  etc., 

1912,  9,  253-265. 

7.  KING,   IRVING.     The  Development  of  Religion.     New  York:   Macmillan,    1911. 

Chapter  III. 

8.  LUDEMANN,  H.     Das  Erkennen  und  die   Werturteile.     Leipzig:  Heinsius,    1910. 

Pp.  viii+23i. 

9.  MAUGE,  F.     La  philosophic  scientifique  comme  systeme  de  valeurs.     Rev.  phil.^ 

1910,  69,  387-408. 

10.  MEINONG,   A.      Fur   die   Psychologic   und   gegen   den   Psychologismus    in   der 
allgemeinen  Werttheorie.     Logos,  3,  No.  I. 


264  GUY  MONTROSE  WH1PPLE 

11.  PERRY,  R.  B.     Present  Philosophical  Tendencies.      New  York:  Longmans,  1912. 

Pp.  xv+383. 

12.  PFORDTEN,  O.   v.   D.     Konformismus.     Eine  Philosophic  der  normativen   Werte. 

I.  Tl.    Heidelberg:  Winter,  1910.     Pp.  iii  +  156. 

13.  QUICK,  O.  C.     The  Humanist  Theory  of  Value:  A  Criticism.     Mind,  1910,  19, 

218-230;  20,  256-257. 

14.  RICKERT,  H.    Vom  Begriff  der  Philosophic.     Logos,  i,  No.  i. 

15.  RUBINSTEIN,  M.     Das  Wertsystem  Hegels  und  die  entwertete  Personlichkeit. 

Kantstud.,  1910,  15,  263-269. 

16.  RUSSELL,  J.  E.    The  Humanist  Theory  of  Value.     Mind,  1910,  19,  547-549. 

17.  RUSSELL,  J.  E.    Truth  as  Value  and  Value  as  Truth.     Mind,  1911,20,538-539. 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  TESTIMONY  AND  REPORT 

BY  PROFESSOR  GUY  MONTROSE  WHIPPLE 

Cornell  University 

The  most  ambitious  and  important  contribution  to  the  psychology 
of  testimony,  or — to  speak  psychologically  rather  than  in  the  language 
of  jurisprudence — to  the  psychology  of  report,  is  the  work  of  the 
Commission  of  the  Institute  for  Applied  Psychology  for  the 
Investigation  of  Pedagogical  Problems  of  the  Psychology  of  Report. 
The  members,  ten  in  number,  including  such  well-known  writers 
as  Meumann,  Stern,  Lipmann,  and  Gross,  planned  to  study  the 
educability  of  report,  to  determine  whether  testimony  could  be 
improved  by  training  and  to  such  an  extent  as  to  make  it  wort,h  while, 
and  they  determined  also  to  use  only  events  as  test-objects,  rather 
than  to  cling  longer  to  the  picture-tests  and  mere  verbal  tests  of  the 
pioneer  experiments.  Five  studies  of  educability  had  already  been 
made  and  some  15  studies  had  used  events  as  test-materials,  but 
no  previous  study  had  combined  these  two  features. 

The  Commission  decided  to  employ  physical  demonstrations  as 
test-material,  because  these  demonstrations  can  be  repeated  with 
exactness,  are  familiar  in  nature  to  school  children  and  command  their 
fullest  attention.  After  elaborate  preliminary  trials,  three  appara- 
tuses were  selected  and  with  each  three  demonstrations  were  made. 
The  apparatuses  were  (i)  a  tank  of  CO2,  stored  under  pressure  in 
fluid  form,  (2)  an  air-pump,  and  (3)  a  rotation  apparatus.  With 
the  last-named,  to  take  but  one  piece,  the  three  demonstrations  were 
(a)  the  effect  of  centrifugal  force  upon  a  vessel  of  water,  (b)  the 
flattening  of  elastic  circular  rings  under  rotation,  and  (c)  color- 
mixture.  The  details  of  all  nine  demonstrations  are  chronicled 
minutely  and  illustrated  by  numerous  photographs. 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF   TESTIMONY  AND  REPORT  265 

The  observers  were  196  girls,  aged  12  to  13  years. 

In  order  to  bring  about  a  possible  effect  of  training,  each  observer 
witnessed  all  three  experiments  (9  demonstrations)  given  at  intervals 
of  one  week,  and  after  each  experiment  its  three  demonstrations  were 
immediately  repeated  and  the  observer  corrected  his  written  report. 
The  report  itself  was  made  by  filling  out  a  printed  form  in  which  was 
included  (for  each  experiment  of  three  demonstrations)  a  series  of  12 
questions.  These  questions  were  so  arranged  as  to  be  substantially 
equivalent  from  the  one  experiment  to  the  next.  They  were  also 
classified  into  seven  categories,  according  as  they  referred  to  events, 
to  the  statements  of  the  demonstrator,  to  duration,  to  sequence,  to 
localization,  to  color,  and  to  dimensions.  For  example:  "What 
happened  when  I  opened  the  stop-cock?"  "What  did  I  say  when  I 
fastened  the  rubber  tube  to  the  iron  tank?"  "What  color  was  the 
rubber  tube?"  etc.  The  original  report  was  made  in  ink.  The 
revisions  (following  the  repetition  of  the  experiment)  were  made  on 
the  same  form  but  in  pencil.  The  article  by  Baade  (i)  deals  with  the 
results  for  the  questions  on  the  words  of  the  demonstrator  only,  that 
of  Lipmann  (4)  with  those  on  color,  sequence  and  localization  only. 
The  results  for  the  other  categories  will  appear  later. 

The  net  results  of  the  experiment,  so  far  as  testimony  on  verbal 
features  was  concerned,  was  that  no  demonstrable  improvement 
appeared,  either  as  a  result  of  the  repetition  of  each  experiment  or  as 
the  result  of  the  succession  of  the  three  experiments.  The  earlier 
experiments  did  exert  a  strong  influence  upon  the  subsequent  experi- 
ments, but  this  influence  was  sometimes  favorable  and  sometimes 
unfavorable.  Baade  has,  however,  done  excellent  work  in  elaborating 
a  system  of  scoring  which  promises  to  afford  an  exactness  in  dealing 
with  "logical  memory  tests"  as  great  as  that  now  enjoyed  in  dealing 
with  "rote  memory"  tests. 

Lipmann,  in  scoring  the  estimates  of  duration  and  size,  has  also 
devised  methods  of  scoring  data  which,  though  too  complex  to  be 
reproduced  here,  will  be  of  assistance  to  those  who  work  in  this  field. 
The  data  show  that  there  is,  on  the  whole,  some  improvement  in  these 
estimates  as  the  result  of  the  successive  experiments,  but  only  a  very 
slight  improvement  as  the  result  of  repetition  of  experiments.  In 
general,  durations  (8"  to  3.5')  are  strongly  overestimated,  while 
extents  (19  to  57  cm.)  are  commonly  underestimated.  There 
appeared  no  positive  training-effect  in  reports  on  colors,  locations  and 
sequences,  but  the  repetitions  did  bring  about  a  decided  improvement 
in  these  answers.  As  a  rule,  a  pupil  who  displayed  much  inaccuracy 


266  GUY  MONTROSE  WEIPPLE 

in  his  original  report  also  displayed  relatively  much  inaccuracy  in 
his  "corrected"  report. 

So  far  as  reported,  therefore,  these  elaborate  and  painstaking 
experiments  yield  a  negative  result,  and  will  be  chiefly  valuable  in 
clearing  the  way  for  further  studies  of  the  training  of  observation 
and  memory,  in  which  more  potent  and  vigorous  influences  are 
brought  into  play  to  effect  the  improvement. 

A  second  experimental  study  of  the  educability  of  report  is  pre- 
sented in  the  work  of  Franken  (2),  who  employed  what  he  terms  the 
"Methode  der  Entscheidungs-  und  Bestimmungsfragen."  One  hundred 
questions,  drawn  from  school  work,  were  propounded  to  150  pupils, 
aged  ii  to  12.5  years.  Each  question  was  given  first  in  a  form  to  be 
answered  by  "  yes  "  or  "  no. "  ("  Do  you  know  what  city  is  the  capital 
of  Norway?")  After  50  such  questions,  the  series  was  repeated  in  a 
form  that  demanded  a  specific  answer.  ("What  city  is  the  capital  of 
Norway?")  At  this  point  the  pupils  of  one  section  checked  up  their 
answers;  those  of  the  second  section  were  simply  told  that  the  next 
set  of  questions  would  be  given  in  both  forms.  All  the  pupils  then 
answered  a  second  lot  of  50  questions  in  both  forms.  Comparison  of 
the  answers  in  the  first  and  second  form,  in  the  first  and  second  half 
of  the  test,  and  in  the  first  and  second  sections  then  permits  con- 
clusions as  to  the  effects  of  training.  Seven  coefficients  of  report  are 
devised  and  formulas  are  worked  out  for  each  of  them.  The  net  result 
is  an  improvement  in  cautiousness  in  asserting  positive  knowledge, 
though  answers  of  "yes"  followed  by  no-answer  or  by  a  false  answer 
still  persist.  The  method  is  of  obvious  interest  and  usefulness.1 

Lipmann  (5)  is  convinced  that  the  unreliability  of  reports  of 
children  is  due  in  the  main  to  two  things:  first,  the  child  does  not 
distribute  his  attention  in  the  same  way  as  the  adult  (though  his 
attention  is  usually  well  enough  concentrated  on  those  details  that 
he  does  report);  secondly,  the  child  is  uncritical  in  filling  out  gaps 
in  his  memory  and  uses  freely  material  supplied  through  custom, 
through  his  own  imagination  or  through  suggestion.  It  follows  that 
the  training  of  the  child  in  correct  report  must  transform  his  distri- 
bution of  attention  to  one  corresponding  to  that  of  the  adult  and 
must  develop  a  critical  attitude  toward  misstatements  in  filling  out 
gaps. 

Miss  Oppenheim  (6)  has  extended  the  "rumor-test"  of  Stern, 
Michel,  and  Kulischer  by  using  two  anecdotes,  given  in  immediate 

1  This  article  will  be  reviewed  somewhat  more  fully  in  an  early  number  of  the 
Journal  of  Educational  Psychology. 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  TESTIMONY  AND  REPORT  267 

succession,  with  the  idea  of  obtaining  conditions  more  akin  to  those 
of  daily  life,  particularly  of  determining  whether  details  of  the  one 
story  get  confused  with  those  of  the  other.  Each  story  was  trans- 
mitted through  five  observers,  adult  women.  The  results  show 
strikingly  how,  even  in  so  few  stages  as  this,  rumor  becomes  extra- 
ordinarily unreliable.  There  is,  in  general,  a  progressive  abbreviation 
of  the  anecdotes;  the  story  becomes  less  definite  and  more  general  in 
phrasing;  each  report  deviates  in  two  or  three  points  from  the  pre- 
ceding; the  errors  are  confusions,  substitutions,  alterations  of  temporal 
and  spatial  setting;  names  and  dates  suffer  particularly. 

Schramm  (8)  compared  16  men  and  16  women  students  at  Freiburg 
University  by  the  aid  of  Stern's  test-story.  It  was  read  once  to  them 
and  reported  24  hours  later.  This  is  virtually  a  test  of  "logical 
memory."  The  author  concludes  that  the  data  point  toward  a  slight 
superiority  of  the  women,  but  the  reviewer  does  not  find  that  the 
differences  exceed  the  probable  error  of  the  results. 

Virtually  identical  is  the  method  followed  by  Vos  (12),  who  read 
a  4O-element  story  to  boys  and  girls  9  to  14  years  old,  and  obtained 
reproductions  three  days  later.  From  his  800  reports  he  draws  these 
inferences:  report  is  very  good  at  the  age  of  9,  best  at  10,  then  deteri- 
orates decidedly  to  13,  but  improves  at  14.  Boys  surpass  girls,  both 
in  narrative  and  deposition,  save  that  boys  are  less  cautious  when 
ignorant  (more  liable  to  give  false  answers  than  no  answers).  Boys 
are  at  their  worst  at  13,  girls  at  9  and  12.  Pupils  from  the  better 
class  of  homes  do  better  than  those  from  the  poorer  districts.  There 
are  more  errors  in  the  deposition  than  in  the  narrative,  even  though 
no  suggestive  questions  are  asked.  The  test  hinges  chiefly  on 
auditory-verbal  memory. 

The  work  of  Heindl,  Reichel  and  Varendonck  bears  more  directly 
on  the  application  of  the  psychology  of  testimony  to  jurisprudence. 
Heindl  (3)  sought  to  measure  quantitatively  the  amount  of  error 
in  signaletic  reports.  He  used  mass  tests  and  talks  almost  entirely 
in  terms  of  averages.  His  method  of  computation  is  open  to  improve- 
ment, as  Lipmann  points  out,  and  despite  the  extraordinary  mass  of 
data  obtained  (20,000  reports  and  80,000  computations),  it  is  ques- 
tionable whether  he  has  derived  the  practical  conclusions  that  he 
sought.  In  brief,  his  method  was  this:  observers  stated  or  estimated 
the  stature,  age,  color  of  hair  and  form  of  face,  either  of  a  stranger 
who  appeared  conspicuously  before  them  for  four  minutes  or  of  a 
well-known  person  not  present  during  the  reporting.  Heindl  con- 
cludes, among  other  things,  that  children  are  perfectly  good  observers, 


268  GUY  MONTROSE  WHIPPLE 

perhaps  more  objective  than  adults,  but  cannot  translate  their  obser- 
vation into  report  skillfully.  Sample  conclusions  are:  children 
overstimate  the  stature  of  a  strange  man  by  12  cm.,  of  a  strange 
woman  by  5.7  cm.,  of  well-known  persons  by  5.6  cm.,  etc. 

Reichel  (7)  is  a  jurist,  who  writes  to  impress  other  jurists  with 
the  need  of  acquaintance  with  the  psychology  of  testimony.  He 
presents  a  good  account  of  the  present  status  of  forensic  psychology, 
shows  in  concrete  cases  how  lack  of  psychological  insight  may  affect 
the  administration  of  justice,  and  proposes  plans  for  the  study  of 
forensic  psychology  at  universities. 

The  contribution  of  Varendonck  (n)  appeals  to  jurists,  psycholo- 
gists and  educators  alike.  He  was  one  of  several  psychologists 
summoned  by  the  defense  at  a  murder  trial  in  Belgium  to  give 
expert  testimony  concerning  the  reliability  of  the  testimony  of  two 
girls,  8  and  10  years  old,  whose  declarations  seemed  likely  to  secure 
a  conviction.  Varendonck  analyzed  the  records  of  the  preliminary 
hearings,  reviewed  the  history  of  the  psychology  of  testimony,  and 
conducted  a  half-dozen  striking  experiments  upon  school  children  to 
demonstrate  the  unreliability  of  their  reports  when  implicative  and 
expectative  questions  are  employed.  The  presentation  of  his  testi- 
mony elicited  violent  outbursts  from  the  court  authorities,  but  it 
reached  the  jury  and  induced  a  verdict  of  "not  guilty."  The  psy- 
chology of  testimony  has,  therefore,  found  its  way  formally  into  the 
court  room  and  saved  a  man's  life.1 

The  literature  upon  the  psychology  of  testimony  was  assembled 
by  Stern  (9)  in  1909  for  the  period  prior  to  1908.  The  same  writer 
has  now  published  a  bibliography  (10)  of  53  titles  covering  the  period 
1908  to  1910. 

REFERENCES 

1.  BAADE,  W.    Aussage    iiber    physikalische   Demonstrationen.     (Mit  besonderer 

Beriicksichtigung  der  Frage  der  Erziehbarkeit  der  Aussage.)  I  Abh.  Die 
Methodik  der  Versuche  u.  die  Inhalte  der  Textaussagen.  Zsch.  f.  angew. 
Psychol.,  1911,  4,  189-311. 

2.  FRANKEN,  A.    Ueber  die  Erziehbarkeit  der  Erinnerrungsaussage  bei  Schulkindern. 

Zsch.  f.  pad.  Psychol.  u.  exp.  Pddag.,  1911,  12,  Hft.  12,  635-642. 

3.  HEINDL,  R.     Die  Zuverlassigkeit  von  Signalamentaussagen.     H.  Grots'  Archw, 

1909,  33,  109-132. 

4.  LIPMANN,  O.     Aussage  iiber  physikalische  Demonstrationen.     (Mit  besonderer 

Beriicksichtigung  der  Frage  der  Erziehbarkeit  der  Aussage.)  2  Abh.  Die 
Schatzungen  u.  d.  Ergebnisse  der  Farben-,  Lokalisations-  u.  Sukzessionsfragen. 
Zsch.f.  angew.  Psychol.,  1911,  4,  312-334. 

1  For  details  the  reader  is  referred  to  the  Journal  of  Criminal  Law  and  Criminology, 
in  an  early  issue  of  which  the  reviewer  will  present  a  more  elaborate  analysis  of  the 
testimony  of  these  children  and  of  Varendonck's  experiments. 


SUGGESTION  269 

5.  LIPMANN,  O.     Pedagogical  Psychology  of  Report.     /.  of  Educ.  Psychol.,  1911, 

2,  253-261. 

6.  OPPENHEIM,  ROSA.     Zur  Psychologic  des  Geruchtes.     Zsch.  f.  angew.  Psychol., 

1911,  5,  344-355- 

7.  REICHEL,  H.     Ueber  forensische  Psychologie.     Miinchen:  Bech,   1910.     Pp.  64. 
•  8.  SCHRAMM,  FRITZ.     Zur  Aussagetreue  der  Geschlechter.     Zsch.  f.  angew.  Psychol., 

19",  5,  355-357- 

9.  STERN,  C.  &  W.     Erinnerung  u.  Luge  in  der  ersten  Kindheit.     Leipzig:  Earth, 
1909.     Pp.  160. 

10.  STERN,  W.     Bibliographic  zur  Psychologie  der  Aussage,   1908-1910.     Zsch.  /. 

angew.  Psychol.,  1911,  4,  378-381. 

11.  VARENDONCK,   J.     Les   Temoignages   d'Enfants   dans   un   Proces   Retentissant. 

Arch,  de  Psychol. ,  1911,  n,  129,  171. 

12.  Vos,  H.  B.  L.     Beitrdge  zur  Psychologie  der  Aussage  bei  Schulkindern.     Analyse 

d.    Aussage   uber   eine   gehorte    Erz'Mung.    Amsterdam:    dissertation,    1909. 
(Eigenbericht  in  Zsch.  f.  angew.  Psychol.,  1911,  4,  375-378.) 


SUGGESTION 

BY  PROFESSOR  WALTER  DILL  SCOTT 

Northwestern  University 

Chojecki  (i)  carried  on  a  series  of  experiments  on  suggestion  in 
the  University  of  Geneva,  using  as  subjects  thirty  men  and  thirty 
women  of  the  university.  His  tests  were  three  in  number:  The  heat 
illusion;  the  Binet  test  on  suggested  increase  in  the  length  of  a  series 
of  lines;  and  increased  and  decreased  tactual  sensitivity  produced  by 
a  magnet.  There  was  found  a  very  low  degree  of  correlation  between 
the  suggestibility  as  discovered  by  the  different  tests.  In  this 
particular  Chojecki  verified  the  results  of  all  investigators  of  recent 
years.  His  results  differ  from  his  predecessors  in  that  he  found  more 
men  suggestible  than  women.  If  this  result  should  be  verified  by 
later  researches  we  shall  be  compelled  to  cast  aside  the  time-honored 
tradition  that  women  are  more  suggestible  than  men. 

Of  a  book  of  350  pages  Jacoby  (2)  devotes  almost  200  pages  to  a 
presentation  of  suggestion.  He  discriminates  between  suggestion 
and  such  other  related  mental  phenomena  as  auto-suggestion  and 
association  of  ideas.  The  discussion  is  unusually  sane  and  scientific 
for  a  presentation  of  this  particular  subject  and  is  one  intended  for 
the  general  public. 

MacDougall  (6)  applies  the  term  "contrary  suggestion"  to  a 
group  of  reactions  that  could  not  be  wisely  designated  by  any  other 
single  term.  The  following  quotations  present  in  brief  MacDougall's 
conception  of  suggestion,  contrary  suggestion  and  the  part  the  two 


270  WALTER  DILL  SCOTT 

play  in  the  development  of  the  individual  mind.  "  The  first  and  more 
elementary  form  is  that  of  slavish  imitation,  in  which  the  suggestion 
is  uncritically  received  and  put  into  execution.  It  represents  the 
primary  and  immediate  reaction  upon  a  stimulus  which  at  the  moment 
dominates  consciousness.  In  such  a  case  the  mind  of  the  imitator  is 
narrow  and  meager,  since  the  suggestion  is  either  uncomplicated  by 
any  system  of  associated  ideas,  or  by  such  only  as  are,  in  an  ele- 
mentary sense,  congruous  with  it.  It  is  the  type  of  reaction  which  we 
call  unreflective  or  precipitate.  To  have  become  characteristic  of  an 
individual  marks  him  as  deficient  in  all  forms  of  intellectual  freedom 
and  independence"  (pp.  384-385).  "The  second  form  of  defect  is 
manifested  in  an  obstinate  opposition  to  what  has  been  suggested.  It 
represents  the  second  stage  in  development,  in  which  the  idea  offered 
to  the  mind  arouses  a  counter-idea  which  takes  exclusive  possession 
of  the  consciousness.  The  outcome,  in  so  far  as  the  psychological 
nature  of  the  reaction  is  concerned,  is  thus  equally  elementary  with 
that  of  slavish  imitation"  (p.  385).  "Contrary  suggestion  represents 
the  method  by  which  the  child  naturally  passes  from  an  uncritical 
acceptance  of  suggestions  and  their  immediate  embodiment  in  action, 
to  a  reflective  consideration  of  the  respective  values  of  two  alternative 
courses  when  offered  for  selection,  and  finally  to  deliberate  action  and 
reasoned  reflection  in  all  their  forms"  (p.  377).  The  discussion  is 
not  confined  to  the  place  of  counter-suggestion  as  a  phase  in  the 
development  of  the  mind  of  the  individual,  but  a  very  satisfactory 
discussion  is  given  of  the  place  of  counter  suggestion  in  the  social 
activities  of  the  individual. 

In  his  later  treatises  (4,  5)  Jones  merely  reaffirms  propositions  laid 
down  in  his  larger  contribution  (3).  He  defines  suggestion  so  broadly 
that  it  includes  practically  all  conscious  and  "unconscious"  cognitive 
and  affective  processes  (pp.  218,  219).  Such  a  definition  finds 
justification  historically  in  a  few  eminent  English  psychologists. 
Thomas  Brown,  for  instance,  used  suggestion  in  this  broad  way, 
although  he  did  not  include  under  it  unconscious  processes.  Instead 
of  using  the  term  in  this  broad  way  throughout  his  discussion,  Jones 
actually  employs  it  with  a  narrow  and  unusual  signification.  The 
usage  is  so  extraordinary  that  it  reminds  one  of  the  manner  in  which 
Thomas  Reid  used  the  term  suggestion  to  signify  magic.  Jones  uses 
the  term  to  express  the  transference  of  an  affective  attitude  (usually 
sexual)  to  an  object  (usually  the  physician)  other  than  that  which 
originally  stimulated  that  particular  attitude  (pp.  224,  249).  If  the 
term  suggestion  were  properly  restricted  to  this  narrow  sense  and 


PSYCHOTHERAPY  271 

identified  with  transference  of  an  emotional  attitude  (usually  uncon- 
scious), then  Jones  would  be  justified  in  attacking  those  who  assert 
that  the  results  secured  by  psychotherapy  are  secured  by  a  process  of 
reeducation  in  which  suggestion  is  the  principle  or  exclusive  method. 
However,  to  identify  suggestion  with  transference  is  to  go  counter 
to  the  historical  and  ordinary  usage  of  the  term. 

REFERENCES 

1.  CHOJECKI,  A.     Contribution   a   1'etude  de  la  suggestibilite.     Arch,  de  PsychoL, 

1911,  u,  182-186. 

2.  JACOBY,  G.  W.     Suggestion  and  Psychotherapy.     New  York:  Charles  Scribner's 

Sons,  1912.     Pp.  355. 

3.  JONES,  ERNEST.    The  Action  of  Suggestion  in  Psychotherapy.     /.  of  Abnorm. 

PsychoL,  1911,  5,  217-254. 

4.  JONES,  ERNEST.    The  Therapeutic  Effect  of  Suggestion.    /.  /.  PsychoL  u.  Neur.t 

1911,  17,427-432. 

5.  JONES,  ERNEST.    The  Therapeutic  Action  of  Psycho-analysis.     Rev.  of  N enrol. 

and  Psychiat.,  1912,  10,  1-12. 

6.  MACDOUGALL,  R.     Contrary  Suggestion.     /.  of  Abnorm.  PsychoL,  1912,  6,  368-391. 


PSYCHOTHERAPY 

BY  DR.  HARRY  MILES  JOHNSON 

The  Johns  Hopkins  University 

The  number  of  recent  articles  which  may  be  grouped  under  this 
caption  is  large;  the  proportion  which  contain  matter  of  especial 
psychological  interest  is  small. 

Cutten  (6)  and  Bruce  have  written  for  the  general  reader  on 
methods  in  psychotherapy.  The  attempt  of  the  former  is  the  more 
ambitious.  He  includes  in  his  discussion  primitive  methods  which 
obtained  in  different  nations;  some  "healing  miracles"  of  the  early 
Christian  church;  a  defense  of  the  character  of  Mesmer;  an  enumera- 
tion of  cases  of  healing  by  rejics,  visits  to  shrines,  the  royal  touch,  etc. 
There  are  interesting  passages  on  Schlatter,  the  Christian  Science 
movement  and  the  Emmanuel  movements,  although  there  is  little 
in  the  discussion  which  is  new  or  of  unusual  importance.  The 
method  of  treatment  is  expository  throughout.  The  whole  argument 
is  rather  disconnected,  but  the  work,  in  the  opinion  of  the  reviewer,  is 
of  considerable  value  as  a  reference-volume.1  Bruce's  work  (4)  is  a 
collection  of  eight  popular  essays.  Its  purpose  is  at  least  frankly 
stated:  To  inform  the  reader  that  there  are  psychotherapeutical 

1  See  special  review  in  this  iournal,  1911,  8,  259. 


272  HARRY  MILES  JOHNSON 

methods  in  practical  use  other  and  better  than  those  used  by  Christian 
Scientists  and  similar  practitioners.  Although  the  author  hopes  that 
scientific  as  well  as  general  readers  may  find  the  work  valuable,  the 
treatment  is  really  quite  superficial.  Some  very  commonplace  inci- 
dents and  doctrines  are  embellished  after  the  style  of  a  descriptive 
novel.  The  opening  essay  is  on  the  evolution  of  mental  healing,  and 
is  an  enumeration  of  theories  ancient  and  modern.  In  the  chapter 
entitled  Masters  of  Mind,  the  author,  himself  a  layman,  unhesi- 
tatingly selects  four  men  for  eulogy  as  the  "world's  greatest  psycho- 
pathologists."  There  are  chapters  on  hypnotism  and  on  secondary 
selves.  We  are  told  that  suggestion  is  the  chief  factor  in  both 
scientific  and  religious  "mental  healing"  but  that  the  true  scientist 
knows  that  it  cannot  be  used  as  a  cure-all.  The  author  deals  tenderly 
and  admiringly  with  the  work  of  the  psychic  researchers,  differ- 
entiating spiritists  from  adherents  to  theories  of  telepathy.  He  avers 
that  the  psychic  researchers  deserve  great  credit  for  inspiration  of 
scientific  men:  more  than  one  of  the  four  psychopathologists  whom  he 
ranks  as  the  world's  greatest  have  become  interested  in  their  present 
work  through  an  early  interest  in  psychic  research.  The  work  closes 
with  an  essay  in  appreciation  of  William  James.  In  the  reviewer's 
opinion  the  contribution  to  popular  enlightenment  made  by  this 
book  is  slight. 

The  psychoanalytic  literature  is  voluminous.  An  extensive 
critique  of  the  method  of  Freud  is  made  by  Kronfeld  (13).  The  first 
70  pages  are  devoted  to  an  exposition  of  Freud's  theory,  following 
which  is  a  detailed  criticism  of  his  principal  assumptions  and  hypoth- 
eses on  factual  and  logical  grounds.  Kronfeld  asserts  that  Freud 
is  guilty  of  petitio  principii  in  assuming  the  truth  of  his  hypotheses. 
Their  validity,  says  Kronfeld,  can  be  shown  only  by  the  correctness 
of  the  results  obtained  by  the  methods  derived  from  the  hypotheses; 
but  there  is  no  criterion  of  the  correctness  of  the  results,  save  the 
validity  of  the  hypotheses  by  which  they  are  to  be  interpreted. 
Bleuler  (2)  attacks  the  tendency  of  many  of  Freud's  followers  to 
overgeneralize,  and  particularly  censures  the  efforts  which  members 
of  that  school  frequently  make  to  treat  psychopathologically  the 
experiences  of  poets,  artists,  etc.  He  regards  Freud's  doctrines  of 
"unconscious  thought-processes,"  sublimation,  censorship,  etc.,  as 
"not  proven,"  and  as  more  or  less  obscure.  However,  he  expresses 
admiration  for  his  general  work,  and  recommends  an  open-minded 
attitude  toward  the  Freudian  tenets. 

Burrow   (5)   and   Kostyleff   (12)   have  given   brief  conventional 


PSYCHOTHERAPY  273 

descriptions  of  the  work  of  Freud  and  Jung.  Kostyleff  has  included 
in  his  article  some  comments  on  current  criticism  of  Freud's  doctrines. 
The  danger  of  indiscriminate  application  of  the  psychoanalytic 
methods  and  of  their  use  by  the  novice  is  pointed  out  by  Freud 
(9,  7),  while  Putnam  (15)  urges  the  importance  of  clear  metaphysical 
thinking  in  dealing  with  problems  with  which  the  method  is  concerned. 

Brill  (3)  and  Jones  (n)  have  followed  Freud  (8)  in  the  main  in 
an  attempt  at  psychopathological  interpretation  of  experiences  of 
every  day  life.  All  these  communications  follow  the  same  general 
line  of  argument,  but  that  of  Jones  is  apparently  the  most  extra- 
ordinary. His  main  thesis  is  that  "certain  inadequacies  of  our  mental 
functioning,  and  certain  apparently  purposeless  performances,  can 
be  shown  by  means  of  psychoanalysis  to  have  been  determined  by 
motives  of  which  we  were  not  at  the  time  aware."  (Italics  mine.) 
The  "determining"  factor  is  always  a  repressed  wish,  and  some  of 
the  consequents  determined  by  it  are  slips  of  the  tongue  or  pen, 
erroneously  performed  reactions  and  "automatic"  reactions;  also, 
forgetting  errands  or  names  and  "erroneous  perception."  Numerous 
incidents  are  cited,  many  being  personal.  The  author's  reason  for 
saying  that  the  repressed  feelings  "determine"  these  reactions,  is 
that  a  train  of  free  association,  pursued  far  enough,  will  reach  such 
an  experience,  which  for  the  time  had  been  forgotten.  To  the 
reviewer  such  reasoning  post,  ergo  propter  hoc,  seems  particularly 
treacherous.  The  metaphysical  assumptions  implied  in  such  a  thesis 
are  also  hard  to  reconcile  with  those  which  seem  necessary  to  account 
satisfactorily  for  other  experiences.  In  the  reviewer's  judgment, 
articles  of  this  type  emphasize  the  need  of  the  sharpest  distinction 
between  the  clinical  and  the  logical  aspects  of  the  Freudian  doctrines. 
Whatever  clinical  value  the  psychoanalytic  methods  may  have 
should  indeed  be  demonstrable  by  the  records  of  the  "thousands  of 
cases"  to  which  they  have  been  applied.  But  that  the  doctrines  are 
useful  as  clinical  tools  does  not  prove  that  they  are  logically  consistent. 
And  to  the  reviewer,  at  least,  it  is  not  yet  evident  that  either  therapy 
or  psychology  can  be  permanently  benefited  by  theorizing  on  the 
basis  of  such  generalizations  as  Freud,  Jones  and  Brill  use  in  these 
articles. 

Acher  (i)  and  van  Teslar  (17)  have  given  abstracts  of  numerous 
recent  publications  on  psychoanalysis,  most  of  which  are  not  men- 
tioned in  this  review. 

Frink  (10),  Rank  (16),  Nepalleck  (14)  and  Wingfield  (18)  give 
accounts  of  the  application  of  psychoanalysis  to  problems  under  their 
own  observation.  Their  reports,  however,  are  conventional. 


274  HARRY  MILES  JOHNSON 

REFERENCES 

1.  ACHER,  R.     Recent  Freudian  Literature.     Amer.  J.  of  Psychol,  1911,  22,  408-443. 

2.  BLEULER,  E.     Die  Psychoanalyse  Freuds.     Jahrb.  f.  psychoanal.  u.  psychopathol. 

Forsch.,  1910,  2,  623-730. 

3.  BRILL,  A.  A.    A  Contribution  to  the  Psychopathology  of  Everyday  Life.     JPjy- 

chotherapy,  3,  5-20. 

4.  BRUCE,  H.  A.     Scientific  Mental  Healing.     Boston:  Little,  Brown  &  Co.,  1911. 

Pp.  viii+258. 

5.  BURROW,  T.    Some  Psychological  Phases  of  Medicine.     /.  of  Abnorm.  Psychol., 

1911,  6,  205-213. 

6.  CUTTEN,  C.  B.     Three  Thousand  Years  of  Mental  Healing.    New  York:  Scribners, 

1911.    Pp.  viii+3i8. 

7.  FREUD,  S.     Nachtrage  zur  Traumdeutung.     Zentbl.  f.  Psychoanal.,  1911,  i,  187- 

192. 

8.  FREUD,    S.     Z«r   Psychopathologie   des    Alltaglebens.     (3    verm.    Aufl.)     Berlin: 

Karger,  1910.    Pp.  149. 

9.  FREUD,  S.    Ueber  "wilde"  Psychoanalyse.     Zentbl.  f.  Psychoanal.,  1910,  1,91-95. 

10.  FRINK,  H.  W.     Psychoanalysis  of  a  Mixed  Neurosis.    /.  of  Abnorm.  Psychol. , 

1911,  6,  185-204. 

11.  JONES,  E.    The  Psychopathology  of  Everyday  Life.     Amer.  J.  of  Psychol.,  1911, 

22,  477-527. 

12.  KOSTYLEFF,  N.    Freud  et  le  traitement  moral  des  nevroses.     /.  de  psychol.  norm. 

et  pathol.,  1911,  8,  246-257. 

13.  KRONFELD,   A.    Ueber  die   psychologischen   Theorien   Freuds   und   verwandte 

Anschauung.     Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  Psychol.,  1911,  22,  117-248. 

14.  NEPALLECK,  R.    Analyse  einer  scheinbar  sinnlosen  infantilen  Obsession.     Zentbl. 

f.  Psychoanal.,  1911,  i,  155-157. 

15.  PUTNAM,  J.  J.    A  Plea  for  the  Study  of  Philosophic  Methods  in  Preparation  for 

Psychoanalytical  Work.    /.  of  Abnorm.  Psychol.,  1911,  6,  249-264. 

16.  RANK,  O.     Ein  Traum,  der  sich  selbst  deutet.     Jahrb.  f.  psychol.  u.  psychopathol. 

Forsch.,  1910,  2,  465-540. 

17.  VAN  TESLAR,  J.  S.     Recent  Literature  of  Psychoanalysis.     Amer.  J.  of  Psychol., 

1912,  23,  115-139- 

1 8.  WINGFIELD,  H.     Four  Cases  Illustrative  of  Certain  Points  in  Psychoanalysis. 

Brit.  Med.  J.,  2,  256-257. 


SPECIAL  REVIEWS 

CHAPTERS  FROM  MODERN  PSYCHOLOGY 

Chapters  from  Modern  Psychology.  JAMES  ROWLAND  ANGELL.  New 
York:  Longmans,  Green,  and  Co.,  1912.  Pp.  vii  +  308. 
This  book  contains  eight  lectures  which  Professor  Angell  delivered 
at  Union  College  during  the  early  part  of  the  year  1911.  As  the 
lectures  were  prepared  for  presentation  to  a  general  college  audience, 
they  remain  on  the  surface  of  the  science.  The  entire  field  of  psy- 
chology is  sketched,  but  only  those  facts  described  which  are  necessary 
for  a  general  idea  of  the  subject.  The  style  is  of  that  clearness, 
fluency,  and  simplicity  which  we  are  accustomed  to  associate  with 
the  author,  so  that  the  book  will  not  only  interest  the  layman,  but 
will  afford  the  scientist  several  enjoyable  hours. 

The  first  chapter  is  upon  General  Psychology.  It  begins  with  a 
discussion  of  the  methods  of  classification,  then  touches  upon  mental 
elements,  instinct  and  impulses,  reason,  emotion,  and  will.  It  can 
give,  the  author  says,  "but  an  imperfect  impression  of  the  multi- 
farious ways  in  which  the  energies  of  general  psychology  are  engaged." 
Under  the  title  Physiological  Psychology  are  described  the  relation  of 
mental  to  bodily  processes,  the  dependence  of  mental  experience  on 
bodily  organization,  the  relation  of  feeling  to  general  somatic  con- 
ditions, and  the  James-Lange  theory  of  emotions.  In  Chapter  III., 
on  Experimental  Psychology,  experimentation  in  general  is  explained, 
and  some  typical  experiences  in  audition,  memory,  association,  and 
will  are  described.  Abnormal  Psychology  considers  dreams,  hypno- 
tism, suggestion,  multiple  personality,  spiritism,  telepathy  and  the 
subconscious.  Chapter  V.  is  divided  into  Individual  and  Applied 
Psychology.  The  first  part  includes  individual  differences  in  sen- 
sation and  memory,  types  of  imagery,  attention,  suggestion,  reactions 
and  emotion.  In  the  second  part,  the  usefulness  of  psychology  for 
education,  medicine,  law,  vocational  guidance,  and  advertising  is 
shown.  In  the  chapter  on  Social  Psychology,  the  author  speaks  of 
the  psychology  of  language,  play,  and  fine  arts,  the  power  of  imitation 
and  emulation,  and  the  effect  of  a  leader  on  mobs  and  crowds.  In 
regard  to  race  psychology,  he  says  that  the  differences  between  races 
do  not  rest  upon  innate  difference  of  brain  structure  but  upon  differ- 

275 


276  REVIEWS 

ence  of  environment  and  interest.  The  essay  on  Animal  Psychology 
begins  with  the  question  of  animal  consciousness  and  intelligence. 
Descriptions  of  some  well-known  experiments  follow.  The  last 
chapter,  which  is  on  General  Genetic  Psychology,  refutes  the  theory 
that  the  characteristics  of  the  savage  are  due  to  lack  of  reasoning 
power  and  efficiency  in  sensory  activity.  Their  minds  are  not  funda- 
mentally different  from  those  of  civilized  races  nor  do  there  seem  to 
be  important  differences  on  the  emotional  side.  "Mental  evolution 
in  man  consists  less  in  the  accidental  possession  of  higher  native 
capacity  and  more  in  the  better  organization  and  the  mastery  of  the 
technique  of  knowledge  and  thought."  The  chapter  ends  with  a 
sketch  of  mental  development  in  the  individual. 

HERBERT  SIDNEY  LANGFELD 
HARVARD  UNIVERSITY 

JAMES'  PHILOSOPHY 

La  Philosophie  de  William  James.     TH.  FLOURNOY.     Saint-Blaise, 

1911.     Pp.  219.     Fr.  2.50. 

In  the  spring  of  1910  the  Association  chretienne  suisse  d'Etudiants 
invited  Professor  William  James  to  address  them  at  their  reunion  to 
be  held  in  the  following  October.  Professor  James,  whose  health  was 
then  seriously  impaired,  replied  accepting  the  invitation  "in 
principle,"  saying,  that  is,  that  should  his  health  sufficiently 
improve  and  should  he  remain  in  Europe  until  October,  he  would 
gladly  address  the  Association.  The  reunion  was  held,  but  William 
James  was  no  more,  and  to  Professor  Flournoy  fell  the  solemn 
honor  of  addressing  the  Association  in  his  stead.  For  many  years 
a  warm  friend  and  admirer  of  the  profoundly  lamented  psychologist 
and  philosopher,  Professor  Flournoy  chose  for  the  subject  of  his 
address  "The  Philosophy  of  William  James."  It  is  this  discourse, 
amplified  and  doubtless  somewhat  revised,  which  now  appears  in 
book-form. 

Professor  Flournoy,  and  we  can  say  it  without  exaggeration, 
has  given  us  a  work  which  is,  although  in  concise  form,  a  sympa- 
thetic and  penetrating  biographical  sketch,  a  notable  contribution 
to  letters,  and  a  commanding  piece  of  philosophical  reasoning.  He 
sums  up  with  extraordinary  articulateness  the  broader  tendencies 
of  the  late  Professor  James's  teaching;  and  all  in  the  spirit  of  James 
himself,  sometimes  almost  with  his  own  inflection,  challenges,  as 
it  were,  the  coming  generations  to  consider  attentively  this  envisage- 


JAMES'   PHILOSOPHY  277 

ment  of  the  universe  and  either  to  reject  it  for  known  and  well- 
weighed  reasons,  or  else  to  accept  it  with  conviction  and  enthusiasm. 
"By  their  works  ye  shall  know  them;"  by  their  results  in  experi- 
ence, alone,  can  values  be  weighed;  or,  in  language  more  current, 
the  sole  test  of  truth — whatsoever  its  definition  may  be — or  of  any 
other  value  is  found  in  empirical  verification.  Not  a  subversive 
doctrine,  this:  yet  it  is  the  touchstone  to  James's  Pragmatism. 
This  principle,  which  all  natural  science  boasts  of  as  its  cardinal 
doctrine,  from  which  indeed  it  takes  the  name  empirical  science,  is 
nevertheless  scouted  as  an  absurdity  when  proposed  as  a  general 
philosophic  rule.  "Morality  estimated  by  its  cash-value  1"  "The 
existence  of  God  proved  by  the  results  experienced  from  believing 
in  God's  existence!"  Yet  the  truth  of  not  a  single  one  of  the  laws 
and  theorems  of  science  is  tested  in  any  other  way.  The  reason 
for  this  singular  paradox  is,  if  one  compares  the  deeper-lying 
intention  of  James  with  that  of  his  opponents,  not  hard  to  find. 
The  effort  of  the  day  is  mainly  spent  in  the  material  sphere.  Here 
we  have  so  genuinely  desired  to  achieve  results  that  we  have  come 
down  to  the  frankly  humble  attitude  of  empiricism.  Here  we 
admit  that  we  get  our  truth  a  'posteriori.  In  other  spheres  where 
the  demand  for  actual — and  certainly  actual — results  is  by  no 
means  so  stern,  another  tradition  prevails;  and  one  that  is  more 
gratifying  to  the  familiar  form  of  self-esteem.  These  truths  we 
have  a  priori;  or  at  least  we  can  secure  them  in  our  hands  without 
verification  and  safe  from  refutation,  and  so  henceforth  dispense 
them  at  our  pleasure.  And  few  persons  genuinely  care  enough 
about  these  truths  to  examine  this  pretension.  The  maker  of  a 
printing-press  is  sharply  held  up  if  his  factory  has  been  playing 
with  untruth:  but  the  clergyman's  account  of  God  is  scrutinized, 
if  at  all,  with  an  eminent  lassitude.  Were  the  splendid  pretension 
examined,  James  said,  it  would  be  found  to  be  a  fiction.  For 
reality  is  the  infinitely  infinite  flux  of  things  and  events,  and  its 
bigger  truths  can  no  more  be  embraced  in  a  few  off-hand  formulae, 
thought  out  in  the  rationalist's  arm-chair,  than  can  its  truths  about 
material  things.  In  both  cases  alike  we  must  test  our  "truths" 
by  verifying  them  in  subsequent  experience.  And  one  need  be  no 
pragmatist  (need  not,  for  instance,  believe  that  Pragmatism 
includes  a  definition  of  truth)  in  order  to  see  that  that  means  of 
winning  truth  which  has  brought  material  science  to  the  position 
which  it  now  occupies  must  be  applied  in  all  other  fields  of  activity 
if  a  similar  success  is  to  be  achieved.  James  saw  this.  And  a 


278  REVIEWS 

thorough-going  empiricism  is  one  of  his  fundamental  articles — 
Radical  Empiricism. 

Now  this  requires  a  rather  curt  dismissal  of  many  cherished 
fancies:  it  involves,  specially,  the  relinquishing  of  nearly  all  the 
products  of  the  rationalistic  movement  of  thought.  For  ration- 
alism, as  the  term  is  used  by  James,  covers  any  theory  or  system 
which  is  so  remote  from  the  concrete  and  infinite  reality  as  to  be 
insusceptible  of  empirical  verification.  If  it  can  make  no  difference 
in  subsequent  experience  whether  a  certain  system  is  true  or  false, 
then  (although  it  may  be  "internally  consistent")  the  terms  truth 
and  falsity  in  no  way  so  much  as  apply  to  it.  Guided  by  this 
maxim  James  is  a  pluralist  and  not  a  monist.  Furthermore,  one 
needs  but  to  loosen  one's  allegiance  to  certain  ingrained  prejudices 
of  the  day  and  generation  in  order  to  discover  in  that  pure  experience 
which  empiricism  makes  its  court  of  last  resort,  the  immediate 
evidence  of  many  facts  to  which  one  had  previously  been  blind. 
And  notable  among  these  are  the  efficacy  and  freedom  of  the 
human  will,  the  actual  thereness  of  ungainsayable  evil,  and — for 
certain  favored  persons  (unless  your  prejudices  fortify  you  arbi- 
trarily to  throw  out  of  consideration  their  life  protocols) — the  pres- 
ence and  cooperation  of  God.  James  believed,  then,  that  what  men 
do  makes  a  difference  in  the  universe,  and  that  they  might  (if  the 
word  has  any  meaning  at  all)  have  done  otherwise;  that  evil  is 
there  and  is  evil;  and  that  God  is,  and  is  amenable  to  contact  with 
human  beings.  These  and  other  propositions,  conceived  as  heretical 
in  certain  quarters  yet  derived  by  means  of  the  same  open-eyed 
empiricism,  involve  clearly  an  entire  philosophy.  Of  all  this 
Professor  Flournoy  takes  a  careful  survey. 

To  many  readers  of  this  volume  it  will  doubtless  seem  that 
the  philosophical  attitude  of  the  late  Professor  James  lacks  a  certain 
high  impersonality  and  detachment,  lacks  the  sort  of  thing  that 
one  finds  in  a  treatise  on  elliptical  functions  and  in  the  pages  of 
approved  dialecticians.  This  may  be  so;  and  the  presence  of  a 
certain  human  warmth,  above  all  James's  acknowledgment  that 
human  volition  plays  a  part  in  philosophizing,  is  highly  repugnant 
to  some  philosophic  traditions.  Yet  it  is  to  be  remembered  that 
in  the  case  of  elliptical  functions  human  will  and  human  weal  are 
no  part  of  the  subject  under  discussion;  whereas  in  the  case  of  the 
whole  universe,  which  is  the  subject-matter  of  philosophy,  man  and 
all  his  concerns  are  integrally  involved.  They  dare  not  be  neglected. 
And  if  James  writes  as  a  man  who  as  a  man  faces  the  problem  of  the 


BOOKS  RECEIVED  279 

universe,  as  one  who,  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  others  in  his 
likeness,  scans  the  quiet  visage  of  the  Sphinx,  so  too,  after  all,  when 
one  comes  to  think  of  it,  the  most  impersonal  chapter  ever  written 
upon  the  Absolute  implies  also  a  writer,  but  one  who  thinks  to  be  in 
cloaked  yet  closest  intimacy  with  this  same  Sphinx.  This  difference 
of  attitude  is  worthy  of  note. 

Professor  Flournoy  has  admirably  succeeded  in  revealing  the 
deep  springs  of  a  sea  whose  surface,  broad  and  flowing  and  reflecting 
light  from  a  thousand  facets,  might  well  have  beguiled  the  most 
resolute  explorer.  But  he  has  done  more,  for  he  has  somehow  given 
us  a  glimpse  once  again  of  the  immediate  person,  the  charm,  the 
motion,  and  the  moral  vigor  of  the  late  Professor  James.  It  is  a 
volume  which  lays  the  friends  and  pupils  of  William  James  under 
a  deep  debt  of  gratitude,  and  one  which  will  give  to  coming  genera- 
tions some  hint  of  what  that  privilege  was  which  is  not  to  be  theirs. 

EDWIN  B.  HOLT 

HARVARD  UNIVERSITY 


BOOKS  RECEIVED  DURING  JUNE 

BOWNE,  B.  P.     Kant  and  Spencer.     A  Critical  Exposition.     Boston 

and   New  York:  Houghton  Mifflin   Co.,    1912.     Pp.   xii  +  440. 

$3.00  net. 
GALLINGER,    A.     Das    Problem    der    objectiven    Mdglichkeit.     Eine 

Bedeutungsanalyse.     Leipzig:  Barth,  1912.     Pp.  vii  +  126.     M.  4 
HENNIG,   R.     Die  Entwicklung  des  Naturgefuhls. — Das   Wesen  der 

Inspiration.     Leipzig:  Barth,  1912.     Pp.  160.     M.  5. 
Vorschldge   zur   psychologischen    Untersuchung   primitiver  Menschen. 

(Beih.  z.   Zsch.  f.  angew.   Psychol.  u.   psychol.   Sammelforsch.) 

Leipzig:  Barth,  1912.     Pp.  124. 
HOCKING,  W.  E.     The  Meaning  of  God  in  Human  Experience.     A 

Philosophic    Study   of  Religion.     New   Haven:  Yale   University 

Press;  London:  Frowde,  1912.     Pp.  xxxiv  +  586.     $3.00. 
PARTRIDGE,  G.   E.     Genetic  Philosophy  of  Education.     New  York: 

Sturgis  and  Walton,  1912.     Pp.  xv  +  4O1-     #1.50  net. 
JAMES,  W.     Essays  in  Radical  Empiricism.     New  York:  Longmans, 

Green,  and  Co.,  1912.     Pp.  xiii  +  283.     $1.25  net. 


NOTES  AND  NEWS 

THE  June  number  of  the  BULLETIN,  entitled  the  Experimental 
Number,  was  prepared  under  the  editorial  care  of  Professor  W.  B. 
Pillsbury. 

DR.  DANIEL  STARCH  has  been  advanced  to  the  rank  of  assistant 
professor  at  the  University  of  Wisconsin. 

J.  CARLETON  BELL,  Ph.D.  (Harvard),  managing  editor  of  the 
Journal  of  Educational  Psychology,  and  director  of  the  psychological 
laboratory  in  the  Brooklyn  Training  School  for  Teachers,  has  been 
appointed  professor  of  the  art  of  teaching  in  the  University  of  Texas. 
Dr.  Bell  will  devote  his  attention  chiefly  to  the  experimental  investi- 
gation of  problems  of  teaching. 

PROFESSOR  WILBUR  M.  URBAN,  of  Trinity  College,  has  been 
granted  leave  of  absence  for  a  year.  The  larger  part  of  the  time 
will  be  spent  in  study  and  investigation  with  Professor  A.  Meinong 
in  Graz. 

AT  the  eighty-first  annual  commencement  of  Wesleyan  University 
at  Middletown,  Conn.,  held  on  June  19,  the  degree  of  doctor  of  laws 
was  conferred  upon  Dr.  Amos  J.  Givens,  proprietor  of  Givens  Sani- 
tarium for  nervous  diseases  at  Stamford,  Conn. 

THE  following  items  are  taken  from  the  press: 

STEPHEN  S.  COLVIN,  professor  of  psychology  in  the  University  of 
Illinois,  has  accepted  a  chair  in  educational  psychology  in  Brown 
University. 

HARRY  MILES  JOHNSON,  Ph.D.  (Hopkins  '12),  has  been  appointed 
psychological  assistant  in  the  physical  laboratory  of  the  National 
Electric  Lamp  Association,  Cleveland,  Ohio. 

M.  E.  HAGGERTY,  of  Indiana  University,  has  been  promoted  from 
an  assistant  professorship  to  an  associate  professorship  of  psychology. 

THE  University  of  California  has  conferred  the  doctorate  of  laws 
on  Dr.  E.  C.  Sanford,  professor  of  psychology  and  president  of  Clark 
College. 

PROFESSOR  G.  M.  WHIPPLE,  of  Cornell  University,  has  been 
granted  a  half  year's  leave  of  absence.  He  will  make  a  study  of  the 
recent  developments  in  applied  and  educational  psychology  in  various 
educational  centers  of  Europe. 

280 


Vol.  IX.  No.  8.  August  15,  1912, 

THE 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN 


GENERAL  REVIEWS  AND   SUMMARIES 

RECENT  LITERATURE  ON  THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  THE 
LOWER  INVERTEBRATES 

BY  PROFESSOR  A.  S.  PEARSE 
University  of  Wisconsin 

Protozoa. — Von  Prowazek's  book  (27)  on  the  general  physiology 
of  the  Protozoa  contains  a  full  discussion  of  their  reactions  to  various 
stimuli. 

Mast  (20)  gives  an  extremely  interesting  account  of  the  habits 
and  reactions  of  Lacrymaria,  an  infusorian  sometimes  found  among 
organic  debris.  The  body  and  head  of  this  protozoon  are  connected 
by  a  slender  neck,  which  is  capable  of  extraordinary  extension — to 
eight  times  the  length  of  the  body  or  fifty  times  its  own  length  when 
contracted.  Mast  gives  evidence  to  show  that  the  extension  of  the 
head  is  due  to  the  pulling  action  of  the  oral  cilia,  rather  than  the 
activity  of  the  neck  itself;  the  withdrawal  after  extension,  however, 
he  attributes  to  the  elasticity  of  the  neck. 

"The  direction  in  which  the  neck  turns  is  in  all  probability  regu- 
lated by  internal  factors,"  and  "the  direction  of  locomotion  of 
Lacrymaria  in  swimming  is  regulated  almost  entirely  by  the  move- 
ments of  the  head.  .  .  .  The  body  follows  the  head  in  a  tortuous 
course.  Lacrymaria  moves  backward,  when  free,  if  stimulated 
at  the  anterior  end.  Practically  all  the  remaining  reactions  are  in 
the  nature  of  random  or  trial  movements,  movements  which  are 
determined  largely  by  internal  factors,  the  nature  of  which  is  as  yet 
unknown."  It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  although  the  direction  of 
reaction  is  structurally  determined  in  some  protozoans  (Para- 
mecium,  Oxytricha)  and  has  a  definite  relation  to  a  particular  side  of 

281 


282  A.  S.  PEARSE 

the  body  in  others  which  are  apparently  radially  symmetrical  (Di- 
dinium),  Lacrymaria  turns  its  head  toward  any  side.  "The  same 
cilia  are  consequently  not  always  involved  in  the  forward  stroke  in 
the  process  of  turning,  as  is  true  for  Didinium  and  QEdogonium. 
During  conjunction  the  reactions  of  the  two  individuals  are  not  co- 
ordinated. Each  responds  to  stimuli  independently."  Mast  (21) 
has  also  made  a  careful  study  of  the  reactions  of  the  flagellate  Per- 
anema. 

Although  Metalnikow's  study  (23)  of  the  digestion  of  infusorians 
is  primarily  physiological,  it  contains  many  points  of  interest  to 
students  of  animal  behavior.  More  food  vacuoles  are  formed  in  an 
acid  medium  than  in  an  alkaline  one;  alcohol  and  small  doses  of 
arsenic  stimulate  their  formation;  they  appear  more  slowly  at  low 
temperatures,  and  cease  to  be  formed  at  33-34°.  The  addition  of 
trypsin  to  the  water  containing  a  Paramecium  accelerates  its  digestive 
processes.  Paramecium  shows  selection  in  taking  its  food  and  diges- 
tible particles  circulate  longer  inside  the  body  than  others. 

Ulehla  (30)  has  made  a  very  careful  study,  by  means  of  a  para- 
boloid condenser  for  dark  field  illumination,  of  the  movements  of  the 
flagella  of  various  flagellates,  algal  swarm-spores,  bacteria,  and 
antherozooids.  He  gives  a  comprehensive  review  of  the  literature 
and  concludes:  (i)  Moving  flagella  describe  variable  figures,  which  are, 
however,  definite  for  each  kind  and  which  seldom  take  the  form  of 
simple  rotation;  (2)  flagella  have  a  complicated  internal  structure; 
(3)  the  rate  of  movement  of  flagella  is  much  more  rapid  than  has  been 
supposed;  (4)  the  regular  beat  is  easily  disturbed  and  may  be  modified; 

(5)  flagella  exert  their  propelling  influence  like  oars,  not  like  screws; 

(6)  the  movements  of  flagella  may  be  grouped  under  six  classes. 
McClendon   (19)   points  out  that   the   movements   of  Amoeba, 

when  subjected  to  an  electric  current  or  to  certain  chemical  sub- 
stances, are  like  the  movements  of  other  colloids  under  similar  cir- 
cumstances. He  believes  that  the  behavior  of  electrolytes  in  passing 
the  plasma  membrane  influences  the  direction  of  locomotion. 

Harper  (12,  13)  has  investigated  the  geotropic  reactions  of  Para- 
mecia  tl^at  have  ingested  particles  of  iron.  He  believes  that  geotro- 
pism  is  due  to  "a  passive  orientation  not  involving  the  irritability." 
The  Paramecia  show  an  increased  upward  orienting  tendency 
which  persists  as  long  as  the  particles  of  iron  remain  in  the  posterior 
end.  A  magnet  placed  at  one  side  of  a  jar  containing  iron-laden 
animals  causes  them  to  stream  upward  in  the  stronger  part  of  the 
field,  and  there  is  a  return  toward  the  bottom  in  the  weaker  part. 


RECENT  LITERATURE  ON  LOWER  INVERTEBRATES         283 

"The  magnet  is  effective  in  producing  this  circulation  by  diminishing 
the  effect  of  gravity  on  animals  containing  iron.  It  also  exerts  a 
passive  pull  upon  them,  and  they  gradually  swing  into  their  finally 
oriented  position  in  a  vertical  path  under  the  combined  influence  of 
the  magnet  and  gravity.  The  oriented  path  is  consequently  a 
curve." 

Wager  (31)  has  made  a  very  comprehensive  study  of  the  aggre- 
gation forms  assumed  by  Euglena  and  other  microscopic  organisms 
and  has  reviewed  the  literature  on  this  subject.  He  experimented 
with  Euglena,  Chlamydomonas,  Glenodinium,  Volvox,  Spirillum,  and 
with  masses  of  finely  divided  particles  in  liquids.  Euglena  usually 
moves  toward  the  light,  and  phototropism  may  interfere  with  the 
characteristic  aggregations.  In  the  dark  or  in  red  light,  however,  if 
Euglense  are  crowded  close  enough  together  to  oblige  them  to  move 
slowly,  gravity  causes  them  to  sink  downward  with  the  posterior 
end  foremost.  Such  a  downward  movement  of  a  mass  of  Euglense 
brings  about  a  counter  current  and  some  individuals  may  move 
upward,  or  they  may  be  brought  into  a  region  where  they  are  not 
crowded,  and  having  been  oriented  with  the  posterior  end  down  by 
gravity,  they  swim  upward.  Masses  of  Euglense  show  a  tendency 
to  cling  together  like  all  small  bodies  suspended  in  liquids.  Wager 
concludes:  "The  action  of  the  physical  forces,  gravity  and  molecular 
attraction,  over  which  Euglense  have  little  or  no  control,  appears, 
therefore,  to  play  an  important  part  in  their  life  history,  and,  whilst 
not  inhibiting  their  power  to  move,  compels  them  to  limit  the  sphere 
of  their  activity  to  certain  definite  areas  in  such  a  way  as  to  promote 
a  more  or  less  regular  dissemination  of  them  through  the  liquid,  and 
this  prevents  any  undesirable  congestion  of  the  organisms  in  one 
place."  He  believes  that  many  of  the  so-called  cases  of  geotaxis 
and  some  phenomena  of  plankton  distribution  may  be  found  to  be 
explainable  as  purely  mechanical  phenomena. 

Desroche  (6)  has  studied  the  phototropism  of  Chlamydomonas 
zoospores  in  capillary  tubes.  These  organisms  are  positively  photo- 
tropic  at  times.  Changes  in  light  intensity  do  not  affect  the  rate  of 
their  locomotion. 

Ccelenterata. — Bohn  (i)  maintains  that  Actinia  shows  a  diurnal 
rhythm,  expanding  at  night  and  contracting  during  the  day,  that  is 
due  to  light.  Nevertheless,  though  such  rhythmical  movements 
are  kept  up  for  some  time  if  animals  are  kept  continuously  in  the 
dark,  individuals  kept  uninterruptedly  in  the  light  will  finally  expand. 

Carpenter  (2)  contributes  some  interesting  facts  in  regard  to  the 


284  A.  S.  PEARSE 

habits  of  the  rose  coral.  This  animal  is  nocturnal  and  remains 
contracted  during  the  day  or  when  it  is  strongly  illuminated  at  night. 
Its  feeding  habits  differ  from  those  of  other  corals,  and  are  adapted 
for  capturing  plankton.  Nervoid  impulses  resulting  from  chemical 
or  tactile  stimuli  applied  to  a  particular  polyp  may  be  transmitted 
to  other  individuals  of  a  colony.  Carpenter  believes  that  branched 
cells  occurring  in  the  mesoglea  may  serve  as  adjusters  by  transmitting 
impulses  from  the  ectodermal  receptors  inward. 

Parker  (24)  has  studied  the  reactions  of  Metrldium.  He  shows 
that  the  mesenteric  muscles  and  the  annular  oral  muscle  may  be 
caused  to  contract  by  stimulating  the  outside  of  the  body  column. 
When  an  anemone  is  cut  nearly  in  two,  nervous  transmission  may 
take  place  through  any  connecting  portion  of  the  body  except  the 
lips.  These  facts  are  considered  in  connection  with  histological 
evidence  and  Parker  concludes  that  the  nervous  system  lies  mostly 
in  the  supporting  lamella;  not,  as  the  Hertwigs  believed,  in  the 
fibrillar  layer  at  the  base  of  the  ectoderm.  Parker  anaesthetized 
Metridium  with  magnesium  sulphate  and  then  obtained  what  he 
believed  to  be  non-nervous  responses  from  the  muscles* 

Schmid  (29)  has  observed  that  Cereactis  aurantiaca  assumes  an 
erect  position  with  the  tentacles  in  the  form  of  a  rosette  when  illumi- 
nated, and  from  experiments  in  which  he  used  solutions  of  calcium 
chromate,  calcium  bichromate,  methyl  green,  and  copper  sulphate 
as  color  filters,  he  asserts  that  the  same  may  be  said  for  red,  yellow, 
green,  and  blue  light.  In  the  dark,  however,  this  actinian  assumes 
a  "sleeping  position"  with  the  tentacles  drooping  and  the  body 
relaxed. 

Annelida. — As  a  result  of  tests  with  nitric,  hydrochloric,  sulphuric, 
and  acetic  acids,  Hurwitz  (17)  asserts  that  the  responses  of  earth- 
worms to  solutions  of  acids  may  be  ascribed  to  the  effect  of  the 
hydrogen  ions  in  such  solutions.  Judged  by  its  responses,  the 
earthworm's  discrimination  of  weak  acids  is  better  than  that  mani- 
fested in  man's  sense  of  taste.  The  earthworm  agrees  with  man  in 
being  more  sensitive  to  acetic  acid  than  would  be  expected  from  the 
degree  of  dissociation  in  solutions  of  that  acid. 

Parker  and  Parshley  (25),  studying  the  earthworm,  show  that 
though  a  moist  surface  is  favorable  for  locomotion,  a  dry  one  acts  as 
a  stimulus  to  bring  about  avoiding  reactions.  They  also  demonstrate 
that  the  receptors  for  stimulation  by  dryness  are  situated  at  the 
anterior  end  of  the  body.  The  avoiding  reaction  disappears  when 
the  prostomial  region  is  removed  or  anaesthetized. 


RECENT  LITERATURE  ON  LOWER  INVERTEBRATES          285 

Hargitt  (n)  extends  his  previous  experiments  on  the  behavior 
of  tubicolous  annelids  to  new  species.  He  pays  particular  attention 
to  what  may  be  called  "anti-tropic"  light  reactions,  but  also  discusses 
other  points.  His  paper  concludes  with  a  general  discussion  of  the 
laws  of  behavior  with  particular  reference  to  the  variability  of 
reactions. 

Echinodermata. — Holmes  (16)  has  studied  the  light  reactions 
of  the  sea-urchin  Arbacia  punctulata  in  some  detail.  This  animal 
usually  reacts  negatively  to  light  and  responds  to  local  stimulation 
by  erecting  its  spines,  but  it  may  become  positively  phototropic  in 
weak  light  and  will  move  toward  the  light  to  get  into  a  shaded 
region.  Cutting  the  oral  nerve-ring  does  not  interfere  with  local 
reactions,  which  are,  in  fact,  usually  characteristic  in  isolated  portions 
of  the  body,  but  such  an  operation  destroys  the  usual  negative 
photic  reaction. 

Cowles  (4)  has  studied  the  responses  of  the  sea-urchin  and  starfish 
to  changes  of  light  intensity.  There  is  a  general  ectodermal  sensi- 
tiveness to  light  in  both  these  echinoderms.  The  pedicellarise  of 
Toxopneustes  react  to  an  increase  or  decrease  in  light,  even  after 
they  have  been  removed  from  the  body.  Cowles  discusses  von 
UexkiilPs  work  at  some  length. 

Mollusca. — Yung  (32)  shows  that,  though  Helix  frequents  shady 
crevices  during  the  day  and  is  active  at  "night,  it  does  not  react  to 
light,  but  rather  to  heat.  The  eyes  possess  little  acuity  and  the 
characteristic  reactions  to  and  from  shady  places  take  place  after 
they  have  been  removed. 

Lefevre  and  Curtis  (18),  in  their  study  of  the  breeding  habits 
of  fresh-water  mussels,  make  some  interesting  observations  on  the 
behavior  of  the  bivalved  glochidium  larva.  The  glochidia  studied 
were  of  two  kinds:  the  hooked,  parasitic  on  the  external  parts  of  fish, 
and  the  hookless,  which  attach  themselves  to  the  gills  of  fish.  When 
they  pass  from  the  parental  marsupium  they  do  not  swim  but  fall 
to  the  bottom  and  remain  there  until  they  become  attached  to  a  fish 
or  die.  When  free  the  two  kinds  of  glochidia  exhibit  marked  differ- 
ences in  behavior.  The  hooked  form  frequently  makes  spontaneous 
snapping  movements  with  the  valves,  and  may  be  induced  to  react 
more  readily  by  mechanical  than  by  chemical  stimulation.  The 
hookless  form  usually  does  not  respond  to  tactile  stimulation  alone, 
but  responds  quickly  to  blood  and  other  chemical  substances.  Both 
forms  may  be  anaesthetized  by  weak  solutions  of  magnesium  salts, 
but  chlorides  of  Na,  K,  and  NH4  produce  the  snapping  reaction. 


286  A.  S.  PEARSE 

Hooked  glochidia  readily  grasp  a  needle  or  a  piece  of  paper  and  "do 
not  relax  but  remain  attached  to  the  object  until  they  die." 

Haseman  (14)  reports  some  very  interesting  observations  arid 
experiments  with  three  snails  of  the  genus  Littorina,  which  are  found 
in  definite  zones  along  the  shore  at  Woods  Hole,  Mass.  Individuals 
of  L.  litorea  located  on  vertical  surfaces  between  tide  marks  exhibit 
oscillatory  movements  which  correspond  to  those  of  the  tides,  but 
they  do  not  exhibit  such  movements  when  on  horizontal  flat  surfaces 
between  tide  marks  or  when  below  low-tide  marks.  "The  primary 
directive  force  for  rhythmical  movements  is  the  surface  film  of  water. 
The  secondary  directive  forces  are  the  quiescent  position  of  desiccated 
individuals,  character  of  surfaces,  moisture  and  food."  Light 
apparently  does  not  influence  such  movements  and  this  species  shows 
no  rhythm  in  the  absence  of  tidal  changes,  as  Bohn  has  asserted. 

The  behavior  of  several  snails  of  the  genus  Physa  is  the  topic 
discussed  by  Miss  Dawson  (5)  in  a  very  interesting  paper.  The 
relation  of  these  animals  to  "natural  environment"  is  treated  at 
some  length.  The  most  important  factors  limiting  the  snails  to 
particular  habitats  are  shallow  water,  minimum  amount  of  shade, 
few  enemies,  minimum  amount  of  debris,  protection  from  waves  and 
currents,  moderate  amount  of  water  weeds,  and  well  aerated  water. 
The  secretion  of  mucus  is  an  important  factor  in  locomotion.  Mucus 
forms  an  epiphragm  to  seal  the  snail  in  its  shell  during  hibernation, 
and  the  spinning  of  mucus  threads  plays  a  prominent  role  in  the  daily 
life  ot  Physa.  These  threads  are  formed  as  a  snail  floats  upward 
through  the  water.  They  are  not  only  used  as  highways  in  going  to 
and  from  the  surface,  but  also  help  to  collect  food,  as  their  viscosity 
causes  many  food  particles  to  become  attached  to  them  and  these 
are  devoured  with  the  threads.  The  mucus  surrounding  the  egg 
masses  is  never  eaten;  apparently  it  is  too  tough.  Physa  is  omniv- 
orous, though  the  usual  diet  is  largely  vegetable.  It  passes  through 
a  hibernating  stage  during  which  no  food  is  taken  and  the  body 
decreases  in  size.  This  snail  is  not  very  sensitive  to  the  presence  of 
food  substances  in  the  water;  it  will  turn  toward  food  one  centimeter 
away.  In  a  starved  individual  feeding  reactions  are  called  forth  by 
mechanical  stimulation,  but  a  well-fed  snail  must  be  affected  by 
both  mechanical  and  chemical  stimuli  in  order  to  feed.  Respiration 
and  sensitiveness  to  air  are  considered  in  some  detail.  Physa  shows 
a  positive  reaction  to  oxygen  and  is  negative  to  carbon  dioxide. 
An  animal  without  air  in  its  "lung"  is  negatively  geotropic.  The 
last  section  of  this  paper  takes  up  "some  psychic  phenomena  of 


RECENT  LITERATURE  ON  LOWER  INVERTEBRATES          287 

Physa."  This  snail  is  very  sensitive  to  contact  stimuli  and  is  strongly 
thigmotropic.  "A  new  experience  produces  a  shock  to  Physa  which 
seems  to  deprive  it  temporarily  of  its  sense  of  gravity."  "By  the 
use  of  the  siphon  [as  a  tactile  organ]  Physa  shows  that  it  distinguishes 
changes  in  its  environment.  By  a  process  of  association  it  're- 
members'  the  location  of  the  surface  film,  the  character  of  the  sides 
of  the  aquarium,  and  even  the  relative  depth  of  the  water.  It  also 
shows  the  development  of  neutral  habit."  The  reactions  of  young 
snails  differ  from  those  of  adults;  they  show  no  "fear  reactions," 
and  this  may  be  due  to  the  lack  of  development  of  the  nervous 
system.  Some  activities,  like  the  tapping  reaction  of  the  siphon, 
change  their  character  as  the  snails  grow  older. 

Pieron  (26)  succeeded  after  twenty-four  hours  in  teaching  the 
cephalopod  Octopus  vulgaris  to  reach  through  a  side  opening  in  a 
test-tube,  instead  of  trying  to  get  through  the  glass,  in  order  to  seize 
a  crab  inside  the  tube. 

Crustacea. — In  a  paper  too  comprehensive  for  review  here,  Doflein 
(7)  has  made  a  very  interesting  study  of  the  habits  and  reactions  of 
certain  prawns.  He  considers  color  changes,  locomotion,  feeding, 
the  effect  of  operations  on  the  nervous  system,  photoreception, 
tangoreception,  and  general  habits.  The  paper  is  well  illustrated. 

In  another  paper  Doflein  (8)  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
first  antennae  (antennules)  of  certain  land  crabs  have  organs  of  smell 
that  differ  somewhat  in  structure  from  taste  organs  found  in  the  same 
situation  on  aquatic  decapod  crustaceans.  He  believes  that  such 
structures  changed  from  tasting  to  smelling  organs  as  the  crabs 
migrated  from  the  water  and  took  up  a  terrestrial  mode  of  existence. 
They  are  concerned  with  chemoreception  in  water  or  on  land,  and 
their  adaptability  furnishes  further  evidence  that  there  is  but  little 
or  no  difference  between  the  gustatory  and  olfactory  sensations  of 
many  invertebrates. 

Chidester  (3)  describes  the  mating  habits  of  four  crabs  and  gives 
an  extended  discussion  of  sex  discrimination  in  arthropods.  In  the 
four  species  studied,  sex  discrimination  is  through  tactual  stimulation. 
The  female  is  passive  when  grasped  by  a  male.  Males  attempted 
to  mate  with  other  males  and  with  fertilized  females  of  their  own 
species,  but  did  not  attempt  to  mate  with  individuals  of  other  species. 
Ghidester  discusses  general  topics  related  to  his  paper.  In  the 
Crustacea  as  a  whole,  sex  discrimination  is  kinsesthetic  and  tactual. 
"In  the  Insecta,  sex  discrimination  is  by  smell;  JForel's  *  contact-odor 
sense.'  .  .  .  Sexual  selection  on  the  part  of  the  female  has  not 


288  A.  S.  PEARSE 

been  definitely  established  in  the  Arthropoda.  We  must  consider 
that  the  successful  male  is  the  one  who  first  demonstrates  his  maleness 
to  the  female.  Though  strength  is  a  great  factor,  opportuneness  of 
proximity  appears  to  be  a  greater  one."  The  conclusions  of  Darwin, 
Alcock,  and  others  that  the  mating  dances  of  certain  male  crabs 
(Uca)  are  for  the  purpose  of  sexual  selection,  are  thus  discountenanced 
by  Chidester  without  review  but  perhaps  justly. 

Matula  (22)  studied  the  influence  of  certain  ganglia  of  the  central 
nervous  system  on  the  rhythmical  respiratory  movements  of  Squilla 
mantis.  Extirpation  of  the  cerebral  ganglion  or  of  the  sub-esophageal 
ganglion  caused  little  change  in  the  rhythm,  but  the  removal  of  the 
first  thoracic  ganglion  caused  respiration  to  cease. 

Drzewina  and  Bohn  (10)  have  investigated  the  reactions  of  several 
marine  invertebrates  in  sea  water  containing  a  little  potassium 
cyanide.  "Sensibility"  to  light  disappears  before  tactile  sensitive- 
ness. The  light  reactions  of  some  crustaceans  were  changed  from 
positive  to  negative. 

Schmid  (28)  observed  that,  though  Zoea  larvae  were  in  general 
negatively  phototropic  and  sank  through  the  water  when  in  the 
light,  they  also  showed  marked  sensitiveness  to  differences  in  temper- 
ature and  often  made  quick  backward  movements  when  they  came 
to  a  place  (Temperaturgrenze)  where  the  temperature  of  the  water 
changed  rapidly. 

Holmes  (15)  reviews  thirty-six  papers  on  the  behavior  of  lower 
invertebrates,  some  of  which  were  noticed  in  this  journal  a  year  ago. 

REFERENCES 

1.  BOHN,  G.     Comparaison  entre  les  reactions  des  actinias  de  la  Mediterranee  et  celles 

de  la  Manche.  C.  r.  Soc.  BioL,  Paris,  1910,  68,  253-255.  Les  reactions  des 
actinies  aux  basses  temperatures.  Ibid.,  1910,  68,  964-966.  Intervention  de 
la  vitesse  des  reactions  chemiques  dans  la  desensibilisation  par  la  lumiere. 
Ibid.,  1910,  68,  1114-1117. 

2.  CARPENTER,  F.  W.     Feeding  Reactions  of  the  Rose  Coral  (Isophylla).     Proc. 

Am.  Acad.  Arts  and  Sci.,  1912,  46,  149-162. 

3.  CHIDESTER,  F.  E.    The  Mating  Habits  of  Four  Species  of  the  Brachyura.     BioL 

Bull.,  1911,  21,  235-248. 

4.  COWLES,  R.  P.     Reactions  of  the  Sea  Urchin  and  Starfish  to  Changes  of  Light 

Intensity.     Johns  Hopkins  Univ.  Circ.,  1911,  1-7. 

5.  DAWSON,  J.    The  Biology  of  Physa.    Behavior  Monographs,  1911,  No.  4.     Pp. 

120,  6  pis. 

6.  DESROCHE,  — .     Sur  le  phototropisme  des  zoospores  de  Chlamydomonas  Steinii 

Goros.     C.  r.  Acad.  Sci.,  Paris,  1911,  152,  890-893. 

7-  DOFLEIN,  F.    Lebensgewohnheiten  und  Anpassungen  bei  dekapoden  Krebsen. 
Festschr.  R.  Hertwig,  1910,  3.    Pp.  76.    4  plates. 


RECENT  LITERATURE  ON  LOWER  INVERTEBRATES         289 

8.  DOFLEIN,  F.     Uber  den  Geruchsinn  bei  Wassertieren.     Biol.   Centralbl.,  1911, 

31,  706-707. 

9.  DRZEWINA,  A.     Sur  la  resistance  des  crustaces  au  cyanure  et  les  effets  sensi- 

bilisateurs  de  cette  substance.     C.  r.  Soc.  Biol.,  Paris,  1911,  71,  535-537. 

10.  DRZEWINA,  A.,  et  BOHN,  G.     Modifications  des  reactions  des  animaux  sous  1'in- 

fluence  du  cyanure  de  potassium.     Ibid.,  1911,  70,  843-845. 

11.  HARGITT,  C.  W.     Observations  on  the  Behavior  of  Tubicolous  Annelids.     III. 

Biol.  Bull,  1912,  22,  67-94. 

12.  HARPER,  E.  H.     The  Geotropism  of  Paramcecium.      /.  of  Morph.,  1911,  22,  993- 

999. 

13.  HARPER,  E.  H.     Magnetic  Control  of  Geotropism  in  Paramcecium.     /.  of  Animal 

Behav.,  1912,  2,  181-189. 

14.  HASEMAN,  J.  D.    The  Rhythmical  Movements  of  Litorina  litorea  Synchronous 

with  Ocean  Tides.     Biol.  Bull,  1911,  21,  113-121. 

15.  HOLMES,  S.  J.     Literature  for  1910  on  the  Behavior  of  Lower  Invertebrates. 

/.  of  Animal  Behav.,  1911,  i,  393-400. 

16.  HOLMES,  S.  J.     Phototaxis  in  the  Sea  Urchin,  Arbacia  punctulata.     J.  of  Animal 

Behav.,  1912,  2,  126-136. 

17.  HURWITZ,  S.  H.    The  Reactions  of  Earthworms  to  Acids.     Proc.  Amer.  Acad. 

Arts  and  Sci.,  1911,  46,  67-81. 

1 8.  LEFEVRE,  G.,  and  CURTIS,  W.  C.      Reproduction  and  Parasitism  in  the  Unionidae. 

/.  of  Exper.  Zool.,  1910,  9,  79-115,  3  plates. 

19.  McCLENDON,  J.  F.     Ein  Versuch,  amoboide  Bewegung  als  Folgeerscheinung  des 

Wechseln  des  elektrischen  Polarisationszustandes  der  Plasmahaut  zu  erklaren. 
Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  Physiol.  (Pfliiger),  1911,  140,  217-280. 

20.  MAST,  S.  O.     Habits  and  Reactions  of  the  Ciliate  Lacrymaria.     /.  of  Animal 

Behav.,  1911,  i,  229-243. 

21.  MAST,  S.  O.    The  Reactions  of  the  Flagellate  Peranema.    /.  of  Animal  Behav., 

1912,  2,  91-97. 

22.  MATULA,  J.     Die  Regulation  der  Atemrythmik  bei  Squilla  mantis.    Arch.  f.  d. 

ges.  Physiol.  (Pfliiger),  1912,  144,  109-131. 

23.  METALNIKOW,  S.     Contributions  a  Petude  de  la  digestion  intracellulaire  chez  les 

Protozoaires.     Arch.  Zool.  exper.  et  gen.,  1912,  49,  373-499. 

24.  PARKER,  G.  H.     Nervous  and  Non-nervous  Responses  of  Actinians.     Science, 

1912,  35,  461-462. 

25.  PARKER,  G.  H.,  and  PARSHLEY,  H.  M.     The  Reactions  of  Earthworms  to  Dry  and 

to  Moist  Surfaces.     /.  of  Exper.  Zool.,  1911,  n,  361-363. 

26.  PIERON,  H.     Contribution  a  la  psychologic  du  Poulpe.     Bull.  Inst.  gen.  psych., 

1911,  n,  111-119. 

27.  PROWAZEK,  S.  VON.      Einfiihrung  in  die  Physiologic   der  einzelligen  Protozoen, 

Leipzig,  Berlin,  1911.     Pp.  172. 

28.  SCHMID,  B.      Ein  Versuch   iiber  die  Warmeempfindlichkeit  von  Zoea-Larven. 

Biol.  Centralbl.,  1911,  31,  538. 

29.  SCHMID,  B.     Ueber  den  Heliotropismus  von  Cereactis  aurantiaca.     Ibid.,  1911,  31, 
„  538-539- 

30.  ULEHLA,  V.    Ultramikroskopische  Studien  iiber  Geisselbewegung.     Biol.   Cen- 

tralbl., 1911,  31,  645-654;  656-676;  689-705;  721-731. 

31.  WAGER,  H.    On  the  Effect  of  Gravity  upon  the  Movements  and  Aggregation  of 

Euglena  viridis  Ehrb.,  and  Other  Microorganisms.     Phil.  Trans.  Roy.  Soc., 
London,  1911,  B,  201,  333-39°-    Pis.  32-36. 


290 


C.  H.   TURNER 


32.  YUNG,  E.    De  1'insensibilite  a  la  lumiere  et  de  la  cecite  de  1'Escargot  des  vignes 
(Helix  pomatia  L.).     C.  r.  Acad.  Sci.,  Paris,  1911,  153,  434~4S6. 


RECENT  LITERATURE  ON  THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  THE 
HIGHER  INVERTEBRATES 

BY  C.  H.  TURNER 

Sumner  High  School,  St.  Louis,  Mo. 

TROPISMS 

Heretofore  it  has  been  thought  that  all  of  the  Hepialidse  fly  only 
at  night.  Last  summer,  on  the  northern  slope  of  Mt.  Hood,  J. 
McDunnough  (29)  found  H.  hyperboreus  flying  about  in  the  sunlight, 
between  half  past  two  and  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  This  was 
not  an  accident,  for  the  same  behavior  was  observed  on  three  suc- 
cessive afternoons.  McDunnough  thinks  the  severe  cold  of  the 
evenings  in  that  latitude  has  caused  a  change  in  the  habits  of  the 
species. 

By  throwing  large  flat  corks  into  an  aquarium  in  which  the  water 
was  only  one  inch  deep,  H.  H.  P.  and  H.  C.  Severin  (36)  obtained 
proof  that  Belostoma  americanum,  Benacus  griseus,  Nepa  apiculata, 
Ranatra  americana,  and  Ranatra  kirkaldyi  are  positively  thigmotactic. 
Thirty-two  out  of  thirty-five  specimens  were  found  hiding  against 
the  under-side  of  the  corks. 

Cornetz  (10)  thinks  the  response  of  ants  to  light  is  a  tropism. 

Turner  (40)  conducted  a  series  of  experiments  upon  the  light 
reactions  of  a  parasitic  bee  of  the  family  Stelidse  which  caused  him 
to  form  the  following  conclusions:  "These  bees  are  endowed  with  a 
pronounced  tendency  to  move  in  the  direction  of  the  rays  of  light  and 
towards  their  source,  but  they  do  not  invariably  so  act.  Light, 
heat,  hunger,  sexual  restlessness  and,  perhaps,  other  factors  arouse 
in  these  bees  an  impulse  to  roam  from  home.  Coupled  with  this 
impulse  to  roam,  there  is  an  instinctive  tendency  to  seek  freedom  in 
the  direction  of  the  rays  of  light.  When  following  this  instinctive 
tendency  fails  to  bring  freedom,  the  bee  tries  other  methods.  In  this 
endeavor  many  bees  make  haphazard  flights  in  all  possible  directions; 
while  others,  in  a  more  systematic  manner,  hover  repeatedly  before 
the  sides  of  the  enclosure.  If  such  behavior  can  be  called  a  tropism, 
then  these  bees  are  positively  phototactic." 


RECENT  LITERATURE  ON  HIGHER  INVERTEBRATES         291 

SENSATIONS 

The  sense  of  touch  of  the  water-bugs  mentioned  above  is  well 
developed;  for,  according  to  the  Severins  (36),  the  slight  disturbance 
caused  by  touching  a  needle  to  the  water  near  a  hungry  bug  is  re- 
sponded to  immediately.  These  investigators  announce  that  the 
ability  of  these  bugs  to  see  moving  bodies  is  quite  pronounced. 

Recently  three  investigators,  working  independently,  have 
conducted  experiments  which  convince  them  that  bees  possess  color 
vision.  These  investigators  are:  Allard  (6),  Lovell  (25),  and  Turner 

(38). 

Allard's  (6)  experiments  were  conducted  in  the  midst  of  a  cotton 
field.  He  tested  the  tendency  of  certain  bees  (Mellissodes  bimaculata, 
Bombus,  Entecnia,  Apus)  to  visit  each  of  the  following  things  when 
arranged  in  various  combinations  of  threes:  normal  cotton  blossoms, 
cotton  blossoms  with  the  petals  removed,  petals  only  of  a  cotton 
blossom  pinned  carelessly  to  a  stem,  cloth  petals  of  an  artificial  rose 
so  arranged  as  to  simulate  a  cotton  blossom,  artificial  cotton  blossoms 
made  out  of  the  petals  of  an  artificial  rose  covered  with  natural  cotton 
petals,  cotton  blossoms  made  out  of  paper,  single  cotton  petals  pinned 
to  a  stem,  leaves  of  cotton  so  wrapped  about  cotton  petals  as  to  re- 
semble a  cotton  bud.  The  three  specimens  used  in  any  one  experi- 
ment were  arranged  either  so  as  to  form  a  triangle  or  else  in  a  straight 
line.  Allard  records  the  following  conclusions:  (i)  Once  visiting 
insects  have  entered  a  cotton  field,  there  is  little  doubt  that  their  visual 
powers  enable  them  to  discover  the  blossoms.  (2)  The  size  and 
general  appearance  of  the  blossoms  do  not  appear  to  be  of  great 
importance  in  initiating  the  process  of  inspection.  (3)  A  blossom 
concealed  except  to  bees  directly  above  it  is  seldom  visited.  (4)  Bees 
are  rarely  induced  to  inspect  paper  or  cloth  artifacts;  this  is  probably 
due  to  perceptual  differences  in  color  and  texture.  (5)  The  actual 
number  of  entrances  into  a  blossom  are  small  compared  with  the 
number  of  inspections.  (6)  Bees  usually  inspect  the  surface  very 
carefully;  hence,  although  the  corolla  of  the  blossom  invites  the  first 
approach,  it  is  not  easy  to  determine  the  relative  importance  of  the 
sense  of  sight  and  of  the  sense  of  smell  involved  in  nearer  inspection. 
(7)  Conspicuousness  and  coloration  are  important  factors  in  leading 
bees  to  perceive  cotton  blossoms.  (8)  A  sort  of  memory  of  associ- 
ation is  developed,  so  that  older  or  much  experienced  bees  often  appear 
to  work  among  blossoms  to  a  much  better  advantage  than  younger 
bees.  The  American  cotton  possesses  extra-floral  nectaries,  but  the 
Asiatic  does  not.  Bees  collecting  nectar  from  the  outer  involucral 


292  C.  H.   TURNER 

nectaries  of  the  American  cotton  visit  similar  structures  of  the  Asiatic, 
but  soon  depart.  Allard  thinks  a  sort  of  odoriferous  cloud  enables 
the  bees  to  find  the  field  itself;  but  he  gives  no  experimental  evidence 
to  support  the  view. 

Lovell's  work  (25)  is  partly  statistical  and  partly  experimental. 
He  states  that,  in  the  portion  of  the  United  States  which  lies  east  of 
the  I02d  meridian  and  north  of  North  Carolina  and  Tennessee  there 
are  1,244  species  of  green  or  dull-colored  flowers,  only  233  of  which 
are  entomophilous;  and  many  of  these  are  capable  of  self-fertilization. 
In  his  experiments  the  bees  were  given  an  opportunity  to  select  con- 
spicuously colored  flowers  from  dull-colored  ones,  flowers  with 
corollas  from  blossoms  with  the  petals  removed,  colored  blossoms  from 
green  leaves  supplied  with  honey,  honey-bearing  surfaces  contrasting 
with  the  environment  from  honey-bearing  surfaces  harmonizing 
with  the  environment.  The  following  conclusions  are  the  results 
of  his  experiments:  (i)  Green  flowers  are  not  well  adapted  to  ento- 
mophily,  and  many  such  plants  have  been  derived  from  larger  and 
more  highly  developed  entomophilous  forms.  As  a  whole,  ento- 
mophilous green  flowers  are  sparingly  visited  by  insects  of  the  less 
specialized  families,  and,  as  a  rule,  they  retain  the  power  of  self- 
pollination.  (2)  The  fact  that  insects  have  been  observed  feeding 
on  over-ripe  fruit,  or  on  the  glandular  secretions  of  the  vegetative 
organs  of  plants,  or  on  the  excretions  of  the  Aphidae,  or  on  foliage,  or 
on  greenish  or  brownish  flowers,  or  on  dull-colored  receptacles  which 
have  contained  sugar  or  sweet  liquids,  affords  no  proof  that  con- 
spicuousness  is  not  an  advantage  to  entomophilous  flowers.  Any 
surface,  whether  it  is  bright  or  dull-colored,  on  which  there  is  nectar 
or  honey  will  be  freely  visited  by  bees  for  stores,  after  these  liquids 
have  once  been  discovered;  but  they  will  not  be  discovered  so  quickly 
on  a  surface  which  does  not  contrast  in  hue  with  the  environment  as 
they  will  be  on  one  that  does  so  contrast.  (3)  As  pointed  out  by 
Knuth,  in  the  absence  of  control  or  comparative  observations,  the 
experiments  of  Plateau  upon  green  or  greenish  flowers  are  fallacious 
and  do  not  prove  that  "  all  flowers  might  be  as  green  as  their  leaves 
without  their  pollination  being  compromised."  (4)  When,  under 
similar  conditions,  bees  are  given  the  choice  between  a  conspicuous 
and  an  inconspicuous  object,  they  exhibit  a  preference  for  the  former. 
This  preference  is  sufficiently  marked  to  account  for  the  development 
of  color  contrast  in  flowers. 

Turner's  experiments  (38)  on  the  pattern-vison  of  bees  were 
conducted  with  paste-board  artifacts  similar  to  those  used  by  him,  a 


RECENT  LITERATURE  ON  HIGHER  INVERTEBRATES         293 

year  ago,  in  his  experiments  upon  the  color-vision  of  bees.  Artifacts 
constructed  out  of  seven  different  kinds  of  color  patterns  were  used. 
The  bees  were  trained  to  collect  honey  from  an  artifact  of  a  certain 
definite  color  pattern.  The  trained  bees  were  given  an  opportunity 
to  select  artifacts  of  that  color-pattern  from  one  or  many  artifacts  of 
different  color  pattern,  under  the  following  three  conditions:  when  the 
artifact  to  be  sleeted  contained  honey  and  the  others  did  not;  when 
some  of  all  kinds  of  artifacts  contained  honey;  when  none  of  the 
artifacts  contained  honey.  Of  the  518  selections  made  by  the  bees, 
508  were  correct.  This  warrants  the  conclusion  that  bees  can  dis- 
tinguish color-patterns.  Hence  since  bees  can  distinguish  colors  and 
the  fine  details  of  color-pattern,  there  is  nothing  about  the  visual 
powers  of  bees  that  militates  against  the  theory  that  the  colors  and 
the  color-patterns  of  flowers  are  adaptations  to  insect  visitors. 

FEELINGS  AND  EMOTIONS 

H.  H.  P  and  H.  C.  Severin  (36)  find  that  a  sudden  approach  to 
an  aquarium  containing  Belostomas  causes  the  bugs  to  flee  in  all 
directions  from  their  resting  places.  This  they  consider  an  indication 
of  fear.  Under  similar  conditions,  Nepa  apicula  um,  Ranatra 
americana,  and  Ranatra  kirkaldyi  show  no  such  signs  of  fear. 

Wodsedalek  (44)  thinks  that,  under  certain  conditions,  the 
may-fly  larvae  show  unmistakable  signs  of  fear.  He  found  that 
larvse  which  had  been  frequently  handled  exhibited  this  type  of 
behavior  in  a  marked  degree. 

Hardy  (19)  thinks  he  has  discovered  in  the  wasp  Diamma  bicolor 
signs  of  anger.  He  bases  this  conclusion  upon  the  following  obser- 
vation. The  wasp  was  dragging  a  cricket  into  its  burrow  when 
Hardy,  with  a  pair  of  forceps,  held  the  cricket  by  its  hind  legs.  After 
tugging  and  tugging  without  accomplishing  anything,  the  wasp 
suddenly  stopped  pulling,  mounted  the  cricket,  seized  a  portion  of 
the  cricket's  abdomen  in  her  jaws  and  stung  the  insect  three  times. 

MATING  INSTINCTS 

Hinds  and  Turner  (23)  find  that  the  rice  weevil  is  both  poly- 
gamous and  polyandrous. 

In  studying  the  behavior  of  Calosoma  sycophanta,  Burgess  (8) 
iound  that  the  same  beetles  copulated  several  times  during  the 
summer. 

Cory  (14)  describes  in  detail  the  copulation  of  Sanninoidea 
txitiosa  Say.  He  finds  that  they  remain  in  copulo  from  51-82  min. 


294  c-  H-  TURNER 

Fuchs  (17)  observed  two  males  copulating  with  one  female 
Cheimatonia  brunnata.  He  also  noticed  a  male  Larentia  bilineata 
copulate  with  a  female  Acidalia  aversata. 

Turner  (40)  describes  in  detail  the  mating  of  a  parasitic  bee  of 
the  family  Stelidse. 

That  certain  syrphid  flies  hover  before  flowers  for  long  stretches 
of  time,  and  that  several  other  flies  engage  in  a  kind  of  an  aerial 
dance  in  which  all  heads  are  directed  the  same  way,  has  been  known 
for  several  years.  Some  have  considered  the  first  an  indication  that 
flies  have  an  aesthetic  taste;  most  students  have  considered  the  latter 
an  anemotropism.  When  Plateau  interposed  his  hand  between  the 
fly  and  the  blossom  and  noticed  that  it  continued  to  hover  there,  and 
when  he  moved  his  hand  to  the  right  and  to  the  left,  forward  and 
backward,  and  noticed  that,  in  each  case,  the  fly  moved  in  the  same 
sense,  he  demonstrated  the  fallacy  of  the  aesthetic  taste  hypothesis. 
Perez  (32)  has  now  proposed  what,  to  the  writer,  seems  the  true 
interpretation  of  both  of  the  phenomena  mentioned  above.  He 
noticed  that  the  flies  hovering  before  flowers  and  those  engaged  in 
the  dances  were  always  males.  Whenever  a  female  approached  one 
or  more  of  the  males  would  dart  after  her.  If  the  female  was  over- 
taken, mating  would  occur  and  the  male  would  drop  out  of  the  dance. 
These  data,  obtained  by  watching  the  behavior  of  several  species  of 
flies,  caused  Perez  to  conclude  that  the  stationary  hovering  of  certain 
flies  and  the  aerial  dances  of  others  were  means  of  securing  mating. 
This  discovery  of  Perez  places  the  stationary  hovering  of  the  Syr- 
phidae,  the  aerial  dances  of  other  flies,  and  the  sun  dances  of  certain 
bees  in  the  same  category;  each  is  what  has  been  called  a  "nuptial 
ambuscade."1 

NEST  BUILDING  AND  MATERNAL  INSTINCTS 

Girault  (18)  describes  the  behavior  of  the  adult  and  larval  Polistes 
pallipes  Lepelletier  during  the  process  of  colony  formation. 

Lozinski  (26)  discovered  a  nest  of  ten  cells,  constructed  by 
Osmia  bicornis,  in  an  open  glass  tube. 

Sasscer  (35)  describes  the  method  of  ovipositing  of  the  saw-fly 
Tomosthetus  mullicinctus  Rohwer. 

Hinds  and  Turner  (23)  describe  the  egg-laying  habits  of  the 
rice  weevil. 

Parrott  (30)  describes,  in  detail,  the  method  of  ovipositing  of  the 
tree  Crickets,  Oecanthus  niveus  DeGeer,  0.  quadripunctatus  Beut., 
0.  nigricornis  Walker. 

1  C.  H.  Turner,  "The  Sun-Dance  of  Melissodes,"  Psyche,  1908,  pp.  122-124. 


RECENT  LITERATURE  ON  HIGHER  INVERTEBRATES         295 

Calvert  (9)  found  the  larvae  of  Mecistogaster  modestus  living  in 
water  between  the  leaves  of  epiphytic  bromelids.  He  thinks  this  is 
an  evolution  from  the  chance  laying  of  eggs  in  the  bromelids  when 
floods  brought  the  water  to  that  level.  The  association  having  once 
been  formed  persists,  so  he  thinks,  even  after  the  plant  is  far  above 
the  water. 

Turner  (39)  has  observed  an  American  Ammophila  stocking  its 
nest  with  subterranean  caterpillars. 

It  is  not  often  that  one  has  the  good  fortune  to  observe,  within 
the  range  of  a  single  genus,  an  epitome  of  the  evolution  of  an  instinct. 
In  SynagriS)  a  genus  of  Eumenidae  found  in  the  Congo,  Roubaud  (33) 
has  made  such  a  discovery.  S.  calida  L.  constructs  a  nest  of  several 
mud  cells,  stocks  them  with  caterpillars,  lays  an  egg  in  each,  seals 
the  cells,  and  takes  no  further  care  of  them.  S.  sicheliana  Sauss. 
lays  an  egg  in  each  of  several  mud  cells,  places  in  each  enough  cater- 
pillars to  last  the  larva  a  little  more  than  a  day,  and  renews  the 
supply  daily.  When  S.  cornuta  L.  has  completed  one  cell,  she  lays 
an  egg  in  it;  but  does  not  stock  the  cell  with  caterpillars.  When  the 
larva  has  hatched,  the  wasp  feeds  it  daily  until  it  is  full  grown.  Then 
she  seals  the  cell  and  proceeds  to  construct  a  new  one. 

FIGHTING  AND  FOOD-PROCURING  INSTINCTS 

Hardy  (19)  describes,  in  detail,  the  capture  and  the  handling  of  a 
tree  cricket  by  Diamma  bicolor. 

Gowdey  (i),  of  Uganda,  has  observed  two  specimens  of  Bembex 
tricolor  Dahl  carrying  off  a  Tabanus  secedens. 

Davidson  (3)  observed  a  large  bug  (Lethocerus  (Belostoma) 
americanus  Leidy)  capture  and  feed  upon  a  fish  (Lucius  americanus 
Gmelin). 

Banks  (7)  discovered  that  one  of  the  phorid  flies  attacks  myria- 
pods. 

McDermott  (28)  observed  a  young  half-winged  bug  feeding  upon 
the  larvae  of  the  tent-caterpillar. 

Knab  (24)  discovers  that  a  genus  of  mosquitoes  (Megarhinus) 
does  not  suck  blood,  but  feeds  upon  fruit  and  that  its  mouth-parts 
have  been  especially  modified  for  that  purpose. 

According  to  the  Severins  (36)  both  Belostoma  and  Nepa  are 
carnivorous. 


296  C.  H.  TURNER 

PARASITISM,  COMMENSALISM  AND  SYMBIOSIS 

T.  L.  Patterson  (31)  has  conducted  some  experiments  which  have 
caused  him  to  conclude  that  the  sarcophagids  are  scavengers  and  not 
parasites. 

Roubaud  (33)  describes  several  commensals  and  parasites  of  the 
solitary  wasps  of  the  genus  Synagris. 

Wheeler  describes  two  new  ant  guests:  a  pseudoscorpion  (Cha- 
lanops  dorsalis  Banks)  (41)  and  a  coccinellid  beetle  (Brachycantha 
quadripunctata  Mels.)  (43)  and  gives  a  list  of  the  hosts  of  five  Xeno- 
dusse  (42). 

Enslin  (15)  describes  a  small  cicada  (Gar  gar  a  genista)  functioning 
as  an  "ant  cow."  The  larvae  and  nymphs  rest  on  a  plant  with  the 
beak  of  each  penetrating  the  plant  tissues.  The  ant  appears  in  the 
rear  and  feels  the  abdomen  of  the  cicada  with  her  antennae.  Immedi- 
ately the  cicada  protrudes  an  anal  tube  on  the  tip  of  which  appears 
a  drop  of  clear  liquid,  which  is  swallowed  by  the  ant. 

Cr emastogaster  difformis  Sm.  (4),  a  Javanese  ant,  excavates  its  nest 
in  the  end  of  dead  branches.  In  certain  places  these  nests  are  filled 
with  rain  water  and  a  mosquito  (Harpagomyia  splendens  Meijere) 
breeds  therein.  In  breeding  mosquitoes  and  ants  together,  Jacobson 
found  that  the  mosquitoes  spent  much  time  on  the  upright  rod  that 
supported  the  nest.  When  an  ant  passed  between  the  legs  of  the 
mosquito,  it  was  caressed  by  the  mosquito  and  between  the  ant's 
wide  open  jaws  there  appeared  a  drop  of  liquid  which  was  swallowed 
by  the  mosquito. 

In  the  literature  much  emphasis  has  been  placed  upon  the  sym- 
biotic relation  of  certain  animals  to  certain  plants.  Recently 
Escherich  (16)  has  made  a  careful  study  of  the  so-called  symbiosis 
between  ants  and  Humboldtia  laurifolia,  a  plant  with  hollow  inter- 
nodes.  He  collected  the  following  data:  (i)  Only  a  small  number  of 
the  cavitie.s  in  the  stem  contained  ants.  (2)  The  following  genera 
of  ants  were  found  in  the  cavities:  Tapinoma,  Monomorium,  Cre- 
mastogaster,  etc.,  all  genera  that  are  found  elsewhere  than  in  the  stems 
of  these  plants.  (3)  The  ants  were  anything  but  aggressive.  (4) 
Many  of  the  branches  containing  ants  showed  scars  caused  by 
woodpeckers.  Escherich  concludes  that  this  is  evidently  not  a 
symbiotic,  but  a  parasitic  relation;  the  ants  being  the  parasites. 


RECENT  LITERATURE  ON  HIGHER  INVERTEBRATES         297 

MISCELLANEOUS  INSTINCTS 

Migrations. — Hill  (22)  describes  dragon  flies  migrating  in  swarms. 

July  9,  1911,  a  moth  (Tortrix  fumiferana  Clemens)  entered 
Philadelphia  in  such  numbers  as  to  interfere  with  traffic  and  to  cause 
the  shop  people  to  close  their  doors  (2). 

Hibernation. — Herrick  (21)  thinks  that,  in  the  south,  the  agamic 
adults  of  the  cabbage  aphis  (Aphis  brassier)  hibernate. 

HOMING 

During  the  year  Cornetz  (10,  n,  12,  13)  has  produced  several 
papers  on  the  homing  of  African  ants.  These  papers  reiterate  the 
same  points  given  in  the  papers  by  him  that  were  reviewed  in  this 
BULLETIN  last  year.  He  lays  especial  stress  upon  the  statement 
that  ants  have  an  awareness  of  distance  and  of  direction,  which  has 
been  obtained  independently  of  the  sense  of  sight  and  of  the  sense 
of  smell. 

Santschi  (34)  has  recently  conducted  a  series  of  well-planned  field 
experiments  upon  the  African  ants.  These  experiments  were  so  ar- 
ranged as  to  give  the  ants  an  opportunity  to  find  the  way  home  under 
the  following  conditions:  when  the  odor  has  been  removed  from  a 
portion  of  the  trail;  when  a  portion  of  the  trail  and  the  ant  upon  it  is 
shifted  bodily  to  a  new  position;  when  the  direction  of  the  impinging 
light  rays  is  shifted  from  time  to  time  by  means  of  mirrors;  when  the 
ant  is  placed  in  a  new  environment.  Santschi  concludes:  (i)  There 
are  two  kinds  of  trails  found  among  ants:  trails  along  which  the  ants 
are  guided  by  the  olfactory  and  topochemical  senses,  and  trails  along 
which  the  ants  are  guided  by  perceptions  which  are  largely  visual. 
(2)  Among  the  Tapinomas,  and  perhaps  among  other  harvesting 
ants,  the  trails  are  started  by  odors  intentionally  deposited  by  a  single 
worker.  (3)  Such  an  intentionally  scented  trail,  although  not  slav- 
ishly followed,  is  utilized  by  workers  to  teach  other  workers  the 
way  to  a  source  of  food.  (4)  The  trace  of  odor  is  not  sufficient  to 
explain  fully  the  orientation  of  the  ants  that  follow  it  and  it  is  suppli- 
mented  by  contact  ideas.  (5)  As  a  rule,  orientation  among  ants  is 
a  complex  phenomenon  based  upon  a  variety  of  sense  stimuli,  the 
one  predominant  depending  upon  the  species  and  the  conditions. 
(6)  Odors,  topochemical  stimuli,  visual  images,  the  direction  of  the 
rays  of  light,  tactile  sensations,  muscular  sensations,  and  auditory 
sensations  form  a  psychic  complex  which  serves  as  a  flexible  guide 
to  behavior.  (7)  The  chief  sense-organs  that  function  in  ant  behavior 


298  C.  H.   TURNER 

are:  antennae,  eyes,  tactile  tegumentary  hairs,  chordotonal  organs, 
and  muscles. 

MEMORY  AND  LEARNING  BY  ASSOCIATION 

Allard  (6)  thinks  that  the  bees  visiting  cotton  blossoms  display 
a  kind  of  memory  or  association. 

By  patient  experimenting,  Wodsedalek  (44)  trained  may-fly 
nymphs  to  move  against  the  light  towards  a  stone,  the  position  of 
which  was  shifted  from  time  to  time,  and  to  swim  considerable 
distances  towards  food  held  in  forceps.  The  latter  was  accomplished 
in  the  following  manner.  Algae,  held  in  forceps,  were  presented  to  a 
hungry  nymph.  When  the  insect  seized  the  algae,  the  experimenter 
pulled  gently  and  thus  caused  the  nymph  to  follow.  Later  he  would 
hold  bits  of  algae  near  a  nymph  and,  when  the  young  may-fly  ap- 
proached, withdraw  the  forceps  a  little.  After  four  weeks  of  such 
training,  many  would  swim  considerable  distances  towards  food, 
and  some  would  swim  towards  the  experimenter  as  soon  as  he  entered 
the  room.  At  the  end  of  two  and  a  half  months,  as  soon  as  Wod- 
sedalek entered  the  room,  the  majority  of  the  nymphs  would  swim 
towards  him  and  claw  against  the  side  of  the  aquarium.  One  speci- 
men came  to  the  top  of  a  stone,  and  partly  into  the  air,  to  obtain  the 
food.  Untrained  specimens  never  behaved  in  this  manner. 

Szymanski  (37)  has  used  the  same  method  in  investigating  the 
behavior  of  young  cockroaches  that  was  employed  by  Yerkes  in 
studying  the  behavior  of  mice;  namely,  punishing  the  subject  with 
an  electric  shock  whenever  it  makes  a  wrong  choice.  The  young 
roaches  were  given  an  opportunity  to  pass  from  a  well-lighted  apart- 
ment into  a  dark  one.  Following  its  natural  tendencies,  each  roach 
started  to  enter  the  dark  chamber.  As  soon  as  it  did  so,  it  received 
an  electric  shock  which  caused  it  to  dart  back  into  the  light.  After 
being  repeatedly  punished  for  entering  the  dark  chamber,  the  roach 
learned  to  turn  back  as  soon  as  it  reached  the  shadow.  To  the  best 
of  my  knowledge,  this  is  the  first  time  that  this  electrical  method  of 
punishment  has  been  used  in  the  investigation  of  insect  behavior. 

REFERENCES. 

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RECENT  LITERATURE  ON  HIGHER  INVERTEBRATES         299 

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7.  BANKS,  N.     A  Curious  Habit  of  One  of  Our  Phorid  Flies.     Proc.  Entom.  Soc. 

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RECENT  LITERATURE  ON  THE  BEHAVIOR  OF 
VERTEBRATES 

BY  PROFESSOR  MARGARET  FLOY  WASHBURN 

Vassar  College 

Fish. — Copeland  (2)  finds  that  the  puffer  bites  much  oftener  at 
packets  containing  food  than  at  empty  packets  of  similar  appearance; 
this  discrimination  is  abolished  by  cutting  the  olfactory  nerves,  and 
reestablished  on  their  recovery. 

Loeb  and  Wasteneys  (13)  have  observed  that  the  maximum  tem- 
perature to  which  Fundulus  may  safely  be  transferred  varies  with 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  VERTEBRATES  301 

the  concentration  of  the  water  and  is  affected  by  the  presence  of 
salts.  The  fish  may  be  immunized  to  a  temperature  of  35°  by  being 
previously  kept  for  thirty  hours  in  water  at  27°. 

Sumner  (23)  has  observed  the  protective  adjustment  of  the  mark- 
ings of  flatfish  to  the  background.  Observations  were  made  with 
the  fish  on  natural  and  artificial  grounds.  The  pigment  pattern  is 
adjusted  not  only  to  the  brightness  of  the  ground  but  to  its  pattern: 
the  plates  show  arrangements  to  correspond  with  large  and  with 
small  black  and  white  checks;  arrangements  quite  foreign  to  the 
previous  experience  of  individual  or  race.  The  pattern  assumed  is 
constant  for  a  given  ground.  The  vertical  walls  have  some  influence; 
the  ceiling  has  none.  The  pigment  changes  do  not  occur  if  both  eyes 
are  destroyed;  hence  their  source  is  retinal.  Since  the  absolute 
degree  of.  illumination  has  little  effect,  the  stimulus  must  be  the  ratio 
of  direct  to  reflected  light.  The  changes  occur  when  the  fish  is  buried 
in  the  sand  or  has  its  skin  covered  with  a  mask.  The  fish  shows  no 
ability  to  choose  between  two  grounds  that  one  to  which  its  pig- 
mentation is  adapted.  It  may  be  remembered  that  Minkiewicz  has 
claimed  such  a  power  for  the  crab,  but  that  Pearse  has  been  unable 
to  confirm  his  observations. 

Parker  (16)  has  recently  made  experiments  to  test  the  effect  on 
various  kinds  of  fish,  which  he  believes  can  hear,  of  the  noises  made 
by  motor  boats  and  guns.  It  was  found  that  "the  sounds  produced 
by  motor  boats  are  extremely  faint  under  water,  and  have  little  in- 
fluence on  the  movements  and  feeding  of  fishes.  .  .  .  Single  ex- 
plosive sounds,  like  the  report  of  a  gun,  may  startle  fish  and  cause 
them  to  cease  feeding,  but  these  responses  are  also  temporary  and 
local."  It  is  pointed  out  that  certain  fish,  like  the  drumfish  and  the 
squeteague,  produce  noises  that  are  connected  with  sex  attraction, 
and  that  therefore  it  might  be  possible  to  use  artificial  noises  as  a  lure. 

A  very  interesting  suggestion,  connecting  the  adjustment  of 
pigmentation  in  certain  fishes  to  the  background  on  which  they  lie, 
with  possible  sensibility  of  their  eyes  to  color,  has  been  made  by  von 
Frisch  (6).  Phoxinus  l&vis  has  this  power  of  adjustment,  but  loses 
it  if  blinded,  showing  that  the  reaction  is  a  retinal  one.  Now  two 
equally  bright  fish  may  be  placed,  the  one  on  a  gray,  the  other  on  a 
yellow  ground,  and  if  the  grounds  are  properly  chosen,  the  fish  will 
not  change  their  brightnesses,  showing  that  the  two  grounds  are  of 
equal  brightness  so  far  as  the  sensitiveness  of  the  fish  is  concerned. 
But  after  a  few  hours  spent  on  these  grounds,  the  fish  on  the  yellow 
shows  a  yellow  stripe  which  does  not  appear  on  the  other  fish.  This 


302  MARGARET  FLOY  WASHBURN 

proves,  von  Frisch  argues,  that  the  light  has  had  a  chromatic  effect 
on  the  retina.  If  such  is  the  case,  there  is  no  reason  why  the  fish 
should  not  have  color  vision.  This  is  drawing  evidence  from  a  new 
source  on  the  problem  of  color-vision  in  an  animal  (see  the  dispute 
between  Hess  and  Bauer  reported  in  the  corresponding  number  of 
this  BULLETIN  for  last  year). 

Amphibia. — Our  opinion  of  the  ability  of  frogs  to  learn  has  been 
raised  by  the  investigations  of  Schaeffer  (19).  Specimens  of  Rana 
clamata,  R.  sylvatica,  and  R.  virescens  learned  in  from  four  to  seven 
trials  to  avoid  hairy  caterpillars,  and  chemically  treated  worms  also 
were  soon  avoided.  An  electric  shock  associated  with  food  inhibited 
the  feeding  instinct  altogether  for  some  days.  Schaeffer  calls  at- 
tention to  the  fact  that  the  frogs  learned  to  avoid  the  disagreeable 
food  in  two  ways:  either  by  taking  it  into  the  mouth  and  rejecting  it, 
or  by  swallowing  it.  In  the  former  case,  rejecting  movements  entered 
into  the  formation  of  the  habit;  in  the  latter  case,  the  habit  must  have 
been  formed  wholly  in  nervous  tissue,  and  under  such  circumstances 
a  habit  might  appear  to  be  suddently  formed  when  its  growth  had 
really  been  gradual  though  invisible.  The  difference  between  the 
speed  of  learning  shown  by  his  frogs  and  the  slowness  of  Yerkes's 
frogs  in  learning  a  labyrinth  the  author  explains  as  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  feeding  instinct,  which  was  not  involved  in  the  work  of 
Yerkes,  is  exercised  with  regard  to  a  great  variety  of  dissimilar  stimuli, 
and  hence  its  mechanism  must  be  very  plastic.  Strong  objection 
is  made  to  the  statement  by  Washburn  and  Bentley  in  their  article 
on  the  formation  of  associations  in  the  chub:  "In  general  it  may  be 
prophesied  that  the  more  deep-rooted  and  essential  the  instinct 
appealed  to  by  the  experience  to  which  an  animal  is  subjected,  the 
more  rapidly  will  the  animal  profit  by  experience."  The  authors  of 
this  statement  did  not  mean  to  imply  that  these  characters  in  an 
instinct  were  the  only  ones  affecting  its  modifiability.  The  presence 
of  a  psychic  accompaniment  to  the  behavior  of  his  frogs  is  concluded 
by  Schaeffer  from  the  fact  that  they  very  carefully  examined  the  food 
supplied  to  them,  after  they  had  had  unfavorable  experience  with  it. 
This  examination  differed  from  instinctive  examination,  for  its  cause 
was  the  individual  experience  of  the  frog.  The  nature  of  this  psychic 
process  the  author  describes  by  using  Morgan's  term  "defining  the 
construct"  of  hairy  caterpillar. 

In  connection  with  prophecies  that  fail,  it  is  rather  amusing  to 
find  in  Hargitt's  (8)  paper  on  the  tree  frog  a  prophecy  that  is  falsified 
by  Schaeffer's  results.  Hargitt  observed  that  a  tree  frog  which  had 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF   VERTEBRATES  303 

caught  and  been  stung  by  a  wasp  went  through  the  same  performance 
next  day  without,  apparently,  having  profited  by  its  lesson,  and  he 
says:  "It  maybe  doubted  whether  amphibia  show  any  particular 
discrimination  based  on  that  type  of  experience."  Hargitt's  work 
was  done  on  the  American  species  Hyla  versicolor,  and  was  supple- 
mented by  a  less  complete  study  of  the  European  H.  arborea.  The 
animals  were  subjected  to  varying  degrees  of  daylight,  and  to  different 
air  and  water  temperatures.  Strong  light  lightens  the  skin  color,  as 
does  high  temperature:  Parker  found  that  in  lizards  light  and  high 
temperature  caused  opposite  effects.  Neither  darkness  nor  low  tem- 
perature had  any  direct  effect  on  the  tree  frogs.  Biedermann's 
hypothesis  that  contact  stimuli  are  important  was  tested  with  differ- 
ent stimuli,  as  well  as  with  individuals  whose  toe  disks  were  clipped 
off,  and  even  with  section  of  the  spinal  cord;  the  results  were  nega- 
tive. The  great  variability  of  the  phenomena  observed  leads  Har- 
gitt  to  think  that  emotional  factors  are  involved  in  their  production. 
Sometimes  mere  handling  would  produce  the  changes.  "I  even," 
says  he,  "tried  the  effect  of  merely  close  scrutiny  without  any  jostling 
or  moving  of  the  jars,  and  found  that  where  a  specimen  could  be 
brought  to  observe  that  it  was  observed,  there  was  often  a  color  change 
quite  as  evident  as  the  others."  In  certain  instances  where  light 
stimuli  on  one  day  produced  response  and  on  the  following  day 
failed  to  do  so,  the  suggestion  is  ventured  that  "the  creature  had 
acquired  such  familiarity  with  conditions  as  to  dissipate  to  a  degree 
its  emotional  sensitiveness."  One  can  imagine  the  reaction  of 
Professor  Loeb  to  the  following  concluding  remark,  which  is  however 
very  gratifying  to  the  psychologist:  "There  are  other  minds  than 
ours,  and  they  share  something  in  common  with  us  in  those  psychic 
powers  which  count  for  something  in  the  stress  of  evolution,  and  as 
behavior  in  its  manifold  aspects  gives  expression  to  the  endless 
struggle  it  is  not  strange  to  find  involved  therein  the  psychic  along 
with  other  factors  which  go  to  constitute  the  organism  and  its  environ- 
ment." 

Cummings  (5)  contributes  a  brief  description  of  the  courting 
behavior  of  a  British  salamander,  Molge  palmata  Schneid. 

The  spotted  newt  has  had  its  food  and  chemical  sense  tested  by 
Reese  (17).  In  securing  food,  both  sight  and  smell  play  a  part,  the 
latter  being  more  important.  Inedible  objects  are  followed  and  some- 
times seized,  but  not  swallowed;  and  when  fatigued  so  that  it  will  no 
longer  follow  such  objects  the  newt  will  usually  still  react  to  food. 
The  head  is  much  the  most  sensitive  part  of  the  body  to  chemical 


304  MARGARET  FLOY  WASHBURN 

stimulation.  All  other  parts  of  the  body  are  equally  sensitive. 
Cutting  the  olfactory  nerves  abolished  all  response  to  food,  but  a 
negative  response  to  a  .5  per  cent,  solution  of  acetic  acid  was  un- 
changed, and  the  greater  sensitiveness  of  the  head  was  maintained, 
from  which  the  author  concludes  that  it  is  probably  due  to  the  sensi- 
tiveness of  the  oral  and  nasal  mucous  membranes,  rather  than  to 
smell  proper.  A  strong  sugar  solution  caused  no  reaction.  Quinine 
produced  a  negative  reaction  when  applied  to  the  head,  but  no  re- 
sponse from  other  regions.  Some  animals  reacted  negatively  to  a 
I  per  cent,  solution  of  common  salt  applied  to  the  head;  a  4  per  cent, 
solution  was  necessary  to  produce  reactions  from  other  parts  of  the 
body.  Very  marked  negative  reactions  to  potassium  hydroxide  and 
to  acetic  acid  occurred.  Ethyl  alcohol  caused  less  reaction  than 
might  have  been  expected.  Cocaine  has  apparently  no  effect  upon 
the  skin  of  this  newt;  applied  to  the  nasal  and  oral  mucous  membrane 
in  a  5  per  cent,  solution  "it  temporarily  inhibits  the  feeding  reaction 
and  diminishes  the  sensitiveness  to  acid  solutions  squirted  upon  the 
head.  This  result  may  be  due  to  the  general  effect  of  the  cocaine 
upon  the  system."  The  writer  quotes  from  the  present  reviewer  the 
term  " telaesthetic  sense"  as  descriptive  of  the  chemical  sense.  The 
term,  which  is  Lloyd  Morgan's,  should  be  "  telaesthetic  taste,"  and  is 
descriptive  of  the  sense  of  smell  in  a  water-dwelling  animal.  "Telaes- 
thetic sense"  does  not  properly  describe  smell,  for  the  senses  of 
sight  and  hearing  are  also  telaesthetic. 

Birds. — Hunter  (n)  used  three  mazes  with  pigeons;  the  first  was 
that  of  Rouse,  the  second  more  complex,  and  the  third  was  one  whose 
paths  could  be  shortened.  Four  males  and  four  females  were  given 
three  tests  each  a  day.  With  Rouse's  maze,  the  time  curves  began 
much  lower  and  fell  more  abruptly  than  in  Rouse's  own  experiments; 
probably  because  in  his  tests  the  birds  could  see  from  one  compart- 
ment into  another,  since  he  used  wire  rather  than  wood  partitions. 
Hunter  found  that  memory  for  this  maze  was  practically  perfect 
after  four  weeks.  With  the  second  maze  the  error  curve  fell  much 
more  slowly,  owing,  the  author  thinks,  to  the  complexity  of  the  maze 
and  to  the  interference  of  habits  from  the  first  maze.  The  time 
curves,  however,  fell  more  rapidly  in  the  case  of  those  birds  that  had 
had  experience  with  the  first  maze.  Tests  were  made  with  the  maze 
rotated  90°,  270°,  and  360°.  Some  birds  were  confused  at  90°  but 
perfect  at  270°;  with  others  the  reverse  tended  to  be  the  case.  One 
bird  was  confused  at  both  positions.  "After  sixteen  days  training 
in  these  two  positions,  all  the  birds  were  perfect  at  360°  rotation." 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  VERTEBRATES  305 

In  explanation,  Hunter  suggests  that  the  birds  which  were  not 
confused  in  a  rotated  position  must  have  been  depending  on  visual 
cues  from  within  the  maze,  while  those  which  were  confused  were 
depending  on  visual  cues  from  without  the  maze.  It  is  then  neces- 
sary to  suppose  that  those  which  were  confused  at  one  rotation  but 
not  at  another  changed  their  system  of  cues  when  the  maze  was  placed 
in  a  new  position,  an  hypothesis  which  "suggests  the  complexity  of 
the  animal  mind  for  types  as  high  as  the  pigeon."  The  final  perfect 
records  at  360°  may  be  explained  either  by  a  persistence  of  the  original 
learning,  or  by  the  acquisition  of  a  system  of  cues  that  is  undisturbed 
by  any  rotation.  The  birds  throughout  depend  on  visual  cues  and  do 
not  make  the  type  of  errors  in  the  shortened  maze,  such  as  butting 
into  the  walls,  characteristic  of  an  animal  guided  by  kinsesthetic  data. 

In  the  second  part  of  Herrick's  (9)  study  of  nests  and  nest- 
building  in  birds,  we  have  sections  on  the  analysis  of  increment  nests 
on  the  basis  of  behavior,  and  on  variations  in  the  nests  of  certain  birds. 
In  Part  III.  careful  descriptions  are  given  of  the  building  behavior  of 
the  robin,  oriole,  and  red-eyed  vireo.  An  interesting  feature  of  the 
robin's  building  is  the  fact  that  the  molding  movements  are  always 
made  in  opposite  directions  on  successive  visits  to  the  nest,  although 
nothing  can  be  detected  in  the  appearance  of  the  nest  that  would 
give  the  bird  a  clue  as  to  which  direction  she  had  turned  in  at  the 
previous  visit.  The  history  of  the  nest-building  instinct  is  outlined 
as  follows:  incubation  arose  through  the  instinct  to  guard  and  to 
conceal  by  covering  with  the  body;  "increment  nests  may  have 
arisen  .  .  .  through  an  earlier  practice  of  collecting  materials  of  any 
description  to  cover  the  eggs  upon  leaving  them  to  look  for  food. 
All  such  would  be  scattered  to  some  extent  upon  reentering  the  nest 
to  cover  and  guard;  some,  however,  would  remain  to  form  a  rude 
rampart  or  wall  of  circular  form,  and  this  would  be  advantageous  in 
holding  the  eggs  to  a  focal  point." 

Haggerty  (7)  notes  an  instance  of  pure  instinct  in  a  young  sparrow 
hawk  which  had  fallen  out  of  the  nest,  and  which  used  towards  a 
piece  of  roast  beef  the  behavior  that  would  have  been  appropriate 
for  living  prey. 

The  series  of  Behavior  Monographs  is  inaugurated  by  Breed's  (i) 
study  of  the  instincts  and  intelligence  of  the  chick.  Part  I.  is  devoted 
to  the  chick's  instinctive  activities.  The  behavior  of  the  chick  while 
still  in  the  shell  was  observed  by  bringing  the  eggs,  just  after  the 
shell  was  chipped,  under  an  electric  light  and  breaking  away  some  of 
the  shell.  Breed  is  inclined  to  think  that  a  movement  much  more 


3o6  MARGARET  FLOY  WASHBURN 

important  than  pecking  in  the  emergence  from  the  shell  is  a  lifting 
movement  of  the  head.  "  Chicks  appeared  to  break  the  shell  in  two 
by  a  lifting,  struggling  movement  of  the  head  accompanied  by  a 
stretching,  straightening  movement  of  the  legs."  A  tapping  sound 
is  heard  before  the  shell  is  chipped  at  all,  but  a  somewhat  similar 
sound  is  heard  after  so  much  of  the  shell  has  been  removed  that  the 
beak  is  no  longer  in  contact  with  it.  Morgan  and  Mills  agree  that 
the  stimulus  to  the  drinking  reaction  is  the  touch  of  water  on  the  bill. 
Breed,  by  keeping  chicks  from  drinking  for  three  days  after  hatching, 
found  that  the  drinking  reaction  was  given  "to  the  surface  of  smooth 
white  note  paper,  the  edge  of  white  glazed  kymograph  paper,  or  the 
edge  of  a  glass  dish;"  the  stimulus  being  evidently  visual.  The 
effect  of  deferring  the  pecking  reaction  was  studied  by  keeping  some 
chicks  in  the  dark  for  a  number  of  hours  after  hatching;  it  was  found 
that  pecking  was  decidedly  more  inaccurate  in  these  chicks,  but  that 
practice  soon  made  up  the  deficiency.  The  effect  of  imitation  on 
the  pecking  reaction  was  studied  by  comparing  the  records  of  accurate 
pecking  made  by  one  brood  with  those  made  by  a  younger  brood 
placed  with  the  older  one  to  profit,  if  possible,  by  imitating  the  latter. 
No  such  beneficial  influence  was  observed.  Possibly,  the  author 
suggests,  the  effect  of  social  influence  may  have  been  exerted  in  the 
direction  of  increasing  the  intensity  and  speed  of  the  pecking,  though 
not  its  accuracy.  An  important  observation  is  that  the  chicks  ate 
readily  in  complete  darkness.  One  of  the  fundamental  methods 
upon  which  Hess's  far-reaching  conclusions  with  regard  to  vision  in 
the  lower  animals  are  based  is  derived  from  the  assumption  that  if 
animals  cannot  see  food  on  the  ground  they  will  not  eat  it.  There 
must,  however,  be  some  explanation  for  the  refusal  to  feed,  under 
certain  visual  conditions,  shown  by  the  animals  in  the  tests  made  by 
Hess,  Katz,  and  Revesz.  A  very  careful  record  of  the  development 
up  to  the  twenty-fifth  day  of  the  pecking  reaction  as  regards  the 
accuracy  of  its  three  components,  striking,  seizing,  and  swallowing, 
was  kept.  Improvement  was  very  rapid  during  the  first  two  days, 
and  was  practically  complete  at  the  eleventh  day.  Seizing  remained 
imperfect  longer  than  the  other  components.  The  belief  of  some 
•observers  that  the  reaction  is  perfect  from  the  outset  is  probably 
accounted  for  by  the  fact  that  the  striking  component  is  very  nearly 
so  by  the  fifth  day,  and  is  "seldom  widely  erroneous." 

In  Part  II.  we  have  a  report  of  the  learning  processes  of  the 
•chick  as  tested  by  the  visual  discrimination  method.  Two  compart- 
ments were  offered,  through  one  of  which  escape  might  be  made  to 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  VERTEBRATES 

the  cage  where  the  other  chicks  were  kept  and  food  was  to  be  had. 
Cards  were  placed  at  the  entrance  to  the  compartments  to  serve  as 
visual  stimuli.  Electric  shocks  furnished  the  punishment  for  wrong 
choices.  Color  differences,  brightness  (black-white)  differences, 
form  differences,  and  size  differences,  were  used  as  stimuli.  The 
principal  object  was  to  study  the  learning  process,  and  the  results 
bearing  on  this  will  be  stated  first;  the  incidental  observations  on 
color  discrimination  will  be  discussed  later.  The  chicks  succeeded 
in  acquiring  habits  of  choosing  one  color  or  brightness  rather  than  the 
other,  and  in  responding  selectively  to  a  small  and  a  large  opening, 
through  which  they  had  to  pass  in  order  to  escape.  They  failed  to 
discriminate  forms,  either  as  figures  pasted  on  the  cards,  or  as  differ- 
ently shaped  openings.  The  doctrine  of  formal  discipline  fails  to  be 
confirmed,  in  so  far  as  learning  to  discriminate  black  and  blue  did 
not  facilitate  learning  to  discriminate  sizes.  "  Of  nine  chicks  perfectly 
trained  in  black-blue,  five  made  perfect  persistence  tests  after  an 
interval  of  thirty  days."  On  the  whole,  the  chicks  that  learned 
most  rapidly  remembered  longest.  The  use  of  the  electric  shock 
tended  to  produce  a  negative  response  to  the  stimulus  to  which  it  was 
attached,  rather  than  a  positive  response  to  the  other  stimulus. 

The  principal  conclusions  with  regard  to  color  vision  which  the 
author  considers  indicated  by  his  experiments  are  two:  that  blue  has 
a  very  light  brightness  value  for  the  chick,  and  that  it  has  a  color 
value  as  well.  The  first  conclusion  is  based  on  the  fact  that  one 
chick  which  preferred  white  to  black  and  yellow  to  black  preferred 
blue  to  yellow  and  to  orange;  while  another  chick  that  had  been 
trained  to  choose  black  rather  than  white  preferred  black  to  blue 
but  displayed  no  preference  between  blue  and  white.  Although 
the  reviewer  found  indications  that  the  rabbit,  too,  sees  blue  as  much 
lighter  than  the  human  subject  does,  she  does  not  feel  sure  that  the 
number  of  tests  given  by  Breed  (in  many  cases  only  ten)  was  sufficient 
to  exclude  chance  and  establish  the  fact  of  a  preference.  That  blue 
is  seen  as  a  color  is  argued  from  the  fact  that  chicks  which  had  been 
trained  to  avoid  blue  in  the  black-blue  combination  avoided  blue  in 
any  combination,  even  with  white;  the  inference  being  that  if  abso- 
lutely recognized,  it  must  have  been  seen  as  a  color.  But  it  is  not  to 
be  assumed  as  certain  that  an  animal  cannot  recognize  an  absolute 
brightness  to  a  certain  extent;  that  is,  that  the  gray  seen  in  place  of  a 
blue  cannot  be  identified  and  avoided  in  successive  experiments. 
In  the  experiments  of  Washburn  and  Abbott  (26)  there  was  some 
indication  that  a  gray  was  thus  identified.  And" in  Breed's  experi- 


308  MARGARET  FLOY  WASHBURN 

ments  there  may  have  been  other  peculiarities  than  either  color  or 
brightness  leading  to  the  identification  of  the  blue  cards:  were  the 
same  cards  used  whenever  blue  was  employed  as  a  stimulus? 

Strong  (22)  has  combined  an  anatomical  study  of  the  smell  organs 
in  birds  with  an  experimental  test  of  the  possibility  of  causing  smell 
to  influence  a  bird's  behavior  through  association.  The  morpho- 
logical study  was  carried  out  on  material  representing  twenty-seven 
out  of  the  thirty-five  existing  orders  of  birds.  From  it  the  writer 
concludes  that  "the  olfactory  organs  of  birds  are  of  too  great  size 
to  be  set  aside  as  non-functional,"  but  that  as  one  passes  from  the 
lower  to  the  higher  orders  of  birds  there  is  a  tendency  towards 
retrogression  in  these  organs.  The  crow  family,  sometimes  con- 
sidered to  be  the  highest  birds,  show  extremely  minute  smell  organs. 
"The  sense  of  smell  has  evidently  been  disappearing  in  birds  with 
the  great  development  of  vision.  It  seems  not  at  all  improbable  that 
the  sense  of  smell  may  be  practically  lost  in  the  passerine  birds." 
The  fulmar,  a  bird  which  takes  long  sea-flights,  has  enormously 
developed  olfactory  apparatus,  suggesting  Cyon's  hypothesis  that 
it  may  be  used  for  orientation.  It  will  be  remembered  that  Watson, 
testing  this  hypothesis  for  terns,  got  negative  results.  Strong  finds, 
however,  that  the  olfactory  organs  of  the  tern  are  very  small,  so  that 
the  use  of  those  organs  in  guiding  the  flights  of  other  birds  is  not  ruled 
out  by  Watson's  observations.  Strong's  experimental  work  was 
performed  upon  the  ring  dove.  A  labyrinth  was  used,  with  a  large 
central  chamber,  and  four  small  chambers,  one  opening  from  the 
middle  of  each  side.  Food  could  be  placed  in  any  one  of  the  four 
small  chambers  and  remain  invisible  from  the  central  compartment. 
Currents  of  air  could  be  sent  from  each  of  the  four  small  chambers 
into  the  central  compartment  by  means  of  a  siphon  arrangement 
outside  each  small  chamber;  the  air  currents  entering  one  of  the  four 
chambers  were  passed  through  a  bottle  containing  an  odorous  sub- 
stance. General  ventilation  was  provided  by  an  air-pump  connected 
with  an  exhaust  funnel  in  the  middle  of  the  roof  of  the  labyrinth. 
To  test  the  actual  diffusion  of  the  odor  from  the  small  chamber  into 
the  large  one,  the  following  method  was  adopted.  The  strength  of 
the  odor  of  an  ammonia  solution  was  compared  with  that  of  the  smell 
of  bergamot  which  was  to  be  used  in  the  experiments,  and  when  the 
two  were  judged  equal,  the  ammonia  was  placed  in  one  of  the  odor 
bottles  and  its  diffusion  tested  with  wet  litmus  paper.  It  was  found 
that  the  odor  was  diffused  in  a  semicircular  area  whose  radii  con- 
verged at  the  entrance  of  the  odor  chamber,  and  whose  front  extended 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  VERTEBRATES  509 

to  the  region  of  the  exhaust  funnel.  Tests  were  also  made  by  the 
experimenter,  lying  on  the  floor  inside  the  enclosure;  the  odor  of 
bergamot  could  be  detected  eighteen  inches  from  the  point  of  emerg- 
ence. The  central  chamber  was  five  feet  square.  Oil  of  bergamot 
was  the  smell  stimulus  chosen  for  use,  although  less  satisfactory  tests 
were  made  with  cologne,  musk,  and  violet  sachet;  and  food  was  to 
be  found  in  the  small  chamber  from  which  the  odor  emerged.  The 
birds  had  previously  been  accustomed  to  the  apparatus.  The  results 
showed  that  when  bergamot  was  used,  the  percentages  of  choices  of 
the  odorous  chamber  rose  for  all  four  birds  tested  considerably  above 
the  twenty-five  per  cent,  which  chance  would  produce.  It  is  to  be 
regretted  that  only  the  total  percentages  are  stated,  rather  than  the 
choices  of  each  successive  day,  so  that  no  data  on  learning  are 
furnished.  The  conclusion  that  the  birds  were  stimulated  by  the 
bergamot  seems  warranted.  That  general  sensation  is  not  concerned 
the  author  infers  from  the  small  amount  of  odorous  material  that 
was  used  as  a  stimulus.  A  few  observations  on  birds  at  liberty  and 
in  a  zoological  garden  are  also  reported,  but  the  results  are  not 
conclusive. 

Craig  (3)  has  been  continuing  his  studies  of  the  vocal  expressions 
of  emotion  in  pigeons.  The  paper  on  those  of  the  mourning  dove  was 
written  chiefly,  the  author  tells  us,  as  a  basis  of  comparison  for  that 
on  the  passenger  pigeon.  Most  of  the  peculiarities  of  the  latter  bird 
can  be  traced  to  its  extreme  gregariousness.  The  softer,  cooing  notes 
of  this  pigeon,  for  instance,  which  could  not  have  much  effect  in  a  noisy 
and  populous  community,  have  degenerated,  and  the  louder  sounds 
have  developed  into  "shrieks,  chatters,  and  clucks."  Two  females 
not  infrequently  lay  in  the  same  nest,  an  occurrence  which  is  much 
rarer  in  less  social  species.  The  testimony  of  various  observers  is 
quoted  to  show  that  orphan  young  are  fed  by  foster-parents.  The 
courting  behavior  of  these  birds  is  described  as  much  rougher  than 
that  of  other  pigeons. 

The  interesting  discovery  has  been  made  by  Craig  (4)  that  egg- 
laying  in  the  female  ring-dove  may  be  produced  by  the  courting 
behavior  of  the  male,  without  actual  fertilization.  "The  influence 
of  the  male  in  inducing  oviposition  is  a  psychological  influence." 
The  word  "psychological"  is  perhaps  a  little  extreme  here:  the 
tactile  stimuli  produced  by  the  male's  preening  of  the  head  and  neck 
of  the  female  might  operate  reflexly. 

Mammals. — Slonaker  (21)  has  investigated  the  activity,  growth, 
and  longevity  of  the  white  rat.  Eight  rats  were  chosen  and  divided 


3io  MARGARET  FLOY  WASHBURN 

into  two  equal  groups;  the  members  of  one  group  were  placed  in 
revolving  cages  whose  revolutions  were  registered  on  a  kymograph; 
those  of  the  other  group  were  kept  in  ordinary  cages  as  controls. 
The  results  show  that  the  daily  activity  increases  rapidly  during  the 
first  third  of  the  animal's  life  and  then  decreases  gradually  until  death. 
The  change  in  the  amount  of  the  daily  activity  is  rhythmical.  During 
youth  and  old  age  the  activity  is  more  or  less  distributed  through  the 
twenty-four  hours;  in  middle  life  it  is  nocturnal.  The  female  is 
much  more  active  than  the  male;  the  males  are  much  heavier.  About 
three-fourths  of  the  whole  amount  of  work  done  during  the  animal's 
lifetime  is  done  before  reaching  middle  age.  During  the  last  30 
per  cent,  of  life  only  one-eighth  of  the  total  work  was  performed. 
The  unexercised  males  are  much  heavier  than  the  exercised  ones, 
and  reach  their  maximum  weight  at  an  earlier  age.  The  exercised 
rats  had  shorter  lives  than  the  unexercised  ones;  they  were  more 
active,  alert,  and  bright  in  appearance. 

Hunter  (12)  records  the  observation  that  two  white  rats  which 
had  been  accustomed  to  being  dropped  into  a  box  as  a  preliminary 
to  being  returned  to  their  living  cage  and  to  food  at  the  close  of  certain 
experiments  with  them,  after  two  hundred  and  four  days  of  this 
experience  dropped  themselves  into  the  box.  This  is  in  opposition 
to  the  results  obtained  by  Thorndike  with  cats,  which  did  not  learn 
to  drop  themselves  into  a  box  after  being  dropped  in  by  the  experi- 
menter. Cole,  on  the  other  hand,  found  that  raccoons  did  display 
this  type  of  behavior.  The  inability  of  Thorndike's  cats  to  perform 
such  an  act  was  taken  as  evidence  against  their  possession  of  an  idea 
of  being  in  the  box  as  a  preliminary  to  food.  The  reviewer's  work 
on  the  rabbit  (26)  furnished  proof  that  these  animals  after  only  a 
few  days'  experience  of  being  dropped  into  a  box  between  tests  will 
jump  in  of  their  own  accord  and  wait  for  the  next  test.  Hunter 
rightly  points  out  that  this  behavior  is  not  necessarily  evidence  of 
ideas:  "the  very  perception  of  the  box  has  acquired  motive  power." 

In  the  study  by  Hoge  and  Stocking  (10)  comparing  punishment 
and  reward  as  motives,  albino  and  black  and  white  rats  were  used. 
The  punishments  were  light  electric  shocks;  the  reward  was  milk- 
soaked  bread;  the  problem  was  brightness  discrimination  in  a  Yerkes 
box.  It  was  found  that  punishment  produces  quicker  learning  than 
reward,  and  a  combination  of  the  two  is  most  effective  of  all. 

Rockwell  (18)  describes  the  behavior  of  a  ground  squirrel  which 
tried  to  go  through  the  motions  of  climbing  up  the  support  that  had 
led  to  her  nest,  after  the  support  and  the  nest  had  been  removed. 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  VERTEBRATES  311 

Warren  (25)  tells  of  a  cat  which  after  several  years  of  failure  to  imitate 
another  cat's  trick  suddenly  did  so. 

Washburn  and  Abbott  (26)  attempted  to  find  by  the  use  of  colored 
and  gray  papers  whether  any  brightness  could  be  found  that  would 
be  indistinguishable  from  gray  to  the  light-adapted  eye  of  the  rabbit. 
The  apparatus  was  a  box  with  two  compartments,  each  opening  by  a 
swing  door  on  the  front  of  the  box.  The  papers  were  pinned  rather 
than  pasted  on  the  doors,  to  avoid  identification  by  wrinkles,  and 
were  changed  from  experiment  to  experiment.  In  the  red  and  gray 
experiments  the  door  carrying  the  red  paper  could  be  pushed  open; 
the  gray  door  was  closed  by  a  button  on  the  inside.  Food  was  in 
both  compartments.  To  avoid  identification  of  the  papers  by  their 
intrinsic  odor  a  narrow  slit  was  cut  in  each  at  the  level  where  the 
rabbit's  nose  touched  it  in  pushing,  and  a  piece  of  the  other  paper  was 
placed  under  the  slit.  The  red  or  open  door  was  in  alternate  sides  in 
succeeding  experiments,  but  the  rabbits  showed  no  trace  of  acquiring 
a  kinaesthetic  habit  of  alternating  from  side  to  side  in  their  choices. 
The  rabbits  learned  to  discriminate  Bradley  red  paper  from  Hering 
gray,  numbers  7,  15,  and  24,  but  failed  to  discriminate  it  from  a 
paper  of  the  brightness  of  Hering  gray  number  46,  which  is  almost 
black.  The  results  thus  agree  with  those  of  Yerkes  on  the  dancing 
mouse  and  Watson  on  the  monkey,  in  showing  a  low  stimulating 
power  of  red  on  the  retina  of  the  rabbit;  and  give  no  proof  that  red 
is  seen  as  a  color.  Some  experiments  were  also  made  on  the  bright- 
ness value  of  Bradley  saturated  blue  paper.  The  results  were  less 
conclusive,  but  gave  indications  that  its  value  is  decidedly  lighter 
than  for  the  human  eye,  a  result  which  may  be  compared  with  the 
similar  observation  made  on  Breed's  chicks.  "To  a  certain  degree, 
the  rabbit  is  able  to  form  a  habit  of  choosing  the  darker  of  two 
impressions,  irrespective  of  their  absolute  brightness."  In  one  series 
the  same  gray  was  presented  sometimes  with  red,  in  which  case  it 
was  on  the  closed  door,  and  sometimes  with  white,  in  which  case  it 
was  on  the  open  door.  The  rabbit  tested  chose  the  gray  only  27  per 
cent,  of  the  time  in  tests  of  the  first  type,  and  72.8  per  cent,  of  the 
time  in  tests  of  the  second  type,  Some  identification  of  the  absolute 
brightness  of  a  gray  seems  to  occur,  however.  The  rabbit  uses 
monocular  more  than  binocular  vision. 

Swift  (24)  has  obtained  associations  with  tone  sensations  in  a  dog 
whose  temporal  lobes  had  been  destroyed.  These  reactions,  he 
thinks,  in  opposition  to  Kalischer,  are  not  reflexes,  since  they  were 
learned;  and  their  location  must  therefore  have  been  in  the  cortex, 
though  not  in  the  temporal  lobe. 


3i2  MARGARET  FLOY  WASHBURN 

Discussion  of  von  Maday's  (14, 15)  articles  on  the  horse  is  deferred 
until  a  recently  published  book  by  this  writer,  summing  them  up, 
can  be  obtained  for  review. 

Shepherd  (20)  found  that  three  raccoons,  which  were  repeatedly 
made  to  watch  another  raccoon  go  up  an  inclined  plane  and  get  food, 
failed  to  show  any  signs  of  inferential  imitation  when  tested  alone. 

REFERENCES 

1.  BREED,  F.  S.    The  Development  of  Certain  Instincts  and  Habits  in  Chicks. 

Behavior  Monographs,  1911,  I.    Pp.  78- 

2.  COPELAND,  M.    The  Olfactory  Reactions  of  the  Puffer  or  Swellfish,  Spheroides 

maculatus  (Block  and  Schneider).    /.  of  Exper.  Zoo!.,  1912,  12,  363-369- 

3.  CRAIG,  W.    The  Expressions  of  Emotion  in  the  Pigeons.     II.  The  Mourning  Dove 

(Zenaidura  macroura  Linn.).    III.  The  Passenger  Pigeon   (Ectopistes  migra- 
torius  Linn.)-     The  Auk,  1911,  28,  398-427. 

4.  CRAIG,  W.    Oviposition  Induced  by  the  Male  in  Pigeons.    /.  of  Morph.,  1911, 

22,  299-303. 

5.  CUMMINGS,  B.  F.    Some  Features  of  Behavior  in  the  Courtship  Display  of  the 

Palmate  Newt  (Molge  palmata  Schneid.).    /.  of  Animal  Behav.,  191 1,  i,  305-307- 

6.  FRISCH,  K.  VON.    Ueber  den  Farbensinn  der  Fische.     Verhandl.  d.  deut.  zool. 

Gesellschaft,  1911. 

7.  HAGGERTY,  M.  E.    A  Case  of  Instinct.    /.  of  Animal  Behav.,  1912,  2,  79-80. 

8.  HARGITT,  C.  W.    Behavior  and  Color  Changes  of  Tree  Frogs.    /.  of  Animal 

Behav.,  1912,2,  51-79. 

9.  HERRICK,  F.  H.    Nests  and  Nest-Building  in  Birds.    Part  II.    /.  of  Animal 

Behav.,  1911,  i,  244-278.    Part  III.    Ibid.,  336-374- 

10.  HOGE,  M.  A.,  and  STOCKING,  R.  J.    A  Note  on  the  Relative  Value  of  Punishment 

and  Reward  as  Motives.     /.  of  Animal  Behav.,  1912,  2,  43-51. 

11.  HUNTER,  W.  S.     Some  Labyrinth  Habits  of  the  Domestic  Pigeon.     /.  of  Animal 

Behav.,  1911,  i,  278-305. 

12.  HUNTER,  VV.  S.    A  Note  on  the  Behavior  of  the  White  Rat.    /.  of  Animal  Behav., 

1912,  2,   137-142. 

13.  LOEB,  J.,  and  WASTENEYS,  H.    On  the  Adaptation  of  Fish  (Fundulus)  to  Higher 

Temperatures.    /.  of  Exper.  Zool.,  1912,  12,  543-557. 

14.  MADAY,  S.  v.    Das  Orientirungsvermogen  des  Pferdes.    Zsch.  f.  angew.  PsychoL, 

1911,  5,  54-87. 

15.  MADAY,  S.  v.    Zur  Psychologic  des  Pferdes  und  des  Reitens.     Ber.  IV.  Kongress 

f.  exper.  PsychoL,  1911,  274-279. 

1 6.  PARKER,  G.  H.     Effects  of  Explosive  Sounds,  Such  as  Those  Produced  by  Motor 

Boats  and  Guns,  upon  Fishes.     Bureau  of  Fisheries,  1911,  Document  no.  752. 

Pp- 9- 

17.  REESE,  A.  M.     Food  and  Chemical  Reactions  of  the  Spotted  Newt,  Diemyctylus 

viridescens.    J.  of  Animal  Behav.,  1912,  2,  190-209. 

18.  ROCKWELL,  R.  B.    Peculiar  Actions  of  a  Striped  Ground  Squirrel.    /.  of  Animal 

Behav.,  1912,  2,  218-222. 

19.  SCHAEFFER,  A.  A.    Habit  Formation  in  Frogs.    /.  of  Animal  Behav.,  1911,  i, 

309-336. 


THE  BEHAVIOR  OF   VERTEBRATES  3*3 

20.  SHEPHERD,  W.  T.     Imitation  in  Raccoons.     Amer.  ].  of  Psychol.,  1911,  22,  583- 

585. 

21.  SLONAKER,  J.  R.     The  Normal  Activity  of  the  Albino  Rat  from  Birth  to  Natural 

Death,  its  Rate  of  Growth  and  Duration  of  Life.     /.  of  Animal  Behav.,  1912, 
2,  20-43. 

22.  STRONG,  R.  M.     On  the  Olfactory  Organs  and  the  Sense  of  Smell  in  Birds.     /.  of 

Morph.,  1911,  22,  619-658,  2  pis. 

23.  SUMNER,  F.  B.     The  Adjustment  of  Flatfish  to  Various  Backgrounds.     A  Study 

of  Adaptive  Color  Change.     /.  of  Exper.  Zob'L,  1911,  10,  409-507. 

24.  SWIFT,  W.  B.     Psychological  Results  in  Reactions  to  Tone  Before  and  After 

Extirpation  of  the  Temporal  Lobes.     /.  of  Animal  Behav.,  1912,  2,  225-228. 

25.  WARREN,  E.  R.     Delayed  Imitation  in  a  Cat.     /.  of  Animal  Behav.,  1912,  2, 

222-225. 

26.  WASHBURN,  M.  F.,  and  ABBOTT,  E.     Experiments  on  the  Brightness  Value  of  Red 

for  the  Light-Adapted  Eye  of  the  Rabbit.    /.  of  Animal  Behav.,  1912,  2,  145- 
181. 


SPECIAL  REVIEWS 
ANIMAL  INTELLIGENCE 

The  Evolution  of  Animal  Intelligence.     S.  J.  HOLMES.     New  York: 

Henry  Holt  and  Company,  1911.     Pp.  v  -f  296. 

An  advance  announcement  of  this  book  reads:  "A  general  account 
of  the  evolution  of  animal  behavior  from  the  mollusc  and  crustacean 
up  to  apes  and  monkeys.  The  critical  point  of  the  transition  from 
instinct  to  intelligence  receives  special  treatment.  One  of  America's 
leading  scientific  authors  who  saw  the  manuscript  before  publication 
writes:  'Holmes's  is  the  best  of  the  lot,  and  on  the  whole,  the  most 
interesting  because  it  gives  the  most  facts,  that  is,  examples,  illustra- 
tions, hence  animal  behavior,  incidents,  stories,  etc.  Holmes  is 
immensely  well  informed.'"  The  reviewer  admits  that  he  was 
somewhat  prejudiced  against  Professor  Holmes's  book  by  this 
publisher's  announcement.  He  was  also  rendered  curious,  and  when 
the  book  came  into  his  hands  he  read  it  at  a  sitting  with  intense 
interest  and  keen  enjoyment.  His  immediate  reaction  was  to  ask 
the  students  of  an  introductory  course  in  comparative  psychology 
to  read  the  book  entire.  The  result  was  quite  as  gratifying  to  the 
instructor  as  important  for  the  class,  for  without  exception  the  men 
were  delighted  with  Professor  Holmes's  description  of  the  develop- 
ment of  intelligence. 

Some  weeks  later  the  book  was  reread  more  carefully  and  critically 
by  the  reviewer  in  preparation  for  the  present  writing.  Naturally, 
many  defects  were  discovered  and  the  reviewer's  judgment  concerning 
the  scientific  value  of  the  work  was  somewhat  modified. 

Professor  Holmes  has  offered  an  essay  on  the  evolution  of  intelli- 
gence, not  a  treatise.  His  book  is  rather  popular  in  style,  sketchy, 
and  introductory  to  the  subject.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  it  is  poorly 
written,  it  is  extremely  readable,  even  fascinating  to  one  who  is 
interested  in  the  problems  of  mental  development.  For  the  author 
appreciates  these  problems;  he  has  observed  animal  behavior  inten- 
sively; he  has  read  widely  and  he  has  pondered  well  the  relations  as 
well  as  the  significance  of  his  facts.  Unlike  most  popular  essays  on 
scientific  subjects,  this  one  has  value  for  the  specialist  as  well  as  for 
the  general  reader. 

3H 


ANIMAL  INTELLIGENCE  315 

The  Evolution  of  Animal  Intelligence  outlines  the  course  of  mental 
development  through  the  discussion  of  reflex  actions,  the  tropisms, 
the  behavior  of  the  Protozoa,  instinct,  non-intelligent  modifications 
of  behavior,  pleasure-pain  and  the  beginnings  of  intelligence,  and  the 
types  of  intelligence  which  appear  in  the  arthropods,  the  lower 
vertebrates,  the  mammals,  and  the  primates. 

There  is  nothing  noteworthy  from  the  scientific  standpoint  in 
the  introductory  chapters,  which  deal  with  reflexes  and  tropisms, 
but  in  connection  with  his  account  of  behavior  in  the  Protozoa 
Professor  Holmes  makes  clear  his  attitude  toward  tests  of  intelligence. 
He  is  doubtful  whether  any  investigator  has  thus  far  satisfactorily 
demonstrated  associative  memory  in  a  unicellular  organism.  "While 
granting  the  possibility  that  future  work  may  compel  us  to  modify 
our  conclusion,"  he  writes,  "it  may  be  said  that,  thus  far,  there  is  no 
unmistakable  evidence  that  the  protozoa  are  capable  of  forming  true 
habits  or  of  learning  by  association"  (p.  89).  Unfortunately  for 
the  reader,  this  discussion  of  the  educability  of  the  Protozoa  is  not 
preceded  by  such  a  definition  of  habit  formation  and  of  associative 
memory  as  would  prepare  him  to  react  critically  to  the  author's 
statements. 

The  two  chapters  which  are  devoted  to  the  description  of  instinct 
and  of  its  evolution  are  decidedly  unsatisfactory  to  the  reviewer. 
They  fairly  well  present  many  of  the  essential  facts  concerning 
instinct  and,  in  a  conventional  way,  they  offer  an  account  of  the 
chief  theories  of  the  origin  of  instinct,  but  they  lack  the  freshness 
and  originality  which  are  characteristic  of  most  parts  of  the  book. 

In  his  chapter  on  the  evolution  of  instinct,  the  author  quotes 
with  apparent  approval  the  following  words  of  Professor  C.  O. 
Whitman:  "Instinct  precedes  intelligence  both  in  ontogeny  and  in 
phylogeny,  and  it  has  furnished  all  the  structural  foundations  em- 
ployed by  intelligence."  At  the  beginning  of  the  next  chapter  he 
quotes,  with  approval  one  must  infer,  Father  Wasmann's  words: 
"Both  elements,  automatism  and  plasticity,  are  found  in  different 
proportions  with  all  animals  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest."  To  the 
reviewer  it  seems  that  instinct  is  one  form  of  automatism  and  that 
intelligence  is  an  expression  of  plasticity.  Evidently  the  author 
would  not  accept  this  statement,  for  he  repeatedly  asserts  that 
intelligence  has  developed  from  instinct.  It  certainly  is  fair  to  object 
that  the  view  of  Professor  Whitman  which  receives  Professor  Holmes's 
support  and  which  he  at  one  point  says  is  commonly  accepted  by 
psychologists  (p.  164)  is  not  the  only  view  which  may  be  defended. 


316  REVIEWS 

As  it  happens,  the  reviewer  numbers  himself  among  those  who  do 
not  conceive  of  intelligence  as  having  developed  from  instinct. 

In  his  account  of  modifications  of  behavior,  the  author  points 
out  that  there  are  certain  modifications  which  should  be  considered 
non-intelligent.  Indeed  he  states  that  certain  forms  of  modifiability 
are  probably  coextensive  with  animal  life  and  that,^if  we  accept  these 
modifications  as  intelligent,  we  must  admit  that  even  the  cells  of  the 
multicellular  organism  are  intelligent.  Intelligent  behavior,  we  are 
told,  differs  from  non-intelligent  behavior  in  that  the  former  involves 
"associations"  (p.  164).  These  associations,  the  author  states,  are 
in  some  cases  associations  of  sense  experiences  with  acts  which  are 
either  pleasurable  or  painful.  In  other  cases  they  are  associations 
of  ideas.  The  former  of  these  associations  represent  a  much  lower 
stage  in  the  development  of  intelligence  than  do  the  latter.  At  some 
points  in  Professor  Holmes's  description,  it  is  not  clear  whether  he 
accepts  the  association  of  sense  impressions  with  affective  experiences 
as  a  form  of  intelligence.  For  example,  on  page  181  he  writes:  "In 
the  Ccelenterata  behavior,  although  of  the  reflex  type,  is  often  highly 
plastic  and  capable  of  being  modified  in  many  ways  as  the  result  of 
previous  experience;  but  while  intelligence  has  often  been  claimed 
for  these  forms,  there  is,  in  the  opinion  of  the  writer,  no  case  in 
which  the  formation  of  associations  is  satisfactorily  proven."  Either 
in  this  statement  the  author  has  misused  the  word  "experience,"  or 
he  has  contradicted  himself.  Similar  contradictory  statements  might 
be  quoted  from  other  portions  of  the  book;  and  fairly  strong  support 
might  be  adduced  for  the  statement  that  the  author  has  not  with 
sufficient  clearness  defined  such  important  terms  as  habit,  association, 
associative  memory,  and  intelligence. 

In  the  chapter  on  primitive  types  of  intelligence  in  crustaceans 
and  molluscs,  Professor  Holmes  thus  briefly  sums  up  the  results  of 
studies  which  have  been  made  concerning  the  educability  and  intelli- 
gence of  the  invertebrates.  The  Protozoa  furnish  no  evidence  of 
ability  to  acquire  associations.  The  Ccelenterata  present  no  con- 
vincing evidence  of  the  formation  of  associations.  "The  same 
statement  may  also  be  risked  for  ...  the  Vermes.  The  behavior  of 
Echinoderms  is  certainly  complex  and  plastic  to  a  remarkable  degree, 
but  even  in  this  group  the  power  of  forming  associations  is  very 
doubtful."  In  the  Crustacea  and  the  Insecta  the  existence  of 
intelligence  is  admitted  and  numerous  examples  are  offered  of  intelli- 
gent modes  of  behavior.  Indeed  the  activities  of  certain  crustaceans 
and  insects  are  most  effectively  described  in  chapters  9  and  10.  In 


ANIMAL  INTELLIGENCE  3*7 

the  latter  chapter,  Professor  Holmes  has  written  (p.  201):  "We  are 
certainly  justified  in  concluding  that  insects  are  not  mere  reflex 
machines  incapable  of  learning  by  experience.  They  can  form 
associations  very  quickly  in  many  cases.  They  give  evidence  of 
memory.  They  have  a  remarkable  ability  for  retaining  impressions 
of  topographical  relations.  We  may  not  be  compelled  to  admit 
that  they  have  ideas,  but  it  must  be  granted,  I  think,  that  a  wasp 
which  after  cutting  a  caterpillar  in  two  and  carrying  away  one  part, 
came  back  and  searched  diligently  for  the  remainder,  retained 
somehow  an  impression  of  the  missing  part  and  its  location.  If  out 
of  sight  it  was  not  out  of  mind." 

The  intelligence  of  the  lower  vertebrates  is  interestingly  charac- 
terized by  the  presentation  of  the  results  of  a  number  of  studies  of 
fishes,  amphibians  and  reptiles.  It  is  pointed  out  that  associations 
(intelligence)  do  not  necessarily  depend  upon  the  cerebral  cortex. 
A  careful  comparison  of  many  of  the  statements  which  appear  in  the 
author's  chapter  on  intelligence  in  the  lower  vertebrates  with  state- 
ments in  his  chapters  7,  8,  and  9  is  likely  to  leave  the  reader  in  doubt 
concerning  the  physiological  and  psychological  characteristics  of 
intelligent  acts  and  even  more  so  concerning  their  structural  relations. 

The  examples  of  different  modes  of  behavior,  non-intelligent  and 
intelligent,  which  make  up  the  greater  part  of  this  book  are  admirably 
chosen  and,  in  addition  to  giving  the  reader  the  impression  of  extensive 
knowledge  on  the  part  of  the  author,  they  serve  to  acquaint  him  with 
many  of  the  most  important  facts  which  the  study  of  behavior  has 
revealed.  It  is  perhaps  unfortunate  that  Professor  Holmes  in  his 
account  of  the  intelligence  of  the  apes  should  have  chosen  Professor 
Witmer's  description  of  "Peter"  to  represent  the  intelligence  of  the 
chimpanzee.  For  Peter,  it  should  be  remarked,  was  a  trick  animal 
whose  behavior  was  observed  only  after  many  months  of  training, 
and  even  then  for  only  brief  periods.  Had  the  author  given  the 
matter  further  consideration,  he  would  doubless  have  concluded  that 
concerning  behavior  of  whose  history  in  the  individual  we  know 
nothing  we  can  say  little  with  safety.  Whether  it  is  intelligent  or 
non-intelligent,  whether  it  is  indicative  of  the  presence  of  ideas  or  of 
images  cannot  be  decided.  One  might  compare  the  behavior  of 
Peter,  as  it  is  described  by  Professor  Witmer,  with  the  behavior  of 
such  a  trained  horse  as  Clever  Hans,  the  observer  of  whose  per- 
formances would  be  likely  to  make  inferences  regarding  the  degrees 
and  types  of  intelligence  of  the  horse  which  in  the  light  of  a  careful 
study  of  the  development  of  the  animal's  behavior  are  amusing. 


318  REVIEWS 

The  Evolution  of  Animal  Intelligence  presents  particular  facts 
in  abundance  and  generalizations  and  theories  in  such  fashion  as  to 
inform  the  reader  and,  at  the  same  time,  suggest  interesting  problems. 
The  book  contains  little  concerning  the  methods  of  studying  animal 
behavior  and  it  will  prove  more  useful  to  those  who  desire  a  sketch 
of  behavior  than  to  those  who  desire  to  learn  how  to  observe  it  or  how 
to  solve  specific  problems  concerning  intelligence. 

ROBERT  M.  YERKES 

HARVARD  UNIVERSITY 

Animal  Intelligence:  Experimental  Studies.     E.  L.  THORNDIKE.     New 

York:  The  Macmillan  Co.,  1911. 

The  present  volume  consists  mainly  of  various  previously  pub- 
lished papers,  a  few  of  which  have  been  for  some  time  out  of  print. 
In  thus  bringing  together  his  contributions  in  the  field  of  animal 
psychology,  Dr.  Thorndike  has  rendered  a  service  for  which  students 
of  this  subject  have  reason  to  feel  grateful.  However  they  may  be 
inclined  to  differ  from  the  conclusions  of  the  author  as  to  the  nature 
and  limitations  of  the  animal  mind,  they  must  needs  recognize  the 
important  part  that  his  investigations  have  played  in  the  development 
of  our  knowledge  of  animal  psychology. 

While  Dr.  Thorndike  has  added  many  interesting  facts  concerning 
the  behavior  of  animals,  the  value  of  his  work  lies  not  so  much  in  his 
contributions  to  knowledge  as  in  the  example  of  his  method.  Since 
the  appearance  of  the  monograph  on  Animal  Intelligence  in  1898  the 
labyrinth  and  the  puzzle-box  have  been  the  favorite  apparatus  for 
testing  the  mental  capacity  of  the  animals  studied.  The  numerous 
experimental  studies  which  followed  close  upon  the  investigations  of 
Dr.  Thorndike  have  been  carried  out,  for  the  most  part,  in  a  more 
careful  and  critical  manner  than  that  which  formerly  prevailed  in 
the  study  of  the  mental  life  of  the  higher  animals.  The  crusade 
against  anecdotal  psychology  and  the  undue  exaltation  of  the  intelli- 
gence of  animals  was  a  wholesome  influence  which  was  perhaps  all 
the  more  potent  on  account  of  the  somewhat  extreme  position  of  the 
author.  And  if  several  of  the  negative  conclusions  to  which  Thorn- 
dike  was  led  have  not  been  upheld  by  later  investigators,  the  positive 
conclusions  which  the  latter  have  drawn  are  based  on  a  more  adequate 
foundation  as  a  result  of  applying  the  methods  of  study  that  Thorn- 
dike  employed.  William  of  Occam's  razor  is  an  unsafe  instrument 
in  the  investigation  of  the  mental  life  of  animals,  but  it  is  one  whose 
constant  employment  is  nevertheless  unavoidable. 


ANIMAL  INTELLIGENCE  319 

Besides  the  monograph  on  Animal  Intelligence,  the  volume  con- 
tains an  introductory  chapter  on  The  Study  of  Consciousness  and 
the  Study  of  Behavior,  and  chapters  entitled  The  Instinctive  Reac- 
tions of  Young  Chicks,  A  Note  on  the  Psychology  of  Fishes,  The 
Mental  Life  of  the  Monkeys,  Laws  and  Hypotheses  of  Behavior,  and 
The  Evolution  of  the  Human  Intellect.  The  introductory  chapter 
and  the  chapter  on  Laws  and  Hypotheses  of  Behavior  are  new. 
The  first  consists  essentially  of  a  discussion  of  the  proper  subject 
matter  of  psychology.  Thorndike  joins  issue  with  those  who  would 
limit  psychology  to  the  consideration  of  consciousness.  As  a  matter 
of  fact  such  a  limitation  is  never  made  in  practice,  however  desirable 
it  may  be  deemed  in  theory;  the  phenomena  of  behavior  and  those 
-of  conscious  life  are  so  closely  interwoven  that  it  is  impracticable  to 
deal  with  them  separately,  and  psychology  must  perforce  continue 
to  occupy  itself  with  both  sides  of  the  impassable  cleft  that  separates 
states  of  consciousness  from  their  physiological  concomitants. 

In  the  chapter  on  Laws  and  Hypotheses  of  Behavior  there  is 
considerable  matter  for  reflection.  There  are  two  laws  of  the  modi- 
fication of  behavior  which,  according  to  Thorndike,  are  of  especial 
value  in  explaining  higher  manifestations  of  mental  activity.  The 
first,  or  the  law  of  effect,  is  that  acts  which  bring  satisfaction  tend  to 
be  repeated,  while  those  which  produce  pain  tend  to  become  dis- 
continued, the  strength  of  the  connections  formed  being  proportional 
to  the  intensity  of  the  resulting  feelings  and  the  smallness  of  the 
interval  of  time  by  which  they  are  separated  from  the  act  that  pro- 
duced them.  The  second  principle,  the  law  of  exercise,  is  that 
'"any  response  to  a  situation  will,  other  things  equal,  be  more  strongly 
connected  with  the  situation  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  times 
it  has  been  connected  with  that  situation  and  to  the  average  vigor 
.and  duration  of  the  connections." 

Satisfaction  and  discomfort  are  admitted  to  be  but  very  roughly 
correlated  with  what  is  favorable  and  unfavorable  respectively  to 
the  animal.  What  is  sought  after  and  produces  satisfaction  may  at 
times  be  deleterious,  but  Thorndike  states  that  "upon  examination 
it  appears  that  the  pernicious  states  of  affairs  an  animal  welcomes 
are  not  pernicious  at  the  time,  to  the  neurones.  We  may  learn  bad 
habits,  such  as  morphinism,  because  there  is  incomplete  adaptation 
of  the  body  state  to  the  temporary  interest  of  its  ruling  class,  the 
neurones." 

Direct  evidence  that  pleasure-giving  and  pain-giving  experiences 
«are  related  in  these  ways  to  the  welfare  of  the  neurones  is  not  adduced, 


320  REFIEWS 

but  the  conclusion  is  incorporated  as  an  element  of  a  further  hy- 
pothesis to  explain  the  law  of  effect.  The  modifications  of  behavior 
which  this  law  formulates  involve  changes  in  the  connections  between 
neurones,  probably  at  the  synapses,  so  that  certain  lines  of  communi- 
cation are  rendered  more  permeable  than  others.  Those  connections 
are  made  more  permeable  which  result  in  favoring  the  life  processes 
of  the  neurone,  and  those  are  weakened  which  result  in  impeding 
these  processes.  It  naturally  follows  that  "  learning  by  the  law  of 
effect  is  thus  more  fully  adaptive  for  the  neurones  in  the  changing 
intimacy  of  whose  synapses  learning  consists,  than  for  the  animal  as 
a  whole."  Profiting  by  experience  through  forming  associations 
rests  upon  the  adaptive  behavior  of  the  neurones. 

This  interesting  hypothesis  of  Thorndike  involves,  as  do  most 
hypotheses  concerning  the  problem  of  learning,  a  number  of  unproven 
assumptions.  It  may  be  questioned  if  the  law  of  exercise  may  not  be 
capable  of  a  simpler  explanation  without  appealing  to  a  selective 
activity  on  the  part  of  the  neurones,  or  any  primary  tendency  to  seek 
the  welfare  of  these  elements. 

The  discussion  of  the  preceding  laws  paves  the  way  for  the  con- 
sideration of  imitation  which  may  be  explained,  according  to  Thorn- 
dike,  "by  the  laws  of  instinct,  exercise  and  effect."  The  important 
conclusion  is  drawn  that  "the  idea  of  a  response  is  in  and  of  itself 
unable  to  produce  that  response,"  imitation  in  all  cases,  except  those 
of  the  purely  instinctive  type,  being  the  indirect  outcome  of  the 
pleasure-pain  type  of  behavior.  The  connections  established  by 
reasoning  fall  under  the  same  far-reaching  principles  of  explanation. 

Adequate  discussion  of  the  fundamental  questions  raised  in  this 
chapter  would  require  more  space  than  can  be  devoted  to  them  here. 
The  treatment  of  these  questions  which  Dr.  Thorndike  has  given 
cannot  fail  to  be  suggestive  and  stimulating  both  to  the  general 
psychologist  and  the  special  student  of  animal  behavior. 

S.  J.  HOLMES 
UNIVERSITY  OF  WISCONSIN 


Vol.  IX.  No.  9.  September  15,  19 


THE 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN 


GENERAL  REVIEWS  AND  SUMMARIES 

MEMORY,  IMAGINATION,  LEARNING,  AND  THE  HIGHER 
MENTAL  PROCESSES   (EXPERIMENTAL)1 

BY  J.  W.  BAIRD 

Clark  University 

I.     MEMORY  AND  IMAGINATION 

(a)  Summaries  and  Systematic  Treatises. — Several  years  ago 
Professor  G.  E.  Miiller  (38)  began  an  investigation  of  a  most  re- 
markable case  of  supra-normal  memory.  During  the  progress  of 
the  experiments  the  author  has  been  led  far  beyond  the  specific 
problem  which  he  set  himself  at  the  outset;  and  we  are  promised  a 
three-volume  treatise  describing  and  discussing  the  experimental 
findings,  together  with  an  evaluation  of  various  points  dealing  with 
experimental  procedure  and  a  critical  consideration  of  numerous 
questions  which  bear  upon  memorial  and  ideational  theory.  Colvin's 
book  (n)  is  essentially  a  summary  of  the  results  which  have  been 
yielded  from  various  investigations  of  the  Lernprozess,  together  with 
an  indication  of  pedagogical  applications.  Starch  (50)  has  compiled 
a  number  of  judiciously  selected  experiments  from  the  field  of  ex- 
perimental pedagogy,  to  which  he  has  added  several  ingenious 
variations  of  his  own.  Offner's  monograph  (39)  has  appeared  in  a 
second  edition  in  essentially  unchanged  form. 

Ranschburg's  Innsbruck  Sammelreferat  (47)  is  a  review  of  recent 
findings  in  the  psychopathology  of  memory.  He  points  out  the 
crudities  of  Freud's  interpretation  of  the  phenomena  in  this  field, 

1  The  writer  is  indebted  for  aid  in  the  preparation  of  this  paper  to  Miss  S.  C.  Fisher 
and  Dr.  K.  J.  Karlson,  of  Clark  University,  and  to  W.  S.  Foster  and  C.  A.  Ruck- 
mich,  of  Cornell  University. 

32I 


322  /•  W.  BAIRD 

and  shows  that  the  recognized  principles  of  associative  and  repro- 
ductive inhibition,  associative  coexcitation,  and  the  like  furnish  a 
much  more  adequate  explanation  of  the  common  defects  of  memory. 
The  methods  of  investigating  memory  are  described  and  discussed; 
and  the  memorial  characteristics  of  normal  and  various  types  of 
abnormal  subjects  are  presented. 

(b)  Discussions  of  General  Questions—Henry's  monograph   (17) 
is  based  upon  an  elaborate   mathematical  treatment  of   a  meager 
group  of  experimental  data.     Memory  and  habit  are  to  be  regarded 
as   wholly   disparate   phenomena.     Memorial   functions   are   never 
performed  successfully  at  the  first  attempt,— the  failure  being  due 
to  the  fact  that  one's  idea  of  the  act  is  at  first  imperfect,  and  becomes 
perfect  only  as  the  result  of  repetition.     In  the  case  of  habit,  however, 
the  idea  of  the  act  to  be  performed  is  complete  from  the  outset. 

Biihler  (6)  describes  a  method  employing  spatial  relationships  for 
memorial  material.  A  sheet  of  paper  is  divided  into  thirty-six  small 
squares,  the  vertical  and  horizontal  diameters  of  the  sheet  being 
indicated  by  heavy  lines.  Each  small  square  stands  in  a  definite 
relationship  to  each  of  the  four  large  squares;  and  a  total  of  1,265 
spatial  relationships  may  be  differentiated  upon  the  sheet.  A  given 
relationship,  indicated  by  the  colored  contents  of  certain  squares,  is 
presented,  learned,  and  reproduced,  with  introspections.  Fischer 
(13)  outlines  a  programme  for  the  investigation  of  creative  imagi-, 
nation,  which  includes  the  following  problems:  a  description  of  its 
sphere  (play,  empathy,  fantasy) ;  a  determination  of  the  boundaries 
of  this  sphere,  and  of  its  relation  to  the  sphere  of  the  real  and  serious; 
a  classification  of  the  typical  forms  of  creative  imagination. 

Moede  (37)  discusses  the  use  of  the  term  memory  in  the  biological 
sciences;  he  points  out  that  the  term  has  been  divested  of  its  essential 
characteristics  by  the  biologists,  who  then  apply  it  in  this  emasculated 
connotation  to  designate  certain  purely  biological  phenomena.  Even 
the  laws  of  heredity  and  of  analogous  biological  phenomena  are  held 
by  the  author  to  be  only  superficially  analogous  to  the  characteristic 
laws  of  memory.  Jesinghaus  (22)  resumes  the  traditional  theories 
of  memory,  and  discusses  the  phenomena  of  perseveration,  forgetting, 
and  feeling  of  familiarity. 

(c)  Imagery. — Angell's  report  (3)  evaluates  the  various  tests  of 
imagery,   and   adds   ingenious   methods   from   his   own   laboratory. 
None  of  the  purely  objective  tests  prove  to  be  trustworthy;  the  author's 
recommendations  include  a  complete  series  of  tests  for  the  whole 
range  of  mental  functioning.     Feuchtwanger's  paper  (12)  reports  an 


MEMORY,  IMAGINATION,  ETC.  323 

investigation  of  the  same  question.  His  problem  was  essentially 
a  comparison  of  results  obtained  by  introspective  and  objective 
methods. 

Meumann  (35)  urges  the  consideration  of  a  hitherto  unrecognized 
factor  in  our  enumeration  of  ideational  types.  Certain  individuals 
are  able  to  deal  efficiently  with  ideational  material  only  when  the 
imagery  from  each  sense  department  is  present  in  isolation;  they  are 
unable  to  make  use  of  joint  imagery  from  different  senses.  Lipmann 
(31)  believes  that  in  our  enumeration  of  types  of  apprehension  we 
should  differentiate,  within  the  visual  type,  between  those  individuals 
who  best  apprehend  size,  position,  color  tone,  etc. 

Schaub  (48)  finds  that  images  (visual,  auditory,  tactual)  possess 
the  attribute  of  intensity.  The  difference  between  image  and  sensa- 
tion is  not  one  of  intensity,  but  rather  one  of  texture  and  context, 
the  image  being  incomplete,  abbreviated,  and  without  kinsesthetic 
context.  Lobsien  (32)  reports  a  series  of  results  from  which  he 
concludes  that  auditory  memory  is  equally  well  developed  in  girls 
and  in  boys,  and  that  it  increases  uniformly  and  progressively  with 
increase  of  age. 

(d)  Association  and  Inhibition. — Langfeld  (28)  investigated  the 
effect  of  alcohol  (30  ccm.,  95  per  cent.,  in  60  ccm.  water)  and  caffeine 
(6  gr.  in  capsule)  upon  association,  reproduction  and  suppression. 
Pictures  were  shown,  and  the  reagents  were  instructed  that  in  their 
choice  of  a  reaction-word  they  must  not  name  the  picture.  Neither 
drug  had  any  appreciable  effect  other  than  to  decrease  the  association- 
time.  The  reagents  did  not  translate  the  negative  into  positive 
instructions,  i.  e.,  there  was  a  distinct  negative  attitude,  which  was 
usually  describable  in  terms  of  cortical  set.  Experiments  with 
pathological  patients  revealed  no  deviation  from  normal  accuracy  of 
reproduction  or  normal  power  of  suppression  excepting  in  certain  cases 
of  dementia  prsecox.  Jacobson  (21)  presented  pairs  of  weights  for 
comparison,  and  introduced  intensive  auditory  stimuli  in  order  to 
determine  whether  and  to  what  extent  it  was  possible  to  affect  the 
judgment  of  the  weights  by  thus  inhibiting  the  sensation  obtained 
from  the  comparative  weight.  In  other  experiments  auditory  stimuli 
were  presented  for  comparison,  and  pressures  constituted  the  distrac- 
tion. It  was  found  that  pressures  of  moderate  intensity  are  inhibited 
by  simultaneous  sounds  and  by  other  pressures,  and  that  sounds  of 
moderate  intensity  are  inhibited  by  intensive  simultaneous  pressures. 
Increased  attention  to  the  inhibiting  sensation  increases  the  inhi- 
bition, while  increased  attention  to  the  other  sensation  decreases 


324  /.  W.  BAIRD 

the  inhibition.  Hence  what  is  called  distraction  of  attention  consists 
in  an  inhibitory  influence  of  one  sensation  upon  another;  and  degree 
of  (subjective)  intensity  of  sensation  is  a  function  of  degree  of  at- 
tention. 

Dauber  (no)  found  that  the  preferrred  association  is  related  to 
the  repeated  association,  and  also  to  a  number  of  other  phenomena: 
the  frequency  with  which  the  stimulus-word  and  the  reaction-word 
occur  in  ordinary  language;  the  phenomenon  of  clang  association. 
Nonsense  syllables  tend  to  arouse  meaningful  reaction-words,  in 
spite  of  instructions  to  react  with  nonsense  words;  and  preferrred 
associations  appear  in  these  responses  to  nonsense  stimuli,  indicating 
that  preference  is  not  merely  a  product  of  close  associative  connection 
between  stimulus-word  and  reaction-word.  Huber  (19)  investigated 
the  influence  of  culture  and  environment  upon  the  association- 
reaction,  by  repeating  with  a  group  of  soldier  reagents  the  experiments 
which  had  been  made  by  Reinhold  with  school-girl  reagents.  The 
soldiers  gave  fewer  preferred  associations,  more  internal  associations, 
more  adjectival  and  definitive  reaction-words.  The  author  confirms 
Jung  and  Riklin's  finding  that  uncultured  reagents  are  more  influenced 
by  the  meaning  of  the  word  and  less  by  the  word  as  such;  and  he 
•concludes  that  the  associations  of  a  group  of  reagents  is  always  in- 
fluenced by  the  milieu  of  the  group. 

Foucault  (15)  brings  forward  empirical  evidence,  obtained  in 
experiments  with  numbers  and  nonsense  syllables,  to  show  that 
association  does  not  take  place  merely  as  the  result  of  resemblance. 
Resemblance  has  no  associative  effect  unless  it  is  perceived  as  such 
by  the  observer;  and  when  resemblance  is  perceived,  we  have  a  case 
not  of  mere  association  but  of  comparison  and  judgment.  Re- 
semblance therefore  owes  its  potency  to  an  intellectual  act,  and  is 
per  se  no  more  efficacious  than  contrast  and  incompatibility,  cause 
and  effect,  or  means  and  end. 

Levy-Suhl  (29)  aimed  to  determine  whether  the  association- 
reactions  of  different  forms  of  mental  abnormality  manifest  typically 
different  characteristics.  Employing  his  data  as  a  basis  of  classi- 
fication, he  divided  his  forty-four  patients  into  four  groups;  and  his 
psychological  classification  showed  a  remarkable  agreement  with  a 
classification  which  had  been  based  upon  a  clinical  diagnosis.  The 
first  group  gave  an  almost  normal  reaction;  it  included  a  convalescent 
case  of  exhaustion  delirium  and  three  cases  of  dementia  paralytica. 
The  second  group  (hyperprosexia)  was  characterized  by  a  hypervigi- 
lance  and  a  hypertenacity  of  attention;  here  appear  ten  cases  of  mania 


MEMORY,  IMAGINATION,  ETC.  325 

and  a  (transitional)  case  of  acute  paranoia,  together  with  five  variants 
from  the  general  group-type.  The  third  group  was  characterized 
by  selective  hyperprosexia  (sixteen  cases  of  paranoia) ;  and  the  fourth 
by  hypervigilant  reaction,  with  contamination  and  dissociation  (four 
cases  of  dementia  paralytica).  Ley  and  Menzerath  (30)  also  report 
the  results  of  an  investigation  of  various  forms  of  mental  abnormality, 
by  means  of  the  association-reaction  but  they  supplement  this  method 
by  introspection.  They  found  that  characteristic  differences  exist 
between  the  associations  of  normal  and  abnormal  subjects;  that  the 
different  forms  of  mental  abnormality  are  each  characterized  by  a 
typical  sort  of  association-reaction;  that  the  lengthened  reaction  is 
due  to  other  causes  than  the  presence  of  an  emotional  complex. 

Woodworth  and  Wells  (55)  publish  the  report  of  the  committee 
which  was  charged  by  the  American  Psychological  Association  with 
the  evaluation  and  the  standardization  of  association  tests.  The 
report  consists  essentially  of  a  series  of  recommendations,  with  di- 
rections as  to  precautions  to  be  observed  and  methods  and  materials 
to  be  employed.  Wells  (51)  draws  upon  12,000  observations  in  his 
discussion  of  certain  properties  of  the  free  association-time.  Women 
show  greater  individual  variation,  and  greater  variability  from  day 
to  day,  than  men.  The  former  give  about  twice  as  many  judgment 
reactions,  and  fewer  associations  by  subordination  and  superordina- 
tion.  Emotional  coloring  may  cause  lengthened  reaction,  but  it  is 
only  one  of  many  causes  of  associative  obstruction;  suppression, 
distraction,  indecision,  and  the  like,  must  all  be  taken  into  account. 
In  another  paper  (52)  Wells  suggests  the  following  categories  for  the 
classification  of  associations:  egocentric;  superordinate;  contrast; 
speech  habit;  miscellaneous. 

(e)  Learning  and  Forgetting. — Abramowski  (i)  deals  with  the 
familiar  phenomenon  that  one  may  fail  to  remember  a  datum  while 
he  remembers  what  it  is  not.  This  resistance  of  memorial  lacunae 
to  being  filled  by  erroneous  data  he  refers  to  generic  feelings,  which 
he  describes  as  being  neither  ideas  nor  definite  feelings.  Objects 
were  placed  upon  the  outstretched  palms  of  blindfolded  observers, 
who  perceived  them  tactually  either  with  concentrated  or  with  dis- 
tracted attention.  In  subsequent  sittings,  attempts  were  made  to 
recognize  the  objects,  various  suggestions  being  introduced  for  the 
purpose  of  determining  whether  and  to  what  degree  erroneous  sug- 
gestions would  be  resisted.  The  author  concludes  from  these  and 
from  similar  experiments  in  kinsesthetic  perception  that  sensory 
impressions,  even  when  divested  of  every  intellectual  element  (by 


326  /.  W.  BAIRD 

distraction),  are  still  retained  in  memory;  and  he  finds  in  this  fact 
a  confirmation  for  his  hypothesis  of  generic  feelings.  Joteyko  (23) 
reports  that  in  the  learning  of  digits,  syllables  and  words,  her  observers 
had  recourse  to  various  sorts  of  imaginal  material,  and  that  associated 
images  were  of  prime  importance.  Pyle  (45)  found  in  his  investi- 
gation of  the  immediate  "substance"  memory  of  twelve  adults,  that 
the  rapid  learner  is  more  accurate  than  the  slow  learner,  nor  does  the 
slow  learner  excel  in  immediate  or  in  permanent  retention. 

Numerous  investigators  have  reported  that  it  is  more  economical 
to  learn  a  given  material  as  a  whole  than  in  piecemeal  fashion.  Is 
this  equally  true  when  the  material  is  of  excessive  length?  Pyle 
and  Snyder  (46)  investigated  this  question,  employing  poetry  as 
memory  material,  and  assigning  sections  which  varied  in  length 
from  five  to  two  hundred  lines.  They  found  that  the  Ganzmethode 
is  invariably  more  economical,  no  matter  how  long  the  whole  or  the 
parts  maybe;  and  the  saving  is  greater  when  the  "wholes"  are  longer. 
They  explain  the  disadvantage  of  the  Teilmethode  from  the  fact 
that  it  involves  the  formation  of  associations  between  the  end  of  a 
section  and  the  beginning  of  the  same  section,  and  the  fact  that 
the  earlier  sections  are  forgotten  during  the  act  of  learning  the  later 
ones. 

Ordahl  (40)  undertook  to  discover  whether  learning  is  aided  by 
wholly  or  relatively  unconscious  factors,  and  whether  the  formation 
of  a  habit  of  whose  existence  one  is  unconscious  can  progress  as  well 
under  distraction;  and  to  discover  what  is  the  role  of  consciousness 
in  the  learning  of  simple  tasks  involving  (a)  almost  no  intellectual 
factor,  (b)  a  complex  coordination  of  motor  impulses,  (c)  in  learning 
of  a  purely  intellectual  character.  Her  experiments  included  the 
learning  of  nonsense  syllables  with  unnoticed  concomitants;  the 
comparison  of  lifted  weights,  with  and  without  distraction;  writing 
in  unusual  ways;  the  mental  multiplication  of  large  numbers.  It 
was  found  that:  (i)  unnoticed  aids  have  no  influence  in  the  act  of 
learning;  (2)  in  learning  simple  muscular  coordinations,  where  con- 
sciousness is  normally  focused  on  the  end,  learning  can  progress 
without  consciousness  either  of  the  end  or  of  the  fact  that  one  is 
learning,  but  a  high  degree  of  attention  to  the  task  gives  better  results 
than  distracted  attention;  (3)  in  learning  of  every  sort,  both  conscious 
and  unconscious  factors  are  present.  Conscious  control  is  most 
direct  where  the  material  is  of  an  "intellectual"  character.  Con- 
sciousness is  a  corrective  agent;  it  eliminates  errors,  improves  on 
elements  unconsciously  developed,  and  organizes  the  whole  procedure. 


MEMORY,  IMAGINATION,  ETC.  327 

Can  the  different  parts  of  speech  be  memorized  and  retained  with 
equal  facility?  Busemann  (7)  employed  nouns,  adjectives,  verbs, 
adverbs,  and  nonsense  syllables.  He  found  that  consciousness  of 
meaning  is  clearer  in  the  case  of  nouns  that  in  the  case  of  adjectives 
and  verbs,  and  that  the  retention  of  the  former  is  correspondingly 
better.  The  author  believes  that  the  Teilmethode  has  not  yet  been 
shown  to  be  more  economical  than  the  Ganzmethode. 

Pieron  (42,  43,  44)  established  the  curve  of  learning  and  the  curve 
of  forgetting  in  the  pond  snail.  Since  the  latter  curve  did  not 
coincide  exactly  with  that  obtained  by  Ebbinghaus  in  the  human 
subject,  Pieron  set  himself  the  task  of  memorizing  series  of  nonsense 
syllables,  and  found  a  confirmation  of  his  own  formula.  He  concluded 
from  his  experiments  that  the  fixing  of  memorial  traces  continues 
after  the  stimulus  has  ceased  to  act,  and  that  the  duration  of  this 
fixing  process  varies  widely  in  different  animals.  Where  fixing 
progresses  slowly,  forgetting  also  progresses  slowly. 

(/)  Affection  and  Memory. — Henderson  (16)  points  out  that  in  the 
simplest  form  of  learning — trial  and  error — those  movements  which 
have  disagreeable  consequences  are  eliminated.  We  banish  dis- 
agreeable reactions;  do  we  really  forget  our  disagreeable  experiences? 
Ten  observers  were  asked  to  record  incidents  from  their  lives,  and 
to  grade  them  into  classes  on  the  basis  of  their  affective  values. 
While  his  results  show  that  remembrances  are  dominantly  agreeable, 
the  author  does  not  believe  that  his  query  is  to  be  answered  in  the 
affirmative.  Peters  (41)  asked  a  number  of  reagents  to  respond  to  a 
stimulus-word  by  the  reproduction  of  a  past  experience,  and  then  to 
describe  the  affective  coloring  of  the  original  incident  and  of  the 
remembrance,  together  with  details  as  to  dates  and  frequency  of 
recall.  Fifty-two  per  cent,  of  the  experiences  were  described  as 
pleasant,  rec.ent  experiences  being  less  pleasant  than  earlier  ex- 
periences. Individual  differences  were  found  in  regard  to  pre- 
ponderance of  pleasant  or  unpleasant,  and  in  regard  to  the  constancy 
of  the  affective  tone  which  attaches  to  a  given  experience  in  its  suc- 
cessive revivals  in  memory. 

Claparede  (8)  discusses  the  question  as  to  whether  an  affective 
process  can  be  an  object  of  memory.  Disagreement  among  psychol- 
ogists is  due  to  a  failure  to  come  to  an  understanding  as  to  the  defini- 
tion and  criteria  of  memory,  and  to  a  misapprehension  regarding  the 
significance  of  the  evidence  which  they  bring  forward  in  support  of 
their  positions.  The  author  differentiates  the  various  functions  or 
phases  of  memory,  and  concludes  that  only  in  the  -case  of  one  of  these, 
recognition,  has  the  existence  of  affective  memory  been  established. 


328  /.  W.  BAIRD 

(g)  Recognition— h\TU\z  (2)  describes  several  remarkable  ex- 
periences which  consist  in  the  false  recognition  of  an  acquaintance, 
but  which  are  invariably  followed  a  few  minutes  later  by  a  meeting 
with  the  acquaintance  who  had  been  falsely  recognized  a  few  minutes 
previously.  He  discusses  the  various  possible  explanations  of  these 
phenomena,  and  concludes  with  the  statement  that  in  his  opinion 
the  telepathic  hypothesis  furnishes  the  most  probable  explanation, — 
i.  e.,  the  acquaintance  who  is  not  yet  within  the  range  of  the  observer's 
vision  is  already  perceived  in  vague  fashion  through  the  medium  of 
a  telepathic  sense  (!).  Alrutz  requests  his  readers  to  furnish  him 
with  additional  reports  of  cases  of  false  recognition. 

Katzaroff's  paper  (25)  contains  a  valuable  classification  and 
discussion  of  theories  of  recognition.  His  experimental  procedure 
consisted  in  exposing  a  series  of  pictures,  and  in  subsequently  exposing 
a  second  series  where  the  original  pictures  appeared  among  others  of  a 
similar  character.  The  observers  were  asked  to  report  whether  or 
not  they  recognized  the  pictures  of  the  second  series,  and  if  so  with 
what  degree  of  confidence.  It  was  hoped  by  this  means,  and  by 
means  of  the  introspective  records  of  his  observers  to  throw 
light  upon  the  process  of  recognition.  The  author  concludes  from 
his  experiments  that  the  process  of  recognition  is  a  product  of  two 
separate  and  distinct  factors,  a  feeling  of  familiarity,  which  constitutes 
pure  or  direct  or  immediate  recognition,  and  the  arousal  of  images  or 
remembrances  which  confirm  or  control  the  immediate  recognition 
and  transform  the  latter  into  an  indirect  or  mediated  recognition. 
Recognition  appears  to  be  an  affective  rather  than  an  intellectual 
process;  in  its  pure  form  it  is  not  determined  by  any  associative 
process  nor  by  the  fusion  or  juxtaposition  of  imagery  or  remembrances. 
The  certainty  of  one's  recognition  is  independent  of  one's  act  of 
recognizing.  Sometimes  the  former  may  be  determined  by  the  latter, 
ind  may  follow  immediately  in  its  wake;  but  more  often  one's 
certainty  develops  during  the  progress  of  the  recognitive  process 
concomitant  with  the  arousal  of  imagery,  remembrances  of  details, 
verbal  or  other  associations,  and  the  like.  The  act  of  immediate 
recognition  appears  to  be  independent  of  all  feelings  or  ideas  of  a 
precise  localization  in  time  or  space,  or  of  a  precise  localization  in  a 
constellation  of  remembrances.  There  is,  on  the  subjective  side,  no 
qualitative  difference  between  correct  and  erroneous  recognitions. 
The  process  of  recognition  manifests  such  great  individual  variations 
that  one  is  led  to  suspect  the  existence  of  typical  differences  in  the 
mechanism  of  the  process.  Katzaroff's  paper  is  followed  by  an 


MEMORY,  IMAGINATION,  ETC. 

appendix  by  Claparede  (8)  who  points  out  the  similarity  between 
Katzaroff's  conception  of  the  process  of  recognition  and  a  view  which 
Claparede  himself  formulated  some  years  ago,  as  a  result  of  certain 
pathological  observations.  This  view  makes  relationship  with  the 
self  (with  me  and  my  experience)  the  essential  principle  upon  which 
recognition  depends.  The  author  assumes  that  mental  associations 
are  of  two  general  sorts:  connections  of  ideas  with  one  another,  and 
connections  between  ideas,  on  the  one  hand,  and  that  which  con- 
stitutes the  self,  on  the  other.  These  latter  (egocentric)  connections 
may  function  in  a  centrifugal  direction, — constituting  voluntary 
recollection, — or  in  a  centripetal  direction, — constituting  recognition. 
Claparede  illustrates  and  supports  his  view  by  citations  from 
pathological  observations. 

Meumann  (36)  has  observed  in  the  course  of  his  investigations 
with  nonsense  syllables  that  the  feeling  of  unfamiliarity  is  much  more 
definite  than  that  of  familiarity,  i.  e.,  we  are  much  more  clearly  con- 
scious of  the  fact  that  an  impression  is  unfamiliar  than  of  the  fact  that 
another  is  familiar.  Unfamiliarity  is  provided  with  a  peculiar  index 
or  character  which  makes  us  aware  of  the  unknown  immediately  and 
directly  without  the  interposition  of  any  act  of  reflection.  It  possesses 
the  following  characteristics :  an  inhibition  of  the  motor  and  ideational 
processes;  the  consciousness  of  a  blank;  the  feeling  of  unpleasantness; 
an  absence  of  the  ordinary  reproductive  flow  of  ideas.  The  ex- 
perience of  familiarity  may  come  to  consciousness  in  various  stages 
or  degrees:  as  the  easier  flow  of  mental  processes,  which  gives  rise  in 
turn  to  characteristic  feelings  and  organic  sensations;  as  a  lesser 
tension  of  attention;  as  a  more  ready  flow  of  reproduction.  Some- 
times all  of  these  criteria  of  the  familiar  are  lacking,  and  still  the  con- 
viction of  familiarity  arises,  apparently  as  the  result  of  physiological 
facilitation;  but  it  seems  more  probable  that  even  here  a  minimum  of 
dimly  conscious  criteria  have  sufficed  to  give  rise  to  the  idea  of 
familiarity. 

II.     INTELLECTUAL  PROCESSES 

Binet  (5)  differentiates  emotions  and  intellectual  acts  as  follows : 
Both  are  attitudes.  But  the  attitude  is  emotional  when  it  is  ac- 
companied by  intensive  organic  sensations;  and  the  more  intensive 
its  corporeal  concomitants,  the  less  doubt  is  there  concerning  the 
emotional  nature  of  the  attitude.  The  attitude  is  intellectual  when 
it  is  accompanied  by  a  minimum  of  subjective  sensations  and  a 
maximum  of  objective  sensations  and  images;  it  is  less  corporeal, 


330  /.  W.  BAIRD 

less  material,  apparently  more  worthy  of  pure  mind.  Intellectual 
phenomena  seem  to  be  less  personal  and  more  general;  they  are 
colder,  farther  removed  from  pleasure  and  pain.  Emotions  are  more 
corporeal,  more  individual,  more  characterized  by  pleasantness  and 
unpleasantness.  To  transform  either  attitude  into  the  other,  we 
need  only  change  the  group  of  concomitant  organic  sensations. 
Divest  the  attitude  of  its  organic  concomitants  and  you  have  left 
nothing  but  an  intellectual  act;  clothe  this  intellectual  act  in  a  garb 
of  organic  sensations  and  you  have  an  emotion. 

Aveling  (30)  aimed  to  determine:  (i)  What  influence  is  exerted 
upon  the  sensorial  content  of  percepts  by  the  thought-processes  which 
are  involved  in  perception?  (2)  What  influence  is  exerted  upon  the 
thought-character  of  perceptions  by  the  sensorial  content  of  percepts? 
(3)  What  influence  is  exerted  by  antecedent  conscious  processes 
upon  the  sensorial  content  and  the  intellectual  character  of  percep- 
tions? Colored  pictures  of  familiar  objects  were  presented  tachisto- 
scopically;  and  an  attempt  was  made  to  predetermine  the  observer's 
perception  by  instructing  him  to  perceive  the  picture,  in  one  case  as  an 
individual  thing,  in  another  case,  as  the  type  of  a  class  of  similar  things. 
In  a  series  of  control  experiments,  the  observer  was  not  instructed  as 
to  his  mode  of  perception.  The  results  show  that  in  these  control 
experiments,  where  no  attempt  was  made  to  predetermine  perception, 
the  "individual"  and  the  "type"  perceptions  occurred  with  equal 
frequency.  Under  "type"  instruction,  "type"  perceptions  occurred 
in  seventy-five  per  cent,  of  the  cases;  and  under  "individual"  in- 
struction, "individual"  per  options  also  occurred  in  seventy-five 
per  cent,  of  the  cases,  a  fact  which  shows  the  degree  to  which  a  given 
consciousness  may  successfully  be  predetermined.  The  fact  that 
the  same  picture  is  perceived  in  symbolic  fashion  by  one  observer, 
and  in  asymbolic  fashion  by  another  furnishes  a  basis  for  the  classi- 
fication of  observers  into  types,  since  they  seem,  in  the  one  case,  to 
be  in  the  presence  of  a  real  object,  and  in  the  other  case,  to  be  in  the 
presence  of  a  mere  picture.  This  difference  between  observers 
seems  to  be  due  to  different  degrees  in  the  facility  with  which  pre- 
vious experiences  are  assimilated  into  the  present  perception. 

In  Kakise's  investigation  (24)  words  and  phrases  were  presented, 
in  auditory  or  visual  fashion,  with  a  view  to  obtaining  an  introspective 
description  of  the  conscious  concomitants  of  understanding.  It 
was  found  that  the  characteristic  constituents  of  the  meaning  of  a 
word  or  phrase  are  not  selective  experiences;  they  are  rather  a  series 
of  phases  of  a  process  of  reproduction.  If  many  such  associations 


MEMORY,  IMAGINATION,  ETC.  331 

of  related  past  experiences  are  reproductively  aroused,  the  result  is  a 
feeling  of  richness  of  content;  when  the  number  of  reproduced  asso- 
ciations is  small,  a  feeling  of  poverty  of  content  results;  if  there  are 
no  associations,  a  feeling  of  no  content  arises.  This  feeling  of  content, 
which  is  the  awareness  of  the  more  or  less  fused  aggregate  of  incipient 
associations,  seems  to  be  irreducible  to  specific  imagery.  The  fre- 
quency of  imagery  in  the  understanding  consciousness  is  primarily 
conditioned  neither  by  the  concrete  or  abstract  character  of  the 
stimulus-word,  nor  by  any  peculiarity  of  the  individual,  but  by  the 
rapidity  of  his  response.  When  the  reaction-word  came  slowly  and 
with  difficulty,  imagery  tended  to  intervene;  when  reaction  was 
prompt,  imagery  tended  to  be  absent.  The  author  is  convinced 
that  the  association-method,  as  customarily  employed,  is  too  artificial 
to  give  satisfactory  results;  the  Ausfragemethode  seems  to  be  better 
adapted  both  to  the  study  of  the  general  laws  of  association  and  to 
the  study  of  individual  peculiarities  of  association. 

Hollingworth  (18)  suggests  that  the  failure  of  certain  individuals 
to  find  that  sensory  components  are  present  in  their  consciousness  of 
relation,  of  intention,  of  purpose,  and  the  like,  may  be  due  to  the  fact 
that  they  seek  for  relevant  imagery.  His  own  introspections  convince 
him  of  the  existence  of  thoughts  whose  character  represents  an  inter- 
mediate between  "the  conventionally  costumed  idea  and  the  nude 
relational  process";  and  he  cites  illustrations  to  show  that  three 
stages  of  this  vicarious  functioning  may  be  differentiated.  "The 
first  stage  includes  dream  states  in  which  images  quite  irrelevant 
as  to  source  or  quality  may  be  seen  to  play  a  symbolic  or  metaphorical 
role  in  the  play  of  meanings,  relations  and  complications  of  situation 
which  make  up  the  plot  of  the  dream.  The  third  stage  is  shown  in 
the  common  observations  that  the  vehicle  of  a  waking  meaning,  the 
two  poles  of  a  relation,  may  be  fragmentary,  transitory,  and  only 
remotely  relevant,  relevant  only  by  virtue  of  accidental  association. 
The  second  stage  is  an  intermediate  one  disclosed  by  observations 
of  drowsiness  hallucinations,  a  stage  in  which  the  thought  process  is  a 
sensible  and  adequate  waking  affair,  although  the  sensory  content  of 
consciousness  may  be  evident  dream  material  or  even  actual  sensory 
impression  of  a  quite  foreign  character." 

Jacobson  (20)  investigated  the  perception  of  single  letters,  the 
understanding  of  words,  and  the  understanding  of  sentences,  em- 
ploying the  "method  of  examination."  His  observers  were  required 
to  furnish  two  reports  of  each  experience — a  description  of  their 
conscious  processes,  and  a  statement  concerning  meanings,  objects, 


332  /.  W.  BA1RD 

stimuli,  and  physiological  occurrences.  No  imageless  processes 
were  reported;  and  he  found  that  the  correlated  meanings  and  proc- 
esses are  two  renderings,  from  different  points  of  view,  of  one  and 
the  same  experience. 

Koffka  (27)  reports  having  asked  a  "catch  question,"  in  con- 
sequence of  which  a  latent  Einstellung  was  produced  in  his  auditors, 
a  fact  which  was  shown  by  their  changed  attitude  toward  a  second 
question.  The  author  describes  methods  of  investigating  the  laws 
of  the  latent  Einstellung,  and  discusses  the  relation  between  this 
phenomenon  and  the  deter  minierende  Tendenz. 

Clarke  (10)  attempted  to  analyze  a  number  of  typical  Bewusst- 
seinslagen  by  a  method  which  consisted  in  obtaining  introspections 
regarding  the  processes  involved  in  learning  to  read  type  for  the  blind; 
in  the  understanding  of  the  meaning  of  words,  sentences,  paragraphs; 
in  the  answering  of  questions,  requiring  and  not  requiring  thought;  and 
in  the  filling  out  of  broken  sentences  ("rule  of  three").  It  was 
found  that  the  conscious  attitude  instead  of  being  a  mental  ulti- 
mate is,  in  numerous  instances  at  least,  capable  of  being  further 
analyzed,  especially  in  the  light  of  its  genesis.  When  the  attitudes 
occur  often  enough  for  generalization,  there  is  found  a  marked  agree- 
ment between  different  observers,  and  between  the  same  observer's  at- 
titudes at  different  times.  This  is  true  of  such  attitudes  as  surprise, 
seeking,  doubt,  hesitation,  uncertainty,  all  of  which  may  be  described 
in  typically  different  terms.  The  same  observer  may  report  a  graded 
series  of  transitions  in  his  imagery,  from  vivid  and  explicit  images 
to  the  vague  and  condensed  consciousness  which  may  be  supposed 
to  be  analogous  to  that  which  has  been  called  "imageless  thought." 
Attitudes  may,  then,  be  analyzed  into  sensations,  images  and  feelings, 
or  their  genesis  may  be  traced  to  these  elements. 

Betz  (4)  cites  illustrations  to  show  that  recognition  may  be  a 
product  not  of  imagery  but  of  "Einstellung"  Perception  is  ordi- 
narily attended  by  a  reaction  which  is  essentially  organic,  kinsesthetic 
and  affective  in  character.  The  subsequent  reproduction  of  this 
reactive  complex  may  serve  to  represent  the  perceived  object  in 
consciousness,  and  to  give  rise  to  a  process  of  recognition.  This 
revived  complex  is  (inappropriately)  called  Einstellung,  by  Betz,  in 
contradistinction  to  Forstellung.  The  author  refers  our  consciousness 
of  similarity  and  identity  to  these  organic,  kinxsthetic  and  affective 
vestiges  of  original  perceptions;  and  in  a  second  paper,  he  invokes  the 
same  principle  (together  with  the  vorgestellte  Einstellung)  to  explain 
the  origin  in  consciousness  of  our  concepts,  our  general  ideas  and  our 
definitions. 


MEMORY,  IMAGINATION,  ETC.  333 

III.     PRACTICE,  HABIT,  TRANSFER 

Foster  (14)  undertook  to  make  a  qualitative  and  quantitative 
determination  of  the  relationship  which  obtains  between  "native" 
(or  unpracticed)  and  practiced  ability  to  evoke  images  of  sensory 
experiences.  Pictures,  objects,  and  nonsense  drawings  were  shown 
to  three  observers,  whose  immediate  reproduction  was  then  tested 
by  their  drawings  or  descriptions  of  the  material.  Practice  was 
continued  for  three  months.  It  was  found  that  ability  to  reproduce 
increased  with  practice,  rapidly  at  first,  then  more  slowly;  but  in 
not  a  single  instance  did  practice  improve  the  ability  to  visualize 
or  even  increase  the  tendency  to  visualize.  The  improved  efficiency 
in  reproduction  was  found  to  be  due  to  the  following  factors :  increased 
confidence  in  ability  to  perform  the  task,  and  consequent  increased 
attention  to  the  task;  increased  familiarity  with  the  material;  the 
adoption  of  a  more  systematic  procedure  and  a  more  economical 
distribution  of  attention  during  the  act  of  learning;  the  discovery  of 
subsidiary  aids,  such  as  counting,  grouping,  naming. 

Kent  (26)  investigated  the  possibility  of  habit  formation  in  de- 
mentia prsecox.  The  procedure  consisted  in  an  attempt  to  obtain 
effects  of  practice.  Eighteen  women,  representing  various  stages  in 
the  progressive  development  of  the  disease,  were  asked  to  practice  a 
series  of  exercises  for  a  period  of  several  months.  The  exercises 
consisted  in  arranging  a  series  of  fifteen  digits  in  a  prescribed  order, 
in  tracing  a  path  through  a  (printed)  labyrinth,  in  crossing  out  digits, 
letters  and  geometrical  figures  A  second  series  of  exercises  consisted 
in  placing  pegs  in  holes  in  a  board,  and  in  fitting  wooden  blocks  into 
a  form-board.  The  records  of  the  errors  and  of  the  times  required  for 
these  exercises  show  that  it  is  possible  for  the  dementia  praecox 
patient  to  acquire  new  habits  as  the  result  of  practice,  and  that  the 
results  attained  in  one  sort  of  exercise  make  themselves  felt  in  other 
exercises  of  a  similar  motor  sort. 

Wells  reports  an  investigation  of  the  effect  of  practice  upon  the 
free  association  (53).  He  employed  six  normal  observers;  and  the 
procedure  consisted  in  obtaining  reactions  to  one  thousand  stimulus- 
words, — twenty  sittings,  fifty  reactions  at  each  sitting, — and  subse- 
quently in  obtaining  a  second  set  of  reactions  from  the  initial  part  of 
the  original  list  of  stimulus-words.  It  was  found  that  the  association- 
time  tended  to  decrease  toward  a  limit  of  approximately  six  fifths  of  a 
second;  that  the  responses  became  further  differentiated  and  gener- 
alized as  a  result  of  the  increased  readiness  with  which  the  reagent's 
whole  vocabulary  became  available;  that  the  forms  of  association 


334  /•  W-  BAIRD 

became  more  superficial;  and  that  the  emotive  value  of  the  associ- 
ations decreased.  The  author  mentions  the  fact  that  this  last  result 
diminishes  the  applicability  of  the  association-method  for  any  pur- 
pose where  emotive  value  is  involved. 

Sleight  (49)  investigated  the  problem  of  the  transfer  of  training 
in  memorial  acquisition.  His  procedure  consisted  in  making  an 
initial  test  of  memorial  ability  (first  "cross-section")?  an^  tnen  in 
practicing  his  observers  in  memorizing  for  a  period  of  three  weeks, 
when  a  second  "cross-section"  was  made.  Then  practice  was  re- 
sumed for  another  three  weeks,  and  a  third  "cross-section"  was 
taken.  His  tests  and  his  practice  consisted  in  the  memorizing  of 
prose,  poetry,  nonsense-syllables,  tables  of  arithmetical  and  geo- 
graphical data,  and  in  learning  the  "substance"  of  prose,  and  the 
like.  His  observers  were  divided  into  three  groups;  and  the  procedure 
was  such  that  no  group  was  tested  by  means  of  the  same  sort  of 
material  which  had  been  employed  in  its  training  exercises.  The 
results  show  that  there  appears  to  be  no  general  memory  improvement 
as  the  result  of  practice,  nor  any  evidence  for  the  hypothesis  of  a 
general  memory  function;  that  there  would  seem  instead  to  be  a 
very  large  number  of  related  and  unrelated  memory  functions;  that 
the  factors  which  contribute  to  the  transfer  of  memorizing  power  are 
similarities  of  a  fundamental  nature,  such  as  specific  forms  of  atten- 
tion, imagery,  rhythm, — in  short,  similarities  of  procedure. 

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MEMORY,  THOUGHT,  JUDGMENT,  ETC.  337 

MEMORY,   CONCEPT,  JUDGMENT,   LOGIC   (THEORY) 

BY  PROFESSOR  W.  C.  GORE 

University  of  Chicago 

It  will  be  recalled  that  Bergson  distinguished  clearly  between 
memory  as  recollection,  or  memory  proper,  and  memory  as  habit, 
which  merges  into  perception.  An  attempt  to  view  the  world  sub 
specie  memoriae  without  making  this  distinction  clear  is  to  be  found 
in  an  article  by  Moede  (n),  who  proposes  memory  as  a  compre- 
hensive principle  of  unity,  a  cardinal  concept  of  psychology  extended 
to  biology  and  thence  to  the  inorganic  sciences.  The  resulting 
mnemonic  Weltbild  includes  the  persistence  of  matter,  which  is  the 
possibility  of  repeated  sensation,  the  laws  of  nature  as  the  recurring 
relationships  between  inorganic  bodies  possessing  memory,  and  in 
the  organic  world  the  principle  of  heredity,  the  idioplasmic  memory 
of  the  germ-cells,  which  is  not  only  the  foundation  of  recapitulation 
and  regeneration  but  also  of  the  functions  of  the  special  organs  and 
even  of  conscious  memory  which  is  an  offshoot  of  that  idioplasmic 
memory.  Spirit  itself,  according  to  one  view  cited,  is  the  eternal 
memory  of  things.  It  is  the  summation  of  all  the  different  stages  of 
memory.  I  am  failing  to  do  justice  to  the  heavy  apparatus  of  learning 
which  is  deployed  in  behalf  of  this  comprehensive  view,  and  to  im- 
portant qualifications.  The  question  persists,  however,  as  to  whether 
the  psychical  characteristic  of  memory  is  not  poured  out  with  the 
bath  in  the  attempt  to  flood  the  universe  with  memory. 

Jesinghaus  (6)  gives  an  historical  and  critical  review  of  the  fol- 
lowing theories  of  memory:  the  theory  of  "  petite  s  perceptions"  the 
"Spur"  theory  (both  of  which  presuppose  in  the  interest  of  causal 
continuity  the  existence  of  latent  psychical  elements  between  the 
original  and  the  recalled  experience),  and  the  theory  of  "dispositions." 
The  last,  as  originated  by  Leibnitz  and  further  developed  by  Wundt 
in  analogy  with  the  formation  of  physiological  habit,  is  espoused  by 
the  author.  The  theory  of  "perseveration"  and  of  "perseveration 
tendencies"  originated  by  G.  E.  Miiller  is  criticized  as  superfluous 
and  untenable. 

The  literature  of  the  doctrine  of  imageless  thought  has  been 
critically  canvassed  by  Angell  (2)  and  the  different  questions  involved 
disentangled  and  analyzed.  Due  credit  is  given  for  the  stimulus  to 
a  keener  and  more  searching  analysis  of  thought-processes  than  any 
previous  generation  has  known  which  the  influence  of  the  advocates 


W.  C.  GORE 

of  this  doctrine  has  afforded,  but  the  doctrine  is  found  open  to  suspicion 
on  the  following  points  (quoting  in  part  from  the  conclusion  of  the 
article):  (i)  The  method  of  its  experimental  investigation  is  at 
least  not  wholly  satisfactory  in  meeting  the  demands  of  ordinary 
experimental  procedure.  (2)  Imageless  thought  ^  seems  with  many 
observers  to  be  at  best  but  a  sporadic  and  occasional  phenomenon. 

(3)  It  seems  almost  impossible  to  describe  it  save  in  negative  terms. 

(4)  We  are  apparently  asked  to  recognize  two  generically  different 
kinds  of  thought-material  to  serve  one  general  function.     This  is  at 
variance  with  our  conceptions  of  the  parsimony  of  nature.     (5)  There 
are  many  well-recognized  conscious  states  which  may  obviously  be 
readily    confused    with    imageless    thought.     The    consciousness    of 
attitude  springing  out  of  very  primitive  physiological  attitudes  is  an 
important  case  in  point.     (6)  The  presence  of  interpretative  factors 
in  perception  gives  no  real  comfort  to  belief  in  imageless  thinking. — 
Angell  concludes  that  "the  only  demonstrably  imageless  thought  is 
subconscious  and  so  primarily  a  matter  of  cerebralistic  physiology. 
Even  this  would  be  imaginal  if  it  got  above  the  limen." 

Ogden  (12),  summarizing  forty-nine  articles  bearing  more  or  less 
directly  on  the  doctrine  of  imageless  thought,  reaches  a  conclusion 
more  favorable  to  the  doctrine  than  Angell,  although  the  up-shot  of 
the  matter  seems  to  turn  on  an  act  of  faith  rather  than  on  fact. 
"Those  of  us  who  believe  that  meaning  is  a  conscious  factor,  directly 
given  in  our  experience,  find  it  unequivocally  described  in  our  intro- 
spective data,  despite  all  errors  of  Kundgabe  which  may  creep  in. 
Those,  on  the  other  hand,  who  believe  that  meaning  is  a  logical 
concept,  which  can  be  psychologically  observed  only  in  terms  of 
sensory  Vehicles,'  obliterate  the  Kundgabe  from  their  reports  and 
direct  attention  on  the  sensations  and  images  which  may  be  present." 
Ogden  is  unable  to  see  that  the  experiments  of  the  latter  give  much 
promise  of  the  possibility  of  working  out  a  psychology  of  thought  in 
terms  of  sensory  symbols. 

Jacobson  (5)  replies  vigorously  to  a  criticism  by  Ogden  and  asserts 
that  as  the  result  of  investigations  described  by  him  "we  find  that 
wherever  there  is  meaning  there  are  also  processes,  and  we  find  that  the 
correlated  meanings  and  processes  are  two  renderings,  from  different 
points  of  view,  of  one  and  the  same  experience" 

Keyser  (8)  describes  an  interesting  illustration  drawn  from  the 
study  of  higher  mathematics  which  is  intended  to  show  the  limita- 
tion of  the  imagination  as  compared  with  thought.  It  is  demon- 
strated that  symmetric  interpretations  of  a  mathematical  expression 


MEMORY,  THOUGHT,  JUDGMENT,  ETC.  339 

possible  for  thought  are  beyond  a  certain  point  impossible  for  imagi- 
nation. Thought  looks  about  in  spaces  of  ever-increasing  dimen- 
sionality like  a  binocular  being  with  its  two-fold  vision  unimpaired, 
whilst  the  eyes  of  imagination  not  only  fail  as  n  mounts  higher  and 
higher  but  fail  in  unequal  measure.  Keyser  appears  to  be  conceiving 
of  the  imagination  in  terms  of  visual  imagery,  or  at  least  in  terms 
of  images  corresponding  to  the  sense-perception  of  tridimensional 
space,  and  of  the  rather  obvious  limitations  of  images  of  this  sort 
in  dealing  with  space  involving  more  than  three  dimensions.  He 
does  not  consider  the  problem  as  to  whether  thought  operates  with 
or  without  some  form  of  imagery. 

The  controversy  between  Alexander  (i)  and  Stout  as  to  whether 
presentations  are  mental  or  non-mental  appears  to  involve  the 
common  assumption  that  the  distinction  is  a  purely  descriptive, 
not  a  functional,  distinction.  Alexander  states  the  view  that  sen- 
sations and  images  are  both  non-mental,  objective,  and  that  only 
conation  and  feeling  belong  to  the  mental  sphere.  Stout  replies 
that  the  criterion  of  the  physical  is  that  of  occupying  space  and 
entering  as  a  factor  into  a  spatially  conditioned  system,  and  that  the 
criterion  of  the  non-physical  is  that  of  being  bound  up  with  our 
existence  as  conscious  beings.  Conceivably,  either  Alexander's  or 
Stout's  view  may  be  agreed  with  as  it  is  exhibited.  But  it  is  not  made 
clear  why  either  view  was  or  may  be  taken. 

Betz  (3)  attacks  the  traditional  doctrine  that  the  concept  is  formed 
through  abstracting  the  common  element  from  a  number  of  more  or 
less  similar  cases.  Psychological  analysis  shows  that  a  concept  may 
arise  from  a  single  case,  and  that  the  collective  ordering  of  various 
cases  under  one  concept  is  a  subsequent  affair. 

Lloyd  (10)  sets  forth  the  following  general  principles  of  antithesis: 
(i)  Mutual  reproduction.  Each  term  is  relative  to  the  other,  not 
merely  by  contrast,  but  intrinsically.  Each  has  in  its  heart  the 
nature  of  the  other.  Each  reproduces  the  other.  (2)  Duplicity  of 
meaning.  Each  term  has  a  local,  narrow,  one-sided  meaning,  and 
also  a  meaning  big  and  deep  enough  to  take  up  both  sides  into  itself. 
(3)  Identity  of  opposites.  An  identity  which  means  a  "becoming," 
in  which  opposites  are  not  reconciled,  but  sharpened.  (4)  Serial 
mediation.  A  mediation  between  the  terms  which  heightens  the 
difference  even  more  than  a  cataclysmic  leap  could  possibly  do,  as 
to  be  always  dying  even  while  living  is  no  ordinary  death,  and  as  to 
be  always  living  even  while  dying  is  no  ordinary  life.  (5)  Difference 
at  once  in  kind  and  in  degree.  Gradation  and  continuity  are  some- 


340  W.  C.  GORE 

times  falsely  taken  as  synonyms,  as  when  it  is  said  difference  in  degree 
but  not  in  kind.  Gradation  must  also  mean  real  difference,  the  realest 
sort  of  difference.  (6)  Dimensional  difference.  The  terms  of  any 
antithesis  are  qualitatively  different,  yet  functionally  related.  So 
are  the  dimensions  of  space.  (7)  Parallelism  in  all  difference.  Not 
mere  occasionalism  but  a  process  of  qualitative  change  incident  to 
serial  mediation. 

The  underlying  logic  of  antithesis  is  that  of  differences  which  are 
all  the  more  different  because  they  are  the  same,  because  they  are 
serially  mediated  and  functionally  related  in  an  on-going  movement 
or  process.  In  other  words,  the  logic  of  antithesis  is  that  of  organic 
unity. 

The  "new  law  of  thought"  discussed  by  Jones  (7)  may  be  stated 
as  a  law  of  identity  in  diversity  with  reference  to  the  fundamental 
judgment-form,  S  is  P,  identity  of  extension,  or  denotation  (Be- 
deutung),  in  diversity  of  intention  or  signification  (Sinn).  There  are 
no  more  ambiguous  words  in  philosophy  than  identity  and  difference, 
none  more  elusive.  The  source  of  the  ambiguity  lies  in  two  funda- 
mental kinds  of  sameness:  (i)  extensional,  or  denotational,  sameness, 
and  (2)  qualitative  sameness.  The  second  is  frequently  but  not  always 
a  sign  of  the  first.  For  example,  if  a  stowaway  is  observed  to  have 
all  of  the  published  characteristics  of  an  escaped  criminal,  the  similar- 
ity is  regarded  as  an  indication  of  "identity."  It  may,  however, 
turn  out  to  be  a  case  of  "mistaken  identity." 

Klein  (9)  agrees  with  the  statement  of  the  law  as  identity  in 
difference  in  its  application  to  affirmative  predication,  but  takes 
exception  to  Jones's  application  of  it  to  negative  predication,  as 
"difference  of  Denotation  (Otherness)  in  difference  of  Intension 
(Diversity)."  Negative  predication  should  be  interpreted  as  assert- 
ing neither  a  difference  in  difference  nor  an  identity  in  difference,  but  a 
difference  in  identity.  Logicians  have  failed  to  do  justice  to  the 
implication  of  identity  between  subject  and  predicate  in  negative 
predication,  to  the  relevancy,  amounting  to  a  partial  identity  in 
intension. 

Russell  (14)  presents  in  clear,  brief,  and  comprehensive  form  some 
of  the  net  results  of  his  work  in  the  logic  of  mathematics.  He  con- 
cludes: (i)  Mathematical  logic  has  resolved  the  problems  of  infinity 
and  of  continuity  and  has  rendered  possible  a  solid  philosophy  of 
space,  time,  and  motion.  (2)  Pure  mathematics  may  be  defined  as  an 
ensemble  of  propositions  which  are  expressed  exclusively  in  terms  of 
variables  and  logical  constants,  in  other  words,  which  are  purely 


MEMORY,  THOUGHT,  JUDGMENT,  ETC.  341 

formal  propositions.  (3)  The  possibility  of  a  knowledge  of  mathe- 
matics refutes  both  empiricism  and  idealism,  since  it  shows  that 
human  knowledge  cannot  be  deduced  entirely  from  types  of  sense 
experience,  nor  can  a  priori  knowledge  be  explained  in  a  subjective 
or  psychological  manner. 

In  a  book  which  is  conceived  in  the  manner  of  the  school  of 
William  James  and  which  runs  "thick,"  not  to  say  turbid,  with 
illustrations  and  metaphors  drawn  from  a  wide  range,  Boodin  (4) 
discusses  the  relations  of  truth  and  reality  as  an  introduction  to  the 
theory  of  knowledge.  The  book  is  itself  a  living  illustration  of  the 
definition  of  thinking  which  it  advances,  "a  matrix  of  relations, 
reading  forward  and  backward  and  throbbing  with  will — not  the 
pale  ghost  of  the  formal  proposition  or  syllogism,  which,  however 
important  for  the  effectiveness  of  thought's  procedure,  are  only 
its  artificial  tools."  The  act  of  judgment  which  involves  a  specific 
problem  and  a  specific  context,  and  which  is  always  purposive,  is  the 
core  of  all  thinking.  That  part  of  the  book  which  seems  most  relevant 
to  the  topic  of  this  summary  is  that  which  discusses  the  presupposi- 
tions of  thinking,  for  the  ego  in  willing  to  think — "both  because  it  is 
practically  useful  and  because  it  provides  ideal  sport" — "also  wills 
to  accept  the  formal  conditions  without  which  thinking  would  become 
impossible"  (p.  157).  These  presuppositions  or  laws  implied  in  all 
thinking  are:  (i)  the  law  of  consistency;  (2)  the  law  of  totality;  (3)  the 
law  of  duality,  or  the  presupposition  of  the  subject-object  relation; 
and  (4)  the  law  of  finitude. 

In  a  discursive  and  suggestive  study  of  the  part  played  by  analogy 
in  artistic  and  scientific  thinking  Read  (13)  gives  especial  attention 
to  the  analogy  of  relations  where  there  is  no  similarity  between  the 
respective  terms  involved.  What  are  the  psychological  conditions 
of  originality  in  thought  and  imagination?  Genius  consists  in  an 
unusual  power  of  "thought  by  analogy."  Sensitiveness  to  analogy 
•that  distinguishes  genius  is  apparently  supported  by  extraordinary 
power  of  registering  experiences,  perhaps  without  consciously  at- 
tending to  them,  or  but  slightly  noticing  them.  Fear  of  convention, 
of  authority,  discourages  the  play  of  analogy.  There  are  ages  in 
which  every  sort  of  censorship,  conventional,  traditional,  authoritative 
is  relaxed,  so  that  every  man  breathes  more  freely,  is  more  himself, 
and  genius  is  relatively  abundant. 

REFERENCES 

1.  ALEXANDER,  S.     On  Sensations  and  Images.     Proc.  Aristo}.  Soc.,  1910,  10,  1-35* 

2.  ANGELL,  J.  R.     Imageless  Thought.     PSYCHOL.  REV.,  1911,  18,  295-323. 


342  JUNE  E.  DOWNEY 

3.  BETZ,  W.    Vorstellung  und  Einstellung.  II.    Begriffe.     Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  PsychoL, 

1911,  20,  186-225. 

4.  BOODIN,  J.  E.     Truth  and  Reality:  An  Introduction  to  the  Theory  of  Knowledge. 

New  York -.Macmillan,  1911.     Pp.x+334. 

5.  JACOBSON,  E.     On  Meaning  and  Understanding.     Amer.  J.  of  PsychoL,  1911,  22, 

6.  JESINGHAUS,    C.     Zur    psychologischen    Theorie    des    Gedachtnisses.     PsychoL 

Stud.,  1911,7,  336-375- 

7.  JONES,  E.  E.  C.    A  New  "Law  of  Thought"  and  its  Implications.     Mind,  1911, 

20,  41-53. 

8.  KEYSER,  C.  J.    The  Asymmetry  of  the  Imagination.     /.  of  Phil.,  PsychoL,  &c.t 

1911,8,309-316. 

9.  KLEIN,  A.     Negation  considered  as  a  Statement  of  Difference  in  Identity.     Mind, 

I9II,  20,  521-529. 

10.  LLOYD,  A.  H.    The  Logic  of  Antithesis.    /.  of  Phil.,  PsychoL,  fete.,  1911, 8, 281-288. 

11.  MOEDE,   W.     Gedachtnis    in   Psychologic,    Physiologic,    u.    Biologic:    Kritische 

Beitrage  zum  Gedachtnisproblem.     Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  PsychoL,  1911,  22,  312-389. 

12.  OGDEN,  R.  M.     Imageless  Thought:  Resume  and  Critique.     PSYCHOL.  BULL., 

1911,  8,  183-197. 

13.  READ,  C.    The  Function  of  Relations  in  Thought.     Brit.  J.  of  PsychoL,  1911,  4, 

342-385- 

14.  RUSSELL,  B.     L'importance  philosophique  de  la  logistique.     Rev.  de  met.  et  de 

mor.,  1911,  19,  281-291. 


GRAPHIC  FUNCTIONS 

BY  PROFESSOR  JUNE  E.  DOWNEY 

University  of  Wyoming 

The  year's  work  on  graphic  functions  is  dominated  by  the  peda- 
gogical interest. 

Miss  Thompson  (8)  presents  an  excellent  resume  of  the  researches 
bearing  on  the  history  and  pedagogy  of  writing,  without  attempting 
any  original  contribution  to  the  subject.  A  chapter  on  the  historical 
development  of  the  alphabet  is  followed  by  a  summary  statement  of 
the  experiments  that  have  been  made  on  the  psychology  of  writing. 
A  neurological  analysis  of  the  writing  act  is  first  given  and  the  views 
of  Mosso,  Flechsig,  Exner,  Collins,  and  Pierre  Marie  stated. 

Among  others,  the  following  experimental  studies  are  reviewed: 
those  of  Bryan  and  of  Gilbert  on  rapidity  of  movement;  of  Woodworth 
on  the  accuracy  and  control  of  voluntary  movement;  of  Downey  on 
sensory  control  of  writing;  of  Fullerton  and  Cattell  and  of  Miin- 
sterberg  on  causes  of  inaccuracy  in  movement;  of  Johnson,  of  Swift, 
of  Bryan  and  Harter,  and  of  Book  on  practice  and  habit;  of  Judd  and 
of  McAllister  on  the  movements  used  in  writing;  of  Gesell  on  the 
elation  of  accuracy  in  writing  to  school  intelligence  and  sex. 


GRAPHIC  FUNCTIONS  343 

In  a  final  chapter  on  the  pedagogy  of  writing,  Miss  Thompson 
attempts  a  practical  application  of  experimental  results  to  the 
teaching  of  writing.  Thorndike's  scale  of  handwriting  is  described 
and  portions  of  it  reproduced. 

Superintendent  Wilson  (n)  of  Connersville,  Indiana,  reports  the 
application  of  the  Thorndike  scale  to  the  evaluation  of  the  quality  of 
writing  of  an  entire  school  system.  A  sudden  advance  in  quality 
was  found  to  occur  at  the  sixth  grade.  A  test  of  the  relation  between 
quality  of  writing  and  training  for  speed  showed  that  speed  may  be 
secured  without  a  sacrifice,  to  any  degree,  of  quality  of  writing. 

Ayres  (i)  presents  a  new  scale  for  measuring  the  quality  of  hand- 
writing of  school  children,  a  scale  which  differs  from  that  of  Thorndike 
in  that  the  quality  of  each  sample  of  writing  was  determined  by  its 
degree  of  legibility  as  shown  by  accurately  timed  readings  made  by 
ten  investigators.  Professor  Thorndike's  scale,  based  on  "general 
merit,"  is  held  to  permit  less  exact  valuation. 

Ayres'  scale  consists  of  eight  samples  of  handwriting,  which  become 
progressively  better  by  equal  steps  from  left  to  right.  Each  of  the 
eight  divisions,  is  represented  by  writing  in  three  slants,  vertical, 
medium,  and  extreme  slant.  A  given  sample  may  be  measured  by 
sliding  it  along  the  scale  to  a  sample  of  the  same  quality  and  slant 
which  bears  a  number  representing  the  value  of  the  writing. 

As  regards  the  relation  between  legibility  and  the  general  appear- 
ance of  handwriting,  it  was  found  that  legible  writing  is  always  of 
good  appearance  but  that  the  converse  is  not  necessarily  true.  The 
crowding  together  of  words  on  the  line  or  the  too  close  spacing  between 
lines  are,  often,  causes  of  a  low  degree  of  legibility,  facts  of  importance 
in  connection  with  the  choice  of  a  system  of  penmanship. 

Starch  (7)  proposes  a  method  of  measuring  handwriting  by  means 
of  a  graphometer  scale  which  measures  the  mean  variation  of  the 
slant  of  letters  and  their  mean  variation  from  the  base-line,  a  method 
held  to  be  more  accurate  than  the  method  of  direct  comparison  with 
standard  specimens. 

Discussing  some  issues  in  the  teaching  of  handwriting,  Freeman  (3) 
raises  several  questions.  First,  as  to  the  preferability  of  vertical 
or  slant  writing.  Since,  as  the  writer  shows,  slant-writing  is  not 
irreconcilable  with  a  hygienic  position,  this  question  must  be  decided 
on  the  score  of  ease  and  rapidity  of  movement  and  of  legibility  of 
writing.  Theoretically,  vertical  writing  is  most  legible,  but  only 
slightly  more  so  than  writing  of  a  moderate  slant.  On  the  other 
hand,  slant  writing  excels  in  ease  and  rapidity  as  shown  by  an  analysis 


344  JUNE  E.  DOWNEY 

of  the  movements  concerned.  Secondly,  should  the  child  be  trained 
at  one  and  the  same  time  in  form  and  in  correct  habits  of  movement? 
To  attempt  this  may  result  in  a  scattering  of  attention.  ^  Moreover, 
since  the  development  of  motor  skill  comes  at  the  age  of  eight  or  nine 
years,  it  is  a  mistake  to  give  the  child  of  six  or  seven  a  drill  for  which 
he  has  not  yet  developed  sufficient  motor  control.  The  perception  of 
form  should  be  early  developed  while  movement  drill  may  be  deferred 
until  the  child  is  in  the  third  or  fourth  grade.  Third,  should  finger 
movement  or  arm  movement  be  taught  together  or  separately?  It  is 
probably  well  to  allow  the  child  to  follow  at  first  his  natural  inclin- 
ation to  use  the  finger  movement,  deferring  the  use  of  the  arm  com- 
ponent in  conjunction  with  the  finger  movement  until  the  child  has 
developed  motor  control.  Fourth,  should  letters  or  words  be  used  at 
the  beginning  of  the  writing  drill  ?  Neither  should  be  used  exclusively. 
Fifth,  what  form  of  movement  is  preferable?  The  arguments 
advanced  for  the  use  of  arm  and  of  finger  movements  are  rehearsed, 
with  the  conclusion  that  the  most  favorable  type  of  movement  com- 
bines the  use  of  the  arm,  of  the  wrist,  and  of  the  fingers. 

Freeman  (4)  also  discusses  certain  problems  and  methods  of 
investigating  handwriting.  One  of  the  most  important  problems 
is  the  effect  upon  quality  of  an  emphasis  upon  the  speed  of  writing 
or  the  effect  upon  speed  of  an  emphasis  upon  quality.  The  writing 
lesson  should  be  so  conducted  as  to  emphasize  one  or  the  other  of  the 
two  characteristics.  Again,  how  does  writing  develop  at  different 
ages?  How  do  speed  and  form  change  from  grade  to  grade?  Are 
there  times  when  there  is  a  marked  increase  in  the  capacity  for  rapid 
writing?  The  relative  advantages  of  arm  movement  and  of  the  com- 
bined arm  and  finger  movement  might  be  determined  by  seeing  that 
two  groups  of  children  were  taught  exactly  alike  except  for  this  one 
feature.  There  must  be  uniformity  in  the  method  of  measuring  the 
speed  and  quality  of  writing.  Speed  may  be  measured  by  finding 
how  long  it  takes  the  child  to  write  a  certain  amount  or  by  finding 
how  much  is  written  in  a  certain  time.  For  the  measurement  of 
quality  of  writing  Ayres's  method  of  grading  legibility  is  recommended. 

An  exposition  of  the  Montessori  method  of  teaching  writing  is 
given  by  Warren  (10).  The  distinctive  feature  of  the  method  is  the 
emphasis  given  to  touch  and  to  the  kinsesthetic  sense. 

An  interesting  resume  of  the  influences  affecting  handwriting  and 
a  statement  of  the  problems  that  need  investigation  is  contributed 
by  Nacke  (5).  Sceptical  of  the  determination  in  any  detail  of  the 
character  significance  of  handwriting,  Nacke  devotes  himself  chiefly 


GRAPHIC  FUNCTIONS  345 

to  the  question  of  the  identification  of  handwriting  and  the  extent  to 
which  individual  features  persist  in  spite  of  changed  conditions. 
Using  as  a  text  the  attempt  of  Frau  Thumm-Knitzel  to  settle  the 
Shakespeare  controversy  by  a  detailed  comparison  of  the  authen- 
ticated signature  of  Shakespeare  with  the  writing  of  other  important 
documents,  the  author  urges  that  in  attempting  any  identification 
by  such  means  much  writing  material  of  different  periods  and  of  dif- 
fering content  must  be  utilized,  for  individual  variation  may  be  very 
great,  especially  in  the  case  of  highly  gifted  individuals.  The  influ- 
ence of  age  on  writing  must  be  noted.  On  account  of  eye  changes, 
in  old  age  script  often  becomes  smaller  and  poorer.  Cases  of  clear 
firm  writing  in  old  age  deserve  special  consideration.  The  kind  of 
pen  and  paper  used;  the  condition  of  the  writer,  whether  warm  or 
cold,  fatigued  or  fresh;  the  speed  with  which  he  writes;  the  formal  or 
informal  contents  of  a  given  document  are  important  factors.  Above 
all,  the  influence  of  race  upon  handwriting  deserves  consideration. 
The  author  recognizes  the  persistence  of  writing  individuality  through 
many  changes  of  conditions,  so  that  left  hand  writing  resembles 
right  hand  writing  and  the  mirror  scripts  of  both  hands  resemble 
each  other  and  the  normal  script.  Even  in  pathological  cases 
similarity  to  the  normal  hand  may  persist  for  a  long  time  and  such 
similarity  may  be  found  in  mediumistic  writing  even  when  there  is 
intentional  or  unconscious  imitation  of  the  writing  of  another. 

Nacke  raises  the  problem  of  handwriting  and  of  inner  speech  in 
dreams,  urging  the  need  of  further  investigation.  There  are,  it 
appears,  a  motor  and  a  visual  type  of  writing  dream.  In  the  first 
instance,  the  dreamer  himself  writes  the  thoughts  which  he  reads; 
in  the  second  case,  he  reads  the  printing  or  writing  which  he  sees 
before  him. 

As  a  transition  from  a  reflex  activity  to  a  conscious  one,  the 
drawings  of  infants  merit  the  attention  of  psychologists.  Bechterew 
(2),  writing  from  this  point  of  view,  protests  against  the  attempt  to 
interpret  the  acts  of  children  as  significant  of  the  thoughts  and  feelings 
of  adults.  He  insists  upon  a  wholly  objective  interpretation  of 
childish  drawings  which  inform  us  of  a  mode  of  reaction  which  con- 
stitutes a  part  of  their  psychic  reaction  and  ought  to  be  judged  only 
in  relation  with  the  factors  which  have  determined  them,  such  as 
hereditary  influences,  motor  coordination  of  the  fingers,  and  the  like. 

Bechterew's  report  concerns  in  particular  the  development  of  the 
drawing  capacity  in  two  children,  with  supplementary  observation 
on  a  number  of  other  children.  Among  other  things  the  study  con- 


346  JUNE  E.  DOWNEY 

earned  itself  with  the  following  points:  the  greater  or  less  regularity 
of  the  lines  evidencing  the  motor  coordination .  of  the  fingers;  the 
greater  or  less  complexity  of  the  drawing;  the  greater  or  less  agreement 
of  the  drawing  with  the  material  object;  the  manifestation  of  creative 
activity  in  the  representation  of  the  different  parts;  the  elaboration 
of  the  subject;  the  exactitude  or  the  inexactitude  of  the  perspective; 
the  peculiarities  of  the  drawing  relevant  to  the  special  conditions  of 
education  and  environment.  The  development  traced  showed  a 
general  parallelism  with  the  evolution  of  drawing  among  primitive 
peoples. 

Van  Gennep  (9)  reports  a  number  of  tests  on  the  drawing  capacity 
of  a  little  girl  of  five  years.  Although  copies  were  set  for  the  child, 
she  manifested  a  strong  inclination  to  throw  her  attention  upon  the 
object  represented.  The  experiment  showed  that  the  execution  of 
geometric  outlines  or  of  alphabetical  signs  was  extraordinarily  difficult 
for  the  child;  the  realistic  representation  of  such  objects  as  a  chair 
or  a  lamp  very  easy.  This  result  is  of  significance  in  the  inter- 
pretation of  prehistoric  drawings  and  the  drawings  of  semi-civilized 
peoples  and  in  line  with  the  conclusion  of  those  investigators  of 
primitive  art  who  have  shown  that,  in  origin,  art  is  realistic  and 
that  geometric  and  conventional  drawing  is  a  later  development. 

As  abstract  ideas  are  posterior  to  concrete  ideas,  so  ornamental 
designs  are  the  product  of  abstraction.  The  alphabetical  sign  is  the 
last  term  in  a  long  course  of  development.  To  teach  first  the  drawing 
of  isolated  letters  is,  according  to  Van  Gennep,  to  invert  the  natural 
order  of  development  which  begins  with  the  representation  of  natural 
objects. 

Sargent  (6)  presents  a  valuble  discussion  of  five  problems  in  the 
experimental  pedagogy  of  drawing.  First,  how  far  does  special 
talent  in  drawing  consist  primarily  in  an  unusual  interest  in  the 
pictorial  aspect  of  objects  and  to  what  degree  may  a  lack  of  such 
interest  be  compensated  for  by  an  emphasis  upon  aspects  of  objects 
related  to  other  interests  of  children?  Second,  what  value  pertains  to 
the  following  methods  in  teaching  the  representation  of  objects 
involving  common  geometric  shapes — drawing  directly  from  objects; 
theoretical  study  of  perspective;  developing  concepts  of  solidity? 
Third,  is  there  any  psychological  reason  for  the  reduced  size  of  draw- 
ings made  naturally  by  a  child  and  does  this  size  bear  any  ascertain- 
able  relation  to  the  size  of  the  retinal  image?  Fourth,  what  habits  of 
expression  are  developed  by  rapid  sketching?  By  carefully  finished 
drawings?  Fifth,  to  what  degree  does  each  of  the  following  methods 


VOCAL  FUNCTIONS  347 

promote  the  child's  drawing  ability:  detailed  observation  of  objects 
and  comparison  of  the  drawings  with  the  object;  study  of  pictures, 
including  copying  or  tracing;  modeling  in  plastic  material;  seeing  a 
skilful  draughtsman  draw  the  object  under  consideration;  memory- 
drawing? 

REFERENCES 

1.  AYRES,  L.  P.     A  Scale  for  Measuring  the  Quality  of  Handwriting  of  School 

Children.     No.  113.     Dep't  of  Child  Hygiene,  Russell  Sage  Foundation. 

2.  BECHTEREW,  W.     Recherches  objectives  sur  1'evolution  du  dessin  chez  1'enfant. 

/.  de  psychol.  norm,  et  path.,  1911,  8,  385-405. 

3.  FREEMAN,  F.  N.     Some  Issues  in  the  Teaching  of  Handwriting.     Elementary 

School  Teacher,  1911,  12,  1-7;  53-59. 

4.  FREEMAN,    F.   N.     Problems   and   Methods   of   Investigation   in   Handwriting. 

/.  of  Educ.  Psychol.,  1912,  3,  181-190. 

5.  NACKE,  P.     Biologisches  und  Forensisches  zur  Handschrift.     Neur.  Centbl.,  1911, 

30,  642-654. 

6.  SARGENT,  W.     Problems  in  the  Experimental  Pedagogy  of  Drawing.     /.  of  Educ. 

Psychol.,  1912,  3,  264-276. 

7.  STARCH,    D.     An    Objective    Measurement    of    Handwriting.     PSYCHOLOGICAL 

BULLETIN,  1912,  9,  83-84. 

8.  THOMPSON,  M.  E.     Psychology  and  Pedagogy  of  Writing.     A  Resume  of  the  Re- 

searches and  Experiments  Bearing  the  on  History  and  Pedagogy  of  Writing. 
Baltimore:  Warwick  &  York,  1911.     Pp.  128. 

9.  VAN  GENNEP,  A.     Dessins  d'enfant  et  dessin  prehistorique.     Arch,  de  psychol., 

1911,  10,327-337. 

10.  WARREN,  H.  C.     "The  House  of  Childhood."    /.  of  Educ.  Psychol,  1912,  3, 

121-132. 

11.  WILSON,    C.    M.     The    Handwriting    of    School    Children.     Elementary    School 

Teacher,  1911,  n,  540-543. 


VOCAL  FUNCTIONS 

BY  PROFESSOR  W.   VAN   DYKE  BINGHAM 

Dartmouth  College 

"To  the  enthusiasm  of  the  eighties  and  nineties  has  succeeded  a 
stagnation,  a  retrogression,  even,  in  experimental  phonetics,"  says 
Poirot  (15),  in  the  preface  to  his  volume  on  Phonetics,  in  Tigerstedt's 
monumental  Handbuch  der  physiologischen  Methodik.  Some  pf  the 
foremost  champions  of  the  science  have  passed  away;  others  have 
devoted  themselves  to  other  studies.  And  the  younger  generation 
has  not  grown  up  to  their  measure.  The  present  situation  will  not 
be  essentially  bettered  until  the  philologically  trained  phoneticians 
have  made  friends  with  the  experimental  methods  and  shared  in  the 


348  W.  VAN  DYKE  BINGE  AM 

labors  of  the  experimental  school.  What  is  most  needed  today  is  a 
series  of  minute  investigations  of  detailed  problems,  to  evaluate  and 
control  the  earlier  results  achieved  by  the  method  of  observation. 
It  is  not  sufficient  that  the  philologist  seek  the  collaboration  of  a 
scientist:  the  philological  and  the  experimental  schools  must  be  united. 
Whoever  utilizes  experiment  must  master  the  experimental  methods. 

Poirot's  manual  aims  to  make  this  thorough  mastery  of  the  ex- 
perimental methods  easier.  It  differs  from  the  two  existing  manuals  of 
L'Abbe  Rousselot  and  Scripture  in  the  great  pains  that  have  been 
exercised  to  make  the  text  clear  and  simple  as  well  as  comprehensive; 
and  in  the  emphasis  upon  methods  rather  than  upon  results.  Only 
such  accounts  of  achieved  results  have  been  admitted  as  serve  to 
illuminate  the  discussion  of  methods,  and  the  selected  bibliography 
of  211  titles  contains  only  references  to  works  significant  for  the 
understanding  of  the  methods  of  experimental  phonetics.  Three 
generous  chapters  are  devoted  chiefly  to  the  technique  of  graphic 
registration  of  speech  movement,  and  the  study  of  those  dynamic  and 
acoustical  properties  of  the  air  which  are  significant  for  phonetics. 
A  fourth  chapter  of  seventy-five  pages,  on  measurements  and  com- 
putations, seeks  to  smooth  the  way  of  the  higher  mathematics  to  the 
neophite  who  must  thread  the  maze  of  Fourier's  Theorem.  The 
volume  as  a  whole  is  distinctly  a  workable  manual. 

The  problem  of  the  nature  and  production  of  vowel  sounds  we 
still  have  with  us.  Hermann  (7)  comes  to  the  defense  of  the  Helm- 
holtz  doctrine  of  formants  (the  doctrine  that  for  each  vowel  a  certain 
absolute  pitch  is  characteristic)  provoked  by  the  assertion  of  L. 
Fredericq  that  the  altering  of  the  rate  of  revolution  of  a  phonograph 
cylinder  does  not  alter  the  character  of  the  vowel  sounds.1  Hermann, 
following  several  earlier  investigators,  had  twenty  years  ago  obtained 
unambiguous  results  of  the  opposite  kind:  alteration  of  rate  was 
found  to  produce  a  distortion  of  the  vowel  qualities,  even  to  the 
point  of  unrecognizability.  He  has  now  repeated  his  experiments 
with  perfected  apparatus,  elaborate  precautions  and  controls,  con- 
firming his  early  researches  and  adding  new  observations.  Among 
these  may  be  noted  the  generalization  that  retarding  the  rate  of  the 
cylinder  distorts  the  vowel  character  much  more  than  a  corresponding 
acceleration.  An  exception  is  found  in  the  case  of  high  soprano 
notes.  The  results  as  a  whole  lend  confirmation  to  the  view  that 
certain  vowel  qualities  are  determined  by  the  presence  of  both  primary 
and  secondary  formants,  the  latter  lower  in  pitch  as  well  as  fainter 
than  the  ones  most  easily  detected.  It  is  further  suggested  that 

1  Bericht  der  VIII.  Internationalen  Physiologen  Kongresses,  Wien,  1910. 


FOCAL  FUNCTIONS  349 

the  pitch  of  a  formant  is  variable  within  moderate  limits;  and  that 
ordinary  vocalization  pitches  these  formants  near  their  lower  limits: 
hence  the  greater  distorting  effect  of  retarding  a  phonographic  cylinder, 
as  compared  with  accelerating  its  rate. 

In  a  more  recently  published  and  more  elaborate  study  of  the 
production  of  vowels,  Hermann  (8)  amplifies  these  and  his  earlier 
researches,  and  develops  the  formant  theory  still  farther.  He 
marshalls  objections  against  the  theory  that  the  resonance  cavity 
in  producing  the  vowel  character  acts  merely  by  strengthening 
overtones  which  are  already  present  in  the  vocal  clang,  and  undertakes 
instead  to  account  for  the  generation  of  formants  by  the  direct  action 
of  the  air  stream  on  the  resonating  cavity,  which  thus  serves  as  an 
independent  source  of  sound.  This,  of  course,  is  no  unique  doctrine 
as  applied  to  whispered  vowels.  Its  distinctive  feature  is  found  in 
the  theory  of  the  manner  in  which  the  formants  of  vocalized  sounds 
are  generated.  It  is  Hermann's  view  that  each  sound-wave  of  the 
vibrating  air  sent  out  from  the  larynx  serves  as  a  separate  blast  to 
actuate  the  resonating  cavity.  Studies  of  the  acoustics  of  reed-pipes 
and  new  experiments  in  artificial  vowel  synthesis  based  upon  the 
results  here  obtained  have  convinced  Hermann  that  such  a  view  is  not 
merely  tenable  but  necessary.  Further  confirmation  is  found  in  an 
analysis  of  speech-sound  photographic  records  made  with  a  stentor- 
microphone  and  a  capillary  electrometer,  a  method  which  has  distinct 
advantages  over  the  more  usual  one  of  enlarging  phonographic 
tracings.  Analysis  of  these  vocal  records  also  serves  to  substantiate 
the  author's  position  that  in  addition  to  the  pitch  of  the  formants  trfere 
are  other  distinguishing  characteristics  of  certain  vowels,  and  perhaps 
of  all  vowels. 

Gutzmann  (5)  brings  additional  confirmation  of  Hermann's 
doctrine  regarding  the  generation  of  formants,  as  a  result  of  his  analysis 
of  vowels  artificially  made  by  combinations  of  reeds  and  resonating 
chambers. 

Weiss  (22)  has  used  a  soap-film  phonoscope  to  record  whispered 
and  lightly  sung  vowels,  for  contrast  with  the  curves  of  louder  tones. 
He  recognizes  that  the  chief  technical  difficulty  in  all  such  investi- 
gations as  these  is  the  elimination  of  damping  and  sympathetic 
vibration  of  the  diaphragm.  Without  achieving  complete  success 
in  meeting  this  problem  he  nevertheless  secures  some  extremely 
interesting  curves  which  show  that,  in  the  records  of  the  vowels  U, 
O  and  A  at  least  (continental  sounds),  the  formant  vibrations  are  of 
uniform  amplitude  in  the  whispered  and  lightly  sung  vowels,  while 
with  louder  singing  they  wax  and  wane  in  amplitude  with  each  pulse 


35o  W.  VAN  DYKE  BINGHAM 

of  the  primary  tone  vibration.  No  attempt  is  made  to  point  out  the 
bearing  which  these  facts  may  have  on  the  doctrine  of  Hermann, 
mentioned  previously.  Weiss  has  succeeded  in  getting  records  of 
sibillants  in  which  the  vibration  frequency  of  Sch  was  found  to  range 
between  3,000  and  4,500.  With  Ss,  the  frequency  rose  to  6,000  and 
more  a  second. 

Glover  (4),  studying  the  production  of  vowel  sounds,  has  made 
observations  of  the  vocal  breath  vapors  simultaneously  emitted  from 
the  nasal  and  buccal  cavities.  Normally  the  vowels  give  a  buccal 
vapor  but  no  nasal  vapor:  throughout  the  whole  extent  of  pitch  and 
in  each  variety  of  voice  the  posterior  nasal  orifice  is  closed.  The 
presence  of  the  consonants  M  and  N  either  initial  or  final  (French) 
produces  a  nasal  vapor;  but  this  diminishes  in  passing  from  grave 
to  acute.  It  is  impossible  for  a  soprano  to  articulate  an,  on,  etc., 
on  a  high  note.  The  soft  palate  particularly,  but  also  the  other 
organs  of  articulation,  undergo  an  evident  influence  from  the  variations 
of  laryngeal  tonicity.  There  is  an  organic  and  functional  harmony  be- 
tween the  activity  of  these  organs.  Hence  the  need  in  vocal  training 
of  emphasis  on  precision  in  articulation,  since  the  process  of  articu- 
lation exerts  an  influence  on  the  laryngeal  note  and  the  two  are  co- 
ordinated. This  leads  to  a  new  conception  of  vocal  registers:  they 
are  infinite  in  number.  They  shift  and  vary  with  all  the  attitudes 
of  the  soft  palate  and  the  other  organs  of  word  formation.  These 
multitudinous  registers  may  be  classified  into  grave  and  acute, 
with  a  region  of  especial  difficulty  in  the  activity  of  the  organs  of 
verbal  formation  around  re9  (293  v.d.),  me3,  fa3  (df,  e'  and  /'  in  our 
notation).  Voices  should  be  classified  according  to  (i)  the  range  of 
laryngeal  tonicity  and  (2)  possible  range  of  articulation.  Glover's 
views  are  supported  by  observations  with  a  thoracic  radioscope  and 
with  a  new  multiple-image  laryngoscope  permitting  lateral  examina- 
tion of  the  vocal  cords,  as  well  as  by  the  breath-vapor  method  men- 
tioned above. 

Marage  (10)  photographed  voice  vibrations  on  a  film  moving 
slowly  so  that  the  vibrations  were  not  dissociated,  but  the  general 
form  of  the  consonants  was  made  obvious.  He  thus  obtained  evi- 
dence confirmatory  of  one  of  the  common  classifications  of  consonants 
into  (i)  nasals,  requiring  both  nose  and  mouth;  and  (2)  mouth  con- 
sonants, of  which  there  are  three  sorts:  (a)  continuous  consonants: 
the  amplitude  of  the  tracing  gradually  increases  from  zero  (F,  S,  J) ; 
(b)  explosives:  the  amplitude  is  maximal  at  the  onset,  and  diminishes 
(B,  D,  G,  P,  T,  K);  and  (c)  vibrant  consonants  (L,  R).  Further  ob- 
servations on  the  relation  and  relative  duration  of  consonants  and 


VOCAL  FUNCTIONS  35 l 

vowels  lead  to  two  applications:  In  first  teaching  children  to  read, 
vowels  and  consonants  should  be  joined  and  not  separated,  as  in  the 
"Janicot"  method.  In  ridding  vocal  pupils  of  an  objectionable 
stroke  of  the  glottis,  exercises  may  well  begin  with  substituting  an 
explosive  consonant,  as  B,  for  the  stroke  of  the  glottis,  before  the 
practice-vowel. 

Several  investigators  are  turning  their  labors  toward  the  problems 
of  speech  melodies.  The  practicability  of  the  Marbe  smoke-flame 
method  for  the  study  of  these  delicate  variations  in  pitch  is  made 
evident  in  the  contribution  of  Panconcelli-Calzia  (13)  whose  study 
of  melodies  in  spoken  Italian  sentences  and  Italian  poetry  is  a  most 
promising  beginning  of  a  series  of  researches  in  the  difficult  field  of 
speech  melodies.  Pollak  (16),  for  similar  purposes,  uses  phonographic 
records  mechanically  transferred  to  smoked  paper.  His  study  of  the 
final  cadence  in  the  German  declarative  sentence  is  the  first  of  several 
researches  he  is  now  carrying  forward  in  the  Vienna  phonographic 
archives.  Stefanini  (18)  has  recourse  to  microscopic  examination  of 
phonographic  cylinders,  but  his  interest  is  not  primarily  in  pitch. 

Gutzmann  (6)  has  carried  the  phongraphic  method  into  the  realm 
of  child  study.  He  caught  the  first  cry  of  his  new-born  daughter, 
and  throughout  the  first  year  observed  and  recorded  with  the  skill 
of  the  practical  phonetician  the  development  of  vocal  and  articulatory 
reflexes.  His  report  has  a  value  to  students  of  instincts  because  of 
the  definiteness  and  minuteness  of  its  records;  and  students  of  musical 
science  will  welcome  the  careful  observations  on  pitch  production 
during  the  pre-imitative  stage  of  development  and  the  early  stages 
of  vocal  control. 

Urbantschitsch  (21)  has  turned  his  attention  to  the  problem  of 
the  influence  of  sound  sensations  on  speech.  He  brings  together  the 
findings  of  many  investigators  who  have  studied  the  motor  effects  of 
sounds  upon  the  ear  muscle,  the  tensor  tympani,  the  eyes,  the  face, 
the  musculature  of  bodily  equilibrium  and  so  on.  As  he  points  out, 
both  anatomical  and  pathological  evidence  demonstrates  that  the 
nervous  paths  of  these  sound  reflexes  generally  do  not  involve  the 
cortical  auditory  centers,  but  are  more  direct.  The  stimuli  of  some 
of  these  reflexes  are  intense  sounds.  Other  responses  are  called  forth 
by  faint,  even  subliminal,  stimuli;  and  in  some  instances  the  specific 
stimulus  is  a  sound  of  a  certain  pitch.  Urbantschitsch  then  raises 
the  question  whether  speech  can  be  reflexly  influenced  through  sound 
sensations.  He  cites  the  literature  regarding  the  reflex  effects  of 
sounds  on  breathing  but  seems  to  have  completely  overlooked  the 
work  of  Cameron,  Seashore,  and  others  on  the  influence  of  sounds  on 


352  W:  VAN  DYKE  BINGE  AM 

maintenance  of  pitch  in  singing.  The  results  of  Sokolowsky  (17), 
who  found  a  much  greater  inaccuracy  in  singing  with  auditory  dis- 
traction than  in  imitating  a  tone,  may  also  be  cited  here. 

Urbantschitsch's  method  was  to  ask  his  subject  to  read  aloud 
without  letting  himself  be  distracted  by  tones  and  noises  conducted 
now  to  the  right  ear  and  now  to  the  left.  The  effects  were  varied,  but 
some  disturbance  amounting  frequently  to  a  stammering,  a  slowing 
of  the  rate  of  utterance  or  even  a  complete  stoppage  of  enunciation 
was  produced  by  some  of  the  auditory  stimuli.  Ordinarily  the  inter- 
ference increased  with  the  continuance  of  the  stimulus. 

J.  Meyer's  contribution  (12)  describes  and  classifies  the  various 
voluntary  and  reflex  movements  of  the  ear  muscles  and  describes  a 
peculiar  case  of  pathological  connection  between  utterance  and  ear- 
movement. 

Dupre  and  Nathan's  Le  langage  musical  (i)  is  the  work  of  two 
gifted  physicians  who  have  concentrated  their  attention  upon  the 
study  of  aphasias,  amnesias  and  allied  mental  disorders,  with  especial 
reference  to  abnormalities  of  the  musical  consciousness.  Language 
is  broadly  defined  as  a  means  of  communicating  psychic  content. 
Its  reflex  origin  is  set  forth,  after  which  follows  a  description  and  a 
theory  of  normal  vocal  control  through  auditory  and  kinesthetic 
sensations,  as  a  preface  to  the  main  purpose  of  the  volume  which  is 
the  description  of  musical  abnormalities.  Few  pages  are  given  to 
vocal  functions  as  such;  many  more  to  the  mental  processes  accom- 
panying and  controlling  them.  Relatively  little  new  material  is 
brought  forward  by  the  authors.  They  have  been  content  with  a 
fluent,  simple  presentation  of  conventional  psychological  doctrine 
and  a  general  survey  of  their  field  with  special  reference  to  the  facts 
of  musical  pathology. 

The  thesis  of  Super  (19)  is  that  rational  thinking  may  be  inde- 
pendent of  speech.  In  support  of  this  position  he  draws  from  varied 
sources,  especially  from  his  knowledge  of  deaf  children,  their  conver- 
sation, their  actions  and  the  peculiarities  of  their  ways  of  learning 
language.  Fay's  paper  (2)  is  a  controversial  discussion  of  an  earlier 
article  by  Professor  Alexander  Hill.  It  is  really  a  defense  of  the 
classics,  and  of  their  study  because  they  are  difficult  and  because 
language  is  a  stimulator  of  thought.  Incidentally  the  reader  finds 
several  good  observations  and  comments  on  naturalness  of  word 
orders  in  different  languages. 


FOCAL  FUNCTIONS  353 

REFERENCES 

1.  DUPRE,  E.  and  NATHAN,  M.     Le  langage  musical.    Etude  medico-psychologique. 

Paris:  Alcan,  1911.     Pp.  viii+197- 

2.  FAY,  E.  W.     Language  Study  and  Language  Psychology.     Pop.  Sci.  Mo.,  1911, 

79,  369-384- 

3.  GIESSWEIN,  M.     Ueber  die  "Resonanz"  der  Mundhohle  und  der  Nasenraume, 

im  besonderen  der  Nebenhohlen  der  Nase.     Beitr.  z.  Anat.  etc.  d.  Ohres,  etc., 
1911,  4,  305-353' 

4.  GLOVER,  J.     Registre  et  classement  des  voix  d'apres  1'observation  des  buees 

vocales  de  la  bouche  et  du  nez,  etc.     C.  r.  acad.  d.  sci.,  1911,  152,  897-899. 

5.  GUTZMANN,  H.     Die  Analyse  kunstlicher  Vokale.     Med.-Pdd.  Monat.  f.  d.  ges. 

Sprachhk.,  1911,  21,  177-185. 

6.  GUTZMANN,    H.     Beobachtungen    der    ersten     sprachlichen     und     stimmlichen 

Entwicklung  eines  Kindes.     Med.-Pdd.  Monat.  f.  d.  ges.  Sprachhk.,  1911,  21, 
27-32;  88-96;  97-111. 

7.  HERMANN,  L.     Der  Einfluss  der  Drehgeschwindigkeit  auf  die  Vokale  bei  der 

Reproduktion   derselben   am   Edison'schen   Phonographen.     Arch.  f.   d.   ges. 
Physiol.  (Pfluger),  1911,  139,  1-9. 

8.  HERMANN,  L.    Neue  Beitrage  zur  Lehre  von  den  Vokalen  und  ihrer  Entstehung. 

Arch.f.  d.  ges.  Physiol.  (Pfluger),  1911,  141,  1-62. 

9.  KATZENSTEIN,  J.    Ueber  Brust-,  Mittel-  und  Falsettstimme.     Beitr.  z.  Anat. 

etc.  d.  Ohres,  etc.,  1911,  4,  271-301. 

10.  MARAGE,  M.     Contribution  a  1'etude  des  consonnes.     C.  r.  acad.  d.  sci.,  1911, 

152,  1265-1267. 

1 1 .  MEYER,  E.  A.     Ein  neues  Verf ahren  zur  graphischen  Bestimmung  des  musikalischen 

Akzents.     Med.-Pdd.  Monat.  f.  d.  ges.  Sprachhk.,  1911,  21,  227-243. 

12.  MEYER,  J.     Ueber  Ohrmuschelbewegungen  beim  Sprechen.     Med.-Pdd.  Monat. 

f.  d.  ges.  Sprachhk.,  1911,  21,  129-134. 

13.  PANCONCELLI-CALZIA,   G.     Die   Sprachmelodie   in   italienischen   Satzen  und   in 

einem  italienischen  Gedicht.     Med.-Pdd.  Monat.  f.  d.  ges.  Sprachhk.,  1911,  21, 
161-176. 

14.  PIELKE,  W.     Ueber  "offen"  und  "gedeckt"  gesungene  Vokale.     Beitr.  z.  Anat. 

etc.  d.  Ohres,  etc.,  1911,  5,  215-231. 

15.  POIROT,  J.     Die  Phonetik.     Leipzig:  Hirzel,  1911.     Pp.  276.     (Dritter  Band,  6 

Abteilung,  Tigerstedt,  Handbuch  der  physiologischen  Methodik.) 

16.  POLLAK,    HANS    W.     Phonetische    Untersuchungen.     I.    Zur    Schlusskadenz    im 

deutschen  Aussagesatz.    Wien,  1911. 

17.  SOKOLOWSKY,  R.     Ueber  die  Genauigkeit  des  Nachsingens  von  Tonen  bei  Beruf- 

sangern.     Beitr.  z.  Anat.  etc.  d.  Ohres,  etc.,  1911,  5,  204-214. 

18.  STEFANINI,  A.     L'analisi  delle  vocali.     Arch.  ital.  d'otol.,  rin.,  e  lar.,  1911,  459-473. 

(Also  translated  into  French,  Arch,  de  laryng.,  ot.,  rhin.,  1911,  32,  835-844.) 

19.  SUPER,  C.  W.     Language  and  Logic.     Pop.  Sci.  Mo.,  1911,  78,  491-499. 

20.  TALAYRACH,  I.     La  philosophic  du  langage  de  Julius  Bahnsen  d'apres  des  docu- 

ments inedits.     Rev.  de  met.  et  de  mor.,  1911,  19,  780-802. 

21.  URBANTSCHITSCH,  V.     Ueber  den  Einfluss  von  Schallempfindungen  auf  die  Sprache. 

Arch.f.  d.  ges.  Physiol.  (Pfluger),  1911,  137,  422-435. 

22.  WEISS,  O.     Die  Kurven  der  gefliisterten  und  leise  gesungenen  Vokale  und  der 

Konsonanten  Sch  und  Ss.     Arch.f.  d.  ges.  Physiol.  (Pfluger),  1911, 142,  567-577. 

23.  WETHLO,    F.     Einfache    Vorrichtung    zur    Demonstration    der    Stimmeinsatze. 

Med.-Pdd.  Monat.  f.  d.  ges.  Sprachhk.,  1911,  21,  270-272. 


SPECIAL  REVIEWS 
LAUGHTER 

Laughter:  an  Essay  on  the  Meaning  of  the  Comic.     HENRI   BERGSON. 

Authorized   translation   by   C.    BRERETON   and   F.    ROTHWELL. 

New  York:  The  Macmillan  Company,  1911.     Pp.  200. 

This  excellent  translation  of  one  of  the  earlier  and  more  popular 
of  Bergson's  writings  will  doubtless  appeal  to  a  wide  circle  of  readers. 
Unless  we  are  mistaken,  however,  the  arguments,  when  examined, 
will  be  found  to  be  more  ingenious  than  convincing.  The  main  title 
of  the  work,  indeed,  is  obviously  too  broad:  laughter  is  exicted  not 
only  by  the  ludicrous,  but  also  by  various  causes  of  joy,  and  even 
physically,  as,  e.  g.,  by  tickling,  by  certain  kinds  of  acute  pain,  and, 
again,  on  occasion,  by  hysterical  grief.  Nor  is  it  always  excited  by 
perception  of  the  comic.  It  belongs,  no  doubt,  to  the  general  type 
of  reflex  acts,  but,  like  others  of  its  class,  it  is  more  or  less  subject  to 
control.  The  connoisseur  of  the  comic  is  apt  to  enjoy  the  finest 
flavor  of  his  amusement  with  a  suppressed  smile,  while  the  pro- 
fessional funny  man,  who  lacks  in  no  respect  appreciation  of  his  own 
jokes,  adds  to  the  merriment  by  masking  his  countenance  with 
the  blandness  of  the  rustic  or  the  solemnity  of  the  judge.  Bergson's 
essay,  then,  is  not  an  essay  on  laughter  generally,  but  on  the  comic  and 
the  laughter  excited  by  it.  Its  real  title  is  the  sub-title. 

What,  then,  makes  a  thing  or  a  person  comic?  Why  do  we 
laugh?  The  comic,  according  to  Bergson,  has  three  noteworthy 
characteristics, — it  is  exclusively  human,  for  although  animals  may 
appear  comical,  it  is  only  by  suggesting  the  human;  it  is  un-emotional, 
appealing  purely  and  simply  to  the  intelligence;  and  it  is  social,  the 
intelligence  perceiving  it  remains  in  touch  with  other  intelligences 
and  the  laughter  it  provokes  has  real  or  imaginary  connection  with 
that  of  others  by  a  sort  of  social  freemasonry.  With  these  character- 
istics in  mind  we  are  ready  for 'the  theory.  The  particular  point,  it 
declares,  on  which  the  attention  of  the  group  is  concentrated  when  it 
finds  anything  ludicrous  is  a  certain  lack  of  elasticity,  something 
rigid  or  mechanical,  an  automatism  or  absentmindedness  where  life 
and  society  require  plasticity  and  adaptation.  The  centrally  comic 
subject — though  it  is  the  last  to  be  treated  in  the  book — is  the  comic 
354 


LAUGHTER  355 

character.  Three  things  are  essential  to  form  a  comic  character, — 
unsociability  in  the  performer,  insensibility  in  the  spectator  and  auto- 
matism, absentmindedness.  The  type  is  Don  Quixote,  with  his 
systematic  absentmindedness,  "the  most  comical  thing  imaginable." 
The  combination  of  elements  found  in  this  case  sheds  its  light  over 
the  entire  field.  The  comic  spirit  cannot,  indeed,  be  imprisoned  in  a 
definition.  The  formula,  "something  mechanical  encrusted  on  the 
living,"  which  expresses  its  essence,  is  modified  as  it  expands.  We 
substitute  the  vaguer  image  of  some  rigidity  or  other  applied  to  the 
mobility  of  life,  or  attention  is  called  to  the  physical  in  a  person  where 
the  moral  side  is  in  question,  or  we  find  the  manner  seeking  to  outdo 
the  matter,  or  the  person  gives  the  impression  of  being  a  thing,  etc. 
But  everywhere  the  principle  is  the  same,  everywhere  there  is  an 
element  of  stiffness,  absentmindedness,  viewed  unemotionally  by  the 
social  group  or  its  representative.  And  the  laughter?  The  laughter 
is  the  social  corrective  of  the  mechanism,  rigidity,  absentmindedness. 
Such  is  Bergson's  theory. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  find  illustrations  for  the  theory;  this  book  is 
full  of  them.  It  is  curious,  indeed,  when  once  our  attention  is  called 
to  the  fact,  to  observe  how  many  funny  things  appear  to  contain  the 
ingredients  indicated.  We  had  not  thought  that  it  was  the  unemo- 
tional perception  of  something  rigid  in  the  living  that  caused  us  to 
laugh,  but  Bergson  makes  us  see  that,  whether  or  not  such  is  of  the 
essence  of  the  comic  and  whether  it  be  true  or  not  that  our  laughter 
is  the  means  appropriated  by  society  for  its  correction,  the  rigidity, 
at  least  in  many  cases,  is  there,  or  the  comic  fact  can  be  interpreted 
plausibly  as  though  it  were.  Evidence  and  explanation  are,  never- 
theless, not  quite  convincing.  We  remember  that  the  comic  on 
any  theory  involves  some  kind  of  incongruity  and,  since  it  is  met  with 
preeminently,  if  not  exclusively,  in  things  human,  we  are  not  surprised 
to  find  numerous  cases  in  which  the  special  incongruity  appears  as 
a  sort  of  rigidity  or  automatism  in  contravention  of  the  plastic 
demands  of  life.  But  is  this  always  the  case?  Well,  there  is  at 
least  one  class  of  cases  in  which  the  interpretation  seems  forced, 
namely  the  witticism,  or  joke.  Bergson  devotes  part  of  a  chapter 
to  the  comic  in  words.  The  witty  or  comical  saying — there  is  no 
essential  difference — has  the  power,  he  says,  of  rapidly  sketching 
and  evoking  the  image,  dim  or  distinct,  of  a  comic  scene.  The  scene 
evoked  is  comic  on  its  own  account  and  conforms  to  the  general 
principles  enunciated  for  the  comic  in  situations  or  actions.  But 
the  word  or  saying  evoking  it  is  also  held  to  be  comic.  How  is  this 


356  REVIEWS 

explained?  As  the  projection  on  the  plane  of  words  of  the  comic  in 
actions  and  situations.  The  rigidity,  mechanism  or  absentminded- 
ness  which  is  found  in  them  is  now  found  as  infecting  language  itself. 
An  illustration  will  make  this  clearer.  "He  is  always  running  after 
a  joke,"  remarked  some  one  of  a  conceited  fellow;  and  the  hearer 
retorted,  "I'll  back  the  joke!"  (p.  116).  Now  we  are  left  to  discover 
for  ourselves  the  element  of  mechanism  in  the  animated  picture  of 
the  pursuit,  and  doubtless  each  one  will  find  it  where  it  pleases  him. 
But  the  comicality  of  the  witticism  is  explained  by  Bergson  as  due  to 
the  fixing  of  attention  on  the  material  aspect  of  a  metaphor,  to  the 
fact  that  an  expression  used  figuratively  is  taken  literally.  And  this, 
no  doubt,  is  partly  true.  But  how  is  this  connected  with  the  prin- 
ciple of  mechanism?  It  is  connected  by  the  application  to  language 
of  the  law,  primarily  applied  to  persons,  that  we  laugh  if  attention 
is  diverted  to  the  physical  when  the  moral  is  in  question.  Here,  then, 
language  itself  is  regarded  as  having  a  kind  of  moral  personality  in 
its  figurative  use  and  a  physical  in  its  literal;  the  comic  saying  is 
viewed  as  a  lapse  of  attention,  not  to— for  the  wit  may  surely  be 
presumed  to  be  alive  to  the  meanings  of  words — but  in  language. 
It  may  be  left  to  the  reader  to  judge  the  warrant  and  fitness  of  the 
analogy.  To  the  reviewer  the  principle  appears  self-attenuated  in  a 
metaphor. 

But  there  are  other  objections.  Life,  we  recall,  is  not  pure 
plasticity ;  the  living  organism  has  its  own  elements  of  rigidity.  Social 
life  in  particular  has  its  own  habits,  its  conventions,  and  the  mechan- 
ization of  the  individual's  life  to  conform  to  them  is  not  regarded  as 
comical,  a  thing  to  be  laughed  at  and  corrected,  but  rather  as  some- 
thing required  and  approved.  The  comical  person  is  one  who,  to 
be  sure  under  definite  restrictions,  flouts  conventions,  the  "original," 
the  eccentric,  often,  it  must  be  acknowledged,  appearing  to  exhibit 
less  rigidity  than  an  effusive  spontaneity  and  abounding  energy. 
The  reply,  of  course,  will  be  that,  whatever  the  liveliness  of  his  mind 
or  movements,  his  very  eccentricity  shows  lack  of  plastic  accom- 
modation to  social  requirements  and  that  his  oddities  carry  him  on 
by  a  kind  of  physical  momentum.  Be  it  so;  we  can  no  doubt  always 
discover  what  we  look  for.  But  there  is  one  thing  at  least  which  the 
theory  fails  to  explain.  Why  is  it,  namely,  that  when  attention  is 
called  to  the  rigidity  encrusted  on  life,  the  mechanical  in  the  living, 
the  absentminded,  or  whatever  the  phrase  may  be,  we  do  not  neces- 
sarily find  it  comical?  The  man  who  is  always  expressing  himself  in 
the  same  set  phrases,  the  speaker  always  using  the  same  wooden 


LAUGHTER  357 

gestures, — these  are  comical  figures,  according  to  Bergson,  but  to  us 
on  occasion,  and  presumably  to  him  also,  such  exhibitions  and  a 
thousand  others  of  different  types  at  which  we  at  times  laugh  heartily, 
appear  simply  dull,  stupid,  irritating,  disgusting,  or  it  may  be,  pitiable, 
or  pathetic.  Even  the  systematic  absentmindedness  of  Don  Quixote, 
that  "most  comical  thing  imaginable,"  has  been  known,  as  the  writer 
can  testify,  to  exert  a  most  depressing  influence.  There  are  times 
when  nothing  whatever  seems  funny  to  us,  and  then  anon  we  are 
ready  to  laugh  at  almost,  anything.  Why.  is  this  ?  The  facts  clearly 
point  to  the  coalescence  of  something  subjective  with  the  objective 
in  the  constitution  of  the  comic.  What  may  this  be?  The  only 
subjective  factor  which  Bergson  explicitly  recognizes  in  the  major 
part  of  his  exposition  is  "insensibility,"  "absence  of  feeling."  The 
comic,  he  says,  makes  its  appeal  to  pure  intelligence;  laughter  has  no 
greater  foe  than  emotion.  Now  it  is  true,  of  course,  that  comic 
laughter  is  incompatible  with  serious  emotion,  but  if  there  is  anything 
certain  in  the  aesthetics  of  this  subject  it  is  surely  this,  that  the  comic 
never  appeals  solely  to  the  intelligence.  On  the  contrary,  to  be 
appreciated,  it  must  either  find  us  in,  or  surprise  us  into,  the  mood  of 
its  own  humor.  And  that  humor  would  seem  to  be,  whatever  its 
other  characteristics,  one  of  relaxation,  or  play.  Bergson  himself, 
near  the  close  of  his  discussion,  offers  us  the  suggestion  of  this  solution 
of  our  question.  Speaking  of  the  comic  character  he  says  (pp.  194  ff.), 
he  is  one  "with  whom,  to  begin  with,  our  mind,  or  rather  our  body, 
sympathizes";  "we  treat  him  first  as  a  playmate";  "there  is  in 
laughter  a  moment  of  relaxation";  "comic  absurdity  gives  us  from 
the  outset  the  impression  of  playing  with  ideas"  and  "our  first 
impulse  is  to  join  in  the  game."  And  the  same,  he  adds,  might  be 
said  of  the  other  forms  of  the  laughable.  Disregarding  the  ex- 
pression, "or  rather  our  body,"  inserted,  apparently,  to  save  the 
face  of  the  theory  which  had  originally  excluded  "feeling,"  and  there- 
fore sympathy,  we  seem  here  to  be  on  the  right  track.  We  begin 
to  see  that  we  discover  the  comic  not,  as  some  theories  (but  not 
Bergson's)  have  held,  in  mere  perception  of  incongruity,  or  in  the 
shock  of  surprise,  or  in  the  glory  of  superiority,  or  in  the  sudden 
thwarting  of  expectation — though  these  may  be  among  its  conditions 
or  accompaniments — but  only  by  a  kind  of  inner  imitation  in  which, 
momentarily  at  least,  the  serious  tension  of  life  is  relaxed  and  we 
become  like  children  at  play.  Bergson,  however,  while  suggesting 
this  explanation,  refuses  to  regard  it  as  either  central  or  final.  Nor 
does  he  follow  it  up  with  an  analysis  of  the  conditions  and  interre- 


358  BOOKS  RECEIVED 

lations  of  the  tension  and  its  brusque  termination  which  we  find  in 
laughter.  All  that  he  says  on  this  subject  is  that  there  is  always  a 
tendency,  deep-rooted  in  the  comic,  to  take  the  line  of  least  resistance, 
generally  that  of  habit  (p.  196).  And  this  he  judges  to  be  a  kind  of 
social  infection.  He  recurs,  accordingly,  to  the  view  that  laughter 
is  before  all  things  a  social  corrective  whereby  society  avenges  itself 
for  the  liberties  taken  with  it  and  seeks  to  counteract  the  "poison"; 
the  last  word  is  that,  like  the  foam  of  the  sea,  it  is  sparkling  froth 
with  a  saline  base  and  its  after-taste  bitter.  This  view  seems  to  be 
too  seriously  pedantic  for  universal  application.  Laughter  does  not 
at  least  seem  to  be  always  of  the  nature  of  a  social  "ragging."  We 
not  only  laugh  at,  but  with,  our  fellows.  Bergson  allows  that  in 
enjoying  a  joke  it  is  in  most  cases  difficult  to  say  whom  we  are  laughing 
at;  would  it  not  be  truer  to  say  that  it  is  impossible?  And  if  comic 
laughter  has  a  social  function,  as  it  doubtless  has,  and  its  spirit  is 
akin  to  that  of  play,  is  it  not  at  least  as  plausible  to  find  that  function 
in  the  serviceable  relaxation  it  affords  to  the  strain  and  stress  of  life 
as  in  the  chastisement  it  inflicts  on  lapses  from  its  "requirements"? 

H.  N.  GARDINER 
SMITH  COLLEGE 

BOOKS  RECEIVED  DURING  JULY  AND  AUGUST 

MOSIMAN,  E.    Das  Zungenreden,  geschichtlich  und  psychologisch  unter- 

sucht.     Tubingen:  Mohr,  1911.      Pp.  xv  -f  137.      M.  4.50. 
ROBINSON,     V.     An    Essay    on    Hasheesh.     New    York:     Medical 

Review  of  Reviews,  1912.      Pp.  83. 
DEUSSEN,  P.     The  System  of  the  Feddnta.     (Authorized  translation 

by    C.   Johnston.)      Chicago:  The  Open  Court  Publishing  Co., 

1912.      Pp.  xiii  -f  513. 

LOEB,  J.  The  Mechanistic  Conception  of  Life.  Chicago:  The  Uni- 
versity of  Chicago  Press,  1912.  Pp.  232.  $1.50  net. 

BINET,  A.  and  SIMON,  TH.  A  Method  of  Measuring  the  Develop- 
ment of  the  Intelligence  of  Young  Children.  (Authorized  transla- 
tion with  preface  by  Clara  H.  Town.)  Lincoln,  111.:  The 
Courier  Co.,  1912.  Pp.  83.  $1.00. 

MOLL,  A.  The  Sexual  Life  of  the  Child.  (Trans,  fr.  German  by 
Paul,  E.;  Intro,  by  Thorndike,  E.  L.)  New  York:  Macmillan, 
1912.  Pp.  xv  +  338.  $1.75  net. 

TROMNER,  E.  Das  Problem  des  Schlafs.  Biologisch  und  psycho- 
physiologisch  betrachtet.  Wiesbaden:  Bergmann,  1912.  Pp.  88. 


NOTES  AND  NEWS  359 


NOTES  AND  NEWS 

THE  first  number  of  a  new  German  periodical,  Fortschritte  der 
Psychologie  und  ihrer  Andwendungen,  has  just  recently  come  to  hand. 
It  is  edited  by  Dr.  Karl  Marbe,  of  Wiirzburg,  with  the  assistance  of 
Dr.  Wilhelm  Peters,  and  it  professes  to  devote  itself  equally  to  the 
science  and  to  its  practical  applications.  To  quote  from  the  intro- 
ductory announcement:  So  wenden  sich  die  "Fortschritte"  nicht 
nur  an  Fachpsychologen,  sondern  auch  an  alle  diejenigen  Praktiker 
und  Gelehrten,  die  sich  von  seiten  der  Psychologie  eine  Forderung 
ihrer  Disziplinen  versprechen  miissen.  Bei  der  besonderen  Bedeu- 
tung  der  Psychologie  fur  die  Philosophic  darf  die  Zeitschrift  wohl 
auch  auf  eine  freundliche  Aufnahme  in  den  Kreisen  der  Philosophen 
rechnen. 

PROFESSOR  IRVING  KING'S  The  Psychology  of  Child  Development 
has  recently  appeared  in  a  Bohemian  translation. 

DOCTOR  EDWIN  D.  STARBUCK,  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the 
State  University  of  Iowa,  has  been  granted  sabbatical  leave  for  the 
coming  year,  and  will  reside  in  Boston.  He  will  act  for  the  year  as 
psychologist  adviser  to  The  Beacon  Press  in  the  publication  of 
children's  and  young  people's  literature,  and  especially  in  the 
formation  of  the  graded  Sunday  School  curriculum. 

H.  PIERON  has  succeeded  Binet  as  Director  of  the  laboratory  at 
the  Sarbonne.  The  Annee  psychologique  will  be  continued  under  his 
editorship.  It  will  be  issued  this  year  by  Simon  and  Larguier  des 
Bancels. 

THE  August  number  of  the  BULLETIN,  dealing  especially  with 
comparative  psychology,  was  prepared  under  the  editorial  care  of 
Professor  Margaret  Floy  Washburn. 

THE  following  items  are  taken  from  the  press: 

DR.  JOSEPH  JASTROW,  professor  of  psychology  in  the  University 
of  Wisconsin,  gave  three  lectures  on  "  The  Sensibilities,"  "  The 
Emotions  "  and  "  The  Appraisal  of  Human  Qualities  "  at  the  sum- 
mer session  of  the  University  of  California. 

PROFESSOR  MORTON  PRINCE  has  retired  from  the  active  duties  of 
the  chair  of  neurology  in  Tufts  College  Medical  School,  and  becomes 
professor  emeritus.  He  is  succeeded  by  Professor  J.  J.  Thomas,  now 
assistant  professor  of  neurology. 


360  NOTES  AND  NEWS 

MR.  WILLIAM  McDouGALL,  F.R.S.,  Wilde  reader  in  mental 
philosophy  at  Oxford,  has  been  elected  an  extraordinary  fellow  of 
Corpus  Christi  College. 

GEORGE  R.  WELLS,  Ph.D.  (Hopkins,  '12),  has  been  appointed 
instructor  in  psychology  at  Oberlin  College. 

L.  R.  GEISSLER,  Ph.D.  (Cornell),  has  resigned  his  position  as  re- 
search psychologist  in  the  Physical  Laboratory  of  the  National  Elec- 
tric Lamp  Association,  Cleveland,  to  become  professor  of  psychology 
at  the  University  of  Georgia.  He  will  organize  and  direct  the  new 
psychological  laboratory  to  be  established  in  connection  with  the 
School  of  Education. 

THE  board  of  trustees  of  Colgate  University  has  created  a  new 
office,  that  of  vice-president  of  the  university,  and  has  elected  Dr. 
Melbourne  Stuart  Read  to  the  office.  Dr.  Read  is  professor  of  psy- 
chology and  has  been  secretary  of  the  university  for  several  years. 

MR.  EDGAR  A.  DOLL  has  been  appointed  associate  psychologist 
in  the  department  of  research  of  the  Vineland  Training  School,  Vine- 
land,  N.  J. 

DR.  WILHELM  WUNDT,  professor  of  philosophy  in  the  University 
of  Leipzig,  one  of  the  founders  of  modern  psychology,  celebrated  his 
eightieth  birthday  on  August  16,  on  which  occasion  a  "Wilhelm 
Wundt  Stiftung,"  amounting  to  7,000  Marks,  was  presented  to  the 
university  by  his  students  and  friends. 

DR.  GUY  MONTROSE  WHIPPLE,  of  the  School  of  Education, 
Cornell  University,  gave  three  lectures  on  "  The  Training  of 
Memory,"  "  The  Psychology  of  the  Marking  System  "  and  "  The 
Supernormal  Child"  at  the  summer  session  of  the  University  of 
Illinois. 

WALTER  FENNO  DEARBORN,  Ph.D.  (Columbia),  recently  pro- 
fessor in  the  school  of  education  of  the  University  of  Chicago,  has 
been  appointed  assistant  professor  of  education  at  Harvard  Uni- 
versity. 

ANNOUNCEMENT.— The  business  department  of  the  Psychological 
Review  Company  will  hereafter  be  located  at  Princeton  and  all 
business  communications  should  be  addressed  to  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
REVIEW  COMPANY,  PRINCETON,  NEW  JERSEY. 


Vol.  IX.  No.  10.  October  15,  1912 

THE 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN 


GENERAL  REVIEWS  AND  SUMMARIES 

THE  RECENT  LITERATURE  OF  MENTAL  CLASSES 

BY  WARNER  BROWN 

University  of  California 

The  classification  of  men  according  to  their  mental  traits  is  directed 
by  numerous  interests.  Foremost  at  the  present  time  is  the  prac- 
tical interest  of  which  the  slogan  is  efficiency.  Miinsterberg  (46) 
continues  to  herald  the  opportunity  of  the  psychologist  to  help  in 
the  choosing  of  a  vocation  by  establishing  a  proper  classification  of 
individuals  according  to  their  talents.  Differences  with  regard  to 
attention,  memory,  apperception,  span  of  attention,  fatiguability, 
time  sense,  mental  rhythm,  correspond  to  the  definite  requirements 
of  different  occupations.  The  intimate  relation  between  this  move- 
ment for  a  practical  classification  of  talents  with  a  view  to  economy 
and  the  broader  movement  for  the  more  efficient  management  of  all 
resources  is  noted.  Zergiebel's  paper  (58)  is  also  typical  of  the 
practical  point  of  view.  Instead  of  regarding  the  variety  of  indi- 
vidual ability  or  gift  as  itself  material  for  the  exercise  of  psycho- 
logical curiosity,  it  regards  the  possibility  of  usefully  applying  the 
various  gifts  and  of  compensating  for  the  deficiencies.  In  the  case 
of  the  elementary  teacher  who  must  teach  a  variety  of  subjects  for 
which  he  has  no  personal  aptitude,  study  of  his  own  idiosyncracies 
of  imagery,  learning  type,  and  type  of  observation,  is  of  the  first 
importance.  For  Chambers  (8)  the  practical  recognition  of  indi- 
vidual differences  of  mental  make-up  should  entail  in  education 
"not  so  much  the  presentation  of  different  subject-matter  to  different 
pupils  as  the  affording  of  opportunity  for  individual  reactions  to 
the  same  subject-matter."  Jones  (30)  finds  that  there  is  the  necessity 
in  democratic  society  of  determining  temperaments  in  order  to  avoid 

361 


362  WARNER  BROWN 

misfits.  He  considers  temperament  as  the  total  manner  of  reacting 
upon  the  situation,  and  follows  Ribot  in  discriminating  four  types, 
active,  sensitive,  apathetic,  and  unstable  or  nervous.  Many  men 
of  genius  are  cited  who  display  neurotic  traits  or  have  a  neurotic 
family  history.  Huther  (26)  is  concerned  with  the  modern  demand 
that  the  schools  fit  people  for  performing  such  functions  in  life  as 
they  are  naturally  fitted  for.  This  ideal  is  not  in  perfect  accord 
with  the  chronic  attempts  of  the  schools  to  round  out  the  character 
by  giving  greatest  attention  to  the  child's  weak  points. 

A  somewhat  different  practical  application  of  the  notion  of  mental 
classes  is  seen  in  the  working  out  by  Healy  and  Fernald  (21)  of  a 
set  of  tests,  to  be  applied  to  delinquent  youths,  which  make  possible 
a  system  of  mental  classification  as  distinguished  from  a  system  of 
grading  applicable  to  individuals  of  the  same  intellectual  age.  The 
authors  find  it  feasible  to  distinguish,  aside  from  the  subnormal  cases, 
three  grades  of  native  ability,  three  grades  of  formal  educational 
advantages,  and  two  grades  of  information,  with  classes  correspond- 
ing to  the  combinations  of  these  grades.  De  Sanctis  (13)  points 
the  way  to  the  gap  which  Healy  and  Fernald  have  already  so  suc- 
cessfully closed  when  he  says  that  tests  of  elementary  mental  func- 
tions, sensation,  attention,  memory,  do  not  measure  the  general 
level  of  intelligence.  The  Ebbinghaus  completion  method  and  the 
Binet  description  of  an  object  he  approves  of.  His  own  "  measur- 
ing scale"  is  intended  primarily  for  measuring  amounts  of  mental 
deficiency.  The  Binet  scale  he  finds  satisfactory  for  grading  normal 
and  slightly  atypical  children.  Bell  (3)  cites  a  number  of  new  con- 
tributions to  the  literature  of  "tests"  which  lie  somewhat  beyond 
the  province  of  the  present  paper. 

A  like  interest  in  sorting  men  into  round  and  square  according 
to  the  holes  which  they  are  to  fill  is  to  be  seen  in  most  of  the  work 
dealing  with  the  correlation  of  traits  and  the  fundamental  question 
whether  ability  in  the  individual  manifests  itself  generally  or  whether 
it  appears  in  streaks.  The  clearest  statement  of  this  thought  is  found 
in  the  paper  by  Hart  and  Spearman  (20).  They  find  very  strong 
evidence  for  the  existence  of  a  "general  factor"  which  remains  a 
constant  through  all  the  phases  of  the  mental  life  of  an  individual. 
They  conceive  of  the  establishment  of  an  "intellectual  index"  for 
all  school  children  and  eventually  for  the  entire  population.  Class 
distinctions  in  society  on  a  purely  psychological  basis  become  a  remote 
possibility  with  the  notion  of  a  minimum  intellectual  index  as  a 
qualification  for  voting  and  for  the  privilege  of  having  children.  The 


MENTAL  CLASSES  363 

argument  for  the  existence  of  the  "general  factor"  is  based  in  the 
first  place  on  a  correlation  of  correlations  covering  all  of  the  available 
studies  in  the  correlation  of  mental  traits  for  the  past  thirty  years, 
the  results  of  the  work  of  14  experimenters  on  1,463  persons.  A  table 
is  arranged  in  the  form  of  a  square,  showing  the  coefficient  of  correla- 
tion of  each  trait  with  each  other  trait.  Then  these  coefficients 
are  themselves  correlated.  For  example  the  coefficients  in  which 
"memory"  figures  are  correlated  with  the  coefficients  in  which 
"touch"  appears.  If  the  various  traits  correlating  more  or  less 
closely  with  memory  and  with  touch  are  independent  of  each  other, 
then  no  correlation  of  correlations  will  appear.  If  the  various  traits 
belong  to  different  "levels"  or  mutually  exclusive  "types,"  as  is 
generally  held,  there  will  be  a  negative  correlation  of  correlations. 
If  the  various  traits  are  all  related  to  one  another  on  the  basis  of  a 
common  factor,  the  correlation  of  correlations  will  be  positive  and 
high;  and  this  is  what  proves  to  be  almost  invariably  true.  A  second 
argument  for  the  general  factor  is  found  in  the  working  applicability 
of  the  modern  mental  "tests"  which  do  not  attempt  to  measure 
special  abilities  but  are  haphazard  samplings  the  results  of  which  are 
pooled  together  into  a  general  estimate  of  mental  standing.  Specific 
abilities  are  not,  however,  lost  sight  of.  "Every  intellectual  perform- 
ance may  be  regarded  as  springing  from  two  distinct  factors:  on 
the  one  hand  the  specific  ability  or  disposition  for  that  particular 
performance;  and  on  the  other  general  ability,  due  to  the  common 
fund  of  intellectual  energy."  A  good  example  of  the  maxim  that 
anything  can  be  proved  by  figures  is  found  in  the  original  presentation 
by  Brown  (5)  of  an  important  part  of  the  data  on  which  Hart  and 
Spearman  found  their  contention  for  "general  ability."  Brown 
finds  in  the  very  low  correlations  between  his  different  tests  (which 
were  numerous  and  varied  and  participated  in  by  six  distinct  groups 
of  students)  no  indication  of  a  general  factor  underlying  the  separate 
functions  measured.  It  is  not  possible  to  discuss  here  the  relative 
merits  of  the  methods  employed  by  Brown  and  by  Spearman  (20) 
or  the  criticisms  of  the  latter  on  Brown's  methods.  In  the  case  of 
schoolboys'  ability  in  arithmetic,  geometry  and  algebra,  Brown  (4) 
also  finds  the  correlations  low  except  as  between  arithmetic  and 
algebra.  Lobsien  (39)  with  one  class  of  boys  between  12  and  15  years 
of  age  finds  high  correlations  between  all  the  school  subjects.  When 
the  record  in  a  formal  memory  test  is  correlated  with  students'  grades 
in  separate  subjects  rather  than  their  class  standing  Busemann  (6) 
finds  positive  results.  Lobsien  (38),  on  the  other  hand,  finds  all  the 


364  WARNER  BROWN 

correlations  low  between  auditory  or  visual  memory  for  numbers 
and  mental  or  written  arithmetic.  The  only  appreciable  positive 
correlation  is  between  mental  and  written  work.  It  is  a  curious 
reflection  which  is  cast  on  this  work  by  Huther  (27)  who,  without 
any  criticism  on  the  manner  or  method  of  Lobsien's  experiments, 
concludes  on  the  basis  of  purely  abstract  deductive  reasoning  that 
there  can  be  no  connection  between  visual  memory  and  mental 
calculation  and  therefore  that  a  slight  negative  correlation  which 
Lobsien  found  between  these  functions  merely  means  the  absence  of 
connection.  Surely,  he  thinks,  there  are  visual-concrete  and  audi- 
tory-abstract types  in  calculating  and  these  are  to  be  regarded  as 
"specific  differences  of  endowment." 

The  queston  of  special  types  of  ability  vs.  general  ability  comes 
up  again  under  the  guise  of  formal  training,  i.  e.,  training  through 
general  ability  or  through  the  interconnection  of  special  abilities. 
De  Sanctis  (13)  says  that  experimental  psychology  can  as  yet  throw 
no  light  on  the  training  of  general  intelligence.  Winch  (57)  attains 
a  golden  mean  with  the  doctrine  that  there  may  be  an  improvement 
in  one  faculty  as  the  result  of  training  another,  although  there  may 
not  be  any  correlation  between  the  faculties.  Johnny,  who  has  a 
good  rote  memory,  may  have  a  very  poor  associative  memory  (lack 
of  correlation)  but  yet  training  of  his  rote  memory  may  improve  his 
associative  memory  (formal  training).  Thus  the  ground  is  cut  out 
from  under  one  of  the  chief  arguments  in  favor  of  a  general  mental 
ability  through  which  the  different  faculties  are  connected  with  one 
another.  Elsenhans  (14)  sees  that  the  so-called  simple  traits  can 
only  be  arrived  at  from  the  more  complex  traits  of  actual  mature 
experience,  and  that  those  complex  traits  are  more  than  mere  bundles 
of  simple  traits.  His  paper  is  typical  of  the  absorbing  interest  in 
individual  capacities,  their  origin  and  interrelationship,  which  domi- 
nates the  first  volumes  of  the  combination  of  the  Zeitschrift  jur 
pddagogische  Psychologie  with  the  Zeitschrift  fur  experimented 
Pddagogik. 

The  discussion  by  Stern,  Ephrussi,  and  others  of  Exner's  (15) 
paper  at  the  fourth  Kongress  fiir  experimented  Psychologie  shows 
again  the  growing  interest  in  the  inheritance  of  human  characters 
and  the  necessity  of  determining  what  a  character  is  before  we  can 
discuss  its  inheritance  intelligently.  Josefovici  (31)  maintains  that 
the  inheritance  of  talents  and  character  is  possible  either  from  both 
parents  to  the  same  child  or  from  one  parent  only.  Sisson  (51) 
throws  the  emphasis  upon  innate  tendencies  by  pleading  for  their 


MENTAL  CLASSES  365 

cultivation  and  redirection,  abandoning  the  hope  of  reforming  char- 
acter by  the  imposition  of  entirely  new  habits.  Reid  (47)  and  Walker 
(52)  discuss  back  and  forth  their  disagreements  over  Pearson's  logic 
by  which  he  seems  to  say  that  human  qualities  are  bred  not  cultivated, 
when  he  is  only  warranted  in  saying  that  they  are  bred  and  cultivated. 
Feis  (16)  shows  that  most  musicians  have  sprung  from  musical 
families,  but  he  fails  utterly  to  distinguish  their  blood  inheritance 
from  their  social  inheritance, — true  inheritance  from  the  influence  of 
favorable  surroundings.  Huther  (25)  attempts  in  a  purely  theoretical 
way  to  disentangle  the  factors  entering  into  "native  talent"  and  to 
discover  which  of  these  factors  is  capable  of  cultivation. 

With  regard  to  the  modification  of  mental  classifications  as  the 
result  of  practice  Whitley  (56)  concludes,  after  practicing  different 
persons  upon  different  tests  of  individual  capacity,  that  "the  criticism 
that  practice  may  influence  individuals  each  according  to  a  law  of  his 
own,  and  processes  each  by  a  law  of  its  own,  does  not  seem  to  hold  so 
far  as  the  general  law  of  improvement  goes."  On  the  other  hand 
Wells  (54)  finds  that  practice  in  the  Kraepelin  addition  test  and  in  a 
number-checking  test  reveals:  (i)  a  difference  in  the  individuals' 
fundamental  plasticity  in  the  function;  (2)  a  difference  in  the  actual 
amount  of  practice  experienced;  (3)  constitutional  factors  in  the 
nervous  system  independent  of  plasticity.  Furthermore,  both  effi- 
ciency and  plasticity  are  specific  in  the  test,  i.  e.,  different  in  the  same 
individual  from  one  test  to  another.  Wells  (53)  also  reports  that  the 
"type"  as  well  as  the  speed  of  free  associations  is  amenable  to 
practice. 

The  development  of  methods  for  the  determination  of  mental 
types  occupies  the  attention  of  several  workers.  The  report  of 
Angell  (2)  to  the  American  Psychological  Association  gives  a  catalog 
of  twenty  tests  in  current  use  for  the  determination  of  mental  imagery 
with  recommendations  concerning  the  more  suitable  of  them  and  with 
the  warning  that  "types"  do  not  follow  the  lines  conventionally  laid 
down,  and  that  it  is  more  difficult  to  establish  the  facts  regarding  them 
than  is  commonly  supposed.  The  new  methods  devised  by  Healy 
and  Fernald  (21)  have  already  been  mentioned.  Whitley  (56)  has 
made  an  experimental  study  of  45  tests  of  individual  differences  by 
correlating  the  results  of  the  several  tests  with  one  another.  There  is 
also  an  historical  review  and  general  catalog  of  such  tests.  Her 
exceedingly  guarded  conclusions  leave  some  doubt  as  to  the  practical 
value  of  the  tests.  Wharton's  (55)  tests  of  the  imagery  of  school 
children  by  ten  widely  used  methods  yield  such  contradictory  data 


366  WARNER  BROWN 

that  he  questions  the  validity  of  any  method  of  determining  the 
image  type  of  children.  Meumann  (44)  presents  a  new  method  for 
measuring  the  mental  ability  of  children,  which  consists  in  giving  two 
words  from  which  a  sentence  is  to  be  constructed;  e.  g.,  "soldier — 
fatherland."  More  or  less  logical  sentences  result.  A  modified  form 
of  the  Ebbinghaus  completion  test  is  also  described,  in  which  the 
subject  fills  out  the  body  of  a  story  from  certain  key  words.  These 
tests  give  both  qualitative  types  of  intelligence  and  gradations  of 
ability.  Meumann  distinguishes  eight  "types"  of  intelligence  of 
which  the  first  four  give  senseless  sentences.  The  remaining  four 
types  are  characterized  as  follows:  the  fifth  by  uncontrolled  fantasy; 
the  sixth  by  merely  logical  connection  without  ornament;  the  seventh 
by  emotionally  toned  imagination;  the  eighth  by  logical  connections 
plus  imaginative  detail.  Furthermore  he  distinguishes  two  main 
classes  of  those  who  comprehend  and  stick  to  the  task  and  those  who 
do  not,  independent  of  the  typical  differences  of  gift  in  feeling, 
reasoning  and  imagination.  The  data  from  the  new  tests  correlate 
poorly  with  class  standing.  He  suggests  modifications  of  these  tests 
in  the  direction  of  greater  explicitness  in  the  task.  A  somewhat 
similar  method  of  determining  the  type  of  imagination  is  reported  by 
Fischer  (18).  Children  are  allowed  to  construct  quasioriginal 
parallels  to  familiar  jingles  like  the  "House  that  Jack  built."  The 
retention  of  rhythm,  sense-content,  etc.,  gives  an  indication  of  the 
child's  mental  type.  Lipmann  (36)  presents  a  program  of  tests 
for  the  use  of  anthropologists. 

Marbe's  method  of  immediate  systematic  introspection  is  applied 
by  Feuchtwanger  (17)  to  the  determination  of  mental  types.  The 
type  for  him  is  determined  by  the  frequency  of  the  ideas  belonging 
to  the  different  sense  realms  rather  than  by  their  vividness.  The  chief 
experimental  controls  used  were  listening  to  words,  letters,  syllables 
and  sentences  read  out  to  the  subject,  and  copying  words,  letters, 
etc.,  by  the  subject.  Stimulation  of  any  sense  did  not  affect  the 
type  in  such  a  way  as  to  reduce  the  frequency  of  ideas  belonging  to 
that  sense.  A  special  lookout  for  a  rare  form  of  image  did  not  increase 
the  frequency  of  images  of  that  kind.  The  "type"  is  connected  with 
ability  to  call  up  voluntarily  images  of  its  own  kind.  Feuchtwanger 
also  describes  a  new  indirect  method  which  consists  in  writing  lists  of 
words  (Kraepelin)  for  objects  of  a  certain  height  or  color,  or  containing 
a  certain  vowel  sound.  In  this  case  the  subject  has  to  think  for  each 
word.  Also,  the  word-type  is  automatically  separated  from  the 
object-type.  The  results  of  this  indirect  method  agree  perfectly 


MENTAL  CLASSES  367 

with  the  classification  by  the  direct  method  of  the  four  subjects 
employed. 

The  more  fundamental  methods  of  determining  intellectual  status 
are  enumerated  by  Meumann  (42)  as  follows:  (i)  psychiatrical;  (2) 
the  distinction  between  normal  and  abnormal;  (3)  the  determining  of 
normal  types  and  individual  capacities;  (4)  determination  of  stand- 
ards of  mental  ability  for  normal  children  of  different  ages.  All  tests 
must  be  functional,  not  merely  measures  of  the  amount  of  acquisition; 
and  they  must  be  as  nearly  tests  of  general  intelligence  as  may  be. 
Little  is  said  under  division  three,  but  prominence  is  given  to  methods 
of  correlation.  Margis  (41)  classifies  the  general  methods  of  another 
basis  into:  (i)  the  method  of  intuitive  description,  including  the 
observation  of  physiognomy,  hand-writing,  etc.,  and  also  including 
the  use  of  anecdotes;  (2)  the  method  of  classification  into  established 
"types"  of  character,  later  development  of  the  doctrine  of  tempera- 
ments; (3)  the  teleographic  method, — a  description  of  the  inner 
calling  of  a  man,  his  specific  gift;  (4)  the  analytic,  scientific,  or 
psychological  method,  which  is  not  a  different  method  but  a  superior 
way  of  carrying  on  the  work  of  all  the  other  methods.  An  account 
is  given  of  the  record  and  program  in  this  direction  of  the  Institut  fur 
angewandte  Psychologie. 

More  "psychographies"  (Stern)  and  more  and  better  questionaries 
in  the  study  of  mental  classes  are  urged  by  Heymans  (22).  He  himself 
has  read  no  biographies  and  found  a  high  correlation  involving  such 
traits  as  mendacity, — seventy  per  cent,  of  the  non-active  emotional 
type  proving  liars,  while  none  of  the  non-emotional  active  type  were 
liars.  He  also  digested  the  answers  to  questionaries  covering  the 
family  history  of  2,523  persons  in  458  families  and  found  similar 
correlations  of  traits. 

Alongside  of  the  newer  practical  interest  in  mental  classes  as  the 
basis  of  efficient  utilization  of  human  energy  there  still  persists  the 
interest,  which  may  be  called  classical,  in  the  variety  of  human  en- 
dowment and  faculty  simply  as  an  array  of  curious  phenomena. 
Purely  psychological  description  still  delights  in  the  pageant  of  men's 
differences  in  sensitivity,  in  imagery,  in  will,  memory,  and  manner  of 
forming  associations.  Various  types  of  school  children  are  reported 
on  by  Munch  (45).  Some  individuals  can  be  classified  at  once; 
some  only  after  they  have  had  time  to  become  adapted  to  new  sur- 
roundings. Some  are  naturally  industrious  and  averse  to  diversions. 
Some  types  are  indicated  in  play-activities.  Surprising  extremes  of 
ability  are  found  by  Chambers  (8)  among  children.  No  trait  is 


368  WARNER  BROWN 

distributed  in  a  normal  curve.  Among  students  Jones  (29)  finds 
that  the  learning  types  are  so  pronounced  that  presentation  of 
material  in  only  one  sense-form  works  a  material  hardship  on  a  con- 
siderable part  of  the  class. 

Some  of  the  peculiarities  of  the  contents  of  the  visual  space  of 
the  imagination,  particularly  in  mathematical  thinking,  are  described 
by  Keyser  (33).  A  census  of  images  representing  the  concept  "mean- 
ing" was  taken  by  Chapin  and  Washburn  (9)  in  a  class  of  college 
women.  Of  193  "good  introspections"  there  were  50  per  cent, 
reporting  visual  images,  37  per  cent,  wholly  kinesthetic,  and  13  per 
cent,  visual  and  kinesthetic  combined.  Nearly  all  of  the  images, 
particularly  the  kinesthetic  ones,  were  obviously  relevant  to  the 
concept. 

Typical  differences  in  the  manner  of  forming  associations  in  re- 
acting to  a  simple  question  are  reported  by  Levy-Suhl  (35)  for  the 
insane  under  the  following  heads:  (i)  Natural  reaction;  (2)  generally 
indifferent  hyperprosexia;  (3)  selective  hyperprosexia;  (4)  hyper- 
vigile  reactions.  Wells  (53)  provides  a  useful  glossary  of  his  own  and 
Jung's  names  for  types  of  reaction  in  association.  Dauber  (12) 
reports  on  experiments  in  which  numerous  persons  react  with  the 
same  word  to  a  given  cue.  In  the  case  of  nonsense  syllables  there 
were  certain  typical  preferences.  Out  of  31  persons  12  tended  to 
react  by  rhyme,  4  by  alliteration,  8  J)y  annexing  a  suffix  to  the  cue, 
2  by  repetition.  Huber  (24)  performed  a  similar  experiment  among 
fresh  recruits  and  old  soldiers  and  came  to  the  conclusion  that  a  large 
allowance  must  be  made  for  the  surroundings  of  the  subjects  and  the 
differences  in  their  training. 

Scott  (48)  finds  that  "suggestibility"  is  not  a  single  trait.  Two 
different  tests  of  suggestibility  fail  to  correlate  with  each  other. 

With  regard  to  attention  McComas  (40)  finds  that  there  are  two 
large  types  with  respect  to  span:  broad  and  narrow.  Those  persons 
with  a  broad  visual  span  have  also  a  broad  auditory  span.  There  is 
also  an  alert  as  opposed  to  a  sluggish  type.  The  ability  to  concen- 
trate, or  inhibit,  or  to  dexterously  manage  the  attention  does  not 
take  the  form  of  a  "type." 

Lipmann  (37)  insists  that  there  is  not  a  visual  type,  but  that 
color-tone,  brightness,  saturation,  size,  position,  each  has  a  special 
type  of  imagery.  Experiments  in  the  recognition  of  geometrical 
forms  of  various  sizes,  variously  colored,  agreed  closely  with  intro- 
spections. Three  hundred  school  girls  who  were  tested  tended  to 
employ  the  same  partial  visual  imagery  on  a  second  trial. 


MENTAL  CLASSES  369 

A  peculiar  special  trait,  fertility  of  expression,  or  the  ability  to 
produce  an  elaborate  and  detailed  representation  of  an  object,  is 
found  by  Cohn  and  Dieffenbacher  (n)  to  reveal  itself  consistently 
in  tests  involving  description,  testimony,  written  composition  and 
drawing.' 

Meumann  (43)  introduces  an  entirely  new  basis  of  mental  classi- 
fication in  his  combination  factor.  Certain  persons  can  employ  cer- 
tain forms  of  imagery  successfully  alone  but  not  in  combination, 
i.  e.,  in  thinking.  A  case  is  analyzed  in  which  there  is  excellent  visual 
and  excellent  auditory-motor  imagery  and  memory  but  great  difficulty 
in  forming  associations  between  the  two  classes  of  objects.  A  map 
can  be  visualized  and  a  list  of  names  easily  learned  by  rote  but  there  is 
difficulty  in  locating  a  name  on  the  map. 

The  concept  of  character  and  types  of  character  is  considered  from 
the  theoretical  standpoint  and  in  relation  to  will  and  feeling  by  Klages 
(34),  Ach  (i),  Selz  (49,  50)  and  Kerschensteiner  (32). 

The  musician  as  a  special  type  is  analyzed  by  Feis  (16).  Musical 
genius  shows  itself  precociously  as  either:  (i)  appreciation  of  rhythm; 
(2)  creative  ability  (in  a  few);  (3)  the  ability  to  reproduce  a  piece 
(tone  memory).  Most  musicians  have  an  abundance  of  other  talents, 
but  none  of  the  great  composers  had  ability  as  a  teacher;  a  fact  which 
must  be  consoling  to  many  teachers  of  music.  Musicians  are  indus- 
trious. Although  musical  geniuses  show  many  stigmata  of  nervous 
disease  Feis  does  not  agree  with  Lombroso  concerning  the  relation 
between  genius  (in  the  case  of  musical  genius)  and  degeneration  and 
epilepsy.  Hinrichsen  (23)  thinks  that  no  one  will  deny  that  there  are 
types  of  disposition  for  poets,  musicians,  painters  and  mathematicians 
as  well  as  for  criminals.  He  analyzes  the  poetic  disposition  in  the 
autobiographical  and  anecdotal  manner,  concluding  that  the  poet's 
state  of  mind  is  like  that  of  the  ordinary  dreamer;  poetic  fancy  is  not 
allied  to  hallucination.  The  poet  is  not  necessarily  (though  he  is 
frequently)  neurotic  any  more  than  any  other  intellectually  produc- 
tive person. 

Numerous  facts  regarding  the  man  of  science  are  presented  by 
Cattell  (7),  particularly  with  respect  to  his  precocity  and  the  kind  of 
community  from  which  he  springs  and  in  which  he  is  nurtured. 

That  sex  establishes  two  distinct  mental  classes  in  the  community 
is  the  assupmtion  upon  which  Glaser  (19)  bases  a  feminist  plea.  The 
assumption  is  prominent  in  the  elaborate  experiments  of  Cohn  and 
DiefTenbacher  (10,  n),  but  their  data  and  conclusions  do  not  furnish 
a  very  strong  argument  for  mental  differences  between  boys  and  girls 


370  WARNER  BROWN 

when  allowance  is  made  for  the  relative  precocity  of  the  girls.  It  is 
significant  that  when  one  sex  excells  the  other  in  any  respect  the 
best  scholars  of  the  inferior  sex  partake  of  the  excellence  of  the 
other  sex. 

Every  phase  of  the  subject  of  mental  classes  is  touched  upon  in 
Jastrow's  essay  (28).  So  much  material  has  been  so  finely  minced 
and  presented  in  so  well  digested  a  form  that  no  summary  can  do 
justice  to  it,  but  its  chief  tendency  is  to  throw  the  emphasis  upon 
inheritance  rather  than  attainment  and  particularly  to  call  attention 
to  differences  of  endowment  in  sensibility  and  in  creative  ability. 
"The  closer  inspection,  through  the  analytical  glasses  of  psychology, 
of  the  differentiating  varieties  of  human  quality  and  of  their  func- 
tional interplay,  falls  outside  the  range  of  this  survey."  The  author's 
endeavor  is  rather  to  cultivate  a  truer  social  appreciation  of  those 
qualities  which  make  their  appearance  among  men,  and  particularly 
of  those  qualities  which  make  it  possible  for  their  unfortunate  possessors 
to  render  distinguished  service  to  mankind.  The  essay  epitomizes 
the  current  attitude  in  psychological  thought  toward  individual  talent, 
special  endowment,  general  ability,  and  mental  classification;  but 
it  is  an  essay,  it  does  not  argue  nor  does  it  hark  back  to  authority. 

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FOLK-PSYCHOLOGY  373 

FOLK-PSYCHOLOGY 

BY  DR.  A.  A.  GOLDENWEISER 

Columbia  University 

Folk-psychology  has  not  yet  reached  the  happy  condition  of  "  the 
ship  that  found  herself."  Its  scope,  its  method,  are  matters  of 
dispute,  its  raison  d'etre  even  is  in  some  quarters  accepted  with  hesita- 
tion. It  would  hardly  be  profitable  to  discuss  here  the  methodological 
and  terminological  questions  involved;  some  of  the  more  important 
issues,  however,  will  be  incidentally  touched  on  in  the  course  of  this 
review. 

ThurYiwald  (12)  observes  that  in  primitive  conditions  there  can 
be  no  question  of  formal  legal  categories;  savage  law  is  simply  savage 
custom  looked  at  from  a  certain  point  of  view.  It  follows  that  we 
cannot  make  use  of  our  own  legal  abstractions  in  describing  the  legal 
forms  of  primitive  folk.  He  further  notes  that  savages  do  not  always 
live  up  to  their  reputation  as  good  observers;  the  people  of  Buin 
(Bougainville,  Melanesia),  for  instance,  are  unaware  of  the  connection 
between  the  caterpillar  and  the  butterfly.  The  inhabitants  of  the 
Gazelle  Peninsula  assert  that  children  found  in  the  bush  are  the  fruit 
of  a  liana.  Thus  we  need  not  wonder  at  the  ignorance  of  some 
peoples  with  reference  to  the  processes  of  sexual  conception;  an  igno- 
rance which'  results  in  multiform  whimsical  beliefs  as  to  the  relations 
between  man  and  plants  and  animals.  Thurnwald's  remarks  about 
blood  revenge  in  Melanesia  are  interesting.  The  avenger  may  meet 
his  victim  in  open  combat  or  he  may  suddenly  attack  him  from 
ambush.  Nor  is  it  necessary  for  the  act  of  vengeance  to  occur  at  once 
or  within  a  defined  period.  If  the  offender  is  strong  and  powerful, 
well  protected  and  hard  to  get  at,  vengeance  may  be  postponed  for 
months  and  years;  but  sooner  or  later  the  fatal  blow  will  fall. 

Kroeber  (7)  points  out  that  the  still  current  belief  that  conduct 
may  be  determined  by  ideas  or  reason  is  a  delusion.  The  opposition 
also  to  some  actions,  as  cannibalism,  incest,  lack  of  parental  or  filial 
devotion,  "is  so  thoroughly  instinctive  that  these  crimes  have  hardly 
had  to  be  dealt  with  by  most  people,  and  their  rarity  and  want  of 
infectiousness  are  recognized  in  the  failure  of  creeds  and  codes  to 
provide  against  them."  While  the  horror  of  incest,  pollution,  etc.,  is 
common  to  all  people,  the  ideas  as  to  what  constitutes  incest  or 
pollution  vary  greatly  from  place  to  place  and  from  time  to  time. 

Stumpf  (10)  criticizes  Darwin's  theory  of  the  origin  of  music  from 


374 


A.  A.  GOLDENWEISER 


song;  Spencer's  theory  of  its  origin  from  emotional  speech;  Wal- 
laschek's,  from  dancing;  Biicher's,  from  communal  labor.  Music,  for 
Stumpf,  is  characterized  by  definitely  fixed  but  transposable  intervals. 
The  origin  of  music  he  finds  in  vocal  signs  at  a  distance.  Thus 
certain  sounds  became  fixed  in  pitch  and  were  sustained  longer  than  in 
ordinary  speech.  Later,  intervals,  beginning  probably  with  the 
octave,  arose.  Religious  motives  may  have  cooperated  in  the  early 
development  of  music.  Stumpf  gives  valuable  bibliographic  refer- 
ences and  a  collection  of  primitive  songs  and  tunes.1 

Thurnwald  attempts  to  characterize  the  mental  atmosphere 
'(Denkart)  reflected  in  totemism  (n).  He  also  emphasizes  the  social 
aspect  of  that  institution.  "Der  Totemismus  ist  eine  sociologische 
Theorie,  die  auf  einer  bestimmten  Naturauffassung  von  den  Existenz- 
bedingungen  des  Menschen  basiert  ist."  And  again,  "Von  Tote- 
mismus aber  sollte  man  nur  dann  reden,  wenn  Anzeichen  vorhanden 
sind,  die  auf  eine  durch  die  geschilderte  eigenartige  Denkart  beein- 
flusste  soziale  Gestaltung  schliessen  lassen." 

Sapir  (9)  draws  attention  to  some  common  elements  in  all  lan- 
guages, such  as  a  fixed  phonetic  system  and  a  definite  grammatical 
structure.  With  reference  to  older  theories  of  the  origin  of  speech 
he  observes  that  "we  are  forced  to  conclude  that  the  existence  of 
onomatopoetic  and  exclamatory  features  is  as  little  correlated  with 
relative  primitiveness  as  we  have  found  the  use  of  gesture  to  be." 
The  probable  origin  of  phonetic  changes  is  seen  in  the  inexact  imita- 
tion by  children  of  the  pronunciation  of  elders.  Some  of  the  phonetic 
variants  thus  produced  are  imitated  by  others  until  either  the  entire 
language  is  changed  phonetically  or  a  separate  dialect  arises.  It 
seems  that  the  time-honored  characterization  of  languages  as  inflec- 
tional, agglutinative,  etc.,  must  be  set  aside.  We  may  speak  of 
derivative  elements  in  language,  elements  which  affect  only  the  form 
of  the  word,  and  of  relational  elements  which,  while  affecting  the  form 
of  the  word,  also  affect  its  relation  to  other  parts  of  the  sentence, 
which,  in  consequence,  also  change.  In  this  connection  "it  is  im- 
portant to  note  that,  although  the  distinction  between  derivational 
and  relational  grammatical  elements  we  have  made  is  clearly  reflected 

1  The  value  of  music  for  folk-psychology  has  only  recently  been  realized,  and  the 
number  of  careful  studies  on  the  subject  is  exceedingly  small.  Professor  Stumpf  and 
his  excellent  colaborrators,  Abraham  and  von  Hornbostel,  are  pioneers  in  this  work. 
I  must  here  refer  to  his  Beitrdge  zur  Akustik  und  Musikwissenschaft  (6),  which  reached 
me  too  late  for  a  more  detailed  review.  Sapir's  "  Song  Recitative  in  Paiute  Mythology  " 
(/.  of  Amer.  Folk-lore,  1910,  23,  455-473)  should  also  be  consulted  for  interesting 
hints  as  to  some  specific  relations  between  primitive  music  and  mythology. 


FOLK-PSYCHOLOGY  375 

in  some  way  or  other  in  most  languages,  they  differ  a  great  deal  as  to 
what  particular  logical  concepts  are  treated  as  respectively  deriva- 
tional and  relational."1 

Rivers  (8)  insists  that  in  many  instances  where  primitive  beliefs 
contain  apparent  contradictions,  these  resolve  themselves  into  per- 
fectly logical  sequences  if  allowance  is  made  for  the  fact  that  natural 
phenomena  "have  been  classified  and  arranged  into  categories  differ- 
ent from  those  of  ourselves."  A  case  in  point  is  afforded  by  the 
Melanesian  concepts  of  life  and  death,  which  do  not  coincide  with 
our  own  but  are  expressed  by  the  terms  mate  and  toa,  one  including 
with  the  dead  the  very  sick  and  the  very  aged,  while  the  other  excludes 
from  the  living  those  who  are  called  mate.  Rivers  believes  that  the 
states  "on  either  side  of  this  condition  of  mateness"  are  much  less 
different,  to  the  primitive  mind,  than  are  for  us  the  states  indicated 
by  the  terms  life  and  death.  Death  to  the  primitive  man  is  a  form 
of  existence,  and  "the  difference  between  the  two  existences  is  prob- 
ably of  much  the  same  order  to  the  primitive  mind  as  two  stages  of 
his  life,  say  the  stages  before  and  after  his  initiation  into  manhood."2 

Boas  (2),  in  his  Clark  University  lecture,  deals  with  the  psycho- 
logical problems  in  the  study  of  ethnology.  On  the  one  hand  the 
anthropologist  seeks  to  reconstruct  the  historical  development  of 
cultures;  on  the  other  hand  he  is  interested  in  the  psychological  laws 
underlying  the  thought  and  action  of  man,  in  different  racial  and 
social  groups.  On  close  analysis  the  "composite  pictures"  of  the 
mental  make-up  of  different  races  would  probably  reveal  significant 
differences.  The  performance  of  individuals  belonging  to  a  given 
group  may  to  some  extent  depend  on  hereditary  individual  and  racial 
ability,  but  in  the  main  it  depends  on  the  habitual  characteristics  of 
the  social  group  to  which  the  individual  belongs.  The  main  diffi- 
culty with  the  comparative  method  commonly  used  by  ethnologists 
is  the  incomparability  of  the  data  on  which  the  conclusions  are  based. 
"The  person,  for  instance,  who  slays  an  enemy  in  revenge  for  wrongs 

1  It  becomes  increasingly  apparent  that  the  field  of  primitive  languages  will  soon 
prove  a  treasure-trove  to  the  folk-psychologist.  For  quite  apart  from  the  value  of 
language  as  a  mirror  of  culture,  the  classification  of  experience  and  the  categories  of 
concepts  unconsciously  expressed  in  the  grammatical  structure,  vocabulary,  and  even 
phonetics,  of  a  language,  and  which  are  now  being  laid  bare  by  the  student,  promise 
to  reveal  to  us  the  sanctum  of  mental  life,  the  laboratory  of  thought  itself.  I  commend 
to  the  attention  of  psychologists  the  Handbook  of  American  Indian  Languages  (Bulletin 
40  of  the  Bureau  of  Ethnology). 

1  Levy-Bruhl  has  reached  much  the  same  conclusion  in  his  Les  Fonctions  Mentales 
des  Societes  Inferieures.  See  the  present  writer's  remarks  on  Rivers  and  Levy-Bruhl 
in  Current  Anthropological  Literature,  1912. 


376  A.  A.  GOLDENWEISER 

done,  a  youth  who  kills  his  father  before  he  gets  decrepit  in  order  to 
enable  him  to  continue  a  vigorous  life  in  the  world  to  come,  a  father 
who  kills  his  child  as  a  sacrifice  for  the  welfare  of  his  people,  act  from 
such  entirely  different  motives  that  psychologically  a  comparison  of 
their  activities  does  not  seem  permissible."  Thus  two  phenomena 
are  culturally  similar,  not  when  they  reveal  objective^  resemblances, 
but  when  the  underlying  psychological  processes  are  similar.1 

The  classification  of  experience  underlying  the  thought  of  differ- 
ent groups  of  men  is  thoroughly  different.  This  classification  of 
experience  is  not  due  to  any  ratiocinative  process  but  occurs  uncon- 
sciously. The  best  example  of  classifications  which  do  not  rise  into 
consciousness  is  offered  by  the  grammatical  categories  of  languages; 
but  it  is  no  less  plausible  that  some  of  the  fundamental  concepts 
of  religion  as  well  as  of  other  cultural  phenomena,  have  arisen  in  the 
same  unconscious  way;  with  the  difference  that  in  the  latter  instances 
the  fundamental  concepts,  and  in  part  the  underlying  classifications, 
tend  to  rise  into  consciousness.  The  subsequent  conscious  elabora- 
tion of  the  concept  leads  to  secondary  explanations,  the  study  of 
which  constitutes  a  highly  important  branch  of  ethnology. 

Woodworth  (14)  examines  the  same  facts  from  a  somewhat  differ- 
ent angle.  He  warns  against  the  hasty  assumption  of  specialized 
mental  traits  in  different  groups.  "The  circumstances  surrounding 
a  group  call  for  certain  special  abilities  and  bring  to  the  fore  indi- 
viduals possessing  these  abilities,  leaving  in  comparative  obscurity 
those  gifted  in  other  directions."  Woodworth  dismisses  with  little 
ceremony  the  oft  made  assertions  that  savages  are  deficient  in  rea- 
soning powers,  that  they  are  incapable  of  abstraction,  of  foresight. 
The  difference  in  these  respects  between  the  savage  and  civilized  is 
only  one  of  degree.  The  author  proceeds  to  analyze  the  results  of 
investigations  on  the  senses  of  savages  conducted  by  Rivers,  Mc- 
Dougall  and  Myers,  among  the  islanders  of  Torres  Straits,  and  of 
his  own  experiments  with  several  primitive  groups  at  the  St.  Louis 
Fair  in  1904.  In  the  light  of  these  data  the  sense  superiority  of  the 
savage  is  as  much  of  an  illusion  as  his  mental  inferiority  seems  to  be. 
Woodworth  thus  reaches  the  conclusion  that  the  progress  made  by  a 
group  cannot  be  conceived  as  determined  solely  by  its  intellectual 
endowment.  "The  spur  of  necessity,  the  opportunities  afforded  by 
leisure,  the  existing  stock  of  knowledge  and  inventions,  and  the 
factor  of  apparent  accident  or  luck  have  all  to  be  considered." 

1  Boas  has  emphasized  this  point  of  view  in  several  previous  publications  as  well 
as  in  his  recent  The  Mind  of  Primitive  Man.  (See  special  review  on  p.  404.) 


FOLK-PSYCHOLOGY  3  77 

Graebner  (5)  lays  down  the  principles  of  the  science  of  ethnology 
and  the  method  of  ethnological  inquiry.  We  are  particularly  con- 
cerned with  pp.  62-124  of  his  work.  He  starts  out  with  the  proposi- 
tion that  two  cultural  phenomena  possess  the  greatest  mutual  inter- 
pretative value  if  they  belong  to  the  same  cultural  complex.  If  then 
we  want  to  interpret  culture  we  must  reconstruct  the  cultural  com- 
plexes that  have  developed,  spread  and  fused  in  the  course  of  the 
historic  process.  This  is  the  main  aim  of  ethnology.  The  geo- 
graphical separation  of  cultural  areas  complicates  our  investigations, 
but  it  should  not  in  principle  affect  our  attitude  towards  cultural 
similarities.  As  independent  development  of  similarities  in  culture 
is  rare  and  convergent,  evolution  is  to  a  large  extent  an  imaginary 
process;  such  cultural  similarities,  however  distant  geographically, 
must  be  interpreted  as  due  to  historic  contact,  and,  in  the  last  analy- 
sis, to  genetic  relationship.  The  actually  existing  cultures  which 
confront  the  ethnologist  are  valuable  to  Graebner  only  in  so  far  as 
they  constitute  the  points  of  departure  for  his  cultural  reconstruc- 
tions. Needless  to  say,  all  intensive  analysis  of  the  interplay  of 
psychic  forces  in  any  given  cultural  area  does  not,  for  Graebner, 
fall  within  the  scope  of  the  ethnologist's  task.  There  is  no  more 
room  for  the  soul  in  Graebner's  system  than  there  was  for  God  in  the 
universe  of  Laplace.1 

We  must  pass  by  without  comment  Ankermann  (i)  who  is  a 
more  cautious  representative  of  the  "historical"  school  of  ethnology, 
and  Foy  (4)  whose  position  is  even  more  extreme  than  that  of 
Graebner. 

Boas  (3)  characterizes  Graebner's  system  as  "mechanical." 
He  sees  safe  progress  in  "the  patient  unravelling  of  the  mental  proc- 
esses that  may  be  observed  among  primitive  and  civilized  peoples, 
and  that  express  the  actual  conditions  under  which  cultural  forms 
develop.  When  we  begin  to  know  these  we  shall  also  be  able  to  pro- 
ceed gradually  to  more  difficult  problems  of  the  cultural  relations 
between  isolated  areas  that  exhibit  peculiar  similarities."  The 

1  The  full  significance  of  Graebner's  methods  as  well  as  their  bearings  on  the 
problems  of  folk-psychology  cannot  be  fully  appreciated  without  acquaintance  with  his 
concrete  investigations.  See  particularly  his  "Die  Melanesische  Bogenkultur" 
(Anthropos,  1909),  "Die  Wanderungen  socialer  Systeme  in  Australien"  (Globus,  1906), 
and  "Die  socialen  Systeme  der  Siidsee"  (Zsch.  f.  Socialwissensch.,  1908).  Also 
Graebner's  and  Foy's  discussion  with  Haberlandt  in  Petermann's  Mitteilungen,  March 
and  May,  1911.  Dixon  meets  Graebner  on  his  own  ground  in  "The  Independence  of 
the  Culture  of  the  American  Indian"  (Science,  1912,  35,  No.  889).  Lowie  defends 
the  principle  of  convergence  against  Graebner's  challenge  of  its  non-existence  (/.  of 
Amer.  Folk-lore,  1912). 


A.  A.  GOLDENWEISER 

significance  of  cultural  phenomena  lies  in  their  psychological  setting. 
Against  Graebner,  Boas  maintains  "that  certain  types  of  changes 
due  to  internal  forces  have  been  observed  everywhere." 

Wundt  (15)  once  more  formulates  his  conception  of  folk-psy- 
chology. Although  it  is  true  that  no  psychic  process  may  occur 
outside  an  individual  consciousness,  many  processes  in  the  individual 
mind  cannot  be  properly  understood  when  abstracted  from  their 
social  context.  The  metaphysical  concept  of  a  soul  and  the  fiction 
of  "laws"  must  be  set  aside.  The  soul  is  naught  but  the  sum  total 
of  psychic  experience;  the  psychic  laws  are  the  regularities  of  that 
experience.  If  so  much  is  granted,  the  ethnic  soul  (Volksseele) 
becomes  as  proper  a  field  for  psychological  investigation  as  is  the 
individual  soul.  Particular  developmental  processes  become  the 
subject-matter  of  folk-psychology  only  in  so  far  as  they  contain 
common  elements  based  on  the  psychic  unity  of  man,  a  condition 
represented  by  remote  social  origins.  In  later  stages,  as  outer 
and  inner  social  forces  increase  in  particularity,  number  and  variety, 
the  common  fundamental  psychic  motives  become  obscured  and 
are  carried  off  with  the  flood  of  historic  conditions.  Thus  folk- 
psychology  and  individual  psychology  constitute  the  foundation  of 
history,  not  vice  versa.  Individual  psychology  furnishes  the  clue 
for  the  solution  of  folk-psychological  problems;  folk-psychology, 
on  the  other  hand,  itself  supplies  valuable  material  for  individual 
psychology.  Thus  linguistic  phenomena  throw  light  on  the  proc- 
esses of  thinking;  mythology,  on  the  workings  of  imagination; 
custom,  on  the  nature  of  will. 

A  number  of  German  psychologists  and  ethnologists  contribute  a 
set  of  suggestions  for  the  psychological  study  of  primitive  peoples. 
Thurnwald  (13)  joins  Levy-Bruhl  in  advocating  the  necessity  of  a  psy- 
chological characterization  of  ethnic  groups.1 

Hayes  (6),  in  a  series  of  articles,  champions  the  psychological 
view  of  society.  He  analyzes  the  views  of  Tarde,  Spencer,  de  Greef, 
Fairbanks,  Ross,  Giddings.  "Society,"  he  defines,  "is  in  essence 
the  interrelated  activities  of  men,"  and  activities  are  psychic  facts, 
while  the  connotations  of  the  term  "interrelated"  are,  in  this  con- 
nection, also  psychic.  Wundt's  view  as  to  the  relation  of  individual 
to  social  psychology  is  endorsed.  "Individual"  psychology  is  really 
"general"  psychology,  for  it  deals  with  what  is  universal  in  man. 
"It  is  sociology  that  investigates  the  building  up  of  the  content  of 
consciousness  which  differs  at  different  times  and  places,  the  indi- 

1  See  special  review  on  p.  400. 


FOLK-PS  YCHOLOG  Y  379 

vidual's  share  in  which  constitutes  his  individual  life,  a  life  composed 
of  activities  which  have  been  socially  evolved  and  which  by  each 
individual  are  socially  derived.  The  individual  is  a  concrete,  com- 
plex, unanalyzed  sample  of  the  social  reality."  In  criticizing  Gid- 
dings,  Hayes  repudiates  the  time-honored  view  of  society  "as  a 
population  of  human  organisms,  under  political  control,  inhabiting 
a  given  territory."  i 

The  narrow  limits  of  this  review  prevent  me  from  treating  this 
problem  of  the  objective  versus  the  psychic  method  of  studying 
man  and  society  with  the  care  it  deserves.  I  believe  that  ethnologists 
as  well  as  sociologists  are  divided  over  the  question.  We  see  a  some- 
what striking  example  of  convergence  in  thinking  in  that  the  psy- 
chologist and  the  professional  philosopher  also  find  themselves  facing 
a  similar  situation.  I  refer  to  such  works  as  .Thorndike's  Animal 
Intelligence  (1911),  particularly  the  last  two  chapters;  the  introductory 
chapters  of  Pillsbury's  The  Essentials  of  Psychology;  the  whole  of 
McDougall's  Introduction  to  Social  Psychology;  as  well  as  the  dis- 
cussions at  the  recent  meeting  of  the  American  Philosophical  Asso- 
ciation, in  Cambridge.  The  situation  is  fascinating  and  somewhat 
ominous.  Need  we  fear  that  the  word  Geisteszuissenschaften  will 
reveal  itself  as  a  contradiction  in  terms? 

REFERENCES 

1.  ANKERMANN,  B.     Die   Lehre   von   den    Kulturkreisen.     Korrespondenzblatt   der 

deutschen  Gesellschaft  f.  AnthropoL,  Ethnologie  u.  Urgeschichte,  42,  156-162  (in 
Arch.}.  Anthropologie^  1911,  io4). 

2.  BOAS  F.     Psychological  Problems  in  Anthropology.     Amer.  J.  of  PsychoL,  1910, 

21,  371-384- 

3.  BOAS,  F.     Review  of  Graebner's  "Methode  der  Ethnologie."     Science,  1911,  34, 

804-810. 

4.  FOY,  W.     Fiihrer  durch  das  Rautenstrauch-Joest  Museum.     Coin,  1910. 

5.  GRAEBNER,  F.     Methode  der  Ethnologie.     Heidelberg:  Carl  Winter,  1911. 

6.  HAYES,  E.  C.    The  Classification  of  Social  Phenomena.    Amer.  J.  of  SocioL, 

1911,  17,90-118;  188-205;  375-399- 

7.  KROEBER,  A.  L.    The   Morals   of  Uncivilized   Peoples.     Amer.   Anthropologist, 

July-September,  1910. 

8.  RIVERS,  W.  H.  R.    The  Primitive  Conception  of  Death.     The  Hibbert  /.,  1912,  io, 

No.  2. 

1  The  inclusion  of  an  article  on  sociology  in  a  review  of  folk-psychology  may 
arouse  criticism.  I  venture  to  submit,  however,  that  sociology  stands  in  the  same 
relation  to  historic  society  in  which  folk-psychology  stands  to  prehistoric  society.  The 
discussion  of  the  scope  and  method  of  sociology  by  a  number  of  German,  English, 
and  American  students  (Amer.  J.  of  Social.,  1910)  will  be  found  suggestive  in  this 
connection. 


380  FRANK  G.  BRUNER 

9.  SAPIR,  E.    The  History  and  Varieties  of  Human  Speech.     Pop.  Sci.  Mo.,  1911, 


79, 

10.  STUMPF,  C.     Die  Anfdnge  der  Musik.     Leipzig,  1910. 

li!  THURNWALD,  R.     Die  Denkart  als  Wurzel  des  Totemismus.     Korrespondenzblatt 

der  deutschen  Gesellschaft  f.  Anthropologie,  Ethnologie  u.  Urgeschichte,  1911,  42 

(in  Arch.}.  Anthropol,  1911,  io4). 

12.  THURNWALD,  R.     Ermittelungen  iiber  Eingeborenenrechte  der  Siidsee.     Zsch.  f. 

vergl.  Rechtswissensch.,  1910,  23,  309-364. 

13.  THURNWALD,  R.     Probleme  der  ethno-psychologischen  Forschung.     Beihefte  zur 

Zsch.  f.  angewandte  Psychol.  u.  psychol.  Sammelforsch.,  5,  1-27. 

14.  WOODWORTH,  R.  S.     Racial  Differences  in  Mental  Traits.     Science,   1910,  31, 

171-186. 

15.  WUNDT,  W.     Probleme  der  Fdlkerpsychologie.     Leipzig:  Ernst  Wiegandt,  1911. 


THE  PRIMITIVE  RACES   IN  AMERICA 

BY  DR.  FRANK  G.  BRUNER 

Department  of  Child  Study,  Board  of  Education,  Chicago 

The  literature  relating,  specifically,  to  the  psychology  of  the 
primitive  races  in  America,  during  the  past  two  or  three  years,  is 
exceedingly  meager,  and  indeed  in  most  cases  its  psychological 
bearing  is  rather  indirect. 

In  Part  I.  of  the  Handbook  of  the  American  Indian  Languages  (i) 
an  attempt  is  made  to  bring  together  material  bearing  on  the  mor- 
phology and  phonetics  of  the  American  languages  with  a  view,  ulti- 
mately, of  organizing  an  analytical  grammar.  When  more  material 
has  been  collected  in  subsequent  volumes,  an  attempt  will  be  made 
to  get  hold  of  the  phonetic  processes  involved  in  these  languages, 
so  as  to  discover  the  psychological  foundations  of  their  structure. 

Boas,  in  the  introduction  of  eighty-three  pages,  traces  the  sig- 
nificant social  and  psychological  influences  which  have  been  factors 
in  modifying  phonal,  articulatory  and  language  complexes.  His 
study  brings  out  the  fact  that  there  is  little  correlation  between  lan- 
guage, material  culture,  and  anatomical  structure  when  these  three 
elements  are  employed,  respectively,-  to  determine  ethnic  relation- 
ship between  groups  of  people.  A  difference  in  physical  type,  and 
customs,  is  noted  when  the  language  is  common;  or  one  finds  the 
anatomical  type  the  same,  but  the  language  and  the  social  customs 
at  wide  variance,  and  so  on.  This  makes  it  fairly  certain  that  sets 
of  influences  may  act  now  in  one  direction  and  now  in  another.  Boas's 
conclusion  is  that  the  biological  unit  is  safest  as  being  the  most  in- 
clusive and  permanent,  since,  obviously,  anatomical  structure  reacts 


THE  PRIMITIVE  RACES  IN  AMERICA  3Sl 

more  slowly  to  changes  than  do  either  social  customs  or  linguistic 
forms. 

Considerable  discussion  is  given  to  the  inherent  nature  of  language 
forms,  and  attention  is  called  to  the  very  limited  number  of  the 
possible  phonetic  elements  that  are  actually  employed  in  human 
speech.  Boas  holds  that  the  influence  which  determines  the  particu- 
lar group  of  phonetic  elements  that  are  used  in  a  given  language 
is  their  facility  in  articulation,  since,  all  unconsciously,  those  phonetic 
elements  are  selected  which  make  for  the  most  rapid  communication. 
All  languages  have  a  few  phonetic  elements  in  common,  but  each  has 
some  that  are  peculiar  to  itself.  One  tends  to  interpret  the  elements 
of  a  strange  speech  in  terms  of  those  phonetic  elements  with  which 
he  is  familiar,  and  thus  there  arises  always  an  error  in  placing  cor- 
rectly unfamiliar  language  forms.  In  this  way  one  accounts  for  a 
fallacy  that  has  frequently  arisen,  to  the  effect  that  primitive  peoples 
are  unable  to  differentiate  phonetic  elements.  Different  observers 
attribute  to  a  group  different  forms  of  pronunciation,  because  of  a 
personal  error  of  observation.  Boas  finds  no  correlation  between 
similarity  in  psychological  traits  of  two  peoples  and  their  language 
structure,  so  that  the  morphological  structure  of  a  language  is  little 
related  to  the  mental  development  of  a  people. 

In  the  Handbook  are  presented  also  detailed  language  studies  of 
the  Athabascans,  by  Goddard;  the  Flenguit  and  Haida,  by  Swanton; 
the  Tsimshian,  Kwakuitl,  and  Chinook,  by  Boas;  the  Maida,  by 
Dixon;  the  Algonquian,  by  Jones;  the  Siouan,  by  Boas  and  Swanton; 
and  the  Eskimo,  by  Thalbitzer.  Thus  there  is  made  available  some 
carefully  prepared  material  for  an  exhaustive  comparative  Indian 
language  study. 

Bushnell  (2)  gives  the  results  of  an  exhaustive  study  of  twelve 
Choctaws,  the  remnants  of  a  numerous  people  once  living  in  the 
Bayou  Lacomb  region  of  Louisiana.  A  few  artifacts  were  unearthed, 
which  belonged  to  the  prehistoric  inhabitants.  They  indicate  a 
relatively  low  state  of  culture,  and  indeed  the  present  inhabitants  irf 
point  of  fundamental  habits  and  customs  have  probably  undergone 
but  little  change  as  the  result  of  their  associations  with  Whites  for 
five  or  six  generations.  Their  habitations  are  still  crude,  improvised 
shelters;  their  food  habits  primitive;  their  implements  and  forms  of 
adornment  simple  and  barbaric;  nor  do  their  forefathers  seem  to 
have  given  much  attention  to  the  spiritual  or  matters  of  spirit  worship. 
Many  of  the  original  customs  and  beliefs  still  persist,  such  as  the 
form  of  tribe  and  family  organization,  the  institution  of  marriage, 


382  FRANK  G.  BRUNER 

customs  associated  with  death  and  burial,  the  form  of  punishment 
for  criminal  offences.  Bushnell  found  them  still  using  their  old 
games  and  pastimes,  and  there  has  persisted  a  firm  belief  in  their 
historic  myths  (3)  and  superstitions.  These  relate  to  an  account 
of  the  creation,  the  presence  of  sickness  and  evil,  the  origin  of  evil 
spirits,  and  many  other  myths  having  to  do  with  the  ordinary  affairs 
of  life.  Suggestive  of  the  simplicity  and  childlike  character  of  their 
mental  machinery,  is  the  direct,  uncritical  and  purely  objective 
character  of  their  explanations,  which  is  in  marked  contrast  with  the 
symbolism  of  some  of  their  neighbors  and  that  of  the  northern 
Indians.  The  influence  of  their  environment  is  directly  apparent. 
The  dense  forests  and  swamps  are  regarded  as  the  haunts  of  mys- 
terious beings  to  whom  they  attribute  all  manner  of  personal  injuries 
and  unusual  natural  phenomena.  Some  of  these  beings  are  visible 
to  the  eye,  the  presence  of  others  can  be  detected  only  by  their  sounds. 

Eastman  (5),  himself  an  Indian,  purports  to  give  an  analytical 
interpretation  of  the  Indian  mind,  his  religious  nature,  his  concept 
of  ceremonial  and  symbolic  worship,  his  moral  code  and  moral  sense, 
and  the  subtle,  spiritual,  and  ideal  elements  of  his  being.  One  is 
tempted  to  question,  however,  whether  Eastman's  Indian  is  not, 
like  Hiawatha,  more  mythical  than  real;  whether,  indeed,  he  has  not 
given  us  an  aesthetic,  highly  ethical,  and  deeply  spiritual,  interpreta- 
tion of  a  set  of  habits  and  customs,  which  was  wholly  foreign  to  the 
primitive  Indian  mind.  Eastman  tells  us  that  rightly  interpreted 
the  Indian  was  a  mystic,  that  he  was  always  thinking  of  the  deeper 
meaning  of  things,  that  to  the  Indian  there  was  a  spiritual  and  a 
physical  mind,  and  that  to  the  latter  were  relegated  ceremonials, 
charms,  incantations;  affairs  which  had  to  do  with  personal  safety, 
sickness,  food,  and  other  selfish  interests.  The  spiritual  mind  deals 
only  with  the  essence  of  things,  and  concerning  the  spiritual  the 
Indian  never  spoke.  Obviously  then  spiritual  matters  were  wholly 
intuitive,  and  since  he  never  related  his  thoughts  concerning  these 
matters,  one  could  truly  know  only  by  inference  whether  the  Indian 
felt  them. 

Eastman  is  writing  doubtless  of  the  Dakotas,  since  he  pretends 
to  speak  from  his  own  early  experiences.  These  Indians  believed 
they  possessed  a  soul  in  common  with  animals,  plants,  and  inanimate 
objects.  They  held  to  a  future  state  but  did  not  concern  themselves 
as  to  its  nature.  We  are  told,  they  were  logical  thinkers  on  matters 
within  their  experience;  that  they  were  individualistic  in  such  things 
as  religion  and  war;  and  that  they  were  fearless,  death  having  no 


THE  PRIMITIVE  RACES  IN  AMERICA  383 

dread,  since  life  had  value  simply  in  the  interest  of  family  and  friends, 
and  when  these  interests  demanded,  one  sacrificed  his  life  gladly. 
The  Indian  was  said  to  be  courageous,  as  a  matter  of  course,  yielding 
neither  to  fear,  danger,  desire,  or  agony,  it  being  disgraceful,  only, 
to  be  killed  in  a  private  quarrel. 

The  one  paramount  mystic  ceremony  that  the  Sioux  observed  was 
the  vapor  bath,  which  was  performed  with  great  solemnity,  and  is 
said  to  have  influenced  the  spiritual  life  of  the  partaker  very  pro- 
foundly. 

Eastman's  book  is  interesting  reading.  He  has  taken  the  pre- 
caution to  say  it  does  not  pretend  to  be  scientific,  and  indeed,  it  is  of 
doubtful  value  as  a  contribution  to  our  knowledge  of  the  Indian  mind. 

Grinnell  (7)  has  collected  some  legends  relative  to  two  sacred 
objects,  and  the  mystic  ceremonies  connected  with  them,  which  the 
Cheyenne  say  have  always  belonged  to  their  tribe, — the  medicine 
arrows,  and  the  sacred  Buffalo  Hat.  With  both  these  objects  are 
associated  also  mystic  culture  heroes.  The  origin  and  purpose  of  the 
objects  have  to  do  with  the  warding  off  of  danger,  and  the  provision 
of  food.  In  olden  times,  during  a  great  famine,  when  the  tribes  were 
about  to  be  stricken  off,  corn,  buffalo  and  other  game  were  brought 
by  the  mystic  appearance  of  a  strange  old  man  and  woman,  who, 
however,  remained  with  the  tribe  only  a  very  short  while,  when  they 
abruptly  disappeared.  Before  leaving,  they  enjoined  the  tribe  to 
certain  observances,  on  penalty  of  a  return  of  the  famine  should  they 
lapse.  Notwithstanding,  through  some  oversight,  the  observances 
were  not  strictly  kept  and  the  threatened  famine  immediately  followed. 
While  away  in  search  of  food  the  Buffalo  Hat  was  found  and  was 
brought  into  camp.  Immediately  it  cast  a  spell  which  caused  the 
buffalo  and  game  to  return,  and  the  corn  to  grow.  The  origin  of  the 
medicine  arrows  is  equally  mystic.  It  is  said  that  the  hero  who 
found  the  medicine  arrows  possessed  rare  spiritual  powers.  He  could, 
for  example,  change  his  form  to  that  of  an  eagle,  a  fox,  a  cloud,  or 
simply  vanish  into  vapor,  and  when  fancy  pleased  return  to  his 
human  form. 

The  Buffalo  Hat  and  the  medicine  arrows  have  been  cherished 
possessions  of  these  tribes  for  generations.  They  afford  spiritual 
protection;  are  talismans  given  them,  they  believe,  by  the  spirits  to 
help  their  people  to  health  and  plenty  in  time  of  peace,  and  in  war 
to  give  them  victory  over  their  enemies.  So  long  as  proper  reverence 
is  given  these  relics,  and  the  ceremonies  associated  with  them  are 
religiously  observed,  these  protective  gifts  are  helpful,  but  failure  in 


384  FRANK  G.  BRUNER 

these  matters  has  invariably  led  to  misfortune,  famine,  and  defeat 
by  their  enemies. 

The  Buffalo  Hat  typifies  subsistence,  the  medicine  arrows  defence. 
The  latter  were  medicine  for  men  alone,  the  women  might  look  upon 
them;  the  former  was  largely  medicine  for  women.  Grinnell  (8) 
gives  a  detailed  account  of  the  ceremonies  related  to  each  of  these 
objects,  and  the  story  of  the  capture  of  the  arrows  by  the  Pawnee  in 
one  of  their  wars.  Here  among  a  primitive  race  we  thus  find  a  form 
of  symbolism  which  indicates  considerable  power  of  mental  abstrac- 
tion. 

Swanton  (ii)  reports,  at  length,  on  the  Indians  of  the  south 
central  states.  Unfortunately,  most  of  his  data  are  from  secondhand 
sources,  so  obviously  their  value  is  correspondingly  less.  They  are 
largely  a  collation  of  the  reports  of  travellers  and  traders  who  visited 
this  region  in  the  early  days. 

In  material  culture  the  tribes,  judging  from  these  reports,  were 
not  far  advanced,  but  there  had  developed  among  them  a  very 
strongly  centralized  form  of  social  organization,  and  a  fairly  well 
organized  mode  of  religious  worship.  The  government  consisted  in  a 
despotic  control  exercised  by  a  centralized  authority,  known  as  the 
great  chief,  who  ruled  over  the  eight,  or  ten  subsidiary  chiefs  of 
surrounding  villages,  and  each  such  group  formed  an  independent 
social  unit.  Now,  in  the  central  village  of  each  group,  there  stood  a 
temple  for  the  worship  of  the  great  spirit,  and  within  each  temple  an 
altar  fire  was  kept  constantly  burning,  a  functionary  being  set  apart 
whose  exclusive  business  it  was  to  keep  the  fire  kindled  and  to  see  to 
it  that  it  should  never  become  extinguished.  It  is  said  that  some  of 
the  villages  did  not  have  true  temples,  nevertheless  the  temple  form 
of  worship  was  a  characteristic  of  the  southern  Indians.  The  temples 
were  dedicated  to  the  sun,  and  associated  with  worship  in  them  was  an 
elaborate  ceremonial.  Four  or  five  days  of  fasting,  at  the  least,  and 
the  use  of  emetics  till  the  blood  issued,  was  a  necessary  form  of 
preparation;  and  a  contrite  submission  and  silent  contemplation  was 
the  assumed  attitude  of  the  worshiper.  To  the  temple  the  father 
always  carried  his  first  fruits.  One  passing  the  edifice,  bearing  a 
burden,  must  put  it  down  and  go  through  a  form  of  exhortation  to 
appease  the  spirit  that  dwelt  within.  Legend  has  it  that  the  building 
of  temples  was  commanded  by  a  man  and  his  wife  who  visited  the 
people  from  the  sun,  and  thus  it  is  that  all  temples  were  dedicated  to 
the  sun  spirit. 

Belief  in  a  kind  of  spiritism  was  universal  with  these  people. 


THE  PRIMITIVE  RACES  IN  AMERICA  385 

They  peopled  the  universe  with  spirits,  and  the  spirits  formed  a  sort 
of  hierarchy,  with  the  sun  at  the  head  all-powerful  and  supreme. 
So  far  as  is  known,  however,  there  was  no  belief  in  anything  akin  to 
a  distinctly  evil  spirit. 

With  a  social  organization  as  complex  as  obtained  among  these 
Indians,  it  is  not  surprising  to  find  evidences  of  a  caste  system.  Social 
levels  existed,  based  on  an  hierarchy  of  totemic  clans.  Property  and 
individual  rights  were,  however,  generally  respected.  A  medical 
function  was  also  recognized,  which,  although  not  altogether  free  from 
magic,  was  far  more  highly  specialized  than  among  the  Northern 
Indians.  Polygamy  extended  to  as  many  wives  as  a  man  could 
support.  Wives  were  not  held  absolutely  to  faithfulness  to  their 
husbands  and  chastity  among  unmarried  girls  was  said  to  be  prac- 
tically non-existent. 

Freire-Marreco  (6)  has  found  evidences  from  a  close  study  of 
the  Mohave-Apache,  of  the  Verde  River,  Arizona,  which  she  believes 
controverts  some  teachings  of  many  English  anthropologists,  to  the 
effect  that  it  is  a  fundamental  characteristic  of  primitive  mind  to  be 
mobbish.  She  discovered  rather  a  loose,  individualistic  mode  of 
life  among  these  peoples,  and  this  she  throws  into  contrast  with  the 
strongly  centralized  and  coherent  social  organization  of  some  related 
tribes,  the  Pueblo  of  the  Upper  Rio  Grande,  New  Mexico.  Freire- 
Marreco  is  convinced  that  the  determining  factor  in  fixing  the  char- 
acter of  the  social  organization  of  a  primitive  people  is  not  a  natural 
mental  bent,  but  rather  the  nature  of  the  physical  environment  that 
encompasses  them.  Whether  the  obtaining  of  food,  for  example,  is 
dependent  on  cooperative  endeavor  or  the  individual  initiative  of 
the  members  of  the  group;  or  whether,  possibly,  the  nature  of  the 
environment  is  such  as  to  compel  or  preclude  cooperative  effort,  she 
holds,  carries  more  weight  in  determining  the  mode  of  life  of  a  people 
than  their  inherent  mental  make-up. 

The  Mohave-Apache  are  not  so  advanced  in  material  culture  as 
the  Pueblo.  They  live  in  small  camps,  scattered  here  and  there, 
two  hundred,  frequently,  being  spread  out  over  an  area  of  seven 
miles  square.  They  have  their  subsistence  by  hunting  and  gathering 
wild  fruit,  and  according  to  the  Pueblo  their  manner  of  life  is  more 
like  that  of  brutes  than  humans.  In  contrast  the  Pueblo  are  con- 
gregated into  compact  villages,  two  hundred  being  crowded  together 
upon  an  acre  of  ground.  They  are  agriculturists  and  carry  on  quite 
an  extensive  scheme  of  cooperative  irrigation.  A  Pueblo  spends  his 
entire  life  in  close  proximity  to  the  village  of  his  birth,  while  the 


386  FRANK  G.  BRUNER 

Mohave-Apache  wanders  away  hundreds  of  miles,  as  the  presence  or 
absence  of  food  tempts  him  to  move  on.  A  corresponding  difference 
is  noted  in  the  manner  of  internal  organization.  While  the  Mohave- 
Apache  have  no  centralized  form  of  control  or  machinery  for  coordi- 
nate effort,  except  a  war  chief  who  is  without  function  save  in  war, 
the  Pueblo  village  has  a  chief  and  council  that  exercise  rather  definite 
legislative  and  judicial  control.  Freire-Marreco  takes  as  an  illustra- 
tion of  the  differences  in  practice  of  these  forms  of  organization  the 
annual  spring  festival  dance,  a  ceremony  of  petition  to  the  great 
spirit  for  a  return  of  the  vernal  rains.  Among  the  Mohave-Apache 
any  one  may  start  the  dance  and  give  it  any  direction  that  the  impulse 
of  the  moment  may  dictate.  The  interest  grows  from  day  to  day 
and  other  individuals  and  tribes  join  in  from  time  to  time,  as  they 
become  possessed  with  the  desire.  With  the  Pueblo,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  is  radically  different.  This  feast  is  definitely  planned  in 
advance,  and  the  plans  are  submitted  to  the  council  for  ratification. 
Not  only  is  its  character  predetermined,  but  the  date  of  its  commence- 
ment and  every  detail  of  its  procedure  are  thoroughly  prearranged. 

Here  then  are  two  forms  of  social  organization  strikingly  different 
and  it  is  held  that  the  determining  influence  which  has  shaped  them, 
respectively,  is  simply  a  matter  of  difference  in  general  social  mor- 
phology. 

A  form  of  social  organization  quite  as  loose  as  that  of  the  Mohave- 
Apache  obtained  among  the  Eastern  Cree  and  Northern  Saulteau, 
reported  by  Skinner  (10).  Among  these  tribes  each  family  formed  a 
distinct  social  unit,  which  partook  of  the  patriarchal  character;  the 
sole  bond  of  cooperative  unity  appearing  to  lie  in  the  family  totem. 
Frequent  changes  in  the  location  of  camps,  because  of  food  scarcity, 
precluded  the  possibility  of  anything  like  a  permanent  village  com- 
munity. The  families  were  ordinarily  widely  scattered,  often  as 
many  as  twenty  miles  intervening  between  any  two,  and  under  such 
circumstances,  it  is  clear,  even  a  rough  cooperative  system  would 
necessarily  break  down. 

Skinner  offers  extensive  data  regarding  these  tribes,  their  habits, 
material  culture,  and  family  and  social  customs.  Polygamy  formerly 
was  common,  and  when  a  man  married  an  older  sister  he  usually 
took  the  younger  ones  also  as  they  became  old  enough.  Social 
purity  among  the  unmarried  was  not  held  as  a  virtue,  nor  was  fidelity 
of  wife  to  husband  considered  a  social  necessity. 

Animism  and  spiritism  were  highly  developed,  and  there  existed 
something  in  the  nature  of  a  spirit  worship.  At  the  proper  age  the 


THE  PRIMITIVE  RACES  IN  AMERICA  387 

young  man  would  repair  to  a  place  of  seclusion  in  the  forest,  where, 
with  fasting,  and  prayer  to  the  great  spirit,  he  awaited  his  vision,  in 
which  his  future  should  be  revealed  to  him,  with  its  possibilities  and 
limitations;  and  no  one  pretended  to  extend  his  activities  beyond 
what  his  vision  had  vouchsafed.  Conjury  was  practiced  in  the  hunt, 
in  love-making,  in  war,  and  to  avenge  a  personal  wrong.  If  one 
wished  to  harm  an  enemy,  the  spirit  left  its  body,  which  then  would 
be  stretched  out  lifeless,  whence  it  departed  to  injure  or  kill,  by  magic, 
whom  it  would.  Animals,  too,  were  believed  to  possess  spirits  as  well 
as  men,  and  their  favor,  it  was  thought,  must  be  obtained  if  that 
species  were  to  be  taken  by  the  hunter.  Indeed,  direct  communica- 
tion with  the  animal  world  was  carried  on  by  especially  gifted  indi- 
viduals. To  the  bear,  in  particular,  was  attributed  highly  human 
powers,  in  that  he  was  believed  to  understand  any  conversation  that 
he  might  overhear.  It  is  thus  apparent  that  a  very  close  kinship  was 
felt  with  the  animal  creation. 

There  was  some  medical  knowledge,  but  the  physician  must  be 
one  who  was  also  highly  skilled  in  magic.  Idiots  were  believed  to  be 
possessed  of  evil  spirits,  so  usually  they  were  killed  by  burning  at  the 
stake,  but  no  attention  or  treatment  was  accorded  the  insane. 

On  the  Negro,  only  two  scientific  studies  have  been  reported. 
Odum  (9),  in  the  one,  has  attempted  to  cover  the  entire  field  of  the 
Negro's  mental  and  social  life,  but,  unfortunately,  his  data  are  only 
from  observations  and  certain  general  interrogations.  The  present 
pressing  need  is  for  information  regarding  the  Negro  mind  secured 
under  carefully  controlled  conditions.  Odum,  however,  reports  to 
have  experienced  great  difficulty  in  securing  accurate  data,  for  the 
reason  that  the  Negro  is  naturally  untrustworthy  and  secretive.  It 
was  seldom  possible,  he  tells  us,  to  get  from  an  individual  correct 
information  regarding  any  important  details.  The  negro  is  skillful  in 
inventing  plausible  stories,  and  expanding  upon  minute  details  having 
no  foundation  in  fact.  To  obtain  acceptable  data,  it  was  necessary 
to  make  repeated  inquiries  from  various  sources  and  to  check  up 
results  constantly.  This  fact,  of  course,  is  interestingly  suggestive 
of  the  nature  of  the  Negro's  mental  machinery. 

Odum  sums  up  the  mental  qualities  of  the  Negro  as:  lacking  in 
filial  affection;  with  strong  migratory  instincts  and  tendencies;  little 
sense  of  veneration,  integrity  or  honor;  shiftless,  indolent,  untidy, 
improvident,  extravagant,  lazy,  untruthful,  lacking  in  persistence 
and  initiative,  and  unwilling  to  work  continuously  at  details.  Indeed, 
experience  with  the  Negro  in  class  rooms  indicates  that  it  is  impossible 


388  FRANK  G.  BRUNER 

to  get  the  child  to  do  anything  with  continued  accuracy,  and  similarly 
in  industrial  pursuits,  the  Negro  shows  a  woeful  lack  of  power  of 
sustained  activity  and  constructive  conduct.  Fear,  sickness,  and 
even  stupidity  are  being  constantly  feigned  to  escape  an  unpleasant 
task.  His  mind  works  mechanically.  He  is  fond  of  joining  together 
euphonious  words  and  phrases,  with  little  regard  to  their  meaning. 

The  Negro  is  said  to  love  excitement.  He  is  restless,  bumptious, 
and  sensuous.  He  will  never  work  except  when  necessity  compels. 
He  has  always  been  the  subject  of  petty  thieving,  and  Negroes  often 
commit,  unfeelingly,  savage  and  ferocious  crimes.  His  emotions  are 
for  the  most  part  of  the  physiological  type,  with  little  objective 
control.  Social  purity,  we  are  told,  is  unusual  among  girls  who 
have  reached  adolescence,  and  infidelity  among  married  women  is 
not  uncommon.  Negroes  possess  little  power  to  inhibit  sensual 
feelings  of  any  kind.  They  are  gluttonous  and  drink  liquors  to  excess. 
Anger  of  the  epileptical,  gesticulating,  maniacal  sort  is  easily  excited, 
and  a  paralysis  of  fear  sets  in  at  the  approach  of  death,  at  the  presence 
of  certain  animals  under  peculiar  conditions,  and  at  unusual  celestial 
occurrences;  and  an  inherent  terror  of  officers  of  the  law  is  said  to 
cause  constant  migrations. 

Negroes  are  gregarious,  but  the  social  instincts  of  friendship, 
loyalty  and  emulation  are  little  apparent.  Other  social  instincts, 
however,  they  possess  in  a  striking  degree.  They  are  proud,  jealous, 
stubborn,  assertive,  covetous,  egoistic.  They  are  likewise  reckless, 
assertive,  impulsive,  demonstrative,  over-religious,  fabalistic,  and 
superstitious.  Their  crimes,  Odum  holds,  are  largely  the  expression 
of  the  animal  instincts,  which  have  been  left  to  work  themselves  out 
unrestrained.  On  the  other  hand  the  Negro  is  imitative,  adaptive 
and  his  protective  instincts  are  strongly  developed.  While  very 
primitive,  therefore,  in  the  majority  of  his  traits,  he  possesses  the 
possibilities  of  development  under  proper  conditions  of  control. 

The  Negro  child  is  characterized  as  psychophysical.  He  loves 
to  sing,  but  cares  little  for  instrumental  music  other  than  the  banjo. 
He  is  fond  of  dancing  and  all  types  of  motor  activity  of  the  grosser 
sort.  He  has  a  good  memory,  both  auditory  and  visual,  and  up  to 
the  age  of  eleven  or  twelve  his  mind  is  bright  and  clear.  In  school 
the  young  child  is  alert,  eager,  attentive  and  interested,  indeed,  seems 
brighter  than  the  white  child  of  corresponding  years,  but  with  the 
oncoming  of  adolescence  mental  growth  suffers  arrest;  the  child  be- 
comes dull  and  stupid,  and  further  development  appears  to  be 
confined  to  the  physical. 


THE  PRIMITIVE  RACES  IN  AMERICA  389 

Odum  speaks  of  Negroes  as  rather  insensitive  to  pain.  They 
go  through  surgical  operations  with  relatively  few  fatalities  and  they 
convalesce  rapidly.  Negroes  are  immune  to  malaria,  and  yellow 
fever.  Fibroid  tumors  among  them  are  rare,  and  the  sequellae  of 
syphilis  and  gonorrhea  are  much  less  pronounced  than  among  whites. 
In  connection  with  this  relative  immunity  from  disease,  the  report 
of  Da  Rocha's  (4)  285  hospital  cases  of  Negroes  in  an  institution  for 
the  insane  is  interesting.  He  tells  us  that  general  paralysis,  one  of 
the  sequellse  of  syphilis,  is  extremely  uncommon  in  the  Negro  race, 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  a  large  proportion  of  both  men  and  women 
have  been  afflicted  with  gonorrhea  and  syphilis  at  least  once  during 
their  lives.  Fixed  delusions  are  rare,  and  epilepsy  occurs  very  much 
less  frequently  than  among  whites.  Senile  dementia  is  found  in  about 
the  same  proportion,  but  Negroes  are  subject  to  the  periodic  insanities 
in  greater  frequency.  It  is  interesting  that  among  the  Negro  insane 
the  women  outnumber  the  men,  whereas  with  whites  just  the  reverse 
obtains.  Da  Rocha  attributes  this  to  the  relatively  greater  stress 
of  civilization  which  falls  upon  the  Negro  woman,  rather  than  upon 
the  man  as  in  the  dominant  race,  since  upon  her  falls  the  burdern  of  the 
family  support.  Negro  women,  also,  were  found  to  be  more  addicted 
to  drunkenness  than  the  men.  Women  are  thus  more  exposed  to  the 
exigencies  of  social  life;  they  succumb  in  larger  numbers  to  its  tempta- 
tions, and  break  mentally  more  frequently  than  do  the  men. 

REFERENCES 

1.  BOAS,  FRANZ.     Handbook  of  American  Indian  Languages.     (Smithsonian  Instit. 

Bureau  of  Amer.  Ethnol.  Bull.  40.)     Washington:  Gov.  Printing  Office,  1911. 
Pp.  vi+io6"9. 

2.  BUSHNELL,  DAVID  J.  JR.     The  Choctozv  of  Bayou  Lacomb.     (Smithsonian  Instit. 

Bureau  of  Amer.  Ethnol.  Bull.  48.)     Washington:  Gov.  Printing  Office,  1909. 

Pp.  37- 

3.  BUSHNELL,  DAVID  J.  JR.     Myths  of  the  Louisiana  Choctow.     Amer.  AnthropoL, 

1910,  12,  526-535. 

4.  DA  ROCHA,  F.     Contribution  a  1'etude  da  la  folie  dans  la  race  noire.     Ann.  med.- 

psychol.,  1911,  14,  337-382. 

5.  EASTMAN,  C.  A.     The  Soul  of  the  Indian.     Boston:  Houghton  Mifflin  Co.,  1911. 

Pp.  xiii-f-171. 

6.  FREIRE-MARRECO,  BARBARA.     Two  American  Indian  Dances.     Sociol.  Rev.,  1911, 

4,  324-337- 

7.  GRINNELL,  G.  B.     Some  Early  Cheyenne  Tales.     Folk-lore,  1907,  20,  169-194; 

1908,  21,  3-54. 

8.  GRINNELL,  G.  B.     The  Great  Mysteries  of  the  Cheyenne.     Amer.  Anthropol., 

1910,  12,  542-575- 

9.  ODUM,  H.  W.     Mental  and  Social  Traits  of  the  Negro.     New  York:  Columbia 

Uni.  Contrib.  to  Econom.,  1910.     Pp.  300. 


390  /.  E.  WALLACE  WALLIN 

10.  SKINNER,  ALANSON.     The  Eastern  Cree  and  the  Northern  Saulteau.     New  York: 

Anthropol.  Papers.  Amer.  Museum  Nat.  Hist.,  1911,  9  (Pt.  I.).     Pp.  177. 

11.  SWANTON,  J.  R.     Indian  Tribes  of  the  Lower  Mississippi.     (Smithsonian  Instit. 

Bureau  of  Amer.  Ethnol.  Bull.  51.)     Washington:  Gov.  Printing  Office,  1911. 
Pp.  387. 


INDIVIDUAL  AND  GROUP  EFFICIENCY 

BY  J.  E.  WALLACE  WALLIN 

School  of  Education,  University  of  Pittsburgh 

In  the  following  pages  it  is  my  purpose  to  review  briefly  the 
efficiency  literature  which  has  appeared  during  the  last  two  years, 
and  which  admits  of  summary  under  the  following  heads. 

I.  The  Conservation  and  Increase  of  Vocational  (Industrial-Commer- 
cial) Efficiency,  by  means  of  scientific  shop  or  business  management. 

In  two  lucidly  written  and  aptly  illustrated  volumes,  Emerson  has 
presented  the  ablest  exposition  extant  of  the  philosophy  of  efficient 
industrial  management  (9),  together  with  a  codification  of  the  prac- 
tical scientific  principles  involved  (10).  He  recognizes  that  efficient 
shop  management — which  depends  on  the  establishment  of  scientific 
analytical  motion  and  times  studies,  of  time  equivalents  for  every 
operation  or  task,  and  the  adoption  of  a  standard  service  or  labor 
equivalent  for  a  given  wage — cannot  be  instituted  without  a  staff  of 
consulting  experts,  consisting  not  merely  of  efficiency  engineers  and 
wage  specialists,  but  also  of  "character  analysts,"  psychologists, 
hygienists,  physiologists,  bacteriologists  and  economists.  While 
absolute  standards  for  chemical,  physical  and  electrical  processes  can 
readily  be  set  and  enforced,  human  beings  must  be  rated,  classified 
and  treated  as  sentient,  moral  beings.  Properly  to  administer  men 
on  efficiency  principles  requires  the  expert  services  of  the  psychologist, 
physiologist,  physician  and  humanitarian.  Indeed  Emerson  avers 
that,  so  far  from  being  a  purely  engineering  problem,  the  highest  staff 
standards  are  psychological.  "It  is  psychology,  not  soil  or  climate, 
that  enables  a  man  to  raise  five  times  as  many  potatoes  per  acre  as  the 
average  of  his  own  state"  (9,  p.  107).  Moreover,  the  science  of 
industrial  efficiency  is  an  idealistic  philosophy,  and  not  merely  a  cold, 
brutal,  calculating  scheme  for  oppressing  labor — a  fact  which  has 
been  emphasized  by  Brandeis  (3),  who  argues  that  there  is  no  inherent 
incompatibility  between  the  claims  of  scientific  management  and  the 
rights  of  organized  labor.  Scientific  management  means  the  "square 
deal"  for  the  wage-worker;  shorter  hours,  without  "speeding  up"; 


INDIVIDUAL  AND  GROUP  EFFICIENCY  39 l 

more  regular  employment  and  greater  security  of  tenure;  propor- 
tionately higher  financial  returns;  instruction  for  the  inefficient;  and 
a  heightened  feeling  of  self-respect  and  interest  in  the  work. 

That  the  problem  is  in  part  both  psychological  and  pedagogical 
is  likewise  emphasized  by  Gantt  (the  author  of  the  "bonus  system"  of 
compensation,  which  provides  extra  pay  for  work  satisfactorily  done 
in  a  specified  time:  piece  work  for  the  skilled  and  day  work  for  the 
unskilled).  He  (n)  recognizes  the  need  of  a  factory  pedagogue,  who 
must  be  a  keen  analyst  as  well  as  an  efficient  teacher.  His  duties  will 
consist  in  instructing  the  workmen,  in  training  them  to  form  efficient 
vocational  habits,  and  to  acquire  habits  of  industry  and  willing 
cooperation.  The  policy  of  the  past  was  to  drive  or  force  the  wage 
worker:  in  the  future  it  must  be  to  teach  and  lead.  The  whip  must 
be  replaced  by  stimuli  derived  from  skilled  instruction,  merited 
promotion,  and  a  deserved  bonus. 

That  the  new  science  of  industrial  efficiency  cannot  justify  itself 
solely  by  its  economic  fruits,  but  must  also  be  judged  by  its  ultimate 
physiological  and  social  effects  upon  the  workers,  is  emphasized  by 
Goldmark  (120),  in  an  able  and  comprehensive  digest  of  the  literature 
bearing  on  "Fatigue  and  Efficiency"  in  industry.  (The  best  psycho- 
logical researches,  unfortunately,  receive  no  mention  in  this  volumi- 
nous compilation).  Owing  to  the  strong  tendency  to  exploit  the 
workers  which  will  exist  under  any  kind  of  management,  the  interests 
of  racial  efficiency  need  to  be  protected  by  adequate  labor  legislation. 
Such  legislation  must,  in  the  first  instance,  be  based  on  scientific 
studies  of  fatigue.  Scientific  shop  management  will  have  to  conform 
to  the  physiological  laws  (and  psychological,  forsooth)  underlying 
the  industrial  life. 

The  psychological  and  pedagogical  principles  which  may  be 
utilized  to  increase  business  efficiency  receive  their  most  explicit 
formulation  by  the  psychologist.  Scott  (19)  considers  that  human 
efficiency  is  not  solely  dependent  on  inherent  capacity,  but  on  a 
number  of  mental  factors  which  it  is  possible  intelligently  to  utilize 
by  becoming  familiar  with  the  principles  of  business  and  educational 
psychology.  Scott  discusses  a  number  of  psychological  principles 
which  can  be  practically  applied  to  increase  business  efficiency,  such 
as  imitation,  competition,  loyalty,  concentration,  wages,  pleasure, 
habit-formation  and  relaxation.1 

2.  The  Conservation  and  Increase  of  the  Efficiency  of  Eminent 
Talent,  by  the  scientific,  impersonal,  objective  study  and  control  of 

1  See  special  review  in  a  forthcoming  number  of  the  BULLETIN. 


392  /.  E.  WALLACE  WALLIN 

the  conditioning  factors  of  scientific,  literary  and  artistic  eminence, 
fame  or  genius. 

After  a  lapse  of  seven  years  Cattell  (5)  has  repeated  his  statistical 
group  study  of  the  most  eminent  American  men  of  science.  He  has 
undertaken  a  painstaking  analysis  of  the  changes  which  have  taken 
place  during  these  years,  in  the  relative  rank,  and  in  the  sectional, 
state,  city,  institutional,  professional,  sex  and  age  distribution  of 
scientific  workers  throughout  the  country.  Among  the  more  im- 
portant furthering  environmental  factors  are  geographical  location  or 
institutional  affiliation,  and  professional  position  (career).  Massa- 
chusetts and  Connecticut  continue  to  maintain  their  scientific  pre- 
eminence, while  three-fourths  of  the  leading  scientists  are  in  the 
teaching  profession — only  three  medical  men  not  teaching  in  medical 
schools  find  positions  in  the  distribution. 

Cattell's  explanation  of  the  fact  that  only  18  of  our  1,000  leading 
scientists  are  women,  as  due  to  an  "innate  sexual  disqualification," 
is  rejected  by  Hayes  (13)  and  Talbot  (22),  who  find  the  cause  in 
woman's  social  and  educational  inequalities  and  handicaps. 

Woodworth  (32)  finds  six  or  seven  factors  responsible  for  the 
fact  that  the  average  American  standard  of  scientific  productivity 
is  below  the  European  level,  of  which  the  most  important  is  our  rapid 
national,  industrial,  economic  and  educational  expansion.  The  fields 
of  industrial,  economic  and  educational  promotion,  organization  and 
administration  offer  higher  financial  and  social  rewards,  and  have 
thereby  attracted  our  best  minds. 

But  the  fact  that  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut  have  produced 
far  more  eminent  men  in  proportion  to  the  general  population  than 
Virginia,  North  Carolina  or  South  Carolina  cannot  be  accounted  for, 
according  to  Johnson  (15),  on  Wood's  hypothesis  of  the  dominance 
of  heredity  over  environment.  It  is  due,  as  shown  by  the  financial 
school  budgets  of  these  states,  to  the  greater  expenditure  of  money 
for  educational  purposes  in  New  England  than  in  the  Southern 
states. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Whethams  (29),  from  an  historiometric 
study  by  the  space  method  of  one  fifth  of  consecutive  names  in  the 
British  Dictionary  of  National  Biography,  reach  the  conclusion:  that 
able  parents  have  able  children,  provided  "like-to-like"  matings 
occur,  as  is  found  to  be  the  case  among  the  English  administrative 
and  peerage  classes.  The  comparative  inferiority  of  the  progeny 
of  artistic,  literary  or  scientific  men  is  due  to  the  fact  that  these 
classes  of  men  form  chance  alliances:  they  do  not  mate  with  their 


INDIVIDUAL  AND  GROUP  EFFICIENCY  393 

likes.  The  "  like-to-like  "  matings  thus  subserve  an  important  evolu- 
tionary function:  they  create  a  super-class  in  the  general  population. 

In  this  connection  note  may  be  made  of  Stern's  recommendation 
(20)  for  the  conservation  of  incipient  talent,  that  special-talent  classes 
and  a  special  pedagogy  should  be  provided  for  super-normal  children; 
and  of  Kiernan's  contention  (17),  that  the  genius  is  a  child  potentially 
developed,  biologically  and  psychologically,  that  he  must  be  provided 
with  a  favorable  environment,  particularly  during  the  psycho- 
biological  stress  periods,  and  that  his  potentialities  must  be  aided 
by  all-round  development  and  not  by  one-sided  stimulation,  which 
will  tend  to  upset  the  instable  bio-psychological  mechanism. 

One  sympathizes  with  the  facts,  which  are  emphasized  and  de- 
plored in  current  discussions  of  the  super-child  or  super-adult,  that 
we  lack  at  present  any  satisfactory  standard  of  genius  (the  Whethams, 
29),  that  misconceptions  of  precocity  are  widespread  (O'Shea,  18), 
and  that  the  necessity  has  not  always  been  recognized  of  clearly 
distinguishing  between  merit  and  fame  in  historiometric  discussions 
(Browne,  4).  Wood's  claim  (31)  that  historiometry  (the  objective 
statistical  treatment  and  relative  grading  of  the  fame  of  historical 
characters)  can  be  reduced  to  an  exact  science  is  denied  by  Browne 
(4),  because  this  would-be  science  does  not  possess  any  historiometric 
functions  of  constant  value.  This  is  particularly  true  of  the  adjective 
method  (the  ratio  of  the  number  of  adjectives  of  praise  to  dispraise), 
which  does  not  give  a  constant  differential  value  to  adjectives  of 
different  qualitative  importance.  Browne  considers  the  adjective 
method  inferior  to  the  space  and  reference-frequency  methods. 

3.  The  Conservation  and  Increase  of  Racial  Efficiency,  through 
eugenical  matings,  and  the  elimination  of  the  unfit  by  sterilization 
or  segregation. 

Among  the  significant  studies  of  the  hereditary  factors  involved 
in  dependency,  defectiveness  and  delinquency  are  the  family  history 
investigations  of  Davenport  (7)  and  Goddard  (12).  Davenport 
voices  his  disapproval  in  no  uncertain  terms  ("  Oh,  fie,  on  legislators 
who  spend  thousands  of  dollars  on  drastic  action  and  refuse  a  dollar 
for  an  inquiry  as  to  the  desirability  of  such  action!")  of  the  legislative 
efforts  to  eliminate  the  unfit  by  the  enactment  of  compulsory  steriliza- 
tion or  anti-procreation  laws.  He  favors  the  milder  remedy  sug- 
gested by  segregation. 

Notice  should  be  taken  of  an  attempt  to  standardize  the  methods 
of  collecting,  charting  and  analyzing  hereditary  data  (8). 

4.  The  Conservation  and  Increase  of  the  Mental  Efficiency  of  Indi- 


294  /•  E.  WALLACE  WALLI'N 

viduals,  by  means  of  the  removal  of  physical  defects  (orthophrenics 
through  orthosomatics),1  or  by  the  administration  of  proper  pharmaco- 
or  dietetico-dynamic  agents. 

Wallin  has  measured  by  serial  psychological  tests  given  throughout 
a  school  year  the  euthenical  effects  of  oral  treatment  and  prophylaxis 
on  the  working  efficiency  of  school  children— a  control  squad,  of  27 
pupils  (26).  The  contention  is  made  "that  the  desirability  of  estab- 
lishing dental  clinics  in  the  public  schools  for  free  inspection  and 
treatment  should  present  itself  to  the  taxpayer  as  a  simple  business, 
if  not  a  humanitarian,  proposition — the  paying  of  proper  dividends  on 
the  capital  invested  in  the  schools,"  the  elimination  of  preventable 
waste. 

The  elaborate  series  of  psychological  measurements  of  Rolling- 
worth  (14)  of  the  influence  of  caffein  on  various  mental  and  motor 
processes  and  on  the  sleep  and  general  health  of  a  control  squad  of 
1 6  male  and  female  adults  will  serve  as  a  model  for  similar  scientific 
investigations  in  the  future  of  the  somato-euphoric  and  psycho- 
orthogenic  effects  of  the  use  of  various  drugs,  foods,  dietaries,  etc. 
His  results  indicate  that  mental  efficiency  may  be  heightened, 
without  reactionary  after  effects,  by  the  administration  of  judicious 
doses  of  caffein  in  its  pure  form. 

Closely  related  is  5.  The  Conservation  and  Increase  of  the  Working 
Efficiency  of  the  School  Population,  of  normal  or  abnormal  pupils,  in 
elementary,  higher,  special,  rural,  urban  or  state  institutions,  by  the 
scientific  study  and  control  of  the  processes  and  agencies  which 
directly  or  indirectly  minister  to  psycho-pedagogical  proficiency. 

Perhaps  we  may  agree  with  the  eugenist  that  permanent  racial 
improvement  will  come  only  by  improving  the  inborn  qualities  of 
men  (considered  under  3,  above).  At  the  same  time,  we  are  obliged 
to  deal  with  conditions  as  we  find  them;  after  the  human  misfits  have 
been  born,  we  must  bring  them  to  maximal  efficiency  by  improving 
the  environmental  factors.  The  most  important  euthenical  agencies 
are  the  schools  and  the  training  or  corrective  institutions.  And  it 
is  gratifying  to  observe  that  in  no  field  of  modern  enterprise  is  the 

1 1  would  suggest  the  use  of  the  word  ortho-phrenic  to  designate  any  process  or 
regimen  by  means  of  which  deviate  mentality  may  be  made  to  function  aright;  the 
word  orthosomatic,  to  designate  any  process  or  regimen  by  means  of  which  any  mal- 
functioning bodily  organ  may  be  made  to  work  normally;  and  the  word  orthogenic,  as 
the  generic  term  to  apply  to  any  orthophrenic  or  orthosomatic  processes  of  restoring 
deviate  human  nature  to  normal  functioning.  All  these  processes  are  essentially  and 
specifically  pedagogico-  or  medico-corrective.  Effectually  to  apply  them  presupposes 
the  development  of  a  number  of  highly  technical  orthogenic  sciences. 


INDIVIDUAL  AND  GROUP  EFFICIENCY  395 

efficiency  problem  receiving  greater  scientific  study  than  in  the  realm 
of  education.  Here  the  major  studies  have  been  concerned  with  the 
attempt  to  determine  more  accurately  than  was  formerly  the  case 
the  current  rate  of  progress  through  the  grades  (thus  Blan,  2;  Keyes, 
16;  Strayer,  21);  with  the  introduction  of  effective  schemes  of  vary- 
ing the  rate  of  progress  through  the  grades,  so  that  the  needs  of  the 
individual  pupil  may  be  properly  conserved  (thus,  e.  g.,  the  Mann- 
heim system  of  grade  organization;  Van  Sickle,  25);  with  the  at- 
tempt to  differentiate  curricula,  so  as  to  render  them  sufficiently 
varied  to  meet  the  needs  of  all  types  of  exceptional  children  (witness 
the  recent  organization  of  special  classes,  occupational  courses,  ele- 
mentary industrial,  trade  and  continuation  schools);  with  the  effort 
to  establish  by  diagnostic,  psychological  tests,  developmental  age- 
scales  of  personal,  social,  industrial,  motor  and  intellectual  traits  for 
retarded,  average  and  accelerated  pupils,  so  that  pedagogical  or 
vocational  tasks  may  be  fitly  adjusted  to  the  level  of  functioning  of 
each  child  (thus  Wallin's  plan  for  gauging  the  efficiencies  of  a  colony 
of  epileptics,  27) ;  with  the  task  of  establishing  pedagogical  efficiency 
scores,  criteria  or  scales,  by  which  to  make  an  impersonal,  objective 
determination  of  a  child's  proficiency  in  various  branches  of  the 
curriculum,  such  as  English  composition  (Thorndike,  23),  handwriting 
(Thorndike,  24;  Ayres,  i);  and  the  fundamental  operations  in  arith- 
metic (Courtis,  6);  with  the  effort  to  deterimne  the  functional  effi- 
ciency of  various  methods  of  teaching,  such  as  the  incidental  or  drill 
method  of  teaching  spelling  (Wallin,  28,  who  fails  to  substantiate  the 
claims  of  Rice  and  Cornman,  and  who  shows  by  tests  that  spelling 
efficiency  can  be  increased  by  the  utilization  of  a  psychologically 
justifiable  drill  technique);  and  with  the  attempt  to  determine  the 
best  age  at  which  to  enter  children  in  the  schools  (Winch,  30,  who 
finds  that  there  is  no  intellectual  advantage  in  entering  children  at 
three  rather  than  at  five  in  English  schools). 

This  survey  of  the  literature  on  human  efficiency — necessarily  all 
too  brief  relatively  to  the  importance  of  the  subject — should  leave  a 
three-fold  impression  in  the  mind  of  the  reader:  first,  that  the  problem 
of  conserving  and  increasing  the  efficiency  of  the  race  is  many-sided, 
presenting  many  varied  and  complex  phases;  second,  that  the  prob- 
lem is  soluble  only  through  the  development  and  application  of  a 
distinct  scientific  technique,  sufficiently  varied  and  specialized  to  fit 
any  phase  of  the  problem;  and,  third,  that  the  problem  is  too  large 
to  be  solved  by  any  one  type  or  class  of  existing  investigator,  but 
that  it  requires  the  development  of  a  new  type  of  scientific  investiga- 


396  /.  E.  WALLACE  WALLIN 

tors,  namely,  a  cooperative  corps  of  "  efficiency  experts  "  in  physiology, 
psychology,  education,  hygiene,  medicine,  anthropology,  sociology, 
philanthropy,  economy,  chemistry,  engineering  and  jurisprudence. 

1.  AYRES,  L.  P.     A  Scale  for  Measuring  the  Quality  of Handwriting  of Schoolchildren. 

New  York:  Department  of  Child  Hygiene,  Russell  Sage  Foundation,  1912. 

2.  BLAN,  L.  B.     A   Special   Study   of  the   Incidence   of  Retardation.     New  York: 

Teachers  College,  Columbia  University,  1911.     Pp.  in. 

3.  BRANDEIS,  Louis  D.    Organized  Labor  and  Efficiency.     The  Survey,  1911,  26, 

148-151- 

4.  BROWNE,  C.  A.     The   Comparative  Value  of  Methods   of  Estimating  Fame. 

Science,  1911,  33,  77°~773- 

5.  CATTELL,  J.  McK.    A  Further  Statistical  Study  of  American  Men  of  Science. 

In  American  Men  of  Science.     New  York,  2d  ed.,  1910,  564-596. 

6.  COURTIS,  S.  A.     Standard  Scores  in  Arithmetic.     The  Elementary  School  Teacher, 

I9II,  12,   127-137. 

7.  DAVENPORT,  C.  B.     Heredity  in  Relation  to  Eugenics.    New  York:  Henry  Holt 

and  Co.,  1911.     Pp.  298. 

8.  DAVENPORT,  C.  B.,  ET  AL.     The  Study  of  Human  Heredity.     Cold  Spring  Harbor: 

Eugenics  Record  Office,  Bulletin  No.  2.     Pp.  17. 

9.  EMERSON,  H.     Efficiency  as  a  Basis  for  Operation  and  Wages.     New  York:  The 

Engineering  Magazine,  1912.     Pp.  254. 

10.  EMERSON,  H.     The  Twelve  Principles  of  Efficiency.    New  York:  The  Engineering 

Magazine,  1912.     Pp.  423. 

11.  GANTT,  H.  L.     Work,  Wages,  and  Profits.    New  York:  The  Engineering  Maga- 

zine, 1911.    Pp.  194. 

12.  GODDARD,  H.  H.    Heredity  of  Feeble-Mindedness.     American  Breeders  Magazine, 

1910,  i,  165-178. 

I2a.  GOLDMARK,  JOSEPHINE.  Fatigue  and  Efficiency,  a  Study  in  Industry.  New 
York:  Charities  Publication  Committee,  1912.  Part  L,  pp.  288.  Part  II., 
PP-  565-  (Briefs  in  defense  of  women's  labor  laws  by  Louis  D.  Brandeis  and 
Josephine  Goldmark.) 

13.  HAYES,  ELLEN.    Women  and  Scientific  Research.     Science,  1910,  32,  864-866. 

14.  HOLLINGWORTH,  H.  L.     The  Influence  of  Caffein  on  Mental  and  Motor  Efficiency. 

New  York:  Archives  of  Psychology,  No.  22,  1912.     Pp.  166. 

15.  JOHNSON,  G.  H.    Dr;  Wood's  Application  of  the  Historiometric  Method.     Science, 

19",  33,  773-775- 

16.  KEYES,  C.  H.    Progress  through  the  Grades  of  City  Schools.    New  York:  Teachers 

College,  Columbia  University,  1911.    Pp.  79. 

17.  KIERNAN,  J.  G.     Is  Genius  a  Sport,  a  Neurosis,  or  a  Child  Potentially  Developed? 

The  Alienist  and  Neurologist,  serial  articles  from  May,  1907,  to  February,  1912. 

18.  O'SHEA,   M.   V.     Popular  Misconceptions   Concerning  Precocity  in    Children. 

Science,  1911,  34,  666-674. 

19.  SCOTT,   W.   D.    Increasing  Human   Efficiency   in   Business.    New   York:   The 

Macmillan  Co.,  1912.    Pp.  339. 

20.  STERN,  W.    The  Supernormal  Child.    /.  of  Educ.  Psychol,  1911,  2,  143-148; 

181-190. 

21.  STRAYER,  G.  D.    Age  and  Grade  Census  of  Schools  and  Colleges.    Washington: 

Bulletin  No.  451,  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Education,  1911.     Pp.  144. 


NATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY  397 

22.  TALBOT,  MARION.    Women  and  Scientific  Research.     Science,  1910,  32,  866. 

23.  THORNDIKE,  E.  L.     A  Scale  of  Merit  in  English  Writing  by  Young   People. 

/.  of  Educ.  PsychoL,  1911,  2,  361-368. 

24.  THORNDIKE,  E.  L.    Handwriting.    New  York:  Teachers  College  Record,   1910. 

Pp.  93- 

25.  VAN  SICKLE,  J.,  ET  AL.     Provision  for  Exceptional  Children  in  Public   Schools. 

Washington:  Bulletin  461,  U.  S.  Bureau  of  Education,  1911.     Pp.  92. 

26.  WALLIN,  J.  E.  W.     Experimental  Oral  Euthenics.     Dental  Cosmos,   1912,   54, 

404-413 ;  545-566.  Also,  Experimental  Oral  Orthogenics.  /.  of  Phil.,  Psychol., 
etc.,  1912,  9,  290-298. 

27.  WALLIN,  J.  E.  W.     Human  Efficiency,  a  Plan  for  the  Observational,  Clinical 

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sia,  1912.) 

28.  WALLIN,  J.  E.  W.     Spelling  Efficiency,  in  Relation  to  Age,  Grade  and  Sex,  and 

the  Question  of  Transfer.  Baltimore:  Warwick  and  York,  1911.  Pp.  91. 
Also,  How  to  Increase  Spelling  Efficiency.  Atlantic  Educational  Journal,  1912, 
7,  225-226. 

29.  WHETHAM,  W.  C.  D.  &  C.  D.     Eminence  and  Heredity.     The  Nineteenth  Century, 

1911,  69,  818-832. 

30.  WINCH,  W.  H.     When  Should  a  Child  Begin  School?    Baltimore:  Warwick  & 

York,  1911.     Pp.  98. 

31.  WOODS,  F.  A.    Historiometry  as  an  Exact  Science.     Science,  1911,  33,  568-574. 

32.  WOODWORTH,  R.  S.    On  Factors  Contributing  to  a  Low  Scientific  Productivity 

in  America.     Science,  1911,  33,  374-379. 


NATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY 

BY  R.  S.  WOODWORTH 

Columbia  University 

National  psychology,  as  popularly  written,  suffers  from  a  variety 
of  defects.  Its  aim  should  be,  evidently,  first  to  determine  the  facts 
of  national  behavior,  and  then  to  seek  an  explanation  of  these  facts 
in  the  national  environment  and  heredity,  and  in  the  social  trans- 
mission to  later  generations  of  what  has  been  acquired  in  the  history 
and  experience  of  the  nation.  To  work  back  from  the  behavior  of  a 
nation  to  its  native  traits  is  no  easy  task,  and  to  infer  a  difference  in 
national  temperament  or  mentality  from  a  difference  in  the  behavior 
of  two  nations  is  illegitimate  unless  the  past  experience  and  training 
of  the  two  nations  are  evaluated.  It  is  a  common  defect  of  national, 
or  international  psychology  to  ignore  this  difficulty  and  to  jump  at 


398  R.  S.  WOODWORTH 

once  from  differences  in  behavior  to  differences  in  national  traits. 
No  less  a  defect  appears  in  the  description  of  national  behavior;  for 
those  who  compare  nations  seem  to  have  an  irresistible  tendency  to 
seek  for  contrasts,  which  leads  them  to  hasty  generalizations  as  to 
the  facts  of  behavior.  The  great  individual  differences  which  exist 
within  any  nation  are  neglected,  and  the  nation  is  spoken  of  as  if  all 
its  members  behaved  in  the  same  way;  and,  further,  no  note  is  taken 
of  the  inconsistencies  that  appear  in  a  nation's  behavior  when  exam- 
ined in  different  particulars.  The  whole  subject,  whether  in  respect 
to  the  facts  or  in  respect  to  their  interpretation,  is  in  a  most  unscien- 
tific and  unsatisfactory  state. 

The  two  books  here  noticed  are  not  worse  than  others  on  national 
psychology.  That  of  Low  (i)  is  rather  to  be  called  unusually  good. 
It  is  a  fair-minded  attempt  to  understand  the  character  of  the  Amer- 
ican people  as  revealed  in  their  political  and  economic  behavior,  and 
follows  their  history  from  the  settlement  of  the  country  to  the  present. 
The  author's  main  contention  is  that  the  American  character  is 
essentially  British,  modified  by  the  conditions  of  life  in  the  new 
country  but  not  by  the  non-British  elements  of  the  population. 
These  last  have  been  assimilated  by  a  process  which  is  sketched  as 
follows.  At  any  given  time,  the  newly  arrived  immigrants  find 
places  near  the  bottom  of  the  economic  scale,  so  that  the  contrast 
between  native  Americans  and  foreigners  is  equivalent  to  a  contrast 
between  higher  and  lower  social  classes,  and  the  effort  to  rise  in  the 
social  scale  resolves  itself  into  an  effort  to  become  Americanized. 
A  sort  of  polarity  pervades  the  population,  and  every  one  strives 
away  from  the  foreign  pole  and  towards  the  native  pole.  The 
older  stock  does  not  take  on  the  ways  of  the  newer  arrivals,  but 
these  take  on  the  ways  of  the  older  stock  to  such  an  extent  as  to 
become  indistinguishable  from  it  in  the  second  or  third  generation. 

Meanwhile,  however,  the  national  character  does  not  remain 
unchanged,  but  responds  to  changing  conditions  by  the  development 
of  new  traits  which  are  transmitted  from  father  to  son  and  outlive 
the  special  conditions  that  gave  rise  to  them.  The  American's 
"disrespect  for  law" — a  generalization  which,  by  the  way,  needs  to 
be  tested  by  a  much  broader  examination  of  the  facts  than  the  author 
attempts — was  a  natural  response  to  the  conditions  of  pioneer  life 
combined  with  the  absence  of  a  governing  class;  but,  originating  in 
this  way  as  a  reaction  to  the  environment,  it  was  so  bred  into  the 
bone  as  to  become  a  hereditary  trait.  Here,  it  will  be  seen,  the 
author  is  on  shaky  biological  ground;  and,  in  fact,  he  nowhere  shows 


NATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY  399 

a  sense  for  the  biological  side  of  his  theme.  But  his  book  is  valuable 
for  its  social  analysis,  and  for  its  study  of  the  mental  and  moral 
traits  that  have  been  prominent  in  American  history. 

Andre  (2)  is  concerned  with  the  mental  and  moral  traits  of  the 
Spanish  people.  He  raises  the  question,  why  Spain  lags  behind  in 
the  march  of  modern  progress,  and  seeks  his  answer  in  an  imperfect 
adaptation  to  modern  requirements  of  the  Spanish  character  and 
ideals  of  life.  According  to  him,  the  Spanish  people  are  lacking  in 
industry,  energy,  initiative  and  scientific  curiosity,  and  have  not 
caught  the  spirit  of  work  which  is  the  life  of  the  progressive  indus- 
trial nations.  How  far  this  lack  of  energy  and  industry  is  inherent 
in  the  national  heredity,  how  far  it  is  due  to  climate,  how  far  to 
poverty  and  insufficient  nutrition,  and  how  far  to  custom  and  tradi- 
tional ideals,  the  author  does  not  seriously  set  himself  to  decide, 
though  he  mentions  all  of  these  factors  and  lays  stress  on  the  last 
two.  The  book  is  a  jeremiad  preached  by  the  author  to  his  country- 
men, and  certainly  exaggerates  the  differences  between  the  Spanish 
and  other  peoples.  It  forcibly  calls  attention  to  an  interesting 
problem  in  national  psychology,  without  contributing  much  of  scien- 
tific value  either  in  the  way  of  facts  or  in  their  analysis.  It  abounds, 
however,  in  interesting  ethical  discussions. 

REFERENCES 

1.  Low,  A.  MAURICE.     The  American  People.     Boston  and  New  York:  Houghton 

Mifflin  Co.     Vol.  II.,  1911.     Pp.  608.     $2.25  net. 

2.  ANDRE,  ELOY  Luis.     Etica  espanola.    Madrid:  M.  G.  Hernandez,  1910.     Pp.  304. 


SPECIAL  REVIEWS 
THE  STUDY  OF  PRIMITIVE  RACES 

V or s Mage  zur  psychologischen    Untersuchung  primitiver    Menschen. 

Beiheft  zur  Zsch.  f.  angew.  Psycho  I.  u.  psychol.   Sammeljorsch.     I 

Theil.     Leipzig,  1912.     Pp.  124. 

These  "Vorschlage"  form  the  first  of  a  series  of  contributions  on 
the  psychological  study  of  primitive  man.  It  is  intended  to  provide 
instructions  in  simple  tests  for  all  those,  such  as  missionaries,  teachers 
of  native  schools,  officials,  doctors  and  the  like,  who  come  into  con- 
tact with  men  in  primitive  stages  of  culture.  The  preface  suggests 
that  all  users  of  the  study  and  others  interested  ally  themselves 
with  the  Institut  fur  Angewandte  Psychologie,  which  will  furnish 
descriptions  and  illustrations  of  the  tests,  preserve  the  data  acquired 
and  offer  the  Zeitschrift  as  the  organ  for  the  publication  of  the  results. 

The  work  consists  of  a  series  of  1 1  reports  by  four  men  on  special 
topics,  with  an  introduction  and  supplement  by  a  fifth,  making  a 
total  of  124  pages. 

Twenty-seven  pages  are  given  to  the  Introduction  by  Thurnwald, 
in  which  he  discusses  the  problems  of  ethnopsychological  investiga- 
tion. The  study  of  man  involves  not  only  his  physical  side  but  also 
his  mental  side  and  his  relations  to  his  environment,  both  natural 
and  social.  These  separate  aspects  of  men  are  so  interwoven  that 
no  one  of  the  problems  can  be  solved  independently  of  the  others. 
In  the  past  the  psychological  aspect  has  been  the  most  neglected.  In 
the  questionnaires  in  which  psychological  questions  have  appeared, 
the  answers  have  been  of  little  value  on  account  of  the  vagueness  of 
the  questions  and  the  lack  of  skilled  investigators. 

The  infinitely  manifold  phenomena  of  social  and  cultural  life 
are  merely  the  varying  effect  of  different  arrangements  of  relatively 
few  simple  elements,  factors  and  conditions.  The  working  of  these 
elements  in  the  social  process,  which  is  mediated  through  the  psychic 
factors,  is  a  constant.  It  is  necessary  first  to  seek  out  these  elements 
and  study  them  rather  than  the  complex  structures  which  they  form, 
—this  is  the  duty  of  the  ethno-psychologist.  For  this  purpose  the 
study  of  certain  individuals  of  a  group  is  of  more  value  than  a  study 
of  the  general  culture  of  a  community.  If  one  wishes  to  get  an 

400 


THE  STUDY  OF  PRIMITIVE  R4CES  401 

average  value  for  some  quality  of  a  group,  he  may  observe  a  few 
typical  cases  from  that  group,  keeping  in  mind  the  fact  of  individual 
differences  and  the  difficulty  of  isolating  the  subject  for  experimental 
purposes.  Since  today  there  are  no  ethno-psychological  norms, 
these  must  be  built  up  from  just  such  tests  as  the  present  collection 
represents.  When  such  norms  are  established,  the  further  investi- 
gation in  this  field  will  be  comparatively  simple. 

Thurnwald  points  out  the  following  sources  of  error  which  the 
use  of  tests  on  primitive  peoples  involves:  (i)  The  influence  of  the 
experimenter  will  be  a  big  factor,  especially  where  the  problems  are 
put  into  the  hands  of  untrained  observers.  Such  a  one  must  have 
not  only  a  knowledge  of  experimental  methods  but  he  must  be  en- 
dowed with  infinite  patience  to  perform  preliminary  experiments, 
in  order  that  the  test  may  be  rightly  understood.  (2)  Exact  work 
will  be  impossible  where  the  laboratory  is  a  clearing  in  the  forest  or 
perhaps  a  native's  hut.  (3)  There  will  be  an  almost  complete  lack 
of  apparatus  on  account  of  the  difficulty  of  transportation,  weather 
conditions,  lack  of  electricity,  etc.  (4)  The  greatest  difficulty  will 
be  the  lack  of  comprehension  both  of  the  general  attitude  toward  the 
experiment  and  of  the  means  of  expression.  The  use  of  an  inter- 
preter will  be  of  doubtful  value,  so  that  the  tests  must  be  so  con- 
structed as  to  demand  the  smallest  possible  amount  of  speech. 

The  ultimate  aim  of  the  tests  is  to  show  not  merely  differences 
between  the  primitive  peoples  and  ourselves,  but  to  draw  distinc- 
tions among  the  primitive  social  groups,  which  shall  be  of  practical 
value  to  all  who  are  brought  into  political  or  economic  relations  with 
them. 

The  optical  space  sense  is  discussed  by  Tschermak  in  13  pages. 
No  great  differences  are  to  be  expected  in  this  field,  which  is  based 
on  relatively  simple  processes,  and  which,  so  far  as  we  can  judge,  is 
the  same  in  the  higher  animals.  An  accurate  study  of  this  sense 
would  require  considerable  apparatus,  but  certain  tests  have  been 
selected  which  require  very  little  more  than  objects  of  nature.  These 
are  tests  to  determine  the  knowledge  of  the  directions  of  space, 
accuracy  of  the  judgment  of  the  vertical  and  horizontal  directions, 
visual  acuity,  visual  illusions,  binocular  vision,  using  the  simple 
stereoscope  and  various  tests  for  detecting  squint. 

Guttmann,  who  contributes  the  report  on  the  color  sense  in  12 
pages,  considers  this  the  most  difficult  sense  for  the  ordinary  indi- 
vidual to  test.  It  presupposes  a  knowledge  of  one's  own  color  sense, 
of  the  various  forms  of  color-blindness  with  their  symptoms,  that  is, 


402  REVIEWS 

total  color-blindness,  partial  color-blindness,  color  weakness  and  the 
various  transition  forms.  It  presupposes  a  knowledge  of  the  diagnos- 
tic methods  and  control  of  the  technique  of  these  methods.  The  lack 
of  color  terminology  in  the  natives  makes  judgments  of  colored  yarns 
or  papers  impossible,  except  the  judgment  of  likeness  and  difference. 
For  the  various  tests  on  color  vision,  Guttmann  recommends  Nagel's 
diagnostic  tables,  on  account  of  their  simplicity  and  cheapness.  By 
these  tests  one  can  determine  the  frequency  of  color-blindness  and 
of  .the  different  forms  of  color-blindness  compared  with  the  cultured 
races.  Among  primitive  peoples  there  should  be  a  good  opportunity 
for  the  study  of  heredity  of  the  defects  of  color  vision.  All  visual 
disturbances  should  be  a  large  social  factor  among  people  with  whom 
almost  every  vocation  depends  on  the  sense  of  vision  and  where  no 
corrective  means  are  at  hand. 

Lipmann  on  memory  and  comprehension  considers  the  function  of 
the  memory  tests  not  to  determine  general  laws  of  memory  which 
have  been  worked  out  under  more  favorable  circumstances,  but  to 
make  tests  that  shall  show  the  absolute  amount  of  material  retained 
by  different  races  or  groups  under  similar  conditions.  He  considers 
it  more  practicable  to  give  one  test  only  of  each  kind  to  each  indi- 
vidual, and  to  compensate  for  this  by  testing  a  large  number  of 
individuals.  This  plan  must  be  adopted  on  account  of  the  scarcity 
of  available  material,  and  on  account  of  the  effect  of  practice,  when 
the  same  material  is  used.  The  series  of  tests  consists  of  memory 
for  simple  tones,  colors  and  weights,  and  tests  to  determine  the  types 
of  memory.  In  the  tests  for  associative  memory  nonsense  syllables 
are  replaced  by  form-color,  German  and  native  words,  and  simple 
words  and  objects.  The  material  for  all  of  the  tests  is  obtainable 
from  the  Institut. 

The  tests  on  suggestion,  also  by  Lipmann,  are  introduced  by  a 
series  of  questions  to  be  answered  by  the  investigator  concerning 
the  part  played  by  suggestion  in  the  daily  life  of  the  people.  Then 
follow  a  number  of  simple  tests  under  the  heads  of  suggestion  of  per- 
ception, of  memory,  hypnotic  suggestion,  auto-suggestion,  and  the 
various  combinations  of  these  forms. 

The  study  of  the  time  sense  by  Vierkandt  and  Stern  consists  of 
17  series  of  questions  relating  to  the  method  of  telling  the  time  of  day, 
the  method  of  recording  the  time  in  the  past,  the  application  of 
time  measurement  to  practical  purposes,  how  closely  small  inter- 
vals of  time  can  be  judged,  etc.  A  few  simple  experiments  with  the 
metronome  are  suggested. 


THE  STUDY  OF  PRIMITIVE  RACES  403 

Vierkandt  contributes  a  series  of  12  questions  on  counting,  as  to 
the  methods  of  counting,  the  existence  of  collective  words  like  dozen, 
score,  and  the  like,  and  the  knowledge  of  the  number  of  ordinary 
objects  such  as  the  fingers,  teeth,  etc.  All  of  the  questions  must  be 
answered  from  the  general  observation  of  the  student. 

Stern  and  Meinhof  report  on  expressive  movements  and  speech. 
Concerning  the  former  the  aim  is  to  discover  whether  expressive 
movements  are  constant  for  the  same  emotional  state  and  whether 
these  movements  correspond  to  those  of  cultured  races.  The  ques- 
tions on  speech  relate  to  the  presence  of  the  different  grammatical 
forms  such  as  adverbs,  interjections,  etc.,  and  of  forms  of  speech 
peculiar  to  certain  classes  of  people,  as  workmen,  or  priests.  All  are 
questions  to  be  answered  from  general  observation. 

The  next  four  sections,  all  of  them  of  the  questionnaire  type,  are 
by  Vierkandt.  The  section  on  drawing  and  art  gives  instructions 
for  studying  the  drawings  common  to  the  natives  and  for  obtaining 
drawings  from  simple  models.  Attention  is  given  to  their  knowledge 
of  perspective,  angles  and  position  of  objects.  This  section  also 
contains  a  series  of  questions  on  the  native  songs,  dances  and  stories. 
The  section  on  convictions  and  manner  of  thought  considers  the  nature 
of  the  native  interest  in  things,  whether  it  be  of  a  theoretical  or 
practical  sort,  their  tendency  toward  lying  and  whether  it  be  un- 
conscious or  toward  definite  ends,  the  nature  of  their  belief  in  myths, 
spirits,  etc.  The  sociology  of  the  native  to  which  12  pages  are  given 
makes  up  the  tenth  section.  It  consists  almost  entirely  of  questions 
concerning  the  leaders  of  groups,  social  stratification,  the  life  and 
training  of  the  children,  and  their  relation  to  their  parents  and  to  each 
other.  There  are  two  groups  of  questions  on  forms  of  play,  ten  on 
family  and  altruistic  relations,  several  on  moral  ideals  and  conditions 
of  immorality,  Then  there  is  a  long  series  of  questions  on  the  varia- 
tion in  customs,  their  source,  the  influence  of  neighboring  and  foreign 
peoples  upon  the  native  customs.  Section  n  deals  with  the  native 
philosophy,  the  ideas  of  the  nature  of  matter,  of  death,  immortality, 
their  explanation  of  disease,  etc. 

In  a  supplement  Thurnwald  points  out  further  the  difficulties 
attendant  upon  the  use  of  the  preceding  tests.  Probably  the  greatest 
difficulty  is  that  of  the  language,  the  fact  that  the  greater  part  of  the 
information  must  be  obtained  from  conversation  with  the  natives. 
This  difficulty  can  be  overcome  only  by  years  spent  among  the  people. 
Success  or  failure  depends  on  the  investigator;  the  outlines  given  can 
only  point  out  the  way  and  suggest  the  line  of  study,  and  the  value 


404  REVIEWS 

of  the  data  obtained  will  be  in  proportion  to  the  ingenuity  and 
originality  of  the  student. 

This  Beiheft  contains  neither  a  short  cut  through  the  difficulties  of 
ethno-psychological  investigations  nor  an  escape  from  them.  But 
by  very  simple  experiments  and  by  short,  explicit  questions  it  aims 
to  have  the  material  take  some  definite  form.  Only  in  this  way  can 
the  questionnaire  method  produce  a  mass  of  data  which  can  be 
presented  in  a  statistical  form  for  comparative  study.  For  this  one 
reason  alone  the  monograph  should  be  welcomed  by  all  those  inter- 
ested in  a  scientific  study  of  social  problems  among  primitive  people. 

A.    T.    POFFENBERGER,   JR. 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 

THE  MIND  OF  PRIMITIVE  MAN 

The  Mind  of  Primitive  Man.     FRANZ  BOAS.     New  York:  The  Mac- 

millan  Co.,  1911.     Pp.  x  +  294- 

This  book  contains  the  lectures  delivered  by  the  author  before  the 
Lowell  Institute  and  the  National  University  of  Mexico,  1910-1911. 
It  is  not  often  that  so  small  a  book  represents  so  much  maturity  of 
scholarship  and  so  extended  research.  The  lectures  were  a  revision 
and  enlargement  of  some  articles  published  in  various  journals  at 
different  times.  There  are  altogether  ten  chapters,  one  being  a 
short  summary  of  the  first  eight.  The  book  is  peculiarly  destructive 
to  popular  and  scientific  theories  about  primitive  people.  In  fact 
it  may  be  said  right  at  the  beginning  that  according  to  the  author 
there  is  no  primitive  mind;  there  is  just  mind  and  that  is  the  same  in 
all  essentials  wherever  it  is  found  in  the  genus  homo.  The  outcome  of 
the  book  is  something  quite  different,  however,  from  destructive 
criticism.  While  it  shows  the  untenableness  of  most  current  views  of 
primitive  and  savage  peoples  and  so  clears  the  field,  it  is  most  con- 
structive in  showing  how  trustworthy  results  may  be  won  and  where 
the  field  lies  that  needs  most  working.  The  book  marks  the  close  of 
the  period  in  the  science  of  anthropology  for  hasty  generalization^and 
unwarranted  speculation.  The  spirit  of  optimism  and  of  respect  for 
all  human  quality  is  its  dominating  note;  it  tends  on  every  page  to 
wholesome-mindedness. 

Under  racial  prejudice  the  assumption  that  achievement  by  a 
race  is  evidence  of  aptitude  is  examined  and  rejected.  Emphasis 
is  laid  (p.  7)  upon  the  carrying  of  ideas  and  inventions  from  one  race 
to  another.  It  is  not  greater  national  endowment  but  better  chance 


THE  MIND  OF  PRIMITIVE  MAN  405 

that  accounts  for  achievement*  The  period  of  cultural  history  is 
very  short  in  comparison  with  the  history  of  the  race  (p.  9).  Ease  of 
diffusion  explains  the  rapid  rise  in  Europe  (p.  13).  He  holds  that 
"the  variations  in  cultural  development  can  as  well  be  explained  by 
a  consideration  of  the  general  course  of  historical  events  without 
recourse  to  the  theory  of  material  differences  of  mental  faculty  in 
different  races." 

In  the  chapter  on  influence  of  environment  the  problems  set  are: 
"the distinctions  between  races"  and  "distinctions  between  the  social 
strata  of  the  same  race."  Given  traits  appear  more  frequently 
among  some  races  than  among  others;  the  "varieties  that  constitute 
each  race  overlap."  This  overlapping  is  greater  with  some  traits 
than  with  others,  and  some  traits  do  not  extend  to  all  races.  The 
author  favors  the  influence  of  environment  rather  than  that  of  selec- 
tion, pointing  to  his  and  Bowditch's  work  in  comparing  the  children 
born  in  America  with  their  European  relatives.  This  is  restricted 
by  the  "assumption  of  a  strictly  limited  plasticity."  The  factors 
that  impinge  upon  this  plasticity  are  "change  of  nutrition  and  mode 
of  life,"  "conscious  selection,"  and  "crossing."  The  study  here  turns 
upon  domesticated  animals. 

"Articulate  language,  the  use  of  implements  and  the  power  of 
reasoning  belong  to  all  members  of  the  human  species  as  opposed  to 
the  higher  animals."  "Hereditary  mental  faculty  was  not  improved 
by  civilization."  Between  primitive  and  civilized  man  there  is  the 
difference  only  of  frequency  of  occurrence  for  given  traits.  The 
power  to  inhibit  impulses,  to  give  attention  and  to  reason  clearly 
come  out  upon  different  occasions,  but  all  types  have  them.  The 
present  types  of  race  are  older  than  languages  and  each  type  has 
doubtless  produced  many  languages.  There  are  common  classifica- 
tions and  formal  elements  in  all  languages.  The  development  of 
language  is  dependent  upon  thought,  not  thought  upon  language — 
a  conclusion  by  no  means  well  supported. 

Under  the  universality  of  cultural  traits,  it  is  said,  "We  may 
therefore  base  our  further  considerations  on  the  theory  of  the  simi- 
larity of  mental  functions  in  all  races,"  and  "much  more  detailed 
similarities  in  thought  and  action  occur  among  the  most  diverse 
peoples."  Four  current  views  are  offered:  first,  similarities  appear 
in  similar  types  of  environment;  second,  common  customs  and  beliefs 
are  "an  old  heritage  derived  from  the  earliest  times";  third,  some 
have  tried  "to  isolate  the  most  generalized  forms  of  similar  ethnic 
phenomena";  and  fourth,  similarities  are  to  be  explained  by  "analysis 


406  REVIEWS 

of  mental  processes."  Under  the  first  is  allowed  that  analogues  of 
culture  are  found  among  a  vast  variety  of  peoples.  But  customs 
prevail  (p.  159)  outside  of  suitable  environments  where  they  may 
work  injury.  Parallel  and  independent  cultures  may  have  arisen. 
Inner  growth  of  a  race  and  dispersion  of  culture  both  need  considera- 
tion. "And  we  may  infer  that  the  simpler  the  observed  fact,  the 
more  likely  it  is  that  it  may  have  developed  from  one  source  here, 
from  another  there"  (p.  192).  In  regard  to  the  evolutionary  point 
of  view,  "serious  objection  may  be  made  against  the  assumption  of 
the  occurrence  of  a  general  sequence  of  cultural  stages";  "we  recog- 
nize a  peculiar  tendency  of  diverse  customs  and  beliefs  to  converge 
towards  similar  forms."  Development  is  not  from  simple  to  com- 
plex, but  rather  is  there  an  intercrossing  of  two  opposite  tendencies — 
one,  from  the  simple  to  complex,  and  the  other  from  the  complex  to 
the  simple. 

Some  traits  of  primitive  culture  are,  (i)  conditions  of  objects 
are  often  considered  as  independent  realities;  (2)  classifications  in 
language  never  rise  into  consciousness,  while  others  do;  (3)  object 
and  attribute  are  treated  differently;  (4)  power  of  will  and  motion  are 
identified  as  one;  (5)  the  wide  inclusion  of  blood  relationships  in  the 
incest  group;  and  (6)  the  perceptions  of  the  senses  are  excellent  and 
the  power  of  logical  interpretation  is  deficient.  This  difference  the 
author  regards  as  due  to  the  traditional  ideas  current  in  the  race 
and  not  to  deficiency  in  mental  endowment.  The  difference  between 
primitive  and  civilized  man  lies  in  the  character  of  the  traditional 
material  with  which  new  perceptions  are  assimilated.  An  under- 
standing of  the  myths  is  the  keynote  of  primitive  society.  This 
accords  with  the  general  tenor  of  the  book,  that  it  is  tradition  and  not 
morphological  character  that  differentiates  races  and  the  primitive 
man  from  the  cultured.  "Any  one  familiar  with  primitive  life  will 
know  that  the  children  are  constantly  exhorted  to  follow  the  example 
of  their  elders,  and  every  collection  of  carefully  recorded  traditions 
contains  numerous  references  to  advice  given  by  parents  to  children, 
impressing  them  with  the  duty  to  observe  the  customs  of  the  tribe" 
(p.  240).  Here  the  direct  influence  of  education  points  in  the  same 
way  as  the  general  treatment  of  the  book,  that  the  differences  among 
men  are  chiefly  due  to  environment  as  hindering  or  aiding  in  the 
spread  of  culture,  that  these  differences  do  not  extend  below  the 
level^  of  custom  and  belief,  and  that  customs  and  beliefs  have  no 
considerable  selective  power  upon  the  races  of  men.  The  chapter  at 
the  close  upon  the  race  problems  in  America  carries  out  the  argument 


NOTES  AND  NEWS  407 

of  the  book.  America  presents  no  entirely  new  situations  and  its 
problems  are  being  met  in  much  the  same  way  as  race  mixtures  have 
been  met  in  the  past.  Prejudice  is  not  going  to  hinder  permanently 
the  amalgamation  of  the  races  and  there  is  no  good  reason  for  regard- 
ing the  negro  as  inferior.  Genius  is  only  a  more  rare  occurrence  in 
this  race  than  in  his  white  neighbor.  His  closing  sentence  deserves 
emphasis:  "We  should  learn  to  look  upon  foreign  races  with  greater 
sympathy,  and  with  the  conviction,  that,  as  all  races  have  contributed 
to  the  past  cultural  progress  in  one  way  or  another,  so  they  are  capable 
of  advancing  the  interests  of  mankind,  if  we  are  only  willing  to  give 
them  a  fair  opportunity." 

T.  L.  BOLTON 

KANSAS  UNIVERSITY 

BOOKS  RECEIVED  DURING  SEPTEMBER 

GODDARD,  H.  H.  The  Kallikak  Family.  New  York:  Macmillan 
Co.,  1912.  Pp.  xv  +  121.  $1.50  net. 

HRDLICKA,  A.  Early  Man  in  South  America  (Bureau  of  American 
Ethnology,  Bulletin  52).  Washington:  Gov.  Printing  Office, 
1912.  Pp.  xv +405. 

KEMMERICH,  M.  Prophezeiungen:  alter  Aberglaube  oder  neue  Wahrheit  ? 
Munich:  A.  Langen,  1911.  Pp.  435. 

HACK,  V.  Das  Wesen  der  Religion  nach  A.  Ritschl  und  A.  E.  Bieder- 
mann.  Leipzig:  Quelle  und  Meyer,  1911.  Pp.  56. 

JONES,  E.  Der  Alptraum  in  seiner  Bezeihung  zu  gewissen  Formen  des 
mittelalterlichen  Aberglaubens .  (Deutsch  von  E.  H.  Sachs.)  Leip- 
zig und  Wien:  Franz  Deuticke,  1912.  Pp.  140.  M.  5. 

NOTES  AND  NEWS 

DR.  MADISON  BENTLEY,  assistant  professor  of  psychology  in 
Cornell  University,  has  accepted  a  professorship  of  psychology  at 
the  University  of  Illinois. 

DR.  H.  P.  WELD,  of  Clark  University,  has  been  called  to  an 
assistant  professorship  of  psychology  at  Cornell  University. 

DR.  GEORGE  F.  ARPS  has  been  called  from  the  position  of  assist- 
ant professor  of  psychology  at  the  University  of  Illinois  to  a  profes- 
sorship of  psychology  at  Ohio  State  University. 

DR.  W.  F.  BOOK,  professor  of  psychology  and  philosophy  at  the 


408  NOTES  AND  NEWS 

State  University  of  Montana,  and  for  the  past  two  years  instuctor 
in  the  summer  school  of  Columbia  University,  has  accepted  a  pro- 
fessorship of  educational  psychology  at  Indiana  University,  to  suc- 
ceed Dean  W.  A.  JESSUP,  who  goes  to  the  State  University  of  Iowa. 

PRENTICE  REEVES,  A.B.,  of  the  University  of  Missouri,  has  been 
made  instructor  in  psychology  at  Princeton  University. 

THE  present  number  of  the  BULLETIN,  dealing  with  race  and  in- 
dividual psychology,  has  been  prepared  under  the  editorial  care  of 
DR.  H.  L.  HOLLINGWORTH,  of  Columbia  University. 

PROFESSOR  ROBERT  H.  GAULT,  of  Northwestern  University,  has 
been  advanced  to  the  position  of  managing  editor  of  the  Journal  of 
Criminal  Law  and  Criminology,  the  official  organ  of  the  American 
Association  of  Criminal  Law  and  Criminology. 

JOHN  MADISON  FLETCHER,  PH.D.,  has  been  appointed  assistant 
professor  of  experimental  and  clinical  psychology  at  the  Newcomb 
College  School  of  Education,  Tulane  University. 

THE  following  items  are  taken  from  the  press: 

CARL  P.  BOCK  has  been  made  assistant  in  experimental  psychol- 
ogy at  the  University  of  Missouri  to  fill  the  vacancy  created  by  the 
resignation  of  A.  P.  WEISS,  who  has  accepted  an  instructorship  in 
Ohio  State  University. 

PROFESSOR  E.  C.  WILM  has  been  called  from  Washburn  College 
to  the  chair  of  philosophy  and  psychology  at  Wells  College. 

RUDOLF  PINTNER,  PH.D.  (Leipzig),  has  been  appointed  professor 
of  psychology  and  education  at  Toledo  University. 


I 

Vol.  IX.  No.  ii.  November  15,  1912 

THE 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN 


GENERAL  REVIEWS  AND  SUMMARIES 

VOLITION  AND  MOTOR  CONSCIOUSNESS— THEORY 

BY  PROFESSOR  E.  B.  DELABARRE 
BROWN  UNIVERSITY 

The  papers  here  brought  together  deal  with  several  different 
phases  of  the  problem  of  volition:  (i)  The  extent  to  which  move- 
ment or  action  can  be  regarded  as  a  factor  in  human  consciousness; 

(2)  the  nature  of  the  immediate  antecedents  of  voluntary  action; 

(3)  the  question  as  to  the  highest   type  of   action;    and   (4)  the 
problem  of  human  freedom. 

I.  With  the  growing  emphasis  in  recent  thought  on  the  active, 
functional  and  pragmatic,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  in  psychology 
this  movement  would  appear  in  the  form  of  an  attempt  to  under- 
stand all  consciousness  in  motor  terms.  Accordingly,  Kostyleff 
(10)  believes  that  consciousness  is  connected  with  the  motor  rather 
than  the  sensory  side  of  the  organism,  and  advances  a  dynamic 
conception  based  on  the  functional  development  of  reflexes  as 
opposed  to  the  current  view  that  mental  states  are  directly  due 
to  inflowing  currents  or  to  revivals  of  these.  Pradines  (14)  also 
claims  that  action  is  the  whole  of  life,  and  is  free  and  undetermined, 
as  is  all  reality.  Knowledge  is  nothing  but  a  form  of  action,  which 
has  come  to  forget  its  own  nature.  Alexander  (i)  makes  a  syste- 
matic attempt  to  sketch  a  complete  conational  psychology.  The 
objects  of  contemplation  are  non-mental.  Conation,  the  act  of 
contemplating  or  "enjoying,"  alone  is  mental,  with  feeling  as  one 
of  its  modalities.  Psychology  must  describe  all  forms  of  conscious- 
ness as  a  series  of  conative  acts,  show  their  relation  to  their  non- 
mental  cognita,  and  make  clear  how  they  assume  a  speculative  as 
well  as  a  practical  form.  Dearborn  (4)  is  more  conservative,  re- 

409 


410  E.  B.  DELABARRE 

taining  more  of  the  older  views.  As  a  coordinator  and  integrator, 
the  central  nervous  system  is  the  basis  of  consciousness.  But 
muscle  constitutes  about  half  the  mass  of  the  organism;  in  subtlety 
of  metabolism  and  intricacy  of  structure,  in  chemical  activity  and  in 
the  molar  activities  of  its  ceaseless  tonal  and  occasional  contraction, 
it  is  not  surpassed  by  any  of  the  tissues.  It  might  well  itself  serve 
as  a  physical  basis  for  consciousness.  At  any  rate,  either  directly, 
or  indirectly  through  kinsesthetic  sensations,  it  is  the  source  of  the 
energy  in  the  stream  of  consciousness  and  subconsciousness.  Pills- 
bury  (13)  opposes  the  attempt  to  reinstate  the  innervation  sense 
without  new  proof,  holding  to  kinaesthetic  sensations  in  their  place. 
He  agrees  with  the  motor  theory  in  emphasizing  the  part  played  by 
kinsesthetic  qualities  in  every  domain,  but  will  not  agree  to  a  motor 
origin  for  all  the  qualities  of  perception,  memory,  selection,  meaning, 
etc.,  nor  accept  movement  as  the  cause  of  any  of  the  antecedent 
conscious  states.  Both  sensation  and  movement  are  needed  for 
the  explanation  of  any  phase  of  consciousness. 

2.  Rowe  (15)  gives  an  extensive  review  of  experimental  and 
pathological   literature,    and   opposes   feeling   as   the   initiator   of 
voluntary  movement.     Feeling  may  inhibit  or  reinforce,'  but  so 
long  as  it  dominates,  there  is  no  volition.     A  perceptual  or  idea- 
tional  process  is  essential  for  the  initiation  of  a  voluntary  movement 
and  involves  a  control  based  on  immediate  sensations  and  per- 
ceptions of  results,  of  a   kinsesthetic,  visual  or  auditory  nature. 
Bernard  (3),  arguing  for  a  unitary  as  against  an  individualistic, 
utilitarian   and  hedonistic  view  of  society,   and  for  its   scientific 
analysis  and  control,  devotes  two  chapters  to  these  psychological 
problems.      The  cause  of  an  act  is  not  feeling  alone,  nor  ideation 
alone,  nor  even  always  either  of  these;  it  consists  rather,  as  Wood- 
worth  maintains,  in  the  total  set  of  the  nervous  system  at  the 
moment,  which  is  itself  determined  by  numerous  factors,   some 
conscious  and  some  unconscious.     Dearborn  (5,  6)  also  holds  that 
every  deliberate  movement  is  the  resultant  of  influences  coming 
from  every  part  of  the  brain  or  even  of  the  entire  gray  fabric  of 
the  nervous  system. 

3.  MacDougall  (n)  says  that  the  system  of  habits  gives  to  ideal 
activity  its  point  of  origin  and  its  direction;  the  system  of  ideas 
gives  to  habit  a  telic  value.     Normal  development  tends  towards  a 
more  complex  synthesis  of  habit-modes  and  a  widened  ideal  horizon. 
The  highest  type  of  self  is  that  in  which  a  life  of  the  most  intense 
intellectual  activity  finds  its  basis  and  its  object  in   the  fullest 


VOLITION  AND  MOTOR  CONSCIOUSNESS— THEORY  411 

organization  of  experience  in  terms  of  significant  reactions  of  the 
will.  Stocks  (16)  distinguishes  between  motive  and  intention.  The 
former  "is  that  characteristic  tendency  or  disposition  of  a  man  in 
virtue  of  which  a  given  act  possesses  an  attraction  for  him."  It  is 
not  mere  feeling,  is  largely  unconscious,  and  is  best  defined  by 
reference  to  end.  Intention  is  what  is  consciously  present  to  the 
agent  at  the  moment  of  action.  The  imperfectly  developed  char- 
acter betrays  in  action  a  number  of  dimly  apprehended  and  chaotic 
purposes.  The  perfect  will  is  one  in  which  there  is  no  motive  other 
than  intention.  Barrett  (2)  makes  an  experimental  study  on  which 
he  bases  the  following  conclusions:  "When  a  choice  has  to  be  made 
between  two  alternatives,  the  choice  is  quick  and  easy  in  propor- 
tion as  the  values  of  the  alternatives  are  clearly  and  definitely 
known."  To  choose  well,  therefore,  "we  must  clearly  and  definitely 
determine  the  values  of  alternatives,  and  that  of  course,  as  far  as 
possible,  long  before  the  choice  begins."  And  the  "top-value"  of 
our  scale,  with  which  nothing  whatever  is  comparable,  "must  act  as 
a  charm,  it  must  electrify  us,  hypnotize  us."  Bernard  (3)  has  as 
the  main  thesis  of  his  sociological  study  mentioned  above  the  fol- 
lowing: "Individuals  have  no  liberties  in  opposition  to  a  scientifi- 
cally controlled  society.  .  .  .  The  really  social  individual  is  not  one 
who  acts  with  individual  reference.  .  .  .  He  attempts  to  discover 
the  conditions  of  the  most  effective  social  life  and  then  to  bring 
these  conditions  about  and  to  adjust  himself  to  them." 

4.  The  problem  of  freedom  is  incidentally  touched  upon  by  more 
than  one  of  the  authors  already  mentioned.  Pradines  (14)  speaks 
of  action  as  free  and  undetermined.  Barrett  (2)  thinks  that  in- 
directly his  study  shows  the  worthlessness  of  the  psychological 
arguments  for  determinism.  Several  are  clearly  written  from  a 
deterministic  standpoint.  Our  four  remaining  references  deal  with 
this  problem  specifically.  Kohnstamm  (9)  is  the  only  determinist 
among  them.  He  finds  the  scientific  explanation  of  freedom  not 
(in  the  exclusion  of  effective  causality,  but  in  a  causally  determined 
choosing  among  several  open  possibilities.  But  the  significance  of 
free  choice  as  thus  defined  lies  not  in  its  cause  but  in  its  end.  For 
Field  (7)  it  is  inconceivable  that  our  own  inner  experience  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  relation  between  motive  and  act  could  deceive  us. 
Any  attempt  to  describe  the  relation  must  be  in  terms  of  something 
not  active,  and  so  be  untrue.  It  is  indescribable,  unanalyzable, 
because  unique  and  singular,  and  this  is  what  we  mean  by  "free." 

Home  (8)  and  Palmer  (12)  both  attempt  a  new  defense  of  the 


412  E.  B.  DELABARRE 

libertarian  position.  Both  define  it  in  terms  of  a  genuinely  am- 
biguous future,  determinable  by  our  purposes,  which  themselves 
can  never  be  wholly  accounted  for  by  sequential  causation  (12,  p. 
126).  Palmer  frankly  accepts  the  implication  of  genuine  chance 
in  the  universe,  and  admits  that  the  existence  of  sin  and  the  nature 
of  the  influence  of  thought  on  matter  remain  insoluble  mysteries. 
Both  authors  use  the  conventional  arguments,  admit  that  these  do 
not  constitute  final  proof,  and  regard  freedom  as  very  limited. 
For  both,  the  series  of  temporal  phenomena  cannot  be  explained 
exclusively  in  terms  of  efficient  causes  (which  Palmer  happily  calls 
sequential),  but  wherever  purposes  exist  involves  also  final  (ante- 
sequential)  causes;  and  thus,  in  their  view,  the  world  remains 
wholly  causal  and  law-abiding.  Both  claim  that  their  conception  is 
not  identical  with  a  freedom  of  indifference,  and  Palmer  says  that 
it  is  not  indeterministic  (p.  1 86).  Home's  work  is  marred  by 
numerous  misconceptions.  He  always  confuses  determinism  with 
many  things  that  it  is  not, — fatalism,  predestination,  necessarian- 
ism,  subjection  to  custom  and  authority, — and  is  thus  led  to  reverse 
the  historical  course  of  thought,  believing  it  to  be  away  from  earlier 
determinism  toward  a  growing  belief  in  indeterministic  freedom. 
He  assumes  that  to  establish  a  psychical  cause  for  physical  phe- 
nomena would  prove  libertarianism  (pp.  103,  108),  and  that  to  deny 
interactionism  is  to  deny  efficiency  for  mind  (pp.  83,  87,  99).  He 
understands  the  mechanical  theory  of  the  universe  to  mean  the 
transformation  of  energy  only  downwards  (pp.  no,  114);  asserts 
that  the  physical  causal  law  claims  only  that  every  cause  has  an 
effect,  not  that  also  every  cause  has  a  cause  (p.  135);  takes  tran- 
scendental to  mean  the  initiation  of  a  new  causal  series  in  the 
temporal  order  (p.  53),  and  thus  is  led  to  place  Kant  and  Royce 
among  the  libertarians.  Palmer  understands  determinism  better; 
but  he  is  forced  to  believe  what  a  scientist  can  hardly  concede, 
namely,  that  the  world  is  split  into  numberless  independent  lines 
of  sequential  causality  and  that  harmonious  correspondences  be- 
tween these  can  be  the  result  only  of  chance  or  of  antesequential 
causation  (pp.  136-150).  Finally,  Home  does  not  mention  and 
Palmer  does  not  adequately  discuss  the  form  of  determinism  which 
holds  that  sequential  mechanism  and  antesequential  teleology 
are  compatible,  that  the  whole  world  may  be  exhaustively  explained 
in  terms  of  cause  but  also  in  terms  of  purpose,  and  that  the  human 
will  may  be  as  free  transcendentally  as  empirically  it  is  without 
limitation  sequentially  causal. 


REFLEX  ACTION  413 

REFERENCES 

1.  ALEXANDER,   S.     Foundations   and   Sketch   Plan  of  a  Conational  Psychology. 

Brit.  J.  of  Psychol.,  1911,  4,  239-267. 

2.  BARRETT,    E.    B.     Motive    Force    and    Motivation-tracks.     London:    Longmans, 

Green  &  Co.,  1911.     Pp.  xiv  +  225. 

3.  BERNARD,  L.L.     The  Transition  to  an  Objective  Standard  of  Social  Control.     Univ. 

of  Chicago  Press,  1911.     Pp.  96. 

4.  DEARBORN,  G.  V.  N.    The  Relation  of  Muscular  Activity  to  the  Mental  Process. 

Reprinted  from  Amer.  Physical  Educ.  Rev.,  1909,  14.     Pp.  8. 

5.  DEARBORN,  G.  V.  N.    The  Nerve-Mechanism  of  Voluntary  Movement.     Re- 

printed from  Amer.  Physical  Educ.  Rev.,  May,  1912.     Pp.  12. 

6.  DEARBORN,  G.  V.  N.    Notes  on  the  Neurology  of  Voluntary  Movement.    Re- 

printed from  Medical  Record,  May  18,  1912.     Pp.  48. 

7.  FIELD,  G.  C.    The  Meaning  of  Human  Freedom.     Mind,  1911,  20,  379-393. 

8.  HORNE,  H.  H.    Free  Will  and  Human  Responsibility.    New  York:  Macmillan, 

1912.     Pp.  xvi+  197. 

9.  KOHNSTAMM,  O.     Willcnsfreihelt  und  Zielstrebigkeit.    /.  /.  Psych.  u.Neur.,  1911, 

18,  87-101. 

10.  KOSTYLEFF,  N.     La  crise  de  la  psychologie  experimental.     Paris:  Alcan,   1911. 

Pp.  176. 

11.  MACDOUGALL,  R.    The  System  of  Habits  and  the  System  of  Ideas.    PSYCHOL. 

REV.,  1911,  18,  324-335- 

12.  PALMER,  G.  H.     The  Problem  of  Freedom.    Boston:  Houghton  Mifflin  Co.,  1911. 

Pp.  ix  +  211. 

13.  PILLSBURY,  W.  B.    The  Place  of  Movement  in  Consciousness.     PSYCHOL.  REV., 

1911,  18,  83-99. 

14.  PRADINES,  M.     Critique  des  conditions  de  faction.     Paris:  Alcan,  1909.     2  vols. 

Pp.  viii  +  702;  ii  +  305. 

15.  ROWE,  E.  C.     Voluntary  Movement.     Amer.  J.  of  PsychoL,  1910,  21,  513-562. 

16.  STOCKS,  J.  L.     Motive.     Mind,  1911,  20,  54-66. 


REFLEX  ACTION 

BY  C.   S.  YOAKUM 

University  of  Texas 

In  the  regular  experiments  with  decerebrate  preparations, 
stimulation  of  the  afferent  nerve  produces  inhibition  of  the  con- 
traction in  progress.  Sherrington  (4)  reports  that  this  phenomenon 
may  be  reversed  in  the  following  ways.  A  constant  weak  galvanic 
current  produces  the  regular  inhibition  at  the  make  and  break,  but 
during  the  action  of  the  stimulus  gives  a  contraction  myogram. 
Repeated,  brief  galvanic  currents,  each  of  about  .04  second  in 
length  and  at  the  rate  of  12  per  second,  cause  contraction.  Weak 
faradic  currents  give  weak  but  noticeable  contraction  phenomena. 
The  weak  galvanic  current  broken  at  the  rate  'of  20  times  per 


414  C.  S.  YOAKUM 

second  by  the  v.  Kries  rotating  rheonome  gives  a  steady,  lasting 
contraction.  Beside  these  changes  in  the  intensity  and  form  of  the 
current,  to  produce  the  reversal  of  action,  the  muscle  must  also 
retain  its  tonic  condition,  i.  e.,  there  must  be  entire  absence  of 
"shock."  When  these  conditions  are  observed,  especially  with  the 
last  form  of  stimulation  mentioned  above,  the  contractions  are 
closely  comparable  to  real  tonic  reflexes.  Some  18  seconds  after 
this  contraction  had  been  produced,  stimulation  with  a  faradic 
current  in  the  regular  way  gave  the  usual  reflex  inhibition.  The 
action  of  the  stimulation  with  the  rotating  rheonome  in  circuit 
seems  to  indicate  that  the  "natural"  tonic  phenomenon  is  also 
produced  by  rhythmic  and  intermittent  stimuli  from  the  receptors. 
In  a  further  investigation  of  reflex  inhibition,  Sherrington  (3)  used 
an  artificial  stimulus  (background  stimulation  of  the  ipsilateral 
nerve)  to  obtain  the  reflex  contraction  of  the  knee  flexor  muscles 
in  the  cat.  The  stimulation  of  the  contralateral  afferent,  while  the 
contraction  was  still  in  progress,  generally  produced  an  inhibition  of 
this  reflex  contraction.  In  certain  weak  stimulations  of  the 
inhibiting  nerves,  increased  contraction  is  noted  followed  by  the 
usual  inhibitory  effect.  "Fatigue  of  the  background  reflex  seems 
to  favor  markedly  the  operation  of  inhibition  against  the  reflex." 
Rebound  occurs  when  the  inhibiting  stimulus  is  removed,  not  only 
when  the  background  stimulation  is  artificial,  but  also  when  it  is 
a  "natural"  reflex,  as  pinching  the  pinna  of  the  ear,  or  when  the 
origin  of  the  contraction  is  not  clear.  Whether  reflex  contraction 
or  inhibition  ensues  depends  upon  the  intensity  of  the  reflex  back- 
ground as  well  as  on  the  intensity  of  the  second  stimulation. 

Pike  (2)  argues  that  the  truth  "concerning  the  conflicting  views 
regarding  the  nature  of  *  spinal  shock'  will  doubtless  be  found  in 
the  study  of  the  phylogenetic  and  ontogenetic  development, 
functional  as  well  as  morphological,  of  the  central  nervous  system." 
He  contributes  evidence  to  show  that  "the  collapse  of  the  animal 
during  the  resuscitation  period  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  bulbar 
vasomotor  mechanism  can  no  longer  produce  any  rise  in  [blood] 
pressure  by  a  constriction  of  peripheral  vessels  after  interruption  of 
the  efferent  nerve  channels.  Occlusion  of  the  head  arteries  and 
transection  of  the  cord  soon  thereafter  produced  a  series  of  collapses. 
The  first  collapse  did  not  occur  immediately,  hence  it  seems  im- 
probable that  the  "hypothetical  shock"  is  due  to  a  loss  of  tonus 
impulses  from  above,  nor  does  it  appear  probable  that  the  secondary 
collapses  are  produced  by  later  stimulation  of  efferent  inhibitory 


REFLEX  ACTION  4*5 

fibers,  since  no  fall  in  blood  pressure  is  noted.  The  assumption  of  a 
fairly  definitely  localized  bulbar  vasomotor  mechanism  seems  to 
him  the  simplest  explanation  of  the  observed  facts. 

By  means  of  the  "artificial  perfusion  of  an  organ,  in  this  case  the 
spleen,  which  is  completely  severed  from  the  natural  circulation, 
by  cutting  or  ligating  all  its  blood  vessels,  but  which  is  still  left  in 
connection  with  the  vasomotor  center  of  the  animal,"  Sollmann  and 
Pilcher  (5)  investigated  the  reactions  of  the  vasomotor  center. 
Both  peripheral  actions  and  the  variations  in  blood  supply  from 
cardiac  disturbances  being  excluded,  the  experiment  consists  in 
interrupting  the  stream  of  oxygen.  The  center  is  thus  stimulated 
by  asphyxia.  They  find  that  the  fall  in  blood  pressure  is  due  to 
cardiac  influences  rather  than  to  central  vasomotor  paralysis. 
"The  results  are  the  same  whether  the  vagi  are  intact  or  divided." 
They  find  that  sudden  arrest  of  the  heart  also  causes  a  marked 
stimulation  of  the  vasomotor  center.  This  stimulation  by  asphyxia 
does  "not  occur  if  the  accumulation  of  carbon  dioxid  is  prevented." 

Lowsley  (i)  studied  the  relation  between  changes  in  blood 
pressure  and  all  forms  of  exercise  in  athletes.  He  finds  a  rise  in 
systolic,  diastolic,  and  pulse  pressure  after  all  exercise.  Moderate 
exercise  causes  about  one-half  the  rise  in  diastolic  pressure  noted 
in  other  types  of  exertion.  All  the  pressures  fall  below  normal 
soon  after  the  close  of  exercise.  The  pulse  rate  exhibits  similar 
changes,  except  that  it  falls  below  normal  in  only  four  cases  out  of 
sixty.  Exercise  may  probably  be  considered  within  hygienic  limits 
when  the  subnormal  phase  disappears  before  the  lapse  of  sixty 
minutes.  A  delay  beyond  one  hundred  and  twenty  minutes,  as 
occurred  after  the  more  violent  forms  of  exercise,  appears  to  indicate 
dangerous  over-straining. 

1.  LOWSLEY,  O.  S.     The  Effects  of  Various  Forms  of  Exercise  on  Systolic,  Diastolic 

and  Pulse  Pressures  and  Pulse  Rate.     Amer.  J.  of  PhysioL,  1911,  27,  446-466. 

2.  PIKE,  F.  H.     Studies  in  the  Physiology  of  the  Central  Nervous  System. — II.  The 

Effect  of  Repeated  Injuries  to  the  Spinal  Cord  During  Spinal  Shock.     Amer.  J. 
of  Physiol.,  1912,  30,  436-450. 

3.  SHERRINGTON,  C.  S.,  &  SOWTON,  S.  C.  M.     On  Reflex  Inhibition  of  the  Knee  Flexor. 

Proc.  Roy.  Soc.,  1911,  B  84,  201-214. 

4.  SHERRINGTON,  C.  S.,  &  SOWTON,  S.  C.  M.     Reversal  of  the  Reflex  Effect  of  an 

Afferent  Nerve  by  Altering  the  Character  of  the  Electrical  Stimulus  Applied. 
Proc.  Roy.  Soc.,  1911,  B  83,  435-446. 

5.  SOLLMANN,  T.,  &  PILCHER,  V.  D.    The  Reaction  of  the  Vasomotor  Center  to 

Asphyxia.     Amer.  J.  of  Physiol.,  1911,  29,  100-107. 


416  F.  L.  WELLS 


FATIGUE 

BY  DR.  F.  L.  WELLS 

McLean  Hospital,  Waverley,  Mass. 

A  valuable  study  and  criticism  of  methods  for  dealing  with  the 
work-curve  is  contributed  by  Thorndike  (5),  but  in  so  concentrated 
a  form  that  one  can  here  do  little  more  than  indicate  the  many 
phases  of  the  problem  it  discusses.  The  work-curves  of  a  pre- 
viously published  (and  here  reviewed)  series  of  multiplication  tests 
and  a  later  series  of  addition  experiments  are  studied  to  test  the 
interpretations  which  previous  investigators  have  put  upon  different 
real  or  supposititious  features  of  the  work-curve.  On  the  whole 
they  seem  to  belong  mainly  in  the  latter  class;  initial  spurt,  end- 
spurt,  warming  up,  adaptation.  A  feature  of  von  Voss's  work  on 
the  temporal  variation  in  mental  capacity  is  severely  handled. 
Fatigue  is  defined  as  that  diminution  in  efficiency  which  rest  can  cure. 
The  effects  noted  are  very  slight  indeed,  in  accordance  with  the 
author's  previous  work;  and  its  disagreement  with  other  conclusions 
is  elucidated.  Another  point  is  the  superiority  of  intermittent 
practice  over  continuous  practice  of  the  same  working  time.  The 
curve  of  mental  work  is  actually  very  near  a  line  both  straight  and 
horizontal.  The  feelings  of  fatigue  are  important,  but  these  tend 
toward  a  stoppage  of  the  work,  and  when  this  response  is  excluded, 
habit  maintains  the  standard  of  speed  and  accuracy.  In  closing,  a 
number  of  defects  in  the  Kraepelinian  analysis  are  enumerated, 
six  in  all,  but  the  author  considers  that  any  attempt  at  speculative 
analysis  could  scarcely  avoid  similar  pitfalls,  well  remarking  that 
in  the  present  state  of  knowledge  it  is  far  better  to  analyze  a  work- 
curve  by  experiment  than  by  deduction,  which,  in  passing,  is  not 
true  of  the  work-curve  alone,  among  present  psychological  problems. 

Winch  (7)  reports  a  study  of  the  effect  of  school  hours  upon  per- 
formance in  arithmetical  problems,  along  the  same  lines  as  his  work 
on  the  value  of  the  night  school,  previously  reviewed  in  these  col- 
umns. Four  series  of  experiments  were  made,  two  in  boys'  schools, 
and  one  in  girls'  and  infants'  schools,  all  in  surroundings  below  the 
average  social  standing.  The  number  of  subjects  in  each  series 
ranged  between  49  and  60.  As  in  the  previous  research,  preliminary 
tests  in  the  functions  to  be  measured  were  given,  by  means  of  which 
the  two  "equal  groups"  were  arranged.  One  group  would  then  work 
at  arithmetical  problems  early  in  the  morning,  while  the  others 


FATIGUE  417 

were  given  the  same  problems  in  the  late  afternoon.  Any  lowering 
in  efficiency  due  to  the  work  of  the  school  day  would  be  shown  in  a 
decreased  ability  of  the  otherwise  equal  afternoon  group.  Both 
groups  may  be  expected  to  improve  on  the  records  of  the  pre- 
liminary tests,  so  that  the  results  are  presented  in  terms  of  the 
per  cent,  of  this  improvement,  showing  the  difference  in  this  respect 
between  the  morning  and  afternoon  work.  In  the  infants'  school 
however  (ages  6-7)  the  afternoon  work  showed  no  improvement 
over  the  preliminary  records,  seeming  accordingly  to  the  author 
useless ;  the  morning  work  showed  over  1 2  per  cent,  of  improvement. 
In  two  experiments  with  boys  and  girls  respectively,  the  ages  being 
about  II  years,  the  averages  of  both  morning  and  afternoon  work 
improved  on  the  preliminary  records,  but  the  excess  of  improvement 
in  the  morning  work  was  some  7  per  cent.  The  fourth  series,  in  a 
boys'  school  with  subjects  of  about  13  years,  showed  rather  slight 
improvement  of  both  groups  over  the  preliminary  tests,  but  the 
excess  of  the  morning  over  the  afternoon  work  was  about  3  per  cent. 
The  author  concludes  by  remarking  that  the  results  are  in  general 
accord  with  the  opinions  prevailing  in  the  best  current  pedagogy; 
the  fatigue  effects  are  very  much  lessened  as  the  children  rise  in  age 
and  mental  capacity. 

Ritter  (4)  describes  a  series  of  experiments  with  school  children 
by  a  method  in  which  he  expresses  considerable  confidence,  a 
Dictierverfahren  adapted  from  Ebbinghaus,  involving  essentially  a 
memory  process.  There  is  a  considerable  review  of  other  educa- 
tionally used  methods  also.  The  experiments  regularly  show  an 
increase  in  the  number  of  errors  with  progressive  school  work,  and 
according  to  the  special  conditions  a  number  of  inferences  regarding 
school  economy  are  drawn.  The  conduct  of  a  summer  Ausflug 
afforded  an  opportunity  to  test  the  performance  in  relation  to 
physical  fatigue.  It  did  not  seem  to  be  especially  affected  thereby. 

Two  interesting  studies  of  the  industrial  bearings  of  the  fatigue 
problem  are  contributed  by  Bogardus  (i).  Its  phases  are  enumer- 
ated by  him  as  (a)  the  relation  of  fatigue  to  industrial  accidents, 
(b)  fatigue  and  industrial  inefficiency,  (c)  fatigue  and  susceptibility 
to  contagious  diseases,  (d)  fatigue  and  nervous  diseases,  (e)  fatigue 
and  future  generations,  (/)  fatigue  and  morals  of  working  people. 
The  present  articles  deal  with  the  first  of  these;  how  does  modern 
industrial  labor  affect  the  normal  development  of  fatigue,  and  what 
are  the  observable  circumstances  under  which  these  processes  result 
in  accidents?  Can  the  subjective  fatigue  process  be  measured  by 


418  F.  L.  WELLS 

means  of  controlled  experiments  in  terms  comparable  to  the  observ- 
able conditions  preceding  accidents,  and  thus  be  causally  related 
to  them?  A  brief  account  is  given  of  the  physiological  chemistry  of 
fatigue,  and  it  is  brought  out  that  an  important  feature  of  it  is  to 
diminish  the  accuracy  of  motor  coordinations,  whose  relation  to 
accident  is  obvious.  The  writer's  observations  are  that  these  are 
characteristic  of  the  phenomena  immediately  preceding  industrial 
accidents.  Monotony  resulting  from  the  specialization  of  tasks  is 
emphasized.  Then  too,  the  tension  under  which  work  is  done 
diminishes  the  feeling  of  fatigue,  increasing  the  liability  to  exhaus- 
tion. Some  figures  of  excessive  work  periods  are  given.  Two 
thousand  six  hundred  and  seventy-eight  accidents  are  analyzed  as 
due  to  causes  beyond  the  control  of  the  injured,  or  to  faulty  re- 
actions on  their  part.  There  seems  to  be  a  misprint  making  a  dis- 
crepancy in  the  presentation,  but  it  appears  that  2,203  or  82  per 
cent,  of  these  involved  fatigue  as  a  causal  factor.  A  series  of 
experiments  was  conducted  in  a  laboratory  at  Chicago  University, 
in  which  the  operation  of  machinery  at  a  dangerous  trade  was 
simulated  as  closely  as  practicable,  showing  a  score  of  errors  doubled 
for  the  second  half  of  a  fifteen-minute  experiment  over  that  of  the 
first  half.  Speeding  up  increased  the  disparity.  The  individual 
differences  are  referred  to  a  temperamental  basis. 

Despite  the  promise  of  the  "  Beeinflussung  einf acker  psychischer 
Forgdnge"  and  the  further  emphasis  laid  by  Kraepelin  on  its 
problems  under  the  concept  of  the  kunstliche  Geistesstorung,  the 
experimental  psychology  of  drugs  has  not  proved  a  field  attractive 
to  most  investigators.  Hoch  and  Kraepelin  observed  the  effects 
of  the  tea-constituents.  Haenel  also,  and  Loewald,  directly  under 
Kraepelin's  influence,  made  special  studies  of  trional  and  bromide 
respectively,  besides  which  there  are  the  researches  of  Rivers, 
Riidin  and  others  on  alcohol.  Experiments  upon  single  mental 
functions  with  various  drugs  have  also  been  reported.  But  the 
necessary  conditions  for  such  experiments  are  not  easy  for  the 
ordinary  laboratory  to  meet,  and,  it  is  possible  that  they  have  never 
been  so  adequately  met  as  in  the  study  by  Hollingworth  (2)  of  the 
influence  of  caffein  upon  various  mental  and  bodily  activities.  The 
circumstances  of  the  work  were  unusual  and  occasion  the  appearance 
in  the  book  of  some  matter  that  is  absent  in  the  usual  presentation 
of  research;  yet  the  immediately  satisfactory  result  of  the  work  may 
well  lead  to  other  similar  applications,  to  the  proper  external  pre- 
cautions in  which  the  present  volume  should  be  a  useful  guide.  A 


FATIGUE  4*9 

general  series  of  experiments  was  performed  with  small,  medium  and 
large  doses  of  caffein.  Neither  experimenter  nor  subject  knew 
whether  the  dose  was  of  caffein  or  a  control.  The  general  result 
of  the  experiments  is  that  of  stimulation  without  secondary  depres- 
sion, confirmatory  to  the  previous  conclusion  of  Rivers.1  An 
extended  account  is  given  of  the  amount  and  character  of  sleep  as 
well  as  of  the  general  health  of  the  subjects  during  the  experiment. 
There  is  a  uniform  gain  in  health  owing  probably  to  the  regular 
living  occasioned  by  the  experimental  conditions.  After  larger 
doses  (4gr.  and  over),  "nervousness,"  dizziness  and  headache,  with 
disturbed  sleep,  were  apt  to  follow.  Increased  constitutional  sus- 
ceptibility appears  to  be  rather  a  function  of  body  weight  than  other 
factors,  and  the  effect  also  depends  upon  the  presence  of  food  in 
the  stomach.  No  Abstinenzerscheinungen  seem  to  have  occurred 
where  they  might  have  been  expected.  The  experiments  are 
generally  evaluated  in  such  a  way  as  to  express  efficiency  in  the 
whole  test,  so  that  they  do  not  measure  the  influence  of  caffein 
on  fatiguability,  but  indicate  that  it  would  serve  to  arrest  the  fall 
of  the  work-curve  in  most  of  the  functions  tested. 

Apropos  of  the  work  of  this  author  here  cited  last  year,  may  be 
mentioned  Weber's  (6)  reply  to  a  criticism  of  his  book  by  Leschke,2 
that  the  former  fails  to  make  proper  use  of  introspection  in  his 
results,  and  publishes  selected  curves  without  a  statement  of  the 
number  of  cases  in  which  the  characteristic  changes  did  not  take 
place.  Weber  replies  in  the  first  instance  that  the  use  of  hypnotic 
suggestion,  by  an  operator  acquainted  with  his  subject,  obviates 
the  necessity  of  introspective  accounts.  In  the  second,  he  replies 
essentially  that  the  exclusion  of  the  negative  records  was  justified 
on  the  ground  of  intercurrent  accidents  which  obscured  their  inter- 
pretation. Leschke  (3)  declines  to  regard  these  explanations  as 
satisfactory. 

On  the  whole,  the  attack  upon  the  problem  of  fatigue  from  the 
psychological  side  might  on  the  surface  appear  somewhat  dis- 
organized. Instead  of  the  coordinate  investigations  that  came  from 
Kraepelin's  laboratory,  and  the  work  that  centered  about  the  ges- 
thesiometric  method  and  the  ergograph,  researches  now  take  on  the 
form  of  studying  a  very  specialized  situation  by  such  method  or 
methods  as  are  specifically  adapted  to  it.  This  indeed  is  as  it 
should  be,  for  the  problem  is  a  complex  if  not  also  a  compound  one; 

1  For  a  tabulated  statement  of  experiments  and  results  see  p.  422. 

2  Arch.f.  d.  ges.  Psychol.,  1911,  ax,  435-463. 


420  H.  L.  HOLLINGWORTH 

we  may  regret  the  difficulty,  but  not  the  fact  that  we  are  learning 
better  to  recognize  and  deal  with  it.  Fatiguability  can  be  measured 
more  satisfactorily  in  some  functions  than  in  others.  In  one  of  these 
we  may  yet  find  a  measure  of  fairly  general  application,  or  it  may 
be  that  the  search  for  the  "measure  of  fatigue"  is  wholly  a  Ponce 
de  Leon's  quest;  but  the  specific  educational  and  hygienic  problems 
in  the  economy  of  effort  and  the  safeguarding  of  our  energies  the 
above  researches  have  placed  us  in  a  distinctly  better  position  to 

encounter. 

REFERENCES 

1.  BOGARDUS,  E.  S.    The  Relation  of  Fatigue  to  Industrial  Accidents.     Amer.  J. 

of  Social.,  1911,  17,  206-222;  351-374. 

2.  HOLLINGWORTH,  H.  L.    The  Influence  of  Caffein  on  Mental  and  Motor  Efficiency. 

Arch,  of  Psychol.,  No.  22,  1912.    Pp.  166. 

3.  LESCHKE,  E.     Erwiderung,  etc.     Arch.  f.  d.  ges.  Psychol.,  1911,  21,  581. 

4.  RITTER,   C.    Ueber   Ermudungsmessungen.    Zsch.  f.   angew.   Psychol.,  1911,   4, 

495-545- 

5.  THORNDIKE,  E.  L.    The  Curve  of  Work.    PSYCHOL.  REV.,  1912,  19,  165-194. 

6.  WEBER,  E.     Bemerkungen  zu  der  Abhandlung,  Die  Korperl.  Begleiterscheinungen 

seelischer  Vorgange.    Arch.f.  d.  ges.  Psychol.,  1911,  21,  579-580. 

7.  WINCH,  W.  H.    Mental  Fatigue  in  Day-school  Children,  as  measured  by  Arith- 

metical Reasoning.     Brit.  J.  of  Psychol.,  1911,  4,  315-341. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   ASPECTS    OF    DRUG   ACTION 

BY  DR.  H.  L.  HOLLINGWORTH 

Columbia  University 

Very  little  of  the  past  year's  work  on  the  influence  of  drugs  has 
any  particular  psychological  interest.  Several  symposiums  on 
anaesthetics  have  dwelt  chiefly  on  the  practical  aspects  of  the  topic. 
Hirschel  (2)  sketches  the  development  of  the  use  of  local  anaesthetics 
(suprarenin,  cocain,  novocain).  Short  and  Salisbury  (13)  have 
demonstrated  that  none  of  the  commonly  used  drugs  for  superficial 
application  (belladonna,  atropine,  aconite,  opium,  chloroform, 
carbolic  acid,  cocaine,  menthol)  possess  any  ansesthetic  properties 
when  applied  to  the  unbroken  skin  (ethyl  chloride,  which  freezes 
the  skin,  is  the  single  exception  to  this  generalization).  Veley  and 
Symes  (14)  discuss  the  physical  properties  of  stovain  and  its 
homologues,  and  report  investigations  of  their  effects  on  contrac- 
tility of  isolated  muscle,  blood  pressure,  respiration,  and  nerve 
conductivity.  On  the  central  nervous  system  and  circulation 
Fourneau's  new  salt  is  less  active  and  methyl  stovain  at  least  no 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASPECTS  OF  DRUG  ACTION  421 

more  active  than  stovain.  Amyl  stovain  is  less  active  on  the 
nervous  system  and  its  depressant  effect  on  circulation  is  greater 
and  more  gradual.  Tested  by  the  effect  on  conductivity  of  frog's 
nerve,  stovain  and  its  homologues  are  more  active  local  anaesthetics 
than  is  cocain.  Examination  of  the  anaesthetic  block  in  individual 
nerve  fibers  indicates  that  the  amplitude  of  a  muscle  twitch  depends 
on  the  number  of  fibers  involved.  Judged  by  muscular  response 
the  anaesthetic  block  in  individual  nerve  fibers  to  impulses  evoked 
by  maximal  stimuli,  throughout  a  wide  range  of  intensity,  is  complete 
or  zero. 

From  an  analysis  of  cutaneous  sensations  as  influenced  by  ethyl 
chloride  Franz  and  Ruediger  (i)  are  led  to  conclude  that  the  hairs 
possess  two  distinct  sensory  end-organs,  the  one  concerned  with 
sensations  produced  when  the  hair  is  brushed  lightly,  the  other 
concerned  with  sensations  resembling  pain  and  pressure,  and  re- 
sulting from  traction  of  the  hair.  In  the  case  of  the  temperature 
sensations  no  such  normal  dissociation  was  found.  Differences  in 
the  rate  of  recovery  of  sensibility  are  relied  on  in  making  these 
analyses.  Raimann  (n)  distinguishes  between  specific  and  purely 
individual  reactions  to  drugs,  from  the  point  of  view  of  their  effects 
on  consciousness,  and  raises  the  question  whether  all  psycho- 
pathological  phenomena  are  not  toxic  in  the  long  run.  Isserlin  (8) 
seeks  to  defend  Kraepelin's  work  on  the  effects  of  alcohol  on  the 
capacity  for  work.  The  article  is  a  reply  to  criticisms  of  Moll  and 
is  purely  controversial  in  character.  Jacobson  (9)  reports  observa- 
tions made  during  a  15-minute  nitrous  oxide  anaesthesia  and  discusses 
recent  papers  of  a  similar  sort.  He  finds  reason  to  believe  that  the 
"higher"  functions  (intellection)  may  persist  for  some  time  after 
"lower"  functions,  such  as  vision,  have  failed.  Consciousness  is 
reported  as  having  been  present  at  the  very  moment  of  the  operation 
in  the  interest  of  which  the  anaesthetic  was  taken.  Langfeld  (10) 
reports  experiments  to  determine  the  influence  of  caffein  on  "sup- 
pression with  negative  instruction."  The  effect  was  found  to  be  an 
acceleration  of  the  association  reaction  time  with  no  deterioration 
of  inhibition. 

Hollingworth  (3,  4,  5,  6  and  7)  reports  experiments  on  the  in- 
fluence of  caffein  on  mental  and  motor  performance  in  typical 
tests  (tapping,  steadiness,  coordination,  perception,  association,  dis- 
crimination, calculation,  cancellation,  typewriting,  quality  and 
amount  of  sleep,  general  health,  weight,  etc.).  Attention  may 
be  called  to  the  attempt  to  develop  a  rigorous  experimental  tech- 


422 


H.  L.  HOLLINGWORTH 


nique  and  a  standardized  series  of  tests  for  future  work  in  this  field. 
Points  of  method  and  the  respective  merits  of  the  various  sorts  of 
tests  are  contained  in  the  complete  report  (6).  The  experimental 
results  are  summarized  in  a  schematic  table  which  is  reproduced 

here.1 

THE  INFLUENCE  OF  CAFFEIN  (HOLLINGWORTH) 

St.—  Stimulation.    O—  No  Effect.     Ret.—  Retardation. 


Process 

Tests 

Primary  Effect 

Secondary 
Reaction 

Action 
Time  in 
Hours 

Duration 
in  Hours 

Small 
Doses 

Me- 
dium 
Doses 

I^arge 
Doses 

Motor  Speed 

Tapping 

St. 

St. 

St. 

None 

•7S-I.S 

2-4 

Coordination 

Three  Hole 
Typewriting 
(a)  Speed 
(b)  Errors 

St. 

St. 
Fewer  : 

O 

0 

or  all  d 

Ret. 

Ret. 

oses. 

None 

None 
None 

i-i-S 

Results  sh 
total  da 

3-4 

ow  only  in 
y's  work. 

Association.  . 
Choice     .... 

Color-naming 
Opposites 
Calculation 

Discrimination 
Reaction  time 
Cancellation 
S-W  Illusion 

St. 
St. 
St. 

Ret. 
Ret. 
O 

St. 
St. 
St. 

O 

? 
O 

St. 
St. 
St. 

St. 
St. 
0 

None 
None 
None 

None 
None 

2-2.5 
2-5-3 
2-5 

2-4 
3-5 

3-4 

Next  day 
Next  day 

Next  day 
No  data 

General  

Steadiness 
Sleep  Quality 
Sleep  Quantity 
General  Health 

?       Unsteadiness 
Individual  differences, 
of  administration,  p 
stomach,  etc.     No 
previous  caffein  hab 

None 
depending 
resence  of 
correlatioi 
its. 

i-3 

on  body  w 
bod  subst. 
i  with    ag 

.    3-4 
eight,  time 
mce  in  the 
e,  sex,   or 

Robinson  (12),  in  a  1 6,000- word  dithyrambic  essay  considers 
hasheesh  "from  the  historic,  botanic,  microscopic,  chemic,  physio- 
logic, therapeutic,  pharmacologic"  and  psychological  viewpoints, 
and  contributes  a  sonnet  to  the  drug.  The  "experiments"  con- 
sisted chiefly  in  administering  hasheesh  to  individuals,  whose  sub- 
sequent behavior,  conversation,  and  general  impressions  are  re- 
corded. Two  subjects  give  retrospective  accounts  of  the  subjective 
features  of  hasheesh  intoxication.  Principal  psychological  results: 
There  is  no  record  of  a  fatal  dose;  idiosyncracy  is  important;  the 
drug  is  a  powerful  narcotic,  producing  euphoria,  erotic  visions, 
superficial  associations,  disturbance  of  time  sense;  tendencies  to 
dissociation  are  also  reported. 

1  See  also  p.  418. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASPECTS  OF  DRUG  ACTION  423 

REFERENCES 

1.  FRANZ,  S.  I.,  and  RUEDIGER,  W.  C.     Sensory  Changes  in  the  Skin  Following  the 

Application  of  Local  Anaesthetics  and  Other  Agents. — I.  Ethyl  Chloride. 
Amer.  J.  of  PhysioL,  1910,  27,  45-59.  Bull.  Gov.  Hosp.  for  Insane,  1911,  3, 
15-26. 

2.  HIRSCHEL,  G.  Fortschritte  auf  dem  Gebiete  der  Lokalanasthesie.     Med.  Klin., 

1911,  7,  1721-1724- 

3.  HOLLINGWORTH,  H.  L.    The  Influence  of  Caffein  on  Performance  in  Typewriting. 

PSYCHOL.  REV.,  1912,  19,  66-73. 

4.  HOLLINGWORTH,  H.  L.     Influence  of  Caffein  on  Quality  and  Amount  of  Sleep. 

Amer.  J.  of  Psychol.,  1912,  23,  89-100. 

5.  HOLLINGWORTH,  H.  L.     Influence  of  Caffein  on  Efficiency.     Therap.Gaz.,  January 

15,  1912.     Pp.  16. 

6.  HOLLINGWORTH,  H.  L.     The  Influence  of  Caffein  on  Mental  and  Motor  Efficiency. 

(Archives  of  Psychology,  No.  22.)  The  Science  Press,  Sub-station  84,  New 
York  City.  Pp.  167.  $1.75  (cloth). 

7.  HOLLINGWORTH,  H.  L.    Experimental  Psychology  and  the  Question  of  Public 

Health.    Ariz.  J.  of  Educ.,  1912,  3,  11-14. 

8.  ISSERLIN,   M.     Kraepelin's   Experimente   mit   kleinen  Alkohol-dosen.     Zsch.  f. 

d.  ges.  Neur.  u.  Psychiat.,  1911,  6,  589-604. 

9.  JACOBSON,  E.     Consciousness  under  Anaesthetics.    Amer.  J.  of  Psychol.,  1911, 

22,  333-345- 

10.  LANGFELD,    H.    S.     Suppression    with    Negative    Instruction.    PSYCHOL.  REV., 

1911,  18,411-424. 

11.  RAIMANN,  E.     Bewusstsein  und  Intoxikation.     Ber.  IV.  Kong.  f.  exper.  Psychol., 

1911,  242. 

12.  ROBINSON,  V.     An  Essay  on  Hasheesh,  including  observations  and  experiments. 

New  York:  Medical  Review  of  Reviews,  1912.     Pp.  83.    $0.50. 

13.  SHORT  and  SALISBURY.    The  Action  of  Cutaneous  Anaesthetics.    Brit.  Med.  /., 

1910,  i,  560-563. 

14.  VELEY,  V.  H.,  and  SYMES,  W.  L.     Certain  Physical  and  Physiological  Properties 

of  Stovain  and  its  Homologues.    Proc.  Roy.  Soc.,  1911,  683,  413-420;  421-432. 


SPECIAL  REVIEWS 

INDIVIDUAL  PSYCHOLOGY 

Henri  Poincare.  Dr.  E.  TOULOUSE.  (Enquete  medico-psycho- 
logique  sur  la  superiorite  intellectuelle.  Tome  II.)  Paris: 
Flammarion,  1910.  Pp.  204. 

This  book  is  one  of  a  series  of  studies,  the  purpose  of  which  is 
to  investigate,  by  the  clinical  method,  the  relation  between  intel- 
lectual superiority  and  neuropathy.  The  plan  is  to  proceed, 
without  prejudice,  by  testing  several  superior  men  by  experimental 
methods,  in  order  to  determine  their  physical  and  mental  char- 
acteristics. It  is  hoped  that  in  this  way  some  light  may  be  thrown 
on  the  psychological  conditions  of  genius.  Toulouse  has  already 
reported  (1896)  such  a  study  of  Zola. 

Zola's  type  was  found  to  be  characterized  by  prominent  volun- 
tary intellectual  activity,  clearly  conscious,  capable  of  intense,  con- 
centrated effort,  with  no  tendency  to  perseveration  after  cessation. 
His  thought,  as  disclosed  by  the  tests,  was  logical,  methodical,  and 
seemed  preeminently  fit  for  the  work  of  mathematical  deduction. 
The  surprising  thing  was  that  such  a  type  should  have  become  the 
prince  of  romance  that  Zola  turned  out  to  be.  The  tests  of  Poincare 
show  him  to  present  a  striking  contrast  with  Zola.  His  mental 
processes  were  shown  to  be  flighty,  uncontrolled,  and  spontaneous; 
his  attention  instable  and  easily  distracted;  his  performance  ir- 
regular and  spasmodic,  disclosing  an  evident  neuropathic  basis, — 
apparently  a  type  preeminently  fitted  for  romance,  but  finding  its 
outlet  in  severe  mathematical  and  philosophical  creation. 

The  tests  (which  were  made  thirteen  years  before  their  publica- 
tion) followed  a  technique  which  the  author  now  recognizes  to  have 
been  quite  imperfect  and  fragmentary,  but  they  are  said  to  have 
yielded  results  quite  sufficient  to  characterize  the  intellectual  type 
of  the  man.  The  investigation  took  account  of  the  special  topics 
of  heredity,  development,  physical  condition,  sensory  acuity,  various 
kinds  of  memory,  attention,  imagery,  reaction  time,  association  of 
ideas,  language  and  handwriting,  character,  habits,  opinions.  The 
account  of  the  tests  is  followed  by  a  synthesis  in  which  is  attempted 
a  general  picture  of  Poincare's  type,  and  an  interpretation  of  the 
conditions  of  invention  and  speculative  genius. 
424 


INDIVIDUAL  PSYCHOLOGY  425 

The  biographical  sketch  is  meager  and  the  attempts  to  trace 
far-reaching  effects  of  minor  juvenile  events  are  anything  but  con- 
vincing, although  they  are  of  course  offered  only  as  suggestions. 
Poincare  resembled  most  his  mother  and  grandmother,  who,  with 
collateral  relatives,  are  said  to  have  shown  special  aptitude  for 
mathematical  calculations.  Several  male  members  of  the  family 
have  had  successful  careers  in  neurology,  meteorology,  law,  politics 
and  mathematics.  There  are  traces  of  arthritic  and  rheumatic 
heredity. 

Poincare's  development  was  not  precocious,  although  he  was 
bright  and  showed,  when  quite  young,  mathematical  ability  of  an 
unusual  order.  His  history,  up  to  the  age  of  30  years,  at  which  time 
he  was  elected  to  the  Academy  of  Sciences,  was  not  unlike  that  of 
many  other  mathematicians  whose  freedom  from  the  necessity  of 
experiment  allows  them  to  make  rapid  progress.  He  was  at  one 
time  troubled  by  rheumatism,  and  in  his  childhood  suffered  from  a 
serious  attack  of  diphtheria,  followed  by  paralysis.  This  attack 
is  said  to  have  profoundly  modified  his  nervous  system,  perhaps  pro- 
viding the  neuropathic  basis  for  traits  shown  in  later  life, — such  as 
awkwardness,  restlessness,  flighty  attention,  distraction  and  general 
sensori-motor  deficiency. 

The  physical  examination,  anthropometric  measurements,  and 
strength  tests,  along  with  the  inquiry  into  habits  of  eating,  sleeping, 
and  the  use  of  narcotics,  revealed  nothing  very  unusual.  Poincare 
had  head  measurements  somewhat  larger  than  the  average.  He  was 
troubled  with  indigestion,  did  not  use  tobacco,  used  wine  and  coffee 
only  sparingly,  and  was  troubled  with  insomnia.  He  was  able  to 
work  for  but  four  hours  a  day,  in  two-hour  periods,  and  the  tendency 
to  automatisms  and  perseveration  of  psychic  activity  compelled 
him  to  cease  work  for  some  time  before  retiring.  He  disliked 
muscular  exercise  except  for  the  automatic  processes  involved  in 
walking.  His  absent-mindedness  was  a  matter  of  common  com- 
ment. 

The  eye  and  ear  examination  are  said  to  have  shown  Poincare  to 
have  been  "rather  feeble  from  a  sensory  point  of  view,"  although 
the  defects  found  do  not  strike  the  reader  as  being  at  all  unusual. 
Hearing  was  defective  for  low  tones;  orientation  and  localization 
fair.  There  was  myopia  but  no  astigmatism,  and  campimetry 
tests  showed  no  abnormality.  Muscular  weakness  was  found,  which 
led  to  accommodation  spasms.  Poincare  had  no  visual  images  or 
memories,  except  in  the  transition  state  between  Waking  and  sleep- 


426  REVIEWS 

ing,  when  he  had  frequent  visual  hallucinations  of  remarkable 
distinctness.  In  his  waking  life  he  relied  on  motor  images  and 
tendencies,  thinking  of  geometrical  forms  in  terms  .of  optical  or 
manual  movements.  He  had  no  visual  "schemes,"  but  represented 
time  by  a  rotation  of  the  eyes  on  their  axes.  In  his  youth  he  had 
pronounced  colored  hearing,  which  was  evoked  not  by  the  form 
but  by  the  sound  of  the  letters.  In  the  case  of  the  vowels  three  of 
the  letters  corresponded  to  the  average  found  by  Flournoy  and 
Claparede,  who  finds  one  out  of  seven  people  to  have  this  colored 
hearing.  Poincare  had  no  other  synsesthesias.  His  movements 
were  characterized  by  uncertainty,  irregularity,  awkwardness  and 
hesitancy,  and  muscular  reflexes  were  prominent. 

Tests  of  recognition  memory  for  the  length  of  lines  (a  total  of 
only  14  different  trials  on  6  different  standards)  showed  large  errors 
in  the  case  of  one  line,  and  this  is  taken  to  be  significant  of  vacillat- 
ing attention.  On  the  basis  of  these  few  trials  Poincare  is  compared 
with  Zola  and  with  Dalou,  who  made  similar  trials.  In  the  case  of 
reproductive  memory  a  total  of  15  trials  on  5  different  standards 
is  taken  to  afford  sufficient  evidence  that  with  Poincare  repro- 
ductive memory  was  poorer  than  recognition  memory.  A  few 
attempts  at  reproducing  drawings  exposed  for  5  seconds  are  said 
to  have  shown  exceptional  capacity  in  this  respect,  but  the  tests 
were  fragmentary  and  uncontrolled.  The  memories  were  held  with 
the  aid  of  motor  imagery,  and  the  reproduction  was  often  not  from 
the  image  but  on  the  basis  of  an  analysis  of  the  material. 

Poincare's  memory  span  for  digits  was  about  n  (as  compared 
with  the  ordinary  record  of  7  or  8).  He  had  an  auditory  span  for 
letters  of  about  9  and  a  visual  span  of  about  7.  Brute  memory  (as 
in  the  cases  of  Zola  and  Dalou  as  well)  did  not  seem  to  be  particu- 
larly good.  Much  emphasis  is  laid  on  Poincare's  tendency  to  use 
memory  devices  in  remembering  this  non-logical  material, — he 
employed  analysis  and  incidental  schemes  whenever  possible.  He 
had  "a  remarkable  facility  in  mental  calculation"  which  is  said 
not  to  be  the  rule  with  mathematicians. 

In  logical  memory  Poincare  was  superior  to  both  Zola  and 
Dalou,  and  in  the  case  of  logical  material  his  memory  is  again  seen 
to  be  analytical  and  artificial  rather  than  brute, — all  material  was 
placed  in  a  coherent  system,  and  it  was  the  system  rather  than 
the  material  which  was  remembered.  This  tendency  to  organize 
is  said  to  be  a  result  rather  than  a  cause  of  Poincare's  high  order  of 
intelligence. 


INDIVIDUAL  PSYCHOLOGY  427 

The  cancellation  and  reaction  time  tests  lacked  standardization 
and  mean  nothing  as  they  stand.  The  simple  sensory  reactions  are 
said  to  have  been  slower  and  more  regular  than  those  of  the  average 
person,  but  the  motor  reactions  much  quicker.  This  accords  with 
the  previous  statements  as  to  his  general  motor  type.  The  most 
significant  thing  about  the  reactions  is  said  to  be  the  wandering  and 
instable  attention  which  they  disclosed.  It  was  difficult  to  keep 
Poincare's  mind  on  the  tests,  because  his  attention  constantly 
wandered  to  the  apparatus.  In  receiving  instructions  for  such 
experiments  Poincare  did  not  seem  to  comprehend  what  was  being 
said,  but  appeared  distracted  and  uninterested.  He  is  said  tb  have 
given  the  same  impression  to  those  whom  he  met  in  his  daily  rela- 
tions. He  was  restless,  could  not  remain  lying  in  one  position  or 
stay  by  one  task,  had  no  patience  and  abandoned  his  work  whenever 
it  seemed  to  require  any  voluntary  effort. 

Tests  of  reverie  associations  and  of  free  paired  associates  showed 
absence  of  voluntary  attention  and  predominance  of  purely  verbal 
association  tendencies.  (This  conclusion  is  based  on  a  single  list 
of  12  words  written  at  random,  and  on  a  single  list  of  the  same 
number  of  paired  associates.)  Binet's  "cigarette  description"  test 
was  used,  and  Poincare  found  to  belong  to  Binet's  first  type  of 
observer  (simple  description,  with  no  evidence  of  reflection  or 
judgment,  no  display  of  erudition,  no  expression  of  fancy  or  senti- 
ment). His  description  was  remarkably  lucid  and  clear. 

Poincare  spoke  correctly,  never  learned  his  addresses  by  heart, 
and  made  few  corrections  either  in  writing  or  in  speaking.  Indica- 
tions of  his  temperament  and  type  are  said  to  be  revealed  in  his 
handwriting. 

Poincare's  opinions  on  various  topics  are  given  and  several 
peculiar  habits  of  daily  life  enumerated,  chiefly  for  the  sake  of 
emphasizing  his  constant  air  of  distraction,  his  impatience  and 
restlessness.  He  loved  music,  sketched  a  little,  did  not  sleep 
soundly,  and  often  began  to  work  on  a  problem  only  to  abandon 
it  in  the  faith  that  it  would  somehow  solve  itself  unconsciously  or 
that  the  right  idea  would  come  spontaneously  on  a  later  occasion. 
He  often  began  a  memoir  without  having  his  conclusion  in  mind, 
or  even  the  development  of  the  problem.  He  often  wrote  formulae 
automatically  for  the  sake  of  the  chance  associations  which  they 
might  bring.  Quite  in  contrast  with  Zola,  when  he  met  with  a 
difficulty  or  with  a  point  requiring  voluntary  effort,  he  abandoned 
his  work  or  proceeded  to  another  part  of  it  which  would  develop 
more  spontaneously. 


428  REVIEWS 

Poincare's  genius  is  thus  said  to  be  incapable  of  explanation  on 
the  basis  of  his  sensori-motor  equipment,  his  memory,  or  the  speed 
or  control  of  his  psychic  activity.  But  his  tendency  to  distraction, 
automatisms,  oscillating  attention,  restlessness,  uncontrolled  asso- 
ciations, his  reliance  on  chance  syntheses  and  spontaneous  ideas 
are  held  to  be  significant  for  the  type  of  genius  required  for  mathe- 
matical and  philosophical  speculation.  In  Poincare's  case  they 
seem  to  have  constituted  a  definite  method  of  research.  His 
intellectual  activity  was,  above  all,  spontaneous  and  automatic. 

These  traits  may  be  supposed  to  have  rested  on  a  more  or  less 
definite  neuropathic  basis.  In  extreme  forms  these  distractions, 
the  flights  of  attention  and  ideas,  the  automatisms  and  the  verbal 
associations,  the  perseverations,  etc.,  appear  in  marked  forms  of 
idiocy  and  insanity.  When  not  extreme  and  when  directed  by 
some  special  aptitude  (such  as  a  congenital  mathematical  bent) 
they  seem  to  be  the  condition  of  such  creative  and  inventive  genius 
as  Poincare  possessed.  Inventive  genius  is  characterized  by 
creation,  and  creation  is  a  spontaneous  activity  or  coordination 
which  may  be  given  direction  by  some  dominant  interest  or  aptitude. 
Genius  is  related  to  insanity  chiefly  by  virtue  of  the  common 
characteristic  of  instable  attention  and  spontaneous  ideas  and 
associations.  "There  is  but  one  psychology;  its  laws  are  common 
to  an  imbecile  and  to  an  Aristotle." 

In  evaluating  this  study  it  is  not  necessary  to  emphasize  unduly 
the  question  propounded  in  its  preface, — "Is  genius  a  neurosis?" 
Its  chief  value  seems  to  the  reviewer  to  lie  in  the  fact  that  it  is  an 
interesting  attempt  to  study  in  a  more  or  less  intimate  and  intensive 
way  the  psychological  processes  and  type  of  an  individual  of  marked 
achievement.  It  is  much  to  be  regretted  that  the  experimental 
technique  was  not  more  systematically  elaborated  and  standardized, 
for  in  these  days  of  interest  in  mental  tests  it  would  be  valuable  to 
know  the  ways  in  which  such  admittedly  superior  individuals  as 
those  enumerated  by  Toulouse,— Zola,  Berthelot,  Dalou,  Rodin, 
Puvis  de  Chavannes,  Saint-Saens,  Edmond  de  Goncourt,  Daudet, 
Lemaitre,  Loti  and  Mallarme,  differing  as  they  do  in  their  types  of 
achievement,  would  react  to  the  simple  tests  now  employed  by  those 
interested  in  the  measurement  of  intelligence. 

Some  of  us  are  inclined  to  believe  that  these  tests,  which  are  at 
best  tests  of  capacity  only,  will  never  be  able  to  throw  much  light 
on  the  individual's  probable  performance  in  competitive  life.  The 
concrete  psychological  life  depends  as  much  on  motive  as  it  does  on 


APPLIED  PSYCHOLOGY  429 

capacity,  and  the  degree  to  which  motive  and  capacity  sustain 
each  other  is  a  difficult  thing  to  measure  under  laboratory  condi- 
tions. It  is  to  be  hoped  that  Dr.  Toulouse  will  utilize  the  improve- 
ments in  technique  presented  in  his  recent  experimental  manual  or 
in  other  test  series  of  a  similar  kind  in  giving  us  more  of  these  inti- 
mate and  intensive  psychological  biographies. 

H.    L.    HOLLINGWORTH 
BARNARD  COLLEGE,  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


APPLIED   PSYCHOLOGY 

Increasing  Human  Efficiency  in  Business.  WALTER  DILL  SCOTT. 
New  York:  The  Macmillan  Company,  1911.  Pp.  331.  $1.25 
net. 

Business  men  are  commencing  to  look  to  psychology  as  a  possible 
assistance  in  their  affairs.  Only  a  few  years  ago  any  reference  they 
might  make  to  it  was  of  a  derogatory  character.  But  their  con- 
ception of  the  nature  of  psychology  and  of  its  possible  applications 
has  undergone  an  enormous  change.  Today  there  are  constant 
references  to  psychological  theories  in  all  of  the  business  and  ad- 
vertising journals.  Some  of  these,  indeed,  still  frankly  oppose  the 
idea  that  there  is  anything  of  practical  value  to  be  found  in  a  so- 
called  "academic  study,"  but  such  writers  are  among  the  minority. 

The  writer  of  the  book  before  me  is  one  of  the  first  psychologists 
to  write  for  the  business  world.  Today,  he  is  known  to  nearly 
every  advertising  man  in  the  country.  To  him  is  due  much  of  the 
credit  for  the  changed  attitude  toward  psychology  which  has  just 
been  pointed  out. 

His  first  two  books  dealt  with  the  application  of  psychology 
to  advertising,  his  third  with  salesmanship  and  this,  his  fourth  book, 
is  concerned  with  the  problems  of  the  business  executive.  In  this 
he  has  taken  up  such  general  psychological  terms  as  "imitation," 
"pleasure,"  "loyalty,"  "relaxation,"  etc.,  and  devoted  a  chapter 
to  each.  General  principles  are  stated  and  each  is  illustrated  by 
many  concrete  examples.  The  last  four  chapters  deal  mainly  with 
"  habit  formation."  Several  practice  curves  of  his  own  and  of  other 
investigators  are  given  and  the  chief  principles  to  be  deduced  from 
them  are  stated. 

The  book  contains  nothing  new  to  the  psychologist.  It  was  not 
written,  however,  for  him,  but  for  the  business  man.  Technicalities 
are  largely  eliminated  and  the  whole  work  is  mainly  inspirational 


430  REVIEWS 

and  suggestive  in  character.  It  should,  however,  be  useful  to  the 
psychologist  as  auxiliary  reading  in  general  courses,  as  it  gives  large 
opportunity  for  the  application  of  general  principles  to  concrete 
cases. 

The  reviewer  wishes  that  the  book  had  contained  some  reference 
to  the  recent  work  on  "fatigue,"  "optimum  working  periods,"  etc. 
The  steady  increase  in  output  per  worker  in  present-day  business  is 
developing  a  new  problem  for  careful  study.  We  need  to  know 
what  are  the  limits  within  which  a  worker  may  increase  his  produc- 
tivity without  becoming  liable  to  disastrous  "after-effects."  To 
have  discussed  the  subject  of  "relaxation"  and  "competition" 
and  not  to  recognize  that  there  is  danger  from  overwork  (aside 
from  "worry,"  which  apparently  can  be  eliminated)  is  a  serious 
defect  to  my  mind.  Psychology  has  much  in  store  for  the  business 
world  in  teaching  better  methods  of  work,  but  it  will  not  have  done 
its  duty  until  it  has  also  pointed  out  the  limits  to  the  length  and 
speed  of  work  which  cannot  be  exceeded  without  permanent  injury 
to  the  worker. 

EDWARD  K.  STRONG,  JR. 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


ESTHETICS 

Beauty  and  Ugliness  and  Other  Studies  in  Psychological  ^Esthetics. 
VERNON  LEE  and  C.  ANSTRUTHER-THOMSON.  London  and 
New  York:  John  Lane  Company,  1912.  Pp.  ix  +  376. 
The  five  studies  making  up  this  volume  begin  with  an  essay  on 
"Anthropomorphic  ^Esthetics"  having  for  its  theme  that  "the 
discovery  of  this  projection  of  our  inner  experience  into  the  forms 
which  we  see  and  realize  is  the  central  discovery  of  modern  aes- 
thetics." The  second  paper  "Esthetic  Empathy  and  its  Organic 
Accompaniments"  is  a  translation  from  Vernon  Lee's  original 
French  in  the  Revue  Philosophique  for  1907.  The  third  "The 
Central  Problem  of  ^Esthetics"  has  appeared  in  the  Zeitschrift 
fur  Aesthetik,  1910,  and  the  fourth  "Beauty  and  Ugliness"  is  re- 
printed from  the  Contemporary  Review  of  1897.  The  fifth  study 
entitled  "^Esthetic  Responsiveness"  is  a  series  of  extracts  from 
Vernon  Lee's  gallery  diaries  from  1901  to  1904.  These  observations 
upon  her  aesthetic  reactions  to  various  works  of  art  were  noted  down 
in  the  galleries  or  within  twenty-four  hours  of  the  time  of  observa- 
tion. They  have  not  been  worked  over  into  essay  form  "  because," 


ANTHROPOLOGY  43 l 

the  author  writes,  "I  wanted  to  place  my  materials  unspoilt  at  the 
disposal  of  other  students." 

The  chief  point  of  theoretical  interest  in  the  book  is  the  modifica- 
tion, by  Lee,  of  the  theory  put  forth  in  the  early  essay  on  Beauty  and 
Ugliness.  It  will  be  remembered  that  in  that  essay  the  authors 
based  their  theory  of  empathy  (though  it  was  not  then  called  by 
that  name)  upon  the  James-Lange  theory  of  emotion,  and  explained 
the  aesthetic  enjoyment  of  visible  beauty  as  a  function  of  the  physio- 
logical changes — circulation,  respiration,  imitative  muscular  adjust- 
ments, etc. — occasioned  by  the  view  of  the  object,  and  felt  by  the 
observer  as  a  mass  of  sensory  data.  Vernon  Lee  is  now  inclined  to 
believe  that  it  is  not  necessary  always  to  have  actual  sensory  experi- 
ence of  these  processes  during  aesthetic  empathy.  She  holds, 
rather,  that  with  some  observers  the  attribution  to  the  object  of 
one's  own  condition  takes  place  in  terms  of  mental  imagery — 
especially  kinaesthetic  imagery — instead  of  present  sensational 
experience. 

One  purpose  of  the  book  is  to  stimulate  experimental  psycholo- 
gists to  the  study  of  aesthetic  appreciation  for  visual  form.  Much 
more,  however,  has  been  done  in  this  field,  particularly  in  America, 
than  the  author  seenls  to  recognize. 

It  is  important  for  students  of  aesthetics  to  have  the  writings  of 
Lee  and  Thomson  on  this  subject  gathered  into  a  book.  And  a 
new  and  real  contribution  has  been  made  in  the  mass  of  intro- 
spective records  from  the  gallery  notes. 

The  book  is  agreeably  printed  and  contains  nine  attractive 
plates. 

KATE  GORDON 
Los  ANGELES 

ANTHROPOLOGY 

Psyche1  s  Task.  A  Discourse  concerning  the  Influence  of  Superstition 
on  the  Growth  of  Institutions.  J.  G.  FRAZER.  London:  Mac- 
millan,  1909.  Pp.  84. 

Any  one  who  values  his  time  is  likely  to  eye  Frazer's  recent 
extensive  works  with  the  wish  that  several  volumes  might  be  trans- 
figured in  some  non-Euclidean  way  into  the  dimensions  of  an 
hour's  reading.  This  of  course  cannot  be  done,  for  their  method 
is  essentially  anecdotal,  and  any  attempt  to  reduce  their  extent 
would  result  in  elimination  and  not  in  condensation.  Nevertheless, 
in  Psyche's  Task,  under  an  obscuring  title  and  without  professing 
to  do  so,  Dr.  Frazer  has  epitomized  for  us  a  train  of  thought  which 


432  REVIEWS 

permeates  and  perhaps  dominates  all  his  writings.  The  discourse 
is  dedicated  to  "all  who  are  engaged  in  Psyche's  task  of  sorting 
out  the  seeds  of  good  from  the  seeds  of  evil."  To  such  seriously 
intending  persons  the  author  of  the  Golden  Bough  presents  a  carefully 
selected  group  of  characteristic  anthropological  anecdotes  by  which 
he  proposes  "to  prove,  or  at  least  make  probable,  that  among 
certain  races  and  at  certain  stages  of  evolution,  some  social  institu- 
tions which  we  all,  or  most  of  us,  believe  to  be  beneficial,  have 
partially  rested  on  a  basis  of  superstition."  Some  justification  for 
such  a  multitude  of  saving  clauses  will  be  granted  when  we  find 
that  the  institutions  in  question  are  civil  government,  private 
property,  marriage,  and  the  secure  enjoyment  of  human  life. 

It  would  be  distinctly  unfair  to  give  the  impression  that  the 
author  rests  these  institutions  entirely  upon  a  basis  of  superstition, 
or  that  he  praises  superstition.  And  yet  the  reviewer,  compelled  as 
he  is  to  believe  that  there  is  a  meaning  in  the  discourse,  retains  the 
impression  that  there  is  a  dilemma  implied  which  is  none  the  less 
convincing  for  not  being  expressed.  The  author  seems  to  mean 
that  either  these  institutions  lack  a  good  deal  of  the  sanctity  which 
some  of  the  unthinking  of  us  incline  to  attach  to  them,  or  else 
superstition  is  sanctified  by  its  parental  relation  to  them. 

In  the  case  of  civil  government  superstition  has  worked  mostly 
through  the  taboo,  placing  a  hedge  of  sanctity  around  the  personal 
head  of  the  government.  The  supposed  sanctity  of  the  chief  is  his 
principal  or  only  means  of  enforcing  his  orders.  This  sanctity 
extends  to  his  belongings,  and  we  have  accounts,  of  psychological 
interest,  of  persons  who  have  died  after  learning  that  they  had 
inadvertently  used  the  king's  lost  tinder-box  or  eaten  the  remains 
of  his  dinner.  Because  of  his  sanctity  and  of  his  relations  with 
spirits  there  is  often  ascribed  to  the  king  power  over  the  rains  and  the 
fruitfulness  of  the  soil;  and  then  the  author,  with  no  visible  smile 
in  the  printed  page,  proceeds  to  say  that  in  Africa  "droughts  or 
famine  are  set  down  to  the  weakness  or  ill-will  of  the  king  and 
accordingly  he  is  punished,  or  deposed,  or  put  to  death."  After 
that  we  are  told  in  conclusion  that  "many  peoples  have  regarded 
their  rulers,  whether  chiefs  or  kings,  with  superstitious  awe  as 
being  of  a  higher  order  and  endowed  with  mightier  powers  than 
common  folk.  Imbued  with  such  a  profound  veneration  for  their 
governors  and  with  such  an  exaggerated  conception  of  their  power, 
they  cannot  but  have  yielded  them  a  prompter  and  more  explicit 
obedience  than  if  they  had  known  them  to  be  mere  men  just  like 


ANTHROPOLOGY  433 

themselves."  This  proves  the  value  of  superstition  as  a  foundation 
of  government. 

With  regard  to  private  property  the  case  is  simple.  Almost 
universally  primitive  and  other  peoples  have  relied  upon  one  an- 
other's superstitious  fears  to  secure  themselves  in  the  possession 
of  whatever  they  have  acquired.  Taboo,  magic,  the  imprecations 
of  the  owner,  all  impress  the  covetous  with  the  dangers  of  stealing. 
It  is  not  impertinent  to  remark  however  that  our  author  calls 
attention  later  on  to  the  enormous  waste  and  destruction  of  property 
for  which  superstition  is  responsible.  If  superstition  is  conservative 
of  private  property  rights,  it  is  not  conserving  of  property  in 
general;  the  destruction  of  property  in  connection  with  funerals  is 
an  instance  of  waste  directly  due  to  superstition  and  to  that  alone. 

Marriage,  or  the  tribal  code  of  sexual  relations,  is  protected  by 
a  great  number  and  variety  of  superstitious  sanctions.  Breaches 
of  the  marriage  laws  are  generally  believed  to  affect  the  community 
as  a  whole,  causing  public  calamities  such  as  droughts.  "Wherever 
these  superstitions  prevail  it  is  obvious  that  public  opinion  and 
public  justice  will  treat  sexual  offences  with  far  greater  severity 
than  is  meted  out  to  them  by  peoples  who,  like  most  civilized 
nations,  regard  such  misdemeanors  as  matters  of  private  rather  than 
public  concern.  .  .  .  And  conversely,  wherever  we  find  that  incest, 
adultery,  and  fornication  are  treated  by  the  community  with  ex- 
treme rigor,  we  may  reasonably  infer  that  the  original  motive  for 
such  treatment  was  superstition."  The  question  why  various 
peoples  come  to  regard  certain  relations  of  the  sexes  as  immoral 
is  mentioned  and  left  unanswered,  but  the  connection  between 
disorders  of  nature  and  disorderly  sexual  relations  is  traced  to  the 
belief  that  a  connection  exists  between  reproduction  in  nature  and 
reproduction  in  man;  men  mimicking  or  recapitulating  the  processes 
of  nature  exercise  a  magical  influence  over  them. 

Finally  superstition,  notably  the  fear  of  ghosts,  has  sanctified 
human  life.  In  this  section  the  argument,  if  there  is  any,  is  exceed- 
ingly obscure,  and  seems  to  the  present  writer  quite  inconclusive. 
To  be  sure  there  is  evidence  that  murderers  are  made  uncomfortable 
under  the  system  of  quarantine  by  which  the  community  seeks  to 
protect  itself  from  the  evil  spirits  who  dog  the  heels  of  man-slayers. 
But  there  is  no  evidence  of  any  such  fatal  results  to  the  murderer 
as  those  which  overtake  the  petty  thief  or  those  who  trespass  upon 
the  king's  prerogatives.  The  ghosts  of  the  slain  are  less  discriminat- 
ing in  their  vengeance  than  the  spirits  who  maintain  the  taboo. 


434  REVIEWS 

"Indeed  the  ghosts  of  all  who  have  died  a  violent  death  are  in  a 
sense  a  public  danger;  for  their  temper  is  naturally  soured  and  they 
are  apt  to  fall  foul  of  the  first  person  they  meet  without  nicely 
discriminating  between  the  innocent  and  the  guilty."  Out  of  a 
varied  array  of  ceremonies  having  to  do  with  the  protection  of  the 
living  from  the  spirits  of  the  dead  there  is  not  one  item  which  indi- 
cates that  the  primitive  mind  recognizes  any  difference  between  the 
dead  who  have  been  respectfully  treated  before  their  death  and  the 
victims  of  human  violence;  all  the  dead  are  equally  dreaded,  no 
matter  how  they  came  by  their  death.  The  most  cruel  of  the  social 
punishments  which  are  mentioned  are  not  those  accorded  to 
murderers  but  to  innocent  widowers.  "His  miseries  begin  with 
his  wife's  death.  He  is  immediately  stripped  of  all  his  ornaments, 
abused  and  beaten  by  his  wife's  relations;  his  house  is  pillaged,  his 
gardens  devastated.  ...  He  may  not  hunt  or  fish  with  the  others, 
his  presence  would  bring  misfortune;  the  spirit  of  his  dead  wife 
would  frighten  the  fish  or  game.  ...  If  he  were  dead  he  could  not 
be  ignored  more  completely.  He  has  become  a  nocturnal  animal. 
He  is  forbidden  to  show  himself  in  public,  to  traverse  the  village, 
to  walk  in  the  roads  and  paths."  Is  it  the  author's  naivete  or  a 
sly  malice  that  lets  him  introduce  as  an  evidence  of  the  influence  of 
superstition  in  increasing  the  respect  for  human  life  the  Fijian 
custom  of  forestalling  subsequent  spirit  activities  by  burying  the 
aged  and  sick  alive?  A  more  forceful,  if  less  trustworthy,  report 
is  presented  in  the  case  of  the  Chinese,  whose  reverence  for  the 
spirits  of  the  dead  is  said  to  increase  their  respect  for  the  aged  and 
helpless,  and  who  are  said  also  to  resort  to  suicide  in  order  to  free 
themselves  from  the  limitations  of  the  body  and  so  as  ghosts  to 
torment  those  who  have  injured  them. 

Having  shown  that  superstition  has  been  helpful  in  developing 
government,  private  property,  marriage,  and  respect  for  human 
life,  the  discourse  closes  by  insisting  that  right  action  is  more  valu- 
able than  right  opinion,  and  that  we  should  not  be  blind  to  "the 
benefit  which  superstition  has  conferred  on  society  by  furnishing 
the  ignorant,  the  weak,  and  the  foolish  with  a  motive,  bad  though 
be,  for  good  conduct."  To  what  extent  government,  private 
property,  marriage,  and  respect  for  human  life  still  rest  upon  super- 
stition the  reader  is  left  to  guess  for  himself. 

WARNER  BROWN 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 


THE  ASSOCIATION  EXPERIMENT  435 


THE  ASSOCIATION  EXPERIMENT 

Untersuchungen  uber  die  Konstanz  und  den  Wechsel  der  psychologischen 

Konstellation  bei  Normalen   und  Fruhdementen    (Schizophrenen). 

W.  PFENNINGER.     Jahr.  f.  psychoanal.  u.  psychopathol.  Forsch., 

1912,  481-524. 
Experimented    Beitrdge    zur    Psychologie    des    psycho-galvanischen 

Phdnomens.     ESTHER  APTEKMANN.     Ibid.,  591—620. 

The  outlook  upon  the  association  experiment  is  broadened  several 
degrees  by  these  two  studies,  which  are  the  same  in  make-up  and 
general  viewpoint.  In  the  first  and  longer  of  the  two,  the  same 
association  experiment  of  100  words  was  repeated  with  8  normal 
subjects,  4  men  and  4  women,  eight  times  at  weekly  intervals;  a 
similar  procedure  was  carried  out  with  n  cases  of  dementia  prsecox, 
6  men  and  5  women.  The  reaction  times  of  the  women  begin  about  a 
third  longer  than  those  of  the  men,  decrease  more  regularly,  and  end 
somewhat  shorter.  The  tendency  to  change  the  response- words  is 
somewhat  more  pronounced  in  the  men  than  in  the  women  subjects, 
and  progressively  decreases  in  both;  more  rapidly  with  the  men  at 
the  end,  in  the  women  at  the  beginning.  Komplexmerkmale  are 
pronouncedly  more  frequent  in  the  women,  and  do  not  decrease  in 
the  later  series  so  much  as  those  of  the  men.  The  changed  responses 
show  through  all  series  somewhat  longer  reaction  times  than  those 
which  are  not  changed.  In  the  relation  of  the  Komplexmerkmale 
to  the  tendency  to  change  responses,  those  without  Komplexmerkmale 
are  changed  much  less  than  those  with  them,  but  in  the  detail  of 
the  latter  there  is  a  complicated  sex  difference,  which  the  author 
endeavors  to  interpret.  The  stimulus  words  are  characterized  in  the 
earliest  series  by  more  Komplexmerkmale,  the  more  change  they  are 
to-  show.  Those  associations  which  are  inconstant  attach  to  the  more 
emotional  constellations.  Associations  which  are  later  to  change 
also  have  longer  time  in  the  first  and  second  repetition.  The  author 
seems  also  to  believe  that  there  is  a  significant  tendency  for -the  time 
of  an  association  to  be  longer  if  it  is  to  show  a  change  in  the  next 
repetition.  In  the  later  repetitions,  the  changed  responses  concen- 
trate themselves  upon  stimulus  words  which  have  also  given  rise  to 
earlier  change,  i.  e.,  certain  stimulus  words  show  throughout  special 
liability  to  changed  responses.  These  associations  are  apt  to  be 
grouped  (Storungsketteri)  with  evidences  of  perseverative  phenomena. 

The  reaction  times  average  some  three  to  four  fold  longer  in 


436  REVIEWS 

the  pathological  cases,  and  the  difference  between  the  men  and  women 
is,  except  at  first,  more  marked  than  in  the  normal.  (Initially  the 
reaction  time  of  the  women  averages  shorter  than  that  of  the  men.) 
The  course  of  the  reaction  times  through  the  eight  repetitions  is 
much  changed,  and:  the  curve  of  the  dementia  praecox  men  corre- 
sponds closer  to  that  of  the  normal  women,  that  of  the  dementia 
praecox  women  to  the  normal  men.  Further,  a  similar  series  of  ex- 
periments with  six  women  subjects,  by  a  woman  experimenter ,  gave 
now  a  result  similar  to  the  previous  one  of  the  man  experimenter 
with  the  men  dementia  praecox  subjects.  Other  results  point  in  the 
same  direction;  e.  g.,  the  number  of  Komplexmerkmale,  while  as  pre- 
viously more  frequent  in  the  women  throughout  (and  in  both  much 
increased),  shows  in  the  curve  of  decrease  rather  the  reversed  re- 
lationship of  the  men  and  women  subjects  from  that  found  in  the 
normal.  Again  the  woman  experimenter  finds  with  women  dementia 
praecox  subjects  the  same  result  as  the  man  experimenter  with  the 
men  dementia  praecox  subjects.  These  seem  very  suggestive  findings. 
The  responses  are  changed  much  more  frequently  in  the  dementia 
praecox  than  in  the  normal  subjects;  the  sex  relationship  is  indeter- 
minate and  is  not  altered  in  the  time  relations  of  the  changed  and 
unchanged  responses. 

The  second  paper  deals  with  normal  subjects  only,  adding  some 
material  on  the  psychogalvanic  reflex.  This  is  from  some  early 
work  by  Jung  and  Brill,  with  a  very  simple  technique.  As- 
sociation series  of  the  same  50  or  25  stimulus  words  were  given  re- 
spectively 6  times  weekly  and  7  times  daily  to  groups  of  4  and  5 
subjects.  A  heightened  reaction  time  in  the  fourth  experiment, 
noted  in  Pfenninger's  men  subjects,  is  seen  here  also,  and  a  corre- 
sponding phenomenon  appears  again  in  the  galvanic  reactions;  the 
authors  talk  of  homosexual  resistances.  As  with  Pfenninger  the 
number  of  changed  responses  decreases  with  repetition,  and  there  is 
less  change  in  the  daily  series  than  in  the  weekly.  Changed  responses 
have  longer  times,  and  are  more  associated  with  Komplexmerkmale 
than  unchanged  ones,  as  we  should  expect.  Also  the  galvanic  re- 
actions show,  in  their  relation  to  these  phenomena,  about  what  our 
knowledge  of  this  method  would  lead  us  to  anticipate.  The  deflections 
tend  to  drop  in  the  later  series,  though  not  always  in  correspondence 
with  the  association  time.  Deflections  above  the  median  are  also 
issociated  with  greater  change  in  response  than  those  below  it;  in  a 
greater  degree  than  the  change  is  related  to  the  remaining 
merkmale. 


THE  ASSOCIATION  EXPERIMENT  437 

The  reviewer,  and  doubtless  others,  have  noted  the  possibility 
of  associative  responses  being  influenced  by  the  personality  of  the 
experimenter.1  The  result  of  Morawitz's  contribution  to  Pfenninger's 
article  is  in  conformity  with  this  idea,  and  Aptekmann  tests  it  out 
somewhat  further.  Experiments  were  made  by  Jung  and  the  author, 
with  six  men  and  six  women  subjects.  The  differences  are  often  too 
small  for  significance,  but  in  a  special  experimental  series  the  women 
subjects  show  a  rather  constant  deflection  with  the  woman  experi- 
menter, much  greater  and  decreasing  deflections  with  the  man 
experimenter.  The  men  subjects  show  with  the  man  experimenter 
about  the  same  result  as  the  women,  with  the  woman  experimenter 
much  smaller  deflections,  slightly  decreasing.  Beyond  the  general 
decrease  with  repetition  there  is  nothing  of  certain  significance  in  the 
association  times.  Detailed  examination  seems  to  the  author  to 
reflect  the  greater  prominence  of  sexual  factors  in  the  experiment  with 
opposite  sex,  of  the  economic  one  in  the  others.  The  two  sets  were 
not  with  the  same  stimulus  words.  Words  which  begin  with  a  high 
deflection  tend  to  preserve  this  superiority  in  repetition.  Dif- 
ferences may  be  shown  in  the  personal  influence  of  various  experi- 
menters on  the  results.  The  author  considers  that  in  the  present 
instance  other  factors  outweigh  the  sex  difference;  the  point  is  well 
taken  that  the  experiment  here  becomes  a  measure  of  the  experimenter 
as  well  as  the  subject. 

Dealing  with  the  responses  by  classification  in  quasi-logical  cate- 
gories seems  to  have  been  abandoned  by  Jung's  pupils.  This  method 
is  essentially  a  criterion  of  personal  association  type,  and  in  Pfen- 
ninger's  problem  would  not  have  made  so  much  difference;  but  some- 
thing of  the  sort  should  probably  have  been  attempted  in  Aptek- 
mann's  research,  with  a  simplification  of  the  original  Jung-Riklin 
categories.  That  no  generalizations  on  the  effect  of  sex  differences 
in  the  experimenter  should  be  made  on  the  basis  of  one  experimenter 
of  each  sex,  seems  as  clear  to  the  author  as  to  the  reviewer. 

A  broader  criticism  to  be  made  of  these  two  papers  is  one  that 
applies  to  much  of  the  work  from  their  common  source.  There  seems 
to  be  no  adequate  conception  of  the  significance  of  variability.  In  a 
school  that  makes  so  much  of  individual  psychology,  it  is  the  more 
regrettable  that  individual  differences  should  be  all  but  ignored  in  a 
study  whose  material  must  contain  much  of  value  for  their  under- 
standing. The  authors  like  to  deal  with  their  averages  without  state- 
ment of  deviations  as  though  every  member  of  the  group  had  shown 

1  PSYCH.  REV.,  1911,  18,  6-7.     PSYCHOL.  MONOG.,  1911,  13,  No.  57,  p.  79. 


438  REVIEWS 

the  same  measure.  As  a  result,  it  often  happens  that  the  authors 
strain  every  neurofibril  for  the  uniform  psychological  interpretation  of 
some  phenomenon  whose  factual  validity  is  far  from  established  in  the 
given  results.  Psychoanalysis  has  an  excellent  Problemstellung  but 
its  methods  as  yet  lack  sense  of  proportion;  psychoanalysts  seek  the 
road  to  knowledge  with  a  good  compass,  but  an  execrable  map. 

While  then  it  seems  very  plain  that  the  presentation  of  the  results 
could  have  been  improved  upon,  experimental  practice  in  psycho- 
analytic envisagement  should  be  in  every  way  encouraged,  that  the 
more  doubtful  theories  associated  with  the  method  may  be  submitted 
to  proper  objective  test. 

F.  L.  WELLS 

McLEAN  HOSPITAL 


A  CORRECTION 

To  THE  EDITOR  OF  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN: 

Mr.  F.  S.  Breed  has  called  to  my  attention  the  fact  that  a 
criticism  suggested  in  my  review  of  his  monograph,  "The  Develop- 
ment of  Certain  Instincts  and  Habits  in  Chicks"  (see  the  August 
number  of  the  BULLETIN),  was  forestalled  by  him  in  the  work 
reviewed.  I  suggested  that  in  the  experiments  which  he  describes, 
where  a  chick  rejected  blue  when  that  color  was  offered  with  black 
and  also  when  it  was  offered  with  white,  there  might  have  been 
identification  of  the  absolute  brightness  of  the  blue,  which  would 
thus  have  been  seen  not  as  a  color  but  as  a  grey.  Mr.  Breed  how- 
ever says  on  page  69:  "It  may  be  suggested  that  after  the  long 
period  of  training  the  chicks  respond  to  a  particular  brightness 
value,  the  blue  amounting  to  certain  degree  of  grey.  But  No.  32 
and  No.  33  rejected  blue  (tint  No.  i)  when  it  was  used  in  combi- 
nation with  the  much  brighter  yellow."  I  am  glad  to  take  this 
opportunity  of  apologizing  for  the  carelessness  shown  in  over- 
looking the  fact  that  more  than  one  saturation  grade  of  blue  was 
used  in  these  experiments,  a  fact  which  decidedly  strengthens  the 
case  for  color  discrimination. 

MARGARET  FLOY  WASHBURN 
VASSAR  COLLEGE 


BOOKS   RECEIVED  DURING  OCTOBER 

LEUBA,   J.   H.     A  Psychological  Study  of  Religion.     New  York: 

Macmillan,  1912.     Pp.  xiv+37i.     $2. 
WATSON,  J.     The  Interpretation  of  Religious  Experience.     2  vols. 

Glasgow:  Maclehose  &  Sons,  1912.     Pp.  xiv+375,  x-f  342.     $6. 
MORGAN,  C.  L.     Instinct  and  Experience.     New  York:  Macmillan, 

1912.     Pp.  xvii+299.     $1.25. 
HOFFDING,  H.     A  Brief  History  of  Modern  Philosophy.     (Trans,  fr. 

German  by  SANDERS,   C.   F.)     New  York:  Macmillan,   1912. 

Pp.  x  +324.     $1.25. 
CALKINS,   M.   W.     A   First  Book   in   Psychology.     (3d   rev.    ed.) 

New  York:  Macmillan,  1912.     Pp.  xix+426.     $1.90. 
CALKINS,  M.  W.     The  Persistent  Problems  of  Philosophy.     (3d  rev. 

edition.)        New    York:     Macmillan,    1912.     Pp.    xxvi+577. 

$2.50. 
HELLER,  T.     Grundriss  der  Heilpadagogik.     (2.  umgearb.  u  verm. 

Aufl.)     Leipzig:    Engelmann,    1912.     Pp.    xi+676.     Mk.    17, 

Geb.  18. 
ELSENHANS,     T.     Lehrbuch     der    Psychologic.     Tubingen:     Mohr 

(Paul  Siebeck),  1912.     Pp.  xxiii+434.     Mk.  15. 
POFFENBERGER,  A.  T.     Reaction  Time  to  Retinal  Stimulation,  with 

Special  Reference  to  the  Time  Lost  in  Conduction  through  Nerve 

Centers.     (No.    23    of  Archives   of    Psychology.)     New   York: 

The  Science  Press,  1912.     Pp.  iii+73. 
CULLER,  A.  J.     Interference   and  Adaptability.     An  Experimental 

Study   of  their  Relation,   with   Special  Reference   to   Individual 

Differences.     (No.  24  of  Archives  of  Psychology.)     New  York: 

The  Science  Press,  1912.     Pp.  v+8o. 
TODD,  J.  W.     Reaction  to  Multiple  Stimuli.     (No.  25  of  Archives 

of   Psychology.)     New   York:   The   Science   Press,    1912.     Pp. 


MARTIN,  L.  J.     Die  Projektionsmethode  und  die  Lokalisation  visueller 
und  anderer  Forstellungsbilder.     Leipzig:  Barth,  1912.     Pp.  231. 

439 


NOTES  AND  NEWS 

DR.  E.  B.  TITCHENER,  Sage  professor  of  psychology  in  the 
Graduate  School  of  Cornell  University,  has  been  appointed  head  of 
the  combined  undergraduate  and  graduate  sections  of  the  depart- 
ment of  psychology  and  lecturer  in  psychology  in  the  College  of 
Arts  and  Sciences.  In  the  latter  position  Professor  Titchener  will 
give  lectures  in  elementary  psychology.  In  connection  with  the 
changes  mentioned  it  is  significant  to  note  the  retention  of  the 
professorship  in  the  Graduate  School. 

SAMUEL  W.  FERNBERGER,  Pn.D.  (Pennsylvania),  succeeds  Dr. 
Harry  P.  Weld  as  instructor  in  experimental  psychology  at  Clark 
University. 

T.  H.  RAINES,  professor  of  psychology  in  the  Ohio  State  Uni- 
versity, is  on  leave  of  absence  for  the  present  year.  Professor 
Haines  plans  to  spend  the  year  in  visiting  a  number  of  European 
psychopathological  institutes. 

DR.  C.  E.  FERREE,  of  Bryn  Mawr  College,  has  been  advanced  to 
an  associate  professorship  of  experimental  psychology.  A  separate 
building  has  been  granted  him  by  the  College  to  be  used  exclusively 
as  a  graduate  laboratory  of  experimental  psychology.  This  building 
will  be  fitted  up  for  research  work  alone  and  will,  when  finished, 
consist  of  eight  rooms.  One  or  more  optics  rooms  will  be  provided, 
furnished  with  sky-lights,  diffusion  sashes,  etc.,  for  the  control  of 
illumination,  and  with  concrete  piers  running  to  the  ground  to  give  a 
vibrationless  support  for  delicate  apparatus.  The  regular  services 
of  a  mechanician  will  be  available  for  this  laboratory. 

PROFESSOR  E.  A.  KIRKPATRICK,  of  the  State  Normal  School, 
Fitchburg,  Massachusetts,  would  be  glad  to  receive  letters  from  all 
those  who  would  care  to  have  a  series  of  photographs,  similar  to 
those  issued  by  the  Open  Court  Publishing  Company,  of  present-day 
psychologists,  educators,  and  men  of  science.  Suggestions  con- 
cerning the  photographs  which  should  be  placed  in  such  a  collection 
would  be  welcomed  by  him,  and  the  amount  of  interest  in  the 
matter  indicated  by  the  communications  received  will  determine 
whether  it  is  feasible  to  undertake  the  task  of  collecting  and  pub- 
lishing. 

44° 


Vol.  IX.  No.  12.  December  15,  1912 

THE 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  BULLETIN 


VALUATION  AS  A  SOCIAL  PROCESS 

BY  PROFESSOR  C.  H.   COOLEY 

University  of  Michigan 

In  a  large  view  of  the  matter  valuation  is  nothing  less  than  the 
selective  process  in  the  mental-social  life  of  man:  all  values  are  in 
some  sense  survival  values  and  have  a  bearing  on  the  onward  tendency 
of  things.  They  indicate  significance  with  reference  to  some  sort  of 
a  crisis,  and  are  factors  in  guiding  the  behavior  of  some  sort  of  organ- 
ism. The  idea  might  easily  be  extended  to  lower  forms  of  life  and 
made  to  embrace  all  the  psychical  aspects  of  selection;  we  shall  be 
content,  however,  to  consider  some  of  its  human  applications. 

The  manner  in  which  a  certain  object  develops  value  for  a  man 
in  a  particular  situation  is  a  matter  of  the  commonest  experience: 
at  every  instant  we  are  passing  from  one  situation  to  another  and  the 
objects  about  us  are  taking  on  new  values  accordingly.  If  I  wish  to 
drive  a  nail  I  look  at  everything  within  reach  with  reference  to  its 
hammer-value,  and  if  the  monkey-wrench  has  more  of  this  than 
any  other  object  available  I  reach  for  it,  its  function  increases,  it 
survives,  it  is  the  fit,  is  a  growing  factor  in  life.  And  men,  nations, 
doctrines,  what  you  will,  wax  and  wane  by  analogous  acts  of  selection. 

The  essential  things  in  the  conception  of  value  are,  then,  a  human 
organism  (not  necessarily  a  person)  a  situation  and  an  object;  the 
last  having  properties  that  have  an  influence  on  the  behavior  of  the 
organism  in  view  of  the  situation.  The  organism  is,  of  course,  the 
heart  of  the  whole  matter.  We  are  interested  primarily  in  that 
because  it  is  a  system  of  life,  and  in  values  because  they  mould  its 
growth.  The  various  values  acting  on  the  organism  are  ever  being 
integrated  by  the  latter  (as  by  a  man  when  he  "  makes  up  his  mind  ") 
and  the  situation  is  met  by  an  act  of  selection,  which  is  a  step  in 
growth,  leading  on  to  new  situations  and  values. 

441 


442  C.  H.  COOLEY 

Valuation  includes  the  history  that  lies  back  of  values,  that  ante- 
cedent process  of  growth  and  struggle  by  which  any  object  of  thought 
or  sentiment  comes  to  have  more  or  less  power  over  choice  and  action. 
If,  for  example,  diamonds,  the  paintings  of  Corot,  the  dogmas  of 
Christian  Science,  the  idea  of  brotherhood,  the  attainment  of  the 
SouthPole,  the  services  of  a  physician,  have  power,  in  various  ways  and 
degrees,  over  human  behavior,  it  is  because  there  has  been  a  previous 
mental  and  social  process  out  of  which  these  objects  have  emerged 
with  a  certain  weight  for  certain  mental  situations. 

The  organism  which  the  idea  of  value  implies,  the  life  which  is 
the  heart  of  the  process,  about  which  values  center  may  be  personal 
or  it  may  be  impersonal:  a  doctrine,  an  institution,  a  movement,  any- 
thing which  lives  and  grows,  gives  rise  to  a  special  system  of  values 
having  reference  to  that  growth,  and  these  values  are  real  powers  in 
life  whether  persons  are  aware  of  or  interested  in  them  or  not;  the 
growth  of  language,  for  example,  of  myth,  of  forms  of  art,  works 
on  to  important  issues  with  little  or  no  conscious  participation  on 
our  part.  In  general  there  are  as  many  centers  of  value  as  there  are 
phases  of  life. 

The  various  classifications  of  value  are  based  in  one  way  or  another 
on  that  of  the  objects,  organisms  or  situations  which  the  general  idea 
of  value  involves.  Thus,  taking  the  point  of  view  of  the  object,  we 
speak  of  grain-values,  stock-values,  the  values  of  books,  of  pictures, 
of  doctrines,  of  men.  Evidently,  however,  these  are  indeterminate 
unless  we  bring  in  the  organism  and  the  situation  to  define  them. 
A  book  has  various  kinds  of  value,  as  literary  and  pecuniary,  and 
these  again  may  be  different  for  different  persons  or  groups. 

As  regards  the  forms  of  human  life  to  which  values  are  to  be 
referred,  it  seems  to  me  of  primary  importance  to  make  a  distinction 
which  I  will  call  that  between  human-nature  values  and  institutional 
values. 

The  first  are  those  which  may  be  traced  without  great  difficulty 
to  phases  of  universal  human  nature.  The  organism  for  which  they 
have  weight  is  simply  man  in  those  comparatively  permanent  aspects 
which  we  are  accustomed  to  speak  of  as  human  nature,  and  to 
contrast  with  the  shifting  institutions  that  are  built  upon  it.  The 
objects  possessing  such  values  differ  greatly  from  age  to  age,  but  the 
tests  which  are  applied  to  them  are  fundamentally  much  the  same, 
because  the  organism  from  which  they  spring  is  much  the  same. 
A  bright  color,  a  harmonious  sound,  have  a  value  for  all  men,  and 
we  may  reckon  all  the  more  universal  forms  of  beauty,  those  which 


VALUATION  AS  A  SOCIAL  PROCESS  443 

men  of  any  age  and  culture  may  appreciate  through  merely  becoming 
familiar  with  them,  as  human-nature  values.  Such  values  are  as 
various  as  human  nature  itself  and  may  be  differentiated  and  classi- 
fied in  a  hundred  ways.  There  are  some  in  which  particular  senses 
are  the  conspicuous  factors,  as  auditory  and  gustatory  values. 
Others  spring  from  the  social  sentiments,  like  the  values  of  social 
self-feeling  which  underlie  conformity,  and  the  values  of  love,  fear, 
ambition,  honor  and  loyalty.  Closely  related  to  these  are  the  more 
universal  religious  and  moral  values,  which,  however,  are  usually 
entangled  with  institutional  values  of  a  more  transient  and  special 
character.  The  same  may  be  said  of  scientific,  philosophical  and 
ethical  values,  and  great  achievement  in  any  of  these  fields  depends 
mainly  on  the  creation  of  values  which  are  such  for  human  nature, 
and  not  merely  for  some  transient  institutional  point  of  view. 

The  second  sort  of  values  are  those  which  must  be  ascribed  to  an 
institutional  system  of  some  sort.  Human  nature  enters  into  them 
but  is  so  transformed  in  its  operation  by  the  system  that  we  regard 
the  latter  as  their  source,  and  are  justified  in  doing  so  by  the  fact  that 
social  organisms  have  a  growth  and  values  that  cannot,  practically, 
be  explained  from  the  standpoint  of  general  human  nature.  The 
distinction  is  obvious  enough  if  we  take  a  clear  instance  of  it,  like  the 
distinction  between  religious  and  ecclesiastical  values.  Such  general 
traits  of  religious  psychology  as  are  treated  in  William  James's 
Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  correspond  to  values  that  we  may 
call  values  of  human  nature;  the  values  established  in  the  Roman 
Catholic  Church  are  a  very  different  matter,  though  human  nature 
certainly  enters  into  them.  In  the  same  way  there  are  special  values 
for  every  sort  of  institutional  development — legal  values,  political 
values,  military  values,  university  values,  and  so  on.  All  technical 
values  come  under  this  head.  Thus  in  every  art  there  are  not  only 
human-nature  values  in  the  shape  of  phases  of  beauty  open  to  men 
at  large,  but  technical  values,  springing  from  the  special  history  and 
methods  of  the  art,  which  only  the  expert  can  appreciate. 

Pecuniary  values  should,  I  think,  be  reckoned  in  this  second  class, 
for  reasons  which  I  shall  not  attempt  to  give  at  present. 

This  distinction,  as  I  have  remarked,  rests  upon  the  fact  that  there 
are  forms  of  social  life  having  a  distinct  organic  growth,  involving 
distinct  needs  and  values,  which  cannot  be  understood  by  direct 
reference  to  universal  human  nature  and  the  conditions  that  immedi- 
ately influence  it.  I  am  aware  that  it  may  be  difficult  to  apply  to 
particular  cases.  It  resembles  most  psychological  distinctions  in 


444  C.  H.  COOLEY 

offering  no  sharp  dividing  line,  being  simply  a  question  of  the  amount 
and  definiteness  of  social  tradition  and  structure  involved.  All 
human  values  are  more  or  less  mediated  by  transient  social  con- 
ditions: they  might,  perhaps,  be  arranged  in  a  scale  as  to  the  degree 
in  which  they  are  so  mediated;  some,  like  the  taste  for  salt,  com- 
paratively little,  others,  like  the  taste  for  poetry,  a  great  deal.  In 
dealing  with  the  latter  kind  we  come  to  a  point  on  the  scale  where  the 
social  antecedents  take  on  such  definite  form  and  development  as  to 
constitute  a  distinct  organism  which  must  be  studied  as  such  before 
we  can  understand  the  value  situation.  In  moral  values,  for  example, 
there  are  some,  like  those  of  loyalty,  kindness  and  courage,  which 
spring  quite  directly  from  universal  conditions  and  may  be  regarded 
as  human-nature  values;  others,  like  the  obligation  to  go  to  church 
on  Sunday,  are  evidently  institutional.  I  need  hardly  add  that 
human  and  institutional  values  often  conflict,  or  that  reform  consists 
largely  in  readjusting  them  to  each  other.  Nor  need  I  discuss  in 
detail  the  familiar  process  by  which  human-nature  values,  seeking 
realization  through  a  complex  social  system,  are  led  to  take  on 
organization  and  an  institutional  character  which  carries  them  far 
away  from  human-nature  and  in  time  calls  for  a  reassertion  of  the 
latter;  or  just  how  this  reassertion  takes  place  on  the  initiative  of 
individuals  and  small  groups.  Any  one  may  see  such  cycles  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  Christian  church,  or  of  any  other  institution  he  may 
prefer  to  study. 

It  is  noteworthy,  also,  that  there  are  words  that  may  be  under- 
stood in  either  a  human-nature  or  an  institutional  sense,  and  so  are 
ambiguous  with  reference  to  this  distinction.  For  example  educa- 
tional value  might  be  a  real  human  value,  or  it  might  refer  to  tests  of  a 
special  and  technical  sort,  and  "religious"  often  means  ecclesiastical. 

The  various  human-nature  and  institutional  values  of  a  given 
object  differ  among  themselves  as  the  phases  of  the  human  mind 
itself  differ:  that  is,  however  marked  the  differences,  the  values  are 
after  all  expressions  of  a  common  organic  life.  There  is  no  clean-cut 
separation  among  them  and  at  times  they  merge  indistinguishably 
one  into  another.  An  organic  mental-social  life  has  for  one  of  its 
phases  an  organic  system  of  values.  For  example  the  aesthetic  and 
moral  values  may  seem  quite  unconnected,  as  in  the  case  of  a  man 
with  a  "fair  outside"  but  a  bad  character,  and  yet  we  feel  that  there 
is  something  beautiful  about  perfect  goodness  and  something  good 
about  perfect  beauty.  It  is  agreed,  I  believe,  that  the  best  literature 
and  art  are  moral,  not,  perhaps,  by  intention,  but  because  the  two 


VALUATION  AS  A  SOCIAL  PROCESS  445 

kinds  of  value  are  related  and  tend  to  coincide  in  their  completeness. 
Alongside  of  these  we  may  put  truth-value,  and  say  of  the  three  that 
they  are  phases  of  the  highest  form  of  human  judgment  which  often 
become  indistinguishable. 

The  institutional  values  are  also  parts  of  the  same  mental-social 
system,  distinguished  by  their  derivation  from  a  special  social 
organism.  They  merge  into  the  human-nature  values,  as  I  have 
suggested,  and  unless  the  two  are  in  opposition  it  may  be  hard  to 
distinguish  between  them.  An  institution,  however,  seldom  or  never 
corresponds  so  closely  to  a  phase  of  human  nature  that  the  insti- 
tutional values  and  the  immediately  human  values  on  the  whole 
coincide.  An  idea,  in  becoming  institutional,  merges  itself  with  the 
whole  traditional  structure  of  society,  taking  the  past  upon  its 
shoulders,  and  loses  much  of  the  breadth  and  spontaneity  of  our 
more  immediate  life.  There  are  no  institutions  that  express  ade- 
quately the  inner  need  for  beauty,  truth,  righteousness  and  religion 
as  human  nature  requires  them  at  a  given  time:  no  church,  for  ex- 
ample, ever  was  or  can  be  wholly  Christian. 

It  is  apparent  that  the  same  object  may  have  many  kinds  of  value, 
perhaps  all  of  those  that  I  have  mentioned.  It  is  conceivable  that 
man  may  turn  all  phases  of  his  life  towards  any  object  and  appraise 
it  differently  for  each  phase.  Consider,  for  instance,  an  animal  like 
the  ox,  of  immemorial  interest  to  the  human  race.  It  may  be 
regarded  as  beautiful  or  ugly,  may  arouse  the  various  emotions,  as 
love,  fear  or  anger,  may  give  rise  to  moral  and  philosophical  questions, 
may  be  the  object  of  religious  feeling,  as  in  India,  and  have  a  value 
for  the  senses  of  sight,  hearing,  touch,  smell  and  taste.  It  has  also, 
especially  among  the  pastoral  peoples,  notable  institutional  values; 
plays  a  large  part  in  law,  ceremony  and  worship,  and,  in  our  own 
tradition,  has  an  eponymous  relation  to  pecuniary  institutions. 

Since  values  are  a  phase  of  the  public  mind,  of  the  same  general 
nature  as  public  opinion;  they  vary  as  that  does  with  the  time,  the 
group  and  the  special  situation.  Every  nation  or  epoch  has  its  more 
or  less  peculiar  value  system,  made  up  of  related  parts:  any  one  can 
see  that  the  values  of  the  Middle  Ages  were  very  different  from  our 
own :  they  are  a  part  of  the  ethos ,  the  mores •,  or  whatever  you  choose 
to  call  the  collective  state  of  mind.1  Each  individual,  also,  has  a 
system  of  values  of  his  own  which  is  a  differentiated  member  of  the 

1  The  human-nature  values,  of  course,  vary  much  less  than  the  institutional 
values.  Thus  fashions  vary  infinitely,  but  conformity,  the  human  nature  basis  of 
allegiance  to  fashion,  remains  much  the  same. 


446  C.  H.  COOLEY 

system  of  the  group.  And  these  various  group  and  individual  aspects 
hang  together  in  such  a  way  that  no  one  aspect  can  be  explained  except 
by  reference  to  the  whole  out  of  which  it  grows.  You  can  hardly 
understand  how  a  man  feels  about  religion,  for  example,  unless  you 
understand  also  how  he  feels  about  his  industrial  position  and 
about  other  matters  in  which  he  is  deeply  concerned;  you  must,  so 
far  as  may  be,  grasp  his  life  as  a  whole.  And  you  will  hardly  do 
this  unless  you  grasp  also  the  social  medium  in  which  he  lives.  Any 
searching  study  of  any  sort  of  values  must  be  the  study  of  an  organic 
social  life. 

The  process  that  generates  value  is  mental  but  not  ordinarily 
conscious;  it  works  by  suggestion,  influence  and  the  competition  and 
survival  of  ideas;  but  all  this  is  constantly  going  on  in  and  through 
us  without  our  knowing  it.  I  may  be  wholly  unaware  of  the  genesis 
or  even  the  existence  of  values  which  live  in  my  mind  and  guide  my 
daily  course:  indeed  this  is  rather  the  rule  than  the  exception.  The 
common  phrase  "I  have  come  to  feel  differently  about  it"  expresses 
well  enough  the  way  in  which  values  usually  change.  The  psychology 
of  the  matter  is  intricate,  involving  the  influence  of  repetition,  of 
subtle  associations  of  ideas,  of  the  prestige  of  personalities,  giving 
weight  to  their  example,  and  the  like;  but  of  all  this  we  commonly 
know  nothing.  The  idea  of  punishment  after  death,  for  example, 
has  been  fading  for  a  generation  past;  its  value  for  conduct  has 
mostly  gone;  yet  few  have  been  aware  of  its  passing  and  fewer  still 
can  tell  how  this  has  come  about.  This  trait  of  the  growth  of  values 
is  of  course  well  understood  in  the  art  of  advertising,  which  aims, 
first  of  all,  to  give  an  idea  weight  in  the  subconscious  processes,  to 
familiarize  it  by  repetition,  to  accredit  it  by  pleasing  or  imposing 
associations,  to  insinuate  it  somehow  into  the  current  of  thought 
without  giving  choice  a  chance  to  pass  upon  it  at  all. 

If  the  simpler  phases  of  valuation,  those  that  relate  to  the  personal 
aims  of  the  individual,  are  usually  subconscious,  much  more  is  this 
true  of  the  larger  phases  which  relate  to  the  development  of  complex 
impersonal  wholes.  It  is  quite  true  that  there  are  "  great  social  values 
whose  motivating  power  directs  the  activities  of  nations,  of  great 
industries,  of  literary  and  artistic  'schools,'  of  churches  and  other 
social  organizations,  as  well  as  the  daily  lives  of  every  man  and 
woman — impelling  them  in  paths  which  no  individual  man  foresaw 
or  purposed."1  Nor  is  there  anything  mysterious  about  this:  it  is 
simply  one  aspect  of  the  fact  that  the  activities,  even  the  existence, 

1  B.  M.  Anderson,  Jr.,  Social  Value,  p.  116. 


VALUATION  AS  A  SOCIAL  PROCESS  447 

of  the  forms  of  social  life  are  not  necessarily  or  usually  objects  of 
consciousness  to  those  involved  in  them.  Every  one  must  see  that 
this  is  true  as  regards  the  past,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that 
the  present  is  different.  Without  doubt  we  are  taking  part  in  in- 
stitutional movements  of  which  we  know  nothing,  and  which  remain 
for  the  future  historian  or  sociologists  to  discover,  just  as  the  organic 
growth  of  language,  of  myth  and  the  like,  which  went  on  in  the  minds 
of  our  remote  predecessors,  has  been  brought  to  light  by  the  philolo- 
gists and  ethnologists  of  our  own  day.  Most  of  the  difficulty  that 
we  have  in  understanding  statements  of  the  sort  just  quoted  arises 
from  our  not  having  assimilated  fully  the  modern  discovery  that 
reflective  consciousness  embraces  only  a  small  part  of  life. 

Values  imply  an  act  of  selection,  which  may  also  be  unconscious 
as  well  as  conscious.  Selection  is  the  critical  activity  in  which  the 
organism  turns  one  way  or  another  under  the  pull  of  values;  but  we 
often  do  not  know  that,  as  individuals,  we  are  in  such  a  crisis,  and 
still  less  do  we  know  it  for  the  groups  and  institutions  of  which  we 
are  a  part.  And  while  values  may  be  altered  more  or  less  in  the 
crisis — nothing  stands  still — they  yet  exist  antecedently  to  it,  very 
much  as  the  military  power  of  a  nation  exists  before  it  is  tested 
in  war,  or  the  "strength"  of  a  presidential  candidate  before  the 
campaign  opens. 

Like  all  phases  of  the  human  mind  valuation  may  be  regarded 
either  in  the  individual  or  in  the  collective,  or  public,  aspect;  these 
two,  of  course,  being  aspects  merely,  which  all  phases  of  value, 
human-nature  or  institutional,  present.  Public  valuation  is  the 
process  viewed  in  a  large  way,  as  it  goes  on  in  the  general  mind,  in 
its  actual  complexity  of  growth.  In  studying  it  one  looks  for  broad 
features,  with  no  special  regard  to  persons.  Private  valuation  is  the 
same  thing  observed  working  itself  out  in  the  individual  mind;  it  is 
a  particular  phase  of  the  collective  process  that  for  various  reasons 
may  have  an  interest  of  its  own.  The  distinction  is  the  same  as  that 
between  public  and  private  opinion,  the  one  being  a  collective,  the 
other  a  particular  view  of  a  common  whole. 

Of  these  phases  public  valuation  is  for  many  purposes  the  more 
important.  It  is  the  real  thing,  the  big  thing,  in  which  other  phases 
of  value  find  their  relation  and  significance.  In  the  widest  sense  it 
embraces  the  genesis,  competition  and  organization  of  particular 
values;  you  aim  to  see  the  value  movement  as  a  living  and  various 
whole,  of  which  all  particular  values  and  kinds  of  value  are  members. 
It  is  a  real  drama,  with  continual  conflicts,  crises  and  denouements. 


448  C.  H.  COOLEY 

It  may  be  too  large  to  grasp  satisfactorily,  but  at  least  we  should 
recognize  that  nothing  less  affords  an  adequate  basis  for  under- 
standing the  past  or  predicting  the  future.  If  we  consider  the  valu- 
ation of  particular  objects  of  any  sort,  such  as,  let  us  say,  the  program 
of  socialism,  the  works  of  Bernard  Shaw,  or  Mr.  Roosevelt's  leader- 
ship; or  of  such  staples  of  the  stock  market  as  wheat  or  New  York 
Central  shares;  we  may  see  that  the  position  of  these  objects  can  be 
understood  only  with  reference  to  the  larger  drama  of  valuation  in 
which  they  have  their  parts:  particular  prices  and  judgments  are  not 
enough,  we  must  see  the  interworking  and  tendency  of  the  whole. 
"The  play's  the  thing"  and  the  function  of  the  object  in  the  play. 

Next  to  this,  if  we  must  be  content  with  a  cross  section,  is  the 
dynamic  situation,  the  state  of  the  play  at  a  given  time,  made  up  of 
many  cooperating  and  conflicting  factors  from  the  interworking  of 
which  the  future  must  emerge. 

I  suppose,  for  example,  that  it  is  the  ability  to  grasp  the  course 
or  state  of  value  in  this  large  way  that  distinguishes  the  financier  from 
the  mere  speculator,  the  statesman  from  the  mere  politician,  or  the 
competent  critic  of  literature  or  art  from  the  mere  reviewer.  Indeed 
it  is  apt  to  be  what  distinguishes  the  capable  man  from  the  incapable 
in  any  field.  It  may  be  said  in  general  that  the  power  to  grasp 
process,  to  see  the  drama  of  values,  is  the  height  of  the  practical. 
It  is  what  we  all  have  to  do  in  the  real  work  of  life,  and  the  man  who 
can  do  it  has  breadth,  caliber,  general  capacity,  can  take  responsi- 
bility, and  does  not  require  some  one  else  to  show  him  what  to  do. 

Private  valuation  is  a  particular  phase  of  public  valuation,  and 
one  cannot  be  understood  without  the  other.  The  individual  in 
forming  his  special  estimates,  no  matter  how  peculiar  they  may  be,  is 
working  with  material  he  gets  from  others— suggestions  and  im- 
pressions that  come  from  the  mental  currents  of  his  time  and  from  the 
general  stream  of  history.  This  material  he  works  up  in  his  own 
way,  always  at  least  a  little  different  from  that  of  any  one  else  and 
sometimes  a  great  deal.  In  proportion  to  the  importance  of  these 
differences  he  exerts  a  special  influence  upon  values  in  the  general 
movement  of  thought.  The  tendency  to  ignore  exceptional  indi- 
viduals, and  consider  only  groups,  is  a  serious  error.  The  non- 
conformer,  though  he  stand  alone,  is  often  the  most  significant  fact 
in  the  situation,  and  may  prove  to  be  that  one  who,  with  God,  is  a 
majority. 

^  Private  valuation,  then,  stands  in  no  opposition  to  public  valu- 
ation;  it  is,  even  in  the  extremes  of  non-conformity,  a  phase  of  the 


VALUATION  AS  A  SOCIAL  PROCESS  449 

same  process.  The  idea  of  an  essential  opposition  between  the  .two 
can  arise  only  when  public  valuation  is,  wrongly,  identified  with 
value  conventions  or  institutions.  With  these  private  valuation 
may  easily  be  at  variance. 

Of  course  this  large  view  of  the  process,  which  I  call  public 
valuation,  should  by  no  means  be  confused  with  institutional  valu- 
ation. The  latter  is  that  part  of  the  process  whose  explanation  must 
be  sought  in  those  special  tendencies  of  institutional  life  which  often 
depart  so  widely  from  the  simpler  workings  of  human  nature.  Insti- 
tutional valuation  has  its  public  and  individual  aspects  like  any  other 
social  phenomenon.  The  good  churchman,  in  expressing  the  views 
of  the  church,  may  be  expressing  himself  as  truly  as  he  does  the 
institution;  but  it  may  be  that  his  self  is  so  institutionized  as  not  to 
express  human  nature. 

It  is  not  uncommon,  however,  to  think  of  public  value,  or,  as  it 
is  usually  called,  social  value,1  as  that  which  is  fixed  by  some  insti- 
tution, or  other  formal  process.  There  is  something  in  this  left  over 
from  those  mechanical  theories  of  society  that  could  not  see  any  unity 
in  human  life  except  this  unity  took  a  mechanical  form — a  contract, 
a  creed,  a  government,  or  the  like.  The  public  or  social  must,  then, 
be  the  institutional,  the  conventional,  and  this  was  set  over  against 
the  individual,  who  was  thought  of  as  becoming  social  only  by  some 
such  combination.  I  trust  that  I  need  not  linger  to  refute  this 
outworn  idea. 

The  institutions,  we  may  note  in  this  connection,  usually  have 
rather  definite  and  precise  methods  for  the  appraisal  of  values  in 
accordance  with  their  own  organic  needs.  In  the  state,  for  example, 
we  have  ancient  institutions  of  choice,  which  include  elaborate  methods 
of  electing  or  appointing  persons,  as  well  as  legislative,  judicial  and 
scientific  authorities  for  passing  upon  ideas.  The  church  has  its 
tests  of  membership,  its  creeds,  scriptures,  sacraments,  penances, 
hierarchy  of  saints  and  dignitaries,  and  the  like,  all  of  which  serve  as 
standards  of  value.  The  army  has  an  analogous  system.  On  the 
institutional  side  of  art  we  have  exhibitions  with  medals,  prize 
competitions,  election  to  academies  and  the  verdict  of  trained  critics: 
in  science  much  the  same,  with  more  emphasis  on  titles  and  academic 
chairs.  You  will  find  something  of  the  same  sort  in  every  well 
organized  traditional  structure.  We  have  it  in  the  universities,  not 

1 1  prefer  the  former  term  in  such  connections  because  the  use  of  "social"  to 
denote  collective  aspects,  in  antithesis  to  "individual,"  perpetuates  the  traditional 
fallacy  that  the  individual  is  not  social. 


450  C.  H.  COOLEY 

only  in  the  official  working  of  the  institution,  but  in  the  fraternities, 
athletic  associations  and  the  like. 

It  is  also  noteworthy  that  institutional  valuation  is  nearly  always 
the  function  of  a  special  class.  This  is  obviously  the  case  with  the 
institutions  mentioned,  and  it  is  equally  true,  though  perhaps  less 
obviously,  with  pecuniary  valuation. 

The  application  of  these  principles  to  the  latter  I  hope  to  take  up 
upon  another  occasion.1 

1 A  paper  dealing  with  some  phases  of  pecuniary  valuation  will  appear  in  the 
American  Journal  of  Sociology  for  January,  1913. 


GENERAL  REVIEWS  AND  SUMMARIES 

CRIMINAL  PSYCHOLOGY 

BY  HARRY  W.   CRANE 

The  University  of  Michigan 

Dr.  Wilhelm  Stekel  (5)  makes  an  interpretation,  truly  Freudian 
in  character,  of  the  thefts  of  kleptomania  as  symbolisms  of  suppressed 
sexual  acts.  Mr.  Albrecht  (5)  in  a  note  says  that  "it  is  our  firm 
conviction  that  criminal  psychology  may  obtain  from  Freud's  dis- 
coveries the  most  stimulating  suggestions,  and  we  hope  that  his 
theories  and  conclusions  will  be  received  with  less  prejudice  here  in 
America  than  they  have  encountered  in  Europe."  Evidently  his 
wishes  are  being  gratified,  although  a  few  at  least  of  the  more  careful 
psychologists  and  psychiatrists,  are  evincing  a  little  of  the  wiser 
European  conservatism  toward  the  Freudian  theories. 

Doubtless  there  may  be  something  of  sexual  symbolism  in  some 
of  the  abnormal  acts  of  some  of  the  psychoses,  but  to  go  to  the 
extremes  to  which  the  writer  in  question  goes  seems  absurd.  To  find 
in  sexual  symbolism  the  explanation  for  each  and  every  psychosis 
indicates  a  psychological  fanaticism  that  might  well  itself  be  looked 
upon  as  symbolic  of  a  perverted  sexual  basis. 

Those  who  read  the  above  paper  and  also  read  "Berufswahl  und 
Kriminalitat"  (6)  will  no  doubt  be  willing  to  agree  that  Dr.  Stekel  is 
an  extremist.  In  this  article  he  maintains  that  the  final  psychosis 
of  a  neurotic  individual  is  brought  about  by  his  struggle  to  suppress 
his  inherent  tendencies  to  crime.  His  theory  of  universal  criminality 
among  children  and  the  relation  of  pseudo-epilepsy  to  crime  are 
suggestive  of  Lombroso,  although  they  lack  the  carefully  worked  out 
support  that  characterizes  the  theories  of  the  latter. 

The  real  thesis  of  the  paper  relates  to  the  influence  which  criminal 
tendencies  have  upon  the  choice  of  a  profession.  The  main  influ- 
ences, aside  from  paternal,  which  affect  one  in  choosing  a  profession 
are  held  to  be  the  desire  to  suppress,  to  give  vent  to,  or  to  seek  pro- 
tection from  criminal  tendencies. 

In  a  very  few  pages  and  with  the  citation  of  only  three  cases 
Wm.  Healy  (2)  sets  forth  more  clearly  and  concisely  than  others  have 
done  in  several  times  the  space,  the  essential  psychological  nature  of 

45' 


452  HARRY  W.  CRANE 

crime  and  the  necessity  of  the  application  of  the  genetic  method  to 
each  individual  case.  The  differential  results  found  by  this  method 
should  be  followed  by  differential  treatment.  He  recognizes,  with 
others,  that  a  large  per  cent,  of  recidivism  has  its  basis  in  feeble- 
mindedness, epilepsy,  and  insanity.  Yet  it  is  refreshing  to  find  that 
he  asserts  that  "no  one  germ  will  be  found  eating  out  the  moral 


nature." 


Dr.  Bernard  Glueck  (i)  by  means  of  a  thorough  study  of  five  cases 
that  came  under  his  observation  in  the  criminal  department  of  the 
Government  Hospital  for  the  Insane  shows  the  existence  of  what  he 
considers  to  be  a  born  criminal  type.  This  type  is  based  on  a  defec- 
tive mentality,  an  unstable  nervous  disposition  of  an  hereditary 
character.  He  further  believes  that  "the  incorrigible  criminal  is 
sufficiently  characterized  by  such  unmistakable  features  (as)  would 
enable  us  to  recognize  him  when  we  see  him,  and  thus  justify  his 
permanent  isolation  from  the  community."  Of  particular  signifi- 
cance is  the  relation  between  the  criminality  and  the  insanity  of 
these  people. 

"The  same  degenerative  soil  which  makes  the  development  of  the 
psychosis  possible  in  the  one  case,  expresses  itself  in  crime  in  another 
instance.  The  factors  which  determine  whether  the  one  or  the  other 
phase  will  manifest  itself,  depend  entirely  upon  environmental 
conditions,  and  are  accidental  in  nature.  The  stresses  which  these 
defective  individuals  meet  with  in  freedom  need  not  have  such  a 
strong  influence  upon  them  as  to  produce  a  psychosis.  The  want  of 
moral  attributes  makes  it  possible  for  them  readily  to  surmount 
many  difficulties  by  means  of  some  criminal  act,  difficulties,  which 
in  a  normal  person,  would  require  extraordinary  effort  to  remove. 
When  placed,  however,  under  the  stress  of  imprisonment  where  they 
can  neither  slip  away  from  under  the  oppressive  situation,  nor  square 
themselves  with  it  by  some  criminal  act,  the  organism  becomes 
affected  to  such  a  degree  that  the  development  of  a  psychosis  is 
greatly  facilitated.  The  character  of  the  delusional  fabric  of  these 
individuals  is  such  that  one  can  easily  find  a  ready  and  more  or  less 
correct  explanation  for  it.  It  is  chiefly  a  compensatory  reaction  in 
an  endeavor  to  make  a  certain  unpleasant  situation  acceptable." 

The  strength  of  the  position  taken  in  this  article  is  increased  if 
we  discuss  in  connection  with  it  two  other  papers.  In  "The  'Im- 
prisonment Psychosjs,'"  by  Dr.  W.  W.  Richardson  (4),  we  have  a 
description  of  cases  that  very  closely  simulate  those  cited  by  Dr. 
Check—cases  with  a  defective,  unstable  basis  which  develop  criminal 


CRIMINAL  PSYCHOLOGY  453 

acts,  and  later  upon  incarceration,  the  psychosis.  Dr.  Richardson 
and  the  authorities  quoted  by  him  agree  that  the  psychosis  is  brought 
on  by  the  bringing  of  an  unstable,  defective  character  into  conflict 
with  the  restrictions  of  prison  discipline. 

The  conclusions  of  Dr.  Richards'  article  (3)  also  lend  support  to 
those  of  Dr.  Glueck.  A  comparison  of  facts  in  the  United  States  with 
those  in  France  and  Germany  seems  to  show  that  in  all  these  countries 
a  considerable  number  of  the  military  offenses  are  committed  by  the 
insane,  and  that  the  insanity  has  been  brought  on  by  inability  to 
withstand  the  strict  military  discipline.  Dr.  Richards  states  that  a 
large  per  cent,  of  these  cases  recover  (57  per  cent,  in  the  experience 
of  the  Government  Hospital  for  the  Insane). 

In  the  study  of  the  "imprisonment  psychosis"  and  in  that  of  the 
insane  military  offenders  the  majority  of  the  cases  seem  to  be  due  to 
dementia  prsecox,  while  Dr.  Glueck  maintains  that  his  cases  were  not 
of  this  nature.  Yet  the  results  of  each  of  these  three  studies  agree 
in  this :  that  a  defective,  deficient,  or  neurotic  temperament  unable  to 
undergo  the  restrictions  of  society  results  in  crime;  unable  to  bear  up 
under  a  more  rigorous  restriction  (prison  or  army  discipline),  it 
results  in  a  psychosis.  Under  the  more  favorable  hospital  environ- 
ment it  tends  to  recover  its  normal,  though  not  the  normal  condition. 

The  further  fact  brought  out  by  these  writers,  that  this  unstable 
class  of  people  tend  to  be  recidivists  adds  weight  to  Dr.  Glueck's  plea 
for  a  permanent  segregation  of  the  class. 

REFERENCES 

1.  GLUECK,  B.    A  Contribution  to  the  Catamnestic  Study  of  the  Juvenile  Offender. 

Amer.  J,  of  Crim.  Law  and  Criminal.,  1912,  3,  220-244. 

2.  HEALY,  WM.    The  Problem  of  Causation  of  Criminality.    Amer.  J.  of  Crim.  Law 

and  Criminal.,  1912,  2,  849-857. 

3.  RICHARDS,  R.  L.    A  Study  of  Military  Offences  Committed  by  the  Insane  in  the 

United  States  Army,  for  the  Past  Fifty  Years.     Amer.  J.  of  Insanity,  1911,  68, 
279-291. 

4.  RICHARDSON,  W.  W.    The  "Imprisonment  Psychosis."     Amer.  J.  of  Insanity, 

1912,  68,  473-483. 

5.  STEKEL,  W.     The  Sexual  Root  of  Kleptomania.     (An  abridgment  by  Adalbert 

Albrecht.)     Amer.  J.  of  Crim.  Law  and  Criminal.,  1911,  2,  239-246. 

6.  STEKEL,   W.     Berufswahl  und   Kriminalitat.       Arch,  fur  Kriminal  Anthr.   und 

Kriminalistik,  1911,  40,  268-280. 


SPECIAL  REVIEWS 
ANTHROPOLOGY  AND  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY 

Totemism,  An  Analytical  Study.    A.  A.  GOLDENWEISER.     J.  of  Amer. 

Folk-Lore,  1910,  23,  179-293.     (Reprint.     Pp.  115.) 

Most  theoretical  works  on  totemism  are  of  a  constructive  or 
synthetic  character,  seeking  to  find  the  essence  of  the  phenomenon 
in  one  or  more  basic  sociological  or  psychological  features,  and  then 
superadding  other  features  as  necessary  or  typical  correlates  in  a 
coherent  system  of  belief  and  practice  that  presents  uniform  or  parallel 
characteristics  wherever  found.  Goldenweiser's  paper  differs  funda- 
mentally in  method  from  these,  as  its  subtitle  indicates.  Its  main 
purpose  is  to  analyze  out  the  various  ethnological  elements  that  form 
part  of  any  given  totemic  system,  to  investigate  the  claims  of  each  as 
a  necessary  feature  of  totemism,  and  to  discover  the  most  generalized 
psychological  definition  applicable  to  all  its  forms.  In  this  way  a 
new  and  independent  standpoint  is  gained  for  the  understanding  of 
the  mechanism  of  totemism. 

In  the  introduction  (pp.  1-5)  the  author  deals  with  the  definitions 
of  totemism  that  have  been  given  by  three  well-known  English 
anthropologists,  Frazer,  Haddon  and  Rivers.  It  should  be  noted 
that  Goldenweiser  is  not  primarily  concerned  with  a  balanced  review 
of  prevalent  theories  of  totemism  and  its  origin,  and  hence  refers  to 
them  only  for  illustrative  purposes.  It  is  the  type  of  totemic  theory 
exemplified  by  Frazer  that  he  has  chiefly  in  mind  throughout  the 
paper  as  opposed  to  his  own  standpoint,  but  issue  is  taken  also  with 
certain  other  writers  on  totemism,  such  as  Lang,  Major  Powell, 
Hill-Tout,  and  Father  Schmidt.  As  a  result  of  his  brief  review  of 
the  definitions  of  totemism  given  by  Frazer,  Haddon  and  Rivers, 
Goldenweiser  finds  that  there  are  chiefly  five  types  of  belief  and 
custom  that  form  elements  of  totemic  systems  as  ordinarily  defined. 
These  are  clan  exogamy,  totemic  names  of  clans,  a  religious  attitude 
toward  the  totem  (an  animal,  plant  or  inanimate  object  serving  as  the 
protector  or  crest  of  the  clan),  taboos  (generally  of  eating  and  killing) 
in  regard  to  the  totem,  and  belief  in  descent  from  the  totem.  As  the 
author  pertinently  remarks,  "The  justification  of  regarding  the 
various  features  of  totemism  as  organically  interrelated  is  not  a  priori 

454 


TOTEM  ISM  455 

obvious."  And  the  whole  trend  of  Goldenweiser's  argument  is  to 
the  effect  that  they  are  not  thus  "organically  interrelated"  in  origin 
or  by  a  uniformly  operative  process  of  evolution,  but  have  become 
so  in  whole  or  in  part,  and  often  with  still  other  features  not  generally 
considered  of  such  fundamental  importance,  by  various  processes  of 
secondary  association. 

The  major  part  of  the  paper  is  taken  up  with  a  survey,  first,  of 
the  totemic  features  found  in  two  areas  in  which  totemism  is  charac- 
teristically developed — Australia  and  the  northwest  coast  of  America 
(PP-  5~52);  secondly,  of  the  general  occurrence  in  different  parts  of 
the  world  of  ethnological  features,  believed  to  be  symptomatic  of 
totemism,  divorced  from  any  totemic  setting,  and,  conversely,  of  the 
frequent  non-occurrence  of  one  or  more  of  the  features  in  cases  where 
one  can  nevertheless  justly  speak  of  a  totemic  society  (pp.  53—86). 
A  careful  comparison  of  the  two  regions  selected,  as  a  test  example, 
for  relatively  detailed  treatment  shows  certain  analogies  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  several  fundamental  differences.  The  results  of  the 
comparison  are  summarized  in  tabular  form  (p.  51).  We  find  that 
in  both  western  British  Columbia  and  Central  Australia,  exogamy, 
that  is,  the  prohibition  of  intermarriage  among  the  members  of  a 
social  unit,  is  found,  with  this  important  difference,  however,  that 
while  among  the  Indians  of  the  north  Pacific  coast  (Tlingit,  Haida, 
Tsimshian,  northern  Kwakiutl)  the  totemic  social  units  (phratries  or 
clans)  are  exogamous  as  such,  among  the  natives  of  Australia  it  is 
the  larger  non-totemic  social  units  (phratries,  otherwise  known  as 
"moieties,"  and  marriage  classes)  that  as  a  rule  regulate  exogamy, 
the  totemic  clans  being  in  most  cases  exogamous  only  by  virtue  of 
their  being  phratric  subdivisions.  Moreover,  the  totemic  social 
units  of  both  areas  bear  totemic  names,  though  the  Australian  clans 
are  more  consistent  in  this  respect  than  the  tribes  of  British  Columbia. 
Of  the  four  Tsimshian  clans  or  phratries  (sociological  nomenclature 
is  in  somewhat  of  a  muddle  in  West  Coast  ethnology)  only  two  have 
names  referring  to  their  animal  totems  or  crests  (wolf  and  eagle); 
the  phratric  subdivisions  (Tlingit  clans  and  Haida  "families"),  while 
possessing  their  distinctive  crests,  have  names  of  a  local  character, 
thus  pointing  to  the  inference  that  they  are  social  units  originally 
confined  each  to  a  single  village;  furthermore,  the  Eagle  clan  (prob- 
ably better  called  phratry)  of  the  Haida  is  just  as  often  termed  Gitins, 
a  name  of  no  ascertainable  totemic  significance.  I  am  inclined  to 
think  that  Goldenweiser  makes  too  much  of  this  relative  lack  of 
totemic  names  in  British  Columbia  as  a  point  of  difference  between 


456  REVIEWS 

the  two  regions  compared.  The  essential  fact  is  the  existence  of 
crests  associated  with  definite  social  units  (phratries  and  clans), 
which  may  well  be  compared  with  the  Australian  totems  that  are 
associated  with  clans;  the  mere  matter  of  whether  or  not  the  names 
of  the  totemic  social  units  have  distinct  reference  to  the  totems  is, 
where  the  phratric  or  clan  totems  or  crests  themselves  stand  out 
clearly,  of  distinctly  secondary  importance. 

Right  here  a  more  serious  criticism  must  be  made.     For  one  who 
aims  to  be  rigidly  analytical  in  method,  Goldenweiser  does  not  carry 
his  analysis  far  enough.     The  concept  "an  exogamous  totemic  clan" 
involves  three  distinct  sociological  concepts — the  clan,  the  totem  or 
crest,  and  the  practice  of  exogamy.     These  are  mutually  independent 
concepts.     Now  the  clan  or  other  subtribal  social  unit  is  of  such  wide 
occurrence  and  is  so  much  a  matter  of  course  as  a  starting  point  for  a 
totemic  society,  that  there  is  perhaps  no  need  to  isolate  the  phe- 
nomenon of  a  grouping  into  clans  as  one  of  the  symptoms  of  totemism, 
though  it  might  have  been  useful  to  entertain  for  a  moment  the 
possibility  of  totemic  features  becoming  associated  with  a  tribe  or 
other  undivided  social  unit  as  such.     Be  this  as  it  may,  it  is  clear 
that  the  concept  of  the  totem,  including  that  of  crest  or  badge,  as 
associated  with  the  clan,  should  be  analyzed  out  as  one  of  the  symp- 
toms of  totemism.     Strange  to  say,  Goldenweiser  has  not  definitely 
done  this,  but  has  tacitly  subsumed  the  notion  under  the  concepts  of 
exogamy  of  totemic  social  units  and  totemic  naming.     This  seems 
unjustifiable,  for  Goldenweiser  shows  clearly  that  the  clan  totem  as 
such  can  subsist  without  either  exogamy,  totemic  naming,  or,  it 
may  be  added,  worship  of  or  other  religious  attitude  toward  the  totem 
(see  pp.  82-86).     It  may  be  objected  that  if  we  eliminate  from  a 
totemic  system  the  totemic  name,  the  taboo  against  eating,  killing  or 
acting  in  some  other  specific  way  toward  the  totem,  the  belief  in 
descent  from  or  other  form  of  kinship  with  it,  and  a  religious  regard 
therefor,  there  is  no  totem  left  wherewith  to  totemize.     The  phe- 
nomenon of  experience,   divested   of  all  its   sense   attributes,   has 
evaporated  into  a  metaphysical  "Ding  an  sich."     This  objection  is 
not  valid.     It  happens  not  infrequently  that  a  social  unit  is  associated 
with  an  animal,  plant  or  inanimate  object  merely  as  a  crest  or  emblem, 
often  guarding  the  right  to  display  or  represent  it  in  some  way  or 
other.    The  totem  is  in  such  cases  seen  in  its  most  simplified  form,  as 
a  communal  badge  or  heraldic  symbol,  or,  again,  it  may  be  merely 
referred  to  in  a  legend.     It  should  be  noted  in  passing  that  the  active 
association  of  art  and  totemism,  on  which  Goldenweiser  justly  lays 


TOTEMISM  457 

stress,  is  not  to  be  confounded,  though  it  may  be  intimately  con- 
nected, with  the  heraldic  aspect  of  totemism.  In  British  Columbia 
in  particular,  where  the  totem  often  tends  to  become  a  mere  crest, 
it  would  have  been  quite  in  place  to  isolate  the  clan  totem  (crest)  as 
such  as  one  of  the  elements  of  totemism. 

The  further  comparison  given  by  the  author  of  Australian  and 
West  Coast  totemism  discloses  instructive  differences.  Taboos, 
particularly  of  eating  and  killing,  are  common  enough  in  both  areas, 
but  while  both  totemic  and  non-totemic  taboos  are  found  in  Australia, 
they  are  never  associated  in  British  Columbia  with  totems  as  such. 
In  central  Australia  the  belief  in  descent  of  the  clansmen  from  the 
totem  has  taken  firm  hold,  whereas  it  is  but  imperfectly  developed 
among  the  natives  of  the  Pacific  coast,  being  absent  among  the 
northern  tribes  (Tlingit,  Haida,  Tsimshian)  and  occurring  to  a 
limited  extent  among  the  Kwakiutl.  In  Australia  magical  cere- 
monies for  the  increase  of  the  food  supply  and  the  belief  in  reincar- 
nation of  mythical  ancestors  are  intimately  connected  with  the 
totemic  system;  in  British  Columbia,  while  both  magical  ceremonies 
and  belief  in  reincarnation  are  found,  they  are  not  in  any  way  brought 
into  relation  with  the  totemic  social  organization.  On  the  other 
hand,  while  the  practice  of  acquiring  guardian  spirits  and  its  elabo- 
ration into  a  system  of  secret  societies  is  bound  up  among  the  natives 
of  the  northwest  coast  of  America  with  their  system  of  crests,  this 
is  far  from  being  the  case  in  Australia,  though  the  guardian  spirit 
idea  is  not  entirely  absent  in  that  continent.  Furthermore,  in 
western  British  Columbia  it  has  left  a  deep  impress  upon  the  deco- 
rative art  of  the  natives,  and  to  some  extent  seems  even  to  have  been 
influenced  in  its  development  by  that  factor;  in  Australia,  however, 
decorative  art,  which  is  far  less  highly  developed  than  in  British 
Columbia,  is  less  apt  to  be  involved  in  totemic  ceremonies  than  in 
that  region.  The  ranking  of  individuals  and  clans  gives  West  Coast 
totemism  a  peculiar  coloring  of  its  own,  this  feature  being  entirely 
lacking  in  Australia.  Finally,  the  number  of  totems  found  in  any 
tribe  of  the  West  Coast  is  small,  while  an  Australian  tribe  regularly 
comprises  a  very  large  number  of  totems.  As  a  net  result  one 
certainly  gets  the  feeling  that  the  two  totemic  systems  compared  owe 
their  undeniable  points  of  similarity,  coupled  with  other  points  of 
difference,  to  what  has  been  termed  convergent  evolution,  and  that 
these  totemic  systems  in  themselves  have  arisen  by  a  process  of 
secondary  association  of  ethnological  elements  of  disparate  nature 
and  origin,  rather  than  by  one  of  an  evolution  of 'custom  and  belief, 


458  REVIEWS 

with  definitely  determined  sequences.  It  is  the  object  of  the  latter 
part  of  the  paper  to  heighten  this  feeling  into  assurance.  . 

The  pages  devoted  to  exogamy  and  endogamy  (pp.  53-73)  are 
among  the  most  interesting  of  the  paper.  Evidence  is  presented 
to  show  that  clan  exogamy  frequently  occurs  unassociated  with 
totemic  features;  further,  that  totemic  clans  need  not  be  exogamous. 
It  is  made  clear  that  clan  exogamy  is  not  the  only  type  of  group 
exogamy  found  among  primitive  peoples,  but  that  we  have  also  to 
deal  with  local  exogamy,  and  kinship  exogamy  based  on  a  classi- 
ficatory  system  of  relationships.  Goldenweiser  lays  stress,  and 
justly,  on  the  importance  and  difficulty  of  determining,  in  cases  of 
intercrossing  or  subdivision  of  social  units,  which  of  the  units  is 
inherently  exogamous  and  which  only  secondarily  so.  Thus,  a  clan 
may  be  exogamous  either  by  virtue  of  its  own  character  as  a  social 
group,  determining  exogamous  relations;  or  by  virtue  of  its  forming 
a  part  of  a  larger  group  of  such  character;  or  because  it  is  localized 
in  a  village  which  is  exogamous  as  such;  or  because  all  the  members 
of  the  clan,  according  to  a  classificatory  system  of  relationship,  are 
held  to  be  kin  to  one  another,  and  thus  debarred  from  intermarrying 
by  the  rule  of  kinship  exogamy.  Bearing  these  important  distinc- 
tions in  mind,  Goldenweiser  makes  a  good  case  for  the  view  that  the 
typical  Australian  totem  clan  is  not  a  true  exogamous  unit,  the  rule 
of  exogamy  as  such  referring  to  the  phratry  or  marriage  class.  To 
call  a  clan  exogamous  under  such  circumstances  might  be  to  commit  a 
fallacy  similar  to  that  of  describing  New  York  State  as  a  common- 
wealth forbidding  slavery,  when,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  this  is  already 
implied  in  the  statement  that  it  forms  part  of  a  larger  commonwealth 
forbidding  slavery. 

As  to  the  next  totemic  feature  examined,  that  of  totemic  names 
(PP-  73-75))  Goldenweiser  gives  a  number  of  instances,  besides  those 
already  adduced  for  British  Columbia,  of  totem  clans  that  do  not 
bear  the  names  of  their  totems,  though  the  naming  of  a  group  from 
its  totem  is  one  of  the  "features"  of  totemism  least  often  absent. 
Examples  are  then  given  to  show  that  the  totem  is  by  no  means  always 
conceived  of  as  the  ancestor  of  the  clansmen  (pp.  75  and  76).  The 
modest  proportion  of  cases  of  taboo  that  are  distinctly  totemic  in 
character  is  next  indicated,  while  conversely  it  not  infrequently 
happens  that  a  totemic  group  observes  no  taboo  in  reference  to  its 
totem  (pp.  76-80).  The  independence  of  the  taboo  as  such  of  any 
necessary  connection  with  totemism  is  conclusively  demonstrated. 
Finally,  in  discussing  the  religious  aspect  of  totemism  (pp.  80-86),  so 


TOTEM1SM  459 

often  believed  to  be  the  significant  aspect  of  the  problem,  Golden- 
weiser  shows,  first,  that  the  worship  of  plants  and  animals  is  a  uni- 
versal ethnological  feature  not  at  all  necessarily  connected  with  a 
totemic  society;  secondly,  that  the  religious  attitude  toward  the 
totem  in  a  totemic  society  is  often  but  weakly  developed,  at  times 
even  absent  altogether.  The  religious  side  of  totemism,  even  where 
present,  never  exhausts,  and  generally  makes  up  but  a  small  part  of 
the  total  religious  life  of  the  totemic  community.  Thus  the  claims 
of  totemism  to  be  considered  a  distinct  stage  in  the  history  of  religion 
are  disposed  of  without  much  difficulty. 

The  following  pages  of  the  paper  (pp.  86-98),  defining  more 
sharply  the  character  and  genesis  of  the  "totemic  complex,"  sound 
the  keynote  of  the  study  and  form  its  most  valuable  and  suggestive 
portion.  Totemism  is  shown  to  consist  not  of  one  particular  eth- 
nological feature,  or  even  of  a  combination  of  two  or  more  such 
features,  but  might  be  understood  as  a  process  of  intimate  association 
of  one  or  more  of  these  with  social  units.  Goldenweiser's  own  words 
are  worth  quoting  here:  "This  association  with  social  units  is  what 
constitutes  the  peculiarity  of  totemic  combinations.  Elements  which 
are  per  se  indifferent  or  vague  in  their  social  bearings  (i.  e.,  as  related 
to  social  units) — such  as  dances,  songs,  carvings,  rituals,  names, 
etc. — become  associated  with  clearly  defined  social  groups,  and  by 
virtue  of  such  association  themselves  become  transformed  into  social 
values  not  merely  intensified  in  degree  but  definite  and  specific  in 
character.  The  one  obvious  important  means  by  which  the  asso- 
ciation with  definite  social  groups  is  accomplished  is  descent"  (p.  93). 
In  proceeding  to  define  totemism  Goldenweiser  points  out  that  a 
definition  of  the  phenomenon  which  aims  to  be  inclusive  must  exclude 
reference  to  the  specific  content  of  different  totemic  systems,  must 
express  the  nature  of  totemism  as  a  relation  subsisting  between  ethno- 
logical elements  rather  than  as  their  sum,  and  must  exclude  the 
notion  of  religion,  for  which  he  substitutes,  as  a  more  inclusive 
concept,  "objects  and  symbols  of  emotional  value."  Owing  to  the 
fact  that  totemism  is  variable  not  only  in  place  but  in  time,  Golden- 
weiser thinks  it  necessary  to  describe  it  as  an  ever-changing  process, 
rather  than  in  purely  descriptive  terms  as  a  static  phenomenon. 
While  it  would  be  quite  wrong  to  deny  this  dynamic  element  in 
totemism,  one  may  reasonably  doubt  whether  it  would  not  have  been 
better  to  neglect  this  aspect  for  the  purpose  of  a  definition.  As 
Goldenweiser's  definition  now  reads,  "Totemism  is  the  tendency  of 
definite  social  units  to  become  associated  with  objects  and  symbols 


460  REVIEWS 

of  emotional  value"  (p.  97),  the  emphasis  seems  somewhat  misplaced, 
for  all  ethnological  complexes,  and,  for  that  matter,  all  single  elements 
of  custom  and  belief,  must  be  understood  dynamically,  that  is, 
historically.  In  the  definition  as  stated  there  is  somewhat  of  a 
contrast  implied,  though  only  vaguely,  between  totemism  as  a  dy- 
namic phenomenon  and  other  cultural  phenomena,  a  contrast  which 
naturally  weakens  rather  than  strengthens  the  emphasis  on  the 
historical  method  of  ethnology  that  Goldenweiser  has  in  mind.  The 
revised,  and,  to  my  mind,  more  acceptable,  definition  would  read: 
Totemism  is  the  association  of  definite  social  units  with  objects  and 
symbols  of  emotional  value.  The  brief  psychological  definition 
given  by  Goldenweiser,  "Totemism  is  the  specific  socialization  of 
emotional  values"  (p.  97),  while  intelligible  in  the  light  of  all  that 
precedes  it,  is  hardly  serviceable  as  a  definition  aiming  to  stand  on 
its  own  feet;  the  process  of  association,  while  implied  in  it,  is  not 
sufficiently  emphasized. 

In  the  final  pages  of  the  paper  (pp.  98-110),  on  the  whole  its  weak- 
est portion,  the  methodology  of  current  evolutionary  theories  of 
totemic  origin  is  first  illustrated,  then  unfavorably  criticized.  Gold- 
enweiser takes  issue  with  the  assumption  of  a  regular  one-line  evo- 
lution of  the  forms  of  totemic  society.  He  points  out  that  it  is 
unwarranted  to  select  one  feature  of  totemism  as  the  primary  element 
historically  of  the  whole  complex,  and  to  establish  a  natural  sequence 
for  the  appearance  of  the  other  features  as  growing  up  out  of  the 
primary  feature.  Merely  plausible  or  intelligible  evolutionary 
theories  of  the  origin  and  development  of  cultural  phenomena  can  in 
this  way  be  built  up  without  end,  and  it  is  often  difficult  to  choose 
among  them.  Plausibility  as  such,  however,  has  no  evidential  value. 
Another  fundamental  error  of  the  evolutionist  school  of  anthropology 
is  the  failure  to  recognize  the  vast  importance  of  borrowing  and 
assimilation  of  cultural  elements.  Processes  which  in  higher  levels 
of  culture  are  recognized  without  question  are  often  tacitly  ignored 
in  the  study  of  primitive  society.  The  lack  of  documented  history 
is  too  often,  ostrich  fashion,  taken  to  mean  the  lack  of  history,  and 
primitive  customs  are  too  often  thought  of  as  the  psychologico- 
mechanical  product  of  "primitive"  modes  of  thought  acted  upon  by 
alleged  principles  of  social  evolution.  That  a  whole  totemic  complex 
may  be  due  primarily  to  processes  of  borrowing  and  assimilation  is 
shown  by  the  totemism  of  the  western  Shuswap,  Lillooet,  Chilcotin, 
and  Carrier  (pp.  103-106),  for  among  these  Indians  we  can  trace  the 
profound  totemic  influence  of  the  coast  tribes.  The  method  employed 


SOCIOLOGY  IN  ITS  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASPECTS  461 

by  Goldenweiser  in  his  study  of  totemism,  the  analysis  of  a  cultural 
phenomenon  into  its  elements  and  the  historical  interpretation  of  the 
phenomenon  as  an  association,  varying  in  character  from  place  to 
place,  of  these  elements,  is  the  method  so  often  insisted  upon  by 
Professor  Franz  Boas  as  that  best  fitted  to  give  fruitful  results  in 
anthropological  investigations.  The  insistence  on  the  importance 
of  mutual  cultural  influence  of  neighboring  tribes  is  also  one  of  the 
leading  notes  in  the  ethnological  method  of  Boas  and  his  school.  The 
examples  given  by  Goldenweiser  of  cultural  borrowing  in  British 
Columbia  in  other  phases  than  totemism  serve  to  illustrate  further 
his  methodological  standpoint. 

One  is  at  times  disposed  to  complain  of  the  rather  small  number 
of  examples  given  or  range  of  tribes  covered  for  certain  points,  but 
it  should  be  remembered  that  the  study  is  in  no  sense  a  survey  of 
totemistic  fact,  any  more  than,  as  we  have  seen,  it  is  one  of  totemistic 
theories.  Once  and  again  a  fact  is  not  stated  quite  accurately 
(thus,  p.  42,  totem  poles  can  hardly  be  said  to  be  a  striking  feature 
of  all  or  even  most  British  Columbia  villages),  or  is  doubtfully 
pertinent  to  the  argument  (thus,  p.  21,  the  restriction  of  whaling 
among  the  Nootka  to  certain  families  has  nothing  to  do  with  taboo). 
These  are  but  slight  blemishes,  however,  that  in  no  way  seriously 
impair  the  value  of  the  study.  It  is  hardly  too  much  to  say  that 
Goldenweiser's  Totemism  forms  one  of  the  most  notable,  perhaps  the 
most  notable,  contribution  to  ethnological  method  yet  produced  by 
American  anthropologists. 

EDWARD  SAPIR 
DIVISION  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY, 

GEOLOGICAL  SURVEY,  CANADA 

Sociology    in    its    Psychological    Aspects.     CHARLES    A.    ELLWOOD. 

New  York:  D.  Appleton  &  Co.,  1912.     Pp.  xiv+417. 

This  clearly  written  work  is  perhaps  the  most  explicit  of  any  of 
our  recent  sociological  texts  in  its  recognition  of  psychology  as 
fundamental.  The  author  expresses  his  indebtedness  to  Professors 
Dewey  and  Mead  for  his  point  of  view,  and  readers  of  the  BULLETIN 
will  not  find  it  unfamiliar.  But  the  theory  takes  on  added  definite- 
ness  and  significance  in  its  applications,  and  the  book  should  make  a 
valuable  contribution  toward  the  sociological  method. 

Functional  psychology  is  interpreted  first  of  all  as  implying 
"that  consciousness  does  work,  does  function,  and  as  such  has  a 
survival  value  in  the  life  process."  This  is  against  a  mechanistic 


462  REVIEWS 

theory  according  to  which  the  explanation  of  social  phenomena  is 
to  be  sought  in  physico-chemical  processes,  whereas  consciousness  is 
not  a  factor  and  performs  no  work  in  the  social  life.  But,  conscious- 
ness in  its  functioning  is  itself  regular,  and  does  its  work  within 
universal  organic  processes,  especially  the  processes  of  habit  and 
adaptation.  This,  as  against  an  indeterministic  point  of  view  which 
would  make  consciousness  a  lawless  factor. 

Assuming  then  that  consciousness  does  work,  the  key  to  its 
nature  is  to  be  found  in  the  character  of  the  life  process  in  which  it 
functions.  The  capital  fact  here  is  that  the  life  process  is  from  the 
outset  essentially  social.  "Life  is  not  and  cannot  be  an  affair  of 
individual  organisms.  The  processes  of  both  nutrition  and  repro- 
duction in  all  higher  forms  of  life  involve  a  necessary  interdependence 
among  organisms  of  the  same  species,  which,  except  under  unfavor- 
able conditions,  gives  rise  to  group  life  and  psychical  interaction. 
.  .  .  Looked  at  from  the  standpoint  of  the  whole  evolution  of  life, 
it  is  really  the  result  of  the  breaking  up  of  the  life-process  into  several 
relatively  independent  centers  while  the  process  itself  remains  a 
unity."  Social  life  is  in  part  a  function  of  the  food  process  (including 
defense  against  enemies  as  the  negative  side  of  the  food  process)  and 
in  part  a  function  of  the  reproductive  process  including  as  the  more 
important  part  of  this  the  care  of  offspring.  The  importance  of  this 
second  factor  in  the  author's  opinion  needs  to  be  emphasized  in 
contrast  with  social  theories  which  seem  to  imply  that  the  only 
function  of  the  social  life  is  to  secure  an  adequate  supply  of  material 
goods. 

As  the  life-process  is  social  so  also  is  the  individual  mind.  Con- 
sciousness is  the  chief  connecting  line  between  individuals  living  in 
association.  "Instincts,  emotions  and  sensations  of  one  individual 
organism  often  seem  made  to  fit  into  corresponding  mental  processes 
of  other  organisms;  and  varied  means  of  interstimulation  and 
response  are  developed."  For  "the  life-process  of  the  individual 
is  only  a  part  of  the  larger  life-process  of  the  group  to  which  he 
belongs."  When  life  activities — procuring  of  food  and  protection 
against  enemies — are  carried  on  by  groups,  the  only  way  the  mind 
can  control  them  is  through  some  form  of  psychic  interconnection 
between  the  individuals  of  the  group.  "The  social  character  of 
mind  is  an  expression  of  the  fact  that  it  has  to  do  with  mediation  of 
process  which  is  carried  on  by  several  cooperating  individual  units; 
while  society,  the  psychical  interrelation  of  these  individuals,  means 
that  there  is  one  common  process  of  living  carried  on  by  these  co- 


SOCIOLOGY  IN  ITS  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASPECTS  463 

operating  units  on  the  psychic  plane,  that  is,  on  the  plane  of  inter- 
stimulation  and  response.  Society  in  the  concrete  sense,  in  other 
words,  may  be  practically  denned  as  a  group  of  individuals  who  carry 
on  a  common  life-process  by  means  of  interstimulation  and  response." 

Social  coordination  or  "coadaptation"  is  then  fundamental  for 
the  sociologist.  It  is  from  this  point  of  the  view  that  the  author 
would  explain  and  evaluate  the  various  processes  which  have  been 
emphasized  as  the  essential  features  of  social  life.  "Folkways"  are 
simply  regular  modes  of  social  activity  in  a  given  group  of  people, 
and  might  better  be  called  "social  habits,"  for  they  are  found  in 
small  groups  such  as  the  family  as  well  as  in  large  groups.  Simmel's 
"types  of  coordination  or  association"  would  on  this  basis  get  a 
principle  for  classification,  and  without  the  consideration  of  the  actual 
situations  in  which  various  types  arise  there  is  practically  no  limit 
to  the  number  that  might  be  enumerated.  Subjective  expressions 
of  coordination  are  found  in  common  feelings,  ideas,  and  beliefs. 
Imitation  plays  a  part  in  mediating  relatively  simple  and  unconscious 
coordination  between  individuals,  but  it  is  an  error  to  confine  at- 
tention to  this  one  element  since  "unlikeness  of  activity  is  necessary 
for  many  of  the  higher  forms  of  social  coordination."  Again,  sym- 
pathy and  understanding  are  both  products  and  instruments  of 
coordination.  Sympathy  is  probably  proportionate  "not  to  the 
amount  of  resemblance  (Giddings)  but  to  the  harmony  of  the  co- 
ordination between  individuals." 

Coordination  in  so  far  as  it  persists  in  uniform  fashion  may  be 
called  "social  habit."  As  the  life-process  encounters  shocks,  dis- 
turbances, and  various  maladjustments,  other  types  of  communi- 
cation are  especially  important  to  bring  about  social  change;  crit- 
icism, discussion,  suggestion  are  evoked.  Revolutions  have  for 
their  first  weapon  certain  destructive  and  disintegrating  ideas.  A 
certain  anarchy  often  marks  the  violence  and  completeness  with 
which  habits  and  institutions  are  overthrown,  and  at  such  times  the 
more  simple  and  animal  activities  come  to  expression. 

The  processes  of  social  adaptation  may  be  stated  not  merely  in 
objective  terms  as  above  but  also  in  the  more  subjective  terms  of 
social  self-control,  under  which  would  fall  activities  of  government, 
education,  religion,  and  moral  ideas.  The  phenomena  of  group  will, 
group  individuality  of  interests,  and  group  rivalry  may  also  be  viewed 
as  aspects  of  the  general  processes  of  coordination.  Successive 
chapters  take  up  the  roles  of  instinct,  feeling,  and  intellect  in  the 
general  social  process. 


464  REVIEWS 

This  general  point  of  view  enables  the  author  to  recognize  the 
role  of  imitation  (Baldwin,  Tarde)  and  sympathy  (Giddings),  while 
not  according  to  either  the  fundamental  position  as  constitutive 
principle  of  social  life.  Each  is  the  instrument  of  interaction. 
Perhaps  the  advantage  of  the  author's  point  of  view  is  best  seen  in 
his  chapter  on  the  theory  of  social  progress.  The  anthropo-geo- 
graphical  theory,  the  biological  or  ethnological  theory,  the  economic 
theory,  the  idealogical  theory  are  all  seen  to  rest  upon  the  recognition 
of  some  one  factor  in  the  life  process  to  the  exclusion  of  others. 
The  range  and  variety  of  human  instincts  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
flexibility  of  human  intelligence  on  the  other  are  evidences  of  the 
impossibility  of  defining  the  whole  life  process,  and  consequently  the 
lines  and  causes  of  progress,  by  any  single  one  of  the  theories  named. 
It  may  be  arrogating  more  to  the  adjective  "sociological"  than  this 
would  necessarily  carry  to  designate  the  synthetic  theory  of  progress 
which  would  give  this  due  recognition  to  all  factors  as  "the  socio- 
logical" theory,  but  without  disputing  over  the  name  the  point  of 
view  may  be  approved  by  the  social  psychologist. 

Numerous  queries  as  to  detail  might  be  raised — e.  g.,  it  seems  to 
suppose  a  very  highly  specialized  set  of  instincts,  to  regard  "truth 
telling"  and  "deception"  as  specific  instincts,  instead  of  viewing  them 
as. merely  instrumental  factors  in  larger  wholes.  But  I  remark  only 
on  a  certain  uncertainty  as  to  just  what  is  implied  in  a  "functional" 
view  of  a  process.  Sometimes  (e.  #.,  p.  195)  it  seems  to  be  assumed 
that  to  give  a  functional  interpretation  means  to  explain  an  act,  such 
as  talking,  in  terms  of  its  utility  for  something  else.  Thus  it  is  said 
that  the  functional  interpretation  breaks  down  at  certain  points,  for 
"We  communicate,  for  example,  oftentimes  when  we  have  no  need 
of  doing  so  in  order  to  carry  on  a  common  life-process.  We  talk 
with  each  other,  merely  for  the  sake  of  talking  without  reference  to 
the  functioning  of  any  correlated  activities."  The  thought  here 
seems  to  be  that  a  certain  level  of  life-process  might  be  maintained 
without  any  members  that  talked  just  for  the  sake  of  talking;  there- 
fore such  activities  are  superfluities  and  non-functional.  But  surely 
one  might  say  that  such  a  thoroughly  stripped-to-its-fighting-weight 
life-process  would  be  quite  lacking  in  some  of  the  equipment  for  good 
society.  Must  the  life-process  exclude  all  self-entertainment? 
On  the  other  hand  in  the  chapter  on  the  Role  of  Intellect,  although 
the  author  sometimes  speaks  of  the  intellect  as  instrumental  for 
adaptation  to  environment— as  though  the  environment  were 
"here"  already  and  man's  only  task  were  to  fit  into  it— the  prevailing 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  LIFE  465 

thought  is  rather  of  creating  by  ideals  a  "subjective  environment'* 
toward  which  the  objective  environment  is  to  be  shaped.  This  is 
not  to  make  intellect  instrumental  to  a  (non-intellectual)  life-process. 
It  is  rather  to  bend  the  life-process  toward  standards  and  ideals 
which  could  have  no  existence  without  intellect.  Intellect,  does  not 
merely  " function"  by  "mediating"  social  adaptations;  it  is  itself 
a  creative  agent,  a  constituent  factor  in  determining  what  the  adap- 
tation shall  be.  I  do  not  mention  this  ambiguity  because  it  is  peculiar 
to  Professor  Ellwood's  discussion.  It  is  not  infrequent,  but  the 
two  interpretations  mark  fundamentally  different  views  as  to  con- 
sciousness. 

J.  H.  TUFTS 
THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO 


RELIGIOUS  PSYCHOLOGY 

Psychology    of  the   Religious   Life.     GEORGE   MALCOLM    STRATTON. 

New  York:  Macmillan,  1911.     Pp.  ix+  376. 

The  appearance  of  this  volume  in  the  well-known  "Library  of 
Philosophy,"  edited  by  J.  H.  Muirhead,  is  an  indication  of  the  in- 
creasing importance  of  the  study  of  the  psychology  of  religion. 
It  is  similarly  significant  that  it  is  written  by  one  so  long  and  fruit- 
fully devoted  to  experimental  psychology.  The  book  is  marked  by 
the  same  clearness  and  charm  of  style  as  the  author's  earlier  work  on 
Experimental  Psychology  and  Its  Bearing  upon  Culture. 

More  than  any  other  treatise  in  its  field,  it  has  employed  materials 
from  the  oriental  religions.  The  use  of  Persian,  Indian,  Egyptian, 
and  Chinese  religious  literatures  is  a  notable  extension  of  the  general 
subject.  The  prayer,  the  hymn,  the  myth,  the  sacred  prophecy  are 
regarded  as  the  best  sources,  and  these  are  found  in  the  great  canonical 
collections.  Only  secondary  importance  is  attached  to  the  intro- 
spective reports  of  individuals.  The  works  of  Tylor  and  Frazer  are 
employed  for  the  accounts  of  less  civilized  peoples,  but  the  names  of 
several  recent  investigators  like  Spencer  and  Gillen,  Howitt,  Rivers, 
and  Dudley  Kidd  do  not  appear  among  the  numerous  references  cited. 

The  book  is  analytical  and  descriptive.  Approaching  the  subject 
in  this  way,  religion  is  found  to  be  marked  by  conflict,  and  this  word 
conflict  is  the  key  to  the  book.  There  are  four  parts.  The  first 
treats  in  seven  chapters  of  the  conflicts  in  regard  to  feeling  and 
emotion.  Part  two  is  concerned  with  the  conflicts  in  regard  to 
action  and  has  five  chapters.  Conflicts  in  regard  to  religious  thought 


466  REVIEWS 

occupy  ten  chapters  in  the  third  part.  The  fourth  part  presents  the 
"Central  Forces  of  Religion"  in  chapters  treating  of  The  Idealizing 
Act,  Change  and  Permanence  in  the  Ideal,  and  Standards  of  Religion. 

It  is  my  impression  that  in  spite  of  the  author's  caution  in  the 
introduction  against  allowing  himself  any  human  interest  in  such  a 
study,  his  work  would  have  gained  in  scientific  clearness  as  well  as 
in  its  grip  upon  the  reader  if  he  had  placed  the  last  part  first  and 
ordered  all  the  others  by  it.  As  it  stands  one  is  indeed  impressed  by 
the  variety  and  depth  of  the  conflicts  in  religion  but  there  seems  to  be 
no  adequate  statement  of  their  source  or  end. 

The  author  shows  an  intimate  appreciation  of  the  various  moods 
and  tempers  of  mankind.  The  reader  is  everywhere  impressed  by  the 
range  of  insight  and  sympathy  for  the  most  divergent  types,  and  by 
the  remarkable  skill  in  portraying  them.  Now  it  is  indeed  important 
to  build  out  in  this  impressive  way  the  complexity  and  variation  of 
the  religious  consciousness,  in  its  appreciation  and  contempt  of  self, 
its  breadth  and  narrowness  of  sympathy,  its  opposition  of  gloom  and 
cheer,  its  activity  and  passivity,  its  opposition  of  picture  and  thought, 
its  contrasts  of  many  gods  and  one,  of  divinity  at  hand  and  afar  off. 
It  is  valuable  to  have  an  elaborate  and  artistic  catalogue  of  these 
differences  and  conflicts,  but  the  demand  constantly  asserts  itself 
for  simplification,  and  for  explanation  of  all  this  variety  by  a  view 
of  the  deep  working  causes. 

This  demand  presses  for  expression  in  the  author's  own  mind 
and  there  are  many  asides,  as  it  were,  in  which  this  demand  rises  to 
the  surface  of  his  thought.  These  are  doubtless  the  "lapses  due  to 
the  infirmity  of  the  flesh"  for  which  the  reader's  charity  is  asked  on 
page  2.  Many  readers  will  wish  that  the  final  fruitful  and  illumi- 
nating "lapse"  which  begins  on  page  325  had  taken  place  in  the 
introduction,  so  that  everything  might  have  been  ordered  by  it  from 
the  first.  On  this  last  mentioned  page  an  account  of  the  idealizing 
act  is  begun  which  reveals  the  sources  of  all  the  conflicts  of  feeling, 
action,  and  thought  in  religious  experience.  A  few  sentences  from 
this  part  will  show  how  the  author  would  explain  the  preceding 
conflicts.  "It  is  a  mark  of  human  nature — though  the  same  trait 
appears  in  life  still  lower— to  transform  its  neighborhood."  "The 
impulse  to  mould  the  facts  until  they  more  nearly  conform  to  some 
inner  rule  and  standard — to  supplement  them,  if  need  be,  by  direct 
addition — appears  in  many  different  forms  between  idealization's 
infancy  and  its  maturer  years."  "The  completion  of  the  observed 
world  by  adding  to  it  that  great  unobserved  world  so  real  to  the 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  LIFE  467 

religious,  is  therefore  no  anomally."  "The  instinct  to  remodel  the 
given  fact  to  our  satisfaction — at  first  to  meet  physical  needs,  but 
soon  to  meet  the  no  less  urgent  need  of  beauty  and  justice  and  intelli- 
gibility— by  this  wide  instinct  all  are  moved."  "The  ideal  is  the 
picture  of  what  will  satisfy  in  fullest  measure  our  desires." 

Here,  then,  is  the  key.  Man,  like  all  sentient  forms,  is  charac- 
terized by  various  desires  and  cravings.  In  the  lower  stages  these 
are  relatively  few  and  primal.  In  the  higher  stages  they  branch  and 
ramify  under  the  pressure  of  environment  and  habit.  Greater  em- 
phasis upon  this  principle  would  have  brought  the  diversity  of 
religions,  and  the  contrasts  within  any  single  faith  more  completely 
under  the  solving  notions  of  genetic  and  social  psychology.  It  is 
surely  a  proper  function  of  scientific  psychology  to  show  how  the 
conflicts  of  individual  and  group  experience  stand  related  to  the 
epochs  of  growth,  to  the  run  of  attention,  to  the  ground  patterns 
determined  by  the  struggle  for  existence,  and  by  the  pace  set  by  the 
leaders  and  geniuses  of  races.  A  hint  of  this  larger  explanation 
appears  on  page  33  where  the  "intellectual  vertigo  and  revulsion" 
of  Buddhism  with  its  endless  transmigrations  and  repetitions  is 
casually  referred  to  the  correlated  "machine-like  round  of  life." 
There  are  doubtless  "types  of  character  that  are  permanently 
magnetized  in  opposite  "ways,"  but  it  is  the  older  static  psychology 
which  stops  at  that  point,  without  inquiring  into  the  environmental 
influences  and  other  forces  which  have  played  the  part  of  the  magnets. 

Religion  is  conceived  as  the  supreme  expression  of  the  idealizing 
activity.  It  is  well  defined  (page  343)  as  "man's  whole  bearing 
toward  what  seems  to  him  the  Best,  or  Greatest — where  'best'  is 
used  in  a  sense  neither  in  nor  out  of  morality,  and  'greatest'  is 
confined  to  no  particular  religion."  Therefore,  "no  clear  line  marks 
the  transition  from  religion  to  other  human  activities."  The  Best 
is  predominantly  social  (pages  337  f.)  and  would  seemingly  be 
regarded  as  primarily  social  but  for  "motives  connected  with  high 
curiosity"  apart  from  any  practical  interest.  The  author's  mild 
dissent  from  recent  attempts  to  state  religion  in  terms  of  the  social 
consciousness  is  seen  in  the  following:  "The  reverence  which  men 
have  shown  the  Highest  has  usually  been,  not  alone  because  it  ful- 
filled their  social  needs,  but  also  because  of  its  satisfaction  to  sensuous 
and  aesthetic  and  causal  and  logical  needs,  which  grow,  it  is  true,  by 
the  mutual  friction  and  support  of  men,  but  seem  not  to  originate 
in  this  way  nor  to  be  part  and  parcel  of  the  social,  feeling  itself." 

E.  S.  AMES 

THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO 


468  REVIEWS 

Prophezeiungen:    Alter  Aberglaube  oder  neue   Warhheit?     M.   KEM- 

MERICH.     Miinchen:  Langen,  1911.     Pp.  vi  +  435. 

Dr.  Kemmerich  tells  us  that  his  study  of  prophecy  has  completely 
altered  his  understanding  of  that  phenomenon.  He  was  at  first 
convinced  that  only  superstitious  persons  could  believe  in  the  an- 
nouncement of  future  events;  and  he  attributed  the  realization  of  cer- 
tain "prophecies"  either  to  luck,  to  simple  coincidence,  or  to  clever 
conjectures.  But  he  has  come  to  believe  that  future  events  can  be 
seen  in  advance.  His  book  is  intended  to  demonstrate  that  that  fact 
is  scientifically  established.  "The  belief  in  prophecy  is  not  an 
antiquated  superstition.  It  is  a  new  truth  of  which  we  make  a  strict 
demonstration.  We  know  now  that  sight  into  the  future  exists." 

Let  it  be  clearly  understood  that  the  author's  purpose  is  simply 
to  verify  the  existence  of  the  fact.  That  is  without  doubt  the  first 
task  of  science.  Whether  the  fact  can  be  explained  and  how  it  is  to 
be  explained  are  questions  independent  of  the  one  with  which  he  is 
concerned. 

The  book  contains  twelve  chapters.  The  third  indicates  the 
method  of  the  demonstration  and  answers  objections.  The  twelfth 
establishes  scientific  conclusions  regarding  prophecy.  The  ten  other 
chapters  discuss  the  facts;  after  mentioning  antiquity,  the  Middle 
Ages,  the  modern  period,  the  author  examines  particularly:  (i)  The 
prophecy  of  the  Abbe  Hermann  of  the  Cistercian  Monastery  of 
Lehnin  in  the  year  1300,  regarding  the  fate  of  the  House  of  Branden- 
burg; (2)  Christina  Ponitowssken,  the  clairvoyant,  of  the  seven- 
teenth century  and  her  prophetic  visions;  (3)  the  prophecies  of 
Christian  of  Heering  of  Prossen  in  the  eighteenth  century;  (4)  the 
prophecy  of  Johann  Adam  Miiller  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 
century;  (5)  the  prophecy  of  Cazotte  on  the  French  Revolution; 
(6)  the  prophecies  of  Madame  de  Ferriem,  a  contemporary;  (7)  and 
finally,  the  prophecies  of  Michel  Nostradamus  in  the  sixteenth 
century. 

It  is  impossible  in  a  brief  account  to  summarize  the  discussion  of 
all  these  facts,  but  however  surprised  one  may  be  at  finding  the 
prophecies  of  Nostradamus  seriously  examined  with  the  purpose  of 
showing  their  agreement  with  future  events,  one  is  compelled  to 
admit  that  the  discussion  is  conducted  with  much  logical  strictness. 
Certain  quatrains  of  the  Centuries  of  Nostradamus  are  truly  very 
curious.  They  are  authentic,  drawn  from  events  anterior  to  the 
events  designated,  sufficiently  clear  in  spite  of  their  intended  ob- 
scurity. They  provide  the  author  with  several  truly  interesting 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  LIFE  469 

examples  of  "  true  "  prophecy.     Demonstrations  of  such  a  kind  can- 
not be  abbreviated;  we  refer  the  reader  to  the  book. 

JULES  PACHEU 
PARIS 

Das    Zungenreden,  geschichtlich    und    psychologisch    untersucht.     E. 

MOSIMAN.     Tubingen:  F.  C.  B.  Mohr,  1911.     Pp.  137. 

This  book  was  originally  written  in  English  in  answer  to  a  prize- 
question  offered  by  the  McCormick  Theological  Seminary.  After 
revision  and  completion,  with  the  assistance  of  Professor  Johannes 
Weiss,  of  Heidelburg,  it  was  published  in  Germany.  It  comprises 
historical  researches  on  the  existence  of  the  facts  of  speaking  with 
tongues  (pp.  1-83),  psychological  explanations  (pp.  86-124),  an^  * 
final  chapter,  rather  theological,  in  which  are  discussed  chiefly  the 
events  of  the  Pentecost  as  they  are  related  in  the  Acts  of  the  Apostles. 

The  problem  of  "glossolalia"  and  of  the  "gift  of  tongues"  goes 
back  to  certain  accounts  of  the  New  Testament.  There  these  mani- 
festations of  involuntary  speech  are  attributed  to  the  Holy  Spirit. 
Other  historical  manifestations  nearer  us  permit  a  fuller  study  of  the 
question  and  throw  some  light  upon  the  facts,  and  their  psychological 
explanation,  often  permitting  one  to  cast  aside  the  hypothesis  of  the 
intervention  of  spirit. 

In  addition  to  the  manifestations  related  in  the  New  Testament, 
considered  by  the  author  in  the  first  three  chapters,  two  chapters 
are  devoted  to  other  instances:  among  the  Montanists,  the  Cami- 
sards,  the  Jansenists,  the  Irwingiens,  and  in  recent  revivals  (in  Wales, 
in  India,  etc.). 

The  theory  of  the  automatic  and  unconscious  movements  of  the 
organs  of  phonation,  produced  by  our  subconscious  activity,  suffices 
to  explain  a  great  many  cases.  A  sort  of  internal  suggestion  takes 
place  and  sets  in  activity  the  nervous  centers.  At  times  the  sounds 
produced  have  no  sense;  at  times  they  are  intelligible  only  to  those 
to  whom  the  power  of  interpretation  is  given;  at  times  they  are  in 
the  language  of  the  subject  and  of  the  auditors;  at  times  they  are  a 
tongue  foreign  to  the  subject.  It  is  well  known  that  in  this  last  case 
very  curious  causes  leading  to  a  misinterpretation  of  the  phenomenon 
have  been  discovered.  The  author  affirms  that  there  exists  no  in- 
controvertible instance  of  a  true  use  of  a  foreign  tongue  (p.  118).  A 
woman  in  Chicago  utters  Chinese  words,  but  she  has  heard  them  in  a 
Chinese  laundry.  Another  person  speaks  Hebrew  words,  but  on 
investigation  one  discovers  that  she  has  lived  as  a  servant  with  a 


470 


REVIEWS 


Hebraic  scholar  who  was  in  the  habit  of  repeating  Hebrew  texts 

aloud. 

The  question  dealt  with  in  the  last  chapter  is  the  relation  which 
exists  between  the  gift  of  tongues  mentioned  in  the  New  Testament 
and  "glossolalia"  in  general.  The  author  identifies  them  and  gives 
them  both  a  purely  psychological  explanation;  but  in  order  to  do  so 
he  is  led  to  affirm  that  the  Biblical  account  is  not  exact  (ungeschichtlich 
dargestellt).  At  this  point  the  question  becomes  one  of  historical 
criticism,  or  of  theology,  with  which  we  are  not  concerned  here.  The 
reasons  advanced  by  Mosiman  appear  to  us  to  some  extent  arbitrary. 
They  are  not  convincing.  There  are  theologians  who  hold  an  opposite 
opinion  (comp.  Pratt,  Theologie  de  Saint-Paul.  Paris:  Beauchesne; 
pp.  175,  184). 

An  extensive  bibliography  is  added. 

JULES  PACHEU 

PARIS 

U  Experience    Mystique    et    VActivite    Subconsciente.     J.     PACHEU. 

Paris:  Perrin,  1911.     Pp.  312. 

This  interesting  work  contains  a  simple  and  clear  exposition  of 
Mystical  Union  (the  central  fact  of  mysticism),  and  a  criticism  of  the 
subconscious  theory  as  applied  to  that  experience.  Using  first-class 
authorities,  the  author  separates  clearly  the  affective  from  the  noetic 
element  at  every  one  of  the  several  degrees  of  that  experience.  It 
includes  feeling  and  also  knowledge:  the  Mystic  is  aware,  even  if  in 
an  obscure  way,  of  the  divine  presence. 

The  exposition  is  done  with  much  exactness;  it  evinces  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  topic.  The  author  insists  very  properly  upon  the 
ethico-religious  value  of  this  experience;  he  shows  the  harmonious 
development  to  which  mystics  tend  beyond  asceticism;  one  sees  very 
clearly  how  the  mystical  experience  makes  part  of  the  religious  life. 
The  theory  which  would  bring  back  these  facts  to  mental  pathology 
is  vigorously  discussed. 

Can  mystical  experience  be  explained  as  an  eruption  from  the 
subconscious?  Must  it  be  supposed  that  the  mystical  intuition  is 
nothing  more  than  a  revelation  of  the  subject  to  himself,  helped  by 
his  reflection  and  his  work  and  which,  having  ripened  subconsciously, 
appears  to  him  external  and  superior  to  himself?  The  interruptions 
and  the  disproportion  which  characterize  these  states  have  seemed  to 
some  adequately  explained  by  the  hypothesis  of  the  subconscious,  on 
condition  that  it  be  given  its  full  value,  and  that  it  should  be  assimi- 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  LIFE  471 

lated  to,  for  instance,  scientific  and  artistic  invention.  Against  this 
hypothesis,  the  author  formulates  the  following  objections:  (i)  How 
are  we  to  explain  on  this  hypothesis  the  sporadic  and  at  times  unique 
character  of  the  mystical  intuitions?  If  the  subconscious  is  the 
author  of  them,  it  should  easily  lead  to  a  flowering  of  phenomena  of 
that  kind.  (2)  The  efficacious  play  of  the  subconscious  supposes  a 
kind  of  mental  disaggregation;  how  is  one  to  conciliate  these  dis- 
sociations with  the  admirable  unity  of  the  mystical  life?  (3)  The 
continuity  of  memory  and  of  consciousness  in  the  mystics  seems  to 
establish  the  unity  of  their  consciousness.  (4)  In  order  to  explain 
the  mystical  facts,  one  is  compelled  to  enlarge  the  subconscious 
hypothesis  to  such  a  degree  that  it  loses  all  precise  meaning.  Certain 
authors,  particularly  M.  Delacroix,  endow  the  subconscious  so  richly 
that  it  "becomes  a  marvellous  fairy  more  difficult  to  scientifically 
imagine  than  Viviane,  or  Morgane,  the  fay,  or  simply  the  divine 
reality  of  which  the  mystics  speak."  The  posited  creative  sub- 
consciousness — a  dynamic,  constructive  automatism — is  in  fact 
copied  after  the  descriptions  of  the  great  mystics.  "This  hypothesis, 
suggested  by  the  facts  which  are  to  be  explained,  is  applied  to  them 
as  a  sufficient  explanation.  There  is  a  gap  and  an  apparent  petitio 
principii:  that  which  is  assumed  is  precisely  that  which  is  in 
question." 

Our  author  is  of  the  opinion  that  subconsciousness  cannot  be  left 
to  its  own  resources;  it  seems  rather  an  instrument  in  the  hands  of  a 
superior  power,  God.  As  psychologists,  our  conclusions  cannot 
affirm  God;  but  we  have  not  the  right  to  exclude  Him,  in  fact  psy- 
chology seems  to  point  to  Him. 

In  closing,  the  author  quotes  from  a  letter  in  which  M.  Delacroix 
explains  how  he  conceives  the  relation  between  psychology  and 
metaphysics  and  also  religion. 

The  only  critical  remark  which  I  will  make  refers  to  the  fourth 
objection.  The  moment  always  comes  when  an  hypothesis  resembles 
the  facts  for  which  it  is  intended  as  an  explanation;  it  must  perforce 
contain  them.  The  question  is  whether  it  contains  only  those  facts; 
if  so,  the  hypothesis  is  in  truth  merely  the  expression  of  those  facts 
and  it  cannot  serve  to  go  beyond  them,  to  relate  them  to  other  facts. 
But  is  this  truly  the  case  of  the  subconscious  hypothesis  ?  I  do  not 
think  so.  The  authors  criticized  by  M.  Pacheu  have  merely  compli- 
cated an  hypothesis  already  in  existence  in  order  to  make  it  include 
the  new  facts  in  question;  and  they  have  found  support  in  inter- 
mediary facts,  for  instance,  the  role  of  subconsciousness  in  artistic 
and  scientific  invention. 


472 


REVIEWS 


The  book  of  M.  Pacheu  manifests  a  very  sincere  and  talented 
effort  to  place  the  religious  reader  face  to  face  with  the  analyses  and 
theories  of  the  psychologists,  and  to  draw  from  them  whatever  is 
possible  from  the  point  of  view  of  religion.  This  book  shows  that 
psychologists  and  religious  souls  can  walk  together  for  a  considerable 
time.  If  the  moment  comes — the  moment  of  explanation — where 
they  diverge,  they  know  at  least  on  what  they  agree  and  on  what 
they  disagree.  This  book  shows  also  that  serious  differences  can  be 
indicated  with  much  tolerance  and  perfect  courtesy. 

H.  DELACROIX 

SORBONNE,  PARIS 

Mysticism  as  Seen  through  its  Psychology.     W.  E.  HOCKING.     Mind, 

1912,  21,  38-61. 

This  is  in  part  a  criticism  of  the  views  concerning  mysticism  held 
by  Royce,  Godfernaux,  Delacroix,  and  Leuba,  and  in  part  a  positive 
theory  (both  psychological  and  metaphysical)  of  the  mystic  con- 
sciousness. Royce's  mistake,  according  to  Hocking,  is  in  failing  to 
distinguish  the  mystic's  motive,  which  is  worship,  from  the  motive 
of  speculation  in  general.  Leuba's  interpretation  of  the  mystic's 
love  as  a  branch  of  the  sexual  impulse  is  only  a  half  truth;  the  whole 
truth  being  that  sexual  love  is  a  part  of  the  mystic  worship.  God- 
fernaux is  right  in  viewing  rhythm  as  the  great  characteristic  of  the 
mystic  life,  but  he  is  mistaken  in  identifying  this  with  the  vital 
rhythm  of  coenesthesia.  Delacroix  recognizes  the  rhythm  of  the 
mystic  consciousness  but  regards  it  as  not  absolutely  essential  and  as, 
in  fact,  outgrown  by  the  greater  mystics.  As  a  fact  the  mystic  never 
does  and  never  can  get  beyond  this  rhythm,  for  it  is  a  function  of  his 
will  and  is  correlated  with  the  laws  of  attention.  It  is,  in  fact,  based 
upon  the  psychological  and  epistemological  law  of  alternation, — the 
necessity  of  turning  from  the  whole  to  the  part  and  from  the  part  to 
the  whole. 

JAMES  B.  PRATT 
WILLIAMS  COLLEGE 

Essai  (Tune  Classification  du  Mystique.     F.  PICAVET.     Rev.   Phil., 
1912,  74,  1-26. 

The  mystics  have  been  classified  according  to  two  principles: 
the  perfection  they  aimed  at,  and  their  nervous  abnormal  phenomena. 
The  author  would  make  three  classes:  (i)  The  Mystics  who  seek  a 
development  of  their  personality  by  means  of  union  with  the  Su- 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  LIFE  473 

preme  Perfection,  but  who  do  not  make  use  of  theurgical  and  religious 
practices.  (2)  The  Mystics  who  seek  God  in  order  to  realize  a  fuller 
personality  and  who  make  use  of  the  well-known  methods  of  mystical 
worship.  (3)  The  Mystics  who  do  not  aim  at  individual  perfection, 
whose  physiological  misery  is  as  profound  as  their  psychological 
deficiencies. 

J.  H.  LEUBA 
BRYN  MAWR  COLLEGE 

Les  Etats  Mystiques  Negatifs.     G.   TRUC.     Rev.    Phil.,    1912,   73, 
610-628. 

After  considering  in  a  previous  paper  the  state  of  grace,  the 
author  takes  up  in  the  present  article  correlated  negative  states: 
lukewarmness,  "acedia,"  dryness.  He  makes  a  detailed  and  careful 
descriptive  analysis  of  these  states.  His  chief  conclusions  are: 

(1)  These  negative  states  are  functionally  related  to  the  state  of 
grace.     They  involve  regret  for  an  affective  experience  which  one 
has  previously  realized,  or  which  one  despairs  of 'ever  obtaining; 
they  include  therefore  a  feeling  of  irritation  at  one's  impotency. 

(2)  These  states  are  only  particular  cases  of  experiences  existing 
outside  the  religious  life. 

J.  H.  LEUBA 

BRYN  MAWR  COLLEGE 

The  Several  Origins  of  the  Ideas  of  Unseen  Personal  Beings.     JAMES 

H.  LEUBA.     Folk-Lore,  1912,  23,  148-171. 
The  Varieties,  Classification,  and  Origin  of  Magic.     JAMES  H.  LEUBA. 

American  Anthropologist,  1912,  N.  S.,  14.  350-367. 

Professor  Leuba,  an  original  thinker  in  the  field  of  religious 
psychology,  discusses  in  the  articles  under  review,  two  fundamental 
questions  interesting  alike  to  the  psychologist  and  to  the  ethnologist, 
questions  concerning  which  there  is  still,  and  rightfully  so,  not  a  little 
disagreement  among  even  the  most  competent  authorities.  Rejecting 
the  theory  of  the  origin  of  the  ideas  of  superhuman  personal  powers 
in  some  one  class  only  of  phenomena,  e.  g.,  dreams  and  related  states 
(Tylor),  worship  of  the  dead  (Spencer),  personification  of  natural 
objects  (Max  Miiller),  a  theory  ascribed  by  him  to  "the  passion  for 
simplicity  and  unity"  in  anthropologists  and  historians,  he  adduces 
psychological  and  historical  evidence  in  support  of  the  following  four 
propositions:  (i)  Gods  grew  out  of  several  different  ideas  of  super- 
human beings.  (2)  These  beings  had  independent  origins.  (3)  The 


474  REVIEWS 

attributes  of  the  gods  differ  according  to  their  origin.  (4)  The  his- 
torical gods  are  usually  mongrel  gods,  the  outcome  of  the  combination 
of  characteristics  belonging  to  superhuman  beings  of  different  origins. 
In  his  position  as  to  the  non-unitary  origin  of  such  beliefs  Professor 
Leuba  places  himself  in  the  company  of  the  so-called  "American 
school"  of  anthropologists,  who  for  some  years  past  have  assumed 
the  same  attitude  with  respect  to  "totemism,"  and  other  phenomena 
of  a  socio-religious  character,  which  the  earlier  observers  and  inter- 
preters of  the  mental  activities  of  non-civilized  peoples,  almost 
without  exception,  considered  as  having  had  a  unitary  origin.  An- 
other point  argued  for,  and  quite  properly,  is  that  several  of  the 
sources  indicated  may  have  operated  simultaneously — "so  that 
several  gods  of  different  origins  may  have,  from  the  first,  divided 
the  attention  of  the  community";  and,  moreover,  succession  (not 
at  all  limited  to  any  one  order),  as  well  as  simultaneity,  is  possible, — 
thus,  "a  ghost-ancestor  may  have  first  attained  dominance,  and, 
later  on,  a  Great  Maker."  The  idea  of  a  "Maker"  can  occur  very 
early  in  the  history  of  the  races,  and  Professor  Leuba  does  not  err  in 
stating  that  "it  may  be  that  a  crude  conception  of  a  Creator  is 
attained  even  earlier  than  that  of  a  soul  or  a  double."  Today,  the 
belief  in  the  existence  of  God,  Professor  Leuba  holds,  "rests  almost 
entirely"  on  experiences  included  under  "the  needs  of  the  heart" 
and  "the  needs  of  conscience," — such  empirical  data  (together  with 
the  metaphysical  arguments)  as  dreams,  hallucinations,  trances, 
personification  of  striking  phenomena,  the  idea  of  a  Maker,  etc., 
"having  lost  all  or  almost  all  the  value  they  had  once  as  prompters 
of  the  belief  in  God." 

The  question  of  "primitive  montheism,"  so  much  discussed  of 
late  by  Andrew  Lang,  Father  Schmidt  and  others,  Professor  Leuba 
answers  by  pointing  out  that  "the  High  Gods  proceeded  from  an 
independent  and  specific  source;  they  are,  or  were  originally,  the 
Makers."  The  fact  that  low  spirits  and  not  the  High  God  are 
worshipped  among  primitive  peoples  does  not  represent  a  deterioration 
from  the  earliest  condition  of  humanity,  but  "rather  the  facts  are 
consistent  with  a  natural  development  and  indicate  the  presence 
of^no  factor  not  operative  in  modern  progressive  societies."  Some- 
thing might  perhaps  be  urged  against  the  author's  derivation  of  the 
"High  Gods"  from  the  "Makers"  alone.  His  emphasis  on  the 
facts  of  childhood  is  worth  attention.  Professor  Leuba  deprecates 
the  application  of  the  term  "monotheism"  to  belief  of  the  uncivilized 
in  the  "High  God,"  since  it  by  no  means  implies  that  there  exist  no 
other  gods  but  him. 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  LIFE  475 

By  "magic"  Professor  Leuba  understands  " those  practices 
intended  to  secure  some  definite  gain  by  coercitive  action  in  essential 
disregard  (i)  of  the  quantitative  relations  implied  in  the  ordinary 
and  in  the  scientific  dealings  with  the  physical  world;  (2)  of  the 
anthropopathic  relations  obtaining  among  persons."  To  this  he 
adds  that  "although  magic  never  makes  an  anthropopathic  appeal, 
it  frequently  brings  to  bear  its  peculiar  coercitive  virtue  upon  feeling 
beings."  The  aim  of  magic  is  then  to  compel  souls,  spirits,  or  gods 
to  do  the  operator's  will,  or  prevent  them  from  doing  their  own. 
As  is  noted  (p.  352),  it  is  only  by  far-fetched  explanations  that  several 
types  of  magic  can  be  brought  within  the  limits  of  Frazer's  classi- 
fication into  "homeopathic  (or  imitative)"  and  "contagious." 
Examples  of  these  are  "certain  dances  performed  by  the  women 
when  the  men  are  engaged  in  war"  (e.  g.,  among  Kafirs  of  the  Hindu 
Kush,  Yuki  Indians,  natives  of  Madagascar,  etc.),  and  the  very  large 
and  significant  class  of  magic-phenomena  known  as  "will-magic." 

Professor  Leuba  offers  a  classification  of  his  own,  viz.  (i)  principle 
of  repetition;  (2)  principle  of  transmission  of  an  effect  from  one 
object  to  another  (sympathetic  magic);  (3)  principle  of  efficiency  of 
will-effort.  The  conceptions  of  the  savage,  the  author  thinks,  are 
not  "clear  and  definite,"  but  "hazy  and  fluid."  This  generalization 
can  hardly  apply  to  all  primitive  peoples,  much  less  to  all  individuals 
among  them.  The  origins  of  magical  behavior,  according  to  Pro- 
fessor Leuba,  while  not  capable  of  interpretation  simply  from  the 
principles  of  association,  may  be  classified,  nevertheless,  according  to 
the  kind  of  association  they  illustrate.  Considering  the  nature  of 
the  power  involved,  magical  practices  may  be  grouped  as  follows: 
(i)  practices  in  which  there  is  no  idea  of  a  power  belonging  to  the 
operator  or  his  instrument,  and  passing  thence  to  the  object  of  the 
magical  art  (much  of  so-called  sympathetic  magic,  many  taboos, 
most  modern  superstitions):  (2)  non-personal  powers  are  believed 
to  belong  to  the  magician  himself,  or  to  particular  objects,  such  as 
the  magician's  instruments,  and  to  pass  from  these  into  other  objects, 
or  to  act  upon  them  so  as  to  produce  certain  effects;  (3)  will-magic, 
including  the  cases  in  which  the  magician  feels  that  his  will-effort  is 
an  efficient  factor. 

Among  the  principles  of  explanation  (of  unequal  value)  of  magical 
behavior  the  author  cites  the  following  phenomena:  Children  often 
amuse  themselves  by  making  prohibitions  and  backing  them  up  with 
threats  of  punishment, — the  make-believe  of  one  person  may  be 
taken  quite  seriously  by  another;  threats  of  untoward  happennings, 


476  REVIEWS 

made  for  the  purpose  of  preserving  things  vital  to  the  life  and  pros- 
perity of  the  tribe;  the  motive  which  leads  civilized  people  to  make 
vows  nowadays;  the  spontaneous  response  of  the  organism  to 
specific  situations.  Besides  these  cases,  in  all  of  which  "movements 
and  behaviors  appear  independently  of  any  magical  intention,  and 
afterward  acquire  a  magical  significance,"  there  comes  a  time,  when 
"magic  no  longer  arises  only  by  chance,  but  new  forms  are  created 
deliberately,"  and  "from  this  moment  there  must  have  been  a  tend- 
ency to  treat,  according  to  more  or  less  definite  principles,  every 
difficult  situation."  And  here  belong  most  of  the  "like  produces 
like"  practices  found  all  over  the  globe  in  all  ages  of  mankind. 

Professor  Frazer,  in  the  opinion  of  the  author,  "seems  to  have 
overlooked  the  fundamental  difference  between  mere  association  of 
ideas  and  the  essential  processes  involved  in  magic."  Magic  cannot 
be  explained  as  "a  simple  (mistaken)  recognition  of  the  similarity 
and  contiguity  of  ideas."  ALEXANDER  F.  CHAMBERLAIN 

CLARK  UNIVERSITY 

On   Faith   in    its   Psychological   Aspects.     B.    B.    WARFIELD.     The 

Princeton  Theol.  Rev.,  1911,  9,  5 3 7-566. 

Professor  Warfield's  paper  is  a  carefully  written  and  convincing 
discussion  of  the  meaning  of  the  word  belief,  and  in  particular  of 
the  difference  expressed  by  "belief"  and  "knowledge." 

"Matters  of  faith,"  he  writes  in  a  partial  summary,  "are  different 
from  matters  of  knowledge — not  as  convictions  less  clear,  firm  or 
well-grounded,  not  as  convictions  resting  on  grounds  less  objectively 
valid,  not  as  convictions  determined  rather  by  desire,  will,  than  by 
evidence — but  as  convictions  resting  on  grounds  less  direct  and 
immediate  to  the  soul,  and  therefore  involving  a  more  prominent 
element  of  trust,  in  a  word  as  convictions  grounded  in  authority, 
testimony  as  distinguished  from  convictions  grounded  in  rational 
proof.  The  two  classes  of  convictions  are  psychologically  just 
convictions;  they  are  alike,  in  Dr.  Baldwin's  phrase, ' forced  consents'; 
they  rest  equally  on  evidence  and  are  equally  the  product  of  evidence; 
they  may  be  equally  clear,  firm  and  assured;  but  they  rest  on  differing 
kinds  of  evidence."  It  is  the  "open  implication  of  'trust'  in  the 
conception  of  *  belief  which  rules  the  usage  of  these  terms." 

Now,  as  there  is  "an  element  of  trust  in  all  our  convictions, ' faith,' 
'belief,'  may  be  employed  of  them  all."  "In  what  we  call  religious 
faith  this  prominent  implication  of  trust  reaches  its  height."  "  Faith 
in  God,  and  above  all,  faith  in  Jesus  Christ  is  just  trusting  Him  in  its 
purity." 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  LIFE  477 

In  the  remainder  of  the  paper  (pp.  557-566)  the  author  examines 
critically,  in  the  light  of  his  analysis,  the  opinion  of  certain  theologians. 

It  appears  to  me  unfortunate  that  "faith"  is  used  throughout 
this  article  as  synonomous  with  "belief,"  for  these  two  terms  cover 
a  range  of  mental  experience  wide  enough  to  make  possible  a  dis- 
criminating use  of  these  terms. 

One  is  surprised  to  find  that  the  only  contemporary  psychologists 
who  apparently  have  been  consulted  are  those  who  wrote  on  this 
topic  in  the  Dictionary  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology.  I  cannot 
help  believing  that  a  wider  knowledge  of  psychological  science  on  the 
part  of  theologians  would  redound  to  the  advantage  of  both  theology 
and  psychology. 

J.  H.  LEUBA 
BRYN  MAWR  COLLEGE 

The  Journal  of  Religious  Psychology,  including  its  Anthropological 
and  Sociological  Aspects,  edited  by  G.  STANLEY  HALL  and  ALEX- 
ANDER F.  CHAMBERLAIN.  Volume  V.,  1912. 

(1)  The  Belief  in  Immortality.     SIMON  SPIDLE.     Pp.  5-51. 

(2)  Satan  and  his  Ancestors  from  a  Psychological  Standpoint.     COLLYS 
F.     SPARKMAN.      Part   I.   Historical   Development,    pp.    52-86; 
Part  II.    The   Rise,  Growth  and  Death  of  Satan,  pp.  163-194. 

(3)  The  Genetic  View  of  Berkeley's  Religious  Motivation.     G.  STANLEY 
HALL.     Pp.  137-162. 

(4)  Fear  in  Religion.     W.  D.  WALLIS.     Pp.  257-304. 

(5)  The  Psychology  and  Pedagogy  of  Doubt.     JOSIAH  MORSE.      Pp. 
418-428. 

(6)  The  Psychology  of  Religion.     JAMES  B.  PRATT.     Pp.  383-394. 
With  the  appearance  of  its  fifth  volume,  The  American  Journal  of 

Religious  Psychology  and  Education  modified  its  name  and  changed 
its  editors.  The  disappearance  of  "Educational"  and  the  appearance 
of  "Anthropological  and  Sociological"  indicate  sufficiently  the  change 
that  has  taken  place  in  the  field  covered  by  the  journal. 

(i)  The  first  parts  of  this  paper  deal  in  a  sketchy  way  with  the 
several  concepts  of  immortality;  with  the  different  theories  of  the 
origin  of  the  belief;  and  with  the  grounds  upon  which  the  belief  rests. 

The  last  part,  entitled  "Present  Status  of  the  Belief,"  is  an 
investigation  by  means  of  a  questionnaire  containing  no  less  than 
thirty  questions.  It  is  much  easier  to  draw  false  than  right  conclu- 
sions from  the  one  hundred  and  seventy  answers  which  the  author 
received.  Of  the  one  hundred  and  four  answers  coming  from  the 


478  REVIEWS 

professional  classes,  seventy-five  announce  a  belief  in  personal 
immortality.  Apparently  all  these  regard  the  doctrine  of  Christ's 
resurrection  as  "the  crowning  evidence  of  a  future  life."  Of  the 
forty-six  answers  received  from  high-school  pupils  only  one  doubts 
the  reality  of  an  after-life.  And  of  the  twenty  answers  from  college 
students,  again  only  one  doubts  personal  immortality. 

The  information  I  have  secured  upon  the  belief  of  college  students 
indicates,  what  is  indeed  apparent  to  any  one  acquainted  with  the 
times,  that  the  questionnaire  of  Mr.  Spidle  fell  into  the  hands  of,  or 
was  answered  almost  exclusively  by,  persons  who  believe  in  im- 
mortality, but  was  not  answered  by  all  the  persons  belonging  to  the 
classes  to  whom  the  questionnaire  was  sent. 

(2)  The  first  half  of  Sparkman's  paper  deals  with  the  historical 
development  of  Satan's  forebears  from  antiquity  to  modern  times. 
The  second  half  seeks  to  discover  the  reasons  for  the  existence  of  a 
belief  that  has  taken  such  a  deep  hold  on  human  nature.     The  author 
proposes  to  apply  to  the  idea  of  the  devil  the  psychoanalysis  used 
by  Freud  for  the  discovery  of  psychic  disorders.     "Using  race  as  a 
psychological  unit,  may  it  not  have  forgotten  many  processes  anal- 
ogous   to   those   of   the   individual?      May   not   its    horizon    have 
broadened  and  its  consciousness  in  toto  have  found  certain  ideas 
unpalatable?     If  so,  .  .  .  the  devil  could  be,  in  Freud's  own  language 
regarding  the  individual,  'the  created  output  in  a  sublimated  mani- 
festation of  various  thwarted  and  repressed  wishes  of  which  it  is  no 
longer  conscious.'"     In  this  view  the  devil  has  been  "an  outlet  for 
otherwise  nauseating  conscious  thoughts." 

(3)  "To  explain  the  philosopher  psychologically  is  one  of  the 
chief  new  duties  which  our  science  now  owes  to  the  great  speculative 
minds  of  the  past."     Berkeley  is,  according  to  Dr.  Hall,  a  favorable 
example  for  "this  new  psychoanalysis."     In  a  brief  account  of  the 
philosopher's  life  we  are  shown  how  by  his  temperament  and  edu- 
cation he  was  tempted  to  a  denial  of  the  reality  of  matter.     "His 
all-dominant  wish  was  to  exalt  the  cause  of  faith  and  reason  above, 
and  at  the  expense  of,  that  of  sense."     "He  would  make  a  great 
coup  which  should  bring  consternation  to  the  critics   of  religion. 
...  He  would  impeach   and  discredit  the   most   ancient   trusted 
oracles  of  mankind  ...  by   showing  that  matter  too  was   really 
immaterial,  was  only  a  practical  postulate  on  the  plane  of  sense, 
which  must  be,  in  fact,  everywhere  accepted  by  an  act  of  faith." 

His  romantic  missionary  enterprises  and  his  advocacy  of  the 
wonderful  properties  of  tar-water  confirm  the  indications  of  his 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  LIFE  479 

early  life,  and  throw  such  additional  light  upon  the  motivation  of 
his  philosophy  that  no  student  who  would  understand  its  raison 
d'etre  should  omit  the  reading  of  Siris,  during  his  lifetime  the  most 
popular  of  his  works,  but  now  almost  forgotten. 

(4)  The  chief  purpose  of  the  author  seems  to  be  two-fold.     First 
to  show  that  awe  and  reverence  are  essential  and  invariable  elements 
in  every  true  religious  consciousness;    secondly  that  the  foundation 
of  religion  rests  in  individual  as  well  as  in  social  psychology.     Here 
he  opposes  the  theory  of  Durkheim  according  to  which  religion  can 
be  explained  only  by  reference  to  social   consciousness. 

The  paper  reports  a  large  number  of  experiences  from  the  life 
of  more  or  less  primitive  peoples,  all  of  which  elicit  the  same  reaction, 
namely  fear. 

The  author's  definition  of  religion  by  means  of  fear,  awe  and  rever- 
ence is  subject  to  the  criticism  which  I  have  offered  in  several  of  my 
writings.  His  contention  that  the  origin  of  religion  must  be  sought 
both  in  individual  and  in  social  psychology  appears  so  nearly  self- 
evident  that  when  it  is  contradicted,  it  must  be,  it  seems  to  me, 
because  of  a  verbal  misunderstanding. 

(5)  "The  thesis  of  this  paper  is  that  doubt  and  belief  are  contrary 
psychical  states,  that  the  law  of  contrast  holds  between  them,  and 
that  belief  is  the  inducing  or  positive  state,  and  doubt  the  induced 
or  negative  state."     It  is  the  inculcation  in  youth  of  beliefs  that 
are  antagonistic  to  those  which  experience  interpreted  by  modern 
knowledge  produces,  which  is  the  cause  of  the  pathetic  state  of  doubt 
so  common  in  adolescence.     "Doubt  is  not  necessary;  it  is  not  a 
natural  heritage  of  youth; — it  is  an  unhappy  state  induced  by  dog- 
matism and  unwise  pedagogy." 

(6)  After  a  critical  discussion  of  the  three  sources  from  which  the 
psychologist  of  religion  obtains  his  facts   (individual  experience  in 
autobiographies,   letters;    answers  to  definite  questions;    objective 
expressions   of  social   religion   furnished   by   history,   anthropology, 
and  literature),  Pratt  passes  to  the  question,  What  is  the  proper 
attitude  of  the  psychologist  toward  the  commonly  assumed  objective 
reality  of  the  cause,  or  causes,  of  religious  experiences?     We  are  told 
that  for  its  own  protection  science  must  act  as  if  there  were  no 
interruptions    in    the    sequence    of    phenomena.     The    psychologist 
should  content  himself  with  describing  the  phenomena  as  he  finds 
them,  leaving  to  others  the  guess  work  by  which  apparent  breaks  in 
experience  are  bridged  over,  that  is,  the  hypothesis  of  supernatural 
interference  and  the  "scientific"  hypothesis  of  unconscious  activity 
and  others. 


480  REVIEWS 

"I  cannot  help  thinking  that  it  would  ultimately  lead  to  great 
disappointment,  if  not  to  positive  scepticism,  if  we  should  sanguinely 
expect,  as  I  fear  many  cultured  religious  people  have  been  led  to 
expect,  that  the  psychological  study  of  religion  can  demonstrate  any 
of  the  truths  of  theology.  And  equally  misleading  does  it  seem  to 
me  to  suppose,  as  some  leading  ' functional'  psychologists  seem 
to  do,  that  the  psychology  of  religion  can  ever  so  develop  as  to  be  in 
any  sense  a  substitute  for  philosophy  or  theology."  Psychology 
"must  content  itself  with  a  description  of  human  experience,  while 
recognizing  that  there  may  be  spheres  of  reality  to  which  these  expe- 
riences refer  and  with  which  they  are  possibly  connected,  which  yet 
cannot  be  investigated  by  science." 

There  is  not  space  here  for  a  critical  discussion  of  Professor  Pratt's 
position.  I  may  however  be  allowed  to  refer  to  my  treatment  of 
certain  aspects  of  this  problem  on  pages  244—261  of  my  book  A 
Psychological  Study  of  Religion;  its  Origin,  Function  and  Future. 

JAMES  H.  LEUBA 
BRYN  MAWR  COLLEGE 

Zeitschrift  der  Religionspsychologie,  1911.    Vol.  V. 

(1)  Aufgabe  und  Methode  der  Religionspsychologie.  HERMANN  BAUKE. 
Pp.  97-104. 

(2)  Zur  Frage  nach  der  transzendental-psychologischen  Methode  in  der 
Religionswissenschaft.     GEORG  WOBBERMIN.     Pp.  225-234. 

(3)  Religioses    Erkennen    und    Erkenntnistheorie .     K.    A.     BUSCH. 
Pp.  209-218. 

(4)  Grundsdtze    und    Aufgaben    der    Religionspsychologie.     ROLAND 
SCHUTZ.     Pp.  245-263. 

(5)  Das  religionspsychologische  Problem  Zinzendorf.     H.  LEHMANN. 
PP-  327-336. 

(6)  Zur  Psychologie  des  hysterischen  M adonnenkultus .     O.  PFISTER. 
Pp.  263-271. 

(i)  The  first  of  these  papers  is  a  criticism  of  an  address  by  Wobber- 
min.  The  second  is  a  retort  by  the  latter. 

Bauke  defends  the  so-called  "American  school  of  religious  psy- 
chology" against  Wobbermin  who  finds  it  too  exclusively  naturalistic, 
and  who,  in  order  to  make  it  adequate,  would  complete  it  by  the 
addition  of  a  "transzendental-psychologischen  Aufgabe  mit  trans- 
zendental-psychologischer  Methode."  Bauke  holds  that  the  American 
psychologists  have  remained  true  to  the  methods  of  a  strictly  em- 
pirical science  and  believes  that  the  transcendental-psychological 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  LIFE  481 

method  of  Wobbermin  does  not  belong  to  the  psychology  of  religion, 
but  to  theology. 

(2)  In  his  answer  Wobbermin  accuses  Bauke  of  not  having  under- 
stood him.     He  maintains  that  that  which  he  means  by  the  phrase 
which  we  have  quoted  does  not  include  a  "  spekulativ-metaphysische 
Bearbeitung  psychischer  Erscheinungen;"    he  does  not  mean  to  enter 
the  field  of  the  normative  sciences.     The  psychological  analysis  of 
religious  experience  "from  the  point  of  view  of  our  interest  in  truth 
(Wahrheitsinteresse) "  deals  with  the  motives  and  tendencies  which 
are   fundamental  to  the  system  of  religious  thought.      The  tran- 
scendental-psychological  analysis   is   interested  not  in  the  religious 
consciousness  of  particular  individuals  in  its  particular  forms,  not  in 
the  varied  individual  expressions  of  religious  life,  but  in  the  establish- 
ment of  religious  thought  as  a  whole.     "That  is  not  a  purely  empirical 
investigation,  it  is  an  investigation   directed   by    a    problem   tran- 
scendentally  formulated.     Nevertheless,  the    investigation   remains 
within  the  field  of  psychological  analysis.     It  is  therefore  not  norma- 
tive."    Wobbermin  rejects  the  imputation  that  by  his  transcendental- 
psychological  procedure  he  seeks  to  draw  conclusions  regarding  the 
objective  reality  of  the  object  of  religious  belief.     He  believes  that 
theology  should  find  help  in  psychology,  but  that  no  help  can  come  to 
it  from  empirical  psychology  unless  it  be  extended  by  the  method  he 
advocates.     Alone   the  transcendental-psychological  point  of  view 
can  produce  a  body  of  conclusions  useful  to  theology. 

If  Wobbermin  uses  here  "transcendental"  in  the  sense  of  "trans- 
individual,"  he  is  certainly  justified  in  demanding  that  the  psy- 
chologists of  religion  do  not  neglect  that  part  of  the  field  of  religious 
experience.  And  if  this  is  the  conclusion  of  the  whole  matter, 
Bauke  would,  I  think,  offer  no  objection.  But  then  would  not  the 
word  "sociological"  advantageously  replace  "transcendental"? 

(3)  This  is  one  of  the  many  defences  of  religion  against  psychology. 
But  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  is  not  religion  such  as  we  find  it  in  history 
that  is  successfully  defended,  but  a  conception  of  it  which  is  far  from 
corresponding  exactly  to  the  religion  of  those  without  whom  religion 
as  a  social  institution  would  never  have  existed.     Religion  is  con- 
ceived here  as  concerned  with  fundamental  judgments  of  worth  upon 
the  existent,  including  scientific  knowledge.     Religion  is  therefore 
very  far  from  expressing  a  scientific  knowledge  similar  to  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  natural  or  of  the   psychological   sciences.     It  is   con- 
cerned   with    value-judgments,    not   with   the,  establishment  of   a 
system  of  causal  connections.     Religion  moves  in  the  sphere  of  the 


482  REVIEWS 

absolute,  not  in  that  of  the  relative.  Therefore  its  object  is  beyond 
the  reach  of  science. 

The  conceptual  formulation  of  religious  beliefs  is  to  be  considered, 
we  are  told,  as  having  simply  a  symbolic  significance;  they  should  be 
looked  upon  as  poetical  forms.  When  thus  considered,  the  ideas  of 
heaven,  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  of  the  Heavenly  Father  are  removed 
from  the  reach  of  psychological  science. 

Who  would  deny  that  the  Absolute  is  outside  of  the  province  of 
psychology?  But  the  religious  peoples  who  have  made  the  historical 
religions,  believed  not  in  an  Absolute,  but  in  a  personal  God  or  gods 
and  it  is  only  because  they  believed  in  the  reality  of  personal  gods 
that  religions  came  into  existence.  With  the  Absolute  really  con- 
ceived as  an  Absolute,  religions  as  such  have  never  had  anything  to  do. 

(4)  This  paper  considers  the  sources  from  which  the  psychology 
of  religion  can  draw  its  material,  the  task  of  that  science,  and  its 
relation  to  theology. 

(5)  We  have  here  a  part  of  the  polemical  discussions  aroused  by 
the  monograph  of  Dr.  Oskar  Piaster,  Die  Frommigkeit  des  Grafen,  L. 
von  Zinzendorf.     In  that  essay  Zinzendorf  appears  as  having  "sexu- 
alized  piety." 

(6)  This  paper  reports  the  psychoanalysis  of  a  neuropathic  youth. 
It  is  of  no  particular  significance. 

JAMES  H.  LEUBA 
BRYN  MAWR  COLLEGE 

William  James  als  Religionsphilosoph.     K.  A.  BUSCH.     Gottingen: 

Vandenhoeck  &  Ruprecht,  1911.     Pp.  vii  +  88. 

The  author  of  this  monograph  was  a  student  at  the  Harvard 
Divinity  School  during  the  year  1909-1910,  and  there  came  under 
James's  personal  influence, — a  fact  which  probably  suggested  the 
writing  of  the  book  and  seems  certainly  to  have  influenced  its  tone. 
For  though  Dr.  Busch  cannot  agree  with  many  of  James's  conclusions, 
he  shows  throughout  an  intelligent  sympathy  with  them  and  a  real 
understanding  of  James's  spirit.  The  work  is  hardly  to  be  compared 
with  Boutroux's  admirable  little  book  on  James,  yet  it  does  well 
what  it  sets  out  to  do,  namely  to  give  a  systematic  presentation  of 
James's  philosophy  of  religion.  That  there  is  need  for  such  a  work— 
and  not  only  in  Germany  but  here  in  America  as  well — is  of  course 
plain  to  every  reader  of  James.  James  was  no  "systematic  phi- 
losopher" and  his  views  on  religious  subjects  are  scattered  through 
most  of  his  works.  And  for  the  task  of  systematization  in  general 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  RELIGIOUS  LIFE  483 

certainly  no  one  is  better  equipped  than  a  German — especially  if  he 
has  (as  is  the  case  with  Dr.  Busch)  a  sympathetic  appreciation  of  the 
person  systematized.  Any  one  wishing  an  orderly  exposition  of 
James's  attitude  toward  religious  problems  will  find  it  here,  duly  set 
forth  with  nothing  of  importance  omitted  and  with  nothing  out  of 
place,  all  the  way  from  Religions -psychologic  to  the  "  Jamesche  Meta- 
physik." 

JAMES  B.  PRATT 
WILLIAMS  COLLEGE 

The   Idea   of  Feeling   in   Rousseau's   Religious   Philosophy.     A.    C. 

ARMSTRONG.    Arch.  f.  Gesch.  d.  Phil.,  1911,  24,  242-260. 

This  paper  is  an  altogether  admirable  exposition  of  its  subject. 
Its  chief  interest  to  the  psychologist  lies  in  directing  attention  to 
the  variety  of  experiences  that  may  be  included  in  such  terms  as 
"feeling"  and  "heart"  when  appealed  to  for  decision  in  questions 
of  religious  belief.  Thus  Rousseau's  sentiment  interieur,  the  source 
of  confident  assurance,  is  shown  to  include  logical  as  well  as  affective 
elements,  to  denote  self-consciousness  and  the  intuition  of  principles 
and,  again,  desire,  emotion,  aspiration  and  the  appreciation  of  ideal 
values.  Rousseau  himself  seems  to  have  been  prevented  by  the 
bent  of  his  genius  from  having  any  conception  of  this  variety;  he 
certainly  contributes  nothing  directly  to  elucidate  it.  By  his  em- 
phasis on  the  affective  side  of  our  nature  as  over  against  the  "analytic 
understanding"  he  powerfully  influenced  not  only  the  constructive 
philosophy,  but  also  the  psychology  of  feeling  and  emotion  in  the 
eighteenth  century,  and  his  observations,  particularly  his  self- 
revelations,  still  furnish  rich  material  for  psychological  study.  But  he 
was  too  little  of  a  systematic  thinker  and  too  lacking  in  scientific 
interest  to  solve  the  problems  involved  in  the  movement  he  in- 
augurated. 

H.  N.  GARDINER 
SMITH  COLLEGE 


BOOKS  RECEIVED  DURING  NOVEMBER 

SCHOPENHAUER,  A.  Essai  sur  les  apparitions  et  opuscules  divers. 
(Traduction  francaise par  Auguste Dietrich.)  Paris:  Alcan,  1912. 

Pp.  201. 

MARTIN,  E.  G.  The  Measurement  of  Induction  Shocks.  New  York: 
Wiley  and  Sons,  1912.  Pp.  vii  +  ny. 

Bulletin  No.  4  of  the  Government  Hospital  for  the  Insane.  Wash- 
ington: Government  Printing  Office,  1912.  Pp.  94. 

DESSOIR,  M.  Outlines  of  the  History  of  Psychology.  (Translated  by 
FISHER,  D.)  New  York:  Macmillan,  1912.  Pp.  xxix  +  2y8. 
$1.60. 

MARVIN,  W.  T.  A  First  Book  in  Metaphysics.  New  York:  Marvin, 
1912.  Pp.  xiv  +  27i.  $1.50. 

WUNDT,W.  An  Introduction  to  Psychology.  (Translated  by  PINTNER, 
R.)  New  York:  Macmillan,  1912.  Pp.  xi  -f  198.  $0.90. 

MEISSNER,  S.  R.  DE.  There  are  No  Dead.  Boston:  Sherman,  French 
&  Co.,  1912.  Pp.  116.  $1.00 

SCRIPTURE,  E.  W.  Stuttering  and  Lisping.  New  York:  Macmillan, 
1912.  Pp.  xiv+251.  $1.50. 

BRETT,  G.  S.  A  History  of  Psychology,  Ancient  and  Patristic. 
London:  George  Allen  &  Co.,  1912.  Pp.  xx-f  388.  $2.75. 

RENOUVIER,  C.  Traite  de  logique  generate  et  de  logique  formelle.  2 
vols.  Paris:  Lib.  A.  Colin,  1912.  Pp.  ix+  397,  386.  8  fr. 

McEwEN,  J.  B.  The  Thought  in  Music.  New  York:  Macmillan, 
1912.  Pp.  viii  +  233.  $1.25  net. 

AVELING,  F.  The  Consciousness  of  the  Universal.  London:  Mac- 
millan, 1912.  Pp.  x  +  255.  5/  net. 

KUHLMANN,  F.  A  Revision  of  the  Binet-Simon  System  for  Measuring 
the  Intelligence  of  Children.  (No.  I  of  the  Monograph  Supple- 
ments of  the  Journal  of  Psycho- A  sthenics)  Faribault,  Minn.: 
Minnesota  School  for  Feeble-Minded  and  Colony  for  Epileptics, 
1912.  Pp.  41.  ii  Plates. 
484 


SUPPLEMENTARY  BOOK-LIST 

DUSSAUZE,  H.  Les  regies  esthetiques  et  les  lois  du  sentiment.  Paris: 
Alcan,  1911.  Pp.  541. 

HOCHFELD,  S.  Das  Kunstlerische  in  der  Sprache  Schopenhauers. 
Leipzig:  Barth,  1912.  Rp.  xi  +  170.  M.  5  . 

LATOUR,  M.  Premiers  principes  (Tune  theorie  generate  des  emotions. 
Paris:  Alcan,  1912.  Pp.  300.  3  fr.  50. 

LEVY-SUHL,  M.  Ueber  experimented  Beeinflussung  des  Forstellungs- 
verlauf  bei  Geisteskranken.  Leipzig:  Barth,  1911.  Pp.  vi  +  142. 

MUNSTERBERG,  H.  Psychologie  und  Wirtschaftsleben.  Leipzig: 
Barth,  1912.  Pp.  viii  +  192.  M.  2.80. 

OssiP-LouRiE.     Le  langage  et  la   verbomanie.     Paris:  Alcan,  1912. 

PP.  275. 

RANSCHBURG,  P.  Das  kranke  Geddchtnis.  Leipzig:  Barth,  1911. 
Pp.  ix+  138. 

SCHMIED-KOWARZIK,  W.  Umriss  einer  neuen  analytischen  Psy- 
chologie. Leipzig:  Barth,  1912.  Pp.  vi  +  318.  M.  7. 

SCHNEIDER,  K.  C.  Tierpsychologisches  Praktikum  in  Dialogform. 
Leipzig:  Veit,  1912.  Pp.  719. 

SIMPSON,  B.  R.  Correlations  of  Mental  Abilities.  (Contributions 
to  Education,  No.  53.)  New  York:  Teachers  College,  1912. 
Pp.  122.  #1.00. 

TAYLOR,  D.  The  Composition  of  Matter  and  the  Evolution  of  Mind. 
London:  Walter  Scott,  1912.  Pp.  176. 

TONNIES,  F.     Thomas  Hobbes.     Der  Mann  und  der  Denker.    (2.  erw. 

Aufl.  der  Schrift  "  Hobbes  Leben  u.  Lehre.")      Osterwieck-Harz 

u.  Leipzig:  Zickfeld,  1912.     Pp.  xvi  +  249.     M.  4. 
Traite  international  de  psychologie  pathologique.      Paris:  Alcan,  1912. 

Pp.  vii  +  1086. 
Anales  de  psicologia.     Trabajos  del  ano  1910.     Buenos  Aires :  "  La 

Semana  Medica,"  1911.     Pp.  359- 

485 


NOTES  AND  NEWS 

DR.  C.  E.  FERREE,  of  Bryn  Mawr  College,  is  one  of  the  members 
of  the  Sub-committee  on  the  Hygiene  of  the  Eye,  of  the  American 
Medical  Association,  the  object  of  which  is  to  study  the  effect  of 
different  kinds  of  lighting  systems  on  the  eye,  with  the  purpose 
of  conserving  vision.  The  work  done  by  Dr.  Ferree  during  the 
past  year,  under  the  auspices  of  this  committee,  was  reported  in  a 
paper  read  by  him  at  the  convention  of  the  Illuminating  Engineer- 
ing Society  held  at  Niagara  Falls  on  September  17,  and  again  before 
the  Philadelphia  Section  of  this  Society,  on  October  18. 

DR.  J.  E.  W.  WALLIN,  Director  of  the  Psychological  Clinic  in  the 
University  of  Pittsburgh,  has  been  appointed  R.  B.  Mellon  Fellow 
in  the  division  of  smoke  investigation  in  the  department  of  industrial 
research  of  the  university,  with  the  immediate  duties  of  making  a  pre- 
liminary survey  of  the  literature  bearing  on  the  psychology  of  smoke, 
and  of  outlining  a  plan  of  investigation  in  this  field.  Owing  to  the  lack 
of  bibliographies  bearing  on  this  topic,  he  will  be  pleased  to  receive 
statements  from  any  one  who  has  made  observations  on  the  mental 
influences  of  smoke,  or  who  is  in  a  position  to  supply  references. 

THE  New  York  Branch  of  the  American  Psychological  Association 
met  in  conjunction  with  the  Section  of  Anthropology  and  Psychology 
of  the  New  York  Academy  of  Sciences  on  November  25.  The  follow- 
ing papers  were  read:  "Difference-Tones  and  Consonance,"  by 
Professor  F.  Krueger,  Professor  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology, 
University  of  Halle-Wittenberg,  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Professor  in  Co- 
lumbia University;  "The  Attempt  to  Measure  Mental  Work  as 
a  Psycho-Dynamic  Process,"  by  Professor  Raymond  Dodge,  of 
Wesleyan  University;  "The  Psychology  of  the  Earthworm,"  by 
Professor  Robert  M.  Yerkes,  of  Harvard  University. 

ON  November  1 1,  Dr.  H.  L.  Hollingworth,  of  Columbia  University, 
read  a  paper  on  "The  Relation  of  Psychology  to  Medicine  and 
Law"  at  a  meeting  of  the  Society  of  Medical  Jurisprudence. 

THE  twenty-first  annual  meeting  of  the  American  Psychological 
Association  will  be  held  at  Western  Reserve  University,  Cleveland, 
on  Monday,  Tuesday,  and  Wednesday,  December  30  and  31,  and 
January  I. 

THE  present   number   of  the  BULLETIN,  dealing  especially  with 
social    and    religious    psychology,    has    been   prepared    under   the 
editorial  care  of  Professor  G.  H.  Mead 
486 


INDEX  OF  NAMES 


Names  of  contributors  are  printed  in  SMALL  CAPITALS,  and  the  page  numbers 
of  the  contributions  in  Full  Face  Type.  In  the  case  of  authors  reviewed  or  sum- 
marized the  page  numbers  are  in  Italics  and  in  the  case  of  mention  in  the  notes  and 
book  lists  they  are  in  Roman  Type. 


ABBOTT,  E.,  68,  3 13 

Abelson,  A.  R.,  220,  230 

Abramowski,  E.,  24,  192,  334 

Ach,  N.,  370 

Acher,  R.,  274 

Adler,  A.,  39 

Alexander,  G.,  178 

Alexander,  S.,  341,  413 

Allard,  299 

D'Allonnes,  G.  R.,  196 

Alrutz,  S.,  334 

AMES,  E.  S.,  465 

Anderson,  B.  M.,  Jr.,  263 

Andre,  E.  L.,  399 

Angell,  J.  R.,  9,  94,  220,  275,  341 

ANGIER,  R.  P.,  173,  255 

Ankermann,  B.,j/p 

Anstruther-Thompson,  C.,  207,  430 

Aptekmann,  E.,  435 

Armstrong,  A.  C.,  483 

Arps,  G.  F.,  407 

Assagioli,  R.,  96 

Auerbach,  F.,  19,  248 

Aveling,  F.,  334,  484 

Ayres,  L.  P.,  167,  220, 347,  396 

Baade,  W.,  268 
Baglioni,  S.,  178 
BAIRD,  J.  W.,  321 
Baker,  S.,  192 
Baldwin,  B.  T.,  128,  230 
Baldwin,  J.  M.,  93,  208,  263 
Banks,  N.,  299 
Barany,  K.,  178 
Barnholt,  S.  E.,  178 
Barrett,  E.  B.,  93,  413 
Easier,  A.,  199,  253 
Bateson,  W.,  115 
Bauer,  V.,  705 
Bauke,  H.,  480 
Bawden,  H.  H.,  24 
Bean,  C.  H.,  207 
Becher,  E.,  19 
Bechterew,  W.,  347 
Becker,  W.  H.,  153 
Behr,  C.,  106 
Bell,  J.  C.,  370 


Bell,  Julia,  230,  280 

BENTLEY,  M.,  97,  178,  407 

Benussi,  V.,  253,  260 

Bergson,  H.,  19,  93,354 

Bernard,  L.  L.,  413 

Betz,  W.,  220,  230, 334, 342 

Binet,  A.,  9,  167,  168,  192, 334,  358 

BlNGHAM,  W.  V.,  40,  41,  2O8,  347 

Blan,  L.  ^.,396 

Bleuler,  E.,  169,  274 

Bliss,  D.  C.,  221 

Blondel,  A.,  214 

Boas,  F.,  379,  389,  404 

Bobertag,  O.,  9,  168 

Bock,  C.  P.,  408 

Bode,  B.  H.,  19,  24 

Boden,  F.,  128 

Bogardus,  E.  S.,  420 

Bohn,  G.,  288,  289 

BOLTON,  T.  L.,  404 

Boodin,  J.  E.,  342 

BOOK,  W.  F.,  30, 34,  407 

BORING,  E.  G.,  60 

Bosanquet,  B.,  128,  263 

Botezat,  E.,  98 

Botti,  M.,  93 

Boutroux,  E.,  12 

Bowne,  B.  P.,  279 

Boyce,  A.  C.,  230 

Brandeis,  L.  D.,  396 

Braunhausen,  N.,  9 

Breed,  F.  S.,  312 

Breitwieser,  J.  V.,  234 

Brett,  G.  S.,  484 

Brewer,  J.  M.,  199 

Bridou,  V.,  192 

Brill,  A.  A.,  274 

Briot,  A.,  19 

BROWN,  WARNER,  199,  361,  431 

Brown,  Wm.,  125,  192,  199,  214,  221,370 

Browne,  C.  A.,  396 

Bruce,  H.  A.,  274 

Briichner,  A.,  106,  112 

BRUNER,  F.  G.,  380 

BUCHNER,  E.  F.,  i 

Biihler,  K.,  334 

Burgess,  A.  F.,  299 

487 


488 


INDEX  OF  NAMES 


BURROW,  T.,  76,  154,  274 
Busch,  A.,  153, 196 
Busch,  K.  A.,  480,  482 
Busemann,  A.,  230,  334, 370 
Bushnell,  D.  J.,  Jr.,  389 
Busse,  A.,  94 

Caldecott,  A.,  192 

CALKINS,  M.  W.,  24,  25,  439 

Calvert,  P.  P.,  299 

CANNON,  W.  B.,  73, 185 

Carpenter,  F.  W.,  288 

CARR,  H.,  257 

Castle,  W.  E.,  116 

Cattell,  J.  McK.,  96, 370, 396 

Chabrier,  192 

Chambers,  W.  G.,  370 

CHAMBERLAIN,  A.  F.,  95,  473,  477 

Chapin,  M.  W.,  370 

CHASE,  H.  W.,  20,  24 

Chaveau,  A.,  253 

Chidester,  F.  E.,  288 

Childs,  H.  G.,  168 

Chinaglia,  L.,  257 

Chojecki,  A.,  271 

Claparede,  E.,  36,  192, 334 

Clark,  D.,  186 

Clarke,  H.  M.,  34, 334 

Cohn,  J.,  230, 370 

Cohn,  M.,  19 

COLE,  L.  W.,  84 

Colvin,  S.  S.,  280, 335 

Cook,  H.  D.,  257 

COOLEY,  C.  H.,  441 

Copeland,  M.,  3 12 

Coriat,  I.  H.,  193 

Cornetz,  V.,  299 

Cory,  E.  N.,  299 

Cotlarciuc,  N.,  19 

Courtis,  S.  A.,  227, 396 

Cowles,  R.  P.,  288 

Craig,  W.,J72 

Cramaussel,  Ed,  39 

CRANE,  H.  W.,  451 

Crawford,  D.,  186 

Crehore,  A.  C.,  235 

Cruchet,  R.,  178 

Culler,  A.  J.,  439 

Cummmgs,  B.  F.,  312 

Curtis,  W.  C,  289 

Cushman,  H.  E.,  12 

Cutten,  C.  B.,  274 

Dana,  C.  L.,  178 

Da  Rocha,  F.,  389 

Dauber,  J,jj5,j7j 

Davenport,  C.  B.,  116, 396 

Dawson,  J.,  128,  228 

DAY,  L.  M.,  60 

DEARBORN,  G.  V.  N.,  73,  196,  413 

Dearborn,  W.  F.,  360 


Decroly,  O.,  168 

Degand,  J.,  168 

DELABARRE,  E.  B.,  409 

DELACROIX,  H.,  470 

De  Sanctis,  S.,  96,  221, 371 

Descoeudres,  A.,  221,  251 

Desroche,  P.,  214,  288 

Dessoir,  Max,  72,  24,  484 

Deussen,  P.,  358 

Dewey,  J.,  19 

Dieffenbacher,  J.,  230,  370 

D'Istria,  F.  C,  19 

DODGE,  R.,  24,  62,  72,  214,  486 

Doflein,  F.,  288,  289 

Doll,  E.  A.,  360 

Dolson,  G.  N.,  19 

Doncaster,  L.,  116 

Donley,  J.  E.,  193 

Dorsey,  J.  O.,  207 

DOWNEY,  J.  E.,  62,  181,  248,  342 

Driesch,  H.,  19 

Drozynski,  L.,  185 

Drzewina,  A.,  289 

Dufour,  M.,  106,  253,  254 

DUNLAP,  K.,  35,  106,  197,  ipp,  207,  234, 

235 

Dupre,  E.,  123,353 
Durkheim,  E.,  263 

Eastman,  C.  A.,  389 
Edridge-Green,  F.  W.,  112 
Elliot,  H.  S.  R.,  248 
Ellis,  H.,  40 
Ellwood,  C.  A.,  461 
Elsenhaus,  T.,  371,  439 
Emerson,  H.,  396 
Enslin,  E.,  299 
Erler,  O.,  231 
Escherich,  K.  v.,  299 
Euken,  R.,  93 
Eulenbiirg,  A.,  93 
Ewald,  J.  R.,  123 
Exner,  S.,  371 

Fay,E.W.,j5J 

Feis,  O.,  371 

FERNALD,  G.  G.,  78 

Fernald,  G.  M.,  221 

Fernberger,  S.  W.,  440 

FERREE,  C.  E.,  70,  106,  107,  440,  486 

Feuchtwanger,  A.,  335,  371 

Fichte,  J.  C.,  94 

Field,  G.  C.,  413 

Fischer,  A.,  335,  371 

FISCHER,  S.  C.,  321 

Fite,  W.,  24 

Fletcher,  J.  M.,  408 

Flournoy,  Th.,  276 

Forbes,  A.,  154,  186 

Forsyth,  C.  H.,  231 

FOSTER,  W.  S.,  321,  335 


INDEX  OF  NAMES 


489 


Foucault,  M.,  335 

Foy,  W.,    379 

Franchim,  G.,  ig6 

Francia,  G.,  192 

Franken,  A.,  7p,  268 

FRANZ,  S.  I.,  47,  89,  98,  145,  153,  425 

Frazer,  J.  G.,  431 

FREEMAN,  F.  N.,  215,  221,347 

Freire-Marreco,  B.,  389 

Freud,  Sig.,  40,  208,  274 

Frey,  H.,  123 

Frey,  M.  v.,  178,  257 

Friedlander,  A.,  178 

Friedmann,  M.,  93,  192 

Frink,  H.  W.,  274 

Frisch,  K.  v.,  312 

Fuchs,  F.,  299 

Fursac,  J.  R.  de,  192 

Gallinger,  A.,  279 

GAMBLE,  E.  A.  McC,  86 

Gantt,  H.  L.,  396 

GARDINER,  H.  N.,  186,  354,  483 

Gault,  R.  H.,  408 

Gaultier,  P.,  19 

Geiger,  M.,  192 

Geissler,  L.  R.,  36,  360 

Giesswein,  353 

Gifford,  E.  G.,  221 

Gilby,  W.  H.,  227,  231 

Gildmeister,  M.,  199 

Gillett,  M.  S.,  263 

Girault,  A.  A.,  299 

Givens,  A.  J.,  280 

Glaser,  O.  C,  371 

Glover,  J.,  353 

Glueck,  B.,  453 

GODDARD,  H.  H.,  p,  79,  81, 168,  227, 396, 

407 

Goebel,  123 

GOLDENWEISER,  A.  A.,  373,  454 
Goldmark,  J.,  396 
Goodell,  M.  S.,  186 
GORDON,  KATE,  430 
GORE,  W.  C,  337 
Goring,  H.,  153 
Graebner,  F.,  379 
Grassi,  L,  196,  234 
Gregor,  A.,  154 
Grinnell,  G.  B.,  389 
Groos,  K.,  19 
Gulick,  L.  H.,  221 
Giinther,  F.,  234 
Gutzmann,  H.,  353 

Hack,  V.,  407 

HAGGERTY,  M.  E.,  52,  280, 312 

Haines,  T.  H.,  440 

Hall,  G.  S.,  95,  477 

Hamilton,  G.  V.,  9 

Hardy,  A.  A.,  299 


Hargitt,  C.  W.,  289, 312 

Harper,  E.  H.,  289 

Hart,  B.,  24,  25,  231 

Hartenberg,  P.,  207 

Haseman,  J.  D.,  289 

Haycraft,  J.  B.,  112 

Hayes,  E.  C,  379,  396 

HAYES,  S.  P.,  95,  112,  116 

Healy,  W.,  221,  453 

Heindl,  R.,  268    ' 

Heller,  T.,  439 

Henderson,  E.  N.,  192, 335 

HENMON,  V.  A.  C.,  85,  232,  239 

Hennig,  R.,  279 

Henry,  C.,  7p,  214,  335 

Henry,  M.  C.,  94 

Hermann,  L.,  123,  353 

Herms,  W.  B.,  299 

Heron,  D.,  231 

HERRICK,  C.  J.,  50 

Herrick,  F.  H.,  312 

Herrick,  G.  W.,  299 

Hertz,  A.  F.,  179 

Heymans,  G.,  371 

Hill,  D.  S.,  24 

Hill,  Mrs.  D.  S.,  24 

Hill,  H.  F.,  227 

Hill,  M.  D.,  200 
Hinds,  W.  E.,  299 
Hinrichsen,  O.,  371 
Hirschel,  G.,  423 
HOCH,  A.,  169 
Hocking,  W.  E.,  279,  472 
Hodge,  F.  A.,  207 
Hoffding,  H.,  439 
Hofmann,  F.  B.,  260 
Hoge,  M.  A.,  312 

HOLLINGWORTH,   H.    L.,   p,    78,    204,    248, 

335, 396,  408,  420,  423,  424,  486 
Holmes,  A.,  208 

HOLMES,  S.  J.,  93,  289,  314,  318 
HOLT,  E.  B.,  276 
Hornbostel,  E.  v.,  72J 
Home,  H.  H.,  128,  413 
Horner,  770 
Hrdlicka,  A.,  407 
Huber,  E.  335,  371 
HUEY,  E.  B.,  63,  95,  160,  168,  221 
Hunter,  W.  S.,  372 
Hurwitz,  S.  H.,  289 
Huther,  A.,  371 

Isserlin,  M.,  423 

Jacobson,  E.,  24,  34,  196,  214,  335,  342, 

423 

[acoby,  G.  W.,  277 
faensch,  E.  R.,  254 
fames,  W.,  279 
Janet,  P.,  24 
fastrow,  J.,  25,  359,  371 


490 


INDEX  OF  NAMES 


'esinghaus,  C.,  JJ5,  J42 

'essup,  W.  A.,  408 

oachim,  H.  H.,  Jp2 
Johnson,  G.  H.,  396 
JOHNSON,  H.  M.,  59,  271,  280 
Johnston,  C.  H.,  207 
Johnston,  K.  L.,  168 

ONES,  E.,  40,  75,  /p2,  271,  274,  407 

ones,  E.  E.  C.,  J42 

[ones,  R.,  371 

[ones,W.F.,J7' 

osefovici,  U.,  371 
Joseph,  H.  W.  B.,  ip 
Joteyko,J.,JJ5 
JUDD,  C.  H.,  24,  51 
Jung,  C.  G.,  40 

Kafka,  G.,  30 
Kakise,  H.,  335 
Kalischer,  O.,  98 
Kallen,  H.  M.,  263 
KARLSON,  K.  J.,  321 
Katz,  D.,  106 
Katzaroff,  D.,  335 
Katzenstein,  J.,  353 
Kemmerich,  M.,  407,  4$? 
Kennedy,  R.  F.,  /7p 
Kent,  G.  H.,  154, 335 
Kerschensteiner,  G.,  371 
Keyes,CH.,jp<5 
Keyser,  C.J.,J42,J7i 
Kiernan,  J.  G.,  396 
Kiesow,  F.,  /7p 
Kilian,  K.,  754 
King,  L,  263,  359 
Kirkpatrick,  E.  A.,  221,  440 
Klages,  L.,  371 
Klein,  A.,  342 
Klemm,  O.,  12 
Klepper,  G.,  754 
Knab,  F.,  2pp 
Koffka,  K.,  335 
Kohnstamm,  0.,  413 
Kollner,  H.,  116 
Kostyleff,  N.,  p,  274,  413 
Kroeber,  A.  L.,  379 
Kronfeld,  A.,  274 
Krueger,  F.,  486 
Kuhlmann,  F.,  168,  484 
Kunz,  M.,  /7P 


Ladd,  G.  T.,  p,  ip,  239 

Landry,  E.,  jpp 

LANGFELD^  H.  S.,  99,  242,  275, 335,  423 

Lasareff,  P.,  214 

Lawrence,  L,  168 

Lee,  V.,  207,  430 

Lefevre,  G.,  289 

Lehmann,  H.,  480 

Lelande,  A.,  35 

LeRoy,  B.,  40 


Leschke,  E.,  186,  420 

LEUBA,  J.  H.,  439,  472,  473 .  476,  477 

Levi,  A.,  207 

Levy-Bruhl,  L.,  12 

Levy-Suhl,  M.,  24, 335, 371 

Lewis,  E.  O.,  260 

Ley,  335 

Liebermann,  M.  E.,  116 

Liebermann,  P.  v.,  106,  116 

Lipmann,  O.,  231,  268,  269, 335, 371, 372 

Lloyd,A.H.,j42 

Lobsien,  M.,  231, 335, 372 

Loeb,J.,j/2,  358 

Loeb,  S.,  106, 335 

LOUGH,  J.  E.,  87 

Lovejoy,  A.  O.,  19 

Lovell,  J.  H.,  2pp 

Low,  A.  M.,  jpp 

Lowsley,  O.  S.,  415 

Lozinski,  P.,  2pp 

Luckiesh,  M.,  106 

Ludemann,  H.,  263 

Liidtke,  F.,  196 

Lund,  E.  J.,  2pp 

LYON,  D.  O.,  86 

MacDougall,  R.,  271,  413 

Mach,  E.,  98 

Mackenzie,  I.  S.,  ip 

Mackenzie,  W.  L.,  24 

MacVannel,  J.  A.,  128 

Maday,  S.  v.,  312 

MAGNUSSON,  C.  E.,  71 

Maloney,  W.  J.,  179,  221 

Mampell,  H.,  254 

Marage,  M.,  353 

Marbe,  K.,  101,  359 

Margis,  P.,  p,  221,  372 

Marie,  A.,  234,  235 

MARSHALL,  H.  R.,  49 

MARTIN,  L.  J.,  p,  61,  208, 335,  439 

Martius,  G.,  20 

Marvin,  W.  T.,  221,  484 

Marx,  E.,  116 

MAST,  S.  O.,  56,  289 

Matula,  J.,  2#p 

Mauge,  F.,  263 

McCabe,  J.,  24 

McClendon,  J.  F.,  2#p 

McComas,  H.  C.,  196 

McDermott,  F.  A.,  2pp 

McDonald,  J.  B.,  221 

McDougall,  W.,  93,  254,  360 

McDunnough,  J.,  2pp 

McEwen,  J.  B.,  484 

McGilvary,  E.  B.,  20,  24 

Mead,  G.  H.,  486 

Meara,  F.  S.,  235 

Medeiros-e-Albuquerque,  181 

Meinong,  A.,  263 

Meissner,  S.  R.  de,  484 


INDEX  OF  NAMES 


491 


Menzerath,  335 

Metalnikow,  S.,  289 

Meumann,  E.,  p,  168,  221,  336, 372 

Meunier,  P.,  40 

MEYER,  A.,  89,  129,  208 

Meyer,  E.  A.,  353 

Meyer,  H.,  34 

Meyer,  J.,  353 

Meyerson,  E.,  207 

Michaelis,  C.,  35 

Michotte,  A.,  p 

Miller,  D.  S.,  20,  24 

MINER,  J.  B.,  222 

Minkowski,  E.,  98 

Minor,  L.,  i/p 

Mitchell,  A.,  20 

Mitchell,  C.,  24 

Mitchell,  J.  F.,  179 

Moede,  W.,  336, 342 

Moll,  A.,  358 

Monnet,  R.,  254 

Moore,  T.  V.,  34 

Morgan,  C.  L.,  439 

Morse,  J.,  477 

Morselli,  E.,  96 

Mosiman,  E.,  358,  469 

Moulinier,  178 

Mount,  G.  H.,  208 

Muench,  W.,  372 

Miiller,  G.  £.,336 

Miiller-Freienfels,  R.,  24 

MUNSELL,  A.  H.,  68 

Miinsterberg,  H.,  25,  95,  221,  372 

MURRAY,  E.,  64 

Myers,  C.  S.,  p,  181,  221,  242 

Nachmann,  L.,  234,  235 
Nacke,  P.,  347 
Nathan,  E.  W.,  154 
Nathan,  M.,  123, 353 
Neil,  T.  F.,  94 
Nepalleck,  R.,  274 
Neumann,  A.,  179 
Norsworthy,  N.,  231 

Odum,  H.  W.,  389 

Oehler,  R.,  94 

Oesterreich,  K.,  20,  25,  30 

Offner,  M.,  336 

OGDEN,  R.  M.,  40,  116,  200,542 

'Okabe,T.,j4 
Oppenheim,  H.,  179 
Oppenheim,  R.,  269 
Ordahl,  L.  E.,  25,  336 
O'Shea,  M.  V.,  jpd 

OVERSTREET,  H.  A.,   1$ 

PACHEU,  J.,  468,  469,  4?o 

Palmer,  G.  H.,  413 
Panconcelli-Calzia,  G.,  353 
PARKER,  G.  H.,  55,  289,  312 


Parrott,  R.  J.,  300 
Parshley,  H.  M.,  2<?p 
Partridge,  G.  E.,  279 
Patini,  E.,  25,  289 
Patterson,  T.  L.,  300 
Pauli,  R.,  /pp 
Paz,  D.  de  la,  185 
Pear,  T.  H.,  123 
Pearce,  H.  J.,  40 
PEARSE,  A.  S.,  281 
Pearson,  H.  C.,  221 
Pearson,  K.,  221,  231 
Perez,  J.,  300 
Perrier,  L.,  207 
PERRIN,  F.  A.  C,  61 
Perry,  R.  B.,  264 
Peters,  W.,^,  359 
PETERSON,  J.,  65 
Pfenninger,  W.,  435 
Pfister,  O.,  480 
Pfordten,  O.  v.  d.,  264 
Picavet,  F.,  472 
Pick,  A.,  112 

Pielke,W.,J5J 

PIERCE,  A.  H.,  179 

Pieron,  H.,  10,  260,  289, 336,  359 

Pigeon,  L.,  254 

Pike,  F.  H.,  415 

Pikler,  J.,  25 

Pilcher,  V.  D.,  415 

PlLLSBURY,  W.  B.,  9,  193,  221,  280, 

Pilotti,  G.,  178 
Pintner,  R.,  408 
Piaut,  F.,  155 

POFFENBERGER,  A.  T.,  Jr.,  4OO,  439 

Poirot,  J.,  353 

Pollak,H.W.,J5J 
Ponzo,  M.,  255,  254,  257,  260 
Poppelreuter,  W.,  254 
Pouget,  R.  J.,  255 
Pradines,  M.,  413 
Prager,  J.  J.,  196 
Prandtl,  A.,  186 
PRATT,  J.  B.,  472,  477.  482 
Prince,  M.,  25,  40,  193,  359 
Prowazek,  S.  v.,  289 
Priim,  E.,  9 
Punnett,  R.  C,  116 
Putnam,  J.  J.,  ipj,  274 
Pyle,W.  H.,  248,336 

Quick,  O.  C.,  264 

Raimann,  E.,  423 
RALL,  E.  E.,  88 
Rand,  B.,  248 
Rand,  M.  G.,  106 
Rank,  O.,  40,  208,  274 
Ranschburg,  P.,  154, 336 
Read,  C.,J42 
Read,  M.  S.,  360 


492 


INDEX  OF  NAMES 


Reese,  A.  M.,  3 12 
Reeves,  P.,  408 
Regnault,  F.,  254 
Rehmke,  J.,  192 
Rehwoldt,  F.,  186 
Reichel,  H.,  269 
Reid,  G.  A.,  372 
Reimer,  W.,  214 
Renouvier,  C,  484 
Revesz,  G.,  106 
Rey,  J.,  214 
Ribot,  Th.,  25 
Rice,  D.  E.,  207 
Richards,  R.  L.,  453 
Richardson,  W.  W.,  453 
Rickert,  H.,  264 
Rignano,  E.,  196,  248 

RlLEY,  I.  W.,  10 

Ritter,  C.,  420 
Rivers,  W.  H.  R.,  379 
Robinson,  V.,  358,  423 
Rockwell,  R.  B.,  312 
Rosanoff,  A.  J.,  154 
Roubaud,  E.,  300 
Roustan,  D.,  93 
Rowe,  E.  C.,  413 
ROWLAND,  E.  H.,  80 
Royce,  J.,  93 
Rubinstein,  M.,  264 
Rubitsek,  A.,  40 
RUCKMICH,  C.  A.,  247,  321 

RUEDIGER,  W.  C.,  40,  46,  72,  423 

Russell,  B.,  342 
Russell,  J.  E.,  264 

Sachs,  H.,  208 

Safford,  F.  H.,  214 

Salisbury,  423 

Sander,  P.,  123 

Sanford,  E.  C.,  280 

Santschi,  F.,  300 

SAPIR,  E.,  380,  454 

Sargent,  W.,  347 

Sasscer,  E.  R.,  300 

Schaeffer,  A.  A.,  312 

Schaub,  A.  deV.,  336 

Schiller,  F.  C.  S.,  207 

Schlegel,  E.,  20 

Schmid,  B.,  289 

Schmidt,  B.  A.,  260 

Schneider,  S.,  106 

Schnidtmann,  M.,  154 

Schonberg,  A.,  98 

Schramm,  F.,  269 

Schubotz,  F.,  254,  260 

Schuster,  E.,  231 

Schutz,  R.,  480 

Schwartzkopf,  20 

SCOTT,  W.  p    O,,  269,  372, 396,  429 

Scripture,  E.  W.,  484 

SEASHORE,  C.  E.,  9,  47,  168,  221,  235 


Selz,0.,j72 

Severin,  H.  C,  300 

Severin,  H.  H.  P.,  300 

Shambaugh,  G.  E.,  123 

SHEPARD,  J.  F.,  181 

SHEPARD,  W.  T.,  53, 313 

Sherrington,  C.  S.,  415 

Short,  423 

Sichler,  A.,  20 

SIDIS,  B.,  36,  40,  192 

Siebrand,  179 

Simon,  Th.,  9,  167,  168,  358 

Singer,  E.  A.,  Jr.,  10,  20 

Sisson,  E.  O.,  372 

Siven,  V.  O.,  106 

Skinner,  A.,  390 

Sleight,  W.G.,336 

Slonaker,  J.  R.,JIJ 

Smith,  A.  G.,  222 

Smith,  N.  K.,  40 

Snyder,  J.  C.,  336 

Sokolowsky,  R.,  353 

Sollmann,  T.,  415 

SOUTHARD,  E.  E.,  91 

Sowton,  S.  C.  M.,  415 

Sparkman,  C.  F.,  477 

Spaulding,  E.  G.,  40 

Spearman,  C.,  231 

Spidle,  S.,  477 

Starbuck,  E.  D.,  359 

STARCH,  D.,  83,  254,  280, 336,  347 

Steele,  A.  G.,  222 

Stefanescu-Goanga,  F.,  186 

Stefanini,  A.,  J5J 

Stekel,  W.,  40,  453 

Stern,  C.,  269 

Stern,  W.,  94,  23 i,  269,  396 

Sternberg,  W.,  179 

STEVENS,  H.  C.,  69 

Stigler,  R.,  106 

Stocking,  R.  J.,  312 

Stocks,  J.  L.,  413 

Stout,  G.  F.,  20 

STRATTON,  G.  M.,  199,  249,  254,  465 

Strayer,  G.  D.,  222,  396 

STRONG,  E.  K.,  JR.,  66,  124,  429 

Strong,  R.  M.,  313 

Stumpf,  C.,  123,  200,  207,  248, 380 

Sumner,  F.  B.,  313 

Super,  C.W..J5J 

Swanton,  J.  R.,  207,  390 

Swift,  W.B,jij 

Swinton,  A.  A.  C.,  106 

Symes,  W.  L.,  423 

Szymanski,  J.  S.,  98,  300 

TAIT,  W.  D.,  124 
Talayrach,  L,  353 
Talbot,  M.,  397 
Tassy,  E.,  193 
Tawney,  G.  A.,  10,  25 


INDEX  OF  NAMES 


493 


Terman,  L.  M.,  168 

Teslar,  J.  S.  van,  274 

Thilly,  F.,  40 

Thompson,  M.  E.,  347 

Thorndike,  E.  L.,  10,  40,  222,  318,  397, 

420 

Thurnwald,  R.,  380 
Tichy,  G.,  260 

Titchener,  E.  B.,  25,30, 36,  193,  440 
Todd,  J.  W.,  439 
Toulouse,  E.,  10,  424 
Town,  C.  H.,  1 68 
Tromner,  E.,  358 
True,  G.,  473 
Truschel,  255 
Tucker,  A.  W.,  106 
TUFTS,  J.  H.,  461 
TURNER,  C.  H.,  290, 300 
Turner,  W.  F.,  299 

Ulehla,  V.,  289 

URBAN,  F.  M.,  125,  179,  209,  214,  215, 

245 
URBAN,  W.  M.,  260,  280 

Urbantschitsch,  V.,  123,  353 
Urtin,  H.,  93 

Valentine,  C.  W.,  260 
Van  Gennep,  A.,  347 
Van  Sickle,  J.,  397 
Varendonck,  J.,  269 
Veley,  V.  H.,  423 
Verain,  L.,  106 
Villa,  G.,  96 
Void,  J.  M.,  10,  40,  248 
Vos,  H.  B.  L.,  269 

Wager,  H.,  289 

Waite,  H.,  222,  231 

Walker,  C.,  372 

Walker,  H.,  25 

WALLIN,  J.  E.  W.,  81,  94,  154,  168,  208, 

390, 397,  486 
Wallis,  W.  D.,  477 
Warfield,  B.  B.,  476 
Warren,  E.  R.,  313 
WARREN,  H.  C.,  35,  84, 347 


WASHBURN,  M.  F.,  54,  67,  186,  300,  313, 

359,570,438 
Wasteneys,  H.,  312 
Waterman,  G.,  40 
Watson,  J.,  439 
WATSON,  J.  B.,  p,  91,  128,  222 
Watson,  W.,  106 
Watt,H   ].,i93 
Weber,  E.,  420 
WEIDENSALL,  J.,  57 
Weiss,  A.  P.,  222 
Weiss,  O.,  353 
WELD,  H.  P.,  236,  407 
WELLS,  F.  L.,  754, 186,  222, 336,  416,  435 
WELLS,  G.  R.,  68,  127,  360 
Wethlo,  F.,  353 
Weyer,  E.  M.,  25 
Wharton,  W.  P.,  372 
Wheeler,  W.  M,joo 
Whetham,  C.  D.,  397 
Whetham,  W.  C.  D.,jp7 
WHIPPLE,  G.  M.,  754, 168,  264,  280,  360 
Whitley,  M.  T.,  231,372 
WILLIAMS,  T.  A.,  76,  193 
Willis,  C.  A.,  179,  215 
Wilm,  E.  C,  408 
Wilson,  C.  M.,  347 

Winch,  W.  H.,  222, 321, 336, 372, 397, 420 
Wingfield,  H.,  274 
Wirth,  W.,  128,  215,  245 
Witherspoon,  J.,  248 
Wobbermin,  G.,  46*0 
Wodsedalek,  J.  E.,  300 
Woods,  F.  A.,  397 

WOODWORTH,  R.  S.,  p,  95,  I06,  222,  2JI, 

239,  336,  380,  397 
WOOLEY,  H.  T.,  82 
Wundt,  W.,  208,  360, 380,  484 

YERKES,  R.  M.,  9, 10,  20, 30,  50,  54, 106, 
222,  314,  486 

YOAKUM,  C.  S.,  413 

Yule,  G.  U.,  231 
Yung,  E.,  290 

Zergiebel,  M.,  372 
Ziehen,  T.,  95,  179 


INDEX  OF  SUBJECTS 


Abstracts  of  Papers,  47 
Action,  Reflex,  413 
Advertising,  Psychology  of,  124,  204 
^Esthetics,  430 

Affective    Phenomena,     (Experimental), 
1 8 1 ;  (Descriptive  and  Theoretical) ,  1 86 
Animal  Intelligence,  314,  318 
Anthropology,  43 1 
Apparatus,  235,  247 
Applied  Psychology,  124,  204,  264,  429 
Association  Experiment,  435 
Associations,  Meetings  of,  41,  46 
Attention  and  Interest,  193 
Auditory  Space,  254 
Auditory  Stimuli,  Reaction  to,  127 

Bibliographical,  35 

Binet  Scale  of  Tests,  Present  Status  of, 
160 

Consciousness  and  the  Unconscious,  20, 

154 

1  Correction,  438 
Correlations,  222 
Criminal  Psychology,  451 
Cutaneous  Senses,  173 

Dementia  Praecox,  169 
Dreams,  36 

Drug  Action,  Psychological  'Aspects  of, 
420 

Efficiency,  Individual  and  Group,  390 
Experimental  Psychology,  242 

Fatigue,  416 
Folk-Psychology,  373 

Graphic  Functions,  342 

Hearing,  116 

Higher  Mental  Processes,  Analyses  of,  30; 

(Experimental),  321;   (Theory),  337 
Historical  Contributions,  10 

Illusions,  Space,  257 
Imagination,  321 
Individual  Psychology,  390,  424 
Interest,  Attention  and,  193 
Invertebrates,  Behavior  of,  281,  290 

James,  W.,  The  Philosophy  of,  276 
494 


Kinaesthetic  Senses,  173 
Kinsesthetic  Space,  255 

Laughter,  354 
Learning,  321 

Measurements,  Mental,  125 
Measurement  Methods,  Psychophysical, 

209 

Meetings,  Reports  of,  41,  46,  236 
Memory,  321,  337 
Mental  Classes,  361 
Mental  Processes,  Higher,  30,  321,  337 
Mentation,   Conscious   and  Unconscious 

from  Psychoanalytic  Viewpoint,  154 
Mind  and  Body,  13 
Motor  Consciousness,  409 
Music,  Origins  of,  200 

Pathopsychology,  129 

Physiological  Psychology,  239 

Primitive  Races,  380,  400 

Proceedings  of  Meetings,  41,  46,  236 

Psychological  Progress,  I 

Psychology,  Applied,  124,  204,  264,  429; 

Comparative,  281,  290,  300,  314,  318, 

404;  Criminal,  451;  Experimental,  242; 

Folk,    373;        Individual,     390,    424; 

Modern,  Angell's  Chapters  from,  275; 

National    and    Race,    380,    397,    400: 

Physiological,     239;  Progress     of,     i; 

Religious,  465-483;  Social,  441,  454 
Psychopathplogy,  129;  Experimental,  145 
Psychophysics,  209,  245 
Psychotherapy,  271 

Reaction  Times,  127,  232 
Reflex  Action,  413 
Religion,  Psychology  of,  465 
Report,  Psychology  of,  264 
Reports  of  Meetings,  41,  46,  236 
Rhythm,  Time  and,  197 

Self  in  Recent  Psychology,  25 

Sensation  (General),  97 

Senses,  Miscellaneous,  173 

Social  Psychology,  441;  454-465 

Space,    Auditory,    254;    Illusions,    257; 

Tactual  and  Kinsesthetic,  255;  Visual, 

249 

Suggestion,  269 
Synsesthesia,  179 


INDEX  OF  SUBJECTS                                               495 

Tactual  Space,  255  Vertebrates,  Behavior  of,  300 

Terminology,  35  Vision,     Color    Defects,     112;     General 

Testimony,  Psychology  of,  264  Phenomena,    99;  Peripheral,     Foveal, 

Tests,  160,  215  etc.,  107 

Thought  Processes,  30  Visual  Space,  249 

Time  and  Rhythm,  197  Visual  Stimuli,  Reaction  to,  127 

Vocal  Functions,  347 

Values,  260  Volition,  409 


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