UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO
from the collection of
Professor Koppel S. Pinson
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
NATIONALITY AND
INTERNATIONALISM
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
NATIONALITY AND
INTERNATIONALISM
BY
W. B. PILLSBURY
PROFESSOR OP PSYCHOLOGY, DIBECTOB OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
LABORATORY, UNIVERSITY OP MICHIGAN. AUTHOR OF
"ESSENTIALS op PSYCHOLOGY," "ATTENTION," AITO
"THE PSYCHOLOGY OP REASONING"
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY
NEW YORK LONDON
1919
COPYRIGHT, 1919, BY
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY
TO
M. M. P.
PREFACE
THIS book was suggested by contact that I
had with the American Greeks returned to
Greece to fight in the Balkan War. That raised
for me a number of problems which I have tried
to answer and in part have answered to my own
satisfaction. On the more theoretical sides
much has been suggested by the writings of
Graham Wallas and his school.
The position taken appears, now that the
work is finished, to be a compromise between
the position of MacDougall, with his great in-
sistence on immediate instinct, and that taken
by Trotter who finds all social phenomena ex-
plained by the fear of the individual for the
social whole, with the consequent dominance of
convention. I have shown that the social re-
sponses are in part due to each of these forces.
They begin in a rudimentary way as instincts
and are then determined by conventions and
ideals developed through experience and im-
posed upon the group by the ''herd instinct."
It also seems necessary to insist that the re-
sult of the action of these forces is not un-
viii PKEFACE
worthy. One obtains the impression from read-
ing Trotter, at least, that the action of man in
the mass is altogether deplorable, that all of
his conventions lead to undesirable results.
One forgets in this view that reason itself is
nothing more than a control of action and
thought by wide experience and tradition, and
that while conventions at times enforce an ultra
conservatism, they also prevent unconsidered
action on .impulse, as well as thinking by un-
controlled association. This is an instance of
a general tendency in ethics and psychology, to
forget that a process when analyzed is the same
process as that with which one started.
I desire to thank my colleague, Professor
Beeves Dow, for reading certain of the later
chapters, and for suggestions he made in con-
nection with them, without, however, holding
him responsible for the doctrines themselves
or for any errors that may have escaped me.
I also desire to thank my wife for help with
the proofs.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER FAOE
I. THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY 1
II. THE NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT — SOCIAL
INSTINCTS 21
III. HATE AS A SOCIAL FORCE 63
IV. NATIONALITY IN HISTORY 90
V. NATIONALITY IN THE PROCESS OF NATURALIZATION 126
VI. THE NATION AND THE MOB CONSCIOUSNESS . . 164
VII. THE NATIONAL MIND AND How IT THINKS, FEELS,
AND ACTS 186
VIII. THE NATION AS IDEAL 224
IX. NATIONALITY AND THE STATE 249
X. NATIONALITY AND SUPER-NATIONALITY AS EX-
PRESSED IN A LEAGUE OF NATIONS . 278
The
Psychology of Nationality
and I nternationalism
CHAPTEE I
THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY
PKOBABLY no word has been spoken more often
in the political discussions of recent years than
the word ''nation" or "nationality." No prin-
ciple has been more frequently referred to by
all sides in arguing for right and wrong than
that each nation is entitled to settle its own af-
fairs. One may assert that there has been many
a declaration of independence for nationalities
that corresponds to the American Declaration
of Independence for the individual, that each
nation has a right to life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness in its own right just as the
individual American claimed that right for him-
self. We are assured over and over again that
the next peace must be based upon the principle
1
2 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
of nationality. This means apparently that each
nation, however small, must be permitted to
manage its own affairs, without interference
from any outside nation. All of these discus-
sions presuppose an agreement as to what a
nation is and the existence of definite criteria
for deciding conflicting claims between peoples
that believe a group of people to belong to its
own rather than to another nation.
That these criteria are not altogether clear
in different cases is evident from numerous dis-
cussions. Both France and Germany claim
Alsace and Lorraine, one on the basis of lan-
guage and the desire of the inhabitants, the
other on the ground of formal connection earlier
in history, and community of race. In Ireland
the same dispute exists in another form. Are
the Orangemen to be regarded as Irish when
they prefer to be English, or shall they deter-
mine their own affiliations! Here the question
is different since it turns on whether a discord-
ant element in a community is to be regarded as
part of the community or as independent. The
problem of criteria presents itself at many
points on the borders between the central and
eastern and southeastern peoples. Are the in-
habitants of the Dalmatian Islands Italian be-
cause they speak the language and because their
land formed part of the Roman and, later, part
THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY 3
of the Venetian Empire? Are the people of
Dobrudja Roumanians or Bulgarians'? Is the
Macedonian, Serb or Greek or Bulgarian? Are
Little Russians really Russian or are they a
separate people because of their different re-
ligion and slightly different language? These
and many similar problems must be settled be-
fore the world can be properly partitioned, and
made safe for democracy or guaranteed a per-
manent peace. But before any one of them
can be solved or even given a basis for adequate
discussion, we must decide what a nation is and
discover suitable criteria of nationality.
Many suggestions have been made as to what
constitutes a nation, and most are accepted in
greater or less degree in- the popular discus-
sions. Most extended, perhaps, of the charac-
teristics regarded as essential is language. It
is felt by many both among the uninstructed
and the more scientific thinkers that nationality
is measured by the presence of a common lan-
guage. We feel that the man who can speak
our own tongue is much nearer to us than the
man with whom we cannot converse. Many of
the authorities on nationalization insist that all
•
citizens should be compelled to speak the lan-
guage of the nation if they are to be regarded as
citizens. One group of scientists implies, if it
does not assert, that language is the best test of
4 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
descent in doubtful cases, and some incline to
the view that descent and language must always
go hand in hand. The second criterion of na-
tionality is this line of descent. Not infre-
quently do we find it implied that nation must
have some close connection with race — that
common physical descent is essential or at least
highly desirable if a nation is to be a unit in the
best and fullest sense. The statement is fre-
quently made that the wonderful resistance of
France to what seemed to be overpowering
force was due to the purity of the race, to the
absence of alien elements in the race. That
the racial feature is important in our own
thought in popular discussions is seen in the
prevalence of race prejudice. If one assigns an
individual to another race, he is willing to ac-
cept that as an explanation of many shortcom-
ings and will be suspicious of the probable mo-
tives or capacity of that individual until he has
had considerable experience with the individual
or with the race. Any popular political discus-
sion will bear evidence of this tendency. Prob-
ably language and race are the elements most
frequently accepted in current discussions as
criteria of nationality.
In discussing the problem of nationality in
general, distinction must be made between the
nation and the state, between the consciousness
THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY 5
cf communal solidarity and the accepted politi-
cd organization. For many purposes the two
an identical. A form of government usually
rests upon the willingness of the governed to
regard themselves as part of the social whole ;
and i successful government of a mass of peo-
ple \\ill frequently develop in them a national
unity. For our present purposes we must dis-
tinguish between the terms no matter how ready
we are to recognize their points of resemblance.
By a nauon we mean a group of individuals that
feels itself one, is ready within limits to sacri-
fice the individual for the group advantage, that
prospers as a whole, that has a group of emo-
tions experienced as a whole, each of whom re-
joices with the advancement and suffers with
the losses of the group. The spirit of nation-
ality may be defined as the personification of
this unity. As opposed to this the state would
be merely the system of government, a unity for
the sake of making and enforcing laws. It rests
upon a feeling of community in most cases, but
frequently the recognized unity extends beyond
the bounds of the state and still more often the
edicts of the state may be enforced upon indi-
viduals who do not feel themselves a part of
the national group. For our purposes, the dis-
tinction must be closely drawn. Nationality is
the mental state or community in behavior.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
This characterizes the nation, and this
concerns us.
The most widely accepted theory of the stite
and of the nation, in so far as state and nation
are confused, is that the nation is an enlarge-
ment of the family, and the state a development
of the paternal authority. We find this theory
so far as it affects the state definitely formu-
lated by Plato in his Laws and it has b^en re-
peated in different forms by most writers on
the development of society from his time on.
If this theory be accepted it would explain why
both racial descent and language hive been
adopted as the criteria of nationality. Were
the human organization to have developed from
the family, all members of the nation would
speak a common tongue and all would be blood
relations, would be descendants of common
ancestors. One could expect to trace the mem-
bers of the nation by the physical similarities
as well as by the similarities in speech. The
nation would be a real biological unit. On the
mental side, one might think of the nation as
united by an extension of the family ties. The
solidarity would be an extension of the family
solidarity and the social instincts would be the
racial instincts in a wider application.
In all primitive communities there is some
evidence for identity between the family and
THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY 7
the narrower political units. Kindred and clan
are recognized among all of the races of North-
ern Europe until well down into medieval
times, and traces can be found in remote dis-
tricts until within two centuries. The system
of land holding in early England shows many
traces of the original family connections, and
still more strikingly, the system of money pay-
ments to kindred for slaying a member is con-
clusive evidence of the solidarity of the kindred
in all the Teutonic peoples. Here we seem to
approach the condition demanded by the theory
that the children of one father form a single
group and these are united for purposes of re-
ceiving and paying the weregild or blood money
into larger groups or kindred to the fourth and
sometimes to the eighth or ninth degree of re-
lationship. The kindred or clan was an ad-
ministrative unit as well as a group bound by
ties of friendliness, a social unit. From the clan
various groupings are made in different lands,
but in all alike the larger groups are aggrega-
tions of clans. Whether the lines of descent are
recognized in the larger groups is not so clear.
Certainly there is evidence that new groupings
of clans that do not recognize degrees of blood
relationship may be made in an emergency, and
that in ordinary circumstances the degree of
blood relationship, if the unit extends beyond
8 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
the clan, has little to do with the system of or-
ganization.
That this closeness of blood relationship is
not the only factor in the development of the
notion of a social whole and may be in a meas-
ure opposed to it and even need to be overcome
before the larger allegiances can be fully de-
veloped is clear from a number of circumstances
of the organization, both in the ancient Teutonic
peoples and in the modern primitive. First we
have good evidence that the notion of kinship
is in some degree symbolic, that while the fam-
ily is thought of as a group descended from a
single father, this is not necessarily true in a
strict sense. In the first place the relation was
never quite restricted to blood relationship.
The practice has grown up almost everywhere
of tracing the connection only on one side,
through one parent. In most of the Teutonic
and Celtic peoples only the relationship on the
male side was accepted in the constitution of
the clan. While the maternal relations might at
times be recognized as in the weregild, the
degree of their contribution was always less
than that of the paternal and in many of the
duties the contribution of the maternal kin was
voluntary.1 Obviously the ties of emotion,
which are as strong on one side as on the other,
'Phillpott: "Kindred and Clan."
THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY 9
were not the basis of the connection of the kin-
dred. It was rather a convenient form of polit-
ical organization.
The symbolic character of the clan is evident,
too, from the fact that a man might be adopted
into the group and have all of the rights of
the natural members. In many of the savage
tribes some symbol of adoption may be more im-
portant in determining the relationship than the
known paternity. Among the Todas of India
a son known to be the offspring of another man
may be accepted as the son by a ceremony per-
formed at the birth, and where the ceremony
and known facts are at variance, the ceremony
is the deciding factor. The limitations of blood
relationship are evident among the many peo-
ples who measure relationship by totems. The
members of the totem are restricted to descend-
ants through the male side. That kinship
as such cannot be regarded as the only meas-
ure of the tribe appears from the requirement
that marriage must always be with a member of
another Totem. At this stage, race and kindred,
as measured by the possession of the same To-
temic symbol, must be distinct, since the mar-
riages are usually restricted to members of the
same tribe, but to those that belong in another
immediate family. Even in the Teutonic peoples
other wider systems of organization develop
10 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
that are recognized as distinct from the family
or kindred. The chief is not the mere heredi-
tary head of the tribe or group of tribes but fre-
quently seems to derive his authority from some
other source. Early, the leadership of the
manor, of the war chief, and later of the church
seemed to compete with the tie of kinship to its
ultimate destruction. It is this wider com-
munity from which the modern nation has de-
veloped rather than from the tribe.
Granted then that the relationship of the fam-
ily is the one from which the relationship of the
nation developed in the beginning, it must still
be admitted that sufficient departures appear
later to make the nation a different entity and
differently derived from the family as an ex-
pression of mere kinship. Either, when the kin-
ship becomes remote, the tribe or clan takes on
a symbolic character that changes it essentially
from the family proper, or new relationships
develop which are different in kind and in the
emotions that they express from those of the
family. In either case the nation raises a new
problem in group psychology, and the questions
that arise with reference to what a particular
nation may be cannot be answered by tracing
the lines of descent.. We have, then, in the dis-
cussion of the nature of the nation or of nation-
ality to ask one by one a series of questions
THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY 11
that grow out of the assumption that the na-
tion may be an outgrowth of the family, and of
the different theories that oppose or limit this
theory. First, how far are nation and race
identical and the nation merely a group of in-
dividuals of similar descent with consequent
physical and mental characters. Second, how
far may one develop the mental qualities that
constitute the nation in individuals of a differ-
ent race.
The first question is particularly important
in the light of the widespread belief in the im-
portance of race which the victims of the dis-
crimination regard as race prejudice and the
supporters as a necessary means of keeping the
race reasonably pure. The extreme upholders
of this theory insist that no real nation can be
developed from mixed blood, or, at least, that
the more pure the blood of the nation, the
stronger and more unified is that nation. Op-
posed to this is a group equally positive in its
belief that only a mixed race may be strong,
although few go to the extreme of insisting that
the greater the mixture the stronger the race.
In these popular discussions, even in race con-
gresses there is frequently more prejudice than
reason. The members of the races that are re-
garded as inferior always point to the accom-
plishments of the best of their race as evidence
12 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
of what they might accomplish were they given
a chance, while the believers in the superiority
of one race or group of races emphasize what
the worst of the lower races have done or failed
to do and forget the lower individuals in their
own or the worst acts of their best.
It cannot be denied that at present clear evi-
dence of racial capacity is lacking. At the ex-
tremes no one would assert that all the races
are equal, on the other hand no one can grade
the races with respect to their intelligence.
Standards of accomplishment are absolutely
different. Tagore denies that one can measure
ability by business capacity or attainments in
pure science. He insists that artistic apprecia-
tion is quite as important. Others insist that
race prejudice and natural environmental con-
ditions have prevented the backward races from
getting a fair chance and that they are back-
ward because of that rather than from lack of
capacity. I suppose that until they have their
chance and really succeed this would not prove
capacity, however much it may complicate the
discussion or the possibility of asserting equal-
ity. It is not sufficient to say that the negro
has not done more because prejudice prevents
him from being accepted as an equal in the pro-
fessions. It may in part explain the failure, but
individuals of other races overcome prejudices
THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY 13
and no one can say whether these prejudices are
greater or less than those under which the negro
labors. This makes it a question whether it is
of any advantage to have a nation all of one
race, whether in fact any emphasis at all is to
be put upon the line of descent. We need not
settle this problem if we could ; suffice it for our
purpose to indicate that race, could one know
it with certainty, is not necessarily final in
determining capacity.
The strongest advocates of the theory hold
that race and nation are or should be identical,
believe that races are distinct physical entities
which may be discovered by measuring the
members of the race. The anthropometrists of
the last generation worked on the assumption
that it was possible to discover a group of char-
acteristics that went together, which when
known would characterize the race. The signs
upon which they insisted most strongly were
the size and shape of the skull, the shape of the
nose and other features, stature, and pigmen-
tation. Some of them seem to believe that one
could measure the skull of an inhabitant of the
British Isles and determine whether he was de-
scended from the pre-Celtic .primitive, from
Celt, from Saxon or Norman. While it cannot
be said that this theory is definitely wrong, re-
cently accumulated evidence tends to discredit
14 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
the more extreme views. Many of the charac-
ters regarded as fixed seem to be open to change
under the influence of environment. One of the
most striking facts in favor of the statements is
the well authenticated series of changes in some
German emigrants who settled in 1817 among
the Georgians near Tim's. Originally fair-
haired, blue-eyed, with coarse features, in two
generations they have developed dark hair and
brown eyes with a "noble oval face. ' ' This was
without inter-marriage with the natives. The
change is ascribed to climate and general en-
vironment alone.2 Boas found a marked change
in the cephalic index of Russian Jews and Ital-
ians in America in only one generation. The
Jews became markedly more dolichocephalic,
while the long-headed southern Italians became
considerably broader-headed. Why this change
should take place Boas does not pretend to say,
but it is apparently because of food and en-
vironment. As the cephalic index or ratio be-
tween length and breadth of the head is m^de
the cornerstone of race by many anthropo-
metrists it is especially significant that it should
prove so variable. Evidence of the change in
mental characters is also apparent in the change
of status of the immigrant in America and in
other cases of widespread race migrations. If
"Keane: "Ethnology," p. 203.
one add the two reasons for skepticism to-
gether, it would seem that it is impossible to
detect race except by tracing the history of the
descent, a history which is lacking in most cases,
and if the physical and mental characters
change with environment, it would make little
contribution to the problem of race could we
succeed. Descent has little influence in deter-
mining the character of the individual over long
periods of time and hence can have little effect
upon the nation.
Could one determine the race and did race
have all of the significance that has been
ascribed to it, we would be little farther ahead
in the discussion of the nature of the modern
problems of nationality. All of the modern
European nations are mongrel, are compounded
of numerous elements and many of them are
composed of much the same elements in a slight-
ly different combination. If we compare the na-
tions that were aligned on opposite sides in the
great war we find that they had quite as many
common elements as those that were fighting to-
gether. In each nation wave after wave of con-
quering peoples has settled and been absorbed
by mixture with the conquered. The original
primitives were probably absorbed in the con-
quering Celts, affecting only a few of their cus-
toms, the Celts in less degree by the Romans,
16 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
themselves a much mixed race, and the more or
less Romanized Celts by the Teutons in the west
and by the Slavs and Mongols farther west. If
one follow Keane 3 in a classification the Eng-
lish would be Celto-Teutonic ; the French, Ibero-
Celto-Teutonic ; the Italians, Liguro-Celto-
Italic; the Russians, Finno-Slavonic. The cen-
tral powers would be made up of Germans who
are Slavo-Celto-Teutonic, the Prussians, Letto-
Teuto-Slavonic, the Austrians would add vari-
ous Slav and Mongol elements, the Bulgars and
Turks would add new complexes which were as
remote from one group as from the other. The
ethnic composition of the opposing groups offers
no explanation of the alliances. The elements
that are mixed are much the same and the pro-
portion of the different components does not
differ sufficiently to explain the lines followed
by the alliances. The nations are not racially
pure, nor do they approximate purity. The
components were found on each side in the al-
liance and approximately as many on one side
as on the other. Possibly a few more Celts on
the side of the Allies, a larger percentage of
Teutons on the other, but in no sense was it a
race war. In the determination of national lines
in general, race is no more important. There
is no pure race in any nation. In the race mix-
* Keane: "Ethnology," p. 201.
THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY 17
tures that constitute nations, it is not the nu-
merical predominance of one racial group which
determines the character of the nation. For
that we must look to more subtle causes.
The prevailing language of a nation may of-
fer a somewhat less uncertain criterion of the
racial descent than the physical measurements.
One at least can say what the language is and
can trace the elements that have entered into
its composition in the development of the peo-
ples. But language is probably no more ac-
curate than physical measurements as an in-
dication of the racial components of a nation
or of community of spirit of its inhabitants.
The language of a nation varies with its racial
components, but one can be sure neither of the
numerical nor political dominance of the races
by the languages. Sometimes the conquering
race may impose its language as the Romans
did on Gaul when the race contribution was com-
paratively slight. Again the conquered persist
in their original speech practically unaffected as
did the English at the Norman Conquest. Com-
munity of language does not mean community
of spirit or the reverse. The Irish will not ad-
mit that they are English although they speak
the tongue nor do the Swiss follow the linguistic
boundaries in their feeling of nationality. The
German Swiss is as much Swiss as the French,
18 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
the Italian as the German. While the sympa-
thies of the communities in the great war seem
to have followed the speech of the district in
some degree, it was not sufficient to endanger
at all the national unity. On the whole it seems
that a common language may be either a result
of national unity, or it may be a sign of the his-
toric development of the peoples. When a na-
tional spirit develops as among the Irish, a na-
tional language may be fostered to give it
strength or serve as a symbol of that unity. In
that case it is rather a symbol or effect of that
community of spirit than its cause. We must
not deny that a common speech is an important
element in furthering the national spirit. All
that is intended is to assert that it is not a sine
qua non, — that language and language alone
does not measure and indicate the nationality.
In this brief survey we have developed a for-
midable list of negatives. We have found many
elements that might and are frequently assumed
to furnish a criterion for nationality which
obviously are either without influence, have less
influence than one is inclined to believe at first
sight, or are impossible of application. Physical
descent cannot be used as a criterion. For, in
the first place, it cannot be traced with accuracy
over a sufficiently long period to settle dis-
puted points. Where it can be traced in historic
THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY 19
periods we find it does not correspond accurate-
ly to the present political boundaries. Large na-
tions that have remained in their territory for a
long period may change their allegiance. When
large numbers of descendants leave the mother
country they may or may not carry with them
the essentials of their native land. Americans
ceased to be English in a few generations, Al-
satians ceased to be German in an equally short
period. Where individuals move from one coun-
try to another they tend to change their al-
legiance, and frequently in the second genera^
tion are by no means to be distinguished from
the people among whom they live.
Granted that physical descent were a basis
for determining nationality, it cannot be discov-
ered by other than historic methods. The phys-
ical features which might be regarded as mark-
ing nations or even races are not sufficiently cer-
tain nor sufficiently permanent to be an aid in
deciding the question. Historical evidence
shows that nearly all races are mongrel, and
that where the lines of division can be traced at
all the mixtures are not markedly different for
any of the countries of Western Europe. An-
thropometry cannot solve the problems that his-
tory leaves in dispute. Were a commission to be
given power to sort the individuals in the Bal-
kan Peninsula into ethnic groups and then to as-
20 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
sign boundaries and rearrange the population
so that all people of similar physical character-
istics were in the same communities, it is safe
to say that the confusion in the Balkans would
be increased rather than diminished, and that
the result would not make for the happiness of
the individuals. Even the more readily discov-
ered speech, while ordinarily following racial
lines, is not an absolute guide. It is an indica-
tion of the probable allegiance, but neither a
necessary cause nor an effect of national spirit.
For the final deciding factors, the final ex-
planation, one must look not to these physical
or fixed mental characteristics and habits but to
purely mental qualities, or to mental qualities
based upon physical characteristics. The na-
tional characteristics are to be discovered not
directly but only through the responses of the
individual and through the responses that be-
tray his emotional and intellectual activities. If
you are to know to what national group an in-
dividual belongs the simplest way is to ask him,
and while his answer cannot always be trusted,
but must be interpreted in terms of his general
behavior, it is, if he speaks the truth, a better
criterion than history, or racial descent, or
physical measurements. Nationality is first of
all a psychological and sociological problem;
only indirectly can it be determined by an-
thropometry or even by history.
CHAPTER H
THE NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT— SOCIAL
INSTINCTS
To have discovered in the last chapter that
the nation cannot be explained from physical
laws alone does not free us from attempting to
discover what laws do control it. For the
psychologist believes that man's so-called men-
tal nature is controlled by laws that are quite
as assured if somewhat more difficult to discover
than the laws of his physical organism. If we
cannot believe that a nation originates by the
grr.dual accumulation of offspring from com-
mon progenitors as a coral island grows, we are
not therefore absolved from all attempts to de-
termine what the laws are that govern the com-
mon action of groups and explain the fact
that certain individuals unite into a group, ac-
cept as proper the acts and desires of the other
members of the group, and refuse adherence
to the ideals of other groups. In fact, we must
endeavor to learn why, when the groups have
been formed, each has many of the aspects of a
single individual and acts toward other groups
21
22 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
very much as if that were a rival individual.
One may reduce many of the acts to common
terms and find in these many points in which
the nation as a whole resembles the activities
of individual animal or man.
In the explanation of the acts of social wholes
as of an individual the most striking single fact
is the divergence between the motives and
forces that the individual himself assigns to his
acts and the explanation which seems to the
scientist the real explanation. One can place
little reliance in the statement that the agent
gives of his motives or of the forces that he
believes to control him. It is the privilege of
the scientist to arrogate to himself omniscience
as to the causes that impel the actions of
the mass. This may be only for effect and is
frequently far from being accepted by the agent
or by other scientists as final. At the worst,
our knowledge is sufficient to indicate that many
of the acts that seem to us simplest are really
the effects of changes wrought in the nervous
system in some remote period of evolution. It
is the duty of the psychologist to trace in every
way the present responses to their causes in
early formed habits, and in the predispositions
of the organism at the birth of the individual.
This can be done only by study of the behavior
of the individual or of the society under differ-
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 23
ent conditions, and by comparing the action of
individuals and societies that have been sub-
jected to those different conditions. The results
of all of these studies have been combined in a
number of different theories of social groups.
One theory, which is perhaps most fundamental,
would explain the social group as the embodi-
ment of instincts. A second finds the closest
analogy for the action of a nation, even when
the individuals are so numerous and so remote
that they may communicate only by the press
and through representatives, in the action of a
crowd and would ascribe to the crowd certain
peculiar qualities that render it different from
a mere group of individuals and much different
from our ordinary conception of a crowd. A
third endows the nation or any social group
with a self in addition to the selves of the sep-
arate individuals, finds in its action evidence
that it thinks, feels, and acts as a unit apart
from the thoughts of its component selves. The
first theory may be regarded as analytic. It
distinguishes different phases of the action of
the social unit and finds similarities for each in
the action of individual animals and men. The
last two are more general analogies, are satis-
fied to point out similarities between well known
phenomena and the action of the nation, and re-
24 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
gard that analogy as an explanation. Each may
be discussed in order.
Since Darwin there has been a growing ten-
dency to explain the acts of man and of the ani-
mals in terms of instinct. This means that most
of the acts are made for some reason that can-
not be understood by the individual, in the case
of man, or by an observer unless one assumes
that they are an expression of innate disposi-
tions,— dispositions that have survived because
they were essential to the existence of the or-
ganism. Many of these acts which we call in-
stinctive are performed in advance of any op-
portunity to learn them, and in certain cases the
organism in question would be better off if they
did not appear. The infant takes nourishment
at the first opportunity and with movements al-
most as perfect at first as after frequent prac-
tice. The first nest of a robin is as well made as
the last, and the beaver needs no practice to cut
a tree in the most approved fashion. These in-
stinctive movements are evidently not rational
as they frequently are performed in every detail
under circumstances in which they are of no
value. Thus a squirrel will give a perfect imi-
tation on a carpet of the actions used in burying
a nut, and James cites an instance of a dog that
carefully laid down a bone in a room, and after
making movements as if scraping dirt over it,
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 25
left it in full sight. Many of the fears of man
are absolutely valueless, probably a detriment
in the environment in which most of us now live.
Fear of snakes in the city dweller or in the
North European, fear of the dark, fear of open
places, as we find them in certain of the
neuroses, have no value in protecting the indi-
vidual and no chance to develop through habit.
Still they appear in the most unexpected places
and in the most rational of men.
One might think of these instincts as inher-
ited habits, activities acquired by progenitors
which have been transmitted to the present gen-
eration. This explanation is accurate save for
the method of origin. The modern biologist
objects to the assumption of an inheritance of
the characters acquired during the life of the
individual. Instead he insists that instincts,
like all changes in structure, arise through some
chance change in the germ plasm, the cell set
aside at the first stage in the development of
the parent and remaining in the body of the
parent unchanged until it begins to develop into
the individual in question. This reproduces the
general type of the race, but may undergo
variations of slight amount in the new individ-
ual. No two are quite alike, and occasionally
very wide divergencies from type present them-
selves. Some of the changes may be due to the
26 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
mating of unlike parents, others seem to be
owing to chemical changes in the cell, which oc-
cur for an unknown reason. When they occur,
the changes in structure or the acts induced by
these changes may be beneficial and increase the
chances for survival of the individual, or they
may be harmful and cause him to act in a way
that shall result in his death. Thus, if some
change in the nervous system cause the new
member to like and eat a food that is abundant
and nourishing, but which has been instinctively
disliked by the race up to that time, the prob-
ability of survival will be increased. If, on the
contrary, the change produce an appetite for a
poison of frequent occurrence in the environ-
ment, the individual will be speedily eliminated.
Similarly any new instinct of caring for the
young will cause the survival of a greater num-
ber and so be self -perpetuating. The race that
develops that instinct will soon outnumber and
may crowd out the others that fail to develop
it. An appetite for its own young would result
in the elimination of the race in which it ap-
peared. One might picture this process of de-
velopment of instincts by natural selection as an
enormous game of chance in which the stakes
are life and death for the individual and in-
crease or decrease in numbers for the race. The
chance lies in the appearance of the changes in
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 27
the germ plasm, the stakes are won for the race
provided the individual lives long enough to
propagate his kind, and the degree of success is
measured by the number propagated and the
number that survive.
Most acts that are essential to the survival of
the individual and to the propagation of his
kind are instinctive. They cannot be left to
learning and so are insured by being established
in the nervous system at birth. They have been
essential to the life of the ancestors and so have
been retained when they appeared by chance.
These individual and racial instincts express'
themselves in two ways. The simpler are acts
which are performed at once when the stimulus
or occasion arises. Taking nourishment, sleep
and exercise, movements of withdrawal from
dangerous stimuli are of this character. The
second form is marked out in the rough and is
controlled in detail by the feelings. Most in-
stinctive movements that serve to approach or
retain objects are pleasant; those that consti-
tute acts of withdrawal are unpleasant. In the
more complicated acts only the pleasantness of
attainment of ends that are beneficial and the
unpleasantness that attaches to the presence of
harmful stimuli give evidence of instinct. The
movements are not mechanical, are not pre-
scribed, but again may be regarded as chance
28 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
responses, in which pleasure or displeasure de-
cides whether they shall be made, or the results
accepted or rejected. Thus a chick will peck
at any bright object at first and, when it takes
into its mouth a bitter tasting worm, will at
once reject it. The movement is not discrimi-
nating. The final test is the pleasure or dis-
pleasure of the taste. A youth selects his mate
on the basis of the instinctive pleasure aroused
by her features or form; we judge the conse-
quences of our acts and plan our future activi-
ties in terms of the pleasure or satisfaction they
are likely to produce. In general, then, our most
important acts are prescribed at first by in-
stincts, and all through life the instinctive feel-
ings of pleasure or satisfaction and discomfort
or dissatisfaction serve to select and guide our
movements.
Many of the fundamentals in human nature
that make social life possible and agreeable are
also instincts. The pleasure in association with
others, the responses of features and voice to
the looks and remarks of friends constitute the
simplest, least active processes. At the other
extreme stand the incentives to cooperate, the
impulses of self-sacrifice for the social unit
upon which depends the formation of nation
and state. In this discussion we must distin-
guish the cooperative from the antagonistic so-
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 29
cial instincts. The first serve to hold the group
together and further the interests of its mem-
bers. Opposed to these are the instincts of co-
operative defense and aggression, instincts
which unite the members of one whole against
another for the sake of advancement at the ex-
pense of the other. The one makes possible the
organization of the peaceful society, the other
the organization for war. The second in a meas-
ure depends upon the first, but contains ele-
ments of self-sacrifice that are not required for
it. The one presupposes life together in the ab-
sence of hostile tribes, the other is a develop-
ment of a life of conflict between rival groups.
It is probable that the second may have been
the first to develop — that only when there were
dangerous rival tribes was it necessary to form
a larger social grouping. However this may be,
it is certain that at present we can see traces
of each. We may begin with a treatment of the
cooperative or intra-social instincts or forces
and pass on later to the instincts of hate and
conflict, the inter-social.
The fundamental instincts upon which co-
operation is dependent may be reduced to two ;
sympathy for the other individuals, and fear of
the social group or of other members of the
group. Upon these two develops a system of
ideals and social concepts which constitutes the
30 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
fabric of the social system. These ideals when
fully developed seem to have many of the posi-
tive features of law. The instincts of sympathy
are among the most definite of the social re-
sponses. When one observes the suffering of
another one suffers with him in the literal sense
of the Greek original. One cannot read of eyes
gouged out without a strain of discomfort in
one's own eyes. Observation of the effects of
hunger or of blows may similarly induce a local-
ized pain. The pain or the discomfort is appar-
ently an immediate instinct. The localization
in one's own body is probably largely due to
suggestion. Whatever the neurological connec-
tion, the fact is obvious and verified every day.
The suffering is very real and can be escaped
only by relieving the suffering of the other or
forcing one's self to forget it. The former is
usually the easier method. This instinct is
probably the strongest incentive to charity; it
makes charity not an intellectually or morally
motived activity merely, but a necessity for the
individual's immediate comfort. Its ramifica-
tions in the social life are wide ; most unselfish
cooperation depends upon it. When strongly
aroused it passes over into resentment and be-
comes a strong factor in the exercise of the
criminal law.
The instincts of the second class are more ef-
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 31
fective in keeping discipline within the group.
They are the instincts of fear or of respect for
the group as a whole or for its members. These
vary from the paralyzing effect of youthful
bashfulness, through stage fright, to respect for
the opinions and feelings of others just because
they are expressed or exhibited by others. In
its strongest manifestations bashfulness sug-
gests a pathological fear. It is most intense
in childhood and weakens later to increase in
adolescence. Even in the adult, only long prac-
tice will enable a man to appear before a large
audience with complete composure, and the
most experienced are subject to embarrassment
when put in a new position or before a strange
audience. It appears when reason gives every
assurance that there is no danger. In the crowd
this fear enables the group to establish its dic-
tates against the better judgment of the indi-
vidual. He does what others do because he is
uncomfortable when he does not, he is in many
cases actually afraid to assert his opinions
against the crowd. The fear may be overcome
by a strong man who is confident that he is
right, but the weak man does not assert himself
and the strong man yields on points that seem
to him relatively non-essential rather than un-
dergo the discomfort of self -assertion. This in
the crowd assures cooperation and is one of the
32 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
factors that make the crowd approach a
unity. It is a powerful agent in the enforce-
ment of standards in groups of individuals who
are in communication only through the indirect
means of the press and hearsay. The individual
tends to subordinate his opinion to the social
group 's. Why he acts as he does, why he feels
uncomfortable when face to face with a crowd,
the individual does not know. The instinct ex-
presses itself only in the acts and in the feel-
ings ; it is not revealed to consciousness in any
other way. The actor knows only that he acts,
and that he would be uncomfortable if he failed
to act as he does.
This fear of the group, or of society as a
whole when at a distance, makes possible what is
perhaps the most important concrete factor in
the development of society and in the develop-
ment of the individual as a member of society —
the development of ideals and the enforcement
of ideals upon the members of a social group.
The ideals themselves we may take for granted
as the gradual development of a standard of ac-
tion or of thinking that has proved valuable for
the group. They certainly do not arise from
rational considerations. When they do ap-
pear, ideals constitute the most essential ele-
ment in determining the life of the individual
and of the community. Success in attaining
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 33
these ideals gives most of the pleasant emotions,
failure to attain them many of the most poig-
nant sorrows. In the present state of industry
and the use of machine tools the absolute needs
for food, clothing, and shelter might be satisfied
by working a few hours a day. The rest of the
time is devoted to satisfaction of what might
be satirized as the "showing off" instinct. No
one, of the gentler sex in particular, is content
with comfort in clothing; one must have some-
thing that shows on the face that it is difficult
to procure. As if to make sure that garments
are not carried over from year to year, the
styles change with frequency, and the most elab-
orate gown that bears the marks of an earlier
season must be discarded. The current styles
emphasize the statement that neither protection
nor comfort has much weight in the minds of the
designer, or in the thought of the wearer who
selects or accepts his product. How little can
be made of the development of these standards
is evident from the way the styles develop.
There is no official dictator, but a changing
group of designers who feel that their success
depends upon their ability to please the public.
The public on the other hand accepts what it
believes to be supplied to the best people. Prob-
ably the public and the designer both are guided
to some slight extent by instinctive apprecia-
tion of beauty, however little beauty there seems
to be in many of the styles. More depends upon
the prestige of earlier successes, obtained in
ways and for reasons that cannot be clearly
determined.
Less clearly, but none the less unmistakably,
the manner if not the materials of eating is de-
termined by these social standards. One eats
in places to be seen of men, or if one lives at
home, has accessories of the table that shall
carry conviction of the social status of the fam-
ily. Less obvious are the manners that are ac-
quired by or forced upon the children as a sign
of descent from a superior stock, minutiae
which have no raison d'etre aside from giving
the distinction of being different. The size and
adornment of the house is chosen rather to im-
press and serve as a sign of power or posses-
sion than for the comfort of the inmates. Many
of the real conveniences are introduced because
they are proper rather than because of their ac-
cepted utility or hygienic value. All of these
features of life derive their vogue from the
fact that they are approved by the group. They
are a sign of the material success of their pos-
sessor, or of his social position. The pleasure
that they give is largely derived from the effect
that they are supposed to have upon others
rather than from their inherent satisfaction.
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 35
The owner does not feel that he is observed of
men, nor does he feel that he is strutting with
the peacock, but take the element of social ap-
proval away and he loses interest in many of
his most treasured possessions. Change the na-
ture of social approval and the things desired
change their character. One can imagine that
in a national struggle for life and death when
everything was needed to save the nation itself,
abstinence might become enough of a virtue to
have men rejoice in rags and plain living. In
the late war we approached this sufficiently to,
appreciate how much the ordinary scale exceeds
the level of minimum necessity and sometimes
even of the minimum comfort.
These standards are set not only for the
creature comforts and material necessities, but
for the matters of the spirit as well. What
shall be the accepted doctrine in politics, in re-
ligion, even in science and philosophy is de-
termined from generation to generation, even
from year to year, by the social whole. Apart
from its truth or philosophy the divine right of
kings had a vogue before the French revolution
that has been entirely lost since the downfall of
Czar and Kaiser. Belief in hell had a long run
of popular favor that seems to have pretty well
passed at present. The dominance or passing
may be in part explained by the experience of a
36 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
society of a given age, and may be a reasoned
belief for the select few, but for the great mass
these fundamental beliefs are almost as much
matters of fashion as the cut of a coat. It either
is or is not the thing at a given time and in a
given circle and is accepted or rejected accord-
ingly. Certain men, the leaders, can give a rea-
son, if not the reason, for a particular belief;
some contrary-minded individuals are spurred
to skepticism by the prevalence of any doctrine,
but the great majority accept their beliefs from
the parson, from the latest book, or from a fash-
ionable lecturer just as they take their hats
from the best milliner. The attitude might be
rationalized by saying "if all the best people
accept it, it may be right, at least it saves
thought, for after all nobody knows and it is
as well to be in good company."
The readiness to accept these ideals and be-
liefs from society is probably one of the most
important factors in the development of social
life in any form. It holds not merely in the
smug, best society, but even more strongly for
the common people and the dregs. It holds as
well for the workingman or man who is disin-
clined to work who believes that a socialistic
state will provide the utopia, as for the capital-
istic believer in protection and large armaments
as a specific for all industrial evils. The social-
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 37
1st orator is as ready with his "it is universally
agreed" or "all the best minds who have exam-
ined the social position of the laborer assure
us" as is the orator in Congress. Each is as
ready to rest upon the authority of a generally
recognized man, and much of the general recog-
nition accorded to certain men arises because
their opinions suit the many who give them
great praise, because they desire to believe their
statements. In the last analysis many such
statements mean merely that it is good form in
my set to accept this opinion. Seldom does any
one either in the high or in the low levels of so-
ciety attempt to go farther when talking for
public effect. When the honest independent
thinker does reach conclusions at variance with
orthodox or accepted opinion, no matter how
thorough his investigation, it is very difficult
to have them considered, and it is almost im-
possible to convince the masses even when the
evidence in their favor is the best possible.
These ideals depend for their existence upon
two factors: (1) the existence in the individual
of an instinctive respect for the opinion of the
whole akin to the fear of the group, and (2)
upon a traditional growth of a conventional
standard. To accept the opinion or the stand-
ard of the group is instinctive, but the opinion
or standard itself is not immediately instinc-
38 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
tive ; it is the product of experience, of separate
instincts and of the tradition in the society.
If one consider the ideals of success of the con-
temporary American, one finds that what he
strives for are things that appeal to the primal
instincts, and are on their material side desired
instinctively by all men. The degree and form
in which they are desired are determined pri-
marily by the conventional standards of each
community. Wealth in any of its forms is in
some degree instinctively desirable. The horses
of the steppes or the buffaloes of the Todas
satisfy the instinctive demands by providing
food and clothing in addition to being beasts
of burden. When the wealthy chief obtains
more than he can use they are of prime value as
a medium of exchange, may, as with the buf-
'faloes of the Todas, become connected with the
religious worship, and in any case obtain their
main worth as a sign of the success and con-
sequent importance of the possessor. Probably
gold and silver and precious stones developed
their place in the scale of values in the same
way. Satisfying first the instinctive aesthetic
desires, their rarity gave them an established
status as a medium of exchange. They were
first an immediate means to the satisfaction of
all needs and, secondly, a symbol of power,
They then became conventionalized as a meas-
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 39
lire of the degree of social approval and hence
the end of all attainment. When thus estab-
lished they are the accepted ideal of the par-
ticular group. One never questions why one
should strive to attain them. They seem to be
an end in themselves.
The standardized ideals of other kinds fol-
low the same course. All men are curious.
From this develops love of knowledge, from
that, in turn, respect for knowledge. From this
series of instincts is derived the social respect,
so far as it exists, which attaches to the schol-
ar's career. In a measure, the appreciation sets
up rewards and standards of attainment in po-
sitions in connection with learned institutions,
memberships in academies abroad and what
not, that in a measure atone for the small finan-
cial returns. That financial rewards are of the
same order as social approval is seen in the
lower levels where the girl of superior intelli-
gence will take the smaller wage of the depart-
ment store rather than the higher of the factory,
and either rather than better paid household
service. The ideal for attainment in these cases
consists in the name of the profession. So-
ciety gives greater esteem to the lawyer than
to the locomotive engineer of the same earn-
ing power, to the physician than to the veteri-
narian, to the clergyman than to the riveter.
40 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
These are in part symbolized in the dress. Any
calling that permits wearing a white collar and
having moderately clean hands seems to stand
higher than one which is too dirty or too rough
for the better clothing. This may be due partly
to the pleasure in the dress, and partly to the
fact that the dress is merely an indication of the
respect in which the calling is held and of the
type of man who seeks to enter it. Certain it is
that these ''white collar" callings have a more
general esteem; men are willing to submit to
longer training in preparation for them and to
receive smaller rewards in them than in others
of less difficulty and in themselves no more dis-
agreeable. Success in none of them is meas-
ured by the financial rewards and in some meas-
ure they compete with business on this basis. In
some of them, the attainment is measured
rather by the standing in the profession itself,
by the number and value of the books written,
by the pictures hung and the prizes received
rather than by the financial reward. There is
in artistic circles a tendency even to look upon
financial rewards as vulgar even though they
are never spurned. The reward is convention-
alized, but it is a different, perhaps a contradic-
tory, ideal from the ordinary monetary reward.
When we turn from these standards of ap-
preciation to the ideals of conduct we find that
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 41
in general outline the process is the same. In
morals the standards have been formulated so
definitely that they may be reduced to codes, al-
though frequently the actual legal codes are not
identical with the standards approved by so-
ciety. The incentives to live up to the ideals
are approximately the same as for the attain-
ment of success, except that more emphasis is
put upon the punishment for failure than upon
reward for success. The acts interdicted are
those that would be harmful to the social whole,
and most would, if permitted, render the group
less likely to survive. As in the preceding in-
stances the standards or ideals are firmly es-
tablished, although it is easier to say when they
have been departed from than exactly what they
are. The moral as distinguished from the re-
ligious among the ten commandments are speci-
fic, but they are given latitude in interpreta-
tion. The less fundamental features of moral
behavior are quite as rigidly enforced, although
not so clearly formulated. All may be said to be
instinctive in their fundamental character,
given a particular form or content by conven-
tion and tradition, and then enforced by the in-
stinctive fear of the dictates of the social group.
Ideals for the vaguer relations of states illus-
trate the same laws. One may say that all mod-
ern states have an ideal of freedom for the in-
42 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
dividual. This ideal is somewhat peculiar in
that it is in large part a reaction against the
older social conventions, but has become estab-
lished in its turn through social approval. The
content varies from nation to nation in the
shade of meaning that is given it, and even from
one social group to another. For the allied
group of nations the term means in general
freedom from interference by the government,
and in less degree by social opinion, with the
details of the thought and action of the indi-
vidual. Even in the different members of the
alliance the meaning varies from nation to na-
tion. In England freedom of speech in political
matters is much more prominent than in any of
the others. In the United States we empha-
size more right to vote and perhaps the abstract
notion of freedom with little practical applica-
tion to personal freedom in conduct or in speech
that affects matters of established government
or general political belief. In France personal
freedom is much more in evidence. The Puri-
tanical restraints of both England and the
United States would be irksome to the French-
man. There is probably, too, less or at least a
different subordination of the individual to the
state where personal pleasure and state inter-
ests come into conflict. In all three countries
the interpretation of the ideals varies from time
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 43
to time, under the stress of circumstances. Dur-
ing the war many of the most cherished features
of the American constitution have been put
aside by popular consent because they stood in
the way of winning, and even the highest courts
have found a way to justify their temporary ab-
rogation. In all of these countries liberty is re-
stricted in its application by the accepted needs,
by the conventionally accepted greatest good of
the greatest number. In all of these countries
rights are tempered by duties. In the Russia
of the Bolshevists alone is there complete free-
dom, with no restriction by convention. The
result is license and, to the distant observer, a
condition that resembles the earlier autocracies,
with the complete dominance of the physically
powerful.
The ideal of personal liberty is very different
from the national ideal in either of the Central
Powers. There the doctrines of a century have
succeeded in reducing the freedom of the indi-
vidual to the exaltation of the State. The State
is accepted as a real person with the rights and
joys of a person and the educated German at
least has accepted it, has become content to
share the glory of its greatness as a substitute
for his own more personal emotions. The less
intelligent are bribed by good wages and living
conditions to accept an existence with a mini-
44 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
mum of personal freedom, aside from the free-
dom to gratify his more fundamental instincts
in his own way. How far this condition will sur-
vive the wreck of the war is still to be seen.
What strikes one most forcibly in the rapid
changes of the war period is the quickness with
which one ideal may supplant another and the
completeness with which the material conditions
change with change in the ideals. Eussia is
made over or destroyed, as one will, by the gen-
eral acceptance of an ideal held before the re-
volt by a small but noisy minority. France is
reborn with the vivifying of an ideal that many
had assumed before the war to be accepted only
as a form. Whether the well disciplined and
conservative German has a latent ideal that
shall transform Germany in the same way is
still to be seen.
These ideals constantly cross the racial and
the individual instincts and may easily be con-
fused with them. One frequently speaks of an
instinct of cleanliness, but study of different
races and the evolution of the small boy show
that much of the dislike of cleanliness depends
upon social ideals. Imitation has been fre-
quently spoken of as an instinct, but it is prob-
ably only one form of the socially enforced ac-
quiescence in the standards of the community.
The forms of the constructive instinct, of the
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 45
acquisitive instinct, of the instinct of curiosity,
if not the acts that are ascribed to the instincts,
are frequently derived from the social stand-
ards or ideals. As opposed to the immediate in-
stincts, these ideals obtain only their general
content and the incentives and warrant from
instinct. Their content comes from learning.
As compared with the individual instincts, too,
they reveal themselves by feelings rather than
by acts. One is guided in the decisions by the
emotions that attach to the contemplated act, or
by the empirically known results of the act rath-
er than by the immediate compulsion of the acts
themselves. In effect they are no less strong
than the immediate instinct, as is evident from
the result when they come into conflict with the
individual and racial instincts. Many a sensible
woman will give up food or comfort for a gown
that will win social approval, and many an am-
bitious youth sacrifices health that he may suc-
ceed in a profession. The birth-rate is low in
the higher classes, for children are incompatible
with the best garments, with automobiles and
other material signs of social standing.
Of particular importance in all discussions of
social psychology, because of the large place
that has been assigned to it by Tarde,1 Bald-
1 Tarde : ' ' Laws of Imitation. ' '
46 THE PSYCHOLOGY OP NATIONALITY
win2 and others is the relation of imitation
to the instincts. Tarde and others who make
most of it regard imitation as a simple instinct,
and assume that any act made by one man will
be imitated by others about, just because this
act is observed. What observations we have on
the simpler forms of imitation indicate that such
an instinct does not exist. Imitation seems
rather to be the result of a number of instincts
and to be closely dependent upon the general
social instincts we have been considering. We
may distinguish at least three different senses
in which the term is used : first, the imitation of
simple movements that have not yet been
learned ; second, of simple movements that have
been learned and made at other times by the
individual who is to imitate ; third, complicated
acts, purposes, or institutions which are adopt- *
ed by one people from another. The experi-
mental evidence both in animals and men for
the influence of imitation of the first sort is neg-
ative. An unknown movement is learned no
more quickly when a model is furnished by an-
other than when the animal or child is left alone,
provided only some incentive for the movement
is given. Cats get out of boxes no more quickly,
monkeys learn to pull bananas near them with a
cane no sooner if they are shown than if they
2 Baldwin: "Social and Ethical Interpretations."
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 47
are left to try by their own efforts. The acts as
made by another may provide an incentive to
attempt to make them, where that is otherwise
lacking. Thus the child learns to speak, ap-
parently, because the sound he hears sets a
model that he tries to repeat. When that sound
comes by chance from his own vocal organs
he is interested in it and will repeat it. Even
this is not a separate instinct but is only one
expression of the instinctive interest in others
of his own species which impels him to notice
the sounds they make.
The movements which have been learned al-
ready will, of course, be repeated when another
is observed to make them. This has fundamen-
tally the same explanation. The general social
instinct leads the actor to observe the movement
of other men, and, when that movement is seen,
the sensation evokes the movement by what we
know as idea-motor action. It should be ob-
served, too, that the movement will not be made
unless the results appeal to the individual as de-
sirable. Whether they shall or shall not be de-
sirable is also dependent upon instinct and ex-
perience, with social convention as an element
in deciding. The same may be said of the third
more complicated form of imitation — the adop-
tion of styles, of ways of thinking, and of social
or legal institutions. Seeing them or knowing
of their existence may suggest the adoption, but
whether they shall be finally adopted depends
upon who exhibits them, the emotional reaction
that they arouse, and their success in practice.
In short, imitation in none of these forms is an
instinct, but like all other acts it is in part de-
pendent upon instincts. At the most it is the
expression not of one instinct alone but of many
divergent ones. Most of the social instincts,
particularly social pressure, combine to induce
imitation in each of the senses in which the term
had been used. We shall have several occasions
to discuss the third form.
The development of social instincts is ex-
plained by the same principles as the develop-
ment of any instinct. The higher animals sur-
vive as groups, packs, or herds, rather than as
individuals. The beasts of prey are more effec-
tive in the pack than alone, the herd of deer or
of cattle is more likely to survive than separate
individuals of the same species. Assume two
species of wolf in the same region, one with the
instinct of hunting in the pack, the other with-
out it. The former would survive in greater
numbers and the others would in time be elim-
inated. Where game is scarce or large animals
predominate, the survival of those that hunt in
the pack would be more pronounced, the elim-
ination of the others more rapid. Similarly,
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 49
where predatory animals abound the non-social
Herbivora would quickly be eliminated.
The specific forms of the social instincts are
also to be related to survival value. The ten-
dency to self-sacrifice would subserve the inter-
ests of the species since if the males alone are
killed there are always enough to preserve the
fertility of the group. Were the herd to scatter
on attack, more individuals would perish and
they would be the young and the females upon
whom survival mainly depends. The instinct of
the deer to gather in a circle with the males on
the outside, then, favors survival. The social
instincts, like the individual and the racial, can
be regarded as tendencies or dispositions that
have developed by chance and which persist be-
cause the individuals in whom they have devel-
oped survive while those who fail to develop
them are eliminated or survive in smaller num-
bers. The fear of the group would tend to make
for discipline. In man, at least, one can trace
the effects clearly, and possibly in the higher
animals one may imagine an instinctive fear of
the group that would force the male to the out-
side of the herd, as it shames a coward to the
attack. The more tender emotions of sympathy
seem little if at all in evidence among the ani-
mals, although they appear in the lowest men.
In man the social instincts are more impor-
50 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
tant than in any of the animals. Man is less
fitted to survive alone, more dependent upon the
care of parents at birth, and he alone, apparent-
ly, is aided by knowledge and the possession
and use of instruments that can be developed
only gradually through the course of genera-
tions rather than found ready to hand. It can
be seen at once that no great numbers of men
could survive did they not gather into groups
and cooperate for defense against the more
powerful beasts and in the pursuit of the ani-
mals which provide them with food. The ques-
tion has been raised by MacDougall whether we
need to assume more than the maternal instinct
to explain the social phenomena of sympathy.
He asserts that when the family instinct is ex-
tended, as it is bound to be, the social instincts
are certain to arise. If we accepted the develop-
ment of society from the family the extension of
the maternal and paternal instincts would nat-
urally follow, weakening as we find them to do,
with remoteness of relationship. We have seen
reason to doubt whether the nation developed
quite in this way, whether, at least, the feeling
of kinship was not extended so far before the
nation developed as practically to cease to exist.
We have also reasons to believe that loyalty to
the social whole contains some elements that
are different in kind from family affection.
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 51
They certainly are more readily developed and
transferred, and have no relation to the near-
ness in blood. Graham Wallas 3 is probably
right in insisting that the social instincts are
distinct from the maternal and paternal. Even
if they are not distinct in origin they are dis-
tinct in application which is all that we need to
contend for our present purposes.
All the social instincts must have been effec-
tive in developing the primitive communities at
a time when the formation of groups of indi-
viduals was necessary and not optional. One
may assume on the one hand that individuals
who spoke the same language or were of the
same general physical structure and had com-
mon interests might be drawn together from
mere gregariousness. They instinctively liked
to be near others of the same kind. The ex-
change of ideas, if we assume them to have
reached the stage of being able to speak and of
having ideas, might of itself be sufficiently
pleasant to bring them together. However dis-
agreeable man in the mass may be when one is
in the midst of the mass, there is a hunger for
society that approaches the strength of a phys-
ical appetite when one has long been alone.
The avidity with which the sheep herder on the
mountain range hangs on the words of the pass-
3 Graham Wallas: "The Great Society," pp. 146 ff.
52 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
ing stranger, even if he can with difficulty or not
at all understand the language, seems due to
this gregariousness alone.
More utilitarian, even if no more pressing,
is the mutual aid from cooperation. • Even at
the stage of the huntsman with no fixed habita-
tion, many tasks are possible for the group that
are impossible for any individual of the group
alone. Large game falls more readily to the
group than to the individual, requires more than
one for its preparation and transportation, and
will supply a small group for as long a time
as it will remain edible. As the development
proceeds the advantages of working together
become more pronounced, and the stages above
the simplest agricultural would be impossible
without it. Where division of labor becomes
the rule, as in all complicated societies, the ad-
vantages are obvious. In fact, the modern state
could not be approximated did it not exist.
"Whether the results for the individuals with the
rougher, harder tasks are such as would be
willed in cold blood by those members of society
were they free to choose and saw all the re-
sults of the choice, as compared with the sim-
pler, less organized primitive existence, is a
question that we have no means of answering.
Certainly those who live under the more primi-
tive conditions on farms and in simply organ-
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 53
ized villages are moving to the great cities
in ever-increasing numbers and few return.
Whether the total result for the individual be a
gain or a loss, the average individual is bound
to desire cooperation and the social group de-
velops from the advantages that lead men to
draw together.
In the original state the desire for protection,
the desire to escape the greater at the expense
of the lesser evil, is also strong. As soon as
tribes come into conflict, as soon as the range
is restricted or game is scarce in a given re-
gion, men must voluntarily draw boundaries
for the country over which each tribe or each
family may hunt. Granted that hostilities re-
sult, the tribe must draw together for protec-
tion or to wreak vengeance upon the other
group. At this stage the impulses of the gentle
cohesive type are replaced by the aggressive
class. The common affection is replaced in em-
phasis by the common hate of the outsider that
would eat the grass from his range, or would
kill and drive away the deer that have fed in
the valley and on the mountain where he has
hunted. This common hate or common anger
obviously implies increased unity in plans for
the destruction of the intruder. The small com-
munity appreciates the advantages of the com-
mon action as it may never have done before.
54 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
The slight bitterness over the brother or neigh-
bor who has offended in some of his own hunt-
ing expeditions, who has finished the deer that
the individual in question wounded, is forgotten
in the greater dislike of the common enemy.
The tribe becomes united in spirit as it never
has been since the occasion of the last common
struggle. Very much of the primitive union of
tribes would be traced to this and similar com-
mon offensive reactions, the community of
spirit of the pack rather than of the defensive
reactions of the herd of deer or the mere gre-
gariousness of the oxen. All three need to be
considered if we are to know why men gather
into communities or feel together as nations.
To assign the relative importance of each may
offer difficulties, but it is a problem that we
may keep in mind as we go on.
The development of social ideals is a different
problem. In some cases they, too, may have de-
veloped by chance and been selected by the sur-
vival of the nations in which suitable ones had
developed. The respect for ancestors and the
consequent ideal of many progeny to worship
those now living when they become ancestors,
which has developed in China, certainly has
been a factor in the survival or great increase
in population ; while the ideal of thrift and con-
sequent race suicide threatens to depopulate
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 55
France. In other cases, however, selection of
the ideal seems to be due to the pleasing result
of action in accordance with the ideals, or the
instinctive respect for the ideal itself. The uni-
versally extended ideal of freedom has little sur-
vival value, but does contribute to the enjoy-
ment of life in the society that accepts it. The
ideal of accumulating goods against a time of
misfortune makes both for greater comfort and,
originally, was a factor in survival. The greater
comfort alone is sufficient reason for its devel-
opment and persistence. The failure of some
codes of morals that depart from tradition and
convention, such as the failure of the numerous
free love communities, seems to be due rather to
the emotional reaction to the results of the prac-
tice when tried than to the elimination of the
communities that have tried it. The practice
is abandoned before time is given for a test of
its survival value. The emotions evoked are
themselves instinctive, so that one might say
that ideals arise in part from instinct, that the
acts which initiate them are instinctive and that
in part the emotional reaction which determines
whether they shall be accepted or rejected in
advance of trial is instinctive.
How the standard actions or the actions which
become standard and the theories or beliefs
which become ideals should develop at first
56 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
is a different and more difficult question. Some
we may explain as we have the origin of in-
stincts, as due to chance. Movements are con-
stantly being made, some of which are success-
ful, and these develop into habits. Of these the
better are adopted and taught to the next gen-
eration. In the course of time many acts be-
come standardized that are of no great superi-
ority to others that are rejected. Here belong
table manners, methods of pronunciation, and
many others that will occur to the reader. They
are passed on as signs of class or caste and have
value as one element in a complex rather than
for themselves. Beliefs and ideals, too, seem to
originate at times in much the same way. New
theories are constantly occurring to individuals
in society. These are propounded to the group,
are tested by their instinctive appeal and by
their harmony with experience. Some seem
promising and are tried in practice and those
which prove useful or give pleasant results are
accepted. After they have been accepted for a
time, they acquire a prestige that makes them
difficult to overthrow; man no longer questions
them. Even when circumstances change in a
way to make the old ideal no longer valuable, it
still persists. It is this that makes tradition
an incubus on progress at the same time that it
gives a conservatism to society which provides
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 57
a necessary stability. After ideals have once
been established they may be propagated by the
conquest of other peoples by the race in which
they have developed, as Greece and Rome im-
posed their civilization upon the world. On the
contrary, ideals may, by their own inherent
strength, survive a conquest, as Rome imposed
her language, laws and religion upon her con-
querors, and China is said always to have ab-
sorbed her conquerors without herself chang-
ing. At other times ideals spread as sugges-
tions to other peoples through their own worth,
or because of the general prestige of the nation
in a particular respect. Parisian styles conquer
the world now as the political ideals of the
French did before and after the Revolution. In
some of these instances ideals are imposed and
physical conquest is the cause of the accept-
ance of the ideals ; in others the ideals are mere-
ly suggested and win because of the superiority
of their appeal.
As instinctively developed, we may look upon
the nation as an outgrowth first of the social
instinct which makes the mere presence of other
individuals pleasant, the fundamental gregari-
ousness that may be regarded as bringing the
units together. Further cooperation is imposed
by the instinct of sympathy which makes it
impossible to see another suffer with comfort to
58 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
one's self. More general in its effect is the in-
stinctive respect for the opinions of others,
which rises at times to a fear of man in the
mass which enforces the ideals of all upon each
individual. More important than either, but
definitely dependent upon the latter for its exist-
ence, are the ideals which each nation has de-
veloped— some for all individuals in a group,
some for separate classes. These are taken
from the society in which one lives. The child
accepts the ideals and standards of the family
in which he grows up, of the teachers in his
school and of the companions in his shop. To
a certain extent he may pass upon the adequacy
of the standard, particularly when he changes
from one environment to another, but for the
most part he accepts them without question.
This choice is made in terms of the instinctive
pleasure or appeal of one or the other, or in
terms of the probable benefits as judged from
earlier experience. For the most part they are
accepted without thought, because of the social
forces, the fear of society, and the instinctive
discomfort which attaches to its real or im-
agined disapproval. This gives the ideals or
the standards of the society in which the indi-
vidual chances to live the effect of a primitive
instinct. The individual thinks of the standard
not as a social imposition but as an ultimate
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 59
law; its dictates are the dictates of his con-
science, of the proprieties or of good taste. As
a result of these instincts and the acceptance
of these ideals, the nation is for each individual
in it something more than an abstraction, he
identifies himself with it as a part of himself,
he suffers pain when it is diminished, he re-
joices with it as it thrives, it becomes almost
as much a center of his emotions as is his self.
Assuming as we may and must that every in-
dividual is born into the world with a full equip-
ment of social instincts, we must still recognize
that these instincts are relatively closely limited
in their application. It is this limitation that is
at work in the development of a national feel-
ing. One is bound in virtue of the instinct to
act in a certain way toward other individuals of
society. One must feel sympathy when they
suffer. One must help them when they are in
trouble, one subordinates one's self to their de-
mands and accepts their ideals without question,
or with relatively little question. One may be
willing to die to win the approval of the group
or to prevent it from being destroyed or from
being subjected to undue hardship. What is
most striking for us in the whole application
of the social instinct to the formation of na-
tionality is that the instinct is strictly limited
in its expression to the individuals who belong
60 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
to one group, to the group recognized as one's
own. A member outside of the group receives
the benefit of these instinctive responses in con-
stantly diminishing amount as he is farther
removed from the immediate circle. When out-
side he has no effect upon our opinion, his ideals
are ridiculed rather than accepted, he has no
influence in restraining our individualistic re-
sponses, he receives but a limited sympathy,
and, at the extreme, we may rejoice at his
suffering and even join with pleasure in in-
flicting pain upon him.
It is the fact of the formation of these limited
groups within which the social instincts may be
applied that is at the basis of the whole prob-
lem of nationality. Were the instincts to be
limited to the immediate family or were all men
without distinction to be included in their appli-
cation we would not have this problem. The
one word instinct would answer all questions.
As it stands, our cooperating impulses extend
beyond the immediate family and still do not
involve the whole range of humanity. The prob-
lem of nationality is primarily one of determin-
ing the limits of the instinct. One feels or may
feel the social response of friendliness or of
helpfulness toward any individual of the ac-
cepted group, but what shall constitute the
group is settled rather by convention or by cus-
NATION AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL UNIT 61
torn than by instinct. The problem would be
simple were the group determined also by in-
stinct. If one were born to love one group and
to have or to be indifferent to another group,
then all that would be needed to decide where to
draw the national boundaries would be to dis-
cover the limits of application of the in-
stinct. If long-headed individuals would with
pleasure live with all other long-headed indi-
viduals and dislike all broad-headed ones, evi-
dently one could, by cranial measurements, form
nations that would insure an ideal of fellow-
ship. It might be asserted by overzealous ad-
vocates of the importance of physical signs of
race that the future wars will be between groups
who differ by a few degrees in cephalic index.
Or were the common heredity to determine the
reactions and responses, one need but to deter-
mine the degree of kinship to divide and sub-
divide the human species into appropriate
groups and classes. As has been seen, the real
lines of division do not follow along the same
lines as physical differences, and slight obser-
vation even of one's own likes and dislikes show
that nearness in kin provides no criterion of
community of spirit.
As the matter stands, one must admit that,
while man is endowed with many social instincts
the range of application of the instincts is rela-
62 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
lively little determined, may in fact be regarded
as undetermined. The decision as to who shall
be regarded as coming within and who as stand-
ing without the field of its application consti-
tutes the real problem and this seems to depend
more upon the conditions of the life of the in-
dividual, upon habit and training, than upon in-
stinct. In practice this means that one may
select whom one will to constitute one's com-
munity, or at least that the limits of one 's com-
munity are not drawn by inheritance or by evo-
lution. If one is to solve the problems of nation-
ality one must study the conditions that deter-
mine the particular groupings of individuals as
well as the general fact that all men desire
to live together and are forced to cooperate
with each other by their inherited dispositions
which not only make another course impossible
but make the only alternative pleasant.
CHAPTER III
HATE AS A SOCIAL FOECE
WE have been emphasizing in the last chapter
the kindly, sympathetic instincts that hold so-
ciety together, that further cooperation and
promote all of the gentler virtues. But there
is another side. Society originated in conflict
and one of the strong incentives to the develop-
ment of a primitive society was protection
against other tribes, and, on occasion, aggres-
sion against others. This meant that instincts
and emotions must develop in the individual
which would insure his taking part in any con-
flict that was necessary to the survival of the
group to which he belonged. These emotions are
not different from those aroused by the individ-
uals with whom he comes in contact, but they are
intensified if not extended by the other mem-
bers of the group. If the instincts have devel-
oped through their value for survival it would
be the instincts that were dominant during
periods of stress that would appear and persist
through the survival of the animals who show
them. Only dangers from without need drive
63
64 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
the herd together, only acts of aggression would
require the pack to gather. The emotions and
instincts appropriate to these situations are
anger and hate, the anger that steels for resist-
ance and nerves for the attack.
If one took as one's thesis that societies are
formed through opposition to outside forces,
one might find an analogy from studies which
were made by Jennings of the tendencies of a
unicellular organism that he studied, the para-
mecium, to gather into groups. The paramecium
lives in colonies which may be transferred to
the slide and studied under a microscope. The
animal is a single shuttle-shaped cell that moves
by the strokes of a row of ciliae, small hair-like
processes which grow on two sides. At first
sight the paramecia seem to be of a marked
social disposition. No matter how scattered
they may be they soon all assemble in one small
group. Were they men we would incline to ex-
plain this by saying that they liked each other's
society or that they had a social instinct, at
least the instinct of gregariousness. Careful
study of their movements and of the way they
gather indicates that the process is very much
more mechanical. In the first place, the only re-
action that they show is a negative one. When
certain stimuli affect them they will reverse the
movements of the cilise and move away from it.
HATE AS A SOCIAL FORCE 65
They make no response whatever when the stim-
ulus is what we would call pleasant. It is this
same negative refaction that causes them to
come together. They always attempt to avoid
an alkaline solution, or to avoid going from a
mildly acid medium to one that is more alkaline.
About each small group of cells there develops
a solution of carbon dioxide, from the respira-
tion of the group. Whenever a member of the
group swims to the limit of this acid, it makes
a sudden reversal movement of the cilise, a
series of back-strokes that makes it return to
the more acid medium. When one from outside
the group chances to swim into the acid me-
dium, it is imprisoned, for when it approaches
the boundary the back-stroke is induced and
again it is forced to turn and swim back. Soon
all are trapped in the small area of acidulated
water. In short, what seems to be a fondness
for other's society proves in the paramecium
to be merely a mechanical impossibility of es-
caping from the water about the group that has
been made acid by the excreted carbonic acid
of the group. If we generalize this, it would
mean that society develops not from a liking
for society but from a dislike of the surround-
ing medium. That which drives the individuals
together is the dislike of the outside forces
'66 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
rather than any fondness for the company of
which they are members.
As we turn to the most developed stage, we
can find instances and phenomena in the human
organization and forms of human emotion
which indicate that many of our human acts,
some even of those that seem most worthy, are
the outcome of hate rather than of love and the
more positive altruistic sentiments to which
they are sometimes ascribed. Were one to take
a militaristic view of the world it would be pos-
sible to argue that it is hate of the opposition
that furnishes all of the real incentives of life,
that if war and hating were to stop, all prog-
ress would stop and we would drop down to a
monotonous stage of little endeavor. All prog-
ress, on this view, has been derived from con-
flict, and when conflict ceases there will be little
incentive to endeavor. One need not go so far
as this to see that the emotion of hate and the
instincts of opposition are important, and that
it is hard to exaggerate the part which they
play in the control of modern life, even if one
should attempt to avoid special pleading. I
remember hearing a distinguished scientist, a
resident of an eastern city, say at the beginning
of the war in 1914 that he had never before
known the joys of unrestrained hate, particu-
larly of unrestrained hate in unison with others.
HATE AS A SOCIAL FORCE 67
He added that he thought he had known some-
thing of it in his hatred for the members of cer-
tain old and prominent families of his commun-
ity for whom he had great contempt, but that
that was nothing in comparison with the grati-
fication which came with the joys of the newer
and freer emotion. This is probably an avowal
that few would be honest enough to make, if
true, and probably that few feel in such an in-
tense degree, still it is not so far removed from
the general attitude, as the mildest of us would
like to believe.
We can see the effects in the individual reac-
tions to war and the choice of sides or at least
the distribution of sympathies in America when
the European war broke out and before we were
engaged. In many cases that came under my
observation, the alignment was determined by
resentment against one side or the other rather
than by fondness for the side favored. One, a
Russian who had been exiled, and who had spent
most of his life in America with study in Ger-
many for one or two periods of a year or so
each, felt first a bitter hatred of Russia that
aligned him against the Allies ; then, when Bel-
gium was invaded and England came in, his
hatred of the German began and continued.
This grew stronger when we entered the war.
Another man, a Swiss, hated Germany and
found his sympathies with France and Russia
until England came in, when his dislike for Eng-
land, much stronger than for Germany, drove
him back to a neutral position; as he put it
'then, he did not care much so long as Switzer-
land could remain neutral.
In the attitude of the native American to the
war, one was struck by the vastly greater effect
of hate and resentment against the cruelty of
the German than of sympathy with the victims.
If we divide Americans into the two groups:
those who knew enough of European politics
to follow the war intelligently and the great
mass who heard of the conflict as one might of
an eruption in Java or in Mars, we can see the
effect in the same form but different degrees.
The first felt a rush of horror at the fact of war
at all and then anger or indignation at the in-
dividuals and nations that started it, that
brought them definitely to take sides for one or
the other of the contestants. It would be fair
to say that, at the beginning, sentiment in this
class was fairly evenly divided. Many of the
group were familiar with both sides; some of
the more highly educated had studied in Ger-
many, others were German by birth or descent
or had come under the influence of the extended
preaching of German ideals that had been so
extensive in the preceding decade. There were
69
certainly as many admirers of Germany as of
England. The affliations as determined by sym-
pataies in the preceding wars were either neu-
tral or were opposed to the Entente. Opinion
was Lostile to England in the Boer war and had
been on the whole bitter. There were few Amer-
icans cf this class who would not have been glad
to see the British whipped at that time. This
was probably more than enough to overcome
the effect produced by England's action at Man-
illa in the Spanish war, particularly as English*
men as a whole had been inclined to side with
Spain during that war. Sentiment in America
had always been hostile to Russia because of
her form of government and the tales of pun-
ishment inflicted on political prisoners — an at-
titude that had been intensified by sympathy
with Japan during the Russo-Japanese war.
Between France and Germany they would have
been neutral, as the outcome of the war of 1871
had generally been regarded as deserved. On
the whole, sentiment was quite as friendly to-
wards Germany as towards the entente when
the war began in 1914, but it developed rapidly
against Germany, really against Germany and
not in favor of the Entente. This began with
the note of the Chancellor von Bethmann-
Hollweg, in which he referred to the Belgian
treaty as a scrap of paper, grew with the vari-
70 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
ous atrocities in Belgium and reached a climax
with the sinking of the Lusitania. If one will
re-read the speeches and letters to the papers,
not to mention the editorials that demanded
that we enter the war, one will see that the
emphasis is always upon the punisliment of the
guilty, seldom that we should save the afflicted.
With the less educated the process was much
longer, but followed about the same course.
The first effect was slight in many parts of the
country. Sympathy, if there was any, was in
favor of the Entente, or at least against Ger-
many. Where German propaganda had been
active opinion was nearly evenly divided ; where
only the American newspapers were responsi-
ble for the information, the Entente was fa-
vored. In any case interest was not so vitally
aroused as would seem necessary as one looks
back upon it. The great mass was opposed to
intervention, where the question had been
raised at all. It was believed that it was not
our quarrel. Some even tried to shut out all
knowledge of the war on account of the suf-
fering they were caused in sympathy. This
attitude was sufficient, when sympathy for the
Allies increased, to induce many to echo the
arguments of German propagandists, rather as
an excuse for our remaining neutral than from
any fondness for Germany. Their neutrality
HATE AS A SOCIAL FORCE 71
was overcome by increasing knowledge of Ger-
man atrocities. Her acts in Belgium were suffi-
cient for some to change toleration into hate;
the sinking of the Lusitania and the attacks of
the submarines on American ships and the cold
blooded ferocity of the German warfare in gen-
eral brought the nation gradually to the culmi-
nation of hate, with the feeling that war was
our duty.
In the whole experience, one is struck by the
great predominance of hate and anger over
sympathy. The Belgian refugees aroused sym-
pathy, of course, and the great mass were sorry
for the victims of the war on all sides, but pun-
ishment and vengeance were the active forces
in bringing us into the war. The eye was kept
first upon the harm that could be done to the
German — the prevention of suffering was in-
cidental. One may have a fair monetary meas-
ure of the two influences in comparing the con-
tributions for relief with the expenses for war.
We were proud of the amounts that were col-
lected for Belgian relief, for French orphans,
and for the other victims of the war in minor
states, but these, large in the aggregate,
amounted to less than a dollar per person, and
were nothing compared with the billions that
were readily spent in preparing for war, in
expressing hate rather than sympathy. To be
72 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
sure, expenditures by private individuals are
always more modest and more reluctantly made
than are expenditures by the state. But even
this is not sufficient to explain the entire dif-
ference, the thousand-fold increase in the
wealth poured out for war as compared with
the few millions per year that were given for
relief of suffering.
Many other lessons of the war indicate the
dominance of hate and anger, or the active un-
pleasant emotions or instincts, over fear and
the passive unpleasant instincts or emotions.
The Germans, as is well known, advocated the
doctrine of frightfulness even in the manual
that they prepared to direct the acts of their
commanders in the field. This is based upon
the assumption that a people if sufficiently
abused, if treated with the greatest atrocity,
will be cowed and give in and sue for peace.
The psychology is that accepted by some ani-
mal trainers towards an animal, that you can
by pain and suffering break him and prepare
him to do what you will. All the experiences
of the war showed that this is a mistaken psy-
chology. Instead of causing fear such acts
always caused hatred and anger; instead of
breaking the temper of the people they angered
and nerved them to renewed effort.
If we run through the list of illegal acts, we
HATE AS A SOCIAL FORCE 73
find no single one that really paid. The fright-
fulness in Belgium, perhaps, came nearest it.
Kellogg1 asserts that the Germans boasted
that one man captured Charleville in France as
a result of the stories of the way the Belgians
had been treated. Even this effect was but
local. While the men in the immediate neigh-
borhood of the advancing Germans fled and
left the cities deserted, the men out of reach
rallied to the colors. It may have had an ef-
fect in reducing the number of franc-tireurs,
but it increased very greatly the number of sol-
diers in uniform, and strengthened the resist-
ance of the conscripts. The Belgians and the
French of the occupied region may have offered
less overt resistance at the time, but the secret
resistance was increased ten-fold. It might be
said that this was only annoying and had no
effect upon the outcome of the war, while if the
Germans had been compelled to keep an army
corps in Belgium it would have cost them the
war, but this seems a marked exaggeration.
All of the Belgians left could not have done
very much by irregular warfare, and showed
no great inclination to such illegal acts ; if they
had, very few men would have been necessary
to deal with them. The exciting effect of the
'Vernon Kellogg: "The Capture of Charleville": Atlantic
Monthly, vol. 122, p. 289.
74 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
atrocities and the letters of Cardinal Mercier,
among others concerning them, served to arouse
the Belgians and all others of the Allies as they
would never have been had the Germans re-
spected the laws of war as generally recog-
nized.
Each of the other violations of the rules of
humanity had the same effect. Bombarding
open towns and air raids in which non-combat-
ants were killed were said to be the greatest
stimuli to recruiting in Great Britain in the
days before conscription was introduced. Later
the murder of Captain Fryatt and the drown-
ing of the crews of the vessels sunk by the
U-boats had no effect in preventing the ordi-
nary sailor from going to sea; they merely an-
gered him and spurred him to greater effort
in ramming or in otherwise attacking the U-
boat. The execution of Miss Cavell, together
with the others mentioned above, had a marked
influence on neutral opinion, and these with the
sinking of neutral ships, probably, by bringing
in the United States, were the final forces in
losing the war for Germany.
Certainly the war as a whole constitutes a
definite refutation of the German doctrine of
frightfulness. The Germans entirely mistook
the psychology of the human race at large.
Frightfulness arouses not fear, but hate. It
HATE AS A SOCIAL FORCE 75
does not break the will of the victim, but merely
spurs to new effort to obtain vengeance. If
the German had been even as humane in the con-
duct of the war as the Turk, when not indulging
in religious prosecution, the outcome might
have been different. As, it is, she is paying in
harsh treaty terms for the indignation she
aroused as well as making restoration in kind,
so far as that is possible, for the damage that
she actually inflicted. Whether this will arouse
the Germans in turn or will be accepted as just
retribution is still to be seen. It is possible but
not probable that the Germans were correct as
to the effect of frightfulness on themselves al-
though mistaken as to the rest of the world.
It would not require any overemphasis of
the facts to argue that even religious organiza-
tions and religious creeds have been developed
more from dislike of the opposing belief, of the
men who hold them, or of their practices, re-
ligious or personal, than from any consuming
belief in the doctrine that was accepted. The
history of the various heresies and heterodoxies
of the early church is one of quarrels over non-
essentials, usually of quarrels whose real occa-
sion was not the one mentioned, but some dis-
agreement on personal points, or on racial dis-
likes. The early controversies turned on points
too slight to be apparent to any but the most
76 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
hair-splitting mind. So trifling were the differ-
ences that one cannot believe that the disputes
were more than a symbol of the real difficulties,
probably rooted in class or racial controversy.
Certainly the bonds that held together the op-
posing parties were not the fondness for the
timeless or the temporal explanation of the re-
lation of father and son. They can hardly have
been an intellectual repugnance for the oppos-
ing doctrine ; rather must we find them in some
deep-seated personal or class antagonism be-
tween the individuals concerned. We have more
knowledge of the Great Keformation of Luther
and his fellows and here can trace the profound
hatred for the immoral life and grasping finan-
cial system of the older clergy on the part of
the reformers and their flocks. The theological
issues of transubstantiation and similar ques-
tions were but incidental to the personal and
financial.
That hate of the opposing groups rather than
affection for the principles and love for the per-
sons of the groups accepted is an important
element in the development of the religious sect
or community is evidenced by the ferocity with
which heretics were dealt with in ancient times,
persisting until the beginning of the eighteenth
century. Why an innocent woman should be
burned for doubting that the communion bread
HATE AS A SOCIAL FORCE 77
was part of the very body of Christ, or a scholar
for believing that it was his privilege to think
for himself in ways prescribed by the brain
and mind with which he had been created, can-
not be explained from affection either for the
creed or for the organization. If these forces
are the first occasion for the combination they
are quickly replaced by the much fiercer emo-
tion or instinct, the hatred of those without. Ee-
ligious organizations flourish just so long as
there is definite opposition ; when the opponents
vanish, the vigor of the group lessens and may
disappear. Even to-day, the active organiza-
tions are those with a personal devil who may
be hated, and forces of evil that may be given
definite embodiment. The evangelist and the
Salvation Army orator have the widest appeal
when they preach against definite and if possi-
ble personal opponents rather than when they
preach the beauties of resignation and the joys
of fellowship. As religion has become more
universal, and the differences in doctrine have
become fewer, particularly since the principle
of toleration of religious belief has been gen-
erally accepted, religious enthusiasm has less-
ened. A vigorous heresy seems important if
not essential to the persistence of a strong faith.
When the devil was a real person he was an
important aid to religious organization. The
78 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
impersonal evil or sin, or the universal evil in
our own desires, is not a satisfactory substi-
tute.
Nor is this influence of a common hate in
uniting individuals in large masses confined to
hates between definitely organized groups. In
the relations between individuals in every day
social intercourse one may trace the same feel-
ing. Dislike of the mass holds many a small
clique together, and plays a not unimportant
part in the development of the universal sys-
tem of social levels. Political parties, schools
of thought in science and philosophy, and even
in religion, are certainly guided by contempt
for the members of the opposite party quite as
much as nations. At times, to be sure, the dis-
like may start from the thwarting of one 's own
desires. The populist movement and the free
trade movement soon ceased to be mere matters
of political theory and became resentment for
injuries feared or actually suffered at the hands
of a supposed conspiracy of the rich. The an-
swer of the conservative parties is again not so
much that the system defended is good for the
laborer or the farmer, but that the pauper labor
of Europe will, if not prevented, steal the mar-
kets and force our citizens into bondage. In
the same way, the favorite answer to the social-
ist is an appeal to the man who has little that
HATE AS A SOCIAL FORCE 79
that little may not be taken from him by the
man who has nothing. Dislike for great wealth
is met by preaching hatred against the multi-
tude pictured as marauders rather than as men-
dicants. In either case, appeals to self-interest
are overshadowed in effectiveness by appeals to
hates.
In the field of charity and criminology the
same instincts are prominent. A cynic might
well argue that most charity develops from
hatred of somebody or of something. Many
bequests for charity or education are made not
from any particular love of the institution bene-
fited but from hatred of the heirs who might
otherwise obtain the money. What proportion
this is one could learn only from revelations
of trustees and of witnesses. Many of the char-
ity workers themselves start from a desire to
help the victims of poverty and misfortune, but
end with hatred of the system or the individuals
that are responsible for the existence of the
condition. When this hating or fighting atti-
tude is aroused, the worker doubles his effi-
ciency. The whole relation of the criminal to
society and of society to the criminal revolves
around the emotion of hate. The criminal is
likely to be guilty of his first offense under the
influence of a sudden resentment. Once he has
been convicted he becomes an object of fear
80 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
and distrust that leaves him no alternative but
to hate society, and there are no means of liveli-
hood that are not at its expense. He may see
the error of his ways and long for the oppor-
tunity to reform, but as long as society is sus-
picious and, as he believes, unfair, he cannot
avoid hating nor the actions that result. So-
ciety cannot escape the suspicion based on a
knowledge of the strength of habit as long as
the man is assigned to the class of the profes-
sional criminal. The exceptional man may rise
to the heights of pitying or even of admiring
the man who attempts to reform, but this seems
hopeless for society as a whole, while it is ruled
by the theories accepted at present and these
are rooted in the instinct of mankind to hate all
who are likely to be dangerous.
The socialist in particular has developed to
the full the principle that you can arouse people
by appealing to hate and anger, where you leave
them untouched by appeals to sympathy or co-
operation. The foreign language and other
radical newspapers are filled with denunciations
of capital and capitalists who have fattened on
the suffering of the toiler for all the ages. The
call to unitary action for the good of the laborer
appears at times, but that receives less space
than the call to fight, the cry of hate. Even the
opposition to war that they preach is not an
HATE AS A SOCIAL FORCE 81
altruistic or sympathetic one ; it is not that war
is a source of suffering that disturbs them, but
that it is an instrument of the capitalistic
class, devised to keep the laborer in subjection
by killing some and reducing the others by taxa-
tion. Meantime, they argue, the excitement will
distract the laborer from his sufferings, will
make him forget his own interests in the emo-
tions of patriotism.
In the development of nations hate is highly
important. A writer,2 sympathetic to the con-
federacy, brings out very clearly the influence
of hate in the development of the attempted
secession. The Southern States were united
primarily against what they regarded as the
aggression of the North. Their primary objec-
tion was to the interference with their institu-
tions and personal freedom, but there were no
common ideals which hdld them together.
When the secession had been effected, even in
the midst of the conflict when common action
usually serves to unite a group, they became
conscious of the differences between them, and
these seemed to many too important to be neg-
lected even to win the war they were actually
engaged in. Those who favored slavery as an
institution came into conflict with those who re-
1 N. W. Stephenson : ' ' The Confederacy, Fifty Years After. ' '
Atlantic Monthly, vol. 123, p. 750.
82 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
garded it merely as a symbol of Southern inde-
pendence, and these with the consistent uphold-
ers of the doctrine of States Eights. The one
group was not willing to abandon slavery nor
to arm the slaves with promise of freedom if
they won ; the others were not inclined to accept
a strong central government, however essen-
tial that might be to coordinated effort. The
confederacy came near splitting on these points
on numerous occasions, because they seemed al-
most if not quite as important as did the main
controversy with the North. The lesser hates
grew almost to equal the greater ; and there was
no common constructive ideal strong enough to
unite them firmly and there were too many
minor differences to drive them apart. Had
the Confederacy been victorious in that war it
would undoubtedly have gone to pieces soon
on other issues, unless, of course, fear and
hatred of outside forces had been sufficient to
unite it.
We can see the same tendencies in the de-
velopment of alliances of nations through
treaties. Lichnowsky3 has said that nations
only make treaties of alliance against some
other nation or group, never merely for the mu-
tual benefit through cooperation of the nations
•Lichnowsky: "The Future of Germany." "Die neue Bun-
echau"; Tr. Littell's Living Age, vol. 301, 1919, p. 580.
HATE AS A SOCIAL FORCE 83
that combine. He made the statement in warn-
ing against a treaty of alliance of Germany with
Russia, on the ground that it would be assumed
to be and would really be a combination against
England and would be provocative of future
wars. The implication can be readily justified
by a study of the treaties that have maintained
the "balance of power" in Europe in the last
century. Whenever one nation is strong enough
to threaten others, alliances are formed against
her; when she loses her position and another
comes up, the alliance shifts to have another
group ready to counter her possible attacks.
The dread of Napoleon united Europe against
France. Fear of Eussia followed, a fear that
even brought England to support the Turk and
kept him in Europe for half a century after
he would naturally have been expelled. As
Germany became strong and began to preach
her doctrine of war for aggression, England
and Eussia came together and the Turk found
a champion in the Triple Alliance. The al-
liances are always against a common danger
and that fact brings many strange partner-
ships.
Similarly a common hate is one of the most
frequently effective factors in making or
uniting a nation. The United States was made
by anger at Great Britain, or more truly at a
84 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
king and his ministers, Italy by hatred of Aus-
tria and the Pope, Germany by the hatred of
Napoleonic rule. Bismarck consciously made
use of wars and the hates that wars engender
to remake the German Empire. The league of
the Balkan nations was the outcome of a com-
mon hate, a hate that ceased to be common al-
most before the war was won, with a consequent
new direction of hate and war between the
earlier allies. In the Great War, as in all wars,
it was primarily hate or fear rather than pros-
pect of gain or mutual sympathy or admiration
that bound the allies together. Barring Ger-
many and possibly Eoumania and Italy, no
country seems to have had any notion of gain in
entering the strife, and even Italy was gov-
erned in some part by her traditional hatred
of Austria and of modern German methods and
of individual Germans who came as tourists
and business men. Austria was moved by
hatred of Serbia and fear of Germany, Ger-
many in part by fear of the Eussia that she
thought was to be, France by fear and by the
hatred left from the earlier war. Both France
and Eussia were given the final impetus by the
insulting ultimatum of Germany, while the peo-
ple and probably the government of Great Brit-
ain were stirred to the point of war by the anger
aroused by the invasion of Belgium.
HATE AS A SOCIAL FORCE 85
These hates are not fixed but fluctuate in in-
tensity from moment to moment in very much
the same way, certainly quite as quickly, as do
likes and also with as little apparent reason.
Ee-alignments on the basis of hates can be
traced in national as in intra-national groups.
The change of partners in the last Balkan war
furnishes one of the best instances of the for-
mer. The split between Greece and Servia on
the one side and Bulgaria on the other could be
seen to grow from the moment Greece captured
Salonica. It was carefully repressed until
peace was made or was on the point of being
made with Turkey and then suddenly flamed
out in the war that enabled Turkey to regain a
considerable portion of her losses and estab-
lished the enmities that have determined the
alignments of the Balkan states in the present
conflicts. Still more striking is the conflict of
hates in Eussia that so profoundly changed the
whole aspect of the war on both fronts. Here
the conflict of dislikes is between the internal
and the external. The Eussian peasant or arti-
san may dislike the German, but this paled into
insignificance beside his hatred of the wealthy
and of the system that enables differences in
social and industrial condition to exist.
The utility of combinations through hate and
the vigorous common action induced by it are
86 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
obvious from the evolutionary considerations.
Societies are primarily means of defense
against outside agencies. They apparently sur-
vive as units in the original savage state and
both the organizations and the hates are an ex-
pression of the needs of survival. If hate, then,
is an instinctive response against an injury or
a threatened injury, cooperation of the indi-
viduals subject to injury is an effective if not
an essential agent in common defense. Unlike
the lower animals, in whom the response is
aroused only by direct stimulation by pain after
the injury, man undergoes the emotion when
he hears of injury or has reason to believe that
injury is to be suffered. His sufferings are
largely mental and his responses are to im-
agined or foreseen injuries rather than to real
injuries. On the whole this prevents the actual
harm, but in the highly organized civilization
with its overkeen imagination and openness to
suggestion it may cause as much mental an-
guish as it prevents of bodily injury. In no
few cases it generates unnecessary wars, wars
on suspicion of injuries that are not intended.
One nation becomes suspicious of evil intent in
another, and prepares to meet the assumed
danger. The second sees the preparations, as-
sumes that some offense is intended against it
on the initiative of the other nation, and begins
HATE AS A SOCIAL FORCE 87
its own preparations. Each suspicion breeds
new suspicions, each preparation new prepara-
tions, until what starts as a protective measure,
becomes an actual cause of the act that was
dreaded. The instinct that was an instrument
of advancement and even a necessity for the
survival of the original primitive society has
become in the complex modern civilization one,
and probably the most important, of the agen-
cies of destruction. Although it must be granted
that once a nation becomes the victim of a war
of aggression hate is still the most important
factor in national defense.
One might question whether, if hate is an
important element in making possible the de-
velopment of a nation or a feeling of national-
ity, there is chance for a disappearance of the
unpleasant group of emotions without corre-
sponding loss of national feeling or effective
cooperation — whether one must choose between
the era of good feeling and a loss of all the
virile if not vital forces. We may turn back to
our original analogy with the paramecium.
While the group was held together at first by a
dislike of the outside medium it was found that
as the group kept together the area impreg-
nated with C02 gradually extended until it filled
the entire microscope slide. Then the bond was
broken and the members could go anywhere.
88 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
If man is similar we might expect that as the
different groups increased in size by the ab-
sorption of new races, a process that has gone
far already, we might hope to find in time that
all nations would amalgamate into one so far
as common emotion goes and leave no one out-
side to hate. This condition is in sight if the
League of Nations succeeds.
When we are studying the forces in man's
nature that are important for the development
of society we must not forget the warlike emo-
tions of hatred and anger. Human association
was born of conflict and the instincts made nec-
essary by conflict were the most certain to de-
velop and survive. Even the gentlest, most al-
truistic emotion has its harsh side. Pity or
sympathy is always likely to be linked with
hatred of the person responsible for the situa-
tion that appeals to one's sympathy, and on the
whole the reaction against the offender is
stronger and more immediate than that which
would remove the pain. An appeal to hate is
always more effective in an argument than any
other. The Bolshevist mob robs and murders
the rich or the relatively rich before it con-
siders means that shall prevent suffering by
the poor or the workman. The socialist, in the
street corner orator form, at least, is perfectly
ready to overthrow and destroy before he has
HATE AS A SOCIAL FORCE 89
carefully worked out a plan for rebuilding. In
one's own reaction to political events and in
the pages of history one sees hatred and love
mingled in the reactions of the individual and
of society. This tendency means that nation-
ality thrives on opposition, that any attempt
to crush nationality results in its increase or a
new birth. This statement is illustrated by
every attempt that has been made in history to
discourage or destroy nationality by force or
by law. A nation is strongest when fighting,
whether on the offensive or the defensive. Na-
tionality is a two-fold sentiment, of helpfulness
towards all within the group and of distrust of
all that is without. While it is not true that
had there been no war or if wars were to cease
there would be no nationality, it is certain that
coherence is emphasized when there is opposi-
tion.
CHAPTER IV
NATIONALITY IN HISTOEY
WE have seen reason to believe that nation-
ality is fundamentally an expression of the so-
cial instincts modified and elaborated by habit
and learning, which, in turn, come to constitute
tradition and custom. As phases of the social
instinct we distinguished the liking for the mere
presence of fellow men, whether friend or not,
the instinct that brings men together; sym-
pathy, the suffering that comes with knowledge
that another is suffering, which impels to much
of effective cooperation, and finally, fear of
others which enforces upon the individual re-
spect for the opinions and conventions of the
group. Upon the basis of these instincts, which
may be called the immutable laws of human na-
ture, ideals and standards develop and come
to have the force of laws. The instincts cannot
be changed but the ideals have arisen in the
course of human association and may change
with conditions and the progress of knowledge.
They may arise through the chance suggestion
90
NATIONALITY IN HISTORY 91
of some thinker, but are tested by experience,
and are transmitted by tradition. Because of
the instinctive respect for the opinions of
others, they have, when once established, almost
absolute power and they are often mistaken for
instincts because of their universal acceptance.
Before we go farther in the discussion of
theories we may to advantage consider how
these principles and ideals have developed and
how the national allegiance may change at the
present time. These changes and developments
affect only the ideals or standards ; the instincts
we must regard as the same everywhere. From
these studies we may secure suggestions of
other laws and can at least obtain a body of
facts which may be used to test theoretical con-
clusions. Within our limits we can do no more
than find instances of the way in which nations
have developed, so far as it can be determined
from readily available material. A complete
treatment would require volumes.
Where and when the first nation developed
we do not know. The same laws, working at
different places, must have brought men to-
gether into societies very early, certainly before
recorded history begins. Nowhere do we find
at present a people so primitive that there is
not some approach to a national organization,
or at least to some wider than the family, and
92 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
from no time in the past, aside from the doubt-
ful records of the Bible and the myths of the
Greeks do we have evidence of a merely family
organization. There are remnants of the tribal
elements in the early records of all nations, in
the early law and tradition of the Norseman,
in the traditions of Greece, as well as in the
records of the Old Testament, but they are rem-
nants of an earlier stage and exist side by side
with other forms of organization. We can
nevertheless trace the principles by which
wider national units were formed out of smaller,
and the principles which guided the develop-
ment of nations out of fragments left over from
decaying or disintegrating groups.
The Jew from the earliest day to this has
had a distinct notion of nationality, marked by
pride in his institutions and in his history and
his heroes of ancient times, in his accomplish-
ments and in his laws which still persists as
pride of race since his dispersion over the
surface of the earth. In the biblical times it
was thoroughly tinged with religion. One of the
national perquisites of the Jew was to walk
and talk with God, part of his pride was in hav-
ing a just God as almost his peculiar privilege.
As in many other cases it is difficult to deter-
mine whether nation or religion comes first.
Sometimes one obtains the impression that God
NATIONALITY IN HISTORY 93
was great because he was the God of the Jews
rather than that the Jews were a marked and
peculiar people because of the closeness of their
relation to God. If one were to trace the feel-
ing to its origins, it is probable that one would
find that God had grown into the affection and
respect of the race because He was the God of
the ancestors, because of His connection with
the triumphs of ancient Israel, and because He
served as a convenient means of formulating
and personifying the ideals and standards of
the race. Keligion and race were closely con-
nected. On a relatively small scale the Jews
had a nation, something for which they would
sacrifice themselves, and which was superior
in its appeal even to the family relationship,
although there was always in it something of
the tribal or family element.
The development of nationality among the
Greeks is none the less clear in spite of the fact
that it takes a different form and develops dif-
ferent ideals, or perhaps embodies its ideals
in different materials. We may trace in the
literature the development from the tribal or-
ganization of the Homeric age, through the city
state of Athens or Sparta, to the empire under
Alexander. We can trace the abandonment of
private vengeance in favor of a law of the state,
we can trace the development of a willingness
34 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
to fight for the nation as a whole rather than
for the individual or the tribe. The national
ideals take a different form in Greece from that
which they had in Israel. There is more of
unity of the individuals themselves, a sense of
the strength of an organization as self-depend-
ent, as opposed to the reliance upon a king or
a priest. The ideals of the Athenians stand
out most clearly in the funeral oration of Peri-
cles. They were, first, pride in the attainments
of their ancestors; second, pride in the justice
of the laws and the dependence of the nation
upon the intelligence and virtue of the citizens
and the willingness of each to sacrifice himself
for the whole, and, finally, pride in the beauty
and wealth of the city itself and in the oppor-
tunities tht.t it offered for pleasure and profit.
The Greeks also made less of their religion.
The gods were numerous enough to permit them
to be measured by human standards — if they
failed to measure up to the ideals, they might
be discarded. Justice and the other ideals were
not altogether personified in the gods but ex-
isted independently as ideals in the minds and
hearts of the people. The Greeks in this sense
had passed from religion to philosophy, from
personification to abstraction. One form has
the same effect as the other, they are but dif-
NATIONALITY IN HISTORY 95
ferent expressions of the same fundamental
principle.1
We can see clearly, too, in the Greek world
the expression of the different allegiances with
their balanced loves and hates, their tendencies
to combinations of different sizes and on differ-
ent principles. In Sparta and Athens at their
prime there seems to be little within the city
state that conflicts with the allegiance to the
group as a whole. There is some division along
the lines of wealth or occupation. The dweller
on the land at times felt drawn to others who
made their livelihood in the same way, and at
times we can detect opposition developing be-
tween the dweller in the city and the dweller
by the shore. On the whole there was probably
less of class interest and fewer lines of division
into smaller groups than we find in the modern
nation. Even the family affiliations were care-
fully subordinated in Sparta, and in Athens the
tribe seems to have been intentionally and suc-
cessfully replaced by the national interests.
The wider allegiance among the Greeks as a
whole fluctuated greatly. There seems to have
been a feeling of solidarity with other Greeks
as opposed to the barbarians, but only at times
of great danger did this become pronounced
enough to lead to effective combination. It was
1 Zimmern : ' ' The Greek Commonwealth. ' '
96 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
at its best during the Persian war, but quickly
broke down under the influence of rivalry be-
tween Athens and Sparta. When it develops
again in the empire, the real national solidarity
is gone. External force, pride in a great leader,
and the desire for the loot that came with suc-
cessful war take the place of earlier national
cohesion. These were not sufficient to sustain
the empire any length of time. Only when the
state was destroyed and the nation existed as a
purely ideal or spiritual unity did Greece regain
true unity.
In Rome we see an equally well developed
sense of national unity, developing over a much
wider area, and based upon rather different
ideals. If the Jew may be said to have lived
for his God, the Greek for his city or state
and the ideals of justice which it fostered, Rome
had an ideal of order and economic prosperity.
Subordinate to this and a means to it was a
just rule over all, but it was justice for the sake
of the quiet and consequent prosperity, rather
than justice in the abstract. The Roman roads
and Roman laws are equally significant of the
ideals which ruled the state because they had
become rooted in the beliefs and in the habits
of the people.2 They dominated during all
forms of government from the early kings
* Marvin : « * The Living Past. ' '
NATIONALITY IN HISTORY 97
through the republic to the emperor. When
they began to fall before the difficulty of apply-
ing them under different local conditions
throughout the broad extent of the empire
where they came into conflict with the tradi-
tions of conquered tribes, the empire itself be-
gan to disintegrate.
i At no time has so large a proportion of the
earth's known extent been united under one
common rule over so long a period as under
the Romans. Certainly at no time before and
at no time for centuries after that had there
been such complete recognition of the equality
of man, or, to speak more truly, of equality of
privilege to all men as under the Roman rule.
True, there were distinctions between master
and slave, between Roman and non-Roman, but
the differences could be obliterated by proved
ability. While the Athenians boasted that they
gave rights to foreigners, the other Greek states
were much more exclusive. The Roman seemed
always ready to incorporate the desirable fea-
tures of any tribe or nation within their own
system and were quite ready to leave undis-
turbed the local institutions that worked well.
Roman citizenship was within the reach of any
one who proved worthy, and the line between
slave and free man was one that could be read-
ily passed by all who proved exceptional abil-
98 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
ity. While the Roman legions were an impor-
tant factor in introducing and maintaining the
Roman peace, the common ideals and the com-
mon opportunity for sharing and profiting by
them were the real forces in extending and per-
petuating the Roman nation and the Roman in-
fluence. In spite of its catholicity of taste in
modifying its laws and customs to meet the
needs of subject peoples and even in accepting
better practices into its own code, the Roman
ideals always dominated, the supremacy of
Rome was always accepted, the Roman state
was sufficiently virile to absorb and still to rule.
,We find, then, that tho ideal of justice which de-
veloped in a narrow plain in central Italy, was
sufficiently strong to bind together the few thou-
sand original inhabitants, nerve them to resist
numerous aggressions and to extend itself
through their efforts over the greater part of
the known world. As it conquered it absorbed,
so that the final body was not merely ruled from
above but the whole mass of citizen and subject
alike was united by common respect for the
Roman ideals as embodied in Roman laws and
Roman political institutions. These ideals and
laws outlasted the Roman state and still con-
trol large numbers of individuals, and in less
degree the modern civilized world.
After the fall of the Roman Empire the stage
NATIONALITY IN HISTORY 99
is very dim, the story of actual historical hap-
penings is not always clear and we have little
record that throws light upon the motives of
the great body of individuals. On the "whole it
seems that with the eruptions of the northern
barbarians, the central organization gradually
broke down and the world dissolved into small
units with only local affiliations. The center
of reference was not now the tribe, but the local
chieftain or feudal baron. The loyalties that
remain are personal, to the local leader first
and he to the greater and so on up. At times,
as when certain of the Holy Roman emperors
are in the saddle, there is a reorganization on
something that approximates national lines, but
these groupings are only transitory and when
they exist the loyalty is to the man rather than
to the state. Only the intellectual and religious
affiliations extend beyond the local boundaries.
The intellectual is not very strong, learning is
restricted to a very few and they, because of
their use of Latin, came into slight contact with
the masses. Even the church tended to be some-
thing apart from the mass of common in-
dividuals. Religion no longer was for man,
man existed for religion. Its doctrines were
imposed from above and were tbeir own justi-
fication. At times, as in the crusades, the com-
mon religion would unite mankind everywhere
100 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
for a common end, but these ends were tem-
porary and when the expedition was over the
organization disbanded. In short, it seems safe
to say that the national organization disinte-
grated in the medieval period, and that only
very gradually did nations begin to arise after-
wards.
"When the new nations did begin to appear,
they took on a slightly different character from
that of the ancient time. The modern nation
always began as a combination to resist op-
pression, and to establish an ideal. If we re-
gard the feudal system with its personal alle-
giance as typical of the medieval state, the
modern is characterized by a revival of the no-
tion of a social group as a definite entity, with
loyalty to the group and its peculiar ideals.
The modern state is different from the ancient
also from the fact that in the former the ideals
of the nation, on the whole, grow up within
and may be said to be a product of the nation,
while the modern nations are often new or re-
vived outgrowths or embodiments of ideals. In
the one the nation came first, the ideal later, in
the other the ideals were first and the nation ap-
peared later to establish it. This is more nat-
ural than it seems at first sight for when an-
cient civilizations went to pieces as states the
ideals still survived; they were cherished by
NATIONALITY IN HISTORY 101
many men and when physical hardships became
too great, they were revived to form the basis
of new organizations and to justify the instinc-
tively organized revolts. Many of the modern
states, most of the very modern, are embodi-
ments of these ideals, although it must be
granted that the ideal alone did not suffice to
produce a state until some practical need or
anger against oppression drove a group to
struggle to realize it.
While the state first fully develops according
to this principle in the late eighteenth century
we can see anticipations of it on a small scale
here and there in the medieval period and
from then on. Some of the Italian cities ap-
proach it from time to time on a small scale,
and the Netherlands of the sixteenth century
exhibit it in full measure.
This course of growth is seen very clearly
in the development of Switzerland, one of the
earliest to appear as a distinctly national unit,
the first certainly in which there is little trace
of loyalty to a leader as the basis or starting
point of the organization. Switzerland, too,
has had a purely democratic form of govern-
ment for the longest time. If we may believe
the tradition, the men of the original four can-
tons were driven to unite in the revolt by the
heavy taxes and cruelty of the Hapsburgs. The
102 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
revolt itself was justified by an appeal to the
general principle of liberty. After the original
revolt was successful, pride in the deeds of the
men who had struggled and won, of Tell and of
Arnold von Winkelried, added enthusiasm to
the union and cooperation of the descendants.
The common tradition, pride in ancestors, and
the continued necessity for protection against
strong and dangerous neighbors sufficed to con-
tinue and to strengthen the bond. Even when
with the growth of the nation new groups were
added, some with different languages, and when
religious differences made their appearance, the
national unity triumphed. Switzerland may
safely be said to be the first of the modern na-
tions to have developed through a desire for
liberty. As such it was a place of refuge for
those seeking freedom all through the modern
period. As in most of medieval history many
of the heroic events and even the motives for
the original organization may have been a con-
struction of later origin. But they neverthe-
less reveal the ideals of the people who origi-
nated and accepted the myths, the Swiss of the
fifteenth and sixteenth century. They indicate
that with the renaissance we had in Switzerland
a real nation, held together by ideals of free-
dom and strong enough to maintain its posi-
tion. It is probable that it is in Switzerland
NATIONALITY IN HISTORY 103
we have the strongest national consciousness
that has persisted for the longest period of any
in the modern world.
In other countries the course of the develop-
ment is more obscure. England certainly had
a gradually increasing consciousness of being
a distinct people from a very early time. It
is the more difficult to determine in what it con-
sisted because it developed so gradually and
never had occasion to burst forth into any
single expression. As everywhere, it increased
during periods of external conflict and was sub-
ordinated to class and religious allegiances
during periods of internal strife. It may be
said to have had its first marked development
during the aggressive campaigns of the Hun-
dred Years ' War and was especially strong dur-
ing the threat of the Spanish Armada. Eng-
land most nearly approaches the ancient Bo-
mans in the nature of the national conscious-
ness, in that that consciousness has been closely
connected with the development of the practical
institutions. The ideals most firmly impressed
were the ideals of justice, which were respected
in fact, in spite of marked theoretical differ-
ences in privileges between the orders of so-
ciety and even the degrees of education. The
most distinctive characteristics of the nation
are its laws, which were accepted as superior
to the authority of the king in the Magna
Charta, and have been supreme for all ever
since with constant growth through adaptation
to the changing ideals of the people. About
this develops the sacredness of the person and
of the home of the common citizens, and an
ideal of civil liberty that is equaled in few other
countries. Together with this has gone a grad-
ual perfection in the organization of business
and manufacture, and an ideal of business suc-
cess that reminds one of the Eoman organiza-
tion and ideals. At times in the later years it
is probable that this ideal has been permitted
to dominate the other ideal of the personal
rights of the individual in a way that has been
unfortunate for the lower members of the so-
cial order, perhaps in even greater degree than
in the other commercial states.
The development of the spirit of nationality
in England is particularly important since the
spurs to that development so prominent in most
other nations, resistance to an aggressor or op-
pressor, have been singularly lacking. England
has never been conquered since it was England
and seldom seriously threatened by a foreign
power. It gives evidence that the spirit of
nationality may develop to the full in a people
who have usually been moved by the desire to
cooperate, by the sympathetic instincts, rather
NATIONALITY IN HISTORY 105
than by the more active protective or aggres-
sive impulses. While the ideals have seldom
come to full consciousness, and the nature of
the nation is therefore rather more difficult to
trace, no one would deny the existence in the
Englishman of a strong national conscious-
ness. And that, too, in spite of the fact that
the lines between the classes and between dif-
ferent forms of religious beliefs are more rigid-
ly drawn and society more conventionalized
than in other modern states.
In France, loyalty to the nation as a whole
has alternated with adherence to the local
group. In the early years the local allegiances
were much stronger than loyalty to the central
authority, and since the central authority was
the king, loyalty was a personal loyalty, rather
than loyalty to the nation as such. A man was
less a Frenchman than a follower of Louis or
of Henry. At times, as when Jeanne d'Arc
stirred the nation, the national spirit is brought
to the fore. All are French and will fight to
the death rather than be subjected by the hated
Englishman. On the whole, however, in me-
dieval and modern France to the death of
Louis XIV, the consciousness of unity is a com-
mon dependence on the reigning family. This
varies from time to time with the popularity of
the monarch, and on the whole there is a pro-
106 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
grassing national spirit, an allegiance to the
whole people as a group or entity. A man be-
comes gradually more a Frenchman than a Bre-
ton or a Norman, or Provencal, and more a
citizen and less a subject.
Of Germany and Italy little is to be added
to what has been said of Europe in general.
Both had such checkered careers from the fall
of the Koman Empire to the time of Napoleon,
or really until the period of the universal blos-
soming of the national consciousness in the
middle of the last century, that it is impossible
to say at most times whether there is a nation
or only a group of principalities, and, if both
exist, whether the whole or the part is the ob-
ject of the individual's allegiance or loyalty.
During the greater portion of this period it is
fairly clear that in Italy the sense of a com-
mon nationality was at a low ebb. Undoubted-
ly the common language, and at times the recog-
nition of the Pope as the head of the church
with claims to temporal power made many in-
dividuals count themselves as Italians when
there was no common state to which they might
belong. This was certainly true of many upon
whom Dante had an influence, both his imme-
diate successors and his intellectual disciples
through the centuries. If one were to choose
whether he were Italian or French there would
NATIONALITY IN HISTORY 107
be no question, except in the region of Savoy,
but if the question were raised as to whether
one were Florentine or Italian, or Venetian or
Italian, the answer would not be quite so easy.
Here, too, the consciousness of nationality
was stimulated at times by the conflicts with the
German Holy Roman emperors, to lapse again
when no outside force threatened.
In Germany the problem is still more diffi-
cult and the situation varies more from time
to time. The personal allegiance is, as in
France, the most important element. If we re-
gard the Holy Roman emperors as the rulers
of Germany, we may say that when a strong
man is on the throne, there is a sense of unity
and a recognition of a common authority ; when
a weak man succeeds, the empire dissolves into
its constituent parts. Through the empire even
when divided politically there is probably al-
ways some recognition of a wider Deutschthvm.
How much, it is particularly difficult to say, for
since the modern revival of the empire, Ger-
man historians have undoubtedly exaggerated
the unity of earlier periods for political effect
upon the present generation. When Luther or-
ganized his revolt against the Church a na-
tional spirit was aroused which was strength-
ened by his translation of the Bible and the
consequent general literary use of the German
108 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
language. In neither Germany nor Italy was
there a nation in the sense that we find one
in Switzerland, in Holland, in England, or even
in France, although in both many of the men-
tal or social forces essential to the develop-
ment of a nation are operative.
It is not until the latter part of the eight-
eenth century that we first find full recogni-
tion of the nation as an organic unity, a whole
with the action of the parts determined by the
parts instead of from without or from above.
Before that the picture of the state was of a
mass of individuals dominated by superior au-
thority. Even when the warrant for the or-
ganization really came from the ideals of the
individuals who composed it, the rules were
justified by reference to some higher power,
human or divine. From the Greeks down men
had sought the best means of securing jus-
tice and of giving each man his rights,
but in theory the standard of justice was al-
ways derived from a lawgiver, from God or
a god, or at the best from some immutable and
logically deduced principle which was only
recognized by man, not made by him or derived
from his nature and rights. When, as hap-
pened not infrequently in the middle ages, ap-
peal was taken from the king or pope it was
always to the law of God rather than to the
NATIONALITY IN HISTORY 109
rights of man. Man was made for the state or
for the law or for the nation, not the state or
the law or religion for man. It should be said
that most of the early theories of human so-
ciety follow Plato in considering the political
organization of the state as primary and in de-
riving justice from theoretical principles rather
than from the nation as a social body, devel-
oped by natural laws.
With the last half of the eighteenth century
the emphasis is shifted fairly suddenly to the
problems of the nation as such and of the ways
in which peoples might have developed states
for themselves. The assumption gradually
gains acceptance that, if there were no central
authority or divine warrants for a social or po-
litical organization, one must have developed
because of the nature of mankind. This
way of looking at the problem was a natural
outcome of the skeptical and naturalistic atti-
tude of the philosophers from Descartes to Con-
dillac, Lamettrie and Hume, but it found more
definite expression in the very popular works
of the Encyclopedists and Voltaire. It took the
form that exercised a profound influence on po-
litical and social theories in the writings of
Montesquieu and particularly in the contrat
social of Eousseau. Rousseau's insistence on
the natural goodness of mankind in a state of
110 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
nature, and his belief that government arose
and must have arisen from the very character
of human nature by the spontaneous union of
men into groups appealed strongly to the im-
agination of the western world and became the
political bible of the epoch. It is not within
our province to trace the origin of Rousseau's
theory. It is probable that other men were ex-
pressing the same theory; certainly the cur-
rent philosophy led rather easily to the con-
clusion expressed. As happens so frequently
it fell to the lot of Rousseau to crystallize and
formulate what had been previously only sug-
gested, and he is given credit, whether de-
servedly or not, for a radical departure in po-
litical theory.
Beginning with the American Revolution the
history of modern times has seen one nation
after another develop a vigorous and very often
an aggressive democracy which embodies in
some degree the same fundamental principles.
In each instance the change in the form of gov-
ernment has followed approximately the same
course. There was usually some definite abuse
or discomfort ; efforts were made to remove or
to reduce it and in the process the movement
went farther than was at first intended. In
the first two cases, too, political ideals have
been adduced to warrant or to justify the po-
NATIONALITY IN HISTORY 111
litical change, but these theories have been
brought in to excuse or to advance the change.
They do not originate the movement. It chanced
that the most immediate cause for complaint in
each of the peoples was that the taxes were
unfairly imposed. It was not so much the bur-
densomeness of the taxes, although in France
they were burdensome, as the way in which
they were levied that aroused the ire of the
masses. In America the exactions were not suf-
ficient to produce any real suffering or to take
any undue proportion of the total income. The
resentment was against the injustice, the men-
tal rather than the physical anguish. Probably
the resentment started because the taxes were
of a new kind and the language of the decree
that assessed them was not altogether tactful.
This led to seeking an excuse for not paying
them. Partly they came after the stress of a
successful war when the colonies felt that the
mother country should have been grateful for
their services and shown increased generosity
rather than have added an unwonted burden.
The objections to the taxes were not much
greater than were those of the Englishman at
home to the corresponding imposts, the cider
tax, for instance.
Before the taxes were imposed, the attitude
of the colonists towards England had been as
112 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
friendly as could be desired, more friendly than
the relation between the different colonies them-
selves. There was less in common between the
Puritans of New England and the Cavaliers
of Virginia or the Catholics of Maryland than
between any of the colonies and England. The
political theories of each of the colonies were
represented by a certain group or class in the
old country, while they were absolutely antag-
onistic among themselves. In fact one of the
members of Parliament who favored the im-
position of the new taxes argued that the dif-
ferences between the colonies would prevent
them from uniting for common defense. Even
after the temporary repeal of the stamp tax in
1766, the colonies gave over all opposition to
the king and celebrated his birthday as loyal
and friendly subjects. Once the attitude of
opposition had been taken, however, it grew
on both sides. The colonists were less con-
cerned about the money loss than the principle,
and the king was anxious to compel the colonies
to pay, not so much because he needed the rev-
enue— he was in danger of spending more than
that amounted to in the cost of collection — as
because he would not be defied. "What strikes
one most is the suddenness with which the storm
breaks. It is not a case in which there had
been a long period of irritation that suddenly
NATIONALITY IN HISTORY 113
rose to unendurable force. Bather, all had been
harmonious and the best of relations had ex-
isted. Then with the passage of a single bill
opposition came at once and went compara-
tively quickly to the point of action.
When the dispute begins, the feelings grow
constantly stronger on both sides. As usual,
the instinctive resentment was quickly justi-
fied by theory. As John Morley has said, the
feeling or the act is instinctive, only later is
a rational explanation and, in case of need, a
justification given for it. The reason alleged
may or may not be the real cause of the re-
sentment. In this instance, we find after the
resentment arose that a large number of beau-
tiful theories were developed or revived to
prove that taxes should not be paid and to
arouse the more lethargic to opposition. Some
of these theories, such as the argument that
there could be no taxation without representa-
tion, were derived from pure English sources.
Others were modifications of Rousseau's prin-
ciples of natural rights. The appeal to liberty,
with little attempt to define what was meant
by liberty and with shades of meaning that
varied from man to man, was the most common.
What had been accepted without question be-
fore the great cause of irritation had been given
was now a violation of the sacred principle and
114 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
must be eliminated at all cost. These furnished
the ideal element that was accepted after the
fact as the reason for the outburst and all of
the resistance that was offered. If objection
to taxes, the objection to the remarks of the
new government in England and probably, too,
dislike of the more prosperous colonials who
as a rule arrayed themselves on the side of the
government, really produced the emotions ; the
cause assigned was the more presentable doc-
trine of liberty and the infringement upon local
freedom of government. That the resentment
would have been felt if the way had not been
prepared by the theories of liberty and other
liberal political theories everywhere in the air,
is not probable. That the ideals of liberty and
self-government alone would have produced the
revolt in the absence of anger at a disturbance
of the regular course of life is still less prob-
able.
After the issue had been drawn and the ma-
jority of colonists had been united in opposi-
tion, the common hate and the combined action
against the enemy brought almost at once the
sense of community that constitutes the essence
of nationality. Differences in political theory,
in social organization, in religion were all for-
gotten for the time being in the prosecution of
the great purpose. After peace had been made,
NATIONALITY IN HISTORY 115
the necessity for continued cooperation and the
memory of common deeds and the common suf-
ferings of the struggle continued to hold all to-
gether, until the spirit could be embodied in
written law and in accepted practice, which con-
stitute the state. When all was peaceful in for-
eign relations, the older differences in theory
and in temperament became more prominent
and for the first quarter century it was now
and again a question whether the instincts that
divide or the instincts that unite would domi-
nate. In the second war with great Britain and
the period that preceded, the dislike of one sec-
tion by the other very nearly overcame the co-
hesive forces, and it was not until the period
of prosperity which followed that war that the
nation was assured. During the disruption of
the nation in the Civil War the bonds between
the people were completely severed; only the
forces of the state, the political rather than the
emotional union, survived.
The laws that control and the course of the
changes in France are very similar. The occa-
sion for the commotion was objection to taxes;
the revolution was not intended when objec-
tions were first made, and after the break had
been made the accomplished acts were justi-
fied in terms of Rousseau's theory and of the
theory of the American Revolution. Each step
116 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
taken was also discussed in advance and the
principles of the rights of man and human free-
dom advocated in the Assembly. But the series
of moves made towards increasing democracy
came suddenly and seem never to have been in-
tended by the responsible leaders, if any of
the leaders could be regarded as responsible.
Thus we find an Assembly called to discuss im-
proved methods of levying taxes spending its
time discussing more or less fatuously almost
every other problem of government, and finally
ending by being compelled by an outside force,
the Parisian mob, to limit the powers of the
monarchy. The king gave way to the Assem-
bly, the Assembly to the Convention, the Con-
vention in reality to a few leaders and to the
mob. Absence of the local self-government and
lack of a foreign enemy to force internal co-
hesion, that had been present in the American
Revolution, led to a constant increase in an-
archy. The old regime dissolved, but no new
organization appeared sufficient to take the
necessary responsibility for the simplest acts
of government. Each man in authority was
ready to execute any one that he feared might
be an enemy lest he himself should be a victim
later. While the ideals of liberty and of love
were upon the lips of every one, each became
a petty tyrant when he had a chance and pas-
NATIONALITY IN HISTORY 117
sions of hate were very much more in evidence
than deeds of kindness.
Striking, too, was the fact that the armies
of the Revolution at the first excuse started
out on the paths of conquest, and while the
words and songs of freedom and the spirit of
independence inspired them with an unwonted
courage and effectiveness, their attitude to-
wards the conquered was the same as that of
the older autocrats except perhaps that they
were even more cruel and overbearing be-
cause of the belief that the new freedom gave
them a great superiority over their less pro-
gressive neighbors. Of the three watchwords
introduced by the revolution and still the motto
of France, " liberty" came to mean merely li-
cense to oppress every one who was weak,
"equality" was for the public while the lead-
ers successively prescribed elaborate forms of
servility for all who approached them, and
"fraternity" was reserved for men of the same
party or at the most of the same nation. The
whole course is a striking illustration of the
fact that the tender and aggressive instincts,
love and hate, are present in nearly equal meas-
ure in every individual. When freed from the
restraint of habit, particularly of habit and
convention as embodied in institutions, the op-
posed instincts alternate in such rapid succes-
118 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
sion that social life is at best uncertain, and is
almost sure to become frightful. The Russian
chaos offers, if we may trust reports, further
evidence of the same laws.
Not the least instructive part of the French
Revolution is its far-reaching effect upon the
spirit of the world. Although it ended in a
riot of internal disorganization, which made its
strongest supporters enthusiastically welcome
a dictator as a relief, it is the most important
single influence in the remaking of the states of
Europe into nations. Its principles, which
failed absolutely in practice, persisted as ac-
cepted theories during the succeeding regimes
of the Empire and of the new monarchy and, as
they were adopted by states which were suffi-
ciently organized to repress the excesses of the
uncontrolled conflicting instincts and emotions,
became the guiding influence in each of the new
free nations. While the first failure made the
Revolutionary governments abhorrent to the
French themselves and to the enlightened
world, the ideals from which the Revolution
grew, or which justified it to thei populace,
were unaffected. In the French nation itself
they have remained the watchwords of the
people, and have sought embodiment in institu-
tions whenever opportunity offered. Even
under Napoleon they served to unite the people
NATIONALITY IN HISTORY 119
and to nerve the armies to conflict. Common
acceptance of them was an important element
in the spirit of unity that has made the French
people a nation from that day to this, in spite
of temporary departures from freedom in the
form of government.
There has been an exuberant growth of na-
tionalities in the nineteenth and in the early
years of the twentieth centuries. As we stand
now at the end of the war it seems that many
more will be born or embodied in states in
the next few years. The development of these
modern nationalities has followed a course more
like that of the American than of the French
Revolution, while one, Germany, has a law all
her own. One of the striking cases is the de-
velopment of modern Italy. The Italian sense
of unity persisted, or was at least sporadically
reawakened at intervals after the fall of the
Eoman Empire. It is probably safe to say that
the common people had been united in aspira-
tions to a certain extent from the time of Dante,
but had been prevented from realizing that
union by the heads of states. On the whole the
strictly Italian consciousness had been subordi-
nated to the local allegiances and to the re-
ligious devotion to the Pope. Dante had at-
tempted to rearouse it and had left an abiding
reminder of the possibilities and an eloquent
120 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
appeal for their attainment. Still the emotional
response was mild, there was little embodiment
of it in institutions and the love of a united
Italy was largely Platonic.
The end of a united Italy with a single politi-
cal organization was realized in the usual way.
Mazzini furnished the ideals, or at least vivi-
fied to every Italian the ideals of the century.
The Austrian, the Pope, and the King of Naples
furnished the more painful and immediately
stirring incentives of oppression, cruel punish-
ments, over-taxation and suppression of free
speech. Not the least important was the states-
manship of Cavour. Finally the enthusiasm
and generalship of Garibaldi touched off the
material prepared for the conflagration, and
provided the heroic figure that inspired any
hesitating patriot. The pride in the early his-
tory and the appeals of Mazzini, reenforced and
advertised by the failure of the earlier revolts
and the cruelty that was used in suppressing
them, had prepared the way and, when leader-
ship was provided, the spirit of nationality
flamed forth and an independent state was born.
It is interesting that the rallying cry of Maz-
zini, the atheist, pro popolo e deo, should have
contained the religious element. This must
have seemed to the followers of the church most
ironical, and the ultra-sceptical mind of Maz-
NATIONALITY IN HISTORY 121
zini himself must have given it a peculiar in-
terpretation. One might argue from this that
the ideals which are used to warrant a revolt
need not express its real cause — that the rally-
ing cries need not be taken literally. Any
watchword will arouse the people, provided
only it obtains sufficient vogue. Not its mean-
ings but its emotional association is impor-
tant.
In the nations that are now just coming into
political recognition or are being revived, the
Ukrainians, the Czechs, the Slovenes and Jugo-
Slavs, the Poles, one may see the same ele-
ments. Each has a common and peculiar lan-
guage, an ancient history and in some cases an
ancient literature in which they have taken a
gradually increasing pride. All have been im-
pelled to seek an independent political exist-
ence by the oppressive form of government to
which they have been subjected, and now that
the great powers that have been holding them
in check are weakened or dissolved they are
ready to develop the political independence
that their national existence has long demanded
and deserved. The ideals are fully accepted;
all that is necessary is a chance to give expres-
sion to them. The new states they are estab-
lishing will give an opportunity to test at once
the virility of the national spirit, and the capac-
122 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
ity of the people for political organization and
coherence.
. The development of German unity is of par-
ticular interest from the fact that the instinc-
tive bonds that brought the various parts of
the Empire together are very different from
those that were effective in the other states of
the western world. The first impulse came
from the long and uncertain but finally suc-
cessful struggle against Napoleon. After some
centuries of fighting against each other and in
various combinations against foreign foes, the
northern German states found themselves
united at that time against a common enemy,
an enemy that on several occasions had an op-
portunity to prove his capacity as an oppressor.
Coupled with this there had been a literary and
philosophical awakening that had developed a
system of inspiring ideals, and had emphasized
the community of the German people and re-
vived a memory of the ancient glories. Kant
and Hegel, Schiller and Goethe provided the
ideals, the successes of Stein after the period of
subjection stirred the spirit of the people. This
part of the development of the German nation
follows the general rule as observed hitherto.
There is first a development of ideals in the
people as a whole, then some occasion is found
for sacrifice in a common cause to attain a de-
NATIONALITY IN HISTORY 123
sired end. This brought the northern German
states into a certain degree of unity of spirit,
partly sealed in the political organization.
After the Napoleonic period we find a new
tendency and a turning of the ideals into a new
form. The scientific development added new
glories to the continued philosophical and lit-
erary activities and the pride in race and
language increased constantly. Aside from the
theories of the leaders in the abortive revolu-
tion of 1848, the dominant note in the speeches
and writings of the German political theorists
was the supremacy of the state over the indi-
vidual and the necessity for a strong state in
the struggle for existence, not as in other parts
of the western world, emphasis upon the prin-
ciples of freedom and popular rights. The state
was exalted as the unit for survival and its ex-
altation became the aim of every true citizen.
This ideal seems to have been as thoroughly
rooted in the governing class as were ever the
notions of Eousseau in the minds of the French
populace, and it echoed in less definite .form
through the lower classes. The state was made
a super-person with an existence almost as real
as that of the individual person. It was given
a divine warrant and a personal devotion was
developed towards it that seemed to equal in
many cases the devotion towards immediate
124 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
relatives or to the church. The series of wars
engineered by Bismarck increased the patriotic
emotion by their successful outcome. The first
in 1864 and the second in 1866 united northern
Germany, and the French war, given the form
of a defensive war by Bismarck's cunning,
united all by the glow of common deeds and
the participation in the benefits of the indem-
nity.
This development of the German state is im-
portant for our theory as it is one of the few
instances in modern times in which a national
consciousness has been aroused on any other
ideal than liberty or freedom. With Germany,
the ideal was the aggrandizement of the state
at the expense of the neighbors. It was justi-
fied by the assertion and apparently by a gen-
eral belief that the Germans were a superior
people, that their state had a superior civiliza-
tion and by virtue of that superiority was en-
titled to rule the world of lesser states and of
inferior men with inferior attainments. This
was furthered by an appeal to selfishness. The
citizens were to be rewarded, not merely by the
pride they were to feel in membership in an all-
conquering body, but they were individually to
be better fed and cared for, to receive better
wages and thrive at the expense of their weaker
neighbors. The union was cemented by a sue-
NATIONALITY IN HISTORY 125
cessful war, but it was a war of aggression
rather than of defense. The war was started
under the pretense of a defensive war which
gave the government a stronger position with
the people and with the world outside. Once
started it continued as a war of aggression, and
the official political theory of modern Germany
recognizes the necessity for war, even an ag-
gressive war, for the furtherance of the ends of
the state. As we have viewed the nation in the
light of evolutionary analogies we have found
hitherto that the instincts that were promi-
nent in the development were the instincts of
self-protection, the people were as deer herd-
ing together for common defense. The origin
of the German nation represents the pack of
wolves gathering for a united foray. It seems
that either will suffice for the development of
a common consciousness, whatever moral judg-
ment we may pass upon the method and the re-
sult.
CHAPTEK V
NATIONALITY IN THE PEOCESS OF NATURALIZA-
TION
AT the end of the first chapter we had come
to the tentative conclusion that nationality was
the expression of a mental attitude and the
product of experience based upon a fundamen-
tal instinct, that it was acquired rather than
innate. The best evidence for this statement is
found in the fact that national affiliations
change. A study of the conditions of this
change and of the process itself should give a
knowledge of the nature of the mental state
and of many problems connected with it. Any
nation in which the population is compounded
of immigrants from many countries would fur-
nish a laboratory for this problem. Undoubt-
edly, the most favorable conditions for study
are provided in the United States. In no other
country is the population so mixed, and in no
other has the process of transferring allegiance
been so long continued and on the whole so
complete.
This method of studying our problem is not
126
PROCESS OF NATURALIZATION 127
altogether free from objections. In the first
place the facts obtained are individual rather
than statistical in character, and in consequence
their interpretation is bound to be open to prej-
udices due to the experiences and heredity of
the individual who passes judgment. The only
available statistics of the sentiments of immi-
grants are furnished by the number of natu-
ralizations, and these are open to many inter-
pretations. Some are naturalized for pecuniary
and social advantages, some even for the pro-
tection it will afford them in the native land,
without undergoing any real change in atti-
tude, any change of heart. On the other hand
we are often inclined to mistake a difference in
political theory for differences in national alle-
giance. Many foreigners are socialists and so
have a very weak affection for any form of gov-
ernment of the present type, and at the same
time may be American in national spirit, or
at least be more nearly a member of this com-
munity than of any other. Many of the native
stock have accepted these theories without
thereby being eliminated from the American
nation. We must not expect more of the for-
eign born than we do of our native citizens.
Other prejudices of similar nature are likely
to becloud the interpretation of the facts. One
of the most important is race prejudice. No
128 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
one can count himself free from this, because
when he is deeply affected by it he does not
regard it as a prejudice but as an accepted fact.
Through family and community environment
every one has a fondness for his own race and
coupled with that a firm belief in the inferior-
ity of all others. When present, this prevents
complete national amalgamation. Neverthe-
less we do find that race prejudices are, for
certain purposes, overlooked in the nation, —
that several nations are composed of races, each
of which looks with distaste upon the others
and yet work together for national ends. The
negro in America constitutes such an element,
the Jew, wherever he is found, another. In
the one case the feeling that one is inferior is
held by one alone, but in the other it is mutual.
The social prejudices are equally strong and
in many cases hold towards the same peoples
as the racial prejudices. Any of my readers
will admit without question that he dislikes men
who are too poor, or too dirty, or who speak
ungrammatically and use tooth picks in public.
Many on the other hand feel the same distaste
for the men with too much money or those too
fastidious in dress, perhaps even for those too
fastidious in language. The Montana ranch-
man meets the condescension of the eastern
visitor, whether real or suspected, by calling
PROCESS OF NATURALIZATION 129
him a dude. These objections to people of dif-
ferent wealth, different education, manners, or
even of trades and professions, which fuse to
constitute social differences, give rise to a com-
mon emotion in which the elements are not dis-
tinguished. In coming to a decision whether
a foreigner is or is not a member of the Ameri-
can nation, it is necessary to determine whether
the feelings that separate him from the ob-
server are the product of his national or of
his social or of his political attitudes.
Study of the question whether a particular
individual is an integral member of a nation
may be approached from two sides, from the
attitude of the individual towards society and
from the attitude of society towards him. Usu-
ally the individual regards himself as a member
of the nation before the other members of the
social group are willing to accept him fully.
If one follows the process of amalgamation, one
finds that it begins with a belief on the part of
the individual that he is one with the com-
munity in which he lives in aspirations and de-
sires while he is still looked upon by the mem-
bers or by many of them with suspicion or
aloofness. He is content with a very platonic
affection. Gradually he is accepted as a mem-
ber of the state for business and political pur-
poses, but is not regarded as a social equal.
130 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
Slowly and grudgingly lie may be admitted to
some degree of social intimacy, but not to the
most complete intimacy — he will be invited to
the house but marriage with a daughter would
be looked upon with aversion. In the final
stage, all consciousness of race is lost and he is
accepted without question as friend and equal.
For the man himself and others he is at this
point a part of the nation in the full sense.
Historically, it is easy to trace the various
stages in this development. Numerous races
have passed through it. The Irish, the German,
the Swede, each in his own region has been first
a complete outsider, the object of poorly con-
cealed scorn or ridicule; then he is tolerated
and his good qualities recognized; finally he is
completely accepted and intermarries with the
oldest stocks without question or hesitation on
their part. If one traces the history of the atti-
tude of any small or medium sized New Eng-
land manufacturing town to the successive
waves of immigration, these different degrees
of acceptance of each race can be seen in suc-
ceeding stages. From the comments of grand-
parents and from books one can reconstruct the
course of the Irish. In the grandmother of the
middle class, whose reaction was determined in
the forties, there is still sufficient explanation
of the shortcomings of a neighbor in the Irish
PROCESS OF NATURALIZATION 131
name. You can expect nothing of a Murphy.
This attitude is brought out now only when
some fault or misfortune is to be explained or
understood, but is general. It is a remnant of
the original attitude of half a century ago.
The son shows signs of suspicion or distaste;
the grandson can little understand either, un-
less the race is also coupled with adherence to
a religion or a political party objectionable to
the speaker.
I have myself seen somewhat the same
change in the case of the French Canadian. As
a boy visiting a New England factory town I
was repeatedly told by an intelligent native of
the disagreeable qualities of the French. They
were dirty, were given to drink, constituted for
some not well defined reason a danger that
made it necessary to shun them for one 's moral
and physical salvation. They were represented
as coming in swarma- to this country, where
large families all worked together in the mills,
lived in squalor and saved money enough to go
back home and buy a farm. As in most in-
stances of race prejudice the faults were
hinted at rather than specified, and the very
vagueness of the statements added to the dis-
taste produced. I remember that it was said of
a close fisted, aggressive native real estate spec-
ulator that when he wanted to buy a piece of
132 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
property lie made the owner an offer and if it
was not accepted he would buy a house on
either side, fill it with French and in the expres-
sive colloquialism of my informant "stink him
out."
After twenty years' absence I happened to
make some comment to this same man about the
ways of the French, quoting as literally as I
could remember them his own statements of an
earlier visit and was surprised to have him
deny that they had any of the qualities as-
signed. They were a sober, clean, industrious
people, in fact were altogether American. I
found that the natives were mixing with them
on terms of equality and with no repugnance
towards their manners or morals. That the
change had not been altogether in the habits of
the French became clear when I talked with
men who had had more intimate dealings with
them in the earlier period. A member of the
same man's family, who had as employment
manager to look up the reasons for absence
from work in the homes of the operatives, re-
ported that they had always been neat and law
abiding, a statement that harmonizes with what
one knows of their life in their home environ-
ment. "When the new immigrants are regarded
as outsiders all their peculiarities are exag-
gerated, the habits of the few are ascribed to
PROCESS OF NATURALIZATION 133
all, and many traits are attributed to them
which have absolutely no foundation. When
accepted, the estimate becomes more just. The
French Canadian has been accepted as the Irish
before him, and now the Greek and the southern
Slav is taking his place as the outsider, the
individual scarcely human.
You will find that the man who has this
prejudice, as who has not, will find a reason
for it in the inferiority of the race of the new
and unaccepted group. He will tell you that
the earlier Irish knew the language, are of our
own stock. The French lived in a democracy
before they came into this country and so on
throughout the list. There may be much or lit-
tle of fact in these statements, but they suffice
to satisfy the prejudice and that is all that is
needed. The enthusiast for the community of
mankind assures you that they will amalgamate
as have their predecessors; the cynic sees in
them, as did his predecessor of three quarters
of a century ago in the Irish, a menace to the
purity of the race and to our free institutions.
It may be objected to this statement that
newer arrivals have amalgamated only with the
lower classes, that these people have not been
admitted into the highest circles, but only into
the fellowship of the middle class. Their names
do not appear in the list of those present at im-
134 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
portant social gatherings in the big cities. Ad-
mit this and you need say only that the list
does not include members of the native stock
of similar wealth and opportunities. Not in-
frequently this list is based on descent and on
the time that the family has been a resident.
They are accepted socially by individuals whom
they know in trade and shop. Men of the race
of special training, lawyers and physicians, are
accepted by the native stock and marriage with
them is not looked on askance by the native
group. The exceptional man who gains wealth
and education does appear in all but the most
exclusive homes and on the most intimate occa-
sions in the most select circles.
The process of amalgamation on the part of
the immigrants follows much the same course.
Most of those admitted are fleeing from some-
thing worse, and, hard as their lot may be here,
they have suffered and escaped from a harder.
They come ready to be assimilated and thank-
ful to be accepted as a part of the community,
even a humble part. That on the whole they
become amalgamated in spirit cannot, I think,
be denied in spite of a few exceptions and in
spite of the long time required in many cases.
For the most part they are more concerned
with being accepted into the nation and its life
than with the question of its advantages. Only
PROCESS OF NATURALIZATION i35
as they obtain a place and know more of the
life do they become critical of American ideals
or of American practices. Even then they are
likely to take the avowed political ideals as a
basis for the criticism of life and practice as
they actually find it. Several recent critics
among the foreigners and even some native
Americans claim that the ideals of American-
ism persist only among the recent immigrants,
while the native stock is devoted to the worship
of mammon and lost in the marshes of racial
prejudice and intolerance.
What it is that makes an individual change
his allegiance can be determined in a measure
from a study of the reports available in the
records of the individuals who have changed,
and of the influences which statistics and ob-
servations show to produce the change. First,
one must assume that there is the social instinct
common to all men. This has identified the
individual in emotion and ideal with his older
community. One may readily distinguish two
groups of individuals in this respect. The man
of education or position or both is moved
largely by ideals. He has not infrequently
accepted the ideals of the nation before, he
comes and if then he finds only a moderately
friendly reception from the citizens he is likely
to change his allegiance fully by such slow de-
136 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
grees that he will hardly know himself when or
how the process takes place. As one reads the
* * Eeminiscences " of Carl Schurz, for example,
one discovers little or nothing- of the forces at
•work in the change because apparently he ac-
cepts citizenship and is accepted altogether
without question. He passes from the distin-
guished guest to the respected citizen with prac-
tically no intermediate stage. This is partly
due, no doubt, to the fact that he at once be-
comes an active worker against slavery in com-
mon with a large number of older residents. He
finds that he holds ideals in common with them
and fights in a single cause.
Opposed to this, one may see at times an edu-
cated man who looks at the new always from
the standpoint of the old civilization, who ac-
cepts the customs and values of his former resi-
dence as standard and passes upon all things
and peoples in terms of them. Such a man
will remain essentially a foreigner no matter
how long he may live in the community. It
is true that when he returns to the country of
his birth he may find that it is as far different
in reality from what he had pictured it in his
memory as is the new. In that case our carp-
ing critic either returns more ready to change
his allegiance or remains without definite affili-
ations in spirit with either country. What is
PROCESS OF NATURALIZATION 137
lacking here is usually the willingness to accept
the ideals of the new community or inability
to work in harmony with its citizens for a com-
mon cause. One can find numerous examples
of each class among educated foreigners resi-
dent for longer or shorter periods among us.
The difference between them is partly in age,
the one usually younger and more tractable,
the other older and more fixed in standards;
and is partly personal. The one is willing to
learn, the other assured, perhaps even con-
ceited, in his own opinion. On the whole, how-
ever, a man of this training who has united
with a group of the native born in the pushing
of some ideal, who makes common cause on any
point with the citizens of the community,
quickly becomes in essentials a true member of
the nation. On certain points he is bound to
retain his old beliefs, to be a critic rather than
a partisan of the new country. In this he is,
of course, in no different position from any in-
telligent citizen. One can decide whether he
has or has not changed his allegiance from his
whole attitude rather than from his attitude on
one point alone.
The factors and forces that make for the
naturalization and nationalization of the un-
educated or unintelligent mass are of a differ-
ent nature. These must always be the great
138 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
majority and constitute at once the greatest
problem for the nation and the most interest-
ing material for investigation on the nature of
the feeling of nationality. The intelligent men
are few and are moved in greater part by
rational considerations. The real reasons for
their becoming citizens are more nearly the
reasons alleged. At least they are more open
to observation and more capable of reporting
than are the great mass. The latter constitute
the real nation. In them the instinctive and
habitual processes run their course less influ-
enced by the pale cast of thought. "We may
study in them the forces that are really effec-
tive rather than those the theorist thinks should
work.
Before discussing the influences that produce
the assimilation of immigrants, it may be well
to admit that there is a question as to how far
that assimilation is really possible among the
lowest classes and those who live together in
the poorer neighborhoods in great cities, in
isolated rural communities, or in the colonies
of unskilled or partly skilled laborers in vil-
lages devoted to a single industry. Undoubt-
edly we can find striking instances of complete
amalgamation under the most unfavorable of
these conditions. It is also true that most of
the members of families in the third generation
PKOCESS OF NATURALIZATION 139
are really assimilated and in many cases are
not to be distinguished from descendants of
first settlers of English stock. The excep-
tions are to be found in the relatively few iso-
lated communities which have been trans-
planted as a whole from the old country, and
have retained its language and customs.
In estimating the relative importance of the
different influences, one may probably put first
the desire for the better social standing and
higher degree of physical comfort enjoyed by
the native. That the superiority of wealth and
ordinarily of education is an important factor
in inducing the amalgamation, becomes evident
if one thinks what the probable course would be
were the immigrant to go among an inferior
people. It has been the history of the settle-
ment of countries inhabited by inferior races
that they were merely driven out or extermi-
nated. Where the native and immigrant are
more nearly on a level or the natives are strong
enough to hold their own, as in China and in
certain of the more backward Latin American
countries, either the races live entirely apart
or the two fuse into a new race to which each
contributes its share.
Many of the altruistic social workers and
Zimmern among the theorists have criticized
the American people for assumption of superi-
140 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
ority and for their contempt of the foreigner.
It must be admitted that it has no defense on
theoretical or moral grounds. One must admit
that the American is full of conceit as to his
superiority and that the conceit is largely based
on ignorance. In every city there are undoubt-
edly many men who are passed by with con-
tempt, or more likely never noticed at all, who,
by their training and ability, are entitled to a
high place in literature or art or political
theory. This attitude is taken not by the
superior Americans but by the ordinary man,
very much inferior in every respect to the men
he is looking down upon. Much as we may
deprecate the unfairness of the American in
this respect and lament the opportunities that
he misses on account of it, we must still grant
that by it the process of naturalization is hast-
ened. The unreasoning race prejudice which
shows itself in repugnance toward the strange
speech, customs, and standards of the immi-
grant is one of the strongest forces in com-
pelling him to be absorbed. How the opposite
course of accepting all as equals, with manners
and clothing and standards that were merely
different but just as good, would work, we can-
not say because it has never been tried. Prob-
ably one would find that if the newcomer was
not repressed he would dominate and soon
PROCESS OF NATURALIZATION 141
oppress. At the best he would not be assimi-
lated. Whatever its ethical value, even its logi-
cal truth, race prejudice is one of the most im-
portant forces in the amalgamation of the
stranger.
It is, of course, granted that the more inde-
pendent minds among the newcomers see the
injustice of the native attitude, the more self-
reliant resent it. The prejudice accounts in
part for the strong socialistic and anti-govern-
mental political beliefs among them. The great
majority, however, feel the steady pressure of
implied inferiority that meets them on every
side and in every field. They respond to it
both in essentials and non-essentials. Their
costume may be affected first. The native
dress is discarded as soon as possible. The
women are ashamed to be seen without a hat;
the native costume, however attractive in itself,
soon becomes a mark of inferiority and a mat-
ter of reproach. All of the external manners
and customs yield in the same way. The
methods of salutation, habits in ^ connection
with the toilet and table are gradually given
up or modified to meet the prevailing American
usage.
Many of these are superficial and unimpor-
tant in themselves and serve only to indicate
the way in which the assumed superiority of the
142 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
new compels the change in old customs. In the
more essential respects the same forces are at
work. Between manners and hygiene there is
a close relation. The reason for abandoning
overcrowding in sleeping quarters, unhygienic
food and personal habits is usually the social
disrepute in which they stand rather than any
rational consideration. To be able to receive
friends in a room not used as a bed room, to
say that the wife does not keep boarders, is a
mark of social distinction, or a plea for social
recognition quite as frequently as it is an ac-
ceptance of rational hygiene or a consideration
of the well-being of the wife. Even the pos-
session of a bath room is frequently, among
the lower circles, more a mark of social superi-
ority than a means of cleanliness. When the
change, whatever its nature, has been intro-
duced as means for the attainment of social
distinction, habits develop that have a hygienic
value. Cleanliness in its different forms be-
comes essential to comfort and cannot be easily
dispensed with.
Frequently the change has been worked with
slight recognition on the part of the individual.
He may still look back with fondness to the
good old ways. It is only when he tries a re-
turn to the old that he appreciates his change
and the advantages of the new. I remember a
PROCESS OF NATURALIZATION 143
relatively young Greek at Patras, who had been
recalled for service during the Turkish war
and had gone .back to the shepherd's life of his
parents while waiting for induction. Before
his return he had looked back upon the shep-
herd's life as idyllic, even as ideal. When he
experienced it, the hardships, particularly the
dirt, were insufferable. After a few weeks he
gave up the life and came to Patras and worked
as porter about a hotel. Even there he could
not endure his accommodations but rented a
room at his own expense to obtain the cleanli-
ness that had become essential to him. Once
the standard of comfort has been raised by the
social forces, the new habits and the emotions
that develop with them prevent slipping back
to the lower level.
The changes in language show the influence
either as cause or effect of the same forces.
Here again the vices or incapacities of the Eng-
lish race have what we may regard as a bene-
ficial effect. Notoriously the Englishman is a
bad linguist — it is with difficulty that he learns
another language. Furthermore he has no de-
sire to learn other tongues and is inclined to
regard them as hardly worth while, if they are
not beneath him. In consequence, wherever he
goes he refuses or is not able to learn the
language, and the other more competent lin-
144 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
guists and more adaptable individuals learn
his. The German, on the contrary, is usually
better trained in languages, is keen to acquire
a new one, and, in consequence, adopts the
speech of the new home and gradually loses
his own. The American may have more
competence than the Englishman in learning
the languages of others, but he is certainly as
little able to appreciate the beauties or the ad-
vantages of the immigrant's tongue. Ordi-
narily he refuses to learn and in addition he
assumes an attitude of superiority to the man
who speaks another tongue or at least towards
the man who cannot speak English. He is in-
clined, even, to measure the general intelligence
of a man by the accuracy with which he speaks
English. One who speaks it brokenly is by the
average untutored American at once assigned
to an inferior social position.
While language may not be essential to be-
longing to a nation, the individual who speaks
the language of the race is more likely to know
and to accept the ideals of the race than the
individual who does not. He is also much more
open to the manifold suggestions on all points
that serve to mold the mass of newcomers in
the unessentials as well as in the essentials. To
read the newspapers, to understand political
addresses and on occasion to make them one's
PROCESS OF NATURALIZATION 145
self, are important elements in becoming a
member of a nation. To know the literature
gives one a point of contact with other mem-
bers of the same group, stimulates emotions to
be shared in common with them, and gradually
gives a pleasant tone that will fuse with other
feelings aroused by the thought of the nation
or of the state. One can become one in spirit
with the group only by knowing what the other
members are thinking and learning, and this is
impossible or at least very difficult unless one
knows the language.
The other strong influence is the school.
Most of the forces we have mentioned operate
much more effectively upon the child than upon
the adult. In the school the child feels them
all with greatest force. Here he is forced to
learn the language, here he receives his instruc-
tion in hygiene and becomes aware of the habits
and manners of the native morei intimately
than his parents may ever do unless they be-
come servants in the native homes. Here, too,
the influence of race prejudice is felt most fully,
even most brutally. The boy has no respect for
the feelings of others and has no doubts about
the superiority'of the ways of his elders. Even
in neighborhoods where newcomers from one
race are present in large numbers and possess
considerable wealth, we find the children
ashamed to speak the language of their parents
and thus gradually forgetting it. In many
cases I have heard a college student regretting
that he failed to take advantage of the oppor-
tunity to learn the speech of his parents be-
cause as a child he was ashamed to be heard
speaking it. The cruelty with which children
enforce the dictates of fashion upon members
of their own race is much increased when the
victim is an alien. When the foreigners are
few in number the effect is overpowering and
rapid. Even in schools where, as in many
cities, the number of foreign children is large in
proportion, the effect is still seen. It is weak-
est where most of the children are of one for-
eign nationality. If several nationalities are
represented so that the different prejudices
nullify each other, the American comes in to
tip the beam and dominates all.
The Americanization of the child is effective
not only for the next generation, but also works
back upon the parents. The old people learn
from their children and gradually accept the
leading of the children. That this is true is
emphasized by the reports of most social work-
ers that the parent often loses his natural con-
trol over the child in ways that are unfortunate.
The father speaks only the language that the
child has learned to disdain, the mother wears
PEOCESS OF NATURALIZATION 147
clothes that mark the "dago" or "wop," the
manners of both are uncouth from the child's
newly acquired standards. The teaching of the
parents on all points is similarly open to suspi-
cion. Where the child is exposed to tempta-
tions the parental admonitions on points of
morals are regarded as of no more value than
their opinions on matters of dress or speech,
and morals suffer. The new environment ex-
erts its influence for bad as well as for good.
Its strength is undoubted. The assimilation of
the parent is frequently accomplished through
the child.
In addition to the changes in ideals and other
purely emotional respects it seems that even
the physical and mental characteristics undergo
a change as an individual moves from one coun-
try to another. To make an American of an
immigrant may mean, if this be true, not
merely that he changes his likes and dislikes
and his habits of living and thinking, but that
he changes his physical characters and his men-
tal capacity. Proof of this statement requires
much longer observation and more accurate
measurement than has been possible so far. A
few bits of evidence are accumulating in its
favor. On the physical side we have already
mentioned the changes that have taken place in
the Germans who settled in the Caucasus. One
148 THE PSYCHOLOGY OP NATIONALITY
can easily note the changes that are found in
the second generation of many races that keep
pure in the United States. Men of both Ger-
man and English stock are taller and in many
cases more lithe than were their progenitors.
These may easily be ascribed to better food and
a more active life, as we find a similar change
in the native stock as a family moves from the
city to the country or from the east to the
West. Most striking evidence for the physical
change is Boas's1 series of measurements of
the shape of the head in immigrant parent and
native born child. He finds that the shape of
the head tends to approach the average Ameri-
can head, that the child of the broad headed
(brachy cephalic) Eussian Jew becomes mark-
edly longer (more dolichocephalic) in a single
generation, while the head of the child of the
long-headed Sicilian is broader than that of his
parent. Why these changes take place cannot
be stated at present. Boas himself makes no
explanation. Their main significance is to in-
dicate that even the physical characteristics of
the immigrants may be changed. If the process
continues there is a possibility that the new
will not be distinguishable from the old even in
stature and formation of the head.
*F. Boas: "Changes in Bodily Form of Descendants of Im-
migrants." Government Printing Office. 1910.
PKOCESS OF NATURALIZATION 149
The change in the mental status of the immi-
grant after a few years has often been re-
marked. Carl Schurz 2 asserted that the Euro-
pean peasant assumed in America an attitude
of independence that he never would have at-
tained in his home environment. The change
he ascribed to the practice in self-government
acquired here. Miss Balch, in her study of the
Slavonic immigration, asserts that the returned
immigrant can be easily detected in his Euro-
pean home by his carriage and his greater in-
dependence of thought and his interest in
education. The returned Greeks who fought
in the Balkan war had the reputation of being
much better soldiers in every way than their
fellows from the same province. They had
more initiative, learned much more quickly,
were in every way more intelligent. I was
struck, as I chanced to be in Athens at the time,
to see a Greek I had met on the boat, who had
been unusually successful in America, walking
with his brother who had come up to the city
with him to enlist. The one had all the marks,
the bearing, the garments of the better type of
American business man. The brother was un-
couth, awkward, a typical peasant, obviously
what his brother had been a dozen years before.
"Carl Schurz: "Reminiscences," vol. 2, p. 77.
150 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
This is typical of the change that is wrought
by a few years' residence in America.
The results of measurements that have been
made recently of the mental capacity of groups
of immigrants, are in certain respects more
definite than these general observations. The
Binet tests were applied for three years to the
Russian Jews and Italians who entered New
York.3 These showed that at least 40 per cent
of the adults of each race were below normal
intelligence, had a mental capacity of no more
than the equivalent of the American child of
ten. This low state of intelligence is not trans-
mitted to the offspring as measurements of
their children in the schools show no such
prevalence of mental defectiveness. Nor is it
characteristic of the younger members of a first
generation after a few years ' residence in this
country, if one may judge from their success
in business and in other pursuits. If low in-
telligence were an innate character, we would
expect it to appear in the children. As it is,
we must assume that it is merely an acquired
characteristic. One may venture the hypothe-
sis that the narrow life of the peasants or lower
grades of laborers in the home country which
gives no opportunity for initiative results in
"H. H. Goddard: "Mental Tests and the Immigrant."
Journal of Delinquency, vol. 2, p. 243.
151
the formation of habits of accepting everything
on authority and so of not thinking, and that
these habits have an injurious effect upon what
seem to be the fundamental mental character-
istics.
This fact of the low intelligence of the immi-
grant would at least eliminate the hypothesis
sometimes offered as an explanation that the
emigrants are superior individuals, selected by
their intelligence and initiative for the venture
to the unknown land across the sea. That the
best emigrate might be doubted on a priori
consideration as well. To be sure, it requires
initiative to break home ties and start alone.
On the other hand the adventure appeals to
the individuals who are not too prosperous and
contented with their lot in the home environ-
ment. The man who has succeeded is not likely
to make the break unless he is the victim of
political misfortune or of a wandering, venture-
some disposition. It is the man who has not
quite found his place and so probably the man
of less than the average intelligence or adapta-
bility who is forced to emigrate. In these days
of assisted immigration, when the large major-
ity come on funds sent from relatives already
established in America, when, too, the steam-
ship agents are soliciting immigrants and sup-
plying through tickets from the village in Eu-
152 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
rope to the destination in America, it fre-
quently requires more strength, of character to
resist than to yield to their entreaties. These
forces would not necessarily select the worst
for emigration but they would add to the best
a large number of the less intelligent, and make
it probable that the emigrants would be not
much above the average of their community.
The elements we have been enumerating
might be regarded as unessential, in many
ways they are symbolic of the fundamental
changes rather than themselves important. A
woman may be just as good an American when
she wears a shawl as when she wears a hat,
but when she is sufficiently affected by the new
environment to feel uncomfortable in the shawl,
she and her family are likely to appreciate the
forces of American society in other ways as
well. And in associating American life with
cleanliness and a high standard of living the
immigrant is accepting ideals that may be more
effective in creating an allegiance to the coun-
try of his new residence than would acceptance
of the principles embodied in the Declaration
of Independence.
But the work of transformation does not or-
dinarily stop with a change in the habits of the
toilet or in the standards of living. The formal
political beliefs of the United States are suffi-
PROCESS OF NATURALIZATION 153
ciently in harmony with the general likes and
beliefs to make them acceptable to all, no mat-
ter whence they may come. The questions
raised are rather of the sincerity with which
they may be applied, than of the principles
themselves. Our immigrants may be socialists
or belong to other anti-government groups in
reaction against the overbearing treatment of
their employers or in continuance of home
teachings or the preaching of the American
agitator, but they are all willing to accept the
principles of the Constitution. It may well be
questioned whether a larger percentage of them
will be found in the socialist group than one
would find among native born Americans of the
same social and financial standing. As they in-
crease in wealth the number of socialists among
them certainly diminishes. The list of leaders
among our most radical organization, the I.
W. W., contains fewer foreign names than the
proportion of the foreign population among the
poorest paid groups would lead one to expect.
As one talks casually with the foreigner of
the working class, one finds a wealth of political
ideas that are in harmony with the best in
American political theory. During the first
summer of the war, I remember hearing re-
peated expressions from Scandinavian and
southern Slav sheep herders in Wyoming of
154 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
the opinion that the end of the war would bring
a United States of Europe. I could not trace
the idea to any common source, and individuals
who spoke it were sufficiently far apart to make
a common source unlikely. In all conversation
with men who would be regarded at first sight
as still foreigners, one finds an objection to
monarchies as such and a preference for repub-
lican or democratic institutions which, whether
acquired during residence here or in Europe,
argues well for respect and affection for our
form of government and political ideals. Will-
ingness to count as part of the social or na-
tional group is much more important.
How far changes in ideals of a social sort,
such as we have been enumerating, indicate
or prove a change in the fundamental emotional
attitude that would have political significance,
is a problem of the utmost importance. At
present its solution requires detailed knowl-
edge of motives that neither the individuals
themselves nor careful observers can supply.
Opinions differ widely. Pessimists insist that
the much vaunted "melting pot" has proved
incapable of fusing the different national ele-
ments into a homogeneous mixture, a single
product that may be called American. Enthu-
siasts for the effects of life in America, on the
other hand, find evidence from approximately
the same facts for a belief that Americaniza-
tion is as complete as could be expected, even,
as has been said, that the new citizens may be
more American than the Americans themselves.
The differences seem to depend in part upon
the prejudices of the authorities, in part upon
the definition of Americanism or of nationality
in general, probably in greater part upon the
experience of the individual who passes the
judgment.
An objective measure of the transfer of af-
fection is difficult to obtain. Naturalization is
a legal .rite and may be unaccompanied by the
change of heart in which we are interested. It
is generally accepted, as was said earlier in
the chapter, that an alien not infrequently
makes application for citizenship for the social
or pecuniary rewards that go with it. On the
other hand many who are thoroughly American
in spirit neglect to take the legal steps and
may even be accepted as citizens and vote for
many years without realizing that the legal
form has not been complied with. No single
test is altogether adequate. Between two races
or two civilizations likes and dislikes are always
of parts and of phases, not of wholes. One
may like the national ideals and dislike their
application or the failure to realize them in
action. One may be fascinated by the man-
156 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
ners of a people and disgusted with their mor-
als. On the other hand one may appreciate the
necessity of fulfilling certain property obliga-
tions, like paying taxes, without appreciating
the political doctrines of the state.
Perhaps the simplest and on the whole the
most satisfactory test is willingness to fight
for one country against the other. That means
a willingness to cut one's self off completely
from the land of one's birth and to cause the
death of one's own old neighbors and perhaps
one's kin. Even this test is met in the present
war by many of the citizens of the first gen-
eration. Large numbers of the second and
third have satisfied it with little or no hesita-
tion, even if there may have been regret. In
fact, for the citizens of the third generation
who have not lived in a close community, po-
litical or religious, one could hardly distinguish
the man of German from the man of English or
Scandinavian descent in his attitude towards
the war. Where the individual has lived in a
community where German customs have con-
tinued, and the language is still spoken, or
where the man is a teacher of German or a
preacher in a German church or even the son
of such a teacher or preacher, the feelings are
likely to be mixed. Even of these a larger per-
centage than would be expected were loyal.
PROCESS OF NATURALIZATION 157
The clergyman and the teacher of German have
been recognized propagandists of the German
spirit as well as of the language and the gospel.
It is not strange that they and their children
persist as Germans when others have become
Americans. A secondary allegiance undoubt-
edly goes to America and were the enemy other
than the fatherland, they would fight as well
as another. Put ourselves in their places as
residents of the second generation in Germany
and one can see how little one would desire to
face the ordeal of fighting against the home
nation and possibly against relatives and
friends.
Of the neutral nationalities one finds on the
whole much the same willingness to fight that
one does among the natives. Eesistance to the
draft was found in surprisingly few cases, and
then among individuals who did not speak the
language well enough to know what it was all
about or who were members of sects and par-
ties that on principle did not believe in fight-
ing. When the full statistics of the draft are
published, as it is to be hoped that they will be,
we shall have an interesting indication of the
degree of de- and re-nationalization among the
immigrants. Meantime if the accounts of court
martials have any value and the names among
the casualties overseas have any significance,
158 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
we must admit that the optimist is nearer the
truth than the pessimist. The citizens of for-
eign descent have been converted into real
members of the nation to a degree that few
could have hoped.
While there are a number of instances of im-
migrants, who have proved disloyal or less loyal
than one could wish, it must also be remem-
bered that much of what has been called dis-
loyalty is based on political theory that would
have made the individual disloyal to his own
native country as well. Pacifists from convic-
tion, socialists of long standing, and hired spies
constituted the great majority of trouble
makers and these found almost as many rep-
resentatives among native and neutral citi-
zens as among the alien enemies. Were one
to imagine two million Americans permitted
to live freely in Germany with as little police
or military surveillance exercised over them as
has been exercised here, we would be very much
disappointed if there had been no more trouble
than the United States experienced in the
course of the war. In fact a similar expecta-
tion was formed on the part of the less expe-
rienced among German commentators. The hope
for a revolution among the German- Ameri-
cans had apparently been one of the stones
in the foundation of the German military and
PROCESS OF NATURALIZATION 159
political theory. Those among the Germans
who had a better opportunity to observe the
changes that came over the immigrant after a
few years or decades of residence in America
knew better. The German university profes-
sors who saw students of the second generation
returned to study have long marveled at the
assimilative capacity of the American nation.
As one said to me, "Children of German par-
ents come back to us with names no longer Ger-
man, with no knowledge of the language, ap-
parently even trying to forget that they are
German." That assimilation is the rule, per-
sistence in the native tradition, the exception,
is fairly evident from observation and from
what few statistics we possess. Those who
would expect more forget the failures of the
native born, and overestimate the possible ef-
fect of a few years' residence in a foreign land.
While discussing the influence of change in
residence upon nationality one must remember
that occasionally at least the American may
similarly change his affiliations. One need only
mention Caspar Gregory's death in the Ger-
man trenches and a few less conspicuous ex-
amples of men of intelligence who as a result
of residence in Germany espoused the German
cause, although of definitely American or Eng-
lish descent.
160 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
The attitude of the returned immigrant as
he is met upon his native soil is also significant
in emphasizing impressions, if it is not to be
regarded as furnishing convincing evidence.
As a traveler in Greece during 'the Balkan
war, I was much impressed by the enthusiasm
of the returned Greek for America. One found
them with small American flags on their Greek
uniforms, their conversation was always of
America and the superiority of things Ameri-
can. They were loyal to Greece, too, and many
of them had returned to fight to avoid losing
their citizenship. Some, as they spoke of it,
regarded it as an anchor to windward in case
they should desire to return, some wanted to
make secure the freedom of their country out
of pure patriotism, in spite of the fact that they
did not expect to return. All alike, whether
they had been laborers or merchants in Amer-
ica, whether they expected to be permanent
residents or only to return to accumulate more
wealth to be enjoyed in the home land, were
imbued with the American spirit and were in-
clined to place things American on a pedestal.
What they spoke of most often was not the
ideals of American political life, but the stand-
ards of living, the increased comfort that is
possible in America, and the higher wage which
makes that possible. Coupled with this was
PROCESS OF NATURALIZATION 161
the appreciation of an opportunity for advance-
ment. Those who had succeeded were thankful
for the chance, those who had not, hoped that
their turn might come and were rejoicing in the
anticipation. This personal freedom rather
more than the abstract political freedom was
most frequently mentioned.
The factors which further the change in na-
tionality as an individual lives among a new
people are in part identical with those that
led to the development of the nation in history.
The main difference lies in the fact that the
ideals and resentment against oppression or
actual hardship are more important in the his-
torical development of a nation, while the for-
mation of habits and the gentler influence of
improvement of social conditions are of greater
effect in inducing the individual to transfer
allegiance. The ideals may cause the individual
to emigrate and raise a presumption in favor
of the adopted country. The most effective fac-
tor of all is the gradual development of new
standards of living, the acceptance of the stand-
ards of the new home as applicable to himself.
The change in ideals is accomplished in part
through imitation of the model passively set,
but more by the constantly effective pressure
of the contempt of the older residents for the
costumes and habits of the newcomer. The
162 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
harsh attitude toward the foreigner is coupled
with a kindly reception of the man who changes
and equal opportunity before the law in busi-
ness and property relations. This punishment
of contempt for the old and the reward of will-
ingness to receive as an equal the man who
changes combine to impress the language, the
styles, the size and location of the house, and
finally political ideals and willingness to die
for the new people of which he has become a
part.
After the standards have been accepted under
the influence of this double process of punish-
ment for remaining alien and reward for assim-
ilation, becoming emotionally and politically a
part of the nation follows naturally and un-
avoidably. The newcomer, who finds himself
at first an outcast except among the immediate
members of his old race, gradually accepts the
customs and learns the language of the new
country and as he does, finds that his lot is im-
proved physically and socially. He is more
and more accepted. If he had not decided to
remain and become a permanent citizen he seri-
ously considers it at this stage. He finds that
his closest associates are with Americans, or
at least that the ideals of American life have
become his ideals. He in turn begins to look
down upon the newcomer with his own old
PROCESS OF NATURALIZATION 163
standards. With that acceptance of the nation
as his nation, a desire for its continuance and
prosperity over all other nations develops and
with that goes willingness for self-sacrifice to
further that end. Then, naturalization or na-
tionalization is complete. Were he to be called
upon to justify the changes in affiliation that
have developed in this habitual way, the proba-
bility is that he would find a reason for it in
the phrases of liberty, opportunity, or the su-
periority of our institutions. That these have
had no effect cannot be asserted, but the great-
er well-being and the formation of habits which
make the continuance of the new life an essen-
tial to happiness are probably much more im-
portant.
CHAPTER VI
THE NATION AND THE MOB CONSCIOUSNESS
MODEEN writers without any important ex-
ception unite in believing that nations are held
together by mental rather than by physical or
hereditary bonds. It is something in the spirit,
not anything in the physical constitution or
common ancestry that makes them one. Our
discussion so far reenforces this belief, Exact-
ly what the nature of the mental or spiritual
process may be that unites, what it is that
changes when a group of individuals becomes
a nation, or what is altered in an individual
when he transfers his allegiance from the Em-
peror of Austria to the United States of Amer-
ica, is not made so clear where any attempt is
made to answer the problem at all. In a psy-
chological study, such as we are attempting,
it is this phase of the problem which must have
the center of the stage. It is our task to de-
cide what the mental processes are which are
referred to so vaguely by the writers in history
and political science. Zimmern1 defines na-
1 Zimmern : ' ' Nationality and Government, ' ' p. 96.
164
NATION AND MOB CONSCIOUSNESS 165
tionality as "a form of corporate conscious-
ness of peculiar intensity, intimacy, and dig-
nity, related to a definite home country." If
we discount the relation to a definite home coun-
try now and leave it to be discussed more
seriously later, it would seem that all that we
have is a corporate consciousness, which prob-
ably means a consciousness of belonging to a
common body or society. What this is, whether
instinct or habit, and whether as consciousness
it belongs under feeling, intellect or will, he
does not say and probably for the problem he
is interested in does not much care. For our
purpose, however, it is just this that does mat-
ter. We must attempt to discover if we can
what this peculiar consciousness is and what its
effects may be upon the action of the indi-
viduals that feel or experience it.
Of the more definitely psychological theories
we may select a few types for more detailed
analysis to show what is characteristic of each
and what all regard as essential to the nature
of nationality. It must be said that some of
the theories we are to discuss are almost as
vague in their statements as those that we have
just quoted. They are more picturesque in
their analogies, but are quite as elusive when
we attempt to discover what they really mean.
Others are sufficiently definite in the compari-
166 THE PSYCHOLOGY OP NATIONALITY
sons that they make, but the states or processes
to which they compare the consciousness are
quite as little known as the consciousness itself.
Perhaps the most vivid and at the same time
most widely known of the modern theories is
Le Bon's, which is, in essentials, that a nation
approaches a crowd in the nature of its con-
sciousness and that a crowd induces in the indi-
viduals who compose it a state peculiar to itself
and allied to the hypnotic and other abnormal
conditions. Examination of this theory implies
an investigation of the nature of the mind of
a mob in the first place and then of the ques-
tion how far the nation resembles the crowd.
Le Bon 2 insists that the man in the crowd is
altogether transformed, that in considerable
measure he loses all of his distinguishing char-
acteristics of control, that he is fused with the
other individuals to constitute a new mental
unit. He speaks more or less pictorially of the
process as one of giving over all of the ac-
quired characters and getting back to the in-
stincts which all men have in common just be-
cause they are men. In these fundamental in-
stincts they are little different from the beasts ;
they descend to a lower level of culture and
evolution. More definitely he compares the
man in the mob to a man hypnotized. He as-
*G. Le Bon: "The Crowd," p. 11 et passim.
NATION AND MOB CONSCIOUSNESS 167
serts that in both conditions the activity of the
cortex is in abeyance and that the individual
is controlled only by the action of the medulla.
The neurology involved in this statement is
archaic, if it were ever accepted, but we are
less concerned with the detailed theory than
with the description of the state and the condi-
tions of the action. The test of the theory
is the closeness of the resemblance between the
man hypnotized and the man in the crowd. The
stage of hypnosis that offers similarities is the
somnambulistic. In this the patient is marked
by susceptibility to suggestion in thought and
action, and even in perception. The least com-
mand is executed, however absurd it may seem.
Any statement seems to meet with acceptance,
and the patient will even see objects said to be
present where nothing resembles them. Thus
Binet could make a patient see a picture on a
blank card, and when shown the same card
when hypnotized on another occasion the pa-
tient would again see the picture. The indi-
vidual hypnotized seems also to have the emo-
tions that are suggested to him. He will weep
at command or when it is suggested by word or
picture; he becomes angry when his fist is
clenched or the command is given. He also
will at suggestion assume a part and act it
out consistently. An almost invariable symp-
168 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
torn of this stage of hypnosis is that there is
when wakened no memory of any of the hap-
penings of the hypnotized period.
When we compare the action of the man in
the crowd with this state we find many similari-
ties and a few differences. It should be em-
phasized that Le Bon would not ascribe this
peculiar state to every crowd, but only to those
under special conditions. He would say that
men might gather without going into this con-
dition, without becoming fused into the unity
that submits each to the control of the whole.
The existence of the peculiar condition does not
depend upon the size of the crowd, but upon
other attendant circumstances. At times the
group goes into a trance, becomes hypnotized;
at times the same group or another group of
the same size might gather and the men in it
remain normal. Le Bon has in mind the mob
in action, as in the French or Russian Revo-
lution* or any crowd indulging in riots. It is
then that we see the individuals carried away
with little thought and less control. There
can be no question that under these conditions
the individual will commit acts that he would
despise when alone. The reduction of control
is in the influence of the directive forces of ex-
periences, the forces that constitute what we
group under the term reason. In general, the
NATION AND MOB CONSCIOUSNESS 169
instincts dominate, but in neither the hypno-
tized condition nor in the mob is direction alto-
gether abrogated. The limitations of ordinary
morals and good taste are merely reduced.
There is a point beyond which neither will go.
The hypnotized patient will commit a play mur-
der with a paper dagger, but will not stab with
a real dagger. A mob will commit murder, as
has happened altogether too often, but it does
not do it unless it can find some reason that,
in form at least, would satisfy a sane man in
a quiet moment. The criminal is lynched be-
cause the punishment of the law is not ade-
quate. The bourgeoisie are destroyed for fear
that they may again regain power and oppress
the proletariat. Or this rich man deserves
death, not that he has done anything him-
self, but that he belongs to a class that has op-
pressed and he will himself if occasion arises,
or he must have injured some one or he would
not have been so wealthy. The crowd acts be-
cause it accepts these arguments, but in many
cases the arguments are supplied by a leader,
and the greater suggestibility of the mob is
shown by the fact that they will see but the
one side of the case which is presented by the
oratorical leader, and that they are not in a
condition to resist the tendency to believe an
argument of the most fallacious type.
170 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
The suggestibility of the mob extends to the
perception processes as well. Innumerable
cases are on record in which all of the members
of a crowd will see what is suggested in spite
of the fact that it has no existence in reality.
We can find instances all through history in
which armies in the excitement of a conflict or
the fatigue of retreat have seen apparitions.
St. George appeared to the crusaders on the
walls of Jerusalem, and even in the last war
there have been several occasions when a whole
army has seen an apparition or apparitions.
The best attested instance is perhaps the angels
seen by the British on the retreat from Mons.
The evidence for these hallucinations would
easily find acceptance in a court of law unless
questioned on a priori grounds. At other times
St. George or St. Michael has been seen lead-
ing the attack upon the enemy, or strange lights
have been seen in the sky by a number of men
and the sight has been accepted as a happy
omen and inspired a successful charge. All
of these visions must be regarded as collective
hallucinations, started by some one man and
extending to other members of the crowd. They
are altogether similar to the collective hallu-
cinations which are supposed to explain the
Indian conjuring trick of making a tree grow
before the eyes of a crowd or the other of throw-
NATION AND MOB CONSCIOUSNESS 171
ing a rope into the air which extends out of
sight and is climbed by a sailor or acrobat.
All taken together show that on occasion, rather
rare occasion, to be sure, an hallucination suf-
ficiently vivid to lead to vigorous action may
be induced in a crowd.
The changes in the emotions are as marked
as are the changes in thought and action. In
the crowd this is a subordinate phenomenon.
The thought or the perception is suggested first
and emotion and action follow. If we admit
that there are similarities between the condi-
tion in the crowd and in hypnotism, we must
also admit that there are differences which
are quite as striking. The man hypnotized
to the state of somnambulism always forgets
after waking what he did during the stage
of hypnosis. In the crowd there is no such
amnesia. The individual remembers all of his
acts. The hypnotized man gives definite evi-
dence of being in an abnormal state. He shows
signs of the advent of the condition by groans,
change in breathing, and sometimes muscular
contractions that may approach slight con-
vulsions. These are lacking in the development
of the crowd consciousness. While the most
skeptical critic would be compelled to admit
that there are similarities between the crowd
state and the hypnotic, the differences are quite
172 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
as marked. One is justified in the statement
that a man in the crowd is somewhat similar in
his acts to the man hypnotized, not that he is
hypnotized. The similarity is in the action, not
in the state itself.
It has also been asserted that in the mob the
individual is highly suggestible or that he is
controlled altogether by imitation. The first
of these theories states what is true of the hyp-
notic theory. Not to make the man in the mob
too different from the man in his ordinary life,
it is well to emphasize the fact that in one sense
all that we do is done through suggestion. Ee-
duced to its simplest terms suggestion is noth-
ing more than habit on the one hand and asso-
ciation of ideas on the other. Give any man
a stimulus that has been connected with a cer-
tain movement and he will make that move-
ment at once. Ask him a question and the an-
swer that has been most frequently given will
come to his mind and in most cases to his lips.
Suggestion is nothing more. We use the term
suggestion for the instances in which the re-
sponse is more mechanical, when the suggested
movements or ideas are opposed to rational in-
terests or are more than usually uncontrolled.
This statement that the individual is subject to
suggestion is about all that is true in Le Bon's
statement that a man in a mob is a man hypno-
NATION AND MOB CONSCIOUSNESS 173
tized. It is only necessary to add that a man
is always subject to suggestion and is more
subject to it in the crowd than when alone.
The same may be said of imitation which
has been made a law of social action by Tarde
and many of his followers. The movement that
is imitated furnishes a stimulus to action, sug-
gests it, if we use the term discussed above.
Imitation is only another form of suggestion.
Of both it should be said that they attract at-
tention only when the act or thought that they
initiate is in some way different from the ordi-
nary. Usually the movements and ideas are
controlled by wider experiences, by what we or-
dinarily know as will. In the crowd this con-
trol is reduced. But the control is not alto-
gether relinquished in favor either of imita-
tion or of suggestion. The movement that shall
be imitated is determined by the instinct of the
individual and by his reason and all other fac-
tors that control experience. Experiments on
monkeys, supposed to be the most imitative of
animals, show that they will not imitate every
movement that they see, in fact the experi-
ments so far made have never been able to show
that a monkey can be taught to make a new
movement by imitation. He may be shown a
movement a great many times and make but
slight effort to repeat and when he does try to
174 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
repeat it is necessary for him to go through an
elaborate try, try again process before he will
succeed in doing what he has been shown. In
the monkey and in man as well, imitation is
successful only when the movement to be imi-
tated has already been made before and is
thoroughly known. Even then only those move-
ments that promise desirable results will be
imitated and if the results prove undesirable
when obtained, the movement will not be re-
peated. Imitation is not then really an inde-
pendent force or condition of action, it is only
the name for the result of a number of other
forces. The result, not the cause, is empha-
sized in the term. The only new feature and
the only instinctive element in the fact of imi-
tation is the instinct that was emphasized in an
earlier chapter, that a man will be attracted by
the action of his fellows, and will in conse-
quence attend to their movements, and, second-
ly, that there is an instinctive tendency to do
what all others are doing. Imitation is only
suggestion with the added effects of these two
instinctive tendencies.
One must insist, then, that the same truth is
at the basis of the three theories that describe
the man in the mob as hypnotized, as acting
under suggestion and as being controlled alto-
gether by imitation. In hypnotism suggestion
NATION AND MOB CONSCIOUSNESS 175
rules, and imitation is only suggestion in which
the stimulus is the act of another man. If one
object that in hypnotism suggestion is much
stronger than it is in the normal state, we may
answer that the man in the mob is not so com-
pletely open to suggestion as the man hypno-
tized. The principles of action of the man in
the mob are the same as those of the man under
ordinary circumstances. The suggestibility of
the man in the mob is limited as is that of the
normal man by instinct and by ideals or rea-
son. One may even assert that the instincts of
the men in the group are the essential forces
in determining the character and degree of the
action. When a mob is angry because of an act
that arouses its sympathy for the victim and
hatred of the aggressor, it will go to the great-
est excesses at the slightest excuse. In this
the responses are merely exaggerated by the
presence of the other members of the mob.
Should one attempt to induce the mob to run
away at the sight of the atrocity, when no great
danger threatened the members, the endeavor
would be wasted. Should one at any time
suggest to the mob some act that was in it-
self ridiculous or was not in harmony with
some one of the instinctive tendencies of the
individuals there would be complete failure.
More than likely all would break out in laugh-
176 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
ter or in jeers and the mob would dissolve into
its elements. Where the crowd has been trained
by one man and accustomed to one set of acts,
no matter how ridiculous, as happens in the
ritual of certain religious or pseudo-religious
sects, the ridiculous may become an accepted
sign of unity, and be repeated without question.
On the whole, however, only acts that are
adapted to the situation and to the instincts of
the crowd will be made. All that the leader
can do in the most docile mob is to select one
from among the possible instinctive responses.
If a mob wavers between flight and aggression
when each is in some degree appropriate, the
act of a leader or of a part of the crowd will
decide which course shall be adopted.
Again, these theories all assume that a mob
is absolutely under the control of a leader, and
some seem to believe that the leader works with
full consciousness of what he is doing and even
that he malevolently uses the crowd for his
own purposes. This is at most only one side
of the problem. The leader not merely exer-
cises his will upon the crowd, but the crowd
also works its will with him. One could quite
as readily sustain the thesis that the leader
has been hypnotized by the mob as that the
mob has been hypnotized by the leader. If
the statement can be made with some plausibil-
NATION AND MOB CONSCIOUSNESS 177
ity that the members of the mob evidence an
unwonted submissiveness to the leader, it may
also be said that the leader exercises an abnor-
mal aggressiveness. Any one who has even
temporarily and in minor matters assumed the
leadership of a crowd is in some degree aware
of a change in his attitude or character. Even
in addressing an audience, one feels at times
an exaltation which one may imagine leaders
to feel in a crisis. A practised speaker has an
assurance before a sympathetic audience that
h^ does not feel in his study, and will not in-
frequently make statements that he would not
make in writing. For many men the presence
of an audience acts very much like wine, and in
some the effects are deplorable. The perma-
nent or temporary leader of a crowd is affected
even more strongly. He becomes more impor-
tant in his own eyes because of the position he
holds. After he has overcome the first instinc-
tive fear of the crowd that is felt by all of its
members, he goes to the other extreme and
takes courage from the group to attempt deeds
that he would not dare alone, and would not
plan for the crowd in a quiet moment. For
good or for ill he rises to heights of which he
is not ordinarily capable. He feels in himself
the strength of the men he is leading and acts
correspondingly.
178 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
The leader also takes many of his beliefs and
opinions from the crowd. He hears a cry of
" lynch him," repeats the cry as if it were his
own opinion, and takes the first step towards
putting the man to death. Should he hear a
plea for clemency he would be equally willing to
lead a rescue. There is no weighing of evidence
on his part, no real decision, only one side of
the case presents itself and only one set of in-
stincts has a chance for action. He is the em-
bodiment, not merely of the executive force of
the crowd but in large measure of its opinion,
of its reason, and of its emotion as well. It is
here that the ordinary fear of the crowd as-
serts itself. While the leader is bold when he
represents it against the opinion of the victim,
particularly when it is expressed against a
weak individual, he is a coward against the de-
mand of the crowd itself. He does what it de-
mands or what he thinks it demands with little
or no question. Even Napoleon always feared
to oppose or thwart a mob. It is this curious
interdependence between the! leader and the
crowd that contributes most to making the mob
irresponsible. Each relies upon the other and
makes the other take the blame for failure,
while each is willing to ascribe any success to
the leader. A member of a crowd may advo-
NATION AND MOB CONSCIOUSNESS 179
cate a course of action or unite with the
others in doing something of whose advisabil-
ity he may be in doubt. The leader may be
just as doubtful, but afraid to protest for fear
of the mob. It is this that makes the action of
the mob so irrational. Each suggestion is made
more recklessly than it would be in private, it
is also only slightly weighed, for each throws
the responsibility for the act upon some one
else or upon the crowd as a whole.
The activity of the crowd and of the leader
in the crowd is primarily an expression of the
social instincts, particularly of the instinct that
makes the individual subordinate himself to the
opinions and beliefs of the whole. It is this
that makes the crowd act as if hypnotized and
also makes suggestion and imitation so impor-
tant. What makes the crowd different in its
action from the action of a society in its quieter
moods of comparative isolation is the fact that
the ideals and conventions do not exercise their
ordinary restraints. As has been emphasized
in earlier chapters, instinct is usually subor-
dinated to formulated rules of conduct which
have been developed in various ways and tested
by long experience. These decide between the
simple instincts, where they are in conflict, and
select those which have proved most adequate
to similar situations in the past. At the same
180 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
time these ideals of conduct have the impelling
effect of instincts because of the general in-
stinctive respect for the opinions of society
when formulated in convention as well as when
expressed in words or in acts of the group im-
mediately present to sight and hearing. In
brief, then, these theories which would explain
the acts of the crowd by hypnosis, imitation,
or suggestion, are but expressions of our
earlier described general principles of instinct
and ideals. It is only that in the crowd the ef-
fects of the social instincts induced by the bodily
presence of the crowd dominate over the slowly
acquired and tested ideals and so produce what
we call uncontrolled action.
Finally, admitting what there is left that is
peculiar to the action of the crowd, how far is
a nation as a whole similar in its action to the
crowd? Le Bon and Tarde make certain asser-
tions with reference to the action of the crowd
and then without more ado apply the same laws
to the action of a nation or of a people. If this
were altogether fair, either there is nothing
really peculiar about the crowd, or the nation
is in itself an abnormal social entity or organ-
ization. A little consideration will show that
it is only on rare occasions, if at all, that the
laws of the crowd are also the laws of action
of the nation. Le Bon guards himself at the
NATION AND MOB CONSCIOUSNESS 181
beginning of his discussion by the statement
that it is only infrequently that the mob really
fuses into a new entity, only when its cerebral
action is in abeyance and the action of the me-
dulla obtains prominence. This happens only
at moments of great excitement. These mo-
ments must be very rare in the life of the na-
tion. The means of communication are not suf-
ficiently rapid for the whole of a great state
to be fused into one and to be dominated by a
single impulse, except on rare occasions. When
the Maine was sunk in Havana harbor a wave of
emotion spread over the United States, very
much as an emotion might spread in a crowd,
and the authorities were compelled to declare
war against the will of most of the responsible
statesmen. Something of the same kind oc-
curred at the time of the sinking of the Lusi-
tania, but the effect was less immediate, prob-
ably because it was only one of a series of
events of ever increasing atrocity. The na-
tion's decision in favor of war was made more
deliberately and rationally in accordance with
the evidence.
For the most part the nation thinks as a sane
individual in isolation thinks. The various in-
stinctive responses that would impel to opposed
actions neutralize each other, and while it would
be an optimist or a blind man who would assert
182 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
that the decisions have close approximation to
perfection even in the best organized of na-
tional states, the final decisions usually attain
the level of the average intelligence of the men
who compose the group. This hesitation is due
partly to the slow means of communication and
the balancing of different reactions to the same
situation by men in different parts of the coun-
try, partly to the action of established conven-
tion, and partly, in the modern state, to the ef-
fects of party government. Nearly every situa-
tion tends to arouse more than one instinctive
response. In our lynching mob, sympathy for
the victim or anger at his deed are both possi-
ble reactions, but the mob as a whole will make
but one of these reactions and will be but little
affected by the other possibility. In the nation
that hears of the event only by rumor or reads
of it in the papers, one emotion is aroused in
one group, another in another. By the time a
decision has been reached through reconciling
opposed opinions there is a balanced judgment
which neutralizes strong suggestions.
Conventional ideals also have the same effect.
They are to be deprecated as preventing rapid
advance and frequently preventing advance al-
together, but at the same time they do prevent
excesses that result from immediate uncon-
trolled instinctive responses. They may be the
NATION AND MOB CONSCIOUSNESS 183
result of experience at a relatively low stage of
development, but the instinctive responses for
the most part represent responses in the pre-
human period, are remnants of a still more
rudimentary condition. The conventional meth-
ods of procedure in reaching decisions of a so-
cial type compel delay, and while they prevent
rising to a possible best, they also save society
from the possible worst. The influence of party
government, even more than the local differ-
ences of opinion prevents the domination of the
nation by one set of instincts, or by one form
of impulses. Each party is skeptical of the
opinions of the other and questions on prin-
ciple any statement made and any action ad-
vocated by the other. This means that the op-
posing considerations are sure to be heard,
and decision will follow upon consideration of
more than one aspect. A nation will be carried
away by impulse only on some question that has
not been a party matter. Even new questions
are likely either to be similar to familiar is-
sues, or are made party measures because the
men who suggest them belong to a party and
so arouse opposition and discussion.3
The only place where national affairs might
be settled as the mob settles them is in the na-
*Cf. A. Lawrence Lowell: "Public Opinion and Popular
Government," p. 96.
184 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
tional assembly. Even here the mob spirit is
seldom in evidence. The member is in the first
place really representative. He knows that
what he does must be passed upon by his con-
stituency, and that reelection depends upon
doing what they will accept, even if one decision
has not yet been advocated by them. The mass
of his partisans at home restricts his freedom
of judgment and prevents him from being led
away by the suggestions of his colleagues, the
members of the immediately present crowd.
The rules of procedure with their requirements
of votes at different times and by different
houses also make impossible or unlikely an un-
thinking decision. While at times one sees in
the assembly evidence of the effect of the crowd,
that is only on unimportant matters or at the
most only in periods of crisis, when the legis-
lature consciously defers to the individuals who
are responsible for decisions. Again the party
system is active in checking too hasty action,
sometimes even in delaying desirable action.
The presumption that any suggestion from the
opposing party must be wrong inhibits any too
sudden influence that it might have and, if no
other factor were at work, would prevent the
assembly from becoming a mob in Le Bon's
sense of the term.
While, then, we must do justice to the im-
NATION AND MOB CONSCIOUSNESS 185
portance of Le Bon's discussion upon many
modern theories and accept some of his con-
clusions regarding the influences that are active
in the control of crowds and even of peoples,
we cannot accept his views as they are stated.
The crowd is not made up of hypnotized indi-
viduals, nor is suggestion alone the explanation
of its acts. Suggestion in one sense explains
all human acts, but it is not the machine-like
form of suggestion that Le Bon attributes to
the mob. All action is due to suggestion, but
to suggestion controlled by ideals and conven-
tionalized wider experience. Due to the instinc-
tive effect of the other men present, this con-
trol is less when the man is in the mob than
when he is in isolation. We must insist, too,
that what slight difference really exists between
the isolated individual and the man in the crowd
is not in evidence in the collective activity of
the nation, or can be observed only on rare oc-
casions of great excitement. The nation is not
a mob, even when we grant much less of the
abnormal to the action of the mob than Le Bon
insists that it has. We shall attempt in the next
chapter to discover how the nation really does
think and feel and act.
CHAPTER VII
THE NATIONAL MIND AND HOW IT THINKS, FEELS,
AND ACTS
IN the last chapter we reached the negative
conclusion that while the nation has many of
the characteristics of the mob it is not a mob,
nor is the mob so instinctive in its acts as Le
Bon and others assert. Still there are laws
that control the activities of the nation and
there are theories that would assign to the na-
tion a mind very much as mind is assigned to
the individual. These theories have something
in common with the doctrines of Le Bon. They
differ from it mainly in that they regard the
mind of the nation as a more highly developed
mind, more like the mind of a sane, normal in-
dividual than of a man hypnotized. We may
examine this theory and in connection with it
attempt to discover how the nation thinks, even
if we cannot accept the theory that we are ex-
amining.
The analogy on which many of these theories
are based is the somewhat mystical one that
the nation possesses a super-individual mind,
186
THE NATIONAL MIND 187
that by living together the members of a na-
tion in some way develop an actual new mind
that is related to the bodies of the individuals
in very much the same way that the mind of
the individual is to the cells of which his body
is composed. This is a perfectly good analogy.
One frequently speaks of the body as a colony
of cells, each of which is an independent unit
save for its dependence upon the whole for its
nutrition, and for certain of its stimuli. Simi-
larly, one might argue, the individuals are in-
dependent when apart, but when they come to-
gether there is in some way developed or gen-
erated a group of phenomena that is common
to all of them. The voluntary and emotional
processes are more prominent in this complex,
the rational and sensory components are little
in evidence if they are not altogether lacking.
The will of the group dominates the will of the
individual, if the latter has any place in the
action of the group at all.
Many facts can undoubtedly be made to har-
monize with this assumption. Yet it suffers
from two defects if it is intended as more than
a vague analogy. In the first place the relation
of the individual consciousness or mind to the
separate cells is by no means so clearly known
or understood as one would like to have it.
All that we know is that in some way the in-
188 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
dividual is conscious, and that the physical or-
ganism on which that consciousness depends is
a mass of separate cells. We know nothing,
however, of any consciousness in the cells and
we have only indirect evidence of the way in
which the consciousness of the whole individual
depends upon the activities of the different
cells. To explain the consciousness of the so-
cial whole in terms of the relation of the indi-
vidual consciousness to separate elements is to
attempt an explanation by means of something
that is itself far from fully known.
If one may assert that we have no direct
knowledge of the consciousness of the separate
elements in the organism of the individuals, it
must also be asserted that we have no imme-
diate evidence for the existence of a super-con-
sciousness or over-soul in the group or in so-
ciety. Each individual is aware of his own con-
sciousness, may be aware that his own con-
sciousness or his behavior is modified when he is
in a crowd or is acting in a group, but no one
knows immediately the consciousness of the
crowd apart from this modification of the minds
of the individuals who compose it. The crowd
has no means of expression apart from the lan-
guage of its members. One knows what a na-
tion believes only from the assent of its mem-
bers to general propositions ; one knows of the
THE NATIONAL MIND 189
emotions of the crowd only from the emotional
expression of the individuals. There is no pos-
sibility of communicating with the soul of a na-
tion other than by way of the souls of its ele-
ments and these can never be sure that they
are accurately representing the over-soul. One
can go beyond only by means of the plebiscite
and that seldom speaks with unanimity in de-
tail, however close may be the community of
sentiment as regards general principles. That,
too, gives only the opinions of the separate ele-
ments, not the belief of the over-soul as such.
One might abandon the attempt to discover a
super-consciousness directly, as has been done
by one school of psychologists for the individual
consciousness, and endeavor to discover simi-
larities between the action of the group and the
action of the individual. This would not give
any evidence of a super-consciousness because
the theory denies the existence even of the in-
dividual consciousness, but it does permit one
to speak of a social organism, or of a social en-
tity, in a way that is free from many of the ob-
jections raised above. One can admit that the
mob or the nation intensifies the instincts of the
individuals, that the group behaves as if it had
a guiding intelligence above and in addition to
the intelligences of the separate individuals.
This would permit the use of the term national
190 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
spirit. It would not, however, justify its use
as a warrant for acts that would not be permit-
ted of themselves. The German philosophers
since Hegel have spoken as if a nation, par-
ticularly the German nation, were the embodi-
ment of a special spirit of divine or mysterious
origin and as if the advancement of this spirit
were demanded for the improvement not only of
themselves but of the world. The Germans are
to be regarded like the Jews of the Old Testa-
ment as a peculiar people, with a national spirit
that is in an unusual if not exclusive degree
the embodiment of the divine influence, and
which must be advanced at the expense of doing
violence to all human instincts. What matters
a series of murders or debaucheries of the Bel-
gian population! God has decreed that the
spirit of the German people must spread over
and dominate the world. What boots the suf-
fering of the uncultured provided only that all
makes for the attainment of this divine end!
Such deductions as this would have no standing.
The national spirit is not an entity which may
be assumed to exist independently of its expres-
sion; on the contrary, it is merely an analogy
by which certain acts and beliefs of the group
have been expressed or explained. The exist-
ence of the spirit is justified only in so far as
it explains observed facts. It may not be used
THE NATIONAL MIND 191
as an established principle to prove assump-
tions or to justify courses of conduct in them-
selves made reprehensible.
If we make the tentative assumption that the
social whole may be regarded as an entity apart
from or added to the individuals who compose
it, it is interesting to enumerate the qualities or
forms of behavior that distinguish it. If we
are to write a psychology of nations, it may
be well to discuss our phenomena under the
heads used in the traditional individual psy-
chology. First, we have no chapter to write on
sensation and little on perception. The social
whole has no new means of acquiring knowl-
edge. The sense organs of the group are the
sense organs of the members. All that the
group may add is a readiness to interpret the
contributions of the senses in harmony with
the suggestions received from the others. As
was said in the last chapter, a group is more
easily deceived than the individual, since each
tends to accept the statement of another. The
first man, if misled, passes the mistake on to
the others. Of course, if a sceptic or accurate
observer be the first to announce his opinion,
the group will see clearly and will be less open
to mistake than the average individual. The
mistakes of the group are more striking if not
more frequent than the mistakes of the indi-
192 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
vidual. Perhaps they are more striking be-
cause shared by so many, and for that reason
are so likely to be accepted as fundamentally
true. Certain it is that, on occasion, individuals
in a crowd will be subject to illusions that they
would not have fallen into if alone.
Much the same may be said of the thinking of
the nation. The thinking is always of the in-
dividual but the acceptance is determined by
the group. In a popular assembly it may truly
be said that the final arbiter of thought is the
group, not the individual. Suggestions are made
by the speaker or writer. These are passed
upon by all hearers or readers and as they are
accepted or rejected, the group decides upon
their truth. For practical purposes it makes
them true until actual test may confirm or dis-
prove them. In many cases, test is long de-
layed or the results of tests are not correctly
interpreted so that the decision of the group
stands as the truth in the face of fact. Most
thinking is limited by the accuracy of major
premises and, as the premises are not open to
careful, unprejudiced examination, acceptance
depends upon universal agreement or popular
acclaim. Belief in the right to domination of
the German state could never be disproved to
a German by argument. It is an accepted major
premise and can be eliminated only by misfor-
THE NATIONAL MIND 193
tune to the government or the death of the peo-
ple. A good Republican in the United States
is not open to argument on the subject of pro-
tection. Even facts have no effect upon him.
The superiority of a protective system is a
major premise established by generations of
popular speakers and probably by the self-in-
terest of the dominant elements. The good
Democrat has similar major premises, equally
irrefutable. Facts have no effect upon the loyal
partisan. Similarly, the true socialist believes
in the existence as a conscious group of a capi-
talistic class and in the essential malevolence of
that class towards all labor.
Study of the process by which these premises
are developed and the use made of them shows
that the process is in most respects the same
for the group or class as for the individual.
The premises are partly the expression of pre-
judices accepted from parents. In many cases
these were essential to the existence of the
group in the past and have survived in spite of
changing conditions. The continuance for so
long of autocratic government is an instance in
point. Possibly the dominance of the lord or
chief was essential to the satisfactory leading of
the men of the tribe, and continuance of the
leadership through heredity was more certain
than any form of election when the machinery
194 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
of selection had not been developed and accept-
ed. Any unitary leadership was better than
none and because of the tendency to transmis-
sion of capacities from father to son hereditary
continuance of the leadership was on the whole
advantageous. Confidence in the leadership of
old families continues to the present on the con-
tinent at least and it is only with difficulty that
proved ability in a new family will be recog-
nized. Many major premises in politics, in re-
ligion, and even in science can be traced in a
similar way to general statements that har-
monized with the practices and could not be re-,
futed by the experience of earlier times and
which now continue of their own inertia or
through the mental inertia of mankind.
Major premises that are established anew in
a generation owe their appearance at times to
the initiative of experimental workers. Now
that science is given a free hand much, if not
most, of the advance comes from that source.
Premises established by science are always wel-
comed and need no defense. Society is con-
vinced by the successful invention and the com-
forts that come as a result of the success. Yet
not all of the most fully established results of
scientific investigation can establish or maintain
themselves against prejudice. This is perhaps
most striking in medicine where there is great-
THE NATIONAL MIND 195
est difficulty in distinguishing between the effect
upon a single individual and the general results
as determined by statistics. The prevalence of
the use of patent medicines, of the use of con-
coctions handed down from grandparents and
long shown to have no value, and the prevalence
of Christian Science and other healing cults is
striking evidence of this tendency for old be-
liefs to stand against scientific knowledge.
Laws established in physics and chemistry,
where each test gives the same result, are less
affected by popular prejudice. What any one
can try is accepted. Statements resting upon
collection of statistics or determined by condi-
tions that act irregularly are more open to
popular doubt.
Study of the way major premises in the fields
of religion or health or in politics come to be
established affords the best evidence of the
methods of affecting the beliefs of a nation.
One of the most important in its effects is the
desire to believe, the instinctive pleasure given
by the belief. The complete acceptance of the
Tolstoian and Marxian doctrines by the prole-
tariat of Russia and the consequent belief in
the designing cruelty of the capitalist offers one
of the best instances of this effect. The men
who were convinced are for the most part rela-
tively uneducated, although education probably
196 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
has little effect upon the spread of doctrines
or the reasoning of the populace, and also were
undoubtedly suffering from lack of many neces-
sities of life, probably the most essential cir-
cumstances. The doctrine of Tolstoi was pro-
mulgated by a man of the upper class, who had
the prestige of social position and accepted in-
telligence. His doctrines were based upon a
first-hand knowledge of the facts. Where he
described the actual situation his statements
could be checked by individual experience and
seen to be accurate. The scheme promised re-
lief, was based upon a conception of human na-
ture highly flattering to the common man. In
short, it was a doctrine that he desired to be-
lieve, and to arouse the desire to believe takes
the hearer a long way on the road to belief.
The rest was done by iteration and reitera-
tion of the relatively simple principles until
they became familiar to every man in Russia,
however ignorant. It corresponded to the in-
stinctive desires of every peasant in his mud
hut to think that he might have the power of
the lord at the manor, and that when he had
it he would use it to the benefit of himself and
of all mankind. Every time his sympathy was
excited by a hungry child he would think that
when he and his kind were in power there would
be food for every one. He could satisfy his
THE NATIONAL MIND 197
sympathies by a thought, by a dream, at no ex-
pense to himself. Each time he saw himself
imposed upon by a wealthier or more powerful
man he took his vengeance in the thought that
when the revolution came that man would no
longer have more than he had himself. He
satisfied his vengeful instincts as he did his sym-
pathetic by the imagination of the good time to
come when the theory was realized. No won-
der that the doctrines were accepted. As a re-
sult of the propaganda the name of Tolstoi as
well as his doctrines were familiar to all. Since
the doctrines were themselves pleasant, even if
out of harmony with the best results of their
reasoning, th^y were inclined to idealize Tol-
stoi, the author, that they might be the more
certain of his conclusions. Talk even with an
intelligent Russian of the proletariat and he
will quote Tolstoi as a final authority in politi-
cal economy as the old Puritan did his Bible.
What he says is not open to question. If an
observation does not harmonize with his state-
ment, something must be wrong with the ob-
servation. The doctrines of socialism, par-
ticularly as stated by Tolstoi, had become a
major premise for all social and political think-
ing in Russia. One is always inclined to glorify
the men whose opinions one desires to believe,
that one may be spared the trouble of coming
198 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
to a conclusion for one's self or the unpleas-
antness of doubt.
All reasoning of the nation is limited to the
acceptance or rejection of suggestions made by
individuals. As a mind, the nation as a whole
originates nothing, it can do no more than ac-
cept or reject. In this the unintelligent mob
or the nation as a whole is not so very different
from the self-selected body of learned indi-
viduals who pursue any science. The theories
are all worked out by individuals, but the con-
clusions are accepted and become part of the
science only in so far as they are accepted by
the somewhat vaguely limited body of men rec-
ognized as authorities in that field. One could
probably cite instances in which the conclusions
were accepted because one desired to believe
them, or because there was no other statement
on the point and any opinion or decision was
better than none. One might even allege with
some semblance of truth that scientists incline
to vaunt the prowess and genius of the men
who hold views that they desire to believe and
thereby establish the reputation of the man at
the same time that they give vogue to a doctrine
or theory. Certainly the advance of thought in
the most abstruse and accurate sciences and
in philosophy is like the growth of the opinions
of the populace in that the theory is always
THE NATIONAL MIND 199
first outlined by some one man, is then accepted
by the skilled group and becomes the orthodox
theory or belief.
The difference between the mob and the indi-
vidual lies in the more critical attitude of the
latter. The individual believes what he desires
to believe, but only within limits. The limits
are set by the experience of the individual. A
statement directly contrary to the individual's
experience will be rejected. In the social group
if its members can find the vaguest analogy
for the statement in the facts of experience,
the pleasant will be accepted as true. The heal-
ing cults take advantage of the well-known fact
that fear of a disease predisposes to it in cer-
tain cases, or at least may make recovery slower
or more difficult, to generalize in the form that
disease is an illusion and pain a product of a
diseased mind. All advocates of a political
Utopia find analogies in present facts for their
beneficent state. If they can find no analogy
they will at least put their promises on a plane
where no practical test is possible.
While in general the nation tests the theories
presented to it in the same way that the sepa-
rate individuals do, and the conditions of belief
are the same for the rabble as for the select
group of scholars, the nation is more credulous
towards the desired conclusions. This is true,
200 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
first, because the credulity of the group tends
to become that of the weakest member. When
one believes and announces his belief he adds
to the authority of the statement. While one
man does not necessarily count for as much as
another in the opinion of the multitude, each
counts for something and each convert is a new
argument with the propagandist and an added
bit of evidence to the man trembling on the
brink of conviction. Second, society, because of
this acceptance of the opinion of the others,
goes more quickly and thoroughly either by its
reason or its instinct or experience as the case
may be. If the populace finds a syllogism that
will suit its purpose, experiences will not turn
it from its deductive conclusion. When the Rus-
sian revolutionists decreed that all officers were
brutal and must perish, they killed the kindly
with the known despots; the old habits of dis-
cipline, once broken, seemed to exaggerate the
license rather than to restrain it. When it was
decided that the aristocrats should be robbed,
no cessation of robbery occurred when they had
been reduced to a state below that of the rob-
bing peasants. All was taken. In this way the
mob, and the nation, in less degree, is single
minded. On the other hand, when isolated ex-
periences favor the conclusion that has been
suggested and is desired, no heed is taken of
THE NATIONAL MIND 201
general principles. The Christian Scientist or
the devotee of Peruna is content with the fact
that a relative has recovered under the treat-
ment and is little concerned to know what gen-
eral principles would make the recovery possi-
ble. In this sense the nation or the group is
more likely to accept the evidence of a single
observation or relatively few experiences in
the face of lack of general principles, or even
in opposition to general principles, and also to
accept a syllogism when its conclusion is in con-
flict with observations, than is the average of
the individuals who compose it. One takes
courage for the satisfaction of his desires from
the reasoning of others. He excuses his care-
lessness by reference to the general acceptance.
But one can find instances of the same ten-
dency in the most scholarly and refined works.
When an author is hard put to discover a major
premise that will justify a conclusion, he almost
invariably falls back upon the phrase "it is uni-
versally agreed among the most eminent scien-
tists or philosophers," or in a more popular
gathering he will assert "we all know this" or
' ' it is generally agreed. ' ' Where he can prove
his point by particular evidence he does ; where
he cannot, he pretends to rely upon the proofs
of others. Such an argument is always suspect,
but you find it in nearly every popular speech,
202 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
in every political address, in almost every ser-
mon, in most theological treatises, and in nearly
all abstruse metaphysical arguments. One
must admit also that it is occasionally made use
of in scientific treatises, when the writer de-
parts from experimentally verified fact.
One must admit that the nation thinks in this
loose way for the most part only in moments
of excitement and even then there are always
some who are not misled. Each nation or at
least each party in a nation has certain major
premises that are not open to argument for
which the laws of reasoning outlined above will
hold. On other subjects the same groups will
be perfectly rational, or as nearly rational as
human limitations permit. During national
crises the mass becomes organized as a mob and
the domination by the majority is nearly com-
plete. During a war, the Great War at least,
doubt of the final success is not permitted, nor
is any question of the justness of the national
position. Aside from these repressions of opin-
ion demanded by the practical necessities, many
abstract principles thoroughly accepted before
the war cannot obtain a hearing. One who
questions the universality of cruelty among the
enemy is not granted a hearing. The hopes for
a lasting peace and the believers in a possible
abolition of war by universal agreement are
THE NATIONAL MIND 203
laughed to scorn. The individuals who have
kept an eye on economy of expenditure lose all
of their influence, and any recognition of the
usual sympathy for the foe is taken as a sign
of weakness or of hostility to the nation's ends
and desires. This is partly, no doubt, an ex-
pression of the necessity for unity in action
against the foe. When there is no outside dan-
ger, internal differences seem important and
can be pushed to the extreme ; when war comes
and the external dangers are great, lesser diffi-
culties recede into the background. It is the-
greater hate which conquers the less. This
willingness to give over the lesser belief for
the greater in moments of crisis constitutes the
characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon that makes
it possible for them to maintain themselves as
a free people. The Poles, on the other hand,
have always shown when free, that the internal
hatreds, hatred of opposing political parties,
are more important than the external. Even in
a crisis they persist in fighting the other party
in the state more than the common foe. In con-
sequence they divide and are conquered. The
same is said of the Slavic communities in this
country. They can seldom keep up social or
religious organizations because of the fre-
quency of the internal feuds.
In any nation, even in emergencies, a mi-
204 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
nority will continue to exist and if it does not
express itself it is from fear of the consequences
or from a belief that to do the wrong thing is
better than to do nothing. The Irish question
was recognized as unsettled during the Great
War, even if the division which threatened be-
fore the war to lead to a revolution was not per-
mitted to influence the policy of the great par-
ties. Similarly the jealousy between Prussia
and Bavaria was quieted apparently and all
worked together for the common cause. There
is a latent minority ready in all countries to
advocate disarmament and some form of inter-
national agreement for settling conflicts which
will undoubtedly find expression now that the
treaty of peace is actually signed.
In the ordinary life of the nation, political
doctrines are discussed much as they are in a
club. The alternatives suggest themselves and
are weighed by the individual. On many ques-
tions there is never agreement, and on few is
there complete agreement. One aspect appeals
to one group and is reiterated by that group on
all occasions. Each different aspect has its ad-
herents, and action depends upon counting
votes, not by attaining even approximate
unanimity. The reasons that control belief are
approximately those that would appeal to the
individuals, that do in fact appeal to the indi-
THE NATIONAL MIND 205
viduals. These are first, the instincts, which
determine primarily what one desires to be-
lieve ; second, tradition in the community, which
not only influences desire but also determines
what one shall believe to be true; and, finally,
the experience of the individual, including the
results of personal observation and reports
from others on experiments and observa-
tions. In the process of development of belief,
new observations are brought in by written con-
tributions or by the speaker on the platform
or in the political assembly, and the possible
interpretations of the facts and their most prob-
able bearing upon the course of future action
are considered. All these influences serve to
modify the conclusion of the individuals and of
the group as the sum of individuals. In all of
this the nation thinks only as the individuals
that compose it think. To be sure the indi-
vidual would not think as he does were he not
a member of the nation, just as he would not
think as he does did he not possess the instincts
that he does. But the suggestions all come from
individuals, the acceptance of the suggestion is
by the individuals. As Cooley has said, all
thinking, even the most individual, is a social
process, but it is social as a cooperation of in-
dividuals not as a process in a super-individual
mind. Only in moments of great excitement is
206 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
the thought of the individual in a nation pro-
foundly different from what the thinking would
be of a man in a medium as little social as pos-
sible, the thinking of the traditional hermit,
e. g., whose society is the written communica-
tions of past generations. Even then, the pro-
cess is the same as ever, the only difference is
in the greater prominence of the instinctive ele-
ments, and the tendency for the loudly pro-
claimed conclusions of the few to dominate the
belief of the many.
It is in the field of action and feeling that the
group most nearly approaches an individual en-
tity in its organization. If we return to our an-
alogy with the individual, it is the voluntary
processes and the closely interrelated emotional
processes that may be most easily studied by
the objective method. In fact, even in the indi-
vidual, aside from a little more definite knowl-
edge of motives, one knows about as much about
acts and emotions in another as in one's self.
Even the motives are not always more clear to
the actor than to the observer. The action of the
crowd is merely the action of the individuals
that compose it. The individual movement de-
pends upon the reception of a stimulus. This
stimulus arouses the movement most frequently
connected with it, its habitual response, or an
instinctive response. When several responses
THE NATIONAL MIND 207
compete, as when the most frequent response
would produce an effect obviously undesirable,
selection must be made between them. It is here
alone that conscious guidance is of value or is
effective in any degree. Even in the individual
this guidance is exerted first by other stimuli
which are also affecting the man at the mo-
ment, or by consideration of the desirability of
the probable effects of the acts. These effects
are desirable either because they have a direct
instinctive appeal, or have an appeal that is in-
directly instinctive, because they are approved
by the society in which the man lives. To act
in a way to meet social approval is instinctively
agreeable.
The acts of a nation are controlled by the
same laws. The difference is to be found, first,
in the belief that a nation may make right what
would be wrong for an individual. This can
be seen in the mere fact of war. A nation may
kill by the wholesale, although killing is for-
bidden to the individual under other circum-
stances. This is, of course, in part a survival,
in part it seems to be a matter of necessity. In
connection with war a nation will justify what
the individual without casuistry would not. The
atrocities in Belgium were based on the deliber-
ate theory that terrorism was the easiest way
to conquer and to repress revolt. Coupled with
208 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
this there seems to have been a belief that all
tortures inflicted upon women or children, upon
prisoners and defenseless men were done to the
glory of the fatherland and so were to be ex-
cused if not glorified. The looting and rape
were a suitable reward for men who were sacri-
ficing everything for the fatherland. The
peculiar conditions and the general approval of
the country excused the most revolting exhibi-
tion of primitive instincts.
The nation, like the mob, may by the common
approval of what would ordinarily be con-
demned, make possible acts that would not be
possible to the single man. The belief that the
survival of the nation is more important than
the survival of any individual has been used
not infrequently to justify acts for which the in-
dividual could find no warrant. This exalta-
tion of the nation makes a matter of pride
what otherwise would be most reprehensible.
The soldier is esteemed for an act no more es-
sential than that for which the hangman is held
in contempt. In this sense, the will of the na-
tion enforced by slowly developed ideals and
ambitions controls the acts — may at times be
said pictorially to constitute the will of the in-
dividual. In this sense will means no more
than the system of ideals that impel or justify
THE NATIONAL MIND 209
the action. The real execution is by relatively
few members.
The nearest approach in modern times to the
actual movement of the nation as a whole is
seen in the registration for the draft in Great
Britain and America. Both of these countries
had abhorred any interference with the will of
the individual. Only when the crisis came that
could be met in no other way, was compulsory
service resorted to in Great Britain. America
profited by the experience of Great Britain at
once on entering the war. In both countries
the response was direct and immediate, with
practically no necessity for resort to compul-
sion. Individuals as a whole appreciated the
fairness of a selection on the basis of capacity
for service, and obeyed the first summons with
pride. Here again national ideals may be said
to have provided the motives and impelling
force, while the .acts were performed by numer-
ous individuals. After all, the motives are the
essential elements in the initiation of any ac-
tion. They constitute what is essentially the
will of the individual. When they are shared
by a nation as a whole and result in action by a
large proportion of the members, it might be
said that they constitute action of the whole
as truly as some central idea, which excites the
210 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
motion of certain muscles of the body, consti-
tutes the will of the single man.
In moments of excitement the individual in
the nation is like the individual in the crowd
in so far as he is more likely to accept the ideals
and aims as his own than he would be were he
alone. But it is inconceivable that he ever
should be alone, and all that we have as an out-
come of the discussion of the will of the nation
is that the will is a result of the action of com-
mon ideals upon the separate individuals who
compose the nation, that, while the individual
accepts these ideals because they appeal to his
judgment, they appeal to his judgment because
he is part of the nation, and both judgment and
action are an expression of the social instincts
and of the fact that the man has been reared
and been trained in a nation.
In the acts of the nation in ordinary times
when the individuals are not in sight of each
other, even this exaggeration of normal laws is
not present. The opinion of the nation is en-
forced through the papers, but these present
urgings to opposed actions as often as proclaim
the unanimous decision of the whole. It is only
in the popular assemblies that there is any op-
portunity for the action of the forces peculiar
to the mob, and in well ordered democracies,
these assemblies are seldom controlled by the
THE NATIONAL MIND 211
acts of their fellows. They constantly remem-
ber the fact that they are responsible for re-
election to their distant constituencies, and they
try rather to formulate in their speeches what
they believe to be the opinions of those distant
and scattered individuals than to act on the
spur of the moment under the influence of their
fellows exerted either in speeches or in the
quiet conversation of the committee room or
lobby. Even the French Assembly in the Revo-
lutionary period was affected only by the phys-
ical presence of the mob, rarely by the eloquence
of its own members. The acts of the nation
show no greater evidence of a common mind or
common will than do the acts of the individual.
The acts all start with some individual, are
taken up and executed by other individuals.
There is no more a common will in the specific
sense than there is a common arm or a common
trunk.
In the metaphorical sense most of the acts of
individuals whether in the crowd or separately
are determined by social influences. The ideals
that determine the individual are the ideals of
the nation or the community. This means on
strict analysis that they are ideals that have
been stated by some one man, accepted by
many others, and now pass practically unques-
tioned. They are enforced by the approval of
212 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
acts that conform to them by the majority of
individuals. Failure to live up to them and,
more definitely, action in opposition to them is
punished by disapproval. Approval and disap-
proval again are often expressed in very indefi-
nite ways. It may be no more than the shrug
of the shoulders as a friend tells what he has
done. In the crowd the offender may be hooted
at or cheered. In most cases the individual is
influenced more by what he thinks other indi-
viduals are thinking or might be thinking than
by what is said or done. This control is the
more effective in that it works in advance of
action. All that the nation does is to express
more clearly the ideals that are latent in all.
Again only in moments of excitement will the
whole completely dominate the units and then
only through the force of the social instincts
acting in greater strength because of the visi-
ble presence of the members of the group.
The emotions of the crowd, too, are the emo-
tions of the individuals. True again that the
emotions of a man are easily aroused when he
becomes part of a gathering. When the au-
dience is fully under control a speaker can
arouse laughter by a story or remark that would
seem in none too good taste when spoken by an
individual of the group. The enthusiasm of a
crowd in a good cause and the anger or venge-
THE NATIONAL MIND 213
ful spirit of the crowd in a bad cause are like-
wise aroused more easily than are similar emo-
tions in a small group or tete-a-tete. If we ac-
cept the modern notion that emotion is funda-
mentally only a slight movement, and a move-
ment instinctively determined, it would follow
that emotion, too, is always an individual pro-
cess, but an individual process that would be
particularly susceptible to exaggeration by the
presence of the crowd. This we find in prac-
tice. As applied to the nation, the emotions are
obvious expressions of the instinctive responses
to the common appeals of ideals, and of all the
endeavors of the group. One thrills at the story
of the attainments of one's fellow-countrymen,
as one does not for similar deeds of foreigners ;
one feels the glow of exhilaration as one is
called to increased endeavor for the nation,
whether in the armed conflict, in better citizen-
ship, or in self-denial for the benefit of the com-
mon cause. While the glow is due to the changes
in the body of each individual, the cause of the
response is to be found in the community of
ideals and in the inherited nervous connections
of each individual. The emotions in the nation
are an expression of the social instincts, a direct
indication of the tendencies to act induced by
the sight and thought of the group. They are
not new phenomena of the social life, but mere-
214 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
ly the way in which the individual becomes di-
rectly conscious of the fact that he is a social
being — is descended from a race that has acted
with his fellows and is now likely to respond in
certain ways in common with them.
In one other sense does the nation become an
emotional unit. It becomes the center of ref-
erence for many common emotions. The mod-
ern psychologist, since James wrote in 1884,
has emphasized the fact that emotions are in-
stincts regarded from within, that as the ob-
server sees a man respond in certain ways
under the influence of inherited tendencies, the
man himself feels these responses and many
others too slight to be noticed by the observer
as masses of slight movements. If we group
these instincts as those which come with fur-
therance of activity and those which arise from
the thwarting of activity, the one pleasant, and
the other painful, we find that in the individual
the helpful or hindering character comes to be
associated not with the benefit to the physical
being, but with the expansion or contraction of
one's notion of one's self, a pure ideal. One
is hurt when one does not obtain the expected
end, one is pleased when one develops more than
this anticipated amount. It is one's notion of
one's self as a whole which is furthered or
checked. Most emotions are aroused in the
THE NATIONAL MIND 215
modern individual by factors which affect this
imaginary entity.
With the development of the nation it comes
to constitute a similar center of emotional ref-
erence. The individuals who compose a na-
tion suffer real pain when it is in any way in-
jured, when an outsider even speaks disparag-
ingly of it, and are correspondingly elated
when it thrives, when it grows in any way. A
true Britisher feels a thrill of pride when he
hears that the sun never sets upon British soil,
that the sun is followed in its course by the
roll of the morning drum of British garrisons.
The American, however humble, is never left
unmoved by the statistics of billions of imports
and exports, particularly when the balance is in
favor of America. Neither may be in any de-
gree better off for the fact, neither thinks of the
expense that may rest upon him for the attain-
ment of these glories. He thrills as he does at
his own success. As the ideal source or occa-
sion of emotion, the nation is as real an entity
as a person.
It is one form of this emotional reaction to-
wards the nation, what we call the national
honor, that is at the bottom of many of the in-
ternational difficulties, as Perla1 has recently
emphasized. The American is not concerned
1 Perla: "What is National Honor?" 1918.
216 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
about a fisheries dispute or any trade dispute
bocause the outcome may affect him. He feels
an emotion merely because his nation may suf-
fer in its prestige if the decision goes against
him. The extension of national territory in a
modern state is seldom of any value to the sepa-
rate individuals who constitute that state. They
never can take any part of it for their own with-
out the same compensation to the owners that
they would have had to pay if it remained under
the original flag, but they feel a pride if it is
expanded, just as they feel aggrieved if the
territory is in any way diminished. It is the
same pride that the excessively wealthy feel
when they add to their property even if it is al-
ready more than sufficient for any possible need.
The additional acquisition may mean only new
cares with no possible increase in comfort, but
they nevertheless feel pride in the acquisition
and would be chagrined were they beaten in the
struggle for it.
It is probably this development of an entity
which serves as a point of reference for the
emotions that is the most characteristic and the
most important phase of the development of
the nation. When you band a hundred million
men together who will be elated whenever a few
square miles are added to the territory of that
nation, or when it gains any prestige in the
THE NATIONAL MIND 217
financial, intellectual, or moral world and will
grow angry when it is slighted or suffers loss
or even insult in any form, you have a force
that must be reckoned with for good or for ill.
The emotions have an enormous effect upon the
actions of the state as a whole and of the indi-
viduals that compose it. You can argue as did
the pacifist before America entered the war
that each individual would be just as well off
if a German army were occupying New York
and competent German civil servants adminis-
tering our national and state affairs. But even
if the loyal American accepts your statements
of the effects as true he will reply ' ' a thousand
times better to be inefficiently administered as
we are or even to be destroyed altogether than
to have the best German or any foreign official
prescribing in detail the private or political af-
fairs of the smallest portion of our territory."
It is the fact that the nation is a center about
which develop such emotions as these which
constitutes it a real force, perhaps the strong-
est force in the modern world.
What really counts in naturalization is hav-
ing the individual accept the new nation as the
center for him of these emotions. When he can
share them he is in truth a member of the new
nation. It is the development of a common
ideal in a mass of individuals that constitutes
218 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
the appearance of a new nation. All of the
other effects of nationality may be regarded
either as springing from this or contributing
to it. The acceptance of the general ideal
carries with it willingness to strive for the
minor ideals that are accepted by other mem-
bers of the nation — the respect for freedom, for
the standard of morality and cleanliness that is
held by the other individuals in the nation. On
the active side it implies willingness to make
sacrifices that the nation may be maintained in
all of its phases and in all of its mental and
physical characteristics.
The existence of this ideal in so strong a form
has also disadvantages when nations come into
conflict. One can no more see one 's nation give
up to another what seems to be an advantage
than give it up for one's self. Many modern
wars and most dangers of war have arisen over
questions that affected the pride or the honor
of nations rather than their interests. It is
not so much the loss of territory for the value
of the territory as it is the loss of national
prestige involved in the abandonment of terri-
tory that galls and arouses the anger of na-
tions. It was the insult to the flag in the blow-
ing up of the Maine rather than sympathy for
the suffering Cubans that started the Spanish-
American war. It was the demand for an abro-
THE NATIONAL MIND 219
gation of sovereignty on the part of Serbia
that the German and Austrian used to start the
world war. It was quite as much the fact that
the Boers refused to accept the demands of
Great Britain and the consequent apparent con-
tempt for her that was as important as any de-
sire for territory or sympathy for the owners
of Transvaal mines in really causing the
Boer war. The instances may be multiplied
until it seems that material damage, no matter
how great, would seldom start a war were it
not for the purely emotional reactions that are
produced by injury to national pride and na-
tional honor. Rationally regarded, a war al-
ways costs more than it is worth. Once started
on a course of aggression, the same pride will
never permit either nation in the controversy
to draw back. Many wars, no doubt, arise from
unsuccessful bluffing. When a threat has once
been made it is almost invariably carried
through for fear of loss of national respect if
it be withdrawn. Millions in men and billions
in money will be lost before this national pride
will be permitted to suffer.
It may be objected that, after all, the national
entity has no existence outside of the minds
that create and accept it, that no physical pain
or material harm would come to any one if this
ideal should be permitted to disappear. This
220 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
must be granted. . At the same time, since it
does exist and men are willing to make sacri-
fices to maintain it, it is a real force. The same
objection might be made to the existence of
the individual personality. That, too, most
modern psychologists regard as largely a con-
cept, an ideal that has no definite relation to
physical existence. A man's notion of himself
is in large part merely the man's idea of what
others think of him. He might be just as well
off without many of the ideal characteristics or
possessions that he ascribes to himself. James
asserted that many Bostonians would be much
happier if they gave up believing that they were
musical experts and stayed away from the
operas that they pretend to enjoy, if, i. e., they
cut off from their idea of themselves the pre-
tence that they were musical. Most of one 's emo-
tions are connected with ideal elements that
have nothing to do with real suffering or real,
i. e., bodily, pain. The self of which we are
proud is as much a mental construction as is the
nation, yet most of our endeavors are devoted
to furthering this notion of ourselves, to in-
creasing a reputation for wealth, for charity,
for accomplishment in some line. When some
slight is cast upon a capability which we believe
that we have, but really do not have, we are as
much disturbed emotionally as if we were
THE NATIONAL MIND 221
robbed of a real possession. Personal honor
and prestige are all of a piece with national
honor. In many respects the nation is as real
as is the self. Both are in large measure ideal
constructions, but when constructed, much of
thought and action and practically all of emo-
tion both in the individual and in society are
controlled by or derived from them.
Altogether, then, it is clear that the social
mind is merely a metaphor and has no real
existence. Nevertheless the phenomena that it
is used to designate are real. The nation is in a
sense a mental aggregate, and ability to develop
and be controlled by common ideals and to carry
out acts in common is the prime criterion of the
existence of a nation. In many ways the prod-
ucts of the individuals who compose the nation
may be regarded as the products of the nation.
The nation certainly provides a medium in
which the ideal of the individual may develop
to the fullest extent, the nation spurs him to
accomplishments that he would not otherwise
be capable of, and restrains divergent tenden-
cies that he would be liable to in another envir-
onment. The thought is, however, always the
thought of an individual, the acts are the acts
of individuals, the emotions are reverberations
in the bodies of individuals. Even the nation
that is regarded as providing the ideals is a
222 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
mass of individuals, and the ideals have no
existence except as they are expressed by indi-
viduals, or as they are pictured by individuals
as present in the mind's eye of other individ-
uals. Even the social instincts that give force
to the ideals, and make possible social disci-
pline, and the common thought and action in
the nation are embodied in the nervous systems
of individuals. They are individual possessions
and exist only in the individuals. What makes
the group behave as a nation is the qualities of
the individuals that compose it, not a single
superindividual entity.
True, nationality is an affair of the spirit,
not of the body; it is an ideal rather than a
material inheritance of certain races of men;
it is a spirit incarnated in individuals. Again,
it grows with experience, gains force with suc-
cess, is dispirited or weakened by failure, even
though it may be strong in adversity, but the
experiences are the experiences of individuals,
known and appreciated by individuals, and ef-
fective only in so far as these individuals make
them appeal to others.
While, then, the nation is not a single indi-
vidual or a mind in the literal sense of the word,
there is one sense in which the nation does
assume many of the aspects of a person. This
is as an ideal center of reference for emotions.
THE NATIONAL MIND 223
The nation, as a concept, is a reality. About
it the emotions of the members cluster. Increas-
ing or improving it in any way gives them
emotions of joy, impairing its existence or ef-
ficiency in any way gives sorrow or anger very
much as does the waxing or waning of the indi-
vidual's own ideal self. In fact, as ideals for
emotional reference, the self and the nation are
very much on a par. Both are largely social
products, are developed through experience in
harmony with social standards, and while
neither can be said to have material existence,
they are both more effective in controlling the
action of the individuals than any material
forces. In this and in this alone does the nation
resemble a mind. It is or has a self in much
the same sense that the man is or has a self.
CHAPTEE VIII
THE NATION AS IDEAL
WE have come to the conclusion whenever we
have examined any theory of the nation that it
is a number of individuals held together first
by the common social instincts of mankind ; gre-
gariousness, sympathy, and fear of the group
on the one hand, and by the acceptance of a
common group of ideals on the other. Of these
the instincts would explain why there is a
grouping at all, but they would not explain why
a man accepted one group rather than another.
It is the existence of the common group of
ideals that determines the differences between
groups. That a crowd should gather and follow
a leader to the end he suggests may be due to
the instinct of gregariousness for the gather-
ing; to fear, by the individual of the mass as a
whole for the acceptance of the leader's sugges-
tions, and for the tendencies to follow the
crowd. But such a temporary gathering leaves
no after grouping, no tendency to gather again,
no sense of belonging to a common body. There
may be a beginning in a desire to recall the com-
224
THE NATION AS IDEAL 225
mon experiences, but one single common action
would give relatively little even of that. There
is no persisting unity.
What is characteristic of the nation is the
existence of common ideals in all of its mem-
bers. The group must have been united for
some time if the ideals are to have a chance to
develop or even to be accepted by the great
mass. Ideals develop gradually. For a nation
they require either a long period of life in work-
ing together, or a short period of intense
endeavor and strong emotion, if they are to
reach any intensity sufficient to produce marked
effect. The possession of ideals and willing-
ness to act to maintain them are what constitute
the common consciousness or spirit of the na-
tion that we find referred to so frequently by
the different writers and which is so little or
so loosely defined.
In the last chapter we saw that the sense in
which a nation could be assigned a corporate
existence, or something incorporeal that corre-
sponded in some degree to a mind, or to a self,
was the existence in the different individuals
of a common ideal. The most striking effect
of an ideal is that it serves to give to an
individual an end or aim that he could not
acquire by virtue of his own knowledge, by his
own devices. In this sense most of the directing
forces in society are the results of ideals. I
have called their effect social pressure in other
volumes. They constitute the ideal of attain-
ment for the members of the group in every
possible respect. In the ordinary study of a
school boy, we find that he tries to excel because
he respects the ideals set by his teachers and
by his family for standing well in the subjects
of instruction. In a school in which the ideal
develops of slighting work and obtaining honors
in athletics or in social activities only, all at-
tempts to keep students up to the mark in
studies will fail. In a wider sphere the youth
chooses his calling because of the esteem in
which the different callings are held in the com-
munity in which he lives, or in his immediate
family. Much of the incentive to work comes,
from the desire to reach distinction in the
chosen profession, and the subjects in which he
shall work are selected because they are pre-
scribed for the profession or are assumed to
be necessary to the members of that profession.
The ideals of attainment in every field of
social life show the same laws and tendencies.
We have pointed out that what shall constitute
wealth depends upon the ideals of the commu-
nity. It may be the ability to live on nothing
of the anchorite, it may be the mere possession
of a billion dollars, reputed to be the ideal of
THE NATION AS IDEAL 227
one ultra-wealthy American, it may be the ac-
quisition of the largest number of rare books
or rare stamps, or paintings, or it may be the
shell money of the South Sea Islander. It is
wealth, primarily because it has been fixed upon
as desirable by the men who constitute the par-
ticular society, and secondarily because it has
value in exchange, because others are willing to
give other desirable and necessary things for
it. Both depend upon the existence of common
ideals.
In the ethical and legal relations very much
the same rule holds. What shall be proper for
a society is fundamentally a matter of the ex-
istence of ideals, in spite of the apparent fixity
of most of these prescriptions. Many of the
things fixed seem important for survival or for
happiness, but many others are absolutely in-
different to both and may even be uncomfort-
able if not positively harmful or painful. It is
quite as improper and meets quite as much
social disapproval for a woman to smoke a
cigarette as to lie ; in fact, unless the lie is par-
ticularly flagrant or on a matter of great im-
portance, most women in an American small
town or outside of the wealthiest or more
debauched classes would much rather lie than
smoke, although the difference from any ra-
tional consideration between the smoking of
228 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
man and woman cannot be discovered. Simi-
larly, many a man of the educated class would
much prefer to be detected in a minor dis-
honesty than in saying "ain't," which has no
essential value other than as a sign of belonging
to a social class. Many of the compulsions that
are grouped as moral in opposition to mere
social conventions are enforced in the same
way. In fact, the difference between a social
convention and morals is a finely graded one.
Many of my readers would agree that smoking
a cigarette is a matter of morals rather than
of manners. The prescriptions are effective
and the punishment of social disapprobation is*
real. One may even say social disapproval is
the most severe punishment and probably con-
stitutes the really effective element in all pun-
ishment. Any society is held together and most
of the individual acts are in some degree deter-
mined by the force of these ideals.
The ideals that exert an influence within a
nation are in part common to society every-
where, and in part are peculiar. The common
effects represented in the nation are those that
enforce the ordinary standards of decency and
morality (decency and morality being words
that indicate the accepted standards of mankind
as a whole). Some of these are common to the
same class in all nations although they may not
THE NATION AS IDEAL 229
be binding upon the nation as a whole. Such,
for example, would be dressing for dinner, the
avoidance of inelegancies in language, certain
standards of personal hygiene. Others, such
as the ten commandments or the modern sub-
stitutes for them, would be fairly generally ac-
cepted and they are regarded as applicable to
all classes. The punishments are the same
forms of disapproval.
One might enumerate the peculiarities of the
ideals of different nations. Some of these are
important, as, e. g., the attitude towards liberty.
It has been pointed out in an earlier chapter
that there are minor variations even between
the most similar modern democratic nations.
Liberty is essentially freedom from govern-
mental interference with the personal conduct
to the Briton ; to the American, it is more nearly
freedom to express himself on political ques-
tions and a willingness to submit to almost any
detailed control, provided he may impose it
on himself through the polls ; to the Frenchman
freedom has more of an element of equality
with others in a personal way and less of the
political equality. One could undoubtedly find
other shades of difference in each modern na-
tion, even where all alike were enjoying politi-
cal freedom, and were equally impressed with
the ideal of freedom.
230 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
The definite political ideals also vary in some
degree. This can be most readily shown by the
difference in the organic law, or at least in the
fundamental phases of that law which corre-
sponds to the constitution. On the whole, it is
probably safe to say that in part the different
systems of law and government accomplish the
same ends by different means ; in part they ac-
complish different ends by the same means.
Here again some of the ends are set by the
fundamental human instincts common to all
men, others depend upon ideals that have grad-
ually spread from the countries or peoples who
first developed them to others because they have
an instinctive appeal even if they are not them-
selves instinctive in character. The different
methods used in the attainment of the same
ends, as differences in the procedure of the
courts, are to be explained historically in large
measure. Most go back to the acceptance of
the Roman or the English Law. The changes
are to be regarded as due to the attempt to
adjust the accepted system to changing condi-
tions in modern developments in industry and
the accessories of life. They express what we
call the genius of the people, which in its turn
is largely dependent upon the ideals that have
developed because of their peculiar character-
istics and the environment in which they lived
THE NATION AS IDEAL 231
and of the experiences to which they have been
subjected.
To attempt to describe these ideals for the
different nations would require a treatise on
comparative constitutional law as the out-
growth of the history and native endowment of
the peoples, a subject that would take volumes.
Granted the existence of these varying ideals,
it is more within our province to consider their
effects. These we can divide into two groups ;
one which corresponds to, if it is not in part
identical with, the will of the individual, the
other which is more closely analogous to what
we call the self of the individual, the ideal of
the state as a corporate entity, which embodies
the hopes of the people, and is the source and
object of their common emotions. The two in
a measure coincide, for unless one had some
notion of the nation as a corporate entity, as
something which was to be respected and even
loved, the compelling and controlling effect
would be inappreciable.
In so far as the ideals determine the will of
the members of the nation, they act because of
the instinctive respect felt for the desires and
accepted aims of the larger group. The state
is the personification of public opinion with
reference to the affairs of the nation. What
these aims are cannot always be stated, but
232 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
there is always an appeal to them to decide all
questions of state, and one can nearly always
decide when they are infringed upon. Those
ideals of the nation are best typified by the
British constitution, which is definite enough
to serve as a guide for government in all of its
essential general lines although it has never
been formulated in words. The opposing mem-
bers at least always know when it has been
violated even if there is no agreement as to
what it is. It controls the action of statesmen
in no small degree, it is the incentive to many
of the actions of the ordinary voter, it is the
conscience and might be regarded as the will
of the British nation in the same sense that
the ideals and accepted aims of the individual
constitute his will. It is the director and still
more the gauge of all actions.
These ideals may change with time and under
the influence of special stress. We have seen
evidence of these changes over long periods in
the history of the development of nationalities.
"We can see the same sort of change working
over short periods under the influence of special
strains in the change or temporary abrogation
of the British constitution when the power of
the House of Lords to prevent legislation was
given up recently, or in the numerous changes
that were made by common consent during the
THE NATION AS IDEAL 233
war. In the American constitution, the same
changes are wrought more slowly by the adop-
tion of amendments and, a still better instance,
by the immediate effect of the social ideals or the
social conscience, express themselves directly in
the changes in judicial decisions. The consti-
tution, like every written document, is suscep-
tible of many interpretations, and the change
in interpretation has amounted in many cases
to a rewriting of the instrument. It is a ques-
tion whether the writers of the constitution
would have recognized it when it had been in-
terpreted by Marshall, and certainly Marshall
would not recognize it as it stands in the present
interpretations made necessary to conform to
the changed social conditions and the more
humane attitude that man takes towards the
less fortunate members of society. Still more
striking are the effects of decisions made dur-
ing the war when the lower courts and, on some
points, the highest have held to be constitutional
acts that are, to the lay mind, against the spirit
of all earlier interpretations made on similar
questions. With the greater development of
the corporate consciousness then comes the ac-
ceptance of the common ideals and aims as law
for all of the separate members — the courts
recognize as constitutional many acts of the
central government that would have been denied
234 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
a quarter of a century ago. Some of these
changes are made consciously, as when the court
decides that it may take cognizance of social
changes and the advances made in scientific
knowledge; others are the imperceptible effect
of the experiences that come to the judge as a
man and a citizen, which change him with the
rest of the nation. He is bound to think and
act in the light of his knowledge, and to accept
the ideals that have developed in the com-
munity.
In this way the ideals of a nation enforce
action in political and social matters. They
compel each individual to act up to or at least
towards the ideal of conduct in the selection of
candidates for office, in enforcing upon the leg-
islators the measures that shall represent the
standards of the community and make possible
the realization of them. In emergencies they
impel citizens to go forth to fight that the nation
and its ideals may be maintained. They compel
the officers of the state to attain a certain stand-
ard in the performance of their duties and, as
we have seen in the case* of the courts, may
determine the standards and in part at least
take the place of specific laws in determining
what their duties shall be and that they shall
be performed.
Connected with this, the ideal of nationality
THE NATION AS IDEAL 235
becomes associated with many incidental stand-
ards which are not at all essential to the main-
tenance of the state and have only the vaguest
relation to the political ideals. We have seen
the effect of these on the naturalization of the
immigrant in America. There are standards of
dress, of wages, of food and hygiene, even of
entertainment, which come to be accepted here
as American, although there is nothing that
would prevent them from being regarded as a
symbol of occidental civilization in general.
These vary in many respects from nation to
nation and become associated like a flag or
national anthem with the nation itself. They
may be regarded as an expression of the na-
tional solidarity, even if the nation would not
be significantly changed without them.
As closely connected with this directing effect
of the national ideals which may be regarded
as their dynamic phase, we must also reckon
with the existence of a static aspect, the exis-
tence of the nation as an imagined corporeal
or personified existence. It is this aspect that
has been likened in the last chapter to the indi-
vidual self as ideal. It is a notion or concept
of the nation as something existing as a unified
thing which is apart from the individuals but
nevertheless in which they may be regarded as
participating and whose glories they may share.
236 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
This entity is what gives especial solidarity to
the nation. To the member of the nation it has
a real existence and the development of its pres-
tige is a real end towards the accomplishment
of which he is willing to exert effort. Its ex-
istence depends in part upon the history of the
nation and the accomplishments of the glorious
past. A nation like Great Britain with a con-
tinuous history of successful endeavor has a
fuller sense of real existence than a newly de-
veloped group like the Ukraine, although it
must be granted that, when a nation develops
quickly through great peril and much conflict,
the ideal of a national entity acquires great
strength in a comparatively short time. An
element in the development of the spiritual
unity and of national pride is undoubtedly the
sense of past successes.
The existence of a common literature and
hence of a common language is also of great
importance. We have seen that this was all
that held the Italian nationality together for
half a dozen centuries, and it undoubtedly was
largely responsible for the community of feel-
ing among the German states before the de-
velopment of the German Empire and in the
reconstruction of that empire. But this is not
altogether essential as is seen from the fact that
Switzerland was one of the first modern nations
THE NATION AS IDEAL 237
to develop a sense of nationality and that it is
among the states that have a very strong na-
tionality, although it has four languages in ac-
cepted use in different parts of the nation. On
the other hand the United States and Great
Britain have a common language and largely a
common literature, although they are definitely
different nationalities. A people's literature
gives a sense of community, partly because it
praises the nation and the deeds of its heroes,
partly because it is itself a source of pride and
furnishes a center about which the emotionally
toned associates may cluster.
Zimmern1 insists that a nation demands for
existence a home land with which the ideals
may be associated. It is not necessary that the
people live in this home land in any great num-
bers, it is not even necessary that people who
inhabit the physical territory shall be free, but
he asserts that each nation must have a country
of its own if it is to be a real nation. There is
no discussion of the point, although it is as-
serted each time that he defines nationality.
He illustrates by the Irishman in New York
who has never seen the old country but never-
theless has an aspiration for nationality be-
cause he can picture to himself the actual
physical contours of the beloved old home. If
1 Zimmern: "Nationality and the State," pp. 52 and 96.
238 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
we examine the statement by the methods of
similarities and differences, it is hard to find
opportunity of reaching a conclusion. Every
nation has a home land with one exception, the
Jew, and possibly the Gypsy. One may be said
to be so thoroughly a part of the nation in which
he lives that there is little chance for the notion
of a separate nationality to develop ; the other
probably has no sense of nationality, although
there may be a consciousness of race. The Jews
would seem to an outsider to have a sense of
nationality that has persisted marvelously,
considering the fact that they have not only no
independent home country but also have been
scattered over the earth for centuries. Zim-
mern might argue that the bond was race or
religion rather than nationality. If this is
granted one must add that race and religion
are hard to separate from nationality where the
three go together and in any case there is much
in common between them in their psychological
laws and characteristics.
Whether Irishmen would retain so full a con-
sciousness of nationality after two thousand
years away from a home country even if that
country continued to have its present degree of
physical distinctness is a question. Certainly
the Irishman in America shows more of a ten-
dency to be lost in the general population than
THE NATION AS IDEAL 239
does the Jew, and if amalgamation continues
at the present rate, an Irishman with a distinct
consciousness of nationality will soon be very
much more rare than a Jew. The Irishman,
too, is much more likely to remain conscious of
the land of his origin if he retain his religion
than if he change. For him, too, it might be
argued that nation and religion are in part,
at least, one.
"While we may doubt whether a native land is
absolutely necessary for the existence of a con-
sciousness of nationality, there is no doubt that
the possession of a common land is an impor-
tant element in the notion of nationality, that
the concept has as part of its content the picture
of the home country, and that part of the long-
ing of the exile is for the ancient seat. It
matters little whether the land be beautiful as
Switzerland or as unpleasant as the deserts of
Arabia, the native acquires a fondness for it
that aids his pride while at home and makes
him long for it when at a distance. This pride
may be aroused by the natural beauties, as in
Switzerland, or by the architecture and other
works of man as in France or Italy. Whatever
it is, it gives a body to his ideal and a point of
attachment for the other more spiritual or
mental elements. Whether the strength of the
national feeling depends upon the size of the
240 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
country may be doubted, but certainly an
American and probably a Russian is influenced
by a knowledge of the vast extent of his land.
What is most important in the ideal is the
sense of the mental achievements, the civiliza-
tion, the education and technical skill, together
with the physical power that goes with it all.
These combine in different proportions with a
notion of political freedom. All fuse in the
general notion or symbol, but the proportions
differ in different individuals and at different
times in the same individual. The ideal reveals
itself in consciousness in the emotional thrills
that come whan one thinks of the achievements,
the feeling of bitter resentment when the nation
is maligned, and the sorrow with which one
hears of any harm or deterioration that may
affect the nation or any part of it. The true
nationalist identifies himself with his nation and
rejoices or mourns with it as he would at simi-
lar changes in his own physical or social status.
This ideal as a social entity is in part essen-
tial to and identical with the ideals that enforce
the dictates of society. If one did not have the
pride in the national entity, one would not feel
impelled to strive to meet the approval of the
nation in many political and related ways. One
would not accept the standards of the nation
and rise to them. The emotional reaction de-
THE NATION AS IDEAL 241
pends directly upon the ideals; the success of
the nation or its failure arouses the emotion of
the individual, just as does his own success or
failure. The same influences that give rise to
the emotion also serve to impel to action. The
voluntary action of the individual is determined
by very many of the same forces as these which
control the action of the nation. What appears
as the symbol of the nation and is reverenced
as a real thing is also in part identical with the
factor or force which drives the members of
the nation to obey the mandates of common
opinion. It is also a very large element in the
individual will.
It must be said that the nation is only one of
the many partial systems of ideals and ideal-
ized organizations into which each individual
enters. Each group that forms within the na-
tion has approximately the same general char-
acteristics as the nation as a whole. The church
or churches, political parties, in lesser degree,
the occupations and professions, and even the
orders of society come to constitute similar
entities with a distinct group of ideals that are
enforced upon their members and an ideal rep-
resentation that constitutes the end of en-
deavor. A good party man is only less con-
cerned that his party shall win than that his
nation shall not be defeated. Some of the
242 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
members of the socialist party are less con-
cerned about their nation than about the party
or the principles for which the party stands.
In fact, for one branch the nation ceases to be
of any value and should be dissolved to enter
into an international organization of those that
produce, to destroy the power of the capitalists.
Socialism is distinctly anti-national, although
in the late war the international allegiance was
not strong enough to conquer the national and
prevent war. In many cases a man's union or
his class may assume a similar ideal existense
as a definite unit. Still smaller units about
which one 's emotions cluster and which take on
the character of real entities are found in one 's
factory or business where the employees are
really interested, or in a school, or, in fact, in
any organization with which one comes into
close contact. Some, as the relation between the
classes, are more marked by hatred of the other
than by pride or liking of one's own. This
holds definitely of the attitude of the lower to-
wards the higher, although in the upper, par-
ticularly in the older countries where the caste
system is more in evidence, there is pride in
the group as such that holds its members to
certain conventional acts, that enforces definite
standards of action in essentials as well as in
THE NATION AS IDEAL 243
incidentals. To be worthy of the name ' ' gentle-
man" is a conscious ideal.
Some of these different group conscious-
nesses overlap, some as we have seen are antag-
onistic. The religiously inclined nationalist
regards any disparagement of the nation as
irreligious, as opposed to the laws of God as
well as of man, while he may also regard as-
sumption of the national attitude towards
religion as a patriotic duty. This holds par-
ticularly where there is a state religion, as in
England, or where the church is closely con-
nected with a national protest as in Ireland.
In Italy and in France, to a slighter degree, we
find nationalism in some classes connected with
opposition to the church, so that religious be-
lief becomes in some degree unpatriotic.
Others are largely indifferent to the national
ideals, and may be strong or weak with no
reference to its strength. We find that any
individual in the nation is always a member
of numerous groups, is always possessed of a
number of group consciousnesses. Some of
these will exert a control at one time, others at
another. Most of them tend to become organized
so that there shall be little or no conflict be-
tween them. When a man is in one environ-
ment he will be dominated by one consciousness,
in another he will be under the influence of
244 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
another. Many of these may fuse into a single
consciousness, or into a single one with many
phases. In every case one may have a number
of different loyalties more or less equally well
developed. Man's social consciousness is not
single but is a complex of many with control
by a number of different groups of ideals, and
pride in a number of different organizations.
One may well ask whether the existence of
these minor allegiances will affect the nature
of the national allegiance. On the whole the
answer is no. They tend to strengthen it. Be-
longing to a nation is not a matter that can be
daily contemplated and regularly emphasized.
It is possible on the other hand to become im-
mediately aware of the smaller group in the
school and of such larger groups as the politi-
cal parties. These with their frequent meet-
ings serve as centers of real interests and so
increase the warmth of the sense of community.
All of these lesser groups with their allegiances
naturally keep alive the loyalty to the larger
whole. The meetings of the party all involve
references to the solidarity and welfare of the
nation even if it is only to accuse the other
party of threatening that welfare or solidarity.
The school, the church, the lodge, and all other
local meetings recognize the existence of the
larger, while they give specific emphasis to
THE NATION AS IDEAL 245
loyalty to the lesser whole ; all aid rather than
hinder the development of a national loyalty,
even when there is nothing of patriotism in
their specific teachings.
We may, as we look back over the various
considerations so far mentioned, see that na-
tionality is dependent in varying degree upon
race, upon a common language, a common his-
tory with the inspiration of the great deeds of
common ancestors, and upon a home country.
Each of these is important, but its importance
lies primarily in its effect upon the conscious-
ness of the individuals who make the nation,
rather than in its immediate effect. Belonging
to a Common race is of value not because it
gives an instinctive pleasant reaction, or be-
cause, let us say, that the odor of another race
gives an instinctively unpleasant reaction, but
because it is a source of pride to the members
of the nation to believe that they are all de-
scendants of the same progenitors. It may not
correspond to the facts; a belief in belonging
to the race in question is all that is necessary.
This is well illustrated by the story, perhaps
apocryphal, of the negro soldier who spoke of
the effect upon the Germans of "us Angry-
saxums." Each of the nations of Europe, no
matter how mongrel, glories in its assumed
race, even if a very small proportion of the
246 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
population really belongs to that race. The
larger stock to which the nation is assigned
varies according to the prestige of the race in
question. The Englishman a quarter of a cen-
tury ago gloried in being Teuton, but now makes
little mention of that mixture in the population.
The race as we use it is largely an artifact
developed to give an explanation from heredi-
ty of the national consciousness. A common
language is of importance as a medium for the
communication of ideas and so to provide for
the spread of ideals. A common history is of
value in the enthusiasm it may excite for an-
cient deeds and attainments. The "native
land" has the same function. It provides a
physical center about which fond associations
may cluster. Each of these factors is impor-
tant in so far as the nation believes in them.
The nation is what it believes itself to be. The
nation is founded in ideals, and these are effec-
tive in so far as they inspire loyalty. Loyalty
in its turn is pride in what the members of the
nation believe that nation to be and a willing-
ness to strive for the ends which have been ac-
cepted by the group as a whole.
If, in conclusion, we attempt to define the
consciousness of nationality we may assert that
it is an awareness of belonging to a group, with
pride in the ideal notion of that group as a
THE NATION AS IDEAL 247
separate entity, a willingness to be controlled
by the ideals of that group and to serve its
ends. The nation exists only in the minds of
the separate members, but when it does exist
it unites them for action in a way that makes
the nation a force without an equal in the ac-
complishment of common tasks. The members
of the group may change but the ideals persist
in the members who continue and in those who
replace those who fall out. The nation is im-
mortal if its ideals are suited to survive, in
spite of the fact that the men who created the
ideals and those in whom they have been prop-
agated have died and are constantly dying.
The nation is an entity that changes and grows
and still persists. It is a force in the world in
spite of the fact that it is always an ideal in
the minds of changing groups of men, and an
ideal which controls the acts of an ever shifting
multitude. Considerations like this tempt one
to adopt the notion of the Hegelians that the
nation is a super-personality of divine origin
and guided by superhuman knowledge. There
is no objection to this if one is content to take
it as metaphor merely, and if one is permitted
to question whether the force that shapes the
destiny of all nations but one's own is satanic
or divine. It must also be remembered that
248 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
the nation always exists merely in the individ-
uals who compose it, even when they regard it
as an independent entity, and furthermore, that
it exists for the individuals, not the individuals
for it.
NATIONALITY AND THE STATE
WE have been discussing the nation as if it
were an entirely informal organization of a
group of people whose action was always de-
termined by the instincts and ideals of the dif-
ferent groups. We have entirely neglected to
consider the organization of the state, or its
relation to the spirit of nationality. The details
of the organization fall well without our prov-
ince, but it will not be out of our field to con-
sider a few of the general bearings of one upon
the other. One might assume with the philo-
sophical anarchists that a government was un-
necessary, that the human instincts were in
themselves all good and that, were all restraints
removed, man would act for the best and all
individuals would be happy. An assumption
of this type presupposes that instincts are per-
fectly adapted to the environment and that they
alone would suffice to meet situations in the
best possible way. This assumption is true
neither for the higher animals nor for the sim-
249
250 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
pier instincts in man. Instincts as developed
care only for the more general situations and
for those only in the crudest, most general way.
They suffice to keep the individual alive during
the period of learning and to determine the
more general form of response to the new situ-
ations. All else must be learned and then es-
tablished as habits. Even the pecking of a
chick, fundamental as that process seems, is
partly learned and only partly instinctive. At
first the chick pecks awkwardly and at any
small object; it is only with practice that it
learns to discriminate edible from inedible sub-
stances and to make accurate movements.
In the more complicated responses of social
intercourse the instincts are still less adequate
to serve as a complete guide. This is seen very
clearly in the historical cases in which govern-
ment has disappeared and only instincts were
left to trust to for the control of the group or
society. Even the Russian mob which, if one
may believe Lincoln Steffens, started the revo-
lution with a passive doctrine of non-resistance
that promised ideal relations based on brotherly
love alone, quickly gave way to bloodthirsty
acts and exhibited the lowest instincts in the
most unrestrained way. Whether this is to be
attributed to falling under the sway of leaders
in whom hate of the wealthy dominated, and
NATIONALITY AND THE STATE 251
who came to feel the necessity for executing
all possible successors that their own rule might
be continued and their lives saved, or whether
it is the natural outcome of control by instincts
when all rule of ideal and convention is relaxed,
is not altogether clear. Certain it is that in
the two conspicuous instances in modern times
in which an attempt has been made to return
to a natural existence with guidance by instincts
alone, the Russian Revolution and the French
Revolution, not to mention the lesser experi-
ment of the French Commune in 1872, the re-
sults have been a dominance of the worst rather
than the best in man. The excuse that in all
of these cases the condition has developed
through reaction against tyranny, when the
hates of the old order would naturally encour-
age excesses, does not seem entirely adequate.
Even in the communities which have been
drawn together by desire of gain, the unor-
ganized mining and oil camps of the American
frontier or of Australia and Alaska, freedom
from restraint nearly always gives free sway
to the worst instincts.
If one attempt to delimit the role of instinct
and ideal or law in the control of man's action
in society, it would seem that the two are re-
lated very much as are instinct and habit in
the control of the acts of the individual man
252 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
or animal. The fundamentals are prescribed
by instincts, the refinements must be added by
learning. Instincts may be pictured as a rough
hewing of the acts to make sure that they will
be performed somehow, but as leaving much
room for improvement by knowledge. In the
social arrangements, man is provided with a
set of vigorous reactions which are to be ap-
plied when he is the subject of oppression, when
a fight is necessary; with another set of re-
sponses that are called into action when faced
by overpowering force ; with another, still, that
is to be applied when one of his own species or
of any species which may even by personifica-
tion be brought into the same class with him-
self is suffering; but which of these responses
shall be evoked in any particular connection
is not absolutely determined. One may classify
the situations or stimuli in terms of experience,
and in the contemplative human type of action,
response waits upon this classification. It
therefore becomes the deciding factor in de-
termining what reaction shall be made. The
selection from among the possible responses to
a given situation is determined by this classi-
fication. One can see the operation of this
selection best in the action of the human emo-
tions. In a given situation one may frequently
either become angry, be frightened, or amused
NATIONALITY AND THE STATE 253
according to the interpretation that one puts
upon the various circumstances. A remark, for
example, will be a pleasantry or an insult ac-
cording to the tone in which it is uttered or the
previous relations to the man who makes the
remark. It depends upon a rather delicate
estimate of personal strength and the strength
of an opponent, whether one becomes angry or
afraid, and whether in consequence one attacks
or runs, when, let us say, one is forced to deal
with a drunken bully, an infuriated horse, or
bull.
Where the estimates must be made by a
crowd in a moment of excitement or when much
is at stake, all may turn upon some chance cir-
cumstance. A mob will vary in its action from
the extremes of sympathy and helpfulness to
the most fiendish brutality with little change
in the circumstances. Whether a prisoner is to
be classed by a revolutionary mob as a pleas-
ant, inoffensive old man or one of the hated
oppressors will depend upon such a slight
factor as a remark of one of the crowd who
remembers a kind deed, or upon the remem-
brance by another of some time when he has
applied for work in desperation to another
member of the employing class and been re-
fused, perhaps by a man who resembles this
one in dress or stature. The old emotion is re-
254 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
aroused and the victim perishes through his
denunciation or by his overt act. In the actual
contact with problems, instinctive reactions are
determined by such slight factors and the char-
acter of the reaction is so vital that alone they
are a very unsatisfactory guide. The psycho-
logical justification of government, if one is
needed, is to be found in the method that it
affords of standardizing these responses and
freeing them so far as is possible from control
by chance and arbitrary elements.
In essentials, ideals have been seen to furnish
rules of conduct based upon a determination
of what is most satisfactory in the light, not of
crude instinct, but of instinct guided and con-
trolled by experience which has been summed
up in what we call intelligence or reason. As
opposed to instincts, this means action on ra-
tional grounds. In common sense terms the
opposition is between doing what one pleases
and doing what is right. This opposition is
not absolute, because where right is taken to
mean harmony with the most enlightened ex-
perience, right is what one would choose did
one take all of the circumstances and all of the
effects of action into consideration, rather than
the few circumstances and few effects that in-
fluence instinct. Informally these results of
experience are embodied in conventions, stand-
NATIONALITY AND THE STATE 255
ard forms of response or acts that are tacitly
accepted as norms of conduct by all of the mem-
bers of society. Their growth has been shown
to be through trial and error, the acceptance
of acts which have proved useful and the rejec-
tion and reprobation of acts that were found
on trial to produce disagreeable consequences.
Formal government is to be looked upon as
the embodiment of these successful conventions
and rules of conduct. At first one can make
sure that the rules shall be enforced by giving
them a divine origin. It was ordained by the
gods that reparation should be made for life
taken wilfully; later they prescribed that there
should be no killing, etc., as in the command-
ments given to Moses on stone tablets. All
through the earlier stages the enforcement of
the conventional rules even when they were
given a divine origin was in the hands of the
individual and was always subject to the whim
of the stronger, and open to contest by the man
upon whom it was inflicted. Gradually the con-
ventional law, which has been accepted inform-
ally, is expressed in definite statutes and some
one is given or assumes the authority of seeing
that it shall be enforced. We need not run
through the various stages in the development
of government. As all else in evolution it was
at first crude and the means used were or seem
256 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
to us to-day unnecessarily harsh, for the end to
be accomplished. The chief or king would en-
force the penalties of the law with the purpose
of making sure that he maintained his authority
rather than to prevent the suffering of others.
It was only after much experience and much
knowledge of human nature under many differ-
ent conditions that it was possible to consider
the rights or the comfort of the offender.
If we look at the fundamental question of the
control and the source of authority for govern-
ment in general that has been so important in
all of the. theories of political science, we must
find it in the agreement of its methods and ef-
fects with the ideals of the people who are
governed. Each of the theories of the origin
of authority probably can be supported as an
explanation or partial explanation through rea-
son for the particular form that government
took. The patriarch probably received his first
authority from the fact that he was the oldest
member of the group and stood to the others
in the relation of father to son. It was natural
that his authority should be accepted. His
development into a king was again natural with
the increase in the kin over whom he ruled and
the additions to the tribe by conquest and as-
similation. As the king became inefficient,
natural leaders would tend to take his place
NATIONALITY AND THE STATE 257
with the development of aristocracies, or, if the
selfish interests of the king overcame his ten-
dency to care for the good of the whole, he
would be overthrown. In all forms of govern-
ment one finds that the accepted good of the
governed and harmony with the ideals of the
social mass determine the form of the govern-
ment. If one form gives good results and the
community is pleased, the government is con-
tinued and arguments from religion, from the
greatness and success of the ruler, from the
glory gained for the nation by the acts of the
leader and of the whole nation are used to
justify the continuance of the power. When
the form of government is unsuccessful, there
will be grumbling, but it will nearly always be
continued for a time because of the arguments
that have been accepted to enforce the rule of
the good government. They will be too strong
to yield at once to the evidence of facts. After
a particular ruler has been unsuccessful, or a
particular administration has failed, the form
of government will persist for a time in the
hope that the personnel of the ruler or of the
rulers may change for the better and the good
old time return. Habit is always strong with
the mass. All through the early ages, save for
a period in Greece and Rome emphasis was put
upon the maintenance of the particular form
258 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
of government, upon the right of the king to
rule, rather than upon the real source of power.
When it became evident that the government
must derive its authority from the consent of
the governed as it did first in modern times in
England, France, and America, attempts were
again made to develop a theory that should give
a rational warrant for government. This we
see in Eousseau's famous theory of natural
rights and the social contract in which it is
asserted that man is born with a right to do as
he pleases and that he early consented to part
with some of his rights for the good of himself
and his fellows. Each limited his rights on
condition that others would limit theirs for the
mutual benefit of all, a suggestion in which
he had been partly anticipated by Locke. His-
tory and what knowledge we have of primitive
peoples afford no warrant for the belief that
the process of developing a government had
any of the self and other conscious bargaining
that Eousseau suggests. Probably before man
had a knowledge of the needs for government
and any such concept as right, he was already
part of some community or other, through the
action of his social instincts, and group ideals
had begun to develop. Eousseau's and similar
theories are interesting in so far as they em-
phasize the modern tendency to derive the
NATIONALITY AND THE STATE 259
authority of government from the community
as such, rather than from a divine warrant or
from mere tradition or from respect for elders.
Viewed in the large, governments may be
thought of as means of subordinating immedi-
ate instincts to the control by knowledge and
experience — to guide acts towards others by the
results of earlier results of such acts and to
properly classify them for instinctive reaction.
The forms of government developed from the
conditions of life, modified by trial and error.
One might assume that all forms go back to the
patriarchal, but if so they would be modified
in various ways by the exigencies of different
peoples living under divergent conditions.
When a modification comes that gives satis-
factory results, it persists ; when unpleasant or
undesirable results appear, the government is
either overthrown or modified to give greater
satisfaction. One may think of the develop-
ment of government as a process of trial and
error. The various suggestions grow out of
antecedent forms of control, the family, the
more extended chieftainship, the priest, or what
not. Success or failure is measured by the sur-
vival of the group, in the final analysis, and
before that by the satisfaction or happiness of
the individuals in the state. One must not think
of the origin of government as altogether ra-
260 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
tional and voluntary on the part of the indi-
viduals who are involved in the government,
either as ruler or ruled. Occasionally, par-
ticularly in modern times, a scheme of govern-
ment has been worked out theoretically and
applied in practice, sometimes successfully, at
times unsuccessfully. Locke suggested a form
of government for the colony of Carolina which
seems to have been moderately successful.
More often a suggestion as to a desirable
method of government or change in government
has been obtained from a neighboring state.
Maitland 2 instances the transfer of the jury
system from England to the continent in the
eighteenth century. It was adopted at first in
minute detail, although later was changed to
suit the new conditions. Much less successful
were the attempts to borrow other forms of
government by the leaders of the French Revo-
lution. They modeled their form of govern-
ment upon England and the old Greeks.
Although both had been successful in the land
of their origin, the attempt to transfer resulted
in a disastrous failure. It must be said that
Napoleon's code, made equally out of hand, was
on the whole successful. One can see similar
instances of successful and unsuccessful bor-
rowing of forms and methods of government
2 Maitland: "Collected Papers," vol. 3, pp. 298f.
NATIONALITY AND THE STATE 261
in the different states of America. After all,
tht development of government has its closest
analogue in the trial and error and natural se-
lect'on of the biological evolution, rather than
in tie conscious planning of a rational being.
The suggestions for improvement may be given
by tie other forms of government already de-
veloped, or by the imagination of some man of
vision. However the suggestions arise, they
must always be tried in practice, and gradually
modif ed to meet the demands of a nation, be-
fore they can be assured.
The specific prescriptions and laws as well
as the form of government that enforces them
are constantly being tested by their agreement
with the ideals of the community as well as by
their effects in practice. If a law is promul-
gated that seems to work injustice to a large
proportion of the members of a community,
they, at least, will work for its revocation and
if it proves to have bad results it will either be
repealed or ignored. In a democratic state
where the laws are made by the votes of the
people or by their representatives, the initiation
of the law will be due to a belief on the part of
some considerable portion of the community
that it will improve the existing condition. This
anticipation will be checked by its effects in
practice, and thus the laws become an embodi-
262 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
ment of the ideals of the nation. As opposed
to the control by instinct, this means that each
act will be tested not by the instinctive appeal
of the moment with the uncertainty of iiter-
pretation of the situation that results from that,
but by instincts checked by ideals, and by ex-
perience. Then, too, each individual who reads
the law will pass upon it in part by instinct as
well as by knowledge and reason, so that the
final test is by man's original nature plus ex-
perience instead of by his instinct alone.
After the action has been decided upon in
the light of the prescription of the law, the act
itself will have all of the characteristics of
instincts and will arouse all of the emotions
that attach to instinctive acts. If the law or
convention prescribes charitable care, the
emotion of pity and the joy of helpfulness will
be aroused as completely as if the act were done
without forethought, i. e., on mere impulse. If,
on the contrary, punishment is prescribed, the
act of punishment arouses the emotions con-
nected with vengeance. True, the execution of
the law may and probably should be.come im-
personal and unemotional, but the attitude of
the public that impels to the enforcement will
be accompanied by emotion, and this in part
gives force to the public opinion. One may
think of the law as a process of restraining
NATIONALITY AND THE STATE 263
action until the situation has been properly
classified and the plan of action determined in
the light of the best knowledge of the com-
munity. After the classification has been made,
the action is carried out in accordance with the
instinct in whose class it belongs, and the cor-
responding emotion will be aroused in the
natural way. This statement does not take into
account the fact that the individual may be
aided in executing the act by other members of
the state upon whom the duty has been imposed,
but considers only the individual's part in the
act. One can see in the numerous added tests
and safeguards of the correctness of action that
this process of law throws around it, why action
in accordance with law should be more suited
to its ends than purely instinctive responses
such as are made by the mob when it attempts
to enforce its authority.
In general, the relation of the state to the
nation is that the state embodies and provides
a means for realizing the ideals of the nation.
The rulers will be guided by those ideals in
their acts even when they seem arbitrary, and
in the modern state the laws will be an out-
growth of the ideals and will be tested by the
sentiment of the nation before passage and
their effects will be tested by similar compari-
son with ideals and with public opinion. So
far as the general rule goes all is smooth sail-
ing. Of course, in practice the relation is not
so simple. The interests of all members of the
state or nation are not identical. Where they
come into conflict, methods must be developed
of harmonizing the conflicting interests, or
some means of deciding which of the irrecon-
cilable interests shall be permitted to have its
way. These methods of making decisions on
disputed points have also become convention-
alized and reduced to laws. They are probably
more important in the function of the modern
state than are the means of enforcing generally
accepted ideals where such exist. A large part
of the modern development of states has been
made possible by a willingness to abide by the
opinions of a majority, to accept apparent or
actual loss of personal advantage in the in-
terests of harmony, and even to give over ideals
which seem right in the face of a vote in favor
of other ideals by the greater number of the
community.
Even this process is tempered and modified
by the existence of ideals. Most states have
laws or principles behind laws which prevent
a majority from depriving the minority of
rights. One cannot invade the home of the in-
dividual except under definitely stated condi-
tions, one cannot prescribe religious beliefs or
NATIONALITY AND THE STATE 265
interfere with freedom of speech even if the
religion of the few or the opinions expressed
by them be distasteful to the many. The
state cannot divide the property of the few
among the many even if the many vote for the
division. These exceptions are made because
of a belief, in certain cases based on trial, that
the welfare of the state and so of the individual
in the long run and on the average will be
furthered if the action of the majority be lim-
ited in this respect. The man without property
hopes to acquire it later and desires to be able
to keep it when he gets it, the man with no new
theory of government or religion knows that he
may have one later and desires to be free to
expound it, or he may see and have proved by
test that a state or society advances more
rapidly and is more contented if each man is
left free to think and say or do what he pleases
within limits that do not conflict with the free-
dom of others. This again is a case of adjust-
ing acts to the advantage of the future instead
of the present alone and of considering the
greatest good of the greatest number for all
time rather than the immediate advantage or
apparent immediate advantage even of the
majority.
How far the ideals of the nation and the
formal prescriptions of the state will coincide
266 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
varies with circumstances. In nearly every age
there is some lack of harmony from the fact
that the ideals grow more rapidly than they can
be embodied in laws and also because laws are
continued after the ideals have changed. This
is a condition that, with the modern mecha-
nisms, tends to right itself, although in the
period of lack of harmony the result may be
very irritating. More important in many of
the modern states is the problem that arises
when more than one nationality and more than
one set of national ideals chance to be repre-
sented in the same state. Here again the atti-
tude of the modern state is to treat the differ-
ences in nationality much as one does differ-
ences in religion. The essential ideals will be
common to all. These may be enforced. The
unessential must be permitted to stand freely
and each nation be compelled to respect or at
least refrain from interfering with the others.
Where this course has been followed there has
usually resulted an amalgamation of one by the
other or the fusion of both into a common new
group that offers a permanent solution of all
the problems. Where attempts are made to
force a people to give up its national language
or any of its national peculiarities or ideals,
the result is usually to arouse the emotions of
hate with the result of intensifying national
NATIONALITY AND THE STATE 267
feeling and keeping it more distinct than it
would otherwise be. This can be seen with
Danes, Poles, and Alsatians in Germany, and
with the minor sections in the various regions
of Austria. A state is probably strongest when
it has but one nationality, but unity cannot be
forced upon it. National ideals must be ac-
cepted willingly or not at all.
The relation of the state to the nation took
a practical form in connection with the draw-
ing of boundaries at the peace conference.
There were many places where state lines and
national lines did not agree and where it was
difficult to make them agree unless one disre-
garded all economic considerations and all
problems of ease of administration. If one as-
sume for the moment that we were to be given
authority to adjust these problems and were
also given omniscience for the facts, a solution
in the light of our principles must follow several
different rules. The first is that any division
must be made as nearly as possible on the lines
of nationality. Nationality is not a matter of
inheritance primarily, but of ideals. It is an
affair of the mind or spirit, not of length or
breadth of head or even of physical relation-
ship. The only way to decide whether an in-
dividual belongs to one nation rather than an-
other is to ask him. While his answer is not
necessarily infallible, since he may not appre-
ciate what his ideals are in every case, it is
more likely to be right than any other. It does
not necessarily follow that in practice nation-
vality is to be the only consideration in the
creation of a new state. After all, nationality
is not absolutely fixed. As we have had occa-
sion to see in several connections nationality
and the ideals of nationality are subject to
change, and on occasion where any possible
division will do violence to some principle of
nationality one must accept the best solution
possible and trust to adjustment of nationality
with time.
Other circumstances that must be taken into
account are the economic relations and the ease
of government. A state should have easy
communication with its markets, and the in-
dustries of one part of its territory should, if
possible, supplement those of another. Also
where small colonies of one nationality are in-
terspersed among other nationalities or within
a single nation, it would be difficult, if not im-
possible, to administer a government for each
nationality. In such cases any solution will be
unfair and have its disadvantages. All that
can be suggested is to follow the national lines
wherever that will give a unit of homogeneous
people of suitable size. Each of these units
should be sufficiently provided with lines of
communication, and with correlated industries
to be economically independent. On the bor-
derlands inhabited by mixed races, the wishes
of the majority of the inhabitants should be
considered first, but where these were too seri-
ously in conflict with economic conditions, the
best compromise possible must be made. After
an adjustment has been reached it should be
open to change in the light of later experience.
It will always be tempered by the fact that
members of the minority nationality can move
to a region where their own people predominate,
and also by the fact that under any fair gov-
ernment the individuals after a time are likely
to change their ideals to conform to those of
the majority — will become naturalized.
These general principles were accepted in
principle by the peace conference. Poland is
to be given an outlet through Danzig, the claim
of the Slavs to an outlet on the Adriatic is rec-
ognized at the moment by all but the Italians,
who have an adverse claim. The supposed ma-
jority of inhabitants decided the boundary be-
tween Roumania and Hungary and between
Germany and Denmark, although any division
would necessarily leave Roumanians in Hun-
gary and Magyars in Roumania. After a de-
cision has been made, each state, new and old,
270 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
must exercise toleration if the lot of the mi-
nority is to be bearable. In an enlightened state
this should not be difficult. There are always
differences of opinion, many times on matters
that are as important and as much a source of
irritation as nationality. Some we have already
mentioned in this chapter; religion, economic
theories and the resulting political beliefs, race
prejudices, apart from differences of nation-
ality, are all as keen and as difficult to over-
come as national differences. Nevertheless
they are subjects on which all modern states
recognize the right of individual opinion and
even of individual expression, and in most
states working agreements have been reached
which permit amicable relations between op-
posing parties. Development of a habit of for-
bearance on these matters will no doubt prepare
the way for a similar toleration with reference
to nationality.
On the whole, the national boundaries would
follow linguistic lines as well. The common
means of communication implies the develop-
ment of common ideals, and a common history
will give at once common language and common
ideals. Exceptions will occur to any one. The
most prominent at present is probably in Al-
sace and Lorraine where French sentiments are
found in people who speak the German Ian-
NATIONALITY AND THE STATE 271
guage. It was true under the French rule that
the language was German and under the
attempted suppression of the French language
in all places, use of French actually increased.
Even where the language did not become
French, French ideals and the French nation-
ality dominated. While the language spoken
by a people is probably the safest objective in-
dex of nationality, it is only an index and cannot
be trusted against the expressed desires of the
inhabitants. In considering the subsidiary fac-
tors in rearranging state lines, however, lan-
guage might well be taken account of as well
as the economic factors. Other things equal,
a state that, speaks but one language is much
easier to govern than one of polyglot races.
"Where nationality fails to follow linguistic
lines, and the feeling of nationality is accen-
tuated, nationality must be given right of way.
It is more important than anything else.
It must be said that where for any reason
language, economic interests, or ease of admin-
istration tends to require the erection of a state
or a division of sovereignty along other than
national lines, there is always danger. What-
ever solution is reached is certain to be more
or less unsatisfactory; one is presented with a
choice of evils. In a situation such as that in
Ireland, where national aspirations are at
272 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
variance with both the economic interests and
the convenience of government and where in
addition it seems that there is no particular
desire for a solution, any decision is sure to be
unfortunate. Here the south of Ireland cannot
and is not willing to exist without Ulster, and
Ulster cannot and will not be prosperous with-
out connection with England. Furthermore any
division that may be attempted is bound to
leave territory with a bitterly resentful mi-
nority under the dominion of both sides, a
strong minority whose national alignments and
business interests lie with the other group.
Even a plebiscite would probably give no com-
plete satisfaction, for all might be impoverished
with the destruction or impairment of business
relations. In any case as much would be deter-
mined by choice of the districts within which
the votes should be taken as by the results of
the balloting itself. Where there is no spirit
of compromise or toleration on either side as
seems to be the case in Ireland, no arbitrary
selection of a principle to use in solving the
problem is of value. Nor can one trust to the
influence of time to soften the opposition. The
more one nationality asserts itself, the stronger
is the opposition from the other. Should one
side give up, which is unlikely, the other might
NATIONALITY AND THE STATE 273
become tolerant. No solution proposed holds
any great promise of success.
It is evident that the nation derives its
authority and entire raison d'etre from the na-
tion. The nation is cause, the state effect.
Government is the agency by which the nation
as a mental entity expresses its ideals and com-
pels its members to live in accordance with
them. The ideals that develop in the nation
find expression in the form of government first
and then in the specific laws and in the acts of
executives and the judiciary. We need not as-
sume that the ideals become fully conscious be-
fore they are formulated or embodied in gov-
ernment; rather, the state develops by a
tentative process. Some form of government
appears by chance, if it is successful — if it
works — it is continued; if not, a new form is
tried. The results are constantly tested by the
instincts and ideals. The government must
pass the test of permitting the individual to
satisfy his fundamental instinctive needs and
must also harmonize with his developed social
standards and ideals of right. These, too, grow
with life in the state, and with the development
of new ways of living. As the ideals of the
nation grow they must find expression in new
laws or the old laws must be interpreted and
executed in a new spirit. That the change in
274 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
social order frequently shows itself in a change
in the interpretation of the laws rather than in
the passage of new laws is one of the best evi-
dences of the dominant influence of ideals. We
can find evidence of this in the gradual elimi-
nation of the king from all but a formal part
in the government of England and in the de-
velopment of such a legal fiction as the "benefit
of clergy" which made endurable the severe
penalties of the criminal law long after people
in general had forgotten what the legal defini-
tion of clergy or clerk really was.
The laws are formulated ideals. They are of
value primarily because they anticipate situa-
tions which the individual would not know how
to classify in the light of instinct alone or of
his own experience. When tested they give the
individual an approved standard of conduct
that represents the experience of the commu-
nity, even of civilized society everywhere,
rather than his own instincts. As an instru-
ment of enforcing the laws, the state may be
regarded as a means of providing physical
backing to the force of ideals. Even here the
authority of the executive rests both ultimately
and immediately upon the ideals of the nation
or of the smaller group and the instinctive fear
of the group or respect for public opinion. An
important element is respect for the law and
NATIONALITY AND THE STATE 275
for the officers of the law in and of themselves.
There is something even in the most sophisti-
cated adult citizen of the small boy's fear of
the policeman which is one phase of respect
for law as law and for the officers of the state,
irrespective of their personal character. This
is partly habit, partly perhaps derived from
theoretical considerations that the law should
have weight so long as it is law. Both are
ultimately expressions of the instinctive dislike
of disapproval of the mass. The officer becomes
the embodiment of the law as the law is the
formulation of the ideals of society. Where
the law is out of harmony with the ideals it will
be nullified or disregarded by mere popular
consent as has happened with the blue laws of
New England.
It may be again emphasized in summary that
the nation develops first, the state later or pari
passu with it. Last of all comes the theoretical
or rational justification. Whether it be the as-
sertion of the divine origin which was made to
support the older autocratic forms or the social
contract theory, or theory of the rights of man
which were adduced to sanction the modern
democratic state, they are arguments developed
after the fact to explain or justify the estab-
lished order rather than statements of the way
in which the state or nation really arose. After
276 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
a state has existed long enough for the habits
of acting in accordance with its rules to be
firmly established, it seems that no other con-
dition is possible. Then many men are ready
with theories and arguments to prove that it
must have been. These arguments do not state
the real reasons for the existence of the state;
rather they are devised to prove what needs no
proof and to give formal justification for the
existence of a condition long accepted and de-
veloped, no man knows how.
In short, the state in all of its phases and
characteristics can be understood only in its
relations to the nation. It grows out of the
national ideals, derives its final authority from
public opinion, and is merely an instrument by
which the nation as an organized mental unity
may express itself and control the acts of its
members. It takes form slowly by a tentative
process of trial, for ideals are not clearly con-
scious in the minds of the individuals that con-
stitute the nation, the only consciousness that
it has, but are frequently merely vague striv-
ings for a better condition. As each change in
law or form of government is made, it is tested
by its results and accepted, if satisfactory.
While the state never is in complete harmony
with the ideals of the nation, either because the
state has not yet grown to the nation, or the
NATIONALITY AND THE STATE 277
state persists as the embodiment of older ideals,
nevertheless the ideals of the nation set the
standard towards which the state must strive,
and where the two come into conflict the nation
will always emerge supreme.
CHAPTER X
NATIONALITY AND SUPER-NATIONALITY AS EX-
PRESSED IN A LEAGUE OF NATIONS
THE principles of social psychology upon
which nationality depends are fundamentally
two : the common instincts and the ideals which
develop through these instincts acting in and
upon the experience of peoples. The instincts
are fixed and the same for all individuals in
whatever society found; the ideals are an ex-
pression of the experience of the individual
group and of the conditions under which it has
developed. The instincts constitute what we
are accustomed to call the immutable laws of
human nature, while the ideals may change as
experience dictates. Fortunately the more
important elements in the development of na-
tionality are the ideals and so may be made
over to suit the changing conditions and give
room for growth in the general organization
or in the detailed character of the different
states. The instincts force some sort of liv-
ing together, they make possible cooperation
through sympathy, and they enforce ideals by
278
NATIONALITY IN LEAGUE OF NATIONS 279
the instinctive respect for the opinions of
others and by the fear of the disapproval of
the group, expressed either in the immediate
presence of a crowd or by public opinion in
tradition or in the press. The latter instincts
give the ideals and conventions of a nation the
impelling force of instincts at the same time
that they permit adaptability to the changing
conditions.
This distinction is of great importance when
we approach the questions, "Is nationality the
last word in political organization," and "Is it
possible to go beyond and find a larger unity
in a community of states'?" Were the national
organization dependent upon instinct alone, the
problem could not be asked. A nation once
formed would be a closed unit, its members
would be bound together by natural ties — all
outside the group would be forever distasteful
to all within and there would be no hope for a
change of any sort. As nationality is largely
dependent upon the development of ideals and
a new ideal, when developed, has the force of
instinct, it is always possible to make progress.
New organizations may arise in the midst of
old and old organizations may be extended to
include outside elements. These changes in
the old nations have always characterized the
history of peoples, just as changes in allegiance
280 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
are important phenomena in the modern shift-
ing1 of populations.
When we face the pressing problem, whether
the psychology of nationality involves any prin-
ciples that would make impossible the develop-
ment of the wider international state or league
of nations, we naturally ask how many of the
instincts and ideals effective in the nation are
compatible with the development of a wider
union. It may be said at once that all of the
true instincts are quite as much suited to the
international or super-national organization as
to the national. One may confidently assert
that the development of the national spirit has
come about by a restriction of the natural range
of the social instincts by training rather than
by any unnatural extension of them. Sympathy
and fear naturally are not respecters of per-
sons and recognize no limits of race or lan-
guage. With the setting off of smaller groups
through associations they are perhaps un-
equally distributed, more keenly aroused by the
members of the narrower circles and vary in
strength inversely in proportion to the distance
from the center. It is only artificially that these
instincts have been restricted in their applica-
tion to members of one nation.
What has made the nations, as may be seen
clearly in history, is the development of common
NATIONALITY IN LEAGUE OF NATIONS 281
ideals. These are based on instincts but the
form that they shall take is due to the experi-
ence of the nations and of the individuals that
compose it. They change as conditions change.
Just as they have been expanded from the tribe
or similar small group, to the city, and from the
city to the empire, so they may readily spread
to include many or all of the civilized nations.
Of the ideals that at present guide the nations
many are common to all. There is no nation
in which there is not at least lip worship for
the principles of human liberty and democracy.
All at least approve the same general principles
of ethics and it would be hard to find a suffi-
ciently unprejudiced observer to say where
these principles are least respected in practice.
One might object that the dislikes between
nations are too strong ever to be overcome. If
one grant the strength of the national preju-
dices, it must also be remembered that they are
conquered or forgotten daily with reference to
individuals. The national differences are by no
means so marked as many others that are per-
mitted to exist within each nation. There are
many antipathies between geographically dis-
tinct groups, or between different social strata
or even political parties and religions that are
stronger than those between nations. Every
nation has at times had differences in religion
282 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
that have either threatened or have actually
brought on physical conflicts. It is quite as
easy to arouse a Protestant native to the fight-
ing point by stating that a Catholic church is
bringing in boxes of rifles as it would be by
telling him that a Polish society had conducted
the same campaign. Just now more excitement
would be aroused if it were a German society
that was suspected, but that may be regarded
as a temporary condition. The readers of the
Menace have much more bitterness towards the
Pope and the local clergy than they have for
Austria, and certainly more than they had for
Germany five years ago. On the whole, re-
ligious differences have been overcome. No in-
telligent man in any civilized country would
think seriously of stamping out a religious be-
lief or preventing religious practices that were
not abhorrent to his humanitarian or moral
ideals.
The conflicts between political parties, even
when they have ceased to stand for any impor-
tant differences in principle, are stronger,
often, than the dislikes of nations. We have
seldom had a war in which the members of an
opposite political party would subordinate its
interests completely to the interests of the
country as a whole. The New England Federal-
ists in the War of 1812 would smash the coun-
NATIONALITY IN LEAGUE OF NATIONS 283
try rather than give over their political and
business practices ; some of them would rather
see the war lost than have the Democrats ob-
tain the credit of winning it. The northern
Democrats in the Civil War gave only grudging
adherence to Lincoln, and it is not unfair to
say that the debates in this war have had al-
most as much reference to what party should
have the credit for saving the country or civil-
ization as to how and whether it should be
saved. This is in part pure selfishness on the
part of the leaders who see themselves out of
a job if party differences should disappear, but
in part it is shared by their followers who
would regard the dissolution of the Republican
or of the Democratic party as a real calamity,
commensurate in importance with the disin-
tegration of the nation. At any given point
in the controversy they would secretly prefer to
see the nation go, but consideration of the con-
sequences, the fact that the party would go
with the nation and their interests with the
party, restrains them.
Even more prominent and decidedly more
vital are the commercial and business disputes.
But these are quite as strong between indi-
viduals and classes of the same nation as be-
tween nations. There is no more logic in a
citizen of the United States becoming excited
284 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
because an American company is debarred from
transacting business in China or should have
difficulty in collecting a debt in Africa than
that a citizen of Chicago should be disturbed
because another man in the same city has lost
money by the repudiation of a debt by one of
the southern states. It is to the interest of all
that good laws should exist everywhere. These
arrangements have little or nothing to do with
the wider groupings of nations or super-na-
tions. Wherever one sees wrong done one re-
sents it and where that wrong is done to one
of one's own political group the resentment is
increased and may lead to revenge or punish-
ment. The impulse is common to all humanity
in varying degree, irrespective of the closeness
of relation to aggressor or victim. The prac-
tical dangers can be avoided either by making
sure that no harm is done or by providing a
way of righting the wrong that shall not depend
upon the separate national organization.
The strongest antagonisms are those that
arise between the supporters of different the-
ories of government, not between political
groups. A Socialist, a Bolshevist, or an I.
W. W. might conceivably object when a wealthy
corporation obtained a decree that should en-
able it to collect a debt, even a just debt, from
a member of the proletariat, but there is no
NATIONALITY IN LEAGUE OF NATIONS 285
reason why he should object more if the cor-
poration have its home office in Tokio than in
London or New York. So long as disputes are
being settled every day within the nations that
offer very much more cause for friction and
dispute than many or most that would arise be-
tween nations, there is no occasion for regard-
ing the solution of the problems of practical
organization of international judicial machinery
as impossible. In these alone can we see any
real danger to the development of a wider union
of peoples.
The existence of national rivalries, even oft
national hates, need offer no more difficulty in
practice than do the individual and local rival-
ries to the working of the present political in-
stitutions. After all, just as sympathy is great-
er, the rivalry between neighbors is keener than
that between individuals on the opposite sides
of the ocean or the opposite sides of the earth.
The hates between men of different social posi-
tions in the same town or nation are stronger
and can be less easily obviated than the hatred
between men of different civilizations. It is
much more of a problem to find an equitable,
or at least a universally acceptable means of
dividing the proceeds of industry between capi-
tal and labor than to devise a scheme by which
Eussian and Australian, or Englishman and
286 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
Hottentot may live together upon the earth
without interfering with each other. The prob-
lems that do arise between the different races
are the same as those that arise within the races
and are less acute in form because the contacts
are less frequent. On the negative side, then,
there is no more reason why there should not be
an international organization than a national
one. In each case the bond has grown far be-
yond the range of personal acquaintance and
in one case not so much farther than the other
as to make a difference in kind. Granting that
there will never be a disappearance of national
rivalries, we should recognize also that these
are no more inimical to the existence of inter-
national community of spirit than are the more
local rivalries, even the individual rivalries, to
the narrower state or national consciousness.
These local rivalries, at present, certainly aid
as much as they hinder the development of the
wider bond.
If the jealousies between nations are not
sharper than those between individuals and
groups within the nations, there is every hope
that an international organization may be suc-
cessful. No one thinks of restricting the belief
of the citizens of a state in religious matters,
nor in the field of political theory, two sys-
tems that have in the past been as fruitful of
NATIONALITY IN LEAGUE OF NATIONS 287
conflict, even of wars, as have the national at-
tachments. In an international state, if the
machinery of an international state were to be
developed, one would expect the national spirit
of each nation to persist, one would even ex-
pect the conflicts of these aspirations to con-
tinue, but to have them settled in some rational
way. Just as the rivalries of individuals in
any state constitute an element of strength to
the nation as a whole or the rivalries of cities
and of larger subdivisions constitute a factor
that makes for the progress of the nation, so
the rivalries of the nations might very well be
an element in inciting to progress in the inter-
national community. In our American cities
one of the incentives to improvements of all
kinds is the desire to be better or not more
backward than others that claim to be rivals.
A similar rivalry between what are now sepa-
rate nations need not interfere with the proper
coordination of all in the efforts for peace.
Only where questions of boundary or of busi-
ness dealings enter need there be any difficulty
in the adjustment, and, after all, these are just
the problems that the courts of our present
states settle. The issues between states nearly
always go back to issues between individuals
with only the additional complication of decid-
ing who shall settle them. There was, for ex-
288 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
ample, no question as to the punishment that
should be given to the assassin of the Crown
Prince of Austria. The war came, ostensibly,
at least, over deciding who should investigate
and the insistence of the Austrians that the
Serbian state should be subordinated to the
Austrian in the investigations on Serbian soil.
Provided only that some tribunal exists which
is recognized as fair and as having authority to
settle disputes, there need be no serious con-
troversies even over these questions. This is
all the more probable if, with the habit of ap-
peal, national honor becomes less touchy, as
would be the natural tendency. After all, the
individual has no vital direct interest in the
aggrandizement of the national territory. His
interest in the expansion of the nation is an
indirect and acquired one, and while it will
probably never be lost no matter how com-
pletely an international organization may be
developed, it can be expected to become more
rational, more restricted, to shrink to some-
thing like the rivalry between the states in the
United States of America. A century ago, still
more at the time of the formation of the Union,
the states had each its own honor and pride
that threatened war on several occasions over
the adjustment of boundaries. To-day, we see
new divisions made as of the Dakotas and recti-
NATIONALITY IN LEAGUE OF NATIONS 289
fications of boundaries suggested with no feel-
ing at all except on the part of a few people
who see some direct effect upon their financial
prosperity. An instance of such a friendly ad-
justment of a national ambition was recently
given when Norway was established as an in-
dependent state.
What we must hope to develop in an inter-
national state is a condition in which competi-
tions and the emotions that grow out of compe-
tition shall be between " the individuals and
classes of individuals rather than between na-
tions,— that the competition of nations shall
be restricted to matters directly connected with
nationality, and that a national matter shall not
be made of purely individual business affairs.
Most of the dangerous rivalries of the modern
industrial state arise from conflicts in competi-
tion for trade. A firm of one country fails to
make a sale in competition with a firm of an-
other country. It believes that it is due to
prejudice or to undue activity of the officials
of the successful country, and bad blood arises.
An international agreement should insure
equality of treatment so completely that there
is no room for suspicion and no necessity for
the interference of the national government out-
side of its own territory. Then competition
would be between individuals and there would
290 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
be no occasion for raising questions of national
honor over any trade matters. An interna-
tional tribunal might be necessary to adjust
disputes between citizens of different countries,
but they would soon come to be adjusted as dif-
ferences between individuals and not between
nations. Then national rivalries might well be
confined to competitions in advancing general
order and welfare and not to quarrels over the
minor advantages of citizens.
If we find that rivalries and sources of dis-
agreement are no sharper between nations than
between groups within nations, we may also
say that many of the ties which unite men most
strongly do not stop at the national boundaries.
We all have scientific friends of other nations
who are in closer sympathy with our views than
some of our own citizens. The same may be
said of political theories, of religious belief, and
certainly of literature and art. The best illus-
tration is the international socialist movement.
To be sure, this very fortunately or unfor-
tunately, as one thinks of our own socialists or
of the enemy's, was not strong enough to stand
the feeling or emotion of nationalism in war
time. But the sentiment of solidarity between
members of the proletariat is growing faster
than the similar feeling between the members of
the employing group.
NATIONALITY IN LEAGUE OF NATIONS 291
The fundamental sympathies are by no means
restricted by national boundaries. While one
may close one 's eyes or ears against knowledge
of distant atrocities when they are brought to
our attention, one is impressed if not overcome
by stories of massacres of Armenians or of
the Africans in the Congo, almost as much as
by the atrocities in Belgium. In case the event
is striking and a large number of individuals
are involved, a distant event attracts more at-
tention and more sympathy than the ordinary
mishaps even if in the total they result in more
suffering than the single tragedy. Deaths from
influenza arouse less emotion than do the bat-
tle casualties of half the amount. An air raid
that causes fifty deaths in Paris or London ex-
cites the populace even of New York or Chi-
cago much more than the motor vehicles that
kill ten times the number in the streets of the
home city. This is, of course, partly because
the blame may be definitely attached in one case
and not in the other, partly because the latter
is a series of incidents far enough apart so
that one is forgotten, if heard of at all, before
the next appears.
Making all allowances for incidental differ-
ences, it is clear that the sympathetic emotions
may be sufficiently aroused by events that in-
jure distant men and even men of the lower
292 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
races to back up a judicial and executive au-
thority in the infliction of punishment upon in-
ternational criminals. That, after all, is the es-
sential factor in the development of a practical
internationalism. While the sympathetic emo-
tions may weaken with distance, the disagree-
able emotions of hate and resentment also show
a similar, probably even a greater, reduction so
that the balance is not far from equal. One
cannot expect the enthusiasm for man in gen-
eral to attain the strength of the emotion
aroused by an appeal for the Stars and Stripes
or for La France or the King. On the other
hand, the whole world or mankind in general
will not arouse the same hatred as that we now
see exhibited towards the German or the Turk.
It might be objected that the distances which
separate the different parts of the world in
space and still more in ideals are so great that
one can never hope to bring them into the
unified attitude towards problems that are es-
sential for the proper control of the actions of
each by a common ideal. Two answers may
be made to that. In the first place, it is cer-
tain that the modern inventions bring the world
as a whole into closer communication than was
thought possible within many of the single
states of antiquity in which the national spirit
developed. For the purpose of obtaining news
NATIONALITY IN LEAGUE OF NATIONS 293
and the diffusion of ideas all parts of the world
are mechanically one through the agency of the
press and the telegraph. The general spread
of literacy has increased the possibility of a
common understanding, and furthered the de-
velopment of common ideals and the resulting
common control, so that there is more of unity
between America and Australia to-day than
between neighboring parts of the Roman Em-
pire of old or between different provinces of
the Chinese Empire to-day. Probably the in-
telligent classes of Russia and America are also
more closely one than were Egypt and Gaul at
the time of Christ. At the other social extreme,
the I. W. W. and the Russian Bolshevist are
equally moved by the same ideals and active
in a common cause as is seen by the protest of
the Bolshevists against the execution of
Mooney, however little we may grant that they
understood the circumstances and the mo-
tives of that conviction. Taking ease of com-
munication, degree of intelligence, and possi-
bility of mutual confidence into consideration,
we can safely say that the most remote parts of
the civilized world are to-day more nearly
united and more capable of constituting a single
social group than were many of the smaller
states even of the medieval and early modern
period.
294 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
The only one of the fundamental instincts
which has been important in the formation of
nations which would be lacking in the interna-
tional organization is hate, and its similars,
jealousy and suspicion. In Chapter III we
traced the importance of hate in uniting the na-
tion against an outside force or other nations.
If all the nations were gathered into one there
would be no one to hate; at least, the hatreds
would always lead to the disruption of the wider
union rather than to its unification. The only
substitute for this would be hatred of disrup-
tion itself, and of the wars and bad feelings that
result. This would not give the same thrills and
enthusiasms of hate that are provided by the
hatred of persons and groups. The superna-
tional state might and must be content with the
cooperative instincts as a basis for its forma-
tion, together with these colorless emotions of
opposition to abstractions and dread of the con-
dition before the universal state was formed.
Eeligions seems to get on fairly well since
heretic hunting went out of fashion and they
were restricted to hatred of evil in the abstract.
The supernationality must trust to similar mo-
tives. For a generation or two, it is safe to
prophesy, the human race will be sufficiently
impressed with the horrors of war under mod-
ern conditions to be united by opposition to
NATIONALITY IN LEAGUE OF NATIONS 295
that alone, and by the time that lesson has been
forgotten it is to be hoped that the habit of set-
tling disputes by rational methods may have
become sufficiently well established to be con-
tinued.
Some have argued not merely that an ex-
ternal enemy is necessary to hold a nation to-
gether, but that fighting itself is essential to
the welfare of mankind. Two arguments have
been advanced for this, one that elimination
of the unfit is necessary to the process of evo-
lution and that war is the one method of elimi-
nation that is left to mankind; another that
fighting arouses emotions that are essential to
the development of the individual, or that it
alone can produce the highest character. A
little examination of each of these assumptions
shows that all rest on fallacious analogies.
First, it is probably true that part of the selec-
tion that acted in eliminating the unfit in earlier
times was conflict between tribes and indi-
viduals. When fighting was with fists and
teeth or even with bludgeons and swords, the
strong man, the courageous and intelligent
would survive and the weak and unintelligent
would be eliminated. Now that fighting is with
instruments of precision at great distances and
between those self-selected for bravery, or se-
lected after physical examination that shall
send only the best to fight while the unfit are
safe at home, the condition is reversed. In
modern war the fit are eliminated and the unfit
survive. Even the German contention that
struggle between states will select the stronger
states for survival might well be questioned,
or at least it may be questioned whether the
state that survives in a struggle will be of the
type that is most desirable. One may indeed
doubt whether the world would be better or
human happiness greater in a world dominated
by the Germany of William the Second, than in
one in which there was only the weak and divid-
ed Germany of Goethe, Schiller, and Hegel. The
state fitted to survive in a struggle is apparent-
ly the one under an autocratic government, that
shall emphasize the crass material forces and
subordinate the intellectual and artistic. ,Itl
must subject the wills of the many to the one
and permit initiative only in the development
of implements of war and of the many material
resources that add to the effectiveness of the
nation in war. This may include almost every-
thing that improves effectiveness in physical
ways, but at the expense of intellectual and ar-
tistic values and individual independence. In
spite of the efficiency of the latter, most civil-
ized individuals would prefer to live in the Eng-
land rather than in the Germany of pre-war
NATIONALITY IN LEAGUE OF NATIONS 297
times, and it were better for the world to mul-
tiply states like England, America, and France
than like Germany.
It is also by no means assured that war is
necessary to develop the best in man's physical
and mental nature. Some have asserted that
there are changes in internal secretion neces-
sary to the full development and health of the
individual that can be induced only by fighting.
Cannon * finds that an emotion of hate or anger
and even the pleasanter forms of excitement
stimulate an increased secretion of the adrenal
glands which increases the strength of the indi-
vidual temporarily. These and stimulation of
other similar glands are the most important ef-
fects upon the organism that would be produced
by fighting and not by the more routine forms
of bodily activity. That war is not worth while
for the stimulation of these glands alone is evi-
dent from the fact that they may be stimulated
by athletic contests and even by the excitement
of hard mental work and mental contests. One
might well question whether their stimulation
in any great amount is necessary ; in fact, there
is some evidence that the effect of overstimula-
tion is harmful rather than beneficial. All that
is really needed is that the organs should not be
*W. B. Cannon: "Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear
and Bage."
298 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
permitted to atrophy through complete disuse
and present evidence is that there is no great
danger of that until life becomes much less ex-
citing than is even peaceful civilized existence.
The other argument for war lies in the im-
provement that it is supposed to work in the
moral nature of man. It is held that it is es-
sential to man 's full development that he should
be able on occasion to stand pain, to undergo
every hardship for a disinterested end, and pre-
sumably that war alone offers the occasion and
sufficient incentive for the degree of self-sacri-
fice needed to develop this character. That
war does develop these qualities in many is
undoubted. Whether this alone would bei a
sufficient justification for war even if the quali-
ties could be developed in no other way is very
much open to question. That a nation should
sacrifice fifty per cent of its youth between
twenty and thirty, as did France in the last
war, that great virtues might be shown by the
other elements of its population does not appeal
to the rational mind. If the price must be paid
at short intervals, the men of virtue developed
would be too few in number to compensate for
the increase in quality. One must not forget in
the reckoning the disagreeable and injurious
effects upon men's character. If some men de-
velop unsuspected virtues, others develop
NATIONALITY IN LEAGUE OF NATIONS 299
equally unexpected vices. Opposed to courage
and self-sacrifice is the increase in cruelty and
in bloodthirstiness, which seems equally un-
avoidable in the conduct of war, modern as well
as ancient. Opposed to the self-denial of the
soldier and of the patriotic civilian who stints
himself that the Allies may be fed, is the profi-
teering of many who like vultures treat a war
as a time for feeding fat at the public expense.
Of the returning soldiers, some seem to have
risen to new heights, these probably are the
majority; others can find little satisfaction in
the monotony of peace after the excitement of
war, and suffer moral shipwreck; still others
are relatively little affected. While the virtues
of a nation at war are impressive, it is question-
able whether the final benefit to character is
worth what it cost the world in the last war.
And as James has pointed out in his Moral
Equivalents of War, almost if not quite the
same effects may be wrought by the conflicts of
peace. It is probable that the moral sacrifices
made under the more natural incentives of
peace are much more valuable than those forced
by a great war. A sufficient training can be
had from the constant conflicts with evil, with
selfishness, and ignorance, offered in the most
civilized and peaceful of states, to bring the
race to a high standard of moral health.
300 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
On the positive side much may be said even
from the psychological point of view for the de-
velopment of a League of Nations. The need is
readily apparent. The present relation of the
individual states is similar to that of individuals
when social organization was first developing.
While the instincts of the individual in his so-
cial dealings have long been subordinated,
whether he will or no, to rational guidance, to
a course prescribed by the best knowledge of
the group, the action of the state is still un-
controlled action on impulse. True, ideals of
international relationship have developed, rules
that are recognized as honorable for the dec-
laration of war and for the conduct of war
when it has been declared, but these are fol-
lowed only when it suits the convenience of
the nation in question. The Germans had a
theory and system of ideals of warfare at
variance with those of the rest of the world,
a theory that any act however frightful which
produced results was right, and there was no
one to interfere. A specious argument sufficed
to strengthen them in their course in spite of
the indignation of the world. Within the realm
of international relationships there is only a
gentleman's agreement on the rules that shall
temper the cruelty of natural instincts. When
a nation ceases to act like a gentleman there
NATIONALITY IN LEAGUE OF NATIONS 301
is no force that governs it, and there is always
great likelihood that the desire to be considered
honorable may break down under pressure. No
means have been devised for enforcing ideals
when the nation in question refuses to accept
or live up to them.
While one might argue that the decisions of
a nation are so slow that they can be subject to
none of the precipitateness of the individual
acts, that decisions of a nation should be made
in the light of the ideals and experience of the
race rather than in terms of mere instinct, this
seems in practice not to be the case. There is
all too frequently action under the influence of
a widespread emotion. Not infrequently selfish
motives control the rulers, and at other times
the rulers are carried away by the emotion of
the group. The problem is complicated for the
worse, too, by the tendency to exaggerated ego
on the part of the state or nation as a whole.
The reverence which individuals have come to
give the state prevents its interests from being
considered calmly and with due reference to the
rights of individuals and of other nations. The
emphasis upon the welfare of the whole, which
was necessary to develop in the individual a
willingness to sacrifice his own interests and
to subordinate his own instincts to the law,
has resulted in raising the nation as a personi-
302 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
fied entity upon so high a pinnacle that we
all incline to believe that whatever it does is
right, and that anything which will advance its
interests is a sacred duty, no matter how much
suffering may be inflicted upon other indi-
viduals or states in the process. This belief
that national need or even national pleasure
or desire is above all law is so strong that it
makes some curb upon international action
quite as necessary as was control of the indi-
vidual in the savage stage. As it is, claims are
made by nations that would not stand for a
moment in a civil court in a suit between indi-
viduals.
To be sure, there is what is known as interna-
tional law, but this is little more than a series
of precedents for international action. Its only
cogency is in the force of international public
opinion. Where the common decency is suffi-
ciently outraged by the action of one nation
in peace or in war, other nations may inter-
fere, but there is no recognized duty or even
right of other states to do so, and no force
which can be called in to prevent intended or
threatened breaches of accepted international
rules. That all nations feel keenly the approval
or disapproval of others is shown by the propa-
ganda carried on in neutral countries by both
sides engaged in the Great War. Each step
NATIONALITY IN LEAGUE OF NATIONS 303
was argued at length, after it had been taken,
in pamphlet and newspaper to influence the
opinion of the citizens of the world or of the
soldiers engaged. The Germans, in spite of
their apparent callousness to moral or conven-
tional ideals, were evidently alarmed at times
by the universal condemnation of their acts,
even when they did not accept the standards
of those who condemned them or change their
course. To be sure, the United States was
driven into the war in the spirit of an interna-
tional policeman, by resentment at the treat-
ment of others as well as by the injuries to
her own citizens, but she delayed two years
before the leaders could sufficiently arouse the
populace to favor intervention. At present
the world is like a primitive community with-
out a police force. One can expect that when
an innocent pedestrian is attacked by a foot-
pad a good citizen if near will come to his res-
cue and perhaps punish the offender. All the
world will approve such action, unless the mo-
tives are misrepresented, but there is no or-
ganized force for the protection of the weak
or the punishment of the guilty or even for de-
ciding who is guilty.
From historical analogies the world seems
ready for a wider organization. We saw in the
discussion of the development of nationality
304 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
that a nation was likely to develop when an
ideal or set of ideals had been prepared in the
mass of people that were to constitute the na-
tion, and some great incentive came which im-
pelled to a realization of those ideals. The
ideal of a League of Nations has been growing
and becoming ever more specific for cen-
turies. The cynic might object that the cen-
turies of development are so long that there
is no more hope now than ever — that Christ
preached the brotherhood of man nearly two
thousand years ago and that at short intervals
ever since some one has repeated the plea and
suggested means for its realization. While
wars have perhaps been less frequent recently
they have more than made up in ferocity. To
this we must answer that the ideal of com-
munity of interests has been growing more defi-
nite and less exaggerated. We have not merely
the Utopian schemes of Kant and the general
practical plan of Metternich, but we have a
widespread belief in their efficacy on the part
of the common people, and we have seen some
of them realized in a small way in The Hague
conventions. Lack of confidence in any regu-
lation on the part of the practical statesman
or politician limited the effectiveness of these
agreements, but they did provide a standard
of judgment, even when violated, which was
NATIONALITY IN LEAGUE OF NATIONS 305
not without its effects in guiding the action
of neutral governments. Talk with any one of
the common people, in America at least, and
if we may believe the reporters, in almost any
one of the civilized countries, and one discovers
a widespread belief in the necessity for an in-
ternational or supernational organization. The
ideal is prepared and generally accepted.
The immediate incentive of escape from a
particular danger or obtaining relief from in-
justice or peculiar suffering, is perhaps not so
strong as it has usually been where nations
have developed. There was sufficient suffering
in the war just past on the part of the soldiers
who participated, and perhaps still more keen
anguish felt by the relatives of those who
fought and died or were severely injured to
make them willing to do anything to avoid a
repetition. The great lack is that there is no
one in particular to blame for a war, there is
as cause only an impersonal condition of lack
of organization; while in the case of the op-
pressed peoples who have risen to form a new
nation some ruler or some other nation was to
blame and could be hated and fought. Whether
the resentment against a condition of society
and desire for greater security from suffer-
ing, without any reaction against an external
force or individual, will suffice to hold the world
306 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
together is the question. That it was sufficient
to organize the separate states on a principle
of justice is assured. We may only hope that
with the increase in intelligence and imagina-
tion, hatred of war and injustice in the abstract
may be enough to induce a general trial of
a new system, and that habits will develop after
it has been tried that will make possible for all
time a rule of right in international relations.
In no single respect does the psychology of
nationality offer any reasonable objection to
the formation of an international society or
League of Nations. It is an obvious next step
in the development of a social organization, and
the social instincts and the social ideals and
habits offer sufficient basis for its development
and for its proper functioning when it has
been developed. The one instinctive or emo-'
tional element that is lacking to it which has
been effective in the development of the pres-
ent nations is the fear of outside force and the
hatred of a common oppressor. Even this may
be supplied in the same way that fear of the
violence and injustice of an unorganized society
may be said to provide an incentive for the for-
mation of the local political organization. The
disorders and outrages of a Bolshevist regime
serve as an irrefutable argument in favor of
any political organization, however imperfect it
NATIONALITY IN LEAGUE OF NATIONS 307
may be in any of its details. Similarly, the hor-
rors of the most civilized of wars make in-
sistent demand for the development of any
form of international organization that prom-
ises the least chance of success.
It cannot be supposed that the interna-
tional organization will greatly diminish the
importance of nationality in the world rela-
tions. Nations will always exist as next to
the largest unit of organization. It is essen-
tial that they should; no wider state is con-
ceivable except as an organization of the pres-
ent national states. It is even questionable
whether the national pride will ever suffer seri-
ous diminution, however thoroughly the larger
unit should be organized, and however com-
pletely it may be accepted by the world at large.
The most that can be anticipated, and all that
is desirable is that the excess of national as-
sertiveness should be subordinated to the good
of the common whole, that national egotism
should be restrained sufficiently to respect the
rights of others. All that is good in nationality,
all its enthusiasms for the common weal, and
all of the international rivalries might well
be retained and transformed where necessary
into competition for the attainment of mutually
beneficial ends. That the sentiment of loyalty
to separate nations would ever be greatly re-
308 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALITY
duced is not likely and would be a much to be
deplored result. It is doubtful if consciousness
of belonging to a world league would ever re-
duce the consciousness of being an American
or a Frenchman to the extent even that the
Scotchman has been subordinated to the Eng-
lishman and still less to the extent that the
Yankee or Southerner has been subordinated to
the American. One may venture to hope that
the remnants of a national consciousness might
become less painful in the process of subordi-
nation to the wider loyalty than is the national
consciousness of the Irishman. One may well
question whether the allegiance to an interna-
tional league would ever take on the personal
form of loyalty that is connected with the na-
tional consciousness. It would probably always
be more like the general sense of decency com-
mon to all civilized beings, an extension of the
dictates of conscience from the merely personal
relations, as they exist at present, to include
the acts of nations as well as of individuals.
It is not even necessary that the entity should
be personified and individualized as the nation
has been personified and individualized. But
with time and the formation of new habits of
thought and ideals of conduct the sense of be-
longing to a community of mankind might well
be strengthened.
NATIONALITY IN LEAGUE OF NATIONS 309
That the first formulation of rules for the
guidance of the wider league shall be perfect
is not necessary and is not to be expected. As
in the development of all governments the first
attempt must be tentative, and the instruments
must be tested in practice and modified where
found defective. If the suggested draft of a
constitution shall be sufficient to tide the world
over a few crises, and to confirm the desire for
a working agreement, it will suffice. Once the
world accepts the principle that a better way
than war exists for the settlement of interna-
tional disputes, the best machinery for settling
them will be developed by a gradual process of
trial and error. After the habit of appealing
to right rather than to might has been estab-
lished, war will be as unthinkable as a private
duel. Meantime it is essential that the broader
sympathies now wasted in more or less vague
sentimentalism shall be crystallized about a
definite agreement. When that agreement shall
have had the tradition of a century behind it,
it will be considered as immutable as the good
lawyer now regards the constitution, and with
a few centuries of practice it will assume the
fixity of the moral law.
INDEX
America, Development of
nationality in, llOff.
American, constitution, as
an embodiment of
ideals, 232ff
Anthropometry, 13
Balch, Emily, 149
Baldwin, 45f
Beginnings of nationality,
91f
Beliefs, social, 199ff
British constitution as an
ideal, 232
Cannon, W. B., 297
Cavell, Edith, 74
Clan system, 7
Commercial disputes as a
cause of wars, 283f
Condillac, 109
Country, its effects upon
nationality, 237ff
Criminal and society, 79
Crowds and the leader, 169
Crowd, Reasoning in, 169
Darwin, 24
Descartes, 109
Dress and nationality, 152
Economic basis of the
state, 268ff
Emotions of the crowd, 171f
of the nation, 212ff
Encyclopedists, 109
England, Nationality in,
103ff
Environment and physical
characters, 14, 148
Fighting instincts necessary
for social development,
53f
France, Nationality in, 105f
French Revolution, Nation-
ality in the, 115ff
French Canadians, Natural-
ization of, 131ff
Frightfulness as a war
weapon, 72
Fryatt, Captain, 74
German unity, Development
of, 122f
Germany, Nationality in,
106f
Government, developed by
trial and error, 259ff
Government as embodiment
of ideals, 255f
311
312
INDEX
Greece, Nationality in, 93ff
Gregariousness, Instinct of,
28
Group, Fear of, 32f
Habits, Change of, in nat-
uralization, 141f
Hate in international or-
ganization, 294f
in the development of
nations, 81ff
and religion, 75ff
and war, 83ff
Honor, national, 215, 220ff
Hypnotism, Action of the
crowd compared to,
167ff
Hume, 109
Ideals, Effects of, in nat-
uralization, 152
and the nation, 224-228
and the League of Na-
tions, 279flf
Imitation, 45ff
in the crowd, 172ff
Instincts, Development of,
25ff
individual and racial, 24
and feeling, 28
Social, 28ff
Crowd controlled by, 166-
175
and ideals, 37ff
Defects of, as a means of
government, 249ff
and the League of Na-
tions, 278
Intelligence, Increase in,
with change of social
environment, 149f
International law, 302f
Italy, Nationality in, 119f
James, 24, 299
Jennings, 64
Jews, Nationality of, 92f
Keane, 14, 16
Kellogg, Vernon, 73
Kinship, symbolic, 8
Laniettrie, 109
Language and nationality,
17, 143, 236f
Laws as formulated ideals,
274ff
LeBon, 166, 172, 180, 184fl
Liberty, ideal of, 41ff
Lichnowsky, 82
Literature and nationality,
236f
Locke, 260
Lowell, A. Lawrence, 183
Loyalty as measured by
willingness to fight,
156f
Luther, 76
McDougall, 50
Maitland, 260
Marvin, 96
Mercier, Cardinal, 74
Middle ages, Nationality in,
99f
INDEX
313
Minor groups and the na-
tion, 241ff
Morley, 113
Nation as a social concept,
214, 222f, 235
National consciousness, 186ff
pride and the interna-
tional state, 301, 307f
Nationality, Definition of, 5
and the state, 249-277
Theories of, 23, 164ff,
240ff
Netherlands, Nationality in
the, fOl
Paramecium , illustrative of
social phenomena, 64
Profession, Choice of, de-
termined by social
ideals, 41
Party, Influence of, 183
Party vs. nation, 283
Perceptions of the group,
191ff
Perla, 215
Phillpott, 8
Plato, 6, 109
Political ideals, 229ff
Punishment by social dis-
approval, 227
Race and family, 6
and nation, 3, 245f
capacity, 12
Mixtures of, in Europe,
16
prejudice, 128
Religion and nationality,
243
Rivalry of nations a source
of progress, 285ff
Rome, Nationality in, 96ff
School and naturalization,
145f
Schurz, Carl, 136, 149
Social alignments deter-
mined by hate, 67f
contempt as a force in
naturalization, 140f
ideals, 32ff
Conflict of with racial
and individual, 44f
Development of, 54ff
instincts, development of,
49
Socialism a doctrine of
hate, 80f
Stephenson, N. W., 81
Suggestibility of the crowd,
170
Switzerland, Nationality in,
lOlff
Sympathy, 29f
developed from maternal
instinct, 50f
international, 290ff
Tagore, 12
Tarde, 45f, 173, 180
Thought of the nation, 181,
192 to 206
Totem, 9
314
INDEX
Value as social conventions,
38f
Voltaire, 109
Wallace, Graham, 51
War essential to progress,
294 to 299
Wealth as a social ideal.
226ff
Will of a nation, 206 to
209, 210
Zimrnern, 95, 164, 237