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THE
RATIONALE OF REWARD.
BY
JEREMY BENTHAM.
LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY JOHN AND H. L. HUNT,
TAVISTOCK STREET, COVENT GARDEN.
M.DCCC.XXV
- • i. . «.
. 1 ' «
« •
LONDON :
PRINTED nV C. H. REYNELL, BROAU STREET, GOLDEN SQUARE.
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3
ADVERTISEMENT
BY THE EDITOR.
The history of the present work is some-
what curious : it is extracted from two sets of
manuscripts, diifering considerably as to their
arrangement; the one in French, and the
other in English, written by Mr. Bentham
between forty and fifty years ago; and which
do not appear to have been ever confronted
together.
Both these manuscripts, with Mr. Ben-
tham's papers on Punishment, were, at the
desire of M. Dumont, placed in his hands,
and, together with some few additions from
his own elegant pen, form the matter of the
work published by him (at Paris in 1811)
under the title of ThSorie des Peines et des
Recompenses. Of this work three editions
have been printed in France, and one in
England : the " Rationale of Reward" occu-
pies the second volume.
In preparing it for its appearance before
the English public, the Editor has taken the
i5
IV ADVERTISEMENT.
above volume as the ground-work of his
labours; but having availed itself, wherever
it could, of tlie original manuscripts, his will,
in many instances, not be found a literal
translation of M. Dumont's work.
The additions made by M. Duraont are
marked out, where distinguishable, by appro-
priate indications. One of these additions
being at variance with Mr. Bentham's prese?it
opinions, has given rise to the remarks which
immediately follow.
Editor.
REMARKS BY MR. BENTHAM.
"Catherine's Scale of Ranks:" — " Bentham
or Dumont, on Pensions of Retreat?" which
you please. — You ask my present thoughts : —
I am all obedience. Allow me only to name
the place. Not in your work, but let it be
in a sequel I am preparing for it. From that
which you have so kindly made yours, those
wicked thoughts would scare away readers,
whom, if content with what you give them
from my first friend, that sequel may have a
chance for. In that production may be seen,
not in description only, but in terniinis, the
arrangements, which, after from forty to fifty
years for reflection, exhibit the practical — I
do not say the now practicable — result of the
ADVERTISEMENT. V.
principles of yours: and that, c\em'ed (forgive
my saying so) of what now shows itself to me
as dross. Nor yet will it draw readers from
yours ; — for in yours alone will be found dis-
cussions, explanations, and reasonings at
length ; in the new one (except where the
opposite othcially avowed principles are
examined) little else than results.
Official Aptitude maximized ; Expense mini-
mized. In these words you have the title of
a plan of official economy and education
that gives denomination to the whole, and an
indication of the matter of the first and
principal part. Send your readers, if you
have any, to that work. There, with official
economy, and official education, they may
see national growing out of it — added, and
that without need of additional description or
expense. There, confronted with Radical,
they may see Whig and Tory Economy, and
take their choice. I say Whig and Tory; for
these two are one.
As to Catherine and her ranks, they rank
not quite so high with me now as then. Pen-
sions of retreat would be invited to make
their retreat from your pages, were it not for
my respect for editors and readers. In my
own work may be seen a picture of them,
painted in those colours which now appear
to me their proper ones.
" Revise ? " Impossible : not to speak of
my doing you more harm than good. In
VI ADVERTISEMENT.
the French alone, the " Pensions of Retreat"
have already cost me — I had almost said lost
me — more days than I can endure to think
of: I who have so few left, and work enough
left for a hundred times the number. What
I have found possible, I have done, — looking
over the titles of the chapters and sections
(still in the French alone) and, in relation to
them, submitting what appears to me an ap-
propriate wording, together with some little
alterations and additions which presented
themselves to me as amendments.
The other Work, mentioned in pages iv. and \., is in the Press.
CONTENTS.
Page
PRELIMINAKY OBSERVATIONS . . . . i
BOOK I.
OF REWARDS IN GENERAL.
Chap. 1. Definitions .....
2. Matter of Reward — Sources
3. Reward and punishment combined
4. Union of Interest with Duty — Self-executing
Laws ....
5. Matter of Reward — Reasons for Husbanding
6. Remuneration ex-post-facto
7. Punition and Remuneration — their Relations
8. Remuneration — where hurtful
9. Remuneration — where needless
10. Proportion as to Rewards
11. Choice as to Rewards
12. Procedure as to Rewards
13. Rewards to Informers
14. Rewards to Accomplices
15. Competition as to Rewards
16. Rewards for Virtue
17. Accompaniments to Remuneration
BOOK II.
REWARD APPLIED TO OFFICES.
Chap. 1. Salary — how a Reward
2. Rules as to Emoluments
3. — 1. Fees and Perquisites — None
4. — 2. Minimize Emolument
5, — 3. No more Nominal than Real
3
7
19
24
28
37
42
54
67
70
81
93
99
104
110
125
137
143
150
161
163
167
V"i CONTENTS.
Chap. 6. — 4. Couple Burthen with Benefit
7. — 5. By Emoluments exclude Corruption
8. — 6. Give Pensions of Retreat
9. Ofthe Sale of Offices
10. Of Qualifications
11. Of Trust and Contract Management
12. Of Reforms . . . . .
Page
169
174
178
181
189
193
198
Chap.
BOOK III.
EWARD APPLIED TO ART AND SCIENCE.
1. Art-and-Science — Divisions
203
2. Art-and-Science — Advancement
214
3. Art-and-Science — Diffusion
217
BOOK IV.
REWARD APPLIED TO PRODUCTION AND TRADE.
Chap. 1. Bentham and Adam Smith . • . 229
2. Wealth and Happiness — Relation — Increase. 237
3. Production is limited by Capital . . 241
4. Capitalist the best Judge of his ovpn Interest . 243
5. False Encouragements — 1. Loans . . 246
6. — 2. Gifts, or Gratuitous Loans . . ■ . 249
7. — 3. Bounties upon Production . . . 251
8. — 4, Exemptions from Taxes on Production . 259
9. — 5. Bounties on Exportation . . .261
10. — 6. Prohibition of Rival Productions . . 266
11. Fixation of Prices . . . 270
12. Taxes — Effects on Production . . 273
13. Population — forced increase Desirable ? . 279
14. Colonies Desirable ? . . . . 287
15. Wealth — Means of Increase . . . 302
16. Rate of Interest — Evils of Fixation . . 321
Appendix
(A) On Subscriptions to Matters of Opinion . . 337
(B) Mischievousness of Reward latent — Exemplifications 341
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.
The greatest happiness of the greatest number
ought to be the object of every legislator: for
accomplishing his purposes respecting this object,
he possesses two instruments — Punishment and
Reward. The theories of these two forces divide
between them, although in unequal shares, the
whole field of legislation.
The subject of the present work is Reward ; and
not reward alone, but every other use which can
be made of that matter of which rewards may be
formed.*
In the following work, the different sources
from which rewards may be derived are examined ;
the choice which ought to be made between the
different modifications of which it is susceptible,
is pointed out ; and rules are laid down for the
production of the greatest effect with the least
portion of this precious matter.
* Every thing which can be given in the shape of reward
may be called matter of reward. This abstract term is neces-
sary, since in many cases, without being reward, this matter
may be employed for the same purposes as reward ; whilst
there are other cases in which it ought to be employed for
other purposes.
1
11 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.
On the one hand, indication is given of the
venom, more or lessconcealed, which is included in
the employments which have too commonly been
made of it; and an attempt has been made to take
away from others certain imputations which the
enthusiasm of virtue has cast upon them.
The limits have been traced between the fields
of Reward and Punishment; the springs of that
mechanism developed from whence those laws
arise to which the power is attributed of executing
themselves, and directions given for that combi-
nation of remedies, the svi^eet with the bitter,
whereby so happy a union is produced between
interest and duty.
The advantages of a system of remuneratory
procedure are pointed out ; an idea given of the
course it ought to take ; and an enumeration made
of the uses of the matter of reward which are not
remuneratory.
The nature and effects of salaries and other
official emoluments are enquired into ; the na-
ture and degree of the encouragement proper to
be afforded to the arts and sciences is discussed ;
and, finally, the question, — How far it is possible
beneficially to apply artificial reward to the en-
couragement of production and trade, is consi-
dered.
RATIONALE OF REWARD.
BOOK I.
OF REWARDS IN GENERAL.
CHAPTER I.
DEFINITIONS.
Reward, in the most general and extensive
sense ever given to the word, may be defined to
be — a portion of" the matter of good,* which in
consideration of some service supposed or expected
to be done, is bestowed on some one, in the intent
that he may be benefited thereby. f
* A portion of the matter of good, and not a portion of good
itself. The cause must be distinguished from the effect j —
the means of obtaining pleasures or exemptions from pains,
from the pleasures or exemptions from the pains themselves. It
is the former alone which the legislator has to bestow.
t Or, since Reward, in a certain sense, is among the number
of those names of fictitious entities which cannot be expounded
but by paraphrasis, it may be said, that — Reward is given to
a man, when in consideration of some service supposed or ex-
pected to be rendered by him, a service^ which it is intended
should be a service, is done to him.
1.
4 B. I. Cii. I.— DEFINITIONS,
When employed under the direction of the prin-
ciple of utility, it operates as a motive for the per-
formance of actions useful to society, in the same
manner as, under the same guidance, punishment
operates in the prevention of actions to which we
ascribe an injurious tendency.
The services, in the production of whichthis
precious matter may be emplo3^ed, may be distin-
guished into ordinary and extraordiyiary.
Ordinary services may be subdivided into regu-
larly recurring, or routine and occasional. By rou-
tine services^ I mean those which, in all the various
departments of government, the public function-
aries are bound to perform in virtue of their re-
spective offices.
By occasional services^ I mean those required by
the government at the hands of persons not in its
employ. They belong almost entirely to the ad-
ministration of justice, and that branch of the
police which is connected with it, — as denouncing
offences, prosecuting criminals, giving judicial
evidence, and seizing persons accused, &c. To
the same head may be referred services rendered
to individuals in case of fires, inundations, and
shipwrecks: inasmuch as the government is inte-
rested in the preservation of every individual in
the community, these services may be considered
as rendered to it.
To the head of extraordinary services^ may be
referred, — 1. Services rendered to the whole com-
munity by new inventions giving to the operations
of government, in any of its different branches, an
increased degree of perfection : such as important
improvements in military or naval tactics, fortifi-
cation or shipbuilding, &c.; in the mode of admi-
nistering justice, regulating the police, or the
B. I.Cii. I.— DEFINlTIOxNS. O
finances, or in any other part of the field of legis-
lation.
2. Services rendered in time of war, by the
seizure or destruction of objects contributing to
the power of the enemy, or by the preservation
of such as belong to one's own country.
3. Services rendered by persons exercising the
office of foreign Ministers, consisting in the pre-
vention or termination of the calamities of war, or
in the bringing about useful alliances.
4. Discoveries of great importance to the aug-
mentation of the national wealth; new methods of
abridging labour; the introduction of new branches
of industry, &c.
5. Discoveries in science, which are not suscep-
tible of immediate application to the arts.
6. Noble actions and distinguished instances of
virtue: in considering which not only the imme-
diate benefit should be regarded, but their influ-
ence, as examples, upon the cultivation of similar
excellencies.
Such is the field of services: such, therefore, is
the field of reward.
With regard to rewards, the most important
division is into occasional and permanent. The
first are applied, according to times and circum-
stances, to a single individual, or to a number of
individuals, in virtue of some insulated and spe-
cific service. The others are charged upon some
general fund provided for an indefinite number of
persons, and for a succession of services.
In consequence of the extent and permanence
of their effects, it is principally with regard to the.
latter class of rewards that it will be found of
importance to establish the true principles which
ought to regulate their distribution. Occasional
rewards being confined within narrower limits and
6 Bl. Cii. 1.— DEFINITIONS.
their effects more transitory, erroneous views re-
specting them are comparatively of trifling conse-
quence.
The most extensive use of the matter of reward
takes place in transactions between individuals.
In the case of personal services which are performed
in virtue of a contract, the pay given to him by
"whom they are rendered, is his reward. In buy-
ing and selling, the reciprocal delivery is the re-
ward for the mutual transfer. But the public,
that is to say the government on account of the
public, has a demand for a variety of services and
goods exactly similar to those of which an indi-
vidual stands in need: and it is thus that the
most advantageous mode of employing the matter
of reward, even in the ordinary course of business,
enters into the sphere of politics, and claims the
attention of the legislator.
[ 7 ]
CHAPTER II.
MATTER OF REWARD SOURCES.
Between the four objects — delinquency, pu-
nishment, expenditure, and reward, there is an
intimate connection. He who knows thoroughly
the nature and possible modifications of any one,
knows thoroughly the nature and possible modifi-
cations of all the rest. Why so ? because they
are all of them but so many modifications of good
and evil, — of the instruments or causes of pain
and pleasure considered in a particular point of
view. Whatever mischief being produced contrary
to the will of the legislator, takes the name of an
offence, the same when produced in pursuance of
that will (so it be with a direct intention on his
part that the party shall be a sufferer by it) takes
the name of punishment. Reward is to good,
what punishment is to evil. Reward on one part
supposes expenditure on the other. Whatever is
received by one party on the footing of reward, is
expended by some other. When a view then is
given of the several possible modifications of
offence, a view is at the same time given in reality,
if not in name, of the several possible modifications
of reward.
This may at first sight appear a paradox ; but as
the absence of good is comparatively an evil, so
the absence of evil is comparatively a good: the
notion therefore of evil, and of all sorts of evil, is
included in the notion of reward.
The several modifications of the matter of re-
ward, may be comprised under four heads: — •
8 B. J. ch, 11.— matter of reward— sources.
1 . The matter of wealth ; 2. Honour; 3. Power;
4. Exemptions. In respect of the employment of
the direct mode for affording pleasure, itbelongs not
properly to political,* but to domestic government
or education.
1 . The matter of wealth. Money or money^s-
worth is by much the most common stuff of
which rewards are made ; and in general the most
suitable of which they can be made : why it is so
will appear hereafter.
2. Honour. Honour may be made out of any
stuff. In some cases, it is produced by the bear-
ing a particular title not hereditary — as the name
of the office a man holds. In other cases, it is
hereditary, and places the individuals bearing it
in a distinct rank, superior to that of the other
classes — as in the case of the nobility. In other
cases, it is unaccompanied with any distinguishing
denomination, orany particular title — as in the case
of medals, or public thanks conferred after any great
victory, in the name of the king and parliament.
A graduated scale of ranks^ especially when its
gradations are determined by merit, and depend
upon actual service, is an excellent institution.
It creates a new source of happiness, by means of
a tax upon honour, almost imperceptible to those
by whom it is paid — it augments the sum of
human enjoyment — it increases the power of
Government, by clothing its authority with benig-
nity — it opens new sources for the exercise of
hope, the most precious of all possessions ; and it
* Whether wisely or not, it is, however, in some countries
employed by the Government itself. Under the Consulate
Government of France, fetes were given at the expense of the
Government in each year, on what were called the jours compli-
mentaires. The principal part of the expense of the Opera at
Paris, is said now to be defrayed by the government.
B. I. Ch. II.— matter or REWARD— SOURCES. 9
nourishes emulation, the most powerful of all
incentives to virtuous actions.
Such a graduated scale of ranks has, at all times,
been in use in the military branch of the public
service. But in this case, the principal object is
not honour, but power — superiority in rank is in-
variably accompanied by superiority in command.
The honour which accompanies the power is but
an accidental appendage.
Catherine 11. extended the application of this
arrangement to the civil service. She distributed all
the public officers in the civil department into dis-
tinct, and even numerical classes, corresponding
with the distribution of rank in the army ; — secre-
taries, judges, physicians, academicians, all the
civil functionaries, being advanced by steps, a per-
petual state of emulation and of hope stimulated
their labours throughout the whole course of their
career. It was an invention in politics, which
matches the most ingenious discovery in art that the
present century has witnessed. Atone stroke, with
out violence or injustice, hereditary nobility was de-
prived of the greater part of its injurious preroga-
tives. The foremost in rank and wealth began
his career at the lowest step : his ascent through
each gradation depending upon the appointment
of the sovereign, if without merit, he was left
behind, while men of the most obscure birth took
precedence of him. This engine was the more
powerful from the gentleness with which if ope-
rated. The simple non-collation of reward, per-
forming the office of punishment.
Another advantage gained by the transference
of the denominations of the military ranks into the
civilservice is, that the respect borne by the military
to the civil functionaries, is thus in no small
degree increased. It is an ingenious artifice ibr
10 B. I. ch. 11.— matter of reward— sources.
conquering the barbarous and absurd contempt
for civil functions which prevails in all military
governments. The assimilation of ranks naturally
leads to the assimilation of respect. From the
time that this arrangement was made, the nobi-
lity were seen eagerly to engage in offices, which
before they had regarded with disdain.
Orders of knighthood appear like floating frag-
ments detached from some such regular system of
honorary rewards.
In some states, an order of knighthood has been
established underthe title of '* The Order of Merit.''
It might be supposed, that this order had been es-
tablished as a jest, by way of satire upon all other
orders : not so, however : whatever ridicule there
may be falls exclusively upOn those who are
members of this order : of all orders it is the
least distinguished : the nobility are not candidates
for admission ; they consider it derogatory to their
hirth. It is the reward of, it may be purchased by,
service.
The higher ranks of knighthood, are they to be
considered as rewards ? Are they public rewards ?
To this question it appears difficult to give a de-
cisive answer. They are bestowed for so great a
variety of reasons, that to give any description of
them, which shall be applicable to all cases, is
impossible. They are sometimes given for the
performance of distinguished services,; but much
more generally to courtiers and men of rank, who
are the companions of the sovereign, to increase
the splendour of his court. In these cases, the
merit proved is, that the individual has made him-
self agreeable to the sovereign. But if persons
thus decorated claim distinctions not belonging to
other members of the community ; if every one
must yield them precedence, ought not some pub-
B. I. cji. II.— matter of reward— sources. 1 1
Jic reason to be given for creating this superiority,
for this comparative degradation of the largest por-
tion of the community ? Ought such drafts upon
the respect of the pubHc to be drawn in favour of
an individual, till it has been shown that he has
rendered services to entitle him to this special
homage ? When thus conferred, is not a resource
that might yield important fruits employed with
bad economy ? We shall return to this sub-
ject.
3. Power. The principles which ought to re-
gulate the distribution of this great object of hu-
man desire, belong to the head of constitutional
law, rather than to our present subject. Power is
created for a purpose altogether different from that
of serving as matter of reward. Merit is not the
only consideration by which its distribution must
be governed.
Under a monarchical government, for example,
the inconveniences attending the election of a
king may be so serious, that the supreme power
ought to be attached to some qualification more
manifest and indispensable than the personal merit
of an individual. In a mixed government, also,
in which there is a chief magistrate, and a body of
hereditary nobles invested with certain powers, it
may be thought proper that this body should be
composed of many members ; but the more nume-
rous, the less susceptible is it of that sort of selec-
tion which supposes in each individual distin-
guished merit.
Thus far, however, we may determine in general,
viz. that power wherever it can be employed with-
out inconvenience, as matter of reward, ought to
be so employed.
In thus using it, the difficulty is to select any
act or event that shall serve as evidence of the ca-
12 c. I. ch. II.— matter of reward— sources.
pacity of individuals, for exercising the power with
which they may come to be invested. In public
employments, for example, how various are the
talents required, for the possession of which no
single act can be considered as satisfactory evi-
dence. Were this not the case, the greater num-
ber of public employments might be conferred as
rewards for the performance of some determinate
service, respectively relating to them.
In the Gazette, notices might be given, couched
in the following terms, — " Whoever produces the
most perfect die, shall be placed at the head of the
Mint.^' — " Whoever produces a model of the most
serviceable piece of artillery, shall be placed at the
head of the Ordnance." — " He who constructs the
svi'iftest sailing vessel, united with the most per-
fect means of attack and defence, shall be placed
at the head of the naval architecture." — " The
author who writes the best treatise upon com-
merce, finances, or the art of war, shall be placed
at the head of the Board of Trade; shall be first
lord of the Treasury, or Commander-in-Chief,
respectively. He who writes the best treatise on
the laws, shall be made Chancellor."
At first view, nothing can be more captivating
than such a plan ; but upon the slightest examina-
tion it will be found more specious than solid.
Why ? because it is by no means uncommon for a
man who is in an emiment degree endowed with
one of the qualities requisite, to be altogether desti-
tude of others equally indispensible.
There are, besides, cases in which even this im-
perfect mode of proof is altogether wanting. Dur-
inga long period of tranquillity, by what describable
service can a military man display his talents for
command ? Among the qualities most essential
for such a duty, })resence of mind, enlarged views,
B. I. ch. n.— matter of reward— sou rcf.s. 13
foresight, activity, courage, perseverance, personal
influence, &c. &c. ; by v^hat specific act can an
officer who has seen no service, show himself to
be possessed of any of these qualifications ? We
are reduced then to mere conjecture. The best
founded opinions are drawn from his habits of
life, his attachment to his profession, and above
all the confidence reposed in him by those who are
engaged in the same profession, whose opinion is
founded upon a multiplicity of acts, which in the
aggregate constitute his character.
Discernment, or the art of judging of individual
capacity, is a rare quality, whose use it is impos-
sible to supersede by general rules.
A slight advance might perhaps be made in this
difficult art, did we possess a catalogue of the in-
dications of talents or capacity^ as connected with
the various departments of state.*
* For the illustration of the ideas of the author upon this
subject, I had prepared a note, in which I had collected toge-
ther various instances of the prompt display of that subtle and
penetrating talent which detects the possession of qualities, un-
discernible to ordinary eyes. To avoid, however, engaging in
too long a discussion, I shall confine myself to a single instance.
A person well acquainted with anecdotes relating to the Rus-
sian court, gave me, while I was at Petersburgh, the follow-
ing account of the origin of the success of the High Chancellor
Besborodko. — Being still in a subordinate office belonging to
the Chancery, one day, when he had presented various Ukases
to the empress, (Catherine II.) he perceived that he had for-
gotten to compose one that he had been particularly com-
manded to prepare; His first alarm being over, he determined
how to act, and pretended to read the Ukase in question,
though he held in his hand only a sheet of blank paper. The
empress was so well satisfied with the performance, that she
desired to sign it immediately. The disconcerted clerk was
compelled to acknowledge his neglect. The enjpress, less
offended with the imposition than struck by the presence of
mind which it displayed, forthwith placed him at the head of
the department, in which before he had held only a subordinate
situation. — Dumont.
H B. I. ch. II.— matter of reward— sources,
4. Exemptions. — The legislator creates two sorts
of evils; he appoints punishment for offences ; he
imposes burthensome duties upon the various
members of the community. Hence, exemptions
may be of two kinds: — exemptions from punish-
ment already incurred, — exemptions from civil
buthens.
An exemption from punishment already incur-
red, is a pardon ; — pardons have often been given
in the way of reward, that is, in consideration of for-
mer services. Such acts cannot be foreseen and
provided for b}' anticipation : they are the result of
the discretion entrusted in this behalf to the so-
vereign.
Under the English law, however, there are in-
stances in which, by anticipation, exemption from
punishment is granted, that is to say, before the
punishment is inflicted. Thus, from the policy or
weakness of the temporal sovereign, the English
clergy obtained in times of barbarism an exemption
in all cases from capital and several other kinds of
punishment ; an exemption which being by statute
lavvconfined, in regard to causes on the one hand,
while by common law it was extended, with regard
to persons on the other, has left this part of the pe-
nal branch of the law in the confusion under which
it still labours.*
The nobility followed the example of the
clergy. In almost every country of Europe they
have found themselves invested with exemptions
* In Poland, the poor gentlemen serve as domestics to the
wealthy nobility : they perform without scruple all the menial
offices that are reckoned by us as most degrading. There was
only one thing about which they were solicitous, and which
distinguished them from the class of slaves : it was that they
should not be beaten except when stretched upon a mat-
trass.
B.r.Cii. II.— MATTER OF REWARD— SOURCES. 15
of this nature. Ancient Rome set the example.
No citizen could be put to death. Verres, con-
victed of the most atrocious crimes, atoned for
them by enjoying at a distance from Rome the
fruits of his plunder.
When Catherine II., empress of Russia, con-
vened together deputies from all the provinces of
that immense empire, under the pretence of their
assisting in the formation of a code of laws (a sort
of parody of the legislative assemblies of free
states, which was not however without its use, in
so far as it contributed to the spread of enlightened
ideas) she conferred upon them, amongst other
privileges, an exemption from all corporal punish-
ment, cases of high treason excepted. This spe-
cies of distinction, which as a reward for legis-
lators, could scarcely be imagined in any other
state than one just emerging from a state of bar-
barism, had doubtless for its object the increasing
their self importance, and the conferring upon them
a sort of rank which should last beyond the dura-
tion of their duty.
As a man may be punished in his person, his
reputation, his property, in like manner, through
necessity and not with the view of punishing him,
he may l3e burthened. An exemption from a bur-
then is an exemption from the obligation of ren-
dering service : services are either services of sub-
mission, in the rendering of which the will of the
party has no share, or services of behaviour.
Of exemption from services of submission, not
exacted in the way of punishment, we shall not
find a great variety of examples. In Great Britain,
members of the upper house of parliament and
other peers constantly, and members of the lower
house, at certain periods, are exempted from ar-
rests : this privilege they may he considered as
10 B. I. ch. II.— matter of reward— sources.
enjoying partly on the ground of satisfaction,
partly that they may not be diverted from the
exercise of their functions, and partly because,
being members of the sovereign body, they would
have it so.
Among services performed by action, are some
which may be styled services of respect. It is a
service of respect exacted by usage in every king-
dom in Europe not to wear a hat, or what is equi-
valent, in the presence of the king. In Spain, some
families among the nobility enjoy the privilege of
remaining covered in the presence of the king. In
Ireland the head of one family (the family of the
De Courcys, earls of Kinsale) enjoys the like
exemption, as a reward for some service rendered
by an ancestor.
By a British statute, he who apprehends and
prosecutes to conviction, a criminal of a certain
description, received amongst other rewards an
exemption from parish offices, together with the
privilege of transferring that exemption to ano-
ther.
By other British statutes, persons who have
borne arms for a certain length of time in the ser-
vice of the state, were exempted from theobligation
of those laws which, lest industry should be too
common, forbade a man from working for his own
benefit at a trade at which he had not worked
seven years for the benefit of another.
There are various other exemptions of the same
nature : but as the object here is not to give an
exhaustive view of these several exemptions, but
merely a few instances to serve by way of example,
the above specimens may suffice.
One general observation applies to all cases of
exemptions from general obligations imposed by
law : it is, that the more severe the laws the
B.J. Cn. II.— MATTER OF REWARD— SOURCES. 17
more abundant, as drawn from this source, is the
fund of reward. It may be created by a mere act
of restitution, by the rendering of justice : to some
may be given what ought to be left for all : condi-
tions may be annexed to what ought to be given
gratuitously. The greater the mass of injustice
inflicted, the greater the opportunity for gene-
rosity in detail. Xhe oppressive government of
one sovereign is a mine of gold to his successor.
In the church, It is the good works of their prede-
cessors — in the state, it is their bad works, that
increase the treasure of their successors. In
Russia and in Poland emancipation is a very
distinguished reward. A tyrant may reward by
doing less mischief.
One word on the last article of revyard — Plea-
sures. Punishment may be applied in all shapes
to all persons. Pleasure, however, in the hands of
the legislator, is not equally manageable: pleasure
can be given only by giving the means by which
it is purchased: that is to say, the matter of wealth
which every one may employ in his own way.
Among certain barbarous or half civilized na-
tions, the services of their warriors have been
rewarded by the favours of women. Helvetius
appears to smile with approbation at this mode of
exciting bravery. It was perhaps Montesquieu
that led him into this error. In speaking of the
Samnites, among whom the young man declared
the most worthy selected whomsoever he pleased
for his wife, he adds that this custom was calcu-
lated to produce most beneficial effects. Philoso-
phers distinguished for their humanity; both of
them good husbands and good fathers, both of
them eloquent against slavery, how could they
speak in praise of a law which supposes the
slavery of the best half of the human species?
2
18 B. I. Ch. II.— MATTER OF REWARD— SOURCES.
How could they have forgotten that favours not
preceded by an uncontrolled choice, and which
the heart perhaps repelled with disgust, afforded
the spectacle rather of the degradation of wo-
man than the rewarding a hero ? The warrior
surrounded by palms of honour, could he descend
to act the part of a ravisher? And if he disdained
this barbarous right, was nqt his generosity a
satire on the law ?*
Voltaire relates with great simplicity that at the
first representation of one of his tragedies, the
audience, who saw the author in a box with an
extremely beautiful young duchess, required that
she should give him a kiss, by way of acknow-
ledging the public gratitude. The victim, a par-
taker in the general enthusiasm, felt apparently no
repugnance 'to make the sacrifice: and, without
the intervention of the magistrate, we may trust to
the enthusiasm of the sex, and their passion for
distinction, for preferences that may animate cou-
rage and genius in their career.
* In the Koran, Mahomet permits to his followers to add to
the number of their concubines, which otherwise is limited,
the captives whom they can take in battle. It was not thus
the Scipios and Bayards made use of their victories. Such is
the difference between barbarism and civilization.
[ 19 J
CHAPTER III.
OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT COMBINED.
There are some cases in which it would be
improper to employ either reward or punishment
alone. They are those in which the two forces
may with advantage be united : in which the legis-
lator says to the citizen — obey, and you shall
receive a certain reward : disobey, and you shall
suffer a certain punishment.
The two modes may be properly united when
the service required by the law depends for its
performance upon a small number of persons in
virtue of the peculiar circumstances in which they
happened to be placed. If, for example, the object
be the securing a delinquent at the moment that
he is about to commit an offence, to inform against
him or to prosecute him — it will be found expe-
dient in order to ensure the rendering of such
services, to combine with a reward for their perfor-
mance, a punishment for their omission.
In such cases, punishment is useful in two ways :
beside the effect produced by its own force, it also
sustains the value of the reward. There is a very
strong prejudice in the public mind against persons
who accept pecuniary reward for the performance
of such services ; but when a penal motive is added,
the public resentment is abated, if not altogether
removed. The prosecution of a criminal for the
sake of the pecuniary benefit derivable from it is
generally regarded as discreditable ; but he who
undertakes the prosecution to avoid being himself
punished, will be considered at least as excusable.
2.
20 B.I. Ch. III.— REWARD AND PUNISHMENT COMBINED.
The desire of self-preservation is called a natural
propensity, that is to say is regarded with appro-
bation. The desire of gain is a propensity not less
natural, but in this case, although more useful, it
is not regarded with the same approbation. This is
a mischievous prejudice, but it exists, and it is
therefore necessary to combat its influence. We
must treat opinions as we find them, and not act as
though they were what they ought to be. This is
not the only instance in which it is necessary to put
a constraint upon men's inclinations, that they may
be at liberty to follow them.
An instance of the judicious mixture of reward
and punishment is furnished by the practice pursued
in many schools, called challenging. All the scholars
in the same class having ranged themselves around
the master, he who stands at the head of the class
begins the exercise : does he make a mistake, the
next to him in succession corrects him and takes
his place ; does the second not perceive the mis-
take, or is he unable to correct it, the privilege
devolves upon the third, and so of the rest. The
possession of the first place entitling the holder to
certain flattering marks of distinction.
The two incitements are in this case most care-
fully combined. Punishment for the mistake : loss
of rank. Reward for the informer : acquisition of
that same rank. Punishment for not informing:
loss of rank the same as for the offence itself
If, under the ordinary discipline of schools, in
the case where the scholar has no natural interest
which should induce him to point out the mistakes
of his associate, it w^ere attempted to produce these
challenges by the force of reward alone, the opi-
nion which the general interest would create
would oppose an obstacle to the reception of the
reward most difticult to overcome : but when the
B.I. Ch.UI.— Rli:WARD AND PUNISHMENT COMBINED. 21
young competitors have to say in their defence,
that they have depressed their neighbour merely
to avoid being depressed themselves, they are re-
lieved from all pretence for reproach : every one
without hesitation abandons himself to the sugges-
tions of his ambition, and, under the sanction of the
law, honour combats with unrestrained impetuo-
sity.
This ingenious expedient for exciting emulation
is one among the other advantages of numerous
classes. In the private plan of education there are
seldom actors in sufficient number for the perfor-
mance of this comedy.
The most favourable opportunities for legislation
are those in which the two methods are so com-
bined, that the punishment immediately follows
the omission of the duty, and the reward its per-
formance.
This arrangement presents the idea of absolute
perfection — why ? Because to all the force of the
punishment is united all the attractiveness and
certainty of the reward.
1 have said certainty: but this requires to be
explained. Denounce a punishment for such or
such acts: the only individual who cannot fail to
know whether or not he has incurred the punish-
ment is interested in concealing his having in-
curred it. On the other hand, offer a reward, and
the same individual finds himself interested in
producing the necessary proofs for establishing his
title to it. Thus a variety of causes contribute to
the failure of punishment — the artifices of the per-
son interested, the prejudices against informers, the
loss or failure of evidence, the fallibility or mis-
taken humanity of judges — while to the attain-
ment of reward no such obstacles occur: it ope-
rates then upon all occasions with the whole of its
force and ccrtaintv.
22 B. I. Ch. III.— reward and punishment COiMBINED.
Before a celebrated law, which we owe to Mr.
Burke, the lords of the treasury were charged, as
they still are, with the payment of the salaries of
certain of the public servants. Justice required
that all should be paid in the same proportion as
funds for that purpose were received. But no law
was as yet in force to support this principle. As
might naturally be expected, all sorts of preferences
had place. They paid their friends first, and it can-
not be supposed they forgot themselves. When
the funds set apart to this service were insufficient,
the less favoured class suffered. The delays of
payment occasioned continual complaints. How
would an ordinary legislator have acted ? He
would have enacted that every one should be paid
in proportion to the receipts, and that his regula-
tions might not be wanting in form, he would have
added a direct punishment for its breach ; without
enquiring if it were easy to be eluded or not. Mr.
Burke acted differently : he arranged the different
officers in classes ; he prepared a table of preference,
in which the order is the inverse of the credit which
they might be supposed to possess. The noble
lords, with the prime minister at their head, bring
up the rear, and are prohibited from touching a
single shilling of their pay till the lowest scullion
has received every penny of his.
Had he permitted these great officers to pay
themselves, and prescribed his table of preference
for the rest, under the penalty of losing a part of
their salaries, what embarrassment, what difficul-
ties, whatdelays 1 Who would undertake the odious
task of informer? How many pretences of justifi-
cation would they not have had? Who would have
dared to attack the ministers ? In this arrange-
ment of Mr. Burke, till they have fulfilled their
duty, they lose the enjoyment of all their salary;
they lose it without enquiry and without embar-
B.'i. ch. III.— reward and punishment combined. 23
rassment. Thus rendered conditional, their salary
becomes in reality the recompence of their regula-
rity in paying the others.
The advantages of this invention may be thus
summed up. Their salary, depending upon the
performance of the service, is no longer a barren
gratification, but a really productive reward. The
motive has all the force belonging to punishment :
by the suspension of payment it operates as a fine.
It possesses all the certainty of a reward : the
right to receive follows the completion of the ser-
vice, without any judicial procedure.
[ 24 1
CHAPTER IV.
OF THE UNION OF INTEREST WITH DUTY, ANI>
OF SELF-EXECUTING LAWS.
What has been said in the preceding chapter
will seem to elucidate the meaninsj of the above two
expressions, which, though in familiar use with
political writers, have never yet been completely
explained.
The legislator should, say they, endeavour to
unite interest with duty: this accomplished, they
consider perfection as attained. But how is this
union to be brought about ? What constitutes it ?
To create a duty and affix a punishment to the
violation of it, is to unite a man^s interest with his
duty, and even to unite it more strongly than by
any prospect of reward. But this is not, univer-
sally at least, what they mean ; for if punishment
alone were sufficient for the establishment of the
desired connection between interest and duty,
what legislator is there who would fail in its ac-
complishment ? What would there be to boast of
in a contrivance which surpasses not the ingenuity
of the most clumsy politician ?
In this phrase, by the word interest, pleasure or
'profit is understood; the idea designed to be ex-
pressed is, the existence of such a provision in the
law as that conformity to it shall be productive of
certain benefits which will cease of themselves so
soon as the law ceases to be observed.
In a word, the union in question is produced
whenever such a species of interest can be formed
as shall combine \\\q force which is peculiar to pu-
B. I. ch. IV.— union of interest with duty, &c. 25
iiishment with the cerlainly wliich is peculiar to
reward.
This connection between duty and interest, is to
a high degee attained in the case of pensions and
places held during pleasure. Let us suppose, for
example, that the continuance of the pension is
made to depend upon the holder's paying at all times
absolute obedience to the will of his superior. The
pensioner ceases to give satisfaction — the pension
ceases; there are none of the embarrassments and
uncertainties attendant on ordinaay procedure.
There are no complaints of disobedience made
against persons thus circumstanced. It is against
the extreme efficacy of this plan, rather than against
its weakness, that complaints are heard.
In some countries, by the revenue laws, and par-
ticularly in the case of the custom-house duties,
it is not uncommon to allow the officers, as a re-
ward, a portion of the goods seized by them in the
act of being smuggled. This is the only mode that
has appeared efifectually to combat the temptations
to which they are perpetually exposed. The price
which it would be worth while for individuals to
offer to the officers for connivance, can scarcely
equal, upon an average, the advantage they derive
from the performance of their duty. So far from
there being any apprehension of their being remiss
in its discharge when every instance of neglect is
followed by immediate punishment, the danger is
lest they should be led to exceed their duty, and the
innocent should be exposed to suspicion and vexa-
tion.
The legislator should enact laws ichich will exe-
cute themselves. What is to be understood by this ?
Speaking with precision, no law can execute itself.
In a state of insulation a law is inoperative : to pro-
duce its desired effects, it must be supi)ortcd and
26 B. 1. Ca. IV.— UNION OF INTEREST WITH DUTY, &c.
enforced by some other law which in its turn
requires for its support the assistance of other
laws. It is thus that a body of laws forms a group,
or rather a circle, in which each is reciprocally sup-
ported and supports. When it is said, therefore,
that the law executes itself, it is not meant that it
can subsist without the assistance of other laws,
but that its provisions are so arranged, that punish-
ment immediately follows its violation, unaided
by any form of procedure : that to one offence
another more easily susceptible of proof, or more
severely punished, is substituted.
Mr. Burke's law, which has already been men-
tioned, is justly entitled to be ranked under this
head. The clause which forbids the ministers and
treasurers to pay themselves till all other persons
have been paid, possesses in effect the properties
of a punishment annexed to any retardation of
payments : a punishment which commences with
the offence, which lasts as long as the offence,
which is inflicted without need of procedure ; in a
word, a punishment, the imposition of which does
not require the intervention of any third person.
Before the passing of this law, large arrears on
the civil list w^ere allowed to accumulate ; their
accumulation bore the character merely of a simple
act of omission, which could not be classed under
any particular head of offence, and the evil of which
might moreover be palliated by a thousand pretexts.
After the passing of this law, the ministers, it is
true, might still, in spite of the law, continue to give
to themselves a preference over the other credi-
tors on the civil list : there is no physical force
other than existed before to prevent them : but in
virtue of this law, any such preference would be a
palpable offence ; a species of peculation, which
would be strongly reprobated by public opinion.
B. I. ch. IV.— union of interest with duty, &c. 27
Another example is furnished by the laws respect-
ing the payment of stamp duties. These laws
are represented as among the number of those
which execute themselves, and are panegyrized ac-
cordingly. This is true with regard to so much of
these taxes as is levied upon contracts and law
proceedings. Let us explain their mechanism.
The sanction given to private contracts, and the
protection afforded by the law to person and pro-
perty, are services which the public receives at the
hands of the ministers of justice. The method in
which these duties then are levied is this : these
services are at first refused to all persons without
exception ; they are then offered to all persons who,
at the price set upon them, have the means and in-
clination to become purchasers. Thus a protec-
tion which might be considered as a debt due from
the state to all its subjects, is converted into a
reward, by means of the precedent condition an-
nexed to it. This is not the time for examining
whether this duty, which palpably amounts to the
selling of justice, is a judicious tax: all that is
here necessary to be observed is, that the payment
is ensured by the security it affords, and the dan-
ger with which the omission is accompanied.
To range over the whole field of legislation, in
order to ascertain the different cases in which this
species of political mechanism has been employed,
or in which it might be introduced with advantage,
does not belong to our present subject : — general
directions might easily be framed for the construc-
tion of self-executing laws, and their application
might occupy a place in " The recreations of legisla-
tion"
[ 28 ]
CHAPTER V.
MATTER OF REWARD — REASONS FOR
HUSBANDING.
If it be proper to be frugal in the distribution of
punishment, it is no less proper to be so in the
distribution of reward. Evil is inflicted in both
cases. The difference is that punishment is an
evil to him to whom it is applied : — reward, to him
at whose expense it is applied. The matter of re-
ward and the matter of punishment spring from
the same root. Is money bestowed as a reward ?
Such money can only arise from taxes or original
revenue ; can only be bestowed at the public ex-
pense : — truths so obvious, that proof is unneces-
sary ; but which ought on all occasions to be re-
collected, since, all other circumstances being
equal, to pay a tax to a given amount is a greater
evil than to receive it is a good.
Rewards consisting in honour, it is commonly
said cost nothing. This is, however, a mistake.
Honours not only enhance the price of services,
(as we shall presently see) they also occasion ex-
penses and burthens which cannot be estimated in
money. There is no honour without pre-eminence ;
if then, of two persons, for example, who are equal,
one profits by being made the higher, the other
suffers in at least equal proportion by being made
the lower of the two. With regard to honours
which confer rank and privileges, there are com-
monly two sets of persons at whose expense
honour is conferred : the persons from amongst
whom the new dignitary is taken, and the persons,
B. I. Cii. v.— MATTER OF REWARD, &c, 29
if any, to whom he is aggregated by his elevation.
Thus the greater the addition made to the number
of peers, the more their importance is diminished ;
the greater is the defalcation made from the value
of their rank.
The case is similar with regard to power. It is
by taking away liberty or security^ that power is
conferred ; and the share of each man is the less,
the greater the number of co-partners in it. The
power conferred in any case must be either new or
old : if new, it is conferred at the expense of those
who are subject to it ; if old, at the expense of
those by whom it was formerly exercised.
. Exemptions given in the way of reward, may
appear at first sight but little expensive. This
may be one reason why they have been so liberally
granted by short-sighted sovereigns. It ought
however to be recollected, that in the case of pub-
lic burthens, the exemption of one increases the
burthen on the remainder: if it be honourable to
be exempted from them, it becomes a disgrace to
bear them, and such partial exemptions at length
give birth to general discontent.
The exemptions from arrest for debt, enjoyed by
members of parliament, are a reward conferred at
the expense of their creditors. Exemptions from
parish offices and military services are rewards
conferred at the expense of those who are exposed
to the chance of bearing them. The burthen of
exemptions from taxes falls upon those who contri-
bute to the exigencies of the state.
A privilege to carry on, in concurrence with a
limited number of other persons, a particular branch
of trade, is an exemption from the exclusion which
persons in general are laid under with reference to
that trade ; the favour is shewn at the expense of
the persons who are sharers in the privilege.
30 B. 1. Ch. v.— MATTER OF REWARD, &c.
If there be an instance in which any modifica-
tion of the matter of reward can be conferred with-
out expense, it will be found among those which
consist in exemption from punishment. When an
exemption of this sort is conferred, the expense of
it, if there be any, is borne by those who are in-
terested in the infliction of the punishment: that
is, by those in whose favour the law was made,
which the punishment was intended to enforce.
But if by the impunity given, the sanction of the
laws is weakened and crimes consequently multi-
plied, the pardon granted to criminals is dearly
paid for by their victims.
The evil of prodigality is not confined to the
diminishing the fund of reward : it operates as a
law against real merit. If rewards are bestowed
upon pretended services, such pretended services
enter into competition with real services. He suc-
ceeds best, who aims not to entitle himself to the
gratitude of the people, but to captivate the good will
of him at whose disposal the fund of reward is placed.
Obsequiousness and courtly vices triumph over
virtue and genius. The art of pleasing is elevated
at the expense of the art of serving.
What is the consequence ? real services are not
performed, or they are purchased at extravagant
prices. It is not sufficient, that the price paid for
them be equal to that of the false services ; be-
yond this, there must be a surplus to compensate
the labour which real services require. " If so
much is given to one who has done nothing, how
much more is due to me who have borne the heat
and the burthen of the day ? — If parasites are thus
rewarded, how much more is due to my talents and
industry ?" — Such is the language which will na-
turally be employed, and not without reason, by
the man of conscious merit.
B. I. Ch. v.— MATTER OF REWARD, &c. 31
It is thus that the amount of the evil is perpetu-
ally accumulating". The greater the amount al-
ready lavished, the greater the demand for still
further prodigality; as in the case of punishment,
the more profusely it has been dealt out, the greater
oftentimes is the need of employing still more.
When by the display of extraordinary zeal and
distinguished talents, a public functionary has ren-
dered great services to his country, to associate
him vi^ith the crowd of ordinary subordinates is to
degrade him. He will feel in respect of the fund
of reward, in the same manner as the disposer of
it ought to have felt. He will consider himself
injured, not only when anything is refused to him,
but when anything is bestowed upon those who
have not deserved it.
A profuse distribution of honours is attended with
a double inconvenience: in the first place it dete-
riorates the stock ; and in the next, it is productive
of great pecuniary expense. When a peerage, for
example, is conferred, it is generally necessary to
add to it a pension, under the notion of enabling
the bearer to sustain its dignity.
It is thus that the existence of an hereditary
nobility tends to increase the price necessary to be
paid in the shape of reward : has a plebeian ren-
dered such services to his country as cannot be
passed by with neglect, the first operation is to
distinguish him from men of his own rank, by
placing him among the nobility. But without
fortune, a peerage is a burthen : to make it worth
having, it must be accompanied with pecuniary re-
ward : the immediate payment of a large sum
would be too burthensome : posterity is therefore
made to bear a portion of the burthen.
It is true, posterity ought to pay its share in the
32 B. I, Cti. V.-MATTRR OF REWARD, &c.
price of services of which it reaps a share of the
advantage ; but the same benefit might be procured
at a less expense, if there were no hereditary nobi-
lity, personal nobility would answer every purpose.
Among the Greeks, a branch from a pine tree, a
handful of parsley, — among the Romans, a few
laurel leaves, or ears of corn, were the rewards of
heroes.
Fortunate Americans ! fortunate on so many ac-
counts, if to possess happiness it were sufficient to
possess every thing by which it is constituted, this
advantage is still yours : preserve it for ever, bestow
rewards, erect statutes, confer even titles, so that
they be personal alone ; but never bind the crown
of merit upon the brow of sloth.
Such is the language of those passionate admirers
of merit who would gladly see a generous emula-
tion burning in all ranks of the community ; who
consider every thing wasted which is not employed
in its promotion. Can anything be replied to
them ? If there can, it can only be by those who,
jealous of the public tranquillity, as necessary to
the enjoyments of luxury, and more alarmed at the
folly which knows no restraint than at the selfish-
ness which may be constrained to regulate itself,
would have, at any price, a class of persons who
may impose tranquillity upon those who can never
be taught.
In some states, the strictest frugality is observed
in the distribution of rewards ; such in general has
been the case under republican governments ;
though it is true, that even in democracies, history
furnishes instances of the most extravagant prodi-
gality and corruption. The species of reward be-
stowed by the people upon their favourites with the
least examination is power; a gift more precious
B. I. ch. v.— matter of reward, &c. 33
and dangerous than titles of honour or pecuniary
rewards. The maxim, Woe to the grateful nation, \s
altogether devoid of meaning, unless it be designed
as a warning against this disposition of the people
to confer unlimited authority upon those who for a
moment obtain their confidence.
After havinsf said thus much in favour of eco-
nomy, it must not be denied that specious pre-
tences may be urged in justification of a liberal
use of rewards.
That portion of the matter of reward which is
superfluously employed, it is said may be consi-
dered as the fund of a species of lottery. At a
comparatively small expense a large mass of ex-
pectation is created and prizes are offered which
every man may flatter himself with the hope of
obtaining. And what are all the other sources of
enjoyment when put in competition with hope?
But can such reasons justify the imposition or con-
tinuance of taxes with no other view than that of
increasing the amount of the disposable fund of
reward ? — Certainly not. It vi^ould be absurd thus
to create a real evil, thus to pillage the multitude
of what they have earned by the sweat of their
brow, to multiply the enjoyments of the wealthy.
In a word, whatever may be thought of this lottery
we must not forget that its prizes must be drawn
before we can obtain any useful services. To the
individual himself, active is more conducive to his
happiness than idle hope, — the one develops his
talents, the other renders them obtuse ; the first
is naturally allied to virtue, the second to vice.
In England, reasons, or at least pretexts, have
been found for the arbitrary disposal of rewards,
which would not exist under an absolute monarchy.
The constitution of parliament gives occasion to the
performance of services of such a nature as cannot
3
34 B. I. ch. v.— matter of reward, &c.
be acknowledged, but which in the eyes of many
politicians are not the less necessary. A certain
quantity of talent is requisite, it is said, to save the
political vessel from being upset by any momen-
tary turbulence or whim of the people. We must
possess a set of Mediators interested in maintain-
ing harmony between the heterogeneous particles of
our mixed constitution ; a species of Drill Serjeants
is required for the maintenance of discipline among
the undulatins: and tumultuous multitude. There
must be a set of noisy Orators provided for those
who are more easily captivated by strength of lungs
than by strength of argument ; Declaimers for
those who are controuled by sentimentalism ; and
imaginative, facetious, or satirical Orators, for those
whose object it is to be amused ; Reasoners for the
small number, \vho yeild only to reason ; artful
and enterprising men to scour the country to obtain
and^ calculate the number of votes : there must
also be a class of men in good repute at court, who
may maintain a good understanding between the
head and the members. And all this they say
must be paid for — whether correctly or not, does
not belong to our present discussion.
It may be further said, that the matterof reward,
besides being used for reward, may be used as a
means of power, — and that in a mixed constitu-
tion like ours, it is necessary to maintain a balance
among its powers. Certain creations of peers
therefore, for example, which could not be justified,
if considered as rewards, may be justified as distri-
butions of power. There is at least something in
this which deserves examination ; but its exami-
nation here would be out of place.
Want of economy in the distribution of rewards
may also be attempted to be justified, by com-
paring the sum so expended with the expense in-
B. I. ch. v.— matter of reward, &c. 35
curred in the carrying on of a war, I advise every
one who has projects upon the public money,
to employ this argument in preference to every
other: when one calculates the immense sum ex-
pended during a single campaign, either by land
or sea ; when we reflect on the millions that vanish
in sound and smoke, all other profusion sinks into
insignificance. When we behold the treasures of
a nation flowing away in such rapid torrents, can
any great indignation be felt against those who,
by art, or obsequiousness, or court favour, detach
fromthe mass a single drop or a small stream for their
own benefit ? If the people so readily lend them-
selves to the gratification of political passions; if
they part so freely with their gold and their blood,
for the momentary gratification of their vengeance
or their passion for glory, can it be expected they
will murmur at the pomp they covet, and the few
insignificant favours which their prince bestows ?
\J^ilI they be supposed so mean as to be niggard
with pence and lavish with millions ?
This mode of comparison is not new to courts:
it ought to have been familiar to Louis XIV. if it
be true, as there is reason for believing, that the
building of Versailles cost two thousand millions of
livres. In respect of expense, this \Mas more than
equal to a war ; but at least it was expended with-
out bloodshed, there was no interruption of trade,
on«the contrary it gave vigour to industry and shed
lustre over the arts. What a fortunate source of
comparison to the advocates of absolute monarchy !
There isyet another mode of estimating the just-
ness of any public expenditure, another source of
comparison somewhat less agreeable to the eyes of
courtiers. Compare the amount of the proposed
expenditure with an equal portion of the produce
of the most vexatious and burthensome tax. In this
3.
36
B. I. Ch. v.— matter of reward, &c.
country, for example, let the comparison be made
with the produce of the tax on law proceedings,
whose effect is the placing of the great majority of
the people in a state of outlawry. The option lies
between the abolition of this tax and the proposed
employment of its produce. They thus become
two rival services. It is a severe test for frivolous
expenses, but it is strictly just. How disgraceful
does wasteful luxury appear in the budget when
thus put in competition with the good whose place
it occupies, or the evil of which it prevents the
cure !
From these observations the practical conclusion
is, that the matter of reward being all of it costly,
none of it ought to be thrown away. This precious
matter is like the dew : not a drop of it falls upon
the earth which has not previously been drawn
up from it. An upright sovereign therefore gives
nothing. He buys or he sells. His benevolence
consists in economy. Would you praise him fgr
generosity ? Praise also the guardian who lavishes
among his servants the property of his pupils.
The most liberal among the Roman emperors
were the most worthless ; for example, Caligula,
Claudius, Nero, Otho^ Vitellius, Conmiodus, Helio-
gabalus, and Caracalla : the best, as Augustus, Ves-
pasian, Antoninus, Marcus A urelinus, and Per tiriax,
were frugal. (Esprit des Loix, liv. v. ch. xviii.)
A most important lesson to sovereigns: it wajns
them not to value themselves upon the virtue of
generosity: in short, not to think that in their sta-
tion generosity is a virtue. If not a strictly logical
argument, it is, however, a popular and persuasive
induction. " Esteem not yourselves to be good
princes for a quality in which you have been out-
stripped by the worst."
o/
CHAP. VI.
REMUNERATION EX POST FACTO.
In the preceding chapter it was stated, that in
accordance with the principle of utility, the costly
matter of reward ought only to be employed in the
production of service; and that, in accordance
with that principle, a reward can only consist of
a portion of the matter of reward, employed as a
fnotive for the production of service. This would
seem to exclude everything which can be called
liberality, every act by which a reward may be
bestowed upon any service to which it has not
been promised beforehand.
Such may appear the consequence at first sight.
A reward, it may be said, ought only to be be-
stowed upon the performance of the service to
which it has been promised; since it is only where
it has been foreseen that it can have operated as a
motive. Why then bestow it upon a service, how
useful and important soever, to which it has not
been promised ? The service you would have
been willing to purchase, at the expense of a
certain reward, has been happily rendered without
any engagement on your part to bear the expense.
Why therefore should any reward be bestowed ?
Why pretend to employ reward in the production
of an effect which has been produced w^ithout
it ? Is not this a useless employment of reward ?
Is not this an expenditure in pure waste ?
Certainly such an expense cannot be justified
as a means of producing an effect, which has by
the supposition already been produced ; but it may
213157
38 B.I. C». VI.— REMUNERATION EX POST FACTO.
be justified as serving to give birth to other effects
of a like nature, as likely to cause future services
to be rendered, which will agree with those that
are past ; at least in this, that they are services.
A reward which thus follows the service may be
stiled an ex post facto^ or unpromised reward. —
The Society of Arts has recognised and employed
this distinction. A reward bestowed in fulfilment
of a promise, upon the performance of a specified
service, is called o. premium. A reward bestowed
without previous promise, is called a bounty.
To make it a rule never to grant a reward which
has not been promised, is to tie up the hands of
true liberality, and to renounce all chance of re-
ceiving any new kind of service. There is only
one supposition which can justify this parsimony:
it is, that every service has been foreseen and en-
dowed beforehand. Whether legislation will ever
attain this perfection, 1 pretend not to know. It
lias not attained it as yet; and till it be attained,
Sovereigns may reckon liberality amongst the
number of their virtues.
Rewards, which in this manner are the fruits of
liberality, possess a great advantage over those
which are awarded in virtue of a promise. These,
confined to one object, operate only upon the
individual service specified. The genial influence
of the others extends over the whole theatre of
meritorious actions. These are useful in deter-
mining researches to a particular point; the others
present an invitation to extend them to everything
which the human mind can grasp. These are like
the water which the hand of a gardener directs to
a particular flower ; the others are like the dew
which is distilled over the whole surface of the
earth.
A promised reward, bestowed upon one who has
B.I. Cii. VI.— REMUNERATION EX POST FACTO. 39
not deserved it, is entirely lost. An unpromised
reward, thus improperly bestowed, is not necessa-
rily lost. The hand of liberality has been de-
ceived, but the utility of the reward is not altoge-
ther thrown away, whilst opj)ortunity is left for a
better application of it in future. Had Alexander
lavished upon the man who, to obtain his bounty,
exhibited his skill in darting grains of millet through
the eye of a needle, the rewards he bestowed upon
Aristotle, it would have been a proof of prodigality
and folly, whose effect would have been to mul-
tiply the race of mountebanks and jugglers. In
rewarding Aristotle he, without doubt, rewarded
much jargon, of no greater value than this man's
sleight of hand in darting millet ; but since, in
the midst of this jargon, a certain quantity of
useful, and at that time, new truth was found, the
rewards which this celebrated philosopher received
may justly be placed to the account of useful
liberality — their tendency was to multiply the
precious race of instructors of mankind — the race
of philosophers.
In fact, certain acts of liberality, which could
not be justified, considered as promised rewards,
may deserve more or less indulgence, may possess
a sort of utility of the same kind as that which
belongs to rewards not promised. Even the act
regarded as service may not strictly deserve to be
connected with reward, but the disposition dis-
played by the distributing hand in awarding a
recompense, may give birth to the expectation of
similar rewards for really meritorious service.
Rewardsbestowedin pursuance of a promise, may
be considered as conferred, according to a law be-
longing to the class of written laws; whilst unpro-
mised rewards, though not productive of similar
evils, may be considered as establishinga kind of law,
40
C.I. Ch. VI.— REMUNERATION EX POST FACTO.
or rather tacit rule, analogous to that established
by means of punishment, in what \s CAWed unwrilteii
law. It would be fortunate, indeed, if the penal
law might remain unwritten with as little inconve-
nience as remuneratory law. In the penal, and
even the commonly called civil branches, these
unwritten laws develop themselves by a train of
hardships, not to say of injuries, whilst the worst
which can happen in the remuneratory branch of
unwritten law is this, that, by reason of its being
unknown, it may become a tissue of useless
bounty.
Catherine II. did not allow the remuneratory
branch of her laws to be exposed even to this
danger, from which there is so little to be feared.
Had the hand of liberality been expanded — was
the dew of reward poured out upon the head of
merit — immediately inserted in the Gazette the
notification of the reward connected with the name
of the individual, and the service which had de-
served it was resounded throughout the most
distant and unfrequented parts of her vast empire.
It would have been altogether glorious, had she
hastened to give the same character of publicity
and certainty to those other branches of unwritten
law, in which it is required with so much greater
urgency ; and had she never conferred favours
which she would have blushed to see gazetted.
In England, a noble example of reward, e^: post
facto, was exhibited in connection with the first
establishment of mail coaches. The manager of a
provincial theatre having proposed to the minister
this plan for the better conveyance of letters, the
plan was received, and having been tried in one
part of the kingdom, it was afterwards extended
to the whole: and this service being in conse-
quence performed with a celer'ty and economy
B.l, C!i. VI.— REMUNERATION EX POST FACTO. 41
of which formerly there was no idea.* As a
reward, the inventor was appointed Comptroller-
General of the Post-office, with a salary of 1,600/.
per annum, besides a proportion of the savings.
A reward thus judicious and equitable, transports
us to the year 2440. •]* It is equivalent to a pro-
clamation to this effect: — " Men of genius and in-
dustry, employ your talents for the service of your
country ; exert yourselves to the utmost ; produce
your plans ; their reception shall depend alone
upon the opinion formed of their utility; your
country will not grudge the labour necessary for
their examination. Good intentions shall not be
treated with contempt ; you shall not be nick-
named projectors by the idle and the incapable.
Your plans shall not be disregarded because of
their authors ; they shall not be thrown aside
because they are extraordinary, provided they be
useful. Impartiality shall preside at their exami-
nation, and their utility shall be the measure of
your reward."
There may appear at first sight a discrepancy
between this and the immediately preceding chap-
ter, but it is only in appearance. I say here, no
less than heretofore, that the upright dispenser of
public treasures gives nothing. life buys or he
sells. With promised rewards he purchases be-
spoken, clearly defined, and limited services; with
unpromised rewards he purchases services unbe-
spoken, indeterminate, and infinite. The difficulty
in both cases consists in making a proper choice
of the action to be rewarded. This choice will
form the subject of subsequent consideration.
* SeeTraites de Legislation, torn. 2. ch. xi. (Ed. 1820.)
t L'art2440, by M. Mercierj a species of Utopian romance,
of which the idea was ingenious, but the execution weak.
[ 42 ]
CHAPTER VII.
MUNITION AND REMUNERATION THEIR
RELATIONS.
Wherefore, throughout the whole field of le-
gislation, cannot reward be substituted for punish-
ment ? Is hope a less powerful incentive to action
than fear ? When a political pharmacopoeia has
the command of both ingredients, wherefore em-
ploy the bitter instead of the sweet ?
To these natural but unreflecting enquiries, I
reply by a maxim that at first view may appear
paradoxical. " Reward ought never to be em-
ployed when the same effect can be produced by
punishment." And, in support of this paradox, I
employ another — " Let the means be penal and the
desired effect may be attained without giving birth
to suffering : let the means be remuneratory, and
suffering is inevitable."
.The oracular style, however, being no longer in
fashion, I shall in plain language give the solution
of this enigma.
When a punishment is denounced against the
breach of a law, if the law be not broken, no one
need be punished. When a reward is promised to
obedience, if every body obey the law, every body
ought to be rewarded. A demand for rewards is
thus created : and these rewards can only be de-
rived from the labour of the people, and contribu-
tions levied upon their property.
In comparing the respective properties of punish-
ment and reward, we shall find that the first is in-
^nite in quantity, powerful in its operation, and
cerlain\n its effect, so that it cannot be resisted.
B. I. Cii. VII.— PUNITION AND REMUNERATION, &c. 43
That the second is extremely limited in quantity,
oftentimes leeak in its operation, and at all times
uncertain in its effect: tiie desire atier it varying
exceedingly, according to the character and cir-
cumstances of individuals. We mav remark a^ain
that the prospect of punishment saddens, whilst
that of reward animates the mind ; that punishment
blunts, while reward sharpens the activity ; that
punishment diminishes energy, while reward aug-
men^;s it.
It is reward alone, and not punishment, which a
man ought to employ, when his object is to procure
services, the performance of which may or may
not be in the power of those with whom he has
to do. This considered, were it necessary to
draw a rough line between the provinces of re-
ward and punishment in a few words, we might
say, that punishment was peculiarly suited to
the production of acts of the negative stamp,
reward to the production of acts of the positive
stamp. To sit still and do nothing is in the power
of every man at all times : to perform a given ser-
vice is in many instances in the power of one indi-
vidual alone, and that only upon one individual oc-
casion. This arrangement of nature suits very well
with the unlimited plenitude of the fund of pu-
nishment on the one hand, and the limited ampli-
tude of the fund of reward on the other. The
negative acts, of which the peace and welfare of
mankind require the performance, are incessant and
innumerable, and must be exacted at the hands of
every man : the positive acts of which the perform-
ance is required, are comparatively few, perform-
able only by certain persons, and by them on certain
occasions only. Not to steal, not to murder, not
to rob, must be required at all times at the hands of
every man : to take the field for the purpose of
national defence, to occupy a place in the superior
44 B. I. Cu. VII.— MUNITION AND REMUNERATION, &c.
departments of executiveor legislative government,
are acts which it is neither necessary nor proper to
exact at the hands of more than a few, or of them
except on particular occasions. To discover a
specific remedy for a disease, to analize a mineral,
to invent a method of ascertaining a ship's longitude
within a given distance, to determine the quadra-
ture of such or such a curve, are works which, if
done by one man, need never be done again.
It is thus, also, with regard to such extraordi-
nary services as depend upon accident : such as
the giving of information when required, either in
the judicial or any other branch of administration.
Are you ignorant whether an individual is in pos-
session of the information in question, or if in pos-
session w^hether he is disposed to communicate it ?
Punishment would most probably be both ineffi-
cacious and unjust as a means of acquiring this
knowledge : resort then to reward.
In regard to extraordinary services depending
upon personal qualification, the impropriety of
punishment and propriety of reward is the greater,
when the utility of the service is susceptible of
an indeterminate degree of excellence ; as is the
case with works of literature, of science, and the fine
arts. In these cases reward not only calls forth into
exercise talents already existing, but even creates
them where they did not exist. It is the property
of hope, one of the modifications of joy, to put a
man, as the phrase is, into spirits, that is, to increase
the rapidity with which the ideas he is conversant
about succeed each other, and thus to strengthen
his powers of combination and invention by pre-
senting to him a greater variety of objects. The
stronger the hope, so that it have not the effect of
drawing the thoughts out of the proper channel,
the more rapid the succession of ideas ; the more
extensive and varied the trains formed by the prin-
B. 1. Ch. VII.— PUNITION and REMUNERiTION, &c. 45
ciple of association, the better fed, as it were, and
more vigorous will be the powers of invention.
In this state the attention is more steady, the ima-
gination more alert, and the individual elevated by
his success beholds the career of invention dis-
played before him, and discovers within himself
resources of which he had hitherto been ignorant.
On the one hand, let fear be the only motive that
prompts a man to exert himself, he will exert him-
self just so much as he thinks necessary to exempt
him from that fear and no more : but let hope be
the motive he will exert himself to the utmost,
especially if he have reason to think that the mag-
nitude of the reward, (or what comes to the same
thing) the probability of attaining it, will rise in
proportion to the success of his exertions.
Such is the nature of extraordinary services, that
it is neither practicable nor desirable for them to be
performed by a large multitude of persons. If pu-
nishment then were the means employed to induce
men to perform them, it would be necessary to pitch
upon some select persons as those on whom to im*
pose the obligation. But of the personal qualifica-
tions of individuals, the legislator, as such, can have
no knowledge. The case will also be nearly the
same, even with the executive magistrate, if the
number of the persons under his department is
considerable: for antecedently to specific experi-
ence in the very line in question, a man's personal
qualifications for any such extraordinary task are
not to be conjectured, a priori^ but from an intimate
acquaintance; such an acquaintance as it is im-
possible a man should have with a large number.
The consequence is, that among any multitude of
persons thus taken at random, the greater number
would not perform the task, because they would
not be able to perform it. But in this case, by the
supposition, they must all be punished : here there
46 B. I. ch. VII.— punition and remuneration, &c,
would be avast mass of punishment laid on in waste,
and perhaps the end not compassed after all : a
mass of punishment imparting beyond comparison
more pain than it would cost to provide a suificient
quantity of rewards.
On the other hand, let reward be employed, and
not an atom need be spent in waste; for it may be
easily so applied, and it is common so to apply it,
that it shall be bestowed in those instances only in
which the end is compassed : in those instances, in
which not only a benefit is attained, but a benefit
more than equivalent to the expense. By punish-
ment, a great expense would be incurred, and that
for the sake of a faint chance of success ; by reward,
a small expense is incurred, and that not without
a certainty of success.
Again, punishment in these cases would not
only be less likely to produce the requisite ef-
fect, but would have a tendency to prevent it.
How little soever the magistrate might be qua-
lified to collect and to judge of appearances of
capacity, for such appearances he would, how-
ever, naturally keep some sort of look out. To
exhibit those appearances would therefore be to
run a chance of incurring the obligation and the
punishment annexed to it. The consequence is
obvious: to make sure of not appearing qualified,
men would take care not to be so. We are told that,
in Siam,whenamanhasatreeof extraordinary good
fruit, it is seized for the king's use. If this be true,
we may vvell imagine gardening does not make any
very extraordinary progress in the neighbourhood of
the court of Siam. Nature must do much, for art we
may be certain will do nothing. We are told upon
better authority of a time when it was the custom
to give commissions to officers to look out for the
best singers, and press them into the king's service :
unless they were well paid at the same time, which
B, I. Ch. VII.— PUNITION and REMUNERATION, &c. 47
•
would have rendered the alarm occasioned by press-
ing needless, one would not give much to hear the
music of that day.
That selection which in cases like these is so im-
practicable in public, is not equally so in domestic
life. To parents and other preceptors, it is by no
means impracticable to make use of punishment as
a motive. They are enabled to use it, because the
intimacy of their acquaintance with their pupils in
general enables them to give a pretty good guess
at what they are able to perform. It may, perhaps,
even be necessary to have recourse 'to this incen-
tive : before the natural love of ease has been got
under by habit, and especially before the auxiliary
motive of the love of reputation has taken root, and
while the tender intellect has not as yet acquired
sufficient expansion and firmness to receive and
retain the impressions of distant pleasure.
I say perhaps, for it certainly might be practi-
cable to do with much less of this bitter recipe,
than in the present state of education is commonly-
applied. All apparatus contrived on purpose might
at least be spared. Towards providing a suffi-
cient stock of incentives for all purposes, a great
deal more might be done than is commonly done, in
the way of reward alone ; by a little ingenuity in the
invention, and a little frugality in the application ;
by establishing a constant connection between en-
joyment and desert ; granting little or nothing but
what is purchased; and thus transforming into re-
wards the whole stock of gratification, or at least
so much of it as is requisite. If punishment should
still be necessary, mere privations seem to afford in
all cases a sufficient store. A complete stock of in-
centives might thus be formed out of enjoyments
^lone: punishment, by the suspension of such as
48
B. I. ch. VII.— punition and remuneration, &c.
are habitual : reward, by the application of such as
occasionally arise.*
But even when applied by parents and preceptors,
punishment, how well soever it may succeed in
raising skill to its ordinary level, will never raise
it higher; one of the imperfections of punish-
ment remains still insuperable. Accordingly, in the
training of young minds to qualify them for the
achievement of extraordinary works of genius, the
business is best managed, and indeed, in a certain
degree is commonly managed, by punishments and
rewards together; in such sort, that in the earlier
part of man's career, and in the earlier stages of the
progress of talent, a mixture of punishments and
rewards both shall be employed : and that by de-
grees punishment shall be dropt altogether, and the
force employed consist of reward alone.
* See the chapter on Punishments and Rewards in Practical
Education, by Maria and Lovell Edgworth, a 'vvork which
ought to be in the hands of every parent.
No one who takes any interest in the public welfare, can be
unacquainted with the plans of education introduced by Mr.
Lancaster. Among other contrivances to which his success may
be attibruted, his system of rewards occupies a conspicuous
place. His school-room resembled a toy shop — little carriages,
wooden horses, kites, balls and drums, were suspended by ropes
or hung upon the posts, and the walls were ornamented with
halfpenny and penny prints. Every candidate for reward, thus,
had always before his eyes the object of his desire, and he knew
the piice he must pay for the possession of it. Among so large
a number of boys it has, however, been found necessary to
employ severer punishments than such as consist in a mere pri-
vation of pleasure ; those selected by Mr. Lancaster depend
exclusively upon the dread of shame, and have been made uni-
formly emblematical or cliaracteristic. Their efficacy far ex-
ceeds that of corporal punishment, which children are apt to
make it a point of honour to brave, which they habituate
themselves to suffer, or which inspires them with a decided
aversion for study.
B. I. Ch. VJI.— PUNITION AND REMUNERATION, &c.
49
There remain the case in which reward is pro-
per, because punishment, at least punishment alone,
would be unprofitable. By unprofitable, I mean
not efficacious, but uneconomical, unfrugal : the
interest of the whole community together being
taken into the account, not forgetting that of the
particular member on whom the burthen would be
to be imposed, and consequently the punishment,
in case of non-performance, be inflicted.
This seems to be the case with all those offices
which, standing alone, are offices of 7n ere burthen :
whether the party favoured be the public at large, or
any individual, or class of individuals: in all cases the
labourer is worthy of his hire, and unless it be when
every man must labour, no man ought to be made to
labour without his hire. The common soldier no
more than the general, the common seaman no more
than the admiral, the constable no more than the
judge.
True it is, that take any man for example, it
may with propriety be said, that the public has
a right to his services, has a right to command
his service's, for that the interest of any one man
ought to give way to the interest of all. But if
they be true as to any one man who happens to be
first taken, equally true is it of any other, and so
in succession of every man. On the one hand then,
each man is under an obligation to submit to any
burthen that shall be proposed ; on the other hand,
each man has an equal right to see the burthen im-
posed not upon himself, but upon some other. If
either of these propositions are taken in their
full extent, as much may be said in favour of the
one of them as of the other. In this case, if there
were no middle course to take, things must rest in
statu quo, the scale of utility must remain in equi-
librio, one man's interest weighing neither more nor
less than another's ; the burthen would be borne by
4
50 B. I. ch. VII.— punition and remuneration, &c.
nobody, and the immunity of each would be the
destruction of all. But there is a middle course
to take, which is, to divide the burthen and lay it
inequal proportion upon every man.
The principle is indisputable : the application of
it is not free from difficulties. There are many
cases in which the individual burthen cannot be
divided ; an office, the duties of which it requires
but one man to perform, cannot be divided amongst
a thousand. But a mass of profit may be formed
sufficient to counterbalance the inconvenience
which a man would sustain by bearing the office.
Let the requisite mass of profit be taken from the
general fund, and the burthen is distributed propor-
tionably amongst the different members of the
community.*
An expedient sometimes practised in these cases,
is, instead of distributing the burthen of the office,
to lay it on entire upon some one person, according
to lot. This prevents the injustice there would be
in laying it upon any one by design : but it does
not correct the inequality. The mischiefs of
partiality and injustice are obviated ; 'but not so
the sufferings of him upon whom the unfortunate
lot falls. The principle of utility is in this case
only partially followed.
It is one of those instances in which the principle
of utility would seem to have given occasion to a
wrong conclusion. According to this principle, it
is said that the interest of the minority ought to be
* This supposes the reward to consist in money : if a suffi-
cient reward can be provided out of honour and power, or
either of them without money, the burthen of it in the first
case is distributed of course among all the members of the
community over whom the honour gives him a precedence ; in
the last case it may be distributed, according to the nature of
the power, among all of them without distinction.
B. I. Ch. VII.— PUNITION AND REMUNERATION, &c. 51
sacrificed to that of the majority. The conclusion
is just, if it were impossible to act otherwise ; pal-
pably false, if it is. But to charge this as a defect
upon the principle itself, is as reasonable as it would
be to maintain that the art of book-keeping is a mis-
chievous art, because entries may be omitted.
We are now prepared for establishing a compa-
rison between punishment and reward.
1. Punishment is best adapted for restraint or
prevention : reward for excitement and produc-
tion : the one is a bridle, the other a spur.
2. In every case where very extensive mischief
may be produced by a single act, and particularly
in the case of such acts as may be performed at any
time, punishment is the only restraint to be de-
pended on ; such is the case of crimes in general.
When the act endeavoured to be produced is in an
eminent degree beneficial, it is proper to employ
reward alone, or to combine punishment with re-
ward, that the power of the governing motive may
be doubled.
3. Considering the abundance of the one, and
scarcity of the other, punishment is the only eli-
gible means of regulating the conduct of people in
general : reward ought to be reserved for directing
the actions of particular individuals. By punish-
ment, mischievous propensities are subdued; by
reward, valuable qualifications are improved. Pu-
nishment is an instrument for the extirpation of
noxious weeds : reward is a hot bed for raising
fruit, which would not otherwise be produced.
4. Necessity compels the employment of pu-
nishment : reward is a luxury. Discard the first,
and society is dissolved : discard the other, and it
still continues to subsist, though deprived of a por-
tion of its amenity and elegance.
5. In every case where the service is of such a
4.
62 B. I. ch. VII.— punition and remuneration, &c.
nature as, that no individual possessed of the qua-
lifications requisite for its performance can with
certainty be selected, the denunciation of punish-
ment would only produce apprehension and misery,
and its application be but so much injury inflicted
in wanton waste.
In every such case offer a reward, and it travels
forth in quest of hidden or unknown talents : even
if it fail in its search, it produces no evil, not an
atom of it is lost : it is given only when the service
is performed, when the advantage obtained either
equals or surpasses the expense.
By the help of these observations, we shall be
enabled to appreciate the opinion of those politi-
cians, who, after a superficial examination of this
subject, condemn legislators in general for the spar-
ing use made of the matter of reward.
The author of The Wealth of Nations^ who has
displayed such extraordinary saofacity in all his
researches, has upon this point been led away by
mistaken notions of humanity. Fear (says he) is
in almost all cases a miserable instrument of govern-
ment * It is an instrument which has oftentimes
been much perverted from its proper use ; but it is
a necessary instrument, and the only one applica-
ble to the ordinary purposes of society.
A young king, in the first ardour for improve-
ment, having resolved to purge his kingdom from
all crimes, was not satisfied with this alone. His
natural gentleness was shocked at the idea of em-
ploying punishment. He determined to abolish it
altogether, and to effect every thing by reward.
He began with the crime of theft : but, in a short
time, all his subjects were entitled to reward, all of
them were honest. Everv day they were entitled
* Wealth of Nations, 13. v. Ch. i.
B, I. Ch. VII.— PUNITION and REMUNERATION, &c. 53
to new rewards, their honesty remained inviolate.
A scheme for preventing smuggling was proposed
to him. "Wise king/' it was said, " for every penny
that ought to be paid into your treasury, give two,
and the hydra is vanquished.^' The victory was
certain, but he perceived that like that of Pyrrhus
it would be somewhat costly.
A distinction which exists between domestic
and political government may be here worth no-
ticing. No sovereign is so rich as to be able to
effect every thing by reward. There is no parent
who may not. At Sparta, a bit of black bread was
the reward of skill. The stock of pleasures and of
wants is an inexhaustible fund of reward in the
hands of those parents who know how to employ
it.
[ 54 ]
CHAP. VIII.
REMUNERATION WHERE HURTFUL.
A REWARD is mischievous when its tendency
is to produce offences, or to give birth to noxious
dispositions.
To offer a reward to an individual as an induce-
ment to him to commit an act prohibited by law,
is to attempt to suborn him ; the offence may be
called suhornation. Upon the present occasion,
this illegal subornation is not the subject of con-
sideration. The rewards, of which we are about
to speak, have a corruptive tendency, but do not
possess the character of crimes ; they are autho-
rized by custom, sanctioned by the laws, and
given and received without disguise, without
criminal intention: the evil is done with a pure
conscience, and often with the public approbation.
They are the result of erroneous conceptions, the
effects of universal prejudice, or long-established
habits which, as Montaigne says, blunts the acute-
ness of the judgment.
The present is one of those extremely delicate
topics, in respect of which it may be more pru-
dent to put the reader in the path of truth, and
leave him to travel by himself in quest of disco-
veries, than going through the subject in detail to
wound established opinions, or interfere with
individual interests. Without restricting myself
to any precise order, I shall therefore exhibit some
few examples in which the mischievous tendency
is too palpable to admit of denial, and 1 shall
B. I. ch. VIII.— remuneration— where hurtful. 55
begin with an incontrovertible maxim, which will
furnish the criterion of which we are upon the
present occasion in search for distinguishing good
from evil.
Upon all occasions avoid bestowing anything in
the shape of reward which ?nai/ tend to interfere
with the performance of duty.
According to this rule, a judge ought not to
find himself interested in the prolongation of law
proceedings — the minister of state in the promo-
tion of wars — the superintendant in promoting
expense — the moral preceptor in setting an exam-
ple of insincerity — the man of letters in maintain-
ing mischievous prejudices at the expense of truth.
The more narrowly we scrutinize into the sources
of public evils, the more thoroughly shall we be
convinced that they ought to be attributed to the
neglect of this fundamental rule.
In support of this maxim, it is not necessary to
ascribe to men in general an extraordinary procli-
vity towards corruption. Ordinary prudence and
probity are sufficient to enable a man to resist
temptations to crimes, or to lead him to abstain
from whatever is reputed dishonourable ; but it
requires somewhat more than ordinary honesty
and prudence to be proof against the seductions
of an interest that acts with continual energy, and
whose temptations are not opposed either by the
fear of legal punishment, or the condemnation of
public opinion : to yield to such temptations, it is
only necessary for him to follow in the beaten
track, in which he will be cheered by the presence
of a multitude of fellow travellers, and encouraged
by the example of his superiors. To resist these
seductions, he must expose himself to the impu-
tation of singularity, he must proclaim that he is
better than others, he must condemn his col-
56 B. I. ch. viiL— remuneration— where hurtful.
leagues and predecessors, and be bold enough to
make an exhibition of his probity. Such magna-
nimity is not altogether unexampled, but we must
not reckon upon prodigies. There are even some
cases in which by its secresy this seductive inter-
est is so much the more mischievous ; it operates
like a concealed magnet, and produces errors in
the moral conduct against which there has been
no previous warning. We have said that the
iesfislator oudit to endeavour to combine interest
with duty ; for a still stronger reason ought he to
avoid as much as possible everything that yields
to the public functionary a certain or a casual, a
known or an unknown profit, resulting from the
omission or violation of his duties ; we now pro-
ceed to give a few examples.
In England, the superior judges, beside their
ample salaries, which it would be improper to
grudge them, receive certain fees which it is im-
possible not to grudge them ; since it is from this
source alone that they can generally be considered
liable to corruption, and that so much the more
easily, since they may be subject to its influence
without themselves perceiving it. These fees are
multiplied in proportion to the incidents of proce-
dure, the multiplication of which incidents pro-
portionably increases the expense and delay of
obtaining justice. In one case, a judge receives
nearly 4/. for tying for six months, or a year, the
hands of justice, and this in one of those cases in
which indolence adds her seductions to those of
avarice, and the whole is eflected in the presence
of no other witnesses than such as are urged on-
ward by a still stronger interest to aggravate the
abuse.
Another example from among a thousand : un-
der the Lord Chancellor, there are twelve subor-
B.I. Ch.VIII.— REMUNERATION— WHERE HURTFUL. 57
dinate judges called Masters in Chancery. When
an account is to be taken before them, the follow-
ing is the mode of procedure : — The attornies on
the one side and the other ought to appear before
the master, either alone or in company, with
counsel, as may be convenient. First summons;
nobody appears. Second summons ; nobody ap-
pears. At length, third summons, the parties
appear, and the matter is put into train. Care,
however, has been taken to allow only half an
hour, or an hour, to each set of suitors. The
parties are not always punctual; the matter is
begun, the clock strikes, and then the matter is dis-
missed. At the following hearing it is necessary
to begin again. All this is matter of etiquette.
At each summons, the fees to the judges and the
counsel are renewed. All the world must live.
Extortion, it is said, is to be banished from the
dwellings of finance. At some future day, per-
haps, it will not be found a fitting guest for the
Temple of Justice — it will be deemed advisable to
chase it thence.
In England as elsewhere, it is asked, why
law-suits are eternal? The lawyers say it is
owing to the nature of things. Other people say
it is the fault of the lawyers. The above two
little traits, which are as two grains of sand picked
up in the deserts of Arabia, may assist the judg-
ment as to the causes of delay in such pro-
cedures.
3. Previously to the year 1782, the emoluments
of the paymaster of the army, whose duty as such
consisted in signing, or knowing how to sign, his
name, were considerably higher in time of war
than in time of peace, being principally constituted
of a per centage on the money expended in his
58 B.I. Ch.VIII.— REMUNERATION— WHERE HURTFUL.
department. This great officer, however, always
found himself a Member of Parliament, and it is
believed he was thus paid, not for signing, or
knowing how to sign, his name, but for talking and
knowing how to talk. Upon a question of peace
or war, the probity of this orator must have found
itself in somewhat an awkward predicament, con-
tinually besieged as it must have been by Bellona
with the offer of an enormous revenue, which was
to cease immediately he suffered himself to be cor-
rupted by Peace. When the question of econo-
mical reform was upon the carpet, this place was
not forgotten. It was generally felt at that time,
that so decided an opposition between interest and
duty was calculated to produce the most perni-
cious consequences. The emoluments of peace
and war were, therefore, equalized by attaching a
fixed salary to the office, and the same plan was
adopted with respect to various other offices.
In running over the list of functionaries, from
the highest to the lowest, one cannot but be
alarmed at the vast proportion of them who watch
for war as for a prey. It is impossible to say to
what a degree, by this personal interest, the most
important measures of Government are determined.
It cannot be supposed that ministers of state,
generals, admirals, or members of parliament, are
influenced, in the slightest degree, by a vile pe-
cuniary interest. All these honourable persons
possess probity as well as wisdom, so that a trifle
of money never can produce the slightest influence
upon their conduct, not even the effect of an atom
upon the immoveable mass of their probity. The
mischief is, that evil-minded persons are not con-
vinced by their assertion, but continue to repeat,
that — " The honesty which resists temptation is
B.I. Ch.VIII.— REMUNERATION— WHERE HURTFUL. o9
most noble, but that which flies from it is most
secure." *
4. In public and private works of all descrip-
tions, it is customary to pay the architect a per
centage upon the aggregate amount expended.
This arrangement is a good one, when the sum to
be expended is fixed : there is danger in the con-
* " Judge A. has a noble soul," was one day said to me by
one of his friends 5 " this is what he told me was the difference
between himself and Judge B. Consider him well ; he will
never listen to a single word which has the slightest connec-
tion with any suit which may be brought before him, unless in
open court ; he fears lest he should be misled, so weak is he :
he has told me so himself. Whilst, as to me, a suitor might
whisper in my ear, from morning till night, and might as well
have been talking to a deaf man."
I would not insinuate the least suspicion against the valorous
judge ; had I been constrained to form one, it would have been
dissipated by the elogium he bestowed upon his friend.
The heroism of Lord Hale, the model of the English judges,
took a contrary direction. It had been customary, when upon
the circuit, for the judge to receive from the sheriff a certain
number of loaves of sugar. On one occasion a sheriff, who
happened to have a suit which was to be tried before him,
waited upon his lordship, and, as was customary, presented his
sugar : Hale would not receive it. The other judge, if he
had been consistent, would have taken sugar from everybody.
General Rule. — When an honest man is desirous of estab-
lishing his honesty, he ought to employ proofs which will
serTe only for this purpose, and not such as dishonesty alone
can be interested in causing to be received.
Before an assembly of the Roman people, it was required
of Scipio that he should render his accounts. His answer
was — " Romans, on such a day I gained a victory : let U3
ascend to the Capitol, and return thanks to the Gods." His
quietus was granted immediately, and since that day, besides
allowing that Scipio was a great warrior, all the historians
have been assured of the correctness of his accounts. As to
me, had I lived at that time, most probably I should have gone
up with the rest to the Capitol, but I should always have
attained a little curiosity with respect to the accounts.
60 B. [. Ch.VIII.— REMUNERATION— WHERE HURTFUL.
trary case, since the greater the expense the
greater is the architect's pecuniary profit.
5. Veracity is one of the most important bases
of human society. The due administration of
justice absolutely depends upon it; whatever
tends to weaken it, saps the foundations of mora-
lity, security, and happiness. The more we reflect
on its importance, the more we shall be astonished
that legislators have so indiscreetly multiplied the
operations which tend to weaken its influence.*
When the possession of the revenues, or other
privileges attached to a certain condition of life,
depends upon the previous performance of certain
acts which are required at entering upon that
condition, these privileges cannot fail to operate
upon individuals as incentives to the performance
of those acts : the effect produced is the same as if
they were attached to such performance under the
title of reward.
If among the number of these acts, promises
which are never performed are required under
the sanction of an oath, these privileges or other
advantages can only be regarded as rewards
offered for the commission of perjury. If among
the number of these acts it is required, that
certain opinions which are not believed should
be pretended to be believed, these advantages are
neither more nor less than rewards offered for in-
sincerity. But the sanction of an oath once con-
temned, is contemned at all times. Oaths may
afterwards be observed, but they will not be ob-
served because they are oaths.
In the university of Oxford, among whose
members the greater number of ecclesiastical be-
* See Traites de Legislation, torn. 2, ch. xviii. (Ed. 1820.)
Emploi du mobile de la Religion.
B.I. Ch.VIII.— REMUNERATION— WHERE HURTFUL. 61
nefices are bestowed, and which even for laymen
is the most fashionable place of education, when a
young man presents himself for admission, his
tutor who is generally a clergyman, and the vice-
chancellor who is also a clergyman, put into his
hands a book of statutes, of which they cause him
to swear to observe every one. At the same time,
it is perfectly well known to this vice-chancellor
and to this tutor, that there never has been any
person who was able to observe all these statutes.
It is thus, that the first lesson this young man
learns, and the only lesson he is sure to learn, is a
lesson of perjury.*
Nor is this all ; his next step is to subscribe, in
testimony of his belief, to a dogmatical formulary
composed about two centuries ago, asserted by
the Church of England to be infallibly true, and
by most other churches believed to be as infallibly
false. By this expedient, one class of men is ex-
cluded, while three classes are admitted. The class
excluded is composed of men who, either from a
sense of honour, or from conscientious motives,
cannot prevail upon themselves publicly and deli-
berately to utter a lie. The classes admitted con-
sist — 1. Of those who literally believe these dog-
mas — 2. Of those who disbelieve them — 3. Of
those who sign them as they would sign the
Alcoran, without knowing what they sign, or
what they think about it. A nearly similar prac-
tice is pursued at Cambridge, and from these
two sources the clergy of the Church of England
is supplied.
Socrates was accused as a corrupter of youth.
What was meant by this accusation 1 know not.
* See further upon this subject in Mr. Bentham's work,
entitled. Swear not at all.
62 B.I. Ch.VIII.— REMUNERATION— WHERE HURTFUL.
But this I know, that to instruct the young in
falsehood and perjury, is to corrupt them; and
that the benefit of all the other lessons they can
learn can never equal the mischief of this instruc-
tion.*
6. It may be enquired, whether rewards or other
advantages ought to be offered for the defence of
any opinion in matters of theory or science, or any
other subject upon which opinions are divided?!
If the question be one of pure curiosity, the worst
that can happen will be that the reward will be ex-
pended in waste. But if the opinion thus favoured
happen to be a false one and at the same time
mischievous, the reward will be productive of uri-
mixed evil. But whether it be a question of curi-
osity or use, if truth be the object desired, the
chance of obtaining it is not so great as when the
candidates for reward are allowed to seek it where-
soever it may be to be found. If error is to be de-
fended, to offer a reward for its defence, would be
one if not the only method to be adopted. Who
is there that does not perceive that to obtain true
testimony, it is inexpedient to offer a reward to the
witness who shall depose upon a given side ? Who
does not know that the constant effect of such an
offer is to discredit the cause of him who makes it?
If then anything is to be gained by such partiality,
it can only be by error ; truth can only be a loser
by such partial reward.
This practice is attended with another and more
manifest inconvenience; it is that of causing opi-
nions to be professed which are not believed ; of
inducing a truculent exchange not only of truth,
but of sincerity, for money.
I do not know if governments ought even to
* See Appendix (A) t See Appendix (B)
B.I. Ch.VIIL— REMUNERATION— WHERE HURTFUL. 63
permit individuals to offer rewards upon these con-
ditions. To establish error, to repudiate truth, to
suborn falsehood : these, in a few words, are the
effects of all rewards established in favour of one
system to the exclusion of all others.
7. Charity is ever an amiable virtue ; but if in-
judiciously employed, is liable to produce more
evil than good. Hospitals inconsiderately multi-
plied ; regular distributions of provisions, such as
were formerly made at the doors of many convents
in Spain and Italy, tend to habituate a large pro-
portion of the people to idleness and beggary. A
reward thus offered to indolence, impoverishes the
state and corrupts the people. Luxury (and I annex
to this word whatever meaning, except that of pro-
digality, people choose to give to it) luxury, that
pretended vice so much reprobated by the envious
and melancholic, is the steady and natural bene-
factor of the human species : it is a master who is
always doing good, even when he aims not at it ;
he rewards only the industrious. Charity is also a
benefactor, but great circumspection is required
that it may prove so.
8. There is another manner in which reward
may be mischievous : by acting in opposition to the
service required, when, for example, the emolu-
ments attached to an office are such as to afford the
means and temptation not to fulfil the duties of it.
In such a case, what may appear a paradox is not
the less a great truth : the whole does less ihan a
part; by paying too much, the sovereign is less
effectually served. But this subject belongs natu-
rally to the head of salaries,
9. Whatever weakens the connexion between
punishments and offences, operates in proportion as
an encouragement to the commission of offences.
64 B.I. Ch.VIII.-REMUNERATION— WHERE HURTFUL.
It has the effect of a reward offered for their perpe-
tration, for whether the inducement to commit
offences is augmented, or the restraining motives
are debilitated, the result in both cases is the
same.
Thus, a tax on justice is an indirect reward
offered for injustice. The same is the case with
respect to all technical rules, by which, indepen-
dently of the merits, nullities are introduced into
contracts and into procedure ; of every rule that
excludes the evidence of a witness, the only de-
pository of the fact upon which depends the due
administration of justice. In a word, it is the same
with everything that tends to loosen the connexion
between injury and compensation, between the
violation of the law and punishment.
If we open our eyes we shall behold the same
legislators establishing rewards for informers, and
taxes and fees upon law proceedings : they desire
that the first should induce men to render them
services of which they stand in need, whilst the
latter tend to weaken the natural disposition which
is felt to render these same services. At the
threshold of the tribunal of justice are placed a bait
and a bugbear — the bait operates upon the few, the
bugbear upon the multitude.
10. There are cases in which to avoid a greater
inconvenience, it has been found necessary to dis-
pose of the matter of reward in such manner as
that it shall operate as a reward for the most atro-
cious crime ; yet, in spite of the force of the
temptation, this crime is almost unexampled. I
allude to the rule established with respect to suc-
cessions. Happily, whatever may be the force of
the seductive motives in this case, the tutelary
motives act in full concert with all their energy.
B.I. Ch.VIII.— REMUNERATION— WHERE HURTFUL. G5
There are many men who for a trifling personal
benefit, for an advance in rank, or even to gratify
their spleen, would, without scruple, use their
utmost exertions to produce a war that would cost
the lives of two or three hundred thousand of their
fellow creatures ; while among these men there
would not be found perhaps one, who, though he
were set free from the dread of legal punishment,
could be induced for a much greater advantage, to
attempt the life of a single individual, and still less
the life of a parent whose death would put him
in possession of a fortune or a title.
But though laws cannot be framed for its com-
plete removal, nothing which can be done without
inconvenience ought to be left undone towards the
diminution of this danger. The persons most ex-
posed to become its victims, are those who are ne-
cessarily placed under the control of others, such
as infants and women. It is under the guidance of
this principle, that our laws in some cases have
selected as guardians those persons upon whom no
interest can devolve in the way of succession.
Under the laws of Sweden, precautions of the same
description are observed; and it has been else-
where shown that this consideration furnishes one
of the arguments in favour of the liberty of
divorce.*
Contracts relating to insurance furnish another
instance of the same danger. These contracts, in
other respects so beneficial, have given birth to a
new species of crime. A man insures a ship or
a house at a price greatly beyond its value, with the
intention of setting fire to the house or causing the
ship to be lost, and then under pretence of com-
pensation for the loss of which he is the author,
* Traites de Legislation, torn. i. p. 346 (Ed. 1S20).
5
66 B.I. Ch.VIIL— REMUNERATION-WHERE HURTFUL.
claims the money for which the insurance is made.
Thus one of the most beneficial inventions of civi-
lized society is converted into a premium for dis-
honesty, and a punishment to virtuous industry.
Had the commission of this crime been attended
with less risk, or been less difficult to conceal, this
most admirable contrivance for softening inevitable
calamities must have been abandoned.
[ 07 ]
CHAPTER IX.
REMUNERATION — WHERE NEEDLESS.
Factitious reward is superfluous, whenever
natural reward is adequate to produce the desired
effect.
Under this head may be classed all inventions
in the arts which are useful to individuals, and
whose products may become articles of commerce.
Tn the ordinary course of commerce the inventor
vyill meet with a natural reward exactly propor-
tionate to the utility of his discovery, and which
will unite within itself all the qualities which can
be desired in a factitious reward. After the most
mature consideration, no sovereign can find ano-
ther measure so exact as is thus afforded by the
free operations of trade. All that the govern-
ment has to do is to secure for a time, to the in-
ventor, whatever benefit his discovery may yield.
This is generally done by the grant of an exclusive
privilege, or patent. Of this we shall elsewhere
speak more in detail.
Not many years ago a grant of 3000/. was made
by Parliament to a physician for the discovery
of a yellow dye. That money might, without
doubt, have been worse employed: but the re-
ward was unnecessary: — for this discovery, as for
all others in the arts, the proper test of its utility
would have been its use in manufactures and
commerce. The grant of a determinate sum w^as
a loss either to the inventor or to the public: to
the inventor, if it were less than he would have
gained under a patent : to the public, if it were
more. In a word, wherever patents for inventions
5.
68 B.I. Ch.IX.— REMUNERATION— WHERE NEEDLESS,
are in use, factitious reward is either groundless or
superfluous.*
1 shall elsewhere treat of the encouragements to
be given to the arts and sciences. Upon the pre-
sent occasion all that 1 shall observe is, that the
greater the progress they have made, the less ne-
cessary is it to tax the public for their support. In
this country, for example, if the exclusive pro-
perty in his work be secured to an author, a
reward is at the same time secured to him pro-
portionate to the service he has performed ; at
least in every branch of amusement or instruction
that yields a sufficient class of readers. There is
no patron to be compared with the public; and
by the honour with its other rewards which it be-
stows, this patronage has a decided advantage over
any that can be received from any other source.
With respect to the rewards, that in some Euro-
pean states have been bestowed upon poets, the
amount of them is so insignificant as to save them
from the severe scrutiny to which they might,
under other circumstances, have found themselves
* Parliament has granted, in two several sums, W.OOOl.
to Dr. .Tenner, so celebrated by his invention or introduction
of the system of vaccination. This may be considered, per-
haps, rather as an indemnification than a reward, at least than
a reward proportionate to the service : I say indemnification,
because the labour, the researches, the correspondence, the
time employed in committing to writing, in teaching and in
establishing, his new system, were so many sacrifices of the
profits of his profession. As to the natural reward that he
gained by his discovery it was nothing : it impoverished instead
of enriching him. The liberality with which the physicians
throughout Europe, have encouraged a discovery that has
lopped off one of the most lucrative branches of their profes-
sion, is a most honourable feature in the annals of medicine.
When shall we see the lawyers entering into rivalship with
them, by the discovery and propagation of the most simple
and expeditious mode of legal procedure ?
B.I. Ch. IX.— REMUNERATION— WHERE NEEDLESS. gQ
exposed. There are some countries in which the
relish for literature is confined to such small num-
bers, that it may, upon the whole, be beneficial to
encoura2:e it bv factitious rewards. But if we
consider how intense are the enjoyments of the
man born with poetic talents, the sudden reputa-
tion that it produces, and the ample profit that
it often yields, especially in the dramatic line, it
will be found, that the natural rewards attached to
it are far from being inconsiderable ; and that, at
least, our attention ought, in the first place, to be
directed to the department of the sciences, the
approaches to which are repulsive and the utility
of which are indisputable. Happiness depends
upon the correctness of the facts with which
our mind is furnished, and the rectitude of our
judgment; but poetry has no very direct ten-
dency to produce either correctness of know-
ledge, or rectitude of judgment. For one instance
in which it has been employed to combat mis-
chievous prejudices, a thousand might be cited in
which they have been fostered and propagated by
it. Homer is the greatest of poets : where shall
we place him among moralists ? Can any great
advantage be derived from the imitation of his
gods and heroes ? 1 do not condemn prizes for
poetry where the object is to excite youthful emu-
lation : I only desire that serious and truly useful
pursuits may receive a proportionate encourage^
ment.
[ 70 ]
CHAPTER X.
PROPORTION AS TO REWARDS.
In conferring reward, the observance of exact
rules of proportion is not nearly of the same import-
ance, as in the infliction of punishment. These
rules cannot, however, be neglected with impunity.
If too great a reward be held out for a given service,
competitors will be attracted from more useful pur-
suits. If too little, the desired service will either
not be rendered or will not be rendered in perfec-
tion.
Rule I. The aggregate value of the natural and
factitious reward, ought not to be less than suffi-
cient to outweigh the burthen of the service.
Rule II. Factitious rewards may be diminished
in proportion, as natural rev\'ards are increased.
These two rules present three subjects to our
observation — 1. The natural burthens attached to
the service. 2. The natural rewards which either
do or do not require factitious reward to supply
their deficiency. 3. The drawback, more or less
hidden, which in a variety of cases alters the ap-
parent value of the reward.
The natural burthens of any particular service,
may be comprised under the following heads : the
intensity of labour required in its performance,
— the ulterior uneasiness which may arise from
its particular character, — the physical danger at-
tending it, — the expenses or other sacrifices neces-
sarily made previously to its exercise, — the discredit
attached to it, — the peculiar enmities it produces.
The wages of labour in different branches of trade,
are regulated in exact proportion to the combina-
tion of these several circumstances. To the legis-
B. I. Ch. X,— PROPOllTION AS TO REWARDS. 71
lator, however, except in cases where it may be
necessary to add factitious to natural reward, con-
siderations of this sort are in general subjects only
of speculation.*
That any particular service is more or less highly
priced, is of little importance : it affects the indivi-
duals only who stand in need of it. The competi-
tion between those w^ho want and those who can
supply, fixes the price of all services in the most
fitting manner. It is sufficient that the demand
be public and free. To assist, if necessary, in giving
publicity to the demand and in maintaining reci-
procal liberty in such transactions, is all that the
legislator ought to do.
2. Natural rewards are liable to be insufficient
in relation to services, whose utility extends to the
whole community, without producing particular
advantage to any one individual more than another.
Of this nature are public employments. It is true,
many public employments are attended by natural
rewards in the shape of honour, power, the means
of serving ones connections, and deserving the
public gratitude, and when these rewards are suffi-
cient, factitious rewards are superfluous. To their
ambassadors and many others of their great officers
of state, the Venetians never gave any pecuniary
reward. In England, the public functions of she-
riffs and justices of the peace, are generally dis-
charged by opulent and independent individuals,
whose only reward consists in the respect and
power attached to those offices.
3. There are many circumstances which may
diminish the value ofareward without being gene-
rally known beforehand, but against all of which
* In The Wealth of Nations, b. i. ch. 10. The circumstances
which cause the rate of wages to vary in different employ-
ments, arc analysed with the sagacity which characterizes the
father of political economy.
72 B. 1. ch. X.— proportion as to rewards.
it is proper to guard. Does tiie reward consist of
money, its value may be diminislied by a burthen
of the same nature, or by a burthen in the shape of
honour. Honour and money may even be seen at
strife with one another, as well as with themselves.
By these means the value of a reward may some-
times be reduced to nothing and even become
negative.
In this country where, properly speaking, there
is no public prosecutor, many offences, which no
individual has any peculiar interest in prosecuting,
are liable to remain unpunished. In the way of
remedy, the law offers from 10/. to 20/. to be levied
upon the goods of the offender, to whoever will
successfully undertake this function: sometimes it ,
is added, that the expenses will be repaid in case
of conviction : sometimes this is not promised.
These expenses may amount to thirty, fifty and
even one hundred pounds ; it is seldom they are
so iittle as twenty pounds. After this, can we be
surprised that the laws are imperfectly obeyed ?
It maybe added, that it is considered dishonour-
able to attend to this summons of the laws. An in-
dividual who, in this manner, endeavours to serve
his country is called an informer, and lest public
opinion should not be sufficient to brand him with
infamy, the servants of the law and even the laws
themselves have, on some occasions, endeavoured
to fix the stain. The number of private prosecu-
tors would be much more numerous if, instead of
the insidious offer of a reward, an indemnification
were substituted. The dishonourable offer being
suppressed, the dishonour itself would cease. And
who can say, when, by such an arrangement, the
circumstance which offends it is removed, whether
honour itself may not be pressed into the service
of the laws ?
There is another case in which, by the negli-
B.I. Ch.X.— PROPORTION AS TO REWARDS. 73
gence of legal and official arrangements, a consider-
able and certain expense is attached to and made
to precede a variable and uncertain reward. A
new idea presents itself to some workman or artist.
Knowing that the laws grant to every inventor a
privilege to enable him exclusively to reap the
profits of his invention, he enjoys by anticipation
his success, and labours to perfect his invention.
Having in the prosecution of his discovery con-
sumed, perhaps, the greater part of his property
and his life, his invention is complete. He goes,
with a joyful heart, to the public office to ask for
his patent. But what does he encounter ? Clerks,
lawyers, and officers of state, who reap beforehand
the fruits of his industry. This privilege is not
given, but is, in fact, sold for from 100/. to 200/.:
sums greater perhaps than he ever possessed in his
life. He finds himself caught in a snare, which
the law, or rather extortion, which has obtained
the force of law, has spread for the industrious
inventor. It is a tax levied upon ingenuity, and no
man can set bounds to the value of the services ;
it may have lost to the nation.
Rule HI. Reward should be adjusted in such a
manner to each particular service, that for every
part of the benefit there maybe a motive to induce
a man to give birth to it.
In other words, the value of the reward ought
to advance, step by step, with the .value of the
service. This rule is more accurately followed
in respect of rewards than of punishments. If a
man steals a quantity of corn, the punishment is
the same whether he steal one bushel or ten ; but
when a premium is given for the exportation of
corn, the amount of the premium bears an exact
proportion to the amount exported. To be con-
74 B. I. Crt. X.— PROPORTION AS TO REWARDS.
sistent in matters of legislation, the scale ought
to be as regular in the one case as in the other.
The utility of this rule is put beyond doubt, by
the difference that may be observed between the
quantity of work performed by men employed by
the day and men employed by the piece. When a
ditch is to be dug, and the work is divided between
one set of men working by the day, and another
set working by the piece, there is no difficulty in
predicting which set will have finished first.
Hope and, perhaps, emulation are the motives
which actuate the labourer by the piece: the motive
which actuates the labourer by the day is fear: fear
of being discharged in case of manifest and extra-
ordinary idleness.
It must not however be forgotten, that there are
many sorts of work, in respect of which it is im-
proper to adopt this mode of payment ; which
tends indeed to produce the greatest quantity of
labour, but at the same time is calculated to give
birth to negligence and precipitation. This method
ought only to be employed in cases where the
quality of the work can easily be discerned, and
its imperfections (if any) detected.
The value of a reward may be increased or
diminished, in respect of certainty as well as
amount : when, therefore, any services require
frequently renewed efTorts, it is desirable that
each effort should render the probability of its
attainment more certain.
Arrangements should be made for connecting
services with reward, in such manner that the at-
tainment of the reward shall remain uncertain, with-
out however ceasing to be more probable than the
contrary event. The faculties of the individual
emj)loyed will thus naturally be kept upon the
B.I. Ch.X.— PROPORTION AS TO REWARDS. 75
full Stretch. This is accomplished when a com-
petition is established between two or more per-
sons, and a reward is promised to that one who
shall render service in the most eminent degree,
whether it respect the quantity or the quality of
the service proposed.
Rule IV. When two services come in competi-
tion, of which a man cannot be induced to perform
both, the reward for the greater service ought to
be sufficient to induce him to prefer it to the less.
In a certain country matters are so arranged,
that more is to be gained by building ships on the
old plan than by inventing better ; by taking one
ship than by blockading a hundred; by plundering
at sea than by fighting ; by distorting the established
laws than by executing them ; by clamouring for
or against ministers, than by showing in what
manner the laws may be improved. It must how-
ever be admitted, that in respect of some of these
abuses, it would be difficult to prescribe the proper
remedy.
By what method can competition between two
services be established? The individual from whom
they are required must, either from personal quali-
fications or external circumstances, have it in his
power to render either the one or the other. It is
proper to distinguish the cases in which this posi-
tion is transient from those in which it is permanent.
It is in thefirst that the fault committed, by suffer-
ing disproportion to subsist, is most irreparable.
During the American war, upwards of an hun-
dred ships were, at one time, in one of the har-
bours of the revolted colonies. It was of great
importance that they should be kept in a state of
blockade, since many of them were loaded with
military stores. An English captain received
76 B. I. ch. X.— proportion as to rewards.
orders to blockade them. Sufficiently skilled in
arithmetic, and in proverbs, to know that two or
three birds in his cage were worth a hundred in the
bush, he acted as the greater number of men would
have acted in his place. He stood off to a suffi-
cient distance to give the enemy hopes of escaping :
as soon as they had quitted the harbour, he re-
turned, captured half-a-dozen, and the rest pro-
ceeded to their destination. I do not answer for
the truth of this anecdote; but true or not true, it
is equally good as an apologue. It exhibits one
of the fruits of that inconsiderate prodigality,
which grants, without discrimination, the produce
of their captures to the captors.
Another example. A man who has influence
obtains the command of a frigate, with orders to
go upon a cruise. The command of a first-rate is
accepted by those only who cannot obtain a frigate.
It is thus that interest is put in competition with
duty: cupidity with glory. There are doubtless
not wanting noble minds by whom the seductions
of sinister interest are resisted : but wherefore
should they be so much exposed to what it is so
difficult to resist ?
It is true, that their ears may not be altogether
insensible to the call of honour; the law has be-
stowed pecuniary rewards upon the captors of
armed vessels, — another example, where one in-
stance of profusion has created the necessity of a
second, — but these rewards are still unequal : the
chase of doves is more advantageous than the pur-
suit of eagles.
The remedy would be to tax, and tax heavily,
the profits of lucrative cruises, to form a fund of
reward in favour of dangerous, or merely useful
expeditions. By this arrangement, the country
u. I. ch. X.— proportion as to rewards. '^'7
would be doubly benefited, the service would be
rendered more attractive, and conducted with more
economy. It may be true, that if this tax were
deducted from the share of the seamen, their
ardour might be cooled. Neither in value or in
number are their prizes in this lottery susceptible
of diminution ; but though this be true with
respect to the lower ranks of the profession, ought
we to judge in the same manner of the superior
officers, whose minds are elevated as their rank,
and on whose conduct the performance of the duty
has the most immediate dependence ?
In the judicial department, the service which
belongs to the profession of an advocate, and the
service which belongs to the office of a judge, are
in a state of rivalry. They constitute the elements
of two permanent conditions, of which the first
among most nations is the preliminary route to the
second. In England, the judges are uniformly
selected from among the class of advocates. Now
the interest of the country requires that the choice
should fall upon the men of highest attainments
in their profession, since upon the reputation of
the judges depends the opinion which every man
forms of his security. It is not of the same im-
portance to the public that advocates should be
supereminently skilful ; their occupation is not to
seek out what is agreeable to justice, but what
agrees with the interest of the party to which
chance has engaged them. On the contrary, the
more decidedly any advocate is exalted in point
of talents above his colleagues, the more desirable
is it that he should no longer continue an advo-
cate. In proportion to his pre-eminence, is the
probability that he will be opposed to the distri-
bution of justice. The worse the cause of the
78 B. I. Ch. X.— PROPORTION AS TO REWARDS.
suitor, the more pressing is his need of an able
advocate to remedy his weakness.
Per Annum.
In England, the emoluments of the Lord Chan-
cellor are reckoned at - - - £ 20,000
Those of the Vice-chancellor - - - 5,00O
Those of the Master of the Rolls - - 4,000
Those of the Chief Justice of the King's Bench - 6,500
Those of the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas - 5,000
Those of the Chief Baron of the Exchequer - 5,000
Those of the Nine Puisne Judges - - 4,000
Now amongst the class of advocates, there are
always to be found about half a dozen whose an-
nual emoluments average from eight to twelve
thousand pounds. Of this number there is not one
who would not disdain the office of puisne judge,
since his profits are actually two or three times
as great as theirs. To these advocates of the first
class may be added as many more, who would
equally disdain these subordinate situations, in the
hope every day of succeeding to the advocates
who shall succeed to the principal situations.
There are two methods of obviating this inconve-
nience : the one by increasing the emoluments of
the judges. (This course has been adopted upon
many occasions, and they have been raised to their
present amount, without success.) The other con-
sists in lowering the profits of the advocates : a
desirable object in more respects than one, but
which can result only from rendering the whole
system of the laws more simple and intelligible.
In the department of education, there is a nearly
similar rivalry between the profession of the
clergy and the office of professor, as between the
profession of advocate and the office of judge, in
the department of the laws. In proportion as he
is what he ought to be, in order to be useful, a
B. I. Ch. X.— proportion AS TO REWARDS. 79
clergyman is a professor of morality, having for
his pupils a larger or smaller number of persons of
every class, during the whole course of their lives.
On the other hand, a professor (as he is called)
has for his pupils a number of select individuals,
whose character is calculated to exercise the
greatest influence upon the general mass of the
people, and among their number the clergy are
generally to be found. The period during which
these individuals attend the lectures of the pro-
fessor, is the most critical period of life ; the only
period during which they are under obligation to
pay attention to what they hear, or to receive the
instruction presented to them. Such being the
relation between the services of the two classes,
let us see what is the proportion between the
amount of reward respectively allotted to each.
In England, the emoluments of the clergy vary
from 20/. to 10,000/. a-year, while those of the
professors in the chief seats of education — the
universities, are between the twentieth and the
hundredth part of the latter sum. In Scotland, the
emoluments of the professors differ but little from
what they are in England, but the richest ecclesi-
astical benefice is scarcely equal to the least pro-
ductive professorship. It is thus, says Adam
Smith, that " in England the church is continually
draining the universities of all their best and
ablest members ; and an old college tutor, who is
known and distinguished as an eminent man of
letters, is rarely to be found," whilst in Scotland
the case is exactly the reverse. It is by the in-
influence of this circumstance that he explains
how academical education is so excellent in the
Scottish universities, and, according to him, so
defective in those of England.
80 B. 1. ch. X.— proportion as to rewards.
Between tw^o professions which do not enter
into competition with each other (for example,
those of opera-dancers and clergymen) a dispro-
portion between their emoluments is not attended
with such palpable inconveniences ; but when by
any circumstance two professions are brought into
comparison with each other, the least advantage-
ous loses its value by the comparison, and the
disproportion presents to the eye of the observer
the idea of injustice.
t 81 ]
CHAPTER XI.
CHOICE AS TO REWARDS.
In making a proper selection of punishments,
much skill is required : comparatively, much less
is requisite in the proper selection of rewards.
Not only are the species of rewards more limited
in number than those of punishments, but the
grounds of preference are more easily discover-
able, and there are not, as in the case of punish-
ments, any passions which tend to mislead the
judgment.
The qualities desirable in rewards are the same
as in the case of punishments : we shall enumerate
them, and then proceed to point out in what
degree they are united in certain modes of remu-
neration.
A reward is best adapted to fulfil the purpose
for which it may be designed, when it is —
1. Variable^ susceptible of increase or diminu-
tion in respect of amount, that it may be propor-
tioned to the different degrees of service.
2. Equable, that equal portions may at all times
operate with equal force upon all individuals.
3. Commensurable, with respect to other spe-
cies of rewards attached to other services.
4. Exemplary: its apparent ought not to dif-
fer from its real value. This quality is wanting
when a large expense is incurred for the pur-
pose of reward, without its becoming matter of
notoriety. The object aimed at ought to be to
6
82 B.l. Ch. XI.— CHOICE AS TO REWARDS.
Strike the attention, and produce a durable im-
pression.
5. Economical. More ought not to be paid for a
service than it is worth. This is the rule in every
market.
6. Characteristic : as far as possible analogous to
the service. It becomes by this means the more
exemplary.
7. Popular. It ought not to oppose established
prejudices. In vain did the Roman emperors
bestow honours upon the most odious informers ;
they degraded the honours, but the informers were
not the less infamous. But it is not enough that
it does not oppose the prejudices, it is desirable
that every reward should obtain the approbation
of the public.
8. Fructifying: calculated to excite the per-
severance of the individual in the career of service,
and to supply him with new resources.
In the selection from among the variety of
rewards, of that particular one which most cer-
tainly will produce any desired effect, attention
must not only be paid to the nature of the service,
but also to the particular disposition and character
of the individual upon whom it is to operate.*
In this respect, public regulations can never attain
the perfection of which domestic discipline is sus-
ceptible. No sovereign can ever in the same
degree be acquainted with the dispositions of his
subjects as a father may be with those of his chil-
dren ; this disadvantage is however compensated
by the larger number of competitors. In a king-
dom, every diversity of temperament, and every
* See Traites de Legislation, torn. 1. ch. ix. Des cir-
constances qui influent sur la sensibilite. Or^ Theory of Morals
and Legislation, vol. 1, ch. vi.
B.I. Ch. XL— CHOICE AS TO REWARDS. 83
degree of aptitude may be found united together,
and provided the reward be proportionate to the
service, it will be of little importance what may be
its nature: like the magnet, which out of a hete-
rogenous mass attracts and separates the most
hidden particles of iron, it will detect the indi-
vidual susceptible of its attraction. Besides, the
nature of pecuniary reward, which is adapted to
the greater proportion of services, is such that
every individual may convert it into the species
of pleasure which he most prefers.
To form a judgment of the merits and demerits
of pecuniary reward, a glance at the list of desira-
ble qualities will suffice. It will at once be seen
which of them it possesses and of which it is
deficient : it is variable^ equable, and commensura-
ble ; it ought to be added, that it is frequently
indispensably necessary ; there are many cases in
which every other reward separated from this
would not only be a burthen, but even a mockery,
especially if the performance of the service has
been attended with an expense or loss greater than
the individual can easily support.
On the other hand, pecuniary reward is not
exempt from disadvantages : speaking generally
(for there are many exceptions) it is neither exem-
plary, nor characteristic, nor even popular,* When
* " Alt defaut de n'etre pas dignes de la vertu, les recom-
penses pecuniaires joignent celui de n'etre pas assez publiques,
de ne pas parler sans cesse aux yeux et aux ccEurs, de dispa-
roitre aussitot qu'elles sont accordees, et de ne laisser aucune
trace visible qui excite Temulation en perpetuant I'honneur
qui doit les accompagner." — Rousseau : Gouvernment de Po-
logne, ch. xi. The phrase in italics is one of the too common
exaggerations in the writings of Rousseau. It is more striking
than just.
In his letter to the Duke of Wirtemberg upon education, in
6.
84 B. I. ch. XI.— choice as to rewards.
allowed to exceed a certain amount, it tends to
diminish the activity of the receiver: instead of
adding to his inclination to persevere in his ser-
vices, it may furnish him with a temptation to
discontinue them. The enriched man will be apt
to think like the soldier of Lucullus, who became
timid so soon as he possessed property to preserve.
Ibit eo, quo vis^ qui zonam perdidit, inquit.
HoR. Epist. II. Lib. 2.
There are also cases in which money, instead
of an attractive, may have a repulsive effect; in-
stead of operating as a reward, may be considered
as an insult, at least by persons who possess any
delicacy in their sentiments of honour. A certain
degree of skill is therefore required in the applica-
tion of money as a reward : it is oftentimes desira-
ble that the pecuniary should appear only as an
accessary to the honorary, which should be made
to constitute the principal part of the rew^ard.*
Every pecuniary reward maybe, as it were, anni-
hilated by its relative smallness. A man of inde-
pendent fortune, and of a certain rank in society,
would be considered as degraded by accepting a
sum that would not degrade a mechanic. There
is no rule for deterniining what is permitted or
prohibited in this respect : custom has established
the prejudice. But the difficulty it presents is
which he shows that he had reflected much upon the unioa
of interest with duty, he says, '' L'argent est un ressort dans
la mechanique morale, mais il repousse toujours la main qui le
fait agir." Toujours is an exaggeration.
* Tel donne a pleines mains qui n'oblige personne.
La fa9on de donner vaut mieux que ce qu'on donne.
Le Menteur, Sc^ne 1.
B. I, ch. xr.— choice as to rewards. 85
not insurmountable. By combining together
money and honour, a compound is formed which
is universally pleasing: medals, for example,
possess this double advantage. By a little art and
precaution, a solid peace is established between
pride and cupidity ; and thus united, they have both
been ranged under the banners of merit. Pride
proclaims aloud, — " It is not the intrinsic value of
the metal which possesses attractions for me ; it is
the circle of glory alone with which it is sur-
rounded." Cupidity makes its calculation in si-
lence, and accurately estimates the value of the
material of the prize.
By the Society of Arts a still higher degree of
perfection has been attained. A choice is com-
monly allowed between a sum of money and a
medal. Thus all conditions and tastes are satis-
fied. The mechanic or peasant pockets the money.
The peer or gentleman ornaments his cabinet with
a medal.
The apparent value of medals is in some cases
augmented, by rendering the design upon them
characteristic of the service on account of which
they are bestowed. By the addition of the name
of the individual rewarded, an exclusive certificate
is made in his favour. The ingenuity displayed
in the choice of the design has sometimes been
extremely happy.
A British statute gives to the person who ap-
prehends and convicts a highwayman, amongst
other rewards, the horse on which the offender
Wd.9 mounted when he committed the offence.
Possibly the framer of this law may have taken
the hint from the passage in Virgil, in which the
son of vEneas promises to Nisus, in case of the
success of the expedition he was meditating, the
very horse and accoutrements which Turn us had
86 B. I. ch. XI.— choice as to rewards.
been seen to use.* It is equally possible, that
the same knowledge of human nature, which sug-
gested to the Latin poet the efficacy of such a
reward, suggested it at once to the English law-
giver. Be this as it may, this provision is com-
mendable on three several accounts. In the as-
signment of the prize, it pitches upon an object,
which, from the nature of the transaction, is likely
to make a j)articular impression on the mind of the
person whose assistance is required; acting in this
respect in conformity to the rule above laid down,
which recommends an attention to the circum-
stances influencing the sensibility of the person on
whom impression is to be made. It also has the
advantage of being characteristic as well as exem-
plary. The animal, when thus transferred, be-
comes a voucher for the activity and prowess of
its owner, as well as a trophy of his victory.
An arrangement like this, simple as it is, or
rather because it is so simple, was an extraordinary
stretch in British policy; in which, though there
is generally a great mixture of good sense, there
reigns throughout a kind of littleness and mauvaise
honte^ which avoids, with timid caution, everything
that is bold, striking, and eccentric, scarce ever
hazarding any of those strong and masterly touches,
which strike the imagination, and fill the mind with
the idea of the sublime.
Examples of rewards of this nature abound in
* Vidisti quo Turnus equo, quibus ibat in armis
Aureus ; ipsum ilium clypeum, cristasque rubentes
Excipiam sorti, jam nunc tua praemia, Nise.
JEn. ix. 269.
Thou saw'st the courser by proud Turnus prest .^
That Nisus, and his arms and nodding crest
And shield^ from chance exempt, shall be thy share.
Dryden's Translation.
B. [. Ch. XI.— choice as to REWARDS. 87
the Roman system of remuneration. For every
species of merit appropriate symbolic crowns were
provided. This branch of their administration
preserved the ancient simplicity of Rome in its
cradle; and the wreath of parsley long eclipsed the
splendour of the crowns of gold. 1 was about
to speak of their triumphs, but here I am com-
pelled to stop: humanity shudders at that pride
of conquest, which treads under its feet the van-
quished nations. The system of legislation ought
no doubt to be adapted to the encouragement of
military ardour, but it ought not to fan it into
such a flame as to make it the predominant pas-
sion of the people, and to prostrate everything
before it.
Honorary rewards are eminently exemplary :
they are standing monuments of the service for
which they have been bestowed : they also pos-
sess the desirable property of operating as a per-
petual encouragement to fresh exertions. To dis-
grace an honorary reward is to be a traitor to one's
self; he that has once been pronounced brave
should perpetually merit that commendation.
To create a reward of this nature is not very
difficult. The symbolical language of esteem is,
like written language, matter of convention.
Every mode of dress, every ceremony, so soon as
it is made a mark of pre-eminence, becomes ho-
nourable. A branch of laurel, a ribband, a garter,
everything possesses the value which is assigned
to it. It is however desirable, that these ensigns
should possess some emblematic character expres-
sive of the nature of the service for which they
are bestowed. With reference to this principle, the
blazonry of heraldry appears rude and unmeaning.
The decorations of the various orders of knight-
hood, though not deficient in splendour, are highly
88 B.I. Ch. XL— CHOICE AS TO REWARDS.
deficient in respect of character : they strike the
eye, but they convey no instruction to the mind.
A ribband appears more like the finery of a woman
than the distinctive decoration of a hero.
Honorary titles have frequently derived a part
of their glory from being characteristic. The
place which has been the theatre of his exploits
has often furnished a title for a victorious general,
well calculated to perpetuate the memory of his
services and his glory. At a very early period of
their liistory, the Romans employed this expe-
dient in addition to the other rewards which they
conferred upon the general who completed a con-
quest. Hence the surnames of Africanus^ Nu-
onidicus, Asiaticus, Germanicus, 2Lnd so many others.
This custom has frequently been imitated. Cathe-
rine H. revived it in favour of the Romanoffs and
Orloffs. Mahon, twice in the eighteenth century,
furnished titles to its conquerors. The mansion
of Blenheim unites to the eclat of the name a
more substantial proof of national gratitude.*
The Romans occasionally applied the same
mode of reward to services of a different descrip-
tion. The Appian way perpetually recalled, to
the memory of those who journied on it, the libe-
rality of Appius.f
* When after a great naval victory, as an acknowledgment
of his services, the freedom of the City of London was pre-
sented to Admiral Keppel, in a box of heart of oak of curious
workmanship, and enriched with gold, the present was characteris-
tic 3inA popular ; allusion being evidently made to the song, which,
whoever may have been the Tyrtoeus, has doubtless had, at
times, no inconsiderable share in rousing British courage.
t One of the noblest charitable institutions in London, Guy's
Hospital, bears the name of its founder. It is true, it is not
done with the intention of conferring a reward j but there are
few who, of late years, have travelled in Great Britain, who
have not spoken in praise of Mac Adam's systetn of constructing
roads.
B. I. Ch. XI.— CHOICE AS TO REWARDS. 89
The career of legislation may also furnish some
instances of honours which possess this character
of analogy. In the Digest of the Sardinian Laws,
very praiseworthy care was taken to inform the
people to which of their sovereigns they were in-
debted for each particular law. It is an example
worthy of imitation. It may have been intended
as a mark of respect, as well for convenience of
reference, that it has been customary to designate,
by the title of The Grenville Act,, the admirable
law which this representative of the people pro-
cured to be enacted for the impartial decision of
questions relative to contested elections.
Had the statue of this legislator been placed in
the House of Commons, from which he banished
a scandalous disorder, it would both have been a
monument of gratitude, and a noble lesson. It
might have for its companion a statue of his noble
rival, the Author of Economical Reform ; it is thus
that the impartial judgment of posterity, forgetting
the differences which separated them, delights to
recollect the excellences which assimilated them
to each other. It is thus that it has placed, side
by side each other, Eschines and Demosthenes.
The more men become enlightened, the more
clearly will they perceive the necessity, at least,
of dividing honour between those who cause
nations to flourish by means of good laws, and
those who defend them by their valour.
Among the most obvious and efficacious means
of conferring honorary rewards, are pictures, busts,
statues, and other imitative representations of the
person meant to be rewarded. These spread his
fame to posterity, and, in conjunction with the
history of the service, hand down the idea of the
person by whom it was rendered. They are
naturally accompanied with inscriptions expla-
90 B.I. Ch. XI.— CHOICE AS TO REWARDS.
natory of the cause for which the honour was
decreed. When the art of writing has become
common, these inscriptions will frequently give
disgust, by the length or extravagance of the elo-
gium : and it will then become an object of good
taste to say as much in as few words as possible.
Perhaps the happiest specimens of the kind that
were, or ever will be produced, are the two inscrip-
tions placed under the statues of Louis XIV. and
Voltaire : the one erected by the town of Mont-
pellier, the latter by a society of men of letters,
of whom Frederic 111. king of Prussia was one.
A Louis XIV. apres sa niort. A Voltaire pendant
sa vie: to the king, though no longer the object of
hope and fear: to the poet and philosopher, though
still the butt of envy. The business on occasions
like these is not to inform but to remind: history
and the art of printing does the rest.
The greater number of the rewards of which
w^e have spoken above, are occasional^ that is, ap-
plied to a particular action. There are others
which are more permanent in their character, such
as the Hospitals of Chelsea and Greenwich, in
England, and Uhotel des Invalides at Paris.
Doubts have often been entertained of the utility
of these establishments. Rewards, it has been
said, might be extended to a much greater number
of individuals, if the annual amount of the expenses
of these places were distributed in the shape of
pensions, and that the individuals would thus be
rendered much happier; since men who have
passed their days of activity, united in a place
where they are no longer subject to the cares and
labours of life, are exposed to the most ceaseless
listlessness. I shall not dispute the truth of these
observations, but on the other hand shall examine
the effect of these establishments upon the minds
B. I. Ch. XL— CHOICE AS TO REWARDS. 91
of soldiers and sailors. Their imaginations are
flattered by the magnificence of these retreats ; it
is a brilliant prospect opened to them all ; an asy-
lum is provided for those who, having quitted their
country and their families in their youth, have fre-
quently in their days of decrepitude and age no
other home in the world. Those who are muti-
lated or disfigured with wounds, are consoled by
the renown which awaits them in the hospital,
where every thing reminds them of their exploits.
It may also be for the benefit of the service more
prudent thus to unite than to disperse them. It is
a luxury, but it is rational, exemplary, and pos-
sesses a character of justice and magnificence.
These establishments being necessarily limited
in respect to the number which can be admitted
into them, may be considered upon the footing of
extraordinary rewards, applicable to distinguished
services. They would thus constitute a species of
nobility for the soldiers and sailors. They would
acquire an additional degree of splendour were
their walls adorned by the trophies taken in war,
which would there appear much more appropriately
placed than when deposited in the temples of peace.
The decorations of the chapel of U hotel des Inva-
Udes are admirable. The flags suspended in the
cathedral of St. Paul only awaken thoughts at
variance with those of religious worship ; removed
to Chelsea or Greenwich, they would be connected
with natural associations, and would furnish a text
to the commentaries of those who acquired them
by their valour.
It is not often that every desirable quality is seen
to be united in one and the same reward ; this
union however frequently takes place in an almost
imperceptible manner.
^92 B.I. Ch. XI.— CHOICE AS TO REWARDS.
ft
An instance of a reward particularly well adapted
to the nature of the service, is that of the monopoly
which it is almost universally the custom to create
in favour of inventors. From the very nature of
the thing, it adapts itself with the utmost nicety to
those rules of proportion to which it is most diffi-
cult for reward artificially instituted by the legis-
lator to conform. It adapts itself with the utmost
nicety to the value of the service. If confined, as
it ought to be, to the precise point in which the
originality of the invention consists, it is conferred
with the least possible waste of expense. It causes
a service to be rendered, which without it a man
would not have a motive for rendering ; and that
only by forbidding others from doing that which
were it not for that service it would not have been
possible for them to have done. Even with regard
to such inventions, for such there will be, where
others, besides him who possesses himself of the
reward, have scent of the invention, it is still of
use, by stimulating all parties, and setting them to
strive which shall first bring his discovery to bear.
With all this it unites every property which can be
wished for in a reward. It is variable, equable,
commensurable, characteristic, exemplary, frugal,
promotive of perseverance, subservient to com-
pensation, popular, and revocable.
C .A. :.> ' • i". .•-^'W^*— *1ikf
[ 93 ]
CHAPTER XII.
PROCEDURE AS TO REWARDS-
The province of reward is the last aslyum of ar-
bitrary power. In the early stages of society, pu-
nishments, pardons, and rewards were equally
lavished without measure and without necessity.
The infliction of punishment has already in mea-
sure been subject to regulation ; at some future time
rules will be laid down for the granting of pardons,
and last of all for the bestowment of rewards. If
punishment ought not to be inflicted without for-
mal proof of the commission of crime, neither
ought reward to be conferred without equally for-
mal proof of desert.
It may be allowed that in point of importance,
the difference between the two cases is great :
that punishment inflicted without trial excites
universal alarm, whilst reward conferred without
desert excites no such feelings; but these conside-
rations only prove that the advantage of formal
procedure in the distribution of reward is limited
to the prevention of prodigality, and of the other
abuses by which the value of reward is diminished.
At Rome, if certain travellers may be believed,
it is the custom when a saint is about to be ca-
nonized, to allow an advocate, who in familiar
language is called the advocate of the devil, to plead
against his admission. If this advocate had always
been faithful to his client, the calendar might not
have been so full as at present.* Be this as it may,
* '' Pope Urban VIII. having sufTered some ill treatment
94 B. I. ch. XII.— procedure as to rewards.
the idea itselfis excellent, and might advantageously
be borrowed by politics from religion. Ultalico
valor non e ancor morlo : there are yet some lessons
to be learned in the capital of the world.
It is reported of Peter the Great, that when he
condescended to pass through every gradation of
military, rank from the lowest to the highest in his
empire, he took no step without producing regu-
lar, certificates of his qualifications. We may be
allowed to suppose, that even with inferior recom-
mendations to those produced by this great prince
be would have succeeded. There was no advocate
for the devil to contest the point, and even had
there been one, his fidelity would have been doubt-
ful : but had the qualifications of the Czar been as
imperfect as, according to the history, they were
complete, his submitting to produce them would
have offered a noble lesson.
In England, when a dormant peerage is claimed
by any individual, the Attorney-general is consti-
tuted the advocate for the devil, and charged to
examine into and produce every thing which can
invalidate his title. Wherefore is he not thus em-
ployed when it is proposed to create new peers ?
Why should he not be allowed to urge every thing
which can be said against the measure ? Is it feared
that he would be too often successful ?*
from a certain noble Roman family, said to his friends, Questa
gente e molto ingrata, lo ho bealificato uno de loro parenti, che non
lo meritava." — Jortin's Miscellanies.
* If the peers are interested in not suffering the value of
their office to be lessened by sharing it with unintitled persons,
the public have a more important interest in preventing pro-
fusion, with respect to this modification of the matter of re-
ward — in preventing the bestowment of a portion of the
sovereign power upon persons who have not purchased such a
trust by any service. But if merit is not to be regarded, and
there are political reasons for preserving this prerogative tin-
B.I. Ch. XII.— PROCEDURE AS TO REWARDS. 95
In the distribution of rewards, were it always
necessary publicly to assign the reason for their
bestowment, a restraint would be imposed upon
princes and their ministers, to which they are
unwilling to submit. There formerly existed in
Sweden a custom or positive law, obliging the king
to insert in the patent conferring a pension or title,
the reason for the grant. In 1774 this custom
was abolished by an express law inserted in the
Gazette of that court, declaring that the individuals
honoured by the bounty of theking, should be con-
sidered as indebted to his favour alone. Did this
monarch think that he stood in need of services
which he would not dare publicly to acknow-
ledge ?*
In England, the remuneratory branch of arbi-
controuled, the subject assumes another aspect, and its exa-
mination here would be out of place.
* Extract from the Courier of the Lower Rhine, 5th March
1774. — " Stockholm, 11th February. — It was formerly the
custom when the king elevated any one to the rank of nobility,
or conferred on hira the title of baron, to insert in the diploma
the circumstances by which he had merited this distinction.
But upon a late occasion, when his majesty ennobled M. de
Geer, chamberlain of the court, he requested that the kind-
ness and good pleasure of the king might be inserted in his di-
ploma as the only reason for his elevation. His majesty not
only complied, but directed that the Chancery should thence-
forward follow this rule, as was anciently the practice under
the sovereigns of the family of Vasa, till the reign of Christina."
J have not seen any of these ancient diplomas of Swedish
nobility, and I know not whether the facts they exhibited as
the reasons operating upon the Sovereign were specific and
detailed ; but whatever was the nature of this certificate, it
served as a token of respect to public opinion, and a means of
preserving undiminished the value of titles of nobility. This
usurpation was scarcely noticed amidst the great revolution
which the king had just accomplished. In the career of arbi-
trary power, there are open conquests and clandestine acquisi-
tions.
96 B.I. ch. XII.— procedure as to rewards.
trary power has begun^to be pruned. Except in
particular cases, the king is not allowed to grant a
pension exceeding 300/. per annum, without the
consent of parliament. Since the passing of the
act containing this restriction, the candidates for
pensions have been but few.
When M. Necker undertook the administration
of the finances in France, the total of the acknow-
ledged pensions, without reckoning the secret gra-
tuities, which were very considerable, amounted
to 27 millions of livres. In England, where the
national wealth was not less than in France, the
pensions did not amount to the tenth part of this
sum. It is thus that the difference between a li-
mited and an absolute monarchy may be exhibited,
even in fissures.
In Ireland, the king upon his sole authority, in
1783, created an order of knighthood ; thus pro-
fiting by what remained of the fragments of arbitrary
power. No blame was imputed to him for esta-
blishing this tax upon honour : had he levied a tax
upon property the nation might not have been so
tractable. Those who hoped to share in the new
treasure were careful nottoraisean outcry againstits
establishment ; those at whose expense this treasure
was established, did not understand this piece of
finesse ; they opened their eyes widely, but com-
prehended nothing. The measure could not have
been better justified by circumstances. Every day
the crown found itself stripped of some prerogative,
justly or unjustly the subject of envy. It was
therefore high time to avail itself of the small num-
ber of those, in the exercise of which it was still
tolerated. Become independent of Great Britain,
the honour of the Irish nation seemed to require
a decoration of this kind. For what is a kingdom
without an order of knighthood ?
B. I. Ch. XII.-PROCEDURE AS TO REWARDS. 97
To enter into the consideration of the details re-
quisite for the establishment of a system of remu-
neratory procedure, comes not within the present
part of our design : a very slight sketch ofthelead-
ing principles on which it might be grounded, is
the utmost that can here be given. The general
idea would of course be taken from the system es-
tablished in penal and civil cases. Between these
systems, the most striking difference would, how-
ever, arise from the interest and wishes of the agent
whose act might be the subject of investigation,
with respect to the publicity of the act. In the
one case the consequences of such his act, in case
it were proved, being pernicious to him, all his
endeavour would be to keep it concealed : in the
other, these consequences being beneficial, his en-
deavour would be to place it in the most conspi-
cuous light imaginable. In the first case, his en-
deavours would be to delay the process and, if pos-
sible, make it void : in the latter, to expedite it and
keep it valid.
The most striking point of co-incidence is the
occasion there is in both cases for two parties. In
the civil branch, there can hardly be a deficiency
in this respect ; there being commonly two indivi-
duals whose interests are opposite, and known and
felt to be so. But in the penal branch, in one very
large division of it, there is naturally no such
opposition ; I mean in that which concerns of-
fences against the public only : here, therefore, the
law has been obliged to create such an opposition,
and has accordingly created it by the establishment
of a public prosecutor. In the remuneratory branch
of procedure, there is a similar absence of natural
opposition, and accordingly the grand desideratum
is the appointment of an officer whose business it
should be to contest on the part of the public, the
title to whatever reward is proposed to be granted in
7
98 B.I. Ch. XII.— PROCEDURE AS TO REWARDS.
this way. He might be entitled, for shortness, by
some such name as that of Contestor-general.
Without a Prosecutor-general, in the large and
important division of cases above mentioned, there
would not, unless by accident — I mean, when an
individual is engaged in the task of prosecution
by public spirit, or what is much more natural,
by private pique — be any suit instituted, any
punishment inflicted. For want of a Contestor-
general there is not, unless by a similar accident,*
any check given to the injustice of unmerited
remuneration.
Upon the whole then, the penal and civil
branches of procedure, but particularly the penal,
may in all cases serve either as the models, or if
the term may be admitted, as the anti-models of
the remuneratory branch of procedure.
* I say by accident : for as in the case of offences against the
public merely, accident will sometimes raise up a private pro-
secutor in the person of a chance individual, so in matters of
remunerative procedure, will accident sometimes raise up a
contestor in tlie person of some member of the body by whose
appointment the reward is bestowed. This supposes that the
reward is to be in the appointment of a body ; so that if it be
at the appointment of a single person, the chance of contesta-
tion is altogether wanting. This chance will of course be the
greater, the more numerous that body : but if the body be very
small, especially if it be composed without any mixture of dif-
ferent interests and partialities, and its deliberations held in
secret, it will amount to nothing. If the business be confined
to three, or four, or half a dozen who are intimately connected,
the bargain is soon made: ''you serve my friend, I serve
yours.'' Even be the assembly ever so numerous, the chance
of contestation is but a precarious one. The task is at any
rate an invidious task : he must be a man of more than com-
mon public spirit, added to more than common courage, who
unprompted by party jealousy and uncompclled by office, will
undertake it : nor have instances been wanting when the most
numerous and discordant assemblies have concurred unani-
mously in the vote of rewards, which the majority have been
known individually to disappro^ e.
[ 99 ]
CHAPTER XIII.
REWARDS TO INFORMERS.
The execution of a law cannot be enforced,
unless the violation of it be denounced ; the
assistance of the informer is, therefore, altogether
as necessary and as meritorious as that of the
judge.
We have alreadv had occasion to remark, that
with respect to public offences, where no one
individual more than another is interested in their
prosecution, it has been found necessary to create
a sort of magistrate, an accuser-general, to carry
on such prosecutions in virtue of his office ; but
it is indispensably necessary that offences should
be denounced to him before he can begin to act.
In a well-ordered community, it would be the
duty of every individual possessing evidence of
the commission of a crime, to denounce the cri-
minal to the tribunals, and such individual would
be disposed so to do. In most countries, however,
men in general are desirous of withdrawing from
the performance of this duty. Some refuse to
perform it from mistaken notions of pity towards
the delinquent ; others because they disapprove of
some part of the law ; others from the fear of
making enemies ; many from indolence ; almost all
from a disinclination to submit to that loss which
would arise from the interruption of their ordinary
occupations.
In these countries, therefore, it has been found
necessary to offer pecuniary rewards to informers.
So far as my knowledge extends, governments
7.
100 B.I. Ch. XIII.— rewards to informers.
have never been advised to discontinue this
tice. It is supported by authority, but it is
condemned by public opinion : mercenary infor-
mations are considered disgraceful ; salaried in-
formers, odious. From hence it results, that the
reward offered by the law does not possess all its
nominal value ; the disgrace attached to the ser-
vice is a drawback upon its amount. The indi-
vidual is rewarded by the state, and punished by
the moral sanction.
Let us examine the usual objections made
against mercenary informations.
1. It is odious, it is said, toprojit hy the evil we
have caused to others.
This objection is founded upon a feeling of im-
proper commiseration for the offender; since pity
towards the guilty is cruelty towards the innocent.
The reward paid to the informer has for its object,
the service he has performed ; in this respect he is
upon a level with the judge who is paid for passing
sentence. The informer is a servant of the govern-
ment, employed in opposing the internal enemies
of the state, as the soldier is a servant employed in
opposing its external foes.
2. It introduces into society a system of espionage.
To the word espionage a stigma is attached : let
us substitute the word inspection, which is uncon-
nected with the same prejudices. If this inspec-
tion consist in the maintenance of an oppressive
system of police, which subjects innocent actions
to punishment, which condemns secretly and arbi-
trarily, it is natural that such a system and its
agents should become odious. But if this inspec-
tion consist in the maintenance of a system of
police, for the preservation of the public tranquil-
lity, and the execution of good laws, all its inspec-
tors, and all its guardians, act a useful and salu-
B.I. Ch. XIII.— REWARDS TO INFORMERS. 101
tary part; it is the vicious only who will have
reason to complain ; it will be formidable to them
alone.
3. Pecuniary rewards may induce false witnesses
to conspire against the innocejit.
It' we suppose a public and well-organised sys-
tem of procedure, in which the innocent are not
deprived of any means of defence, the danger
resulting from conspiracy will appear but small.
Besides the prodigious difficulty of inventing a
coherent tale capable of enduring a rigorous exa-
mination, there is no comparison between the
reward offered by the law, and the risk to
which false witnesses are exposed. Mercenary
witnesses also are exactly those who excite the
greatest distrust in the mind of a judge, and if
they are the only witnesses, a suspicion of con-
spiracy instantly presents itself, and becomes a
protection to the accused.
These objections are urged in justification of the
prejudice which exists; but the prejudice itself
has been produced by other causes, and those
causes are specious. The first, with respect to
the educated classes of society, is a prejudice
drawn from history, especially from that of the
Roman emperors. The word informer at once
recals to the mind those detestable miscreants, the
horror of all ages, whom even the pencil of Tacitus
has failed to cover with all the ignominy they
deserve : but these informers were not the execu-
tors of the law: they were the executors of the
personal and lawless vengeance of the sovereign.
The second and most general cause of this pre-
judice is founded upon the employment given to
informers by religious intolerance. In the ages of
ignorance and bigotry, barbarous laws having been
enacted against those who did not profess the do-
102 B.l. CH.XllI.— REWARDS TO INFORMERS.
minant religion, informers were then considered as
zealous and orthodox believers ; but in proportion
to the increase of knowledge, the manners of men
have been softened, and these laws having become
odious, the informers, without whose services they
would have fallen into disuse, partook of the hatred
which the laws themselves inspired. It was an
injustice in respect to them, but a salutary effect
resulted from it, to the classes exposed to op-
pression.
These cases of tyranny excepted, the prejudice
which condemns mercenary informers is an evil.
It is a consequence of the inattention of the public
to their true interests, and of the general ignorance
in matters of legislation. Instead of acting in con-
sonance with the dictates of the principle of utility,
people in general have blindly abandoned them-
selves to the guidance of sympathy and antipathy :
of sympathy in favour of those who injure ; of an-
tipathy to those who render them essential service.
If an informer deserves to be hated, a judge de-
serves to be abhorred.
This prejudice also partly springs from a confu-
sion of ideas : no distinction is made between the
judicial and the private informer, between the man
who denounces a crime in a court of justice, and he
who secretly insinuates accusations against his
enemies ; between the man who affords to the ac-
cused an opportunity of defending himself, and he
who imposes the condition of silence with respect
to his perfidious reports. Clandestine accusations
are justly considered as the bane of society ; they
destroy confidence, and produce irremediable evils;
but they have nothing in common with judicial
accusations.
It is extremely difficult to eradicate prejudices
so deeply rooted and natural. From necessity, the
B.I. Cii. XIII.— REWARDS TO INFORMERS. 103
practice of paying public informers continues to be
in use ; but the character of an informer is still re-
garded as disgraceful, and by some strange fatality
the judges make no efforts to enlighten the public
mind on this subject, and to protect this useful and
even necessary class of men from the rigour of
public opinion ; they ought not to suffer the elo-
quence of the bar to insult before their faces these
necessary assistants in the administration of justice.
The conduct of the English law towards informers
furnishes a curious but deplorable instance of hu-
man frailty. It employs them, oftentimes deceives
them, and always holds them up to contempt.
It is time for lawgivers at least, to wean them-
selves from these school -boy prejudices, which
can consist only with a gross inattention to the in-
terests of the public, joined to a gross ignorance of
the principles of human nature. They should
settle with themselves once for all what it is they
would have : they should strike, somehow or other,
a balance between the benefit expected from the
effects of a lavv, and the inconveniences, or sup-
posed inconveniences, inseparable from its execu-
tion. If the inconveniences preponderate, let there
be an end of the law ; if the benefits, let there be
an end of all obstacles which an aversion to the
necessary instruments on which its efficacy de-
pends would oppose to its execution.
[ 104 ]
CHAP. XIV.
REWARDS TO ACCOMPLICES.
Among informers, criminals who denounce their
accomplices have been distinguished from others,
and the offer of pardon or rewards to induce them
thus to act, has been condemned as altogether im-
proper. It must be acknowledged that, so long as
there is any other means of obtaining the con-
viction of a criminal, without thus rewarding an
accomplice, this method is bad ; the impunity
necessarily accompanying it is an evil. But if
there be no other means, this method is good ; since
the impunity of a single criminal is a less evil than
the impunity of many.
In relation, however, to weighty and serious
crimes, no such rewards can with propriety be ap-
pointed by a general law. A general law offering
pardon and reward to the criminal who informed
against his accomplices, would be an invitation to
the commission of all sorts of crimes. It would be
as though the legislator had said, " Among a mul-
titude of criminals, the most wicked shall not only
be unpunished but rewarded." A man shall lay
plans for the commission of a crime, shall engage
accomplices with the intention of betraying them ;
to the natural profits of the crime, such a law
would add the reward bestowed upon him as an
informer. It is what has often happened under
English law. It is one of the fruits of the maxim
which prohibits the examination of suspected per-
sons, respecting facts which may tend to criminate
themselves. It is, however, criminals who can
B. I. Cii. XIV.— REWARDS TO ACCOMPLICES. 105
always furnish, and who often can alone furnish, the
light necessary for the guidance of Justice. J3ut
the examination of suspected persons being forbid-
den as a means of obtaining intelligence, there re-
mains only the method of reward.
But when the reward, instead of being bestowed
in virtue of a general law, is left to the discretion
of the judge, and offered only when necessary, this
inconvenience does not exist. Advantageouscrimes
can no longer be committed with security. Re-
course being had to this costly method only when
all other methods fail, there will always be a longer
or shorter interval, during which every criminal
will feel himself exposed to the punishment de-
nounced against his crimes. The employment of
reward in this manner having become usual, will
exercise upon the security of criminals the effect
of a general law : it might even be prescribed by
such a law. This method would then possess all
the advantages of an unconditional law without its
inconveniences.
Beccaria has condemned, without exception,
every reward offered to accomplices. As the foun-
dation of his opinion, he produces only a confused
sentiment of disapprobation attached to the words
" treason and faithlessness. '^
Voluntary conventions among men are generally
useful to society. It would be in most cases pro-
ductive of evil were they not considered bind-
ing. Infamy has therefore become constantly at-
tached to the terms treason and faithlessness. The
acts, however, to which these terms are applied are
only pernicious in as far as the contracts of which
they are violations are at least innocent. To render
the security of society (which crimes, were they to
remain unpunished, would destroy) subordinate to
the accomplishment of all manner of engagements,
106 B. I. ch. XIV.— rewards to accomplices.
would be to render the end subordinate to the
means. What would become of society, were it
once established as a principle, that the commis-
sion of a crime became a duty if once it had been
promised ? That promises ought to be performed,
is a maxim which without a limitation, excepting
those the performance of which would be pernici-
ous to society, ought to have place neither in laws
nor in morals : it is doubtful which would be most
injurious ; the non-performance of every promise,
or the performance of all. Far from beinga greater
evil than that to which it is opposed, it v/ould be
difficult to shew that the non-performance of cri-
minal engagements isproductiveof any evil. From
the performance of such an engagement, an un-
favourable judgment only can be formed of the
character of the party : how can a similar judgment
be formed from its violation ? — Because he has
repented of having committed, or been willing to
commit, an action injurious to society, and which he
knew to be so, does it follow that he will fail to
perform actions which he knows to be innocent and
useful ?
From the violation of engagements among crimi-
nals, what evil can be apprehended ? — that unani-
mity shall be wanting among them ? — that their
enterprizes shall be unsuccessful ? — that their asso-
ciations shall be dissolved ? It is proverbially said
" there is honour among theives." The honour
which cements their conspiracies is the pest of
society. Why should we not seek to inspire them
with the highest degree of distrust towards each
other ? Why should we not arm them against each
other, and make them fear lest they should find an
informer in every accomplice ? Wherefore should
we not seek to fill them with a desire to inform
against and mutually to destroy each other ? So that
B. I. Ch. XIV.— REWARDS TO ACCOMPLICES. 107
each one uneasy and trembling in the midst of his
fellows, should fear his companions as much as his
judges, nor be able to hope for security but in the
renunciation of his crimes. This is exactly what
the consideration of the public welfare would lead
us to wish ; and if we are to be turned aside from
the care of this object by regard to the fidelity of
thieves and murderers to their engagements, for a
still stronger reason, from humanity, ought we to
abstain from punishing their crimes.
Beccaria, upon just ground, condemns the sove-
reigns and judges, who after having enticed an
offender to become an informer, afterwards violate
their promise and render it illusory. In this case
we need not fear to give vent to the feelings of hor-
ror and indignation which so mischievous a pro-
ceeding inspires. It is mischievous in the highest
possible degree. It destroys all future confidence
in similar offers, and renders powerless this most
necessary instrument. It cements, instead of weak-
ening, the union of criminals among themselves;
and causes government itself to appear as the guar-
dian of their society, by adding mockery to the
rigour of the law, by punishing the individual who
has confided in its promises.
But, says Beccaria, " Societi/ authorizes treason.,
detested even hy critninals among themselves,^' We
have already seen what is to be understood by this
treason. It is natural to criminals to detest it — it
is their ruin : it ought to be approved by honest
men — it is their safearuard. It loitl introduce crimes
of cowardice and baseness. No, it will introduce
acts of prudence, of penitence, and of public util-
ity ; it will operate as an antidote to all crimes.
These pretended crimes of cowardice are more in-
jurious to a nation than the crimes of courage. The
108 B. I. ch. XIV.— rewards to accomplices.
truth is exactly the reverse: which produce most
alarm in society, privately stealing and swindling
on the one side, or highway robJDery and murder
on the other ? The tribunal ichich employs this ex-
pedient^ discovers its uncertainty. It discovers that
it can know nothing without having learnt it. By
what means can a judge attain to certainty without
witnesses? In what country is it customary for
criminals to make the judges the confidants of their
misdeeds and their plans ? The law exhibits its
feebleness in imploring the assistance even of him who
has broke?! it. The law seeks the offender who flies
from it: if the means employed for his discovery
are effectual, it only exhibits its wisdom.
But if rewards are to be bestowed upon criminals
who denounce their accomplices, Beccaria desires
that it may be in virtue of " a general law, which
should promise impunity to every accomplice who
discovers a crime, rather than by a particular de-
claration in each particular case." The reason he
assigns is, that " such a law would prevent the
combination of malefactors, by inspiring each of
them with the fear of exposing himself alone to
danger, and that it would not serve to give that
boldness to the wicked who see that there are some
cases in which their services are required." But
we have already observed that the particular decla-
ration equally serves to prevent this combination,
and that it is the general law which tends to give
boldness to the wicked, and even creates the belief
that justice cannot be executed without them.
" A law of this nature," adds Beccaria, " ought
to join to impunity the banishment of the infor-
mer." A condition of this nature could only serve
to render the law inefficacious in a variety of cases,
and also contains a contradiction in terms. A law
B. I. Ch. XIV.— rewards to ACCOMPLICES. 109
joining banishment to impunity ! Is not banish-
ment a punishment ?*
* To the edition of Beccaria published at Paris in 1797, are
added some notes by Diderot, unfortunately they are short and
few. I translate those which relate to the present chapter.
"The errors of courts of justice and the feebleness of the
law, even when crimes are known to have been committed, are
matters of public notoriety. It is in vain to endeavour to con-
ceal them, there is nothing therefore to counterbalance the
advantage of disseminating distrust among malefactors, and
rendering them suspected and formidable to one another, and
the causing them without ceasing to dread in their accomplices
so many accusers. This can only tend to make the wicked
cowards, and every thing which renders them less daring is
useful."
" The delicacy of the author exhibits a noble and generous
heart : but human morality, of which laws form the basis, is
directed to the maintenance of public order, and cannot admit
among the number of its virtues the fidelity of malefactors
among themselves, that they may disturb that order, and violate
the laws with greater security. In open war, deserters are re-
ceived, with greater reason ought they to be received in a war
carried on amidst silence and darkness, and whose operations
consist of snares and treachery."
[ 110 ]
CHAPTER XV.
COMPETITION AS TO REWARDS.
When a portion of the matter of reward is
allotted for the purchase of services, ought the
liberty of competition to be admitted ? In any and
what cases ? What is the general rule, and what
are the exceptions ? In the case of what species
of service ? For what species of reward ?
If popular opinion is to determine, the question
concerning the general rule is already answered.
In all cases in which no particular reason can be
given to the contrary, the liberty of competition
ought to be admitted upon the largest scale. Yet
to this decision of the public, the practice of na-
tions, that is of those who bear the sway in nations,
is by no means uniformly conformable; there are
privileges and there are exclusions: pursuits open
to one set, closed to another set of men : all go-
vernments have been more or less infected with
that intermeddling disposition, which believes it
can give perfection to particular species of service,
by appropriating its exercise exclusively to particu-
lar individuals.
That there may be cases fit to be excepted out of
the above general rule, is allowed ; but before we
come to the consideration of the exceptions, let us
see how the matter stands upon principle — whether
the people are most right or their rulers.
And in the first place, by way of illustration, let
us stop a moment to examine the connexion there
is upon this occasion between reward and punish-
ment. Let us suppose, apprehensions are enter-
tained of the prevalence of murder and incen-
B.I. Ch.XV.— COiVIPETITION AS TO REWARDS. HI
diarism. Against a particular person the suspicions
are stronger than against any one else. There is
as yet no law against either of those offences. The
sovereign, intending to do his utmost to guard
the state against those calamities, sends for the sus-
pected person, and prohibits him from committing
any such crimes, under such penalties as he thinks
proper : for the suspected person, observe, and for
him only ; there being as yet no general law pro-
hibiting such enormities, and everybody else being
left at perfect liberty. If it were possible that any
such incident could have happened within time of
history,shouid notwe pronounce atonce,thateither
the nation could not yet have emerged from a state
of the profoundest barbarism, or else that the
sovereign so acting could not have been in his right
mind ? Such however is the exact counterpart of
the policy of him, who wanting a service to be
performed of such a nature as that, for aught he can
be certain, there are several competent to perform
it, some better than others, and each man according
to the motives thatare given him better than himself,
commits the business to one in exclusion of the rest.
If penal laws must be applicable to all, that there
may be a chance of preventing all offences, the
offer of reward ought to be general, that there may
be a chance of obtaining all services, and of obtain-
ing the best.
If we enquire in detail for the reasons why com-
petition for reward, and for everything else which
can be bestowed in the way of producing service,
should be as open and as free as possible, the
question may be considered in two points of view :
first, as it concerns the interests of those for whose
sake the service wanted is to be performed ;
secondly, as it concerns the interests of those by
whom the service might come to be performed.
112 B. I. ch. XV.— competition as to rewards.
With regard to the former set of interests; it
has already been observed,* as a reason for the em-
ployment of reward, as a fitter instrument than pu-
nishment, for attaining a given degree of excellence,
the idea of which has already been conceived by
the person who wishes it to be attained, — that the
chance is greater when reward is employed as the
incitement, than when use is made of punishment ;
because, punishment can only operate upon a few
selected individuals, and should they be unequal
to the task, would be altogether employed in vain.
Whatever number you select, you forego all the
chance which you might have of the service being
performed by any one else. The case is equally
the same when rewards are offerred to a selected
few. Allowing the liberty of competition, you
may propose rewards to any number without ex-
pense : you pay it but to one : you do not pay it
till the service is performed : and the chance of its
being performed is in proportion to the number of
persons to whom it is proposed.
Another advantage which reward has over pu-
nishment, as we have seen, is, that by means of the
former the value of the service may be brought to
an indefinitely high degree of perfection. But this
can only be effected by means of a free competition.
In this way, and this only, can individuals be led to
exert their faculties. Were the reward proposed to
one only, having rendered the degree of service suf-
ficient to entitle him to the reward, he would stop
there : to make the exertions necessary to carry it to
any higher degree of perfection would be to trouble
himself to no purpose. But let a reward be offered
to that one of two competitors, for example, who
best performs the service : unless either of them
* Book 1, ch. vii. p. 51.
B.I. Ch. XV.— competition AS TO REWARDS. 113
knows exactly the degree of skill possessed by the
other, and knows it to be clearly interior to his own ;
each will exert himself to his utmost, since the
more perfect he makes his work, the better chance
has he of gaining the reward.. The matter is so
ordered, that for every part of the greatest degree of
service he can possibly find means to render, there
will be a motive to induce him to render it. The
same reasoning may be applied to any other num-
ber of competitors; and the chance of perfection
will be increased, if the faculties of the competitors
are equal in proportion to their number.
Should he who has the disposal of the reward
assert, " I am acquainted with an individual more
competent than any other to perform the service in
question, and with whom no one can be placed in
competition," his assertion is exposed to this
dilemma : upon a fair trial of skill, either this
person will stand first, or he will not; if he stand
first, the competition is not to his prejudice, but
redounds to his honour; if another excel him, the
advantage of a free competition is proved. Par-
tiality is either mischievous or unnecessary.
We next consider the question as it affects the
interest of those who might be admitted as com-
petitors.
Reward in its own nature is a good ; all com-
petitors think so, and that a balance of good remains
even after deducting the evil of that labour, what-
ever it be, which is expended in the performance
of the service, or they would not be competitors.
He who has the disposal of the reward thinks so,
or he would neither offer it, or be so anxious as he
sometimes istosecureitfor those to whom he wishes
to give a preference. But when there is no special
reason to the contrary, why should not all the
members of a state have a chance of obtaining the
8
114 B.I. Ch. XV.— COMPETITION AS TO REWARDS.
goods to be distributed in that state ? To exclude
any man from any chance he might have of better-
ing himself, is at best a hardship; if no special rea-
son can be given for it, it is injustice, and one of
those species of injustice, which, if administered on
pretence of delinquency, would openly bear the
name of punishment.
It may be objected, that if a free competition
were allowed, that " the number of competitors
would be very great, while the reward being con-
fined to one or to a very small number, one only
will be paid for his labour ; the lot of the rest
would be lost labour and disappointment ; that the
public would be losers, by their labours being di-
verted from services of greater utility, and that the
service would, without this competition, be per-
formed in a sufficient degree of perfection, or if
performed in any higher degree would be of no
further use."
The following considerations may serve as a
reply to these objections. Where there is nothing
more than the mere loss of labour to those who can
afford to lose it, or of anything else to those who
can afford to part with it, the possible amount of
mischief, be it what it may, can afford no sufficient
reason for narrowing competition. If there be the
pain of disappointment after trial, there has been
the pleasure of expectation before trial ; and the
latter, there is reason to believe, is upon an average
much greater than the former. The pleasure is of
longer continuance ; it fills a larger space in the
mind ; and the larger, the longer it continues. The
pain of disappointment comes on in a moment, and
gives place to the first dawning of a new hope, or
is driven out by other cares. If it be true, that the
principal part of happiness consists in hope, and
that but few of our hopes are completely realized,
B. I. Ch. XV.— COMPETITION AS TO REWARDS. 115
it would be necessary, that men might be saved
from disappointment, to shut them out from joy.
It may further be observed, that the liberty of
competition seldom includes so many, as if con-
sidered with regard to the particular nature of the
service it would seem to include. Where it is not
restrained by institution, it is often restrained by
nature, and that sometimes within very narrow
bounds. Services depending on opportunity, are
confined to those to whom fortune shall have given
the opportunity ; services depending on science or
on art, are confined to those whom education and
practice have familiarised with the science or the
art; services depending on station, are confined to
one, or to the few, if there be more than one, who
at the time in question are invested with that sta-
tion. Thus the objection derived from the too
great number of competitors is almost always with-
out foundation.
It also often happens that, independently of the
reward given to the successful candidate, the ser-
vice even of the unsuccessful pays itself. This is
more particularly apt to be the case with regard to
services of indefinite excellence which depend on
skill. Some develop their talents; others obtain
notoriety; one discourse obtains the reward;
twenty candidates have improved their minds in
endeavouring to obtain it. The athletic exercises
which on such a vast variety of occasions were ce-
lebrated throughout ancient Greece seem to have
been open to all comers : it was but one at each
game that could obtain the prize ; but even the un-
successful combatants found a sort of subordinate
advantage in the reputation of having contended,
and the advances made by them in those energies,
which at that time of day gave distinguished lustre
to every one who excelled in them.
8.
116 B. I. Cii. XV.— COMPETITION AS TO REWARDS.
It may even happen, that the service of the suc-
cessful shall be no object, and that the services
looked to on the part of him who institutes the re-
ward shall be those which are performed by the
unsuccessful. The Grecian games just mentioned
may be taken as an example. The strength of the
successful combatant was no sensible advantage to
the country : the object aimed at was the encou-
ragement of personal prowess and skill. In this
country, the prizes given at horse races have a si-
milar sort of object. From the few horses who win,
the public may reap no particular advantage ; but
the horses which are beaten or never contend for
the prize, are improved by the emulation to which
it has given birth.
By the English Government, very ample rewards
are offered to him who shall discover the most per-
fect and practicable mode of ascertaining a ship^s
longitude at sea. One effect of this reward is to
divert from their employments a multitude of artists
and students in various branches of physical sci-
ence, of whom a few only can have any recom-
pence for their expense and labour. 1 o pay all
that would try might probably be impracticable ;
but the benefit of the service appears to counter-
balance this inconvenience; and in point of fact,
the persons who can suppose themselves qualified
to contend in such a race are so few, that this in-
convenience can scarcely be very considerable.
Were the same reward to be given for running,
boxing, or wrestling, the common businesses of
life would be deserted, and all the world would
become runners, boxers, and wrestlers.
Amongst the Athenians, rewards not vastly in-
ferior, considering the difference in the value of
money and the common rate of living, were actu-
allv fi'wen to such athletic exercises. But the
B.I, Ch. XV.— COMPETITION AS TO REWARDS. 117
Athenians were as much in the right so to do as we
should be in the wrong to imitate them. In those
days when success in war depended almost entirely
upon bodily address and vigour, encouraging the
performance of these exercises, was disciplining
an army ; and the national wealth could suffer
little, since the labours of agriculture were chiefly
carried on by slaves.
The advantages resulting from the most un-
limited freedom of competition therefore are —
1. Chance of success increased accordinsr to the
number of competitors. 2. Chance of the highest
success increased by invigorating the increased
efforts of each competitor. 3. Equality established.
4. Number of works multiplied. 5. Latent talents
developed
APPLICATION OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLE.
The cases to which this principle may be applied
are much more extensive than might at first view
be imagined : it covers a great part of the field of
legislation ; it may be applied to ecclesiastical, to
fiscal, to administrative, and to constitutional laws.
This rule is in direct opposition to the funda-
mental principle of Hindoo legislation. In that
country, every man belongs to a caste from which
he cannot separate himself. To each caste belongs
the exercise of certain professions : there is a caste
of learned men, a caste of warriors, and a caste of
labourers. Emulation is thus reduced within the
narrowest bounds, and the energies of the people
are stifled.
This principle is opposed to those ecclesiastical
regulations, by which all who refuse to sign certain
articles of belief, or refuse to pronounce a certain
number of words concerning theological subjects.
IIH B.I. Ch. XV.— COMPETITION AS TO REWARDS.
are excluded from certain professions. The greater
the number of individuals thus excluded, the
greater the loss sustained by the diminution of
competition in the performance of those services.
This principle is in direct contradiction to a mul-
titude of fiscal and administrative laws, establishing
exclusive privileges in favour of certain branches
of commerce and trade ; fixing the price of com-
modities, and the places at which they are to be
bought and sold ; prohibiting the entry or the exit
of various productions of agriculture or of manu-
factures. These are so many expedients limiting
competition, and are injurious to the national
wealth.
The father of political economy has from this
principle in a manner created a new science: the
application he has made of it to the laws relating
to trade has nearly exhausted the subject.*
By two opposite competitions, prices are fixed.
Competition among the purchasers secures to the
producers a sufficient compensation for the outlay
of their capital and labour. Competition among the
sellers, serving as a counterpoise to the other, pro-
duces a cheap market, and reduces the prices of
commodities to the lowest sum for which it is worth
while to produce them. The difference between
a low price and a high price is, a reward offered to
the purchaser by one seller for the service he will
render to him, by granting what remains to be
gained, to him instead of to his competitor who
requires more.
In all trades, and in all arts, competition secures
to the public not only the lowest price but the best
work. Whatever degree of superiority is possessed
by one commodity over another of the same de-
* Wealth of Nations.
■'}
B. I. Ch. XV.— competition AS TO REWARDS. 1 19
scription meets with its reward either in the quan-
tity sold, or in the price at which it is sold.
As to stores of every description of which the
public stands in need, why is not the competition
left open to all who may choose to undertake the
supply ? It is not difficult to find the determining
reason : it is more convenient to serve a friend, a
dependant, or a partizan, than a person unknown,
or perhaps an enemy. But this is not an avowable
reason : for the public, some other must be sought.
Open competition would, it is said, produce a
multitude of rash contractors. The terms in ap-
pearance most advantageous to government would
commonly be offered by some rash adventurer,
who, in the end, would be found unable to fulfil
his engagements. When the time came for the
performance of his part of the contract, the stores
in question would not be provided, and the service
would suffer irreparable injury. It is important
that the men with whom we deal should be well
known. In some cases, these reasons may not be
without foundation, but they are most frequently
illusory.*
* The following is the general outline of an arrangement
by which all the above difficulties would be effectually removed :
— Unlimited competition j with power to the minister, or to
any competent authority, to reject the offer, which ought
according to the general rule to be accepted : power also to
the offerer to call upon the minister, or competent authority,
to assign their reasons for such rejection. When all this is
done publicly, no attempt would be luade to reject the offer of
a man, who, together with his sureties, was known to be per-
fectly responsible.
A praise to which one of the most celebrated ministers in
England is justly entitled, and about which there is no differ-
ence of opinion, is the having, with more consistency than any
of his predecessors, followed this principle. Mr. Pitt divested
himself of this source of influence, so dear to ministers, and
opened a free competition for all contracts and all loans. It is
120 B.I. Ch. XV.— COMPETITION AS TO REWARDS.
The very nature of the reward may sometimes
render it necessary to depart from the system of
competition. It is not every office that can be
offered to every one disposed to undertake it.
Ought the education of a prince to be offered to him
who writes the best treatise upon that education ?
No: such an office requires qualities and virtues,
and particularly a knowledge of the world, which
might not be possessed by the philosopher who had
resolved the problem.
Ought the office of master of the mint to be
offered to any one who produces the best die?
No: this important duty requires a probity, an
exactness, a habit of regularity, which has no con-
nexion with manual skill. This is a reason, and
the only reason, for not offering such offices to all
the world ; but it is no reason for not attaching to
this service another reward to which all the world
might aspire.
Some services, which are not directly suscepti-
ble of open competition, are so indirectly ; that is,
by making the competition consist in the perform-
ance of some preliminary service, the execution of
which may serve as a test of a man's ability to per-
form the principal service. This is what is done
in the case of extensive architectural works, when
artists are invited to give in their plans and their
models: this is all that the nature of the service
allows of.*
unnecessary to point out the advantages resulting from this
just and litjeral policy ; tliey are known to all the world ; and
the example set by him has been a law to his successors.
* Some years ago, it was thought desirable to have a gene-
ral Index made to the Journals of the House of Commons j for
if it be not yet desirable to have the laws themselves me-
thodized, it has however been thought desirable to methodise
the history of the proceedings of this branch of the legislature.
It was an undcrtaiiing of very considerable difficulty, both in
i
B. I. Ch, XV.— competition AS TO REWARDS. 121
When, some years ago, it was designed to erect,
in the neighbourhood of London, at the public
expense, a Penitentiary House, the mode ot" unli-
mited competition was adopted, in order to obtain
plans tor it. The superintendants received sixty-
five plans, from among which they had an oppor-
tunity of making a selection, instead of the one
which they would have received, had the system
of favouritism been pursued. If, without reward,
a plan superior to, the best of those thus obtained,
has since been devised, it may be attributed to the
share which chance has in every new invention :
the offer of a reward may accelerate the develop-
ment of new ideas, without enabling an individual
to complete the arrangement of his plans at a
given moment.
When the British Parliament offered a reward of
20,000/. for the discovery of a mode of finding the
consideration of its magnitude, and the variety of matter it
embraced. How were fit persons to be selected for it ? Com-
petition, in the usual mode, could not have been employed.
The legislature could not say to men of letters, — Work, and
the best workman shall be rewarded. Who, uncertain of being
paid for it, would have devoted his life to so repulsive an em-
ployment ? The course taken was this : The work was put into
the hands of four men of letters, selected one knows not how,
nor by whom, noi- why. The work was divided amongst them
in such sort, that each of them received to his share such and
so many volumes, according as he was most in favour. The
result has been four indexes instead of one, all of them mate-
rially varying in method and completeness, and rendering una-
voidable the great inconvenience of consulting four volumes
instead of one. If a plan analogous to that employed in the
case of architectural works had been adopted, the course taken
would have been to advertise a premium for the best essay on
the art of index-making, and particularly as applied to the
work in question. As a still further security, an index to one
volume might have been required by way of specimen ; and
to him who gave the greatest satisfaction upon both these
points, the conduct of the work should have been committed.
] 22 B. I. ch. XV.— competition as to rewards.
longitude, they were not guilty of the absurdity of
confining the competition to the professors of natu-
ral philosophy and astronomy at Oxford and Cam-
bridge. To resolve the problem of the best system
of legislation is more important and more difficult.
Why, in mixed governments, has it been hitherto
confined to the members of the legislative body,
and in monarchies, to the chancellor ? The deter-
mining reason is abundantly clear : those who are
in possession of the power, those to whom it be-
longs to propose this problem, are ashamed to
make a public avowal of their own incapacity to
solve it ; they carefully avoid all acknowledgments
of their own incapacity or indolence ; they are
willing that their labours should be rendered as
little burdensome as possible, by following the
ordinary routine, and not that they should be
increased by the exhibition of the necessity of
reform. In a word, they desire not to be advised,
but to be obeyed. While subject to the influence
of such circumstances, it can be considered no
matter of surprise, that they should, as far as pos-
sible, have made the science of legislation an ex-
clusive monopoly. The interests of human nature
cry aloud against this contemptible jealousy. The
problem of the best system of laws ought to be
proposed to the whole world : it belongs to the
whole world to solve it.
Frederic the Great twice attempted to make a
general reform in the laws of his kingdom : both
times he applied to a single chancellor. The
first of them, too contented with himself to suspect
he could stand in need of assistance from others,
produced a work the most insignificant of any
which has appeared.* The second, M. Von Carmer,
* Some extracts from it may be seen. — B. iv. ch. 11.
B.I. Cn. XV.— COMPETITION AS TO REWARDS. 123
after having completed his labours, acted very
differently and much better : before it received
the authority of a law, he presented it to the
public, with an invitation to learned men to com-
municate to him their observations upon it; se-
conding his invitations by the offer of rewards. It
is with regret that I am constiained to ask, why
did not he, who had, in this respect, thus far sur-
passed all his predecessors, act still more nobly ?
Why only ask for criticism upon a given work? Why
not ask for the work itself ? Why limit the invi-
tation to Germans alone, as though there were no
genius out of Germany ? Why limit the reward
to a sum below the price of those snuff-boxes
which are presented to a foreign minister, for the
service he performs in departing when he is re-
called ? The richest diamond in his master's
crown would not have been too great a reward for
him who should thus have given to all the others a
new and before-unknown splendour.
On different occasions, public-spirited indivi-
duals and societies have endeavoured to supply,
from their slender resources, the neglect of govern-
ments, and have offered larger rewards than the
Chancellor of the Great Frederic. That which
they could not offer, and which it did not depend
upon them to offer, was the reward which the
minds best adapted for the accomplishment of such
an undertaking would esteem above every other.
I mean the assurance that their labours would be
judged by those who could give them authority,
who could make them useful.
In conclusion, I do not say, that with regard to
certain services, sufficient reasons may not be
found for altogether excluding competition, but
that in every such case these reasons ought to be
124 B. I. ch. XV.— competition as to rewards.
ready to be rendered, otherwise it ought to be
Jawtul to conclude that they do not exist.*
* With reference to Constitutional Law, hereditary succes-
sion to the throne is established to prevent the competition of
many pretenders. It is the principal exception to the principle,
and the most easily justified.
Another species of inheritance, of which the Egyptians had
given an example, and the Indians have adopted, has found
admirers even in our days. I refer to hereditary professions in
particular families, where they can neither have two nor change
their first. " Par ce moyen," dit Bossuet, " tous les arts
venoient ^ leur perfection : on faissoit mieux ce qu'on avoit
toujours vu faire, et a quoi Ton s'etoit uniquement exerce dbs
son enfance." — Discours sur VHistoire Universelle.
Robertson, in his Historical Researches respecting India,
has warmly approved the institution of castes, and hereditary
professions. He allows, however, that this system may hinder
the exertions of genius, *'J3ut society is formed," says he,
" for ordinary men, and not for men of genius," &c. — Jp-
pendlv.
If we look at a single art of Europe, that of painting for
instance, its history will show, that very few artists have been
born in a painting room. Among a hundred of the most cele-
brated painters, the father of Raphael alone handled the pencil
— Invito patre sidera verso was the device of the illustrious
Bernouilli, who could only study astronomy in secret, and in
opposition to the authority of his father.
[ 125 ]
CHAPTER XVI.
REWARDS FOR VIRTUE.
Beccaria accuses modern legislators of indif-
ference to this subject. Punishments, says he,
and, in many instances, unduly severe punishments,
are provided for crimes ; for virtue there are no
rewards. These complaints, repeated by a multi-
tude of writers, are matter of common-place decla-
mation.
So long as they are confined to general terms,
the subject presents no difficulty; but when an
attempt is made to remove the ground of com-
plaint, and to frame a code of remuneratory laws
for virtue, how great is the difference between
what has been asserted to be desirable, and what is
possible !
Virtue is sometimes considered as an act, some-
times as a disposition: when it is exhibited by a
positive act, it confers a service ; when it is con-
sidered as a disposition, it is a chance of services.
Apart from this notion of service, it is impossible
to tell wherein virtue consists. To form clear
ideas concerning it, it must altogether be referred to
the principle of utility: utility is its object^ as well
as its motive.
After having thus far considered services to be
rewarded, that is to say acts of public notoriety,
which fall not within the boundary of ordinary
actions, it remains to be shown in relation to
virtue — 1. What cannot be accomplished by gene-
ral rewards. — 2. What it is possible to accomplish,
126 B. I. Ch. XVI.— REWARDS FOR VIRTUE.
either by particular institution, or occasional re-
ward.*
I. We may observe, in the first place, that those
civil virtues, which are most important to the wel-
fare of society, and to the preservation of the hu-
man race, do not consist in striking exploits, which
carry their own proof with them ; but in a train of
daily actions, in an uniform and steady course of
conduct, resulting from the habitual disposition of
the mind. Hence it is precisely because these
virtues are connected with the whole course of our
existence, that they are incapable of being made
the objects of the rewards of institution. It is im-
possible to know what particular fact to select, at
what period to require the proof, to what particular
circumstance to attach the distinction of reward.
2. Add to these difficulties that of finding a
suitable reward, which shall be agreeable to those
for whom it is designed. The modesty and deli-
cacy of virtue would be wounded by the formalities
necessary to the public proof of its existence. It
is fostered by, and perhaps depends upon, esteem ;
but this is a secret which it seeks to hide from
itself, and those prizes for virtue which seem to
suppose that conscience is bankrupt, would not be
accepted by the rich, nor even sought after by the
most worthy among the poor.
3. Every virtue produces advantages which are
peculiar to itself Probity inspires confidence in
all the relations of life. Industry leads on to inde-
pendence and wealth. Benevolence is the source
* This will partly form an application of the principles laid
down in Chap. 7- Punition and Remuneration — their relations.
Mr. Bentham, apparently not having believed it necessary to
enter into this detail^ I have attempted, by this chapter^ to
supply this omission, if it were one. — Note by Dumont.
B.I. Cn. XVI.— REWARDS FOR VIRTUE. 127
of kindly affections ; — and though these advan-
tages are not always reaped, they generally follow
in the natural course of events. Their effect
is much more steady and certain than that of fac-
titious reward, which is necessarily subject to
many imperfections.
In the reign of Louis XIV. a treatise was pub-
lished " On the Falsity of Human Virtues." What
is singular, and what the author probably never sus-
pected is, that by some slight alterations it would
be easy to convert this work into a treatise on their
realiti/. The author appears to have considered
them as false, because they were founded upon re-
ciprocal interest ; because their object is happiness,
esteem, security, and the peaceable enjoyment of
life ; because men in their mutual intercourse settle
with each other for their reciprocal services. But
without these felicitous effects, what would virtue
be? In what consists its reality} What w^ould it
have to recommend it ? How would it be distin-
guished from vice? This basis of interest, which to
this author appears to have rendered it false, is
precisely that which gives it a true and solid, and
we may add, an immutable existence, for no other
source of happiness can be imagined.*
But if the most important class of virtues are
already provided with sufficient motives to lead to
their performance, either in the sufferings they
prevent, or in the advantages to which they
give birth, is it not superfluous to add factitious
motives ? The interference of legislators is useful
only in supplying the deficiency of natural motives.
* The writer above alluded to, like all ascetics, unskilful in
reasoning, injures the religion it was his object to serve.
How strong an argument may we not derive from this coin-
cidence between practical morality and happiness, in proof of
design on the part of the supreme legislator !
128 B.I. Ch. XVI.— REWARDS FOR VIRTUE.
4. What would be our condition were things in
a different state, were it necessary to invite men
to labour, honesty, benevolence, and all the duties
of their several conditions, by means of factitious
reward ? Pecuniary rewards, it is evident, it would
be impossible to bestow. Honour, it is true,
remains ; but how would it be practicable to create,
in the shape of honour, a sufficient fund of reward
for the generality of human actions ? The value of
these rewards consists in their rarity. So soon as
they are common, their value is gone.
In this case, as in so many other cases, there is
an analogy between rewards and punishments. It
is an imperfection common to both these sanc-
tions, that they are applicable to actions alone, and
exercise only a distant and indirect influence upon
the habits and dispositions which give a colour to
the whole course of life. Thus, rewards cannot
be instituted for parental kindness, conjugal fide-
lity, adherence to promises, veracity, gratitude and
pity: legal punishments cannot be assigned to in-
gratitude, hardness of heart, violations of friendly
confidence, malice or envy, in a word, to all those
vicious dispositions which produce so much evil
before they have broken out into those crimes
which are cognizable before legal tribunals. The
two systems are like imperfect scales, useful only
for weighing bulky commodities ; and as an indi-
vidual, whose life has been less guilty than that of
a man of a hard and false heart, is punished for a
single theft, there is also often a necessity of re-
warding a certain distinguished service, performed
by a man who is otherwise little entitled to esteem.
Thus, in regard to the moral virtues, which con-
stitute the basis of daily conduct, there is no reward
which can be applied to them by general institu-
tion. All that it is possible to do, is limited to
.1
B. I. Cn. XVI.— REWARDS FOR VIRTUES, 129
seizing upon those striking actions, readily suscep-
tible of proof, which arise out of extraordinary cir-
cumstances, as opportunities of conferring occa-
sional rewards.
Rewards of this nature cannot be bestowed peri-
odically : the occasions for performing eminent
services do not regularly recur. It is the action,
and not the date in the almanack, which ought to
bring down the reward. The French Academy
annually bestowed a prize upon theindividual who,
among the indigent classes, had performed the
most virtuous action. The judges had always one
prize to bestow, and they had but one. They
must occasionally have experienced regret at leav-
ing unrewarded actions of equal merit, and some-
times at being obliged to reward an action of an
ordinary description. Besides, by the periodical
return of the distribution, this prize would soon
be rendered an object of routine, and cease to
attract attention.
The institution of La Rosicre de Salency may be
produced in answer to the above observations:
but it should be remembered, that a village insti-
tution is of a different nature. The more limited
a society, the more closely may its regulations be
made to resemble those of domestic government ; in
which, as we have already seen, reward may be
applied to almost every purpose. It is thus that
annual prizes may be established for agility, skill,
strength ; for every other quality which it may be
desirable to encourage, and of which the rudiments
always exist. There is not a village in Switzer-
land which does not distribute prizes of this nature
for military exercises : it is an expedient for con-
verting the duties and services of the citizens into
fetes. Geneva, whilst it was a republic, had its
naval king; its king of the arquebuss ; its com-
9
130
B.I. Ch. XVI.— REWARDS FOR VIRTUES.
mander of the bow ; its king of tiie cannon. The
conqueror, during the year of his reign, enjoyed cer-
tain privileges, little costly to the state ; the public
joy marked the return of these national exercises,
which placed all the citizens under the eyes of their
grateful country. La Rosiere de Salency^ designed
to honour virtues, which ought to be perpetuated
and renewed from generation to generation, might
have a periodical return, like the roses of summer.
The Humane Society^ es\.dih\'\s\\e(\ in England for
the purpose of affording assistance to persons in
danger of drowning, and providing the means of
restoration in cases of suspended animation, distri-
butes prizes to those who have saved any individual
from death. In this case, the reward is not, as in
the French Academy, confined to the indigent
class alone: men of the first rank would consider
it an honour to receive a medal commemorative of
so noble an action. Besides, the mode of confer-
ring these rewards has not been dramatised ; the
retired habits of virtue have been consulted; there
is no public exhibition to which it is dragged, to
be confounded or humiliated. Greater eclat might,
however, without adding to the theatrical efiect,
be given to these rewards, were an efficient report
made of them to the king and both houses of par-
liament.
An institution of a similar nature, for the reward
of services rendered in cases of fire, shipwreck, and
all other possible accidents, would still further
contribute to the cultivation of benevolence ; and
these noble actions, brought in the same manner
under the eyes of the legislators, and inscribed in
their journals, would acquire a publicity of much
less importance to the honoured individual than to
society in general.
Indeed, though the reward applies only to one
B.I. Ch. XVI.— REWARDS FOR VIRTUES. 131
particular action, the principal object designed is
the cultivation of those dispositions which such
actions indicate : and this can only be accom-
plished by the publicity which is given to the
example, and the public esteem and honour in
which it is held.
When, upon the site of the prison which had
been the scene of an exalted instance of filial
piety, the Romans erected a temple, they incul-
cated a noble lesson : they proclaimed their respect
for one of the fundamental virtues of their re-
public*
Independently of these eminently meritorious
and always rare actions, governments might render
publicity subservient to the perfection of a great
variety of services, in the performance of which
the regular discharge of duty is more important
than the display of extraordinary virtues. This
project might be realized by the formation of a
comparative table of the subordinate administra-
tions of cities, parishes, or counties. This table
would require to be renewed at fixed periods, and
might be made to show which districts were most
exact in the payment of taxes, in which the fewest
crimes had been committed, in which useful esta-
blishments had been formed, in which the most
liberal exertions had been made for the relief of
calamity, what hospitals had been conducted with
the greatest economy, and had been most success-
* Humilis in plebe et ideo ignobilis puerpera, supplicii
causS. carcere inclusa matre, cum impetrasset aditum, a jani-
tore semper excussa, ne quid inferret cibi, deprehensa est ube-
ribus suis alens earn. Quo miraculo matria salus donata
pietati est, ambaeque perpetuis aliraentis, et locus ille eidem
consecratus deae. C. Quintio M. Acilio Coss. templo Pietatis
extructo in illius carceris sede. — Plin. lib. vii. c. 3G.
'9.
132 B.I. Ch. XVI.— REWARDS FOR VIRTUES.
fill in the cure of diseases ; * what tribunals had
decided the greatest number of causes, and from
which the smallest number of appeals had been
made; in what instances efficacious precautions
had been adopted for relieving any particular dis-
trict from causes tending to render it unhealthy, —
from mendicity, from smuggling, from vice, and
from misery.
Such official reports, independently of their poli-
tical utility to the government, would, without
parade, produce all the good effects of reward ; of
that reward in honour which costs nothing to the
country, and yet maintains all the moral energies
in full activity. Every distinguished service might
find a place in these annals; and the people,
always prone to exaggerate the vigilance and
means of information possessed by their governors,
would soon be persuaded that a perpetual inspec-
tion was kept up, not only with respect to their
faults, but also their meritorious actions.
This project is borrowed, neither from the Re-
public of Plato, nor the Utopia of More. It is even
inferior to what has in our time been carried into
effect, in an empire composed of more than a hun-
dred departments ; ■\ in which tables exhibiting, in
columns, all the results of civil, economical, rural,
and commercial administration, were formed with
* In the report respecting 1' Hotel Dieu, by Bailli, a table of
the mortality in different hospitals is given, and the process of
his calculations.
t I refer here to L' Analyse des Proces-verbaux des Conseils de
Department ; a work in 4to, published in France in 1802. This
work consisted of the answers to a series of questions, addressed
to each department, by the minister of the interior.
These tables have been discontinued. Such is the fact. I
d(i not endeavour to ascertain the cause.
f
B.I. Cn. XVI.— REWARDS FOR VIRTUES, 133
greater facility and promptitude than would have
been experienced by any Russian noble, had he
been desirous of obtaining from his superintendaiits
an account of the state of his property.
If rewards were established for virtue, when
exhibited by the indigent classes, it would be im-
proper to seek for striking instances of its display,
or to suppose that they are actuated by sentiments of
vanity, which operate feebly upon men accustomed
to dependence, and almost constantly employed in
making provision for their daily wants. Institu-
tions of this nature, suited to small communities,
ought to be adapted to local circumstances and
popular habits. In a village or a tov\ni, for in-
stance, it might be proper to assign a distinguished
place in the church for the old men : this distinc-
tion, united to a sentiment of religion, and granted
with discretion, need bear no appearance of flat-
tery, but might be a mark of respect towards old
age, rendered honourable by the blameless life
which had preceded it. There exist in England
many charitable institutions for decayed trades-
men, in which their situation is much preferable
to that of the inhabitants of poor-houses: they
have their separate dwellings, their gardens, and a
small pension. Those only whose conduct has
been generally honourable being admitted to these
asylums, the metal badge which is worn in some
instances, so far from being considered as a dis-
grace, is regarded as a mark of honour.
Different agricultural societies bestow rewards
upon servants who have lived during a certain
number of years in the same place ; this circum-
stance being with reason considered as a proof of
fidelity and good conduct.
Some of these societies also give rewards to day
labourers, who have brought up a certain number
134 B. I. ch. XVI.— rewards for virtues.
of children without having received assistance
from their parishes. This is an encouragement to
economy, and all the virtuous habits which it im-
plies : but as a means of remedying the inconve-
niences arising from the poor laws, its effect is ex-
tremely feeble.
In both these cases the reward generally con-
sists of money ; but the money is connected with
honour ; the notoriety given to the reward operates
as a certificate in favour of the individual in his
particular district.
By examining every thing which has been done
in this respect in Holland, Switzerland, England,
and elsewhere, we should become possessed of an
assortment of remuneratory expedients, applicable
to almost every class in society. Every thing
depends, however, upon the mode of application.
For this duty governments are entirely unfit. It
is local inspection alone which can gain a know-
ledge of circumstances and superintend the details.
After all, just and discriminating public esteem,
that is to say public esteem founded upon the
principle of utility, is the most potent, the most
universally applicable, of all the species of reward.
If virtue be held in public estimation, virtue will
flourish: let it cease to be held in such estimation,
it will decline in the same proportion. The cha-
racter of a people is the moral climate which kills
or vivifies the seeds of excellence.
An inquiry into the causes of the high respect in
which, under certain governments, particular vir-
tues were held ; why the virtues of a Curtius^ of a
Fabricius,o^a Scipio, were nourished and developed
at Rome ; why other countries and other times
have produced only courtiers, parasites, fine gen-
tlemen and wits, men without energy and without
patriotism, would require a moral and historical
B.I. Ch. XVI.— REWARDS FOR VIRTUES. 135
analysis, only to be completed by means of a pro-
found study of the political constitutions, and
particular circumstances of each people. The re-
sult would, however, prove, that the qualities most
successfully cultivated were those held in most
general esteem.
But public esteem, it may be said, is free, essen-
tially free, independent of the authority of govern-
ments. This copious fund of rewards is therefore
withdrawn from the handsof the supreme authority 1
This, however, is not the case : governments may
easily obtain the disposal of this treasure. Public
esteem cannot be compelled, but it may be con-
ducted. It requires but little skill on the part of
a virtuous sovereign to enable him to apply the
high reward of public esteem to any service which
his occasions may require.
There already exists a degree of respect for riches,
honour, and power: if the dispenser of these gifts
bestow them only upon useful qualities, if he unite
what is already esteemed to what ought to be esti-
mable, his success is certain. Reward would serve
as a proclamation of his opinion, and would mark
out a particular line of conduct as meritorious in his
eyes. Its first effect would be that of a lesson in
morality.
Unrewarded, the same service would not ac-
quire the same degree of notoriety. It would be
lost among the multitude of objects soliciting
public attention, and remain undistinguished from
the pretensions, well or ill founded, respecting
which public opinion is undecided. Furnished
with this patent from the sovereign, it becomes au-
thentic and manifest : those who were ignorant
are instructed, those who were doubtful become
decided: the inimical and the envious are rendered
less bold, reputation is acquired, and becomes per-
136 [B. I. Ch. XVI.— rewards for virtues.
manent. The second effect of the reward consists
in the increase of intensity and duration given to
public esteenQ.
Imniediately, all those who are governed by
views of interest, who aspire to honour or fortune ;
those who seek the public good, but who seek it
like ordinary men, not as heroes or martyrs, eagerly
press into that career in which the sovereign has
united private and public interest. In this manner
a proper dispensation of favours directs the passions
of individuals to the promotion of the public wel-
fare, and induces even those who were indifferent
to virtue or vice, to rank themselves upon that
side which promises them the greatest advantage.
Such being the power of sovereigns, he must
be extremely inexpert in the distribution of ho-
nours, who separates them from that public esteem
which has so decided a tendency to unite with
them. Nothing, however, is more common. In-
stances may be found, in most courts, of splendid
decorations of stars and garters in double and
triple range, which do not even give a favourable
turn to public opinion. They are considered as
proofs of favour , but not as signs of merit.
" Honours in the hands of princes resemble
those talismans with which the fairies, according
to the fables, were wont to present their favourites ;
they lose their virtue whenever they are improperly
employed."*
* Helvetius.
[ 137 3
CHAPTER XVil.
ACCOMPANIMENTS TO REMUNERATION.
After having exhibited in what manner the
matter of wealth is ajDplicable to the purposes ot"
reward, we proceed to show other uses derivable
from it for the public service, which are not re-
muneratory.
The idea of reward will be much clearer when
it shall have been distinguished and separated from
these accessory uses, which have certain relations
with it.
1. Wages necessary for the support of life. Ser-
vants must be fed whilst they are employed, and
there are cases in which it is necessary to feed them
even before they begin to work. If the wages paid
do not exceed what is necessary for this purpose,
as is sometimes the case among the soldiery, and
especially if the enrolments are involuntary, such
wages, being absolutely necessary, are not reward.
2. The Instruction of Servants. Certain kinds
of service require advances from Government for
this object. If this instruction require much time,
it is naturally begun at an early age, and is then
called education. This employment of the matter
of reward is sufficiently distinct from that which
regards subsistence, with which however it is very
frequently combined and confounded. If there
are a sufficient number of individuals willing to
bear this expense, so much the better; otherwise
it is necessary that Government should bear it for
them. This has almost everywhere been thought
to be the case with respect to the church. It has
138 B.I.CH.XV1I.— ACCOMPANIMENTS TO REMUNERATION.
also generally been considered necessary in new
countries, or countries but little advanced in the
career of prosperity with respect to the teachers
and professors in most branches of science. In
the war department, the corps of cadets is a nur-
sery for young officers. The foundations of public
schools are nurseries for the church. The greater
number however of these foundations are owing
rather to the good intentions of individuals than
to the cares of governments.
3. Equipment. That an individual may be in
a condition to render service, he must be furnished
with the necessary equipments. The warrior wants
his accoutrements ; the astronomer his observa-
tory ; the chemist his laboratory ; the mechanic
his machines; the naturalist his collections of
natural history ; the botanist his garden ; the
experimental farmer a plot of ground, and funds to
enable him to improve it.
4. Indemnity. When an individual is only in-
demnified, he is not rewarded : reward, properly-
speaking, only begins when indemnity is complete
— Do we wish for services ? we ought to recollect
that b\' the person from whom we seek to obtain
them, the inconveniences of every sort which
compose the burthen of the service will be put
into one scale, the advantages he finds attached to
it into the other. To the head of indemnity be-
longs everything necessary to produce an equili-
brium between the two ; it is only the excess
which is thrown into the scale of advantages which
strictly belongs to the head of reward.
5. The assuring responsibility. In so far as the
matter of reward is employed for this purpose, it
is employed in laying a foundation for the inflic-
tion of punishment. The stock of punishment is
in itself inexhaustible; but when the body is
B. I. ch. XVII.— accompaniments to remuneration . 139
withdrawn from the hands of the ministers of
justice, corporal punishment cannot be inflicted,
and all other punishments can be compensated.
If a servant possess property of his own, so much
the better; if he possess none, and a salary be
given to him, he will always have so much to
lose ; the loss of this salary will be a punishment
he will always be liable to undergo, whatever may
become of him.
The principal use of this employment of the
matter of reward, is in the case of offices which
place property in the hands of those who fill
them. If there are no other means of securing
their probity, it would not be bad economy to
make their appointments amount in value to but
little less than the highest interest they could reap
from the largest sum they ever have in their hands.
This would be to make them assure against their
own dishonesty. The diflPerence between the
actual salary and the least salary they could be
induced to accept, would constitute the premium.
It is rarely that a distinct sum is appropriated to
this purpose ; on the one hand, this end is partly
effected by suretyship, and on the other, the sum
considered requisite for the purposes of indem-
nity and reward equals or surpasses what could
be proposed to be allowed for it ; but this function
is not the less distinct from all the rest.
6. A guarantee against temptations. Money,
like the most valuable articles of the medical
pharmacopeia, may serve either as a poison or an
antidote, according as it is applied. This emplo}^-
ment of the matter of revi^ard resembles that last
mentioned, without being confounded with it.
Money employed for assuring responsibility will
produce its effect, though the individual be
already corrupted. The use of money employed
140 B.I. Ch. XVII.— ACCOMPANIMENTS TO REMUNERATION.
as a guarantee against temptation, is to prevent
corruption. A less sum may suffice in this case
than in the former ; in that, it was necessary that
the revenue granted should preserve some propor-
tion to the sum confided ; in this, such proportion
is not required : the measure to be observed is
only that of the wants of the individual placed in
the rank that the office he occupies confers. In a
word, salary, considered as a pledge, is only useful
in the prevention of theft ; money, employed as
an antiseptic, is equally useful in the prevention
of peculation in all its forms, in the prevention of
all improper conduct which can have for its
motive the desire of money, and for its means the
situation in which the individual is placed by
his office.
7. The support of dignity. Public opinion ex-
acts, it matters not by what reason, from every
individual possessed of a certain rank, a certain
expenditure ; his wants are thus increased in pro-
portion to his dignity. Dignity, deprived of the
wealth necessary for its support, furnishes in pro-
portion to its extent an incentive to malversation,
and at the same time generally furnishes the
opportunity ; as an antidote to such temptations,
money may therefore sometimes be bestowed for
the support of dignity. The good of the service
may also require the same thing. It is incontesti-
bly true that between wealth and power there
subsists an intimate and natural union. Wealth
itself is power, it may be proper therefore that the
support of the respect which it commands be not
refused in favour of certain employments, in
which much depends upon the place they hold in
public opinion.
8. Another use of the matter of reward consists
m the excitement of alacrity ; 1 mean the produc-
B.I, Cu. XVII.— ACCOMPANIMENTS TO REMUNERATION. 141
tion of an habitual disposition to do what is
required with pleasure. The greater the degree
of mental enjoyment, the quicker and more lively
are one's ideas, and the larger the quantity of
work which can be performed in a given time.
The mind, in a happy mood, acts with incompara-
bly more ease than when agitated by grief; or
even in its ordinary condition, when it is moved
only by habit. It is the same with the bodily
powers ; who knows not how much the powers
of the muscles depend upon the energy of the
mind ? What comparison is there between the
labour of slaves and of free men ? It is upon this
that the superiority of hired soldiers over unpaid
and arbitrary levies depends. In the one case, as
in the other, the motive which leads to exertion
consists in the expectation of being treated ac-
cording to their behaviour ; the motive is nothing
else but the fear of pain. But in the first case
there is the gratification of reward to sustain the
alacrity; in the other, the labour has no other
accompaniment but grief.
The simple expectation of a reward, how large
soever it may be, will not always produce the
same effect as a reward previously bestowed.
The condition of expectancy in which the indi-
vidual finds himself in such a case, is a mixed and
uncertain state, in which despair and hope may
alternately predominate.
The danger to be guarded against is, lest rewards
previously bestowed should produce diversions
little favourable to labour, either by suggesting
the idea of some more favourite occupation, or by
supplying the means of its pursuit. The progress
of the thoughts may be accelerated, but the
thoughts excited may be of a different nature;
142 B.I. Ch.XVII.-ACCOMPANIMENTS to REMUNERATION-
the dull ideas of labour ma}'^ be supplanted by the
enliveningconsiderations of shows and of pleasure.
Whether or not it is proper to bestow such
rewards, depends upon the character of the indi-
vidual ; that character must be known, before it is
possible to determine what will be their effect;
but in every case there can be no greater folly
than to waste in previous gratifications every
thing which is destined for reward.
In conclusion, these distinctions ought not to
be abused. The expense of rewards need not be
increased on account of each of these items; it is
not necessary to appropriate a distinct sum to
each. The same sum may serve for many, and
even for all. That which suffices for assuring
responsibility will, in general, suffice as a guaran-
tee against temptations, and vice versa^ so far as
ends so uncertain may be effected by such means,
and will in every case suffice for indemnification.
That which suffices for equipment, may serve in
part for the support of dignity and the excitement
of alacrity. That which suffices for the mainte-
nance of dignity will be sufficient for almost all
the other ends ; and the whole of whatever is
employed for any other of these purposes, except
equipment, cannot but serve for subsistence.
RATIONALE OF REWARD.
BOOK II.
REWARDS APPLIED TO OFFICES.
CHAPTER I.
SALARY HOW A REWARD'.
There are many species of service, and even
services of a positive nature, ofwliich governments
stand in constant and uninterrupted need : such for
the most part are the duties of those who are em-
ployed in the different departments of every go-
vernment. The political state or condition, on
account of which individuals possessing it are
considered liable to render these services, is called
a place, an office, or an employment. To these
places it is both natural and customary to attach,
under the title of emolument, certain portions of
the matter of wealth. If such emolument be deter-
minate in amount, and paid at regularly recurring
periods, it is called a salary.
It is the nature of a reward to operate as a mo-
tive, and in that capacity to give birth to acts
which, by the person by whom the reward is held
up to view, are esteemed services ; the greater the
reward, the greater is the motive it constitutes:
the greater the motive, the more strenuous the
144 B. II. Ch. I.— SALARV-HOVV A REWARD.
exertion it has a tendency to produce ; and if the
value of the service be susceptible of an indefinite
degree of perfection, the more strenuous the exer-
tion to perform it, the greater, as far as depends
upon the will of the party, will be the value of the
service. Hence it follows that, if salary be re-
ward, as far as funds can be found, salaries cannot
be too large. How different the state of things
presented to us when we consult experience ! We
see small salaries, and the service admirably well
performed: largesalaries, and nothing donefor them.
In certain lines, we see the service regularly worse
and worse performed, in proportion to the large-
ness of the salary. Where then lies the error?
In experience there can be none. In the argument
there is none. The error lies in its not being pro-
perly understood : and that in general it has not
been properly understood, the bad management
and weak measures so frequent in this line are
but too pregnant proofs. To understand the argu-
ment aright, two points must be observed : the
one is, to consider, for illustration sake, that just in
the same manner as punishment, and in no other
manner, though with less certainty of effect, is
reward capable of acting as a motive : the other
point is, to consider what is really the service for
which a salary is a reward.
What then is the service with respect to which
a salary operates as a motive ? The answer which
would be generally given to this question is, the
continued service belonging to the office to which
the salary is annexed. Obvious as this answer
may seem, it is not the true one. The service, and
the only service, with respect to which a salary can
operate as a motive, is either the simple instanta-
neous service of taking upon one the office, or the
permanent service of continuing to stand invested
B. ir. Ch. I.— salary— how a reward. 145
with it. If the duties of the office — the services in
the expectation of which the salary annexed to the
office is bestowed, happen to be performed, it
can not be owing merely and immediately to the
salary: it must be owing to some other motive.
If there were no other motive, the service would
not be rendered. Nothing is done without a mo-
tive : — what then is this other motive ? It must be
either of the nature of reward or punishment. It
may by possibility be of the nature of reward ; but
if it be so, one or other of these rewards would
seem superfluous : in common it is principally of
the nature of punishment. In as far as this is the
case, the service for which the salary considered as
a reward is given, is the service of taking upon one
the obligation constituted by the punishment; the
obligation of performing the services expected from
him who possesses the office.
That the zeal displayed in discharging the duties
of an office should not be in proportion to the
salary, will now no longer appear strange. Expe-
rience is reconciled to theory. This subject will
receive elucidation, if we substitute punishment for
reward, and consider what tendency such a motive
would have to give birth to any service, if con-
nected with it in the same manner as a salary is
annexed to an office.
Suppose a schoolmaster, intending to conduct
the business of his school with regularity, were to
make it a rule on a certain day, at the beginning
of every quarter, to call all his scholars before
him and to give each ten lashes, committing their
behaviour during the rest of the quarter altogether
to their discretion ; — the policy of this master
would be the exact counterpart of the founder of
the school towards the master, if he has sought to
attach him to the duties of his office by bestowing
10
146 B.ll. Ch.I.— SALARY— HOW A REWARD.
upon him a salary. Suppose the master, finding
that under this discipline the progress of his
scholars did not equal his expectations, should re-
solve to increase his exertions, and accordingly
should double the dose of stripes; — his policy in
this case would be the exact counterpart of the
founder, who by the single operation of increasing
the master's salary, should think to increase his
diligence.
A salary is not a reward for any individual ser-
vice, of the number of those which are rendered, in
consequence of a man's acceptance of the office to
which the salary is annexed. For the rendering of
any one of these services, the salary presents him
not with any motive which can come under the
head of reward : the motives which it gives him
belong entirely to the head of punishment. It is
by fenr only, and not by hope, that he is impelled
to the discharge of his duty ; by the fear of receiv-
ing less than he would otherwise receive; not by
the hope of receiving more. Though he work ever
so much more or better than a man who liolds his
office is expected to work, he will receive nothing
more than his salary, if the salary is all that he has
to hope for. By working to a certain degree less
or worse, he may indeed stand a chance of having
the salary, or a part of it, taken from him, or he
may be made punishable in some other way ; but
if he continue to keep clear of that extreme degree,
in such case let him work ever so little or ever so
badly, he will not, as far as artificial punishment is
concerned, be ever the worse. He has therefore
no motive, so far as the salary is concerned, for en-
deavouring to pass the line of mediocrity ; and he
has a motive, the motive of indolence or love of
ease, for stopping as far short of it as he can with
safety.
B. II. Ch.I.— SALARY— HOW A REWARD. 147
Suppose, for instance, a salary of 4000/. a year
annexed to the office of a judge: of all the ser-
vices he may come to perform in the discharge of
his function, of which one is this salary the re-
ward ? Of no one whatever. Take any one of the
causes which would regularly come before him for
hearing ; though he were to attend, and to display
ever so much diligence and ever so much ability in
the hearing of it, he would receive no more that
year than his 4000/. — though he were to absent
himself altog^ether, and leave the business to his
colleagues, he would receive no less ; in short,
provided he does not so far swerve from his duty
as to subject himself to fine or deprivation, whe-
ther he perform his duty ever so well, or ever so
ill ; whether he decide many causes or few ; whe-
ther his attendance is constant or remiss ; whether
he display ever so much or ever so little ability,
his salary is the same. Not that a man in this
exalted station is in any want of motives to prompt
him to exert himself in the discharge of its duties:
he has the pleasures of power to balance the pains
of study ; the fear of shame to keep him from sink-
ing below mediocrity ; the hope of celebrity to
elevate him above it ; to spur him on to the high-
est pitch of excellence. These motives are pre-
sented to him by his station, but they are not pre-
sented to him by his salary.
The services, and the only services, with which
the salary presents him a motive for performing,
^re, in the first place, the instantaneous act of
taking upon him the station, that is, of subjecting
himself to the obligations annexed to it, and in
the event of his violating any of those obligations,
to the punishments annexed to such violations : in
the next place, the discharging of the smallest
portion of those obligations which it is necessary
10.
148 B.ll. Ch. I.— SALARY— HOW A REWARD.
he should discharge, in order to his receiving such
or such part of the salary. Let it, for instance, be
paid him quarterly : if the first quarter be paid
him in advance, it will afford ^him no motive of the
nature of reward for doing any of the business of
that quarter. He has that quarter's salary; nor
can he fail of enjoying it, unless, in the way of
punishment, it be afterwards taken from him. If
it be not paid him till the end of the quarter, the
case will be still the same, unless proof of his
having rendered certain services, the having at-
tended, for example, at certain times, be necessary
to his receiving it. With this exception, it may
equally be said that, in both cases, for any other
than the instantaneous act of taking upon him the
burthen of the station for that quarter, he has no
reward, nor any motive but what operates in the
way of punishment.
This distinction is of importance, for if the salary
given were the inducement for performing the ser-
vices, the chance of having them performed, and
well performed, would be exactly as the magni-
tude of the salary. If, for example, fifty pounds
sterling a year sufficed to insure fifty grains of
piety, assiduity, eloquence, and other sacerdotal
virtues in a curate, five thousand of these same
pounds ought to insure five thousand grains of
these same virtues in a bishop or archbishop. But
what everybody knows, is that this proportion does
not hold ; on the contrary, it most frequently hap-
pens that the proportion is inverse : the curate la-
bours much, the bishop little, and the archbishop
less.
The chance of service is as the magnitude of
the punishment ; and if the salary can be with-
drawn, it is so far indeed as the magnitude of the
salary ; but it may be equally great without any
B.II. Ch.1.— SALARY— HOW A REWARD. 149
salary : by the substitution of any other punish-
ment instead of loss of salary.
We see, then, how it is that a salary, be it great
or small, independently of the obligation which it
pays a man for contracting, has not in itself the
smallest direct tendency to produce services ;
whilst experience shows, that in many cases, in
proportion to its magnitude, it has a tendency to
prevent them.
[ 150 ]
CHAPTER II.
RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS.
Before we enter upon this subject in detail, it
may be necessary to remark that, the proper appli-
cation of the following rules will depend upon the
nature of the service required, and its various local
circumstances. It is only by observing the pecu-
liar character assumed by abuse in each office, that
appropriate remedies for each particular evil can be
provided. Since it is impossible to make a com-
plete catalogue of all errors, and to anticipate every
species of abuse, the rules laid down may not con-
stitute a perfect system. They may, however,
serve as a warning against errors and abuses which
have by experience been found to exist, and also
against some which may be imagined likely to
exist. It is useful to erect beacons upon rocks
whose existence has been made known by the
shipwrecks they have caused. Among the rules
about to be given, some may appear so self-evi-
dent as almost to seem superfluous : but if it can
be shewn that errors have arisen from the neglect
of them in practice, such rules, though not enti-
tled to be considered as discoveries, must at least
be regarded as necessary warnings ; they may teach
nothing new, but they may serve to recall princi-
ples which it is desirable should be constantly and
clearly remembered.
Rule I. Emoluments ought in such manner to
be attached to offices, as to produce the most inti-
mate connection between the duty and the interest
of the person employed.
B. fl. Cn.II.— RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS, 151
This rule may be applied in insuring assiduous
attendence on the part of the persons employed, in
different offices, different services are required ; but
the greater number of offices have this one circum-
stance in common : that their duties may be per-
formed, it is necessary that the individual holding
the office should be at a certain time in a certain
place. Hence, of all duties, assiduous attendence
is the first, the most simple, and the most universal.
In many cases, to insure the performance of this
duty, is to insure the performance of every other
duty. When the clerk is at his desk, the judge
upon the bench, the professor in his school, if there
be nothing particularly irksome in their duty, and
they can do nothing else, rather than remain idle,
it is probable they will perform their duty. In
these cases, the service required being of the con-
tinual kind, and in point of quality not susceptible
of an indefinite degree of perfection ; the pay being
required not for certain services, but for such ser-
vices as may come to be performed within a certain
space of time, it may without impropriety be given
in the form of a salary. But even here, the policy
of making reward keep pace with service* should
be pursued as closely as possible ; and for this pur-
pose the long continued mass of service should be
broken down into as many separate services as
possible : the service of a year into the service of
days. In the highest offices, an individual, if paid
by his time, should like the day labourer, and for
the same reason, be paid rather by the day than by
the year. In this way he is kept to his duty with
more than the effect, and at the same time with-
out any of the odium of punishment.
In the station of a judge, it is not common to
* Sec b. i. ch. x. rule 3.
152 B.II. Ch. II.— RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS.
exact attendance by the force of punishment: at
least not by the force of punishment to be applied
in each instance of failure. But if it were, the in-
fliction of that punishment for trivial transgres-
sions, that is for one or a few instances of non-per-
formance, would be thought harsh and rigorous,
nor w^ould any body care for the odium of standing
forth to enforce it. Excuses would be lightly made,
and readily accepted. Punishment in such cases
being to the last degree uncertain, would be in a
great measure ineffectual. It might prevent con-
tinual, but it would never prevent occasional, or
even frequent, delinquency. But what cannot be
etfected by punishment alone, may be effected by
punishment and reward together. When the officer
is paid separately for each day's attendance, each
particle of service has its reward : there is for each
particle of service an inducement to perform it.
There will be no wanton excuses, when inconveni-
ence adheres inseparably to delinquency without
the parade of punishment.
The members of the French Academy and the
Academy of Science, notwithstanding all their dig-
nity, are paid their salaries by the day and not by
the year. And who are the individuals, how low or
how high soever, who cannot, and who ought not
to be paid ih this manner ? If pride has a legiti-
mate scruple, it is that which refuses to receive
the reward for labour which it has not performed.
Whilst as to the objection which might arise from
the minute apportionment of the salary, it is easily
removed by counters given from day to day, and
converted into money at fixed periods.
In the act of parli'^ament for establishing Peni-
tentiary houses, among other good regulations,
this method of insuring assiduity of attendance has
been adopted. The three superintendants receive,
B.II. Ch.1I.— RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS. 153
asthe whole of their emoluments, each a share of the
sum of five guineas, which is directed to be distri-
buted each day of their attendance equally among
those who are present.
A more antient example of this policy may be
found in the incorporated society in London, for
the assurances of lives. The directors of this esta-
blishment receive their trifling emoluments in this
manner ; and thus applied, these emoluments suf-
fice. This plan has also been adopted as it respects
commissioners of bankrupts, and by different asso-
ciations.
These examples ought not to be lost, and yet,
from not having been referred to general princi-
ples, they have not possessed the influence they
ought to have. How often have regulations been
heaped upon regulations without success ! How
many useless decrees were made in France to in-
sure the residence of the bishops and beneficed
clergy.
In England we have not, in this respect, been
more successful, that is to say, more skilful.
Laws have been enacted against the non-residence
of the clergy. Laws badly contrived, and conse-
quently useless. Punishment has been denounced
and a fine imposed, which, being invariable in
amount, has sometimes been greater and sometimes
less than the advantage to be derived from the
offence. For want of a public prosecutor in this,
as in so many other cases, it has been necessary to
rely upon such casual informer as may be allured
by a portion of the fine : the love of gain has sel-
dom proved a motive sufficiently strong to induce
an endeavour to obtain this reward ; whose value,
not to mention the expenses of pursuit, is de-
stroyed by infamy. Till this motive is reinforced
J 54 B. II. Ch. II.— RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS.
by personal animosity, which bursts the bonds of
infamy, these laws are powerless.
Such cases, which may occur once or twice in
the course of ten years, throughout the whole
kingdom, are neither sufficiently frequent, nor
well known, to operate as examples. The offence
remains undiminished; the useless punishment
constitutes only an additional evil : whilst such
laws and such methods, powerless among friends,
serve only to bring enemies into contact 1 When-
ever it is desirable that a clergyman should live in
the midst of his parishioners, that is to say, when
they are amicable, the law is a dead letter ; its
power is exerted only when they are irreconcilable
enemies ; that is, in the only cases wherein its
utility is problematical, and it were to be wished
that its execution would admit of an exception.
His return into his parish is a triumph for his ene-
mies, and a humiliation for himself.
Had the salaries, paid to the professors in the
universities, been interwoven with their services,
it might have been the custom for some of these
pretended labourers to have laboured for their hire;
and to be a professor, might have meant something
more than having a title, a salary, and nothing to
teach.
A salary, paid day by day, has an advantage
beyond that of insuring assiduity of attendance;
it even renders a service agreeable, which, with
an annual salary, will be regarded as purely bur-
thensome. When reward, instead of being be-
stowed in a lump, follows each successive portion
of labour, the idea of labour becomes associated
with pleasure instead of pain. In England, hus-
bandmen, like other labourers, are paid in hard
money by the week, and their labour is cheerfully
B. II. Ch. II.— rules as to emoluments. 155
and well performed. In some parts of the conti-
nent, husbandmen are still paid as they were for-
merly in England, by houses and pieces of land
given once for all ; and the labour is said to be
performed with all the slovenliness and reluctance
of slavery.
Rule 11. — Emoluments ought in such manner
to be attached to office, as to produce the greatest
possible degree of excellence in theservice rendered.
Thus far the subject has only been considered
as applicable to insuring attendance in cases where
assiduity of attendance appears to suffice for in-
suring the performance of all other duties. There
follow some cases, in which it appears possible to
apply the same principle, either in the prevention
of abuse, or in insuring an extraordinary degree of
perfection in the employment of the powers which
belong to certain stations.
Instead of appointing a fixed salary, invariably
of the same amount, as the emolument of the
superintendant, or superintendants, of a prison, a
poor-house, an asylum for orphans, or any kind of
hospital, whose inhabitants depend upon the care
of one, or a small number of individuals, whatever
may be the difference in the degree of attention
displayed, or the degree of perfection with which
the service is performed, it would be well to make
such emolument in some measure depend upon the
care with which their duties have been performed,
as evidenced by their success. In a penitentiary,
or other prison, that the prisoners might be insured
from all negligence or ill-treatment, tending di-
rectly or indirectly to shorten their lives, make a
calculation of the average number of deaths among
the prisoners in the particular prison, compared
with the number of persons confined there. Allow
the superintendant each year a certain sum for
156 B.II. Ch. 11.— RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS.
each person of this number, upon condition, that
for every prisoner who dies, an equal sum is
to be withheld from the amount of his emolu-
ments. It is clear, that having a net profit upon
the lives of all whom he preserves, there is scarcely
any necessity for any other precaution against
ill-treatment, or negligence, tending to shorten
life.*
In the naval service, the laws of England allow
a certain sum for each vessel taken or destroyed,
and so much for every individual captured. Why
is not this method of encouragement extended to
the military service ?
Is the commander of an army employed in de-
fending a province — allow him a pension which
shall be diminished in proportion to the territory
he loses. Is the governor of an important place
besieged — allow him so much for every day that
he continues the defence. Is the conquest of a
province desirable — promise to the general em-
ployed, besides the honours he shall receive, a
sum of money which shall increase in proportion
to the territory he acquires, besides giving him a
pension, as above, for preserving it when acquired.
To the principal diity of taking and destroying
those who are opposed to him, might be added,
the subordinate duty of preserving the living ma-
chines whose exertions are necessary for its accom-
* " The managers of L Hotel Dieu were used to charge fifty
livres for each patient who either died or was cured. M. de
Chamousset and Co. offered to undertake the management for
fifty livres, for those only who were cured. All who died were
not to he reckoned in the bargain, and were to be at their
expense. The offer was so admirable, it was not accepted. It
was feared that they would not be able to fulfil their engagement.
Every abuse which it is attempted to reform is the patrimony
of those who have more credit than the Reformers." — Quest.
Encycl. art. Charite.
B.II. Ch. II.— RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS. 157
plishment. The method proposed for the preser-
vation of prisoners, why should it not be enmployed
for the preservation of soldiers ? It must be ac-
knowledged, that no reward exclusively attached
to this subordinate duty could, in the mind of
a prudent commander, add anything to the weight
of those arguments which arise out of the principal
object. A soldier when he is ill, is worth less than
nothing; a recruit may not arrive at the moment,
may not arrive at all, and when he has arrived he
is not like a veteran. If therefore it be proper to
strengthen motives thus palpable, by a separate
and particular reward, it ought at least to be kept
in a subordination sufficiently marked with respect
to the principal object.
Thus much as to a time of war. In time of
peace the propriety of this method is much less
doubtful. It is then that the attention of a general
should be more particularly directed to the preser-
vation of his soldiers. Make him the insurer of
their lives, and he will become the rival of Escu-
lapius in medical science, and of Howard in phi-
lanthropy. He will no longer be indifferent, whe-
ther they encamp upon a hill or in a morass. His
vigilance will be exercised upon the quality of his
supplies, and the arrangement of his hospitals; and
his discipline •will be rendered perfect against those
vices of armies, which are sometimes no less de-
structive than the sword of the enemy.*
The same system might be extended to ships of
war, in which negligence is so fatal, and in which
general rules are so easily enforced. The admiral,
or captain, would thus have an immediate in-
* A slight sketch is all that can be attempted : the details
would occupy too much space. A general might be made the
insurer, as it respects those who die of disease, but not of those
who are killed.
158 B.II. Ch. II.— RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS.
terest in the preservation of each sailor. The
admirable example of Captain Cook, who cir-
cumnavigated the world, and traversed so many
different climates and unknown seas, without the
loss of a single sailor, would no longer be unfruitful.
His instructions respecting diet, change of air,
and cleanliness, would not be neglected. The
British navy, it is true, is much improved in these
respects, but who can tell how much greater per-
fection might be attained, if to the already exist-
ing motives, were added the influence of a con-
stantly acting interest, which, without injuring
any virtue, might supply the place of all, if they
were wanting ?
In the application of these suggestions, there
may be difficulties : are they insurmountable ? It
is for those who have had experience to reply.
In the treaty made by the Landgrave of Hesse
Cassel, relative to the troops which the British
s:overnment hired of him to serve in America, one
stipulation was, that for every man not returned to
his country, he should receive thirty pounds. I
know not whether such a stipulation were cus-
tomary or not, but whether it were or not, nothing
could be more happily imagined, either for the
fiscal interest of the sovereign lender, or the in-
terest of the individuals lent. The spirit of party
found in this stipulation a theme for declama-
tion, as if its only effect were to give to the
prince an interest in the slaughter of his subjects;
whilst, if anything could counterbalance the mis-
chievous effects of the treaty, it was this pecuniary
condition. It gave to these strangers a security
against the negligence or indifference of the bor-
rowers, on account of which they might more wil-
lingly have been exposed to danger than native
subjects. The price attached to their loss would
B.II. Ch. II.— RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS. 159
act as an insurance, that care should bo taken to
preserve them.
It has been said, that in some countries the
emoluments of the commanders of regiments
increase in proportion to the number of non-effec-
tives : that is to say, that they receive always the
same amount for the pay of his corps, though they
have not always the same number of men to pay.
Such an arrangement is precisely the opposite of
what is recommended above. The number of non-
etFectives increasing by death or desertion, the
commander gains in money what he loses in men.
Every penny which he is thus permitted to acquire
is a reward offered, if not for murder, at least for
negligence.
Note. — The principles thus laid down by Mr. Bentham are
susceptible of great diversity of application. When Mr.
Whiibread brought into parliament his bill for the establish-
ment of schools for the education of the poor, I flattered myself
that I had discovered one instance to which they might very
readily be applied ; and, in a letter addressed to Sir Samuel
Romilly, from which the following paragraphs are extracted,
I explained my ideas upon the subject. It will be perceived,
that the whole plan depends upon the principles laid down in
this chapter.
" Mr. Whitbread has been fully aware of the necessity of
superintendance in respect to the masters, — and he has pro-
posed to commit it to the clei'gyman and justices of the peace j
but it is not difficult to foresee, that this burthensome super-
intendance will be inefficacious. No good will be effected un-
less the interest of the master is constantly combined with all
parts of his duty. The only method of accomplishing this,
consists in making his reward depend upon his success ; in
giving him no fixed salary ; in allowing him a certain sum for
each child, payable only when each child has learned to read ;
in a word, in paying him, as workmen are sometimes paid,
by the work done.
" When he receives a fixed salary, the master has only a
slight interest in the progress of his pupils. If he act suffi-
ciently well to prevent his being discharged, this is all that can
reasonably be expected.
160 B.II. Ch. II.— RULES AS TO EMOLUMENTS.
" If he receive no reward till the service be performed, he
has a constant interest in performing it quickly. He can relax
his exertions only at his own expense. There is no longer any
necessity for superintendance. The master will himself seek
to improve the modes of instruction, and to excite the children
to emulation. He will be disposed to listen to the advice, and
to profit by the experience of others.
" When he receives a fixed salary, every new scholar in-
creases the trouble of the master, diminishes his exertions,
and disposes him to complain. Upon the plan which I propose,
it is the master who will stir up the negligent parents ; it is
he who will become the servant of the law. Instead of com-
plaining that he has too many pupils, he will only complain if
he have too few. Should he have three or four hundred, or
even as many as Mr. Lancaster, like him, he would find the
means of attending to them all ; he would employ the most
forward in instructing those who were less advanced, &c. &c.
" Should a negligent or incapable master be appointed, he
would be forced to quit his place. Substitute for this plan
examinations, depositions^ and decisions, and see what would
be the consequence.
" There would be no difficulty in the execution of this pro-
posed plan. It would be sufficient if, twice or thrice in the
year, that the clergyman, and certain justices of the peace, or
other persons of consequence, who were willing to promote so
useful a work, should meet together for two or three hours at
the school -house. The examination of each scholar would not
occupy more than half a minute. The master himself might
be trusted for selecting only such as were capable of un-
dergoing the test, and an honorary would thus be added
to his pecuniary reward, by the publicity given to his suc-
cess." DUMONT.
[ IGl ]
CHAPTER III.
FEES AND PERQUISITES — NONE.
Another expedient is often emplo^'ed in the
payment of public officers. 1 refer to the fees,
which they are sometimes authorised to receive
on their own account, from those who require their
services.
This arrangement is attended with a specious
advantage, and a real danger. The advantage is,
that the reward seems to be exactly and directly
in proportion to the labour performed. The
danger lies in the temptation given to such officers
to increase their emoluments, by increasing the
difficulties of those who need their services. The
abuse is easily introduced. It is very natural, for
example, that an individual who has been served
withan extraordinary expedition, should add some-
thing to the accustomed fee. But this reward,
bestowed on account of superior expedition in the
first instance, infallibly becomes a cause of delay
in all which follow. The regulated hours of busi-
ness are employed in doing nothing, or in doing
the least possible, that extraordinary pay may be
received for what is done out of office-hours.
The industry of all the persons employed will be
directed to increasing the profit of their places, by
lending one another mutual assistance ; and the
heads of departments will connive at the disorder,
either for their share of the benefit, or out of kind-
ness to their inferiors, or for fear of rendering them
discontented.
11
16^ B.Il. Ch.III.— FEES AND PERQUISITES— NONE.
The inconveniences will be yet greater, if they
relate to a service covered with a mysterious veil,
which the public cannot raise. Such is the veil
of the law. The useless and oppressive delays in
legal procedure arise from very complicated causes ;
but it cannot be doubted, that one of the most
considerable of these causes is the sinister interest
which lawyers have in multiplying processes and
questions, that they may multiply the occasions for
receiving fees.
Integrity is more easily preserved in public
offices in which there are no fees, than those in
which they are allowed. A lawful right often
serves as a pretext for extortion. The distinction
between what is permitted and what is prohibited,
in many cases, is exceedingly minute ; and how many
temptations may occur of profiting by the igno-
rance of strangers, when circumstances will insure
impunity! An easy method of detecting offences
is a great restraint. Whenever therefore fees are
allowed, a list of them should be publicly fixed
up in the office itself: this will operate as a pro-
tection to the persons employed against suspicion,
and to the public against vexation.
This mode of rewarding services supposes, that
the individuals, who stand in need of them, should
bear the expenses of the establishment : this is
true only in case the benefit is solely for those in-
dividuals; in all other cases fees constitute an
unequal and very unjustly assessed tax. We
shall have occasion to recur to this subject shortlv.
[ 163 ]
CHAPTER IV.
MINIMIZE EMOLUMENT.
Rule HI. — The amount of the salary, or other
emoluments, attached to every office, ought to be
the least that the individuals, qualified to execute
its duties, are willing to accept for their perform-
ance.
The fair and proper price of any vendible com-
modity is the least that anybody will take for it;
so that the expectation of like payment shall be a
sufficient inducement to the Jabour requisite to
produce other like articles in future. The fair and
proper price of any service is the least that any-
body will do it for: so that if more were given, it
would be done either not at all the better, or not
so much the better as that the difference of qua-
lity should be equivalent to the difference of ex-
pense. In this proper and necessary price is in-
cluded, of course, everything necessary to enable
the individual to perform, and to continue to per-
form, the service ; and also whatever is necessary,
on account of the disadvantages attending the ser-
vice, and on account of the chance which may be
given up of the advantages that might be expected
from other services.
At the first establishment of an office, it may be
difficult accurately to determine what ought to be
the amount of its emoluments: in this, as is the
case with every commodity when carried to market
for the first time, we can only be guided by chance.
11.
164 B. ij. ch. IV.— minimize emolument.
The number and character of the candidates will,
however, soon determine whether the amount
offered is too large or too small.
According to this rule, the salaries paid to the
judges in England, which appear so considerable,
are scarcely enough ; since, as we have already
seen, they are not sufficient to induce those, who
are best qualified to discharge the duty, to under-
take the office.
In France, before the revolution, scarcely any
salaries were paid to the judges; they were not
drafted from the class of advocates, and no sacrifice
was required of them when they entered upon
their duties; it was not necessary that they should
be possessed of much experience, and their reward
consisted principally in the honour and respect
attached to their station. In England, the number
of judges is so small, that there is no place for
ciphers: it is necessary that each judge should
possess, from the first day he enters upon his office,
that skill which, in the present state of immen-
sity and obscurity in which the law is found, can
only be the fruit of long stud}^ In France,
among the enormous multitude of her judges,
there w^as always a sufficient number endowed
with the requisite skill; and the novice might, so
long as he chose, preserve a Pythagorean silence.
A method of ascertaining the proper amount of
emoluments for any office, simple as it is effica-
cious, is afforded by allowing the persons em-
ployed to discharge their duty by deputy; if no
one employs a deputy, the emoluments cannot be
much too great ; if many individuals employ de-
puties, it will be only necessary to observe what
is paid to the deputies: the salary of the deputy
is the proper salary for the place.
B. II. ch. IV.— minimize emolument. 165
If this rule be applied to the emoluments of the
clergy, and it be asked what is the proper price
for their services, the answer is not ditlicult.
It is, prima facie, the price given by one class
of the clergy, and received by the other ; it is the
current price of curacies. I say always prima
facie, for, in reality, the current price is somewhat
greater; part of the price being made up in hope.
l"or insuring the due performance of all the duties
of their office, this price is found to be sufficient.
The possession of any greater emolument is not
only useless but pernicious, inasmuch as it enables
them to engage in occupations incompatible with
the due performance of their function, and as it
tends to give them a distaste for the duties of that
function.
The inequality observable in the emoluments
of the established clergy, is also disadvantageous
in respect to the greater number of ecclesiastics.
The comparison which they make between their
condition, and that of the rich incumbents, dimi-
nishes still further, in their eyes, the value of
what they receive. A reward so unequal for equal
services, degrades those who receive only their
proper portion. The whole presents the ap-
pearance of a lottery, of favour and injustice,
ill according with the moral character of their
vocation.
It is a good rule of economy to employ only real
labourers, who do not think themselves superior
to the work they have to perform. Dutch florists
ought not to be employed in the cultivation of
potatoes.
It is well also fully to employ the time of the
individuals employed. The duties of many public
offices require only three or four hours attendance
166 B.IJ. Ch. IV.— MINIMIZE EMOLUMENT.
daily. After the office hours are passed, such in-
dividuals seldom are able profitably to employ
their time. The leisure they possess increases
their wants. Ennui, the scourge of life, is no
less the enemy of economy. It is among this
class, that those who are most discontented with
their salaries, are generally found.
[ 1^7 ]
CHAPTER V.
NO MORE NOMINAL THAN REAL.
Rule IV. — The nominal and real amount of sa-
laries ought to correspond.
In other words, no deduction ought to be made
from the real value of a salary without reducing its
nominal amount. The practice whicli has fre-
quently been adopted in England of reducing the
real value of salaries and pensions by taxes and
other deductions, while the nominal amount of the
salaries has remained unaltered, has given rise to
this rule. In some instances, the deductions thus
made have amounted to one third of the nominal
salary.
No advantage arises from this arrangement, but
its inconveniences are numerous. In the first
place, it is an evil in so far as it spreads an exagger-
ated idea of the sacrifices made by the public, and
the expense incurred under the head of salaries.
With respect to the public functionaries, it is an
evil to possess an income greater in appearance
than reality. The erroneous conceptions hence
entertained of their wealth, imposes upon them, in
deference to public opinion, the necessity of keep-
ing up a corresponding establishment. Under the
penalty of being considered niggardly, they are
compelled to be extravagant. It is true the pubMc
are aware, in general, that salaries and pensions are
subject to deductions, but they are oftentimes only
acquainted with a part of the deductions, and the}-^
seldom in such cases enter into minute calcula-
tions.
168 B. II. Ch. v.— NO MORE NOMINAL THAN REAL.
In this manner the diflference between the no-
minal and real value of a salary, tends to produce
an increase in the wants of the individual employed.
Call the amount of his salary what it really is, and
he will be at ease, but every nominal addition will
prove a costly ornament. If the opportunity of
illicit profit is presented to him, such nominal ad-
dition will be an incentive to corruption, and
should he not be dishonest it will prove a cause of
distress.*
The remedy is simple as efficacious ; the change
need only be in words.
* A further inconvenience frequently arises from the expense
of collecting and managing all such peculiar contributions.
[ 169 ]
CHAPTER VI.
COUPLE BURTHEN WITH BENEFIT.
EuleY. — The expenses of an office ought to he
defrayed by those who enjoy the benefit of the
services rendered by the office.
The author of the Wealth of Nations, in inves-
tigating* the manner in which the expense of ser-
vices ought to be divided, has shewn that in some
cases it ought to be defrayed by the public, in
others, exclusively by those who immediately reap
the benefit of the service. He has also shewn
that there is a class of mixed cases in which the ex-
pense ought to be defrayed partly by the public, and
partly by the individuals who derive the immediate
benefit. To this class belongs public education.
The rule just laid down seems scarcely to stand
in need of proof. It may, however, be useful to
mention the modes in which it may be violated ;
as, when for a service rendered to one person or set
of persons, the obligation of payment is imposed
upon another. This is partly the case of dissenters
who support their own clergy, in so far as they are
obliged to pay for the support of the clergy of that
established sect from which they dissent. 2. When
for a service rendered to a certain number of indi-
viduals, the obligation ofpayment is imposed upon
the public. For example, the expenses of a
theatre, wholly or in part paid out of the public
purse. 3. When for a service rendered to the
* Book V.
170 B. II. Ch. VI.— COUPLE BURTHEN WITH BENEFIT.
public, the obligation of payment is imposed upon
an individual.
With respect to this third case, the examples are
but too abundant.
I. The most remarkable example will be found
in the administration ofjustice. At first sight it
may be thought that he who obtains a verdict in
his favour reaps the principal, or even the only
advantage to be obtained ; and therefore that it is
reasonable he should bear the expense incurred ;
that he should pay the officers ofjustice for the
time they have been employed. It is in this man-
ner that the subject appeared even to Adam Smith.
(B. V. sec. 2.) Upon a closer examination, we shall
discover an important error. The individual in
whose favour a verdict is given, is precisely the indi-
vidual who has received least benefit : setting aside
the rewards paid to the officers ofjustice, how many
other expenses, which the nature of things render
inevitable, remain. It is he who, at the price of his
time, his care and his money, has purchased that
protection which others receive for nothing.
Suppose that among a million persons there has
been, for example, a thousand law-suits in a year;
without these law-suits, without the judgments
which terminate them, injustice would have had
nothing to hold it in check, but the defensive
energy of individuals. A million acts of injustice
would have been perpetrated in the same time.
But since, by means of these thousand judgments,
a million acts of injustice have been prevented, it
is the same thing as if each complainant had him-
self prevented a thousand. Because he has ren-
dered so important a service, because he has ex-
posed himself to so many mishaps, to so much
trouble and expense, does he deserve to be taxed ?
B. II. Ch. VI.— COUPLE BURTHEN WITH BENEFIT. 171
It is as though the militia who defend the fron-
tiers should be selected to bear the expenses of the
campaign.
" Who goeth a warfare any time at his own
charges ?" saith St. Paul. It is the poor litigant
who makes war upon injustice, who pursues it
before the tribunals at his own risk, and who is
made to pay for the service which is rendered to
him.
When such expenses are thrown upon a defen-
dant, unjustly dragged into the litigious contention,
the case is yet worse ; instead of any thing having
been done for his advantage, he has been tormented,
and he is made to pay for having been tormented.
If the expenses are altogether thrown upon the
party who is found to have done wrong, (although it
often happens, owing to the uncertainty either of
the facts or of the law, that there has been no wil-
ful wrong on either side,) this cannot be done at
first ; this party can only be known at the termina-
tion of the suit. But then such a judgment would
be a punishment ; and there is a chance that
such a punishment may not be deserved ; another
chance, that the individual may not be in a condi-
tion to support it ; another chance, that it will be
either too great or too little.*
II. As another violation of this rule, may be
cited the practice of taking fees, as carried on in
most custom-houses, and which constituted a great
abuse in those of England, previously to the re-
* There are many other objections to taxes upon law pro-
ceedings, but they do not belong to the present subject. Un-
der the head of procedure^ it might be shewn that these taxes
oppose the ends of justice : under the head of finance, that
they constitute a bad source of revenue. The subject has been
more fully discussed in Mr. Bentliam's " Protest against Lata
Taxes."
172 B.II. Ch. VI.— COUPLE BURTHEN WITH BENEFIT.
form introduced by Mr. Pitt. Many of the offi-
cers, not receiving salaries sufficient for their main-
tenance, were allowed to make up the deficiency
by fees received for their own advantage. This
custom had an appearance of reason. " We pass
your merchandise through the custom-house," they
might have said ; " and you ought to pay for this
service." But this reason is deceptive. " Without
this custom-house," the merchants might have re-
plied, " our merchandize would have gone straight
forward ; it is not for our advantage that this costly
depot is established. It is for the general wants of
the state. The state therefore, which you serve,
ought to pay you, and not us, whom you torment
with your services, which we should be very
happy to do without." But, it may be said, this
expense must be borne by somebody, why should
it not be borne by these merchants as well as any
body else ? Because it is a partial and unequal
tax. Taxes upon merchandize are generally in
proportion to the value of the goods ; this abusive
tax seldom is so. A rich merchant does not feel
it; he is reimbursed by the sale of his goods. A
poor individual is oppressed by this second contri-
bution, which he finds it necessary to pay to the
clerk after he has paid what is due to the exche-
quer ; and it with reason appears to him the more
odious, because it is oftentimes arbitrary.
III. In conclusion, as a last example of the
violation of this rule, we mention the emoluments
of the clergy, in so far as they consist of tithes. If
the services of the clergy contribute to the main-
tenance of public morality, and obedience to the
laws, even those to whom these services are not
personally directed are benefited by them ; they
are useful to the whole state. Their expense, what-
ever ought to be its amount, ought to be borne by
B.II.Ch. VI.— COUPLE BURTHEN WITH BENEFIT. 173
the whole community. Distributed as tliis expense
isatpresent, under the systemof tithes, in such man-
ner that every one knows how much and to whom
he pays it, no advantage is derived from this know-
ledge; whilst the inconveniences are but too mani-
fest in that hatred which so frequently subsists be-
tween the parishioners and their minister, the shep-
herd and his flock ; by means of which his labours,
so long as this enmity subsists, are rendered worse
than useless. Were this expense to be defrayed
from the general source of the public treasure,
these scandalous dissensions would be avoided, and
whether the revenues were more or less ample, it
would be possible to preserve a more just propor-
tion between them and the different degrees of
labour; instead of floating as at present between
^20. and .£20,000. per annum, under the direction
chance.*
* Tithes considered as a tax are attended with other incon-
veniences : they belong not to our present subject. They have
been exposed by Adam Smith, with that force and precision
which characterise that great master.
[ 174 ]
CHAPTER VII.
BY EMOLUMENTS EXCLUDE CORRUPTION.
Rule V. — In employments which expose the
public functionary to peculiar temptations, the
emoluments ought to be sufficient to preserve him
from corruption.
Setting aside all considerations of the happiness
of the individual, the interest of the public re-
quires that in all employments which afford the
means of illicit gain, the individuals employed
should be placed above want. If this important
consideration be neglected, we ought not to be sur-
prised that men urged on by perpetually recurring
wants should abuse the powers they possess. Under
such circumstances, if they are found guilty of
extortion and peculation, they are less deserving of
blame than that government which has spread the
snare into which it was scarcely possible that
their probity should not fall. Placed between the ,
necessity of providing the means of subsistence,
and the impossibility of providing them honestly,
they will naturally be led to regard peculation and
extortion as a lawful supplement, tacitly autho-
rized by the government. The examples of this
mischievous economy, and of the inconveniences
resulting from it, are more frequent in Russia than
under any other European government.
" M. de Launay (Farmer-General under Fre-
derick II.) represented to the king that the sala-
ries of the custom-house officers were too small
for their subsistence, and that it would be but
justice to augment them ; he added that he
B. 11. Ch.VII.— BY EMOLUMENTS EXCLUDE CORRUPTION. 175
could insure to his majesty that every one would
then discharge his duty better, and that the aggregate
receipts in all the offices would be larger at the
end of the year." — " You do not know my sub-
jects," said Frederick, " they are all rogues where
my interests are in question. I have thoroughly
studied them, and 1 am sure they would rob
me at the altar. By paying them better you
would diminish my revenues, and they would not
rob me less." — " Sire," replied M. de Launay,
" how can they do otherwise than steal ? Their
salaries are not enough to buy them shoes and
stockings 1 a pair of boots costs them a month's
pay ! at the same time, many of them are married.
And where can they obtain food for their wives
and families, if it is not by conniving at the smug-
glers ? There is, sire, a most important maxim
which, in matters of government, is too frequently
neglected. It is that men in general desire to be
honest; but it is always necessary to leave them
the ability of being so. If your majesty will con-
sent to make the trial I propose, I will engage that
your revenues will be augmented more than a
fourth." The maxim in morals, thus brought for-
ward by M. de Launay, appeared to the king, beau-
tiful and just, as it really is in itself — so much the
more excellent from being in the mouth of a finan-
cier ; smce men of this class are not in general
reputed to know many such. He authorized the
experiment, he increased the salaries of the officers
by a half, and his revenues were increased a third
without any new taxes.*
A salary proportionate to the wants of the func-
tionary operates as a kind of moral antiseptic^ or
preservative. It fortifies a man's probity against
* Thiebault. Mes Souvenirs de Berlin. Tome iv. p. 12G.
17G B.II. Ch.VII.— BY EMOLUMENTS EXCLUDE CORRUPTION.
the influence of sinister and seductive motives.
The fear of losing it will, in general, be more than
equivalent to the ordinary temptations held out
by illicit gains.
But in the estimation of a man's v^^ants, it is not
merely to what is absolutely necessary that our
calculation ought to be confined. Fabricius and
Cincinnatus are not the proper standards to be
selected. The actual state of society ought to be
considered. The average measure of probity must
be our rule. Public opinion assigns to every
public functionary a "certain relative rank ; and,
whether reasonably or not, expects from him an
expenditure nearly equal to that of persons in a
similar rank. If he is compelled to act in defiance
of public opinion, he degrades and exposes himself
to contempt — a punishment so much the more
afflictive, in proportion as his rank is elevated.
Wants keep pace with dignity. Destitute of the
lawful means of supporting his rank, his dignity
presents a motive for malversation, and his power
furnishes the means. History abounds with crimes,
the result of this ill-judged policy.
If a justification is required for the extraordi-
narily high salaries, which it is customary to pay to
the supreme magistrates, who are called Kings, it
will be found in the principles above laid down.
The Americans, by denominating their chief ma-
gistrate a President, have thereby made a small
salary, compared with what is paid in England to
the sovereign, answer every purpose of a large
one. Why ? Because the dignity of the presi-
dent is compared with that of the other officers of
the republic, whilst in Europe the dignity of the
sovereign is measured by a sort of comparison
with that of other kings. If he were unable to
maintain a certain pomp amidst the opulence of
ll. Cii. VII.— BY EMOLUMENTS EXCLUDE CORRUPTION. 177
his courtiers, he would feel himself tlegraded.
Charles II., to relieve himself from the restrictions
imposed upon him by the economy of parliament,
sold himself to a foreign potentate, who offered to
supply his profusion. The hope of escaping from
the embarrassments into which he had plunged
himself, drove him, like an insolvent individual,
to criminal resources. This mistaken economy
occasioned the expense of two successive wars,
terminating in a peace more disastrous perhaps
than either of the wars. Our strength was wasted
in oppressing a necessary ally, instead of being
employed in checking the ambition of a rival, with
whom we had afterwards to contend, with dimi-
nished resources. Thus the establishment of the
Civil List, though its amount may appear large,
may be considered as a measure of general securiti/.
It is true that the sum necessary to prevent
Charles II. from selling himself, or, in other words,
the amount which in this instance would have
operated as a moral antiseptic, or preservative,
could not have been very accurately calculated.
A greater or less portion of this antiseptic must
be employed in proportion as there exists a greater
or less proclivity towards corruption. Experience
is the touchstone of all calculations in this respect.
Provided these abuses are guarded against, a low
scale of salaries can never be an evil ; it must
be a good. If the salary be not a sufficient re-
ward for the service to be performed, the office
will not be accepted. If it be sufficient, everything
which is added to its amount is so much lavished
in pure waste.
12
I 17S ]
CHAPTER VIIT.
GIVE PENSIONS OF RETREAT.
RuieYll. — Pensions of retreat ought to be pro-
vided, especially when the emoluments allowed
are not more than sufficient to meet the absolute
wants of the functionary.*
Pensions of retreat are recommended by consi-
derations of humanity, justice, and good economy;
they moreover tend to insure the proper discharge
of duty, and constitute a source of responsibility
on the part of the individuals employed.
1. There are many cases in which it is not de-
sirable that a public functionary should continue
to be employed after his activity and capacity have
become impaired. But, since the infirmities of
age tend to increase his wants, this is not the time
in which he will be able to retrench his expendi-
ture; and he will be induced by this consideration,
in his old age and impotency, to continue to en-
deavour to perform, with pain, and even with dis-
grace, the duties of a station which, in his matu-
rity, he had filled with pleasure and reputation.
To wait till he voluntarily resigns, is to expect a
species of suicide ; to dismiss him without a pen-
sion of retreat is, in the supposed state of his
faculties, a species of homicide. A pension of
* The reader ought to be apprised that, having found in
Mr. Benthani's MSS. upon this subject, only the memorandum
" Pensions of Retreat," I have confined myself to the most
simple exposition of the subject : its details would have been
too widely extended. — Note by Dumont.
B.ir. Ch. Vlll.— GIVE PENSIONS OF RETREAT. 179
retreat removes all these difficulties: it is a debt
of humanity paid by the public to its servants.
2. By means of these pensions, the scale of all
salaries may be lower than otherwise, without
producing any ill effect upon the quality of the
services rendered. They will constitute an item
in the calculation which every individual makes:
in the mean time, government will obtain from all,
at a low price, services, the ulterior compensation
for which, on account of the casualties of human
life, will only be received by a few. It is a lottery,
in which there are no blanks.
3. In all employments from which the indivi-
duals are removable at pleasure, the pension of
retreat, in consequence of the approach of the
period at which it will become necessary or due,
will add an increasing value to the salary, and
augment the responsibility of the individual em-
ployed. Should he be tempted to malversation,
it will be necessary that the profit derivable from
his malversation should compensate with certainty
not only for the loss of his annual salary, but also
the value of his future pension of retreat ; his fide-
lity is thus secured to the last moment of his con-
tinuing in office.
4. We ought not to forget the happiness, insured
to thepersons employed, resultingfrom the security
given to them by the provision thus made against
that period of life, which is most menaced with
weakness and neglect. Hence an habitual dispo-
sition to perform the duties of their office with
alacrity will arise ; they will consider themselves
as permanently provided for, and fixed in a situa-
tion in which all their faculties may be applied to
the discharge of its duties, without being turned
aside by vague apprehensions of future distress,
and the desire of improving their condition, which
12.
180 B. II. Cu. VIII.— GIVE PENSIONS OF RETREAT.
SO often leads individuals successively to try diffe-
rent stations. Another advantage to the govern-
ment ; instead of being badly served by novices,
it will possess a body of experienced functionaries,
expert and worthy of its confidence.
The amount of these pensions ought to be
regulated by fixed rules, otherwise they will
become a source of abuse; offices will be bestowed
for the sake of the pension, instead of the pension
being bestowed for the sake of the office. They
ought also to increase according to the length of
service, leaving at all times an inducement to con-
tinued exertion, without which precaution the
services of experienced individuals, which it might
be desirable to retain, would frequently be lost.
[ 181 ]
CHAPTER IX.
OF THE SALE OF OFFICES.
If it be desirable that the public servants should
be contented with small salaries, it is more desi-
rable that they should be willing to serve gra-
tuitously, and most desirable that they should be
willing to pay for the liberty of serving, instead of
being paid for their services. Such is the simple
but conclusive train of argument, in favour of the
venality of offices, abstractly considered.
Such an arrangement is attended with another
advantage. A sum laid out in the purchase of an
office renders the purchaser responsible in a higher
degree than he would be were he to receive a
salary equal to, or even exceeding in amount, the
interest of the money he has paid. The loss of
a salary paid by the public, is merely the cessation
of so much gain ; the loss of an office which has
been purchased, is the positive loss of so much
capital which the individual has actually pos-
sessed. The impression produced upon the mind
by these two species of loss is widely different.
The cessation of a gain is generally much less
severely felt than a loss to a corresponding amount.
The gain which depends upon external circum-
stances is always precarious, it cannot be reckoned
upon with certainty; on the other hand, if an
individual have purchased an office with his own
capital, he looks upon it as absolutely his own ;
it comes to be reuarded as a certain, fixed, and
182 B.ll. Ch.IX.— OF THE SALE OF OFFICES.
permanent source of revenue, and as identified
with his original property upon which he has
always reckoned.
When a man purchases an office, it may be
fairly presumed that he possesses appropriate apti-
tude for the discharge of its duties. Are there
pecuniary emoluments attached to an office — the
office may be accepted for the sake of these emo-
luments. Are there no pecuniary emoluments —
the office can be desired only on account of its
duties, or of the natural rewards of honour and
power, which are inseparable from it. Such, at
least, is the ordinary state of things. It is how-
ever possible that such an office might be desired
as a means of obtaining some hidden profit preju-
dicial to the public ; but this would be a particu-
lar case, whose existence ought to be established
by proof.
It is not by names alone that we can determine
whether it is most advantageous for the public
that offices should, without emoluments, be given
away, or vi^hen with emoluments should be sold :
this question can only be determined by an accu-
rate account, exhibiting the balance of the sums
paid and received. If, however, there be any
offices without emoluments, for which purchasers
can be found; were it possible to sell purely
honorary appointments, offices connected with
public pomp and show, it would be entirely con-
sistent with good economy ; it would be to
convert a tax upon honour, unfelt by any one, but
established in favour of the purchasers, into hard
cash. A tax would thus be levied upon vanity.
The gain would be real, though the bargain, like
that of the Lapland sorcerers, were only for bags
of wind.
B.ii. ch. i::.— or the sale or oifices. 18o
As it respects offices of which the emoluments
are fixed, the question of economy is simple ; the
amount of the emoluments does not differ from a
perpetual rent. But when an office is sold, the
profits of which, whether received from the public,
or levied upon individuals, are uncertain in
amount, this uncertainty causes a presumption
against the economy of the bargain: it is disad-
vantageous to the public to be subject to uncer-
tain expenses, and it is not probable that these
uncertain profits will sell for so large a price as
would willingly be paid for a salary equal to their
average amount.
Again, as to emoluments derived solely from indi-
viduals, these are a species of tax often created and
alienated at the same time in favour of the office.
The general presumption cannot but be unfavour-
able to taxes imposed under such circumstances.
In former times, when the science of political
economy was in its cradle, when taxes and the
methods of collecting them were little understood,
governments have frequently thus alienated large
branches of the public revenue. Tempted by an
immediate supply, they either did not or would
not regard the extent of the sacrifices they made.
The history of French finance is replete with
instances of this kind. The customs of Orleans,
which were originally purchased by a Duke of
Orleans for 60,000 francs, afterwards yielded to
his posterity a yearly revenue of more than u
1, 000,000 /rrmcs.
The venality of offices in that kingdom had
created an exceedingly complex, and consequently
exceedingly vicious system. The sale of offices
conferring hereditary nobility was especially mis-
chievous, since this nobility enjoyed a multitude
of exemptions. The nobles paid no taxes. Ilcuc6
184 B. II. ch. IX.— of the sale of offices.
every creation of nobility vvasatax, equal in value
to the exemption granted, thrown upon those who
continued liable to pay them.
Should the price for which an office is sold form
a part of the emoluments of tlie head of the office,
and not be received by the public, this would
make no difference in the question of economy
as respects giving and selling. That the produce
of the sale is afterwards wasted, is an accident
unconnected with the sale. The emoluments re-
ceived by the head of the department may be too
large or not. if not loo large, the public gains by
the operation; since, in suppressing the sale, it
would be necessary to increase his emoluments
by other means. If too large, the excess might
be made applicable to the public service.
THE SALE OF OFFICES CONSIDERED W^TII RE-
SPECT TO PARTICULAR DEPARTMENTS.
Public opinion is at present adverse to the sale
of public offices. It more particularly' condemns
their sale in the three great departments of war,
law, and religion. This prejudice has probably
arisen from the improper use to which it has
sometimes been applied ; but whether this be the
case or not, the use of the word venal seldom, if
ever, but in an odious and dysolgystic sense, has
tended to preserve it.
" He who has bought the right of judging will
sell judgments," is the sort of reasoning in use
upon this subject. Instead of an argument, it is
only an epigram.* The members of the French
* Vendere jure potest, emerat ille prius. Apply the reason-
ing to ftnother subject : "He who has bought apples, will sell
apples." The consequence docs not follow ; lor he may chance
to eat or to give them away.
»
B.II. Cii.IX.— OF THE SALE OF OFFICES. 185
parliaments were judges, and they purchased their
places ; it did not by any means follow that they
were disposed to sell their judgments, or that they
could have done so with impunity. The greater
number of these parliaments were never even
suspected of having sold them. Countries may
however be cited in which the judges sell both
justice and injustice, though they have not bought
their places. The uprightness of a judge does
not depend upon these but upon other circum-
stances. If the laws be intelligible and known ;
if the proceedings of the judges are public ; if the
punishment for injustice surpass the profit to be
reaped from it, judges will be upright, even though
they purchase their offices.
In England, there are certain judicial offices
which the judges sell, sometimes openly, some-
times clandestinely; the purchasers of these
offices extract from the suitors as much as they
can : if they had not purchased their places, they
would not have endeavoured to extract less. The
mischief is, not that this right of plundering is
sold, but that the right exists.
In the English army, the system of venality
has been adopted. Military commissions, from
the rank of ensign to that of lieutenant-colonel,
are sold, with permission to the purchasers to
re-sell them. The epigram upon the judges is
not applied here. The complaint is, that the
patrimony of merit is invaded by wealth. But it
ought to be recollected, that in this career the
opportunities for the display of merit do not occur
every day. It is only upon extraordinary occa-
sions that extraordinary talents can be displayed ;
and when these occur, there can be no difficulty,
even under this system, of bestowing proportionate
and approi)riatc rewards. Besides, though the
186
B.II. Ch.IX.— OF THE SALE OF OFFICES.
patrimony of merit should by this means be in-
vaded by wealth, it would at the same time be
defended from favouritism, a divinity in less esteem
even than wealth. The circumstance which
ought to recommend the system of venalty to
suspicious politicians is, that it diminishes the
influence of the crown. The whole circle over
which it extends is so much reclaimed from the
influence of the crown. It may be called a cor-
ruption, but it serves as an antidote to a corruption
more to be dreaded.
It is the sale of ecclesiastical offices which has
occasioned the greatest outcry. It has been made
a particular sin, to which has been given the
name of Simonij. In the Acts of the Apostles,
we are informed that at Samaria, there was a
magician named Simon, to whose gainful prac-
tices an immediate stop was put by the preach-
ing and miracles of Philip, one of the deacons of
the church of Jerusalem, who had been driven to
Samaria by persecution. Simon therefore, regard-
ing Philip as a more fortunate rival, enrolled him-
self among the number of his proselytes, and when
the apostles Peter and John came down from Jeru-
salem, and by the laying on of their hands commu-
nicated to the disciples the gift of the Holy Ghost,
Simon, desirous of possessing something more
than the rest, offered to them money, saying, " give
me also this power, that on whomsoever I lay hands,
he may receive the Holy Ghost." Upon which
Peter severely reprimanded him, and the magician,
supple as he was intriguing, asked forgiveness, and
thus his history closes. It is nowhere said he was
punished.
Upon the strength of this story, the Roman
Catholic church has converted the act of buying
or selling ecclesiastical benefices into a sin ; and
B.ll. Cii. IX.— OF THE SALE OF OFFICES, 187
the English law, copying from the Catholic church,
has constituted such an act a crime. As the Roman
Catholic church, among catholics, is infallible, as
to them it must have decided rightly when it
declared such acts to be sinful. Our subject, how-
ever, leads us only to the consideration of the
legal crime ; and between this crime and the of-
fence of Simon Magus, there is nothing in com-
mon. Presentation to a living and the reception
of the Holv Ghost' are not the same things. If it
be the object of this law to exclude improper
persons, more direct, simple, and efficacious means
might be employed ; their qualifications might be
ascertained by public examinations, their good
conduct by the previous publication of their names,
with liberty to all the world to object against them.
Their moral and intellectual capacity being thus
proved, why should they not be allowed to pur-
chase the employment, or to discharge it gratui-
tously ? An idiot, once admitted to priests' orders,
may hold an ecclesiastical benefice, but were a
man, gifted like an apostle, to give five guineas
to be permitted to discharge the duties of that
benefice, he would be borne down by the outcry
against the simony he had committed.
What then is the effect of these anti-simoniacal
laws ? A priest may not purchase a benefice for
himself; but his friend, whether priest or layman,
may purchase it for him. He may not purchase
the presentation to a vacant benefice, but he may
purchase the right of presentation to a benefice
filled by a dying man, or by a person in good
health who will have the complaisance to resign,
and receive it again with an obligation, again to
resign whenever his patron requires it. In reading
these self-styled anti-simoniacal laws, it is difficult
188 B.II, Ch. IX.— OF THE SALE OF OFFICES.
to discover, whether they are intended to prohibit
or to allow the practice of simony. Their only
real effects are to encourage deception and fraud.
Blackstone complains of their inexecution. He
did not perceive that a law which is not executed
is ridiculous.
[ i«y ]
CHAPTER X.
OF QUALIFICATIONS.
We have already seen that a salary may be em-
ployed as a means of insuring the responsibility of
an individual, and- as a moral antiseptic to preserve
him from the influence of corruption. By the sale
of offices, it has been seen that the actual expense
of a salary may be diminished, and even reduced to
nothing. It is therefore evident that the important
circumstance is, that the individual should possess
the requisite portion of the precious matter of re-
ward, and not that it should have been given to
him. If he possess it of his own, so much the
better ; and the more he already possesses the less
is it necessary to give him. In England, such are
the attractions of power and dignity, that the num-
ber of candidates for their possession has been
found so large, that it has been thought desirable
to limit the selection to the number of those who
possess the required quantity of this moral antisep-
tic; and this circumstance has given birth to what
have been called qualifications.
The most remarkable and important offices to
which these pecuniary qualifications have been at-
tached, are those of justices of the peace and mem-
bers of parliament. A justice of the peace ought
to possess at least 100/. per annum landed pfbperty.
There is no reasonable objection against this law.
The office is one of those for which an ordinarily
liberal education is sufficient. It is at the same
time such an office that the individual invested
190 B, n. ch. X.— of qualifications.
with it might do much mischief were he not re-
strained by powerful motives.
As a quahfication for the more important office
of member of parliament, the law requires of the
member for a borough or city a similar qualifica-
tion of 300/. per annum, and of the member for a
county of 600/. per annum. This case differs
widely from the other. Sufficient talent for carry-
ing the laws into execution is possessed by a mul-
titude of individuals ; but few are able to deter-
mine what laws ought to be framed. The science
of legislation is still in its cradle ; it has scarcely
been begun to be formed in the cabinets of philo-
sophers ; among legislators in name, scarcely any
other practice can be found than that of children,
who in their prattle copy what they have learned
of their nurses. That a science may be learned, a
motive is necessary ; that the science of legisla-
tion may be learned, or rather may be created,
motives so much the more powerful are necessary,
as this science is most repulsive and thorny. For
the pursuit of this study, an ardent and persevering
mind is required, which can scarcely be expected
to be formed in the lap of ease, of luxury, and of
wealtJi. Among those whose wants have been
forestalled from their cradle, among those who
become legislators to gratify their vanit}', or relieve
their ennui, there can scarcely be found one who
could be called a legislator without mockery. How
shall he who possesses everything without the
trouble of thinking, be led to subject himself to
the labour of thought ? If it be desirable that le-
gislators should be men of enlarged and well-in-
structed minds, they must be sought among those
who possess but little wealth, among those who,
oppressed with their insignificance, are stimulated
B. II, ch. X.— of qualifications. 191
by ambition, and even by hunger, to distinguish
themselves ; they must be sought among those
who possess the habits of Cyrus and not otSarda-
napalus. Among the children ot" luxury, of whom
the great mass of senators chosen by a rich people
will always be composed, there are but few who
will undergo the fatigue of studying the lessons
which, at the expense of so much labour, have been
furnished them by Beccaria and Adam Smith !
Can it be expected, then, that from among their
number the rivals of these great masters should be
found ? Qualifications in this case tend to ex-
clude the individuals endowed with the greatest
moral and intellectual capacity.
The reasons however in favour of qualifications
are plausible. It is alleged, that the possession of
a certain property tends to guarantee the indepen-
dence of its possessor, and that in no other situa-
tion is independence more desirable, than in that of
a deputy appointed to watch over and defend the
interests of the people against the encroachments
of the executive power, supplied as that power
almost necessarily is with so many means of seduc-
tion. To this it may be replied, that it is not the
poor alone who are liable to be seduced ; multi-
tudes possessing property exceeding in value the
qualifications required, are biassed by the seductive
influence of places and pensions, whilst the poor
remain unmoved.
A law of this nature whose effect, were it strictly
executed, would be to exclude the most capable, is
made to be evaded, and in fact has constantly been
evaded: among those who have acted the most
conspicuous parts in the British House of Com-
mons, many have been able to enter there only by
an evasion of this law. Means might be provided
which would afford a perfect guarantee against
192 B.II. Ch.X.— OF QUALIFICATIONS.
such evasions, but happily upon this, as upon
many other occasions, the veil that hides from
human weakness the distant inconveniences of bad
laws, hides also the means necessary for rendering
such laws efficacious.
Some years ago, a member, the honesty of whose
intentions could not be doubted, proposed to aug-
ment the qualifications for cities and boroughs
from 300/. to 600/. per annum. The proposition,
after having made considerable progress, fell to the
ground. 1 know not whether this happened from
a conviction of its trifling utility, or from one of
those accidents which in that slippery path equally
befal the most useful and most mischievous
projects.
When the greatest possible freedom is given to
popular suffrage, and even when no corrupt influ-
ence is used, the popular employment of wealth,
being of all species of merit that of which people
in general are best qualified to judge, and most
disposed to esteem, there naturally exists an
aristocracy of wealth. Is it desirable that this
aristocracy should be rendered necessary and
complete ?
[ 193 1
CHAPTER XI.
OF TRUST AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT.
The capacity of the individuals to discharge the
duties required of them having been ascertained,
and the most intimate connection between their
interest and the discharge of these duties having
been estabhshed, the only desirable circumstance
remaining is, to reduce the amount of the emolu-
ments to be paid for the discharge of these duties
to the lowest term. Suppose the amount expended
in the purchase of a given service to be a certain
sum, and that an individual equally capable of
rendering this service, should offer to render it at
jess expense, is there any good reason for refusing
such an offer? 1 can discover none. The accept-
ance of such a proposition is the acceptance of
a contract ; the service thus agreed to be per-
formed, is said to be contracted for, or let to farm.
To this method, the mode of obtaining services
by employing commissioners and managers, is op-
posed.
General reasonings upon this subject are insuffi-
cient to determine which of these two opposite
systems will be most advantageous in any particu-
lar department : the nature of the service must be
ascertained before the question can be decided.
If we confine ourselves to general principles,
contracts must be preferred to commissions. Un-
der the system of contracts, the interests about
which the individual is employed are his own ;
whilst, under the system of commissions, the in-
terests about which he is employed remain the
13
194 B.II. Cii.XI.— OF TRUST AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT,
interests of the state, that is, the interests of
another. In the first case, the sub-functionaries
employed are the servants of .?.n individual, in the
other they are the servants of the public — fellow-
servants of those who are to watch over them.
" But the servants of the most negligent master,"
says Adam Smith, " are better superintended than
the servants of the most vigilant sovereign." If
this cannot be admitted as an infallible rule, it
is at least more frequently true than otherwise.
Public opinion is, however, but little favourable
to the system of contracts. The savings which
result to the state are forgotten, whilst the profits
reaped by the farmers are recollected and exagge-
rated. Upon this subject the ignorant and the
])hilosopher, those who judge without thought, and
those who pretend to have examined the subject,
are nearly agreed. The objections which they
bring forward against contractors (for they relate to
individuals rather than to the system) are suffici-
ently specious.
I. The contractors are ricli. Iftlieyare so, this
is not the fault of the system, but of the conditions
of the bargain made with them.
II. The contractors are ostentations and vain.
And if they burst with vanity, what then ? Such in-
appreciable, or rather imaginary evils, cannot be
brought into political calculations. Their vanity
will find a sufiicient counterpoise and punish-
ment in the vanity of those whom they incommode,
whilst their ostentation will distribute their wealth
among those whom it employs.
III. The contractors excite envy. This is the
fault of those who are envious, and not of the con-
tractors : it is another imaginary evil, in opposi-
tion to which may be placed the pleasure of detrac-
tion. Besides, if the contracts are open to all.
n. II. Cn.XI.— OF TRUST AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT. 195
unless improvident bargains are made through
favour, corruption, or ignorance, rapid fortunes will
not often be accumulated by contractors. Should
they siill become rich, it will be because they have
deserved it.
IV. Contractors never Jind the laws too severe to
insure the collection of the taxes for which they have
contracted. They will procure severe and sanguinary
laws to be enacted. If the laws are severe and san-
guinary, the legisla-ture is in fault, and not the con-
tractors. Whether the taxes are managed by con-
tractors or commissioners, it is equally proper that
the most efficacious system of laws, for their col-
lection, should be established ; and certainly se-
vere and sanguinary laws are not the most effica-
cious. Contractors, therefore, are not likely to seek
the enactment of the most severe laws: there are
many reasons for supposing the contrary will be
the case. The better the law is executed, that is
to say, the more certainly punishment follows the
transgression of the law, the less severe need it be.
But under the inspection of the contractor, who
has so strong an interest in its execution, the law
has abetter chance of being put in execution, than
when under the inspection of a commissioner who
has so little, if any, interest in the matter. Upon
this point it is impossible to imagine by what
means two interests can be more intimately con-
nected, than those of the contractor and the state.
It is the interest of the contractor that all who
illegally evade the payment of the taxes should be
punished: this, also, is the interest of the state.
But it can never be the interest of the contractor
to punish the innocent: this would tend to excite
the whole people against him : of every species of
injustice, this is one which is least likely to meet
with tranquil and acquiescent spectators.
13.
1 96 B. II. Ch. XL— OF TRUST AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT.
Adam Smith, who has adopted all these objec*
tions, little calculated as they seem to me to ap-
pear in such a work as his, also contends that
" the best and most frugal way of levying a tax,
can never be by farm.*" If this were true, it would
be a conclusive reason against ever letting taxes to
farm, and it would be useless to seek for others.
When a fact is proved, it is useless to trouble one-
self with prejudices and probabilities.
It is true, without the hope of gain, no contrac-
tor would undertake to collect the produce of a
tax, and to make the advances required. But
from whence ought the profit of the farmer to arise ?
This is what Adam Smith has not examined: he
supposes that the state would make the same pro-
fit, by establishing an administration under their
own inspection. The truth of this supposition is
altogether doubtful. The personal interest of a
minister is to have as many individuals, that is to
say, as many dependants, employed under him as
possible, that their salaries should be as large as
possible; and he will lose nothing by their negli-
gence. The interest of the farmer, or contractor, is
to have as few individuals employed under him as
possible, and to pay each one no more than he
deserves; and he will lose by every instance of
their negligence. In these circumstances, though
no srreater amount should be received from the
people than would have been collected by the
state, a contractor might reasonably hope to find a
source of profit.
Adam Smith has attacked, with as much force as
reason, the popular prejudices against the dealers
in corn, so odious and so much suspected under
the name of forestallers. He has shewn that the
* Wealth of Nations, b. v. ch. 2.
B. II. Ch.XI.— OF TRUST AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT. 197
interest of the public is most intimately connected
with the natural, and almost necessary interests of
this suspected class of merchants. He might with
equal justice have extended his protection to far-
mers of the public revenue, a class of men nearly
as little beloved.
In every branch of politics, and especially in so
wide a field as his subject embraced, it was
nearly impossible that he should examine every
thing with his owrreyes. It was almost of neces-
sity that he was sometimes guided by general opi-
nion: this seems to me to have happened upon
this occasion. He forgot in this instance to apply
the principle already cited, and of which he had
elsewhere made such beautiful applications. 1 had
myself once written an essay against farmers of
the revenue ; I have thrown it into the fire, for
which alone it was fit. 1 know not how long I
should have retained the opinions it advocated,
had I not been better instructed by Adam Smith.
Note. — In Burgoyne's " Picture of Spain/' vol. ii. page 4,
&c. it is stated, that in that country Trust was found more
economical than Contract management. But he does not
state in what manner contracts were granted : whether favour
or corruption did not preside at their disposal ; whether the
trust management had not superior means of enforcing the
payment of the taxes ; nor whether their increased produce
was not, in part at least, owing to the increase of trade and.
wealth.
[ 1!)N ]
CHAPTEli Xil.
OF REFORMS,
The emoluments annexed to any office being
shown to be in excess, and the mischiefs resulting
from such excess being ascertained, the next
question which occurs is, What remedy ought to
be applied ? The most obvious answer is a short
one: strike them off at once. But thus unquali-
fied, this answer is far from being the proper one.
Reform is the practical conclusion expected
as the reward for all the labour bestowed on the
examination of these theoretic propositions. Upon
this subject, nothing further remains but to point
out one limitation, without which every reform
can only be a greater abuse than the whole of
those which it pretends to correct. This limita-
tion is, tJiat no reform ought to be carried into
effect without granting complete indemnity to those
whose emoluments are diminished^ or whose offices
are suppressed. In a word, that the only legiti-
mate benefit to be derived by the public from
economical reform, consists in the conversion of
perpetual into life annuities. *
Will it be said, that the immediate suppres-
sion of these offices would be a gain to the
public ? This would be a mere sophism. The
sum in question would, without doubt, be gained
by the public, if it came from abroad, if it were
obtained by commerce, &c. but it is not gained
when it is taken from individuals who form a part
of that same public. Would a family be richer,
because the father disinherited one of his children
B, II. Cii, XII.— OF RliFUIlMS. 199
that he might the more richly endow the oth^r*^ ?
In this instance, as the disinheriting of one cliiUI
would increase the inheritance of the oth^-rs, the
mischief would not be without some countervail-
ing advantage; it would be productive of good to
some part of the family. But when it relates to
the public, the emoluments of a suppressed place
being divided amongst the whole community,
the gain being distributed among a multitude, is
divided into impalpable quantities; whilst the
loss, being confined to one, is felt in its entirety
by him who supports it alone. The result of the
operation is in no respect to enrich the party who
gains, whilst it reduces the party who loses to
poverty. Instead of one place suppressed, sup-
pose a thousand, or ten thousand, or a hundred
thousand, the total disadvantage will remain the
same : the plunder taken from thousands will
have to be distributed among millions ; your
public places will be filled with unfortunate citi-
zens whom you will have plunged into indigence,
whilst you will scarcely see one individual who
is sensibly enriched in consequence of all these
cruel operations. The groans of sorrow and the
cries of despair will resound on every side; the
shouts of joy, if any such are heard, will not be
the expressions of happiness, but of that male-
volence which rejoices in the agony of its
victims.
By what means do individuals deceive them-
selves and others into the sanction of such mis-
chievous acts ? It is by having recourse to cer-
tain vague maxims, consisting of a mixture of
truth and falsehood, and which give to a question,
in itself simple, an appearance of deep and mys-
terious policy. The interest of individuals, it is
200 B.II. Ch.XII.— OF REFORMS.
said, must give way to the public interest. But
what does this mean ? Is not one individual as
much a part of the public as any other ? This
public interest, which is thus personified, is only
an abstract term ; it only represents the aggregate
of individual interests. They must all be taken
into the account, instead of considering a part as
the whole, and the rest as nothing. If it were
proper to sacrifice the fortune of one individual to
augment that of the others, it would be still more
desirable to sacrifice a second and a third, and so
on to any greater number, without the possibility
of assigning limits to the operation ; since, what-
ever number may have been sacrificed, there still
remains the same reason for adding one more, la
a word, the interest of the first is sacred, or the
interest of no one can be so.
" The interests of individuals are the only real
interests. Take care of individuals, never molest
them, never suffer them to be molested, and you
have done enough for the public.
"Among the multiplicity of human affairs, indi-
viduals have often been injured by the operation
of particular laws, without daring to complain, or
without being able to obtain a hearing for their
complaints, on account of this vague and false
notion, that the interest of individuals ought to
give way to the public interest. Considered as a
question of generosity, by whom ought this virtue
to be displayed ? By all towards one, or by one
towards all ? Which then is the most selfish, he
who would preserve what he already possesses, or
he who would seize, even by force, what belongs
to another?
" An evil felt, and a good unfelt, — such is the
result of those magnificent reforms, in which the
B. II. Cn. XII.— OF REFORMS. 201
interests of individuals are sacrificed to those of
the public."*
The principles here laid down, it may be said,
are applicable to offices and pensions held/or lij'e^
but not to offices and pensions held during plea-
sure ; and which consequently may be revoked at
any time. May not these be reformed at any
time? No: the difference between the two is
only verbal ; — in all those cases in which it has
been customary for-those places, which are granted
during pleasure^ to be held for life, though the
possessor may have been led to expect other causes
of removal, he has never expected this. " My
superior," he has said to himself, " may dismiss
me, I know ; but I flatter myself I shall never
deserve to be dismissed ; I shall, therefore, retain
my office for life." Hence the dismission of such
an individual, without indemnity, is as great an
evil, as much unforeseen, and equally unjust, as
in the former case.
To these reasons, arising from justice and hu-
manity, may be added a prudential consideration.
By such indemnification, the interests of indivi-
duals and the public are reconciled, and a better
chance of securing the latter is obtained. Assure
those who are interested that they shall not be in-
jured, they will be among the foremost in facilitat-
ing reforms. By thus removing the grand obstacle
of contrary interests, the politician prevents those
clandestine intrigues, and private solicitations,
which so often arrest the progress of the noblest
plans.
It was thus that Leopold, the Grand Duke of
Tuscany, proceeded: — " Notwithstanding the mul-
* This passage is extracted from Mr. Bentham's work^
Traites des Legislation, tome i. partic i. ch. 15. Ed. IS'20.
202 B. II. Ch. XII.— OF REFORMS.
titude of reforms introduced by his royal highness
since his accession to the throne, there has not
been a single office reformed inTuscany, the holder
of which has not either been placed in some other
office {equal to that suppressed^ must be understood)
or who has not received as a pension a salary equal
in value to the emoluments of his office."* Upon
such conditions, the pleasure of reform is pure :
nothing is hazarded ; good only is accomplished ;
at least the principal object is secured, and the
happiness of no one is interrupted.
* " Indication Sommaire des Reglemens de Leopold, Grand
Due de Toscane." Bruxelles^ 1775.
RATIONALE OF REWARD.
BOOK III.
REWARD APPLIED TO ART AND SCIENCE.
CHAPTER I.
ART AND SCIENCE DIVISIONS.
A CLOUD of perplexity, raised by indistinct and
erroneous conceptions, seems at all times to have
been hanging over the import of the terms art and
science. The common supposition seems to have
been, that in the vj\\o\e.Jield of thought 3.ud action,
a determinate number of existing compartments
are assignable, marked out all round, and distin-
guished from one another by so many sets of natu-
ral and determinate boundary lines : that of these
compartments some are filled, each by an art,
without any mixture of science; others by a sci-
ence, without any mixture of art ; and others,
again, are so constituted that, as it has never hap-
pened to them hitherto, so neither can it ever
happen to them in future, to contain in them any
thinsf either of art or science.
This supposition will, it is believed, be found in
every part erroneous ; as between art and science,
in the whole field of thought and action, no one
204 B. III. ch. I.— apxT and science-divisions.
spot will be found belonging to either to the ex-
clusion of the other. In whatsoever spot a portion
of either is found, a portion of the other may be
also seen ; whatsoever spot is occupied by either,
is occupied by both : is occupied by them in joint
tenancy. Whatsoever spot is thus occupied, is so
much taken out o^ the waste; and there is not any
determinate part of the whole waste which is not
liable to be thus occupied.
Practice, in proportion as attention and exertion
are regarded as necessary to due performance^ is
termed art. Knowledge, in proportion as attention
and exertion are regarded as necessary to attain-
ment, is termed science.
In the very nature of the case, they will be
found so combined as to be inseparable. Man
cannot do anything well, but in proportion as he
knows how to do it : he cannot, in consequence
of attention and exertion, know anything but in
proportion as he has practised the art of learning
it.,.^ Correspondent therefore to every art, there is
nt least one branch o^ science ; correspondent to
every branch o{ science, there is at least one branch
of art. There is no determinate line of distinc-
tion between art, on the one hand, and science on
the other ; no determinate line of distinction be-
tween art and science, on the one hand, and unar-
tijicial practice and unscientific knowledge, on the
other. In proportion as that which is seen to be
done, is more conspicuous than that which is seen
or supposed to be known: that which has place is
apt to be considered as the work of art: in pro-
portion as that which is seen or supposed to be
known is more conspicuous than anything else
that is seen to be done, that which has place is
apt to be set down to the account of sc/ewcc. Day
by day, acting in conjunction, art and science are
B. III. Ch. I.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIVISIONS. 205
gaining upon the above-mentioned waste — the field
of imartificial practice and unscientijic knoifledge*
Taken collectively, and considered in their con-
nection w^ith the happiness of society, the arts and
sciences may be arranged in two divisions, viz.
1. Those of amusement and curiosity ; 2. Those
of utility, immediate and remote. These two
branches of human knowledge require different
methods of treatment on the part of governments.
By arts and sciences of amusement, 1 mean
those which are ordinarily called the Jine arts ;
such as music, poetry, painting, sculpture, archi-
tecture, ornamental gardening, &c. &c. Their
complete enumeration must be excused : it would
lead us too far from our present subject, were we
to plunge into the metaphysical discussions neces-
sary for its accomplishment. Amusements of all
sorts would be comprised under this head.
Custom has, in a manner, compelled us to make
the distinction between the arts and sciences of
amusement, and those of curiosity. It is not how-
ever proper to regard the former as destitute of
utility ; on the contrary, there is nothing, the
utility of which is more incontestible. To what
shall the character of utility be ascribed, if not to
that which is a source of pleasure ? All that can
be alleged in diminution of their utility is, that
it is limited to the excitement of pleasure : they
cannot disperse the clouds of grief or of misfortune.
They are useless to those who are not pleased with
them : they are useful only to those who take
pleasure in them, and only in proportion as they
are pleased.
By arts and sciences of curiosity, I mean those
* The foregoing paragraphs are extracted from Mr. Ben-
tham's " Chrestomathia^" part i. p. 508,
20G B.Ill. Ch.I.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIVISIONS.
which in truth are pleasing, but not in the same
degree as the fine arts, and to which at the first
glance we might be tempted to refuse this quahty.
It is not that these arts and sciences of curiosity do
not yield as much pleasure to those who cultivate
them as the fine arts ; but the number of those
who study them is more limited. Of this nature
are the sciences of heraldry, of medals, of pure
chronology, the knowledge of ancient and barba-
rous languages, which present only collections of
strange words, and the study of antiquities, inas-
much as they furnish no instruction applicable to
morality, or any other branch of useful or agreeable
knowledge.
The utility of all these arts and sciences, — I speak
both of those of amusement and curiosity, — the
value which they possess, is exactly in proportion to
the pleasure they yield. Every other species of pre-
eminence which may be attempted to be established
among them is altogether fanciful. Prejudice apart,
the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts
and sciences of music and poetr\^ If the game
of push-pin furnish more pleasure, it is more
valuable than either. Everybody can play at push-
pin : poetry and music are relished only by a few.
The game of push-pin is always innocent : it were
well could the same be always asserted of poetry.
Indeed, between poetry and truth there is a natural
opposition : false morals, fictitious nature : the
poet always stands in need of something false.
When he pretends to lay his foundations in truth,
the ornaments of his superstructure are fictions;
his business consists in stimulating our passions,
and exciting our prejudices. Truth, exactitude
of every kind, is fatal to poetry. The poet must
see everything through coloured media, and strive
to make every one else to do the same. It is true.
B.iii. qll—art and science— divisions. 207
there have been noble spirits, to whom poetry and
philosophy have been equally indebted, but these
exceptions do not remove the mischiefs which
have resulted from this magic art. If poetry and
music deserve to be preferred before a game of
push-pin, it must be because they are calculated
to gratify those individuals who are most difficult
to be pleased.
All the arts and sciences, without exception,
inasmuch as they constitute innocent employments,
at least of time, possess a species of moral utility,
neither the less real or important, because it is
frequently unobserved. They compete with, and
occupy the place of those mischievous and dan-
gerous passions and employments, to which want
of occupation and ennui give birth. They are
excellent substitutes for drunkenness, slander, and
the love of gaming.*
The effects of idleness upon the ancient Germans
maybe seen in Tacitus : his observations are ap-
plicable to all uncivilized nations : for want of
other occupations they waged war upon each other:
it was a more animated amusement than that of the
chase. The chieftain who proposed a martial ex-
pedition, at the first sound of his trumpet ranged
under his banners a crowd of idlers, to whom peace
was a condition of restraint, of languor, and of
ennui. Glory could be reaped only in one field :
opulence knew but one luxury. This field was
that of battle ; this luxury that of conquering or
recounting past conquests. Their women them-
selves, ignorant of those agreeable arts which mul-
tiply the means of pleasing, and prolong the empire
of beauty, became the rivals of the men in courage.
* Traites de Legislation, torn. u. i^artle 4. (Ed. IS'iO.) "Des
moyens indirects de prevenir les dclits."
208 B. ni. ch. I.— art and science-divisions.
and, mingling with them in the barbarous tumult
of a military life, became unfeeling as they.
It is to the cultivation of the arts and sciences
that we must, in great measure, ascribe the exist-
ence of that party which is now opposed to war :
it has received its birth amid the occupations
and pleasures furnished by the fine arts. These
arts, so to speak, have enrolled under their peace-
ful banners that army of idlers which would have
otherwise possessed no amusement but in the
hazardous and bloody game of war.
Such is the species of utility which belongs in-
discriminately to all the arts and sciences. Were
it the only reason, it would be a sufficient reason
for desiring to see them flourish and receive the
most extended diffusion.
If these principles are correct, we shall know
how to estimate those critics, more ingenious than
useful, who, under pretence of purifying the public
taste, endeavour successively to deprive mankind
of a larger or smaller part of the sources of their
amusement. These modest judges of elegance
and taste consider themselves as benefactors to the
human race, whilst they are really only the inter-
rupters of their pleasure — a sort of importunate
hosts, who place themselves at the table to dimi-
nish, by their pretended delicacy, the appetite of
their guests. It is only from custom and preju-
dice that, in matters of taste, we speak of false and
true. There is no taste which deserves the epithet
good^ unless it be the taste for such employments
which, to the pleasure actually produced by them,
conjoin some contingent or future utility : there
is no taste which deserves to be characterized as
bad, unless it be a taste for some occupation which
has a mischievous tendency.
The celebrated and ingenious Addison has dis-
B. III. ch. I.— art and science-djvisions. 209
tinguished himself by his skill in the art of ridi-
culing enjoyments, by attaching to them the fan-
tastic idea of bad taste. In the Spectator he wages
relentless war against the whole generation of
false wits. Acrostics, conundrums, pantomimes,
puppet-shows, bouts-rimes, stanzas in the shape of
eggs, of wings, burlesque poetry of every descrip-
tion; in a word, a thousand other light and equally
innocent amusements fall crushed under the strokes
of his club. And, proud of having established his
empire above the ruins of these literary trifles, he
regards himself as the legislator of Parnassus !
What, however, was the effect of his new laws ?
They deprived those who submitted to them of
many sources of pleasure ; they exposed those who
were more inflexible, to the contempt of their
companions.
Even Hume himself, in spite of his proud and
independent philosophy, has yielded to this literary
prejudice. *' By a single piece," says he, " the
Duke of Buckingham rendered a great service to
his age, and was the reformer of its taste!" In
what consisted this important service ? He had
written a comedy, I'lie Rehearsal, the object of
which was to render those theatrical pieces, which
had been most popular, the objects of general dis-
taste. His satire was completely successful ;
but what was its fruit ? The lovers of that species
of amusement were deprived of so much pleasure;
a multitude of authors, covered with ridicule and
contempt, deplored, at the same time, the loss of
their reputaion and their bread.
As the amusement of a minister of state, it must
be confessed, that a more suitable one might be
found than a game at solitaire. Still, among the
number of its amateurs was once found Potemkin,
one of the most active and respected Russian
14
210 B. III. Cii.I.—ART AND SCIENCE— DIVISIONS.
ministers of state. I see a smile of contempt upon
tlie lips of many of my readers, who would not
think it strange that any one should play at cards
from " eve till morn," provided it were in company.
But, how incomparably superior is this solitary
game to many social games ; so often anti-social
in their consequences ! Thefirst, a pure and simple
amusement, stripped of everything injurious, free
from passion, avarice, loss, and regret. It is gaming
enjoyed by some happy individuals, in that state
in which legislators may desire, but cannot hope
that it will ever be enjoyed by all throughout
the whole world. How much better was this
minister occupied, than if, with the Iliad in his
hand, he had stirred up within his heart the seeds
of those ferocious passions which can only be
gratified with tears and blood.
As men grow old, they lose their relish for the
simple amusements of childhood. Is this a reason
for pride? It may be so; when to be hard to
please, and to have our happiness dependant on
what is costly and complicated, shall be found to
be advantageous. The child who is building houses
of cards is happier than was Louis XIV. when
building Versailles. Architect and mason at once,
master of his situation and his materials, he alters
and overturns at will.
Diruit, edificatj mutat quadrata rotundis.
And all this at the expense neither of groans
nor money. The proverbial expression of the games
of princes^ may furnish us with strong reasons for
regretting that princes should ever cease to love
the games of children.
A reward was offered by one of the Roman
emperors to whoever would invent a new pleasure;
and because this emperor was called Nero, or Cali-
gula, it has been imputed to him as a crime : as if
B. HI. Ch. I.— art and SC7ENCE— divisions. '21 1
every sovereign, and even every private individual,
who encourages the cultivation of the arts and
sciences, were not an accomplice m this crime.
The employment of those critics, to whom we have
before referred, tends to diminish the existing stock
of our pleasures : the natural effect of increasing
years, is to render us insensible to those which re-
main : by those who blame the offer of the Roman
emperor, these critics should be esteemed the be-
nefactors of mankind, and old age the perfection
of human liTe.
In league with these critics are the tribe of sati-
rists ; those generous men, who without other
reward than the pleasure of humbling and dis-
figuring everything which does not please them,
have constituted themselves reformers of man-
kind ! The only satire I could read, without disgust
and aversion, would be a satire on these libellers
themselves. Their occupation consists in fo-
menting scandal, and in disseminating its poisons
throughout the world, that they may be furnished
with pretexts for pouring contempt upon every-
thing that employs or interests other men. By
blackening everything, and exaggerating every-
thing (for it is by exaggeration they exist) they
deceive the judgments of their readers : — innocent
amusements, ludicrous eccentricities, venial trans-
gressions and crimes, are alike confounded and
covered with their venom. Their design is to
efface all the lines of demarcation, all the essential
distinctions which philosophy and legislation have
with so much labour traced. For one truth, we
find a thousand odious hyperboles in their works.
Thev never cease to excite malevolence and anti-
pathy : under their auspices, or at least under the
influence of the passions which animate them,
language itself becomes satirical. Neutral expres-
14.
212 B. III. Ch.I.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIVISIONS.
sions can scarcely be found to designate the motives
which determine human actions : to the words ex-
pressive of the motive, such as avarice^ ambition,
pride, idlenesr., and many others, the idea of dis-
approbation is so closely, though unnecessarily,
connected, that the simple mention of the motive
implies a censure, even when the actions which
have resulted from it have been most innocent. The
nomenclature of morals is so tinctured with these
prejudices, that it is not possible, without great
difiiculty and long circumlocutions, simply and
purely, without reprobation or approbation, to
express the motives by which mankind are go-
verned. Hence our languages, rich in terms of
hatred and reproach, are poor and rugged for the
purposes of science and of reason. Such is the
evil created and augmented by satiric writers.*
Among rich and prosperous nations, it is not
necessary that the public should be at the expense
of cultivating the arts and sciences of amusement
and curiosity. Indivdiuals will always bestow
upon these that portion of reward which is pro-
portioned to the pleasure they bestow.
Whilst, as to the arts and sciences of immediate
and those of more remote utility, it would not be
necessary, nor perhaps possible, to preserve be-
tween these two classes an exact line of demarca-
tion. The distinctions of theory and practice are
equally applicable to all. Considered as matter
of theory, every art or science, even when its prac-
tical utility is most immediate and incontestable,
appears to retire into the division of arts and
sciences of remote utility. It is thus that medi-
cine and legislation, these arts so practical, consi-
* See further on this subject in Mr. Bentham's " Table of
Springs of Action."
B.III. Ch.I— ART AND SCIENCE— DIVISIONS. 213
dered under a particular aspect, appear equally
remote in respect to their utility with the specu-
lative sciences of logic and mathematics. On the
other hand, there is a branch of science for which,
at first, a place would scarcely have been found)
among the arts and sciences of curiosity, but which-
cultivated by industrious hands, has at length pre-
sented the characters of immediate and incontes-
table utility. Electricity, which, when first diso
covered, seemed destined only to amuse certai
philosophers by the singularity of its phenomena
has at length been employed with most striking
success in the service of medicine, and in the pro-
tection of our dwellings against those calamities,
for which ignorant and affrighted antiquity could
find no sufficient cause, but the special anger of
the gods.
That which governments ought to do for the arts
and sciences of immediate and remote utility, may
be comprised in three things — I. To remove the
discouragements under which they labour; 2. To
favour their advancement; 3. To contribute to
their diffusion.
[ 214 j
CHAPTER II.
ART AND SCIENCE — ADVANCEMENT.
Though discoveries in science may be the re-
sult of genius or accident, and though the most
important discoveries may have been made by
individuals without public assistance, the progress
of such discoveries may at all times be materially
accelerated by a proper application of public en-
couragement. The most simple and efficacious
method of encouraging investigations of pure
theory^ the first step in the career of invention,
consists in the appropriation of specific funds to
the researches requisite in each particular science.
It may, at first sight, appear superfluous to re-
commend such a measure as this, since there are
few states which have not sometimes made such ap-
propriations, and since all governments, in propor-
tion as they have become enlightened, have been
more and more disposed to reckon such expenses
necessary. The most eificacious methods of em-
ploying the large funds which ought thus to be
appropriated, remain, however, to be examined.
It would be necessary that the funds applicable to
a given science, chemistry for example, should be
confided to the students of chemistry themselves.
They ought, however, to be bestowed in the shape
of reward. Thus the chemist, who upon a given
subject should have produced the best theoretic
dissertation, might be put into possession of these
funds, upon condition that he should employ
them in makins: the experiments which he had
pointed out. What more natural or useful re-
B.lll. Cm, II.— ART AND SCIENCE— ADVANCEMENT- 215
ward could be conferred upon a philosopher, than
thus to be enabled, with honour to himself, to
satisfy a taste or a passion which the insufficiency
of his own fortune would have rendered rather a
torment than a pleasure ? His talents are rewarded,
by giving him new means of increasing them.
Other rewards often have a contrary effect, they
tend to distract his attention, and to give birth to
opposite tastes.
Ifthis method of encouraging theoretic researches
has been neglected, it has been because the inti-
mate connection between the sciences and arts,
between theory and practice, has only been well
understood by philosophers themselves ; the greater
number of men recognise the utility of the sciences
only at a moment when they are applied to imme-
diate use. The ignorant are always desirous of
humbling the wise; gratifying their self love, by
accusing the sciences of being more curious than
useful. " All your books of natural history are
very pretty," said a lady to a philosopher, " but
you have never saved a single leaf of our trees from
the teeth of the insects." Such is the frivolous
judgment of the ignorant. There are many disco-
veries which, though at first they might seem use-
^ less in themselves, have given birth to thousands
of others of the greatest utility. It is in conduct-
ing the sciences to this point, that encouragements
might thus be advantageously employed, instead of
beingbestowed in whatare generally called rewards.
When the discoveries of science can be practically
employed in the increase of the mass of general
wealth, they receive a reward naturally propor-
tioned to their utility: it is therefore for such dis-
coveries as are not thus immediately applicable,
that reward is most necessary. Of this nature are
most of the discoveries of chemistry. Is a new
216 B. III. ch. II.— art and science— advancement.
earth discovered ? a new air ? a new salt ? a
new metal ? the utility of the discovery is at
first confined to the pleasure experienced by those
interested in such researches. This ordinarilv is
all the benefit reaped by the discoverer: occu-
pied in making fuither discoveries, he leaves it
to others to reap their fruits. It is those who
follow him who apply them to the purposes of
art, and levy contributions upon the individuals,
who are desirous ofenjoying the fruits of his labour.
Ought the master workman, who sees no particular
individual upon whom he may levy a contribution,
therefore to go without reward.
[ 217 ]
CHAPTER III.
ARTS AND SCIENCE DIFFUSION.
The sciences, like plants, may expand in two
directions ; in superficies and in height. The su-
perficial expansion of those sciences which are
most immediately useful, is most to be desired.
There is no method more calculated to accelerate
their advancement, than their general diffusion :
the greater the number of those by whom they are
cultivated, the greater the probability that they will
be enriched by new discoveries. Fewer opportu-
nities will be lost, and greater emulation will be
excited in their cultivation.
Suppose a country divided into districts, some-
what similar to the English counties, but more
equal in size, say from thirty to forty miles in dia-
meter, the following is the system of establish-
ments which ought to be kept up in the central
town of each district.
1. A professor of medicine,
2. A professor of surgery and midwifery.
3. An hospital.
4. A professor of the veterinary art.
6. A professor of chemistry.
6. A professor of mechanical and experimental
philosophy.
7. A professor of botany and experimental hor-
ticulture.
8. A professor of the other branches of natural
history.
9. An experimental farm.
The first advantage resulting from this plan
218 B.lll. Ch. III.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIFFUSION.
would be the establishment, in each district, of a
practitioner, skilled in the various branches of the
art of healing. An hospital, necessary in itself,
would also be further useful, by serving as a school
for the students of this art.
The veterinary art, or the art of healing as ap-
plied to animals, has only w^ithin these few years
been separately studied in England. The farriers,
who formerly practised upon our cattle, were ge-
nerally no better qualified for their duty, than the
old women whom our ancestors allowed to practice
upon themselves. The establishment of a professor
of the veterinary art in every district, might even
be recommended as a matter of economy : the
value of the cattle preserved would more than coun-
terbalance the necessary expense. This professor-
ship might, for want of sufficient funds, be united
to one of the others.
The connections of chemistry with domestic
and manufacturing economy are well known. The
professor of this science would of course direct
his principal attention to the carrying this prac-
tical part to its greatest perfection. His lec-
tures would treat of the business of the dairy; the
preservation of corn and other agricultural produc-
tions ; the preservation of provisions of all sorts ;
the prevention of putrefaction, that subtle enemy
of health as well as of corruptible wealth ; the pro-
per precautions for guarding against poisons of all
sorts, which may so easily be mingled with our pro-
visions, or which may be collected from the vessels
in which they are prepared. They would also
treat of the various branches of trade : of the arts
of working in metal, of breweries, of the prepara-
tion of leather, and the manufactures of soap and
candles, &c. &c.
Botany, to a certain degree, is necessary in the
B.III. Cii.lII.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIFFUSION. 219
science of medicine: it supplies a considerable part
of the materials employed. It has a similar con-
nection with chemistry, and the arts which
depend upon it. The combined researches of the
botanist and chemist would increase our know-
ledge of the various uses to which vegetable sub-
stances might be applied. It is to them that we
must look for the discovery of cheaper and better
methods, if such methods are to be found : of
giving durability and tenacity to hemp and flax
for the manufacture of linens, ropes, and paper;
for discoveries respecting the astringent matters
applicable to the preparation of leather ; and for
the invention of new dyes, &c. and so on, to infi-
nity. Indeed, it is the botanist who must enable
the agriculturist to distinguish the most useful
and excellent herbs and grasses, from those which
are less useful and pernicious.
The professor of natural history would also
furnish abundance not only of curious but useful
information. He would teach the cultivator to
distinguish throughout all the departments of the
animal kingdom his allies from his enemies. He
would point out the habits and the different
shapes assumed by different insects, and the most
efficacious methods of destroying them and pre-
venting their ravages. It might, however, per-
haps appear, were we fully acquainted with the
history of all the animals which dwell with us
upon the surface of this planet, that there would
be found none whose existence was to us a mat-
ter of indifference.
I have placed in the last rank the institution of
an experimental farm ; not because its utility
would be inferior to all the others, but because its
functions may be easily supplied by individual
industry. In a country so well rej)lenished with
220 B.III. Ch. III.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIFFUSION.
knowledge, wealth, and zeal, as England, there is
no district which could not furnish an abundance
of experiments in this dejDartment. Little more
would be necessary than to provide a register
into which they might be collected, and in which
they might receive the degree of publicity neces-
sary for displaying their utility. Such a register
England once possessed in the work of the
enlightened and patriotic Arthur Young. Such
a register, however numerous and excellent as
the hints dispersed throughout it were, was far
from supplying the place, and rendering useless
a system of regular and connected researches
in which instruction should constitute the sole
object.*
In enumerating the branches of knowledge with
■which, on account of their superior utility, it is
most desirable that the great mass of the people
should be acquainted, it may well be supposed
that I ought not to forget the knowledge of the
laws. But that this knowledge may be diffused,
a determinate system of cognoscible laws, capable
of being known, is necessary. Unhappily, such a
system does not yet exist: whenever it shall
come to be established, the knowledge of the laws
will hardly be considered worthy of the name of
science. The legislator who allows more intelli-
gible terms to exist within the compass of lan-
guage, than those in which he expresses his laws,
deserves the execration of his fellow men. I
have endeavoured to present to the world the
outlines of a system, j* which should it ever be
* The Board of Agriculture, which, at the solicitation of Sir
John Sinclair, was formed during the administration of Mr.
Pitt, was designed to carry purposes similar to those recom-
mended above into effect.
t See An Introduction to Principles of Morals and Legislation.
E.III. C'H.ril.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIFFUSION. 221
filled up, I flatter myself would render the whole
system of laws cognoscible and intelligible to all.
As to those arts and sciences which may be
learned from books, such as the arts of legislation,
history in all its branches, moral philosophy and
logic, comprehending metaphysics, grammar, and
rhetoric, — these may be left to be gathered from
books. Those individuals who are desirous of al-
leviating the pains of study, by the charms of de-
clamation upon these subjects, may be permitted
to pay for their amusements. There is however
one branch of encouragement which the hand of
government might extend even to these studies.
It might establish in each district in which the
lectures, of which we have already spoken, should
be delivered, an increasing library, appropriated to
these studies. This would be at once to bestow
upon students the instruments of study, and upon
authors their most appro])riate reward.
I should not consider knowledge in these de-
partments, at once so useful and so curious, ill
acquired, were it even acquired at the expense of
Latin and Greek, an acquaintance with which is
held in such high estimation in our days, and for
instruction in which the foundations are so abun-
dant. Common opinion appears to have consi-
dered the sciences more difficult of attainment than
these dead languages. This opinion is only a pre-
judice arising from the comparatively small number
of individuals who apply themselves to the study
of the sciences, and from its not having been the
custom to study them till the labour of these other
studies has been completed. But, custom and pre-
judice apart, it is in the study of the sciences that
young people would find most pleasure and fewest
difficulties. In this career, ideas find easy access
through the senses to the memory and the other
222 B.III. Cn.in.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIFFUSION.
intellectual faculties. Curiosity, that passion
which even in infancy displays so much energy,
would here be continually gratified. In the study
of language, on the contrary, all is abstraction;
there are no sensible objects to relieve the memory ;
all the energy of the mind is consumed in the ac-
quisition of words, of which neither the utility
nor the application is visible. Hence, the longest
and most detailed course of instruction which need
be given upon all the sciences before mentioned,
would not together occupy so much time as is
usually devoted to the study of Latin, which is
forgotten almost as soon as learned. The know-
ledge of languages is valuable only as a means of
acquiring the information which may be obtained
from conversation or books. For the purposes of
conversation, the dead languages are useless, and
translations of all the books contained in them may
be found in all the languages of modern Europe.
What then remains to be obtained from them, not
by the common people, but even by the most in-
structed ? I must confess, I can discover nothing
but a fund of allusions wherewith to ornament their
speeches, their conversations, and their books :
too small a compensation for the false and narrow
notions which custom continues to compel us to
draw up from these imperfect and deceptive
sources. To prefer the study of these languages
to the study of those useful truths which the more
mature industry of the moderns has placed in their
stead, is to make a dwelling-place of a scaffolding,
instead of employing it in the erection of a build-
ing : it is as though, in his mature age, a man
should continue to prattle like a child. Let those
who are pleased with these studies continue to
amuse themselves ; but let us cease to torment
children with them, at least those children who
B. III. Cii. III.— AFIT AND SCIENCE— DIFFUSION. 223
will have to provide for their ovvn subsistence, till
such time as we have supplied them with the
means of slaking their thirst for knowledge at those
springs where pleasure is combined with immediate
and incontestable utility.
It is especially by a complete course of instruc-
tion that the clergy, who might be rendered so
useful, ought to be prepared for their functions.
Within the narrow limits of every parish, there
would then be found one man at least well in-
structed upon all subjects with which acquain-
tance is most desirable. In exchange for this know-
ledge which constitutes the glory of man, 1 would
exchange as much as might be desired of that con-
troversy which is his scourge and his disgrace.
The intervals between divine service on the
sabbath might then be filled up by the communi-
cation of knowledge to those, whose necessary
avocations leave them no other leisure time for
improvement. An attendance upon a course of
physico-theology, it appears to me. would be a
much more suitable mode of employing this time,
than wasting it in that idleness and dissipation in
which both health and money are so frequently
lost.
There are three causes which tend to strengthen
an attachment to the dead languages. The first is,
the utility which they formerly possessed. At
the revival of letters, there was nothing to learn
but Latin and Greek, and nothing could be learnt
but by Latin and Greek. The period when this
utility ceased having never been fixed, custom
has led us to regard it as still subsisting.
A second reason is, the time and trouble ex-
pended by so many persons in learning them.
The price of any thing is regulated not only by
its utility, but also by the labour expended in pro-
224 B. III. Ch.III.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIFFUSIO N.
curing it. Few would be willing to acknowledge
that they had spent a large portion of their life in
learning that, which when learnt was not worth
knowing. There are many individuals who have
learnt Latin and Greek, but have learned nothing
else. Can it be expected that they should ac-
knowledge these languages are useless ? As well
might a knight-errant have been expected to ac-
knowledge that his mistress was ugly !
The third cause is, their reputed necessity.
This necessity, though purely conventional, is not
* " En effet, la plupart de ces savans ne sentent plus les
choses en elles-m6mes. lis sont comme ces imaginations
faibles, qui, subjuguees par recl&,t des dignites et des richesses,
admirent dans la bouche d'un grand ce qu'ils trouveraient
pitoyable dans celle d'un homnie du commun. Ainsi, I'ancienne
reputation et les langues savantes leur imposent, et changent
tout a leurs yeux. Telle pensee qu'ils entendent tous les jours
en Francois sans y prendre garde, les enleve s'ils viennent k la
rencontrer dans un auteur Grec. Tout pleins qu'ils en sont,
ils vous la citent avec emphase ; et si vous ne partagez pas
leur enthousiasme, Ah! s'ecrient-ils, si vous saviez le Grec !
II me semble entendre le heros de Cervantes, qui, parcequ'il
est arme chevalier, voit des enchanteurs oti son ecuyer ne voit
que des moulins.
" Tel est I'inconvenient ordinaire de I'erudition, et il n'y a
que les esprits du premier ordre qui puissent I'eviter. L'igno-
rance, me dira-t-on, n'a-t-elle pas aussi ses inconveniens?
Oui, sans doute ; mais on a tort d'appeler ignorans ceux
memes qui ne sauroient ni Grec ni Latin. lis peuvent mfeme
avoir acquis en Fran9ois toutes les idees necessaires pour per-
fectionner leur raison, et toutes les experiences propres a assu-
rer leur godt. Nous avons des philosophes, des orateurs, des
poetes: nous avons m6me des traducteurs oti Ton peut puiser
toutes les richesses anciennes, depouillees de I'orgueil de les
avoir recueillies dans les originaux. Un homme qui, sans Grec
et sans Latin, auroit mis a profit toixt ce qui s'est fait d'excel-
lent dans notre langue, I'emporterait sans doute sur le savant
qui, par un amour der^gle des anciens, auroit dedaign^ les
ouvrages modernes.'' — La Mothe, Reflexions sur la Critique,
p. 148.
B.III. Ch. III.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIFFUSION. 225
the less real. Public opinion has attached a de-
gree of importance to an acquaintance with them,
and he who should be known to be entirely igno-
rant of them, would be branded with disgrace.
So long as this law subsists, it must be obeyed. A
single individual is seldom able to withstand or
change the laws established by public opinion.
As the public mind becomes enlightened, these
laws will change of themselves. A sovereign may,
however, hasten these changes if he believe them
useful, and if he consider the attempt worth the
trouble. He may reward individuals for teaching
the arts and sciences, and thus establish a new
public opinion, which shall at first compete with,
and at length ultimately subdue the previous pre-
judice.
He may also attain the same end by another less
costly, but more startling method. He may pre-
scribe an attendance upon different scientific lec-
tures, as a necessary condition to the holding of
certain offices, and particularly of all honorary em-
ployments. To those who have completed their
course of attendance, an honorary diploma may be
given, which upon all occasions of public cere-
mony shall entitle those who possess it to a certain
precedence.
In the times of feudal barbarism, when war was
the only occupation of those who did not belong to
the commonalty or the clergy, the upper ranks in
society were necessarily military. The knight was
the warrior who could afford to fight on horse-
back ; the squire was one who, not being so rich
as the knight, could afford to be his principal at-
tendant, and this constituted their nobility.
In future times, when other occupations shall be
pursued and other manners established, it is possi-
ble that knowledge may confer rank in Europe, as
15
226 B.III. Cn. III.— ART AND SCIENCE-DIFFUSION.
the appearance of it has for a long time past in
China. Wealth, independently of any convention,
possesses real power, and will always nningle with
everything which tends to confer respect. The
philosopher, to his title of honour, will unite the
idea of an individual sufficiently wealthy to have
supported the expense of a learned education:
Knowledge, whether true or presumptive, might
thus become a mark of distinction, as the length
of the nails is in China.
But it may be said, that something more than
attendance upon a course of scientific lectures is
necessary, if anj^thing is to be learned, and that the
law which should bestow honour upon attendance
would not insure study. If it were necessary to
have a nobility composed of real philosophers,
other methods must be pursued ; but when the
.object in view is merely to change the species of
knowledge in which they are to be instructed, from
what is useless to what is useful, what more need
be required ? When interesting objects of study are
substituted for those which are uninteresting, they
would not study less.
I know that public examinations are powerful
means for exciting emulation, but 1 have no desire
to place additional obstacles in the way of a plan
whose novelty alone would render it but too alarm-
ing : a project v/hich to many will appear ro-
mantic, need not be accompanied by an accessory
whose aspect is alarming, and whose utility is
problematic.
The most stupid and inattentive could scarcely
attend upon a long course of instruction without
gaining some advantage ; they would, at least, be
familiarised with the terms of art, which constitute
not only the first, but the greatest difficulty ;
they would form some idea of the principal divi-
B.III. Cii. Iir.— ART AND SCIENCE— DIFFUSION. 227
sions of the country they traversed ; and should
they ever be desirous of directing a more par-
ticular examination to any particular division,
they will at least know in what direction to
seek for it. As all the world would then be
occupied with the study of the sciences, they
would pretend thus to employ themselves, and
would be ashamed to be entirely ignorant of
those things which were the subjects of general
conversation.
Russia is an instance of the ease with which a
new direction may be given to the opinions of a
whole people. Nobility of birth is but little
respected ; official rank is the only ground of dis*
tinction. This change has been effected by a few
simple regulations. Unless he is an officer, no in-
dividual, how rich or nobly born soever he may
be, can vote, or even sit in the assembly of the no-
bility. The consequence has been, that all classes
have pressed into the service of the state. If they
do not intend to make it their profession, they quit
it when they have attained the rank which confers
this privilege.
Note. — If Mr. Bentham had consented to revise his MSS.
which were written more than forty years ago, he might have
seen reason to alter many of his observations.
In England, much has been done in the interval. Public
opinion has sensibly changed respecting the value of classical
learning. It is highly esteemed at college, but elsewhere it is
now only considered as an accessory ; the most enlightened
parents regret that it is still the only object of instruction in
our puplic schools.
Since the establishment of the Royal Institution, many simi-
lar institutions have been foimed, and a general desire for
useful knowledge has been disseminated. The ladies have dis-
played a persevering ardour in their attendance on these means
of instruction, so much the more praiseworthy, as it has been
uniformly excited by inclination alone. Elementary worka
15.
228 B.III, Ch. III.— ART AND SCIENCE-DIFFUSION,
have been multiplied ; but all this has been done by the exer-
tions of individuals^ without any encouragement from the state.
As to public education^ it is more easy to create than to re-
form. A good institution would be the best criticism upon the
bad. If two or three colleges were founded in London, suited
to the wants of the more numerous classes of those who are
destined to the pursuits of art, trade, or commerce, in which
not Latin or Greek (almost always useless in these avocations)
should be taught, but the national language, which has gene-
rally been neglected, together with all those branches of know-
ledge, which if not absolutely necessary, are always useful and
agreeable, we should soon see these seminaries draw together
a crowd of scholars, and the old colleges would be obliged to
correct their system in order to maintain their ground.
It may be said, that private schools may supply the defici-
ency 3 but there is a great difference between public and pri-
vate establisliments. Private education can only succeed by a
train of happy events, whilst in public education, a multitude
of circumstances are overcome. Besides, domestic education
is limited to the rich, whilst public instruction is adapted to
the most moderate fortunes. — Dumont.
RATIONALE OF REWARD.
BOOK IV.
REWARD APPLIED TO PRODUCTION AND TRADE.
CHAPTER I.
BENTHAM AND ADAM SMITH.
N.B. This fourth book was not included by
the author, in his plan, as a part of a treatise upon
rewards. It consists, however, of the most im-
portant application of the principles laid down in
the former part of this work, and particularly in
Book 1, ch. 15, Competition as to Rewards. It
is extracted from another of Mr. Bentham's ma-
nuscripts, entitled, A Manual of Political Eco-
nomy ; a work, which as it respects its foun-
dations and its results, is the same as Adam
Smith's Wealth of Nations, but from w^hich it
widely differs in plan and form.
The Scotch Philosopher, having to discuss a
new subject which presented a controversy at
every step, thought it necessary to begin with an
exposition of facts. His work is principally his-
torical : he has described in a most admirable
manner the progress of society, from its state of
** Translated from the French of Dumont.
230 B,;1V. Cn. I.— BENTHAM AND ADAM SMITH.
primitive poverty to its present condition of
opulence; he has traced the march of industry in
its natural course, from agriculture to manufac-
tures, from manufactures to commerce, and from
internal to foreign commerce. In the midst of
these interesting pictures, the didactic part is only
incidental : he seems to have been fearful of pre-
maturely forming a system. He has collected the
elements of knowledge, and he has left to the
fermentation of time the care of bringing them to
perfection, and extracting their consequences.
The object of Adam Smith allowed of a happy
diversity, and he has chosen the easiest and most
ornamental method of effecting it; but it is neither
the shortest nor the most favourable for the purposes
of instruction. His movements are not progres-
sive ; he often retraces his steps : active minds
reproach him with being diffuse in argumentation,
and pretend that each of his chapters forms a dis-
tinct treatise.
Mr. Bentham has chosen a narrower and more
difficult path : he has considered the subject with
a reference to legislation alone, and uniformly has
confined himself to the practical part. This is
what the law ought to be on this point : this is
what ought to be done ; and above all this
ought not to be done, if it be desirable that the
national prosperity should be carried to the highest
possible pitch : such is his design. His progress
is marked by a didactic rigour: he advances from
definitions to principles, and from principles to
consequences.
This difHerence in design is not the only one
between the two works. Mr. Bentham has sim-
plified his subject, by referring everything to one
principle ; namely, the limitation of production and
trade bi/ the limitation of capital: a principle which
brings all his reasonings into a very small circle,
B.IV. Ch. I.— BI^NTIIAM AND AUAM SMITH. 231
and which serves to unite into one bundle those
observations which cannot be so easily grasped
when they are disunited. His is not a new dis-
covery. This principle pervades, and, so to speak,
is diffused throughout the whole work of Adam
Smith, but is nowhere announced as a governing
principle: he has never directly employed it. Had
he clearly recognized it, he would have made it
the centre of his system: it would have been the
foundation upon which he would have erected his
whole superstructure, and he would have been
spared a multitude of repetitions and windings.
The Manual of Mr. Bentham would not tend to
supersede the necessity of reading the Wealth of
Nations. The historical part of that work, in
exhibiting the origin of things; in leading us to
reflect upon the phenomena of society ; in taking
down its machinery and exhibiting each part se-
parately, lays the foundation of the science. It is
thus, that the knowledge of anatomy and physi-
ology ought to precede the science of medicine,
properly so called.
I have extracted from Mr. Bentham's Manual,
those parts which belonged to my present work,
and which I could not have omitted without, in
some respects, leaving it incomplete. It is not,
however, for the learned that this part of the
work is intended : they are above these elements.
The study of political economy has become com-
mon and familiar, in comparison with what it was
when these writings were composed. Still, how-
ever, in them errors are attacked which are yet far
from being completely destroyed; and which have
a continual tendency to be reproduced. The pas-
sions of men are continually sowing in this field
briars and poisonous plants, which it is necessary
continually to extirpate. This little extract, which
232 J3. IV. Ch.I.— BENTHAM AND ADAM SMITH.
may be read in half an hour, places in a new light
the grand principles of social order, security, the
free exercise of industry, the energy of the at-
tractive and remuneratory motives which induce
free men to labour, the comparative weakness of
the motives of constraint which induce slaves
to exert themselves. New arguments are fur-
nished wherewith to combat national jealousies,
the desire for distant establishments, and other
prejudices not less mischievous.
In conclusion, political economy is a science,
rather than an art. There is much to be learned
respecting it and little to be done.
Is it inquired what ought governments to do,
that wealth may be increased — the answer is,-
Very little, and nothing rather than too much.
What ought to be done for the increase of popula-
tion ?— Nothing. In the greater number of states,
the best methods of augmenting population and
wealth, would consist in abolishing those laws and
regulations whereby it has been sought to increase
them, provided such abolition were gradually and
carefully accomplished.
The art therefore is reduced within a small com-
pass : securitif and freedom is all that industry
requires. The request which agriculture, manu-
factures, and commerce presents to governments, is
modest and reasonable as that which Diogenes
made to Alexander: " Stand out of my sunshine."
We have no need of favour, we require only a
secure and open path.
In connexion with this Manual, I cannot omit
the opportunity of making a remark in favour of
those philosophers who have particularly culti-
vated the science of political economy. They have
taken no part in the dissemination of those splene-
tic and odious paradoxes respecting the inequality
B. IV. Cii. I.— BENTHAM AND ADAM SMITH. 233
i)f ranks, the progress of wealth and civilization,
the enjoyments of" luxury and arts. It is they, on
the contrary, who have furnished the most solid ar-
guments wherewith to refute these subversive opi-
nions, and wherewith to justify social order. They
have replied to declamation by reasoning; to the
pictures of fancy, by facts ; to conjectures, by cal-
culations. They have shown that men in society
have a much greater number of interests in com-
mon, than of interests opposed to one another;
that ignorance alone separates them ; that the more
they are enlightened, the more closely they be-
come united ; that there is a sensible progression
among the human race towards perfection, although
its march may be irregular, and its movements
even sometimes retrograde.
What answer so victorious to the multitude of
complaints respecting the misery of the poorer
classes amongst us, as the real picture of the uni-
versal indigence of primitive societies ! Poverty is
not a consequence of social order: why is it con-
sidered as its reproach ? It is a remnant of a state
of nature. Wealth has been created by man : po-
verty is the condition of nature. The division of
])roperty, of labour, the invention of machines, the
application of the elements to the purposes of pro-
duction, have increased the powers of the human
race a hundred-fold, and have in like manner aug-
mented the sources of abundance, so that famine,
that almost habitual scourge of savage nations, is
unknown among nations moderately well governed;
they have even a sufficient superfluity for the sup-
port of numerous classes who consume without
reproducing. To this security respecting subsist-
ence, the first benefit accruing from social order,
add the pleasures of gradual acquisition ; that sweet
association of industry with hope, that growing in-
234 B. IV. Cn. I.— BENTHAM AND ADAM SMITH.
terestof life when one advances towards the object
of his desires ; that charm of property, the spur of
youth and pillow of old age. This system of in-
dustry is at the same time the foundation of mora-
lity, of reciprocal wants, of relative bonds, and of
public and private virtues.
The objection apparently the most specious is
happily found the most false. It has been pretended,
that individuals could only enrich themselves by
despoiling others ; that they were necessarily ene-
mies, and lived, as gladiators, only by destroying
one another. Trade has been confounded with
gambling, in which the gain of one is always
founded upon the loss of another. But on the
contrary, in a social undertaking, all the adven-
turers may reap their share of advantage ; since, all
other things equal, the more labour there is, the
greater will be the result. The sources of wealth,
if the government be not very bad, are always in-
creasing ; so that the number of the successful,
among the candidates for fortune, always increases,
and there are not any who are necessarily unsuc-
cessful.
The idea of beholding in those who enrich
themselves, only more daring and expert plun-
derers than others, is correct as that of the mis-
anthropist, who considers its criminal calendar as
an account of the habitual actions of the citizens
of any country. Without stopping to refute in
detail such absurd exaggerations, we shall only
point out a single clear and palpable proof of the
fact. When we look at North America, we may
there behold society in almost all its stages; we
may there trace the formation of wealth in the
furrows of agriculture, and its distribution through
the channels of industry. Industry, like an hy-
draulic machine, raises the waters as they proceed
B. IV. Ch.I.—BENTHAM and ADAM SMITH, 235
from their source ; it turns them back again, re-
raises, and makes them circulate without cessation.
There is no waste in the whole process. The
wealth of one is so little founded upon the impo-
verishment of others, that, on the contrary, the
creation of one capital soon creates others, and the
level of all conditions is elevated at the same time.
The argument against civilization, drawn from
the power and number of those swarms of barba-
rians which issued from the north, is become,
when judiciously examined, a direct proof in its
favour. These barbarians had no home : deprived
of everything which attaches man to the soil which
gave him birth, they envied what they knew not
how to create, and destroyed instead of imitating.
The innumerable multitudes, which were gratui-
tously supposed, have vanished when it has been
considered that hordes, wandering in countries
covered with forests, could not have increased
above their narrow means of subsistence. Since
civilization has penetrated into these countries ;
since the means of enjoyment and combatting the
disadvantaoes of the climate bv the resources of
art have been multiplied, the people, more happy
and more numerous, have assumed habitudes
which have attached them to the possession of the
soil. Famine no longer obliges them to pounce
like vultures upon their wealthy neighbours: their
necessary wants supplied, their manners have been
softened. Production has supplanted pillage, and
they have become incorporated in that great family
of which they were the scourge.
A culpable insensibility ought not, however, to
be imputed to the admirers of social order, with
respect to the evils which they have not yet known
how to prevent. If happiness be produced by
natural and constant causes ; if it greatly exceed
236 B.IV, Cm. I.— BENTHAM AND ADAM SMITH.
the evil; if it have a tendency to augmentation,
their admiration is justified. Happiness is of ne-
cessity; misery is accidental. Happiness arises
from the order of nature, misery from the igno-
rance of men. Happiness multiplies itself, and
every instance of its increase produces more;
misery carries with it its warning, and is its own
antidote. These considerations, far from cooling
our zeal in favour of the suffering part of society,
leave those without excuse who turn away from
assisting them. It is lawful to turn away our
thoughts from incurable evils, but we are criminal
if we allow those to exist which we can cure.
Omnisque non solum cessatio ignavia est : sed etiam
quaerendi defatigatio existimari debet turpissima,
ubi id quod quaeritur est pulcherrimum.*
* Scaliger.
[ 237 ]
CHAPTER II.
WEALTH AND HAPPINESS— RELATION— INCREASE.
That the reader may not be detained by a
multitude of definitions, I shall confine myself to
a few preliminary explanations. Under the general
name of the matter of wealth,* every object is
comprehended which can be desired by man ;
which can be possessed by him ; which is actually
fit for his use, or which can be made so.
The wealth of a community is the aggregate
amount of the matter of wealth belonging to the
different individuals of which that community is
composed.
All wealth is either the spontaneous production
of the earth, or the result of labour, employed in
the cultivation of the earth, or upon the materials
which it yields.
Wealth may be employed in four ways: 1. For
subsistence ; 2. For enjoyment ; 3. For security
or defence ; 4. For increase.
As the matter of wealih cannot be employed in
any one of these ways, without being in a greater
* The compound term, " matter of wealth," is employed to
prevent ambiguity ; it carries with it a reference to quantity.
There are many things which may constitute part of the
matter of wealth, which, when taken separately or in small
quantities, would hardly be called wealth. Thus the wealth
of a stationer may consist of a mass of rags ; a small portion
of which lying upon a dunghill few would call wealth ; none,
however, could deny that they might constitute part of the
matter of wealth.
238 B. IV. ch. II.— wealth and happiness, &c.
or less degree consumed, the stock existing at
any given period would be continually diminish-
ing, if constant exertions were not employed in
the increasing of it.
Wealth, considered as arising at successive
periods, is called income.
That portion of it which is employed for the
purposes of giving increase to its amount, is called
capital.
An individual who would in any manner em-
ploy himself in the accumulation of wealth,
ought to possess — 1. Materials on which to work ;
2. Tools wherewith to work ; 3. A place in which
to work ; 4. Necessaries for his subsistence while
at work. All these objects are comprised under
the name o^ capital.
In the order of history, labour precedes capital.
From land and labour, everything proceeds. But
in the actual order of things there is always some
capital already produced, which is united with
land and labour in the production of new values.
When an article of the produce of land or labour,
in place of being consumed or kept for the use of
him who has made it, or caused it to be made, is
offered in exchange, it then becomes an article of
commerce: it is merchandise.
The general wealth is increased : —
1. By the increased efficacy of labour.
2. By the increase of the number of workmen.
3. By the increase of capital.
4. By the more advantageous employment of
capital.
5. By means of trade.
In all civilised societies, a class of persons is
found who purchase of the manufacturer that they
may sell to the consumer.
B. IV. Ch. II,— wealth and HAPPINESS, &c. 239
The whole of the operations of manufacture,
and of sale, may be described by the general terms
o{ production and trade.
The spontaneous actions of individuals, in
the career of production and trade, depend on
three conditions : Inclination^ knowledge, and
power.
Inclination to increase in wealth by labour and
economy may be wanting in some individuals,
but it predominates in men in general, and needs
no other encouragement than legal security for the
possession of what has been produced by it.
Knowledge, in the shape here in question, is a
result of the inclination which naturally leads men
to study, every one in his own concerns, the means
of preserving and increasing his M'ealth. By
power, in the shape here in question, I under-
stand that which consists in pecuniary capital,
which is in proportion to this capital, and cannot
exceed it.
As to inclination, government has no need
to do anything for its increase ; any more than
for the increase of the desire of eating and
drinking.
In respect of knowledge, it may contribute to
extend it, not only by means of general in-
struction, of which we have already spoken, but
also by information respecting particular facts;
respecting particular branches of production and
trade, and respecting particular new discoveries
to which it may give birth by reward and encou-
ragement, and which it may communicate by
publication.
In respect of power, in so far as it consists
in pecuniary capital, government cannot with
advantage create it : whatever it gives to one
individual it must have taken from another ;
240 B. IV. ch. II.— wealth and happiness, &c,
but there is another species of power, which
consists in liberty of acting, which government
may grant without any expense: it has only to
repeal restrictive laws, to take away obstacles ;
in a word, to leave things to themselves.
Such are the outlines of an analytical plan,
by which, it is believed, it will be found, that
a circle is drawn around the subject.
I 241 ]
CHAPTER III.
PRODUCTION IS LIMITED BY CAPITAL.
No kind of productive labour of any importance
can be carried on without capital. From hence it
•follows that the quantity of labour, applicable to
any object, is limited by the quantity of capital
which can be employed on it.
If I possess a capital of 10,000/. and two species
of trade, each yielding twenty per cent, profit, but
each requiring a capital of 10,000/. for carrying
them on, are proposed to me, it is clear that I may
carry on the one or the other with this profit, so
long as I confine myself to one, but that in carrying
on the one, it is not in my power to carry on
the other ; and that if I seek to divide my capital
between them both, I shall not make more than
twenty per cent ; but I may make less, and even
convert my profit into a loss. But if this propo-
sition is true in the case of one individual, it is
true for all the individuals in a whole nation.
Production is therefore limited by capital.
There is one circumstance which demonstrates,
that men are not sensible of this truth, apparently
so obvious. When they recommend the encourage-
ment of particular branches of trade, they do not
pretend that they are more profitable than others ;
but because they are branches of trade, and they
cannot possess too many. In a word, they would
encourage trade in general; as if all trade did
not yield its own reward; as if an unprofitable
16
242 B.IV. Ch. III.— PRODUCTION IS LIMITED BY CAPITAL.
trade deserved to be encouraged ; and as if a profi-
table trade stood in need of encouragement; as if
indeed, by these capricious operations, it were pos-
sible to do any other thing than transfer capital
from one branch of trade to another.
[ 243 ]
CHAPTER IV.
CAPITALIST THE BEST JUDGE OF HIS OWN
INTEREST.
The quantity of capital being given, the increase
of wealth will, in a certain period, be in proportion
to the good employment of this capital ; that is to
say, of the more or less advantageous direction
which shall have been given to it.
The advantageous direction of capital depends
upon two things : 1. The choice of the undertak-
ing ; 2. The choice of the means for carrying it
on.
The probability of the best choice in both these
respects, will be in proportion to the degree of in-
terest which the undertaker has in its being well
made, in connection with the means he has of ac-
quiring the information relative to his undertak-
ing.
But knowledge itself depends in a great mea-
sure upon the degree of interest which the indivi-
dual has in obtaining it; he who possesses the
greatest interest will apply himself with the
greatest attention and constancy to obtain it.
The interest which a man takes in the concerns
of another, is never so great as he feels in his own.
If we consider every thing necessary for the
most advantageous choice of an undertaking, or
the means of carr3nng it on, we shall see that the
official person, so fond of intermeddling in the
details of production and trade, is in no respect
superior to the individuals he desires to govern,
and that in most points he is their inferior.
16.
244 15. IV. ch. IV.— capitalist the best judge, &c.
A prime minister has not so many occasions for
acquiring information respecting farming as a
farmer, respecting distillation as a distiller, re-
specting the construction of vessels as a ship-
builder, respecting the sale of commodities, as
those who have been engaged in it all their lives.
' It is not probable that he should either have
directed his attention to these objects for so long a
time, or with the same degree of energy, as those
who have been urged on by such powerful motives.
It is therefore probable that in point of information
relative to these professions, he is inferior to those
who follow them.
Official persons, therefore, with fewer oppor-
tunities of instruction, less attention to the affairs,
and less practical information, are not in a condi-
tion to form a better judgment than those who are
interested, neither in the choice of the undertak-
ing nor the means of carrying it on.
If by chance a minister should become informed
of any circumstance, which proves the superior ad-
vantage of a certain branch of trade, or of a certain
process, it would not be a reason for employing
authority in causing its adoption. Publicity alone
would produce this effect : the more real the ad-
vantage, the more superfluous the exercise of
a*uthority.
To justify the regulatory interference of govern-
ment in the affairs of trade, one or other of these
two opinions must be maintained : that the pub-
lic functionary understands the interests of indi-
viduals better than they do themselves ; or that
the quantity of capital in every nation being infi-
nite, or that the new branches of trade not requiring
any capital, all the wealth produced by a new and
favourite commerce is so much clear gain, over
and above what would have been produced if
B.IV. Cii. IV.— CAPITALIST THE BEST JUDGE, &c. 245
these advantages had not been conferred on this
trade.
These two opinions being contrary to truth, it
follows that the interference of government is al-
together erroneous, that it operates rather as an
obstacle than a means of advancement.
It is hurtful in another manner: by imposing
restraints upon the actions of individuals, it pro-
duces a feeling of uneasiness — so much liberty
lost, so much happiness destroyed.
This indeed is not a conclusive objection against
these laws, since it may be urged against the best
laws. All laws are coercive ; but this is a reason
for not making any laws, at least where their
utility does not more than overbalance this incon-
venience.
A measure of government, which would be un-
justifiable employed as a means of increasing the
national wealth, may be proper as a means of sub-
sistence (for example, the maintaining of maga-
zines of corn), or as a means of defence (for exam-
ple, encouragements given to certain branches of
commerce considered as a nursery for seamen) ;
but it is essential to know that it produces its de-
signed end, and not to mistake a sacrifice for an
advantage, a loss for a gain. Encouragements of
this nature do not the less belong to the class of
things which ought not to be done, when uncon-
nected with imperious circumstances, which pro-
duce the exception to the general rule.
[ 246 ]
CHAPTER V.
FALSE ENCOURAGEMENTS LOANS.
Of all the means whereby a government may
give a particular direction to production, the loan
of pecuniary capital to individuals, to be employed
in any particular branch of trade, is the least open
to objection.
It ought, however, at all times, to be free from
objection with respect to justice and prudence.
All the treasure of the government, from whence
does it arise but from taxes, and these taxes levied
by constraint?* To take from one portion of its
subjects to lend to another, to diminish their actual
enjoyments, or the amount which they would have
laid up in reserve, is to do a certain evil for an
uncertain good ; is to sacrifice security for the
hope of increasing wealth.
If loans of this nature were always faithfully
repaid, their injustice would be limited to a certain
period. Let us suppose that the capital thus em-
ployed is 100,000/., and that the whole sum has
been levied in one year, the injustice of the mea-
sure will have begun and ended in a year; and if
tile money thus lent has produced an increase of
industry, it is an advantage to be set in opposition
to the evil arising from the tax.
But these loans have a natural tendency to be
ill employed, wasted, or stolen. Monarchs, and
* At least where the revenue of the government is not the
produce of land, or the interest of money formed by an accu-
mulation of rent. Of this nature is a part of the revenue of
the republic of Berne.
B.IV. Ch.V.—EALSE ENCOURAGEMENTS— loans. 247
their ministers, are as liable to be deceived in the
choice of individuals as in the selection of parti-
cular branches of commerce. Those who succeed
with them prove only that they possess the talent of
persuasion, or understand the practices of courts ;
but these are not the things which produce suc-
cess in trade. It may be seen in the w^ork of
Mirabeau, upon the Prussian Monarchy, that
Frederick II., with all his vigilance and severity,
was often deceived by the ignorance or dishonesty
of those who obtained from his avaricious credulity
loans of this nature. Thus, in the train of the
first unjust tax for the formation of the capital
lent, follow other taxes, rendered necessary to re-
place the thefts and dilapidations to which the
first has been exposed.
It is also most probable, that the capital thus
employed will only be applied upon branches of
industry less productive than those towards which
it would naturally have directed itself. What is
the argument of the borrower? that the trade he
wishes to establish is new, or that it is necessary
to support an established trade : but why should
the government intermeddle with it, if not because
individuals who consider their own interests are
not willing to meddle with it ? The presumption
is therefore against the enterprise.
Suppose even that, by chance, ihis loan should
take the most advantageous direction possible,
the loan is not justified by this profit : it was
unnecessary. For employing capital in the most
advantageous manner, it is only necessary that
the most advantageous employment should be
known. If it be not well employed, it is that a
better employment is not known. It is know-
ledge which is wanted : it is proper to teach and
not to lend. If the government cannot tell which
248 B. IV. ch. v.— false encouragements-loans.
is the most advantageous employment of capital,
it is still less able to employ it well ; if it can tell
which is the bestemployment, that is all it need do.
If the money of government had not taken this'
direction, that of individuals would, had they been
instructed and left free.
There are circumstances in which loans of this
nature are always iustifiable: when thev are not
employed for the encouragement of new enter-
prises, but only to afford support to particular
branches of commerce, labouring under temporary
difficulties, and which need only to be sustained
for a short time till the crisis of peril or suspen-
sion is passed. This is not a speculation on the
part of government, but rather an assurance against
a calamity, which it seeks to prevent or to lighten.
In such cases of distress individuals will not, of
themselves, assist the merchants whose affairs are
thus in danger: it is necessary, therefore, that
assistance be supplied; and, when supplied, it is
not in the way of regulation but of remedy.
[ 249 ]
CHAPTER VI.
GIFT, OR GRATUITOUS LOAN.
Were we to judge from the number of instances
in which it has been adopted, we should conclude
that gratuitous grants of capital for the encourage-
ment of commerce were most excellent measures.
Their inconveniences are of the same kinds as
those of loans, but they greatly exceed them in
degree. In case of a loan, if it be repaid, the same
sum may serve the same purpose a second time;
and so of the rest. The oppressive act by which
the government obtained the capital need not be
repeated. But if, in place of being lent, it be
given, — so often as this favour is repeated, so often
must the amount be levied by taxes : and upon
every occasion it may be said, that the produce of
the tax is lost, if we consider the use which might
have been made of it in lightening the public bur-
thens.
Sometimes capital has been lent with this view,
without interest; sometimes at an interest below
the ordinary rate. In the first case, if it be repaid,
it is not the capital which is lost, but only the
interest ; in the second case, it is not all the inte-
rest, but only the difference between the lower
and the ordinary rate. It is still the same false
policy as to its kind ; all the difference is in the
degree.
It may be observed, that gratuitous grants are
more likely to be wasted than loans: it may be
because, in the latter case, responsibility is always
incurred ; it may be, because money received as a
250 B.IV. Ch. VI.— GIFT, OR GRATUITOUS LOAN.
gift tends to produce prodigality: as it has been
obtained without labour, it seems to have the less
value.
In some cases, capital has been given, not in the
shape of money, but in that of goods ; by advanc-
ing to a manufacturer, for example, those articles
which he wants for the completion of his work.
This plan may have the good effect of insuring
the employment of the articles furnished upon the
intended object. Those articles, however, with
which the government interferes, are ordinarily
dearer and worse in quality than those which the
individual, with the same sum of money, could
have obtained at his own choice. It is not the best
method of treating men worthy of confidence ; and
it will not succeed with those who are unworthy
of trust, since, after they are put in possession of
them, they can convert the articles into money,
and spend the amount. There may be measures
which would obviate this danger : inspection,
suretyship, &c. ; but, when it regards a plan radi-
cally bad, the discussion of the comparative incon-
veniences of any particular scheme, whereby the
risk may be diminished, is not worth the labour it
would cost.
[ 251 ]
CHAPTER VII.
BOUNTIES UPON PRODUCTION.
This mode of encouragement much exceeds
the two former in the career of absurdity. In the
two former cases it was an expense, a risk, with-
out sufficient reason for supposing it would prove
successful, and even without sufficient reason in
case of success. But a bounty is an expense in-
curred with the certainty of not obtaining the
object sought, and even because it is certain that
it cannot be obtained.
In the case of a bounty upon production, it is
not only the end which is absurd, but the means
also, which possess this particular character of con-
tributing nothing towards the end.
It is uniformly because the trade in question is
disadvantageous, that it is necessary to bestow
money upon its maintenance ; if it were advanta-
geous, it would maintain itself. It is because the
workman is not able to obtain from the buyer a
price for his merchandise which will yield an or-
dinary profit, that it is necessary that he should re-
ceive from the government a bounty which shall
make up the difference.
Whether the kind of product upon which it
operates be advantageous or not, the bounty has
no efficacy in increasing the ability of the pro-
ducer to augment it. Since it follows the produc-
tion, since he receives it when the thing is done,
and not before, it is clear that he has possessed
other means of producing it. The bounty may
252 B.IV. Ch. VII.— BOUNTIES UPON PRODUCTION.
have operated upon his inclination, but it cannot
have contributed to his ability.
Bounties have been bestowed upon particular
branches of trade for all sorts of reasons ; on ac-
count of their antiquity, on account of their
novelty, because they were flourishing, because
they were decaying, because they were advan-
tageous, because they were burthensome, be-
cause there vv^ere hopes of improving them, and
because it was feared they would grow worse :
so that there is no species of commerce in the
world which could not, by one or other of these
contrary reasons, claim this kind of favour during
every moment of its existence.
It is in the case of an old branch of trade that
the evil of such measures is most enormous, and
in that of a new one that its inefficacy is most
striking. A long established branch of trade is in
general widely extended: this extent furnishes
the best reason for those who solicit these favours
for its support ; and, to give it effect, it ought at the
same time to be represented as gaining and losing;
gaining, that there maybe a disposition to preserve
it ; losing, that there may be a disposition to as-
sist it.*
In the case of a new branch of trade or industry,
the futility of the measure is its principal feature.
Here, there is no reason which carries the mask of
an apparent necessity — no pompous descriptions
* It is true, though it may not be worth the expense of
supporting it by bounties with a view to the increase of
wealth, it may be proper to assist it as a means of subsistence
or defence. It is still more true, that what ought not to be
done with the intention of supporting an unprofitable branch
of trade, may yet be proper for preventing the ruin of .the
workman actually employed in such business : but these are
objects entirely distinct.
B.IV.Ch.VII.— BOUNTIES UPON PRODUCTION. 253
of its extent. All which can be alleged is that,
once established, it will become great and lucrative,
but what it wants, is to be established. What then
is done for its establishment ? measures are taken
which can only operate after it is established.
When the trade is established, it will have such
great success that it will yield, for example, fifty
per cent, profit ; but, to establish it, it requires
such large advances, that it is doubtful if those who
possess capital will make them, on account of the
risks which are almost al ways i nseparable from every
new undertaking. What course does the govern-
ment pursue? does it give capital? no, this
would be foolish. Does it lend capital? no, this
would be to run too great risk ; it will give a
bounty upon the article when it shall have been
made: till then, it says, we shall give no money.
Thus, to the fifty per cent, you will gain by your
merchandize, we will add a bounty often percent
— very well : and, according to this reasoning, at
what time will you refuse assistance ? You refuse
so long as the bestowment of it will be useful,
you grant it in order that something may be done,
and you do not give it till it is already done by
means independent of you.
Mistrust, shortsightedness, a suspicious disposi-
tion, and a confused head, are very susceptible
of union. Why are bounties preferred to advance
capital ? they are afraid of being deceived in the
latter case. If 10,000/. are given at once, nothing
may perhaps be done : to avoid this risk they give,
when the thing is done, 10,000/. per annum, which
they will never receive again.
Instead of being beneficial, the expense to the
state becomes more burthensome in proportion as
the trade becomes extended. The bounty insti-
tuted for one reason, is continued on an opposite
254 B.IV. Ch. VII.— BOUNTIES UPON PRODUCTION.
account : at first it was given in order to obtain,
in the end it is continued for fear of losing, the par-
ticular branch of trade. What would have been
necessary for its establishment was a trifle, what
must be paid for its continuance, knows no bounds.
The capital bestowed upon a new branch of in-
dustry for an experiment, is always comparatively
a small sum; but what is given as a bounty is
always, or at least it is always hoped that it will be,
a large one : for unless a large quantity of the
merchandise is manufactured and sold, and conse-
quently unless a large bounty is paid for its pro-
duction and sale, the object is considered as un-
accomplished : it is considered that the bounty has
not answered its end.
When the article is one which would not have
been manufactured without the bounty, all that is
paid is lost ; but if it be one of those which, even
without the bounty, the manufacturers would have
found it their interest to produce, only a portion
of the bounty is lost. As it makes an addi-
tion, and that a very sensible addition to the ordi-
nary profit of the trade, it attracts a great number
of individuals towards this particular enterprise :
by their competition, the article is sold at the
lowest rate, and the diminution of price is in pro-
portion to the bounty itself (allowance being made
for the necessary expenses of soliciting and re-
ceiving it). In this state of things it would
appear, at first sight, that the bounty does neither
good nor harm : the public gains by the reduction
of price as much as it loses by the tax, which is
the effective cause of this reduction.
This would be true, if the individuals who paid
the tax in the one case were the same who profited
by the bounty in the other, if the measure of this
profit were exactly the measure of their contribu-
B.IV. Cn. VIl.— BOUNTIES UPON PRODUCTION. 255
tion, if they received the one at the same time that
they paid the other, and if all the labour lost in
these operations had not cost anything. But all
these suppositions are contrary to fact. There are
not two taxes which affect all the members of the
state : there is not one which affects them all
equally. The tax is paid a long time before the
indemnification, by the reduction of price, is re-
ceived, and the expenses of this useless circulation
are always considerable.
After all that can be said, it is clear that a
bounty upon production cannot, in the long run,
produce an increased abundance of the article in
question, whatsoever maybe thediminution of price
which may result from it. The profit which the pro-
ducer will obtain is not greater than before : the only
difference is, that it comes to him from another
hand. It is not individuals who give it him in a
direct manner, it is the government. Without the
bounty, those who pay for the article are those who
enjoy it : with the bounty, they only pay directly
a part of the price ; the rest is paid by the public
in general ; that is to say, more or less, by those
who derive no advantages from it.*
Although a bounty upon production adds
nothing to the abundance of any article of general
consumption, it diminishes the price to the buyer.
Suppose that, in Scotland, there were a bounty
upon the production of oats, and that the bounty
were paid by a tax upon beer brewed from this
grain, oats would not be more abundant than
before ; but they would be sold at a less price to
the buyer (though the merchant would make the
* Adam Smith has made a mistake in saying, that a bounty
upon production was a means of abundance, on which account
it was better than a bounty on exportation.
256 B.IV, Ch. VII.— BOUNTIES UPON PRODUCTION.
same profit), whilst the beer brewed with this grain
would be proportionally dearer : the consumer of
oats would not find himself richer than before, but
for the same price he would have a greater quantity
of this grain in the form of food, and less in the
shape of drink.
1 speak here of relative abundance, in proportion
to the ordinary consumption ; I speak of superfluity
compared with habitual wants. The lower this
commodity is in price, compared with others, the
greater will be the demand for it. More will be
produced in consequence of the increased demand,
but more will not be produced than is demanded.
The commodity, as it respects abundance, will re-
main upon the same footing as before. If a su-
perfluity is required, if a quantity be required ex-
ceeding what is commonly produced, other mea-
sures must be resorted to than a bounty on pro-
duction.
If a bounty upon production could be justified,
it would seem that it ought to be so in the case
where the article thus favoured was an article of
general consumption — as, corn in England, oats in
Scotland, potatoes in Ireland, and rice in India;
but it would only appear so as a means of pro-
ducing equality, and not under any other point of
view. In fact, this measure does not tend to pro-
duce abundance — what it does, is to take the
money out of the pockets of the rich to put it
into the pockets of the poor. A commodity of
general consumption is always the most necessary
of all the articles of life : it is always that of
which the poor make the greatest use. The richer
a man is, the more he consumes of other commodi-
ties beside this universal commodity. Suppose,
then, a bounty upon the production of oats in
Scotland; if nothing is consumed there but oats,
B. IV. Ch. VII.— BOUNTIES UPON PRODUCTION. 257
or if there is only a tax upon oats, the persons
who reap the advantage of the bounty would be
those who bear the burthen of the tax, and that
in the same proportion, inasmuch as the expense
of levying the tax would be the only result of this
measure. But commodities of all kinds are con-
sumed in Scotland, and taxes are there levied
upon a great variety of commodities. Oats, the
commodity of the poor, being the object not of a
tax but a bounty, and the articles consumed by
the rich being the object not of a bounty but of a
tax, from the produce of which the bounty upon
the production of oats is paid, the result will be,
that the poor will obtain the commodity of which
they make the greatest use at a lower price.
1 a2:ree to this ; but does it follow that their
condition will be bettered ? Not at all. Oats
will be sold to the poor at a lower price, but they
will have less money wherewith to buy them. All
the means of subsistence in this class resolve
themselves into the wages of labour; but the
wages of labour necessarily depend upon the
degree of opulence which a country possesses;
that is, upon the quantity of capital applicable to
the purchase of labour in connection with the
number of those whose labour is for sale. The
low price resulting from the bounty will produce
no advantage to the labourers, whilst the wealth of
the country remains the same: if the commodity be
lowered in price, they will be less paid ; or, what
comes to the same thing, as they work for a ration
of oats, they will be obliged to give more labour
for this ration if oats are at a lower price.
All that relates to this mode of encouragement
may be summed up in a few words.
The natural course of things gives a bounty
upon the application of industry to the most
17
258 B. IV. Ch. VIII.— BOUNTIES UPON PRODUCTION.
advantageous branches, a bounty of which the
division will always be made in the most equitable
manner. If artificial bounties take the same course
as the natural, they are superfluous ; if they take
a different course, they are injurious.
[ 2-5y J
CHAPTER VIII.
EXEMPTIONS FROM TAXES ON PRODUCTION.
An exemption from a tax capable of being im-
posed upon any article in tiie hands of the maker
or seller, is a modification of a bounty upon pro-
duction ; it is a disguised bounty.
This kind of negative favour may be extended
to every species of tax upon trade. The methods
of encouragement in this way are as numerous as
those of discouragement. \i\ of two rival manu-
factures, the one is weighed down by a tax, and
the other free, that which is taxed is, in respect of
that which is not, in the same situation as if both
were free from taxes, and a bounty Vv^ere bestowed
upon one.
But each manufacture is a rival to every other ;
if this rivalry is not special, it is at least general
and indirect. For what reason ? — because the
power of purchasing is limited, as to every indi-
vidual, by his fortune and his credit. Every arti-
cle which is for sale, and which he can desire, is
in a state of competition with every other ; the
more he expends for the one, the less can he spend
for the others.
Exemption from taxes upon production cannot
be blamed absolutely ; for it is to be wished, if the
thing were possible, that there were no taxes.
But, relatively, any particular exemption may be
blamed, when the article exempted has nothing
which justifies this particular exemption. If it
were equally fit for taxation, the favour granted to
it is an injury to other productions.
17.
260 B. IV. Ch. Vlll.— EXEMPTION'S FROM TAXES, &c.
That an object fit for taxation be exempt, is an
evil. It renders necessary some other tax, which
by the supposition is less proper, or it allows some
injurious tax to remain.
Whilst, as to advantage, there is none. If more
of this untaxed merchandise is produced, less is
produced of that which is taxed.
The evil of an unjust tax is all the difference
between a more or less eligible tax, and the worst
of those which exist.
[ 261 ]
CHAPTER IX.
BOUNTIES ON EXPORTATION.
In the case of Bounties upon Exportation^ the
error is not so palpable as in that o^ Bounties upon
Production., but the evil is greater. In both cases,
the money is equally lost : the difference is in the
persons who receive it. What you pay for pro-
duction, is received by your countrymen ; what
you pay for exportation, you bestow upon stran-
gers. It is an ingenious scheme for inducing a
foreiofn nation to receive tribute from you without
beins: aware of it ; a little like that of the Irishman
who passed his light guinea, by cleverly slipping it
between two halfpence.
As a bounty upon production may sustain a
disadvantageous trade, which would cease with-
out it, by forming its sole profit, it is also possible
that it may for a short time increase the profit of
an advantageous trade, which would support itself
without this aid.
Does the bounty support a disadvantageous
trade? It does not produce a farthing of profit
more than would have existed without it. Left to
itself, this trade would have ceased and made way
for a better ; and the community loses the profits
of a capital better employed in lucrative under-
takings.
Does the bounty support an advantageous trade?
The evil, in the end, will be greater, because the
extra profit drawing more rivals into this career,
their competition will reduce the price so low, that
262 B.IV. Ch. IX.— BOUNTIES ON EXPORTATION.
the bounty will constitute at last the whole profit
of this trade.
However, till the price is thus reduced, the
bounty is a net gain for the first undertakers ; and,
the consumers beins: our feliow-countrvmen, a
part of this ill-employed money turns to their ad-
vantage by the low price of the commodity.
But in the case of a bounty upon exportation,
the nation which pays it never receives any advan-
tage : everything is lost, as if it were thrown into
the sea, or at least as if it had been given to
foreigners.
Without this bounty, the article would have been
exported, or it would not. It would have been
exported, if foreigners were willing to pay a price
which would cover the expense of the manufactur-
ing, of exporting, and the ordinary profit of trade.
It would not have been exported, if they did not
offer a sufficient price. In the first case, they would
liave obtained the article by paying its worth ; in
the second case, this disadvantageous commerce
would not have been carried on.
Suppose a bounty upon exportation, what are
its effects ? The foreigners who heretofore had
found the article too dear, become disposed to pur-
chase it : why ? Because you pay them to induce
them to do so. The more government gives to the
exporter, the less need the foreigner give. But it
is clear that he will not pay more than the lowest
price which will satisfy the exporter : he need not
give more ; since, if one merchant refuses to sup-
ply him at this price, another will be quite ready
to do it.
Suppose an article of our manufacture, already
purchased by foreign nations without a bounty
upon its exportation, what will happen if a bounty
B.IV. Ch.IX.— BOUNTIES ON EXPORTATION. 263
is given? Solely the lowering of its price to the
foreigners. A bounty of one penny for every
pound in weight is given upon an article which
sells for five pence per pound ; the manufacturer
would not have found it worth while to have sold
it for less than five pence per pound ; he will now,
however, find the same profit in selling it for four
pence, because his own government makes up the
difference. He will sell at four pence, because,
if he do not, some other will ; and, because, in this
case, instead of selling for five pence, it may happen
that he will not sell at all. Thus the whole which
government gives is a net saving to the foreigners:
the effect in the way of encouragement is nothing.
The whole which is exported with the bounty is
neither more nor less than would be without it.*
Though a bounty does not render such a branch
of trade more flourishing than it would otherwise
have been, it will not render it /c5s flourishing;
but the more flourishing it becomes, the greater
will be the loss to the nation.
Disadvantageous branches of trade are often
spoken of. People are uneasy ; they fear that
certain manufactures, left to themselves, will be
unprofitable. It arises from error; it is not possible
that any branch of trade, left to itself, can be disad-
vantageous to a nation: it may become so by the
interference of government, by bounties, and other
favours of the same nature. It is not to the mer-
chant himself that it can become disadvantageous ;
for the moment he perceives there is nothing to be
gained, he will not persevere in it ; but to the
nation in general it may become so, — to the na-
■* The same effect is produced when it is endeavoured to
favour the importation of corn, for example, by giving a
bounty to the first importers. Its effect is to increase the price
in foreign countries.
264' B.IV. Ch. IX.— BOUNTIES ON EXPORTATION.
tion, in its quality of contributor ; and the amount
of the bounty is the exact amount of the loss.
The Irishman who passed his light guinea was
very cunning; but there have been French and
English more cunning than he, who have taken
care not to be imposed upon by his trick. When
a cunning individual perceives you have gained
some point with him, his imagination mechani-
cally begins to endeavour to get the advantage of
you, without examining whether he would not do
better were he to leave you alone. Do you appear
to believe that the matter in question is advanta-
geous to you — he is convinced by this circum-
stance that it is proportionally disadvantageous to
him, and that the safest line of conduct for him to
adopt, is to be guided by your judgment. Well
acquainted with this disposition of the human
mind, an Englishman laid a wager, and placed
himself upon the Pont-neuf, the most public tho-
roughfare in Paris, offering to the passengers a
crown of six francs for a piece of twelve sous.
During half a day he only sold two or three.
Since individuals in general are such dupes to
their self-mistrust, is it strange that governments,
having to manage interests which they so little
understand, and of which they are so jealous,
should have fallen into the same errors ? A govern-
ment, believing itself clever, has given a bounty
upon the exportation of an article, in order to force
the sale of it among a foreign nation ; what does
this other nation in consequence ? Alarmed at the
sight of this danger, it takes all possible methods
for its prevention. AVhen it has ventured to pro-
hibit the article, everything is done. It has refused
the six franc pieces for twelve sous. When it has
not dared to prohibit it, it has balanced this bounty
by a counter bounty upon some article that it ex-
B.IV. Ch. IX.— BOUNTIES ON EXPORTATION. 265
ports. Not daring to refuse the crowns of six
francs for twelve sous, it has cleverly slipped some
little diamond between the two pieces of money,
and thus the cheat is cheated.
A strife of this nature, painted in its true colours,
and stripped of the eclat which dazzles by the
magnitude of the object and the dignity of the
agents, appears too absurd to be possible ; but for
one example among a thousand, we may refer to
what has happened between England and Ireland
respecting the trade in linens.
[ 266 ]
CHAPTER X.
PROHIBITION OF RIVAL PRODUCTIONS.
This pretended mode of encouragement can
never be productive of good ; but it may produce
evil : hurtful or useless^ such is the alternative.
1. I say useless. It is a particular privilege of
this exercise of power, to be employed in certain
cases without doing any harm; and these cases
occur when the branch of production or trade
which is prohibited would not have been intro-
duced, even had there been no prohibition. In
former times, it was declared felony in England to
\ui\iOit pollards and crocards, a kind of base coin at
that time. This prohibition is yet in existence,
without producing any inconvenience. If, with the
intention of encouraging the increase of poultry,
or with any other similarly patriotic view, the im-
portation and increase of phoenixes were prohi-
bited, it is clear that the trade in poultry would
neither gain nor lose much.
Among all the species of manufacture which
England, with so much anxiety, has prohibited to
her colonies, there are many which, in comparison
with agriculture, are no more suitable to the
Americans than the breeding of phoenixes, the
cultivation of pine-apples in their fields, or the
manufacture of stuffs from spiders' webs.
Were the articles of foreign manufacture, loaded
with the expenses of importation, neither better in
quality nor lower in price than the articles of home
manufacture, they would not be imported ; the
prohibition exists in the nature of things.
B.IV. Ch.X.— PROHIBITION OF RIVAL PRODUCTIONS. 267
2. Hurtful. By the prohibition of a rival ma-
nufacture, you wish to insure the success of a
favoured manufacture, and you at once create all
the mischiefs of a monopoly. You enable the
monopolists to sell at a higher rate, and you di-
minish the number of enjoyments ; you grant them
the singular privilege of manufacturing inferior ar-
ticles, or of ceasing to improve them ; you weaken
the principle of emulation, which exists only when
there is competition ; in short, you favour the
enriching of a small number of individuals at the
expense of all those who would have enjoyed the
benefit; you give to a few bad manufacturers an
excessive degree of wealth, instead of supplying
the wants of ten thousand good ones ; you also
wound the feelings of the people, by the idea of
injustice and violence attached to the partiality of
this measure.
Prohibitions of foreign manufactures are most
frequently applied to those objects which foreign-
ers can supply less expensively, on account of
some peculiar advantage arising from their soil or
their industry. By such prohibitions, you refuse
to participate in this natural advantage which they
^"joy ' you prefer what costs you more capital and
labour; you employ your workmen and your capi-
tal at a loss, rather than receive from the hands of
a rival what he offers you of a better quality or at
a lower price. If you hope, by this means, to
support a trade which would otherwise cease, it
may be supported it is true ; but, left to itself,
capital would only leave this channel where its
disadvantages are unavoidable, to enter upon
others where it would be employed with greater
advantage. The greatest of all errors is to suppose,
that by prohibitions, whether of foreign or domes-
tic manufactures, more trade can be obtained.
268 B.IV. Ch.X.— PROHIBITION OF RIVAL PRODUCTIONS.
The quantity of capital, the efficient cause of all
increase, remaining the same, all the increase thus
given to a favoured commerce is so much taken
from other branches.
The collateral evils of this prohibitory system
ought not to be forgotten. It is a source of ex-
pense, of vexation, and of crimes.
The expense most evidently lost, is that of the
custom-house officers, the inspectors, and other
individuals employed ; but the greatest loss is
that of labour, both of the unproductive labour of
the smuggler and of those who are, or who appear
to be, employed in the prevention of smuggling.
To destroy foreign commerce, it is only neces-
sary to sell everything and to purchase nothing:
such is the folly which has been passed off as the
depth of political wisdom among statesmen.
Among the transactions between nation and
nation, men have consented, at great expense, to
support disadvantageous manufactures, that they
may not buy of their rivals. We do not see such
monstrous extravagance on the part of individuals.
If a merchant were to act thus, we should say he
was hastening to ruin ; but his interest guides him
much better. It is only public functionaries who
are capable of this mistake, and they only when
they are acting on account of others.
Covetousness desires to possess more than it can
hold. Malevolence likes better to punish itself
than to allow a benefit to an adversary.
To have its eyes greater than its belli/, is a pro-
verb which nurses apply to children, and which
always applies to nations. An individual corrects
this fault by experience. The politician, when .
once affected by it, never corrects himself.
When a child refuses physic, mothers and nurses
sometimes induce it to take it by threatening to
B.IV. Ch.X.— PROHIBITION OF RIVAL PRODUCTIONS. 269
give it to the dog or the cat. How many states-
men, children badly educated, persist in supporting
a commerce by which they lose, that they may
avoid the mortification of allowing a rival nation to
carry it on.
The statesman who believes he can infinitely
extend commerce without perceiving that it is
limited by the amount of capital, is the child whose
eyes are larger than his belly.
The statesman who strives to retain a disadvan-
tageous commerce, because he fears another nation
will gain it, is the child who swallows the bitter
pill for fear it should be given to the dog or the cat.
These are not noble comparisons, but they are
just ones ; when errors cover themselves with an
imposing mask, one is tempted to set them in a
light which will show thein to be ridiculous.
[ 270 ]
CHAPTER XI.
FIXATION OF PRICES.
The limitation of the price of commodities may
have two opposite objects: 1. The rendering them
dearer: 2. The rendering them cheaper.
The first of these objects is least natural: so
many commodities, so many means of enjoy-
ment : to put them within the reach of the largest
number, is to contribute to the general happiness.
This motive, however, is not unexampled, and in-
toxicating liquors are an instance of its exercise.
Legislators have often endeavoured, and not with-
out reason, to increase their price, with the design
of limiting their consumption on account of their
dearness. But imposing a tax upon them suffices
to increase their price ; there is no necessity for re-
sorting to the method of direct limitation.
Is the design of these limitations the obtaining
of the article at a low rate — the method will
scarcely answer its end. Before the existence of
the law, the article was sold at what may be called
its average or natural price ^ that is to say, it was
confined within certain limits : 1. by the compe-
tition between the buyers and the sellers: 2. by
a competition between the branch of trade in ques-
tion, and that of other branches to which the mer-
chant might find it to his advantage to transfer his
capital.
Does the law endeavour to fix the price at
a lower rate than this average or natural price —
it may obtain a transient success, but by little
B. IV. Ch. XI.— FIXATION OF PRICES. 271
and little this branch of trade will be abandoned.
If the constraint is increased, the evil will grow
worse, the constraint in fact can only act upon the
existing stock ; this being sold at a forced price, the
merchant will take care not to replace it. What
can the law effect ? Can it oblige him to reple-
nish his storehouse with the same comuiodities ?
No legislator has ever attempted it, or at least no one
has ever attempted it with success. This would
be to convert the officers of justice into commercial
agents, it would be to give them a right to dispose
of the capitals of the merchants, and to employ the
merchants themselves as their clerks.
The most common fixation has been that of the
rate of interest. It will form the subject of another
chapter.
The fixation of the price of wages (especially
with regard to agriculture) has often been pro-
posed, and even carried into effect, for the most
opposite reasons : to prevent what is considered
as an excess ; to remedy what has been regarded
as a deficiency.
In this latter point of view, this measure is
liable to great objection. To fix the minimuin of
wages, is to exclude from labour many workmen
who would otherwise have been employed ; it is
to aggravate the distress you wish to relieve. In
fact, all that can be done, is limited to determining
that, if they are emplo3'^ed they shall not receive
less than the price fixed : it is useless to enact that
they shall be employed. Which is the farmer,
where is the manufacturer, who will submit to em-
ploy labourers who cost them more than they
yield? In a word, a regulation which fixes the
minimum of wages, is a regulation of a prohi-
bitory nature, which excludes from the com-
272 B. IV. ch. XI.— fixation of prices.
petition all whose labour is not worth the price
fixed.
The fixation of the rate of wages, in order to pre-
vent their excess, is a favour conferred on the rich
at the expense of the poor ; on the master at the
expense of the workman. It is a violation, with
regard to the weakest class, of the principles of se-
curity and property.
•273
CHAPTER XII.
TAXES EFFECTS ON PRODUCTION.
Taxes ought to have no other end than the
production of revenue, with as light a burthen as
possible.* When it is attempted to employ them
as indirect means of encouragement or discourage-
ment for any particular species of industry, go-
vernment, as we have already seen, only succeeds
in deranging the natural course of trade, and in
giving it a less advantageous direction.
The effects of particular taxes may appear very
complicated and difficult to trace. By considering
the subject in a general point of view, and distin-
guishing the permanent from the temporary effects
of taxes, this complexity will be disentangled and
the difficulty disappear.
First question: What are the effects of a tax im-
posed hij a foreign nation upon the articles of our
manufacture ?
Permanent consequences : — 1. If the exporta-
tion is not diminished, the tax makes no differ-
ence with respect to us : it is only paid by the
consumers in the state which imposes the tax.
2. If the exportation is diminished, the capital
which was employed in this branch of manufacture
withdraws itself and passes into others.
* This principle may admit some exceptions, but they are
very rare; for example, a tax may be imposed upon intoxi-
cating liquors, with the design of diminishing their consump-
tion by increasing their price.
18
274 B.iv. ch.xh.--taxes~effects on production.
Temporary consequences: — This dinminution of
exportation occasions a proportional distress among
the individuals interested in this species of in-
dustry. The workmen lose their occupations;
they are obliged to undertake labours to which
they are unaccustomed, and which yield them
less. As to the master manufacturer, a part of
his fixed capital is rendered useless; he loses
his profits in proportion as the manufacture is
reduced.
Second question : What are the effects of a tax,
imposed by ourselves, upon the manufactures we
ourselves consume I
Permanent consequences : — 1 . If the consump-
tion is not diminished, no other difference is pro-
duced than the disadvantage of the tax to the
consumer, and a proportional advantage for the
public.
2. If the consumption is diminished, indivi-
duals are deprived of that portion of happiness
which consisted in the use of this particular ar-
ticle of enjoyment.
3. Capital, in this as in the preceding case, re-
tires from this branch and passes into others.
Temporary consequences : — If the consumption
is not diminished, the tax makes no difference: if
it is diminished, similar distress, in proportion as
in the case above.
Third question : What are the consequences of a
tax, imposed by ourselves, upon the manufactures of
our own country consumed by foreigners !
Permanent consequences: — 1. Whilst the con-
sumption is not diminished, the operation produces
so much clear gain for us. The burthen of the tax
is borne by the foreigner, and the profit is reaped
by ourselves.
B.IV. Ch, XII.—TAXES— EFFECTS ON PRODUCTION. 275
If the consumption is diminished, the capital
which loses this employment passes into others.
Temporary consequences : — Consumption not
diminished, no difference to us : consumption
diminished, similar distress in proportion, as in the
former cases.
It results from hence, that the permanent effects
of these taxes are always of little importance as to
commerce in general ; and that their temporary
efJ'ects are evil in proportion to the diminution of
the consumption. The evil is greater or less,
according as it is more or less easy to transfer
capital and labour from one branch of industry to
another.
The least hurtful of these taxes are those which
bear upon our own productions consumed by
foreigners. If the same quantity is exported after
the tax as before, so far from being prejudicial, it
yields us a clear benefit: it is a tribute levied upon
them precisely as if it were raised out of the bowels
of the earth.
The tax imposed by us upon foreign importa-
tions is paid by ourselves, and burthensome as any
other tax would be to the same amount. If the
consumption is not diminished, it would be better
that the tax upon this article should be imposed
by us, that we might profit by it, rather than the
country which produced it, and which would
otherwise enjoy the benefit.
A nation, which has a natural monopoly of an
article necessary to foreigners, has a natural means
of taxing them for its own profit. Let us take tin
for an example: England is the only country which
has mines of this metal, at least all others are too
inconsiderable to satisfy the demand. England
might, therefore, lav a considerable tax upon the
18.
-76 B. IV. Ch.XII.— TAXES— EFFECTS ON PRODUCTION.
exportation of tin, without danger of smuggling,
because it might be levied at the mine, or at the
foundry. France could not impose an equal tax,
because it would give too great an allurement to
the smugglers.
These principles are easy of application to com-
mercial treaties : everything which is permanent,
whether it be called encouragement or discou-
ragement, has but little effect upon trade and
commerce in general ; since trade and commerce
are always governed by the capital which can be
employed on them. But international precautions
may be taken for the prevention of rapid changes,
from which temporary distresses result. Let every
nation make a sacrifice by refusing to impose taxes,
or to augment them, upon articles of its own ex-
portation: every nation would then receive indem-
nification by a reciprocal sacrifice. Commerce
would thus acquire stability; and that petty fiscal
warfare would no longer be carried on, which pro-
duces a dangerous irritation among the people,
always greatly disproportioned to the importance
of the object.
The object of the first chapter of the Commer-
cial Code ought to be to show the reciprocity of in-
ternational interests, to prove that there is no
impropriety, during the continuance of peace, in
favouring the opulence of foreigners; no merit in
opposing it.
It may happen to be a misfortune that our
neighbour is rich ; it is certainly one that he be
poor. If he be rich, we may have reason to fear
him ; if he be poor, he has little or nothing to sell
to, or to buy of, us.
But that he should become an object of dread,
by reason of an increase in riches, it is necessary
B. IV. Ch. XII.— TAXES— EFFliCTS ON PRODUCTION. 277
tliat this prosperity should be his alone. He will
have no advantage, it" our wealth has made the
same progress as his own, or if this progress has,
taken place in other nations equally well disposed
with ourselves to repress him.
Jealousies against rich nations are only founded
upon mistakes and misunderstandings : it is with
these nations that the most profitable commerce is
carried on ; it is from these that the returns are the
most abundant, the most rapid, and the most
certain.
Great capitals produce the greatest division of
labour, the most perfect machines, the most active
competition among the merchants, the most ex-
tended credits, and, consequently, the lowest price.
Each nation, in receiving from the richest every-
thing which it furnishes, at the lowest rate, and
of the best quality, would be able to devote its
capital exclusively to the most advantageous
branches of industry.
Wherefore do governments give so marked a
preference to export trade }
1. It is this branch which exhibits itself with
the greatest show and eclat : it is this which is
most under the eyes of the governors ; and which
therefore most strongly excites their attention.
2. This commerce more particularly appears
to them as their work : they imagine they are
creators ; and inaction appears to them a species
of impotence.
All these pretensions fall before the principle,
that production is subordinate to capital. These
new branches of trade, these remote establish-
ments, these costly encouragements, produce no
new creations ; it is only a new employment of
a part of one and the same capital which was
278 B. IV. Ch.XII.— FAXES— EFFECTS ON PRODUCTION.
not idle before. It is a new service, which is
performed at the expense of the old. The sap
which by this operation is strained through a new
branch, being diverted from another, gives a dif-
ferent product, but not an increase of produce.
[ 279 ]
CHAPTER XIII.
POPULATION FORCED — INCREASE DESIRABLE?
Many volumes have been written upon the sub-
ject of population, because the means of promot-
ing its increase have generally been the subject of
examination. I shall be very short upon this
subject, because 1 shall confine myself to shewing
that all these means are useless.
If anything could prevent men from marrying,
it would be the trouble which is pretended lo be
taken to induce them to marry. So much uneasi-
ness upon the part of the legislator can only in-
spire doubts respecting the happiness of this state.
Pleasures are made objects of dread when con-
verted into obligations.
Would you encourage population ? render men
happy, and trust to nature. But that you may
render men happy, do not govern them too much.
Do not constrain them even in their domestic
arrangements, and above all, in that which can
please only under the auspices of liberty. In a
word, leave them to live as they like, under the
single condition of not injuring one another.
Population is in proportion to the means of
subsistence and wants. Montesquieu, Condillac,
Sir James Stewart, Adam Smith, the economists,
have only one opinion upon this subject.* Ac-
♦ The name of Mr. Malthus, who will for the future oc-
cupy the post of honour in political economy upon the subject
of population, is not mentioned here, because this work was
many years anterior to his. This chapter, with many other
fragments, was communicated to the authors of the Bibliotheque
280 B.iV. Ch. XI II.— POPULATION FORCED— INCREASE, &c.
cording to this principle, there is also a means of
increasing population, but there is only one : it
consists in increasing the national wealth, or, to
speak more correctly, in allowing it to increase.
Young womeii^ says Montesquieu, are 5^«^c^67^//j/
ready to marri/. How should they not be ? The
pleasures, the avowed sentiments of love, are only
permitted in this condition : it is thus only tha
they are emancipated from a double subjection,
and that they are placed at the head of a little em-
pire. // is the young me7i, he adds, ivho need to be
encouraoed.
But whv ? Do the motives which lead men to
marry want force ? It is only by marriage that a
man can obtain the favours of the woman who, in
in his eyes, is worth all others. It is only by mar-
riage that he can live freely and publicly with an
honest and respectable woman, and who will live
only for him. There is nothing more delightful
than the hope of a family, where proofs of the
tenderest affections may be given and received;
where power blended with kindness may be ex-
ercised ; where confidence and security are found ;
where the consolations of old age may be treasured
up ; where we may behold ourselves replaced by
other selves. Where we may say, I shall not en-
Britannique, published at Geneva, and was inserted in the
7th vol., in 1798. If Mr. Malthus had known it, he might
have cited it as an additional proof, that his principle relating
to population was not a new paradox. But what was new,
was to make a rational and connected application of it ; to
deduce" from it the solution of so many historical problems;
to .survey Europe with this principle in his hand; and to prove
that it cannot be resisted without producing great confusion in
social order ; and this is what Mr. Malthus has accomplished,
in a manner as conclusive as respects his arguments, as in-
teresting in respect of his style and his details. — Note by
DUMONT.
B. IV. tH.XllI.— POPULATION FORCED— INCREASE, &c. 281
tirely die. A man wants an associate, a confidant,
a counsellor, a steward, a mistress, a nurse, a com-
panion for all seasons. All these may be found
united in a wife. What substitute can be pro-
vided ?
It is not among the poor that there is any aver-
sion to marriage ; that is to say, it is not among the
labourers; that class, in the increase of which, alone,
the public is interested; that class which consti-
tutes the strength and creates the wealth of a
nation ; that class which is the last in the sense-
less vocabulary of pride, but which the enlightened
politician regards as the first.
It is in the countr\^ especially, that men seek to
marry. A bachelor does not there possess the re-
sources he can find in a town. A husbandman, a
farmer, require the assistance of a wife, to attend to
their concerns at all hours of the day.
The population of the productive classes is
limited only by their real wants ; that of the un-
productive classes is limited by their conventional
wants.
With regard to these, instead of inducing them
to marry by invitations, rewards and menaces, as
did Augustus, we ought to be well pleased when
they live in celibacy. The increase of the purely
consumptive classes is neither an advantage to the
state nor to themselves. Their welfare is exactly
in the inverse ratio of their numbers. If they
should insensibly become extinct, as in Holland,
where there is scarcely one citizen who does not
exercise some occupation, where would be the
evil ? A workman may in a moment be converted
into an idle consumer. A good workman is not
so soon made: he needs skill and practice; habits
of industry are slowly acquired, if indeed, after a
certain age, they can ever be acquired. On the
28'2 B. JV. Ch. XIII.— POl'ULAi ion fOHCED— I\< HEASi:, Ac.
Other hand, when a consumer passes into the cla.ss
of labourers, it is generally owing to a reverse in
fortune, and he is in a state ofsuftering'. When a
labourer is transported into the class of consumers,
he is exalted in his own eyes and in the eyes of
others, and his happiness is increased. On all
these accounts, it is desirable that the class of
idlers be not increased: their own interest requires
it, and it is also a great good when their number
is diminished, whether by celibacy or their cui]-
version into labourers.* Convents have been con-
* The author is consistent, and Montesquieu appears to nie
not to be so. Book xxiii. ch. x. he has well explained the
true principle, but he has not followed it.
His elogium upon the regulations of Augustus respecting
marriage, is extremely singular. Tiiey have pleased Montes-
quieu by some vague idea of the protection of manners. Tiiey
violate every principle of reward and punishment; they are
neither analogous or proportional ; they punish a man because
he is unhappy or prudenjt, they reward him because he is happy
or imprudent; they coirupt marriage by mercenary and poli-
tical views ; and, after all, the object aimed at is missed. Mon-
tesquieu acknowledges the impotence of tliese laws. The be-
nefit of the remedy being null, there remains only the evil.
He blames Louis XIV. (ch. xxvii.) for not having sutSciently
encouraged marriage, by only rewarding prodigies of fecundity.
Louis XIV. did too much by his establisliuients for the poor
nobility, and he has been too frequently imitated. Humanity
was the motive of these foundations ; but this humanity was
equally productive of evil as it respected those who bore the
expense, and as it respected the class whom it was intended
to relieve, and who were not relieved. On the contrary, the
more the indigent of this order were assisted, the more tiiey
increased. In fact, every individual requires a certain quan-
tity of wealth to be in a state to marry. Does he mairv
imprudently, his distress is without doubt an evil j but it
operates as a warning to other persons of the same class. If
you oppose this natural effect, if you institute foundations for
families, if you grant pensions or other favours on account of
marriage, what follows ? It is no longer an establi>hnient
submitted to calculation, it i^ a luUery, u\ which h<jpe is con-
H. IV. Ch.XIII.— POPULATION FOKCEO— INCREASE, &.c. '2H':l
stantly accused of hurting population. Poor con-
vents, and the mendicant orders, injure it, without
doubt, since they add to the number of idle con-
sumers. It is not so with rich convents ; they
add nothing to this number. He who possesses
the rent of land can command labour without
working himself; but what matters it whether a
fund, destined to the support of idlers, be trans-
mitted from father to son, or from stranger to
stranger }
Large cities are decried : they are the gulphs,
it is said, in which the population of the country
is lost. That which is furnished to the towns is
visible to all the world ; what is received from them,
is less apparent. It is the ancient quarrel of the
Belly and the Members. Cultivation increases in
proportion to the consumers. People live longer
in the country ; but that a greater number of per-
sons may be born there, it is necessary that the
capital of the towns, which animates labour,
should be sent thither.
This imaginary evil, the increase of towns, has
excited the most extravagant fears. Absurdity
has been carried so far, as to make rules for limit-
ing their bounds : they should rather have been
made for extending them. They would thus have
suited rather than prudence : many venture, but few succeed.
You intended to give support, and you have laid a snare.
What you did in order to diminish the evil, has only served to
make it worse. In pity to these unfortunate persons, they
ought not to be encouraged to marry. When they no longer
are deceived by hope, they will no longer be unhappy.
Ip England there is neither restriction nor encouragement,
and there is no dread lest the stock of nobility should fail ;
there is no dread lest celibacy should be hurtful to population.
The shameful and sad misfortune is not known there of the
existence of a class of persons set apart to idleness and poverty.
— Note by DuMONT. ,
284 K.IV. Cii.XIll.— POPULATION FORCED— INCREASE, &c.
prevented contagious disorders ; they would have
rendered the air more salubrious. The opposite
regulations do not diminish the number of inha-
bitants, but oblige them to heap themselves up
within close habitations, and to build one city
upon another.
Are emigrations disadvantageous to a state ?
Yes, if the emigrants could have found employ-
ment at home : No, if they could not. But it is
not natural that labourers should exile them-
selves, if they could live at home. However, if
they desire so to do, ought they to be prevented ?
Cases must be distinguished. It is possible that
this desire may have been produced by some
momentary distaste, by some false idea, some
whim, which may mislead a multitude of men
before they have leisure to undeceive themselves.
1 will not therefore affirm, that circumstances may
not happen in which emigration may not be for-
bidden by a law of short duration ; but to convert
this prohibition into a perpetual law, is to change
the country into a prison ; is to publish, in the
name even of the government itself, that it is
not good to live there. It would be proper that
such a law should commence thus — " We, &c.,
ignorant of the art of rendering our subjects happy,
and well assured that, if we give them an opportu-
nity to escape, they will go in search of countries
less oppressed, hereby prohibit," &c.
Would not this be to aggravate the evil ? Could
all the frontiers of a great country be guarded ?
Louis XIV., with all his authority, could he ac-
complish it ? As many persons as were thus
enchained, so many discontented and unhappy
persons, who would be looked upon with distrust,
vyhom it would be necessary perhaps to repress
by violence, and who would become enemies
B.IV. Ch. XIII.— POPULATION FORCED— INCREASE, &c. 285
when they found themselves treated as such.
Others, who had never thought of quitting their
country, would become uneasy when they found
themselves obliged to remain ; whilst others, who
might have thought of establishing themselves
there, would take care not to do it. For those
individuals retained against their will, you lose
those who would have come among you volun-
tarily.
lingland has sustained temporary losses of men '
and capital by emigrations to America; but what
has happened ? she has received from that coun-
try a mass of productions which have more than
compensated the loss. The men and capitals
carried away, employed upon new lands, have
produced a benefit more considerable for England
itself, than if they had been employed upon her
own. To exhibit this clearly, would require a
multitude of facts and calculations; but it may be
presumed to be the case, from the vast extent of
this new commerce.
On the subject of emigration, the wisest part
then is to do nothing. Under the guidance of
liberty, the benefit is certain ; under the guidance
of constraint, it is uncertain.
After this, the advantages of emigration are
easily estimated. In order to people a country as
yet unfilled, if will be advisable to invite thither
strangers who depend upon their labour alone. It
may even be advantageous to make them advances
for their support, in order to establish them.
In respect to methods of preventing the destruc-
tion of the species, they belong to that branch of
police which is employed about the means of sub-
sistence and the public health. We may be tran-
quil, therefore, upon the subject of population.
There will be everywhere an abundance of men,
2S6 B.IV. Ch. XIII. —POPULATION FORCED— INCREASE, &c.
provided they are not deprived, by a hard and ty-
rannical government, of what is necessary for
subsistence and enjoyment, of which contentment
constitutes a part.*
* I have under my eyes a large political work of M. Beau-
sobre, counsellor to the King of Prussia, in which, at the
article Population, he gives no less than twenty recipes for in-
creasing it. The nineteenth is as follows: — "It is proper to
watch during the fruit season, lest the people eat that which
is not ripe." He ought to have provided the means for car-
rying this regulation into execution ; to have indicated the
number of inspectors who should judge of the ripeness of
fruit, the watchmen who should be stationed over it, and the
magistrates who were to judge of its infractions.
Another method consists in "hindering men from marrying
very disagreeable women." He neither says to what judge he
would remit this delicate inquiry, nor upon what principles he
would have the ugliness of women proved ; nor the degree of
inquiry which ought to be permitted, nor the fees that ought
to be paid. The remainder is very nearly in the same taste.
Hindering the marriage of old men with young women, that
of young men with women much older than themselves ; hin-
dering the marriage of persons not likely to have children :
there are other recipes of this political pharmacopoeia little less
ridiculous, but not less useless.
His complaints respecting prostitution are reasonable, if they
had for their object the misery of the class of courtesans,
victims of a constrained celibacy. They are of no force as
respects population, which suffers nothing. 1 refer to what
has been said upon this subject in Les Traites de Legislation,
torn. ii. partie 4. (Ed. 1820) ; " Des moyens indirects pour
prevenir les Delits, ch. 5 : Faire en sorte qu'un desir donne se
satisfaire sans prejudice, ou avec le moindre prejudice pos-
sible."
[ 287 ]
CHAPTER XIV.
COLONIES DESIRABLE ?
When an excess of population, in relation to
territory, exists or is foreseen, colonization is a very
proper measure. As a means of increasing the ge-
neral wealth of a country, or of increasing the
revenue of the mother country, it is a very impro-
per measure. All the common ideas upon this
subject are I'ounded in illusions.
That colonies add to the general wealth of the
world, is what cannot be doubted ; for if labour is
necessary to production, land is no less so. The
soil also of many colonies, independently of what
it annually produces, is rich in raw materials,
which only require that they should be extracted
and carried away, to give them value. But this
wealth belongs to the colonists, to those who oc-
cupy the land, and not to the mother country.
When first established, colonies are not in a
conditi(jn to pay taxes ; in the end they will not
pay them. In order to establish them, to protect
them, to keep them in dependance, expense is re-
quired ; and all these expenses must be discharged
by taxes levied upon the mother country.
Colonization requires an immediate expense, an
actual loss of wealth, for a future profit, for a con-
tingent gain. The capital which is carried away
for the improvement of the land in the colonies,
had it been employed in the mother country would
have added to its increasing wealth, as well as to
its population, and to the means of its defence ;
288 B.IV. Ch. XIV.— COLONIES DESIRABLE?
whilst, as to the produce of the colonies, only a
small part ever reaches the mother country.
If colonization is a folly when employed as a
means of enrichment, it is at least an agreeable
folly. New enjoyments, insomuch as enjoyments
depend upon the novelty and variety of objects,
result from it. The substitution of sugar for
honey ; of tea, coffee, and chocolate, for the beer
and meat which composed the breakfast of maids
of honour in the reign of Elizabeth ; of the indigo
which varies our dyes ; the cochineal which fur-
nishes the most brilliant scarlet ; the mahogany
which ornaments our apartments ; the vessels of
gold and silver which decorate our tables, are all
sources of enjoyment, and the pleasure which re-
sults from these objects of luxury is, in part, the
profit of colonization ; whilst the medicinal and
nutritive plants which have been received from the
colonies, in particular bark and potatoes, are pos-
sessed of much superior utility.
Novelty and variety, in respect of means of en-
joyment, add nothing to the quantity of wealth,
which remains as it was, if the old productions are
supplanted by the new ones. It is thus also with
new fruits, new flowers, new colours, new clothes,
new furniture, if the new supplant the old. But
as novelty and variety are sources of pleasure, in
proportion as they are increased, wealth increases
also, if not in quantity, at least in value. And if
these new wants are incentives to new labour, a
positive increase of real wealth results from them.
These advantages, such as they are, can only be
derived from a colony situated in a climate whose
productions cannot be naturalized in the mother
country ; whilst as to the mines of Mexico and
Potosi, their effect has been to add to the quantity
B.IV. Ch. XIV.— COLONIES DESIRABLE? 289
of vessels composed of the precious metals and to
the quantity of coin. The addition to the vessels
increases the amount of real wealth ; the addition
to the coin has all been lost: the new mass of gold
and silver has had no other effect than to depreci-
ate the old, and to diminish in the same proportion
the value of all pecuniary revenues, without adding
to the amount of real capital or future wealth.
However, in taking all interests into the calcula-
tion, it is certain that the welfare of mankind has been
increased by the establishment of colonies. There
can be no doubt on this subject, in respect to the
nations who by degrees have become established
there, and who owe their existence to coloniza-
tion ; the mother countries also have themselves
gained in happiness in another point of view. Let
us take England, for example. According to the
progress which population has made during the last
century, it may be supposed that it w^ould soon
have attained its extreme limits, that is to say, that
it would have exceeded the ordinary means of sub-
sistence, if the superabundance had not found
means of discharging itself in these new countries.
But, along time before population has reached these
limits, there will be a great diminution of relative
opulence, a painful feeling of general poverty and
distress, a superabundance of men in all the labo-
rious classes, and a mischievous rivalry in offering
their labour at the lowest price.
For the benefit of mankind at large, it is desira-
ble that the offsets which are to be employed as
new plants, should be taken from the most healthy
stocks and the most flourishing roots ; that the
people who go forth to colonize unoccupied lands,
should go forth from the nation whose political
constitution is most favourable to the security of
individuals ; that the new colonies should be
19
293 B.IV. Ch. XIV.— COLONIES DESIRABLE?
swarms from the most industrious hive ; and that
their education should have formed them to those
habits of frugality and labour which are necessary
to make transplanted families succeed.
It may often be advantageous for colonies to re-
main a long time under the government of the
mother country, provided always that such govern-
ment be what it ought to be.
It would, without doubt, have been advantage-
ous to Egypt to have remained under the govern-
ment of Great Britain ; a government which would
have bestowed upon it peace, security, the fine
arts, and the enjoyment of the magnificent gifts
which nature has lavished upon it. But, in respect
to wealth, the possession of Egypt, far from being
advantageous to England, would have proved only
a burthen.
I hear a universal cry raised against this paradox.
So many profound politicians, divided upon every
other point, are unanimous upon the importance
of colonies, — are they only agreed, that they may
fall into an error? So many merchants, — have
they deceived themselves in so simple a calculation
as that of the profit or loss of colonial commerce ?
The experience of two or three centuries, — has it
not opened the eyes of governments ? would it
not be extraordinary that they should still obsti-
nately sustain the enormous weight of these distant
establishments, if their advantages were not clear
and manifest ?
I might reply, that a long train of alchymists,
after all the misfortunes of their predecessors, long
continued obstinately to seek after the philoso-
pher's stone, and that this great work yet has its
partisans. I might reply, that many nations in the
East have, during many ages, been governed by
astrology. I might enumerate a long list of errors
B.IV. Ch. XIV.— COLONIES DESIRABLE? 291
which have misled both governments and people.
But a question of this nature ought not to be ob-
scured by declamation. He who alleges the
number of partisans by which a system is supported
instead of supporting it by proofs, desires to inti-
midate and not to convince his adversary. Let us
examine all the arguments by which the advan-
tages of colonies, in respect of wealth, have been
endeavoured to be proved : we shall not find a
single one which is not in opposition to the most
firmly established principles of political economy.
I. The loealth of the colonies is poured into the
mother country ; it is brought thither by commerce,
it consequently animates manufactures, and they
support the large towns : the prosperity of Bordeaux,
for example, is one proof; its wealth depends upon
its trade with the West Indies^
This reasoning proves nothing in favour of a
system of colonies ; there is no necessity for go-
verning or possessing any island in order that we
may sell merchandise there. The inhabitants of
the Antilles stand in need of the productions of
England and France. Were they independent
states, it would still be necessary that they should
buy them : during their state of dependance what
can they do more ? They will not give their sugars
to the mother country ; they exchange them for
corn and cloth. Those who supply these commo-
dities, if they had not sold them to these parties,
would have sold them to others. Suppose that the
inhabitants of St. Domingo, in place of buying
their corn in France, were to buy it in England ;
France would lose nothing, because, on the whole,
the consumption of corn would not be less: Eng-
land having supplied St. Domingo, would not be
able to supply other countries, which would be
obliged to supply themselves from France.
19.
292 B.iv. ch.xiv.-colonies desirable?
Trade is in proportion to capital. This is the
principle; the total amount of trade in each
country is always in proportion to the capital which
each country possesses. I ann a merchant ; 1 have
a capital of 10,000/. employed in commerce; —
suppose Spanish America were opened to me,
could I, with my 10,000/., carry on a greater trade
than I do at present ? Suppose the West Indies
were shut against me, would my 10,000/. become
useless in my hands ? should 1 not be able to apply
them to some other foreign trade, or to make them
useful in the interior of the country, or to employ
them in some enterprise of domestic agriculture ?
It is thus capital always preserves its value. The
trade to which it gives birth may change its form
or its direction, may flow in different channels,
may be directed upon one manufacture or another,
upon foreign or domestic undertakings ; but the
final result is, that these productive capitals al-
ways produce ; and they produce the same quan-
tity, the same value, or at least the difference does
not deserve attention.
It is therefore the quantity of capital which
determines the quantity of trade, and not the ex-
tent of the market^ as has been generally believed.
Open a new market, the quantity of trade will not,
unless by some accidental circumstance, be in-
creased. Shut up an old market, the quantity of
trade will not be diminished, unless by accident,
and only for a moment.
Should the new market be more advantageous
than the old ones, in this case the profit will be
greater, the trade may become more extended ;
but the existence of this extra profit is always
supposed but never proved.*
* Bryan Edwards, in his History of the West Indies, even
n. IV. ch. XIV.— colonies desirable ? 29o
The mistake consists in representing all the pro-
fit of a new trade, as so much added to the amount
of national profit, without considering that the
same capital employed in any other branch of
trade would not have been unproductive. People
suppose themselves to have created^ when they
have only transferred. A minister pompously
boasts of certain new acquisitions, certain esta-
blishments upon far distant shores, and if the ad-
ventures which have been made have yielded a
million profit, for example, he does not fail to be-
lieve that he has opened a nev/ source of national
wealth; he supposes that this million profit would
not have existed without him, whilst he may
have occasioned a loss : he will have done so, if
the capital employed in this new trade has only
yielded ten per cent, and that employed in the
ordinary trade, has yielded twelve.
The answer to this first objection may be re-
duced to two points. 1. That the possession of
colonies is not necessary to the carrying on of
trade with them. 2. That even when trade is not
carried on with the colonies, the capital which
such trade would have required, will be applied as
productively toother undertakings.
II. The advocates of the colonial system would
consider the above answer extremely weak ; they
in exaggerating the utility of colonies, does not suppose the
rate of profit upon capitals employed in the plantations greater
than seven per cent., whilst it is fifteen per cent, upon capital
employed in the mother country.*
• This fifteen per cent, was taken from one of the finance pamphlets
of Treasury Secietary Rose. Some years before, to a question put by me
to the late Sir Francis Baring, the answer was, six per cent. This meant,
of course, over and above interest, then at five per cent. — ^Communicated
bi/ the Author,
294 B.IV. Ch. XIV.— COLONIES DESIRABLE?
see in this commerce two circumstances which
render it more advantageous than that which is
carried on with free nations.
" IVe established,'' say they, " a double mono-
jjoly against the colonist ;Jirst, the monopoly of their
productions, which lee permit them to sell to us
alone, and ivhich we thus obtain from them at the
lowest price. Secondly, the monopoly of their pur-
chases, ichich we oblige them to make among our-
selves, so that we are able to sell our produce and
manufactures to them, at a dearer rate than we
could to a free people, among whom, other nations
would enter into competition with us."
Let us examine the effect of these two mono-
polies separately.
1. You prevent your colonies from selling their
productions to any but yourselves ; but you can-
not oblige them to cultivate their lands, or to ma-
nufacture at a loss. There is a natural price for
every commodity, determined by the average rate
of profit in commerce in general. If the cultiva-
tor connot obtain this natural price, he will not
continue to cultivate ; he will apply his capital to
other undertakings. The monopoly may produce
•a forced reduction of priceybr a time; but the co-
lonist will not continue to cultivate sugar, if he
lose by its cultivation instead of gaining. It is
therefore impossible for this monopoly to produce
2i constant reduction of the price of commodities
below their natural price ; whilst free competi-
tion is sufficient to reduce them and keep them
at this natural price. The high price which you
■wish to remedy by the monopoly is an evil which
will cure itself. Large profits in any one branch
of trade will draw thither a large number of com-
petitors: all merchants are rivals, and their rivalry
B. IV. Cm. XIV.— COLONIES DESIRABLE * 295
naturally produces a reduction of price, till the
rate of profit in each particular branch of trade is
upon a level with all others.
2. You may oblige your colonist to buy every
thing of you, but the advantage you expect to
derive from this exclusive commerce is decep-
tive.
If it respect commodities and manufactures,
which, owing to a natural superiority, you are
enabled to furnish of better quality and at a lower
price than foreigners, it is clear that, without mo-
nopoly, your colonists would rather buy them of
you than of others. The monopoly will not en-
able you to sell them at a higher price ; your mer-
chants, being all in a state of competition with
each other, naturally seek to support each other by
offering their goods at the lowest price possible.
While as to the productions and other articles
which you are not able to furnish them upon
terms equally favourable with foreigners, it is
certain that, without the monopoly, your colonists
will not buy them of you. Ought we to conclude,
that the monopoly will be advantageous to you ?
Not in the least. The nation in general will gain
nothing. It will only follow, that a species of in-
dustry will be cultivated among you, which does
not naturally suit you; that bad commodities will
be produced, and bad manufactures carried on.
The monopoly is similar to a reward bestowed
by government, for the maintenance of manufac-
tures inferior to those of other nations. If this
monopoly did not exist, the same capital would be
applied to other species of industry in which you
have a decided advantage. Instead of losing by
this arrangement, you will gain a more stable pros-
perity ; since the manufactures, which cannot be
maintained but by forced means, are exposed to a
296 B.IV. Ch. XIV.— COLONIES DESIRABLE?
thousand vicissitudes. Observe further, that this
monopoly is burthened with a counler monopoly.
It is not permitted to you to purchase productions
similar to those of your colonies, when you find
them elsewhere at a lower price. In compensation
for the restraint you impose upon your colonies,
you impose one upon yourselves. If they can buy
only of you, you can buy only of them. How
many inconveniences result from this 1 When
the harvest has been deficient in your colonies,
you are not able to supply yourselves from those
places where the season has been more favourable;
in the midst of abundance you are suffering from
dearth. The monopoly has no effect in lowering;
the price of commodities ; but the counter mono-
poly is certain occasionally to produce extraordi-
narily high prices.
III. The partisans of the colonial sj'stem con-
sider colonies under another point of view — the
advantage they produce to the revenue. The taxes
levied upon the commerce of the colonies^ whether
upon importation or upon exportation^ produce a
revenue lehich would cease, or be much diminished.,
if they leere indepe7ident.
The taxes levied upon the commerce with the
colonies may produce a considerable amount ; but
if they were free, would they carry on no com-
merce ? Could not this commerce be taxed ?
Could it not be taxed as heavily as smuggling
would permit ? England levies taxes upon its
commerce w^ith France ; France levies taxes upon
its commerce with England. The possession of
colonies is not necessary to the levying of taxes
upon the commerce carried on with them.
I do not repeat here, that your taxes upon the
articles of their production, and upon those of
your importation from the colonics, arc taxes of
B.IV. Cii. XIV.— COLONIES DESIRABLE? 297
which you pay every farthing yourself: this has
already been demonstrated. What you make the
colonies to pay, are only the taxes upon your ex-
portations to them.
I allow that you may thus gain more from your
colonies than you would be able to gain from foreign
nations ; since the foreigners can quit your market
when they please, if they cannot obtain among you
certain articles so cheap as from others ; — you are
therefore obliged to humour them. But your own
subjects, obliged to supply themselves from you,
are obliged to submit; you keep them in a prison,
and you can put w^hat price you please upon their
existence.
An advantage, however, of this nature can only
be deceptive. When you have made a prison of
your colonies, it is necessary to keep all the
doors carefully shut : you have to strive against
the Proteus of smuggling; fleets are necessary to
blockade their ports, armies to restrain a discon-
tented people, courts of justice to punish the
refractory. How enormous are the expenses to
be deducted, before this forced commerce will
yield a net revenue 1
To the amount of the expenses of peace, add
that of a single armament, of a single war, and
you will perceive, that dependant colonies cost
much to the mother countr}^ and never yield an
equal return ; that, far from contributing to the
strength of a state, they are always its weak and
vulnerable points ; that they keep up among
maritime nations continual jealousy, and that thus
the people in France, and in England, are sub-
jected to heavy taxes, which have no other effect
than to render the productions of the colonies
dearer than if they were free.
To these considerations, opposed to the colonial
298 B. IV. Ch. XIV.— COLONIES DESIRABLE?
system, drawn from political economy, many others
may be added, derived from justice and huma-
nity. This system is often mischievous to the
people submitted to it ; government is almost
always, as it respects them, in a state either of
jealousy or indifference: they are either neglected
or pillaged ; they are made places of banishment
for the reception of the vilest part of society, or
places to be pillaged by minions and favourites,
whom it is considered desirable suddenly to enrich.
The sovereign, at two thousand leagues distance
from his subjects, can be acquainted neither with
their wants, their interests, their manners, nor
their character. Their most legitimate and weighty
complaints, weakened by reason of distance,
stripped of everything which might excite sensi-
bility, of everything which might soften or subdue
the pride of power, are delivered, without defence,
into the cabinet of the prince, to the most insi-
dious interpretations, to the most unfaithful repre-
sentations : the colonists are still too happy, if their
demand of justice is not construed into a crime,
and if their most moderate remonstrances are not
punished as acts of rebellion. In a word, little is
cared for their affection, nothing is feared for their
resentment, and their despair is contemned. The
most violent procedures are easily disguised, under
an appearance of necessity, and the best intentions
will not always suffice to prevent the sacrifice of
the public to private interests.
If we proceed to consider the situation of colo-
nies in detail, we shall not fail to be struck with
its disadvantages. Have the colonists any law-
suits in their mother country — their witnesses
must cross the seas ; they are at the mercy of their
agents ; years glide away, and the expenses of
justice continually accumulate. Is there danger
B.IV. Ch. XIV.— COLONIES DESIRABLE? 299
of a revolt — Are they threatened by an enemy —
succours arrive when the mischief is done. The
remedy oftentimes proves an additional calamity.
Do they want food — famine has laid waste the
country, before the mother country has been ap-
prised of their necessities.
These are not mere assertions ; they are borne
out by a faithful summary of the history of every
colony. It is tragical, even to horror ! The evils
suffered in these establishments, from the igno-
rance, the weakness, or the insensibility of Euro-
pean governments, exceed everything which can
be imagined. When we consider the multitude
of men destroyed, the fleets lost, the treasures
swallowed up, the establishments pillaged, we are
astonished to hear colonies spoken of as a means
of enrichment. The natural development of their
fruitfulness, and of their industry, has been re-
tarded for ages ; they have been covered a thou-
sand times with ruins; nations have impoverished
themselves, that they might hold them in servi-
tude, when they might have been sharers in their
wealth by leaving to them the enjoyment of the
benefits of liberty.
There are many arguments which prove the
inutility of their dependance : North America
presents a striking fact which ought to enlighten
Europe. Has the trade of England diminished
since her former subjects became free? Since
she lost these immense possessions, has she exhi-
bited any symptoms of decay ? Has she had fewer
sailors ? Has her maritime power been weak-
ened ? She has found a new source of wealth in
the independence of the United States. The
emancipation of this great country has carried
thither a greater number of men, more capital,
and more industry. Great Britain, relieved from
the expense of defence and government, has car-
300 B.IV. Ch. XIV.— COIXJNIES DESIRABLE?
ried on a more advantageous commerce with a
more numerous and wealthy people ; and it is thus
that everything concurs in proving, that the pros-
perity of a nation is a benefit in which all others
participate — every one in proportion to his means;
and that the colonial system is hurtful to Euro-
peans, only because it is hurtful to the colonies.
Let us, however, see the consequences which
we ought to draw from these data.
1. Ought we not to form any colonial establish-
ment ? Certainly not with the intention of en-
riching the mother country : it is always a certain
expense for a contingent and far distant profit. But
we have seen that, as a means of relieving the
population, of preventing its excess, by providing
a vent for those who find then^selves overburthened
upon their native soil, colonization offers an ad-
vantageous resource ; and when it is well con-
ducted, and free from any regulations which may
hinder its prosperity, there may result from it a
new people, with whom we shall possess all the
connections of language, of social habits, of natural
and political ties.
2. Ought colonies already possessed to be eman-
cipated ? Yes, certainly ; if we only consider the
saving of the expenses of their government, and
the superior advantages of a free commerce. But
it is necessary to examine what is due to colonial
establishments; to a family which has been created,
and which ought not to be abandoned. Can they
maintain themselves? Will not their internal
tranquillity be interrupted ? Will not one class of
the inhabitants be sacrificed to another — for exam-
ple, the free men to the slaves, or the slaves to the
free men ? Is it not necessary that they should
be protected and directed, in their condition of
comparative weakness and ignorance? Is not
their4)rcsent state of dependance their safeguard
B.IV. Ch. XI v.— COLONIES DESIRABLE? 301
against anarchy, murder, and pillage ? Siicii are
the points of view under which this question
ought to be considered.
When we shall have ceased to consider colonies
with the greedy eyes of fiscality, the greater
number of these inconveniences will cease of
themselves. Let governments lay aside all false
mercantile notions, and all jealousy of their sub-
jects, and everything which renders their yoke
burthensome will fall at once : there will no
longer be any reason to fear hostile dispositions,
and wars for independence. If wisdom alone were
listened to, the ordinary object of contention
would be reversed, the mother country would
desire to see her children powerful, that they
might become free, and the colonies would fear
the loss of that tutelary authority which gave them
internal tranquillity, and security against external
foes.
[ 302 ]
CHAPTER XV.
WEALTH MEANS OF INCREASE.
If we trace the progress of wealth in its natural
channel, we shall clearly perceive that the inter-
position of government is only beneficial and ne-
cessary when employed in the maintenance of
security, in the removal of obstacles, or the disse-
mination of knowledge.
Wealth may be increased —
I. By increasing the efficacy of labour.
II. By increasing the number of labourers.
III. By the more advantageous employment of
capital.
IV.. By increasing the mass of capital.
V. By means of trade.
I. By increasing the efjicaey of labour.
This subject might furnish most interesting and
instructive historic details ; we shall confine our-
selves to a simple enumeration of the means
whereby it may be accomplished.
The efficacy of labour may be augmented —
1. By increase of skill and dexterity.
2. By saving the time occupied by superfluous
movements.
3. By the invention of machines.
4. By employing, instead of human labour,
more powerful and less costly prime movers, as
water, air, fire, explosive powders, and beasts of
burthen.
The two first advantages are obtained by the
division of labour : the third necessarily results
from it. Adam Smith has developed this grand
means of attaining perfection with an attention,
B. IV. Ch. XV.— wealth— means of increase. 303
and, so to speak, a particular affection. He relates,
that the process of converting a morsel of brass
wire into a pin requires eighteen operations, and
employs as many different workmen, of whom the
greater part borrow the assistance of machines ;
whereby, although ten workmen would not sepa-
rately have been able to make more than 240 pins
a day, they are enabled to make 4800. It is hence
that this little branch of national wealth, which
affords a more commodious adjustment than the
buckles of the Romans, and the skewers em-
ployed by Queen Elizabeth, has increased in pro- 
