•
i f •
I
UNIV.OF
TORONTO
LIBRARY
THE
Psychological Bulletin
EDITED BY
ARTHUR H. PIERCE, SMITH COLLEGE
HOWARD C. WARREN, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY (Index)
JOHN B. WATSON, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY (Review) AMD
JAMES R. ANGELL, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO (Monograph)
WITH THE CO-OPERATION Of
J. W. BAIRD,CLARK UNIVERSITY; MADISON BENTLEY, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS; E. F
BUCHNER, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY- ; H. A. CARR, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO; KNIGHT
DUNLAP, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY ; E. B. HOLT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY ; J. H.
LEUBA, BRYN MAWR COLLEGE; MAX MEYER, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI; ROBERT
MAcDOUGALL, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY ; G. H. MEAD, UNIVERSITY OK CHICAGO ; R. M.
OGDEN, UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE ; W. D. SCOTT, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY ; E.
J. SWIFT, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY; M. F. WASHBURN, VASSAR COLLEGE; R. S.
WOODWORTH, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
VOLUME IX, 1912
Containing the Literature Section of the PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW
PUBLISHED MONTHLY BY THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW COMPANY
NORTH QUEEN ST., LANCASTER, PA.,
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CONTENTS OF VOLUME IX
i
ALPHABETICAL INDEXES OF NAMES AND SUBJECTS WILL BE FOUND
END OF THE VOLUME
ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS, REPORTS GENERAL
REVIEWS AND SUMMARIES
Psychological Progress in 1911: EDWARD FRANKLIN BUCHNER
Historical Contributions: I. WOODBRIDGE RILEY
Mind and Body: H. A. OVERSTREET .
Consciousness and the Unconscious: H. W. CHASE
The Self in Recent Psychology: M. W. CALKINS '.
Analyses of Some of the Higher Thought Processes: W. F. BOOK 30
Terminology: H. C. WARREN 3-
Bibliographical: H. C. WARREN . . * .
Dreams: BORIS SIDIS .... ~£
Report of the Secretary of the American Psychological Associ-
ation: W. V. BINGHAM 4!
Report of the Secretary of the Southern Society for Philosophy
and Psychology: W. C. RUEDIGER 46
Abstracts of Papers 47
Sensation (General): MADISON BENTLEY 97
Vision — General Phenomena: H. S. LANGFELD .... 99
Vision — Peripheral, Foveal, etc.: C. E. FERREE . . . 107
Vision — Color Defects : S.P.HAYES. 112
Hearing: R. M. OGDEN 116
Pathopsychology and Psychopathology : ADOLF MEYER . .129
Experimental Psychopathology: S. I. FRANZ .... 145
Conscious and Unconscious Mentation from the Psychoanalytic
Viewpoint: TRIGANT BURROW .... . 154
The Present Status of the Binet Scale of Tests for the Measure-
ment of Intelligence: E. B. HUEY . • 160
Cutaneous, Kinaesthetic and Miscellaneous Senses: R. P.
ANGIER • 173
Synaesthesia: A. H. PIERCE . • J79
Affective Phenomena— Experimental: J. F. SHEPARD. . 181
111
iv CONTENTS OF VOLUME IX
Affective Phenomena — Descriptive and Theoretical: H. N.
GARDINER 186
Attention and Interest: W. B. PILLSBURY ..... 193
Time and Rhythm: KNIGHT DUNLAP . . . . . 197
Psychophysical Measurement Methods: F. M. URBAN . . 209
Tests: F. N. FREEMAN 215
Correlations: J. B. MINER 222
Reaction Times : V. A. C. HENMON 232
Apparatus: C. E. SEASHORE 235
Report of the Clark Meeting of Experimental Psychologists:
H. P. WELD 236
Visual Space: G. M. STRATTON 249
Auditory Space: DANIEL STARCH 254
Tactual and Kinsesthetic Space: R. P. ANGIER . . . .255
Space Illusions: HARVEY CARR 257
Values: W.M. URBAN 260
Psychology of Testimony and Report: G. M. WHIPPLE . . 264
Suggestion: W. D. SCOTT 269
Psychotherapy: H. M. JOHNSON 271
Recent Literature on the Behavior of the Lower Invertebrates:
A. S. PEARSE 281
Recent Literature on the Behavior of the Higher Invertebrates :
C. H. TURNER 290
Recent Literature on the Behavior of the Vertebrates: MAR-
GARET F. WASHBURN 300
Memory, Imagination, Learning, and the Higher Mental
Processes (Experimental): J. W. BAIRD .... 321
Memory, Concept, Judgment, Logic (Theory): W. C. GORE . 337
Graphic Functions: JUNE E. DOWNEY 342
Vocal Functions: W. V. BINGHAM 347
The Recent Literature of Mental Classes: WARNER BROWN . 361
Folk-Psychology: A. A. GOLDENWEISER 373
The Primitive Races in America: F. G. BRUNER . . .380
Individual and Group Efficiency: J. E. W. WALLIN . . . 390
National Psychology: R. S. WOODWORTH 397
Volition and Motor Consciousness — Theory: E. B. DELABARRE 409
Reflex Action : C. S. YOAKUM 413
Fatigue: F. L. WELLS 416
Psychological Aspects of Drug Action: H. L. HOLLINGWORTH . 420
Valuation as a Social Process: C. H. COOLEY .... 441
Criminal Psychology: H. W. CRANE 451
CONTENTS OF VOLUME IX v
SPECIAL REVIEWS
Psychology of Advertising: W. D. TAIT . 12±
Mental Measurements : F. M. URBAN . 12e
Bleuler's "Dementia Praecox": AUGUST HOCH . . . ifo
The Origins of Music (Stumpf) : R. M. OGDEN . . 2oo
Ladd and Woodworth's Elements of Physiological Psychology:
V. A. C. HENMON 239
Myers' Text-Book of Experimental Psychology: H. S. LANG-
FIELD 242
Wirth's Psychophysik: F. M. URBAN 245
Angell's Chapters from Modern Psychology: H. S. LANGFELD. 275
Flournoy's La Philosophic de William James: E. B. HOLT. . 276
Holmes' The Evolution of Animal Intelligence: R. M. YERKES. 314
Thorndike's Animal Intelligence: Experimental Studies: S. J.
HOLMES 318
Laughter (Bergson): H.N.GARDINER 354
The Study of Primitive Races (Thurnwald, Tschermak, etc.):
A. T. POFFENBERGER, JR 4OO
The Mind of Primitive Man (Boas) : T. L. BOLTON . . 404
Individual Psychology (Toulouse) : H. L. HOLLINGWORTH . . 424
Applied Psychology (Scott) : E. K. STRONG . 429
Esthetics : KATE GORDON . . -43°
Anthropology: WARNER BROWN . 43 l
The Association Experiment: F. L. WELLS . 435
Goldenweiser's Totemism: E. SAPIR . • 454
Ellwood's Sociology in its Psychological Aspects: J. H. TUFTS . 461
Stratton's Psychology of the Religious Life: E. S. AMES . . 465
Kemmerich's Prophezeiungen : J. PACHEU .
Mosiman's Das Zungenreden: J. PACHEU . • 4^9
Pacheu's L'Experience Mystique et 1'Activite Subconsciente
H. DELACROIX .
Hocking's Mysticism as Seen through its Psychology:
PRATT .
Mysticism (Picavet, True): J. H. LEUBA .
Leuba's Origins of the Ideas of Unseen Personal Beings, and
Varieties, Classification, and Origin of Magic
CHAMBERLAIN
Warfield's On Faith in its Psychological Aspects: J I:
Religious Psychology in Current Periodicals: J- H. LEUB
Busch's William James als Religionsph.losoph : J. B. F
vi CONTENTS OF VOLUME IX
Armstrong's The Idea of Feeling in Rousseau's Religious Phi-
losophy: H. N. GARDINER 483
DISCUSSIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE
Reactions to Visual and Auditory Stimuli: G. R. WELLS . .127
The Psychology of Advertising: H. L. HOLLING WORTH . . 204
A Note on Apparatus: C. A. RUCKMICH 247
A Correction: M. F. WASHBURN 438
MISCELLANEOUS
Books Received . . 93, 128, 207, 248, 279, 358, 407, 439, 484
Notes and News . 40, 95, 128, 208, 280, 359, 407, 440, 486
Announcement . 360
Indexes 487
Vol. JX. No. i. T
January 15, J9I2<
THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN
GENERAL REVIEWS AND SUMMARIES
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN 1911
BY PROFESSOR EDWARD FRANKLIN BUCHNER
Johns Hopkins University
The year just closed presented a variety of events and results
which show a steadily increasing vitality in the science of psy-
chology. Wearying of "the patient search and vigil long" in the
quest of the true object of their ceaseless inquiries, some psycholo-
gists would have us modify our intentions by such definition as will
make the object unquestionably clear and certain. The term "con-
sciousness" seems to face the dangers which years ago routed the
terms "soul" and "mind" from our vocabulary. The philosophers,
too, seem so to weight their current problems in terms of realism,
humanism and " Bergsonianism," as to let the metaphysical gravi-
tation of consciousness move it out of the system of the empirical
relations which are of right preempted by and for the scientific
methods of psychology. The focalized expression of this tendency
appeared among American psychologists by whom the use and
meaning of the terms was especially discussed at the Minneapolis
meeting in 1910. In its place it is proposed to substitute the term
"behavior," as is done, for example, by Pillsbury (15) in his defi-
nition of psychology as "the science of human behavior." This
is proposed in the interest of the permanent objectivity of the facts
of the science. The argument of Singer (20) is positive that "con-
sciousness is not something inferred from behavior, it is behavior."
The dangers of an ambiguity in speech, of the elimination of all
introspection and of the study of the psychology of animals, and
the narrowing of experience to a possible single mode of movement
do not seem to be effective as checks in the adoption of the sub-
i
3 EDWARD FRANKLIN BUCHNER
stitute. Tawney (21) is more temperate, but not less deviating,
in his expression of a pedagogically felt need for a reconstructed
science that will develop without serious break into the correlated
disciplines. While "it is all very well to write psychology for the
sake of psychology, and to work steadily under the lead of facts, . . .
we need a psychology of human conduct to supplant the psychology
of consciousness."
In his criticism of psychology as experimental, Kostyleff (7),
upbraids it as lacking system in its methods and objects of research,
presenting too much variety and planlessness in its investigations,
and exhibiting individuals who follow masters rather than attack
fundamental problems. While its measurements and graphs and
laws may be interesting, they cannot become explanations, but
remain only questions. This criticism entirely forgets that scien-
tific experimentation is fruitful because the analysis of any partic-
ular phenomenon is never carried to completion. Progress is possi-
ble only on condition that this is not done. Complete treatment,
in requiring unending time and effort, would preclude all attempt at
hypothesis and explanation. Braunhausen (2) offers as a refuta-
tion of this criticism a brief and richly compacted review of the work
and results of modern psychology.
The first answer to these and similar doubts as to the worth
of psychology is, however, to be found in the revision of Ladd's
Elements of Physiological Psychology, the appearance of which is
the most interesting single event of the year (8). The first edition
of this classic appeared in 1887, and passed through ten reprintings.
That the work is, after nearly a quarter of a century, subject to
such a wide revision as to incorporate the neurone theory, the facts
of the evolution of the brain, and the latest experimental data with-
out losing its original identity, even as to the number of chapters
and pages, is probably the best evidence our literature has given us
of the inner vitality of psychological methods, and the clear per-
spective of the safe direction its researches have been taking. It
presents our best survey of the varied material in the organizing
and reorganizing fund of knowledge which psychology can now
claim as its own. A comparison of the revised edition with the
original shows exactly the advancement in the experimental and
objective character of this knowledge, at once an answer to the
critic and an indication of the progress for which he should be in-
quiring. From these points of view this work becomes historically
more interesting than the famous Grundzuge, the completion of
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN
1911
whose sixth edition was chronicled one year ago. The appearance
of second editions of the manuals by Myers (14) and by Toulouse
and Pieron (23) is further indication of the sufficiency of exact
methods and a welcome sign of the seriousness in English and French
experimental psychology.
The spread of experimental technique over the field of the
thought processes was the most considerable and daring advance
made in the first decade of this century. Now a similar attempt
at controlled introspection is passing over into the field of volun-
tary phenomena, and happily, with a fair degree of assurance that
the results are reliable. Continuing the work begun by Ach and by
Bovet, and reaching results partly agreeing and partly disagreeing
with ^ theirs, Michotte and Prum (13) used reaction methods in
securing their contribution to the descriptive psychology of will.
They aimed to bring out in relief the problems of motivation and
determination. In the final stage of the latter, the observers found
the phenomenon of choice to be a consciousness of doing, but not
as a content alongside of other contents. Now that the initial
difficulties, interposed by logic, ethics, and the earlier conclusions
of psychology precluding these fields, have been overcome, it is hoped
that future progress will not be hindered by the controversial side-
issues of misunderstanding.
The renewed efforts of recent years to make the technique of the
science definitive and applicable in the measurement of individuals,
both in particular processes and as a whole, have been fortunately
advancing towards at least working, if not assured results. The
excellent contribution of Whipple last year is now followed by the
report of the special Committee of the American Psychological
Association (18) and the spreading interest in trying out the Binet-
Simon scale for measuring intelligence and its development. As early
as 1896 the American Psychological Association made its first effort
to standardize mental tests, which did not get beyond the statement
of the general problem. The work of the permanent Committee of
1906, which is ripening slowly, becomes peculiarly serviceable by
bringing the different methods of procedure together in such a way
as to be mutually corrective. A fresh and potent incentive is now
at hand for re-experimentation by psychologists in these newly
charted fields. As if by common consent, the other line of cooperative
work is being done in the sudden spread of interest in the applicability
and validity of the scale of intelligence. Meumann (12), in specifying
the four aims to be realized by these tests, viz. the psychiatric, the
4 EDWARD FRANKLIN BUCHNER
tests to determine the limits of abnormality and the typical intelli-
gence disorders in childhood, tests to analyze the normal adult, and
also normal children, raises as a new problem the question, to what
extent may an individual (especially a child) deviate mentally from
the normal average for a given age and still be normal? Bobertag
(i) has reviewed the work done in 1910. Binet and Simon (3) have
extended and simplified their 1908 order of tests so as to include the
fifteen-year-olds and over, and to measure each year (except the
fourth, which has four questions), with five tests. Goddard (4), in
trying the tests on a homogeneous group of two thousand normal
children, reaches the conclusion that we have now "a mathematical
demonstration of the accuracy of the tests," particularly for the
ages of five to twelve years. In the " Symposium on the Binet Tests "
in the Psychological Clinic (16), Terman presents the results obtained
from four hundred non-selected children. The organization of com-
mittees and institutes in Europe to promote further investigations,
mentioned below, indicates an unusually serious belief in the value
of standardized mental tests.
The phenomena of dreams have long been a region of opinion and
superstition. One may now ask, with some hope of an affirmative
answer, whether this field shall finally yield to sound theory. The
continued development of the method of psychoanalysis and the
extension of Freud's theories to the explanation of traits recorded in
biography is a matter of importance in spite of its lack of general
acceptance. Void (24) was probably the first to apply the methods
of careful control and comparison to dreams, this strange material
of experience which seems to be beyond all control. In attempting
to determine dreams experimentally, by tightly placed bands chiefly
on the lower limbs, he found for example, in tests on nineteen sub-
jects, experimental dreams contained two and a half times the
elements recallable in ordinary dreams. It also appears that motor
ideas are most frequently aroused in controlled dreams, ideas of
pressure and temperature only slightly so. Hollingsworth's observa-
tions on the transition state between waking and sleeping may lead
to a further inquiry into the psychology of dreams (6).
From the abundance of other expressions of tendencies and ad-
vances, mention may be made of the following fruits of the year.
Continuing the American pedagogical practice of demonstrating a
position by constructing a text-book, Yerkes (25) has issued a clear
call to the science to hark back to the importance of introspection and
to a recognition of psychical causation. His exhibition of the gen-
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN
i9II
°*
eralization of the science (part IV ) is
extensive scientific claims it ^
projection method for studying Lagery
demonstr on of th ^ ^ ^ rf
(9, 10), the range of poss.ble improvement in methods is indicated
A new meanmg of comparative psychology is given in thc Z2J
study by Harmlton (5) whose subjects were eleven hum.?, fiv
monkeys, s.xteen dogs, five cats, and one horse. The reprinting
the papers by Thorndike (22), who first made the experiment,
attack on the problems of animal psychology over a decade aKc
affords an opportunity to note the general soundness of his inter-
pretations, as well as a basis for estimating the progress in technique
and theory which may have been made in the meantime in this
branch of the science.
1909
1910
No. of
Titles
Rubric
No of
Titles
Rubric
739
512
Genetic, individual and social
psychology.
Philosophical implications of
psychology.
712
587
Genetic, individual and social
psychology.
Sleep, trance and pathology.
512
Sleep, trance and pathology.
471
Sensation.
358
Sensation.
417
Philosophical implications of psy-
chology.
322
General.
292
Anatomy and physiology of thc
277
Anatomy and physiology of the
248
nervous system.
General.
nervous system.
128
Conation and movement.
171
Conation and movement.
122
Cognition.
169 Cognition.
69
Conditions and relations of con-
86
Conditions and relations of con-
sciousness.
sciousness.
28
Affection.
33
Affection.
3,067
3,186
As a helpful sign of the high level of activity in psychology one can
read the indications in the record of publications to be found in the
Psychological Index for 1910 (17). That the science is "established"
beyond all peradventure may be gathered from the striking steadiness
of its literary output. The growth of the Index is approaching the
limits which may result, as announced, in reducing the space given to
philosophy. The total entries for 1910 were 3,186, by two thousand
five hundred and fourteen authors. This total is over ten per cent,
less than that of 1908, but four per cent, increase over that of 1909.
Last year seven topics showed an increase, and three a decrease, in
6 EDWARD FRANKLIN BUCHNER
the number of contributions. The largest gain is one hundred and
thirteen on sensation, the greatest loss is ninety-five on the conditions
and relations of consciousness. The slight displacement in rank
shown by sleep, trance and pathology, the philosophical implications,
general, and the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system,
do not effect the general significance of the table above. The fact
that the field of genetic, individual and social psychology has steadily
held the first place during the past four years should be highly
instructive to one seeking for indications of the positive directions
being taken by psychological inquiry.
A more striking illustration of the enormous range of activity in
the science may be found in the year's history of the PSYCHOLOGICAL
BULLETIN. In 1911 this journal inaugurated a new and helpful
plan for reporting the literature of psychology. In addition to its
reports of the proceedings of four psychological congresses or annual
meetings, and the special reviews, eleven issues were given to general
reviews and summaries of the work of the year 1910 (including some
reference to the results of 1909 and 1911). These were grouped under
forty-seven topics; and while they aggregated over seven hundred
references, they numbered less than one fourth the number recorded
in the Index for the same year!
The ability of psychology to maintain its scientific and educational
interests in America, at least, is shown in the annual record of the
bestowal of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by American uni-
versities which is being kept by Science (19). Psychology is one of
the seventeen natural and exact sciences, in which two hundred and
thirty-nine degrees, and one of the thirty-four subjects, in which four
hundred and thirty-seven degrees were conferred in 1911. Twenty-
three degrees, a number greatly above the average (15.8) for this
science since 1898, were conferred upon candidates presenting dis-
sertations on psychological subjects. Twenty of these were conferred
by four universities, Clark (seven), Chicago (six), Columbia (four),
and Pennsylvania (three). Psychology also continues to rank fourth
among the twenty sciences, and seventh among the thirty-seven
subjects which are credited with the doctorate of American uni-
versities. The same record shows that education, as a subject, was
credited in 1911 with twenty-three degrees, and calls attention to the
impossibility of picking out the psychology that may have crept
into education, and vice versa.
During the year the channels of publication in psychology have
shown interesting development. The activities of investigators in
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN
all the clearly differentiated branches of the science are increasing
rapidly. We have come to the happy state where each aspect i!
having its own periodical. The beginning of the year saw the appear-
TV °*/v }? °f imd Behavi°r> Under the edito"*l direction
of R. M. Yerkes and an editorial board, and its series of The Behavior
Monographs, edited by J. B. Watson. Another sign of rapidly «-
tending investigations is found in the two additional outlets for
extensive material opened in 1911 in the Beihefte of the Zeitschrift
fur angewandte Psychologic und psychologist Sammelforschung, now
m its fifth volume, and in the series of monograph supplements to the
British Journal of Psychology, in its third volume. W. Specht is the
editor of the new Zeitschrift fur Patho-psychologie appearing in
Munich. The new Zeitschrift fur pddagogische Psychologie und
experimented Pddagogik, under the editorial care of Meumann and
Scheibner, is a combination to continue the interest in the fields
hitherto cultivated by the older Zeitschrift fur pddagogische Psy-
chologie (since 1899) and the younger Zeitschrift fur experimented
Pddagogik (since 1905). The first volume of the institute for experi-
mental pedagogy and psychology of the Teachers' Association of
Leipzig, the Pddagogisch-Psychologische Arbeiten, aims to bring the
achievements of experimental psychology to the acquaintance of
students of education. That exact methods of inquiry in this field
are beginning to receive some attention in England is shown by the
new Journal of Experimental Pedagogy and Training College Record,
edited by J. A. Green, of Sheffield University.
The associational interests of psychology continued to exercise
the diverse activities of former years. The stated meetings of
national, sectional and local organizations offered the usual oppor-
tunities for expressions in general, experimental, educational, com-
parative, and abnormal psychology. Besides these efforts, several
events of unequal significance for progress may be chronicled. The
Fourth International Congress of Philosophy, held at Bologna in
April, devoted one of its eight sections to philosophy— an indication
that the divorce of the two subjects remains to be made final. The
American Psycho-analytic Association was organized at Baltimore,
in May, under the presidency of J. J. Putnam, and in affiliation with
the International Psycho-analytic Association. Renewed efforts to
bring together the results of scientific child study led to the organiza-
tion of the First International Congress of Pedology held at Brussels,
in August, under the presidency of M. C. Schuyten. In the following
month was held the international Verein for medidal psychology and
psychotherapy in Munich.
8 EDWARD FRANKLIN BUCHNER
The year also brought forth a number of instances of organized
efforts to further the movement of the application of psychology,
particularly to education. In Berlin, teachers and psychologists
united in the organization of a Verein fiir pddagogisch-psychologische
Statistik, which aims to keep foremost the use of methods of investiga-
tion of a scientific character. Teachers are also to be immediate
beneficiaries of psychology in the Institute for Pedagogical Psychology
established in Munich under Fischer and in the Pedagogical Institute
at the University of Tubingen under Deuchler, while in Breslau
special study of intelligence tests is being carried on by the new
committee organized for work in educational psychology. The more
permanent establishment of the science and its further extension and
application are evidenced in the gift of one hundred and fifty thousand
marks by Professor Hans Meyer to the University of Leipzig for an
institute of experimental psychology, in the fund of one hundred and
twenty thousand roubles by an anonymous donor for the building
and equipment of a psychological institute at the University of
Moscow, and in the Gatzert Foundation for child welfare in the
University and State of Washington, to direct which a psychologist,
S. Smith, has been appointed. The varied services of "applied"
psychology found a new direction in the appointment of a psycholo-
gist, L. R. Geissler, for special research in the physical laboratory of
the National Electric Lamp Association, in Cleveland.
The deaths of Alfred Binet, of France, Sir Francis Galton and
John Hughlings Jackson, of England, W. A. Nagel, of Germany,
Angelo Mosso, of Italy, and Henry P. Bowditch, of America,
remind us of the distinctive services in specializing problems and
devising techniques for their solution which may come from physiolo-
gists and neurologists as well as from psychologists. Binet was
director of the laboratory of physiological psychology at the Uni-
versity of Paris, founder of the Uannee psychologique, and a special
student of child psychology, whose collaboration in the tests of
intelligence, familiarly known by his name, promises to be directive
of numerous inquiries in the years to come. Galton's wide range
of scientific interest gave to psychology a new era by his statistical
methods and his approach to the problems of special traits and
mental heredity. Each of the four physiologists left his impress at
some point in psychology. Jackson nearly a generation ago worked
out the suggestion of the widely serviceable generalization of evolu-
tionary levels in brain function, by showing wherein higher functions
become specific and the structures supporting them become more
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN 1911 9
complex. Nagel's interest as a physiologist in psychology became
fixed in his contribution to the advancement of the theory of color-
blindness and his devices of test-cards and apparatus for light-trans-
mission. Mosso invented the ergograph, and largely fashioned the
important field of fatigue. Bowditch advanced our knowledge of
the physiology of vision and the knee-jerk, and filled with permanent
suggestiveness his anthropometric work on the growth of children.
REFERENCES
1. BOBERTAG, O. Zsch. f. angew., PsychoL u. psych. Sammelforschung, 1911, 5,
105-203.
2. BRAUNHAUSEN, N. Eine Krisis der experimentellen Psychologic? Arch. f. d.
ges. Psych., 1911, 21, 4. Literaturbericht, i-io.
3. BINET, A. and SIMON, T. Le mesure du developpement de 1'intelligence chez les
jeunes enfants. Bull de la soc. libre pour r etude psych, de V enfant, 1911, n,
187-248.
4. GODDARD, H. H. Two Thousand Normal Children Measured by the Binet
Measuring Scale of Intelligence. Ped. Sem., 1911, 18, 232-259.
5. HAMILTON, G. V. A Study of Trial and Error Reactions in Mammals. Jour, of
Animal Behavior, 1911, i, 33-66.
6. HOLLINGWORTH, H. L. The Psychology of Drowsiness. Amer. Journ. of PsychoL,
1911, 22, 99-111.
7. KOSTYLEFF, N. La crise de la psychologie experimental. Le present et favenir.
Paris: Alcan, 1911. Pp. 176.
8. LADD, G. T. and WOODWORTH, R. S. Elements of Physiological Psychology.
Thoroughly revised and re-written. New York: Scribner's Sons, 1911. Pp.
704.
9. MARGIS, P. Das Problem und die Methoden der Psychographie. Zsch.f. angew.
PsychoL, etc., 1911, 5, 409-451.
10. MARGIS, P. E. J. A. Hoffmann: Ein psychographische Individualanalyse. Leipzig,
1911. Ibid., Beiheft, No. 4.
11. MARTIN, L. J. The Projection Method. PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 1911, 8,
36-37 (abstract).
12. MEUMANN, E. Der gegenwartige Stand der Methodik der Intelligenzpriifungen.
Zsch.f. exper. Pad., 1910, n, 68-79.
13. MICHOTTE, A. and PRUM, E. Etude experimentale sur le choix volontaire et ses
antecedents immediats. Arch, de psychol., 1910, 10, 113 ff.
14. MYERS, C. S. A Text-Book of Experimental Psychology, with Laboratory Exercises.
2d ed., Pt. L and II. New York, 1911.
15. PILLSBURY, W. B. The Essentials of Psychology. New York: Macmillan, 1911-
Pp. 362.
16. Psychological Clinic, 1911, S, 199-238.
17. Psychological Index, No. 17, for the Year 1910. PSYCHOL. REV. Publ., 1911.
1 8. Report of the Committee of the Amer. Psych. As soc. on the Standardizing of Procedure
in Experimental Tests: PILLSBURY, W. B., SEASHORE, C. E., ANGELL, J. R.
PSYCH. REV. MON. No. 53, Dec., 1910. Methods of Studying Piston in Ani-
mals, R. M. YERKES and J. B. WATSON. Behavior Monographs, 1911, Vol. I,
No. 2.
io I. WOODBRIDGE RILEY
19. Doctorates conferred by American Universities. Science, 1911, 34, 193 ff.
20. SINGER, E. A., Jr. Mind as an Observable Object. /. of Phil, Psychol., etc., 1911,
8, 1 80 ff.
21. TAWNEY, G. A. Consciousness in Psychology and Philosophy. /. of Phil.,
PsychoL, etc., 1911, 8, 197 ff.
22. THORNDIKE, E. L. Animal Intelligence. Experimental Studies. New York:
Macmillan, 1911. Pp. 297.
23. TOULOUSE, E. and PIERON, H. Technique de psychologic experimentale. 2d ed.
2 vols. Paris, 1911.
24. VOLD, J. M. Ufbfr den Traum: Experimental-psychologischf Untersuchungen.
(Posthumous.) Edited by O. KLEMM. Vol. I. Leipzig, 1910. Pp. 435.
25. YERKES, R. M. Introduction to Psychology. New York: Holt & Co., 1911.
Pp. 427.
HISTORICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
BY PROFESSOR I. WOODBRIDGE RILEY
Vassar College
The year is signalized by two important histories of psychology.
Of these Dessoir's (3) has the wider sweep, attempting to give, from
direct sources, the fundamental lines of ancient and modern thought,
and especially to present the advance made in the development of
this discipline. The three roots of psychology are the religious, —
the phenomena of dreams and death giving us occult psychosophy;
the individual, — with the localization of the soul in the heart and
midriff; the social, — with its linguistic and poetic implications.
These three roots may be traced through classical antiquity, the
temperamental school of Galen, the introspective Alexandrians to the
Renaissance itself. The latter's psychognosis splits into the genetic-
individual psychology of quietism and the temperamental-racial
which began with Gracian and ended with Chamfort. Here the
French studies are made responsible for a double development of
Humanism: on the one hand arising a decadent dissection of character
by Rousseau, on the other the more healthy self-portraiture of Goethe,
Maine de Biran, Maurice de Guerin. This extremely interesting
study of the psychology of comparative literature is succeeded by
another on the ancient conception of the life of the soul. This in-
cludes the background of folk-lore, and the esoteric Orphic-Pythag-
orean cult as to the soul's two-fold relation to the spirit world and to
physical nature. Next come the Pre-Socratics proper, Platonism as
a combination of the mystical and mechanical, the Aristotelian genetic-
rational views, the variants among the Epicureans, Stoics and Neo-
HISTORICAL CONTRIBUTIONS n
platonists, and the neglected opinions of the Patristics. In the
Middle Ages psychology becomes a history of the activities of the
soul under Roman-Germanic Christianity. After the brief career
of the Arabian physiological psychology, high Scholasticism is over-
thrown by new empirical and mystical doctrines from Roger Bacon
to Tauler. With the founding of constructive psychology under
Vives and Lord Bacon there arises the connection with mathematics,
utilized by Descartes, despite his adoption of the Augustinian ego',
by Hobbes, and even by Malebranche in his heuristic principle of
parallelism* but less successfully by Spinoza who leaves the connection
between psychologv and epistemology to be made clearer by Locke,
by Hartley and his associationism, and by the analytics Hume, Reid,
and Tetens. With Leibniz and Wolf begins the German faculty
psychology. This, being criticized by Kant, eventuates in the self-
determining systems of Fichte and Schelling, the vague spiritism
of Hegel, and the animism of Herder. With the more exact methods
of Schubert, Carus and Burdach come the opponents of the dialectical
school Fries and Beneke, the eclectics Tiedemann, Reinhold and
Scheidler. At this point historic proportion is lost. Ten pages
are devoted to Herbart and his school while less than two are granted
to the French founders Condillac, Cabanis, and Destutt de Tracy;
there is an interesting paragraph on Gall but nothing or. Spurzheim;
in the rubric, but not in the text, Hazard and James are put among
the English psychologists, and, in conclusion, but twelve pages are
devoted to German psychology since 1850. The work is, however,
notable for tracing the golden thread of continuity, and especially
interesting in its account of the primitives in Hellenism and the
Renaissance.
Klemm (4) presents a history of the problems of psychology much
as Janet and Seailles have done in philosophy. Besides tracing the
development of the past he attempts to define the limits of modern
psychology as a separate discipline, from the point of view of a dis-
ciple of Wundt. The work ranges from the beginnings of intro-
spection in the occult sciences to present applications in pedagogy,
jurisprudence and psychiatry. Under the heads of metaphysical
psychology we have spiritualism proper, and materialism in its atomic,
mechanical and psychophysical varieties, and under empirical psy-
chology the associational, comparative and experimental varieties.
This first division on the common aims of psychology is followed by
a second on the development of fundamental concepts such as con-
sciousness, the contents of consciousness, psychological method,
12 /. WOOD BRIDGE RILEY
and psychological measurements as presented by Weber, Fechner
and G. E. Miiller. The last division offers a highly interesting his-
tory of the most important theories regarding not only the general
problems of sensations of sight and hearing, but also special problems
of space, such as Miiller's nativistic, Helmholtz's empirical, and
Herbart's genetic hypotheses. The thoroughness of Klemm's work
is evidenced in the last chapter with its theories of feeling subdivided
into the phenomenal, psycho-mechanical, physiological, and psycho-
physical; and its theories of the will into the intellectual, absolutistic,
heterogenetic, and emotional. We note, in conclusion, the names of
nine American psychologists from Edwards to James.
Boutroux (i) in his beautifully written monograph, makes James
an opponent both of the actualists and the substantialists, since the
former are too atomistic, the latter too remote from reality. Intro-
spection shows the reality to be rather the stream of consciousness.
Here psychophysical parallelism has a new meaning because the nerve
centers are to be considered partially spontaneous and intelligent.
In this way the principles of science tend to become transfigured by
the contact of physiology, their materialism being sublimated, their
mechanism animated, their determinism rendered more supple.
Cushman (2) continues his treatment of last year's volume, com-
menting succinctly on the psychology of the modern philosophers
from Hobbes to Herbart. To his chapter on the Enlightenment he
adds, without comment, one group of associationist psychologists
from Peter to Thomas Brown, and another of "associationist psy-
chologists and related philosophers" from Kruger to Sulzer.
Levy-Bruhl offers an appreciation of Cournot on the occasion of a
reprint of his Traite de V enchainement des I dees fondamentales, which
has remained almost unknown because of the original opposition of
Comte and Renouvier.
REFERENCES
1. BOUTROUX, E. William James. Paris: Colin, 1911. Pp. 142.
2. CUSHMAN, H. E. A Beginner's History of Philosophy. Vol. II. New York:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911. Pp. v + 377.
3. DESSOIR, MAX. Abriss einer Geschichte der Psychologic. Heidelberg: Winter,
1911. Pp. viii + 272.
4. KLEMM, OTTO. Geschichte der Psychologic. Berlin :Teubner, 1911. Pp. x + 388.
5. LEVY-BRUHL, L. Une reimpression de Cournot. Rev. de met. et de mor., 1911, 19,
292-295.
MIND AND BODY ,3
MIND AND BODY
BY PROFESSOR HARRY ALLEN OVERSTREET
College of the City of New York
Noteworthy in the discussion of this problem during the year is
a searching, but, in result, considerably diverse attempt to define
mind or consciousness. Oesterreich (28), resting his case on self-
observation, which, according to him, discovers a not-further-reduc-
ible "I-moment," argues that the "I" is not a complex of phenomena
which singly do not contain it but is a phenomenon of a special kind.
On the contrary, Gross (17), while dissatisfied with the bundle theory
of consciousness, agrees with Hume that we do not actually find
the self as object. Nevertheless he holds that our introspection is
accompanied by the conviction that there was something-more-than-
that present in the feeling- willing-judging experience than we ac-
tually have in the object of introspection. This "more-than" we
express metaphorically as "center," "focus," etc. Martius (24) re-
jects the substance view of mind, which Schwartzkopf (29) on the
contrary, and by appealing to introspection, accepts. The latter,
however, attempts to substitute a living substantiality for the static
substantiality of older thought. Schwartzkopf argues that I am not
the mere sum of my life experiences; they belong to me as "mine."
Sichler (31), on the contrary, maintains, with Wundt, the conception
of the soul as pure activity, arguing that the conception of the soul
as doer of its deeds or carrier of its qualities is due to the transference
of the "thing" concept to the soul. "It is asked that the act be
referred back to an acting subject. But the act itself is primary.
The division of act and acting subject is a play with concepts of
reflection, which we first distinguish as subject and object and then
proceed to separate into independent realities." He holds likewise
that the introspected consciousness has not the constancy requisite
for the concept of substantiality. Singer (32), too, rejects the sub-
stance view, explaining it as due to the satisfaction of treating any
complex thing as an additive result. Consciousness is not something
to be inferred from behavior ("an eject forever veiled and hidden in
a land beyond experience"); it is behavior. Or, more accurately,
our belief in consciousness is an expectation of probable behavior
based on an observation of actual behavior, a belief to be confirmed
or refuted by more observation, as any other belief in a fact is to be
tried out. Miller (26) questions the correctness of this view. Con-
1 4 HARRY ALLEN OVERSTREET
sciousness, to him, appears to be a "field," or at least," the relation
of conjunction between the components of the field." "It is these
pools of conjoint phenomenality that Mr. Singer completely ignores."
Joseph (20) objects to the prevalent psychological manner of treating
the soul or mind mechanically. " I do not say that we cannot to some
extent assign the conditions psychical or physical under which [think-
ing and knowing] occur in the individual mind. . . . But such obser-
vations do nothing to explain the process; the whole process still
remains, as something which has an intelligible nature of its own, not
mechanical." Cotlarciuc (10) holds the view of the soul as a bearer
of its qualities. D'Istria (12) recounts the important work of Cabanis
in leading French philosophy away from Condillac's view of the self.
Bergson (3, 4, 5) repudiates the notion of a substantial ego. The
moi (jui dure is ceaseless change. There is no permanent substrate.
Ladd (21) rejects "the distinction between the 'phenomenal ego'
and the real mind, if by the former we mean the one subject to which
we attribute all the characteristics of doing and suffering that make
themselves known as consciousness. . . . This subject of states is
the reality." Bode (7) passes in review the newer realistic concep-
tions of consciousness, approving them as a protest against subjec-
tivism and transcendentalism, but discovering in them inherent
weaknesses in so far as they aim to be rival doctrines. McGilvary
(25) would describe consciousness not as a relation of meaning nor as
a way of appropriation of past experiences, but as a "way of being
felt together." Dewey (n) maintains that as long as perceptions
are "regarded as cases of knowledge, the gate is opened to the ideal-
istic interpretation." They should be conceived as pure natural
events. "Knowing is something that happens to things in the
natural course of their career, not the sudden introduction of a
' unique* and non-natural type of relation."
On the question of the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the
physical and the psychical, Oesterreich (28) takes firm stand for the
latter alternative. All attempts, he holds, to treat the psychical
processes as complexes of natural processes fail. It is the "I" char-
acter of all psychical facts which places the subject-matter of psy-
chology in complete contrast to that of the physical world. Martius
(24), although differing from Oesterreich in his view of the nature of
consciousness, holds similarly that consciousness is not part of the
physical series. Two facts, according to him, substantiate this: the
discontinuity of physical and psychical with regard to stimulus and
result; the well-nigh mechanical self-sufficiency of certain chains of
MIND AND BODY 15
psychical processes. Rejecting parallelism as contrary to introspec-
tive analysis and as requiring a mass of accessory hypotheses, and
the energy theory as employing a concept too narrow to include the
psychical, he describes the relation between mind and body as a
teleological one, in the sense that the physical world is a means to
the realization of the psychical. A teleological view is necessary, he
holds, by reason of the abstract one-sidedness of the sciences and the
inability of the causal series to explain themselves. Schlegel (30),
on the contrary, supports the view that consciousness is a form of
energy. Henry (18, 19) works out in elaborate detail a description
of psychical facts in terms of energy. Franken (15) approaches the
problem from the point of view of the question whether a universal
psychology is possible, or whether such .psychology must not in fact
be merely a physiology of the nervous system. In the course of his
negative answer to the latter alternative, he rejects the energy con-
cept as inadequate to express psychological processes; he likewise
rejects the identity theory, showing that it is based upon a spatial
metaphor — inner and outer. He asks why reality, possessing the
aspects inner and outer, might not possess innumerable others. He
sees no excuse for parallelism; its fear of a causal interchange, he
holds, is due to a confusion of "causality" with "energy." If
causality means invariable sequence, interaction (causal relation)
need not mean the intrusion of energy from the psychical into the
closed world of physical energy. He concludes, holding this sole
legitimate meaning of causality, that the physical and psychical are
related by way of interaction. The psychical is the principle of
organization or equilibrium. Psychical processes are of such a
nature, always, that the result is a total impression, a higher unity,
a kind of equilibrium. Disturbances of this unity call forth processes
for the restoration of the original unity or the achievement of a new
one. In this sense, the psychical (i. *-., the totality or equilibrium
principle) is prior to the parts and ideologically related to them.
Becher (2) likewise finds no incompatibility between psychophysical
interaction and the principle of conservation of energy, (i) Every
measurement of energy transformations fails of complete agreement
with the conservation principle. This discrepancy may actually be
due to the intrusion of the psychical. (2) The psychical may itself
be a form of energy. (3) In so far as there are even physico-chemical
influxes which bespeak no increase or diminution of energy, the
same may be true of psychical influxes. Mackenzie (23) attempts to
remove the difficulty by finding it unnecessary "to assume that the
16 HARRY ALLEN 07ERSTREET
amount of energy in the physical system is in any way interfered with
by the presence of conscious processes. It is enough if we may
suppose that its form is in some way affected." Cohn (9), on the
other hand, rejecting both interactionism and parallelism, regards
the physical and the psychical as differently characterized but in fact
identical processes of the one world. Singer (32) contents himself
with the view that life and consciousness are aspects of a body's
behavior from which other aspects may be distinguished, but which
may not be regarded as separable. Sichler (31) upholds Wundt's
monistic view of body and mind, declaring however that this view
was for Wundt a hypothesis solely of heuristic worth. Stout (33),
announcing a radical change in his view, maintains, with the new
realists, that "what is existentially present in consciousness in
sense-perception is matter directly apprehended as it is in itself."
Only it is and is thought as being partial and fragmentary. "For
thought, it signifies its own continuation and completion in a whole
which transcends and includes it." Mitchell (27) holds that con-
sciousness and material processes imply each other with logical
necessity, consciousness being the inversion or reciprocal aspect of
organic activity, i. e., virtual, in distinction from externalized or
real, activity.
On the closely related problem of the relation of life to the bodily
processes, Lovejoy (22) attempts to define three possible positions
of vitalism: (i) That organisms have unique laws; (2) that these
laws cannot be stated in terms of the number and arrangement of
the organism's physical components; (3) that there are special forces
or agents as causes of these peculiar modes of action. The presump-
tion he holds to be in favor of (2). In any case, the hypothetical
"forces" or "causes" would not constitute the basis of an irreducible
minimum of vitalism. Briot (8) defends a vitalistic view of biology.
Driesch (14) presents a new — a logico-metaphysical — basis for
vitalism. Becher (2) shows that the conflict between mechanism
and vitalism is one with the conflict between parallelism and interac-
tionism, and holds with the latter pair of alternatives.
Differing considerably from these attempts is the attitude of
"interested ignorance" of Yerkes (34). "Instead of working on the
presupposition that mind causes body or that body causes mind, we
may more profitably admit to ourselves that we do not know whether
a causal relation exists between the two sets of phenomena. Thus
we should be free to work toward a solution of the problem without
the encumbrance of a philosophical system or of prejudicial assump-
MIND AND BODY !7
tions." Yerkes, like^Becher, supports "psychical causality," in so
far as, to him, there is as much orderliness in mental as in physical
events. "What psychology needs is more extensive and accurate
information concerning the sequences of its phenomena. Too long
the notion has held sway that psychical events are wayward, un-
caused, etc. ... or that their true causes are not other mental
events but bodily events. This last view and no other in my opinion
has so retarded the development of real psychological insight and
information." Hence he advises the study of (i) the facts of con-
sciousness in their mutual relations; (2) the facts of bodily life in
their relations; (3) the correlation of the two series of events.
Becher (2) notes the tacit assumption of many scientists that
causality has no place in the psychical sphere, but is present solely
in the sphere of the physico-chemical. To this unwarranted assump-
tion, he holds, is largely traceable their unwillingness to permit any
manner of psychophysical interaction.
Except for Franken's (15) rather obscure view of the psychical
as "equilibrium principle," the one view which departs in a marked
manner from the conventional modes of treatment of the problem is
that of Bergson (3, 4, 5, 6). The novelty of his view is due to his
thought of perception as a means, not to knowledge, but to action.
Hence the initial separation ordinarily made between a subjective
knower and an objective known is not permitted. Perceptual ac-
tivity is essentially the activity of an object in and with the world of
objects. It differs from other activity solely in degree. All life is
reactive. Perceptive life is distinguished simply by a greater power
to postpone reaction and by a larger range of reactive possibilities.
Matter is the totality of images; perception is a selection from
matter, a selection necessitated by motor needs. The reactive organ-
ism cannot respond to the total world; its selected world of response
therefore is matter transformed into perception. Perception, in this
sense, is not a "looking at" a world outside; it is simply a selective
mode of activity in and upon the world. "Whereas matter is the
whole sum of images, such portions of the latter as are related to the
possible actions of my body constitute perception, which is then a
selected portion of matter."
Such selective activity, which divides the world into mutually
exclusive images, Bergson regards as due to the arrest of the vital
impulse. "Matter is ... an inverse motion which runs counter to
the vital impulse, or, what is declared to be the same thing, an inter-
ruption of the latter. The creation of matter is a simple arrest of
i8 HARRY ALLEN OFERSTREET
the action which generates life, just as an interruption of the act of
creating a poem spreads it out into sentences and words. As a
result we have matter and intellect, always correlatives, which thus
are both a checking of the vital impulse, a constrained pause in its
spontaneous flow. The tension of duration is relieved, and quality
becomes quantity" (13). "Apparently," says Dolson, "not only is
the inverse motion equally primitive with that which it opposes,
but matter and intellect, though neither is founded upon the other,
yet become progressively so adapted to each other, that they
sometimes seem like different aspects of the same thing." In his
Birmingham address, Bergson casts further light upon the func-
tion of matter: "When setting one against the other, we examine
consciousness and matter in their mutual reactions, we have the
impression that matter plays at first the part of an instrument that
cuts it up in order to bring about a greater precision. A thought
only becomes precise when it is divided into words" — a process which
costs eflort. "Now this effort would not have been put forth without
matter, which by the unique nature of the persistence it opposes and
the unique nature of the docility to which it can be brought, plays
at cne and the same time the role of obstacle and stimulus, causes
us to feel our force and also to succeed in intensifying it." Finally
he relates consciousness and matter to duration as follows: "Sensa-
tion, which is the point at which consciousness touches matter, is
. . . the condensation ... of a history which in itself — in the world
of matter — is something infinitely diluted and which occupies enor-
mous periods of what might be called the duration of things. • On the
one hand, matter subject to necessity, a kind of immense machine,
without memory, or at least having only just sufficient memory to
bridge the interval between one instant and the next, each of the
states of the material world being capable, or almost so, of mathe-
matical deduction from the preceding state, and consequently adding
nothing thereto; on the other hand consciousness — that is to say,
on the contrary, a force essentially free and essentially memory, a
force whose very character is to pile up the past on the past, like a
rolling snowball, and at every instant of duration to organize with
this rast something new which is a real creation. That these two
forms of existence, matter and consciousness, have indeed a common
origin, seems to me probable. I believe that the first is a reversal
of the second, that while consciousness is action that continually
creates and multiplies, matter is action which continually unmakes
itself and wears out." The view stated in the last sentence is one
deveVpcd with some poetic power by Auerbach (i).
MIND AND BODY 19
REFERENCES
1. AUERBACH, F. Ektropismus oder die physikalische Theorie des Lebens. Leipzig:
Engelmann, 1910. Pp. v -}- 99.
2. BECKER, E. Gehirn und Seele. Heidelberg: Winter, 1911. Pp. xiii + 405.
3. BERGSON, H. Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Conscious-
ness. Authorized translation by F. L. Pogson. London: Swan Sonnenschein;
New York: Macmillan, 1910. Pp. v -f- 252.
4. BERGSON, H. Creative Evolution. Authorized translation by Arthur Mitchell.
New York: Holt, 1911. Pp. xv + 407.
5. BERGSON, H. Matter and Memory. Authorized translation by N. M. Paul and
W. S. Palmer. London: Swan Sonnenschein; New York: Macmillan, 1911.
Pp. xx + 339.
6. BERGSON, H. Life and Consciousness: The "Huxley Lecture" delivered at the
University of Birmingham, May 29, 1911. Hibbert Journal, 1911, 10, 24-44.
7. BODE, B. H. Realistic Conceptions of Consciousness. Phil. Rev., 1911, 20, 265-
279.
8. BRIOT, A. Le probleme de 1'origine de la vie. Rev. de phil., 1910, 17, 250-270.
9. COHN, M. Ueber das Denken. Zusammenhang des Geistes und Kdrpers. Eine
Studie. Berlin: L. Simion, Nachf., 1910. Pp. iv + HO-
10. COTLARCIUC, N. Das Problem der immateriellen geistigen Seelensubstanz. (Studien
zur Philosophic und Religion; 6te Heft.) Paderborn: Schoningh, 1910. Pp.
xi + 266.
11. DEWEY, J. Brief Studies in Realism. /. of Phil., Psychol., etc., 1911, 8, 393-400;
546-554.
12. D'ISTRIA, F. C. Cabanis et les origines de la vie psychologique. Rev. de met. et
de mor., 1911, 19, 177-198.
13. DOLSON, G. N. The Philosophy of Henri Bergson. Phil. Rev., 1910, 19, 579-
596; 1911, 20,46-58.
14. DRIESCH, H. Zwei Vortrdge zur Naturphilosophie. I. Die logische Rechtfertigung
der Lehre von der Eigengesetzlichkeit des Belebten. II. Ueber Aufgabe und Begrifi
der Naturphilosophie. Leipzig: Engelmann, 1910. Pp. iii + 38.
15. FRANKEN, A. Moglichkeit und Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Psychologic, im
besonderen der Tierpsychologie. Zsch. f. Phil. u. Pad., 1910, 17, 313-325;
361-374; 425-448; 489-502; 538-549.
16. GAULTIER, P. La pensee contemporaine: les grandes problemes. (La vie in-
terieure.) Paris: Hachette et Cie, 1911. Pp. 62-92.
17. GROOS, K. Bemerkungen zum Problem der Selbstbeobachtung. Zsch. f. Phil.
u. ph. Kr., 1910, 137, 76-81.
18. HENRY, C. Psycho-physique et energetique. Bull. inst. gen. psychol., 1909, 9,
3-25-
19. HENRY, C. Psycho-biologic et energetique. Bull. inst. gen. psychol., 1909, 9,
25-236; 317-319-
20. JOSEPH, H. W. B. The Psychological Explanation of the Development c
Perception of External Objects (III.). (Reply to Prof. Stout.) Mind, 1911,
78, 161-180.
21. LADD, G. T. The Ontological Problem of Psychology. Phil. Rev., 1911, 20,
363-385-
22. LOVEJOY, A. O. The Meaning of Vitalism. Science, 1.911, 33, 61
23. MACKENZIE, J. S. Mind and Body. Mind, 1911, 80, 489-506.
20 H. W. CHASE
24. MARTIUS, G. Leib und Seele. Kiel: Lipsius und Tischer, 1910. Pp. 26.
25. McGiLVARY, E. B. Experience as Pure and Consciousness as Meaning. /. of
Phil., PsychoL, etc., 1911, 8, 511-525.
26. MILLER, D. S. Is Consciousness "a Type of Behavior"? /. of Phil., PsychoL,
etc., 1911, 8, 322-327.
27. MITCHELL, A. The Logical Implication of Matter in the Definition of Conscious-
ness. /. of Phil., PsychoL, etc., 1911, 8, 561-565.
28. OESTERREICH, K. Die Phdnomenologie des Ich in ihrer Grundproblemen. Leipzig:
Barth, 1910. Pp. vii -f- 532.
29. SCHWARTZKOPF, Prof. Dr. 1st die Seele eine Substanz? Zsch.f. Phil, und ph. Kr.,
1909, 134, 88-102.
30. SCHLEGEL, E. Energetikund Bewusstsein. Ann. der NaturphiL, 1911, 10, 415-
436.
31. SICHLER, A. Ueber falsche Interpretation des kritischen Realismus und Volun-
tarismus Wundts. Arch. f. syst. Phil., 1911, 17, 1-43.
32. SINGER, E. A., Jr. Mind as an Observable Object. /. of Phil., PsychoL, etc.,
1911, 8, 180-186.
33. STOUT, G. F. Reply to Mr. Joseph. Mind, 1911, N. S. 77, 1-14.
34. YERKES, R. M. Introduction to Psychology. New York: Holt, 1911. Pp. xii +
427.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
BY PROFESSOR H. W. CHASE
University of North Carolina
Of recent books dealing with the problems of consciousness those
by the following authors may be noted. McCabe (16) attempts to
synthesize data from a group of related sciences in such a way
as to give a history of the development of mind. Consciousness
is not present everywhere in the animal series, but first appears when
a certain degree of nervous complexity is reached, surely in the mam-
mal, perhaps before. As to the exact moment of its appearance, all
proposed criteria are inadequate; the answer must be deferred until
we know more of the nervous system than at present.
Fite, in his "Individualism" (8), sets an ethical problem which
requires for its solution a theory of consciousness. For the author,
the true nature of consciousness is unity in diversity. From the
mechanical point of view, the universe shows irreconcilable opposi-
tions, which it is the function of consciousness to resolve through
higher syntheses. Just in proportion as action is fully conscious,
it harmonizes opposing phases of experience. The relation between
the self and the object is always present in consciousness, self- and
object-consciousness developing together in the individual.
Oesterreich (23) postulates the existence of a permanent ego as
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
21
the principle of unity of conscious contents. The opposition between
the self and the object is always given in experience. Feelings form
a truer groundwork for personality than do the organic sensations.
Various abnormal phenomena are discussed, and the ego is shown to
be permanent amid all pathological changes of personality.
Titchener (30) rejects the definition of consciousness as "the
mind's awareness of its own processes." For him, it is the "sum-
total of mental processes occurring now, at any given present time."
Miss Calkins (4), defining psychology as "the science of the self
as conscious," holds that "in being conscious, I am always conscious
(even if vaguely conscious), of myself as related either to an object
or to that totality of objects which I call my environment."
Recent papers dealing with consciousness approach the subject
from both psychological and philosophical points of view. For the
psychologists, Judd (13) argues that an adequate explanation of
human life in biological terms, without use of the concept conscious-
ness, is impossible. Consciousness has "solved the age-long opposi-
tion between individual and environment," by literally "taking up
the environment into the individual and there remoulding the ab-
sorbed environment in conformity to individual needs." The indi-
vidual thus comes ultimately to live in an inner world with laws of
combination differing wholly from those of the outer world.
Weyer (32) thinks that psychology needs a unit concept more
psychical than that of the physiological reflex arc. The essential
characteristic of consciousness is found in "complexity, differentiated
in clearness as opposed to sensory intensity." For Pikler (27), con-
sciousness arises from purely objective and physical tendencies to
repetition. It first appears as the result of resistances aroused by
the excitation of opposed tendencies of such a nature. Abolition of
resistances between related systems forms the higher levels of con-
sciousness, which give rise to voluntary action. Dodge (7) regards
consciousness as a form of organization, to which the concept of
apperception in Erdmann's sense is the key. It thus shows the same
sort of organization as its contents.
The experimental study of Ordahl (25) finds both conscious and
unconscious factors involved in learning. Associations are fixed and
variations crop out unconsciously, consciousness being a "corrective
agent." While learning is possible when neither the end nor the
fact of learning is conscious, attention gives more marked results.
Experiments undertaken to determine whether material present but
not conscious was more easily learned later proved inconclusive.
22 H. W. CHASE
A group of papers deal with special phases of the question.
Miiller-Freienfels (21) discusses states of consciousness of heightened
intensity. He finds them characterized by alterations of the emotive
life, and, on the intellectual side, by increased clearness, with a
telescoping of the "transitive parts." Levy-Suhl (14) makes the
Einstellung a general capacity of all organized matter, and points out
its importance both in normal and abnormal consciousness. Oester-
reich (24) distinguishes three phases of disturbance of function of
consciousness, depersonalization, successive alterations of self-con-
sciousness, and splitting of consciousness.
Three papers deal with consciousness under anesthesia. Hill (10)
finds the waning of consciousness under chloroform characterized by
no sharply marked stages, motor ability being the last to leave, the
affective state, pleasant. On recovery, sensory phenomena and emo-
tional tone were reversed, and there was later amnesia for a partially
rational period. Walker (31) notes especially a sense of loss of individu-
ality at the beginning of recovery from ether. Jacobson (n), from an
experience with nitrous oxide, concludes that higher functions may
remain when lower have gone, and that subsequent amnesia may not
mean unconsciousness in the patient at the time of operation. The
suggestion to remember might be effective here.
Of the philosophical writers, Bawden (2) regards mental phe-
nomena as "vicarious substitutes for physical phenomena when the
latter are for any reason inadequate." Mind is but "the machinery
by which the content of experience undergoes metamorphosis into a
different mode." Behavior is here central.
Bode (3) criticizes the definitions of consciousness offered by the
realistic movement. The instrumentalism of Professor Dewey, pos-
tulating that consciousness is merely "a name for 'sensations,' 'states
of consciousness' or 'psychic elements' which emerge as the results
or products of the psychological investigation," with no proper exist-
ence elsewhere, offers at least a working program.
Tawney (29) argues that functional psychology has failed to
bridge the gap, created by modern science and philosophv, between
inner and outer experience. Woodworth's definition of consciousness
as relation seems promising. A psychology based on "immediate
values" is needed.
McGilvary (18), while expressing his sympathy with relational
theories of consciousness, considers that the peculiar sort of relation
which constitutes consciousness is neither to be found in the appro-
priation bv the present of past experience, as James would hold, nor
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS 23
in the meaning relation assumed by Woodbridge. Consciousness,
while relational in character, is characterized by "a unique way of
togetherness, distinct from all other ways of togetherness," which
"must be taken at its face value, neither less nor more." His other
paper (17) is a protest against Dewey's identification of consciousness
with the "organic releases . . . which are the conditions of aware-
ness." Such a position is hardly distinguishable from that of the
realists, and still leaves untouched the whole problem of consciousness.
Miller (19) criticizes Singer's statement that "consciousness is
not something inferred from behavior, it is behavior." Conscious-
ness implies a peculiar conjunction of objects in its field at. any mo-
ment, a sort of togetherness which the realist ignores. Mitchell (20)
considers that consciousness and matter imply one another as truly
as convexity and concavity. The argument directed against parallel-
ism and based on the denial of such implication thus loses its force.
Recent literature in the field of the "unconscious" or "subcon-
scious" has at least served to emphasize the existing confusion. The
earlier symposium on this topic in the Journal of Abnormal Psychology
appears in book form (22). The article by Hart (9) which is added
to the former symposium, distinguishes between marginal, co-con-
scious, subconscious in the sense of Janet, and the conceptual ex-
planatory construction of Freud. Whether the facts are interpreted
in mental or physical terms is of small consequence; the conception
of the subconscious itself has the same pragmatic justification as the
ether of the physicist.
Abramowski (i), as the result of an experimental study, argues
for a subconscious which is a creative stratum, showing various
degrees of organization, and the content of which tends either to
enter or to recede from consciousness. Patini (26) attempts another
classification of observed facts. Consciousness involves awareness of
self. The apsychic are twilight states without this criterion. The
unconscious is inactive and latent; the subconscious, active, but
subliminal. Mackenzie (15) points out the possibility of other inter-
pretations of the facts observed in the Beauchamp case. Chase (5)
summarizes critically Freud's theories of the unconscious.
A symposium on the subject at the Geneva conference was opened
by Dessoir (6), who would make the subconscious differ from con-
sciousness, not in content, but in a less close organization of its
elements. There is no water-tight compartment between the two,
the marginal zone being of especial significance in phenomena of
dissociation. Janet (12) again expresses his desire to limit the use
24 H. W. CHASE
of the term "subconscious" to split-off systems which function in
diseases of personality. Prince (28) regards the unconscious as in-
active memory-dispositions. Co-consciousness is preferred as a term
for active processes outside of consciousness. The Freudian con-
ception of the mechanism of the unconscious is criticized in that
psychoanalysis shows origins and not actual mechanisms.
REFERENCES
1. ABRAMOWSKI, E. Dissociation et transformation du subconscient normal. Rev.
psychoL, 1910, 3, 63-80, 187-209.
2. BAWDEN, H. H. Mind as a Category of Science. PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN,
1910, 7, 221-225.
3. BODE, B. H. Realistic Conceptions of Consciousness. Phil. Rev., 1911, 20, 265-
279.
4. CALKINS, M. W. A First Book in Psychology. New York: Macmillan, 1910.
Pp. viii -f 4*9-
5. CHASE, H. W. Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious. Ped. Sent., 1910, 17, 281-
327.
6. DESSOIR, Max. Das Unterbewusstsein. Proc. Flme Cong. Int. de PsychoL ,
tenu a Geneve, 1909. Geneva, 1910, 37-56.
7. DODGE, R. A Working Hypothesis for Inner Psychophysics. PSYCHOL. REV.,
1911, 18, 167-185.
8. FITE, W. Individualism. New York: Longmans, 1911. Pp. viii + 301.
9. HART, B. The Conception of the Subconscious. /. of Abnorm. PsychoL, 1910, 4,
3SI-37L
10. HILL, Prof, and Mrs. D. S. The Loss and Recovery of Consciousness under
Anesthesia. PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 1910, 7, 77-83.
11. JACOBSON, E. Consciousness under Anesthetics. Amer. J. of PsychoL, 1911, 22,
334-345-
12. JANET, P. Les Problemes du Subconscient. Proc. VIme Cong. Int. de PsychoL,
tenu a Geneve, 1909. Geneva, 1910, 57-70.
13. JUDD, C. H. Evolution and Consciousness. PSYCHOL. REV., 1910, 17, 77-97.
14. LEVY-SUHL, M. Ueber Einstellungsvorgange in normalen und anormalen Seelen-
zustanden. Zsch. f. Psychother. u. med. PsychoL, 1910, 2, 141-164.
15. MACKENZIE, W. L. Observations on the Case of Sally Beauchamp. Mind, 1910,
19, 1-29.
16. McCABE, J. The Evolution of Mind. London: Black, 1910. Pp. xvii -f- 287.
17. McGiLVARY, E. Prof. Dewey's "Action of Consciousness." J. of Phil., PsychoL,
etc., 1911, 8,458-460.
1 8. McGiLVARY, E. Experience as Pure and Consciousness as Meaning. /. of Phil.,
PsychoL, etc., 1911, 8, 511-525.
19. MILLER, D. S. Is Consciousness a Type of Behavior? /. of Phil., PsychoL, etc.,
1911,8, 322-327.
20. MITCHELL, C. The Logical Implication of Matter in the Definition of Conscious-
ness, y. of Phil., PsychoL, etc., 1911, 8, 561-565.
21. MtiLLER-pREiENFELS, R. Zur Psychologic der Erregungs- und Rauschzustande.
Zsch. f. SinnesphysioL, 1910, 57, 161-194.
THE SELF IN RECENT PSYCHOLOGY
25
22. MUNSTERBERG, H, RlBOT, P., JASTROW, J., HART, B., PRINCE, M. Subconscious
Phenomena. Boston: Badger, 1910. Pp. 141.
23 . OESTERREICH, K. Die Phdnomenologie des Ich in ihren Grundproblemen Lei™*
1910.
24. OESTERREICH, K. Das Selbstbewusstsein und seine Storungen. Zsch.f. Psycho-
ther. u. med. Psychol., 1910, 2.
25. ORDAHL, L. E. Consciousness in Relation to Learning. Amer. J. of Psychol
1911, 22, 159-213-
26. PATINI, E. Coscienza, Subcoscienza, Incoscienza, ed Apsychia. Riv. di psicol
appl, 1910, 6, 24-45.
27. PIKLER, J. Die Stelle des Bewusstseins in der Natur. Leipzig: Earth 1910 Pp
34-
28. PRINCE, M. The Subconscious. Proc. VI 'me Cong. Int. de Psychol. tenu a
Geneve, 1909. Geneva, 1910, 71-97.
29. TAWNEY, G. A. Consciousness in Psychology and Philosophy. /. of Phil.,
Psychol. , etc., 1911, 8, 197-203.
30. TITCHENER, E. B. A Text-Book of Psychology. New York: Macmillan 1910
Pp. ix + 558.
31. WALKER, H. Record of an Experience while under the Influence of Ether.
/. of Phil., Psychol., etc., 1910, 7, 437.
32. WEYER, E. M. A Unit Concept of Consciousness. PSYCHOL. REV., 1910, 17,
301-318.
THE SELF IN RECENT PSYCHOLOGY
BY PROFESSOR MARY WHITON CALKINS
Wellesley College
Professor Titchener has made a notable contribution (3) to the
discussion of the self in psychology by collecting from thirteen grad-
uate students, all of them "trained in introspection" and six of them
with "unusually thorough training," answers to the following ques-
tions:
I. " 'I am always inattentively or attentively conscious of my-
self.' ... Is this statement true, as a matter of experience, (a)
in everyday life, (b) in the introspective exercises of the laboratory?"
(P- 542).
II. A question calling for a description of self-consciousness made
"as definite as possible" (p. 545).
III. A question addressed only to those who had answered I. (a)
in the negative, pointing out "that this answer implies that self-
consciousness is intermittent. Under what circumstances, then, is it
likely to appear?" (p. 548).
In reply to the first question, two of Titchener's thirteen subjects
assert, but "with qualification" that they are always conscious of
26 MARY WHITON CALKINS
self, the "center of material, psychical, social relations" as one of
them calls it. Four declare that they are conscious of self during
laboratory introspection. All assert or imply that they are some-
times conscious of self. The descriptions of self-consciousness called
for by question II. are summarized in the following rough list:
"Organic complexes, 12. Visual imagery, 10. Affective processes, 8 (implied in
4 other cases). Kinsesthetic complexes, 8 (probably in other cases merged in organic).
Conscious attitudes, 4 (those of responsibility, recognition of ownership of intro-
spections, ownership of experience, and activity in the background of consciousness"
(p. 551, slightly condensed).
The "one outstanding result" of the answers to question III. is
"that the experience of self is preponderantly a social matter. . . .
Next in order comes the unusual or novel situation" (p. 551).
From the answers to question I. Titchener concludes that "self-
consciousness is, in many cases, an intermittent and even a rare
experience" (p. 550); and he explains the persistence of self-conscious-
ness in the four cases by "the hypothesis of individual difference."
With the fairness which characterizes his entire discussion, he none
the less admits that "it is possible that the two groups of observers
[those who assert and those who deny the persistence of the con-
sciousness of self] may have understood the question differently and
are therefore talking of different things." My own reading of the
records — which is colored, of course, by previous conclusions pre-
cisely opposed to Titchener' s — is that the two groups of observers
have indeed understood the question differently and that those who
answer in the negative deny the persistence, not of self-consciousness
as such but of some particular stage or phase of it. The study of
the records of introspection seems to me to bear out this conclusion.
It is to be regretted that five of the eleven who answered I. (a) in the
negative and three of the nine who answered I. (b) in the negative
neglect to supplement their bare "No" by any introspective detail.
From the remaining records I quote the following indications of what
seems to me a misapprehension of the meaning of self-consciousness:
"Btm. 'No. In seeing a play I am often another person, portrayed by the actor,
and do not realize that I am a spectator until my neighbor speaks'" (p. 542, end).
But self-consciousness is surely present when a man seems to
himself "a person" even though "another person." B. is uncon-
scious, in the experience which he describes, of circumstances, of
surroundings, of the past, but not of self.
In the following case, that of an observer who changes an origi-
THE SELF IN RECENT PSYCHOLOGY 27
nally affirmative to a negative reply, the consciousness of self is
evidently confused with what is merely a common constituent of it:
"Am. 'No. ... Self-consciousness carried kinsesthetically with possible visual
images occurs comparatively seldom'" (p. 544).
But the answers to question II. have made clear that self-con-
sciousness need not always include kinaesthetic and visual imagery.
The other negative experiences are, to say the least, entirely
compatible with the hypothesis that those who deny the persistence
of self-consciousness confuse "self" with some prominent aspect of
it. I am unquestionably more attentively conscious of myself in
novel situations and in social relations than in perception and in
thought. In fact, the very word " self-consciousness " very commonly
means "embarrassment" or "shyness." Thus, these observers when
they deny self-consciousness except in experiences of "shame,"
of "being watched," of "appearing before some personage of im-
portance" may well have overlooked the ever-present self-conscious-
ness precisely because, being always present, it does not draw or
hold their attention.
Every psychologist should read for himself these records of
introspection with Mr. Titchener's discussion of them.
It would probably be unreasonable to demand that every one of
us should read entire two German works, issued late in 1910, which
consider, critically and historically, the psychological doctrine of the
self. And yet each of them well repays study. In the first of
these (i), Dr. Kafka examines contemporary conceptions of the 7
under three headings, " metaphysical," " empirical," and " epistemo-
Ibgical" conceptions. He treats Bergmann and Drews as representa-
tives of writers of the first type and Rickert as upholder of the empir-
ical theory. The empirical group is subdivided; Spir and Busse are
name as examples of the intellectualistic tendency, Wundt and
Miinsterberg as voluntarists, Lipps as emotionalist, James and
Avenarius as holding the sensationalistic empirical conception, and
finally Schubert-Solden and Schuppe as teaching that by "7" is meant
merely the total content of consciousness. The possibility of such a
classification is, of course, open to some question. Kafka himself
indicates, in the course'of his careful analysis, that Miinsterberg, though
a voluntarist, does not treat the 7 as content, that Lipps recognizes
a real as well as an empirical self, and that James tends sometimes
to an epistemological and somtimes to a voluntaristic theory.
Kafka criticizes in great detail the views which he summarizes
28 MARY JVHITON CALKINS
under all these heads, and reaches the following results: (i) The con-
ception of the / as substance behind phenomena is meaningless; and
the arguments adduced for the conception are either invalid or else
they establish the existence of an / of a different sort. (2) Most
" empirical" theories agree in regarding the / as content of conscious-
ness (Bewusstseinsinhalt) either complete or partial. Theories,
whether intellectualistic, voluntaristic, emotionalistic, or sensation-
alistic, which conceive the / as partial content must, one and all,
be rejected on the ground that no one of them justifies the conclusion
that volitions, feelings or sensations are to be distinguished from
the other psychic phenomena" (p. 109) as constituting the self. It is
equally impossible, Kafka continues, to regard the / as total content
(Gesamtbewusstseinsinhalt) — and for two reasons. In the first place,
such a hypothesis leaves unacccounted for the contrast actually made
between 7 and not-I. And, second, the very existence of a content
presupposes the existence of that-of-which-it-is-content, and the
experienced (das Erlebniss) must be experienced (erlebt) by some sub-
ject (p. 233). But the 7, or subject, is that whose nature we are dis-
cussing. It would be meaningless to call it both subject and object
for that would be to do violence to its unity. Or, to parapharse
another of Kafka's statements of this difficulty, the content of con-
sciousness is related to its subject, and neither term of a relation can be
identical with the other term or with the relation (p. 234 et aL).
Thus, Kafka reaches the epistemological, or Kantian, conception of an
7 which is subject, not object, of consciousness, which is not " found"
or " experienced" but which must be assumed to exist as " necessary
common point of relation of all contents combined in the unity of one
consciousness" (p. 233). Such an 7, Kafka says, is perfectly empty,
has no predicates, is, indeed, mere relation. To this conclusion, it
must be added, Kafka does not himself consistently hold, for in
many passages he attributes to the 7 the character of being unique
as well as that of being relation (pp. 225, 233 et at.).
The difficulties of this conception are obvious. How can one
insist that it is necessary to assert the existence not of the merely
unexperienced but of that which it is logically impossible to experi-
ence? If consciousness-as-content exists and if a content can exist
only as content of a subject, or 7 (and Kafka makes both these asser-
tions), then the experiencing self must exist by the same right as the
experienced content.
Not merely a solution but an explanation of the origin of this
problem of subject-objectivity — the problem which Kafka, as has
THE SELF IN RECENT PSYCHOLOGY 29
been indicated, vainly tries to solve by the Kantian expedient— is
offered in Oesterreich's volume (2). Part II. of this book1 is a detailed
study of cases of dissociated personality, and concludes that in all
these cases the essential unity of the self remains unaffected. Part
I. embodies a careful study, comparable with that of Kafka, of
the fundamental problem of the nature of the self. Oesterreich's
definition of the / as "that whose states are the feelings and which
in each of us remains ever identical with itself" (p. 8) suggests both
the weakness and the strength of his theory. In so far as he con-
ceives the / as preeminently or exclusively an emotional /, he lays
himself open to Kafka's criticism, already summarized, of emo-
tionalistic empiricists — in other words, he shows no adequate reason
why the 7 should be described as an emotional, and not also as a
thinking and a willing self. But more to be noted than this in-
adequacy in his doctrine is Oesterreich's teaching that the / is di-
rectly experienced, not as a substance behind phenomena nor as a
mere, abstract " content" — sensation or thought, emotion or volition,
or all combined — but as a feeling, willing, perceiving and thinking 7.
Kafka's logical difficulty — that the 7 as subject is related to its
content or object and therefore distinct from it — is traced by Oester-
reich to the unjustifiable effort to apply the subject-object categories
to an experience wholly fundamental to them.
Oesterreich, like Kafka, is to be commended for the thorough and
careful way in which he sets forth the views of other psychologists.
His exposition and criticism is less systematic, but he quotes where
Kafka cites and summarizes, referring to a greater number but treat-
ing only a few in detail. Neither author takes adequate account of
the contributions by English and American writers to the discussion
of their problem.
My present concern being with psychology, I pass over certain
recent philosophical discussions of the self and close with the mention
of the early chapters of Yerkes's recently issued Introduction to
Psychology (4). They are well worth reading by teachers of psy-
chology for their vigorous suggestion of points of view and of methods.
In my opinion, they are written from the standpoint of an implicit
"self-psychology." "Each one of us," Professor Yerkes says,
"must start in his study of consciousness by looking inward, by
observing the self" (p. 15).
1 A more extended review of the book, by the writer of this notice, appears in the
Philosophical Review, 1911, 20, 636-641.
30 WILLIAM FREDERICK BOOK
REFERENCES
1. KAFKA, G. Versuch einer kritischen Darstellung der neueren Anschauungen iiber
das Ichproblem. Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 1910, 19, 1-241.
2. OESTERREICH, K. Die Phdnomenologie des Ich. Leipzig, 1910. Pp. 532.
3. TITCHENER, E. B. A Note of the Consciousness of Self. Amer. J. of Psycho!.,
1911, 22, 540-552.
4. YERKES, R. M. Introduction to Psychology. New York, 1911. Pp. 427.
ANALYSES OF SOME OF THE HIGHER
THOUGHT PROCESSES
BY PROFESSOR WILLIAM FREDERICK BOOK
University of Montana
Notwithstanding the fact that a few psychologists still regard
any attempt to determine the psychic factors involved in such com-
plex processes as behavior and thought as a kind of useless mental
gymnastic and the result of such analyses as a sort of "introspective
mythology," interest in the psychology of the higher thought proc-
esses has continued to increase during the year. In fact the studies
made have contributed very materially to the belief, already held
by some, that these studies are making an epoch in psychological
history and mark a turning point in our psychological interests and
methods.
The studies published during the year range all the way from
those which attempt to determine the psychic factors involved in
such mental processes as conscious attitudes, belief and doubt,
meaning and understanding, and the process of abstraction on the
one hand, and such complex tasks as determining the psychological
processes involved in learning to shoot with a rifle on the other (4),
it being suggested by the author of the latter study that a complete
psychological history of the learning process involved in becoming
an expert marksman was necessary to make the training of the soldier
rational and economic. These studies are all interesting and im-
portant not merely because of the specific results obtained, but
because of the bearing which these results have on current psycho-
logical discussions and because of the problems and refinements of
method which they suggest. Not all of the studies published during
the year can be mentioned or reviewed.
Okabe (6) tried to analyze and describe in analytic terms the
belief and doubt consciousness, or certainty and uncertainty exper-
ience. He presented to experienced observers statements calculated
ANALYSES OF HIGHER THOUGHT PROCESSES 31
to arouse belief or disbelief in their validity and "upon the appear-
ance of either type of consciousness the observers closed their eyes
and dictated to the experimenter a full account of the consciousness."
Single sentences and mathematical expressions were first presented,
then sentences arranged for comparison. A summary account of
the observers' reports was afterwards submitted to each subject for
correction and verification. Many of the conditions under which
belief and disbelief arose in consciousness were thus determined. It
was found that belief might occur "in terms of a general kinsesthetic
attitude, as internal speech and localized kinaesthesis, or as the
result of the mental relations of visual images. It might also
be bound up with, or incorporated in, a particular consciousness,
verbal or visual." "Like intention, assurance, and volition, belief
may be bound up with, incorporated in, a sequence of mental proc-
esses which proceed under determination, though there is nothing
specific in these processes to serve as a vehicle of that meaning.
These processes go on in a certain way, under the instructions given,
and their going on in that way constitutes them will, recognition or
belief." It would have been interesting to determine by a genetic
method of observation just how such conscious patterns were actually
formed or developed, a procedure which might have thrown much
light on the nature and present constitution of the belief conscious-
ness, but this was not done. The author also concludes that the
belief-disbelief consciousness is not of common occurrence in everyday
life and that it is not necessarily or regularly an emotional conscious-
ness.
Jacobson (3) tried to analyze the consciousness involved in the
perception of single letters and the understanding of words and
sentences. From his results it appears that meaning is chiefly
carried by representative processes, i. e., processes representative
of the content of the sentences or words. When these appeared, the
sentences or words at once had a meaning, though the meaning some-
times arose when these representative processes seemed to be absent.
The meaning tendency does not, however, always rise promptly in
consciousness. A word or sentence may be perceived without it and
different meanings may be attached to the same objective stimulus.
The particular meanings actually attached to his words and sentences
were psychological rather than logical. They were in general "par-
tial meanings, particular exemplifications, or what not, touched ^off
under the given instruction by the habit or momentary disposition
of the observer." "The same stimulus-sentence gave rise to different
32 WILLIAM FREDERICK BOOK
meanings for the same observer so that it was not enought for him
to say that he understood it; he must be asked to specify precisely
what he understood."
Moore (5) attempted to determine experimentally the mental
processes involved in abstraction. He sought to discover how general
ideas actually formed and developed in a given case. His method
consisted of presenting to his subjects a series of geometrical figures
so drawn and arranged that a common element constantly recurred
in $ach group of figures while the other figures of the group were
constantly varied. As soon as the common element was discovered
the exposure apparatus was stopped and the subject required, on
the basis of his introspective analysis, to state how the common ele-
ment in the group had been isolated and perceived. He tried by
this means to determine: (i) How the group of figures containing the
common element was actually broken up and the common element
selected; (2) how the process of perceiving or apprehending the
common element actually took place; (3) how it was held in mind until
recognized as having occurred before; (4) how this state of recognitive
certainty was formed or developed. The analyses of these several
steps were not, however, carried to the point of detailed certainty
because of failure to make the observations sufficiently detailed and
directed. Perhaps the most significant conclusion arrived at in the
study is that the final recognition of the common element depended
upon appropriate mental categories which represented compound
psychical processes entirely distinct and different from imaginal
processes or feelings. These mental categories were acquired through
the past experience of the subjects and were aroused in this case by
the sensations set up by the common element. The fact that these
mental categories were not more minutely and carefully observed and
described and their true nature or constitution determined, keeps
the study from making an important contribution to the psychology
of imageless thought. So far as the author's analyses go they support
the contention that non-imaginal processes exist.
Two studies on Conscious Attitudes have appeared. Miss Clarke
(2) sought to arouse conscious situations in which various attitudes
would be likely to become operative. Single letters, written in blind
point style, were given to her subjects to be perceived tactually and
the observers instructed "to give complete introspections." The
time required to recognize the letters was taken but no use was made
of this reaction time in the treatment of results. A list of all the
attitudes noted by the observers is given and each attitude briefly
ANALYSES OF HIGHER THOUGHT PROCESSES
33
described. The attitudes which often recurred in the course of the
experiment, surprise, uncertainty, hesitation, doubt, etc., were
analyzed in detail. A few attitudes recurred often enough to'enable
the experimenter to determine, in part, their development or genetic
history from the observers' introspective accounts. Woodworth's
method of studying the relational consciousness was repeated, in
part, with the result that all the relational processes observed* by
Miss Clarke's subjects were carried in imaginal terms. Her results
did not fit Woodworth's four ways of perceiving relations. His
fourth class, where "the relation was present in consciousness but
not analyzable into sensory or affective terms" was not paralleled.
Miss Clarke, therefore, concludes, on the basis of the attitudes de-
scribed in her experiments, which she believes to be fairly repre-
sentative, "that all conscious attitudes can be analyzed into sensa-
tions, images and feelings, or traced genetically to such analyzable
complexes; that the conscious attitudes do not warrant the assump-
tion of an additional conscious element."
The most suggestive section of the study is the part dealing with
the genesis and development of these attitudes. "The introspections
of any one observer show," she says, "different stages of clearness
and intensity of imagery, which allow us to connect, by graded series
of intermediate steps, a complex of vivid and explicit imagery with
a vague and condensed consciousness which we suppose to represent
what is called imageless thought." A number of attitudes were
shown to be capable of actual development, by a process of change
through mechanization, ranging from states which were clearly
complex and rich in imagery to a state of vague and condensed
consciousness, reached by a dropping out of the former imaginal
content.
Her conclusions, therefore, verify the results and conclusions
reached by Book in his study of the "Genesis and Development of
Conscious Attitudes" reported some four months before (i). He
showed, by tracing the development of certain specific attitudes in
the same mind, that the attitudes developed in his experiments were
in reality the developed form of certain specific imaginal processes
present in earlier stages of his experiment; that the specific attitudes
which guided the fingers and hands in manipulating a typewriter
in the expert stages of skill were in reality the developed forms of
certain clear and definite imaginal processes used to guide the fingers
and hands in the earlier stages of the learning. Every step or stage
in this process was here followed in the same mind and the develop-
34 WILLIAM FREDERICK BOOK
ment traced from a stage of vivid imagery to a point where the con-
scious processes used to direct the fingers and hands became free from
all imaginal elements. It was also determined that there was a marked
tendency, as this expert stage was approached, to revert to the former
type of conscious direction and control of the fingers and hands, when-
ever particular difficulties occurred or when fatigue set in. There
was a continual slipping back into a method of control where the
consciousness involved was rich in representative processes which
promptly disappeared again when the higher method of control was
used. The fact that the exact nature and final constitution of the
attitudes formed in these experiments were not more minutely de-
scribed is due to the fact that the results were incidentally obtained
in an experiment made for an entirely different purpose.
These studies of conscious attitudes, like the attempted analyses
of the other thought processes mentioned above, therefore, suggest
some important refinements in our methods of psychological ob-
servation. A genetic method of observation must be used whereby
these thought processes may be observed at all stages of their for-
mation and development so that any change or changes which may
occur in these conscious states from stage to stage, as mechanization
takes place, may be accurately determined and described. Further-
more, the observations must be more sharply directed and the cross-
section analyses repeated often enough for the true nature and con-
stitution of the processes studied to be determined. Such a method
of determining the facts would doubtless reveal the true nature and
constitution of these higher thought processes and settle some or
all of the current disputes about imageless thought and conscious
elements. These studies clearly indicate the need of much careful
and patient experimental work and the necessity of carefully refining
and modifying our introspective methods.
REFERENCES
1. BOOK, W. F. On the Genesis and Development of Conscious Attitudes. PSYCHOI..
REV., 1910, 17, 381-398-
2. CLARKE, H. M. Conscious Attitudes. Amer. J. of PsychoL, 1911, 22, 214-249.
3. JACOBSON, E. On Meaning and Understanding. Amer. J. of PsychoL, 1911, 22,
553-577-
4. MEYER, H. Experimentelle Analyse psychischer Vorgange beim Schiessen mit
Handfeuerwaffe. Archiv f. d. ges. PsychoL, 1911, 20, 397-413.
5. MOORE, T. V. The Process of Abstraction. Univ. of California Pub. in PsychoL,
1910, i, 73-197.
6. OKABE, T. An Experimental Study of Belief. Amer. J. of PsychoL, 1910, 21,
TERMINOLOGY AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL 35
TERMINOLOGY
BY PROFESSOR HOWARD C. WARREN J
Princeton University
Dunlap (i) suggests a uniform system of compound words for the
various sensations. The Greek roots are recommended, with pre-
fixes a-, para-, hypo-, hyper-, and the suffixes -meter, -ic, modified
according to the regular laws of euphony. For example, hearing
would be acusia, with the compound forms anacusia, paracusia,
hypacusia, hyperacusia, acumeter, and acusic. The system is ex-
tended to senses whose Greek names are not in common use, and
several other suggestions of form are made, such as myope and
chromopsia.
Attention should be called to the new French philosophic vocabu-
lary in course of compilation by the Societe francaise de Philosophic
(2), containing a number of psychological definitions. The present
installment (No. 13) includes L and M to Metaphysique. We note
the words liminal, localisation, signes locaux, ludique (as an adjective
for play), marginal, memoire, mental, and many terms on the border
line between philosophy and psychology.
German terminology is represented by a new edition of Kirchner
(3), which has been again revised. Little appears to have been done
during the past year in the field of psychological terminology.
REFERENCES
1. DUNLAP, K. Terminology in the Field of Sensation. Amer. J. of PsychoL, 1911,
22,444.
2. LELANDE, A., etc. Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophic. Bull. Soe.
franc., de phil., 1910, 13, 159-212.
3. MICHAELIS, C. Kirchner's Worterbuch der philosophischen Grundbegriffe. (6.
Aufl.) Dritte Neubearb. Leipzig: Meiner, 1911. Pp. vi + 1124.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL
BY PROFESSOR HOWARD C. WARRENJ]
Princeton University
It is interesting to note a movement towards compilation of
complete bibliographies of the works of individual writers. The list
of William James's writings (4) has been compiled with great care
and contains 204 titles. Titchener and Geissler (2) give another
supplementary list of the writings of Wundt, completing 1910 and
36 BORIS SIDIS
including a partial list for 1911; three popular articles published
1 861-2, and two more recent translations are also included.
Claparede (i) discusses systematic abbreviation of the titles of
magazines, and advocates a set of rules for abbreviation in reference
work which are nearly identical with those already adopted by the
Psychological Index and this BULLETIN. The editors of the Zsch. f.
angew. Psychol. publish (3) a list of abbreviations for magazine titles
which are much more condensed. To this plan the objection is raised
by Claparede that no ready clue is afforded either to the actual title
of the periodical or to the language of publication.
The announcement is made (5) that the annual psychological
bibliographies published by the Zsch. f. Psychol. and the Psychol.
Index have adopted a uniform scheme of classification and will in
future be practically identical in material and arrangement, the chief
point of difference being in the language of the section headings.
REFERENCES
1. CLAPARfeDE, E. L'abreviation des titres des publications periodiques. Arch, de
Psychol., 1911, u, 114-117.
2. TITCHENER, E. B., and GEISSLER, L. R. A Bibliography of the Scientific Writings
of Wilhelm Wundt. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1911, 22, 586-587. (cf. 1908, 19,
541-556; 1909, 20, 570; 1910, 21, 603-604.)
3. [ANON.] Abkiirzungen. Zsch. f. angew. Psychol., 1911, 5, 630-634.
4. [ANON.] A List of the Published Writings of William James. PSYCHOL. REV., 1911,
18, 157-165.
5. [ANON. | Editorial Note. PSYCHOL. BULL., 1911, 8, 334.
DREAMS
BY DR. BORIS SIDIS
Sidis Psychotherapeutic Institute, Portsmouth, N. H.
In spite of the fact that much is written on dream states their
psychology is still in deep obscurity. Dr. P. Meunier (10) advances
the view that dreams occur during transitional states from waking
to sleep or from sleep to waking. Dreams are a form of hypnagogic
states. In this respect he agrees with Sidis (17) that dreams occur
mostly in the hypnoidal state which is the transitional state between
waking and sleeping. Dreams which do not occur during the inter-
mediary state Meunier regards as abnormal. The causation he
ascribes to mental disturbances and to external and internal stimula-
tions. The pathological dream is of ccenesthetic character and points
to a diseased organ. The dream may thus be utilized for clinical
DREAMS yj
purposes. In his larger work Meunier (n) maintains the same thesis
Dreams are of the character of hypnagogic hallucinations. An halluci-
nation is an isolated fact or percept, the dream is a continuous whole,
an episode, a drama. A large part of the work is devoted to an
interesting clinical study of dream consciousness.
Dr. Bernard Leroy (9) in his study of dreams comes to the con-
clusion that the final stimulus which causes awakening is not identical
with the original stimulus which causes the dream. The original
sensory stimulus is forgotten in the total memory of the dream
episode.
An excellent work carried out for a number of years in a true
experimental scientific way is that on dreams by Professor J. Mourly
Void (19). The main thesis is that dreams are brought about by
the positions of the bodily organs during sleep and in general by
kinsesthetic sensations. This is the best scientific study of dreams
that has thus far appeared on the subject of dream consciousness.
The work should be closely studied by those who wish to undertake
an investigation of the psychology of dreams.
Dr. Edmond Cramaussel (2) studies variations of sleep of an
infant by observing the modifications of respirations.
Dr. Waterman (20) makes a short study of dreams as a cause of
various symptoms in psychopathic maladies. He finds, as many psy-
chopathologists have shown before him, that dreams may give rise
to psychopathic disturbances. The dreams themselves are based on
experiences of waking life. This corroborates the work in psycho-
pathology carried out by Janet, Prince and Sidis. What is question-
able is the symbolism of the dreams under investigation.
Havelock Ellis (3) gives a popular account of dream life. Dr.
Ellis accepts the division of dreams into two groups, presentative
and representative. The presentative group may be subdivided into
two subgroups, " according as they refer to external stimuli present to
the senses or to internal disturbances within the organism. The
representative group falls into two subdivisions according as the
memories are of old or of recent date." He also is of the opinion,
now current, that "the internal or external stimuli which act upon
sleeping consciousness are not part of that consciousness, nor in any
real sense its source or its cause." Representative elements, memory
images, constitute the content, the make-up of dream consciousness.
Inattention, lack of mental synthesis, disturbance of apperception,
emotion, dissociation, fatigue are the factors of dream life. The
theory advanced can be put in a nutshell: Sensations and perceptions
38 BORIS SIDIS
(under perceptions Ellis also includes memory images, ideas or what
he prefers to describe as "internally aroused perceptions — memories")
"are not properly apperceived" (Ellis's italics). This generalization
gives rise to a speculative theory on paramnesia. In discussing
dream symbolism he tells dogmatically that "there can be no manner
of doubt that our dreams are full of symbolism." Under the com-
prehensive term of symbolism he includes language, music, art, the
phenomena of synsesthesia, the theory of perception and hallucina-
tion in regard to the nature of secondary sensory elements, in fact
all forms of association of elements of one sense with those of another.
The psychoanalytic school is specially prolific in the number of
articles on dreams. The quantity unfortunately predominates. Dr.
Ernest Jones (6, 7), an earnest follower of the school, gives a resume
of Freud's work on dreams (4). There is a latent content and there
is a manifest content and four mechanisms: condensation, displace-
ment, dramatization and secondary elaboration. Consciousness acts
as the censor that suppresses and alters the latent content. The
groundwork of every dream is infantile and sexual and is of high
personal significance. Dream analysis helps to penetrate into the
depths of the unconscious. The biological function of the dream is
to lull consciousness to sleep like a nurse telling a story to a child to
make it go to sleep. "When however the activity of the endopsychic
censor is insufficient to keep back or alter materially the thoughts of
the latent content, then we have a nightmare." To get at the
symbolic meaning of the latent content is supposed to be the task
of psychoanalysis. The paper is illustrated by a few short examples.
Dr. Alfred Rubitsek (16) analyzes Egmont's dream. Symbolism
characteristic of decadent thought and the stronghold of Freud's
psychoanalytic method is naively employed as is the case with all
adherents of the school. The symbolism reminds one of the mediaeval
symbolic interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. Freud's writings form
the psychoanalytic Bible and are quoted with reverence and piety.
Dr. Otto Rank (14) makes a long psychoanalytic study of a girl's
dreams, with notes and footnotes, along Freud's lines. The inter-
pretation is ingenious and full of that rank, sexual, artificial symbolism
for which the school is so notorious. The painstaking studies, the
loyalty, the devotion to the master's great discoveries are worthy of
a better cause and remind one of the disciples of Mrs. Mary Baker
Eddy. Dr. Rank (15) also discusses a couple of dreams which he
traces to an "incest-complex" — Eifersucht auf die Mutter und
Zartlichkeit gegen den Vater.
DREAMS 39
Dr. Sig. Freud (5) gives a few examples of interpretation of dream
symbols in a few of his cases. The interpretation is full of Talmudic
casuistry in regard to the sexual meaning of certain dream visions.
Dr. Alfred Adler (i) gives the analysis of a false dream of one of
his female patients as an illustration of the mechanism of deception
in neurosis. The psychoanalysis, as usual with the Freudist, discloses
sexual experiences, "psychic hermaphroditism," as the basis of the
neurosis.
Dr. Morton Prince (12) in his investigation of dreams does not
find any of the elaborate machinery claimed by the psychoanalytic
school. Prince finds that in his cases symbolism plays an important
role. He finds that dream material is derived from a variety of
conserved memories and from ideas phantasmagorically running
through the mind during the presleeping state. In this he agrees
with Meunier and Sidis as to the relation of the hypnagogic and
hypnoidal states to the content and mechanism of dreams. Prince
lays stress on subconscious motives round which the dream activity
plays symbolically. Dr. Prince, however, unlike the Freudists, in-
sists that this symbolism and motivization are present only in some
special cases. Dr. Prince is very careful not to make sweeping
generalizations and as such his study is important both from psycho-
logical and psychopathological standpoints.
Dr. E. Jones (7) sharply criticizes Dr. Prince's work for calling in
vain the name of the master's method. To which Prince (13) rightly
replies that it makes no difference what the name of the method is
provided the method is correct, the facts are true and the work is
well done.
Dr. C. G. Jung (8) undertakes in a patronizing way to give what he
regards as the real psychoanalysis of Prince's dream cases which
Yung claims have been inefficiently, insufficiently and inadequately
studied by Prince. Yung's psychoanalysis is full of unconscious
sexual humor. Dr. Stekel (18), who is understood to have used
psychoanalysis on tens of thousands of dreams and whose name may
be regarded as a symbol characteristic of his own psychoanalysis,
presents a short communication of a dream study which as to mechan-
ism, symbolism and cabalistic interpretation well illustrates the
elaborate artificiality of Freudian dream psychology and ingenious
triviality of symbolic sexual psychoanalysis.
REFERENCES
1. ADLER, A. Ein erlogener Traum. Zentrb. f. Psychoanal.,-1. Jahrg. H. 3, 1910.
2. CRAMAUSSEL, Ed. Le Sommeil d'un petit Enfant. Arch, de Psychol., 1910, 9,
172-181.
,40
NOTES AND NEWS
3. ELLIS, H. The World of Dreams. Boston, 1911. Pp.283.
4. FREUD, SIG. Die Traumdeutung. Leipzig, 1909.
5. FREUD, SIG. Nachtrage zur Traumdeutung. Zentrb. f. Psychoanal., I. Jahrg. H. 5
and 6, 1911, 187-192.
6. JONES, E. Freud's Theory of Dreams. Amer. J. of Psycho!., 1910, 21, 283-308.
(See author's abstract in /. of Abnorm. PsychoL, 1910, 5, 211-214.)
7. JONES, E. Remarks on Prince's "The Mechanism of Dreams." /. of Abnorm.
PsychoL, 1911,5,328-336.
8. JUNG, C. G. Morton Prince. Eine kritische Besprechung. Jahrb.f. psychoanal.
u. psychophys. Forsch., I. Halfte, 1911.
9. LER.OY, B. Sur 1'inversion du temps dans le reve. Rev. phil., 1910, 69, 65-69.
10. MEUNIER, P. La Valeur semeiologique des reves. /. de psychol. norm, et path.,
1910, 7-
11. MEUNIER, P. Les Reves. Paris, 1910. Pp. 198.
12. PRINCE, M. The Mechanism and Interpretation of Dreams. /. of Abnorm.
Psychol, 1910, 5, I39-I95-
13. PRINCE, M. A Reply to Dr. Jones. /. of Abnorm. PsychoL, 1911, 5, 337~353-
14. RANK, O. Ein Traum der sich deutet. Jahrb. f. psychoanal. u. psychophys.
Forsch., II. Halfte, 1910, 465-540.
15. RANK, O. Beispiel eines verkappten Oedipustraumes. Zentrb. f. Psychoanal.,
I. Jahrg. H. 4, 1911, 167-170.
16. RUBITSEK, A. Die Analyse von Egmont's Traum. Jahrb. f. psychoanal. u.
psychophys. Forsch., II. Halfte, 1910, 451-464.
17. SIDIS, B. An Experimental Study of Sleep. Boston, 1909.
18. STEKEL, W. Zur Symbolik der Mutterleibsphantasie. Zentrb. f. Psychoanal., I.
Jahrg. H. 3, 1910, 102-103.
19. VOLD, J. M. Der Traum. Leipzig, 1910.
20. WATERMAN, G. Dreams as a Cause of Symptoms. /. of Abnorm. PsychoL, 1910,
5, 196-210.
NOTES AND NEWS
AT the recent meeting of the American Psychological Association
at Washington, D. C., Professor E. L. Thorndike (Teachers College)
was elected president for the coming year. Professor W. V. Bing-
ham continues as secretary-treasurer.
THE Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology has elected
the following officers for the year 1911: President, Professor R. M.
Ogden (Tennessee); vice-president, President H. J. Pearce (Brenau);
secretary-treasurer, Professor W. C. Ruediger (George Washington).
THE American Philosophical Association has elected Professor
Frank Thilly (Cornell) president and Professor Norman K. Smith
(Princeton) vice-president. Professor E. G. Spaulding continues as
secretary.
-I
Vol. IX. No. 2. February 15, 191 2.
THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
AND THE SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
SOUTHERN SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY AND PSY-
CHOLOGY, WASHINGTON, D. C, DECEMBER 27, 28
AND 29, 1911
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION
The twentieth annual meeting of the American Psychological
Association was held in Washington, D. C., on Wednesday, Thursday
and Friday, December 27, 28 and 29, 1911, in affiliation with the
Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology and the American
Association for the Advancement of Science.
Professor Carl E. Seashore, Dean of the Graduate School of the
University of Iowa, was the presiding officer. His presidential
address Thursday evening pointed out the possibilities of applied
psychology, using as a typical illustration the psychological measure-
ments of a singer which the consulting psychologist of the future
will make when aiding a young person to decide whether or not to
devote himself to a musical career. Many papers throughout the
three days' sessions made strikingly evident the fact that psychology
in America is seeking to find itself in various fields of application,
as well as in the realm of pure psychology.
The meetings were held, with one exception, in the main building
of the George Washington Medical School. Two assembly halls
were provided for the formal sessions and two rooms were devoted
to a large exhibit of both new and standard forms of apparatus.
About eighty members were in attendance.
The program began Wednesday morning with a symposium on the
demarcation of the distinct differences between "Instinct and In-
41
42 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
telligence." Four formal papers provoked a lively discussion, which
made evident most clearly the need and importance of much patient,
detailed observation and investigation of instinctive behavior. The
opening of the apparatus exhibit Wednesday afternoon was followed
by a double program. In one section the papers on mental tests were
presented, and in another, the experimental contributions to the study
of animal behavior. Double programs were also necessary on Thurs-
day and Friday afternoons to make possible the reading of the large
number of papers submitted. Two of these programs were made up
of reports of research in experimental psychology. Paralleling them
were a program of general and theoretical papers, and a joint session
with Section L devoted to educational psychology.
The program which attracted widest interest was that of Thursday
forenoon, at which time the Associations met at the Government
Hospital for the Insane. A conference had been arranged on the
relations of psychology and medical education; and the interest in
the papers which had been prepared showed the timeliness and im-
portance of the subject. Several eminent psychiatrists and repre-
sentatives of medical faculties were present to share in the informal
discussion, and although there were extreme divergences of view
regarding the type of psychology which ought to be taught and re-
garding the place in the curriculum where it ought to be introduced,
there was marked unanimity of opinion regarding the need of psy-
chology. It is expected that the proceedings of this meeting will be
printed in full in the Journal of the American Medical Association.
Following this session the two societies and their guests were
entertained at luncheon by Professor Franz. On that same evening
Professor Franz and Professor Ruediger were the hosts at a joint
smoker which proved in many ways to be one of the most delightful
occasions of the week, for during the festivities the members had the
privilege of hearing anecdotes and reminiscences of the early days
of the Psychological Association narrated by President Stanley Hall,
the first President of the Association, Professor Ladd, who cooperated
with President Hall in getting the Association organized, Professor
Cattell, a member of the first council, and Professor Miinsterberg,
who, having just come from Germany to America, was present at the
first annual meeting, held in Philadelphia nineteen years ago.
At the annual business meeting of the Association Friday morning,
Professor E. L. Thorndike was elected President of the Association
for the ensuing year. Professor Margaret F. Washburn and Pro-
fessor Max Meyer were elected to membership in the council for
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 43
three years, to succeed President Sanford and Professor Thorndike.
Professor C. E. Seashore, the retiring president, was elected to rep-
resent the Association on the Council of the A. A. A. S.
The following persons, having been recommended by the Council,
were elected to membership in the Association : Jasper Converse Barnes'
Ph.D., Maryville College; Frederick Stephen Breed, Ph.D., Univer-
sity of Michigan; Lucy Hoesch-Ernst, Ph.D., Milwaukee, Wis.; Mabel
Ruth Fernald, Ph.D., Chicago Teachers College; Samuel Weiller
Fernberger, A.M., University of Pennsylvania; Joseph Wanton
Hayes, Ph.D., University of Chicago; Mrs. Mary Holmes Stevens
Hayes, Ph.D., University of Chicago; Samuel J. Holmes, Ph.D.,
University of Wisconsin; Herbert Sidney Langfeld, Ph.D., Harvard
University; Henry C. McComas, Ph.D., Princeton University; John
Moffatt Mecklin, 'Ph.D., Lafayette College; Ethel Chamberlain
Porter, Ph.D., East Orange, N. J.; W. H. Pyle, Ph.D., University
of Missouri; Carl L. Rahn, Ph.B., University of Minnesota; Christian
A. Ruckmich, A.B., Cornell University; William T. Shepherd, Ph.D.,
Washington, D. C.; H. Douglas Singer, M.D., Illinois State Psycho-
pathic Institute; Raymond H. Stetson, Ph.D., Oberlin College;
Elmer Ernest Southard, M.D., Ph.D., Harvard University; Edward
K. Strong, Ph.D., Columbia University; J. E. W. Wallin, Ph.D.;
Clara Jean Weidensall, Ph.D., New York State Reformatory for
Women, Bedford Hills; Harry Porter Weld, Ph.D., Clark University;
Edward Moffat Weyer, Ph.D., Washington and Jefferson College;
Mary T. Whitley, Ph.D., Teachers College, Columbia University.
The determination of the time and place of the next meeting was
left to the Council, with power to act. A cordial invitation had been
received to come to Western Reserve University, Cleveland, where
the American Association for the Advancement of Science will meet
next December. But a meeting at this time was of course deemed
inadvisable if the International Congress of Psychology is to be held
in New York and Boston at Easter, in the spring of 1913.
The advisability of undertaking to hold this Congress in America
as originally planned has been brought into question by certain
members of the Executive Committee of the Congress, who have
found a lamentable lack of interest in the Congress abroad. Other
members of the committee have felt that it is important not to aban-
don the project in spite of the attitude of European psychologists
and the difficulties in the way of holding a successful congress of
really international character. On motion of Professor Cattell, the
Secretary was instructed to secure by mail from the members of this
44 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
Association, the Southern Society, and the North Central Association,
an informal expression of opinion regarding the desirability of having
the congress in America.
(Since the above was put into type, word has been received from
the officers of the Congress that the project of holding the Congress
in America in 1913 has been definitely abandoned. The next meeting
of the Association will, then, be held next December in Cleveland.
This central location will make possible a splendid "get-together"
meeting of eastern and western members on the occasion of the
twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Association.)
The Council, having for some years back experienced frequent
difficulty in securing adequate information regarding applicants for
membership in the Association, made public the following announce-
ment: "The Council requests that all recommendations for member-
ship in the Association be submitted to the Secretary at least a month
in advance of the time of election, and that these recommendations
be accompanied by a statement of the candidate's professional posi-
tion and by copies of his published researches."
On recommendation of the Council it was voted that a com-
mittee of three be appointed by the President to study and report
on the relations of psychology and medical education, and to confer
on behalf of this Association with other bodies interested in these
problems. (Professor W. D. Scott, Professor E. E. Southard and
Professor J. B. Watson were appointed.) The Council was empowered
to authorize the expenditure of a sum not to exceed $50 for the ex-
penses of this Committee.
Professor Angell reported the completion of the investigations
heretofore planned by the Committee on the Standardization of
Mental Tests, and announced in a general way the plans of the
Committee for the immediate future. On recommendation of the
Council it was voted that the Committee be continued; that the prin-
ciple of rotation of one member per year be adopted; that the order
of rotation be determined by the Committee; and that the new
member be chosen by the Council upon nomination of the Committee.
$250 was appropriated for the publication of reports of this Com-
mittee during the present year, the conditions of publication to be
subject to the regulation of the Council. It was the general senti-
ment of those participating in the discussion that this appropriation
should be renewed annually as needed.
It was also voted, on recommendation of the Council, that the
Committee on Tests be requested to hold itself ready to examine and
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS
45
report upon the relative merit of different forms of apparatus de-
signed to serve the same general purpose. In explaining the object
of this resolution, one of the speakers cited the desirability of a body
which would be prepared to undertake investigations of the relative
merits of the various forms of esthesiometers, tachistoscopes, etc.
The committee, of which Professor Angell is Chairman, will welcome
suggestions as to possible lines of usefulness.
Professor Whipple made a report of the work undertaken by
the Committee on Teaching Experiments. It was voted that this
committee be continued. The Association also authorized the ex-
penditure of a sum not to exceed $50 to meet necessary expenses of
the committee.
Professor Warren presented a report for the Committee on
Periodicals. It was voted that this committee be continued, with
power to add to its membership. It at present consists of represen-
tatives of each of the psychological journals, but it was deemed desir-
able to have a representative for the readers and contributors, as
well as for the editors.
A sum not exceeding $25 was voted to meet necessary expenses
in connection with the apparatus exhibit, and the expenditure of a
similar sum next year was also authorized.
The following recommendation of the Council was adopted;
"The Council, believing that the members of the Association should
consider exercising a more direct control over the choice of its officers,
recommends the appointment of a committee of three to consider
this question and, in the event of their approving a change in the
present arrangements, to submit to the next annual meeting the
necessary amendments to the constitution." (Professor Aikins,
Professor Minor, and Professor Pierce were appointed to this com-
mittee.)
The Association voted a most cordial expression of appreciation
of the courtesies extended by the officers of the George Washington
Medical School and the Government Hospital for the Insane, with
special thanks to Professor Franz and Professor Ruediger for their
generous hospitality.
REPORT OF THE TREASURER FOR THE YEAR 1911
DR.
To Balance from previous year £3,077.69
Dues received from members 243-3S
Interest from July I, 1910, to July I, 1911 99-72
Receipts from sales of Psychological Monographs No. 51 and No. 53. . 95-89
33,516.6s
46 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
CR.
Stationery and printing .................................. $75-25
Traveling expenses (1910 meeting) ........................ 86.16
Clerical assistance ....................................... IS-7S
Postage ......... ....................................... 56.5 1
Express and telegrams ................................... 6.91
Printing and distribution of Proceedings ................... 8.37
Appropriation toward printing and distribution of report of
Committee on Standardization of Tests ................ 150.00
Appropriation toward printing and distribution of report of
sub-committee on Standardization of Methods of Studying
Color-vision ........................................ 200.00
Miscellaneous ........................................... 3-83
Unexpended petty cash .................................. 10-65 613.43
Balance in Union Dime Savings Institution ................. #2,772.99
Balance in Fifth Avenue Bank ............................ 130.23 2,903.22
W. V. BlNGHAM,
Secretary and Treasurer
HANOVER, N. H.,
December 20, 1911.
Audited by the Council
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE SOUTHERN SOCIETY
FOR PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
The Seventh Annual Meeting of the Southern Society for Philos-
ophy and Psychology was held at Washington, D. C., on Wednesday,
Thursday, and Friday, December 27, 28, and 29, 1911, in conjunction
with the American Psychological Association and the American
Association for the Advancement of Science. The meetings were
held in the George Washington University Medical School, President
Shepherd Ivory Franz presiding. The programs for December 27
and 28 were arranged jointly with the American Psychological Asso-
ciation. Following the joint meeting on Thursday afternoon came
the president's address on " New Phrenology." On Thursday evening
the members of both societies were entertained at a smoker held at
the New Fredonia Hotel by Professors Franz and Ruediger.
The following items were passed upon at the business meeting
held on Friday morning, December 29.
1. The proposed amendment to Art. II., Sec. 3, of the constitution
was adopted.
2. It was resolved that the existing arrangement with the Psy-
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 47
chological Review Publishing Company be continued as optional to
the members of the Southern Society and he handled as hitherto by
the secretary of the society. In the future, however, this option
is available only to members residing in the southern territory, but
it is no longer restricted to those who are new subscribers. Notice
of the above arrangement is to be printed after the constitution on
the membership list.
3. The secretary was authorized to drop the names of members
after one year of delinquency.
4. The determination of the time and place of the next meeting
was left in the hands of the Council.
5. The treasurer's report was audited by the Council and showed
a balance on hand, December 23, 1911, of $65. 64.
6. The following officers were elected for the year 1912: President,
Robert Morris Ogden, University of Tennessee; Vice- President, H. J.
Pearce, Brenau College, Gainesville, Ga.; Secretary-Treasurer, Wil-
liam Carl Ruediger, The George Washington University; Council for
3 years, Shepherd Ivory Franz and John Brodus Watson; Council
for i year, W. B. Lane.
7. The following persons were elected to membership: Samuel
Claman, Howard University; H. E. Cunningham, Lookout Mt.,
Tenn.; Gardner C. Basset, Johns Hopkins University; Williston S.
Hough, George Washington University; Edmund B. Huey, Johns
Hopkins University; Herbert Charles Sanborn, Vanderbilt Univer-
sity.
8. Votes of thanks were extended to Dean W. C. Borden for the
use of the George Washington University Medical School and to
Professors Franz and Ruediger for the smoker.
W. C. RUEDIGER, Secretary
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
ABSTRACTS OF PAPERS
The Measure of a Singer. Address of the President of the American
Psychological Association. CARL E. SEASHORE, University of
Iowa.
(This address is published in full in Science, Feb. 9, 1912, Vol.
XXXV, p. 201.)
New Phrenology. Address of the President of the Southern Society
for Philosophy and Psychology. SHEPHERD IVORY FRANZ,
Government Hospital for the Insane.
48 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
An examination of the system of Gall shows that the basis for
his conclusions was an artificial division of the mind into elements
which differ from one another in degree or in kind. Gall attempted
to correlate these divisions with divisions of the brain, assuming that
the mental processes were localized in certain areas of that organ.
Although this view has been attacked from time to time, it has
left its impress upon anatomists and clinicians. Broca had a view
of mental and brain relations somewhat similar to that of Gall, and
this view was amplified by Wernicke and others.
The schematic subdivisions of the mind were combated, but
numerous attempts from the clinical and anatomical standpoints
have been made to uphold the doctrine. In this class belong the
studies of Flechsig, and the more recent studies of the histological
localization of function.
Histologically the cerebral cortex can be divided into a number of
areas, which have the same fundamental characteristics of cells and
fibers arranged in more or less definite layers, but which differ from
one another in the special arrangements of these elements. Because
of these differences it has been assumed that the areas have different
mental functions.
The direct relation of the so-called sensory and perceptive areas
to mental states has not been proven. The histologists have not
been able to give any good explanation for the differences in the
so-called motor areas, of which, clinically and physiologically, we
have more information than of other parts of the cerebrum.
Many clinicians refer to the localization of aphasias as evidence
for the localization of mental processes, but even as clinical mani-
festations the disorders of speech cannot be said to be associated with
definite parts of the brain.
Another principle of histological localization is that of definite
functions for the different layers of the cortex, but there are no facts
which warrant a localization of definite mental states in the indi-
vidual layers.
It has been assumed that the principle of localization has been
settled, but this cannot be accepted, because there is dispute whether
mental states, clinical phenomena or cells are localized. There is
some doubt about the exact localizations of cell groups in the cere-
brum; there is more doubt regarding the relation of clinical mani-
festations to the injury of certain areas, and there is no evidence to
warrant a psychic localization.
All that can be concluded at the present time is that the mind
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 49
is associated with brain activity. We are unable to say that the
activity of the cerebrum alone is the concomitant of mental processes.
Instinct and Intelligence. HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL, New York
City.
We avoid confusion by considering activities from the subjective
and objective standpoints separately.
Objective View. — Activities increase in variety part passu with
increase of complexity of animals' structure.
The most striking characteristics of activities of animals of lowest
and highest complexity are as follows:
Class A. Activities in simplest animals display (i) Evident
biologic value. (2) Directness. (3) Immediacy. (4) "Perfect
very first time." (5) Non-modifiable. (6) Innate.
Class B. Activities in complex animals display (i) Often no
evident biologic value. (2) Indirectness. (3) Hesitancy. (4) Not
"perfect very first time." (5) Highly modifiable. (6) Not evi-
dently innate.
But in complex animals we discover certain activities of class
A. These we call "instinct-actions." The nearer an animal ap-
proaches to simplicity of organization the closer do its activities
approach the ideal of "instinct-action." The "instinct-action" of
the simple cell may be assumed to reach this ideal. The character-
istics of varied activities of complex animals may then be conceived
of as due to the "instinct-actions " of cells, or minor systems of cells,
in a highly complex system. Hence the varied activities of complex
animals may be stated in terms of cell "instinct-action," which may
be looked upon as the biologic unit.
Subjective View. — But these varied activities (class B} are what
we ourselves know as intelligent activities; hence we may argue that
intelligence is statable in terms of "instinct-feelings," the psychic
correspondents of "instinct-actions," "instinct-feeling" being the
psychic unit.
This view is corroborated by introspection, the distinguishing
marks of intelligent acts appearing to be due to the emphasis of the
correlated "instinct-feelings" involved. If we could grasp the full
psychic significance of an "instinct-feeling," by slowing down the
process, we should find in it all the essentials of intelligence; and if
intelligent acts could be made immediate they would appear objec-
tively as "instinct-actions," and subjectively as "instinct-feelings."
50 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
Instinct and Intelligence. C. JUDSON HERRI CK, University of Chicago.
The term instinct as popularly used is incapable of accurate sci-
entific definition for it is commonly applied to behavior complexes
including variable proportions of structurally predetermined innate
action and intelligent action. I would replace the terms instinct
action and intelligent action of Marshall by innate action and indi-
vidually variable action, and I maintain that these two types of
action are separate biological functions, both of which are exhibited
in some measure by all animals, and that they are independently
variable.
Innate action includes the fundamental physiological properties,
tropisms, taxes, reflexes, compound and chain reflexes and the
inherited elements of all higher behavior complexes. These actions
are common, within narrow limits of variation, to all members of a
race or species. And they are developed in accordance with the same
evolutionary laws (natural selection, etc.) as are the other stable
elements in the action-system which is typical for each species.
Individually variable action includes all non-heritable acquired
behavior from simple physiological modifications resulting from
practice, at the lower extreme, to learning by experience and the
higher intelligent adaptations, at the other extreme. Individually
acquired automatisms are derivatives of individually variable
actions.
A special mechanism has been differentiated for the higher forms
of individually variable action, viz., the association centers of the
brain, whose highly developed mnemonic functions are derived from
the simple "physiological memory" of ordinary protoplasm, and
whose connections are such as to facilitate functional associations
independently of immediate sense stimulation.
Instinct and Intelligence. ROBERT M. YERKES, Harvard University.
Instinct and intelligence, physiologically considered, are two
functional capacities or tendencies of organisms. Neither has
developed from the other: each is a fundamental organic capacity.
Now the one, now the other tendency predominates in the life of the
individual or of the species.
Instinctive activities are practically serviceable on first appear-
ance; strikingly perfect in important respects; predictable; heritable
in definite form; and suggestive of experiences, and results thereof,
which the organism has not had. Intelligent activities, by contrast,
are serviceable as the result of trial; practically unpredictable; not
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 51
definitely heritable; and suggestive of experiences which the organism
has had.
No organism lacks either the instinct capacity or the intelligence
capacity. Instinct means, first of all, conservation— the holding to
that which has been tested and found good by previous generations.
Intelligence means progress— the blazing of new paths.
It is through the study of the behavior of activities in inheritance
that we may hope for the solution of our most important questions
concerning the relations of instinct to intelligence.
Intelligence as Distinguished from Instinct. CHARLES H. JUDD,
University of Chicago.
The discussions of the relation between instinct and intelligence
are very much clearer in their definitions of instincts than they are
in their definitions of intelligence. Intelligence is commonly defined
by saying that it is merely the outgrowth of instinct, and is like
instinct in form; or, if a discrimination is made, intelligence is de-
scribed in negative terms. It is that which is not inherited. It is
not a fixed type of behavior.
The importance of intelligence in human life justifies the demand
that we give a positive definition of its characteristics. In the process
of organic adaptation there is evolved in the individual the power of
initiating activities from inner motives. This is shown by the delay
which appears when one of the higher animals is stimulated, and
reacts only after a long series of internal processes. The internal
processes in this case are more significant in determining action than
is the external stimulus. Furthermore, the sequences of external
stimuli do not determine the sequences of activities. Within the
complex individual new types of relationship are established between
the impressions that come from the outer world. Thus the individual,
instead of reacting upon objects which stand near to each other in
nature, is able to bring together objects that in nature are remote
from each other. This bringing together of remote objects is the
result of inner processes of comparison or association. The power
of making independent associations or comparisons is the highest
outgrowth of the evolutionary process. It is superior to memory,
which merely retains external impressions. It gives to the individual
a power over his environment which he could not have if he merely
followed the dictates of the environment.
Such statements as the foregoing make it clear that intelligence
is that characteristic whereby an individual becomes superior to his
52 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
environment, and capable of modifying what he finds in the environ-
ment. In man this ability to modify environment is the characteristic
power which differentiates him from the lower organisms. Man
has gone so far as to evolve certain forms of activity which are em-
ployed chiefly in planning and preparing for changes in his environ-
ment. Language is a form of behavior of this indirect type which
man works out as a means by which he can ultimately react upon his
environment. Language is first envolved as a means of reacting to
the social environment, as distinguished from the physical environ-
ment. After language is produced through social intercourse, it
becomes an instrument of inner planning and comparison, and as
such promotes the further evolution of a higher form of reaction,
namely, intelligent reaction.
Any organism which is characterized by a type of behavior so
remote from the lower forms of behavior must be described as having
reached a higher stage of evolution. This statement should not be
interpreted to mean that there is any breach in evolutionary con-
tinuity, but it certainly does call attention to the fact that evolution
has progressed to such a point that continuity is not the most im-
portant phase of the matter.
Imitation and Animal Behavior. M. E. HAGGERTY, University of
Indiana.
Advance in the experimental analysis of behavior tends to make
psychological concepts inadequate. Many of the concepts of com-
parative psychology are of the relative unanalyzed sort, which indi-
cates that in this field we have not pushed our experimental analysis
to the end. Imitation is a case in point. One reason why we have
not made more progress in our study of imitative behavior is that the
concept of imitation has been hampered by its classification into
instinctive and voluntary. These adjectives when used with imita-
tion are intended, not as descriptive of objectively observed behavior
but as explanatory, i. e., they are intended to indicate the non-
observed processes antecedent to such behavior. Yet instinct and
volition when taken concretely in the behavior of mammals have
the most uncertain significance, and instead of being explanatory
they really obscure the great variety of imitative behavior. If we
are not to give up the category of imitation in comparative psychology
and to withdraw from the experimental study of imitative behavior
we must have a reworking of the concept itself. This reexamination
of the concept must be made independently of the ideas of instinct
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 53
and volition and be based on objectively observed facts, i. e., upon
facts which have been experimentally determined. There are not
enough such experimentally determined data for an adequate re-
organization of the concept, but the recent work on rats, cats, birds,
monkeys and apes gives some basis upon which to work. Such a
reorganization must take account of all the factors that determine
attention and also of the various levels of accuracy and complexity
in the imitative behavior. We may for a time be compelled to have
a different grouping for different species of animals.
The Discrimination of Articulate Sounds by Cats. W. T. SHEPHERD,
Washington, D. C.
The paper is a report of experiments which were made with cats
to determine their ability to discriminate articulate sounds. The
major part of the work of the experiments was done by the writer's
wife, Mrs. Barbara Shepherd.
One of the animals used in the experiments was seven months
old, the other about three years old. The younger cat had not
previously been given any name, and had no training in the dis-
crimination of words. The other animal had previously been given
a name, different from that given it in the experiments. Both
were gray house-cats, and both were females.
The experimeter called the name given the animal and also
other words in conjunction. The cat was to show its discrimination
of the name given it from the other words used by appropriate motor
reactions to its name, such as rearing up in the cage and looking
for food to be given it when its name was called, and by not so re-
sponding when the other words were called. Suitable control
tests were employed.
The younger cat began to show indications of forming the proper
association on the third day. On the thirteenth day it had perfected
the association. The older cat first showed indications of discrim-
ination on the tenth day. On the twenty-fifth day of the experi-
ments it properly responded nineteen times in twenty trials.
The writer concludes from the experiments that cats are able
to discriminate articulate sounds. The younger animal took 150
trials of each auditory stimulus to perfect the association, the older
cat 490 trials, the younger of the two individuals learning much
more rapidly. In rapidity in forming the association, these two cats
showed a rough correspondence to ability in raccoons, in similar
tests, to discriminate words.
54 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
Some Experiments on the Brightness Value of Red for the Light-
Adapted Eye of the Rabbit. M. F. WASHBURN, Vassar College.
In order to eliminate the brightness error in experiments on
color vision in animals it is not sufficient to show that the animal
tested can distinguish a color from the gray that a color-blind human
being would see in place of the color, but the animal must be proved
capable of discriminating the color from all grays. The present
experiments attempted to find whether any one of a series of gray
papers was indistinguishable from the Bradley saturated red paper
to the light-adapted eye of the gray rabbit. An error mentioned
by Watson as incidental to the use of colored papers, namely, that
when pasted on surfaces they show irregularities that would serve
to distinguish them was eliminated by pinning the papers on the
two doors of a food box, and pinning them on freshly for each
experiment. Food was in both compartments of the box. The
doors could be pushed open by the rabbit, but the door carrying the
gray paper was always bolted on the inside. The gray paper was
sometimes on one door and sometimes on the other. Fresh red
papers were used in each test, to eliminate a smell error. To avoid
the possibility that the rabbit might distinguish the red paper from
the gray by smell, in many of the tests gray paper was put under
the red and red under the gray, a narrow slit being cut in the upper
paper at about the level of the rabbit's nose. This mixture of the
two smells never had any effect on the discrimination. To show
that the animals were not guided by differences in the surfaces of
the two papers, red and gray velvet were substituted occasionally
for the papers, without at all interfering with the discrimination.
The five rabbits tested were all able to discriminate the red
papers from Hering grays number 6, 7, 15, and 24; but all failed to
discriminate red from the very dark gray number 46, and from the
black paper supplied by the Stoelting Company. Red would thus
appear to have a low stimulating power for the light-adapted eye
of the rabbit. The experiments were performed in collaboration with
Miss E. Abbott.
Modifiability of Behavior in the Earthworm Allolobophora fcetida.
ROBERT M. YERKES, Harvard University.
By means of a T-shaped glass labyrinth, in one arm of which
were placed a strip of sandpaper and a strip of blotting paper mois-
tened with NaCl(8N) earthworms have been tested for modifications
of behavior.
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS
55
The following results are presented, subject to revision in the
light of further observations:
1. The worms have not acquired a definite habit of turning
directly to the open arm of the T and thus escaping to a moist dark
tube.
2. Certain modifications have appeared during daily series of
trials.
3. There are indications of tracking.
4. The animals rapidly fatigue. Five trials per day prove
more satisfactory than ten, fifteen, or twenty.
5. In so far as the worms learn to follow a direct path through
the T, they do so apparently by the use of certain cutaneous sense
data rather than by inner kinesthetic data.
6. The first trial each day almost invariably presents numerous
mistakes.
7. There are some indications that the sandpaper becomes a
"warning" against the salt which lies beyond it in the arm of the T.
The Nervous and Non- Nervous Reactions of Actinians. G. H.
PARKER, Harvard University.
When the column of a sea-anemone (Metridium marginatum) is
touched gently or otherwise stimulated, the animal responds in a few
seconds by contracting the longitudinal muscles of its mesenteries
whereby the oral disk is withdrawn. This reaction is better elicited
from the oral or aboral edge of the column than from the middle of
the column. If a crystal of magnesium sulphate is allowed to dissolve
on a spot on the aboral margin of the column, that spot in a few
minutes becomes insensitive to stimulation though the adjacent
margin may retain to the full its sensitiveness. Since the mesenteric
muscles are situated far from the point of stimulation,' the reaction
in question is undoubtedly nervous in character.
When the equatorial region of the column of the sea-anemone is
stimulated mechanically, there follows in the course of half a minute
or so a circular constriction of the column due to the contraction of
the circular muscles. This constriction occurs with regularity even
after this region has been anesthetized with magnesium sulphate.
It is therefore probably non-nervous in character and dependent
upon the direct stimulation of the circular muscles.
Thus *ea-anemones possess not only muscles controlled by nerves
such as are seen in the higher animals, but probably also muscles
that are directly stimulated, such as have been observed in the more
primitive metazoans, the sponges.
56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
Seventeen Different Definitions of the Term " Tropism" as Applied to
Reactions in Organisms. S. O. MAST, Johns Hopkins University.
The term "tropism" was first used by Decandolle (1832) in the
study of reactions of plants to light. He prefixed "helio," thus
making "heliotropism" and used this term in a very definite sense,
indicating merely the fact that plants bend toward the light. But
the term "tropism" soon came to signify not only bending toward
but also the processes involved in bending, both real and imaginary,
and since then it has been applied to almost every conceivable sort
of reaction. I have collected seventeen different definitions of this
term, varying in meaning from the practically all-inclusive one of
Willey (1910) — "The word tropism means the tendency to react in a
definite manner towards external stimuli" — to the all-exclusive one
of Torrey (1907), — "In heliotropism as well as in galvanotropism,
the oriented organism is in a condition of physiological stimulation,
and . . . the response to stimulation is local."
In nearly all of the definitions orientation is implied as one of the
distinguishing characteristics of "tropisms," and some use the
term merely to indicate orientation, but if nothing more than this
is implied it would certainly be much less confusing to use "orienta-
tion," which has a definite meaning.
About one half of the definitions, including three different ones
by Loeb, contain the idea that "tropisms" are orienting reactions
caused by the continuous action of the stimulating agent, i. e., that
the stimuli resulting in orientation are not due to change of intensity
but to "constant intensity." As Loeb puts it, "they are a function
of the constant intensity" (ital. mine). The only trouble with defini-
tions implying this is that there is no conclusive evidence indicating
that orientation in any organism is ever due to continuous action of
the external agent, while it has been demonstrated to be due to change
of intensity in a number of cases. There is not the slightest evidence
that "tropisms" as defined by Loeb form a class of specific reactions
essentially different from other reactions as he, Bonn and others
maintain.
As matters now stand it is utterly impossible to know what is
meant by "tropisms" unless it is first definitely stated according to
which of the 17 or more definitions the term is used.
Behavior of Fire-flies (Photinus ardens ?) with Special Reference to
the Problem of Orientation. S. O. MAST, Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity.
The fire-flies studied are found in dark crevices or under ground
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 57
during the day. In the evening when it is still light enough to read
they come out; the females crawl to the tips of grass or other objects
and remain quiet; the males fly about and glow fairly regularly at
intervals of about five seconds. The females do not glow unless
light from the males or from some other source is flashed on them.
When a female glows in response to the glow of a male, the male
ordinarily turns directly toward her. This is repeated until the two
come together, after which copulation takes place. If a female is
held near a male he pays no attention to her unless there is actual
contact, showing that neither objective vision nor smell is functional
in mating.
The males do not orient when exposed to continuous illumination.
They respond only to flashes of light and do not react until after
the light has disappeared. Thus orientation may take place in total
darkness, and it is surprising how accurately these animals turn
through the proper angle in the total absence of the stimulating agent
that caused the response. Here we have a case in which it is clearly
demonstrated that light does not act continuously in the process
of orientation as demanded by Loeb's theories, a case in which it is
also clearly demonstrated that continuous stimulation is not necessary
to keep the organism oriented.
No difference could be detected between the glow of females and
that of males either in quality or quantity of light emitted and yet
males rarely if ever respond to the glow of other males, shbwing that
in some way they distinguish between the flashes of light produced
by opposite sexes. It was demonstrated that this is not due to pos-
sible minute differences in color, form or intensity of the glow. The
glow of a female in response to a male, occurs shortly after that of
the male, while among the flashes of different males there is no such
time relation. The sequence in the time of glowing is undoubtedly
an important factor in the process in question, but many observations
indicate that it is not the only factor, although no others were dis-
covered.
A Critique of the Discrimination Test: a Study in Animal Behavior.
JEAN WEIDENSALL, State Reformatory, Bedford Hills, N. Y.
Taking the black-white discrimination test as typical of the dis-
crimination method, we proposed to investigate the relative efficiency
of the black and the white after and during learning in such a test.
We suspected that of the two or more stimuli presumably involved
in learning the ordinary test of this kind only one, as a matter of
58 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
fact, might be used. This suspicion was based upon the fact that
previous experiments have proceeded as though but one discrimi-
nation were necessary — that of the two stimuli from each other —
whereas three discriminations are essential. Until each quality is
first discriminable from its background, the two cannot be discrimi-
nated from each other. Any conclusions, therefore, stated in terms
of the discriminability of the two qualities are unfounded so long as
we continue to display the stimuli against the unknown background
of our various problem boxes over against which one or both of the
stimuli may be inefficient 'throughout the entire test, or unequally
efficient at different stages of the learning process.
Our conclusions based upon a series of five carefully controlled
experiments with 36 rats were:
1. Black and white are both visible against the background of our
box; but they are not equally so. Their effectiveness varies as
1:2:: white : black. That is, it takes twice as long to learn the problem
of following black alone as it does to follow white alone. Wherefore,
2. When the two stimuli are supposedly involved only the white
is used because the black is so much more difficult to perceive. And
after learning the typical discrimination test, only the white is
efficient. Thus the standard discrimination method in a typical
instance has reduced itself to one of simple recognition.
Since the standard discrimination test is one whereby the existence
of differing sensory qualities are determined in terms of their efficiency
in conduct, since, that is, we say that two qualities are discriminated
because they call out different reactions, it is a serious criticism if
the conditions of our experiments have not been such that both the
stimuli are inevitably involved and that the chances for their effi-
ciency are equal.
The second half of the paper concerned itself with an investigation
of the relative efficiency of quality and position. Previous tests have
isolated each in turn, series, form, intensity, and extensity, but so
far as we know quality and position have not been isolated. Yet in
all these tests the quality of the stimulus and its "thereness" are
independent variables; for the position of the quality and the position
of the food bear a fixed relationship or set of relationships. There
is nothing, accordingly, to prevent the animal from learning in terms
of the "thereness" of the stimulus rather than in terms of its specific
quality. Had the two been varied independently either one or the
other might have proved to be of relative or absolute efficiency.
The results on this point will be published later in detail. We found
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 59
that the variation of position was a confusing factor and that though
the complete abstraction of quality from position is entirely possible
for us it is extremely difficult, if at all possible, for the rat.
Some Experiments on Pitch-discrimination in Dogs. H. M. JOHNSON,
Johns Hopkins University.
A preliminary report was presented of work begun in April, 1910,
on two blind dogs, in an attempt to test by a better method the work
of Kalischer, Rothmann and others on pitch-discrimination in the
dog, and localization of the center for pitch.
The dogs were taught to react in one way to middle C and in
another to the G above sounded on tuning forks, and learned the
problem in 285 and 405 trials (19 and 27 days) respectively. When
Stern variators were substituted for the forks, the number of trials
necessary to complete recovery from disturbance was respectively
120 and 90. When forks and variators were used indifferently in a
given series the number of trials required was respectively 150 and
600. (An accident producing considerable emotional disturbance
accounts for the longer learning time of the second animal.) When
the problem of discriminating between chords containing one or the
other stimulus tones was set, the learning time was respectively 615
and 660 trials, but the daily percentage of error seldom exceeded 20.
When last summer the same dogs were given the problem of dis-
criminating between middle C and the E above and made to work
at the problem with the operator removed from the room, the problem
was yet unlearned after 505 trials each. On suspicion that the
mode of reaction chosen was not sufficiently definite, and that enough
attention had not been given to the factor of "delayed reaction,"
a special stimulus box was constructed, forcing the animal to turn
at right angles right or left toward the food box chosen, and per-
mitting punishment to be given in case of incorrect choice. The
stimulus was given by the Helmholtz method of "tandem-driven"
forks equipped with Konig resonators, giving practically pure tones
with widely variable intensity. Two normal dogs were introduced
as a control. After 300 trials punishment was introduced for in-
correct choice. The problem is yet unlearned after about 1,000
trials each.
These results indicate that neither in Kalischer and Rothmann's
work nor in the former part of this experiment, were the animals
certainly reacting to tone at all; and that our anatomical conclusions
to be reliable must be supported by better behavior results than
have yet been obtained.
60 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
The Use of the Maze in Comparative Psychology. EDWIN G. BORING
and LUCY M. DAY, Cornell University.
In the study of the animal mind comparative psychology must
always make reference, either implicitly or explicitly, to human
consciousness under similar conditions. It is this reference that
distinguishes comparative psychology from the study of animal be-
havior. In such a complex experience as the learning of the maze
the reference must be fully explicit. Hence, as a preliminary to the
use of the maze with animals, there should be made a thorough
analysis of human consciousness under as similar conditions as
possible.
Such an analysis has been undertaken by Miss Lucy M. Day and
the writer at Cornell University. We present herewith a preliminary
report on the work.
The Watson circular maze was duplicated on a large scale.
Sixteen observers, most of them trained in introspection, learned the
maze, giving full introspective reports. The reports were independ-
ently analyzed by the two experimenters to obtain a numerical esti-
mate of the processes involved in making the turns. The two
estimates showed an agreement of 85 per cent.
The analysis shows that the maze-learning consciousness con-
sists of three phases: (i) Determination of direction after making
the turns, (2) guidance within the passages, and (3) location of the
turns.
The determination of direction after the turns involves five
factors — attitudinal, verbal, visual, kinesthetic, and automatic.
Each of these follows a definite course throughout the learning
process, although the course varies somewhat with the ideational
type of the observer. The attitudinal factor is of importance in
only the first two or three trials. The verbal factor reaches its
maximum very early, the visual slightly later. They both give place
to kinesthesis, which in turn is resolved into a somatic automatism.
Moreover, the course of learning, with regard to the first phase,
naturally falls into three periods. In the first period, attitudes and
verbal and visual imagery are advantageous to learning, while the
introduction of motor imagery is disadvantageous. In the second
period, kinesthesis becomes favorable, while attitudes and verbal
and visual imagery become unfavorable. In the third period, autom-
atism predominates, and learning is retarded by the introduction of
any form of imagery.
With respect to the other two phases of the learning process, our
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 61
analysis is not yet complete. So far as our results go, however, they
indicate that vision is most important for guidance within the
passages, and that both motor and visual factors are involved in the
location of turns.
An Experimental and Introspective Study of the Human Learning
Process in the Maze. F. A. C. PERRIN, University of Chicago.
Two types of maze were employed in this experiment — the pencil
maze, and a maze through which the subject walked. In either case
the subject was blind-folded, and learned the route by trials. The
time and error curves obtained were quite comparable with the curves
based upon the records of the white rat in the maze, (i) The intro-
spections, however, brought out the fact that it was essentially a
human, and not an animal, learning process, inasmuch as it was
conscious learning and, as such, had involved in it the rudiments of
the higher cognitive activities. The various subjects built up and
employed ideational controls for the maze. In doing so, they em-
ployed in a rudimentary way at least the processes of attending, dis-
criminating, judging, inferring, reasoning. It was the human mind
at work, not the animal mind. (2) While the rational element was
necessarily present, the actual method was distinctly that of trial and
error. Some special mazes, designed to give the maximum oppor-
tunity for reasoning, failed to call forth any other method.
The rational element was necessarily present. It was not only
present but it was effective, and not merely accessory. This fact
suggests the question of its relative efficacy. The adult human, in
learning a maze, does not improve upon the time and error records
of the white rat in any pronounced way, but he is decidedly at an
advantage in tests that call for an application of the learning expe-
rience to modified conditions, such as is represented when the maze
is altered in size, or rotated.
Memory versus Imagination — an Experimental Critique. LILLIEN J.
MARTIN, Stanford University.
The paper gives an account of an experimental examination which
the writer had made at Bonn and Stanford Universities of the results
of Mrs. Perky 's experiments ("An Experimental Study of Imagina-
tion," Amer. J. of Psychol. 21, 422) on the differences between visual
memory and imagination images.
As the differences between the two kinds of images which Mrs.
Perky had found were not present in the writer's results, she looks
62 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
upon Mrs. Perky's results as having only an individual character,
and considers it therefore a mistake to assign to them that general
character which has been done in a recent textbook.
Literary Self -projection. JUNE E. DOWNEY, University of Wyoming.
In connection with an extensive study of the imagery aroused by
reading poetic fragments, observations were made as to the frequency
and kinds of self-projection — self-projection being defined as any
form of explicit self-reference — in order to determine the significance
for the psychology of self-consciousness of the various forms of self-
projection and their function in esthetic appreciation.
The discussion concerned itself chiefly with the forms assumed by
the visual and kinesthetic self-projection and with the relations
subsisting between them.
It was shown that the different reagents saw themselves with
varying frequency as actors in or spectators of a visualized scene.
The visual self might appear as a vague figure or in considerable
detail. Again, the orientation of the visual self might be vague or
exceedingly precise. A double visual self-projection was not unusual.
Kinesthetic or organic self-reference was found to occur frequently
and to assume the following forms: (i) Objectified and fused with
the visual self; (2) oscillating with the visualized self and localized
in the body of the subject; (3) objectified and fused with a visualized
object or a visualized person other than the self; (4) abstracted from
all visual content and objectified or not.
Relative to the esthetic value of self-projection, a distinction was
made between an emphatic and non-emphatic self-projection and the
question raised as to the significance of the latter mode of self-
projection, particularly in the form of the visualized self. The possi-
bility, however, of an Einfuhlung mediated by a purely visual
objectification, without organic resonance, was recognized.
The Nature and Limits of Introspection. R. DODGE, Wesleyan
University.
Introspection is not only an instrument of psychological investiga-
tion, it is also itself a psychological process or group of processes, and
as such must be capable of psychological analysis. Such an analysis
should furnish data for the evaluation of the products of introspection,
for an estimate of its reliability as an instrument, and for an estimate
of the factors of mental life that it is best calculated to disclose.
Lacking a sense organ, introspection is analogous to sense per-
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 63
ception only in the processes of apperceptive integration. While
sense^objects^are integrated as a world of things, the objects of intro-
spection are integrated as a unitary experience.
Dependence on apperceptive systems and actual noetic patterns
gives rise to gross sources of error, limits its application, and prevents
the disclosure either of mental elements or the fundamental processes
of mental life. The phenomena of introspection are not final facts
of mental life, but like the phenomena of sound are indicators for
scientific construction.
Emotivity and Emotion in their Relations with Adaptation. E. B.
HUEY, Johns Hopkins University.
Emotivity is a psycho-organic disposition to interrupt adapta-
tions felt to be called for, and for which the organism has at least
partial resources, displacing these with derivative phenomena char-
acterized by disorder and misfit. The ensemble of phenomena char-
acterizing such interruption of adaptation is properly termed emotion.
Clinical observation reminds us that psychology tends to fixate
on a few "classical" emotional expressions, the vasomotor and vis-
ceral (Lange-James Theory), the sentimental (heart, tears, etc.).
Clinical observation shows almost equal involvement of all organs
and functions, and shows opposite disturbances for emotions of the
same name and almost identical disturbances for emotions of opposite
names, the only common and essential feature being the break in
adaptation, with disorder and misfit derivative functionings.
Emotional expression depends on (i) what functionings are called
for by the situation; (2) what functionings happen to be in use at
the time; (3) early acquired habits of reacting in a given manner to
a given emotional situation; (4) what organs or functions are most
enfeebled, these being affected preferably; (5) occurrence of misfit
instinctive functionings of possible utility in race experience; (6)
functionings suggested to the individual in the fatigue of emotion,
by social custom or contagion or by auto-suggestion.
Intellectual and linguistic disturbances in emotion have been
especially neglected, and are prominent and representative of the
emotions of many persons. The brain itself may be as basal an
organ of emotion as the heart (Janet), and for many persons dis-
turbances of the pharynx, bladder, genitals, or skin "mirror the
soul" more closely than do the heart or blood vessels.
The real cause of emotion is a failure in the mechanics of brain
tegration, immediately occasioned by the occurrence of factors,
64 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
inner and outer, that are too difficult of synthesis under the given
conditions and to whose action the organism may be abnormally
sensitive. An instinct only becomes an emotion when it is mal-
apropos or when it occasions complexity and strain too great for
synthesis and for satisfaction of its intent.
Of theories of emotion, the present presentation owes almost
everything to the clinics and lectures of Professor Pierre Janet.
Organic Sensation and the Symbolic Imagery of Thought. (By title.)
ELSIE MURRAY, Wilson College.
The term organic is here limited to the awareness of general
organic reaction, internal or external, as distinguished from the
awareness of specific bodily movements.
The object of this paper is to emphasize the role of this organic
factor in the consciousness of meaning, and to urge an adoption of
terms, and an introspective training which will enable the average
observer to detect and name this component when present.
The attention of the writer was first attracted to this phase of the
problem through certain introspections on the words beauty and
beautiful, in which the meaning of these words appeared in conscious-
ness not in illustrative but in reactive terms, in the guise, that is, of
the actual or imaged recall of the total organic set characteristic of
the esthetic mood. Systematic investigation of this linguistic
peculiarity, its relative frequency and importance, seemed at first
impracticable, owing to the difficulties inherent in the technique of
organic introspection. Recent observations have, however, thrown
a new light on the problem. The use of an extended imagery ques-
tionnaire in an introductory class of forty-five has brought emphat-
ically to notice the fact that organic attitudes as wholes are accessible
to the introspection of the relatively untrained observer. Through
the use of stimulus words such as expectancy, impatience, fright,
surprise, relief, etc., the possession of a fairly wide range of definite
organic imagery1 was roughly demonstrated. The spontaneous func-
tioning of this imagery was then tested as follows. A list of abstract
and general terms, such as mental, delicate, difficult, mistake, pos-
sible, etc., was placed in the hands of the student, with instructions
to state in what terms the meaning of each word seemed to present
itself. In the results organic and motor imagery claim at least an
equal prominence with visual and auditory, though the preceding
1 The question as to the central or peripheral nature of the recall is here irrelevant,
since the accessibility of organic reactions to introspection, and the richness of sub-
jective revival, is alone at issue.
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 65
tests and questions had indicated the special vividness of visual
imagery.
The results of later and more accurate tests are not yet available.
The writer feels, however, sufficient assurance to prophesy that a
similar preliminary training, and the adoption and rough definition
of a uniform set of terms for felt organic attitudes, such as excitement,
stimulation, depression, irritation, etc., would enable many now
reporting their ideation as purely verbal to detect a concrete conscious
content. The value of a certain measure of such organic ideation
hardly requires emphasis. The relative simplicity of the organic
attitude, its vital relevancy to the total meaning, its status as the
natural center of a system of irradiating associations, give it an
intrinsic representative value far above that of the arbitrary verbal
symbol, or the "pure thought" element of the imageless thinkers.
A Study of 'Meaning as Inferred from the Methods of Attacking Mathe-
matical Problems. (By title.) JOSEPH PETERSON, University of
Utah.
This study was made on sixteen high school students throughout
the second half of their first year's work in algebra. The investigation
was carried on by the writer, who used every means possible, without
interfering with the students' whole-souled attack on the problems,
of obtaining the mental content involved in the operations. A special
method was that of comparing the work of the best with the poorest
students and of ascertaining as far as possible in what specific ways
this difference in mathematical ability manifests itself.
As a rule the poor students fumbled on their problems, treating
the algebraic expressions not as symbols representing experiences or
relations beyond themselves but rather as things-in-themselves.
They worked too much in terms of percepts rather than concepts.
Frequently, in operations for which the general formula to be fol-
lowed was well known, they failed because of not seeing in the
problem the general principles represented by the formula; that is,
they failed to isolate the essentials of the solution and were conse-
quently bound to treat each case as a "law unto itself," as one would
treat a puzzle. This was especially noticeable in cases where certain
"ear marks" would be altered, as the interchange of terms in an
equation; or where an equation to be solved lacked a term, i. e., had
a zero coefficient. In general the weakness displayed by some of the
students was one of failure to isolate essentials and to hold them in
mind when once recognized. The stronger students were keener in
66 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
the perception of the general direction that a solution must take and
in recognizing the larger aspects of problems, the principles involved
in them. These students profited more by experience because they
attended particularly to the aspects common to many problems.
The difference is one of the degree of meaning perceived in the
problematic situations presented. Meaning is a sort of disposition
toward activity in which certain fundamental qualities of experience
are singled out, or abstracted, and thrown into the foreground to
guide action. The meaning of anything is determined not only by
past experience with that thing but also by its particular relation to
its present purpose. Is meaning merely a composite of sensory
images? If so, what holds these images together and gives them
relation in any situation? — more images? If images only constitute
meaning, and if two images may suffice to make meaning, one symbol-
izing or "meaning" the other, how can one tell which is which, without
some larger emotive background or motor attitude giving trend to
experience?
The Role of Attention in Advertising. EDWARD K. STRONG, JR.,
Columbia University.
The first function of an advertisement is to force itself upon our
attention. Why certain advertisements fail in this respect and why
certain others arouse our interest so that we read them clear through
is the problem of my research.
In taking up this work three problems of method have been first
attacked. The results of the first, which is now practically com-
pleted, indicate that the method of simultaneous presentation of
many advertisements gives no valid results, while the successive
presentation of this same material gives surprisingly constant results
from different subjects. The second problem as to whether a constant
rate of presentation or a rate varied by the subject at his pleasure
gives results more comparable with the actual conditions of the
casual reader is still to be determined. And the third, as to whether
experimental results, when the subject knows he is being tested,
check up with the actual impressions received by the casual reader,
is still not settled, although enough data have been obtained to
indicate pretty strongly that relatively the results are the same.
But we are interested not only in learning why certain advertise-
ments are noticed but also in studying the differences between
advertisements which are remembered for themselves and those which
make memorable instead the commodity. There is a great difference
here, but the factors comprising it have not yet been made clear.
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 67
There have been so far several by-products of this investigation
of considerable interest to psychology. Two might be mentioned.
The first is that there is no indication of the potency of either primacy
or recency when more than ten advertisements are shown successively
and then tested for attention-value and memorability by the recogni-
tion method. And secondly, it seems conclusive that advertisements
are as "simple" psychically as nonsense syllables, at least as far as
attention and recognition enter. This points to an important im-
plication psychologically. Is it not true that because of the insistence
on the use of so-called simple physical objects, psychological investiga-
tions, such as in the field of esthetics, have been falling off since the
.physically simple material has been studied ? Now the use of adver-
tisements has shown that those that obey the canons of art are the
best attended to and remembered. Why can they not be used then
in more wide-reaching esthetic studies? Is it not time, indeed, for
an advance from the "simple" experimental material to that more
related to experience?
A New Method of Studying Mediate Associations. M. F. WASHBURN,
Vassar College.
The term mediate association is taken in the following sense: A
process A is followed in consciousness by an apparently unassociated
process C; later it appears that the connection was made by means
of the process B formerly associated with both A and C but not in
the present instance appearing in consciousness. The method used
to study mediate associations thus defined was as follows: the observer
was given a stimulus word and instructed to react with another word
which should be wholly unassociated with the stimulus word. The
method offered a good opportunity to study the effect of a definite
task or Aufgabe set the observer. A number of typical mediate
associations resulted in the course of the 662 experiments performed.
The instructions, which inhibited ordinary associative processes,
allowed the following processes to occur:
Sound associations: the instructions diminished attention to the
meaning of the stimulus word and thus strengthened sound associa-
tions.
Perseverations from recent experiences of the observer.
Perseverating reaction and stimulus words, but not those used in
the experiment immediately preceding.
Words associated with perseverating reaction or stimulus words.
Words of meaning directly associated with the stimulus word, the
68 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
fact of the association being overlooked through the tendency of the
instructions to direct attention away from the meaning of the stimulus
word.
Mediate associations.
The actual experiments were carried on under the author's di-
rection by her pupil, Miss V. Atherton. The paper appears in full in
the January number of The American Journal of Psychology.
The Effect of Adaptation on Temperature Discrimination. E. ABBOTT,
Vassar College.
After simultaneously adapting the right and left hands to tem-
peratures with a difference of five degrees, discrimination for tem-
peratures slightly warmer was tested. Adaptation to moderate
temperatures had more effect than to extreme temperatures.
The Relation of Reaction Time to the Duration of Auditory Stimulus.
GEORGE R. WELLS, Johns Hopkins University.
Five lengths of stimulus were used, viz., 7<r, 300-, 510-, 760-, and
1060-. No characteristic difference was found in the reactions to
these different stimuli. When a subject was given a long pre-
liminary training in reacting to a stimulus of one of the above lengths
and was later presented with series of stimuli of varying durations,
he reacted to them all in the same way, including the one to which
he had been "trained." And when a subject was "trained" to one
duration of stimulus and then reacted to another stimulus of very
different length, no difference was found in the reaction times of
the two series.
A Pigment Color System. ALBERT H. MUNSELL, Boston.
This system aims to classify and visualize color relations in
pigment form. It is built up experimentally, with the help of a
photometer, Maxwell discs and the trained capacity of the painter,
using the consensus of many individuals. Charts and models present
the measured image, while decimal notation and a score provide for
graphic records.
This classification depends on the recognition of three color
dimensions — value, hue and chroma — arranged spatially as follows.
A central vertical axis represents changes in value (painter term for
luminosity) from black at the bottom to white at the top, the pro-
gression being logarithmic to follow the Weber-Fechner law. The
value of every point on this axis determines the level of every possible
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 69
color of equal value. Vertical planes intersecting in this axis repre-
sent particular hues, the opposed portions being complementary in
hue. Any three planes separated by 120° form a complementary
trio, etc. Thus the angular position of any hue is determined.
Chroma (intensity of hue or "saturation") is measured by the per-
pendicular distance from any point to the vertical axis, its progression
being arithmetic.1
Thus is constructed a solid in which every horizontal plane corre-
sponds to one and only one value; every radial plane contains colors
of but one hue; and the surface of each cylinder concentric with the
axis contains colors of equal chroma. Each point in this solid stands
for one and only one color, and when these three dimensions of a
color have been measured, its position in the solid is obvious.
The system begins with central gray — the balancing point for
pigment mixture as white light is for spectral hues. No regular solid
portrays the unequal degrees of pigment value and chroma disclosed
by measurement, but the sphere suggested by Riinge (1810) is
a convenient model for establishing balanced relations. The spherical
equator comprises ten equal hue steps arranged as five complementary
pairs, all of equal chroma to accord with equal departure from the
neutral center, and of middle value to accord with their level. Rota-
tion causes retinal fusion of this hue-circuit in neutral gray. Zones
lighter to white and darker to black are similarly established. At
high speed the sphere reproduces the white-black axis. A certain low
speed presents these balanced color zones to the eye at such rate that
their vividness is almost prismatic.
Stronger chroma in various pigments projects beyond the sphere
describing an irregular solid or color tree, whose trunk is the
white-black axis, with branches extending to the maxima of red,
yellow, green, blue and purple. The tree is a quantitative and quali-
tative statement of all pigment mixtures. These are displayed in a
color atlas2 whose charts — horizontal, vertical and oblique — are
worked out in matt color to satisfy the three scales of measure.
The Retina and Righthandedness. H. C. STEVENS, University of
Washington.
Measurements of the space sense of the retina for symmetrical
extents upon the same retinal meridian were made by that form^of the
method of average error which Miiller calls the determination of
1 Color Notation, Munsell, Boston, 1905. PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 1909, 6, 238
2 Atlas of the Munsell Color System, Wadsworth Rowland & Co., Inc., Boston.
70 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
equivalent stimuli by means of the method of limits. The standard
extents were 40, 80 and 200 mm. There were four observers each of
whom made 1,920 observations. The constant error for each
standard was determined in 4 meridians of the field of vision, viz.,
the vertical, horizontal and right and left oblique meridians. The
apparatus consisted of a black velvet disc 61 cm. in diameter. The
center fixation point served as the middle point between two adjacent
extents. The outer limits of the extents were marked by white
spots. One of these spots was carried upon a movable radius which
permitted the variable extent to be made larger, smaller or equal to
the standard extent. Observations were made with the right and
left eyes separately. The results may be stated as follows: (i) In
the horizontal meridian, the right half of an extent in the field of
vision is overestimated. (2) This overestimation holds true for both
right and left eyes. (3) The extent which is overestimated forms its
retinal image upon the left corresponding halves of the two retinas.
(4) The left corresponding halves of the retinas are connected exclu-
sively with the left hemisphere of the cerebrum. (5) By reason of
the fact of a marked difference in the space sense of the two halves of
the retina, those objects in the right half of the field of vision, by
appearing larger, attract the visual attention which in turn leads to
grasping movements of the right hand. The hand thus favored by
earliest experience acquires a special skill which causes it to be used
in all manual acts requiring the greatest precision.
The Determination of the Sensitivity of the Retina to Colored Light in
Terms of Radiometric Units. (By title.) C. E. FERREE, Bryn
Mawr College.
About a year ago the writer undertook to determine the relative
and the absolute sensitivity of the retina to colored light in terms
of units that can be compared. Since several years will be required
to complete this work, he has thought it best to publish a preliminary
note showing briefly the purpose and scope of the investigation.
The following points will serve to indicate what is being attempted
in this study.
I. All measurements of sensitivity will be made in terms of the
number of radiometric units required to arouse color sensation. This
will give an expression of the sensitivity of the retina in units that
can be compared. At present we have no estimate of the comparative
sensitivity of the retina to the different colors further than is expressed
by the relative width of the collimator-slit that has to be used to
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 71
arouse color sensation when a light-source of a given candle-power is
used. This kind of comparison is obviously unfair, because such dif-
ferent amounts of energy are represented from point to point in the
spectrum that a given width of slit would admit many times the
amount of energy to one part of the spectrum that it would to another.
In short, no proper estimation of the sensitivity of the retina to color,
relative or absolute, can be made with the methods now in use.
2. The limits of the color zones will be determined with colored
lights representing an equal number of units of energy. In color
theory a great deal has been made of the relative limits of color sen-
sitivity. Hering's theory, for example, demands that the boundary
of the zone for red must coincide with the boundary for green, and
the boundary for blue with the boundary for yellow. The final
answer to this question cannot be given until an investigation is made
with colors equalized in energy.
We began a quantitative study of the factors that influence the
sensitivity of the retina to color three years ago. With the control
of factors we had at that time, we could not, for example, duplicate
by several degrees at any two consecutive determinations the limits
of the zone of sensitivity to any color. The result of our study has
been that we are now able with a given light-source to duplicate within
a degree the results obtained at a previous sitting. We can also
duplicate almost as closely the threshold values or the amounts of
light required to arouse color sensation in the more sensitive parts
of the retina. Details of this work are given in a series of papers
to be published in the course of the present year, beginning with the
April issue of the American Journal of Psychology.
Visual Sensations Caused by Changes in the Strength of a Magnetic
Field. C. E. MAGNUSSON, University of Washington.
The paper gives experimental data on the following points: (a)
Verifying the observations made by S. P. Thompson and Knight
Dunlap. (b) Ascertaining that the magnetic field induced while
making and breaking a direct current gives a visual sensation, (c)
Determining the threshold of the sensation in terms of ampere turns.
(d) Determining the dependence of the sensation upon the frequency
of the current, (e) No sensation other than the visual was noticed
by any of the observers. No after effects appeared. For stronger
fields, care should be exercised, as the sensations are of considerable
intensity.
72 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
Local Signature and the Extensity of Sensation. WILLIAM C. RUE-
DIGER, The George Washington University.
The different theories that are advanced to account for the
ability to localize points on the skin or in the visual field may ap-
parently all be classified under three heads. These are (i) the
kinesthetic theory, (2) the sensational-element theory, and (3) the
sensational-complex theory.
According to the kinesthetic theory, localizations are made reflexly
by the child, and the accompanying kinesthetic sensations give the
needed data to consciousness for making localizations later. Ac-
cording to the sensational-element theory, every elemental visual
and skin sensation has an inherent characteristic that varies with
the particular end organ that is stimulated. According to the
sensational-complex theory the sensations received from the elemental
sense organs in the skin or retinas would be alike and the differences
in local signs that we feel or see would be due to different combinations
or complexes of these homogeneous elemental sensations.
The kinesthetic theory alone appears clearly inadequate (see
Myers, Experimental Psychology, p. 239), and this leaves the choice
to lie between the other two. The experiments that I have per-
formed appear to point to the truth of the sensational-element theory.
I have performed experiments with the Bloch instrument on the
forearms of four subjects, using I gram of pressure in one series and
10 grams in another, and applying the pressures respectively to a
vein and to the skin where no vein was in evidence.
Localization was just as accurate with one gram of pressure as
with ten, and it was even more accurate on a vein than on the skin
where no vein was evident. This is contrary to what one would
reasonably expect according to the sensational-complex theory.
If it is true that there are innate differences in sensations corre-
sponding to the points of the skin or retinas stimulated, the develop-
ment of space perception may be readily accounted for. The assump-
tion of sensational extensity seems entirely unnecessary. Further-
more, this assumption, while insistently made by many psychologists,
is not used by these psychologists in explaining or developing space
perception.
Two New Sphygmo graphic Instruments. R. DODGE, Wesleyan Uni-
versity.
The first is a pneumatic photographic recorder of extremely low
latency and high sensitivity. Used in connection with any good
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 73
microscope, it records vibrations of over 1,000 per second, shows
overtones of vowels and heart tones, and gives pulse waves' of any
desired amplitude without changing its latency or other constants.
Suitable for class lantern-demonstrations of pulse and plethysmcH
graphic changes, it is durable and practically fool-proof, at least for
anyone who can use a microscope.
The second instrument cannot be shown in action. Used with a
string galvanometer, it registers the pulse of a distant subject who is
not hampered in his activities, provided he remains connected with
the binding posts.
Some Recently Discovered Physiological Changes Attending Fear and
Rage. W. B. CANNON, Harvard Medical School.
A close relation exists between adrenalin and the sympathetic
system. The adrenal glands are caused to secrete when the sym-
pathetic is stimulated, and adrenalin affects all structures innervated
by the sympathetic as if they were receiving sympathetic impulses.
Major emotional disturbances (fear, rage) indicate the dominance
of sympathetic impulses. In the cat, for example, fear or rage pro-
duces dilatation of the pupils, inhibition of the stomach and intestines,
rapid heart, and erection of the hairs of the back and tail. Tests
with excised intestinal strips (sensitive to adrenalin I to 20,000,000)
prove that fear or rage causes also the adrenal glands to pour an
increased secretion into the blood.
The persistence of the excited state of the body may therefore
be due to chemical stimulation which continues the changes started
by nervous impulses.
Injected adrenalin mobilizes sugar in the blood and results in
glycosuria. Fear or rage has the same effect, if the adrenal glands
are present. Emotional glycosuria can be evoked in a cat by per-
mitting a dog to bark at it at close range.
Fear is related to the instinct to flee, rage with the instinct to
fight (MacDougall). Possibly in the wild state emotions are useful
in providing sugar as a source of energy, and adrenalin as a means of
offsetting fatigue, in excessive muscular exertion.
Electrical stimulation of nerves innervating the adrenal glands,
while a muscular fatigue curve is being written, increases (in some
cases more than one hundred per cent.) the height of the curve.
A Contribution to the Physiology of Kinesthesia. (By title.) GEO.
V. N. DEARBORN, Tufts College.
From an experimental study (begun in 1909) of the voluntary
74 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
(new and unrhythmic) movements of more than forty intelligent
subjects (varying in age from fourteen to sixty- two, of both sexes,
some blind and some with normal vision) the following conclusions
issue, and they are supported by sundry outside evidence set forth
in the paper itself:
1. Aside from the more or less passive indication of posture,
resistance, equilibrium, vibrations, etc., the function of the conscious
movement sensations is inhibition, the deliberate active restraint of
tendencies to inaccuracy in voluntary action otherwise actuated.
2. Save in some "motiles," a series of voluntary movements per-
ceived only kinesthetically is promptly visualized and then forms the
conscious phase of the motor idea for the series' repetition. The
motor idea of a truly deliberate movement is given, then, in visualizers
as a partly conscious visual (aut al.) image in inseparable association
with actuating kinesthetic coordinations wholly unconscious, which,
lacking a better name, may be termed spinal kinesthesia. This motor
idea is in practical opposition, in a sense, with the conscious kines-
thesia, but the two may be fused by habitual effort.
3. The voluntary action of blindfolded "motiles" is like that of
blind people, both having comprehensive conscious kinesthesia but
usually at the expense of the accuracy of the general motor idea in
visual and spinal kinesthetic terms.
4. The direction of a voluntary movement has no advance repre-
sentation in the conscious kinesthesia and must therefore be deter-
mined in the combined visual and spinal-kinesthetic motor idea.
5. The extent of a movement, likewise, probably determined by
the muscles and felt there, is presumably a function of the unconscious
spinal kinesthesia. Hence Hollingworth's scepticism as to judg-
ments of extent, and one or two of Woodworth's conclusions.
6. Motor skill, neurally speaking, consists especially in the power
and habit of fusing in running control these two phases of kinesthesia
— the actuating (unconscious) and the conscious inhibitory impres-
sions on the voluntary cerebral resultant.
7. Voluntary movement as such, new and personal and difficult,
is inherently an inhibitory process.
The products of this experimental study appear to make easier
of understanding the duality of the pathway between the posterior
lateral gray cord and the great cortex, one "kind" of kinesthesia
(the inhibitory) going apparently with relative directness via the
lemniscus, the other (the hereditary, spatial, impersonal, actuating
influences) through the cerebellum, etc. These results seem also to
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 75
reconcile and help explain^certain illusions and seeming inconsistencies
in the relations of consciousness to various aspects of a voluntary
movement.
The Value of Sublimating Processes for Education and Reeducation.
ERNEST JONES, University of Toronto.
The process denoted by the term "sublimation" is defined by
Freud as "the capacity to exchange an original sexual aim for another
no longer sexual aim, though a psychically related one." It has long
been empirically recognized that undue sexual excitation can be
relieved by diversion of the person's interests into other directions,
such as those of sport, etc., and also that energy thus derived furnishes
a not inconsiderable contribution to artistic and other social impulses.
Two matters not generally recognized in this connection are these:
What happens is not so much a replacement of one interest by another
totally different one so much as the displacement of a given conative
trend from one aim to another, more suitable one; the original trend
or desire does not die, but undergoes a transformation in finding a
different mode of expression. It is possible that the law of conserva-
tion and transformation of energy holds as well in the mental sphere
as in the physical. Further, the diversion of normal sexual desire
constitutes only a small part of what is included under the term
"sublimation." Sublimation is more concerned with the socially
useless and primitive components of the sexual instinct from which
the adult form of sexuality is only a residuum left after an extensive
process of repression of the rest. Accompanying this repression is
the process of sublimation, which therefore is mainly a question of
early childhood life. These discarded desires form the basis of many
of our later acquired interests and activities, and it is maintained that
a fuller knowledge of them would be of the greatest value to education
by indicating the most fruitful paths along which sublimation could
take place. It is at present to a great extent left to chance for a
given educational topic to find some already existing potential interest
in the child to which it can make an appeal, whereas if these potential
interests were investigated and the nature realized of the energy
which is at our disposal for educative purposes, then we should be
in a position to apply them in the most profitable directions and thus
make the best use of them for social purposes.
Several matters in connection with the reeducation of criminals,
perverts, neurotic and insane patients are dealt with, and stress is laid
on the application of the foregoing principles to the treatment of
76 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
advanced cases of dementia. Psychologically such patients are in a
state of early childhood, and their activities are often confined to
seeking long past sources of bodily pleasure. These activities should
be correlated with the corresponding ones of infantile life, and the
attempt to divert them into more suitable directions should be
guided by a knowledge of the evolution they undergo in the normal
child.
Apropos of the Doctrine of Reserve Energy. TOM A. WILLIAMS,
Washington, D. C.
Using the conception of the subconscious as applying to a special
series of nerve processes, energizing independently of those which are
the bases of the thoughts of everyday life, a psychological theory
has arisen that these subconscious processes constitute energies which
may be regarded as a reserve susceptible of being utilized by means of
special associationizing processes. On this basis a therapeutic
method is employed.
This theory depends upon the postulate that the threshold of
excitation is somewhat inversely proportionate to the richness in
associations of the constellation to be excited. This postulate regards
the inhibition of energy as synonymous with its storage, forgetting
that inhibition itself is a greedy consumer of energy. So that the
absence of manifestation of energy to a superficial examination at
least, does not connote its storage on reserve on these grounds at least.
Nor is the fact that useful work is not done by any means an
index that energy is not expended; for a very little observation shows
that it is extended in fatuities and sterile activities.
So that for the principle of reserve energy would be more correctly
substituted the principle of channeling energy in fruitful directions.
The results of what is called training, that is, technical methods,
clearly show this difference. The trained man may spend less energy
than the untrained man, but his work is more effective in result
because more wisely expended.
The Psychological Analysis of So-called Neurasthenic and Allied
States. TRIGANT BURROW, Johns Hopkins University.
Etymologically, of course, neurasthenia means an exhaustion
of the nerve structure. It is a fatigue-state constituted of chemical
or molecular alterations of the substance of the neurones. Neuras-
thenia is then essentially an anatomical process. But is this definition
of neurasthenia appropriate to the various aberrant states which are
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 77
at present universally subsumed under this generic head? Ought
we longer to^be satisfied with the prevailing static, neurological con-
ception of this widely variable disease-complex, or ought we rather to
press for a more restricted, individual, dynamic interpretation such as
may be yielded through a psychological analysis of the particular
case ?
Cases of neurasthenia present symptoms which are noteworthy
in respect to two important features: First, because of the lack of
coherence and systematization, such as we are wont to demand in
the recognized clinical disease-entities; and second, because of the
'absence of the objective morphological findings, such as might bear
out the patient's subjective complaints.
In such a pass, we are clearly confronted with an apparent dis-
crepancy, and in strict observance of established medical precepts,
the neurasthenic ought accordingly to be excluded from the interest
of the average physician.
To escape this alternative, neurology has invoked the conception
of functional changes having their basis in disintegrations occurring
within the elements of the nervous system, presumably so minute
as to be impalpable to ordinary objective tests. The conception
affords us a comforting subterfuge, but this is an insincere lodging of
issues, unworthy of the scientific ideal.
Experience afforded by the use of the psychoanalytic method
compels the recognition of important affective trends, such as seem
ever insatiably pressing for satisfaction, and it would appear that in
the event of obstruction to the natural course of such instinctive
tendencies, there occur vicarious gratifications in unconsciously
motivated reactions, such as are allied with the former through what
may be called somatic associative connections. It is precisely such
somatic associations that constitute in this view the so-called symp-
toms of the patient.
The phenomenon furnishing strongest support for this interpreta-
tion of many so-called neurasthenic states is the persistent reiteration
of one and the same unconscious trend throughout a patient's dreams,
as revealed upon analysis, and the very striking analogy between
the psychological imagery of the patient as presented in his dreams
and the organic imagery, as presented in his symptoms.
Considering the trend of these observations, are we not justified
in bringing into question the prevailing neurological conception of
so-called neurasthenic and allied states, and in view of the parallelism
here indicated between the content of the patient's dreams and the
78 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
content of his objective symptoms, may we not regard the latter as
also answering the purpose, as it were, of a physiological charade and
as constituting like the dreams an associative or symbolic representa-
tion of an inherent biological trend, to which external circumstances
have denied, perhaps, a normal fruition and which, therefore, seek an
outlet in such unconscious, surrogate issues ?
The Influence of Caffein on Mental and Motor Efficiency. H. L.
HOLLINGWORTH, Columbia University.
Report of an elaborate experiment on 16 subjects for a period
of 40 days, under controlled conditions of life, administration of
doses, etc. The effect of single doses was traced for 72 hours
after administration. The tests used were steadiness, rate of tap-
ping, visual-motor coordination, typewriting (speed and accuracy),
color-naming, naming opposites, calculation, size-weight illusions,
cancellation, discrimination and choice reaction time, quality and
amount of sleep. Motor tests show quick and transient stimulation.
Association tests show stimulation which comes more slowly and
persists longer. Tests of discrimination and coordination show
similar stimulation, which may be preceded by retardation due to
false reactions and consequent caution. No sleep disturbance for
doses smaller than 4 or 6 gr. of pure caffein alkaloid. The magni-
tude of the caffein influence varies inversely with body weight, is
reduced and delayed when the dose is taken along with food sub-
stance, and is relatively slight when the dose is taken in the morning.
There is absolutely no evidence of any secondary depression or
retardation following upon the stimulation. Full reports of the
investigation appear in the January numbers of the American
Journal of Psychology, the PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, the Thera-
peutic Gazette, and in the Archives of Psychology, Columbia Con-
tributions to Psychology, No. 21.
A Kinetic Will Test.1 GUY G. FERNALD, Concord Reformatory.
In selecting and devising psychological tests to be applied in the
differentiation of defectives, especially among delinquents, it is
important to test the ability to endure for the sake of achievement.
This function complex may be measured in terms of fatigue in units
of time.
Fatigue is naturally and rapidly induced in a subject who stands
with heels about I cm. off the floor. Incentive to endure is sup-
lfThis test is to be known henceforth as "An Achievement Capacity Test."
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS
79
plied in the stimulus and in visualizing the degree of elevation of
the heels by means of a delicately energized indicator on a dial
before the subject's eyes which faithfully magnifies the amplitude
of the fluctuations of the heels.
This test has been applied to 116 Reformatory prisoners and to
12 Manual Training school students. The disparity of lowest
and highest scores is remarkable— i. e., 2% and 52% minutes in the
former group and 12 minutes and 2^ hours in the latter — and the
difference of the average and median for these two groups is 35
minutes, about twice the average of the Reformatory group.
It is essential that the limit of mental persistence be reached
before the limit of muscular resistance is encountered, and experi-
ence shows that this form of the test realizes that desideratum.
No subject involuntarily rested his heels while still striving; but
each decided to yield. This was the universal observation both
objective and subjective.
The disturbing elements of varying training and body weight
are almost nugatory, as in male subjects of nearly uniform age the
coefficient of correlation of the development and strength of the
musculature involved to the body weight would be direct and very
high.
The Adaptation Board. HENRY H. GODDARD, Vineland Training
School.
The ability to adapt one's self to changed conditions is something
that comes with developing intelligence and young children possess
it only in a slight degree or not at all. Feeble-minded persons who
are arrested in their development so that they have the mentality
of young children of various ages, show markedly this lack of power
of adaptation. In order to measure if possible this lack, the Adapta-
tion Board has been devised.
It consists of a board a centimeter thick, 22 X 28 cm. with
four holes placed near the corners, three of these being 63 mm. in
diameter while the fourth is 65 mm. A circular block is provided
large enough to just fill the largest hole, therefore too large to be
placed in either of the others.
The Test. — It will be noticed that the difference in the size of
the holes is too slight to be detected by the eye.
The board is placed in front of the child in such a position that
the hole into which the block will fit is in the upper left hand corner.
The child is then made to discover which is the only hole into which
8o PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
the block will fit. After trying this several times until he can show
without hesitation the correct answer to the question, "which is
the only hole into which the block fits," he is given the block and
told to watch what happens. The board is then turned over from
his left to his right and he is asked then to put the block into the
only hole into which it will fit. The child of sufficient intelligence,
of course, puts it in the upper right hand hole; if of lower intelli-
gence, he tries it still in the upper left hand hole because that was
what he had learned and he has not been able to adapt himself to
the changed condition, even though he was watching the change.
For the second part, the board is now placed in its original posi-
tion and the child shown again that now it is in the position where
the block fits the upper left hand hole. He is then told to watch.
The board is now inverted, the edge farthest from him being brought
toward him, and he is now asked to put the block into the only
hole into which it will fit.
Here are shown at once three types of children. The intelli-
gent child places it, of course, in the lower left hand hole; while
the child who is totally unable to adapt himself or to learn, tries it
still in the upper left hand. There is, however, an intermediate
group of children, who, while not able to adapt themselves to the
exact condition, remember that on the former occasion, after being
told to watch what happened, the block went into the upper right
hand hole, and they therefore now try to put it there.
Report of Experiments at Bedford Reformatory, 1910. (By title.)
E. H. ROWLAND, Mt. Holyoke College.
Nine psychological tests of reaction-time, memory, attention,
and suggestion, were performed on 35 women in the N. Y. State
reformatory at Bedford. The object of these tests was to find out
whether the resulting grades would be an index of the ability of the
subjects, and whether those failing to pass a certain number of the
experiments could be fairly judged as unable to earn their own
living after their term was over. Failure in 6 out of 9 tests was
called sub-normality. Eleven of the thirty-five failed to reach this
standard. These already comprised the list of those graded by
the superintendent as sub-normal and incapable of honest freedom,
with the addition of two more who failed only in 5 tests.
The experiments were later tried upon Mt. Holyoke and Amherst
students. No student failed in 6 tests.
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 81
The Present Status of the Binet-Simon Tests. J. E. WALLACE
WALLIN.
The reader discussed four methods by means of which to check
up the accuracy of measuring scales of intelligence: (a) Extensive
surveys of normal children in each age by a wide-range system of
testing, to ascertain whether the age norms are correct, as deter-
mined by the percentage of passing and the size of the MV's; (b)
annual tests of the same groups of normal children, to determine
whether the amount of actual growth corresponds to the growth
norms laid down in the scale; (c) the plotting of curves of frequency
for homogeneous groups of individuals, to determine whether the
curves assume the normal shape for chance distributions; and (d)
the plotting of efficiency or capacity curves for each age for the various
traits tested in the scale, or for traits tested independently of the
scale, to determine whether the capacities increase in strength with
age and whether they vary within the limits of the maximal permis-
sible norm of variation.
An analysis by these methods of the available experimental data
of various workers in different countries indicated that there are
various inequalities and imperfections in the 1908 Binet-Simon scale,
both in respect to the placement of a considerable number of indi-
vidual tests and the correctness of several collective age norms.
But it also appeared that, in spite of obvious inequalities, the scale
possesses considerable value as an instrument for gauging mental
station and classifying groups of mental defectives. Several objec-
tions to the 1911 scale were offered, and a plea was made for more
extensive wide-range try-outs of the 1908 scale by uniform and
standardized methods on normal school children, before any American
revisions should be attempted.
The Status of the Binet Tests to Date. HENRY H. GODDARD, Vineland
Training School.
The a priori arguments against the tests were considered, and some
cautions noted.
A summary of the results of their use brought to light these facts:
The results of the tests applied to 400 feeble-minded children agree
perfectly with long experience in institutional life. A second testing
on the same group shows remarkable agreement with the first.
2,000 normal children tested by this method show the remarkable
curve of distribution; and the results agree very closely with the
experience of the teachers. 1,000 of these, retested a year later, again
82 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
show considerable correlation with the earlier test, but with marked
and peculiar differences which must be explained. A test of 56
delinquent girls in Boston shows 52 of them mentally defective
according to the scale. These are the girls that have given the most
trouble to the probation officers. 100 Juvenile Court children in the
Detention Home in Newark, N. J., show 66 per cent, feeble-minded
according to scale, and only one of normal intelligence. 100 children
admitted to the Rahway Reformatory in New Jersey show 26 per
cent, feeble-minded. The test of an entire private school in Penn-
sylvania showed results agreeing strongly with the experience of the
teachers with one or two striking exceptions.
Feeble-minded children tested from two to seven times show
remarkable uniformity in the results, largely regardless of the experi-
ence and personnel of the examiner. Some tests of the insane have
shown that the method is of remarkable value in these cases, the
difference in the results being that whereas normal and feeble-minded
children nearly always answer all the questions up to a certain point
and then stop, the insane, on the contrary, miss the questions in
earlier years and do those that are for older people, indicating that
the disease has destroyed certain processes without producing a
leveling down of the whole intelligence. The same thing has been
discovered from the use of the tests on epileptics at Skillman, N. J.,
indicating that epilepsy is a degenerative process.
Conclusion. — The tests go a long way toward giving us what we
want. They are accurate far beyond belief. While it is true that
they need supplementing and improving, yet it is quite possible that
this supplementing will have to be in the nature of a consideration of
individual cases and special tests for special children. It is a problem
that may well occupy the attention of psychologists, but no one
should attempt to criticize the tests until he has used them on some
hundreds of children.
The Application of Experimental Psychology to the Problem of Voca-
tional Guidance. HELEN THOMPSON WOOLEY, Cincinnati.
The present paper reports an attempt which is being made to
test the usefulness of a psychological laboratory as a part of a voca-
tional bureau. The bureau is established in connection with the
office which issues working certificates to children in Cincinnati.
The general plan of research is to follow for five years the careers of
a thousand or more children who have left school at the age of fourteen
to go to work, and to compare them with a corresponding series of
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 83
children who stay in school. The records cover the child's school
career; his physical condition; his home conditions; his industrial
history, including a study of the places of occupation; and his mental
state as determined by the psychological examinations.
The considerations which guided the selection of tests were the
following: (i) a series suited to the capacity of 14-year-old children
who have completed at least the fifth grade; (2) a series which would
help to analyze the fundamental aptitudes of the child; (3) a series
which could be administrated in about an hour's time; (4) tests
which could be quickly evaluated; (5) a series in which the disturbing
effects of communication between children who have been tested and
those who have not, can be minimized, partly by selecting tests which
are very little modified by previous knowledge of their nature, and
partly by selecting those whose form can be changed without changing
their value; (6) tests requiring only inexpensive apparatus.
The series now in use is the following. (A) For Sensation: (i)
Visual acuity taken with the Snellen Chart, and (2) auditory acuity
taken with the tick of a stop watch. These tests reveal nothing more
than the presence of abnormalities which might have a hampering
effect. (B) For motor ability: (i) The strength of the hand taken
with an adjustable dynamometer, (2) the rapidity of movement in
tapping, (3) the rate of fatigue in tapping, (4) the steadiness of the
hand, taken with the apparatus described in Whipple, page 124, and
(6) coordination as tested by card sorting. (C) For perception: The
quickness and accuracy of perception, as revealed in the A test.
(D) For the higher mental faculties: (i) Immediate memory for
digits, (2) learning power, taken with a special form of substitution
tests, (3) the use of language, and range of ideas, tested by association
of opposites, and by completion of sentences, (4) ingenuity taken with
a form board test. The speaker discussed the exact method of
giving each test, and of evaluating results.
An Objective Measurement of Handwriting, D. STARCH, University
of Wisconsin.
The proposed method of measuring handwriting consists in
measuring, by means of a celluloid graphometer, the mean variation
of the slant of letters and their mean deviation from the base-line.
These two measures are reduced to the same units of linear distance
and averaged. In this manner all the samples in Thorndike's scale
were measured which showed that the uniformity of letters regularly
decreases as the quality of the writing decreases. Measurements
84 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
of other specimens of writing made by this proposed method and
by the method of direct comparison with standard specimens showed
that the former method is considerably more accurate. The applica-
tion of this graphometer scale to various problems of research was
illustrated in the measurement of a considerable number of specimens
of writing from pupils in the second grade to the last year in the
high school. This yielded a curve of learning reaching its maximum
point of excellence in the seventh grade.
Relative Time and Accuracy in Adding Upward and Downward.
(By title.) L. W. COLE, Boulder, Colorado.
Measured by averages, twenty-nine out of a group of thirty
persons, selected at random, added the same problems more rapidly
and less accurately when adding upward than when adding downward.
Counting to the left was also slower and more accurate than counting
to the right. This is apparently due to a habit acquired by reading
from right to left. In both experiments the factor of habit seemed
to produce a saving of time at the expense of accuracy. The subjects
of the experiments were persons of average practice in adding.
Probably a very great amount of drill in addition (perhaps more than
a school program could allot to it) would be required before a different
type of results would emerge and the adding process become both
mechanical and accurate. This paper will be printed in the Journal
of Educational Psychology, Vol. III., No. 2, February, 1912.
Montessori's Method of Teaching Writing and Reading. HOWARD
C. WARREN, Princeton University.
The Casa dei Bambini is an important modification of the Kinder-
garten originated by Maria Montessori in 1907. The pupils range
from 3 to 7 years of age.
Besides sensory and intellectual training the program includes
lessons in deportment and self-help, gymnastics, manual training,
play, and nature study. The scheme of studies is founded on an
unusually correct appreciation of the child's mental processes. Motor
habits are developed from instinctive motor tendencies; habits of
thought are built up by association. The theory of discipline is
novel: the children are subject to no drill; and there are no extrinsic
rewards or punishments. A cardinal principle in the method is the
brevity of the instructions given.
Writing and reading are the culmination of a long series of sensory
and muscular training. Touch and the kinsesthetic sense are em-
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 85
phasized. The child learns to distinguish blind-folded between silk,
velvet, satin, wool, cotton, and linen, and between different grades
of texture in each. The sense of form is taught in the same way.
The teaching of writing falls into three stages: practice in holding
and wielding the pen; exercises in associating the tactual-motor form
of a letter with its name and visual form; and combining of letters
into syllables and words. On account of the careful preliminary
training in the motor equivalents these children form letters more
accurately at 5 and 6 than the ordinary child of 10 or 12 who has
learned to write by imitating visual copies.
In the new system reading follows writing instead of preceding it.
The children already know how to read detached words; but ac-
cording to Montessori this is not really "reading." They are first
trained to recite in unison sentences written on the blackboard.
At length something is written which involves action. When the
children understand and obey the directions, reading attains its true
value. It is no longer merely mechanical expression, but a means of
acquiring ideas. The change comes when the impulse to read aloud
is checked.
The program and methods of these schools challenge our entire
system of both primary and secondary education. They, indicate
that the present curriculum needs thorough revision. It is founded
on a faulty psychology; it does not consider what a child is fitted to
assimilate at any given stage of mental development. Montessori's
system is based on a study of precisely these problems.
(This paper will appear in full in the March number of the
Journal of Educational Psychology.)
The Relation between Amount to be Learned and Retention. V. A. C.
HENMON, University of Wisconsin.
Ebbinghaus, in the widely quoted results on the relation of the
length of series to the number of repetitions required for learning,
found that the number of repetitions increases at first with very
' great rapidity and then less rapidly and that the increase in repetitions
is relatively greater than the increase in the length of series. A sys-
tematic investigation of the problem in learning nonsense-syllables,
poetry and prose has failed to confirm the law. On the contrary,
there is a relative decrease in the number of repetitions as the length
of series increases and an increase in retention after an interval of
time. This result holds not only for practiced but also for un-
practiced subjects and is most marked with sense material.
86 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
The Relation of Facility in Learning to Tenacity of Impression. E. A.
McC. GAMBLE, Wellesley College.
Question I. — Do the persons who learn with the greater facility
retain for a given time the larger fraction of the material severally
mastered? The results in point have been obtained with series of
words, letters and figures, by the method of retained members, from
about 350 college students. Tenacity was gauged by the number of
series members which could be produced without a fresh presentation
of the series, with a single presentation and after several presentations.
The results show no correlation, either positive or negative, between
facility and tenacity.
Question 2. — In the case of individual subjects, does the rate at
which material is presented affect the fraction of the initial learning
time which is saved in relearning?
Question 3. — When the learning time is lengthened by the difficulty
of the material is the relearning time relatively short or relatively
long? The results bearing upon these two questions have been ob-
tained from trained subjects, with normal series of nonsense syllables,
by the method of complete memorizing and with aural presentation.
When series are learned and relearned at the same rate of presentation,
the fraction of the learning time saved in relearning is greater if the
presentation rate is neither very slow nor very fast. When the series
are learned at different presentation rates but relearned at the same
rate, the fraction of the learning time saved is greater for the series
which were originally learned at the slow rate of presentation, unless
the absolute learning time of the "slow series" is very small. Series
which are hard to learn are more often hard than easy to relearn.
Question 4. — How may retention best be gauged? The method
of reproduction without fresh presentation is unsatisfactory because
it reveals only the strongest of the original impressions, the "supra-
liminal associations." The method of relearning is unsatisfactory
because in relearning it is impossible to distinguish facility in forming
fresh associations from retention of subliminal associations. The
method of reproduction after a single presentation is perhaps most
satisfactory. The small amount of work done on this plot in the
field of memory investigation may be due to its hedge of experi-
mental difficulties.
The Relation of the Quickness of Learning to Retentiveness. DARWIN
OLIVER LYON, Columbia University.
Do those who learn quickly remember the longest? Those who
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 87
have attempted to answer this question experimentally have obtained
results that do not agree. Close inspection proves the problem to
be a very elaborate one, for the results depend upon nature and
length of material used as well as on age, sex, condition, etc., of the
subject. Most important of all is the method used in ascertaining
the subject's " retentiveness " after the lapse of the time interval
chosen. Roughly speaking we may say that those who learn quickly
remember longest where the material used is "logical" or "meaning-
ful" in character, but forget quickest where the material is such as
involves the memorizing of motor associations, which is generally
the case with digits, words, and nonsense syllables. We can state
quite positively that the amount of difference in retentiveness between
the fast learner and the slow learner is much less than is generally
believed.
Plateaus in Simple Learning. JAMES E. LOUGH, New York Uni-
versity.
The present study deals with the determination of the habit
curve in the field of a simple visual association. The material for the
test consisted of 3 sheets: (i) A test sheet with 10 lines of letters in
mixed order; (2) a key sheet, in which 20 letters used in the test
sheet are arranged in a vertical column and opposite each is printed
some other letter; (3) a record sheet. The method has been de-
scribed in detail in my previous reports and in Kirkpatrick's " Studies
in Learning," Archives of Psychology, 1909. I have used this method
since 1902 as a class test and as an individual test, and have collected
over 500 records including adults and children. Some of these tests
were made as home tests and some as laboratory experiments under
carefully controlled conditions. No difference can be observed in
the results of tests made under these two conditions.
These tests are made in order to study habit formation as affected
by (i) practice, (2) fatigue, (3) distribution of repetition, (4) diurnal
efficiency, (5) changing keys, (6) sex, (7) age, (8) ability, and (9)
individual variation. I expect shortly to publish with Dr. P. R.
Radosavljevich, under the title "Habit-Formation in the Light of
Experimental Investigation," a detailed report of this study. At
this time I wish to say only a few words with reference to the problem
of plateaus as indicated by my experiments.
As it is known Bryan and Harter were the first who found in their
study one or more special periods of delay in progress, so-called
"arrest periods," "critical stages," or periods of "incubation," giving
88 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
a "plateau" or two in curve, where certain elementary habits make
substantial gains, preparatory to their organization. In my tests
in simple associative learning, where only one or a simple group of
special associations are formed no "plateaus" occurred. The prac-
tice period in these tests lasted from 20 to 90 days.
The habit curves all agree in type; showing (i) a more or less
concave form; (2) general increase of quickness of response; (3)
certain irregularities. These irregularities, however, are not plateaus
but are normal small irregularities due, as introspection proves, to
regular and irregular fluctuations in attention and effort, to fatigue,
to "breathing" factors, or to some inner or outer incident; the second-
ary causes of these irregularities are in some cases the time of day,
weather, temperature changes, etc. The majority of subjects claim
that those irregularities are due to fatigue, because even in a single
test (10 trials in each group) in the 5th and yth trial there is usually
little or no gain, and sometimes a loss.
The nature of learning in these experiments is much simpler than
in the experiments of Bryan and Harter, Swift, and Book, and my
failure to discover plateaus would seem to indicate that this feature
of the learning process is confined to the more complex activities.
Some Experimental Evidence on the Transfer of Training in Memory.
E. E. RALL, University of Tennessee.
This is a report of experiments with 44 students at the University
of Texas in 1909 and 1911. A memory test on lines from "Evan-
geline" and nonsense syllables was given for three days before and
after a training* period which lasted four weeks and averaged 20
minutes a day. The training material was varied for different
individuals, and included poetry and prose in English and foreign
languages, irregular verbs and vocabularies. The time for the first
three and the last three days of the training period was used to
measure improvement or loss, the same amount having been mem-
orized each day. Parallel control experiments, involving 28 ob-
servers, were carried on in both years, using only the tests.
The results showed wide variations : 4 out of 44 lost in the training,
one lost in the "Evangeline" tests and 6 out of 34 in the nonsense
syllable tests. In the control series 4 out of 28 lost in "Evangeline,"
3 out of 1 6 in nonsense syllables. In the training 22 improved more,
20 less than in the "Evangeline" test; 2 improved the same in both,
and 23 out of 34 improved more (or lost less) and n improved less in
the training than in the nonsense syllable tests.
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 89
Taking the average of all gains and losses, the 25 observers in 1909
gained 32.5 per cent, in training, 26.9 per cent, in " Evangeline,"
24.5 per cent, in nonsense syllables; while the 20 control observers
gained 17.8 per cent, in "Evangeline" and 12 per cent, in nonsense
syllables. Deducting the amount of gain in the control observers
from that shown in the practiced group and calculating the percen-
tages on the basis of the amount of material learned in a given time
it appears that there was, on an average, 21 per cent, transfer in
"Evangeline" and 36 per cent, in the nonsense syllables. A smaller
percentage of transfer is shown in the 1911 series.
CONFERENCE ON THE RELATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND MEDICAL
EDUCATION
1. The Present Status of Psychology in Medical Education and Prac-
tice. S. I. FRANZ, Government Hospital, Washington, D. C.
Psychology has recently grown in favor in connection with medical
affairs. This has been due to the realization of the importance of
psychiatry, and of the success of non-medical healers. In present-
day medical education, psychology has a place in few departments of
medicine, but in most schools psychological matters are discussed in
the courses in physiology, psychiatry, neurology and medicine.
All physicians depend upon the account of mental processes for
diagnostic information and for the estimation of the effects of re-
medial agents. In the consideration of mental diseases psychology has
its greatest value to the physician, both in diagnosis and treatment.
The general conceptions of the latter are inadequate, and usually too
exclusive.
Psychology has value in research in psychiatry and neurology,
and its principles have also been applied in pharmacological studies.
Technical psychology and its terms have been criticized by
physicians, and it has sometimes been assumed that no special in-
struction is necessary, but if its general relations are to be understood
some special attention to it is needed.
2. The Value of Psychology in Psychiatry. ADOLPH MEYER, Johns
Hopkins Medical School.
It is necessary to consider the fields of both psychiatry and of
psychology as open to expansion. There is a psychology which will
cope not only with the problems of introspection, but also with the
other problems dealing with the biological, physiological and even
anatomical conditions of mental life. Who but the psychologist
90 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
would be qualified to deal with the broad field between the physiology
of special organs and the behavior of personalities ? Psychiatry has
at all times tended to share the prevailing psychological attitudes.
It inevitably has common ground with psychology, and to agree on
the common ground or even on how we should want to characterize
it is a vital issue for a discussion of the mutual value of two fields of
work.
Psychiatry is forced to deal with psychological material and the
more satisfactorily it does it, the better for both psychiatry and psy-
chology. It determines mental facts partly as symptoms of diseases
back of the conditions and partly as biological reactions of the type of
mental integration, which, like suggestion, once induced, play a more
or less well defined dynamic role.
The first task is to describe critically the plain events of abnormal
reactions and conduct, as experiments of nature for the conditions
under which they occur, the subjective and objective characteristics
which allow us to differentiate the reactions from one another, the
events and results in the conduct and life of the person, the dynamic
factors and their modifiability, the time and influences needed for a
readjustment of a state of balance. With this rule of formal tech-
nique and logical arrangement of the inquiry we are bound to get
sound common ground for a psychiatry which aims merely at the
identification of given conditions with accepted disease-processes
and also for a dynamic pathology which gives psychobiological data
a dynamic position.
With regard to the program developed by Dr. Prince, I feel that
the college curriculum should not preempt the field of psychopathol-
ogy unless it has clinical material on which to work and on which to
obtain the facts under discussion. Common-sense psychology offers
enough problems for sound psychology at that stage. In the medical
curriculum he would expect the program of Dr. Watson (including
the study of instincts, work and fatigue and sleep) to be added to the
physiology course in the second year (or the first year if the physiology
of the nervous system can be made to precede) ; the course of pathology
would then have to give space to the elements of psychopathology
(effects of drugs, of glandular action, hypnotism and the collisions of
attitudes and emotions, and their effects on memory). The third
year would extend into the field of substitutions of the hysterical
and psychasthenic type, and simpler psychotic reactions, and to the
aphasia-apraxia group. The fourth year would then be prepared to
cover psychopathology and psychiatry as it appears in the clinical
work and in clinical research.
OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATIONS 91
3. Psychopathology and Neuropathology: The Problems of Teaching
and Research Contrasted. E. E. SOUTHARD, Pathologist to the
Massachusetts Board of Insanity.
The ideas that I wish to bring to this symposium are few, and I
hope not too^ unorthodox. How shall research psychology and
research medicine come together, on what ground, and to what ends?
I wish (i) to insist strongly on the unique value of the pathological
method, not merely for the diagnostic and therapeutic purposes of
medicine, but for biology as a whole and for the most vital of biological
sciences, psychology. I wish (2) to point out how pernicious in
research may be the dogmatic insistence on the doctrine of psy-
chophysical parallelism in medical or premedical courses in psychol-
ogy, pernicious because it inhibits the free interchange of structural
and functional concepts and the passage to and fro of workers in
the several sciences. I wish (3) to show that psychology and phys-
iology have more in common than either has with such structural
sciences as anatomy and histology, and that the main common ele-
ment of both mental and cerebral processes is the time-element as
against the space-element of the structural sciences. On this ground
(4) I conceive that the mind twist and brain spot hypotheses for the
explanation of certain forms of mental disease are entirely consistent
with each other, since from a different angle each is dealing with the
same facts. (5) Above all let us not divide up the tasks of research
as we divide up the tasks of teaching, since research, looking to the
future, defies the compartments of the past.
4. Content of a Course in Psychology for Medical Students. JOHN B.
WATSON, Johns Hopkins University.
The proposed course should concern itself largely with the ob-
jective material of psychology. It should include a brief course in
visual and auditory sensation, thorough tests and applications of
the Binet-Simon system, and work in mental and muscular fatigue.
The greater part of the time in the course should be devoted to ex-
perimental studies in the acquisition and retention of skillful acts,
since this type of experimentation will show the methods and the
different stages of acquiring accommodations, the distribution of
effort in learning, short cuts in learning, etc. Such experiments pave
the way for the normal understanding of lack of interest at certain
stages of development, as shown in "resting places" and "plateaus";
the understanding of "bungling" and "conflicts"; the stamping in
and retention of wrong methods of response and the effect of emotional
states upon the acquisition and exercise of habit.
92 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS
This work on habit formation should be followed by a study of
the normal process of association, memory, and retention. These
studies should be purely objective. Definite tasks should be set;
words, phrases and various other material presented, then the time
of learning under ordinary conditions and under conditions of ex-
citement, obtained by rushing, interruption, etc., should be taken.
The student will see that the rate of learning and the errors in learning
can be measured as any other biological function can be measured.
Memory in the narrower sense ("associations" with time, place,
and emotional setting) can very easily be tested by the picture method
or by the method of presenting concrete situations, now largely used
in Germany in the psychological training of students of law.
This work on memory in the narrower sense may be greatly sup-
plemented by the introduction of Jung's association method.
It is the view of the writer that the course should contain several
lectures and experiments upon normal reaction time. It is unsafe
and unwise to put a stop-watch in the hands of the medical student
without at the same time telling him a little about the factors which
influence reaction times, their normal variability especially in un-
trained subjects and the individual peculiarities of different subjects
in this and other respects.
By these lectures and experiments upon the above subjects it
is thought that the student will be prepared to enter the clinic, where
he should find the means of broadening his knowledge of hypnotism,
multiple personalities, suggestion, aphasia. Only in the clinic can be
obtained the material for such study. Without the individual study
of cases all lecture work is unavailing. It is the psychopathologist's
function, and not the psychologist's, to teach such subjects. The
study of the "subconscious" should be excluded; nothing is gained
by this concept. The visible and tangible effects of suppressions,
tangles, conflicting habits and the like, may be studied without posit-
ing a subconscious. Such a concept is as detrimental to the advance-
ment of psychological analysis as is the discussion of those philosophical
remnants — psychophysical parallelism and interaction.
The course might be given as an elective in the second or third
year of the medical work. Two laboratory periods of two hours
each and one lecture should be given. A thorough course in ele-
mentary psychology is presupposed as a part of the student's pre-
medical training.
BOOKS RECEIVED
BOOKS RECEIVED FROM NOVEMBER TO
JANUARY
SCOTT, W. D. Increasing Human Efficiency in Business. New
York: Macmillan, 1911. Pp. v + 339. $1.25 net.
[ANON.] Life, Love and Light. New York: Macmillan, 1911. Pp.
viii -f- 177. $1.10 net.
BERGSON, H. Laughter. An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic.
(Authorized trans, by C. Brereton & F. Rothwell.) New York:
Macmillan, 1911. Pp. vii + 200. $1.25 net.
ROYCE, J. William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of
Life. New York: Macmillan, 1911. Pp. ix + 301. $1.50.
BARRETT, E. B. Motive-force and Motivation-tracks. London: Long-
mans, Green, & Co., 1911. Pp. x + 225. 7/6 net.
McDouGALL, W. Body and Mind. London: Methuen & Co.,
1911. Pp. xix + 384. 10/6 net.
EULENBURG, A. Sadismus und Masochismus. (2. Aufl.) Wiesba-
den: Bergmann, 1911. Pp. 106. Mk. 2.80.
FRIEDMANN, M. Ueber die Psychologic der Eifersucht. Wiesbaden:
Bergmann, 1911. Pp. vii -f- 112. Mk. 3.
URTIN H. U Action Criminelle. Etude de philosophie pratique.
Paris: Alcan, 1911. Pp. 268. 5 fr.
HOLMES, S. J. The Evolution of Animal Intelligence. New York:
Henry Holt & Co., 1911. Pp. 296.
BOTTI, M. U Infinite. Genova: Formiggini, 1912. Pp. 529.
EUCKEN, R. Life's Basis and Life's Ideal. The Fundamentals of a
New Philosophy of Life. (Widgery, A. G., trans., introd.)
London: A. & C. Black, 1911. Pp. xix+377. $2.50 net.
BALDWIN, J. M. Thought and Things. A Study of the Development
and Meaning of Thought or Genetic Logic. Vol. III. New York:
Macmillan, 1911. Pp. xvi-f-284. $2.75 net.
ROUSTAN, D. Lemons de philosophie. L Psychologie. Paris: Dela-
grave, 1911. Pp. 520. 5 fr. 50 net.
94 BOOKS RECEIVED
STERN, W. Die differentielle Psychologie in ihren methodischen
Grundlagen. Leipzig: Earth, 1911. Pp. xi + 5O3. Mk. 12
NEIL, T. F. Whence and Whither or The Evolution of Life. Altoona,
Pa.: Mirror Printing Co., 1911. Pp. 62.
HENRY, M. C. Sensation et Energie. Paris: Hermann, 1911. Pp.
iii + 296. 8 f r.
HENRY, M. C. Memoire et Habitude. Paris: Hermann, 1911. Pp.
iii+ 116. 3 fr.
FICHTE, J. C. Die Amueisung zum seligen Leben. Leipzig: F.
Eckardt, 1910. Pp. xii + 205. 2 Mk. 50.
OEHLER, R. Nietzsche als Bildner der Personlichkeit. Vortrag gehalten
am 1 6 Oktober 1910 im Nietzsche-Archiv zu Weimar. Leipzig:
F. Meiner, 1911. Pp. 31. 60 Pf.
BUSSE, A. Aristoteles Ueber die Seele. Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1911.
Pp. xx + 120. 2 Mk. 20.
WALLIN, J. E. W. A Practical Guide for the Administration of the Binet-
Simon Scale for Measuring Intelligence. (Reprint from The Psy-
chological Clinic. Obtainable from the author.) Pp. 22. 1 5 cents.
ANGELL, J. R. Chapters from Modern Psychology. New York, Long-
mans, Green, and Co., 1912, Pp. vii + 308. $1.35 net.
NOTES AND NEWS 95
NOTES AND NEWS,
DR. EDMUND B. HUEY, ^who has for some time been making
examinations of defective children and of aphasic patients at the
Johns Hopkins Hospital, has been appointed lecturer on mental
development in the Johns Hopkins University and assistant in
psychiatry in the Phipps Clinic of the Johns Hopkins Hospital.
From January to June, 1912, Dr. Huey will give, at the university,
a series of weekly public lectures and clinics on the subject of back-
ward and feeble-minded children, and on related phases of clinical
psychology.
PROFESSOR S. P. HAYES, of Mount Holyoke College, has been
granted leave of absence and will spend the coming semester in
England.
PROFESSOR R. S. WOODWORTH, of Columbia University, is plan-
ning to spend a semester's leave of absence in visiting the Psycho-
logical Institutes of England and Germany.
PROFESSOR HUGO MUNSTERBERG, of Harvard University, is giving
a course of eight lectures at Union College as incumbent for 1912 of
the Ichabod Spencer Lectureship in Psychology.
THE following items are taken from the press:
DR. G. STANLEY HALL, president of Clark University, delivered
the address at the inauguration of Dr. George E. Myers, principal of
the State Manual Training Normal School at Pittsburg, Kansas.
The subject of the address was " Educational Efficiency." During
the month of January President Hall gave a course of six lectures on
" The Founders of Modern Psychology " at Columbia University.
IT is stated in the Journal of the American Medical Association
that Professor Theodor Ziehen, director of the psychiatric and neuro-
logic clinic in Berlin, will resign his position at the end of the winter
semester and discontinue all medical work, in order to devote himself
exclusively to research in psychology. For this purpose, he will re-
move to Wiesbaden, where he will erect for himself a private psy-
chological laboratory.
DR. ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN, hitherto assistant professor,
has been promoted to a full professorship in anthropology at
Clark University.
96 NOTES AND NEWS
•
PROFESSOR J. McKEEN CATTELL, of Columbia University,
addressed the Huxley Society of the Johns Hopkins University on
December 20, his subject being " Some Problems of University
Administration." On the morning of January 19 he gave the founda-
tion address at Indiana University. In the afternoon he spoke before
the faculties on " Grades and Credits," and in the evening addressed
the Society of Sigma Xi. On January 22, he gave an address before
the faculties of the University of Illinois on "The Administration of
a University." On January 5, Professor Cattell gave an address at
Lehigh University and in the evening addressed the faculties of
Lehigh University and Lafayette College.
A NEW psychological review, Psiche, has been launched in Italy
with Professor Enrico Morselli of Genoa, Professor Sante de Sanctis
of Rome, and Professor Guido Villa of Pavia as directors, and Dr.
Roberto Assagioli of Florence as editor-in-chief. The directors aim
to make the new review different from previous reviews in certain
respects, one of which will be the devotion of each number to a par-
ticular topic. It is planned to publish six numbers of not less than
sixty-four pages each in the course of the present year. The sub-
scription price is L. 8 for Italian and L. 10 for foreign subscriptions.
Single Cumbers will cost L. 2. Communications may be addressed
to Via degli Alfani, 46, Florence.
. IX. No. 3. March
THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN
GENERAL REVIEWS AND SUMMARIES
SENSATION (GENERAL)
BY PROFESSOR MADISON BENTLEY
Cornell University
Minkowski (5) denies the validity of Miiller's law of specific
sense energies. He finds that the law is inconsistent with the concept
of the adequate stimulus, and that it fails also to allow, if taken in
strictness, the attribution of qualitative differences to the world of
objects. Moreover, he finds Miiller inconsistent in applying
the law to the modalities of sense while conceding that stimulus
may condition the individual qualities (colors, tones, etc.) within a
single modality. Minkowski brings the argument from phylogeny
to show that nervous system and end-organ have grown up under the
influence of the environment and that they have been moulded in
conformity to the properties of stimulus. The specificity of response
he refers to Nagel's "specific disposition" which tunes the sensory
apparatus, from the start, to a particular form of stimulation. A.
Schonberg (6) thinks, on the contrary, that the doctrine of specific
energies may be retained by assuming a relatively small number of
nervous elements which respond differently under different intensities
of stimulus. From the observation that strong taste stimuli often
yield not one but two or three taste qualities, he draws the wide
inference that "with every quantitative change of stimulus there
is correlated a qualitative change in sensation." Schonberg cites
other sense modalities, too; but he quite fails to support his gen-
eralization. Structures found within several of the sense-organs and
known to the histologists as "secondary sense-cells" are thought by
Botezat (i) to be of a glandular nature and to facilitate, by their
97
98 _: MADISON BENTLEY
secretions, the excitatory functions of the end-organ. Botezat calls
them "sensory gland-cells" (Sinnesdrusenzellen). He includes the
auditory cells of the labyrinth, rod-cells of the taste-buds, the cells
in the rod-cone layer of the retina, and other similar structures.
Upon his view, the stimulus sets these cells secreting, and their
products act chemically upon the nervous substance. By treating
the stimulating agents in an animal's environment under the principle
of the parallelogram of forces, Szymanski (7) seeks to work out the
relative physiological values of light, heat, etc., as these stimuli
simultaneously affect the organism. The rate and direction of move-
ment under combined stimuli are regarded by his method as resultants
to be factored into stimulus-moments. From a brilliant series of
experiments under the method of training (Dressurmethode), Kalischer
(3) concludes (i) that the labyrinth is not an organ of analysis, (2)
that the vestibule possesses auditory functions, and (3) that the
cortex is not the sole seat of auditory and visual processes. Kalischer
trained dogs to associate the taking of food with certain tones, odors,
and colors. When the association had become fixed, the animal
suffered an operation (such as the removal of the labyrinth or of the
temporal or occipital lobes). From the subsequent retention or loss
of the trained response the experimenter drew his inferences regarding
the psychophysical processes involved. The brief account of the
experiments leaves one in doubt whether sufficient precautions were
taken against secondary cues. The method of training has for some
time been used in this country by S. I. Franz (2) in his study of
cerebral functions.
REFERENCES
1. BOTEZAT, E. Ueber Sinnesdrusenzellen und die Funktion von Sinnesapparaten
Anat. Anz., 1910, 37, 513-530.
2. FRANZ, S. I. On the Functions of the Cerebrum: Concerning the Lateral Portions
of the Occipital Lobes. Amer. J. of Physiol, 191 1, 28, 308-3 17.
3. KALISCHER, O. Weitere Mitteilung iiber die Ergebnisse der Dressur als physio-
logische Untersuchungsmethode auf den Gebieten des Gehor-, Geruchs- und
Farbensinns. Arch.f. Physiol., 1909, 303-322.
4. MACH, E. Sinnliche Elemente und naturwissenschaftliche Begriffe. Arch.f.d.ges.
Physiol. (Pfluger), 1910, 136, 263-274.
5. MINKOWSKI, E. Zur Mullerschen Lehre von den spezifischen Sinnesenergien.
Zsch.f. SinnesphysioL, 1911, 45, 129-152.
6. SCHONBERG, A. Bezichungen zwischen der Quantitat des Reizes und der Qualitat
der Empfindung. Zsch. f. SinnesphysioL, 191 1, 45, 197-203 .
7. SZYMANSKI, J. S. Ein Versuch, das Verhaltnis zwischen modal verschiedenen
Reizen in Zahlen auszudriicken. Arch. f. d. ges. Physiol (Pfluger), 1911, 138,
457-486.
VISION— GENERAL PHENOMENA 99
VISION— GENERAL PHENOMENA
BY HERBERT SYDNEY LANGFELD
Harvard University
In his experiments upon the retinas of frogs, Bauer (i) found
strong evidence that an assimilating as well as a dissimilating process
takes place in the visual purple in daylight vision and that the assimi-
lating process increases with increasing intensity of light up to a
certain maximum intensity. Upon first submitting the purple to
strong light, it pales, but gradually adaptation takes place and the
assimilating process overtakes and often exceeds the dissimilating
process. In the latter case the purple returns to the original dark
color. Absence of change in the color of the purple does not mean
that there is no retinal process in progress, but that the assimilating
process is equal to the dissimilating. These facts seem to support
the theory of Hering as against that of v. Kries. The visual purple of
the rods not only functions in daylight vision but it is only then that
it reaches its full activity. Siven (17) thinks the following facts
point to the possible functioning of the rods for blue- violet perception:
first, the spectrum at low intensities is not colorless but bluish;
second, the Purkinje phenomenon takes place in the region of the
rods; third, violet blindness during santonin poisoning, — since san-
tonin affects the rods; fourth, the yellow perception during jaundice
caused by affection of the rods; fifth, blue-blindness during hemeral-
opia; sixth, the results of the experiments of Hess on the color
vision of night and day animals. The experiments which Bruckner
made upon the blind spot,1 in which he found a contrast effect of the
surrounding field upon the blind spot, leads him to conclude (3)
that the physiological processes underlying the phenomenon of
contrast take place not in the retina, but in the corpus geniculatum
externum or in the visual cortex. In a preliminary report of experi-
ments upon after images, Ferree and Rand (9) state that the results
so far obtained indicate that the influence of brightness upon color
excitation takes place posterior to the level usually ascribed to the
paired processes.
The experiment of S. P. Thompson,2 in which a sensation of light
is caused by subjecting the head to the influence of a magnetic field,
1 Briichner, A. "Ueber die Sichtbarkeit des blinden Fleckes." Arch. f. d. ges.
Physiol. (Pfluger), 1911, 136, 610-658.
2 Thompson, S. P. "A Physiological Effect of an Alternating Magnetic Field."
Proc. Roy. Soc., 1910, 82, 396-398.
100 HERBERT SYDNEY LANGFELD
was repeated by Dunlap (8) in order to determine if the phenomenon
was not "due to idio-retinal light under the suggestion of the hum of
the coil due to the alternating current." The transformer was placed
on a table near the coil "so that the loud noise of the former com-
pletely drowned the hum of the latter" and the sensation still per-
sisted. Dunlap therefore concludes that "the phenomenon was
really a matter of visual sensation." Of special interest is the fact
that the sensation is strongest when the head is so turned in the
magnetic field that the general direction of the optic pathway is
parallel to the lines of force. Dunlap thinks rather that the alter-
nating current alternately intensifies and inhibits a process already
in progress, such as idio-retinal light, rather than that it arouses a
visual sensation, but he hesitates to decide definitely from the present
data. Swinton (19) some fifteen years ago observed this phenomenon
of visual sensation due to the effect of the electric current. His
method was to employ a continuous-current magneto generator, one
terminal of which was held in one hand, while a wire from the other
together with a wet sponge was held by the other hand to the side of
the head. The frequency of the flicker increased with the speed of
the generator. Swinton adds that this method also precludes the
possibility of suggestion being the cause of the flicker.
One of the reasons given by Edridge-Green1 in explanation of the
fact that Lord Rayleigh's threshold for change in the hue of yellow
(D) light was so much lower than the threshold he obtained by his
method, namely, because of the admixture of white light in Rayleigh's
experiment, has been proven false by a series of experiments con-
ducted by Watson (21). By means of the Abney double spectrum
apparatus, two fields of light of the same wave-length were projected
side by side on a magnesium carbonate screen and one field changed
in wave-length until the difference in hue was quite distinct. A dif-
ference of I.4M/X was detected, while Edridge-Green's monochromatic
patch measured 4.5 MM- Watson then found that additions of small
amounts of white light made no change in the threshold. The dif-
ference in the results of Edridge-Green and Rayleigh seems to be
caused by a difference in the method of presenting the change, namely,
whether two monochromatic patches are used or a single patch in
which the hue changes gradually from one side to the other.
A comparison of the effect of the exposure of the eye for ten seconds
to a continuous stimulation of light with that of a like exposure to an
1 Edridge-Green, F. W. "The Discrimination of Colour." Proc. Roy. Soc., 1911,
B. 84, 116-118.
VISION— GENERAL PHENOMENA 101
intermittent stimulation, upon the subsequent process of adaptation,
was made by Schneider (16). The rate of alternation of light and
darkness was varied as well as the relative amount of light to darkness
in a given period. The intensity of the continuous light was so chosen
that the brightness produced was equal, according to the Talbot law,
to the brightness of the compared intermittent light. It was found
that the two adaptation curves approached one another under the
following conditions: first, by increasing the rapidity of alternation
of the intermittent light; second, by increasing the difference between
the exposure time for light and for darkness; third, by increasing the
mean intensity of the intermittent light. These results were con-
sidered the more significant in that the above conditions are the
same as those found by Marbe1 to be most conducive to an elimination
of flicker.
Behr (2), in his article upon the relation of dark adaptation
to certain pathological conditions, includes the interesting fact that
if one eye is exposed to light while the other is being dark adapted, the
latter after three quarters of an hour is only half as sensitive to light
as it would have been if both eyes had been dark adapted. He con-
cludes from this that the action of the rods and the visual purple are
in direct relation to a higher process. Dufour (4) has made some ob-
servations upon the after-images of motion of the Plateau spiral as
well as upon those of the motion of translation. He found that if
the motion was observed monocularly a negative after-image could
be obtained from the eye which had been closed.
A preliminary study has been made by v. Liebermann (n) of
the rate of rotation necessary for the fusion of different pairs of colors.
No definite results were obtained, but the methods used and the pre-
cautions observed, as well as some of the difficulties of the problem
discovered, are of interest. Dufour and Verain (7) explain a simple
method of obtaining the threshold for the perception of flicker,
namely, by placing a disk of n white and black sectors upon a larger
disk of n + I white and black sectors. Dufour (6) has observed
the same laws of fusion, flicker, etc., to hold in movements of transla-
tion of bands as in rotatory movement of disks. He also describes
(5) a simple device for obtaining these movements of translation.
A method of obtaining the time that it takes for a sensation of
light to reach its maximum brightness has been devised by Stigler
(18). The instrument, which he calls a chronophotometer, permits
1 Marbe, K. "Tatsachen und Theorien des Talbot'sch'en Gesetzes." Arch. f. d.
ges. Physiol (Pfliiger), 1903, 97, 335~393-
102 HERBERT SYDNEY LANGFELD
the successive exposure of two neighboring fields of the same or
different intensities of light and the regulation and measurement of
the exposure time as well as the interval between the two exposures.
If the first sensation does not reach its maximum intensity at the
time of exposure of the second stimulus, it will never reach it in that
part of the field adjacent to the second field, owing to the contrasting
effect of the latter. By regulating the exposure times and the inter-
vals between the two stimulations and comparing the intensity of
all parts of the two fields, the approximate time necessary for the
first sensation to reach its maximum intensity may be ascertained.
The phenomenon of brightness contrast has been used by Revesz
(15) as a basis for a new method of measuring the brightness of colors
of different hues. The maximum saturation of a color can be obtained
by gradually increasing the brightness of a contrast-producing field
until the white (W-Valenz) of the color is entirely compensated. It
follows that if two colors, for example red and green, both reach
their maximum of saturation with the same increase of brightness of
the contrasting field, they may be considered to contain the same
amount of white. The relative amount of white, which different
colors were found to contain by this method, coincides with the
relative brightness of the colors as determined both by the direct
method of measuring brightness at the fovea, and by the method of
indirect vision. The author finds theoretical support for his method
in G. E. Miiller's theory of vision.
One of the most suggestive books of the year is that by Katz (10).
He has given us the result of five years investigations of the various
characteristics of colors and especially of those changes in these
characteristics brought about by experience. He has displayed
much ingenuity in the methods of his countless experiments and in
the variation of the conditions, as well as a keen power of analysis
and an appreciation of the relation of his results to the more general
problems of vision. It is only possible here to mention some of the
most important facts. As regards the localization in space, idio-
retinal light is characterized by an indefiniteness of localization.
The more vivid (eindringlicti) an after-image is, the nearer it appears.
What is meant by vividness of colors may be understood if one fixates
the middle of a larger white surface; it will then be observed that the
color gradually lessens in vividness towards the periphery. Idio-
retinal light shows the lowest degree of vividness. The darker
colors seem nearer than the lighter.
There are three forms in which colors may appear: first, as sur-
VISION-GENERAL PHENOMENA 103
face colors (Oberfldchenfarben), that is, the surface of an object
seems to have a certain color; second, as surfaces (Flachenfarben),
that is, the colors are perceived in two dimensions and without any
reference to an object; third, as transparent colors in three dimen-
sions. The last two may be reduced to surface colors by observing
them through the small aperture of a screen. It is in perceiving
colors as surface colors that the results of experience play a role.
It is then that we abstract as far as possible from the existing condi-
tions of illumination and see the color as it would appear under
normal conditions. The conditions may be considered normal
when the objects are seen most sharply defined and outlined. These
conditions may be obtained in the open air and under a slightly
clouded sky.
If we look at a gray disk placed some distance behind a revolving
black episkotister through a small hole in a screen in front of the
instrument, and notice that the episkotister is cutting off some of the
light, we abstract from its effect, and see the gray in its normal
color, that is, brighter than it appears when the conditions behind
the screen are concealed from us. Vividness, however, is not
affected by psychological factors, for vividness depends upon the
absolute amount of light falling on the retina. Neither do psycho-
logical factors influence the difference threshold for brightness nor
the absolute threshold for the normal adapted eye. But the Talbot
law does not hold for brightness under the above conditions, the
variations from the law becoming greater the more vivid the psycho-
logical factors become. As might be supposed from the above, the
Talbot law does hold for the vividness of colors.
If it is seen that a paper is darkened by a shadow, it appears
lighter than when this fact is concealed from the observer. The
relative brightening of the paper by psychological factors is greater
the deeper the shadow. Individual differences are greater when the
psychological factors are most influential. Katz does not call these
phenomena illusions, since attending to them does not entirely
eliminate them. The longer one observes, the stronger is the effect
of the psychological factors, but even in a very short exposure they
are influential. Hering's memory-color (Geddchtnisfarben) theory
only applies to objects with which we are very familiar. Hering
explains phenomena similar to the above through adaptation and
other physiological causes. Such physiological explanations are
considered by Katz secondary to a psychological explanation. Also
the fact that colored papers illuminated by colored light are seen in
104 HERBERT SYDNEY LANGFELD
their original colors is explained by Katz through psychological
factors as against Hering's physiological explanation. On the other
hand, Katz's results agree with Hering's, that contrast depends upon
the intensity and quality of the retinal processes and not upon psycho-
logical factors. From the experiments on dark adaptation, Katz
comes to the conclusion that the psychological factors only alter
those sensations depending upon processes in the cones. Many
interesting references are also made to the influence of psychological
factors similar to the above in the effect of works of art.
Tucker (20) has made a series of tests on the color vision of sixty-
three girls and sixty-four boys of the English schools, in order to
compare their color sense with that of primitive peoples. In the
color discrimination test with Holmgren's wools, in the case of all
the children "blue and violet tend to be confused. Then the images
with green extend their range and finally those of pink, red and
yellow." In the color nomenclature test, similar mistakes were made.
The names included a wide range of hues. These results coincide
with those obtained with primitive peoples. Tests for the threshold
for red, yellow, and blue were also made and it was found that the
threshold for colors rose as the age decreased, but that the ratio of
the threshold of one color to the other remained unchanged both in
the tests on children and those on adults. Since these quantitative
results show that the relative threshold for blue did not change, and
the qualitative results, that the children made the same mistakes in
color discrimination as primitive races, the author thinks that the
latter's confusion of colors can hardly be explained satisfactorily
through a weakness for blue due to a greater yellow pigmentation of
the macula lutea among dark-skinned races. Her conclusions are
rather that there are two causes for the peculiarity in color confusion
among primitive people; the one, psychological, "depending on the
stage of the development of the powers of observation and thought
leading to mistakes similar to those made by European people," the
other physiological, depending on the stage of the development of
the sense organ.
Leob (14) in his experiments upon the memory for colors
used the Asher color mixture apparatus and allowed from five
minutes to several days to intervene between the exposure of the
color and the reproduction. Loeb concludes from the fact that the
m.v. for the eleven trials made in the reproduction test for each color
was less for blue and yellow than for red and green, that the precision
of reproduction, and with it the actual memory for colors for the
VISION— GENERAL PHENOMENA 105
former pair, is greater than for the latter, although the colors repro-
duced were further from the original in the case of blue and yellow
than in that of red and green. This latter result he considers to be
caused by the conditions of his method and not to be contradictory
to the results of L. v. Kries and E. Schottelius1 whose order of accuracy
of reproduction was the same as his order of precision. He is, how-
ever, hardly justified in deducing an accuracy of memory from a
small m.v.
Luckiesh (12) has measured the difference in visual acuity in
monochromatic light and in light having an extended spectrum.
To quote from the author's summary in this journal:2
"The green line of the mercury vapor spectrum was isolated and used as a mono-
chromatic source. This line was matched in hue by light having an extended spectrum
obtained by filters used with the tungsten lamp. These two green colors could easily
be matched for brightness without any of the difficulties which would obtain if they
differed in hue.
"A printed page of type of such size that at a distance of I meter it was just
readable in monochromatic light, was arranged in a photometer so that two adjacent
patches were illuminated respectively by the two green lights of different spectral
character. For the same ease in reading it was found that the illumination having an
extended spectrum must be increased 75 per cent, over the monochromatic illumination.
This result was substantiated by other experiments. Later the Ives3 acuity test
object was used and by this more sensitive method it was found that for two observers
the illumination having an extended spectrum must be five times greater than that
of the monochromatic illumination for the same visual acuity. Another observer
required an increase of only 33 per cent. It was shown that there was rio movement of
the pupil when alternately subjected to the two lights."
Luckiesh (13) has also investigated the relation between visual
acuity and wave-length. The influence of brightness differences
was as far as possible eliminated. He found that "the extremes
of the visible spectrum show a lower defining power than the middle
region, the maximum acuity appearing to be in the yellow region."
Two essays, one by Woodworth (22), and the other by Yerkes (23),
embodying the facts of the sensation of light most important for
illuminating engineering, have appeared.
REFERENCES
I. BAUER, V. Ueber das Verhalten des Sehpurpurs beim Tagessehen. Arch. f. d.
ges. Physiol. (Pfliiger), 1911, 141, 479~496-
1 v. Kries, L., und Schottelius, E. "Beitrage zur Lehre vom Farbengedachtnis."
Zsch. /. SinnesphysioL, 1907-8, 42, 192-209.
2 Luckiesh, L. "Monochromatic Light and Visual Acuity." PSYCHOLOGICAL
BULLETIN, 1911, 8, 404.
3 Ives, H. E. "A Visual Acuity Test Object. Description of a Composite
Object Composed of Superposed Gratings." Elec. World, 1910, 55, 939^94°-
106 HERBERT SYDNEY LANGFELD
2. BEHR, C. Der Reflexcharacter der Adaptationsvorgange inbesondere der Dunkei-
adaptation, und deren Beziehungen zur typischen Diagnose und zur Hemeral-
opie. Arch.f. Ophthalmol., 1910, 75, 201-283.
3. BRUCKNER, A. Zur Lokalisation einiger Vorgange in der Sehsinnsubstanz. Arch.
f. d. ges. Physiol. (Pfliiger), 1911, 142, 241-254.
4. DUFOUR, M. Sur la spirale de J. Plateau. C. r. soc. de biol., 1911, 70, 151-152.
5. DUFOUR, M. Un appareil permettant de faire certaines experiences d'optique
physiologique. C. r. soc. de biol., 1911, 70, 295-297.
6. DUFOUR, M. Sur quelques phenomenes d'optique physiologique. II., III. C.r.
soc. de biol., 1911, 70, 485-487; 886-888.
7. DUFOUR, M., and VERAIN, L. Sur quelques phenomenes d'optique physiologique.
IV. C. r. soc. de biol., 1911, 71, 289-290.
8. DUNLAP, K. Visual Sensations from the Alternating Magnetic Field. Science,
1911, 33, 68-71.
9. FERREE, C. E., and RAND, M. G. An Experimental Study of the Fusion of
Colored and Colorless Light Sensation: The Locus of the Action. /. of Phil. ,
Psychol., etc., 1911, 8, 294-297.
10. KATZ, D. Die Erscheinungsweisen der Farben und ihre Beeinflussung durch die
individuelle Erfahrung. Zsch. f. Psychol., Ergbd. 7, 1911. Pp. xviii + 425.
11. v. LIEBERMANN, P. Vcrschmelzungsfrequenzen von Farbenpaaren. Zsch. f.
SinnesphysioL, 1910-11, 45, 117-128.
12. LUCKIESH, M. Monochromatic Light and Visual Acuity. Elec. World, 1911,
58, 450-452-
13. LUCKIESH, M. The Dependence of Visual Acuity on the Wave-Length of Light.
Elec. World, 1911, 58, 1252-1254.
14. LOEB, S. Ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom Farbengedachtnis. Zsch. f. Sinnesphysiol.y
1911, 46, 83-128.
15. REVESZ, G. Ueber eine neue Methode der heterochromen Photometric. Ber. IV.
Kongress f. exper. Psychol., 1911, 217-219.
16. SCHNEIDER, S. Die Helligkeitsadaptation bei kontinuierlichen und diskontinuier-
lichen Erregungen. Psychol. Stud., 1911, 7, 196-228.
17. SIVEN, V. 0. Die Stabschen als Farbenperzipierende Organe. Klin. Monatsbl.
f. Augenheilkunde, 1911, 49, 531.
18. STIGLER, R. Chronophotische Untersuchungen iiber den Umgebungskontrast.
Ber. 17. Kongress f. exper. Psychol., 1911, 279-281.
19. SWINTON, A. A. C. Visual Sensations from the Alternating Magnetic Field.
Nature, 1911, 86, 143.
20. TUCKER, A. W. Observations on the Colour Vision of School Children. Brit. J.
of Psychol., i9ii,4,33-43-
21. WATSON, W. Note on the Sensibility of the Eye to Variations of Wave-Length.
Proc. Roy. Soc., 1911, 84, 118-120.
22. WOODWORTH, R. S. The Psychology of Light. Trans, of the Illuminating Engi-
neering Soc., 1911, 6, 437-471.
23. YERKES, R. M. The Psychological Aspects of Illuminating Engineering. (Lec-
tures on Illuminating Engineering, Vol. 11.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1911. Pp. 575-604.
VISION— PERIPHERAL, FOVEAL, ETC. 107
VISION— PERIPHERAL, FOVEAL, ETC.
BY DR. C. E. FERREE
Bryn Mawr College
The year's work in this field is comprised in four articles.
A. Pick (4) gives a clinical report on cases of functional narrowing
of the visual field. He concludes, in contradiction to the commonly
accepted view, that in these cases the patient is just as much aware
of his defect as is the patient who suffers the contraction from organic
causes. Two circumstances he thinks have led to the false conclusion
by previous writers, (i) The patient has not been carefully ques-
tioned with regard to what he sees. (2) The examiner has been
influenced by certain objective signs which have not been studied
with sufficient care. For example, it has been claimed that no
disturbance of orientation is suffered. The patient must, therefore,
not be aware of the defect in his visual field. But Pick and many
others have found that disturbances in orientation do occur. They
last, however, only a short time after the contraction has begun. The
patient soon adapts to his changed condition of seeing and recovers
his power of orientation. This is what happens in every case of
sudden loss of visual acuity. It also happens when the field is nar-
rowed from organic causes. Such evidence therefore, argues Pick,
should not lead to the conclusion that the patient suffering from
functional contraction is less aware of his defect than the patient with
organic disease.
Pick supports his position by the direct testimony of his patients.
He wishes, moreover, to emphasize the importance of carefully
questioning the patient in making diagnoses. The testimony of
the patient is necessary to diagnosis and it can not be assumed that
he can and will tell of his own accord all the diagnostician needs
to know.
Edridge-Green (2) describes some visual phenomena connected
with the yellow spot. The article consists of a statement of the
observations of previous writers on the following points supple-
mented by some observations of his own: various appearances in the
field of vision due to peculiarities of the yellow spot; entoptic appear-
ance of the yellow spot and the blood vessels of the retina; currents
seen in the field of vision not due to circulation; and appearances
due to the pigment cells of the retina. The third of these topics
alone contains sufficient new material to warrant mention in this
review. This topic is of particular importance to Edridge-Green
108 DR. C. E. FERREE
because of its bearing on his theory of vision. He assumes that all
visual sensations are caused by the decomposition of the visual purple.
This decomposition sets up electrical impulses which travel along the
optic nerve to the brain. These impulses he believes are wave-
like and periodic in nature. Each wave-length of light sets up an
impulse different from that set up by every other wave-length. A
physiological basis is thus laid for the different visual qualities. The
visual purple is generated in the rods, hence there is none in the fovea.
But it is necessary to foveal vision hence it must be supplied from
the extra-foveal retina. It is the streaming of the visual purple
from the peripheral retina to the fovea that constitutes, he thinks,
the currents seen in the field of vision not due to circulation. He is
able to see these currents under the following conditions: with one
eye partially covered; with one or both eyes open at full illumina-
tion; with the eyes open in the dark-room; with a field of vision
given by looking through a yellow-green glass; and with an inter-
mittent stimulation by light produced by rotating a disk composed
of white and black sectors. There are four main stream channels
which are fixed in position. These four channels end in the fovea
and form a figure closely resembling the written letter X. On exam-
ining the retina of a monkey he finds four shallow channels leading
to the fovea which correspond roughly to the stream channels seen
by him entoptically. Between the fixed stream channels indefinite
streaming movements are observed.
The streaming has a characteristic effect on visual sensation.
The stream currents carry the visual quality, color and brightness,
of the region from which they come into the after-image. They
also tend to move the after-image towards the center of the field
of vision.1
1 Ed ridge-Green seems inclined to identify this phenomenon with the streaming
phenomenon described by the writer in 1908. The writer is strongly impelled to
question the propriety of this identification because of the obvious disagreement of
the phenomena in so many important particulars, (i) Even a casual comparison of
the drawings representing the two phenomena shows many differences that are char-
acteristic and essential. In fact not even a general similarity is found between the
stream patterns and the appearance and behavior of the streaming material in the two
cases. (2) The descriptions of the phenomenon given in the two cases are even more
incompatible. If there is one thing above another that is characteristic of the " stream-
ing phenomenon" as it was observed and described by the writer, it is just the absence
of any fixed channel or path of movement. There is a general tendency for the streams
to move towards the center of the field of vision but that movement may occur along
any possible meridian in the field of vision. Very frequently also the stream is de-
flected from its course before it reaches the center of the field of vision or even that
VISION-PERIPHERAL, FOVEAL, ETC. 109
Haycraft (3) reports work on the color sensitivity of the retina
immediately surrounding the blind spot. In mapping the blind
spot with a colored stimulus in 1907, he noticed that when the stim-
ulus fell just within the blind spot a slight movement caused it to
be seen as gray while a greater movement caused it to be seen in
its proper color. This led him to investigate the relative sensi-
tivity of the margin of the blind spot to colored and to colorless
light.1 The investigation was conducted by means of a scotometer.
The scotometer consists of a head-rest, a projection-screen, and a
supporting base. The projection-screen is provided with a fixa-
tion point, a movable stimulus, and a frame fastened immediately
behind the movable stimulus to hold the paper on which the outline
of the blind spot is to be traced. The movable stimulus is fastened
on the front end of a plunger which, when pushed in, punches a hole
in the paper in the frame behind. A line connecting these holes
marks the outline of the blind spot. The stimulus is moved by
means of two screws one of which gives it a motion in the vertical
plane and the other in the horizontal plane. By means of this
adjustment the position of the stimulus can be changed by small
and definite amounts, a feature of particular advantage in the tech-
nique of the problem. Red, green, blue, yellow, and gray stimuli
part of the field corresponding to the "external fovea." This deflection is often trace-
able to an involuntary eye-movement and can generally be caused by a sharp voluntary
movement executed at the right time. Space will not be taken here to enumerate other
numerous and important points of difference. The points of similarity can be pointed
out more briefly. Both are subjective movement phenomena not caused by the cir-
culation of the blood, and the tendency of movement in both cases is towards the center
of the field of vision. (3) Characteristic differences are also found in the effect on
visual sensation. Edridge-Green says the currents described by him carry the visual
quality, color and brightness, of the region from which they come into the after-image.
They also tend to move the after-image towards the center of the field of vision. No
further details are given. If one be permitted to infer details, it is obvious that the
effect of streaming on the fluctuation of after-images described by the writer could
not be compatible with a streaming system in which the distinctive and definite stream-
ing is limited to four narrow channels. The writer is forced to conclude, then, that
either Edridge-Green and he have not observed the same phenomenon, or that they
have differed widely in their descriptions of its essential features.
1 That there is a color-blind area around the blind spot has been mentioned by
Johansson (Upsala Ldkareforenings Forhandlingar, 1884, 19, 491-493), Ovio (Annali
di Ottalmologia, a, 1906, 36), and Polimanti (Jour, de PsychoL, 1908, 5, 298). That
the order of loss of sensitivity in passing from the surrounding retina into the blind
spot is the same as it is in passing from the center towards the periphery of the retina
was mentioned by the present writer in a paper read before the meeting of experimental
psychologists held at Princeton in April, 1909.
IIO DR. C. E. FERREE
were used in mapping the blind spot. The brightness of the colors
was in each case made equal to the brightness of the yellow by the
method described by Abney (Philos. Trans, of Royal Soc., 1886
and 1892). Several observers were used and some variation was
found in the order of loss of sensitivity for the different observers.
In Haycraft's own case, as the blind spot was approached from any
direction, sensitivity was lost in the following order: red, green and
yellow, blue, and gray. Using the same stimuli to map the sensi-
tivity of the retina as a whole, he found the same order of loss of
sensitivity as the stimuli were moved from the center towards the
periphery of the retina.
A. Bruckner (i) publishes concerning "Die Sichtbarkeit des
blinden Fleckes." Both the experimentation as it is described
in the article and the conclusions seem to the writer to be in some
measure open to question. Extended criticism, however, will not
be attempted in this brief review.
Three explanations have been given for the absence of a gap
in the monocular field of regard: Weber's theory of shrinkage,
DuBois-Reymond's and Volkmann's theories of associative filling-
in, and Tschermak's theory of physiological induction. Bruckner
decides against the theories of shrinkage and associative filling-in,
and accepts the theory of physiological induction. The gap is
filled in either by irradiation or by simultaneous contrast. It is
filled in most frequently by irradiation. This is why in ordinary
monocular vision we are not conscious of the blind spot.
Bruckner is not the first to claim that visual sensations may be
referred to that part of the field of vision usually called the blind
spot. Prior mention has been made by Purkinje, Heinrich Muller,
Meissner, Aubert, Charpentier, Woinow, Helmholtz, Finkelstein,
Zehender, Tschermak, Czermak and others. Bruckner aims
merely to verify the observations of his predecessors and to
extend the conditions under which the phenomenon may be
observed, (i) With the eye thoroughly dark-adapted the blind spot
may be seen as a dark disk surrounded by a light halo, immediately
following a quick pressure of the front of the eye-ball through the
closed lids. The phenomenon lasts only a fraction of a second.
This observation has been previously made by Aubert and Finkel-
stein. (2) The blind spot may be seen by the method used by
Purkinje to demonstrate the Aderfigur. This observation has been
made by Heinrich Muller, and Tschermak. (3) When one looks
with one eye at a uniform field, for example, the sky at twilight, one
VISION— PERIPHERAL, FOVEAL, ETC.
Ill
sees the blind spot as a dark disk surrounded by a light halo. Obser-
vations of this kind have been made by Helmholtz, Woinow, Zehender,
Charpentier, and Tschermak. Bruckner extends the observation
to fields of white, of black, and of color. On white paper he sees the
blind spot as a shadowy spot surrounded by a light halo; on black
paper as a spot of more intensive blackness surrounded by a light
halo; on a field formed by looking at a neutral surface through
colored glass as a dark spot surrounded by a halo of the color comple-
mentary to the field. (4) When the field is formed of black and
white paper with their line of junction passing vertically through
the blind spot, the part of the field towards the center of the retina
is seen as bulged out to fill the area of the blind spot. Thus when
the white field is towards the center of the retina, the blind spot is
filled in with white; and, commonly, when the black field is towards
the center of the retina, the blind spot is filled in with black. In each
case the bulging portion is surrounded by a halo of antagonistic
quality. The bulging is due to irradiation from the stronger field
and the halo is due to marginal contrast. In using colored fields
he finds that the law of irradiation from the stronger field does not
always hold. The weaker field, i. e., the field beyond the blind spot,
sometimes fills in the gap. (5) An after-image may be gotten of the
visual quality filling in the blind spot. When one with a thoroughly
dark-adapted eye looks for a moment at the sky at twilight and
then closes the eye, he sees at first a black disk with a halo in a light
field which soon gives way to a light disk with a black halo in a dark
field. This observation has been made by Charpentier and Tscher-
mak. (6) At the make and break of an electric current, sent through
the head by means of two electrodes, one applied to the middle of
the forehead and the other to the back of the neck, the blind spot
is seen sometimes as a light and sometimes as a dark disk. This
phenomenon has been reported by Tschermak and others.
In general Bruckner is inclined to attribute the visibility of the
blind spot with the dark-adapted eye to contrast, and with the light-
adapted eye to irradiation. He gets into difficulty, however, in
attempting to apply this principle of explanation in detail, (i) When
the field is white and the blind spot is seen as a dark disk surrounded
by a light halo on a white ground, he explains the quality of the disk
as due to contrast from the surrounding field. For the halo he gives
the rather remarkable explanation that it is due to marginal contrast
between the two fields, one of which he has already explained as a
contrast effect due to the other. When the field is black and the
112 SAMUEL P. HAYES
blind spot is seen as a disk of more intensive blackness, he offers no
explanation, yet as before the observation was made with a dark-
adapted eye. When the field is colored the blind spot is almost
invariably seen as a dark disk instead of in the color complementary
to the field. The halo in this case is of a color complementary to
the field. He attempts to explain the failure of the blind spot to
appear in the complementary color as due to the extreme suscepti-
bility of the blind spot to fatigue. The contrast color is of such
short duration it can not be observed. This explanation, however,
can hardly be accepted as satisfactory. In the first place no reason
is given why the blind spot should fatigue so easily to color and
apparently not at all, within the limits of the observation, to bright-
ness; and in the second place, according to the writer's experience,
the tendency of color contrast within limits is to grow with prolonged
observation rather than to disappear. (2) In case the field was half
white and half black with the line of junction passing vertically
through the blind spot, the observation was also made with a dark-
adapted eye. Yet in this case Bruckner says the blind spot is filled
out by irradiation from the stronger half of the field.
REFERENCES
1. BRUCKNER, A. Ueber die Sichtbarkeit des blinden Fleckes. Arch. f. d. gfs.
Physiol., 1910, 136, 610-658.
2. EDRIDGE-GREEN, F. W. Visual Phenomena Connected with the Yellow Spot.
/. of Physiol., 1910, 41, 263-275.
3. HAYCRAFT, J. B. The Color-blind Margin of the Blind Spot, and the Scotometer.
/. of Physiol., 1910, 40, 492-497.
4. PICK, A. Zur Psychologic des konzentrisch eingeengten Gesichtsfeldes. Arch. /.
d. ges. Physiol., 1910, 136, 101-106.
VISION— COLOR DEFECTS
BY PROFESSOR SAMUEL P. HAYES
Mt. Holyoke College
It has long been known that red-green blindness is inheritable
and that it occurs more frequently among men than among women.
As early as 1876 Homer (6) formulated a law of descent, that color-
blindness is ordinarily transmitted to males through unaffected
females. In a number of recent books on heredity the attempt has
been made to explain the transmission of color-blindness by Mendel's
law. Bateson (i) considers color-blindness to be a sex-limited unit
character, dominant in males and recessive in females. "Color-
blindness is not, therefore, as might have been imagined, a condition
VISION— COLOR DEFECTS 113
due to the omission of something from the total ingredients of the
body, but is plainly the consequence of the addition of some factor
absent from the normal. We can scarcely avoid the surmise that
this added element has the power of paralyzing the color-sense, some-
what as nicotin-poisoning may do." Bateson's views find expression
in the recent books of Punnett (9) and Doncaster (4). The latter
puts the matter briefly as follows: "Color-blindness is dominant in
males, but recessive in females, but at the same time an affected
man transmits the * factor' for color-blindness only to his daughter
so that while his sons and their descendants are free, his grandsons
through his daughters may be affected" (p. 84). Castle (2) and
Davenport (3) also regard color-blindness as sex-limited in descent,
but consider the defect to be caused by the absence of a "factor"
necessary to normal vision, a position more consistent with psycho-
logical theories of color-vision, and apply to the problem the recent
cytological theory of sex-chromosomes. Castle (p. 180) says: "A
color-blind man does not transmit color-blindness to his sons, but
only to his daughters, the daughters, however, are themselves normal
provided the mother was; yet they transmit color-blindness to half
their sons. A color-blind daughter may be produced, apparently,
only by the marriage of a color-blind man with a woman who trans-
mitted color-blindness, since the daughter to be color-blind must have
received the character from both parents, whereas the color-blind
son receives the character only from his mother. Color-blindness is
apparently due to a defect in the germ-cell — absence of something
normally associated there with an JF-structure, which is represented
twice in woman, once in man."
The assertion is often made that dichromates equal or surpass
persons of normal color vision in discrimination of small differences
in color tone. The only experimental work upon the question, that
of Brodhun, showed the deuteranope tested (Brodhun) to be more
sensitive to difference in color tone in the more refrangible part of
the spectrum than were two normal observers (Konig and Uhthoff).
This superiority was most marked in the region of the neutral band.
Liebermann and Marx (8) report an experimental investigation of the
question, with a protanope and a normal person as subjects. The
Helmholtz color-mixing apparatus was used, and tests made with a
longer list of lights than Brodhun tried, including among others a
non-spectral purple formed by the mixture of red and blue light,
which appeared colorless to the protanopic subject. The results
showed the protanope clearly inferior to the normal subject in dis-
tinguishing differences in color quality, throughout the whole series
114 SAMUEL P. HAYES
of colored lights, thus directly contradicting Brodhun's results. The au-
thors do not think it justifiable to assume that this difference is to be
accounted for by the difference between protanopes and deuteranopes.
Kollner (7) shows how acquired color-blindness may be distin-
guished from congenital protanopia and deuteranopia by psychological
tests, without reference to its accompanying physiological symptoms
— lowered visual acuity, abnormal condition of the retina, etc.
Acquired red-green blindness, like congenital red-green blindness, is
a two-color system with a neutral zone in the green-blue region. In
the acquired form, however, we find no division into distinct groups
like protanopia and deuteranopia without transition forms, but,
rather, a fairly definite condition of dichromatic vision which appears
regularly at a certain stage in progressive tabetic atrophy of the
optic nerve and in chronic alcohol poisoning. It is, further, a quan-
titative reduction from the normal condition, with color-memories
intact, rather than a qualitative simplification of normal color-vision
with dichromatic color-memories. By means of Nagel's color-mixing
apparatus and anomaloscope, Kollner finds that in acquired red-
green blindness the subjects see colors at a very low saturation (as
they would appear to a normal person through a thin white veil).
As a result of this, it is especially difficult to determine exactly the
limits of the neutral zone, faint colors from the warm end of the
spectrum which would appear yellowish to the congenital color-blinds
being seen as white by the acquired color-blinds. Moreover, the
stage of the progressive defect can be determined by finding which
colors are equivalent to white, since they fade out in the following
order: green, yellow, red, blue. Ordinarily red appears of about the
same brightness to the acquired color-blind as to a deuteranope,
about the same amount of yellow being needed in both cases to make
the red-yellow equation. In two out of about 100 cases, the subjects
showed the protanopic lowered sensitiveness to the red end of the spec-
trum, but in both cases there is considerable reason for assuming that
congenital protanopia existed before the acquired defect developed.
Hayes (5) examines the evidence for the common assumption
that all typical cases of partial color-blindness are dichromates —
see only yellow and blue — and presents the results of a series of
experiments upon 19 new cases, one of whom is a woman color-blind
in one eye only. He feels that theoretical bias has prejudiced the
interpretation of the facts in many of the published articles on color-
blindness; and upon the basis of his own historical and experimental
work he concludes that dichromacy is not a typical but an extreme
condition of partial color-blindness connected with normal vision by
VISION— COLOR DEFECTS 115
a series of intermediate forms showing greater or less deficiency in red
and green, but not totally lacking red and green sensations. Five
lines of evidence are considered, (i) Opposed to the testimony of
various color-blinds (Dalton, Pole, etc.) that they see only blue and
yellow, Hayes presents the testimony of five of his subjects that red
and green are specifically different color qualities from yellow and
gray. This claim is further supported by a study of the color-con-
fusions made by these observers. (2) Dichromates should accept
mixtures of blue, yellow, black and white as matches for all colors.
But when Hayes presented reds and greens to his observers under
favorable conditions — high saturation, large area, bright illumination
— no equations could be made, oftentimes, without the addition of
red or green to the dichromate mixture. (3) Hayes presents no new
data upon acquired color-blindness, and thinks it unsafe at present
to claim analogies between the acquired and congenital forms. The
findings of other investigators, however, raise a significant question,
whose ultimate solution promises support to the thesis of his paper.
If sensitivity to green may lapse before sensitivity to red is lost, and
if transitional forms between trichromacy and dichromacy occur in
acquired color-blindness, what theoretical warrant can there be for
refusing to believe that an analogous series of transitional forms
occurs in congenital color-blindness? (4) To meet the claim that
colors appear to the partially color-blind as they do to normal persons
stimulated in the blue-yellow zone of the eye, Hayes quotes Baird's
conclusion that retinal function in the periphery lapses, when it
does lapse, in a gradual and not in an abrupt fashion, a conclusion
which supports his own conclusion. (5) A review of the experiments
performed upon the 7 historical cases of monocular red-green blind-
ness shows little evidence of strict dichromacy except in the case
reported by von Hippel, while the new case extensively studied by
Hayes gives undoubted evidence of the appreciation of green as a
distinct color quality. In general, then, as there seems to be so large
a mass of evidence, direct and indirect, for the presence of sensations
of red or green in the color-systems of the partially color-blind, Hayes
thinks we should regard dichromacy as an extreme form of partial
color-blindness, and class as partially color-blind, also, all mild cases
of color deficiency in which an equation can be formed between an
unsaturated blue-green or green and an unsaturated blue-red or red.
REFERENCES
i. BATESON, W. MendeVs Principles of Heredity. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,
1909. Pp. 396.
Il6 ROBERT MORRIS OGDEN
2. CASTLE, W. E. Heredity: Its Relation to Evolution and Animal Breeding. New
York: D. Appleton, 1911. Pp. 184.
3. DAVENPORT, C. B. Heredity in Relation to Eugenics. New York: Henry Holt
and Co., 1911. Pp.298.
4. DONCASTER, L. Heredity in the Light of Recent Research. New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1910. Pp. 140.
5. HAYES, S. P. The Color Sensations of the Partially Color-Blind, a Criticism of
Current Teaching. Amer. J. Psychol, 1911, 22, 369-407.
6. HORNER. Die Erblichkeit des Daltonismus. Ophth. Klinik., 1876.
7. KOLLNER, H. Beitrage zur Pathologic des Farbensinnes. Ueber die Unter-
scheidung der erworbenen Rotgriinblindheit von der angeborenen Protanopie
und Deuteranopie. Zsch.f. Augenhk., 1910, 23, 97-111.
8. LIEBERMANN, P. v., und MARX, E. Ueber die Empfindlichkeit des normalen und
des protanopischen Sehorgans fur Unterscheide des Farbentons. Zsch. /.
SinnesphysioL, 1911, 45, 103-108.
9. PUNNETT, R. C. Mendelism. New York: Macmillan Co., 1911. Pp. 192.
HEARING
BY PROFESSOR ROBERT MORRIS OGDEN
University of Tennessee
The year 1911 has brought us no very exhaustive or systematic
research in the field of hearing. Pear (7) has published some results
obtained in the Wiirzburg laboratory which tend to substantiate
experimentally the difference in degree of fusion which is usually
admitted to exist between major and minor chords. He worked with
both musical and unmusical observers, testing their respective abilities
along this line (8) by means of the analysis of intervals, the differential
limen for pitch and a "singing" test in which they were required to
imitate notes given at random. He also made a "consistency" test
on the basis of eleven musical intervals, varying from the octave to
the minor second, by comparing each of these intervals with every
other one four times.
The principal experiments were made with the Appunn tonometer.
The method was that of "paired comparisons," the observer being
required to judge by direct impression which of two tri- tonal chords
possessed the greater degree of fusion. The extreme notes in the
chords compared remained constant, and included the intervals 3 : 5,
2 : 3, i-: 2, 2 : 5, i : 3, and I : 4. The middle tone was shifted so as
to produce in each experimental comparison two chords of three con-
stant intervals, the smaller of which was placed, now between the lower
and the middle tone, now between the middle and the higher tone.
His results substantiate the assumption that "the degree of fusion
of a chord varies with the position of its constituent degrees of fusion
within the tonal scale, decreasing when the worse degrees are the
HEARING 117
lower, and increasing when they are the higher." The degree of
fusion "increases when the interval possessing the greater frequency-
ratio (i. e., the 'greater interval' in the musical sense) occupies the
lower, and decreases when it occupies the higher position." The
same is true for intervals of " greater frequency-difference (i. e., the
'greater interval' in the physical sense)." These conclusions are in
accord with the assumption that chords possessing greater indirect
clang relationship are more highly fused than those possessing greater
direct relationship. Meyer's tentative assumption that "the fusion
of a chord of three clangs is the higher, the simpler the ratios of its
frequencies, whether the chord be considered as a whole or the tones
be taken in pairs" is also substantiated. Finally, the experiments
seem to show that these conclusions have a more general significance
than the mere differentiation of major and minor chords in music,
since they apply to "unmusical" as well as to "musical" chords.
Stumpf (12) takes up some of the criticisms which have been
urged against his explanation of consonance. After defining fusion
as a uniformity rather than a unity of effect, and contrasting it with
similarity, which increases with the decrease in an interval, he pro-
ceeds to warn against the correlation of fusion with physical pitch,
since the pitch of a tone is known to vary with its distance from the
ear. He concludes that the degree of fusion is a function of two
physiological pitches, and that it is impossible for the same pair of
tones, thus considered, to fuse in different degrees. Consonance and
dissonance exist only between two simultaneous tones; successive
tones reveal the phenomena of relationship. As long as we deal
with sense impressions, consonance and dissonance exist, not in
specific degrees, but in gradual differentiations. In dealing with
music, however, we have passed beyond simple sense impression.
Our music is based upon a tri-tonal chord, either major or minor.
This chord is determined rationally by the greatest number of tones
within an octave, all of which are mutually consonant in such a
manner that in passing from the lower to the higher tones in succes-
sion, we pass from the stronger to the weaker degrees of consonance.
Stumpf regards the major and minor as fundamentally equal.
The musical scale is built up by the derivation of successive tri-tonal
chords of the sort mentioned, the so-called "dissonant" tones which
thus come in are all indirectly related to the fundamental. In this
system concords consist in any three principal tones, either major or
minor, but they must contain a fifth or fourth, and a third or sixth.
All remaining chords are discordant. Concordance and discordance
are thus very much more complex than are consonance and dis-
Il8 ROBERT MORRIS OGDEN
sonance, although they are based upon these. Accordingly, the same
consonant pair may be judged as concordant or discordant by virtue
of the chord to which it is conceived to belong. The consonance of
the pair is in no wise affected, but its concordance is. Musical
thought, based upon this system of major and minor chords, is
responsible, in the varying attitudes which are aroused in us, for the
acceptance or rejection of single intervals. This accounts for the
seeming contradiction which has been noted to exist at times between
consonant pairs and musical practice.
In a critical article directed against Kriiger's reply to Stumpfs
original strictures upon the derivation of consonance from the effects
of difference tones in the total complex, the Berlin psychologist re-
turns (13) to his contention that the interval 800 : 1,100 ought, on
Kriiger's hypothesis, to be completely consonant, because no beats or
mean-tones are present among the difference tones aroused. Kriiger
having since responded that the large number of difference tones in this
and similar cases affords a complex clang which is disadvantageous to
consonance, Stumpf answers that it is absurd to suppose that the mere
aggregation of tones should have any such result, since no such effect
is apparent in the addition of successive tones in the octave relation.
With regard to certain other "critical intervals" which Stumpf
had pointed out, Kriiger has contended that the "sonance" character
of intervals extends only to the approximate limits of the human
voice, 80-1,024 vib., beyond this, the intervals all tend to become
neutral. This Stumpf denies, claiming that musical practice shows
that a limit cannot be set under 4,000 vib. In Stumpfs opinion, then,
Kriiger's theory contradicts itself, even if we assume the five difference
tones, the existence of which Stumpf has experimentally tested and
largely disproven.1 One consequence of Kriiger's theory would be
that the intervals of the third and fourth accented octaves should be
the strongest and clearest in their consonant effectiveness, because
here the difference tones are strongest and clearest. Yet in this
range appear the "critical intervals" which in consequence of such a
theory should be completely consonant, yet they are not.
Goebel (4) has made an interesting observation which he believes
to be in substantiation of the Helmholtz theory of consonance. A
tone of sufficient intensity, he finds, is accompanied by a second tone
whose pitch is one octave lower. When two weak tones in the octave
relationship are presented simultaneously, one to each ear, there
appears to be no unity in the effect.2 If, however, the higher of the
1 Cf. "Summary on Hearing," this journal, 1911, 8, 93 ff.
2 An analogous phenomenon has been observed by Ebbinghaus (cf. Grundziigf,
HEARING ng
two tones be intensified, the unity is at once established, since the
lower tone is then present in each ear. The author assumes that
different cells in the same cross-section of the cochlea must be speci-
fically sensitive to octaves. The assumption provides that the outer
cells in a given cross-section may function for the higher tone, the
inner cells for the lower tone, although in man, where the number of
cells is small, the differential effect may be centrally produced. With
the exception of very low, and perhaps also of very high, tones the
author concludes that the intensification of any single tone is effective
in exciting certain cells which produce an additional tone one octave
lower than the objective. This may be offered in explanation of
certain cases of fusion among pure tones in the octave relationship
where over-tones are not objectively present to make the Helmholtz
explanation of identical over-tones applicable.
In a combined report with v. Hornbostel made before the Fourth
Congress for Experimental Psychology (n), Stumpf refers to the
collection of phonograms of exotic music which has been in progress
since 1904 at the Berlin Institute. He also indicates two interesting
points in connection with the study of non-European musical systems.
First, it has been found from examination of xylophones and metallo-
phones that the Javanese have a scale of seven equal intervals, and
the Siamese a scale of five equal intervals. The equality of the
relations of adjacent tones is so exact that we must assume for these
people a sense for equality of interval which we apparently have lost
in the harmonic development of our music. Wundt's explanation
that the intervals have been determined by a mechanical process of
making the instrument mathematically correct as to the relative
lengths of the bars of wood or metal is not substantiated by an ex-
amination of the instruments themselves. They reveal both a crude
manufacture, and also filing and weighting for the evident purpose of
tuning them after completion to the exact intervals required. The
second point has reference to the appearance of simultaneous octaves,
fifths and fourths in primitive choral singing. Stumpf assumes that
this must have resulted from a selection based upon unitary effective-
ness, and thus reveals the universality of the principle of fusion. He
believes it probable that, prior to such selection, primitive melodies
arose from the use of arbitrary small intervals which were quite
unrelated.
In his portion of the report, v. Hornbostel describes another way
L, 2d ed., pp. 345-346) in substantiation of his theory of "undertones" as the expla-
nation for tonal fusion. It may be further suggested that Goebel's observations can
be quite readily adapted to the Ebbinghaus theory.
120 ROBERT MORRIS OGDEN
in which polyphony may have arisen. In passing from a solo to a
choral part, the second party may start too soon. This would result
in simultaneous tone effects some of which are perpetuated in practice
because of their fundamental fusion. The usage of simultaneous
major seconds, however, which he has found to be frequent, remains
unexplained. The author makes a second point with regard to the
very high development of rhythm in exotic music. The fact that
uncivilized folk do not count the beats, as we are apt to do, probably
explains their greater capacity for rhythmical groups and variations.
It is interesting to study the complexity of their rhythms in combina-
tion with a melody. The rhythmic accompaniment often shows a
relatively independent structure with accents which vary considerably
from those of the melody.
Hermann (6) returns to the substantiation of his theory of the
"formant" as the basis of vowel sounds. Experiments with the
microphone method show the production of formants whose perio-
dicity is uninfluenced by the note on which the vowel is sung. How-
ever, as soon as the vowel note exceeds noticeably the pitch of the
formant, the vowel is no longer heard. The formant is therefore a
fixed tone which characterizes the vowel. It is produced by a
blowing process, with the mouth cavity as a resonator. This is quite
different, however, from the Helmholtz notion of the resonance effect
produced by this cavity in intensifying characteristic overtones.
These tones would often be altogether too weak for such a purpose,
as, for instance, i on a bass note would depend upon the 2ist-29th
partials. Resonators, according to Hermann, behave differently
when they are blown and when they respond sympathetically. It is
in the former case that vowels result from "anaperiodic" blowing of
the mouth resonator in the period of the voice vibration. Whether
the mouth tone is harmonic or inharmonic to the voice note is of no
importance. Hermann replies briefly to Kohler's experimental at-
tempt to disprove the formant theory, but aside from indicating that
Kohler has misapprehended the nature of the relationship existing
between the vowel tone and the formant, or vowel quality, he does
not enter upon a critique of Kohler's interesting results.1
In reply to certain experiments by Fredericq which seemed to
show that the speed of a phonograph has no influence upon the vowel
sounds produced by it, Hermann (5) adds that the vowel character is
not exclusively dependent on pitch, which, is of course, altered with
varying speed of the phonograph. It depends also upon other things,
as the manner in which the formant vibration is spread over the
HEARING I2i
period. For each vowel, too, the formant may vary over a certain
range: a from e* to a2, e from c4 to d$*. Certain facts are not yet
explained, as the passage of high tones into a sounds, and the passage
of e into o and i into u when the speed of the phonograph is increased.
It may be that e and i, which according to Helmholtz find their
characteristic in the fourth accented octave, possess also a deeper-
lying formant to which they are driven by the increased pitch, and
thus they approach o and u of the lower register.
Sander (9) experimented upon the effect of duration on the inten-
sity of tones. He used two successive stimuli furnished by tuning
forks and conducted to the ear by means of telephonic connection.
One of these was given with a constant full intensity, but with varying
durations in the different experiments. The other, by which the
subjective intensity of the first was measured, had a constant duration
and an easily variable intensity. Reproduction of the same stimulus,
after an interval of three seconds, was marked by an increased inten-
sity of 4 per cent, to 5 per cent. The apparent rising intensity of a
tone, for all degrees of pitch and objective intensity, is rather rapid
at first and then more gradual. The point of time at which the
stimulus first reaches its tonal maximum cannot be exactly deter-
mined, but with the author it lies always between 615 and 925*.
The remission of intensity began for a tone of 218 vib. after i,uoe;
with the weaker tones 384 and 640, there was no remission indicated.
With more intensive stimuli the tone rises more rapidly, yet it is
doubtful if the maximum is reached more quickly. Increase in vibra-
tion rate plus increase in intensity effects a still quicker arousal. It
is impossible to alter the quality with a constant intensity since the
two factors operate together.
Urbantschitsch (14) reports a few preliminary experiments to
prove that reflex movements are occasioned by sound stimuli. He
had ten observers read aloud while various tones and noises were
sounded. They were instructed to pay no heed to the sounds. In all
cases speech was interfered with. Reflexes were called out particu-
larly in the regions of the neck and breast. The reflexes were found
to vary in different persons, but no very exact correlations were noted.
The results appear to be rather slight for supporting the contention
that sounds occasion definite reflex responses.
With reference to the physiology of hearing, Shambaugh (10)
makes an interesting plea that more consideration be given ^the
tectorial membrane in the functioning of the Corti organs. He points
out the anatomical fact that in all three organs of the labyrinth
122 ROBERT MORRIS OGDEN
hair-cells are to be found in contact with a fine membrane. Whereas
it is generally admitted that the stimulations of the semicircular canal
and the vestibule are mediated by reciprocal effects of the hairs and
the membrane above, the tectorial membrane of the cochlea is over-
looked in favor of the basilar membrane. It is impossible, the author
thinks, that the basilar membrane should be adequate to the function
of hearing, since it is subject to a varying blood pressure which can
not but affect its vibratory capacity. The reciprocal effects between
the hair-cells and the tectorial membrane are not complicated by such
disturbances. Although it is impossible to demonstrate the manner
in which this delicate membrane might behave under stimulation,
we may, perhaps, assume that different regions respond with different
tones, the high tones being produced near the base, the low tones
near the apex. We should thus be able to accommodate for the
pathological "tone-islands," and the facts of tonal analysis.
Ewald (2) criticizes certain results supposedly in confirmation of
the Helmholtz theory, obtained by Wittmaack and Yoshii. They
worked (separately) on guinea-pigs, and brought about the destruction
of certain regions of the Corti organ by stimulation with tones of
varying pitch. Ewald shows that the regions destroyed were not
definitely in accord with the theoretical location of the particular
tones in question, and, furthermore, that the areas were much too
large to be accommodated to the Helmholtz theory. Ewald has
noticed with his "camera acustica" that small bubbles appearing
on the membrane in the water are driven forward with great force
by sudden intensive tones. It is in accordance with this analogy
that he would explain the results of the two investigators named.
Frey (3), having demonstrated in many cases anchylosis between
the malleus and incus, and furthermore, that this is in no. case a true
joint, concludes that there is no displacement here during the act of
hearing, and that the protection of the conducting apparatus, which
was supposed to be effected by the movements of these bones, may
and must be explained by other factors, as the various ligaments
involved.
In an interesting volume Dupre and Nathan (i) have sum-
marized the principal results thus far obtained in the study of musical
defects in various types of mental disturbance. After an intro-
ductory chapter in which the psychology of language in general,
and the musical language in particular, is described in a simple, and
also somewhat naive, manner, the authors proceed to the consider-
ation of sensory, psychic and motor disturbances among aphasic,
HEARING
123
psychopathic and insane individuals. The origin of partial amusia
is, they believe, dynamic, the organic cases being invariably complex
or total. They find no necessary parallelism between amusia and
aphasia, and a precise cortical localization for the disturbances in
musical language is not evident. In dementia musical capacity
suffers along with the other mental activities, but somewhat more
slowly. An interesting critical study of the psychoses of great
musicians leaves little support for the contentions of Lombroso and
Grasset that these individuals are peculiarly susceptible to insanity.
A consideration of melotherapy brings the conservative conclusion
that it has no great virtue as a cure for the insane. With psycho-
and neuropathic cases its influence is at times undeniable, yet even
here it is entirely conditional on the individual musical capacity
and interests of the subject treated.
REFERENCES
1. DUPRE, E., et NATHAN, M. Le Langage Musical Paris: Alcan, 1911. Pp. vii
+ 195-
2. EWALD, J. R. Ueber die neuen Versuche, die Angriffsstellen der von Tonen
ausgehenden Schallwellen im Ohre zu lokalisieren. Arch. f. d. ges. PhysioL,
1910, 131, 188-198.
3. FREY, H. Die physiologische Bedeutung der Hammer-Ambossverbindung.
Arch.f. d. ges. PhysioL, 1911, 139, 548-561.
4. GOEBEL, — . Ueber die Ursache der Einklangsempfindung bei Einwirkung von
Tonen, die im Oktavenverhaltnis zueinander stehen. Zsch. f. SinnesphysioL,
1911,45, 109-116.
5. HERMANN, L. Der Einfluss der Drehgeschwindigkeit auf die Vokale bei der
Reproduktion derselben am Edison'schen Phonographen. Arch. f. d. ges.
PhysioL, 1911, 139, 1-9.
6. HERMANN, L. Neue Beitrage zur Lehre von den Vokalen und ihrer Entstehung.
Arch.f. d. ges. PhysioL, 1911, 141, 1-62.
7. PEAR, T. H. The Experimental Examination of some Differences between the
Major and the Minor Chords. Brit. J. of PsychoL, 1911, 4, 56-88.
8. PEAR, T. H. The Classification of Observers as "Musical" and "Unmusical."
Brit. J. of PsychoL, 1911, 4, 89-94.
9. SANDER, P. Das Ansteigen der Schallerregung bei Tonen verschiedener Hohe.
PsychoL Stud., 1910, 6, 1-38.
10. SHAMBAUGH, G. E. Die Frage der Tonempfindung. Arch. f. d. ges. PhysioL.
1911, 138, 155-158.
11. STUMPF, C., u. HORNBOSTEL, E. v. Ueber die Bedeutung ethnologischer Unter-
suchungen fur die Psychologic und Aesthetik der Tonkunst. Bericht uber den
IV. Kongress f. experim. PsychoL in Innsbruck, 1910. Leipzig: Earth, 1911.
Pp. 256-269.
12. STUMPF, C. Konsonanz und Konkordanz. Zsch. f. PsychoL, 1911, 58, 321-355-
13. STUMPF, C. Differenztone und Konsonanz. (Zweiter Artikel.) Zsch. f. PsychoL,
1911, 59, 161-175-
14. URBANTSCHITSCH, V. Ueber den Einfluss von Schallempfindungen auf die
Sprache. Arch.f. d. ges. PhysioL, 1911, 137, 422~434-
SPECIAL REVIEWS
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADVERTISING
The Relative Merit of Advertisements. EDWARD K. STRONG. New
York: The Science Press, 1911. Pp. 81.
Strong set out to compare advertisements as to "pulling power,"
"attention value," "persuasiveness," etc. In the main, his subjects
were college students, but in certain experiments individuals from
other classes of society were included. His materials were piano,
soap, breakfast food and vacuum cleaner advertisements. A special
study was made in the case of fifty Packer's Tar Soap advertise-
ments.
The following are the chief results which may be gathered: An
advertisement should be half picture and half copy. Direct appeals
are better than indirect appeals. The strongest appeals are those
which are strictly relevant and then come more general appeals to
instincts and habits of life. College students represent the educated
classes of the community, but do not represent the smaller towns
and farming districts.
The prominence given to the purely mathematical part of the
work has rather overshadowed the remainder, or, to put it otherwise,
qualitative distinctions have been sacrificed to quantitative distinc-
tions, a procedure which is always detrimental to good psychology.
The comparison between two experiments by using the mean in one,
and the median in the other, is not even good statistics.
The following statement occurs in connection with the Packer
advertisements: "Take for granted that each advertisement repre-
sents a different make of soap." It is submitted that such inhibition
is impossible except in a specially trained subject and even then not
always, as the maker's name is prominent on each. Any detailed
introspection is lacking, so that the very characteristic of a psy-
chological experiment is lacking.
Taking Strong's study or procedure as typical rather than specific,
attention may be drawn to some work which is being called "psy-
chology of advertising."
Even if done in a psychological laboratory, such investigations
are not psychological, for they tell us nothing about the psychological
124
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADVERTISING 125
factors which make an advertisement good or bad. It is cheerfully
admitted that such a line of investigation gives many useful facts.
The method used here was the rough comparison of advertisements
according to "attention value," "pulling power," etc. A glance at
the results shows that many of them are already known or are of such
a nature as can be ascertained without any previous training in
psychology.
When we compare a series of advertisements and place "relia-
bility first" "cleanliness second," etc., as the case may be, we are
not contributing to the psychology of advertising. To do that, we
must ascertain why such terms take first or second place. These
terms are not psychological and instead of being put down as results,
they should be the objects of inquiry.
Take "attention value." Strong has given no hint as to any
measure or criterion and at best it seems but the vague opinion of the
observer, which in the case of the "negro elevator man" cannot be
credited with the superlative of accuracy.
By a conglomeration of vague preferences, under still vaguer
headings, we can never reach the psychological bases of appeal.
A psychology of advertising can only be realized by a keen analysis
of the conditions, not by a mere catalogue of those conditions.
WILLIAM D. TAIT
McGiLL UNIVERSITY
MENTAL MEASUREMENTS
The Essentials of Mental Measurement. WILLIAM BROWN. Cam-
bridge: University Press, 1911. Pp. 154.
The book consists of two parts, the first dealing with psycho-
physics and the second with the use of the theory of correlation in
psychology. Part II. is a reprint of the author's doctorate thesis
and was reviewed in the January, 1911, number of the American
Journal of Psychology. Part I. begins with a discussion of the possi-
bility of mental measurement and the author states the reasons why
he believes that such measurement is possible. Then follows a
description of the different psychophysical methods. The method
of constant stimuli is described in some detail and with great clearness.
There is a misprint in the observation equations on p. 30, where
only one side of the equations is multiplied with the coefficient of
weight. Curiously enough the same misprint occurs in Titch-
ener's Manual, Vol. II., Part L, p. 102. Brown gives Miiller's
table of weights as well as mine, which is inconsistent, since only one
126 REVIEWS
of the tables can be correct. It may be mentioned in this place that
many of the values in Miiller's table are incorrect, since they are
out by the unity or more of the last decimal place. The connection
between the method of constant stimuli and the method of just
perceptible difference is made by my formulae.
The last part of the chapter on psychophysics is easily the most
interesting. Brown proposes to apply Pearson's general formulae to
the study of the distribution of the threshold. This idea — though
very obvious to any one acquainted with Pearson's work — is new and
it ought to be tried on a large and trustworthy empirical material.
Such an investigation is bound to give interesting results and it is
to be hoped that the author may soon supplement his book by some
such work. It is very important to see how an idea works out in
practice and it also is important to know how much work the practical
application of a method requires. For this purpose all the necessary
calculations ought to be given in detail.
F. M. URBAN
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
DISCUSSION
REACTIONS TO VISUAL AND AUDITORY STIMULI
In his summary of the work of Dunlap and Wells1 on "Reactions
to Visual and Auditory Stimuli," Dr. Herbert Woodrow mentions the
fact that while in the case of simple sensory reaction to visual and to
auditory stimuli the former were found to be the longer, it was also
found that reactions to sound and flash simultaneously presented
(the reaction being to the flash, and the attention being concentrated
on it exclusively during the preparatory interval) were almost as
short as simple sound reactions.
Dr. Woodrow says that this circumstance naturally indicates that
when the reaction was ostensibly to the flash, it was actually to the
accompanying sound simply, and adds the bare statement that the
authors did not accept this explanation.
In the paper in question, our reasons for not accepting the simple
explanation were definitely assigned (p. 328), being based on a second
set of experiments which was planned to throw light on the results
of the first set. The results of this second set are fully given in the
paper in question.
The reactions in the second set were with discrimination. In one
group the reactions were to flash plus sound, flash attended to (Fs)
discriminated from sound alone (s). In another group the reactions
were to flash alone (F) discriminated from sound alone (s). In each
series the numbers of both kinds of stimuli were equal, and the
sequence in the series was determined by the order of a well-shuffled
pack of cards. In these series it was found that the reaction to Fs
was considerably shorter than the reaction to F, although the dis-
crimination control rendered it out of the question that ostensible
Fs reactions should really be S reactions.
While, as we pointed out in the paper, the results of these experi-
ments are meager from the numerical point of view, and do not war-
rant even a provisional positive conclusion, they are of sufficient
importance to prevent acceptance of the simple explanation above
mentioned, and to point out a line for research.
GEORGE R. WELLS
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
1 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 1911, 8, 387-390.
127
BOOKS RECEIVED DURING FEBRUARY
MACVANNEL, J. A. Outline of a Course in the Philosophy of Edu-
cation. New York: Macmillan, 1912. Pp. ix + 207. $.90 net.
HORNE, H. H. Free Will and Human Responsibility. A Philo-
sophical Argument. New York: Macmillan, 1912. Pp. xvi + 197.
$1.50 net.
BOSANQUET, B. The Principle oj Individuality and Value. London:
Macmillan, 1912. Pp. xxxvii + 409. $3.25 net.
WIRTH, W. Psychophysik. Darstellung der Methoden der experi-
mentellen Psychologie. Leipzig: Hirzel, 1912. Pp. viii + 522.
Mk. 1 8, geb. Mk. 20.
BODEN, F. Die Instiktbedingtheit der Wahrheit und Erfahrung.
Berlin: L. Simion, 1911. Pp. 80. Mk. 2.50.
Jubilaums ' Katalog der Verlagsbuchhandlung Wilhelm Engelmann
in Le'pzig, 1811-1911. Leipzig: Breitkopf & Hartel, 1911. Pp.
iii + 447.
DAWSON, JEAN. The Biology of Physa. (Behavior Monographs, I,
No. 2.) New York: Holt, 1912. Pp. 120.
NOTES AND NEWS
PROFESSOR JOHN B. WATSON, of the Johns Hopkins University,
has recently been granted a three years' appointment as a research
associate of the Carnegie Institution of Washington. In this capa-
city he will study the migratory and other instincts of the sea-gulls
of the Tortugas, Florida.
DR. BIRD T. BALDWIN, now professor of education at the Uni-
versity of Texas, is to have charge of the new department of psy-
chology and education which is to be established next year at
Swarthmore College.
128
Vol. IX. No. 4. April I5
THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN
GENERAL REVIEWS AND SUMMARIES
PATHOPSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
BY DR. ADOLF MEYER
Johns Hopkins Hospital
The last year has brought to us the emphasis of a new contrast
in our field, viz., the opposition of pathopsychology and psycho-
pathology.
A mere creation of contrasts not infrequently helps in bringing
otherwise vague perspectives to clearer attention, especially so in
the discussions of broader issues. Often enough the generalities are
of a kind which need not touch the genuine worker who can readily
leave them to the time when enough facts are available to make a
conclusion easy, and who in the meantime trusts the sound trend of
the day or the vogue of the programs of our scientific societies. At
the same time, if a beginner or the average worker has the chance to
grasp clear starting points and perspectives, he is bound to be better
off than if he moves in a groove made by others or yields to tempta-
tions which may unnecessarily check or side-track his soundest
instincts of reaction to the world of facts. And where a branch of
science is just beginning to shape itself, the neighbors — in our special
case, the psychologist and the physician — will be better able to appre-
ciate the attitude of new departments in a measure as there is clear-
ness about the starting-point and perspectives; for to take success
as the only test merely opens the door to the deplorable flood of un-
critical psychopathologies which struggle for the supremacy in the
public eye, not without effects upon the more scientifically minded
workers.
129
130 ADOLF MEYER
In previous numbers of the BULLETIN an effort has been made to
review especially those topics which promised to have an influence
upon the geographical and political map of systematized science and
what we might call the interstate relations: psychopatholqgy as
nosology and as non-dogmatic pathology in 1904; then the evolution
of a possible dynamic standpoint; the development of the association-
experiment, and of the interpretation of cerebral integration in
aphasia and apraxia; the psychological experiment in psychopathol-
ogy, and more special problems, such as the feeling of reality (1905);
aphasia, and the relation of emotional and intellectual functions in
paranoia and obsessions, and the psychopathological development in
association studies (1906); next the psychogenic factors in the devel-
opment of psychoses, and misconceptions of a dogmatic "medical
psychology" and the "revisions" of aphasia (1907); and finally the
criticism of nosology and mental dynamics in 1908, and in 1910 the
Freudian psychology. These were the leading topics discussed by
the contributors of the psychopathological numbers of the BULLETIN.
Today we are confronted with a double current manifested in the
assertion of autonomy of introspective psychology and also the
creation of a contrast of pathopsychology and psychopathology,
which may or may not complicate the already complex path of the
domain of concern to us. The latter comes out most strongly in the
new Zeitschrift fur Pathopsychologie, edited by Wilhelm Specht; and
I also wish to discuss in this connection some reflections on the kin-
dred current in recent psychology, as far as it is apt to influence the
worker in mental disorders.
II
In his preface, Specht urges that the way from psychiatry to
psychology must necessarily pass through philosophy. The chief
factor of retardation of psychiatry is the materialistic dogma of
the epiphenomenal nature of "psychics" (des Psychischen). Psy-
chiatry must learn to surrender its one-sided focusing upon the
brain and must learn to apply psychological methods to mental
diseases. On the other hand psychology must accept the wealth of
opportunities and the kind of broadening out which, in its way,
pathology has given to physiology. English and French philosophy
(Maudsley, Taine and Ribot, and lately also Bergson) has long appre-
ciated the importance of pathology for psychology; Stoning and
Oesterreich and others have created psychological studies in pathology
in Germany; a few alienists have at least developed a psychologically
PATHOPSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 131
more refined symptomatology, and others promoted a deeper psycho-
logical understanding of diseases. But "in psychiatric circles not
even the essential difference between mere clinical experimental
psychology and pathopsychology is clearly grasped." To them to
speak of function is merely an admission of insufficient anatomical
knowledge-. Thus it happens that a reduction of the facts to terms
of function in a truly psychological sense is only in its beginning.
With his Zeitschrift he wishes to give the study of mental diseases
a new foundation by bringing the psychologist and psychiatrist
together in the work of pathology of mental life on a really psycho-
logical foundation, in a pathopsychology, dealing with the pathology
of the individual consciousness, and also with the psychology of
abnormal conditions and creations of society.
On pp. 4-49 Specht gives a full discussion of the program of
pathopsychology. He shows how a careful description and analysis
of the pathological phenomena in mental diseases are possible only
through penetration into the mental mechanism of the disorders.
Without wanting to discuss why, with all its productivity, "psy-
chology as developed under the leadership of Wundt does not seem
to succeed in establishing theses which would be teachable and
generally acceptable," and without taking sides in the recent disputes
concerning the experimental method, Specht wishes to show first
wherein the' pathological method is preferable to the experimental
method. He concedes to such a philosophical critic as Husserl
(Logos, I, Heft 3, 1910-11) a whole range of problems (the essence
of psychics, the nature of our understanding other minds, the rela-
tion of psychics to a self, the question of the independent exist-
ence of thought or of degree of consciousness, etc.); they cannot,
he thinks, be settled by observation or experimentation; "they
belong to the epistemology of psychics and precede inductive
psychology as philosophical propaedeutics of psychology or as the
phenomenology of psychics"; but he finds an ample field for the
experimental method in the search for lawfulness wherever the task
is one of the inductive science of psychology, whether it does or does
not turn its attention especially upon the introspective issues.
The aim of all experimentally modified introspection is to single
out or to eliminate certain components. In the normal, this is only
approximately possible; perceptive and recognitive functions cannot
be dissociated in the normal; nor can a somatic memory of Bergson
be completely cut off from the representative memory in the normal.
Pathology however furnishes exactly such dissociations. Only
132 ADOLF MEYER
pathology knows of states in which a hand although anaesthetic may
nevertheless recognize an object; or in which recognition may be
eliminated while perception and memory are preserved; or in which
objects given to external perception give up their claim to be
present; or in which the realization of a motor intention becomes
dependent upon actual concepts or memories of motion; or in which
(as in hallucinations) the meanings are no longer founded on sensory
contents, but where an already prepared intention of meaning seems to
slip in between sensation and content. Normal psychology can at
best come near such an elimination, or solution of continuity, or per-
version of functions, but it never can realize them completely. For
some reason Specht is however exceedingly cautious about his appli-
cations and somewhat arbitrary. "There follows from this a negative
and a positive rule concerning the significance of pathology for psycho-
logical science. Wherever there are phenomena which only occur
in pathological conditions, an immediate application of pathology
to psychology is not admissible." Hallucinations for instance are
considered as strictly pathological phenomena, devoid of all transition
through illusion to normal perception. "Similarly it is pathological
when volitional intention requires motor images for the realization
of its content." The phenomenon of the positive after-image has
been too rashly used for false theories of sense-perception and even
for metaphysical theories on the subjectivity of the contents of per-
ception. The association psychology should not appeal directly to
the findings in mania and in intoxication; and the doctrine of the
mind-substance should not be considered as refuted by the dissocia-
tion of the ego in hysteria, lest one ignore the fact that these condi-
tions are abnormal and " that there are also occasional thinking, non-
intoxicated and non-hysterical personalities." The physiologist
would err in a similar manner if he described the elimination of
albumen as a function of the kidney and not merely a function of the
diseased kidney.
There is no doubt that Specht is justified in drawing the attention
to the necessity of reserve. It is necessary to check the uncritical
and to cultivate a certain respect for the concrete situation of any
special type of occurrence as opposed to the license of untrammeled
generalization. Passing to the positive rule, Specht shows how the
perception of things by an anaesthetic hand endorses Kiilpe's re-
habilitation of the inner sense and how it warns against sensualistic
generalization which minimizes the difference between recognizing
the thing and recognizing the tactile sensations. Or (p. 14) he shows
PATHOPSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 133
how, notwithstanding preserved capacity of perception and of re-
membrance of previous perception, recognition can be lacking; and
that abolition of visual memory does not entail mind-blindness, so
that Bergson's contrast of memory for motor utilizations and of
independent memories is more justified than the current explanations
such as those of Lehmann (Phil. Stud., Vol. V.). This does not call
for a wholesale transfer of conceptions from pathopsychology to
psychology; it is a broadening of the world of facts on which general
theories should be brought to a test. In my own mode of expression
I should have to emphasize the respect for the concrete situation and
the mistrust of any "absolute" generalization which would want to
be anything more than a more or less comprehensive simplification
of our concrete picture of the world and our experience. If we bear
this in mind, some of the points specified above as warnings may not
have to be brushed aside in as final a fashion as Specht seems to
feel obliged to do, as with regard to the hallucinations and the artificial
reproduction of "flight of ideas," etc. They, like the favored in-
stances of acceptable generalization, will stand or fall according to
whether they will stand the tests of repeated experimentation and
analytical penetration.
Pathology adds to our knowledge not only by eliminating certain
connections, but by the independent variation of various functions
(or, as I should put it, of various integrated factors). It does for us
what caricature and the experiment do, and it suggests new channels
of work and new viewpoints. Specht certainly makes plain "the
value of pathology as shown by elimination of functions" and "the
narrowness of the thesis that normal mental life should not be ex-
plained from the pathological side."
Specht (p. 1 6) next passes to the question of what role can patho-
psychology play in the business of psychiatry (which is the " discrimina-
tion and cure of mental diseases"). With the dogmatic assurance
shared by Miinsterberg, Specht claims that medicine ceases to be a
medical science, if it ceases to prove that a patient asking for treatment
has this or that disease; the knowledge of the "disease" and the
knowledge of the causes calls for the baths, medicaments, psycho-
therapy, etc. Psychiatry thus must make it its business to recognize
and cure mental diseases.
Specht accepts the establishment of absolutely distinct disease
entities as achieved (?), and also the demonstration of some definite
etiologies; but he deplores the hopelessness and dogmatic pessimism
which spurns the psychological concepts even in the functional dis-
134 ADOLF MEYER
eases and there can reckon merely with "brain diseases in which we
are still ignorant of the lesion," and which is apt to see only in these
"physical" processes realities, even though they may be merely
hypothetical, while the psychic facts figure as mere epiphenomena;
so that the psychiatrist maintains a passive attitude wherever he
does not find a point of attack upon the gross or molecular changes in
the brain. In the mind of the "psychiatrist" even mental influences
can have a beneficial effect only through the influence on the molecular
conditions with a secondary effect on the mental state (Specht
illustrates this position by Kraepelin's attitude). In contrast to
this, Specht wants to restore their reality to the psychic data, and he
does not want to wait for the day when a drug will be available to
counteract a melancholia as a drug counteracts constipation; he
wants to recognize mental diseases as mental diseases and study
them for psychical causes (if they exist) and a corresponding therapy,
or for physical causes when physical causes exist; and he wants to
distinguish brain diseases and mental diseases (rather than "organic"
and " functional " diseases) . " Brain diseases " and " mental diseases "
are not altogether synonymous with "exogenous" and "endogenous"
disorders; but in the one, therapy attacks the brain, in the other it
attacks the mind (in which I should emphasize conduct and behavior).
Only experience and the facts will decide which conditions belong
to the one and which to the other group. While nobody would
exclude the possibility that some day a drug might affect the brain
in exactly the necessary way to bring about even the mental changes
required, a study of the psychogenic mental disorder from the mental
side in the meantime is to say the least absolutely justified, even if,
as in dementia prsecox, the deterioration speaks definitely for an
involvement of the brain tissue in the decline.
Lack of space forces me to give only a limited summary of the
well written arguments of pp. 16-49. They form a counterpart to
my own statements in earlier years of this BULLETIN. Specht gives
a very lucid discussion of the necessity of a more plastic and func-
tional conception of "disposition" which makes different persons
react differently to the same difficulty (as, e. g., different women would
react differently to marital infelicity), and he formulates the treatment
as an attempt to make the patient see things in a wholesome light —
not through blunt arguments but through helps which help. He
appeals to the psychiatrist to approach his work free from all dog-
matic presupposition and to depend on what he finds by experience,
to recognize psychogenic and non-psychogenic disturbances and with
PATHOPSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 135
this the existence of mental causes, seen both in the production and
in the remedial modification of disease. It is quite characteristic
that he harks back to some psychiatric voices of sixty years ago,
before the anatomical fascination created the doctrine of exclusive
salvation in putting all psychopathology in terms of hypothetical
brain-changes.
Specht errs if he claims that Freud's somewhat over-systematized
psychopathology is the only attempt in this direction in modern psy-
chiatry. He is not informed of the work in the PSYCHOLOGICAL
BULLETIN. And I must confess that the recent discussion of the
introduction of psychology in the medical curriculum shows a broader
and freer development than the one under which Specht feels justified
to introduce his new journal. He certainly does not make clear how
he promises help to the psychiatrist who should find his way to
psychology "through philosophy." Will that become clear through
his philosophical contributor?
Ill
Miinsterberg ("Psychologic und Pathologic," pp. 50-66) takes
up the methodological issues. He complains of the continual careless
intermingling of the two expressions, psychopathology and patho-
psychology (or, he might possibly have said more justly, of the
promiscuous use of the word psychopathology where M. would prefer
the adoption of the term pathopsychology). An investigation may
be of importance to both psychology and to pathology, but it naturally
is logically differently focused according to whether it aims to serve
a knowledge of the mental phenomena or of the diseases. He per-
emptorily assumes that qua pathology any mental disorder must be
viewed as "symptom of some definite disease," while qua psychology
it is treated as a variation of other similar mental variations.
Pathopsychology at once appears under two sets of conditions.
Psychology may be furthered in its intrinsic problems by studying
the abnormal states and processes beside those of normal life; on
the other hand it may draw in pathology (I should say nature's
experiments) for the purpose of interpreting normal mental life (I
should say mental life in general). "In the one case the relation to
pathology yields a special group of problems; in the other case a
special method for psychology. Both result in a gain of purely psycho-
logical knowledge and therefore constitute pathopsychology; but they
form two different fields of work which coincide only in certain
points," very much as the psychology of normal life and experimental
136 ADOLF MEYER
psychology. The same kind of contrasts can be made in animal
psychology and in physiological psychology (and M. might say also
in pathology itself when it studies constitutions as well as the specially
definable processes or "diseases," or when we compare its descriptive-
analytical part and the experimental pathology).
Pathopsychology thus studies the mental processes occurring in
disease not as symptoms of diseases but as deviations from the normal
course of mental life and for the gain of purely psychological knowl-
edge, partly to broaden the field of facts (a special group of contents)
and partly to explain normal mental life (as a counterpart of experi-
mental psychology in a new field, or as a special method). M. urges
the verbally plausible contrast between an extension of matter and
an extension of method.
By giving up the concept of disease and morbidness, pathopsy-
chology according to M. "encounters considerable methodological
difficulties." The contrast of health and disease is logically simple.
Health and disease necessarily refer to biological conditions and are
concepts borrowed from general pathology, which is based on diseases
of the body; a special adaptation to the psychical conditions
is therefore not necessary for the concept of "disease." Whatever
damages the self-preservation of the organism is morbid whether it
shows in the purely physical domain or in part also in the mental
field. "Hence the concept of what is pathological" remains abso-
lutely dependent on the vital conditions of the physical body even
when we are concerned with psychology, and it does not require any
special adaptation out of consideration for psychics. (The reader
will see that all this resolves itself to the traditional conception that
there are no mental "diseases" but only physical "diseases" and to
M.'s views concerning causality.)
In the mental domain proper we can only speak of normality and
abnormality, i. e., reference to mere averages (which would be lowered
in case of increase of insanity) or to an ideal of harmony of the mental
forces. Abnormality and disease are not parallel concepts: a genius
is abnormal but not pathological; from a teleological-psychological
standpoint dreams should be looked upon as abnormal and yet
not a pathological symptom, but on the contrary, with some psycho-
pathologists, a really important help to the normal organic function-
ing; whereas the euphoria of the consumptive may be pathologically
part of the disease but is psychologically normal. In "suggestion"
the abnormal begins "where the hypnotic influence sets in," or in
blindness or deafness "where they modify a mental life"; yet neither
PATHOSPYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 137
of these abnormal states turns on the notion of disease. "Patho-
psychology will attempt to explain the whole range of the abnormal
with the helps of the normal psychology," and by using its knowledge
of memory, of attention, of feelings, of volition. To all this we might
say that to the psychologist, as to the scientist generally, normality
and abnormality can no longer be a primary scientific issue. Science
must generalize the venerable declaration of breadth in "Nihil
humani a me alienum puto," and it must accept the fact that this
broadening out is to be allowed without a priori restrictions — for who
knows what the investigator may find and what he must be ready
to meet. At this point, M. properly criticizes the use of the term
"applied psychology" for pathopsychology, which would be as in-
appropriate as calling the psychology of myths, of morals, and of
languages, applied psychology. So much for M.'s discussion of
pathopsychology as "psychological penetration of the abnormal psy-
chological phenomena."
M. next takes up pathopsychology as determined by the methodo-
logical viewpoint. " It is the entire psychology as far as it is fur-
thered by the study of abnormal and especially pathological phe-
nomena," especially where clinical observation gives insight into
the psychical mechanism. But M. evidently still assumes that what-
ever mental phenomena occur in disease must, in pathopsychology,
be viewed as an exaggeration or a reduction of the "normal."
Psychopathology is "quite different"; according to M. it turns
absolutely on the concept of "disease." As far as it studies special
contents, it takes up the special mental symptoms in specifically
mental diseases and also in other diseases. As far as it takes the
methodological viewpoint, it deals with the entire domain of human
diseases as far as its study can be furthered by the consideration of
mental facts and psychological knowledge. "Here then the normal
mental attitude is the real starting point. We may take as an
instance the much-disputed mental tests which try to elucidate a
pathological behavior in the domain of a simple measurable activity
by comparing it with the normal typical condition," etc.
The four fields are further complicated by the physiopsychological
and psychophysiological correlations and substitutions which must
be made problems "clearly kept apart."
M. next turns from the theoretical field to the union of psychology
and pathology for practical results in the service of hygiene and
pedagogy, in psychodiagnosis and psychoprognosis, or in the diagnosis
of mental states by non-psychological means, or with the help of
138 ADOLF MEYER
normal-psychological demonstrations (as in the disorders of intelli-
gence). Even for the study of peripheral and spinal diseases psycho-
logical methods (tests of sensibility or motility) may be used. Even
broader is the field of therapy in the form of "psychiatry" and
"psychotherapy." Psychiatry may use baths and non-psychological
helps; psychopathology uses mental influences against mental and
physical disorders (such as digestive disorders, etc.). As a specially
promising category M. suggests the psychological experiment on the
normal in the interest of psychology but under the direction of
pathology. Kraepelin did the reverse; now should come the turn of
the use in the normal of what, for instance, special studies of amnesia
have suggested.
"It would, however, be methodological confusion to expect that
pathological observation could throw any light on the fundamental
questions of psychological conceptions." The experience with sug-
gestion could not possibly further the theory of the relation of mind
and body; of a great share (?) of Freudian literature he claims that it
is pervaded by the thought that psychoanalysis furnishes evidence
of a causal action of psychics "independent of brain-processes," and
that for this reason it vainly assumes that the psychophysical parallel-
ism is overcome. It is also futile to expect that one could in any
way justify the psychological concept of the unconscious by facts
in pathology, or a decision on whether psychological analysis finds
merely elements of content or also elements of function, or whether
there are various degrees of consciousness, etc. Not one of these
questions can even be touched by any pathological study as little as
by the normal psychological experiment. All this can be as little
a problem within psychology as the problem of time and space can
be a problem of physics.
To an active investigator in psychopathology, these discrimina-
tions may be pleasing if he agrees with the dogmatic foundations
from which Miinsterberg chooses to start. If, however, he should
have relegated the concept of a "disease" to the category of mere
convenient medical logic in nosology, while at bottom in his pathology
he only recognizes conditions and factors at work in experiments of
nature and reaction-types worth defining (see PSYCH. BULL., 1908, 5,
245-261), he may easily come to feel obligatory nosological assump-
tions a hindrance or at least an encumbrance of doubtful value,
something needing more help itself than it can possibly give in
pathology. With a profound respect for the helps of logic and critical
definition of problems and epistemology, I do consider it essential
PATHOPSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 139
that the first thing to aim at is sufficient accuracy and clearness of
work, just as we demand it (together with rigid clearness) as we embark
on a bacteriological or chemical analysis or a logical elaboration of
data. For all this a first-hand familiarity with the facts and with the
fundamental methods in use must precede whatever subsequent
philosophical consideration one wants to introduce. Only if that is
granted does the help and critical training of the philosopher come
in good stead; otherwise its contrasts smack of word-play and logo-
machia.
The psychologist and the pathologist who take up the study of a
depression, or of an hysterical repression, or a psychasthenic rumina-
tion will do well to ascertain the facts, determine their actual inter-
relation in a chain of causes and effects (i. e., in terms of an experi-
ment of nature), and then they analyze the relative role of each link
and the modifiability of the links and of the whole chain — and all this
can be done without speaking of "symptoms of a disease" or a dis-
cussion of what is "normal." Fundamentally both the psychologist
and the pathologist, if there are such in pure culture, must take all the
facts into consideration to be on a strictly scientific basis; the dif-
ference will only show in the emphasis on various groups of facts and
their interrelation, and in the grouping of the material; and the value
of the one or the other emphasis and method can only be an issue
of economy and accuracy in the procedure, but not something radi-
cally different, unless, of course, we start out with a psychologist who
knows of no causality in his realm, and a pathologist who treats
psychics by elimination. The very transformation on this point is
the fruit of work with facts and the adaptation is far from being
aprioristic, as Miinsterberg seems to demand. It is after all the
facts which call for the making of categories or for their simplifica-
tion or readjustment, and the preliminary result next may call for
logical-philosophical sifting.
The discussion is given so much space here because it makes one
long for the passing of aprioristic specialism. First-hand work must
more and more become the condition for the whole range of verbal
and conceptual permutations of psyche, pathos and logos, and the
ramifications will be considered safe or in need of more or less modesty
and reserve, according to the extent of a writer's first-hand mastery of
work in the integrated fields— biology, physiology, psychology, logic
and what not. I feel that I must be in perfect harmony with M. on
this point: that it will be considered more and more hazardous and
dilettantic to make claims in psychology or in pathology without a
140 ADOLF MEYER
fair working knowledge of the working elements of both. As long,
however, as the working knowledge is safe, we can trust continued
work better than the continual creation of methodological contrasts.
Where does the system of logical permutation lead us?
The claim of Specht that the way from psychiatry to psychology
must necessarily pass through philosophy, receives a peculiar illustra-
tion in M.'s essay, and it makes one ask seriously: Is it not chiefly
a warning against mere philosophical method and against too much
awe of accepted philosophical rules that is needed in this field ?
IV
Oswald Kiilpe, who deplores the lack of support for psychology
as an independent science and department in German universities,
offers a practical contribution in an article entitled "Psychologic u.
Medizin" in the second number of the Zeitschrift (Vol. I., pp. 187-
267). He brings very pertinent criticisms of methods and results in
recent studies in psychopathology by Isserlin, Binet et Simon,
Oesterreich, Liepmann's study of flight of ideas, the problem of mind-
blindness, and a program for the examination of mind-blindness. It
shows what a wealth of detail is suggested by the systematic and
critical consideration of the introspective material. It also shows the
distance between the naive medical attempts and the searching
demands of the psychologist who is experienced in what we might
call psychohistology; but also the interesting limitation of non-
mental issues in his considerations.
Another study of a more concrete character is that of Pick, who
presents a most interesting case, showing the role of the relation of
perception to the self — a patient who went through attacks in which
he saw the city as he used to know it and experienced peculiar panics
during the conflict of the hallucinations and the real perception of the
city as it stood before him, when he could bring himself to help his
vision by touch or by rapping a gate or a building with his stick.
From very interesting records of the introspection of the patient he
shows how important in the conflict between obsessive visual mem-
ories or hallucinations and real perception of the real outside world
the activations of other sense-mechanisms (and we might also add the
motor mechanisms) become.
These studies plainly concern themselves with only a limited
field of what psychology will meet in abnormal situations. They
do not come out plainly as a new and exclusive method, but as more
PATHOPSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 141
conscientious and well-considered efforts to do justice to introspective
material, such as must also appeal to one who strives for precision
in a non-dogmatic attitude concerning psychology and its relation to
science. The last two years have however emphasized more pro-
nounced types of reemancipation of psychology into a strictly autono-
mous position.
One of the ablest German psychologists, Narziss Ach, of Konigs-
berg, says at the end of a discourse "Ueber den Willen": "Die
experimentelle Psychologic selbst ist zwar keine Naturwissenschaft,
denn den Gegenstand ihrer Untersuchung bilden die geistigen Vor-
gange, aber sie benutzt naturwissenschaftliche Methoden zur Festle-
gung der Gesetze dieser geistigen Vorgange, etc."
This is the German version of the attitude most emphatically
voiced by Yerkes in this country. In his analysis of the replies of
physiologists and biologists on the relation of psychology to biology
(/. of Philos., Psychol., etc., i, 113-124) and in his Introduction to
Psychology, Yerkes feels forced to assert what I might call an overcor-
rection of the ordinary training which tends to disquality the average
person for a naive and direct use of the introspective material of
experience. Yerkes, from conviction or for didactic reasons, is intent
on making the student cultivate the view of a world divided into two
distinct aspects, psychics and physics; to both of which he can apply
the fundamental methods of the natural sciences. Observation under
natural and experimental conditions, quantitatively accurate and
verifiable description, and causal explanation.
In my own words, without a radical division of psychics and
physics, psychology, in the' normal, or the abnormal, aims at suffi-
cient differentiative description of these events, determination of the
conditions under which they arise and the conditions the events lead
to and the law of their modifiability; in other words a reduction to
experimental terms or to experimental function. Psychology as a
study of events would then be opposed to the consideration of merely
logical or at least adynamic relations, and will have to deal also with
non-introspective material. Any such effort necessarily presupposes
sufficiently organized living beings in action, and as long as the
reactions have dynamic factors involved, they can be studied in terms
of experiments (not merely in experimental situations) ; if the dynamic
factors are eliminated, a chiefly logical treatment begins, hence the
view maintained by Miinsterberg that psychology knows only of
purposive relations, while the causal chains are observable only in
the physical side of the events, which, of course, leaves psychology,
as he conceives it, in clear opposition to Naturwissenschaft.
142 ADOLF MEYER
It is of course conceivable to think of the states of various degrees
of abnormal synthesis in the same terms as of those of normal and
not further conditioned mental life, purely in terms of relational and
logical sequences or in the mode of psychologizing of common-sense
when it leaves outside of the sphere of discussion the non-mental
series of physiological or biological events or integrated material.
One might go so far as to make sure that the differences in the time-
relationships which evidently characterize the different physiological
states in a general way, should be expressed in terms of "psychological
time" and create a picture of a world of pure introspection. This
might be a natural extreme of consistency for the psychologist who
enters psychology from the philosophical camp; but for one who
approaches it from the field of direct objective as well as subjective
experience, without going through the phase of "secondary naivety"
of the philosophical standpoint, this temptation is assigned a secondary
place and the emphasis is put upon whatever standpoint gives us
the best definition of the conditions under which the matters under
discussion occur, and under which we can study them as modifiable
factors of experiments.
I cannot help referring here to an exaggerated instance of a
pathopsychological study, the quaint book of M. Herz (Kritische
Psychiatrie. Kantische Studien uber die Storungen der reinen specu-
lativen Fernunft. Wien, 1895). Oesterreich's Phaenomenologie des
Ich would form a more modern type, and also an illustration of a
tendency which insists on the "total heterogeneity of psychics as
opposed to the processes of external nature."
On the other hand, I am tempted to interweave here a brief
abstract of what I should call the direct and naive call of a physician
for a psychology which he can grasp and which is part of his practical
and theoretical world. In the main his contentions can readily be
compared with Specht's appeal for a psychopathology which recog-
nizes causal chains among and within the mental events.
Koertke (Somatische Medizin und Psychologie in der Psychiatrie.
Mitteil. aus d. Hamburgischen Staatskrankenanstalten, 1910, n,
1-17) reviews the uncertainties of psychiatrical nosology, cerebral
histopathology, the insufficiency of psychological and histological
correlations, the improbability of getting far with the mere concept of
cerebral localization. He analyzes especially the supposed parallelism
between general paralysis and dementia prsecox, and the preponder-
ance of a kinship with hysteria and absence of a progressive condition
describable in neurological terms in dementia prsecox; the need of a
PATHOPSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 143
special accounting for the mental symptom-complexes even in
general paralysis, and the dreary effects of formal routine diagnoses of
dementia prsecox which prejudice the physician against the case and
throw the patient into the ranks of mere inmates. He urgently calls
for a psychological penetration of the cases, points to the advantages
of the association-method, not only for the study of hysteria and
neurotic states, but for a more intimate knowledge of any case. The
psychiatrist cannot afford to be a one-sided physician but must also
be a psychologist.
This is in many respects a trend of thought akin to that developed
in the decennial lecture at Clark University, or the dynamic inter-
pretation of dementia prsecox (Amer. J. of Psychol., 21, 385-403) in
which von Voss sees merely Freudian speculations and a one-sided
psychological interpretation of the disease, "unintelligible considering
the great number of physical manifestations," as if the habit conflicts
referred to were one-sidedly psychical unless one expurgates the whole
mass of incidental and absolutely intrinsic motor and vasomotor and
glandular functions and perversions involved (Jacobsohn's Jahres-
bericht, 14, 1054). Who can blame a critic who only knows the
orthodox tenets of a psychology without a body?
The appearance of pathopsychology is a somewhat surprising
secession and declaration of independence of psychology in the field
in which the possibility of a blending of natural science and psychology
into a really unitary science had seemed most promising. With all
the recognition of discontinuity and pluralism which cold-blooded
criticism has to face in a systematic account of experience, there is no
doubt about convergence and growing harmony of perspectives in the
direction of experimentation as the fundamental trait of modern
science. It is not the essence of the objects of study but their sufficient
differentiation and what they do, i. e., the role in chains of cause and
effect, that goes at the core of what we long for. For a long time
psychology had to assert itself against aggressive and sometimes
brutally crude types of materialism, and the safest way was the
complete retirement behind a partition furnished by the parallelistic
dogma. Today psychology is in great demand to fill gaps which the
coarse materialism has failed to touch, and it is called upon to bring
lawful order into our knowledge of and experience with a great and
important field of human interests, not only abstract introspection,
144 ADOLF MEYER
but the world of conduct and behavior. Those who approach it from
biology and pathology naturally bring a strong interest in the con-
ditions on which certain reactions depend for their very occurrence.
Some of these conditions lie in the outside world, others in the organ-
ism of the individual and for some of the conditions we can point to
states or events expressible only in terms of the symbols characteristic
of conscious or mental reactions. The question then arises whether
the biologically trained workers must be told that they either must
change their faith or remain in the cold world of "matter," excluded
from "psychics," or whether they are allowed to take with them the
interests in the objective as well as in the subjective data of the science
of conduct and behavior, and the privilege of using them according
to the accuracy needed or the connection in which the facts appear
in the chains of cause and effect. It may be that for reasons of
simplicity we should favor the categorical separation of the facts by
the maintenance of a rigorous parallelism. But if the simplicity leads
to undue restrictions or to undesirable licenses of imagination such as
the neurologizing tautologies criticized in previous articles, we are
willing to accept more complex rules of procedure and a freer range
to our common-sense way of dealing with conduct and behavior and
its metabolism or inner mechanisms manifested in introspection and
its exteriorization. Instead of dividing the world of facts and of
workers into a long series of contrasting types, we specify the rules of
the special procedures and keep them subordinated to the main facts
and interests without any partitions such as the cumbersome division
of the world of experience into psychics and physics, or into patho-
psychology and psychopathology, and similar contrasts.
Psychology as the science of conduct and behavior and its mechan-
isms as a natural science and branch of biology, deals with that range
of facts which can in many conditions leave the substrata or the strata
of lower integration as "taken for granted," or as sufficiently con-
sidered, as long as the data of the psychological strata and of the
external stimuli are taken conscientiously. But as soon as we leave
the simplest situations, as in the variations of the mental level in
conditions of fatigue, sleep, intoxications, brain-disease or even emo-
tional conflicts, etc., it is absolutely necessary to command the facts
concerning the entire integrative material, mental and non-mental.
Facts which also can be studied apart, as functions of independent
organs (such as the brain) or mechanism (such as the polyglandular
system of regulations), must then be open to study from the point
of view of the broader functions of the individual as a whole, and he
PATHOPSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 1 45
will be the conqueror who commands the whole hierarchy of sciences
—from physics and chemistry to the biological sciences (including
the science of conduct and behavior) and to logic or the science of
relations; from the dynamic sciences with its world of cause and
effect to the philosophy of which Specht and Miinsterberg say that
it is needed to pass from psychiatry to psychology — or we might say,
to the philosophy which reflects the manner in which a worker passes
from psychiatry to psychology. For it does seem after all as if the
connection of the two called for a recasting of the rules of intellectual
procedure and a recasting of important assumptions, too often shirked
under the excuse of aversion to metaphysics, i. e., to the formulation
of systematized logical consequences. Whether or not experience
with psychopathology will ever touch or throw any light on funda-
mental psychological conceptions can safely be left to the future
and to the workers who have to shape their fundamental conceptions
in keeping with growing experience.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
BY PROFESSOR SHEPHERD IVORY FRANZ
Government Hospital for the Insane, Washington, D. C.
Much has been written during the past few years concerning the
mutual relations of psychology and medical science. The establish-
ment of laboratories of psychology in hospitals for the insane, in
institutions for the feeble-minded, and in universities for the examina-
tion of abnormal children has resulted in a wider and more general
appreciation of the possible advantages which may accrue to both
psychology and medicine by the combination. This interest has
been shown to some extent by various attempts to give names to
each new application or junction of psychology with one of the medical
disciplines, and at present we have to deal with abnormal psychology,
psychopathology, pathopsychology and clinical psychology. Many
other divisions are made, and the extremes to which this attempted
division may go is well illustrated in Wallin's article (14), where we
find the terms "clinical psychology," "psycho-clinical," "medical
psychology," and "medico-clinical" as well as psychopathology. In
many instances the reader is left to judge whether or not each term is
to designate something different from the others.
A practical distinction which may be made and held to is that
when an investigator is concerned chiefly with the general course of a
146 SHEPHERD IVORY FRANZ
disease and its treatment his interests are in psychiatry, but when his
chief concern is the investigation of the development or interrelations
of mental symptoms his interests are in psychology, and the emphasis,
either on the psychological or the pathological aspect, makes his work
either pathopsychological or psychopathological. This distinction is
well brought out in the work of Gregor (5). In this book Gregor,
like his predecessor Stoning, gives a general account of the mental
processes in a variety of diseases. Although it can not be said to be
a complete exposition of all forms of abnormal mental conditions, the
book gives a better view of the present status of psychopathology
than any other single work. Here one may find a summary of many
of the experimental results in psychopathology which are scattered
throughout psychiatric and psychological journals, but there is a
Germanic exclusiveness which slightly mars the work as a whole.
Many of the chapters dealing with psychopathology have companion
chapters dealing with the normal psychology of the processes under
consideration which serve to bridge the gap between normal psy-
chology and psychopathology and also to introduce the physician
to general and experimental psychology. The material included in
the book is mostly two or more years old, so that our review precludes
the possibility of much more than mention of the titles of the chapters,
which are as follows: psychology and psychiatry; psychopathology
of time sense; reaction experiments; pathology of apprehension;
association reactions; association experiments with the insane;
methods of testing memory; pathology of memory; psychology of
evidence; experiments on the psychology of evidence of the insane;
psychology and pathology of attention; methods of testing atten-
tion; experimental testing of movement; bodily changes accom-
panying mental states; mental work; methods of testing general
intelligence.
A notable omission is that of the sensory equipment of the insane,
but this defect is not due solely to the author but to the great body
of those who investigate the abnormal. It is strange that although
psychologists have devoted much time to the investigation of sensa-
tion, little or no work of this character has been published regarding
the sensory equipment of the abnormal. Psychiatrists have dealt
with conduct (or movement, if you will) to the exclusion of sensation
except in as far as the latter topic bears directly upon hallucinations
and illusions. They criticize the psychologists for their analytic
sensation work and demand the investigation of "conduct," showing
thereby a lack of appreciation of the fact that "conduct" is a complex
depending, in part at least, upon sensations.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 147
In some respects the book of Whipple is an equally notable con-
tribution to general psychopathology (15). Here psychiatrists may
find details of more exact methods of testing patients than have
usually been employed by them, but which for them have hitherto
not been available in simple form, or which have been grouped in
college text-books or scattered through many psychological journals.
The partial limitation of the object of the book to the study of children
prevents a full consideration of it from a psychiatric (i. e., psycho-
pathological) point of view, but many of the methods should prove
useful to those who wish to examine the mental states of the insane in
ways more exact than those usually employed. From personal expe-
rience, the writer is inclined to doubt the psychiatric (i. e., the psycho-
pathological) value of some of the methods advocated, and certain
matters have not been taken up which have great value for the
psychologically inclined psychiatrist. Many of the methods can be
used with the insane only as research methods, others are very simple
and of great practical value but are parts of the general equipment
of those who have to deal with the insane, e. g., tests for heterophoria
et al. Because the general character of the tests which are recom-
mended is simple, Whipple's book is much more useful to those who
deal with the insane than most other works dealing with experimental
method, and in this connection mention may be made of the report
of the special committee of the American Psychological Association
on the standardization of experimental procedure in tests (12). The
committee apparently had in view the application of the methods
they advocate solely to the normal. Few of the methods recom-
mended are useful in the examination of the insane, and it is to be
regretted that the part of the committee which has already reported
has apparently neglected to deal with certain practical relations of
psychology and has restricted its report largely to the consideration
of the testing of normal individuals. Two of the topics discussed
in the report may, it is true, have only a limited bearing upon prob-
lems of psychopathology, but that of mental imagery may be impor-
tant in the consideration of the types of reaction, of hallucinations,
or delusions, etc., of the abnormal.
Although, as indicated above, experimental psychologists have
devoted a large part of their time to the investigation of sensations,
Gregor's work passes over sensation disturbances, and Whipple's
book fails to give indications of methods of testing some of the sensa-
tions which at times are much altered in the insane and other abnormal
classes. Thus, we find no discussion of methods of testing taste,
148 SHEPHERD IVORY FRANZ
smell, temperature and the threshold of touch. It may also be noted
that in general Whipple's tests of movement are directed towards the
testing of motor equipment as such, rather than to the sensations of
movement, which are also often disturbed in pathological conditions,
not only in the insane but also in the feeble-minded. Recent personal
work, not yet published, indicates that the sensory equipment of
the insane and of other abnormal classes must be investigated as of
equal importance to the motor or conduct sphere, and that there
are as many sensory disturbances or deviations in the abnormal as
there are motor or conduct disturbances. It is surprising that
psychiatrists and psychopathologists have not investigated the
sensory equipment of their patients, but part of their failure to do
so may be due to the fact that they have been unable to obtain
from the normal psychologists data suitable to compare with their
own. It is largely because of the necessity of having data on
untrained subjects that some psychopathologists have been com-
pelled to devote a large part of their time to experiments on
normal, but psychologically untrained, subjects so that a direct com-
parison with similar results on abnormal, but equally psychologically,
untrained subjects may be made. This is what the writer has been
compelled to do in his work on the sensations mediated through the
skin and the underlying tissues (3), for he has found no available data
for purposes of comparison. The methods can usually not be as
fine as those used in a purely psychological research, in other words
they must be clinical. The results from this work may be little
different from those on trained subjects with finer methods, and
perhaps no great amount of material for theoretical psychology may
accrue from the work, but it is needed for purposes of comparison
as practical psychological standards. If we are to have much advance
in our understanding of the abnormal and any advance in the under-
standing of the normal from the study of the abnormal, many tests
must be devised and applied to a number of normal, but untrained,
subjects and the same tests applied to the numerous abnormal classes.
For example, the usual procedures of reaction time experiments can
be applied to only a very small percentage of the abnormal.
Sommer's tridimensional analyzer can be used with normal subjects
but can not be used with many abnormal. Much simpler instruments
and methods may be devised to make tests of a similar character
and have wide applicability and give valuable results.
Largely on account of the value association tests have for diag-
nosis, the number of researches on the association of ideas in the
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 149
insane is more than on any other topic. Some of the more important
of these are worthy of even more extended consideration than can be
given in this review. Of the greatest value is that of Kent and
Rosanoff (7). These investigators obtained 100 free associations from
each of 1,000 normal subjects and have carefully tabulated the results
according to their frequency values, so that the results of any ab-
normal subject may be directly compared with those of the 1,000
normal subjects. The grouping of the normal reactions resulted in
the formulation of a table, or tables, of actual facts without the ex-
tended consideration of the logical characters of the reactions, as has
been done by many previous investigators. Since this review is con-
cerned mainly with pathological advances and methods, we must
pass over the normal results and consider only the results on the 250
insane patients. The results on 108 cases of dementia praecox showed
a larger number of "individual" reactions than the normal or than
any other form of insanity studied; of 33 cases of paranoic conditions,
a heterogeneous group, many showed no departure from the normal,
and only a few cases closely allied to the dementia prsecox group gave
evidence of great abnormality; 24 cases of epilepsy showed many
repetitions and many particles of speech as association reactions, and
it is worthy of note that these cases were mostly in a state of advanced
dementia; 32 cases of paresis gave varying reactions, those "pre-
senting no considerable dementia or confusion and cases in a state of
remission" gave practically normal reactions, and those showing
mental deterioration showed many repetitions, associations to pre-
vious reactions, etc.; 32 cases of manic-depressive insanity showed
slight variations from the normal, although there was a number of
"sound reactions, word complements, and particles"; in 8 cases of
involutional melancholia no evident abnormality was observed; 6
cases of alcoholic dementia showed no evidence of abnormality; and
only one of the 4 cases of senile dementia showed more than the usual
number of individual reactions.
In this connection the works of Klepper (9), of Kilian (8) and of
Nathan (10) deserve mention. Klepper investigated the associations
of epileptics and katatonics, which types of cases sometimes have a
somewhat similar symptomatology and which are, therefore, difficult
to differentiate. The characters of the associations differ in the two
types which were investigated. Without going into the enumeration
of the logical differences in the types of reactions it is evident that
there are sufficiently well marked differences, and these are so great
that the author concludes that he is able to differentiate one type
150 SHEPHERD IFORY FRANZ
from the other by the association tests alone, without having any
history or case record. Kilian tested the associations of a case of
manic-depressive insanity over a period of five months, during which
there was a return to the normal condition. He found a gradual
decrease in the number of klang and non-understandable reactions, a
decrease in a number of perseverations of the associations, but there
was a greater tendency to repetition of the stimulus words. Nathan
worked on a case of imbecility, investigating principally the so-called
senseless reactions, and found that many of these are due to sense
impressions obtained or received immediately before or during the
course of the experiments, others were due to ideas present in the mind
of the subject, which were more or less stable and apparently personal,
and some others were reactions to stimulus words given in previous
tests. This study is of great psychological interest on account of its
analysis of the senseless reactions, for these are more frequent than
is commonly believed, and, as the writer has pointed out in another
place, they can not be considered to be senseless for the subject, but
senseless only as far as the logical beliefs of the experimenter are
concerned.
The attempts to explain some symptoms in abnormal cases by
tests of the effects of drugs, a method with which the name of Kraepe-
lin is closely associated, have been continued in the Munich clinic.
The work of Schnidtmann (13) is an account of an effort to discover
the reason for certain prolonged association reactions in certain
pathological cases. Seven subjects were given from 40 to 50 c.c. of
alcohol, and their associations tested before and after its ingestion.
One of the subjects gave shortened times after the taking of the
alcohol, and the other six gave normal or lengthened times. The
quality of the associations differed in the individual cases, but these
are impossible to summarize in a few words. Another series of tests
to determine the effects of alcohol had its origin in the Munich
laboratory. Goring (4) tested the effect of similar doses of alcohol
on muscular force, apprehension, and the ability to add in 18 cases
(n men and 7 women). Preliminary series of tests were made and
the testing series were begun 20 minutes after the ingestion of the
alcohol. The tests of muscular force were the last of the series and
these were usually begun 42 minutes after the taking of the dose of
alcohol. All subjects showed less ability to apprehend after the
taking of the alcohol, for there were more mistakes; some were un-
able to add as many figures, although there were marked deviations
both up and down; and the muscular force varied, sometimes being
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 151
greater and sometimes less after the alcohol. The seven women were
given different amounts of alchool, and it is not possible to make a
full comparison with the men, but in general it may be concluded that
the women showed more effects from their doses than did the men,
and the author believes they are less resistant, probably being less
accustomed to the drug. In neither of these two experiments (Goring
and Schnidtmann), although valuable in themselves, can it be said
that all the precautions were taken that should be taken. Rivers
has shown that alcohol when taken and not recognized does not have
the marked effect that Kraepelin and his pupils attribute to it, and
the excellent method of Rivers, or a similar one which would give as
good control, should have been used in these experiments if the results
are to be accepted as they stand. No account of Rivers' work has
been taken, or at least the later work of Rivers is not mentioned, and
since we know from that work how great an influence upon the re-
actions "knowledge" may have, we are not justified at present in
concluding that the results of the work of Schnidtmann and Goring
are more than suggestive.
The application of psychological methods to the investigation of
therapeutic procedure has been made in the work of Busch and
Plaut (2), who investigated the effect of continuous warm baths upon
pulse rate, on temperature, on blood-pressure, on muscular force,
on associations, on choice reaction time, on apprehension, and on
addition ability. Baths of two hours' duration were taken and the
effects of these were investigated in relation to the above mentioned
processes in 3 normal subjects and 2 hypomaniacal subjects. In
general there was a slight increase in temperature, no noticeable
change in the pulse rate, and a slight decrease in the blood pressure.
The results with the ergograph (muscular force experiments) were
varied, sometimes a greater force than normal was obtained, and
sometimes the force was less than normal. The choice reaction time
was varied but little, if at all; the accuracy of apprehension was
increased about 2 per cent, after the bath; the ability to add was
also slightly increased; the character of the associations is difficult
to estimate and to summarize. All the results are within the normal
variation, and since this is so, the effects of prolonged baths on normal
and slightly abnormal individuals may be judged to be insignificant.
That such therapeutic measures have a quieting effect upon certain
excited cases there can be no doubt, and the present work is of value
in that it gives a basis for comparison with the more disturbed of the
psychiatric cases.
152 SHEPHERD IVORY FRANZ
The results of Ranschburg's study of memory (u) are of im-
portance for normal and pathological psychology. The method used
in the work is that of word pairs, the subject being given pairs of
words in a series, and after the series is completed is given the first
word of each pair and asked to supply the second word. Five series
were made with 6, 6, 9, 9, and 9 pairs respectively. There were
calculated the percentages of words retained immediately, the time
of reproduction, the percentages of words retained after 24 hours,
and the characters of the mistakes. Normal children reproduced
correctly from 75 to 100 per cent, immediately and about 80 per cent,
after 24 hours. The average time for the reproduction was 2 sec.
for children from 6 to 12 years of age, and 1.2 sec. for those between
12 and 19. There was only about 25 per cent, correct immediate
reproduction in the feeble-minded from 6 to 12 years, and only 60
per cent, for those between the ages of 12 and 19; there was a much
greater deviation from the normal after 24 hours. The time for
reproduction was from I to losec. The general paralytics were poor
memorizers; only 2 reproduced correctly as much as 75 per cent,
immediately, and 19 of the total number averaged only 7 per cent.
Fifteen neurasthenics showed normal memory. Although Ranschburg
uses his results as indicators for diagnosis and prognosis, this is suc-
cessful only in certain specially selected cases and in groups, but not
for each individual case in any special type of psychosis.
Many tests for the estimation of the general intelligence of abnor-
mal subjects have been devised, and Becker (i) discusses some of these
in relation to paranoia and to dementia prsecox. The method used
by him was a series of questions which called forth observations or
statements from the patients. Following are two examples of the
type of questions which he used: (i) "Which is heavier, a pound of
lead or a pound of feathers?" (2) "Herodotus says: A lioness
can bear only one young, because at its birth the cub destroys the
womb of the lioness. Why is this statement false?" Results of
these tests can be interpreted only in an indirect fashion, and at
times no interpretation is possible. Much depends upon the pre-
vious education and training of the individual subject and much
more upon his cooperation in the test. At the same time such tests
can be used only for large groups if they are intended to have any
diagnostic value.
Numerous insane patients show no reaction to stimuli, and casual
observation would tend to lead to the conclusion that the stimuli
were not apprehended. Some of these cases return to a more normal
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 153
condition and can recount much that occurred during the period
when they did not respond. The stimuli were apprehended, but
the reactions were inhibited. That these patients may appreciate
stimuli has been shown by the galvanic reactions obtained from some
of them by Wells and Forbes (16). One of their cases of catatonic
stupor " showed no evidence whatever of consciousness," but reacted
galvanically to all forms of stimuli which were applied. One case
of senile dementia showed no marked deflections, which would indi-
cate that the stimuli had been appreciated.
Miss Kent's work on the formation of simple habits in cases of
dementia praecox (6) is of great interest for it gives a scientific basis
for the work of training of these cases which has been lacking. It is
well known that many of these patients may be made very useful
about an institution, but there are large numbers which are not trained
because it appears on the surface that it would take too long a time to
get them to acquire proper habits of work. The results of this work,
however, show that it is a comparatively easy matter to get almost any
case of dementia prsecox trained to perform simple series of movements
which are useful. Some of these patients who are normally (sic)
destructive and filthy may be taught such movements that the old
destructiveness and filthy habits are replaced. One of the most
important variables in the work was the cooperation of the subjects,
but the tests which were used were of such a character that they
were not directly appealing to the subjects and they could not be
taken as the best possible conditions for the production of coopera-
tion. In general the curves of training resemble those of animals
and the method used by the subjects were mostly those of trial and
error, although in certain cases the methods were unlike those of
animals and those of normal subjects. Continuation of this work,
especially in regard to the factors influencing the method of work, are
urgently needed, both for psychopathology and for its applications in
psychiatry. Here should come tests of the effects of punishments,
and of rewards.
REFERENCES
1. BECKER, W. H. Zu den Methoden der Intelligenzpriifung. Klinik f. psychische
u. nervb'se Krankh., 1910, 5, I-I2.
2. BUSCH, A., and PLAUT, F. Ueber die Einwirkung verlangerter warmer Bader auf
einige korperliche und geistige Funktionen. Psychol. Arbeiten, 1910, 5, 5°$-
3. FRANZ, S. I. Touch Sensations in Different Bodily Segments. Goo/. Hasp, for
the Insane, Bull. No. 2, 1910, 60-72.
4. GORING, H. Vergleichende Messung der Alkoholwirkung. Psychol. Arbeiten,
1911, 6, 261-299.
154 SHEPHERD IVORY FRANZ
5. GREGOR, A. Leitfaden der experimentellen Psychopathologie. Berlin: S. Karger,
1910. Pp. 222.
6. KENT, G. H. Experiments on Habit Formation in Dementia Praecox. PSYCHOL.
REV., 1911, 18, 275-410.
7. KENT, G. H., and ROSANOFF, A. J. A Study of Association in Insanity. Amer.
Jour, of Insan., 1910, 67, 37-96; 317-390.
8. KILIAN, K. Zur Untersuchung der Assoziationen bei Maniakalischen. Klinik
f. psychische u. nervose Krankh., 1911, 6, 28-82.
9. KLEPPER, G. Die Unterscheidung von epileptischen und katatonischen Zustan-
den, speziell aus den Assoziationen. Klinik f. psychische u. nervose Krankh.,
1911,6, 1-27.
10. NATHAN, E. W. Ueber die sogenannten sinnlosen Reaktionen beim Assoziations-
versuch. Klinik f. psychische u. nervose Krankh., 1910, 5, 76-82.
11. RANSCHBURG, P. Ueber Art und Wert klinischer Gedachtnismessungen bei
nervosen und psychischen Krankheiten. III. Die diagnostische und prognostische
Verwertbarkeit von Gedachtnismessungen. Klinik f. psychische u. nervose
Krankh., 1910, 5, 89-194.
12. PILLSBURY, W. B., SEASHORE, C. E., and ANGELL, J. R. Report of the Committee
of the American Psychological Association on the Standardization of Procedure
in Experimental Tests. PSYCHOL. REV. MONOG., No. 53. Pp. 108.
13. SCHNIDTMANN, M. Der Einfluss des Alkohols auf den Ablauf der Vorstellung.
Psychol. Arbeiten, 1911, 6, 300-338.
14. WALLIN, J. E. W. The New Clinical Psychology and the Psychoclinicist. Jour.
of Educ. Psychol., 1911, 2, 121-132; 191-210.
15. WHIFFLE, G. M. Manual of Mental and Physical Tests. Baltimore: Warwick and
York, 1910. Pp. 534.
16. WELLS, F. L., and FORBES, A. On Certain Electrical Processes in the Human Body
and their Relation to Emotional Reactions. (Archives of Psychol., No. 16.)
New York: The Science Press, 1911. Pp. 39.
CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS MENTATION FROM
THE PSYCHOANALYTIC VIEWPOINT
BY DR. TRIGANT BURROW
Johns Hopkins University
The recent writings of Freud and Jung have a special interest
and importance because of their concern with the biological founda-
tions on which the Freudian psychology rests. We are led back to
the secure ground of first principles from which we may set out anew
to reconstruct with the raw materials of primal, rudimentary psy-
chogenic processes.
Freud rallies attention first of all to the element of disunity which
is the central and inseparable factor in the production of the neuroses.
It is this element of disaffection in the life of the individual — this
inherent revulsion to the existence of things as they actually are
CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS MENTATION 155
and the substitution of a fanciful portrait of things as they might
have been — which constitutes the basis of the neurotic diathesis.
A neurosis presupposes then to a greater or a less degree a with-
drawal from the world of reality. It becomes in its essence a sinister
evasion of actual issues. Janet recognized this hall-mark of these
disorders and aptly characterized it as the loss of the "fonction du
reel." It remained to Freud to trace the phenomenon to its genetic
source. Through his psychoanalytic researches Freud has brought
to light the existence of the essential factor in the causation of this
recessive, infolding tendency. He has unearthed a hidden wherefore
in the situation. Abandoning the prevailing static, mechanically
deterministic conception of neurotic disorders, he has removed these
processes from the place they had formerly occupied in the sphere of
brain disease states and placed them upon a dynamic, conative,
biologically purposive footing.
Positing the existence of a primary matrix of unconscious proc-
esses as the background of mental life, Freud describes it as con-
sisting throughout of a homogeneous pleasure-pain principle (Lust-
Unlustprincip) or briefly pleasure-principle.1 It is precisely this
"pleasure-principle" belonging to the embryonic psychic organism
and actuating it to resist the invasions of outer actuality which
represents the point of departure in Freud's psychoanalytic method
of interpretation. The mechanism whereby the primitive, elemental
organism seeks to preserve its even tenor and to repel the encroach-
ments of reality Freud has called the process of repression (Ver-
drangungsprozess). This repressive mechanism with its entail of
conflicts is the central point in Freud's psychological system.
Upon the assumption of this primary, fundamental, self-sufficing
pleasure-principle to which the claims of reality are essentially
opposed we come to feel the justification of such conceptions as
appear to regard neurotic conditions in the light of a commodity
rather than an affliction. Accordingly are made light usages which
were dark; such for example as the reference Freud makes to "the
choice of a neurosis" or "the retreat into the psychosis" wherein,
contrary to the prevailing view, these disorders are represented as
rather of the nature of a deliverance than a disease.
Freud regards this pleasure-principle then as primary. It is the
elemental psychic principle, constituting, as it were, the menstruum
of consciousness. Originally in a state of quiescence its equilibrium
1 FREUD, S., Formulierungen ueber die zwei Prinzipien des psychischen Geschehens.
Jahrbuch fur psychoanalyt. u. psychopathol. Forschungen, III.
156 TRIG ANT BURROW
is first disturbed through the functional demands of the organism.
"In this case," says Freud, "what was thought (i. e., wished) was
simply hallucinated, just as happens later nightly in our dreams."
It is only when the required satisfaction is no longer to be had through
the process of hallucination, that the psychic organism is forced to
yield to the importunities of reality. Thus is thrust in upon the
psyche the recognition of a stern outer reality in contradistinction
to the benign inner world of fancy. And thus is introduced over
against the primal pleasure-principle the principle of reality.
With the entrance of the reality-principle a whole system of
adaptations is demanded of the psychic organism — adaptations
with which we are familiar in the various activities of consciousness;
as for example the adjustments of attention and observation; memory;
the purposeful motor innervations; and the higher intellectual proc-
esses. Meanwhile there is preserved still the original pleasure-
principle which in its antagonism to the reality-principle has estab-
lished a mode of psychic activity all its own — das Phantasieren or
phantastic thinking "which begins with the play of children and,
continued later as day-dreams, tends to release our contact with
objective reality."
The gradual infringement of the elements of the reality-principle
upon the pleasure-principle does not take place uniformly through-
out. This is notably illustrated in regard to the sexual trends which
are tardiest in the process of transformation. So that while the
other trends of the ego are responding in a measure to the behests of
the reality-principle, the sexual trend, remaining in arrears, continues
still under the sway of the primary pleasure-principle. Thus sexual-
ity being in the beginning autoerotic tends to remain in this phase,
and, because of the possibilities it is afforded in the direction of auto-
erotic satisfactions, the sexual trend is in consequence bound up for
a proportionately longer time with the pleasure-principle; in which
phase indeed it is in many individuals, through the process of repres-
sion, delayed throughout life. In consequence of these relations there
is established a closer connection between the sexual trend and the
sphere of the phantastic on the one hand and the remaining trends
of the ego and the conscious activities on the other. " In the sphere
of the phantastic, repression remains supreme; so that it comes to
pass that images in statu nascendi, if their cognition can give rise to a
painful affect, are blocked before they may reach consciousness."
It follows then that an essential part of the psychic disposition to
the neurosis lies in the retarded evolution of the sexual trend in its rela-
CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS MENTATION 157
tion to reality. The pleasure-ego desires merely the immediate satis-
faction, however transient and unstable; while the reality-ego seeks
the ultimate and permanent good. The former seeks satisfaction in
chimerical illusions, the latter in scientific reality. So that education
is in truth nothing else than the progressive displacement of the
pleasure- by the reality-principle.
As an interruption (through unconscious repression) in the course
of readaptation of these two basic trends — the egoistic and libidinous
— may occur at any stage of the developmental process, it follows
that the character of the resulting neurosis is dependent upon or
rather is concomitant with the (unconscious) choice of the phase of
retardation and that therefore the character of a neurosis should be
studied in relation to the genetic mode in which the above-mentioned
developmental arrest takes place.
In the chapter "Ueber die zwei Arten des Denkens"1 of his
"Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido" Jung enters upon a more
detailed discussion of the theme unfolded by Freud in his paper on
the "Zwei Prinzipien," namely, that of the essential distinction be-
tween the characters of the psychological processes involved in
conscious and in unconscious mentation.
Setting out with the empirically manifest phenomenon of symboli-
zation presented in dreams, Jung enters directly in medias res with
the pertinent psychological inquiry as to "whence it comes that
dreams are symbolic." The more dynamic problem involved in the
question "wherefore are dreams symbolic?" is left aside because
involving issues no less extensive than the Freudian system of psy-
chology itself.
He first calls attention to the characteristic absence of symbolism
in the type of psychic activity we know as conscious thinking, such
psychic processes for example as are brought to bear upon the solution
of a given problem, and says how upon scrutiny it becomes manifest
that this species of mental activity invariably depends upon verbal
imagery — that in reality words, or their motor equivalents, are the
indispensable medium of thought.
Thinking then, i. *., directed, purposeful thinking, tends to expres-
sion, to communicable form. It seeks to address itself outwardly and
to conform to reality; in other words it tends to reflect " the succession
of objectively real things." So that biologically stated conscious
thinking, like every vital function, is an adaptation to environment.
1 JUNG, C. G., Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido. Jahrbuch fur psychoanalyt-
u. psychopathol. Forschungen, III.
158 TRIG ANT BURROW
Jung recalls to mind the biological rudiments of speech which
consist "of a system of emotional and imitative sounds" as attested
today in the onomatopoeic vestiges of current usage. " So that speech
is originally and essentially nothing else than a system of signs and
symbols which indicate real processes or their reverberation in the
human soul" and "howsoever abstract a system of philosophy, it
yet represents in regard to end and means nothing else than the most
highly elaborated combination of primordial sounds."
Adaptation to the natural sequence of outward phenomena —
imitation of and conformity to reality — is characteristic of con-
scious, directed, verbal thinking. It is the progressive, social, exter-
nally assimilable type of psychic activity.
Contrariwise, thinking which is not conscious proceeds aimlessly,
intransitively, unproductively. Its flow runs without fixed, pre-
determined course. It is restricted by no anterior design. It is
subjective and automatic, image succeeding image in passive obedi-
ence to unpremeditated quests. Unconscious thinking being un-
purposive soon leads away from reality into phantasies of past and
future. It does not reflect things as they are but decks them out in
fanciful array. Thus it represents what is wished in contradistinction
to what is. Because of its likeness to the psychic processes familiar
to us in the phantasmagoria of sleep, it is the custom to give to this
manner of thinking the name of "dreams."
Comparably with all phenomena in the scale of evolution these
two types of psychic activity have their ethnic as well as their indi-
vidual aspect — conscious thinking being represented in its ethnic
phase in the practical system of organized scientific ratiocinations
characteristic of our own adult age, while das Phastasieren is repre-
sented in the phantastic, bizarre, mythological vagaries through which
the childhood of the race was wont to seek appeasement. Thus
the forward, scientific trend of thought of the present age is the
phylogenetic correlate of individual consciousness as presented in the
ontogenetic series and correspondingly the illusory, visionary, unreal
constructions belonging to the psychic infancy of the race find their
genetic analogy in the phantastic, "play" creations characteristic of
the psychic life of individual childhood. The analogy here indicated
is nothing else than the mental concomitance of the familiar corre-
spondence stage for stage in the historic development of individual
characters, as shown in the comparative study of anatomical and
embryological evolution. "The myth," says Karl Abraham,1 "is a
1 ABRAHAM, KARL. Traum und Mythus. 1909.
CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS MENTATION 159
vestigial remnant of the psychic infancy of the race and the dream is
the myth of the individual." But in the phantasies entering into the
psychic life of the normal individual of modern times there is lack
of conscious indorsement, while the phantasies belonging to an antique
cultural period were elevated to a conscious social plane and given
the significance of national credence. This is especially illustrated in
the phantasies occurring within the sexual sphere. "The symbolism
relating to the instrument of coitus was an inexhaustible topic for
the fancies of antiquity." So that there arose' extensive cults of
phallic worshippers. The phallic symbols appeared in countless
forms, e. g., as the bird, the fish, the snake, etc., and there existed
national theriomorphic representations of the sexual trend, com-
parable to the theriomorphic symbols of sexuality which the psycho-
analyst meets anew in the dreams of the neurotic.
"Viewed from this standpoint, the symbolism which Freud has
discovered is seen to be an expression (limited to the dream, the
symptom-act and to mental aberrations) of thought processes and
psychobiological trends which once exerted a most powerful influence
over past cultural epochs."
The type of thinking we call unconscious, uncontrolled, sub-
jective, tending, as it does, to elude the rigid causality of outer reality,
is therefore essentially infantile, for it belongs to the infancy of the
individual and of the race.
"It would seem then that the psyche possesses an historical
stratification in which the oldest strata correspond to the uncon-
scious." So that when in later life there occurs an introversion (in
the sense of Jung), it consists of a harking back to regressive,
reminiscent, infantile material of the individual's (ontogenetic) past,
but when a yet further regression takes place (as in the introversion
psychosis — skizophrenia) "there are presented outspoken traces of
an archaic mentality which under circumstances can extend backward
even to the revivification of psychic processes which have now become
wholly archaic."
The philosophical discussion the trend of which is here but briefly
indicated is the preamble to a detailed analysis of the unconscious
material presented in a publication of a Miss Frank Miller under the
title "Quelques faits d'imagination creatrice subconsciente," in which
Jung traces the thread of unconscious symbolism running through
them and points out the interesting correlation between the symbol-
isms in Miss Miller's poesie and the symbolism .contained in the
legends of an early mythology. To follow the author into the inter-
160 EDMUND B. HUEY
esting inductions he draws from the analysis of Miss Miller's pictu-
resque phantasy would be however to infringe the limits of the present
review.
THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE BINET SCALE OF TESTS
FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF INTELLIGENCE
BY DR. EDMUND B. HUEY
Johns Hopkins Hospital
In 1905, Professor Binet published in /' Annee psychologique (4)
a tentative scale of some thirty tests for the measurement of intelli-
gence, these tests being arranged in order of difficulty, beginning
with the very simplest kinds of mental adaptation. In r Annee for
1908 (5), Binet and Simon published the new and much improved
scale which has become the basis of world-wide discussion. The
tests of this scale, about fifty in number, had been carefully applied
to some two hundred normal Paris children of the poorer quar-
ter, as well as to many defective children. There are from three
to eight tests for each year from three to thirteen inclusive, and these
groups of tests are given as norms for children of these ages and of
corresponding social and industrial rank. The scale appeared almost
simultaneously with a law providing for the establishemnt of special
classes for defective children in the schools of France. In a little
volume, Les Enfants Anormaux (3), Binet and Simon give illustra-
tive directions for the use of the scale in selecting the children to be
placed in special classes.
In April, 1911, these authors published (6) a revision of the scale
embodying the results of its further application by themselves and
others. Five tests are assigned to each year, except for the fourth
year. A test was ranked as normal to a given age when 75 per cent,
of the children of that age passed it. Above the ten-year level,
tests are not given for other levels than 12 years, 15 years, and
"adult" (used for "above 15 years").
In P Annee for 1911 (2), Binet and Simon present this revised
scale with an extended discussion of their experiments and of the
criticisms that have been made of the scale, particularly by experi-
menters in Belgium, England, and America. This article is worthy of
note as being Prof. Binet's final word about the scale before his death,
which occurred in October, 1911. It seems due to these authors
that we sketch here their own very candid review of the " Binet
literature":
PRESENT STATUS OF THE B1NET TESTS 161
Decroly and Degand (8) applied the 1908 scale to 43 normal girls
and boys in a private school in Brussels. The parents were physi-
cians, lawyers, professors, etc., of very much higher station than the
poor Parisian working-people. The classes were small (8-10 pupils),
and the instruction highly individualized. Binet and Simon obtained
these experimenters' notes of their tests and review them in detail.
The Belgians were found to be more indulgent that the French in
giving the tests. The Belgian pupils tested in advance in the tests
requiring attention, language, and "family lessons," and were behind
in the six tests which depend partly on "school exercises." On the
average they tested a year and a half in advance of the Paris children,
which in Binet's opinion illustrates the difference in intelligence level
and in language between children of the poor and of the rich. The
Decroly and Degand results do not therefore call for a revision of the
scale. Tests in Paris show a decidedly higher level of intelligence
(% year), in children of a well-to-do quarter over those in a poor
quarter, though this difference does not hold for rich and poor taken
from the same school.
Miss Katherine Johnston (14) applied the tests to two hundred
pupils of the schools in Sheffield, England. Binet and Simon ex-
amined the notes of these tests. They find that the tests were
applied to some schools of the rich and to others of the extremely
poor, and that "these heterogeneous results are confounded in the
averages." Irregular variations from the Paris norms are thus to be
expected, as found, according as the children were of different social
and industrial stations. The count was not made according to the
method proper to the scale. Properly counted, and allowing for the
admitted fact that in the 1908 scale "the tests for n and 12 years
are much too severe," Binet and Simon conclude that "the results
of Miss Johnston are in perfect accord with ours."
Binet and Simon do not accept the opinion of Whipple (24) and
others that the tests are too easy. They consider that Whipple's
substitutes for the supposedly "cruel" nonsense statements "cannot
be accepted before being tried experimentally. There is nothing to
prove that they present a difficulty of comprehension equal to that
of our own." The "cruelty" of these sentences does not affect the
Paris children unfavorably. They "laugh at them."
Binet and Simon urge as a lesson that they have long been learning
and as profoundly important, that intelligence and other mental
functions are to be measured by what children do for a variety of
different tests and not for any one. When correlations of intelligence
1 62 EDMUND B. HUEY
with other functions are to be determined, it is these resultants that
are to be dealt with. "A particular test, isolated from all the rest,
is not worth much," and is "subject to errors of all sorts," especially
if it is rapid. One could almost say, "the tests matter little if they
are only numerous enough." For almost any series of tests the
number to which replies are satisfactory "grows regularly enough
with age."
As to the general employment of the scale by teachers, these
authors call the scale a "Methode de luxe," which like the vernier
and microscope secure a fineness of estimate not necessary for most
teachers, who are too busy to employ it and do not need to employ it.
It is a method which requires "apprentissage," to be employed, like
the microscope, in "une etude soigneuse."
Leaving at this point the review by Binet and Simon, we find that
the tests have had much further discussion, of which but partial
report can be made in this article.
Whipple includes in his Manual (24) descriptions of the 1905 and
1908 scales with directions for their use, and summarizes the criti-
cisms of Decroly and Degand.
Goddard (9, 10) applied the 1908 scale throughout the New
Jersey Training School for feeble-minded children, at Vineland, and
finds that results for the 400 children "agree perfectly with long
experience in institution life," and a second testing " shows remarkable
agreement with the first." Goddard's tests of 1,547 normal children
in the first six grades show that the largest number test just to their
age, while successively smaller numbers test to higher or lower age
levels, these numbers arranging themselves in a normal curve of
distribution. (Criticism of this curve, by Terman and by Ayres, will
be noted later.) Seventy-eight per cent, of these children test to
their age or within a year above or below it. However, certain tests
seemed to be wrongly placed, particularly for the latest years; and
in view of these and other tests of normal children and of Binet's own
revision, Goddard has published (n) a revised scale on the general
plan of Binet's revision, but giving tests for n years and placing
some of the other tests differently. After one year Goddard re-
tested 1,000 of the normal children, and states that the results "show
considerable correlation with the earlier test, but with marked and
peculiar differences which must be explained." He finds that
"feeble-minded children tested from two to seven times show remark-
able uniformity in the results, largely regardless of the experience
and personnel of the examiner."
PRESENT STATUS OF THE BINET TESTS 163
Beginning with the autumn of 1909, Huey (13) has used the Binet
scale continuously with defectives, at the Illinois state institution at
Lincoln and later at the Johns Hopkins Dispensary. The results
published for the Lincoln work state that the scale has been indis-
pensable in this actual work with cases, without attempting criticism
which the author believes should be based on the examination of
normal children. Huey's statement of the scale incorporates the
revision of Goddard, and gives the directions most necessary for the
employment of the tests.
Walli'n (23), as psychologist to the New Jersey State Village for
Epileptics, at Skillman, has likewise found the scale a routine necessity
in his examinations, but suggests certain revisions. He prints a
complete set of detailed directions for giving the 1908 scale.
Kuhlmann (15) has found the scale of great practical service in his
work as psychologist to the Minnesota state institution for the feeble-
minded, and has used it in the examination of more than 1,300
children. He publishes a condensed and partial translation of the
1908 scale, from the original article of Binet and Simon. He presents
the tests and the directions and comments of their authors, with such
adaptations as are necessary for American practice.
Bobertag (7) had already reported the Binet-Simon tests in the
Zeitschrift. In the article here referred to he publishes the results
obtained in applying the 1908 tests to 355 normal children of the
schools, of the ages 5 to 12 years; and to 80 Hilfschule children of
8-14 years, all in the schools of Breslau. He gives a full and pains-
taking account of his method of applying each test, with statement of
his results, comments, and criticism. He suggests many changes,
especially the amelioration, since made by Binet and Simon, of the
too severe tests for n, 12, and 13 years. No one who purposes mak-
ing a revision of the scale should neglect to review this discussion of
the tests by Bobertag.
Lawrence (17) tested 784 public school children, of all the grades
from 6 to 13 years, with Binet' s definition tests (use, superior to use,
difference between paper and cloth, etc., meaning of charity, etc.,
difference between poverty and misery, etc.). The teachers, inde-
pendently of these tests, sent in estimates of the scholarship of these
pupils. In these definition tests, 435 pupils tested to age or not more
than a year below; 140 were in advance and 209 were retarded.
Seventy-five per cent, of the pupils pointed out by these tests as
behind their age are so recognized in the teachers' independent
estimate of scholarship, while seventy-nine per cent, of those marked
164 EDMUND B. HUEY
"good" or "excellent" in scholarship tested to age or above it.
Seventy-five per cent, of the school "laggards" "were found by the
tests to be mentally retarded one year or more," while the same
per cent, of those who are advancing in school more rapidly than the
rank and file are found, as above indicated, to be advanced a year or
more mentally." The 8-year test was "decidedly too easy" and the
" 13-year decidedly too hard."
Terman (20), in giving his impressions after testing 90 children
and supervising the testing of about 40x3, says that "by far the most
important result was a decided conviction that measuring scales of
this general type are feasible, and that when corrected, extended,
and multiplied, they will prove of great practical and theoretical
value." He finds that "the scale originally offered by Binet is in
general far too easy at the lower end, while in the upper ranges it is
too difficult. . . . However, in spite of the many imperfections and
inadequacies of the revised scale I believe that by its use it is possible
for the psychologist to submit, after a 4<>minute diagnostication, a
more reliable and more enlightening estimate of the child's intelligence
than most teachers can offer after a year of daily contact in the school-
room." He believes, nevertheless, that "tests of intelligence stand
in serious need of further attention before we undertake to determine
standards of performance in the different branches of the curriculum."
In a later article Terman and Childs (21) while further eulogizing
the plan and usefulness of the scale, urge the need of its revision and
extension. Their results, for the tests referred to above, show that
on the average their California children of 4-6 years tested to nearly
ij^ years above their chronological age, while the children of ii}/£
to I3 % years tested from one to two years below their chronological
age. Goddard's table of distribution (10, p. 234) for each age really
shows much of this same tendency, particularly for the latest years.
Terman considers that Goddard's curve of distribution, "lumping all
the ages together conceals, of course, the very facts we wish to know.
From the above (Goddard's curve) it is seen that the number of
younger pupils testing ahead is about balanced by the number of
older ones testing behind. What we want to know is how nearly
accurate the scale is at every point." Of course it is to be remembered
that the 1911 revisions of the scale are in the direction of remedying
the errors noted for the later years. Terman and Childs have been
trying out some additional tests along with those of Binet and Simon,
-and plan to publish a revised scale on the basis of their work.
Without having used the scale to any extent with cases, Ayres (i)
PRE SENT STATUS OF THE BINET TESTS 165
presents certain criticisms of it: (i) The tests are largely tests of
language ability. (2) Five depend on recent enivronmental in-
fluences. (3) Seven depend on reading and writing. (4) The ability
to repeat words and numbers is given too much importance. (5) The
same is true of "puzzle tests" and definition of abstract terms. (6)
The tests do not sufficiently test native ability, but rather scholastic
and other attainments. (7) Due account is not taken of the emo-
tions, habit, etc. He admits that Binet and Simon's " application of
tests to a definite, universally understood scale . . . constitutes so
important a contribution that its excellence outweighs the short-
comings of the tests themselves." Ayres reaffirms and illustrates
Terman's criticism of the fallacy in Goddard's distribution curve.
He urges that an improved scale be worked out by coordinating the
work of a large number of experimenters, "by some central agency or
agencies," to develop a scale that will " really measure native ability."
Kuhlmann in a later article (16), after using the scale in testing
1,300 feeble-minded children, replies seriatim to the criticisms of Dr.
Ayres, considering most of these to be erroneous and to "come largely
from a misunderstanding as to what the different individual tests
aim at, and of the mental processes involved in them. The former
might have been largely obviated by a more careful consideration
of the author's original publications, and the latter by a careful and
extensive use of the tests themselves. There is especially a general
impression that the authors meant that the results with each indi-
vidual test will always come out just right, which impression Dr.
Ayres seems to share somewhat. If this degree of perfection were
attained, only one test of mental age for each chronological age would
be necessary, where the authors use from four to eight, and besides
point out that this or that individual test often gives wrong results.
Probably not a single test in the whole system is free from such
objection. In general this article reminds one that it is easy to make
criticisms and difficult often to clearly disprove them. But even so,
the validity of merely possible objections is not thereby established."
Clara Harrison Town (22), in an especially timely article apropos
of the present popularization of the scale, says: "Accustomed to
the complicated apparatus of a psychological laboratory, the laity
were pleased to find it unnecessary, and overlooked entirely the fact
that the psychologist himself was not unnecessary." She quotes
Binet's own warnings that "It is not, in spite of appearances, an
automatic method, comparable to a scale which, when one stands upon
it, throws out a ticket on which one's weight is printed. It is not a
i66 EDMUND B. HUEY
mechanical method, and we predict to the busy physician who wishes
to apply it in hospitals, that he will meet with disappointments.
The results of our examinations are of no value if they are separated
from all commentary; an interpretation is necessary. . . . The idea
that a method of examination can be made precise enough to be
trusted to every one must be abandoned; all scientific procedure is but
an instrument which requires the direction of an intelligent hand. . . .
Any one can use it for his personal satisfaction or to obtain an approxi-
mation evaluation of the intelligence of a child; but for the result
of this method to have a scientific value, it is absolutely necessary
that the individual who uses it should have had an apprenticeship in
a laboratory of pedagogy or possess a thorough practical knowledge
of psychological experimentation."
Dr. Town, who is herself having extensive experience in the use
of the scale at the Illinois state institution at Lincoln, reminds us
that Dr. Ay res' "whole critique is based on the 1908 series of 'tests,
which has since been revised and greatly altered by Binet himself";
and also that many of his criticisms rest on a misunderstanding of
these tests themselves or of the manner in which they are actually
given and scored. In general Dr. Town believes that "the result
which is threatening is a wholesale use of the scale in an unscientific
manner, which will do nothing but postpone the time of its real
usefulness — that time when it will be applied by experts along the
four practical lines indicated by Binet himself — the grading of normal
and backward children in the schools, the diagnosis and classification
of abnormal children, the arrangement of school curricula, and in the
courts of law."
Meumann (18) makes a condensed but keen analysis of tests of
the intelligence, outlining their present status and attempting a con-
structive interpretation of the principles involved.
Seashore (19) urges briefly that "retardation does not follow a
common flat level any more than growth does, nor even nearly so
much." We "should not be satisfied with a flat mental age" except
for rough classification, as in determining whether a child is feeble-
minded. A child may be at the mental age of six in one capacity
and twelve in another, and "the important thing to know about the
individual is this difference and direction of unsymmetrical develop-
ment." He thinks the Binet tests should be developed to measure
relative rank or age "of more specific capacities and powers, such as
reasoning ability, sensory observation, memory, imagination, initia-
tive, emotional control, self-control, etc."
PRESENT STATUS OF THE BINET TESTS 167
The present writer has elsewhere (12; 13, Chapter VII.) urged
such an extension of the principle of the scale to other and more specific
mental functions, and believes that this may be a source of most fruit-
ful development in genetic psychology.
In general the scale of Binet and Simon has interested us all in
making more methodical study of the intelligence. It has been of
immediate and valuable service to psychologists in making exami-
nations of defectives, and it gives promise of being developed to
a scale which will render much service in the classification and study
of normal pupils. It is hoped that psychologists will prove them-
selves clinically vigorous enough to use the present scale as a means
of growth to the far better ones that Binet himself foresaw.
As for the many non-psychologists who have to make estimates
of intelligence, an investigation by Binet himself showed that in
making these practical estimates the appeal is regularly to tests, to
try-outs of the individual in one or another way. Such persons will
at least find the Binet and other series of tests an enrichment of their
stock of home-made devices, often economical of time and giving a
glimpse, at least, of mental efficiency in more varied and representa-
tive directions. Each will makes these tests somewhat in his own
fashion, inevitably, and the results will by no means match the
standardized results. It will be a try-out with a series of test-groups
that are progressively more difficult, to see how far the individual
can go with them. The more intelligent individuals will be found
to go the further, case will be compared with case, and thus if each
will give the tests somewhat uniformly for his own cases, they may
be made the means of building up a more methodical and correct
procedure in making estimates of mental efficiency. The tests will not
displace the practical judgment, but may be of great assistance in
forming and improving it. And even the trained clinical psychologist,
with the scale at its best, will doubtless have to "set" it somewhat
differently for various social and industrious classes, and will make
various allowances for local circumstances, even if not for his own
" personal equation."
REFERENCES
1. AYRES, L. P. The Binet-Simon Measuring Scale for Intelligence: Some Criticisms
and Suggestions. Psych. Clinic, 1911, 5, 187-196.
2. BINET, A. Nouvelles recherches sur la mesure du niveau intellectuel chez les
enfants d'ecole. V Annie psychol., 1911, 17, I45-201-
3. BINET, A. Les enfants anormaux; guide pour V admission des enfants anormaux
dans les classes de perfectionnement. Paris: A. Colin, 1.907.
4. BINET, A., et SIMON, TH. Du niveau intellectuel des anormaux. UAnnee psychol.,
1905, n, 191-244.
1 68 EDMUND B. HUEY
5. BINET, A., et SIMON, TH. Le developpement de 1'intelligence chez les enfants.
UAnnee psychoL, 1908, 14, 1-94.
6. BINET, A., et SIMON, TH. La mesure du developpement de 1'intelligence chez les
jeunes enfants. Bull, de la soc. libre pour V etude psych, de V enfant, Avril, 1911,
187-248.
7. BOBERTAG, O. Ueber Intelligenzpriifungen (nach der Methode von Binet und
Simon). Zsch. f. angew. PsychoL u. psych. Sammelforschung, 1911, 5, 105-203.
8. DECROLY, O., et DEGAND, MLLE. J. La mesure de 1'intelligence chez des enfants
normaux d'apres les tests de Mm. Binet et Simon. Arch, de psychoL, 1910,
9, 81-108.
9. GODDARD, H. H. Four Hundred Feeble-Minded Children Classified by the Binet
Method. J. of Psycho- A sthenics, 15.
10. GODDARD, H. H. Two Thousand Normal Children Measured by the Binet Meas-
uring Scale of Intelligence. Ped. Sem., 1911, 18, 232-259.
11. GODDARD, H. H. The Binet-Simon Measuring Scale for Intelligence. Revised ed.,
1911. Pp. 16. Vineland, N. J.: The Training School.
12. HUEY, E. B. Retardation and the Mental Examination of Retarded Children.
/. of Psycho- A 'sthenics, 15.
13. HUEY, E. B. Backward and Feeble-Minded Children. Baltimore: Warwick and
York, 1912. Pp. 221.
14. JOHNSTON, K. L. Binet's Method for the Measurement of Intelligence. — Some
Results. The Journal of Experimental Pedagogy and Training College Record,
1911, i, 24-31.
15. KUHLMANN, F. Binet and Simon's System for Measuring the Intelligence of
Children. /. of Psycho- A sthenics, 1911, 15, 79-92.
1 6. KUHLMANN, F. Dr. Ayres' Criticism of the Binet and Simon System for Meas-
uring the Intelligence of Children — a Reply. /. of Psycho-Asthenics, 1911,
16, 58-67.
17. LAWRENCE, ISABEL. A Study of the Binet Definition Tests. Psych. Clinic,
1911, 5, 207-216.
1 8. MEUMANN, E. Der Gegenwartige Stand der Methodik der Intelligenzpriifungen
(mit besonderer Riicksicht auf der Kinderpsychologie). Zsch. f. exper. Pceda-
gogik, 1910, pp. 68-79.
19. SEASHORE, C. E. The Binet-Simon Tests. /. of Ed. Psych., 1912, 3, 50.
20. TERMAN, L. M. The Binet-Simon Scale for Measuring Intelligence; Impressions
Gained by its Application. Psych. Clinic, 1911, 5, 239-244.
21. TERMAN, L. M., and CHILDS, H. G. A Tentative Revision and Extension of the
Binet-Simon Measuring Scale of Intelligence. Part I. /. of Ed. Psych., 1912,
3, 61-74.
22. TOWN, CLARA H. The Binet-Simon Scale and the Psychologist. Psych. Clinic,
1912, 5, 239-244.
23. WALLIN, J. E. W. A Practical Guide for the Administration of the Binet-Simon
Scale for Measuring Intelligence. Psych. Clinic, 1911, 5, 217-238.
24. WHIPPLE, G. M. Manual of Mental and Physical Tests, pp. 473-517. Baltimore:
Warwick and York, 1910.
SPECIAL REVIEWS
DEMENTIA PR^COX
Dementia Praecox oder Gruppe der Schizophrenien. BLEULER. Leip-
zig und Wien: Franz Deuticke, 1911.
Of a comprehensive work on psychiatry, the "Handbuch der
Psychiatric," edited by Aschaffenburg, there have been published
thus far two parts, one on manic-depressive insanity by Stransky,
and one on dementia prsecox by Bleuler. The latter work, a book of
some 400 pages, takes up the study of this important disorder in a
very comprehensive manner. The purpose of the present writer is
to give here a brief review, not of the clinical-nosological part of the
work, but of the psychological portion entirely. It is, however,
necessary to state that Bleuler comprises in his book a great many
cases which others would not include in the group or groups of de-
mentia prsecox, so that his analysis refers in reality a great deal to
the symptomatology of the functional psychoses.
What characterizes the manifestations of dementia prsecox are:
a more or less marked disorder of the train of thought, sometimes
spoken of as scattering of ideation with bizarre turns, fragmentary
thoughts, and so on; frequently a lack of harmony of affect and
intellectual content; an absence of correlation of mental contents;
various interferences with the train of thought in the form of sudden
stoppage of a topical nature, or of diffuse inhibition of mental opera-
tions [termed blocking of thought (Sperrung)] ; the frequent appear-
ance of impulses opposite to what the circumstances would demand, or
a warding off of all interferences, diffuse, or under certain situations
only (negativism) ; a general tendency to shut out the world of reality
(by Bleuler called "autism"); an affective deterioration; and finally
such symptoms as hallucinations, delusions, impulsive acts, peculiar
mannerisms, and the like.
Bleuler gives an excellent and extensive description of all these
symptoms, and also makes an attempt at a psychological explanation
which he admits frankly to be tentative, yet which to the psychiatrist
is of great value and represents a splendid attempt at clarifying the
mechanisms in a disorder which, at best, is complex and difficult to
understand. Bleuler has proposed to give to dementia praecox the
169
170 REVIEWS
name schizophrenia, because a great deal in the symptomatology
refers to a tearing asunder of normal mental cohesions. This he pro-
ceeds to analyze more in detail. He assumes, first of all, a primary
diffuse "association disorder," which he seems to consider not further
reducible, and which he attributes, therefore, directly to a physical
disease process. This he admits to be problematical. The associa-
tion disorder, therefore, represents an ultimate defect, very much in
the same way, I take it, as the loss of memory represents an ultimate
defect in the organic disorders. He refrains, however, from any
correlation with anatomical changes. This primary disease process
he attempts to support by some other phenomena, notably physical
ones, an attempt which is not especially convincing. The primary
association disorder, he conceives as a sort of leveling down of normal
associative affinities, which leads in itself to elisions and fragmentary
mental products but which, above all, forms the fundamental defect
upon which develop the other symptoms. This is possible, particu-
larly, owing to the fact that the affects can then exert a much greater
influence than normally; in other words, the symptomatology is
largely determined by the affectivity, through mechanisms, some of
which Freud has taught. Bleuler therefore shows how affective
complexes are at the bottom of a great deal in the manifestations of
dementia prsecox, and how, in addition to primary splitting, there is
an extensive secondary splitting produced by the affects; thus he
admits the great importance of psychogenesis in dementia prsecox,
but he confines this action to the secondary symptoms, which repre-
sent more or less plain evasions of difficult situations.
The psychology of dementia prsecox cannot be understood unless
we accept the importance of unconscious trains of thought which fol-
low in many ways the same laws as conscious thinking, and which
manifest themselves through Freudian mechanisms. But this in-
fluence is a much more extensive one in dementia prsecox than in the
normal, or in hysteria, for example. The affects produce much more
profound dissociations. The influence of reality is much more ex-
excluded. We might almost say, the individual manifestations stand
in the mind much more like foreign bodies. We have attempted to
account for this largely by the shut-in tendencies, which probably
must be referred to more fundamental defects in make-up and which
manifest themselves more or less early in tendencies to live in a world
apart where the correcting influence of reality is more or less excluded.
Bleuler attributes all this, the shut-in tendencies included, to his
primary association disorder, which, as we have said, in turn, gives
DEMENTIA PRAECOX 171
the affects greater sway. Whereas the logical train of thought follows
paths established by experience, the affects direct the train of thought
according to desires and aversions. In the normal they are respon-
sible only for the general direction of action, and the logical operations
are not falsified except in realms where subjectivity is generally per-
mitted to guide us, as in matters of taste, for example. In dementia
praecox the affects disturb even otherwise well-grounded associations.
Through this greater influence of the affects, the possibility of a
more or less complete exclusion of all that does not harmonize with
the affective complexes is also possible, so that these assume more and
more a certain autonomy, and can manifest themselves without there
being any attempt at correlation.
The remarkable affective deterioration is, according to Bleuler,
a secondary phenomenon. He justly points to the fact that normal
affects can be produced in dementia praecox patients when they are
forced to think of their complexes; he shows how in the beginning of
the disorder, the affective deterioration is by no means general but
refers to certain topics only (affective complexes), and also that cases
with apparent affective deterioration sometimes get well. Hence he
assumes not a loss, but a repression of affects. These repressed affects
manifest themselves in various ways but also inhibit other affects.
This is not unlike what we see in normal individuals who are preoc-
cupied with an affectful experience. In addition to this, the autism
and the splitting off of affective complexes have their share in the
production of the general indifference.
The normal individual includes in his logical operations more or
less everything in his past and present experience, which has a bearing,
irrespective of its emotional value; the fundamental shizophrenic
disorder on the other hand makes the exclusion of external and inter-
nal facts possible, and permits the natural tendency to live in fancies
to flourish. Bleuler speaks of this as autistic thinking, and of the
general tendency to turn away from reality as autism, making it
dependent, therefore, upon his primary association disorder. In
attempting to make negativism comprehensible, he points in the first
place, to the fact that every impulse is closely associated with its
opposite, which he looks upon as a sort of protective mechanism and
which he designates ambivalence. This assumes pathological pro-
portions in dementia praecox. But this negativism, of course, is also
closely related to autism and further accentuated by it, and other
factors also contribute to the prominence which this symptom may
attain in dementia praecox, such as a certain sensitiveness and an
instinctive desire on the part of the patient to protect himself against
172 REVIEWS
actual or possible irritation of "mental wounds," also an opposition
to the more or less hostile attitude of the environment, and very
likely, not infrequently, a certain difficulty in thinking and acting.
What we term "blocking" is undoubtedly an exaggeration of that
which we normally know as repression, and whenever the symptom was
analyzed in cases, it could be traced to the influences of complexes.
But Bleuler also refers some general reductions of activity, or some
more or less pronounced conditions of inhibition of mental operations
to the same principle, because this can be seen at times to develop
out of more topical blocking; and he likens this to the so-called
emotive stupor seen in normal persons; at the same time the tendency
to stereotypy of impulses, and the tendency to generalization seen
in dementia prsecox, as well as the lack of interest and the difficulty
in mental operations, may also contribute to the full development of
this blocking. Stupor or stupor-like reductions may also be due
to hallucinations and other causes, e. g., a certain cerebral torpor
conceived by Bleuler as the direct outcome of the disease process.
Catalepsy, though difficult to explain, seems at least in part accounted
for by a certain dearth of ideas which, in other conditions, is also
found to be associated with it.
Many symptoms, such as delusion, hallucinations, and odd acts,
are direct intrusions into consciousness, of subconscious complexes,
and represent wishes and fears, often symbolized and only compre-
hensible when the possibility of symbolism is fully recognized. They
are often difficult to analyze because they may be distorted by sub-
stitutions or gradual metamorphoses. The peculiar disharmony
between affects and ideas is certainly often explained by the fact
that, just as in the case of dreams, the ideas stand for something
else than what they appear to represent.
An important part of the work is to be found in the fact that
Bleuler clearly demarcates the disorders found in dementia prsecox
from those of the organic mental disorders, and justly shows that an
elementary memory and apprehension defect, as well as primary
motility symptoms, are foreign to the symptomatology of dementia
praecox.
Such a short review cannot do justice to a work which contains
so much that is valuable. A thorough study of it will repay every
one interested in normal and abnormal psychology and in the
analysis of the most complex pathological phenomena, in which
constant reference is made to normal processes.
PSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTE, AUGUST HoCH
WARD'S ISLAND, N. Y.
Vol. IX. No. 5. May
THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN
GENERAL REVIEWS AND SUMMARIES
CUTANEOUS, KIN^ESTHETIC AND MISCELLANEOUS
SENSES
BY ROSWELL P. ANGIER
Yale University
Cutaneous Sensation. — So far as the literature of the year 1911
has been accessible to the reviewer, perhaps the most significant
piece of work on cutaneous sensation is that by Kiesow (10). It
concerns the observation of E. H. Weber (published in 1846) that a
given object (German Thaler) felt, on the skin of the forehead, when
cooled, heavier than when warmed. The problem rouses a somewhat
livelier interest because of the observations of Szabadfoldi (1865),
apparently contradictory to those of Weber. Szabadfoldi found that,
of two discs of hard wood, one warmed to 50° or more and the other
of indifferent temperature, the warmer disc felt the heavier, even
though actually smaller than the other, but that the character of
the results was somewhat dependent on the diameter, thickness and
absolute weight of the discs utilized.
Kiesow, in his own tests, verifies Weber's results, even if the
warmer object has a temperature as high as 50°, provided that the
other gives a manifest sensation of cold. Szabadfoldi is, however,
confirmed when a disc of 50° is compared with one of indifferent or
slightly warm temperature. Diameter, thickness, or absolute weight
have, furthermore, no special influence on the result. Nor have
such different substances as copper, silver and nickel coins, cork,
gypsum, cardboard, paper, etc. It was found, finally, that a cold
stimulus as such may give an impression of weight (evaporating ether
from a saturated disc of filter-paper as compared with a similar disc,
173
174 ROSWELL P. ANGIER
not etherized and tactually unfelt). The best results, as in the case
of the earlier experimenters, were obtained on the forehead. Other
facts observed by Kiesow were that the cooler object appears to
have the greater area and to lie deeper in the skin than the warmer.
As for explanation of the main phenomenon, Kiesow offers the
following (p. 85): Es "kann als sicher gelten, dass die Erregimg der
Tastorgane eine Funktion des an ihrem Orte herrschenden Druck-
gefalles ist, und es kann weiter als wahrscheinlich angenommen
werden, dass hierbei Konzentrationsanderungen der Zellflussigkeit
auftreten, die direkte Erregung der Tastorgane durch Anderungen
des osmotischen Drucks verursacht wird, im letzten Grunde also
eine chemische ist. Dies vorasugesetzt, . . . diirfte die Annahme
berechtigt sein, dass auch der Kaltereiz im Innern der Haut Ver-
anderungen hervorruft, die den durch mechanische Einwirkungen
erzeugten Deformationen analog sind. Durch diese wiirde unter
den genannten Voraussetzungen dann ebenfalls eine Stoning des
chemischen Gleichgewichts herbeigefuhrt werden, die ihrerseits
wiederum auf die Enden der Tastnerven einwirken muss. . . . Dass
bei Einwirkung von Kaltereizen Kontraktionen der einzelnen Ge-
websteile auftreten miissen, ist eine Tatsache, die ausser allem
Zweifel steht. . . . Dass solche Kontraktionsvorgange weiter Ver-
schiebungen der Gewebsflussigkeit und demzufolge auch wohl
Konzentrationsanderungen der Zellflussigkeit nach sich ziehen
mussen, diirfte somit nur eine berechtigte Folgerung sein." The
warmer object, furthermore, feels lighter than it normally would feel
because the heat, causing expansion of the tissue or of the cell fluids,
exerts a stimulus on the touch organs in a direction contrary to that
given by its weight, so that the latter cannot have the full effect that
it would, acting alone, possess. If the object is further warmed,
the expansion-effect outbalances the antagonistic pressure-effect and
one observes Szabadfoldi's phenomenon — the warm object appears
heavier than one of indifferent temperature — since a pressure organ
mediates the same kind of sensation whatever the direction in which
the stimulus acts. The forehead, finally, is the most favorable field
for tests, since the sensitivity to pressure is great, the pressure spots
thicker together and the skin thin. Other parts of the body with
these characteristics also give the phenomena, although less
pronounced.
v. Frey (7) gives simply a preliminary report of experiments made
with H. D. Cook on the influence of different pressure-stimuli on
one another. So far as tactual sensation is concerned, it was found
CUTANEOUS AND ALLIED SENSES 175
that the stimulation of two points on the skin yields mutual facili-
tation (two simultaneous impressions, either alone subliminal, rising
above the threshold) and that this is in dependence on their distance
apart and their relative intensity. Of three equally intense stimu-
lations, for instance, two near together are subjectively more intense
than a third more distant, v. Frey's results apparently contradict
those of Heymans, who found that tactual stimuli have, in proportion
to their proximity, a mutually inhibitory effect. One awaits with
interest, therefore, the full report of v. Frey's work.
Siebrand (18) concerns himself with differential sensitivity to
cold stimuli. The areas tested were on the ball of the thumb and the
volar forearm. The results were as follows: (i) Stimulation of a
given cold spot at various stimulus temperatures, with a constant
area of contact, showed marked individual differences, — .4° C. for
one subject, 3° C. for another; (2) increasing the area of stimulation,
although on but a single cold-spot, increased discriminability;
(3) increase in the number of cold-spots stimulated, with constant
temperature and area, increased felt intensity of cold, the same
results obtaining, too, if the area was enlarged but the number of
spots stimulated constant; (4) a single cold-spot, if thickly set with
others, gave a lower threshold than one more isolated.
Barnholt and Bentley's experiments (4) concern the problem of
the effect of areal or numerical increase of thermal stimulus on sensory
intensity. On chosen surfaces (palm, volar forearm) 70 per cent, of
the observations of three subjects gave in tenser cold with the larger
area. Less sensitive areas were then compared with more sensitive,
the smallest stimulus area being used for the latter and all other
areas for the former. A large less sensitive area may thus report
intensities equal to a small area of greater sensitivity. Tests of
another sort showed, however, that the intensity of a temperature
sensation is determined by the most sensitive area in the excited com-
plex. The high intensity of a large area is doubtless due in part at
least to the better conditions afforded by a stimulus of great area
for conduction to the true temperature organs. These results may
be profitably compared with those of Siebrand.
The clinical interest in tactual sensation is represented by the
articles of Baglioni and Pilotti (2), Minor (13), and Maloney and
Kennedy (12) . The first of these, on the effects of stovaine injections,
duplicates an article in German, by the same authors, and already
reviewed in the BULLETIN last year (p. 152). Minor offers a con-
venient thermosesthesiometer for psychiatric-clinical use by means
1 76 ROSWELL P. ANGIER
of which the temperature difference between two stimulus tubes,
filled with water, may be quickly reduced. Maloney and Kennedy
tested the pressure sense about the face in a number of cases with well-
defined lesions of the fifth, seventh and twelfth cranial nerves, in an
attempt to determine the functional distribution of these nerves.
It is impossible to enter into the details of their discussion. Of general
interest to psychologists is their statement that after removal of
the Gasserian ganglion (origin of the fifth nerve), the areas of the
face anaesthetic to light touch are identical with those lacking deep
sensibility. It will be remembered that Head and Sherren found,
for lesions to the radial nerve, that the former extended beyond the
latter. Maloney and Kennedy believe the apparent greater circum-
scription of the areas of loss of deep sensibility, in their tests on
the face, to be due to the tension effect of the heavier stimulus on
the normal tissue bordering the anaesthetic area. This can, in the
reviewer's opinion, scarcely explain the findings of Head and Sherren,
since the area of loss for light touch often went far beyond that for
pressure. Certain of the authors' further conclusions are (i) that
the fifth nerve is the essential path for pressure-touch impressions
in the face; (2) that the seventh nerve in the Fallopian canal is
associated with fibers mediating pressure-pain from the skin muscles
and bones of the facial muscular apparatus up to pressure of about
four kilos (low threshold mechanism); (3) that the peripheral twelfth
subserves no sensory function for the tongue; and (4) that the
sympathetic mediates a crude pressure-pain sensibility for pressure
upwards of four kilos (high threshold mechanism), a mechanism less
sensitive, therefore, than that of the fifth or seventh nerves.
The interest of the work of Willis and Urban (22) with weights
lies in the sphere of psychophysical methods and need not here be
considered. Their article is supplementary to a previous publication.1
Ziehen (23) argues for the method of right and wrong cases in investi-
gations of the kinaesthetic sense, especially in its development and
in that of kinsesthetic space in children. Incidentally he states his
belief that what one really investigates is not kinaesthetic sensations,
but a fusion of mechanical stimulations in the joint, muscles and
tendons felt as an indeed very indefinite Beruhrungsempfindung, with
ideas of movement, the latter being normally visual but, for the
blind, tactual. What is really investigated is, therefore, ideas of
movement evoked by kinaesthetic sensations.
1 Urban, F. M., "Die psychophysischen Massmethoden als Grundlagen em-
pirischer Messungen," Arch. f. d. ges. PsychoL, 1909, 15, 264-267.
CUTANEOUS AND ALLIED SENSES 177
Kunz (n) returns to a polemic (Cf. Zsch. f. pad. PsychoL, 1909,
Vol. 9) on the nature of distance "sensation" or "feeling" as distinct
from orientation, maintaining his previous conclusions, that this
sense, localized on the skin, is indeed of tactual and not auditory
origin.
Organic and Other Sensations.— Physiologists and clinicians return
again and again to the problem of the sensibility of the inner organs.
Neumann (15), in a series of articles scattered through the volume,
gives a comprehensive historical review of work up to 1910. In
another series (16) he reports certain experiments on the frog. Un-
covering and stimulating the various inner organs (pinching with
forceps, faradic stimulation, hot glass rod, etc.) he secured from
most of them a peculiar reaction — a stretching and backward bending
of the back, slow and quite distinct from the jerky defense reactions.
In other experiments, conclusions concerning the functional distri-
butions of nerves were reached.
Hertz (9), in three lectures, partly historical and critical, partly
based on his own experiments on direct stimulation of the alimentary
canal of human beings and on inferences from the symptomatic pains
of typical alimentary diseases, gives, among manifold other con-
clusions, the following: (i) "The mucous membrane of the alimentary
canal from the upper end of the oesophagus to the junction of the
rectum with the anal canal is insensitive to tactile stimulation. "
(2) "The mucous membrane of the oesophagus and the anal canal is
sensitive to thermal stimulation, but that of the stomach and in-
testines is insensitive. (3) The only immediate cause of true visceral
pain is tension; this is exerted on the muscular coat of hollow organs
and on the fibrous capsule of solid organs. . . . Pain in diseases of
the alimentary canal is most frequently true visceral pain; it is some-
times due to spread of the disease to surrounding sensitive structures
or to tension exerted on the peritoneal connexions" (p. 1193). Mit-
chell (14) concludes from a series of correlations between accounts of
pains of his patients before abdominal operations and his findings on
operating that the parietal peritoneum, and consequently the organs
involved with it, is sensitive to pain, but that the visceral peritoneum
with its abdominal organs supplied only by the sympathetic system
is not sensitive. This result supports in general the views of Lenn-
ander (1901). Dana (6) gives an entertaining discussion of the
possible correlations between types of pains and types of psycho-
neuroses.
Two papers, one by Alexander (i), the other by Barany (3), on
178 ROSWELL P. ANGIER
the functions of the inner ear deserve passing mention. Alexander's
is a succinct and comprehensive review of the facts and theories
concerning the functions of the vestibular apparatus. Barany's is a
brief summary of his theoretical position discussed in extenso in
another article.1
Oppenheim (17) describes and discusses cases met with in his
practice of permanent dizziness not assignable to objective causes.
It differs from either cerebellar or vestibular dizziness and always
begins with a marked attack, resists treatment, especially psycho-
therapeutic, and is probably not in the psychiatrical sense a mental
trouble, but is rather dependent on some still undiscovered irritation
in the central nervous system. Friedlander (8) reports a case,
however, manifestly hysteric in origin, but showing the same stubborn
permanent dizziness already described by Oppenheim. Cruchet and
Moulinier (5) gives merely a brief description of symptoms of aviator
sickness.
Finally, Sternberg (19, 20), recurs anew in two articles to his
already much exploited doctrines of the nature and functions of
appetite. A third article (21) gives another of his remarkable dis-
cussions on tickling feelings. He attempts to define, chiefly on the
basis of philological usage, the meaning and function of tickling
in general and in particular. When philological analysis has done
its best "erst dann," he thinks, "wird man zur Feststellung des
Begriffes der Kitzelgefiihle und zur Einsicht in das Wesen des Kitzels
gelangen" (p. 109). Bis dahin — Geduldl
REFERENCES
1. ALEXANDER, G. Die Funktionen des Vestibularapparates. Ber. IV. Kongress
f. exper. Psychol., 1911, 74-94.
2. BAGLIONI, S., & PILOTTI, G. Recherches dans la rachiostovainisation humaine.
Arch. ital. de biol., 1911, 55, 82-90.
3. BARANY, K. Zur Theorie des Bogengangapparates. Ber. IF. Kongress f. exper.
Psychol., 1911, 250-252.
4. BARNHOLT, S. E., & BENTLEY, M. Thermal intensity and the area of stimulus.
Amer. J. of Psychol., 1911, 22, 325-332.
5. CRUCHET, R., & MOULINIER, — . Le mal des aviateurs. C. r. acad. d. sci., 1911,
152,1114-1115.
6. DANA, C. L. The interpretation of pain and the dysesthesias. /. of the Amer.
Med. Assoc., 1911, 56, 787-791.
7. FREY, M. VON. Die Einwirkung einfacher Druckempfindungen aufeinander.
Ber. IV. Kongress f. exper. Psychol., 1911, 233-236.
8. FRIEDLANDER, A. Bemerkungen zu Oppenheim's Arbeit: "Ueber Dauer-
schwindel." Neur. Cenibl., 1911, 30, 1162-1164.
1 Zsch. f. Sinnesphysiol., 1910, 45, 63-68.
CUTANEOUS AND ALLIED SENSES 179
9. HERTZ, A. F. The sensibility of the alimentary canal in health and disease.
Lancet, 1911, 180, 1051-1056; 1119-1124; 1187-1193.
10. KIESOW, F. Ueber die Versuche von E. H. Weber und M. Szabadfoldi, nach
welchen einer Hautstelle aufliegende Gegenstande von gleicher Grosse nicht
gleich schwer empfunden werden, wenn ihre Temperaturen gewisse Unter-
schiede aufweisen. Nach einer zum Teil von Dr. Leopold Chinaglia ausge-
fiihrten Untersuchung. Arch.f. d. ges. PsychoL, 1911, 22, 50-104.
11. KUNZ, M. Zum "Ferngefuhl" als Hautsinn. Zsch. f. pad. PsychoL, 1911, xa,
621-634.
12. MALONEY, W. J., & KENNEDY, R. F. The sense of pressure in the face, eye and
tongue. Brain, 1911, 34, 1-28.
13. MINOR, L. Ein neuer Thermoasthesiometer mit Mischvorrichtung. Neur.
CentbL, 1911, 30, 1037-1041.
14. MITCHELL, J. F. Sensibility of the peritoneum and abdominal viscera. /. of
the Amer. Med. Assoc., 1911, 57, 709-712.
15. NEUMANN, A. Ueber die Sensibilitat der inneren Organe. CentbL f. d. Grenzgeb.
d. Med. u. Chir., 1910, 13, iff.
16. NEUMANN, A. Zur Frage der Sensibilitat der inneren Organe. Zentbl.f. Physiol.,
1911, 24, 1213-1217; 1217-1219; 25, 53-56.
17. OPPENHEIM, H. Ueber Dauerschwindel (vertigo permanens). Monat. f. Psy-
chiat. u. Neur., 1911, 29, 275-293; Neur. CentbL, 1911, 30, 290-296.
1 8. SIEBRAND, — . Untersuchungen iiber den Kaltesinn. Zsch. f. Sinnesphysiol.,
1911,45,204-216.
19. STERNBERG, W. Das Appetitproblem in der Physiologic und in der Psychologic.
Zsch.f. PsychoL, 1911, 59, 91-112.
20. STERNBERG, W. Der Appetit in der exakten Medizin. Zsch. f. Sinnesphysiol. ,
1911,45,433-459.
21. STERNBERG, W. Die Physiologic der Kitzelgefuhle. Zsch. f. PsychoL, 1911, 60,
73-109-
22. WILLIS, C. A., & URBAN, F. M. Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der psychometrischen
Funktionen im Gebiete der Gewichtsempfindungen. Arch. f. d. ges. PsychoL,
1911,22,40-46.
23. ZIEHEN, T. Die Methoden zur Priifung der Kinaesthetischen Empfindungen.
Zsch.f. Pad. PsychoL, 1911, 12, 216-225.
SYN^STHESIA
BY PROFESSOR A. H. PIERCE
Smith College
A full and detailed account of the case of colored gustation
reported in outline last year1 is now available (i). It is abundantly
shown that the subject— a young man of college age— has a defective
sense of taste. Tastes seem to be recognized largely by tactual
accompaniments and discriminated by their "feel" and by the color
induced. Substances as different as cayenne pepper and quinine
1 Cf. PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 1911, 8, 158.
i8o A. H. PIERCE
(both in solutions) are indistinguishable, both producing the same
"feel" on the tongue and both inducing the same color — a dull
orange-red. Furthermore, the behavior of the induced color is at
times dependent upon the temperature of the solution. Plugging
the nostrils reduced the intensity and persistence of the taste-colors.
A reasonably definite correlation between taste-color tones and taste
qualities was made out.
The genuineness of the synsesthesia and the sensational (rather
than imaginal) value of the taste-colors is attested by (i) the con-
stancy of the correlation just referred to, (2) the persistence of the
induced color (sometimes for more than ten minutes), (3) its locali-
zation (in the mouth), (4) its independence of the subject's volition,
and (5) the feelings of tension and dizziness when simultaneously
experiencing a taste-color and fixating a colored surface.
The case of colored audition reported by Myers (3) is peculiar
first in the fact that colors are induced only by tones, — timbre, in-
tensity, and the pitch of the foregoing tone being conjointly influential.
Tones below 600 vibrations per second give brown and orange colors;
those between 600 and 12,000 give blue, changing to green; and those
above 12,000 give a colorless gray. The subject is a man of thirty,
unmusical.
This case stands in marked contrast with that summarized above,
the induced color being neither sensory nor imaginal in character.
The subject "insisted that his imagery was verbal or more often that
his thoughts were entirely imageless." As a believer in "imageless
thought" Myers finds no difficulties here.
The subject himself "regards his synsesthesia as the result of
some 'sympathy' existing in him between auditory and visual
experiences." Myers interprets this as analogous to the tendencies
by which we speak of tones as "heavy, rounded or dull"; and in the
fact that synsesthesias are more common among children he sees
grounds for the view that "their origin may perhaps be ascribed to
the persistence of a primitive stage in the differentiation and elabora-
tion of sensations and in the development of their functional inter-
relation." Strong tendencies to association, combined with the
"sympathy" referred to, would then be favorable to the formation
of synsesthesias.
The paper by Medeiros-e-Albuquerque (2) is weak and uncon-
vincing, with a quite unjustified title. The author finds that those
who think only in Portugese associate the u of that language with the
color black. This arises from the fact that u is the accented vowel of
SYNASTHESIA jSi
the majority of Portugese words signifying black objects or ideas
•elating to black. This association is, admittedly, no true synaes-
thesia, but the author believes that it is only a matter of degree
between these logical and spontaneous associations and genuine
cases of colored audition.
REFERENCES
DOWNEY, JUNE E. A Case of Colored Gustation. Amer. J. of Psychol ion «
S28-S39.
MEDEIROS-E-ALBUQUERQUE. Sur un phenomene de synopsie presente par des millions
de sujets. /. de psychol. norm, et 'path., 1911, 8, 147-151.
MYERS, C. S. A Case of Synsesthesia. Brit. J. of Psychol., 1911, 4, 228-238.
AFFECTIVE PHENOMENA — EXPERIMENTAL
BY PROFESSOR JOHN F. SHEPARD
University of Michigan
Three articles have appeared from the Leipzig laboratory during
the year. Drozynski (2) objects to the use of gustatory and olfactory
stimuli in the study of organic reactions with feelings, because of the
disturbance ot breathing that may be involved. He uses rhythmical
auditory stimuli, and finds that when given at different rates and in
various groupings, they are accompanied by characteristic feelings
in each subject. He records the chest breathing, and curves from a
sphygmograph and a water plethysmograph. Each experiment
began with a normal record, then the stimulus was given, and this
was followed by a contrast stimulus; lastly, another normal was
taken. The length and depth of breathing were measured (no time
line was recorded), and the relation of length of inspiration to length
of expiration was determined. The length and height of the pulse-
beats were also measured. Tabular summaries are given of the
number of times the author finds each quantity to have been increased
or decreased during a reaction period with each type of feeling. The
feeling state accompanying a given rhythm is always complex, but the
result is referred to that dimension which seemed to be dominant.
Only a few disconnected extracts from normal and reaction periods
are reproduced from the records.
The author states that excitement gives increase in the rate and
depth of breathing, in the inspiration-expiration ratio, and in the rate
and size of pulse. There are undulations in the arm volume. In so
far as the effect is quieting, it causes decrease in rate and depth of
1 82 JOHN F. SHEPARD
breathing, in the inspiration-expiration ratio, and in the pulse rate
and size. The arm volume shows a tendency to rise with respiratory
waves. Agreeableness shows an increase in rate of breathing, the
inspiration-expiration ratio, and size of pulse; and a decrease in depth
of breathing and pulse rate. There is a tendency for the volume to
rise with respiratory and other waves. Disagreeableness is accom-
panied by increase in rate of breathing and pulse, decrease in depth of
breathing and height of pulse. In the arm volume there are falls
and undulations. Strain causes generally faster and shallower
breathing, faster and stronger pulse, and a rise of arm volume with
respiratory waves. Relaxation shows slower and deeper breathing,
slower and stronger pulse. When excitement is combined with the
others, it seems to dominate in the organic expression. Each feeling
has its characteristic expression-valence. There are many exceptions
to all correlations. A given feeling may show itself in only part
of the expressive reactions at once. The author considers the
breathing the most reliable index of feeling.
One criticism especially must be passed upon this and many other
works of the kind. It is necessary that sufficient data he reproduced
in some complete and accurate form that the reader may judge for
himself whether physiological matters have been adequately con-
sidered, whether the reactions are significant and whether he agrees
with the author's interpretation. Otherwise one need not place much
confidence in the conclusions. This article does not fulfill such
requirements.
The second article from Leipzig is by Rehwoldt (5). He recorded
curves from five pneumographs, two on the chest and three on the
abdomen, and from a sphygmograph. After the apparatus was
adjusted, the subject gave a signal when he had succeeded in placing
himself in an indifferent condition and a normal record was taken.
The subject then aroused an affective state by reproduction of an
experience or idea. He gave a signal when he had succeeded in this
and a reaction record was taken. From two to six affective states
were thus studied in an hour and finally another normal curve,
modified perhaps by resonance of the preceding feelings, was taken.
The subject's report was recorded after each normal or reaction curve.
For each normal record the average length of breath and length
of pulse and the amplitude of movement in each respiratory curve
were determined in millimeters and tabulated. The inspiration-
expiration ratio is also given. For each reaction record the inspira-
tion-expiration ratio and the ratio of the other quantities to the
similar measurements in the corresponding normal record are given.
AFFECTIFE PHENOMENA-EXPERIMENTAL 183
The feelings obtained were always complex. The author found a
clear-cut expression for quiet, excitement, and strain only. With
quieting conditions, the inspiration-expiration ratio was less than one
and the breathing tended to be abdominal. Excitement gave an
inspiration-expiration ratio which was greater than one in the chest
and tended to be greater in the chest than in the abdomen. There
was a dominance of chest breathing and the rate of breathing was
sometimes increased, sometimes decreased. Strain showed an
inspiration-expiration ratio which averaged about one and the rate
of breathing was increased. There was no certain correlation between
agreeableness and decreased heart rate.
Stefanescu-Goanga (6) studied the affective states caused by
colors, and the organic expression of these affective states. Light
from a projection lantern was passed through colored gelatine and
thrown upon a white screen in a darkened room. In the greater
part of the experiments a single, isolated stimulus was used. The
subject was asked to describe the affective state, and was helped by
questions from the experimenter. In part, the method of paired
comparison, both successive and simultaneous, was used. The
chest and abdominal breathing, and a sphygmographic curve were
recorded. A normal period, a stimulus period, and a recovery period
constituted a test.
The length of breaths, the depth of chest and abdominal breathing,
the inspiration-expiration ratio, the depth at the middle of inspiration
and that at the middle of expiration compared with the total depth,
and the pulse length were determined by measuring the curves in
millimeters. Tabular summaries give the number of cases and direc-
tion of change which the author finds in each of these quantities
when the reaction period is compared with the normal period.
The colors are found to cause strong affective states which must
be classified first of all under the heads of excitement and rest or
depression. Excitement is the most constant and dominant feeling
with red, orange, yellow and purple; rest or depression is foremost
with green, blue, indigo and violet. Combinations with agreeable-
ness or disagreeableness are variable. Excitement and rest are not
simple feeling qualities, but rather feeling dimensions, each one of
manifold varieties.
The author decides that the organic expressions indicated by the
results are as follows: Excitement causes faster breathing and in-
creased depth of breathing especially in the chest. The inspiration-
expiration ratio, the pulse rate and size of pulse are increased. The
184 JOHN F. SHEPARD
form of the curve shows a forceful beginning of inspiration. Rest or
depression gives opposite reactions. Agreeableness shows a tendency
toward decreased chest and increased abdominal breathing. The
length and size of pulse are increased. With disagreeableness the
opposite pu^e reactions are found. In the breathing changes,
agreeableness approaches rest, disagreeableness approaches excite-
ment.
As nearly as one can judge from measurement of the curves
published, it seems to me that the majority show no definite reaction
in pulse rate, and No. 4 gives a result opposite to that assigned to it.
It is noticeable that these articles from Leipzig all insist that we must
find a basis in organic expression for the tridimensional theory of
feeling; but they differ as to the details of such reactions, and differ
markedly from the statements of others who have tried to defend the
same theory in the past.
Leschke (3) gives a very interesting and useful critical discussion
of work that has been done on organic accompaniments of mental
processes. I may take this occasion to say that an attempt to use
related methods caused me to be much more skeptical than Leschke
seems to be, of the results from the "inner plethysmograph" and
balance-board of Weber.
Wells and Forbes (9) give evidence which tends to show that
electromotive changes and especially resistance changes in the psycho-
galvanic test are due to sweat-gland activity. Atropine, which tends
to paralyze the sweat glands, obliterates the response with stimuli.
When the fingers used in a cell current were coated with paraffin, both
the original deflection and the emotional reaction were small. When
the paraffin was scraped from the finger-nails only, the original
deflection was much increased, but emotional reactions remained
very small. When the remainder, of the finger was bared, the original
deflection was somewhat further increased, the emotional reaction was
relatively greatly increased. They find that the use of a cell current
will give more uniform and reliable results in the study of emotional
reactions than the use of the body current. The latter would merely
give the difference between the action of the sweat-glands at the two
electrodes, while the former would depend upon the lowered resistance
from the combined action at the two electrodes.
In a series of experiments stimulus words were given and the
association times were recorded along with the amount of deflection.
The subjects classified the degree of emotion called out as: "(A)
strongly emotional, (E) rather emotional, (C) rather unemotional,
AFFECTIVE PHENOMENA— EXPERIMENTAL 185
(F) practically devoid of emotion." On the whole the results show a
relationship between the degree of emotion and the amount of electri-
cal change. But this does not hold in individual cases, especially
with grades below A. There is no such correlation between the
association time and either the introspection or the electrical change.
A few experiments with abnormal patients suggest that the
failure of ordinary motor response in catatonic stupor " resulted rather
from inhibition of reaction than from failure to apprehend." This
was DeBruyn's conclusion from vasomotor tests.
Cannon and de la Paz (i) tested the blood from the adrenal veins
of a cat before and after the animal had been frightened. They
found that the emotion caused an increased adrenal secretion. The
persistence of the emotional state may be due to this greater supply
of adrenal secretion in the blood.
Miss Washburn and co-workers (7) compared colored paper
squares 5 cm. a side with others 25 cm. a side. They found that
saturated colors are preferred in the smaller area, except saturated
red; the larger area of tints and shades is preferred.
When colors are fixated for one minute the arousal of associations
and adaptations may change the affective value (8). Associations
have little influence on saturated colors. What they have is favor-
able. Adaptation is favorable to violet, blue and green, unfavorable
to yellow and red. Associations were favorable to the tints and to
the shades of violet, green, orange and red. Adaptation was, on the
whole, unfavorable to tints and shades.
Prandtl (4) investigated the question whether the feeling content
of consciousness has an influence on the time of reading and the
accent. He found that serious passages were read more slowly than
light ones and stimulating articles were read more slowly than restful
ones. With passages which might be either serious or light, according
to the point of view, it was found that the subject read them more
slowly when made to think of them as serious. In reading serious
or stimulating texts or those considered so, more accents were used
and more and longer pauses were made, than in reading other texts.
Even if the extra time occupied by accents and pauses were sub-
tracted from the total, the reading time for the serious and stimulating
passages would still be relatively long.
REFERENCES
1. CANNON, W. B., & DE LA PAZ, D. Emotional Stimulation of Adrenal Secretion.
Amer. J. of PhysioL, 1911, 28, 64-70.
2. DROZYNSKI, L. Atmungs- und Pulssymptome rhythmischer Gefiihle. PsychoL
Stud., 1911, 7, 83-140.
1 86 H. N. GARDINER
3. LESCHKE, E. Die korperlichen Begleiterscheinungen seelischer Vorgange. Arch.
f. d. ges. Psychol., 1911, 21, 433-463.
4. PRANDTL, A. Experimente iiber den Einfluss von gefiihlsbetonten Bewusstseinslagen
auf Lesezeit und Betonung. Zsch. f. PsychoL, 1911, 60, 26-45.
5. REHWOLDT, F. Uber respiratorische Affektsymptome. Psychol. Stud., 1911, 7,
141-195-
6. STEFANESCU-GOANGA, F. Experimentclle Untersuchungen zur Gefiihlsbetonung
der Farben. Psychol. Stud., 1911, 7, 284-335.
7. WASHBURN, M. F., CLARK, D., and GOODELL, M. S. The Effect of Area on the
Pleasantness of Colors. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1911, 22, 578-579-
8. WASHBURN, M. F. and CRAWFORD, D. Fluctuations in the Affective Value of
Colors During Fixation for One Minute. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1911, 22,
579-582.
9. WELLS, F. L. and FORBES, A. On Certain Electrical Processes in the Human Body
and their Relation to Emotional Reactions. (No. 16 of Archives of Psychology).
New York: The Science Press, 1911. Pp. 39.
AFFECTIVE PHENOMENA — DESCRIPTIVE AND
THEORETICAL
BY PROFESSOR H. N. GARDINER
Smith College
Fundamental questions are discussed systematically by Rehmke
(18) in a second edition of a well-digested treatise, a characteristic
feature of which is its attempt to relate feeling, emotion and mood.
Feeling (Gefiihl) is defined as a Bestimmtheitsbesonderheit des zustand-
lichen Bewusstseins. Consciousness being conceived as the individual
soul, its state is assumed to be at any given moment simple and
unique; hence the momentary feeling is always one of pleasure or
displeasure, never " mixed." It is determined, not by any one, but
by the totality of the objective factors, those being massgebend which
are in the focus of attention. A " feeling," in the ordinary sense, is a
complex of the affective state and the "determining" and "accom-
panying" objective components, the "determining" objects of at-
tention giving the kind of feeling, the "accompanying" organic
sensations being mainly responsible for its obscure "coloring" and
its degree. Mood (Stimmung) appears in a certain contrast to
"feeling" in that in it organic sensation is the "determining" factor
and no particular object occupies the focus of attention. Emotion
(Affekt} is not contrasted with "feeling," but is "feeling" charac-
terized by the intensity of the "accompanying" organic sensations,
which are rightly included in the emotion; we must not, however,
confuse, with James and Lange, the bodily changes which give rise
AFFECTirE PHENOMENA— THEORETICAL 187
to these sensations and those bodily movements which follow on the
emotion and express it.
A novel point of view for the conception of feeling, as of many
other mental phenomena, is proposed by Watt (22). Feeling for
him is neither a sensation, nor an attribute, nor a unique element,
but an experience of a mode of the integration of elements. Pleasure,
e. g., may be the result of the mutual harmony of integrations. The
theory most nearly resembles activity theories of feeling. Watt
has no difficulty in meeting the most obvious objections to the
general principle, but admits that the specific integrative basis of
feeling is still to seek. Titchener's criterion of feeling, lack of clear-
ness, explained (21) as meaning, not that feeling is dim, but that it is
non-clear in the same way that it is non-spatial, is criticised by
Watt (23), who finds a state that lacks clearness as unintelligible as
a state that lacks duration. The real question appears to be whether
feeling, as such, is a possible object of attention. The difficulty
comes up in another form in the dispute as to the content of feeling.
The common opinion that the esse of feeling is sentire and therefore
indubitable is called in question by Joachim (17), who contends
that there is a distinction between "feeling" and "felt" analogous
to that between "perceiving" and "perceived" and that accordingly,
since everywhere "experiencing" and "what is experienced" are
mutually determining correlatives, pleasures and pains are not
self-identical qualities attached only in varying degrees to intellectual
contents, but differ internally and may be more or less illusory.
Tassy (20) refers feelings in general to a twofold origin, one con-
stituante, or primary, the other de specialisation, the source of their
intellectual meaning. He conceives the "intelligence" as constituted
by the association of several relatively autonomic functions, desig-
nated respectively as "psychic" (directly implicating personal
interest), "mental" (pure ideation) and "organic." Some feelings
originate in the mechanism of the mental activity and are then
individualized in the psychic; others depend on organic activity and
derive their specific character from the mental or psychic mechanism.
In connection with a speculative construction of their neurological
basis, the author traces, rather obscurely, the origin and compli-
cations of certain feelings under the above three heads.
Claparede (10) finds in the discussion of affective memory a
double source of confusion, disagreement as to the criterion of memory
and misunderstanding of the James theory of emotion. The only
indubitable form of affective memory is that constituted by recog-
1 88 H. N. GARDINER
nition, but that does not necessarily include an "image" of the
object, nor is there any proof of the representation, or reproduction,
of an affective state except through the intervention of organic proc-
esses. But these on the James theory are the causes of actual emo-
tion. To prove affective memory in Ribot's sense we should have
to show, what in the author's opinion has not been done, either (a)
that the James theory is false, or (b) that in affective memory the
organic processes follow the conscious affective phenomena, or
(c) that these processes are entirely wanting. The improbability
of affective memory is further argued from the utility of the ideal
representation of objects not present, whereas there is no such evident
need of the ideal revival of what we can actually experience as our
own state. Apart from this theoretical discussion, which, of course,
does not deny that we remember in some sense our affectively colored
experiences, the question has been raised whether we do not tend to
forget the disagreeable. Henderson (15) adduces facts and con-
siderations which point to the negative. The different question,
whether we tend to banish disagreeable memories, receives a qualified
answer: we always strive to banish disagreeableness, and disagreeable
thoughts which do not lead to efficient action probably tend to
disappear; on the other hand disagreeable memories are important
factors in learning by trial and error and in leading to the reconstruc-
tion of experience.
Several writers treat specifically of the theory of emotion and other
complex affective phenomena. Binet (3, 4), taking as his point of
departure the recent demonstration, as he considers it, of imageless
thought, puts forth the hypothesis that the whole of psychology is
summarized in two "elements," sensations and motor attitudes.
Emotion and thought are both attitudes, the attitude in the former
being accompanied by strong organic sensations, in the latter by a
minimum of subjective sensations and a maximum of objective
sensations or images. This distinction, however, is supplemented
and qualified by consideration of the coordination of acts expressed
by the attitude. The more organized the attitude, the more pro-
nounced, other things being equal, will be its intellectual character;
the less organized, the more the phenomenon is one of pure emotion.
This hypothesis is regarded by its author as including, while making
more definite, the explanations of the same facts by unconscious
action, central adjustment, etc., and as constituting a veritable
revolution by introducing into psychology the conception of dynam-
ism as opposed to sensationalism. Brown (6) defines "passion" as
AFFECTIVE PHENOMENA-THEORETICAL 189
an uncontrollable emotion or system of emotional tendencies and
criticizes Shand's suggestion of "sentiment" for the latter on account
of the literary associations with that term of weakness and placidity.
The identification of "tender emotion" with the parental instinct
is criticized on the ground that it is also found in the pathos of many
aesthetic emotions. Shand's working out of a "sentiment" like love
as an organized system of emotions and desires is made the basis of
Caldecott's thesis (7), illustrated by the case of St. Catherine of
Genoa, that a central emotion can so organize the feelings as to make
them constitutents of a healthy ideal of life. Two papers on emotional
expression read at the last meeting of the American Psychological
Association deserve mention. Cannon (8) reported experiments
which showed increased secretion of adrenalin, followed by glycosuria,
in fear and rage in cats, suggesting that in the wild state these emo-
tions might be useful in providing sugar as a source of energy for
flight or attack. Huey (16), emphasizing the incoordination charac-
teristic of emotion, laid special stress on the intellectual and linguistic
disturbances. The real cause of emotion, he held, is a failure in the
mechanics of brain integration occasioned by factors too difficult of
synthesis under the given conditions. The organic theory of emotion
is accepted in a qualified way by Chabrier (9), who criticizes James
and Lange for not sufficiently allowing for the representative factor.
Ideal processes, he maintains, determine the bodily and are essential
to explain the complexity, extent and delicacy of the emotion. But
they are only affective in so far as they act more or less directly on
the organic function.
To the descriptive psychology of aesthetic experience Geiger (14)
contributes a finely discriminating study of Stimmungseinfuhlung.
Experimenting first with simple colors, he found that, e. g., the
cheerfulness of the color was uniformly experienced as, in some sense,
a quality of the color, not as a feeling of the subject. The relation of
the subjective mood to this objective character was shown by further
experiment to vary considerably; hence differences in the total
feeling in consciousness. Both have the same tone of feeling, but
that of the mood seems more external to the object, to overlay and
suffuse it. The apprehension of the object was found by analysis of
the author's own experience to involve four distinct kinds of appre-
hensive attitude, marked off by abstraction as the objective-passive,
the stellungnehmende, where the relation between the object and the
subject is reciprocal, the sentimental, in which the distinction between
my experience and the feeling-character of the object is obliterated in
190 H. N. GARDINER
a still higher degree, and the einfuhlende, in which there is a more or
less complete absorption of the object's character in my mood or of
my mood in the object. Abramowski (i), whose work, in Polish,
is known, however, to the writer only from a French review, sug-
gestively applies to the interpretation of certain aesthetic and other
experiences the conception of generic feelings or sentiments derived
from past experiences and surviving the loss of their original presenta-
tive elements. The existence of such feelings is held to be experi-
mentally demonstrated. According to Abromowski such feelings
greatly influence the appreciation of beauty and artistic creation
arises from the impulse to give to them a relatively adequate repre-
sentative embodiment. Mystical experience shows analogous phe-
nomena. Among the forgotten experiences which furnish such
generic feelings the author mentions those of infancy, dreams, un-
noticed impressions, hereditary memories and telepathy. We have
here, perhaps, a clue to the psychological origin of Plato's doctrine
of the reminiscence of Ideas.
The symptoms of many conditions of mental distress are described
by Baker (2) in an article whose main purport is a plea for their more
adequate recognition as mental rather than as bodily. He tells the
pathetic story of a lady afflicted with Parkinson's disease who, with
infinite patience, succeeded in the course of two years in spelling out,
by means of children's blocks, a brief account of her mental state.
Francia (n) reports the sorrows of a nervous little girl and describes
the process of their alleviation. One important conclusion is that
the series, sorrow — immediate reaction — substituted mental state,
must be supplemented by an obscure sense of vitality at the decisive
moment. Special interest attaches to the discussion before the
American Pathological Association (19) as indicating the trend of
opinion, at least in America, regarding the pathogenesis of emotional
states of recurrent fears, phobias and anxiety. Much of the dis-
cussion dealt with the two Freudian doctrines, (a) of a distinct
anxiety-neurosis, as over against phobias, and (b) the sexual origin
of the former. False abstraction was charged against the first of
these doctrines, hobby-riding against the second, both being defended
by Jones and Putnam. Sidis regarded anxiety as simply the working
of the instinct of fear, the obsession of which, conscious or uncon-
scious, he held to be the tap-root of every functional psychosis.
Prince traced the mechanism of recurrent psychopathic states mainly
to the automatism of the "neurograms" established by residua of
past experience combined with the fear instinct operating by auto-
AFFECTIVE PHENOMENA— THEORETICAL 191
suggestion. The original attack always arises, he thinks, in some
psychical trauma. There is, however, an incomplete type of attack,
identical with Freud's anxiety-neurosis, where the fear (anxiety)
is expressed in the appropriate physiological symptoms without
specific ideas to which it attaches itself. Prince thinks that in such
cases the ideas are unconscious or co-conscious. The explanation
varies with the cases. There is no fear, he thinks, apart from some
experience suggesting danger. But in some cases the fixed ideas
are mere cat's-paws made use of by the neurographic residua of other
past experiences functioning in an unconscious process. The psy-
chasthenia to which these states are commonly referred may itself,
he thinks, be a consequence of other unconscious factors. Southard
contributed a possibly important suggestion by distinguishing three
types of etiology for these cases, vestigial (hereditary), residual
(ontogenetic) and neoplastic (formed independently in the course
of the disease).
Two authors treat at length of specific passions. De Fursac (13)
brings together into a book the articles noticed here1 a year ago on
avarice, with an added chapter on pseudo-misers and a conclusion.
He believes the vice incurable in the individual, but thinks that
social changes are likely to greatly diminish in the future the number
of its victims. Friedmann (12) gives what is probably the most
exhaustive study of jealousy in scientific literature. Largely owing
to the influence of Shakespeare, whose Moor of Venice is taken as the
type of jealous passion, the term "jealous" has tended among our-
selves to be conceived too narrowly and to lose connection with the
etymologically identical term "zealous." Friedmann shows im-
pressively the wide range of the passion, not only in love, but in
every kind of competition in the family, in office and calling, in art,
in science, in public life, between nations as well as between individ-
uals. Its essential elements are the feeling of disturbed excitement
in contemplating a rival and the impulse to drive him from the field.
These are complicated and strengthened by feelings of fear, envy and
wounded amour propre. The probable basis of the feeling is found in
the rmpulse, prominent in sport, to actively participate in what we see
another doing when we ourselves are prepared by habit and strong
feelings of pleasure to do the same. The passion, which the author
regards as one of the greatest of evils, is richly illustrated by facts
from the animal world, by a survey of its manifestations among
different peoples and different stages of civilization and, as might
1 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 1911, 8, 166.
1 92 H. N. GARDINER
be expected from a specialist in nervous diseases, by pathological
facts, some of which are of a rather startling character
Finally, reference may be made to Bridou's work (5) on the edu-
cation of the sentiments, which is based on the conception of a law of
functional subordination and directed especially against the imper-
fections and narrowness of French education.
REFERENCES
1. ABRAMOWSKI, E. Les sentiments generiques en tant qu'elements de 1'esthetique
et du mysticisme. Przeglad filozoficzny, 1911, 14, 156-185. Reported, /. de
psychol. norm, et path., 1911, 8, 368-371.
2. BAKER, S. The Relative Importance of Mental Pain. Pop. Sci. Mo., 1911, 79,
3SS-368.
3. BINET, A. La nature des emotions. /. de psychol. norm, et path., 1911, 8, 258 f.
4. BINET, A. Qu'est-ce qu'une emotion? Qu'est-ce qu'un acte intellectuel? Annee
psychol, 1911,^17, 1-47.
5. BRIDOU, V. UEducation des sentiments. Paris: Doin, 1911. Pp. 403.
6. BROWN, W. Emotion and Morals. Reported, Nature, 1911, 86, 125 f.
7. CALDECOTT, A. Emotionality: a Method of its Unification. Proc. Arist. Soc.t
1911, n, 206-220.
8. CANNON, W. B. Some Recently Discovered Physiological Changes Attending
Fear and Rage. Reported, PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 1912, 9, 73.
9. CHABRIER (DR.) Les emotions et les hats organiques. Paris: Alcan, 1911. Pp.
159-
10. CLAPAREDE, E. La question de la "memoire" affective. Arch, de psychol., 1911,
10, 36I-377-
11. FRANCIA, G. Sul meccanismo dell' auto-consolazione. Riv. di psicol. appl.,
1911, 7, 105-144.
12. FRIEDMANN, M. Ueber die Psychologie der Eifersucht. Wiesbaden: Bergmann,
1911. Pp. vii + H2.
13. FURSAC, J. R. DE. U Avarice: Essai de psychologie morbide. Paris: Alcan, 1911.
Pp. 185.
14. GEIGER, M. Zum Problem der Stimmungseinfuhlung. Zschr. f. Aesth. u. allg-
Kunstw., 1911, 6, 1-42.
15. HENDERSON, E. N. Do We Forget the Disagreeable? /. of Phil. , Psychol., etc.,
1911, 8, 43*2-437-
16. HUEY, E. B. Emotivity and Emotion in their Relations and Adaptation. Re-
ported, PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 1912, 9, 63.
17. JOACHIM, H. H. The Platonic Distinction between "True" and "False" Pleasures
and Pains. Phil. Rev., 1911, 20, 471-497.
18. REHMKE, J. Zur Lehre vom Gemut. 2te umgearb. Aufl. Leipzig: Diirr, 1911.
Pp. viii + 115.
19. Symposium and Discussion on the Pathogenesis of Morbid Anxiety at the Meeting
of the American Pathological Association in Baltimore, May 10, 1911, together
with the President's Address on this and related topics. /. of Abnorm. Psychol.,
1911, 6, 81-181.
(1) JONES, E. The Pathology of Morbid Anxiety.
(2) SIDIS, B. Fear Anxiety and Psychopathic Maladies.
ATTENTION AND INTEREST 193
(3) DONLEY, J. E. Freud's Anxiety Neurosis.
(4) PRINCE, M. The Mechanism of Recurrent Mental States, with Special
Reference to Anxiety States.
(5) Discussion by J. J. PUTNAM, T. A. WILLIAMS, J. H. CORIAT and others.
20. TASSY, E. Essai de classification des etats affectives. Rev. phil., 1911, 71,
690-704; 72, 72-89.
21. TITCHENER, E. B. Feeling and Thought: a Reply. Mind, 1911, 20, 258-260.
22. WATT, H. J. The Elements of Experience and their Integration: or Modalism.
Brit. J. of PsychoL, 1911, 4, 127-204.
23. WATT, H. J. Feeling and Thought: a Restatement. Mind, 1911, 20, 402-404.
ATTENTION AND INTEREST
BY PROFESSOR W. B. PILLSBURY
University of Michigan
Grass! (6) measured the effect of concentrated and dispersed or
well-directed and misdirected attention upon reaction times. The
experiments consisted in comparing the touch reactions to contact
upon parts of the body where the stimuli were expected with those
to stimuli upon unexpected places. Three degrees of preparation
were distinguished. In the first the stimuli were all on the same part
of the body, to which attention was directed in advance. In the
second the stimuli were given alternately on each of two parts of the
body for which preparation was had in advance. In the third touches
upon unexpected parts of the body were interspersed irregularly in a
series of the first sort. It was found that times increased from one to
three for each sort of attention. Even longer times were found when
the subject was surprised by the contacts. The writer explains the
increased times for the less prepared spots as an expression of the time
required to adjust the mental gaze to the new spot.
Jacobson (7) extends the experiments of Heymans on inhibition
of liminal stimuli to supraliminal values. He compared weights and
sounds with each other when other weights or sounds were also
acting simultaneously and found that simultaneous stimuli always
exerted an inhibitory effect. The weight or sound seemed less
intense if another stimulus were given with it than if it were present
alone. Similar diminution of intensity was observed if attention were
relaxed on one stimulus. It was also found that the inhibiting effect
of one stimulus upon another might be overcome by increased
attention. He makes no attempt to connect the decrease in intensity
with the decrease in clearness reported by other authors.
McComas (9) tests the methods of determining types of attention.
194 PROFESSOR W. B. PILLSBURY
The work grew out of the statement of Stern and Meumann that it
was possible to divide individuals into well marked classes on the
basis of widely or narrowly distributed attention. He correlated the
span of attention for words and colors, the span for auditory im-
pressions, the ability to concentrate against distraction (inhibition)
both in auditory and in visual attention, and the correlation of all
with the type of imagery. Some of the more important conclusions
are that there is a broad and a narrow spanned type of attention, and
a close correlation between the span for auditory and visual attention.
There is also an active, alert attention and a sluggish attention;
the former is broad spanned. The ability to concentrate and inhibit
and the dexterity of attention seem to have no close correlation with
other qualities. Of the ideational types the visual has a broad span
for both visual and auditory impressions, while the auditory has
marked ability to inhibit sound and a large span for visual and audi-
tory impressions given simultaneously. The motor type shows no
marked correlations. There are a large number of incidental points
that we have no space to mention, but which are of importance for
other problems in attention.
Prager (10) studies the relations between defects of attention and
control of associations. He raises two questions: (i) Does a dis-
turbance of the function of association accompany disturbances of
attention (Merkfahigkeit)t (2) Is it possible to discover in associa-
tion tests any phenomenon that is directly connected with disturb-
ances of attention? The questions are answered in the light of associ-
ation tests on four patients who suffered from impairment of attention.
The first is answered in the affirmative. All the patients showed
lengthened reaction times and a tendency to the -sentence form of
association. The associations took the form of explanation, descrip-
tions and egocentric responses toward the stimulus word. To the
second question an affirmative answer is also given. Successive
responses to the same word by the Pappenheim method showed no
great shortening of the reaction time and little tendency to repeat the
response. Both course of association and immediate retention are
impaired with degeneration of capacity for attending. Another study
of attention in pathology is by Franchini (5). His experiments
consisted of a measure of the simple reaction times of patients. In
general it is found that reaction times are slow and irregular and that
there is a marked tendency to fatigue for all pathological mental
states. Imbecility, dementia precox, the alcoholic and involution
psychoses are marked mainly by the two former symptoms, the circu-
ATTENTION AND INTEREST 195
lar insanity by the quick onset of fatigue. In one article D'Allonnes
(2) gives the results of a conceptual analysis of the attention processes
as they are found in the insane. He insists that we must distinguish
four varieties of attention, the momentary and the prolonged, the
spontaneous and the provoked, and that these are present in different
degrees and in different combinations in different cases. In order of
disappearance they run from the light cases to the severe, the pro-
longed and provoked, the prolonged and spontaneous, the momentary
and spontaneous, and the momentary and provoked, if we couple the
forms as they are likely to be found in actual cases. He gives a long
list of the symptoms under each of eight stages in the degeneration of
attention. Much of it must however be largely hypothetical and
no two men would agree on the details. In another paper (i) he
reports a new and simple method of measuring disturbances of
attention of momentary duration. The apparatus or device is a
square with five divisions on each side, numbered vertically up to
five and with five horizontal columns headed by the vowels. The
problem is to point to the intersection of a line headed by a vowel and
a line designated by a number. Thus a patient is asked to point to
03 and the time required to find it is measured. It was found that
the time was increased for cases of dementia and mania over that
required by normal individuals and that the more severe the case the
longer the time.
A. Busch (3) has conducted a long series of experiments upon the
effect of alcohol upon attention. Three measures were used; two
upon attention proper and one of simple visual acuity. First the
distribution of attention was measured by a device similar to Wirth's.
This indicated that the more important effect was to narrow the field
of attention. The figures in the periphery of the field of vision were
very much more likely to be overlooked after a dose of 30 c.c. of
alcohol than when normal. The central region is also affected in
some degree, but not so noticeably. The second experiment con-
sisted in measuring the apperception of letters by the Finzi method.
This showed the same effect in more marked degree. A third series
tested visual acuity under alcohol and found that it was either
practically unaffected or increased. The effects noted are to be
referred to the effects of alcohol upon the central processes, in spite
of the increased efficiency of the peripheral nervous system. The
effects could be noted at least twenty-four hours after the dose and
were cumulative.
Dearborn (4) gives a summary of the bearing of attention in its
different aspects upon exercise and physical education in general.
196 W. B. PILLSBURY
He combines a vasomotor, with a nervous coordination theory. It is
valuable largely for its practical suggestions to the teacher of physical
education.
Two papers of a more theoretical character have appeared.
Rignano (u, 12) in an article published both in French and in
German advances the theory that attention arises from a conflict
between two affective inclinations. In the second part of his work
he argues that intensity and choice of memories really depend upon
this affective element, that associations alone will not really
explain. On the nervous side he explains these processes by the
interaction of different nervous processes either in harmony or in
opposition. He does not make very clear, however, the exact rela-
tion between sensation and affection or between the affective elements
and the nervous currents. Liidtke (8) traces the history of the word
apperception from Leibniz to Lipps and Jerusalem in German psychol-
ogy. He points out the different meanings that it has had for
different men and the inconsistencies in use by different men, particu-
larly by Wundt, and ends with a plea that it be discarded from the
psychological and philosophical vocabulary.
REFERENCES
1. D'ALLONNES, G. R. Recherches sur Pattention. Rev. phil., 1911, 71, 285-312;
494-520.
2. D'ALLONNES, G. R. Precede clinique pour mesurer la rapidite de 1'attention.
J. de psychol. norm, et path., 1911, 8, 47-51.
3. BUSCH, A. Ueber den Einfluss des Alkohols auf Klarheit und Umfang des op-
tischen Bewusstseins. /./. Psychol. u. Neur., 1910, 17, 63-82; 1911, 18, 36-71.
4. DEARBORN, G. V. N. Attention: Certain of its Aspects and a Few of its Relations
to Physical Education. Amer. Phys. Educ. Rev., 1910, 15, 559-571; 637-650;
1911, 16, 26-40; 125-143; 186-199.
5. FRANCHINI, G. Le graphique psychometrique de 1'attention dans les maladies
mentales. Arch. ital. de biologie, 1911, 54, 267-277.
6. GRASSI, ISABELLA. Einfache Reaktionszeit und Einstellung der Aufmerksamkeit.
Zsch.f. Psychol., 1911, 60, 46-72.
7. JACOBSON, E. Experiments on the Inhibition of Sensations. PSYCHOL. REV.,
1911, 18, 24-53.
8. LUDTKE, F. Kritische Geschichte der Apperzeptionsbegriffe. Zsch. f. Phil. u.
phil. Krit., 1911, 141, 41-135.
9. McCoMAS, H. C. Some Types of Attention. PSYCHOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS,
1911, 13, whole No. 55.
10. PRAGER, J. J. Experimented Beitrag zur Psychopathologie der Merkfahigkeits-
storungen. /. /. Psychol. u. Neur., 1911, 18, 1-22.
11. E. RIGNANO, E. De 1'attention. I. Scientia, 1911, 10, 165-190. II. 1912, u,
71-87.
12. RIGNANO, E. Von der Aufmerksamkeit. Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 1911, 22, 267-
TIME AND RHYTHM 197
TIME AND RHYTHM
BY KNIGHT DUNLAP
The Johns Hopkins University
Easier (i), from a very few observations with excellent apparatus,
concludes that two tactual stimuli on the same area fuse when
separated by an interval of about 50 a, or less, on ringer tip, and by
longer intervals on other parts of the hand. He points to the differ-
ence between such intervals and the intervals found adequate by other
observers with serial stimulations — from a few c to less than one a.
In his second paper (2) Easier reports a similar peculiarity of light
stimuli. The maximal interval permitting fusion between two stimuli,
produced by revolving sector, was 83 o-, whereas the maximal interval
for flicker was 330-.
Brewer (3) and Stratton (10) determined the thresholds of dura-
tion between two successive visual stimulations on different retinal
areas, and the thresholds for movement-duration. Brewer, with
five subjects, using an exposure-pendulum which gave two points
of light or a moving point, found thresholds of from 2 cr to 58 <r for
discrete succession merely, 19 a to 76 a for motion merely, 22 a to
61 a for order, and 19 a to 76 a for direction. The differences due
to angular separation and length of movement are inconsiderable.
Stratton, with two subjects, using the pendulum, and a wheel-
pendulum, exposing successively the two halves of a streak of light,
or equivalent motion of a half, obtained thresholds of 16.4 a and 14.8 a
for mere succession and 31.5 a and 13.8 <r for mere motion. Both ex-
perimenters used the method of serial groups which in the reviewer's
estimation detracts from the significance of the definite values of the
thresholds, but does not diminish the general importance of the
results.
Pauli (9) investigated the temporal relations of two visual stimuli,
one foveal and one peripheral. He worked with two small surfaces
illuminated by Geissler tubes, controlled by the time attachment to
the Zimmermann kymograph. He found that of two simultaneous
stimuli, the foveal was sensed first, the peripheral stimulus needing
to be advanced 50 a to 100 a to make the two appear simultaneous.
The differential increased with the angular separation of the stimuli,
and with the intensity and area of the foveal stimulus; it was greater
for the temporal field. The direction of attention had no influence
(Dvorak and Bethe had reported such influence). In this part of
the work Pauli apparently took no account of eye-movement.
198 KNIGHT DUN LAP
The phenomenon observed by Mach from which these experiments
grew — the green appearence of a momentary red light in peripheral
vision — was also found to be unaffected by the direction of attention.
Pauli also attempted to measure the rapidity of change (spatial)
of visual attention, using a method suggested by Kiilpe: to find the
time interyal between two stimuli, 10° to 60° apart, which brings the
second just as the attention is ready for it. This time, 80 a to 170 <r,
Pauli thinks to be not a function of eye-movement, because similar
experiments with voluntary eye-movements gave a much longer time.
It would seem remarkable that the significant American work in
eye-movement should be so neglected by the Germans, were it not
that they seem to be unaware of progress in many other lines also.
Gildmeister (7) remarks on a difficulty he finds in counting repeti-
tions of a given process (pulse, etc.), and recommends the use of some
melody involving an eight-rhythm (4/4 or 2/4) : the observer need only
notice the tone on which the observation ends; computing the number
subsequently; or, after habituation, obtaining it directly from
association with the note. This method should be useful to any one
afflicted as Gildmeister is.
For estimating a time interval, in default of mechanical aids,
Gildmeister finds it useful to run over a melody in march tempo;
with a certain melody he is able to come within 10 per cent, of 120
measures to the minute. Hence, he needs to note only the number
of repetitions and point of ending in the final repetition.
Dunlap, in his first article (5), argues for the explicit consideration
of rhythmic grouping as a function of the specious present. In his
second article (6) he gives the results of experiments undertaken with
this consideration in view. The threshold of difference for rate of
discrete auditory stimulation (50 per cent, discrimination in the
author's tables and charts, which is the same as 75 per cent, right
judgment by the traditional method) is lower with rhythmic grouping
than without; while not appreciately higher for series with irregular
intensities and durations of stimuli than for regular series. The
difference-thresholds for time-intervals corresponding to the rates
used, were appreciably higher. Experiments with two intensities of
auditory stimuli, and others with two modes (auditory and visual),
give results which the author thinks speak for strain-sensations as
time-content.
Brown (4) reports mean variations of the measurements of force
and time-relations of rhythmic tapping; of rhythmically vocalized
syllables; and of a mother goose jingle. The mean variation for the
TIME AND RHYTHM 199
force of the foot or foot element is from 2 to 4 times as large as the
mean variation of the duration of the same. This is an indication
that the time element is more fundamental than the accent in rhythm.
Landry (8), in a volume which he opines "n'est que trop succinct,"
presents the results of some measurements of the rhythm and tempo
of French verse and prose declaimed by various persons ranging from
Bernhardt and Mounet-Sully to illiterates. Considerable space is
given to a very good discussion of the psychology of rhythm, which
however does not seem to advance the subject; and there is also a
discussion of the rhythmic peculiarities of spoken French which is
certainly interesting and informing, although the reviewer makes no
pretense of being able to judge of its accuracy. One point is however
made quite clear (particularly by Livre II., Chap. I.): in these
matters no foreigner need hope to do more than accept the opinion
of the Frenchman whom he believes to be the most competent
authority.
The two important indications in Landry's results are (i) that
the rhythmic divisions are controlled but slightly by the significance
of the word-groups, and not at all by logical word-relations, and
(2) that increase in emphasis of an element increases its duration;
but these are not new discoveries.
REFERENCES
1. BASLER, A. Ueber die Verschmelzung zweier nacheinander erfolgender Tastreize.
Pfluger's Arch., 1911, 143, 230-244.
2. BASLER, A. Ueber die Verschmelzung zweier nacheinander erfolgender Licht-
reize. Pfluger's Arch., 1911, 143, 245-251.
3. BREWER, J. M. The Psychology of Change; on Some Phases of Minimal Time by
Sight. PSYCHOL. REV., 1911, 1 8, 257-261.
4. BROWN, W. Temporal and Accentual Rhythm. PSYCHOL. REV., 1911, 18,
336-346.
5. DUNLAP, K. Rhythm and the Specious Present. /. of Phil., PsychoL, etc., 1911,
8, 348-354.
6. DUNLAP, K. Difference Sensibility for Rate of Discrete Impression. PSYCHOL.
REV., 1912, 19, 32-59-
7. GILDMEISTER, M. Ueber Zahlen und Zeitschatzen. Zsch. f. biol Techmk u.
Methodik, 1911, 2, 49-52.
8. LANDRY, E. La theorie du rythme et le rythme du fran(ais declame. Paris: Cham-
pion, 1911. Pp. 427.
9. PAULI, R. Ueber die Beurteilung der Zeitordnung von optischen Reizen in
Anschluss an eine von E. Mach beobachtete Farbenerscheinung. Arch. f. d.
ges. PsychoL, 1911, 21, 132-218.
10. STRATTON, G. M. The Psychology of Change; How is the Perception of Movement
Related to That of Succession? PSYCHOL. REV., 1911,. 18, 262-293.
SPECIAL REVIEWS
THE ORIGINS OF MUSIC
Die Anfdnge der Musik. CARL STUMPF. Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1911.
Pp. 209.
In this interesting little book the author draws in a simple and
popular manner the conclusions which may be reached from recent
studies of primitive music. It should perhaps be noted at once that
the use of the term primitive is to be taken, relatively, not literally.
Careful study of the structure of exotic melodies usually reveals the
fact that they represent a considerable degree of cultural evolution.
Only by reference to relative simplicity of structure may we approach
a conception of the beginnings of music.
The book deals first with certain recent theories as to the origin
of music. The Darwinian theory is characterized by the phrase:
"Im Anfang war die Liebe." Here it is noted that Darwin's attempt
to derive music from sexual selection gives no adequate explanation
of the unique ability to recognize and transpose melodies. So far
as we yet know animals have no capacity of this order. Bird songs
seem to depend upon absolute pitch, whereas human music is based
upon a recognition of tonal relations which involves a capacity for
abstraction which the animal does not appear to possess. Spencer's
theory is characterized by the phrase: "Im Anfange war das Wort,"
indicating a derivation from accent and tonal variations in speech.
But music differs essentially from singing-speech in the use of fixed
intervals. In speech, on the contrary, it has been shown that the
sounding of a single syllable shows great variation in pitch. Simi-
larly the view that music finds its origin in rhythm, as characterized
by Hans v. Billow's phrase: "Im Anfange war der Rhythmus,"
is equally unsuited to explain the facts, since the problem of definite
intervals remains unsolved. Rhythmic expression may involve
differences in intonation, but it makes no demand for consonant
intervals. Furthermore, the most primitive songs known to us
evidence a regard primarily for musical composition, rather than any
definite aim or requirement of rhythmic expression. The oft-cited
rhythmic accompaniment of work done by a group in unison is not
found among the most primitive tribes, but seems to indicate a stage
in cultural evolution beyond that at which music appears.
200
THE ORIGINS OF MUSIC 201
To explain the origin of music we must have in mind, not merely
tonal expression of any arbitrary sort, but the use of tones in definite
relationships. The explanation for this phenomenon finds its basis
for Stumpf in the inherent capacity to recognize tonal fusion. He
therefore characterizes his own explanation by Goethe's phrase:
"Im Anfang war die Tat." The problem is, how did primitive man
discover this natural capacity? Stumpf believes that the essential
facts were first brought to his notice through the use of vocal signals.
In signalling the production of an intense and relatively fixed high
tone is demanded. The duplication of this tone by men, women and
children, whose vocal register naturally varies, brings about the
expression of similar tones which appear to be identical because
they fuse. Thus in the attempt of voices of different range to produce
the same tone, we see the first use of the consonant intervals of
octave, fifth and fourth which furnish the framework for all music.
Little by little these intervals are recognized as such, even when the
absolute pitch varies.
The first melodic phrases may be due to the filling-in of the interval
of the fourth, say, with arbitrary tones. Brief phrases constructed
from such tones are well adapted to use as signal calls, and it is noted
that, among the most primitive songs recorded, the fourth and fifth
represent the greatest intervals used, indeed they often limit the
total range of the melody. Thus we see that although the steps in
primitive music are often arbitrary and sometimes variable, they are
nevertheless constrained by the limit of a consonant interval. The
evolution of music is dependent upon the reconciliation of these small
steps with the consonant intervals which furnish the framework and
basis of transposition. Polyphony is found very early in parallel
passages where various members of a family may duplicate the melody
simultaneously in octaves, fifths and fourths. The use of the falsetto,
which is very frequent, also indicates an attempt to imitate the precise
register of a certain individual.
From primitive instruments we may learn much concerning the
origins of music, although it is well to remember that many very
simple forms of instrument now in use probably represent a retrograde
development from forms originally much more complex. Pipes are
among the most ancient instruments of which we have knowledge.
The introduction of holes to produce a variety of tones was doubtless
determined at first, not in accordance with musical principles, but
by external conditions. For instance, the rings of the bamboo, and
the use of three or six fingers seem to have been prominent factors.
202 REVIEWS
Pipes of varying length are combined in the Pan's-pipes which may
follow one another in pitch, or form groups, sometimes even giving
a definite melody. We are not to conclude from this, however, that
the intervals used by a people are entirely arbitrary, varying from
individual to individual. On the contrary, even though the scale
contains not a single pure consonance, the relation of the intervals is
fixed and duplicated with remarkable exactness in all the instruments
of a tribe.
Among some of the wind instruments there occurs the possibility
of blowing higher tones (Uberblasen), thus producing harmonics in
definite consonant relationship to the fundamental. This may be
considered as a contributary cause for the use of consonant intervals.
It is not a primary cause, however, for these intervals are quite as
well known among people who have no such instruments. String
instruments appear to have their origin in a modification of the
hunter's bow. The musical-bow, much used by primitive people,
is a single stringed bow which indicates this analogy clearly. Drums
are found in great variety with varying tones, but no consonant
effects. The xylophone and metallophone are among the most
interesting of exotic instruments, since with their aid we can study
most exactly the scale of intervals in use. Here, as with the Pan's-
pipes we learn the exactness with which unmusical intervals are
employed.
The pleasure in manifold combinations, developments and reso-
lutions of accords is a modern invention. Primitive music is essen-
tially homophonic; dissonances without resolution are frequent.
The use of polyphony is quite different from that which we make of it.
Aside from the parallel passages, already noted, the repetition of a
fixed tone is often met with, similar to the drone-bass or bourdon.
However, if polyphony is undeveloped, rhythmic accompaniment
has evolved to a point quite beyond our ordinary capacity. This is
due primarily to the lack of polyphony, which requires for its per-
formance relatively simple rhythms. The rhythmic accompaniments
to the songs of primitive peoples are often extraordinarily complex,
and we find that five- and seven-part measures are not at all excep-
tional. The rhythmic setting is also characterized by a frequent and
complicated shifting from one tempo to another.
The appearance of a fixed scale indicates the usage of five and
seven intervals within the octave as the most common divisions.
Two methods of development may be distinguished: (i) the construc-
tion of a scale by reference to the consonant intervals of fourth,
THE ORIGINS OF MUSIC 203
fifth, and later, the third, with a more or less arbitrary filling-in of
the larger steps; (2) the construction of a scale by a purely arbitrary
division into five or seven steps of equal intervals, as may be found
in the Siamese and Javanese scales, respectively. Even in this case,
however, the limiting interval is the octave, so we may say that all
scales in their development are in some measure limited by the
principle of consonance.
An interesting polyphonic orchestral usage among certain Asiatic
peoples is noted. The principle of these compositions is a more or
less independent elaboration and variation upon a central melodic
theme, which is carried out in unison by the different instruments of
the orchestra. The effect upon our ears, trained to harmonic combi-
nations, is very strange, but to a people whose musical development
has been strictly homophonic, the effect is apparently agreeable.
Stumpf proposes to call this form of composition heterophony, a term
which he derives from a passage in Plato which describes what
appears to have been a similar practice among the Greeks.
The second part of the volume consists of a series of transcriptions
of exotic melodies, largely derived from the phonogram archives of
the Berlin Laboratory, with a running commentary on varying
peculiarities and principles of construction. The examples include
melodies from the Wedda of Ceylon — the most primitive forms
of music which we now know, — the Andamanese, the Kubu of Su-
matra, Australian aborigines, South American, Mexican and North
American Indians, the Eskimos, Greenlanders and the African
Negroes. There are also appended eleven plates illustrating primitive
musical instruments.
R. M. OGDEN
UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE
DISCUSSION
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADVERTISING
A recent review1 of Strong's The Relative Merit of Advertisements
displays so inadequate an appreciation both of the problem of that
suggestive monograph and of the tendencies of modern experimental
psychology in general that I am impelled to call further attention to
the work. It is much to be regretted that this book should have been
reviewed by one who failed to discriminate between a personal point
of view and the total content of a large and growing science; between
individual inclination for certain species of problem and "the very
characteristics of a psychological experiment."
From the fact that the mathematical portion of the work in
question may have been puzzling to the reviewer it does not at once
follow that a search for exact measurement of complex mental
processes is "detrimental to good psychology." There are indeed
psychologists who are temperamentally disposed to be equally short-
sighted and to assert that it is just the "detailed introspection" and
the "qualitative distinctions" that get nowhere. The fact is, how-
ever, that qualitative distinction and quantitative analysis are both
needed in a psychology that is "good."
Two further things are also true. The first is that a piece of work
which emphasizes the latter type of inquiry reflects the trend of by
far the greater part of current investigation and interest. One
familiar with the contents of current periodicals and recent treatises
will require no proof of this fact. The second truth is that a large
body of students and teachers have been convinced that a psychology
which refuses to be both sterile and unstimulating, but which aspires
to be adequate and serviceable in its treatment of conscious indi-
viduals, must busy itself with outcome, conduct and behavior as
much as, if not even more than, with mere content and qualitative
elements and patterns.
As the writer has already insisted: "A psychology which aims to
be an account of behavior cannot go far without making a careful
study of more complex judgments such as those of appeal and interest.
Especially will this be true of a psychology which aspires to be con-
1 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, March 15, 1912, p. 124.
204
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADVERTISING 205
cretely serviceable. Such a psychology will find but little use for
the introspective method. It will be interested, not in the momen-
tary content of a conscious moment; nor in the descriptive character
of the sensory fragment which may at the moment be the bearer of
meaning; nor in the instrument, criterion or vehicle of an act of
apprehension, a comparison, a feeling or a choice. It will be most
of all interested in the outcome of this moment in the form of behavior,
an act, a choice, a judgment, and in the character, reliability, con-
stancy and significance which the outcome of such a mental operation
bears."1
To return to the review in question, the paragraph presented by
Mr. Tait as embodying the "chief results" quite ignores the real
problem, which was the measurement of the relative strength of
various appeals and interests, and the determination of the depend-
ence of these measurements on such factors as commodity, sex, class
and copy differences. The paragraph cites only certain interesting
facts which came out as by-products in the course of the inquiry.
Not until the importance of this type of study is fully realized
shall we possess a body of principles that will really convey infor-
mation concerning human nature and human behavior, a knowledge
which the psychology which Mr. Tait seems to have been taught has
so far failed to deliver. If a personal opinion be permitted by way
of contrast with that of the reviewer, the writer would like to express
his conviction that pure qualitative and introspective distinctions
fall as far short of an adequate psychology as the conversational
description of a stomach-ache falls short of being a complete account
of the laws of digestion.
It is however not clear what the reviewer means by saying "any
detailed introspection is lacking." The determination to introspect
and to report the introspections as such was purposely avoided, and
with good reason. But the determination to introspect and to report
is apparently not a sufficient criterion of introspection. Indeed one
of the foremost exponents of the introspective methods has remarked:
"After all, therefore, it is not so absurd as at first thought it seems,
to say that we require the animal and society and the madman to
introspect. ... All three may attend; all three may report their
experiences."2 Is a report any the less introspective, in the final
sense, because it is expressed by gesture, by behavior or by arrange-
ment or indication of stimuli, rather than vocally or graphically?
1 Judgments of Persuasiveness. PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, July, 1911.
*TITCHENER, A Text-Book of Psychology, p. 35.
206 DISCUSSION
The reviewer was quite right when he remarked, "By a con-
glomeration of vague preferences under still vaguer headings, we
can never reach the basis of appeal." But Strong seems to have fully
realized this even before he set about his investigation. It was just
this conglomeration which the psychology of appeal had previously
contained, and for which "The Relative Merit of Advertisements"
suggests the substitution of definite judgments and weighted com-
parisons, quantitatively as well as qualitatively expressed.
Whether this type of work is or is not to be called "psychological"
depends of course on the idiosyncrasies of one's vocabulary. A
study of the relative strength of appeals and interests, of the certainty
and constancy of the judgments passed upon them, of the possibilities
of the exact measurement of the relations to be found among such
complex stimuli, and of individual, sex and class differences in these
respects, may not fall within that field of psychological inquiry which
happens to be the most interesting to one or to several particular
individuals. But the science is surely larger than any one set of
interests. Let us not quibble over the use of a word. Even a quibb-
ler should observe that the subtitle of the monograph in question
includes both its psychological and statistical aspects.
My purpose in writing is not to defend either the matter or the
method of this pioneer work in the application of exact method to a
phase of applied psychology which has hitherto been satisfied with
mere generalities. These features are amply justified by the immedi-
ate results of Strong's work. My purpose is to put on record the
conviction of many BULLETIN readers that human nature is larger
than any one personal point of view, and that any attempt to extend
the problems, methods and applications of psychological investigation
should be both welcomed and encouraged.
H. L. HOLLINGWORTH
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
BOOKS RECEIVED DURING MARCH AND APRIL
SCHILLER, F. C. S. Formal Logic. A Scientific and Social Problem.
London: Macmillan, 1912. Pp. xviii + 423. $3.25 net.
STUMPF, C. Die Anfdnge der Musik. Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1911.
Pp. 209. Mk. 6.60; geb. Mk. 7.50.
LEE, V., and ANSTRUTHER-THOMSON, C. Beauty and Ugliness.
And Other Studies in Psychological ^Esthetics. London and New
York: John Lane Company, 1912. Pp. xiii + 376. $1.75 net.
RICE, D. E. Visual Acuity with Lights of Different Colors and
Intensities. (No. 20 of Archives of Psychology.) New York:
The Science Press, 1912. Pp. 59.
BEAN, C. H. The Curve of Forgetting. (No. 21 of Archives of
Psychology.) New York: The Science Press, 1912. Pp. 45.
HODGE, F. A. John Locke and Formal Discipline. Lynchburg, Va. :
J. P. Bell Co., 1911. Pp. 31.
LEVI, A. Studi Logici. II. II trascendentalismo logico. Firenze,
1911. Pp. 34-
LEVI, A. La Filosofia dell' Esperienza. II. La Filosofia dell9
Intuizione primitiva. Bologna, 1911. Pp. 31.
HARTENBERG, P. Traitement des neurastheniques. Paris: Alcan,
1912. Pp. 346. 3 fr. 50.
MEYERSON, E. Identite et realite. (2d ed.) Paris: Alcan, 1912.
Pp. xix + 542. 10 fr.
DUNLAP, K. A System of Psychology. New York: Scribner, 1912.
Pp. xiv + 368.
JOHNSTON, C. H. High School Education. New York: Scribner,
1912. Pp. xxii + 555.
PERRIER, L. Le Sentiment Religieux a-t-il une origine patho-
logique? Paris: Fischbacher, 1912. Pp. 63.
[ANON.] Sixty-fourth Annual Report of the Trustees of the Massa-
chusetts School for the Feeble-Minded at Waltham for the year
ending November jo, ipn. Boston: Wright & Potter Pr. Co.,
1912. Pp. 48.
DORSEY, J. O., & SWANTON, J. R. A Dictionary of the Biloxi and
Ofo Languages. Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 47.
Washington: Gov. Printing Co., 1912. Pp. 340.
207
NOTES AND NEWS
THE Ninth Annual Meeting of the Experimental Psychologists
was held at Worcester, Mass., April 15-17.
PROFESSOR LILLIEN J. MARTIN, of Stanford University, gave
an address entitled "Ueber die Lokalisation optischer Vorstellungs-
bilder" at the V. Kongress fur experimentelle Psychologic, held in
Berlin, April 15-19.
AT the National University of Mexico Professor J. M. Baldwin
is delivering the second half of the two years' program of lectures
on psychosociology. In addition to these lectures a course in the
history of psychology is also announced.
A NEW periodical, Imago, is announced from Vienna, edited by
Professor S. Freud and published under the direction of Otto Rank
and Dr. Hanns Sachs. It is to be devoted to the application of
psychoanalysis to the entire field of the mental sciences.
THE April number of the BULLETIN, dealing with psycho-
pathology, was prepared under the editorial care of Dr. Adolf Meyer,
of the Johns Hopkins Hospital.
THE following items are taken from the press:
DR. J. E. W. WALLIN has been appointed assistant professor of
educational psychology and director of the recently established
department of clinical psychology in the school of education of the
University of Pittsburgh.
THE coming session of the Dartmouth Summer School will be
in charge of Dr. W. V. D. Bingham, director of the psychological
laboratory, and professor of psychology and education.
DR. GEORGE H. MOUNT has resigned his position as instructor
in psychology in the Northern Michigan State Normal School to
accept an assistant professorship in the Iowa State Teachers'
College.
DR. ARTHUR HOLMES, assistant professor of psychology at the
University of Pennsylvania, has accepted the post of dean of the
faculties of Pennsylvania State College.
DR. WILHELM WUNDT, professor of philosophy at Leipzig, has
been made a knight of the Prussian order "pour le merite."
208
/
Vol. IX. No. 6. June 15, 1912.
THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN
GENERAL REVIEWS AND SUMMARIES
PSYCHOPHYSICAL MEASUREMENT METHODS
BY PROFESSOR F. M. URBAN
University of Pennsylvania
Blondel and Rey (i) raise the question as to the dependence of
the threshold for light stimuli on the intensity and duration of the
stimulus. They come to the conclusion that Bloch's law which
makes the threshold depend on the quantity of illumination (the
product of optical energy times duration) holds for stimuli of com-
paratively high intensity only. The following argument is of con-
siderable theoretical interest to psychophysics. Ribiere made
experiments on the distance inside of which a light of given intensity
but variable duration could be seen. It was found that this distance
increased constantly with duration of the light stimulus between the
limits 0.25 to 1.78 seconds without attaining the distance at which a
constant light could be seen. From this it follows that the so-called
minimum stimulation is well defined only with reference to a certain
duration. The absolute minimum stimulation would be the one
produced by a liminal stimulus after an infinite duration.
Wm. Brown (2) undertook to write a short text-book for the use
of the student of quantitative psychology, which is a wider field than
psychophysical investigation. The first chapter contains a pres-
entation of the methods, which is perhaps a little short but presents
the methods of constant stimuli and of just perceptible differences
in some detail. The reader will be pleased to find a new idea. Brown
proposes to apply Pearson's theory of the curves of distribution to
the study of psychometric functions. The difficulties of this promis-
ing enterprise are by no means small, but they may be overcome.
209
210 F. M. URBAN
P. Desroche (3) made observations on the influence of the distance
of a constant source of light on the phototropic reactions of Chlamy-
domonas Steinii. The animals were first attracted to one side of a
drop by a light placed at a certain distance, and then the drop was
turned by 180° so as to attract the animals to the other side. The
speed of this movement was determined. In the study of the
influence of the distance of the light on the speed, one has to dis-
tinguish two cases. If several hundred of these animals are placed
in the drop the distance of the light influences their speed in a
way closely resembling the law of Fechner. If a single animal
is experimented on, one finds that its speed is uniform and does not
depend on the distance of the light. If, however, the distance of the
light increases, the animal does not move straight towards the light
and it indulges in frequent stops. Desroche believes that the
similarity of his results with the law of Fechner is the result of the
compound influence of the individual movements of the animals
which become more irregular the greater the distance of the light.
R. Dodge (4) raises the question whether introspective facts are
the only mental reality, or whether there are other real indicators
of mental life. Rejecting the first view he welcomes every fact, no
matter whether its source is pathology, neurology, introspection, or
the observation of animal behavior, as long as it is capable of throwing
some light on human psychology. There are certain facts like fatigue,
or mental work, which are not accessible to introspection, but which
are nevertheless as valid indications of mental facts as any result of
introspection. Experimental evidence that certain mental capacities
undergo measurable objective changes is as true a psychological fact
as anything discovered by introspection. Introspection is a real and
important factor in certain fields of work, but is only one among many.
Chas. Henry (5) attempts to apply mathematical methods to the
general problems of biology, an enterprise for which he is doubly
qualified as the author of a text-book on mathematics, and the director
of a physiological laboratory. His problem is to study sensitivity
and muscular irritability as dependent on the intensity and duration
of the stimulus. He studies particularly the sensations of light
produced by a variable optical energy of constant duration and those
produced by constant energy of variable duration. He tries to
determine the character of this dependence and finds that it is
identical with the so-called photographic function, which gives the
amount of silver reduced by a variable intensity of light of constant
duration. It is likely that the curve of photographic action also gives
PSYCHOPHYSICAL MEASUREMENT METHODS 211
the process of nervous excitation produced by a variable optical energy
of constant duration. Only a certain part of this curve, however,
corresponds to conscious processes; the rest of it, from a certain
point of inflection on, represents the course of nervous excitation
not accompanied by mental processes. The entire curve is called the
psychophysical curve, and the author believes that its nature very
likely remains the same for different kinds of sense perception. From
this one would have to conclude that the processes produced by differ-
ent stimulations resemble each other to a high degree.
Studying the excitation of the muscle the author assumes that it
is directly proportional to the duration of the effort. The dependence
of these two quantities can be expressed in a myophysical law and
can be studied by the self-registering ergograph for the total work.
The curves obtained in this way closely resemble the curve of sen-
sations. The author then proceeds to show that the form of the
functions for the irritability of the senses and the muscles do not
differ much from those for the change in the weight of cells placed in
a medium where the products of dissimilation accumulate, provided
that assimilation diminishes in the course of time. These con-
siderations show the possibility of connecting the psychophysical
and myophysical laws with those of physical chemistry and of finding
the principles of a general mathematical theory of irritability.
The second part of the book is very curious. The author assumes
a certain general principle from which he deduces the laws for the
variations in the apparent size of straight lines and the wave-lengths
of complementary colors. Short mention is made of my demon-
stration that the arithmetic mean of a group of observations is the
most probable value if these observations are made systematically.
E. Jacobson (6) studied the interference of qualitatively different
stimuli. The technique of this kind of experiments is not very well
developed and its methodology is still untouched by modern refine-
ments. The author did not feel called upon to comply with the
requirements of psychophysical experimentation, and the outcome
is that there is hardly one result in his paper that would stand a
thorough test.
P. Lasareff (7) studies the influence of the size of the visual field
on the threshold of sensations. He represents his results by the
formula of Helmholtz who modified the psychophysical formula of
Fechner by taking into consideration the illumination of the retina.
W. Reimer (8) studied the history of the notion of intensity with
special reference to the applications which this notion has found in
212 F. M. URBAN
psychology. This historical sketch, however, does not include the
most recent researches in this field.
F. H. Safford (9) took up the rather technical question as to the
number of decimal places to be retained in the numbers of relative
frequency and in the coefficients of the equation of the psychometric
functions set up by Lagrange's formula. He concludes that the
relative frequencies in my monograph on statistical methods should
be cut to three instead of four decimal places, and that the number
of figures retained by me in Lagrange's formula is entirely too large.
He also criticizes my expression of treating the data without a definite
hypothesis about the psychometric functions.
Sanford's variation of the method of just perceptible differences
is dealt with in (10). There exists some diversity of opinion as to
the real value and significance of this variation. It is shown that it
does not change the final outcome of this method and that it has the
character of a precaution in so far as it enables us to discover gross
mistakes.
My paper (n) is a reply to (9). It is pointed out that Lagrange's
formula is merely an artificial construction for the representation
of the data of observations, and the coefficients in the equation set
up by this formula have no immediate physical significance. If a
smaller number of figures is retained in the calculation of the co-
efficients, the equation does not represent the empirical data at all
and becomes useless. The phrase "treating the data without a
definite hypothesis on the psychometric functions" merely implies
that the hypothesis used for the purpose of computation is so in-
different that one could not possibly mistake it for a final solution
of the problem.
A further paper (12) is of indirect importance for the problems of
psychophysics. A new definition of the notions of chance and
probability is given which is based on the modern theory of classes.
It is shown that the notion of logical chance, that is, the relation
between the general and the particular, is the only one used for
defining the notion of mathematical probability. The calculus of
probabilities does not make use of events which are not causally
necessitated. This is shown by several examples of events which are
the objects of the calculus of probabilities in spite of the fact that
there does not exist any doubt as to the causes which necessitate them.
The demonstration is carried as far as the deduction of the two
fundamental propositions of the calculus of probabilities (the theorem
of addition and the theorem of multiplication), because all the
PSYCHOPHYSICAL MEASUREMENT METHODS 213
remaining propositions can be deduced from these two by purely
logical processes. Psychophysics makes very wide use of the notion
of probability in so far as the method of just perceptible differences as
well as the method of constant stimuli are built up on this notion.
The passing of a judgment under well-defined conditions is regarded
as a chance event, and the question naturally arises whether we should
favor the idea of these events not being fully determined by their
antecedent causes, or whether we should form an idea about them
which is more in agreement with the principles of physical science.
The paper shows that the use of the calculus of probabilities does not
deny the causal connections between events and it is, therefore,
advisable to favor the view that the passing of a judgment is an
event causally fully determined in spite of the fact that we are at
present unable to follow up these connections.
C. A. Willis and the present writer (13) worked out some experi-
mental data on lifted weights. The results show the influence of
variations of the standard stimulus on the constants of the psycho-
metric functions. The standard stimuli of 100, 125, 150, 175, 200,
225 grammes were compared with appropriate comparison weights,
and the results worked out by the method of constant stimuli. It was
found that the constant h decreased constantly with increasing inten-
sity of the comparison stimulus, while c remains more or less constant.
These results are in agreement with those obtained in working out
the data of acoumetric experiments. No well-pronounced regularity
corresponding to the so-called law of Weber was found.
W. Wirth's Psychophysik (14) is doubtlessly the most significant
publication of the year. The book is divided into two parts, the
first of which contains the mathematical methods, and the second
the experimental arrangements used in psychophysical investigations.
It is not possible to give a full statement of the contents of this book,
and we shall call attention to two significant facts only. The first
is that WTirth defines psychophysics so as to let it comprise all the
methods of experimental psychology. In this sense one may say that
the book contains a new program for psychophysical investigation,
and it cannot be doubted that the majority of workers in this field
will welcome this new definition of psychophysics. The next obser-
vation refers to Wirth's treatment of the so-called psychophysical
methods. He recognizes one genuine psychophysical method only,
namely, the one based on the notion of the psychometric functions,
the theory of which he himself has cultivated with great success.
The old methods of psychophysical measurement are mentioned on
214 F- M- URBAN
account of their historical interest and because they frequently enable
one to find a rough and ready result, the exact determination of which
would require a considerable amount of work. We lastly mention as
significant the fact that the book appeared as part of a text-book on
the methods of physiology, thereby procuring to psychophysics the
standing of a recognized auxiliary science of physiology.1
Wirth's paper (15) contains a criticism of the present writer's
treatment of the method of just perceptible differences and of G. F.
Lipp's use of the equality judgments. He emphasizes the hypo-
thetical nature of the threshold, and insists that it cannot be defined
in terms of the result of the method of just perceptible differences.
He furthermore tries to show that the result of the method of just
perceptible differences does not coincide with that of the method of
constant stimuli unless one introduces some special hypothesis in
regard to the nature of the psychometric functions. The appendix
of the paper contains an interesting discussion of one of the series
of my experiments on lifted weights. He calculates the arithmetical
means of the limits and of their standard deviations in groups of 50
experiments, and tries to show that a definite eifect of practice can be
found in these results. It would not seem very surprising that such
an influence of practice should have taken place, but it is doubtful
whether Wirth's numbers definitely establish the existence of this
factor.
REFERENCES
1. BLONDEL, A. and REY, J. Sur la perception des lumieres breves a la limite de
leur portee. C. R. de I' Academie des Sciences, 1911, 153, 54-56.
2. BROWN, WILLIAM. The Essentials of Mental Measurement. Cambridge: Uni-
versity Press, 1911. Pp. 154.
3. DESROCHE, P. Sur une interpretation de la loi de Weber-Fechner. C. R. de
la Societe de Biologie, 1911, 70, 571-572.
4. DODGE, R. The Theory and Limitations of Introspection. Amer. J. of PsychoL,
1912, 23, 214-229.
5. HENRY, CHARLES. Sensation et energie. Paris, 1911. Pp. 296.
6. JACOBSON, E. Experiments on the Inhibition of Sensations. PSYCHOL. REV.,
1911, 18, 24-53.
7. LASAREFF, P. Studien xiber das Weber-Fechner'sche Gesetz. Arch. f. d. ges.
Physiol. (Pfliiger), 1911, 142, 235-240.
8. REIMER, W. Der Intensitatsbegriff in der Psychologic. Vjsck. f. wiss. Phil,
1911, 35, 277-339-
9. S AFFORD, F. H. Precision of Measurement Applied to Psychometric Functions.
Amer. J. of Psychol., 1911, 22, 94-98.
IO. URBAN, F. M. Eine Bemerkung iiber die Methode der ebenmerklichen Unter-
schiede. Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 1911, 20, 45-51.
1 See special review on p. 245, below.
TESTS 215
11. URBAN, F. M. A Reply to Professor Safford. Amer. J.'of Psychol., 1911, 22,
298-303.
12. URBAN, F. M. Ueber den Begriff der mathematischen Wahrscheinlichkeit.
Fjsch.f. wiss. Phil., 1911, 35, 1-49; 145-185.
13. WILLIS, C. A. and URBAN, F. M. Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der psychometrischen
Funktionen im Gebiete der Gewichtsempfindungen. Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol.,
1911, 22, 40-46.
14. WIRTH, W. Psychophysik. Darstellung der Methoden der experimented Psy-
chologic. Leipzig, 1912. Pp. 522.
15. WIRTH, W. Zur erkenntnistheoretischen und mathematischen Begrundung der
Massmethoden fur die Unterschiedsschwelle. Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 1911,
20, 52-100.
TESTS
BY DR. FRANK N. FREEMAN
The University of Chicago
The field of tests has broadened out so that it now includes several
types of investigation which do not in all cases closely resemble one
another. The first group of investigations which may be regarded
as being included in this topic deal with the development of methods
of [testing single mental processes. The purpose of these investi-
gations is to determine the best method of procedure to be followed.
There have thus far been published under the direction of the Com-
mittee on Tests of the American Psychological Association reports
by Angell (2) upon Mental Imagery; by Pillsbury (29) on Tests of
the Intensity of Sound; by Seashore (31) on Pitch Discrimination;
by Woodworth and Wells (42) on Association; and by Yerkes and
Watson (43) on Vision in Animals.
Angell describes the methods which have been used to test
imagery, classifying them into objective and subjective methods.
The objective methods in general, which exclude introspection, are
held to be unreliable as methods of determining the type of mental
imagery. The author chooses the tests which he has found to be
most reliable and forms two series, adding suggestions regarding
the grading of the results. Pillsbury criticises in detail the methods
for testing intensity of sound, and selects the telephone as the one
to be most highly recommended from the point of view of accuracy,
but recommends the tuning fork from the point of view of conven-
ience. Seashore not only recommends the most reliable apparatus
for testing pitch discrimination, but also goes into some detail in
giving directions for the conduct of the tests and interpretation of the
results, and discusses their practical application. Woodworth and
216 FRANK N. FREEM4N
Wells have made an elaborate study of methods of testing
association, for the purpose not so much of comparing the various
methods which are in use as of working out a standard method of each
type of testing, and of describing the methods in sufficient detail so
that they may be followed by other investigators. Yerkes and
Watson give a very detailed description of the methods and
apparatus which are used for testing the light and color vision,
and the size, form, and distance perception in animals, and recommend
the most reliable forms. A short article by Kirkpatrick (20) consists
mainly in the criticism of the Betts test for the vividness of imagery.
The study of Whitley (40) was undertaken for the purpose of investi-
gating the reliability of certain of the Columbia tests of simple mental
processes, and other tests which are added to these. As a result
of the investigation, certain of the tests were found to be more
reliable than others and were selected for recommendation. The
investigation concludes with a study of the practice curve.
The second group of tests to be considered deals with single
mental processes or groups of the mental processes for the purpose of
determining their value as a means of diagnosis. The diagnosis
may be of general capacity or general ability or of mental derange-
ment or retardation, or of some special condition such as fatigue.
Healy and Fernald (17) have collected a series of tests which
they have found useful in diagnosing the mental capacity of children
in the Juvenile Court. The same tests are applied to the children of
all ages, and are for the purpose not of rating the children quantita-
tively, but of classifying them into one of a number of groups, such as
superior mental ability, average mental ability, dull, etc. The aim
in choosing the tests was so far as possible to bring out the capacity
of the child for dealing with practical situations of life rather than
for meeting the demand of the school room.
Another group of tests has been tried out by Abelson (i) upon a
group of backward children, of a mean age of n. The tests dealt
partly with simple motor or perceptual processes and partly with
higher mental processes. The author found that the tests on the
whole correlated well with the teacher's estimates, but that a single
test taken alone was not reliable. The tests of higher mental
processes did not seem to be better than the tests of the simpler
processes.
Descoeudres (n) investigated various tests upon a very small
group of fourteen backward children. The main purpose was to
compare the reliability of the different tests used, and this was done
TESTS 217
by finding the correlation between the rank of the children in each
individual test, and in the average of all the tests together. The
author concluded that tests of reasoning were the best, tests of
imagination next, and tests of attention and memory of the least
value.
In order to determine whether certain criticisms which have
been made of the value of the teacher's estimate are well founded,
Gilby (15) and Waite (38) compared the order in which school
children are placed in the estimate of the teacher, and the order in
which they are placed by their grades on examination or in their class
work. On the basis of the correlation which was found between these
two methods of ranking, both investigators concluded that the
teacher's estimate of the children was as reliable as their school
grades. A comparison of the results of testing memory, and the
ability to apprehend abstract relations by giving opposites to such
words as "but" and "although" with the rank in class in logic and
psychology was made by Marvin (24). The author found that
there was a correlation between the standing in class and in the
tests, and that the correlation between memory and psychology was
somewhat closer than that between memory and logic.
Immediate memory was used as a test of fatigue in school children
by Winch (41). He investigated the relative improvement in mechan-
ical memory which was made by a group of children who were tested
in the morning, and a parallel group tested in the afternoon. The
average difference was found to be small, amounting to 2 per cent,
in one case and to 5 per cent, in the other. The result may be inter-
preted as indicating either that immediate memory is not a good
test for fatigue, or that there was not much fatigue present in the
case of these children.
The use of Kraepelin's reckoning test in psychiatry is recom-
mended in the article by Maloney (22). The author describes the
test and the manner in which it may be used for the purpose of
diagnosing mental derangement.
The same general purpose which underlies the tests of the pre-
ceding group underlies also another group of tests, which are arranged
in series of ascending difficulty. The series may contain tests which
correspond to the different ages as do the Binet tests, or may merely
be arranged in groups as are the De Sanctis tests.
The Binet tests have received much attention during the past
year, and have been subjected to many experiments. These experi-
ments have been described for the most part in the article by Huey
2i8 FRANK N. FREEMAN
(19). It will not be worth while to duplicate either his reviews or his
bibliography. The reader is therefore referred to Huey's article for
the literature upon the Binet tests. A few articles that Huey has
not referred to may be mentioned.
Descoeudres (12) has attempted to determine how accurately the
Binet scale distinguishes bright from dull pupils, and how uniform
it is throughout its range. The 1908 series was used. The tests were
applied to two bright and two dull pupils (each pair consisting of a
boy and a girl) from each of six classes, the ages ranging from 7^ to
13 years. The author found that of all the correct responses which
were made the bright pupils made 57 per cent, and the dull pupils
43 per cent. Some of the tests, however, distinguished the bright
from the dull pupils much better than others. The author agrees
with the other investigators who have used the Binet scale, that the
tests for the early vears are too easy, and the tests for the later years
too difficult. Gilford and Goddard (14) used the Binet scale in the
examination of defective children in the Juvenile Court, and found
more or less mental retardation in every case but one out of 100
children. Hill and Goddard (18) tested fifty delinquent girls by means
of the Binet scale and concluded that all but four were mentally
defective. McDonald (21) says in a communication that he regards
the Binet scale as of value in testing senile dementia, paresis and
moral imbecility.
An article by De Sanctis (10) discusses the theoretical basis for
test series and reproduces his own scale, which has been described
elsewhere by Goddard and Whipple. De Sanctis distinguishes two
levels of mental processes, the level of lower and higher ideation.
Development proceeds from one level of intelligence to another, and
hence series of tests may be devised to determine the level of experi-
ence or the maturity of individuals. De Sanctis does not accept the
hypothesis, however, that intellectual defect in defective children
and dements corresponds "to the degrees of intellectual development
in the ages of growth."
An entirely different type of test has to do with accomplishment
rather than with native ability, and seeks to measure the result of
educational effort. One form of test of this sort consists in standard-
ized tests in particular school subjects. Pearson (28) describes a
method by which the results of work in spelling may be scientifically
tested. His method, however, is not standardized in the sense that
the results found by different investigators may be compared.
Courtis (9) describes briefly his elaborately standardized tests in
TESTS 219
arithmetic and discusses the need of such tests for purposes of com-
parison and of guidance in teaching. Courtis (8) gives in another
article illustrations of tests in writing, arithmetic, spelling, history
and English in order to show the value and possibility of standardized
tests. Bliss (6) describes a method, which he has used for some
years, of testing deficiency in English teaching by means of the
"reproduction story." A story, according to this method, is read
to the pupils, which they are then required to reproduce. Though
not permitting of strictly comparable results on account of the lack
of a standardized method of grading, the author believes the test to
be of value as an aid in supervision.
Thorndike (35, 36) describes the method of construction of a
scale which is intended to serve as a means for grading in English
composition. The purpose is to make comparable grading of compo-
sitions by different persons and in different places, and to enable the
investigator to determine not merely the relative rank of different
specimens, but also the amount of difference in excellence between
them.
Ayers (3) describes the derivation of a scale for the measurement
of the legibility of handwriting and submits the scale which was
constructed on a basis of the investigation. The scale was con-
structed upon the basis of the time taken by ten investigators to
read a large number of samples of writing of school children. Free-
man (13) describes the procedure by which the teacher or supervisor
may test the legibility and speed of writing in order to obtain stand-
ardized results.
School and college grades may also be regarded as tests. Smith
(32) and Steele (33) urge the adoption of systems of grading which
are based upon the normal distribution of traits. Steele suggests
that teachers be led to see the importance of a rational system by a
demonstration of the lack of uniformity in their own marking, and
gives an illustration of the means by which this may be done.
Strayer (34), Ayers (4), and Thorndike (37) discuss in general
the importance of quantitative measurements of the results of
educational effort. Gulick (16) discusses the same topic in relation
to school hygiene.
Another purpose for which tests are employed is the characteri-
zation of an individual in order to determine his relationship to other
individuals or to a norm in respect to his general mental type. Margis
(23) describes various more or less unsatisfactory methods by which
this determination may be made — the intuitive-descriptive method,
220 FRANK N. FREEMAN
the classification method, etc., — and describes in some detail the
analytic method as advocated by Stern and employed in the Institut
fur Angewandte Psychologic and Psychologische Sammelforschung.
This method consists of a thorough investigation of the individual
by means of a carefully worked out questionnaire.
Miinsterberg (26) discusses with some illustrations the use of tests
in vocational guidance, and Seashore (30) describes an elaborate
method for determining the qualification for singing possessed by an
individual.
The theoretical principles which underlie mental tests are dis-
cussed by Betz (5) and Brown (7). Both of these authors treat at
some length the mathematical principles by which correlation may
be determined and give particular attention to the work of Galton,
Pearson and Spearman in this connection. They also discuss criti-
cally the investigations which have been carried on and the methods
which are employed. Betz concludes that it is futile to attempt to
determine general intelligence, but holds that the mental processes
are more specialized than such a concept would assume. Brown
concludes by describing the results of his investigations into the
correlation of various mental processes. He concludes that certain
tests, as that of Ebbinghaus, correlate better with general intelligence
than others, but that there is much less correlation between processes
which we regard as similar than we should expect.
Weiss (39) suggests a new method of ranking individuals by
comparing the performance of the various members of a group with
the average performance of the group. The method in short is to
determine the deviation of a particular individual from the mean of
the group to which he belongs.
Myers (27) in a critical article points out the dangers of the
unsuccessful use of mental tests, or of hasty and ill-advised con-
clusions drawn from their interpretation.
REFERENCES
1. ABELSON, A. R. The Measurement of Mental Ability of "Backward" Children.
Brit. J. of Psychol., 1911, 4, 268-314.
2. ANGELL, J. R. " Methods for the Determination of Mental Imagery. PSYCHOL.
MONOG., 1910, 13 (53), 61-108.
3. AYERS, L. P. A Scale for Measuring the Quality of Handwriting of School Children.
New York, 1912. Dept. of Child Hygiene, Russel Sage Foundation.
4. AYERS, L. P. Measuring Educational Processes through Educational Results.
Sch. Rev., 1912, 20, 300.
5. BETZ, W. Ueber Korrelation. Beihefte zur Zsch. f. angew. Psychol. u. psychol.
Sammelforsch., 3, 1911.
TESTS 221
6. BLISS, D. C. Some Results of Standard Tests. Psychol. Clinic, 1912, 6, i.
7. BROWN, WM. The Essentials of Mental Measurement. Camb. Univ. Press, IOII,
Pp. vii-f-154.
8. COURTIS, S. A. The Comparative Test as an Educational Ruler. Amer. Educ.
1911, 13-18.
9. COURTIS, S. A. Standard Tests in Arithmetic. /. of Educ. Psychol., 191 1, 2, 272.
10. DE ^SANCTIS, S. Mental Development and the Measurement of the Level of
Intelligence. /. of Educ. Psychol., 1911, 2, 498-507.
11. DESCOEUDRES, A. Exploration de quelques tests d'intelligence chez des enfants
anormaux et arrieres. Arch, de Psychol^ 1911, n, 351-375.
12. DESCOEUDRES, A. Les tests de Binet et Simon et leur valeur scolaire. Arch.
de Psychol., 1911, u, 331-350.
13. FREEMAN, F. N. Problems and Methods of Investigation in Handwriting.
/. of Educ. Psychol., 1912, 3, 181-190.
14. GIFFORD, Mrs. E. G. and GODDARD, H. H. Defective Children in the Juvenile
Court. Training School, 1912, 9, 132-134.
15. GILBY, W. H. and PEARSON, K. On the Significance of the Teacher's Appreciation
of General Intelligence. Biometrika, 1911, 8, 94-108.
16. GULICK, L. H. Measurements as Applied to School Hygiene. /. of Educ.
Psychol., 1911, 2, 301.
17. HEALY, W. and FERNALD, G. M. Tests for Practical Mental Classification.
PSYCHOL. MONOG., 1911, 13. Pp. 53.
18. HILL, H. F. and GODDARD, H. H. Delinquent Girls Tested by the Binet Scale.
Training School, 1911, 8, 50-56.
19. HUEY, E. B. The Present Status of the Binet Scale for Measuring Intelligence.
PSYCHOL. BULL., 1912, 9, 160-168.
20. KIRKPATRICK, E. A. Tests for Class Purposes and for Research Purposes. /. of
Educ. Psychol., 1911, 2, 336-338.
21. MCDONALD, J. B. The Binet Tests in a Hospital for the Insane. Training
School, 1910, 7, 250-251.
22. MALONEY, W. J. On the Reckoning Test and its Uses in Psychiatry. Rev. of
Neur. and Psychiat., 1911, 9, 366-377.
23. MARGIS, P. Das Problem und die Methoden der Psychographie. Zsch.f. angew.
Psychol, 1911, 5,409-45I-
24. MARVIN, W. T. A Comparison of Some Mental Measurements with the Standing
of Students in Two College Courses. Training School, 1911, 8, 66-69.
25. MEUMANN, E. Ueber eine neue Methode der Intelligenzpriifung und iiber den
Wert der Kombinationsmethode. Zsch.f. pad. Psychol. u. exper. Pad., 1912,
13, 161.
26. MUNSTERBERG, H. Experimented Psychologic und Berufswahl. Zsch. f. pad.
Psychol. u. exper. Pad., 1912, 13, I.
27. MYERS, C. S. The Pitfalls of "Mental Tests." Brit. Med. J., 1911, i, 195-197.
28. PEARSON, H. C. The Scientific Study of the Teaching of Spelling. /. of Educ.
Psychol., 1911, 2, 241.
29. PILLSBURY, W. B. Methods for the Determination of the Intensity of Sound.
PSYCHOL. MONOG., 1910, 13 (53), 1-20.
30. SEASHORE, C. E. The Measure of a Singer. Science, 1912, 35, 201.
31. SEASHORE, C. E. The Measurement of Pitch Determinajtion. PSYCHOL. MONOG.,
1910, 13 (53), 21-60.
222 JAMES BURT MINER
32. SMITH, A. G. A Rational College Marking System. /. of Educ. Psychol., 1911,
a, 383-393-
33. STEELE, A. G. Training Teachers to Grade. Fed. Sem., 1911, 18, 523-532-
34. STRAYER, G. C. Measuring Results in Education. /. of Educ. Psychol., 191 1, 2, 3.
35. THORNDIKE, E. L. A Scale for Merit in English Writing by Young People. /. of
Educ. Psychol., 1911, 2, 361-368.
36. THORNDIKE, E. L. A Method for Grading Excellence in Composition. Science,
191 I, 33, 935-938.
37. THORNDIKE, E. L. The Measurement of Educational Products. School Review,
1912, 20, 289.
38. WAITE, H. Estimation of the General Intelligence of School Children. Bio-
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39. WEISS, A. P. On Methods of Mental Measurements, Especially in School and
College. /. of Educ. Psychol., 1911, 2, 555~563-
40. WHITLEY, M. J. An Empirical Study of Certain Tests for Individual Differences.
(Arch, of Psychol., No. 19.) New York: The Science Press, 1911. Pp. iii+ 146.
41. WINCH, W. H. Mental Fatigue in Day School Children as Measured by Im-
mediate Memory. /. of Educ. Psychol., 1912, 3, 18-28; 75-82.
42. WOODWORTH, R. S. and WELLS, F. L. Association Tests. PSYCHOL. MONOG.,
1911, 13 (57)- Pp- 85-
43. YERKES, R. M. and WATSON, J. B. Methods of Studying Fision in Animals.
Behavior Monographs, 1911, i, No. 2. Pp. 90.
CORRELATION
BY PROFESSOR JAMES BURT MINER
The University of Minnesota
The publication during 1911-12 of many important papers on
correlation, its interpretation, methods and applications, affords an
unusual opportunity to introduce a general review on this topic.
Contributions by Pearson, Hart and Spearman, and Winch, if they
stand the test of criticism, will remain fundamental in this field.
Betz with his monograph Uber Korrelation (4) publishes a bibli-
ography of 1 02 titles, most of which are dated within the last ten years.
He presents a complete and critical treatment of the subject, devoting
chapters to the methods for determining correlation, the correlation
investigations of psychological problems, the recent publications of
the Galton Eugenics Laboratory and the correlation work done upon
ability in mathematics. In the chapter on methods, besides explain-
ing Pearson's fundamental product-moment formula he gives Shep-
pard's formula for correction of cr if the distribution is not symmetrical.
He also devotes sections to non-linear correlations, the probable
errors of the coefficients, correlations by rank, the four-fold method,
CORRELATION 223
multiple correlation, Spearman's correction formulae, and spurious
correlation, giving briefly the standard treatments of each of these
topics. The criticism of Spearman's correction formula by Pearson
and Brown is reviewed and approved. It is contended that the as-
sumption that the errors of observation in the different series are not
correlated does not hold in specific cases, Brown claiming .66 corre-
lation in one case. It should not be expected to hold under the
usual experimental conditions. This difficulty is not avoided in
Spearman's modification of his formula. Furthermore Betz believes
that it is not clear whether Spearman would not eliminate gross true
fluctuations of activity along with slight chance errors of observation.
The high coefficients in sensory discrimination obtained by Spear-
man are more likely to show the ease in which the different children
followed the instructions. The evidence of a central factor is not
convincing. The "hierarchical" ordering of abilities might be
produced by a general cause of error. The evidence at present is
against a general pronounced, easily apparent intelligence. Were
it not for our prejudice, we should be surprised that the correlations
of intellectual activities are so high rather than that they are not
higher.
The eugenics researches are most important indirectly to psy-
chology in forming a general point of view because they show that
factors like alcohol and housing which were thought to be of enormous
importance are found to be of minimal effect. This is at present
determined for only a few characteristics but it is very conceivable
that it holds generally.
In conclusion Betz emphasizes that correlation alone does not
demonstrate a functional connection. Moreover, if changing one
variable necessarily changes the second it is not shown that the
converse is true; not all functional connections are reversible. An
inventory of correlations cannot disclose psychological secrets unless
supplemented by an understanding of mental facts. Correlations
serve two purposes in psychology: (i) mass-studies, in which traits
are described in popular terms, to aid in the educational or social
description of groups; (2) the discovery of functional connections
by using the greatest care in analysis and experiment with small
groups. In another brief paper (5) Betz shows with actual examples
how to prepare a correlation table, compute the product-moment
coefficient, the correlation ratio and test for linearity.
Pearson (20) grasps and sets forth correlation and contingency
in their ultimate significance. His wider outlook regards the universe
224 JAMES BURT MINER
as "a complex of contingent, not causally linked phenomena." "The
aim of science ceases to be the discovery of 'cause' and 'effect'; in
order to predict future experience it seeks out the phenomena which
are most highly correlated. . . . From this standpoint it finds no
distinction in kind but only in degree between the data, method of
treatment, or the resulting 'laws' of chemical, physical, biological,
or sociological investigations. . . . No phenomena are causal;
all phenomena are contingent, and the problem before us is to measure
the degree of this contingency, which we have seen lies between the
zero of independence and the unity of causation." Pearson is to be
thanked for clearly showing how easy it is and how useful to science
to conceive causation as a specific limited form of contingency.
For understanding the assumptions underlying the correlation ratio
and the coefficient of contingency this new chapter is the clearest
brief statement t;o be found anywhere. Students of correlation will
undoubtedly get much joy out of the statement of this leader
that a contingency table is "the numerical syllogism of observational
science, which replaces for all its purposes the barren syllogism of the
old Aristotelian logic. We do not say, 'Some B is A* but we state
numerically how much of each class of B is associated with each cate-
gory of A." Pearson promises that much is to be added to the
chapters on living forms when these appear in Part II. of the new
edition.
Pearson (21) derives a formula for determining whether small
values of the correlation ratio are significant. He also contributes
further (22) to the discussion of the Law of Ancestral Heredity
and reiterates his former conclusions that "the theory of multiple
correlation is the natural manner in which to approach the theory of
ancestral inheritance." "The fact that Mendelian gametic corre-
lations approach in some respects those found by observation on
populations, is not a justification of Mendelism."
An astonishing paper on the interpretation of psychological corre-
lations, if we may accept its basic presupposition, is that which has
appeared very recently under the joint authorship of Spearman and
Hart (15). The article claims to demonstrate conclusively by means
of a correlation criterion which they propose as crucial that "corre-
lation arises through performances, however different, depending
partly on a 'General Common Factor.'" They offer also a new
interpretation of this source of correlation which in one form or
another has been the favorite explanation of Spearman for some time.
This view, called "unifocal," they contrast with the "non-focal"
CORRELATION 225
view of universal independence of mental processes drawn from
Thorndike's earlier writings, and Thorndike's later view of levels
as well as those other "multifocal" interpretations which attribute
correlation to correspondence of type or faculty. "Every perform-
ance depends, not only on this General Factor, but also in varying
degree on a factor specific to itself and all very similar performances."
The General Factor is not any special sort of process, such as "intelli-
gence" or "synthetic power," nor is it to be identified with attention.
It is "some common fund of energy," characterized on the mental
side as "intellective energy." On the physiological side every
intellectual act involves "both the specific activity of a particular
system of cortical neurons, and also the general energy of the whole
cortex." Every such performance, therefore, inhibits quite different
simultaneous ones, any kind of non-mechanical process competes for
this fund of energy. As evidence of this conception the authors point
to "the larger correlations usually produced by the operations
demanding attention, the reduction of correlation as the performances
tend to become mechanical, and the large correlations shown by even
the simplest performances of the mentally defective." The recent
"surprising regeneration of * mental tests'" they attribute to "both
their purpose and method having been transformed in accordance with
the theory of a General Factor."
The proposed correlation criterion which the authors suggest as
the conclusive mathematical test of their "unifocal" theory is too
complex to set forth here. The authors believe that it is decidedly
better than the "hierarchy" of coefficients heretofore used. Apply-
ing this criterion to the results of fourteen different series of corre-
lation experiments by men of all the different faiths, they find the
surprising result that in every case the correlations are +.73 or over
and the median almost complete + 1.00, the value demanded by their
theory and as far as possible from the values of o and — i.oo which
they contend is demanded by the other theories. They also use their
criterion to controvert Brown's criticism of their "hierarchical"
arrangements of coefficients. The paper disclaims any opposition
to Thorndike's work on specific abilities, the correlations of which
may be superposed upon correlations of a more general character.
"Still less is it in opposition to his work on 'formal training.' . . .
Variation of training, within normal limits, appears to have no
appreciable influence on the General Factor, but only on the specific
ones." Spearman (24) presents a new form of his correction formula
for eliminating chance errors of observation, which had been published
226 JAMES BURT MINER
also in the Brit. ]. of PsychoL, 1910, 3, 271-295. It is based on
dividing the measurements of each individual into two or more groups
in such a way that the average of each group may be considered alike
except for these chance observational variations. Spearman (25)
also replies to the criticism of Brown and Betz concerning his former
correction formulae. He contends that only computation can deter-
mine how far chance errors are to be guarded against. The careful
arrangement of the research, which his critics advise, is insufficient.
Brown's mathematical and empirical criticisms, he claims, are both
faulty. Betz (6) answers this reply of Spearman and remains un-
convinced about the usefulness to psychology of Spearman's formulae
for eliminating accidental errors.
Abelson's research (i), carried out under the direction of Spear-
man, afforded part of the data on which the interpretation of the
General Factor was based. Nine specially devised tests were tried
on 88 girls and 43 boys from London schools for defectives, 10-12
of each sex of the highest grade pupils in each of eight schools. The
coefficients were computed by Spearman's "foot-rule" method for
the boys and girls separately in each school and then averaged.
The tests were repeated two or more times until a reliability of .70
or more was reached. Tables give the intercorrelations of each test
with the others and with the average of the others. Corrections for
differences in age and for chance errors he has calculated in part and
estimates that they will not affect his conclusions. The tests may be
regarded "as almost independent and about equally accurate measure-
ments of * general ability.'" On this assumption Spearman devised
formulae for estimating how much any number of tests pooled together
will differ from the result of an infinite number of tests pooled.
Pooling tests very greatly increases their trustworthiness in estimating
"general ability." The correlation between all the tests pooled
together and estimates of "practical intelligence" was .60 for the
girls and .56 for the boys.
In a paper outlined before the joint meeting of the British Psycho-
logical Society, the Mind Association, and the Aristotelian Society,
Winch (29) with hesitation sets forth a "modified faculty doctrine,"
which is based mainly on determining the functions thus to be
regarded as associated by discovering their correlations and measuring
the transfer of training under improved methods. He emphasizes
especially his method of "steadying" a group by repeating the tests
until succeeding tests correlate highly. This should be done before
one kind of test is correlated with another. It is to be remembered,
CORRELATION 227
however, that "high correlation sets us a problem of connection. It
does not ipso facto enable us to conclude that a relation of inter-
dependence exists." Low correlation between traits measured for
groups of individuals may even go with functional connection of the
two traits in the same individual. "Brown's capacity may be big
in one direction and small in another as compared with that of Smith and
Robinson, but an alteration in one of his functions may produce
some alteration in the other. To find the connection of functions
within the same mind, would it not be best to get a number of
measures for the same individual and correlate these?" In deter-
mining whether training of one function transfers, we should use his
method of "equal groups," chosen after "steadying." "The mental
functions thus connected will, I believe, give 'groupings' or 'faculties'
rather unlike those of early psychology." In order to justify formal
training "we should need to show that, by the formal training of
function a we can produce a transferred improvement in function /3
which we could not, with equal work, produce by training function
/3 itself," or that "that function may not be accessible to direct
attack."
Woodworth (30) introduces a new quick method of computing r
which he believes is "worthy to be regarded as one of the best ab-
ridged or 'foot-rule' methods." He also develops simplified formulae
for computing r, the average correlation within any number of tests,
and for the Spearman correction for attenuation, when the original
measurements have been reduced to terms of the standard or the
average deviation. He advocates this method of reduction whenever
several tests on the same individuals are either to be combined or
correlated. It is the only way to preserve the refinement of the
original measurements. The reduction of the measurements also
allows one to show the success of each individual in relation to the
tests taken as a whole. With nine tests for logical relationships
applied to thirteen individuals, he finds that those who ranked high
were more consistent than those who ranked low. The Pearson
coefficient between standing and consistence was .72. He suggests
that the standard variability of the average standing of the individuals
is a new measure of the agreement of several tests which has certain
advantages over the Av. r. Woodworth and Wells (31) utilize the
method of correlating the average standing of each subject with his
standing in each test, after reducing the tests to equivalence, and
thus determine the relative value of certain association tests.
Yule (32) gives us a text-book on statistics which devotes eight
228 JAMES BURT MINER
chapters to association and correlation methods and is adapted to
those who have a limited knowledge of mathematics. Written pri-
marily for students of economics and vital statistics, it aims also to
be of use to biologists and others. The text is the most compre-
hensive simple treatment of correlation to be found. Two of the
formulae suggested in the text — the Coefficient of Association and the
Correction Coefficient for a two- X two-fold table are emphatically
attacked by Heron (16) both as to their derivation and the results
obtained by their use. Stern (26) devotes a chapter to the statistical
methods of correlation and two other brief chapters to the concept
of correlation and the aims of research in this line. Brown's book on
Mental Measurement (8) is written primarily for the psychologist,
who will find it perhaps, the handiest manual of the recent correlation
formulae. It follows Pearson closely.1
In two researches the teacher's estimate of intelligence is empiri-
cally defended from Yule's belief "that unless they are very carefully
controlled, the teacher's judgments are relatively as well as absolutely
valueless." Gilby's study (14) is authoritatively prepared with the
assistance of Pearson. The judgments of 36 teachers in eight schools
on 1,725 boys in which they graded intelligence on the scale of five
categories defined by Pearson, it traced in interrelations with order
in examination, percentage of marks, age, standard, school, and
clothing, the latter defined in five grades. Correlation of general
intelligence and order in examination for constant age and constant
standard was .671. The places in marks and examination were
settled by headmasters independently of the class teachers. The
correlation between clothing and intelligence for constant age and
constant standard is .22. "There can we think be little doubt that
the evidence of clothing is roughly a measure of home conditions."
There is very little relation between age and order in class or age and
intelligence. The other research by Waite (27) presents similar results.
"No single psychological test or complex of tests is in the least likely
to replace our present method of judging general efficiency for public
or other service." The correlation between age and intelligence in the
same "form" is either negligible or negative. In both papers the
work is very carefully done from the statistical point of view, full
correlation tables are given, various methods tried, and linearity
estimated.
Correlation has been used extensively by Whitley (28) as a method
for evaluating various tests for similar functions and for determining
1See special review in this BULLETIN, 1912, 9, 125-126.
CORRELATION 229
the relationship of various scores for tests involving practice. About
45 different tests were repeated on from three to seven subjects and
occasionally checked by a larger group. The tests, grouped around
each of six types (association, memory, perception, discrimination,
discrimination and motor, motor), were each correlated with the
average records in that group, the test showing the highest correlation
being regarded as the best representative of that type, although it
might be less valuable from other points of view. In the second part
of the study perhaps the most striking result is the high negative
correlation between the position at the start and either gross or
percentile gain with practice. Five of the ten coefficients are over
— .90. " Individuals with low standing can and do improve the most,
judging objectively." The relationship of the position at the start
with the average of the whole series is closer than between it and the
position at the finish. " Fewer tests each administered oftener would
give a truer estimate of an individual and a better basis for comparison
and correlation." "The criticism that giving only a few trials
measures not the mental process supposedly tested but merely
adaptability to strange conditions such as apparatus, instructions,
working for speed, and the particular requirements of the test is
seldom of weight."
The first published results of the Anthropometric Laboratory at
Oxford (23) include 16 physical measurements and one mental test,
McDougalPs spot pattern. Twenty correlations are given for the
physical measurements for each of the ages from 18 to 22, with 95 to
330 cases at the different ages. The table is thus the most complete
for any of the college data on the subject. The correlations between
the possession of a scholarship or exhibition and the spot pattern
test which McDougall thinks measures concentration is small, .22
on the average for all grade groups, and about the same for this test
and "class in final schools."
In a preliminary report of an important study to be published by
the Bureau of Education Baldwin (2), as the result of successive
measurements on the same group of 350 boys and 435 girls taken for
periods of from 3 to n^£ years indicates that there are different
correlations for growth in height and weight for those above the
median than for those below. Those above begin and end their
various periods of acceleration and retardation earlier. Curves for
52 individuals show that correlations in weight do not follow those
for height in detail.
Boyce (7) correlates the estimates of 27 superintendents and
230 JAMES BURT MINER
principals as to the rank of their high school teachers in various
traits bearing on teaching efficiency, and finds that general merit had
little or no relation to sex, to general appearance .36, to instructional
skill .90, to stimulation of pupils .85, to stimulation of individuals .85.
These three, with intellectual capacity .71 and discipline .67, are the
qualities deemed most important. Descoeudres (n) gives corre-
lations between 15 tests (six taken from the Binet series) and her
estimate of intelligence for 14 deficient children from 6 to 14 years.
For the separate tests the coefficients run from .509 to .878. The
correlation with the average rank in all is .991. No correction was
made for differences in age. Norsworthy (19) finds the correla-
tions of the rate of learning German-English word associations with
immediate memory to be .41 and with memory after 30 days to be
.50; between immediate and this later memory .60. The tests were
on, 83 college students and disprove the theory of "easy come, easy
go," at least for this group. Lobsein (17) and Erler (12) get opposed
results on the problem whether memory for numbers correlates with
ability in the simple arithmetical operations. Busemann's and Bell's
aims are shown in the title of their papers (9) and (3). Lipmann's
paper (18) is a review of that field. Cohn and Dieffenbacher's
correlation results (10) are probably affected by neglect of age
differences in their groups. Forsyth (13) found slight correlation
between ages and grades with college students.
REFERENCES
1. ABELSON, A. R. The Measurement of Mental Ability of "Backward" Children.
Brit. J. of Psychol., 1911, 4, 315-341.
2. BALDWIN, B. T. Individual Differences in the Correlation of Physical Growth.
of Elementary and High School Pupils. /. of Educ. Psychol., 1911, 2, 150-152.
3. BELL, JULIA. On Pulse and Breathing Rates and their Relation to Stature.
Biometrika, 8, 232-236.
4. BETZ, W. tjber Korrelation. Zsch.f. angew. Psychol., 1911, 5 (Beih. 3).
5. BETZ, W. Rechenbeispiele in Erganzung zu Beiheft 3, tJber Korrelation. Zsch.
f. angew. Psychol., 1912, 6, 65-73.
6. BETZ, W. Erwiderung auf den vorstehenden Aufsatz von Spearman. Zsch. f.
angew. Psychol., 1912, 6, 77-78.
7. BOYCE, A. C. Qualities of Merit in Secondary School Teachers. /. of Educ.
Psychol, 1912, 3, I44-I57.
8. BROWN, WILLIAM. The Essentials of Mental Measurement. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1911. Pp. vi+154.
9. BUSEMANN, A. Die individuellen Korrelationen zwischen den Leistungen in
Gedachtnisexperimente und denen im Unterrichte. Zsch. /. angew. Psychol.,
1911, 5, 341-344.
10. COHN, J. and DIEFFENBACHER, J. Untersuchungen iiber Geschlechts-, Alters-
CORRELATION 231
und Begabungs-Unterschiede bei Schulern. Zsch. f. angew . Psychol., 1911, 5
(Beih. 2). Pp. vi+214.
11. DESCOEUDRES, ALICE. Exploration de quelques tests d'intelligence chez des
enfants anormaux et arrieres. Arch, de Psychol., 1911, xi, 351-375.
12. ERLER, O. Zahlengedachtnis und Rechenfertigkeit. Zsch. f. pad. Psychol. u.
exper. Pad., 1911, 12, 294-295.
13. FORSYTH, C. H. Correlation between Ages and Grades. /. of Educ. Psychol.,
1912, 3, 164.
14. GILBY, W. H., with the assistance of PEARSON, K. On the Significance of the
Teacher's Appreciation of General Intelligence. Biometrika, 1911, 8, 94-108.
15. HART, B. and SPEARMAN, C. General Ability, its Existence and Nature. Brit.
J. of Psychol., 1912, 5, 5I-84-
1 6. HERON, D. The Danger of Certain Formulae Suggested as Substitutes for the
Correlation Coefficient. Biometrika, 1911, 8, 109-122.
17. LOBSEIN, M. Korrelationen zwischen Zahlengedachtnis und Rechenleistung.
Zsch.f. pad. Psychol. u. exper. Pad., 1911, 12, 54-60.
1 8. LIPMANN, O. Die experimentelle Untersuchung der Rechenfertigkeit. Zsch.
f. angew. Psychol., 1911, 5, 3^9-399-
19. NORSWORTHY, NAOMI. Acquisition as Related to Retention. /. of Educ. Psychol.,
1912, 3, 214-218.
20. PEARSON, K. The Grammar of Science, Part I. — Physical, third edition, revised
and enlarged. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1911. Pp. xx+394-
2.1. PEARSON, K. On a Correction Needful in the Case of the Correlation Ratio.
Biometrika, 1911, 8, 254-255.
22. PEARSON, K. Further Remarks on the Law of Ancestral Heredity. Biometrika,
1911,8, 239-243.
23. SCHUSTER, E. First Results from the Oxford Anthropometric Laboratory.
Biometrika, 1911, 8, 40-51.
24. SPEARMAN, C. Eine neue Korrelationsformel. Ber. IV. Kongress f. exper.
Psychol., 1911, 189-191.
25. SPEARMAN, C. Der Beobachtungsfehler in der Korrelationslehre. Zsch. /.
angew. Psychol., 1912, 6, 73-77.
26. STERN, W. Die Di/erentielle in ihren methodischen Grundlagen. Leipzig: J. A.
Barth, 1911. Pp. v+5<D3.
27. WAITE, H. The Teacher's Estimation of the General Intelligence of School
Children. Biometrika, 1911, 8, 79-93.
28. WHITLEY, MARY T. An Empirical Study of Certain Tests for Individual Differ-
ences. Archives of Psychology, No. 19. New York: The Science Press, 1911.
Pp. 146.
29. WINCH, W. H. The Faculty Doctrine, Correlation, and Educational Theory.
/. of Phil., Psychol, etc., 1911, 8, 337~348; 372-384-
30. WOODWORTH, R. S. Combining the Results of Several Tests: a Study in Sta-
tistical Method. PSYCHOL. REV., 1912, 19, 97~I23-
31. WOODWORTH, R. S. and WELLS, F. L. Association Tests. PSYCHOL. MONOG.,
1911, 8, No. 5. Pp.85.
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Griffin and Company, 1911. Pp. vi+376.
232 V. A. C. HENMON
REACTION TIMES
BY PROFESSOR V. A. C. HENMON
University of Wisconsin
The studies of the year have been concerned with questions of
technique and the effect of direction of attention on reaction time.
Breitwieser (i) attacks again the old problem of sensory and motor
reactions. Eleven subjects gave an average excess of sensory
reaction time to auditory stimuli over motor reaction time of 180-,
the excess ranging from 8.90 to 440-. Series were then obtained
from two trained subjects without instructions as to direction of
attention. Sensory, motor, and normal reactions were introspectively
noted and the number reported as motor or sensory was about equal.
The times were the same as when the attitudes were voluntarily
assumed. In reactions with artificial direction of attention the
attempt was made to devise an objective method of insuring the type
of attention, motor by varying the resistance of the key, sensory by
variation in the clang character of the auditory stimuli. The times
for the "induced" sensory and the voluntary sensory reactions are
about the same. The times for the induced motor and the voluntary
motor are very different and the attitudes in the two cases are differ-
ent. The voluntary motor reaction involves merely the preparation
to react, the voluntary sensory reaction involves both the preparation
to observe and to react, the interference between the two adjustments
being reflected in the lengthened time for sensory reactions.
Breitwieser next applied the reaction time method to a study of
fluctuations of attention, by varying from one to ten seconds the
intervals between the ready signal and the stimulus. The results
with eighteen subjects, contrary to those reported by Delia Valle,
showed no rhythmic variations. The number of reactions with each
subject is too small and the variability too great for the effects to be
shown with any reliability. The most favorable interval for audi-
tory stimuli is apparently 2-3 sees, and for visual stimuli 3-4 sees.
Detailed studies with two trained subjects showed considerable
regularity as to favorable and unfavorable intervals, but there was no
evidence of rhythmic fluctuations in the reaction times.
The last chapter is concerned with the effect of varying the
resistance of the reacting key. The times are lengthened progress-
ively as the resistance is increased, hence the necessity of indicating
the resistance of the key when the downward pressure type of move-
REACTION TIMES 233
ment is used. The time of reaction with the release type of movement
is independent of the resistance. The excess of force expended varies
independently of the resistance and tends to decrease with practice.
The purpose of Grassi's (3) experiments was to determine the
effect of change in the direction of attention on sensory reactions to
tactual stimuli of constant intensity. Comparisons were made
between reactions (i) when the area stimulated is constant, (2) when
the area is varied with each stimulation — points on the left side
of the body, face, forearm, leg and back — (3) when the area is varied
periodically, after from seven to fourteen reactions with a constant
area. The experimenter found considerable variation, curiously
enough, in reaction times from day to day and from forenoon to
afternoon, so that comparisons between reactions with constant
stimulus points and the "transition" reactions, with which the study
is mainly concerned, are based on reactions made at one sitting.
The rather unusual diurnal variations do not appear to be a matter
of practice. However, the experiments are chiefly on one subject
and no measure of variability is given. The variability appears
to be too great for the results to have much significance. The most
important point of the study is the comparison, in the series with
periodic variation in the points stimulated, between the reactions
with constant stimulus points and the "transition" reactions. The
"transition" reactions are longer by from 140- to 550-, depending on
whether the transition is made from one area to another or from one
point to another point within the same area.
Giinther (4) reexamines in detail the processes of reaction in
recording stellar transits and the differences between reactions to
sudden stimuli and reactions to transits. In reactions to transits
the conditions in the fore-period between the emergence of the
stimulus into the field of vision and the transit give rise to two forms
of reaction, the anticipating and the complete. Just as in reactions
to rhythmic stimuli the reactions come to coincide in time with the
stimulus, so in recording transits the observer tends to anticipate
the stimulus. The effect of such anticipation and its relation to
methods of registration are now under investigation in the Leipzig
laboratory. Giinther's problem is the complete reaction and the
conditions affecting it. Even in the complete reaction sensory and
motor attitudes complicate the problem. The motor reaction tends
to become anticipating or at any rate there is no real apperception of
the stimulus preceding the reaction. In reactions to transits it is
peculiarly difficult to resist the tendency to premature and abbre-
234 V. A. C. HENMON
viated reactions and they are likely to become ultimately anticipating
reactions. Introspective testimony as to the nature of the reaction
is unreliable and some objective control is necessary. This was
done by conducting practice experiments where the stimulus —
artificial star on a kymograph — was arrested just before it reached the
meridian. Such series were continued until the proper adjustment of
attention was developed and were repeated at intervals to insure the
maintenance of the attitude.
Experiments were made with five subjects and with six rates of
movement of the stimulus,^, 1.5, I, .75, .37, .19 cm. per second. The
average reaction times for these rates are 2i6<r, 2040-, 205 <r, 2090-,
2250-, and 2490- respectively. That the attitude in the complete
reaction can be developed and maintained is shown by the close agree-
ment in the length of the times by the different subjects and by the
uniformity of the distribution about the mode, which is greater than
that shown in Alechsieff's results. It is shown also in the relatively
slight influence of variations in rates of transits. Contrary to
Alechsieff, Giinther recommends the complete reaction as the best
and most reliable method in recording transit observations, on the
ground that the adjustment of attention is more readily controlled
and that individual differences are less in evidence.
Dunlap (2) finds that a source of error in time measurements with
the Hipp chronoscope, due to the effects of use and temperature on
the armature spring, may be eliminated by removing the spring and
making the necessary readjustments in the counterpoise and circuit
arrangements. For the technical details reference must be made to
the original article.
Marie and Nachmann (6) describe briefly the arrangement for
measuring with the d'Arsonval chronometer reaction times to visual
stimuli — seven colored lightfc — and to olfactory stimuli — odorous
liquids. The arrangement for olfactory stimuli is ingenious.
REFERENCES
1. BREITWIESER, J. V. Attention and Movement in Reaction Time. (Archives of
Psychol., No. 18.) New York: The Science Press, 1911. Pp. 49.
2. DUNLAP, K. The Hipp Chronoscope without Armature Springs. Brit. J. of
Psychol., 1912, 5, 1-7-
3. GRASSI, ISABELLA. Einfache Reaktionszeit und Einstellung der Aufmerksamkeit.
Zsch.f. Psychol., 1911, 60, 46-72.
4. GUNTHER, F. Reaktionsversuche bei Durchgangsbeobachtungen. Psychol. Stud.y
1911, 7, 229-283.
5. MARIE, A. and NACHMANN, L. Considerations sur les donnees obtenues avec
1'appareil chronometrique enregistreur d'Arsonval au sujet de 1'ouie et du tact.
Arch. int. de neur., 96 S., 1911, 2, 364-371.
APPARATUS 235
6. MARIE, A. and NACHMANN, L. De nouveaux dispositifs simples s'adaptant au
chronometre du professeur d'Arsonval pour enregistrer les temps de reaction
visuelle et olfactive. Comptes rendus de la Soc. de Biol., 1911, 71, 661-663.
APPARATUS
BY PROFESSOR C. E. SEASHORE
University of Iowa
Crehore and Meara (i) describe an instrument which records
the microscopic movements of a diaphragm by means of light
interference. It works on the principle of the tambour, and the
record is made by means of interference bands obtained by a mercury
vapor lamp. The registration may be made by direct reading or by
a photograph. The instrument seems to be capable of exceedingly
fine and accurate registration. The article contains a number of
illustrations, the records of physiological events showing the regis-
tration of sound waves, including those from the human voice.
Dunlap (2) gives a report of a careful experimental investigation
of the errors in the fall-hammer, the reliability of the break spark
in chronoscopic records, the latency of the magnetic markers, the
effect of the reversal of the current in the Hipp chronoscope, and
other features. Suggestions are made for improvements in these
instruments.
Ponzo (3) describes a new two-point sesthesiometer, which is
designed to secure simultaneous and equal pressure of the two points,
and furnishes a convenient means of adjusting the distance. It may
be obtained from E. Zimmermann, Leipzig, Germany.
REFERENCES
1. CREHORE, A. C. and MEARA, F. S. The Micrograph. Jour, of Exper. Med.y
13, 616-625.
2. DUNLAP, K. The Fall-Hammer, Chronoscope, and Chronograph. Brit. Jour.
of Psychol, 4, 44-55-
3. PONZO, M. Ueber einen neuen Zirkel fur die Bestimmung der simultanen Raum-
schwellen der Korperhaut. Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 22, 390-394.
REPORT OF MEETING
THE CLARK MEETING OF EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGISTS
The ninth annual meeting of experimental psychologists took
place in the Psychological Laboratory of Clark University, Monday-
Wednesday, April 15-17. Twenty-four experimental psychologists
were present representing the laboratories of Columbia, Cornell,
Clark, Dartmouth, Harvard, Hobart, Pennsylvania, Princeton,
Wesleyan, and Yale.
The program of Monday afternoon consisted of two papers on
Inhibition, the first presented by Dr. H. S. Langfeld (Harvard),
and the second by Dr. E. Jacobson. Dr. Langfeld reported upon
further investigations into the nature of the negative attitude and
the act of suppression. Two methods of experimentation were
employed. The one, which consisted in guiding a stylus down the
groove of a modified Whipple tracing board, was used to determine
what processes are involved in the suppression of movement. Series
of trials were made both under positive instruction, i. e., to go down
the center, and under negative instruction, i. e., not to touch the
sides. As yet there have been too few trials to permit of deductions
from the quantitative results, but the introspection in some instances
showed imagery corresponding to a negative attitude. It was also
found that when the left hand was used, it was more difficult to hold
the instruction in mind. The other method was to instruct the
subject to recite the alphabet or the numbers from one to thirty
omitting certain letters or numbers. In the fore-period visual and
auditory imagery predominated. The negative was generally
expressed solely in the auditory image of the instruction, but instances
of visual imagery of the negative were discovered. In the main-
period the words to be suppressed appeared in consciousness at
times as auditory-kinsesthetic imagery. In several cases, however,
introspection found no trace of these words. Dr. Jacobson reported
three series of experiments on Inhibition, which were carried out at
Cornell University. In the first the effect of strong sound sensations
on simultaneous odors was tested. The results were negative. On
the supposition that these negative results might be due to added
236
MEETING OF EXPERIMENTALISTS 237
effort of attention to the odors in order to overcome the distraction,
passive and effortless attention was cultivated. The figures showed
some difference from those of the first series, indicating that the
abandonment of effort had had some effect, but, in general, inhibitions
still failed to appear. Finally, the observers were trained to give
strongest attention to the sound, and it was then found that the
intensity of the odor sensations was markedly diminished. Many
introspective analyses were made of inhibition and attention. The
meeting then adjourned to the home of President and Mrs. Sanford
who entertained at tea. Later in the afternoon Professor J. P. Por-
ter exhibited a trained dog whose behavior is under investigation.
The evening session was devoted to reports of investigations in
progress in various laboratories. The reports from the laboratories
of Teachers College and Columbia were given by Professor E. L.
Thorndike, of Harvard by Dr. H. S. Langfeld, of Pennsylvania by
Professor F. M. Urban, of Princeton by Professor H. C. Warren, of
Wesleyan by Professor R. Dodge, and of Yale by Dr. E. P. Frost.
Both the reports and the discussions which followed were informal.
The session of Tuesday morning was opened by Mr. C. A. Ruck-
mich (Cornell), who discussed the History and Status of Psychology
in America. Dr. L. R. Geissler (Physical Laboratory, National
Electric Lamp Association) read a paper on The Introspective Study
of Mental Functions. A systematic functional psychology, he said,
has yet to work out its own methods and terminology. Its subject-
matter may be divided into (a) extrinsic relations, existing between
mental and non-mental facts and including the cognitive, adaptive,
and organic relations of mind to its corresponding physical, biological,
and physiological determinants; (b) intrinsic relations, occurring
between attributes of the same mental process, or between simulta-
neous and successive processes, or between individual processes and
mind as a whole; and (c) mental activities, considered as structural
changes in consciousness viewed in the light of the completed mental
product or result accomplished. Introspection seems adequate to
the problems under (b), but may require supplementary methods such
as biological reflection, neurological and pathological observations,
systematic study of human and animal behavior, etc., for the problems
under (a) and (c). A confusion of the structural and functional
aspects of mind may perhaps account for the recent controversies
over imageless thought, relational elements, and the distinction
between mental act and content. Mr. K. M. Dallenbach (Cornell)
followed with a paper on Blindfold Chess Playing. The final paper of
238 MEETING OF EXPERIMENTALISTS
the morning was presented by Professor Dodge, who reported the
results of an investigation on mental work. Three students were
required to write examination papers of various degrees of difficulty,
and a record of the rate of heart-beat was obtained by a device which
successfully registered the heart-rate, yet at the same time permitted
bodily movements on the part of the observer. Mental work is
believed to be physical work, and the rate of heart-beat is taken to be
a reliable indicator of the degree of mental work.
The afternoon session was devoted to a general discussion of the
experimental investigation of thought: methods, results, applications.
The discussion was introduced by Professor Titchener who was
followed by President Hall, Dr. Geissler, Professor Dodge, Professor
Urban, President Sanford, Professor Warren, Dr. Jacobson, Professor
Thorndike and Professor Baird. Professor Titchener then sum-
marized the discussion.
The evening session was held at the home of President G. Stanley
Hall. Professor J. P. Porter read a paper reporting an investigation
by Professor B. N. Gates (Mass. Agricultural College) on Color
Discrimination in Bees. Yellow, white, and crimson paper flowers
were used, and it was found that the bees went to the flowers even
when they were sealed in glass tubes and when they were reflected in
a mirror. Although brightness was not altogether eliminated, the
results so far appear to be positive. Further experiments are con-
templated. Dr. Geissler gave an informal report of the laboratory
maintained by the National Electric Lamp Association, and of the
several investigations in the psychology of light and vision which are
in progress under his direction. The remainder of the evening was
given over to the enjoyment of the hospitality extended by President
Hall.
The concluding session of the meeting was held on Wednesday
morning, when reports were heard from the Clark, Cornell, and
Dartmouth laboratories. Mr. J. M. Fletcher, Mr. E. O. Finken-
binder, and Dr. H. P. Weld reported on investigations which are
practically completed, and Professor Baird reported on investigations
in progress in the laboratory of Clark University. Professor W. V.
Bingham gave an account of the work at Dartmouth and Mr. C. A.
Ruchmich and Professor Titchener reported on the investigations
in progress in the undergraduate and graduate laboratories, respec-
tively, at Cornell.
It was agreed to hold the tenth annual meeting at Wesleyan
University. H. P. WELD
CLARK UNIVERSITY
SPECIAL REVIEWS
PHYSIOLOGICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL TEXTS
Elements of Physiological Psychology. GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD
and ROBERT SESSIONS WOODWORTH. New York: Charles Scrib-
ner's Sons, 1911. Pp. xix -f- 704.
Ladd's Elements of Physiological Psychology was first published
in 1887. For many years it has served as the standard reference work
in English on physiological . and experimental psychology and its
influence on the development of the science in this country has
undoubtedly been very great. Many of the younger psychologists
got their first introduction to and interest in the experimental study
of mental processes through its pages and to them a new edition will
be especially welcome.
The extensiveness of the revision which the book has undergone
at the hands of the author and Professor Woodworth and which was
found necessary in order to make it adequately representative of the
present status of the science, is a striking testimony to the vigor with
which research has been carried on in psychology and its most closely
related sciences during the intervening twenty-four years. To
incorporate the wealth of material that has accumulated, every
chapter has been rewritten and new chapters have been added. The
changes in data, in the arrangement for systematic presentation, and
the shiftings of emphasis are so great that one who wishes to compare
in detail the treatment in the two editions has difficulty in finding his
way about.
The general plan of the new volume is the same as that of the
earlier edition. In details of logical arrangement the new edition is
superior to the old. Part I. gives a lucid exposition in 292 pages of
the development, anatomy, chemistry, and physiology of the nervous
system. This part opens with two new chapters on The Place of the
Nervous System in the Animal Kingdom and on The Development of
the Nervous System in the Individual. These chapters strike the
reviewer as the best in the entire book and as most likely to be widely
used by students of psychology. The clearness of the presentation
of the typical stages in the evolution of the nervous system from the
amoeba to man, and of the growth of the nervous system in embryonic
239
240 REVIEWS
life and childhood is an evidence of the skill of the writers in exposition
and an impressive indication of the progress of neurological research.
The substantial gains to our knowledge in these fields make possible
precision of statement and detail in description that are noteworthy.
This is especially shown by a comparison of Chapter VI. in the old
edition on the development of the nervous system with the corre-
sponding chapter in the new edition. They are so radically different
that the latter may fairly be called new.
The succeeding chapters on the gross and minute anatomy of the
nervous system incorporate goodly portions from the first edition
with the inevitable result that repetition and references back to the
earlier chapters occur with great frequency. Thirty-seven figures,
for the most part new, richly illustrate and illumine the text. The
chemistry of the nervous system is briefly treated in a special chapter,
and two chapters are given to nervous conduction and the reflex
functions.
The chapter on the end-organs, or receptors, of the nervous system
is the only rather disappointing chapter in Part I. It has undergone
less change than any other. The psychologist would surely hope to
find in a book of this character a full and adequate discussion of the
anatomy and physiology of the sense-organs. One is inclined to
regret the space given to the gross anatomy, and particularly the 59
pages given to the metaphysics of the relation of mind and body, when
one reads the sections on the muscle sense, the effects of light on the
retina, the semicircular canals, and the end organs of motion.
The two chapters on the cerebral hemispheres and the localization
of cerebral functions have been transferred to Part I., where they
logically belong. Many admirably selected illustrations of locali-
zation and of the histological structure of the cortex accompany a
remarkably clear and critical review of the complex and conflicting
literature on cerebral physiology. These two chapters alone make
the book a necessary addition to the psychologist's library.
Part II. summarizes in 328 pages the main results of the qualitative
and quantitative experimental study of sensation, perception,
memory, thought, feeling, movement, and the time-relations of
mental phenomena, and the correlations of mental processes with
nervous processes. While this part does not purport to review the
whole field of experimental psychology, it is nevertheless perhaps the
best general treatment we have. In the main the substance and
arrangement of the chapters on the quality and quantity of sensations,
presentations of sense, and reaction time are unchanged. Practically
PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 241
every section has been rewritten and such additional data as are at
hand have been added. It is a gratifying evidence of scientific
productivity in this country to find that these data can be drawn as
largely as they are from investigations by American students.
The application of experimental methods to the feelings and to
the higher mental processes has necessitated three practically new
chapters, the first on feeling, emotion, and expressive movement,
including also a brief discussion of fatigue; a second on memory and
the process of learning, which reviews not only the results of the
experimental study of memory and the acquistion of skill in man but
also learning processes in lower animals; and a third on the mechanism
of thought, including a brief discussion of attention. The chapter on
memory and learning is especially valuable.
The chapters in this part are not of equal completeness and value.
While twenty-nine pages are given to reaction time, undoubtedly
the best summary of the literature obtainable, seven pages each to
fatigue and attention do not, of course, adequately represent the
relative amounts of experimental works in these fields. It is perhaps
ungracious, however, to mention such a point when one reflects upon
the labor already involved in canvassing and critically evaluating a
literature which covers practically the whole field of experimentation
in psychology, and in preparing a compendium of facts which puts
every psychologist under a debt of gratitude to the authors.
Part III., abridged in the new edition to 59 pages, treats of the
Nature of Mind and the metaphysical conception of the relation
of mind and body to which the results of physiological psychology
point. This part could have been omitted without great loss, and
the space devoted to a fuller discussion of physiological and experi-
mental problems. The closing chapter of Part I. and sections 14-34
in the last chapter of Part II. set forth clearly the limits of present
scientific knowledge concerning psychophysical correlations. They
hardly furnish evidence either for or against the "common-sense"
dualism, which is maintained, and the discussion of the problem
might well have been left to philosophy to which in the Preface it is
relegated.
The "controlling purpose" of the book is to present an adequate
summary of "what modern science knows, or reasonably conjectures,
about the correlations existing between the nervous mechanism and
the mental life of man." The erudition of the authors, combined
with a keen critical judgment and exceptional skill in presentation,
leads to a realization of this purpose in a high degree. The book is
242 REVIEWS
again one that the student of physiological and experimental psychol-
ogy cannot well be without.
V. A. C. HENMON
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
A Text-Book of Experimental Psychology with Laboratory Exercises.
CHARLES S. MYERS. Second Edition. Cambridge: The Uni-
versity Press; New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911.
Part /., Text-Book. Pp. xiv + 344. Part II., Laboratory
Exercises. Pp. v + 107.
The author tells us in his preface that the work has been thor-
oughly revised. It is now published in two volumes, the laboratory
exercises being bound separately from the text-book. This is in
some respects an advantage. It is, however, regrettable that the
text-book cannot be obtained separately if so desired.
The recent work of Dr. H. Head, especially the material of the
Croonian Lectures1 has inspired most of the important changes and
additions. It is interesting to note the influence of these physio-
logical investigations.
In the paragraph on The Two Systems of Cutaneous Sensibility,
which has been partially rewritten, Myers says (p. 13) that there is
no evidence, at present, that two separate systems of peripheral nerve
fibers correspond to the two systems of cutaneous sensibility. In the
first edition, we were told that the work of Head and his collab-
orators compel us to assume the existence of these two systems.
The title of Chapter XVI. has been changed from "On Weight" to
"Muscular Effort" and the last part upon effort (pp. 213-217),
which is now called an experience and not a "sense," has been
partially rewritten and enlarged. The efferent impulses influence
our perceptions. For example, they are responsible for the dis-
placements in localization in case of paralysis of the eye muscles.
There is no necessity to adopt the hypothesis that the motor impulse
is directed toward some cortical sensory center. It is probable that
volitional movements effect a disturbance in various systems of
unconscious dispositions which Head calls "schemata" upon which
is based our awareness of spatial relations. Not only, however, does
Myers assume an effect of volition upon unconscious dispositions,
but also a consciousness of the effort, which he describes as "the ' act '
that is inherent in every conative experience." This latter assump-
1 These lectures appeared in the 34th volume of Brain and not in the 33d volume,
as Myers undoubtedly thought they would.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 243
tion is not clearly stated here, but the reference to Ach's experiments
on page 332 more fully explains it.
In the paragraph on the Histological Basis of the Spatial Thresh-
old it is stated (p. 223) that the spatial threshold may be impaired
in regions where tactual sensibility is normal. This is due to the fact
that the impulses concerned with spatial discrimination do not cross
until they reach the medulla oblongata, while the impulses concerned
with tactual sensibility cross already in the cord. In the paragraph
on Relative and Absolute Localization on the Skin, we learn (p. 224)
that, due to a similar difference in the place of crossing of the impulses,
localization may be present with an absence of kinaesthesis, although
normally kinaesthesis aids localization. Before describing Lotze's
and Hering's theory of local signs M. says (p. 225): "Introspection
and the study of abnormal states show that the ability to distinguish
a double from a single touch is something different from the ability
to ascribe to the two touches definite and different localizations."
At the beginning of the chapter On Sensibility and Sensory
Acuity, we find that lesions of the sensory cortex destroy the power
of discrimination and thus affect sensory acuity, and the chapter on
Identity and Difference begins with a paragraph on The Influence
of the Sensory Cortex.
At the end of Chapter XXIV. (p. 313) there is an interesting
description of the effect of thalamic lesion on feeling. The most
significant change is a decided increase in the amount of pleasure
or displeasure produced by a given sensation.
Among the other changes and additions, we note (p. 33) a descrip-
tion of the vowel quality of pure tones as discovered in the recent
investigations of W. Kohler. In the paragraph on Theories of
Consonants, reference is made to Liebermann and Revesz's article
"Ueber Orthosymphonie" (pp. 54 and 55).
In discussing adequate and inadequate stimuli (p. in), electrical
stimuli have been omitted from the list of inadequate stimuli for
pain, heat, cold, or pressure.
In the chapter on Size and Direction, it is stated (pp. 282-283)
that, although a perception of distance does not consciously affect
that of size, yet, primarily, size must depend on distance. An
appeal is made to unconscious dispositions as a possible explanation
of the relation of apparent distance to the apparent size of objects.
Presumably in consideration of the work in the Cornell laboratory
on attention, the doubt expressed as to the possibility of measuring
attention, which ended the chapter on that function in the first edition,
has now been omitted.
244 REVIEWS
An additional chapter on Thought and Volition has been added.
It seems to the reviewer that the book would be better without it,
the more in that it does not fit into the general scheme of the book,
there being no experiment in the second volume corresponding to
this chapter. It is vague in its descriptions and contains statements
which are bound to give the student a distorted idea of the present
situation in regard to the question of imageless thought. Surely a
search through the literature will fail to find "a general agreement
that in addition to the objects thought of, in addition to feelings, there
is a specific act of thinking, which is totally devoid of sensory content"
(p. 327), nor can the view that "there can be no doubt that among
the more cultured, especially among those who are practiced in
abstract thinking, imageless thought is very common" (p. 327) be
entertained by a number of psychologists whom the author would
undoubtedly place in this favored class. The description of the
genesis of the experience of awareness of meaning is difficult to follow.
" Doubtless in the development of species, meaning is prior to thought.
In the development of the individual, thought is doubtless prior to
language; infants being capable of rudimentary thought before they
have acquired internal speech. It is therefore not surprising that
imagery, which plays so important a part in the mental life of children
and in that of adults who encourage its use, may yet fall away under
certain conditions and in certain individuals, leaving recognizable
only what can be expressed as 'awareness' of meaning." If meaning
is prior to imageless thought, is not this statement against rather
than for his theory? We are also told that usually there is no diffi-
culty in separating the content of thought from the act of thinking.
The part of the chapter on volition follows closely the experiments of
Ach.
In Part II., the experimental portion, the experiment on the after-
sensations of tones is omitted. The experiment on The Distinction
between Cutaneous and Motor Sensations is also omitted and two
experiments upon the labyrinthine sensations substituted. A brief
description of experiments on testimony has been added to the
experiment on association reactions.
The book is very solidly written and, in most instances, a rare
discrimination has been used in the selection of the important facts
of psychology. It remains one of the best text-books we have and it
is, therefore, more the pity that the author is not as clear in his
exposition as he is thorough in his thought. So many facts are con-
tained in so small a space, that the connecting links have had to be
PSYCHOPHYSICS 245
omitted and the reader is compelled to fill in between the lines. This
makes it very difficult reading for the beginner and robs the book of
much of its usefulness.
HERBERT SIDNEY LANGFELD
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Psychophysik. Darstellung der Methoden der experimentellen Psy-
chologie. W. WIRTH. (R. Tigerstedt's Handbuch der physi-
ologischen Methodik. Vol. 3, Abt. 5.) Leipzig, 1912. Pp. 522.
The scope of this book is similar to that of Titchener's Quantitative
Manual or of G. E. Miiller's Gesichtspunkte, in so far as it aims at a
presentation of the present status of psychophysics. It differs
radically from its predecessors in that historical discussions and
controversies are almost totally absent. The reason seems to be that
psychophysics has found its bearings since the publication of the
Manual and that most of its problems are beyond the controversial
state. Titchener (loc. cit., p. 174) quotes Lipps as expressing the
desirability of finding a new foundation for the psychophysical
measurement methods, but Wirth has no doubt as to this point and
his book shows clearly that psychophysics reaches as far as the field
of experimental psychology, a view already expressed by the reviewer
on several occasions.
Experimental psychology is a part of general psychology and
though finding its immediate material within individual consciousness
only, it is to be defined as the study of consciousness in general. In
such a study one has to consider all the phenomena of the organism
connected with the changes of consciousness. Constant progress
in scientific observation can be obtained only by applying the experi-
mental method. A psychological experiment does not make intro-
spection superfluous, but gives it objectivity, because the experiences
of different people under the same conditions can thus be observed.
Furthermore, introspection may aid in securing the correct per-
formance of the experiments, the subject actively cooperating in
assuming and maintaining not only a certain position of the body, but
also a certain "inner adjustment" essential for the outcome of the
results. On the other hand, the objective data furnish the means of
controlling introspection.
The general purpose of psychological experimentation is to find
relations between psychical events so as to link them with the general
causal connection of phenomena. The ideal -of such a mutual
dependence is its expression in the form of a mathematical function.
246 REVIEWS
It is not indispensable for this purpose that both cause and effect be
measurable, but the expression of such regularities is much simplified
if one or both can be expressed quantitatively.
Most experimental investigations deal with sensations, and the
problem arises to represent sensation as function of the stimulus.
Every functional relation which we have found may be used for the
purpose of indirect measurement, which has the formal character of a
relation between purely physical quantities but which really is a
symptom of a psychological relationship. Such relations are of
special interest, because they show the mind in relation to the objects
which surround us and thereby show the basis for the purposeful
adaptation of our will reactions.
All measurements are affected by errors and the most exact
physical determinations are no exception to this rule. Psychology
differs in this respect only gradually from the more favored sciences.
These errors are due to the fact that every event depends not only on
its known causes alone but also on an indefinite number of influences
which escape our notice and our control. A repetition of the measure-
ment of a quantity implies the supposition that this uncontrollable
complex of causes has remained constant. These variations are very
large in the biological sciences which deal with processes subject to
many strong influences, and for this reason it is necessary to treat
the data of observation according to the rules of the theory of dis-
tributions (Kollektivmasslehre). The variations of the results in
human psychology do not seem to be quite as large as those of animal
psychology, because the voluntary control by the introspection of the
subject eliminates some sources of variability.
Wirth explains the principles of the theory of distributions and
gives the formulae for the direct treatment of the results, for the
application of the formula of Gauss and of the series of Bruns. In his
treatment of the theory of psychophysical measurement the method
of constant stimuli and its generalizations stand in the foreground
of the interest, as is seen from the large amount of space given to the
discussion of this method and its problems. We call particular
attention to the formulae for the direct treatment, some of which are
of Wirth's own invention and bid fair to be of great practical use.1
Wirth gives the weights of the observation equations in the method
of constant stimuli, calculated by my formula as well as by those of
Miiller. W. Brown in his book on Mental Measurement does the
same without giving any reasons, while Wirth's suggestion that
1 Cf. Arch.f. d. ges. Psychol., 20, 1911, pp. 1-8 of the Literaturbericht.
NOTE ON APPARATUS 247
Miiller's solution is especially simple is obviously wrong. It seems
curious that both authors should have overlooked the fact that both
formulae cannot be correct.
In a complete presentation of the theory of distributions, Pearson's
views ought not to have been omitted. It is true that they have not
been applied to psychology until now, but practically the same remark
may be made in regard to the series of Bruns. There may be some
doubt as to whether this lack of success of Bruns and Pearson is
due to the inherent difficulties of their methods, or to certain defi-
ciencies of their presentation. Pearson's papers are not easy reading
and Bruns's book is such that it ought to be given to senior wranglers
only. The second edition of Czuber's textbook of the calculus of
probabilities has made Bruns's views a little more accessible, but
psychologists will be grateful to Wirth for his trouble in presenting
the theory and practice of the series of Bruns.
It is not possible to give here even a brief survey of the rich experi-
mental material embodied in this book. We merely mention pres-
entations of the methods for studying attention, memory, time
perception, feelings, and voluntary reactions. Some of the investi-
gations, as, e. g., those on the influence of sounds of different pitch
on attention, or the one on the decimal equation, have not been
reported before, and there are only few chapters where Wirth can-
not refer to his own investigations. The general purpose of the
investigation, however, remains the same everywhere: the goal is to
arrive at as exact an understanding of the mental processes as possible;
the psychophysical methods are the most indispensable tools for
this purpose, but they are not more than tools.
F. M. URBAN
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
A NOTE ON APPARATUS
A SIMPLE BLIND FOR THE EYES. An inexpensive type of motoring-
goggles (procurable at five-and-ten-cent stores for ten cents) is in use
in the laboratory as a blindfold for light and dark adaptation. For
the latter purpose, a heavy black paper is inserted in the eye-pieces
and kept in place by means of a steel wire spring bent to fit the inside
of the eye-piece. This has proved to be a very satisfactory way of
excluding light stimuli of even the greatest degree of intensity. For
light adaptation, the pieces of black paper are replaced with a set
of translucent discs cut from architect's paper.- Finally, in experi-
248 BOOKS RECEIVED
merits upon color-adaptation, the goggles furnish a convenient sub-
stitution for the ordinary colored glasses. In this case, gelatin papers
of various colors are available for insertion in the eye-pieces. Since
the goggles cover virtually the whole field of vision, they afford an
excellent opportunity for producing general as well as local adaptation
to color.
CHRISTIAN A. RUCKMICH
CORNELL UNIVERSITY
BOOKS RECEIVED DURING MAY
WITHERSPOON, J. Lectures on Moral Philosophy. Princeton: Univ.
Press, 1912. Pp. xxix + 144. $1.50.
STUMPF, C. Beitrdge zur Akustik und Musikwissenschaft. VI.
Leipzig: Earth, 1911. Pp. 165. 5. Mk.
VOLD, J. M. Ueber den Traum. Bd. II. Leipzig: Barth, 1912.
Pp. vi + 449-879. ii. Mk.
HOLLINGWORTH, H. L. The Influence of Caffein on Mental and
Motor Efficiency. (Columbia Contributions to Psychology.)
New York: Science Press, 1912. Pp. v + 166.
RAND, B. The Classical Psychologists. Selections Illustrating Psy-
chology from Anaxagoras to Wundt. Boston, New York, Chicago:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1912. Pp. xxi + 734. #3.50.
DOWNEY, JUNE E. The Imaginal Reaction to Poetry. The Affective
and the ^Esthetic Judgment. (Bulletin No. 2 of the Department of
Psychology of the University of Wyoming.) Laramie, Wyo.,
1912. Pp. 56.
ELLIOT, H. S. R. Modern Science and the Illusions of Professor
Bergson. London, New York, etc.: Longmans, Green, and Co.,
1912. Pp. xix + 257. #1.60 net.
Contributi Psicologici del Labor atorio di Psicologia Sperimentale della R.
Universitd di Roma. Vol. I, 1910-1911. Roma: Presso il
Laboratorio di Psicologia.
AUERBACH, F. Die Grundlagen der Musik. Leipzig: J. A. Barth,
1911. Pp. vi + 209. Geb. Mk. 5.
PYLE, W. H. The Outlines of Educational Psychology. Baltimore:
Warwick and York, 1911. Pp. x + 254. $1.25.
RIGNANO, E. Essais de Synthese Scientifique. Paris: Alcan, 1912.
Pp. xxxi + 294.
Vol. IX. No. 7. July 15, 1912,
THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN
GENERAL REVIEWS AND SUMMARIES
VISUAL SPACE
BY PROFESSOR G. M. STRATTON
University of California
The tendency, in explaining our perception of depth, to make
light of the peculiarly binocular factors continues as in the year
preceding. Jaensch, in an elaborate work (7) which merits a fuller
account than can here be given, dwells upon a number of facts which
tell against the importance of retinal disparity. For him, attention,
especially the changes and sweep of attention which go with certain
eye-movements, are particularly emphasized, after recounting a
range and variety of his own experimental findings. In several
regions he discovers apparent shifts of depth with no change of the
binocular situation. He brings his theory into connection with visual
art by experiments on the perception of intervening illuminated
media — colored fluids, and the like — and believes that the peculiar
effects which are observable in momentary observation, especially
the peculiar character of the attention-process then, help to explain
the contributions of impressionistic painters. Not only is the mode
of observing which such painters employ peculiarly successful in
detecting "atmosphere," but it also brings in other influences which
heighten the aesthetic effect. Finally he divides the truth which
nativist and empiricist each claim entire, assigning a part to each.
Other experimenters continue this process of subtracting from the
supposed binocular influence. Schubotz (17) repeating Hillebrand's
" Alice" experiment finds, as did Hillebrand, a curvature in the line
of objects which apparently form straight rows of receding equal
lateral extents; the direction of the curvature, .however, sometimes
249
250 G. M. STRATTON
departs from that found by Hillebrand. He then simplified Hille-
brand's procedure, by arranging receding objects into a single row,
instead of double rows, apparently straight, and having them not
simply to left and to right, but also above and below the line of sight.
He finds curvature in all these cases; in the vertical plane, where
binocular parallax does not hold, as well as in the horizontal direction
where it does. Hillebrand's insistence here upon the importance of
binocular parallax is therefore unwarranted. Especially important
is the fact that actual curvature occurs in these apparently straight
lines with not only binocular, but also with monocular observation,
when Hillebrand's factor is absent. Such curvature, he holds, is an
original property of visual space. He experimented also upon the
"stereoscopic zone" — that is, the range, fore and aft, of a given
fixation point, within which there is noticeable plastic effect without
double-images; upon the over-estimation of verticals, finding a
difference in its amount according as the line is observed with one
or with two eyes — a result which does not exactly tally with that
since reported by Valentine.1 This overestimation also he regards
as an original property of visual space.
Poppelreuter, in a briefer (14) and a longer (15) report upon the
same topic, likewise attacks Hillebrand's conclusions from the
"Alice" experiment. He repeats the experiment, with various
modifications, finding that the arrangement which produces the effect
of equal amounts of increase of depth is actually neither a series of
equal binocular disparities nor of equal differences of visual angle,
but a series approximately one of arithmetical differences. The
"Alice" curve is very irregular, especially as it approaches the ob-
server. The arrangement arrived at monocularly differs but slightly
from that reached binocularly — thus agreeing with the findings of
Schubotz, as above. Binocular parallax therefore, as against Hille-
brand, cannot be the decisive factor in such depth arrangements; it
but intensifies and makes more impressive and stable the relief-
effect already present in monocular vision. For unless "empirical"
factors for the production of relief are present abundantly, monocular
depth tends to fade out, especially with inattention, and repetition.
Poppelreuter, besides arguing against Hillebrand, opposes Hering's
contention that there is a specific depth sensation. Hering's theory
of depth, in so far as it attributes importance to a physiological
mechanism, he believes to be sound for the apparent direction of
depth changes, but not for their apparent amount. In an appendix
1 Brit. J. of PsychoL, 1912, 5, 8-35.
VISUAL SPACE 251
to his article, Poppelreuter describes several pieces of apparatus for
the study of visual space.
Mampell's dissertation (9), which is wholly theoretical and does
not appear to have taken any sufficient account of the literature of
the subject, surveys various theories of visual space, concluding that
extension, depth, and direction are directly given as sensuous proper-
ties of the visual impression. The precise localization of the im-
pression as regards distance, whether monocular or binocular, is
determined by experience. Monnet (10) presents with true Gallic
clearness certain matters of depth-perception that have long been
common property.
The depth-effect of ordinary single photographs is considerably
heightened, according to Ponzo, by a device which he describes (13).
His is a very simply apparatus by which the light from the photo-
graph is twice passed through a convex lens and is reflected in a
mirror before coming to the observer's eyes. The disturbance due
to the surface of the photograph itself is thus doubly reduced, and a
vivid plastic effect is said to result both for binocular and monocular
vision. Pigeon (n) describes a stereoscope so constructed that the
picture for the one eye can be shifted vertically and for the other eye
horizontally, — a device applicable not only to the study of binocular
vision, but to the treatment of various abnormalities of the external
optic muscles. Special devices add to its value for the medico-legal
examination of disturbances of vision, real or simulated. Chaveau
(3) likewise deals with stereoscopic vision, seemingly having redis-
covered the fact of retinal rivalry. The dominance of the image in
the one eye over that in the other is aided by unsymmetrical images,
by difference of acuity, and differences of brightness and distinctness
in the opposing images.
The changes of apparent depth in the well-known figures of
ambiguous perspective is studied by Benussi (2). With catholic
temper he accepts the entire list of factors urged in rival theories of
these phenomena — the importance of changes of the point of ocular
fixation, of the direction of attention, of the readiness of certain ideas
to arise, of the different relation of the figure to the surface upon
which it might rest. Each and all of these, he believes, play a part.
His experimental contribution is chronometric: he timed the appear-
ance of the perspective with different positions of a given figure; and
found the proportion of successes and failures in arriving at any
perspective when the exposure-time is reduced. He finds that the
time between the beginning of the exposure and the rise of perspective-
252 G. M. STRATTON
effect is about three times as great when the position of the drawing
is such as to prevent a normal rest and stability of the object. For
each position of the drawing there is a preferred perspective. The
reduction of the exposure-time reduces the number of cases where
perspective appears. Repetition does not regularly reduce the time
of appearance of the perspective — a fact which Benussi, I think
unwarrantably, believes should make us cautious in explaining here
by empirical and associational factors. The stages by which the
perspective arises are, according to Benussi, these: the sensory im-
pressions from line and ground are first worked up mentally into a
two-dimensional form; and only upon this form as a basis, and not
directly upon the impressions themselves, does the plastic effect arise.
Passing now to a group of articles dealing with the perception and
the after-effect of motion, Dufour (4, 5, 6) describes an apparatus for
the study of the after-effect of visual movement — an apparatus in
principle such as has long been familiar in this country. For Plateau's
spiral he substitutes a belt-surface with alternate parallel stripes
of black and white set at a right-angle to the direction of motion.
He finds transfer of after-effect from stimulated and unstimulated
eye — a finding which he seems not to be aware had long ago been
noted by other observers — even with motions of translation (instead
of rotation), for which alone he claims his observations to be novel.
Easier (i) measures the interval between the close of the motion
which serves as visual stimulus and the beginning of the after-motion
in vision, and finds it to be 0.5-0.8 sec. This interval does not
seem to be affected either by the speed, the direction, or the intensity
of the stimulating movement. Stratton (18) finds that rapid motion
in vision, if it is to be perceived as motion, must occupy a time that
is approximately the same as that of the least succession which we
can notice; and this fact, conjoined with his earlier finding that the
least extent within which motion is observable is approximately the
same as the just-noticeable difference of visual points in space, takes
away all ground for supposing that the visual experience of motion
is something unique and elemental and independent of our experience
of space and of time.
Regnault (16) notes a number of widespread divergences between
the representation of movement visually and the form of the actual
movement as revealed by instantaneous photography. From the
art of the Bushmen to that of the Greek sculptors there are certain
universal exaggerations of the spread of the legs in running, the rise
of the body above the ground, as well as in certain "dyschronisms,"
VISUAL SPACE 253
i. <?., where — as in the discus thrower, and in the representation of the
running of animals and of men — phases of movement actually distinct
in time are seen and represented as though simultaneous. Ponzo (12),
observing " motion-pictures," has noted a number of interesting
fusions from sources outside of vision — as when he seems to hear the
visible water-fall or carriage, smell the new-mown hay, or feel the
coolness of the sea. Usually he is able to find something in the actual
impressions from these non-visual senses that give a sensory basis for
the fusion — impressions that would be quite unnoticed if they did
not happen to fit into the total visual object. But such fusions
occur for him only when he does not aim to observe them; when he is
off his guard.
Evidence is tellingly arrayed by McDougall (8), in a mass and
detail impossible here to reproduce, that corresponding retinal points
are not connected with a common cortical center; at the central parts
immediately connected with consciousness the paths taken by the
excitation from corresponding points are anatomically distinct.
Yet there is an intimate functional relation — now a reciprocal
inhibition and now a reciprocal reinforcement of the processes arising
from such points. The anatomical separation of the centers, Mc-
Dougall feels, works against Bering's theory of color, and in favor
of the Young-Helmholtz theory. An interesting though incidental
feature of the paper is McDougalPs adoption of the idea that instead
of looking for a special cause of fusion in things mental, fusion is the
fundamental and inevitable process and to be taken for granted
wherever there is no special cause working for discrimination. The
impressions from points in the two eyes, therefore, must always be
seen singly unless there be a special motive for distinguishing them —
either a different quality or a different motor tendency in the two
impressions.
REFERENCES
1. BASLER, A. Ueber das Sehen von Bewegungen. VI. Mitteilung. Der Beginn des
Bewegungsnachbildes. P finger's Arch. f. d. ges. Pkysiol., 139, 611-622.
2. BENUSSI, V. Ueber die Motive der Scheinkorperlichkeit bei umkehrbaren Zeich-
nungen. Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 20, 363-396.
3. CHAVEAU, A. Phenomenes d'inhibition visuelle qui peuvent accompagner la
reassociation des deux images retiniennes dissociees par les prismes du stereo-
scope. Conditions et determinisme de ses phenomenes. Comptes Rendus des
Seances de I1 Academic des Sciences, 152, 481-487.
4. DUFOUR, M. Sur la spirale de J. Plateau. Comptes Rendus des Seances de la
Sociele de Biologie (Paris), 70, 151-2.
5. DUFOUR, M. Un appareil permettant de faire certaines experiences d'optique
physiologique. Ibid., 70, 295-6.
254
DANIEL STARCH
6. DUFOUR, M. Sur quelques phenomenes d'optique physiologique (Deuxieme note).
Ibid., 70, 485-487.
7. JAENSCH, E. R. Ueber die Wahrnehmung des Raumes. Zsch. f. Psychol.,
Erganzungsband 6. Pp. 488.
8. McDouGALL, W. On the Relations between Corresponding Points of the Two
Retinae. Brain, 33, 37i~388.
9. MAMPELL, H. Zur Theorie des rdumlichen Sehens. (Dissertation.) Strassburg,
1909.
10. MONNET, R. La perception de la troisieme dimension. /. de psychol. norm, et
path., 8, 104-127.
11. PIGEON, L. Sur un stereoscope a coulisses. Comptes Rendus des Seance s de I'Aca-
demie des Sciences, 152, 1111-1114-
12. PONZO, M. Quelques observations psychologiques faites durant des representa-
tions cinematographiques. Arch. ltd. de Biol., 56, 81-86.
13. PONZO, M. Un appareil pour la vision plastique du photographies. Ibid., 56,
125-126.
14. POPPELREUTER, W. Beitrage zu einer Theorie der scheinbaren Grosse. Bericht
iiber den IV. Kongress fur experimented Psychologie (in Innsbruck, 1910).
Leipzig, 1911, 269-270.
15. POPPELREUTER, W. Beitrage zur Raumpsychologie. Zsch. f. Psychol., 58, 200-
262.
16. REGNAULT, F. Le mouvement dans le photographic et dans 1'art. Comptes
Rendus des Seances de la Societe de Biologic , 70, 342-343.
17. SCHUBOTZ, F. Beitrage zur Kenntnis des Sehraumes auf Grund der Erfahrung.
Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 20, 101-149.
18. STRATTON, G. M. The Psychology of Change; How is the Perception of Move-
ment related to that of Succession? Psychol. Rev., 1911, 18, 262-293.
AUDITORY SPACE
BY PROFESSOR DANIEL STARCH
University of Wisconsin
Very little work has been done on auditory space during the past
year. M. Truschel (2) briefly reports some experiments to determine
the factors concerned in detecting the presence of objects by the
blind. The head of a blind subject was shielded in various ways
while a piece of cardboard suspended from the end of a stick was
moved about and placed in various positions to see how accurately
the subject could detect its presence and location. M. Truschel
concludes that the chief factor is the localization of the noises reflected
from the objects and that odor, air currents, and temperature stimuli
are entirely secondary.
M. Pouget's (i) article has only very indirect bearing on auditory
space. He describes a test employed in Prof. Siebenmann's clinic
TACTUAL AND KINASTHETIC SPACE 255
in Basel for measuring auditory acuity. It is the well known method
of comparing the length of time that a tuning fork can be heard by a
normal ear and by the ear to be tested. This method has been found
satisfactory for diagnostic purposes.
REFERENCES
1. POUGET, R. J. Determination du champs auditif. Arch, de laryng., ot., rhin.t
1911,32,470-475.
2. TRUSCHEL. Contribution a 1'etude du sens de la direction chez'les aveugles. C.
r. acad. d. sci., 1911, 152, 1022-1024.
TACTUAL AND KIN^STHETIC SPACE
BY ROSWELL P. ANGIER
Yale University
Cook and v. Frey (2) studied the influence of the intensity of
stimulation on the values of simultaneous spatial thresholds of the
skin, using, as the area of stimulation, the volar surface of the left
forearm. Two sorts of apparatus were employed, by means of
which stimuli of graded intensities and limiting different extents
on the skin could simultaneously be applied under admirably uni-
form conditions. Between any two applications of stimuli there
was usually an interval of 30 seconds. It was found that the spatial
discrimination of two intenser stimuli was consistently easier than
that of two weaker, and this with a range of stimulation from just
perceptible to nearly painful intensities. The forearm threshold
sank, indeed, to 2 cm. or less with intenser and rose to 6 cm. or
more with weaker stimuli. Exceedingly important, however, for
exact results, was a preliminary subjective equation o'f the sen-
sations from the points stimulated, an equation that had occasion-
ally to be repeated during the course of the experiments. Under
the most favorable conditions attainable (intense stimuli subjec-
tively equated on pressure points mediating similar sense-qualities),
the absolute values of the simultaneous two-point threshold varied,
with four subjects, from 1.5 to 3.0 cm. With unequal intensities
of the two stimulations the threshold became greater^ rising even
to 8 cm. This influence of unequal intensities comes out with
great clearness if two unequal extents, determined by three limiting
points in a straight line, are compared; if points I and 2 limit the
shorter extent, and points 2 and 3 the longer, an increase of the
intensity of point 3 will make extent 2-3, even if objectively twice
256 ROSWELL P. ANGIER
as long as 1-2, seem the shorter. It appears, indeed, that two
simultaneously given stimuli exert, in a spatial sense, an attraction
effect on each other, for a comparison of extents occurs with greater
certainty if given successively (i sec. interval). The attraction
is a function of intensity in the sense that the point less intensely
stimulated appears displaced towards that more strongly stimulated.
Chinagli (i) discovered that if a circle of wood or other ma-
terial, 5 mm. thick, and with any diameter smaller than 35 mm.,
is placed on the skin — preferably of the forehead — it is felt as
a filled disc. Similarly with triangles, squares, etc. Further-
more, if a point within the circle was touched, verbal localization
placed it outside the circle, but pointing localization within the
circle.
Ponzo (3) gives a summary of articles by him already published
in the Memorie deW Accad. delle Scienze di Torino^ serie 2, t. LX.,
1909, and t. LXL, 1910, on the localization of tactual and pain
sensations on the skin. Twenty-five different areas of the body
were examined, in each of which ten specially sensitive points were
marked and tactually stimulated with v. Frey's sesthesiometer.
After each stimulation the subject pointed with a rod to the point
stimulated, the extent and the direction of error being recorded.
The error of direction was determined with reference to a constant
axis. For pain Kiesow's sesthesiometer was used. It was found
that the errors differed in both size and direction in the'various areas,
but were fairly constant for a given area. There was no stable
relation between threshold-value and accuracy of localization, nor
any decrease in accuracy with lower intensities of stimulation.
Maximal accuracy appeared on the tip of the tongue, the cushion
of the index finger and the middle of the lower lip; minimal accuracy
in the costal region. The extent of the tactual errors corresponded
well with those given by Weber. The accuracy of localization of
painful stimuli proved to be as great as that for tactual. Finally,
the results showed that for all the regions investigated most of the
errors, as well as the greatest mean errors, were in the longitudinal
direction.
Ponzo also reports two new instruments for cutaneous investi-
gation. One (4 and 5) is a simple arrangement for investigating
simultaneous spatial thresholds. It secures, particularly, quick
variation or equalization of pressures and involves a device for
registering any time differences in the applications of the two stimuli.
With it the author secured average differences of less than 3 sigma.
SPACE ILLUSIONS 257
The other apparatus (6 and 7) is likewise simple and is designed to
secure rapid measurement of the extent and direction of errors in
the localization of cutaneous sensations.
REFERENCES
1. CHINAGLIA, L. Riempimento soggettivo di spazi vuoti nel campo delle sensazion
cutanee. Riv. di Piscol., 1912, 8, 133-135.
2. COOK, H. D., & FREY, M. v. Der Einfluss der Reizstarke auf den Wert der
simultanen Raumschwelle der Haut. Zsch. f. Biol., 1911, 56, 537-573.
3. PONZO, M. Recherches sur la localisation des sensations tactiles et des sensations
dolorifiques. Arch. ltd. de biol., 1911, 55, 1-14.
4. PONZO, M. Sur un nouveau compas pour mesurer les perceptions d'espace dans
le champ des sensations cutanees. Arch. ital. de biol., 1911, 56, 139-144.
5. PONZO, M. Ueber einen neuen Zirkel fur die Bestimmung der simultanen Raum-
schwellen der Korperhaut. Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 1911, 22, 390-394.
6. PONZO, M. Sur un appareil pour la determination facile et precise de la grandeur
et la direction des erreurs de localisation dans le champ des sensations cutanees.
Arch. ital. de biol., 1911, 56, 148-150.
y. PONZO, M. Ueber einen Apparat zur Bestimmung der beim Lokalisieren von
Hautempfindungen begangenen Fehler und deren Richtungen (Dermolokali-
meter). Arch. f. d. ges. PsychoL, 1911, 22, 105-107.
SPACE ILLUSIONS
BY PROFESSOR HARVEY CARR
University of Chicago
Ponzo in his two papers (5, 6) gives a restatement of some facts
and apparatus which he has previously published in other journals,
and which were reviewed in last year's report. Schmidt (7) gives a
translation and commentary of a lately discovered Latin manuscript
of Kant which consists mainly of notes, partly disconnected, used in
a disputation. His various arguments, possessing but little psycho-
logical interest, are directed against the thesis of his opponent that
the sense illusions and the dominance of the perceptual furnish the
clue for the interpretation of much in the literature of early peoples.
Benussi's work (i) on solidity reversals of ambiguous figures was
instigated by that of Becher and de Boer reported last year. The
time of cognition reactions for the perception of solidity was taken
for one observer for four positions of a cube. One type of solidity
prevailed for each position. The reaction times varied greatly for
the four positions. Practice decreased the times but in an irregular
manner. Tachistoscopic exposures with many subjects for two
intervals demonstrated that the frequency of the solidity perception
258 HARVEY CARR
was related to the length of the exposure, though generalizations are
regarded as unsafe because of the presence of after-images. The
most important facts are those derived from introspective observa-
tions: Sides differ in apparent size as well as apparent depth, though
there is no correlation between the two, as reversals in depth occurred
without any change in relative size. The solidity often appears to
have a reference to a vertical plane as its base and not to a horizontal
plane. Lines non-essential to solidity were often unnoticed. The eye
movement and fixation hypotheses are discarded; motives of "Boden-
standigkeit" are not always available; reproductive processes are
not the exclusive factor, as practice does not decrease the reaction
times regularly. Certain arrangements of plane lines are associated
with a definite type of solidity, and reversals are due to the fluctuating
dominance of these plane patterns.
Hofmann (2) in studying the relation between the apparent direc-
tions of the horizontal and vertical noted that he invariably gave
them both an anti-clockwise twist from their true positions. He
normally holds his head inclined to the right and his tests indicate
that this head inclination is due to an asymmetrical ocular tension,
and that this tension is responsible for the deviation of the apparent
direction of the two lines.
The article of Pieron (4) consists mainly of an excellent digest of
the literature on the Miiller-Lyer illusion. His tests are supple-
mentary to previous experimentation. He maintains that the
illusion is based upon a double mechanism, i. e., two theories are
applicable. In momentary exposures, estimation is inaccurate and
the illusion persists with practice; these facts are explicable in terms
of the Einthoven conception. With prolonged exposure, eye move-
ments are regarded as the effective factor.
Tichy (9) worked with the Poggendorff illusion on eight subjects
using a variety of methods. His results disagree with Wundt's
statement that a reversal of the illusion occurs for the horizontal
position when the intervening space is composed of a series of vertical
lines. He found that the "continuation line" is invariably located
in the direction of the obtuse angle. There is not even a diminution
of the illusion for the horizontal position. The illusion does not
depend upon binocular vision, freedom or fixity of fixation, knowledge
or ignorance. Its size varies directly with the size of the intervening
space and inversely with the size of the angle. The facts lead him to
reject the Wundtian motives and to accept an explanation in terms
of a tendency of the eyes to cross the intervening space by as short
a line as possible.
SPACE ILLUSIONS 259
Lewis (3) and Valentine (10) continue the Cambridge work with
the tachistoscopic projection method. Valentine attacks the theories
of Lipps and Kiilpe as to the vertical-horizontal illusion. The
indefiniteness of the Lippsian concept does not render it subject to
conclusive experimental disproof and the author does not regard his
tests as final. In opposition to the theory of Kiilpe that the contour
of the visual field produces the illusion by contrast, he finds that the
value of the illusion is greater for monocular vision where there is less
disparity between the vertical and horizontal diameters of the visual
field. Significant facts noted are: Practice increased the illusion
with three subjects; the value of the illusion differs for the two eyes;
and there is some indication that a maximum value is correlated with
a definite length of line. No theory is advanced. Lewis worked with
filled and unfilled visual extents and found: The illusion is largest
with momentary exposure; its size does not vary directly with the
length of the line; there is a maximal effect with a certain degree of
filling; prolonged exposure and a minimum of filling produce under-
estimation; prolonged exposure and unsymmetrical filling diminish
the illusion; and practice destroys the effect very quickly. The
effective factors are thus duration of exposure, practice, amount and
arrangement and nature of the filling. The Wundtian, Hering and
all physiological theories are discarded and an appeal is made to the
judgmental aspect of perception.
Schubotz (8) seems to be mainly interested in a comparison of
monocular and binocular space. He has constructed a very compli-
cated and interesting apparatus which will not allow of a brief de-
scription. He deals with four problems, (i) In the vertical-
horizontal illusion as exemplified in the square, he finds no correlation
between its size and the distance from the observer with varying
convergence. With fixation beyond the square, overestimation
increases with decrease of depth. Its size varies somewhat directly
with the size of the square. There was no maximum value as found
by Valentine. He agrees with Valentine that monocular vision gives
the largest illusion. (2) By a transparent mirror he superimposed
extents monocularly perceived upon those binocularly seen. There
was no difference with prolonged exposure. With some conditions
of observation, a slight binocular underestimation was correlated with
a nearer depth location. (3) He determined the form of apparent
straight lines extending in the third dimensional direction. Such
apparent straight lines are really straight when located at the height
of the eyes. Lines above and below the eyes are curved in the middle
260 WILBUR M. URBAN
down and up respectively. The construction of two such lines makes
the curvature greater and opposite to that which would occur for
one line. The results are similar with monocular vision. (4) He
attempted to determine the scope or range of binocular unitary vision.
The near range is less than the far range. The lateral and the depth
ranges are intimately connected. The depth range is greater for
points adjacent to the median line; it is increased by a multiplicity
of objects in the field, and decreased when the fixation is lateral to
the median plane.
REFERENCES
1. BENUSSI, V. Ueber die Motive der Scheinkorperlichkeit bei umkehrbaren Zeich-
nungen. Arch. f. d. ges. PsychoL, 1911, 20, 363-396.
2. HOFMANN, F. B. Der Einfluss schrager Konturen auf die scheinbare Horizontale
und Vertikale. Ber. IF. Kongress f. exper. PsychoL, 1911, 236-239.
3. LEWIS, E. O. The Illusion of Filled and Unfilled Space. Brit. J. of PsychoL,
1912, 5, 36-50-
4. PIERON, H. L'illusion de Miiller-Lyer et son double mecanisme. Rev. phil.,
1911, 71, 245-284.
5. PONZO, M. Sur une nouvelle illusion dependant du croisement des doigts. Arch.
ltd. de bioL, 1911, 56, 127-128.
6. PONZO, M. Sur quelque illusions dans le champ des sensations tactiles. Arch. ital.
debioL, 1911, 55, 20-34.
7. SCHMIDT, B. A. Eine bisher unbekannte lateinische Rede Kants iiber Sinnes-
tauschung und poetische Fiktion. Kantstud., 1911, 16, 5-21.
8. SCHUBOTZ, F. Beitrage zur Kenntnis des Sehraumes auf Grund der Erfahrung.
Arch. f. d. ges. PsychoL, 1911, 20, 101-149.
9. TICHY, G. Ueber eine vermeintliche optische Tauschung. Zsch f. PsychoL,
1912, 60, 267-279.
10. VALENTINE, C. W. Psychological Theories of the Horizontal-Vertical Illusion.
Brit. J. of PsychoL, 1912, 5, 8-35.
VALUES
BY PROFESSOR WILBUR M. URBAN
Trinity College
The history of Value-theory for 1911 is to be found more in its
enrichment of other fields of inquiry than in any noteworthy additions
to the psychological and technical side of the subject. The "trail"
leads one to chapters on the Consciousness of Value in books on
religion (7), to studies of the psychology of value in books on eco-
nomics (i) and indeed, as will appear, to strictly philosophical trea-
tises themselves. As a preliminary to this review, however, the
pronouncement of that veteran of the subject, Meinong (10), on
VALUES 261
fundamental questions, deserves the first place. Prepared by special
invitation of the ethical section of the Bologna Congress for 1911,
this discussion of the vexed question of psychology and " Psychologis-
mus" in the theory of value justifies in every way his colleagues'
expectations of authoritative treatment. His survey of the situation
results in the conclusion that "the psychological study of values
which has hitherto not been without results, must continue to go
its way untroubled." "Zu fehlerhaften Psychologismus wiirde solche
Psychologic aber werden, wenn man sich um ihretwillen der Anerken-
nung und Wiirdigung der Thatsachen unpersonlichen Wertes iiber-
heben zu diirfen meinte."
Of the many fruitful contacts of the subject with the social
sciences two may be noted here. Durkheim's paper (4) also read
before the Bologna Congress, and which, we are told, made a profound
impression, explicitly defines sociology as a science of values, attempt-
ing to show how it may make values its subject-matter and yet
remain a science, how it may conceive them as the products of social
life without treating them as merely natural phenomena. As an
attempt to deal with very delicate questions, to avoid the difficulties
both of naturalism and transcendentalism, and to make values the
objects of description without robbing them of their character as
values and ideals, the paper deserves close attention.
Anderson's book, favorably received in many quarters, seeks a
reconstruction of economic theory in the light of an adequate concept
of "social value." Criticizing the "faulty presuppositions" of eco-
nomic theory, "avowed or implicit," he attempts "to reconstruct
them in the light of later epistemological, psychological and socio-
logical doctrine." In this development of "a truly organic doctrine
of social value" he makes extended use of the psychological studies of
Meinong, Tarde and Urban, and is influenced throughout by the
epistemological conceptions of Dewey. He concludes that "value is
a quantity, socially valid, not logically dependent upon exchange,
but prior to it." "The determinants of value include not only the
highly abstract factors that the value theories criticized have under-
taken to handle arithmetically, but also all the other volitional
factors in the inter-mental life of men in society." Above all, he
stresses the "presuppositions" of economic value, ethical and legal.
In his study of James's Religious Philosophy, K. A. Busch says:
"One thing he as well as others has brought to light: the final phi-
losophy must be a theory of value." Again in reporting the Bologna
Congress for the Revue Philosophique, M. Rey tells us that, as the
262 WILBUR M. URBAN
Heidelberg Congress had been preoccupied with pragmatism, so that
of 1911 was concerned primarily with the problem of values, in the
domains of science, religion, art, and morals. The former statement
may be but an obiter dictum, as the latter is, perhaps an exaggeration;
yet it is in this spirit that many are working. As indicative of the
interest in these problems one may note such papers as those of
Mauge (9) and Gillett (5). In Germany, two books by Liidemann
(8) and Pfordten (12) also continue the discussion of the fundamental
epistemological and philosophical value-problems. The first, by a
professor of theology, is an acute polemic against any deduction of
existential from value-judgments, and is valuable for its critical
account of the use of value-judgments in both philosophy and
theology. The second breathes the spirit of the so-called Freiburg
school, but is distinguished in an interesting fashion by a realistic
activistic note. Conceptual constructions have normative value
when they permit of "ein Wirken auf ein Werden."
Whether or not a final philosophy must be a theory of value,
recent developments seem to indicate that the value-concept is at
least a temporary preoccupation. The discussions between Mr. J. E.
Russell and Mr. Quick (13, 16, 17) if they have not settled the
question of the priority of truth or value, have at least shown that
value so dogs the steps of truth as to be inseparable from it. This
form of the "ego-centric predicament," if it be such, is likely to
continue to give trouble. Significant from this point of view are
Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures for 1911 (3). A distinct attempt to
rewrite absolute idealism from the point of view of value, it is not
surprising that, for its author, "logic is the spirit of value." Notable
for the proof it gives of how the permanent insights of this way of
thinking may be illuminated and clarified by the value-concept, the
unfortunate results of an apparent disdain of the technical discussions
of the subject are evident. The most unsatisfactory part of the
book is the discussion of the value-concept itself in Chapter VII.
As a contribution to this rewriting of idealism, Rubenstein's paper
(15) is also worth noting.
It has been charged that "every idealistic theory of the world
has as its ultimate premise an unsupported judgment of value."
This is no less true of realism. The last chapter of Perry's new book
(n), a chapter entitled "A Realistic Theory of Life," is at least an
explicit recognition of this, realism's most pressing, problem. If it
is the least satisfactory chapter of an interesting book, it is still
sufficient to show how far the " new realism " is from any ade-
quate solution of its problem.
VALUES 263
Fully one third of Baldwin's new book (2) is taken up with what
may be called the "logic of valuation." For him, value represents
a distinct and specific mediation of the real, to be put side by side with
the mediation of thought and logic. "Both are vital approaches to
the real, since each is an essential movement in the commerce of
thought with things." It is only, he holds, by a complete understand-
ing of both these types, with their presuppositions and immanent
conditions, that we reach a higher immediacy that includes them
both — for him the aesthetic. A somewhat similar view, arrived at
also by an analysis of valuation, is presented by H. M. Kallen in a
recent article (6).
That the present realistic-idealistic impasse in philosophy is to
be broken through only by becoming more and more conscious of
the unsupported value presuppositions of both, is becoming more and
more clear. The important paper of Rickert (14) is doubtless no
final solution of the problem, but it is at least suggestive in its insist-
ence that the true boundary line (in contrast to the various oppositions
in philosophy, of which the idealistic-realistic is perhaps the most
pronounced) does not run within existence, between the subjective
and objective halves of reality, but between the total existence,
whether subjective or objective, and that sphere that lies beyond
them both, that is the sphere of values."
REFERENCES
1. ANDERSON, B. M., JR. Social Value. A Study of Economic Theory, Critical and
Constructive. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911. Pp. xviii-f-2O4.
2. BALDWIN, J. M. Thought and Things. Vol. III. London: Allen; New York:
Macmillan, 1911. Pp. xxi+284.
3. BOSANQUET, B. The Principle of Individuality and Value. Macmillan & Co.,
1911. Pp. xxxvii+4O3.
4. DURKHEIM, E. Jugements de valeur et jugements de realite. Rev. de Met. et de
Mor., 1911, 19, 437-453-
5. GILLETT, M. S. Les jugements de valeur et la conception positive de la morale.
Rev. des. Sci. Phil, et Theol., 6, 5-31.
6. KALLEN, H. M. Beauty, Cognition and Goodness. /. of Phil., PsychoL, etc.,
1912, 9, 253-265.
7. KING, IRVING. The Development of Religion. New York: Macmillan, 1911.
Chapter III.
8. LUDEMANN, H. Das Erkennen und die Werturteile. Leipzig: Heinsius, 1910.
Pp. viii+23i.
9. MAUGE, F. La philosophic scientifique comme systeme de valeurs. Rev. phil.^
1910, 69, 387-408.
10. MEINONG, A. Fur die Psychologic und gegen den Psychologismus in der
allgemeinen Werttheorie. Logos, 3, No. I.
264 GUY MONTROSE WH1PPLE
11. PERRY, R. B. Present Philosophical Tendencies. New York: Longmans, 1912.
Pp. xv+383.
12. PFORDTEN, O. v. D. Konformismus. Eine Philosophic der normativen Werte.
I. Tl. Heidelberg: Winter, 1910. Pp. iii + 156.
13. QUICK, O. C. The Humanist Theory of Value: A Criticism. Mind, 1910, 19,
218-230; 20, 256-257.
14. RICKERT, H. Vom Begriff der Philosophic. Logos, i, No. i.
15. RUBINSTEIN, M. Das Wertsystem Hegels und die entwertete Personlichkeit.
Kantstud., 1910, 15, 263-269.
16. RUSSELL, J. E. The Humanist Theory of Value. Mind, 1910, 19, 547-549.
17. RUSSELL, J. E. Truth as Value and Value as Truth. Mind, 1911,20,538-539.
PSYCHOLOGY OF TESTIMONY AND REPORT
BY PROFESSOR GUY MONTROSE WHIPPLE
Cornell University
The most ambitious and important contribution to the psychology
of testimony, or — to speak psychologically rather than in the language
of jurisprudence — to the psychology of report, is the work of the
Commission of the Institute for Applied Psychology for the
Investigation of Pedagogical Problems of the Psychology of Report.
The members, ten in number, including such well-known writers
as Meumann, Stern, Lipmann, and Gross, planned to study the
educability of report, to determine whether testimony could be
improved by training and to such an extent as to make it wort,h while,
and they determined also to use only events as test-objects, rather
than to cling longer to the picture-tests and mere verbal tests of the
pioneer experiments. Five studies of educability had already been
made and some 15 studies had used events as test-materials, but
no previous study had combined these two features.
The Commission decided to employ physical demonstrations as
test-material, because these demonstrations can be repeated with
exactness, are familiar in nature to school children and command their
fullest attention. After elaborate preliminary trials, three appara-
tuses were selected and with each three demonstrations were made.
The apparatuses were (i) a tank of CO2, stored under pressure in
fluid form, (2) an air-pump, and (3) a rotation apparatus. With
the last-named, to take but one piece, the three demonstrations were
(a) the effect of centrifugal force upon a vessel of water, (b) the
flattening of elastic circular rings under rotation, and (c) color-
mixture. The details of all nine demonstrations are chronicled
minutely and illustrated by numerous photographs.
PSYCHOLOGY OF TESTIMONY AND REPORT 265
The observers were 196 girls, aged 12 to 13 years.
In order to bring about a possible effect of training, each observer
witnessed all three experiments (9 demonstrations) given at intervals
of one week, and after each experiment its three demonstrations were
immediately repeated and the observer corrected his written report.
The report itself was made by filling out a printed form in which was
included (for each experiment of three demonstrations) a series of 12
questions. These questions were so arranged as to be substantially
equivalent from the one experiment to the next. They were also
classified into seven categories, according as they referred to events,
to the statements of the demonstrator, to duration, to sequence, to
localization, to color, and to dimensions. For example: "What
happened when I opened the stop-cock?" "What did I say when I
fastened the rubber tube to the iron tank?" "What color was the
rubber tube?" etc. The original report was made in ink. The
revisions (following the repetition of the experiment) were made on
the same form but in pencil. The article by Baade (i) deals with the
results for the questions on the words of the demonstrator only, that
of Lipmann (4) with those on color, sequence and localization only.
The results for the other categories will appear later.
The net results of the experiment, so far as testimony on verbal
features was concerned, was that no demonstrable improvement
appeared, either as a result of the repetition of each experiment or as
the result of the succession of the three experiments. The earlier
experiments did exert a strong influence upon the subsequent experi-
ments, but this influence was sometimes favorable and sometimes
unfavorable. Baade has, however, done excellent work in elaborating
a system of scoring which promises to afford an exactness in dealing
with "logical memory tests" as great as that now enjoyed in dealing
with "rote memory" tests.
Lipmann, in scoring the estimates of duration and size, has also
devised methods of scoring data which, though too complex to be
reproduced here, will be of assistance to those who work in this field.
The data show that there is, on the whole, some improvement in these
estimates as the result of the successive experiments, but only a very
slight improvement as the result of repetition of experiments. In
general, durations (8" to 3.5') are strongly overestimated, while
extents (19 to 57 cm.) are commonly underestimated. There
appeared no positive training-effect in reports on colors, locations and
sequences, but the repetitions did bring about a decided improvement
in these answers. As a rule, a pupil who displayed much inaccuracy
266 GUY MONTROSE WEIPPLE
in his original report also displayed relatively much inaccuracy in
his "corrected" report.
So far as reported, therefore, these elaborate and painstaking
experiments yield a negative result, and will be chiefly valuable in
clearing the way for further studies of the training of observation
and memory, in which more potent and vigorous influences are
brought into play to effect the improvement.
A second experimental study of the educability of report is pre-
sented in the work of Franken (2), who employed what he terms the
"Methode der Entscheidungs- und Bestimmungsfragen." One hundred
questions, drawn from school work, were propounded to 150 pupils,
aged ii to 12.5 years. Each question was given first in a form to be
answered by " yes " or " no. " (" Do you know what city is the capital
of Norway?") After 50 such questions, the series was repeated in a
form that demanded a specific answer. ("What city is the capital of
Norway?") At this point the pupils of one section checked up their
answers; those of the second section were simply told that the next
set of questions would be given in both forms. All the pupils then
answered a second lot of 50 questions in both forms. Comparison of
the answers in the first and second form, in the first and second half
of the test, and in the first and second sections then permits con-
clusions as to the effects of training. Seven coefficients of report are
devised and formulas are worked out for each of them. The net result
is an improvement in cautiousness in asserting positive knowledge,
though answers of "yes" followed by no-answer or by a false answer
still persist. The method is of obvious interest and usefulness.1
Lipmann (5) is convinced that the unreliability of reports of
children is due in the main to two things: first, the child does not
distribute his attention in the same way as the adult (though his
attention is usually well enough concentrated on those details that
he does report); secondly, the child is uncritical in filling out gaps
in his memory and uses freely material supplied through custom,
through his own imagination or through suggestion. It follows that
the training of the child in correct report must transform his distri-
bution of attention to one corresponding to that of the adult and
must develop a critical attitude toward misstatements in filling out
gaps.
Miss Oppenheim (6) has extended the "rumor-test" of Stern,
Michel, and Kulischer by using two anecdotes, given in immediate
1 This article will be reviewed somewhat more fully in an early number of the
Journal of Educational Psychology.
PSYCHOLOGY OF TESTIMONY AND REPORT 267
succession, with the idea of obtaining conditions more akin to those
of daily life, particularly of determining whether details of the one
story get confused with those of the other. Each story was trans-
mitted through five observers, adult women. The results show
strikingly how, even in so few stages as this, rumor becomes extra-
ordinarily unreliable. There is, in general, a progressive abbreviation
of the anecdotes; the story becomes less definite and more general in
phrasing; each report deviates in two or three points from the pre-
ceding; the errors are confusions, substitutions, alterations of temporal
and spatial setting; names and dates suffer particularly.
Schramm (8) compared 16 men and 16 women students at Freiburg
University by the aid of Stern's test-story. It was read once to them
and reported 24 hours later. This is virtually a test of "logical
memory." The author concludes that the data point toward a slight
superiority of the women, but the reviewer does not find that the
differences exceed the probable error of the results.
Virtually identical is the method followed by Vos (12), who read
a 4O-element story to boys and girls 9 to 14 years old, and obtained
reproductions three days later. From his 800 reports he draws these
inferences: report is very good at the age of 9, best at 10, then deteri-
orates decidedly to 13, but improves at 14. Boys surpass girls, both
in narrative and deposition, save that boys are less cautious when
ignorant (more liable to give false answers than no answers). Boys
are at their worst at 13, girls at 9 and 12. Pupils from the better
class of homes do better than those from the poorer districts. There
are more errors in the deposition than in the narrative, even though
no suggestive questions are asked. The test hinges chiefly on
auditory-verbal memory.
The work of Heindl, Reichel and Varendonck bears more directly
on the application of the psychology of testimony to jurisprudence.
Heindl (3) sought to measure quantitatively the amount of error
in signaletic reports. He used mass tests and talks almost entirely
in terms of averages. His method of computation is open to improve-
ment, as Lipmann points out, and despite the extraordinary mass of
data obtained (20,000 reports and 80,000 computations), it is ques-
tionable whether he has derived the practical conclusions that he
sought. In brief, his method was this: observers stated or estimated
the stature, age, color of hair and form of face, either of a stranger
who appeared conspicuously before them for four minutes or of a
well-known person not present during the reporting. Heindl con-
cludes, among other things, that children are perfectly good observers,
268 GUY MONTROSE WHIPPLE
perhaps more objective than adults, but cannot translate their obser-
vation into report skillfully. Sample conclusions are: children
overstimate the stature of a strange man by 12 cm., of a strange
woman by 5.7 cm., of well-known persons by 5.6 cm., etc.
Reichel (7) is a jurist, who writes to impress other jurists with
the need of acquaintance with the psychology of testimony. He
presents a good account of the present status of forensic psychology,
shows in concrete cases how lack of psychological insight may affect
the administration of justice, and proposes plans for the study of
forensic psychology at universities.
The contribution of Varendonck (n) appeals to jurists, psycholo-
gists and educators alike. He was one of several psychologists
summoned by the defense at a murder trial in Belgium to give
expert testimony concerning the reliability of the testimony of two
girls, 8 and 10 years old, whose declarations seemed likely to secure
a conviction. Varendonck analyzed the records of the preliminary
hearings, reviewed the history of the psychology of testimony, and
conducted a half-dozen striking experiments upon school children to
demonstrate the unreliability of their reports when implicative and
expectative questions are employed. The presentation of his testi-
mony elicited violent outbursts from the court authorities, but it
reached the jury and induced a verdict of "not guilty." The psy-
chology of testimony has, therefore, found its way formally into the
court room and saved a man's life.1
The literature upon the psychology of testimony was assembled
by Stern (9) in 1909 for the period prior to 1908. The same writer
has now published a bibliography (10) of 53 titles covering the period
1908 to 1910.
REFERENCES
1. BAADE, W. Aussage iiber physikalische Demonstrationen. (Mit besonderer
Beriicksichtigung der Frage der Erziehbarkeit der Aussage.) I Abh. Die
Methodik der Versuche u. die Inhalte der Textaussagen. Zsch. f. angew.
Psychol., 1911, 4, 189-311.
2. FRANKEN, A. Ueber die Erziehbarkeit der Erinnerrungsaussage bei Schulkindern.
Zsch. f. pad. Psychol. u. exp. Pddag., 1911, 12, Hft. 12, 635-642.
3. HEINDL, R. Die Zuverlassigkeit von Signalamentaussagen. H. Grots' Archw,
1909, 33, 109-132.
4. LIPMANN, O. Aussage iiber physikalische Demonstrationen. (Mit besonderer
Beriicksichtigung der Frage der Erziehbarkeit der Aussage.) 2 Abh. Die
Schatzungen u. d. Ergebnisse der Farben-, Lokalisations- u. Sukzessionsfragen.
Zsch.f. angew. Psychol., 1911, 4, 312-334.
1 For details the reader is referred to the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology,
in an early issue of which the reviewer will present a more elaborate analysis of the
testimony of these children and of Varendonck's experiments.
SUGGESTION 269
5. LIPMANN, O. Pedagogical Psychology of Report. /. of Educ. Psychol., 1911,
2, 253-261.
6. OPPENHEIM, ROSA. Zur Psychologic des Geruchtes. Zsch. f. angew. Psychol.,
1911, 5, 344-355-
7. REICHEL, H. Ueber forensische Psychologie. Miinchen: Bech, 1910. Pp. 64.
• 8. SCHRAMM, FRITZ. Zur Aussagetreue der Geschlechter. Zsch. f. angew. Psychol.,
19", 5, 355-357-
9. STERN, C. & W. Erinnerung u. Luge in der ersten Kindheit. Leipzig: Earth,
1909. Pp. 160.
10. STERN, W. Bibliographic zur Psychologie der Aussage, 1908-1910. Zsch. /.
angew. Psychol., 1911, 4, 378-381.
11. VARENDONCK, J. Les Temoignages d'Enfants dans un Proces Retentissant.
Arch, de Psychol. , 1911, n, 129, 171.
12. Vos, H. B. L. Beitrdge zur Psychologie der Aussage bei Schulkindern. Analyse
d. Aussage uber eine gehorte Erz'Mung. Amsterdam: dissertation, 1909.
(Eigenbericht in Zsch. f. angew. Psychol., 1911, 4, 375-378.)
SUGGESTION
BY PROFESSOR WALTER DILL SCOTT
Northwestern University
Chojecki (i) carried on a series of experiments on suggestion in
the University of Geneva, using as subjects thirty men and thirty
women of the university. His tests were three in number: The heat
illusion; the Binet test on suggested increase in the length of a series
of lines; and increased and decreased tactual sensitivity produced by
a magnet. There was found a very low degree of correlation between
the suggestibility as discovered by the different tests. In this
particular Chojecki verified the results of all investigators of recent
years. His results differ from his predecessors in that he found more
men suggestible than women. If this result should be verified by
later researches we shall be compelled to cast aside the time-honored
tradition that women are more suggestible than men.
Of a book of 350 pages Jacoby (2) devotes almost 200 pages to a
presentation of suggestion. He discriminates between suggestion
and such other related mental phenomena as auto-suggestion and
association of ideas. The discussion is unusually sane and scientific
for a presentation of this particular subject and is one intended for
the general public.
MacDougall (6) applies the term "contrary suggestion" to a
group of reactions that could not be wisely designated by any other
single term. The following quotations present in brief MacDougall's
conception of suggestion, contrary suggestion and the part the two
270 WALTER DILL SCOTT
play in the development of the individual mind. " The first and more
elementary form is that of slavish imitation, in which the suggestion
is uncritically received and put into execution. It represents the
primary and immediate reaction upon a stimulus which at the moment
dominates consciousness. In such a case the mind of the imitator is
narrow and meager, since the suggestion is either uncomplicated by
any system of associated ideas, or by such only as are, in an ele-
mentary sense, congruous with it. It is the type of reaction which we
call unreflective or precipitate. To have become characteristic of an
individual marks him as deficient in all forms of intellectual freedom
and independence" (pp. 384-385). "The second form of defect is
manifested in an obstinate opposition to what has been suggested. It
represents the second stage in development, in which the idea offered
to the mind arouses a counter-idea which takes exclusive possession
of the consciousness. The outcome, in so far as the psychological
nature of the reaction is concerned, is thus equally elementary with
that of slavish imitation" (p. 385). "Contrary suggestion represents
the method by which the child naturally passes from an uncritical
acceptance of suggestions and their immediate embodiment in action,
to a reflective consideration of the respective values of two alternative
courses when offered for selection, and finally to deliberate action and
reasoned reflection in all their forms" (p. 377). The discussion is
not confined to the place of counter-suggestion as a phase in the
development of the mind of the individual, but a very satisfactory
discussion is given of the place of counter suggestion in the social
activities of the individual.
In his later treatises (4, 5) Jones merely reaffirms propositions laid
down in his larger contribution (3). He defines suggestion so broadly
that it includes practically all conscious and "unconscious" cognitive
and affective processes (pp. 218, 219). Such a definition finds
justification historically in a few eminent English psychologists.
Thomas Brown, for instance, used suggestion in this broad way,
although he did not include under it unconscious processes. Instead
of using the term in this broad way throughout his discussion, Jones
actually employs it with a narrow and unusual signification. The
usage is so extraordinary that it reminds one of the manner in which
Thomas Reid used the term suggestion to signify magic. Jones uses
the term to express the transference of an affective attitude (usually
sexual) to an object (usually the physician) other than that which
originally stimulated that particular attitude (pp. 224, 249). If the
term suggestion were properly restricted to this narrow sense and
PSYCHOTHERAPY 271
identified with transference of an emotional attitude (usually uncon-
scious), then Jones would be justified in attacking those who assert
that the results secured by psychotherapy are secured by a process of
reeducation in which suggestion is the principle or exclusive method.
However, to identify suggestion with transference is to go counter
to the historical and ordinary usage of the term.
REFERENCES
1. CHOJECKI, A. Contribution a 1'etude de la suggestibilite. Arch, de PsychoL,
1911, u, 182-186.
2. JACOBY, G. W. Suggestion and Psychotherapy. New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1912. Pp. 355.
3. JONES, ERNEST. The Action of Suggestion in Psychotherapy. /. of Abnorm.
PsychoL, 1911, 5, 217-254.
4. JONES, ERNEST. The Therapeutic Effect of Suggestion. /. /. PsychoL u. Neur.t
1911, 17,427-432.
5. JONES, ERNEST. The Therapeutic Action of Psycho-analysis. Rev. of N enrol.
and Psychiat., 1912, 10, 1-12.
6. MACDOUGALL, R. Contrary Suggestion. /. of Abnorm. PsychoL, 1912, 6, 368-391.
PSYCHOTHERAPY
BY DR. HARRY MILES JOHNSON
The Johns Hopkins University
The number of recent articles which may be grouped under this
caption is large; the proportion which contain matter of especial
psychological interest is small.
Cutten (6) and Bruce have written for the general reader on
methods in psychotherapy. The attempt of the former is the more
ambitious. He includes in his discussion primitive methods which
obtained in different nations; some "healing miracles" of the early
Christian church; a defense of the character of Mesmer; an enumera-
tion of cases of healing by rejics, visits to shrines, the royal touch, etc.
There are interesting passages on Schlatter, the Christian Science
movement and the Emmanuel movements, although there is little
in the discussion which is new or of unusual importance. The
method of treatment is expository throughout. The whole argument
is rather disconnected, but the work, in the opinion of the reviewer, is
of considerable value as a reference-volume.1 Bruce's work (4) is a
collection of eight popular essays. Its purpose is at least frankly
stated: To inform the reader that there are psychotherapeutical
1 See special review in this iournal, 1911, 8, 259.
272 HARRY MILES JOHNSON
methods in practical use other and better than those used by Christian
Scientists and similar practitioners. Although the author hopes that
scientific as well as general readers may find the work valuable, the
treatment is really quite superficial. Some very commonplace inci-
dents and doctrines are embellished after the style of a descriptive
novel. The opening essay is on the evolution of mental healing, and
is an enumeration of theories ancient and modern. In the chapter
entitled Masters of Mind, the author, himself a layman, unhesi-
tatingly selects four men for eulogy as the "world's greatest psycho-
pathologists." There are chapters on hypnotism and on secondary
selves. We are told that suggestion is the chief factor in both
scientific and religious "mental healing" but that the true scientist
knows that it cannot be used as a cure-all. The author deals tenderly
and admiringly with the work of the psychic researchers, differ-
entiating spiritists from adherents to theories of telepathy. He avers
that the psychic researchers deserve great credit for inspiration of
scientific men: more than one of the four psychopathologists whom he
ranks as the world's greatest have become interested in their present
work through an early interest in psychic research. The work closes
with an essay in appreciation of William James. In the reviewer's
opinion the contribution to popular enlightenment made by this
book is slight.
The psychoanalytic literature is voluminous. An extensive
critique of the method of Freud is made by Kronfeld (13). The first
70 pages are devoted to an exposition of Freud's theory, following
which is a detailed criticism of his principal assumptions and hypoth-
eses on factual and logical grounds. Kronfeld asserts that Freud
is guilty of petitio principii in assuming the truth of his hypotheses.
Their validity, says Kronfeld, can be shown only by the correctness
of the results obtained by the methods derived from the hypotheses;
but there is no criterion of the correctness of the results, save the
validity of the hypotheses by which they are to be interpreted.
Bleuler (2) attacks the tendency of many of Freud's followers to
overgeneralize, and particularly censures the efforts which members
of that school frequently make to treat psychopathologically the
experiences of poets, artists, etc. He regards Freud's doctrines of
"unconscious thought-processes," sublimation, censorship, etc., as
"not proven," and as more or less obscure. However, he expresses
admiration for his general work, and recommends an open-minded
attitude toward the Freudian tenets.
Burrow (5) and Kostyleff (12) have given brief conventional
PSYCHOTHERAPY 273
descriptions of the work of Freud and Jung. Kostyleff has included
in his article some comments on current criticism of Freud's doctrines.
The danger of indiscriminate application of the psychoanalytic
methods and of their use by the novice is pointed out by Freud
(9, 7), while Putnam (15) urges the importance of clear metaphysical
thinking in dealing with problems with which the method is concerned.
Brill (3) and Jones (n) have followed Freud (8) in the main in
an attempt at psychopathological interpretation of experiences of
every day life. All these communications follow the same general
line of argument, but that of Jones is apparently the most extra-
ordinary. His main thesis is that "certain inadequacies of our mental
functioning, and certain apparently purposeless performances, can
be shown by means of psychoanalysis to have been determined by
motives of which we were not at the time aware." (Italics mine.)
The "determining" factor is always a repressed wish, and some of
the consequents determined by it are slips of the tongue or pen,
erroneously performed reactions and "automatic" reactions; also,
forgetting errands or names and "erroneous perception." Numerous
incidents are cited, many being personal. The author's reason for
saying that the repressed feelings "determine" these reactions, is
that a train of free association, pursued far enough, will reach such
an experience, which for the time had been forgotten. To the
reviewer such reasoning post, ergo propter hoc, seems particularly
treacherous. The metaphysical assumptions implied in such a thesis
are also hard to reconcile with those which seem necessary to account
satisfactorily for other experiences. In the reviewer's judgment,
articles of this type emphasize the need of the sharpest distinction
between the clinical and the logical aspects of the Freudian doctrines.
Whatever clinical value the psychoanalytic methods may have
should indeed be demonstrable by the records of the "thousands of
cases" to which they have been applied. But that the doctrines are
useful as clinical tools does not prove that they are logically consistent.
And to the reviewer, at least, it is not yet evident that either therapy
or psychology can be permanently benefited by theorizing on the
basis of such generalizations as Freud, Jones and Brill use in these
articles.
Acher (i) and van Teslar (17) have given abstracts of numerous
recent publications on psychoanalysis, most of which are not men-
tioned in this review.
Frink (10), Rank (16), Nepalleck (14) and Wingfield (18) give
accounts of the application of psychoanalysis to problems under their
own observation. Their reports, however, are conventional.
274 HARRY MILES JOHNSON
REFERENCES
1. ACHER, R. Recent Freudian Literature. Amer. J. of Psychol, 1911, 22, 408-443.
2. BLEULER, E. Die Psychoanalyse Freuds. Jahrb. f. psychoanal. u. psychopathol.
Forsch., 1910, 2, 623-730.
3. BRILL, A. A. A Contribution to the Psychopathology of Everyday Life. JPjy-
chotherapy, 3, 5-20.
4. BRUCE, H. A. Scientific Mental Healing. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1911.
Pp. viii+258.
5. BURROW, T. Some Psychological Phases of Medicine. /. of Abnorm. Psychol.,
1911, 6, 205-213.
6. CUTTEN, C. B. Three Thousand Years of Mental Healing. New York: Scribners,
1911. Pp. viii+3i8.
7. FREUD, S. Nachtrage zur Traumdeutung. Zentbl. f. Psychoanal., 1911, i, 187-
192.
8. FREUD, S. Z«r Psychopathologie des Alltaglebens. (3 verm. Aufl.) Berlin:
Karger, 1910. Pp. 149.
9. FREUD, S. Ueber "wilde" Psychoanalyse. Zentbl. f. Psychoanal., 1910, 1,91-95.
10. FRINK, H. W. Psychoanalysis of a Mixed Neurosis. /. of Abnorm. Psychol. ,
1911, 6, 185-204.
11. JONES, E. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1911,
22, 477-527.
12. KOSTYLEFF, N. Freud et le traitement moral des nevroses. /. de psychol. norm.
et pathol., 1911, 8, 246-257.
13. KRONFELD, A. Ueber die psychologischen Theorien Freuds und verwandte
Anschauung. Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 1911, 22, 117-248.
14. NEPALLECK, R. Analyse einer scheinbar sinnlosen infantilen Obsession. Zentbl.
f. Psychoanal., 1911, i, 155-157.
15. PUTNAM, J. J. A Plea for the Study of Philosophic Methods in Preparation for
Psychoanalytical Work. /. of Abnorm. Psychol., 1911, 6, 249-264.
16. RANK, O. Ein Traum, der sich selbst deutet. Jahrb. f. psychol. u. psychopathol.
Forsch., 1910, 2, 465-540.
17. VAN TESLAR, J. S. Recent Literature of Psychoanalysis. Amer. J. of Psychol.,
1912, 23, 115-139-
1 8. WINGFIELD, H. Four Cases Illustrative of Certain Points in Psychoanalysis.
Brit. Med. J., 2, 256-257.
SPECIAL REVIEWS
CHAPTERS FROM MODERN PSYCHOLOGY
Chapters from Modern Psychology. JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL. New
York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912. Pp. vii + 308.
This book contains eight lectures which Professor Angell delivered
at Union College during the early part of the year 1911. As the
lectures were prepared for presentation to a general college audience,
they remain on the surface of the science. The entire field of psy-
chology is sketched, but only those facts described which are necessary
for a general idea of the subject. The style is of that clearness,
fluency, and simplicity which we are accustomed to associate with
the author, so that the book will not only interest the layman, but
will afford the scientist several enjoyable hours.
The first chapter is upon General Psychology. It begins with a
discussion of the methods of classification, then touches upon mental
elements, instinct and impulses, reason, emotion, and will. It can
give, the author says, "but an imperfect impression of the multi-
farious ways in which the energies of general psychology are engaged."
Under the title Physiological Psychology are described the relation of
mental to bodily processes, the dependence of mental experience on
bodily organization, the relation of feeling to general somatic con-
ditions, and the James-Lange theory of emotions. In Chapter III.,
on Experimental Psychology, experimentation in general is explained,
and some typical experiences in audition, memory, association, and
will are described. Abnormal Psychology considers dreams, hypno-
tism, suggestion, multiple personality, spiritism, telepathy and the
subconscious. Chapter V. is divided into Individual and Applied
Psychology. The first part includes individual differences in sen-
sation and memory, types of imagery, attention, suggestion, reactions
and emotion. In the second part, the usefulness of psychology for
education, medicine, law, vocational guidance, and advertising is
shown. In the chapter on Social Psychology, the author speaks of
the psychology of language, play, and fine arts, the power of imitation
and emulation, and the effect of a leader on mobs and crowds. In
regard to race psychology, he says that the differences between races
do not rest upon innate difference of brain structure but upon differ-
275
276 REVIEWS
ence of environment and interest. The essay on Animal Psychology
begins with the question of animal consciousness and intelligence.
Descriptions of some well-known experiments follow. The last
chapter, which is on General Genetic Psychology, refutes the theory
that the characteristics of the savage are due to lack of reasoning
power and efficiency in sensory activity. Their minds are not funda-
mentally different from those of civilized races nor do there seem to
be important differences on the emotional side. "Mental evolution
in man consists less in the accidental possession of higher native
capacity and more in the better organization and the mastery of the
technique of knowledge and thought." The chapter ends with a
sketch of mental development in the individual.
HERBERT SIDNEY LANGFELD
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
JAMES' PHILOSOPHY
La Philosophie de William James. TH. FLOURNOY. Saint-Blaise,
1911. Pp. 219. Fr. 2.50.
In the spring of 1910 the Association chretienne suisse d'Etudiants
invited Professor William James to address them at their reunion to
be held in the following October. Professor James, whose health was
then seriously impaired, replied accepting the invitation "in
principle," saying, that is, that should his health sufficiently
improve and should he remain in Europe until October, he would
gladly address the Association. The reunion was held, but William
James was no more, and to Professor Flournoy fell the solemn
honor of addressing the Association in his stead. For many years
a warm friend and admirer of the profoundly lamented psychologist
and philosopher, Professor Flournoy chose for the subject of his
address "The Philosophy of William James." It is this discourse,
amplified and doubtless somewhat revised, which now appears in
book-form.
Professor Flournoy, and we can say it without exaggeration,
has given us a work which is, although in concise form, a sympa-
thetic and penetrating biographical sketch, a notable contribution
to letters, and a commanding piece of philosophical reasoning. He
sums up with extraordinary articulateness the broader tendencies
of the late Professor James's teaching; and all in the spirit of James
himself, sometimes almost with his own inflection, challenges, as
it were, the coming generations to consider attentively this envisage-
JAMES' PHILOSOPHY 277
ment of the universe and either to reject it for known and well-
weighed reasons, or else to accept it with conviction and enthusiasm.
"By their works ye shall know them;" by their results in experi-
ence, alone, can values be weighed; or, in language more current,
the sole test of truth — whatsoever its definition may be — or of any
other value is found in empirical verification. Not a subversive
doctrine, this: yet it is the touchstone to James's Pragmatism.
This principle, which all natural science boasts of as its cardinal
doctrine, from which indeed it takes the name empirical science, is
nevertheless scouted as an absurdity when proposed as a general
philosophic rule. "Morality estimated by its cash-value 1" "The
existence of God proved by the results experienced from believing
in God's existence!" Yet the truth of not a single one of the laws
and theorems of science is tested in any other way. The reason
for this singular paradox is, if one compares the deeper-lying
intention of James with that of his opponents, not hard to find.
The effort of the day is mainly spent in the material sphere. Here
we have so genuinely desired to achieve results that we have come
down to the frankly humble attitude of empiricism. Here we
admit that we get our truth a 'posteriori. In other spheres where
the demand for actual — and certainly actual — results is by no
means so stern, another tradition prevails; and one that is more
gratifying to the familiar form of self-esteem. These truths we
have a priori; or at least we can secure them in our hands without
verification and safe from refutation, and so henceforth dispense
them at our pleasure. And few persons genuinely care enough
about these truths to examine this pretension. The maker of a
printing-press is sharply held up if his factory has been playing
with untruth: but the clergyman's account of God is scrutinized,
if at all, with an eminent lassitude. Were the splendid pretension
examined, James said, it would be found to be a fiction. For
reality is the infinitely infinite flux of things and events, and its
bigger truths can no more be embraced in a few off-hand formulae,
thought out in the rationalist's arm-chair, than can its truths about
material things. In both cases alike we must test our "truths"
by verifying them in subsequent experience. And one need be no
pragmatist (need not, for instance, believe that Pragmatism
includes a definition of truth) in order to see that that means of
winning truth which has brought material science to the position
which it now occupies must be applied in all other fields of activity
if a similar success is to be achieved. James saw this. And a
278 REVIEWS
thorough-going empiricism is one of his fundamental articles —
Radical Empiricism.
Now this requires a rather curt dismissal of many cherished
fancies: it involves, specially, the relinquishing of nearly all the
products of the rationalistic movement of thought. For ration-
alism, as the term is used by James, covers any theory or system
which is so remote from the concrete and infinite reality as to be
insusceptible of empirical verification. If it can make no difference
in subsequent experience whether a certain system is true or false,
then (although it may be "internally consistent") the terms truth
and falsity in no way so much as apply to it. Guided by this
maxim James is a pluralist and not a monist. Furthermore, one
needs but to loosen one's allegiance to certain ingrained prejudices
of the day and generation in order to discover in that pure experience
which empiricism makes its court of last resort, the immediate
evidence of many facts to which one had previously been blind.
And notable among these are the efficacy and freedom of the
human will, the actual thereness of ungainsayable evil, and — for
certain favored persons (unless your prejudices fortify you arbi-
trarily to throw out of consideration their life protocols) — the pres-
ence and cooperation of God. James believed, then, that what men
do makes a difference in the universe, and that they might (if the
word has any meaning at all) have done otherwise; that evil is
there and is evil; and that God is, and is amenable to contact with
human beings. These and other propositions, conceived as heretical
in certain quarters yet derived by means of the same open-eyed
empiricism, involve clearly an entire philosophy. Of all this
Professor Flournoy takes a careful survey.
To many readers of this volume it will doubtless seem that
the philosophical attitude of the late Professor James lacks a certain
high impersonality and detachment, lacks the sort of thing that
one finds in a treatise on elliptical functions and in the pages of
approved dialecticians. This may be so; and the presence of a
certain human warmth, above all James's acknowledgment that
human volition plays a part in philosophizing, is highly repugnant
to some philosophic traditions. Yet it is to be remembered that
in the case of elliptical functions human will and human weal are
no part of the subject under discussion; whereas in the case of the
whole universe, which is the subject-matter of philosophy, man and
all his concerns are integrally involved. They dare not be neglected.
And if James writes as a man who as a man faces the problem of the
BOOKS RECEIVED 279
universe, as one who, shoulder to shoulder with others in his
likeness, scans the quiet visage of the Sphinx, so too, after all, when
one comes to think of it, the most impersonal chapter ever written
upon the Absolute implies also a writer, but one who thinks to be in
cloaked yet closest intimacy with this same Sphinx. This difference
of attitude is worthy of note.
Professor Flournoy has admirably succeeded in revealing the
deep springs of a sea whose surface, broad and flowing and reflecting
light from a thousand facets, might well have beguiled the most
resolute explorer. But he has done more, for he has somehow given
us a glimpse once again of the immediate person, the charm, the
motion, and the moral vigor of the late Professor James. It is a
volume which lays the friends and pupils of William James under
a deep debt of gratitude, and one which will give to coming genera-
tions some hint of what that privilege was which is not to be theirs.
EDWIN B. HOLT
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
BOOKS RECEIVED DURING JUNE
BOWNE, B. P. Kant and Spencer. A Critical Exposition. Boston
and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1912. Pp. xii + 440.
$3.00 net.
GALLINGER, A. Das Problem der objectiven Mdglichkeit. Eine
Bedeutungsanalyse. Leipzig: Barth, 1912. Pp. vii + 126. M. 4
HENNIG, R. Die Entwicklung des Naturgefuhls. — Das Wesen der
Inspiration. Leipzig: Barth, 1912. Pp. 160. M. 5.
Vorschldge zur psychologischen Untersuchung primitiver Menschen.
(Beih. z. Zsch. f. angew. Psychol. u. psychol. Sammelforsch.)
Leipzig: Barth, 1912. Pp. 124.
HOCKING, W. E. The Meaning of God in Human Experience. A
Philosophic Study of Religion. New Haven: Yale University
Press; London: Frowde, 1912. Pp. xxxiv + 586. $3.00.
PARTRIDGE, G. E. Genetic Philosophy of Education. New York:
Sturgis and Walton, 1912. Pp. xv + 4O1- #1.50 net.
JAMES, W. Essays in Radical Empiricism. New York: Longmans,
Green, and Co., 1912. Pp. xiii + 283. $1.25 net.
NOTES AND NEWS
THE June number of the BULLETIN, entitled the Experimental
Number, was prepared under the editorial care of Professor W. B.
Pillsbury.
DR. DANIEL STARCH has been advanced to the rank of assistant
professor at the University of Wisconsin.
J. CARLETON BELL, Ph.D. (Harvard), managing editor of the
Journal of Educational Psychology, and director of the psychological
laboratory in the Brooklyn Training School for Teachers, has been
appointed professor of the art of teaching in the University of Texas.
Dr. Bell will devote his attention chiefly to the experimental investi-
gation of problems of teaching.
PROFESSOR WILBUR M. URBAN, of Trinity College, has been
granted leave of absence for a year. The larger part of the time
will be spent in study and investigation with Professor A. Meinong
in Graz.
AT the eighty-first annual commencement of Wesleyan University
at Middletown, Conn., held on June 19, the degree of doctor of laws
was conferred upon Dr. Amos J. Givens, proprietor of Givens Sani-
tarium for nervous diseases at Stamford, Conn.
THE following items are taken from the press:
STEPHEN S. COLVIN, professor of psychology in the University of
Illinois, has accepted a chair in educational psychology in Brown
University.
HARRY MILES JOHNSON, Ph.D. (Hopkins '12), has been appointed
psychological assistant in the physical laboratory of the National
Electric Lamp Association, Cleveland, Ohio.
M. E. HAGGERTY, of Indiana University, has been promoted from
an assistant professorship to an associate professorship of psychology.
THE University of California has conferred the doctorate of laws
on Dr. E. C. Sanford, professor of psychology and president of Clark
College.
PROFESSOR G. M. WHIPPLE, of Cornell University, has been
granted a half year's leave of absence. He will make a study of the
recent developments in applied and educational psychology in various
educational centers of Europe.
280
Vol. IX. No. 8. August 15, 1912,
THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN
GENERAL REVIEWS AND SUMMARIES
RECENT LITERATURE ON THE BEHAVIOR OF THE
LOWER INVERTEBRATES
BY PROFESSOR A. S. PEARSE
University of Wisconsin
Protozoa. — Von Prowazek's book (27) on the general physiology
of the Protozoa contains a full discussion of their reactions to various
stimuli.
Mast (20) gives an extremely interesting account of the habits
and reactions of Lacrymaria, an infusorian sometimes found among
organic debris. The body and head of this protozoon are connected
by a slender neck, which is capable of extraordinary extension — to
eight times the length of the body or fifty times its own length when
contracted. Mast gives evidence to show that the extension of the
head is due to the pulling action of the oral cilia, rather than the
activity of the neck itself; the withdrawal after extension, however,
he attributes to the elasticity of the neck.
"The direction in which the neck turns is in all probability regu-
lated by internal factors," and "the direction of locomotion of
Lacrymaria in swimming is regulated almost entirely by the move-
ments of the head. . . . The body follows the head in a tortuous
course. Lacrymaria moves backward, when free, if stimulated
at the anterior end. Practically all the remaining reactions are in
the nature of random or trial movements, movements which are
determined largely by internal factors, the nature of which is as yet
unknown." It is interesting to note that, although the direction of
reaction is structurally determined in some protozoans (Para-
mecium, Oxytricha) and has a definite relation to a particular side of
281
282 A. S. PEARSE
the body in others which are apparently radially symmetrical (Di-
dinium), Lacrymaria turns its head toward any side. "The same
cilia are consequently not always involved in the forward stroke in
the process of turning, as is true for Didinium and QEdogonium.
During conjunction the reactions of the two individuals are not co-
ordinated. Each responds to stimuli independently." Mast (21)
has also made a careful study of the reactions of the flagellate Per-
anema.
Although Metalnikow's study (23) of the digestion of infusorians
is primarily physiological, it contains many points of interest to
students of animal behavior. More food vacuoles are formed in an
acid medium than in an alkaline one; alcohol and small doses of
arsenic stimulate their formation; they appear more slowly at low
temperatures, and cease to be formed at 33-34°. The addition of
trypsin to the water containing a Paramecium accelerates its digestive
processes. Paramecium shows selection in taking its food and diges-
tible particles circulate longer inside the body than others.
Ulehla (30) has made a very careful study, by means of a para-
boloid condenser for dark field illumination, of the movements of the
flagella of various flagellates, algal swarm-spores, bacteria, and
antherozooids. He gives a comprehensive review of the literature
and concludes: (i) Moving flagella describe variable figures, which are,
however, definite for each kind and which seldom take the form of
simple rotation; (2) flagella have a complicated internal structure;
(3) the rate of movement of flagella is much more rapid than has been
supposed; (4) the regular beat is easily disturbed and may be modified;
(5) flagella exert their propelling influence like oars, not like screws;
(6) the movements of flagella may be grouped under six classes.
McClendon (19) points out that the movements of Amoeba,
when subjected to an electric current or to certain chemical sub-
stances, are like the movements of other colloids under similar cir-
cumstances. He believes that the behavior of electrolytes in passing
the plasma membrane influences the direction of locomotion.
Harper (12, 13) has investigated the geotropic reactions of Para-
mecia tl^at have ingested particles of iron. He believes that geotro-
pism is due to "a passive orientation not involving the irritability."
The Paramecia show an increased upward orienting tendency
which persists as long as the particles of iron remain in the posterior
end. A magnet placed at one side of a jar containing iron-laden
animals causes them to stream upward in the stronger part of the
field, and there is a return toward the bottom in the weaker part.
RECENT LITERATURE ON LOWER INVERTEBRATES 283
"The magnet is effective in producing this circulation by diminishing
the effect of gravity on animals containing iron. It also exerts a
passive pull upon them, and they gradually swing into their finally
oriented position in a vertical path under the combined influence of
the magnet and gravity. The oriented path is consequently a
curve."
Wager (31) has made a very comprehensive study of the aggre-
gation forms assumed by Euglena and other microscopic organisms
and has reviewed the literature on this subject. He experimented
with Euglena, Chlamydomonas, Glenodinium, Volvox, Spirillum, and
with masses of finely divided particles in liquids. Euglena usually
moves toward the light, and phototropism may interfere with the
characteristic aggregations. In the dark or in red light, however, if
Euglense are crowded close enough together to oblige them to move
slowly, gravity causes them to sink downward with the posterior
end foremost. Such a downward movement of a mass of Euglense
brings about a counter current and some individuals may move
upward, or they may be brought into a region where they are not
crowded, and having been oriented with the posterior end down by
gravity, they swim upward. Masses of Euglense show a tendency
to cling together like all small bodies suspended in liquids. Wager
concludes: "The action of the physical forces, gravity and molecular
attraction, over which Euglense have little or no control, appears,
therefore, to play an important part in their life history, and, whilst
not inhibiting their power to move, compels them to limit the sphere
of their activity to certain definite areas in such a way as to promote
a more or less regular dissemination of them through the liquid, and
this prevents any undesirable congestion of the organisms in one
place." He believes that many of the so-called cases of geotaxis
and some phenomena of plankton distribution may be found to be
explainable as purely mechanical phenomena.
Desroche (6) has studied the phototropism of Chlamydomonas
zoospores in capillary tubes. These organisms are positively photo-
tropic at times. Changes in light intensity do not affect the rate of
their locomotion.
Ccelenterata. — Bohn (i) maintains that Actinia shows a diurnal
rhythm, expanding at night and contracting during the day, that is
due to light. Nevertheless, though such rhythmical movements
are kept up for some time if animals are kept continuously in the
dark, individuals kept uninterruptedly in the light will finally expand.
Carpenter (2) contributes some interesting facts in regard to the
284 A. S. PEARSE
habits of the rose coral. This animal is nocturnal and remains
contracted during the day or when it is strongly illuminated at night.
Its feeding habits differ from those of other corals, and are adapted
for capturing plankton. Nervoid impulses resulting from chemical
or tactile stimuli applied to a particular polyp may be transmitted
to other individuals of a colony. Carpenter believes that branched
cells occurring in the mesoglea may serve as adjusters by transmitting
impulses from the ectodermal receptors inward.
Parker (24) has studied the reactions of Metrldium. He shows
that the mesenteric muscles and the annular oral muscle may be
caused to contract by stimulating the outside of the body column.
When an anemone is cut nearly in two, nervous transmission may
take place through any connecting portion of the body except the
lips. These facts are considered in connection with histological
evidence and Parker concludes that the nervous system lies mostly
in the supporting lamella; not, as the Hertwigs believed, in the
fibrillar layer at the base of the ectoderm. Parker anaesthetized
Metridium with magnesium sulphate and then obtained what he
believed to be non-nervous responses from the muscles*
Schmid (29) has observed that Cereactis aurantiaca assumes an
erect position with the tentacles in the form of a rosette when illumi-
nated, and from experiments in which he used solutions of calcium
chromate, calcium bichromate, methyl green, and copper sulphate
as color filters, he asserts that the same may be said for red, yellow,
green, and blue light. In the dark, however, this actinian assumes
a "sleeping position" with the tentacles drooping and the body
relaxed.
Annelida. — As a result of tests with nitric, hydrochloric, sulphuric,
and acetic acids, Hurwitz (17) asserts that the responses of earth-
worms to solutions of acids may be ascribed to the effect of the
hydrogen ions in such solutions. Judged by its responses, the
earthworm's discrimination of weak acids is better than that mani-
fested in man's sense of taste. The earthworm agrees with man in
being more sensitive to acetic acid than would be expected from the
degree of dissociation in solutions of that acid.
Parker and Parshley (25), studying the earthworm, show that
though a moist surface is favorable for locomotion, a dry one acts as
a stimulus to bring about avoiding reactions. They also demonstrate
that the receptors for stimulation by dryness are situated at the
anterior end of the body. The avoiding reaction disappears when
the prostomial region is removed or anaesthetized.
RECENT LITERATURE ON LOWER INVERTEBRATES 285
Hargitt (n) extends his previous experiments on the behavior
of tubicolous annelids to new species. He pays particular attention
to what may be called "anti-tropic" light reactions, but also discusses
other points. His paper concludes with a general discussion of the
laws of behavior with particular reference to the variability of
reactions.
Echinodermata. — Holmes (16) has studied the light reactions
of the sea-urchin Arbacia punctulata in some detail. This animal
usually reacts negatively to light and responds to local stimulation
by erecting its spines, but it may become positively phototropic in
weak light and will move toward the light to get into a shaded
region. Cutting the oral nerve-ring does not interfere with local
reactions, which are, in fact, usually characteristic in isolated portions
of the body, but such an operation destroys the usual negative
photic reaction.
Cowles (4) has studied the responses of the sea-urchin and starfish
to changes of light intensity. There is a general ectodermal sensi-
tiveness to light in both these echinoderms. The pedicellarise of
Toxopneustes react to an increase or decrease in light, even after
they have been removed from the body. Cowles discusses von
UexkiilPs work at some length.
Mollusca. — Yung (32) shows that, though Helix frequents shady
crevices during the day and is active at "night, it does not react to
light, but rather to heat. The eyes possess little acuity and the
characteristic reactions to and from shady places take place after
they have been removed.
Lefevre and Curtis (18), in their study of the breeding habits
of fresh-water mussels, make some interesting observations on the
behavior of the bivalved glochidium larva. The glochidia studied
were of two kinds: the hooked, parasitic on the external parts of fish,
and the hookless, which attach themselves to the gills of fish. When
they pass from the parental marsupium they do not swim but fall
to the bottom and remain there until they become attached to a fish
or die. When free the two kinds of glochidia exhibit marked differ-
ences in behavior. The hooked form frequently makes spontaneous
snapping movements with the valves, and may be induced to react
more readily by mechanical than by chemical stimulation. The
hookless form usually does not respond to tactile stimulation alone,
but responds quickly to blood and other chemical substances. Both
forms may be anaesthetized by weak solutions of magnesium salts,
but chlorides of Na, K, and NH4 produce the snapping reaction.
286 A. S. PEARSE
Hooked glochidia readily grasp a needle or a piece of paper and "do
not relax but remain attached to the object until they die."
Haseman (14) reports some very interesting observations arid
experiments with three snails of the genus Littorina, which are found
in definite zones along the shore at Woods Hole, Mass. Individuals
of L. litorea located on vertical surfaces between tide marks exhibit
oscillatory movements which correspond to those of the tides, but
they do not exhibit such movements when on horizontal flat surfaces
between tide marks or when below low-tide marks. "The primary
directive force for rhythmical movements is the surface film of water.
The secondary directive forces are the quiescent position of desiccated
individuals, character of surfaces, moisture and food." Light
apparently does not influence such movements and this species shows
no rhythm in the absence of tidal changes, as Bohn has asserted.
The behavior of several snails of the genus Physa is the topic
discussed by Miss Dawson (5) in a very interesting paper. The
relation of these animals to "natural environment" is treated at
some length. The most important factors limiting the snails to
particular habitats are shallow water, minimum amount of shade,
few enemies, minimum amount of debris, protection from waves and
currents, moderate amount of water weeds, and well aerated water.
The secretion of mucus is an important factor in locomotion. Mucus
forms an epiphragm to seal the snail in its shell during hibernation,
and the spinning of mucus threads plays a prominent role in the daily
life ot Physa. These threads are formed as a snail floats upward
through the water. They are not only used as highways in going to
and from the surface, but also help to collect food, as their viscosity
causes many food particles to become attached to them and these
are devoured with the threads. The mucus surrounding the egg
masses is never eaten; apparently it is too tough. Physa is omniv-
orous, though the usual diet is largely vegetable. It passes through
a hibernating stage during which no food is taken and the body
decreases in size. This snail is not very sensitive to the presence of
food substances in the water; it will turn toward food one centimeter
away. In a starved individual feeding reactions are called forth by
mechanical stimulation, but a well-fed snail must be affected by
both mechanical and chemical stimuli in order to feed. Respiration
and sensitiveness to air are considered in some detail. Physa shows
a positive reaction to oxygen and is negative to carbon dioxide.
An animal without air in its "lung" is negatively geotropic. The
last section of this paper takes up "some psychic phenomena of
RECENT LITERATURE ON LOWER INVERTEBRATES 287
Physa." This snail is very sensitive to contact stimuli and is strongly
thigmotropic. "A new experience produces a shock to Physa which
seems to deprive it temporarily of its sense of gravity." "By the
use of the siphon [as a tactile organ] Physa shows that it distinguishes
changes in its environment. By a process of association it 're-
members' the location of the surface film, the character of the sides
of the aquarium, and even the relative depth of the water. It also
shows the development of neutral habit." The reactions of young
snails differ from those of adults; they show no "fear reactions,"
and this may be due to the lack of development of the nervous
system. Some activities, like the tapping reaction of the siphon,
change their character as the snails grow older.
Pieron (26) succeeded after twenty-four hours in teaching the
cephalopod Octopus vulgaris to reach through a side opening in a
test-tube, instead of trying to get through the glass, in order to seize
a crab inside the tube.
Crustacea. — In a paper too comprehensive for review here, Doflein
(7) has made a very interesting study of the habits and reactions of
certain prawns. He considers color changes, locomotion, feeding,
the effect of operations on the nervous system, photoreception,
tangoreception, and general habits. The paper is well illustrated.
In another paper Doflein (8) calls attention to the fact that the
first antennae (antennules) of certain land crabs have organs of smell
that differ somewhat in structure from taste organs found in the same
situation on aquatic decapod crustaceans. He believes that such
structures changed from tasting to smelling organs as the crabs
migrated from the water and took up a terrestrial mode of existence.
They are concerned with chemoreception in water or on land, and
their adaptability furnishes further evidence that there is but little
or no difference between the gustatory and olfactory sensations of
many invertebrates.
Chidester (3) describes the mating habits of four crabs and gives
an extended discussion of sex discrimination in arthropods. In the
four species studied, sex discrimination is through tactual stimulation.
The female is passive when grasped by a male. Males attempted
to mate with other males and with fertilized females of their own
species, but did not attempt to mate with individuals of other species.
Ghidester discusses general topics related to his paper. In the
Crustacea as a whole, sex discrimination is kinsesthetic and tactual.
"In the Insecta, sex discrimination is by smell; JForel's * contact-odor
sense.' . . . Sexual selection on the part of the female has not
288 A. S. PEARSE
been definitely established in the Arthropoda. We must consider
that the successful male is the one who first demonstrates his maleness
to the female. Though strength is a great factor, opportuneness of
proximity appears to be a greater one." The conclusions of Darwin,
Alcock, and others that the mating dances of certain male crabs
(Uca) are for the purpose of sexual selection, are thus discountenanced
by Chidester without review but perhaps justly.
Matula (22) studied the influence of certain ganglia of the central
nervous system on the rhythmical respiratory movements of Squilla
mantis. Extirpation of the cerebral ganglion or of the sub-esophageal
ganglion caused little change in the rhythm, but the removal of the
first thoracic ganglion caused respiration to cease.
Drzewina and Bohn (10) have investigated the reactions of several
marine invertebrates in sea water containing a little potassium
cyanide. "Sensibility" to light disappears before tactile sensitive-
ness. The light reactions of some crustaceans were changed from
positive to negative.
Schmid (28) observed that, though Zoea larvae were in general
negatively phototropic and sank through the water when in the
light, they also showed marked sensitiveness to differences in temper-
ature and often made quick backward movements when they came
to a place (Temperaturgrenze) where the temperature of the water
changed rapidly.
Holmes (15) reviews thirty-six papers on the behavior of lower
invertebrates, some of which were noticed in this journal a year ago.
REFERENCES
1. BOHN, G. Comparaison entre les reactions des actinias de la Mediterranee et celles
de la Manche. C. r. Soc. BioL, Paris, 1910, 68, 253-255. Les reactions des
actinies aux basses temperatures. Ibid., 1910, 68, 964-966. Intervention de
la vitesse des reactions chemiques dans la desensibilisation par la lumiere.
Ibid., 1910, 68, 1114-1117.
2. CARPENTER, F. W. Feeding Reactions of the Rose Coral (Isophylla). Proc.
Am. Acad. Arts and Sci., 1912, 46, 149-162.
3. CHIDESTER, F. E. The Mating Habits of Four Species of the Brachyura. BioL
Bull., 1911, 21, 235-248.
4. COWLES, R. P. Reactions of the Sea Urchin and Starfish to Changes of Light
Intensity. Johns Hopkins Univ. Circ., 1911, 1-7.
5. DAWSON, J. The Biology of Physa. Behavior Monographs, 1911, No. 4. Pp.
120, 6 pis.
6. DESROCHE, — . Sur le phototropisme des zoospores de Chlamydomonas Steinii
Goros. C. r. Acad. Sci., Paris, 1911, 152, 890-893.
7- DOFLEIN, F. Lebensgewohnheiten und Anpassungen bei dekapoden Krebsen.
Festschr. R. Hertwig, 1910, 3. Pp. 76. 4 plates.
RECENT LITERATURE ON LOWER INVERTEBRATES 289
8. DOFLEIN, F. Uber den Geruchsinn bei Wassertieren. Biol. Centralbl., 1911,
31, 706-707.
9. DRZEWINA, A. Sur la resistance des crustaces au cyanure et les effets sensi-
bilisateurs de cette substance. C. r. Soc. Biol., Paris, 1911, 71, 535-537.
10. DRZEWINA, A., et BOHN, G. Modifications des reactions des animaux sous 1'in-
fluence du cyanure de potassium. Ibid., 1911, 70, 843-845.
11. HARGITT, C. W. Observations on the Behavior of Tubicolous Annelids. III.
Biol. Bull, 1912, 22, 67-94.
12. HARPER, E. H. The Geotropism of Paramcecium. /. of Morph., 1911, 22, 993-
999.
13. HARPER, E. H. Magnetic Control of Geotropism in Paramcecium. /. of Animal
Behav., 1912, 2, 181-189.
14. HASEMAN, J. D. The Rhythmical Movements of Litorina litorea Synchronous
with Ocean Tides. Biol. Bull, 1911, 21, 113-121.
15. HOLMES, S. J. Literature for 1910 on the Behavior of Lower Invertebrates.
/. of Animal Behav., 1911, i, 393-400.
16. HOLMES, S. J. Phototaxis in the Sea Urchin, Arbacia punctulata. J. of Animal
Behav., 1912, 2, 126-136.
17. HURWITZ, S. H. The Reactions of Earthworms to Acids. Proc. Amer. Acad.
Arts and Sci., 1911, 46, 67-81.
1 8. LEFEVRE, G., and CURTIS, W. C. Reproduction and Parasitism in the Unionidae.
/. of Exper. Zool., 1910, 9, 79-115, 3 plates.
19. McCLENDON, J. F. Ein Versuch, amoboide Bewegung als Folgeerscheinung des
Wechseln des elektrischen Polarisationszustandes der Plasmahaut zu erklaren.
Arch. f. d. ges. Physiol. (Pfliiger), 1911, 140, 217-280.
20. MAST, S. O. Habits and Reactions of the Ciliate Lacrymaria. /. of Animal
Behav., 1911, i, 229-243.
21. MAST, S. O. The Reactions of the Flagellate Peranema. /. of Animal Behav.,
1912, 2, 91-97.
22. MATULA, J. Die Regulation der Atemrythmik bei Squilla mantis. Arch. f. d.
ges. Physiol. (Pfliiger), 1912, 144, 109-131.
23. METALNIKOW, S. Contributions a Petude de la digestion intracellulaire chez les
Protozoaires. Arch. Zool. exper. et gen., 1912, 49, 373-499.
24. PARKER, G. H. Nervous and Non-nervous Responses of Actinians. Science,
1912, 35, 461-462.
25. PARKER, G. H., and PARSHLEY, H. M. The Reactions of Earthworms to Dry and
to Moist Surfaces. /. of Exper. Zool., 1911, n, 361-363.
26. PIERON, H. Contribution a la psychologic du Poulpe. Bull. Inst. gen. psych.,
1911, n, 111-119.
27. PROWAZEK, S. VON. Einfiihrung in die Physiologic der einzelligen Protozoen,
Leipzig, Berlin, 1911. Pp. 172.
28. SCHMID, B. Ein Versuch iiber die Warmeempfindlichkeit von Zoea-Larven.
Biol. Centralbl., 1911, 31, 538.
29. SCHMID, B. Ueber den Heliotropismus von Cereactis aurantiaca. Ibid., 1911, 31,
„ 538-539-
30. ULEHLA, V. Ultramikroskopische Studien iiber Geisselbewegung. Biol. Cen-
tralbl., 1911, 31, 645-654; 656-676; 689-705; 721-731.
31. WAGER, H. On the Effect of Gravity upon the Movements and Aggregation of
Euglena viridis Ehrb., and Other Microorganisms. Phil. Trans. Roy. Soc.,
London, 1911, B, 201, 333-39°- Pis. 32-36.
290
C. H. TURNER
32. YUNG, E. De 1'insensibilite a la lumiere et de la cecite de 1'Escargot des vignes
(Helix pomatia L.). C. r. Acad. Sci., Paris, 1911, 153, 434~4S6.
RECENT LITERATURE ON THE BEHAVIOR OF THE
HIGHER INVERTEBRATES
BY C. H. TURNER
Sumner High School, St. Louis, Mo.
TROPISMS
Heretofore it has been thought that all of the Hepialidse fly only
at night. Last summer, on the northern slope of Mt. Hood, J.
McDunnough (29) found H. hyperboreus flying about in the sunlight,
between half past two and three o'clock in the afternoon. This was
not an accident, for the same behavior was observed on three suc-
cessive afternoons. McDunnough thinks the severe cold of the
evenings in that latitude has caused a change in the habits of the
species.
By throwing large flat corks into an aquarium in which the water
was only one inch deep, H. H. P. and H. C. Severin (36) obtained
proof that Belostoma americanum, Benacus griseus, Nepa apiculata,
Ranatra americana, and Ranatra kirkaldyi are positively thigmotactic.
Thirty-two out of thirty-five specimens were found hiding against
the under-side of the corks.
Cornetz (10) thinks the response of ants to light is a tropism.
Turner (40) conducted a series of experiments upon the light
reactions of a parasitic bee of the family Stelidse which caused him
to form the following conclusions: "These bees are endowed with a
pronounced tendency to move in the direction of the rays of light and
towards their source, but they do not invariably so act. Light,
heat, hunger, sexual restlessness and, perhaps, other factors arouse
in these bees an impulse to roam from home. Coupled with this
impulse to roam, there is an instinctive tendency to seek freedom in
the direction of the rays of light. When following this instinctive
tendency fails to bring freedom, the bee tries other methods. In this
endeavor many bees make haphazard flights in all possible directions;
while others, in a more systematic manner, hover repeatedly before
the sides of the enclosure. If such behavior can be called a tropism,
then these bees are positively phototactic."
RECENT LITERATURE ON HIGHER INVERTEBRATES 291
SENSATIONS
The sense of touch of the water-bugs mentioned above is well
developed; for, according to the Severins (36), the slight disturbance
caused by touching a needle to the water near a hungry bug is re-
sponded to immediately. These investigators announce that the
ability of these bugs to see moving bodies is quite pronounced.
Recently three investigators, working independently, have
conducted experiments which convince them that bees possess color
vision. These investigators are: Allard (6), Lovell (25), and Turner
(38).
Allard's (6) experiments were conducted in the midst of a cotton
field. He tested the tendency of certain bees (Mellissodes bimaculata,
Bombus, Entecnia, Apus) to visit each of the following things when
arranged in various combinations of threes: normal cotton blossoms,
cotton blossoms with the petals removed, petals only of a cotton
blossom pinned carelessly to a stem, cloth petals of an artificial rose
so arranged as to simulate a cotton blossom, artificial cotton blossoms
made out of the petals of an artificial rose covered with natural cotton
petals, cotton blossoms made out of paper, single cotton petals pinned
to a stem, leaves of cotton so wrapped about cotton petals as to re-
semble a cotton bud. The three specimens used in any one experi-
ment were arranged either so as to form a triangle or else in a straight
line. Allard records the following conclusions: (i) Once visiting
insects have entered a cotton field, there is little doubt that their visual
powers enable them to discover the blossoms. (2) The size and
general appearance of the blossoms do not appear to be of great
importance in initiating the process of inspection. (3) A blossom
concealed except to bees directly above it is seldom visited. (4) Bees
are rarely induced to inspect paper or cloth artifacts; this is probably
due to perceptual differences in color and texture. (5) The actual
number of entrances into a blossom are small compared with the
number of inspections. (6) Bees usually inspect the surface very
carefully; hence, although the corolla of the blossom invites the first
approach, it is not easy to determine the relative importance of the
sense of sight and of the sense of smell involved in nearer inspection.
(7) Conspicuousness and coloration are important factors in leading
bees to perceive cotton blossoms. (8) A sort of memory of associ-
ation is developed, so that older or much experienced bees often appear
to work among blossoms to a much better advantage than younger
bees. The American cotton possesses extra-floral nectaries, but the
Asiatic does not. Bees collecting nectar from the outer involucral
292 C. H. TURNER
nectaries of the American cotton visit similar structures of the Asiatic,
but soon depart. Allard thinks a sort of odoriferous cloud enables
the bees to find the field itself; but he gives no experimental evidence
to support the view.
Lovell's work (25) is partly statistical and partly experimental.
He states that, in the portion of the United States which lies east of
the I02d meridian and north of North Carolina and Tennessee there
are 1,244 species of green or dull-colored flowers, only 233 of which
are entomophilous; and many of these are capable of self-fertilization.
In his experiments the bees were given an opportunity to select con-
spicuously colored flowers from dull-colored ones, flowers with
corollas from blossoms with the petals removed, colored blossoms from
green leaves supplied with honey, honey-bearing surfaces contrasting
with the environment from honey-bearing surfaces harmonizing
with the environment. The following conclusions are the results
of his experiments: (i) Green flowers are not well adapted to ento-
mophily, and many such plants have been derived from larger and
more highly developed entomophilous forms. As a whole, ento-
mophilous green flowers are sparingly visited by insects of the less
specialized families, and, as a rule, they retain the power of self-
pollination. (2) The fact that insects have been observed feeding
on over-ripe fruit, or on the glandular secretions of the vegetative
organs of plants, or on the excretions of the Aphidae, or on foliage, or
on greenish or brownish flowers, or on dull-colored receptacles which
have contained sugar or sweet liquids, affords no proof that con-
spicuousness is not an advantage to entomophilous flowers. Any
surface, whether it is bright or dull-colored, on which there is nectar
or honey will be freely visited by bees for stores, after these liquids
have once been discovered; but they will not be discovered so quickly
on a surface which does not contrast in hue with the environment as
they will be on one that does so contrast. (3) As pointed out by
Knuth, in the absence of control or comparative observations, the
experiments of Plateau upon green or greenish flowers are fallacious
and do not prove that " all flowers might be as green as their leaves
without their pollination being compromised." (4) When, under
similar conditions, bees are given the choice between a conspicuous
and an inconspicuous object, they exhibit a preference for the former.
This preference is sufficiently marked to account for the development
of color contrast in flowers.
Turner's experiments (38) on the pattern-vison of bees were
conducted with paste-board artifacts similar to those used by him, a
RECENT LITERATURE ON HIGHER INVERTEBRATES 293
year ago, in his experiments upon the color-vision of bees. Artifacts
constructed out of seven different kinds of color patterns were used.
The bees were trained to collect honey from an artifact of a certain
definite color pattern. The trained bees were given an opportunity
to select artifacts of that color-pattern from one or many artifacts of
different color pattern, under the following three conditions: when the
artifact to be sleeted contained honey and the others did not; when
some of all kinds of artifacts contained honey; when none of the
artifacts contained honey. Of the 518 selections made by the bees,
508 were correct. This warrants the conclusion that bees can dis-
tinguish color-patterns. Hence since bees can distinguish colors and
the fine details of color-pattern, there is nothing about the visual
powers of bees that militates against the theory that the colors and
the color-patterns of flowers are adaptations to insect visitors.
FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS
H. H. P and H. C. Severin (36) find that a sudden approach to
an aquarium containing Belostomas causes the bugs to flee in all
directions from their resting places. This they consider an indication
of fear. Under similar conditions, Nepa apicula um, Ranatra
americana, and Ranatra kirkaldyi show no such signs of fear.
Wodsedalek (44) thinks that, under certain conditions, the
may-fly larvae show unmistakable signs of fear. He found that
larvse which had been frequently handled exhibited this type of
behavior in a marked degree.
Hardy (19) thinks he has discovered in the wasp Diamma bicolor
signs of anger. He bases this conclusion upon the following obser-
vation. The wasp was dragging a cricket into its burrow when
Hardy, with a pair of forceps, held the cricket by its hind legs. After
tugging and tugging without accomplishing anything, the wasp
suddenly stopped pulling, mounted the cricket, seized a portion of
the cricket's abdomen in her jaws and stung the insect three times.
MATING INSTINCTS
Hinds and Turner (23) find that the rice weevil is both poly-
gamous and polyandrous.
In studying the behavior of Calosoma sycophanta, Burgess (8)
iound that the same beetles copulated several times during the
summer.
Cory (14) describes in detail the copulation of Sanninoidea
txitiosa Say. He finds that they remain in copulo from 51-82 min.
294 c- H- TURNER
Fuchs (17) observed two males copulating with one female
Cheimatonia brunnata. He also noticed a male Larentia bilineata
copulate with a female Acidalia aversata.
Turner (40) describes in detail the mating of a parasitic bee of
the family Stelidse.
That certain syrphid flies hover before flowers for long stretches
of time, and that several other flies engage in a kind of an aerial
dance in which all heads are directed the same way, has been known
for several years. Some have considered the first an indication that
flies have an aesthetic taste; most students have considered the latter
an anemotropism. When Plateau interposed his hand between the
fly and the blossom and noticed that it continued to hover there, and
when he moved his hand to the right and to the left, forward and
backward, and noticed that, in each case, the fly moved in the same
sense, he demonstrated the fallacy of the aesthetic taste hypothesis.
Perez (32) has now proposed what, to the writer, seems the true
interpretation of both of the phenomena mentioned above. He
noticed that the flies hovering before flowers and those engaged in
the dances were always males. Whenever a female approached one
or more of the males would dart after her. If the female was over-
taken, mating would occur and the male would drop out of the dance.
These data, obtained by watching the behavior of several species of
flies, caused Perez to conclude that the stationary hovering of certain
flies and the aerial dances of others were means of securing mating.
This discovery of Perez places the stationary hovering of the Syr-
phidae, the aerial dances of other flies, and the sun dances of certain
bees in the same category; each is what has been called a "nuptial
ambuscade."1
NEST BUILDING AND MATERNAL INSTINCTS
Girault (18) describes the behavior of the adult and larval Polistes
pallipes Lepelletier during the process of colony formation.
Lozinski (26) discovered a nest of ten cells, constructed by
Osmia bicornis, in an open glass tube.
Sasscer (35) describes the method of ovipositing of the saw-fly
Tomosthetus mullicinctus Rohwer.
Hinds and Turner (23) describe the egg-laying habits of the
rice weevil.
Parrott (30) describes, in detail, the method of ovipositing of the
tree Crickets, Oecanthus niveus DeGeer, 0. quadripunctatus Beut.,
0. nigricornis Walker.
1 C. H. Turner, "The Sun-Dance of Melissodes," Psyche, 1908, pp. 122-124.
RECENT LITERATURE ON HIGHER INVERTEBRATES 295
Calvert (9) found the larvae of Mecistogaster modestus living in
water between the leaves of epiphytic bromelids. He thinks this is
an evolution from the chance laying of eggs in the bromelids when
floods brought the water to that level. The association having once
been formed persists, so he thinks, even after the plant is far above
the water.
Turner (39) has observed an American Ammophila stocking its
nest with subterranean caterpillars.
It is not often that one has the good fortune to observe, within
the range of a single genus, an epitome of the evolution of an instinct.
In SynagriS) a genus of Eumenidae found in the Congo, Roubaud (33)
has made such a discovery. S. calida L. constructs a nest of several
mud cells, stocks them with caterpillars, lays an egg in each, seals
the cells, and takes no further care of them. S. sicheliana Sauss.
lays an egg in each of several mud cells, places in each enough cater-
pillars to last the larva a little more than a day, and renews the
supply daily. When S. cornuta L. has completed one cell, she lays
an egg in it; but does not stock the cell with caterpillars. When the
larva has hatched, the wasp feeds it daily until it is full grown. Then
she seals the cell and proceeds to construct a new one.
FIGHTING AND FOOD-PROCURING INSTINCTS
Hardy (19) describes, in detail, the capture and the handling of a
tree cricket by Diamma bicolor.
Gowdey (i), of Uganda, has observed two specimens of Bembex
tricolor Dahl carrying off a Tabanus secedens.
Davidson (3) observed a large bug (Lethocerus (Belostoma)
americanus Leidy) capture and feed upon a fish (Lucius americanus
Gmelin).
Banks (7) discovered that one of the phorid flies attacks myria-
pods.
McDermott (28) observed a young half-winged bug feeding upon
the larvae of the tent-caterpillar.
Knab (24) discovers that a genus of mosquitoes (Megarhinus)
does not suck blood, but feeds upon fruit and that its mouth-parts
have been especially modified for that purpose.
According to the Severins (36) both Belostoma and Nepa are
carnivorous.
296 C. H. TURNER
PARASITISM, COMMENSALISM AND SYMBIOSIS
T. L. Patterson (31) has conducted some experiments which have
caused him to conclude that the sarcophagids are scavengers and not
parasites.
Roubaud (33) describes several commensals and parasites of the
solitary wasps of the genus Synagris.
Wheeler describes two new ant guests: a pseudoscorpion (Cha-
lanops dorsalis Banks) (41) and a coccinellid beetle (Brachycantha
quadripunctata Mels.) (43) and gives a list of the hosts of five Xeno-
dusse (42).
Enslin (15) describes a small cicada (Gar gar a genista) functioning
as an "ant cow." The larvae and nymphs rest on a plant with the
beak of each penetrating the plant tissues. The ant appears in the
rear and feels the abdomen of the cicada with her antennae. Immedi-
ately the cicada protrudes an anal tube on the tip of which appears
a drop of clear liquid, which is swallowed by the ant.
Cr emastogaster difformis Sm. (4), a Javanese ant, excavates its nest
in the end of dead branches. In certain places these nests are filled
with rain water and a mosquito (Harpagomyia splendens Meijere)
breeds therein. In breeding mosquitoes and ants together, Jacobson
found that the mosquitoes spent much time on the upright rod that
supported the nest. When an ant passed between the legs of the
mosquito, it was caressed by the mosquito and between the ant's
wide open jaws there appeared a drop of liquid which was swallowed
by the mosquito.
In the literature much emphasis has been placed upon the sym-
biotic relation of certain animals to certain plants. Recently
Escherich (16) has made a careful study of the so-called symbiosis
between ants and Humboldtia laurifolia, a plant with hollow inter-
nodes. He collected the following data: (i) Only a small number of
the cavitie.s in the stem contained ants. (2) The following genera
of ants were found in the cavities: Tapinoma, Monomorium, Cre-
mastogaster, etc., all genera that are found elsewhere than in the stems
of these plants. (3) The ants were anything but aggressive. (4)
Many of the branches containing ants showed scars caused by
woodpeckers. Escherich concludes that this is evidently not a
symbiotic, but a parasitic relation; the ants being the parasites.
RECENT LITERATURE ON HIGHER INVERTEBRATES 297
MISCELLANEOUS INSTINCTS
Migrations. — Hill (22) describes dragon flies migrating in swarms.
July 9, 1911, a moth (Tortrix fumiferana Clemens) entered
Philadelphia in such numbers as to interfere with traffic and to cause
the shop people to close their doors (2).
Hibernation. — Herrick (21) thinks that, in the south, the agamic
adults of the cabbage aphis (Aphis brassier) hibernate.
HOMING
During the year Cornetz (10, n, 12, 13) has produced several
papers on the homing of African ants. These papers reiterate the
same points given in the papers by him that were reviewed in this
BULLETIN last year. He lays especial stress upon the statement
that ants have an awareness of distance and of direction, which has
been obtained independently of the sense of sight and of the sense
of smell.
Santschi (34) has recently conducted a series of well-planned field
experiments upon the African ants. These experiments were so ar-
ranged as to give the ants an opportunity to find the way home under
the following conditions: when the odor has been removed from a
portion of the trail; when a portion of the trail and the ant upon it is
shifted bodily to a new position; when the direction of the impinging
light rays is shifted from time to time by means of mirrors; when the
ant is placed in a new environment. Santschi concludes: (i) There
are two kinds of trails found among ants: trails along which the ants
are guided by the olfactory and topochemical senses, and trails along
which the ants are guided by perceptions which are largely visual.
(2) Among the Tapinomas, and perhaps among other harvesting
ants, the trails are started by odors intentionally deposited by a single
worker. (3) Such an intentionally scented trail, although not slav-
ishly followed, is utilized by workers to teach other workers the
way to a source of food. (4) The trace of odor is not sufficient to
explain fully the orientation of the ants that follow it and it is suppli-
mented by contact ideas. (5) As a rule, orientation among ants is
a complex phenomenon based upon a variety of sense stimuli, the
one predominant depending upon the species and the conditions.
(6) Odors, topochemical stimuli, visual images, the direction of the
rays of light, tactile sensations, muscular sensations, and auditory
sensations form a psychic complex which serves as a flexible guide
to behavior. (7) The chief sense-organs that function in ant behavior
298 C. H. TURNER
are: antennae, eyes, tactile tegumentary hairs, chordotonal organs,
and muscles.
MEMORY AND LEARNING BY ASSOCIATION
Allard (6) thinks that the bees visiting cotton blossoms display
a kind of memory or association.
By patient experimenting, Wodsedalek (44) trained may-fly
nymphs to move against the light towards a stone, the position of
which was shifted from time to time, and to swim considerable
distances towards food held in forceps. The latter was accomplished
in the following manner. Algae, held in forceps, were presented to a
hungry nymph. When the insect seized the algae, the experimenter
pulled gently and thus caused the nymph to follow. Later he would
hold bits of algae near a nymph and, when the young may-fly ap-
proached, withdraw the forceps a little. After four weeks of such
training, many would swim considerable distances towards food,
and some would swim towards the experimenter as soon as he entered
the room. At the end of two and a half months, as soon as Wod-
sedalek entered the room, the majority of the nymphs would swim
towards him and claw against the side of the aquarium. One speci-
men came to the top of a stone, and partly into the air, to obtain the
food. Untrained specimens never behaved in this manner.
Szymanski (37) has used the same method in investigating the
behavior of young cockroaches that was employed by Yerkes in
studying the behavior of mice; namely, punishing the subject with
an electric shock whenever it makes a wrong choice. The young
roaches were given an opportunity to pass from a well-lighted apart-
ment into a dark one. Following its natural tendencies, each roach
started to enter the dark chamber. As soon as it did so, it received
an electric shock which caused it to dart back into the light. After
being repeatedly punished for entering the dark chamber, the roach
learned to turn back as soon as it reached the shadow. To the best
of my knowledge, this is the first time that this electrical method of
punishment has been used in the investigation of insect behavior.
REFERENCES.
1. IANON.]. Bembex Preying upon Tabanidae. Bull Entom. Research, London,
I9II, 2, 182.
2. [ANON.]. Entomological News, 1911, 22, 371-372.
3. [ANON.]. Entomological News, 1911, 22, 372-373.
4. [ANON.]. Entomological News, 1911, 22, 466.
5. [ANON.]. Le retour au nid chez les Fourmis. Le Naturaliste Canadien. Quebec,
1911, 38, 29-31.
RECENT LITERATURE ON HIGHER INVERTEBRATES 299
6. ALLARD. Some Experimental Observations Concerning the Behavior of Various
Bees in their Visits to Cotton Blossoms. Amer. Nat., 1911, 45, 607-622;
668-685.
7. BANKS, N. A Curious Habit of One of Our Phorid Flies. Proc. Entom. Soc.
Washington, 1911, 13, 212-214.
8. BURGESS, A. F. Calosoma sycophanta: Its Life History, Behavior and Successful
Colonization in New England. U. S. Dept. of Agri., Bureau of Entomology,
Bull. 101, 1911, 1-94; Pis. I.-IX.
9. CALVERT, P. P. Habits of Plant-Dwelling Larva of Mecisiogaster modestus.
Entom. News, 1911, 22, 402-411.
IO. CORNETZ, V. L'Oeil-boussole de la Fourmi d'apres Santschi. Revue des Idees,
1911, Oct. 15, 1-7.
"II. CORNETZ, V. Observations a faire a propos des trajets de la Fourmi. La
Feuille des Jeunes Naturalistes: Revue Mensuelle d'Histoire Naturelle, 1911,
41, 1-6.
12. CORNETZ, V. Das Problem der Riickkehr zum Nest der forschenden Ameisen.
Zsch.f. Insektbiol., 1912, 7, 181-183; 218-223; 312-316; 347-350.
13. CORNETZ, V. Quelques observations sur 1'estimation de la distance chez la
Fourmi. Bull, de la Societe de rAfrique du Nord, Feb. 15, 1912.
14. CORY, E. N. Notes on the Egg-Laying Habits and Emergence of Adult San-
ninoidea exitiosa Say. /. of Econ. Entom., 1911, 4, 332-336.
15. ENSLIN, E. Gargara genista Y. und Formica cinerea Mayr. Zsch. f. wiss. Insekt-
biol., 1911, 7, 19-21; 56-58.
16. ESCHERICH, K. VON. Zwei Beitrage zum Kapitel "Ameisen und Pflanzen."
Biol. CentralbL, 1911, 31, 44-51.
17. FUCHS, F. Unnatiirliche Copula bei Lepidopteren. Zsch. f. wiss. Insektbiol. ,
I9H» 7, 359-360.
18. GIRAULT, A. A. Incidental Observations on a Queen of Polistes pallipes Lepel-
letier while Founding a Colony, Including Fragmentary Biological Notes.
Bull Wis. Nat. Hist. Soc., 1911,9, 49-63.
19. HARDY, A. D. The Stinging of Gryllotalpa coarctata by Diamma bicolor. Vic-
torian Naturalist, 1911, 28, 33-38.
20. HERMS, W. B. The Photic Reactions of Sarcophagid Flies, Especially Lucilia
ccesar and Calliphora vomitoria. J. of Exper. Zool., 1911, 10, 167-226.
21. HERRICK, G. W. The Cabbage Aphis (Aphis brassier). J. of Econ. Entom.,
1911, 4, 219-224.
22. HILL, M. D. Entom. News, 1911, 22, 419-421.
23. HINDS, W. E., and TURNER, W. F. Life History of the Rice Weevil (Calandra
oryza L.) in Alabama. /. of Econ. Entom., 1911, 4, 230-236; PI. VII.
24. KNAB, F. The Food-Habits of Megarhinus. Psyche, 1911, 18, 80-83.
25. LOVELL, J. H. The Color Sense of the Honey Bee: The Pollination of Green
Flowers. Amer. Nat., 1912, 46, 83-107.
26. LOZINSKI, P. Ueber einen eigentumlichen Nestbau von Osmi& Bicornis. Zsch.
f. Insektbiol., 1911, 7, 223-230; 316-322.
27. LUND, E. J. On the Structure and Use of Photogenic Organs, with Special Ref-
erence to the Lampyridse. /. of Exper. Zool., 1911, 10, 415-468.
28. McDERMorr, F. A. The Attack of a Larval Hemipter upon a Caterpillar. Proc.
Entom. Soc. Washington, 1911, 13, 90-91.
29. McDuNNOUGH, J. Peculiar Habits of a Hepialid Moth. Canadian Entom., 1911,
43, 289-292.
3oo MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN
30. PARROTT, R. J. Oviposition among Tree Crickets. /. of Econ. Entom., 1911,
55, 216-218, PI. VI.
31. PATTERSON, T. L. Investigations of the Habits of Certain Sarcophagidae. U. S.
Dept. of Agriculture, Tech. Series, No. 19, part III., 25-32.
32. PEREZ, J. Sur quelques particularites curieuses du rapprochement des sexes chez
certains Dipteres. Bull. Scientifique de la France et de la Belgique, 1911, 7th
Series, 45, i-H-
33. ROUBAUD, E. The Natural History of the Solitary Wasps of the Genus Synagris.
Ann. Rept. Smith. Inst. for 1910-1911, 507-526. PI. 1-4-
34. SANTSCHI, DR. F. Observations et remarques critiques sur le mecanisme de
l'orientation chez les Fourmis. Rev. Suisse de Zoo/., Ann. de la Societe Zoologique
Suisse, etc., 1911, 19, 3°4-338-
35. SASSCER, E. R. Notes on a Sawfly Injurious to Ash. Proc. Entom. Soc. Wash-
ington, 1911, 13, 107-110, PI. VII.
36. SEVERIN, H. H. P. & H. C. Habits of Belostoma ( = Zaitha) flumineum Say and
Nepa apiculata Uhler with Observations on Other Closely Related Aquatic
Hemiptera. /. of N. Y. Entom. Soc., 1911, 19, 99~i°8.
37. SZYMANSKI, J. S. Modification of the Innate Behavior of Cockroaches. /. o/
Animal Behav., 1912, 2, 81-90.
38. TURNER, C. H. Experiments on Pattern-Vision of the Honey Bee. Biol. Bull.,
1911, 21, 249-264.
39. TURNER, C. H. A Note on the Hunting Habits of an American Ammophila.
Psyche, 1911, 18, 13-14.
40. TURNER, C. H. Notes on the Behavior of a Parasitic Bee of the Family Stelidae.
/. of Animal Behav., 1911, i, 374~392-
41. WHEELER, W. M. Pseudoscorpions in Ant Nests. Psyche, 1911, 18, 166-168.
42. WHEELER, W. M. Notes on the Myrmecophilous Beetles of the Genus Xenodusa,
with a Description of the Larva of X. cava Leconte. /. of N. Y. Entom. Soc.,
1911, 19, 163-169.
43. WHEELER, W. M. An Ant-Nest Coccinellid (Brachycantha quadripunctata Mels.).
/. of N. Y. Entom. Soc., 1911, 19, 169-174.
44. WODSEDALEK, J. E. Formation of Associations in May-Fly Nymphs Heptagenia
interpunctata Say. /. of Animal Behav., 1912, 2, 1-19.
RECENT LITERATURE ON THE BEHAVIOR OF
VERTEBRATES
BY PROFESSOR MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN
Vassar College
Fish. — Copeland (2) finds that the puffer bites much oftener at
packets containing food than at empty packets of similar appearance;
this discrimination is abolished by cutting the olfactory nerves, and
reestablished on their recovery.
Loeb and Wasteneys (13) have observed that the maximum tem-
perature to which Fundulus may safely be transferred varies with
THE BEHAVIOR OF VERTEBRATES 301
the concentration of the water and is affected by the presence of
salts. The fish may be immunized to a temperature of 35° by being
previously kept for thirty hours in water at 27°.
Sumner (23) has observed the protective adjustment of the mark-
ings of flatfish to the background. Observations were made with
the fish on natural and artificial grounds. The pigment pattern is
adjusted not only to the brightness of the ground but to its pattern:
the plates show arrangements to correspond with large and with
small black and white checks; arrangements quite foreign to the
previous experience of individual or race. The pattern assumed is
constant for a given ground. The vertical walls have some influence;
the ceiling has none. The pigment changes do not occur if both eyes
are destroyed; hence their source is retinal. Since the absolute
degree of. illumination has little effect, the stimulus must be the ratio
of direct to reflected light. The changes occur when the fish is buried
in the sand or has its skin covered with a mask. The fish shows no
ability to choose between two grounds that one to which its pig-
mentation is adapted. It may be remembered that Minkiewicz has
claimed such a power for the crab, but that Pearse has been unable
to confirm his observations.
Parker (16) has recently made experiments to test the effect on
various kinds of fish, which he believes can hear, of the noises made
by motor boats and guns. It was found that "the sounds produced
by motor boats are extremely faint under water, and have little in-
fluence on the movements and feeding of fishes. . . . Single ex-
plosive sounds, like the report of a gun, may startle fish and cause
them to cease feeding, but these responses are also temporary and
local." It is pointed out that certain fish, like the drumfish and the
squeteague, produce noises that are connected with sex attraction,
and that therefore it might be possible to use artificial noises as a lure.
A very interesting suggestion, connecting the adjustment of
pigmentation in certain fishes to the background on which they lie,
with possible sensibility of their eyes to color, has been made by von
Frisch (6). Phoxinus l&vis has this power of adjustment, but loses
it if blinded, showing that the reaction is a retinal one. Now two
equally bright fish may be placed, the one on a gray, the other on a
yellow ground, and if the grounds are properly chosen, the fish will
not change their brightnesses, showing that the two grounds are of
equal brightness so far as the sensitiveness of the fish is concerned.
But after a few hours spent on these grounds, the fish on the yellow
shows a yellow stripe which does not appear on the other fish. This
302 MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN
proves, von Frisch argues, that the light has had a chromatic effect
on the retina. If such is the case, there is no reason why the fish
should not have color vision. This is drawing evidence from a new
source on the problem of color-vision in an animal (see the dispute
between Hess and Bauer reported in the corresponding number of
this BULLETIN for last year).
Amphibia. — Our opinion of the ability of frogs to learn has been
raised by the investigations of Schaeffer (19). Specimens of Rana
clamata, R. sylvatica, and R. virescens learned in from four to seven
trials to avoid hairy caterpillars, and chemically treated worms also
were soon avoided. An electric shock associated with food inhibited
the feeding instinct altogether for some days. Schaeffer calls at-
tention to the fact that the frogs learned to avoid the disagreeable
food in two ways: either by taking it into the mouth and rejecting it,
or by swallowing it. In the former case, rejecting movements entered
into the formation of the habit; in the latter case, the habit must have
been formed wholly in nervous tissue, and under such circumstances
a habit might appear to be suddently formed when its growth had
really been gradual though invisible. The difference between the
speed of learning shown by his frogs and the slowness of Yerkes's
frogs in learning a labyrinth the author explains as due to the fact
that the feeding instinct, which was not involved in the work of
Yerkes, is exercised with regard to a great variety of dissimilar stimuli,
and hence its mechanism must be very plastic. Strong objection
is made to the statement by Washburn and Bentley in their article
on the formation of associations in the chub: "In general it may be
prophesied that the more deep-rooted and essential the instinct
appealed to by the experience to which an animal is subjected, the
more rapidly will the animal profit by experience." The authors of
this statement did not mean to imply that these characters in an
instinct were the only ones affecting its modifiability. The presence
of a psychic accompaniment to the behavior of his frogs is concluded
by Schaeffer from the fact that they very carefully examined the food
supplied to them, after they had had unfavorable experience with it.
This examination differed from instinctive examination, for its cause
was the individual experience of the frog. The nature of this psychic
process the author describes by using Morgan's term "defining the
construct" of hairy caterpillar.
In connection with prophecies that fail, it is rather amusing to
find in Hargitt's (8) paper on the tree frog a prophecy that is falsified
by Schaeffer's results. Hargitt observed that a tree frog which had
THE BEHAVIOR OF VERTEBRATES 303
caught and been stung by a wasp went through the same performance
next day without, apparently, having profited by its lesson, and he
says: "It maybe doubted whether amphibia show any particular
discrimination based on that type of experience." Hargitt's work
was done on the American species Hyla versicolor, and was supple-
mented by a less complete study of the European H. arborea. The
animals were subjected to varying degrees of daylight, and to different
air and water temperatures. Strong light lightens the skin color, as
does high temperature: Parker found that in lizards light and high
temperature caused opposite effects. Neither darkness nor low tem-
perature had any direct effect on the tree frogs. Biedermann's
hypothesis that contact stimuli are important was tested with differ-
ent stimuli, as well as with individuals whose toe disks were clipped
off, and even with section of the spinal cord; the results were nega-
tive. The great variability of the phenomena observed leads Har-
gitt to think that emotional factors are involved in their production.
Sometimes mere handling would produce the changes. "I even,"
says he, "tried the effect of merely close scrutiny without any jostling
or moving of the jars, and found that where a specimen could be
brought to observe that it was observed, there was often a color change
quite as evident as the others." In certain instances where light
stimuli on one day produced response and on the following day
failed to do so, the suggestion is ventured that "the creature had
acquired such familiarity with conditions as to dissipate to a degree
its emotional sensitiveness." One can imagine the reaction of
Professor Loeb to the following concluding remark, which is however
very gratifying to the psychologist: "There are other minds than
ours, and they share something in common with us in those psychic
powers which count for something in the stress of evolution, and as
behavior in its manifold aspects gives expression to the endless
struggle it is not strange to find involved therein the psychic along
with other factors which go to constitute the organism and its environ-
ment."
Cummings (5) contributes a brief description of the courting
behavior of a British salamander, Molge palmata Schneid.
The spotted newt has had its food and chemical sense tested by
Reese (17). In securing food, both sight and smell play a part, the
latter being more important. Inedible objects are followed and some-
times seized, but not swallowed; and when fatigued so that it will no
longer follow such objects the newt will usually still react to food.
The head is much the most sensitive part of the body to chemical
304 MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN
stimulation. All other parts of the body are equally sensitive.
Cutting the olfactory nerves abolished all response to food, but a
negative response to a .5 per cent, solution of acetic acid was un-
changed, and the greater sensitiveness of the head was maintained,
from which the author concludes that it is probably due to the sensi-
tiveness of the oral and nasal mucous membranes, rather than to
smell proper. A strong sugar solution caused no reaction. Quinine
produced a negative reaction when applied to the head, but no re-
sponse from other regions. Some animals reacted negatively to a
I per cent, solution of common salt applied to the head; a 4 per cent,
solution was necessary to produce reactions from other parts of the
body. Very marked negative reactions to potassium hydroxide and
to acetic acid occurred. Ethyl alcohol caused less reaction than
might have been expected. Cocaine has apparently no effect upon
the skin of this newt; applied to the nasal and oral mucous membrane
in a 5 per cent, solution "it temporarily inhibits the feeding reaction
and diminishes the sensitiveness to acid solutions squirted upon the
head. This result may be due to the general effect of the cocaine
upon the system." The writer quotes from the present reviewer the
term " telaesthetic sense" as descriptive of the chemical sense. The
term, which is Lloyd Morgan's, should be " telaesthetic taste," and is
descriptive of the sense of smell in a water-dwelling animal. "Telaes-
thetic sense" does not properly describe smell, for the senses of
sight and hearing are also telaesthetic.
Birds. — Hunter (n) used three mazes with pigeons; the first was
that of Rouse, the second more complex, and the third was one whose
paths could be shortened. Four males and four females were given
three tests each a day. With Rouse's maze, the time curves began
much lower and fell more abruptly than in Rouse's own experiments;
probably because in his tests the birds could see from one compart-
ment into another, since he used wire rather than wood partitions.
Hunter found that memory for this maze was practically perfect
after four weeks. With the second maze the error curve fell much
more slowly, owing, the author thinks, to the complexity of the maze
and to the interference of habits from the first maze. The time
curves, however, fell more rapidly in the case of those birds that had
had experience with the first maze. Tests were made with the maze
rotated 90°, 270°, and 360°. Some birds were confused at 90° but
perfect at 270°; with others the reverse tended to be the case. One
bird was confused at both positions. "After sixteen days training
in these two positions, all the birds were perfect at 360° rotation."
THE BEHAVIOR OF VERTEBRATES 305
In explanation, Hunter suggests that the birds which were not
confused in a rotated position must have been depending on visual
cues from within the maze, while those which were confused were
depending on visual cues from without the maze. It is then neces-
sary to suppose that those which were confused at one rotation but
not at another changed their system of cues when the maze was placed
in a new position, an hypothesis which "suggests the complexity of
the animal mind for types as high as the pigeon." The final perfect
records at 360° may be explained either by a persistence of the original
learning, or by the acquisition of a system of cues that is undisturbed
by any rotation. The birds throughout depend on visual cues and do
not make the type of errors in the shortened maze, such as butting
into the walls, characteristic of an animal guided by kinsesthetic data.
In the second part of Herrick's (9) study of nests and nest-
building in birds, we have sections on the analysis of increment nests
on the basis of behavior, and on variations in the nests of certain birds.
In Part III. careful descriptions are given of the building behavior of
the robin, oriole, and red-eyed vireo. An interesting feature of the
robin's building is the fact that the molding movements are always
made in opposite directions on successive visits to the nest, although
nothing can be detected in the appearance of the nest that would
give the bird a clue as to which direction she had turned in at the
previous visit. The history of the nest-building instinct is outlined
as follows: incubation arose through the instinct to guard and to
conceal by covering with the body; "increment nests may have
arisen . . . through an earlier practice of collecting materials of any
description to cover the eggs upon leaving them to look for food.
All such would be scattered to some extent upon reentering the nest
to cover and guard; some, however, would remain to form a rude
rampart or wall of circular form, and this would be advantageous in
holding the eggs to a focal point."
Haggerty (7) notes an instance of pure instinct in a young sparrow
hawk which had fallen out of the nest, and which used towards a
piece of roast beef the behavior that would have been appropriate
for living prey.
The series of Behavior Monographs is inaugurated by Breed's (i)
study of the instincts and intelligence of the chick. Part I. is devoted
to the chick's instinctive activities. The behavior of the chick while
still in the shell was observed by bringing the eggs, just after the
shell was chipped, under an electric light and breaking away some of
the shell. Breed is inclined to think that a movement much more
3o6 MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN
important than pecking in the emergence from the shell is a lifting
movement of the head. " Chicks appeared to break the shell in two
by a lifting, struggling movement of the head accompanied by a
stretching, straightening movement of the legs." A tapping sound
is heard before the shell is chipped at all, but a somewhat similar
sound is heard after so much of the shell has been removed that the
beak is no longer in contact with it. Morgan and Mills agree that
the stimulus to the drinking reaction is the touch of water on the bill.
Breed, by keeping chicks from drinking for three days after hatching,
found that the drinking reaction was given "to the surface of smooth
white note paper, the edge of white glazed kymograph paper, or the
edge of a glass dish;" the stimulus being evidently visual. The
effect of deferring the pecking reaction was studied by keeping some
chicks in the dark for a number of hours after hatching; it was found
that pecking was decidedly more inaccurate in these chicks, but that
practice soon made up the deficiency. The effect of imitation on
the pecking reaction was studied by comparing the records of accurate
pecking made by one brood with those made by a younger brood
placed with the older one to profit, if possible, by imitating the latter.
No such beneficial influence was observed. Possibly, the author
suggests, the effect of social influence may have been exerted in the
direction of increasing the intensity and speed of the pecking, though
not its accuracy. An important observation is that the chicks ate
readily in complete darkness. One of the fundamental methods
upon which Hess's far-reaching conclusions with regard to vision in
the lower animals are based is derived from the assumption that if
animals cannot see food on the ground they will not eat it. There
must, however, be some explanation for the refusal to feed, under
certain visual conditions, shown by the animals in the tests made by
Hess, Katz, and Revesz. A very careful record of the development
up to the twenty-fifth day of the pecking reaction as regards the
accuracy of its three components, striking, seizing, and swallowing,
was kept. Improvement was very rapid during the first two days,
and was practically complete at the eleventh day. Seizing remained
imperfect longer than the other components. The belief of some
•observers that the reaction is perfect from the outset is probably
accounted for by the fact that the striking component is very nearly
so by the fifth day, and is "seldom widely erroneous."
In Part II. we have a report of the learning processes of the
•chick as tested by the visual discrimination method. Two compart-
ments were offered, through one of which escape might be made to
THE BEHAVIOR OF VERTEBRATES
the cage where the other chicks were kept and food was to be had.
Cards were placed at the entrance to the compartments to serve as
visual stimuli. Electric shocks furnished the punishment for wrong
choices. Color differences, brightness (black-white) differences,
form differences, and size differences, were used as stimuli. The
principal object was to study the learning process, and the results
bearing on this will be stated first; the incidental observations on
color discrimination will be discussed later. The chicks succeeded
in acquiring habits of choosing one color or brightness rather than the
other, and in responding selectively to a small and a large opening,
through which they had to pass in order to escape. They failed to
discriminate forms, either as figures pasted on the cards, or as differ-
ently shaped openings. The doctrine of formal discipline fails to be
confirmed, in so far as learning to discriminate black and blue did
not facilitate learning to discriminate sizes. " Of nine chicks perfectly
trained in black-blue, five made perfect persistence tests after an
interval of thirty days." On the whole, the chicks that learned
most rapidly remembered longest. The use of the electric shock
tended to produce a negative response to the stimulus to which it was
attached, rather than a positive response to the other stimulus.
The principal conclusions with regard to color vision which the
author considers indicated by his experiments are two: that blue has
a very light brightness value for the chick, and that it has a color
value as well. The first conclusion is based on the fact that one
chick which preferred white to black and yellow to black preferred
blue to yellow and to orange; while another chick that had been
trained to choose black rather than white preferred black to blue
but displayed no preference between blue and white. Although
the reviewer found indications that the rabbit, too, sees blue as much
lighter than the human subject does, she does not feel sure that the
number of tests given by Breed (in many cases only ten) was sufficient
to exclude chance and establish the fact of a preference. That blue
is seen as a color is argued from the fact that chicks which had been
trained to avoid blue in the black-blue combination avoided blue in
any combination, even with white; the inference being that if abso-
lutely recognized, it must have been seen as a color. But it is not to
be assumed as certain that an animal cannot recognize an absolute
brightness to a certain extent; that is, that the gray seen in place of a
blue cannot be identified and avoided in successive experiments.
In the experiments of Washburn and Abbott (26) there was some
indication that a gray was thus identified. And" in Breed's experi-
308 MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN
ments there may have been other peculiarities than either color or
brightness leading to the identification of the blue cards: were the
same cards used whenever blue was employed as a stimulus?
Strong (22) has combined an anatomical study of the smell organs
in birds with an experimental test of the possibility of causing smell
to influence a bird's behavior through association. The morpho-
logical study was carried out on material representing twenty-seven
out of the thirty-five existing orders of birds. From it the writer
concludes that "the olfactory organs of birds are of too great size
to be set aside as non-functional," but that as one passes from the
lower to the higher orders of birds there is a tendency towards
retrogression in these organs. The crow family, sometimes con-
sidered to be the highest birds, show extremely minute smell organs.
"The sense of smell has evidently been disappearing in birds with
the great development of vision. It seems not at all improbable that
the sense of smell may be practically lost in the passerine birds."
The fulmar, a bird which takes long sea-flights, has enormously
developed olfactory apparatus, suggesting Cyon's hypothesis that
it may be used for orientation. It will be remembered that Watson,
testing this hypothesis for terns, got negative results. Strong finds,
however, that the olfactory organs of the tern are very small, so that
the use of those organs in guiding the flights of other birds is not ruled
out by Watson's observations. Strong's experimental work was
performed upon the ring dove. A labyrinth was used, with a large
central chamber, and four small chambers, one opening from the
middle of each side. Food could be placed in any one of the four
small chambers and remain invisible from the central compartment.
Currents of air could be sent from each of the four small chambers
into the central compartment by means of a siphon arrangement
outside each small chamber; the air currents entering one of the four
chambers were passed through a bottle containing an odorous sub-
stance. General ventilation was provided by an air-pump connected
with an exhaust funnel in the middle of the roof of the labyrinth.
To test the actual diffusion of the odor from the small chamber into
the large one, the following method was adopted. The strength of
the odor of an ammonia solution was compared with that of the smell
of bergamot which was to be used in the experiments, and when the
two were judged equal, the ammonia was placed in one of the odor
bottles and its diffusion tested with wet litmus paper. It was found
that the odor was diffused in a semicircular area whose radii con-
verged at the entrance of the odor chamber, and whose front extended
THE BEHAVIOR OF VERTEBRATES 509
to the region of the exhaust funnel. Tests were also made by the
experimenter, lying on the floor inside the enclosure; the odor of
bergamot could be detected eighteen inches from the point of emerg-
ence. The central chamber was five feet square. Oil of bergamot
was the smell stimulus chosen for use, although less satisfactory tests
were made with cologne, musk, and violet sachet; and food was to
be found in the small chamber from which the odor emerged. The
birds had previously been accustomed to the apparatus. The results
showed that when bergamot was used, the percentages of choices of
the odorous chamber rose for all four birds tested considerably above
the twenty-five per cent, which chance would produce. It is to be
regretted that only the total percentages are stated, rather than the
choices of each successive day, so that no data on learning are
furnished. The conclusion that the birds were stimulated by the
bergamot seems warranted. That general sensation is not concerned
the author infers from the small amount of odorous material that
was used as a stimulus. A few observations on birds at liberty and
in a zoological garden are also reported, but the results are not
conclusive.
Craig (3) has been continuing his studies of the vocal expressions
of emotion in pigeons. The paper on those of the mourning dove was
written chiefly, the author tells us, as a basis of comparison for that
on the passenger pigeon. Most of the peculiarities of the latter bird
can be traced to its extreme gregariousness. The softer, cooing notes
of this pigeon, for instance, which could not have much effect in a noisy
and populous community, have degenerated, and the louder sounds
have developed into "shrieks, chatters, and clucks." Two females
not infrequently lay in the same nest, an occurrence which is much
rarer in less social species. The testimony of various observers is
quoted to show that orphan young are fed by foster-parents. The
courting behavior of these birds is described as much rougher than
that of other pigeons.
The interesting discovery has been made by Craig (4) that egg-
laying in the female ring-dove may be produced by the courting
behavior of the male, without actual fertilization. "The influence
of the male in inducing oviposition is a psychological influence."
The word "psychological" is perhaps a little extreme here: the
tactile stimuli produced by the male's preening of the head and neck
of the female might operate reflexly.
Mammals. — Slonaker (21) has investigated the activity, growth,
and longevity of the white rat. Eight rats were chosen and divided
3io MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN
into two equal groups; the members of one group were placed in
revolving cages whose revolutions were registered on a kymograph;
those of the other group were kept in ordinary cages as controls.
The results show that the daily activity increases rapidly during the
first third of the animal's life and then decreases gradually until death.
The change in the amount of the daily activity is rhythmical. During
youth and old age the activity is more or less distributed through the
twenty-four hours; in middle life it is nocturnal. The female is
much more active than the male; the males are much heavier. About
three-fourths of the whole amount of work done during the animal's
lifetime is done before reaching middle age. During the last 30
per cent, of life only one-eighth of the total work was performed.
The unexercised males are much heavier than the exercised ones,
and reach their maximum weight at an earlier age. The exercised
rats had shorter lives than the unexercised ones; they were more
active, alert, and bright in appearance.
Hunter (12) records the observation that two white rats which
had been accustomed to being dropped into a box as a preliminary
to being returned to their living cage and to food at the close of certain
experiments with them, after two hundred and four days of this
experience dropped themselves into the box. This is in opposition
to the results obtained by Thorndike with cats, which did not learn
to drop themselves into a box after being dropped in by the experi-
menter. Cole, on the other hand, found that raccoons did display
this type of behavior. The inability of Thorndike's cats to perform
such an act was taken as evidence against their possession of an idea
of being in the box as a preliminary to food. The reviewer's work
on the rabbit (26) furnished proof that these animals after only a
few days' experience of being dropped into a box between tests will
jump in of their own accord and wait for the next test. Hunter
rightly points out that this behavior is not necessarily evidence of
ideas: "the very perception of the box has acquired motive power."
In the study by Hoge and Stocking (10) comparing punishment
and reward as motives, albino and black and white rats were used.
The punishments were light electric shocks; the reward was milk-
soaked bread; the problem was brightness discrimination in a Yerkes
box. It was found that punishment produces quicker learning than
reward, and a combination of the two is most effective of all.
Rockwell (18) describes the behavior of a ground squirrel which
tried to go through the motions of climbing up the support that had
led to her nest, after the support and the nest had been removed.
THE BEHAVIOR OF VERTEBRATES 311
Warren (25) tells of a cat which after several years of failure to imitate
another cat's trick suddenly did so.
Washburn and Abbott (26) attempted to find by the use of colored
and gray papers whether any brightness could be found that would
be indistinguishable from gray to the light-adapted eye of the rabbit.
The apparatus was a box with two compartments, each opening by a
swing door on the front of the box. The papers were pinned rather
than pasted on the doors, to avoid identification by wrinkles, and
were changed from experiment to experiment. In the red and gray
experiments the door carrying the red paper could be pushed open;
the gray door was closed by a button on the inside. Food was in
both compartments. To avoid identification of the papers by their
intrinsic odor a narrow slit was cut in each at the level where the
rabbit's nose touched it in pushing, and a piece of the other paper was
placed under the slit. The red or open door was in alternate sides in
succeeding experiments, but the rabbits showed no trace of acquiring
a kinaesthetic habit of alternating from side to side in their choices.
The rabbits learned to discriminate Bradley red paper from Hering
gray, numbers 7, 15, and 24, but failed to discriminate it from a
paper of the brightness of Hering gray number 46, which is almost
black. The results thus agree with those of Yerkes on the dancing
mouse and Watson on the monkey, in showing a low stimulating
power of red on the retina of the rabbit; and give no proof that red
is seen as a color. Some experiments were also made on the bright-
ness value of Bradley saturated blue paper. The results were less
conclusive, but gave indications that its value is decidedly lighter
than for the human eye, a result which may be compared with the
similar observation made on Breed's chicks. "To a certain degree,
the rabbit is able to form a habit of choosing the darker of two
impressions, irrespective of their absolute brightness." In one series
the same gray was presented sometimes with red, in which case it
was on the closed door, and sometimes with white, in which case it
was on the open door. The rabbit tested chose the gray only 27 per
cent, of the time in tests of the first type, and 72.8 per cent, of the
time in tests of the second type, Some identification of the absolute
brightness of a gray seems to occur, however. The rabbit uses
monocular more than binocular vision.
Swift (24) has obtained associations with tone sensations in a dog
whose temporal lobes had been destroyed. These reactions, he
thinks, in opposition to Kalischer, are not reflexes, since they were
learned; and their location must therefore have been in the cortex,
though not in the temporal lobe.
3i2 MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN
Discussion of von Maday's (14, 15) articles on the horse is deferred
until a recently published book by this writer, summing them up,
can be obtained for review.
Shepherd (20) found that three raccoons, which were repeatedly
made to watch another raccoon go up an inclined plane and get food,
failed to show any signs of inferential imitation when tested alone.
REFERENCES
1. BREED, F. S. The Development of Certain Instincts and Habits in Chicks.
Behavior Monographs, 1911, I. Pp. 78-
2. COPELAND, M. The Olfactory Reactions of the Puffer or Swellfish, Spheroides
maculatus (Block and Schneider). /. of Exper. Zoo!., 1912, 12, 363-369-
3. CRAIG, W. The Expressions of Emotion in the Pigeons. II. The Mourning Dove
(Zenaidura macroura Linn.). III. The Passenger Pigeon (Ectopistes migra-
torius Linn.)- The Auk, 1911, 28, 398-427.
4. CRAIG, W. Oviposition Induced by the Male in Pigeons. /. of Morph., 1911,
22, 299-303.
5. CUMMINGS, B. F. Some Features of Behavior in the Courtship Display of the
Palmate Newt (Molge palmata Schneid.). /. of Animal Behav., 191 1, i, 305-307-
6. FRISCH, K. VON. Ueber den Farbensinn der Fische. Verhandl. d. deut. zool.
Gesellschaft, 1911.
7. HAGGERTY, M. E. A Case of Instinct. /. of Animal Behav., 1912, 2, 79-80.
8. HARGITT, C. W. Behavior and Color Changes of Tree Frogs. /. of Animal
Behav., 1912,2, 51-79.
9. HERRICK, F. H. Nests and Nest-Building in Birds. Part II. /. of Animal
Behav., 1911, i, 244-278. Part III. Ibid., 336-374-
10. HOGE, M. A., and STOCKING, R. J. A Note on the Relative Value of Punishment
and Reward as Motives. /. of Animal Behav., 1912, 2, 43-51.
11. HUNTER, W. S. Some Labyrinth Habits of the Domestic Pigeon. /. of Animal
Behav., 1911, i, 278-305.
12. HUNTER, VV. S. A Note on the Behavior of the White Rat. /. of Animal Behav.,
1912, 2, 137-142.
13. LOEB, J., and WASTENEYS, H. On the Adaptation of Fish (Fundulus) to Higher
Temperatures. /. of Exper. Zool., 1912, 12, 543-557.
14. MADAY, S. v. Das Orientirungsvermogen des Pferdes. Zsch. f. angew. PsychoL,
1911, 5, 54-87.
15. MADAY, S. v. Zur Psychologic des Pferdes und des Reitens. Ber. IV. Kongress
f. exper. PsychoL, 1911, 274-279.
1 6. PARKER, G. H. Effects of Explosive Sounds, Such as Those Produced by Motor
Boats and Guns, upon Fishes. Bureau of Fisheries, 1911, Document no. 752.
Pp- 9-
17. REESE, A. M. Food and Chemical Reactions of the Spotted Newt, Diemyctylus
viridescens. J. of Animal Behav., 1912, 2, 190-209.
18. ROCKWELL, R. B. Peculiar Actions of a Striped Ground Squirrel. /. of Animal
Behav., 1912, 2, 218-222.
19. SCHAEFFER, A. A. Habit Formation in Frogs. /. of Animal Behav., 1911, i,
309-336.
THE BEHAVIOR OF VERTEBRATES 3*3
20. SHEPHERD, W. T. Imitation in Raccoons. Amer. ]. of Psychol., 1911, 22, 583-
585.
21. SLONAKER, J. R. The Normal Activity of the Albino Rat from Birth to Natural
Death, its Rate of Growth and Duration of Life. /. of Animal Behav., 1912,
2, 20-43.
22. STRONG, R. M. On the Olfactory Organs and the Sense of Smell in Birds. /. of
Morph., 1911, 22, 619-658, 2 pis.
23. SUMNER, F. B. The Adjustment of Flatfish to Various Backgrounds. A Study
of Adaptive Color Change. /. of Exper. Zob'L, 1911, 10, 409-507.
24. SWIFT, W. B. Psychological Results in Reactions to Tone Before and After
Extirpation of the Temporal Lobes. /. of Animal Behav., 1912, 2, 225-228.
25. WARREN, E. R. Delayed Imitation in a Cat. /. of Animal Behav., 1912, 2,
222-225.
26. WASHBURN, M. F., and ABBOTT, E. Experiments on the Brightness Value of Red
for the Light-Adapted Eye of the Rabbit. /. of Animal Behav., 1912, 2, 145-
181.
SPECIAL REVIEWS
ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE
The Evolution of Animal Intelligence. S. J. HOLMES. New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1911. Pp. v -f 296.
An advance announcement of this book reads: "A general account
of the evolution of animal behavior from the mollusc and crustacean
up to apes and monkeys. The critical point of the transition from
instinct to intelligence receives special treatment. One of America's
leading scientific authors who saw the manuscript before publication
writes: 'Holmes's is the best of the lot, and on the whole, the most
interesting because it gives the most facts, that is, examples, illustra-
tions, hence animal behavior, incidents, stories, etc. Holmes is
immensely well informed.'" The reviewer admits that he was
somewhat prejudiced against Professor Holmes's book by this
publisher's announcement. He was also rendered curious, and when
the book came into his hands he read it at a sitting with intense
interest and keen enjoyment. His immediate reaction was to ask
the students of an introductory course in comparative psychology
to read the book entire. The result was quite as gratifying to the
instructor as important for the class, for without exception the men
were delighted with Professor Holmes's description of the develop-
ment of intelligence.
Some weeks later the book was reread more carefully and critically
by the reviewer in preparation for the present writing. Naturally,
many defects were discovered and the reviewer's judgment concerning
the scientific value of the work was somewhat modified.
Professor Holmes has offered an essay on the evolution of intelli-
gence, not a treatise. His book is rather popular in style, sketchy,
and introductory to the subject. In spite of the fact that it is poorly
written, it is extremely readable, even fascinating to one who is
interested in the problems of mental development. For the author
appreciates these problems; he has observed animal behavior inten-
sively; he has read widely and he has pondered well the relations as
well as the significance of his facts. Unlike most popular essays on
scientific subjects, this one has value for the specialist as well as for
the general reader.
3H
ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE 315
The Evolution of Animal Intelligence outlines the course of mental
development through the discussion of reflex actions, the tropisms,
the behavior of the Protozoa, instinct, non-intelligent modifications
of behavior, pleasure-pain and the beginnings of intelligence, and the
types of intelligence which appear in the arthropods, the lower
vertebrates, the mammals, and the primates.
There is nothing noteworthy from the scientific standpoint in
the introductory chapters, which deal with reflexes and tropisms,
but in connection with his account of behavior in the Protozoa
Professor Holmes makes clear his attitude toward tests of intelligence.
He is doubtful whether any investigator has thus far satisfactorily
demonstrated associative memory in a unicellular organism. "While
granting the possibility that future work may compel us to modify
our conclusion," he writes, "it may be said that, thus far, there is no
unmistakable evidence that the protozoa are capable of forming true
habits or of learning by association" (p. 89). Unfortunately for
the reader, this discussion of the educability of the Protozoa is not
preceded by such a definition of habit formation and of associative
memory as would prepare him to react critically to the author's
statements.
The two chapters which are devoted to the description of instinct
and of its evolution are decidedly unsatisfactory to the reviewer.
They fairly well present many of the essential facts concerning
instinct and, in a conventional way, they offer an account of the
chief theories of the origin of instinct, but they lack the freshness
and originality which are characteristic of most parts of the book.
In his chapter on the evolution of instinct, the author quotes
with apparent approval the following words of Professor C. O.
Whitman: "Instinct precedes intelligence both in ontogeny and in
phylogeny, and it has furnished all the structural foundations em-
ployed by intelligence." At the beginning of the next chapter he
quotes, with approval one must infer, Father Wasmann's words:
"Both elements, automatism and plasticity, are found in different
proportions with all animals from the highest to the lowest." To the
reviewer it seems that instinct is one form of automatism and that
intelligence is an expression of plasticity. Evidently the author
would not accept this statement, for he repeatedly asserts that
intelligence has developed from instinct. It certainly is fair to object
that the view of Professor Whitman which receives Professor Holmes's
support and which he at one point says is commonly accepted by
psychologists (p. 164) is not the only view which may be defended.
316 REVIEWS
As it happens, the reviewer numbers himself among those who do
not conceive of intelligence as having developed from instinct.
In his account of modifications of behavior, the author points
out that there are certain modifications which should be considered
non-intelligent. Indeed he states that certain forms of modifiability
are probably coextensive with animal life and that,^if we accept these
modifications as intelligent, we must admit that even the cells of the
multicellular organism are intelligent. Intelligent behavior, we are
told, differs from non-intelligent behavior in that the former involves
"associations" (p. 164). These associations, the author states, are
in some cases associations of sense experiences with acts which are
either pleasurable or painful. In other cases they are associations
of ideas. The former of these associations represent a much lower
stage in the development of intelligence than do the latter. At some
points in Professor Holmes's description, it is not clear whether he
accepts the association of sense impressions with affective experiences
as a form of intelligence. For example, on page 181 he writes: "In
the Ccelenterata behavior, although of the reflex type, is often highly
plastic and capable of being modified in many ways as the result of
previous experience; but while intelligence has often been claimed
for these forms, there is, in the opinion of the writer, no case in
which the formation of associations is satisfactorily proven." Either
in this statement the author has misused the word "experience," or
he has contradicted himself. Similar contradictory statements might
be quoted from other portions of the book; and fairly strong support
might be adduced for the statement that the author has not with
sufficient clearness defined such important terms as habit, association,
associative memory, and intelligence.
In the chapter on primitive types of intelligence in crustaceans
and molluscs, Professor Holmes thus briefly sums up the results of
studies which have been made concerning the educability and intelli-
gence of the invertebrates. The Protozoa furnish no evidence of
ability to acquire associations. The Ccelenterata present no con-
vincing evidence of the formation of associations. "The same
statement may also be risked for ... the Vermes. The behavior of
Echinoderms is certainly complex and plastic to a remarkable degree,
but even in this group the power of forming associations is very
doubtful." In the Crustacea and the Insecta the existence of
intelligence is admitted and numerous examples are offered of intelli-
gent modes of behavior. Indeed the activities of certain crustaceans
and insects are most effectively described in chapters 9 and 10. In
ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE 3*7
the latter chapter, Professor Holmes has written (p. 201): "We are
certainly justified in concluding that insects are not mere reflex
machines incapable of learning by experience. They can form
associations very quickly in many cases. They give evidence of
memory. They have a remarkable ability for retaining impressions
of topographical relations. We may not be compelled to admit
that they have ideas, but it must be granted, I think, that a wasp
which after cutting a caterpillar in two and carrying away one part,
came back and searched diligently for the remainder, retained
somehow an impression of the missing part and its location. If out
of sight it was not out of mind."
The intelligence of the lower vertebrates is interestingly charac-
terized by the presentation of the results of a number of studies of
fishes, amphibians and reptiles. It is pointed out that associations
(intelligence) do not necessarily depend upon the cerebral cortex.
A careful comparison of many of the statements which appear in the
author's chapter on intelligence in the lower vertebrates with state-
ments in his chapters 7, 8, and 9 is likely to leave the reader in doubt
concerning the physiological and psychological characteristics of
intelligent acts and even more so concerning their structural relations.
The examples of different modes of behavior, non-intelligent and
intelligent, which make up the greater part of this book are admirably
chosen and, in addition to giving the reader the impression of extensive
knowledge on the part of the author, they serve to acquaint him with
many of the most important facts which the study of behavior has
revealed. It is perhaps unfortunate that Professor Holmes in his
account of the intelligence of the apes should have chosen Professor
Witmer's description of "Peter" to represent the intelligence of the
chimpanzee. For Peter, it should be remarked, was a trick animal
whose behavior was observed only after many months of training,
and even then for only brief periods. Had the author given the
matter further consideration, he would doubless have concluded that
concerning behavior of whose history in the individual we know
nothing we can say little with safety. Whether it is intelligent or
non-intelligent, whether it is indicative of the presence of ideas or of
images cannot be decided. One might compare the behavior of
Peter, as it is described by Professor Witmer, with the behavior of
such a trained horse as Clever Hans, the observer of whose per-
formances would be likely to make inferences regarding the degrees
and types of intelligence of the horse which in the light of a careful
study of the development of the animal's behavior are amusing.
318 REVIEWS
The Evolution of Animal Intelligence presents particular facts
in abundance and generalizations and theories in such fashion as to
inform the reader and, at the same time, suggest interesting problems.
The book contains little concerning the methods of studying animal
behavior and it will prove more useful to those who desire a sketch
of behavior than to those who desire to learn how to observe it or how
to solve specific problems concerning intelligence.
ROBERT M. YERKES
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Animal Intelligence: Experimental Studies. E. L. THORNDIKE. New
York: The Macmillan Co., 1911.
The present volume consists mainly of various previously pub-
lished papers, a few of which have been for some time out of print.
In thus bringing together his contributions in the field of animal
psychology, Dr. Thorndike has rendered a service for which students
of this subject have reason to feel grateful. However they may be
inclined to differ from the conclusions of the author as to the nature
and limitations of the animal mind, they must needs recognize the
important part that his investigations have played in the development
of our knowledge of animal psychology.
While Dr. Thorndike has added many interesting facts concerning
the behavior of animals, the value of his work lies not so much in his
contributions to knowledge as in the example of his method. Since
the appearance of the monograph on Animal Intelligence in 1898 the
labyrinth and the puzzle-box have been the favorite apparatus for
testing the mental capacity of the animals studied. The numerous
experimental studies which followed close upon the investigations of
Dr. Thorndike have been carried out, for the most part, in a more
careful and critical manner than that which formerly prevailed in
the study of the mental life of the higher animals. The crusade
against anecdotal psychology and the undue exaltation of the intelli-
gence of animals was a wholesome influence which was perhaps all
the more potent on account of the somewhat extreme position of the
author. And if several of the negative conclusions to which Thorn-
dike was led have not been upheld by later investigators, the positive
conclusions which the latter have drawn are based on a more adequate
foundation as a result of applying the methods of study that Thorn-
dike employed. William of Occam's razor is an unsafe instrument
in the investigation of the mental life of animals, but it is one whose
constant employment is nevertheless unavoidable.
ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE 319
Besides the monograph on Animal Intelligence, the volume con-
tains an introductory chapter on The Study of Consciousness and
the Study of Behavior, and chapters entitled The Instinctive Reac-
tions of Young Chicks, A Note on the Psychology of Fishes, The
Mental Life of the Monkeys, Laws and Hypotheses of Behavior, and
The Evolution of the Human Intellect. The introductory chapter
and the chapter on Laws and Hypotheses of Behavior are new.
The first consists essentially of a discussion of the proper subject
matter of psychology. Thorndike joins issue with those who would
limit psychology to the consideration of consciousness. As a matter
of fact such a limitation is never made in practice, however desirable
it may be deemed in theory; the phenomena of behavior and those
-of conscious life are so closely interwoven that it is impracticable to
deal with them separately, and psychology must perforce continue
to occupy itself with both sides of the impassable cleft that separates
states of consciousness from their physiological concomitants.
In the chapter on Laws and Hypotheses of Behavior there is
considerable matter for reflection. There are two laws of the modi-
fication of behavior which, according to Thorndike, are of especial
value in explaining higher manifestations of mental activity. The
first, or the law of effect, is that acts which bring satisfaction tend to
be repeated, while those which produce pain tend to become dis-
continued, the strength of the connections formed being proportional
to the intensity of the resulting feelings and the smallness of the
interval of time by which they are separated from the act that pro-
duced them. The second principle, the law of exercise, is that
'"any response to a situation will, other things equal, be more strongly
connected with the situation in proportion to the number of times
it has been connected with that situation and to the average vigor
.and duration of the connections."
Satisfaction and discomfort are admitted to be but very roughly
correlated with what is favorable and unfavorable respectively to
the animal. What is sought after and produces satisfaction may at
times be deleterious, but Thorndike states that "upon examination
it appears that the pernicious states of affairs an animal welcomes
are not pernicious at the time, to the neurones. We may learn bad
habits, such as morphinism, because there is incomplete adaptation
of the body state to the temporary interest of its ruling class, the
neurones."
Direct evidence that pleasure-giving and pain-giving experiences
«are related in these ways to the welfare of the neurones is not adduced,
320 REFIEWS
but the conclusion is incorporated as an element of a further hy-
pothesis to explain the law of effect. The modifications of behavior
which this law formulates involve changes in the connections between
neurones, probably at the synapses, so that certain lines of communi-
cation are rendered more permeable than others. Those connections
are made more permeable which result in favoring the life processes
of the neurone, and those are weakened which result in impeding
these processes. It naturally follows that " learning by the law of
effect is thus more fully adaptive for the neurones in the changing
intimacy of whose synapses learning consists, than for the animal as
a whole." Profiting by experience through forming associations
rests upon the adaptive behavior of the neurones.
This interesting hypothesis of Thorndike involves, as do most
hypotheses concerning the problem of learning, a number of unproven
assumptions. It may be questioned if the law of exercise may not be
capable of a simpler explanation without appealing to a selective
activity on the part of the neurones, or any primary tendency to seek
the welfare of these elements.
The discussion of the preceding laws paves the way for the con-
sideration of imitation which may be explained, according to Thorn-
dike, "by the laws of instinct, exercise and effect." The important
conclusion is drawn that "the idea of a response is in and of itself
unable to produce that response," imitation in all cases, except those
of the purely instinctive type, being the indirect outcome of the
pleasure-pain type of behavior. The connections established by
reasoning fall under the same far-reaching principles of explanation.
Adequate discussion of the fundamental questions raised in this
chapter would require more space than can be devoted to them here.
The treatment of these questions which Dr. Thorndike has given
cannot fail to be suggestive and stimulating both to the general
psychologist and the special student of animal behavior.
S. J. HOLMES
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
Vol. IX. No. 9. September 15, 19
THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN
GENERAL REVIEWS AND SUMMARIES
MEMORY, IMAGINATION, LEARNING, AND THE HIGHER
MENTAL PROCESSES (EXPERIMENTAL)1
BY J. W. BAIRD
Clark University
I. MEMORY AND IMAGINATION
(a) Summaries and Systematic Treatises. — Several years ago
Professor G. E. Miiller (38) began an investigation of a most re-
markable case of supra-normal memory. During the progress of
the experiments the author has been led far beyond the specific
problem which he set himself at the outset; and we are promised a
three-volume treatise describing and discussing the experimental
findings, together with an evaluation of various points dealing with
experimental procedure and a critical consideration of numerous
questions which bear upon memorial and ideational theory. Colvin's
book (n) is essentially a summary of the results which have been
yielded from various investigations of the Lernprozess, together with
an indication of pedagogical applications. Starch (50) has compiled
a number of judiciously selected experiments from the field of ex-
perimental pedagogy, to which he has added several ingenious
variations of his own. Offner's monograph (39) has appeared in a
second edition in essentially unchanged form.
Ranschburg's Innsbruck Sammelreferat (47) is a review of recent
findings in the psychopathology of memory. He points out the
crudities of Freud's interpretation of the phenomena in this field,
1 The writer is indebted for aid in the preparation of this paper to Miss S. C. Fisher
and Dr. K. J. Karlson, of Clark University, and to W. S. Foster and C. A. Ruck-
mich, of Cornell University.
32I
322 /• W. BAIRD
and shows that the recognized principles of associative and repro-
ductive inhibition, associative coexcitation, and the like furnish a
much more adequate explanation of the common defects of memory.
The methods of investigating memory are described and discussed;
and the memorial characteristics of normal and various types of
abnormal subjects are presented.
(b) Discussions of General Questions—Henry's monograph (17)
is based upon an elaborate mathematical treatment of a meager
group of experimental data. Memory and habit are to be regarded
as wholly disparate phenomena. Memorial functions are never
performed successfully at the first attempt,— the failure being due
to the fact that one's idea of the act is at first imperfect, and becomes
perfect only as the result of repetition. In the case of habit, however,
the idea of the act to be performed is complete from the outset.
Biihler (6) describes a method employing spatial relationships for
memorial material. A sheet of paper is divided into thirty-six small
squares, the vertical and horizontal diameters of the sheet being
indicated by heavy lines. Each small square stands in a definite
relationship to each of the four large squares; and a total of 1,265
spatial relationships may be differentiated upon the sheet. A given
relationship, indicated by the colored contents of certain squares, is
presented, learned, and reproduced, with introspections. Fischer
(13) outlines a programme for the investigation of creative imagi-,
nation, which includes the following problems: a description of its
sphere (play, empathy, fantasy) ; a determination of the boundaries
of this sphere, and of its relation to the sphere of the real and serious;
a classification of the typical forms of creative imagination.
Moede (37) discusses the use of the term memory in the biological
sciences; he points out that the term has been divested of its essential
characteristics by the biologists, who then apply it in this emasculated
connotation to designate certain purely biological phenomena. Even
the laws of heredity and of analogous biological phenomena are held
by the author to be only superficially analogous to the characteristic
laws of memory. Jesinghaus (22) resumes the traditional theories
of memory, and discusses the phenomena of perseveration, forgetting,
and feeling of familiarity.
(c) Imagery. — Angell's report (3) evaluates the various tests of
imagery, and adds ingenious methods from his own laboratory.
None of the purely objective tests prove to be trustworthy; the author's
recommendations include a complete series of tests for the whole
range of mental functioning. Feuchtwanger's paper (12) reports an
MEMORY, IMAGINATION, ETC. 323
investigation of the same question. His problem was essentially
a comparison of results obtained by introspective and objective
methods.
Meumann (35) urges the consideration of a hitherto unrecognized
factor in our enumeration of ideational types. Certain individuals
are able to deal efficiently with ideational material only when the
imagery from each sense department is present in isolation; they are
unable to make use of joint imagery from different senses. Lipmann
(31) believes that in our enumeration of types of apprehension we
should differentiate, within the visual type, between those individuals
who best apprehend size, position, color tone, etc.
Schaub (48) finds that images (visual, auditory, tactual) possess
the attribute of intensity. The difference between image and sensa-
tion is not one of intensity, but rather one of texture and context,
the image being incomplete, abbreviated, and without kinsesthetic
context. Lobsien (32) reports a series of results from which he
concludes that auditory memory is equally well developed in girls
and in boys, and that it increases uniformly and progressively with
increase of age.
(d) Association and Inhibition. — Langfeld (28) investigated the
effect of alcohol (30 ccm., 95 per cent., in 60 ccm. water) and caffeine
(6 gr. in capsule) upon association, reproduction and suppression.
Pictures were shown, and the reagents were instructed that in their
choice of a reaction-word they must not name the picture. Neither
drug had any appreciable effect other than to decrease the association-
time. The reagents did not translate the negative into positive
instructions, i. e., there was a distinct negative attitude, which was
usually describable in terms of cortical set. Experiments with
pathological patients revealed no deviation from normal accuracy of
reproduction or normal power of suppression excepting in certain cases
of dementia prsecox. Jacobson (21) presented pairs of weights for
comparison, and introduced intensive auditory stimuli in order to
determine whether and to what extent it was possible to affect the
judgment of the weights by thus inhibiting the sensation obtained
from the comparative weight. In other experiments auditory stimuli
were presented for comparison, and pressures constituted the distrac-
tion. It was found that pressures of moderate intensity are inhibited
by simultaneous sounds and by other pressures, and that sounds of
moderate intensity are inhibited by intensive simultaneous pressures.
Increased attention to the inhibiting sensation increases the inhi-
bition, while increased attention to the other sensation decreases
324 /. W. BAIRD
the inhibition. Hence what is called distraction of attention consists
in an inhibitory influence of one sensation upon another; and degree
of (subjective) intensity of sensation is a function of degree of at-
tention.
Dauber (no) found that the preferrred association is related to
the repeated association, and also to a number of other phenomena:
the frequency with which the stimulus-word and the reaction-word
occur in ordinary language; the phenomenon of clang association.
Nonsense syllables tend to arouse meaningful reaction-words, in
spite of instructions to react with nonsense words; and preferrred
associations appear in these responses to nonsense stimuli, indicating
that preference is not merely a product of close associative connection
between stimulus-word and reaction-word. Huber (19) investigated
the influence of culture and environment upon the association-
reaction, by repeating with a group of soldier reagents the experiments
which had been made by Reinhold with school-girl reagents. The
soldiers gave fewer preferred associations, more internal associations,
more adjectival and definitive reaction-words. The author confirms
Jung and Riklin's finding that uncultured reagents are more influenced
by the meaning of the word and less by the word as such; and he
•concludes that the associations of a group of reagents is always in-
fluenced by the milieu of the group.
Foucault (15) brings forward empirical evidence, obtained in
experiments with numbers and nonsense syllables, to show that
association does not take place merely as the result of resemblance.
Resemblance has no associative effect unless it is perceived as such
by the observer; and when resemblance is perceived, we have a case
not of mere association but of comparison and judgment. Re-
semblance therefore owes its potency to an intellectual act, and is
per se no more efficacious than contrast and incompatibility, cause
and effect, or means and end.
Levy-Suhl (29) aimed to determine whether the association-
reactions of different forms of mental abnormality manifest typically
different characteristics. Employing his data as a basis of classi-
fication, he divided his forty-four patients into four groups; and his
psychological classification showed a remarkable agreement with a
classification which had been based upon a clinical diagnosis. The
first group gave an almost normal reaction; it included a convalescent
case of exhaustion delirium and three cases of dementia paralytica.
The second group (hyperprosexia) was characterized by a hypervigi-
lance and a hypertenacity of attention; here appear ten cases of mania
MEMORY, IMAGINATION, ETC. 325
and a (transitional) case of acute paranoia, together with five variants
from the general group-type. The third group was characterized
by selective hyperprosexia (sixteen cases of paranoia) ; and the fourth
by hypervigilant reaction, with contamination and dissociation (four
cases of dementia paralytica). Ley and Menzerath (30) also report
the results of an investigation of various forms of mental abnormality,
by means of the association-reaction but they supplement this method
by introspection. They found that characteristic differences exist
between the associations of normal and abnormal subjects; that the
different forms of mental abnormality are each characterized by a
typical sort of association-reaction; that the lengthened reaction is
due to other causes than the presence of an emotional complex.
Woodworth and Wells (55) publish the report of the committee
which was charged by the American Psychological Association with
the evaluation and the standardization of association tests. The
report consists essentially of a series of recommendations, with di-
rections as to precautions to be observed and methods and materials
to be employed. Wells (51) draws upon 12,000 observations in his
discussion of certain properties of the free association-time. Women
show greater individual variation, and greater variability from day
to day, than men. The former give about twice as many judgment
reactions, and fewer associations by subordination and superordina-
tion. Emotional coloring may cause lengthened reaction, but it is
only one of many causes of associative obstruction; suppression,
distraction, indecision, and the like, must all be taken into account.
In another paper (52) Wells suggests the following categories for the
classification of associations: egocentric; superordinate; contrast;
speech habit; miscellaneous.
(e) Learning and Forgetting. — Abramowski (i) deals with the
familiar phenomenon that one may fail to remember a datum while
he remembers what it is not. This resistance of memorial lacunae
to being filled by erroneous data he refers to generic feelings, which
he describes as being neither ideas nor definite feelings. Objects
were placed upon the outstretched palms of blindfolded observers,
who perceived them tactually either with concentrated or with dis-
tracted attention. In subsequent sittings, attempts were made to
recognize the objects, various suggestions being introduced for the
purpose of determining whether and to what degree erroneous sug-
gestions would be resisted. The author concludes from these and
from similar experiments in kinsesthetic perception that sensory
impressions, even when divested of every intellectual element (by
326 /. W. BAIRD
distraction), are still retained in memory; and he finds in this fact
a confirmation for his hypothesis of generic feelings. Joteyko (23)
reports that in the learning of digits, syllables and words, her observers
had recourse to various sorts of imaginal material, and that associated
images were of prime importance. Pyle (45) found in his investi-
gation of the immediate "substance" memory of twelve adults, that
the rapid learner is more accurate than the slow learner, nor does the
slow learner excel in immediate or in permanent retention.
Numerous investigators have reported that it is more economical
to learn a given material as a whole than in piecemeal fashion. Is
this equally true when the material is of excessive length? Pyle
and Snyder (46) investigated this question, employing poetry as
memory material, and assigning sections which varied in length
from five to two hundred lines. They found that the Ganzmethode
is invariably more economical, no matter how long the whole or the
parts maybe; and the saving is greater when the "wholes" are longer.
They explain the disadvantage of the Teilmethode from the fact
that it involves the formation of associations between the end of a
section and the beginning of the same section, and the fact that
the earlier sections are forgotten during the act of learning the later
ones.
Ordahl (40) undertook to discover whether learning is aided by
wholly or relatively unconscious factors, and whether the formation
of a habit of whose existence one is unconscious can progress as well
under distraction; and to discover what is the role of consciousness
in the learning of simple tasks involving (a) almost no intellectual
factor, (b) a complex coordination of motor impulses, (c) in learning
of a purely intellectual character. Her experiments included the
learning of nonsense syllables with unnoticed concomitants; the
comparison of lifted weights, with and without distraction; writing
in unusual ways; the mental multiplication of large numbers. It
was found that: (i) unnoticed aids have no influence in the act of
learning; (2) in learning simple muscular coordinations, where con-
sciousness is normally focused on the end, learning can progress
without consciousness either of the end or of the fact that one is
learning, but a high degree of attention to the task gives better results
than distracted attention; (3) in learning of every sort, both conscious
and unconscious factors are present. Conscious control is most
direct where the material is of an "intellectual" character. Con-
sciousness is a corrective agent; it eliminates errors, improves on
elements unconsciously developed, and organizes the whole procedure.
MEMORY, IMAGINATION, ETC. 327
Can the different parts of speech be memorized and retained with
equal facility? Busemann (7) employed nouns, adjectives, verbs,
adverbs, and nonsense syllables. He found that consciousness of
meaning is clearer in the case of nouns that in the case of adjectives
and verbs, and that the retention of the former is correspondingly
better. The author believes that the Teilmethode has not yet been
shown to be more economical than the Ganzmethode.
Pieron (42, 43, 44) established the curve of learning and the curve
of forgetting in the pond snail. Since the latter curve did not
coincide exactly with that obtained by Ebbinghaus in the human
subject, Pieron set himself the task of memorizing series of nonsense
syllables, and found a confirmation of his own formula. He concluded
from his experiments that the fixing of memorial traces continues
after the stimulus has ceased to act, and that the duration of this
fixing process varies widely in different animals. Where fixing
progresses slowly, forgetting also progresses slowly.
(/) Affection and Memory. — Henderson (16) points out that in the
simplest form of learning — trial and error — those movements which
have disagreeable consequences are eliminated. We banish dis-
agreeable reactions; do we really forget our disagreeable experiences?
Ten observers were asked to record incidents from their lives, and
to grade them into classes on the basis of their affective values.
While his results show that remembrances are dominantly agreeable,
the author does not believe that his query is to be answered in the
affirmative. Peters (41) asked a number of reagents to respond to a
stimulus-word by the reproduction of a past experience, and then to
describe the affective coloring of the original incident and of the
remembrance, together with details as to dates and frequency of
recall. Fifty-two per cent, of the experiences were described as
pleasant, rec.ent experiences being less pleasant than earlier ex-
periences. Individual differences were found in regard to pre-
ponderance of pleasant or unpleasant, and in regard to the constancy
of the affective tone which attaches to a given experience in its suc-
cessive revivals in memory.
Claparede (8) discusses the question as to whether an affective
process can be an object of memory. Disagreement among psychol-
ogists is due to a failure to come to an understanding as to the defini-
tion and criteria of memory, and to a misapprehension regarding the
significance of the evidence which they bring forward in support of
their positions. The author differentiates the various functions or
phases of memory, and concludes that only in the -case of one of these,
recognition, has the existence of affective memory been established.
328 /. W. BAIRD
(g) Recognition— h\TU\z (2) describes several remarkable ex-
periences which consist in the false recognition of an acquaintance,
but which are invariably followed a few minutes later by a meeting
with the acquaintance who had been falsely recognized a few minutes
previously. He discusses the various possible explanations of these
phenomena, and concludes with the statement that in his opinion
the telepathic hypothesis furnishes the most probable explanation, —
i. e., the acquaintance who is not yet within the range of the observer's
vision is already perceived in vague fashion through the medium of
a telepathic sense (!). Alrutz requests his readers to furnish him
with additional reports of cases of false recognition.
Katzaroff's paper (25) contains a valuable classification and
discussion of theories of recognition. His experimental procedure
consisted in exposing a series of pictures, and in subsequently exposing
a second series where the original pictures appeared among others of a
similar character. The observers were asked to report whether or
not they recognized the pictures of the second series, and if so with
what degree of confidence. It was hoped by this means, and by
means of the introspective records of his observers to throw
light upon the process of recognition. The author concludes from
his experiments that the process of recognition is a product of two
separate and distinct factors, a feeling of familiarity, which constitutes
pure or direct or immediate recognition, and the arousal of images or
remembrances which confirm or control the immediate recognition
and transform the latter into an indirect or mediated recognition.
Recognition appears to be an affective rather than an intellectual
process; in its pure form it is not determined by any associative
process nor by the fusion or juxtaposition of imagery or remembrances.
The certainty of one's recognition is independent of one's act of
recognizing. Sometimes the former may be determined by the latter,
ind may follow immediately in its wake; but more often one's
certainty develops during the progress of the recognitive process
concomitant with the arousal of imagery, remembrances of details,
verbal or other associations, and the like. The act of immediate
recognition appears to be independent of all feelings or ideas of a
precise localization in time or space, or of a precise localization in a
constellation of remembrances. There is, on the subjective side, no
qualitative difference between correct and erroneous recognitions.
The process of recognition manifests such great individual variations
that one is led to suspect the existence of typical differences in the
mechanism of the process. Katzaroff's paper is followed by an
MEMORY, IMAGINATION, ETC.
appendix by Claparede (8) who points out the similarity between
Katzaroff's conception of the process of recognition and a view which
Claparede himself formulated some years ago, as a result of certain
pathological observations. This view makes relationship with the
self (with me and my experience) the essential principle upon which
recognition depends. The author assumes that mental associations
are of two general sorts: connections of ideas with one another, and
connections between ideas, on the one hand, and that which con-
stitutes the self, on the other. These latter (egocentric) connections
may function in a centrifugal direction, — constituting voluntary
recollection, — or in a centripetal direction, — constituting recognition.
Claparede illustrates and supports his view by citations from
pathological observations.
Meumann (36) has observed in the course of his investigations
with nonsense syllables that the feeling of unfamiliarity is much more
definite than that of familiarity, i. e., we are much more clearly con-
scious of the fact that an impression is unfamiliar than of the fact that
another is familiar. Unfamiliarity is provided with a peculiar index
or character which makes us aware of the unknown immediately and
directly without the interposition of any act of reflection. It possesses
the following characteristics : an inhibition of the motor and ideational
processes; the consciousness of a blank; the feeling of unpleasantness;
an absence of the ordinary reproductive flow of ideas. The ex-
perience of familiarity may come to consciousness in various stages
or degrees: as the easier flow of mental processes, which gives rise in
turn to characteristic feelings and organic sensations; as a lesser
tension of attention; as a more ready flow of reproduction. Some-
times all of these criteria of the familiar are lacking, and still the con-
viction of familiarity arises, apparently as the result of physiological
facilitation; but it seems more probable that even here a minimum of
dimly conscious criteria have sufficed to give rise to the idea of
familiarity.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROCESSES
Binet (5) differentiates emotions and intellectual acts as follows :
Both are attitudes. But the attitude is emotional when it is ac-
companied by intensive organic sensations; and the more intensive
its corporeal concomitants, the less doubt is there concerning the
emotional nature of the attitude. The attitude is intellectual when
it is accompanied by a minimum of subjective sensations and a
maximum of objective sensations and images; it is less corporeal,
330 /. W. BAIRD
less material, apparently more worthy of pure mind. Intellectual
phenomena seem to be less personal and more general; they are
colder, farther removed from pleasure and pain. Emotions are more
corporeal, more individual, more characterized by pleasantness and
unpleasantness. To transform either attitude into the other, we
need only change the group of concomitant organic sensations.
Divest the attitude of its organic concomitants and you have left
nothing but an intellectual act; clothe this intellectual act in a garb
of organic sensations and you have an emotion.
Aveling (30) aimed to determine: (i) What influence is exerted
upon the sensorial content of percepts by the thought-processes which
are involved in perception? (2) What influence is exerted upon the
thought-character of perceptions by the sensorial content of percepts?
(3) What influence is exerted by antecedent conscious processes
upon the sensorial content and the intellectual character of percep-
tions? Colored pictures of familiar objects were presented tachisto-
scopically; and an attempt was made to predetermine the observer's
perception by instructing him to perceive the picture, in one case as an
individual thing, in another case, as the type of a class of similar things.
In a series of control experiments, the observer was not instructed as
to his mode of perception. The results show that in these control
experiments, where no attempt was made to predetermine perception,
the "individual" and the "type" perceptions occurred with equal
frequency. Under "type" instruction, "type" perceptions occurred
in seventy-five per cent, of the cases; and under "individual" in-
struction, "individual" per options also occurred in seventy-five
per cent, of the cases, a fact which shows the degree to which a given
consciousness may successfully be predetermined. The fact that
the same picture is perceived in symbolic fashion by one observer,
and in asymbolic fashion by another furnishes a basis for the classi-
fication of observers into types, since they seem, in the one case, to
be in the presence of a real object, and in the other case, to be in the
presence of a mere picture. This difference between observers
seems to be due to different degrees in the facility with which pre-
vious experiences are assimilated into the present perception.
In Kakise's investigation (24) words and phrases were presented,
in auditory or visual fashion, with a view to obtaining an introspective
description of the conscious concomitants of understanding. It
was found that the characteristic constituents of the meaning of a
word or phrase are not selective experiences; they are rather a series
of phases of a process of reproduction. If many such associations
MEMORY, IMAGINATION, ETC. 331
of related past experiences are reproductively aroused, the result is a
feeling of richness of content; when the number of reproduced asso-
ciations is small, a feeling of poverty of content results; if there are
no associations, a feeling of no content arises. This feeling of content,
which is the awareness of the more or less fused aggregate of incipient
associations, seems to be irreducible to specific imagery. The fre-
quency of imagery in the understanding consciousness is primarily
conditioned neither by the concrete or abstract character of the
stimulus-word, nor by any peculiarity of the individual, but by the
rapidity of his response. When the reaction-word came slowly and
with difficulty, imagery tended to intervene; when reaction was
prompt, imagery tended to be absent. The author is convinced
that the association-method, as customarily employed, is too artificial
to give satisfactory results; the Ausfragemethode seems to be better
adapted both to the study of the general laws of association and to
the study of individual peculiarities of association.
Hollingworth (18) suggests that the failure of certain individuals
to find that sensory components are present in their consciousness of
relation, of intention, of purpose, and the like, may be due to the fact
that they seek for relevant imagery. His own introspections convince
him of the existence of thoughts whose character represents an inter-
mediate between "the conventionally costumed idea and the nude
relational process"; and he cites illustrations to show that three
stages of this vicarious functioning may be differentiated. "The
first stage includes dream states in which images quite irrelevant
as to source or quality may be seen to play a symbolic or metaphorical
role in the play of meanings, relations and complications of situation
which make up the plot of the dream. The third stage is shown in
the common observations that the vehicle of a waking meaning, the
two poles of a relation, may be fragmentary, transitory, and only
remotely relevant, relevant only by virtue of accidental association.
The second stage is an intermediate one disclosed by observations
of drowsiness hallucinations, a stage in which the thought process is a
sensible and adequate waking affair, although the sensory content of
consciousness may be evident dream material or even actual sensory
impression of a quite foreign character."
Jacobson (20) investigated the perception of single letters, the
understanding of words, and the understanding of sentences, em-
ploying the "method of examination." His observers were required
to furnish two reports of each experience — a description of their
conscious processes, and a statement concerning meanings, objects,
332 /. W. BA1RD
stimuli, and physiological occurrences. No imageless processes
were reported; and he found that the correlated meanings and proc-
esses are two renderings, from different points of view, of one and
the same experience.
Koffka (27) reports having asked a "catch question," in con-
sequence of which a latent Einstellung was produced in his auditors,
a fact which was shown by their changed attitude toward a second
question. The author describes methods of investigating the laws
of the latent Einstellung, and discusses the relation between this
phenomenon and the deter minierende Tendenz.
Clarke (10) attempted to analyze a number of typical Bewusst-
seinslagen by a method which consisted in obtaining introspections
regarding the processes involved in learning to read type for the blind;
in the understanding of the meaning of words, sentences, paragraphs;
in the answering of questions, requiring and not requiring thought; and
in the filling out of broken sentences ("rule of three"). It was
found that the conscious attitude instead of being a mental ulti-
mate is, in numerous instances at least, capable of being further
analyzed, especially in the light of its genesis. When the attitudes
occur often enough for generalization, there is found a marked agree-
ment between different observers, and between the same observer's at-
titudes at different times. This is true of such attitudes as surprise,
seeking, doubt, hesitation, uncertainty, all of which may be described
in typically different terms. The same observer may report a graded
series of transitions in his imagery, from vivid and explicit images
to the vague and condensed consciousness which may be supposed
to be analogous to that which has been called "imageless thought."
Attitudes may, then, be analyzed into sensations, images and feelings,
or their genesis may be traced to these elements.
Betz (4) cites illustrations to show that recognition may be a
product not of imagery but of "Einstellung" Perception is ordi-
narily attended by a reaction which is essentially organic, kinsesthetic
and affective in character. The subsequent reproduction of this
reactive complex may serve to represent the perceived object in
consciousness, and to give rise to a process of recognition. This
revived complex is (inappropriately) called Einstellung, by Betz, in
contradistinction to Forstellung. The author refers our consciousness
of similarity and identity to these organic, kinxsthetic and affective
vestiges of original perceptions; and in a second paper, he invokes the
same principle (together with the vorgestellte Einstellung) to explain
the origin in consciousness of our concepts, our general ideas and our
definitions.
MEMORY, IMAGINATION, ETC. 333
III. PRACTICE, HABIT, TRANSFER
Foster (14) undertook to make a qualitative and quantitative
determination of the relationship which obtains between "native"
(or unpracticed) and practiced ability to evoke images of sensory
experiences. Pictures, objects, and nonsense drawings were shown
to three observers, whose immediate reproduction was then tested
by their drawings or descriptions of the material. Practice was
continued for three months. It was found that ability to reproduce
increased with practice, rapidly at first, then more slowly; but in
not a single instance did practice improve the ability to visualize
or even increase the tendency to visualize. The improved efficiency
in reproduction was found to be due to the following factors : increased
confidence in ability to perform the task, and consequent increased
attention to the task; increased familiarity with the material; the
adoption of a more systematic procedure and a more economical
distribution of attention during the act of learning; the discovery of
subsidiary aids, such as counting, grouping, naming.
Kent (26) investigated the possibility of habit formation in de-
mentia prsecox. The procedure consisted in an attempt to obtain
effects of practice. Eighteen women, representing various stages in
the progressive development of the disease, were asked to practice a
series of exercises for a period of several months. The exercises
consisted in arranging a series of fifteen digits in a prescribed order,
in tracing a path through a (printed) labyrinth, in crossing out digits,
letters and geometrical figures A second series of exercises consisted
in placing pegs in holes in a board, and in fitting wooden blocks into
a form-board. The records of the errors and of the times required for
these exercises show that it is possible for the dementia praecox
patient to acquire new habits as the result of practice, and that the
results attained in one sort of exercise make themselves felt in other
exercises of a similar motor sort.
Wells reports an investigation of the effect of practice upon the
free association (53). He employed six normal observers; and the
procedure consisted in obtaining reactions to one thousand stimulus-
words, — twenty sittings, fifty reactions at each sitting, — and subse-
quently in obtaining a second set of reactions from the initial part of
the original list of stimulus-words. It was found that the association-
time tended to decrease toward a limit of approximately six fifths of a
second; that the responses became further differentiated and gener-
alized as a result of the increased readiness with which the reagent's
whole vocabulary became available; that the forms of association
334 /• W- BAIRD
became more superficial; and that the emotive value of the associ-
ations decreased. The author mentions the fact that this last result
diminishes the applicability of the association-method for any pur-
pose where emotive value is involved.
Sleight (49) investigated the problem of the transfer of training
in memorial acquisition. His procedure consisted in making an
initial test of memorial ability (first "cross-section")? an^ tnen in
practicing his observers in memorizing for a period of three weeks,
when a second "cross-section" was made. Then practice was re-
sumed for another three weeks, and a third "cross-section" was
taken. His tests and his practice consisted in the memorizing of
prose, poetry, nonsense-syllables, tables of arithmetical and geo-
graphical data, and in learning the "substance" of prose, and the
like. His observers were divided into three groups; and the procedure
was such that no group was tested by means of the same sort of
material which had been employed in its training exercises. The
results show that there appears to be no general memory improvement
as the result of practice, nor any evidence for the hypothesis of a
general memory function; that there would seem instead to be a
very large number of related and unrelated memory functions; that
the factors which contribute to the transfer of memorizing power are
similarities of a fundamental nature, such as specific forms of atten-
tion, imagery, rhythm, — in short, similarities of procedure.
REFERENCES
1. ABRAMOWSKI, E. La resistance de 1'oublie dans la memoire tactile et musculaire.
/. de psychol norm, et path., 1911, 8, 221-245.
2. ALRUTZ, S. Det falska igenkannandet ("La fausse reconnaissance"). Psyke,
1910, 6, Bilaga I, 87-99.
3. ANGELL, J. R. Methods for the Determination of Mental Imagery. Psychol.
Monog., 1910., 13, 61-107.
3 a. AVELING, F. The Relation of Thought-Process and Percept in Perception.
Brit. J. of Psychol., 1911, 4, 211-227.
4. BETZ, W. Vorstellung und Einstellung. I. Ueber Wiedererkennen. Arch. f. d.
ges. Psychol, 1910, 17, 266-296. II. Ueber Begriffe. Ibid., 1911, 20, 186-
225.
5. BINET, A. Qu'est-ce qu'une emotion? Qu'est-ce qu'un acte intellectuel? Uannee
psycho!., 1911, 17, 1-47.
6. BUHLER, K. Ein Verfahren zur Untersuchung des Gedachtnisses fur raumliche
Beziehungen. Ber. IV. Kongress f. exper. Psychol, 1911, 252-255.
7. BUSEMANN, A. Lernen und Behalten. Zsch.f. angew. Psychol, 1911,5, 211-271.
8. CLAPAREDE, E. Recognition et moiite. Arch, de psychol, 1911, n, 79-90.
9. CLAPAREDE, E. La question de la memoire affective. Arch, de psychol, 1911,
10, 361-377-
10. CLARKE, H. M. Conscious Attitudes. Amer. J. of Psychol, 1911, 22, 214-249.
MEMORY, IMAGINATION, ETC. 335
11. COLVIN, S. S. The Learning Process. New York: Macmillan, 1911. Pp. xix+
336.
110. DAUBER, J. Ueber bevorzugte Assoziationen und verwandte Phanomene.
Zsch.f. Psychol., 1911, 59, 176-222.
12. FEUCHTWANGER, A. Versuche iiber Vorstellungstypen. Zsch.f. Psychol., 1911,
58, 161-199.
13. FISCHER, A. Methoden zur experimentellen Untersuchung der elementaren
Phantasieprozesse. Zsch.f. pad. Psychol., 1911, 12, 448-458; 497-507.
14. FOSTER, W. S. The Effect of Practice upon Visualizing and upon the Repro-
duction of Visual Impressions. /. of Educ. Psychol., 1911, 2, 11-22.
15. FOUCAULT, M. Etude experimentale sur 1'association de ressemblance. Arch.
de psychol., 1911, 10, 338-360.
16. HENDERSON, K N. Do we Forget the Disagreeable? /. of Phil., Psychol. &c.,
1911, 8, 432-437.
17. HENRY, C. Memoire et habitude. Paris: Hermann et Fils, 1911. Pp. 116.
18. HOLLINGWORTH, H. L. Vicarious Functioning of Irrelevant Imagery. /. of
Phil., Psychol., t3c., 1911, 8, 688-692.
19. HUBER, E. Assoziationsversuche an Soldaten. Zsch.f. Psychol., 1911, 59, 241-
272.
20. JACOBSON, E. On Meaning and Understanding. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1911, 22,
553-577-
21. JACOBSON, E. Experiments on the Inhibition of Sensations. Psychol. Rev.
1911, 18, 24-53.
22. JESINGHAUS, C. Zur psychologischen Theorie des Gedachtnisses. Psychol.
Stud., 1911, 7, 336-375.
23. JOTEYKO, J. Comment on retient les chiffres, les syllabes, les mots, les images.
Rev. psychol., 1911, 4, 3-20.
24. KAKISE, H. A Preliminary Experimental Study of the Conscious Concomitants
of Understanding. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1911, 22, 14-64.
25. KATZAROFF, D. Contribution a 1'etude de la recognition. Arch, de Psychol.,
1911, n, 2-78.
26. KENT, G. H. Experiments on Habit Formation in Dementia Prsecox. Psychol.
Rev., 1911, 18, 375-410.
27. KOFFKA, K. Ueber latente Einstellung. Ber. IV. Kongress f. exper. Psychol. ,
1911, 239-241.
28. LANGFELD, H. S. Suppression with Negative Instruction. Psychol. Rev., 1911,
18,411-424.
29. LEVY-SUHL, M. Studien iiber die experimentelle Beeinflussung des Vorstellungs-
verlaufes. Zsch. f. Psychol., 1911, 59, 1-90. (See also Vols. 42 and 45.)
Collected and republished as a monograph. Leipzig: Earth, 1911. Pp. vi+142,
30. LEY & MENZERATH. Uetude experimentale de 1'association des idees dans les
maladies mentales. Gand: Van der Haeghen, 1911. Pp. 199.
31. LIPMANN, O. Visuelle Auffassungstypen. Ber. IV. Kongress f. exper. Psychol.,
1911, 198-201.
32. LOBSIEN, M. Zur Entwickelung des akustischen Wortgedachtnisses der Schuler.
Zsch.f. pad. Psychol., 1911, 12, 238-245.
33. LOEB, S. Ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom Farbengedachtnis. Zsch. f. Sinnesphysiol.,
1911, 46, 83-128.
34. MARTIN, L. J. Zur Lehre von den Bewegungsvorstellungen. Ber. IF. Kongress
f. exper. Psychol., 1911, 196-198.
336 /. W. BAIRD
35. MEUMANN, E. Ueber den kombinatorischen Faktor der Vorstellungs-typen.
Zsch.f. pad. PsychoL, 1911, 12, 115-120.
36. MEUMANN, E. Ueber Bekanntheits- und Unbekanntheitsqualitat. Arch. f. d.
ges. PsychoL, 1911, 20, 36-44.
37. MOEDE, W. Gedachtnis in Psychologic, Physiologic und Biologic. Kritische
Beitrage zum Gedachtnisproblem. Arch. f. d. ges. PsychoL, 1911, 22, 312-389.
38. MULLER, G. E. Zur Analyse der Gedachtnistatigkeit und des Vorstellungsver-
laufes. (Zsch.f. PsychoL, Ergbd. 5, Teil I.) Leipzig: Barth, 1911. Pp. xiv+
403-
39. OFFNER, M. Das Gedachtnis. Die Ergebnisse der experimentellen Psychologic
und ihre Anwendung in Unterricht und Erziehung. (2. Aufl.) Berlin: Reuther
& Reichard, 1911. Pp. x+258.
40. ORDAHL, L. E. Consciousness in Relation to Learning. Amer. J. of PsychoL,
I9II, 22, IS8-2I3.
41. PETERS, W. Gefuhl und Erinnerung. PsychoL Arbeiten (Kraepeliri), 1911, 6,
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d. sci., 1911, 152, 1115-1118.
43. PIERON, H. L'etude biologique de la memoire. Bull. soc. franc, de phil., 1911, u,
1-27.
44. PIERON, H. Sur la determination de la periode d'etablissement dans les acquisitions
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2,311-321.
46. PYLE, W. H., & SNYDER, J. C. The Most Economical Unit for Committing to
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47. RANSCHBURG, P. Die Ergebnisse der experimentellen Psychopathologie des
Gedachtnisses. Eer.lV. Kongress f. exper. PsychoL, 1911, 95-180.
48. SCHAUB, A. DEV. On the Intensity of Images. Amer. J. of PsychoL, 1911, 22,
346-368.
49. SLEIGHT, W. G. Memory and Formal Training. Brit. J. of PsychoL, 1911, 4,
386-457.
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PsychoL, 1911, 2, 306-310.
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18, 1-23.
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PsychoL Rev., 1911, 18, 229-233.
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2,. 262-271.
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13, No. 57. Pp. 85.
MEMORY, THOUGHT, JUDGMENT, ETC. 337
MEMORY, CONCEPT, JUDGMENT, LOGIC (THEORY)
BY PROFESSOR W. C. GORE
University of Chicago
It will be recalled that Bergson distinguished clearly between
memory as recollection, or memory proper, and memory as habit,
which merges into perception. An attempt to view the world sub
specie memoriae without making this distinction clear is to be found
in an article by Moede (n), who proposes memory as a compre-
hensive principle of unity, a cardinal concept of psychology extended
to biology and thence to the inorganic sciences. The resulting
mnemonic Weltbild includes the persistence of matter, which is the
possibility of repeated sensation, the laws of nature as the recurring
relationships between inorganic bodies possessing memory, and in
the organic world the principle of heredity, the idioplasmic memory
of the germ-cells, which is not only the foundation of recapitulation
and regeneration but also of the functions of the special organs and
even of conscious memory which is an offshoot of that idioplasmic
memory. Spirit itself, according to one view cited, is the eternal
memory of things. It is the summation of all the different stages of
memory. I am failing to do justice to the heavy apparatus of learning
which is deployed in behalf of this comprehensive view, and to im-
portant qualifications. The question persists, however, as to whether
the psychical characteristic of memory is not poured out with the
bath in the attempt to flood the universe with memory.
Jesinghaus (6) gives an historical and critical review of the fol-
lowing theories of memory: the theory of " petite s perceptions" the
"Spur" theory (both of which presuppose in the interest of causal
continuity the existence of latent psychical elements between the
original and the recalled experience), and the theory of "dispositions."
The last, as originated by Leibnitz and further developed by Wundt
in analogy with the formation of physiological habit, is espoused by
the author. The theory of "perseveration" and of "perseveration
tendencies" originated by G. E. Miiller is criticized as superfluous
and untenable.
The literature of the doctrine of imageless thought has been
critically canvassed by Angell (2) and the different questions involved
disentangled and analyzed. Due credit is given for the stimulus to
a keener and more searching analysis of thought-processes than any
previous generation has known which the influence of the advocates
W. C. GORE
of this doctrine has afforded, but the doctrine is found open to suspicion
on the following points (quoting in part from the conclusion of the
article): (i) The method of its experimental investigation is at
least not wholly satisfactory in meeting the demands of ordinary
experimental procedure. (2) Imageless thought ^ seems with many
observers to be at best but a sporadic and occasional phenomenon.
(3) It seems almost impossible to describe it save in negative terms.
(4) We are apparently asked to recognize two generically different
kinds of thought-material to serve one general function. This is at
variance with our conceptions of the parsimony of nature. (5) There
are many well-recognized conscious states which may obviously be
readily confused with imageless thought. The consciousness of
attitude springing out of very primitive physiological attitudes is an
important case in point. (6) The presence of interpretative factors
in perception gives no real comfort to belief in imageless thinking. —
Angell concludes that "the only demonstrably imageless thought is
subconscious and so primarily a matter of cerebralistic physiology.
Even this would be imaginal if it got above the limen."
Ogden (12), summarizing forty-nine articles bearing more or less
directly on the doctrine of imageless thought, reaches a conclusion
more favorable to the doctrine than Angell, although the up-shot of
the matter seems to turn on an act of faith rather than on fact.
"Those of us who believe that meaning is a conscious factor, directly
given in our experience, find it unequivocally described in our intro-
spective data, despite all errors of Kundgabe which may creep in.
Those, on the other hand, who believe that meaning is a logical
concept, which can be psychologically observed only in terms of
sensory Vehicles,' obliterate the Kundgabe from their reports and
direct attention on the sensations and images which may be present."
Ogden is unable to see that the experiments of the latter give much
promise of the possibility of working out a psychology of thought in
terms of sensory symbols.
Jacobson (5) replies vigorously to a criticism by Ogden and asserts
that as the result of investigations described by him "we find that
wherever there is meaning there are also processes, and we find that the
correlated meanings and processes are two renderings, from different
points of view, of one and the same experience"
Keyser (8) describes an interesting illustration drawn from the
study of higher mathematics which is intended to show the limita-
tion of the imagination as compared with thought. It is demon-
strated that symmetric interpretations of a mathematical expression
MEMORY, THOUGHT, JUDGMENT, ETC. 339
possible for thought are beyond a certain point impossible for imagi-
nation. Thought looks about in spaces of ever-increasing dimen-
sionality like a binocular being with its two-fold vision unimpaired,
whilst the eyes of imagination not only fail as n mounts higher and
higher but fail in unequal measure. Keyser appears to be conceiving
of the imagination in terms of visual imagery, or at least in terms
of images corresponding to the sense-perception of tridimensional
space, and of the rather obvious limitations of images of this sort
in dealing with space involving more than three dimensions. He
does not consider the problem as to whether thought operates with
or without some form of imagery.
The controversy between Alexander (i) and Stout as to whether
presentations are mental or non-mental appears to involve the
common assumption that the distinction is a purely descriptive,
not a functional, distinction. Alexander states the view that sen-
sations and images are both non-mental, objective, and that only
conation and feeling belong to the mental sphere. Stout replies
that the criterion of the physical is that of occupying space and
entering as a factor into a spatially conditioned system, and that the
criterion of the non-physical is that of being bound up with our
existence as conscious beings. Conceivably, either Alexander's or
Stout's view may be agreed with as it is exhibited. But it is not made
clear why either view was or may be taken.
Betz (3) attacks the traditional doctrine that the concept is formed
through abstracting the common element from a number of more or
less similar cases. Psychological analysis shows that a concept may
arise from a single case, and that the collective ordering of various
cases under one concept is a subsequent affair.
Lloyd (10) sets forth the following general principles of antithesis:
(i) Mutual reproduction. Each term is relative to the other, not
merely by contrast, but intrinsically. Each has in its heart the
nature of the other. Each reproduces the other. (2) Duplicity of
meaning. Each term has a local, narrow, one-sided meaning, and
also a meaning big and deep enough to take up both sides into itself.
(3) Identity of opposites. An identity which means a "becoming,"
in which opposites are not reconciled, but sharpened. (4) Serial
mediation. A mediation between the terms which heightens the
difference even more than a cataclysmic leap could possibly do, as
to be always dying even while living is no ordinary death, and as to
be always living even while dying is no ordinary life. (5) Difference
at once in kind and in degree. Gradation and continuity are some-
340 W. C. GORE
times falsely taken as synonyms, as when it is said difference in degree
but not in kind. Gradation must also mean real difference, the realest
sort of difference. (6) Dimensional difference. The terms of any
antithesis are qualitatively different, yet functionally related. So
are the dimensions of space. (7) Parallelism in all difference. Not
mere occasionalism but a process of qualitative change incident to
serial mediation.
The underlying logic of antithesis is that of differences which are
all the more different because they are the same, because they are
serially mediated and functionally related in an on-going movement
or process. In other words, the logic of antithesis is that of organic
unity.
The "new law of thought" discussed by Jones (7) may be stated
as a law of identity in diversity with reference to the fundamental
judgment-form, S is P, identity of extension, or denotation (Be-
deutung), in diversity of intention or signification (Sinn). There are
no more ambiguous words in philosophy than identity and difference,
none more elusive. The source of the ambiguity lies in two funda-
mental kinds of sameness: (i) extensional, or denotational, sameness,
and (2) qualitative sameness. The second is frequently but not always
a sign of the first. For example, if a stowaway is observed to have
all of the published characteristics of an escaped criminal, the similar-
ity is regarded as an indication of "identity." It may, however,
turn out to be a case of "mistaken identity."
Klein (9) agrees with the statement of the law as identity in
difference in its application to affirmative predication, but takes
exception to Jones's application of it to negative predication, as
"difference of Denotation (Otherness) in difference of Intension
(Diversity)." Negative predication should be interpreted as assert-
ing neither a difference in difference nor an identity in difference, but a
difference in identity. Logicians have failed to do justice to the
implication of identity between subject and predicate in negative
predication, to the relevancy, amounting to a partial identity in
intension.
Russell (14) presents in clear, brief, and comprehensive form some
of the net results of his work in the logic of mathematics. He con-
cludes: (i) Mathematical logic has resolved the problems of infinity
and of continuity and has rendered possible a solid philosophy of
space, time, and motion. (2) Pure mathematics may be defined as an
ensemble of propositions which are expressed exclusively in terms of
variables and logical constants, in other words, which are purely
MEMORY, THOUGHT, JUDGMENT, ETC. 341
formal propositions. (3) The possibility of a knowledge of mathe-
matics refutes both empiricism and idealism, since it shows that
human knowledge cannot be deduced entirely from types of sense
experience, nor can a priori knowledge be explained in a subjective
or psychological manner.
In a book which is conceived in the manner of the school of
William James and which runs "thick," not to say turbid, with
illustrations and metaphors drawn from a wide range, Boodin (4)
discusses the relations of truth and reality as an introduction to the
theory of knowledge. The book is itself a living illustration of the
definition of thinking which it advances, "a matrix of relations,
reading forward and backward and throbbing with will — not the
pale ghost of the formal proposition or syllogism, which, however
important for the effectiveness of thought's procedure, are only
its artificial tools." The act of judgment which involves a specific
problem and a specific context, and which is always purposive, is the
core of all thinking. That part of the book which seems most relevant
to the topic of this summary is that which discusses the presupposi-
tions of thinking, for the ego in willing to think — "both because it is
practically useful and because it provides ideal sport" — "also wills
to accept the formal conditions without which thinking would become
impossible" (p. 157). These presuppositions or laws implied in all
thinking are: (i) the law of consistency; (2) the law of totality; (3) the
law of duality, or the presupposition of the subject-object relation;
and (4) the law of finitude.
In a discursive and suggestive study of the part played by analogy
in artistic and scientific thinking Read (13) gives especial attention
to the analogy of relations where there is no similarity between the
respective terms involved. What are the psychological conditions
of originality in thought and imagination? Genius consists in an
unusual power of "thought by analogy." Sensitiveness to analogy
•that distinguishes genius is apparently supported by extraordinary
power of registering experiences, perhaps without consciously at-
tending to them, or but slightly noticing them. Fear of convention,
of authority, discourages the play of analogy. There are ages in
which every sort of censorship, conventional, traditional, authoritative
is relaxed, so that every man breathes more freely, is more himself,
and genius is relatively abundant.
REFERENCES
1. ALEXANDER, S. On Sensations and Images. Proc. Aristo}. Soc., 1910, 10, 1-35*
2. ANGELL, J. R. Imageless Thought. PSYCHOL. REV., 1911, 18, 295-323.
342 JUNE E. DOWNEY
3. BETZ, W. Vorstellung und Einstellung. II. Begriffe. Arch. f. d. ges. PsychoL,
1911, 20, 186-225.
4. BOODIN, J. E. Truth and Reality: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge.
New York -.Macmillan, 1911. Pp.x+334.
5. JACOBSON, E. On Meaning and Understanding. Amer. J. of PsychoL, 1911, 22,
6. JESINGHAUS, C. Zur psychologischen Theorie des Gedachtnisses. PsychoL
Stud., 1911,7, 336-375-
7. JONES, E. E. C. A New "Law of Thought" and its Implications. Mind, 1911,
20, 41-53.
8. KEYSER, C. J. The Asymmetry of the Imagination. /. of Phil., PsychoL, &c.t
1911,8,309-316.
9. KLEIN, A. Negation considered as a Statement of Difference in Identity. Mind,
I9II, 20, 521-529.
10. LLOYD, A. H. The Logic of Antithesis. /. of Phil., PsychoL, fete., 1911, 8, 281-288.
11. MOEDE, W. Gedachtnis in Psychologic, Physiologic, u. Biologic: Kritische
Beitrage zum Gedachtnisproblem. Arch. f. d. ges. PsychoL, 1911, 22, 312-389.
12. OGDEN, R. M. Imageless Thought: Resume and Critique. PSYCHOL. BULL.,
1911, 8, 183-197.
13. READ, C. The Function of Relations in Thought. Brit. J. of PsychoL, 1911, 4,
342-385-
14. RUSSELL, B. L'importance philosophique de la logistique. Rev. de met. et de
mor., 1911, 19, 281-291.
GRAPHIC FUNCTIONS
BY PROFESSOR JUNE E. DOWNEY
University of Wyoming
The year's work on graphic functions is dominated by the peda-
gogical interest.
Miss Thompson (8) presents an excellent resume of the researches
bearing on the history and pedagogy of writing, without attempting
any original contribution to the subject. A chapter on the historical
development of the alphabet is followed by a summary statement of
the experiments that have been made on the psychology of writing.
A neurological analysis of the writing act is first given and the views
of Mosso, Flechsig, Exner, Collins, and Pierre Marie stated.
Among others, the following experimental studies are reviewed:
those of Bryan and of Gilbert on rapidity of movement; of Woodworth
on the accuracy and control of voluntary movement; of Downey on
sensory control of writing; of Fullerton and Cattell and of Miin-
sterberg on causes of inaccuracy in movement; of Johnson, of Swift,
of Bryan and Harter, and of Book on practice and habit; of Judd and
of McAllister on the movements used in writing; of Gesell on the
elation of accuracy in writing to school intelligence and sex.
GRAPHIC FUNCTIONS 343
In a final chapter on the pedagogy of writing, Miss Thompson
attempts a practical application of experimental results to the
teaching of writing. Thorndike's scale of handwriting is described
and portions of it reproduced.
Superintendent Wilson (n) of Connersville, Indiana, reports the
application of the Thorndike scale to the evaluation of the quality of
writing of an entire school system. A sudden advance in quality
was found to occur at the sixth grade. A test of the relation between
quality of writing and training for speed showed that speed may be
secured without a sacrifice, to any degree, of quality of writing.
Ayres (i) presents a new scale for measuring the quality of hand-
writing of school children, a scale which differs from that of Thorndike
in that the quality of each sample of writing was determined by its
degree of legibility as shown by accurately timed readings made by
ten investigators. Professor Thorndike's scale, based on "general
merit," is held to permit less exact valuation.
Ayres' scale consists of eight samples of handwriting, which become
progressively better by equal steps from left to right. Each of the
eight divisions, is represented by writing in three slants, vertical,
medium, and extreme slant. A given sample may be measured by
sliding it along the scale to a sample of the same quality and slant
which bears a number representing the value of the writing.
As regards the relation between legibility and the general appear-
ance of handwriting, it was found that legible writing is always of
good appearance but that the converse is not necessarily true. The
crowding together of words on the line or the too close spacing between
lines are, often, causes of a low degree of legibility, facts of importance
in connection with the choice of a system of penmanship.
Starch (7) proposes a method of measuring handwriting by means
of a graphometer scale which measures the mean variation of the
slant of letters and their mean variation from the base-line, a method
held to be more accurate than the method of direct comparison with
standard specimens.
Discussing some issues in the teaching of handwriting, Freeman (3)
raises several questions. First, as to the preferability of vertical
or slant writing. Since, as the writer shows, slant-writing is not
irreconcilable with a hygienic position, this question must be decided
on the score of ease and rapidity of movement and of legibility of
writing. Theoretically, vertical writing is most legible, but only
slightly more so than writing of a moderate slant. On the other
hand, slant writing excels in ease and rapidity as shown by an analysis
344 JUNE E. DOWNEY
of the movements concerned. Secondly, should the child be trained
at one and the same time in form and in correct habits of movement?
To attempt this may result in a scattering of attention. ^ Moreover,
since the development of motor skill comes at the age of eight or nine
years, it is a mistake to give the child of six or seven a drill for which
he has not yet developed sufficient motor control. The perception of
form should be early developed while movement drill may be deferred
until the child is in the third or fourth grade. Third, should finger
movement or arm movement be taught together or separately? It is
probably well to allow the child to follow at first his natural inclin-
ation to use the finger movement, deferring the use of the arm com-
ponent in conjunction with the finger movement until the child has
developed motor control. Fourth, should letters or words be used at
the beginning of the writing drill ? Neither should be used exclusively.
Fifth, what form of movement is preferable? The arguments
advanced for the use of arm and of finger movements are rehearsed,
with the conclusion that the most favorable type of movement com-
bines the use of the arm, of the wrist, and of the fingers.
Freeman (4) also discusses certain problems and methods of
investigating handwriting. One of the most important problems
is the effect upon quality of an emphasis upon the speed of writing
or the effect upon speed of an emphasis upon quality. The writing
lesson should be so conducted as to emphasize one or the other of the
two characteristics. Again, how does writing develop at different
ages? How do speed and form change from grade to grade? Are
there times when there is a marked increase in the capacity for rapid
writing? The relative advantages of arm movement and of the com-
bined arm and finger movement might be determined by seeing that
two groups of children were taught exactly alike except for this one
feature. There must be uniformity in the method of measuring the
speed and quality of writing. Speed may be measured by finding
how long it takes the child to write a certain amount or by finding
how much is written in a certain time. For the measurement of
quality of writing Ayres's method of grading legibility is recommended.
An exposition of the Montessori method of teaching writing is
given by Warren (10). The distinctive feature of the method is the
emphasis given to touch and to the kinsesthetic sense.
An interesting resume of the influences affecting handwriting and
a statement of the problems that need investigation is contributed
by Nacke (5). Sceptical of the determination in any detail of the
character significance of handwriting, Nacke devotes himself chiefly
GRAPHIC FUNCTIONS 345
to the question of the identification of handwriting and the extent to
which individual features persist in spite of changed conditions.
Using as a text the attempt of Frau Thumm-Knitzel to settle the
Shakespeare controversy by a detailed comparison of the authen-
ticated signature of Shakespeare with the writing of other important
documents, the author urges that in attempting any identification
by such means much writing material of different periods and of dif-
fering content must be utilized, for individual variation may be very
great, especially in the case of highly gifted individuals. The influ-
ence of age on writing must be noted. On account of eye changes,
in old age script often becomes smaller and poorer. Cases of clear
firm writing in old age deserve special consideration. The kind of
pen and paper used; the condition of the writer, whether warm or
cold, fatigued or fresh; the speed with which he writes; the formal or
informal contents of a given document are important factors. Above
all, the influence of race upon handwriting deserves consideration.
The author recognizes the persistence of writing individuality through
many changes of conditions, so that left hand writing resembles
right hand writing and the mirror scripts of both hands resemble
each other and the normal script. Even in pathological cases
similarity to the normal hand may persist for a long time and such
similarity may be found in mediumistic writing even when there is
intentional or unconscious imitation of the writing of another.
Nacke raises the problem of handwriting and of inner speech in
dreams, urging the need of further investigation. There are, it
appears, a motor and a visual type of writing dream. In the first
instance, the dreamer himself writes the thoughts which he reads;
in the second case, he reads the printing or writing which he sees
before him.
As a transition from a reflex activity to a conscious one, the
drawings of infants merit the attention of psychologists. Bechterew
(2), writing from this point of view, protests against the attempt to
interpret the acts of children as significant of the thoughts and feelings
of adults. He insists upon a wholly objective interpretation of
childish drawings which inform us of a mode of reaction which con-
stitutes a part of their psychic reaction and ought to be judged only
in relation with the factors which have determined them, such as
hereditary influences, motor coordination of the fingers, and the like.
Bechterew's report concerns in particular the development of the
drawing capacity in two children, with supplementary observation
on a number of other children. Among other things the study con-
346 JUNE E. DOWNEY
earned itself with the following points: the greater or less regularity
of the lines evidencing the motor coordination . of the fingers; the
greater or less complexity of the drawing; the greater or less agreement
of the drawing with the material object; the manifestation of creative
activity in the representation of the different parts; the elaboration
of the subject; the exactitude or the inexactitude of the perspective;
the peculiarities of the drawing relevant to the special conditions of
education and environment. The development traced showed a
general parallelism with the evolution of drawing among primitive
peoples.
Van Gennep (9) reports a number of tests on the drawing capacity
of a little girl of five years. Although copies were set for the child,
she manifested a strong inclination to throw her attention upon the
object represented. The experiment showed that the execution of
geometric outlines or of alphabetical signs was extraordinarily difficult
for the child; the realistic representation of such objects as a chair
or a lamp very easy. This result is of significance in the inter-
pretation of prehistoric drawings and the drawings of semi-civilized
peoples and in line with the conclusion of those investigators of
primitive art who have shown that, in origin, art is realistic and
that geometric and conventional drawing is a later development.
As abstract ideas are posterior to concrete ideas, so ornamental
designs are the product of abstraction. The alphabetical sign is the
last term in a long course of development. To teach first the drawing
of isolated letters is, according to Van Gennep, to invert the natural
order of development which begins with the representation of natural
objects.
Sargent (6) presents a valuble discussion of five problems in the
experimental pedagogy of drawing. First, how far does special
talent in drawing consist primarily in an unusual interest in the
pictorial aspect of objects and to what degree may a lack of such
interest be compensated for by an emphasis upon aspects of objects
related to other interests of children? Second, what value pertains to
the following methods in teaching the representation of objects
involving common geometric shapes — drawing directly from objects;
theoretical study of perspective; developing concepts of solidity?
Third, is there any psychological reason for the reduced size of draw-
ings made naturally by a child and does this size bear any ascertain-
able relation to the size of the retinal image? Fourth, what habits of
expression are developed by rapid sketching? By carefully finished
drawings? Fifth, to what degree does each of the following methods
VOCAL FUNCTIONS 347
promote the child's drawing ability: detailed observation of objects
and comparison of the drawings with the object; study of pictures,
including copying or tracing; modeling in plastic material; seeing a
skilful draughtsman draw the object under consideration; memory-
drawing?
REFERENCES
1. AYRES, L. P. A Scale for Measuring the Quality of Handwriting of School
Children. No. 113. Dep't of Child Hygiene, Russell Sage Foundation.
2. BECHTEREW, W. Recherches objectives sur 1'evolution du dessin chez 1'enfant.
/. de psychol. norm, et path., 1911, 8, 385-405.
3. FREEMAN, F. N. Some Issues in the Teaching of Handwriting. Elementary
School Teacher, 1911, 12, 1-7; 53-59.
4. FREEMAN, F. N. Problems and Methods of Investigation in Handwriting.
/. of Educ. Psychol., 1912, 3, 181-190.
5. NACKE, P. Biologisches und Forensisches zur Handschrift. Neur. Centbl., 1911,
30, 642-654.
6. SARGENT, W. Problems in the Experimental Pedagogy of Drawing. /. of Educ.
Psychol., 1912, 3, 264-276.
7. STARCH, D. An Objective Measurement of Handwriting. PSYCHOLOGICAL
BULLETIN, 1912, 9, 83-84.
8. THOMPSON, M. E. Psychology and Pedagogy of Writing. A Resume of the Re-
searches and Experiments Bearing the on History and Pedagogy of Writing.
Baltimore: Warwick & York, 1911. Pp. 128.
9. VAN GENNEP, A. Dessins d'enfant et dessin prehistorique. Arch, de psychol.,
1911, 10,327-337.
10. WARREN, H. C. "The House of Childhood." /. of Educ. Psychol, 1912, 3,
121-132.
11. WILSON, C. M. The Handwriting of School Children. Elementary School
Teacher, 1911, n, 540-543.
VOCAL FUNCTIONS
BY PROFESSOR W. VAN DYKE BINGHAM
Dartmouth College
"To the enthusiasm of the eighties and nineties has succeeded a
stagnation, a retrogression, even, in experimental phonetics," says
Poirot (15), in the preface to his volume on Phonetics, in Tigerstedt's
monumental Handbuch der physiologischen Methodik. Some pf the
foremost champions of the science have passed away; others have
devoted themselves to other studies. And the younger generation
has not grown up to their measure. The present situation will not
be essentially bettered until the philologically trained phoneticians
have made friends with the experimental methods and shared in the
348 W. VAN DYKE BINGE AM
labors of the experimental school. What is most needed today is a
series of minute investigations of detailed problems, to evaluate and
control the earlier results achieved by the method of observation.
It is not sufficient that the philologist seek the collaboration of a
scientist: the philological and the experimental schools must be united.
Whoever utilizes experiment must master the experimental methods.
Poirot's manual aims to make this thorough mastery of the ex-
perimental methods easier. It differs from the two existing manuals of
L'Abbe Rousselot and Scripture in the great pains that have been
exercised to make the text clear and simple as well as comprehensive;
and in the emphasis upon methods rather than upon results. Only
such accounts of achieved results have been admitted as serve to
illuminate the discussion of methods, and the selected bibliography
of 211 titles contains only references to works significant for the
understanding of the methods of experimental phonetics. Three
generous chapters are devoted chiefly to the technique of graphic
registration of speech movement, and the study of those dynamic and
acoustical properties of the air which are significant for phonetics.
A fourth chapter of seventy-five pages, on measurements and com-
putations, seeks to smooth the way of the higher mathematics to the
neophite who must thread the maze of Fourier's Theorem. The
volume as a whole is distinctly a workable manual.
The problem of the nature and production of vowel sounds we
still have with us. Hermann (7) comes to the defense of the Helm-
holtz doctrine of formants (the doctrine that for each vowel a certain
absolute pitch is characteristic) provoked by the assertion of L.
Fredericq that the altering of the rate of revolution of a phonograph
cylinder does not alter the character of the vowel sounds.1 Hermann,
following several earlier investigators, had twenty years ago obtained
unambiguous results of the opposite kind: alteration of rate was
found to produce a distortion of the vowel qualities, even to the
point of unrecognizability. He has now repeated his experiments
with perfected apparatus, elaborate precautions and controls, con-
firming his early researches and adding new observations. Among
these may be noted the generalization that retarding the rate of the
cylinder distorts the vowel character much more than a corresponding
acceleration. An exception is found in the case of high soprano
notes. The results as a whole lend confirmation to the view that
certain vowel qualities are determined by the presence of both primary
and secondary formants, the latter lower in pitch as well as fainter
than the ones most easily detected. It is further suggested that
1 Bericht der VIII. Internationalen Physiologen Kongresses, Wien, 1910.
FOCAL FUNCTIONS 349
the pitch of a formant is variable within moderate limits; and that
ordinary vocalization pitches these formants near their lower limits:
hence the greater distorting effect of retarding a phonographic cylinder,
as compared with accelerating its rate.
In a more recently published and more elaborate study of the
production of vowels, Hermann (8) amplifies these and his earlier
researches, and develops the formant theory still farther. He
marshalls objections against the theory that the resonance cavity
in producing the vowel character acts merely by strengthening
overtones which are already present in the vocal clang, and undertakes
instead to account for the generation of formants by the direct action
of the air stream on the resonating cavity, which thus serves as an
independent source of sound. This, of course, is no unique doctrine
as applied to whispered vowels. Its distinctive feature is found in
the theory of the manner in which the formants of vocalized sounds
are generated. It is Hermann's view that each sound-wave of the
vibrating air sent out from the larynx serves as a separate blast to
actuate the resonating cavity. Studies of the acoustics of reed-pipes
and new experiments in artificial vowel synthesis based upon the
results here obtained have convinced Hermann that such a view is not
merely tenable but necessary. Further confirmation is found in an
analysis of speech-sound photographic records made with a stentor-
microphone and a capillary electrometer, a method which has distinct
advantages over the more usual one of enlarging phonographic
tracings. Analysis of these vocal records also serves to substantiate
the author's position that in addition to the pitch of the formants trfere
are other distinguishing characteristics of certain vowels, and perhaps
of all vowels.
Gutzmann (5) brings additional confirmation of Hermann's
doctrine regarding the generation of formants, as a result of his analysis
of vowels artificially made by combinations of reeds and resonating
chambers.
Weiss (22) has used a soap-film phonoscope to record whispered
and lightly sung vowels, for contrast with the curves of louder tones.
He recognizes that the chief technical difficulty in all such investi-
gations as these is the elimination of damping and sympathetic
vibration of the diaphragm. Without achieving complete success
in meeting this problem he nevertheless secures some extremely
interesting curves which show that, in the records of the vowels U,
O and A at least (continental sounds), the formant vibrations are of
uniform amplitude in the whispered and lightly sung vowels, while
with louder singing they wax and wane in amplitude with each pulse
35o W. VAN DYKE BINGHAM
of the primary tone vibration. No attempt is made to point out the
bearing which these facts may have on the doctrine of Hermann,
mentioned previously. Weiss has succeeded in getting records of
sibillants in which the vibration frequency of Sch was found to range
between 3,000 and 4,500. With Ss, the frequency rose to 6,000 and
more a second.
Glover (4), studying the production of vowel sounds, has made
observations of the vocal breath vapors simultaneously emitted from
the nasal and buccal cavities. Normally the vowels give a buccal
vapor but no nasal vapor: throughout the whole extent of pitch and
in each variety of voice the posterior nasal orifice is closed. The
presence of the consonants M and N either initial or final (French)
produces a nasal vapor; but this diminishes in passing from grave
to acute. It is impossible for a soprano to articulate an, on, etc.,
on a high note. The soft palate particularly, but also the other
organs of articulation, undergo an evident influence from the variations
of laryngeal tonicity. There is an organic and functional harmony be-
tween the activity of these organs. Hence the need in vocal training
of emphasis on precision in articulation, since the process of articu-
lation exerts an influence on the laryngeal note and the two are co-
ordinated. This leads to a new conception of vocal registers: they
are infinite in number. They shift and vary with all the attitudes
of the soft palate and the other organs of word formation. These
multitudinous registers may be classified into grave and acute,
with a region of especial difficulty in the activity of the organs of
verbal formation around re9 (293 v.d.), me3, fa3 (df, e' and /' in our
notation). Voices should be classified according to (i) the range of
laryngeal tonicity and (2) possible range of articulation. Glover's
views are supported by observations with a thoracic radioscope and
with a new multiple-image laryngoscope permitting lateral examina-
tion of the vocal cords, as well as by the breath-vapor method men-
tioned above.
Marage (10) photographed voice vibrations on a film moving
slowly so that the vibrations were not dissociated, but the general
form of the consonants was made obvious. He thus obtained evi-
dence confirmatory of one of the common classifications of consonants
into (i) nasals, requiring both nose and mouth; and (2) mouth con-
sonants, of which there are three sorts: (a) continuous consonants:
the amplitude of the tracing gradually increases from zero (F, S, J) ;
(b) explosives: the amplitude is maximal at the onset, and diminishes
(B, D, G, P, T, K); and (c) vibrant consonants (L, R). Further ob-
servations on the relation and relative duration of consonants and
VOCAL FUNCTIONS 35 l
vowels lead to two applications: In first teaching children to read,
vowels and consonants should be joined and not separated, as in the
"Janicot" method. In ridding vocal pupils of an objectionable
stroke of the glottis, exercises may well begin with substituting an
explosive consonant, as B, for the stroke of the glottis, before the
practice-vowel.
Several investigators are turning their labors toward the problems
of speech melodies. The practicability of the Marbe smoke-flame
method for the study of these delicate variations in pitch is made
evident in the contribution of Panconcelli-Calzia (13) whose study
of melodies in spoken Italian sentences and Italian poetry is a most
promising beginning of a series of researches in the difficult field of
speech melodies. Pollak (16), for similar purposes, uses phonographic
records mechanically transferred to smoked paper. His study of the
final cadence in the German declarative sentence is the first of several
researches he is now carrying forward in the Vienna phonographic
archives. Stefanini (18) has recourse to microscopic examination of
phonographic cylinders, but his interest is not primarily in pitch.
Gutzmann (6) has carried the phongraphic method into the realm
of child study. He caught the first cry of his new-born daughter,
and throughout the first year observed and recorded with the skill
of the practical phonetician the development of vocal and articulatory
reflexes. His report has a value to students of instincts because of
the definiteness and minuteness of its records; and students of musical
science will welcome the careful observations on pitch production
during the pre-imitative stage of development and the early stages
of vocal control.
Urbantschitsch (21) has turned his attention to the problem of
the influence of sound sensations on speech. He brings together the
findings of many investigators who have studied the motor effects of
sounds upon the ear muscle, the tensor tympani, the eyes, the face,
the musculature of bodily equilibrium and so on. As he points out,
both anatomical and pathological evidence demonstrates that the
nervous paths of these sound reflexes generally do not involve the
cortical auditory centers, but are more direct. The stimuli of some
of these reflexes are intense sounds. Other responses are called forth
by faint, even subliminal, stimuli; and in some instances the specific
stimulus is a sound of a certain pitch. Urbantschitsch then raises
the question whether speech can be reflexly influenced through sound
sensations. He cites the literature regarding the reflex effects of
sounds on breathing but seems to have completely overlooked the
work of Cameron, Seashore, and others on the influence of sounds on
352 W: VAN DYKE BINGE AM
maintenance of pitch in singing. The results of Sokolowsky (17),
who found a much greater inaccuracy in singing with auditory dis-
traction than in imitating a tone, may also be cited here.
Urbantschitsch's method was to ask his subject to read aloud
without letting himself be distracted by tones and noises conducted
now to the right ear and now to the left. The effects were varied, but
some disturbance amounting frequently to a stammering, a slowing
of the rate of utterance or even a complete stoppage of enunciation
was produced by some of the auditory stimuli. Ordinarily the inter-
ference increased with the continuance of the stimulus.
J. Meyer's contribution (12) describes and classifies the various
voluntary and reflex movements of the ear muscles and describes a
peculiar case of pathological connection between utterance and ear-
movement.
Dupre and Nathan's Le langage musical (i) is the work of two
gifted physicians who have concentrated their attention upon the
study of aphasias, amnesias and allied mental disorders, with especial
reference to abnormalities of the musical consciousness. Language
is broadly defined as a means of communicating psychic content.
Its reflex origin is set forth, after which follows a description and a
theory of normal vocal control through auditory and kinesthetic
sensations, as a preface to the main purpose of the volume which is
the description of musical abnormalities. Few pages are given to
vocal functions as such; many more to the mental processes accom-
panying and controlling them. Relatively little new material is
brought forward by the authors. They have been content with a
fluent, simple presentation of conventional psychological doctrine
and a general survey of their field with special reference to the facts
of musical pathology.
The thesis of Super (19) is that rational thinking may be inde-
pendent of speech. In support of this position he draws from varied
sources, especially from his knowledge of deaf children, their conver-
sation, their actions and the peculiarities of their ways of learning
language. Fay's paper (2) is a controversial discussion of an earlier
article by Professor Alexander Hill. It is really a defense of the
classics, and of their study because they are difficult and because
language is a stimulator of thought. Incidentally the reader finds
several good observations and comments on naturalness of word
orders in different languages.
FOCAL FUNCTIONS 353
REFERENCES
1. DUPRE, E. and NATHAN, M. Le langage musical. Etude medico-psychologique.
Paris: Alcan, 1911. Pp. viii+197-
2. FAY, E. W. Language Study and Language Psychology. Pop. Sci. Mo., 1911,
79, 369-384-
3. GIESSWEIN, M. Ueber die "Resonanz" der Mundhohle und der Nasenraume,
im besonderen der Nebenhohlen der Nase. Beitr. z. Anat. etc. d. Ohres, etc.,
1911, 4, 305-353'
4. GLOVER, J. Registre et classement des voix d'apres 1'observation des buees
vocales de la bouche et du nez, etc. C. r. acad. d. sci., 1911, 152, 897-899.
5. GUTZMANN, H. Die Analyse kunstlicher Vokale. Med.-Pdd. Monat. f. d. ges.
Sprachhk., 1911, 21, 177-185.
6. GUTZMANN, H. Beobachtungen der ersten sprachlichen und stimmlichen
Entwicklung eines Kindes. Med.-Pdd. Monat. f. d. ges. Sprachhk., 1911, 21,
27-32; 88-96; 97-111.
7. HERMANN, L. Der Einfluss der Drehgeschwindigkeit auf die Vokale bei der
Reproduktion derselben am Edison'schen Phonographen. Arch. f. d. ges.
Physiol. (Pfluger), 1911, 139, 1-9.
8. HERMANN, L. Neue Beitrage zur Lehre von den Vokalen und ihrer Entstehung.
Arch.f. d. ges. Physiol. (Pfluger), 1911, 141, 1-62.
9. KATZENSTEIN, J. Ueber Brust-, Mittel- und Falsettstimme. Beitr. z. Anat.
etc. d. Ohres, etc., 1911, 4, 271-301.
10. MARAGE, M. Contribution a 1'etude des consonnes. C. r. acad. d. sci., 1911,
152, 1265-1267.
1 1 . MEYER, E. A. Ein neues Verf ahren zur graphischen Bestimmung des musikalischen
Akzents. Med.-Pdd. Monat. f. d. ges. Sprachhk., 1911, 21, 227-243.
12. MEYER, J. Ueber Ohrmuschelbewegungen beim Sprechen. Med.-Pdd. Monat.
f. d. ges. Sprachhk., 1911, 21, 129-134.
13. PANCONCELLI-CALZIA, G. Die Sprachmelodie in italienischen Satzen und in
einem italienischen Gedicht. Med.-Pdd. Monat. f. d. ges. Sprachhk., 1911, 21,
161-176.
14. PIELKE, W. Ueber "offen" und "gedeckt" gesungene Vokale. Beitr. z. Anat.
etc. d. Ohres, etc., 1911, 5, 215-231.
15. POIROT, J. Die Phonetik. Leipzig: Hirzel, 1911. Pp. 276. (Dritter Band, 6
Abteilung, Tigerstedt, Handbuch der physiologischen Methodik.)
16. POLLAK, HANS W. Phonetische Untersuchungen. I. Zur Schlusskadenz im
deutschen Aussagesatz. Wien, 1911.
17. SOKOLOWSKY, R. Ueber die Genauigkeit des Nachsingens von Tonen bei Beruf-
sangern. Beitr. z. Anat. etc. d. Ohres, etc., 1911, 5, 204-214.
18. STEFANINI, A. L'analisi delle vocali. Arch. ital. d'otol., rin., e lar., 1911, 459-473.
(Also translated into French, Arch, de laryng., ot., rhin., 1911, 32, 835-844.)
19. SUPER, C. W. Language and Logic. Pop. Sci. Mo., 1911, 78, 491-499.
20. TALAYRACH, I. La philosophic du langage de Julius Bahnsen d'apres des docu-
ments inedits. Rev. de met. et de mor., 1911, 19, 780-802.
21. URBANTSCHITSCH, V. Ueber den Einfluss von Schallempfindungen auf die Sprache.
Arch.f. d. ges. Physiol. (Pfluger), 1911, 137, 422-435.
22. WEISS, O. Die Kurven der gefliisterten und leise gesungenen Vokale und der
Konsonanten Sch und Ss. Arch.f. d. ges. Physiol. (Pfluger), 1911, 142, 567-577.
23. WETHLO, F. Einfache Vorrichtung zur Demonstration der Stimmeinsatze.
Med.-Pdd. Monat. f. d. ges. Sprachhk., 1911, 21, 270-272.
SPECIAL REVIEWS
LAUGHTER
Laughter: an Essay on the Meaning of the Comic. HENRI BERGSON.
Authorized translation by C. BRERETON and F. ROTHWELL.
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911. Pp. 200.
This excellent translation of one of the earlier and more popular
of Bergson's writings will doubtless appeal to a wide circle of readers.
Unless we are mistaken, however, the arguments, when examined,
will be found to be more ingenious than convincing. The main title
of the work, indeed, is obviously too broad: laughter is exicted not
only by the ludicrous, but also by various causes of joy, and even
physically, as, e. g., by tickling, by certain kinds of acute pain, and,
again, on occasion, by hysterical grief. Nor is it always excited by
perception of the comic. It belongs, no doubt, to the general type
of reflex acts, but, like others of its class, it is more or less subject to
control. The connoisseur of the comic is apt to enjoy the finest
flavor of his amusement with a suppressed smile, while the pro-
fessional funny man, who lacks in no respect appreciation of his own
jokes, adds to the merriment by masking his countenance with
the blandness of the rustic or the solemnity of the judge. Bergson's
essay, then, is not an essay on laughter generally, but on the comic and
the laughter excited by it. Its real title is the sub-title.
What, then, makes a thing or a person comic? Why do we
laugh? The comic, according to Bergson, has three noteworthy
characteristics, — it is exclusively human, for although animals may
appear comical, it is only by suggesting the human; it is un-emotional,
appealing purely and simply to the intelligence; and it is social, the
intelligence perceiving it remains in touch with other intelligences
and the laughter it provokes has real or imaginary connection with
that of others by a sort of social freemasonry. With these character-
istics in mind we are ready for 'the theory. The particular point, it
declares, on which the attention of the group is concentrated when it
finds anything ludicrous is a certain lack of elasticity, something
rigid or mechanical, an automatism or absentmindedness where life
and society require plasticity and adaptation. The centrally comic
subject — though it is the last to be treated in the book — is the comic
354
LAUGHTER 355
character. Three things are essential to form a comic character, —
unsociability in the performer, insensibility in the spectator and auto-
matism, absentmindedness. The type is Don Quixote, with his
systematic absentmindedness, "the most comical thing imaginable."
The combination of elements found in this case sheds its light over
the entire field. The comic spirit cannot, indeed, be imprisoned in a
definition. The formula, "something mechanical encrusted on the
living," which expresses its essence, is modified as it expands. We
substitute the vaguer image of some rigidity or other applied to the
mobility of life, or attention is called to the physical in a person where
the moral side is in question, or we find the manner seeking to outdo
the matter, or the person gives the impression of being a thing, etc.
But everywhere the principle is the same, everywhere there is an
element of stiffness, absentmindedness, viewed unemotionally by the
social group or its representative. And the laughter? The laughter
is the social corrective of the mechanism, rigidity, absentmindedness.
Such is Bergson's theory.
It is not difficult to find illustrations for the theory; this book is
full of them. It is curious, indeed, when once our attention is called
to the fact, to observe how many funny things appear to contain the
ingredients indicated. We had not thought that it was the unemo-
tional perception of something rigid in the living that caused us to
laugh, but Bergson makes us see that, whether or not such is of the
essence of the comic and whether it be true or not that our laughter
is the means appropriated by society for its correction, the rigidity,
at least in many cases, is there, or the comic fact can be interpreted
plausibly as though it were. Evidence and explanation are, never-
theless, not quite convincing. We remember that the comic on
any theory involves some kind of incongruity and, since it is met with
preeminently, if not exclusively, in things human, we are not surprised
to find numerous cases in which the special incongruity appears as
a sort of rigidity or automatism in contravention of the plastic
demands of life. But is this always the case? Well, there is at
least one class of cases in which the interpretation seems forced,
namely the witticism, or joke. Bergson devotes part of a chapter
to the comic in words. The witty or comical saying — there is no
essential difference — has the power, he says, of rapidly sketching
and evoking the image, dim or distinct, of a comic scene. The scene
evoked is comic on its own account and conforms to the general
principles enunciated for the comic in situations or actions. But
the word or saying evoking it is also held to be comic. How is this
356 REVIEWS
explained? As the projection on the plane of words of the comic in
actions and situations. The rigidity, mechanism or absentminded-
ness which is found in them is now found as infecting language itself.
An illustration will make this clearer. "He is always running after
a joke," remarked some one of a conceited fellow; and the hearer
retorted, "I'll back the joke!" (p. 116). Now we are left to discover
for ourselves the element of mechanism in the animated picture of
the pursuit, and doubtless each one will find it where it pleases him.
But the comicality of the witticism is explained by Bergson as due to
the fixing of attention on the material aspect of a metaphor, to the
fact that an expression used figuratively is taken literally. And this,
no doubt, is partly true. But how is this connected with the prin-
ciple of mechanism? It is connected by the application to language
of the law, primarily applied to persons, that we laugh if attention
is diverted to the physical when the moral is in question. Here, then,
language itself is regarded as having a kind of moral personality in
its figurative use and a physical in its literal; the comic saying is
viewed as a lapse of attention, not to— for the wit may surely be
presumed to be alive to the meanings of words — but in language.
It may be left to the reader to judge the warrant and fitness of the
analogy. To the reviewer the principle appears self-attenuated in a
metaphor.
But there are other objections. Life, we recall, is not pure
plasticity ; the living organism has its own elements of rigidity. Social
life in particular has its own habits, its conventions, and the mechan-
ization of the individual's life to conform to them is not regarded as
comical, a thing to be laughed at and corrected, but rather as some-
thing required and approved. The comical person is one who, to
be sure under definite restrictions, flouts conventions, the "original,"
the eccentric, often, it must be acknowledged, appearing to exhibit
less rigidity than an effusive spontaneity and abounding energy.
The reply, of course, will be that, whatever the liveliness of his mind
or movements, his very eccentricity shows lack of plastic accom-
modation to social requirements and that his oddities carry him on
by a kind of physical momentum. Be it so; we can no doubt always
discover what we look for. But there is one thing at least which the
theory fails to explain. Why is it, namely, that when attention is
called to the rigidity encrusted on life, the mechanical in the living,
the absentminded, or whatever the phrase may be, we do not neces-
sarily find it comical? The man who is always expressing himself in
the same set phrases, the speaker always using the same wooden
LAUGHTER 357
gestures, — these are comical figures, according to Bergson, but to us
on occasion, and presumably to him also, such exhibitions and a
thousand others of different types at which we at times laugh heartily,
appear simply dull, stupid, irritating, disgusting, or it may be, pitiable,
or pathetic. Even the systematic absentmindedness of Don Quixote,
that "most comical thing imaginable," has been known, as the writer
can testify, to exert a most depressing influence. There are times
when nothing whatever seems funny to us, and then anon we are
ready to laugh at almost, anything. Why. is this ? The facts clearly
point to the coalescence of something subjective with the objective
in the constitution of the comic. What may this be? The only
subjective factor which Bergson explicitly recognizes in the major
part of his exposition is "insensibility," "absence of feeling." The
comic, he says, makes its appeal to pure intelligence; laughter has no
greater foe than emotion. Now it is true, of course, that comic
laughter is incompatible with serious emotion, but if there is anything
certain in the aesthetics of this subject it is surely this, that the comic
never appeals solely to the intelligence. On the contrary, to be
appreciated, it must either find us in, or surprise us into, the mood of
its own humor. And that humor would seem to be, whatever its
other characteristics, one of relaxation, or play. Bergson himself,
near the close of his discussion, offers us the suggestion of this solution
of our question. Speaking of the comic character he says (pp. 194 ff.),
he is one "with whom, to begin with, our mind, or rather our body,
sympathizes"; "we treat him first as a playmate"; "there is in
laughter a moment of relaxation"; "comic absurdity gives us from
the outset the impression of playing with ideas" and "our first
impulse is to join in the game." And the same, he adds, might be
said of the other forms of the laughable. Disregarding the ex-
pression, "or rather our body," inserted, apparently, to save the
face of the theory which had originally excluded "feeling," and there-
fore sympathy, we seem here to be on the right track. We begin
to see that we discover the comic not, as some theories (but not
Bergson's) have held, in mere perception of incongruity, or in the
shock of surprise, or in the glory of superiority, or in the sudden
thwarting of expectation — though these may be among its conditions
or accompaniments — but only by a kind of inner imitation in which,
momentarily at least, the serious tension of life is relaxed and we
become like children at play. Bergson, however, while suggesting
this explanation, refuses to regard it as either central or final. Nor
does he follow it up with an analysis of the conditions and interre-
358 BOOKS RECEIVED
lations of the tension and its brusque termination which we find in
laughter. All that he says on this subject is that there is always a
tendency, deep-rooted in the comic, to take the line of least resistance,
generally that of habit (p. 196). And this he judges to be a kind of
social infection. He recurs, accordingly, to the view that laughter
is before all things a social corrective whereby society avenges itself
for the liberties taken with it and seeks to counteract the "poison";
the last word is that, like the foam of the sea, it is sparkling froth
with a saline base and its after-taste bitter. This view seems to be
too seriously pedantic for universal application. Laughter does not
at least seem to be always of the nature of a social "ragging." We
not only laugh at, but with, our fellows. Bergson allows that in
enjoying a joke it is in most cases difficult to say whom we are laughing
at; would it not be truer to say that it is impossible? And if comic
laughter has a social function, as it doubtless has, and its spirit is
akin to that of play, is it not at least as plausible to find that function
in the serviceable relaxation it affords to the strain and stress of life
as in the chastisement it inflicts on lapses from its "requirements"?
H. N. GARDINER
SMITH COLLEGE
BOOKS RECEIVED DURING JULY AND AUGUST
MOSIMAN, E. Das Zungenreden, geschichtlich und psychologisch unter-
sucht. Tubingen: Mohr, 1911. Pp. xv -f 137. M. 4.50.
ROBINSON, V. An Essay on Hasheesh. New York: Medical
Review of Reviews, 1912. Pp. 83.
DEUSSEN, P. The System of the Feddnta. (Authorized translation
by C. Johnston.) Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co.,
1912. Pp. xiii -f 513.
LOEB, J. The Mechanistic Conception of Life. Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1912. Pp. 232. $1.50 net.
BINET, A. and SIMON, TH. A Method of Measuring the Develop-
ment of the Intelligence of Young Children. (Authorized transla-
tion with preface by Clara H. Town.) Lincoln, 111.: The
Courier Co., 1912. Pp. 83. $1.00.
MOLL, A. The Sexual Life of the Child. (Trans, fr. German by
Paul, E.; Intro, by Thorndike, E. L.) New York: Macmillan,
1912. Pp. xv + 338. $1.75 net.
TROMNER, E. Das Problem des Schlafs. Biologisch und psycho-
physiologisch betrachtet. Wiesbaden: Bergmann, 1912. Pp. 88.
NOTES AND NEWS 359
NOTES AND NEWS
THE first number of a new German periodical, Fortschritte der
Psychologie und ihrer Andwendungen, has just recently come to hand.
It is edited by Dr. Karl Marbe, of Wiirzburg, with the assistance of
Dr. Wilhelm Peters, and it professes to devote itself equally to the
science and to its practical applications. To quote from the intro-
ductory announcement: So wenden sich die "Fortschritte" nicht
nur an Fachpsychologen, sondern auch an alle diejenigen Praktiker
und Gelehrten, die sich von seiten der Psychologie eine Forderung
ihrer Disziplinen versprechen miissen. Bei der besonderen Bedeu-
tung der Psychologie fur die Philosophic darf die Zeitschrift wohl
auch auf eine freundliche Aufnahme in den Kreisen der Philosophen
rechnen.
PROFESSOR IRVING KING'S The Psychology of Child Development
has recently appeared in a Bohemian translation.
DOCTOR EDWIN D. STARBUCK, Professor of Philosophy in the
State University of Iowa, has been granted sabbatical leave for the
coming year, and will reside in Boston. He will act for the year as
psychologist adviser to The Beacon Press in the publication of
children's and young people's literature, and especially in the
formation of the graded Sunday School curriculum.
H. PIERON has succeeded Binet as Director of the laboratory at
the Sarbonne. The Annee psychologique will be continued under his
editorship. It will be issued this year by Simon and Larguier des
Bancels.
THE August number of the BULLETIN, dealing especially with
comparative psychology, was prepared under the editorial care of
Professor Margaret Floy Washburn.
THE following items are taken from the press:
DR. JOSEPH JASTROW, professor of psychology in the University
of Wisconsin, gave three lectures on " The Sensibilities," " The
Emotions " and " The Appraisal of Human Qualities " at the sum-
mer session of the University of California.
PROFESSOR MORTON PRINCE has retired from the active duties of
the chair of neurology in Tufts College Medical School, and becomes
professor emeritus. He is succeeded by Professor J. J. Thomas, now
assistant professor of neurology.
360 NOTES AND NEWS
MR. WILLIAM McDouGALL, F.R.S., Wilde reader in mental
philosophy at Oxford, has been elected an extraordinary fellow of
Corpus Christi College.
GEORGE R. WELLS, Ph.D. (Hopkins, '12), has been appointed
instructor in psychology at Oberlin College.
L. R. GEISSLER, Ph.D. (Cornell), has resigned his position as re-
search psychologist in the Physical Laboratory of the National Elec-
tric Lamp Association, Cleveland, to become professor of psychology
at the University of Georgia. He will organize and direct the new
psychological laboratory to be established in connection with the
School of Education.
THE board of trustees of Colgate University has created a new
office, that of vice-president of the university, and has elected Dr.
Melbourne Stuart Read to the office. Dr. Read is professor of psy-
chology and has been secretary of the university for several years.
MR. EDGAR A. DOLL has been appointed associate psychologist
in the department of research of the Vineland Training School, Vine-
land, N. J.
DR. WILHELM WUNDT, professor of philosophy in the University
of Leipzig, one of the founders of modern psychology, celebrated his
eightieth birthday on August 16, on which occasion a "Wilhelm
Wundt Stiftung," amounting to 7,000 Marks, was presented to the
university by his students and friends.
DR. GUY MONTROSE WHIPPLE, of the School of Education,
Cornell University, gave three lectures on " The Training of
Memory," " The Psychology of the Marking System " and " The
Supernormal Child" at the summer session of the University of
Illinois.
WALTER FENNO DEARBORN, Ph.D. (Columbia), recently pro-
fessor in the school of education of the University of Chicago, has
been appointed assistant professor of education at Harvard Uni-
versity.
ANNOUNCEMENT.— The business department of the Psychological
Review Company will hereafter be located at Princeton and all
business communications should be addressed to PSYCHOLOGICAL
REVIEW COMPANY, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY.
Vol. IX. No. 10. October 15, 1912
THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN
GENERAL REVIEWS AND SUMMARIES
THE RECENT LITERATURE OF MENTAL CLASSES
BY WARNER BROWN
University of California
The classification of men according to their mental traits is directed
by numerous interests. Foremost at the present time is the prac-
tical interest of which the slogan is efficiency. Miinsterberg (46)
continues to herald the opportunity of the psychologist to help in
the choosing of a vocation by establishing a proper classification of
individuals according to their talents. Differences with regard to
attention, memory, apperception, span of attention, fatiguability,
time sense, mental rhythm, correspond to the definite requirements
of different occupations. The intimate relation between this move-
ment for a practical classification of talents with a view to economy
and the broader movement for the more efficient management of all
resources is noted. Zergiebel's paper (58) is also typical of the
practical point of view. Instead of regarding the variety of indi-
vidual ability or gift as itself material for the exercise of psycho-
logical curiosity, it regards the possibility of usefully applying the
various gifts and of compensating for the deficiencies. In the case
of the elementary teacher who must teach a variety of subjects for
which he has no personal aptitude, study of his own idiosyncracies
of imagery, learning type, and type of observation, is of the first
importance. For Chambers (8) the practical recognition of indi-
vidual differences of mental make-up should entail in education
"not so much the presentation of different subject-matter to different
pupils as the affording of opportunity for individual reactions to
the same subject-matter." Jones (30) finds that there is the necessity
in democratic society of determining temperaments in order to avoid
361
362 WARNER BROWN
misfits. He considers temperament as the total manner of reacting
upon the situation, and follows Ribot in discriminating four types,
active, sensitive, apathetic, and unstable or nervous. Many men
of genius are cited who display neurotic traits or have a neurotic
family history. Huther (26) is concerned with the modern demand
that the schools fit people for performing such functions in life as
they are naturally fitted for. This ideal is not in perfect accord
with the chronic attempts of the schools to round out the character
by giving greatest attention to the child's weak points.
A somewhat different practical application of the notion of mental
classes is seen in the working out by Healy and Fernald (21) of a
set of tests, to be applied to delinquent youths, which make possible
a system of mental classification as distinguished from a system of
grading applicable to individuals of the same intellectual age. The
authors find it feasible to distinguish, aside from the subnormal cases,
three grades of native ability, three grades of formal educational
advantages, and two grades of information, with classes correspond-
ing to the combinations of these grades. De Sanctis (13) points
the way to the gap which Healy and Fernald have already so suc-
cessfully closed when he says that tests of elementary mental func-
tions, sensation, attention, memory, do not measure the general
level of intelligence. The Ebbinghaus completion method and the
Binet description of an object he approves of. His own " measur-
ing scale" is intended primarily for measuring amounts of mental
deficiency. The Binet scale he finds satisfactory for grading normal
and slightly atypical children. Bell (3) cites a number of new con-
tributions to the literature of "tests" which lie somewhat beyond
the province of the present paper.
A like interest in sorting men into round and square according
to the holes which they are to fill is to be seen in most of the work
dealing with the correlation of traits and the fundamental question
whether ability in the individual manifests itself generally or whether
it appears in streaks. The clearest statement of this thought is found
in the paper by Hart and Spearman (20). They find very strong
evidence for the existence of a "general factor" which remains a
constant through all the phases of the mental life of an individual.
They conceive of the establishment of an "intellectual index" for
all school children and eventually for the entire population. Class
distinctions in society on a purely psychological basis become a remote
possibility with the notion of a minimum intellectual index as a
qualification for voting and for the privilege of having children. The
MENTAL CLASSES 363
argument for the existence of the "general factor" is based in the
first place on a correlation of correlations covering all of the available
studies in the correlation of mental traits for the past thirty years,
the results of the work of 14 experimenters on 1,463 persons. A table
is arranged in the form of a square, showing the coefficient of correla-
tion of each trait with each other trait. Then these coefficients
are themselves correlated. For example the coefficients in which
"memory" figures are correlated with the coefficients in which
"touch" appears. If the various traits correlating more or less
closely with memory and with touch are independent of each other,
then no correlation of correlations will appear. If the various traits
belong to different "levels" or mutually exclusive "types," as is
generally held, there will be a negative correlation of correlations.
If the various traits are all related to one another on the basis of a
common factor, the correlation of correlations will be positive and
high; and this is what proves to be almost invariably true. A second
argument for the general factor is found in the working applicability
of the modern mental "tests" which do not attempt to measure
special abilities but are haphazard samplings the results of which are
pooled together into a general estimate of mental standing. Specific
abilities are not, however, lost sight of. "Every intellectual perform-
ance may be regarded as springing from two distinct factors: on
the one hand the specific ability or disposition for that particular
performance; and on the other general ability, due to the common
fund of intellectual energy." A good example of the maxim that
anything can be proved by figures is found in the original presentation
by Brown (5) of an important part of the data on which Hart and
Spearman found their contention for "general ability." Brown
finds in the very low correlations between his different tests (which
were numerous and varied and participated in by six distinct groups
of students) no indication of a general factor underlying the separate
functions measured. It is not possible to discuss here the relative
merits of the methods employed by Brown and by Spearman (20)
or the criticisms of the latter on Brown's methods. In the case of
schoolboys' ability in arithmetic, geometry and algebra, Brown (4)
also finds the correlations low except as between arithmetic and
algebra. Lobsien (39) with one class of boys between 12 and 15 years
of age finds high correlations between all the school subjects. When
the record in a formal memory test is correlated with students' grades
in separate subjects rather than their class standing Busemann (6)
finds positive results. Lobsien (38), on the other hand, finds all the
364 WARNER BROWN
correlations low between auditory or visual memory for numbers
and mental or written arithmetic. The only appreciable positive
correlation is between mental and written work. It is a curious
reflection which is cast on this work by Huther (27) who, without
any criticism on the manner or method of Lobsien's experiments,
concludes on the basis of purely abstract deductive reasoning that
there can be no connection between visual memory and mental
calculation and therefore that a slight negative correlation which
Lobsien found between these functions merely means the absence of
connection. Surely, he thinks, there are visual-concrete and audi-
tory-abstract types in calculating and these are to be regarded as
"specific differences of endowment."
The queston of special types of ability vs. general ability comes
up again under the guise of formal training, i. e., training through
general ability or through the interconnection of special abilities.
De Sanctis (13) says that experimental psychology can as yet throw
no light on the training of general intelligence. Winch (57) attains
a golden mean with the doctrine that there may be an improvement
in one faculty as the result of training another, although there may
not be any correlation between the faculties. Johnny, who has a
good rote memory, may have a very poor associative memory (lack
of correlation) but yet training of his rote memory may improve his
associative memory (formal training). Thus the ground is cut out
from under one of the chief arguments in favor of a general mental
ability through which the different faculties are connected with one
another. Elsenhans (14) sees that the so-called simple traits can
only be arrived at from the more complex traits of actual mature
experience, and that those complex traits are more than mere bundles
of simple traits. His paper is typical of the absorbing interest in
individual capacities, their origin and interrelationship, which domi-
nates the first volumes of the combination of the Zeitschrift jur
pddagogische Psychologie with the Zeitschrift fur experimented
Pddagogik.
The discussion by Stern, Ephrussi, and others of Exner's (15)
paper at the fourth Kongress fiir experimented Psychologie shows
again the growing interest in the inheritance of human characters
and the necessity of determining what a character is before we can
discuss its inheritance intelligently. Josefovici (31) maintains that
the inheritance of talents and character is possible either from both
parents to the same child or from one parent only. Sisson (51)
throws the emphasis upon innate tendencies by pleading for their
MENTAL CLASSES 365
cultivation and redirection, abandoning the hope of reforming char-
acter by the imposition of entirely new habits. Reid (47) and Walker
(52) discuss back and forth their disagreements over Pearson's logic
by which he seems to say that human qualities are bred not cultivated,
when he is only warranted in saying that they are bred and cultivated.
Feis (16) shows that most musicians have sprung from musical
families, but he fails utterly to distinguish their blood inheritance
from their social inheritance, — true inheritance from the influence of
favorable surroundings. Huther (25) attempts in a purely theoretical
way to disentangle the factors entering into "native talent" and to
discover which of these factors is capable of cultivation.
With regard to the modification of mental classifications as the
result of practice Whitley (56) concludes, after practicing different
persons upon different tests of individual capacity, that "the criticism
that practice may influence individuals each according to a law of his
own, and processes each by a law of its own, does not seem to hold so
far as the general law of improvement goes." On the other hand
Wells (54) finds that practice in the Kraepelin addition test and in a
number-checking test reveals: (i) a difference in the individuals'
fundamental plasticity in the function; (2) a difference in the actual
amount of practice experienced; (3) constitutional factors in the
nervous system independent of plasticity. Furthermore, both effi-
ciency and plasticity are specific in the test, i. e., different in the same
individual from one test to another. Wells (53) also reports that the
"type" as well as the speed of free associations is amenable to
practice.
The development of methods for the determination of mental
types occupies the attention of several workers. The report of
Angell (2) to the American Psychological Association gives a catalog
of twenty tests in current use for the determination of mental imagery
with recommendations concerning the more suitable of them and with
the warning that "types" do not follow the lines conventionally laid
down, and that it is more difficult to establish the facts regarding them
than is commonly supposed. The new methods devised by Healy
and Fernald (21) have already been mentioned. Whitley (56) has
made an experimental study of 45 tests of individual differences by
correlating the results of the several tests with one another. There is
also an historical review and general catalog of such tests. Her
exceedingly guarded conclusions leave some doubt as to the practical
value of the tests. Wharton's (55) tests of the imagery of school
children by ten widely used methods yield such contradictory data
366 WARNER BROWN
that he questions the validity of any method of determining the
image type of children. Meumann (44) presents a new method for
measuring the mental ability of children, which consists in giving two
words from which a sentence is to be constructed; e. g., "soldier —
fatherland." More or less logical sentences result. A modified form
of the Ebbinghaus completion test is also described, in which the
subject fills out the body of a story from certain key words. These
tests give both qualitative types of intelligence and gradations of
ability. Meumann distinguishes eight "types" of intelligence of
which the first four give senseless sentences. The remaining four
types are characterized as follows: the fifth by uncontrolled fantasy;
the sixth by merely logical connection without ornament; the seventh
by emotionally toned imagination; the eighth by logical connections
plus imaginative detail. Furthermore he distinguishes two main
classes of those who comprehend and stick to the task and those who
do not, independent of the typical differences of gift in feeling,
reasoning and imagination. The data from the new tests correlate
poorly with class standing. He suggests modifications of these tests
in the direction of greater explicitness in the task. A somewhat
similar method of determining the type of imagination is reported by
Fischer (18). Children are allowed to construct quasioriginal
parallels to familiar jingles like the "House that Jack built." The
retention of rhythm, sense-content, etc., gives an indication of the
child's mental type. Lipmann (36) presents a program of tests
for the use of anthropologists.
Marbe's method of immediate systematic introspection is applied
by Feuchtwanger (17) to the determination of mental types. The
type for him is determined by the frequency of the ideas belonging
to the different sense realms rather than by their vividness. The chief
experimental controls used were listening to words, letters, syllables
and sentences read out to the subject, and copying words, letters,
etc., by the subject. Stimulation of any sense did not affect the
type in such a way as to reduce the frequency of ideas belonging to
that sense. A special lookout for a rare form of image did not increase
the frequency of images of that kind. The "type" is connected with
ability to call up voluntarily images of its own kind. Feuchtwanger
also describes a new indirect method which consists in writing lists of
words (Kraepelin) for objects of a certain height or color, or containing
a certain vowel sound. In this case the subject has to think for each
word. Also, the word-type is automatically separated from the
object-type. The results of this indirect method agree perfectly
MENTAL CLASSES 367
with the classification by the direct method of the four subjects
employed.
The more fundamental methods of determining intellectual status
are enumerated by Meumann (42) as follows: (i) psychiatrical; (2)
the distinction between normal and abnormal; (3) the determining of
normal types and individual capacities; (4) determination of stand-
ards of mental ability for normal children of different ages. All tests
must be functional, not merely measures of the amount of acquisition;
and they must be as nearly tests of general intelligence as may be.
Little is said under division three, but prominence is given to methods
of correlation. Margis (41) classifies the general methods of another
basis into: (i) the method of intuitive description, including the
observation of physiognomy, hand-writing, etc., and also including
the use of anecdotes; (2) the method of classification into established
"types" of character, later development of the doctrine of tempera-
ments; (3) the teleographic method, — a description of the inner
calling of a man, his specific gift; (4) the analytic, scientific, or
psychological method, which is not a different method but a superior
way of carrying on the work of all the other methods. An account
is given of the record and program in this direction of the Institut fur
angewandte Psychologie.
More "psychographies" (Stern) and more and better questionaries
in the study of mental classes are urged by Heymans (22). He himself
has read no biographies and found a high correlation involving such
traits as mendacity, — seventy per cent, of the non-active emotional
type proving liars, while none of the non-emotional active type were
liars. He also digested the answers to questionaries covering the
family history of 2,523 persons in 458 families and found similar
correlations of traits.
Alongside of the newer practical interest in mental classes as the
basis of efficient utilization of human energy there still persists the
interest, which may be called classical, in the variety of human en-
dowment and faculty simply as an array of curious phenomena.
Purely psychological description still delights in the pageant of men's
differences in sensitivity, in imagery, in will, memory, and manner of
forming associations. Various types of school children are reported
on by Munch (45). Some individuals can be classified at once;
some only after they have had time to become adapted to new sur-
roundings. Some are naturally industrious and averse to diversions.
Some types are indicated in play-activities. Surprising extremes of
ability are found by Chambers (8) among children. No trait is
368 WARNER BROWN
distributed in a normal curve. Among students Jones (29) finds
that the learning types are so pronounced that presentation of
material in only one sense-form works a material hardship on a con-
siderable part of the class.
Some of the peculiarities of the contents of the visual space of
the imagination, particularly in mathematical thinking, are described
by Keyser (33). A census of images representing the concept "mean-
ing" was taken by Chapin and Washburn (9) in a class of college
women. Of 193 "good introspections" there were 50 per cent,
reporting visual images, 37 per cent, wholly kinesthetic, and 13 per
cent, visual and kinesthetic combined. Nearly all of the images,
particularly the kinesthetic ones, were obviously relevant to the
concept.
Typical differences in the manner of forming associations in re-
acting to a simple question are reported by Levy-Suhl (35) for the
insane under the following heads: (i) Natural reaction; (2) generally
indifferent hyperprosexia; (3) selective hyperprosexia; (4) hyper-
vigile reactions. Wells (53) provides a useful glossary of his own and
Jung's names for types of reaction in association. Dauber (12)
reports on experiments in which numerous persons react with the
same word to a given cue. In the case of nonsense syllables there
were certain typical preferences. Out of 31 persons 12 tended to
react by rhyme, 4 by alliteration, 8 J)y annexing a suffix to the cue,
2 by repetition. Huber (24) performed a similar experiment among
fresh recruits and old soldiers and came to the conclusion that a large
allowance must be made for the surroundings of the subjects and the
differences in their training.
Scott (48) finds that "suggestibility" is not a single trait. Two
different tests of suggestibility fail to correlate with each other.
With regard to attention McComas (40) finds that there are two
large types with respect to span: broad and narrow. Those persons
with a broad visual span have also a broad auditory span. There is
also an alert as opposed to a sluggish type. The ability to concen-
trate, or inhibit, or to dexterously manage the attention does not
take the form of a "type."
Lipmann (37) insists that there is not a visual type, but that
color-tone, brightness, saturation, size, position, each has a special
type of imagery. Experiments in the recognition of geometrical
forms of various sizes, variously colored, agreed closely with intro-
spections. Three hundred school girls who were tested tended to
employ the same partial visual imagery on a second trial.
MENTAL CLASSES 369
A peculiar special trait, fertility of expression, or the ability to
produce an elaborate and detailed representation of an object, is
found by Cohn and Dieffenbacher (n) to reveal itself consistently
in tests involving description, testimony, written composition and
drawing.'
Meumann (43) introduces an entirely new basis of mental classi-
fication in his combination factor. Certain persons can employ cer-
tain forms of imagery successfully alone but not in combination,
i. e., in thinking. A case is analyzed in which there is excellent visual
and excellent auditory-motor imagery and memory but great difficulty
in forming associations between the two classes of objects. A map
can be visualized and a list of names easily learned by rote but there is
difficulty in locating a name on the map.
The concept of character and types of character is considered from
the theoretical standpoint and in relation to will and feeling by Klages
(34), Ach (i), Selz (49, 50) and Kerschensteiner (32).
The musician as a special type is analyzed by Feis (16). Musical
genius shows itself precociously as either: (i) appreciation of rhythm;
(2) creative ability (in a few); (3) the ability to reproduce a piece
(tone memory). Most musicians have an abundance of other talents,
but none of the great composers had ability as a teacher; a fact which
must be consoling to many teachers of music. Musicians are indus-
trious. Although musical geniuses show many stigmata of nervous
disease Feis does not agree with Lombroso concerning the relation
between genius (in the case of musical genius) and degeneration and
epilepsy. Hinrichsen (23) thinks that no one will deny that there are
types of disposition for poets, musicians, painters and mathematicians
as well as for criminals. He analyzes the poetic disposition in the
autobiographical and anecdotal manner, concluding that the poet's
state of mind is like that of the ordinary dreamer; poetic fancy is not
allied to hallucination. The poet is not necessarily (though he is
frequently) neurotic any more than any other intellectually produc-
tive person.
Numerous facts regarding the man of science are presented by
Cattell (7), particularly with respect to his precocity and the kind of
community from which he springs and in which he is nurtured.
That sex establishes two distinct mental classes in the community
is the assupmtion upon which Glaser (19) bases a feminist plea. The
assumption is prominent in the elaborate experiments of Cohn and
DiefTenbacher (10, n), but their data and conclusions do not furnish
a very strong argument for mental differences between boys and girls
370 WARNER BROWN
when allowance is made for the relative precocity of the girls. It is
significant that when one sex excells the other in any respect the
best scholars of the inferior sex partake of the excellence of the
other sex.
Every phase of the subject of mental classes is touched upon in
Jastrow's essay (28). So much material has been so finely minced
and presented in so well digested a form that no summary can do
justice to it, but its chief tendency is to throw the emphasis upon
inheritance rather than attainment and particularly to call attention
to differences of endowment in sensibility and in creative ability.
"The closer inspection, through the analytical glasses of psychology,
of the differentiating varieties of human quality and of their func-
tional interplay, falls outside the range of this survey." The author's
endeavor is rather to cultivate a truer social appreciation of those
qualities which make their appearance among men, and particularly
of those qualities which make it possible for their unfortunate possessors
to render distinguished service to mankind. The essay epitomizes
the current attitude in psychological thought toward individual talent,
special endowment, general ability, and mental classification; but
it is an essay, it does not argue nor does it hark back to authority.
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MENTAL CLASSES 371
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FOLK-PSYCHOLOGY 373
FOLK-PSYCHOLOGY
BY DR. A. A. GOLDENWEISER
Columbia University
Folk-psychology has not yet reached the happy condition of " the
ship that found herself." Its scope, its method, are matters of
dispute, its raison d'etre even is in some quarters accepted with hesita-
tion. It would hardly be profitable to discuss here the methodological
and terminological questions involved; some of the more important
issues, however, will be incidentally touched on in the course of this
review.
ThurYiwald (12) observes that in primitive conditions there can
be no question of formal legal categories; savage law is simply savage
custom looked at from a certain point of view. It follows that we
cannot make use of our own legal abstractions in describing the legal
forms of primitive folk. He further notes that savages do not always
live up to their reputation as good observers; the people of Buin
(Bougainville, Melanesia), for instance, are unaware of the connection
between the caterpillar and the butterfly. The inhabitants of the
Gazelle Peninsula assert that children found in the bush are the fruit
of a liana. Thus we need not wonder at the ignorance of some
peoples with reference to the processes of sexual conception; an igno-
rance which' results in multiform whimsical beliefs as to the relations
between man and plants and animals. Thurnwald's remarks about
blood revenge in Melanesia are interesting. The avenger may meet
his victim in open combat or he may suddenly attack him from
ambush. Nor is it necessary for the act of vengeance to occur at once
or within a defined period. If the offender is strong and powerful,
well protected and hard to get at, vengeance may be postponed for
months and years; but sooner or later the fatal blow will fall.
Kroeber (7) points out that the still current belief that conduct
may be determined by ideas or reason is a delusion. The opposition
also to some actions, as cannibalism, incest, lack of parental or filial
devotion, "is so thoroughly instinctive that these crimes have hardly
had to be dealt with by most people, and their rarity and want of
infectiousness are recognized in the failure of creeds and codes to
provide against them." While the horror of incest, pollution, etc., is
common to all people, the ideas as to what constitutes incest or
pollution vary greatly from place to place and from time to time.
Stumpf (10) criticizes Darwin's theory of the origin of music from
374
A. A. GOLDENWEISER
song; Spencer's theory of its origin from emotional speech; Wal-
laschek's, from dancing; Biicher's, from communal labor. Music, for
Stumpf, is characterized by definitely fixed but transposable intervals.
The origin of music he finds in vocal signs at a distance. Thus
certain sounds became fixed in pitch and were sustained longer than in
ordinary speech. Later, intervals, beginning probably with the
octave, arose. Religious motives may have cooperated in the early
development of music. Stumpf gives valuable bibliographic refer-
ences and a collection of primitive songs and tunes.1
Thurnwald attempts to characterize the mental atmosphere
'(Denkart) reflected in totemism (n). He also emphasizes the social
aspect of that institution. "Der Totemismus ist eine sociologische
Theorie, die auf einer bestimmten Naturauffassung von den Existenz-
bedingungen des Menschen basiert ist." And again, "Von Tote-
mismus aber sollte man nur dann reden, wenn Anzeichen vorhanden
sind, die auf eine durch die geschilderte eigenartige Denkart beein-
flusste soziale Gestaltung schliessen lassen."
Sapir (9) draws attention to some common elements in all lan-
guages, such as a fixed phonetic system and a definite grammatical
structure. With reference to older theories of the origin of speech
he observes that "we are forced to conclude that the existence of
onomatopoetic and exclamatory features is as little correlated with
relative primitiveness as we have found the use of gesture to be."
The probable origin of phonetic changes is seen in the inexact imita-
tion by children of the pronunciation of elders. Some of the phonetic
variants thus produced are imitated by others until either the entire
language is changed phonetically or a separate dialect arises. It
seems that the time-honored characterization of languages as inflec-
tional, agglutinative, etc., must be set aside. We may speak of
derivative elements in language, elements which affect only the form
of the word, and of relational elements which, while affecting the form
of the word, also affect its relation to other parts of the sentence,
which, in consequence, also change. In this connection "it is im-
portant to note that, although the distinction between derivational
and relational grammatical elements we have made is clearly reflected
1 The value of music for folk-psychology has only recently been realized, and the
number of careful studies on the subject is exceedingly small. Professor Stumpf and
his excellent colaborrators, Abraham and von Hornbostel, are pioneers in this work.
I must here refer to his Beitrdge zur Akustik und Musikwissenschaft (6), which reached
me too late for a more detailed review. Sapir's " Song Recitative in Paiute Mythology "
(/. of Amer. Folk-lore, 1910, 23, 455-473) should also be consulted for interesting
hints as to some specific relations between primitive music and mythology.
FOLK-PSYCHOLOGY 375
in some way or other in most languages, they differ a great deal as to
what particular logical concepts are treated as respectively deriva-
tional and relational."1
Rivers (8) insists that in many instances where primitive beliefs
contain apparent contradictions, these resolve themselves into per-
fectly logical sequences if allowance is made for the fact that natural
phenomena "have been classified and arranged into categories differ-
ent from those of ourselves." A case in point is afforded by the
Melanesian concepts of life and death, which do not coincide with
our own but are expressed by the terms mate and toa, one including
with the dead the very sick and the very aged, while the other excludes
from the living those who are called mate. Rivers believes that the
states "on either side of this condition of mateness" are much less
different, to the primitive mind, than are for us the states indicated
by the terms life and death. Death to the primitive man is a form
of existence, and "the difference between the two existences is prob-
ably of much the same order to the primitive mind as two stages of
his life, say the stages before and after his initiation into manhood."2
Boas (2), in his Clark University lecture, deals with the psycho-
logical problems in the study of ethnology. On the one hand the
anthropologist seeks to reconstruct the historical development of
cultures; on the other hand he is interested in the psychological laws
underlying the thought and action of man, in different racial and
social groups. On close analysis the "composite pictures" of the
mental make-up of different races would probably reveal significant
differences. The performance of individuals belonging to a given
group may to some extent depend on hereditary individual and racial
ability, but in the main it depends on the habitual characteristics of
the social group to which the individual belongs. The main diffi-
culty with the comparative method commonly used by ethnologists
is the incomparability of the data on which the conclusions are based.
"The person, for instance, who slays an enemy in revenge for wrongs
1 It becomes increasingly apparent that the field of primitive languages will soon
prove a treasure-trove to the folk-psychologist. For quite apart from the value of
language as a mirror of culture, the classification of experience and the categories of
concepts unconsciously expressed in the grammatical structure, vocabulary, and even
phonetics, of a language, and which are now being laid bare by the student, promise
to reveal to us the sanctum of mental life, the laboratory of thought itself. I commend
to the attention of psychologists the Handbook of American Indian Languages (Bulletin
40 of the Bureau of Ethnology).
1 Levy-Bruhl has reached much the same conclusion in his Les Fonctions Mentales
des Societes Inferieures. See the present writer's remarks on Rivers and Levy-Bruhl
in Current Anthropological Literature, 1912.
376 A. A. GOLDENWEISER
done, a youth who kills his father before he gets decrepit in order to
enable him to continue a vigorous life in the world to come, a father
who kills his child as a sacrifice for the welfare of his people, act from
such entirely different motives that psychologically a comparison of
their activities does not seem permissible." Thus two phenomena
are culturally similar, not when they reveal objective^ resemblances,
but when the underlying psychological processes are similar.1
The classification of experience underlying the thought of differ-
ent groups of men is thoroughly different. This classification of
experience is not due to any ratiocinative process but occurs uncon-
sciously. The best example of classifications which do not rise into
consciousness is offered by the grammatical categories of languages;
but it is no less plausible that some of the fundamental concepts
of religion as well as of other cultural phenomena, have arisen in the
same unconscious way; with the difference that in the latter instances
the fundamental concepts, and in part the underlying classifications,
tend to rise into consciousness. The subsequent conscious elabora-
tion of the concept leads to secondary explanations, the study of
which constitutes a highly important branch of ethnology.
Woodworth (14) examines the same facts from a somewhat differ-
ent angle. He warns against the hasty assumption of specialized
mental traits in different groups. "The circumstances surrounding
a group call for certain special abilities and bring to the fore indi-
viduals possessing these abilities, leaving in comparative obscurity
those gifted in other directions." Woodworth dismisses with little
ceremony the oft made assertions that savages are deficient in rea-
soning powers, that they are incapable of abstraction, of foresight.
The difference in these respects between the savage and civilized is
only one of degree. The author proceeds to analyze the results of
investigations on the senses of savages conducted by Rivers, Mc-
Dougall and Myers, among the islanders of Torres Straits, and of
his own experiments with several primitive groups at the St. Louis
Fair in 1904. In the light of these data the sense superiority of the
savage is as much of an illusion as his mental inferiority seems to be.
Woodworth thus reaches the conclusion that the progress made by a
group cannot be conceived as determined solely by its intellectual
endowment. "The spur of necessity, the opportunities afforded by
leisure, the existing stock of knowledge and inventions, and the
factor of apparent accident or luck have all to be considered."
1 Boas has emphasized this point of view in several previous publications as well
as in his recent The Mind of Primitive Man. (See special review on p. 404.)
FOLK-PSYCHOLOGY 3 77
Graebner (5) lays down the principles of the science of ethnology
and the method of ethnological inquiry. We are particularly con-
cerned with pp. 62-124 of his work. He starts out with the proposi-
tion that two cultural phenomena possess the greatest mutual inter-
pretative value if they belong to the same cultural complex. If then
we want to interpret culture we must reconstruct the cultural com-
plexes that have developed, spread and fused in the course of the
historic process. This is the main aim of ethnology. The geo-
graphical separation of cultural areas complicates our investigations,
but it should not in principle affect our attitude towards cultural
similarities. As independent development of similarities in culture
is rare and convergent, evolution is to a large extent an imaginary
process; such cultural similarities, however distant geographically,
must be interpreted as due to historic contact, and, in the last analy-
sis, to genetic relationship. The actually existing cultures which
confront the ethnologist are valuable to Graebner only in so far as
they constitute the points of departure for his cultural reconstruc-
tions. Needless to say, all intensive analysis of the interplay of
psychic forces in any given cultural area does not, for Graebner,
fall within the scope of the ethnologist's task. There is no more
room for the soul in Graebner's system than there was for God in the
universe of Laplace.1
We must pass by without comment Ankermann (i) who is a
more cautious representative of the "historical" school of ethnology,
and Foy (4) whose position is even more extreme than that of
Graebner.
Boas (3) characterizes Graebner's system as "mechanical."
He sees safe progress in "the patient unravelling of the mental proc-
esses that may be observed among primitive and civilized peoples,
and that express the actual conditions under which cultural forms
develop. When we begin to know these we shall also be able to pro-
ceed gradually to more difficult problems of the cultural relations
between isolated areas that exhibit peculiar similarities." The
1 The full significance of Graebner's methods as well as their bearings on the
problems of folk-psychology cannot be fully appreciated without acquaintance with his
concrete investigations. See particularly his "Die Melanesische Bogenkultur"
(Anthropos, 1909), "Die Wanderungen socialer Systeme in Australien" (Globus, 1906),
and "Die socialen Systeme der Siidsee" (Zsch. f. Socialwissensch., 1908). Also
Graebner's and Foy's discussion with Haberlandt in Petermann's Mitteilungen, March
and May, 1911. Dixon meets Graebner on his own ground in "The Independence of
the Culture of the American Indian" (Science, 1912, 35, No. 889). Lowie defends
the principle of convergence against Graebner's challenge of its non-existence (/. of
Amer. Folk-lore, 1912).
A. A. GOLDENWEISER
significance of cultural phenomena lies in their psychological setting.
Against Graebner, Boas maintains "that certain types of changes
due to internal forces have been observed everywhere."
Wundt (15) once more formulates his conception of folk-psy-
chology. Although it is true that no psychic process may occur
outside an individual consciousness, many processes in the individual
mind cannot be properly understood when abstracted from their
social context. The metaphysical concept of a soul and the fiction
of "laws" must be set aside. The soul is naught but the sum total
of psychic experience; the psychic laws are the regularities of that
experience. If so much is granted, the ethnic soul (Volksseele)
becomes as proper a field for psychological investigation as is the
individual soul. Particular developmental processes become the
subject-matter of folk-psychology only in so far as they contain
common elements based on the psychic unity of man, a condition
represented by remote social origins. In later stages, as outer
and inner social forces increase in particularity, number and variety,
the common fundamental psychic motives become obscured and
are carried off with the flood of historic conditions. Thus folk-
psychology and individual psychology constitute the foundation of
history, not vice versa. Individual psychology furnishes the clue
for the solution of folk-psychological problems; folk-psychology,
on the other hand, itself supplies valuable material for individual
psychology. Thus linguistic phenomena throw light on the proc-
esses of thinking; mythology, on the workings of imagination;
custom, on the nature of will.
A number of German psychologists and ethnologists contribute a
set of suggestions for the psychological study of primitive peoples.
Thurnwald (13) joins Levy-Bruhl in advocating the necessity of a psy-
chological characterization of ethnic groups.1
Hayes (6), in a series of articles, champions the psychological
view of society. He analyzes the views of Tarde, Spencer, de Greef,
Fairbanks, Ross, Giddings. "Society," he defines, "is in essence
the interrelated activities of men," and activities are psychic facts,
while the connotations of the term "interrelated" are, in this con-
nection, also psychic. Wundt's view as to the relation of individual
to social psychology is endorsed. "Individual" psychology is really
"general" psychology, for it deals with what is universal in man.
"It is sociology that investigates the building up of the content of
consciousness which differs at different times and places, the indi-
1 See special review on p. 400.
FOLK-PS YCHOLOG Y 379
vidual's share in which constitutes his individual life, a life composed
of activities which have been socially evolved and which by each
individual are socially derived. The individual is a concrete, com-
plex, unanalyzed sample of the social reality." In criticizing Gid-
dings, Hayes repudiates the time-honored view of society "as a
population of human organisms, under political control, inhabiting
a given territory." i
The narrow limits of this review prevent me from treating this
problem of the objective versus the psychic method of studying
man and society with the care it deserves. I believe that ethnologists
as well as sociologists are divided over the question. We see a some-
what striking example of convergence in thinking in that the psy-
chologist and the professional philosopher also find themselves facing
a similar situation. I refer to such works as .Thorndike's Animal
Intelligence (1911), particularly the last two chapters; the introductory
chapters of Pillsbury's The Essentials of Psychology; the whole of
McDougall's Introduction to Social Psychology; as well as the dis-
cussions at the recent meeting of the American Philosophical Asso-
ciation, in Cambridge. The situation is fascinating and somewhat
ominous. Need we fear that the word Geisteszuissenschaften will
reveal itself as a contradiction in terms?
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Arch.}. Anthropologie^ 1911, io4).
2. BOAS F. Psychological Problems in Anthropology. Amer. J. of PsychoL, 1910,
21, 371-384-
3. BOAS, F. Review of Graebner's "Methode der Ethnologie." Science, 1911, 34,
804-810.
4. FOY, W. Fiihrer durch das Rautenstrauch-Joest Museum. Coin, 1910.
5. GRAEBNER, F. Methode der Ethnologie. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1911.
6. HAYES, E. C. The Classification of Social Phenomena. Amer. J. of SocioL,
1911, 17,90-118; 188-205; 375-399-
7. KROEBER, A. L. The Morals of Uncivilized Peoples. Amer. Anthropologist,
July-September, 1910.
8. RIVERS, W. H. R. The Primitive Conception of Death. The Hibbert /., 1912, io,
No. 2.
1 The inclusion of an article on sociology in a review of folk-psychology may
arouse criticism. I venture to submit, however, that sociology stands in the same
relation to historic society in which folk-psychology stands to prehistoric society. The
discussion of the scope and method of sociology by a number of German, English,
and American students (Amer. J. of Social., 1910) will be found suggestive in this
connection.
380 FRANK G. BRUNER
9. SAPIR, E. The History and Varieties of Human Speech. Pop. Sci. Mo., 1911,
79,
10. STUMPF, C. Die Anfdnge der Musik. Leipzig, 1910.
li! THURNWALD, R. Die Denkart als Wurzel des Totemismus. Korrespondenzblatt
der deutschen Gesellschaft f. Anthropologie, Ethnologie u. Urgeschichte, 1911, 42
(in Arch.}. Anthropol, 1911, io4).
12. THURNWALD, R. Ermittelungen iiber Eingeborenenrechte der Siidsee. Zsch. f.
vergl. Rechtswissensch., 1910, 23, 309-364.
13. THURNWALD, R. Probleme der ethno-psychologischen Forschung. Beihefte zur
Zsch. f. angewandte Psychol. u. psychol. Sammelforsch., 5, 1-27.
14. WOODWORTH, R. S. Racial Differences in Mental Traits. Science, 1910, 31,
171-186.
15. WUNDT, W. Probleme der Fdlkerpsychologie. Leipzig: Ernst Wiegandt, 1911.
THE PRIMITIVE RACES IN AMERICA
BY DR. FRANK G. BRUNER
Department of Child Study, Board of Education, Chicago
The literature relating, specifically, to the psychology of the
primitive races in America, during the past two or three years, is
exceedingly meager, and indeed in most cases its psychological
bearing is rather indirect.
In Part I. of the Handbook of the American Indian Languages (i)
an attempt is made to bring together material bearing on the mor-
phology and phonetics of the American languages with a view, ulti-
mately, of organizing an analytical grammar. When more material
has been collected in subsequent volumes, an attempt will be made
to get hold of the phonetic processes involved in these languages,
so as to discover the psychological foundations of their structure.
Boas, in the introduction of eighty-three pages, traces the sig-
nificant social and psychological influences which have been factors
in modifying phonal, articulatory and language complexes. His
study brings out the fact that there is little correlation between lan-
guage, material culture, and anatomical structure when these three
elements are employed, respectively,- to determine ethnic relation-
ship between groups of people. A difference in physical type, and
customs, is noted when the language is common; or one finds the
anatomical type the same, but the language and the social customs
at wide variance, and so on. This makes it fairly certain that sets
of influences may act now in one direction and now in another. Boas's
conclusion is that the biological unit is safest as being the most in-
clusive and permanent, since, obviously, anatomical structure reacts
THE PRIMITIVE RACES IN AMERICA 3Sl
more slowly to changes than do either social customs or linguistic
forms.
Considerable discussion is given to the inherent nature of language
forms, and attention is called to the very limited number of the
possible phonetic elements that are actually employed in human
speech. Boas holds that the influence which determines the particu-
lar group of phonetic elements that are used in a given language
is their facility in articulation, since, all unconsciously, those phonetic
elements are selected which make for the most rapid communication.
All languages have a few phonetic elements in common, but each has
some that are peculiar to itself. One tends to interpret the elements
of a strange speech in terms of those phonetic elements with which
he is familiar, and thus there arises always an error in placing cor-
rectly unfamiliar language forms. In this way one accounts for a
fallacy that has frequently arisen, to the effect that primitive peoples
are unable to differentiate phonetic elements. Different observers
attribute to a group different forms of pronunciation, because of a
personal error of observation. Boas finds no correlation between
similarity in psychological traits of two peoples and their language
structure, so that the morphological structure of a language is little
related to the mental development of a people.
In the Handbook are presented also detailed language studies of
the Athabascans, by Goddard; the Flenguit and Haida, by Swanton;
the Tsimshian, Kwakuitl, and Chinook, by Boas; the Maida, by
Dixon; the Algonquian, by Jones; the Siouan, by Boas and Swanton;
and the Eskimo, by Thalbitzer. Thus there is made available some
carefully prepared material for an exhaustive comparative Indian
language study.
Bushnell (2) gives the results of an exhaustive study of twelve
Choctaws, the remnants of a numerous people once living in the
Bayou Lacomb region of Louisiana. A few artifacts were unearthed,
which belonged to the prehistoric inhabitants. They indicate a
relatively low state of culture, and indeed the present inhabitants irf
point of fundamental habits and customs have probably undergone
but little change as the result of their associations with Whites for
five or six generations. Their habitations are still crude, improvised
shelters; their food habits primitive; their implements and forms of
adornment simple and barbaric; nor do their forefathers seem to
have given much attention to the spiritual or matters of spirit worship.
Many of the original customs and beliefs still persist, such as the
form of tribe and family organization, the institution of marriage,
382 FRANK G. BRUNER
customs associated with death and burial, the form of punishment
for criminal offences. Bushnell found them still using their old
games and pastimes, and there has persisted a firm belief in their
historic myths (3) and superstitions. These relate to an account
of the creation, the presence of sickness and evil, the origin of evil
spirits, and many other myths having to do with the ordinary affairs
of life. Suggestive of the simplicity and childlike character of their
mental machinery, is the direct, uncritical and purely objective
character of their explanations, which is in marked contrast with the
symbolism of some of their neighbors and that of the northern
Indians. The influence of their environment is directly apparent.
The dense forests and swamps are regarded as the haunts of mys-
terious beings to whom they attribute all manner of personal injuries
and unusual natural phenomena. Some of these beings are visible
to the eye, the presence of others can be detected only by their sounds.
Eastman (5), himself an Indian, purports to give an analytical
interpretation of the Indian mind, his religious nature, his concept
of ceremonial and symbolic worship, his moral code and moral sense,
and the subtle, spiritual, and ideal elements of his being. One is
tempted to question, however, whether Eastman's Indian is not,
like Hiawatha, more mythical than real; whether, indeed, he has not
given us an aesthetic, highly ethical, and deeply spiritual, interpreta-
tion of a set of habits and customs, which was wholly foreign to the
primitive Indian mind. Eastman tells us that rightly interpreted
the Indian was a mystic, that he was always thinking of the deeper
meaning of things, that to the Indian there was a spiritual and a
physical mind, and that to the latter were relegated ceremonials,
charms, incantations; affairs which had to do with personal safety,
sickness, food, and other selfish interests. The spiritual mind deals
only with the essence of things, and concerning the spiritual the
Indian never spoke. Obviously then spiritual matters were wholly
intuitive, and since he never related his thoughts concerning these
matters, one could truly know only by inference whether the Indian
felt them.
Eastman is writing doubtless of the Dakotas, since he pretends
to speak from his own early experiences. These Indians believed
they possessed a soul in common with animals, plants, and inanimate
objects. They held to a future state but did not concern themselves
as to its nature. We are told, they were logical thinkers on matters
within their experience; that they were individualistic in such things
as religion and war; and that they were fearless, death having no
THE PRIMITIVE RACES IN AMERICA 383
dread, since life had value simply in the interest of family and friends,
and when these interests demanded, one sacrificed his life gladly.
The Indian was said to be courageous, as a matter of course, yielding
neither to fear, danger, desire, or agony, it being disgraceful, only,
to be killed in a private quarrel.
The one paramount mystic ceremony that the Sioux observed was
the vapor bath, which was performed with great solemnity, and is
said to have influenced the spiritual life of the partaker very pro-
foundly.
Eastman's book is interesting reading. He has taken the pre-
caution to say it does not pretend to be scientific, and indeed, it is of
doubtful value as a contribution to our knowledge of the Indian mind.
Grinnell (7) has collected some legends relative to two sacred
objects, and the mystic ceremonies connected with them, which the
Cheyenne say have always belonged to their tribe, — the medicine
arrows, and the sacred Buffalo Hat. With both these objects are
associated also mystic culture heroes. The origin and purpose of the
objects have to do with the warding off of danger, and the provision
of food. In olden times, during a great famine, when the tribes were
about to be stricken off, corn, buffalo and other game were brought
by the mystic appearance of a strange old man and woman, who,
however, remained with the tribe only a very short while, when they
abruptly disappeared. Before leaving, they enjoined the tribe to
certain observances, on penalty of a return of the famine should they
lapse. Notwithstanding, through some oversight, the observances
were not strictly kept and the threatened famine immediately followed.
While away in search of food the Buffalo Hat was found and was
brought into camp. Immediately it cast a spell which caused the
buffalo and game to return, and the corn to grow. The origin of the
medicine arrows is equally mystic. It is said that the hero who
found the medicine arrows possessed rare spiritual powers. He could,
for example, change his form to that of an eagle, a fox, a cloud, or
simply vanish into vapor, and when fancy pleased return to his
human form.
The Buffalo Hat and the medicine arrows have been cherished
possessions of these tribes for generations. They afford spiritual
protection; are talismans given them, they believe, by the spirits to
help their people to health and plenty in time of peace, and in war
to give them victory over their enemies. So long as proper reverence
is given these relics, and the ceremonies associated with them are
religiously observed, these protective gifts are helpful, but failure in
384 FRANK G. BRUNER
these matters has invariably led to misfortune, famine, and defeat
by their enemies.
The Buffalo Hat typifies subsistence, the medicine arrows defence.
The latter were medicine for men alone, the women might look upon
them; the former was largely medicine for women. Grinnell (8)
gives a detailed account of the ceremonies related to each of these
objects, and the story of the capture of the arrows by the Pawnee in
one of their wars. Here among a primitive race we thus find a form
of symbolism which indicates considerable power of mental abstrac-
tion.
Swanton (ii) reports, at length, on the Indians of the south
central states. Unfortunately, most of his data are from secondhand
sources, so obviously their value is correspondingly less. They are
largely a collation of the reports of travellers and traders who visited
this region in the early days.
In material culture the tribes, judging from these reports, were
not far advanced, but there had developed among them a very
strongly centralized form of social organization, and a fairly well
organized mode of religious worship. The government consisted in a
despotic control exercised by a centralized authority, known as the
great chief, who ruled over the eight, or ten subsidiary chiefs of
surrounding villages, and each such group formed an independent
social unit. Now, in the central village of each group, there stood a
temple for the worship of the great spirit, and within each temple an
altar fire was kept constantly burning, a functionary being set apart
whose exclusive business it was to keep the fire kindled and to see to
it that it should never become extinguished. It is said that some of
the villages did not have true temples, nevertheless the temple form
of worship was a characteristic of the southern Indians. The temples
were dedicated to the sun, and associated with worship in them was an
elaborate ceremonial. Four or five days of fasting, at the least, and
the use of emetics till the blood issued, was a necessary form of
preparation; and a contrite submission and silent contemplation was
the assumed attitude of the worshiper. To the temple the father
always carried his first fruits. One passing the edifice, bearing a
burden, must put it down and go through a form of exhortation to
appease the spirit that dwelt within. Legend has it that the building
of temples was commanded by a man and his wife who visited the
people from the sun, and thus it is that all temples were dedicated to
the sun spirit.
Belief in a kind of spiritism was universal with these people.
THE PRIMITIVE RACES IN AMERICA 385
They peopled the universe with spirits, and the spirits formed a sort
of hierarchy, with the sun at the head all-powerful and supreme.
So far as is known, however, there was no belief in anything akin to
a distinctly evil spirit.
With a social organization as complex as obtained among these
Indians, it is not surprising to find evidences of a caste system. Social
levels existed, based on an hierarchy of totemic clans. Property and
individual rights were, however, generally respected. A medical
function was also recognized, which, although not altogether free from
magic, was far more highly specialized than among the Northern
Indians. Polygamy extended to as many wives as a man could
support. Wives were not held absolutely to faithfulness to their
husbands and chastity among unmarried girls was said to be prac-
tically non-existent.
Freire-Marreco (6) has found evidences from a close study of
the Mohave-Apache, of the Verde River, Arizona, which she believes
controverts some teachings of many English anthropologists, to the
effect that it is a fundamental characteristic of primitive mind to be
mobbish. She discovered rather a loose, individualistic mode of
life among these peoples, and this she throws into contrast with the
strongly centralized and coherent social organization of some related
tribes, the Pueblo of the Upper Rio Grande, New Mexico. Freire-
Marreco is convinced that the determining factor in fixing the char-
acter of the social organization of a primitive people is not a natural
mental bent, but rather the nature of the physical environment that
encompasses them. Whether the obtaining of food, for example, is
dependent on cooperative endeavor or the individual initiative of
the members of the group; or whether, possibly, the nature of the
environment is such as to compel or preclude cooperative effort, she
holds, carries more weight in determining the mode of life of a people
than their inherent mental make-up.
The Mohave-Apache are not so advanced in material culture as
the Pueblo. They live in small camps, scattered here and there,
two hundred, frequently, being spread out over an area of seven
miles square. They have their subsistence by hunting and gathering
wild fruit, and according to the Pueblo their manner of life is more
like that of brutes than humans. In contrast the Pueblo are con-
gregated into compact villages, two hundred being crowded together
upon an acre of ground. They are agriculturists and carry on quite
an extensive scheme of cooperative irrigation. A Pueblo spends his
entire life in close proximity to the village of his birth, while the
386 FRANK G. BRUNER
Mohave-Apache wanders away hundreds of miles, as the presence or
absence of food tempts him to move on. A corresponding difference
is noted in the manner of internal organization. While the Mohave-
Apache have no centralized form of control or machinery for coordi-
nate effort, except a war chief who is without function save in war,
the Pueblo village has a chief and council that exercise rather definite
legislative and judicial control. Freire-Marreco takes as an illustra-
tion of the differences in practice of these forms of organization the
annual spring festival dance, a ceremony of petition to the great
spirit for a return of the vernal rains. Among the Mohave-Apache
any one may start the dance and give it any direction that the impulse
of the moment may dictate. The interest grows from day to day
and other individuals and tribes join in from time to time, as they
become possessed with the desire. With the Pueblo, on the other
hand, it is radically different. This feast is definitely planned in
advance, and the plans are submitted to the council for ratification.
Not only is its character predetermined, but the date of its commence-
ment and every detail of its procedure are thoroughly prearranged.
Here then are two forms of social organization strikingly different
and it is held that the determining influence which has shaped them,
respectively, is simply a matter of difference in general social mor-
phology.
A form of social organization quite as loose as that of the Mohave-
Apache obtained among the Eastern Cree and Northern Saulteau,
reported by Skinner (10). Among these tribes each family formed a
distinct social unit, which partook of the patriarchal character; the
sole bond of cooperative unity appearing to lie in the family totem.
Frequent changes in the location of camps, because of food scarcity,
precluded the possibility of anything like a permanent village com-
munity. The families were ordinarily widely scattered, often as
many as twenty miles intervening between any two, and under such
circumstances, it is clear, even a rough cooperative system would
necessarily break down.
Skinner offers extensive data regarding these tribes, their habits,
material culture, and family and social customs. Polygamy formerly
was common, and when a man married an older sister he usually
took the younger ones also as they became old enough. Social
purity among the unmarried was not held as a virtue, nor was fidelity
of wife to husband considered a social necessity.
Animism and spiritism were highly developed, and there existed
something in the nature of a spirit worship. At the proper age the
THE PRIMITIVE RACES IN AMERICA 387
young man would repair to a place of seclusion in the forest, where,
with fasting, and prayer to the great spirit, he awaited his vision, in
which his future should be revealed to him, with its possibilities and
limitations; and no one pretended to extend his activities beyond
what his vision had vouchsafed. Conjury was practiced in the hunt,
in love-making, in war, and to avenge a personal wrong. If one
wished to harm an enemy, the spirit left its body, which then would
be stretched out lifeless, whence it departed to injure or kill, by magic,
whom it would. Animals, too, were believed to possess spirits as well
as men, and their favor, it was thought, must be obtained if that
species were to be taken by the hunter. Indeed, direct communica-
tion with the animal world was carried on by especially gifted indi-
viduals. To the bear, in particular, was attributed highly human
powers, in that he was believed to understand any conversation that
he might overhear. It is thus apparent that a very close kinship was
felt with the animal creation.
There was some medical knowledge, but the physician must be
one who was also highly skilled in magic. Idiots were believed to be
possessed of evil spirits, so usually they were killed by burning at the
stake, but no attention or treatment was accorded the insane.
On the Negro, only two scientific studies have been reported.
Odum (9), in the one, has attempted to cover the entire field of the
Negro's mental and social life, but, unfortunately, his data are only
from observations and certain general interrogations. The present
pressing need is for information regarding the Negro mind secured
under carefully controlled conditions. Odum, however, reports to
have experienced great difficulty in securing accurate data, for the
reason that the Negro is naturally untrustworthy and secretive. It
was seldom possible, he tells us, to get from an individual correct
information regarding any important details. The negro is skillful in
inventing plausible stories, and expanding upon minute details having
no foundation in fact. To obtain acceptable data, it was necessary
to make repeated inquiries from various sources and to check up
results constantly. This fact, of course, is interestingly suggestive
of the nature of the Negro's mental machinery.
Odum sums up the mental qualities of the Negro as: lacking in
filial affection; with strong migratory instincts and tendencies; little
sense of veneration, integrity or honor; shiftless, indolent, untidy,
improvident, extravagant, lazy, untruthful, lacking in persistence
and initiative, and unwilling to work continuously at details. Indeed,
experience with the Negro in class rooms indicates that it is impossible
388 FRANK G. BRUNER
to get the child to do anything with continued accuracy, and similarly
in industrial pursuits, the Negro shows a woeful lack of power of
sustained activity and constructive conduct. Fear, sickness, and
even stupidity are being constantly feigned to escape an unpleasant
task. His mind works mechanically. He is fond of joining together
euphonious words and phrases, with little regard to their meaning.
The Negro is said to love excitement. He is restless, bumptious,
and sensuous. He will never work except when necessity compels.
He has always been the subject of petty thieving, and Negroes often
commit, unfeelingly, savage and ferocious crimes. His emotions are
for the most part of the physiological type, with little objective
control. Social purity, we are told, is unusual among girls who
have reached adolescence, and infidelity among married women is
not uncommon. Negroes possess little power to inhibit sensual
feelings of any kind. They are gluttonous and drink liquors to excess.
Anger of the epileptical, gesticulating, maniacal sort is easily excited,
and a paralysis of fear sets in at the approach of death, at the presence
of certain animals under peculiar conditions, and at unusual celestial
occurrences; and an inherent terror of officers of the law is said to
cause constant migrations.
Negroes are gregarious, but the social instincts of friendship,
loyalty and emulation are little apparent. Other social instincts,
however, they possess in a striking degree. They are proud, jealous,
stubborn, assertive, covetous, egoistic. They are likewise reckless,
assertive, impulsive, demonstrative, over-religious, fabalistic, and
superstitious. Their crimes, Odum holds, are largely the expression
of the animal instincts, which have been left to work themselves out
unrestrained. On the other hand the Negro is imitative, adaptive
and his protective instincts are strongly developed. While very
primitive, therefore, in the majority of his traits, he possesses the
possibilities of development under proper conditions of control.
The Negro child is characterized as psychophysical. He loves
to sing, but cares little for instrumental music other than the banjo.
He is fond of dancing and all types of motor activity of the grosser
sort. He has a good memory, both auditory and visual, and up to
the age of eleven or twelve his mind is bright and clear. In school
the young child is alert, eager, attentive and interested, indeed, seems
brighter than the white child of corresponding years, but with the
oncoming of adolescence mental growth suffers arrest; the child be-
comes dull and stupid, and further development appears to be
confined to the physical.
THE PRIMITIVE RACES IN AMERICA 389
Odum speaks of Negroes as rather insensitive to pain. They
go through surgical operations with relatively few fatalities and they
convalesce rapidly. Negroes are immune to malaria, and yellow
fever. Fibroid tumors among them are rare, and the sequellae of
syphilis and gonorrhea are much less pronounced than among whites.
In connection with this relative immunity from disease, the report
of Da Rocha's (4) 285 hospital cases of Negroes in an institution for
the insane is interesting. He tells us that general paralysis, one of
the sequellse of syphilis, is extremely uncommon in the Negro race,
in spite of the fact that a large proportion of both men and women
have been afflicted with gonorrhea and syphilis at least once during
their lives. Fixed delusions are rare, and epilepsy occurs very much
less frequently than among whites. Senile dementia is found in about
the same proportion, but Negroes are subject to the periodic insanities
in greater frequency. It is interesting that among the Negro insane
the women outnumber the men, whereas with whites just the reverse
obtains. Da Rocha attributes this to the relatively greater stress
of civilization which falls upon the Negro woman, rather than upon
the man as in the dominant race, since upon her falls the burdern of the
family support. Negro women, also, were found to be more addicted
to drunkenness than the men. Women are thus more exposed to the
exigencies of social life; they succumb in larger numbers to its tempta-
tions, and break mentally more frequently than do the men.
REFERENCES
1. BOAS, FRANZ. Handbook of American Indian Languages. (Smithsonian Instit.
Bureau of Amer. Ethnol. Bull. 40.) Washington: Gov. Printing Office, 1911.
Pp. vi+io6"9.
2. BUSHNELL, DAVID J. JR. The Choctozv of Bayou Lacomb. (Smithsonian Instit.
Bureau of Amer. Ethnol. Bull. 48.) Washington: Gov. Printing Office, 1909.
Pp. 37-
3. BUSHNELL, DAVID J. JR. Myths of the Louisiana Choctow. Amer. AnthropoL,
1910, 12, 526-535.
4. DA ROCHA, F. Contribution a 1'etude da la folie dans la race noire. Ann. med.-
psychol., 1911, 14, 337-382.
5. EASTMAN, C. A. The Soul of the Indian. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911.
Pp. xiii-f-171.
6. FREIRE-MARRECO, BARBARA. Two American Indian Dances. Sociol. Rev., 1911,
4, 324-337-
7. GRINNELL, G. B. Some Early Cheyenne Tales. Folk-lore, 1907, 20, 169-194;
1908, 21, 3-54.
8. GRINNELL, G. B. The Great Mysteries of the Cheyenne. Amer. Anthropol.,
1910, 12, 542-575-
9. ODUM, H. W. Mental and Social Traits of the Negro. New York: Columbia
Uni. Contrib. to Econom., 1910. Pp. 300.
390 /. E. WALLACE WALLIN
10. SKINNER, ALANSON. The Eastern Cree and the Northern Saulteau. New York:
Anthropol. Papers. Amer. Museum Nat. Hist., 1911, 9 (Pt. I.). Pp. 177.
11. SWANTON, J. R. Indian Tribes of the Lower Mississippi. (Smithsonian Instit.
Bureau of Amer. Ethnol. Bull. 51.) Washington: Gov. Printing Office, 1911.
Pp. 387.
INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP EFFICIENCY
BY J. E. WALLACE WALLIN
School of Education, University of Pittsburgh
In the following pages it is my purpose to review briefly the
efficiency literature which has appeared during the last two years,
and which admits of summary under the following heads.
I. The Conservation and Increase of Vocational (Industrial-Commer-
cial) Efficiency, by means of scientific shop or business management.
In two lucidly written and aptly illustrated volumes, Emerson has
presented the ablest exposition extant of the philosophy of efficient
industrial management (9), together with a codification of the prac-
tical scientific principles involved (10). He recognizes that efficient
shop management — which depends on the establishment of scientific
analytical motion and times studies, of time equivalents for every
operation or task, and the adoption of a standard service or labor
equivalent for a given wage — cannot be instituted without a staff of
consulting experts, consisting not merely of efficiency engineers and
wage specialists, but also of "character analysts," psychologists,
hygienists, physiologists, bacteriologists and economists. While
absolute standards for chemical, physical and electrical processes can
readily be set and enforced, human beings must be rated, classified
and treated as sentient, moral beings. Properly to administer men
on efficiency principles requires the expert services of the psychologist,
physiologist, physician and humanitarian. Indeed Emerson avers
that, so far from being a purely engineering problem, the highest staff
standards are psychological. "It is psychology, not soil or climate,
that enables a man to raise five times as many potatoes per acre as the
average of his own state" (9, p. 107). Moreover, the science of
industrial efficiency is an idealistic philosophy, and not merely a cold,
brutal, calculating scheme for oppressing labor — a fact which has
been emphasized by Brandeis (3), who argues that there is no inherent
incompatibility between the claims of scientific management and the
rights of organized labor. Scientific management means the "square
deal" for the wage-worker; shorter hours, without "speeding up";
INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP EFFICIENCY 39 l
more regular employment and greater security of tenure; propor-
tionately higher financial returns; instruction for the inefficient; and
a heightened feeling of self-respect and interest in the work.
That the problem is in part both psychological and pedagogical
is likewise emphasized by Gantt (the author of the "bonus system" of
compensation, which provides extra pay for work satisfactorily done
in a specified time: piece work for the skilled and day work for the
unskilled). He (n) recognizes the need of a factory pedagogue, who
must be a keen analyst as well as an efficient teacher. His duties will
consist in instructing the workmen, in training them to form efficient
vocational habits, and to acquire habits of industry and willing
cooperation. The policy of the past was to drive or force the wage
worker: in the future it must be to teach and lead. The whip must
be replaced by stimuli derived from skilled instruction, merited
promotion, and a deserved bonus.
That the new science of industrial efficiency cannot justify itself
solely by its economic fruits, but must also be judged by its ultimate
physiological and social effects upon the workers, is emphasized by
Goldmark (120), in an able and comprehensive digest of the literature
bearing on "Fatigue and Efficiency" in industry. (The best psycho-
logical researches, unfortunately, receive no mention in this volumi-
nous compilation). Owing to the strong tendency to exploit the
workers which will exist under any kind of management, the interests
of racial efficiency need to be protected by adequate labor legislation.
Such legislation must, in the first instance, be based on scientific
studies of fatigue. Scientific shop management will have to conform
to the physiological laws (and psychological, forsooth) underlying
the industrial life.
The psychological and pedagogical principles which may be
utilized to increase business efficiency receive their most explicit
formulation by the psychologist. Scott (19) considers that human
efficiency is not solely dependent on inherent capacity, but on a
number of mental factors which it is possible intelligently to utilize
by becoming familiar with the principles of business and educational
psychology. Scott discusses a number of psychological principles
which can be practically applied to increase business efficiency, such
as imitation, competition, loyalty, concentration, wages, pleasure,
habit-formation and relaxation.1
2. The Conservation and Increase of the Efficiency of Eminent
Talent, by the scientific, impersonal, objective study and control of
1 See special review in a forthcoming number of the BULLETIN.
392 /. E. WALLACE WALLIN
the conditioning factors of scientific, literary and artistic eminence,
fame or genius.
After a lapse of seven years Cattell (5) has repeated his statistical
group study of the most eminent American men of science. He has
undertaken a painstaking analysis of the changes which have taken
place during these years, in the relative rank, and in the sectional,
state, city, institutional, professional, sex and age distribution of
scientific workers throughout the country. Among the more im-
portant furthering environmental factors are geographical location or
institutional affiliation, and professional position (career). Massa-
chusetts and Connecticut continue to maintain their scientific pre-
eminence, while three-fourths of the leading scientists are in the
teaching profession — only three medical men not teaching in medical
schools find positions in the distribution.
Cattell's explanation of the fact that only 18 of our 1,000 leading
scientists are women, as due to an "innate sexual disqualification,"
is rejected by Hayes (13) and Talbot (22), who find the cause in
woman's social and educational inequalities and handicaps.
Woodworth (32) finds six or seven factors responsible for the
fact that the average American standard of scientific productivity
is below the European level, of which the most important is our rapid
national, industrial, economic and educational expansion. The fields
of industrial, economic and educational promotion, organization and
administration offer higher financial and social rewards, and have
thereby attracted our best minds.
But the fact that Massachusetts and Connecticut have produced
far more eminent men in proportion to the general population than
Virginia, North Carolina or South Carolina cannot be accounted for,
according to Johnson (15), on Wood's hypothesis of the dominance
of heredity over environment. It is due, as shown by the financial
school budgets of these states, to the greater expenditure of money
for educational purposes in New England than in the Southern
states.
On the other hand, the Whethams (29), from an historiometric
study by the space method of one fifth of consecutive names in the
British Dictionary of National Biography, reach the conclusion: that
able parents have able children, provided "like-to-like" matings
occur, as is found to be the case among the English administrative
and peerage classes. The comparative inferiority of the progeny
of artistic, literary or scientific men is due to the fact that these
classes of men form chance alliances: they do not mate with their
INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP EFFICIENCY 393
likes. The " like-to-like " matings thus subserve an important evolu-
tionary function: they create a super-class in the general population.
In this connection note may be made of Stern's recommendation
(20) for the conservation of incipient talent, that special-talent classes
and a special pedagogy should be provided for super-normal children;
and of Kiernan's contention (17), that the genius is a child potentially
developed, biologically and psychologically, that he must be provided
with a favorable environment, particularly during the psycho-
biological stress periods, and that his potentialities must be aided
by all-round development and not by one-sided stimulation, which
will tend to upset the instable bio-psychological mechanism.
One sympathizes with the facts, which are emphasized and de-
plored in current discussions of the super-child or super-adult, that
we lack at present any satisfactory standard of genius (the Whethams,
29), that misconceptions of precocity are widespread (O'Shea, 18),
and that the necessity has not always been recognized of clearly
distinguishing between merit and fame in historiometric discussions
(Browne, 4). Wood's claim (31) that historiometry (the objective
statistical treatment and relative grading of the fame of historical
characters) can be reduced to an exact science is denied by Browne
(4), because this would-be science does not possess any historiometric
functions of constant value. This is particularly true of the adjective
method (the ratio of the number of adjectives of praise to dispraise),
which does not give a constant differential value to adjectives of
different qualitative importance. Browne considers the adjective
method inferior to the space and reference-frequency methods.
3. The Conservation and Increase of Racial Efficiency, through
eugenical matings, and the elimination of the unfit by sterilization
or segregation.
Among the significant studies of the hereditary factors involved
in dependency, defectiveness and delinquency are the family history
investigations of Davenport (7) and Goddard (12). Davenport
voices his disapproval in no uncertain terms (" Oh, fie, on legislators
who spend thousands of dollars on drastic action and refuse a dollar
for an inquiry as to the desirability of such action!") of the legislative
efforts to eliminate the unfit by the enactment of compulsory steriliza-
tion or anti-procreation laws. He favors the milder remedy sug-
gested by segregation.
Notice should be taken of an attempt to standardize the methods
of collecting, charting and analyzing hereditary data (8).
4. The Conservation and Increase of the Mental Efficiency of Indi-
294 /• E. WALLACE WALLI'N
viduals, by means of the removal of physical defects (orthophrenics
through orthosomatics),1 or by the administration of proper pharmaco-
or dietetico-dynamic agents.
Wallin has measured by serial psychological tests given throughout
a school year the euthenical effects of oral treatment and prophylaxis
on the working efficiency of school children— a control squad, of 27
pupils (26). The contention is made "that the desirability of estab-
lishing dental clinics in the public schools for free inspection and
treatment should present itself to the taxpayer as a simple business,
if not a humanitarian, proposition — the paying of proper dividends on
the capital invested in the schools," the elimination of preventable
waste.
The elaborate series of psychological measurements of Rolling-
worth (14) of the influence of caffein on various mental and motor
processes and on the sleep and general health of a control squad of
1 6 male and female adults will serve as a model for similar scientific
investigations in the future of the somato-euphoric and psycho-
orthogenic effects of the use of various drugs, foods, dietaries, etc.
His results indicate that mental efficiency may be heightened,
without reactionary after effects, by the administration of judicious
doses of caffein in its pure form.
Closely related is 5. The Conservation and Increase of the Working
Efficiency of the School Population, of normal or abnormal pupils, in
elementary, higher, special, rural, urban or state institutions, by the
scientific study and control of the processes and agencies which
directly or indirectly minister to psycho-pedagogical proficiency.
Perhaps we may agree with the eugenist that permanent racial
improvement will come only by improving the inborn qualities of
men (considered under 3, above). At the same time, we are obliged
to deal with conditions as we find them; after the human misfits have
been born, we must bring them to maximal efficiency by improving
the environmental factors. The most important euthenical agencies
are the schools and the training or corrective institutions. And it
is gratifying to observe that in no field of modern enterprise is the
1 1 would suggest the use of the word ortho-phrenic to designate any process or
regimen by means of which deviate mentality may be made to function aright; the
word orthosomatic, to designate any process or regimen by means of which any mal-
functioning bodily organ may be made to work normally; and the word orthogenic, as
the generic term to apply to any orthophrenic or orthosomatic processes of restoring
deviate human nature to normal functioning. All these processes are essentially and
specifically pedagogico- or medico-corrective. Effectually to apply them presupposes
the development of a number of highly technical orthogenic sciences.
INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP EFFICIENCY 395
efficiency problem receiving greater scientific study than in the realm
of education. Here the major studies have been concerned with the
attempt to determine more accurately than was formerly the case
the current rate of progress through the grades (thus Blan, 2; Keyes,
16; Strayer, 21); with the introduction of effective schemes of vary-
ing the rate of progress through the grades, so that the needs of the
individual pupil may be properly conserved (thus, e. g., the Mann-
heim system of grade organization; Van Sickle, 25); with the at-
tempt to differentiate curricula, so as to render them sufficiently
varied to meet the needs of all types of exceptional children (witness
the recent organization of special classes, occupational courses, ele-
mentary industrial, trade and continuation schools); with the effort
to establish by diagnostic, psychological tests, developmental age-
scales of personal, social, industrial, motor and intellectual traits for
retarded, average and accelerated pupils, so that pedagogical or
vocational tasks may be fitly adjusted to the level of functioning of
each child (thus Wallin's plan for gauging the efficiencies of a colony
of epileptics, 27) ; with the task of establishing pedagogical efficiency
scores, criteria or scales, by which to make an impersonal, objective
determination of a child's proficiency in various branches of the
curriculum, such as English composition (Thorndike, 23), handwriting
(Thorndike, 24; Ayres, i); and the fundamental operations in arith-
metic (Courtis, 6); with the effort to deterimne the functional effi-
ciency of various methods of teaching, such as the incidental or drill
method of teaching spelling (Wallin, 28, who fails to substantiate the
claims of Rice and Cornman, and who shows by tests that spelling
efficiency can be increased by the utilization of a psychologically
justifiable drill technique); and with the attempt to determine the
best age at which to enter children in the schools (Winch, 30, who
finds that there is no intellectual advantage in entering children at
three rather than at five in English schools).
This survey of the literature on human efficiency — necessarily all
too brief relatively to the importance of the subject — should leave a
three-fold impression in the mind of the reader: first, that the problem
of conserving and increasing the efficiency of the race is many-sided,
presenting many varied and complex phases; second, that the prob-
lem is soluble only through the development and application of a
distinct scientific technique, sufficiently varied and specialized to fit
any phase of the problem; and, third, that the problem is too large
to be solved by any one type or class of existing investigator, but
that it requires the development of a new type of scientific investiga-
396 /. E. WALLACE WALLIN
tors, namely, a cooperative corps of " efficiency experts " in physiology,
psychology, education, hygiene, medicine, anthropology, sociology,
philanthropy, economy, chemistry, engineering and jurisprudence.
1. AYRES, L. P. A Scale for Measuring the Quality of Handwriting of Schoolchildren.
New York: Department of Child Hygiene, Russell Sage Foundation, 1912.
2. BLAN, L. B. A Special Study of the Incidence of Retardation. New York:
Teachers College, Columbia University, 1911. Pp. in.
3. BRANDEIS, Louis D. Organized Labor and Efficiency. The Survey, 1911, 26,
148-151-
4. BROWNE, C. A. The Comparative Value of Methods of Estimating Fame.
Science, 1911, 33, 77°~773-
5. CATTELL, J. McK. A Further Statistical Study of American Men of Science.
In American Men of Science. New York, 2d ed., 1910, 564-596.
6. COURTIS, S. A. Standard Scores in Arithmetic. The Elementary School Teacher,
I9II, 12, 127-137.
7. DAVENPORT, C. B. Heredity in Relation to Eugenics. New York: Henry Holt
and Co., 1911. Pp. 298.
8. DAVENPORT, C. B., ET AL. The Study of Human Heredity. Cold Spring Harbor:
Eugenics Record Office, Bulletin No. 2. Pp. 17.
9. EMERSON, H. Efficiency as a Basis for Operation and Wages. New York: The
Engineering Magazine, 1912. Pp. 254.
10. EMERSON, H. The Twelve Principles of Efficiency. New York: The Engineering
Magazine, 1912. Pp. 423.
11. GANTT, H. L. Work, Wages, and Profits. New York: The Engineering Maga-
zine, 1911. Pp. 194.
12. GODDARD, H. H. Heredity of Feeble-Mindedness. American Breeders Magazine,
1910, i, 165-178.
I2a. GOLDMARK, JOSEPHINE. Fatigue and Efficiency, a Study in Industry. New
York: Charities Publication Committee, 1912. Part L, pp. 288. Part II.,
PP- 565- (Briefs in defense of women's labor laws by Louis D. Brandeis and
Josephine Goldmark.)
13. HAYES, ELLEN. Women and Scientific Research. Science, 1910, 32, 864-866.
14. HOLLINGWORTH, H. L. The Influence of Caffein on Mental and Motor Efficiency.
New York: Archives of Psychology, No. 22, 1912. Pp. 166.
15. JOHNSON, G. H. Dr; Wood's Application of the Historiometric Method. Science,
19", 33, 773-775-
16. KEYES, C. H. Progress through the Grades of City Schools. New York: Teachers
College, Columbia University, 1911. Pp. 79.
17. KIERNAN, J. G. Is Genius a Sport, a Neurosis, or a Child Potentially Developed?
The Alienist and Neurologist, serial articles from May, 1907, to February, 1912.
18. O'SHEA, M. V. Popular Misconceptions Concerning Precocity in Children.
Science, 1911, 34, 666-674.
19. SCOTT, W. D. Increasing Human Efficiency in Business. New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1912. Pp. 339.
20. STERN, W. The Supernormal Child. /. of Educ. Psychol, 1911, 2, 143-148;
181-190.
21. STRAYER, G. D. Age and Grade Census of Schools and Colleges. Washington:
Bulletin No. 451, U. S. Bureau of Education, 1911. Pp. 144.
NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 397
22. TALBOT, MARION. Women and Scientific Research. Science, 1910, 32, 866.
23. THORNDIKE, E. L. A Scale of Merit in English Writing by Young People.
/. of Educ. PsychoL, 1911, 2, 361-368.
24. THORNDIKE, E. L. Handwriting. New York: Teachers College Record, 1910.
Pp. 93-
25. VAN SICKLE, J., ET AL. Provision for Exceptional Children in Public Schools.
Washington: Bulletin 461, U. S. Bureau of Education, 1911. Pp. 92.
26. WALLIN, J. E. W. Experimental Oral Euthenics. Dental Cosmos, 1912, 54,
404-413 ; 545-566. Also, Experimental Oral Orthogenics. /. of Phil., Psychol.,
etc., 1912, 9, 290-298.
27. WALLIN, J. E. W. Human Efficiency, a Plan for the Observational, Clinical
and Experimental Study of the Personal, Social, Industrial, School and Intel-
lectual Efficiencies of Normal and Abnormal Individuals. Ped. Sem., 1911,
18, 74-84. See also Eight Months of Psycho-Clinical Research at the New
Jersey State Village for Epileptics, with Some Results from the Binet-Simon
Testing. Transactions of the National Association for the Study of Epilepsy
and the Care and Treatment of Epileptics, 1912, 8, 29-43. (Reprinted in Epilep-
sia, 1912.)
28. WALLIN, J. E. W. Spelling Efficiency, in Relation to Age, Grade and Sex, and
the Question of Transfer. Baltimore: Warwick and York, 1911. Pp. 91.
Also, How to Increase Spelling Efficiency. Atlantic Educational Journal, 1912,
7, 225-226.
29. WHETHAM, W. C. D. & C. D. Eminence and Heredity. The Nineteenth Century,
1911, 69, 818-832.
30. WINCH, W. H. When Should a Child Begin School? Baltimore: Warwick &
York, 1911. Pp. 98.
31. WOODS, F. A. Historiometry as an Exact Science. Science, 1911, 33, 568-574.
32. WOODWORTH, R. S. On Factors Contributing to a Low Scientific Productivity
in America. Science, 1911, 33, 374-379.
NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
BY R. S. WOODWORTH
Columbia University
National psychology, as popularly written, suffers from a variety
of defects. Its aim should be, evidently, first to determine the facts
of national behavior, and then to seek an explanation of these facts
in the national environment and heredity, and in the social trans-
mission to later generations of what has been acquired in the history
and experience of the nation. To work back from the behavior of a
nation to its native traits is no easy task, and to infer a difference in
national temperament or mentality from a difference in the behavior
of two nations is illegitimate unless the past experience and training
of the two nations are evaluated. It is a common defect of national,
or international psychology to ignore this difficulty and to jump at
398 R. S. WOODWORTH
once from differences in behavior to differences in national traits.
No less a defect appears in the description of national behavior; for
those who compare nations seem to have an irresistible tendency to
seek for contrasts, which leads them to hasty generalizations as to
the facts of behavior. The great individual differences which exist
within any nation are neglected, and the nation is spoken of as if all
its members behaved in the same way; and, further, no note is taken
of the inconsistencies that appear in a nation's behavior when exam-
ined in different particulars. The whole subject, whether in respect
to the facts or in respect to their interpretation, is in a most unscien-
tific and unsatisfactory state.
The two books here noticed are not worse than others on national
psychology. That of Low (i) is rather to be called unusually good.
It is a fair-minded attempt to understand the character of the Amer-
ican people as revealed in their political and economic behavior, and
follows their history from the settlement of the country to the present.
The author's main contention is that the American character is
essentially British, modified by the conditions of life in the new
country but not by the non-British elements of the population.
These last have been assimilated by a process which is sketched as
follows. At any given time, the newly arrived immigrants find
places near the bottom of the economic scale, so that the contrast
between native Americans and foreigners is equivalent to a contrast
between higher and lower social classes, and the effort to rise in the
social scale resolves itself into an effort to become Americanized.
A sort of polarity pervades the population, and every one strives
away from the foreign pole and towards the native pole. The
older stock does not take on the ways of the newer arrivals, but
these take on the ways of the older stock to such an extent as to
become indistinguishable from it in the second or third generation.
Meanwhile, however, the national character does not remain
unchanged, but responds to changing conditions by the development
of new traits which are transmitted from father to son and outlive
the special conditions that gave rise to them. The American's
"disrespect for law" — a generalization which, by the way, needs to
be tested by a much broader examination of the facts than the author
attempts — was a natural response to the conditions of pioneer life
combined with the absence of a governing class; but, originating in
this way as a reaction to the environment, it was so bred into the
bone as to become a hereditary trait. Here, it will be seen, the
author is on shaky biological ground; and, in fact, he nowhere shows
NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 399
a sense for the biological side of his theme. But his book is valuable
for its social analysis, and for its study of the mental and moral
traits that have been prominent in American history.
Andre (2) is concerned with the mental and moral traits of the
Spanish people. He raises the question, why Spain lags behind in
the march of modern progress, and seeks his answer in an imperfect
adaptation to modern requirements of the Spanish character and
ideals of life. According to him, the Spanish people are lacking in
industry, energy, initiative and scientific curiosity, and have not
caught the spirit of work which is the life of the progressive indus-
trial nations. How far this lack of energy and industry is inherent
in the national heredity, how far it is due to climate, how far to
poverty and insufficient nutrition, and how far to custom and tradi-
tional ideals, the author does not seriously set himself to decide,
though he mentions all of these factors and lays stress on the last
two. The book is a jeremiad preached by the author to his country-
men, and certainly exaggerates the differences between the Spanish
and other peoples. It forcibly calls attention to an interesting
problem in national psychology, without contributing much of scien-
tific value either in the way of facts or in their analysis. It abounds,
however, in interesting ethical discussions.
REFERENCES
1. Low, A. MAURICE. The American People. Boston and New York: Houghton
Mifflin Co. Vol. II., 1911. Pp. 608. $2.25 net.
2. ANDRE, ELOY Luis. Etica espanola. Madrid: M. G. Hernandez, 1910. Pp. 304.
SPECIAL REVIEWS
THE STUDY OF PRIMITIVE RACES
V or s Mage zur psychologischen Untersuchung primitiver Menschen.
Beiheft zur Zsch. f. angew. Psycho I. u. psychol. Sammeljorsch. I
Theil. Leipzig, 1912. Pp. 124.
These "Vorschlage" form the first of a series of contributions on
the psychological study of primitive man. It is intended to provide
instructions in simple tests for all those, such as missionaries, teachers
of native schools, officials, doctors and the like, who come into con-
tact with men in primitive stages of culture. The preface suggests
that all users of the study and others interested ally themselves
with the Institut fur Angewandte Psychologie, which will furnish
descriptions and illustrations of the tests, preserve the data acquired
and offer the Zeitschrift as the organ for the publication of the results.
The work consists of a series of 1 1 reports by four men on special
topics, with an introduction and supplement by a fifth, making a
total of 124 pages.
Twenty-seven pages are given to the Introduction by Thurnwald,
in which he discusses the problems of ethnopsychological investiga-
tion. The study of man involves not only his physical side but also
his mental side and his relations to his environment, both natural
and social. These separate aspects of men are so interwoven that
no one of the problems can be solved independently of the others.
In the past the psychological aspect has been the most neglected. In
the questionnaires in which psychological questions have appeared,
the answers have been of little value on account of the vagueness of
the questions and the lack of skilled investigators.
The infinitely manifold phenomena of social and cultural life
are merely the varying effect of different arrangements of relatively
few simple elements, factors and conditions. The working of these
elements in the social process, which is mediated through the psychic
factors, is a constant. It is necessary first to seek out these elements
and study them rather than the complex structures which they form,
—this is the duty of the ethno-psychologist. For this purpose the
study of certain individuals of a group is of more value than a study
of the general culture of a community. If one wishes to get an
400
THE STUDY OF PRIMITIVE R4CES 401
average value for some quality of a group, he may observe a few
typical cases from that group, keeping in mind the fact of individual
differences and the difficulty of isolating the subject for experimental
purposes. Since today there are no ethno-psychological norms,
these must be built up from just such tests as the present collection
represents. When such norms are established, the further investi-
gation in this field will be comparatively simple.
Thurnwald points out the following sources of error which the
use of tests on primitive peoples involves: (i) The influence of the
experimenter will be a big factor, especially where the problems are
put into the hands of untrained observers. Such a one must have
not only a knowledge of experimental methods but he must be en-
dowed with infinite patience to perform preliminary experiments,
in order that the test may be rightly understood. (2) Exact work
will be impossible where the laboratory is a clearing in the forest or
perhaps a native's hut. (3) There will be an almost complete lack
of apparatus on account of the difficulty of transportation, weather
conditions, lack of electricity, etc. (4) The greatest difficulty will
be the lack of comprehension both of the general attitude toward the
experiment and of the means of expression. The use of an inter-
preter will be of doubtful value, so that the tests must be so con-
structed as to demand the smallest possible amount of speech.
The ultimate aim of the tests is to show not merely differences
between the primitive peoples and ourselves, but to draw distinc-
tions among the primitive social groups, which shall be of practical
value to all who are brought into political or economic relations with
them.
The optical space sense is discussed by Tschermak in 13 pages.
No great differences are to be expected in this field, which is based
on relatively simple processes, and which, so far as we can judge, is
the same in the higher animals. An accurate study of this sense
would require considerable apparatus, but certain tests have been
selected which require very little more than objects of nature. These
are tests to determine the knowledge of the directions of space,
accuracy of the judgment of the vertical and horizontal directions,
visual acuity, visual illusions, binocular vision, using the simple
stereoscope and various tests for detecting squint.
Guttmann, who contributes the report on the color sense in 12
pages, considers this the most difficult sense for the ordinary indi-
vidual to test. It presupposes a knowledge of one's own color sense,
of the various forms of color-blindness with their symptoms, that is,
402 REVIEWS
total color-blindness, partial color-blindness, color weakness and the
various transition forms. It presupposes a knowledge of the diagnos-
tic methods and control of the technique of these methods. The lack
of color terminology in the natives makes judgments of colored yarns
or papers impossible, except the judgment of likeness and difference.
For the various tests on color vision, Guttmann recommends Nagel's
diagnostic tables, on account of their simplicity and cheapness. By
these tests one can determine the frequency of color-blindness and
of .the different forms of color-blindness compared with the cultured
races. Among primitive peoples there should be a good opportunity
for the study of heredity of the defects of color vision. All visual
disturbances should be a large social factor among people with whom
almost every vocation depends on the sense of vision and where no
corrective means are at hand.
Lipmann on memory and comprehension considers the function of
the memory tests not to determine general laws of memory which
have been worked out under more favorable circumstances, but to
make tests that shall show the absolute amount of material retained
by different races or groups under similar conditions. He considers
it more practicable to give one test only of each kind to each indi-
vidual, and to compensate for this by testing a large number of
individuals. This plan must be adopted on account of the scarcity
of available material, and on account of the effect of practice, when
the same material is used. The series of tests consists of memory
for simple tones, colors and weights, and tests to determine the types
of memory. In the tests for associative memory nonsense syllables
are replaced by form-color, German and native words, and simple
words and objects. The material for all of the tests is obtainable
from the Institut.
The tests on suggestion, also by Lipmann, are introduced by a
series of questions to be answered by the investigator concerning
the part played by suggestion in the daily life of the people. Then
follow a number of simple tests under the heads of suggestion of per-
ception, of memory, hypnotic suggestion, auto-suggestion, and the
various combinations of these forms.
The study of the time sense by Vierkandt and Stern consists of
17 series of questions relating to the method of telling the time of day,
the method of recording the time in the past, the application of
time measurement to practical purposes, how closely small inter-
vals of time can be judged, etc. A few simple experiments with the
metronome are suggested.
THE STUDY OF PRIMITIVE RACES 403
Vierkandt contributes a series of 12 questions on counting, as to
the methods of counting, the existence of collective words like dozen,
score, and the like, and the knowledge of the number of ordinary
objects such as the fingers, teeth, etc. All of the questions must be
answered from the general observation of the student.
Stern and Meinhof report on expressive movements and speech.
Concerning the former the aim is to discover whether expressive
movements are constant for the same emotional state and whether
these movements correspond to those of cultured races. The ques-
tions on speech relate to the presence of the different grammatical
forms such as adverbs, interjections, etc., and of forms of speech
peculiar to certain classes of people, as workmen, or priests. All are
questions to be answered from general observation.
The next four sections, all of them of the questionnaire type, are
by Vierkandt. The section on drawing and art gives instructions
for studying the drawings common to the natives and for obtaining
drawings from simple models. Attention is given to their knowledge
of perspective, angles and position of objects. This section also
contains a series of questions on the native songs, dances and stories.
The section on convictions and manner of thought considers the nature
of the native interest in things, whether it be of a theoretical or
practical sort, their tendency toward lying and whether it be un-
conscious or toward definite ends, the nature of their belief in myths,
spirits, etc. The sociology of the native to which 12 pages are given
makes up the tenth section. It consists almost entirely of questions
concerning the leaders of groups, social stratification, the life and
training of the children, and their relation to their parents and to each
other. There are two groups of questions on forms of play, ten on
family and altruistic relations, several on moral ideals and conditions
of immorality, Then there is a long series of questions on the varia-
tion in customs, their source, the influence of neighboring and foreign
peoples upon the native customs. Section n deals with the native
philosophy, the ideas of the nature of matter, of death, immortality,
their explanation of disease, etc.
In a supplement Thurnwald points out further the difficulties
attendant upon the use of the preceding tests. Probably the greatest
difficulty is that of the language, the fact that the greater part of the
information must be obtained from conversation with the natives.
This difficulty can be overcome only by years spent among the people.
Success or failure depends on the investigator; the outlines given can
only point out the way and suggest the line of study, and the value
404 REVIEWS
of the data obtained will be in proportion to the ingenuity and
originality of the student.
This Beiheft contains neither a short cut through the difficulties of
ethno-psychological investigations nor an escape from them. But
by very simple experiments and by short, explicit questions it aims
to have the material take some definite form. Only in this way can
the questionnaire method produce a mass of data which can be
presented in a statistical form for comparative study. For this one
reason alone the monograph should be welcomed by all those inter-
ested in a scientific study of social problems among primitive people.
A. T. POFFENBERGER, JR.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
THE MIND OF PRIMITIVE MAN
The Mind of Primitive Man. FRANZ BOAS. New York: The Mac-
millan Co., 1911. Pp. x + 294-
This book contains the lectures delivered by the author before the
Lowell Institute and the National University of Mexico, 1910-1911.
It is not often that so small a book represents so much maturity of
scholarship and so extended research. The lectures were a revision
and enlargement of some articles published in various journals at
different times. There are altogether ten chapters, one being a
short summary of the first eight. The book is peculiarly destructive
to popular and scientific theories about primitive people. In fact
it may be said right at the beginning that according to the author
there is no primitive mind; there is just mind and that is the same in
all essentials wherever it is found in the genus homo. The outcome of
the book is something quite different, however, from destructive
criticism. While it shows the untenableness of most current views of
primitive and savage peoples and so clears the field, it is most con-
structive in showing how trustworthy results may be won and where
the field lies that needs most working. The book marks the close of
the period in the science of anthropology for hasty generalization^and
unwarranted speculation. The spirit of optimism and of respect for
all human quality is its dominating note; it tends on every page to
wholesome-mindedness.
Under racial prejudice the assumption that achievement by a
race is evidence of aptitude is examined and rejected. Emphasis
is laid (p. 7) upon the carrying of ideas and inventions from one race
to another. It is not greater national endowment but better chance
THE MIND OF PRIMITIVE MAN 405
that accounts for achievement* The period of cultural history is
very short in comparison with the history of the race (p. 9). Ease of
diffusion explains the rapid rise in Europe (p. 13). He holds that
"the variations in cultural development can as well be explained by
a consideration of the general course of historical events without
recourse to the theory of material differences of mental faculty in
different races."
In the chapter on influence of environment the problems set are:
"the distinctions between races" and "distinctions between the social
strata of the same race." Given traits appear more frequently
among some races than among others; the "varieties that constitute
each race overlap." This overlapping is greater with some traits
than with others, and some traits do not extend to all races. The
author favors the influence of environment rather than that of selec-
tion, pointing to his and Bowditch's work in comparing the children
born in America with their European relatives. This is restricted
by the "assumption of a strictly limited plasticity." The factors
that impinge upon this plasticity are "change of nutrition and mode
of life," "conscious selection," and "crossing." The study here turns
upon domesticated animals.
"Articulate language, the use of implements and the power of
reasoning belong to all members of the human species as opposed to
the higher animals." "Hereditary mental faculty was not improved
by civilization." Between primitive and civilized man there is the
difference only of frequency of occurrence for given traits. The
power to inhibit impulses, to give attention and to reason clearly
come out upon different occasions, but all types have them. The
present types of race are older than languages and each type has
doubtless produced many languages. There are common classifica-
tions and formal elements in all languages. The development of
language is dependent upon thought, not thought upon language —
a conclusion by no means well supported.
Under the universality of cultural traits, it is said, "We may
therefore base our further considerations on the theory of the simi-
larity of mental functions in all races," and "much more detailed
similarities in thought and action occur among the most diverse
peoples." Four current views are offered: first, similarities appear
in similar types of environment; second, common customs and beliefs
are "an old heritage derived from the earliest times"; third, some
have tried "to isolate the most generalized forms of similar ethnic
phenomena"; and fourth, similarities are to be explained by "analysis
406 REVIEWS
of mental processes." Under the first is allowed that analogues of
culture are found among a vast variety of peoples. But customs
prevail (p. 159) outside of suitable environments where they may
work injury. Parallel and independent cultures may have arisen.
Inner growth of a race and dispersion of culture both need considera-
tion. "And we may infer that the simpler the observed fact, the
more likely it is that it may have developed from one source here,
from another there" (p. 192). In regard to the evolutionary point
of view, "serious objection may be made against the assumption of
the occurrence of a general sequence of cultural stages"; "we recog-
nize a peculiar tendency of diverse customs and beliefs to converge
towards similar forms." Development is not from simple to com-
plex, but rather is there an intercrossing of two opposite tendencies —
one, from the simple to complex, and the other from the complex to
the simple.
Some traits of primitive culture are, (i) conditions of objects
are often considered as independent realities; (2) classifications in
language never rise into consciousness, while others do; (3) object
and attribute are treated differently; (4) power of will and motion are
identified as one; (5) the wide inclusion of blood relationships in the
incest group; and (6) the perceptions of the senses are excellent and
the power of logical interpretation is deficient. This difference the
author regards as due to the traditional ideas current in the race
and not to deficiency in mental endowment. The difference between
primitive and civilized man lies in the character of the traditional
material with which new perceptions are assimilated. An under-
standing of the myths is the keynote of primitive society. This
accords with the general tenor of the book, that it is tradition and not
morphological character that differentiates races and the primitive
man from the cultured. "Any one familiar with primitive life will
know that the children are constantly exhorted to follow the example
of their elders, and every collection of carefully recorded traditions
contains numerous references to advice given by parents to children,
impressing them with the duty to observe the customs of the tribe"
(p. 240). Here the direct influence of education points in the same
way as the general treatment of the book, that the differences among
men are chiefly due to environment as hindering or aiding in the
spread of culture, that these differences do not extend below the
level^ of custom and belief, and that customs and beliefs have no
considerable selective power upon the races of men. The chapter at
the close upon the race problems in America carries out the argument
NOTES AND NEWS 407
of the book. America presents no entirely new situations and its
problems are being met in much the same way as race mixtures have
been met in the past. Prejudice is not going to hinder permanently
the amalgamation of the races and there is no good reason for regard-
ing the negro as inferior. Genius is only a more rare occurrence in
this race than in his white neighbor. His closing sentence deserves
emphasis: "We should learn to look upon foreign races with greater
sympathy, and with the conviction, that, as all races have contributed
to the past cultural progress in one way or another, so they are capable
of advancing the interests of mankind, if we are only willing to give
them a fair opportunity."
T. L. BOLTON
KANSAS UNIVERSITY
BOOKS RECEIVED DURING SEPTEMBER
GODDARD, H. H. The Kallikak Family. New York: Macmillan
Co., 1912. Pp. xv + 121. $1.50 net.
HRDLICKA, A. Early Man in South America (Bureau of American
Ethnology, Bulletin 52). Washington: Gov. Printing Office,
1912. Pp. xv +405.
KEMMERICH, M. Prophezeiungen: alter Aberglaube oder neue Wahrheit ?
Munich: A. Langen, 1911. Pp. 435.
HACK, V. Das Wesen der Religion nach A. Ritschl und A. E. Bieder-
mann. Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1911. Pp. 56.
JONES, E. Der Alptraum in seiner Bezeihung zu gewissen Formen des
mittelalterlichen Aberglaubens . (Deutsch von E. H. Sachs.) Leip-
zig und Wien: Franz Deuticke, 1912. Pp. 140. M. 5.
NOTES AND NEWS
DR. MADISON BENTLEY, assistant professor of psychology in
Cornell University, has accepted a professorship of psychology at
the University of Illinois.
DR. H. P. WELD, of Clark University, has been called to an
assistant professorship of psychology at Cornell University.
DR. GEORGE F. ARPS has been called from the position of assist-
ant professor of psychology at the University of Illinois to a profes-
sorship of psychology at Ohio State University.
DR. W. F. BOOK, professor of psychology and philosophy at the
408 NOTES AND NEWS
State University of Montana, and for the past two years instuctor
in the summer school of Columbia University, has accepted a pro-
fessorship of educational psychology at Indiana University, to suc-
ceed Dean W. A. JESSUP, who goes to the State University of Iowa.
PRENTICE REEVES, A.B., of the University of Missouri, has been
made instructor in psychology at Princeton University.
THE present number of the BULLETIN, dealing with race and in-
dividual psychology, has been prepared under the editorial care of
DR. H. L. HOLLINGWORTH, of Columbia University.
PROFESSOR ROBERT H. GAULT, of Northwestern University, has
been advanced to the position of managing editor of the Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology, the official organ of the American
Association of Criminal Law and Criminology.
JOHN MADISON FLETCHER, PH.D., has been appointed assistant
professor of experimental and clinical psychology at the Newcomb
College School of Education, Tulane University.
THE following items are taken from the press:
CARL P. BOCK has been made assistant in experimental psychol-
ogy at the University of Missouri to fill the vacancy created by the
resignation of A. P. WEISS, who has accepted an instructorship in
Ohio State University.
PROFESSOR E. C. WILM has been called from Washburn College
to the chair of philosophy and psychology at Wells College.
RUDOLF PINTNER, PH.D. (Leipzig), has been appointed professor
of psychology and education at Toledo University.
I
Vol. IX. No. ii. November 15, 1912
THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN
GENERAL REVIEWS AND SUMMARIES
VOLITION AND MOTOR CONSCIOUSNESS— THEORY
BY PROFESSOR E. B. DELABARRE
BROWN UNIVERSITY
The papers here brought together deal with several different
phases of the problem of volition: (i) The extent to which move-
ment or action can be regarded as a factor in human consciousness;
(2) the nature of the immediate antecedents of voluntary action;
(3) the question as to the highest type of action; and (4) the
problem of human freedom.
I. With the growing emphasis in recent thought on the active,
functional and pragmatic, it is to be expected that in psychology
this movement would appear in the form of an attempt to under-
stand all consciousness in motor terms. Accordingly, Kostyleff
(10) believes that consciousness is connected with the motor rather
than the sensory side of the organism, and advances a dynamic
conception based on the functional development of reflexes as
opposed to the current view that mental states are directly due
to inflowing currents or to revivals of these. Pradines (14) also
claims that action is the whole of life, and is free and undetermined,
as is all reality. Knowledge is nothing but a form of action, which
has come to forget its own nature. Alexander (i) makes a syste-
matic attempt to sketch a complete conational psychology. The
objects of contemplation are non-mental. Conation, the act of
contemplating or "enjoying," alone is mental, with feeling as one
of its modalities. Psychology must describe all forms of conscious-
ness as a series of conative acts, show their relation to their non-
mental cognita, and make clear how they assume a speculative as
well as a practical form. Dearborn (4) is more conservative, re-
409
410 E. B. DELABARRE
taining more of the older views. As a coordinator and integrator,
the central nervous system is the basis of consciousness. But
muscle constitutes about half the mass of the organism; in subtlety
of metabolism and intricacy of structure, in chemical activity and in
the molar activities of its ceaseless tonal and occasional contraction,
it is not surpassed by any of the tissues. It might well itself serve
as a physical basis for consciousness. At any rate, either directly,
or indirectly through kinsesthetic sensations, it is the source of the
energy in the stream of consciousness and subconsciousness. Pills-
bury (13) opposes the attempt to reinstate the innervation sense
without new proof, holding to kinaesthetic sensations in their place.
He agrees with the motor theory in emphasizing the part played by
kinsesthetic qualities in every domain, but will not agree to a motor
origin for all the qualities of perception, memory, selection, meaning,
etc., nor accept movement as the cause of any of the antecedent
conscious states. Both sensation and movement are needed for
the explanation of any phase of consciousness.
2. Rowe (15) gives an extensive review of experimental and
pathological literature, and opposes feeling as the initiator of
voluntary movement. Feeling may inhibit or reinforce,' but so
long as it dominates, there is no volition. A perceptual or idea-
tional process is essential for the initiation of a voluntary movement
and involves a control based on immediate sensations and per-
ceptions of results, of a kinsesthetic, visual or auditory nature.
Bernard (3), arguing for a unitary as against an individualistic,
utilitarian and hedonistic view of society, and for its scientific
analysis and control, devotes two chapters to these psychological
problems. The cause of an act is not feeling alone, nor ideation
alone, nor even always either of these; it consists rather, as Wood-
worth maintains, in the total set of the nervous system at the
moment, which is itself determined by numerous factors, some
conscious and some unconscious. Dearborn (5, 6) also holds that
every deliberate movement is the resultant of influences coming
from every part of the brain or even of the entire gray fabric of
the nervous system.
3. MacDougall (n) says that the system of habits gives to ideal
activity its point of origin and its direction; the system of ideas
gives to habit a telic value. Normal development tends towards a
more complex synthesis of habit-modes and a widened ideal horizon.
The highest type of self is that in which a life of the most intense
intellectual activity finds its basis and its object in the fullest
VOLITION AND MOTOR CONSCIOUSNESS— THEORY 411
organization of experience in terms of significant reactions of the
will. Stocks (16) distinguishes between motive and intention. The
former "is that characteristic tendency or disposition of a man in
virtue of which a given act possesses an attraction for him." It is
not mere feeling, is largely unconscious, and is best defined by
reference to end. Intention is what is consciously present to the
agent at the moment of action. The imperfectly developed char-
acter betrays in action a number of dimly apprehended and chaotic
purposes. The perfect will is one in which there is no motive other
than intention. Barrett (2) makes an experimental study on which
he bases the following conclusions: "When a choice has to be made
between two alternatives, the choice is quick and easy in propor-
tion as the values of the alternatives are clearly and definitely
known." To choose well, therefore, "we must clearly and definitely
determine the values of alternatives, and that of course, as far as
possible, long before the choice begins." And the "top-value" of
our scale, with which nothing whatever is comparable, "must act as
a charm, it must electrify us, hypnotize us." Bernard (3) has as
the main thesis of his sociological study mentioned above the fol-
lowing: "Individuals have no liberties in opposition to a scientifi-
cally controlled society. . . . The really social individual is not one
who acts with individual reference. . . . He attempts to discover
the conditions of the most effective social life and then to bring
these conditions about and to adjust himself to them."
4. The problem of freedom is incidentally touched upon by more
than one of the authors already mentioned. Pradines (14) speaks
of action as free and undetermined. Barrett (2) thinks that in-
directly his study shows the worthlessness of the psychological
arguments for determinism. Several are clearly written from a
deterministic standpoint. Our four remaining references deal with
this problem specifically. Kohnstamm (9) is the only determinist
among them. He finds the scientific explanation of freedom not
(in the exclusion of effective causality, but in a causally determined
choosing among several open possibilities. But the significance of
free choice as thus defined lies not in its cause but in its end. For
Field (7) it is inconceivable that our own inner experience as to the
nature of the relation between motive and act could deceive us.
Any attempt to describe the relation must be in terms of something
not active, and so be untrue. It is indescribable, unanalyzable,
because unique and singular, and this is what we mean by "free."
Home (8) and Palmer (12) both attempt a new defense of the
412 E. B. DELABARRE
libertarian position. Both define it in terms of a genuinely am-
biguous future, determinable by our purposes, which themselves
can never be wholly accounted for by sequential causation (12, p.
126). Palmer frankly accepts the implication of genuine chance
in the universe, and admits that the existence of sin and the nature
of the influence of thought on matter remain insoluble mysteries.
Both authors use the conventional arguments, admit that these do
not constitute final proof, and regard freedom as very limited.
For both, the series of temporal phenomena cannot be explained
exclusively in terms of efficient causes (which Palmer happily calls
sequential), but wherever purposes exist involves also final (ante-
sequential) causes; and thus, in their view, the world remains
wholly causal and law-abiding. Both claim that their conception is
not identical with a freedom of indifference, and Palmer says that
it is not indeterministic (p. 1 86). Home's work is marred by
numerous misconceptions. He always confuses determinism with
many things that it is not, — fatalism, predestination, necessarian-
ism, subjection to custom and authority, — and is thus led to reverse
the historical course of thought, believing it to be away from earlier
determinism toward a growing belief in indeterministic freedom.
He assumes that to establish a psychical cause for physical phe-
nomena would prove libertarianism (pp. 103, 108), and that to deny
interactionism is to deny efficiency for mind (pp. 83, 87, 99). He
understands the mechanical theory of the universe to mean the
transformation of energy only downwards (pp. no, 114); asserts
that the physical causal law claims only that every cause has an
effect, not that also every cause has a cause (p. 135); takes tran-
scendental to mean the initiation of a new causal series in the
temporal order (p. 53), and thus is led to place Kant and Royce
among the libertarians. Palmer understands determinism better;
but he is forced to believe what a scientist can hardly concede,
namely, that the world is split into numberless independent lines
of sequential causality and that harmonious correspondences be-
tween these can be the result only of chance or of antesequential
causation (pp. 136-150). Finally, Home does not mention and
Palmer does not adequately discuss the form of determinism which
holds that sequential mechanism and antesequential teleology
are compatible, that the whole world may be exhaustively explained
in terms of cause but also in terms of purpose, and that the human
will may be as free transcendentally as empirically it is without
limitation sequentially causal.
REFLEX ACTION 413
REFERENCES
1. ALEXANDER, S. Foundations and Sketch Plan of a Conational Psychology.
Brit. J. of Psychol., 1911, 4, 239-267.
2. BARRETT, E. B. Motive Force and Motivation-tracks. London: Longmans,
Green & Co., 1911. Pp. xiv + 225.
3. BERNARD, L.L. The Transition to an Objective Standard of Social Control. Univ.
of Chicago Press, 1911. Pp. 96.
4. DEARBORN, G. V. N. The Relation of Muscular Activity to the Mental Process.
Reprinted from Amer. Physical Educ. Rev., 1909, 14. Pp. 8.
5. DEARBORN, G. V. N. The Nerve-Mechanism of Voluntary Movement. Re-
printed from Amer. Physical Educ. Rev., May, 1912. Pp. 12.
6. DEARBORN, G. V. N. Notes on the Neurology of Voluntary Movement. Re-
printed from Medical Record, May 18, 1912. Pp. 48.
7. FIELD, G. C. The Meaning of Human Freedom. Mind, 1911, 20, 379-393.
8. HORNE, H. H. Free Will and Human Responsibility. New York: Macmillan,
1912. Pp. xvi+ 197.
9. KOHNSTAMM, O. Willcnsfreihelt und Zielstrebigkeit. /. /. Psych. u.Neur., 1911,
18, 87-101.
10. KOSTYLEFF, N. La crise de la psychologie experimental. Paris: Alcan, 1911.
Pp. 176.
11. MACDOUGALL, R. The System of Habits and the System of Ideas. PSYCHOL.
REV., 1911, 18, 324-335-
12. PALMER, G. H. The Problem of Freedom. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911.
Pp. ix + 211.
13. PILLSBURY, W. B. The Place of Movement in Consciousness. PSYCHOL. REV.,
1911, 18, 83-99.
14. PRADINES, M. Critique des conditions de faction. Paris: Alcan, 1909. 2 vols.
Pp. viii + 702; ii + 305.
15. ROWE, E. C. Voluntary Movement. Amer. J. of PsychoL, 1910, 21, 513-562.
16. STOCKS, J. L. Motive. Mind, 1911, 20, 54-66.
REFLEX ACTION
BY C. S. YOAKUM
University of Texas
In the regular experiments with decerebrate preparations,
stimulation of the afferent nerve produces inhibition of the con-
traction in progress. Sherrington (4) reports that this phenomenon
may be reversed in the following ways. A constant weak galvanic
current produces the regular inhibition at the make and break, but
during the action of the stimulus gives a contraction myogram.
Repeated, brief galvanic currents, each of about .04 second in
length and at the rate of 12 per second, cause contraction. Weak
faradic currents give weak but noticeable contraction phenomena.
The weak galvanic current broken at the rate 'of 20 times per
414 C. S. YOAKUM
second by the v. Kries rotating rheonome gives a steady, lasting
contraction. Beside these changes in the intensity and form of the
current, to produce the reversal of action, the muscle must also
retain its tonic condition, i. e., there must be entire absence of
"shock." When these conditions are observed, especially with the
last form of stimulation mentioned above, the contractions are
closely comparable to real tonic reflexes. Some 18 seconds after
this contraction had been produced, stimulation with a faradic
current in the regular way gave the usual reflex inhibition. The
action of the stimulation with the rotating rheonome in circuit
seems to indicate that the "natural" tonic phenomenon is also
produced by rhythmic and intermittent stimuli from the receptors.
In a further investigation of reflex inhibition, Sherrington (3) used
an artificial stimulus (background stimulation of the ipsilateral
nerve) to obtain the reflex contraction of the knee flexor muscles
in the cat. The stimulation of the contralateral afferent, while the
contraction was still in progress, generally produced an inhibition of
this reflex contraction. In certain weak stimulations of the
inhibiting nerves, increased contraction is noted followed by the
usual inhibitory effect. "Fatigue of the background reflex seems
to favor markedly the operation of inhibition against the reflex."
Rebound occurs when the inhibiting stimulus is removed, not only
when the background stimulation is artificial, but also when it is
a "natural" reflex, as pinching the pinna of the ear, or when the
origin of the contraction is not clear. Whether reflex contraction
or inhibition ensues depends upon the intensity of the reflex back-
ground as well as on the intensity of the second stimulation.
Pike (2) argues that the truth "concerning the conflicting views
regarding the nature of * spinal shock' will doubtless be found in
the study of the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development,
functional as well as morphological, of the central nervous system."
He contributes evidence to show that "the collapse of the animal
during the resuscitation period is due to the fact that the bulbar
vasomotor mechanism can no longer produce any rise in [blood]
pressure by a constriction of peripheral vessels after interruption of
the efferent nerve channels. Occlusion of the head arteries and
transection of the cord soon thereafter produced a series of collapses.
The first collapse did not occur immediately, hence it seems im-
probable that the "hypothetical shock" is due to a loss of tonus
impulses from above, nor does it appear probable that the secondary
collapses are produced by later stimulation of efferent inhibitory
REFLEX ACTION 4*5
fibers, since no fall in blood pressure is noted. The assumption of a
fairly definitely localized bulbar vasomotor mechanism seems to
him the simplest explanation of the observed facts.
By means of the "artificial perfusion of an organ, in this case the
spleen, which is completely severed from the natural circulation,
by cutting or ligating all its blood vessels, but which is still left in
connection with the vasomotor center of the animal," Sollmann and
Pilcher (5) investigated the reactions of the vasomotor center.
Both peripheral actions and the variations in blood supply from
cardiac disturbances being excluded, the experiment consists in
interrupting the stream of oxygen. The center is thus stimulated
by asphyxia. They find that the fall in blood pressure is due to
cardiac influences rather than to central vasomotor paralysis.
"The results are the same whether the vagi are intact or divided."
They find that sudden arrest of the heart also causes a marked
stimulation of the vasomotor center. This stimulation by asphyxia
does "not occur if the accumulation of carbon dioxid is prevented."
Lowsley (i) studied the relation between changes in blood
pressure and all forms of exercise in athletes. He finds a rise in
systolic, diastolic, and pulse pressure after all exercise. Moderate
exercise causes about one-half the rise in diastolic pressure noted
in other types of exertion. All the pressures fall below normal
soon after the close of exercise. The pulse rate exhibits similar
changes, except that it falls below normal in only four cases out of
sixty. Exercise may probably be considered within hygienic limits
when the subnormal phase disappears before the lapse of sixty
minutes. A delay beyond one hundred and twenty minutes, as
occurred after the more violent forms of exercise, appears to indicate
dangerous over-straining.
1. LOWSLEY, O. S. The Effects of Various Forms of Exercise on Systolic, Diastolic
and Pulse Pressures and Pulse Rate. Amer. J. of PhysioL, 1911, 27, 446-466.
2. PIKE, F. H. Studies in the Physiology of the Central Nervous System. — II. The
Effect of Repeated Injuries to the Spinal Cord During Spinal Shock. Amer. J.
of Physiol., 1912, 30, 436-450.
3. SHERRINGTON, C. S., & SOWTON, S. C. M. On Reflex Inhibition of the Knee Flexor.
Proc. Roy. Soc., 1911, B 84, 201-214.
4. SHERRINGTON, C. S., & SOWTON, S. C. M. Reversal of the Reflex Effect of an
Afferent Nerve by Altering the Character of the Electrical Stimulus Applied.
Proc. Roy. Soc., 1911, B 83, 435-446.
5. SOLLMANN, T., & PILCHER, V. D. The Reaction of the Vasomotor Center to
Asphyxia. Amer. J. of Physiol., 1911, 29, 100-107.
416 F. L. WELLS
FATIGUE
BY DR. F. L. WELLS
McLean Hospital, Waverley, Mass.
A valuable study and criticism of methods for dealing with the
work-curve is contributed by Thorndike (5), but in so concentrated
a form that one can here do little more than indicate the many
phases of the problem it discusses. The work-curves of a pre-
viously published (and here reviewed) series of multiplication tests
and a later series of addition experiments are studied to test the
interpretations which previous investigators have put upon different
real or supposititious features of the work-curve. On the whole
they seem to belong mainly in the latter class; initial spurt, end-
spurt, warming up, adaptation. A feature of von Voss's work on
the temporal variation in mental capacity is severely handled.
Fatigue is defined as that diminution in efficiency which rest can cure.
The effects noted are very slight indeed, in accordance with the
author's previous work; and its disagreement with other conclusions
is elucidated. Another point is the superiority of intermittent
practice over continuous practice of the same working time. The
curve of mental work is actually very near a line both straight and
horizontal. The feelings of fatigue are important, but these tend
toward a stoppage of the work, and when this response is excluded,
habit maintains the standard of speed and accuracy. In closing, a
number of defects in the Kraepelinian analysis are enumerated,
six in all, but the author considers that any attempt at speculative
analysis could scarcely avoid similar pitfalls, well remarking that
in the present state of knowledge it is far better to analyze a work-
curve by experiment than by deduction, which, in passing, is not
true of the work-curve alone, among present psychological problems.
Winch (7) reports a study of the effect of school hours upon per-
formance in arithmetical problems, along the same lines as his work
on the value of the night school, previously reviewed in these col-
umns. Four series of experiments were made, two in boys' schools,
and one in girls' and infants' schools, all in surroundings below the
average social standing. The number of subjects in each series
ranged between 49 and 60. As in the previous research, preliminary
tests in the functions to be measured were given, by means of which
the two "equal groups" were arranged. One group would then work
at arithmetical problems early in the morning, while the others
FATIGUE 417
were given the same problems in the late afternoon. Any lowering
in efficiency due to the work of the school day would be shown in a
decreased ability of the otherwise equal afternoon group. Both
groups may be expected to improve on the records of the pre-
liminary tests, so that the results are presented in terms of the
per cent, of this improvement, showing the difference in this respect
between the morning and afternoon work. In the infants' school
however (ages 6-7) the afternoon work showed no improvement
over the preliminary records, seeming accordingly to the author
useless ; the morning work showed over 1 2 per cent, of improvement.
In two experiments with boys and girls respectively, the ages being
about II years, the averages of both morning and afternoon work
improved on the preliminary records, but the excess of improvement
in the morning work was some 7 per cent. The fourth series, in a
boys' school with subjects of about 13 years, showed rather slight
improvement of both groups over the preliminary tests, but the
excess of the morning over the afternoon work was about 3 per cent.
The author concludes by remarking that the results are in general
accord with the opinions prevailing in the best current pedagogy;
the fatigue effects are very much lessened as the children rise in age
and mental capacity.
Ritter (4) describes a series of experiments with school children
by a method in which he expresses considerable confidence, a
Dictierverfahren adapted from Ebbinghaus, involving essentially a
memory process. There is a considerable review of other educa-
tionally used methods also. The experiments regularly show an
increase in the number of errors with progressive school work, and
according to the special conditions a number of inferences regarding
school economy are drawn. The conduct of a summer Ausflug
afforded an opportunity to test the performance in relation to
physical fatigue. It did not seem to be especially affected thereby.
Two interesting studies of the industrial bearings of the fatigue
problem are contributed by Bogardus (i). Its phases are enumer-
ated by him as (a) the relation of fatigue to industrial accidents,
(b) fatigue and industrial inefficiency, (c) fatigue and susceptibility
to contagious diseases, (d) fatigue and nervous diseases, (e) fatigue
and future generations, (/) fatigue and morals of working people.
The present articles deal with the first of these; how does modern
industrial labor affect the normal development of fatigue, and what
are the observable circumstances under which these processes result
in accidents? Can the subjective fatigue process be measured by
418 F. L. WELLS
means of controlled experiments in terms comparable to the observ-
able conditions preceding accidents, and thus be causally related
to them? A brief account is given of the physiological chemistry of
fatigue, and it is brought out that an important feature of it is to
diminish the accuracy of motor coordinations, whose relation to
accident is obvious. The writer's observations are that these are
characteristic of the phenomena immediately preceding industrial
accidents. Monotony resulting from the specialization of tasks is
emphasized. Then too, the tension under which work is done
diminishes the feeling of fatigue, increasing the liability to exhaus-
tion. Some figures of excessive work periods are given. Two
thousand six hundred and seventy-eight accidents are analyzed as
due to causes beyond the control of the injured, or to faulty re-
actions on their part. There seems to be a misprint making a dis-
crepancy in the presentation, but it appears that 2,203 or 82 per
cent, of these involved fatigue as a causal factor. A series of
experiments was conducted in a laboratory at Chicago University,
in which the operation of machinery at a dangerous trade was
simulated as closely as practicable, showing a score of errors doubled
for the second half of a fifteen-minute experiment over that of the
first half. Speeding up increased the disparity. The individual
differences are referred to a temperamental basis.
Despite the promise of the " Beeinflussung einf acker psychischer
Forgdnge" and the further emphasis laid by Kraepelin on its
problems under the concept of the kunstliche Geistesstorung, the
experimental psychology of drugs has not proved a field attractive
to most investigators. Hoch and Kraepelin observed the effects
of the tea-constituents. Haenel also, and Loewald, directly under
Kraepelin's influence, made special studies of trional and bromide
respectively, besides which there are the researches of Rivers,
Riidin and others on alcohol. Experiments upon single mental
functions with various drugs have also been reported. But the
necessary conditions for such experiments are not easy for the
ordinary laboratory to meet, and, it is possible that they have never
been so adequately met as in the study by Hollingworth (2) of the
influence of caffein upon various mental and bodily activities. The
circumstances of the work were unusual and occasion the appearance
in the book of some matter that is absent in the usual presentation
of research; yet the immediately satisfactory result of the work may
well lead to other similar applications, to the proper external pre-
cautions in which the present volume should be a useful guide. A
FATIGUE 4*9
general series of experiments was performed with small, medium and
large doses of caffein. Neither experimenter nor subject knew
whether the dose was of caffein or a control. The general result
of the experiments is that of stimulation without secondary depres-
sion, confirmatory to the previous conclusion of Rivers.1 An
extended account is given of the amount and character of sleep as
well as of the general health of the subjects during the experiment.
There is a uniform gain in health owing probably to the regular
living occasioned by the experimental conditions. After larger
doses (4gr. and over), "nervousness," dizziness and headache, with
disturbed sleep, were apt to follow. Increased constitutional sus-
ceptibility appears to be rather a function of body weight than other
factors, and the effect also depends upon the presence of food in
the stomach. No Abstinenzerscheinungen seem to have occurred
where they might have been expected. The experiments are
generally evaluated in such a way as to express efficiency in the
whole test, so that they do not measure the influence of caffein
on fatiguability, but indicate that it would serve to arrest the fall
of the work-curve in most of the functions tested.
Apropos of the work of this author here cited last year, may be
mentioned Weber's (6) reply to a criticism of his book by Leschke,2
that the former fails to make proper use of introspection in his
results, and publishes selected curves without a statement of the
number of cases in which the characteristic changes did not take
place. Weber replies in the first instance that the use of hypnotic
suggestion, by an operator acquainted with his subject, obviates
the necessity of introspective accounts. In the second, he replies
essentially that the exclusion of the negative records was justified
on the ground of intercurrent accidents which obscured their inter-
pretation. Leschke (3) declines to regard these explanations as
satisfactory.
On the whole, the attack upon the problem of fatigue from the
psychological side might on the surface appear somewhat dis-
organized. Instead of the coordinate investigations that came from
Kraepelin's laboratory, and the work that centered about the ges-
thesiometric method and the ergograph, researches now take on the
form of studying a very specialized situation by such method or
methods as are specifically adapted to it. This indeed is as it
should be, for the problem is a complex if not also a compound one;
1 For a tabulated statement of experiments and results see p. 422.
2 Arch.f. d. ges. Psychol., 1911, ax, 435-463.
420 H. L. HOLLINGWORTH
we may regret the difficulty, but not the fact that we are learning
better to recognize and deal with it. Fatiguability can be measured
more satisfactorily in some functions than in others. In one of these
we may yet find a measure of fairly general application, or it may
be that the search for the "measure of fatigue" is wholly a Ponce
de Leon's quest; but the specific educational and hygienic problems
in the economy of effort and the safeguarding of our energies the
above researches have placed us in a distinctly better position to
encounter.
REFERENCES
1. BOGARDUS, E. S. The Relation of Fatigue to Industrial Accidents. Amer. J.
of Social., 1911, 17, 206-222; 351-374.
2. HOLLINGWORTH, H. L. The Influence of Caffein on Mental and Motor Efficiency.
Arch, of Psychol., No. 22, 1912. Pp. 166.
3. LESCHKE, E. Erwiderung, etc. Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 1911, 21, 581.
4. RITTER, C. Ueber Ermudungsmessungen. Zsch. f. angew. Psychol., 1911, 4,
495-545-
5. THORNDIKE, E. L. The Curve of Work. PSYCHOL. REV., 1912, 19, 165-194.
6. WEBER, E. Bemerkungen zu der Abhandlung, Die Korperl. Begleiterscheinungen
seelischer Vorgange. Arch.f. d. ges. Psychol., 1911, 21, 579-580.
7. WINCH, W. H. Mental Fatigue in Day-school Children, as measured by Arith-
metical Reasoning. Brit. J. of Psychol., 1911, 4, 315-341.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF DRUG ACTION
BY DR. H. L. HOLLINGWORTH
Columbia University
Very little of the past year's work on the influence of drugs has
any particular psychological interest. Several symposiums on
anaesthetics have dwelt chiefly on the practical aspects of the topic.
Hirschel (2) sketches the development of the use of local anaesthetics
(suprarenin, cocain, novocain). Short and Salisbury (13) have
demonstrated that none of the commonly used drugs for superficial
application (belladonna, atropine, aconite, opium, chloroform,
carbolic acid, cocaine, menthol) possess any ansesthetic properties
when applied to the unbroken skin (ethyl chloride, which freezes
the skin, is the single exception to this generalization). Veley and
Symes (14) discuss the physical properties of stovain and its
homologues, and report investigations of their effects on contrac-
tility of isolated muscle, blood pressure, respiration, and nerve
conductivity. On the central nervous system and circulation
Fourneau's new salt is less active and methyl stovain at least no
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF DRUG ACTION 421
more active than stovain. Amyl stovain is less active on the
nervous system and its depressant effect on circulation is greater
and more gradual. Tested by the effect on conductivity of frog's
nerve, stovain and its homologues are more active local anaesthetics
than is cocain. Examination of the anaesthetic block in individual
nerve fibers indicates that the amplitude of a muscle twitch depends
on the number of fibers involved. Judged by muscular response
the anaesthetic block in individual nerve fibers to impulses evoked
by maximal stimuli, throughout a wide range of intensity, is complete
or zero.
From an analysis of cutaneous sensations as influenced by ethyl
chloride Franz and Ruediger (i) are led to conclude that the hairs
possess two distinct sensory end-organs, the one concerned with
sensations produced when the hair is brushed lightly, the other
concerned with sensations resembling pain and pressure, and re-
sulting from traction of the hair. In the case of the temperature
sensations no such normal dissociation was found. Differences in
the rate of recovery of sensibility are relied on in making these
analyses. Raimann (n) distinguishes between specific and purely
individual reactions to drugs, from the point of view of their effects
on consciousness, and raises the question whether all psycho-
pathological phenomena are not toxic in the long run. Isserlin (8)
seeks to defend Kraepelin's work on the effects of alcohol on the
capacity for work. The article is a reply to criticisms of Moll and
is purely controversial in character. Jacobson (9) reports observa-
tions made during a 15-minute nitrous oxide anaesthesia and discusses
recent papers of a similar sort. He finds reason to believe that the
"higher" functions (intellection) may persist for some time after
"lower" functions, such as vision, have failed. Consciousness is
reported as having been present at the very moment of the operation
in the interest of which the anaesthetic was taken. Langfeld (10)
reports experiments to determine the influence of caffein on "sup-
pression with negative instruction." The effect was found to be an
acceleration of the association reaction time with no deterioration
of inhibition.
Hollingworth (3, 4, 5, 6 and 7) reports experiments on the in-
fluence of caffein on mental and motor performance in typical
tests (tapping, steadiness, coordination, perception, association, dis-
crimination, calculation, cancellation, typewriting, quality and
amount of sleep, general health, weight, etc.). Attention may
be called to the attempt to develop a rigorous experimental tech-
422
H. L. HOLLINGWORTH
nique and a standardized series of tests for future work in this field.
Points of method and the respective merits of the various sorts of
tests are contained in the complete report (6). The experimental
results are summarized in a schematic table which is reproduced
here.1
THE INFLUENCE OF CAFFEIN (HOLLINGWORTH)
St.— Stimulation. O— No Effect. Ret.— Retardation.
Process
Tests
Primary Effect
Secondary
Reaction
Action
Time in
Hours
Duration
in Hours
Small
Doses
Me-
dium
Doses
I^arge
Doses
Motor Speed
Tapping
St.
St.
St.
None
•7S-I.S
2-4
Coordination
Three Hole
Typewriting
(a) Speed
(b) Errors
St.
St.
Fewer :
O
0
or all d
Ret.
Ret.
oses.
None
None
None
i-i-S
Results sh
total da
3-4
ow only in
y's work.
Association. .
Choice ....
Color-naming
Opposites
Calculation
Discrimination
Reaction time
Cancellation
S-W Illusion
St.
St.
St.
Ret.
Ret.
O
St.
St.
St.
O
?
O
St.
St.
St.
St.
St.
0
None
None
None
None
None
2-2.5
2-5-3
2-5
2-4
3-5
3-4
Next day
Next day
Next day
No data
General
Steadiness
Sleep Quality
Sleep Quantity
General Health
? Unsteadiness
Individual differences,
of administration, p
stomach, etc. No
previous caffein hab
None
depending
resence of
correlatioi
its.
i-3
on body w
bod subst.
i with ag
. 3-4
eight, time
mce in the
e, sex, or
Robinson (12), in a 1 6,000- word dithyrambic essay considers
hasheesh "from the historic, botanic, microscopic, chemic, physio-
logic, therapeutic, pharmacologic" and psychological viewpoints,
and contributes a sonnet to the drug. The "experiments" con-
sisted chiefly in administering hasheesh to individuals, whose sub-
sequent behavior, conversation, and general impressions are re-
corded. Two subjects give retrospective accounts of the subjective
features of hasheesh intoxication. Principal psychological results:
There is no record of a fatal dose; idiosyncracy is important; the
drug is a powerful narcotic, producing euphoria, erotic visions,
superficial associations, disturbance of time sense; tendencies to
dissociation are also reported.
1 See also p. 418.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF DRUG ACTION 423
REFERENCES
1. FRANZ, S. I., and RUEDIGER, W. C. Sensory Changes in the Skin Following the
Application of Local Anaesthetics and Other Agents. — I. Ethyl Chloride.
Amer. J. of PhysioL, 1910, 27, 45-59. Bull. Gov. Hosp. for Insane, 1911, 3,
15-26.
2. HIRSCHEL, G. Fortschritte auf dem Gebiete der Lokalanasthesie. Med. Klin.,
1911, 7, 1721-1724-
3. HOLLINGWORTH, H. L. The Influence of Caffein on Performance in Typewriting.
PSYCHOL. REV., 1912, 19, 66-73.
4. HOLLINGWORTH, H. L. Influence of Caffein on Quality and Amount of Sleep.
Amer. J. of Psychol., 1912, 23, 89-100.
5. HOLLINGWORTH, H. L. Influence of Caffein on Efficiency. Therap.Gaz., January
15, 1912. Pp. 16.
6. HOLLINGWORTH, H. L. The Influence of Caffein on Mental and Motor Efficiency.
(Archives of Psychology, No. 22.) The Science Press, Sub-station 84, New
York City. Pp. 167. $1.75 (cloth).
7. HOLLINGWORTH, H. L. Experimental Psychology and the Question of Public
Health. Ariz. J. of Educ., 1912, 3, 11-14.
8. ISSERLIN, M. Kraepelin's Experimente mit kleinen Alkohol-dosen. Zsch. f.
d. ges. Neur. u. Psychiat., 1911, 6, 589-604.
9. JACOBSON, E. Consciousness under Anaesthetics. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1911,
22, 333-345-
10. LANGFELD, H. S. Suppression with Negative Instruction. PSYCHOL. REV.,
1911, 18,411-424.
11. RAIMANN, E. Bewusstsein und Intoxikation. Ber. IV. Kong. f. exper. Psychol.,
1911, 242.
12. ROBINSON, V. An Essay on Hasheesh, including observations and experiments.
New York: Medical Review of Reviews, 1912. Pp. 83. $0.50.
13. SHORT and SALISBURY. The Action of Cutaneous Anaesthetics. Brit. Med. /.,
1910, i, 560-563.
14. VELEY, V. H., and SYMES, W. L. Certain Physical and Physiological Properties
of Stovain and its Homologues. Proc. Roy. Soc., 1911, 683, 413-420; 421-432.
SPECIAL REVIEWS
INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY
Henri Poincare. Dr. E. TOULOUSE. (Enquete medico-psycho-
logique sur la superiorite intellectuelle. Tome II.) Paris:
Flammarion, 1910. Pp. 204.
This book is one of a series of studies, the purpose of which is
to investigate, by the clinical method, the relation between intel-
lectual superiority and neuropathy. The plan is to proceed,
without prejudice, by testing several superior men by experimental
methods, in order to determine their physical and mental char-
acteristics. It is hoped that in this way some light may be thrown
on the psychological conditions of genius. Toulouse has already
reported (1896) such a study of Zola.
Zola's type was found to be characterized by prominent volun-
tary intellectual activity, clearly conscious, capable of intense, con-
centrated effort, with no tendency to perseveration after cessation.
His thought, as disclosed by the tests, was logical, methodical, and
seemed preeminently fit for the work of mathematical deduction.
The surprising thing was that such a type should have become the
prince of romance that Zola turned out to be. The tests of Poincare
show him to present a striking contrast with Zola. His mental
processes were shown to be flighty, uncontrolled, and spontaneous;
his attention instable and easily distracted; his performance ir-
regular and spasmodic, disclosing an evident neuropathic basis, —
apparently a type preeminently fitted for romance, but finding its
outlet in severe mathematical and philosophical creation.
The tests (which were made thirteen years before their publica-
tion) followed a technique which the author now recognizes to have
been quite imperfect and fragmentary, but they are said to have
yielded results quite sufficient to characterize the intellectual type
of the man. The investigation took account of the special topics
of heredity, development, physical condition, sensory acuity, various
kinds of memory, attention, imagery, reaction time, association of
ideas, language and handwriting, character, habits, opinions. The
account of the tests is followed by a synthesis in which is attempted
a general picture of Poincare's type, and an interpretation of the
conditions of invention and speculative genius.
424
INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY 425
The biographical sketch is meager and the attempts to trace
far-reaching effects of minor juvenile events are anything but con-
vincing, although they are of course offered only as suggestions.
Poincare resembled most his mother and grandmother, who, with
collateral relatives, are said to have shown special aptitude for
mathematical calculations. Several male members of the family
have had successful careers in neurology, meteorology, law, politics
and mathematics. There are traces of arthritic and rheumatic
heredity.
Poincare's development was not precocious, although he was
bright and showed, when quite young, mathematical ability of an
unusual order. His history, up to the age of 30 years, at which time
he was elected to the Academy of Sciences, was not unlike that of
many other mathematicians whose freedom from the necessity of
experiment allows them to make rapid progress. He was at one
time troubled by rheumatism, and in his childhood suffered from a
serious attack of diphtheria, followed by paralysis. This attack
is said to have profoundly modified his nervous system, perhaps pro-
viding the neuropathic basis for traits shown in later life, — such as
awkwardness, restlessness, flighty attention, distraction and general
sensori-motor deficiency.
The physical examination, anthropometric measurements, and
strength tests, along with the inquiry into habits of eating, sleeping,
and the use of narcotics, revealed nothing very unusual. Poincare
had head measurements somewhat larger than the average. He was
troubled with indigestion, did not use tobacco, used wine and coffee
only sparingly, and was troubled with insomnia. He was able to
work for but four hours a day, in two-hour periods, and the tendency
to automatisms and perseveration of psychic activity compelled
him to cease work for some time before retiring. He disliked
muscular exercise except for the automatic processes involved in
walking. His absent-mindedness was a matter of common com-
ment.
The eye and ear examination are said to have shown Poincare to
have been "rather feeble from a sensory point of view," although
the defects found do not strike the reader as being at all unusual.
Hearing was defective for low tones; orientation and localization
fair. There was myopia but no astigmatism, and campimetry
tests showed no abnormality. Muscular weakness was found, which
led to accommodation spasms. Poincare had no visual images or
memories, except in the transition state between Waking and sleep-
426 REVIEWS
ing, when he had frequent visual hallucinations of remarkable
distinctness. In his waking life he relied on motor images and
tendencies, thinking of geometrical forms in terms .of optical or
manual movements. He had no visual "schemes," but represented
time by a rotation of the eyes on their axes. In his youth he had
pronounced colored hearing, which was evoked not by the form
but by the sound of the letters. In the case of the vowels three of
the letters corresponded to the average found by Flournoy and
Claparede, who finds one out of seven people to have this colored
hearing. Poincare had no other synsesthesias. His movements
were characterized by uncertainty, irregularity, awkwardness and
hesitancy, and muscular reflexes were prominent.
Tests of recognition memory for the length of lines (a total of
only 14 different trials on 6 different standards) showed large errors
in the case of one line, and this is taken to be significant of vacillat-
ing attention. On the basis of these few trials Poincare is compared
with Zola and with Dalou, who made similar trials. In the case of
reproductive memory a total of 15 trials on 5 different standards
is taken to afford sufficient evidence that with Poincare repro-
ductive memory was poorer than recognition memory. A few
attempts at reproducing drawings exposed for 5 seconds are said
to have shown exceptional capacity in this respect, but the tests
were fragmentary and uncontrolled. The memories were held with
the aid of motor imagery, and the reproduction was often not from
the image but on the basis of an analysis of the material.
Poincare's memory span for digits was about n (as compared
with the ordinary record of 7 or 8). He had an auditory span for
letters of about 9 and a visual span of about 7. Brute memory (as
in the cases of Zola and Dalou as well) did not seem to be particu-
larly good. Much emphasis is laid on Poincare's tendency to use
memory devices in remembering this non-logical material, — he
employed analysis and incidental schemes whenever possible. He
had "a remarkable facility in mental calculation" which is said
not to be the rule with mathematicians.
In logical memory Poincare was superior to both Zola and
Dalou, and in the case of logical material his memory is again seen
to be analytical and artificial rather than brute, — all material was
placed in a coherent system, and it was the system rather than
the material which was remembered. This tendency to organize
is said to be a result rather than a cause of Poincare's high order of
intelligence.
INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY 427
The cancellation and reaction time tests lacked standardization
and mean nothing as they stand. The simple sensory reactions are
said to have been slower and more regular than those of the average
person, but the motor reactions much quicker. This accords with
the previous statements as to his general motor type. The most
significant thing about the reactions is said to be the wandering and
instable attention which they disclosed. It was difficult to keep
Poincare's mind on the tests, because his attention constantly
wandered to the apparatus. In receiving instructions for such
experiments Poincare did not seem to comprehend what was being
said, but appeared distracted and uninterested. He is said tb have
given the same impression to those whom he met in his daily rela-
tions. He was restless, could not remain lying in one position or
stay by one task, had no patience and abandoned his work whenever
it seemed to require any voluntary effort.
Tests of reverie associations and of free paired associates showed
absence of voluntary attention and predominance of purely verbal
association tendencies. (This conclusion is based on a single list
of 12 words written at random, and on a single list of the same
number of paired associates.) Binet's "cigarette description" test
was used, and Poincare found to belong to Binet's first type of
observer (simple description, with no evidence of reflection or
judgment, no display of erudition, no expression of fancy or senti-
ment). His description was remarkably lucid and clear.
Poincare spoke correctly, never learned his addresses by heart,
and made few corrections either in writing or in speaking. Indica-
tions of his temperament and type are said to be revealed in his
handwriting.
Poincare's opinions on various topics are given and several
peculiar habits of daily life enumerated, chiefly for the sake of
emphasizing his constant air of distraction, his impatience and
restlessness. He loved music, sketched a little, did not sleep
soundly, and often began to work on a problem only to abandon
it in the faith that it would somehow solve itself unconsciously or
that the right idea would come spontaneously on a later occasion.
He often began a memoir without having his conclusion in mind,
or even the development of the problem. He often wrote formulae
automatically for the sake of the chance associations which they
might bring. Quite in contrast with Zola, when he met with a
difficulty or with a point requiring voluntary effort, he abandoned
his work or proceeded to another part of it which would develop
more spontaneously.
428 REVIEWS
Poincare's genius is thus said to be incapable of explanation on
the basis of his sensori-motor equipment, his memory, or the speed
or control of his psychic activity. But his tendency to distraction,
automatisms, oscillating attention, restlessness, uncontrolled asso-
ciations, his reliance on chance syntheses and spontaneous ideas
are held to be significant for the type of genius required for mathe-
matical and philosophical speculation. In Poincare's case they
seem to have constituted a definite method of research. His
intellectual activity was, above all, spontaneous and automatic.
These traits may be supposed to have rested on a more or less
definite neuropathic basis. In extreme forms these distractions,
the flights of attention and ideas, the automatisms and the verbal
associations, the perseverations, etc., appear in marked forms of
idiocy and insanity. When not extreme and when directed by
some special aptitude (such as a congenital mathematical bent)
they seem to be the condition of such creative and inventive genius
as Poincare possessed. Inventive genius is characterized by
creation, and creation is a spontaneous activity or coordination
which may be given direction by some dominant interest or aptitude.
Genius is related to insanity chiefly by virtue of the common
characteristic of instable attention and spontaneous ideas and
associations. "There is but one psychology; its laws are common
to an imbecile and to an Aristotle."
In evaluating this study it is not necessary to emphasize unduly
the question propounded in its preface, — "Is genius a neurosis?"
Its chief value seems to the reviewer to lie in the fact that it is an
interesting attempt to study in a more or less intimate and intensive
way the psychological processes and type of an individual of marked
achievement. It is much to be regretted that the experimental
technique was not more systematically elaborated and standardized,
for in these days of interest in mental tests it would be valuable to
know the ways in which such admittedly superior individuals as
those enumerated by Toulouse,— Zola, Berthelot, Dalou, Rodin,
Puvis de Chavannes, Saint-Saens, Edmond de Goncourt, Daudet,
Lemaitre, Loti and Mallarme, differing as they do in their types of
achievement, would react to the simple tests now employed by those
interested in the measurement of intelligence.
Some of us are inclined to believe that these tests, which are at
best tests of capacity only, will never be able to throw much light
on the individual's probable performance in competitive life. The
concrete psychological life depends as much on motive as it does on
APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 429
capacity, and the degree to which motive and capacity sustain
each other is a difficult thing to measure under laboratory condi-
tions. It is to be hoped that Dr. Toulouse will utilize the improve-
ments in technique presented in his recent experimental manual or
in other test series of a similar kind in giving us more of these inti-
mate and intensive psychological biographies.
H. L. HOLLINGWORTH
BARNARD COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY
Increasing Human Efficiency in Business. WALTER DILL SCOTT.
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911. Pp. 331. $1.25
net.
Business men are commencing to look to psychology as a possible
assistance in their affairs. Only a few years ago any reference they
might make to it was of a derogatory character. But their con-
ception of the nature of psychology and of its possible applications
has undergone an enormous change. Today there are constant
references to psychological theories in all of the business and ad-
vertising journals. Some of these, indeed, still frankly oppose the
idea that there is anything of practical value to be found in a so-
called "academic study," but such writers are among the minority.
The writer of the book before me is one of the first psychologists
to write for the business world. Today, he is known to nearly
every advertising man in the country. To him is due much of the
credit for the changed attitude toward psychology which has just
been pointed out.
His first two books dealt with the application of psychology
to advertising, his third with salesmanship and this, his fourth book,
is concerned with the problems of the business executive. In this
he has taken up such general psychological terms as "imitation,"
"pleasure," "loyalty," "relaxation," etc., and devoted a chapter
to each. General principles are stated and each is illustrated by
many concrete examples. The last four chapters deal mainly with
" habit formation." Several practice curves of his own and of other
investigators are given and the chief principles to be deduced from
them are stated.
The book contains nothing new to the psychologist. It was not
written, however, for him, but for the business man. Technicalities
are largely eliminated and the whole work is mainly inspirational
430 REVIEWS
and suggestive in character. It should, however, be useful to the
psychologist as auxiliary reading in general courses, as it gives large
opportunity for the application of general principles to concrete
cases.
The reviewer wishes that the book had contained some reference
to the recent work on "fatigue," "optimum working periods," etc.
The steady increase in output per worker in present-day business is
developing a new problem for careful study. We need to know
what are the limits within which a worker may increase his produc-
tivity without becoming liable to disastrous "after-effects." To
have discussed the subject of "relaxation" and "competition"
and not to recognize that there is danger from overwork (aside
from "worry," which apparently can be eliminated) is a serious
defect to my mind. Psychology has much in store for the business
world in teaching better methods of work, but it will not have done
its duty until it has also pointed out the limits to the length and
speed of work which cannot be exceeded without permanent injury
to the worker.
EDWARD K. STRONG, JR.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
ESTHETICS
Beauty and Ugliness and Other Studies in Psychological ^Esthetics.
VERNON LEE and C. ANSTRUTHER-THOMSON. London and
New York: John Lane Company, 1912. Pp. ix + 376.
The five studies making up this volume begin with an essay on
"Anthropomorphic ^Esthetics" having for its theme that "the
discovery of this projection of our inner experience into the forms
which we see and realize is the central discovery of modern aes-
thetics." The second paper "Esthetic Empathy and its Organic
Accompaniments" is a translation from Vernon Lee's original
French in the Revue Philosophique for 1907. The third "The
Central Problem of ^Esthetics" has appeared in the Zeitschrift
fur Aesthetik, 1910, and the fourth "Beauty and Ugliness" is re-
printed from the Contemporary Review of 1897. The fifth study
entitled "^Esthetic Responsiveness" is a series of extracts from
Vernon Lee's gallery diaries from 1901 to 1904. These observations
upon her aesthetic reactions to various works of art were noted down
in the galleries or within twenty-four hours of the time of observa-
tion. They have not been worked over into essay form " because,"
ANTHROPOLOGY 43 l
the author writes, "I wanted to place my materials unspoilt at the
disposal of other students."
The chief point of theoretical interest in the book is the modifica-
tion, by Lee, of the theory put forth in the early essay on Beauty and
Ugliness. It will be remembered that in that essay the authors
based their theory of empathy (though it was not then called by
that name) upon the James-Lange theory of emotion, and explained
the aesthetic enjoyment of visible beauty as a function of the physio-
logical changes — circulation, respiration, imitative muscular adjust-
ments, etc. — occasioned by the view of the object, and felt by the
observer as a mass of sensory data. Vernon Lee is now inclined to
believe that it is not necessary always to have actual sensory experi-
ence of these processes during aesthetic empathy. She holds,
rather, that with some observers the attribution to the object of
one's own condition takes place in terms of mental imagery —
especially kinaesthetic imagery — instead of present sensational
experience.
One purpose of the book is to stimulate experimental psycholo-
gists to the study of aesthetic appreciation for visual form. Much
more, however, has been done in this field, particularly in America,
than the author seenls to recognize.
It is important for students of aesthetics to have the writings of
Lee and Thomson on this subject gathered into a book. And a
new and real contribution has been made in the mass of intro-
spective records from the gallery notes.
The book is agreeably printed and contains nine attractive
plates.
KATE GORDON
Los ANGELES
ANTHROPOLOGY
Psyche1 s Task. A Discourse concerning the Influence of Superstition
on the Growth of Institutions. J. G. FRAZER. London: Mac-
millan, 1909. Pp. 84.
Any one who values his time is likely to eye Frazer's recent
extensive works with the wish that several volumes might be trans-
figured in some non-Euclidean way into the dimensions of an
hour's reading. This of course cannot be done, for their method
is essentially anecdotal, and any attempt to reduce their extent
would result in elimination and not in condensation. Nevertheless,
in Psyche's Task, under an obscuring title and without professing
to do so, Dr. Frazer has epitomized for us a train of thought which
432 REVIEWS
permeates and perhaps dominates all his writings. The discourse
is dedicated to "all who are engaged in Psyche's task of sorting
out the seeds of good from the seeds of evil." To such seriously
intending persons the author of the Golden Bough presents a carefully
selected group of characteristic anthropological anecdotes by which
he proposes "to prove, or at least make probable, that among
certain races and at certain stages of evolution, some social institu-
tions which we all, or most of us, believe to be beneficial, have
partially rested on a basis of superstition." Some justification for
such a multitude of saving clauses will be granted when we find
that the institutions in question are civil government, private
property, marriage, and the secure enjoyment of human life.
It would be distinctly unfair to give the impression that the
author rests these institutions entirely upon a basis of superstition,
or that he praises superstition. And yet the reviewer, compelled as
he is to believe that there is a meaning in the discourse, retains the
impression that there is a dilemma implied which is none the less
convincing for not being expressed. The author seems to mean
that either these institutions lack a good deal of the sanctity which
some of the unthinking of us incline to attach to them, or else
superstition is sanctified by its parental relation to them.
In the case of civil government superstition has worked mostly
through the taboo, placing a hedge of sanctity around the personal
head of the government. The supposed sanctity of the chief is his
principal or only means of enforcing his orders. This sanctity
extends to his belongings, and we have accounts, of psychological
interest, of persons who have died after learning that they had
inadvertently used the king's lost tinder-box or eaten the remains
of his dinner. Because of his sanctity and of his relations with
spirits there is often ascribed to the king power over the rains and the
fruitfulness of the soil; and then the author, with no visible smile
in the printed page, proceeds to say that in Africa "droughts or
famine are set down to the weakness or ill-will of the king and
accordingly he is punished, or deposed, or put to death." After
that we are told in conclusion that "many peoples have regarded
their rulers, whether chiefs or kings, with superstitious awe as
being of a higher order and endowed with mightier powers than
common folk. Imbued with such a profound veneration for their
governors and with such an exaggerated conception of their power,
they cannot but have yielded them a prompter and more explicit
obedience than if they had known them to be mere men just like
ANTHROPOLOGY 433
themselves." This proves the value of superstition as a foundation
of government.
With regard to private property the case is simple. Almost
universally primitive and other peoples have relied upon one an-
other's superstitious fears to secure themselves in the possession
of whatever they have acquired. Taboo, magic, the imprecations
of the owner, all impress the covetous with the dangers of stealing.
It is not impertinent to remark however that our author calls
attention later on to the enormous waste and destruction of property
for which superstition is responsible. If superstition is conservative
of private property rights, it is not conserving of property in
general; the destruction of property in connection with funerals is
an instance of waste directly due to superstition and to that alone.
Marriage, or the tribal code of sexual relations, is protected by
a great number and variety of superstitious sanctions. Breaches
of the marriage laws are generally believed to affect the community
as a whole, causing public calamities such as droughts. "Wherever
these superstitions prevail it is obvious that public opinion and
public justice will treat sexual offences with far greater severity
than is meted out to them by peoples who, like most civilized
nations, regard such misdemeanors as matters of private rather than
public concern. . . . And conversely, wherever we find that incest,
adultery, and fornication are treated by the community with ex-
treme rigor, we may reasonably infer that the original motive for
such treatment was superstition." The question why various
peoples come to regard certain relations of the sexes as immoral
is mentioned and left unanswered, but the connection between
disorders of nature and disorderly sexual relations is traced to the
belief that a connection exists between reproduction in nature and
reproduction in man; men mimicking or recapitulating the processes
of nature exercise a magical influence over them.
Finally superstition, notably the fear of ghosts, has sanctified
human life. In this section the argument, if there is any, is exceed-
ingly obscure, and seems to the present writer quite inconclusive.
To be sure there is evidence that murderers are made uncomfortable
under the system of quarantine by which the community seeks to
protect itself from the evil spirits who dog the heels of man-slayers.
But there is no evidence of any such fatal results to the murderer
as those which overtake the petty thief or those who trespass upon
the king's prerogatives. The ghosts of the slain are less discriminat-
ing in their vengeance than the spirits who maintain the taboo.
434 REVIEWS
"Indeed the ghosts of all who have died a violent death are in a
sense a public danger; for their temper is naturally soured and they
are apt to fall foul of the first person they meet without nicely
discriminating between the innocent and the guilty." Out of a
varied array of ceremonies having to do with the protection of the
living from the spirits of the dead there is not one item which indi-
cates that the primitive mind recognizes any difference between the
dead who have been respectfully treated before their death and the
victims of human violence; all the dead are equally dreaded, no
matter how they came by their death. The most cruel of the social
punishments which are mentioned are not those accorded to
murderers but to innocent widowers. "His miseries begin with
his wife's death. He is immediately stripped of all his ornaments,
abused and beaten by his wife's relations; his house is pillaged, his
gardens devastated. ... He may not hunt or fish with the others,
his presence would bring misfortune; the spirit of his dead wife
would frighten the fish or game. ... If he were dead he could not
be ignored more completely. He has become a nocturnal animal.
He is forbidden to show himself in public, to traverse the village,
to walk in the roads and paths." Is it the author's naivete or a
sly malice that lets him introduce as an evidence of the influence of
superstition in increasing the respect for human life the Fijian
custom of forestalling subsequent spirit activities by burying the
aged and sick alive? A more forceful, if less trustworthy, report
is presented in the case of the Chinese, whose reverence for the
spirits of the dead is said to increase their respect for the aged and
helpless, and who are said also to resort to suicide in order to free
themselves from the limitations of the body and so as ghosts to
torment those who have injured them.
Having shown that superstition has been helpful in developing
government, private property, marriage, and respect for human
life, the discourse closes by insisting that right action is more valu-
able than right opinion, and that we should not be blind to "the
benefit which superstition has conferred on society by furnishing
the ignorant, the weak, and the foolish with a motive, bad though
be, for good conduct." To what extent government, private
property, marriage, and respect for human life still rest upon super-
stition the reader is left to guess for himself.
WARNER BROWN
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
THE ASSOCIATION EXPERIMENT 435
THE ASSOCIATION EXPERIMENT
Untersuchungen uber die Konstanz und den Wechsel der psychologischen
Konstellation bei Normalen und Fruhdementen (Schizophrenen).
W. PFENNINGER. Jahr. f. psychoanal. u. psychopathol. Forsch.,
1912, 481-524.
Experimented Beitrdge zur Psychologie des psycho-galvanischen
Phdnomens. ESTHER APTEKMANN. Ibid., 591—620.
The outlook upon the association experiment is broadened several
degrees by these two studies, which are the same in make-up and
general viewpoint. In the first and longer of the two, the same
association experiment of 100 words was repeated with 8 normal
subjects, 4 men and 4 women, eight times at weekly intervals; a
similar procedure was carried out with n cases of dementia prsecox,
6 men and 5 women. The reaction times of the women begin about a
third longer than those of the men, decrease more regularly, and end
somewhat shorter. The tendency to change the response- words is
somewhat more pronounced in the men than in the women subjects,
and progressively decreases in both; more rapidly with the men at
the end, in the women at the beginning. Komplexmerkmale are
pronouncedly more frequent in the women, and do not decrease in
the later series so much as those of the men. The changed responses
show through all series somewhat longer reaction times than those
which are not changed. In the relation of the Komplexmerkmale
to the tendency to change responses, those without Komplexmerkmale
are changed much less than those with them, but in the detail of
the latter there is a complicated sex difference, which the author
endeavors to interpret. The stimulus words are characterized in the
earliest series by more Komplexmerkmale, the more change they are
to- show. Those associations which are inconstant attach to the more
emotional constellations. Associations which are later to change
also have longer time in the first and second repetition. The author
seems also to believe that there is a significant tendency for -the time
of an association to be longer if it is to show a change in the next
repetition. In the later repetitions, the changed responses concen-
trate themselves upon stimulus words which have also given rise to
earlier change, i. e., certain stimulus words show throughout special
liability to changed responses. These associations are apt to be
grouped (Storungsketteri) with evidences of perseverative phenomena.
The reaction times average some three to four fold longer in
436 REVIEWS
the pathological cases, and the difference between the men and women
is, except at first, more marked than in the normal. (Initially the
reaction time of the women averages shorter than that of the men.)
The course of the reaction times through the eight repetitions is
much changed, and: the curve of the dementia praecox men corre-
sponds closer to that of the normal women, that of the dementia
praecox women to the normal men. Further, a similar series of ex-
periments with six women subjects, by a woman experimenter , gave
now a result similar to the previous one of the man experimenter
with the men dementia praecox subjects. Other results point in the
same direction; e. g., the number of Komplexmerkmale, while as pre-
viously more frequent in the women throughout (and in both much
increased), shows in the curve of decrease rather the reversed re-
lationship of the men and women subjects from that found in the
normal. Again the woman experimenter finds with women dementia
praecox subjects the same result as the man experimenter with the
men dementia praecox subjects. These seem very suggestive findings.
The responses are changed much more frequently in the dementia
praecox than in the normal subjects; the sex relationship is indeter-
minate and is not altered in the time relations of the changed and
unchanged responses.
The second paper deals with normal subjects only, adding some
material on the psychogalvanic reflex. This is from some early
work by Jung and Brill, with a very simple technique. As-
sociation series of the same 50 or 25 stimulus words were given re-
spectively 6 times weekly and 7 times daily to groups of 4 and 5
subjects. A heightened reaction time in the fourth experiment,
noted in Pfenninger's men subjects, is seen here also, and a corre-
sponding phenomenon appears again in the galvanic reactions; the
authors talk of homosexual resistances. As with Pfenninger the
number of changed responses decreases with repetition, and there is
less change in the daily series than in the weekly. Changed responses
have longer times, and are more associated with Komplexmerkmale
than unchanged ones, as we should expect. Also the galvanic re-
actions show, in their relation to these phenomena, about what our
knowledge of this method would lead us to anticipate. The deflections
tend to drop in the later series, though not always in correspondence
with the association time. Deflections above the median are also
issociated with greater change in response than those below it; in a
greater degree than the change is related to the remaining
merkmale.
THE ASSOCIATION EXPERIMENT 437
The reviewer, and doubtless others, have noted the possibility
of associative responses being influenced by the personality of the
experimenter.1 The result of Morawitz's contribution to Pfenninger's
article is in conformity with this idea, and Aptekmann tests it out
somewhat further. Experiments were made by Jung and the author,
with six men and six women subjects. The differences are often too
small for significance, but in a special experimental series the women
subjects show a rather constant deflection with the woman experi-
menter, much greater and decreasing deflections with the man
experimenter. The men subjects show with the man experimenter
about the same result as the women, with the woman experimenter
much smaller deflections, slightly decreasing. Beyond the general
decrease with repetition there is nothing of certain significance in the
association times. Detailed examination seems to the author to
reflect the greater prominence of sexual factors in the experiment with
opposite sex, of the economic one in the others. The two sets were
not with the same stimulus words. Words which begin with a high
deflection tend to preserve this superiority in repetition. Dif-
ferences may be shown in the personal influence of various experi-
menters on the results. The author considers that in the present
instance other factors outweigh the sex difference; the point is well
taken that the experiment here becomes a measure of the experimenter
as well as the subject.
Dealing with the responses by classification in quasi-logical cate-
gories seems to have been abandoned by Jung's pupils. This method
is essentially a criterion of personal association type, and in Pfen-
ninger's problem would not have made so much difference; but some-
thing of the sort should probably have been attempted in Aptek-
mann's research, with a simplification of the original Jung-Riklin
categories. That no generalizations on the effect of sex differences
in the experimenter should be made on the basis of one experimenter
of each sex, seems as clear to the author as to the reviewer.
A broader criticism to be made of these two papers is one that
applies to much of the work from their common source. There seems
to be no adequate conception of the significance of variability. In a
school that makes so much of individual psychology, it is the more
regrettable that individual differences should be all but ignored in a
study whose material must contain much of value for their under-
standing. The authors like to deal with their averages without state-
ment of deviations as though every member of the group had shown
1 PSYCH. REV., 1911, 18, 6-7. PSYCHOL. MONOG., 1911, 13, No. 57, p. 79.
438 REVIEWS
the same measure. As a result, it often happens that the authors
strain every neurofibril for the uniform psychological interpretation of
some phenomenon whose factual validity is far from established in the
given results. Psychoanalysis has an excellent Problemstellung but
its methods as yet lack sense of proportion; psychoanalysts seek the
road to knowledge with a good compass, but an execrable map.
While then it seems very plain that the presentation of the results
could have been improved upon, experimental practice in psycho-
analytic envisagement should be in every way encouraged, that the
more doubtful theories associated with the method may be submitted
to proper objective test.
F. L. WELLS
McLEAN HOSPITAL
A CORRECTION
To THE EDITOR OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN:
Mr. F. S. Breed has called to my attention the fact that a
criticism suggested in my review of his monograph, "The Develop-
ment of Certain Instincts and Habits in Chicks" (see the August
number of the BULLETIN), was forestalled by him in the work
reviewed. I suggested that in the experiments which he describes,
where a chick rejected blue when that color was offered with black
and also when it was offered with white, there might have been
identification of the absolute brightness of the blue, which would
thus have been seen not as a color but as a grey. Mr. Breed how-
ever says on page 69: "It may be suggested that after the long
period of training the chicks respond to a particular brightness
value, the blue amounting to certain degree of grey. But No. 32
and No. 33 rejected blue (tint No. i) when it was used in combi-
nation with the much brighter yellow." I am glad to take this
opportunity of apologizing for the carelessness shown in over-
looking the fact that more than one saturation grade of blue was
used in these experiments, a fact which decidedly strengthens the
case for color discrimination.
MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN
VASSAR COLLEGE
BOOKS RECEIVED DURING OCTOBER
LEUBA, J. H. A Psychological Study of Religion. New York:
Macmillan, 1912. Pp. xiv+37i. $2.
WATSON, J. The Interpretation of Religious Experience. 2 vols.
Glasgow: Maclehose & Sons, 1912. Pp. xiv+375, x-f 342. $6.
MORGAN, C. L. Instinct and Experience. New York: Macmillan,
1912. Pp. xvii+299. $1.25.
HOFFDING, H. A Brief History of Modern Philosophy. (Trans, fr.
German by SANDERS, C. F.) New York: Macmillan, 1912.
Pp. x +324. $1.25.
CALKINS, M. W. A First Book in Psychology. (3d rev. ed.)
New York: Macmillan, 1912. Pp. xix+426. $1.90.
CALKINS, M. W. The Persistent Problems of Philosophy. (3d rev.
edition.) New York: Macmillan, 1912. Pp. xxvi+577.
$2.50.
HELLER, T. Grundriss der Heilpadagogik. (2. umgearb. u verm.
Aufl.) Leipzig: Engelmann, 1912. Pp. xi+676. Mk. 17,
Geb. 18.
ELSENHANS, T. Lehrbuch der Psychologic. Tubingen: Mohr
(Paul Siebeck), 1912. Pp. xxiii+434. Mk. 15.
POFFENBERGER, A. T. Reaction Time to Retinal Stimulation, with
Special Reference to the Time Lost in Conduction through Nerve
Centers. (No. 23 of Archives of Psychology.) New York:
The Science Press, 1912. Pp. iii+73.
CULLER, A. J. Interference and Adaptability. An Experimental
Study of their Relation, with Special Reference to Individual
Differences. (No. 24 of Archives of Psychology.) New York:
The Science Press, 1912. Pp. v+8o.
TODD, J. W. Reaction to Multiple Stimuli. (No. 25 of Archives
of Psychology.) New York: The Science Press, 1912. Pp.
MARTIN, L. J. Die Projektionsmethode und die Lokalisation visueller
und anderer Forstellungsbilder. Leipzig: Barth, 1912. Pp. 231.
439
NOTES AND NEWS
DR. E. B. TITCHENER, Sage professor of psychology in the
Graduate School of Cornell University, has been appointed head of
the combined undergraduate and graduate sections of the depart-
ment of psychology and lecturer in psychology in the College of
Arts and Sciences. In the latter position Professor Titchener will
give lectures in elementary psychology. In connection with the
changes mentioned it is significant to note the retention of the
professorship in the Graduate School.
SAMUEL W. FERNBERGER, Pn.D. (Pennsylvania), succeeds Dr.
Harry P. Weld as instructor in experimental psychology at Clark
University.
T. H. RAINES, professor of psychology in the Ohio State Uni-
versity, is on leave of absence for the present year. Professor
Haines plans to spend the year in visiting a number of European
psychopathological institutes.
DR. C. E. FERREE, of Bryn Mawr College, has been advanced to
an associate professorship of experimental psychology. A separate
building has been granted him by the College to be used exclusively
as a graduate laboratory of experimental psychology. This building
will be fitted up for research work alone and will, when finished,
consist of eight rooms. One or more optics rooms will be provided,
furnished with sky-lights, diffusion sashes, etc., for the control of
illumination, and with concrete piers running to the ground to give a
vibrationless support for delicate apparatus. The regular services
of a mechanician will be available for this laboratory.
PROFESSOR E. A. KIRKPATRICK, of the State Normal School,
Fitchburg, Massachusetts, would be glad to receive letters from all
those who would care to have a series of photographs, similar to
those issued by the Open Court Publishing Company, of present-day
psychologists, educators, and men of science. Suggestions con-
cerning the photographs which should be placed in such a collection
would be welcomed by him, and the amount of interest in the
matter indicated by the communications received will determine
whether it is feasible to undertake the task of collecting and pub-
lishing.
44°
Vol. IX. No. 12. December 15, 1912
THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN
VALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS
BY PROFESSOR C. H. COOLEY
University of Michigan
In a large view of the matter valuation is nothing less than the
selective process in the mental-social life of man: all values are in
some sense survival values and have a bearing on the onward tendency
of things. They indicate significance with reference to some sort of
a crisis, and are factors in guiding the behavior of some sort of organ-
ism. The idea might easily be extended to lower forms of life and
made to embrace all the psychical aspects of selection; we shall be
content, however, to consider some of its human applications.
The manner in which a certain object develops value for a man
in a particular situation is a matter of the commonest experience:
at every instant we are passing from one situation to another and the
objects about us are taking on new values accordingly. If I wish to
drive a nail I look at everything within reach with reference to its
hammer-value, and if the monkey-wrench has more of this than
any other object available I reach for it, its function increases, it
survives, it is the fit, is a growing factor in life. And men, nations,
doctrines, what you will, wax and wane by analogous acts of selection.
The essential things in the conception of value are, then, a human
organism (not necessarily a person) a situation and an object; the
last having properties that have an influence on the behavior of the
organism in view of the situation. The organism is, of course, the
heart of the whole matter. We are interested primarily in that
because it is a system of life, and in values because they mould its
growth. The various values acting on the organism are ever being
integrated by the latter (as by a man when he " makes up his mind ")
and the situation is met by an act of selection, which is a step in
growth, leading on to new situations and values.
441
442 C. H. COOLEY
Valuation includes the history that lies back of values, that ante-
cedent process of growth and struggle by which any object of thought
or sentiment comes to have more or less power over choice and action.
If, for example, diamonds, the paintings of Corot, the dogmas of
Christian Science, the idea of brotherhood, the attainment of the
SouthPole, the services of a physician, have power, in various ways and
degrees, over human behavior, it is because there has been a previous
mental and social process out of which these objects have emerged
with a certain weight for certain mental situations.
The organism which the idea of value implies, the life which is
the heart of the process, about which values center may be personal
or it may be impersonal: a doctrine, an institution, a movement, any-
thing which lives and grows, gives rise to a special system of values
having reference to that growth, and these values are real powers in
life whether persons are aware of or interested in them or not; the
growth of language, for example, of myth, of forms of art, works
on to important issues with little or no conscious participation on
our part. In general there are as many centers of value as there are
phases of life.
The various classifications of value are based in one way or another
on that of the objects, organisms or situations which the general idea
of value involves. Thus, taking the point of view of the object, we
speak of grain-values, stock-values, the values of books, of pictures,
of doctrines, of men. Evidently, however, these are indeterminate
unless we bring in the organism and the situation to define them.
A book has various kinds of value, as literary and pecuniary, and
these again may be different for different persons or groups.
As regards the forms of human life to which values are to be
referred, it seems to me of primary importance to make a distinction
which I will call that between human-nature values and institutional
values.
The first are those which may be traced without great difficulty
to phases of universal human nature. The organism for which they
have weight is simply man in those comparatively permanent aspects
which we are accustomed to speak of as human nature, and to
contrast with the shifting institutions that are built upon it. The
objects possessing such values differ greatly from age to age, but the
tests which are applied to them are fundamentally much the same,
because the organism from which they spring is much the same.
A bright color, a harmonious sound, have a value for all men, and
we may reckon all the more universal forms of beauty, those which
VALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 443
men of any age and culture may appreciate through merely becoming
familiar with them, as human-nature values. Such values are as
various as human nature itself and may be differentiated and classi-
fied in a hundred ways. There are some in which particular senses
are the conspicuous factors, as auditory and gustatory values.
Others spring from the social sentiments, like the values of social
self-feeling which underlie conformity, and the values of love, fear,
ambition, honor and loyalty. Closely related to these are the more
universal religious and moral values, which, however, are usually
entangled with institutional values of a more transient and special
character. The same may be said of scientific, philosophical and
ethical values, and great achievement in any of these fields depends
mainly on the creation of values which are such for human nature,
and not merely for some transient institutional point of view.
The second sort of values are those which must be ascribed to an
institutional system of some sort. Human nature enters into them
but is so transformed in its operation by the system that we regard
the latter as their source, and are justified in doing so by the fact that
social organisms have a growth and values that cannot, practically,
be explained from the standpoint of general human nature. The
distinction is obvious enough if we take a clear instance of it, like the
distinction between religious and ecclesiastical values. Such general
traits of religious psychology as are treated in William James's
Varieties of Religious Experience, correspond to values that we may
call values of human nature; the values established in the Roman
Catholic Church are a very different matter, though human nature
certainly enters into them. In the same way there are special values
for every sort of institutional development — legal values, political
values, military values, university values, and so on. All technical
values come under this head. Thus in every art there are not only
human-nature values in the shape of phases of beauty open to men
at large, but technical values, springing from the special history and
methods of the art, which only the expert can appreciate.
Pecuniary values should, I think, be reckoned in this second class,
for reasons which I shall not attempt to give at present.
This distinction, as I have remarked, rests upon the fact that there
are forms of social life having a distinct organic growth, involving
distinct needs and values, which cannot be understood by direct
reference to universal human nature and the conditions that immedi-
ately influence it. I am aware that it may be difficult to apply to
particular cases. It resembles most psychological distinctions in
444 C. H. COOLEY
offering no sharp dividing line, being simply a question of the amount
and definiteness of social tradition and structure involved. All
human values are more or less mediated by transient social con-
ditions: they might, perhaps, be arranged in a scale as to the degree
in which they are so mediated; some, like the taste for salt, com-
paratively little, others, like the taste for poetry, a great deal. In
dealing with the latter kind we come to a point on the scale where the
social antecedents take on such definite form and development as to
constitute a distinct organism which must be studied as such before
we can understand the value situation. In moral values, for example,
there are some, like those of loyalty, kindness and courage, which
spring quite directly from universal conditions and may be regarded
as human-nature values; others, like the obligation to go to church
on Sunday, are evidently institutional. I need hardly add that
human and institutional values often conflict, or that reform consists
largely in readjusting them to each other. Nor need I discuss in
detail the familiar process by which human-nature values, seeking
realization through a complex social system, are led to take on
organization and an institutional character which carries them far
away from human-nature and in time calls for a reassertion of the
latter; or just how this reassertion takes place on the initiative of
individuals and small groups. Any one may see such cycles in the his-
tory of the Christian church, or of any other institution he may
prefer to study.
It is noteworthy, also, that there are words that may be under-
stood in either a human-nature or an institutional sense, and so are
ambiguous with reference to this distinction. For example educa-
tional value might be a real human value, or it might refer to tests of a
special and technical sort, and "religious" often means ecclesiastical.
The various human-nature and institutional values of a given
object differ among themselves as the phases of the human mind
itself differ: that is, however marked the differences, the values are
after all expressions of a common organic life. There is no clean-cut
separation among them and at times they merge indistinguishably
one into another. An organic mental-social life has for one of its
phases an organic system of values. For example the aesthetic and
moral values may seem quite unconnected, as in the case of a man
with a "fair outside" but a bad character, and yet we feel that there
is something beautiful about perfect goodness and something good
about perfect beauty. It is agreed, I believe, that the best literature
and art are moral, not, perhaps, by intention, but because the two
VALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 445
kinds of value are related and tend to coincide in their completeness.
Alongside of these we may put truth-value, and say of the three that
they are phases of the highest form of human judgment which often
become indistinguishable.
The institutional values are also parts of the same mental-social
system, distinguished by their derivation from a special social
organism. They merge into the human-nature values, as I have
suggested, and unless the two are in opposition it may be hard to
distinguish between them. An institution, however, seldom or never
corresponds so closely to a phase of human nature that the insti-
tutional values and the immediately human values on the whole
coincide. An idea, in becoming institutional, merges itself with the
whole traditional structure of society, taking the past upon its
shoulders, and loses much of the breadth and spontaneity of our
more immediate life. There are no institutions that express ade-
quately the inner need for beauty, truth, righteousness and religion
as human nature requires them at a given time: no church, for ex-
ample, ever was or can be wholly Christian.
It is apparent that the same object may have many kinds of value,
perhaps all of those that I have mentioned. It is conceivable that
man may turn all phases of his life towards any object and appraise
it differently for each phase. Consider, for instance, an animal like
the ox, of immemorial interest to the human race. It may be
regarded as beautiful or ugly, may arouse the various emotions, as
love, fear or anger, may give rise to moral and philosophical questions,
may be the object of religious feeling, as in India, and have a value
for the senses of sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste. It has also,
especially among the pastoral peoples, notable institutional values;
plays a large part in law, ceremony and worship, and, in our own
tradition, has an eponymous relation to pecuniary institutions.
Since values are a phase of the public mind, of the same general
nature as public opinion; they vary as that does with the time, the
group and the special situation. Every nation or epoch has its more
or less peculiar value system, made up of related parts: any one can
see that the values of the Middle Ages were very different from our
own : they are a part of the ethos , the mores •, or whatever you choose
to call the collective state of mind.1 Each individual, also, has a
system of values of his own which is a differentiated member of the
1 The human-nature values, of course, vary much less than the institutional
values. Thus fashions vary infinitely, but conformity, the human nature basis of
allegiance to fashion, remains much the same.
446 C. H. COOLEY
system of the group. And these various group and individual aspects
hang together in such a way that no one aspect can be explained except
by reference to the whole out of which it grows. You can hardly
understand how a man feels about religion, for example, unless you
understand also how he feels about his industrial position and
about other matters in which he is deeply concerned; you must, so
far as may be, grasp his life as a whole. And you will hardly do
this unless you grasp also the social medium in which he lives. Any
searching study of any sort of values must be the study of an organic
social life.
The process that generates value is mental but not ordinarily
conscious; it works by suggestion, influence and the competition and
survival of ideas; but all this is constantly going on in and through
us without our knowing it. I may be wholly unaware of the genesis
or even the existence of values which live in my mind and guide my
daily course: indeed this is rather the rule than the exception. The
common phrase "I have come to feel differently about it" expresses
well enough the way in which values usually change. The psychology
of the matter is intricate, involving the influence of repetition, of
subtle associations of ideas, of the prestige of personalities, giving
weight to their example, and the like; but of all this we commonly
know nothing. The idea of punishment after death, for example,
has been fading for a generation past; its value for conduct has
mostly gone; yet few have been aware of its passing and fewer still
can tell how this has come about. This trait of the growth of values
is of course well understood in the art of advertising, which aims,
first of all, to give an idea weight in the subconscious processes, to
familiarize it by repetition, to accredit it by pleasing or imposing
associations, to insinuate it somehow into the current of thought
without giving choice a chance to pass upon it at all.
If the simpler phases of valuation, those that relate to the personal
aims of the individual, are usually subconscious, much more is this
true of the larger phases which relate to the development of complex
impersonal wholes. It is quite true that there are " great social values
whose motivating power directs the activities of nations, of great
industries, of literary and artistic 'schools,' of churches and other
social organizations, as well as the daily lives of every man and
woman — impelling them in paths which no individual man foresaw
or purposed."1 Nor is there anything mysterious about this: it is
simply one aspect of the fact that the activities, even the existence,
1 B. M. Anderson, Jr., Social Value, p. 116.
VALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 447
of the forms of social life are not necessarily or usually objects of
consciousness to those involved in them. Every one must see that
this is true as regards the past, and there is no reason to suppose that
the present is different. Without doubt we are taking part in in-
stitutional movements of which we know nothing, and which remain
for the future historian or sociologists to discover, just as the organic
growth of language, of myth and the like, which went on in the minds
of our remote predecessors, has been brought to light by the philolo-
gists and ethnologists of our own day. Most of the difficulty that
we have in understanding statements of the sort just quoted arises
from our not having assimilated fully the modern discovery that
reflective consciousness embraces only a small part of life.
Values imply an act of selection, which may also be unconscious
as well as conscious. Selection is the critical activity in which the
organism turns one way or another under the pull of values; but we
often do not know that, as individuals, we are in such a crisis, and
still less do we know it for the groups and institutions of which we
are a part. And while values may be altered more or less in the
crisis — nothing stands still — they yet exist antecedently to it, very
much as the military power of a nation exists before it is tested
in war, or the "strength" of a presidential candidate before the
campaign opens.
Like all phases of the human mind valuation may be regarded
either in the individual or in the collective, or public, aspect; these
two, of course, being aspects merely, which all phases of value,
human-nature or institutional, present. Public valuation is the
process viewed in a large way, as it goes on in the general mind, in
its actual complexity of growth. In studying it one looks for broad
features, with no special regard to persons. Private valuation is the
same thing observed working itself out in the individual mind; it is
a particular phase of the collective process that for various reasons
may have an interest of its own. The distinction is the same as that
between public and private opinion, the one being a collective, the
other a particular view of a common whole.
Of these phases public valuation is for many purposes the more
important. It is the real thing, the big thing, in which other phases
of value find their relation and significance. In the widest sense it
embraces the genesis, competition and organization of particular
values; you aim to see the value movement as a living and various
whole, of which all particular values and kinds of value are members.
It is a real drama, with continual conflicts, crises and denouements.
448 C. H. COOLEY
It may be too large to grasp satisfactorily, but at least we should
recognize that nothing less affords an adequate basis for under-
standing the past or predicting the future. If we consider the valu-
ation of particular objects of any sort, such as, let us say, the program
of socialism, the works of Bernard Shaw, or Mr. Roosevelt's leader-
ship; or of such staples of the stock market as wheat or New York
Central shares; we may see that the position of these objects can be
understood only with reference to the larger drama of valuation in
which they have their parts: particular prices and judgments are not
enough, we must see the interworking and tendency of the whole.
"The play's the thing" and the function of the object in the play.
Next to this, if we must be content with a cross section, is the
dynamic situation, the state of the play at a given time, made up of
many cooperating and conflicting factors from the interworking of
which the future must emerge.
I suppose, for example, that it is the ability to grasp the course
or state of value in this large way that distinguishes the financier from
the mere speculator, the statesman from the mere politician, or the
competent critic of literature or art from the mere reviewer. Indeed
it is apt to be what distinguishes the capable man from the incapable
in any field. It may be said in general that the power to grasp
process, to see the drama of values, is the height of the practical.
It is what we all have to do in the real work of life, and the man who
can do it has breadth, caliber, general capacity, can take responsi-
bility, and does not require some one else to show him what to do.
Private valuation is a particular phase of public valuation, and
one cannot be understood without the other. The individual in
forming his special estimates, no matter how peculiar they may be, is
working with material he gets from others— suggestions and im-
pressions that come from the mental currents of his time and from the
general stream of history. This material he works up in his own
way, always at least a little different from that of any one else and
sometimes a great deal. In proportion to the importance of these
differences he exerts a special influence upon values in the general
movement of thought. The tendency to ignore exceptional indi-
viduals, and consider only groups, is a serious error. The non-
conformer, though he stand alone, is often the most significant fact
in the situation, and may prove to be that one who, with God, is a
majority.
^ Private valuation, then, stands in no opposition to public valu-
ation; it is, even in the extremes of non-conformity, a phase of the
VALUATION AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 449
same process. The idea of an essential opposition between the .two
can arise only when public valuation is, wrongly, identified with
value conventions or institutions. With these private valuation
may easily be at variance.
Of course this large view of the process, which I call public
valuation, should by no means be confused with institutional valu-
ation. The latter is that part of the process whose explanation must
be sought in those special tendencies of institutional life which often
depart so widely from the simpler workings of human nature. Insti-
tutional valuation has its public and individual aspects like any other
social phenomenon. The good churchman, in expressing the views
of the church, may be expressing himself as truly as he does the
institution; but it may be that his self is so institutionized as not to
express human nature.
It is not uncommon, however, to think of public value, or, as it
is usually called, social value,1 as that which is fixed by some insti-
tution, or other formal process. There is something in this left over
from those mechanical theories of society that could not see any unity
in human life except this unity took a mechanical form — a contract,
a creed, a government, or the like. The public or social must, then,
be the institutional, the conventional, and this was set over against
the individual, who was thought of as becoming social only by some
such combination. I trust that I need not linger to refute this
outworn idea.
The institutions, we may note in this connection, usually have
rather definite and precise methods for the appraisal of values in
accordance with their own organic needs. In the state, for example,
we have ancient institutions of choice, which include elaborate methods
of electing or appointing persons, as well as legislative, judicial and
scientific authorities for passing upon ideas. The church has its
tests of membership, its creeds, scriptures, sacraments, penances,
hierarchy of saints and dignitaries, and the like, all of which serve as
standards of value. The army has an analogous system. On the
institutional side of art we have exhibitions with medals, prize
competitions, election to academies and the verdict of trained critics:
in science much the same, with more emphasis on titles and academic
chairs. You will find something of the same sort in every well
organized traditional structure. We have it in the universities, not
1 1 prefer the former term in such connections because the use of "social" to
denote collective aspects, in antithesis to "individual," perpetuates the traditional
fallacy that the individual is not social.
450 C. H. COOLEY
only in the official working of the institution, but in the fraternities,
athletic associations and the like.
It is also noteworthy that institutional valuation is nearly always
the function of a special class. This is obviously the case with the
institutions mentioned, and it is equally true, though perhaps less
obviously, with pecuniary valuation.
The application of these principles to the latter I hope to take up
upon another occasion.1
1 A paper dealing with some phases of pecuniary valuation will appear in the
American Journal of Sociology for January, 1913.
GENERAL REVIEWS AND SUMMARIES
CRIMINAL PSYCHOLOGY
BY HARRY W. CRANE
The University of Michigan
Dr. Wilhelm Stekel (5) makes an interpretation, truly Freudian
in character, of the thefts of kleptomania as symbolisms of suppressed
sexual acts. Mr. Albrecht (5) in a note says that "it is our firm
conviction that criminal psychology may obtain from Freud's dis-
coveries the most stimulating suggestions, and we hope that his
theories and conclusions will be received with less prejudice here in
America than they have encountered in Europe." Evidently his
wishes are being gratified, although a few at least of the more careful
psychologists and psychiatrists, are evincing a little of the wiser
European conservatism toward the Freudian theories.
Doubtless there may be something of sexual symbolism in some
of the abnormal acts of some of the psychoses, but to go to the
extremes to which the writer in question goes seems absurd. To find
in sexual symbolism the explanation for each and every psychosis
indicates a psychological fanaticism that might well itself be looked
upon as symbolic of a perverted sexual basis.
Those who read the above paper and also read "Berufswahl und
Kriminalitat" (6) will no doubt be willing to agree that Dr. Stekel is
an extremist. In this article he maintains that the final psychosis
of a neurotic individual is brought about by his struggle to suppress
his inherent tendencies to crime. His theory of universal criminality
among children and the relation of pseudo-epilepsy to crime are
suggestive of Lombroso, although they lack the carefully worked out
support that characterizes the theories of the latter.
The real thesis of the paper relates to the influence which criminal
tendencies have upon the choice of a profession. The main influ-
ences, aside from paternal, which affect one in choosing a profession
are held to be the desire to suppress, to give vent to, or to seek pro-
tection from criminal tendencies.
In a very few pages and with the citation of only three cases
Wm. Healy (2) sets forth more clearly and concisely than others have
done in several times the space, the essential psychological nature of
45'
452 HARRY W. CRANE
crime and the necessity of the application of the genetic method to
each individual case. The differential results found by this method
should be followed by differential treatment. He recognizes, with
others, that a large per cent, of recidivism has its basis in feeble-
mindedness, epilepsy, and insanity. Yet it is refreshing to find that
he asserts that "no one germ will be found eating out the moral
nature."
Dr. Bernard Glueck (i) by means of a thorough study of five cases
that came under his observation in the criminal department of the
Government Hospital for the Insane shows the existence of what he
considers to be a born criminal type. This type is based on a defec-
tive mentality, an unstable nervous disposition of an hereditary
character. He further believes that "the incorrigible criminal is
sufficiently characterized by such unmistakable features (as) would
enable us to recognize him when we see him, and thus justify his
permanent isolation from the community." Of particular signifi-
cance is the relation between the criminality and the insanity of
these people.
"The same degenerative soil which makes the development of the
psychosis possible in the one case, expresses itself in crime in another
instance. The factors which determine whether the one or the other
phase will manifest itself, depend entirely upon environmental
conditions, and are accidental in nature. The stresses which these
defective individuals meet with in freedom need not have such a
strong influence upon them as to produce a psychosis. The want of
moral attributes makes it possible for them readily to surmount
many difficulties by means of some criminal act, difficulties, which
in a normal person, would require extraordinary effort to remove.
When placed, however, under the stress of imprisonment where they
can neither slip away from under the oppressive situation, nor square
themselves with it by some criminal act, the organism becomes
affected to such a degree that the development of a psychosis is
greatly facilitated. The character of the delusional fabric of these
individuals is such that one can easily find a ready and more or less
correct explanation for it. It is chiefly a compensatory reaction in
an endeavor to make a certain unpleasant situation acceptable."
The strength of the position taken in this article is increased if
we discuss in connection with it two other papers. In "The 'Im-
prisonment Psychosjs,'" by Dr. W. W. Richardson (4), we have a
description of cases that very closely simulate those cited by Dr.
Check—cases with a defective, unstable basis which develop criminal
CRIMINAL PSYCHOLOGY 453
acts, and later upon incarceration, the psychosis. Dr. Richardson
and the authorities quoted by him agree that the psychosis is brought
on by the bringing of an unstable, defective character into conflict
with the restrictions of prison discipline.
The conclusions of Dr. Richards' article (3) also lend support to
those of Dr. Glueck. A comparison of facts in the United States with
those in France and Germany seems to show that in all these countries
a considerable number of the military offenses are committed by the
insane, and that the insanity has been brought on by inability to
withstand the strict military discipline. Dr. Richards states that a
large per cent, of these cases recover (57 per cent, in the experience
of the Government Hospital for the Insane).
In the study of the "imprisonment psychosis" and in that of the
insane military offenders the majority of the cases seem to be due to
dementia prsecox, while Dr. Glueck maintains that his cases were not
of this nature. Yet the results of each of these three studies agree
in this : that a defective, deficient, or neurotic temperament unable to
undergo the restrictions of society results in crime; unable to bear up
under a more rigorous restriction (prison or army discipline), it
results in a psychosis. Under the more favorable hospital environ-
ment it tends to recover its normal, though not the normal condition.
The further fact brought out by these writers, that this unstable
class of people tend to be recidivists adds weight to Dr. Glueck's plea
for a permanent segregation of the class.
REFERENCES
1. GLUECK, B. A Contribution to the Catamnestic Study of the Juvenile Offender.
Amer. J, of Crim. Law and Criminal., 1912, 3, 220-244.
2. HEALY, WM. The Problem of Causation of Criminality. Amer. J. of Crim. Law
and Criminal., 1912, 2, 849-857.
3. RICHARDS, R. L. A Study of Military Offences Committed by the Insane in the
United States Army, for the Past Fifty Years. Amer. J. of Insanity, 1911, 68,
279-291.
4. RICHARDSON, W. W. The "Imprisonment Psychosis." Amer. J. of Insanity,
1912, 68, 473-483.
5. STEKEL, W. The Sexual Root of Kleptomania. (An abridgment by Adalbert
Albrecht.) Amer. J. of Crim. Law and Criminal., 1911, 2, 239-246.
6. STEKEL, W. Berufswahl und Kriminalitat. Arch, fur Kriminal Anthr. und
Kriminalistik, 1911, 40, 268-280.
SPECIAL REVIEWS
ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Totemism, An Analytical Study. A. A. GOLDENWEISER. J. of Amer.
Folk-Lore, 1910, 23, 179-293. (Reprint. Pp. 115.)
Most theoretical works on totemism are of a constructive or
synthetic character, seeking to find the essence of the phenomenon
in one or more basic sociological or psychological features, and then
superadding other features as necessary or typical correlates in a
coherent system of belief and practice that presents uniform or parallel
characteristics wherever found. Goldenweiser's paper differs funda-
mentally in method from these, as its subtitle indicates. Its main
purpose is to analyze out the various ethnological elements that form
part of any given totemic system, to investigate the claims of each as
a necessary feature of totemism, and to discover the most generalized
psychological definition applicable to all its forms. In this way a
new and independent standpoint is gained for the understanding of
the mechanism of totemism.
In the introduction (pp. 1-5) the author deals with the definitions
of totemism that have been given by three well-known English
anthropologists, Frazer, Haddon and Rivers. It should be noted
that Goldenweiser is not primarily concerned with a balanced review
of prevalent theories of totemism and its origin, and hence refers to
them only for illustrative purposes. It is the type of totemic theory
exemplified by Frazer that he has chiefly in mind throughout the
paper as opposed to his own standpoint, but issue is taken also with
certain other writers on totemism, such as Lang, Major Powell,
Hill-Tout, and Father Schmidt. As a result of his brief review of
the definitions of totemism given by Frazer, Haddon and Rivers,
Goldenweiser finds that there are chiefly five types of belief and
custom that form elements of totemic systems as ordinarily defined.
These are clan exogamy, totemic names of clans, a religious attitude
toward the totem (an animal, plant or inanimate object serving as the
protector or crest of the clan), taboos (generally of eating and killing)
in regard to the totem, and belief in descent from the totem. As the
author pertinently remarks, "The justification of regarding the
various features of totemism as organically interrelated is not a priori
454
TOTEM ISM 455
obvious." And the whole trend of Goldenweiser's argument is to
the effect that they are not thus "organically interrelated" in origin
or by a uniformly operative process of evolution, but have become
so in whole or in part, and often with still other features not generally
considered of such fundamental importance, by various processes of
secondary association.
The major part of the paper is taken up with a survey, first, of
the totemic features found in two areas in which totemism is charac-
teristically developed — Australia and the northwest coast of America
(PP- 5~52); secondly, of the general occurrence in different parts of
the world of ethnological features, believed to be symptomatic of
totemism, divorced from any totemic setting, and, conversely, of the
frequent non-occurrence of one or more of the features in cases where
one can nevertheless justly speak of a totemic society (pp. 53—86).
A careful comparison of the two regions selected, as a test example,
for relatively detailed treatment shows certain analogies and, on the
other hand, several fundamental differences. The results of the
comparison are summarized in tabular form (p. 51). We find that
in both western British Columbia and Central Australia, exogamy,
that is, the prohibition of intermarriage among the members of a
social unit, is found, with this important difference, however, that
while among the Indians of the north Pacific coast (Tlingit, Haida,
Tsimshian, northern Kwakiutl) the totemic social units (phratries or
clans) are exogamous as such, among the natives of Australia it is
the larger non-totemic social units (phratries, otherwise known as
"moieties," and marriage classes) that as a rule regulate exogamy,
the totemic clans being in most cases exogamous only by virtue of
their being phratric subdivisions. Moreover, the totemic social
units of both areas bear totemic names, though the Australian clans
are more consistent in this respect than the tribes of British Columbia.
Of the four Tsimshian clans or phratries (sociological nomenclature
is in somewhat of a muddle in West Coast ethnology) only two have
names referring to their animal totems or crests (wolf and eagle);
the phratric subdivisions (Tlingit clans and Haida "families"), while
possessing their distinctive crests, have names of a local character,
thus pointing to the inference that they are social units originally
confined each to a single village; furthermore, the Eagle clan (prob-
ably better called phratry) of the Haida is just as often termed Gitins,
a name of no ascertainable totemic significance. I am inclined to
think that Goldenweiser makes too much of this relative lack of
totemic names in British Columbia as a point of difference between
456 REVIEWS
the two regions compared. The essential fact is the existence of
crests associated with definite social units (phratries and clans),
which may well be compared with the Australian totems that are
associated with clans; the mere matter of whether or not the names
of the totemic social units have distinct reference to the totems is,
where the phratric or clan totems or crests themselves stand out
clearly, of distinctly secondary importance.
Right here a more serious criticism must be made. For one who
aims to be rigidly analytical in method, Goldenweiser does not carry
his analysis far enough. The concept "an exogamous totemic clan"
involves three distinct sociological concepts — the clan, the totem or
crest, and the practice of exogamy. These are mutually independent
concepts. Now the clan or other subtribal social unit is of such wide
occurrence and is so much a matter of course as a starting point for a
totemic society, that there is perhaps no need to isolate the phe-
nomenon of a grouping into clans as one of the symptoms of totemism,
though it might have been useful to entertain for a moment the
possibility of totemic features becoming associated with a tribe or
other undivided social unit as such. Be this as it may, it is clear
that the concept of the totem, including that of crest or badge, as
associated with the clan, should be analyzed out as one of the symp-
toms of totemism. Strange to say, Goldenweiser has not definitely
done this, but has tacitly subsumed the notion under the concepts of
exogamy of totemic social units and totemic naming. This seems
unjustifiable, for Goldenweiser shows clearly that the clan totem as
such can subsist without either exogamy, totemic naming, or, it
may be added, worship of or other religious attitude toward the totem
(see pp. 82-86). It may be objected that if we eliminate from a
totemic system the totemic name, the taboo against eating, killing or
acting in some other specific way toward the totem, the belief in
descent from or other form of kinship with it, and a religious regard
therefor, there is no totem left wherewith to totemize. The phe-
nomenon of experience, divested of all its sense attributes, has
evaporated into a metaphysical "Ding an sich." This objection is
not valid. It happens not infrequently that a social unit is associated
with an animal, plant or inanimate object merely as a crest or emblem,
often guarding the right to display or represent it in some way or
other. The totem is in such cases seen in its most simplified form, as
a communal badge or heraldic symbol, or, again, it may be merely
referred to in a legend. It should be noted in passing that the active
association of art and totemism, on which Goldenweiser justly lays
TOTEMISM 457
stress, is not to be confounded, though it may be intimately con-
nected, with the heraldic aspect of totemism. In British Columbia
in particular, where the totem often tends to become a mere crest,
it would have been quite in place to isolate the clan totem (crest) as
such as one of the elements of totemism.
The further comparison given by the author of Australian and
West Coast totemism discloses instructive differences. Taboos,
particularly of eating and killing, are common enough in both areas,
but while both totemic and non-totemic taboos are found in Australia,
they are never associated in British Columbia with totems as such.
In central Australia the belief in descent of the clansmen from the
totem has taken firm hold, whereas it is but imperfectly developed
among the natives of the Pacific coast, being absent among the
northern tribes (Tlingit, Haida, Tsimshian) and occurring to a
limited extent among the Kwakiutl. In Australia magical cere-
monies for the increase of the food supply and the belief in reincar-
nation of mythical ancestors are intimately connected with the
totemic system; in British Columbia, while both magical ceremonies
and belief in reincarnation are found, they are not in any way brought
into relation with the totemic social organization. On the other
hand, while the practice of acquiring guardian spirits and its elabo-
ration into a system of secret societies is bound up among the natives
of the northwest coast of America with their system of crests, this
is far from being the case in Australia, though the guardian spirit
idea is not entirely absent in that continent. Furthermore, in
western British Columbia it has left a deep impress upon the deco-
rative art of the natives, and to some extent seems even to have been
influenced in its development by that factor; in Australia, however,
decorative art, which is far less highly developed than in British
Columbia, is less apt to be involved in totemic ceremonies than in
that region. The ranking of individuals and clans gives West Coast
totemism a peculiar coloring of its own, this feature being entirely
lacking in Australia. Finally, the number of totems found in any
tribe of the West Coast is small, while an Australian tribe regularly
comprises a very large number of totems. As a net result one
certainly gets the feeling that the two totemic systems compared owe
their undeniable points of similarity, coupled with other points of
difference, to what has been termed convergent evolution, and that
these totemic systems in themselves have arisen by a process of
secondary association of ethnological elements of disparate nature
and origin, rather than by one of an evolution of 'custom and belief,
458 REVIEWS
with definitely determined sequences. It is the object of the latter
part of the paper to heighten this feeling into assurance. .
The pages devoted to exogamy and endogamy (pp. 53-73) are
among the most interesting of the paper. Evidence is presented
to show that clan exogamy frequently occurs unassociated with
totemic features; further, that totemic clans need not be exogamous.
It is made clear that clan exogamy is not the only type of group
exogamy found among primitive peoples, but that we have also to
deal with local exogamy, and kinship exogamy based on a classi-
ficatory system of relationships. Goldenweiser lays stress, and
justly, on the importance and difficulty of determining, in cases of
intercrossing or subdivision of social units, which of the units is
inherently exogamous and which only secondarily so. Thus, a clan
may be exogamous either by virtue of its own character as a social
group, determining exogamous relations; or by virtue of its forming
a part of a larger group of such character; or because it is localized
in a village which is exogamous as such; or because all the members
of the clan, according to a classificatory system of relationship, are
held to be kin to one another, and thus debarred from intermarrying
by the rule of kinship exogamy. Bearing these important distinc-
tions in mind, Goldenweiser makes a good case for the view that the
typical Australian totem clan is not a true exogamous unit, the rule
of exogamy as such referring to the phratry or marriage class. To
call a clan exogamous under such circumstances might be to commit a
fallacy similar to that of describing New York State as a common-
wealth forbidding slavery, when, as a matter of fact, this is already
implied in the statement that it forms part of a larger commonwealth
forbidding slavery.
As to the next totemic feature examined, that of totemic names
(PP- 73-75)) Goldenweiser gives a number of instances, besides those
already adduced for British Columbia, of totem clans that do not
bear the names of their totems, though the naming of a group from
its totem is one of the "features" of totemism least often absent.
Examples are then given to show that the totem is by no means always
conceived of as the ancestor of the clansmen (pp. 75 and 76). The
modest proportion of cases of taboo that are distinctly totemic in
character is next indicated, while conversely it not infrequently
happens that a totemic group observes no taboo in reference to its
totem (pp. 76-80). The independence of the taboo as such of any
necessary connection with totemism is conclusively demonstrated.
Finally, in discussing the religious aspect of totemism (pp. 80-86), so
TOTEM1SM 459
often believed to be the significant aspect of the problem, Golden-
weiser shows, first, that the worship of plants and animals is a uni-
versal ethnological feature not at all necessarily connected with a
totemic society; secondly, that the religious attitude toward the
totem in a totemic society is often but weakly developed, at times
even absent altogether. The religious side of totemism, even where
present, never exhausts, and generally makes up but a small part of
the total religious life of the totemic community. Thus the claims
of totemism to be considered a distinct stage in the history of religion
are disposed of without much difficulty.
The following pages of the paper (pp. 86-98), defining more
sharply the character and genesis of the "totemic complex," sound
the keynote of the study and form its most valuable and suggestive
portion. Totemism is shown to consist not of one particular eth-
nological feature, or even of a combination of two or more such
features, but might be understood as a process of intimate association
of one or more of these with social units. Goldenweiser's own words
are worth quoting here: "This association with social units is what
constitutes the peculiarity of totemic combinations. Elements which
are per se indifferent or vague in their social bearings (i. e., as related
to social units) — such as dances, songs, carvings, rituals, names,
etc. — become associated with clearly defined social groups, and by
virtue of such association themselves become transformed into social
values not merely intensified in degree but definite and specific in
character. The one obvious important means by which the asso-
ciation with definite social groups is accomplished is descent" (p. 93).
In proceeding to define totemism Goldenweiser points out that a
definition of the phenomenon which aims to be inclusive must exclude
reference to the specific content of different totemic systems, must
express the nature of totemism as a relation subsisting between ethno-
logical elements rather than as their sum, and must exclude the
notion of religion, for which he substitutes, as a more inclusive
concept, "objects and symbols of emotional value." Owing to the
fact that totemism is variable not only in place but in time, Golden-
weiser thinks it necessary to describe it as an ever-changing process,
rather than in purely descriptive terms as a static phenomenon.
While it would be quite wrong to deny this dynamic element in
totemism, one may reasonably doubt whether it would not have been
better to neglect this aspect for the purpose of a definition. As
Goldenweiser's definition now reads, "Totemism is the tendency of
definite social units to become associated with objects and symbols
460 REVIEWS
of emotional value" (p. 97), the emphasis seems somewhat misplaced,
for all ethnological complexes, and, for that matter, all single elements
of custom and belief, must be understood dynamically, that is,
historically. In the definition as stated there is somewhat of a
contrast implied, though only vaguely, between totemism as a dy-
namic phenomenon and other cultural phenomena, a contrast which
naturally weakens rather than strengthens the emphasis on the
historical method of ethnology that Goldenweiser has in mind. The
revised, and, to my mind, more acceptable, definition would read:
Totemism is the association of definite social units with objects and
symbols of emotional value. The brief psychological definition
given by Goldenweiser, "Totemism is the specific socialization of
emotional values" (p. 97), while intelligible in the light of all that
precedes it, is hardly serviceable as a definition aiming to stand on
its own feet; the process of association, while implied in it, is not
sufficiently emphasized.
In the final pages of the paper (pp. 98-110), on the whole its weak-
est portion, the methodology of current evolutionary theories of
totemic origin is first illustrated, then unfavorably criticized. Gold-
enweiser takes issue with the assumption of a regular one-line evo-
lution of the forms of totemic society. He points out that it is
unwarranted to select one feature of totemism as the primary element
historically of the whole complex, and to establish a natural sequence
for the appearance of the other features as growing up out of the
primary feature. Merely plausible or intelligible evolutionary
theories of the origin and development of cultural phenomena can in
this way be built up without end, and it is often difficult to choose
among them. Plausibility as such, however, has no evidential value.
Another fundamental error of the evolutionist school of anthropology
is the failure to recognize the vast importance of borrowing and
assimilation of cultural elements. Processes which in higher levels
of culture are recognized without question are often tacitly ignored
in the study of primitive society. The lack of documented history
is too often, ostrich fashion, taken to mean the lack of history, and
primitive customs are too often thought of as the psychologico-
mechanical product of "primitive" modes of thought acted upon by
alleged principles of social evolution. That a whole totemic complex
may be due primarily to processes of borrowing and assimilation is
shown by the totemism of the western Shuswap, Lillooet, Chilcotin,
and Carrier (pp. 103-106), for among these Indians we can trace the
profound totemic influence of the coast tribes. The method employed
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 461
by Goldenweiser in his study of totemism, the analysis of a cultural
phenomenon into its elements and the historical interpretation of the
phenomenon as an association, varying in character from place to
place, of these elements, is the method so often insisted upon by
Professor Franz Boas as that best fitted to give fruitful results in
anthropological investigations. The insistence on the importance
of mutual cultural influence of neighboring tribes is also one of the
leading notes in the ethnological method of Boas and his school. The
examples given by Goldenweiser of cultural borrowing in British
Columbia in other phases than totemism serve to illustrate further
his methodological standpoint.
One is at times disposed to complain of the rather small number
of examples given or range of tribes covered for certain points, but
it should be remembered that the study is in no sense a survey of
totemistic fact, any more than, as we have seen, it is one of totemistic
theories. Once and again a fact is not stated quite accurately
(thus, p. 42, totem poles can hardly be said to be a striking feature
of all or even most British Columbia villages), or is doubtfully
pertinent to the argument (thus, p. 21, the restriction of whaling
among the Nootka to certain families has nothing to do with taboo).
These are but slight blemishes, however, that in no way seriously
impair the value of the study. It is hardly too much to say that
Goldenweiser's Totemism forms one of the most notable, perhaps the
most notable, contribution to ethnological method yet produced by
American anthropologists.
EDWARD SAPIR
DIVISION OF ANTHROPOLOGY,
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CANADA
Sociology in its Psychological Aspects. CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.
New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1912. Pp. xiv+417.
This clearly written work is perhaps the most explicit of any of
our recent sociological texts in its recognition of psychology as
fundamental. The author expresses his indebtedness to Professors
Dewey and Mead for his point of view, and readers of the BULLETIN
will not find it unfamiliar. But the theory takes on added definite-
ness and significance in its applications, and the book should make a
valuable contribution toward the sociological method.
Functional psychology is interpreted first of all as implying
"that consciousness does work, does function, and as such has a
survival value in the life process." This is against a mechanistic
462 REVIEWS
theory according to which the explanation of social phenomena is
to be sought in physico-chemical processes, whereas consciousness is
not a factor and performs no work in the social life. But, conscious-
ness in its functioning is itself regular, and does its work within
universal organic processes, especially the processes of habit and
adaptation. This, as against an indeterministic point of view which
would make consciousness a lawless factor.
Assuming then that consciousness does work, the key to its
nature is to be found in the character of the life process in which it
functions. The capital fact here is that the life process is from the
outset essentially social. "Life is not and cannot be an affair of
individual organisms. The processes of both nutrition and repro-
duction in all higher forms of life involve a necessary interdependence
among organisms of the same species, which, except under unfavor-
able conditions, gives rise to group life and psychical interaction.
. . . Looked at from the standpoint of the whole evolution of life,
it is really the result of the breaking up of the life-process into several
relatively independent centers while the process itself remains a
unity." Social life is in part a function of the food process (including
defense against enemies as the negative side of the food process) and
in part a function of the reproductive process including as the more
important part of this the care of offspring. The importance of this
second factor in the author's opinion needs to be emphasized in
contrast with social theories which seem to imply that the only
function of the social life is to secure an adequate supply of material
goods.
As the life-process is social so also is the individual mind. Con-
sciousness is the chief connecting line between individuals living in
association. "Instincts, emotions and sensations of one individual
organism often seem made to fit into corresponding mental processes
of other organisms; and varied means of interstimulation and
response are developed." For "the life-process of the individual
is only a part of the larger life-process of the group to which he
belongs." When life activities — procuring of food and protection
against enemies — are carried on by groups, the only way the mind
can control them is through some form of psychic interconnection
between the individuals of the group. "The social character of
mind is an expression of the fact that it has to do with mediation of
process which is carried on by several cooperating individual units;
while society, the psychical interrelation of these individuals, means
that there is one common process of living carried on by these co-
SOCIOLOGY IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 463
operating units on the psychic plane, that is, on the plane of inter-
stimulation and response. Society in the concrete sense, in other
words, may be practically denned as a group of individuals who carry
on a common life-process by means of interstimulation and response."
Social coordination or "coadaptation" is then fundamental for
the sociologist. It is from this point of the view that the author
would explain and evaluate the various processes which have been
emphasized as the essential features of social life. "Folkways" are
simply regular modes of social activity in a given group of people,
and might better be called "social habits," for they are found in
small groups such as the family as well as in large groups. Simmel's
"types of coordination or association" would on this basis get a
principle for classification, and without the consideration of the actual
situations in which various types arise there is practically no limit
to the number that might be enumerated. Subjective expressions
of coordination are found in common feelings, ideas, and beliefs.
Imitation plays a part in mediating relatively simple and unconscious
coordination between individuals, but it is an error to confine at-
tention to this one element since "unlikeness of activity is necessary
for many of the higher forms of social coordination." Again, sym-
pathy and understanding are both products and instruments of
coordination. Sympathy is probably proportionate "not to the
amount of resemblance (Giddings) but to the harmony of the co-
ordination between individuals."
Coordination in so far as it persists in uniform fashion may be
called "social habit." As the life-process encounters shocks, dis-
turbances, and various maladjustments, other types of communi-
cation are especially important to bring about social change; crit-
icism, discussion, suggestion are evoked. Revolutions have for
their first weapon certain destructive and disintegrating ideas. A
certain anarchy often marks the violence and completeness with
which habits and institutions are overthrown, and at such times the
more simple and animal activities come to expression.
The processes of social adaptation may be stated not merely in
objective terms as above but also in the more subjective terms of
social self-control, under which would fall activities of government,
education, religion, and moral ideas. The phenomena of group will,
group individuality of interests, and group rivalry may also be viewed
as aspects of the general processes of coordination. Successive
chapters take up the roles of instinct, feeling, and intellect in the
general social process.
464 REVIEWS
This general point of view enables the author to recognize the
role of imitation (Baldwin, Tarde) and sympathy (Giddings), while
not according to either the fundamental position as constitutive
principle of social life. Each is the instrument of interaction.
Perhaps the advantage of the author's point of view is best seen in
his chapter on the theory of social progress. The anthropo-geo-
graphical theory, the biological or ethnological theory, the economic
theory, the idealogical theory are all seen to rest upon the recognition
of some one factor in the life process to the exclusion of others.
The range and variety of human instincts on the one hand and the
flexibility of human intelligence on the other are evidences of the
impossibility of defining the whole life process, and consequently the
lines and causes of progress, by any single one of the theories named.
It may be arrogating more to the adjective "sociological" than this
would necessarily carry to designate the synthetic theory of progress
which would give this due recognition to all factors as "the socio-
logical" theory, but without disputing over the name the point of
view may be approved by the social psychologist.
Numerous queries as to detail might be raised — e. g., it seems to
suppose a very highly specialized set of instincts, to regard "truth
telling" and "deception" as specific instincts, instead of viewing them
as. merely instrumental factors in larger wholes. But I remark only
on a certain uncertainty as to just what is implied in a "functional"
view of a process. Sometimes (e. #., p. 195) it seems to be assumed
that to give a functional interpretation means to explain an act, such
as talking, in terms of its utility for something else. Thus it is said
that the functional interpretation breaks down at certain points, for
"We communicate, for example, oftentimes when we have no need
of doing so in order to carry on a common life-process. We talk
with each other, merely for the sake of talking without reference to
the functioning of any correlated activities." The thought here
seems to be that a certain level of life-process might be maintained
without any members that talked just for the sake of talking; there-
fore such activities are superfluities and non-functional. But surely
one might say that such a thoroughly stripped-to-its-fighting-weight
life-process would be quite lacking in some of the equipment for good
society. Must the life-process exclude all self-entertainment?
On the other hand in the chapter on the Role of Intellect, although
the author sometimes speaks of the intellect as instrumental for
adaptation to environment— as though the environment were
"here" already and man's only task were to fit into it— the prevailing
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 465
thought is rather of creating by ideals a "subjective environment'*
toward which the objective environment is to be shaped. This is
not to make intellect instrumental to a (non-intellectual) life-process.
It is rather to bend the life-process toward standards and ideals
which could have no existence without intellect. Intellect, does not
merely " function" by "mediating" social adaptations; it is itself
a creative agent, a constituent factor in determining what the adap-
tation shall be. I do not mention this ambiguity because it is peculiar
to Professor Ellwood's discussion. It is not infrequent, but the
two interpretations mark fundamentally different views as to con-
sciousness.
J. H. TUFTS
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY
Psychology of the Religious Life. GEORGE MALCOLM STRATTON.
New York: Macmillan, 1911. Pp. ix+ 376.
The appearance of this volume in the well-known "Library of
Philosophy," edited by J. H. Muirhead, is an indication of the in-
creasing importance of the study of the psychology of religion.
It is similarly significant that it is written by one so long and fruit-
fully devoted to experimental psychology. The book is marked by
the same clearness and charm of style as the author's earlier work on
Experimental Psychology and Its Bearing upon Culture.
More than any other treatise in its field, it has employed materials
from the oriental religions. The use of Persian, Indian, Egyptian,
and Chinese religious literatures is a notable extension of the general
subject. The prayer, the hymn, the myth, the sacred prophecy are
regarded as the best sources, and these are found in the great canonical
collections. Only secondary importance is attached to the intro-
spective reports of individuals. The works of Tylor and Frazer are
employed for the accounts of less civilized peoples, but the names of
several recent investigators like Spencer and Gillen, Howitt, Rivers,
and Dudley Kidd do not appear among the numerous references cited.
The book is analytical and descriptive. Approaching the subject
in this way, religion is found to be marked by conflict, and this word
conflict is the key to the book. There are four parts. The first
treats in seven chapters of the conflicts in regard to feeling and
emotion. Part two is concerned with the conflicts in regard to
action and has five chapters. Conflicts in regard to religious thought
466 REVIEWS
occupy ten chapters in the third part. The fourth part presents the
"Central Forces of Religion" in chapters treating of The Idealizing
Act, Change and Permanence in the Ideal, and Standards of Religion.
It is my impression that in spite of the author's caution in the
introduction against allowing himself any human interest in such a
study, his work would have gained in scientific clearness as well as
in its grip upon the reader if he had placed the last part first and
ordered all the others by it. As it stands one is indeed impressed by
the variety and depth of the conflicts in religion but there seems to be
no adequate statement of their source or end.
The author shows an intimate appreciation of the various moods
and tempers of mankind. The reader is everywhere impressed by the
range of insight and sympathy for the most divergent types, and by
the remarkable skill in portraying them. Now it is indeed important
to build out in this impressive way the complexity and variation of
the religious consciousness, in its appreciation and contempt of self,
its breadth and narrowness of sympathy, its opposition of gloom and
cheer, its activity and passivity, its opposition of picture and thought,
its contrasts of many gods and one, of divinity at hand and afar off.
It is valuable to have an elaborate and artistic catalogue of these
differences and conflicts, but the demand constantly asserts itself
for simplification, and for explanation of all this variety by a view
of the deep working causes.
This demand presses for expression in the author's own mind
and there are many asides, as it were, in which this demand rises to
the surface of his thought. These are doubtless the "lapses due to
the infirmity of the flesh" for which the reader's charity is asked on
page 2. Many readers will wish that the final fruitful and illumi-
nating "lapse" which begins on page 325 had taken place in the
introduction, so that everything might have been ordered by it from
the first. On this last mentioned page an account of the idealizing
act is begun which reveals the sources of all the conflicts of feeling,
action, and thought in religious experience. A few sentences from
this part will show how the author would explain the preceding
conflicts. "It is a mark of human nature — though the same trait
appears in life still lower— to transform its neighborhood." "The
impulse to mould the facts until they more nearly conform to some
inner rule and standard — to supplement them, if need be, by direct
addition — appears in many different forms between idealization's
infancy and its maturer years." "The completion of the observed
world by adding to it that great unobserved world so real to the
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 467
religious, is therefore no anomally." "The instinct to remodel the
given fact to our satisfaction — at first to meet physical needs, but
soon to meet the no less urgent need of beauty and justice and intelli-
gibility— by this wide instinct all are moved." "The ideal is the
picture of what will satisfy in fullest measure our desires."
Here, then, is the key. Man, like all sentient forms, is charac-
terized by various desires and cravings. In the lower stages these
are relatively few and primal. In the higher stages they branch and
ramify under the pressure of environment and habit. Greater em-
phasis upon this principle would have brought the diversity of
religions, and the contrasts within any single faith more completely
under the solving notions of genetic and social psychology. It is
surely a proper function of scientific psychology to show how the
conflicts of individual and group experience stand related to the
epochs of growth, to the run of attention, to the ground patterns
determined by the struggle for existence, and by the pace set by the
leaders and geniuses of races. A hint of this larger explanation
appears on page 33 where the "intellectual vertigo and revulsion"
of Buddhism with its endless transmigrations and repetitions is
casually referred to the correlated "machine-like round of life."
There are doubtless "types of character that are permanently
magnetized in opposite "ways," but it is the older static psychology
which stops at that point, without inquiring into the environmental
influences and other forces which have played the part of the magnets.
Religion is conceived as the supreme expression of the idealizing
activity. It is well defined (page 343) as "man's whole bearing
toward what seems to him the Best, or Greatest — where 'best' is
used in a sense neither in nor out of morality, and 'greatest' is
confined to no particular religion." Therefore, "no clear line marks
the transition from religion to other human activities." The Best
is predominantly social (pages 337 f.) and would seemingly be
regarded as primarily social but for "motives connected with high
curiosity" apart from any practical interest. The author's mild
dissent from recent attempts to state religion in terms of the social
consciousness is seen in the following: "The reverence which men
have shown the Highest has usually been, not alone because it ful-
filled their social needs, but also because of its satisfaction to sensuous
and aesthetic and causal and logical needs, which grow, it is true, by
the mutual friction and support of men, but seem not to originate
in this way nor to be part and parcel of the social, feeling itself."
E. S. AMES
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
468 REVIEWS
Prophezeiungen: Alter Aberglaube oder neue Warhheit? M. KEM-
MERICH. Miinchen: Langen, 1911. Pp. vi + 435.
Dr. Kemmerich tells us that his study of prophecy has completely
altered his understanding of that phenomenon. He was at first
convinced that only superstitious persons could believe in the an-
nouncement of future events; and he attributed the realization of cer-
tain "prophecies" either to luck, to simple coincidence, or to clever
conjectures. But he has come to believe that future events can be
seen in advance. His book is intended to demonstrate that that fact
is scientifically established. "The belief in prophecy is not an
antiquated superstition. It is a new truth of which we make a strict
demonstration. We know now that sight into the future exists."
Let it be clearly understood that the author's purpose is simply
to verify the existence of the fact. That is without doubt the first
task of science. Whether the fact can be explained and how it is to
be explained are questions independent of the one with which he is
concerned.
The book contains twelve chapters. The third indicates the
method of the demonstration and answers objections. The twelfth
establishes scientific conclusions regarding prophecy. The ten other
chapters discuss the facts; after mentioning antiquity, the Middle
Ages, the modern period, the author examines particularly: (i) The
prophecy of the Abbe Hermann of the Cistercian Monastery of
Lehnin in the year 1300, regarding the fate of the House of Branden-
burg; (2) Christina Ponitowssken, the clairvoyant, of the seven-
teenth century and her prophetic visions; (3) the prophecies of
Christian of Heering of Prossen in the eighteenth century; (4) the
prophecy of Johann Adam Miiller at the beginning of the nineteenth
century; (5) the prophecy of Cazotte on the French Revolution;
(6) the prophecies of Madame de Ferriem, a contemporary; (7) and
finally, the prophecies of Michel Nostradamus in the sixteenth
century.
It is impossible in a brief account to summarize the discussion of
all these facts, but however surprised one may be at finding the
prophecies of Nostradamus seriously examined with the purpose of
showing their agreement with future events, one is compelled to
admit that the discussion is conducted with much logical strictness.
Certain quatrains of the Centuries of Nostradamus are truly very
curious. They are authentic, drawn from events anterior to the
events designated, sufficiently clear in spite of their intended ob-
scurity. They provide the author with several truly interesting
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 469
examples of " true " prophecy. Demonstrations of such a kind can-
not be abbreviated; we refer the reader to the book.
JULES PACHEU
PARIS
Das Zungenreden, geschichtlich und psychologisch untersucht. E.
MOSIMAN. Tubingen: F. C. B. Mohr, 1911. Pp. 137.
This book was originally written in English in answer to a prize-
question offered by the McCormick Theological Seminary. After
revision and completion, with the assistance of Professor Johannes
Weiss, of Heidelburg, it was published in Germany. It comprises
historical researches on the existence of the facts of speaking with
tongues (pp. 1-83), psychological explanations (pp. 86-124), an^ *
final chapter, rather theological, in which are discussed chiefly the
events of the Pentecost as they are related in the Acts of the Apostles.
The problem of "glossolalia" and of the "gift of tongues" goes
back to certain accounts of the New Testament. There these mani-
festations of involuntary speech are attributed to the Holy Spirit.
Other historical manifestations nearer us permit a fuller study of the
question and throw some light upon the facts, and their psychological
explanation, often permitting one to cast aside the hypothesis of the
intervention of spirit.
In addition to the manifestations related in the New Testament,
considered by the author in the first three chapters, two chapters
are devoted to other instances: among the Montanists, the Cami-
sards, the Jansenists, the Irwingiens, and in recent revivals (in Wales,
in India, etc.).
The theory of the automatic and unconscious movements of the
organs of phonation, produced by our subconscious activity, suffices
to explain a great many cases. A sort of internal suggestion takes
place and sets in activity the nervous centers. At times the sounds
produced have no sense; at times they are intelligible only to those
to whom the power of interpretation is given; at times they are in
the language of the subject and of the auditors; at times they are a
tongue foreign to the subject. It is well known that in this last case
very curious causes leading to a misinterpretation of the phenomenon
have been discovered. The author affirms that there exists no in-
controvertible instance of a true use of a foreign tongue (p. 118). A
woman in Chicago utters Chinese words, but she has heard them in a
Chinese laundry. Another person speaks Hebrew words, but on
investigation one discovers that she has lived as a servant with a
470
REVIEWS
Hebraic scholar who was in the habit of repeating Hebrew texts
aloud.
The question dealt with in the last chapter is the relation which
exists between the gift of tongues mentioned in the New Testament
and "glossolalia" in general. The author identifies them and gives
them both a purely psychological explanation; but in order to do so
he is led to affirm that the Biblical account is not exact (ungeschichtlich
dargestellt). At this point the question becomes one of historical
criticism, or of theology, with which we are not concerned here. The
reasons advanced by Mosiman appear to us to some extent arbitrary.
They are not convincing. There are theologians who hold an opposite
opinion (comp. Pratt, Theologie de Saint-Paul. Paris: Beauchesne;
pp. 175, 184).
An extensive bibliography is added.
JULES PACHEU
PARIS
U Experience Mystique et VActivite Subconsciente. J. PACHEU.
Paris: Perrin, 1911. Pp. 312.
This interesting work contains a simple and clear exposition of
Mystical Union (the central fact of mysticism), and a criticism of the
subconscious theory as applied to that experience. Using first-class
authorities, the author separates clearly the affective from the noetic
element at every one of the several degrees of that experience. It
includes feeling and also knowledge: the Mystic is aware, even if in
an obscure way, of the divine presence.
The exposition is done with much exactness; it evinces a thorough
knowledge of the topic. The author insists very properly upon the
ethico-religious value of this experience; he shows the harmonious
development to which mystics tend beyond asceticism; one sees very
clearly how the mystical experience makes part of the religious life.
The theory which would bring back these facts to mental pathology
is vigorously discussed.
Can mystical experience be explained as an eruption from the
subconscious? Must it be supposed that the mystical intuition is
nothing more than a revelation of the subject to himself, helped by
his reflection and his work and which, having ripened subconsciously,
appears to him external and superior to himself? The interruptions
and the disproportion which characterize these states have seemed to
some adequately explained by the hypothesis of the subconscious, on
condition that it be given its full value, and that it should be assimi-
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 471
lated to, for instance, scientific and artistic invention. Against this
hypothesis, the author formulates the following objections: (i) How
are we to explain on this hypothesis the sporadic and at times unique
character of the mystical intuitions? If the subconscious is the
author of them, it should easily lead to a flowering of phenomena of
that kind. (2) The efficacious play of the subconscious supposes a
kind of mental disaggregation; how is one to conciliate these dis-
sociations with the admirable unity of the mystical life? (3) The
continuity of memory and of consciousness in the mystics seems to
establish the unity of their consciousness. (4) In order to explain
the mystical facts, one is compelled to enlarge the subconscious
hypothesis to such a degree that it loses all precise meaning. Certain
authors, particularly M. Delacroix, endow the subconscious so richly
that it "becomes a marvellous fairy more difficult to scientifically
imagine than Viviane, or Morgane, the fay, or simply the divine
reality of which the mystics speak." The posited creative sub-
consciousness — a dynamic, constructive automatism — is in fact
copied after the descriptions of the great mystics. "This hypothesis,
suggested by the facts which are to be explained, is applied to them
as a sufficient explanation. There is a gap and an apparent petitio
principii: that which is assumed is precisely that which is in
question."
Our author is of the opinion that subconsciousness cannot be left
to its own resources; it seems rather an instrument in the hands of a
superior power, God. As psychologists, our conclusions cannot
affirm God; but we have not the right to exclude Him, in fact psy-
chology seems to point to Him.
In closing, the author quotes from a letter in which M. Delacroix
explains how he conceives the relation between psychology and
metaphysics and also religion.
The only critical remark which I will make refers to the fourth
objection. The moment always comes when an hypothesis resembles
the facts for which it is intended as an explanation; it must perforce
contain them. The question is whether it contains only those facts;
if so, the hypothesis is in truth merely the expression of those facts
and it cannot serve to go beyond them, to relate them to other facts.
But is this truly the case of the subconscious hypothesis ? I do not
think so. The authors criticized by M. Pacheu have merely compli-
cated an hypothesis already in existence in order to make it include
the new facts in question; and they have found support in inter-
mediary facts, for instance, the role of subconsciousness in artistic
and scientific invention.
472
REVIEWS
The book of M. Pacheu manifests a very sincere and talented
effort to place the religious reader face to face with the analyses and
theories of the psychologists, and to draw from them whatever is
possible from the point of view of religion. This book shows that
psychologists and religious souls can walk together for a considerable
time. If the moment comes — the moment of explanation — where
they diverge, they know at least on what they agree and on what
they disagree. This book shows also that serious differences can be
indicated with much tolerance and perfect courtesy.
H. DELACROIX
SORBONNE, PARIS
Mysticism as Seen through its Psychology. W. E. HOCKING. Mind,
1912, 21, 38-61.
This is in part a criticism of the views concerning mysticism held
by Royce, Godfernaux, Delacroix, and Leuba, and in part a positive
theory (both psychological and metaphysical) of the mystic con-
sciousness. Royce's mistake, according to Hocking, is in failing to
distinguish the mystic's motive, which is worship, from the motive
of speculation in general. Leuba's interpretation of the mystic's
love as a branch of the sexual impulse is only a half truth; the whole
truth being that sexual love is a part of the mystic worship. God-
fernaux is right in viewing rhythm as the great characteristic of the
mystic life, but he is mistaken in identifying this with the vital
rhythm of coenesthesia. Delacroix recognizes the rhythm of the
mystic consciousness but regards it as not absolutely essential and as,
in fact, outgrown by the greater mystics. As a fact the mystic never
does and never can get beyond this rhythm, for it is a function of his
will and is correlated with the laws of attention. It is, in fact, based
upon the psychological and epistemological law of alternation, — the
necessity of turning from the whole to the part and from the part to
the whole.
JAMES B. PRATT
WILLIAMS COLLEGE
Essai (Tune Classification du Mystique. F. PICAVET. Rev. Phil.,
1912, 74, 1-26.
The mystics have been classified according to two principles:
the perfection they aimed at, and their nervous abnormal phenomena.
The author would make three classes: (i) The Mystics who seek a
development of their personality by means of union with the Su-
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 473
preme Perfection, but who do not make use of theurgical and religious
practices. (2) The Mystics who seek God in order to realize a fuller
personality and who make use of the well-known methods of mystical
worship. (3) The Mystics who do not aim at individual perfection,
whose physiological misery is as profound as their psychological
deficiencies.
J. H. LEUBA
BRYN MAWR COLLEGE
Les Etats Mystiques Negatifs. G. TRUC. Rev. Phil., 1912, 73,
610-628.
After considering in a previous paper the state of grace, the
author takes up in the present article correlated negative states:
lukewarmness, "acedia," dryness. He makes a detailed and careful
descriptive analysis of these states. His chief conclusions are:
(1) These negative states are functionally related to the state of
grace. They involve regret for an affective experience which one
has previously realized, or which one despairs of 'ever obtaining;
they include therefore a feeling of irritation at one's impotency.
(2) These states are only particular cases of experiences existing
outside the religious life.
J. H. LEUBA
BRYN MAWR COLLEGE
The Several Origins of the Ideas of Unseen Personal Beings. JAMES
H. LEUBA. Folk-Lore, 1912, 23, 148-171.
The Varieties, Classification, and Origin of Magic. JAMES H. LEUBA.
American Anthropologist, 1912, N. S., 14. 350-367.
Professor Leuba, an original thinker in the field of religious
psychology, discusses in the articles under review, two fundamental
questions interesting alike to the psychologist and to the ethnologist,
questions concerning which there is still, and rightfully so, not a little
disagreement among even the most competent authorities. Rejecting
the theory of the origin of the ideas of superhuman personal powers
in some one class only of phenomena, e. g., dreams and related states
(Tylor), worship of the dead (Spencer), personification of natural
objects (Max Miiller), a theory ascribed by him to "the passion for
simplicity and unity" in anthropologists and historians, he adduces
psychological and historical evidence in support of the following four
propositions: (i) Gods grew out of several different ideas of super-
human beings. (2) These beings had independent origins. (3) The
474 REVIEWS
attributes of the gods differ according to their origin. (4) The his-
torical gods are usually mongrel gods, the outcome of the combination
of characteristics belonging to superhuman beings of different origins.
In his position as to the non-unitary origin of such beliefs Professor
Leuba places himself in the company of the so-called "American
school" of anthropologists, who for some years past have assumed
the same attitude with respect to "totemism," and other phenomena
of a socio-religious character, which the earlier observers and inter-
preters of the mental activities of non-civilized peoples, almost
without exception, considered as having had a unitary origin. An-
other point argued for, and quite properly, is that several of the
sources indicated may have operated simultaneously — "so that
several gods of different origins may have, from the first, divided
the attention of the community"; and, moreover, succession (not
at all limited to any one order), as well as simultaneity, is possible, —
thus, "a ghost-ancestor may have first attained dominance, and,
later on, a Great Maker." The idea of a "Maker" can occur very
early in the history of the races, and Professor Leuba does not err in
stating that "it may be that a crude conception of a Creator is
attained even earlier than that of a soul or a double." Today, the
belief in the existence of God, Professor Leuba holds, "rests almost
entirely" on experiences included under "the needs of the heart"
and "the needs of conscience," — such empirical data (together with
the metaphysical arguments) as dreams, hallucinations, trances,
personification of striking phenomena, the idea of a Maker, etc.,
"having lost all or almost all the value they had once as prompters
of the belief in God."
The question of "primitive montheism," so much discussed of
late by Andrew Lang, Father Schmidt and others, Professor Leuba
answers by pointing out that "the High Gods proceeded from an
independent and specific source; they are, or were originally, the
Makers." The fact that low spirits and not the High God are
worshipped among primitive peoples does not represent a deterioration
from the earliest condition of humanity, but "rather the facts are
consistent with a natural development and indicate the presence
of^no factor not operative in modern progressive societies." Some-
thing might perhaps be urged against the author's derivation of the
"High Gods" from the "Makers" alone. His emphasis on the
facts of childhood is worth attention. Professor Leuba deprecates
the application of the term "monotheism" to belief of the uncivilized
in the "High God," since it by no means implies that there exist no
other gods but him.
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 475
By "magic" Professor Leuba understands " those practices
intended to secure some definite gain by coercitive action in essential
disregard (i) of the quantitative relations implied in the ordinary
and in the scientific dealings with the physical world; (2) of the
anthropopathic relations obtaining among persons." To this he
adds that "although magic never makes an anthropopathic appeal,
it frequently brings to bear its peculiar coercitive virtue upon feeling
beings." The aim of magic is then to compel souls, spirits, or gods
to do the operator's will, or prevent them from doing their own.
As is noted (p. 352), it is only by far-fetched explanations that several
types of magic can be brought within the limits of Frazer's classi-
fication into "homeopathic (or imitative)" and "contagious."
Examples of these are "certain dances performed by the women
when the men are engaged in war" (e. g., among Kafirs of the Hindu
Kush, Yuki Indians, natives of Madagascar, etc.), and the very large
and significant class of magic-phenomena known as "will-magic."
Professor Leuba offers a classification of his own, viz. (i) principle
of repetition; (2) principle of transmission of an effect from one
object to another (sympathetic magic); (3) principle of efficiency of
will-effort. The conceptions of the savage, the author thinks, are
not "clear and definite," but "hazy and fluid." This generalization
can hardly apply to all primitive peoples, much less to all individuals
among them. The origins of magical behavior, according to Pro-
fessor Leuba, while not capable of interpretation simply from the
principles of association, may be classified, nevertheless, according to
the kind of association they illustrate. Considering the nature of
the power involved, magical practices may be grouped as follows:
(i) practices in which there is no idea of a power belonging to the
operator or his instrument, and passing thence to the object of the
magical art (much of so-called sympathetic magic, many taboos,
most modern superstitions): (2) non-personal powers are believed
to belong to the magician himself, or to particular objects, such as
the magician's instruments, and to pass from these into other objects,
or to act upon them so as to produce certain effects; (3) will-magic,
including the cases in which the magician feels that his will-effort is
an efficient factor.
Among the principles of explanation (of unequal value) of magical
behavior the author cites the following phenomena: Children often
amuse themselves by making prohibitions and backing them up with
threats of punishment, — the make-believe of one person may be
taken quite seriously by another; threats of untoward happennings,
476 REVIEWS
made for the purpose of preserving things vital to the life and pros-
perity of the tribe; the motive which leads civilized people to make
vows nowadays; the spontaneous response of the organism to
specific situations. Besides these cases, in all of which "movements
and behaviors appear independently of any magical intention, and
afterward acquire a magical significance," there comes a time, when
"magic no longer arises only by chance, but new forms are created
deliberately," and "from this moment there must have been a tend-
ency to treat, according to more or less definite principles, every
difficult situation." And here belong most of the "like produces
like" practices found all over the globe in all ages of mankind.
Professor Frazer, in the opinion of the author, "seems to have
overlooked the fundamental difference between mere association of
ideas and the essential processes involved in magic." Magic cannot
be explained as "a simple (mistaken) recognition of the similarity
and contiguity of ideas." ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN
CLARK UNIVERSITY
On Faith in its Psychological Aspects. B. B. WARFIELD. The
Princeton Theol. Rev., 1911, 9, 5 3 7-566.
Professor Warfield's paper is a carefully written and convincing
discussion of the meaning of the word belief, and in particular of
the difference expressed by "belief" and "knowledge."
"Matters of faith," he writes in a partial summary, "are different
from matters of knowledge — not as convictions less clear, firm or
well-grounded, not as convictions resting on grounds less objectively
valid, not as convictions determined rather by desire, will, than by
evidence — but as convictions resting on grounds less direct and
immediate to the soul, and therefore involving a more prominent
element of trust, in a word as convictions grounded in authority,
testimony as distinguished from convictions grounded in rational
proof. The two classes of convictions are psychologically just
convictions; they are alike, in Dr. Baldwin's phrase, ' forced consents';
they rest equally on evidence and are equally the product of evidence;
they may be equally clear, firm and assured; but they rest on differing
kinds of evidence." It is the "open implication of 'trust' in the
conception of * belief which rules the usage of these terms."
Now, as there is "an element of trust in all our convictions, ' faith,'
'belief,' may be employed of them all." "In what we call religious
faith this prominent implication of trust reaches its height." " Faith
in God, and above all, faith in Jesus Christ is just trusting Him in its
purity."
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 477
In the remainder of the paper (pp. 557-566) the author examines
critically, in the light of his analysis, the opinion of certain theologians.
It appears to me unfortunate that "faith" is used throughout
this article as synonomous with "belief," for these two terms cover
a range of mental experience wide enough to make possible a dis-
criminating use of these terms.
One is surprised to find that the only contemporary psychologists
who apparently have been consulted are those who wrote on this
topic in the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. I cannot
help believing that a wider knowledge of psychological science on the
part of theologians would redound to the advantage of both theology
and psychology.
J. H. LEUBA
BRYN MAWR COLLEGE
The Journal of Religious Psychology, including its Anthropological
and Sociological Aspects, edited by G. STANLEY HALL and ALEX-
ANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN. Volume V., 1912.
(1) The Belief in Immortality. SIMON SPIDLE. Pp. 5-51.
(2) Satan and his Ancestors from a Psychological Standpoint. COLLYS
F. SPARKMAN. Part I. Historical Development, pp. 52-86;
Part II. The Rise, Growth and Death of Satan, pp. 163-194.
(3) The Genetic View of Berkeley's Religious Motivation. G. STANLEY
HALL. Pp. 137-162.
(4) Fear in Religion. W. D. WALLIS. Pp. 257-304.
(5) The Psychology and Pedagogy of Doubt. JOSIAH MORSE. Pp.
418-428.
(6) The Psychology of Religion. JAMES B. PRATT. Pp. 383-394.
With the appearance of its fifth volume, The American Journal of
Religious Psychology and Education modified its name and changed
its editors. The disappearance of "Educational" and the appearance
of "Anthropological and Sociological" indicate sufficiently the change
that has taken place in the field covered by the journal.
(i) The first parts of this paper deal in a sketchy way with the
several concepts of immortality; with the different theories of the
origin of the belief; and with the grounds upon which the belief rests.
The last part, entitled "Present Status of the Belief," is an
investigation by means of a questionnaire containing no less than
thirty questions. It is much easier to draw false than right conclu-
sions from the one hundred and seventy answers which the author
received. Of the one hundred and four answers coming from the
478 REVIEWS
professional classes, seventy-five announce a belief in personal
immortality. Apparently all these regard the doctrine of Christ's
resurrection as "the crowning evidence of a future life." Of the
forty-six answers received from high-school pupils only one doubts
the reality of an after-life. And of the twenty answers from college
students, again only one doubts personal immortality.
The information I have secured upon the belief of college students
indicates, what is indeed apparent to any one acquainted with the
times, that the questionnaire of Mr. Spidle fell into the hands of, or
was answered almost exclusively by, persons who believe in im-
mortality, but was not answered by all the persons belonging to the
classes to whom the questionnaire was sent.
(2) The first half of Sparkman's paper deals with the historical
development of Satan's forebears from antiquity to modern times.
The second half seeks to discover the reasons for the existence of a
belief that has taken such a deep hold on human nature. The author
proposes to apply to the idea of the devil the psychoanalysis used
by Freud for the discovery of psychic disorders. "Using race as a
psychological unit, may it not have forgotten many processes anal-
ogous to those of the individual? May not its horizon have
broadened and its consciousness in toto have found certain ideas
unpalatable? If so, . . . the devil could be, in Freud's own language
regarding the individual, 'the created output in a sublimated mani-
festation of various thwarted and repressed wishes of which it is no
longer conscious.'" In this view the devil has been "an outlet for
otherwise nauseating conscious thoughts."
(3) "To explain the philosopher psychologically is one of the
chief new duties which our science now owes to the great speculative
minds of the past." Berkeley is, according to Dr. Hall, a favorable
example for "this new psychoanalysis." In a brief account of the
philosopher's life we are shown how by his temperament and edu-
cation he was tempted to a denial of the reality of matter. "His
all-dominant wish was to exalt the cause of faith and reason above,
and at the expense of, that of sense." "He would make a great
coup which should bring consternation to the critics of religion.
... He would impeach and discredit the most ancient trusted
oracles of mankind ... by showing that matter too was really
immaterial, was only a practical postulate on the plane of sense,
which must be, in fact, everywhere accepted by an act of faith."
His romantic missionary enterprises and his advocacy of the
wonderful properties of tar-water confirm the indications of his
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 479
early life, and throw such additional light upon the motivation of
his philosophy that no student who would understand its raison
d'etre should omit the reading of Siris, during his lifetime the most
popular of his works, but now almost forgotten.
(4) The chief purpose of the author seems to be two-fold. First
to show that awe and reverence are essential and invariable elements
in every true religious consciousness; secondly that the foundation
of religion rests in individual as well as in social psychology. Here
he opposes the theory of Durkheim according to which religion can
be explained only by reference to social consciousness.
The paper reports a large number of experiences from the life
of more or less primitive peoples, all of which elicit the same reaction,
namely fear.
The author's definition of religion by means of fear, awe and rever-
ence is subject to the criticism which I have offered in several of my
writings. His contention that the origin of religion must be sought
both in individual and in social psychology appears so nearly self-
evident that when it is contradicted, it must be, it seems to me,
because of a verbal misunderstanding.
(5) "The thesis of this paper is that doubt and belief are contrary
psychical states, that the law of contrast holds between them, and
that belief is the inducing or positive state, and doubt the induced
or negative state." It is the inculcation in youth of beliefs that
are antagonistic to those which experience interpreted by modern
knowledge produces, which is the cause of the pathetic state of doubt
so common in adolescence. "Doubt is not necessary; it is not a
natural heritage of youth; — it is an unhappy state induced by dog-
matism and unwise pedagogy."
(6) After a critical discussion of the three sources from which the
psychologist of religion obtains his facts (individual experience in
autobiographies, letters; answers to definite questions; objective
expressions of social religion furnished by history, anthropology,
and literature), Pratt passes to the question, What is the proper
attitude of the psychologist toward the commonly assumed objective
reality of the cause, or causes, of religious experiences? We are told
that for its own protection science must act as if there were no
interruptions in the sequence of phenomena. The psychologist
should content himself with describing the phenomena as he finds
them, leaving to others the guess work by which apparent breaks in
experience are bridged over, that is, the hypothesis of supernatural
interference and the "scientific" hypothesis of unconscious activity
and others.
480 REVIEWS
"I cannot help thinking that it would ultimately lead to great
disappointment, if not to positive scepticism, if we should sanguinely
expect, as I fear many cultured religious people have been led to
expect, that the psychological study of religion can demonstrate any
of the truths of theology. And equally misleading does it seem to
me to suppose, as some leading ' functional' psychologists seem
to do, that the psychology of religion can ever so develop as to be in
any sense a substitute for philosophy or theology." Psychology
"must content itself with a description of human experience, while
recognizing that there may be spheres of reality to which these expe-
riences refer and with which they are possibly connected, which yet
cannot be investigated by science."
There is not space here for a critical discussion of Professor Pratt's
position. I may however be allowed to refer to my treatment of
certain aspects of this problem on pages 244—261 of my book A
Psychological Study of Religion; its Origin, Function and Future.
JAMES H. LEUBA
BRYN MAWR COLLEGE
Zeitschrift der Religionspsychologie, 1911. Vol. V.
(1) Aufgabe und Methode der Religionspsychologie. HERMANN BAUKE.
Pp. 97-104.
(2) Zur Frage nach der transzendental-psychologischen Methode in der
Religionswissenschaft. GEORG WOBBERMIN. Pp. 225-234.
(3) Religioses Erkennen und Erkenntnistheorie . K. A. BUSCH.
Pp. 209-218.
(4) Grundsdtze und Aufgaben der Religionspsychologie. ROLAND
SCHUTZ. Pp. 245-263.
(5) Das religionspsychologische Problem Zinzendorf. H. LEHMANN.
PP- 327-336.
(6) Zur Psychologie des hysterischen M adonnenkultus . O. PFISTER.
Pp. 263-271.
(i) The first of these papers is a criticism of an address by Wobber-
min. The second is a retort by the latter.
Bauke defends the so-called "American school of religious psy-
chology" against Wobbermin who finds it too exclusively naturalistic,
and who, in order to make it adequate, would complete it by the
addition of a "transzendental-psychologischen Aufgabe mit trans-
zendental-psychologischer Methode." Bauke holds that the American
psychologists have remained true to the methods of a strictly em-
pirical science and believes that the transcendental-psychological
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 481
method of Wobbermin does not belong to the psychology of religion,
but to theology.
(2) In his answer Wobbermin accuses Bauke of not having under-
stood him. He maintains that that which he means by the phrase
which we have quoted does not include a " spekulativ-metaphysische
Bearbeitung psychischer Erscheinungen;" he does not mean to enter
the field of the normative sciences. The psychological analysis of
religious experience "from the point of view of our interest in truth
(Wahrheitsinteresse) " deals with the motives and tendencies which
are fundamental to the system of religious thought. The tran-
scendental-psychological analysis is interested not in the religious
consciousness of particular individuals in its particular forms, not in
the varied individual expressions of religious life, but in the establish-
ment of religious thought as a whole. "That is not a purely empirical
investigation, it is an investigation directed by a problem tran-
scendentally formulated. Nevertheless, the investigation remains
within the field of psychological analysis. It is therefore not norma-
tive." Wobbermin rejects the imputation that by his transcendental-
psychological procedure he seeks to draw conclusions regarding the
objective reality of the object of religious belief. He believes that
theology should find help in psychology, but that no help can come to
it from empirical psychology unless it be extended by the method he
advocates. Alone the transcendental-psychological point of view
can produce a body of conclusions useful to theology.
If Wobbermin uses here "transcendental" in the sense of "trans-
individual," he is certainly justified in demanding that the psy-
chologists of religion do not neglect that part of the field of religious
experience. And if this is the conclusion of the whole matter,
Bauke would, I think, offer no objection. But then would not the
word "sociological" advantageously replace "transcendental"?
(3) This is one of the many defences of religion against psychology.
But as a matter of fact it is not religion such as we find it in history
that is successfully defended, but a conception of it which is far from
corresponding exactly to the religion of those without whom religion
as a social institution would never have existed. Religion is con-
ceived here as concerned with fundamental judgments of worth upon
the existent, including scientific knowledge. Religion is therefore
very far from expressing a scientific knowledge similar to the knowl-
edge of the natural or of the psychological sciences. It is con-
cerned with value-judgments, not with the, establishment of a
system of causal connections. Religion moves in the sphere of the
482 REVIEWS
absolute, not in that of the relative. Therefore its object is beyond
the reach of science.
The conceptual formulation of religious beliefs is to be considered,
we are told, as having simply a symbolic significance; they should be
looked upon as poetical forms. When thus considered, the ideas of
heaven, of the Kingdom of God, of the Heavenly Father are removed
from the reach of psychological science.
Who would deny that the Absolute is outside of the province of
psychology? But the religious peoples who have made the historical
religions, believed not in an Absolute, but in a personal God or gods
and it is only because they believed in the reality of personal gods
that religions came into existence. With the Absolute really con-
ceived as an Absolute, religions as such have never had anything to do.
(4) This paper considers the sources from which the psychology
of religion can draw its material, the task of that science, and its
relation to theology.
(5) We have here a part of the polemical discussions aroused by
the monograph of Dr. Oskar Piaster, Die Frommigkeit des Grafen, L.
von Zinzendorf. In that essay Zinzendorf appears as having "sexu-
alized piety."
(6) This paper reports the psychoanalysis of a neuropathic youth.
It is of no particular significance.
JAMES H. LEUBA
BRYN MAWR COLLEGE
William James als Religionsphilosoph. K. A. BUSCH. Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1911. Pp. vii + 88.
The author of this monograph was a student at the Harvard
Divinity School during the year 1909-1910, and there came under
James's personal influence, — a fact which probably suggested the
writing of the book and seems certainly to have influenced its tone.
For though Dr. Busch cannot agree with many of James's conclusions,
he shows throughout an intelligent sympathy with them and a real
understanding of James's spirit. The work is hardly to be compared
with Boutroux's admirable little book on James, yet it does well
what it sets out to do, namely to give a systematic presentation of
James's philosophy of religion. That there is need for such a work—
and not only in Germany but here in America as well — is of course
plain to every reader of James. James was no "systematic phi-
losopher" and his views on religious subjects are scattered through
most of his works. And for the task of systematization in general
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 483
certainly no one is better equipped than a German — especially if he
has (as is the case with Dr. Busch) a sympathetic appreciation of the
person systematized. Any one wishing an orderly exposition of
James's attitude toward religious problems will find it here, duly set
forth with nothing of importance omitted and with nothing out of
place, all the way from Religions -psychologic to the " Jamesche Meta-
physik."
JAMES B. PRATT
WILLIAMS COLLEGE
The Idea of Feeling in Rousseau's Religious Philosophy. A. C.
ARMSTRONG. Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil., 1911, 24, 242-260.
This paper is an altogether admirable exposition of its subject.
Its chief interest to the psychologist lies in directing attention to
the variety of experiences that may be included in such terms as
"feeling" and "heart" when appealed to for decision in questions
of religious belief. Thus Rousseau's sentiment interieur, the source
of confident assurance, is shown to include logical as well as affective
elements, to denote self-consciousness and the intuition of principles
and, again, desire, emotion, aspiration and the appreciation of ideal
values. Rousseau himself seems to have been prevented by the
bent of his genius from having any conception of this variety; he
certainly contributes nothing directly to elucidate it. By his em-
phasis on the affective side of our nature as over against the "analytic
understanding" he powerfully influenced not only the constructive
philosophy, but also the psychology of feeling and emotion in the
eighteenth century, and his observations, particularly his self-
revelations, still furnish rich material for psychological study. But he
was too little of a systematic thinker and too lacking in scientific
interest to solve the problems involved in the movement he in-
augurated.
H. N. GARDINER
SMITH COLLEGE
BOOKS RECEIVED DURING NOVEMBER
SCHOPENHAUER, A. Essai sur les apparitions et opuscules divers.
(Traduction francaise par Auguste Dietrich.) Paris: Alcan, 1912.
Pp. 201.
MARTIN, E. G. The Measurement of Induction Shocks. New York:
Wiley and Sons, 1912. Pp. vii + ny.
Bulletin No. 4 of the Government Hospital for the Insane. Wash-
ington: Government Printing Office, 1912. Pp. 94.
DESSOIR, M. Outlines of the History of Psychology. (Translated by
FISHER, D.) New York: Macmillan, 1912. Pp. xxix + 2y8.
$1.60.
MARVIN, W. T. A First Book in Metaphysics. New York: Marvin,
1912. Pp. xiv + 27i. $1.50.
WUNDT,W. An Introduction to Psychology. (Translated by PINTNER,
R.) New York: Macmillan, 1912. Pp. xi -f 198. $0.90.
MEISSNER, S. R. DE. There are No Dead. Boston: Sherman, French
& Co., 1912. Pp. 116. $1.00
SCRIPTURE, E. W. Stuttering and Lisping. New York: Macmillan,
1912. Pp. xiv+251. $1.50.
BRETT, G. S. A History of Psychology, Ancient and Patristic.
London: George Allen & Co., 1912. Pp. xx-f 388. $2.75.
RENOUVIER, C. Traite de logique generate et de logique formelle. 2
vols. Paris: Lib. A. Colin, 1912. Pp. ix+ 397, 386. 8 fr.
McEwEN, J. B. The Thought in Music. New York: Macmillan,
1912. Pp. viii + 233. $1.25 net.
AVELING, F. The Consciousness of the Universal. London: Mac-
millan, 1912. Pp. x + 255. 5/ net.
KUHLMANN, F. A Revision of the Binet-Simon System for Measuring
the Intelligence of Children. (No. I of the Monograph Supple-
ments of the Journal of Psycho- A sthenics) Faribault, Minn.:
Minnesota School for Feeble-Minded and Colony for Epileptics,
1912. Pp. 41. ii Plates.
484
SUPPLEMENTARY BOOK-LIST
DUSSAUZE, H. Les regies esthetiques et les lois du sentiment. Paris:
Alcan, 1911. Pp. 541.
HOCHFELD, S. Das Kunstlerische in der Sprache Schopenhauers.
Leipzig: Barth, 1912. Rp. xi + 170. M. 5 .
LATOUR, M. Premiers principes (Tune theorie generate des emotions.
Paris: Alcan, 1912. Pp. 300. 3 fr. 50.
LEVY-SUHL, M. Ueber experimented Beeinflussung des Forstellungs-
verlauf bei Geisteskranken. Leipzig: Barth, 1911. Pp. vi + 142.
MUNSTERBERG, H. Psychologie und Wirtschaftsleben. Leipzig:
Barth, 1912. Pp. viii + 192. M. 2.80.
OssiP-LouRiE. Le langage et la verbomanie. Paris: Alcan, 1912.
PP. 275.
RANSCHBURG, P. Das kranke Geddchtnis. Leipzig: Barth, 1911.
Pp. ix+ 138.
SCHMIED-KOWARZIK, W. Umriss einer neuen analytischen Psy-
chologie. Leipzig: Barth, 1912. Pp. vi + 318. M. 7.
SCHNEIDER, K. C. Tierpsychologisches Praktikum in Dialogform.
Leipzig: Veit, 1912. Pp. 719.
SIMPSON, B. R. Correlations of Mental Abilities. (Contributions
to Education, No. 53.) New York: Teachers College, 1912.
Pp. 122. #1.00.
TAYLOR, D. The Composition of Matter and the Evolution of Mind.
London: Walter Scott, 1912. Pp. 176.
TONNIES, F. Thomas Hobbes. Der Mann und der Denker. (2. erw.
Aufl. der Schrift " Hobbes Leben u. Lehre.") Osterwieck-Harz
u. Leipzig: Zickfeld, 1912. Pp. xvi + 249. M. 4.
Traite international de psychologie pathologique. Paris: Alcan, 1912.
Pp. vii + 1086.
Anales de psicologia. Trabajos del ano 1910. Buenos Aires : " La
Semana Medica," 1911. Pp. 359-
485
NOTES AND NEWS
DR. C. E. FERREE, of Bryn Mawr College, is one of the members
of the Sub-committee on the Hygiene of the Eye, of the American
Medical Association, the object of which is to study the effect of
different kinds of lighting systems on the eye, with the purpose
of conserving vision. The work done by Dr. Ferree during the
past year, under the auspices of this committee, was reported in a
paper read by him at the convention of the Illuminating Engineer-
ing Society held at Niagara Falls on September 17, and again before
the Philadelphia Section of this Society, on October 18.
DR. J. E. W. WALLIN, Director of the Psychological Clinic in the
University of Pittsburgh, has been appointed R. B. Mellon Fellow
in the division of smoke investigation in the department of industrial
research of the university, with the immediate duties of making a pre-
liminary survey of the literature bearing on the psychology of smoke,
and of outlining a plan of investigation in this field. Owing to the lack
of bibliographies bearing on this topic, he will be pleased to receive
statements from any one who has made observations on the mental
influences of smoke, or who is in a position to supply references.
THE New York Branch of the American Psychological Association
met in conjunction with the Section of Anthropology and Psychology
of the New York Academy of Sciences on November 25. The follow-
ing papers were read: "Difference-Tones and Consonance," by
Professor F. Krueger, Professor of Philosophy and Psychology,
University of Halle-Wittenberg, Kaiser Wilhelm Professor in Co-
lumbia University; "The Attempt to Measure Mental Work as
a Psycho-Dynamic Process," by Professor Raymond Dodge, of
Wesleyan University; "The Psychology of the Earthworm," by
Professor Robert M. Yerkes, of Harvard University.
ON November 1 1, Dr. H. L. Hollingworth, of Columbia University,
read a paper on "The Relation of Psychology to Medicine and
Law" at a meeting of the Society of Medical Jurisprudence.
THE twenty-first annual meeting of the American Psychological
Association will be held at Western Reserve University, Cleveland,
on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, December 30 and 31, and
January I.
THE present number of the BULLETIN, dealing especially with
social and religious psychology, has been prepared under the
editorial care of Professor G. H. Mead
486
INDEX OF NAMES
Names of contributors are printed in SMALL CAPITALS, and the page numbers
of the contributions in Full Face Type. In the case of authors reviewed or sum-
marized the page numbers are in Italics and in the case of mention in the notes and
book lists they are in Roman Type.
ABBOTT, E., 68, 3 13
Abelson, A. R., 220, 230
Abramowski, E., 24, 192, 334
Ach, N., 370
Acher, R., 274
Adler, A., 39
Alexander, G., 178
Alexander, S., 341, 413
Allard, 299
D'Allonnes, G. R., 196
Alrutz, S., 334
AMES, E. S., 465
Anderson, B. M., Jr., 263
Andre, E. L., 399
Angell, J. R., 9, 94, 220, 275, 341
ANGIER, R. P., 173, 255
Ankermann, B.,j/p
Anstruther-Thompson, C., 207, 430
Aptekmann, E., 435
Armstrong, A. C., 483
Arps, G. F., 407
Assagioli, R., 96
Auerbach, F., 19, 248
Aveling, F., 334, 484
Ayres, L. P., 167, 220, 347, 396
Baade, W., 268
Baglioni, S., 178
BAIRD, J. W., 321
Baker, S., 192
Baldwin, B. T., 128, 230
Baldwin, J. M., 93, 208, 263
Banks, N., 299
Barany, K., 178
Barnholt, S. E., 178
Barrett, E. B., 93, 413
Easier, A., 199, 253
Bateson, W., 115
Bauer, V., 705
Bauke, H., 480
Bawden, H. H., 24
Bean, C. H., 207
Becher, E., 19
Bechterew, W., 347
Becker, W. H., 153
Behr, C., 106
Bell, J. C., 370
Bell, Julia, 230, 280
BENTLEY, M., 97, 178, 407
Benussi, V., 253, 260
Bergson, H., 19, 93,354
Bernard, L. L., 413
Betz, W., 220, 230, 334, 342
Binet, A., 9, 167, 168, 192, 334, 358
BlNGHAM, W. V., 40, 41, 2O8, 347
Blan, L. ^.,396
Bleuler, E., 169, 274
Bliss, D. C., 221
Blondel, A., 214
Boas, F., 379, 389, 404
Bobertag, O., 9, 168
Bock, C. P., 408
Bode, B. H., 19, 24
Boden, F., 128
Bogardus, E. S., 420
Bohn, G., 288, 289
BOLTON, T. L., 404
Boodin, J. E., 342
BOOK, W. F., 30, 34, 407
BORING, E. G., 60
Bosanquet, B., 128, 263
Botezat, E., 98
Botti, M., 93
Boutroux, E., 12
Bowne, B. P., 279
Boyce, A. C., 230
Brandeis, L. D., 396
Braunhausen, N., 9
Breed, F. S., 312
Breitwieser, J. V., 234
Brett, G. S., 484
Brewer, J. M., 199
Bridou, V., 192
Brill, A. A., 274
Briot, A., 19
BROWN, WARNER, 199, 361, 431
Brown, Wm., 125, 192, 199, 214, 221,370
Browne, C. A., 396
Bruce, H. A., 274
Briichner, A., 106, 112
BRUNER, F. G., 380
BUCHNER, E. F., i
Biihler, K., 334
Burgess, A. F., 299
487
488
INDEX OF NAMES
BURROW, T., 76, 154, 274
Busch, A., 153, 196
Busch, K. A., 480, 482
Busemann, A., 230, 334, 370
Bushnell, D. J., Jr., 389
Busse, A., 94
Caldecott, A., 192
CALKINS, M. W., 24, 25, 439
Calvert, P. P., 299
CANNON, W. B., 73, 185
Carpenter, F. W., 288
CARR, H., 257
Castle, W. E., 116
Cattell, J. McK., 96, 370, 396
Chabrier, 192
Chambers, W. G., 370
CHAMBERLAIN, A. F., 95, 473, 477
Chapin, M. W., 370
CHASE, H. W., 20, 24
Chaveau, A., 253
Chidester, F. E., 288
Childs, H. G., 168
Chinaglia, L., 257
Chojecki, A., 271
Claparede, E., 36, 192, 334
Clark, D., 186
Clarke, H. M., 34, 334
Cohn, J., 230, 370
Cohn, M., 19
COLE, L. W., 84
Colvin, S. S., 280, 335
Cook, H. D., 257
COOLEY, C. H., 441
Copeland, M., 3 12
Coriat, I. H., 193
Cornetz, V., 299
Cory, E. N., 299
Cotlarciuc, N., 19
Courtis, S. A., 227, 396
Cowles, R. P., 288
Craig, W.,J72
Cramaussel, Ed, 39
CRANE, H. W., 451
Crawford, D., 186
Crehore, A. C., 235
Cruchet, R., 178
Culler, A. J., 439
Cummmgs, B. F., 312
Curtis, W. C, 289
Cushman, H. E., 12
Cutten, C. B., 274
Dana, C. L., 178
Da Rocha, F., 389
Dauber, J,jj5,j7j
Davenport, C. B., 116, 396
Dawson, J., 128, 228
DAY, L. M., 60
DEARBORN, G. V. N., 73, 196, 413
Dearborn, W. F., 360
Decroly, O., 168
Degand, J., 168
DELABARRE, E. B., 409
DELACROIX, H., 470
De Sanctis, S., 96, 221, 371
Descoeudres, A., 221, 251
Desroche, P., 214, 288
Dessoir, Max, 72, 24, 484
Deussen, P., 358
Dewey, J., 19
Dieffenbacher, J., 230, 370
D'Istria, F. C, 19
DODGE, R., 24, 62, 72, 214, 486
Doflein, F., 288, 289
Doll, E. A., 360
Dolson, G. N., 19
Doncaster, L., 116
Donley, J. E., 193
Dorsey, J. O., 207
DOWNEY, J. E., 62, 181, 248, 342
Driesch, H., 19
Drozynski, L., 185
Drzewina, A., 289
Dufour, M., 106, 253, 254
DUNLAP, K., 35, 106, 197, ipp, 207, 234,
235
Dupre, E., 123,353
Durkheim, E., 263
Eastman, C. A., 389
Edridge-Green, F. W., 112
Elliot, H. S. R., 248
Ellis, H., 40
Ellwood, C. A., 461
Elsenhaus, T., 371, 439
Emerson, H., 396
Enslin, E., 299
Erler, O., 231
Escherich, K. v., 299
Euken, R., 93
Eulenbiirg, A., 93
Ewald, J. R., 123
Exner, S., 371
Fay,E.W.,j5J
Feis, O., 371
FERNALD, G. G., 78
Fernald, G. M., 221
Fernberger, S. W., 440
FERREE, C. E., 70, 106, 107, 440, 486
Feuchtwanger, A., 335, 371
Fichte, J. C., 94
Field, G. C., 413
Fischer, A., 335, 371
FISCHER, S. C., 321
Fite, W., 24
Fletcher, J. M., 408
Flournoy, Th., 276
Forbes, A., 154, 186
Forsyth, C. H., 231
FOSTER, W. S., 321, 335
INDEX OF NAMES
489
Foucault, M., 335
Foy, W., 379
Franchim, G., ig6
Francia, G., 192
Franken, A., 7p, 268
FRANZ, S. I., 47, 89, 98, 145, 153, 425
Frazer, J. G., 431
FREEMAN, F. N., 215, 221,347
Freire-Marreco, B., 389
Freud, Sig., 40, 208, 274
Frey, H., 123
Frey, M. v., 178, 257
Friedlander, A., 178
Friedmann, M., 93, 192
Frink, H. W., 274
Frisch, K. v., 312
Fuchs, F., 299
Fursac, J. R. de, 192
Gallinger, A., 279
GAMBLE, E. A. McC, 86
Gantt, H. L., 396
GARDINER, H. N., 186, 354, 483
Gault, R. H., 408
Gaultier, P., 19
Geiger, M., 192
Geissler, L. R., 36, 360
Giesswein, 353
Gifford, E. G., 221
Gilby, W. H., 227, 231
Gildmeister, M., 199
Gillett, M. S., 263
Girault, A. A., 299
Givens, A. J., 280
Glaser, O. C, 371
Glover, J., 353
Glueck, B., 453
GODDARD, H. H., p, 79, 81, 168, 227, 396,
407
Goebel, 123
GOLDENWEISER, A. A., 373, 454
Goldmark, J., 396
Goodell, M. S., 186
GORDON, KATE, 430
GORE, W. C, 337
Goring, H., 153
Graebner, F., 379
Grassi, L, 196, 234
Gregor, A., 154
Grinnell, G. B., 389
Groos, K., 19
Gulick, L. H., 221
Giinther, F., 234
Gutzmann, H., 353
Hack, V., 407
HAGGERTY, M. E., 52, 280, 312
Haines, T. H., 440
Hall, G. S., 95, 477
Hamilton, G. V., 9
Hardy, A. A., 299
Hargitt, C. W., 289, 312
Harper, E. H., 289
Hart, B., 24, 25, 231
Hartenberg, P., 207
Haseman, J. D., 289
Haycraft, J. B., 112
Hayes, E. C, 379, 396
HAYES, S. P., 95, 112, 116
Healy, W., 221, 453
Heindl, R., 268 '
Heller, T., 439
Henderson, E. N., 192, 335
HENMON, V. A. C., 85, 232, 239
Hennig, R., 279
Henry, C., 7p, 214, 335
Henry, M. C., 94
Hermann, L., 123, 353
Herms, W. B., 299
Heron, D., 231
HERRICK, C. J., 50
Herrick, F. H., 312
Herrick, G. W., 299
Hertz, A. F., 179
Heymans, G., 371
Hill, D. S., 24
Hill, Mrs. D. S., 24
Hill, H. F., 227
Hill, M. D., 200
Hinds, W. E., 299
Hinrichsen, O., 371
Hirschel, G., 423
HOCH, A., 169
Hocking, W. E., 279, 472
Hodge, F. A., 207
Hoffding, H., 439
Hofmann, F. B., 260
Hoge, M. A., 312
HOLLINGWORTH, H. L., p, 78, 204, 248,
335, 396, 408, 420, 423, 424, 486
Holmes, A., 208
HOLMES, S. J., 93, 289, 314, 318
HOLT, E. B., 276
Hornbostel, E. v., 72J
Home, H. H., 128, 413
Horner, 770
Hrdlicka, A., 407
Huber, E. 335, 371
HUEY, E. B., 63, 95, 160, 168, 221
Hunter, W. S., 372
Hurwitz, S. H., 289
Huther, A., 371
Isserlin, M., 423
Jacobson, E., 24, 34, 196, 214, 335, 342,
423
[acoby, G. W., 277
faensch, E. R., 254
fames, W., 279
Janet, P., 24
fastrow, J., 25, 359, 371
490
INDEX OF NAMES
'esinghaus, C., JJ5, J42
'essup, W. A., 408
oachim, H. H., Jp2
Johnson, G. H., 396
JOHNSON, H. M., 59, 271, 280
Johnston, C. H., 207
Johnston, K. L., 168
ONES, E., 40, 75, /p2, 271, 274, 407
ones, E. E. C., J42
[ones, R., 371
[ones,W.F.,J7'
osefovici, U., 371
Joseph, H. W. B., ip
Joteyko,J.,JJ5
JUDD, C. H., 24, 51
Jung, C. G., 40
Kafka, G., 30
Kakise, H., 335
Kalischer, O., 98
Kallen, H. M., 263
KARLSON, K. J., 321
Katz, D., 106
Katzaroff, D., 335
Katzenstein, J., 353
Kemmerich, M., 407, 4$?
Kennedy, R. F., /7p
Kent, G. H., 154, 335
Kerschensteiner, G., 371
Keyes,CH.,jp<5
Keyser, C.J.,J42,J7i
Kiernan, J. G., 396
Kiesow, F., /7p
Kilian, K., 754
King, L, 263, 359
Kirkpatrick, E. A., 221, 440
Klages, L., 371
Klein, A., 342
Klemm, O., 12
Klepper, G., 754
Knab, F., 2pp
Koffka, K., 335
Kohnstamm, 0., 413
Kollner, H., 116
Kostyleff, N., p, 274, 413
Kroeber, A. L., 379
Kronfeld, A., 274
Krueger, F., 486
Kuhlmann, F., 168, 484
Kunz, M., /7P
Ladd, G. T., p, ip, 239
Landry, E., jpp
LANGFELD^ H. S., 99, 242, 275, 335, 423
Lasareff, P., 214
Lawrence, L, 168
Lee, V., 207, 430
Lefevre, G., 289
Lehmann, H., 480
Lelande, A., 35
LeRoy, B., 40
Leschke, E., 186, 420
LEUBA, J. H., 439, 472, 473 . 476, 477
Levi, A., 207
Levy-Bruhl, L., 12
Levy-Suhl, M., 24, 335, 371
Lewis, E. O., 260
Ley, 335
Liebermann, M. E., 116
Liebermann, P. v., 106, 116
Lipmann, O., 231, 268, 269, 335, 371, 372
Lloyd,A.H.,j42
Lobsien, M., 231, 335, 372
Loeb,J.,j/2, 358
Loeb, S., 106, 335
LOUGH, J. E., 87
Lovejoy, A. O., 19
Lovell, J. H., 2pp
Low, A. M., jpp
Lowsley, O. S., 415
Lozinski, P., 2pp
Luckiesh, M., 106
Ludemann, H., 263
Liidtke, F., 196
Lund, E. J., 2pp
LYON, D. O., 86
MacDougall, R., 271, 413
Mach, E., 98
Mackenzie, I. S., ip
Mackenzie, W. L., 24
MacVannel, J. A., 128
Maday, S. v., 312
MAGNUSSON, C. E., 71
Maloney, W. J., 179, 221
Mampell, H., 254
Marage, M., 353
Marbe, K., 101, 359
Margis, P., p, 221, 372
Marie, A., 234, 235
MARSHALL, H. R., 49
MARTIN, L. J., p, 61, 208, 335, 439
Martius, G., 20
Marvin, W. T., 221, 484
Marx, E., 116
MAST, S. O., 56, 289
Matula, J., 2#p
Mauge, F., 263
McCabe, J., 24
McClendon, J. F., 2#p
McComas, H. C., 196
McDermott, F. A., 2pp
McDonald, J. B., 221
McDougall, W., 93, 254, 360
McDunnough, J., 2pp
McEwen, J. B., 484
McGilvary, E. B., 20, 24
Mead, G. H., 486
Meara, F. S., 235
Medeiros-e-Albuquerque, 181
Meinong, A., 263
Meissner, S. R. de, 484
INDEX OF NAMES
491
Menzerath, 335
Metalnikow, S., 289
Meumann, E., p, 168, 221, 336, 372
Meunier, P., 40
MEYER, A., 89, 129, 208
Meyer, E. A., 353
Meyer, H., 34
Meyer, J., 353
Meyerson, E., 207
Michaelis, C., 35
Michotte, A., p
Miller, D. S., 20, 24
MINER, J. B., 222
Minkowski, E., 98
Minor, L., i/p
Mitchell, A., 20
Mitchell, C., 24
Mitchell, J. F., 179
Moede, W., 336, 342
Moll, A., 358
Monnet, R., 254
Moore, T. V., 34
Morgan, C. L., 439
Morse, J., 477
Morselli, E., 96
Mosiman, E., 358, 469
Moulinier, 178
Mount, G. H., 208
Muench, W., 372
Miiller, G. £.,336
Miiller-Freienfels, R., 24
MUNSELL, A. H., 68
Miinsterberg, H., 25, 95, 221, 372
MURRAY, E., 64
Myers, C. S., p, 181, 221, 242
Nachmann, L., 234, 235
Nacke, P., 347
Nathan, E. W., 154
Nathan, M., 123, 353
Neil, T. F., 94
Nepalleck, R., 274
Neumann, A., 179
Norsworthy, N., 231
Odum, H. W., 389
Oehler, R., 94
Oesterreich, K., 20, 25, 30
Offner, M., 336
OGDEN, R. M., 40, 116, 200,542
'Okabe,T.,j4
Oppenheim, H., 179
Oppenheim, R., 269
Ordahl, L. E., 25, 336
O'Shea, M. V., jpd
OVERSTREET, H. A., 1$
PACHEU, J., 468, 469, 4?o
Palmer, G. H., 413
Panconcelli-Calzia, G., 353
PARKER, G. H., 55, 289, 312
Parrott, R. J., 300
Parshley, H. M., 2<?p
Partridge, G. E., 279
Patini, E., 25, 289
Patterson, T. L., 300
Pauli, R., /pp
Paz, D. de la, 185
Pear, T. H., 123
Pearce, H. J., 40
PEARSE, A. S., 281
Pearson, H. C., 221
Pearson, K., 221, 231
Perez, J., 300
Perrier, L., 207
PERRIN, F. A. C, 61
Perry, R. B., 264
Peters, W.,^, 359
PETERSON, J., 65
Pfenninger, W., 435
Pfister, O., 480
Pfordten, O. v. d., 264
Picavet, F., 472
Pick, A., 112
Pielke,W.,J5J
PIERCE, A. H., 179
Pieron, H., 10, 260, 289, 336, 359
Pigeon, L., 254
Pike, F. H., 415
Pikler, J., 25
Pilcher, V. D., 415
PlLLSBURY, W. B., 9, 193, 221, 280,
Pilotti, G., 178
Pintner, R., 408
Piaut, F., 155
POFFENBERGER, A. T., Jr., 4OO, 439
Poirot, J., 353
Pollak,H.W.,J5J
Ponzo, M., 255, 254, 257, 260
Poppelreuter, W., 254
Pouget, R. J., 255
Pradines, M., 413
Prager, J. J., 196
Prandtl, A., 186
PRATT, J. B., 472, 477. 482
Prince, M., 25, 40, 193, 359
Prowazek, S. v., 289
Priim, E., 9
Punnett, R. C, 116
Putnam, J. J., ipj, 274
Pyle,W. H., 248,336
Quick, O. C., 264
Raimann, E., 423
RALL, E. E., 88
Rand, B., 248
Rand, M. G., 106
Rank, O., 40, 208, 274
Ranschburg, P., 154, 336
Read, C.,J42
Read, M. S., 360
492
INDEX OF NAMES
Reese, A. M., 3 12
Reeves, P., 408
Regnault, F., 254
Rehmke, J., 192
Rehwoldt, F., 186
Reichel, H., 269
Reid, G. A., 372
Reimer, W., 214
Renouvier, C, 484
Revesz, G., 106
Rey, J., 214
Ribot, Th., 25
Rice, D. E., 207
Richards, R. L., 453
Richardson, W. W., 453
Rickert, H., 264
Rignano, E., 196, 248
RlLEY, I. W., 10
Ritter, C., 420
Rivers, W. H. R., 379
Robinson, V., 358, 423
Rockwell, R. B., 312
Rosanoff, A. J., 154
Roubaud, E., 300
Roustan, D., 93
Rowe, E. C., 413
ROWLAND, E. H., 80
Royce, J., 93
Rubinstein, M., 264
Rubitsek, A., 40
RUCKMICH, C. A., 247, 321
RUEDIGER, W. C., 40, 46, 72, 423
Russell, B., 342
Russell, J. E., 264
Sachs, H., 208
Safford, F. H., 214
Salisbury, 423
Sander, P., 123
Sanford, E. C., 280
Santschi, F., 300
SAPIR, E., 380, 454
Sargent, W., 347
Sasscer, E. R., 300
Schaeffer, A. A., 312
Schaub, A. deV., 336
Schiller, F. C. S., 207
Schlegel, E., 20
Schmid, B., 289
Schmidt, B. A., 260
Schneider, S., 106
Schnidtmann, M., 154
Schonberg, A., 98
Schramm, F., 269
Schubotz, F., 254, 260
Schuster, E., 231
Schutz, R., 480
Schwartzkopf, 20
SCOTT, W. p O,, 269, 372, 396, 429
Scripture, E. W., 484
SEASHORE, C. E., 9, 47, 168, 221, 235
Selz,0.,j72
Severin, H. C, 300
Severin, H. H. P., 300
Shambaugh, G. E., 123
SHEPARD, J. F., 181
SHEPARD, W. T., 53, 313
Sherrington, C. S., 415
Short, 423
Sichler, A., 20
SIDIS, B., 36, 40, 192
Siebrand, 179
Simon, Th., 9, 167, 168, 358
Singer, E. A., Jr., 10, 20
Sisson, E. O., 372
Siven, V. O., 106
Skinner, A., 390
Sleight, W.G.,336
Slonaker, J. R.,JIJ
Smith, A. G., 222
Smith, N. K., 40
Snyder, J. C., 336
Sokolowsky, R., 353
Sollmann, T., 415
SOUTHARD, E. E., 91
Sowton, S. C. M., 415
Sparkman, C. F., 477
Spaulding, E. G., 40
Spearman, C., 231
Spidle, S., 477
Starbuck, E. D., 359
STARCH, D., 83, 254, 280, 336, 347
Steele, A. G., 222
Stefanescu-Goanga, F., 186
Stefanini, A., J5J
Stekel, W., 40, 453
Stern, C., 269
Stern, W., 94, 23 i, 269, 396
Sternberg, W., 179
STEVENS, H. C., 69
Stigler, R., 106
Stocking, R. J., 312
Stocks, J. L., 413
Stout, G. F., 20
STRATTON, G. M., 199, 249, 254, 465
Strayer, G. D., 222, 396
STRONG, E. K., JR., 66, 124, 429
Strong, R. M., 313
Stumpf, C., 123, 200, 207, 248, 380
Sumner, F. B., 313
Super, C.W..J5J
Swanton, J. R., 207, 390
Swift, W.B,jij
Swinton, A. A. C., 106
Symes, W. L., 423
Szymanski, J. S., 98, 300
TAIT, W. D., 124
Talayrach, L, 353
Talbot, M., 397
Tassy, E., 193
Tawney, G. A., 10, 25
INDEX OF NAMES
493
Terman, L. M., 168
Teslar, J. S. van, 274
Thilly, F., 40
Thompson, M. E., 347
Thorndike, E. L., 10, 40, 222, 318, 397,
420
Thurnwald, R., 380
Tichy, G., 260
Titchener, E. B., 25,30, 36, 193, 440
Todd, J. W., 439
Toulouse, E., 10, 424
Town, C. H., 1 68
Tromner, E., 358
True, G., 473
Truschel, 255
Tucker, A. W., 106
TUFTS, J. H., 461
TURNER, C. H., 290, 300
Turner, W. F., 299
Ulehla, V., 289
URBAN, F. M., 125, 179, 209, 214, 215,
245
URBAN, W. M., 260, 280
Urbantschitsch, V., 123, 353
Urtin, H., 93
Valentine, C. W., 260
Van Gennep, A., 347
Van Sickle, J., 397
Varendonck, J., 269
Veley, V. H., 423
Verain, L., 106
Villa, G., 96
Void, J. M., 10, 40, 248
Vos, H. B. L., 269
Wager, H., 289
Waite, H., 222, 231
Walker, C., 372
Walker, H., 25
WALLIN, J. E. W., 81, 94, 154, 168, 208,
390, 397, 486
Wallis, W. D., 477
Warfield, B. B., 476
Warren, E. R., 313
WARREN, H. C., 35, 84, 347
WASHBURN, M. F., 54, 67, 186, 300, 313,
359,570,438
Wasteneys, H., 312
Waterman, G., 40
Watson, J., 439
WATSON, J. B., p, 91, 128, 222
Watson, W., 106
Watt,H ].,i93
Weber, E., 420
WEIDENSALL, J., 57
Weiss, A. P., 222
Weiss, O., 353
WELD, H. P., 236, 407
WELLS, F. L., 754, 186, 222, 336, 416, 435
WELLS, G. R., 68, 127, 360
Wethlo, F., 353
Weyer, E. M., 25
Wharton, W. P., 372
Wheeler, W. M,joo
Whetham, C. D., 397
Whetham, W. C. D.,jp7
WHIPPLE, G. M., 754, 168, 264, 280, 360
Whitley, M. T., 231,372
WILLIAMS, T. A., 76, 193
Willis, C. A., 179, 215
Wilm, E. C, 408
Wilson, C. M., 347
Winch, W. H., 222, 321, 336, 372, 397, 420
Wingfield, H., 274
Wirth, W., 128, 215, 245
Witherspoon, J., 248
Wobbermin, G., 46*0
Wodsedalek, J. E., 300
Woods, F. A., 397
WOODWORTH, R. S., p, 95, I06, 222, 2JI,
239, 336, 380, 397
WOOLEY, H. T., 82
Wundt, W., 208, 360, 380, 484
YERKES, R. M., 9, 10, 20, 30, 50, 54, 106,
222, 314, 486
YOAKUM, C. S., 413
Yule, G. U., 231
Yung, E., 290
Zergiebel, M., 372
Ziehen, T., 95, 179
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
Abstracts of Papers, 47
Action, Reflex, 413
Advertising, Psychology of, 124, 204
^Esthetics, 430
Affective Phenomena, (Experimental),
1 8 1 ; (Descriptive and Theoretical) , 1 86
Animal Intelligence, 314, 318
Anthropology, 43 1
Apparatus, 235, 247
Applied Psychology, 124, 204, 264, 429
Association Experiment, 435
Associations, Meetings of, 41, 46
Attention and Interest, 193
Auditory Space, 254
Auditory Stimuli, Reaction to, 127
Bibliographical, 35
Binet Scale of Tests, Present Status of,
160
Consciousness and the Unconscious, 20,
154
1 Correction, 438
Correlations, 222
Criminal Psychology, 451
Cutaneous Senses, 173
Dementia Praecox, 169
Dreams, 36
Drug Action, Psychological 'Aspects of,
420
Efficiency, Individual and Group, 390
Experimental Psychology, 242
Fatigue, 416
Folk-Psychology, 373
Graphic Functions, 342
Hearing, 116
Higher Mental Processes, Analyses of, 30;
(Experimental), 321; (Theory), 337
Historical Contributions, 10
Illusions, Space, 257
Imagination, 321
Individual Psychology, 390, 424
Interest, Attention and, 193
Invertebrates, Behavior of, 281, 290
James, W., The Philosophy of, 276
494
Kinaesthetic Senses, 173
Kinsesthetic Space, 255
Laughter, 354
Learning, 321
Measurements, Mental, 125
Measurement Methods, Psychophysical,
209
Meetings, Reports of, 41, 46, 236
Memory, 321, 337
Mental Classes, 361
Mental Processes, Higher, 30, 321, 337
Mentation, Conscious and Unconscious
from Psychoanalytic Viewpoint, 154
Mind and Body, 13
Motor Consciousness, 409
Music, Origins of, 200
Pathopsychology, 129
Physiological Psychology, 239
Primitive Races, 380, 400
Proceedings of Meetings, 41, 46, 236
Psychological Progress, I
Psychology, Applied, 124, 204, 264, 429;
Comparative, 281, 290, 300, 314, 318,
404; Criminal, 451; Experimental, 242;
Folk, 373; Individual, 390, 424;
Modern, Angell's Chapters from, 275;
National and Race, 380, 397, 400:
Physiological, 239; Progress of, i;
Religious, 465-483; Social, 441, 454
Psychopathplogy, 129; Experimental, 145
Psychophysics, 209, 245
Psychotherapy, 271
Reaction Times, 127, 232
Reflex Action, 413
Religion, Psychology of, 465
Report, Psychology of, 264
Reports of Meetings, 41, 46, 236
Rhythm, Time and, 197
Self in Recent Psychology, 25
Sensation (General), 97
Senses, Miscellaneous, 173
Social Psychology, 441; 454-465
Space, Auditory, 254; Illusions, 257;
Tactual and Kinsesthetic, 255; Visual,
249
Suggestion, 269
Synsesthesia, 179
INDEX OF SUBJECTS 495
Tactual Space, 255 Vertebrates, Behavior of, 300
Terminology, 35 Vision, Color Defects, 112; General
Testimony, Psychology of, 264 Phenomena, 99; Peripheral, Foveal,
Tests, 160, 215 etc., 107
Thought Processes, 30 Visual Space, 249
Time and Rhythm, 197 Visual Stimuli, Reaction to, 127
Vocal Functions, 347
Values, 260 Volition, 409
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