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A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


A 

REFERENCE    HISTORY 

OF  THE  WAR 


COMPILED    AND    WRITTEN    BY 

IRWIN  SCOFIELD  GUERNSEY,  M.A. 


WITH    A    PREFACE    BY 

FRANK  MOORE   COLBY 

EDITOR    OF    THE    NEW    INTERNATIONAL    ENCYCLOPAEDIA 


NEW  YORK 
DODD,  MEAD  AND  COMPANY 


r^^^^r^uaJ 


5&' 


Copyright,  1920,  by 
Dodd,  Mead  and  Compant,  Inc. 


1  1320 
©CI.A601548 


PREFACE 

This  volume  has  been  prepared  in  order  to  meet  the  ever  increasing  de- 
mand for  a  reliable  authentic  history  of  the  war  in  all  its  phases  in  one  volume. 
Almost  all  the  histories  of  the  war  that  have  been  published  to  date  have  been 
written  on  specific  aspects  of  the  tremendous  struggle.  Those  that  cover  the 
entire  subject  have  been  set  before  the  public  in  many  volumes,  and,  as  a  con- 
sequence, demand  a  large  amount  of  time  on  the  part  of  the  reader.  After 
the  armistice  was  signed  and  the  Peace  Conference  finished,  the  publishers 
of  this  volume  determined  to  offer  the  reading  public  a  compact  history  of  the 
war  in  a  single  volume.  This  has  been  done  with  the  result  that  a  compre- 
hensive but  not  detailed  history  of  the  war  has  been  produced.  It  is  nar- 
rated in  an  entertaining,  scholarly  style.  The  various  chapter  headings,  War 
in  Brief,  Underlying  Causes  of  the  War,  Military  Operations,  Naval  Opera- 
tions, Aerial  Operations,  Destruction  of  Art  and  Architecture,  Alleged  Atroci- 
ties, Peace  Terms  and  War  Aims,  Neutral  Nations,  Economic  and  Financial 
Aspects,  Peace  Conference  and  Peace  Treaties,  etc.,  will  show  at  a  glance 
the  scope  of  the  volume.  An  index  and  bibliography  of  the  most  accessible 
books  on  the  war  have  also  been  included.  The  material  for  the  history  of  the 
war  was  gathered  from  the  most  reliable  contemporary  sources,  and  was  edited 
from  time  to  time  in  order  to  include  new  facts  that  were  unearthed  or  to 
delete  material  that  had  been  assumed  true  at  the  time  it  was  incorporated 
but  later  proved  contrary  to  fact.  The  basic  material  presented  for  the  first 
two  years  was  contributed  by  several  members  of  the  staff  of  the  New  In- 
ternational Encyclopaedia,  namely,  Colonel  Cornells  De  Witt  Wilcox, 
U.  S.  A. ;  Professor  F.  H.  Hankins ;  Professor  Nelson  P.  Mead ;  Captain  Lewis 
Sayre  Van  Duzer,  U.  S.  N. ;  Mr.  Herbert  T.  Wade;  and  Mr.  Irwin  Scofield 
Guernsey.     The  bulk  of  the  work  has  been  done  by  Mr.  Irwin  Scofield  Guernsey. 

Frank  Moore  Colby,  Editor-in-Chief, 
New  International  Encyclopaedia. 


CONTENTS 


I.      The  War  in  Brief 


II.  Underlying  Causes  of  the 

War 5 

National  Antagonisms;  Pan-German- 
ism; Military  Alliances;  Economic 
Causes. 

III.  Outbreak  of  the  War  .     .       18 

Austria's  Demands;  the  Serbian  Re- 
ply; Germany  and  Russia;  Ger- 
many and  France;  Great  Britain 
and  Germany;  Question  of  Belgian 
Neutrality;  Italy's  Position;  Ja- 
pan's Position;  The  Balkan  States, 
Bulgaria,  Greece,  Rumania;  Por- 
tugal ;    Czecho-Slovakia. 

IV.  Military  Operations    .     .       39 

Mobilization  and  Concentration;  Gen- 
eral Strategy  and  Resources; 
Equipment  of  the  Armies;  West- 
ern Theatre;  American  Expedition- 
ary Force;  Eastern  Theatre;  Rus- 
sian Revolution;  The  Bolsheviki; 
Southern  Theatre;  Southeastern 
Theatre;   Colonies. 

V.  Naval  Operations      .     .     .     177 

Operations  in  the  North  Sea  and  the 
Waters  about  Great  Britain;  Oper- 
ations in  the  Mediterranean;  Opera- 
tions in  the  Black  Sea  and  Darda- 
nelles; Cruiser  Operations  in  the  At- 
lantic, Pacific,  and  Indian  Oceans; 
Naval  Strategy  of  the  War;  Some 
Naval  Lessons  of  the  War. 

VI.  Aerial  Operations    .      .      .     207 

Estimated  Participants  and  Casual- 
ties. 


VII.  Alleged  Atrocities     .     .     219 

Belgium;  Armenia;  Poland;  Serbia; 
France. 

VIII.  Destruction      of     Art      and 

Architecture    .     .     225 

IX.  Neutral  Nations  at  Beginning 

of  War    ....     227 

United  States;  Scandinavian  Coun- 
tries; Netherlands;  Switzerland; 
South  American  Countries;  Other 
Countries. 

X.  Peace     Proposals     and     State- 

ments of  War  Aims    273 

XI.  Relief  Measures     .     .      .     2,98 

Commission  for  Relief  in  Belgium; 
Belgium  Relief  Fund;  Jewish  Re- 
lief; Other  Funds;  Red  Cross. 

XII.  Financial   and   Economic   As- 

pects     304 

International  Exchange  and  Banking 
Problems;  Currency;  Employment 
and  Wages;  American  Foreign 
Trade;  World  Trade;  Foreign 
Credits;  Prices  and  Food  Supplies; 
Cost  of  the  War. 

XIII.  Peace      Conference      and 

Treaties  of  Peace     331 

XIV.  Bibliography     ....     386 

Historical  Background;  Military 
Operations;  Naval  Operations; 
Aerial  Operations;  Economic  As- 
pects; Finances. 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY 
OF  THE  WAR 


I.     THE  WAR  IN  BRIEF 


On  June  28,  1914,  the  Austrian  heir- 
apparent,  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand, 
and  his  wife  were  assassinated  at  Sara- 
jevo, the  capital  of  Bosnia.  Accusing 
Serbia  of  complicity  in  the  crime  and 
alleging  that  the  anti-Austrian  machi- 
nations of  Serbian  patriots  menaced 
the  integrity  of  the  Hapsburg  Em- 
pire, Austria-Hungary  on  July  23, 
1914,  delivered  an  ultimatum  contain- 
ing demands  with  which  the  Serbian 
government  would  only  partially  com- 
ply. Despite  the  diplomatic  remon- 
strances of  other  powers,  Austria- 
Hungary  refused  to  submit  the  mat- 
ter to  peaceful  arbitration  and  declar- 
ed war  on  Serbia,  July  28,  1914.  The 
Russian  government,  frankly  sympa- 
thetic with  Serbia,  ordered  the  mobili- 
zation of  the  Russian  army  and  de- 
clined to  countermand  the  order, 
whereupon  the  German  government  de- 
clared what  it  considered  to  be  a  de- 
fensive war  against  Russia,  August  1, 
1914.  Two  days  later  Germany  de- 
clared war  against  Russia's  ally, 
France.  Preparatory  to  an  invasion 
of  France,  German  troops  had  al- 
ready occupied  Luxemburg,  August  2, 
and  begun  to  invade  Belgium,  August 
4,  notwithstanding  Belgium's  opposi- 
tion. The  British  government  con- 
strued   the    German    violation    of    Bel- 


gian neutrality  as  a  casus  belli  and 
declared  war  against  Germany,  August 
4.  Serbia  and  the  "Allies,"  or  En- 
tente Powers — Russia,  France,  and 
Great  Britain  —  were  subsequently 
joined  by  Montenegro  (August  7, 
1914),  Japan  (August  23,  1914), 
Italy  (May  23,  1915),  San  Marino 
(May  24,  1915),  Portugal  (March  9, 
1916),  Rumania  (August  27,  1916), 
United  States  (April  6,  1917),  Pana- 
ma and  Cuba  (April  7,  1917),  Greece 
(July  2,  1917),  Siam  (July  21,  1917), 
Liberia  (August  4,  1917),  China  (Au- 
gust 14,  1917),  Brazil  (October  26, 
1917),  Guatemala  (April  22,  1918), 
Costa  Rica  (May  23,  1918),  Nicara- 
gua (May  24,  1918),  Haiti  (July  15, 
1918),  and  Honduras  (July  19,  1918). 
The  "Teutonic"  or  Central  Powers — 
Austria-Hungary  and  Germany — on 
the  other  hand,  while  they  failed  to  re- 
ceive the  support  of  their  former  ally, 
Italy,  succeeded  in  enlisting  the  aid 
of  Turkey  ("state  of  war"  with  Rus- 
sia, October  30 ;  attacked  by  Great 
Britain  and  France,  November  5, 
1914)  and  Bulgaria  (October  14, 
1915). 

From  the  outset  the  Allied  navies 
controlled  the  seas,  putting  an  end  to 
German  overseas  commerce  and  com- 
pelling the  German  battleships  for  the 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


most  part  to  remain  in  home  waters 
under  the  protection  of  coast  defenses 
and  mines,  although  the  main  German 
battle  fleet  ventured  out  to  fight  an 
indecisive  battle,  off  Jutland,  May  31, 
1916,  and  swift  German  battle  cruisers 
repeatedly  raided  the  British  coast. 
The  naval  engagements  in  the  Bight 
of  Heligoland  (August  24,  1914),  off 
Coronel  (November  1,  1914),  near 
Dogger  Bank  (January  24,  1915),  and 
in  the  Gulf  of  Riga  (October,  1917) 
were  of  secondary  importance.  A  few 
daring  German  commerce  raiders  and 
the  surprisingly  effective  German  sub- 
marines were  able  to  inflict  consider- 
able damage  upon  the  Allied  and  neu- 
tral merchant  marines,  but  not  to 
break  the  virtual  blockade  by  means 
of  which  Great  Britain  hoped  to  starve 
out  her  principal  enemy.  By  the  terms 
of  the  armistice  which  ended  the  war 
the  greater  part  of  the  battle  fleets 
and  submarines  of  the  Central  Powers 
had  to  be  turned  over  to  the  Allies 
(November,   1918). 

The  military  operations  may  be 
briefly  summarized  as  follows:  (1)  In 
the  Franco-Belgian  theatre,  the  gallant 
defense  of  Liege  (August  4-5,  1914), 
the  stand  at  the  Mons-Namur-Char- 
leroi  (August  21-24,  1914),  and  a 
counter  invasion  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
(August,  1914)  failed  to  stop  the  on- 
ward sweep  of  the  German  armies 
through  Belgium,  Luxemburg,  and 
Lorraine  toward  Paris.  The  high  tide 
of  the  German  invasion  was  reached 
in  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  (Septem- 
ber 6-10,  1914),  after  which  the  Ger- 
man right  wing  fell  back  upon  the 
Aisne  River  and  extended  itself  north- 
ward through  Picardy,  Artois,  and 
Flanders  to  the  Belgian  coast.  From 
October,  1914,  to  July,  1918,  the  long 
intrenched  battleline  from  the  coast 
to    Switzerland    remained    almost    sta- 


tionary, although  terrific  attempts  to 
break  through  were  made  by  the  Ger- 
mans in  Flanders  (October-November, 
1914),  again  at  Ypres  (April-May, 
1915),  in  the  Argonne  (July,  1915),  at 
Verdun  (February- July,  1916),  be- 
tween St.  Quentin  and  La  Fere  toward 
Amiens  (March,  1918),  in  the  Ypres 
sector  (April,  1918),  at  the  Chemin 
des  Dames  (May-June,  1918),  be- 
tween Rheims  and  Soissons  (June- July, 
1918),  and  at  the  Marne  (July, 
1918)  ;  as  well  by  the  Allies  at  Neuve 
Chapelle  (March  10,  1915),  in  the 
region  just  north  of  Arras  (May- June, 
1915),  in  Champagne  (September-Oc- 
tober, 1915),  in  Artois,  near  Lens 
(September-October,  1915),  in  the 
Valley  of  the  Somme  (July,  1916- 
March,  1917),  near  Arras  (April- 
June,  1917),  on  the  Aisne  (April-No- 
vember, 1917),  in  Flanders  (July-De- 
cember, 1917).  After  the  failure  of 
the  five  great  German  attempts  be- 
tween March  and  July,  1918,  the  Al- 
lies found  themselves  in  a  position  to 
take  the  offensive.  They  did  not  de- 
pend upon  the  customary  single  huge 
blow  but  struck  a  series  of  smaller 
blows  which  set  the  whole  line  rocking 
from  the  sea  to  the  Swiss  border.  The 
second  Marne  was  won  in  July,  the 
third  Somme  in  August  and  by  Sep- 
tember the  whole  German  line  from 
Rheims  to  Ypres  was  in  a  backward 
movement.  In  September  the  St. 
Mihiel  salient  was  wiped  out  and  an 
advance  on  both  sides  of  the  Argonne 
forest  begun.  Toward  the  end  of  the 
same  month  Foch  struck  in  Flanders 
and  so  on.  By  the  end  of  the  month 
the  Germans  were  back  to  the  starting 
place  of  March  21.  In  October  the 
Allies  smashed  the  Hindenburg  line, 
cleared  the  Belgian  coast,  and  ad- 
vanced along  the  Meuse,  threatening 
all  communications,  and  compelling  the 


THE  WAR  IN  BRIEF 


3 


Germans  to  ask  for  an  armistice  which 
was  granted  on  November  11,  1918. 
(2)  In  the  East  the  initial  Russian  of- 
fensive in  East  Prussia  was  shattered 
by  Hindenburg  at  Tannenberg  (Au- 
gust 26-31,  1914)  ;  an  Austro-German 
counter-invasion  of  Russian  Poland 
was  checked  before  Warsaw  (Febru- 
ary, 1915)  ;  the  Russian  armies  invad- 
ing Galicia  attained  the  passes  of  the 
Carpathians  early  in  1915,  but  were 
completely  expelled  from  Austrian  ter- 
ritory by  "Mackensen's  Drive"  (May- 
June)  ;  and  an  Austro-German  inva- 
sion of  Russia  under  the  masterly  di- 
rection of  Hindenburg,  after  conquer- 
ing Warsaw  (August  4,  1915),  Brest- 
Litovsk  (August  25),  and  Vilna  (Sep- 
tember 18,  1915)  was  halted  only  by 
the  swamps  before  Riga,  the  lakes 
around  Dwinsk,  and  the  Pripet 
marshes.  The  Russians  returning  to 
the  attack  in  1916  (June-August)  re- 
captured the  Volhynian  fortresses  of 
Lutsk  and  Dubno,  conquered  the 
Bukowina,  and  penetrated  up  the 
Dniester  River  as  far  as  Halicz. 
The  Russian  revolution  brought  opera- 
tions on  the  East  Front  to  a  stand- 
still, the  only  outstanding  feature  be- 
ing the  unsuccessful  Russian  offensive 
(July)  and  the  fall  of  Riga  (Septem- 
ber-October, 1917).  Ater  the  Bolshe- 
viki  came  into  power  they  evinced  a 
strong  desire  to  make  peace  and  ulti- 
mately signed  the  treaty  of  Brest- 
Litovsk  (March,  1918).  The  Allies 
determined  to  save  Russia  from  herself 
and  from  Germany  and  sent  an  army 
into  Siberia  (to  aid  the  Czecho-Slo- 
vaks)  and  landed  two  small  forces  at 
Archangel  and  Murman  (July,  1918). 
They  hoped  by  these  means  to  re-es- 
tablish an  Eastern  Front.  After  vary- 
ing success  the  fighting  in  Russia  was 
still  continuing  after  all  the  Central 
Powers  had  signed  an  armistice.      (3) 


After  two  important  Austro-Hungar- 
ian  attempts  to  "punish  Serbia"  had 
failed  (in  August  and  December, 
1914),  a  new  Austro-German  inva- 
sion of  Serbia  was  undertaken  in  Oc- 
tober, 1915,  with  the  aid  of  Bulgaria, 
and  by  December  5,  1915,  Serbia  was 
completely  conquered.  Anglo-French 
forces  endeavoring  to  succor  Serbia 
were  defeated  in  the  battle  of  the  Var- 
dar  (December,  1915),  and  driven 
back  on  their  base  at  Saloniki,  in 
Greek  territory.  Montenegro  and 
northern  Albania  were  overrun  by 
Austrian  and  Bulgar  armies  (Janu- 
ary-February, 1916).  In  the  summer 
of  1916,  the  Allied  army  at  Saloniki 
assumed  the  offensive  and  wrested  the 
iSerbian  town  of  Monastir  from  the 
Bulgarians  (November  19),  but  were 
unable  to  advance  very  much  beyond 
that  point  in  1917,  owing  to  the  com- 
plete downfall  of  Russia  and  Rumania. 
During  July,  1918,  after  initial  suc- 
cesses an  Allied  offensive  in  Albania 
failed.  During  the  succeeding  months 
after  careful  preparation,  the  Allies 
broke  the  Bulgarian  defenses  and  aft- 
er a  series  of  remarkable  victories  com- 
pelled them  to  accept  an  armistice 
(September,  1918),  which  amounted 
to  an  unconditional  surrender. 
(It.)  Rumania,  entering  the  war  on 
August  27,  1916,  too  rashly  sent  her 
armies  to  "emancipate"  Transylvania, 
leaving  the  Dobrudja  undefended 
against  Mackensen;  the  Rumanian  in- 
vaders of  Transylvania  were  thrown 
back  by  Falkenhayn;  and  all  of  Ru- 
mania, excepting  a  small  part  of  Mol- 
davia, was  conquered  by  the  Central 
Powers.  Disclosures  made  by  the  Rus- 
sian revolutionists  show  that  Rumania 
was  betrayed  by  the  Germanophile 
Russian  premier,  Sturmer,  who  failed 
to  send  the  promised  army  to  protect 
Rumania's   flank.      She   was    compelled 


4 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


to   sign   a   humiliating  peace   with   the 
Central  Powers  in  March,  1918.      (5) 
Turkish    armies    held    the    Dardanelles 
against  Anglo-French  attacks  (Febru- 
ary,  1915,  to  January  8,   1916)  ;  de- 
livered   futile    attacks    upon    the    Suez 
Canal;  captured  a  British  army  under 
Gen.      Townshend      in      Mesopotamia 
(April    28,    1916);    and    expelled    the 
Russians    from    Kermanshah    (July    5, 
1916)     and     Hamadan     (August     10, 
1916),  but  were  unable  to  defend  the 
important  Armenian  cities  of  Erzerum 
(February       16,       1916),      Trebizond 
(April   18),   and  Erzingan    (July  25) 
against    Grand    Duke    Nicholas's    ad- 
vance.    Assuming  the  offensive  in  1917 
the  Allies  took  Kut-el-Amara   (Febru- 
ary   24),    Bagdad    (March    10)     and 
Jerusalem      (December     10).      During 
1918  the  Allies   continued  their  offen- 
sive against  the  Turko-German  forces 
in  Asia  Minor  and  succeeded  in  prac- 
tically wiping  them  out.     The  capitu- 
lation of  Bulgaria  placed  Turkey  in  a 
precarious  position  and  compelled  her 
to     sue     for     an     armistice     (October, 
1918).      The    conditions    granted    her 
also  amounted  to  an  unconditional  sur- 
render.   (6)  The  Italians,  having  pain- 
fully   penetrated   into    the    Trentino    a 
few  miles,  were  rudely  repulsed  in  May, 


1916;    towards    Trieste    the    Italians 
made    slow   progress   and    finally    cap- 
tured Gorizia,  August  9,  1916.     Strik- 
ing  out    on    the    Carso    and   Bainsizza 
plateaus   in   the   summer   of   1917,   the 
Italians  were  making  substantial  prog- 
ress    towards     Laibach     and     Trieste, 
when  they  were  again  rudely  repulsed 
by  a  German-Austro  force  and  hurled 
back    to    the    Piave    River    (October- 
December,  1917).     Contrary  to  expec- 
tations the  Central  Powers  did  not  at- 
tempt   to    force    the    Piave    when    the 
fighting  season  of  1918  opened.     The* 
attempt  was  not  made  until  June  and 
then  it  was  severely  checked.     Assum- 
ing the  offensive  in  August   and  Sep- 
tember,   1918,    the    Allies    completely 
broke    through    the    enemy    lines    and 
threw  them  back  in  a  disorderly  rout. 
Austria-Hungary    sued    for    an    armis- 
tice and   received   terms   amounting  to 
unconditional     surrender      (November, 
1918).     (7)  All  of  the  German  colon- 
ies were  taken:  Kiaochow  (in  China)  by 
the  Japanese  (November  6,  1914)  ;  the 
German  island  possessions  in  the  Pacific 
by  British   and  Japanese  expeditions; 
Togoland    (August,    1914),    Kamerun 
(February,   1916),  German  Southwest 
Africa  (July,  1916),  and  German  East 
Africa  (November,  1918). 


II.     UNDERLYING  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR 


In  July,  1914,  the  murder  of  Fran- 
cis Ferdinand,  a  member  of  the  Aus- 
trian   royal    family,    set    in    motion    a 
train    of    events    which    culminated    in 
the    terrible    catastrophe    of    a    great 
European  war.     It  was  clear,  however, 
that  this  crime  was  not  the  real  cause 
of  the  tremendous  struggle  which  many 
of    the    statesmen    and    diplomats    of 
Europe   had    anticipated    and    all   had 
feared    for   many   years.      The    under- 
lying causes  of  this  great  War  of  the 
Nations   reach  far  back  into  the  past 
and  cannot  be  reduced  to   any   simple 
formula.      Some  knowledge  of  the  im- 
portant  political   and   economic   forces 
which     have     shaped     the     history     of 
Europe  during  the  past  century  is  nec- 
essary for  an  adequate  appreciation  of 
the    causes    of    the    great    cataclysm. 
Among   the   many   and    complex   influ- 
ences   which    have    been    suggested    as 
causes    of    the    war,    there    are    three 
forces   which   appear  to   have   contrib- 
uted  most  directly   in   bringing   about 
the    critical    situation    in    Europe    in 
1914.     These  were  (1)  the  clashing  of 
national   interests   and  ideals,   (2)    the 
maintenance    of    a    system    of    military 
alliances,  and  (3)  the  economic  rivalry 
among  the  nations  of  Europe. 

National  Antagonisms.  Viewed  broad- 
ly, the  political  history  of  Europe  in 
the  nineteenth  century  centres  about 
two  movements  which  were  the  in- 
heritance of  the  French  Revolution 
and  the  Napoleonic  wars,  (1)  the 
growth  of  democracy  and  (2)  the 
realization  of  national  liberty.  When 
the  diplomats  of  the  Great  Powers 
met  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna  in  1815 

5 


to  readjust  the  map  of  Europe,  many- 
expressed  the  hope  that  the  Congress 
would  be  guided  in  its  work  by  these 
two  principles.  There  was  much  talk 
of  "the  reconstruction  of  the  moral 
order,"  "the  regeneration  of  the  po- 
litical system  of  Europe,"  of  the  es- 
tablishment "of  an  enduring  peace 
founded  on  a  just  distribution  of  po- 
litical forces,"  and  of  the  formation 
of  an  effective  and  permanent  in- 
ternational tribunal.  Unfortunately 
these  fair  promises  were  not  realized 
and  the  Congress,  instead  of  establish- 
ing a  new  era,  did  its  utmost  to  re- 
store the  old  one.  The  principles  of 
popular  freedom  and  national  liberty 
were  ignored  wherever  it  was  neces- 
sary to  do  so  to  satisfy  the  dynastic 
and  personal  influences  which  domi- 
nated the  Congress. 

In  the  first  place,  as  an  inheritance 
of  the  French  Revolution  these  prin- 
ciples were  anathema  to  the  reaction- 
aries and,  in  the  second  place,  Met- 
ternich,*  the  reactionary  Austrian 
Chancellor  who  dominated  the  Con- 
gress,  realized   that   encouragement   of 

*  Metternich,  Clemexs  Wenzel  Nepomuk 
Lothar,  Prince  (1773-1859).  A  noted  Austrian 
diplomat,  born  at  Coblenz.  Educated  at  Uni- 
versity of  Strassburg  and  studied  law  at  Mainz. 
Diplomatic  career  commenced  at  Congress  of 
Rastadt  (1797-1799).  Became  Austrian  Am- 
bassador at  Dresden  (1801).  Two  years  later 
became  ambassador  to  Prussia  where  he  nego- 
tiated treaty  of  alliance  between  Austria, 
Prussia  and  Russia  against  France  in  1805. 
Went  to  Paris  in  1806  as  ambassador.  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  1809.  Opposed  dismember- 
ment of  France  for  fear  Russia  and  Prussia 
would  become  too  powerful.  Presiding  officer 
of  Congress  of  Vienna.  Inspiring  genius  of 
reactionary  policy  of  Restoration  period.  Aus- 
trian Chancellor,  1821.  Aimed  to  restore  old 
order  as  far  as  possible. 


6 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


the  nationalist  principle  would  endan- 
ger the  heterogeneous  Austrian  domin- 
ions. Consequently  the  work  of  the 
Congress  of  Vienna  was  an  effort  to 
establish  the  status  quo  ante  bellum. 
The  consummation  of  this  aim  caused 
numerous  violations  of  the  principle 
of  nationality.  The  history  of  the 
nineteenth  century  shows  a  number  of 
revolutionary  periods  such  as  1830, 
1848,  1866,  and  1870  which  were  caus- 
ed by  the  determined  efforts  of  the 
liberals  and  radicals  of  Europe  to 
put  into  effect  the  three  cardinal  prin- 
ciples of  the  French  Revolution,  lib- 
erty, equality,  and  fraternity.  The 
last  term  is  praetically  synonymous 
with  the  term  nationality.  Some  of 
the  cruder  violations  of  the  principle 
were  done  away  with  in  the  course  of 
the  century.  For  example,  Belgium 
was  separated  from  Holland  and  Ve- 
netia  and  other  Italian-speaking  sec- 
tions were  taken  away  from  Austria 
and  joined  to  the  newly  created  Ital- 
ian kingdom.  There  remained,  how- 
ever, at  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, a  number  of  situations  which 
clearly  violated  the  principle  of  na- 
tional sovereignty.  The  completion 
of  German  unity  in  1871  was  accom- 
panied by  the  violation  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  French  nationality  in  the  an- 
nexation of  the  territories  of  Alsace 
and  Lorraine  after  the  Franco-Prus- 
sian War.  The  reasons  for  the  an- 
nexations of  these  territories  were 
partially  economic  and  partially  po- 
litical. The  Germans  wished  to  wipe 
out  the  memories  of  French  aggression 
after  the  Battle  of  Jena  during  the 
Napoleonic  period.  They  also  wished 
to  obtain  the  extremely  valuable  coal 
and  iron  mines  which  were  in  these 
territories.  It  was  an  ever  present 
challenge  to  the  French  people  to  at- 
tempt   to    regain   these   lost   provinces 


and  a  constant  reminder  of  the  hu- 
miliation which  they  had  suffered  at 
the  hands  of  Germany.  On  the  other 
hand  it  was  used  by  Bismarck  *  and 
the  Prussian  military  party  to  justify 
their  programme  of  huge  military 
armaments  in  Germany. 

Nowhere  else  in  Europe  was  the 
problem  of  nationality  so  acute  dur- 
ing the  nineteenth  century  as  in  Aus- 
tria-Hungary. The  very  existence  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  has 
been  a  constant  challenge  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  nationality.  Logically  car- 
ried out  this  principle  would  mean 
the  disappearance  of  Austria-Hungary 
and  the  distribution  of  its  territory 
among  the  surrounding  nations.  The 
appreciation  of  this  fact  by  the  Aus- 
trian authorities  made  them  apprehen- 
sive of  all  nationalist  movements,  and 
especially  that  of  the  southern  Slavs. 
As  will  be  seen  it  was  the  outgrowth 
of  one  of  these  movements  which  pre- 
cipitated the  crisis  which  led  to  the 
outbreak  of  the  war. 

The  Balkan  states  presented  a  pe- 
culiarly vexing  problem  in  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  principle  of  nationality. 
The  intricate  mixture  of  racial  groups 
in  this  region  made  it  an  almost  hope- 

*  BlSMAHCK-SCHONHATJSEN,  KARL  OtTO 

Eduard  Leopold  vox,  Prince  (1815-98).  A 
famous  Prussian  diplomat  and  statesman,  born 
in  the  district  of  Magdeburg,  Prussia.  From 
1832-33  he  was  a  student  of  jurisprudence  and 
political  science.  Entered  First  General  Diet 
of  Prussia  (1847).  Champion  of  ultra-con- 
servative measures.  Advocated  increased  pow- 
ers of  monarchy  in  Erfurt  Parliament  (1850). 
As  Prussian  Ambassador  to  Germanic  Diet  at 
Frankfort  adopted  policy  of  hostility  to  Aus- 
tria. Head  of  Prussian  cabinet  and  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  (1862).  Governed  without 
a  budget  and  parliamentary  majority.  To 
unify  Germany  under  Prussia  adopted  ruth- 
less policy,  "mighty  problems  of  age  to  be 
solved  by  blood  and  iron."  Forced  out  Austria 
and  in  1871  Germanic  states  formed  an  empire 
with  Prussian  King  as  Emperor.  Introduced 
state  socialism  as  a  means  of  fighting  social- 
ism. He  was  a  bitter  opponent  of  the  Roman 
Catholic  church,  being  the  author  of  the  famous 
"May   Laws,"  of  1873-74-75. 


UNDERLYING  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR 


less  task  to  arrange  geographical 
boundaries  to  correspond  with  na- 
tional lines.  The  problem  was  com- 
plicated, moreover,  by  the  clashing  of 
the  interests  of  the  great  European 
Powers,  especially  Austria  and  Rus- 
sia, in  this  territory.  The  condition 
of  chronic  disorder  and  strife  in  this 
region  during  the  nineteenth  century 
was  a  source  of  almost  constant  con- 
cern to  the  diplomats  of  the  great 
European  states. 

While  the  triumph  of  the  ideal  of 
nationality  has  done  much  to  advance 
European  civilization,  it  has  not  been 
an  unmixed  blessing.  Too  often  na- 
tional patriotism  became  a  fetish.  Love 
of  one's  country  meant  a  lack  of  ap- 
preciation of  or  a  contempt  for  the 
people  of  other  countries ;  a  feeling 
that  the  "kultur"  of  one's  country  was 
not  only  different  from  but  distinctly 
superior  to  that  of  any  other  country. 
From  this  it  naturally  followed  that  it 
was  a  laudable  ambition  to  wish  to  im- 
pose one's  superior  civilization  upon 
an  inferior  people. 

"If  it  were  possible,"  says  Prince 
Bernhard  von  Biilow  *  in  his  book  on 
Imperial  Germany,  "for  members  of 
different  nationalities,  with  different 
language  and  customs,  and  an  intel- 
lectual life  of  a  different  kind,  to  hve 
side  by  side  in  one  and  the  same 
state,  without  succumbing  to  the  temp- 
tation of  each  trying  to  force  his  own 

*  Bulow,  Bernhard,  Prince  von.  A  former 
German  Chancellor,  born  (1849)  at  Klein- 
Flottbeck,  Holstein.  Studied  at  Lausanne, 
L,eipsic,  and  Berlin.  Served  in  Franco-Prus- 
sian War  and  entered  German  Foreign  Office 
in  1874.  Served  as  secretary  of  legations  at 
various  capitals  and  also  ambassador.  Ap- 
pointed Foreign  Secretary  in  1897  and  Chancel- 
lor of  the  German  Empire  and  Prime  Minister 
of  Prussia  in  1900.  His  diplomacy  shaped  by 
emperor.  Against  ambition  of  France  in  Mo- 
rocco and  led  to  Algeciras  conference  (1906). 
Able  to  control  majority  in  Reichstag  until 
1909  when  failure  of  budget  led  to  resigna- 
tion. 


nationality  on  the  other,  things  on 
earth  would  look  a  good  deal  more 
peaceful.  But  it  is  a  law  of  life  and 
development  in  history  that  where  two 
national  civilizations  meet  they  fight 
for  ascendancy.  In  the  struggle  be- 
tween nationalities,  one  nation  is  the 
hammer  and  the  other  the  anvil;  one 
is  the  victor  and  the  other  the  van- 
quished." Prince  von  Billow's  words 
really  go  to  the  root  of  the  whole 
trouble  in  European  politics.  They 
show  clearly  that  exaggerated  idea  of 
the  inevitable  antagonism  of  national 
interests  which  dominated  European 
politics  during  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury. 

In  its  extreme  form  this  national 
spirit  has  found  expression  in  move- 
ments .  to  unite  various  related  ethnic 
and  racial  groups  into  one  political 
group.  Such  movements  have  been 
more  or  less  prominent  in  Germany, 
Russia,  and  the  Balkan  states  under 
the  names  Pan-Germanism,  Panslav- 
ism,  Pan-Serbianism,  etc.  It  is  doubt- 
ful whether  any  of  these  movements 
had  passed  beyond  the  state  of  vague 
aspirations  held  by  a  comparatively 
small  group  of  people.  As  a  con- 
tributing cause  of  the  war  the  Pan- 
slavic  and  Pan-Serbian  movements 
were  of  some  importance.  The  growth 
of  such  propaganda  was  a  source  of 
concern  to  Austria-Hungary,  with  its 
large  Slavic  population. 

Pan-Germanism. — The  Pan-German 
movement  was  an  outgrowth  of  Ger- 
man imperialism  and  of  the  exag- 
gerated race  consciousness  of  the  Ger- 
mans. Roughly  stated,  this  movement 
conceives  the  German  people  wherever 
located  as  forming  one  great  nation- 
ality. Some  Pan-Germanists  deny  any 
political  or  territorial  ambitions  and 
assert  that  they  wish  merely  to  spread 
the     knowledge     of     German     culture 


8 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


throughout  the  world.  Others,  more1 
radical,  proclaimed  the  ultimate  domi- 
nation of  the  world  by  the  German 
race.  The  German  authorities  re- 
peatedly stated  that  the  Pan-German 
movement  had  no  official  sanction  and 
that  it  was  the  work  of  only  a  very 
small  part  of  the  German  people.  How- 
ever, what  the  movement  has  lacked 
in  numbers  it  has  made  up  in  activity. 
Prominent  historians,  scientists,  and 
other  writers  expounded  its  views,  while 
numerous  societies  had  been  formed  to 
advance  German  ideas  of  culture  and 
civilization  throughout  the  civilized 
world. 

One  or  two  quotations  will  serve  to 
show  the  attitude  of  some  of  the  lead- 
ers of  the  Pan-German  movement. 
Von  Bernhardi  said  on  one  occasion: 
"Our  next  war  will  be  fought  for  the 
highest  interests  of  our  country  and  of 
mankind.  This  will  invest  it  with  im- 
portance in  the  world's  history. 
'World  power  or  downfall !'  will  be  our 
rallying  cry. 

"Keeping  this  idea  before  us,  we 
must  prepare  for  war  with  the  confi- 
dent intention  of  conquering  and  with 
the  iron  resolve  to  persevere  to  the 
end,  come  what  may." 

The  French  Yellow  Book  quotes 
from  an  official  secret  report  the  fol- 
lowing: "Neither  ridiculous  shriek- 
ings  for  revenge  by  French  chauvin- 
ists, nor  the  Englishmen's  gnashing  of 
teeth,  nor  the  wild  gestures  of  the 
Slavs  will  turn  us  from  our  aim  of 
protecting  and  extending  Deutschtum 
(German  influence)  all  the  world 
over." 

The  Kaiser  said  in  the  course  of  a 
speech  in  July,  1900:  "Germany's 
greatness  makes  it  impossible  for  her 
to  do  without  the  ocean,  but  the  ocean 
also  proves  that  even  in  the  distance, 
and   on  its   farther  side,  without  Ger- 


many and  the  German  Emperor  no 
great  decision  dare  henceforth  be 
taken. 

"I  do  not  believe  that  thirty  years 
ago  our  German  people,  under  the 
leadership  of  their  princes,  bled  and 
conquered  in  order  that  they  might  be 
shoved  aside  when  great  decisions  are 
to  be  made  in  foreign  politics.  If  that 
could  happen,  the  idea  that  the  Ger- 
man people  are  to  be  considered  a 
world  power  would  be  dead  and  done 
for,  and  it  is  not  my  will  that  this 
would  happen.  To  this  end  it  is  only 
my  duty  and  my  finest  privilege  to  use 
the  proper  and,  if  need  be,  the  most 
drastic  means  without  fear  of  conse- 
quences. I  am  convinced  that  in  this 
course  I  have  the  German  princes  and 
the  German  people  firmly  behind  me." 

In  another  speech  in  October,  1900, 
the  Kaiser  said:  "Our  German  Fath- 
erland, (to)  which  I  hope  will  be 
granted,  through  the  harmonious  co- 
operation of  princes  and  peoples,  of  its 
armies  and  its  citizens,  to  become  in 
the  future  as  closely  united,  as  power- 
ful, and  as  authoritative  as  once  the 
Roman  world-empire  was,  and  that, 
just  as  in  the  old  times  they  said 
'Civis  romanus  sum,'  hereafter,  at 
some  time  in  the  future,  they  will  say 
'I  am  a  German  citizen.'  " 

Military  Alliances.  The  obsession 
of  national  jealousy  led  inevitably  to 
the  view  that  it  was  necessary  to  de- 
fend nationalism  with  huge  armaments. 
The  remarkable  success  of  Bismarck  in 
uniting  Germany  by  a  policy  of  blood 
and  iron  was  used  as  an  object  lesson 
by  the  militarists  of  Germany  and  oth- 
er nations.  War  was  glorified  as  an 
institution  in  itself,  not  simply  as  a 
means    to    an    end.      Says    Bernhardi,* 

*  Friedrich  von  Bernhardi,  born  (1849)  at 
St.  Petersburg,  son  of  a  German  diplomat; 
served  in  Franco-Prussian  War;  general  of 
cavalry  and  commander  of  the  Seventh  Army 


UNDERLYING  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR 


9 


one  of  the  leading  exponents  of  this 
school,  "War  is  in  itself  a  good  thing. 
It  is  a  biological  necessity  of  the  first 
importance."  And  again,  "The  in- 
evitableness,  the  idealism,  the  blessing 
of  war  as  an  indispensable  and  stimu- 
lating law  of  development  must  be  re- 
peatedly emphasized."  John  Adam 
Cramb,*  an  English  historian,  pre- 
dicted a  war  between  Germany  and 
England  and  warned  England  to  pre- 
pare for  it.  Everywhere  the  doctrine 
of  military  preparedness  was  advocat- 
ed and  it  bore  fruit  in  the  tremendous 
standing  armies  and  huge  navies  of  the 
different  European  countries.  It  led 
also  to  the  grouping  of  the  great 
European  Powers  into  two  hostile  mili- 
tary alliances. 

When  the  representatives  of  the 
European  Powers  met  at  the  Congress 
of  Vienna  in  1815,  there  was  organized 
the  so-called  Concert  of  Europe,  by 
which  it  was  hoped  that  the  problems 
of  European  politics  would  be  adjust- 
ed. For  some  years  congresses  rep- 
resenting the  Great  Powers  were  held 
at  which  international  questidns  were 
considered  and  efforts  made  to  main- 
tain the  balance  of  power  in  Europe. 
After  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury,   however,    the    influence    of    this 

Corps  (1908);  retired  (1909),  but  in  1915,  dur- 
ing the  European  War,  assigned  to  field  com- 
mand at  his  own  request.  His  writings,  for 
which  he  is  known  internationally,  are  con- 
cerned with  German  military  progress  and  with 
an  expected  war  for  the  advancement  of  Pan- 
Germanism  and  expansion.  In  English  have 
appeared:  Cavalry  in  War  and  Peace  (1910); 
On  War  of  To-Bay,  Britain  as  Germany's  Vas- 
sal, and  Germanv  and  the  Next  War  (all 
191-1) ;  The  New  Bcrnhardi:  "World  Power  or 
Borcnfall"  (1915),  a  collection  of  articles  writ- 
ten during  the  European  War. 

*John  Adam  Cramb  (1862-1913),  educated 
at  Glasgow  and  Bonn;  from  1893  to  his  death 
professor  of  modern  history  at  Queen's  College, 
London:  also  lectured  at  other  institutions  and 
gave  private  courses;  author  of  Germany  and 
England  (1914)  and  The  Origins  and  Bestiny 
of  Imperial  Britain  and  Nineteenth  Century 
Europe   (1915). 


Concert      was      materially      weakened. 

A  political  transformation  of 
Europe  occurred  in  the  decade  between 
1860  and  1870,  culminating  in  the 
creation  of  two  new  European  states, 
Germany  and  Italy.  The  appearance 
of  these  two  states  in  the  family  of 
European  nations  seriously  disturbed 
the  old  political  relations.  Bismarck, 
who  had  been  largely  instrumental  in 
the  creation  of  the  German  Empire, 
adopted  as  his  guiding  principle  a  sys- 
tem of  firm  alliances  rather  than  de- 
pendence upon  the  more  loosely  consti- 
tuted European  Concert.  In  an  effort 
to  isolate  France,  he  first  strove  to 
unite  Russia,  German}^,  and  Austria  in 
a  defensive  alliance.  When  Russia  with- 
drew from  this  alliance  on  account  of 
antagonism  to  Austria,  Bismarck  de- 
voted his  efforts  to  binding  together 
more  closely  the  two  Teutonic  Pow- 
ers. Italy  later  (1882)  joined  with 
the  Central  Powers  to  form  the  Triple 
Alliance. 

Italy's  alliance  with  the  Teutonic 
Powers  was  largely  a  result  of  her  re- 
sentment against  France  because  of 
the  latter's  acquisition  of  Tunis  in 
1881.  Checkmated  by  France,  Italy 
turned  to  the  Germanic  Powers  and 
joined  an  unnatural  alliance.  It  was 
unnatural  because  Austria  had  con- 
sistently opposed  Italian  unity  as  well 
as  on  account  of  clashes  of  economic 
interests  in  the  Balkan  peninsula. 

This  organization  of  the  states  of 
central  Europe  into  a  strong  military 
alliance  was  an  invitation  to  the  other 
states  of  Europe  to  create  an  oppos- 
ing alliance  in  order  to  maintain  the 
balance  of  power.  First  France  and 
Russia,  drawn  together  by  mutual  hos- 
tility to  Germany,  formed  a  Dual  Al- 
liance (1895)  and  finally  Great  Brit- 
ain, aroused  by  the  threatening  naval 
policy  of  Germany,  abandoned  her  pol- 


10 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


icy  of  "splendid  isolation,"  and  joined 
with  France  and  Russia  to  form  a  sec- 
ond diplomatic  group  known  as  the 
Triple  Entente.  England  was  com- 
pelled to  smooth  over  difficulties  which 
existed  between  herself  and  her  two 
allies.  She  clashed  with  France  in 
Northern  Africa,  in  Siam,  and  over 
the  Newfoundland  fisheries.  She  was 
opposed  to  the  extension  of  Russian 
influence  in  the  Balkans  as  well  as  to 
the  advance  towards  India  in  Asia. 
Due  largely  to  the  efforts  of  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey,  these  misunderstandings 
were  cleared  up  and  a  "diplomatic 
group"  was  established.  The  precise 
nature  of  this  understanding  was  in- 
definite, there  being  no  treaty  agree- 
ment specifying  its  scope.  The  for- 
mation of  these  two  rival  military 
groups  created  a  situation  in  Europe 
where  every  disturbance  of  the  po- 
litical or  diplomatic  status  quo 
brought  on  a  crisis.  Since  1905 
Europe  has  passed  through  several 
such  crises,  each  one  increasing  the 
tension  among  the  Great  Powers  and 
each  making  the  maintenance  of  peace 
more  difficult. 

The  first  of  these  crises  came  in 
1905  in  a  dispute  over  Morocco.  A 
part  of  the  understanding  reached  be- 
tween England  and  France  in  1904 
provided  that  France  should  have  a 
free  hand  in  Morocco,  while  England 
was  given  a  free  hand  in  Egypt.  Ger- 
many, which  had  abandoned  Bis- 
marck's policy  of  opposition  to  co- 
lonial expansion,  was  looking  about  for 
such  stray  portions  of  undeveloped 
land  as  had  not  been  appropriated  by 
England  and  France.  Germany  had 
to  choose  between  two  courses.  Eith- 
er she  could  frankly  recognize  the  in- 
evitable consequences  of  her  geograph- 
ical position  and  her  late  entrance  in- 
to the  field  as  a  colonial  power,  which 


handicapped  her  development  as  a 
world  state,  or  she  might  determine  to 
challenge  the  more  fortunately  sit- 
uated and  longer  established  world 
powers  and  create  for  herself  a  larger 
"place  in  the  sun."  She  chose  the  lat- 
ter alternative.  With  a  rapidly  in- 
creasing population,  it  became  a  ques- 
tion whether  even  her  remarkable  in- 
dustrial development  would  accommo- 
date the  added  millions  of  population. 
It  is  true  that  at  this  time  Germany 
imported  unskilled  agricultural  labor 
from  Russia,  and  that  there  was  no 
alarming  emigration  from  Germany. 
But  the  future  held  out  the  prospect 
of  a  large  emigration  of  Germans  to 
other  countries,  and  the  Germans  re- 
sented the  loss  of  this  good  German 
stock  to  the  Fatherland.  Colonies 
where  Germans  might  be  kept  under 
German  control  were  felt  to  be  the 
great  need.  Germany  therefore  deter- 
mined not  to  stand  quietly  by  and  al- 
low further  colonial  acquisitions  by 
the  other  great  European  Powers  with- 
out making  an  effort  to  share  in  the 
spoils. 

The  Russo-Japanese  War  (1904- 
1905)  had  revealed  the  military  weak- 
ness and  inefficiency  of  Russia.  This 
situation  made  Russia's  support  of 
France  much  less  valuable  and  Ger- 
many felt  that  it  was  an  opportune 
time  to  assert  her  position  in  regard 
to  Morocco.  On  March  21,  1905,  the 
German  Emperor,  while  on  a  voyage 
to  Constantinople,  disembarked  at 
Tangier  and  encouraged  the  Sultan  to 
reject  the  scheme  of  reforms  pro- 
posed by  France.  He,  moreover,  suc- 
ceeded in  forcing  France  to  submit 
the  whole  Moroccan  question  to  a  con- 
ference of  the  Powers  held  at  Algeciras 
in  January,  1906.  England  firmly 
supported  France  and  let  it  be  known 
that    any    interference    with    France's 


UNDERLYING  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR 


11 


predominant  position  in  Morocco 
would  be  resisted  by  her.  Italy,  more- 
over, refused  to  support  her  ally,  with 
the  result  that  France  scored  a  dis- 
tinct diplomatic  victory. 

One  phase  of  Germany's  policy  of 
colonial  and  commercial  expansion 
contemplated  the  extension  of  Teu- 
tonic commercial  and  political  inter- 
ests in  the  Balkans  and  Turkey.  In 
this  "Drang  nach  Osten"  Germany,  in 
conjunction  with  Austria,  hoped  to 
create  a  great  economic,  if  not  politi- 
cal, sphere  of  influence  extending 
through  the  Balkans  to  Constantino- 
ple and  thence  through  Turkey  in  Asia 
to  the  Persian  Gulf.  German  engineers 
and  German  capitalists  began  to  de- 
velop Turkish  resources.  German  mili- 
tary officials  trained  the  Turkish 
forces. 

As  an  example  of  the  importance 
that  the  Pan-Germanist  element  placed 
upon  the  movement  toward  the  south- 
east, the  following  quotation  is  given 
from  a  book  entitled,  Asia,  by  Fried- 
rich  Naumann  (1900):  "All  weaken- 
ing of  German  national  energy  by 
pacifist  associations  or  analogous  ac- 
tivities reinforces  the  formidably  in- 
creasing power  of  those  who  rule  to- 
day from  the  Cape  to  Cairo,  from 
Ceylon  to  the  Polar  Sea.  .  .  .  No 
truce  with  England.  Let  our  policy  be 
a  national  policy. 

"This  must  be  the  mainspring  of  our 
action  in  the  eastern  question.  This 
is  the  fundamental  reason  which  ne- 
cessitates our  political  indifference  to 
the  sufferings  of  Christians  in  the 
Turkish  Empire,  painful  as  these  must 
be  to  our  private  feelings.  If  Turkey 
were  disintegrated  to-day,  the  frag- 
ments of  her  empire  would  become  the 
sport  of  the  great  powers,  and  we  would 
be  left  with  nothing,  as  has  happened 
so  often  in  the  past.     We  must  retard 


the  catastrophe.  Let  Turkey  have 
any  constitution  she  likes,  so  long  as 
she  can  keep  herself  afloat  a  while 
longer. 

"Bismarck  taught  us  to  make  a  dis- 
tinction between  our  foreign  policy 
and  our  domestic  policy.  The  same 
thing  applies  to  the  Christian  mis- 
sions. As  Christians  we  desire  the 
propagation  of  the  faith  by  which  we 
were  saved.  But  it  is  not  the  task  of 
our  policy  to  concern  itself  with  Chris- 
tian missions. 

"The  truth  here,  as  elsewhere,  is 
that  we  must  find  out  which  is  the 
greatest  and  morally  the  most  impor- 
tant task.  When  the  choice  has  been 
made,  there  must  be  no  tergiversation. 
William  II  has  made  his  choice;  he  is 
the  friend  of  the  Padishah,  because  he 
believes  in  a  greater  Germany.   .  .   . 

"Imagine  a  few  firm,  rigid,  incor- 
ruptible officials  at  the  head  of  a  ter- 
ritory like  Palestine  scouring  the  coun- 
try on  horseback  with  European 
promptitude.  They  would  be  as  much 
abused  as  Satan,  but  as  useful  as 
angels.  .  .  . 

"A  sort  of  amicable  dictatorship 
would  be  set  up,  which  would  often 
address  Turkey  as  the  bird  of  the 
proverb  was  addressed,  'Eat  or  die.' 
.  .  .  Meanwhile  Germans  would  be  set- 
tling upon  all  the  shores  of  the  Medi- 
terranean. Good  luck  to  you,  my 
brethren.  Work  hard.  Bestir  your- 
selves. The  old  sea  will  yet  behold 
many  things.  You  hold  in  your  hands 
a  morsel  of  Germany's  future  life." 

In  July,  1908,  a  revolution,  led  by 
the  Young  Turks,  broke  out  in  Con- 
stantinople. Taking  advantage  of  this 
situation  Bulgaria  annexed  eastern 
Rumelia  and  declared  her  complete  in- 
dependence of  Turkey.  Austria  felt 
the  time  opportune  to  annex  Bosnia 
and     Herzegovina,     which     had     been 


12 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


placed  under  her  administration  in 
1878  by  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  main- 
ly through  the  efforts  of  Bismarck. 
This  action  of  Austria  irritated  Italy 
and  aroused  Serbia,  which  latter  had 
hoped  to  bring  these  provinces,  closely 
related  to  her  in  blood,  into  a  Greater 
Serbia.  Russia  protested  against  Aus- 
tria's violation  of  the  Treaty  of  Ber- 
lin, but  Germany  stood  by  her  ally, 
and  Russia,  unprepared  for  war,  was 
forced  to  submit.  The  Teutonic  al- 
lies had  scored  a  distinct  diplomatic 
success  and  another  European  crisis 
was  passed. 

Once  again  in  1911,  the  Moroccan 
question  brought  Europe  to  the  verge 
of  war.  Germany  had  not  accepted 
with  good  grace  her  diplomatic  defeat 
at  Algeciras,  and  watched  with  an  in- 
creasing irritation  the  extension  of 
French  influence  and  control  in  Mo- 
rocco. Germany  complained  that 
France  was  not  observing  the  policy 
of  equal  commercial  opportunity  for 
all  nations  and  on  July  1,  1911,  the 
German  cruiser  Panther  appeared  off 
Agadir  with  the  avowed  purpose  of 
protecting  German  interests.  Both 
England  and  France  likewise  sent 
ships  there,  and  for  several  months 
European  peace  hung  in  the  balance. 
A  compromise  was  finally  reached 
whereby  Germany  recognized  France's 
predominant  position  in  Morocco  while 
in  return  Germany  received  100,000 
square  miles  of  the  French  Congo. 

Hardly  had  this  second  Moroccan 
crisis  been  passed  when  the  delicate 
balance  in  European  politics  was  dis- 
turbed by  the  Turco-Italian  War.  Dis- 
appointed in  her  desire  to  obtain 
Tunis,  Italy  turned  her  attentions  to 
the  neighboring  Turkish  province  of 
Tripoli  and  gradually  extended  her 
economic  interests  there.  Friction  de- 
veloped with  the  corrupt  and  inefficient 


Turkish  authorities  and  in  September, 
1911,  the  Italian  government  demand- 
ed that  Turkey  place  the  provinces  of 
Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica  under  Italian 
control.  Upon  Turkey's  refusal  Italy 
declared  war  and  after  a  long  cam- 
paign succeeded  in  occupying  the  ter- 
ritory. Germany  was  placed  in  the 
difficult  position  of  seeing  her  protege 
Turkey  despoiled  by  her  ally  Italy. 
She  was,  however,  powerless  to  prevent 
Italy  from  carrying  through  her  de- 
signs for  fear  that  the  latter  might 
desert  the  Triple  Alliance  and  join  the 
Entente. 

The  Turco-Italian  War  was  a  pre- 
lude to  a  much  more  serious  and  far- 
reaching  upheaval  in  the  Turkish  do- 
minions. The  policy  of  the  Young 
Turks  after  the  revolution  of  1908,  in 
attempting  to  build  up  a  strong,  uni- 
fied Ottoman  nation,  stirred  the  smol- 
dering embers  of  the  rival  nationalities 
in  the  Balkans.  The  Greeks,  Bulgar- 
ians, Serbs,  and  Montenegrins  resented 
the  attempt  to  Ottomanize  their  fellow 
nationals  in  Macedonia  and  Albania. 
Putting  aside  for  the  moment  their 
own  rivalries  these  four  Powers  or- 
ganized the  Balkan  League,  and  sub- 
mitted to  Turkey  a  demand  for  far- 
reaching  reforms  in  Macedonia.  The 
European  Powers  quickly  saw  the  dan- 
ger of  a  European  war  if  the  Balkan 
situation  was  disturbed  and  they 
served  notice  on  the  Allies  that  under 
no  conditions  would  they  allow  a  modi- 
fication of  the  territorial  status  quo 
in  the  Balkans.  Undeterred  by  this 
threat  of  European  intervention  the 
Allies  declared  war  on  Turkey  in  Oc- 
tober, 1912,  and  after  a  series  of  bril- 
liant campaigns,  completely  routed  the 
Turks  and  drove  them  to  the  gates  of 
Constantinople.  As  the  Allies  had  an- 
ticipated, the  European  Powers  did 
not  make  good  their  threat  to  restore 


UNDERLYING  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR 


13 


the  status  quo.  When  it  came  to  a  di- 
vision of  the  spoils  the  old  rivalries 
among  the  Allies  once  more  appeared. 
Serbia  had  been  thwarted  in  her  de- 
sire to  obtain  Albania  by  the  opposi- 
tion of  Italy  and  Austria.  This  led 
to  a  demand  by  Serbia  for  a  modifica- 
tion of  the  agreement  for  the  divisions 
of  the  territory  made  by  the  Allies 
before  the  war.  To  this  Bulgaria 
would  not  consent  and  Serbia,  Greece, 
and  Montenegro  combined  against 
their  former  ally.  Rumania  and  Tur- 
key also  joined  Bulgaria's  enemies 
with  the  result  that  Bulgaria's  forces 
were  quickly  overwhelmed.  The  strug- 
gle closed  in  August,  1913,  and  Bul- 
garia was  forced  to  give  up  a  large 
part  of  the  conquered  Turkish  terri- 
tory. 

As  a  result  of  interference  by  the 
great  Powers  of  Europe  an  autonom- 
ous Albania  was  established  under  the 
kingship  of  William  Frederick  of 
Wied,  a  German  mediatized  prince. 
This  effectively  thwarted  Serbia's  de- 
sire for  a  seaport  on  the  Adriatic. 

The  outcome  of  the  Balkan  wars 
was  a  bitter  disappointment  to  Ger- 
many and  Austria.  Not  only  had 
their  protege  Turkey  been  practically 
driven  from  Europe,  but  the  creation 
of  a  greater  Serbia  and  the  strength- 
ening of  Greece  and  Bulgaria  checked 
the  plans  of  Austria  to  reach  the 
^Egean  Sea  at  Saloniki.  Russian  in- 
fluence, too,  had  been  greatly  in- 
creased in  the  Balkans  by  the 
strengthening  of  the  Slavic  states. 

That  Germany  appreciated  the  seri- 
ous blow  which  had  been  dealt  to  Teu- 
tonic influence  in  the  Balkans  was  in- 
dicated by  the  introduction  in  Febru- 
ary, 1913,  of  a  new  army  bill.  This 
was  defended  on  the  ground  that  the 
outcome  of  the  Balkan  wars  had  seri- 
ously disturbed   the  balance   of  power 


in  central  Europe  to  the  detriment  of 
Austria  and  Germany. 

To  the  peace  footing  of  the  German 
army  were  added  117,000  men  and 
19,000  officers,  bringing  the  total 
strength  of  the  peace  army,  including 
auxiliary  services,  up  to  870,000.  Im- 
mediately the  Superior  Council  of  War 
in  France  replied  to  the  German  chal- 
lenge by  proposing  March  4,  that  the 
term  of  military  service  be  increased 
from  2  to  3  years,  in  order  to  aug- 
ment the  strength  and  improve  the  or- 
ganization of  the  French  army.  It 
should  be  noted  that  the  German  in- 
crease was  proposed  first,  that  it  was 
approved  by  the  Bundesrath  on  March 
28,  and  that  it  was  finally  passed  by 
the  Reichstag  on  June  30,  1913,  three 
weeks  before  the  French  Three- Year 
Law  was  passed  by  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  July  19.  Russia,  the  ally 
of  France,  and  Austria-Hungary,  the 
ally  of  Germany,  likewise  made  war- 
like preparations.  In  July  the  Duma 
authorized  a  new  army  budget  and 
the  lengthening  of  military  service 
from  3  to  3y±  years ;  General  Joffre, 
the  French  commander-in-chief,  vis- 
ited Russia  in  August,  1913,  to  con- 
fer on  the  reorganization  of  the  Rus- 
sian army.  Austria-Hungary  intro- 
duced a  new  scheme  whereby  her  peace 
army  was  increased  from  463,000  to 
560,000 ;  and  enormous  sums  were  ap- 
propriated for  the  provision  of  artil- 
lery. Even  the  smaller  states  of  the 
Balkan,  Iberian,  and  Scandinavian 
peninsulas  caught  the  contagion  of  the 
army  fever.  The  most  ominous  fea- 
ture of  all  this  military  preparation 
was  the  fear  and  hatred  it  inspired. 
France  introduced  three-year  service 
because  she  feared  the  German  army, 
with  its  corps  at  Metz,  Saarbriicken, 
and  Strassburg.  When  little  Belgium 
introduced    universal    military    service 


14 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


and  planned  to  create  a  field  army  of 
150,000  in  addition  to  garrisons  of 
130,000  men,  the  explanation  was 
frankly  made  that  the  recent  construc- 
tion of  German  railways  leading  to  the 
Belgian  frontier,  without  obvious  eco- 
nomic purpose,  signified  that  Germany 
was  preparing  to  transport  troops  in- 
to and  through  Belgium  in  case  of  a 
Franco-German  war.  Similarly  Ger- 
many was  alarmed  by  the  projected 
construction  of  new  Russian  railways, 
which  would  facilitate  Russian  mobili- 
zation against  Germany.  And  in  the 
spring  of  1914  a  veritable  panic  was 
created  in  the  German  and  Austro- 
Hungarian  press,  by  articles  in  the 
Cologne  Gazette,  Germania,  the  Post, 
and  the  Berliner  Tageblatt,  comment- 
ing on  the  Russian  preparations, 
which  would  be  perfected  in  a  year  or 
two.  Bernhardi,  in  the  Post,  warned 
Germany  to  be  ready  for  a  war  in  the 
near  future.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  St.  Petersburg  (Petrograd)  Bir- 
shewija  Wjedomosti  on  June  13,  1914, 
declared  that,  "France  and  Russia  do 
not  desire  war,  but  Russia  is  pre- 
pared, and  hopes  that  France  will 
likewise  be  prepared."  Thus  national 
militarism  created  the  situation  out  of 
which  grew  the  War  of  the  Nations — 
the  nations  of  Europe  armed  to  the 
teeth,  regarding  each  other  with  in- 
sane fear,  awaiting  the  inevitable  con- 
flict. 

Economic  Causes.  Some  advocates 
of  the  economic  interpretation  of  his- 
tory seek  to  place  all  historical  facts 
on  an  economic  basis.  To  this  school 
of  historical  writers  this  war  is  ex- 
plained almost  entirely  on  economic 
grounds.  While  it  is  quite  possible  to 
exaggerate  this  economic  motive,  there 
is  no  question  that  economic  consid- 
erations played  an  important  part  in 
bringing    about    the    situation    which 


precipitated  the  European  crisis. 
Some  of  these  economic  influences  may 
be  briefly  stated. 

At  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury there  occurred  in  Europe  a  com- 
plete transformation  of  industrial  con- 
ditions known  as  the  industrial  revolu- 
tion. The  invention  of  improved 
methods  of  spinning  and  weaving,  the 
application  of  steam  power,  the  sub- 
stitution of  the  factory  system  for  the 
former  method  of  cottage  industry, 
and  the  appearance  of  distinct  cap- 
italist and  laboring  classes  were  the 
most  striking  features  of  this  revolu- 
tion in  industrial  life. 

England  was  the  first  country  to 
feel  the  effects  of  this  change.  Fac- 
tories began  to  turn  out  large  quan- 
tities of  manufactured  commodities, 
more  than  enough  to  supply  the  home 
market.  For  a  time  England  had  a 
practical  monopoly  of  the  field,  and 
had  no  difficulty  in  disposing  of  her 
surplus  products  in  the  markets  of  the 
world.  But  the  industrial  revolution 
in  time  reached  other  countries ; 
France  in  the  period  after  1830,  the 
United  States  in  the  period  following 
the  Civil  War,  and  Germany  in  the 
period  after  1880.  The  great  indus- 
trial interests  in  these  countries  began 
to  compete  with  those  of  England  for 
the  control  of  the  markets  of  the 
world.  England  had  the  advantage  of 
having  vast  colonial  possessions  which 
might  serve  both  as  a  market  for  her 
manufactured  products  and  as  a  field 
for  the  investment  of  surplus  capital 
in  the  development  of  their  natural 
resources.  France  and  the  United 
States,  in  a  lesser  degree,  also  enjoyed 
this  advantage.  Germany,  on  the 
other  hand,  because  of  her  late  ap- 
pearance as  a  great  power,  was  prac- 
tically without  colonial  possessions  of 
any  potential  value.     She  felt  that  her 


UNDERLYING  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR 


15 


industrial  development  was  being  ham- 
pered through  no  fault  of  her  own,  but 
simply  because  the  best  parts  of  the 
world  had  been  appropriated  by  other 
countries. 

It  has  been  argued,  with  consider- 
able force,  that  a  nation  does  not  bene- 
fit commercially  by  the  control  of  col- 
onies or  weak  states.  The  case  of  Ger- 
many is  cited  to  show  how  marvel- 
ously  a  state  may  expand  commercial- 
ly without  colonies.  But  there  is  no 
doubt  that  certain  economic  interests 
within  a  nation  do  gain  by  national 
control  of  undeveloped  parts  of  the 
world.  There  are  government  con- 
tracts to  be  let,  franchises  to  be  given, 
concessions  to  be  granted,  and  pos- 
sibly preferential  tariffs  to  be  estab- 
lished. The  financial  interests  in  close 
touch  with  the  governmental  author- 
ities of  a  great  power  undoubtedly 
have  a  great  advantage. 

In  the  German  apologies  for  the 
war,  Great  Britain  is  bitterly  accused 
of  envying  German  prosperity  and  of 
welcoming  the  war  as  an  opportunity 
to  crush  German  commercial  and  in- 
dustrial competition.  The  strenuous 
efforts  of  British  business  men  during 
the  war  to  capture  German  trade  are 
cited  as  proof.  The  British  apologists 
reply  that  Great  Britain  entered  the 
war  only  after  extreme  hesitation,  aft- 
er warning  Germany  not  to  violate 
Belgian  neutrality ;  that  Great  Britain 
had  not  welcomed  the  war,  far  less 
caused  it ;  and  that  the  war  on  Ger- 
man trade  was  a  result  rather  than 
the  purpose  of  the  armed  conflict. 

On  the  other  side,  Germany  is  ac- 
cused of  waging  war  for  economic  ag- 
grandizement. In  explanation,  let  us 
refer  to  the  origin  of  the  German  Em- 
pire. Besides  a  sentimental  yearning 
for  national  unity,  two  factors  worked 
together  to  weld  the  many  petty  Ger- 


man States  into  a  united  nation.  The 
spectacular  part  was  played  by  the 
Prussian  army,  under  the  control  of 
domineering,  landowning  aristocrats, 
like  Prince  Bismarck.  Equally  impor- 
tant, if  less  striking,  was  the  work  of 
the  industrial  capitalists.  They  had 
built  railways  binding  the  Germanies 
together  with  bands  of  steel;  they  had 
economically  federated  the  Germanies 
in  the  Tariff  League  (ZoUverem), 
preparing  the  way  for  political  union. 
After  the  formation  of  the  German 
Empire  (1871),  the  influence  of  the 
two  elements,  the  landed  aristocracy 
of  army  officers  and  the  business  aris- 
tocracy of  wealth,  was  manifested  in 
the  demand  for  a  protective  tariff. 
The  former  demanded  a  high  tariff  on 
imported  foodstuffs  to  raise  the  price 
of  their  own  farm  products ;  the  latter 
required  a  tariff  wall  to  keep  foreign 
manufacturers  from  entering  into  com- 
petition with  German  articles  in  the 
home  market.  Bismarck  adopted  the 
protective  tariff  policy  in  1879.  It  is 
easy  to  see  how  such  a  policy  might 
endanger  peace.  For  example,  consid- 
er Russo-German  relations.  In  1904 
Russia  and  Germany  signed  a  commer- 
cial treaty  whereby  each  country  made 
certain  reductions  in  its  tariff  duties 
on  imports  from  the  other  country. 
The  Russians  felt  that  Germany  had 
the  best  of  the  bargain.  In  1914,  as 
the  date  approached  for  the  renewal  or 
modification  of  the  treaty,  fear  was 
expressed  in  the  German  press  lest 
Russia's  improved  army  would  enable 
her  to  demand  more  favorable  terms. 
In  this  fashion  the  desire  of  each  na- 
tion to  tax  foreign  imports  and  at  the 
same  time  to  obtain  free  admission  of 
its  own  products  into  foreign  coun- 
tries, stimulated  militarism  and  pro- 
voked warlike  sentiments  among  the 
Powers.       The     United     Kingdom,     it 


16 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


should  be  observed,  adhered  to  its  free 
trade  policy,  and,  with  few  exceptions, 
admitted  the  products  of  all  lands  on 
an  equal  footing.  The  British  self- 
governing  colonies,  however,  had 
adopted   protection. 

Whether  it  was  due  to  the  protec- 
tion of  the  tariff  wall,  or  to  the  Ger- 
man genius  for  applying  natural 
science  to  industry,  or  to  German 
thoroughness,  or  to  aggressive  com- 
mercial methods,  the  business  inter- 
ests prospered  mightily  under  the 
aegis  of  the  German  Empire.  Mills 
and  mines  multiplied  wealth.  Titanic 
ocean  steamships  carried  German 
wares  to  the  ends  of  the  earth.  By 
1912,  British  excelled  German  foreign 
commerce  by  about  $1,300,000,000; 
but  German  commerce  had  trebled  it- 
self since  1883,  while  British  commerce 
had  not  quite  doubled.  The  German 
government  derived  rich  revenues  from 
the  customs  duties  on  an  expanding 
commerce,  and  viewed  with  satisfac- 
tion the  prodigious  increase  in  wealth 
and  population  (population  increased 
from  41  to  66  millions  between  1871 
and  1912)  which  furnished  men  and 
money  for  an  ever-growing  army. 
And  on  the  other  hand,  the  industrial 
and  landowning  classes  considered  the 
army  as  protection  and  insurance  for 
their  interests.  In  one  respect,  how- 
ever, the  German  business  community 
was  dissatisfied.  The  German  mer- 
chant marine,  although  it  had  rapidly 
expanded,  was  still  four  times  out- 
weighed by  British  shipping.  Great 
Britain's  superiority  was  ascribed  to 
her  earlier  economic  development,  to 
the  fact  that  Germany  had  very  little 
Atlantic  sea-coast,  to  the  superiority 
of  the  British  navy.  Germany,  there- 
fore, set  herself  to  overcome  these 
handicaps.  And  without  imputing  ag- 
gressive  motives   to    the    German    gov- 


ernment, the  historian  may  and  should 
affirm  that  certain  German  business 
men  consciously  hoped  for  the  over- 
throw of  British  naval  power  and  for 
the  annexation  of  an  Atlantic  port  by 
Germany.  The  open  confession  of 
such  desires  by  German  journalists 
like  Maximilian  Harden  and  by  Ger- 
man shipping  magnates  like  Herr  Bal- 
lin,  explains  why  the  Belgians  feared 
the  loss  of  Antwerp  and  Ostend,  and 
the  British  the  loss  of  the  sea.  In 
parenthesis,  it  may  be  observed  that 
similar  desires  for  advantageous  sea- 
ports were  urging  Russia  on  to  Con- 
stantinople and  to  the  Southern  Bal- 
tic, Serbia  on  to  the  Adriatic,  and 
Austria-Hungary  on  to  Saloniki. 

In  a  third  respect  the  economic  am- 
bitions of  Germany  conflicted  with 
those  of  other  nations.  In  the  last 
quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century  cer- 
tain groups  of  business  men  awoke  to 
the  opportunities  which  the  vast  un- 
civilized areas  of  Africa  and  Oceanica 
offered  for  the  sale  of  cheap  cotton 
goods,  cheap  liquors,  and  other  manu- 
factures, for  the  highly  remunerative 
investment  of  money  in  the  construc- 
tion of  railways,  the  development  of 
mines,  and  the  traffic  in  rubber,  ivory, 
and  oil.  King  Leopold  of  Belgium, 
one  of  the  first  to  realize  the  oppor- 
tunity, acquired  control  of  the  Congo 
region  in  the  heart  of  Africa.  France 
carved  out  a  mighty  colonial  empire, 
and  Great  Britain  added  to  hers.  Ger- 
many, a  belated  arrival  in  the  field, 
was  permitted,  even  encouraged  by 
the  British  government,  to  acquire  ter- 
ritories in  Africa.  But  when  Ger- 
many, becoming  aggressive  in  world 
politics,  and  demanding  an  ever  larg- 
er "place  in  the  sun,"  challenged  the 
French  in  Morocco  and  appeared  en- 
vious of  the  British  and  French  pos- 
sessions,   the    prospect    of    a    war    for 


UNDERLYING  CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR 


17 


world-empire  began  to  fill  Europe  with 
uneasy   forebodings. 

Concessions  as  well  as  colonies  were 
contended  for  by  Germans  as  against 
British  and  French  capitalists.  For 
example,  when  in  1914  Bulgaria  ar- 
ranged in  return  for  a  loan  to  concede 
to  German  capitalists  valuable  railway 
and  mining  privileges  in  Bulgaria,  a 
rival  bid  was  unsuccessfully  made  by 
the  French.  The  financing  of  the 
Bagdad  railway  occasioned  consider- 
able rivalry  between  France  and  Ger- 
many, until  an  agreement  was  reached. 
In  1914  the  envious  cry  was  raised  in 
Germany  that  German  interests  were 
being  outstripped  by  the  other  Pow- 
ers ;  that  the  English  were  greedily 
helping  themselves  to  the  oil  product 
of  Persia  and  striving  to  secure  the 
oil  fields  of  Latin  America ;  that  the 
French  capitalists  were  securing  new 
railway  contracts  in  China,  in  Russia, 
and  in  Greece. 

Of  all  the  economic  interests  inimic- 
al to  peace,  the  most  dangerous  was 
the  arms-manufacturing  business.  It 
is  commonly  known  that  in  1913  Karl 
Liebknecht  *  horrified  the  German 
Reichstag  by  alleging  that  the 
Krupps,  the  world-famous  makers  of 
guns       and       armor,       systematically 

*  Liebknecht,  Karl  (Paul  August  Ferdin- 
and) (1871-1919).  Born  at  Leipsic,  where  he 
studied  law.  Became  practicing  attorney  in 
Berlin.  Chosen  Selectman  of  City  of  Berlin 
(1902);  member  Prussian  House  of  Deputies 
(1908),  and  elected  to  Reichstag  (1912)  and 
soon  recognized  as  a  leader  among  Socialist 
deputies.  In  1913  made  charges  leading  to  reve- 
lation of  Krupp  scandals  and  in  1914  only 
member  to  vote  against  war  credits.  His  work 
Militarisms  und  Antimilit  (trismus  (1907)  for- 
bidden circulation  and  led  to  charge  of  high 
treason,  for  which  he  was  convicted.  Despite 
protests,  mustered  into  army  (1915).  Arrested 
(1916)  for  making  a  speech  at  May  Day  dem- 
onstration. On  signing  of  armistice  and  flight 
of  Emperor  became  leader  of  extreme  Socialist 
group  known  as  Spartacides.  Killed  (Janu- 
ary 15,  1919)  by  military  officers  while  under 
arrest. 


stirred  up  hostility  between  France 
and  Germany  in  order  to  obtain  larger 
orders  for  arms.  Every  Army  Bill, 
every  dreadnought,  every  war,  meant 
profits  for  the  armament  firms.  The 
Balkan  Wars  were  fought  with  weap- 
ons forged  in  Germany  and  France. 
As  the  Krupps  had  made  the  Turkish 
guns,  the  defeat  of  Turkey  meant  di- 
minished prestige  and  smaller  sales 
for  Krupp  wares,  unless  another  war 
should  reestablish  the  fame  of  can- 
non "made  in  Germany."  English 
firms — Armstrong  &  Vickers,  and  Wit- 
worth — were  engaged  to  build  an  ord- 
nance factory  in  Russia,  and  to  con- 
struct battleships  for  Spain,  for  Bra- 
zil, for  Turkey.  For  Krupps,  as  well 
as  for  their  rivals,  the  War  of  the 
Nations  was  a  golden  opportunity. 
The  Belgian  armament  manufacturers 
at  Liege  alone  were  unfortunate,  for 
Liege  was  captured  by  German  troops. 
Finally,  a  word  may  be  added  re- 
garding the  banking  interests  and  the 
war.  Articles  have  appeared  in  sup- 
port of  the  argument  that  the  panic 
and  consternation  in  financial  circles 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  proved  con- 
clusively that  "capital"  did  not  want 
the  war.  While  there  is  doubtless 
much  truth  in  this  reasoning,  the  fact 
must  not  be  overlooked  that  in  panics 
large  fortunes  are  won  as  well  as  for- 
tunes lost.  The  huge  war  loans,  more- 
over, offered  unexampled  opportuni- 
ties for  financial  speculation.  The 
statement  is  also  made  that  the  cap- 
italists welcomed  the  war  as  a  relief 
from  the  intolerable  burden  of  mili- 
tarism ;  for  by  means  of  income-,  prop- 
erty-, and  inheritance-taxes,  Socialist- 
ically-inclined  legislators  were  shifting 
the  burden  of  militarism  so  as  to  bear 
more  and  more  heavily  on  the  wealth- 
ier classes. 


III.     OUTBREAK    OF   THE    WAR 


On  June  28,  1914,  the  Archduke 
Francis  Ferdinand,*  nephew  of  Em- 
peror Francis  Joseph  and  heir  to  the 
Hapsburg  throne,  and  his  morganatic 
wife,  the  Duchess  of  Hohenburg,  were 
assassinated  by  Serbian  sympathizers 
while  on  an  official  visit  to  the  town  of 
Serajevo,  the  capital  of  Bosnia.  It 
was  generally  believed  in  Austria  that 
the  crime  was  instigated  by  Pan-Ser- 
bian agitators,  who  had  maintained 
a  persistent  propaganda  for  the  ac- 
quisition of  the  provinces  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  ever  since  they  had 
been  annexed  by  Austria  in  1908. 
These  provinces  had  once  formed  part 
of  the  old  Serbian  Empire,  and  about 
half  of  the  population  was  related  to 
the  Serbs  in  race  and  speech.  Despite 
the  fact  that  Serbia  had  agreed  in 
1909  to  recognize  the  annexation  of 
these  provinces  by  Austria  as  a  fait 
accompli,  the  Pan-Serbian  movement 
was  allowed  to  continue  in  Serbia,  un- 
hampered by  the  government  author- 
ities. 

In  Austria  this  movement  was  re- 
sented for  two  reasons.  In  the  first 
place,  Serbia  had  emerged  from  the 
second  Balkan  war  doubled  in  size,  and 
any  further  strengthening  of  this 
country  ran  counter  to  Austria's  com- 
mercial interests  in  the  Balkans.  As 
it  was,  Serbia  stood  in  the  way  of 
Austria's    realizing    her    ambition    of 

*  Francis  Ferdinand  (1863-1914).  Arch- 
duke of  Austria-Este.  Born  at  Graz.  On 
death  of  Crown  Prince  Rudolph  (1889)  and  his 
own  father,  became  heir  apparent  to  crowns  of 
Austria  and  Hungary.  Assassinated  with  his 
wife  at  Serajevo,  Bosnia  (June  28,  1914),  as 
result  of  political  plot  due  to  absorption  of 
Bosnia  into  Austro-Hungarian  Empire   (1908). 


reaching  the  ^Egean  Sea  at  Saloniki 
as  well  as  obstructing  the  Berlin  to 
Bagdad  route.  In  the  second  place, 
the  Pan-Serbian  movement  was  a  posi- 
tive danger  to  the  integrity  of  the 
Austrian  Empire.  If  successful,  it 
might  encourage  other  racial  groups 
within  the  Empire  to  disrupt  com- 
pletely the  Hapsburg  dominions.  Aus- 
tria had  therefore  good  reasons  for 
regarding  the  Pan-Serbian  propagan- 
da with  fear  and  resentment.  Inves- 
tigations carried  on  by  the  Austrian 
officials  at  Serajevo  led  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  assassination  of  the 
Archduke  had  been  planned  by  the 
conspirators  at  Belgrade  and  that 
the  pistols  and  bombs  used  had  been 
smuggled  into  Bosnia  from  Serbia  with 
the  connivance  of  Serbian  officials. 
Having  established  these  alleged  facts, 
the  Austrian  government  felt  justified 
in  proceeding  in  the  most  summary 
manner  to  crush  once  and  for  all  the 
Pan-Serbian  movement.  With  this  in 
view  there  was  presented  to  Serbia,  by 
Austria,  on  July  23,  1914,  an  ulti- 
matum couched  in  the  most  vigorous 
language.  Count  Berchtold  *  was  the 
Austrian   Foreign   Minister. 

The  note  began  by  recalling  the  dec- 
laration made  by  Serbia  on  the  31st  of 
March,  1909,  wherein  Serbia  recog- 
nized the  fait  accompli  regarding  Bos- 
nia and  agreed  to   renounce  any  atti- 

*  Berchtold,  Leopold  Anthony  Johann 
Sigmund,  Count  von.  Born  (1863)  in  Vienna. 
Entered  diplomatic  service  at  early  age,  and 
in  1895  appointed  secretary  of  Austrian  Em- 
bassy in  Paris.  In  1899  appointed  counselor  of 
Embassy  in  London  and  in  1903  same  position 
in  St.  Petersburg.  1912  became  Foreign  Minis- 
ter of  Dual  Monarchy. 


18 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR 


19 


tude  of  protest  or  opposition  to  the 
annexation  of  Bosnia  by  Austria.  The 
Austrian  note  then  went  on  to  com- 
plain that  Serbia  had  not  lived  up  to 
this  undertaking,  and  had  made  it  nec- 
essary for  Austria  to  take  action  to 
protect  herself  against  the  Pan-Ser- 
bian propaganda.  Austria  insisted 
that  Serbia  should  make  an  official  and 
public  condemnation  of  this  propa- 
ganda and  express  regret  at  its  conse- 
quences. 

The  note  then  submitted  ten  specific 
demands  and  required  an  answer  from 
Serbia  by  six  o'clock  on  Saturday 
evening,  July  25,  within  48  hours  of 
its  presentation. 

These  demands  required  that  Serbia 
should  suppress  every  publication 
which  excited  hatred  of  the  Dual  Mon- 
archy; that  the  Serbian  government 
dissolve  certain  societies  accused  of 
fomenting  the  propaganda  hostile  to 
Austria;  that  teachers  guilty  of  insti- 
gating hatred  of  Austria  be  dismissed 
and  that  objectionable  matter  in  the 
textbooks  be  eliminated ;  that  Serbia 
dismiss  from  her  army  and  govern- 
mental employ  all  officers  and  officials 
found  taking  part  in  the  propaganda ; 
that  Serbia  accept  the  collaboration 
of  agents  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
government  in  suppression  of  the  sub- 
versive movement  against  Austria ; 
that  Austro-Hungarian  representa- 
tives be  allowed  to  take  part  in  the  in- 
vestigation of  persons  in  Serbia  ac- 
cused of  complicity  in  the  murder  of 
the  Archduke;  that  Serbia  take  action 
against  two  specified  officials,  who 
were  accused  of  complicity  in  the  crime 
at  Serajevo;  that  Serbia  take  effective 
measures  to  stop  the  smuggling  of 
arms  and  ammunition  across  her  bor- 
der; and  finally  that  Serbia  give  ex- 
planation of  the  expressions  of  hos- 
tility toward  Austria-Hungary  on  the 


part  of  certain  high  Serbian   officials. 

The  publication  of  this  note  imme- 
diately aroused  great  apprehension  in 
the  chancelleries  of  the  European  Pow- 
ers. It  was  clear  that  Europe  was 
confronted  with  another  serious  crisis. 

It  is  a  striking  fact  that  each  of  the 
Powers  of  the  Triple  Entente  was  con- 
fronted by  serious  internal  difficulties 
at  this  most  critical  time.  Great  Brit- 
ain was  threatened  by  serious  disturb- 
ances in  Ireland  resulting  from  the 
passage  of  the  Home  Rule  Bill;  St. 
Petersburg  was  involved  in  a  great 
strike;  in  France  the  Caillaux  affair 
had  affected  seriously  the  prestige  of 
the  government  and  the  Minister  of 
War  declared  that  the  army  was  in 
a  deplorable  state  of  unpreparedness. 

The  first  move  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey,*  the  British  Foreign  Secretary, 
was  to  urge  upon  Austria-Hungary 
the  necessity  of  extending  the  time  lim- 
it of  the  ultimatum.  In  this  he  was 
strongly  supported  by  M.  Sazonov, 
the  Russian  Foreign  Minister.  Ger- 
many, however,  was  not  inclined  to 
bring  pressure  upon  her  ally  in  this 
matter  and  Austria  flatly  refused  any 
extension  of  time. 

Failing  in  this  move,  the  British  and 
Russian  Ministers  turned  their  efforts 
to  persuading  Serbia  to  accept,  as  far 
as  possible,  the  demands  made  by  Aus- 
tria. In  this  they  were  largely  suc- 
cessful. 

The  Serbian  Reply.     Serbia's  reply 

*  Grey,  Sir  Edward.  Born  (1862)  in  North- 
umberland. Educated  at  Winchester  and  Bal- 
liol  College,  Oxford.  Entered  Parliament,  1885. 
Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
1892-95.  Made  "Privy  Councillor  1902.  In  1905 
became  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs 
and  soon  became  most  commanding  figure  in 
European  diplomacy.  Consummated  Triple 
Entente,  uniting  Great  Britain,  France,  and 
Russia.  Opposed  German  expansion  in  North 
Africa.  In  Balkan  crisis  of  1912  brought  about 
conference  in  London  and  presided  over  its 
deliberations.  Unable  to  prevent  the  great 
world  war,  despite  strenuous  efforts. 


20 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


to  the  Austrian  ultimatum  was  handed 
to  the  Austrian  Minister  at  Belgrade 
on  July  25,  only  two  minutes  before 
the  expiration  of  the  time  limit.  The 
reply  began  by  stating  that  the  Ser- 
bian government  was  not  aware  of  any 
official  action  since  1909  protesting 
against  the  political  status  of  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina,  and  that  the  only  rep- 
resentation made  by  Austria,  that  con- 
cerning a  school  book,  had  been  ex- 
plained to  the  satisfaction  of  the  Aus- 
trian government.  To  this  the  Aus- 
trian government  replied  in  an  of- 
ficial rejoinder  that  it  was  not  sufficient 
to  indicate  that  there  had  been  no  of- 
ficial action  against  Austria.  It  was 
the  failure  of  Serbia  to  use  energetic 
measures  to  suppress  unofficial  agita- 
tion directed  against  the  territorial  in- 
tegrity of  Austria  of  which  complaint 
was  made. 

The  Serbian  reply  further  stated 
that  the  Serbian  government  did  not 
consider  that  they  could  be  held  re- 
sponsible for  the  opinions  expressed 
by  private  individuals,  such  as  articles 
appearing  in  the  press  and  the  peace- 
ful proceedings  of  societies.  Serbia 
agreed,  however,  to  amend  her  consti- 
tution to  permit  the  enactment  of  leg- 
islation to  suppress  such  publications. 
Most  of  the  other  demands  were 
agreed  to  by  Serbia  with  slight  verbal 
changes.  There  were  two  points, 
however,  with  which  Serbia  did  not 
comply.  In  the  first  place,  to  the 
demand  that  Serbia  accept  the  colla- 
boration of  agents  of  the  Austrian 
government  in  the  suppression  of  the 
subversive  movement  directed  against 
the  territorial  integrity  of  the  Dual 
Monarchy,  Serbia  replied  that  she  did 
not  understand  exactly  the  meaning 
of  the  demand,  but  that  she  was  ready 
to  accept  such  collaboration  as  should 
conform   to   the  principles   of  interna- 


tional law  and  criminal  procedure.  The 
Austrian  rejoinder  stated  that  it  was 
not  a  question  of  international  law  but 
of  the  exercise  of  police  powers  which 
could  be  settled  by  agreement  between 
the  parties  concerned.  In  the  second 
place  the  demand  made  by  Austria  that 
Austrian  officials  be  permitted  to  take 
part  in  the  investigation  relating  to 
the  judicial  proceedings  in  Serbia 
against  persons  involved  in  the  Sera- 
jevo  crime,  the  Serbian  government 
would  not  concede  on  the  ground  that 
such  action  would  violate  the  Serbian 
constitution.  The  Austrian  rejoinder 
accused  the  Serbian  government  of  de- 
liberately misrepresenting  the  Aus- 
trian demand,  which  contemplated  sim- 
ply a  participation  in  the  preliminary 
investigation  to  the  judicial  proceed- 
ings. Finally  the  Serbian  government 
agreed,  in  case  the  Austrian  govern- 
ment should  find  the  reply  unsatisfac- 
tory, to  submit  the  disputed  questions 
to  The  Hague  Tribunal  or  the  Great 
Powers  for  decision. 

The  representatives  of  the  Entente 
Powers  were  satisfied  that  Serbia's  re- 
ply was  a  substantial  agreement  to  the 
Austrian  demands.  Austria,  however, 
claimed  to  find  the  reply  wholly  unsat- 
isfactory and  in  this  view  she  was  ap- 
parently supported  by  Germany,  which 
country  adopted  the  view  that  she 
could  not  infringe  on  Austria's  sov- 
ereignty. 

From  the  time  of  the  presentation 
of  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  it  was  rec- 
ognized on  all  sides  that  the  great  dan- 
ger was  that  any  move  on  the  part  of 
Austria  would  precipitate  a  general 
European  war.  The  delicate  balance 
of  interests  in  the  Balkans  could  not 
be  disturbed  without  involving  serious 
consequences.  Russia  in  particular 
felt  that  she  was  deeply  interested  in 
the   fate  of  the  small   Slav  nations  in 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR 


21 


the  Balkan  Peninsula.  The  Russian 
Ambassador  at  Vienna  stated  on  July 
24  that  "any  action  taken  by  Austria 
to  humiliate  Serbia  could  not  leave 
Russia  indifferent."  (B.W.P.  No.  7.) 
At  Berlin,  too,  it  was  clearly  recog- 
nized that  Austria's  action  would  prob- 
ably involve  Russia.  The  German 
memorandum  states  that  Germany  was 
fully  aware  that  "warlike  moves  on  the 
part  of  Austria-Hungary  against  Ser- 
bia, would  bring  Russia  into  the  ques- 
tion and  might  draw  Germany  into  a 
war  in  accordance  with  her  duty  as 
Austria's  ally."     (G.W.B.  p.  4.)  * 

Despite  Austria's  assurance  that  she 
had  no  intention  of  annexing  Serbian 
territory  or  disturbing  the  balance  of 
power  in  the  Balkans,  Russia  felt  that, 
apart  from  the  acquisition  of  territory, 
the  crushing  of  Serbia  would  reduce 
her  to  a  vassal  state  of  Austria,  and 
that  this  would  imperil  the  balance  of 
power  in  the  Balkans.  In  view  of  this 
situation  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister 
stated  that  Russia  would  mobilize 
against  Austria  on  the  day  that  the 
Austrian  army  crossed  the  Serbian 
frontier.     (B.W.P.  No.  72.) 

This  determined  attitude  of  Russia 
made  any  efforts  which  the  Powers 
might  make  to  localize  the  struggle 
futile.  The  next  question  of  vital  in- 
terest was  the  attitude  which  Germany 
would  take.  How  far  was  she  prepared 
to  support  her  ally  Austria  in  her  un- 
compromising position  towards  Serbia? 
In  defining  its  position  the  German  gov- 
ernment declared  "The  attitude  of  the 
Imperial  government  in  this  question  is 
clearly  indicated.  The  agitation  car- 
ried on  by  the  Pan-Slavs  in  Austria- 

*  In  referring  to  the  official  documents,  the 
following  abbreviations  are  used:  British  White 
Paper,  B.W.P.;  German  White  Book,  G.W.B. ; 
Austrian  Red  Book,  A.R.B.;  Russian  Orange 
Book,  R.O.B.;  French  Yellow  Book,  F.Y.B.; 
Belgian  Gray  Book,  B.G.B.;  Italian  Green 
Book,  I.G.B. 


Hungary  has  for  its  goal  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Mon- 
archy, which  carries  with  it  the  shat- 
tering or  weakening  of  the  Triple  Al- 
liance and,  in  consequence,  the  complete 
isolation  of  the  German  Empire.  Our 
nearest  interests,  therefore,  summon  us 
to  the  support  of  Austria-Hungary." 
(G.W.B.  exhibit  2.)  And  further  "A 
morally  weakened  Austria  under  the 
pressure  of  Pan-slavism  would  be  no 
longer  an  ally  on  whom  we  could  count 
and  in  whom  we  could  have  confidence, 
such  as  we  must  have,  in  view  of  the 
increasingly  menacing  attitudes  of  our 
neighbors  on  the  east  and  west."  (G. 
W.B.  memo.  p.  5.)  It  is  clear  there- 
fore that  Germany  felt  that  her  inter- 
ests as  well  as  those  of  Austria  were 
vitally  affected.  It  was  generally  be- 
lieved, and  openly  stated,  that  Ger- 
many knew  the  nature  of  the  Austrian 
ultimatum  to  Serbia  before  it  was  sent 
and  had  urged  Austria  to  precipitate  a 
crisis  by  presenting  demands  which 
Serbia  would  not  accept.  This  was 
categorically  denied  by  the  German  au- 
thorities. (B.W.P.  No.  25.)  Never- 
theless Germany  thoroughly  approved 
of  the  Austrian  demands  and  insisted 
that  the  quarrel  should  be  considered 
simply  as  an  affair  between  Austria 
and  Serbia. 

Obviously  it  was  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance to  prevent,  or  at  least  delay, 
the  first  hostile  move  by  Austria 
against  Serbia.  On  July  26,  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  suggested  a  conference  of 
the  representatives  of  the  four  Powers, 
England,  France,  Germany,  and  Italy, 
for  the  purpose  of  discovering  an  issue 
which  would  prevent  complications  be- 
tween Austria  and  Russia.  (B.W.P. 
No.  36.)  To  this  suggestion  France 
and  Italy  agreed.  Germany,  however, 
declined  to  fall  in  with  this  plan.  The 
German   Foreign   Minister   stated   that 


22 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


"a  conference  such  as  Sir  Edward 
Grey  suggested  would  amount  to  a 
court  of  arbitration  and  could  not,  in 
his  opinion,  be  called  together  except 
at  the  request  of  Austria  and  Russia'* 
(B.W.P.  No.  43)  ;  and  furthermore 
that  "he  did  not  think  it  [the  confer- 
ence] would  be  effective,  because  such  a 
conference  would  in  his  opinion  have 
had  the  appearance  of  an  Areopagus 
consisting  of  two  Powers  of  each  group 
sitting  in  judgment  upon  the  two  re- 
maining Powers."  (B.W.P.  No.  71; 
G.W.B.   memo.   p.   8.) 

Direct  negotiations  between  Russia 
and  Austria  were  unsuccessful,  Austria 
refusing  to  consider  a  modification  of 
the  terms  of  her  ultimatum  to  Serbia. 
(B.W.P.  No.  93;  R.O.B.  No.  45.)  Fur- 
ther efforts  on  the  part  of  England  to 
have  Germany  propose  some  formula 
which  would  be  acceptable  proved  un- 
availing (B.W.P.  No.  Ill),  and  on 
July  28,  1914,  Austria  declared  war 
on  Serbia.  This  action  on  the  part  of 
Austria  appears  explicable  on  one  of 
two  grounds.  Either  she  was  con- 
vinced that  Russia  was  bluffing  and 
would  back  down  as  she  did  in  1908, 
or  else  that  Austria  was  prepared  de- 
liberately to  precipitate  a  European 
war. 

Germany  and  Russia.  The  Russian 
government  had  very  definitely  declared 
that  Russia  could  not  remain  indiffer- 
ent to  the  fate  of  Serbia.  It  was  gen- 
erally believed  in  Russia  that  Austria's 
action  was  directed  against  her  quite 
as  much  as  against  Serbia.  (R.O.B. 
No.  75.)  Consequently  on  July  29, 
1914,  Russia  declared  partial  mobili- 
zation against  Austria-Hungary.  At 
the  same  time  the  Russian  Foreign 
Minister  stated  that  this  action  was  in 
no  way  directed  against  Germany.  (R. 
O.B.  No.  49.)  These  military  prepa- 
rations   stimulated    the    diplomats    in 


their  final  efforts  to  find  some  solution 
which  would  prevent  a  European  con- 
flagration. Various  formulas  were  sug- 
gested but  none  was  acceptable.  On 
July  29,  Sir  Edward  Grey  urged  that 
"the  German  government  should  sug- 
gest any  method  by  which  the  influ- 
ence of  the  four  Powers  could  be  used 
to  prevent  war  between  Austria  and 
Russia.  France  agreed.  Italy  agreed. 
The  whole  idea  of  mediation  or  mediat- 
ing influence  was  ready  to  be  put  in 
operation  by  any  method  that  Ger- 
many thought  possible,  if  only  Ger- 
many would  press  the  button  in  the 
interests  of  peace."  (B.W.P.  No.  84.) 
Germany  did  press  the  button  to  the 
extent  of  urging  Austria  to  renew  ne- 
gotiations with  Russia.  At  the  same 
time  Russia  was  requested  to  prepare  a 
formula  which  would  be  satisfactory 
to  her.  M.  Sazonov  accordingly  sub- 
mitted the  following  suggestion:  "If 
Austria,  recognizing  that  her  conflict 
with  Serbia  has  assumed  the  character 
of  a  question  of  European  interest,  de- 
clares herself  ready  to  eliminate  from 
her  ultimatum  points  which  violate  the 
principle  of  the  sovereignty  of  Serbia, 
Russia  engages  to  stop  all  military 
preparations."  This  formula  was  whol- 
ly unsatisfactory  to  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria, and  at  the  suggestion  of  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  the  Russian  formula  was 
modified  to  read :  "If  Austria  will 
agree  to  check  the  advance  of  her 
troops  on  Serbian  territory;  if,  recog- 
nizing the  fact  that  the  dispute  be- 
tween Austria  and  Serbia  has  assumed 
a  character  of  European  interest,  she 
will  allow  the  Great  Powers  to  look 
into  the  matter  and  determine  whether 
Serbia  could  satisfy  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  government  without  impairing 
her  rights  as  a  sovereign  state  or  her 
independence,  Russia  will  undertake  to 
maintain  her  waiting  attitude." 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR 


23 


One  final  effort  was  made  by  Eng- 
land and  Germany  to  prevent  a  break 
between  Austria  and  Russia.  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey,  on  July  31,  said  that  if 
Germany  would  suggest  any  reason- 
able proposal  which  would  preserve 
peace,  and  if  France  and  Russia  re- 
jected such  a  proposal,  Great  Britain 
would  not  support  them,  but  on  the 
other  hand  if  no  such  proposal  were 
made  and  France  became  involved, 
Great  Britain  would  be  drawn  in.  (B. 
W.P.  No.  111.)  Germany,  on  her 
part,  brought  pressure  on  Austria  to 
agree  to  discuss  with  Russia  the  terms 
of  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  and  at  the 
last  moment,  on  July  31,  Austria 
agreed  to  do  so.  (A.R.B.  Nos.  49-50.) 
This  slim  chance  of  preventing  a  break 
at  the  eleventh  hour  was  nullified  by 
the  demand  made  by  Germany  that 
Russia  should  cease  her  military  prepa- 
rations and  demobilize  her  army.  At 
midnight  on  July  31,  1914,  the  Ger- 
man Ambassador  delivered  an  ultima- 
tum to  Russia  demanding  that  she  de- 
mobilize her  forces  not  only  against 
Germany  but  also  against  Austria- 
Hungary.  (R.O.B.  No.  70.)  As  Rus- 
sia returned  no  reply  to  this  demand 
the  German  Ambassador  was  ordered 
on  August  1,  at  5  p.m.,  to  notify  the 
Russian  government  that  Germany 
considered  that  a  state  of  war  existed 
between  the  two  countries.  (G.W.B. 
exhibit  26;  R.O.B.  No.  76.) 

Germany  and  France.  At  the  same 
time  that  Germany  presented  the  ulti- 
matum to  Russia,  a  communication  was 
sent  to  France  informing  her  of  Ger- 
many's action  and  asking  what  atti- 
tude France  would  take  in  the  event 
of  war  between  Germany  and  Russia. 
An  answer  was  demanded  within  18 
hours.  (F.Y.B.  No.  116;  G.W.B.  ex- 
hibit 25.)  To  this  demand  the  French 
Premier    replied    on    August    1,    that 


"France  would  take  such  action  as  her 
interests  might  require."  (G.W.B.  ex- 
hibit 27.)  Despite  this  unsatisfactory 
answer  the  German  Ambassador  did 
not  leave  Paris  until  August  3.  In  the 
meantime  charges  and  countercharges 
were  made  by  the  French  and  German 
authorities  that  warlike  moves  had  been 
made  on  the  frontier. 

A  document  which  was  purported  to 
be  instructions  from  the  Imperial  Ger- 
man government  to  its  ambassador  at 
Paris  was  published  about  the  middle 
of  1918  in  the  French  press  at  the  in- 
stance of  the  government.  The  Ger- 
man Ambassador  was  to  ask  the 
French  Government  if  it  would  remain 
neutral  in  case  of  war  between  Rus- 
sia and  Germany.  If  the  answer  was 
"Yes,"  the  German  Ambassador  was 
to  demand  the  surrender  of  Verdun, 
Nancy,  Toul,  and  Belfort  and  other 
strategic  points  as  a  guarantee  that 
France  would  keep  her  word  and  re- 
main neutral.  Inasmuch  as  this  would 
be  a  severe  infringement  upon  the  sov- 
ereignty of  France  and  would  likely 
be  met  by  a  flat  refusal,  the  inference 
is  drawn  that  Germany  did  not  want 
France  to  remain  neutral,  but  wished 
to  draw  her  into  a  world  conflict. 

Great  Britain  and  Germany.  From 
the  first  it  was  evident  that  the  ques- 
tion of  England's  attitude  in  the  face 
of  the  great  European  crisis  was  of 
the  most  vital  importance.  In  that 
most  critical  week  following  the  presen- 
tation of  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  Sir 
Edward  Grey  worked  early  and  late 
to  arrive  at  some  peaceful  solution  of 
the  difficulty.  From  the  very  begin- 
ning France  and  Russia  had  urged 
Great  Britain  to  come  out  with  a  def- 
inite statement  that  if  war  was  pre- 
cipitated she  would  support  them, 
pointing  out  that  such  a  stand  by 
Great    Britain    would    deter    Germany 


24 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


from  entering  the  war.  M.  Sazonov, 
the  Russian  Foreign  Minister,  said  "he 
did  not  believe  that  Germany  realty 
wanted  war,  but  her  attitude  was  de- 
cided by  England's.  If  she  took  her 
stand  firmly  with  France  and  Russia 
there  would  be  no  war."  (B.W.P.  No. 
17.)  The  President  of  France,  M. 
Poincare,*  went  so  far  as  to  appeal 
directly  to  King  George  stating  "I  am 
profoundly  convinced  that  at  the  pres- 
ent moment  the  more  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  Russia  can  give  a  deep 
impression  that  they  are  united  in  their 
diplomatic  action,  the  more  possible  it 
will  be  to  count  upon  the  preservation 
of  peace."  Sir  Edward  Grey  did  not 
accept  their  suggestions.  It  was  his 
view  that  Great  Britain  could  work 
most  effectively  for  peace  by  playing 
the  part  of  mediator.  At  the  same 
time  he  made  it  clear  to  the  German 
Ambassador  that  if  Germany  and 
France  became  involved  "the  issue 
might  be  so  great  that  it  would  in- 
volve European  interests  and  he  did 
not  wish  him  to  be  misled  into  think- 
ing that  Great  Britain  would  stand 
aside."  (B.W.P.  No.  89.)  Germany 
fully  appreciated  the  importance  of 
keeping  Great  Britain  neutral,  if  pos- 
sible. With  this  end  in  view  the  Ger- 
man Chancellor  proposed  that  if  Great 
Britain  would  remain  neutral  Germany 

Poixcare,  Raymond.  Born  (1860)  in  Bar- 
le-Duc,  Lorraine.  Educated  early  at  lycees  of 
Bar-le-Duc  and  Louis-le-Grand.  Later  made 
brilliant  record  as  law  student  in  Paris.  Prac- 
ticed law  for  short  time.  At  age  of  27  elected 
to  Chamber  of  Deputies.  Opposed  separation 
of  church  and  state.  Made  Minister  of  Public 
Instruction  (1893);  Minister  of  Finance 
(1894).  Held  various  ministries.  Elected  to 
Senate  (1903).  Prime  Minister  (1912)  and 
took  portfolio  of  Foreign  Affairs.  Vigorous 
supporter  of  alliance  with  Russia  and  of  the 
entente  with  England.  Elected  President 
(1913).  Believed"  President  should  not  be 
figurehead  and  made  himself  influential.  Fa- 
vored three-year  military  service  bill.  Admit- 
ted to  French  Academy  (1909).  Author  of 
several   books. 


would  guarantee  that  no  territorial  ac- 
quisitions would  be  made  at  the  ex- 
pense of  France.  He  was  unwilling, 
however,  to  make  a  similar  undertak- 
ing in  regard  to  the  French  colonies. 
(B.W.P.  No.  85.)  This  suggestion 
was  declined  by  Great  Britain  on  the 
ground  that  France  might  be  so 
crushed  as  to  lose  her  position  as  a 
great  power,  without  having  territory 
taken  from  her.  Furthermore  that 
other  contingencies  might  arise  which 
would  justify  Great  Britain's  entrance 
into  the  war.  (B.W.P.  No.  101.)  A 
further  request  from  Germany  that  Sir 
Edward  Grey  formulate  conditions  on 
which  Great  Britain  would  remain  neu- 
tral was  declined.  He  stated  that  "he 
could  only  say  that  they  must  keep 
their  hands  free."  (B.W.P.  No.  123.) 
The  British  government,  therefore,  up 
to  the  very  last  day  of  European  peace 
refused  either  to  bind  herself  to  come 
to  the  aid  of  France  and  Russia  or  to 
remain  neutral. 

Question  of  Belgian  Neutrality.  The 
Congress  of  Vienna  in  1815  turned 
over  the  Austrian  Netherlands,  or  Bel- 
gium, to  Holland  in  compensation  for 
certain  Dutch  colonial  possessions  re- 
tained by  Great  Britain.  This  union 
was  opposed  by  the  Belgians  and  at 
the  first  favorable  opportunity  (1830) 
they  revolted.  France  was  anxious  to 
annex  the  provinces  but  Great  Britain, 
following  her  traditional  policy,  op- 
posed their  union  with  any  great  pow- 
er. This  opposition  was  due  to  the 
proximity  of  the  Belgian  coast  to  her 
shores  and  also  because  of  the  impor- 
tant commercial  interests  of  Great 
Britain  in  these  rich  provinces,  which 
might  suffer  if  they  passed  into  the 
hands  of  some  great  European  power. 
Great  Britain's  interests  would  be  best 
served  by  erecting  Belgium  into  an  in- 
dependent  state   and   by   guaranteeing 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR 


25 


the  permanence  of  this  independent 
status  by  making  the  country  perpet- 
ually neutral.  Accordingly  in  1831 
the  principal  European  Powers,  Great 
Britain,  France,  Prussia,  and  Russia, 
joined  in  guaranteeing  the  indepen- 
dence and  perpetual  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium. This  treaty  was  replaced  by 
treaties  signed  in  1839  after  Holland 
had  agreed  to  recognize  Belgian  inde- 
pendence. When  in  1870,  at  the  out- 
break of  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  it 
seemed  possible  that  one  or  both  of  the 
combatants  might  violate  the  neutral- 
ity of  Belgium,  a  separate  treaty  was 
signed  between  Great  Britain  and  each 
of  the  belligerents,  by  which  Great 
Britain  agreed  that  if  either  belliger- 
ent should  violate  Belgian  neutrality 
the  other  could  rely  upon  England  as 
an  ally  in  defense  of  the  treaty  of 
1839. 

When  on  July  31,  1914,  the  out- 
break of  a  European  war  seemed  un- 
avoidable, Sir  Edward  Grey  tele- 
graphed the  British  ambassadors  at 
Paris  and  Berlin  to  request  the  French 
and  German  governments  to  state 
whether  they  were  prepared  to  respect 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  so  long  as  no 
other  power  violated  it.  To  this  the 
French  authorities  returned  an  affir- 
mative answer.  The  German  Secre- 
tary of  State,  however,  stated  that  it 
was  doubtful  if  Germany  could  return 
any  reply  without  disclosing  a  certain 
amount  of  her  plan  of  campaign.  On 
August  2,  1914,  the  German  Minister 
presented  to  the  Belgian  Foreign  Min- 
ister an  ultimatum  which  stated  that 
Germany  had  "reliable  information 
...  of  the  intention  of  France  to 
march  through  Belgian  territory,"  that 
it  was  "an  imperative  duty  for  the 
preservation  of  Germany  to  forestall 
this  attack."  Germany  agreed  to 
evacuate  Belgian  territory  as  soon  as 


the  war  was  over  and  to  indemnify  Bel- 
gium for  all  damages  if  she  would 
maintain  an  attitude  of  "friendly  neu- 
trality." In  case  of  refusal  Germany 
stated  that  Belgium  would  be  consid- 
ered as  an  enemy  and  the  question 
would  be  left  "to  a  decision  of  arms." 
(B.G.B.  No.  20.)  To  this  demand  the 
Belgian  government  returned  a  flat  re- 
fusal and  stated  that  they  were  "firmly 
resolved  to  repulse  by  every  means 
within  their  power  any  attack  upon 
their  rights."  (B.G.B.  No.  22.)  At 
the  same  time  Belgium  called  upon 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia,  as 
signatories  of  the  treaty  of  1839,  to 
carry  out  the  guarantee  of  Belgian 
neutrality.  In  response  to  this  request 
Sir  Edward  Grey  on  August  4,  1914, 
sent  an  ultimatum  to  Germany  demand- 
ing a  satisfactory  reply  to  her  request 
that  Belgian  neutrality  be  respected 
and  requiring  an  answer  by  midnight 
of  the  same  day.  Upon  Germany's  re- 
fusal to  give  such  a  guarantee  Great 
Britain  declared  war  on  Germany. 
While  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutral- 
ity was  the  ostensible  reason  for  Great 
Britain's  declaration  of  war,  she  had, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  intervened  in  the 
war  two  days  before  the  dispatch  of 
her  ultimatum  to  Germany.  In  a 
speech  made  in  the  House  of  Commons 
on  August  2,  1914,  Sir  Edward  Grey 
stated  that  he  had  on  that  day  assured 
the  French  government  that  the  Brit- 
ish fleet  would  protect  the  northern 
coast  of  France  from  any  attack  by 
the  German  fleet.  By  this  act  Great 
Britain  had  tentatively  intervened  in 
the  war,  and  the  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality  by  Germany  changed  this 
partial  and  tentative  intervention  into 
full  participation  in  the  war. 

German  authorities  clearly  appre- 
ciated that  Germany's  action  in  invad- 
ing Belgium  would   arouse  public  sen- 


26 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


timent  in  most  neutral  countries  and 
strenuous  efforts  were  made  subse- 
quently to  justify  their  action.  In  a 
speech  in  the  Reichstag  on  August  4, 
1914,  the  German  Chancellor,  Theo- 
bald von  Bethmann-Hollweg,*  said: 
"Gentlemen,  we  are  now  acting  in  self- 
defense.  Necessity  knows  no  law.  Our 
troops  have  occupied  Luxemburg  and 
have  possibly  already  entered  on  Bel- 
gian soil.  Gentlemen,  this  is  a  breach 
of  international  law."  But  other 
grounds  than  that  of  bald  necessity 
have  been  advanced  by  German  apol- 
ogists to  justify  their  action.  It  has 
been  claimed  that  Prussia,  and  not 
the  German  Empire,  signed  the  treaty 
of  1839  and  hence  the  latter  was  not 
bound  by  its  provisions.  To  this  it 
has  been  answered  that  the  German 
Empire  succeeded  to  the  obligations  of 
its  component  parts  and  that  all 
treaties  survived  that  were  not  for- 
mally renounced.  It  has  also  been 
stated  that  the  treaty  of  1839  was 
superseded  by  the  treaties  of  1870 
which  latter  had  lapsed.  From  the 
debates  in  the  British  Parliament  at 
the  time  of  the  proposal  of  the  treaties 
of  1870  there  is  no  indication  that  the 
treaty  of  1839  was  to  be  superseded 
but  rather  to  be  strengthened.  Ger- 
many furthermore  claimed  that  certain 
secret  documents  which  were  discovered 
among  the  papers  of  the  Belgian  gov- 
ernment at  Brussels  go  to  prove  that 
Belgium  had  by  its  own  acts  relieved 
Germany   of  the  obligation  to   respect 

*  Bethmann-Hollweg,  Theobald  Theodore 
Frederic  Alfred  von.  Born  (1856)  in  Bran- 
denburg, Germany.  Educated  at  College  of 
Pforta  and  at  universities  of  Strassburg, 
Leipsic  and  Berlin.  Appointed  Landrat  of 
Oberbarnim,  Brandenburg.  President  Province 
of  Brandenburg  (1901),  Minister  of  Interior 
(1905),  appointed  Imperial  Secretary  of  State 
for  the  Interior  and  Vice  President  of  the 
Prussian  Council  (1907),  and  Chancellor  of 
the  German  Empire  (1909).  A  mild  conserva- 
tive, but  non-partisan  in  domestic  affairs. 


her  neutrality.  These  documents  con- 
tain an  account  of  certain  conversa- 
tions between  the  Chief  of  the  Belgian 
General  Staff  and  the  British  Mili- 
tary Attache  at  Brussels,  relative  to 
the  sending  of  British  military  forces 
to  Belgium  in  case  of  an  invasion  of 
the  latter  by  Germany.  The  German 
authorities  claim  that  this  amounted 
to  an  Anglo-Belgian  alliance  against 
Germany.  In  answer  to  this  charge 
King  Albert  *  of  Belgium  stated,  ac- 
cording to  an  interview  in  the  New 
York  World  (March  22,  1915),  that 
the  conversations  referred  to  had  been 
long  known  to  the  German  authorities, 
having  been  communicated  to  the  Ger- 
man Military  Attache  at  Brussels  so 
as  to  avoid  any  semblance  of  entering 
into  an  unneutral  agreement.  Germany 
also  complained  that  Belgian  military 
preparations  for  the  defense  of  her 
neutrality,  instead  of  being  impartially 
directed  against  the  possibility  of  an 
attack  from  any  of  the  Powers,  were 
made  entirely  against  Germany.  To 
this  it  is  answered  that  the  fortress  of 
Namur  was  directed  against  France  as 
Liege  was  directed  against  Germany. 
Furthermore  that  if  greater  energy 
had  been  directed  towards  fortifying 
the  German  than  the  French  frontier, 
this  was  but  natural  in  view  of  the 
German  activity  in  building  military 
railways  leading  up  to  the  Belgian 
frontier.  Finally  Germany  declared 
that  her  invasion  of  Belgium  was  in 
response  to  violations  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality by  France.  But  of  this  no 
satisfactory    evidence    has    been    pro- 

*  Albert  I.,  King  of  the  Belgians.  Born 
in  1875.  Carefully  educated.  Democratic  and 
firiendly  in  manner.  Traveled  widely  and 
student  of  economics  and  politics.  Made  tour 
of  Belgian  Congo  and  advocated  reform  in 
the  treatment  of  natives.  When  he  became 
King  (December,  1909)  many  improvements 
were  made  in  the  administration  of  the  colony. 
One  of  the  heroic  figures  of  the  great  war. 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR 


27 


duced.  To  the  impartial  observer, 
therefore,  it  would  appear  that  Ger- 
man justification  for  the  violation  of 
Belgian  neutrality  must  rest  entirely 
on  the  ground  of  military  necessity. 

The  Lichnowsky  Memorandum. 
Notes  taken  by  Prince  Lichnowsky, 
formerly  German  Ambassador  in  Lon- 
don, were  made  public  early  in  1918 
and  caused  a  sensation  in  the  press  of 
the  belligerent  powers  by  their  revela- 
tion of  the  friendly  attitude  of  Eng- 
land and  her  desire  to  maintain  peace 
in  the  period  just  preceding  the  war. 
The  memorandum,  which  bears  the  title 
My  London  Mission,  1912-H,  was 
dated  August  16,  1916.  When  called 
to  account  by  his  government  the 
prince  said  that  the  document  was 
meant  for  the  family  archives  and 
that  it  had  found  its  way  outside  that 
circle  as  a  result  of  a  breach  of  con- 
fidence. He  expressed  his  regret  and 
resigned  his  rank  as  ambassador.  The 
government  forbade  the  prince  to  write 
articles  for  the  press.  Space  is  lack- 
ing for  the  quotation  of  the  letters,  but 
the  following  summary  indicates  his 
general  attitude.  In  the  first  place  he 
emphasized  the  conciliatory  attitude 
of  the  British  statesmen,  especially  Sir 
Edward  Grey.  Reviewing  the  policy 
of  the  German  government  just  before 
the  war,  he  said  that  although  it  had 
made  repeated  errors  there,  everything 
was  still  open  as  late  as  July,  1914. 
Agreement  with  England  had  been 
reached.  If  a  representative  of  aver- 
age ability  had  been  sent  to  St.  Peters- 
burg he  might  have  convinced  Russia 
of  Germany's  peaceful  intentions.  The 
German  government  could  have  proven 
to  Russia  that  it  had  no  desire  to  seize 
the  Dardanelles  or  to  destroy  the 
Serbs.  At  this  time  M.  Sazonov  was 
saying,  "Leave  Austria  and  we  will 
leave    the    French,"    and    the    French 


ambassador  was  saying,  "You  need 
not  follow  Austria  everywhere."  He 
said  that  there  was  no  need  then  of 
either  alliances  or  wars,  but  only  of 
treaties  that  would  protect  Germany 
and  others  and  guarantee  Germany  an 
economic  development.  After  Russia 
had  been  relieved  of  trouble  in  the  west 
she  would  have  turned  again  to  the  east 
which  would  have  saved  the  situation. 
He  said  that  Germany  might  also  have 
taken  up  the  matter  of  the  limitation 
of  armaments.  He  summed  up  the 
case  against  his  own  government  as 
follows : 

"As  appears  from  all  official  publications, 
without  the  facts  being  controverted  by  our 
own  White  Book,  which,  owing  to  its  poverty 
and   gaps,   constitutes   a   grave   self-accusation: 

(1).  We  encouraged  Count  Berchtold  to  at- 
tack Serbia,  although  no  German  interest  was 
involved,  and  the  danger  of  a  world  war  must 
have  been  known  to  us — whether  we  knew  the 
text  of  the  ultimatum  is  a  question  of  com- 
plete indifference. 

(2).  In  the  days  between  July  23  and  July 
30,  1914,  when  M.  Sazonov  emphatically  de- 
clared that  Russia  could  not  tolerate  an  attack 
on  Serbia,  we  rejected  the  British  proposals  of 
mediation,  although  Serbia,  under  Russian  and 
British  pressure,  had  accepted  almost  the  whole 
ultimatum,  and  although  an  agreement  about 
the  two  points  in  question  could  easily  have 
been  reached,  and  Count  Berchtold  was  even 
ready  to  satisfy  himself  with  the  Serbian  re- 
ply- 

(3).  On  July  30,  when  Count  Berchtold 
wanted  to  give  way,  we,  without  Austria's  hav- 
ing attacked,  replied  to  Russia's  mere  mobili- 
zation by  sending  an  ultimatum  to  St.  Peters- 
burg, and  on  July  31  we  declared  war  on  the 
Russians,  although  the  czar  had  pledged  his 
word  that  as  long  as  negotiations  continued  not 
a  man  should  march — so  that  we  deliberately 
destroyed  the  possibility  of  a  peaceful  settle- 
ment. 

In  view  of  these  indisputable  facts,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  the  whole  civilized  world  out- 
side Germany  attributes  to  us  the  sole  guilt 
for  the  world's  war." 

In  one  of  his  papers  the  prince  asks 
the  following  questions :  "Is  it  not  in- 
telligible that  our  enemies  declare  that 
they  will  not  rest  until  a  system  is  de- 
stroyed   which    constitutes    a    perma- 


28 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


nent  threatening  of  our  neighbors?" 
.  .  .  "Were  those  people  not  right 
who  declared  that  it  was  the  spirit  of 
Treitschke  and  Bernhardi  which  domi- 
nated the  German  people — the  spirit 
which  glorifies  war  as  an  aim  in  itself 
and  does  not  abhor  it  as  an  evil?" 

Italy's  Position.  At  the  outbreak  of 
the  European  War,  Italy  found  her- 
self in  a  most  trying  position.  To 
Austria  and  Germany  she  was  bound 
by  the  defensive  treaty  of  the  Triple 
Alliance.  Her  position  as  a  member  of 
this  alliance  had  from  the  beginning 
been  unnatural.  Ever  since  Italy  ob- 
tained national  unity  in  1870,  there 
has  been  a  strong  movement  to  obtain 
the  Italian-speaking  provinces  of  Tri- 
este and  Trentino,  still  held  by  Aus- 
tria. This  aspiration  in  Italy  for  what 
is  called  "Italia  Irredenta,"  or  unre- 
deemed Italy,  has  been  a  source  of  fric- 
tion between  Italy  and  Austria. 

The  first  indication  of  Italy's  waver- 
ing in  the  support  of  her  allies  was 
when  she  threw  her  influence  against 
Germany  at  the  Algeciras  Conference 
in  1906.  Again  in  1908  Italy  was 
much  irritated  when  Austria-Hungary 
annexed  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  thereby 
strengthening  her  position  on  the 
Adriatic  Sea.  But  the  most  serious 
blow  to  the  diplomatic  group  of  the 
Triple  Alliance  was  given  by  Italy  in 
1911  when  she  declared  war  on  Tur- 
key, a  country  which  had  come  to  be 
regarded  as  a  member  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  group.  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria were  forced  to  stand  by  and  allow 
Italy  to  weaken  the  influence  of  the 
Triple  Alliance  by  dismembering  Tur- 
key. All  of  these  events  indicated  that 
Italy's  attitude  at  the  outbreak  of  a 
European  war  would  be  uncertain.  Her 
position  was  made  more  precarious  by 
her  extensive  coast  line.  Any  war 
which    involved    Great    Britain    as    an 


enemy    would    expose    Italy    to    attack 
by  the  powerful  British  navy. 

Apart,  however,  from  questions  of 
vital  self-interest,  Italy  maintained 
that  under  the  terms  of  the  Triple  Al- 
liance she  was  not  bound  to  come  to 
the  aid  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary, because,  in  her  view,  Austria- 
Hungary  had  been  the  aggressor  and 
Italy's  obligations  under  the  treaty 
contemplated  only  a  defensive  war.  Ac- 
cordingly on  August  1,  1911,  Italy  de- 
clared that  she  would  remain  neutral. 
Italy's  declaration  of  neutrality  did 
not,  as  the  Italian  Foreign  Minister 
stated,  "signify  the  relinquishment  of 
Italian  interests  in  the  Balkans  and  in 
the  Adriatic,  but,  on  the  contrary,  the 
persuasion  that  such  interests  and  as- 
pirations shall  be  validly  supported 
while  the  neutrality  be  maintained." 
(I.G.B.  No.  2.) 

Italy's  next  step  was  a  most  dif- 
ficult one  to  determine.  Should  she- 
remain  neutral  she  could  expect  to  gain 
little  from  either  side,  and  she  had  to 
fear  from  her  former  allies,  Germany 
and  Austria,  in  case  of  their  military 
success,  a  revengeful  attitude.  On  the 
other  hand  to  join  the  Entente  allies 
was  a  difficult  policy  to  pursue.  In 
the  first  place  it  involved  the  moral 
question  of  turning  against  her  former 
allies.  In  the  second  place  the  Rus- 
sian and  Serbian  policy  in  the  Balkans 
was  not  certain  to  be  in  agreement 
with  Italy's  ambition  to  control  the 
Adriatic.  Other  considerations  also 
caused  Italy  to  hesitate  before  casting 
in  her  lot  with  the  Entente  allies.  Such 
were  the  unfavorable  financial  condi- 
tion of  the  country,  the  pro-German 
sympathies  of  the  royal  family,  and 
the  opposition  of  ex-Premier  Giolitti,* 

*  Giolttti,  Giovanni.  Born  (1843)  at  Mon- 
dovi  in  Province  of  Cuneo.  Educated  at  Turin. 
Served  in  a  department  of  Ministry  of  Finance. 
Elected  to  Chamber  of  Deputies.     1889  became 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR 


29 


who,  with  a  strong  personal  following 
in  the  Italian  Parliament,  maintained 
that  Italy  should  not  enter  the  war. 

For  10  months  the  contest  between 
the  neutralists  and  the  interventionists 
went  on  in  Italy.  Great  efforts  were 
made  by  Germany  and  Austria,  espe- 
cially through  Prince  von  Biilow  and 
his  Italian  wife,  to  influence  public 
opinion  in  Italy.  It  was  clear,  how- 
ever, that  there  was  a  steady  drift  of 
popular  sentiment  in  favor  of  the  En- 
tente. This  movement  was  strength- 
ened, too,  by  the  death  of  the  Marquis 
di  San  Giuliano,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  in  October,  1914,  who  was 
popularly  regarded  as  a  strong  sym- 
pathizer with  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary.  Baron  Sidney  Sonnino,* 
who  succeeded  him,  is  regarded  as  one 
of  the  most  astute  Italian  statesmen 
since  Cavour.  In  the  meantime  the 
Italian  government  had  entered  upon  a 
series  of  communications  with  Austria- 
Hungary  looking  to  a  satisfaction  of 
Italian  aspirations  and  interests  in  the 
Balkans.  The  Italian  Foreign  Minis- 
ter began  by  setting  forth  that,  under 
Article  VII  of  the  Triple  Alliance, 
Italy  was  entitled  to  compensations,  in 
the  event  of  any  occupation  of  Serbian 
territory,  even  temporarily,  by  Aus- 
tria-Hungary.     The  Austrian   officials 

Minister  of  the  Treasury  and  following  year 
Minister  of  Finance.  Forced  to  resign  because 
of  his  policy  of  extreme  economy.  Became 
President  of  Ministry  in  1892.  Introduced 
many  reforms  in  favor  of  lower  classes.  In 
1893  compelled  to  resign  because  of  bank  scan- 
dals. Became  Minister  of  the  Interior  in  1901, 
resigned  May,  1903.  Prime  Minister  several 
times.  Resigned  last  time  in  1914  on  veto  of 
colonial   budget. 

*  Sonnino,  Sidney,  Baron.  Born  (1847)  at 
Pisa.  Graduated  from  university  there  (1865). 
In  diplomatic  service  (1867-72),  and  after  1880 
deputy  in  Italian  legislature.  Minister  of 
Finance  (1893-94).  Minister  of  Treasury,  Pre- 
mier and  Minister  of  the  Interior  in  1906  and 
1909-10.  Accepted  portfolio  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs December,  1914,  when  Italy  made  prep- 
arations to  enter  European  war.  Author  of 
works  on  social  and  political  topics. 


were  not  inclined  to  admit,  at  first, 
that  Italy  had  any  valid  claim  to  com- 
pensations under  the  terms  of  the 
treaty  of  alliances. 

From  this  stand,  however,  Austria 
soon  receded,  probably  under  pressure 
from  Germany,  and  conceded  the  prin- 
ciple that  Italy  was  entitled  to  com- 
pensations. There  followed  several 
months  of  protracted  negotiations. 
Italy  demanded  as  the  minimum  that 
she  would  accept  in  the  way  of  com- 
pensations "the  district  of  the  Tren- 
tino,  a  new  district  on  the  Isonzo,  the 
special  treatment  of  Trieste,  the  ces- 
sion of  some  islands  of  the  Curzolari 
Archipelago,  a  declaration  of  Aus- 
tria's disinterestedness  in  Albania,  and 
the  recognition  of  our  possession  of 
Valona  and  Dodecanesia."  To  these 
demands  Austria  was  willing  to  con- 
cede only  a  portion  of  the  Trentino 
and  was  unwilling  to  make  any  cession 
before  the  end  of  the  war. 

These  fruitless  negotiations  culmi- 
nated in  the  declaration  by  Italy,  on 
May  4,  that  she  no  longer  considered 
herself  bound  by  the  provisions  of  the 
Triple  Alliance.  After  three  weeks  of 
hesitation  during  which  public  excite- 
ment in  Italy  reached  a  high  pitch, 
Italy  finally  declared  war  on  Austria, 
May  24,  1915.  Just  before  the  final 
break,  according  to  a  statement  made 
by  the  German  Chancellor,  Austria- 
Hungary  made  a  last  attempt  to  pur- 
chase Italy's  neutrality  offering  (1) 
the  Italian  part  of  the  Tirol;  (2)  the 
western  bank  of  the  Isonzo  "in  so  far 
as  the  population  is  purely  Italian," 
and  the  town  of  Gradisca;  (3)  sov- 
ereignty over  Valona  and  a  free  hand 
in  Albania;  (4)  special  treatment  of 
Italian  nationals  in  Austria  and  am- 
nesty for  political  prisoners  who  were 
natives  in  the  ceded  provinces;  (5) 
Trieste   to   be  made   an   Imperial   free 


30 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


city,  and  to  have  an  Italian  University. 
Furthermore,  it  was  stated  that  Aus- 
tria would  make  these  concessions  at 
once  and  not  wait  for  the  conclusion 
of  the  war. 

Japan's  Position.  Japan's  entrance 
into  the  European  War  was  due  to 
her  treaty  of  alliance  with  Great  Brit- 
ain. After  the  Chinese-Japanese  War 
Japan  was  deprived  of  the  fruits  of 
her  victory,  when  Port  Arthur  and  the 
Liaotung  peninsula  had  to  be  returned 
to  China  at  the  demand  of  Russia, 
France,  and  Germany.  Smarting  un- 
der this  humiliation,  Japan  turned  to 
Great  Britain  and  in  1902  negotiated 
a  treaty  of  alliance,  according  to  the 
terms  of  which  Japan  agreed  to  come 
to  the  defense  of  Great  Britain's  east- 
ern possessions  if  she  were  attacked  by 
more  than  one  Power.  Great  Britain 
on  the  other  hand  insured  Japan 
against  a  European  coalition  such  as 
had  intervened  at  the  conclusion  of 
the  Chinese-Japanese  War. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  European 
War  Japan  saw  her  opportunity  to  re- 
venge her  humiliation  at  the  close  of 
the  Chinese  War.  Actuated  also  by  a 
determination  to  carry  out  her  obliga- 
tions to  Great  Britain,  the  Japanese 
representative  in  Berlin  presented  an 
ultimatum  on  August  19,  1911,  "ad- 
vising" Germany  to  withdraw  all  war- 
ships from  Asiatic  waters  and  turn 
over  to  Japan  the  territory  of  Kiao- 
chow  before  September  15,  1911,  which 
territory  Japan  promised  eventually 
to  restore  to  China.  This  port  and 
surrounding  territory  had  been  ob- 
tained by  Germany  from  China  in 
1897  as  a  compensation  for  the  mur- 
der of  two  German  missionaries.  The 
Germans  had  fortified  the  harbor 
strongly  and  had  made  it  a  fine  naval 
base.  As  Germany  refused  to  reply  to 
the  Japanese  demand,  Japan  declared 


war  on  August  23,  1914.  The  Japa- 
nese Foreign  Minister  defended  this 
action  on  the  ground  that  Japan  was 
bound  by  treaty  obligations  to  come  to 
the  aid  of  her  ally,  Great  Britain,  and 
that  Germany's  position  at  Kiaochow 
gravely  threatened  the  maintenance  of 
peace  in  the  Far  East  and  the  inde- 
pendence and  integrity  of  China  which 
Japan  had  bound  herself  to  maintain. 

Turkey.  Germanic  influence  had  for 
a  number  of  years  prior  to  the  out- 
break of  the  war  been  predominant 
in  Turkey.  It  was  natural,  therefore, 
that  Turkish  sympathies  would  be  with 
the  Teutonic  allies.  But  Turkey  hesi- 
tated, at  first,  to  make  common  cause 
with  Germany  because  of  her  exposed 
position  and  the  fact  that  her  recent 
experiences  in  the  Balkan  wars  had 
left  her  exhausted.  Events,  however, 
rapidly  forced  Turkey  to  abandon  her 
attitude  of  quasi-neutrality.  Shortly 
after  the  outbreak  of  the  war  two  Ger- 
man warships,  the  Goeben  and  the 
Breslau,  in  order  to  escape  capture  by 
the  British  and  French  fleets,  sought 
refuge  in  the  Dardanelles.  The  de- 
mand of  England  and  France  that 
these  ships  should  either  be  forced  to 
put  to  sea  or  be  interned  was  answered 
by  Turkey  stating  that  she  had  pur- 
chased the  ships  from  Germany.  Tur- 
key also  refused  to  remove  the  German 
crews  of  the  two  vessels.  The  Triple 
Entente  also  resented  the  action  of 
Turkey  in  closing  the  Dardanelles  and 
in  serving  notice  that  the  "capitula- 
tions," under  the  terms  of  which  the 
national  subjects  of  various  Powers 
were  given  special  privileges  in  Turkey, 
would  be  revoked  on  October  1,  1914. 

When  on  October  29  the  former  Ger- 
man warship,  the  Breslau,  bombarded 
the  Russian  Black  Sea  port  of  Theo- 
dosia,  Russia  accepted  this  as  a  dec- 
laration of  war  and  the  following  day 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR 


31 


the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Constanti- 
nople demanded  his  passports.  This 
action  of  Russia  was  followed  by 
France  and  England  declaring  war  on 
Turkey,  November  5,  191-1.  Turkey's 
entrance  into  the  war  aroused  the  hope 
in  Germany  and  some  fear  in  Great 
Britain  and  France  that  a  Holy  War 
would  be  proclaimed  by  the  Sultan 
which  would  arouse  the  Moslem  popu- 
lations in  India,  Egypt,  and  Morocco. 
The  Sultan's  efforts  in  this  direction 
proved  unavailing,  and  no  serious  up- 
rising occurred  among  the  Moham- 
medan subjects  of  Great  Britain  and 
France. 

The  Balkan  States.  The  opening  of 
the  European  War  found  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  in  the  political  shape  given 
to  it  by  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  Au- 
gust 10,  1913,  which  closed  the  second 
Balkan  War.  This  treaty,  which  rep- 
resented the  latest  effort  on  the  part 
of  the  European  Powers  to  adjust  the 
Balkan  situation,  proved  unsatisfac- 
tory to  nearly  all  of  the  parties  con- 
cerned. Turkey  did  not  accept  with 
good  grace  the  loss  of  nearly  all  of  her 
European  territory.  Bulgaria  was  bit- 
ter towards  her  former  allies,  Greece, 
Serbia,  and  Montenegro,  who  she  felt 
had  treacherously  combined  to  deprive 
her  of  her  just  rewards.  Serbia  re- 
sented the  action  of  Austria,  Italy,  and 
Germany  in  depriving  her  of  an  outlet 
to  the  Adriatic.  Montenegro  was  dis- 
appointed in  being  forced  to  surrender 
Scutari.  Finally  Albania,  the  new 
state  created  by  the  Powers  to  thwart 
Serbia's  ambition  to  reach  the  Adri- 
atic, was  in  a  state  of  ill-disguised  an- 
archy under  the  shadowy  control  of 
Prince  William  of  Wied.* 

*  William  of  Wied,  Prince  (Wilhelm  Fried- 
rich  Heinrich).  Born  (1876)  at  Neuwied, 
Prussia.  Studied  law  and  political  science  at 
Jena.  Later  graduated  with  distinction  at  the 
Kriegsakademie.     Accepted  throne   of   Albania 


As  has  been  seen,  Serbia  had  been 
involved  in  the  war  from  the  beginning 
and  Montenegro  soon  threw  in  her  lot 
with  her  neighbor.  The  attitude  of  the 
other  Balkan  states  was  a  matter  of 
great  concern  to  the  diplomats  of  the 
allied  groups.  During  the  months  suc- 
ceeding the  outbreak  of  the  war,  a  dip- 
lomatic struggle  ensued  in  these  states, 
with  the  aim  of  winning  their  support 
to  one  or  the  other  side. 

In  this  struggle  the  diplomats  of  the 
Teutonic  Powers  had  certain  distinct 
advantages.  In  the  first  place  the  mon- 
archs  (Constantine  I,*  Ferdinand  I,f 
Charles     I  $)      of     the     three     states, 

offered  to  him  by  great  Powers  of  Europe 
(1914).  Reign  troubled  and  forced  to  leave 
country  September,  1914.  Albanian  Senavte 
elected  as  ruler  Burhan  Eddin,  the  son  of  the 
former  sultan  of  Turkey.  His  bitter  opponent 
and  rival  for  the  throne  was  Essad  Pascha. 

*  Constantine  I.,  King  of  Greece,  born 
(1868)  in  Athens,  son  of  King  George  I.  and 
Olga,  niece  of  Czar  Nicholas  I.  Studied  at 
the  Universities  of  Berlin  and  Leipsic.  Mar- 
ried (1889)  a  sister  of  Emperor  William  II.  of 
Germany.  Received  careful  military  training. 
Commander  in  chief  of  Greek  forces  in  Turk- 
ish War  of  1897.  In  the  Balkan  War  (1912-13) 
acquitted  himself  so  well,  he  was  hailed  as  na- 
tional hero.  Became  King  of  the  Hellenes  on 
March  21,  1913.  Continued  campaigns  against 
Turks  and  Bulgarians  and  doubled  area  of 
country.  During  the  European  war  he  main- 
tained a  strong  pro-German  attitude  as  a  re- 
sult of  which  he  was  compelled  to  abdicate  by 
the  Entente  Allies.  He  was  succeeded  by  his 
second   son   Alexander. 

f  Ferdinand  I.  Born  (1861)  in  Vienna.  Re- 
ceived excellent  education.  Offered  throne  of 
Bulgaria  (1886)  and  took  oath  to  constitution 
and  title  of  Prince  (1887).  Not  recognized  by 
Great  Powers  or  Turkey  until  1896.  In  1908 
proclaimed  full  independence  of  Bulgaria  and 
assumed  title  of  King.  Royal  title  recognized 
by  Powers  and  Turkey  in  1909.  Favored  form- 
ation of  Balkan  League  and  prosecution  of 
Balkan  War  (1912-13).  As  a  result  of  this 
war  territory  increased,  but  not  sufficiently  to 
satisfy  Ferdinand. 

$  Charles  I.  Born  (1839).  Served  in  Prus- 
sian army.  Elected  Prince  of  Rumania  (1866). 
Country  in  wretched  condition.  Showed  tact 
and  statesmanship  in  work  of  reorganization. 
Helped  Russia  in  Russo-Turkish  War  (1877). 
Declared  independence  of  Rumania  shortly 
after  beginning  of  war.  In  1881  crowned 
King.  Country  developed,  education  advanced. 
Held  aloof  from  recent  war  in  Balkans.  Be- 
loved by  peasants,  but  opposed  by  landowning 
Boyards    (lower   nobility). 


32 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Greece,  Bulgaria,  and  Rumania,  were 
related  by  blood  and  marriage  with  the 
Teutonic  royal  families.  Moreover,  as 
the  British  Prime  Minister  (H.  H.  As- 
quith  *)  indicated  in  a  speech  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  Germany  had  a 
distinct  advantage  in  that  she  could 
conduct  her  negotiations  with  a  single- 
ness of  purpose,  as  her  interests  and 
those  of  Austria-Hungary  were  identi- 
cal. On  the  other  hand,  the  Entente 
diplomats  had  to  consider  the  interests, 
not  always  identical,  of  three  and, 
later,  four  Powers.  Finally  the  En- 
tente allies  were  handicapped  by  the 
fact  that  Russian  ambitions  in  the  Bal- 
kans conflicted  with  the  national  aspi- 
rations of  the  smaller  Balkan  states; 
that  Italy's  territorial  ambitions  in  Al- 
bania ran  counter  to  the  legitimate  as- 
pirations of  Serbia,  and  that  Greece 
resented  the  attempt  of  ItahT  to  gain  a 
foothold  on  the  coast  of  Asia  Miner, 
which  was  racially  and  historically 
Greek. 

In  view  of  these  conditions  it  is  not 
surprising  that  the  efforts  of  the  En- 
tente diplomats,  even  had  they  been 
conducted  more  skillfully  than  they  ap- 
pear to  have  been,  should  have  failed. 

Bulgaria. — The  second  Balkan  War 

left,  as  has  been  noted,  a  heritage  or 

bitterness  and  hatred  among  the  former 

Balkan  allies.     The  Bulgars,  smarting 

under  the  humiliation  of  the  Treaty  of 

Bucharest,   welcomed    the    opportunity 

*  Asquith,  Herbert  Henry.  Born  (1852) 
in  Yorkshire.  Admitted  to  bar  after  gradua- 
tion from  Oxford.  Became  member  of  Par- 
liament and  won  favor  of  Gladstone.  Made 
Home  Secretary  (1882).  Favored  free  trade. 
Helped  turn  Conservatives  out  of  office  (1905) 
and  became  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  under 
Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman  and  because 
of  feeble  health  of  Prime  Minister,  virtual  head 
of  government.  Favored  old-age  pension  bill, 
which  was  passed.  Became  Prime  Minister 
(1908)  and  a  liberal  programme  accelerated. 
House  of  Lords  sheared  of  power  of  veto,  be- 
cause opposed  to  social  legislation  and  defeat 
of  budget.  He  resigned  on  December  5,  1916, 
and  was  succeeded  by  David  Lloyd  George. 


to  revenge  themselves  upon  their  for- 
mer allies.  Completely  disillusioned 
by  their  experiences  of  the  past  few 
years,  they  put  aside  all  feeling  of 
generosity  or  gratitude  and  frankly 
adopted  a  programme  of  "real  politik." 
To  the  diplomats  of  the  Entente  and 
the  Teutonic  allies  the  Bulgarian  au- 
thorities made  it  clear  that  all  ques- 
tion of  sentiment,  so  far  as  Bulgaria 
was  concerned,  was  to  be  disregarded 
and  that  they  were  prepared  to  sell  out 
to  the  highest  bidder.  Great  Britain 
and  France  brought  pressure  to  bear 
on  Rumania,  Serbia,  and  Greece  to  sat- 
isfy, in  part,  the  territorial  demands  of 
Bulgaria.  The  Teutonic  Powers  made 
counter  proposals  promising  Bulgaria 
a  large  part  of  Serbian  territory  in 
case  of  the  success  of  the  Central  Pow- 
ers. For  more  than  a  year  Bulgaria 
hesitated,  apparently  weighing  the  rela- 
tive advantages  of  the  rival  proposals. 
In  the  meantime  the  Bulgarian  army 
was  mobilized,  in  order  to  be  prepared 
when  the  final  decision  was  reached.  It 
became  increasingly  evident  as  the 
months  passed  that  the  attitude  of  King 
Ferdinand  and  the  military  leaders  was 
favorable  to  the  Teutonic  allies.  Mat- 
ters were  brought  to  a  head  when,  on 
Oct.  3,  1915,  Russia  notified  Bulgaria 
that  if  she  did  not,  within  24  hours, 
break  with  the  Teutonic  Powers,  the 
Russian  Minister  would  withdraw  from 
Sofia.  A  similar  demand  was  made  by 
France,  while  Great  Britain  stated  that 
if  Bulgaria  precipitated  hostilities  in 
the  Balkans  she  would  break  off  rela- 
tions with  her.  On  Oct.  8,  1915,  Bul- 
garia replied,  rejecting  these  demands 
and  throwing  her  support  to  the  Teu- 
tonic Powers.  In  a  manifesto  issued 
by  M.  Radoslavoff,*  the  Bulgarian  Pre- 

*  Vaseil  Radoslavoff,  born  in  Lowatsch;  stud- 
ied law  at  Heidelberg;  at  various  times  served 
as  Minister  of  Justice,  Minister  of  the  Interior, 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR 


33 


mier,  there  was  set  forth  the  reasons 
for  Bulgaria's  decision.  He  stated 
frankly  that  considerations  of  self-in- 
terest had  dictated  the  step.  He 
pointed  out  that  Bulgaria's  chief  eco- 
nomic interests  were  with  the  Teutonic 
Powers  and  Turkey,  and  that  these  in- 
terests would  be  seriously  menaced  if 
Constantinople  fell  into  the  hands  of 
Russia.  In  reviewing  the  proposals  of 
concessions  made  to  Bulgaria  by  the 
opposing  groups,  he  held  that  the  Teu- 
tonic proposals  were  more  advanta- 
geous to  Bulgaria.  And  finally  he  had 
reached  the  conclusion  that  the  pro- 
gress of  the  war  indicated  the  probable 
success  of  the  Central  Powers,  and  it 
was  vital  to  the  interests  of  Bulgaria 
to  be  on  the  side  of  the  victors. 

Greece. — Conflicting  influences  and 
interests  complicated  the  situation  in 
Greece  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  On 
the  one  hand,  the  royal  family  was 
closely  related  to  the  Hohenzollerns, 
the  Greek  Queen  Sophia  being  a  sister  of 
the  German  Emperor,  William  II.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  Premier  Venizelos  * 
felt  that  the  best  interests  of  Greece 
would  be  served  by  joining  the  Entente 
allies.  Popular  sympathy  in  the  coun- 
try appeared  to  be  with  the  Entente 
group,  and  especially  with  France.  In 
addition,  Greece  was  bound  by  a  treaty 
of  alliance  with  Serbia  which  obligated 
her  to  come  to  the  aid  of  Serbia  if  she 

and  Premier;  did  much  as  Premier  in  1913  to 
bring  Balkan  War  to  an  end;  became  Premier 
and  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  (October, 
1915)  during  European  War;  made  important 
declarations  of  Bulgarian  policy;  shot  at  twice 
(March,  1916). 

*  Vexizelos,  Eleutherios.  Born  (1864)  on 
island  of  Crete.  Graduated  (1886)  from  Uni- 
versity of  Athens  in  law.  Made  brilliant  repu- 
tation as  a  lawyer.  At  25  chosen  to  Cretan 
legislature.  Minister  of  Justice  in  1899.  Fa- 
vored political  union  of  Crete  and  Greece. 
Chosen  Premier  of  Crete  (1910).  Central  fig- 
ure in  events  in  the  Balkans.  Greek  premier 
in  1910.  Had  prominent  part  in  revising  Greek 
constitution.  Championed  side  of  Triple  En- 
tente. 


were  attacked  by  Bulgaria.  During  the 
first  months  of  the  war  the  diplomats 
of  France  and  Great  Britain  directed 
their  efforts  to  winning  all  of  the  Bal- 
kan states  to  the  support  of  the  En- 
tente. With  this  end  in  view  both 
Greece  and  Serbia  were  urged  to  make 
territorial  concessions  to  Bulgaria. 
These  efforts  were  seconded  by  M. 
Venizelos,  but  the  Greek  King  flatly 
opposed  any  territorial  concessions  and 
maintained  that  the  best  interests  of 
Greece  would  be  served  by  the  observ- 
ance of  strict  neutrality.  The  break 
between  the  King  and  his  chief  Minis- 
ter led  to  the  resignation  of  the  latter 
in  March,  1915.  His  return  to  office 
shortly  after  as  a  result  of  popular  ap- 
proval expressed  in  the  elections  to  the 
new  Chamber  was  hailed  as  a  victory 
for  the  Entente,  and  it  was  generally 
expected  that  Greece  would  soon  enter 
the  war.  The  situation  became  acute 
when,  in  September,  1915,  Bulgaria 
mobilized  her  army  and  Greece  did  like- 
wise. Bulgaria's  entrance  into  the  war 
on  the  side  of  the  Teutonic  Powers 
raised  the  question  of  Greece's  obliga- 
tion under  the  treaty  of  alliance  with 
Serbia.  M.  Venizelos  maintained  that 
Greece  was  bound  to  come  to  Serbia's 
aid,  but  the  King  once  more  interposed 
his  objections,  holding  that  the  treaty 
contemplated  only  a  local  Balkan  war 
and  not  one  in  which  the  Great  Powers 
were  involved.  Again  M.  Venizelos  re- 
signed. In  the  meantime  arrangements 
had  been  made  by  the  Greek  Premier 
with  the  Entente  allies  for  the  landing 
of  French  and  English  troops  at  the 
Greek  port  of  Saloniki,  which  troops 
were  to  be  used  to  aid  Serbia.  This 
use  of  a  Greek  port  was  a  clear  viola- 
tion of  Greek  neutrality  and  the  Greek 
government  entered  a  formal  protest. 
It  was  understood  on  all  sides  that  this 
protest    was    purely    formal,    and    the 


34 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


landing  of  troops  continued.  The  resig- 
nation of  M.  Venizelos  aroused  some  ap- 
prehension in  France  and  England  and 
pressure  was  brought  to  bear  upon  the 
new  Premier,  M.  Zaimis,*  to  define  his 
position.  He  stated  that  the  attitude 
of  Greece  would  be  "neutrality,  with 
the  character  of  sincerest  benevolence 
towards  the  Entente  Powers."  King 
Constantine,  however,  vigorously  pro- 
tested against  the  violation  of  Greek 
territory  by  Great  Britain  and  France. 
He  maintained  that  it  was  the  sheerest 
hypocrisy  for  these  countries  to  pro- 
test against  the  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality  by  the  Germans,  while  they 
themselves  were  violating  Greek  neu- 
trality. He  was  strongly  supported  in 
these  views  by  Stephanos  Skouloudis, 
who  succeeded  Zaimis  as  Premier  and 
who  also  took  the  portfolio  of  Foreign 
Affairs. 

The  period  of  the  premiership  of 
Skouloudis  was  very  stormy.  The  Al- 
lies seemed  to  fear  that  their  Saloniki 
expedition  was  threatened  from  the  rear 
by  the  Greek  army.  This  fear  of  an 
attack  compelled  General  Sarrail  to 
keep  a  strong  force  on  the  Macedonian 
front.  In  order  to  remove  this  threat 
the  Allies  from  time  to  time  made  de- 
mands on  the  Greek  government  which 
weakened  the  latter's  military  posi- 
tion. The  Allies  desired  the  use  of  the 
Peloponnesian  railway  to  transport  the 
regenerated  Serbian  army  from  Corfu 
to  Saloniki.  This  was  refused  on  the 
ground  that  it  would  be  a  violation  of 
neutrality.  After  some  hesitation  the 
British  Foreign  Office  announced  that 
the  troops  would  be  transported  by 
water. 

*  Zaimis,  Alexander.  Born  (1855)  in  Athens. 
Educated  at  universities  of  Athens,  Leipsic, 
Berlin  (Ph.D.),  and  Paris.  Elected  deputy 
(1885);  Minister  of  Justice,  (1890-93);  presi- 
dent of  Chamber  of  Deputies  (1895-97);  Pre- 
mier (1897-99  and  1901-02).  Brought  about 
annexation  of  Island  of  Crete  to  Greece  (1913). 


This  demand  was  only  a  preliminary 
to  those  which  were  to  follow.  In  June, 
1916,  the  Bulgarians  crossed  the  Mace- 
donian frontier  and  seized  several  Greek 
forts.  When  war  was  not  immediately 
declared  on  Bulgaria,  the  Allied  Pow- 
ers demanded  that  the  Greek  army  be 
demobilized.  To  enforce  their  demands, 
they  blockaded  the  Greek  ports  and 
seized  vessels  and  supplies  in  the  har- 
bors. Martial  law  was  declared  in  Sa- 
loniki and  the  Greek  military  com- 
mander was  superseded  by  a  French- 
man. The  Greek  government  sent  iden- 
tical notes  of  protest  against  interfer- 
ence with  her  trade  by  the  Entente  Pow- 
ers to  the  United  States  and  to  all  the 
South  American  governments.  Never- 
theless the  result  of  the  blockade  was 
the  demobilization  of  the  12  senior 
classes  on  June  9th. 

As  soon  as  order  was  restored  a  new 
set  of  demands  was  made  on  the  Greek 
government.  Before  they  were  officially 
received,  however,  the  Skouloudis  gov- 
ernment resigned.  Former  Premier 
Alexander  Zaimis  was  again  called  upon 
to  head  the  cabinet.  The  first  act  of 
his  government  was  to  accept  uncondi- 
tionally the  demands  of  the  Allies, 
which  included  briefly,  (1)  demobiliza- 
tion of  the  rest  of  the  Greek  army,  (2) 
replacing  of  the  Skouloudis  cabinet 
with  a  business  cabinet  favorable  to  the 
Allies,  (3)  dissolution  of  the  chamber 
and  the  holding  of  new  elections,  and, 
(4)  replacement  of  certain  police  func- 
tionaries who  had  permitted  insults 
against  the  Allied  legations.  Upon  the 
acceptance  of  these  demands  the  Allied 
blockade  was  withdrawn. 

During  this  period  of  national  un- 
rest there  was  gradually  springing  up 
a  strong  anti-German  party.  The  seiz- 
ure of  the  garrison  at  Kavala  by  the 
Bulgarians,  the  abandonment  of  the 
Macedonian   forts    without    a    struggle 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR 


35 


and  the  entrance  of  Rumania  into  the 
war,  brought  the  move  to  a  head.  A 
Committee  of  National  Defense  was  es- 
tablished by  those  who  were  opposed  to 
the  supine  attitude  of  the  Greek  gov- 
ernment. It  set  up  a  provisional  form 
of  government  for  Macedonia  and  de- 
manded that  the  Bulgarians  be  driven 
out.  In  order  to  aid  this  movement  to 
succeed  the  Allies  took  an  active  part 
in  it.  They  seized  enemy  merchant- 
men in  the  Piraeus,  the  port  of  Athens. 
They  also  demanded  and  received  all 
Greek  ports  and  the  use  of  the  tele- 
graph system.  On  account  of  inabil- 
ity to  handle  the  situation  the  Zaimis 
ministry  resigned. 

The  pro-Ally  movement  reached  its 
height  when  a  formidable  revolution 
broke  out  in  Crete  during  the  third 
week  in  September.  Venizelos  immedi- 
ately left  Athens  with  a  number  of  sup- 
porters for  the  seat  of  the  revolution. 
One  of  his  chief  followers  was  Admiral 
Coudouriotis,  whose  desertion  of  the 
King  left  the  latter  in  a  very  serious 
predicament.  A  proclamation  estab- 
lishing a  provisional  government  was 
issued  by  Venizelos  and  Admiral  Cou- 
douriotis, and  within  a  very  short  time 
Macedonia  and  all  of  the  Greek  islands 
were  under  their  control.  The  provi- 
sional government  declared  war  on  Ger- 
many and  Bulgaria  on  Nov.  25,  1916. 

The  Allies  heartily  approved  the  new 
Venizelos  government  and  proceeded  to 
make  further  demands  on  the  new  Greek 
government,  headed  by  Spyridon  Lam- 
bros.  The  new  demands  included  the 
turning  over  to  the  Allies  of  the  Greek 
navy,  certain  strategical  railways, 
forts,  mails,  telegraphs,  police  service, 
naval  material  and  the  Piraeus.  They 
further  demanded  that  any  Greek  who 
so  desired  be  permitted  to  join  the  new 
government.  All  these  demands  were 
acceded  to  as  a  result  of  necessity. 


Apparently  still  fearing  an  attack  in 
their  rear,  the  Allies  demanded  that  all 
the  arms  and  munitions  belonging  to 
the  Greek  army  and  navy  be  turned 
over  to  them.  The  Greek  government 
was  given  until  Dec.  1,  1916,  to  grant 
this  last  request.  King  Constantine  re- 
fused to  agree,  marines  were  landed 
from  the  Allied  fleet,  and  a  scene  simi- 
lar to  the  days  of  the  French  Revolu- 
tion occurred  in  Athens.  True  to  his 
promise,  Vice  Admiral  du  Fournet  fired 
upon  royalist  troops,  when  the  time  of 
his  ultimatum  expired.  Thereupon  a 
regular  civil  war  broke  out  in  Athens. 
Royalist  troops  fired  upon  Venizelists 
and  vice  versa.  As  a  result  of  a  truce 
King  Constantine  agreed  to  surrender 
all  the  mountain  guns  of  the  Greek 
army.  When  this  was  accomplished  all 
the  Allied  marines  were  withdrawn  to 
the  fleet  with  the  exception  of  a  small 
guard. 

The  Entente  nations  continued  to 
exert  a  political  and  economic  pressure 
upon  the  Greek  government.  King  Con- 
stantine adopted  a  passive  attitude  of 
submission  to  the  demands  of  the  Allies 
and  determined  to  rely  on  the  ultimate 
recognition  by  the  world  that  his  treat- 
ment had  been  unjust.  The  long  con- 
flict between  King  Constantine  and  the 
Entente  came  to  an  end  on  June  12, 
1917,  when  the  King  abdicated  in  favor 
of  his  second  son  Alexander.  This  step 
was  taken  at  the  dictation  of  the  Allies, 
who  decided,  after  investigation,  that 
the  King  and  his  elder  son  George  were 
strongly  pro-German.  Zaimis,  the 
prime  minister,  resigned  and  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Venizelos,  the  staunch  friend 
of  the  Entente.  One  of  the  first  acts  of 
the  new  ministry  was  to  declare  war  on 
Bulgaria  and  Germany  (July  2).  Al- 
lied control  was  withdrawn  with  the  ex- 
ception of  that  over  telegraphs  and 
press     censorship.        Immediate     steps 


36 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


were  taken  to  actively  join  the  Entente 
army  around  Saloniki.  This  removed 
the  continual  threat  of  an  attack  by 
Greek  forces  in  the  rear  of  General 
Sarrail's  army.  See  Southeastern 
Theatre, 

Rumania. — Somewhat  the  same  di- 
vision of  sentiment  obtained  in  Rumania 
as  in  Greece  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
European  War.  The  King,  Charles  I, 
was  a  member  of  the  Hohenzollern  fam- 
ily, and  it  was  rumored  that  there  was 
a  secret  treaty  between  Rumania,  Ger- 
many, and  Austria-Hungary.  The 
mass  of  the  Rumanian  population  is 
composed  of  illiterate  peasants,  but 
among  the  educated  classes  there  was 
a  strong  pro-French  and  especially  pro- 
Italian  sentiment.  The  Rumanians 
claim  descent  from  Roman  colonists ; 
and  there  has  always  been  a  strong  sen- 
timental attachment  to  Italy  among  the 
Rumanians.  Apart  from  conflicting 
sentimental  influences,  the  question  of 
the  wisest  policy  for  Rumania  to  pur- 
sue to  advance  her  material  interests 
was  not  easy  to  determine.  On  the  one 
hand  a  large  Rumanian  population  was 
included  in  the  Austrian  dominions  in 
Transylvania,  while  on  the  other  hand 
the  Russian  province  of  Bessarabia  was 
equally  Rumanian  in  nationality  and 
more  valuable  economically  than  Tran- 
sylvania. 

At  the  head  of  the  Rumanian  minis- 
try was  John  Bratianu,  one  of  the 
shrewdest  statesmen  in  the  Balkans.  He 
advocated  a  policy  of  wraiting,  with  the 
intention  of  entering  the  war  at  the 
proper  time  when  the  greatest  reward 
could  be  obtained  by  the  least  fighting. 
The  death  of  King  Charles  in  October, 
1914,  and  the  entrance  of  Italy  into  the 
war,  were  expected  to  influence  Ru- 
mania to  join  forces  with  the  Entente 
allies.  But  the  failure  of  the  Russian 
campaign    in    Galicia    and    Bulgaria's 


alliance  with  the  Teutonic  Powers 
caused  Rumania  to  continue  her  policy 
of  watchful  waiting. 

She  continued  this  policy  until  April 
28,  1916,  when  the  Rumanian  minister 
at  Vienna  presented  a  note  to  the  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian  Foreign  Minister  which 
said  that  Rumania  considered  herself 
at  war  with  Austria-Hungary  since  nine 
o'clock  the  previous  evening.  She 
maintained  that  her  treaties  with  the 
Central  Powers  had  been  continually 
broken  since  the  war  began  and  that 
Rumanians  in  Austria-Hungary  were 
being  persecuted.  She  intervened  to 
prevent  these  persecutions,  to  shorten 
the  war  if  possible,  and  to  realize  her 
national  ideal.  She  thought  an  alli- 
ance with  the  Entente  allies  would  best 
enable  her  to  accomplish  the  last  pur- 
pose. 

Portugal.  Portugal  was  bound  by  a 
treaty  of  alliance  with  Great  Britain, 
and  at  the  outbreak  of  the  European 
War  Portugal  stated  that  she  was  pre- 
pared to  carry  out  her  treaty  obliga- 
tions whenever  Great  Britain  desired 
her  to  do  so.  However,  Portugal  did 
not  enter  the  war  until  more  than  a 
year  after  the  beginning  of  hostilities, 
although  there  were  clashes  between 
Portuguese  and  German  troops  in  Af- 
rica. On  Feb.  24,  1916,  at  the  request 
of  Great  Britain,  Portugal  seized  a 
number  of  German  and  Austrian  ships 
lying  in  Portuguese  harbors.  On 
March  8,  1916,  Germany  declared  war 
on  Portugal,  stating  that  the  seizure  of 
German  vessels  was  done  at  the  dicta- 
tion of  Great  Britain,  and  could  be  re- 
garded in  no  other  light  than  as  a  hos- 
tile move  against  Germany. 

Czecho-Slovakia.  This  is  the  name 
of  a  new  nation  which  was  born  as  a 
result  of  the  war.  It  comprises  the 
former  Austrian  states  of  Bohemia, 
Moravia,  part  of  Silesia,  and  the  dis- 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR 


37 


trict  of  Hungary  known  as  Slovakia. 
It  has  a  population  of  about  13  mil- 
lions with  an  area  of  52,000  square 
miles.  The  natural  wealth  is  estimated 
at  15  billions  of  dollars.  Its  declara- 
tion of  independence  was  published  at 
Paris  October  18,  1918;  the  local  gov- 
ernment was  taken  over  in  Prague  Oc- 
tober 28,  1918,  and  the  republic  for- 
mally proclaimed  the  next  day.  The 
republic  had  maintained  four  armies, 
one  in  Bohemia,  one  in  France,  one  in 
Italy,  and  a  force  of  approximately 
75,000  men  operating  in  Russia  and 
Siberia  partially  at  the  request  of  the 
Allied  governments.  The  first  presi- 
dent of  the  republic  was  Thomas  Gar- 
rigue  Masaryk,  who  was  also  one  of  the 
chief  leaders  in  the  movement  for  an 
independent  Czecho-Slovakia. 

In  the  first  part  of  August,  1918,  the 
British  government  formally  recognized 
the  Czecho-Slovaks  as  an  Allied  nation. 
The  Italian  and  French  governments 
had  made  special  agreements  with  the 
Czecho-Slovak  National  Council  in  re- 
gard to  the  Czecho-Slovak  army  which 
had  been  formed  in  each  of  those  coun- 
tries {see  below).  The  British  govern- 
ment definitely  recognized  the  unity  of 
that  army  and  said  that  in  considera- 
tion of  their  efforts  to  achieve  inde^ 
pendence,  Great  Britain  regarded  the 
Czecho-Slovak  armies  as  constituting 
an  Allied  and  pledged  army  waging 
regular  warfare  against  Austria-Hun- 
gary and  Germany.  It  also  recognized 
the  Czecho-Slovak  National  Council  as 
the  representative  of  the  future  gov- 
ernment. At  the  beginning  of  Sep- 
tember the  United  States  government 
also  recognized  the  Czecho-Slovak  Na- 
tional Council  as  a  belligerent  govern- 
ment clothed  with  proper  authority  and 
recognized  the  state  of  war  between 
the  Czecho-Slovaks  and  the  German  and 
Austro-Hungarian    empires.      At    this 


time  the  Czecho-Slovak  forces  were  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Chita  and  the  com- 
posite Allied  force  was  advancing  in 
the  Ussuri  Province  from  Vladivostok. 
For  an  account  of  their  military  cam- 
paigns see  Military  Operations, 
Eastern  Front. 

For  the  purposes  of  convenience  the 
following  dates  of  the  declaration  of 
war  are  given: 

CENTRAL    POWERS 

Austria  against  Serbia — July  28,  1914. 
Austria  against  Russia — August  6,  1914. 
Austria  against  Montenegro — August   9,   1914. 
Austria  against  Japan — August  27,  1914. 
Austria  against  Belgium — August  28.   1914. 
Bulgaria  against  Serbia — October   14,   1915. 
Germany  against  Russia — August  1,  1914. 
Germany  against  France — August  3,  1914. 
Germany  against  Belgium — August  4,  1914. 
Germany  against  Portugal — March    9,    1916. 
Germany     against      Rumania — September      14, 

1916.  ' 
Turkey  against  the  Allies — November  23,   1914. 
Turkey  against  Rumania — August  29,  1916. 

ENTENTE    ALLIES 

Brazil  against  Germany — October  26,   1917. 

China  against  Austria  and  Germany — August 
14,  1917. 

Costa  Rica  against  Germany — May  24,  1918. 

Cuba  against  Germany — April  7,  1917. 

France  against  Germany — August  3,   1914.   ' 

France  against  Austria — August   13,  1914. 

France  against  Turkey — November    5,    1914. 

France  against  Bulgaria — October  16,  1915. 

Great  Britain  against  Germany — August  4, 
1914. 

Great  Britain  against  Austria — August  13, 
1914. 

Great  Britain  against  Turkey — November  5, 
1914. 

Great  Britain  against  Bulgaria — October  15, 
1914. 

Greece  (provisional  government)  against  Ger- 
many and  Bulgaria — November  28,  1916. 

Greece  (Alexander's  government)  against  Ger- 
many and  Bulgaria — July  2,  1917. 

Guatemala  against  Germany — April  23,  1918. 

Hayti  against  Germany — July   15,   1918. 

Honduras  against  Germany — July  19,  1918. 

Italy  against  Austria — May  24,  1915. 

Italy  against  Turkey — August  21,  1915. 

Italy  against  Bulgaria — October  19,   1915. 

Italy  against  Germany — August  28,  1916. 

Japan  against  Germany — August  23,  1914. 


38 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Liberia  against  Germany — August  4,  1917. 

Montenegro  against  Germany — August  9,  1914. 

Nicaragua  against  Germany — May   7,   1918. 

Panama  against  Germany — April  7,  1917. 

Panama  against  Austria — December  10,  1917. 

Portugal  against  Germany — November  23,  1914. 
(Passed  resolutions  authorizing  military  in- 
terventions as  treaty  ally  of  Great  Britain.) 

Portugal  against  Germany — May  19,  1915. 
(Military  aid  granted.) 

Rumania  against  Austria — August  27,  1916. 
(Allies  of  Austria  also  considered  it  a  dec- 
laration  against   them.) 


Russia  against  Turkey — November   3,   1914. 
Russia  against  Bulgaria — October  19,  1915. 
San  Marino  against  Austria — May  24,  1915. 
Serbia  rgainst  Germany — August  6,  1914. 
Serbia  against  Turkey — December  2,  1914. 
Serbia  against  Bulgaria — October  19,  1915. 
Siam   against   Germany  and   Austria — July   22, 

1917. 
The  Hedjaz   (Arabia)   against  Central  Powers 

—June  9,  1916. 
United  States  against  Germany — April  6,  1917. 
United    States    against    Austria — December    7, 

1917. 


IV.     MILITARY   OPERATIONS 


The  military  operations  of  the  great 
war,  in  which  the  Central  Powers  were 
by  turns  on  the  offensive  and  on  the 
defensive,  hinge  on  the  plan  of  the 
German  general  staff  according  to 
which  Austria,  with  a  small  German 
force,  was  to  hold  Russia  in  check, 
while  Germany  crushed  France,  both 
Central  Powers  uniting  for  the  subse- 
quent Russian  campaign. 

The  strategy  of  the  war  from  this 
viewpoint  falls  easily  under  the  follow- 
ing main  divisions :  I,  Introduction 
and  discussion  of  mobilization  and  re- 
sources ;  II,  Western  theatre,  or  cam- 
paign against  France;  III,  Eastern 
theatre,  or  campaigns  against  Russia; 
IV,  Southern  theatre,  or  campaigns 
against  Serbia  (involving  Bulgaria's 
entry  into  the  war)  and  Italian  cam- 
paign ;  V,  Southeastern  theatre,  or 
Turkish  campaigns,  including  Suez, 
Gallipoli,  and  Caucasus.  In  no  theatre 
of  the  war  was  the  strategy  unconnect- 
ed with  events  taking  place  or  about  to 
take  place  on  other  fronts. 

I.  Introduction.  The  war  that  broke 
out  in  1914  involved  three  continents 
and  the  seven  seas.  Not  only  its  com- 
batants, but  the  killed  and  wounded, 
were  to  be  numbered  by  millions.  Every 
known  resource  of  mechanical  ingenuity 
was  drawn  upon,  and  old  and  forgotten 
methods  of  warfare  were  brought  into 
play  side  by  side  with  the  most  power- 
ful modern  artillery,  while  aeronautics 
for  the  first  time  had  occasion  to  show 
its  worth.  (See  section  Aerial  Opera- 
tions.) The  edifice  of  international 
law,  of  the  conventions  of  warfare,  so 
painfully   built   up    after    centuries    of 


struggle,  was  toppled  over  as  a  thing 
of  no  account.  With  these  considera- 
tions before  us  we  must  remark  that  in 
the  space  here  available  nothing  but  a 
statement  of  the  principal  facts  can  be 
attempted.  But  even  so,  the  nature 
of  the  struggle  on  one  front,  the  west- 
ern, calls  for  a  word  or  two.  When 
both  sides  simultaneously  reached  the 
sea  there  began  a  siege  over  the  whole 
front  that  gave  the  struggle  in  this 
theatre  a  character  unique  in  military 
history.  At  certain  places  in  the  "line" 
32  parallel  lines  of  German  trenches 
were  discovered  by  reconnoissance.  The 
trench  systems  of  this  front  were  esti- 
mated, after  including  communication 
trenches,  to  be  25,000  miles  long. 
Frontal  attack  became  a  necessity, 
since  flanks  there  were  none,  and  yet 
these  attacks  all  proved  failures,  for 
the  experience  gained  under  the  new 
conditions  had  not  as  yet  led  to  such  a 
disposition  of  forces  and  resources  as 
to  carry  them  through  to  a  decision. 
The  most  desperate  efforts  were  made, 
first  by  one  and  then  by  the  other  side, 
to  raise  the  siege,  so  to  say,  by  a  con- 
centration at  some  selected  point,  and 
thus  break  through  and  end  a  situa- 
tion that  only  a  few  years  ago  would 
have   been   deemed  intolerable. 

The  war  was  finally  won  as  a  result 
of  a  series  of  brilliant  flank  attacks 
after  the  failure  of  major  German 
frontal  attacks. 

On  the  other  fronts  the  phenomena 
of  what  may  well  now  be  called  old- 
fashioned  warfare  were  more  or  less 
reproduced,  but  even  in  their  case  a 
marked  tendency  to  approximate  to  the 


39 


40 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


conditions  in  France  manifested  itself 
— indeed  may  be  said  to  have  estab- 
lished itself  on  a  part  of  the  Russian 
lines  and  to  a  certain  extent  on  the 
Italian.  A  marked  feature  of  this  war 
was  the  so-called  mobilization  of  in- 
dustries. So  great  was  the  draft  made 
on  the  industrial  resources  of  the  coun- 
tries involved  that  the  struggle,  other 
conditions  equal,  may  be  said  to  have 
resolved  itself  into  a  competition  by 
each  side  to  outstrip  the  other  in  sup- 
plies and  munitions. 

Mobilization  and  Concentration. 
When  it  became  evident  that  the  gen- 
eral European  situation  was  becoming 
more  and  more  serious,  covering  troops 
{troupes  de  couierture)  were  sent  by 
the  French  government  to  the  eastern 
frontier.  These  troops,  five  corps  in 
all,  or  200,000  men,  with  cavalry,  began 
their  movement  on  July  31  at  9  p.  m., 
and  had  completed  it  on  August  3  at 
noon.  They  were  not  to  cross  a  zone 
8  kilometers  wide  along  the  frontier,  in 
order  to  prevent  any  clash  with  the 
Germans,  so  long  as  war  was  unde- 
clared. On  the  German  side  the  Em- 
peror, on  July  31,  decreed  the  Kriegs- 
gefahrzustand,  or  a  sort  of  state  of 
martial  law,  under  which  certain  mili- 
tary measures  could  be  adopted  on  the 
frontier,  and  the  telegraph  and  railway 
services  taken  over  by  the  military  au- 
thorities. 

Mobilization  proper,  however,  began 
in  both  Germany  and  in  France  on 
August  2,  in  France  at  midnight.  It 
was  asserted  that  in  Germany  the  op- 
eration was  set  afoot  well  before  the 
formal  date  given  above.  In  both  coun- 
tries it  was  carried  on  with  the  preci- 
sion that  the  whole  world  had  learned 
to  expect  of  Germany,  but  of  which,  as 
regards  France,  it  was  somewhat  doubt- 
ful. The  purpose  of  mobilization,  it 
may  be  recalled  here,  is  to  pass  from 


peace  to  war  footing.  Each  man  liable 
to  service  reports  on  a  given  date  at  a 
specified  point,  draws  his  arms,  uni- 
form, and  equipment,  and  joins  a 
designated  organization.  Companies, 
battalions,  regiments,  etc.,  are  thus 
brought  up  to  war  strength;  transport 
material  is  requisitioned  and  train  ser- 
vice prepared.  The  French  mobiliza- 
tion, in  two  periods  of  ten  and  six  days 
respectively,  closed  on  August  18;  the 
German,  according  to  the  French,  on 
the  16th.  German  authorities,  how- 
ever, give  the  closing  date  as  the  20th. 
Mobilization  was  followed  by  concen- 
tration. 

The  French  armies  began  their  con- 
centration in  the  east  of  France  from 
Belfort  to  the  Belgian  frontier,  thus 
respecting  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
and  of  Luxemburg.  By  this  course  the 
French,  incidentally,  gave  the  Germans 
choice  of  ground  and  freedom  of  man- 
oeuvre. It  should  be  recollected,  how- 
ever, that  the  exact  intentions  of  the 
German  general  staff  were  unknown; 
they  might  attack  either  on  the  right  or 
the  left  bank  of  the  Meuse,  or  attempt 
a  demonstration  by  the  Oise,  or  even 
risk  a  break  from  Nancy  on  to  Verdun. 
Further,  the  possibility  of  the  offensive 
had.  to  be  kept  in  view,  and  the  offen- 
sive, for  the  French,  was  possible  only 
in  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  In  other 
words,  the  concentration  of  the  French 
wras  both  offensive  and  defensive ;  while 
guarding  the  approaches  on  the  east, 
they  would  be  ready  to  face  in  any  di- 
rection. As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  plan 
of  concentration  could  not  be  fully  car- 
ried out ;  it  had  to  be  modified  because 
of  the  German  advance  through  Bel- 
gium. Hence,  in  general  terms,  the 
French  armies  were  stretched  out  from 
Belfort  north  and  then  northwest 
towards  the  Sambre,  to  join  hands,  if 
possible,  with  the  English  and  Belgians. 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


41 


Certain  corps  even  pushed  their  way 
into  Belgium  itself. 

The  German  problem  of  concentra- 
tion was  simpler,  if,  as  there  is  reason 
to  believe,  their  intention  from  the  first 
was  to  smash  their  way  through  Bel- 
gium. They  contented  themselves  with 
merely  observing  the  strong  eastern 
(French)  frontier,  and  disposed  their 
other  armies  northward  through  Treves, 
etc.,  to  Aix-la-Chapelle,  in  position  to 
inaugurate  and  carry  through  a  vast 
sweeping  movement  through  Belgium. 
They  crossed  the  frontier  of  this  coun- 
try without  waiting  for  either  mobiliza- 
tion or  concentration,  using  for  this 
purpose  troops  kept  immediately  avail- 
able near  the  frontier. 

On  the  periods  of  mobilization  and 
concentration  of  the  other  combatants 
it  is  not  necessary  to  dwell.  In  Aus- 
tria-Hungary the  operation  was  merely 
a  repetition  of  the  German  process, 
and,  like  that,  carried  out  with  prompt- 
ness and  accuracy.  Russia  was  ex- 
pected to  be  slow,  but  on  the  contrary 
was  so  energetic  as  to  suggest  a  belief 
that  she  began  before  the  formal  dec- 
laration of  war.  England  had  no  army 
to  mobilize,  but  she  prepared  her  "ex- 
peditionary force,"  crossed  it  over  to 
the  Continent,  and  got  into  position  op- 
posite the  German  right  in  time  to 
offer  a  resistance  that  was  invaluable 
to  the  Allied  cause. 

General  Strategy  and  Resources. 
The  War  of  the  Nations  originated  as 
a  struggle  on  the  part  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary and  Germany  against  the  "Slavic 
Peril" — against  the  huge  Slav  empire 
of  Russia  and  the  small  Slav  kingdoms 
of  Serbia  and  Montenegro.  But  from 
the  very  beginning  of  the  conflict,  de- 
fense against  Russia  was  of  minor  in- 
terest as  compared  with  the  attack  on 
Belgium,  Britain,  and  France.  The 
reason  was  quite  simple.     The  German 


General  Staff  *  had  planned,  so  said 
the  military  experts,  that  the  bulk  of 
the  German  army  should  be  hurled  first 
against  France,  and  then,  having 
crushed  France,  be  transferred  to  the 
east  to  turn  back  the  tide  of  Russia's 
slow-mobilizing  multitudes.  For  Rus- 
sia, with  all  her  171  millions  of  inhabi- 
tants in  Europe  and  in  Asia,  was  spread 
over  so  vast  an  area,  and  was  so  defi- 
cient in  railways  that  10  of  her  36  army 
corps  (an  army  corps  may  be  counted 
as  50,000  men)  could  not  be  expected 
to  arrive  on  the  scene  in  the  first  month, 
and  the  remaining  26  could  not  begin 
a  serious  attack  within  the  first  few 
weeks  of  the  war.  Germany  could 
leave  5  of  her  25  army  corps  to  coop- 
erate with  12  Austrian  corps  in  hold- 
ing back  the  Russian  advance  guard, 
while  2  Austrian  corps  "punished" 
Serbia,  and  the  remaining  2  Austrian 
and  19  German  corps  crushed  France. 
The  German  armies  in  the  west  would 
isweep  across  Belgium — with  its  net- 
work of  convenient  railways  and  smooth 
highways — turning  the  flank  of  the 
strong  line  of  French  fortifications 
along  the  Franco-German  frontier,  and 
swoop  down  upon  Paris  with  irresistible 
might.  The  French  army  annihilated, 
the  German  troops  could  be  shifted 
from  the  west  to  the  east  (it  is  only  a 
little  more  than  500  miles  from  Bel- 
gium to  Russia,  that  is,  twice  the  dis- 

*  At  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  the  Chief  of  the 
German  General  Staff  was  Helmuth  von 
Moltke,  who  was  born  in  Mecklenburg- 
Schwerin  in  1848,  served  in  the  Franco-Prus- 
sian War  of  1870-1871,  was  attached  to  the 
General  Staff  as  adjutant  under  his  famous 
uncle,  Field  Marshal  von  Moltke,  and  was  ap- 
pointed Chief  of  the  General  Staff  and  general 
of  infantry  in  1906.  During  the  course  of 
the  War  of  the  Nations,  he  was  superseded  in 
chief  command  of  the  German  forces  by 
General  Erich  von  Falkenhayn,  who  was 
born  at  Burg  Belchau  in  1861,  served  in  China 
several  years,  acted  as  chief  of  staff  of  the 
16th,  and  later  of  the  4th  Army  Corps,  and 
was  appointed  minister  of  war  in  1913. 


42 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


tance  from  Albany  to  Buffalo)  and 
reserves  could  be  brought  up  to  defeat 
the  advancing  Russians.  The  attack 
on  France  and  Belgium,  however,  met 
with  such  fierce  resistance  that  al- 
though 13  reserve  corps  were  sent  into 
France  on  the  heels  of  21  active  corps, 
in  August,  followed  by  4  substitute  re- 
serve corps  at  the  end  of  August,  8 
Landwehr  corps  in  September,  and  5 
semi-corps  of  reserves  in  October,  in 
addition  to  10  cavalry  divisions,  the 
German  forces  in  France  and  Belgium 
had  to  fall  back  after  their  first  swift 
stroke  and  could  then  do  little  more 
than  hold  a  long  intrenched  battle  line 
against  the  enemy.  This  delay  in  the 
west  ffave  the  dreaded  "Russian  hordes" 
time  to  mass  in  Poland  for  an  invasion 
of  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany. 
The  Austro-Hungarian  armies,  more- 
over, began  to  show  alarming  weakness, 
and  were  unable  either  to  conquer  the 
Serbs  in  the  south  or  to  hold  back  the 
Russians  in  the  north  of  the  Hapsburg 
Empire.  Germany  was  now  compelled 
to  fight  the  war  on  two  fronts,  shifting 
her  troops  back  and  forth  as  occasion 
required,  and  finding  her  magnificent 
strategic  railways  of  incalculable  value. 
Skillful  distribution  of  forces,  able  gen- 
eralship, and  superior  equipment  en- 
abled the  Germans,  with  Austrian  as- 
sistance, to  hold  back  the  Russian  in- 
vaders, and  even  to  take  up  an  advance 
position  in  Russian  Poland.  After  five 
months  of  the  war,  Germany  was  cer- 
tainly holding  her  own.  Most  of  Bel- 
gium, Northeastern  France,  and  part 
of  Russian  Poland  were  occupied  by 
German  troops,  whereas  only  a  small 
corner  of  Alsace  and  a  bit  of  East 
Prussia  had  been  lost  to  French  or 
Russians.  The  prospect  of  ultimate 
victory  for  the  German  arms  was,  how- 
ever, becoming  rather  uncertain.  To 
be  sure,  the  danger  of  a  Russian  "tidal 


wave"  sweeping  over  Germany  from  the 
east  was  no  longer  feared ;  but  in  a  long 
war,  where  endurance  rather  than  speed 
of  mobilization  wins  the  victory,  Ger- 
many would  labor  under  great  difficul- 
ties. Germany,  with  a  total  population 
of  65,000,000,  Austria-Hungary  with 
less  than  50,000,000,  and  later  Turkey 
with  about  21,000,000  and  Bulgaria 
with  5,000,000,  aggregating  141,- 
000,000,  were  confronted  by  a  coali- 
tion representing  252,000,000  of  Euro- 
peans, not  to  speak  of  Russia's 
20,000,000  in  Siberia  and  the  vast 
transmaritime  empires  of  Great  Britain 
and  France  and  later  the  110,000,000 
inhabitants  of  the  United  States.  Ac- 
cording to  the  best  information  ob- 
tainable, Germany  had  placed  between 
4  and  5  million  men  in  the  field  by  the 
end  of  1914,  that  is,  for  every  16  Ger- 
mans there  was  1  soldier.  Germany  still 
had  second-rate  fighting  men  and  fresh- 
ly matured  3Touths  to  call  upon,  but  ob- 
viously the  number  was  limited.  France 
likewise  was  limited ;  an  army  of  5,000,- 
000  would  be  one-eighth  the  population. 
But  Russia  boasted,  in  addition  to  5^- 
000,000  trained  warriors,  a  reserve  of 
population  which  could  furnish  5,- 
000,000  more  if  they  could  be  mus- 
tered, trained,  and  equipped.  Great 
Britain,  with  a  population  of  over  45,- 
000,000  to  draw  upon,  was  already 
drilling  1,000,000  or  more  recruits  to 
take  part  in  the  battles  of  France. 
From  the  15,000,000  white  inhabitants 
of  Canada,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  and 
South  Africa,  100,000  or  more  sol- 
diers might  be  sent  to  the  battlefields 
of  western  Europe.  The  contingents 
of  "native"  soldiers  brought  from  Af- 
rica by  Great  Britain  and  France,  and 
the  British  Indians,  were  picturesque, 
but  hardly  numerous  enough  to  exert 
an  appreciable  influence  on  the  final 
issue.     In  short,  the  allies  appeared  to 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


43 


possess  superior  resources  of  men  and 
munitions  for  the  conduct  of  a  pro- 
tracted war.  If  joined  by  Italy,  or  by 
one  of  the  Balkan  States,  the  Allies 
would  enjoy  a  still  more  marked  ad- 
vantage. Or  again,  if  Austria-Hun- 
gary should  be  rent  by  internal  dissen- 
sions, Germany  would  be  left  to  fight 
against  overwhelming  odds.  On  the 
other  hand,  one  of  the  Allies  might  con- 
ceivably refuse  to  make  further  sacri- 
fices, and  either  make  peace  or  carry 
on  the  war  in  a  half-hearted  fashion. 
Or  German  generalship  might  win  a 
brilliant  victory  and  destroy  part  of 
the  Allied  army.  Into  any  forecast  to 
the  war's  outcome,  these  and  similar 
considerations  were  bound  to  inject  a 
considerable  amount  of  uncertainty. 
The  possibility  that  the  Allies  would 
capitulate  separately,  however,  ap- 
peared very  slight  indeed  after  the 
agreement  signed  in  London,  September 
5,  by  Russia,  France,  and  Great  Brit- 
ain, binding  themselves  not  to  make 
terms  with  Germany  until  they  could 
do  so  jointly. 

Equipment  of  the  Armies.  No  less 
perfect  than  the  organization  of  the 
enormous  armies  was  the  equipment 
with  which  they  fought.  The  War  of 
the  Nations  was  a  battle  of  machines, 
waged  with  the  help  of  every  deadly 
device  science  could  invent.  The  fea- 
ture of  the  conflict  in  the  Franco-Bel- 
gian theatre  was  the  new  Krupp  11-inch 
howitzer.  (A  "gun"  throws  its  pro- 
jectile in  almost  a  straight  line;  a 
"howitzer"  discharges  its  shell  at  an 
angle  of  elevation  varying  from  15°  to 
45°;  a  "mortar"  is  fired  at  a  still 
greater  angle  of  elevation,  the  object 
being  to  drop  a  shell  on  the  top  of  a 
fortification  or  behind  the  earth-works 
of  the  enemy.)  The  new  Krupp  how- 
itzer, weighing  nearly  40  tons,  was 
hauled    by    powerful    motors    on    two 


heavy  motor  trucks  whose  "caterpillar" 
wheels  were  shod  with  great  flapping 
feet  so  as  not  to  sink  in  soft  ground. 
Arriving  at  the  scene  of  action,  two 
trucks  were  backed  up  together  and 
the  howitzer  was  ready  to  throw  11 -inch 
shells  at  any  object  within  a  radius  of 
six  miles.  The  heaviest  portable 
French  siege  piece  had  been  the  10.7- 
inch  howitzer,  drawn  in  four  parts,  and 
difficult  to  move,  assemble,  and  mount. 
Still  more  formidable  than  the  Krupp 
"11"  was  the  Austrian  12-inch  howit- 
zer, built  at  the  Skoda  works.  But  the 
surpassing  achievement  of  the  Krupp 
gun  factory  at  Essen  was  the  produc- 
tion of  a  16-inch  (42-centimeter)  siege 
piece  which  could  be  transported  by 
rail  and  readily  emplaced  on  a  concrete 
foundation.  From  this  gun,  discharged 
by  electricity,  a  shell  one  meter  in 
length,  weighing  almost  a  ton,  and  filled 
with  high  explosive,  could  be  hurled 
some  15  miles.  Skilled  mechanics  from 
the  Essen  works  accompanied  each  of 
the  7  or  8  of  these  16-inch  pieces  which 
Germany  was  said  to  have  put  in  the 
field.  Two  of  these  gigantic  howitzers, 
stationed  10  miles  from  the  inner  forts 
of  Antwerp,  rendered  the  elaborate  de- 
fenses of  that  city  worthless.  Even  the 
smaller  German  howitzers  were  capable 
of  demolishing  the  forts  at  Liege  and 
Namur  and  wrecking  the  steel-domed 
cupolas  which  had  been  the  pride  of 
Belgium's  forts.  In  the  field,  much 
smaller  guns  were  ordinarily  used.  The 
German  army  employed  a  3-inch  gun 
capable  of  throwing  20  15-pound  shells 
per  minute  at  an  enemy  three  miles 
away.  The  shell  was  timed  to  explode 
just  before  striking,  and  would  scatter 
250  steel  bullets  in  the  ranks  of  the 
enemy.  Gun  and  carriage  together 
weighed  about  a  ton.  Aeroplanes, 
whose  value  in  warfare  had  long  been 
discussed,  now   rendered   service  in  lo- 


44 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


eating  the  enemy,  so  that  the  artillery 
officers  could  instruct  their  gunners  at 
what  angle  to  fire  at  the  unseen  enemy. 
The  French  field  gun  was  of  slightly 
smaller  bore  than  the  German,  but  of 
greater  power  and  weight.  Machine 
guns  or  mitrailleuses  were  also  used 
with  telling  effect.  A  machine  gun  is 
light  enough  to  be  packed  on  the  back 
of  a  horse  or  drawn  on  a  light  carriage 
by  a  pair  of  dogs  (as  in  the  Belgian 
army)  and  even  by  the  individual  sol- 
dier ;  it  fires  from  400  to  500  ordinary 
rifle  bullets  per  minute.  The  regular 
arm  of  the  infantry  was  the  rifle,  tipped 
with  the  bayonet -for  hand-to-hand  en- 
counters. England  used  the  excellent 
Lee-Enfield  rifle,  France  the  Lebel,  Rus- 
sia the  Nagant,  Belgium  the  Mauser, 
Germany  the  Mauser,  and  Austria  the 
Mannlicher;  of  these  various  makes, 
the  German  Mauser  possessed  the 
greatest  muzzle  velocity,  although  the 
French  had  the  longest  effective  range. 
Almost  as  important  as  artillery  or 
fire-arms  was  the  automobile.  Motor 
cars  encased  in  steel  and  armed  with 
rapid-fire  guns  accompanied  Von 
Kluck's  cavalry  on  its  swift  advance. 
Speedy  automobiles  and  motorcycles 
were  invaluable  for  reconnoissance  and 
communication  where  telephone,  wire- 
less telegraph,  or  aeroplane  was  not 
available.  Monster         searchlights 

mounted  on  motor  cars  illuminated  the 
field  of  battle  by  night.  The  greatest 
service  of  the  motor,  however,  was  be- 
hind the  firing  lines.  An  army  cannot 
fight  unless  it  is  fed.  To  feed  the  mil- 
lions of  fighting  men,  many  thousands 
of  motor  trucks  were  ceaselessly  em- 
ployed in  conveying  incalculable  quan- 
tities of  foodstuffs.  Finally,  some  of 
the  most  brilliant  successes  of  the  Ger- 
mans were  won  by  hurrying  troops  in 
motor  trucks  to  the  most  effective  point 
on  the  battle  line.     Other  new  devices 


invented  and  used  during  the  war  will 
be  treated  in  the  subsequent  military 
history. 

II.  Western  Theatre.  The  German 
armies,  by  a  surprise  thrust  through 
Belgium  in  August,  1914,  sought  to 
paralyze  the  French  army.  This  op- 
eration failed  at  the  Marne  (Septem- 
ber). 

Trench  warfare  resulted  in  the  West, 
and  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Swiss 
border  the  line  remained  substantially 
unchanged  to  July,  1916,  the  battle  of 
Verdun  and  the  joint  Allied  offensive 
(July,  1916)  forming  the  high-water 
marks  of  this  fighting  until  the  cam- 
paigns carried  out  on  a  grand  scale  in 
1918. 

The  detailed  account  of  military  op- 
erations on  this  front  has  seven  main 
steps:  (1)  The  fortunes  of  the  Belgian 
army  up  to  its  escape  from  Antwerp 
and  safe  retreat  to  the  Yser  Canal;  (2) 
The  relative  dispositions  of  the  rival 
armies  of  the  French  and  German  high 
commands  up  to  and  including  the 
battle  of  the  Marne;  (3)  The  race  to 
the  seacoast  which  resulted  in  the  es- 
tablishment of  the  intrenched  lines  from 
Dixmude  to  Belfort ;  (4)  The  attempts 
of  either  side  to  break  the  intrenched 
line,  including  the  battles  of  Ypres, 
Lille,  Lens,  and  the  Champagne  drive 
inaugurated  by  Joff  re  to  aid  the  hardly 
pressed  Russians;  (5)  The  battle  for 
Verdun,  in  which  the  Germans  sought 
a  decision  hoping  not  so  much  to  shat- 
ter the  French  line  as  to  shatter  the 
morale  of  the  French  people  and  make 
a  breach  in  Allied  solidarity;  (6)  The 
Allied  offensive  in  Picardy,  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  Russian  and  Italian  ac- 
tivities in  the  East  and  South.  (7) 
The  final  attempt  made  by  the  Ger- 
mans to  break  through  in  1918  and  the 
successful  Allied  counter  attack.  It 
seems  clear  that  Germany's  plan  of  ac- 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


45 


tion  was  first  to  crush  France  and  then 
to  fall  upon  Russia.  What  was  the 
shortest  road  to  France?  The  frontier 
was  heavily  fortified;  but  even  other- 
wise it  would  have  left  too  narrow  a 
front  for  the  overwhelming  armies 
which  Germany  intended  to  set  in  the 
field.  Hence  the  shortest  road  lay 
through  Luxemburg  and  Belgium.  Of 
natural  obstacles  there  were  none;  the 
three  fortresses,  Liege,  Namur,  and 
Maubeuge,  were  not  in  supporting  re- 
lation to  one  another,  the  Belgian  fron- 
tier was  only  120  miles  from  Paris,  and 
the  way  lay  through  the  easy  valleys 
of  the  Oise  and  of  the  Meuse. 

Accordingly  the  Germans,  violat- 
ing the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  and 
Belgium,  undertook  a  vast  sweeping 
movement,  with  its  pivot  at  Mont 
Donon  and  its  marching  flank  flung  be- 
yond the  Sambre  and  the  Oise.  The 
French,  on  the  other  hand,  respecting 
the  neutrality  of  the  countries  just 
mentioned,  had  planned  to  attack  the 
Franco-German  frontier  directly,  under 
the  following  distribution  of  armies: 
first  army  (Dubail)  *  from  the  Swiss 
frontier  to  Donon;  second  (de  Castel- 
nau)  f  from  Donon  towards  Metz; 
third  (Ruffey)  in  the  Woevre,  facing 
the    Metz-Thionville    frontier    region ; 

*  Augustin  Yvon  Edmond  Dubail,  born 
(1851)  at  Belfort;  educated  at  Saint-Cyr, 
served  in  Franco-Prussian  War,  and  later  at- 
tended the  Ecole  de  Guerre;  general  of  brigade 
(1904);  at  Saint-Cyr  was  adjunct  professor  of 
geography  (1874-76)  and  of  military  art  and 
history  (1880-85)  and  then  commandant;  wrote 
on  his  specialties;  Commander  of  the  Legion 
of  Honor  and  possessor  of  various  decorations; 
Military  Governor  of  Paris  during  European 
War. 

f  Edottard  de  Curieres  de  Castelnau,  born 
in  1851;  served  in  Franco-Prussian  War;  col- 
onel attached  to  general  staff  (1896);  served 
in  Cochin-China  and  Algeria;  commander  of 
"Iron  Division"  at  Nancy  (1899);  early  in  Eu- 
ropean War  commanded  Second  Army  of  Lor- 
raine and  came  to  be  known  as  the  "savior  of 
Nancy";  after  battle  of  the  Marne  took  com- 
mand of  the  Army  of  the  Somme;  chief  of  the 
general  staff  (December,  1915);  went  to  Greece 
and  helped  plan  defenses  of  Saloniki. 


fourth  and  fifth  (Langle  de  Cary  and 
Lanrezac)  on  the  Belgian  frontier. 

Germany  placed  in  line  the  following 
armies:  first  (Von  Kluck)  the  march- 
ing flank;  second  (Von  Biilow)  ;  third 
(Von  Hausen)  ;  fourth  (Duke  of  Wiirt- 
temberg) ;  j  fifth  (Crown  Prince  of 
Prussia) ;  sixth  (Rupprecht,  Crown 
Prince  of  Bavaria)  ;  §  seventh  (Von 
Heeringen)  ;  eighth  (Von  Deimling), 
to  remain  on  the  defensive  in  Alsace. 
What  may  be  counted  as  a  ninth  army, 
under  Von  Emmich,  made  up  of  ele- 
ments in  immediate  readiness,  was  to 
act  as  advance  guard  to  the  right  wing, 
and  carry  Liege,  on  the  expiration  of 
the  ultimatum  addressed  to  the  Belgian 
government. 

As  has  been  implied,  Belgium  declined 
to  agree  to  the  demand  made  by  Ger- 
many to  allow  German  troops  to  cross 
Belgian  territory  to  the  French  fron- 
tier. August  3  and  4,  all  doubt  as  to 
German  intentions  having  been  re- 
moved, the  Belgian  authorities  ordered 
bridges  destroyed  on  all  probable  lines 
of  advance,  and  the  Belgian  forces  to 
move  forward  as  follows :  the  first  di- 
vision from  Ghent  to  Tirlemont;  the 
second,  Antwerp  to  Louvain ;  the  fifth, 

t  Albrecht,  Duke  of  Wiirttemberg,  born 
(1865)  in  Vienna,  son  of  Duke  Philip  of 
Wiirttemberg  and  heir  presumptive  to  the 
throne  of  the  Kingdom;  married  (1893)  the 
Archduchess  Margareta  Sophia  of  Austria; 
held  commands  in  regiments  of  Uhlans,  Grena- 
diers, Dragoons,  cavalry,  and  infantry,  rising 
to  be  general  in  command  of  the  Thirteenth 
Army  Corps;  in  command  of  German  forces 
in  Belgium  (October,  1914)  after  its  invasion 
and  temporarily  took  over  command  of  Crown 
Prince's  army  (February,  1916);  received 
Order  Pour  le  Merite  from  the  Kaiser. 

§  Rupprecht,  Crown  Prince  of  Bavaria,  born 
(1869)  in  Munich,  eldest  son  of  Ludwig 
(Louis)  III,  who  became  King  in  1913;  mar- 
ried the  Duchess  Marie  Gabriele  of  Bavaria 
(1900);  had  a  university  education  and  mili- 
tary training  in  the  Kriegsakademie;  traveled 
extensively  in  India,  Japan,  China,  etc.  (1902- 
03);  general,  commanding  the  First  Army 
Corps  (1906);  led  Bavarian  army  in  Euro- 
pean War  and  received  from  the  Kaiser  the 
Order  Pour  le  Merite. 


46 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Mons  to  Perwez;  the  sixth,  Brussels  to 
Wavre.  The  fourth  was  to  remain  at 
Naraur,  and  the  third  in  its  position, 
Hasselt-Liege-Verviers.  These  move- 
ments were  covered  by  the  cavalry  di- 
vision (Waremme),  by  a  mixed  brigade 
at  Tongres,  and  by  another  at  Huy. 
The  strength  of  this  army  was  about 
117,000  men,  increased  later  by  18,500 
volunteers,  with  the  King  in  command. 
It  was,  if  opposed  by  superior  numbers, 
to  hold  good  defensive  positions  barring 
the  enemy's  advance,  and  to  await  in 
these  positions  the  arrival  of  troops 
from  the  British  and  French  armies. 
But  if  this  junction  were  impossible, 
then  the  Belgian  army  was  not  to  run 
the  risk  of  severe  loss,  but  was  to  guard 
against  being  enveloped,  and  act  so 
as  to  secure  its  communications,  for 
the  purpose  ultimately  of  joining  hands 
with  the  Allies.  Opposed  by  equal  num- 
bers, it  was  to  attack,  if  conditions  were 
favorable.  In  any  case,  Liege,  Namur, 
and  Antwerp  were  to  be  defended. 

Invasion  of  Belgium. — On  August  4 
two  cavalry  divisions  crossed  the  fron- 
tier, advanced  upon  Vise,  and  there 
found  the  bridge  destroyed.  Behind  the 
cavalry  forces  came  an  army  composed 
of  the  seventh,  eighth,  ninth,  and  elev- 
enth corps.  At  the  same  time  two 
other  corps  were  concentrated  at  and 
near  St.  Vith — thus  making  a  force  of 
about  300,000  men  on  the  roads  lead- 
ing into  Belgium  and  converging  on 
Liege.  On  the  5th  a  demand  was  made 
on  the  governor  of  the  fortress  of  Liege, 
General  Leman,  to  allow  an  unopposed 
passage  to  the  German  army.  This  de- 
mand refused,  the  forts  east  and  north- 
east of  the  town  were  attacked,  but  the 
Germans  were  repulsed.  On  the  night 
of  August  5  and  6  an  attempt  was  made 
to  break  the  Belgian  line  between  the 
Meuse  and  the  Ourthe,  and  succeeded 
in  forcing  the  troops   between  the  in- 


tervals of  the  forts  to  fall  back.  The 
mobile  troops  of  the  defense  were  now 
withdrawn  to  join  the  main  army,  leav- 
ing their  garrisons  in  the  forts.  On 
the  12th  large  calibre  fire  was  opened 
on  the  forts  of  the  right  bank,  and  by 
the  17th  the  last  one  had  fallen  to  the 
Germans.  During  this  time  the  main 
Belgian  army  had  taken  up  a  position 
on  the  Gette.  On  the  12th  this  stream 
was  forced  at  Hselen,  but  an  attempt  to 
pass  on  was  repulsed.  Fresh  troops 
came  up  and  threatened  to  turn  the 
Belgian  left ;  on  the  south  they  occu- 
pied Tirlemont;  on  the  18th  the  Bel- 
gian position  was  critical.  Hence  but 
one  course  was  open  to  the  Belgians: 
they  retired  on  the  18th  at  dusk  to 
take  a  position  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Dyle.  But  the  Germans  advanced  so 
rapidly  that  the  Belgians  could  not 
safely  stop,  and  were  forced  instead  to 
continue  their  way  to  Antwerp,  which 
they  reached  on  the  20th.  The  Ger- 
mans entered  Louvain  on  the  10th, 
Brussels  on  the  20th,  and  crossed  the 
French  frontier  on  the  24th. 

Namur  was  taken  under  fire  on  the 
20th  and  21st  of  August;  on  the  25th 
the  last  fort,  Suarlee,  fell.  Here,  as 
at  Liege,  heavy  calibres  were  used.  The 
commander  of  the  4th  (Belgian)  di- 
vision withdrew  his  forces  on  the  night 
of  the  23d  and  24th  of  August,  and 
succeeded  10  days  later  in  entering  Ant- 
werp. 

A  new  part  now  fell  to  the  Belgian 
army.  August  20  it  had  taken  up  a 
position  resting  on  the  forts  of  Antwerp 
with  a  detachment  at  Termonde.  Its 
business  now  was  to  detain  as  large  a 
force  as  possible,  to  take  the  offensive 
whenever  an  important  engagement, 
took  place  elsewhere,  and  to  attack  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Antwerp  whenever 
there  was  any  chance  of  success.  Ac- 
cordingly a  sortie  was  made  August  25 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


47 


and  26 ;  on  September  4  a  German  force 
that  had  driven  its  garrison  out  of  Ter- 
monde  crossed  the  Scheldt,  but  on  the 
appearance  of  Belgian  forces  on  the  left 
bank  crossed  back,  leaving  Termonde 
once  more  in  Belgian  hands.  After  this 
date  all  hostile  efforts  to  cross  the  river 
were  checked  and  the  line  of  retreat  to 
the  west  kept  open.  Other  operations 
took  place,  as  on  September  9,  when  the 
Belgians  got  as  far  as  Louvain  and 
forced  the  recall  of  a  division  from 
France  to  Antwerp.  One  effect  of  these 
operations  was  to  delay  for  two  days 
the  march  southward  of  a  German 
corps,  at  the  time  when  the  retreat  from 
the  Marne  had  begun. 

The  fall  of  Antwerp  was,  however, 
only  a  question  of  time ;  the  siege  began 
on  September  28,  and  in  a  very  short 
time  it  became  clear  that  the  place 
could  no  more  resist  the  German  ar- 
tillery than  had  Liege  and  Namur.  A 
delicate  question  then  presented  itself: 
to  hold  Antwerp  as  long  as  possible 
without  compromising  the  retreat.  Day 
by  day  the  Germans  continued  their 
work  of  demolishing  the  detached  forts 
of  the  place  and  drew  closer  and  closer. 
On  October  5  Lierre  was  occupied  and 
the  river  crossed  below  the  town.  On 
the  3d  and  6th  of  October  they  tried 
without  success  to  cross  the  Scheldt. 
Furthermore,  in  France,  the  German 
right  was  steadily  approaching  the  sea ; 
if  they  could  reach  it  before  the  Bel- 
gians had  made  good  their  retreat  these 
latter  might  be  entirely  cut  off.  The 
better  to  secure  this  retreat  Ghent  was 
occupied  on  the  9th  by  the  French  and 
British  (7th  division).  The  retreat, 
however,  began  on  the  evening  of  the 
6th,  and  by  the  morning  of  the  next  day 
the  entire  Belgian  army  was  across  the 
river.  The  Germans  had  indeed  crossed 
the  Scheldt  themselves,  on  the  6th  at 
Schoonasrde,  but  were  unable  to  inter- 


rupt the  retreat.  On  October  10  Ant- 
werp capitulated,  and  on  the  15th  the 
Belgian  army  took  its  stand  on  the 
Yser,  82,000  strong.  The  subsequent 
fortunes  of  this  army  are  bound  up  with 
those  of  the  Franco-British  forces  on 
this  front. 

Invasion  of  France. — When  it  be- 
came evident  that  France  was  to  be  in- 
vaded from  Belgium,  the  3d  (French) 
army  moved  up  (August  10)  to 
Longwy,  with  the  4th  army  taking  a 
position  further  west,  and  the  5th  sta- 
tioning itself  between  the  Sambre  and 
the  Meuse.  General  French  (August 
23)  stood  between  the  Sambre  and  the 
Scheldt,  on  the  line  Conde-Binche,  with 
so  much  of  the  British  expeditionary 
force,  two  corps  and  a  cavalry  division, 
as  had  crossed  to  the  Continent.  The 
German  armies  that  had  concentrated 
on  the  line  Aix-la-Chapelle-Malmedy- 
Treves-Metz-Strassburg  now  moved 
out,  Von  Kluck  through  Belgium,  Von 
Bulow  to  the  Sambre  (Namur-Char- 
leroi)  ;  Von  Hausen  and  the  Duke  of 
Wiirttemberg  across  the  Ardennes  on 
Dinant  and  Neufchateau.  The  Crown 
Prince  crossed  Luxemburg.  The  Crown 
Prince  of  Bavaria  marched  against  de 
Castelnau  and  in  this  region  the  general 
action  opened  on  August  20,  with  the 
driving  back  of  de  Castelnau  (invasion 
of  Lorraine),  who,  however,  brought  up 
firm  before  Nancy,  September  7.  As 
early  as  August  15  some  French  troops 
had  crossed  the  Belgian  frontier  and 
had  engaged  the  Germans  in  minor  af- 
fairs (e.g.,  Dinant).  On  the  22d 
Charleroi  was  taken  by  the  Germans, 
who  on  the  23d  attacked  the  French  at 
this  place  and  the  British  at  Mons. 
As  the  3d  and  4th  (French)  armies 
were  compelled  to  withdraw  before  an 
attack  coming  from  Belgian  Luxem- 
burg, the  right  flank  of  the  fifth  army 
extending  almost  up  to  Namur  was  ex- 


48 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


posed,  and  that  army  withdrew.  This 
in  turn  compelled  the  withdrawal  of  the 
English  from  Mons,  and  so  the  whole 
Allied  army  now  retreated,  vigorously 
pursued  by  the  Germans,  on  the  line 
Paris-Verdun.  In  spite  of  one  or  two 
checks  suffered  in  the  advance,  as  at 
Guise,  it  may  be  said  that  on  the  whole 
this  movement  was  up  to  a  certain  point 
irresistible.  That  point  was  reached 
when  the  Allies  turned  on  crossing  the 
river  Marne,  and  not  only  defeated  the 
Germans,  but  forced  them  to  retreat  to 
the  Aisne.  The  French  generalissimo, 
Joffre,  had  constantly  kept  before  him 
the  plan  of  so  turning  in  the  retreat 
from  the  Belgian  frontier,  and  had  se- 
lected the  line  Paris-Marne-Verdun  as 
the  proper  place,  and  Sept.  6,  1914,  as 
the  proper  date. 

On  Aug.  20,  1914,  General  Joffre  * 
assumed  command  of  the  Allied  armies 
in  France.  He  had  before  him  the  in- 
finitely grave  problem  of  developing 
suitable  powers  of  resistance,  mostly 
out  of  beaten  and  retreating  armies, 
and  of  selecting  the  time,  place,  and 
manner  of  applying  these  powers,  which 
he  did  at  the  Marne  (to  be  described 
later).  After  that  battle  the  Allied 
armies  under  his  command  successfully 
held  off  the  Germans,  thus  upsetting 
their  plans  of  crushing  France  before 
proceeding  to   conquests   elsewhere. 

The  Approach  to  Paris. — During  the 
retreat  two  new  armies  had  been 
formed:  one  under  General  Foch  f  (the 

*  Joffre,  Joseph  Jacques  Cesaire.  Born 
(1852)  in  Rivesaltes,  Pyrenees.  Student  of 
military  engineering  at  Ecole  Polytechnique. 
Entered  active  service  (1870)  in  Franco-Prus- 
sian War  after  which  returned  to  Polytechnique. 
Became  captain  (1874) ;  fought  in  Tonkin 
(1883-84);  in  Dahomey  (1893).  Professor  in 
Higher  War  School  for  a  time  and  then  pro- 
moted brigadier  general  of  division.  Became 
chief  of  general  staff  (1911).  Helped  pass 
the  three  years'  military  service  law. 

f  Ferdinand  Foch,  born  (1851)  at  Tarbes, 
Hautes  Pyrenees,  of  a  Basque  family;  served 
in   the   Franco-Prussian   War   as   a  subaltern; 


ninth),  which  took  position  between 
d'Esperey's  (formerly  Lanrezac's)  and 
Langle  de  Cary's ;  and  another  (the 
sixth)  under  Manoury  from  Paris.  This 
last  army  was  to  rest  on  the  intrenched 
camp  of  the  capital,  face  east  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Ourcq,  and  attack 
Von  Kluck's  right.  It  is  a  sound  prin- 
ciple of  warfare  that  victory  may  be 
obtained  only  by  beating  the  hostile 
army.  When  therefore  the  Allied 
armies  passed  into  the  Paris-Verdun 
gap,  Von  Kluck,  sweeping  down  on 
Paris  from  the  north,  properly  turned 
south-eastward  after  the  enemy.  But 
he  had  not  reckoned  upon  the  formation 
of  the  sixth  army  sent  out  from  Paris, 
in  motor  vehicles  of  every  description 
to  take  its  place  on  the  battle  front. 
Before,  however,  taking  up  the  Battle 
of  the  Marne,  we  must  very  briefly  de- 
scribe what  had  in  the  meantime  been 
taking  place  in  eastern  France ;  the 
pressure  in  this  quarter,  indeed,  cul- 
minated in  conflicts  contemporaneous 
with  and  forming  a  part  of  the  great 
battle  of  September  6.  Before  the  sud- 
den swerve  of  Von  Kluck  from  Paris  on 
September  4,  it  seemed  as  if  the  predic- 
tion that  the  Germans  would  be  in  Paris 
six  weeks  from  the  outbreak  of  war  was 
about  to  be  fulfilled.  General  Gallieni 
had  begun  to  prepare  the  city  for  a 
siege.  The  noise  of  the  battle  could  be 
heard  by  the  Parisians. 

Events  before  the  Marne. — After  the 
declaration  of  war  the  French  invaded 
both  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  These  in- 
vasions came  to  grief.  The  French 
twice  occupied  Mulhausen ;  the  first  time 

artillery  captain  at  26;  professor  of  tactics  in 
the  Ecole  de  Guerre  for  five  years  and  later,  as 
general  of  brigade,  its  director;  in  command  of 
various  divisions  before  European  War;  during 
war  commander  of  northern  armies  in  France, 
gaining  victories  of  the  Marne  and  Ypres; 
known  internationally  as  a  strategist  and  au- 
thor of  Principles  of  War  and  Conduct  of  War, 
published  in  French,  English,  Italian  and  Ger- 
man;  received   British   G.C.B. 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


49 


they  were  driven  out,  the  second  they 
retired  of  their  own  accord.  They  had 
also  reached  Saarburg  and  Saarbruck- 
en.  These  invasions  undoubtedly  had  a 
political  end  in  view,  conditioned  of 
course  by  the  possibility  of  military 
success.  Incidentally,  the  Alsace  op- 
erations were  to  contain  troops  that 
otherwise  might  have  been  used  to  re- 
sist the  invasion  of  Lorraine.  This  in- 
vasion opened  well  enough:  the  French 
occupied  Dieuze,  Morhange,  Chateau- 
Salins,  across  the  frontier.  But  it  came 
to  naught  at  Morhange,  in  which  the 
French,  completely  beaten,  were  driven 
back  across  the  frontier,  and  were 
forced  to  settle  down  to  the  real  busi- 
ness of  protecting  their  eastern  fron- 
tier. The  Germans,  early  in  August, 
occupied  Cirey,  Badonviller,  and  Bac- 
carat. Farther  north  the  army  of  Metz 
got  to  within  15  miles  of  Verdun.  Still, 
farther  north  the  army  of  the  Crown 
Prince,  which  had  on  August  22  crossed 
the  frontier  near  Longwy  (occupied  the 
27th),  drove  back  the  French,  and 
finally  took  up  a  position  between  Bar- 
le-Duc  and  the  Ardennes,  facing  east- 
ward, and  opposed  by  General  Sarrail's 
army.  To  the  west  of  the  Crown  Prince 
the  Duke  of  Wurttemberg,  who  had 
crossed  the  Meuse  near  Mezieres, 
formed  up,  facing  south  between  the 
Crown  Prince's  army  and  Epernay. 
The  first  French  army  (Dubail)  in 
front  of  Epinal  faced  the  east;  on  its 
left  General  de  Castelnau  continued  the 
line  east  and  north  of  Nancy,  along  the 
Meuse,  until  it  rested  on  the  defenses  of 
Verdun.  The  garrison  of  Verdun  car- 
ried it  on  east,  north,  and  west  of  the 
position  until  it  joined  with  Sarrail's 
army. 

With  the  armies  in  these  positions 
Nancy  was  attacked;  its  main  natural 
defense  in  the  chain  of  hills  known  as 
the  Grand  Couronne  de  Nancy.      The 


Germans  occupied  various  towns  in  the 
east,  e.g.,  St.  Die,  but  not  without  some 
heavy  fighting  in  the  Vosges.  On  the 
north  they  pushed  the  French  back  to 
the  Grand  Couronne,  but  never  got  be- 
yond it.  The  main  army  marched  from 
Chateau-Salins  and  engaged  the  French 
in  a  series  of  stiff  fights  around  the 
Forest  of  Champenoux.  At  the  same 
time  a  part  of  the  army  of  Metz,  with 
its  left  resting  on  Pont-a-Mousson, 
joined  in  the  attack.  Six  miles  north- 
east of  the  city,  on  the  plateau  of 
Amance,  de  Castelnau  had  assembled 
his  artillery.  Before  the  troops  from 
the  north  could  cooperate  with  those 
from  the  east  in  attacking  this  position, 
Ste.  Genevieve,  10  miles  or  so  northwest 
of  Amance,  had  to  be  occupied.  Here 
Foch  (August  22),  with  a  modest  force, 
defeated  the  Germans  with  fearful 
slaughter.  The  attack  on  Nancy  from 
the  east  through  Amance  was  equally 
unsuccessful.  After  much  fighting 
along  the  entire  position  the  bombard- 
ment of  Amance  began  on  August  30, 
31  and  lasted  for  more  than  a  week. 
The  contest  over  the  entire  line  in- 
creased in  intensity;  indeed,  from  the 
German  point  of  view,  it  could  do  no 
less,  for  now  (September  7-8)  their 
armies  were  being  pushed  back  from 
the  Marne,  and  it  was  vital  to  their 
success  that  they  should  break  through. 
The  Emperor  himself  was  present  at 
the  great  assaults,  six  in  number,  made 
on  Amance,  and  all  driven  back  with 
loss.  Checked  before  Nancy,  the  Ger- 
mans on  September  10  evacuated  Pont- 
a-Mousson,  and  on  the  12th,  Luneville, 
St.  Die,  and  some  smaller  places.  They 
now  concentrated  their  efforts  between 
Toul  and  Verdun,  with  the  purpose  of 
surrounding  the  latter  place.  To  this 
end  they  bombarded  Fort  de  Troyon  on 
the  Meuse  south  of  Verdun  and  several 
times  attempted  to  take  it  by  assault. 


50 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


But  the  fort  made  an  extremely  gallant 
defense,  and  although  almost  reduced 
to  extremities,  managed  to  hold  out. 
The  final  assault  was  delivered  on  the 
13th  of  September.  On  the  20th  a 
fresh  advance  was  made  on  the  for- 
tresses from  the  east  to  cross  the  Meuse 
south  of  Verdun.  The  garrisons  of 
Verdun  and  Toul  respectively  pushed 
out  attacks  on  the  German  flanks,  while 
the  Germans  themselves  advanced  in 
the  centre  and  captured  the  point  of 
St.  Mihiel  on  the  Meuse  (September 
25). 

Grip  on  St.  Mihiel. — The  Germans 
crossed  the  river  on  the  26th  and  began 
to  march  northward  towards  the  Aire 
valley.  A  situation  was  then  developed 
that  might  have  proved  of  the  utmost 
consequence  to  the  French.  To  meet 
it,  Sarrail  came  down  from  the  north, 
and  the  twentieth  corps  was  hurried  up 
from  near  Champenoux.  At  5  p.  m. 
of  the  26th  the  advance  guard  of  the 
corps,  which  had  crossed  at  Lironville, 
got  contact  with  the  enemy.  After 
some  extremely  heavy  fighting  the  Ger- 
mans fell  back  to  the  Meuse  and  in- 
trenched at  St.  Mihiel,  keeping  their 
footing  across  the  river  at  Camp  des 
Romains. 

While  these  operations  were  taking 
place  on  the  east  and  south,  the  other 
German  armies  had  proceeded  south- 
ward in  pursuit  of  the  retreating 
French  and  English  (as  related  else- 
where). On  September  6,  the  Crown 
Prince's  army  stretched  from  a  point 
southwest  of  Verdun  to  the  neighbor- 
hood of  Bar-le-Duc.  Verdun  was  thus 
almost  completely  surrounded.  But 
the  tide  turned  with  the  German  defeat 
of  the  Marne;  they  retreated  north- 
ward and  divided  right  and  left  at  the 
forest  of  Argonne.  This  rocky,  hilly 
forested  ridge,  about  30  miles  long 
north  and  south  and  8  miles  wide,  then 


became  the  scene  of  incessant  close 
fighting  all  through  the  autumn  and 
winter.  In  the  northern  part  of  the 
Argonne  Forest  the  Aire  runs  west  to 
fall  into  the  Aisne.  This  pass,  called 
the  Gap  of  Grand  Pre,  pierced  as  it 
was  by  a  railway,  would  have  been 
useful  to  the  French,  and  so  was  one 
objective  kept  constantly  in  view  by 
them  in  the  operations  of  this  region. 
These  now  took  on  the  character  that 
prevailed  farther  in  the  west,  trench 
warfare,  with  the  French  pressing  the 
Germans  slowly  back.  Farther  south 
there  was  much  fighting  on  both  sides 
of  the  St.  Mihiel  wedge,  and  in  the 
Bois  le  Pretre  to  the  eastward. 

In  Alsace,  after  the  second  evacua- 
tion of  Mulhausen,  the  French  took  up 
and  held  an  intrenched  position  in  front 
of  Belfort  from  Thann  to  Moos  until 
winter,  when  they  fell  back  a  little 
nearer  to  Belfort.  Trench  conditions 
developed  here  also,  except  that  there 
were  desperate  struggles  to  take  and 
hold  Hartmannsweilerkopf,  a  mountain 
about  2900  feet  high  some  miles  to  the 
north  of  Thann,  which  changed  hands 
several  times.  Apart  from  various 
thrusts  and  points  at  German  territory, 
the  main  purpose  of  the  French  was  to 
cover  the  great  position  of  Belfort.  In 
this   they   succeeded. 

The  Battle  of  the  Marne. — Between 
the  close  of  the  retreat  and  the  battle 
about  to  be  described  air  reconnois- 
sances,  etc.,  had  revealed  the  fact  that 
Von  Kluck  had  changed  direction  to  the 
southeast.  The  Battle  of  the  Marne 
opened  on  Sunday,  September  6.  On 
the  3d  the  British  had  fallen  back  of 
that  river  and  later  had  taken  up  a 
position  behind  the  Seine.  About  this 
time  (September  4)  Joffre  had  resolved 
to  take  the  offensive,  wheeling  up  the 
left  flank  of  the  sixth  army,  pivoting  it 
on  the  Marne,  to  move  on  the  Ourcq. 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


51 


The  British  were  to  fill  the  gap  between 
the  sixth  and  fifth  French  armies.  Ger- 
man troops  had  been  reported  moving 
southeast  along  the  left  bank  of  the 
Ourcq  on  the  4th  and  were  now  halted 
and  facing  that  river.  Heads  of 
columns  were  also  seen  crossing  at 
Changis,  La  Ferte,  Nogent,  Chateau- 
Thierry,  and  Mezy.  The  Allies'  line 
on  the  6th  reached  from  Ermenonville, 
in  front  of  the  left  flank  of  the  sixth 
army,  through  Lizy  on  the  Marne, 
Mauperthuis,  to  Esternay  and  Charle- 
ville,  the  left  of  the  ninth  army  under 
Foch,  and  so  along  the  front  of  the 
ninth,  fourth,  and  third  French  armies 
to  a  point  north  of  Verdun. 

Recollecting,  then,  that  the  first  and 
second  French  armies  based  on  Belfort- 
Verdun  were  facing  the  German  seventh 
and  sixth,  the  French  order  of  battle 
on  September  6  was :  the  third  army 
(Sarrail)  Verdun-Bar-le-Duc,  opposed 
by  the  German  third  (Crown  Prince)  ; 
the  fourth  (de  Langle  de  Cary)  across 
the  plain  of  Champagne,  south  of  Vitry- 
le-Francois,  facing  north,  and  opposed 
to  the  German  fourth  (Prince  of  Wiirt- 
temberg)  ;  the  ninth  (Foch)  Mailly- 
Sezanne,  opposed  to  the  German  second 
(Von  Biilow);  the  fifth  (d'Esperey) 
Esterney-Courtacon,  with  Conneau's 
cavalry  on  his  left.  The  sixth  army 
(Manoury)  held  a  line  north  and  south, 
with  its  right  at  Meaux  and  its  left 
near  Betz.  The  fifth  and  sixth  armies 
were  to  engage  Von  Kluck.  The  gap 
between  the  fifth  and  sixth  (French) 
armies  was  held  by  the  British  five  divi- 
sions and  five  cavalry  brigades,  Ville- 
neuve-le-Comte  to  Jouy-le-Chateau. 

Von  Kluck  left  two  corps  (II  and 
IV)  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Ourcq  to 
hold  the  sixth  army,  while  he  proceeded 
with  III,  IV,  and  VII  to  Coulommiers, 
Rebais,  and  La  Ferte  Gaucher  to  at- 
tack  the   left   and   centre   of   the   fifth 


(French)  army.  He  had  pushed  for- 
ward two  cavalry  divisions  towards 
Coulommiers  and  Crecy  to  give  notice 
of  any  attack  possibly  coming  from 
that  quarter,  and  had  occupied  the 
villages  on  the  west  bank  of  the 
Ourcq.  ,  :| 

The  battle  began  at  daylight  Sep- 
tember 6  by  the  advance  of  the  sixth 
army  against  the  villages  just  men- 
tioned, and  became  general  over  the 
whole  line  from  Paris  to  Verdun.  In 
this  struggle  the  British  at  once  took 
a  hand,  and  moving  northeast,  drove 
back  Von  Kluck's  cavalry  and  advance 
guards.  In  the  words  of  Sir  John 
French,  it  must  have  been  at  about 
noon  "that  the  enemy  realized  the  pow- 
erful threat  that  was  being  made 
against  the  flank  of  his  columns  moving 
southeast."  By  night  the  British  had 
reached  the  line  Dagny-Coulommiers. 
This  retreat  of  the  Germans  uncover- 
ing the  west  flank  of  the  troops  oper- 
ating against  the  fifth  army  forced 
these  to  withdraw  and  enabled  the  fifth 
to  reach  the  Grand  Morin  between  Es- 
ternay and  La  Ferte  Gaucher.  In  the 
meantime  the  struggle  further  east  had 
been  most  serious.  Foch  was  heavily 
engaged  with  Von  Biilow,  and  on  his 
right  with  Von  Hausen.  On  the  whole, 
the  centre  had  all  it  could  do  to  hold 
its  own,  while  the  right  even  fell  back  a 
little.  The  day  closed  with  the  balance 
leaning  a  little  in  favor  of  the  Germans, 
except  on  their  left,  when  Von  Kluck 
began  to  realize  that  he  must  look  to 
his  right  as  well  as  to  his  front.  Sep- 
tember 7  was  a  day  of  desperate 
struggle,  with  the  Allies  progressing  in 
the  west,  but  not  elsewhere.  On  the 
8th  the  German  right  was  definitely 
turned,  and  began  to  retreat.  On  this 
day,  d'Esperey  carried  Montmirail, 
and  thus  made  an  opening  on  Von 
Bulow's  right.     Into  this  opening  Foch 


52 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


pushed  his  left,  and  he  is  reported  to 
have  discovered  a  gap  between  Von 
Biilow  and  Von  Hausen,  of  which  he 
also  took  advantage.  The  third  and 
fourth  armies  on  this  same  day  held 
on  only  by  the  most  devoted  courage 
in  face  of  the  equally  devoted  attacks 
made  upon  them.  September  9  saw  the 
scale  turn  in  favor  of  the  Allies.  The 
line  of  the  Ourcq  was  taken ;  French 
and  d'Esperey  joined  hands  at  Cha- 
teau-Thierry in  the  evening.  Foch 
drove  a  part  of  Von  Bulow's  right  into 
the  marshes  of  Saint-Gond  and  attacked 
his  left  with  success,  while  the  Saxons 
on  Von  Billow's  left,  after  heavy  losses, 
were  pushed  back  towards  Chalons.  The 
third  army  still  held.  By  the  10th 
there  could  be  no  doubt  that  the  Allies 
had  won  a  victory:  the  Germans  re- 
treated, and  in  good  order,  to  the  Aisne, 
where  they  occupied  a  line  said  to  have 
been  prepared  in  advance. 

The  Battle  of  the  Marne  must  be  re- 
garded as  a  significant  defeat  for  the 
German  army.  Flushed  with  success, 
having  the  initiative,  opposed  to  troops 
supposedly  dispirited  by  defeat  after 
defeat  during  a  long  and  exhausting  re- 
treat, the  Germans  found  this  check  as 
unexpected  as  the  French  found  it  wel- 
come. On  the  French  side  moral  forces 
were  developed  whose  intensity  con- 
tinued undiminished.  The  Germans, 
although  not  disabled,  were  neverthe- 
less compelled  radically  to  change  all 
their  plans  of  operation. 

The  German  position  on  the  Aisne 
extended  from  a  point  on  the  Heights 
of  the  Meuse  north  of  Verdun,  west 
across  the  Argonne  country  and  the 
plain  of  Champagne  to  Rheims,  north- 
west across  the  Aisne,  west  along  the 
Heights  of  the  Aisne  to  the  Foret  de 
PAigle,  north  of  Compiegne.  This  po- 
sition was  of  great  strength,  carefully 
intrenched    and    thoroughly    supplied. 


The  Allied  armies  followed  the  Germans 
in  their  retreat.  On  the  morning  of  the 
13th  the  British  advanced,  and  in  spite 
of  the  resistance  of  the  Germans  passed 
the  Aisne  on  pontoon  bridges,  a  re- 
markable military  achievement.  The 
Allied  lines,  September  21,  reached 
from  the  extreme  south  of  Alsace 
through  St.  Die,  Luneville,  Pont-a- 
Mousson,  Consenvoye,  Grande  Pre, 
Souain,  Craonne,  Noyon,  to  Le  Catelet. 
Strong  German  forces  held  St.  Quen- 
tin.  In  the  east  the  Germans  had 
pushed  their  way  along  the  promontory 
of  Hatton  Chatel  towards  St.  Mihiel 
and  were  shelling  the  forts  of  Camp 
des  Romains  and  des  Parodies.  On  the 
26th  they  crossed  the  Meuse  near  St. 
Mihiel.  Ypres  was  occupied  on  Octo- 
ber 14  by  the  British  seventh  division, 
which  had  assisted  the  withdrawal  of 
the  Allied  troops  from  Antwerp.  A 
period  of  deadlock  now  followed  on  the 
Aisne,  during  which  each  adversary 
made  the  most  determined  efforts  to 
outflank  the  other  on  the  west. 

From  the  Aisne  to  Flanders. — These 
efforts  were  logical  for  both  sides.  An 
attack  on  the  German  left,  even  if  suc- 
cessful, would  not  interfere  with  their 
communications  through  northern 
France  with  Belgium  and  Germany.  A 
frontal  attack  would  have  called  for 
resources  not  then  in  the  possession  of 
the  Allies.  To  turn  their  right,  how- 
ever, might  result  in  eutting  some  of 
the  communications,  might  even  save 
Antwerp.  It  would  in  any  case  assist 
the  retreat  of  the  Belgians  and  British 
from  that  city.  Moreover,  it  was  not 
impossible  that  the  Germans  might 
strike  at  Calais  and  Boulogne;  it  was 
not  inconceivable  that  they  might  even 
push  their  way  as  far  southwest  as 
Abbeville.  Accordingly  about  Septem- 
ber 20  an  army  was  formed  west  of 
Compiegne,  and  its  command  given  to 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


53 


de  Castelnau,  who  was  to  fill  the  gap 
between  the  Oise  and  the  Somme,  and  to 
push  his  lines  north  of  the  Somme;  as 
objectives  he  had  St.  Quentin  and  La 
Fere.  On  the  21st  de  Castelnau's  right 
had  moved  as  far  as  Noyon ;  there  was 
violent  fighting  around  Lassigny.  From 
Lassigny  the  French  right  moved 
towards  Roye,  while  their  left  momen- 
tarily occupied  Peronne.  The  Germans 
in  the  meantime  concentrated  a  large 
force  in  the  region,  formed  in  part  of 
troops  drawn  from  the  centre  on  the 
Aisne,  and  from  Lorraine  and  the 
Vosges.  On  the  25th  the  French  near 
Noyon  were  pushed  back  on  that  day 
and  the  next  two,  and  the  whole  line  as 
far  as  the  Vosges  was  engaged.  De  Cas- 
telnau was  driven  from  Lassigny,  but 
during  the  next  few  days  managed  to 
hold  his  own.  There  was  now  some  dan- 
ger that  the  Germans  would  themselves 
outflank  the  French;  to  meet  this  pos- 
sibility a  new  army  (tenth,  Maud'huy) 
was  formed.  De  Castelnau  was  now 
merely  to  hold  his  position.  Maud'huy's 
line  ran  from  the  Ancre  through  Arras 
and  Lens  to  Lille,  and  his  plan  would  be 
to  move  on  Valenciennes.  The  Germans, 
who  were  in  force  in  the  region  of  Cam- 
brai  and  Douai,  planned  to  take  Lille, 
turn  on  and  force  back  Maud'huy;  at 
the  same  time  other  forces  would  ad- 
vance on  Boulogne,  Calais,  and  Dun- 
kirk. 

The  battle  opened  October  1,  and  by 
the  4th  the  French  had  been  pushed 
back  west  of  Lens,  and  were  beginning 
to  retire  to  the  hills  behind  Arras.  On 
the  6th  the  Germans  shelled  Arras,  and 
later  attempted  to  take  the  town,  in 
which  they  failed.  They  had  succeeded, 
however,  in  repelling  Maud'huy's  of- 
fensive, and  had  prevented  the  turning 
of  their  flank.  It  was  now  decided  to 
move  the  British  force  from  their 
trenches   on   the  Aisne   to   the   left  of 


Maud'huy,  who  now,  like  de  Castelnau 
before  him,  would  remain  on  the  defen- 
sive. The  situation  of  the  Allies  was 
critical.  Antwerp  was  about  to  fall, 
the  Lys  had  been  crossed  by  the  Ger- 
mans and  Ypres  occupied  by  them  (Oc- 
tober 3).  The  channel  ports  as  well  as 
Lille  were  in  danger.  The  presence  of 
Germans  in  the  region  about  Haze- 
brouck  and  Ypres  implied  an  attempt 
either  to  intercept  the  British  and  Bel- 
gians retreating  from  Antwerp,  or  to 
turn  Maud'huy's  left  in  the  region  of 
Lens.  Joffre  therefore  decided  to  con- 
centrate still  another  army  between 
Lens  and  Dunkirk,  which,  with  the  Brit- 
ish, was  to  form  the  extreme  left  of  the 
Allies.  This  army  was  to  be  com- 
manded by  General  d'Urbal,  while  Foch 
was  to  take  general  charge  of  the  four 
armies — de  Castelnau's,  Maud'huy's, 
French's,  and  d'UrbaPs.  The  transfer 
of  the  British  forces  was  successfully 
accomplished;  they  were  to  take  posi- 
tion north  of  the  line  Bethune-Lille,  at- 
tack the  enemy  opposing  Maud'huy's 
left  wing  west  of  La  Bassee,  and  at- 
tempt to  defend  or  recover  Lille,  as  the 
case  might  be. 

The  country  in  which  the  operations 
of  many  months  on  the  left  of  the  Allies 
were  to  take  place  consists  essentially 
of  the  plain  of  the  Scheldt.  This  plain 
is  broken  by  no  natural  obstacles  but 
is  intersected  by  many  canals.  The 
Scheldt  bisects  it  roughly  and  receives 
the  Lys  at  Ghent.  On  the  western  boun- 
dary of  the  plain  rises  the  higher  land 
running  from  Calais  southeast  to 
Peronne,  at  the  base  of  which  runs  a 
series  of  waterways,  mostly  canals, 
forming  as  it  were  a  wet  ditch  to  the  ta- 
bleland to  the  westward.  The  ditch  was 
held  by  the  French.  The  Germans  oc- 
cupied Ghent,  Bruges,  and  Ostend,  and 
succeeded  in  capturing  Lille,  but  were 
driven  east   of  Ypres   by  the   British. 


54 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Further  south,  the  Allies  pushed  the 
Germans  back  towards  Lille  between 
the  Lys  and  the  Bethune-Lille  Canal. 
While  these  movements  were  going1  on 
the  other  French  armies  still  further  to 
the  south  were  in  conflict  with  the  Ger- 
mans from  Bethune  to  Compiegne. 

This  period  is  signalized  by  Joffre's 
third  attempt  to  turn  the  German  right. 
Lille,  although  held  by  the  French,  was 
in  danger  of  being  cut  off  by  the  ad- 
vance of  the  Germans  west  of  the  city 
south  of  the  Lys,  and  the  possibility 
was  still  strong  that  the  Germans  might 
make  a  rush  for  Calais  and  Dunkirk,  or 
else  try  to  crush  the  British  and  Bel- 
gians in  retreat  from  Antwerp.  Hence 
Lille  was  to  be  saved,  if  possible,  and  at 
any  rate  the  other  purposes  of  the  Ger- 
mans were  to  be  negatived  at  any  cost. 

-The  offensive  was  taken  up  by  d'Ur- 
bal's  army,  the  British  Seventh  Divi- 
sion, and  the  main  forces  of  the  British 
coming  up  from  the  Aisne.  On  Octo- 
ber 11  the  Allies  engaged  the  Ger- 
mans in  a  position  extending  from 
Mont-des-Cats  southwest  of  Ypres 
through  La  Bassee  to  Vermelles.  Part 
of  this  position  was  carried,  but  the 
main  purpose,  to  drive  the  Germans 
out  of  La  Bassee  and  to  save  Lille, 
failed.  On  the  10th  this  city  had  been 
bombarded;  on  the  13th  it  was  sur- 
rendered. To  the  north  the  Allies  had 
met  with  some  success,  driving  the 
enemy  from  Ypres  as  their  comrades 
were  entering  Lille.  On  the  17th  the 
Allies  lay  approximately  north  and 
south  from  the  Forest  of  Houthulst, 
holding  the  villages  of  Langemarck, 
Poelcapelle,  Passchendaele,  and  east 
from  Ypres  to  Zonnebeke  and  south  to 
Wytschaete  and  Nieppe. 

Battle  of  the  Yser.—  On  October  16 
the  Germans  attacked  Dixmude  and 
opened  the  Battle  of  the  Yser.  The  left 
wing  of  the  Allies  now  stretched  from 


Compiegne  through  Arras,  Ypres,  and 
Dixmude  to  Nieuport.  With  the  com- 
mand of  the  sea  in  the  hands  of  the 
Allies,  the  efforts  of  the  Germans  were 
necessarily  confined  to  the  fronts  Nieu- 
port-Bethune  and  Bethune-Compiegne. 
The  nature  of  the  ground  north  of  Be- 
thune greatly  influenced  the  character 
of  the  operations,  at  first  rolling,  and 
then,  as  the  sea  is  approached,  flat  and 
open,  filled  with  dikes  and  ditches.  From 
Nieuport  to  Dixmude  the  line  was  held 
by  the  Belgians  and  French  colonial  in- 
fantry. Then  from  Dixmude  past  Zon- 
nebeke came  French  Territorials  and 
cavalry,  then  British,  who  continued  on 
to  Bethune.  From  Dixmude  to  Nieu- 
port the  Yser  is  canalized,  and  15-20 
feet  above  the  ground  to  the  west, 
across  which  runs  the  embanked  rail- 
road between  the  same  points.  As  the 
country  could  be  flooded,  the  bridge 
crossings  were  more  than  usually  im- 
portant. Off  the  roads  the  ground  was 
difficult  to  cross,  by  reason  of  ditches, 
dikes,  etc.,  and,  moreover,  was  marshy, 
so  that  artificial  cover  could  not  be 
made.  For  eight  days,  by  night  as  well 
as  by  day,  the  Germans  assaulted  the 
Belgian  position  only  to  be  repulsed 
and  beaten  back.  The  British  monitor 
fleet,  mounting  6-inch  rifles,  did  great 
service  shelling  the  German  right  and 
rear,  during  which  Knocke  was  partial- 
ly destroyed.  The  conduct  of  the  Bel- 
gians and  the  French  colonial  infantry 
during  these  eight  days  was  beyond  all 
praise:  they  had  held  their  position 
against  superior  numbers  backed  by  ar- 
tillery under  the  most  terrible  and  dis- 
couraging circumstances,  and  had  suc- 
cessfully prevented  the  desperate  ef- 
forts of  the  Germans  to  break  through 
across  the  position  to  Dunkirk  and 
Calais. 

The  plan  of  the  Allies  had  been  to 
fight  a  defensive  battle  on  the  Yser,  and 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


55 


to  attack  with  their  centre  and  right  in 
front  of  Ypres  and  south  of  the  Lys  re- 
spectively. French's  specific  objective 
was  the  capture  of  Menin  on  the  Lys, 
halfway  between  Roulers  and  Lille,  as 
necessary  to  an  offensive  that  should 
take  Bruges  and  thus  cut  the  German 
communications.  To  hold  the  road 
Menin-Roulers-Ostend  was  essential  to 
German  success,  because  from  it  ran  out 
westward  all  the  roads  leading  to  the 
Allied  line  between  Ypres  and  the  sea. 
Heavily  reenforced  on  the  19th,  the 
Germans  themselves  took  the  offensive, 
captured  Roulers,  most  of  the  Roulers- 
Dixmude  road,  and  all  of  the  Menin- 
Roulers-Dixmude-Ostend  road  and  rail- 
road. 

The  Menin  operation  failed.  The 
plan  assigned  to  Sir  Douglas  Haig,*  to 
push  through  and  if  possible  to  cap- 
ture Bruges,  became  impossible  of  ac- 
complishment, for  the  Germans,  in  spite 
of  the  most  determined  resistance,  in 
spite  of  frightful  losses,  were  gaining, 
and  it  became  evident  that  the  best  the 
Allies  could  hope  for  was  to  hold  on 
until  reinforcements  could  come  up.  By 
the  night  of  the  22d  the  Germans  had 
crossed  the  Yser  Canal  at  Tervaete, 
and  north  of  Ypres  had  pierced  the 
Allied  lines.  South  of  that  city  there 
was  only  a  thin  line,  and  the  right  of 
the  Allies  was  withdrawing  from  the 
Givenchy-Radinghem  ridge.  But  on 
the  23d  the  Allied  prospect  brightened. 

*  Sir  Douglas  Haig,  born  (1861)  in  Fife- 
shire;  educated  at  Brasenose  College,  Oxford; 
served  with  distinction  in  the  Sudan  and  in 
South  Africa;  later  held  important  posts  of 
India,  being  chief  of  staff  (1909-1912);  was 
general  officer  in  command  at  Aldershot  (1912- 
14) ;  general  in  command  in  the  First  Army 
from  landing  of  expeditionary  force  in  Euro- 
pean War  (1914);  distinguished  himself  in  the 
retreat  from  Mons,  at  the  Aisne,  at  Ypres,  and 
Neuve  Chapelle;  succeeded  Sir  John  French 
as  commander  in  chief  of  British  forces  in 
France  and  Belgium  (December,  1915);  G.C.B. 
and  Grand  Officer  of  the  Legion  of  Honor  of 
France;  author  of  Cavalry  Studies   (1907). 


The  Forty-second  French  Division 
(Grossetti)  with  howitzers  had  reached 
Furnes  and  relieved  the  Belgians  in 
Nieuport.  On  the  night  of  October  23- 
24,  14  assaults  were  made  on  Dixmude 
and  all  repulsed.  North  of  Ypres,  Brit- 
ish reinforcements  had  come  up,  moved 
on  the  enemy,  captured  their  trenches, 
and  beat  back  five  attempts  at  recap- 
ture, and  in  the  evening  of  this  day  a 
division  of  the  French  Ninth  Corps  was 
moved  into  the  line. 

So  far  the  Germans  had  failed  to 
break  through.  On  the  24th  the  French 
on  the  left  stormed  Lombartzyde  and 
moved  on  Westende,  thus  menacing  the 
German  right.  To  prevent  this  the 
Germans  opened  a  determined  attack 
on  Nieuport,  and  along  the  Yser  Canal 
as  far  south  as  Dixmude.  These  at- 
tacks failed.  The  next  day  the  battle 
was  renewed ;  guns  were  mounted  on  the 
dunes  to  beat  off  the  fleet.  So  tremen- 
dous was  the  effort  made  that  JofFre, 
October  25,  resolved  to  flood  the  coun- 
try. But  the  water  was  slow  to  spread 
over  the  meadow's.  In  the  meantime  the 
Germans  continued  their  attack,  and  on 
the  26th  seemed  to  be  in  a  fair  way  to 
reach  Pervyse,  halfway  between  Nieu- 
port and  Dixmude.  On  the  28th  they 
attacked  all  along  the  line.  But  in  the 
meantime  JofFre  was  hurrying  up  re- 
enforcements,  and  the  water  was  rising. 
The  next  day  attack  after  attack  was 
made  on  Pervyse-Ramscapelle,  and  the 
latter  place  was  captured  that  night. 
The  30th  found  the  British  fleet  reen- 
forced by  five  destroyers,  the  Germans 
in  Ramscapelle  and  along  the  railroad, 
but  between  it.  and  the  canal  embank- 
ment the  water  was  mounting.  All  day 
the  struggle  continued  for  Ramscapelle, 
the  embankment,  and  Pervyse.  The 
31st  saw  the  Germans  driven  back 
across  the  railroad  and  the  inundated 
region  east  of  the  canal. 


56 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Battle  around  Ypres. — The  Battle  of 
Ypres  is  not  a  separate  event  from  the 
Battle  of  the  Yser.  They  really  over- 
lapped, and  are  indeed  only  periods  of 
increased  intensity  of  combat  distin- 
guished by  the  prominence  of  a  special 
objective  on  the  part  of  the  Germans, 
and  of  a  special  effort  by  the  Allies  to 
prevent  the  realization  of  that  objec- 
tive. Both  of  these  battles  are  by  the 
French  denominated  the  battles  in  Flan- 
ders,   a   better   name   than   Yser   and 


YPRES  BATTLE  FRONT 

Ypres.  However  this  may  be,  opera- 
tions on  the  Yser  proper  were  checked 
by  the  inundation  spoken  of  above  and 
by  the  expulsion  of  the  Germans  from 
Ramscapelle.  The  scene  now  shifts  to 
the  southward,  to  the  attempts  made  by 
the  Germans  to  capture  Ypres  in  the 
pursuit  of  the  objective  still  held  by 
them,  to  wit,  to  break  through  the  Al- 
lied lines  to  the  French  channel  ports. 

On  October  24  the  Allies  lines  ran  in 
a  great  arc  from  Dixmude  through 
Langemarck,  Gheluvelt,  through  the 
woods  southeast  of  Ypres,  along  the 
eastern    ridge    of    the    Mont-des-Cats, 


across  the  Lys,  to  La  Bassee.  This 
position  was  energetically  attacked  on 
this  day  by  the  Germans,  who  very 
nearly  succeeded  in  taking  possession 
of  Gheluvelt.  Attacks  on  Mont-des-- 
Cats  were  beaten  off.  At  various  other 
points  likewise  the  Allies  held.  On  the 
23d  a  French  division  had  entered 
Ypres,  and  for  the  first  time  East  In- 
dian troops  entered  the  trenches  to  do 
battle  for  the  Empire — Gurkhas,  Sikhs, 
etc.  They  were  afterward  withdrawn, 
for  climatic  reasons,  it  was  said.  Fight- 
ing continued  through  the  25th,  and 
on  the  26th  many  attempts  were  made 
against  the  Nieuport-Dixmude  line. 
The  advantage  this  day  lay  on  the 
whole  with  the  Germans,  who  had  moved 
up  the  Menin- Ypres  road,  capturing 
Gheluvelt,  and,  south  of  the  Lys,  had 
got  hold  of  part  of  Neuve  Chapelle.  On 
the  28th  Gheluvelt  was  recaptured  by 
the  British,  who  also  drove  the  enemy 
to  the  edge  of  Neuve  Chapelle.  Return- 
ing to  the  attack,  the  Germans  recap- 
tured the  entire  village,  only  to  be  driv- 
en out  again,  this  time  by  a  force  com- 
posed in  part  of  East  Indian  troops. 
Passing  over  the  fighting  of  the  next 
day  or  two,  on  the  28th  a  wireless  was 
intercepted,  saying  that  the  Germans 
would  attack  next  morning.  On  that 
day  (the  29th)  the  French  south  of 
Bethune  took  the  offensive  so  as  to  keep 
as  large  a  force  as  possible  of  the  enemy 
from  joining  in  the  struggle  around 
Ypres.  On  the  30th  and  31st  French 
reinforcements  continued  to  arrive. 

The  Allied  position  on  the  morning  of 
the  31st  ran  from  Zonnebeke  on  the 
north  to  Festubert  on  the  southwest. 
The  eastern  ridges  of  Mont-des-Cats 
were  still  held  by  the  Allies ;  south  of 
this  the  line  extended  to  the  Lys,  cross- 
ing it  and  curving  around  Armentieres 
to  Neuve  Chapelle  and  thence  to  Festu- 
bert.    The  German  plan  was  to  hold  on 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


57 


the  flanks  and  to  make  their  main  at- 
tack on  the  centre  to  Ypres :  if  the  cen- 
tre could  be  broken,  and  the  ridge  of 
Mont-des-Cats  captured,  the  Allied 
forces  would  be  cut  in  two,  and  permit 
either  an  advance  on  Boulogne  or  an  at- 
tack south  of  the  Lys  against  the  Al- 
lies intrenched  there,  or  indeed  both.  At 
daybreak  the  Germans  opened  an  in- 
tense fire  on  the  lines  southeast  of  Ypres 
and  drove  the  British  back  into  their  re- 
serve trenches.  An  equally  violent  at- 
tack was  made  across  the  Ypres-Com- 
ines  Canal,  which  also  drove  back  the 
British.  At  one  or  two  points  the  lines 
were  momentarily  broken.  In  general 
the  Germans  had  advanced  in  the  cen- 
tre and  were  within  a  few  miles  of 
Ypres.  In  the  north  the  French  had 
taken  Bixschoote  and  reached  Passchen- 
daele.  On  the  Yser,  at  Ramscapelle, 
the  Germans  were  hurled  across  the  ca- 
nal, and  farther  south  the  French 
pushed  their  offensive  in  the  direction  of 
Roulers.  But  in  the  centre  a  tremen- 
dous effort  was  made  to  crumple  up  the 
British  line  and  capture  the  ridge  of 
Mont-des-Cats  and  Ypres.  The  defense 
made  by  the  British,  outnumbered  and 
outgunned,  against  the  successive  at- 
tacks of  the  Germans  will  ever  remain 
remarkable  in  their  annals.  These  at- 
tacks came  very  near  succeeding;  the 
thin  British  lines,  worn  out  by  their 
efforts  to  hold,  exposed  to  artillery  fire, 
began  to  fall  back,  and  the  guns  were 
even  withdrawn  to  Ypres.  The  roads 
behind  the  Germans  were  filled  with  mo- 
tor vehicles  ready  to  take  the  troops  to 
any  point  of  the  field.  But  at  this  mo- 
ment the  British  stood  their  ground. 
The  Germans  coming  up  the  Menin- 
Ypres  road  were  stopped,  and  were 
driven  out  of  the  woods  east  and  south- 
east of  Ypres.  To  the  south  the  de- 
fense was  equally  spirited,  keeping  the 
Germans    from    reaching   the   ridge   of 


Mont-des-Cats.  November  1  the  Ger- 
mans took  Wytschaete  and  Messines, 
villages  at  the  foot  of  the  ridge,  but 
failed  to  make  the  ridge  itself.  The 
struggle  continued  during  the  whole  of 
this  day ;  the  Germans  were  driven  out 
of  Wytschaete,  but  the  village  was 
abandoned.  On  the  2d  Neuve  Chapelle 
was  carried,  but  the  attempt  on  Armen- 
tieres  failed.  North  of  the  Lys  re- 
newed efforts  to  gain  possession  of  the 
ridge  of  Mont-des-Cats  proved  unsuc- 
cessful. On  the  3d  the  French  took  the 
offensive  from  Dixmude-Nordschoote ; 
the  effect  of  this  was  to  hold  back  forces 
that  otherwise  would  have  moved 
against  the  lines  farther  south. 

And  so  it  went  day  after  day.  The 
Germans  made  another  great  effort  on 
November  10,  when  they  shelled  Dix- 
mude  more  heavily  than  ever  before, 
blew  up  the  French  trenches  and  ad- 
vanced against  the  town.  After  a  ter- 
rible hand-to-hand  fight  the  French 
withdrew  to  the  west  of  the  Yser.  On 
the  remainder  of  the  front  artillery 
played  and  assaults  were  made.  The 
11th  opened  with  tremendous  artillery 
fire  from  both  sides  of  the  Menin-Ypres 
road,  lasting  three  hours.  Immediate- 
ly afterward  15  battalions  of  the  Prus- 
sian Guard  advanced  from  the  east, 
while  at  the  same  time  charges  were  un- 
dertaken by  other  troops.  Everywhere 
north  of  the  Lys  the  Allied  front  was 
attacked.  Everything  failed  except  the 
effort  of  the  Prussian  Guard,  who  got 
up  to  within  a  few  yards  of  the  trenches 
only  to  recoil  and  finally  to  retreat  be- 
fore the  blasting  fire  that  greeted  them. 
The  Battle  of  Ypres  was  over,  after 
having  lasted  one  month,  with  stag- 
gering losses  on  both  sides.  It  must  be 
accounted  a  German  defeat. 

The  conclusion  of  the  battles  of  Flan- 
ders, November  11,  1914,  marks  the  be- 
ginning of  what  may  be  called  the  long 


58 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


siege  of  the  armies  over  the  whole  line 
from  the  sea  to  the  Swiss  frontier.  It 
was  a  time  of  ceaseless  watching,  of 
hardship  and  trial,  of  continuous  fight- 
ing with  neither  side  able  to  advance  at 
the  expense  of  the  other.  Local  advan- 
tages gained  first  by  one  and  then  by 
the  other  adversary  in  no  way  affected 
the  issue,  and  indeed,  as  measured  by 
the  ground  gained,  could  not  be  repre- 
sented on  an  ordinary  map.  A  word 
is  perhaps  not  out  of  place  in  respect  of 
the  nature  of  the  contest  that  now  be- 
came the  rule  over  the  entire  western 
front.  Trench  warfare  over  this  front 
took  the  place  of  what  may  now  be 
called  old-fashioned  operations  in  the 
open.  Mining  and  countermining  be- 
came the  rule:  the  lines  in  reality  were 
areas  of  parallel  trenches  protected  by 
networks  of  barbed  wire  so  thickly  in- 
terlaid and  interwoven  that  only  long- 
sustained  artillery  fire  proved  equal  to 
breaking  them  down  in  clearing  the  way 
for  assault.  The  troops  lived  in  and 
under  the  ground,  so  that  the  shrapnel, 
the  ideal  man-killing  projectile  against 
troops  in  the  open,  proved  nearly  use- 
less, and  was  replaced  by  the  high  ex- 
plosive shell,  able  to  pierce  overhead 
shelter  and  overwhelm  the  occupants. 
Operations  degenerated  into  a  struggle 
of  wear  and  tear.  So  close  did  the  lines 
draw  to  each  other  that  antiquated 
methods  and  weapons  sprang  into  new 
life:  hand  grenades,  knives,  and  even 
clubs  for  close  work.  Trench  mortars 
came  into  existence.  Asphyxiating 
gases,  in  violation  of  The  Hague  Con- 
vention, were  used.  Artillery  took  a  po- 
sition of  first  importance,  as  was  but 
natural,  seeing  that  a  state  of  siege 
warfare  had  developed.  The  reason  of 
this  state  of  affairs  is  to  be  found,  in 
part  at  least,  in  the  air  service,  making 
surprise  well-nigh  impossible,  and  allow- 
ing time  for  the  threatened  side  to  make 


ample  preparations  to  resist  any  im- 
pending movement.  It  also  greatly  in- 
creased the  efficiency  of  artillery  by  en- 
abling batteries  to  correct  their  fire, 
and  by  discovering  and  assigning  tar- 
gets invisible  from  the  batteries  them- 
selves. In  this  tremendous  struggle 
some  few  encounters  deserve  passing  no- 
tice before  going  on  to  the  serious  at- 
tempts made  by  the  Allies  to  break 
through  the  German  lines.  Thus  the 
French  took  Vermelles  on  December  7 ; 
later  in  the  month  there  was  some  ex- 
tremely heavy  fighting  in  and  near 
Givenchy,  followed  a  few  days  after- 
ward by  the  capture  of  St.  Georges  by 
the  Allies  (French  and  Belgians).  Jan. 
3-4,  1915,  was  marked  by  a  French  vic- 
tory at  Steinbach  in  Alsace.  Soissons, 
too,  became  the  scene  of  great  activity. 
North  of  this  city  the  French  on  Janu- 
ary 8  captured  Hill  132,  and  pushed 
their  way  eastward.  The  German  coun- 
ter attack,  made  in  force,  drove  the 
French  in  from  the  east,  and  finally  re- 
captured Hill  132.  The  French  were 
compelled  to  cross  the  river.  Under 
any  other  circumstances  this  action 
would  have  constituted  a  considerable 
affair;  in  reality  it  was  only  an  inci- 
dent. 

The  next  action  standing  above  the 
general  level  was  that  in  the  region  of 
La  Bassee.  On  January  25  a  German 
demonstration  was  made  along  the 
whole  front,  from  Festubert  to  Vermel- 
les and  as  far  north  as  Ypres.  Bethune 
was  shelled.  This  contest  lasted  sev- 
eral days  and  ended  in  the  repulse  of 
the  Germans.  The  French  won  some 
success  in  Champagne  during  this 
period,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Perthes 
(February  16),  and  on  the  whole  had 
rather  the  better  of  it  until  the  month 
of  March. 

Battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle. — The 
event   of   this    period    is,   however,   the 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


59 


Battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  an  operation 
carried  out  by  the  British.  The  imme- 
diate purpose  of  the  Allies  was  to  carry 
this  village,  as  the  first  step  in  an  ef- 
fort to  pass  on  and  capture  the  ridge 
Aubers-Illies,  held  by  the  Germans,  and 
curving  westward  between  these  two 
points.  If  this  ridge  could  be  taken,  it 
was  not  impossible  that  the  attack 
might  even  result  in  the  capture  of 
Lille,  an  event  that  would  have  been  of 
the  first  importance  to  the  Allies,  as 
menacing  the  German  position  north- 
ward to  the  sea.  Neuve  Chapelle  itself 
sits  in  the  easterly  angle  of  a  lozenge 
formed  by  the  roads  breaking  off*  from 
the  main  road  La  Bassee-Estaires. 
The  village  itself,  with  the  eastern  side 
of  the  lozenge,  was  held  by  the  Ger- 
mans ;  the  western  side  by  the  British. 
Strongly  reenforced,  the  British  at  7.30 
a.m.  on  the  10th  of  March  opened  a 
bombardment  said  to  surpass  in  inten- 
sity anything  ever  heard  before.  It  was 
effective  everywhere  except  at  the  ex- 
treme north  point  of  the  front  of  at- 
tack, where  it  failed  to  break  down  the 
wire  entanglement.  After  35  minutes 
the  fire  was  shifted  to  Neuve  Chapelle, 
and  the  British  infantry  advanced.  In 
the  village  and  south  of  it  the  attack 
succeeded,  but  to  the  northeast  was  held 
up  by  wire  entanglement  just  men- 
tioned. It  held  off  the  advance  until 
the  artillery  succeeded  in  breaking  it 
up.  By  11  a.m.  the  whole  village  and 
wood  leading  from  it  northeast  and 
southwest  had  been  taken.  So  well  di- 
rected was  the  artillery  fire  that  the  at- 
tempt of  the  Germans  to  bring  up 
troops  was  completely  stopped.  The 
British,  however,  made  no  further  prog- 
ress. 

The  German  fire  had  cut  all  or  nearly 
all  the  telephone  wires  and  communica- 
tion with  the  rear  became  almost  impos- 
sible.    Furthermore  the  orchard  north 


of  the  village  had  remained  in  German 
hands  and  so  threatened  the  flank  of 
the  advance  towards  the  Aubers-Illies 
ridge.  There  thus  arose  a  delay  of 
four  and  a  half  hours,  which  the  Ger- 
mans took  full  advantage  of  to  repair 
their  lines,  organize  fresh  defenses  in 
rear,  and  bring  up  reinforcements. 
When  the  British  advanced  again,  they 
were  stopped  both  north  and  south  by 
machine-gun  fire. 

The  next  day  found  the  British  east 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  but  the  remainder  of 
their  plan  had  miscarried.  On  the  12th 
the  arrival  of  German  reinforcements 
put  the  British  on  the  defensive.  That 
night  the  British  set  to  work  to  con- 
solidate the  positions  won,  some  1200 
yards  on  a  front  of  4000.  The  13th 
was  taken  up  in  beating  off  a  few  Ger- 
man counter  attacks.  On  the  14th  the 
battle  died  down  on  both  sides.  The 
British  casualties  were  extremely  se- 
vere, over  12,000  killed  and  wounded; 
so  also  were  the  German.  The  net  re- 
sult of  the  battle  was  undeniably  a  Brit- 
ish defeat,  in  that  they  had  failed  to 
carry  through  their  plans.  But  it  is 
also  undeniable  that  they  had  managed 
to  break  the  enemy  lines ;  whether  the 
price  paid  was  worth  it,  is  doubtful. 

After  Ypres  and  Neuve  Chapelle. — 
In  the  next  month,  April,  1915,  the  Ger- 
mans made  another  great  effort  on  a 
large  scale  to  break  through  the  Allied 
lines  on  the  north  and  so  gain  the  chan- 
nel ports.  In  anticipation  of  their  ad- 
vance the  British  took  the  offensive 
themselves  on  April  17,  with  the  result 
that,  as  before  in  the  same  region,  the 
German  plan  was  frustrated.  The  Al- 
lies were  posted  along  an  arc  running 
from  Steenstraate  on  the  Yperlee  Ca- 
nal east,  southeast,  southwest,  through 
Langemarck,  through  Broodsende- 
Becelaere,  from  which  last  point  the 
line   curved   round   to   Hill  50   and   to 


60 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


the  Ypres-Comines  Canal.  The  chord 
of  this  arc  was  formed  by  the  Yperlee 
Canal  to  a  point  about  a  mile  southeast 
of  Hill  60.  From  this  position  the  Al- 
lies were  driven  back  to  a  line  close  to 
Ypres,  with  especially  heavy  righting  in 
and  near  St.  Julien,  where  the  Canadian 
contingent  distinguished  itself.  The 
Germans  even  got  across  the  canal  at 
Steenstraate,  and  for  a  time  the  posi- 
tion of  the  Allies  was  precarious.  In 
this  particular  battle  of  Ypres  the 
Germans  made  use  of  deadly  gases.  By 
means  of  these  the  French  troops  de- 
fending the  northern  part  of  the  arc 
were  driven  out ;  these  gases  were  later 
again  and  again  discharged  against  the 
British.  Until  respirators  were  fur- 
nished later,  there  was  no  living  in  the 
fumes  let  loose  on  the  trenches  under  at- 
tack. Day  after  day  the  contest  went 
on,  the  Germans  attacking  and  the  Al- 
lies resisting,  with  the  utmost  despera- 
tion. On  the  30th  a  vigorous  attack 
by  the  French  pushed  back  the  enemy 
on  the  north  of  the  line.  On  May  8 
a  concentrated  effort — one  of  many — 
was  made  to  reach  Ypres.  Allied  (Brit- 
ish) attempts  to  push  back  the  enemy 
coming  up  on  both  sides  of  the  Ypres- 
Roulers  road  were  unsuccessful.  On 
the  9th,  fresh  but  unsuccessful  at- 
tempts were  made  on  Ypres.  On  this 
day  the  French  were  successful  at  La 
Bassee  (Carency),  the  English  unsuc- 
cessful south  of  the  Lys.  On  the  11th, 
Ypres  was  severely  shelled.  On  the 
13th,  the  British  met  with  some  suc- 
cess on  the  Ypres-Roulers  railway,  as 
well  as  towards  the  north.  The  French 
on  May  15  recaptured  Steenstraate  and 
got  up  to  the  canal;  by  the  17th  they 
were  masters  of  the  left  bank. 

In  its  entirety  this  battle  of  a  month's 
duration  must  be  regarded  as  a  defeat 
for  the  Germans.  Setting  out  to  take 
Ypres  and  break  through,  they  had,  in 


spite  of  many  local  successes,  largely 
at  least  at  the  outset  due  to  their  use 
of  poisonous  gases,  failed  to  carry  out 
their  plan.  They  had  lost  many  thou- 
sands in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners. 
During  the  later  part  of  the  struggle 
around  Ypres  the  British  made  a  second 
attempt  to  carry  the  Aubers  ridge  with 
the  capture  of  Lille  as  the  principal  ob- 
jective. The  battle  opened  May  9  and 
lasted  until  May  20.     The  net  result 


ARTOIS  BATTLEGROUND 

was  that  the  Allied  lines  were  ad- 
vanced some  600  yards  over  a  front  of 
four  miles.  This  battle  comprised  two 
actions  known  as  Aubers  Ridge  and 
Festubert. 

Battle  of  Artois. — Before  the  contest 
before  Ypres,  just  described,  had 
closed,  the  French  began  the  tremen- 
dous Battle  of  Artois,  on  the  plateau 
of  Notre  Dame  de  Lorette  and  south  of 
it,  or  the  line  La  Bassee-Arras. 

If  this  operation  could  be  carried 
through    German    communications    be- 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


61 


hind  it  would  be  threatened  and  there 
might  be  a  chance  of  taking  Lille.  The 
German  positions  on  this  front  were 
of  the  strongest. 

They  held  the  high  ground  around 
Loos,  the  ridges  north  of  the  Souchez 
stream,  and  most  of  the  plateau  run- 
ning south  of  Lens  to  the  banks  of  the 
Scarpe.  Upon  this  position  had  been 
expended  every  effort  of  modern  mili- 
tary science  to  make  it  secure.  Be- 
tween Souchez  and  Arras  was  a  network 
of  trenches  known  as  the  Labyrinth 
(underground),  about  2  miles  square. 
The  ridge  of  Notre  Dame  breaks  off 
abruptly  to  the  south  in  spurs,  the 
eastern  one  of  which,  the  Souchez  spur, 
commands  Ablain  St.  Nazaire  and  a 
sugar  refinery  between  Ablain  and 
Souchez,  held  by  the  Germans.  From 
one  of  these  spurs  trenches  had  been 
constructed  across  to  the  Arras-Be- 
thune  road.  South  of  Ablain  are  the 
heights  of  Carency,  connected  by 
trenches  with  Ablain  and  Souchez,  and 
by  another  series,  the  "White  Works" 
(white  chalk),  with  La  Targette  on 
the  Souchez-Arras  road.  East  of  La 
Targette  is  Neuville  St.  Vaast,  like  the 
Labyrinth,  an  underground  fortress.  In 
other  words,  not  only  was  the  surface 
of  the  ground  admirably  fortified  by 
elaborate  trenches  and  redoubts,  sup- 
plied with  ammunition,  etc.,  but  sub- 
terranean areas  had  been  excavated  to 
house  troops  and  supplies,  where,  safe 
from  aerial  observation  and  overhead 
fire,  they  could  be  kept  until  needed,  to 
rejiel  the  enemy  already  exhausted  and 
reduced  by  his  advance. 

General  d'Urbal  was  in  immediate 
command,  assisted  by  Foch  and  Joffre, 
but  to  General  Petain,  later  to  distin- 
guish himself  at  Verdun,  belongs  the 
credit  of  the  reduction  of  the  Labyrinth. 
Seven  corps  were  engaged,  and  over 
1100  guns  of  all  calibres  had  been  con- 


centrated for  the  preparation.  For 
months  the  French  sappers  had  been 
occupied  in  mining  the  German  defenses. 
The  battle  opened  at  6  a.m.  on  Sunday, 
May  9,  by  the  fire  of  the  1100  French 
guns.  Three-quarters  of  an  hour  later 
the  Carency  mines  were  blown  up,  as 
were  others  on  the  Notre  Dame  ridge. 
The  bombardment  lasted  three  hours 
and  at  10  the  infantry  moved  out.  All 
day  the  battle  raged.  Three  of  the 
five  trenches  on  Notre  Dame  plateau 
were  carried  ;  when  night  fell  the  French 
dug  themselves  in.  South  of  Notre 
Dame,  at  the  same  time,  the  French  at- 
tacked Carency,  took  the  trenches,  but 
failed  to  take  a  work  on  the  east.  They 
nevertheless  pushed  on  to  Souchez.  La 
Targette  was  taken,  as  was  part  of  the 
White  Works.  Passing  on,  a  part  of 
Neuville  St.  Vaast  was  then  captured. 
On  the  10th  the  fighting  continued.  On 
the  11th  the  attack  on  Neuville  St. 
Vaast  reduced  the  cemetery,  but  the 
Labyrinth  still  held  out.  The  next  day 
Notre  Dame  de  Lorette  fell,  as  did 
Carency.  From  Carency  the  French 
pushed  on  to  Ablain  St.  Nazaire.  But 
the  Germans  still  held  on  to  a  spur  of 
the  Notre  Dame  ridge,  the  spur  of  the 
"White  Way."  On  the  21st,  however, 
the  spur  was  carried,  as  was  most  of 
Ablain.  A  few  Germans,  however,  still 
held  the  cemetery,  only  to  be  dislodged 
on  the  28th.  Three  days  later  the 
French  took  the  Souchez  refinery  and  in 
June  captured  the  Labyrinth.  Indeed, 
fighting  went  on  in  this  region  until  the 
autumn.  Each  side  is  estimated  to  have 
lost  60,000  men  in  this  tremendous  bat- 
tle. Having  regard  to  the  ultimate 
purpose  of  the  French  in  taking  the  of- 
fensive, it  must  be  admitted  that  they 
failed :  they  had  not  broken  through  the 
German  lines.  Lille  was  still  in  posses- 
sion of  the  enemy  whose  communications 
were    still    open.     In    all    probability, 


62 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


however,  the  Germans  had  been  kept  so 
busy  as  to  have  no  troops  to  spare  for 
the  attempt  on  Ypres  previously  de- 
scribed. And  it  was  further  proved 
that  with  sufficient  preparation  by  ar- 
tillery and  mining  German  positions 
could  be  carried  to  a  considerable 
depth. 

Simultaneously  with  the  Battle  of 
Artois,  there  was  considerable  activity 
further  east  in  the  Argonne  region  and 
on  the  St.  Mihiel  salient,  on  the  western 
front  of  which  the  French  succeeded  in 
capturing  Les  Eparges.  They  also  met 
with  some  success  on  the  southern  face, 
on  the  edge  of  the  Forest  of  Apremont. 
Southeast  of  Luneville  in  the  Vosges  the 
Germans  took  the  Ban  de  Sapt  on  June 
22.  In  July  it  was  recaptured  by  the 
French,  who  also  made  some  small  ad- 
vances in  Alsace. 

Battle  of  Champagne. — The  French 
check  in  the  Artois  country  was  fol- 
lowed by  fighting  chiefly  in  the  Vosges, 
mostly  of  a  local  character.  This  con- 
tinued until  September,  when  the 
French  opened  an  offensive  for  which 
they  had  long  been  making  prepara- 
tions. Apart  from  the  advantage  that 
would  accrue  if  this  offensive  should 
succeed,  there  -were  reasons  of  a  politi- 
cal order  that  called  for  something  more 
from  the  Allies  than  mere  nibbling  at 
the  German  lines.  The  German  cam- 
paign in  the  east  was  meeting  with  suc- 
cess. To  counterbalance  this  success, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  relieve  the  pres- 
sure on  the  Russians,  it  was  regarded  as 
necessary  to  deal  the  common  enemy  a 
mighty  blow  in  the  west.  To  keep  him 
ignorant  of  the  precise  point  at  which 
the  blow  was  to  fall,  for  weeks  previous 
substantially  the  entire  German  posi- 
tion was  subjected  to  intense  bombard- 
ment. Beginning  in  the  middle  of  Au- 
gust, this  bombardment  was  especially 
heavy    on    the    Belgian    front    in    the 


Souchez  region,  before  Arras  and  Roye, 
along  the  Aisne,  in  Champagne,  and  fin- 
ally in  the  Argonne  and  Woevre  dis- 
tricts, and  in  Lorraine.  As  the  time 
drew  near  for  the  infantry  work,  the 
bombardment  increased  in  intensity  over 
the  front  selected  for  attack.  That 
front  was  in  Champagne,  between  Au- 
berive  on  the  west  and  Ville-sur-Tourbe 
on  the  east,  a  distance  of  some  15  or  16 
miles.  The  centre  of  the  French  line 
was  defended  by  the  6th,  5th,  and  4th 
armies.  The  front  held  by  the  4th 
(Langle  de  Cary)  was  the  one  selected 
from  which  to  deliver  the  offensive. 

Some  4  or  5  miles  behind  the  corre- 
sponding German  position  and  roughly 
parallel  to  it,  runs  the  Bazancourt- 
Challerange  railway.  If  the  French  of- 
fensive could  reach  this  railway  a  mis- 
chief would  be  done  to  the  enemy,  for 
this  road  communicated  with  Metz  on 
the  east.  But  the  natural  strength  of 
the  German  position  had  been  increased 
by  the  arts  of  the  engineer.  From  Au- 
berive  this  position  followed  the  crest  of 
the  low  ridge  north  of  the  Suippes  Riv- 
er, rising,  as  it  passed  though  Souain, 
then  by  Perthes,  with  Tahure  behind 
(north  of)  it,  and  terminated  at  Mas- 
siges.  To  say  that  this  whole  position 
was  intrenched  is  scarcely  to  do  justice 
to  the  effort  spent  on  its  defensive  or- 
ganization ;  not  only  were  there  the 
usual  trenches  (lines)  facing  the  enemy 
position,  but  cross  trenches  had  been 
dug  over  the  entire  area,  from  which 
flanking  fire  could  be  delivered  upon  the 
enemy  if  he  should  succeed  in  passing 
the  first  and  subsequent  lines.  There 
were  really  two  positions,  two  miles  or 
so  apart,  the  first  immediately  in  front 
of  the  French,  the  second  on  the  re- 
verse of  the  ridge.  The  area  between 
them  was  a  network  of  trenches  and  en- 
tanglements. 

On  September  22  the  bombardment 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


63 


increased  in  intensity  and  was  kept  up 
until  the  25th,  when  the  French  infan- 
try broke  out  of  its  own  trenches  and 
gained  practically  the  first  line  posi- 
tions of  the  enemy  by  12  o'clock  noon. 
At  some  points,  however,  the  Germans 
held,  and  the  work  therefore  became  in 
some  sort  a  series  of  isolated  and  de- 
tached actions.  On  the  left  the  attack 
was  exposed  to  the  German  artillery 
fire  from  the  plateau  of  Moronvillers, 
in  front  it  came  up  against  the  salients 
of  the  ridge.  The  first  line  was  carried, 
however,  and  the  right  of  this  attack 
held  all  day,  and  later  pushed  on  deep- 
er and  deeper  into  the  German  network. 
To  the  right  of  the  St.  Hilaire-St. 
Souplet  road,  much  the  same  thing 
happened,  the  French  left  being  stopped 
while  the  right  managed  to  advance  and 
took  all  four  lines  of  trenches.  Fur- 
ther east  the  enemy  trenches  were  pene- 
trated to  a  depth  of  about  500  yards, 
but  machine  guns  stopped  the  advance. 
North  of  Souain  the  French  met  with 
pronounced  success,  carrying  trench 
after  trench  almost  to  the  Navarin 
Farm.  Between  Souain  and  Perthes 
the  German  position  had  been  most  sol- 
idly organized,  but  in  its  eastern  por- 
tion the  defenses  were  comparatively 
weak.  Here  the  French  delivered  their 
main  attack  in  this  part  of  the  front, 
the  remainder  (the  left)  playing  a  sec- 
ondary part.  The  attack  carried  the 
French  advance  as  far  as  the  Souain- 
Tahure  road.  In  the  Mesnil  sector 
(east  of  Perthes)  the  greatest  difficul- 
ties were  encountered,  but  still  further 
east,  north  of  Beausejour,  the  French 
had  better  fortune,  pushing  north  as 
far  as  Maison  de  Champagne.  On  the 
extreme  right  (Massiges)  the  colonial 
troops  reached  the  top  of  the  plateau 
in  an  incredibly  short  time,  but  could 
not  advance,  because  of  the  effective 
machine-gun  fire  here  developed.     The 


first  day's  fighting  therefore  had  pushed 
back  the  enemy  lines  in  the  centre :  the 
flanks  had  not  been  driven  in,  but  the 
French  managed  to  secure  the  ground 
gained.  In  the  west,  on  the  27th,  the 
French  got  up  to  the  Epine  de  Vede- 
grange,  but  no  farther.  On  the  next 
day  the  fighting  died  down  in  this  sector 
of  the  battlefield.  In  the  Souain  sector 
the  French  on  the  28th  made  contact 
with  the  second  German  position  in 
these  parts.  Between  Souain  and  Ta- 
hure,  in  front  of  Perthes,  contact  with 
this  second  position  was  also  establish- 
ed, but  here  the  French  remained,  dig- 
ging themselves  in,  until  October  6. 

While  all  these  events  were  occurring 
in  the  centre  and  left,  the  most  desper- 
ate struggle  of  all  was  going  on  to  the 
north  of  Massiges.  From  the  plateau 
three  long  spurs  ran  down  like  fingers, 
whence  the  name  given  to  them  and  to 
the  plateau  from  which  they  spring,  La 
Main  de  Massiges.  These  were  strong- 
ly held  by  the  Germans.  The  French 
accordingly  attacked  across  the  back 
of  the  hand,  and  got  up  on  the  pla- 
teau. 

The  general  result  of  this  battle,  the 
local  and  separate  contests  of  which 
were  not  over  before  October  4,  was 
that  the  French  gained  the  Massiges 
plateau,  the  Tahure  ridge,  and  various 
points  in  the  German  second  position. 
The  elaborate  intrenchments  and  work 
of  the  first  positions  were  taken.  The 
total  number  of  prisoners  officially  giv- 
en was  over  23,000;  many  guns  and 
much  war  material  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  French.  But  as  in  all  the  other 
cases  of  real  battles,  as  distinguished 
from  the  daily  local  strife,  on  the  long 
front,  the  German  lines  were  not  brok- 
en ;  they  were  merely  pushed  back.  Al- 
though, therefore,  the  Germans  had  suf- 
fered a  defeat  in  that  they  had  been 
driven  out  of  their  positions,  yet  it  must 


64 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


be  admitted,  on  the  other  hand,  that 
the  French  had  been  disappointed  of 
their  purpose.  This  apart,  there  can 
be  no  question  as  to  the  thoroughness 
of  the  German  defeat.  The  French  staff 
estimated  the  German  loss  in  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing  at  1-10,000. 

Battle  of  Loos. — While  this  great 
battle  was  going  on  in  Champagne,  the 
Allies  were  renewing  their  offensive  in 
Artois,  the  British  in  the  Battle  of 
Loos,  the  French  in  that  of  Vimy.  As 
before  in  this  region,  the  objective  was 
to  push  into  the  plain  of  the  Scheldt. 
Reinforcements  both  of  men  and  of 
guns  had  given  the  British  the  necessary 
elements  to  undertake  the  offensive. 
Thanks  to  this  increased  strength,  they 
had  extended  their  trenches  southward 
to  Grenay,  opposite  to  Loos  and  Lens. 
It  is  apparent,  therefore,  that  in  the 
month  of  September  theAllies  undertook 
a  general  offensive,  for  in  addition  to 
their  two  mighty  efforts  in  Champagne 
and  Artois,  the  Germans  were  kept  busy 
in  other  regions  of  the  front,  by  dem- 
onstrations on  the  extreme  left,  in  which 
the  navy  took  a  part,  in  front  of  Ypres 
and  also  in  the  Vosges. 

In  spite  of  the  Battle  of  Artois,  the 
Germans  still  held  the  eastern  slopes 
of  Notre  Dame  de  Lorette ;  from  this 
point  their  lines  stretched  north  in 
front  of  (west  of)  the  Loos-Hulluch- 
Haisnes  ridge  to  the  canal  near  La  Bas- 
see ;  south,  they  curved  through  Angres 
and  Lievin  to  Souchez,  thench  eastward 
of  the  high  road  from  Bethune  to  Arras. 
Between  Haisnes  and  Hulluch  lay  the 
powerful  Hohenzollern  redoubt,  a  work 
more  or  less  like  the  Labyrinth.  Their 
general  position  thus  formed  a  sort  of 
salient  oriented  southwestward  on  the 
axis  Souchez-Lens.  The  plan  contem- 
plated that  the  British  should  drive  at 
the  northern  side  of  the  salient  (Loos- 
Hulluch-Haisnes),    the   French    at   the 


southern  (Vimy  Heights).  The  capture 
of  either  of  these  positions  would  force 
the  evacuation  of  Lens.  The  terrain 
over  which  the  British  were  to  advance 
was  covered  with  villages,  pits,  gal- 
leries, slag  heaps,  and  mine  works  gen- 
erally, all  connected  by  trenches.  More- 
over, the  industrial  pits  and  galleries 
had  been  taken  over  and  extended  by 
the  Germans  for  war  purposes.  The 
entire  area  had  been  defensively  organ- 
ized, and  equipped  with  machine  guns, 
artillery,  and  small  works  and  trenches 
generally.  In  front  of  the  French  po- 
sition, northeast  of  Neuville  St.  Vaast, 
lay  the  wooded  heights  of  Vimy  running 
northwest  to  Givenchy  with  hills  140 
and  119  as  conspicuous  elevations. 

Preparations  for  the  great  offensive 
were  completed  by  September  21. 
Specifically  the  British  were  to  capture 
Auchy,  Haisnes,  Pit  No.  8,  and  the 
LTohenzollern  Redoubt;  further  south 
the  ridge  between  Hulluch  was  to  be  the 
objective,  involving  the  capture  of 
Loos,  and  Hill  70  to  the  east  of  the 
town.  The  French,  as  stated,  were  to 
attack  the  Vimy  Heights.  Amply  pro- 
vided with  artillery,  the  British  besides 
were  to  employ,  for  the  first  time,  a  gas 
that  stupefied  but  did  not  kill.  The 
action  opened  with  artillery  prepara- 
tion on  the  21th.  During  this  day  the 
entire  German  position  within  range 
was  taken  under  fire  by  both  the  French 
and  the  British  artillery.  On  the  25th 
this  fire  was  renewed  very  early  in  the 
morning,  and  suspended  two  hours  later 
in  order  to  allow  the  infantry  to  ad- 
vance. This  they  did  at  6.30  a.m.  The 
French,  however,  continued  the  artil- 
lery preparation  until  noon.  On  the 
extreme  left,  between  the  canal  and  Pit 
No.  8,  the  British  met  with  a  serious 
repulse.  Part  of  the  Hohenzollern  Re- 
doubt was  carried,  so  was  Pit  No.  8. 
Haisnes  was  taken  as  early  as  8  a.m., 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


65 


but  had  to  be  abandoned  by  5  p.m. 
Loos,  after  a  terrible  struggle,  fell  to 
the  English,  as  did  Hill  No.  70.  A 
counter-attack  by  the  Germans  recov- 
ered most  of  Hill  70.  As  night  fell,  the 
British  line  ran  around  the  south  of 
Loos  to  the  western  part  of  Hill  70, 
past  the  west  of  Hulluch  quarries  to  Pit 
No.  8,  then  east  of  Hohenzollern  Re- 
doubt, and  so  back  to  the  original  posi- 
tion. The  fighting  was  renewed  the 
next  day  with  no  material  results  on 
either  side.  By  night  the  line  ran  back 
from  Hill  70  to  the  Loos-La  Bassee 
road,  then  north  along  this  road,  then 
northeast  of  Hulluch.  The  remainder 
of  the  line  was  unchanged.  On  the  27th 
the  Germans  recaptured  Pit.  No.  8  and 
forced  their  enemies  back  to  the  eastern 
part  of  Hohenzollern  Redoubt.  The 
next  few  days  were  filled  with  desperate 
fighting,  more  or  less  localized.  The 
net  result,  so  far  as  the  British  were 
concerned,  was  the  capture  of  Loos  and 
a  portion  of  Hill  70. 

The  French,  on  their  side,  advancing 
a  little  after  12  o'clock  noon,  had  made 
but  slight  progress.  They  took  the 
Souchez  cemetery,  but  lost  it  later,  and 
reached  the  lower  slopes  of  Hill  119. 
The  German  garrison  of  Souchez  re- 
tired to  Hill  119.  On  the  28th  Vimy 
Heights  were  attacked;  the  western 
slopes  and  a  large  part  of  the  wood  of 
Givenchy  were  taken. 

This  battle  must  be  regarded  as  a 
failure  on  the  part  of  the  Allies.  It 
would  seem  that  the  British  had  no  re- 
serves available  to  clinch  the  results  ob- 
tained in  their  advance.  The  Germans 
thus  had  time  to  rally  and  counterat- 
tack. It  would  seem  too  that  the 
French  perhaps  made  a  mistake  in  de- 
laying their  advance  on  the  25th  by 
six  hours.  Had  they  moved  out  at  the 
same  time,  the  French  left  and  the  Brit- 
ish right  might  have  joined  hands.    The 


Allies'  losses  were  very  heavy.  The 
British  alone  lost  50,000  men  in  this 
battle.  Disappointed,  however,  as  were 
the  Allies  in  respect  of  the  main  pur- 
pose they  had  in  view,  both  in  Cham- 
pagne and  in  Artois,  they  had,  never- 
theless, made  some  real  gains.  In  the 
latter  regions  they  were  gradually 
pushing  the  Germans  to  the  rim  of  the 
plain  of  the  Scheldt.  The  British  gain 
had,  as  it  were,  pushed  a  salient  in  be- 
tween La  Bassee  on  the  north  and  Lens 
on  the  south,  thus  creating  in  some 
sort  two  German  salients. 

After  the  battle  the  French  relieved 
the  British  from  the  French  left  up  to 
and  including  the  village  of  Loos  and  a 
part  of  Hill  70.  The  position  of  the 
Allies  in  this  new  salient  of  Loos  was 
none  too  secure.  But  apart  from  this, 
it  was  clearly  incumbent  on  the  Ger- 
mans to  try  to  recover  the  terrain  they 
had  just  lost.  They  accordingly,  on 
September  29,  attacked  the  northwest 
face  of  the  British  salient,  but  were 
beaten  off.  The  French  on  their  side 
advanced  to  Hill  140.  The  next  day 
the  German  attempts  on  the  northwest 
face  were  renewed.  October  1  the 
French  made  more  progress  on  Vimy 
Heights.  October  3  was  marked  by  a 
fresh  attack  on  the  northwestern  face, 
and  most  of  the  Hohenzollern  Redoubt 
was  recaptured.  On  the  8th  a  counter- 
attack was  made  on  the  British  posi- 
tion. It  was  repulsed  with  loss,  as  were 
the  attempts  made  on  the  French  near 
Neuville  St.  Vaast.  Later,  October  13, 
these  attempts  on  the  French  were  re- 
newed with  very  much  the  same  results. 
On  this  day  the  British  themselves  took 
the  offensive  in  an  effort  to  extend  the 
northern  face  of  their  salient.  This  ef- 
fort very  nearly  succeeded  in  gaining 
the  Hohenzollern  Redoubt  for  the  Eng- 
lish, a  part  of  which  only  was  held,  how- 
ever.    October  19  the  British  line  ran 


66 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


from  Auchez-Hohenzollern,  St.  Elie, 
and  then,  so  as  to  encircle  Loos  on  the 
east  and  south,  back  to  the  old  trenches. 

The  close  of  the  year  1915  saw  the 
adversaries  confronting  one  another  on 
this  as  on  other  portions  of  the  front. 
But  in  respect  of  the  northern  region  it 
must  be  remarked  that  unsuccessful  as 
the  Anglo-French  efforts  to  break 
through  had  proved,  yet  they  had  suc- 
ceeded in  pushing  back  the  Germans  to 
the  last  ridge  of  hills  separating  the 
area  of  conflict  from  the  plain  of  the 
Scheldt.  One  more  drive  like  the  Sep- 
tember one,  and  the  Germans  might  be 
pushed  into  the  plain  and  so  lose  this 
part  of  France.  Hence  they  reenforced 
their  hold  by  reinforcements  estimated 
at  600,000,  and  throughout  the  winter 
obtained  a  few  minor  successes. 

Verdun. — But  these,  as  well  as  all 
the  other  events,  gave  way  in  February, 
1916,  to  the  most  determined  attempt 
yet  made  by  any  of  the  combatants  on 
any  front  to  win  a  decision.  On  the 
21st  of  this  month  the  Germans  opened 
their  assault  on  Verdun.  But  this  place 
had  changed  its  character  since  the 
opening  days  of  the  war.  Warned  by 
the  fate  of  Liege,  Namur,  and  Mau- 
beuge,  it  had  passed  from  the  condi- 
tion of  fortress  pure  and  simple  to  that 
of  fortress  related  to  an  army  in  the 
field.  Hence  its  reduction  was  no  long- 
er a  matter  of  sufficient  pounding  by 
42-centimeter  guns.  General  Petain  * 
was  summoned  to  conduct  the  of- 
fense. 

*  Henri  Philippe  Petain,  born  in  1857;  de- 
livered notable  lectures  at  the  Eeole  de  Guerre, 
for  which  he  was  decorated  by  King  Ferdinand 
of  Bulgaria;  at  beginning  of  European  War 
was  colonel  of  the  Thirty-third  Regiment  of 
Infantry  at  Arras;  distinguished  himself  in 
the  retreat  from  Charleroi  to  the  Marne;  pro- 
moted general  of  division;  in  command  of  an 
army  corps  took  Carency,  breaking  through  the 
German  front;  in  1915  was  in  command  of  part 
of  the  "Iron  Division"  of  Colonials  in  Artois 
and  Champagne;  given  command  of  armies 
around    Verdun. 


The  first  German  drive  was  delivered 
against  the  point  of  the  Verdun  salient 
by  heavy  columns,  over  a  7-mile  front, 
from  Consenvoye  to  Azannes.  After  a 
prolonged  bombardment  of  heavy  artil- 
lery— it  is  estimated  that  during  the 
first  four  days  no  fewer  than  2,000,000 
shells  were  fired — these  columns  struck 
the  French  advanced  lines,  and  at  the 
end  of  a  week  had  advanced  4  miles 
towards  Verdun.  The  right,  advancing 
along  the  Meuse,  had  reached  Champ- 
neuville ;  the  centre,  after  taking  Beau- 
mont, faced  the  ridge  known  as  the  Cote 
de  Poivre;  while  the  left,  after  captur- 
ing Ornes,  threw  itself  against  Fort 
Douaumont,  the  most  northerly  of  the 
permanent  forts  of  Verdun.  After  sev- 
eral costly  repulses  this  fort  was  storm- 
ed and  held  by  the  21<th.  Brandenburg 
regiment. 

The  second  phase  of  the  attack  shifts 
to  the  east.  Pushed  back  to  a  line  run- 
ning west  from  Douaumont  along  the 
Cote  de  Poivre  to  the  Meuse,  the  French 
now  lost  Mauheulle  and  Fresnes.  From 
these  points  the  Germans  made  their 
way  across  the  Woevre  plain  to  the 
edge  of  the  plateau  on  which  the  per- 
manent forts  are  constructed,  and  ad- 
vanced to  Eix,  about  5  miles  from  Ver- 
dun. The  total  gains  so  far  amounted 
to  over  100  square  miles. 

Operations  in  this  sector  culminated 
in  assaults  on  the  fort  and  the  village 
of  Vaux,  2  miles  southeast  of  Fort 
Douaumont.  From  conflicting  reports 
it  would  seem  that  the  German  infan- 
try finally  won  the  village,  but  failed 
to  carry  the  fort  and  the  slopes  to  the 
east. 

The  Germans  now  turned  their  atten- 
tion to  the  territory  west  of  the  Meuse. 
Their  advance  east  of  the  river  had 
found  its  flank  exposed  to  artillery  fire 
from  the  west.  Moreover,  it  might  be 
possible    to    cut    the    western    railroad 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


67 


communication  of  Verdun.  Opening  in 
this  region  on  March  6  the  Germans, 
after  taking  Forges  and  Regneville, 
found  further  progress  barred  by  two 
fortified  heights — the  Cote  de  l'Oie  and 
Le  Mort  Homme,  both  over  800  feet 
high.  On  the  lower  hills  between  these 
points  is  the  wood  known  as  the  Bois 
des  Corbeaux,  strengthened  with  en- 
tanglements and  batteries.  Here,  final- 
ly, the  Germans  made  some  gains,  so 
that  their  advance,  some  2  miles  south 
of  Forges,  brought  their  line  into  ap- 
proximate alignment  with  their  posi- 
tions farther  east,  and  threatened  the 
French  line,  strongly  posted  on  Le 
Mort  Homme.  Moreover,  they  had 
some  success  as  far  west  as  Melan- 
court. 

In  the  fifth  week  of  the  campaign  the 
point  of  attack  was  shifted  still  far- 
ther west,  about  3  miles  beyond  Le  Mort 
Homme.  On  March  21  the  wood  north- 
east of  Avocourt,  and  on  the  22d  Hau- 
court  Hill,  were  captured.  This  left 
the  French  positions  at  Melancourt  and 
Bethincourt  exposed.  The  greater  part 
of  Le  Mort  Homme,  as  well  as  the  woods 
that  flanked  it,  was  now  held  by  the 
Germans. 

On  the  night  of  March  30  the  town 
of  Melancourt  was  attacked  from  three 
sides,  and  at  dawn  carried.  The  Be- 
thincourt position  was  thus  rendered 
still  more  precarious,  though  the 
French  had  succeeded  in  retaking  a 
small  section  of  Avocourt  Wood. 

In  the  meanwhile  Douaumont  ridge 
and  vicinity  were  first  shelled  and  then 
attacked  by  infantry.  A  sudden  attack 
gave  the  village  of  Vaux  to  the  Ger- 
mans. The  next  day  Caillette  Wood, 
between  Vaux  and  Douaumont,  was 
penetrated  by  a  strong  German  attack, 
but  the  French  first  lines,  about  300 
meters  south  of  Douaumont  village, 
held  against  a  German  assault,  in  which 


the  attack  was  made  in  successive  waves 
of  great  strength. 

The  struggle  over  Caillette  Wood, 
the  first  week  in  April,  although  severe, 
yields  in  interest  to  the  operations  now 
resumed  west  of  the  Meuse.  On  April 
5  the  Germans  took  Haucourt,  half  a 
mile  southeast  of  Melancourt.  The 
withdrawal  from  Bethincourt  was  now 
rendered  inevitable,  and  skillfully  made 
on  April  8,  with  small  losses ;  the  new 
French  line  was  established  a  mile  to 
the  south.  Still  keeping  the  offensive 
and  continuing  to  make  gains  in  this 
sector,  the  Germans  penetrated  the 
French  lines  on  hills  265  and  295  (near 
Le  Mort  Homme),  and  captured  a  mile 
and  a  quarter  of  French  trenches  on 
Termiten  Hill.  This  latter  gain  marks 
substantial  progress  towards  Hill  304, 
the  key  position  of  this  whole  region. 
An  interesting  and  novel  illustration  of 
the  future  powers  of  air  craft  in  actual 
battle  was  furnished  at  Cote  de  Poivre. 
As  the  Germans  were  bringing  up  a  bat- 
tery to  shell  this  ridge  an  air  squad- 
ron came  up  and  dropped  bombs  on  the 
battery  from  an  altitude  of  less  than 
1000  feet.  The  first  round  of  bombs 
killed  9  horses  and  30  men,  and 
wounded  and  frightened  so  many  oth- 
ers that  the  guns  had  to  be  abandoned. 

At  the  end  of  three  months'  continu- 
ous fighting,  the  Verdun  campaign  had 
not  reached  a  decisive  issue.  Whatever 
gains  were  made,  however,  were  made  by 
the  Germans.  Up  to  this  time  they  had 
occupied  about  150  square  miles  of  ter- 
ritory, and  approximately  30  villages. 
Their  lines  were  shortened  10  miles  (40 
to  30)  and  they  had  pushed  forward  an 
average  of  about  three  miles. 

On  May  4,  the  Germans  again  re- 
newed their  offensive  with  increased 
ferocity.  The  main  attack  was  again 
directed  against  Hill  304  which  domi- 
nated the  ridge  west  of  the  Meuse.  The 


68 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


German  artillery  preparation  had  been 
scarcely  if  ever  equaled  for  rapidity 
and  intensity  of  concentration.  In  one 
week  the  Teutons  made  seven  attacks. 
Ultimately  east  of  Hill  304,  all  the 
trenches  and  shelters  were  destroyed 
and  then  carried  chiefly  by  means  of 
poisonous  gases.  Despite  this  the  hill 
itself  could  not  be  taken.  They  at- 
tacked Le  Mort  Homme  from  all  sides 
and  finally  succeeded  in  establishing  a 
foothold  between  it  and  Hill  304.  They 
then  attacked  from  a  new  angle  and 
captured  Cumieres,  a  village  close  to  the 
Meuse.  A  strong  French  counter  at- 
tack only  succeeded  in  recapturing  a 
part  of  the  village.  The  Germans  made 
their  farthest  advance  up  to  this  time 
when,  on  May  30,  attacking  with  fresh 
soldiers  drawn  from  another  quarter, 
they  captured  Caurette  Wood  on  the 
east  of  Le  Mort  Homme.  They  now 
occupied  the  northern  slope  and  posi- 
tions well  around  on  each  side  and 
threatened  to  cut  the  French  off  from 
their  line  of  communications. 

In  the  meanwhile  the  action  on  the 
east  bank  of  the  Meuse  had  been  rapid. 
The  French  by  a  surprise  attack  cap- 
tured Fort  Douaumont  on  May  22,  but 
were  unable  to  maintain  their  position, 
inasmuch  as  the  Germans  recaptured  it 
in  ten  days  as  well  as  Caillette  Wood. 
Upwards  of  2000  prisoners  were  taken 
by  the  German  forces.  On  the  east  of 
Fort  Vaux  the  Teutonic  forces  also 
made  advances.  It  was  surrounded  on 
three  sides  and  its  fall  was  only  a  mat- 
ter of  a  few  days.  A  small  garrison  of 
1000  men  was  left  in  the  fort  to  defend 
it.  By  most  courageous  righting  this 
handful  of  men  held  the  Germans  at 
bay  for  five  days.  They  were  finally 
compelled  to  surrender  on  June  7. 

In  the  latter  part  of  June  the  Ger- 
mans captured  the  village  of  Fleury 
which   is   only   S1/^    miles  northeast   of 


Verdun.  The  French  counterattacked 
and  won  back  a  foothold  in  the  village 
which  they  stubbornly  maintained  and 
thus  offset  to  some  extent  the  import- 
ance of  the  German  victory.  West  of 
the  Meuse,  the  efforts  of  the  Germans 
seemed  to  be  in  vain  at  Avocourt, 
Cumieres,  and  Hill  304,  although  they 
held  almost  all  of  Le  Mort  Homme. 
However  they  captured  Thiaumont  by 
assault  on  July  3,  and  held  it  until  early 
August  when  they  were  driven  out  by 
the  French.  Then  followed  the  spec- 
tacle of  almost  daily  changes  in  pos- 
session of  the  work.  It  remained  ul- 
timately in  the  hands  of  the  Germans. 

The  struggle  for  Verdun  now  became 
a  deadlock,  neither  side  being  able  to 
advance.  The  Germans  were  forced  to 
withdraw  some  of  their  men  from  the 
Verdun  front  in  order  to  reinforce  their 
position  on  the  Somme.  This  deadlock 
continued  until  the  latter  part  of  Oc- 
tober, when  the  French  regained  in 
three  hours  what  it  had  taken  the  Ger- 
mans months  of  effort  to  attain.  It 
was  the  most  brilliant  action  of  the 
whole  Verdun  campaign.  General  Ni- 
velle  planned  his  attack  so  that  it  would 
occur  when  the  German  lines  were  the 
weakest  and  thus  have  a  greater  chance 
of  success.  His  artillery  preparations 
were  brief  but  of  exceedingly  great  in- 
tensity. Then  came  the  infantry  attack 
on  October  24.  It  advanced  in  four 
columns.  The  first  was  between  Pepper 
Hill  and  Thiaumont  Farm.  This  divi- 
sion advanced  about  a  mile  and  carried 
Thiaumont  Farm  and  Thiaumont  Work 
and  the  Haudromont  Quarries. 

The  second  division  was  to  take  Hill 
320  and  the  Caillette  Wood.  It  carried 
both  these  positions  by  an  irresistible 
rush.  Although  this  was  all  they  were 
supposed  to  accomplish  the  commander 
decided  to  continue  his  push  forward. 
Consequently    they    proceeded    beyond 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


69 


the  wood  and  surrounded  the  Douau- 
mont  Fort.  The  village  of  Douaumont 
on  the  west  was  captured  and  then  a 
rush  was  made  for  the  fort  itself.  The 
Prussian  defenders  refused  to  surrender 
and  nearly  every  one  of  them  was  killed 
before  the  French  completely  occupied 
the  work. 

The  third  division  advanced  about 
half  a  mile,  capturing  the  remainder  of 
Vaux-Chapitre  Wood  and  all  of  Fumin 
Wood.  The  fourth  division  pushed  the 
Germans  from  Chcnois  and  Laufee 
woods,  captured  Damloup  battery  and 
encircled  Vaux  Fort  on  the  east,  south 
and  west.  After  the  failure  of  German 
counter  attacks,  the  French  began  to 
finish  the  encircling  of  the  fort  on  the 
next  day.  It  fell  on  the  night  of  No- 
vember 1-2. 

During  the  next  six  weeks  there  were 
scarcely  any  infantry  engagements  and 
the  artillery  actions  which  occurred 
were  only  of  minor  importance.  On  the 
15th  of  December,  however,  General 
Nivelle  executed  another  great  coup. 
He  attacked  on  a  front  of  6  miles  after 
a  three-day  artillery  preparation.  He 
succeeded  in  penetrating  the  German 
front  for  a  distance  of  nearly  2  miles, 
and  according  to  a  Paris  report  cap- 
tured over  11,000  prisoners.  Vacherau- 
ville,  Louvemont,  Chambrette  Farm, 
Hardaumont  and  Bezouvaux  were  tak- 
en. On  the  16th  and  17th  new  gains 
consolidated  the  French  positions. 

After  this  advance  the  Verdun  front 
once  again  became  quiet,  each  adver- 
sary watching  the  other  and  being  con- 
tent to  remain  on  the  defensive.  After 
10  months  of  heavy  fighting  the  Ver- 
dun struggle  was  virtually  over.  In  the 
last  analysis  it  was  a  great  French  vic- 
tory. The  moral  effects  on  the  French 
troops  and  French  nation  can  scarcely 
be  estimated.  As  a  reward  for  his  hero- 
ic work  at  Verdun,  General  Nivelle  was 


made  commander-in-chief  of  all  the 
French  armies,  succeeding  General 
Joffre. 

The  purpose  of  the  Germans  in  se- 
lecting Verdun  as  a  point  of  attack 
gave  rise  to  much  discussion.  The  date 
of  the  attack  was  well  chosen,  in  an- 
ticipation of  a  general  Allied  offensive 
on  the  western  front,  but  Verdun  itself 
had  long  ago  ceased  to  be  a  fortress  in 
the  technical  sense  of  the  word.  Hence 
the  German  effort  falls  into  the  same 
class  as  all  others,  whether  German  or 
Allied,  to  obtain  a  decision  in  the  west. 
The  effort  made  at  Verdun  might  have 
produced  better  results  if  made  nearer 
to  Paris.  Even  if  successful  it  would 
result,  moral  effect  apart,  in  merely 
straightening  the  German  lines  (  accom- 
panied of  course  by  a  similar  straight- 
ening on  the  French  side),  unless,  in- 
deed, it  was  believed  that  a  real  breach 
could  be  made,  opening  the  way  for  a 
real  advance  into  the  heart  of  France. 
It  is  declared  in  some  quarters  that  the 
determining  condition  of  the  selection 
was  for  political  and  dynastic  reasons 
the  need  of  a  victory  for  the  Crown 
Prince ;  and  it  is  further  declared  that 
Von  Hindenburg  and  Von  Mackensen 
both  opposed  Verdun  as  the  theatre  of 
the  new  offensive.  One  thing  stands 
out :  the  enormous  losses  of  the  Germans 
for  the  sake,  so  far,  of  a  few  square 
miles  of  French  territory. 

Campaign  in  Picardy. — The  expect- 
ed Allied  offensive  on  the  western  front 
began  in  the  last  week  of  June  by  a 
continuous  shelling  of  the  German  lines 
on  the  British  front.  The  point  chosen 
for  the  attack  was  at  last  seen  to  be 
the  junction  of  the  British  and  French 
lines  near  the  Somme  River. 

The  preparation  for  the  advance 
was  unique.  The  new  mortars  of  the 
Allies  were  first  concentrated  on  the 
first  line  trenches  of  the  Germans.  They 


70 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


were  kept  in  that  position  for  10  min- 
utes and  then  concentrated  on  the  sec- 
ond line  of  trenches.  While  firing  on 
these  the  Allied  troops  rushed  out  and 
easily  took  the  first  line.  In  many  cases 
the  trenches  were  completely  destroyed, 
and  the  attackers  in  some  instances 
swept  on  to  the  second  and  third  lines. 
Another  unique  thing  about  the  battle 
on  this  front  was  the  institution  of  the 
trench-raiding  system,  after  prolonged 
shelling.  At  night  a  raiding  party 
would  rush  into  an  enemy  trench  and 
would  abandon  it  as  soon  as  the  occu- 
pants were  bombed  or  captured.  This 
was  also  important  as  a  method  of  find- 
ing out  the  effectiveness  of  the  artillery 
firing. 

The  objective  of  this  campaign  was 
the  capture  of  Bapaume  and  Peronne. 
The  British  were  to  take  the  former  and 
the  French  the  latter.  By  the  end  of 
the  first  week  the  French  had  advanced 
about  4  miles  and  had  captured  Curulu, 
Estrees  and  Heure.  They  took  about 
800  prisoners.  During  the  same  week 
the  British  advanced  about  2  miles  and 
captured  La  Boisselle,  Thiepval,  and 
Contalmaison.  They  took  about  6000 
prisoners.  It  was  apparently  the  plan 
of  campaign  for  the  French  and  Brit- 
ish armies  to  advance  pari  passu,  in- 
asmuch as  in  the  second  week  the 
French  just  held  the  positions  won  and 
waited  for  the  British  to  come  abreast 
of  them.  The  British  captured  Trones 
Wood  for  the  second  time  on  July  11, 
and  again  took  Mametz  Wood  on  the 
next  day.  On  the  15th  they  captured 
the  village  of  Pozieres  and  2000  prison- 
ers. In  the  meantime  the  French  had 
advanced  eastward  and  captured 
Biaches,  only  2  miles  from  Peronne. 
They  had  also  taken  Hill  97,  the  high- 
est land  in  the  neighborhood  and  a  posi- 
tion which  controlled  the  Somme  valley 
for  some  distance.     The  latter  part  of 


July  saw  the  French  positions  consoli- 
dated and  the  British  firmly  entrenched 
in  Pozieres. 

In  the  first  week  of  August  the  Brit- 
ish and  Australian  troops  advanced 
from  their  trenches  north  of  Pozieres 
and  captured  the  top  of  a  crest  which 
overlooks  Courcellette  and  Martin- 
puich.  This  gave  them  a  direct  out- 
look on  their  immediate  objective  Ba- 
paume, which  was  6  miles  distant  over 
a  stretch  of  rolling  country.  On  Au- 
gust 8  a  combined  French  and  British 
offensive  made  important  gains  towards 
Guillemont,  west  of  Combles.  The  re- 
sult was  a  gain  of  from  300  to  500 
yards  on  a  front  of  about  4  miles.  Ger- 
man counter  attacks  with  the  aid  of 
liquid  fire  succeeded  in  taking  50  yards 
of  trenches  from  the  Australians  north- 
west of  Pozieres. 

The  next  Allied  advance  occurred 
north  of  the  Somme.  The  French  moved 
forward  from  a  point  opposite  Harde- 
court  (where  they  joined  the  British) 
to  the  Somme.  The  advance  stopped. 
The  pushing  in  of  this  wedge  placed 
Clery  and  Guillemont  in  a  pocket. 
Northwest  of  Pozieres  the  British,  on 
the  14th,  advanced  about  350  yards  on 
a  front  of  approximately  a  mile,  while 
the  French  further  strengthened  their 
position  on  Hill  109.  On  the  16th  the 
French  made  substantial  gains  north  of 
Maurepas  and  also  south  of  that  town, 
between  it  and  Santerre.  The  efforts 
of  the  French  in  driving  eastward 
toward  Guillemont,  Clery  and  Maure- 
pas seemed  to  indicate  that  they  were 
going  to  try  to  approach  Peronne  from 
the  north  rather  than  to  expose  them- 
selves to  a  frontal  attack. 

On  the  24th  Maurepas  fell  and  the 
French  pushed  several  hundred  yards 
beyond  on  a  l1/^  mile  front.  This  left 
Clery  almost  completely  surrounded  and 
left  the  French  in  front  of  Combles,  an 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


71 


important  railroad  centre.  The  Brit- 
ish advanced  300  yards  south  of  Thiep- 
val  and  put  this  town  in  a  similar  posi- 
tion to  that  of  Clery.  The  month  end- 
ed with  the  British  seizing  ground  be- 
tween Guillemont  and  Ginchy.  Strong 
German  counter  attacks  had  been  re- 
pulsed all  along  the  line. 

During  the  month  of  September  Com- 
bles  and  Thiepval  were  captured  by  the 
French  and  British  respectively.  The 
French  salient  between  Ginchy  and 
Clery  was  deepened  by  the  capture  of 
several  small  villages.  The  result  was 
that  the  new  French  lines  were  estab- 
lished on  the  outskirts  of  Combles. 
Then  south  of  the  Somme  a  great  effort 
on  the  part  of  the  French  succeeded  in 
capturing  Berny,  Soyecourt,  almost  all 
of  Vermandovillers,  Chilly  and  about  2 
miles  of  the  railroad  running  from  Roye 
to  Chaulnes.  During  the  second  week 
the  British  thrust  out  west  of  Combles 
and  succeeded  in  taking  the  entire  vil- 
lage of  Ginchy.  The  British  lines  were 
now  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of 
Combles.  Taking  advantage  of  this 
thrust,  the  French  prepared  to  com- 
plete the  pocket  around  Combles.  After 
a  heavy  artillery  preparation,  the  infan- 
try advanced  on  the  12th.  They  ad- 
vanced a  distance  of  about  2  miles  and 
gained  the  Peronne-Bapaume  road  just 
south  of  Rancourt.  The  next  day  they 
captured  Bouchavesnes  and  Hill  76.  On 
the  16th  and  17th  the  Allied  armies 
stormed  German  positions  over  4  miles 
in  length.  In  this  advance  the  British 
captured  the  famous  "Danube  Trench." 
They  also  captured  the  almost  impreg- 
nable Mouquet  Farm  which  had  been 
the  scene  of  several  hard  struggles. 

On  the  20th  the  Germans  made 
strong  counter  attacks  in  order  to  re- 
gain the  ground  lost  to  the  French 
north  of  the  Somme.  They  attacked  on 
a  three-mile  front  for  a  period  of  al- 


most    10     hours    but     were     repulsed. 

On  the  25th,  another  great  forward 
movement  of  the  Allies  began  and  re- 
sulted in  victories  on  a  front  almost  15 
miles  long.  The  British  captured  the 
villages  of  Morval  and  Lesboeufs,  north 
of  Combles.  The  French  took  Rancourt 
and  went  right  up  to  the  village  of 
Fregicourt.  These  two  movements  com- 
pletely cut  off  all  means  of  escape  from 
Combles.  On  the  26th  it  was  taken. 
The  British  swept  in  from  the  north 
and  the  French  from  the  south.  A  large 
quantity  of  war  supplies  fell  to  the  vic- 
tors. The  British  also  took  Thiepval, 
which  was  of  even  greater  importance 
than  the  taking  of  Combles,  because  it 
had  checked  them  ever  since  the  cam- 
paign began.  Not  content  with  these 
gains,  the  Allies  pushed  on.  The  Brit- 
ish captured  a  very  strong  redoubt 
northeast  of  Thiepval  and  were  now  less 
than  3  miles  from  Bapaume.  The 
French  advanced  east  of  Rancourt  and 
also  entered  the  St.  Pierre  Vaast  Wood 
east  of  Fregicourt. 

The  first  week  in  October  saw  a  com- 
parative lull  in  the  battle  on  the  Somme. 
The  British  and  the  French  made  some 
small  advances  but  seemed  to  be  resting 
up  for  a  renewed  effort.  This  began 
on  October  7.  The  Allies  by  a  con- 
certed movement  pushed  forward  over 
half  a  mile  on  an  eight-mile  front.  The 
British  captured  Le  Sars.  The  French, 
breaking  through  the  German  Morval- 
Bouchavesnes  trenches,  pushed  their 
line  to  the  top  of  Sailly-Saillisel  ridge 
and  were  right  at  the  entrance  to  the 
village  of  Sailly.  South  of  the  Somme 
the  French  occupied  the  village  of  Bo- 
vent  on  the  10th,  and  also  took  a  large 
part  of  Chaulnes  Wood.  In  the  next 
two  weeks  the  Allies  extended  their 
lines  up  to  the  village  of  Le  Transloy 
and  the  French  gained  a  foothold  in  the 
village  of  Sailly-Saillisel. 


72 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


On  October  30  the  Germans  began 
strong  counter  attacks.  They  succeed- 
ed in  driving  the  Allies  out  of  part  of 
La  Maisonette  and  took  several  hun- 
dred prisoners  as  well  as  several  lines 
of  trenches.  The  positions  gained  were 
the  most  threatening  to  Peronne  held 
by  the  French.  The  heavy  fighting 
was  done  by  German  troops  which  had 
been  withdrawn  from  the  Verdun  front. 

In  November  it  appeared  that  the  Al- 
lied offensive  had  spent  itself  without 
accomplishing  its  objective.  The  heavi- 
est fighting  was  in  the  Ancre  Brook 
region,  at  the  northern  end  of  the 
Somme  battle  front.  Before  this  op- 
eration took  place  the  French  had  suc- 
ceeded in  tightening  their  hold  on  the 
Le  Transloy  region  and  in  taking  the 
greater  portion  of  Saillisel.  They  also 
captured  Ablaincourt,  Ablaincourt 
Cemetery  and  Pressoire.  On  the  11th 
they  took  the  rest  of  Saillisel.  On  the 
13th  began  the  great  drive  in  the  Ancre 
region.  By  a  surprise  attack  the  Brit- 
ish penetrated  the  whole  German  front. 
On  the  14th  they  advanced  up  the  An- 
cre valley  and  captured  the  village  of 
Beaucourt.  This  gave  them  a  position 
overlooking  Bapaume  and  straightened 
out  a  salient  which  threatened  their 
lines  in  this  region.  Strong  German 
counter  attacks  in  the  vicinity  of  Pres- 
soire resulted  in  the  retaking  of  part  of 
that  village.  On  the  16th  the  French 
counterattacked  and  succeeded  in  re- 
gaining these  positions. 

During  the  months  of  December, 
1916,  and  January,  1917,  the  positions 
on  the  Somme  front  remained  practi- 
cally the  same.  The  days  were  broken 
by  skirmishes  and  artillery  duels  and 
the  nights  by  trench  raids,  but  the  ex- 
tremely cold  weather,  the  fog  and 
enormous  shell  .holes  filled  with  water 
made  any  real  advances  out  of  the  ques- 
tion.     Another   unique    feature    of  the 


Somme  battle  ought  to  be  mentioned 
here.  It  was  the  use  by  the  Allies  of 
great  armored  tractors.  They  were 
carried  along  on  giant  caterpillar 
wheels  and  could  go  right  over  trenches 
and  shell  holes  without  having  their 
progress  impeded.  They  were  armed 
with  machine  guns  and  wrought  con- 
siderable havoc,  especially  where  the 
ground  was  anyway  level. 

The  new  Allied  attack  in  the  west 
was  part  of  a  general  plan  whereby 
the  Allies  attacking  simultaneously  on 
all  fronts — France,  Russia,  Italy — 
hoped  to  deprive  the  Central  Powers  of 
the  advantage  they  hitherto  derived 
from  their  interior  position  of  being 
able  to  move  troops  quickly  from  one 
threatened  position  to  another.  The 
success  achieved  in  the  early  part  of 
the  new  offensive  proved  the  soundness 
of  this  plan. 

Continuation  of  the  Campaign  in 
Picardy  {Battle  of  the  Somme). — Dur- 
ing the  month  of  December  the  Allied 
army  devoted  almost  its  entire  energies 
to  the  improvement  of  its  positions. 
New  trenches  were  built  and  the  old 
ones  improved.  Roads  and  other  means 
of  communications  behind  them  were 
put  in  the  highest  state  of  efficiency. 
When  the  weather  permitted  further 
operations  the  first  British  object  was 
to  drive  the  Germans  from  the  re- 
mainder of  the  Beaumont  Hamel  Spur 
and  the  Beaucourt  Valley.  By  the  end 
of  January,  as  a  result  of  a  series  of 
minor  operations,  the  high  ground  north 
and  east  of  Beaumont  Hamel  was  oc- 
cupied and  they  had  pushed  across  the 
Beaucourt  Valley  and  had  gained  a 
footing  on  the  southern  slopes  to  the 
west. 

The  possession  of  this  spur  gave  the 
British  complete  artillery  control  of 
the  Beaucourt  Valley  and  the  western 
slope.    The  capture  of  German  trenches 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


73 


on  the  western  slope  on  the  night  of 
February  3-4  made  the  German  hold  on 
Grandecourt  and  the  positions  west  of 
that  place  and  south  of  the  Ancre  Val- 
ley very  uncertain.  The  result  was  that 
these    positions    were    abandoned    and 


this  were  successful  it  would  bring  into 
view  hostile  batteries  in  the  upper  An- 
cre Valley  and  would  command  the  ap- 
proaches to  Miraumont  on  the  west. 
These  two  attacks  were  executed  on  the 
night  of   February   17,  and  continued 


From  Current  History  Magazine,  New  York  Times  Co. 

Scene    of   the   German    Withdrawal 


Grandecourt   was   occupied   on   Febru- 
ary 7. 

The  British  High  Command  now  de- 
vised a  scheme  to  carry  its  line  along 
the  spur  which  runs  northward  from  the 
Morval-Thiepval  ridge  about  Courcel- 
ette  and  so  gain  possession  of  the  high 
ground  at  its  northern  extremity.     If 


next  day.  The  fighting  was  severe 
and  fraught  with  counter  attacks. 
The  British  plans  succeeded,  neverthe- 
less, with  the  result  that,  after  a  heavy 
bombardment  the  villages  of  Pys,  Mir- 
aumont and  Serre  were  found  to  be 
evacuated  and  were  occupied. 

The  capture  of  Puiseux-au-Mont  on 


74 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


February  27-28  and  the  villages  of  Le 
Barque,  Ligny-Thilloy  and  Thilloy  on 
March  2,  had  driven  the  Germans  back 
to  the  Le  Transloy-Loupart  line  with 
the  exception  of  the  salient  formed  by 
the  village  of  Irles.  This  was  taken  by 
assault  on  March  10.  The  Le  Trans- 
loy-Loupart line  was  now  so  heavily 
bombarded  that  the  Germans  were  com- 
pelled to  retire  to  a  parallel  system  of 
trenches  on  the  other  side  of  the  vil- 
lage. 

The  German  Withdrawal. — General 
Haig  in  his  report  on  May  31,  1917, 
stated  that  for  some  time  previous  to 
the  middle  of  March  observations 
seemed  to  indicate  that  the  area  of  Ger- 
man withdrawal  would  be  greater  than 
the  one  described  above.  It  was  learned 
that  the  Germans  were  preparing  a  new 
defensive  line  called  the  "Hindenburg 
Line,"  which  branched  off  from  the 
original  line  at  Arras,  ran  southeast- 
ward to  Queant  and  then  passed  west  of 
Cambrai  toward  Saint  Quentin.  Hin- 
denburg apparently  feared  the  salient 
between  Le  Transloy  and  Arras  which 
became  more  difficult  to  hold  as  the 
British  pushed  up  the  Ancre  Valley. 

On  March  14,  it  was  discovered  that 
practically  all  the  German  first  line 
trenches  before  St.  Pierre  Vaast  Wood 
had  been  evacuated.  About  the  same 
time  it  was  discovered  that  the  German 
forces  south  of  the  Somme  had  been 
greatly  weakened.  As  a  result  of  these 
observations,  the  British  and  French 
High  Commands  ordered  a  general  ad- 
vance for  March  17.  By  the  evening  of 
the  same  day  Chaulnes  and  Bapaume 
had  been  captured.  These  were  de- 
fended by  machine  guns  and  infantry 
left  to  cover  the  retreat.  On  March  18, 
Peronne  was  taken  by  the  British  in 
conjunction  with  the  French.  By 
March  20,  the  British  had  crossed  the 
Somme  River  in  large  numbers  and  had 


established  a  line  from  south  of  Ger- 
maine,  where  they  joined  the  French, 
through  Havcourt  to  Bus.  This  move- 
ment necessitated  hasty  building  of 
bridges  across  the  Somme.  All  the  old 
bridges  had  been  destroyed  by  the  re- 
treating Germans.  Northeast  of  Ba- 
paume, Morchies  had  been  occupied. 

The  Allied  advance  continued,  meet- 
ing with  little  opposition,  so  that  by 
the  first  week  in  April,  the  British  were 
established  on  a  line  running  through 
Selency,  Jeancourt,  Epehy,  Ryaul- 
court,  Doignies,  Mercatel,  and  Beau- 
rains.  This  line  brought  the  British 
and  French  into  contact  with  the  "Hin- 
denburg Line"  from  Arras  to  Saint 
Quentin.  This  withdrawal  on  the  part 
of  the  Germans  returned  to  France  ap- 
proximately 1500  square  miles  of  ter- 
ritory. It  was  the  first  time  since 
trench  warfare  had  started  that  cavalry 
and  large  bodies  of  troops  had  partici- 
pated in  an  open  battle.  The  retreat- 
ing Germans  had  completely  devas- 
tated the  country  as  they  withdrew. 
Roads,  railways,  and  bridges  were  sys- 
tematically destroyed.  Houses,  wells, 
and  orchards  were  blown  up  with  dyna- 
mite. Not  a  thing  was  left  which  could 
be  of  the  least  value  to  the  advancing 
armies. 

Battle  of  Arras. — One  of  the  reasons 
for  the  German  withdrawal  was  to  nul- 
lify any  preparations  the  Allies  had 
made  for  a  spring  offensive.  This  ob- 
ject failed  of  realization  when  scarcely 
a  week  later  the  British  began  an  of- 
fensive on  a  12-mile  front  north  and 
south  of  Arras.  The  battle  gradually 
extended  to  an  offensive  over  the  whole 
line  from  Arras  to  Saint  Quentin.  The 
heaviest  fighting  was  done  on  a  line  ex- 
tending from  Givenchy,  southwest  of 
Lens,  to  Henin,  southeast  of  Arras. 
This  line  has  commonly  been  called  the 
hinge  on  which  Hindenburg  swung  his 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


75 


retreat  after  the  battle  of  the  Somme. 
A  four-day  artillery  preparation  of  al- 
most unprecedented  violence  paved  the 
way  for  the  advance.  On  the  first  day 
of  the  battle,  Canadian  troops  stormed 
Vimy  Ridge,  the  top  of  which  was  liter- 
ally blown  off  by  the  artillery.  Four 
thousand  prisoners  and  large  quantities 
of  war  material  were  captured  here.  On 
April  10,  the  British  advanced  to  the 
outskirts  of  Monchy-le-Preux,  which 
threatened  Mochy  and  the  entire  Arras- 
Cambrai  road.  On  April  11,  Monchy 
fell  and  on  the  next  day  Wancourt  and 
Heninel  did  likewise. 

On  April  13,  the  battle  took  an  en- 
tirely new  turn.  Sweeping  northward 
from  their  new  positions  east  of  Arras 
the  British  drove  the  Germans  back  on 
a  12-mile  front,  capturing  six  villages 
and  seriously  threatening  the  coal  city 
of  Lens.  On  the  14th  the  British 
pushed  closer  to  Lens  and  on  the  15th 
entered  the  outskirts  of  the  city  itself. 
For  several  days  no  further  progress 
was  made  because  of  severe  artillery 
duels,  violent  counter  attacks,  and  con- 
solidation of  positions. 

On  April  24,  the  British  pushed  for- 
ward east  of  Monchy  and  the  next  day 
advanced  south  of  the  Scarpe  River. 
Three  days  later  they  broke  the  "Oppy 
Line,"  a  switch  of  the  Hindenburg  line, 
by  the  capture  of  Arleux-en-Gohelle. 
They  also  occupied  a  part  of  Oppy  vil- 
lage (29th),  but  were  compelled  to  re- 
tire from  it  in  the  face  of  heavy  ar- 
tillery fire.  On  May  3,  the  British  took 
Fresnoy  and  part  of  Bullecourt,  but 
were  later  forced  to  give  them  up  on 
account  of  heavy  counter  attacks.  It 
may  help  to  realize  the  fierceness  of 
the  fighting  when  it  is  stated  that  Ga- 
vrelle  changed  hands  eight  times  in  one 
day.  The  British  reentered  Bullecourt 
on  May  12,  and  also  took  part  of 
Rceux.     In  the  next  three  days  these  po- 


sitions changed  hands  three  times,  with 
the  Germans  having  the  better  of  the 
counter  attacks. 

The  battle  of  Arras  had  now  prac- 
tically come  to  a  standstill.  In  the  first 
two  weeks  of  June  the  British  were 
driven  back  east  of  Loos,  from  Bulle- 
court and  east  of  Monchy-le-Preux. 
The  Germans  had  lost  15,000  prison- 
ers and  nearly  200  guns.  The  total 
effects  of  the  battle  of  Arras  was  the 
placing  of  Lens  in  a  pocket,  the  mouth 
of  which  was  ever  growing  smaller. 
This  city  was  a  nest  of  machine  guns 
and  all  the  houses  had  been  leveled  so 
that  the  German  artillery  might  get  a 
full  sweep.  The  British  suddenly  shift- 
ed their  operations  to  the  Ypres  sector. 
(See  below). 

Aisne  Offensive  (April,  1917). — The 
French  pursuit  of  the  Germans  after 
their  great  retirement  was  very  rapid. 
Their  advance  was  directed  toward  La 
Fere.  Without  any  serious  opposition 
the  French  reached  Tergnier,  2  miles 
from  La  Fere.  Further  south,  how- 
ever, the  French  struck  a  snag  in  the 
Ailette  River  which  protected  the  for- 
ests of  Coucy  and  St.  Gobain.  They 
succeeded  in  crossing  the  river  and  cap- 
turing the  village  of  Coucy,  but  were 
unsuccessful  in  their  attempts  to  cap- 
ture the  forest  of  St.  Gobain,  which 
was  one  of  the  main  defenses  of  the  Hin- 
denburg: line.  Moving-  their  line  east- 
ward,  the  French  pushed  the  Germans 
back  along  the  Oise  River  and  thus 
threatened  the  German  hold  on  St. 
Quentin.  In  the  meantime  the  British 
had  thrown  a  semi-circle  around  St. 
Quentin  on  the  north  and  west  of  the 
town  so  that  the  artillery  controlled 
the  approaches  to  it.  All  attempts  on 
the  part  of  the  Allies  to  take  the  city 
failed,  however. 

On  April  16,  the  French  launched  a 
great    offensive    on    the    Aisne    River. 


76 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


They  attacked  on  a  25-mile  front  from 
Soissons  to  Rheims.  The  Germans  had 
held  this  line  since  their  retreat  from 
the  Marne.  For  10  days  French  ar- 
tillery had  prepared  for  the  offensive 
and  for  a  similar  length  of  time  the 
Germans  had  been  bringing  up  great 
quantities  of  men  and  guns  to  meet  the 
expected  attack.  A  successful  attack 
by  the  French  would  threaten  the  im- 
portant city  of  Laon.  On  the  first  day 
the  entire  German  positions  on  the 
front  line  were  taken  along  with  10,000 
prisoners.  By  the  end  of  the  third 
day  the  French  had  taken  17,000  pris- 
oners and  75  guns.  The  villages  of 
Chavonne,  Chivy,  Ostel,  and  Braye-en- 
Laonnois  were  captured.  Further  west 
on  the  southern  bank  of  the  Aisne  the 
French  captured  all  of  Vailly  and  an 
important  bridgehead.  Hindenburg 
brought  up  thousands  of  fresh  troops 
and  on  April  19,  delivered  one  of  the 
strongest  counter  attacks  of  the  entire 
war  between  Juvincourt  and  Berry-au- 
Bac,  but  they  were  thrown  back  in  dis- 
order after  furious  fighting.  On  the 
same  day  the  French  advanced  on  the 
eastern  end  of  the  battle  front  in  west- 
ern Champagne  and  threatened  the 
town  of  Moronvillers. 

On  April  20,  the  French  pressed  the 
Germans  back  toward  the  Chemin  des 
Dames,  an  important  road  running 
along  the  top  of  the  heights  north  of 
the  Aisne  River.  In  this  sector  Mal- 
maison  fort  protecting  the  road  from 
Soissons  to  Laon  prevented  further 
French  advances.  For  the  next  10  days 
there  were  severe  artillery  duels  and 
numerous  local  engagements  and  coun- 
ter attacks,  with  the  advantage  usually 
with  the  French.  The  terrain  of  the 
Aisne  territory  was  peculiar.  It  con- 
sisted of  limestone  cliffs,  which  were 
honeycombed  with  natural  and  artificial 
caverns,  which  were  practically  immune 


to  French  artillery  fire.  This  necessi- 
tated fierce  hand  to  hand  struggles, 
sometimes  far  underground. 

On  May  4,  Craonne  and  several 
strong  points  north  and  east  of  it,  as 
well  as  the  German  first-line  positions 
on  a  front  2*4  miles  northwest  of 
Rheims  were  taken  by  the  French. 
Craonne  is  on  the  southern  end  of  the 
Chemin  des  Dames  ridge.  Counter  at- 
tacks of  unprecedented  violence  failed 
to  shake  the  French  grip  on  the  Ladies' 
Road  (so  called  because  it  was  built  by 
Louis  XV  as  a  promenade  for  his 
daughters).  They  gradually  pushed 
ahead  from  the  eastern  and  western 
slopes  until  they  controlled  the  entire 
road  and  thus  overlooked  the  Ailette 
River  and  valley  from  which  the  heights 
of  Laon  rise.  Almost  ceaseless  counter 
attacks  were  made  against  the  newly 
won  French  positions  but  completely 
failed,  despite  temporary  local  success- 
es. The  French  completed  their  opera- 
tions by  driving  the  Germans  across  the 
Ailette  River  (October,  1917),  and  then 
turned  their  energies  to  the  Battle  of 
Flanders  (see  below). 

French  Success  at  Verdim. — On  Aug. 
20,  1917,  after  nine  months  of  compara- 
tive quiet  the  French  resumed  the  offen- 
sive at  Verdun.  After  a  three-day  bom- 
bardment they  advanced  on  both  sides 
of  the  Meuse  and  penetrated  a  mile  and 
a  quarter  on  an  11 -mile  front.  They 
captured  Avocourt  Wood,  Le  Mort 
Homme,  Corbeaux  and  Cumieres  woods, 
Cote  de  Talou,  Chapneuville,  Mormont 
farm,  Hill  240  and  4000  prisoners.  In 
the  next  four  da}^s  smashing  blows  were 
delivered  which  resulted  in  the  capture 
of  Regneville,  Samogneux,  Cote  de  l'Oie 
and  15,000  prisoners.  By  the  15th  of 
September  the  French  had  recovered 
100  square  miles  of  the  120  the  Ger- 
mans had  seized  in  their  great  offensive. 
They  now  held  all  the  dominating  posi- 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


77 


tions  in  the  Verdun  sector  and  strong 
German  counter  attacks  failed  to  dis- 
lodge them. 

Battle  of  Flanders. — On  June  7, 
1917,  occurred  one  of  the  most  spec- 
tacular battles  of  the  entire  war,  that 
for  the  Messines-Wytschaete  ridge. 
This  ridge  formed  a  salient  which  domi- 
nated the  entire  Ypres  sector  and  which 
was  literally  a  thorn  in  the  sides  of 
the  Allies.  For  over  two  years  Brit- 
ish sappers  had  been  burrowing  under 
this  ridge  and  finally  succeeded  in  plac- 
ing in  position,  undetected  by  the  Ger- 
mans, 19  mines  containing  more  than 
1,000,000  pounds  of  ammonite.  These 
were  exploded  by  electricity  on  the 
morning  of  June  7.  It  was  like  a  tre- 
mendous earthquake.  The  whole  tops 
of  the  hills  were  blown  off  and  the  roar 
could  be  heard  for  a  distance  of  150 
miles.  A  tremendous  shell  fire  which 
had  been  playing  on  the  ridge  for  two 
weeks  reached  its  greatest  intensity  as 
the  mines  were  exploded.  After  the 
explosion  the  British  infantry  rushed 
forward  and  by  the  end  of  the  day  had 
wiped  out  the  entire  salient.  Seven 
thousand  prisoners  and  many  guns  were 
taken  with  relatively  small  losses  to  the 
attackers.  Even  the  rear  protecting 
positions  were  taken.  The  attack  was 
on  a  5-mile  front  and  penetrated  to  a 
depth  of  3  miles. 

The  Germans  retaliated  for  this  al- 
lied success  by  a  successful  attack  on 
the  Allied  line  at  its  most  northern  ex- 
tremity in  Belgium.  On  July  11,  after 
strong  artillery  preparation,  the  Ger- 
mans made  a  strong  infantry  attack  on 
the  British  positions  east  of  the  Yser 
River.  The  British  line  at  this  point 
was  about  600  yards  east  of  the  river. 
Their  entire  lines  of  communication  had 
to  cross  the  river  to  supply  the  first- 
line  trenches.  The  Germans  complete- 
ly destroyed  the  lines  of  approach  and 


captured  or  killed  the  entire  British 
force  east  of  the  river  (about  3000). 
Twelve  hundred  prisoners  were  taken. 
The  reduction  of  the  Messines-Wyt- 
schaete salient  prepared  the  way  for 
further  Allied  activities  in  the  Ypres 
sector.  Consequently,  on  July  31,  1917, 
the  British  and  French  began  an  of- 
fensive which  lasted  intermittently  down 
to  the  beginning  of  1918,  when  weather 
conditions  forced  a  halt.  The  objects 
of  this  offensive  were  to  compel  the  Ger- 
mans to  give  up  their  submarine  bases 
at  Ostend  and  Zeebrugge  and  to  en- 
velop the  important  industrial  centre 
of  Lille.  For  three  weeks  previous  to 
the  above  date,  the  artillery  prepara- 
tions on  both  sides  had  been  stupendous. 
The  infantry  attack  was  on  a  20-mile 
front  from  Dixmude  to  Warneton.  The 
first  attack  passed  the  German  third- 
line  trenches.  On  August  1,  a  severe 
rainstorm  lasting  50  hours  began,  and 
perforce  held  up  further  operations. 
On  August  10,  Westhoek  village  and 
ridge  were  carried  by  storm.  The 
French  took  Bixschoote.  The  next  day 
the  British  attacked  in  Glencorse 
Wood.  The  artillery  battle  reached 
heights  never  before  attained.  Both 
sides  seemed  to  have  unlimited  supplies 
of  ammunition.  The  German  and  al- 
lied barrage  fires  were  wonderful  to 
watch.  On  one  occasion  five  distinct 
British  barrages  were  counted.  The 
Germans  devised  on  this  front  a  new 
method  of  defense.  The  trench  system 
was  practically  given  up  and  concrete 
redoubts,  called  by  the  British  "pill- 
boxes," were  erected  in  the  shell  holes. 
They  were  nests  of  machine  guns  and 
were  often  invisible  to  airplanes.  This 
did  away  with  the  necessity  of  keeping 
great  quantities  of  troops  in  the  for- 
ward trenches  and  allowed  the  advance 
lines  to  be  held  by  scattered  forces. 
The    terrain   was    also    peculiar.      The 


78 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


heavy  torrents  of  rain  made  the  flat 
ground  a  veritable  quagmire.  The  in- 
fantry sank  up  to  their  knees  in  mud 
and  it  was  almost  impossible  to  bring 
up  heavy  artillery. 

On  August  16  the  Allies  struck  again 
on  a  9-mile  front  north  and  east  of 
Ypres  and  carried  practically  all  their 
objectives.  On  the  left  the  French 
drove  the  Germans  from  the  salient  be- 
tween the  Yser  Canal  and  Martjevaart 
and  captured  the  bridgehead  at  Drei- 
grachten.  In  the  centre  the  British  cap- 
tured the  strongly  fortified  position  of 
Langemarck  and  pushed  forward  for 
another  mile.  On  the  right  the  British 
failed  to  capture  the  high  ground  al- 
most due  east  of  Ypres.  They  seized  it 
in  their  first  assault  but  were  compelled 
to  give  it  up.  Weather  conditions  pre- 
vented any  further  operations  for  an 
entire  month. 

From  the  middle  of  September  to  the 
middle  of  October  five  brutal  assaults 
by  the  allies  made  a  great  salient  into 
the  enemy  positions.  On  September  20, 
an  attack  began  on  an  8-mile  front  be- 
tween the  Ypres-Comines  canal  and  the 
Ypres-Staden  railway.  This  resulted 
in  the  capture  of  Inverness  Copse, 
Glencorse  Wood,  Nonne  Boshen,  Pots- 
dam Vampir,  Iberian  farm,  and  Gal- 
lipoli.  All  of  these  places  were  named 
by  the  Allied  troops  in  front  of  them. 
In  the  centre  Veldhoek  and  part  of 
Polygon  Wood  were  taken.  All  of 
these  gains  were  consolidated.  On  Sep- 
tember 26  came  another  great  smash  at 
the  German  lines.  Driving  on  a  6-mile 
front,  Tower  Hamlets  Spur,  the  re- 
mainder of  Polygon  Wood  and  Zonne- 
beke  were  taken.  The  advance  was  ap- 
proximately !/2  mile.  On  October  4, 
the  Allies  again  attacked  on  an  8-mile 
front.  The  British  gained  control  of 
the  Passchendaele  ridge  (their  immedi- 
ate object  in  the  Flanders  battle)   as 


far  as  Broodseinde.  The  weather  pre- 
vented any  further  attacks  or  counter 
attacks.  On  the  9th,  a  fourth  concerted 
blow  captured  St.  Jean  de  Mangelaere 
and  Poelcappelle.  On  the  12th,  an- 
other attack,  interrupted  by  the 
Aveather,  brought  the  Allies  up  to  with- 
in 500  yards  of  the  town  of  Passchen- 
daele. These  five  blows  captured  an 
area  of  approximately  28  square  miles 
and  carried  the  Allies  to  the  Ypres- 
Roulers  road  on  the  northeast  as  well 
as  an  advance  of  a  mile  over  the  Ypres- 
Menin  road.  Roulers  was  now  in  the 
range  of  the  heavy  artillery,  which  was 
also  able  to  sweep  the  Flanders  plain. 
The  losses  of  the  Allies  were  compara- 
tively slight. 

After  a  brief  lull  the  Battle  of  Flan- 
ders was  continued  on  October  22.  On 
that  day  the  British  and  French  ad- 
vanced on  both  sides  of  the  Ypres- 
Staden  railroad.  The  French  secured 
the  southern  part  of  Houthoulst  For- 
est and  a  number  of  fortified  farms. 
The  26th  saw  another  big  advance  in 
the  same  direction.  The  British  ad- 
vanced west  of  Passchendaele  and  north 
of  Gheluvelt,  while  the  French  took 
Draeibank  and  several  more  fortified 
farms.  On  the  28th  the  French  and  part 
of  the  reorganized  Belgian  army  cap- 
tured the  Mercken  peninsula  (formed 
by  canals  on  three  sides)  south  of  Dix- 
mude.  On  the  30th  the  British  ad- 
vanced from  the  positions  won  by  them 
on  the  26th  and  captured  most  of  Pass- 
chendaele, but  were  compelled  to  retire 
in  the  face  of  heavy  counter  attacks. 
A  week  later  after  heavy  bombardment, 
the  Canadians  advanced,  took  the  town 
and  continued  800  yards  beyond  it. 
Furious  German  counter  attacks  in  the 
next  few  days  failed  to  penetrate  the 
new  British  line.  The  British  then  pro- 
ceeded to  clear  the  rest  of  the  spur  by 
advancing  northwest  of  the  town.   They 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


79 


were  now  within  5  miles  of  Roulers. 
The  entire  Ypres  front  remained  prac- 
tically the  same  until  the  beginning  of 
1918.  The  British  efforts  were  turned 
to  the  battle  that  developed  at  Cambrai 
and  the  Belgian  front  was  the  scene  of 
heavy  artillery  duels  and  trench  raids 
carried  out  to  relieve  the  pressure  on 
the  Cambrai  front. 

Battle  around  Cambrai. — On  Nov. 
21,  1917,  began  one  of  the  greatest  bat- 
tles of  the  year  in  the  region  around 
Cambrai.  For  a  time  it  appeared  as  if 
the  British  were  going  to  smash  the 
Hindenburg  line  to  pieces.  Then  the 
Germans  started  a  counter  offensive 
which  almost  nullified  the  British  gains. 
The  battle  was  a  surprise  attack  with- 
out artillery  preparation,  a  method 
practically  unheard  of  in  the  present 
war.  The  attack  was  on  a  35-mile 
front  between  St.  Quentin  and  the 
Scarpe  River,  although  the  main  part 
of  it  was  due  west  of  Cambrai.  Huge 
"tanks"  screened  by  smoke  led  the  ad- 
vance and  plunged  through  the  Ger- 
man defenses  as  though  they  were  pa- 
per. The  first  day  netted  5  miles,  8000 
prisoners  and  a  number  of  guns.  Gen- 
eral Julian  H.  G.  Byng  was  in  direct 
command  of  the  operations.  The  vil- 
lages of  Benavis,  La  Vacquerie,  Ribe- 
court,  Havrincourt,  Marcoing,  Grain- 
court,  Anneux,  and  Noyelles-sur-1'Es- 
caut  were  captured  as  well  as  several 
forests  and  fortified  farms.  Part  of 
Bourlon  Wood,  the  dominating  height 
around  Cambrai,  and  part  of  Bulle- 
court  were  also  taken.  The  village  of 
Fontaine  Notre  Dame,  ^4  of  a  mile 
from  Cambrai,  was  captured  but  the 
Germans  retook  it  the  next  day.  Open 
fighting  prevailed  and  the  cavalry 
played  a  big  part  in  the  British  ad- 
vance. 

On  November  23  the  British  attack 
was  renewed  and  a  bitter  struggle  en- 


sued in  the  neighborhood  of  Moeuvres 
(south  of  Bourlon  Wood)  and  at  Creve- 
coeur,  south  of  Cambrai.  The  British 
took  a  hill  dominating  the  former  po- 
sition. Cambrai  was  under  British 
shell  fire  and  Queant  was  in  serious 
danger.  Bourlon  Wood  and  village 
changed  hands  several  times.  The 
Germans  made  tremendous  efforts  to 
hold  these  dominating  positions,  but  the 
British  held  on  to  them  tenaciously  un- 
til encircled  by  German  troops  and 
finally  driven  out  of  the  village.  Cam- 
brai was  heavily  shelled  from  the  Bour- 
lon Wood. 

On  November  30  the  Germans  began 
a  grand  counter  offensive  on  a  16-mile 
front  on  the  north,  south,  and  east  sides 
of  the  British  wedge.  On  the  north  and 
east  they  failed  to  gain,  but  on  the 
south  they  reached  La  Vacquerie  and 
Gouzeaucourt  taken  by  the  British  on 
the  first  day  of  their  offensive.  On  De- 
cember 2,  after  ten  attacks  the  Germans 
occupied  Masnieres.  The  German  re- 
ports stated  that  6000  prisoners  and 
100  guns  had  been  taken  by  them  up 
to  December  4. 

The  success  of  the  German  counter 
drive  on  the  south  compelled  the  British 
to  rectify  their  line  on  the  eastern  side. 
Consequently  they  withdrew  from  Bour- 
lon Wood  and  gave  up  Noyelle-sur- 
l'Escaut,  Anneux,  Cantaing,  Grain- 
court,  and  Marcoing.  Approximately 
one-half  of  the  territory  gained  by  the 
British  was  regained  by  the  Germans. 
American  engineers,  working  behind  the 
British  lines,  were  caught  when  the  Ger- 
mans broke  through.  They  seized  guns 
from  fallen  soldiers  and  fought  vali- 
antly.    Several  lost  their  lives. 

The  entire  western  front  was  now 
alive  with  artillery  action  from  the  sea 
to  Switzerland.  All  the  European 
newspapers  predicted  a  big  drive  "some- 
where on  the  front."     A  furious  attack 


80 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


west  of  Cambrai  on  December  13  was 
repulsed  by  the  British.  The  Germans 
attacked  between  Bullecourt  and  Queant 
(10  miles)  in  mass  formation  but  were 
unable  to  break  through.  The  line  on 
the  entire  front  was  the  same  at  the  be- 
ginning of  1918,  because  winter  put  an 
end  to  any  further  operations. 

Allied  Unity. — The  prime  ministers 
of  France,  Italy,  and  Great  Britain  met 
at  Rapallo,  Italy,  on  November  9  and 
formed  the  Supreme  War  Council, 
which  was  to  coordinate  the  military 
powers  of  the  Allies  and  wage  war  as 
a  unified  group  and  not  as  individuals. 
The  members  of  the  Supreme  War  Staff 
were  to  be  Generals  Cadorna  (Italy), 
Foch  (France),  and  Wilson  (British). 
According  to  the  agreement,  "The  Su- 
preme War  Council  has  for  its  mission 
to  watch  over  the  general  conduct  of 
the  war.  It  prepares  recommendations 
for  the  considerations  of  the  govern- 
ments and  keeps  itself  informed  of  the 
execution  and  reports  thereon  to  the  re- 
spective governments." 

On  November  7,  1917,  a  United 
States  Commission  headed  by  Colonel 
E.  M.  House  arrived  in  London  to  con- 
sult with  the  Allies.  Secretary  of  State 
Lansing  announced  that  the  object  of 
the  mission  was  "a  more  complete  co- 
ordination of  the  activities  of  the  vari- 
ous nations  engaged  in  the  conflict  and 
a  more  comprehensive  understanding  of 
their  respective  needs,  in  order  that  the 
co-belligerents  may  attain  the  highest 
efficiency."  He  strongly  emphasized  the 
fact  that  it  was  a  war  and  not  a  peace 
conference.  Most  of  the  other  Allies 
sent  representatives  with  the  same  ob- 
jects in  view.  President  Wilson  cabled 
to  Colonel  House  that  "unity  of  plan 
and  control"  were  essential  and  he  told 
him  to  attend  the  first  meeting  of  the 
Supreme  War  Council.  Colonel  House 
returned  in  late  December,  and  urged 


the  hasty  despatch  of  American  forces 
to  Europe,  as  well  as  the  speeding  up  of 
shipbuilding,  and  the  securing  of  Allied 
unity. 

American  Expeditionary  Force. — 
The  first  contingents  of  a  United  States 
Army  to  fight  in  Europe  arrived  at  a 
French  port  on  June  26-27,  1917. 
They  were  commanded  by  Major-Gen- 
eral William  L.  Sibert  and  received  a 
tremendous  ovation  from  the  French 
people.  The  transports  on  the  way 
over  had  been  unsuccessfully  attacked 
twice  by  submarines.  Gen.  John  J. 
Pershing,*  the  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  American  force,  had  been  in  France 
for  some  time  preparing  for  the  coming 
of  the  "Sammies,"  as  the  French  char- 
acterized the  American  soldiers. 

Training  camps  for  the  American 
troops  had  been  located  in  various  parts 
of  France  and  were  ready  for  occupancy 
when  the  soldiers  arrived.  Infantry, 
artillery,  aviation,  and  medical  bases 
were  established.  The  number  of  men 
gradually  increased,  many  of  them  stop- 
ping in  England  before  going  over  to 
France.  An  intensive  system  of  train- 
ing was  entered  upon  during  the  latter 
part  of  July.  The  instructors  were  offi- 
cers and  men  of  the  British  and  French 
armies.  The  American  transportation 
service  took  over  all  railways  leading 
to  American  bases  and  a  section  of 
French  forest  was  turned  over  to  Amer- 

*  Pershing,  John  J.  Born  in  1860  and 
graduated  from  the  United  States  Military 
Academy  in  1886.  First  American  to  com- 
mand American  troops  on  European  battle- 
fields. Graduate  of  West  Point;  entered  reg- 
ular army  as  second  lieutenant  in  1886.  Fought 
in  Indian  wars  against  Apaches  and  Sioux. 
Engaged  in  war  with  Spain  in  Cuba,  and  after 
peace  declared  ordered  to  Philippines.  Then  a 
captain.  Fought  with  great  bravery  against 
Moros  and  made  brigadier  general  in  1906, 
being  jumped  over  862  senior  officers.  Sub- 
dued Moros  in  1913  and  returned  to  United 
States  and  stationed  a*.  El  Paso,  Texas.  After 
Villa  raid  on  Columbus,  N.  M.,  led  punitive 
raid  into  Mexico.  Known  as  "Black  Jack"  in 
armv. 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


81 


jean  lumbermen  to  supply  the  needs  of 
the  expeditionary  force. 

The  news  that  American  forces  were 
in  action  "somewhere  in  France"  was 
given  out  in  a  dispatch  on  Oct.  27, 
1917,  which  stated  that  the  artillery  had 
fired  the  first  shot  and  that  the  infantry 
had  entered  the  first-line  trenches.  The 
activities  did  not  mean  that  American 
troops  were  taking  over  a  section  of 
trenches  on  the  western  front,  but  that 
they  were  completing  their  training  un- 
der actual  war  conditions.  A  few  nights 
later  the  Americans  crept  out  into  "No 
Man's  Land"  on  reconnoitering  expedi- 
tions. Every  so  often  the  troops  in  the 
trenches  were  changed  so  that  as  many 
troops  as  possible  could  get  a  taste  of 
real  war  conditions.  On  November  3, 
the  Germans  announced  the  capture  of 
American  prisoners  when  a  salient 
which  they  occupied  was  cut  off  from 
the  main  trenches  by  a  barrage  fire. 
The  Americans  lost  3  killed,  11 
wounded,  and  11  missing.  Although  no 
official  announcement  was  made  as  to 
the  exact  location  of  the  sector,  a  com- 
parison of  the  various  reports  seemed 
to  show  that  the  region  was  in  the 
Vosges  Mountains  where  the  Rhine- 
Marne  Canal  crosses  the  boundary  line 
between  France  and  Lorraine.  During 
November  and  December,  1917,  inter- 
mittent artillery  duels  and  engagements 
between  patrols  occurred,  but  no  con- 
flict of  any  size  developed. 

The  Last  Year  of  the  War  on  the 
Western  Front. — The  months  of  Janu- 
ary and  February,  1918,  were  months 
of  comparative  inactivity  along  the  bat- 
tle line  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Swiss 
border,  as  well  as  in  Italy,  the  Balkans, 
and  Asia  Minor.  The  outstanding  fea- 
ture of  the  war  at  the  close  of  1917 
was  the  signing  of  an  armistice  between 
the  Central  Powers  on  the  one  hand  and 
Rumania  and  the  de  facto  government 


of  Russia  on  the  other.  The  defection 
of  Russia  from  the  side  of  the  Allies 
was  the  signal  for  a  tremendous  pub- 
licity campaign  in  Germany,  which  pre- 
dicted a  gigantic  blow  on  the  western 
front  which  would  completely  crush  the 
British  and  French  armies  before  the 
American  forces  could  land  in  sufficient 
numbers  to  give  any  substantial  aid. 
The  depression  in  allied  countries 
caused  by  the  abolition  of  the  eastern 
front  was  somewhat  overcome  by  Allen- 
by's  victories  in  Asia  Minor  and  the 
unexpected  rapidity  with  which  the 
United  States  rushed  men  and  material 
to  Europe. 

The  chief  cause  for  the  optimistic 
tone  of  the  Teutonic  press  was  the  fact 
that  huge  quantities  of  material  and  a 
large  number  of  men  could  now  be  trans- 
ferred from  the  eastern  front  for  imme- 
diate service  on  the  western  front.  The 
German  High  Command  adopted  a 
policy  of  careful  selection  of  the  men 
who  were  to  be  transported  westward. 
As  a  skeleton  for  the  new  divisions  to 
be  formed  they  picked  out  all  the  sol- 
diers in  Russia  between  the  ages  of  25 
and  35.  They  realized  that  it  would  be 
impossible  to  withdraw  all  the  men  from 
Russia  inasmuch  as  the  terms  of  the 
Treaty  of  Brest  Litovsk  provided  for 
the  occupation  of  a  considerable  amount 
of  Russian  territory  by  German  troops. 
While  it  was  generally  known  that  the 
personnel  and  morale  of  the  Germans 
on  the  eastern  front  were  considerably 
lower  than  on  the  western  front,  never- 
theless the  German  Command  hoped  to 
build  up  from  eastern  material  about 
59  or  60  divisions  of  12,000  men  each. 
This  would  increase  the  fighting 
strength  on  the  western  front  by  about 
700,000  men.  About  the  middle  of  Feb- 
ruary according  to  a  French  official 
statement  it  was  estimated  that  there 
were    already    on    the    western    front 


82 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


2,100,000  men  and  that  further  incre- 
ments from  the  east  and  from  new  re- 
cruits would  bring  the  highest  total  of 
men  available  to  2,340,000  men.  This 
total  would  approximately  equal  the  to- 
tal number  of  men  France  and  England 
had  available.  American,  Belgian,  and 
Portuguese  troops  practically  assured 
the  Allies  a  numerical  superiority  over 
the  whole  front  although  not  necessarily 
in  any  one  sector.  Any  numerical  ad- 
vantage that  the  Allies  possessed  was 
more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  su- 
periority of  the  German  railway  sys- 
tems. The  Germans  were  fighting  on  in- 
terior lines  and  the  Allies  on  exterior 
lines.  The  German  railway  system  may 
be  likened  to  a  huge  wheel.  All  lines 
radiated  from  the  hub  and  could  feed 
any  part  of  the  rim  (battle  line),  while 
on  the  other  hand  the  Allies  in  order  to 
supply  their  lines  were  compelled  to 
travel  around  the  outside  of  the  rim,  a 
much  longer  process. 

On  the  western  front  during  the  first 
ten  weeks  of  the  year  the  fighting  con- 
sisted of  a  series  of  almost  unending 
trench  and  aerial  raids,  carried  out  for 
the  purposes  of  reconnaissances.  Some- 
times the  trench  raids  would  follow 
heavy  bombardments,  but  generally 
speaking  they  were  carried  out  by  small 
patrols  under  cover  of  darkness.  The 
Germans  with  varying  success  carried 
out  raids  in  Flanders,  Artois,  Picardy, 
the  Verdun  sector,  Champagne,  and 
Lorraine,  with  the  evident  intention  of 
ferreting  out  the  weak  points  of  the 
allied  line  for  the  much  heralded  offen- 
sive on  the  western  front.  The  purpose 
of  the  allied  raids  was  to  discover,  if 
possible,  the  places  on  the  German  lines 
where  any  unusual  concentrations  were 
being  made.  The  aerial  raids  to  a  large 
extent  were  carried  out  over  the  Rhine 
and  Moselle  river  valleys,  where  it  was 
known  that  the  troops  transported  from 


the  eastern  front  were  being  refitted  for 
service  on  the  western  front. 

The  American  troops,  which  had  been 
pouring  into  France  in  an  ever  increas- 
ing stream,  and  which  had  been  grad- 
ually concentrating  in  camps  at  Toul 
and  Nancy,  had  finally  reached  the 
stage  of  training  when  they  were  ready 
to  take  over  a  section  of  the  battle  line. 
The  sector  allotted  to  them  was  about 
eight  miles  long  and  was  on  the  south- 
ern side  of  the  St.  Mihiel  salient,  which 
had  been  established  by  the  Germans, 
advancing  from  Metz,  in  1914,  and 
which  had  withstood  several  attempts 
on  the  part  of  the  French  to  "pinch" 
it.  The  American  line  was  roughly  be- 
tween Flirey  and  Remenauville  on  the 
east  and  Apremont  on  the  west.  The 
Germans  lost  no  time  in  trying  out  the 
new  American  forces  by  means  of  heavy 
bombardments  of  high  explosives  and 
gas  shells. 

The  Second  Battle  of  Picardy. — On 
March  21,  1918,  came  the  great  blow 
which  the  German  press  and  public  had 
been  so  continually  prophesying  since 
the  collapse  of  Russia  and  Rumania. 
The  German  plan  was  based  upon  sound 
military  strategy.  It  recalls  to  mind 
the  famous  campaign  carried  on  by  Na- 
poleon in  Italy  in  1796-97.  Napoleon 
at  the  head  of  an  army  which  had  just 
crossed  the  Alps  found  himself  facing 
superior  forces  composed  of  Austrians 
and  Sardinians.  He  struck  at  Mon- 
tenotte,  the  point  where  the  two  enemy 
armies  joined,  forced  his  way  through, 
rolled  up  the  Sardinian  army  on  its 
base  and  compelled  Sardinia  to  sign  a 
separate  peace.  Then  he  faced  and 
conquered  Austria.  The  German  con- 
ception was  strikingly  similar.  It  was 
to  strike  the  Anglo-French  line  where 
the  two  armies  joined,  break  through 
and  reach  the  channel  ports,  and  thus 
either  confine  the  British,  Belgian,  and 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


83 


Portuguese  armies  in  the  narrow  region 
between  the  Somme  and  the  Belgian  bor- 
der or  drive  them  into  the  sea,  and  then 
turn  their  attention  southward  to  the 
French  armies  and  make  a  direct  ad- 
vance on  Paris.  This  attack  was  so 
timed  as  to  offset  any  increase  to  the 
allied  force  from  the  United  States. 
The  success  of  this  scheme  depended 
entirely  on  a  complete  breakthrough 
at  the  junction  point  of  the  British  and 
French  armies.  A  tremendous  gap  was 
made  and  for  four  or  five  days  it  ap- 
peared as  though  they  were  about  to 
accomplish  their  purpose,  but,  fortu- 
nately for  the  Allies,  it  was  closed  in 
time  to  prevent  a  complete  disaster. 

The  front  chosen  for  the  attack  was 
between  Marcoing,  near  Cambrai,  and 
the  Oise  river,  and  was  held  by  the  Brit- 
ish 5th  army,  under  General  Gough. 
This  section  of  the  battle  line  was  taken 
over  by  the  British  from  the  French  at 
the  beginning  of  the  year.  The  5th 
army  was  composed  of  about  14  divi- 
sions or  roughly  170,000  men,  which 
had  to  protect  a  line  about  50  miles 
long.  It  is  difficult  to  understand  why 
this  particular  section  of  the  line  was 
held  so  lightly.  This  inadequate  force 
was  attacked  by  a  force  composed  of 
between  40  and  50  divisions,  amounting 
to  approximately  750,000  men,  about 
150,000  of  which  were  concentrated  be- 
tween St.  Quentin  and  La  Fere.  It  is 
scarcely  to  be  wondered  at  that  the 
British  army  was  brushed  aside  by  such 
a  superiority  of  men,  and  by  the  dogged 
determination  on  the  part  of  the  Ger- 
mans to  get  through  at  any  cost. 

The  line  held  by  the  British  was  very 
carefully  constructed  and  admirably 
suited  to  defense  by  a  force  compara- 
tively inferior  to  the  attacking  force. 
It  really  consisted  of  three  separate  de- 
fensive positions,  an  outpost  line,  a  re- 
sistance line,  and  then  in  case  these  were 


penetrated,  a  battle  line,  where  the  main 
battle  was  to  be  fought.  The  outposts 
were  so  arranged  that  a  terrible  enfilad- 
ing fire  could  be  poured  into  the  Ger- 
mans as  soon  as  they  penetrated  this 
outpost  line.  The  German  armies  fac- 
ing the  battle  line  were  under  the  su- 
preme command  of  Crown  Prince  Rup- 
precht  of  Bavaria,  and  the  individual 
armies  under  the  leadership  of  von 
Below,  von  der  Marwitz,  and  von 
Hutier.  The  plan  of  attack  was  drawn 
up  by  the  last  named  general. 

The  weather  favored  the  Germans  to 
a  very  large  extent.  The  attack  was 
begun  a  little  before  5  o'clock  on  the 
morning;  of  the  21st  under  the  cover  of 
such  a  heavy  fog  and  mist  that  it  was 
impossible  to  see  more  than  100  feet 
ahead.  General  Gough  knew  from  docu- 
ments taken  from  German  prisoners 
that  the  assault  was  impending  and  had 
made  preparation  to  meet  it,  but  his 
preparations  were  practically  nullified 
by  the  weather  conditions.  The  first 
line  of  defense,  i.  e.  the  outpost  line, 
was  taken  before  the  British  were  cogni- 
zant of  the  fact  that  the  attack  had 
begun.  The  tremendous  superiority  of 
numbers  forced  the  resistance  line  very 
quickly  and  enabled  the  Germans  to 
rush  up  to  the  battle  line,  or  last  system 
of  defense.  Here  again  the  inequality 
of  numbers  ultimately  told  and  the  Ger- 
man armies  forced  their  way  through 
where  some  of  Gough's  divisions  joined. 
Apparently  the  British  had  made  no 
provisions  for  a  breakthrough,  because 
there  were  no  defense  positions  behind 
the  third  defense  system.  The  road  to 
Amiens  seemed  opened  and  only  heroic 
efforts  saved  it. 

As  has  been  stated  above,  the  terrific 
battle  of  Picardy  began  shortly  before 
5  a.  m.  on  March  21.  It  was  preceded 
by  a  brief  but  very  intense  artillery  fire 
which  was  composed  mainly  of  high  ex- 


84 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


plosives  and  gas  shells.  Simultaneously 
a  heavy  artillery  fire  broke  out  in  the 
Champagne  and  Lorraine  sectors  with 
the  obvious  purpose  of  preventing  the 
bringing  up  of  reinforcements  to  the 
vital   places    attacked.      The   Germans 


From  Current  History  Magazine,  published  by  the 
New  York  Times  Co. 

Shaded  Portions  Show  Total  Gains  of  the 
Great  German  Offensive.  The  Numerals 
Indicate  the  Sequence  of  the  Four  Battles 
or  Phases.  The  Drive  on  the  Somme  was 
Launched  March  21,  that  in  Flanders 
April  9,  the  Champagne  Drive  May  27,  and 
the  Offensive  on  the  Oise  June  9. 


also  bombarded  Paris  with  a  long  range 
gun  placed  in  the  forest  of  St.  Gobain, 
approximately  75  miles  away.  This 
gun  killed  many  civilians  and  did  much 
material  damage  in  Paris,  but  instead 
of  causing  the  Parisians  to  become 
panicky,  it  seemed  to  renew  their  grim 
determination  to  carry  on.  The  battle 
line  of  the  German  offensive  extended 
from  southeast  of  Arras  in  the  direction 


of  Cambrai,  as  far  as  La  Fere.     The 
first  infantry  attack  broke  through  the 
first  and  second  lines  of  British  trenches 
on  a  16-mile  front  from  Lagnicourt  to 
just  south  of  Gouzeaucourt.     The  re- 
sult of  this  attack  was  the  evacuation 
of  the  British  positions  in  the  salient 
that  remained  after  the  battle  of  Cam- 
brai at  the  close  of  1917.     On  the  22nd, 
the  Germans  after  more  heavy  artillery 
preparation  smashed  through  the  entire 
British  position  along  the  whole  front. 
The   British  5th  army  was   now   com- 
pletely   cut    off    from    the    permanent 
French  position  at  La  Fere  and  the  per- 
manent British  positions  at  Arras.    Be- 
tween   these    two    points    there    was    a 
struggling  mass  of  humanity  with  prac- 
tically no   organization  as   far   as   the 
Allies  were  concerned.      The   Teutonic 
armies  were  advancing  along  the  road 
to  Peronne  and  Albert,  along  the  direct 
route  from  St.  Quentin  to  Amiens,  and 
down   the   Oise   river  valley   along  two 
roads,  one  of  which  led  to  Paris  and  the 
other  to  the  south  of  Amiens.    For  four 
days  it  seemed  certain  that  the  German 
plan  was  to  succeed  and  a  permanent 
wedge  inserted  between  the  French  and 
the  British   armies.      On  the  23rd   the 
British  were  defeated  near  Monchy,  St. 
Quentin,  La  Fere,   and  opposite  Cam- 
brai,  and  the  British  second  positions 
between    Fontaine    les     Croiselles     and 
Moeuvres  were  penetrated.      The  Allies 
hoped  to  be  able  to  hold  the  line  of  the 
Somme,  but  were  unable  to  do  so  be- 
cause  no   adequate   defenses   had   been 
constructed    there.      On   the    24th    the 
Germans    took   Peronne,    Chauny,    and 
Ham,  and  crossed  the  Somme  river  at 
various  points  south  of  the  first  men- 
tioned  place,   by  means   of  a   pontoon 
bridge    and    rafts.      The    British   were 
unable  to  completely  destroy  the  bridge 
because  of  the  haste  with  which   they 
were  withdrawing  their  artillery. 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


85 


Continuing  to  advance  on  the  25th, 
the  Germans  captured  Bapaume,  Nesle, 
Etalon,  Barleux,  Biaches,  and  Guis- 
card.  On  this  day  the  French  War 
Office  announced  that  British  lines  south 
of  St.  Quentin  and  around  Noyon  had 
been  taken  over  by  a  French  army,  thus 
showing  that  at  last  the  Allies  were 
making  some  successful  attempts  to 
stem  the  tide  of  invasion.  On  the  26th, 
the  Germans  crossed  the  old  battle  line 
of  1916  in  several  places  and  captured 
Noyon,  Roye,  and  Lihon.  The  26th 
was  the  decisive  day  of  the  Battle  of 
Picardy.  This  day  saw  the  closing  of 
the  gap  caused  by  the  breakthrough  of 
the  21st.  The  French  came  up  along 
the  southern  front  from  the  Oise  to  the 
Avre,  and  west  of  the  Avre,  where  they 
united  with  the  British  at  Moreiul. 
The  26th  also  saw  the  organization  of 
a  new  British  army  under  General  San- 
deman  Carey,  who  had  received  orders 
to  hold  a  gap  made  by  the  Germans. 
With  rare  judgment  and  skill  he  impro- 
vised an  army  from  sappers,  laborers, 
engineers,  in  fact  anybody  he  could  find, 
and  with  this  cosmopolitan  army  faced 
the  Germans  for  six  days,  fighting  over 
unknown  ground,  and  with  officers  in 
charge  of  men  they  had  never  seen 
before. 

A  word  should  be  mentioned  here  of 
the  method  used  by  the  Germans  to  re- 
lieve men  who  were  exhausted  by  con- 
stant attacking  or  shot  to  pieces  by  the 
heroic  British  resistance.  Reserve  di- 
visions were  kept  directly  behind  the 
battle  line  and  when  advanced  divisions 
needed  replacement,  the  reserves  were 
passed  through  the  forward  divisions, 
and  the  latter  were  rested  and  reformed, 
and  then  they  became  the  reserve.  By 
this  means  the  Germans  were  able  to 
continually  present  fresh  men  to  the 
British,  who  had  been  fighting  without 
rest  or  relief  since  the  tremendous  battle 


began.  Another  thing  to  be  noticed 
about  this  battle  was  the  ease  with  which 
the  Germans  were  able  to  manoeuvre 
their  attacking  columns.  The  attack 
was  made  with  three  or  four  columns  of 
several  divisions  each,  and  when  they 
were  stopped  in  one  direction  they  were 
able  to  turn  without  loss  of  power  in 
another  direction.  As  most  of  the  new 
ideas  worked  out  in  this  battle  were  de- 
vised by  von  Hutier,  this  plan  of  attack 
became  known  as  the  von  Hutier 
method.  Many  of  its  features  were 
later  adopted  by  the  Allies. 

The  27th  saw  the  first  perceptible 
signs  of  the  slowing  up  of  the  German 
forward  movement.  The  British,  now 
reinforced,  checked  the  Germans,  and 
recaptured  Morlancourt  and  Chipilly 
north  of  the  Somme,  and  advanced  to 
Proyart  south  of  the  Somme.  These 
gains  were  offset,  however,  by  the  cap- 
ture of  Albert  and  the  crossing  of  the 
Ancre  river  north  and  south  of  that 
city,  and  forcing  of  the  French  back- 
wards east  of  Montdidier.  The  28th  saw 
the  fall  of  Montdidier,  but  it  also  saw 
the  complete  repulse  of  a  tremendous 
German  attack  on  Arras.  The  artillery 
preparation  was  terrific  and  the  Ger- 
mans' orders  were  not  only  to  take  the 
city  but  Vimy  Ridge  also,  at  all  costs. 
The  Germans  used  about  20  divisions 
in  this  huge  effort,  and  after  suffering 
appalling  losses,  which  materially  re- 
duced their  numbers,  were  compelled  to 
give  up  the  attempt,  after  an  all  day 
battle  which  equalled  in  intensity  any- 
thing that  the  war  had  produced. 

The  German  effort  had  now  almost 
spent  itself  and  the  German  High  Com- 
mand found  itself  caught  in  a  rather 
difficult  position.  The  Germans  had 
pushed  a  35-mile  salient  towards 
Amiens,  which  was  quite  narrow  at  its 
extreme  tip.  The  northern  side  of  the 
salient    was    bounded    roughly    by    the 


86 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Ancre  river,  and  the  southern  side  by 
the  Avre.  These  water  barriers  were, 
comparatively  speaking,  no  protection 
to  the  French  and  British,  but  the  high 
ground  on  the  allied  sides  was  an  ideal 
spot  for  artillery  emplacements,  which 
commanded  all  the  German  positions  in 
the  tip  of  the  salient.  The  German 
problem  was  to  break  the  sides  of  this 
wedge  and  broaden  the  salient  or  face 
a  possible  disaster.  The  attempt  at 
Arras,  as  has  been  noted  above,  failed. 
During  the  first  week  of  April  tremen- 
dous assaults  were  made  from  Albert  at 
the  Ancre  line  on  the  north,  and  on  the 
Avre  line  from  Grivesnes  to  north  of 
the  Amiens-Roye  road  on  the  south. 
Although  local  successes  were  gained  by 
the  Germans,  they  failed  in  their  main 
purpose,  i.  e.,  breaking  the  lines  of  the 
Avre  and  the  Ancre  and  widening  the 
salient.  The  chief  reason  for  this  was 
the  time  element,  which  had  permitted 
the  British  and  French  to  bring  up  men 
and  guns  and  thus  to  stabilize  their 
lines.  Another  contributory  cause  was 
the  fact  that  a  heavy  rain  had  turned 
the  Somme  battlefield  into  a  desolate 
sea  of  mud,  and  hindered  the  Germans' 
transportation  of  men,  munitions,  and 
supplies. 

The  failure  during  the  first  week  of 
April  to  smash  the  sides  of  the  Amiens 
salient  ended  what  might  be  called  the 
Second  Battle  of  the  Somme  as  well  as 
the  Battle  of  Picardy.  As  to  results 
the  main  German  plan  was  frustrated. 
The  French  and  British  were  still  united 
and  held  strong  defensive  positions. 
The  Germans  had  taken  practically  all 
the  ground  they  held  at  the  beginning 
of  the  Battle  of  the  Somme  in  1916, 
and  some  more  besides,  approximately 
1,500  square  miles.  A  report  from  Ber- 
lin stated  that  90,000  prisoners,  1,300 
guns,  and  100  tanks  had  been  captured. 
The  British  maintained  that  these  fig- 


ures were  too  high,  but  to  neutral  critics 
and  observers  they  seem  approximately 
correct.  Both  sides  suffered  severe 
losses.  A  conservative  estimate  would 
place  the  German  casualties  at  a  quar- 
ter of  a  million  men,  while  the  Allies' 
were  probably  50,000  less.  Most  of  the 
Allies'  losses  were  borne  by  the  British. 
Ferdinand  Foch — Allied  Commander- 
in-Chief. — The  terrific  blow  struck  at 
the  British  5th  army  on  the  21st  of 
March,  with  the  subsequent  demoraliza- 
tion and  almost  complete  defeat  of  the 
Allies,  compelled  them  to  take  a  step, 
which  up  to  this  time  they  had  been 
loath  to  do.  That  was  to  appoint  one 
man  as  the  leader  of  all  the  Allied 
armies.  It  is  idle  to  speculate  on  what 
might  have  happened  if  this  had  been 
done  previously?  but  many  critics  have 
stated  that  the  great  March  disaster 
would  have  been  avoided  under  a  unified 
command.  On  November  12,  1917, 
after  the  creation  of  the  Supreme  War 
Council,  Lloyd  George  said  concerning 
it,  "...  The  Italian  disaster  necessi- 
tated action  without  delay  to  repair  it. 
...  It  is  true  we  sent  troops  to  Saloniki 
to  succor  Serbia,  but  as  always  they 
were  sent  too  late.  Half  the  men  who 
fell  in  the  vain  effort  to  pierce  the 
Western  Front  in  September  that  year 
would  have  saved  Serbia,  saved  the  Bal- 
kans, and  completed  the  blockade  of 
Germany  .  .  .  1915  was  the  year  of  the 
Serbian  tragedy;  1916  was  the  year  of 
the  Rumanian  tragedy,  which  was  a 
repetition  of  the  Serbian  story  almost 
without  change.  .  .  .  National  and  pro- 
fessional traditions,  questions  of  pres- 
tige and  susceptibilities,  all  conspired  to 
render  our  best  decisions  vain.  .  .  .  The 
war  has  been  prolonged  by  particular- 
ism. It  will  be  shortened  by  solidarity." 
(See  above.)  These  words  seemed  to 
point  to  a  unified  command,  but  Lloyd 
George  was   compelled  to   go   back  on 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


87 


them,  because  the  British  General  Staff, 
which  was  opposed  to  the  scheme,  was 
too  influential  with  the  British  public 
and  Parliament.  The  move  was  charac- 
terized as  an  attempt  to  subordinate 
the  military  to  the  political  leaders. 
But  Allied  failure  on  the  western  front, 
such  as  at  Cambrai,  the  collapse  of 
Italy  and  the  colossal  defeat  just  suf- 
fered by  the  British  arms,  converted  the 
British  public  to  Lloyd  George's  point 
of  view. 

Ever  since  the  United  States  entered 
the  war,  President  Wilson  had  argued 
unity  of  command  as  well  as  the  pooling 
of  all  the  resources  of  the  Allies.  When 
the  Germans  struck  in  March,  General 
Pershing  offered  the  small  American 
forces  in  France  to  the  Allies  for  use  in 
any  way  they  saw  fit,  either  to  be  used 
as  an  independent  unit  or  to  be  broken 
up  and  brigaded  with  the  British  or  the 
French.  This  act  on  the  part  of  the 
American  commander  finally  overruled 
the  last  objections  on  the  part  of  the 
British  Staff.  General  Foch,  whose 
ability,  achievements,  and  popularity, 
in  the  allied  countries,  eminently  fitted 
him  for  the  task,  was  named  commander- 
in-chief  of  all  the  Allied  armies.  His 
first  statement  was  an  assurance  that 
Amiens  would  not  fall.  In  all  the  coun- 
tries involved  he  was  heartily  welcomed 
as  the  savior  of  the  world  by  the  press 
and  the  public.  Painleve's  words 
spoken  at  the  same  time  as  those  of 
Lloyd  George,  quoted  above,  now  be- 
came an  actuality.  "A  single  front,  a 
single  army,  a  single  nation — that  is  the 
programme  requisite  for  future  vic- 
tory." 

The  Battle  of  the  Lys  River. — As  has 
been  stated  above  the  German  High 
Command  found  itself,  during  the  first 
week  of  April,  in  a  rather  dangerous 
salient  from  which  it  was  unable  to  ex- 
tricate  itself.      A   stable   position   had 


been  reached  by  the  Allies,  and,  if  they 
were  to  be  driven  back,  considerable 
more  men  and  guns  than  the  Germans 
had  brought  along  with  them  on  their 
35-mile  advance  would  be  necessary. 
Possibly  as  a  result  of  the  von  Hutier 
idea  of  changing  the  direction  of  the 
attack  or  possibly  as  a  result  of  the 
check  they  received  before  Amiens,  the 
Germans  suddenly  launched  an  attack 
between  the  high  ground  north  of  Ypres 
and  Arras.  The  main  part  of  the  at- 
tack was  aimed  between  the  first  men- 
tioned positions  and  La  Bassee,  astride 
the  Lys  River.  The  Teutonic  strategy 
was  practically  the  same  as  that  used  in 
the  Battle  of  Picardy.  Instead  of  try- 
ing to  separate  the  French  from  the 
British,  the  plan  was  to  separate  the 
British  army  at  Ypres  from  that  at 
Arras,  and  then  roll  up  each  part  and 
reach  the  channel  ports.  A  successful 
breakthrough  would  mean  that  the 
British  army  at  Arras  would  be  almost 
automatically  thrown  back  upon  the 
British  and  French  armies  that  had  re- 
treated during  the  great  March  offen- 
sive. Apparently  the  Germans  hoped 
to  create  a  gap  in  the  British  forces 
under  the  command  of  General  Home, 
as  they  had  done  in  Gough's  5th  army 
the  previous  month,  and  then  pour 
through  the  gap  and  spread  out.  This 
was  another  feature  of  the  von  Hutier 
method  of  attack.  This  was  usually 
accomplished  by  concentrating  a  huge 
mass  of  men  on  a  relatively  small  front. 
A  breakthrough  of  any  size  would  seri- 
ously imperil  the  channel  ports,  inas- 
much as  the  British  had  scarcely  40 
miles  to  manoeuvre  in.  An  advance 
similar  to  that  before  Amiens  would 
have  resulted  in  the  capture  of  Calais, 
one  of  the  chief  bases  of  supply  of  the 
British  armies.  The  chief  objectives  of 
the  first  German  thrust  were  Bethune, 
Bailleul,    and    Hazebrouck.     The    last 


88 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


named  place  was  a  little  over  15  miles 
from  the  starting  place  of  the  attack, 
and  if  captured  meant  the  fall  of  Ypres 
and  the  dislocation  of  the  entire  railway 
line  behind  the  British  and  Belgian 
armies. 

On  April  9,  the  German  High  Com- 
mand struck  at  a  portion  of  the  line  be- 
tween Estaires  and  Bac  St.  Maur,  held 
by  a  Portuguese  division,  and  smashed 
it  completely,  capturing  Richebourcq- 
St.  Vaast  and  Laventie.  This  attack 
created  a  gap  of  about  three  miles  in 
the  British  lines  and  through  this  open- 
ing German  troops  began  to  pour  and 
spread  out  in  ever  increasing  numbers. 
On  the  10th,  the  Germans  crossed  the 
Lys  river  at  several  points  between 
Estaires  and  Armentieres,  and  launched 
a  terrific  assault  at  the  base  of  Mes- 
sines  Ridge,  which  resulted  in  the  cap- 
ture of  the  village  and  forest  of  Ploeg- 
steert.  These  movements  caused  the 
fall  of  Armentieres,  which  had  been  en- 
circled', and  its  garrison,  amounting  to 
several  thousand  men.  Attempts  to 
take  Givenchy  and  Festubert  in  the 
La  Bassee  sector  were  frustrated  after 
a  day  of  bitter  fighting  (the  11th).  On 
the  same  day  the  Germans  launched  an 
attack  all  along  the  front  from  La 
Bassee  to  the  Ypres-Comines  Canal  and 
took  Estaires  and  Steenwerck.  The 
Teutons  as  in  their  previous  offensive 
were  making  rapid  advances  in  the  cen- 
tre toward  Hazebrouck,  but  were 
checked  by  the  defenses  around  the 
wings  at  Ypres  and  Arras.  Unless  one 
or  the  other  of  these  wings  could  be 
pierced  the  German  advance  was  bound 
to  be  stopped  before  it  could  reach  its 
rrtain  objective  at  Hazebrouck.  On  the 
12th,  Merville  was  taken  and  by  the 
next  day  the  Germans  were  only  five 
miles  from  Hazebrouck.  The  serious- 
ness of  the  British  position  may  be 
gathered  from  General  Haig's  statement 


to  his  troops  on  April  12.  "...  Many 
among  us  are  now  tired.  To  those  I 
would  say  that  victory  will  belong  to 
the  side  which  holds  out  the  longest. 
.  .  .  Every  position  must  be  held  to  the 
last  man.  There  must  be  no  retirement. 
With  our  backs  to  the  wall,  and  believ- 
ing in  the  justice  of  our  cause,  each  one 
of  us  must  fight  to  the  end.  The  safety 
of  our  homes  and  the  freedom  of  man- 
kind depend  alike  upon  the  conduct  of 
each  one  of  us  at  this  critical  moment." 

On  the  14th,  it  appeared  that  the 
German  offensive  had  slowed  up.  They 
were  held  on  both  wings  and  in  the  cen- 
tre of  the  salient,  the  British  making  a 
particularly  desperate  resistance  at 
Neuve  Eglise.  The  Allies,  however,  met 
with  severe  reverses  on  the  15th.  The 
heroic  defenders  of  Neuve  Eglise  were 
forced  out  and  a  terrific  assault  towards 
Bailleul  and  Wulverghem  resulted  in  the 
capture  of  Bailleul,  Wytschaete,  and 
Spanbroekmolen.  On  the  17th,  the 
British  after  a  bitter  attack  recaptured 
Wytschaete,  but  were  almost  immedi- 
ately driven  out  again.  On  this  same 
day  the  Germans  occupied  Poelcappelle, 
Langemarck,  and  Passchendaele,  which 
the  British  were  compelled  to  evacuate, 
in  order  to  escape  the  dangers  of  a 
salient,  the  base  of  supplies  of  which 
was  nearer  to  the  Germans  than  to  the 
British  themselves. 

The  capture  of  Wytschaete  placed 
the  British  positions  around  Ypres  in 
a  very  precarious  situation.  Messines 
Ridge  on  which  this  was  located  domi- 
nated all  the  British  positions  in  Ypres 
and  overlooked  the  means  of  communi- 
cation with  that  city.  The  capture  of 
Messines  Ridge  and  the  consequent  pos- 
sibility of  cutting  off  Ypres,  further 
seriously  endangered  the  British  posi- 
tions on  Passchendaele  Ridge,  which  had 
been  captured  by  the  British  at  a  tre- 
mendously   heavy    cost    (estimated    at 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


89 


500,000  men)  in  the  closing  months  of 
1917.  (See  above.)  In  order  to  pre- 
vent a  serious  catastrophe  the  British 
retired  to  a  line  that  ran  from  Bix- 
schoote  to  the  neighborhood  of  Zonne- 
beke.  As  noted  above  the  British  failed 
to  re-take  Mcssines  Ridge  on  the  17th. 
This  failure  compelled  them  to  give  up 
more  ground,  so  that  on  the  18th  their 
positions  were  almost  identical  with 
those  they  held  after  the  first  Battle  of 
Ypres  in  1914.  The  surrender  of  this 
territory  was  a  terrible  blow  to  British 
morale  and  pride.  The  first  and  second 
Battles  of  Ypres  had  made  that  city,  in 
the  eyes  of  all  Englishmen,  what  Ver- 
dun was  to  the  Frenchmen.  The  slo- 
gan, "They  shall  not  pass,"  applied  to 
both  historic  cities.  While  it  is  true 
that  Ypres  did  not  fall  it  was  certainly 
on  the  verge  of  falling  several  times. 
Later  events,  however,  proved  that  the 
resultant  shortening  of  the  British  lines 
strengthened  their  general  position. 
On  the  18th  and  19th  the  British  lines, 
both  new  and  old,  held  everywhere,  and 
French  reserves  had  arrived  and  were 
immediately  in  action  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  BailleuL 

The  Germans,  checked  for  the  time 
being  in  the  north,  made  a  heavy  assault 
on  Villers  Bretonneux,  southeast  of 
Amiens,  on  the  24th.  With  the  aid  of  a 
number  of  tanks  (used  for  the  first  time 
since  the  great  offensive  began),  they 
captured  the  village.  At  the  same  time 
just  south  of  this  French  and  American 
forces  were  compelled  to  abandon  an 
unimportant  salient  near  Hangard,  in 
the  valley  of  the  Luce  river. 

Mount  Kemmel,  which  seemed  to  be 
the  only  remaining  key  to  the  Ypres 
salient,  was  the  scene  of  extremely  bit- 
ter fighting  from  April  24th  to  the 
27th.  The  Germans,  prodigal  of  men 
as  at  Verdun,  made  frontal  and  flank 
attacks  on  the  positions,  until  by  sheer 


weight  of  men  and  metal,  they  compelled 
the  British  and  French  to  relinquish  the 
height,  as  well  as  the  villages  of  Kemmel 
and  Dranoutre.  Hundreds  of  French- 
men refused  to  retreat  and  fought  until 
they  were  killed,  wounded  or  captured. 
The  foggy  weather  again  permitted  the 
Germans  to  creep  up  to  the  allied  po- 
sitions before  they  were  discovered.  It 
is  stated  that  the  losses  suffered  by  Gen- 
eral von  Arnim's  army  were  so  great 
that  he  was  unable  to  follow  up  the 
fruits  of  his  victory.  Ypres  did  not 
fall  as  was  expected  because  of  the  fail- 
ure on  the  part  of  the  Germans  to  cap- 
ture Mont  Rouge,  Mont  des  Cats, 
Scherpenberg,  and  several  other  hills 
that  belonged  to  the  same  range  as 
Mount  Kemmel.  Heavy  attacks  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Voormezelle,  Scherpen- 
berg, and  Mont  Rouge,  were  repulsed 
with  such  heavy  losses  that  von  Arnim 
was  compelled  to  intrench  and  accept 
a  defensive  attitude.  As  a  result,  be- 
fore fighting  died  down  on  this  front 
about  the  middle  of  May,  the  French 
and  British  won  local  successes  between 
Locre  and  Dranoutre  (May  5)  and 
Hill  44,  north  of  Kemmel  (May  12). 
German  offensives  toward  Bethune  and 
south  of  Dickebusch  Lake  not  only 
failed,  but  were  followed  by  Allied 
counter-attacks  which  won  back  consid- 
erable ground.  Thus  ended  the  second 
great  German  thrust.  It  failed  to  ac- 
complish its  purpose,  although  approxi- 
mately 800  square  miles  of  French  and 
Belgian  territory  were  occupied.  The 
significant  fact  that  remained  after 
these  two  German  attempts  to  gain  a 
decision,  was,  that  the  15-mile  front  be- 
tween Lens  and  Arras  held.  This  pre- 
vented the  Germans  from  broadening 
their  salients  and  thus,  in  a  sense,  lim- 
ited the  depth  of  their  penetration,  in- 
asmuch as  a  narrow  salient  is  constant- 
ly in  danger  of  being  "pinched." 


90 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


The  Forcing  of  the  Aisne  and  the 
Marne. — As  has  been  stated  above,  the 
purpose  of  the  second  great  German  of- 
fensive was  to  broaden  the  Picardy 
salient  on  its  northern  side  so  that  the 
tip  could  be  made  wider  and  thus  per- 
mit the  centre  to  advance.  The  fact 
that  the  defensive  around  Arras,  par- 
ticularly Vimy  Ridge,  and  around 
Ypres,  particularly  Mont  Rouge,  held 
against  all  assaults,  forced  the  Germans 
to  turn  to  the  southern  side  of  the 
Picardy  salient  and  attempt  to  widen 
it  there.  Although  their  initial  suc- 
cesses were  great,  they  failed  to  achieve 
their  object  and  merely  created  a  new 
salient  similar  to  those  before  Amiens 
and  in  the  vicinity  of  Ypres.  From  the 
point  of  view  of  attrition,  the  third  of- 
fensive, which  reached  the  Marne  at 
Chateau-Thierry,  was  really  an  allied 
victory,  inasmuch  as  no  real  strategical 
gain  resulted,  despite  the  sacrifice  of 
great  numbers  of  men  and  a  vast  quan- 
tity of  material.  The  Germans  struck 
on  a  30-mile  front,  which  was  later  ex- 
tended 20  miles  further  in  the  direction 
of  Noyon.  When  the  offensive  ended 
they  had  penetrated  30  miles,  but  their 
fighting  front  had  been  reduced  to  six 
miles.  Attempts  to  broaden  this  failed, 
and  a  salient,  dangerous  for  the  Ger- 
mans, was  formed. 

A  few  days  previous  to  the  beginning 
of  the  Battle  of  the  Aisne  heavy  artil- 
lery fire  in  the  Picardy  and  Ypres  sali- 
ents seemed  to  presage  an  attack  in 
those  localities.  When  the  real  direc- 
tion of  the  attack  was  revealed  and  the 
Germans  forced  the  Chemin  des  Dames 
positions  and  the  Aisne  river  with  com- 
parative ease,  many  critics  believed  that 
Marshal  Foch  had  been  out-generalled 
and  out-manoeuvred.  Later  events 
proved  that  he  had  adopted  the  best 
course  of  action,  because,  while  he  could 
doubtlessly  have  held  these  positions  at 


great  cost,  he  achieved  far  better  results 
by  permitting  the  Germans  to  ad- 
vance in  the  centre,  while  holding  them 
on  the  wings,  thus  placing  them  in  a 
vulnerable  position. 

On  the  27th  of  May  the  third  Ger- 
man offensive  began.  As  in  the  previ- 
ous two,  great  concentrations  of  men 
and  material  were  made  by  the  Ger- 
mans with  comparative  ease,  and  ap- 
parently without  the  knowledge  of  the 
allies.  The  ability  to  concentrate  large 
forces  on  a  comparatively  limited  front 
was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  Germans, 
not  only  were  fighting  on  interior  lines, 
but  had  a  railway  system  which  radi- 
ated like  the  spokes  of  a  wheel  from  the 
hub  to  the  rim.  The  Allies  had  to 
travel  all  around  the  rim  before  they 
could  even  bring  up  reinforcements.  A 
three-hour  artillery  preparation,  com- 
posed mainly  of  gas  with  a  sprinkling 
of  high  explosives,  preceded  the  infan- 
try attack.  The  attacking  force  com- 
prised 250,000  of  the  best  fighting  men 
in  the  German  army.  The  British  and 
French  defenders  consisted  of  between 
50,000  and  75,000  men.  The  attack 
was  on  a  40-mile  front  from  around 
Vauxaillon,  near  the  Ailette,  to  Rheims. 
The  chief  attack  was  near  Craonne  and 
its  purpose  was  to  outflank  the  Chemin 
des  Dames,  in  case  it  could  not  be  taken 
by  frontal  assault.  The  entire  Chemin 
des  Dames  line  was  overrun  on  the  27th, 
and  the  Allies  retreated  across  the  Aisne 
between  Vailly  and  Berry-au-Bac,  a  dis- 
tance of  18  miles,  in  relatively  good  or- 
der. On  the  28th,  the  Germans  drove 
forward  about  six  miles  on  a  9-mile 
front,  between  Vauxaillon  and  Cauroy, 
took  about  20  towns  and  villages, 
crossed  the  Aisne  and  Vesle  rivers,  and 
reached  Fismes  on  the  southern  bank 
of  the  latter  river.  The  allies  were  fall- 
ing back  in  the  centre,  but  on  the 
Rheims    side    they    held    the    Thillois- 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


91 


Savigny-Brouillet  line  which  protected 
the  city.  An  attempt  was  made  to  do 
the  same  on  the  western  side  to  protect 
Soissons,  but  the  line  failed  to  hold. 
The  same  day  also  saw  the  end  of  the 
German  assaults  in  the  Ypres  and 
Picardy  sectors,  which  were  intended  to 
divert  attention  from  the  main  battle. 
The  Allies  recovered  their  lines  on  the 
Lys-Ypres  front  east  of  Dickebusch 
Lake  and  the  Americans  took  Cantigny, 
near  Montdidier,  after  a  brilliant  as- 
sault, and  held  it  against  several  strong 
counter-attacks. 

On  the  29th,  Soissons  fell  after  an 
extremely  heavy  bombardment  of  high 
explosive  and  incendiary  shells.  Bitter 
street  fighting  occurred  in  which  the 
French  were,  at  first,  uniformly  success- 
ful, but  as  German  reinforcements  were 
continually  arriving,  they  were  finally 
compelled  to  retire.  Soissons,  an  un- 
fortified city,  was  a  smoking  ruin.  On 
the  30th,  the  Germans  continued  their 
advance  in  the  centre  but  were  checked 
on  the  flanks.  They  captured  Fere-en- 
Tardenois  and  Vezilly,  and  forced  the 
Allies  back  on  Rheims,  but  in  the  west 
were  held  along  the  Soissons-Chateau- 
Thierry  highroad.  They  succeeded  in 
wiping  out  the  salient  south  of  Noyon 
from  the  Oise  canal  to  Soissons.  The 
31st  saw  an  8-mile  drive  to  the  Marne, 
which  was  reached  on  a  6-mile  front 
from  Chateau-Thierry  to  Dormans. 
Attempts  in  the  next  few  days  to 
broaden  this  front,  particularly  in  the 
direction  of  Epernay,  were  severely  re- 
pulsed. 

On  June  1st,  the  Germans  began  to 
widen  this  salient  to  the  westward. 
They  pushed  six  miles  in  that  direction 
along  the  Ourcq,  a  tributary  of  the 
Marne.  This  push  brought  them  be- 
yond Neuilly  and  Chony,  and  reached 
Nouvron  and  Fontenoy  northwest  of 
Soissons.     A     heavy     assault     against 


Rheims,  with  the  intention  of  smashing 
the  eastern  side  of  the  salient,  was  se- 
verely checked  before  it  made  any  head- 
way. The  tide  of  battle  was  now  slowly 
but  surely  swinging  to  the  side  of  the 
Allies.  Although  the  Germans  had  al- 
most half  a  million  men  across  the 
Aisne,  General  Foch,  by  calling  on 
British,  French,  Italian,  and  American 
reserves,  presented  at  least  an  equal 
number  to  them.  On  the  next  day 
French  counter-attacks  in  force  slowed 
up  the  German  drive  westward.  The 
latter  captured  Troesnes,  Longport, 
Corey,  and  Faverolles,  but  were  almost 
immediately  thrown  out  again  after  ex- 
tremely bitter  fighting.  Faverolles 
changed  hands  several  times,  but  ulti- 
mately remained  in  the  hands  of  the 
Allies.  On  the  3rd,  the  Germans  gained 
slightly  west  of  Nouvron  and  Fontenoy 
and  advanced  a  short  distance  west  of 
Chateau-Thierry. 

The  German  advance  had  now  prac- 
tically stopped  and  during  the  next  few 
days,  the  French,  with  the  assistance  of 
the  Americans,  not  only  stopped  the 
Germans,  but  drove  them  back  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Chateau-Thierry.  On 
June  6,  Franco-American  troops  ad- 
vanced nearly  a  mile  in  the  vicinity  of 
Veuilly-la-Poterie,  and  American  ma- 
rines advanced  more  than  two  miles  on 
a  3-mile  front  northwest  of  Chateau- 
Thierry.  On  the  next  day  Veuilly-la- 
Poterie  was  captured  and  the  Ameri- 
cans took  Torcy  and  Bouresches,  which 
they  held  against  strong  counter  as- 
saults. The  subsequent  activities  of  the 
Americans  in  this  sector  will  be  treated 
in  the  section  dealing  with  the  Battle 
of  the  Oise.  On  June  18,  a  terrific 
attack  on  Rheims,  carried  out  by 
40,000  Germans,  was  completely 
crushed.  This  blow  was  similar  to  that 
against  Arras  during  the  first  German 
offensive  of  the  year. 


92 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


The  German  War  Office  announced 
that  they  had  taken  45,000  prisoners 
and  400  guns.  They  had  occupied  650 
square  miles  of  territory,  had  advanced 
a  maximum  depth  of  30  miles,  and  cre- 
ated another  salient  with  a  narrow  tip, 
only  six  miles  along  the  Marne.  No 
considerable  strategical  advantage  had 
been  gained,  unless  it  be  the  fact  that 
the  Germans  were  now  only  44  miles 
from  Paris  at  the  nearest  point,  instead 
of  62.  The  price  paid,  to  gain  what 
was  merely  a  geographical  advantage, 
was,  conservatively,  110,000  men,  killed, 
wounded,  and  captured. 

The  Battle  of  the  Oise. — The  Battle 
of  the  Aisne  and  Marne  left  the  Ger- 
mans in  a  very  precarious  position. 
The  salient  had  to  be  widened,  strongly 
fortified,  or  else,  abandoned.  The  line 
from  Chateau-Thierry  was  in  the  shape 
of  a  huge  crescent  with  the  bend  facing 
towards  the  Germans.  The  German 
plan  was  to  link  up  the  Picardy  salient 
with  theMarne  salient  and  thus  wipe  out 
the  hufje  bulge  in  their  line  and  besides 
capture  Compiegne,  Compiegne  Forest, 
and  Villers  Cotterets  Forest,  and  then 
use  the  first  mentioned  place  for  a  di- 
rect attack  on  Paris.  The  river  valleys 
of  the  Aisne,  Oise,  Marne,  and  Ourcq 
would  then  be  available  for  a  converg- 
ing attack  on  Paris,  the  nerve  centre  of 
France.  The  strategy  of  the  offensive 
was  sound  but  its  execution  failed.  In 
five  days  the  Germans  suffered  their 
most  ghastly  failure  of  the  whole  war. 
This  offensive  lacked  the  element  of  sur- 
prise, which,  undoubtedly,  was  the  chief 
cause  of  the  initial  successes  of  the 
earlier  offensives.  The  French  com- 
mand had  made  a  minute  survey  of  the 
field  and  placed  artillery  and  machine 
guns  in  such  positions  as  to  enfilade  all 
avenues  of  attack.  They  also  made 
provisions  in  case  of  initial  German  suc- 
cesses, to  check  their  forward  movement 


on  second  and  third  defense  lines,  as 
carefully  prepared  as  the  first.  The 
French  plan  was  to  hold  the  front  line 
lightly  and  resist  the  enemy  on  the  com- 
bat lines,  which  were  out  of  range  of 
the  German  light  artillery. 

The  attack  was  preceded  by  a  heavy 
artillery  attack,  again  mainly  composed 
of  gas,  which  lasted  from  midnight  un- 
til 4 :30  in  the  morning  of  the  9th  of 

o 

June.  The  Germans  endeavored  to 
bombard  the  back  areas  of  the  French 
front,  with  the  hope  of  breaking  up  the 
reserves,  which  were  known  to  be  con- 
centrated there.  Following  the  policy 
adopted  in  the  earlier  offensives,  heavy 
bombardments  were  carried  out  in  the 
Picardy  and  Armentieres  salients.  The 
attack  began  at  4 :30  in  the  morning  on 
a  20-mile  front  from  Montdidier  to 
Noyon.  As  in  the  previous  battles  the 
Germans  advanced  in  the  centre  but 
were  held  on  the  flanks.  The  total  ad- 
vance on  the  first  day  was  2%  miles  and 
was  only  attained  after  frightful  losses. 
The  Germans  captured  Ressons-sur- 
Matz  and  Mareuil-la-Motte.  The 
French  made  a  heavy  counter-attack  on 
the  very  first  day  between  the  Oise  and 
the  Aisne,  which  showed  that  the  forces 
on  both  sides  were  nearly  equal.  On 
the  next  day  the  Germans  advanced 
about  three  miles  further  and  captured, 
after  extremely  bitter  fighting,  Mery, 
Belloy,  and  St.  Maur.  They  also  ad- 
vanced from  Thiescourt  wood.  The 
Teuton  penetration  was  now  about  five 
miles  and  this  was  approximately  the 
depth  of  their  entire  advance. 

On  the  third  day  the  Germans  were 
compelled  to  bring  up  fresh  divisions, 
and,  with  their  aid,  reached  the  Aronde 
river,  a  small  stream  on  the  western  side 
of  the  battle  line.  They  also  advanced 
a  mile  along  both  banks  of  the  Matz 
river  and  almost  reached  its  junction 
with  the  Oise  on  its  northern  bank.     On 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


93 


the  eastern  end  of  the  battle  line,  Ours- 
camps  forest  was  enveloped.  This  day 
was  the  turning  point  of  the  battle,  be- 
cause, before  it  was  over,  two  French 
counter-attacks  had  driven  the  Germans 
back  between  Ribescourt  and  St.  Maur, 
and  recaptured  Belloy,  Senlis  wood, 
and  the  heights  between  Mortemer  and 
Courcelles.  They  also  captured  An- 
theuil,  but  were  compelled  to  give  up 
Ribescourt  and  some  ground  along  the 
Oise,  which  was  outflanked  by  the  drive 
along  the  Matz.  On  the  next  day  the 
French  gained  further  ground  between 
Belloy  and  St.  Maur.  The  Germans 
forced  a  crossing  of  the  Matz  and  oc- 
cupied Croix  Ricard,  Milicocq,  and  the 
heights  around  the  latter  place.  On 
the  13th,  the  French  again  counter- 
attacked in  force  and  drove  the  Ger- 
mans back  across  the  Matz.  They  also 
advanced  in  the  vicinity  of  Courcelles. 
This  ended  the  German  offensive  which 
resulted  in  the  using  up  of  over  300,000 
German  troops  and  the  actual  putting 
out  of  action  of  80,000. 

A  word  should  be  mentioned  here  of 
the  activities  of  the  Franco-American 
troops  in  the  neighborhood  of  Chateau- 
Thierry.  On  the  10th  the  American 
marines  moved  forward  in  the  Belleau 
wood  and  by  the  next  day  had  captured 
all  of  it.  The  Americans  also  crossed 
the  Marne  at  Chateau-Thierry  on 
scouting  expeditions.  In  the  Lys  river 
sector  the  British  checked  the  abortive 
German  offensive  carried  out  simultane- 
ous with  the  Battle  of  Oise  and  on  June 
15  captured  and  held  the  German  first- 
line  trenches  around  Bethune. 

The  Second  Battle  of  the  Marne. — 
On  July  15,  Ludendorff  opened  his  fifth 
and  what  proved  to  be  his  last  offen- 
sive of  the  year.  It  also  proved  to 
be  the  last  German  offensive  of  the 
war.  It  was  under  the  personal  direc- 
tion of  the  German  Crown  Prince  and 


was  called  "Friedensturm"  (peace  of- 
fensive). The  whole  line  attacked  was 
roughly  60  miles  long  and  extended 
from  Chateau-Thierry  to  Dormans, 
around  Rheims,  and  then  east  almost 
to  the  Argonne  Forest.  It  is  estimated 
that  the  German  Crown  Prince  had 
more  than  800,000  men  available  for 
this  "peace  offensive."  The  plan  of  at- 
tack was  to  encircle  and  capture  Rheims 
by  taking  the  Rheims  mountains,  and 
also  to  get  control  of  the  railway  centre 
at  Epernay,  which  would  compel  the 
French  to  give  up  the  entire  Champagne 
line,  which  was  very  strongly  fortified, 
and  thus  leave  the  centre  in  a  very  vul- 
nerable position. 

The  attack  began  at  six  o'clock  on 
the  morning  of  the  15th.  The  first  blow 
was  aimed  at  the  Americans  on  both 
sides  of  Chateau-Thierry.  The  attack 
on  Vaux  was  a  mere  diversion.  The 
Germans  crossed  the  Marne  in  force 
southeast  of  Chateau-Thierry  between 
Fossoy  and  Mezy,  compelling  the  Amer- 
icans to  retire  on  Conde-en-Brie.  Here 
a  counter-attack  was  immediately  or- 
ganized, which  drove  the  Germans  back 
across  the  river  and  left  1,500  prisoners 
in  American  hands.  On  other  portions 
of  the  front  the  Germans  were  more 
successful.  They  crossed  the  Marne 
east  of  Dormans  and  advanced  astride 
it  in  the  direction  of  Epernay.  At 
Bligny,  southwest  of  Rheims,  they  pene- 
trated positions  held  by  Italian  troops, 
and  thus  threatened  to  get  in  the  rear 
of  Rheims.  Southeast  of  Rheims,  the 
Germans  made  a  fierce  attack  east  of 
Prunay,  with  the  idea  of  squeezing  out 
the  city,  in  conjunction  with  the  ad- 
vance at  Bligny.  General  Gourand's 
troops  put  up  a  magnificent  resistance 
and  held  the  Germans  to  very  slight 
gains  after  ?tiflicting  appalling  losses  on 
them. 

On   the    16th   and   17th,   further   at- 


94 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


tacks  against  the  American  forces  were 
checked  almost  before  they  had  started, 
but  the  pockets  around  Bligny  and 
Prunay  southwest  and  southeast  of 
Rheims,  respectively,  were  deepened. 
Everywhere  else  the  Germans  were  held 
or  driven  back  by  counter-attacks.  The 
distance  across  the  base  of  the  Rheims 
salient  was  scarcely  10  miles,  which 
shows  the  critical  position  this  allied 
bulwark  was  in.  The  aspect  of  the  en- 
tire front  was  changed  on  the  18th, 
when  the  French  and  Americans  began 
an  offensive  from  the  Marne  to  the 
Aisne,  which  was  highly  successful,  and 
which  changed  a  dangerous  situation 
for  the  Allies  into  a  more  dangerous  one 
for  the  Germans.  It  is  estimated  that 
the  Crown  Prince  in  this  "peace  offen- 
sive" used  400,000  men,  just  one-half 
of  those  available,  and  that  at  the  end 
of  three  days  one-fourth  of  those  em- 
ployed were  on  the  casualty  list. 

The  "Pinching"  of  the  Marne  Salient. 
— Before  the  fifth  German  offensive  was 
launched  on  July  15,  Marshal  Foch 
was  considering  a  plan  of  counter- 
attack, drawn  up  by  General  Petain, 
in  conference  with  Generals  Fayolle, 
Mangin,  and  Degoutte.  This  plan  was 
approved  by  Marshal  Foch,  and  while 
the  Crown  Prince  was  attempting  to 
encircle  Rheims  and  cross  the  Marne 
the  details  were  being  worked  out.  As 
has  been  related  above,  various  at- 
tempts to  widen  the  Marne  salient  had 
failed.  As  a  result  of  these  failures, 
the  salient  was  entirely  too  deep  and 
narrow  to  be  safe.  The  Foch  plan  was 
to  strike  on  the  western  side  of  this 
salient,  along  the  line  between  Soissons 
and  Chateau-Thierry.  The  prepara- 
tions for  this  counter-attack  were  kept 
very  secret.  Vast  quantities  of  supplies 
were  stored  up  in  the  Villers-Cotterets 
forest,  which  lent  itself  admirably  to  the 
purpose.     Great  numbers  of  men  of  the 


army  of  manoeuvre  (the  existence  of 
which  the  Germans  doubted)  were  con- 
centrated in  the  ravines  and  valleys  of 
this  forest  without  detection  by  the 
enemy. 

For  several  weeks  previous  to  the 
launching  of  the  counter-offensive, 
small  local  attacks  had  prepared  the 
way  for  the  final  assault.  The  Allies  at- 
tacked on  July  18  on  a  28-mile  front 
from  Ambleny,  west  of  Soissons,  to 
Bouresches,  northwest  of  Chateau- 
Thierry.  It  was  made  without  artillery 
preparation,  the  advancing  infantry  be- 
ing protected  by  large  numbers  of  tanks 
and  a  creeping  barrage.  The  attack 
was  made  by  Franco-American  troops, 
the  latter  being  most  prominent  in  the 
Soissons  and  Chateau-Thierry  regions. 
The  blow  took  the  Germans  completely 
by  surprise,  and,  as  a  result  of  it,  and 
the  vulnerability  of  the  German  lines, 
the  Crown  Prince  and  his  armies  were 
driven  across  the  Vesle.  The  hinge  of 
the  entire  German  retirement  was  the 
high  ground  around  Chaudon,  south- 
west of  Soissons.  The  first  push  net- 
ted the  allies  a  six-mile  advance  to  the 
Crise  river,  which  runs  around  the 
Chaudun  plateau  and  which  joins  the 
Aisne  at  Soissons.  This  brought  Gen- 
eral Mangin  and  his  Franco-American 
forces  to  within  a  mile  of  the  city,  but 
the  German  High  Command  continued 
to  hurl  in  fresh  divisions  in  this  vicinity 
which  effectually  prevented  the  with- 
drawal from  becoming  a  rout.  The 
Allies  also  advanced  from  2  to  3  miles 
astride  the  Ourcq,  and  the  whole  Ger- 
man line  from  Soissons  to  Chateau- 
Thierry  began  to  retreat.  Assaults 
carried  out  by  British,  Italian,  and 
French  troops,  along  the  line  from  Cha- 
teau-Thierry to  Rheims,  won  initial 
successes,  but  were  unable  to  make  a 
breakthrough  similar  to  that  on  the 
western  side.     Ludendorff  was  practic- 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


95 


ing  Foch's  strategy  during  the  previ- 
ous drives,  i.  e.,  he  was  holding  his 
wings  while  the  centre  retired.  The 
Allies  captured  more  than  16,000 
prisoners  and  300  guns  in  the  first  two 
days.  By  the  20th  all  the  German 
troops  south  of  the  Marne  had  been 
forced  over  to  the  other  side. 

Chateau-Thierry  was  evacuated  on 
the  21st,  and  on  the  same  day  Franco- 
American  troops  crossed  the  Marne  and 
advanced  four  miles  toward  the  Ourcq. 
On  the  next  day  Epieds  was  captured 
after  several  strong  counter-attacks  be- 
tween the  Ourcq  and  the  Marne  had 
been  repulsed.  By  the  23rd  the  entire 
Soissons  -  Chateau  -  Thierry  highroad, 
with  the  exception  of  a  small  portion 
south  of  the  city  (Soissons),  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  Allies.  On  the  eastern  leg 
of  the  salient,  the  British  and  Italian 
troops  were  striving  to  break  through. 
At  Vrigny  and  Bouilly  they  achieved  lo- 
cal successes,  but  were  unable  to  make 
a  hole  big  enough  to  threaten  the  rear 
of  the  enemy.  They  did  keep  many 
German  divisions  actively  engaged 
which  might  otherwise  have  been  used 
to  stem  the  allied  advance.  So  far  the 
Allies  had  captured  25,000  prisoners 
and  more  than  400  guns.  Added  to 
these  was  a  great  amount  of  war  ma- 
terial which  the  Crown  Prince  had  gath- 
ered for  his  "peace  offensive"  of  July 
18.  On  the  24th  the  Franco-American 
forces  advanced  two  miles  north  of 
Chateau-Thierry  and  the  British  pene- 
trated the  German  lines  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Vrigny  on  the  eastern  leg  of 
the  salient.  On  the  next  day  the  Ger- 
mans made  a  heavy  assault  against  the 
eastern  leg,  with  the  hopes  of  widening 
the  salient,  but  they  were  thrown  back 
everywhere.  On  this  day  the  French 
captured  Oulchy  and,  together  with  the 
Americans,  occupied  40  square  miles  of 
territory.    After  a  week  of  severe  fight- 


ing, the  Crown  Prince  was  using  every 
effort  to  extricate  his  armies  in  the  best 
possible  shape  out  of  a  salient  the  neck 
of  which  was  scarcely  20  miles  wide. 
A  German  counter-offensive  was  practi- 
cally out  of  the  question. 

By  the  27th  the  Germans  were  in  full 
retreat  and  the  Franco-Americans  ad- 
vanced along  the  Ourcq  toward  Fere- 
en-Tardenois,  which  was  captured  the 
next  day.  On  the  28th  the  Germans 
abandoned  the  line  of  the  Ourcq,  and 
the  Allies  crossed  it  from  the  south. 
On  the  eastern  side  of  the  salient  the 
Allies  crossed  the  Rheims-Dormans 
highway  after  bitter  fighting.  This 
threat  to  completely  crush  the  Germans 
resulted  in  severe  fighting  in  the  vicinity 
of  Vrigny  and  St.  Euphraise.  The  ad- 
vance to  the  Vesle  river  was  marked  by 
extremely  heavy  fighting  between  the 
Prussian  Guards  and  the  American 
forces  at  Sergy  and  Seringes.  The 
former  place  changed  hands  nine  times 
and  the  latter  five  before  remaining  in 
the  hands  of  the  Americans.  On  the 
31st,  the  Germans  made  bitter  but  un- 
successful efforts  to  keep  the  Americans 
from  Nesles  Forest.  On  August  1  the 
allies  struck  on  a  10-mile  front  north 
of  Fere,  penetrated  two  miles,  captured 
the  height  north  of  Grand  Rozoy,  and 
advanced  to  Cramoiselles.  This  effec- 
tively broke  the  hinge  around  Soissons 
and  enabled  the  French  to  enter  the  city 
on  the  2nd  after  bitter  street  fighting. 
The  advance  on  the  3rd  was  six  miles 
deep  in  some  places  and  recovered  more 
than  50  villages,  the  most  important  of 
which  was  Fismes.  The  Germans  were 
now  completely  behind  the  Aisne-Vesle 
line  and  made  desperate  attempts  to 
hold  the  north  bank  of  the  latter  river 
with  the  aid  of  the  heavy  artillery  on 
the  far  side  of  the  Aisne.  The  results 
of  the  first  allied  offensive  of  the  year 
were   enormous — 35,000   prisoners   and 


96 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


more  than  500  guns  were  in  allied 
hands.  They  suffered  comparatively 
slight  losses.  The  Germans  at  home, 
as  well  as  in  the  field,  were  convinced 
that  their  armies  were  not  invincible. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Allies'  morale 
was  considerably  heightened. 

The  German  Retreat  to  the  Hinden- 
burg  Line. — On  August  8,  1918,  Mar- 
shal Foch  struck  his  second  great  blow. 
In  many  ways  it  resembled  the  Marne 
offensive.  His  aim  was  to  "pinch"  the 
over-extended  salient  in  Picardy,  reach- 
ing out  toward  Amiens.  He  was  mak- 
ing his  plans  and  preparations  for  this 
attack  while  the  offensive  was  being 
carried  out  on  the  Marne.  A  series  of 
local  successes  between  Montdidier  and 
Moreuii  resulted  in  the  capture  of  sev- 
eral admirable  "jumping-off"  places, 
such  as  Aubvillers  and  Sauvillers,  which 
were  located  on  the  heights  overlooking 
the  Avre  river.  The  immediate  objec- 
tive was  the  railroad  running  from 
Peronne  to  Roye. 

The  attack  was  on  a  front  approxi- 
mately 30  miles  long  from  Amiens  to 
Montdidier.  Later  this  front  was  ex- 
tended all  the  way  to  Soissons.  The 
element  of  surprise  was  entirely  with  the 
Allies.  The  misty  weather  which  ac- 
companied the  opening  of  the  attack 
was  strikingly  similar  to  that  during 
the  beginning  of  the  German  attack  on 
March  21.  The  allied  aircraft,  ar- 
tillery and  tanks,  worked  in  complete 
harmony  with  the  infantry.  The  Brit- 
ish under  General  Rawlinson  struck  the 
Germans  under  General  von  der  Mar- 
witz  before  Moreuii  and  in  three  days 
drove  them  back  15  miles  in  some  places 
and  an  average  of  10  miles  along  the 
entire  line.  Most  of  the  advance  was 
on  the  plateau  just  south  of  the  Somme 
river.  During  this  time  the  French  un- 
der General  Debeney,  who  were  sup- 
porting the  right  of  the  British,  crossed 


the  Avre  river,  in  the  face  of  an  ex- 
tremely destructive  artillery  fire,  and 
wiped  out  strong  enemy  positions,  which 
threatened  to  flank  Rawlinson's  ad- 
vance. When  he  had  accomplished  this, 
he  and  Rawlinson  began  a  concerted  ad- 
vance in  the  general  direction  of  the 
Hindenburg  Line.  On  the  13th,  Mont- 
didier fell  and  the  French  advanced  six 
miles  on  a  13-mile  front.  In  the  north 
the  British  with  the  aid  of  a  few  Amer- 
icans captured  Morlancourt  and  Chip- 
ply  ridge  and  advanced  on  Bray.  The 
Germans  had  retreated  by  the  18th  to 
the  Albert-Chaulnes-Roye-Lassigny  line 
and  had  lost  most  of  the  Lassigny  pla- 
teau. The  line  bears  a  striking  resem- 
blance to  the  old  Somme  battlefront  be- 
for  the  big  British  offensive  in  July, 
1916.  On  the  13th  the  French  struck 
between  the  Oise  and  the  Matz  rivers 
and  captured  Canny-sur-Matz.  This 
blow  also  threatened  Noyon,  since  that 
place  was  dominated  by  the  artillery 
along  the  banks  of  the  Oise. 

On  August  20,  General  Mangin,  with 
the  aid  of  American  troops,  launched 
an  offensive  from  the  Oise,  near  Ribe- 
court,  to  the  Aisne,  near  Soissons. 
This  was  a  part  of  Foch's  plan  to  keep 
the  whole  line  in  action  so  that  the 
German  High  Command  would  have 
great  difficulty  in  bringing  up  reserves. 
Probably  it  was  the  activity  of  the 
Franco-Americans  from  Montdidier  to 
Rheims  that  enabled  the  British  to  make 
such  huge  strides  to  the  Hindenburg 
Line  without  suffering  severe  losses. 
The  object  of  Mangin's  blow  was  to  se- 
cure the  control  of  the  plateau  between 
the  two  rivers.  On  the  21st  La  Pom- 
meraye  was  taken  and  the  French  in 
this  vicinity  had  reached  the  front  held 
before  the  Chemin  des  Dames  offensive. 
Ten  thousand  prisoners  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Franco-American  troops. 
On  the  same  day  Lassigny  fell  and  the 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


97 


Germans  evacuated  Ourscamps  forest, 
which  was  outflanked  by  the  advance 
on  both  sides  of  the  Oise.  On  the  23rd, 
the  French  advanced  seven  miles  along 
the  front  from  Lassigny  to  north  of 
Soissons.  They  captured  several  vil- 
lages and  crossed  the  Ailette  river.  On 
the  23rd,  the  Third  French  Army 
crossed  the  Divette  river,  near  Evri- 
court,  and  General  Mangin's  Tenth 
Army  crossed  the  Oise  river  and  the 
Oise  canal  at  Manicamp,  eight  miles 
east  of  Noyon,  and  reached  the  out- 
skirts of  Morlincourt,  which  seriously 
threatened  the  entire  Noyon  salient. 

Roye  fell  on  the  27th,  Chaulnes  on 
the  28th,  and  Noyon  on  the  29th.  The 
operation  which  resulted  in  the  capture 
of  Chaulnes  drove  forward  eight  miles 
and  made  it  certain  that  the  German 
retreat  could  not  stop  short  of  the  Hin- 
denburg  Line.  The  fall  of  Noyon  was 
followed  by  the  French  gaining  a  foot- 
hold on  Mt.  St.  Simeon,  northeast  of 
that  city.  This  position  held  up  the 
French  advance  up  the  Oise,  in  the 
direction  of  La  Fere,  12  miles  away. 
They  also  crossed  the  Oise  at  Morlin- 
court and  captured  Beaurains  and 
Quesnoy  wood. 

On  the  30th,  Mt.  St.  Simeon  was 
completely  occupied,  and  the  Franco- 
Americans  captured  Juvigny,  a  small 
town  north  of  Soissons,  which  was  of 
great  strategic  importance  because  it 
controlled  the  Juvigny  plateau.  The 
entire  line  of  the  Roye-Noyon-Soissons 
railway  was  now  in  the  hands  of  the 
Allies.  During  the  next  five  days  the 
Franco-Americans  saw  bitter  fighting, 
but  nevertheless  made  advances  of  an 
extremely  important  nature.  They 
gained  a  strong  foothold  on  the  Sois- 
sons-St.  Quentin  highway,  by  the  cap- 
ture of  Terny-Serny.  This  highway  is 
on  the  plateau  running  along  the  north- 
ern bank  of  the  Aisne.     In  conjunction 


with  this  advance  on  and  from  the 
Juvigny  plateau  the  French  made  rapid 
progress  up  the  Ailette  river  and  cap- 
tured Crecy-au-Mont  and  Leury  (Sept. 
1).  The  result  of  this  drive  between 
the  Oise  and  the  Aisne  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Soissons  was  to  outflank  the 
German  positions  on  the  Vesle.  Conse- 
quently, on  Sept.  4,  the  Germans  be- 
gan a  hasty  retreat  on  a  20-mile  front 
from  the  river,  setting  fire  to  ammuni- 
tion dumps  and  other  supplies  that  they 
could  not  take  away  with  them.  Their 
retreat  was  covered  by  the  heavy  ar- 
tillery on  the  north  bank  of  the  Aisne 
and  the  Chemin  des  Dames.  Franco- 
American  troops  forced  a  crossing  of 
the  Vesle  on  the  very  first  day  of  the 
retreat  and  captured  Blanzy,  Chas- 
semy,  Vauxcere,  Branelle,  and  Bucy-le- 
Long.  By  the  eighth,  the  Allied  troops 
were  fighting  around  Villers-en-Prayeres 
and  Revillon.  By  the  middle  of  the 
month,  the  Germans  were  everywhere 
thrust  behind  the  Aisne  in  the  region  as 
far  as  Vailly.  The  French  now  began 
preparations  to  make  a  direct  assault 
on  the  St.  Gobain  forest  and  the  west- 
ern end  of  the  Chemin  des  Dames.  Laon 
could  be  seen  in  the  distance. 

In  the  meantime  the  other  French 
armies  operating  just  south  of  the 
Somme  river  were  making  rapid  strides 
toward  the  Hindenburg  Line.  On  Sep- 
tember 4,  the  French  gained  northeast 
of  Noyon  and  forced  the  Germans  to 
beat  a  hasty  retreat  over  the  territory 
between  the  Canal  du  Nord  and  the 
Oise.  On  the  6th,  Ham  and  Chauny 
fell,  and  the  French  advanced  6  miles  in 
some  places  east  of  the  Canal  du  Nord. 
During  the  next  few  days  they  made 
slow  progress  astride  the  Oise  in  the  di- 
rection of  La  Fere.  When  the  fighting 
slowed  down  the  French  and  Americans 
were  practically  in  the  positions  held 
by  the  French  before  the  Hindenburg 


98 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


line  previous  to  the  huge  offensive  of 
March  21. 

The  beginning  of  this  section  related 
that  General  Rawlinson  smashed  the 
southern  side  of  the  Amiens  salient  by 
striking  from  Albert  to  Montdidier. 
Foch  gave  the  Germans  no  rest.  Aft- 
er Rawlinson's  blow  had  exhausted  its 
possibilities,  he  hurled  Byng's  Third 
British  army  north  of  the  Somme  and 
took  Bapaume,  and  when  this  blow  ex- 
hausted its  possibilities  he  hurled 
Home's  First  British  army  astride  the 
Scarpe  and  actually  broke  the  Hinden- 
burg  Line,  besides  threatening  Cambrai 
and  Douai.  The  1st,  3rd,  and  4th  Brit- 
ish armies  were  fighting  north  of  the 
Bra}7,  Peronne,  St.  Quentin  line.  The 
activities  of  the  French  and  Americans 
south  of  that  line  have  already  been  de- 
scribed. 

On  August  21,  Byng  struck  on  a  10- 
mile  front  from  the  Ancre  river  to 
Moyenneville  and  took  7  villages.  In 
the  course  of  the  next  day's  fighting  the 
British  captured  Albert,  after  bitter 
street  fighting,  and  advanced  2  miles 
on  a  6-mile  front.  A  similar  gain  was 
made  the  next  day  from  Bray  to  the 
vicinity  of  Grandcourt,  which  resulted 
in  the  seizure  of  nine  villages  and  an 
imminent  threat  to  outflank  Bapaume. 
On  the  21th,  the  British  captured  Bray, 
on  the  Somme,  10  other  towns,  and  the 
famous  Thiepval  ridge.  It  had  taken 
approximately  3  months  to  take  this 
position  during  the  first  Battle  of  the 
Somme  (see  above).  The  British  swept 
on  despite  stiffening  resistance  and  the 
utter  disregard  with  which  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Bavaria  hurled  his  reserves 
into  the  fray.  Twelve  more  villages 
and  the  Albert-Bapaume  highway  were 
seized  on  the  25th.  After  steady  pres- 
sure the  Germans  were  compelled  to  give 
up  Bapaume  on  the  29th,  and  to  begin 
a   retreat  along1  the  whole  line  south- 


ward to  Peronne  and  Brie  on  the 
Somme.  Two  days  later  the  Austra- 
lians in  a  brilliant  assault  stormed  Mt. 
St.  Quentin  and  Feuillaucourt.  The 
former  position  is  the  key  to  Peronne 
and  this  city  fell  on  the  1st  of  Septem- 
ber, along  with  Bouchavesnes  and  Ran- 
court. 

The  interest  in  the  drive  toward  the 
Hindenburg  Line  now  centres  in  the 
advances  made  by  Home's  army,  which 
struck  astride  the  Scarpe,  when  Gen- 
eral Byng's  forward  movement  began 
to  slow  up.  Nevertheless  it  was  the  suc- 
cess of  Byng's  push  that  made  Home's 
attack  possible.  Home's  blow  was  tre- 
mendously successful,  because  it  not 
only  broke  the  famous  Hindenburg 
Line  at  its  northern  end  but  broke  the 
famous  Drocourt-Queant  switch  line  as 
well.  The  very  first  day  of  the  new 
drive,  August  26,  saw  the  piercing  of 
the  Hindenburg  Line.  The  Canadians 
captured  Wancourt  and  Monchy-le- 
Preux.  On  the  next  day  they  smashed 
through  the  Hindenburg  Line  for  four 
miles  southeast  of  Arras,  and  oc- 
cupied Cherisy,  Vis-en-Artois,  and  the 
Bois-du-Sait.  Scotch  troops  crossed 
the  Sensee  river,  just  south  of  the 
Cojeul,  and  captured  Fontaine-les- 
Croisilles,  besides  seizing  Rosux  and 
Gavrelle,  north  of  the  Scarpe.  On  the 
28th  the  Germans  lost  Croiselles  and 
the  Canadians  took  Boiry  and  Pelves, 
behind  the  Hindenburg  Line.  Bulle- 
court  was  reached  on  the  29th,  and  the 
British  were  face  to  face  with  the  Dro- 
court-Queant line  which  had  held  them 
up  in  their  Cambrai  offensive  at  the  end 
of  1917  (see  above). 

The  Drocourt-Queant  line  was  a  very 
formidable  line  of  defense  intended  to 
be  a  second  barrier  to  the  great  bases 
at  Cambrai  and  Douai.  It  branched 
off  from  the  main  line  at  Queant  and 
then  ran  almost  parallel  to  it  to  Dro- 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


99 


court.  The  British  attacked  it  at  5 
o'clock  on  the  morning  of  September  2, 
under  the  protection  of  an  extremely 
heavy  barrage  fire.  The  Germans  had 
rushed  every  available  man  they  had  to 
stem  the  allied  tide.  The  result  was 
some  of  the  bitterest  fighting  of  the 
war.  In  their  first  attack  the  British 
penetrated  6  miles  of  the  lines  to  a 
depth  of  four  miles.  They  captured 
Dury,  Mt.  Dury,  Cagnicourt  wood  and 
village,  and  Buissy,  after  desperate 
fighting.  Tanks  were  often  found  op- 
erating far  ahead  of  the  infantry.  Dur- 
ing the  second  day,  the  British,  having 
broken  the  line,  penetrated  6  miles  along 
a  front  of  more  than  20.  Queant 
was  taken  by  storm,  along  with  a  dozen 
towns  and  villages.  More  than  10,000 
prisoners  fell  to  the  British  in  this  one 
operation. 

The  British  now  settled  down  to  a 
slow  but  steady  advance  along  the  Ba- 
paume-Cambrai  road.  It  might  be  add- 
ed here  that  Lens  was  evacuated  by  the 
Germans  on  September  4,  but  the  Al- 
lies were  unable  to  occupy  it  because  it 
was  saturated  with  poison  gas.  On  Sep- 
tember 8,  Villeveque,  and  part  of  Hav- 
rincourt  wood  fell  to  the  British.  Four 
days  later  Havrincourt,  Moeuvres,  and 
Trescault  were  in  their  hands,  and  the 
threat  toward  Cambrai  increased. 

What  might  be  called  the  second  part 
of  the  Allied  offensive  was  now  over.  It 
had  begun  with  Rawlinson's  attack  on 
the  southern  side  of  the  Picardy  sa- 
lient. Then  the  French  and  Amer- 
icans, under  Mangin  and  Debeney, 
joined  in  from  Montdidier  to  the  Chem- 
in  des  Dames  and  the  Vesle.  After 
Byng  had  successfully  struck  north  of 
the  Somme,  Home  struck  astride  the 
Scarpe  and  broke  the  Hindenburg  and 
Drocourt-Queant  lines.  The  result  was 
everywhere  favorable  to  the  Allies. 
With   the    exception    of   Flanders    and 


along  the  Aisne,  the  Germans  were  ev- 
erywhere back  to  their  starting  place 
in  March.  The  German  people  at  home, 
although  somewhat  buoyed  up  by  false 
reports,  had  lost  their  supreme  faith 
in  their  army.  Vast  quantities  of  sup- 
plies and  ammunition  were  captured  or 
destroyed  to  prevent  capture.  Eight 
German  divisions  had  been  destroyed, 
since  the  beginning  of  the  allied  offen- 
sive up  to  the  middle  of  September.  Ap- 
proximately 200,000  prisoners  and 
2,300  guns  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of 
the  Allies.  Almost  300,000  fresh  Amer- 
ican troops  were  pouring  into  France 
a  month.  Ludendorff's  attempt  to  re- 
treat to  a  smaller  front  was  frustrated 
by  Foch's  tactics,  the  fundamental 
theory  of  which  was  to  keep  the  enemy 
engaged  all  along  the  line  and  not  to 
let  him  effectively  use  his  reserves. 

The  St.  Mihiel  Salient. — By  Septem- 
ber 12,  Foch  realized  that  he  had  ex- 
hausted the  possibilities  of  further  im- 
mediate advance  against  the  Hinden- 
burg Line.  Instead  of  resting,  which, 
of  course,  would  also  permit  the  Ger- 
mans to  rest,  he  hurled  the  First  Amer- 
ican army  against  the  St.  Mihiel  sa- 
lient, and  reduced  it,  thus  confronting 
the  Germans  with  the  necessity  of  de- 
fending Metz  and  the  Briey  iron  fields. 
This  salient,  enclosing  the  Woevre 
plain,  and  with  its  tip  extending  to  the 
Meuse,  had  existed  since  the  first  year 
of  the  Mar.  One  of  the  most  important 
results  of  Pershing's  successful  offensive 
was  the  freeing  of  the  great  French 
railway  system  running  through  Ver- 
dun, Toul,  and  Nancy.  It  was  the  loss 
of  this  railway  that  greatly  hampered 
the  bringing  up  of  reserves  during  the 
Crown  Prince's  tremendous  assaults  on 
Verdun. 

The  plan  of  attack  was  to  strike  on 
both  sides  of  the  salient  and  crush  it  by 
advancing  toward  the  centre.   The  chief 


100 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


attack  was  made  on  the  southern  leg  of 
the  salient  on  a  front  extending  about 
12  miles  due  west  of  Pont-a-Mousson. 
The  attack  on  the  western  leg  of  the 
salient  extended  for  a  distance  of  about 
8  miles  between  Dommartin  and 
Fresnes.  Simultaneous  with  these  at- 
tacks the  French  destroyed  the  bridges 
over  the  Meuse  river  at  St.  Mihiel.  The 
attacks  were  made  at  5  a.m.  on  Sep- 
tember 12,  after  about  4  hours  of  artil- 
lery preparation.  Foggy  weather  aided 
the  attackers.  The  chief  resistance  was 
in  the  west,  where  the  German  positions 
were  defended  by  the  heights  on  the 
edge  of  the  Woevre.  The  Americans 
stormed  these  heights,  the  highest  of 
which  is  Les  Eparges,  and  took  the  vil- 
lages of  Herbeuville,  Hattonchatel, 
Hanonville,  Billy,  St.  Maurice,  Thillot, 
and  Hattonville,  and  during  the  night 
entered  Vigneulles,  which  is  at  tin; 
southern  end  of  the  line  of  hills  pro- 
tecting this  side  of  the  salient.  On  the 
southern  leg  of  the  salient  the  results 
were  just  as  successful  to  American 
arms.  During  the  first  day  Labayville, 
St.  Bausscant,  Vilcey,  Essey,  and  the 
important  town  of  Thiaucourt  wete 
captured.  During  the  night  Pannes, 
Nonsard,  Buxieres,  and  St.  Mihiel  were 
captured.  Twenty-seven  hours  after 
the  attack  began,  the  forces  advancing 
from  the  east  and  west  met  at  Vigneul- 
les and  Heudicourt,  and  the  St.  Mihiel 
salient  was  no  more.  The  American  com- 
manders operating  under  General 
Pershing  were  Generals  Liggett,  Dick- 
man,  and  Cameron. 

During  the  next  few  days  the  pocket 
was  "mopped  up"  and  the  new  lines 
consolidated.  Sixteen  thousand  prison- 
ers, among  whom  were  many  Austro- 
Hungarians,  and  almost  450  guns  were 
taken.  Besides  these,  vast  stores  of 
arms,  ammunition,  and  military  sup- 
plies were  captured.   Nearly  175  square 


miles  of  territory  and  70  villages  were 
delivered  from  the  enemy.  The  Allies 
were  now  in  a  position  to  seriously 
threaten  Metz,  and  the  great  Metz- 
Mezieres  trunk  railway,  one  of  Ger- 
many's main  supply  lines.  Another 
important  result,  for  the  Germans  as 
well  as  for  the  Allies,  was  to  show  that 
the  American  forces  had  reached  a 
stage  of  development  where  they  could 
be  depended  upon  to  take  their  full 
share  in  the  war. 

The  A  rgonne-Meuse  Offensive. — As 
has  been  related  above,  Marshal  Foch, 
in  the  last  week  of  September,  began  an 
offensive  over  the  entire  front  from 
Switzerland  to  the  sea.  He  attacked 
one  flank  in  Flanders,  the  centre  along 
the  Hindenburg  line,  and  now  the  other 
flank  in  Champagne.  From  the  strate- 
gic point  of  view,  the  Champagne  flank 
was  by  far  the  most  important  front. 
A  break  through  of  any  size  here  would 
cut  the  lines  of  communication  between 
Germany  and  her  armies  in  France  and 
Belgium.  The  Argonne-Meuse  line  was 
also  the  hinge  of  the  German  retreat  in 
Belgium  and  northern  France,  and,  if 
broken,  would  doubtlessly  cause  a  huge 
debacle.  The  German  defenses  in  this 
region,  both  natural  and  artificial,  were 
exceptionally  strong.  The  bend  in  the 
Aisne,  west  of  the  Argonne  Forest,  the 
forest  itself,  and  the  Meuse  River,  were 
tremendous  natural  advantages.  Be- 
sides these  the  German  High  Command, 
realizing  the  strategical  importance  of 
the  sector,  had  placed  many  of  its  best 
divisions  there,  as  well  as  profusely 
sprinkling  the  area  with  barbed  wire 
and  machine  gun  emplacements. 

After  the  fall  of  the  St.  Mihiel  sa- 
lient, which  really  paved  the  way  for 
this  offensive,  the  First  American  Army 
took  over  the  lines  between  the  Argonne 
Forest  and  the  Meuse  River.  This  army 
was   to   cooperate  with   General   Gour- 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


101 


and's  French  army  which  extended  from 
the  neighborhood  of  Rheims  to  where  it 
joined  the  Americans  in  the  Argonne. 
The  attack  began  on  the  26th  of  Sep- 
tember, when  the  French  advanced  four 
miles  and  the  Americans  about  six.  By 
the  28th,  the  Americans  had  taken 
Montfaucon,  Exermont,  Garcourt, 
Cuisy,  Septsarges,  Malancourt,  Ivoiry, 
Epinonville,     Charpentry,     Very,     and 


From    Current    History    Magazine,    published 
by  the  New  York  Times  Co. 

Scenes    of    Bitterest    Fighting    in    Argonne 
Forest  Region. 


10,000  prisoners.  The  French  took 
Sevron,  the  Butte  des  Mesnil,  and  Na- 
varin  Farm.  The  Americans  were 
within  range  of  the  Kriemhilde  line 
which  extended  from  Grand  Pre  to 
Damvillers  across  the  Meuse.  East  of 
the  Meuse  the  Americans  captured 
Marcheville  and  Rieville,  which 
strengthened  the  flank  of  the  army  west 
of  the  Meuse.  On  the  29th  and  30th, 
General  Gourand  advanced  to  within 
five  miles  of  Vouziers. 

On  October  4th,  the  Americans  as- 
saulted the  Kriemhilde  line  and  smashed 
their  way   through  part  of  it.      They 


captured  Cesnes,  and  advanced  2  miles 
up  the  Aire  river  valley.  On  October 
5,  the  Germans  before  Gourand  retired 
along  a  12-mile  front  closely  pursued 
by  the  French  army,  By  the  11th,  the 
French  held  the  whole  line  of  the  Suippe 
river  and  the  Americans  had  seized  the 
heights  dominating  the  Aire  valley.  So 
far  the  French  had  taken  21,000  pris- 
oners and  600  guns.  On  the  11th,  the 
Americans  took  St.  Juvin,  and  two 
days  later  took  the  important  town  of 
Grand  Pre  and  Champigneulles.  On 
the  17th  Ptomagne  fell  and  the  Ameri- 
cans were  everywhere  beyond  the  Kriem- 
hilde positions.  During  the  next  day 
Bantheville  and  Talma  Farm  were  seized 
in  surprise  attacks.  They  changed 
hands  several  times  before  remaining 
in  the  possession  of  the  Americans.  On 
the  same  day  the  French  crossed  the 
Aisne  near  Vouziers,  and  made  impor- 
tant gains  toward  Bethel. 

The  only  German  defense  between  the 
Americans  and  the  Belgian  border  was 
the  Freya-Stellung  which  ran  from  near 
Dun-sur-Meuse  to  the  Bourgogne  wood. 
About  ten  miles  north  of  this  line  was 
the  great  trunk  railway  line  running 
from  Metz  to  Mezieres,  through  Sedan 
and  Montmedy.  Part  of  the  Freya  line 
was  seized  on  October  26  and  the  rail- 
way line  was  bombarded.  On  November 
1,  both  General  Pershing  and  General 
Gourand  began  their  final  advance.  The 
latter  crossed  the  Aisne  between  Bethel 
and  Vouziers,  and,  advancing  with 
Berthelot's  army  on  the  left,  reached 
the  outskirts  of  Mezieres,  when  the  ar- 
mistice went  into  effect  (November  11). 
General  Pershing's  forces  reached  Se- 
dan on  the  6th.  Between  that  date 
and  the  11th,  east  of  the  Meuse,  he 
seized  the  heights  of  the  Woevre,  and 
had  brought  Metz  into  effective  gunfire 
range. 

The  Franco-American  advance  in  the 


102 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Argonne-Meuse  region  cut  the  German 
main  line  of  communication  (mentioned 
above)  and  foreordained  a  complete 
defeat  within  a  very  short  time  for  Ger- 
man}r,  had  the  armistice  not  intervened. 
Some  of  the  bitterest  righting  of  the 
war  occurred  in  this  sector.  Most  of  it 
was  hand  to  hand,  and  the  nature  of 
the  ground  with  its  ravines,  gullies,  for- 
ests, etc.,  made  it  necessary  to  wipe  out 
machine  gun  nests  with  infantry  rather 
than  with  artillery.  The  Americans 
captured  26,000  prisoners  and  468 
guns.  The  French  took  about  30,000 
prisoners  and  700  guns.  It  is  esti- 
mated that  the  Germans  lost  150,000 
men  trying  to  defend  their  main  line  of 
communication. 

The  Withdrawal  from  the  Lys  Sa- 
lient.— In  order  to  save  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Bavaria's  army  from  an  over- 
whelming defeat  similar  to  those  suf- 
fered during  the  "pinching"  of  the 
Marne  and  Picardy  salients,  the  Ger- 
man High  Command  determined  to  with- 
draw from  the  overextended  salient 
south  of  Ypres.  This  withdrawal  was 
accelerated  by  short,  sharp  blows  un- 
der the  direction  of  Field  Marshal  Haig. 
The  first  retirement  was  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  La  Bassee  on  August  5. 
The  British  immediately  occupied  the 
abandoned  trenches.  This  movement 
was  followed  by  an  attack  on  the  Lawe 
river  which  advanced  more  than  half  a 
mile  on  a  5-mile  line.  Two  days  later 
the  British  made  an  advance  between 
the  Lawe  and  the  Bourre  rivers  which 
penetrated  2000  yards  and  occupied  5 
villages,  including.  Locon.  Marshal 
Haig  then  struck  due  west  of  Armen- 
tieres,  between  Bailleul  and  Vieux-Ber- 
quin,  and  captured  Outtersteene.  These 
attacks  were  on  the  side  of  the  salient, 
and  besides  gaining  almost  all  of  its 
area,  placed  the  tip,  pointing  toward 
Nieppe  forest,  in  a  serious  position. 


Merville,  almost  at  the  tip  of  the  sa- 
lient, was  entered  on  August  19,  after 
an  advance  by  the  British  on  a  6-mile 
front.  On  August  30,  the  Germans 
evacuated  Bailleul,  and  the  next  day 
the  famous  Kemmel  Hill.  Haig  had 
planned  to  take  this  hill  by  assault  with 
the  aid  of  American  divisions,  but  the 
German  withdrawal  forestalled  him. 
The  British  on  the  same  day  advanced 
along  the  Lawe  river  on  the  southern  leg 
of  the  salient.  On  September  2,  Amer- 
ican troops  north  of  Wytschaete  were 
thrown  into  battle  and  captured  Voor- 
mezeele,  while  the  British  were  taking 
Neuve  Eglise,  and  some  territory  east 
of  Estaires.  The  situation  remained 
almost  stationary  until  the  latter  part 
of  September,  when  the  Allies  began 
their  great  drive  which  wiped  out  not 
only  the  remainder  of  the  Lys  salient, 
but  compelled  the  Germans  to  retire 
from  the  Belgian  coast. 

Breaking  the  Hindenburg  Line. — In 
the  section  treating  the  German  retreat 
to  the  Hindenburg  Line  it  was  narrated 
how  certain  sectors  of  this  line  were 
penetrated  and  how  the  Queant-Dro- 
court  was  smashed.  This  section  will 
deal  with  the  breaking  of  the  line,  it- 
self, the  capture  of  Cambrai,  St.  Quen- 
tin,  and  Laon,  and  the  advance  across 
France  and  Belgium,  until  the  armistice 
put  an  end  to  the  fighting.  The  reader 
must  bear  in  mind  that  while  this  tre- 
mendous drive  was  pushing  the  German 
centre  back,  the  Allies  were  crushing 
one  flank  in  Flanders  and  the  other  in 
the  Meuse-Argonne  Forest  region.  In 
the  bitter  fighting  that  resulted  in  the 
breaking  of  the  famous  defense  system, 
the  27th  and  30th  American  divisions 
played  conspicuous  parts. 

Although  the  main  attack  was  made 
on  September  29,  important  advances  in 
the  direction  of  Cambrai  were  made  on 
the    27th,    when    Generals    Byng    and 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


103 


Home  with  the  American  2d  Corps 
(27th  and  30th  divisions),  struck  on  a 
14-mile  front  before  Cambrai,  crossed 
the  Canal  du  Nord,  took  6,000  prison- 
ers and  several  villages,  and  pierced  the 
outposts  of  the  Hindenburg  Line.  On 
the  28th,  Marcoing,  Fontaine-Notre- 
Dame,  Cantaing,  and  Noyelles  were  tak- 
en along  with  4,000  more  prisoners.  On 
the  29th,  General  Rawlinson,  with  the 
aid  of  the  Americans,  struck  on  a  30- 
mile  front  from  St.  Quentin  to  the  Sen- 
see  Canal.  The  former  crossed  the 
Scheldt  Canal  and  the  latter,  after 
seizing  Bellicourt  and  Nauroy,  entered 
the  suburbs  of  Cambrai,  itself.  Gener- 
al Home  now  attacked  in  the  Arras  sec- 
tor and  advanced  toward  Douai  by  cap- 
turing Oppy  and  Biache-St.  Vaast. 
This  compelled  the  Germans  to  retire 
from  the  Lens  coal  field  regions.  Byng, 
by  crossing  the  Scheldt  Canal  northwest 
of  Cambrai,  threatened  the  city  from 
that  direction. 

While  these  operations  were  going  on 
around  Cambrai,  the  fate  of  St.  Quen- 
tin was  being  sealed.  After  nibbling 
operations,  the  French  and  British  cap- 
tured Thorigny  and  Le  Tronquoy, 
about  three  miles  from  the  city  (Sep- 
tember 30).  On  the  first  of  October, 
General  Debeney's  army  occupied  part 
of  the  city,  and  on  the  next  day  seized 
all  of  it.  In  the  meantime  Rawlinson's 
army  forced  the  Scheldt  Canal  and  oc- 
cupied Le  Catelet  and  Beauvoir. 

On  October  9,  a  great  drive  covering 
the  whole  line  from  Cambrai  to  the 
neighborhood  of  St.  Quentin  was  begun 
without  artillery  preparation.  It  was 
a  tremendous  success,  penetrating  9 
miles  on  a  20-mile  front.  Cambrai  was 
occupied  on  the  very  first  day,  which 
necessitated  a  further  retreat  on  the 
Arras-Lens  front  toward  Douai.  By 
the  10th,  the  British  had  advanced  their 
lines  to  the  Selle  river  between  Solesmes 


and  St.  Souplet,  and  captured  the  im- 
portant German  base  of  Le  Cateau.  On 
the  next  day  the  Germans  abandoned 
the  line  along  the  Sensee  river,  and  the 
Allies  were  closing  in  on  Douai.  This 
city  fell  on  the  17th.  Steady  progress 
was  made  east  of  Cambrai  and  north- 
east of  St.  Quentin,  in  the  general  di- 
rection of  Valenciennes,  Maubeuge,  and 
Hirson,    an    important    supply    centre. 

On  the  20th,  the  British  forced  a 
crossing  of  the  Selle  north  of  Le  Ca- 
teau and  on  the  22d  advanced  from 
northwest  of  Tournai  to  southwest  of 
Valenciennes,  patrols  actually  reaching 
the  suburbs  of  the  latter  city.  On  the 
25th  the  Valenciennes-Le  Quesnoy  rail- 
way was  reached  on  a  7-mile  front.  On 
November  2  Valenciennes  fell  after  a 
"pinching"  operation,  and  the  British 
advanced  along  the  road  to  Mons.  On 
November  4,  the  British  and  Americans 
struck  on  a  20-mile  front  between  the 
Scheldt  and  the  Oise-Sambre  Canal  and 
captured  10,000  prisoners  and  many 
guns,  thus  forcing  the  Germans  to  make 
a  75-mile  retreat  from  the  Scheldt  to 
the  Aisne.  As  a  result  of  this  the 
French  took  the  fortified  city  and  rail- 
road centre  of  Hirson,  and  the  British 
captured  the  fortress  of  Maubeuge  on 
the  9th  of  November.  On  the  11th, 
the  last  day  of  fighting,  the  British  cap- 
tured Mons,  the  scene  of  their  defeat 
and  retreat  in  August,  1914. 

In  considering  the  breaking  of  the 
Hindenburg  Line,  the  events  that  oc- 
curred between  the  Oise  and  the  Aisne 
and  which  resulted  in  the  capture  of 
Laon  and  the  Chemin  des  Dames,  must 
be  included.  Foch  determined  to  use  his 
"pincers"  method  on  a  large  scale  in 
order  to  take  Laon.  In  order  to  ac- 
complish this  he  had  to  advance 
through  the  formidable  forest  of  St. 
Gobain  and  recapture  the  Chemin  des 
Dames  positions.    After  the  "pinching" 


104 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


of  the  Marne  salient  (July,  1918),  the 
Franco-Americans  had  nibbled  away  at 
the  German  positions  in  order  to  get 
a  good  place  to  start  their  offensive. 
The  Americans  had  taken  the  Juvigny 
plateau  and  later  the  French  seized  the 
Vauxaillon  plateau  just  south  of  the 
Aisne.  The  German  Crown  Prince 
made  repeated  and  bitter  counter  at- 
tacks to  retake  these  strategical  posi- 
tions, but  they  were  all  futile  as  well  as 
costly.  On  September  28,  General  Man- 
gin's  Franco-American  army  captured 
Fort  de  Malmaison,  the  old  lime  stone 
position  which  is  in  the  rear  of  the 
Chemin  des  Dames  positions.  Then  be- 
gan a  slow  advance  between  these  posi- 
tions and  the  Ailette  river,  as  well  as 
between  the  Aisne  and  the  Vesle.  Gen- 
eral Berthelot,  in  conjunction  with  Gen- 
eral Mangin,  and  with  the  aid  of  Italian 
troops,  began  an  advance  northwest  of 
Rheims,  which  resulted  in  the  capture 
of  Berry-au-Bac  on  October  7.  On  the 
9th,  Bazancourt  and  Vaux-les-Mauron 
fell.  By  the  12th,  Mangin  had  suc- 
ceeded in  occupying  practically  the  en- 
tire Chemin  des  Dames  positions.  The 
next  day  saw  the  success  of  Foch's 
strategy,  because  the  St.  Gobain  For- 
est, La  Fere,  and  Laon,  were  evacuated 
by  the  Germans  with  scarcely  any  fight- 
ing. 

Mangin  now  advanced  rapidly  be- 
tween the  Aisne  and  the  Oise  rivers, 
with  the  idea  of  reaching  the  Franco- 
Belgian  frontier  between  Hirson  and 
Mezieres.  When  the  Germans  began 
their  75-mile  retreat  from  the  Scheldt 
to  the  Aisne,  Mangin,  with  Debeney 
on  his  left,  exerted  strong  pressure  on 
the  Teutonic  flank.  By  the  8th  of  No- 
vember, he  was  at  the  outskirts  of 
Mezieres,  but  was  unable  to  capture  it 
before  the  armistice  was  signed  on  the 
11th. 

Thus   ended  the  battle   or   series   of 


battles  which  resulted  in  the  breaking 
of  the  Hindenburg  Line,  and  which  were 
directly  responsible  for  the  Germans 
suing  for  an  armistice.  The  fall  of 
the  great  bases  at  Cambrai,  St.  Quen- 
tin,  La  Fere,  and  Laon,  left  the  Ger- 
mans with  no  easily  defended  line  west 
of  the  Rhine.  It  is  extremely  doubtful 
whether  the  Germans  could  have 
reached  the  Rhine  with  sufficient  men, 
material,  and  organization,  to  prevent 
an  invasion  of  Germany  by  the  Allies, 
on  a  grand  scale. 

The  German  Retreat  from  Belgium. 
— By  the  last  week  in  September,  Foch 
had  wiped  out  the  Marne,  Picardy,  Lys, 
and  St.  Mihiel  salients  and  the  Germans 
everywhere  were  practically  back  to 
their  lines  of  March  21,  and  in  some  in- 
stances behind  them.  Foch  now  planned 
a  concerted  attack  on  the  flanks  and  in 
the  centre  all  the  way  from  the  sea  to 
the  Alps.  On  September  28  he  struck 
the  German  flank  which  rested  on  the 
sea  coast,  by  sea  and  by  land.  The 
land  attack  was  aided  by  a  heavy  bom- 
bardment all  along  the  coast  from 
Nieuport  to  Zeebrugge  by  the  British 
fleet. 

The  attack  was  made  by  the  reor- 
ganized Belgian  army,  under  the  per- 
sonal direction  of  King  Albert,  and 
the  British  Second  Army,  under  Gen- 
eral Plumer,  on  a  ten-mile  front  from 
Dixmude  to  Passchendaele  Ridge,  north 
of  Ypres.  This  initial  attack  penetrat- 
ed approximately  4  miles  and  resulted 
in  the  capture  of  4000  prisoners  and  a 
great  quantity  of  supplies  of  all  kinds. 
All  of  Houthulst  forest  and  several  vil- 
lages were  also  taken.  On  the  next 
day  the  Belgians  tore  a  hole  in  the  per- 
manent German  lines  and  captured  Dix- 
mude, Passchendaele,  Stadenberg, 
Moorslede,  and  Zarren,  and  were  only  2 
miles  from  Roulers.  This  city  was  won 
and  lost  by  them  in  the  course  of  the 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


105 


next  day.  On  this  same  day  the  Brit- 
ish took  the  formidable  Messines  and 
Passchendaele  ridges,  and  Gheluvelt. 
On  the  1st  of  October,  the  Allies  crossed 
the  Menin-Roulers  road  and  struck  in  a 
southerly  direction,  reaching  the  Lys 
river  between  Wervioq  and  Warneton. 

The  threat  to  envelop  the  industrial 
centre  of  Lille  had  now  become  so  pro- 
nounced and  had  created  such  a  serious 
position  for  the  German  forces,  that  the 
German  Command  determined  to  evacu- 
ate it,  which  necessitated  a  retirement 
from  the  Belgian  coast.  Consequently, 
on  the  2nd  the  Germans  began  the 
evacuation  of  the  city  and  a  retreat 
on  both  sides  of  the  La  Bassee  canal. 
This  retreat  was  accelerated  by  the 
joining  of  General  Degoutte's  French 
army  to  the  Belgian  and  British  armies. 
The  Belgians  captured  Hooglede  and 
Handzeeme  northeast  of  Roulers,  and 
the  British  seized  Rolleghencapelle,  be- 
tween Courtrai  and  Roulers.  Armen- 
tieres  was  entered  on  the  same  day.  So 
far  the  Germans  had  lost  25,000  prison- 
ers and  150  guns. 

After  a  week  and  a  half  of  further 
preparation,  the  Allies  struck  an  ex- 
tremely heavy  blow  aimed  at  clearing 
the  west  bank  of  the  Scheldt  as  far  as 
Ghent.  The  attack  extended  from  the 
Lys,  near  Comines,  to  the  sea.  The 
Belgians  drove  forward  7  miles  north 
of  a  line  running  from  Handzeeme  to 
Courtemarck,  and  the  French  and  Brit- 
ish to  the  Hooglede  plateau  and  Winck- 
elhoek  and  Lendelede.  The  German 
forced  retreat  from  Belgium  now  began 
in  earnest.  The  Belgians  advanced 
steadily  along  the  roads  to  Bruges  and 
Ostend  from  Thourout,  and  the  French 
advanced  toward  Thielt,  while  the  Brit- 
ish advanced  along  the  Lys  from  Com- 
ines. On  the  17th  the  British  entered 
Lille,  and  naval  forces  entered  Ostend, 
which  had  been  evacuated.    On  the  next 


day  Zeebrugge  was  entered,  as  well  as 
Bruges,  Thielt,  Courtrai,  Tourcoing, 
and  Roubaix.  The  total  number  of 
prisoners  taken  was  40,000. 

Between  the  20th  and  25th  of  Octo- 
ber, the  French  and  Belgians  added 
11,000  more  prisoners  to  the  total  by 
forcing  the  Lys  Canal  in  the  direction 
of  Ghent.  The  British  in  the  south 
took  Bruay  and  Estain.  On  the  last 
day  of  the  month,  Byng's  army,  with 
the  aid  of  the  80th  American  division, 
struck  between  the  Lys  and  the  Scheldt 
from  Deynze  to  Avelghem  and  captured 
several  villages  and  towns.  While  this 
operation  was  going  on  the  British  and 
French  were  driving  the  Germans  back 
on  Ghent  and  the  line  of  the  Scheldt. 
The  retreat  was  precipitous.  On  No- 
vember 3,  the  Belgians  advanced  10 
miles  along  the  Dutch  frontier  and 
reached  the  Terneuzen  (Dutch) -Ghent 
canal.  This  advance  coupled  with  that 
of  the  French  and  British  in  the  south 
brought  the  Allies  to  within  5  miles  of 
Ghent.  The  British  forced  the  Scheldt 
near  Pofter  and  began  an  advance  on 
Brussels.  Tournai  fell  to  the  British  on 
November  9  and  when  the  fighting 
ceased  two  days  later,  the  line  in  Bel- 
gium ran  almost  north  and  south  from 
Terneuzen  to  north  of  Audenarde  and 
then  southeasterly  to  Mons. 

General  Foch  had  thus  successfully 
turned  the  German  flank  and,  if  the  ar- 
mistice had  not  intervened,  it  is  safe  to 
predict  that  supreme  disaster  awaited 
the  German  armies  as  a  result  of  this 
movement.  General  Foch  is  credited 
with  the  statement  that  the  German 
army  would  have  been  captured  or  de- 
stroyed within  six  weeks  (after  Novem- 
ber 11),  but  he  had  agreed  to  an  armis- 
tice to  save  lives.  More  than  60,000 
prisoners  and  500  guns  of  all  calibres 
had  been  captured  in  this  flank  move- 
ment. 


106 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


The  End  of  the  War. — Negotiations 
between  the  United  States  and  Germany 
which  began  on  October  5  ended  on  No- 
vember 5,  when  President  Wilson  in  his 
note  of  that  date  informed  the  Germans 
that  General  Foch  had  been  authorized 
by  the  United  States  and  the  Allies  to 
open  negotiations  with  accredited  Ger- 
man agents.  See  section  below  entitled 
Peace  Proposals.  This  was  followed 
two  days  later  by  announcement  that 
German  agents  had  been  appointed  and 
were  about  to  leave  the  German  Head- 
quarters at  Spa,  Belgium.  They  were 
received  at  General  Foch's  quarters  the 
next  day  and  received  the  terms  of  the 
armistice  from  him.  A  request  to  stop 
hostilities  until  the  terms  had  been  sent 
to  the  German  headquarters  was  re- 
fused. After  several  delays  the  terms 
were  accepted  by  Germany  on  Novem- 
ber 11,  at  5  o'clock  a.m.  Paris  time. 
They  were  as  follows : 

"I.  Cessation  of  operations  by  land  and  in 
the  air  six  hours  after  the  signature  of  the 
armistice. 

"II.  Immediate  evacuation  of  invaded  coun- 
tries: Belgium,  France,  Alsace-Lorraine,  Lux- 
emburg, so  ordered  as  to  be  completed  within 
fourteen  days  from  the  signature  of  the  armis- 
tice. German  troops  which  have  not  left  the 
above-mentioned  territories  within  the  period 
fixed  will  become  prisoners  of  war.  Occupation 
by  the  allied  and  United  States  forces  jointly 
will  keep  pace  with  evacuation  in  these  areas. 
All  movements  of  evacuation  and  occupation 
will  be  regulated  in  accordance  with  a  note 
annexed  to  the   stated  terms. 

"III.  Repatriation,  beginning  at  once  and  to 
be  completed  within  fourteen  days,  of  all  in- 
habitants of  the  countries  above  mentioned,  in- 
cluding hostages  and  persons  under  trial  or 
convicted. 

"IV.  Surrender  in  good  condition  by  the  Ger- 
man armies  of  the  following  equipment:  Five 
thousand  guns  (2,500  heavy,  2,500  field),  30,000 
machine  guns.  Three  thousand  minenwerfers. 
Two  thousand  airplanes  (fighters,  bombers — 
firstly,  D,  seventy-three's  and  night  bombing 
machines).  The  above  to  be  delivered  in  situ 
to  the  Allies  and  the  United  States  troops  in 
accordance  with  the  detailed  conditions  laid 
down   in   the   annexed   note. 

"V.  Evacuation  by  the  German  armies  of  the 


countries  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  These 
countries  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  shall 
be  administered  by  the  local  authorities  under 
the  control  of  the  allied  and  United  States 
armies  of  occupation.  The  occupation  of  these 
territories  will  be  determined  by  allied  and 
United  States  garrisons  holding  the  principal 
crossings  of  the  Rhine — Mayence,  Coblenz,  Co- 
logne— together  with  bridgeheads  at  these 
points  in  thirty  kilometer  radius  on  the  right 
bank  and  by  garrisons  similarly  holding  the 
strategic  points  of  the  regions.  A  neutral  zone 
shall  be  reserved  on  the  right  of  the  Rhine  be- 
tween the  stream  and  a  line  drawn  parallel  to 
it  forty  kilometers  to  the  east  from  the  frontier 
of  Holland  to  the  parallel  of  Gernsheim  and 
as  far  as  practicable  a  distance  of  thirty  kilo- 
meters from  the  east  of  the  stream  from  this 
parallel  upon  the  Swiss  frontier.  Evacuation 
by  the  enemy  of  the  Rhine  lands  shall  be  so 
ordered  as  to  be  completed  within  a  further 
period  of  eleven  days — in  all,  twenty-five 
days  after  the  signature  of  the  armistice. 
All  movements  of  evacuation  and  occupation 
will  be  regulated  according  to  the  note  an- 
nexed. 

"VI.  In  all  territory  evacuated  by  the  enemy 
there  shall  be  no  evacuation  of  inhabitants;  no 
damage  or  harm  shall  be  done  to  the  persons 
or  property  of  the  inhabitants.  No  destruc- 
tion of  any  kind  to  be  committed.  Military 
establishments  of  all  kinds  shall  be  delivered 
intact  as  well  as  military  stores  of  food,  muni- 
tions, equipment  not  removed  during  the  peri- 
ods fixed  for  evacuation.  Stores  of  food  of 
all  kinds  for  the  civil  population,  cattle,  etc., 
shall  be  left  in  situ.  Industrial  establishments 
shall  not  be  impaired  in  any  way  and  their 
personnel  shall  not  be  moved.  Roads  and 
means  of  communication  of  every  kind,  rail- 
road, waterways,  main  roads,  bridges,  tele- 
graphs, telephones,  shall  be  in  no  manner  im- 
paired. 

"VII.  All  civil  and  military  personnel  at 
present  employed  on  them  shall  remain.  Five 
thousand  locomotives,  50,000  wagons,  and 
10,000  motor  lorries  in  good  working  order  with 
all  necessary  spare  parts  and  fittings  shall  be 
delivered  to  the  Associated  Powers  within  the 
period  fixed  for  the  evacuation  of  Belgium  and 
Luxemburg.  The  railways  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
shall  be  handed  over  within  the  same  period, 
together  with  all  pre-war  personnel  and  ma- 
terial. Further  material  necessary  for  the 
working  of  railways  in  the  country  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine  shall  be  left  in  situ.  All 
stores  of  coal  and  material  for  the  upkeep  of 
permanent  ways,  signals  and  repair  shops  left 
entire  in  situ  and  kept  in  an  efficient  state  by 
Germany  during  the  whole  period  of  armistice. 
All  barges  taken  from  the  Allies  shall  be  re- 
stored to  them.  A  note  appended  regulates  the 
details  of  these  measures. 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


107 


"VIII.  The  German  command  shall  be  re- 
sponsible for  revealing  all  mines  or  delay-act- 
ing fuse  disposed  on  territory  evacuated  by  the 
German  troops,  and  shall  assist  in  their  discov- 
ery and  destruction.  The  German  command 
shall  also  reveal  all  destructive  measures  that 
may  have  been  taken  (such  as  poisoning  or 
polluting  of  springs,  wells,  etc.)  under  penalty 
of  reprisals. 

"IX.  The  right  of  requisition  shall  be  exer- 
cised by  the  Allies  and  the  United  States  ar- 
mies in  all  occupied  territory.  The  upkeep  of 
the  troops  of  occupation  in  the  Rhine  land  (ex- 
cluding Alsace-Lorraine)  shall  be  charged  to 
the  German  Government. 

"X.  An  immediate  repatriation  without  reci- 
procity according  to  detailed  conditions,  which 
shall  be  fixed,  of  all  allied  and  United  States 
prisoners  of  war.  The  allied  powers  and  the 
United  States  shall  be  able  to  dispose  of  these 
prisoners  as  they  wish. 

"XI.  Sick  and  wounded  who  cannot  be  re- 
moved from  evacuated  territory  will  be  cared 
for  by  German  personnel,  who  will  be  left  on 
the  spot  with  all  the  medical  materials  re- 
quired. 

"XII.  All  German  troops  at  present  in  any 
territory  which  before  the  war  belonged  to  Rus- 
sia, Rumania  or  Turkey,  shall  withdraw  with- 
in the  frontiers  of  Germany  as  they  existed  on 
August  1,  1914. 

"XIII.  Evacuation  by  German  troops  to  be- 
gin at  once,  and  all  German  instructors,  pris- 
oners, and  civilian  as  well  as  military  agents 
now  on  the  territory  of  Russia  (as  defined  be- 
fore 1914)   to  be  recalled. 

"XIV.  German  troops  to  cease  at  once  all 
requisitions  and  seizures  and  any  other  under- 
taking with  a  view  to  obtaining  supplies  in- 
tended for  Germany  in  Rumania  and  Russia 
(as   defined   on   August   1,   1914). 

"XV.  Abandonment  of  the  treaties  of  Bu- 
charest and  Brest-Litovsk  and  of  the  supple- 
mentary treaties. 

"XVI.  The  Allies  shall  have  free  access  to 
the  territories  evacuated  by  the  Germans  on 
their  eastern  frontier  either  through  Danzig  or 
by  the  Vistula  in  order  to  convey  supplies  to 
the  populations  of  those  territories  or  for  any 
other   purpose. 

"XVII.  Unconditional  capitulation  of  all 
German  forces  operating  in  East  Africa  within 
one  month. 

"XVIII.  Repatriation,  without  reciprocity, 
within  a  maximum  period  of  one  month,  in  ac- 
cordance with  detailed  conditions  hereafter  to 
be  fixed,  of  all  civilians  interned  or  deported, 
who  may  be  citizens  of  other  allied  or  associated 
States  than  those  mentioned  in  Clause  Three, 
Paragraph  Nineteen,  with  the  reservation  that 
any  future  claims  and  demands  of  the  Allies 
and  the  United  States  of  America  remain  un- 
affected. 


"XIX.  The  following  financial  conditions  are 
required:  Reparation  for  damage  done.  While 
such  armistice  lasts  no  public  securities  shall 
be  removed  by  the  enemy  which  can  serve  as  a 
pledge  to  the  Allies  for  the  recovery  or  rep- 
aration for  war  losses.  Immediate  restitution 
of  the  cash  deposit  in  the  National  Bank  of 
Belgium,  and  in  general  immediate  return  of 
all  documents,  specie,  stocks,  shares,  paper 
money,  together  with  plant  for  the  issue  there- 
of, touching  public  or  private  interests  in  the 
invaded  countries.  Restitution  of  the  Russian 
and  Rumanian  gold  yielded  to  Germany  or 
taken  by  that  power.  This  gold  to  be  delivered 
n  trust  to  the  Allies  until  the  signature  of 
peace. 

"XX.  Immediate  cessation  of  all  hostilities 
at  sea  and  definite  information  to  be  given  as 
to  the  location  and  movements  of  all  German 
ships.  Notification  to  be  given  to  neutrals 
that  freedom  of  navigation  in  all  territorial 
waters  is  given  to  the  naval  and  mercantile 
marines  of  the  allied  and  associated  powers, 
all  questions  of  neutrality  being  waived. 

"XXI.  All  naval  and  mercantile  marine  pris- 
oners of  the  allied  and  associated  powers  in 
German  hands  to  be  returned  without  reci- 
procity. 

"XXII.  Surrender  to  the  Allies  and  the 
United  States  of  America  of  one  hundred  and 
sixty  German  submarines  (including  all  sub- 
marine cruisers  and  mine  laying  submarines), 
with  their  complete  armament  and  equipment 
in  ports  which  will  be  specified  by  the  Allies 
and  the  United  States  of  America.  All  other 
submarines  to  be  paid  off  and  completely  dis- 
armed and  placed  under  the  supervision  of  the 
allied  powers  and  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica. 

"XXIII.  The  following  German  surface  war- 
ships, which  shall  be  designated  by  the  Allies 
and  the  United  States  of  America,  shall  forth- 
with be  disarmed  and  thereafter  interned  in 
neutral  ports,  or  for  the  want  of  them,  in 
allied  ports,  to  be  designated  by  the  Allies  and 
the  United  States  of  America,  and  placed  un- 
der the  surveillance  of  the  Allies  and  the 
United  States  of  America,  only  caretakers 
being  left  on  board,  namely:  Six  battle  cruis- 
ers, ten  battleships,  eight  light  cruisers,  includ- 
ing two  mine  layers,  fifty  destroyers  of  the 
most  modern  type.  All  other  surface  warships 
(including  river  craft)  are  to  be  concentrated 
in  German  naval  bases  to  be  designated  by  the 
Allies  and  the  United  States  of  America,  and 
are  to  be  paid  off  and  completely  disarmed 
and  placed  under  the  supervision  of  the  Allies 
and  the  United  States  of  America.  All  vessels 
of  the  auxiliary  fleet,  trawlers,  motor  vessels, 
etc.,  are  to  be  disarmed. 

"XXIV.  The  Allies  and  the  United  States  of 
America  shall  have  the  right  to  sweep  up  all 
mine  fields   and  obstructions  laid  by  Germany 


108 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


outside  German  territorial  waters  and  the  posi- 
tions of  these  are  to  be  indicated. 

"XXV.  Freedom  of  access  to  and  from  the 
Baltic  to  be  given  to  the  naval  and  mercantile 
marines  of  the  allied  and  'associated  powers. 
To  secure  this  the  Allies  and  the  United  States 
of  America  shall  be  empowered  to  occupy  all 
German  forts,  fortifications,  batteries  and  de- 
fense works  of  all  kinds  in  all  the  entrances 
from  the  Cattegat  into  the  Baltic,  and  to  sweep 
up  all  mines  and  obstructions  within  and  with- 
out German  territorial  waters,  without  any 
question  of  neutrality  being  raised,  and  the 
positions  of  all  such  mines  and  obstructions  are 
to  be  indicated. 

"XXVI.  The  existing  blockade  conditions  set 
up  by  the  allied  and  associated  powers  are  to 
remain  unchanged,  and  all  German  merchant 
ships  found  at  sea  are  to  remain  liable  to  cap- 
ture. 

"XXVII.  All  naval  aircraft  are  to  be  con- 
centrated and  immobilized  in  German  bases  to 
be  specified  by  the  Allies  and  the  United  States 
of  America. 

"XXVIII.  In  evacuating  the  Belgian  coasts 
and  ports,  Germany  shall  abandon  all  merchant 
ships,  tugs,  lighters,  cranes  and  all  other  harbor 
materials,  all  materials  for  inland  navigation, 
all  aircraft  and  all  materials  and  stores,  all 
arms  and  armaments,  and  all  stores  and  appa- 
ratus of  all  kinds. 

"XXIX.  All  Black  Sea  ports  are  to  be  evac- 
uated by  Germany;  all  Russian  war  vessels  of 
all  descriptions  seized  by  Germany  in  the  Black 
Sea  are  to  be  handed  over  to  the  Allies  and  the 
United  States  of  America;  all  neutral  merchant 
vessels  seized  are  to  be  released ;  all  warlike  and 
other  materials  of  all  kinds  seized  in  those 
ports  are  to  be  returned  and  German  materials 
as  specified  in  Clause  Twenty-eight  are  to  be 
abandoned. 

"XXX.  All  merchant  vessels  in  German 
hands  belonging  to  the  allied  and  associated 
powers  are  to  be  restored  in  ports  to  be  speci- 
fied by  the  Allies  and  the  United  States  of 
America  without  reciprocity. 

"XXXI.  No  destruction  of  ships  or  of  ma- 
terials to  be  permitted  before  evacuation,  sur- 
render, or  restoration. 

"XXXII.  The  German  Government  will  noti- 
fy the  neutral  Governments  of  the  world,  and 
particularly  the  Governments  of  Norway, 
Sweden,  Denmark,  and  Holland,  that  all  re- 
strictions placed  on  the  trading  of  their  ves- 
sels with  the  allied  and  associated  countries, 
whether  by  the  German  Government  or  by  pri- 
vate German  interests,  and  whether  in  return 
for  specific  concessions,  such  as  the  export  of 
shipbuilding  materials  or  not,  are  immediately 
cancelled. 

"XXXIII.  No  transfers  of  German  merchant 
shipping  of  any  description  to  any  neutral  flag 


are  to  take  place  after  signature  of  the  armis- 
tice. 

"XXXIV.  The  duration  of  the  armistice  is 
to  be  thirty  days,  with  option  to  extend.  Dur- 
ing this  period,  on  failure  of  execution  of  any 
of  the  above  clauses,  the  armistice  may  be 
denounced  by  one  of  the  contracting  parties 
on   forty-eight   hours'  previous   notice. 

"XXXV.  This  armistice  to  be  accepted  or 
refused  by  Germany  within  seventy-two  hours 
of  notification." 

This  armistice  has  been  signed  the 
Eleventh  of  November,  Nineteen  Eight- 
een, at  5  o'clock  (a.m.)  French  time. 

F.   Foch 

R.  E.  Wemyss 

Erzbergeb 

A.  Oberndorff 

WlNTERFELDT 

Von    Salow 

The  evacuation  of  the  territory  west 
of  the  Rhine  went  along  very  smoothly. 
The  Allies  were  hailed  as  deliverers  ev- 
erywhere, especially  in  Alsace-Lor- 
raine, which  was  triumphantly  entered 
by  French  forces.  A  similar  entry  was 
made  by  King  Albert  and  his  Queen 
riding  at  the  head  of  his  troops.  The 
British  took  over  the  administration  of 
the  zone  around  Cologne,  the  Americans 
that  around  Coblenz,  and  the  French 
that  around  Mayence. 

On  December  11,  1918,  the  terms  of 
the  armistice  were  renewed  for  a  month, 
or  until  January  17,  1919.  During  this 
period  the  conditions  that  were  unful- 
filled were  to  be  completed.  The  fol- 
lowing provision  was  also  added  to  the 
general  terms :  "The  Allied  High  Com- 
mand reserves  the  right  to  begin,  mean- 
while, if  it  thinks  it  wise  in  order  to 
assure  new  guarantees,  to  occupy  the 
neutral  zone  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Rhine  to  the  north  of  the  bridgehead  of 
Cologne,  up  to  the  Dutch  frontier.  This 
occupation  will  be  announced  by  the 
Allied  High  Command  by  giving  six 
days'  notice." 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


109 


Subsequent  renewals  of  the  armistice 
terms  occurred  during  the  time  that  the 
peace  conference  was  holding  its  meet- 
ings at  Paris. 

III.  Eastern  Theatre.  An  unex- 
pected blow  by  the  Russians  through 
East  Prussia  early  in  the  war  would 
have  upset  the  German  plan,  but  for 
the  superior  generalship  of  Von  Hin- 
denburg  (Tannenberg).  Meanwhile  the 
Austrian  advance  to  hold  the  main  Rus- 
sian armies  failed  in  the  rout  through 
Galicia,  and  October,  1914,  found  the 
Russians  astride  the  Carpathians.  To 
save  the  Austrians,  Germany  hurried 
troops  from  France  and  organized  a 
counter-offensive  through  Poland,  which 
developed  during  the  winter  and  spring, 
1914  and  1915,  and  drove  the  Russians 
far  behind  their  own  frontier. 

Trench  warfare  marks  this  front 
during  1915-16  until  June,  1916,  when 
the  Russians,  finding  Austria  advanc- 
ing in  Italy  and  Germany  engaged  at 
Verdun,  once  more  began  a  successful 
drive  through  Galicia  that  reacted  on 
the  Italian  and  Verdun  fronts.  This 
success  was  followed  by  the  Russian 
revolution  which  ultimately  prevented 
that  country  from  being  a  factor  in  the 
war. 

The  detailed  account  of  these  mili- 
tary operations  falls  under  the  follow- 
ing heads  :  (1)  Russian  drive  into  East 
Prussia,  outgeneraled  by  Hindenburg 
and  culminating  in  defeat  at  Tannen- 
berg; (2)  Austrian  advance  through 
Galicia  to  cut  the  Kiev-Warsaw  rail- 
road; (3)  defeat  of  this  Austrian  cam- 
paign and  pursuit  by  the  Russians  to 
the  Carpathians;  (4)  German  advance 
in  Poland,  including  first  attack  on 
Warsaw;  (5)  siege  of  Przemysl;  (6) 
Austro-German  advance  in  Galicia,  with 
rout  of  Russians,  including  loss  of  Po- 
land, and  taking  up  of  intrenched  line 
from  Riga  to  Dvinsk  to  Lutsk  and  down 


to  the  outer  Bukowina  border;  (7) 
Brusiloff's  drive  into  Galicia,  June, 
1916;  (8)  the  Russian  Revolution; 
(9)  Russia  under  the  Bolsheviki.  The 
struggle  on  the  east  front  was  condi- 
tioned by  a  number  of  circumstances. 
We  have  first  the  German  plan  itself, 
to  smash  the  French  and  then  turn  up- 
on the  Russians  before  they  could  get 
ready.  A  corollary  of  this  proposition 
was  the  retention  on  the  east  front  of 
but  few  troops.  Next  we  must  take 
into  account  the  fact  that  the  Russians 
mobilized  and  were  in  readiness  far  fast- 
er than  any  one  thought  they  possibly 
could.  Lastly,  and  of  paramount  im- 
portance, is  the  nature  of  the  terrain 
and  its  organization  in  view  of  war,  and 
then  the  configuration  of  the  frontier  it- 
self. The  striking  feature  of  this  con- 
figuration is  that  Russian  Poland  pro- 
jects like  a  huge  bastion  between  Prus- 
sia on  the  north  and  Galicia  on  the 
south.  The  political  frontier  separat- 
ing the  conterminous  states  is,  on  the 
whole,  not  a  military  frontier.  Hence 
Russian  Poland  lies  peculiarly  exposed 
to  attack  from  the  north,  west,  and 
south.  On  the  German  frontier  of  East 
Prussia  lie  the  Masurian  lakes,  form- 
ing a  natural  obstacle  to  invasion  either 
east  or  west.  On  the  south,  and  some 
distance  from  the  political  frontier, 
stretches  the  Carpathian  Range,  the 
natural  protection  of  Hungary. 
Through  this  great  central  plain  run 
many  rivers ;  chief  of  these  are  the  Nie- 
men  in  Courland  and  Kovno,  and  the 
Vistula  roughly  bisecting  Russian  Po- 
land. In  Germany  the  foresight  of  the 
general  staff  had  furnished  a  complete 
network  of  railways,  but  in  Russia  and 
in  Russian  Poland  there  were  compara- 
tively few.  The  German  frontier  was 
protected  by  important  fortresses — 
Konigsberg,  Graudenz,  Thorn,  Posen. 
In  Russian  Poland,  besides  the  fortified 


110 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


capital,  Warsaw,  there  were  Novogeor- 
gievsk,  northwest  of  Warsaw,  and  Ivan- 
gorod,  southeast,  and  the  line  of  for- 
tresses along  the  Narew  River  terminat- 
ing in  Ossowiec  (on  the  Bobr).  East 
of  Warsaw,  at  the  junction  of  the  rail- 
ways from  Petrograd  and  Kiev,  lies 
Brest-Litovsk  on  the  Bug.  It  stands 
on  the  western  rim  of  a  great  stretch  of 
almost  impenetrable  marshes,  the  Pri- 
pet  Marshes. 

Russia  at  once  took  the  offensive. 
But  it  was  plain  that  before  she  could 
advance,  or  attempt  any  great  move- 
ment from  her  own  domain  of  Poland, 
she  would  have  to  clear  both  East  Prus- 
sia and  Galicia  of  the  Germans  and  Aus- 
trians  respectively.  The  German  idea 
apparently  was  to  hold  East  Prussia 
and  the  remainder  of  the  frontier  to 
Galicia,  while  Austrian  armies  were  to 
advance  northwest  into  Poland,  and 
eastward  into  Volhynia,  and  thus  hold 
off  or  engage  any  Russian  forces  that 
might  undertake  operations  in  this  re- 
gion. The  Russian  commander  in  chief 
was  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas,*  until 
superseded  by  the  Czar  (Nicholas  II) 
in  September,  1915. 

Invasion  of  East  Prussia. — What- 
ever the  motives  that  induced  the 
course,  the  Russians  opened  the  cam- 
paign by  an  invasion  of  East  Prussia. 
Three  railways  cross  the  frontier  of  this 
province — the  main  line  Petrograd-Ber- 


*  Nicholas  (Nikolai  Nikolaievitch),  Grand 
Duke.  Born  (1856)  at  St.  Petersburg.  Grad- 
uated from  Nikolaiev  Military  Academy,  be- 
came a  member  of  Russian  General  Staff  and 
aide-de-camp  to  Czar.  Began  career  as  junior 
officer  in  Russo-Turkish  War.  Lieutenant  Gen- 
eral (1893),  inspector  of  cavalry  (1895),  major 
general  of  the  Guards  and  President  of  Coun- 
cil of  Defense  (1905),  commander  of  military 
district  of  St.  Petersburg  (1906).  Interested 
in  military  science  and  gave  special  attention 
to  history  of  European  strategy.  Leader  of 
aggressive  Panslavism.  Commander  in  chief 
of  Russian  army  at  outbreak  of  European 
War  in  1914.  Superseded  in  1915,  by  the 
Czar. 


lin,  at  Wirballen ;  the  Bialystok-Lyck 
railway;  and  the  Warsaw-Danzig, 
through  Mlawa  and  Soldau.  The  Ger- 
mans had  made  no  effort  to  fortify 
their  frontier  save  in  so  far  as  the  great 
positions  of  Konigsberg  and  Danzig 
may  be  said  to  have  fortified  it. 

In  August,  1914,  at  the  outset  of  the 
war,  the  Russians  sent  in  two  armies, 
one  from  the  Niemen,  resting  on  the 
fortresses  of  Kovno  and  Grodno,  under 
General  Rennenkampf,f  and  the  other 
from  the  Narew  under  Samsonoff,  each 
of  them  about  250,000  strong.  Ren- 
nenkampf  was  the  first  to  come  into 
contact  with  the  Germans  under  Von 
Francois,  who,  seriously  outnumbered, 
fell  back  after  fighting  delaying  actions 
to  Gumbinnen,  where  on  August  20  aft- 
er a  stubborn  resistance  he  was  defeat- 
ed. He  retired  on  Insterburg,  but  made 
no  attempt  to  hold  the  place,  which  was 
entered  by  the  Russians  on  August  24. 
Rennenkampf  now  continued  his  ad- 
vance west  and  southwest,  clearing  the 
country,  and  approached  closely  to 
Konigsberg,  without  however  really 
menacing  that  formidable  fortress. 
Samsonoff,  marching  northward,  found 
only  inferior  numbers  to  oppose  him, 
engaging  them  at  Soldau,  Neidenburg, 
Allenstein,  and  Frankenau.  The  result 
of  the  campaign  so  far  had  been  to 
drive  the  Germans  out  of  a  great  part 
of  East  Prussia,  where  two  armies,  to- 
taling nearly  500,000,  were  about  to 
join  hands.  Samsonoff's  army  occu- 
pied the  line  Soldau-Allenstein-Frank- 
enau  while  Rennenkampf's  ran  north- 
west-southeast along  the  line  Friedland- 

f  Rennenkampf,  Paul  K.  von.  Born 
(1854)  in  one  of  the  Baltic  Provinces.  En- 
tered military  service  (1870)  and  after  attend- 
ing military  academy  called  to  the  staff.  Given 
command  of  Transcaucasian  army  (1899)  and 
next  year  made  major  general.  Won  distinc- 
tion by  daring  raids  in  Russo-Japanese  War. 
Notoriously  severe  in  his  repressive  measures  in 
revolution  of   1905. 


S*f"0^Arensburer       *  eXlkau\ 


T  5,s 


f  r- 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


111 


Angerburg.  The  situation  was  serious 
for  the  Germans,  who  had  left  but  few 
troops  (5  corps  of  the  active  army)  in 
this  region  of  the  theatre  of  war. 

After  their  initial  successes  in  East 
Prussia  the  Russians  pushed  their  cav- 
alry patrols  almost  to  the  lower  reaches 
of  the  Vistula.  It  was  even  reported 
that  they  had  begun  the  investment  of 
Konigsberg.  Apart  from  sentimental 
reasons,  the  permanent  retention  by  the 
Russians  of  East  Prussia  would  have 
paralyzed  German  efforts  in  that  re- 
gion, and  affected  the  whole  course  of 
the  war  in  the  East. 

The  business  of  clearing  the  country 
of  the  enemy  was  intrusted  to  Von  Hin- 
denburg,*" a  retired  general  thoroughly 
acquainted  with  the  topography  of  the 
region.  His  first  task  was  to  assemble 
an  army,  which  he  did  from  the  troops 
that  had  retreated  before  the  Russians, 
from  part  of  Von  Francois'  army  and 
from  the  Vistula  fortresses.  He  thus 
got  together  some  150,000  men,  with 
whom  he  advanced  into  East  Prussia. 
The  two  Russian  armies  had  in  the 
meantime  become  separated,  Rennen- 
kampf  going  down  the  railway  from 
Insterburg  towards  Konigsberg,  while 
Samsonoff  had  got  as  far  west  as  Oster- 
ode,  where  lay  his  right  with  his  left 
further  south  along  the  Soldau-Ortels- 
burg  railway.  Far  outnumbering  Von 
Hindenburg,  Samsonoff  could  derive  no 
advantage  from  his  superior  strength 
because  his  troops  were,  so  to  say,  tan- 


*  Hindenburg,  Paul  von  Beneckendorf 
und  von,  born  (1847)  in  Posen.  Entered  army 
in  1866  and  same  year  served  in  war  against 
Austria,  and  in  Franco-Prussian  War  (1870- 
71).  Received  military  education  (1872-75). 
Served  in  General  Staff  and  as  head  of  War 
Department.  Became  major  general  in  1900 
and  lieutenant  general  in  1903.  Was  retired  in 
1911  but  recalled  at  beginning  of  great  war  in 
1914  and  given  command  of  campaign  against 
Russia.  At  Tannenberg  won  great  victory 
against  Russians.  Received  Iron  Cross  in  1870 
and  1914.     Made  Field  Marshal  in  1914. 


gled  up  in  the  lake-and-swamp  region 
in  which  they  had  become  involved. 

Von  Hindenburg  stood  with  his  left 
near  Allenstein,  across  the  Osterode-In- 
sterburg  railway,  his  centre  near  Gil- 
genburg,  and  his  right  at  Soldau.  With 
his  front  protected  by  the  nature  of 
the  ground,  the  roads  on  his  flanks  gave 
him  opportunity,  should  it  be  necessary, 
to  pass  troops  around  either  flank. 
Having,  on  August  26,  repulsed  the 
Russian  attacks,  Hindenburg  on  his 
right  forced  the  enemy  back  towards 
Neidenburg,  and  thus  got  control  of 
the  road  to  Mlawa.  To  meet  this  Ger- 
man effort,  Samsonoff  strengthened  his 
left,  and  on  the  27th  tried  to  win  back 
the  road.  In  this  he  failed;  his  centre 
at  the  same  time  fell  back.  Meanwhile 
Hindenburg  had  been  sending  men  by 
the  thousands  northeast,  past  Allen- 
stein, to  envelop  the  Russian  right.  On 
the  28th  and  29th  there  was  severe 
fighting  for  the  possession  of  Passen- 
heim,  on  the  railway  from  Ortelsburg 
to  the  main  line,  in  which  the  Germans 
were  successful.  But  one  line  of  re- 
treat was  now  open  to  the  Russians,  the 
road  running  east  through  Ortelsburg 
towards  Lyck,  with  the  Germans  well 
to  the  eastward  of  Passenheim.  The 
Russians  by  this  time  had  both  their 
flanks  turned  and  their  centre  driven  in, 
and  that  by  an  army  markedly  inferior 
in  numbers.  Accordingly  on  the  30th 
the  retreat  began,  and  on  the  31st  the 
destruction  of  Samsonoff's  army  was 
complete.  He  was  himself  killed, 
90,000,  and  possibly  more,  prisoners 
were  taken,  30,000  or  more  killed  and 
wounded,  guns  lost  by  the  hundreds, 
and  all  sorts  of  stores  abandoned.  Sam- 
sonoff had  marched  into  a  trap  and 
there  been  crushed  by  inferior  numbers 
compensated  by  superior  generalship, 
extreme  mobility,  freedom  of  movement, 
and  control  of  communication.     Barely 


112 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


more  than  one  corps  of  the  five  compos- 
ing the  army  managed  to  escape. 

The  battle  over,  Hindenburg  set  out 
northeastward.  But  Rennenkampf  had 
fallen  back  towards  the  Niemen  on  hear- 
ing of  Samsonoff's  fate.  He  fought  a 
rear-guard  action  at  Gumbinnen,  fol- 
lowed by  more  fighting  at  Augustowo, 
and  retired  behind  the  Niemen,  Sep- 
tember 23.  Von  Hindenburg  tried  the 
crossings,  failed,  was  pursued  by  Ren- 
nenkampf, and  after  suffering  severely 
in  the  Augustowo  morasses  (October 
1-9)  was  relieved  to  take  command  in 
Poland.  In  the  meantime  the  centre  of 
interest  had  shifted  to  Galicia. 

Conquest  of  Galicia. — The  German 
plan  of  campaign  contemplated,  as  we 
have  seen,  the  crushing  of  PVance,  while 
Russia  should  be  held  by  the  Central 
Powers.  In  form,  so  far  as  Austria  was 
concerned,  this  holding  was  to  be  an  in- 
vasion of  Russian  Poland.  South  of  the 
frontier  two  railways  run  roughly 
parallel  to  the  boundary,  and  from 
these  two  run  branch  lines  and  feeders. 
The  Russians  were  not  nearly  so  well 
off  in  the  matter  of  transportation. 
Given,  therefore,  the  supposed  slowness 
of  Russia's  mobilization  and  the  pov- 
erty of  her  rail  system,  an  invasion  of 
Russian  Poland  seemed  to  be  a  prom- 
ising undertaking.  It  would  at  any  rate 
hold  Russian  forces  in  the  region  and 
thus  prevent  their  cooperation  with 
those  invading  East  Prussia  further 
north.  The  invasion  was  made  by  two 
armies,  the  first  under  General  Dankl, 
of  over  300,000  men,  with  its  base  on 
Przemysl  and  Jaroslav,  and  for  its  ob- 
jective to  push  northeast  to  Lublin  and 
Kholm,  and  cut  and  hold  the  Warsaw- 
Kiev  railway.  This  done,  Brest-Litovsk 
would  be  threatened  and  with  it  com- 
munication with  Warsaw.  To  protect 
this  army  on  the  right  and  rear,  a  sec- 
ond  army   under   General  von   Auffen- 


berg  *  was  to  advance  northeast  from 
Lemberg.  This  army  mustered  also 
probably  300,000  men.  A  third,  or  re- 
serve army,  under  the  Archduke  Fred- 
erick, was  sent  forward  on  Dankl's  left 
in  the  direction  of  Kielce.  If  with  this 
offensive  we  couple  a  German  offensive 
coming  down  from  the  north,  and  the 
possibility  of  troops  from  Silesia  join- 
ing hands  with  the  3d  Austrian  army,  it 
must  be  admitted  that  the  plan  of  at- 
tack was  not  without  merits.  But  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  Russians  by  the  end 
of  August,  1914,  had  brought  into  Gali- 
cia from  Kiev  and  Odessa  armies  total- 
ing more  than  1,000,000  men.  They 
allowed  Dankl  to  advance,  practically 
unopposed,  almost  as  far  as  Lublin. 
There  was  a  battle  at  Krasnik,  in  which 
the  Austrians  were  successful.  The  real 
Russian  strength  all  this  time  was  gath- 
ering behind  Lublin  and  Kholm,  where 
two  armies  under  Ivanoff  waited  for  the 
moment  to  strike.  When  September 
came,  the  Austrians  found  opposed  to 
them,  in  this  region,  forces  at  least  as 
great  as  their  own. 

In  the  meantime  Von  Auffenberg  had 
pushed  on  to  Tomaszow,  his  purpose  be- 
ing, as  already  stated,  to  guard  Dankl's 
right.  Contact  was  established  August 
11  at  Brody,  and  two  days  later  at  So- 
kal,  where  the  Russians  were  successful. 
On  the  17th  began  the  general  advance 
against  Austria.  The  commander-in- 
chief  on  this  front  was  Ruzsky  (2d 
army),  assisted  on  his  left  by  Brusil- 
off  f  (3d  army),  who  between  them  had 

*      MORITZ,      RlTTER      VON       AuFFENBERG,      bom 

(1852)  in  Troppau,  Silesia;  became  lieutenant 
(1871);  field  marshal  (1905);  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Minister  of  War  (1911);  general  of  in- 
fantry; commander  of  a  corps  at  beginning  of 
European  War  and  won  victory  at  Kamarow; 
retired  soon  after;  accused  of  plot  to  sell  mili- 
tary secrets  to  Russia  and  imprisoned  at  Span- 
dau   (1915). 

f  Alexei  ALEXEreviTCH  Brusiloff,  born  (c. 
1860)  at  Kutais  in  the  Russian  Caucasus;  of  a 
family  long  distinguished  in  Russian  military 
and  political  life;  educated  at  Tiflis  and  in  a 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


113 


over  600,000  men.  On  discovering  the 
strength  in  front  of  him,  Von  Auffen- 
berg  drew  reinforcements  from  the  re- 
serve army.  It  is  possible  that  on  both 
sides  there  were  not  far  from  1,200,000 
men,  with  the  advantage  slightly  in 
favor  of  the  Russians. 

On  August  17  Ruzsky  attacked  Von 
Auffenberg.  He  crossed  the  frontier 
on  the  22d,  as  did  Brusiloff  further 
south.  On  the  23d  Brusiloff  drove  the 
Austrians  out  of  Tarnopol ;  they  fell 
back  on  the  Zlota  Lipa,  where  they 
made  a  stand,  but  were  finally  beaten 
back  in  the  direction  of  Halicz.  Ruz- 
sky in  the  meantime  had  been  thrusting 
at  the  Austrian  left  and  centre.  The 
Austrians  finally  took  up  a  strong  po- 
sition 70  or  80  miles  long  in  front  of 
Lemberg,  and  extending  from  Busk  in 
the  north  to  Halicz  in  the  south.  Here 
they  were  attacked  on  August  26-27! 
by  Brusiloff  and  Ruzsky  together,  and 
beaten,  their  right  having  been  turned 
at  Halicz,  and  their  left  thrown  back. 

The  result  of  this  great  battle  was 
that  Lemberg  fell  into  Russian  hands, 
and  that  the  Austrians  retired  in  dis- 
order. The  losses  on  both  sides  were 
very  heavy.  In  prisoners,  the  Aus- 
trians are  said  to  have  lost  100,000. 
Lemberg,  on  account  of  its  rail  con- 
nections, was  a  valuable  capture.  On 
September  4,  after  the  defeat  of  Von 
Auffenberg,  the  Russians  opened  on 
Dankl.  There  had  been  more  or  less 
fighting  before  this  date  in  the  region 
between  the  two  Austrian  armies,  e.g., 
at  Tomaszow,  where  the  Austrians 
were    seriously     beaten;    the    Russian 

military  school;  gained  a  reputation  for  horse- 
manship and  was  chosen  aid  to  General  Suk- 
homlinov,  then  head  of  the  Cavalry  School 
for  Officers  at  St.  Petersburg;  with  Grand 
Duke  Nicholas  he  witnessed  the  French  army 
manoeuvres;  rose  to  be  general  of  brigade  and 
of  division,  and  after  1910  commanded  an  army 
corps,  being  stationed  successively  at  Lublin, 
Warsaw  and  Vinnitza. 


front  Lublin-Kholm  had  itself  been  at- 
tacked, but  without  effect.  Under  the 
pressure  of  the  Russians,  Dankl  was 
forced  to  fall  back  on  a  front  of  75  or 
80  miles,  with  the  Vistula  on  his  left, 
to  the  river  San  (September  12),  a  re- 
treat that  was  a  running  fight  between 
the  Austrian  rear  and  the  Russian  ad- 
vance. This  struggle  developed  into 
genuine  engagements  at  various  points, 
as  at  Krasnik. 

Auffenberg,  after  Lemberg,  took  up 
another  position,  Grodek-Rawa-Ruska. 
He  had  been  reen forced,  and  his  posi- 
tion was  strong.  But,  nevertheless,  his 
left  (Rawa-Ruska)  was  crushed,  after 
a  most  gallant  resistance  lasting  over  a 
week,  and  when  Grodek  was  carried 
(September  14)  his  defeat  was  com- 
plete. The  Russians  pushed  on  vigor- 
ously, captured  Jaroslav  (September 
21),  and  drove  the  fragments  of  Auf- 
fenberg's  army  into  the  defenses  of 
Przemysl. 

The  passage  of  the  San  cost  the  Aus- 
trians very  heavily  in  men,  in  supplies, 
and  war  material.  A  Russian  force 
that  had  crossed  the  Vistula  at  Josefov 
marched  up  the  left  bank  of  that  river, 
and  reaching  the  San  at  the  same  time 
as  the  main  body,  defeated  an  Austrian 
force  on  this  side  and  took  Sandomierz. 

The  Russian  campaign  so  far  had 
been  successful.  Their  victory  at 
Tomaszow  interposed  them  between  the 
two  Austrian  armies.  The  defeat  of  the 
2d  had  left  the  1st  in  a  serious  situa- 
tion, for  which  immediate  retreat  was 
the  only  remedy.  This  retreat  was  one 
succession  of  defeats.  The  general  re- 
sult was  the  crowding  of  the  two  armies 
into  the  region  west  of  Przemysl,  leav- 
ing the  Russians  in  control  of  eastern 
Galicia,  with  its  railways  and  cities. 
Przemysl  itself  was  invested  on  Sep- 
tember 26. 

After  their  victories  in  east  Galicia, 


114 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


the  Russians  by  the  beginning  of  Oc- 
tober had  crossed  the  three  eastern 
passes  of  the  Carpathians,  and  had  ad- 
vanced some  distance  toward  Cracow, 
the  possession  of  which  would  have 
wrought  serious  harm  to  the  Central 
Powers.  But  the  news  of  the  offensive 
now  forming  against  western  Poland 
put  a  stop  to  these  plans,  and  they  fell 
back  to  the  San. 

First  German  Drive  at  Warsaw. — If, 
as  has  been  noted,  it  was  the  German 
expectation  that  the  Austrians  would 
hold  the  Russians  in  Poland,  and  thus 
leave  Germany  free  to  throw  her  full 
weight  on  France,  the  Galician  cam- 
paign must  have  proved  a  rude  awak- 
ening. In  spite  of  Tannenberg,  East 
Prussia  had  again  been  invaded,  and 
in  the  south  Cracow  would  be  the  next 
objective  of  the  Russians.  But  if  Po- 
land could  be  attacked  directly  and  its 
great  fortresses  captured,  the  Central 
Powers  would  be  in  a  position  to  menace 
the  flanks  of  the  Russian  armies,  and 
by  seizing  their  communications  force 
them  to  withdraw.  And  at  any  rate 
it  was  time  to  do  something  to  check 
the  Russians,  whose  efficiency  had  been 
as  greatly  underestimated  as  their  vic- 
tories had  been  unexpected.  Accord- 
ingly the  Central  Empires  opened  their 
first  offensive  against  Warsaw  (Sep- 
tember 27)  with  Von  Hindenburg  (a 
few  days  later)  in  command  of  the  Aus- 
tro-German  forces.  Four  separate 
armies  advanced — one  from  Thorn  up 
the  Vistula,  another  from  Kalisch 
towards  Lodz,  and  a  third  from  Bres- 
lau  towards  Novo-Radomsk,  the  fourth 
from  Cracow  towards  Kielce.  These 
four  armies  numbered  probably  about 
1,500,000  men,  of  whom  two-thirds  were 
Germans.  The  advance  was  rapid.  On 
October  8  Lodz  was  occupied,  by  the 
11th  contact  made  with  the  Russians  at 
Skierniewice.     The  southernmost  army 


was  on  October  13  engaged  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Ivangorod.  By  the  middle 
of  the  month  the  Germans  were  almost 
within  siege-gun  range  of  Warsaw. 
That  city  on  the  north  was  well  pro- 
tected by  the  Vistula  and  the  Narew 
with  their  fortresses,  but  the  Germans 
had  turned,  so  to  say,  the  position  by 
advancing  from  the  south  and  west. 
Apparently  the  Russians  had  not  con- 
templated the  possibility  of  the  offen- 
sive now  developing,  and  had  made  no 
adequate  preparations  to  defend  War- 
saw. At  any  rate  the  northern  army 
(Von  Mackensen*)  greatly  outnum- 
bered the  Russians  available  for  its  de- 
fense. In  fact  there  were  but  few  Rus- 
sians in  central  Poland.  We  have  then 
by  the  9th  of  October  the  following  situ- 
ation: an  army  at  the  gates  of  War- 
saw, two  others  to  the  west  to  face  any 
eventuality,  and  a  fourth  covering 
Ivangorod.  Warsaw  apparently  was 
doomed,  and  possibly  with  it  the  whole 
of  Poland.  Such  troops  as  held  War- 
saw were  having  the  worst  of  it.  But 
on  the  18th  Russian  reinforcements  ap- 
peared, and  increased  on  the  succeeding 
days.  They  crossed  the  Vistula  at  No- 
vogeorgievsk,  and  advanced  upon  the 
Germans,  who  on  the  21st  were  in  re- 
treat. Before  withdrawing,  however, 
they  resisted  strongly,  but  their  left 
was  turned  at  Sochaczew.  The  Ger- 
mans succeeded  in  crossing  at  Josefov, 
but  were  annihilated  on  the  21st.     At 

*  August  vox  Mackensen,  born  (1849)  at 
Haus  Leipnitz,  Saxony;  served  in  the  Franco- 
Prussian  War;  later  studied  at  Halle;  at  vari- 
ous times  attached  to  the  general  staff;  colonel 
of  the  First  Regiment  of  Hussar  Body  Guards 
(1894);  raised  to  the  nobility  (1899);  general 
of  cavalry  and  general  in  command  of  the  Sev- 
enteenth Army  Corps  (1908);  wrote  a  history 
of  the  Hussar  Body  Guards  and  a  military 
history;  in  European  War  received  chief 
credit  for  directing  the  Austro-German  drive 
which  swept  the  Russians  back  from  the  Car- 
pathians across  the  San  and  resulted  in  the  re- 
capture of  Przemysl  and  later  in  the  fall  of 
Lemberg;  received  Order  Pour  le  Merite  for 
early  victory  (1914)  at  Lowicz. 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


115 


Ivangorod  the  Russians  crossed  the 
river  (October  20-22)  to  the  western 
bank,  attacked  the  Austrian  right,  and 
after  several  days'  fighting  forced  their 
entire  army  to  retreat  to  Radom,  which 
place,  with  Lodz,  was  reoccupied.  At 
Kielce  the  Austrians  on  November  3 
were  severely  beaten.  The  main  Ger- 
man armies,  after  heavy  fighting  around 
Rawa,  Skierniewice,  and  Lowicz,  con- 
tinued their  retreat,  and  early  in  No- 
vember were  once  more  across  their 
own  frontier. 

Second  Offensive  in  Galicia. — At  the 
same  time  with  the  main  offensive  in 
Poland  the  Austrian  forces  in  Galicia, 
composed  in  part  of  Auffenberg's  origi- 
nal army  and  in  part  of  German  troops, 
resumed  the  offensive,  before  which  the 
Russians  had  fallen  back  behind  the 
San.  On  October  18  the  passage  was 
attempted  by  the  Austrians  but  failed. 
There  was  more  or  less  fighting 
throughout  this  region :  Bukowina  had 
been  cleared  of  Austrians  and  Czerno- 
witz  captured.  On  November  4  the 
Russians  had  recrossed  the  San,  and 
two  days  later  completely  defeated  the 
Austrians. 

The  Russians  resumed  their  offensive 
against  Cracow.  The  cavalry  advanc- 
ing westward  passed  Kolo  November  9, 
and  next  day  crossed  the  frontier. 
This  showed  that  the  Germans  had  no 
idea  of  making  any  stand  on  the  War- 
ta.  Hence  the  Cracow  movement  was 
coupled  with  a  movement  against  the 
Warta,  directed  against  the  left  of  the 
Germans,  and  a  general  advance  began. 
By  November  12  the  Uzsok,  Lupkow, 
and  Dukla  passes  were  occupied,  and 
by  December  6  the  Russians  had  got 
to  within  12  miles  of  their  goal. 

On  the  8th,  however,  they  were  com- 
pelled, after  a  battle  under  the  walls 
of  the  place,  to  fall  back,  and  on  the 
12th  the  Dukla  was  recaptured.     This 


called  for  a  fresh  withdrawal  to  the 
Dunajec-Biala  line,  past  Tarnow  to 
Krosno.  The  Dukla-Lupkow  pass  was 
the  next  to  fall  to  the  Austrians  (prob- 
ably Germans),  but  now  the  Russians 
counterattacked,  and  succeeded  in 
taking  the  Galician  entrances  of  the 
western  passes. 

Second  Drive  at  Warsaw. — It  was 
partly  to  relieve  this  serious  threat 
against  Cracow  that  Von  Hindenburg 
opened  his  second  offensive  against 
Warsaw.  By  November  15,  he  had 
driven  the  Russians  towards  Kutno, 
who  on  the  18th  crossed  their  left  over 
the  Bzura  from  Lodz  westward.  On 
the  19th,  Von  Mackensen  had  broken 
the  enemy's  lines  between  Lodz  and 
Strykov.  Into  this  gap  he  drove  two 
corps ;  with  the  Russian  army  cut  in 
two,  it  looked  as  though  a  decisive  suc- 
cess were  at  hand.  But  reinforcements 
coming  up  just  in  time,  reestablished 
the  line ;  the  two  German  corps,  how- 
ever, after  a  most  desperate  struggle, 
November  24-26,  in  which  they  suffered 
frightful  losses,  managed  to  break  out 
to  the  north.  The  Russians  on  Decem- 
ber 6  abandoned  Lodz ;  on  December 
7  there  began  a  three  weeks'  battle  for 
the  possession  of  Warsaw.  When  it 
closed,  Warsaw  was  still  in  Russian 
hands,  whose  line  now  followed  the 
Bzura-Rawka  River  to  the  west  of 
Kielce  through  Tarnow,  joining  the 
forces  on  the  Dunajec.  By  taking  up 
this  position,  Lowicz,  Petrikov,  Tomas- 
zow,  and  other  towns  were  abandoned 
to  the  Germans,  but  the  line  was  better, 
and  in  war  it  is  armies  and  not  cities 
that  count.  The  year  closed  with  the 
repulse  of  German  attacks  upon  this 
line  of  the  rivers. 

Russian  Campaigns;  Przemysl. — In 
the  winter  of  1914-15,  fighting  contin- 
ued over  the  whole  front  from  the  Baltic 
through  Poland  along  the  Carpathians 


116 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


to  Bukowina.  A  serious  assault  on  the 
Bzura-Rawka  line,  including  the  con- 
siderable battle  of  Borzynov,  ended  in 
a  German  check.  In  the  north,  the 
Russians  had  to  fall  back  across  the 
East  Prussian  frontier,  losing  Lyck 
(Feb.  7-20).  They,  however,  repelled 
the  German  attempt  to  reach  the  War- 
saw-Petrograd  (St.  Petersburg)  rail- 
way. Ossowiec  continued  to  distinguish 
itself  by  resisting  a  renewed  German  at- 
tempt to  take  it,  and  the  offensive  in 
this  region  closed  with  no  special  ad- 
vantage to  the  Germans.  On  the  Na- 
rew,  they  were  beaten  (Feb.  26)  near 
Prasnysz,  which  they  had  captured  on 
the  24th,  thereby  threatening  Ostro- 
lenka. 

In  the  south  a  vigorous  attempt  was 
made  to  relieve  Przemysl.  This  in- 
volved the  control  of  the  Carpathian 
passes.  One  of  these,  Kirlibaba,  was 
captured  by  the  Russians,  Jan.  17, 
1915.  They  already  had  the  crest  of 
Dukla,  controlled  Lupkow  and  were  in 
the  foothills  everywhere  else.  To  turn 
them  out,  three  Austrian  armies  at- 
tacked the  positions.  The  left  made 
little  headway,  but  east  of  the  Lupkow, 
all  the  passes  were  taken.  At  Koziowa, 
a  battle  lasted  from  February  into 
March,  in  which  the  Austrian  assaults 
were  beaten  off,  thus  saving  Stryj  and 
Lemberg,  and  preventing  the  relief  of 
Przemysl.  In  Bukowina,  the  Austrians 
took  Czernowitz,  Kolomea,  and  Stanis- 
lau,  only  to  be  driven  out  of  this  latter 
place,  and  compelled  to  fall  back  to 
the  Kolomea-Czernowitz  line.  No  relief 
therefore  coming,  Przemysl,  after  a 
siege  of  seven  months,  fell  on  March 
22,  1915.  The  Russians  now  renewed 
their  attention  to  the  passes ;  only  by 
controlling  them  could  they  hope  to  in- 
vade Hungary,  and  whether  they 
should  attempt  this  or  not,  it  was  of 
the  first  importance  to  hold  the  passes 


in  order  to  protect  their  flank  against 
attacks  coming  from  the  south.  As  a 
result  of  their  efforts,  the  Russians 
claimed  (April  12-18)  the  capture  of  a 
considerable  part  of  the  principal 
chain.  But  these  operations  had  little 
or  no  effect  on  the  general  situation, 
any  more  than  the  Russian  capture  of 
Memel  (March  17),  which  they  evacuat- 
ed four  days  later.  More  serious  was 
the  German  invasion  of  Courland ;  there 
was  an  affair  at  Shavli  (April  29)  and 
Libau  was  entered  on  May  8.  The  Ger- 
mans had  broken  ground  for  severe  ef- 
forts to  be  made  later. 

Russian  Defeat  and  Withdrawal. — 
These  and  all  other  contemporaneous 
events  in  this  theatre,  however,  pale  into 
insignificance  in  comparison  with  the 
Austro-German  offensive  on  the  Duna- 
jec  line.  Aroused  by  the  unexpected 
success  of  the  Russians  so  far,  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  rose  to  the  occasion,  and 
by  an  application  of  their  powers  of 
organization  prepared  during  the  win- 
ter of  1914  and  spring  of  1915  for  a 
campaign  about  the  issue  of  which  there 
was  from  the  outset  not  a  shadow  of 
doubt. 

At  the  end  of  April  four  German 
corps  stood  between  the  Middle  Pilica 
and  the  junction  of  the  Nida  and  the 
Vistula ;  on  the  west  Galician  front  were 
at  least  10  more  corps,  half  German, 
half  Austro-Hungarian,  while  the  Car- 
pathian front  was  held  by  12.  The 
leader  of  all  these  forces  was  General 
von  Mackensen.  Opposed  to  him  the 
Russians  had  barely  14  corps,  com- 
manded by  General  Ivanoff,  who  had 
under  him  Dmitrieff  and  Brusiloff.  The 
Austro-Germans  for  the  approaching 
campaign  had  brought  together  a  num- 
ber of  guns,  and  supplies  of  ammuni- 
tion, more  staggering  to  the  imagina- 
tion than,  their  concentration  of  men. 
It   is   said   that   over  4000   guns   were 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


117 


collected,  of  which  over  one-half  ex- 
ceeded 8  inches  in  calibre.  The  work 
of  preparation,  which  perhaps  is  unique 
in  military  history,  would  perhaps  have 
been  impossible  but  for  the  admirable 
roads,  both  rail  and  ordinary,  in  the 
region  to  the  south  and  west  of  the 
scene  of  the  conflict.  The  campaign 
was  planned  by  Erich  von  Falkenhayn.* 

The  end  now  sought  by  the  Central 
Powers  was  to  crush  the  Russians  so 
thoroughly  that  they  should  no  longer 
be  a  factor  in  the  war.  As  early  as 
April  28,  Mackensen  had  advanced 
against  Gorlice.  Three  days  later 
(May  1)  the  tremendous  batteries 
opened,  and  continued  for  several  hours 
on  the  2d.  It  is  said  that  in  this  time 
700,000  rounds  were  fired.  The  Rus- 
sian first  line  was  powdered  out  of  ex- 
istence. The  Austro-Germans  crossed 
the  Dunajec-Biala  line  at  various 
points ;  once  the  front  broken  in,  Von 
Mackensen  advanced  sending  his  right 
due  east  to  reach  Dukla  Pass,  hoping 
to  catch  the  Russians  in  Hungary  be- 
fore they  could  make  their  retreat  by 
it ;  his  left  and  centre  changed  direc- 
tion so  as  to  face  northeast.  This 
manoeuvre  forced  the  Russians  to  aban- 
don Tarnow  and  widen  the  gap  already 
made  in  their  lines  near  Gorlice. 

The  campaign  that  followed  the  de- 
feat of  the  Russians  in  the  battle  of 
Gorlice  and  their  dislodgment  from  the 
lines  of  the  Dunajec,  of  the  Wisloka, 

*  Erich  vox  Falkenhayk,  born  (1853)  at 
Burg  Belchau;  entered  the  army  in  youth;  mili- 
tary attache  to  the  Legation  at  Paris  (1887); 
military  instructor  and  favorite  of  the  Crown 
Prince  and  Prince  Eitel  Friedrich  (1889);  chief 
of  the  general  staff  of  the  Ninth  Army  Corps 
(1898) ;  served  in  China  during  Boxer  Rebel- 
lion (1900);  lieutenant  general  (1906);  re- 
tired (1910),  but  became  active  again  in  the 
European  War;  Minister  of  War  (1914),  in 
which  office  he  upheld  the  officers  whose  con- 
duct in  Alsace  resulted  in  the  Zabern  disor- 
ders; succeeded  Moltke  as  chief  of  the  general 
staff  (December,  1914),  the  youngest  man 
ever  to  hold  that  office,  and  was  made  a  general 
of  infantry. 


and  of  the  San,  respectively,  consisted 
in  a  pursuit  by  the  Austro-Germans 
that  resulted  in  a  withdrawal  from  the 
passes,  in  the  evacuation  of  Bukowina 
(June  12)  and  in  the  recapture  of 
Jaroslav  (May  15),  Stryj  (May  31), 
Przemysl  (June  3),  and  of  Lemberg 
(June  22).  Galicia  was  cleared  of 
Russians. 

But  as  may  be  inferred  from  these 
dates,  the  Russians  offered  a  stubborn 
resistance  at  every  point  and  some- 
times, as  at  Opatov  (May  15-17)  and 
at  the  crossings  of  the  Dniester,  even 
repulsed  their  pursuers.  The  fact  is 
that,  although  defeated  and  driven 
back,  they  had  not  lost  their  cohesion 
as  troops  and  were  ready,  whenever  cir- 
cumstances favored,  to  give  a  good  ac- 
count of  themselves.  We  are  compelled 
to  believe  that  in  this  tremendous  cam- 
paign the  Russians  were  taken  by  sur- 
prise, that  the  magnitude  of  the  attack 
was  unexpected  by  them.  It  seems  to 
be  reasonably  certain,  moreover,  that 
they  lacked  the  guns  and  shells  to  reply 
effectively  to  the  terrible  Austro-Ger- 
man  artillery. 

Entire  Eastern  Front. — The  opera- 
tions for  the  fall  of  Przemysl  and  Lem- 
berg must  be  regarded  as  the  prelude 
of  a  general  offensive  on  the  entire 
Russian  front  from  the  Baltic  to  the 
frontier  of  Rumania.  The  immediate 
effect  of  the  Galician  campaign  was  to 
force  the  withdrawal  of  the  Russians  in 
this  part  of  the  tremendous  theatre  to 
a  defensive  position  behind  the  Zlota 
Lipa  and  the  upper  Bug,  which  re- 
mained the  line  of  separation  in  this 
region  until  August  27.  On  the  side 
of  the  Central  Powers  it  was  necessary 
in  this  region  to  guard  against  any 
counter  offensive  originating  in  Volhy- 
nia  and  menacing  the  right  of  the 
forces  that  turned  northward  against 
the  line  Lublin-Kholm  in  the  general  of- 


118 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


fensive  that  now  gathered  headway. 
This  new  offensive  as  just  stated  ex- 
tended over  the  whole  eastern  front, 
along  a  line  over  1000  miles  long,  and 
opened  in  the  middle  of  July.  But  al- 
ready, on  June  28,  the  advance  had  been 
begun  against  Lublin-Kholm.  This  ad- 
vance received  a  check,  however,  July 
1-7,  in  the  severe  defeat  of  the  Aus- 
trians at  Krasnik,  a  victory  from  which, 
save  in  the  important  element  of  time 
gained,  the  Russians  derived  no  benefit. 
The  German  campaign  had  for  its  main 
object  to  bag  the  Russian  armies.  It  is 
clear  that  the  Russian  situation  was 
most  serious.  Four  lines  of  railway 
formed  their  lines  of  communication, 
the  Petrograd-Vilna-Warsaw,  covered 
by  the  Niemen  and  Narew ;  two  interior 
lines,  Siedlce-Warsaw,  and  Brest-Lit- 
ovsk-Ivangorod,  without  any  natural 
defenses ;  and  the  Kovel-Kholm-Ivango- 
rod  line  in  the  south.  These  four  lines 
are  interconnected  by  three  others  run- 
ning approximately  north  and  south. 
If  these  railways  could  be  seized  by  the 
Austro-Germans  before  the  Russians 
could  withdraw  by  them,  a  material  part 
of  the  Russian  forces  in  Poland  could 
be  cut  off  and  surrounded. 

Pressure  was  applied  everywhere, 
thus  robbing  the  Russians  of  the  ad- 
vantage of  their  interior  line ;  specifi- 
cally, the  Vistula  and  the  Narew  and 
Lublin-Kholm  lines  were  to  be  forced. 
In  the  north  Von  Biilow  was  to  renew 
his  attacks ;  if  successful,  the  Petro- 
grad-Vilna-Warsaw line  would  be  cut. 
In  the  south  the  Austrians  were  to  cross 
the  Dniester  and  roll  up  Ivanoff's  left 
wing. 

A  week  after  the  opening  of  the  cam- 
paign the  Russians  had  abandoned  the 
line  of  the  Bzura ;  Von  Gallwitz  had 
crossed  the  Narew  between  Pultusk  and 
Ostrolenka,  where  he  was  held  by  the 
stubborn    resistance    of    the    Russians. 


Further  north,  Mitau  and  Shavli  were 
captured.  In  the  south  the  Austrians 
failed  in  the  Dniester  region ;  the  offen- 
sive against  Lublin-Kholm,  renewed 
July  15,  was  successful,  the  Russians 
suffering  a  defeat  at  Krasnostaw.  But 
they  offered  so  stout  a  resistance  im- 
mediately afterward,  that  it  was  not 
until  July  30  that  Lublin  was  reached. 
Campaigns  around  Warsaw. — But 
the  Austro-Germans  were  too  strong 
for  the  Russians,  who  had  managed, 
west  of  Warsaw,  to  hold  the  Blonie 
lines  as  late  as  July  26.  On  the  30th, 
however,  the  Germans  crossed  the  Vis- 
tula, 20  miles  north  of  Ivangorod.  This 
fortress  fell  on  August  4,  and  Warsaw 
was  evacuated  on  the  5th.  Novogeor- 
gievsk,  however,  was  not  evacuated,  as 
it  was  thought  capable  of  delaying  the 
German  advance.  It  fell,  however,  un- 
der the  fire  of  Von  Beseler's  guns  on 
August  19.  The  necessity  of  abandon- 
ing Warsaw  had  been  foreseen,  and 
preparations  made  for  withdrawal. 
Part  of  the  forces  retreated  to  the  Na- 
rew, and  part  joined  the  forces  on  the 
south.  This  was  the  opportunity  for 
the  Austro-Germans.  Could  the  forces 
pressing  south  and  north  from  the  Na- 
rew and  Lublin-Kholm,  respectively, 
join  hands  in  the  Siedlce-Lukow  region, 
a  lasting  victory  would  have  been 
achieved.  But  the  Russians  offered  an 
extremely  stiff  resistance  between  the 
Narew  and  the  Bug.  They  held  so 
strongly  on  the  Vyshkoff-Ostroff  line 
that  the  Germans  shifted  their  efforts 
to  the  northeastward  between  Ostro- 
lenka and  Vilna.  Here  they  did  break 
through  on  August  9  and  on  the  10th 
captured  the  fortress  of  Lomza.  But 
even  after  this  success  their  advance 
was  slow;  and  in  the  meantime  the  Rus- 
sians had  succeeded  in  escaping.  In 
the  south  an  equally  stiff  resistance  was 
offered.     Here  in  the  neighborhood  of 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


119 


Lubartoff  a  serious  battle  was  fought 
August  6-9;  although  a  Russian  de- 
feat, it  gained  time  for  the  withdrawal 
of  the  last  forces  further  north  and 
west. 

The  attempt  made  against  Riga 
August  9  to  September  8  came  to 
nought,  but  on  August  17  Kovno  was 
taken  and  the  line  of  the  Niemen  thus 
broken.  The  effect  of  this  German  vic- 
tory was  the  abandonment  of  Brest- 
Litovsk  and  a  withdrawal  along  the 
whole  front  from  Ossowiec  (abandoned 
Aug.  22)  to  Vladimir  Volynski.  Grodno 
was  evacuated  September  1-2.  In  the 
south,  Kovel  was  (Aug.  23)  entered  by 
the  Austro-Germans,  and  the  Russians 
were  compelled  to  evacuate  their  line  of 
the  Zlota-Lipa  and  the  upper  Bug. 
Pinsk  was  occupied. 

Thus,  four  weeks  after  the  fall  of 
Warsaw,  the  Central  Powers  were  in 
full  possession  of  the  entire  line  Nie- 
men-Bug.  They  had  failed  to  capture 
the  Russian  army,  but  Poland  had  fall- 
en into  their  hands  with  its  fortresses. 
They  now  directed  their  attention  to 
the  capture  of  the  railway  running  from 
Vilna  to  Rovno  across  the  Pripet 
Marshes.  East  of  this  railway  lies  a 
vast  stretch  of  marshland  not  traversed 
by  any  other  north  and  south  line;  if 
this  road  could  be  taken  from  the  Rus- 
sians, the  Austro-Germans  would  have 
a  line  of  communication  between  their 
northern  and  southern  theatres  of  op- 
eration, while  the  Russians  would  find 
their  own  forces  cut  in  two  by  the 
marshes.  The  operations  of  the  Ger- 
mans north  of  the  marshes  were  success- 
ful. On  September  19,  the  evacuation 
of  Vilna  was  ordered.  In  the  south,  on 
August  27,  the  Austro-Germans  had 
renewed  their  offensive.  The  Russians 
withdrew  into  Volhynia,  were  beaten  at 
and  lost  Lutsk,  and  forced  to  cross  the 
Styr.     Dubno  was  entered  on  the  7th. 


But  on  the  8th  the  Russians  struck 
back,  inflicting  a  defeat  on  the  Austro- 
Germans  at  Tarnopol  and  again  at 
Tremblowa.  On  the  23d  they  succeeded 
in  recapturing  Lutsk. 

Baltic  Campaign. — As  may  be  im- 
agined, the  fall  of  Vilna  did  not  end 
the  Austro-German  offensive.  Once  in 
possession  of  it,  the  Germans  advanced 
eastward,  sending  five  cavalry  divisions 
towards  Polotsk.  Detachments  of  cav- 
alry were  also  sent  out  against  the 
Molodetchno-Polotsk  railway,  while 
strong  forces  were  converging  on 
Minsk.  Just  north  of  the  Pripet 
Marshes  another  force  undertook  an 
enveloping  movement  against  the  line 
Minsk-Bobrinsk ;  that  is,  a  movement 
over  a  front  of  150  miles  was  initiated, 
partly  to  cut  off,  if  possible,  the  re- 
treating Russians,  and  partly  to  con- 
firm the  German  hold  on  the  Riga- 
Dvinsk-Vilna  line.  Contact  was  made 
in  the  region  around  Vileika.  After 
several  days'  fighting  the  Russians 
managed  to  straighten  their  front,  and 
even  took  the  offensive.  They  cleared 
the  Polotsk  line,  held  on  around  Vileika 
and  Molodetchno,  and  further  south 
succeeded  in  checking  the  German  ad- 
vance. It  is  possible  that  the  need  of 
troops  in  Serbia  and  on  the  western 
front  may  explain  the  German  failure 
to  continue  the  offensive. 

In  the  meantime  an  important  at- 
tack was  being  made  on  Dvinsk.  On 
September  24*  a  battle  was  fought  be- 
tween the  Dvina  and  Lake  Drisviaty, 
20  miles  south  of  Dvinsk,  in  which  the 
Germans  made  no  gains  of  any  conse- 
quence. Later,  October  4-18,  they  con- 
centrated their  efforts  between  Illukst, 
15  miles  northwest  of  the  city,  and  Lake 
Sventen,  five  or  six  miles  due  west. 
There  was  severe  fighting  in  this  re- 
gion, but  with  no  particular  advantage 
to  the  Germans  until  October  25,  when 


120 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


they  captured  Illukst,  and  a  day  or  two 
later  made  other  advances.  But  these 
gains  were  more  than  neutralized  by 
the  Russian  counter  offensive,  which 
opened  October  31,  between  Lake  Sven- 
ten  and  Ilsen  (battle  of  Platokovna,  a 
village  between  the  lakes),  and  resulted 
in  a  German  defeat.  The  Russians  fol- 
lowed up  this  victory  by  further  ad- 
vances to  the  north  and  northwest  of 
Illukst,  and  towards  that  place  itself. 
By  the  end  of  November,  fighting  ceased 
in  this  particular  sector. 

Riga. — The  Germans  were  no  more 
successful  in  front  of  Riga.  This  city, 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Dvina,  is  pro- 
tected on  the  southwest  by  the  Tirul 
swamp,  crossed  by  the  railway  and  road 
from  Mitau  through  Olai,  which  con- 
stitutes from  this  direction  the  only 
possible  approach.  The  German  lines 
about  mid-October  ran  south  from  the 
sea  along  the  river  Aa  to  Mitau,  and 
thence  curved  eastward  to  Friedrich- 
stadt  and  Jacobstadt  on  the  Dvina, 
halfway  between  Riga  and  Dvinsk. 
Three  possible  lines  of  attack  existed — 
the  Tukkum-Riga  railway  between 
Lake  Babit  (west  of  Riga)  and  the  sea; 
the  Mitau-Olai  line;  and  one  from  the 
southeast,  from  an  island  (Dalen)  in 
the  river.  On  October  14  the  Germans 
opened,  and  managed  by  October  20  to 
reach  the  river  at  Borkowitz,  20  miles 
up.  But  they  failed  to  cross  the  river 
in  spate  of  all  their  efforts.  Their 
centre  in  the  meantime  had  got  to  Olai, 
but  could  go  no  farther.  During  the 
first  half  of  November  they  tried  the 
first  line  mentioned  above,  but  on  the 
10th  the  Russians,  assisted  by  their 
fleet,  beat  them  back,  and  later  pushed 
on  beyond  Kemmern.  These  attempts 
to  take  Riga  proved  a  failure. 

In  the  beginning  of  December,  1915, 
the  Germans  captured  the  Borsemiinde 
position  on  the  Dvina,  but  at  Dvinsk 


continued  to  lose  ground  about  Lake 
Sventen  and  at  Illukst.  On  the  other 
hand  they  beat  off  with  great  loss  an 
attack  on  Postavy,  50  miles  south  of 
Dvinsk. 

During  the  last  ten  days  of  March 
the  Russians  developed  without  effect 
an  offensive  against  the  bridgehead  at 
Jacobstadt  and  the  railroad  thence  to 
Mitau.  Similarly  south  of  Dvinsk  they 
were  defeated  near  Lake  Narocz,  where 
their  objective  was  Sventziany,  on  the 
Vilna-Dvinsk    railroad. 

Soutliem  Sector. — We  must  now 
turn  south  to  see  what  was  happening 
in  that  region.  Three  days  after  tak- 
ing Lutsk  (September  23)  the  Rus- 
sians abandoned  it,  and  took  up  a  po- 
sition to  the  east  extending  from  Rafa- 
lovka  through  Czartorysk  and  Kolki  to 
a  point  south  of  Dubno.  Rovno  was  be- 
hind them.  The  first  attempt  to  con- 
verge on  that  place  failed.  Von  Lin- 
singen  then  early  in  October  advanced 
against  Sarny,  where  the  Kovel-Kiev 
railway  crosses  the  Vilna-Rovno  line. 
The  capture  of  Sarny  would  have  meant 
the  loss  to  the  Russians  of  this  latter 
railway.  During  the  next  two  months 
Von  Linsingen  and  Brusiloff  were  at 
grips  on  the  middle  Styr. 

Along  the  line  of  the  Styr  River  the 
struggle  continued  for  the  control  of 
the  left  bank.  At  the  end  of  the  month 
the  Russians  took  the  offensive  on  the 
Bessarabian  frontier,  and  advanced 
along  two  main  lines — first,  the  Odessa- 
Czernowitz-Lemberg  railroad ;  second, 
farther  north,  the  Kiev-Kovel-Warsaw 
line.  In  the  first  region  their  efforts, 
centred  on  the  capture  of  the  Buko- 
winan  capital,  which  had  already 
changed  hands  five  times  in  the  course 
of  the  war,  met  with  failure. 

In  the  region  of  the  Styr  River,  how- 
ever, they  had  better  fortune.  Early  in 
January  they  succeeded  in  crossing  this 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


121 


line  north  of  the  Kovel-Sarny  railroad, 
and  in  holding1  on  to  their  position. 
Thereupon  the  village  of  Czartorysk 
became  a  storm  centre,  and  was  finally 
captured  by  the  Russians  by  assault. 

Early  in  February,  1916,  they 
achieved  some  gain  in  the  Lutsk-Rovno- 
Dubno  sector ;  the  Germans  were  re- 
ported as  standing  on  the  defensive 
along  the  Pruth,  the  Dniester,  and  the 
Sereth.  Further  Russian  advances  also 
were  reported,  the  most  important 
being  the  capture  of  Uscieczko,  on  the 
Dniester,  thus  again  threatening 
Czernowitz. 

In  April,  1916,  Brusiloff  succeeded 
Ivanoff  in  command  of  the  armies  from 
the  Pripet  Marshes  to  Rumania,  and 
began  preparations  for  a  general  offen- 
sive on  this  line.  Heavily  fortified  as 
it  was,  the  Austrians  had  believed  it  to 
be  so  strong  that  they  had  transferred 
many  of  its  defenders  to  other  fronts. 

The  Russians  opened  northwest  from 
Rovno  through  Lutsk  towards  Kovel ; 
west  along  the  Rovno-Lemberg  railway 
towards  Dubno  ;  northwest  from  Tarno- 
pol  towards  Lemberg;  and  south  across 
the  Pruth  against  Czernowitz.  Great 
success  attended  the  effort.  Lutsk, 
abandoned  by  the  Austrians,  fell  on 
June  6;  Dubno  on  June  10,  with  35,000 
prisoners  and  30  guns  as  additional 
prize;  farther  south  on  the  same  day 
Buczacz  and  Potok  Zloty  were  entered 
and  many  more  prisoners  taken.  But 
now  the  resistance  of  the  Central  Pow- 
ers stiffened  from  Tarnopol  to  Kolki, 
and  the  Russian  advance  was  checked, 
giving  way  to  obstinate  fighting  by  both 
sides.  It  is  believed  that  the  Germans 
came  to  the  Austrian  rescue  on  this 
portion  of  the  front.  Beaten  at  Do- 
bronobtze  (18,000  prisoners,  10  guns), 
the  Austrians,  June  17,  abandoned 
Czernowitz.  The  effect  of  its  fall  was 
greatly  to  imperil  Pflanzer's  army.     A 


small  part  of  this  army  was  pushed 
over  the  frontier  into  Rumania  and 
interned;  the  main  body,  cut  off  from 
communication  with  Lemberg  by  the 
capture  of  Kolomea  and  the  threat 
against  Stanislau,  was  crowded  against 
the  flanks  of  the  Carpathians. 

In  this  great  movement  of  the  Rus- 
sians the  significant  thing  was  the  loss 
of  the  Austrians  in  prisoners  (250,000) 
and  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  (un- 
known), an  irreparable  loss.  Hungary 
alone  admitted  a  loss  of  600,000  men 
in  this  campaign.  In  ground  gained, 
the  Russians  had  recovered  about  15,- 
000  square  miles  of  territory.  By  the 
middle  of  July  (1916)  the  Russians 
were  still  some  miles  from  the  railroad 
centre  of  Kovel ;  and  in  their  progress 
towards  Lemberg,  had  reached  the 
Zlota  Lipa  River. 

The  situation  on  the  eastern  front 
became  so  serious  that  the  German  Gen- 
eral Staff  determined  to  reenforce  the 
weakened  Austrians  with  German 
troops.  Consequently,  General  von 
Linsingen  was  sent  at  the  head  of 
200,000  men.  These  were  sent  against 
the  Russians  west  and  northwest  of 
Lutsk.  Their  presence  was  immediately 
felt,  inasmuch  as  they  won  important 
successes  at  Kiselin  and  Lokatchi. 
Many  Russian  prisoners  fell  into  their 
hands.  The  Russian  offensive  was 
checked  effectively  for  the  time  being 
at  the  Stokhod  River.  The  advance 
on  Lemberg  was  also  stopped  at  the 
Galician  frontier  at  Brody. 

The  advance  in  the  south  neverthe- 
less went  on  almost  as  rapidly  as  be- 
fore. After  the  capture  of  Czerno- 
witz the  Russians  again  overran  the 
Bukowina.  They  proceeded  down  the 
railroad  to  Radautz,  cut  off  the  re- 
treating Austrians  and  took  over  1000 
prisoners.  West  of  Czernowitz  the  op- 
position was  stiffer,  but  on  July  1  the 


122 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


important  railroad  junction  at  Kolo- 
mea  was  captured  and  a  little  later  the 
railroad  running  from  Lemberg  into 
Hungary  was  cut  at  Delaytyn.  This 
seriously  threatened  the  Austrians  in 
the  north.  New  gains  were  now  made 
in  the  Kovel  sector.  They  crossed  the 
Stokhod  River  at  Ulgi  by  means  of 
pontoon  bridges  and  made  another 
great  thrust  at  Kovel  in  the  face  of  ex- 
tremely heavy  resistance  by  Von  Lin- 
singen.  On  July  16  they  captured  30 
guns  and  13,000  prisoners  at  the  battle 
of  Sviniusky.  On  the  28th,  they  cap- 
tured Brody  and  advanced  upon  Lem- 
berg. Lemberg  was  now  threatened  on 
three  sides  and  was  in  serious  danger 
of  being  enveloped. 

The  Russians  now  seemed  to  concen- 
trate all  their  efforts  to  capture  this 
stronghold.  They  advanced  from 
Dubno  and  Tarnopol  on  the  north  and 
from  Stanislau  on  the  south.  They 
captured  this  latter  place  with  very 
little  effort.  In  the  Carpathians  the 
Russians  also  continued  their  successes, 
by  capturing  Jablonica. 

South  of  Brody  the  Russians  cap- 
tured an  entire  ridge  held  by  the  Teu- 
tonic forces  on  the  5th  and  6th  of 
August.  The  ridge  contained  six  vil- 
lages. More  than  5000  prisoners  were 
taken.  On  the  8th  8,500  more  prisoners 
were  taken  in  eastern  Galicia.  The 
Central  Allies  continued  to  retreat  in 
this  region  as  the  Russians  continued  to 
gain  on  the  Sereth  and  Zlota  Lipa  riv- 
ers. On  the  14th  the  town  of  Tusto- 
baby,  a  strongly  fortified  point,  was 
taken.  This  put  the  Russians  several 
miles  west  of  General  Bothmer's  front 
and  menaced  his  flank  and  rear.  So 
serious  was  his  position  that  he  was 
compelled  to  abandon  the  Strypa  River 
line.  Immediately  upon  the  fall  of  this 
line  General  Letchitsky  struck  on  both 
sides   of  the  Dniester.      He  drove  the 


Austrians  out  of  the  Jablonica  Pass 
and  thus  opened  up  the  way  to  Kuty. 

During  September  the  Russians  were 
able  to  make  little  progress  toward 
Lemberg.  They  were  checked  at  Halicz 
and  were  not  able  to  advance  on  the 
Kovel-Vladimir-Volynsky  line.  Heavy 
fighting  occurred  at  Brzezany  and  very 
heavy  assaults  were  made  further  south. 
The  results  of  these  were  the  abandon- 
ment by  the  Germans  of  the  entire 
Strypa  and  Zlota  Lipa  river  lines. 
Now  the  only  natural  boundary  between 
the  Russians  and  Lemberg  was  the  Gnila 
Lipa  River.  All  attempts  to  take 
Halicz,  however,  failed  and  a  strong 
German  counter  offensive  compelled 
the  Russians  to  give  up  much  of  the 
newly  captured  territory.  They  also 
lost  about  5000  men  in  prisoners. 

In  October  the  Russians  renewed 
their  assaults  in  the  general  direction 
of  Lemberg.  On  October  4  the  Zlota 
Lipa  was  crossed  after  a  severe  three 
days'  battle  south  of  Brzezany.  North 
of  Lemberg  intense  fighting  occurred 
along  the  Brody-Lemberg  railroad. 
Along  the  Stokhod  the  Russians  merely 
kept  on  the  defensive  in  order  to  keep 
the  Teutonic  allies  from  starting  an  of- 
fensive movement.  The  latter,  never- 
theless, attempted  to  relieve  the  pres- 
sure on  Lemberg  by  beginning  an  offen- 
sive movement  in  the  Carpathian  Moun- 
tains. This  extended  from  the  Ruman- 
ian border  to  the  Jablonica  Pass,  a 
front  of  75  miles.  The  Russians  were 
compelled  to  immediately  give  way  in 
the  Negra  valley. 

West  of  Lutsk  the  Russians  made 
some  gains  south  of  the  Stokhod  along 
the  Luga  River.  This  enabled  them 
seriously  to  menace  the  city  of  Vladi- 
mir-Volynsky  which  controlled  the 
southern  entrance  to  Kovel.  The  be- 
ginning of  the  severe  Russian  winter 
now  seemed  to  put  an  end  to  the  Rus- 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


123 


sian  forward  movements  and  the  Teu- 
tons took  the  opportunity  to  strengthen 
their  lines.  Their  weakest  point  was 
along  the  Stokhod.  They  advanced 
here  as  well  as  on  the  Navayuvke, 
which  flows  near  Halicz.  On  Novem- 
ber 9  an  extremely  heavy  attack  was 
made  on  Russian  positions  at  Bkro- 
bowa  in  Volhynia.  The  Russians,  after 
savage  resistance,  were  compelled  to  fall 
back  to  their  second  line  of  trenches. 
Another  German  blow  at  Dorna  Watra 
also  was  successful  and  compelled  the 
Russians  to  relinquish  newly  won  posi- 
tions. In  this  latter  engagement  they 
lost  over  4000  prisoners.  As  a  result 
of  the  taking  of  a  bridgehead  on  the 
Stokhod  the  German  hold  on  Halicz 
was  considerably  strengthened. 

In  December,  1916,  and  January, 
1917,  the  entire  eastern  front  was  prac- 
tically quiet.  The  Germans  contented 
themselves  with  small  sorties  and  trench 
raids  in  order  to  protect  their  positions 
in  Volhynia.  The  chief  Russian  activi- 
ties during  these  months  were  in  the 
south  where  they  attempted  to  relieve 
the  tremendous  pressure  being  exerted 
on  Rumania.  Their  aim  was  to  threat- 
en Von  Falkenhayn's  rear  by  crossing 
the  mountains  and  securing  the  rail- 
roads which  were  the  arteries  which  fed 
his  troops.  The  main  point  of  attack 
through  the  Trotus  valley  was  unsuc- 
cessful, and  by  the  middle  of  December 
was  abandoned. 

In  order  to  relieve  this  great  Teutonic 
pressure  on  Rumania,  the  Russians  be- 
gan an  offensive  in  the  Riga  sector  dur- 
ing the  first  week  of  January,  1917. 
They  attacked  the  German  lines  in  the 
Lake  Babit  region  west  of  Riga  and 
advanced  more  than  a  mile,  capturing 
a  fortified  position  between  the  Tirul 
swamp  and  the  Aa  River.  Heavy 
fighting,  usually  successful  to  the  Rus- 
sians,   occurred   along   the   Dvina    and 


south  of  Dvinsk  as  well  as  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Vilna.  These  gains  were 
held  in  the  face  of  strong  German  coun- 
ter attacks. 

During  the  third  week  of  January  the 
Russian  offensive  appeared  to  have 
broken  down.  They  were  compelled  to 
release  their  hold  on  the  newly  won 
ground  between  the  Tirul  swamp  and 
the  Aa.  On  the  25th  the  Germans  at- 
tacked on  both  banks  of  the  Aa  and 
captured  several  fortified  positions 
along  with  2000  prisoners.  Strong 
Russian  counter  attacks  failed  and 
towards  the  last  part  of  the  month  they 
were  driven  back  an  additional  two- 
thirds  of  a  mile.  For  the  participa- 
tion of  the  Russians  in  the  Rumanian 
campaign  see  Southern  Theatre,  Ru- 
mania. 

Russian  Revolution. — On  March  9, 
1917,  began  one  of  the  greatest  events 
in  world  history.  That  was  the  Rus- 
sian revolution.  Its  immediate  cause 
was  the  inefficient  handling  of  food  sup- 
plies in  Petrograd.  Its  remote  cause 
was  the  growth  of  a  democratic  Russia, 
which  could  no  longer  be  controlled  by 
the  Czar  and  his  bureaucratic,  pro-Ger- 
man government.  A  vast  majority  of 
the  Russian  people  who  felt  that  the 
overthrow  of  the  Czar  would  be  a  hard 
task  were  agreeably  surprised  at  the 
ease  with  which  it  was  consummated. 

The  first  institution  attacked  was  the 
cabinet.  The  revolutionary  army 
rushed  into  the  administrative  build- 
ings and  arrested  or  executed  the  for- 
mer premier,  Sturmer,  a  Germanophile, 
Protopopoff,  the  Minister  of  Interior, 
Golitzin,  the  premier,  Rittich,  the  Min- 
ister of  Agriculture  and  many  other 
conservative  bureaucrats.  The  Duma 
immediately  took  control  of  the  govern- 
ment and  appointed  a  Committee  of 
Safety  headed  by  Michael  Rodzianko, 
President  of  the  Duma.     A  delegation 


124 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


was  immediately  sent  to  the  Czar  de- 
manding his  resignation.  The  Czar 
abdicated,  giving  the  throne  to  his 
brother,  Michael  Alexandrovitch.  An- 
other delegation  was  sent  to  Michael 
which  compelled  him  to  give  up  his  claim 
to  the  throne.  Democratic  rule  in  Pet- 
rograd  immediately  began  to  destroy 
all  traces  of  the  Romanoff  dynasty. 
The  Secret  Service,  most  detestable  to 
the  Russians,  was  abolished.  The  for- 
tress of  St.  Peter  and  St.  Paul,  com- 
parable to  the  Bastile,  was  captured, 
and  all  the  political  prisoners  released. 
The  Winter  Palace,  scene  of  Bloody 
Sunday  in  1905,  was  taken  over  as  a 
meeting  place  for  the  Duma.  Even  the 
orthodox  church,  which  was  a  strong- 
hold of  Czarism,  came  over  to  the  side 
of  the  revolutionists.  This  event  was 
of  almost  as  great  importance  as  the 
overthrow  of  the  Czar  himself. 

The  Committee  of  Safety  set  the  new 
government  in  motion  by  appointing  a 
cabinet.  It  was  composed  of  the  best 
men  in  Russia.  Prince  George  Lvoff 
was  made  Premier.  He  was  of  royalist 
descent  and  a  man  of  untiring  energy, 
great  business  experience  and  a  thor- 
ough democrat.  The  Minister  of  For- 
eign  Affairs  was  Paul  Miliukoff,*  who 
was  chiefly  responsible  for  the  over- 
throw of  the  Stiirmer  ministry.  The 
Minister  of  War  and  Navy  was  Alex- 
ander Guchkoff,  Minister  of  Agricul- 
ture,   Shingareff,   Minister   of   Justice, 

*  Milyukov,  Pavel  Nikolaevitch.  Born 
(1859)  near  St.  Petersburg.  Studied  in  Mos- 
cow and  tutor  in  history  at  the  university 
(1886-95).  Banished  from  Russia  because  of 
liberal  views;  served  as  professor  of  history 
at  University  of  Sofia  (1897-98);  member  of 
faculty  of  University  of  Chicago  (1901-05), 
where  he  delivered  lectures  on  historical  and 
political  subjects.  Returned  to  Russia  on  out- 
break of  revolution  of  1905  and  was  im- 
prisoned. Elected  to  first  Duma  as  Constitu- 
tional Democrat.  Election  annulled  and  ar- 
rested, but  soon  liberated.  Member  of  Balkan 
Committee  of  Inquiry  which  investigated  con- 
duct of  War  of  1913.  Wrote  a  number  of 
books  dealing  with  Russia. 


Kerensky,f  who  was  to  play  a  promi- 
nent part  in  the  later  history  of  the 
revolution,  Minister  of  Education, 
Manuiloff,  Minister  of  Communica- 
tions, Nekrasoff,  Minister  of  Trade, 
Konovaloff,  and  Controller  of  the  State, 
Godneff.  Roditcheff,  a  strong  advocate 
of  the  rights  of  free  nationalities,  was 
appointed  Governor-General  of  Fin- 
land. The  Jews  were  given  political 
and  religious  freedom.  The  leaders  of 
the  Zemstvos  were  ordered  to  take  over 
the  governorship  of  the  provinces. 

The  first  country  to  recognize  the 
provisional  government  was  the  United 
States,  which  sent  a  message  of  recog- 
nition through  Ambassador  Francis  on 
March  22.  Great  Britain,  France  and 
Italy  did  likewise  the  next  day.  The 
new  government  was  put  in  a  smooth 
running  order  in  a  week.  Internal 
abuses  were  done  away  with  and  the 
work  of  reorganizing  the  army  was  un- 
dertaken. Grand  Duke  Nicholas  was 
removed  as  Commander-in-Chief  and 
General  M.  V.  Alexieff  was  appointed 
his  successor. 

Events  moved  rapidly  throughout  all 
the  Russias  during  the  next  few  weeks. 
Czar  Nicholas  was  imprisoned  in  Tsars- 
koe  Selo,  but  was  later  removed  to 
Tobolsk.  An  excess  war  profits  tax 
was  levied  on  all  war  industries.  All 
the  imperial  lands  and  monasteries 
were  confiscated.  In  the  cities  a  mania 
for  organization  raged.  Trade  unions 
sprang  up  and  the  8-hour  working  day 
appeared  in  almost  all  the  cities.  Even 
the  peasants  organized  a  council  of 
peasants'  deputies.  One  hundred  thou- 
sand exiles  made  a  triumphant  journey 

f  Kekexsky,  Alexaxder.  Born  at  Simbirsk. 
Graduated  from  University  of  Petrograd  in 
law.  Became  commissioner  of  oaths  in  Petro- 
grad. Specialized  in  political  prosecutions, 
taking  side  of  political  offenders.  Elected  to 
Fourth  Duma  and  became  its  leader  because  of 
ability  as  orator.  For  short  time  President  of 
Russian  Republic  set  tip  by  revolution. 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


125 


across  Russia  from  Siberia.  Premier 
Lvoff  stated  on  April  10th,  "The  ob- 
ject of  independent  Russia  is  a  perma- 
nent peace  based  on  the  right  of  all 
nations  to  determine  their  own  destiny." 
Kerensky  stated  that  if  the  German 
people  would  throw  off  the  yoke  of  au- 
tocracy, the  provisional  government 
would  offer  preliminary  peace  negotia- 
tions. 

Despite  the  celerity  and  thorough- 
ness with  which  the  provisional  govern- 
ment took  over  the  reins  of  authority, 
there  were  signs  of  unrest  throughout 
the  country.  A  party  of  Russian  radi- 
cals under  the  leadership  of  Lenine,* 
was  allowed  to  pass  through  Germany 
from  Switzerland  to  attend  a  Socialist 
conference  at  Stockholm.  Another  dis- 
turbing element  was  the  Council  of 
Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Delegates. 
This  body,  whose  name  is  self-explana- 
tory, passed  a  resolution  of  April  16, 
stating  that  it  was  necessary  for  it  to 
exercise  influence  and  control  over  the 
provisional  government  and  called  upon 
the  people  to  back  it  up  as  the  only 
body  able  to  put  down  any  reactionary 
movement.  They  took  military  matters 
into  their  own  hands  and  arrested  sev- 
eral  conservative   officers. 

In  the  first  two  weeks  of  May  a  de- 
cided breach  appeared  between  the 
government  and  the  Council.  It  oc- 
curred over  the  war  aims  of  the  new 
government.     After  a  series  of  radical 

*  Lenine,  Nikolai.  Leader  with  Leon  Trotz- 
ky  of  the  Russian  Bolsheviki.  Real  name 
Vladimir  Ilyitch  Uulyanoff.  Born  (about 
1870)  at  Simbirsk  on  the  Volga.  Of  noble 
birth.  Became  prominent  shortly  after  1890  as 
leader  of  radical  Social  Democrats.  Insisted  on 
literal  application  of  Marxian  theories.  Elected 
to  second  Duma  after  revolution  of  1905  and 
later  exiled.  Returned  after  revolution  just 
after  resignation  of  Miliukoff  and  began  to 
preach  immediate  peace  and  general  confisca- 
tion. Attacked  both  Germany  and  France  in 
his  paper  the  Pravda.  Author  on  socialistic 
subjects.  Most  important  works,  The  Develop- 
ment of  Capitalism  in  Russia;  The  Soviets  at 
Work. 


outbreaks  headed  by  Lenine,  the  Coun- 
cil demanded  that  the  government  as- 
sert its  aims.  This  was  done  when  a 
note  signed  by  Miliukoff  was  sent  to 
the  Allied  countries  to  the  effect  that 
Russia  pledged  herself  against  a  sep- 
arate peace  and  asked  for  a  cordial  re- 
newal of  bonds  between  Russia  and 
the  Allies.  The  members  of  the  Coun- 
cil vigorously  protested  against  this 
stand  and  stated  that  they  would  com- 
pel the  government  to  accept  their  views 
or  else  resign.  Hostile  demonstrations 
occurred  in  the  streets  of  Petrosrad. 
Parleying  between  the  Council  and  the 
government  went  on  for  several  days 
which  resulted  in  the  weakening  of  the 
latter.  General  Korniloff  and  Minis- 
ter of  War  Guchkoff  resigned  because 
the  Council  practically  took  all  power 
from  their  hands.  Appeals  to  the  pa- 
triotism of  the  soldiers  and  workmen 
were  of  no  avail. 

On  May  15,  the  Council  suddenly  de- 
termined to  accept  a  suggestion  offered 
by  Kerensky,  some  time  previously,  to 
form  a  coalition  government.  This  de- 
cision was  issued  in  the  form  of  a  mani- 
festo and  also  declared  against  a  sep- 
arate peace  and  fraternizing  between 
German  and  Russian  soldiers.  Peace 
was  to  be  brought  about  by  an  appeal 
to  the  socialists  of  Austria  and  Ger- 
many to  overthrow  autocracy. 

Foreign  Minister  Miliukoff  resigned 
on  May  16  because  of  a  dispute  in  the 
government  over  the  question  of  coali- 
tion. Thereupon  the  cabinet  was  en- 
tirely reorganized.  Tereschtenko  re- 
placed Miliukoff  and  Kerensky  became 
Minister  of  War.  Kerensky  was  a  So- 
cial Revolutionist  and  one  of  the  most 
popular  men  in  Russia.  The  day  be- 
fore the  coalition  cabinet  was  formed, 
President  Wilson  announced  the  per- 
sonnel of  a  special  mission  (headed  by 
Elihu  Root)  which  was  to  go  to  Russia 


126 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


to  counteract  German  influences  favor- 
ing a  separate  peace.  He  also  an- 
nounced the  sending  of  a  railroad  com- 
mission which  was  to  aid  in  the  recon- 
struction of  Russian  railroads. 

The  Root  mission  arrived  in  Russia 
on  June  4,  1917,  and  proceeded  at 
once  to  Petrograd,  where  on  June  15 
Mr.  Root  delivered  to  the  head  of  the 
provisional  government  a  communica- 
tion from  President  Wilson,  a  brief 
summary  of  which  follows : 

In  view  of  the  approaching  visit  of 
the  American  delegation  to  Russia, 
President  Wilson  desired  to  express  the 
friendship  of  the  American  people  for 
the  people  of  Russia  and  to  discuss  the 
means  of  cooperation  for  carrying  the 
war  to  a  successful  conclusion.  At  the 
same  time  he  thought  it  necessary  to 
repeat  the  reasons  for  America's  en- 
try into  the  war. 

America  was  seeking  no  material 
profit.  She  was  seeking  no  aggran- 
dizement, but  was  fighting  "for  the 
liberation  of  peoples  everywhere  from 
the  aggressions  of  autocratic   forces." 

The  war  is  beginning  to  go  against 
Germany  and  it  is  using  propaganda 
on  both  sides  of  the  sea.  She  has  suc- 
ceeded in  linking  together  nation  after 
nation  in  an  intrigue  directed  at  the 
peace  and  liberty  of  the  world.  This 
intrigue  must  be  broken  up,  but  cannot 
be  unless  all  wrongs  are  undone  and 
measures  taken  to  prevent  their  being 
done  again. 

The  German  government  is  trying  to 
have  the  war  end  in  the  restoration  of 
the  status  quo  ante,  but  as  this  was 
the  cause  of  the  war,  the  status  must 
be  altered  so  that  such  things  can  never 
happen  again.  "We  are  fighting  for 
the  liberty,  the  self-government,  and 
the  undictated  development  of  all  peo- 
ples." All  wrongs  are  to  be  first  right- 
ed  and   safeguards   erected   to  prevent 


their  recurrence.  The  principle  to  be 
followed  in  this  settlement  is :  "No  peo- 
ple must  be  forced  under  sovereignty 
under  which  it  does  not  wish  to  live." 
No  territories  to  change  hands  except 
for  benefit  of  peoples.  No  indemnities 
to  be  required  except  in  payment  of 
manifest  wrongs.  All  readjustments  of 
power  to  be  made  to  secure  future 
peace  of  world. 

As  a  guarantee  the  nations  of  the 
world  should  combine  their  forces  to  se- 
cure peace  and  justice.  Now  is  the 
time  for  the  nations  to  unite,  for  if 
they   stand   together  victory   is   theirs. 

The  mission  returned  to  the  United 
States  in  the  first  week  in  August,  1917, 
and  at  once  made  a  report  to  the  presi- 
dent. On  August  25  Secretary  Lan- 
sing, for  the  president,  sent  the  fol- 
lowing communication  to  the  Russian 
Ambassador  in  response  to  a  note  from 
him  transmitting  a  commission  from  the 
Russian  minister  of  foreign  affairs: 

Excellency:  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowl- 
edge the  receipt  of  your  note  of  the  3rd  instant 
in  which  you  transcribe  a  communication  from 
the  minister  of  foreign  affairs  of  Russia  to 
the  government  of  the  United   States. 

A  translation  of  that  communication  has  been 
furnished  to  the  president,  who,  in  full  appre- 
ciation of  the  vast  task  confronting  the  pro- 
visional government  of  Russia  in  the  recon- 
struction of  its  forces,  and  of  the  energy  with 
which  that  government  is  endeavoring,  in  the 
face  of  disloyalty  and  enemy-inspired  propa- 
ganda, to  uphold  the  good  faith  of  Russia, 
welcomes  the  assurance  now  given  by  the  pro- 
visional government  of  Russia  of  its  intention, 
of  which  the  president  has  had  no  doubt,  of 
being  deterred  by  no  difficulty  in  pursuing  the 
war  to  a  final  triumph.  No  less  gratifying  to 
the  president  is  the  announcement,  by  that 
government  that,  like  the  United  States,  Rus- 
sia consecrates  all  its  forces  and  all  its  re- 
sources to  this  end.  With  this  tenacity  of  pur- 
pose moving  all  the  allied  governments,  there 
can  be  no  doubt  of  the  outcome  of  the  conflict 
now  raging. 

I  ask  you  to  be  so  good  as  to  give  to  your 
government  renewed  expression  of  the  presi- 
dent's deep  sympathy  with  them  in  the  burden 
they  have   assumed   and   in   the   obstacles   they 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


127 


have  encountered,  and  are  encountering,  and 
his  confidence  that,  inspired  and  impelled  by 
their  patriotic  efforts  and  guidance,  there  will 
emerge  from  the  present  conflict  a  regenerated 
Russia  founded  upon  those  great  principles  of 
democracy,  freedom  and  equality,  right  and 
justice. 

Accept,  Excellency,  the  renewed  assurances 
of  my  highest  consideration. 

The  reorganized  cabinet  declared 
that  it  stood  for  a  general  peace  only 
and  that  it  favored  no  annexations  and 
no  indemnities..  Within  a  week  internal 
dissension  caused  a  partial  downfall  of 
the  cabinet.  Strikes  caused  by  the  ex- 
orbitant demands  of  the  laborers  oc- 
curred daily  throughout  Russia.  The 
Kronstadt  Committee  of  the  Council  of 
Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Delegates  de- 
clared their  independence  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government,  and  General  Alex- 
ieff  resigned  as  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  army.  He  was  succeeded  by  Gen- 
eral Brusiloff.  The  outstanding  figure 
in  the  Revolution  now  was  the  Minister 
of  War,  Kerensky.  It  was  only  his 
eloquence  and  patriotism  that  held  in 
abeyance  the  complete  collapse  of  the 
economic  and  military  forces  of  the 
government.  Backed  by  the  All-Rus- 
sian Council  of  Peasant  Deputies,  which 
voted  against  a  separate  peace,  and  for 
a  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war,  he 
introduced  strong  disciplinary  methods 
into  the  army. 

The  attention  of  the  country  and 
government  was  now  given  to  the  in- 
ternal political  situation.  On  June  8, 
a  meeting  was  held  by  the  commercial, 
industrial  and  banking  institutions. 
This  body  declared  against  a  separate 
peace.  On  June  12,  a  committee  of 
the  Duma,  composed  of  61  members, 
met  to  plan  for  a  meeting  of  a  Con- 
stituent Assembly,  which  was  to  draft 
a  permanent  constitution  for  Russia 
and  to  solve  internal  economic,  indus- 
trial and  racial  problems.      Both  men 


and  women  were  to  be  allowed  to  vote 
for  the  deputies.  Changes  were  made 
by  the  government  whereby  the  can- 
tons and  communes,  which  heretofore 
had  no  local  self-government,  were  to 
be  governed  by  peasant  administrators 
elected  by  universal  suffrage.  A  law 
was  also  promulgated  which  gave  Fin- 
land complete  internal  autonomy.  All 
anti-Jewish  laws  were  repealed. 

On  July  17,  there  occurred  serious 
riots  in  Petrograd  between  the  Radical 
Socialist  element  under  Lenine  and  gov- 
ernment forces.  The  purposes  of  these 
anarchistic  demonstrations  were  to 
overthrow  the  provisional  government 
and  to  recall  the  armies  from  the  fronts. 
After  four  days  of  heavy  fighting  in 
the  streets  the  rioters  were  dispersed 
and  their  leaders  ordered  arrested. 
Lenine  escaped.  Another  situation 
which  caused  five  cabinet  members  to  re- 
sign was  the  Ukrainian  problem.  The 
Ukrainian  party  demanded  autonomy 
for  the  region  in  southwest  Russia  and 
part  of  Galicia.  It  was  their  demand 
that  autonomy  be  granted  immediately 
that  caused  the  five  Constitutional  Dem- 
ocrats to  resign  from  the  cabinet. 

On  July  20,  Lvoff,  the  Prime  Min- 
ister, resigned.  Kerensky  was  appoint- 
ed head  of  the  cabinet  and  also  kept 
the  portfolio  of  War  and  Munitions. 
He  was  made  a  virtual  dictator  with 
unlimited  power.  He  later  became  the 
President  of  the  Russian  Republic.  His 
government  was  backed  up  by  the  Joint 
Council  of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers' 
Council  and  of  the  All-Russia  Council 
of  Peasant  Delegates.  Kerensky  im- 
mediately ordered  all  deserters  to  be 
shot  and  all  revolutionary  agitators  to 
be  arrested  wherever  found.  General 
Brusiloff  resigned  on  August  2  and  was 
succeeded  by  General  Korniloff.  The 
radical  disturbances  and  the  spreading 
of  anti-war  propaganda  had  completely 


128 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


demoralized  the  army,  with  the  result 
that  they  retreated  everywhere  on  the 
Galician   front. 

Owing  to  the  serious  condition  of  the 
entire  country,  Premier  Kerensky  called 
together  an  "Extraordinary  National 
Council"  to  meet  at  Moscow  on  Aug. 
26,  1917.  He  determined  not  to  wait 
for  the  meeting  of  the  Constituent  As- 
sembly. The  conference  was  composed 
of  2500  men,  representing  practically 
all  the  parties  in  Russia.  The  internal 
conditions  of  the  country  were  outlined 
by  members  of  the  cabinet,  and  the  con- 
dition of  the  army  was  outlined  by  Gen- 
eralissimo Korniloff. 

President  Wilson  on  August  26, 
1917,  sent  the  following  greeting  to 
the  members  of  the  Extraordinary  Na- 
tional Council: 

"President  of  the  National  Council  Assem- 
bly, Moscoio:  I  take  the  liberty  to  send  to  the 
members  of  the  great  council  now  meeting  in 
Moscow  the  cordial  greetings  of  their  friends, 
the  people  of  the  United  States,  to  express 
their  confidence  in  the  ultimate  triumph  of 
ideals  of  democracy  and  self-government  against 
all  enemies  within  and  without,  and  to  give  their 
renewed  assurance  of  every  material  and  moral 
assistance  they  can  extend  to  the  government 
of  Russia  in  the  promotion  of  the  common 
cause  in  which  the  two  nations  are  unselfishly 
united." 

The  conference  had  the  authority  to 
take  direct  action,  but  it  clearly  showed 
the  division  of  the  country.  On  the 
one  hand  was  the  socialistic  element, 
represented  by  Kerensky,  and  on  the 
other  hand  the  conservative  bourgeoisie 
element,  represented  by  the  commanders 
of  the  armies  and  the  constitutional 
democrats.  The  radical  Bolsheviki  ele- 
ment, which  was  to  play  a  commanding 
part  later,  was  not  very  strongly  repre- 
sented because  of  repressive  measures 
taken  by  the  government.  Almost  con- 
temporaneously with  the  Moscow  con- 
ference came  the  announcement  on  Sep- 


tember 3  of  the  fall  of  Riga  (see  be- 
low). The  effect  on  Russia  was  tre- 
mendous. Monarchist  plots  were  dis- 
covered, and  Petrograd  feared  that  the 
German  army  would  advance  on  the 
capital.  The  government  was  severely 
criticized  for  the  lack  of  discipline  in 
the  army. 

The  crisis  came  on  September  9,  when 
General  Korniloff  revolted  against  the 
provisional  government.  A  representa- 
tive of  the  Duma  called  on  Kerensky 
and  demanded  that  he  turn  all  the  pow- 
ers of  the  government  over  to  General 
Korniloff.  Kerensky  refused  outright 
and  then  moved  with  characteristic  dis- 
patch and  resolution.  He  deposed 
Korniloff,  arrested  his  envoy,  declared 
Petrograd  and  Moscow  in  a  state  of 
siege  and  asked  for  and  received  the 
combined  backing  of  the  Council  of  Sol- 
diers and  Workmen  and  the  Peasants' 
Council.  Kerensky  himself  became  the 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  army  and 
advanced  to  meet  the  army  Korniloff 
was  leading  against  Petrograd.  It  had 
advanced  to  within  30  miles  of  Petro- 
grad when  the  entire  revolt  collapsed, 
chiefly  through  the  winning  over  to  the 
government's  side  of  General  Alexieff, 
who  had  at  first  favored  the  revolution. 

On  Sept.  27,  1917,  there  assembled  at 
Moscow  a  Democratic  Congress,  called 
into  being  by  the  Workmen's  and  Sol- 
diers' Central  Council.  It  consisted  of 
1200  members  from  all  over  Russia  and 
was  under  the  control  of  the  ultra-radi- 
cals or  Bolsheviki  (majority).  The 
congress  provided  for  a  parliament 
which  was  to  have  a  consultative  func- 
tion. Kerensky,  who  organized  a  new 
coalition  cabinet  without  consulting  the 
congress,  accepted  the  idea  of  the  par- 
liament, which  was  to  be  called  the 
Temporary  Council  of  the  Russian  Re- 
public. The  parliament  had  the  right 
to  interpolate  the  government,  but  the 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


129 


latter  was  in  no  way  responsible  to  the 
former.  This  body  was  to  exist  until 
the  Constituent  Assembly  met  in  De- 
cember, 1917. 

Late  in  October,  the  Bolsheviki  lead- 
ers stated  in  no  uncertain  tones  that 
Kerensky's  government  had  lost  the 
confidence  of  the  real  revolutionary 
party  of  the  country  and  that  it  soon 
would  be  replaced  by  them.  On  No- 
vember 1,  Kerensky  gave  a  statement 
to  the  Associated  Press,  which  showed 
that  he  had  practically  given  up  all 
hope  of  restoring  civil  order  in  Russia 
and  that  urgent  help  was  needed  from 
the  Allies  if  Russia  was  to  continue  the 
war.  This  was  his  last  official  utter- 
ance to  the  public. 

Operations  of  the  Russian  Armies 
under  the  Reiwlution. — After  the  break- 
down of  the  Russian  offensive  on  the 
Aa  River  at  the  beginning  of  1917,  the 
Russian  front  was  comparatively  quiet 
until  the  Russian  revolution  was  well 
under  way.  The  situation  on  the  entire 
front  was  deplorable.  Discipline  had 
completely  broken  down.  Generals 
were  appointed  and  removed  or  they 
resigned.  The  orders  issued  by  the  of- 
ficers had  to  be  approved  by  the  men 
themselves.  Fraternization  between  the 
Russian  and  German  soldiers  was  car- 
ried on  to  a  large  extent  and  could  not 
be  checked.  The  situation  could  not 
have  been  much  worse.  As  a  result 
of  this  demoralization  the  Germans  and 
Austrians  were  able  to  remove  several 
divisions  from  the  Russian  front  for 
use  on  other  fronts.  What  fighting 
was  done  was  spasmodic  and  of  a  local 
character. 

When  Kerensky  came  into  supreme 
power  in  Russia  he  reestablished  mili- 
tary discipline  in  the  army  and  inspired 
the  officers  and  men  with  a  strong  anti- 
German  spirit.  The  result  of  Keren- 
sky's    efforts   was    the   beginning   of   a 


strong  offensive  from  Brzezany  to 
Zloczow  on  the  upper  stretches  of  the 
Zlota  Lipa  River.  The  objective  was 
the  capture  of  Lembcrg.  Brusiloff's 
army  surprised  the  world  with  their 
vigor  of  assault  and  their  seemingly  lim- 
itless supply  of  ammunition.  Brusil- 
off  made  fruitless  attempts  to  break 
through  at  Brzezany  and  Zloczow  and 
then  suddenly  shifted  his  attack  south 
of  the  Dniester,  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Stanislau,  where  the  Austrian  and  Ger- 
man lines  met.  The  weight  of  the  on- 
slaught broke  the  Austrian  line  and  the 
Russian  forces  pushed  through  and 
crossed  the  LukWa  and  Lomnica  rivers. 
They  then  occupied  Kalucz,  which  had 
been  the  Austrian  Army  headquarters. 
This  town  was  on  the  Lemberg-Stanis- 
lau  railway.  Then  the  town  of  Halicz 
was  taken  by  storm.  So  far  50,000 
prisoners  and  vast  quantities  of  war 
material  had  been  taken.  A  wedge  20 
miles  long  and  10  miles  deep  had  been 
driven  into  the  Austro-German  line. 

This  drive  turned  out  to  be  of  no 
avail.  Various  sections  of  the  Russian 
army  mutinied  with  the  result  that  the 
entire  army  was  compelled  to  retire  all 
along  the  front.  On  July  19,  the  Ger- 
mans began  a  countermovement  and 
penetrated  the  Russian  positions  on  a 
wide  front  near  Zloczow.  Russian 
trenches  near  Brzezany  were  occupied 
on  the  next  day,  owing  to  the  mutiny  of 
the  extreme  socialist  troops.  The  whole 
line  in  Galicia  now  began  to  retire.  The 
Germans  and  Austrians  occupied  Tar- 
nopol,  Stanislau,  Nadworna,  Czerno- 
witz,  Kolomea  and  drove  the  Russians 
across  their  own  border  out  of  Galicia. 
Spasmodic  attempts  to  take  the  offen- 
sive in  the  north  to  relieve  the  pres- 
sure in  the  south  were  frustrated  by  mu- 
tiny among  the  troops. 

Fall  of  Riga. — The  month  of  Sep- 
tember  saw   the   capture   by   the    Ger- 


130 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


mans  of  the  important  city  of  Riga. 
Its  fall  was  chiefly  due  to  the  superior- 
ity of  German  artillery  and  the  defec- 
tion of  the  Russian  troops.  On  August 
22,  the  Germans  began  to  advance  from 
Kemmern,  between  the  Baltic  and  the 
Aa,  and  bombarded  the  Russian  posi- 
tions north  of  Dvinsk  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Dvina  River.  On  Sept.  2,  they 
crossed  the  river  at  Uxkul,  16  miles 
southeast  of  Riga.  The  same  day  out- 
posts entered  the  city  and  General 
Letchitzky  withdrew  to  a  prepared  line 
east  of  the  city.  The  Germans  con- 
tinued their  attacks  and  took  Jacob- 
stadt,  and  penetrated  6  miles  on  a  26- 
mile  front.  The  Russians  attacked 
heavily  but  unsuccessfully.  The  Ger- 
mans, in  November  and  December,  1917, 
withdrew  from  most  of  the  area  cap- 
tured after  the  fall  of  Riga  and  sent 
the  troops  to  aid  the  Austrians  in  a 
grand  offensive  against  Italy  (see  be- 
low). 

From  the  military  point  of  view  the 
capture  of  Riga  was  of  no  importance 
without  the  occupation  of  islands  which 
controlled  the  mouth  of  the  Gulf  of 
Riga.  In  October  the  Germans  set  out 
to  accomplish  this  purpose.  On  Octo- 
ber 13,  forces  were  landed  under  the 
protection  of  warships  on  a  northern 
inlet  of  Oesel  Island.  By  October  15, 
the  chief  city  of  the  island,  Orensburg, 
was  in  their  hands.  The  Russian  bat- 
tleship, Slava,  13,516  tons,  and  several 
smaller  units,  were  lost  in  the  defence 
of  the  Gulf.  A  landing  was  also  made 
on  Dago  Island,  and  the  Russian  gar- 
risons of  both  islands  were  compelled 
to  flee  to  the  mainland  to  the  eastward. 
The  Russian  Baltic  fleet  was  locked  up 
by  the  superior  German  fleet  (50  war- 
ships) in  Moon  Sound.  The  Germans 
completely  occupied  the  three  islands, 
— Oesel,  Dago,  and  Moon, — and  on  Oc- 
tober   21    effected    a    landing    on    the 


mainland  at  Werder,  but  later  with- 
drew. In  the  meantime  the  Russian 
fleet  escaped  after  inflicting  unknown 
losses  on  the  German  fleet.  Events  on 
the  Italian  front  prevented  a  combined 
land  and  sea  attack  on  Reval  and  the 
coast  of  Finland. 

The  Bolsheviki. — The  Bolsheviki 
seized  the  reins  of  government  on  No- 
vember 7,  and  dismissed  the  Prelimi- 
nary Parliament.  The  guiding  spirit 
was  the  Revolutionary  Military  Com- 
mittee of  the  Council  of  Workmen's  and 
Soldiers'  Delegates.  Trotzky*  and 
Lenine,  the  two  Maximalist  leaders, 
spoke  before  the  Council,  and  the  lat- 
ter stated  the  problems  before  Russia. 
They  were,  first,  immediate  conclusion 
of  the  war ;  second,  the  handing  over 
of  the  land  to  the  peasants ;  and  third, 
the  settlement  of  the  economic  crisis. 
On  November  9,  a  new  cabinet  was 
formed  by  the  Council,  in  which  Nikolai 
Lenine  was  Premier  and  Leon  Trotzky 
Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs.  Keren- 
sky  escaped  from  Petrograd  but  the 
rest  of  his  cabinet  was  arrested.  The 
former  premier  and  a  few  thousand 
troops  marched  on  Petrograd,  but  were 
defeated  by  the  Bolsheviki.  The  Pro- 
visional Government  was  overthrown  in 
Moscow  and  everywhere  else  the  Bolshe- 
viki were  victorious. 

Chaos  and  civil  war  now  reigned  su- 
preme in  Russia.  Ukraine  again  pro- 
claimed  its   independence,   as   did   Fin- 

*  Trotzky,  Leok,  with  Nikolai  Lenine,  lead- 
ers of  Russian  Bolsheviki.  Real  name  Leber 
Bronstein.  About  40  years  old.  On  account 
of  revolutionary  ideas  often  sent  to  jail.  Sent 
to  Siberia  from  1905  to  1912.  After  release 
went  to  Berlin  and  established  a  paper.  Or- 
dered to  leave  country  after  war  broke  out. 
Lived  short  time  in  Switzerland,  then  went  to 
Paris.  Started  paper  advocating  peace.  Rus- 
sian Ambassador  had  paper  suppressed  and  he 
then  went  to  Spain  where  he  was  arrested. 
After  release  came  to  New  York  City  and  be- 
came editor  of  Novi  Mir  (New  World),  a  revo- 
lutionary paper.  Prominent  in  radical  circles. 
Returned  to  Russia  after  overthrow  of  Czar. 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


131 


land.  General  Kaledines,  leader  of  the 
Cossacks,  with  the  aid  of  General  Kor- 
niloff,  declared  war  against  the  Bol- 
sheviki,  with  the  avowed  purpose  of 
saving  the  country.  Americans  and 
other  foreigners  took  the  first  oppor- 
tunity to  get  out  of  the  country.  The 
Bolsheviki  passed  a  resolution  asking 
for  an  immediate  peace,  stating  that  all 
belligerent  governments  should  enter 
into  negotiations  for  democratic  and 
equitable  peace.  General  Dukhonin, 
who  commanded  the  armies,  was  or- 
dered to  offer  an  armistice.  He  re- 
fused, and  as  a  result  was  dismissed. 
Pie  was  succeeded  by  Ensign  N.  Kry- 
lenko,  who  was  given  the  title  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  People's  Com- 
missaries of  War.  Trotzky,  in  a  state- 
ment issued  on  November  22,  said  that 
the  Bolsheviki  stood  for  a  universal  and 
not  for  a  separate  peace.  The  de- 
mobilization of  the  older  classes  of  the 
Russian  army  was  begun.  Secret 
treaties  signed  by  former  Russian  min- 
isters and  foreign  countries  concern- 
ing the  war  aims  of  the  Allies  were  pub- 
lished and  created  a  profound  impres- 
sion. 

Representatives  sent  within  the  Ger- 
man lines  were  cordially  received,  and 
arrangements  were  made  to  conduct  ne- 
gotiations for  an  armistice.  Von  Hert- 
ling,  the  German  Chancellor,  told  the 
Reichstag  (Nov.  29)  that  negotiations 
would  be  opened  with  accredited  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Russian  government 
and  that  he  was  ready  to  discuss  de- 
batable questions  immediately.  On  De- 
cember 3,  the  German  government  an- 
nounced that  an  armistice  prevailed 
from  Pripet  to  south  of  the  Lipa  River, 
and  that  arrangements  were  being  made 
to  extend  them  over  the  entire  front. 
Germany,  Austria,  Bulgaria  and  Ru- 
mania were  represented  at  the  negotia- 
tions.     On   December   8,   Trotzky   an- 


nounced that  they  had  been  suspended 
for  a  week  to  permit  all  the  belligerents 
to  be  informed  that  they  were  going 
on.  On  December  14,  the  armistice  was 
finally  signed  at  Brest-Litovsk.  It  was 
to  be  in  effect  28  days  and  could  be  au- 
tomatically extended.  Another  provi- 
sion provided  that  peace  negotiations 
were  to  be  entered  upon  immediately, 
and  consequently  by  January,  1918, 
they  were  in  full  swing. 

While  these  negotiations  were  going 
on,  Russian  internal  affairs  were  in 
chaos,  and  it  seemed  as  though  Ger- 
many was  very  anxious  to  make  a  peace 
before  the  Bolsheviki  lost  power.  None 
of  the  allied  countries  had  recognized 
the  Lenine  government,  and  even  the 
neutrals  refused  to  do  so.  Continual 
uprisings  occurred.  The  Cossacks  and 
Ukrainians  united  against  the  Bol- 
sheviki, Siberia  proclaimed  its  inde- 
pendence, and  even  Kerensky  raised  an- 
other force  to  restore  him  to  power. 

The  Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk. — The 
German  and  Austro-Hungarian  de- 
mands were  such  that  the  Russian  rep- 
resentatives refused  to  concede  them. 
Then  the  Bolsheviki  made  an  announce- 
ment on  Feb.  10th,  which  was  an  en- 
tirely new  idea  in  peace  making.  It 
said  that  Russia  had  withdrawn  from 
the  war  without  signing  a  peace  and 
immediately  ordered  the  troops  on  all 
fronts  to  demobilize.  Germany  stated 
that  if  no  peace  were  signed  then  a 
state  of  war  still  existed  and  as  soon  as 
the  armistice  ended  (Feb.  17)  a  new 
invasion  of  Russia  would  begin. 

Tins  is  exactly  what  occurred.  On 
the  18,  the  Germans  crossed  the  Dwina 
and  entered  Dvinsk,  and  the  whole 
German  line  from  the  Baltic  to  Volhy- 
nia  moved  forward.  The  advance  in 
the  south  was  undertaken,  so  the  Ger- 
mans announced,  at  the  request  of  the 
Ukrainians      who      wanted      protection 


132 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


against  the  Bolsheviki.  This  advance 
caused  the  Russian  government  on  the 
very  next  day  to  declare  that  they  ac- 
cepted the  terms  of  peace  that  they  had 
formerly  refused.  The  Germans,  never- 
theless, continued  to  advance  without 
opposition,  and  on  February  23,  the 
Turks  started  an  offensive  in  the  Cau- 
casus. Trotzky,  the  Bolshevik  Minis- 
ter of  War,  in  view  of  these  movements, 
called  upon  the  workmen  and  peasants 
to  resist.  Lenine,  on  the  other  hand, 
was  opposed  to  further  war,  and  in- 
duced the  Central  Executive  Committee 
of  the  Soviets  to  accept  the  Germans' 
terms.  The  German  advance  ended  on 
March  3,  the  day  that  the  treaty  was 
signed.  The  German  High  Command 
announced  that  they  had  captured  64,- 
000  prisoners,  2400  guns,  800  locomo- 
tives, and  enormous  stores  of  supplies 
and  munitions,  and  had  occupied  the 
cities  of  Reval,  Dorpat,  Narva,  Pskov, 
Kiev,  Polotzk,  and  Borissoff. 

A  brief  summary  of  the  treaty  of 
Brest-Litovsk,  which  terminated  hostili- 
ties between  Russia  and  the  Central 
Powers,  follows: 

1.  The  state  of  war  is  terminated. 

2.  The  contracting  powers  will  re- 
frain from  all  agitation  against  the 
other  signatory  powers. 

3.  Russia  to  give  up  all  claim  to 
Finland,  Esthonia,  Livonia,  Courland, 
Lithuania,  Russian  Poland,  and  the 
Ukraine.  Russia  also  promised  not  to 
interfere  in  any  way  with  the  internal 
affairs  of  any  of  these  districts.  Their 
future  is  to  be  decided  upon  by  Ger- 
many and  Austria  in  agreement  with 
their   respective   populations. 

4.  As  soon  as  a  general  peace  is  con- 
cluded the  Central  Powers  agree  to 
evacuate  all  other  Russian  territory 
held  by  them.  Russia  must  evacuate  all 
Anatolian  provinces  and  return  them  to 
Turkey.     Russian  Armenia  was  also  to 


be  evacuated  and  allowed  self-determi- 
nation in  their  reorganization  in  agree- 
ment with  Turkey. 

5.  Russia  demobilize  her  army  as 
soon  as  possible.  The  Russian  fleet  and 
any  Allied  vessels  in  Russian  control 
must  be  taken  into  a  Russian  harbor 
and  kept  there  until  a  general  peace  is 
signed  or  else  immediately  disarm. 
Russian  mines  in  the  Baltic  and  Black 
Seas  were  to  be  swept  up  as  soon  as 
possible  and  commerce  in  these  waters 
to  be  resumed. 

6.  Russia  to  conclude  an  immediate 
peace  with  the  Ukrainian  People's  Re- 
public and  to  recognize  the  peace  treaty 
signed  by  this  republic  and  the  Central 
Powers.  Russian  troops  must  immedi- 
ately evacuate  the  Ukraine  and  other 
territory  given  up  by  Russia.  All  Rus- 
sian fortifications  on  the  Aland  Islands 
were  to  be  removed  and  the  islands  to 
be  governed  under  an  international 
agreement  concluded  by  all  the  powers 
bordering  on  the  Baltic  Sea. 

7.  The  independence  of  Persia  and 
Afghanistan  was  to  be  recognized  by 
the  contracting  parties. 

8.  Prisoners  of  war  were  to  be  sent 
home. 

9.  War  indemnities  to  be  renounced. 

10.  Diplomatic  and  consular  rela- 
tions were  to  be  resumed. 

11.  Certain  economic  agreements  en- 
tered which  practically  gave  Germany 
control  of  Russia's  trade  for  an  indefi- 
nite period  of  time. 

This  treaty  ceded  to  the  Central 
Powers  approximately  460,000  square 
miles  of  the  choicest  territory  of  Rus- 
sia, with  a  population  of  almost  60,- 
000,000. 

Russia  and  Ukraine. — The  Ukraini- 
ans who  are  also  known  as  Malorus- 
sians,  Little  Russians,  and  Ruthenians, 
belong  to  the  western  Slavic  group  of 
nations.     Their  chief  seat  is  in  the  Rus- 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


133 


sian  provinces  of  Podolia,  Volhynia, 
Kiev,  Poltava,  Chernygov,  Ekaterino- 
slav,  and  Kharkov,  and  parts  of  the  ad- 
joining provinces.  The  Ukrainian  eth- 
nographic area  also  includes  the  adja- 
cent Austro-Hungarian  territory,  viz., 
East  Galicia,  the  northwest  of  Buko- 
wina,  and  a  portion  of  Hungary  along 
the  slope  of  the  Carpathian  Mountains, 
from  Marmaros  to  Zips.  Their  num- 
ber is  estimated  as  thirty  million  in 
Russia,  upwards  of  three  million  in  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, and  about  one  million  in 
other  countries.  The  Ukrainians  in 
Russia  are  of  Greek  Orthodox  faith, 
and  those  in  Galicia  are  mostly  Uni- 
ates.  Notwithstanding  local  varia- 
tions, the  Ukrainians  are  easily  distin- 
guished from  the  Great  Russians  (or 
Russians  proper)  by  their  taller  stat- 
ure, broader  and  shorter  heads,  and 
darker  complexion.  They  grow  no 
beards,  as  do  the  Russians.  Livelier, 
gayer,  and  gentler  than  the  latter,  the 
Ukrainians  are  noted  for  their  poetical 
and  musical  gifts.  The  Ukrainian  peas- 
ant is  said  to  be  more  self-reliant  than 
the  Russian.  Upon  the  overthrow  of 
Czar  Nicholas  II  (1917)  general  up- 
heaval followed.  In  April,  1917,  a 
Congress  (Rada)  made  up  of  represen- 
tatives of  all  classes  and  interests  de- 
manded autonomy  for  the  Ukraine  and 
proposed  that  a  democratic  republic  be 
established.  Ukrainian  regiments  were 
created  which  declared  themselves  in 
favor  of  the  new  government  and  plans 
went  ahead  for  organizing  the  Ukraini- 
an republic.  A  separate  cabinet  with  dis- 
tinct ministries  of  war  and  external  af- 
fairs was  included.  The  Russian  provi- 
sional government  (Lvov  Cabinet)  sent 
two  Ukrainian  members  to  investigate. 
On  July  15,  1917,  they  returned  with 
what  was  practically  an  ultimatum: 
Russia  to  recognize  complete  autonomy 
for  Ukraine  or  total  separation  would 


ensue.  The  provisional  government 
feared  that  complete  autonomy  would 
seriously  injure  the  campaign  against 
the  Central  Powers,  accepted  the  prin- 
ciple of  autonomy  and  favored  attach- 
ing Ukrainian  delegates  to  the  Russian 
war  ministry  and  military  staffs.  The 
Ukrainians  feared  that  in  this  way  they 
would  lose  control  of  their  troops.  The 
territorial  demands  of  the  Ukrainians 
also  seemed  excessive  to  the  provisional 
government.  It  was  proposed  that  the 
purely  Ukrainian  provinces  (Kiev,  Vol- 
hynia, Poltava,  Podolia,  and  part  of 
Chernygov)  come  under  immediate  su- 
pervision of  Ukrainian  secretariat  gen- 
eral, the  disputed  provinces  to  decide 
for  themselves. 

The  Ukrainian  government  had  to 
contend  with  military  and  economic 
difficulties  and  also  to  reckon  with  the 
Russian  government  on  which  it  de- 
pended for  financial  support.  On  the 
east  it  was  hard  pressed  by  the  Cossack 
armies  of  General  Kaledin.  Bolshevism 
did  not  find  favor  in  the  Ukraine.  The 
Bolsheviki  refused  to  advance  money  to 
the  Ukraine  and  the  latter  retaliated 
by  forbidding  the  sending  of  foodstuffs 
to  Northern  Russia.  Massing  of  troops 
followed  and  clashes  took  place  in  De- 
cember, 1917.  Bolsheviki  urged  the 
cessation  of  hostilities,  Ukrainians  de- 
manded full  recognition  of  their  re- 
public, participation  in  all  peace 
negotiations,  military  control  of  the 
Ukrainian,  southwestern,  and  Ruma- 
nian fronts,  and  guarantees  of  payment 
for  foodstuffs. 

On  January  10,  1918,  delegates  from 
Ukraine  to  the  Brest-Litovsk  peace  con- 
ference were  recognized  by  both  the 
Russian  and  the  German  representa- 
tives. On  January  21,  it  was  an- 
nounced that  an  agreement  had  been 
reached  between  the  representatives  of 
the   Central  Powers   and   those   of  the 


134 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Ukrainian  People's  Republic,  of  which 
the  main  terms  were  that  the  state  of 
war  should  be  ended  at  once,  the  troops 
of  both  parties  withdrawn,  and  arrange- 
ments made  in  the  treaty  for  the  im- 
mediate resumption  of  trade  relations, 
which  should  be  followed  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible by  the  resumption  of  diplomatic 
and  council  relations.  The  treaty  was 
signed  by  the  Ukraine  government  Feb- 
ruary 9  and  its  text  was  made  public 
by  the  Bolshevik  government  soon 
afterwards.  It  provided  that  the  new 
republic  of  Ukraine  should  have,  as  its 
southwestern  frontier,  the  frontier  of 
Galicia  and  should  include  a  consider- 
able area  then  occupied  by  the  enemy 
in  the  governments  of  Volhynia,  Lubin, 
Siedlics,  Grodno,  and  Minsk.  Both 
parties  agreed  to  abandon  any  claims 
for  damages.  The  signing  of  the  treaty 
by  Germany  was  greeted  with  satisfac- 
tion by  the  German  press.  It  was  an- 
nounced on  February  17  that  the 
Ukraine  government  had  published  a 
statement  expressing  gratitude  and  sat- 
isfaction at  the  intervention  of  Ger- 
many. The  Ukrainians  had  signed  the 
peace  with  Germany,  it  declared,  in 
order  to  put  an  end  to  the  war.  Peace 
had  not  resulted  from  it  because  the 
Russian  Bolsheviks  were  making  what 
they  called  a  holy  war  upon  the  Social- 
ists of  the  Ukraine.  The  Red  Guards 
were  invading  the  country  from  the 
north,  murdering  the  people,  and  ter- 
rorizing the  community.  It  said  the 
reports  as  to  the  uprising  of  the  people 
of  the  Ukraine  were  false,  as  were  also 
the  reports  that  the  government  of 
Ukraine,  which  really  consisted  of  So- 
cialists, was  in  any  sense  a  middle-class 
government.  It  looked  to  the  German 
people  to  protect  them  and  aid  them  in 
saving  the  fruits  of  their  young  revolu- 
tion. The  Bolshevik  forces  were  re- 
ported to  have  taken  Kiev  and  German 


military  intervention  thus  found  its 
excuse.  The  Germans  required  the 
greater  part  of  the  Ukraine  stock  of 
grain  and  other  foodstuffs  and  it  was 
not  supplied  in  the  quantities  demanded. 
In  revenge,  according  to  press  reports, 
they  killed  many  of  the  peasants  with 
machine  guns,  destroyed  their  villages, 
and  laid  hands  upon  the  government, 
setting  up  a  dictator  who  was  favorable 
to  their  interests.  Odessa  changed 
hands  again,  being  captured  by  the 
Black  Sea  fleet.  On  July  31,  Field 
Marshal  Eichhorn,  German  military 
dictator  of  Ukraine,  was  assassinated 
by  an  agent  of  the  Left  Social  Revo- 
lutionary Party  in  Moscow.  The 
assassin  was  arrested  and  a  few  days 
later  hanged.  Toward  the  end  of 
August  a  Ukrainian  National  Council 
was  formed  at  Paris  and  addressed  a 
manifesto  to  the  Allies  asking  for  sup- 
port in  the  struggle  of  the  people  of 
the  Ukraine  against  German  violence. 
It  stated  that  the  people  had  risen 
against  the  Germans  and  that  the  in- 
terests of  the  Ukraine  and  the  Allies 
were  identical. 

In  the  Ukraine  Germany  robbed  the 
peasants  of  their  foodstuffs  and  brought 
about  a  coup  d'etat  in  the  Rada.  In 
Great  Russia  the  German  troops,  re- 
gardless of  the  treaty,  passed  the  fron- 
tier and  advanced  toward  Lursk  and 
then  invaded  the  Crimea  with  the  ap- 
parent purpose  of  seizing  the  Black 
Sea  fleet.  There  were  many  reports  in 
the  Allied  press  of  brutalities  committed 
by  Germans  in  Russia.  Huge  sums 
were  said  to  have  been  demanded  in  gold 
from  peasants  along  with  all  the  wheat 
to  be  found  in  the  locality.  At  a  cer- 
tain village  not  only  was  this  reported 
but  it  was  said  that  when  the  peasants 
brought  only  a  part  of  what  was  de- 
manded the  German  troops  surrounded 
the  village,  shot  down  the  peasants  with 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


135 


machine  guns,  killed  them  by  hundreds, 
and  dragged  their  old  men  out,  tied 
them  to  their  stirrups,  and  dragged 
them  for  many  miles  across  country.  A 
Vienna  paper,  the  Arbeit er  Zeitung, 
May  3,  1918,  remarked  that  the  people 
of  the  Ukraine  could  not  regard  the 
army  of  occupation  as  liberators  but 
rather  would  regard  them  as  agents  of 
brute  force  sent  into  their  country  to 
enforce  military  rule  and  take  posses- 
sion of  the  cereals  for  the  Central 
Powers,  and  that  Germany  and  Austria 
would  not  make  themselves  beloved  by 
the  Ukraine  any  more  than  they  had 
endeared  themselves  to  the  Letts,  Estho- 
nians,  Poles,  and  Lithuanians. 

Russia  and  Finland. — A  grand  duchy 
on  the  gulfs  of  Finland  and  Bothnia, 
which  was  conquered  by  Russia  from 
Sweden,  and  finally  annexed  in  1808. 
Consequent  upon  Russia's  revolution 
and  subsequent  disruptions,  the  Finnish 
papers  stated  that  on  Friday,  Novem- 
ber 9,  1917,  the  Finnish  Diet  decided, 
by  106  votes  to  90,  to  inaugurate  a  re- 
gime of  complete  independence  by  de- 
claring that  as  the  Provisional  Russian 
government  no  longer  existed  the  Diet 
entrusted  the  government  of  Finland  to 
a  directory  of  three  persons — namely, 
the  magistrate  Svinhufvud,  privy  coun- 
cillor Gripenberg,  and  the  banker 
Passikive.  The  post  of  governor-gen- 
eral was  declared  abolished.  At  the 
close  of  1917  it  was  officially  reported 
from  Berlin  that  after  the  Russian  gov- 
ernment announced  its  willingness  to 
recognize  the  independence  of  Finland, 
the  German  Emperor  charged  the  im- 
perial chancellor  to  express  in  the  name 
of  the  German  government  recognition 
of  the  Finnish  republic  to  plenipoten- 
tiaries of  Finland  then  in  Berlin. 
Chancellor  von  Hertling  received  the 
plenipotentiaries  and  informed  them 
Germany  had  recognized  Finland. 


Finland's  independence  was  recog- 
nized by  Russia,  Sweden,  Norway, 
France,  Spain,  Denmark  and  Germany 
in  the  order  named,  on  the  understand- 
ing that  an  arrangement  be  reached 
between  Finland  and  Russia  in  regard 
to  formal  separation.  On  January  9, 
1918,  the  Russian  central  executive 
committee  of  the  Soviets,  acting  in  be- 
half of  the  Russian  provisional  gov- 
ernment, unanimously  recognized  the 
republic  as  free  and  independent. 
Meanwhile  the  red  guards  (Bolsheviki) 
and  the  white  guards  (pro-German) 
were  arrayed  against  each  other,  and 
civil  war  had  broken  out. 

Civil  war  conditions  continued  till  the 
signing  of  the  Brest-Litovsk  treaty  be- 
tween Germany  and  Bolshevik  govern- 
ment. Generally  speaking  the  fighting 
favored  the  white  guards  led  by  Gen. 
Mannerheim.  On  March  7,  1918,  Ger- 
many signed  a  treaty  with  Finland,  hav- 
ing meanwhile  invaded  Finnish  territory 
and  occupied  the  Aland  Islands.  This 
treaty  declared  that  a  state  of  war  be- 
tween Germany  and  Finland  no  longer 
existed.  Germany  promised  to  do 
everything  in  her  power  to  have  the  in- 
dependence of  Finland  recognized  by 
the  world.  Finland  promised  that  she 
would  never  give  up  any  of  the  territory 
over  which  she  was  sovereign  without 
first  consulting  Germany.  Consular 
and  diplomatic  services  were  to  be  es- 
tablished, prisoners  of  war  exchanged, 
and  civil  relations  put  into  force.  A 
commercial  agreement  was  entered  into, 
which  made  Finland  a  practical  vassal 
of  Germany. 

Later  events  showed  that  Germany 
was  evidently  trying  to  carry  out  in 
Finland  the  same  policy  as  she  had 
shown  at  the  time  of  the  Brest-Litovsk 
treaty.  She  wished  to  constitute  two 
minor  states — the  Ukraine  and  Finland 
— in  order  that  a  new  and  unified  Rus- 


136 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


sia  might  not  rise  up  from  the  ruins 
which  the  Bolsheviks  had  caused.  The 
German  side  appealed  to  the  propertied 
classes  and  also  to  the  spirit  of  national 
pride,  by  encouraging  hopes  of  expan- 
sion. This  policy  was  opposed  by  the 
radicals  who  were  angered  by  the 
tyranny  of  the  white  guard  and  also 
by  certain  Swedish  elements  who  were 
by  no  means  radical  but  whose  claims 
were  rejected  by  the  ruling  party.  The 
collapse  of  Germany  prevented  the  con- 
summation of  the  plan  which  provided 
for  an  alliance  between  the  Finns  and 
Germans,  the  object  of  which  was  a 
military  advance  to  drive  the  Allies 
from  northern  Russia. 

Arguments  and  Programme  of  the 
Bolsheviki. — In  the  leading  newspapers 
of  the  countries  of  the  Entente  the 
feeling  against  the  Bolsheviks  is  so 
strong  that  for  the  most  part  their 
arguments  in  their  own  behalf  and  ac- 
counts of  their  programme  and  organi- 
zation were  excluded,  with  the  result 
that  there  was  little  understanding 
among  the  public  at  large  of  the  points 
at  issue  between  them  and  their  oppo- 
nents and  the  discussion  of  Russian 
affairs  was  often  unintelligible.  The 
following  brief  summary  of  the  Bol- 
sheviks' position,  which  is  derived  from 
sources  sympathetic  to  their  point  of 
view,  may  therefore  be  of  service : 

The  Bolsheviks  argued  that  the  mid- 
dle class  had  nothing  whatever  to  do 
with  the  revolution  of  March,  1917, 
which  was  a  genuinely  popular  rising. 
The  prominent  representative  of  the 
middle  class,  Miliukov,  for  example,  had 
urged  the  working  class  not  to  come 
into  the  streets  and  at  the  first  stage 
of  the  revolution  had  predicted  its  im- 
mediate failure.  The  middle  class  was 
opposed  to  the  government  because  it 
did  not  carry  on  the  war  efficiently. 
The  revolutionists  opposed  the  govern- 


ment because  it  did  not  get  the  country 
out  of  war.  Russia's  Allies,  thinking 
that  the  final  object  of  the  revolution 
was  the  overthrow  of  the  dynasty,  per- 
sisted for  a  long  time  in  the  belief  that 
as  far  as  the  war  was  concerned  things 
would  go  on  as  before.  The  middle  class 
party  in  Russia  encouraged  them  in 
their  illusion.  The  Duma,  which  rep- 
resented the  middle  class,  did  not  take 
part  in  the  revolution  until  it  was  sure 
that  it  was  successful ;  then  it  fell  into 
line  and  attempted  to  direct  the  move- 
ment. The  new  Provisional  government 
was  chosen  by  an  executive  committee 
of  the  Duma  and  was  a  middle  class 
body  in  no  wise  representative  of  the 
masses,  whereas  strictly  out  of  the  revo- 
lution itself  there  arose  a  so-called 
Soviet  of  Workman's  Deputies,  which 
was  later  organized  under  the  title  of 
Soviet  of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers' 
Deputies.  The  latter  became  the  real 
source  of  power,  watching  over  the  Pro- 
visional government  and  calling  it  to 
account.  As  time  went  on  the  breach 
between  these  two  bodies  widened.  The 
Soviets  more  and  more  definitely  ex- 
pressed the  will  of  the  people  that  steps 
be  immediately  taken  toward  peace, 
whereas  the  Provisional  government 
worked  steadily  to  keep  Russia  in  the 
war  and  to  gain  control  of  the  army. 
This  latter  purpose  the  Soviets  were 
determined  to  block,  believing  that  if 
accomplished  it  would  simply  result  in 
intrenching  the  middle  class  govern- 
ment, which  would  thus  have  usurped 
in  the  interests  of  a  class  the  revolu- 
tion which  was  the  work  of  the  majority 
of  the  people.  The  army,  which  com- 
prised practically  all  of  the  young 
peasantry  of  the  country,  took  part  in 
political  affairs  from  the  first  and  had 
its  share  in  directing  the  revolution. 
All  attempts,  such  as  those  of  Kerensky, 
Korniloff,  and  Kaledin,  to  gain  control 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


137 


by  means  of  a  portion  of  the  army 
failed.  The  Soviet  brought  increased 
pressure  upon  the  government  for 
peace,  but  the  government  staved  it  off 
and  gave  Russia's  Allies  to  understand 
that  Russia  would  still  fight.  But  when 
Miliukov  issued  his  statement  to  the 
Allies  implying  that  the  Russian  mili- 
tary policy  had  not  changed,  there  was 
a  threatening  demonstration  by  soldiers 
and  citizens  in  the  streets  and  it  had 
to  be  withdrawn. 

In  the  meantime  there  was  increasing 
hostility  in  the  Soviet  between  the 
Moderates  and  the  Bolsheviks,  the 
former  trying  to  maintain  a  union  with 
the  middle  class  government  and  the 
latter  opposed  to  it  as  causing  delay 
and  leading  to  ultimate  disaster.  It 
is  noteworthy  that  the  Bolsheviks,  like 
the  governments  of  the  Allied  countries, 
opposed  the  Stockholm  conference  and 
they  did  so  for  the  avowed  reason  that 
the  representatives  of  the  German  ma- 
jority Socialists  at  such  a  conference 
would  really  be  the  agents  of  the  Ger- 
man government.  In  other  contests 
that  ensued  between  Moderates  and 
Bolsiheviks  the  latter  were  successful 
and  gained  strength.  The  aims  of  their 
leaders,  Lenine  and  Trotzky,  were  not 
only  for  peace  but  for  a  world  revolu- 
tion in  which  the  working  class  of  all 
belligerent  countries  would  insist  that 
their  governments  should  end  the  war. 
As  time  went  on  the  government  and 
the  Moderate  Party  in  the  Soviets  be- 
came weaker  and  the  struggle  became 
more  clearly  one  of  class.  The  Bol- 
sheviks, representing  the  working  class, 
were  soon  able  to  show  that  a  majority 
of  the  people  was  behind  them  and  when 
they  took  over  the  government  in  Octo- 
ber, 1917,  the  transition  was  easily  ac- 
complished for  the  actual  power  had 
already  for  a  long  time  been  in  their 
hands.     Thus,  it  is  the  Bolsheviks'  con- 


tention that  they  represented  the  real 
purposes  of  the  revolution  from  the  be- 
ginning and  that  they  moved  along  in 
absolute  accord  with  the  will  of  the  peo- 
ple. They  believed  that  the  strictly 
representative  form  of  government  that 
had  developed  answered  exactly  to  the 
wishes  of  the  people.  This  government 
of  Soviets  was  the  natural  outcome  of 
the  democratic  revolutionary  movement. 
It  was  exceedingly  flexible  and  rested  on 
the  widest  popular  basis.  Every  Rus- 
sian workman  and  peasant  had  the 
right  to  vote  for  a  deputy  in  his  local 
Soviet,  which  was  made  up  of  represen- 
tatives varying  in  number  according  to 
the  size  of  the  electorate ;  every  local 
Soviet  had  the  right  to  choose  delegates 
to  the  All-Russian  Assembly  of  Soviets, 
which  in  turn  chose  the  Central  Execu- 
tive Committee.  This  Central  Executive 
Committee,  the  number  of  whose  dele- 
gates was  about  one-fifth  of  that  of  the 
assembly,  appointed  the  actual  govern- 
ment, the  so-called  People's  Commissa- 
ries, who  remained  under  the  control  of 
and  were  subject  to  dismissal  by  the 
committee.  The  Central  Executive 
Committee  was  the  legislative  body  and 
all  acts  of  importance  were  passed  by  it 
before  they  were  issued  as  laws  by  the 
Council  of  People's  Commissaries.  The 
term  of  the  Executive  Committee  lasts 
only  to  the  next  meeting  of  the  All- 
Russian  Assembly,  which  passes  upon 
its  acts  and  the  acts  of  the  People's 
Commissaries  and  elects  a  new  executive 
committee.  Thus  the  actual  govern- 
ment could  be  made  to  correspond  al- 
most at  once  to  changes  in  public 
opinion.  Moreover,  there  were  no  limits 
to  the  withdrawal  and  reelection  of  dele- 
gates to  the  Soviets.  In  the  working 
out  of  this  system,  the  relation  between 
the  government  and  the  people  of  the 
locality  was  very  close.  The  local 
Soviets  could  follow  minutely  every  act 


138 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


of  the  People's  Commissaries  and  the 
communication  between  the  central  au- 
thorities and  the  local  was  complete. 
From  the  Bolshevik  point  of  view  there 
was  no  sense  whatever  in  the  criticism 
directed  against  them  by  the  democrats 
of  other  countries  for  having  excluded 
the  middle  class  from  power.  They 
contended  that  the  purpose  of  the  revo- 
lution was  not  merely  to  exclude  the 
middle  class  from  power  but  to  put  an 
end  to  it.  The  revolution  from  the 
beginning  aimed  at  the  destruction  of 
the  middle  and  exploiting  class,  and 
from  the  Bolshevik  point  of  view  the 
existence  of  that  class  could  not  be  ad- 
mitted. Ultimately  the  middle  class 
would  cease  to  be  parasites  and  would 
be  absorbed  among  the  workers  on  an 
equal  footing.  The  critics  of  the  Bol- 
sheviks seemed  not  to  realize  that  it  was 
of  the  very  essence  of  Bolshevism  to 
seek  the  destruction  of  the  whole  system 
of  privilege  and  exploitation.  The  Bol- 
sheviks explained  the  misunderstanding 
in  the  foreign  press  by  the  fact  that  the 
foreign  observer  almost  always  belonged 
to  the  privileged  class  himself  and  de- 
rived his  information  from  the  cor- 
responding class  in  Russia. 

Another  criticism  which  the  Bol- 
sheviks considered  unfair  was  that 
which  condemned  them  for  dissolving 
the  Constituent  Assembly.  They  main- 
tained that  the  Constituent  Assembly, 
as  it  finally  turned  out,  was  not  repre- 
sentative at  all  of  actual  public  opinion. 
The  Bolsheviks  had  at  first  insisted 
upon  the  Constituent  Assembly.  It  was 
the  Moderates  who  really  caused  its 
failure.  They  repeatedly  put  it  off  and 
when  after  eight  months  it  had  come 
into  existence  it  was  too  antiquated  and 
useless  an  instrument.  It  was  de- 
stroyed by  the  very  element  that  had 
demanded  it.  The  middle  class  had 
manoeuvered  to  delay  its  gathering  until 


they  were  sure  that  its  character  would 
be  satisfactory  to  them.  When  they 
saw  that  the  Soviet  government  really 
conformed  to  the  will  of  the  masses  they 
looked  to  the  Constituent  Assembly  as 
a  desperate  and  last  resort.  It  seemed 
to  them  less  likely  to  injure  their  class 
than  was  the  Soviet  government.  Al- 
though in  the  Constituent  Assembly 
there  was  a  majority  against  the  Bol- 
sheviks this  did  not,  according  to  their 
defenders,  represent  the  real  wishes  of 
the  masses,  for  the  canvass  for  it  had 
taken  place  before  the  October  revolu- 
tion. Moreover,  the  great  mass  of  the 
people  had  not  been  made  to  perceive 
the  real  issue  and  all  active-thinking 
representatives  of  the  masses  were  op- 
posed to  the  assembly  because  as  a 
matter  of  fact  its  majority  consisted 
of  the  very  element  which  had  been  over- 
thrown in  the  October  revolution.  The 
Bolsheviks  took  their  chances  of  public 
support  and  pushed  the  assembly  aside. 
That  they  really  had  the  country  behind  ' 
them  was  proven  by  the  fact  that  among 
the  people  at  large  there  was  no  protest. 
As  to  peace  the  Bolsheviks  had  all 
along  sought  it  as  a  result  of  the  social 
revolution  that  they  had  aimed  at 
bringing  about  in  all  countries,  and 
they  would  have  been  glad  to  see  the 
governments  reject  peace  if  that  would 
have  provoked  the  workers  to  rise  and 
overthrow  them.  They  aimed  at  a  gen- 
eral peace,  and  least  of  all  they  were 
interested  in  a  German  victory.  When 
Germany  sent  her  first  answer  as  to 
the  condition  of  peace,  saying  that  she 
would  accept  the  Russian  formula  as  a 
basis  for  negotiation,  Russia's  allies 
ought,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Bolsheviks, 
to  have  taken  their  side,  for  Germany 
would  have  been  compelled  to  remain 
true  to  her  agreement.  The  Allies  did 
not  support  Russia  and  Germany,  hav- 
ing   only    her   weak    opponent    to    deal 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


139 


with,  forced  the  harsh  terms  of  the  final 
treaty. 

Trotzky  now  tried  to  bring  about  a 
revolution  of  the  working  classes  in  Ger- 
many or  in  any  event  to  prove  to  the 
German  people  that  their  government  in 
its  peace  negotiations  showed  not  the 
slightest  respect  for  their  wishes. 
There  were,  in  fact,  vast  strikes  in 
Austria-Hungary  and  Germany,  and 
according  to  the  Bolsheviks  this  plan 
might  have  succeeded  had  it  not  been 
for  the  treachery  of  the  conservative 
element  in  the  Ukraine,  who  entered 
into  separate  negotiations  with  Ger- 
many. In  the  Ukraine  the  soldiers  and 
workmen  had  gained  the  upper  hand, 
and  the  self-styled  government  had  to 
take  refuge  at  German  military  head- 
quarters. They  were  there,  under  Ger- 
man protection,  when  peace  was  con- 
cluded between  Germany  and  the 
Ukraine.  Although  the  majority  in  the 
Ukraine  were  represented  by  the  Soviet 
and  although  the  Soviet  had  declared 
itself  one  with  the  rest  of  Russia,  Ger- 
many preferred  to  recognize  the  minor- 
ity element,  and  in  this  respect  the 
policy  of  Russia's  allies  was  precisely 
the  same  as  that  of  the  Germans.  Then 
came  the  refusal  of  the  Russian  dele- 
gates to  sign  the  German  peace  terms. 
They  hoped  that  the  German  people 
would  prevent  their  government  from 
advancing  against  the  defenseless  masses 
of  Russia.  The  German  government 
did  advance,  however,  and  the  Soviet 
had  to  choose  between  collapse  and  the 
signature  of  a  disgraceful  peace.  Some 
/believed  in  holding  out  no  matter  what 
happened.  Lenine  thought  the  Soviet 
government  ought  to  be  preserved  as  a 
nucleus  of  revolution  in  Russia,  and  ul- 
timately of  the  great  world  revolution 
that  he  had  in  mind.  This  view  pre- 
vailed, being  accepted  by  first  the  execu- 
tive   committee    and   then  by   the   All- 


Russian  Assembly.  The  Germans  con- 
tinued to  advance  till  they  had  reached 
the  Don  in  the  south  and  nearly  reached 
Petrograd  in  the  north. 

The  Bolsheviks  declared  that  the 
Soviet  government  is  the  real  govern- 
ment of  the  Russian  majority.  Their 
opponents,  they  said,  had  so  little  faith 
in  their  hold  on  the  masses,  that  all 
along  they  looked  upon  a  foreign  in- 
tervention as  the  only  thing  that  could 
save  them.  Their  request  for  foreign 
aid  against  the  Soviet  government 
showed  that  they  were  striving  for 
something  that  the  Russians  themselves 
did  not  want.  The  Soviet  government 
following  the  October  revolution  had 
stood  firm  for  six  months.  The  Allies 
helped  the  anti-Soviet  minority  in  the 
Ukraine,  thus  aiding  the  German  ag- 
gression, and  they  gave  moral  aid  at 
least  to  the  White  Finns,  who  were  op- 
posed by  the  Red  Finns,  supported  by 
the  Soviet.  The  Bolsheviks  resented 
this  and  believed  that  if  the  Allies  con- 
tinued this  policy  and  should  eventually 
succeed  in  imposing  on  Russia  the  gov- 
ernment of  a  minority,  it  could  be  kept 
in  power  only  by  foreign  aid,  and  that 
of  geographical  necessity  such  aid  would 
come  from  Germany.  They  urged  the 
Allies  not  to  repeat  their  mistakes. 
They  argued  that  any  non-Soviet  gov- 
ernment would  be  directly  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  Germany.  They  reminded 
the  United  States  of  the  presence  in 
the  colonies  at  the  time  of  their  own 
revolution  of  men  who  tried  to  secure 
foreign  aid  against  the  movement  for 
American  independence,  and  they  asked 
how  those  men  were  regarded  to-day. 
The  only  way  to  thwart  the  design  of 
Germany  to  gain  control  of  Russia's 
resources  was  to  support  the  Soviet 
government,  which  would  welcome  such 
cooperation  from  the  Allies  and  might 
even  grant  them  control  over  a  portion 


140 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


of  Russia's  resources  in  order  to  save 
themselves  from  the  German  menace. 

Rival  Parties. — During  1918  and 
1919  there  were  many  conflicting  ac- 
counts of  the  situation.  According  to 
some  of  these  the  government  of  Lenine 
was  tottering  to  its  end ;  according  to 
others  the  revolution  was  fast  spread- 
ing; and  according  to  still  others,  the 
severest  measures  were  being  taken 
against  the  counter  revolutionaries. 
The  rival  parties  and  movements  in 
Russia  at  this  time  may  be  summed  up 
as  follows  :  In  the  south  were  the  Czecho- 
slovaks whose  effectives  were  placed 
at  from  60,000  to  80,000  men,  and 
who,  in  August,  were  holding  the  great 
strip  of  territory  along  the  railway 
from  Penza  (to  the  west  of  the  River 
Volga)  to  Irkutsk,  except  for  a  few 
breaks  in  line.  The  Cossacks  of  the 
Caucasus  and  the  leagues  of  officers 
were  still  under  arms,  having  been 
formed  into  a  military  force  by  Gen- 
erals Kaledin,  Korniloff,  and  Alexieff, 
of  whom  Kaledin  was  reported  later 
to  have  committed  suicide  and  Korni- 
loff to  have  died.  Besides  these  Cos- 
sacks, there  were  the  Cossacks  of  Oren- 
burg, who  were  under  the  command  of 
Gen.  Dutoff ;  the  Cossacks  of  the  Don, 
under  Gen.  Krasnoff ;  and  the  leagues 
of  officers  formed  by  Gen.  Alexieff  and 
other  generals.  It  appeared  in  August 
that  all  these  elements  of  Cossacks  and 
officers  were  concentrated  in  the  Samara 
regions  under  Generals  Alexieff  and 
Dutoff,  and  M.  Rodzianko,  the  presi- 
dent of  the  last  Duma.  Then  there 
were  the  following  Siberian  govern- 
ments: The  Siberian  Diet,  which  had 
been  dispersed  and  taken  refuge  in  one 
city  after  another  and  was  finally  re- 
ported to  have  assembled  at  Omsk  in 
June,  where  it  soon  afterwards  pro- 
claimed the  independence  of  Siberia,  an- 
nulled the  acts  of  the  Bolsheviks,  and 


accepted  the  land  situation  provision- 
ally until  the  meeting  of  the  Constituent 
Assembly ;  the  government  of  the  Grand 
Duke  Michael  who  had  been  named  by 
the  late  Czar  as  a  successor  and  who, 
having  escaped  on  June  15,  issued  a 
manifesto  on  June  26,  asserting  his 
claim  to  the  throne,  though  adding  that 
he  would  wait  until  the  Constituent  As- 
sembly should  bestow  the  power  on  him ; 
the  government  of  Gen.  Horvath  at 
Kharbin,  which  was  working  for  the 
restoration  of  the  monarchy  ;  and  finally 
the  forces  of  Gen.  Semenoff,  who  at  that 
time  were  reported  to  have  won  suc- 
cesses on  the  Manchurian  frontier. 

The  End  of  the  Constituent  Assem- 
bly.— In  January,  1918,  the  executive 
committee  of  Soviets  issued  a  decree 
empowering  the  workmen,  soldiers,  and 
peasants  of  the  Soviets  to  arrange  for 
an  early  election  or  to  recall  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Constituent  Assembly  if 
they  no  longer  represented  the  views 
of  their  constituents.  At  the  new  con- 
gress of  the  peasants  it  was  decided  to 
recall  all  the  members  who  acted  in  op- 
position to  the  government.  On  Janu- 
ary 18,  the  Constituent  Assembly  lis- 
tened to  the  reading  of  the  Committee 
of  Soviets'  declaration  of  the  rights  of 
the  working  classes  and  proclamation 
of  Russia  as  a  republic  of  Soviets. 
The  Bolsheviki  applauded  with  great 
enthusiasm.  A  declaration  was  then 
read  by  M.  Tseretelli,  former  minister 
in  the  Kerensky  government,  setting 
forth  the  position  of  the  moderate  So- 
cialists. He  was  cheered  by  his  own 
party,  but  the  cheers  were  drowned 
out  by  the  hooting  of  the  Bolsheviki, 
among  whom  was  the  commander-in- 
chief,  Krilenko.  A  speech  by  M.  Tcher- 
noff,  former  minister  of  agriculture,  ap- 
pealing for  order,  had  no  effect.  The 
Revolutionary  Socialists  proposed  the 
discussion  of  the  most  important  ques- 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


141 


tions,  namely,  the  making  of  peace,  and 
the  questions  of  land,  industry,  and  of 
the  new  form  of  government ;  but  the 
radical  party  concentrated  its  attention 
on  the  alleged  encroachment,  by  the 
Constituent  Assembly,  on  the  authority 
of  the  Soviets.  Reconciliation  was  im- 
possible and  finally  the  Bolsheviki  and 
the  Revolutionary  Left  walked  out  of 
the  building  in  a  body,  as  a  protest 
against  a  decision  of  the  majority  to 
proceed  to  the  discussion  of  the  above- 
mentioned  questions  and  to  postpone 
the  consideration  of  the  Soviets'  so- 
called  declaration  of  rights.  The  vote 
on  these  questions  was  273  against  140, 
thus  showing  the  balance  between  the 
moderate  Revolutionary  Socialists  or 
Right  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Bol- 
sheviki, together  with  the  Left  Revolu- 
tionary Socialists  on  the  other.  On  the 
morning  of  January  19,  sailors  armed 
with  rifles  dissolved  the  assembly,  which 
had  been  in  session  only  a  few  weeks. 
This  left  the  Bolsheviki  in  complete  con- 
trol. The  decree  of  dissolution  de- 
nounced the  Moderate  and  Revolution- 
ary Socialists  for  their  opposition  to 
the  granting  of  sufficient  power  to  the 
commissaries  for  carrying  out  the  eco- 
nomic programme,  and  rejected  any 
compromise  with  the  bourgeois  classes, 
or  with  what  it  called  democratic  par- 
liamentarism. 

Allied  Intervention  in  Russia  and 
Siberia. — The  reports  concerning  the 
activities  of  the  Czecho-Slovak  troops 
and  the  Allied  forces,  which  were  landed 
at  Murmansk,  Archangel,  and  Vladi- 
vostok, were  very  meagre  and  conflict- 
ing throughout  the  war.  Reports  given 
out  by  the  Soviet  government  of  Rus- 
sia and  the  various  governments  of 
Siberia  differed  widely  from  and  often 
contradicted  those  given  out  by  allied 
governments.  Therefore  the  material 
contained    in    this    section    cannot    be 


strictly  vouched  for.  The  method  of 
obtaining  it  was  to  gather,  as  far  as 
possible,  material  from  European  and 
American  sources  and  then  to  compare 
it  and  keep  that  matter  which  seemed 
to  be  founded  on  fact.  The  material 
covering  all  phases  is  given  in  chrono- 
logical order  because  it  is  almost  im- 
possible to  group  it  under  separate 
headings. 

After  the  Bolsheviki  had  made  peace 
with  the  Central  Powers,  their  attempts 
to  pacify  that  part  of  Russia  which  re- 
mained in  their  hands  were  rather  un- 
successful. A  considerable  army  of 
Czecho-Slovaks  was  roaming  around  the 
central  part  of  Russia,  attempting  to 
reach  Vladivostok  and  then  rejoin  the 
allies  in  order  to  down  their  hereditary 
enemies,  the  Germans  and  Austrians. 
These  men  had  deserted  from  the  forces 
of  the  Central  Powers  and  had  fought 
with  the  Russians  against  their  ene- 
mies. When  the  Treaty  of  Brest- 
Litovsk  was  signed  and  Russia  retired 
from  the  war,  they  received  permission 
from  the  Bolsheviki  to  cross  Siberia  and 
rejoin  the  Allies.  For  some  time  their 
relations  with  the  new  rulers  of  Russia 
were  very  friendly.  Then,  presumably 
at  the  request  of  Germany,  the  Bol- 
sheviks ordered  them  to  be  disarmed, 
but  the  Czecho-Slovaks  resisted,  and 
conflicts  occurred  between  them  and  the 
Soviet  forces.  The  first  battles  began 
in  the  latter  part  of  May  and  continued 
throughout  1918  and  1919. 

In  Siberia,  the  Bolsheviki  met  with 
the  greatest  opposition  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  their  government.  Anti- 
Bolshevik  forces  headed  by  Gen.  Seme- 
noff,  Admiral  Kolchak,  Col.  Orloff,  Gen. 
Kalmakoff,  and  others  joined  forces  or 
operated  independently  to  defeat  the 
Bolsheviki.  In  June,  with  the  aid  of 
Chinese  mercenaries,  they  seized  most 
of  the  railway  lines  in  Siberia  and  in- 


142 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


formed  the  Soviet  government  that  any 
attempt  to  occupy  Siberia  would  be  bit- 
terly opposed.  During  the  same  month 
the  Czecho-Slovaks  seized  the  railway 
station  at  Penza  on  the  Volga,  and 
started  their  battles  for  Vladivostok  by 
penetrating  into  the  region  of  the  Ural 
Mountains.  They  held  the  Siberian 
Railroad  from  Theliabinsk  to  Tomsk,  a 
distance  of  more  than  1,000  miles,  and 
had  occupied  Samara,  as  well  as  Irkutsk 
and  Vladivostok.  The  latter  city  was 
taken  by  Czecho-Slovaks  who  had 
reached  there  before  Trotzky  had  or- 
dered them  to  disarm.  By  the  middle 
of  July,  1918,  the  Czechs  held  most 
of  the  Siberian  railroad.  Their  line 
was  very  thin  'and  largely  depended 
upon  the  cooperation  of  the  independent 
Siberian  forces.  Detachments  from  the 
eastern  end  of  the  line,  after  occupying 
towns  in  the  Amur  River  basin,  started 
westward  along  the  railroad  with  the 
purpose  of  relieving  their  brethren,  who 
were  rather  sorely  beset  as  a  result  of 
strong  Bolshevik  counter-offensive  be- 
gun against  them  in  July.  The  number 
of  Czecho-Slovaks  fighting  against  the 
Bolsheviki  has  never  been  definitely 
stated  but  estimates  place  the  figures  as 
anywhere  from  '50,000  to  175,000. 
Probably  the  former  figure  is  more  ac- 
curate than  the  latter.  Although  the 
Czechs  stated  time  and  again  that  they 
were  absolutely  neutral  concerning  the 
internal  affairs  of  Russia,  nevertheless, 
whatever  sections  of  Siberia  they  came 
in  contact  with  immediately  arose  in  re- 
volt against  the  Soviet  government. 
This,  of  course,  may  have  been  a  result 
of  distrust  of  this  government. 

When  it  became  known  that  the 
treaties  of  peace  between  Germany  on 
the  one  hand  and  Finland,  Russia,  Ru- 
mania, and  the  Ukraine,  on  the  other, 
were  to  be  used  by  Germany  as  a  means 
for  making  these  countries  subservient 


to  Germany,  the  Allies  determined  upon 
a  certain  amount  of  military  interven- 
tion in  order  to  try  to  save  something 
from  the  chaos  that  existed  in  Russia. 
The  Allies  first  seized  the  region  around 
the  Murman  coast,  with  the  cities  of 
Murmansk,  Kola,  and  Kem  (July, 
1918).  The  purpose  of  this  was  to 
prevent  Germany  from  obtaining  sub- 
marine bases  on  the  Arctic  Ocean  and 
from  seizing  control  of  the  Murman 
Railroad  which  might  have  resulted  in 
the  cutting  off  of  Petrograd  from  the 
rest  of  Russia.  There  were  also  vast 
quantities  of  war  materials  there  which 
had  been  ordered  by  the  old  Russian 
government  and  which  had  never  been 
paid  for.  From  April  to  July,  1918, 
the  Germans  and  their  Finnish  allies 
were  planning  an  attack  on  the  railroad 
and  even  went  so  far  as  to  build  a  rail- 
road across  Russia  from  Finland  to 
the  neighborhood  of  Kem.  Conse- 
quently, in  July,  1918,  allied  forces, 
including  Americans,  were  landed  at 
Murmansk  and  were  welcomed  by  the 
anti-Bolshevik  inhabitants,  who  almost 
immediately  seceded  from  Russia  and 
established  an  independent  government. 
The  Allies  advanced  at  once  along  the 
railroad  and  seized  Kem. 

In  July,  1918,  it  was  also  announced 
that  the  Allies  after  a  long  period  of 
consultation  had  determined  to  send  a 
combined  force  of  men  to  Vladivostok 
to  aid  the  Czechs  as  far  as  possible,  and 
also  to  attempt  to  break  up  the  armed 
bands  of  Austrian  and  German  prison- 
ers who  were  the  main  part  of  the  Bol- 
shevik forces.  Ten  thousand  Amer- 
icans, 10,000  Japanese,  and  smaller 
numbers  of  British  and  French  were 
placed  under  the  command  of  Gen. 
Otani  (Japanese),  and  dispatched  to 
Vladivostok  in  August.  Ma  j  .-Gen. 
William  S.  Graves  was  placed  in  com- 
mand  of   the  American   troops.      This 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


143 


force  immediately  started  to  occupy  the 
valley  of  the  Ussuri  River  and  met  with 
little  resistance.  On  August  4,  1918, 
it  was  announced  that  the  Allied  troops 
had  taken  possession  of  Archangel  after 
ineffectual  resistance  by  the  Bolsheviki. 
The  Allies  (including  Americans)  now 
controlled  the  entire  coast  from  Arch- 
angel to  Murmansk. 

During  September  and  October  the 
Allies  and  Czecho-Slovaks  made  some 
progress  against  the  Bolsheviki.  The 
Japanese  advanced  along  the  Siberian 
Railroad  and  captured  Blagoviests- 
chenk,  the  capital  of  Amur,  and  Alex- 
ievsk  on  September  18.  Many  towns 
along  the  Dvina  River  were  occupied 
by  the  Allied  and  American  troops. 
Kadish,  in  the  Province  of  Archangel, 
was  occupied  on  October  18.  During 
the  latter  half  of  October  and  in  early 
November  the  fighting  seemed  to  favor 
the  Bolshevik  forces.  The  Czechs  were 
driven  from  Samara  and  reported  that 
without  immediate  assistance  they  would 
not  be  able  to  hold  out  much  longer. 
The  Allies  were  forced  to  abandon  some 
of  their  newly  won  ground  along  the 
Dvina  (Kadish),  but  succeeded  in  driv- 
ing the  Bolsheviks  across  the  Finnish 
border  from  Karelia. 

The  signing  of  the  armistice  with 
Germany,  contrary  to  the  expectations 
of  many  people,  did  not  bring  to  a  close 
the  hostilities  in  Russia.  No  official 
declaration  of  war  had  ever  been  made 
against  the  Bolsheviki  and  consequently 
a  legal  state  of  war  did  not  exist,  al- 
though fighting  continued.  On  Decem- 
ber 24,  Siberian  troops  with  the  aid 
of  Czecho-Slovak  troops  were  reported 
to  have  captured  the  city  of  Perm  and 
to  have  practically  wiped  out  an  entire 
Bolshevik  army,  taking  31,000  prison- 
ers and  much  booty.  The  Allies  ad- 
vanced up  the  Onega  River,  in  the 
Archangel  district,  for  a  distance  of  fif- 


teen miles  on  December  30,  and  recap- 
tured Kadish  and  made  their  rather 
precarious  position  more  secure. 

During  1918  and  1919  the  whole 
situation  in  Russia  and  Siberia  was  still 
unsettled.  Arguments  were  rife  in 
Allied  countries  as  to  what  should  be 
done.  Some  contended  that  a  large 
force  should  be  sent  into  Russia  and 
Bolshevism  crushed,  while  others  main- 
tained that  the  armies  should  be  with- 
drawn and  Russia  permitted  to  work 
out  her  own  salvation.  The  question 
was  for  the  peace  conference  to  decide. 
See  below  under  the  heading  Peace 
Conference. 

IV.  Southern  Theatre.  A.  Campaigns 
against  Serbia. — The  campaigns  against 
Serbia  have  two  main  stages :  ( 1 )  Aus- 
trian campaign  across  the  Drina  (Aug- 
ust-December, 1914),  which  failed  owing 
to  demands  in  the  Russian  field;  (2) 
Austro-German-Bulgar  invasion  of  Ser- 
bia, to  open  the  road  to  Constantino- 
ple. This  campaign  ended  in  the  con- 
quest of  Serbia  and  Montenegro  (Oc- 
tober-December, 1915). 

The  military  strategy  of  this  cam- 
paign develops  on  three  fronts:  (a) 
the  Germans  crossed  the  Danube  and 
took  the  line  of  the  Morava  valley ; 
(6)  the  Austrians  crossed  the  Drina 
and  moved  up  the  Lim;  (c)  the  Bul- 
gars,  sending  one  army  to  beat  off  Al- 
lied reinforcements  from  Greece,  moved 
on  Nish  with  another  army.  The  Serb 
army  was  driven  to  the  sea  through  Al- 
bania. It  was  ultimately  reformed  and 
reequipped  and  pla3red  a  prominent 
part  in  the  campaigns  of  1918. 

B.  Italian  Campaign. — Italy's  en- 
trance into  the  war  in  May,  1915,  re- 
lieving Russia,  has  two  main  move- 
ments: (1)  to  the  north,  to  close  the 
passes  of  the  Alps  against  invasion; 
(2)  to  the  northeast,  to  cross  the  Ison- 
zo  and  take  Trieste. 


144 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


The  Isonzo  line  was  reached,  but  the 
operation  was  not  completed.  An  Aus- 
trian invasion  from  the  north  (May, 
1916)  was  checked  mainly  by  an  op- 
portune Russian  drive  into  Galicia. 
After  a  successful  attack  against  Aus- 
tria the  Italians  were  compelled  to  beat 
a  precipitous  retreat  to  the  Piave  in 
1917.  From  here  they  organized  the 
blow  that  crushed  Austria  in  1918. 

The  work  before  the  Italians  was 
therefore  simple  in  respect  of  concep- 
tion, difficult  in  point  of  execution.  The 
configuration  of  the  frontier  at  once 
fixed  the  nature  of  the  task.  It  was 
absolutely  essential  to  close  the  passes 
of  the  Alps  from  Switzerland  eastward, 
in  order  to  protect  the  flank  and  rear 
of  their  armies  on  the  Isonzo  line,  and 
to  prevent  invasion  of  Italy.  This  con- 
dition secured,  the  task  of  the  remainder 
of  the  forces  was  to  cross  the  Isonzo, 
for  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  Italy's 
material  objective  was  Trieste  with  the 
Istrian  Peninsula. 

Four  armies  took  the  field,  two  on 
each  frontier,  the  northern  and  eastern. 
A  fifth  force,  composed  of  Bersaglieri 
and  Alpini,  was  designated  for  opera- 
tions in  the  Carnic  Alps.  Gen.  Count 
Luigi  Cadorna,*  the  chief  of  the  gen- 
eral staff,  was  in  general  command.  On 
May  24  the  frontier  of  the  Trentino 
was  crossed.  Two  weeks  later  the  Itali- 
ans were  well  advanced  in  the  Trentino 
and  Tyrol;  the  road  to  Verona  was 
closed.  It  would  seem  that  the  Aus- 
trians  during  the  opening  days  of  the 

*  Count  Lttigi  Cadorna,  born  (1850)  at  Pal- 
lanza,  son  of  Gen.  Raffaele  Cadorna;  gradu- 
ated from  military  academy  at  Turin  (1868); 
colonel  (1892);  commander  of  Tenth  Regiment 
of  Bersaglieri;  chief  of  staff  of  the  Army  of 
Florence;  major  general  (1898);  commander 
of  the  division  at  Naples  (1907)  and  at  Genoa 
(1910) ;  designated  commander  of  an  army  in 
case  of  war  (1911);  chief  of  the  general  staff; 
preparation  for  participation  in  European  War 
worked  out  by  him  in  detail  and  he  became 
generalissimo  of  the  entire  Italian  army; 
author  of  notable  pamphlets  on  tactics. 


campaign  in  this  region  had  opposed 
but  slight  resistance  to  the  forward 
movement  of  the  Italians.  Further  east 
a  more  severe  struggle  took  place  for 
the  possession  of  the  passes  of  the  Car- 
nic Alps.  Here  the  Italians  took  the 
Plbcken  Pass  and  gradually  extended 
their  hold  upon  the  peaks  to  its  east 
and  west,  thus  closing  the  gateways 
opening  southward  into  the  valley  of 
the  Tagliamento.  The  struggle  con- 
tinued in  the  mountains  during  the  en- 
tire summer,  and  took  place  chiefly  at 
high  altitudes.  In  the  Trentino  as  a 
whole  the  Italians  managed  to  get  con- 
trol of  most  of  the  roads  leading  into 
their  country.  West  of  Lake  Garda 
(Val  Giudicaria)  they  pushed  forward 
in  the  autumn  and  got  close  to  Riva. 
On  the  east  side  of  the  lake,  by  the 
end  of  the  year  they  were  in  the  out- 
skirts of  Rovereto.  Farther  east,  on 
November  7,  Col  di  Lana  was  taken  by 
Garibaldi,  but  later  abandoned,  only 
to  be  recaptured  in  April,  1916.  In 
the  Carnic  Alps  the  Austrians  made 
desperate  efforts  to  dislodge  their  ad- 
versaries from  the  passes  seized  by 
them  in  June,  but  to  no  avail ;  the  Itali- 
ans held.  They  failed,  however,  to  get 
the  Malborghctto  works,  but  had  better 
success  in  forcing  the  Austrians  to 
abandon  the  Plezzo  valley.  South  of 
Plezzo,  Tolmino  was  invested,  but  with- 
out success. 

The  nature  of  events  on  the  eastern 
frontier  was  almost  wholly  determined 
by  the  obstacle  forming  the  line  of 
separation  between  the  contending 
armies,  i.e.,  the  Isonzo  River.  From  its 
left  (Austrian)  bank  rise  ridges  upon 
ridges,  whereas  the  right  bank,  from 
which  the  attack  must  come,  below  Go- 
rizia  (Gorz),  is  flat  (the  Friuli  plain). 
In  crossing  the  river,  therefore,  the 
Italians  would  be  compelled  to  fight  up- 
hill.     The   rectangle  Gorizia-Gradisca- 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


145 


Trieste-San  Daniele  is  occupied  by  the 
Carso  (Karst)  plateau,  with  hills  from 
150  to  1700  feet  high.  This  plateau 
would  have  to  be  taken,  or  at  least  a 
passage  opened  through  it,  before 
Trieste  could  be  reached.  On  May  21< 
Italian  troops  occupied  various  small 
towns  just  across  the  frontier.  Their 
troubles  began  when  they  undertook  to 
cross  the  Isonzo,  for  soon  after  reach- 
ing it  they  found  it  in  flood.  It  is  said 
that  their  difficulties  were  increased  by 
the  failure  of  the  cavalry  to  seize  the 
bridges  at  Pieris.  A  dash  for  these 
bridges  would  have  insured  a  crossing 
and  might  have  given  possession  of  a 
part  at  least  of  the  Carso  plateau.  As 
it  was,  the  Austrians  blew  up  the 
bridges  before  any  Italians  got  across. 
The  flood  subsiding  on  June  5,  a  cross- 
ing was  made  at  Pieris  and  Monfalcone 
occupied.  But  now  a  fresh  obstacle 
presented  itself.  The  Austrians  flooded 
the  low  country  at  the  foot  of  the  Carso 
plateau.  The  advance  against  the  pla- 
teau was  thus  blocked,  and  operations 
along  the  entire  line  delayed.  Another 
crossing  had  to  be  sought  unaffected 
by  the  flood  conditions.  The  point  se- 
lected was  just  above  Sagrado,  where 
the  river  makes  a  great  salient  to  the 
west ;  unsuccessful  attempts  were  made 
on  June  9,  15,  and  23. 

It  was  therefore  decided  to  make  a 
general  advance  along  the  whole  line  of 
the  Carso,  a  movement  which  began 
June  18.  By  the  23d  various  villages 
at  the  foot  of  the  Carso  had  been  taken. 
A  fourth  attempt  to  cross  succeeded  on 
the  24th.  The  Italians  by  the  27th  had 
got  a  bridgehead  on  the  Isonzo  and  a 
line  of  advance  to  the  Carso  plateau. 
This  struggle  formed  part  of  a  gen- 
eral struggle  over  the  whole  line  from 
Plezzo  to  the  sea.  The  conflict  was  nec- 
essarily intensified  at  certain  points, 
such  as  Gorizia,  Plava,  and  Tolmino. 


Gorizia. — Gorizia  lies  in  a  bend  of 
the  river,  and  is  dominated  by  the  hills 
behind  it  stretching  away  into  the  gen- 
eral mountain  system.  On  the  west 
bank  Monte  Sabotino,  itself  command- 
ed by  the  hills  on  the  eastern  bank,  like- 
wise controls  the  position;  from  Sabo- 
tino run  out  the  Podgora  heights  well 
below  (south  of)  Gorizia.  Between 
Podgora  and  Gorizia  is  open  ground  3 
miles  wide,  bounded  on  the  southeast 
by  the  river.  Sabotino  and  Podgora, 
thoroughly  organized  defensively  by  the 
Austrians,  were  unsuccessfully  attacked 
by  the  Italians  at  the  end  of  May. 
They  were  more  successful  at  Plava. 
Back  of  the  village  stands  Hill  383,  and 
south  of  383  a  peak  known  as  Kuk. 
The  Italians  hoped,  if  they  could  get 
across,  to  work  down  the  left  bank  and 
menace  Monte  Santo,  the  bulwark  of 
the  Austrians  on  this  bank  in  the  Go- 
rizia sector.  Attempts  to  cross  by 
bridging  on  the  8th  and  10th  of  June 
were  defeated,  but  on  the  11th  two  bat- 
talions were  got  over  by  rafting  and 
attacked  Hill  383,  securing  a  footing 
on  the  lower  slopes.  Reinforcements 
enabled  the  Italians  on  the  17th,  after 
heavy  fighting,  to  gain  the  summit. 
They  held  the  hill  thereafter  in  spite 
of  the  efforts  of  the  Austrians  to  win 
it  back,  but  were  unable  to  extend  their 
holdings   on  the  left  bank. 

Tolmino. — At  Tolmino  the  river 
turns  90  degrees  from  southeast  to 
southwest.  In  the  bend  stand  two  hills 
joined  by  a  saddle,  Santa  Maria  and 
Santa  Lucia.  These  were  held  by  the 
Austrians,  and  formed  with  Sabotino 
and  Podgora  the  only  positions  re- 
tained by  them  on  the  west  bank  of  the 
Isonzo.  North  of  Tolmino  runs  a 
range  of  high  mountains,  one  of  which, 
Monte  Nero,  rises  over  7000  feet.  Tol- 
mino itself  was  a  point  of  some  military 
importance,  probably  because  the  Aus- 


146 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


trians,  should  the  occasion  arise,  meant 
to  use  it  as  a  point  of  departure  in  the 
invasion  of  Italy. 

The  resistance  offered  at  Tolmino 
was  more  serious  than  apparently  the 
Italians  had  expected.  Their  attempt 
to  seize  it  by  sudden  attack  failed,  and 
they  were  compelled  to  proceed  against 
the  place  by  regular  investment.  In  the 
meantime  they  were  more  fortunate  10 
miles  to  the  northwest  at  Caporetto, 
which  they  had  occupied  on  the  first 
day  of  the  war.  The  heights  across 
were  turned  by  a  column  that  crossed 
higher  up,  climbed  the  Polonnik  ridge, 
and  thus  drove  the  Austrians  back  on 
the  Monte  Nero  ridge.  On  June  2  the 
highest  peak  of  the  ridge  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  Italians.  The  occupation 
of  Monte  Nero  was  a  necessary  condi- 
tion to  operations  directed  southward 
against  Tolmino,  but  Monte  Nero  it- 
self was  not  safe  unless  Plezzo,  an  Aus- 
trian base  and  magazine,  could  be  neu- 
tralized. By  June  23,  the  Italians  had 
succeeded  in  getting  into  positions  from 
which  they  threatened  the  Plezzo  val- 
ley. They  now  came  down  from  the 
north  against  Tolmino.  In  August 
they  attacked  Santa  Lucia  and  Santa 
Maria,  but  were  compelled  to  resort  to 
trench  warfare.  Later,  in  October,  the 
offensive  was  resumed,  without  how- 
ever succeeding  in  dispossessing  the 
Austrians. 

Plava. — The  war  had  now  lasted  over 
five  months  without  any  result  of  mag- 
nitude on  the  Isonzo  front.  But  on 
October  18  began  a  general  bombard- 
ment from  Plava  to  the  sea,  as  a  prepa- 
ration for  an  extension  beyond  the 
.Plava  bridgehead  in  order  to  attack 
Monte  Santo  from  the  north,  for  the 
capture  of  Sabotino-Podgora,  and  for 
the  occupation  of  the  Carso  plateau. 
Operations  in  the  Plava  sector  proved 
unfruitful,  owing  to  the  inability  of  the 


Italians  to  capture  Kuk.  As  long  as 
this  elevation  remained  in  Austrian 
hands,  it  was  useless  to  think  of  pro- 
ceeding against  Monte  Santo.  Hence 
the  attack  on  the  Gorizia  front  derived 
no  help  from  the  north.  The  fighting 
on  this  front  lasted  six  weeks  and  at 
one  time  Monte  Sabotino  was  actually 
taken  but  was  not  held.  In  December 
there  was  a  lull  but  no  cessation.  As 
a  result  of  their  efforts  the  Italians  had 
gained  a  little,  and  now  turned  their 
guns  upon  Gorizia  itself.  On  the  Carso 
plateau  very  little  was  achieved.  Part 
of  Monte  San  Michele  was  taken,  as 
well  as  trenches  on  the  northern  slope 
of  the  plateau.  But  on  the  whole  the 
Italian  offensive  had  failed.  The  Aus- 
trian lines  had  held  at  all  essential 
points. 

At  the  end  of  the  year  1915  Italy 
had  gained  one  of  her  points.  She  had 
closed  the  gates  of  her  northern  fron- 
tier, and  held  the  keys.  A  period  of 
relative  quiet  then  prevailed.  In  May, 
1916,  the  Austrians  began  a  success- 
ful drive  down  the  Adige  valley,  forc- 
ing the  Italians  back  over  their  own 
frontier  at  many  points.  The  Italian 
towns  of  Arsiero  and  Asiago  were  cap- 
tured. This  campaign  against  Italy 
was  brought  to  a  sudden  halt  by  the 
Russian  offensive  in  Galicia,  and  in  a 
short  time  the  Italians  had  regained 
most  of  the  lost  ground.  In  August 
the  Italians  won  their  greatest  victory 
of  the  war.  This  was  the  taking  of  Go- 
rizia, the  key  to  Trieste.  The  attack 
began  in  the  Malfalcone  sector.  Then 
San  Sabotino  and  San  Michele,  the 
other  two  defenses  of  the  city,  were 
taken  with  a  rush.  The  city  itself  was 
attacked  from  all  sides.  A  bloody  en- 
gagement was  fought  at  the  Podgora 
bridge  crossing  the  Isonzo.  The  Itali- 
ans pushed  eastward  across  the  Carso 
plateau,  which  extends  22  miles  to  Tri- 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


147 


este.  They  captured  San  Grado  and 
several  lines  of  trenches  near  Loguizza. 
On  October  11  the  Italians  stormed  the 
whole  first  line  of  Austrian  defenses. 
They  captured  Loguizza  and  Jamiano. 
In  November  the  Italians  began  an- 
other great  offensive  on  the  Carso  pla- 
teau and  advanced  an  average  of  % 
of  a  mile.  They  claimed  to  have  taken 
39,000  prisoners  to  date.  The  wintry 
months  of  December,  1916,  and  Janu- 
ary, 1917,  prevented  further  operations. 
Artillery  and  aerial  engagements  were 
frequent. 

Italian  Spring  and  Summer  Offens- 
sives. — The  winter  on  the  Italian  front 
was  very  severe  and  of  long  duration. 
The  time  was  spent  in  increasing  the 
entire  military  establishment  on  the 
front  and  (by  the  Italians)  in  pre- 
paring to  meet  an  Austrian  attack  on 
the  Trentino  front,  and  in  organizing 
an  Italian  attack  in  the  southern  part 
of  the  battleline.  The  plans  of  the 
Italian  General  Staff  were  as  follows : 
First,  to  engage  the  enemy  on  the  en- 
tire front  from  Tolmino  to  the  sea  in 
an  intense  artillery  action  which  would 
leave  him  doubtful  as  to  the  real  direc- 
tion of  the  decisive  attacks ;  then  to 
attack  on  the  right  wing  to  the  north 
of  Gorizia,  and,  lastly,  to  strike  out 
on  the  Carso. 

Operations  were  begun  on  May  12, 
and  on  May  14,  the  infantry  advanced 
from  Plava  and  Gorizia.  Initial  suc- 
cesses were  gained  on  Mount  Cucco 
and  Mount  Santo.  On  the  entire  front 
the  Austrians  presented  stubborn  and 
determined  resistance.  The  next  day 
the  Isonzo  was  crossed  between  Loga 
and  Bodrez  and  new  advances  were 
made  on  the  two  mountains  mentioned 
above,  and  on  the  Vodice  ridge.  By  the 
22d  the  advances  were  consolidated  and 
the  Italians  had  a  firm  grip  on  the  whole 
mountainous  ridge  which  separates  the 


Isonzo  from  the  deep  valley  which 
branches  out  in  front  of  Anhovo.  The 
Italians  had  taken  over  7000  prison- 
ers. 

In  order  to  create  a  diversion  the 
Austrians  attacked  in  the  Trentino  re- 
gion (May  19  to  22).  Unsuccessful 
attacks  were  made  in  Val  Sugana,  on 
the  Asiago  plateau,  around  Lake 
Garda  and  in  the  Adige  valley.  A 
strong  attack  in  force  was  repulsed  by 
the  Italians  on  the  22d,  after  tempo- 
rary successes  in  the  Piccolo  Colbri- 
con  and  in  the  Travignolo  valley.  In 
these  attacks  the  Austrians  lost  many 
men,  killed,  wounded,  and  captured. 

On  May  23,  the  Italian  infantry, 
after  tremendous  artillery  preparation, 
attacked  on  the  southern  edge  of  the 
Carso  Plateau  from  Castagnavizza  to 
the  sea.  Over  100  aeroplanes  aided  in 
this  battle.  Lucati,  Jamiano,  Bagni, 
and  several  important  heights  were 
captured.  On  the  next  day  the  battle 
was  resumed  and  extended  from  Gorizia 
to  the  sea.  Allied  monitors  bombarded 
the  extremity  of  the  Austrian  lines  with 
heavy  naval  guns.  The  Italians  ad- 
vanced in  the  face  of  exceedingly  stub- 
born resistance — counterattacks,  vio- 
lent shelling,  and  aerial  bombardments 
from  machines  flying  very  low  to  the 
ground.  The  Italians  in  this  phase  of 
the  battle  took  17,000  prisoners  and 
20  guns  and  were  within  11  miles  of 
Trieste. 

The  Austrians  on  June  1  began  an 
offensive  which  compelled  the  Italians 
to  retire  somewhat  from  their  newly  won 
positions.  On  account  of  the  conditions 
in  Russia  (see  above)  they  were  able 
to  bring  up  great  quantities  of  men  and 
material  from  the  Eastern  front.  On 
June  3,  a  general  attack  from  Mount 
S.  Marco  to  the  sea  was  begun  and 
lasted  with  unabated  intensity  for 
three  days.     It  was  at  first  successful. 


148 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Italian  positions  on  Mount  S.  Marco 
were  taken  and  positions  on  Dosso  Faiti 
were  penetrated.  South  of  Jamiano 
the  Italians  were  compelled  to  give  up 
a  strip  of  territory  which  they  did  not 
have  time  to  consolidate.  A  counter- 
assault  by  General  Cadorna  in  the 
Trentino  compelled  the  Austrians  to 
give  up  this  offensive  which  was  sup- 
posed to  neutralize  the  Italian  gains  in 
the  latter  part  of  May.  There  is  no 
doubt  that  the  fighting  on  the  Carso 
favored  the  Italians  in  the  first  months 
of  the  campaign,  although  it  is  doubt- 
ful if  they  penetrated  the  Austrian 
lines  as  far  as  the  General  Staff  had 
hoped. 

During  July  and  the  first  part  of 
August  the  opposing  forces  battled 
back  and  forth  in  an  attempt  to  get  ad- 
vantageous positions.  The  Italians  ad- 
vanced on  the  Carso  and  took  Dalino, 
and  repulsed  strong  Austrian  attacks 
in  the  Trentino.  The  Austrian  artil- 
lery was  everywhere  active,  as  though 
it  was  attempting  to  prevent  the  Itali- 
ans from  organizing  an  offensive  on  a 
large  scale.  Nevertheless,  on  the  night 
of  August  18,  the  Italians  began  a 
spectacular  offensive  from  Tolmino  to 
the  sea,  a  front  of  approximately  37 
miles.  The  attack  was  made  by  the 
Third  Army,  under  General  Cappello, 
which  operated  on  the  Bainsizza  pla- 
teau, Monte  Santo,  and  Monte  San  Ga- 
briele,  and  the  Second  Army,  under  the 
Duke  of  Aosta,  which  operated  in  the 
Vippacco  and  Brestovizza  valleys,  and 
in  front  of  the  Hermada  mountains. 
These  armies  were  aided  by  Italian  and 
British  monitors  in  the  Gulf  of  Trieste 
and  by  vast  fleets  of  aeroplanes. 

The  Italians  paved  the  way  for  their 
advance  by  a  great  engineering  feat. 
They  had  diverted  the  course  of  the 
waters  of  the  Isonzo  River  from  its  bed 
above   Anhovo    and   had   built   bridges 


across  the  shallow  stream  that  re- 
mained. This  work  was  done  at  night, 
and  at  daylight  the  stream  was  re-di- 
verted to  its  regular  channel.  By 
means  of  these  bridges  and  some  pon- 
toon bridges  hastily  constructed  the 
Italians  crossed  the  river  on  the  18th 
and  gained  a  foothold  on  the  northern 
part  of  the  Bainsizza  plateau.  At  the 
same  time  General  Cappello's  right 
wing  began  to  envelop  Monte  Santo. 
These  two  movements  compelled  the 
Austrians  to  retire  to  the  easternmost 
edge  of  the  Bainsizza  plateau.  The 
Italians  captured  a  vast  quantity  of 
military  stores  and  food  supplies,  be- 
sides a  great  number  of  prisoners.  From 
the  nature  of  the  Austrian  defenses,  it 
was  quite  apparent  that  the  Austrian 
Staff  thought  this  plateau  impregna- 
ble. On  August  24,  the  Italians  oc- 
cupied the  summit  of  Monte  Santo, 
2240  feet  high,  and  on  September  the 
summit  of  Monte  San  Gabriele,  1700 
feet  above  the  Isonzo  and  300  feet 
above  Monte  San  Daniele.  The  Austri- 
ans still  held  the  eastern  slopes  of 
Monte  San  Gabriele. 

The  Duke  of  Aosta  had  been  busy 
in  the  south  in  the  meanwhile.  His  ob- 
ject was  to  surround  the  Hermada 
mountains,  which  were  the  key  to  Tri- 
este, and  to  occupy  the  Vippacco  val- 
ley. In  his  assault  on  the  Hermada  he 
was  aided  to  a  large  extent  by  moni- 
tors and  aeroplanes.  He  was  unable 
to  break  through  the  Hermada  moun- 
tains, however,  and  spent  the  entire 
month  in  fruitless  efforts.  During  Sep- 
tember and  early  October,  General  Cap- 
pello succeeded  in  driving  the  Austri- 
ans from  the  slopes  of  Monte  San  Ga- 
briele, and  also  made  slight  gains  on 
the  Bainsizza  and  Carso  plateaus.  The 
objectives  of  the  Italian  summer  cam- 
paign were  to  capture  ultimately  Tri- 
este and  Laibach.     The  capture  of  the 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


149 


former  would  destroy  the  submarine 
bases  in  the  Adriatic,  and  the  capture 
of  the  latter  would  open  up  the  wa}r  to 
Vienna.  The  sudden  German-Austrian 
blow  at  the  northern  extremity  of  the 
battle-line  compelled  the  Italians  to  give 
up  their  entire  gains  of  the  year. 

Great  Italian  Retreat. — As  has  been 
described  above,  the  main  Italian  army 
was  striking  on  a  comparatively  limit- 
ed front  on  the  Bainsizza  plateau.  The 
entire  line  of  action  was  scarcely  more 
than  12  or  15  miles  long.  This  attack- 
ing force  was  composed  of  seasoned 
veterans.  The  armies  protecting  its 
flank  were  of  unequal  strength  and  were 
used  for  different  purposes.  Those  on 
the  upper  Isonzo  were  territorials,  i.e., 
older  men  who  in  peace  times  are  held 
in  reserve.  They  extended  from  Tol- 
mino  to  Plezzo  (Flitsch)  and  were  to 
protect  the  flank  of  the  Bainsizza  army. 
The  troops  on  the  lower  Isonzo  were 
veterans,  who  were  thrusting  forward 
on  the  Carso  plateau  pari  passu  with 
the  troops  on  the  Bainsizza,  and  who 
were  ultimately  to  march  on  Trieste. 
The  German  General  Staff  had  been 
receiving  calls  for  help  from  the  Aus- 
trians  for  some  time  and  at  last  gave 
heed  to  them.  The  strategy  of  the  Ger- 
man plan  was  to  strike  at  the  unsea- 
soned troops  on  the  upper  Isonzo,  break 
through,  and  then  cut  the  lines  of  com- 
munications of  the  other  two  armies 
by  outflanking  them.  This  plan  was 
put  into  operation  and  worked  exceed- 
ingly well.  The  task  was  made  easier 
by  the  collapse  of  Russia,  a  superiority 
of  artillery,  surprise,  socialistic  propa- 
ganda, and  cowardice,  which  General 
Cadorna  claimed  was  exhibited  by  his 
troops  on  the  upper  Isonzo. 

The  battle  began  on  October  21,  with 
a  bombardment  of  the  Plezzo-Tolmino 
front  and  the  northern  flank  of  the 
Bainsizza  plateau.  Under  cover  of  these 


guns  the  Germans  and  Austrians  broke 
through  the  front-line  trenches  at  Plez- 
zo and  Tolmino  and  crossed  to  the  west- 
ern bank  of  the  Isonzo.  Converging 
from  these  points  on  Caporetto,  the 
Germans  opened  the  way  down  the  val- 
leys of  the  Natisone  and  Judrio  rivers. 
This  move  threatened  the  rear  of  the 
Bainsizza  and  Carso  armies,  and  com- 
pelled them  to  begin  a  hasty  retreat. 
By  the  27th  Berlin  announced  the  cap- 
ture of  60,000  Italians  (mostly  non- 
combatants  used  behind  the  lines)  and 
500  guns.  This  was  accomplished  by 
the  capture  of  Monte  Matajur,  which 
dominated  the  Italian  rear  down  the 
valleys  of  the  two  rivers  mentioned 
above.  The  retreat  from  the  plateaus 
through  Gorizia  across  hastily  con- 
structed bridges  over  the  Isonzo  be- 
came a  rout.  On  the  28th  Civadale  was 
taken,  which  opened  up  railway  com- 
munication with  Udine,  the  seat  of  the 
Italian  General  Headquarters.  This 
advance  also  compelled  the  Fourth 
Italian  Army,  which  was  guarding  the 
frontier  in  the  Carnic  Alps,  to  abandon 
the  passes  on  the  frontier  and  retreat 
down  the  streams  flowing  into  the  Tag- 
liamento  and  Piave  rivers. 

On  October  30  Udine  fell,  and  by  the 
first  of  November  the  Teutonic  Allies 
had  reached  the  Tagliamento  River. 
The  Italians,  particularly  the  cavalry, 
fought  valiant  rearguard  actions  to 
stem  the  tide  of  invasion  and  hold  the 
line  of  the  Tagliamento.  So  far  they 
had  lost  180,000  prisoners  and  1500 
guns.  The  Germans  couldn't  be 
stopped.  They  crossed  the  Tagliamen- 
to in  scores  of  places,  increased  their 
number  of  prisoners  to  250,000  (Ger- 
man report),  and  the  number  of  guns 
to  2300.  The  next  river  flowing  into 
the  Gulf  of  Trieste  was  the  Livenza. 
This  offered  very  little  chances  of  re- 
sistance   and   was    defended    merely    to 


150 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


give  more  time  to  prepare  the  line  of 
the  Piave  River,  from  10  to  20  miles 
further  west.  This  line  had  been  a 
training  base  for  recruits  and  was  pro- 
tected by  modern  trenches  and  other 
fortifications.  French  and  British  in- 
fantry and  heavy  artillery,  which  was 
sorely  needed,  was  arriving  daily  in 
ever-increasing  numbers.  At  this  stage 
a  change  in  command  was  made.  Gen- 
eral Cadorna  was  succeeded  by  General 
Diaz,  who  was  to  be  assisted  by  Gen- 
erals Badoglio  and  Giardino.  The  al- 
lied reserves  were  held  on  the  Adige  line 
in  case  the  Italians  were  unable  to  de- 
fend the  Piave.  The  Adige  line  was 
very  strong  naturally,  and  was  practi- 
cally incapable  of  a  flanking  movement 
such  as  had  won  all  the  rivers  so  far 
gained. 

The  strategy  of  the  Austro-German 
Staff  was  now  to  outflank  the  lower 
Piave  line,  which  was  fairly  strong,  by 
seizing  the  Asiago  plateau  and  the  hills 
between  the  Piave  and  the  Brenta  and 
coming  down  the  Piave  valley.  They 
also  attempted  to  cross  the  lower  Piave 
at  several  points  and  were  successful 
at  Zenson  and  one  or  two  other  points. 
They  were  driven  back  at  all  of  these 
except  the  first.  The  Teutons  were  at 
a  great  disadvantage  because  they  were 
unable  to  bring  up  their  heavy  artil- 
lery on  account  of  the  destruction  of 
the  railroads.  The  extreme  lower  Piave 
was  protected  by  great  naval  floats  and 
the  Italian  fleet.  A  large  area  between 
Venice  and  the  mouth  of  the  Piave  was 
flooded,  which  effectively  prevented  fur- 
ther crossings  near  the  coast. 

The  Central  Allies  now  concentrated 
their  efforts  to  break  through  in  the 
neighborhood  of  the  Asiago  plateau,  the 
weakest  point  of  the  Italian  line.  They 
captured  the  village  of  Asiago  and 
other  more  or  less  important  points, 
but   up   to   January,   1918,   they   were 


unable  to  break  through  to  the  Venetian 
plains.  The  Italians  gradually  with- 
drew in  the  region  from  Lake  Garda 
to  the  upper  reaches  of  the  Piave  in 
order  to  strengthen  their  positions  for 
defensive  purposes.  They  grimly  held 
on  to  Monte  Tomba  and  Monte  Mon- 
feriera  that  guarded  the  gateway  to  the 
plains  between  the  Brenta  and  the  Piave 
rivers.  Mass  attacks  comparable  to 
those  used  by  the  Crown  Prince  at 
Verdun  were  repeatedly  made  on  these 
mountain  slopes,  but  the  rock  trenches 
of  the  Italians  held  firmly.  These 
peaks  are  a  part  of  a  chain  of  low 
mountains  which  stretch  across  the 
plain  between  the  Piave  and  the  Brenta. 
For  more  than  three  weeks  this  moun- 
tain range  was  the  scene  of  extremely 
bitter  fighting.  Intense  artillery  duels 
were  fought,  and  the  Teutons  and  the 
Italians  took  turns  at  the  offensive. 
Each  side  won  local  successes  but  the 
main  Italian  line  held. 

The  Germans  and  Austrians  made 
another  great  effort  to  break  through 
in  the  first  week  of  December,  1917. 
This  time  they  struck  between  the 
Brenta  and  Astico  rivers.  The  main 
attack  was  delivered  on  a  four-mile 
front  from  Ronchi  valley  to  Monte 
Kaberlaba  after  heavy  artillery  prepa- 
ration. This  was  where  the  new  Italian 
line  was  anchored  to  the  line  held  be- 
fore the  great  retreat  began.  The  Itali- 
ans were  about  to  withdraw  when  the 
attack  was  made.  In  three  days'  furi- 
ous fighting  (5th  to  8th)  the  Germans 
took  15,000  prisoners.  The  Italians 
were  forced  back  to  positions  more 
easily  defended.  Their  line  had  been 
U-shaped  and  the  bulge  had  been  driven 
into  a  straight  line.  Their  line  was 
based  on  a  group  of  low  mountains 
similar  to  those  between  the  Brenta  and 
the  Piave.  The  Austro-German  troops 
tcck  these  mountains  one  by  one.     On 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


151 


December  15  they  stormed  Col  Caprille 
and  took  3000  prisoners.  On  the  19th 
they  also  stormed  Monte  Asolone  and 
took  2000  more  prisoners.  They  were 
now  within  four  miles  of  the  plains  that 
would  lead  them  to  Venice  and  outflank 
the  Piave  line.  With  a  desperation 
born  of  despair,  the  Italians  counter- 
assaulted  and  regained  the  lost  posi- 
tions on  Monte  Asolone. 

The  Germans  had  taken  almost  4000 
square  miles  of  territory,  300,000  pris- 
oners, and  2700  guns,  according  to  re- 
ports from  Berlin. 

When  the  campaign  closed  on  the 
Italian  front  in  1917  the  Italians  were 
in  a  very  precarious  position.  The 
Austro-German  armies  held  almost  all 
the  important  passes  to  the  Venetian 
plains  and  had  established  a  foothold 
on  the  southern  bank  of  the  lower  Piave 
at  Zenson.  The  opening  of  1918  saw 
two  points  of  strategical  advantage  to 
the  Italians.  One  was  the  cooperation 
in  force  of  the  British  and  French 
armies  under  Generals  Plumer  and 
Fayolle,  respectively,  and  the  other  was 
the  tremendous  fall  of  snow  in  the  last 
half  of  December,  which  ended  the  ex- 
tremely open  winter,  which  had  aided 
the  Teutonic  invaders,  and  which  now, 
not  only  seriously  hampered  their  lines 
of  communications,  but  prevented  them 
from  capturing  vital  passes,  and  from 
debouching  on  to  the  Venetian  plains 
from  those  they  had  already  captured. 
In  January  and  February  by  a  series  of 
local  successes,  the  Italians,  British, 
and  French  compelled  the  enemy  to  give 
up  the  offensive  and  seek  defensive  po- 
sitions. By  the  capture  of  the  north- 
ern summit  of  Monte  Tomba  (Dec.  31, 
1917)  and  by  advancing  four  miles 
up  the  Piave  toward  Quero  (Jan.  20- 
23),  the  French  compelled  the  enemy 
to  retire  from  Monte  Monfenera,  which 
was  the  eastern  gateway  to  the  Vene- 


tian plains.  On  January  28  the  Itali- 
ans started  a  drive  which  extended  from 
the  Nos  valley  to  the  Brenta,  covering 
Monte  di  Val  Bella,  the  Col  del  Rosso, 
Monte  Sisemol,  Bertigo,  and  the  Fren- 
zela  river.  This  drive  broke  up  an  Aus- 
trian drive  aimed  to  break  through  to 
the  plains  at  those  points  and  estab- 
lished for  the  Italians  what  were  to  be 
new  and  permanent  positions  on  Monte 
di  Val  Bella  and  Col  del  Rosso.  This 
effectively  closed  the  only  other  passage 
to  the  Venetian  plains  in  the  hands  of 
the  Austrians  and  Germans.  During 
February  and  March  attempts  to  dis- 
lodge the  Allies  were  futile.  The  en- 
emy foothold  on  the  southern  bank  of 
the  Piave  was  also  wiped  out  by  a  per- 
fectly combined  artillery  and  infantry 
attack  by  the  Italians.  The  result  of 
these  three  local  successes  was  to  put 
the  Austro-Germans  on  the  defensive 
and  to  increase  the  difficulties  of  a  de- 
bouching movement  onto  the  plains  of 
Venetia.  The  month  of  January  saw 
a  change  in  the  Austro-German  com- 
mand on  the  Italian  front.  General 
Borovic  succeeded  Archduke  Eugene 
as  supreme  commander.  Borovic  had 
before  this  commanded  the  Piave  front. 
Field  Marshal  Conrad  von  Hoetzen- 
dorf  still  retained  his  command  on  the 
mountain  front.  It  is  stated  that  Gen- 
eral Borovic  was  promoted  in  order  to 
placate  the  Slavic  elements  in  the  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian  empire. 

The  Austrian  Failure  in  Italy. — The 
long  looked  for  offensive  on  the  Italian 
front  which  was  expected  to  finish  the 
work  of  1917  developed  in  June,  1918, 
and  extended  along  the  whole  front 
from  the  Asiago  plateau  to  the  sea, 
nearly  100  miles.  The  movement  was 
entirely  Austrian,  all  the  German 
troops,  which  participated  in  the  Ital- 
ian debacle  of  1917,  having  been  with- 
drawn for  use  on  the  western  front.     It 


152 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


is  understood  that  the  German  mili- 
tary party  had  told  Austria  in  no  un- 
certain tones  that  she  alone  was  ex- 
pected to  put  Italy  completely  out  of 
the  war.  The  Austrian  plan  of  attack 
was  as  follows :  Field  Marshal  von 
Hoetzendorf  was  to  break  through  the 
Allied  positions  on  the  Asiago  plateau, 
and  at  Monte  Grappa  and  Monte  Tom- 
ba,  and  then  march  down  the  Brenta 
valley,  and  debouch  on  to  the  plains  by 
way  of  Bassano.  In  conjunction  with 
Hoetzendorf,  General  Borovic  was  to 
cross  the  Piave  between  Montello  and 
the  upper  stretches  of  the  Piave  delta, 
and  thus  outflank  Venice,  and  leave  it 
the  alternatives  of  surrender  or  destruc- 
tion. The  capture  of  Montello  would 
assure  the  Austrians  domination  of  sev- 
eral important  railway  centres  and  pos- 
sibly cause  a  huge  disaster.  The  offen- 
sive was  well  planned  and  everything 
done  to  insure  its  success.  The  Aus- 
trians were  well  supplied  with  gas  shells, 
smoke  shells,  rafts,  pontoons,  and  every 
other  means  of  carrying  on  modern 
warfare. 

From  the  outset,  the  attempts  to 
reach  the  manufacturing  heart  of  Italy 
were  doomed  to  failure.  In  the  moun- 
tain region  the  first  attack  took  Pen- 
nar,  Cornone,  Fenilon  and  Mt.  Moschin 
from  the  French  and  British  defenders. 
Less  than  two  days  later,  the  Allies, 
at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  had  recov- 
ered all  the  ground  lost  and  some  more 
besides.  They  took  almost  1000  pris- 
oners and  a  few  machine  guns,  which 
were  particularly  noteworthy  achieve- 
ments in  an  offensive  of  this  kind. 

The  Austrians  were  a  little  more  suc- 
cessful along  the  Piave.  Their  success 
was  largely  due  to  the  very  effective 
use  of  "tear"  shells  and  smoke  screens. 
They  crossed  at  San  Dona,  Capo  Sile 
(the  old  Piave),  San  Andrea,  Candelu, 
Zenson,  and  Nervesa.     The  last  named 


place  is  on  the  slopes  of  the  plateau  of 
Montello,  which  has  been  mentioned 
above.  On  the  16th,  they  reached  Fos- 
salta  and  threatened  to  cross  the  canal 
of  the  same  name,  which  branches  off 
from  the  Piave  at  Fossalta  and  extends 
to  Porte  Grand.  On  this  day  they  also 
extended  their  gains  on  II  Montello  but 
were  held  at  all  other  places  where  they 
had  crossed.  Nature  now  came  to  the 
aid  of  the  Italians,  in  the  form  of  ex- 
ceedingly heavy  rainstorms,  which  made 
the  Piave  a  swollen  flood.  This  had 
two  effects,  first,  it  cut  off  completely 
the  Austrians  on  the  western  bank  of 
the  river,  and,  second,  it  enabled  Italian 
naval  monitors  of  light  draft  to  go  up 
the  river  and  heavily  bombard  the  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian  positions.  On  June  23, 
the  Italians  began  an  offensive  all  along 
the  western  bank  against  the  isolated 
Austrian  positions,  which  resulted  in 
the  capture  of  4500  prisoners.  By  the 
first  week  in  July,  not  only  had  the  Al- 
lies driven  the  enemy  back  to  their  old 
positions,  but,  in  some  cases,  captured 
ground  which  had  been  lost  in  1917, 
notably  the  delta  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Piave.  On  June  29,  Monte  di  Valbella 
was  captured  and  on  the  next  day  Col 
del  Rosso.  Minor  engagements,  invari- 
ably favorable  to  the  Allies,  further 
closed  up  the  mountainous  gates  to  the 
plains  of  Venetia. 

By  July  10,  the  Austrian  offensive 
and  the  Allied  counter-offensive  had 
practically  subsided.  The  result  was 
a  decisive  victory  for  the  Allied  arms, 
particularly  the  Italians.  The  leaven- 
ing effect  on  Italian,  as  well  as  allied 
morale,  was  remarkable,  and,  naturally, 
it  had  a  very  depressing  effect  on  the 
Austro-Hungarians.  The  Austro-Hun- 
garian  war  office  announced  that  35,- 
000  prisoners  were  captured,  but  most 
military  critics  say  these  figures  are 
very  high  in  the  light  of  events.     The 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


153 


Austrian  casualties  were, estimated  by 
the  Italians  to  have  been  nearly  300,- 
000.  Twenty  thousand  prisoners  were 
taken. 

The  Complete  Collapse  of  Austria- 
Hungary. — Austria-Hungary  was  the 
third  member  of  the  Central  Alliance  to 
make  a  separate  peace  with  the  Allies 
{see  below).  An  armistice,  amounting 
to  unconditional  surrender,  was  signed 
on  Nov.  3,  after  Italy  and  her  Allies 
had  secured  one  of  the  most  decisive 
victories  of  the  war.  Sixty-three  Aus- 
trian divisions  were  utterly  routed  by 
51  Italian  divisions,  3  British,  2  French, 
and  1  Czechoslovak  division,  and  the 
332d  American  Infantry  regiment.  On 
Nov.  4,  the  Italian  War  Office  report- 
ed, "The  Austro-Hungarian  army  is 
destroyed.  It  suffered  heavy  losses  in 
the  fierce  resistance  of  the  first  days  of 
the  struggle,  and  in  pursuit  it  has  lost 
an  immense  quantity  of  material  of  all 
kinds,  nearly  all  its  stores  and  depots, 
and  has  left  in  our  hands  about  300,000 
prisoners,  with  their  commands  com- 
plete, and  not  less  than  500  guns." 

The  main  attack  was  made  on  Oc- 
tober 24,  when  the  Italians  and  their 
allies  began  a  heavj^  artillery  fire  in 
the  mountainous  regions  around  the 
Asiago  plateau  and  Monte  Grappa. 
The  first  Italian  infantry  assault  forced 
a  passage  of  the  Ornic  river  and  cap- 
tured Monte  Salarole,  and  parts  of 
Mts.  Prossolan  and  Pertica.  The  Brit- 
ish on  the  same  day  occupied  some 
islands  in  the  Piave,  which  the  Austro- 
Hungarians  had  held  since  their  abor- 
tive offensive  in  June  {see  above).  By 
the  28th,  three  allied  armies  had  forced 
their  way  across  the  Piave  and  were 
driving  the  enemy  precipitously  before 
them,  with  cavalry  units  well  in  advance 
of  the  infantry.  The  Austro-Hungari- 
ans  were  in  a  disorderly  rout  and  made 
absolutely  no  attempt  to   carry  along 


or  destroy  their  munitions  and  sup- 
plies. Vittorio  was  reached  on  the  30th, 
and  on  the  next  day  Italian  forces 
reached  Ponte  nelle  Alpi,  which  sepa- 
rated the  Austrian  army  in  the  moun- 
tains from  that  along  the  Piave.  The 
capture  of  the  Vadal  pass  on  the  same 
day  penned  15  Austrian  divisions  be- 
tween the  Brenta  and  Piave  rivers. 

By  the  first  of  November,  four  armies 
had  reached  the  Livenza  and  cavalry 
outposts  had  operated  almost  to  the 
Tagliamento.  On  the  2d,  the  Italians 
had  advanced  in  the  Trentino  as  far  as 
the  Sugana  valley  and  by  the  next  day, 
when  the  armistice  was  signed,  Rovereto 
and  Trent  were  occupied.  Italian  and 
British  cavalry  also  had  entered  Udine 
and  had  overrun  the  plains  surrounding 
it.  On  the  last  day  of  the  fighting 
Italian  land  and  sea  forces  had  occu- 
pied the  great  Austrian  naval  base  and 
seaport  at  Trieste. 

On  Oct.  31,  Austria-Hungary  sued 
for  an  armistice.  Terms  were  handed 
to  her  on  the  next  day,  which  were  ac- 
cepted. They  went  into  effect  on  Nov. 
3,  and  may  be  summed  up  as  follows: 

1.  Immediate  cessation  of  hostilities 
by  land,  sea,  and  air. 

2.  Total  demobilization  of  the  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian army  and  the  with- 
drawal of  all  troops  operating  with  the 
Germans  from  the  North  Sea  to  Switz- 
erland. Half  of  the  divisional,  corps, 
and  army  artillery  and  equipment  to 
be  delivered  to  the  Allies. 

3.  Evacuation  of  all  territories  in- 
vaded by  Austro-Hungarian  troops, 
since  the  beginning  of  the  war.  Also 
the  evacuation  of  all  territory  which 
was  subject  to  dispute  between  the 
Austro-Hungarians  on  one  hand  and 
Italians  and  Slavs  on  the  other.  This 
territory  was  to  be  occupied  by  the 
forces  of  the  Allies.  All  railway  equip- 
ment, etc.,  in  the  evacuated   territory 


154 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


to  be  left  as  it  was  when  the  armistice 
was  signed.  No  new  destruction  or  pil- 
lage was  to  be  permitted  in  the  terri- 
tories to  be  evacuated. 

4.  The  Allies  were  to  be  able  to  oc- 
cupy any  strategical  points  in  Austria- 
Hungary  that  they  desired,  and  all 
means  of  transportation  were  to  be  at 
their  disposal. 

5.  All  German  troops  were  to  be 
withdrawn  from  the  Balkan  and  Italian 
fronts  as  well  as  from  Austria-Hun- 
gary. 

6.  Evacuated  territory  was  to  be 
governed  by  the  local  authorities,  un- 
der the  control  of  the  Allies. 

7.  All  Allied  prisoners  of  war  to  be 
immediately  repatriated  as  well  as  civil- 
ians who  had  been  removed  from  their 
homes. 

8.  Surrender  to  the  Allies  of  15  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian  submarines,  and  the  rest 
disarmed  and  the  crews  paid  off. 

9.  Surrender  of  3  battleships,  3 
light  cruisers,  9  destroyers,  12  torpedo 
boats,  1  mine  layer,  and  6  Danube 
monitors.  All  other  surface  craft  to 
be  collected  at  points  designated  and 
completely  disarmed. 

10.  Freedom  of  navigation  for  the 
Allies  on  the  Danube  river  and  in  the 
Adriatic. 

11.  The  existing  rules  of  blockade  to 
remain  unchanged. 

12.  Occupation  by  the  Allies  of  Pola. 

13.  All  allied  merchant  vessels  held 
by  Austria-Hungary  to  be  released. 

14.  No  destruction  of  ships  or  ma- 
terial to  be  permitted  and  all  naval  and 
merchant  marine  prisoners  to  be  re- 
patriated. 

See  section  headed  Peace  Confer- 
ence. 

The  Balkans.  Serbia. — Serbia  be- 
gan her  mobilization  July  26,  1914, 
and  two  days  later  Austria  declared 
war.      There    seems    to    be    reason    for 


the  belief  that  Austria  lost  time  in  pass- 
ing to  actual  hostilities.  Apparently 
she  could  have  seized  Belgrade  at  once, 
and  thus  secured  a  footing  on  Serbian 
soil,  some  days  before  the  Serbians 
were  ready  to  strike  back.  She  delayed, 
however,  and  when  she  did  move,  it  was 
across  the  Drina,  on  the  west.  An  in- 
vasion from  the  Drina  would  lengthen 
her  lines,  but  if  successful  would  enable 
her  to  strike  at  the  heart  of  the  coun- 
try. The  lack  of  good  communications 
would  tell  on  one  adversary  as  much 
as  on  the  other,  and  would  be  largely 
compensated  by  Austrian  superiority 
in  transport.  Accordingly  after  dem- 
onstrations on  the  Danube,  on  August 
12,  she  sent  her  first  troops  over  at 
Losnitza  on  the  Drina,  on  the  same  day 
she  crossed  the  Save  near  Shabatz. 
Other  troops  crossed  the  Drina  at  Zvor- 
nik  and  Liubovia.  The  direct  objective 
of  the  Austrians  was  to  reach  Valievo, 
and  thence  Kraguyevats,  the  site  of  the 
National  Serbian  arsenal.  The  com- 
manding generals  on  the  respective 
sides  were  Potiorek  (Austrian)  and 
Putnik  (Serbian). 

The  line  of  the  Austrian  invasion 
being  known,  the  bulk  of  the  Serbians 
moved  to  meet  it  in  the  direction  of 
the  Jadar  valley,  while  sending  troops 
to  the  northwest  to  offset  the  invasion 
from  Shabatz.  In  the  meantime  the 
Austrians  moved  up  the  Jadar,  and  the 
Serbians,  or  as  many  as  had  come  up 
to  join  the  sparse  forces  falling  back 
before  the  advance,  intrenched  at  Jare- 
bitze,  across  the  valley.  The  Serbian 
cavalry,  sent  to  reconnoitre  the  Match- 
va  plain,  reported  the  Austrians  pres- 
ent in  force,  and  therefore  received  or- 
ders, with  the  Serbian  right,  to  prevent 
the  Austrians  from  the  north  from  join- 
ing the  troops  that  had  crossed  the 
Drina.  The  main  body  occupied  posi- 
tions   extending   well   to    the    south    of 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


155 


Jarebitze,  while  other  forces  were  de- 
tailed to  beat  off  attacks  coming  from 
Krupani,  15  miles  south,  and  from 
Liubovia,  another  crossing  of  the 
Drina. 

The  battle  opened  in  earnest  August 
16,  on  the  Serbian  right.  The  action, 
lasting  all  day,  resulted  in  the  defeat  of 
the  Austrians,  and  in  bringing  to 
nought  their  plan  to  join  their  forces 
on  the  Jadar.  It  also  left  the  Serbians 
free  to  operate  against  Shabatz.  On 
the  17th  they  pushed  on  to  within  4 
miles  of  that  town,  only  to  find  it 
strongly  defended  ;  they  therefore  aban- 
doned, for  the  moment,  any  further 
active  efforts  and  awaited  reinforce- 
ments. On  the  centre  and  left,  the  Aus- 
trians had  better  fortune,  and  succeed- 
ed in  pushing  back  their  adversaries. 
This  was  particularly  the  case  on  the 
Serbian  extreme  left.  But  on  the  17th, 
the  Serbians  resumed  the  offensive,  and 
captured  two  positions  in  the  Tzer. 
Further  south,  however,  the  Austrians 
were  again  successful,  and  drove  back 
the  Serbians,  who,  however,  intrenched, 
ready  to  move  forward  again  the  next 
day.  On  the  18th,  the  Austrians  ad- 
vancing from  Shabatz,  drove  back  the 
Serbs  in  front  of  the  town,  and  at  the 
same  time  prepared  to  resist  the  ex- 
pected Serb  attack  on  Kosannigrad, 
their  main  position  on  Tzer.  This  at- 
tack was  successful,  and  the  Serbs  then 
turned  their  efforts  against  an  eleva- 
tion between  the  two  mountain  ranges 
(Rashulatcha)  which  was  taken  the  fol- 
lowing day,  the  19th,  on  which  the  issue 
of  the  battle  was  decided.  The  Aus- 
trian right  was  beaten  on  that  day,  and 
the  Serbs  were  now  in  possession  of 
Tzer  and  Iverak.  On  the  20th,  the 
Dobrava  was  crossed,  fighting  con- 
tinued on  the  21st,  22d,  and  23d;  on 
the  24th,  the  Serbs  entered  Shabatz. 
While  these  actions  were  going  on,  the 


Austrians  farther  south  had  been  re- 
treating to  the  Drina,  and  the  invasion 
had  failed.  The  losses  on  both  sides  in 
the  battle  of  Jadar  were  heavy,  prob- 
ably 35,000  killed  and  wounded  Aus- 
trians and  18,000  Serbs.  The  Serbs 
took  4000  prisoners,  and  gathered  in 
a  considerable  quantity  of  guns,  rifles, 
and  military  stores  generally. 

On  September  1,  the  Serbs  invaded 
Syrmia,  a  province  lying  between  the 
Save  and  the  Danube.  On  the  whole, 
this  step  was  ill-advised,  and  in  any 
case  of  short  duration,  for  now  the  Aus- 
trians were  about  to  launch  another  in- 
vasion, like  the  first,  from  the  line  of 
the  Drina,  under  the  same  general. 
About  five  corps  composed  this  invad- 
ing army.  The  attack  opened  over  the 
whole  line  from  Liubovia  on  the  south 
to  Jarak  on  the  north.  North  of  Los- 
nitza  the  Austrians  fared  badly,  save 
that  they  managed  to  acquire  a  strip 
of  the  Matchva  plain.  South  of  Los- 
nitza,  however,  they  established  their 
crossing  and  drove  back  the  Serbs  to  a 
line  about  10  miles  from  the  river,  where 
they  intrenched.  Here  they  turned, 
and  drove  their  adversaries  out  of  the 
position.  But  no  decisive  result  was 
achieved  by  either  side,  for  in  this  re- 
gion both  settled  down  to  trench  work. 
A  struggle  ensued,  however,  for  the 
Guchevo  mountains,  equally  indecisive, 
for  they  were  held  by  both. 

After  six  weeks  of  position  fighting 
the  Serbs  retreated,  abandoning  the 
Matchva  and  the  Tzer.  The  Austrians 
followed  over  the  whole  frontier,  en- 
tering Valievo  on  November  11.  The 
Serbs  now  took  up  a  position  down  the 
Kolubara  River  to  the  Lyg,  up  which 
their  line  turned  to  the  southeast ;  the 
heights  south  of  this  position  were  oc- 
cupied and  protected  by  earthworks. 
On  November  11,  the  Austrians  at- 
tacked towards  Lazarevatz,  and  a  de- 


156 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


tached  force  20  miles  southwest  guard- 
ing the  valley  of  the  western  Morava. 
On  November  20,  the  first  of  these  at- 
tacks proved  successful  and  drove  in 
the  Serb  centre.  By  the  24th,  the  ac- 
tion had  extended  over  the  whole  front 
with  continued  success  falling  to  the 
Austrians,  who  later  in  the  month  got 
possession  of  the  Suvobor  mountains, 
dominating,  as  it  were,  the  Serbian  po- 
sitions. They  had  now  succeeded  in  ex- 
tending their  front  to  Belgrade,  and 
had  thus  cut  the  region  in  two,  driv- 
ing back  the  Serbs  in  the  direction  of 
Kraguyevats,  on  a  line  from  the  Bel- 
grade railway  to  the  western  Morava. 
The  situation  was  now  saved  to  the 
Serbs  by  a  resumption  of  the  offensive. 
On  December  2,  they  attacked  and,  on 
the  5th,  recaptured  the  Suvobor,  and 
drove  back  the  Austrian  right  and  cen- 
tre to  Valievo.  The  advance  was  equal- 
ly successful  in  the  other  sectors.  Its 
result  was  an  interposition  between  the 
three  Austrian  corps  on  the  south  and 
the  two  farther  north.  The  three  south- 
erly corps  retreated  as  well  as  they 
could  on  the  frontier.  The  action  now 
turned  towards  Belgrade,  towards 
which  the  Austrians  were  steadily  driv- 
en back.  The  evacuation  of  the  capital 
occurred  on  December  14  and  15.  Near- 
ly 42,000  Austrians  were  taken  prison- 
ers ;  60,000  were  killed  and  wounded. 

Bulgaria. — Serbia  was  once  more  in 
October,  1915,  called  upon  to  defend 
her  territory,  for  Bulgaria  had  finally 
decided  to  cast  in  her  lot  with  the  Cen- 
tral Powers.  Accordingly  her  armies 
crossed  the  Serbian  frontier  towards 
Nish,  striking  in  conjunction  with  the 
Austro-German  forces,  which  had  al- 
ready begun  their  invasion  from  the 
north.  Meanwhile  French  and  English 
troops,  debarked  at  Saloniki,  were  has- 
tening up  along  the  Saloniki-Nish  rail- 
road.    The  importance  of  the  new  cam- 


paign centred  in  the  strategic  value  of 
the  railroad,  as  there  was  no  other  line 
from  Austria  to  Constantinople  that 
did  not  cross  Rumanian  territory.  At 
Velika  Plana,  25  miles  from  the  Serbian 
frontier,  the  railroad  forks,  its  two 
branches  running  respectively  to  Bel- 
grade and  to  Semendria,  with  the  latter 
route  in  the  Morava  River.  It  was 
up  this  line  that  the  Austro-Germans 
advanced,  after  capturing  Belgrade. 

In  the  first  week  of  October  the  Aus- 
tro-German army,  reported  to  be  300,- 
000  strong,  crossed  the  Danube  near 
Belgrade  and  at  Semendria,  while  other 
armies  attacked  farther  west  along  the 
Drina  and  Save  rivers.  Among  the  com- 
manders of  the  invading  armies  was 
Field  Marshal  von  Mackensen,  in  com- 
mand of  the  army  east  of  Belgrade. 

Bulgaria's  first  operations  were  di- 
rected towards  Nish.  But  realizing  the 
danger  of  the  arrival  of  Allied  rein- 
forcements from  Saloniki,  the  Bulgar- 
ians then  developed  their  main  attacks 
farther  south  against  the  railroad,  at 
Vranya  and  Vilandovo.  At  the  latter 
point,  only  five  miles  from  the  south- 
western corner  of  Bulgaria,  an  army  of 
40,000  men  threatened  to  cut  the  rail- 
way. Serbo-French  troops,  however, 
hurried  up,  and  threatening  the  Bul- 
garian town  of  Strumnitza  behind  these 
troops,  compelled  them  to  fall  back. 
At  Vranya,  however,  some  60  miles 
south  of  Nish,  the  Bulgarians  were  more 
successful. 

The  advance  of  the  Austro-German 
columns  from  the  north  was  at  first 
slow,  for  by  the  end  of  October  they 
had  gained,  advancing  on  a  100-mile 
front,  only  from  25  to  40  miles  south 
of  Belgrade.  Another  column  about 
this  time  crossed  the  Drina  River  at 
Vishegrad,  and  constituted  a  new  army 
of  invasion.  In  the  south,  however,  the 
Bulgarians    having    seized    the    Nish- 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


157 


Saloniki  railroad  at  Vranya,  promptly 
confirmed  their  grip  on  the  enemy's  line 
of  supplies  by  taking  the  important 
junction  city  of  Uskub,  and  Veles,  25 
miles  farther  south.  And  in  the  mean- 
time, their  columns  directed  towards 
Nish  were  making  progress,  and  Pirot, 
on  the  Nish-Sofia  line,  was  stormed  aft- 
er a  four-day  battle. 

The  Germans  took  the  Serbian  arsen- 
al at  Kraguyevats  during  the  second 
week  in  November.  In  the  meantime, 
the  other  Austro-German  columns  had 
reached  the  east  and  west  line  of  the 
Western  Morava,  at  Krushevats  at 
Kralyevo,  before  the  middle  of  the 
month.  The  fall  of  Nish  was  not  long 
delayed,  upon  a  heavy  bombardment  by 
the  Bulgars.  A  route  to  Constantino- 
ple had  already  been  opened  via  the 
Danube,  when  Germans  and  Bulgars 
joined  hands  near  Orsova. 

Meanwhile  the  Anglo-French  forces 
from  Saloniki  held  the  railroad  from 
Krivolak  south  to  the  frontier,  and  had 
gained  some  successes  against  the  Bul- 
gars around  Strumnitza.  But  these, 
moving  wjth  ease  around  the  French 
left  to  the  Babuna  Pass,  25  miles  west 
of  Krivolak,  swept  aside  the  small  Ser- 
bian defending  force,  and  descended 
through  the  mountains  upon  Prilep  and 
Krushevo.  The  French  were  scarcely 
able  to  maintain  their  position  on  the 
Vardar  and  Cerna  rivers,  and  the  small 
British  force  was  but  little  in  evidence 
north  of  Doiran.  An  Italian  support- 
ing army  was  rumored  to  be  about  to 
land  at  Avlona. 

The  remaining  strokes  in  Serbia's  de- 
feat followed  quickly.  Sienitza,  Novi- 
bazar,  Mitrovitza  (the  last  the  tempo- 
rary Serb  capital)  fell  in  rapid  succes- 
sion before  the  Austro-German  columns. 
Teutonic  and  Bulgarian  invading  forces 
joined  hands  at  Prishtina,  on  the  rail- 
road branch  south  of  Mitrovitza,  which 


surrendered  with  10,000  men.  On  the 
last  day  of  the  month,  the  two  remain- 
ing cities  of  importance,  Prisrend  and 
Monastir,  were  lost  to  Serbia.  Sixteen 
thousand  prisoners  were  taken  at  Pris- 
rend ;  the  rest  of  the  fugitive  northern 
army  was  driven  either  into  Montenegro 
or  Albania. 

At  the  beginning  of  December  the 
main  object  of  the  German-Bulgar  cam- 
paign in  Serbia  had  been  achieved.  The 
Serbian  army  had  been  eliminated  as  a 
fighting  force  and  the  surviving  Serb 
troops,  fewer  than  100,000  men,  driven 
into  Montenegro  and  Albania,  where 
they  were  pursued  by  the  Austrians, 
against  whom  they  could  make  no  stand 
whatever. 

The  retreat  of  the  Serbs  from  Kat- 
chanik  left  the  French  left  flank,  on 
the  Cerna  River,  in  a  critical  position. 
The  retreat  of  the  Allies,  however,  was 
skillfully  conducted,  and  they  succeeded 
in  escaping  to  neutral  territory,  where 
they  fortified  themselves  at  Saloniki, 
with  the  intention  apparently  of  hold- 
ing their  position  at  all  costs.  Monte- 
negro was  conquered  by  the  Austrians 
in  January.  The  capture  of  Mount 
Lovcen,  dominating  Cettinje,  determin- 
ed the  fall  of  the  capital.  The  Aus- 
trians then  proceeded  to  take  Scutari 
in  Albania  (January  25,  1916),  and 
joined  hands  with  the  Bulgars  at  El- 
basan,  east  of  Durazzo,  on  February 
17.  The  Italians  abandoned  the  place 
February  26,  and  the  Austrians  now  ad- 
vanced against  Avlona.  The  remnant 
of  the  Serbian  army  was  transported 
by  the  Allies  from  the  Albanian  coast 
to  the  Island  of  Corfu  to  undergo  re- 
organization. After  a  few  months'  rest 
the  refitted  army  of  100,000  men  was 
taken  to  Saloniki  to  reenforce  the 
French  and  British  forces  concentrated 
there  and  await  developments  in  the 
Balkans. 


158 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Allied  Offensizre  in  Albania. — On 
July  6,  1918,  the  Allies,  chiefly  Italians 
and  French,  began  to  advance  in  Al- 
bania. The  Italians  crossed  the  Voyu- 
sa  river  and  took  1000  prisoners.  The 
French  started  down  the  valley  of  the 
Devoli  river.  By  the  10th,  the  Ital- 
ians had  reached  Fieri,  which  controlled 
the  only  good  road  to  Berat,  the  imme- 
diate objective.  They  had  also  reached 
the  Semeni  river,  and,  with  the  French, 
were  rapidly  converging  on  that  city, 
which  fell  on  the  11th.  From  here  the 
Italians  and  French  marched  on  El- 
bassan,  which,  is  on  the  road  to  Duraz- 
zo.  Before  Durazzo  could  be  reached, 
the  Skumbi  river  would  have  to  be 
forced.  This  stream  was  very  strong- 
ly fortified  and  the  retreating  Aus- 
trians,  reinforced,  were  reformed  be- 
hind this  line  and  began  a  counter-of- 
fensive. The  Allies  were  compelled  to 
beat  a  precipitate  retreat  and  by  Au- 
gust 29  were  back  of  the  Fieri-Berat 
line  which  they  held  until  the  great  Bal- 
kan offensive  began  in  September.  {See 
below.) 

The  long-awaited  Allied  drive  from 
Saloniki  began  on  July  29,  when  the 
reorganized  Serbian  army  began  to 
move  north.  Within  two  days  it  was 
entrenched  300  yards  from  the  Greek 
frontier.  With  the  entrance  of  Ru- 
mania into  the  war,  an  Allied  offensive 
from  the  Adriatic  to  the  JEgean  began 
(August-September).  The  Italians  ad- 
vanced in  Albania,  the  French  attacked 
from  the  Vardar  to  Lake  Doiran,  and 
the  British  crossed  the  Struma  River 
and  strongly  entrenched  themselves  on 
the  eastern  bank.  A  Franco-Russian 
force  advanced  along  the  western  bank 
of  Lake  Ostrovo  and  took  Fiorina  by 
assault  on  September  18.  This  opened 
up  the  road  to  Monastir,  which  was  at- 
tacked by  the  French  and  Serbians 
about  15  miles  northeast  of  Fiorina. 


In  the  meantime  the  Bulgarians  con- 
tinued their  invasion  of  northern 
Greece.  Early  in  September  a  Bulgarian 
force  crossed  the  frontier  and  took  the 
fort  of  Drama.  The  Greeks  made  only 
a  slight  resistance.  Seres  was  then  taken 
and  the  provisional  government  de- 
scribed above  (Outbreak  of  the  War: 
Greece)  was  organized.  The  port  of 
Kavala,  long  desired  by  the  Bulgarians, 
was  next  seized.  The  Germans  claimed 
that  the  garrison  asked  them  for  food, 
shelter,  and  protection.  The  Greek  sol- 
diers were  sent  to  Germany  as  guests  of 
the  nation  in  order  not  to  violate 
Greece's  neutrality.  The  fall  of  Kava- 
la completely  cut  off  the  Greek  soldiers 
in  the  far  eastern  part  of  Macedonia. 

During  the  month  of  October  the  en- 
tire Allied  line  advanced.  The  Italian 
forces  in  Albania  joined  those  of  Gen- 
eral Sarrail  and  thus  prevented  any  at- 
tempt to  envelop  his  army.  The  Ser- 
bians continued  their  advance  and 
stormed  Kotchovie  on  the  1st.  They 
then  crossed  the  Cerna  and  broke 
through  the  Monastir  defenses.  With 
the  aid  of  the  French  they  won  a  very 
important  political  success  by  captur- 
ing the  city  on  November  19.  From  a 
military  point  of  view  the  victory  was 
not  so  very  important  because  severe 
weather  prevented  a  successful  pursuit. 
The  entire  front  was  quiet  in  1917. 
The  Allies'  task  was  to  move  up  the 
Varda,  Struma,  or  Cerna  valleys.  This 
was  made  hopeless  by  the  inactivity  of 
the  Russian  armies.  Local  fighting  oc- 
curred around  Lake  Doiran.  The  sit- 
uation up  to  September,  1918,  was  ap- 
proximately as  in  January,  1917. 

The  Surrender  of  Bulgaria. — Bul- 
garia was  the  first  of  the  Central  Pow- 
ers to  surrender  to  allied  arms.  This 
act  marked  the  beginning  of  the  end 
of  the  great  war  of  the  nations.  Bul- 
garia's surrender  was  the  direct  result 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


159 


of  a  brilliant  offensive  carried  out  by 
French,  British,  Italian,  Greek,  Serbian, 
Czechoslovak,  and  Jugoslavic  forces, 
under  the  supreme  leadership  of  Gen- 
eral Franchet  d'Esperey.  The  capitu- 
lation of  Bulgaria  meant  the  isolation 
of  Turkey  and  her  eventual  loss  to  the 
Central  Powers.  It  was  also  the  death 
knell  of  the  Teutonic  Mittel  Europa 
and  Pan  German  ideas.  British  and 
Greek  troops  struck  around  Lake  Doi- 
ran,  on  the  right  of  the  Macedonian 
front ;  French  and  Serbian  troops 
struck  in  the  centre,  and  Italians  struck 
on  the  left  near  and  in  Albania.  The 
artillery  preparations  began  on  Sep- 
tember 14,  1918,  and  on  the  17th-18th 
the  Allied  right  started  to  advance,  as 
well  as  the  centre,  which  captured  45 
villages  and  crossed  the  Perez  river.  On 
the  21st,  the  Serbs  east  of  Monastir  ad- 
vanced 9  miles  and  freed  9  villages. 

By  September  22,  the  Serbians  had 
succeeded  in  cutting  the  communica- 
tions of  the  First  Bulgarian  Army, 
operating  along  the  Vardar,  and  those 
of  the  Second  Bulgarian  Army  and  the 
Germans  north  of  Monastir.  This  day 
saw  a  general  pursuit  of  the  armies  of 
the  Central  Powers  on  a  90-mile  front. 
On  the  23d,  the  Serbians  and  French 
crossed  the  Vardar  in  the  direction  of 
Krivolak.  On  the  24th,  French  cavalry 
entered  Prilep.  The  next  day  saw  the 
capture  of  Ishtib  and  the  formidable 
barriers  to  Veles.  The  British  entered 
Strumnitza  on  September  26,  and  the 
Serbians  reached  Kochana  and  Veles. 
The  Italians,  with  the  aid  of  the 
Greeks  and  French,  were  marching  on 
Kichevo.  The  road  to  Sofia  was  opened 
to  the  victorious  Allies.  Consequently, 
the  Bulgarians  sued  for  a  separate  ar- 
mistice. One  containing  terms  of  un- 
conditional surrender  was  granted  on 
the  30th,  when  active  fighting  ceased. 
The  last  act   of  the  fighting  was   the 


occupation  of  Uskub  by  the  French  on 
the  30th.  A  brief  summary  of  the  ar- 
mistice terms,  which  were  purely  mili- 
tary, are  as  follows : 

Bulgaria  was  to  evacuate  all  allied 
territory,  demobilize  her  army  as  rap- 
idly as  possible,  and  turn  over  to  the 
Allies  all  means  of  transport. 

The  Allies  were  to  be  allowed  to  pass 
through  Bulgaria  if  necessary  to  future 
military  operations. 

Control  of  the  Danube  and  Bulgarian 
merchant  marine  on  that  river  to  be 
given  up. 

All  important  strategic  points  to  be 
occupied  by  the  Allies  if  they  wish. 

If  any  part  of  Bulgaria  was  taken 
over  it  was  to  be  occupied  by  British, 
French,  and  Italian  troops.  Evacuated 
portions  of  Greece  and  Serbia  to  be 
occupied  by  Greek  and  Serbian  troops 
respectively. 

The  armistice  was  to  remain  in  op- 
eration until  a  general  peace  was  con- 
cluded. 

Interest  in  the  Balkans  after  the 
signing  of  the  armistice  centred  in  the 
driving  out  of  the  Teutonic  troops  from 
Albania,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro.  On 
October  1,  the  Bulgarians  began  to 
evacuate  Serbian  territory  and  two  days 
later  the  Austrians  began  the  evacua- 
tion of  Albania.  Greek  troops  entered 
Seres  and  seized  the  Demis-Hassan 
Pass  on  the  4th,  and  on  the  8th  they 
occupied  Drama.  Italians  entered  El- 
basan,  Albania,  on  the  9th  and  the  Al- 
lies took  Nish  on  the  13th,  thus  cutting 
the  Berlin-Constantinople  railroad.  The 
15th  saw  the  fall  of  Durazzo.  (The 
naval  base  had  been  destroyed  on  the 
2d  by  an  Allied  navy,  which  included 
American  submarines.)  On  the  17th, 
the  Serbians  captured  Alexinatz  and 
Krushavatz,  and  the  German  forces  in 
western  Serbia  retired  into  Montenegro. 
On   the   21st,  the  French   reached   the 


160 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Danube  near  Vidon.  Nine  days  later 
the  Austrians  fled  from  Montenegro  and 
Cettinje  and  other  places  were  occu- 
pied by  insurgents.  On  the  same  day 
Scutari  was  seized  by  Albanian  and 
Montenegrin  irregulars.  On  November 
3,  Belgrade  was  reoccupied  and  the 
Second  Serbian  army  reached  the  Bos- 
nian border,  which  they  passed,  and, 
after    crossing   the    Danube    and    Save 


This  new  force  added  about  600,000 
men  under  arms  to  the  Allied  cause  and 
could  increase  this  amount  to  900,000 
including  the  reserves.  From  the  out- 
set it  was  apparent  that  the  Rumanian 
plan  of  attack  was  to  invade  Transyl- 
vania and  thus  attain  the  Rumanian 
ideal,  i.e.,  to  capture  and  hold  the  prov- 
inces of  Austria-Hungary  that  were  in- 
habited by  Rumanians.    As  later  events 


SCALE  Of   MILES 


Mesopotamia  and  Palestine  Areas 


rivers,  entered  Serajevo,  the  scene  of 
murder  of  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdi- 
nand and  his  wife,  on  June  28,  1914, 
on  the  10th. 

The  Macedonian  front,  which  had 
been  comparatively  inactive  since  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  had  suddenly  be- 
come alive  in  September,  1918,  and  the 
operations  there  resulted  in  the  cap- 
ture of  nearly  100,000  prisoners  and 
the  complete  elimination  of  Bulgaria 
from  the  war. 

Rumania. — As  has  been  stated  above 
the  question  of  Rumania's  entrance  into 
the  war  was  settled  on  April  28,  1916. 


turned  out,  the  geographical  features  of 
Rumania  were  to  play  an  important 
part  in  her  campaigns.  In  general  the 
shape  of  the  country  is  like  a  large  Y. 
The  bottom  of  the  Y  is  bounded  by  the 
Black  Sea  and  the  two  arms  are  bound- 
ed across  their  mouth  by  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  province  of  Transylvania. 
Russia  is  on  the  north  and  Bulgaria  on 
the  south.  The  Alps  (in  Transylvania) 
and  the  Carpathians  form  formidable 
natural  barriers.  The  Danube  forms 
another  natural  boundary  on  the  south 
for  a  part  of  the  distance,  but  the  ac- 
quisition of  Bulgarian  territory  at  the 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


161 


close  of  the  Balkan  Wars  added  a  strip 
of  territory  bordering  on  the  Black  Sea 
which  was  peculiarly  vulnerable.  It 
later  proved  that  this  was  going  to  be 
the  point  of  Bulgarian  attack  and  the 
starting  place  of  the  great  German 
drive  which  ultimately  resulted  in  the 
complete  overrunning  of  the  country. 

Immediately  after  the  declaration  of 
war  the  Rumanian  forces  swept  into 
Transylvania  with  all  the  vigor  a  new 
army  on  its  first  campaign  possesses. 
The  first  objectives  were  the  two  Tran- 
sylvanian  cities  of  Kronstadt  and  Her- 
mannstadt  just  across  the  border.  By 
the  end  of  August  both  of  these  places 
had  been  captured  with  very  little  op- 
position. The  Rumanians  continued 
their  impetuous  advance  apparently  not 
taking  into  consideration  the  distance 
they  were  traveling  from  their  base  and 
also  not  considering  their  weak  defen- 
sive line  on  the  south.  After  the  fall  of 
Kronstadt  they  immediately  struck  west 
towards  the  coal  fields.  Another  army, 
however,  had  crossed  the  Vulcan  Pass 
and  had  captured  Petroseny  in  the  cen- 
tre of  these  fields  on  August  31.  A 
third  army  captured  Orsova  on  Septem- 
ber 1,  after  five  days  of  the  heaviest 
fighting  the  campaign  had  yet  seen.  On 
September  9  the  Rumanians  captured 
six  more  small  villages  and  now  held  in 
their  possession  nearly  one-fourth  of 
Transylvania. 

The  campaign  now  assumed  such 
serious  proportions  that  Von  Hinden- 
burg  was  sent  down  with  450,000  men 
to  check  it.  The  Rumanians  were  not 
able  to  make  any  headway  against  the 
new  enemy.  They  were  forced  to  give 
up  the  Szurduk  Pass  and  after  the  cap- 
ture of  Petroseny  were  forced  to  give 
up  the  Vulcan  Pass  also.  The  check, 
however,  was  only  temporary,  inasmuch 
as  in  the  middle  of  September  another 
offensive   on   a  large   scale  was   begun 


west  of  Hermannstadt.  It  succeeded  in 
driving  the  Teutons  out  of  both  the 
Szurduk  and  Vulcan  passes.  It  then 
pushed  on  into  the  Jiu  valley. 

This  marked  the  high  tide  of  the  sec- 
ond Rumanian  invasion,  since  the  Ru- 
manians suffered  a  severe  setback  at 
Hermannstadt.  The  victory  won  here 
by  the  Austrians  and  their  German  al- 
lies was  one  of  the  greatest  of  the  war. 
The  battle  raged  four  days  and  resulted 
in  the  complete  annihilation  of  the  first 
Rumanian  army.  The  German  army 
was  divided  into  two  parts.  The  first 
attacked  the  Rumanian  front  at  Her- 
mannstadt while  the  second  by  a  rapid 
enveloping  movement  came  up  in  the 
Rumanian  rear  and  cut  off  their  only 
line  of  retreat,  through  the  Red  Tower 
Pass.  The  fleeing  Rumanians  were 
swallowed  up  when  they  came  to  this 
pass  by  a  large  force  of  Bavarians.  Von 
Falkenhayn  now  stood  at  the  entrance 
to  Rumania  without  being  opposed  by 
any  real  army.  The  second  Rumanian 
army  tried  to  save  the  precarious  situa- 
tion but  came  on  the  scene  too  late  and 
was  checked  everywhere  on  a  50-mile 
offensive.  The  remains  of  the  first  army 
fled  in  great  disorder  through  the  Car- 
pathians to  the  east  and  west  of  the 
Red  Tower  Pass. 

Rumania  was  now  threatened  from 
another  quarter,  on  the  south.  The 
forces  in  this  sector  were  entirely  insuf- 
ficient to  withstand  the  attacks  of  the 
allied  Bulgar  and  German  army.  The 
expected  Russian  reinforcements  failed 
to  arrive  on  scheduled  time  and  another 
great  drive  similar  to  that  in  Serbia  was 
begun.  It  entered  the  Rumanian  terri- 
tory in  two  columns.  The  first  under 
Von  Mackensen  entered  the  Dobrudja 
and  captured  Tutrakan  on  September 
3.  The  garrison  of  20,000  men  was 
forced  to  surrender.  On  September  10 
Mackensen  took  a  second  large  fortress, 


162 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Silistria,  which  lies  on  the  south  bank 
of  the  Danube.  The  garrison  of  this 
fortress  had  been  defeated  by  the  Bul- 
garians in  an  attempt  to  relieve  the 
fortress  of  Tutrakan. 

The  second  invading  column  at- 
tacked along  the  coast  of  the  Black  Sea. 
It  captured  Dobric  and  the  seaports  of 
Kali  Akra,  Baltjic  and  Kavarna.  The 
arrival  of  a  Russian  force,  however, 
compelled  the  invaders  to  give  up  all 
of  these  places  with  the  exception  of 
Baltjic.  The  battle  on  this  front  now 
settled  down  into  trench  warfare  with 
the  Rumanians  holding  a  strong  posi- 
tion extending  from  the  Danube  to  the 
Black  Sea. 

Rumania  was  now  like  a  nut  in  the 
jaws  of  a  nutcracker.  Van  Falkenhayn 
was  pushing  on  from  the  north  and  Von 
Mackensen  from  the  south.  It  was 
almost  inevitable  that  she  was  to  be 
crushed  even  as  Serbia  had  been.  Rus- 
sian reinforcements  had  been  sent  to 
strengthen  the  Rumanian  line  but  they 
only  succeeded  temporarily.  The 
Grand  Duke  Nicholas  was  placed  in 
charge  of  these  forces  and  he  was  also 
military  adviser  to  the  Rumanians.  In 
the  middle  of  October,  1916,  King  Fer- 
dinand of  Rumania  took  personal  com- 
mand of  the  Russo-Rumanian  army. 

In  the  north  the  Germans  pushed 
their  way  through  the  Vulcan  Pass,  hav- 
ing taken  it  by  storm.  Gradually  Von 
Falkenhayn  succeeded  in  pushing  the 
Rumanians  completely  off  the  Transyl- 
vanian  Alps.  They  also  advanced  fur- 
ther south  of  Kronstadt  towards  Kim- 
polung  and  the  Sinaia,  the  Rumanian 
summer  capital.  They  now  had  a  grip 
on  the  railroad  which  ran  to  Craiova 
and  then  to  Bucharest.  By  the  last 
week  in  October  Von  Falkenhayn  had 
reached  Azuga,  which  was  only  7  miles 
from  Sinaia  and  almost  on  the  border 
of  the   Rumanian   oil   fields.      He   also 


threatened  to  envelop  the  Rumanian 
army  which  still  held  Orsova.  The  Rus- 
sians and  Rumanians  now  made  a 
strenuous  effort  to  stop  Von  Falken- 
hayn's  advance.  They  started  an  of- 
fensive on  the  Moldavian  frontier, 
which  while  it  lacked  power  at  least 
held  open  the  rail  communication  with 
Russia.  In  the  region  around  Kimpo- 
lung  and  south  of  the  Vulcan  Pass  the 
Rumanians  not  only  checked  the  Ger- 
mans but  succeeded  in  pushing  them 
back.  By  the  end  of  October  they  had 
forced  them  back  to  the  frontier  in  the 
neighborhood  of  the  Szurduk  Pass. 

The  trench  warfare  which  existed  in 
the  southern  sector  was  broken  by  Von 
Mackensen  in  the  third  week  of  Octo- 
ber. On  the  23d  of  this  month  he  took 
Constanza  and  two  days  later  the  very 
important  city  of  Cernavoda.  This  was 
the  Danube  bridgehead  which  controlled 
the  railway  to  Bucharest.  Constanza 
was  the  port  of  entry  for  Russian 
troops  and  supplies,  sent  to  assist  Ru- 
mania. Besides  this  Constanza  was  the 
largest  seaport  Rumania  had  and  was 
the  base  of  its  Black  Sea  fleet.  At 
Cernavoda  the  railway  from  Constanza 
to  Bucharest  crosses  the  Danube.  This 
bridge  is  of  immense  size,  being  11 
miles  long.  The  other  side  of  it  from 
Cernavoda  crosses  great  swamp  lands. 
The  Germans  did  not  immediatel}'  at- 
tempt to  cross  this  bridge  and  pursue 
the  Rumanians  towards  Bucharest.  In- 
stead they  followed  up  the  coast  line  of 
the  Black  Sea.  On  October  27  Mack- 
ensen seized  the  city  of  Hirsova.  He 
had  an  opportunity  to  cross  the  Danube 
here  by  pontoon  bridges,  since  the 
ground  was  not  so  marshy  as  it  was 
in  the  vicinity  of  Cernavoda.  By  this 
time  the  flight  of  the  Slavic  allies  was 
precipitous  and  they  did  not  attempt 
to  hold  any  defensive  positions.  By  the 
end  of  October  Mackensen  had  estab- 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


163 


lished  his  line  well  north  of  the  Con- 
stanza-Cernavoda  railway.  An  at- 
tempted Rumanian  offensive  through 
Bulgaria  in  order  to  attack  Macken- 
sen's  rear  failed  and  the  Rumanians 
were  forced  to  retire  to  their  own  terri- 
tory. 

In  the  early  part  of  the  month  of 
November  the  Russians  and  Rumanians 
made  strenuous  and  for  a  time  suc- 
cessful efforts  to  stem  the  tide  of  Ger- 
man invasion.  Their  main  aim  was  to 
save  the  Cernavoda  bridge.  When  they 
retreated  across  this  bridge  they  had 
destroyed  only  a  few  spans  of  it  and  evi- 
dently they  were  easily  replaced  by  the 
Germans.  In  the  north  the  Slavs  were 
also  temporarily  successful,  but  were 
unable  to  withstand  the  Teuton  push. 

Von  Falkenhayn's  troops  were  push- 
ing south  through  the  Predeal,  Vulcan, 
and  Rothenthurm  passes  and  were  ad- 
vancing down  the  Alt  and  Jiu  valleys. 
They  captured  Tirgujiul  and  Liresht 
and  then  swept  across  the  plains  of 
Wallachia.  A  simultaneous  movement 
was  started  in  the  extreme  western  part 
of  Rumania  near  the  Iron  Gate.  The 
object  of  these  two  drives  was  to  cap- 
ture Craiova,  the  capital  city  of  west- 
ern Wallachia.  After  administering  a 
severe  defeat  to  the  Rumanian  army, 
Von  Falkenhayn  took  this  place  on  No- 
vember 20.  He  immediately  fortified  it 
strongly  in  order  to  have  a  base  of  at- 
tack on  Bucharest.  The  Rumanians 
made  preparations  to  hold  the  Alt  val- 
ley as  a  defensive  line.  Mackensen's  ac- 
tivities in  the  south,  however,  prevented 
this. 

He  forced  the  crossing  of  the  Danube 
at  Zimnica,  a  spot  where  the  river  is 
both  wide  and  deep.  This  threatened  to 
cut  the  Rumanian  line  of  communica- 
tions and  as  a  result  the  Alt  river  line 
was  abandoned.  The  Vedea  river  was 
next  chosen  as  a  defensive  line,  but  this 


also  had  to  be  abandoned  because  the 
Germans  crossed  the  Danube  at  another 
point  and  cut  the  railroad  which  sup- 
plied the  Vedea  line.  The  Rumanians 
again  started  their  retreat  towards  Bu- 
charest. At  each  of  the  small  streams 
the  Germans  had  to  cross,  however, 
their  defense  stiffened,  but  never  suffi- 
ciently to  stop  the  invading  forces.  By 
the  end  of  November  the  Germans  had 
reached  the  Arges  river,  the  last  river 
of  any  size  between  them  and  Bucharest. 
The  fall  of  the  capital  was  now  almost 
a  certainty  and  the  Rumanian  govern- 
ment was  moved  to  Jassy  on  the  29th. 

The  attack  on  the  capital  city  was 
made  from  the  north  and  south.  The 
real  danger  to  the  city  was  from  the 
north.  The  Rumanians  made  their  last 
stand  on  the  Averescu.  The  Germans, 
however,  swept  down  from  south  of 
Kronstadt  and  crossed  this  stream 
themselves  and  after  several  victories 
captured  Bucharest  on  December  7. 
On  the  same  day  Ploesci,  in  the  centre 
of  the  oil  district,  fell.  The  Germans 
then  drove  the  fleeing  Rumanians  across 
the  Jalonitz  river  and  captured  Mizil 
on  the  12th  and  Buzeu  on  the  15th.  The 
Slavic  allies  retired  to  the  Rimnik- 
Sarat  river,  which  they  managed  to 
hold  for  five  days.  This  enabled  them 
to  remove  their  supplies  to  Braila.  The 
Germans  forced  the  passage  of  the  river 
on  the  27th  and  pushed  the  enemy  into 
Braila. 

The  Russo-Rumanians  made  a  strong 
stand  at  the  Matchin  bridgehead,  on  the 
Danube.  This  really  controlled  the  way 
to  Braila.  Nevertheless,  in  the  face  of 
a  heavy  artillery  bombardment  they 
were  forced  to  retire  from  the  bridge- 
head on  January  S,  1917.  This  cleared 
the  Dobrudja  of  Russians  and  Ruman- 
ians with  the  exception  of  a  small  neck 
of  land  which  extended  towards  Galatz. 
On  January  5,  Braila,  Rumania's  chief 


164 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


commercial  city,  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  Germans.  The  Slavic  allies  were 
now  completely  driven  out  of  the  Dob- 
rudja.  The  Russians  were  forced  to 
cross  to  the  north  bank  of  the  Sereth. 
Fokshani  fell  on  the  8th.  A  new  line, 
formed  on  the  Putna,  had  to  be  aban- 
doned on  the  10th.  Vadeni,  6  miles 
from  Galatz,  was  captured  on  the  14th, 
but  was  recaptured  on  the  17th.  Bitter 
fighting  ensued  until  August,  1917, 
when  the  German  drive  was  stopped. 
The  line  ran  south  of  Galatz,  then 
northwest  along  the  Hungarian  border 
to  the  Pruth,  east  of  Czernowitz.  The 
Teutons  held  all  Rumania  excepting 
part  of  Moldavia.  Exposures  made  by 
the  Russian  revolutionists  showed  that 
Rumania  was  betrayed  by  Sturmer,  the 
Russian  Premier.  The  promised  Rus- 
sian protection  on  its  flank  had  been 
withheld.  The  Rumanians  entered  an 
armistice  with  the  Teutons  in  Decem- 
ber, 1917.     See  Eastern  Theatre. 

Treaty  of  Bucharest. — The  complete 
collapse  of  Russia  and  the  inactivity 
of  the  allied  army  at  Saloniki  left  Ru- 
mania isolated.  The  Rumanian  gov- 
ernment was  loath  to  enter  into  any 
peace  negotiations,  but  two  ultimatums 
were  received  from  General  Mackensen, 
the  German  Field  Marshal,  which  stated 
that  unless  Rumania  entered  into  peace 
negotiations,  she  would  be  overrun  by 
the  German  army  and  completely  de- 
stroyed as  a  state.  Accepting  the  in- 
evitable, Rumania  entered  into  negotia- 
tions and  was  compelled  to  accept  a 
humiliating  peace.  Some  of  the  more 
important  terms  were  as  follows :  The 
Dobrudja  as  far  as  the  Danube  was  to 
be  ceded  to  the  Central  Powers ;  recti- 
fications of  the  boundary  line  between 
Rumania  and  Austria-Hungary  were  to 
be  permitted  and  recognized  by  Ru- 
mania ;  the  port  of  Constanza  to  be 
used  by  the  Central  Powers  as  a  base 


for  Black  Sea  trade;  the  Rumanian 
army  to  be  demobilized  under  the 
supervision  of  Field  Marshal  von  Mack- 
ensen ;  Rumanian  troops  to  evacuate  all 
Austro-Hungarian  territory  occupied 
by  them ;  Teutonic  troops  to  be  permit- 
ted to  cross  Rumania  in  order  to  get 
to  Odessa ;  Allied  officers  in  Rumanian 
service  to  be  dismissed  at  once;  eco- 
nomic advantages,  such  as  the  control 
of  railways,  wheat  crops,  and  petro- 
leum wells,  to  be  granted  to  the  Central 
Powers  for  an  indefinite  period  of  time. 

V.  Southeastern  Theatre.  The  stra- 
tegic importance  of  Turkey  from  the 
Germanic  point  of  view  lay  in  keeping 
supplies  from  Russia  through  control 
of  the  Dardanelles.  Turkish  military 
activity  manifested  itself  on  five  dis- 
tinct stages.  1.  Caucasus,  (a)  Turk- 
ish thrust  against  Russia  (1914-15); 
(6)  Russian  campaign  (1916)  forcing 
Turkish  armies  behind  Trebizond,  Er- 
zerum,  and  Bitlis  line  to  the  west,  and 
threatening  Bagdad  to  the  south.  2. 
Gallipoli  campaign  by  Franco-British 
forces.  3.  Turkish  attack  on  Suez 
Canal.  4.  British  advance  on  Mesopo- 
tamia.   5.   Collapse  of  Turkey. 

Turkey,  Caucasus,  Egypt.  —  War 
was  declared  between  Russia  and  Tur- 
key on  October  30,  1914,  and  between 
England  (and  France)  and  Turkey  on 
November  5,  1914.  But  at  the  end  of 
July,  1914,  Turkey  had  already  begun 
to  mobilize;  by  the  end  of  October  it 
was  estimated  that  she  had  some  500,- 
000  men  in  her  army  with  250,000  more 
at  the  depots. 

These  troops  were  concentrated  in 
three  principal  groups ;  near  Constan- 
tinople and  in  Asia  Minor,  in  the  Cau- 
casus, and  in  Syria.  The  Turks  under 
Enver  Pasha,  at  once  opened  a  winter 
campaign  in  the  Caucasus.  Here,  in- 
deed, they  had  been  anticipated  by  the 
Russians,   who,    crossing   the    frontier, 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


165 


captured,  on  November  13,  a  position 
near  Koprukeui  and  Erzerum.  From 
this  they  were  compelled  to  withdraw, 
but  returning  to  the  attack  recaptured 
the  place  November  20.  What  had  been 
intended  as  a  mere  demonstration  by 
the  Russians  was  converted  into  a  seri- 
ous matter  by  the  initiative  and  energy 
of  the  Turks.  The  Russians  would  nat- 
urally advance  by  the  Kars-Erzerum 
road.  Hence  the  Turks  purposed  to 
hold  the  Russians  on  this  road,  while 
making  an  enveloping  movement  on  the 
left  against  Kars  and  the  Russian  right. 
This  plan  came  near  succeeding.  The 
Russians  were  pushed  back  from  Kop- 
rukeui to  Khorosan  and  were  driven  out 
of  Ardahan  on  January  1.  Two  Turk- 
ish corps  reached  Sarikamish,  the  Rus- 
sian railhead  south  of  Kars,  on  Decem- 
ber 25.  But  the  weather  and  the 
season,  together  with  the  natural  diffi- 
culties of  the  country,  brought  the  plan 
to  naught.  One  of  the  two  Turkish 
corps  was  driven  back  from  Sarikamish 
(January  1)  and  the  other  dislodged 
on  the  3d.  Ardahan  was  recaptured. 
The  remaining  body  at  Khorosan  sur- 
rendered. Two  Russian  columns  that 
had  crossed  the  Turco-Persian  frontier 
reentered  Tabriz,  which  had  been  occu- 
pied by  the  Turks  early  in  January,  on 
January  30.  Relieved  from  command 
in  Europe  and  sent  to  the  Caucasus,  the 
Grand  Duke  Nicholas  inaugurated  a 
midwinter  campaign,  1915-16,  with  an 
army  estimated  at  300,000  men.  On 
February  16  he  took  Erzerum  with  13,- 
000  prisoners.  The  part  of  the  garri- 
son that  escaped  fled  to  Trebizond,  to 
the  Van  region  and  elsewhere,  with  the 
Russians  in  pursuit.  One  column  cap- 
tured Bitlis  on  March  3,  and  advanced 
south  in  the  direction  of  Sert.  An- 
other column  marched  on  Erzingan.  In 
the  direction  of  Trebizond  the  Turks 
were  defeated  at  Kara  Dere,  and  Trebi- 


zond itself  was  taken  April  20-21.  A 
Turkish  attempt  to  turn  the  Russian 
left  in  the  neighborhood  of  Trebizond 
was  checked,  and  the  Russians  contin- 
ued their  march  westward.  Baron  von 
der  Goltz  was  in  command  of  the  Turk- 
ish troops.  Two  flying  detachments  in 
Persia  carried  on  operations,  one  in  the 
Urumiah  district,  the  other  from  Ker- 
man-Shah,  taken  by  the  Russians, 
towards  Bagdad. 

Simultaneously  with  the  original 
Caucasian  campaign  mentioned  above 
an  expedition  under  Djemal  Pasha  was 
undertaken  against  the  Suez  Canal.  The 
importance  of  this  waterway  to  the 
Allies  is  self-evident.  In  anticipation 
of  an  attack  upon  it,  troops  had  been 
collected  in  Egypt,  consisting  chiefly  of 
East  Indians  and  Colonials,  with  a  few 
Imperial  service  units.  In  the  canal 
itself  several  French  and  English  war- 
ships took  position  to  assist  in  the  de- 
fense. Moreover,  during  the  autumn 
and  winter  the  position  had  been  thor- 
oughly strengthened  by  modern  field 
fortifications ;  the  defenses  consisted  of 
bridgeheads  on  the  east  covered  by  in- 
trenched positions  on  the  western  bank 
at  El  Kantara,  El  Ferdan  and  Ismailia, 
Tussum  and  Serapeum,  Shaluf  and 
Kubri. 

Dejemal  Pasha  formed  his  forces  of 
30,000  men  into  three  columns.  The 
northerly  one,  of  about  6000  men  of  all 
arms,  followed  the  caravan  road  from 
Rafa  to  El  Kantara ;  the  southerly,  of 
3000,  the  pilgrim  road  from  Nakhl  to 
Suez;  the  middle  column,  that  from 
Kossaima  to  Ismailia.  This  last  road 
happened  to  be  practicable  at  this  time 
because  a  rainfall  had  filled  a  pool  on 
the  line.  Pontoon  boats  accompanied 
the  expedition,  whose  march  was  well 
organized  and  well  carried  out.  On 
January  26  the  advance  guards  of  the 
south  and  middle  columns  were  reported 


166 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


near  the  canal.  The  Turks  were  com- 
pletely beaten  (February  2-3).  The 
main  attack  (Tussum-Serapeum)  was 
made  by  the  middle  column ;  that  of  the 
southerly  (Suez)  was  a  fiasco;  the 
northern  made  a  better  though  vain  ef- 


over  6  miles  to  a  position  east  of  Birs- 
el-Manca.  Many  guns  and  2500  pris- 
oners fell  to  the  victors.  In  December 
the  British  captured  El  Arish  and  the 
strongly  fortified  position  of  Maghda- 
bah.     These  victories  effectively  stop- 


Gallipoli  Peninsula,   Scene   of  Disastrous  Campaign  for  the 
Control  of  the   Dardanelles 

fort   (Kantara);  on  the  night  of  Feb-     ped  further  threats  of  raids  on  the  ca- 
ruary  6-7  a  general  retirement  began. 

The  next  serious  threat  on  the  canal 
was  made  in  August,  when  the  Turks 
attacked  the  British  positions  at  Ro- 
mani.  The  British  gave  way  before  a 
strong  frontal  and  flank  attack.  Think- 


nal.  On  January  11,  1917,  the  British 
took  six  lines  of  trenches  and  1600 
prisoners  at  Rafa,  on  the  Sinai  penin- 
sula.    (See  below.) 

Dardanelles. — The      Turkish      arms 
thus  came  to  grief  in  both  the  Caucasus 


ing   they    were    retreating,    the    Turks  and  in  Egypt.     Better  fortune  waited 

sprang  forward  in  pursuit  order,  and  upon   them   in   the   Dardanelles.      The 

soon  were  lost  in  the  dunes.     Then  the  temptation  to  strike  a  blow  at  the  vi- 

entire  British  front  attacked  and  com-  tals  of  Turkey  by  taking  possession  of 

pletely  routed  the  Turks,  driving  them  the  Dardanelles,  and  hence  of  Constan- 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


167 


tinople,  was  irresistible.  Success  here 
would  have  met  with  a  rich  reward. 
A  way  would  have  been  opened  to 
supply  Russia  with  the  war  munitions 
she  so  sorely  needed ;  the  Balkan  ques- 
tion would  have  been  settled  out 
of  hand,  and  in  a  manner  favorable 
to  the  Allies.  But  the  entire  campaign 
was  mismanaged  from  the  outset ;  the 
nature  of  the  effort  to  be  made  was  cer- 
tainly not  correctly  estimated;  efforts 
were  scattered,  time  was  lost. 

For  the  naval  campaign,  reference 
should  be  made  to  the  naval  subdivision 
of  this  article.  It  opened  on  Novem- 
ber 3,  1914,  and  it  was  not  until  the 
following  March  that  joint  land  and 
naval  operations  were  decided  upon. 
By  that  time  the  Turks  had  received 
ample  warning,  and  here,  as  elsewhere, 
under  German  leadership,  had  made 
what  turned  out  to  be  more  than  ample 
preparation. 

In  the  Gallipoli  peninsula  nature 
was  on  the  side  of  the  defense.  Fur- 
thermore the  Turks  enjoyed  an  ad- 
vantage in  their  supply  of  men,  for  the 
bulk  of  their  forces  were  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Constantinople  and  could 
therefore  be  drawn  on  as  needed.  Gen. 
Sir  Ian  Hamilton  was  selected  to  direct 
land  operations  for  the  Allies.  These 
were  to  be  carried  on  by  a  French  force 
under  General  d'Amade,  drawn  from 
north  Africa,  and  by  Colonials,  Terri- 
torials, and  some  Indians  from  Egypt 
and  Imperial  troops. 

On  arriving  at  Tenedos  (March  17), 
selected  as  his  headquarters,  Sir  Ian 
made  up  his  mind  that  the  transports 
had  been  so  badly  loaded  that  he  would 
not  undertake  any  operations  until  the 
loading  had  been  corrected.  The  trans- 
ports were  accordingly  sent  back  to 
Egypt  to  be  reloaded.  Upon  their  re- 
turn, five  weeks  had  been  lost  to  the 
Allies  and  gained  to  the  Turks. 


The  British  began  their  landing  on 
April  25.  How  strong  the  force  of  the 
Turks  was  is  not  accurately  known;  it 
must  have  been  well  over  100,000.  The 
German  General  Liman  von  Sanders 
had  been  appointed  commander-in-chief 
of  the  Turkish  forces  at  the  Darda- 
nelles. The  chief  landings  were  made  at 
the  tip  of  the  peninsula.  Once  ashore, 
the  advance  was  to  be  made  against  the 
village  of  Krithia,  and  the  height  of 
Achi  Baba  was  then  to  be  carried.  At 
each  of  the  beaches  selected,  the  Turks 
were  ready  and  received  the  landing 
party  with  tremendous  fire.  The  Aus- 
tralian and  New  Zealand  corps 
("Anzac")  near  Gaba  Tepe  especially 
distinguished  themselves  by  rushing  the 
opposing  Turks  with  the  bayonet,  clear- 
ing the  slopes  and  securing  a  foothold 
on  the  top.  The  French  landed  a  regi- 
ment on  the  Asiatic  side,  near  Kum 
Kale,  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  an 
attack  by  gunfire  against  the  trans- 
ports at  the  nose  of  the  peninsula.  In 
this  they  were  more  or  less  successful, 
but  at  considerable  loss  to  themselves. 
The  result  of  the  work  of  the  24  hours 
was  that  the  Anzacs,  isolated,  were 
holding  a  semicircular  line  against  an 
enemy  ever  increasing  in  numbers,  other 
landings  were  abandoned,  some  forces 
were  holding  their  own  but  isolated, 
while  other  landing  parties  had  man- 
aged to  join  hands.  The  next  three  or 
four  days  were  marked  by  severe  fight- 
ing and  an  advance  of  the  British  from 
the  southern  beaches.  By  the  after- 
noon of  April  28  some  of  the  troops 
had  pushed  up  to  within  1300  yards 
of  Krithia,  but  could  get  no  farther. 
The  lines  then  dug  in.  On  May  1,  the 
Turks  attacked  at  night,  and  there  was 
a  counterattack  the  next  day.  This  is 
the  first  so-called  battle  of  Krithia.  The 
second  occurred  on  May  6,  and  was  an 
attempt  to  win  the  Krithia  ridge ;  this 


168 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


attempt  failed,  but  the  British  ad- 
vanced their  lines  500  yards.  The  third 
came  off  on  June  4,  with  the  same  ob- 
jective and  the  same  result.  The 
fourth  was  fought  on  July  12,  and  re- 
sulted in  an  advance  of  300  yards  more 
or  less.  Achi  Baba  still  remained  in 
Turkish  hands.  Meanwhile,  the  Turks 
were  attacking  the  Anzacs  (May  5-10) 
and  were  repulsed.  They  renewed  their 
efforts  in  great  force  May  18,  and  were 
again  beaten  off  with  great  loss.  There 
were  other  engagements,  as  that  of  the 
French  (June  21)  who  captured  a  work 
known  as  the  Haricot  Redoubt,  and  the 
English  action  of  June  28,  known  as  the 
battle  of  the  Gully  Ravine.  And  so  it 
went  until  fresh  British  forces  were 
landed  at  Suvla  Bay  on  August  7,  and 
the  Anzacs  advanced  upon  the  ridges 
of  Sari  Bair. 

But  before  the  landing  at  Suvla  Bay, 
the  Allies  on  July  12  made  a  fresh  at- 
tack in  front  of  Krithia.  It  resulted  in 
the  capture  of  trenches  and  was  fol- 
lowed on  the  next  day  by  another  gen- 
eral attack,  resulting  in  a  similar  cap- 
ture. But  no  really  significant  success 
was  obtained. 

The  Suvla  Bay  landing  and  simul- 
taneous operations  at  the  tip  of  the 
peninsula  and  by  the  Anzacs  consti- 
tute the  last  great  attempt  to  drive  the 
Turks  off  the  peninsula.  Sir  Ian  Ham- 
ilton in  May  had  asked  for  two  addi- 
tional corps.  By  the  end  of  July  he 
got  them.  His  plan  was  now  to  re- 
enforce  the  Anzacs  and  direct  them  to 
make  a  drive  to  capture  Sari  Bair.  A 
landing  at  Suvla  Bay  would  surprise 
the  Turks,  and  might  enable  the  Anzacs 
after  taking  Sari  Bair  to  push  on  to 
Maidos.  The  Turks  at  Krithia  and  on 
Achi  Baba  would  thus  be  cut  off.  A 
containing  attack  was  to  be  made  at 
the  tip  of  the  peninsula.  This  attack 
was  delivered  on  August  5  and  failed. 


It  was  renewed  on  the  7th  and  resulted 
in  minor  local  successes ;  its  main  pur- 
pose of  keeping  the  Turks  busy  on  the 
spot,  and  then  preventing  them  from 
lending  a  hand  elsewhere,  may  be  said 
to  have  been  realized.  The  Anzacs,  re- 
enforced,  attacked  on  the  6th,  and  very 
nearly  succeeded  in  their  purpose ;  but 
on  the  9th  an  assaulting  column  lost  its 
way,  and  so  arrived  too  late  to  clinch 
the  positive  gains  already  made  on  the 
spur  to  the  southwest  of  the  main  ele- 
vation (Hill  305)  of  the  Turkish  posi- 
tion. During  the  attack  on  Sari  Bair 
the  landing  at  Suvla  Bay  was  begun 
August  6  by  night  under  the  direction 
of  Lieut.  General  Sir  F.  Stopford.  It 
resulted  in  failure,  for  although  the 
troops  got  ashore,  yet  once  there  they 
accomplished  nothing.  Apparently 
there  was  no  well-thought-out  plan  of 
operations,  or,  if  there  was,  it  was  not 
carried  out.  Some  of  the  troop  units 
were  landed  at  places  other  than  those 
designated,  others  were  late  in  moving 
out.  Some  local  successes  were  obtain- 
ed, however,  and  on  the  evening  of  Au- 
gust 7  the  British  extended  in  a  semi- 
circle around  the  bay.  On  the  8th  the 
British  stood  fast  and  made  no  attempt 
to  advance,  and  so  lost  their  opportun- 
ity not  merely  to  accomplish  something 
on  their  own  account,  but  to  help  their 
comrades  farther  south  engaged  in  the 
desperate  struggle  of  Sari  Bair.  The 
enemy  were  fewer  in  numbers  than  the 
British  and  were  not  in  heart.  The  re- 
sponsibility for  the  inaction  of  the  8th 
must  rest  with  General  Stopford,  but 
Sir  Ian  Hamilton  must  come  in  for 
some  part  of  the  blame.  There  was 
more  or  less  fighting  during  the  next 
week;  on  the  15th  General  Stopford 
turned  over  the  command  of  his  troops 
to  General  de  Lisle.  Open  fighting  gave 
way  to  trench  work.  There  was  one 
more  battle  on  August  21,  when  an  at- 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


169 


tempt  was  made  to  take  Hill  100,  about 
two  miles  east  of  Suvla  Bay.  Sir  Ian 
Hamilton  was  recalled  in  October,  and 
the  whole  peninsula  evacuated  in  De- 
cember and  January. 

Mesopotamia.  —  The  long-standing 
conflict  between  British  and  German  in- 
terests in  the  Persian  Gulf  cannot  be 
said  to  have  had  any  immediate  military 
bearing  on  the  decision  of  the  British 
government  to  open  a  campaign  in  the 
Mesopotamia.  British  interests,  how- 
ever, called  for  protection,  and  in  par- 
ticular the  plant  of  the  Anglo-Persian 
Oil  Company  on  Abadan  Island,  with  its 
150-mile  long  pipe  line,  and  the  oil  fields 
at  Ahwaz  on  the  Karun  River.  This 
plant,  intended  to  furnish  fuel  oil  for 
the  royal  navy,  was  an  enterprise  in 
which  the  government  was  financially 
interested.  Moreover,  a  successful  cam- 
paign in  the  great  valley  would  hurt 
Turkey's  standing  in  the  Mohammedan 
world,  and  from  purely  a  military  point 
of  view  would  prove  of  assistance  to  the 
Allies.  A  small  force  had  been  sent 
to  the  Gulf  before  the  outbreak  of  hos- 
tilities. On  November  7  it  reached  the 
mouth  of  the  river  and  took  a  small 
village,  Fao  by  name,  three  miles  up. 
Thence  the  expedition  moved  up  river 
to  Abadan,  for  the  protection  of  the 
works  already  mentioned,  and  Novem- 
ber 11  had  a  brush  with  the  Turks  on 
the  Turkish  side  of  the  river  at  Saniyeh. 
Reenf  or  cements  joined  this  column  on 
the  15th,  and  the  combined  forces,  after 
some  minor  engagements,  on  November 
23  entered  Basra  after  its  evacuation 
by  the  Turks ;  and  on  December  9,  after 
getting  into  the  rear  of  Kurna,  received 
the  surrender  of  its  garrison,  50  miles 
up  river.  The  British  now  took  up  an 
intrenched  position,  and  might  have 
been  content  merely  to  hold  the  road 
down  to  the  sea  if  it  had  not  been  for  a 
Turkish  counteroffensive  in  April,  1915. 


Early  in  January  of  1915  the  Turks 
were  found  to  be  holding  a  strong  posi- 
tion north  of  Mezera.  An  expedition 
drove  them  out  of  their  lines.  They 
next  appeared  at  Ahwaz  up  the  Karun 
River.  A  reconnaissance  showed  them 
to  be  in  strength,  and  it  was  evident 
that  they  were  contemplating  an  at- 
tack on  the  main  British  position.  This 
attack  occurred  April  11-12  at  Kurna 
itself,  Ahwaz,  and  Shaiba.  The  action 
at  Shaiba  lasted  three  days  and  resulted 
in  a  serious  Turkish  defeat.  During 
May  but  little  happened,  but  on  May 
31  the  British  moved  out  and  proceeded 
up  as  far  as  75  miles  from  Kurna.  From 
Amara  a  road  runs  to  Ahwaz,  the  con- 
trol of  which  assured  the  security  of 
the  oil  region.  The  Turks  had  in  the 
meantime  withdrawn  to  Kut-el-Amara, 
150  miles  up  the  Tigris. 

On  May  31  a  Turkish  force  north 
of  Kurna  was  dispersed;  on  June  3 
Amara  was  occupied.  The  Turks  with- 
drew to  Kut-el-Amara.  From  the  Tig- 
ris at  this  point  a  cross  river  runs  al- 
most due  south  to  join  the  Euphrates 
at  Nasiriyeh.  Unless  this  cross  river 
were  in  British  control  the  Turks  could 
use  it  to  menace  the  British  left.  Hence 
a  force  was  sent  against  Nasiriyeh  and 
on  July  24  captured  the  place,  the 
Turks  retreating  toward  Kut.  Early 
in  August  General  Townshend  went  up 
the  river  marching  on  Kut,  and  on  Sep- 
tember 25  contact  was  made.  A  battle 
was  fought  on  the  next  two  days,  and 
at  dawn  on  the  29th  it  was  discovered 
that  the  Turks  had  evacuated  the  posi- 
tion of  Kut-el-Amara  and  retreated  on 
Bagdad.  They  were  pursued  and  con- 
siderable loss  inflicted  on  them.  By 
September  30  General  Townshend  was 
within  100  miles  of  Bagdad  by  road  and 
200  by  river.  He  continued  his  march, 
and  at  Ctesiphon,  about  30  miles  down 
river  from  Bagdad,  fought,  November 


170 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


22-25,  an  indecisive  battle  against  su- 
perior numbers.  At  first  victorious,  he 
was  compelled  in  consequence  of  Iris  lack 
of  reserves  and  his  shortage  of  am- 
munition to  fall  back  in  the  face  of 
Turkish  reinforcements.  He  retreated 
to  Kut  after  having  lost  about  one- 
fourth  of  his  total  20,000  men.  Here 
he  intrenched  and  was  besieged  by  the 
Turks. 

All  attempts  to  succor  him  having 
failed,  and  his  supplies  being  exhausted, 
General  Townshend  on  April  30  was 
compelled  to  surrender  to  the  Turks, 
after  a  gallant  defense  protracted  for 
143  days.  This  surrender  simply  meant 
that  the  ill-advised  expedition  against 
Bagdad  had  failed;  it  was  still  the 
fact  that  the  original  purpose  of  the 
Mesopotamian  campaign  had  been  ful- 
filled. General  Aylmer's  relief  expedi- 
tion, setting  out  January  6,  1916,  after 
defeating  the  Turks  in  two  battles,  man- 
aged, January  21,  to  reach  a  point  only 
eight  miles  from  Kut-el-Amara.  But 
floods  now  came  to  the  Turkish  rescue 
and  Aylmer  was  forced  to  fall  back. 
He  set  out  again  in  February,  better 
equipped  with  boats,  and  after  meeting 
with  a  reverse  at  Felahie  defeated  the 
Turks  at  Umm-el-Heuna,  April  5 ;  the 
next  day  the  capture  of  Felahie  was  an- 
nounced. He  was  now  within  23  miles 
of  Kut ;  but  the  Turks  in  the  meantime 
had  occupied  strongly  intrenched  posts 
to  dispute  any  further  advance,  imped- 
ed as  before  by  floods.  Much  fighting 
took  place,  and  although  some  ground 
was  gained  the  relief  force  was  unable 
to  gain  any  decisive  success.  General 
Aylmer's  forces  continued  to  hold  their 
lines  in  the  neighborhood  of  Kut  dur- 
ing most  of  1916.  In  December,  1916, 
and  January,  1917,  there  were  several 
engagements  of  a  local  character  in  the 
neighborhood  of  Kut-el-Amara. 

In  February,    1917,   the   Mesopota- 


mian campaign  again  began  to  assume 
importance.  As  a  result  of  local  en- 
gagements and  manceuvering  for  po- 
sition the  British  by  the  middle  of  Feb- 
ruary had  established  their  line  on  both 
banks  of  the  Tigris,  Avhere  it  formed  a 
bend  west  of  Kut-el-Amara,  and  conse- 
quently hemmed  in  the  Turks  in  this 
town.  On  February  23  bodies  of  Brit- 
ish troops  were  ferried  across  the  Tigris 
under  the  protection  of  artillery  and 
machine-gun  fire.  These  troops  cleared 
the  opposite  bank  sufficiently  to  enable 
General  Maude  to  erect  a  pontoon 
bridge.  By  the  next  day  part  of  the 
Shamrun  peninsula  and  Sanna-i-yat 
were  seized.  The  taking  of  these  im- 
portant positions  compelled  the  Turks 
to  abandon  Kut-el-Amara  and  to  re- 
treat toward  Baghela,  24  miles  up  the 
river. 

The  British  cavalry  followed  the  flee- 
ing Turks  on  their  right,  the  infantry 
their  centre  and  gunboats  on  the  Tigris 
their  left.  The  last-mentioned  forces 
caused  considerable  havoc  among  the 
Turks,  by  getting  ahead  of  them  and 
firing  upon  them  as  they  advanced.  The 
British  left  wing  under  Sir  Percy  Lake, 
crossed  the  Tigris  below  its  junction 
with  the  Diala  and  marched  on  Bag- 
dad, 20  miles  away.  On  March  10,  an 
attack  on  Bagdad  from  both  sides  of 
the  river  drove  the  Turks  back  on  the 
city  itself.  During  the  night  the  Turks 
evacuated  the  city  and  left  the  British 
artillery  captured  at  Kut-el-Amara  and 
the  greater  part  of  their  own.  The 
fall  of  Bagdad  was  not  of  great  strate- 
gic importance  but  had  a  great  moral 
effect  throughout  the  world.  Besides 
that  the  entire  cultivated  lands  of  Baby- 
lonia fell  into  the  hands  of  the  British. 
A  Russian  offensive  drove  the  Turks 
from  Hamadan  and  gave  promise  of  a 
Russian-British  advance  which  would 
completely  occupy  Turkey  in  Asia.  The 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


171 


Russian  revolution  upset  these  plans 
and  enabled  the  Turks  to  withdraw 
troops  from  the  Armenian  front  to 
stem  the  British  advance.  During  June 
and  July  the  Turks  drove  the  Rus- 
sians across  the  border  into  Persia  and 
left  the  British  left  wing  in  a  very 
exposed  position. 

After  the  fall  of  Bagdad  the  Turks 
retreated  up  the  Tigris  toward  Mosul 
and  up  the  Euphrates  toward  Aleppo. 
The  main  body  took  the  first  route  with 
the  idea  of  holding  the  headwaters  of 
the  Diala  until  they  could  rescue  their 
army  which  was  practically  lost  in  Per- 
sia as  a  result  of  renewed  Russian  ac- 
tivities. The  latter  had  crossed  the 
border  of  Persia  again  and  had  joined 
with  the  British  outposts.  General 
Maude  seized  Feluja  on  the  Euphrates 
with  the  general  purpose  of  ascending 
that  river  and  capturing  El  Deir  which 
was  the  key  to  the  crossroads  leading  to 
Damascus,  Aleppo,  and  Mosul.  The 
plan  was  to  have  the  centre  advance  on 
Mosul,  the  right  wing  to  clear  the  cara- 
van route  into  Persia  and  the  left  wing 
to  secure  El  Deir.  The  first  step  ac- 
complished in  this  advance  was  the  cap- 
ture of  Samara  on  April  23.  This  put 
the  Samara-Bagdad  railroad  in  the 
hands  of  the  British  and  facilitated  the 
bringing  of  supplies  from  the  latter 
city.  The  British  right  flank  was  left 
in  an  exposed  position  again  by  the 
complete  downfall  of  the  Russian  armies 
and  the  reoccupation  of  Khanikan  by 
the  Turks  (July)  on  the  Persian  bor- 
der. This  town  controls  the  caravan 
route  from  Bagdad  to  Kermansha. 

A  word  or  two  should  be  mentioned 
here  of  the  revolt  in  the  Hejaz,  which 
declared  its  independence  under  the 
leadership  of  the  Grand  Sherif  of  Mec- 
ca, Hujayn  Ibn  Aly,  who  took  the  title 
of  King.  This  revolt  was  engineered 
by  the  Entente  allies  and  won  over  the 


orthodox  Arabs  and  the  Syrians  op- 
posed to  Turkish  rule.  Arms  and  am- 
munition of  the  latest  type  were  sup- 
plied to  the  revolutionists  and  they  took 
several  Turkish  towns  and  seriously 
hampered  the  Syrian  railway  system  of 
the  Turks. 

When  fighting  could  be  resumed,  aft- 
er the  heat  of  the  summer,  the  British 
on  September  30  captured  Ramadie  on 
the  Euphrates  and  the  entire  army  of 
Ahmed  Bey.  This  followed  the  brilliant 
storming  of  Mushaid  Ridge  on  the  pre- 
vious day.  On  October  5,  the  Russians 
took  by  assault  Nereman,  50  miles 
north  of  Mosul  which  was  now  seri- 
ously menaced.  The  British  were  with- 
in 100  miles  of  it  on  the  south.  They 
advanced  still  further  when  they  took 
Tekrit  15  miles  north  of  Samara.  Op- 
erations halted  here  again  for  a  long 
time  because  of  the  final  collapse  of  the 
Russian  forces  with  the  consequent  ex- 
posure of  the  British  right  wing.  Gen- 
eral von  Falkenhayn,  who  had  won  such 
a  great  reputation  for  himself  as  Chief 
of  Staff  in  Germany  and  as  a  command- 
ing General  in  the  Rumanian  campaign, 
was  now  sent  to  Asia  Minor  to  com- 
mand the  Turkish  forces  and  spent  the 
rest  of  1917  building  up  the  Turkish 
forces  at  Aleppo.  He  succeeded  Gen- 
eral von  der  Goltz,  who  had  been  assas- 
sinated. 

The  1917  Campaign  in  Palestine. — 
As  was  stated  above  (section  Turkey, 
Caucasus,  Egypt)  the  British  began  an 
advance  on  Rafa  on  the  Sinai  peninsula 
in  January,  1917.  This  town  fell  early 
in  February  and  the  British  advanced 
northward  toward  Gaza  and  eastward 
toward  Beersheba.  They  were  com- 
pelled to  spend  the  summer  on  the  Gaza 
river  after  failing  to  take  these  places. 
In  October  they  started  forward  again 
and  by  January,  1918,  had  won  a  series 
of  brilliant  successes.     On  October  31, 


172 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Beersheba  was  taken  in  a  sudden  as- 
sault and  on  November  6  Gaza  fell. 
By  November  15,  General  Allenby  *  had 
cut  the  Jaffa-Jerusalem  railway  at 
Ludd  and  Er  Ramie.  Two  days  later 
Jaffa,  the  port  of  Jerusalem,  was  oc- 
cupied. The  British  advanced  down 
the  Surar  River  valley  toward  the  Holy 
City  and  up  the  Damascus-Beersheba 
railway  in  order  to  encircle  the  city  and 
cut  off  its  supplies,  so  that  it  would  not 
come  under  the  bombardment  of  the  ar- 
tillery. All  the  towns  surrounding  the 
city  were  gradually  taken  by  storm 
and  as  the  British  closed  in  it  became 
apparent  that  the  Turks  would  not  risk 
a  siege.  The  city  fell  on  December  10. 
There  was  general  rejoicing  throughout 
the  world  over  the  return  of  the  city  to 
Christian  hands  after  having  been  in 
Turkish  hands  for  almost  seven  cen- 
turies. The  Turks  west  and  northwest 
of  the  city  broke  up  into  small  bands 
and  carried  on  guerilla  warfare  until 
the  British  finally  got  control  of  all  the 
high  land.  General  Allenby  then 
pushed  across  a  small  stream  4  miles 
north  of  Jaffa  and  captured  several 
small  towns  which  gave  him  all  the 
high  land  in  the  neighborhood,  and  as- 
sured a  good  defense  of  the  Jaffa-Jeru- 
salem railroad. 

The  success  of  the  British  arms  in 
Palestine  effectively  put  an  end  to 
Turkish  threats  on  the  Suez  Canal  and 
Egypt  which  had  been  going  on  for 
three  years.  It  also  revived  the  hopes 
of  the  Zionists,  who  dreamed  of  a  re- 
establishment  of  the  Jewish  nation  in 
Palestine.     The  British  government  an- 

*  Allenby,  Sir  Edmund  Henry  Hynman. 
Born  1861.  Served  in  Bechuanaland  Expedi- 
tion, 1884-85.  With  British  forces  in  Zululand 
in  1888.  Took  part  in  South  African  War  with 
distinction.  Skill  contributed  largely  to  vic- 
tories of  Somme  and  Aisne.  In  June,  1917,  put 
in  command  of  expedition  to  Palestine.  Cap- 
tured Jerusalem  December  10,  1917,  and  en- 
tered on  December  11. 


nounced  on  several  occasions  that  it 
looked  with  favor  on  the  Zionist  move- 
ment. 

The  Collapse  of  Turkey  {October). 
— Turkey  was  the  second  member  of  the 
Central  Powers  alliance  to  surrender  to 
Allied  arms.  This  was  a  direct  result 
of  a  crushing  defeat  administered  by 
General  Allenby.  As  was  narrated 
above,  Jerusalem  was  captured  by  Gen- 
eral Allenby  in  December,  1917.  Be- 
tween that  time  and  September,  1918, 
the  British  commander  was  making 
preparations  for  his  attack  on  a  grand 
scale.  His  first  object  was  to  secure  his 
right  flank  by  the  capture  of  Jericho 
and  the  line  of  the  Jordan.  This  opera- 
tion was  carried  out  in  February,  and 
was  highly  successful,  the  two  objectives 
having  been  taken  shortly  after  the 
middle  of  the  month.  During  March 
General  Allenby  was  engaged  in  gaining 
a  line  which  would  enable  him  to  carry 
out  operations  east  of  the  Jordan  and 
against  the  Hedjah  railway,  in  coopera- 
tion with  the  Arab  forces  under  the 
Emir  Faisal.  These  were  southeast  of 
the  Dead  Sea  and  were  under  the  com- 
mand of  Allenby.  Rainy  weather  and 
the  raising  of  the  level  of  the  Jordan 
river  prevented  General  Allenby  from 
making  any  advance  across  that  river. 
He  made  several  raids  which  materially 
hindered  the  Turkish  forces.  His  fur- 
ther progress  was  also  held  up  by  the 
difficulties  of  the  Allies  in  France.  He 
reported  that  in  April  the  52nd  and 
74th  divisions,  nine  yeomanry  regi- 
ments, five  and  a  half  siege  batteries, 
ten  British  battalions,  and  five  machine 
gun  companies  were  withdrawn  prepar- 
atory to  embark  for  France.  In  May 
11  more  battalions  were  sent  to  Europe. 
During  July  and  August  10  more  Brit- 
ish battalions  were  withdrawn  from  the 
fighting  in  the  eastern  area.  While  it 
is  true   chat  most  of  these  units  were 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


173 


replaced  by  Indian  forces,  nevertheless 
his  actual  fighting  force  was  so  reduced 
that  he  was  unable  to  continue  the  ad- 
vance against  the  Turkish  troops  un- 
til the  following  September.  During 
the  hot  summer  months  the  only  fight- 
ing of  any  note  was  an  attack  deliv- 
ered by  Turkish-German  forces  on  July 
14.  It  gained  initial  successes  by  tak- 
ing Abu  Tellul,  an  important  height, 
and  surrounded  several  other  advanced 
positions.  These  gains  were  almost  im- 
mediately lost  again  as  a  result  of  a 
brilliant  counterattack  by  Australian 
forces. 

On  September  18,  the  British  and  the 
Arabs  began  an  advance  in  Mesopo- 
tamia and  Palestine  which  was  ulti- 
mately to  result  in  the  surrender  of 
Turkey  and  settle  once  and  for  all  the 
Berlin  to  Bagdad  route  which  had  al- 
ready been  broken  by  the  collapse  of 
Bulgaria.  Allenby  made  minute  prep- 
arations for  his  blow  and  completely 
fooled  the  Turks  as  to  his  intentions. 
The  British,  with  some  French  forces 
in  support,  struck  on  a  16-mile  front 
and  broke  through  the  Turkish  lines 
between  Fafat  and  the  sea  and  advanced 
13  miles.  By  the  22d,  enemy  resist- 
ance between  the  Mediterranean  and 
the  Jordan  river  had  practically  brok- 
en down  completely  and  the  Allies  were 
forging  ahead  rapidly.  In  4  days  they 
had  advanced  approximately  60  miles 
and  had  occupied  Beisan,  Nazareth, 
and  El  Afule.  Arab  forces  east  of  the 
Jordan  destroyed  railroads  and  bridges 
crossing  the  stream  and  thus  forced 
the  Turks  to  retreat  in  a  northerly  di- 
rection only.  Haifa  and  Acre  were 
seized  on  the  23d  and  the  Turks  east  of 
the  Jordan  were  forced  to  retreat 
southerly  in  the  direction  of  Amman. 
Three  days  later  saw  the  British  at  the 
Sea  of  Galilee  and  the  occupation  of 
Tiberias,  Semakh,  Es-Samra,  and  Am- 


man. On  the  27th  the  British  forces 
joined  with  the  Arabs  east  of  the  Jor- 
dan at  Mezeris.  The  advance  was  now 
a  steady  pursuit,  without  any  frontal 
fighting  on  the  part  of  the  Turks.  Da- 
mascus fell  on  the  1st  of  October, 
Zahich  and  Rayak  on  the  6th,  and  Tri- 
poli and  Horns  on  the  16th.  In  the  first 
three  weeks  of  the  campaign  more  than 
80,000  prisoners  and  350  guns  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  British  and  Arabs. 

The  last  half  of  October  saw  the  cap- 
ture of  Aleppo  and  the  complete  defeat 
of  the  Turkish  troops  along  the  Tigris 
by  British  forces  under  General  Mar- 
shall. This  last  event  was  accomplish- 
ed by  the  capture  of  Kaleh  Sherghat, 
which  completely  cut  off  communication 
with  Mosul,  which  with  Aleppo,  was  the 
main  base  of  supplies  of  the  Turkish- 
German  forces  in  Asia  Minor. 

Facing  a  supreme  disaster,  the  Turks 
sued  for  an  armistice.  They  sent  the 
British  General,  Townshend,  who  had 
been  captured  at  Kut-el-Amara,  to  the 
Allied  commander  of  the  iEgean  fleet. 
Vice  Admiral  Calthorp,  to  ask  for 
terms.  He  asked  for  regularly  accred- 
ited agents  to  carry  on  the  negotiations. 
These  were  sent  to  the  island  of  Lemnos, 
and  after  a  3-day  session,  terms  were 
handed  to  the  Turks  which  they  ac- 
cepted on  October  30,  and  which  went 
into  effect  the  next  day.  A  summary  of 
these  terms,  which  practically  amounted 
to  unconditional  surrender,  follows : 

The  Dardanelles,  Bosphorus,  and 
Black  Sea  were  to  be  opened  to  the  Al- 
lies. 

The  location  of  all  mine  fields,  etc., 
were  to  be  disclosed. 

Allied  prisoners  of  war  were  to  be 
given  up. 

Immediate  demobilization  of  the 
Turkish  army. 

Surrender  of  all  Turkish  warships, 
and  use  of  mercantile  vessels. 


174 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Allied  occupation  of  any  strategical 
points  in  Turkey  desired  by  them. 

Immediate  withdrawal  of  Turkish 
forces  from  Persia. 

Transcaucasia  to  be  evacuated  if  Al- 
lies desire. 

Wireless,  telegraph,  and  cable  sys- 
tems to  be  controlled  by  the  Allies. 

Allies  to  be  permitted  to  purchase 
supplies  of  all  kinds. 

The  surrender  of  all  garrisons  in 
Asia  Minor  and  Turkish  Africa. 

All  Germans  and  Austrians  to  get 
out  of  Turkey  within  a  month  and  Tur- 
key was  to  break  off  all  relations  with 
them. 

Colonies.  Africa. — As  early  as  Au- 
gust 7  the  British  Imperial  government 
telegraphed  the  South  African  govern- 
ment to  suggest  the  desirability  of  seiz- 
ing such  parts  of  German  Southwest 
Africa,  "as  would  give  them  the  com- 
mand of  Swakopmund,  Luderitzbucht, 
and  the  wireless  stations  there  or  in  the 
interior."  But  before  operations  could 
be  carried  on  against  German  territory 
the  local  government  found  itself  face 
to  face  with  a  rebellion  in  sympathy 
with,  if  not  inspired  by,  Germany,  and 
having  for  its  end  the  establishment  of 
independence.  Maritz,  one  of  its  lead- 
ers, was,  on  October  26,  completely  de- 
feated by  loyalist  troops  under  the  di- 
rection of  General  Smuts,  so  that  the 
rebellion  came  to  an  end  in  those  parts. 
A  more  serious  situation  existed  in  the 
Union  itself.  But  here  too  the  loyalists 
prevailed.  On  October  27  General 
Botha  took  the  field  against  General 
Beyers,  the  leader  of  the  rebels,  defeated 
him  at  Commissie  Drift,  and  scattered 
his  troops.  On  November  12  Botha 
routed  De  Wet  at  Mushroom  Valley.  A 
fugitive,  De  Wet  was  taken  prisoner 
on  December  1.  Beyers,  who  in  the 
meantime  had  collected  another  force, 
was   again  beaten  December  7   and  in 


escaping  was  drowned  while  trying  to 
swim  his  horse  across  the  Vail  River. 
His  death  and  De  Wet's  capture  ended 
the  rebellion,  though  small  parties  kept 
the  field  for  some  time  afterward. 

Togoland  was  taken  in  a  campaign 
that  lasted  just  three  weeks,  from  Au- 
gust 7  to  August  28,  1915.  Surround- 
ed on  three  sides  by  hostile  territory, 
with  the  sea  under  British  control,  it 
could  not  hope  to  offer  any  resistance. 
The  allied  base  was  the  littoral;  minor 
expeditions  entered  the  country  from 
the  north,  the  east,  and  the  west.  The 
capital  of  the  colony,  Lome,  fell  on  the 
sixth.  The  campaign  thereafter  had 
for  its  objective  the  powerful  wireless 
station  at  Kamina,  125  miles  from  the 
coast.  This  point  was  entered,  after 
some  fighting  by  the  Allies,  on  the  27th, 
and  the  colony  was  surrendered  by  its 
Governor.  The  German  forces  could 
not  have  exceeded  1000,  mostly  natives. 

Kamerun  called  for  a  more  serious 
effort  on  the  part  of  the  Allies.  Like 
Togoland,  it  was  surrounded  on  all 
sides  by  hostile  territory,  with  the  sea 
under  Allied  control.  But  its  vastly 
greater  area  made  operations  more  dif- 
ficult and  it  was  more  strongly  defend- 
ed. Three  expeditions  from  the  north- 
west were  defeated  by  the  Germans  in 
August  and  September,  1915.  Attack- 
ing from  the  sea,  however,  the  Allies 
took  Duala  (September  27)  and  from 
this  point  widened  their  holding.  Early 
in  October  it  was  clear  that  the  colony 
would  be  lost.  Two  columns  pushed 
their  way  into  the  interior  along  the 
railways,  one  of  which  on  October  26 
took  Edea,  repelling  six  weeks  later  a 
counterattack  for  its  recovery.  The 
other  column  north  of  Duala  captured 
the  entire  railway  and  advanced  be- 
yond its  head.  The  French  sent  down 
troops  from  the  Tchad,  and  others  re- 
enforced  by  Belgians   from  Equatoria. 


MILITARY  OPERATIONS 


175 


The  result  of  all  these  efforts  was  that 
German  resistance  was  well  worn  down, 
and  came  to  an  end  with  the  surrender 
of  Mora  Hill  early  in  1916. 

The  situation  in  German  Southwest 
Africa  was  complicated  by  the  South 
African  rebellion.  This  rebellion 
crushed,  real  operations  began  in  Janu- 
ary, Luderitz  Bay  having  been  occu- 
pied as  early  as  September  18,  1914. 
Swakopmund  was  occupied  January  14. 
The  campaign  was  directed  against  the 
capital  Windhoek  and  carried  on  by 
two  armies ;  the  northern  under  Botha 
was  to  move  from  Swakopmund ;  while 
the  southern  under  Smuts,  divided  into 
three  columns,  was  to  move  east  from 
Luderitz  Bay,  north  from  Warmbad, 
and  west  from  Bechuanaland.  By  May 
1,  the  end  was  near.  On  the  12th, 
Botha  entered  Windhoek  and  the  strug- 
gle was  practically  over;  for  pushing 
on  to  Grootfontein,  now  the  German 
capital,  he  there,  on  July  9,  received 
the  surrender  of  the  enemy  forces. 

The  most  important  colony  in  Africa, 
German  East  Africa,  gave  the  British 
far  more  trouble  than  any  of  the  others. 
Here  the  Germans  disposed  of  some 
8000  men,  though  all  reports  as  to 
forces  in  the  colonies  are  subject  to  cau- 
tion, and  the  British  forces  at  the  be- 
ginning were  insignificant,  say  1200. 
During  August,  1914,  some  successes 
fell  to  the  British.  For  example,  they 
demolished,  August  13,  the  port  of  Dar- 
es-Salaam. On  September  3,  British  re- 
enforcements  arrived  in  time  to  check 
German  operations  against  the  Uganda 
railway.  September  was  taken  up  by 
German  attacks  without  any  special  re- 
sult. The  British  remained  on  the  de- 
fensive, waiting  for  troops  from  India. 
These  arrived  November  1,  and  lay  off 
the  German  port  of  Tanga.  An  attack 
made  on  the  4th  resulted  in  a  decided 
reverse  for  the  British,  who  were  com- 


pelled to  reembark.  The  Germans  now 
invaded  British  East  Africa,  but  were 
pushed  back  to  Jassin  in  German  ter- 
ritory, where  on  January  18  they  de- 
feated the  British,  and  forced  a  with- 
drawal of  all  the  outlying  posts  in  this 
region.  They  had,  as  early  as  Sep- 
tember, 1914,  invaded  northeast  Rho- 
desia, where  they  came  into  contact 
with  Belgian  troops.  April,  1915,  was 
spent  in  skirmishing.  In  July,  1915, 
the  Konigsberg  was  destroyed.  This 
vessel,  after  doing  much  mischief,  had 
been  chased  by  British  cruisers  and  had 
taken  refuge  (November,  1914)  in  the 
Rufiji  River.  Her  guns,  however,  were 
removed  and  used  in  the  defenses  of  Ta- 
bora,  on  the  main  east  and  west  line  of 
the  colony.  General  Smith-Dorrien, 
later  relieved  by  General  Smuts,  was 
sent  out  to  take  command  of  the  troops 
in  British  East  Africa  and  the  invasion 
proceeded  from  that  region,  as  well  as 
from  Nyassa  on  the  south. 

The  British  expedition  commanded 
by  General  Jan  Smuts  won  an  impor- 
tant victory  at  the  Kitovo  Hills,  near 
the  northern  boundary  of  German  East 
Africa.  After  five  days  of  fighting 
(March  7-12)  the  Germans  fell  back  to 
a  position  in  the  forest  along  the  Rufu 
River.  As  a  result  of  the  operations 
that  followed,  the  Germans,  although 
reenforced,  were  compelled  to  abandon 
their  positions  and  retire  southward 
along  the  Tanga  railway. 

The  Allies  began  in  September  to 
tighten  the  ring  around  the  colony. 
The  Belgians,  French,  British,  and  Por- 
tuguese were  invading  it  from  all  sides. 
All  of  the  seaports  were  in  their  hands 
and  Tabora,  a  strong  fortress  in  the 
north,  was  captured  (September  1-11), 
by  the  Belgians.  Progress  was  slow  but 
in  December,  1917,  its  probable  com- 
plete occupation  was  announced. 

General     von     Lettow-Vorbeck,     the 


176 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


German  commander  who  had  held  out 
against  the  Allies  for  such  a  long  time, 
finally  surrendered  to  the  Allies  on  No- 
vember 14,  1918,  three  days  after  the 
signing  of  the  armistice.  During  No- 
vember, 1917,  one  German  force  oper- 
ating in  German  East  Africa  was  cap- 
tured and  the  other  (the  only  remain- 
ing one)  escaped  into  Portuguese  East 
Africa.  It  was  chased  southward  al- 
most as  far  as  the  Zambesi  River 
through  almost  impassable  country. 
Turning  around,  von  Lettow-Vorbeck 
took  another  route  and  again  reached 
German  East  Africa  in  September, 
1918.  He  was  quickly  compelled  to  re- 
treat again  and  this  time  he  marched 
into  northern  Rhodesia,  where  he  sur- 
rendered just  south  of  Kasama. 

The  Pacific. — Japan,  as  Great  Brit- 
ain's ally,  declared  war  on  German}' 
August  23,  1914,  but  confined  her  of- 
fensive to  Germany's  possessions  in  the 
Pacific.  On  August  27,  she  began  the 
blockade  of  Tsingtao,  and  by  the  end  of 


September,  two  Japanese  armies  and  a 
few  English  troops  had  completed  land- 
ing, one  on  the  north,  the  other  with  the 
English  at  Rozan  Bay.  The  German 
defenses  consisted  of  three  lines,  the 
first  of  fortified  hills,  the  second  of  10 
forts,  the  third  of  five.  By  September 
28,  the  first  two  lines  had  been  carried, 
and  the  siege  was  begun.  October  31  a 
general  attack  was  opened  on  the  third 
line  which  was  occupied  November  6. 
The  next  day  the  place  was  surrendered 
with  201  officers  and  3841  non-commis- 
sioned officers  and  men.  The  Japanese 
land  forces  engaged  in  the  siege  num- 
bered 22,980  officers  and  men,  with  142 
guns.  The  British  forces  were  far  less 
numerous,  920  European  troops  and 
450  Sikhs.  The  British  casualties  were 
insignificant,  12  killed  and  62  wounded ; 
the  Japanese  relatively  very  little 
greater,  236  killed  and  1282  wounded. 
For  the  capture  of  other  German  is- 
lands in  the  Pacific  see  the  section  on 
Naval,  Operations. 


V.     NAVAL  OPERATIONS 


At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  bel- 
ligerent navies  were  constituted  as 
shown  in  the  subjoined  tables.  For 
the  sake  of  space  and  conciseness,  cer- 
tain methods  of  lettering  and  abbrevia- 
tion are  used  in  the  tables  and  through- 
out the  article,  viz. : 

Abbreviations:  a.c,  armored  cruiser;  a.c.d., 
armored  coast-defense  vessel;  b.c,  battle 
cruiser;  b.s.,  battleship;  c,  cruiser  (not  ar- 
mored); des.,  destroyer;  Div.,  division  (of  a 
fleet  or  squadron);  g.b.,  gunboat;  Sq.,  squad- 
ron;  sub.,   submarine;   t.b.,  torpedo  boat. 

EXAMPLES    AND    EXPLANATIONS 

First  example:  b.s.  Ihon  Duke  (25d-10gl3.5- 
22k). 

Explanation:  b.s.  stands  for  battleship;  small 
capitals  indicate  that  the  vessel  is  of  the  dread- 
nought type;  25d  means  25,000  tons'  displace- 
ment; 10gl3.5,  that  the  main  battery  consists 
of  10  guns  of  13.5-inch  calibre;  22k,  that  the 
maximum   speed  is  22  knots. 

Second  example:  des.  Ferret  (0.75d-2g4,  2g3- 
27k),  Hind   (same),  Hydra   (same). 

Explanation:  this  means  that  the  destroyer 
Ferret  has  a  displacement  of  750  (0.75x1000) 
tons,  carries  a  main  battery  of  two  4-inch  and 
two  3-inch  guns,  and  has  a  maximum  speed  of 
27  knots;  and  that  the  Hind  and  Hydra  are  the 
same  as  the  Ferret  in  all  respects. 

Forces  in  the  North  Sea  and  Adjacent 
Waters 

GREAT  BRITAIN 

First   Fleet    (Admiral  J.   R.   Jellicoe,   com- 
manding) 

Flagship,  b.s.  Iron  Duke  (25d-10gl3.5-22k) ; 
tenders,  c.  Sappho  (3.4d-2g6,6g4.7-20k), 
des.  Oak  (0.8-2g4,2g3-32k) ;  repair 
ships,  Cyclops  (lld-13k),  Assistance 
(10d-13k). 

1st  Battle  Sq.,  1st  Div.:  b.s.  Marlborough 
(25d-10gl3.5-22k),  St.  Vincent  (19d- 
10gl2-21k),  Colossus  (20d-10gl2-21k), 
Hercules  (same). 
2d  Div.:  b.s.  Neptune  (19d-10gl2-21k),  Su- 
perb (same),  Collingwood  (same),  Van- 
guard   (same). 


2d  Battle  Sq.,  1st  Div.:  b.s.  King  George  V 
(24d-10gl3.5-21k),  Ajax  (same),  Auda- 
cious (same),  Orion  (23d-10gl3.5-21k). 
2d  Div.:  b.s.  Centurion  (24d-10gl3.5-21k), 
Conqueror  (23d-10gl3.5-21k),  Monarch 
(same),  Thunderer  (same). 

3d  Battle  Sq.,  1st  Div.:  b.s.  King  Edward  VII 
(16d-4gl2,4g9.2-19k),  Hibernia  (same), 
Africa  (same),  Britannia  (same). 
2d  Div.:  b.s.  Commonwealth  (16d-4gl2,4g9.2- 
19k),  Dominion  (same),  Hindustan 
(same),  Zealandia    (same). 

4th  Battle  Sq.,  1st  Div.:  b.s.  Dreadnought 
(18d-10gl2-21k),  Temeraire  (19d-10gl2- 
21k),  Bellerophon  (same),  Agamemnon 
(17d-4gl2,  10g9.2-19k). 
2d  Div.:  Not  organized;  ships  under  con- 
struction. 

Scouts:  1st  Sq.,  c.  Bellona  (3.3d-6g4-26k)  ;  2d 
Sq.,  c.  Boadicea  (3.3d-6g4-26k) ;  3d  Sq., 
c.  Blanche  ( 3.4-1 0g4-26 ) ;  4th  Sq.,  c. 
Blonde   (3.4-10g4-26k). 

1st  Battle  Cruiser  Sq.  :  b.c.  Lion  (26d-8gl3.5- 
28k),  Princess  Royal  (same),  Queen 
Mary  (27d-8gl3.5-28k),  New  Zealand 
(19d-8gl2-27k). 

2d  Cruiser  Sq.:  a.c.  Shannon  (15d-4g9.2,  10g7.5- 
23k),  Achilles  (14d-6g9.2,4g7.5-23k), 
Cochrane    (same),  Natal   (same). 

3d  Cruiser  Sq.:  a.c.  Antrim  (Hd-4g7.5,6g6- 
22k),  Argyll  (same),  Devonshire  (same), 
Roxburgh    (same). 

4th  Cruiser  Sq.:  a.c.  Sufolk  (10d-14g6-23k), 
Berwick  (same),  Essex  (same),  Lancas- 
ter   (same). 

1st  Light  Cruiser  Sq.  :  c.  Southampton  (5.4d- 
8g6-26k),  Birmingham  (5.4d-9g6-26k), 
Lowestoft    (same),   Nottingham    (same). 

Destroyer  Flotilla  of  1st  Fleet:  c.  Amethyst 
(3d-12g4-22k),     carrying     flotilla     com- 
mander. 
1st  Sq.:   c.  Fearless    (3.4d-10g4-25k)    and  20 

destroyers    (0.8d-2g4,2g3-28   to   30k). 
2d  Sq.:  c.  Active  (3.4d-10g4-25k)  and  20  de- 
stroyers   (0.8d-2g4,    2g3-28k). 
3d  Sq.:   c.  Amphion   (3.4d-10g4-25k)    and   13 

destroyers    (ld-3g4-29k). 
4th    Sq.:   des.   Swift    (2.2d-4g4-35k)    and   20 
destroyers   (0.9d-3g4-32k). 

Second  Fleet 
Flagship:  b.s.  Lord  Nelson   (17d-4gl2,10g9.2- 
19k). 
5th   Battle   Sq.  :   b.s.  Prince   of   Wales    (15d- 


177 


178 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


4gl2-18k),  Bulwark  (same),  Formidable 
(same),  Irresistible  (same),  Implacable 
(same),  London  (same),  Queen  (same), 
Venerable  (same).  Scout:  c.  Diamond 
(3d-12g4-22k). 

6th  Battle  Sq.:  b.s.  Russell  (14d-4gl2-19k), 
Albemarle  (same),  Cornwallis  (same), 
Duncan  (same),  Exmouth  (same),  Ven- 
geance (13d-4gl2-18k).  Scout:  c.  To- 
paze    (3d-12g4-22k). 

5th  Cruiser  So.:  a.c.  Carnarvon  (lld-4g7.5,- 
6g6-22k),  Sutlej  (12d-2g9.2,12g6-21k),  c. 
Liverpool  (4,8d-2g6,  10g4-25k). 

6th  Cruiser  Sq.:  a.c.  Drake  (14d-2g9.2,16g6- 
22k),  King  Alfred  (same),  Good  Hope 
(same). 

Mine  Layer  So..:  c.  Andromache  (3.4d-6g2.2- 
20k),  Apollo  (same),  Intrepid  (same), 
Iphigenia  (same),  Latona  (same),  Naiad 
(same),  Thetis  (same). 

Third  Fleet 

7th  Battle  Sq.:  b.s.  Caesar  (15d-4gl2-18k), 
Hannibal  (same),  Illustrious  (same), 
Magnificent  (same),  Majestic  (same), 
Mars  (same),  Victorious  (same),  Prince 
George  (same).  Tender:  c.  Doris  (5.6d- 
llg6-20k). 

8th  Battle  Sq.:  b.s.  Albion  (13d-4gl2-18k), 
Canopus  (same),  Glory  (same),  Goliath 
(same),  Ocean  (same),  Jupiter  (15d- 
4gl2-18k).  Tender:  c.  Proserpine  (2d- 
8g4-20k). 

7th  Cruiser  Sq.:  a.c.  Aboukir  (12d-2g9.2,  12g6- 
21k),  Hogue  (same),  Cressy  (same), 
Bacchante    (same),  Euryalus   (same). 

8th  Cruiser  Sq.:  Not  organized. 

9th  Cruiser  Sq.:  a.c.  Donegal  (10d-14g6-23k), 
Monmouth  (same),  c.  Europa  (lld-16g6- 
21k),  Amphitrite  (same),  Argonaut 
(same),  Challenger  (5.9d-llg6-21k),  Vin- 
dictive (5.8d-10g6-19k),  Highflyer  (5.6d- 
llg6-20k). 

10th  Cruiser  Sq.:  c.  Edgar  (7.4d-2g9.2,10g6- 
20k),  Grafton  (same),  Hawke  (same), 
Theseus  (same),  Crescent  (7.7d-lg9.2, 
12g6-20k),  Royal  Arthur  (same),  Gib- 
raltar (7.7d-2g9.2,10g6-20k). 

Patrol  Flotilla.  Consists  of  6  scout  cruisers 
as  flagboats  and  the  6th,  7th,  8th,  and  9th 
destroyer  flotillas  (79  boats— 360  to  1050 
tons) ;  7  old  cruisers  and  the  3d,  4th,  5th, 
6th,  7th,  8th,  and  9th  submarine  flotillas 
(3  boats  of  210  tons,  36  of  320  tons,  8  of 
630  tons,  6  of  825  tons)  ;  also  24  torpedo 
boats  of  250  tons. 

Coast-Defense  Flotillas.  These  are  separ- 
ately organized  for  each  port  and  consist 
of  21  destroyers  (320  to  480  tons),  44 
torpedo  boats  (75  to  750  tons),  and  7 
submarines   (210  to  320  tons). 


FRANCE 
(North  Sea  and  Atlantic  Forces) 
2d  Light  Sq.:  Armored  Cruiser  Div.:  a.c.  Mar- 
seillaise       (10d-2g7.6,8g6.4-21k),       Aube 
(same),  Condi   (same). 

Destroyer  Flotilla:  c.  Dunois  (0.9-6g2.5-22k) 
flagboat;  three  divisions  of  6  boats  each 
(310  to  340  tons,  26  to  27  knots). 

Submarine  Flotilla:  Five  divisions  with  5  de- 
stroyers as  flagboats,  18  submarines  (550 
to  810  tons). 

Mining  Flotilla:  Two  mine  layers  (600d- 
20k),  1  gunboat  (950d-21k),'l  destroyer 
(300d-26k). 

Schoolship  Div.:  a.c.  Gloire  (10d-2g7.6,8g6.4- 
21k),  Jeanne  d'Arc  (Ild-2g7.6,14g5.5- 
23k),  Gueydon  (9d-2g7.6,8g6.4-21k),  Du- 
petit  Thouars  (same). 
Coast  Defense.  The  mobile  defense  of  Cher- 
bourg, Brest,  Rochefort,  Dunquerque, 
and  Bidassoa  consists  of  2  destroyers,  7 
torpedo  boats,  and  11  submarines. 

RUSSIA 

(Baltic   Sea  only) 
Active  Fleet   (Admiral  von   Essen,  command- 
ing) 
Battleship  Sq.:  b.s.  Czarevitch  (13d-4gl2-18k), 
Imperator  Pavel  I    (16d-4gl2,14g8-18k), 
Andrei  Pervosvanyi  (same),  Slava   (14d- 
4gl2-18k),     a.c.     Rurik      (15d-4gl0,8g8- 
22k). 
Armored  Cruiser  Sq.:  a.c.  Gromoboi   (13d-4g8, 
22g6-20k),      Bay  an      (7.8d-2g8,8g6-21k), 
Pallada       (same),      Admiral      Makarov 
(same),  des.  Novik   (1.3d-4g4-36k). 
Destroyer    Flotilla,   1st   Sq.:   Base,   Libau;   4 
divisions  of  9  boats  each  (350  to  580  tons, 
26  knots). 
2d  Sq.:  Base,   Helsingfors;  2  divisions  of  9 
boats,  1  of  8  boats   (350  tons,  26  knots). 
Submarine  Flotilla,  1st  Div.:  Base,  Libau;  2 
boats  of  370  tons,  1  of  150,  1  of  129. 
2d  Div.:  Base,  Reval;  4  boats  of  450  tons. 
Ships   in   Reserve,   battleships:   Imp.   Alex.   II 
(9d-2gl2,    5g8-15k),    Petr    Velikii    (lOd- 
4g8-12k). 
Armored  cruiser:  Rossya  (12d-4g8,22g6-19k). 
Cruisers:      Diana      (6.7d-8g6-20k),      Aurora 

(same). 
Destroyers  and  submarines:    Many  building; 

some  completed. 
Torpedo  boats:    About  20  (108  to  150  tons). 

GERMANY 
High    Seas    Fleet    (Vice    Admiral    Ingenohl,* 
commanding) 
Flagship:  Friedrich  der  Grosse    (25d-10gl2- 
23k). 

*  Oscar  von  Ingenohl,  born    (1857),  at  Neu- 
wied;   spent  half  of  his  seafaring  life  in   the 


NAVAL  OPERATIONS 


179 


1st  Battleship  Sq.,  1st  Div.:  b.s.  Ostfriesland 

(22d-12gl2-21k),       Helgoland       (same), 

Thuringen    (same),  Oldenburg    (same). 
2d  Div.:  b.s.  Posen   (19d-12gll-20k),  Nassau 

(same),  Rheinland  (same),  Westfalen 

(same). 
2d    Battleship    Sq.,    1st    Div.:    b.s.    Preussen 

(13d-4gll-18k),  Schleswig-Holstein 

(same),     Pommern      (same),     Schlesien 

(same). 
2d  Div.:  b.s.  Hannover  (13d-4gll-18k),  Hes- 

sen         (same),        Lothringen         (same), 

Deutschland    (same). 
3d  Battleship  Sq.,  1st  Div.:  b.s.  Kaiser   (24d- 

10gl2-23k),    Kaiserin    (same),   Pr.   Reg. 

Luitpold  (same),  Konig  Albert  (same). 
2d  Div.:  Ships  not  completed. 
Cruiser  Sq.,  Battle  Cruiser  Div.:  b.c.  Seydlitz 

(25d-10gll-29k),   Von   der   Tann    (19d- 

8gll-27k),       Moltke       (23d-10gll-27k), 

Derfflinger   (28d-8gl2-30k). 
Light  Cruiser  Sq.:  c.  Kbln   (4.3d-12g4.1-27k), 

Kolberg  (same),  Mainz  (same),  Rostock 

(4.8d-12g4.1-27k),        Strassburg        (4.5d- 

12g4.1-27k),   Stralsund    (same),  Dresden 

(3.6d-10g4.1-24k),     Stettin     (3.4d-10g4M- 

24k). 
Destroyer    Flotillas:    1st    Flotilla:    12    boats 

(550   tons-2g3.4-32.5k). 
2d  Flotilla:  12  boats   (570d-2g3.4-32.5k). 
3d  and  4th  Flotillas:  each  of  12  boats   (640 

tons-2g3.4-32.5k). 
5th  Flotilla:  12  boats  (616  tons-2g3.4-30k). 
6th  and  7th  Flotillas:  each  of  12  boats   (550 

tons-2g3.4-30k). 
Submarine  Flotillas:  1st  Flotilla:  7  boats,  U- 

21  to   U-27   (910  tons). 
2d   Flotilla:    7    boats,    U-14    to     JJ-20     (295 

tons). 
3d  Flotilla:  7  boats,  U-7  to  U-13  (255  tons). 
Mine    Layers    Flotilla:   Arkona    (1970   tons), 

Nautilus   (same),  Albatross   (2200  tons), 

Pelikan    (2360  tons). 

Reserve    Squadrons 

4th  Battleship  Sq.  :  b.s.  Wittelsbach  (12d- 
4g9.4-18k),  Zahringen  (same),  Schwaben 
(same),  Mecklenburg  (same),  Elsass 
(13d-4gll-18k),   Braunschweig    (same). 

5th  Battleship  Sq.  :  b.s.  Kaiser  Barbarossa 
(lld-4g9.4-18k),  Kais.  Wilhelm  der 
Grosse  (same),  Kais.  Wilhelm  II 
(same),  Kais.  Karl  der  Grosse    (same). 

Armored     Coast-Defense      Sq.  :     a.c.d.     Sieg- 

Far  East  in  command  of  various  vessels;  at- 
tached to  Admiralty  in  Berlin  (1897-1901);  ac- 
companied the  Kaiser  on  many  of  his  cruises 
and  for  a  time  commanded  the  royal  yacht 
Hohenzollern;  rear  admiral  (1908);  commander 
of  second  squadron  of  the  high-sea  fleet  (1910) ; 
served  in  command  during  early  part  of  Euro- 
pean War,  but  was  removed   (February,  1915). 


fried  (4d-3g9.4-15k),  Beowulf  (same), 
Frithiof  (same),  Heimdall  (same), 
Hildebrand  (same),  Hagen  (same), 
Odin    (3.5d-3g9.4-15k),  Aegir    (same). 

Squadron  of  Instruction,  Cadet  and  Seaman 
Schools:  c.  Freya  (5.6d-2g8.2,8g5.9-18k), 
Hertha  (same),  Vineta  (same),  Victoria 
Louise  (same),  Hansa  (same),  b.s.  (old) 
Konig  Wilhelm  (10d-22g9.4-15k). 
Gunnery  School:  b.s.  Wettin  (12d-4g9.4-18k), 
a.c.  Bliieher  (16d-12g8.2-23k),  Prinz 
Adalbert  (9d-4g8.2,10g5.9-20k),  c.  Augs- 
burg (4.3d-12g4.1-27k),  Danzig  (3.2d- 
10g4.1-23k),  Stuttgart  (3.4d-10g4.1-24k). 
Torpedo  School:  b.s.  (old)  Wiirttemburg 
(7d-6gl0.2-16k),  a.c.  Fiirst  Bismarck 
(Ild-4g9.4,12g5.9-19k),  Friedrich  Karl 
(9d-4g8.2,10g5.9-20k),  c.  Miinchen  (3.2d- 
10g4.1-23k). 

Old  battleships:  b.s.  Worth  (10d-6gll-17k), 
Brandenburg    (same). 

Destroyers  and  submarines:  About  35  destroy- 
ers, 6  submarines,  50  torpedo  boats  and 
several  old  cruisers  and  coast-defense 
craft  were  in  reserve  or  laid  up. 

Belligerent   Naval   Forces  in   the 
,   Mediterranean 

GREAT  BRITAIN 

2d  Battle  Cruiser  Sq.  :  b.c.  Inflexible  (17d- 
8gl2-27k),  Indomitable  (same),  Indefat- 
igable   (19d-8gl2-27k). 

1st  Cruiser  Sq.:  a.c.  Defense  (15d-4g9.2,10g7.5- 
23k),  Black  Prince  (14d-6g9.2,4g7.5-23k), 
Duke  of  Edinburgh  (same),  Warrior 
(14d-6g9.2,10g6-23k). 

Light  cruisers:  c.  Gloucester  (4.8d-2g6,10g4- 
26k),  Chatham  (5.4d-9g6-26k),  Dublin 
(same),   Weymouth   (5.3d-8g6-26k). 

5th  Destroyer  Flotilla:  24  boats  (550  tons-27 
knots). 

Submarines:  6  boats  of  320  tons. 

FRANCE 

First  Fleet  (Vice  Admiral  Boue  de  Lapeyere, 

commanding) 

Section  of  the  Commander  in  Chief:  Flag- 
ship: b.s.  Courbet  (23d-12gl2-21k),  b.s. 
Jean  Bart  (23d-12g-12-21k),  c.  Jurien 
de  la  Graviere  (5.6d-8g6.4-23k). 

1st  Battleship  Sq.,  1st  Div.:  b.s.  Diderot 
(18d-4gl2,12g9.4-19k),  Danton  (same), 
Vergniaud  (same),  France  (23d-12gl2- 
21k). 
2d  Div.:  b.s.  Voltaire  (18d-4gl2,12g9.4-19k), 
Mirabeau  (same),  Condorcet  (same), 
Paris    (23d-12gl2-21k). 

2d  Battleship  Sq.,  1st  Div.:  b.s.  Verity  (15d- 
4gl2-19k),  Bepublique  (same),  Patrie 
(same). 


180 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


2d  Div.:  b.s.  Justice  (14d-4gl2-19k),  Dem- 
ocratic (same). 
Light  Sq.,  1st  Dw.:  a.c.  Jules  Michelet  (12d- 
4g7.6,12gG.4-22k),  Ernest  Renan  (13d- 
4g7.6,12g6.4-24k),  Edgar  Quinet  (Hd- 
14g7.6-23k),    Waldeck  Rousseau    (same). 

2d  Div.:  a.c.  Leon  Gambetta  (12d-4g7.6,12g 
6.4-23k),  Victor  Hugo  (same),  Jules 
Ferry  (same). 
Supplementary  Battleship  Div.:  b.s.  Sufren 
(12d-4gl2-18k),  St.  Louis  (lld-4gl2- 
18k),  Bouvet  (12d-2gl2,2gl0.8-18k). 
Destroyer  Flotilla:  flagboat,  des.  Bouchier 
(0.70d-2g3.9,2g2.5-32k). 

1st  Div.:  5  boats   (0.73d-2g3.9,2g2.5-32k). 

2d  Div.:  5  boats   (0.4  to  0.45d-6g2.6-28k). 

3d  Div.:  5  boats   (0.45d-6g2.6-28  to  31k). 

4th  Div.:  6  boats  (0.33    to    0.4d-lg2.6-27    to 
30k). 

5th  Div.:  6  boats   (0.33d-lg2.6-29k). 

6th    Dw.:    5  boats     (0.75d-2g3.9,4g2.6-30    to 
32k). 
Submarine    Flotilla:    flagboat,    des.    Dehorter 
(0.75d-2g3.9,4g2.6-31k). 

1st    Div.:    des.    ArbalUe    (0.3d-lg2.6-31k),    3 
submarines    (550  tons). 

2d  Div.:  des  Hallebarde    (0.3d-lg2.6-27k),  2 
submarines    (550  tons). 

3d  Div.:  des.  Dard   (0.3d-lg2.6-29k),  2  sub- 
marines   (550  and  490  tons). 

4th  Div.:   des.  Mousqueton    (0.3d-lg2.6-29k), 
3  submarines    (550  tons). 

5th  Div.:  des.  Sarbacane    (0.3d-lg2.6-29k),  2 
submarines   (550  tons). 
Mine  layers:  Casablanca  (945  tons),  des.Baliste 

(300  tons). 
Schoolship  Div.:  b.s.  Jaureguiberry    (12d-2gl2, 
2gl0.8-18k),       Charlemagne       (lld-4gl2- 
18k),    Gaulois     (same),    Marceau     (lld- 
4gl3.4-16k),  a.c.  Pottruau  (5.3d-2g7.6,10g 
5.5-19k),  g.b.  La  Hire    (0.9d-6g2.6-22k), 
transport  Tourville. 
Defense    Mobile.      At    Toulon,    3    submarines, 
several  torpedo  boats,  1  mother  ship  for 
aeroplanes;  at  Bizerta,  3  submarines  and 
several  torpedo  boats. 
Morocco    Div.:    c.    Du    Chayla    (4d-6g6.4,4g3.9- 

20k),  Cassard   (same). 
Levant  Div.:  a.c.  Latouche  Treville  (4.7d-2g7.6, 

6g5.5-18k),  Bruix  (same). 
Miscellaneous:  In  addition  to  the  active  forces 
mentioned,  there  were  5  old  battleships 
(1891-97),  4  old  armored  cruisers,  and  10 
old  cruisers  which  were  on  special  ser- 
vice, in  reserve,  or  laid  up;  also  about  12 
destroyers,  17  submarines,  and  115  tor- 
pedo boats. 


RUSSIA 

Mediterranean   Sq.:  a.c.   Bogatyr   (6.7d-12g6- 
23k),  Oleg   (same). 


GERMANY 

Special  Sq.:  b.c.  Goeben  (23d-10gll-27k),  c. 
Breslcm    (4.5d-12g4.1-27k). 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

Battle    Fleet    (Admiral   Haus,   commanding) 

1st  Div.:  b.s.  Viribus  Unitis  (20d-12gl2-21k), 
Tegetthoff  (same),  Prinz  Eugen 
(same). 

2d  Div.:  b.s.  Erzherzog  Franz  Ferdinand  (14d- 
4gl2,8g9 A-20k) ^ Radetzky  (same),  Zrinyi 
(same). 

3d  Div.:  b.s.  Erz.  Ferd.  Mac  (10.5d-4g9.4-20k), 
Erz.  Friedrick  (same),  Erz.  Karl 
(same). 

Cruiser  Div.:  a.c.  Sankt  Georg  (7.2d-2g9.4,5g7. 
6,4g5.9-22k),  Kaiser  Karl  VI  (6.2d-2g9.4, 
8g5.9-21k),  des.  Tttrul  (0.4d-lg2.8,7gl.8- 
28k),  Velebit   (same). 

Scout  Div.:  c.  Saida  (3.4d-7g3.9-27k),  Novara 
(same),  Ad.  Spawn  (same),  Helgoland 
(same). 

Coast-Defense    Service,    1st    Div.:    b.s.    Haps- 
burg      (8d-3g9.4-19k),     Arpad      (same), 
Badenburg  (same). 
2d  Div.:  b.s.  Wien  (5.5d-4g9.4-17k),  Monarch 

(same),  Buda-Pest  (same). 
Cruisers:  a.c.d.  Kronprinz  Erzherzog  Rudolf 
(6.8d-3gl2-16k),  a.c.  Kaiserin  Maria  The- 
resa (5.2d-2g7.6,8g5.9-19k),  c.  Kaiser 
Franz  Joseph  I  (4d-8g5.9-19k),  Aspern 
(2.4d-8g4.7-20k),  Tzigetvar  (same), 
Zenta  (same),  Panther  (1.5d-2g4.7-18k). 

Destroyer  Flotilla:  6  boats  (0.8d-2g4-32.5k),  10 
boats  (0.4d-lg2.8-28k) ;  reserve:  1  boat 
(0.5d-6gl.8-26k),  6  boats  (0.4  to  0.5d- 
misc-20  to  23k). 

Torpedo-Boat  Flotilla:  12  boats  (0.25d-2g2.8- 
28k),  24  boats  (0.2d-4gl.8-26k),  12  boats 
(0.1d-2gl.8-28k),  6  boats  (0.1d-2gl.8- 
26k),  11  boats  (0.1d-2gl.4-19k),  mother 
ship    (13d-4g4.7-20k). 

Submarine  Flotilla:  2  boats  (270  tons),  2  boats 
(300  tons),  2  boats  (273  tons),  1  depot 
ship    (ld-4g2.8-15k). 

ITALY 

Note. — Though  Italy  did  not  enter  the  war 
until  later,  for  purposes  of  comparison  the 
condition  on  Aug.  1,  1914,  is  given. 

Active  Fleet   (Vice  Admiral  Marcello,  com- 
manding) 
First  Sq.,  1st  Div.:  b.s.  Dante  Alighieri  (19d 
12gl2-23k),    Giulio    Cesare    (22d-13gl2- 
28k),    Leonardo    da    Vinci     (same),    c. 
Nino    Bixio    (3.5d-6g4.7-29k). 
1st  Destroyer  Flotilla:  4  boats   (0.7d-lg4.7, 
4g3-30k). 
3d  Div.:   b.s.   Regina  Margherita    (13d-4gl2, 
4g8-20k),  Benedetto  Brin  (same),  Eman- 


NAVAL  OPERATIONS 


181 


uelo  Filiberto  (10d-4gl0-18k),  Ammirag- 
lio  di  St.  Bon  (same). 
4th  Destroyer  Flotilla:  6  boats    (0.4d-4g3- 
29k). 
5th  Div.:  a.c.  Giuseppe  Garibaldi  (7.2d-lgl0, 
2g8,14g6-20k),     Varese      (same),     Fran'- 
cesco    Ferruccio    (same).    Carlo    Alberto 
(6.4d-12g6-19k),    g.b.    Coatit     (13d-12g3- 
23k). 
5th  Destroyer  Flotilla:  6  boats   (0.33d-lg3, 
5g2.2-30k). 
Second  So..,  2d  Div.:  b.s.  Regina  Elena  (12.5d- 
2gl2,12g8-22k),   Vittorio  Emmanuele  III 
(same),   Roma    (same),   Napoli    (same), 
c.   Quarto   (3.2d-6g4.7-28k). 
3d  Destroyer  Flotilla:  6  boats   (0.7d-lg4.7, 
4g3-30k). 
4th     Div.:     a.c.     Pisa      (10d-4gl0,8g7.5-23k), 
Amalfl    (same),  San  Giorgio    (9.7d-4gl0, 
8g7.5-23k),  San  Marco    (same),   c.  Mar- 
sala      (3.5d-6g4.7-29k),      g.b.      Agordat 
(1.3d-12g3-23k). 
2d  Destroyer  Flotilla:   6   boats    (0.4d-4g3- 
29k). 

In  Reserve  or  on  Special  Service  in  the 
Mediterranean  : 

Battleships:  b.s.  Conte  di  Cavour  (22d- 
13gl2-23k);  old  battleships,  b.s.  Dan- 
dolo  (12d-4gl0-16k),  Duilio  (same), 
Sardegna  (13d-4gl3.5-20k),  Sicilia 
(same),  Re  Umberto  (same). 

Armored  cruiser:  a.c.  Vettor  Pisani  (6.4d- 
12g6-19k). 

Cruisers:  c.  Libia  (3.7d-2g6,8g4.7-22k)  and  6 
old   cruisers    (2200  to  3500  tons). 

Destroyers:  About  14   (300  to  700  tons). 

Torpedo  boats:  About  93    (34  to   215  tons). 

Submarines:  20  boats   (110  to  463  tons). 
Ships  in   Foreign  Waters: 

China  Seas:  a.c. Marco  Polo  (4.5d-6g6,10g4.7- 
19k). 

Red  Sea  and  Indian  Ocean:  c.  Piemonte 
(2.6d-10g4.7-22k),  Calabria  (2.5d-6g4.7- 
16k). 

TURKEY 

Note. — Though  Turkey  did  not  enter  the  war 
until  later,  for  purposes  of  comparison  the 
condition  on  Aug.  1,  1914,  is  given,  adding  the 
Goeben  and  Breslau.  The  battleships  build- 
ing in  England  were  taken  over  by  Great 
Britain  at  the  outbreak  of  war.  So  far  as 
known  the  Turkish  navy  had  no  fleet  or  squad- 
ron organization.     The  vessels  were  as  follows: 

Battle  cruiser:  Sultan  Selim  Javuz    (ex-Goe- 

ben)    (23d-10gll-27k). 
Ba'ttleships     (old) :    Kheyr-ed-din    Barbarossa 

(10d-6gll-17k),    Torgut  Reis  (same). 
Old  6..?.  reconstructed  as  a.c:  Messudieh  (lOd- 

2g9.2,12g6-16k). 


Coast-Defense  vessel:  Muin-i-Zaffer   (2.7d-4g6- 

12k). 
Cruisers:    Medillu     (ex-Breslau)     (4.5d-12g4.1- 

27k),      Hamidieh       (3.8d-2gS,8g4.7-22k), 

Medjidieh    (3.4d-2g6,8g4.7-22k ) . 
Destroyers:    4   boats    (0.6d-2g3.4-35k),    6    boats 

(0.3d-various-25   to   28k). 
Torpedo  boats:  10  boats   (96  to  165  tons-27k). 
Submarines:  none.     Many   small   gunboats. 

Belligerent  Naval  Forces  in  the  Black  Sea 

RUSSIA 
Active   Fleet    (Admiral   Eberhard,   command- 
ing) 
Battleship    Sq. :    b.s.    Panteleimon    (13d-4gl2- 
16k),     Tri     Sviatitelya     (13d-4gl2-17k), 
Joann  Zlatoust    (13d-4gl2,4g8-16k),  Svi- 
atoi  Evstafii   (same),  Repair  ship  Kron- 
stadt   (16d-13k). 
Destroyer  Flotilla:  1st  Div.:  6  boats  (615  tons, 

25  knots);   2d   Div.:   6   boats    (360  tons, 

26  knots);   3d   Div.:   6   boats    (250  tons, 
26    knots). 

Submarine  Div.:  2  boats  (240  tons),  2  boats 
(150   tons). 

Mine  layers:  Beresany   (5d-12k),  Prut  (same). 

Submergible  mine  layer:  Krab  (500  to  700 
tons). 

Reserve  Ships:  b.s.  Georgia  Pobiedonosetz 
(lld-6gl2-16k),  Sinop  (same),  Rostis- 
lav  (9d-4gl0-16k),  a.c.  Kagul  (6.7d-12g6- 
23k),  P  amy  at  Mercuria  (same).  Tor- 
pedo boats,  10   (88  to  164  tons). 

Belligerent  Naval  Forces  in  the  Pacific 
and   Indian   Oceans 

GREAT  BRITAIN 

Battleships:  Triumph  (12d-4gl0,14g7.5-20k), 
Swift  sure  (same). 

Armored  cruisers:  Minotaur  (15d-4g9.2,10g7.5- 
23k),   Hampshire    (Ild-4g7.5,6g6-23k). 

Cruisers:  Newcastle  (4.8d-2g6,10g4-26k),  Glas- 
gow (same),  Yarmouth  (5.3d-8g6-26k), 
Dartmouth  (same),  Fox  (4.4d-2g6,8g4.7- 
19k),  Philomel  (2.6d-8g4.7-16k),  Psyche 
2.1d-8g4-20k),  Py ramus  (same),  Pelorus 
(same). 

Submarines:  3  of  320  tons. 

Australian  navy:  b.c.  Australia  (19d-8gl2- 
27k),  c.  Melbourne  (5.4d-8g6-26k),  Syd- 
ney (same),  Encounter  (5.9d-llg6-21k), 
Pioneer  (2.2d-8g4-20k).  Destroyers:  3 
boats  (0.7d-lg4,3g3-26k).  Submarines:  2 
of   825   tons. 

FRANCE 

Armored  cruisers:  Montcalm   (9.5d-2g7.6,8g6.4- 

21k),  Dupleix    (7.6d-8g6.4-21k). 
Destroyers:  3  boats   (4.3d-lg2.6-30k). 


182 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


RUSSIA 
Cruisers:     Askold      (6d-12g6-23k),     Jemtchug 

(3.1d-6g4.7-24k). 
Destroyers:   1st  Div.:  8  boats    (0.35d-26k) ;   2d 

Div.:   7  boats    (0.24d-26k). 
Submarines:    1    div.    of    5    boats    (175    to    200 

tons). 
Reserve:  4  torpedo  boats,  2  mine  layers. 

GERMANY 

Armored  cruisers:  Scharnhorst  (11.4d-8g8.2, 
6g5.9-23k),  Gneisenau  (same). 

Cruisers:  Emden  (3.6d-10g4.1-24k),  Dresden 
(same),  Niirnberg  (3.4d-10g4.1-24k),  Ko- 
nigsberg  (same),  Bremen  (3.2d-10g4.1- 
23k),  Leipzig  (same). 

Miscellaneous:  Many  unimportant  gunboats, 
500  to  1600  tons,  of  no  fighting  value. 

Belligerent  Naval  Forces  in  the  North 
Atlantic 

GREAT  BRITAIN 

Temporary  Squadron:  a.c.  Monmouth  (lOd- 
14g6-23k),  and  several  old  and  unimpor- 
tant   cruisers. 

Canadian  navy:  c.  Niobe  (lld-16g6-20k),  1 
mine  layer,   1   transport. 

GERMANY 

Cruiser:  Karlsruhe   (4.8d-12g4.1-27k). 

Miscellaneous:  Several  fast  passenger  steam- 
ers which  were  turned  into  auxiliary 
cruisers. 

FRANCE 
Temporary  squadron  of  two  cruisers  in  Mexico. 


Operations  in  the  North  Sea  and  the 
Waters  about  Great  Britain.  At  the 
end  of  July.  1914,  the  German  High 
Seas  fleet  was  off  the  coast  of  Norway 
and  nearly  the  whole  of  the  British 
Grand  fleet  lay  at  Spithead  off  the  Isle 
of  Wight.  As  the  probability  of  war 
increased,  more  and  more  definite  steps 
were  taken  to  prepare  for  mobilizing 
the  entire  British  naval  force  and  put- 
ting into  full  commission  all  ships  in 
reserve  and  laid  up.  On  August  2, 
German  troops  invaded  Belgium  and  the 
same  day  the  British  Grand  fleet  was 
ordered  to  proceed  to  an  unknown  des- 
tination  in    the    North   Sea.      On   Au- 


gust 4,  Great  Britain  and  France  de- 
clared war  and  mobilization  of  both 
fleets  was  directed.  Within  four  hours 
of  the  declaration  of  war,  British  scout- 
ing squadrons  were  sent  towards  the 
German  fleet  and  coast,  one  submarine 
flotilla  exploring  the  Helgoland  bight. 

The  German  High  Seas  fleet,  being 
vastly  inferior  to  the  British  forces 
facing  it,  was  hastily  withdrawn  behind 
the  defenses  of  the  German  coast  at 
Kiel  and  in  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal 
which  had  fortunately  been  completed  a 
couple  of  months  before. 

The  laying  of  mines  now  proceeded 
with  indescribable  rapidity.  It  is  sup- 
posed that  the  Germans  had  begun  as 
early  as  July  29,  but  this  is  uncertain. 
Not  only  were  the  German  harbors  and 
the  vicinity  of  Helgoland  protected  but 
the  whole  eastern  part  of  the  North 
Sea  was  planted  with  mine  fields  where 
they  were  most  likely  to  be  useful  and 
the  approaches  to  the  Baltic  were  closed 
except  a  narrow  strip  along  the  Swed- 
ish coast  in  Swedish  territorial  waters 
and  the  channels  through  the  mined 
area  which  were  known  only  to  German 
and  Danish  pilots.  Denmark  was  forced 
to  lay  mines  in  her  own  waters  by  Ger- 
many which  sent  her  an  ultimatum  stat- 
ing that  if  she  did  not  place  them  Ger- 
many would.  According  to  British  re- 
ports the  German  fields  were  extended 
over  the  whole  southern  part  of  the 
North  Sea  above  a  line  joining  the 
Hook  of  Holland  with  Harwich,  Eng- 
land. The  separate  mine  areas  were 
small  or  narrow  but  were  so  numerous 
as  to  make  navigation  dangerous.  The 
British  thereupon  closed  the  Strait  of 
Dover  by  a  mined  area  with  boundar- 
ies consisting  of  the  parallels  of  51° 
15'  and  51°  40'  N.  latitude  and  the 
meridians  of  1°  35'  and  3°  E.  longi- 
tude. 

They  then  began  a  systematic  search 


NAVAL  OPERATIONS 


183 


for  German  mines,  mine  layers,  and  pro- 
tecting forces,  and  also  dispatched  their 
mine-sweeping  groups  of  trawlers  as 
fast  as  work  was  found  for  them.  It 
was  in  connection  with  mine  planting 
that  the  first  naval  action  of  the  war 
was  brought  about.  On  August  5, 
H.M.S.  Amphion  (3400t-25k),  with  the 
third  destroyer  flotilla,  was  carrying 
out  a  prearranged  plan  of  search  when 
a  suspicious  ship  was  reported  by  a 
trawler.  This  was  the  German  mine 
layer  Kbnigin  Louise,  and  she  was 
chased  and  sunk;  but  early  the  next 
morning  the  Amphion  struck  a  mine 
and  was  herself  destroyed. 

On  August  9,  the  First  Light  Cruis- 
er Squadron  was  attacked  by  three  or 
more  German  submarines,  showing  only 
their  periscopes.  A  lucky  shot  de- 
stroyed the  periscope  of  one  boat  and 
the  splash  of  countless  projectiles 
blinded  the  view  from  the  periscopes 
of  the  others.  All  except  the  injured 
boat  disappeared  and  retreated  but  she 
came  to  the  surface  after  a  time  quite 
close  to  the  cruisers.  Just  as  her  con- 
ning tower  appeared  sufficiently  to  note 
her  name,  JJ-15,  a  shot  from  the  Bir- 
mingham tore  a  hole  in  its  base  and  the 
boat  sank  like  a  stone.  None  of  the 
British  vessels  were  injured.  For  more 
than  two  weeks  following  this  incident 
the  British  continued  their  scouting  and 
dragging  for  mines.  Frequent  clashes 
took  place  between  the  patrol  vessels 
but  no  serious  damages  were  inflicted  on 
either  side. 

On  August  26,  the  Eighth  Submarine 
Flotilla  (eight  boats),  two  destroyer 
flotillas,  and  their  flag  cruisers  and 
tenders,  were  ordered  to  proceed  to  re- 
connoitre Helgoland  and  the  waters  to 
the  southward.  They  were  followed  by 
the  Battle  Cruiser  and  First  Light 
Cruiser  Squadrons  at  a  distance  of  20 
to   30   miles.      On  August  28,  the  de- 


stroyer flotillas,  when  about  25  miles 
from  Helgoland,  and  not  much  far- 
ther from  Wilhelmshaven,  found  the 
enemy  in  superior  force  and  were  com- 
pelled to  fall  back.  Admiral  Beatty  * 
promptly  sent  the  First  Light  Cruiser 
Squadron  to  their  assistance  but,  as  the 
enemy's  force  seemed  strong,  he  soon  de- 
cided to  follow  with  his  heavy  vessels. 
The  advent  of  the  battle  cruisers  quick- 
ly decided  matters.  In  a  short  time,  the 
German  vessels  were  retiring  along  the 
whole  front.  The  light  cruisers,  Mainz, 
Koln,  and  Ariadne,  and  the  destroyer 
V-187  were  sunk.  No  British  vessels 
were  lost  but  the  Arethusa,  flagship  of 
the  destroyer  fleet,  was  severely  injured 
and  had  to  be  towed  to  England.  As 
soon  as  his  light  vessels  were  safely 
withdrawn,  Admiral  Beatty  retired  the 
battle  cruisers  a  he  was  operating  in 
the  vicinity  of  mine  fields  and  was  ex- 
posed to  attack  by  submarines,  several 
of  which  were  seen.  The  Queen  Mary 
was  twice  attacked  and  the  Lowestoft 
once,  but  high  speed  in  each  case  made 
the  attempt  abortive.  The  short  range 
of  the  torpedoes  used  in  German  sub- 
marines was  first  noticed  in  these  at- 
tacks. 

The  month  of  September  was  a  par- 
ticularly eventful  one.  On  September 
3,  the  British  gunboat  Speedy  was  de- 
stroyed by  a  mine  and,  on  September 
7,  the  light  cruiser  Pathfinder  was  sunk 
by  the  German  U-%1,  the  first  surface 
vessel  to  fall  a  victim  to  the  dreaded 
submarine.  On  September  9,  the  White 
Star  liner  Oceanic,  now  a  naval  trans- 
port,   was    run    ashore    in    a    fog    and 

*  Sir  David  Beatty,  born  (1871)  in  County 
Wexford,  Ireland;  entered  navy  (1884);  served 
with  Nile  flotilla  (1896)  and  in  the  advance  on 
Peking  (1900);  aid-de-camp  to  King  Edward 
VII  (1908);  naval  secretary  to  First  Lord  of 
the  Admiralty  (1912);  commander  First  Bat- 
tle Cruiser  Squadron  (1912);  K.C.B.  (1914); 
vice  admiral  (1915),  youngest  officer  ever  to 
reach  that  grade;  married  a  daughter  of  Mar- 
shall Field  of  Chicago. 


184 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


wrecked.  On  September  28,  there  came 
an  event  which  startled  the  world  and 
added  greatly  to  the  prestige  of  the 
submarine.  About  daylight  that  morn- 
ing, the  British  armored  cruisers  Abo-w- 
hir, Hogue,  and  Cressy  were  on  patrol 
duty  in  the  North  Sea  and  steaming  at 
moderate  speed  in  column.  At  6.25 
a.m.,  the  Abouhir,  which  was  leading, 
was  struck  by  a  torpedo  from  a  sub- 
marine and  began  to  sink  slowly.  The 
Hogue  and  Cressy  came  up  to  her  as- 
sistance, stopped,  and  attempted  to 
save  life.  A  little  before  7  a.m.,  a  tor- 
pedo struck  the  Hogue.  She  quickly 
capsized  and  sank ;  probably  the  tor- 
pedo exploded  a  magazine.  About  7.15, 
the  Cressy  was  hit  by  a  torpedo  and  15 
minutes  later  by  another.  The  reports 
indicate  that,  of  the  personnel  of  the 
three  ships,  1067  were  saved  and  about 
1133  drowned.  All  were  sunk  by  the 
German  submarine  U-9,  a  300-ton  boat 
commanded  by  Kapitan-Leutnant  Wed- 
digen.  The  ease  with  which  he  per- 
formed his  work  was  due  to  the  lack  of  a 
destroyer  screen  and  the  folly  of  the 
Hogue  and  Cressy  in  stopping  their  en- 
gines in  the  known  presence  of  sub- 
marines. The  frightful  loss  due  to  this 
error  caused  the  Admiralty  to  issue  or- 
ders forbidding  large  vessels  to  pro- 
ceed to  the  assistance  of  others  under 
such  circumstances. 

After  the  Abouhir-Hogue-Cressy 
catastrophe  the  war  against  submarines 
was  intensified.  New  types  of  mines 
were  devised.  Air  craft  began  to  scout 
for  them  and  finally  to  destroy  them  by 
dropping  bombs  on  their  decks  or  in 
their  hatches.  Huge  wire  nets  were 
built.  Some  were  supported  by  float- 
ing buoys,  others  by  buoys  which  were 
kept  below  the  surface  by  the  moorings. 
While  it  was  expected  that  some  sub- 
marines would  become  inextricably  en- 
tangled in  the  nets,  this  was  not  relied 


upon.  The  nets  were  watched  and  when 
an  entangled  submarine  came  to  the  sur- 
face she  was  destroyed  by  gun  fire.  It 
was  soon  found  that  this  watching  could 
well  be  performed  by  very  fast  motor 
boats  carrying  1,  3,  or  6  pounders  or  a 
short  3-inch.  Hundreds  of  these  were 
built — many  purchased  in  the  United 
States.  The  speed  was  high — well  over 
20  knots  in  all  cases  and  as  near  30 
knots  as  the  size  and  condition  per- 
mitted. By  means  of  these  and  of  nets 
stretching  almost  from  shore  to  shore 
and  in  several  places,  the  channel  was 
kept  nearly  free  from  the  enemy's  sub- 
marines during  the  transport  of  troops 
and  munitions  of  war  to  France. 

During  the  month  of  October,  the 
Germans  lost  a  destroyer  and  a  sub- 
marine ;  the  British,  a  submarine,  an  old 
cruiser,  and  the  dreadnought  battleship 
Audacious  by  a  mine.  On  November 
3,  a  German  scouting  expedition  along 
the  Yorkshire  coast  destroyed  a  British 
submarine  and  slightly  injured  a  gun- 
boat. The  armored  cruiser  Torch,  re- 
turning from  this  service,  struck  a 
chain  of  mines  in  entering  the  Jahde 
estuary  and  was  sunk.  A  week  later 
the  gunboat  Niger  was  sent  to  the  bot- 
tom by  a  German  submarine  in  the 
Downs  north  of  Dover.  On  the  16th, 
the  German  auxiliary  cruiser  Berlin  was 
interned  at  Trondjem;  on  the  20th, 
U-18  was  rammed  by  a  patrol  boat  and 
foundered;  on  the  23d,  the  German  de- 
stroyer S-I2J4.  was  sunk  in  collision  with 
a  Danish  steamer ;  and  on  the  26th,  the 
old  British  battleship  Bulwarh  was 
blown  up  in  Sheerness  harbor.  The  loss 
of  the  Bulwarh  was  due  to  some  form 
of  interior  explosion  in  which  her  maga- 
zines were  involved.  The  explosion  was 
tremendously  violent,  only  14  of  the 
complement  of  815  escaping;  and  the 
ship  sank  in  three  minutes. 

During  the  month  of  November,  na- 


NAVAL  OPERATIONS 


185 


val  vessels  were  used  to  support  the 
army  by  attacking  the  enemy's  right 
flank  wherever  it  reached  the  coast. 
Three  small  river  monitors,  purchased 
from  Brazil,  were  found  to  be  of  great 
service  in  this  work,  their  light  draft  of 
four  and  one-half  feet  enabling  them  to 
get  close  in  shore. 

On  December  16,  a  German  battle 
cruiser  squadron,  supposedly  consisting 
of  the  Derfflinger,  Seydlitz,  Moltke,  Von 
der  Tann,  and  Bliicher,  raided  the 
Yorkshire  coast,  bombarding  the  har- 
bors and  cities  of  Hartlepool,  Whitby, 
and  Scarborough.  Nearly  100  non- 
combatants  were  killed  and  500  wound- 
ed. None  of  the  towns  has  forts  or  de- 
fensive works  of  any  kind. 

On  Christmas  day,  a  squadron  of 
seven  naval  seaplanes  delivered  an  at- 
tack on  Cuxhaven  naval  base  but  did 
no  damage  of  importance ;  four  of  the 
aeroplanes  were  lost,  though  all  the  op- 
erators were  saved.  Bombs  were  drop- 
ped on  or  near  the  German  warships  ly- 
ing in  Schillig  roads  but  none  were  ma- 
terially injured.  The  only  value  of  the 
raid  seems  to  have  been  a  gain  in  ex- 
perience and  some  information  of  the 
enemy's  condition. 

The  year  1915  opened  with  the  sink- 
ing of  the  old  battleship  Formidable  on 
January  1,  by  a  German  submarine  in 
the  Channel  off  Plymouth.  This  feat 
is  specially  remarkable  as  it  took  place 
at  night  and  in  a  heavy  sea,  both  con- 
ditions being  very  unfavorable  to  sub- 
marine operations.  She  was  not,  how- 
ever, accompanied  by  destroyers  and 
this  enabled  the  submarine  to  approach 
on  the  surface  without  being  seen. 

On  the  morning  of  January  24,  the 
fast  cruiser  fleet,  in  command  of  Vice 
Admiral  Sir  David  Beatty,  was  patrol- 
ling in  the  North  Sea  (approx.  Lat.  55° 
N.,  approx.  Long.  5°  E.).  This  fleet 
consisted   of   the  First   Battle   Cruiser 


Squadron,  Lion,  Tiger,  Princess  Royal, 
New  Zealand,  and  Indomitable;  the 
First  Light  Cruiser  Squadron,  South- 
ampton, Nottingham,  Birmingham,  and 
Lowestoft;  and  two  destroyer  flotillas. 
About  7  a.m.,  the  cruiser  Aurora,  one 
of  the  destroyer  flagships,  sighted  the 
German  light  cruiser  Kolberg  and  a  de- 
stroyer flotilla  and,  at  7.25,  action  be- 
gan between  them.  About  this  time  the 
German  fast  squadron  (Rear  Admiral 
Hipper),  steering  northwest,  was  sight- 
ed from  the  destroyer  flotillas.  This 
consisted  of  the  battle  cruisers  Derf- 
flinger, Seydlitz,  and  Moltke  and  the 
large  armored  cruiser  Bliicher.  As  soon 
as  the  information  was  signaled  to  Ad- 
miral Beatty,  he  headed  for  the  enemy 
which  had  changed  course  to  southeast 
as  soon  as  they  perceived  the  British 
battle  cruisers.  At  8.52,  the  Lion 
(flagship)  opened  fire  on  the  Bliicher, 
the  rear  ship  of  the  German  column,  at 
a  range  of  a  little  less  than  20,000 
3'ards  but  did  not  effect  a  hit  until  9.09. 
The  German  vessels  began  to  return  the 
fire  at  9.14;  the  Tiger  began  at  9.20, 
the  Princess  Royal  a  few  minutes  later, 
and  the  New  Zealand  at  9.40.  The  In<- 
domitable,  the  slowest  of  the  British 
ships,  apparently  did  not  get  near 
enough  to  any  of  the  German  ships  to 
open  fire  until  after  the  Bliicher  was 
disabled.  The  last  named  had  much  less 
speed  than  the  other  German  vessels 
and  slowly  dropped  astern.  About 
10.48,  she  fell  out  of  line  and  turned  to 
the  northward  with  a  heavy  list.  The 
Indomitable  was  ordered  to  attack  her 
and  the  others  of  the  British  fleet 
pushed  forward  after  the  main  body. 
At  10.54,  submarines  were  reported  on 
the  starboard  bow  of  the  Lion.  The 
British  fleet  at  once  changed  course  to- 
wards the  left.  At  11.03,  the  Lion  re- 
ceived a  shell  in  her  engine  room  which 
disabled  her  port  engine  and  she  hauled 


186 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


out  of  action,  but  Admiral  Beatty  was 
unable  to  transfer  his  flag  to  the 
Princess  Royal  until  12.20.  The  Brit- 
ish squadron  was  now  retiring,  having 
pursued  the  enemy  as  close  as  possible 
to  the  areas  protected  by  mine  fields  and 
submarines.  The  German  losses  are  not 
exactly  known.  Of  the  Bluchers  total 
complement  of  885,  about  200  were 
saved  by  British  destroyers ;  and  they 
were  bombarded  by  German  aeroplanes 
and  a  Zeppelin  while  engaged  in  this 
work.  The  German  reports  of  the  in- 
juries to  their  three  battle  cruisers 
are  not  in  agreement.  One  says  that 
but  a  single  battle  cruiser  was  injured 
while  another  congratulated  the  navy 
that  none  of  the  injuries  received  would 
require  the  ships  to  be  docked.  The 
British  casualties  were  reported  in  full. 
The  Lion's  machinery  was  disabled  by 
destruction  of  the  feed  tank ;  after  try- 
ing to  steam  with  one  engine,  that  began 
to  give  trouble  through  priming  so  she 
was  taken  in  tow  by  the  Indomitable. 
On  the  Lion,  17  men  were  wounded ;  on 
the  Tiger,  one  officer  and  nine  men  were 
killed  and  three  officers  and  eight  men 
wounded. 

About  January  26,  the  French  tor- 
pedo boat  No.  219  was  sunk  off  Nieu- 
port.  On  March  4,  U-8  was  rammed 
and  sunk  off  Dover,  the  crew  being  made 
prisoners.  On  March  10,  the  auxiliary 
cruiser  Bayano  was  torpedoed  by  a  Ger- 
man submarine  and  all  hands  lost.  On 
the  same  day,  U-12  was  rammed  and 
sent  to  the  bottom  by  the  destroyer 
Ariel  and  about  the  same  date  U-29 
was  sunk.  The  captain  of  this  boat  was^ 
Commander  Weddigen  who  torpedoed 
the  Aboukir,  Cressy,  and  Hogue.  On 
May  1,  the  British  destroyer  Recruit 
was  sunk  by  a  submarine  and  about 
May  7  the  Maori,  a  much  larger  boat, 
was  destroyed  by  a  mine  off  Zeebrugge. 
On  May  27,  the  British  auxiliary  cruis- 


er Princess  Irene  was  blown  up  in  Sheer- 
ness  harbor,  only  one  of  her  crew  es- 
caping. Like  the  Bulwark,  she  was 
loading  ammunition  and  it  is  supposed 
that  a  shell  may  have  dropped  from  the 
upper  deck  to  the  hold  and  struck  point 
down  among  many  other  projectiles. 

On  June  10,  the  British  torpedo 
boats  Nos.  10  and  12  were  sunk  by  a 
German  submarine  and  about  the  same 
time  U-lJf.  was  destroyed  and  her  crew 
made  prisoners.  On  June  24,  the  ar- 
mored cruiser  Roxburgh  was  torpedoed 
but  the  damage  was  not  so  serious  as  to 
prevent  reaching  port;  on  July  1,  the 
destroyer  Lightning  received  injuries 
of  similar  gravity  from  a  mine  or  tor- 
pedo, and,  although  the  boat  escaped 
to  port,  15  of  her  crew  were  lost. 

Early  in  July  U-30  was  accidentally 
sunk,  but  was  raised  within  48  hours 
and  only  one  of  the  crew  was  found 
dead.  On  August  8,  the  patrol  boat 
Ramsey  was  sunk  by  the  German  auxil- 
iary cruiser  Meteor,  but  before  the  lat- 
ter could  escape  she  was  discovered  by 
some  British  cruisers  and  was  blown  up 
by  her  commander  to  avoid  surrender. 
On  August  9,  the  destroyer  Lynx 
struck  a  mine  in  the  North  Sea  and  im- 
mediately foundered;  and,  on  August 
12,  the  auxiliary  cruiser  India  was  sunk 
by  a  submarine  while  on  patrol  duty. 
During  the  early  part  of  August  the 
coast  of  Belgium  was  repeatedly  bom- 
barded by  British  vessels  to  assist  mili- 
tary operations.  It  was  reported  that 
at  Zeebrugge,  which  the  Germans  made 
a  naval  port,  a  number  of  vessels,  in- 
cluding submarines  and  destroyers,  were 
destroyed  by  the  bombardment. 

On  August  19,  British  submarine 
E-13  grounded  on  the  Danish  island  of 
Saltholm  in  the  Sound.  Two  German 
destroyers,  which  sighted  her  in  this 
position,  violated  Danish  sovereignty 
by   firing  upon  her  in  Danish  waters. 


NAVAL  OPERATIONS 


187 


On  August  23,  a  German  destroyer  was 
sunk  by  English  boats  near  Zeebrugge 
and  about  the  same  time  U-27  was  lost 
— cause  unknown. 

Between  October  1st  and  4th,  the  Bel- 
gian coast  was  again  bombarded  to  as- 
sist military  operations.  On  October 
28,  the  armored  cruiser  Argyle  ran 
ashore  and  was  wrecked.  On  Novem- 
ber 4,  German  submarine  U-8  was  dis- 
abled off  the  Dutch  coast  and  was  towed 
into  port  where  she  was  interned.  This 
is  apparently  a  new  boat  with  an  old 
number  as  the  U-8,  reported  sunk  on 
March  4,  was  visibly  destroyed  and  her 
crew  made  prisoners.  On  the  same  date 
(November  4),  a  German  submarine  of 
new  type  (length,  250  feet)  was  cap- 
tured by  being  caught  in  a  British  wire 
net.  On  November  13,  the  yachts  Aries 
and  Irene  were  sunk  while  on  patrol 
duty  (circumstances  not  reported),  and 
on  November  17,  the  hospital  ship  Ang- 
lia  was  sunk  by  a  mine  in  midchannel 
with  a  loss  of  100  lives — chiefly  wound- 
ed men.  On  November  28,  a  German 
submarine  was  sunk  off  the  Belgian 
coast  by  a  bomb  from  a  seaplane.  On 
December  30,  the  armored  cruiser  Natal 
was  destroyed  by  an  internal  explosion 
while  at  anchor.  Of  the  complement  of 
725,  400  were  saved.  On  January  9, 
1916,  the  King  Edward  VII  was  sunk 
by  a  mine.  This  battleship  belonged  to 
a  class  that  was  one  of  the  last  and  best 
of  the  pre-dreadnoughts. 

On  May  31,  1916,  began  the  great- 
est naval  battle  of  the  war  up  to  that 
time.  About  four  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon the  British  fast  battle  squadron 
of  seven  battle  cruisers  and  four  battle- 
ships met  the  German  High  Seas  fleet 
of  five  battle  cruisers  and  24  battleships 
off  the  northwest  coast  of  Denmark. 
The  British  engaged  the  enemy  but  fell 
back  before  the  vastly  superior  force  in 
the   direction   of  their  main  fleet.      In 


this  part  of  the  action  they  lost  the  bat- 
tle cruisers  Queen  Mary,  Invincible,  and 
Indefatigable,  and  three  armored  cruis- 
ers— all  of  which  were  sunk;  eight 
destroyers  were  sunk  during  the  night 
attacks.  The  British  Grand  fleet  came 
up  about  six  o'clock,  and  soon  after- 
ward the  Germans  began  to  retire,  pur- 
sued by  the  British.  The  action  con- 
tinued until  after  midnight;  the  night 
attacks  being  chiefly  those  of  destroy- 
ers and  submarines.  The  German  losses 
are  not  definitely  known  but  include  the 
following,  which  were  admitted  by  the 
German  Admiralty :  battleship  Pom- 
mem,  battle  cruiser  Liitzen,  four  fast 
cruisers,  and  five  destroyers.  The  losses 
of  officers  and  men  were  about:  British, 
5000 ;  Germans,  3500 ;  among  the  Brit- 
ish were  Rear  Admirals  Hood  and  Ar- 
buthnot.  The  Germans  were  favored 
by  misty  weather,  the  close  proximity 
of  their  own  coast  (which  injured  ves- 
sels could  quickly  reach),  and  by  the 
fact  that,  a  few  minutes  after  the  ar- 
rival of  the  main  British  force,  mist  and 
darkness  obscured  them  from  the  enemy. 
Both  the  British  and  Germans  claim 
that  additional  vessels  of  their  oppo- 
nents were  destroyed.  As  regards  the 
British  losses,  the  ships  alleged  to  have 
been  sunk  have  been  seen  by  disinterest- 
ed observers ;  as  to-  further  German 
losses  there  is  no  proof. 

On  June  5,  *L916,  the  British  cruiser 
Hampshire  was  destroyed  either  by  a 
mine  or  torpedo  near  the  Orkney  Is- 
lands. Lord  Kitchener  of  Khartum  and 
his  staff  lost  their  lives.  The  Secretary 
of  State  for  War  was  on  a  mission  to 
Russia. 

The  Nottingham  and  Falmouth, 
light  cruisers,  were  sunk  in  the  North 
Sea  by  German  submarines  on  August 
19.  On  October  26  German  torpedo- 
boat  destroyers  made  an  unsuccessful 
attack    on    the    cross-channel    service. 


188 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


They  lost  two  destroyers.  The  British 
lost  the  destroyers  Flirt  and  Nubian. 
On  November  23  torpedo  boats  raided 
the  east  coast  of  England  near  Rams- 
gate.  They  fired  only  a  few  shots  and 
then  retired.  On  January  23,  1917,  a 
battle  between  destroyers  occurred  in 
the  North  Sea.  Berlin  claimed  two 
British  vessels  were  sunk  while  all  of 
hers  returned.  London  admitted  the 
loss  of  one  vessel. 

On  February  26,  1917,  German  de- 
stroyers bombarded  Broadstairs  and 
Margate  on  the  English  coast.  They 
caused  little  damage  and  got  away  un- 
scathed themselves.  In  a  running  fight 
off  the  Belgian  coast  on  April  8  the 
Germans  lost  one  destroyer  and  another 
was  seriously  damaged.  Two  German 
destroyers  and  two  small  British  ves- 
sels were  sunk  near  Dover  on  April  21. 
During  April  several  raiding  expedi- 
tions were  carried  out  by  the  British 
and  Germans.  The  former  bombarded 
the  submarine  bases  at  Ostend  and  Zee- 
brugge,  and  the  latter  bombarded 
Ramsgate,  Calais,  and  Dunkirk.  Dur- 
ing this  month  also  American  destroy- 
ers under  Admiral  Sims  were  sent  to 
European  waters  and  greatly  aided  in 
combating  the  submarines.  In  the  early 
part  of  June  the  British  sank  the  S-20 
and  damaged  another  German  destroy- 
er. A  few  days  later  each  country  lost 
a  destroyer  by  the  explosion  of  mines 
in  the  North  Sea.  British  vessels  on 
several  occasions  crept  close  to  the 
Dutch  coast  and  captured  or  destroyed 
German  merchantmen. 

On  September  5,  Scarborough,  on  the 
English  coast,  was  shelled  by  a  German 
submarine.  On  October  2,  1917,  the 
British  cruiser,  Drake,  was  torpedoed 
and  sunk  off  the  northern  coast  of  Ire- 
land. On  October  17,  two  German  raid- 
ing cruisers  attacked  a  convoy  in  the 
North  Sea  and  sank  5  Norwegian  ves- 


sels, 1  Danish,  3  Swedish,  and  the  Brit- 
ish destroyers  Mary  Rose  and  Strong- 
bow.  On  the  same  day  the  American 
transport,  Antilles,  was  sunk,  with  a 
loss  of  70  lives.  On  November  1,  an- 
other American  transport,  the  Finland, 
was  torpedoed,  but  she  was  able  to  re- 
turn to  the  French  port  she  had  just 
left.  On  November  3  the  British  sank 
the  German  auxiliary  cruiser  Marie  of 
Flensburg  and  10  patrol  boats  in  the 
Cattegat.  On  the  same  day  they  de- 
stroyed a  crewless  raider  off  the  Bel- 
gian coast.  This  is  a  vessel  loaded  with 
high  explosives,  which  will  go  off  on 
contact.  It  was  electrically  controlled, 
run  by  gas  engines,  and  is  supposed  to 
be  steered  into  hostile  warships. 

On  November  5,  the  Alcedo,  an  Amer- 
ican patrol  boat  in  European  waters, 
was  torpedoed  and  sunk  with  the  loss  of 
21  men.  On  November  18,  a  skirmish 
occurred  between  British  and  German 
light  forces,  in  which  neither  side  did 
much  damage.  The  British  pursued 
the  Germans  to  within  30  miles  of  the 
Bight  of  Helgoland.  On  November  19 
the  American  destroyer,  Chauncey,  was 
sunk  as  a  result  of  a  collision  in  the  war 
zone.  Twenty-one  lives  were  lost.  On 
December  6,  the  American  destroyer, 
Jacob  Jones,  was  torpedoed  and  sunk, 
with  a  loss  of  over  60  men.  On  Decem- 
ber 17,  German  cruisers  again  raided  a 
convoy  in  the  North  Sea  and  sank  11 
ships,  including  the  British  destroyer, 
Partridge.  This  caused  considerable 
comment  in  England  and  was  the  sub- 
ject of  an  investigation. 

After  the  battle  of  Jutland,  naval 
operations  on  the  part  of  the  Allies  and 
the  United  States  have  been  chiefly  con- 
cerned in  anti-submarine  warfare  at  sea, 
and  in  attack  on  naval  bases — chiefly 
submarine.  German  naval  activity  with 
surface  ships  was  confined  almost  whol- 
ly to  the  Baltic,  where  their  work  was 


NAVAL  OPERATIONS 


189 


made  comparatively  easy  by  the  ac- 
tivities of  the  Bolsheviki  who,  as  far  as 
they  were  able,  turned  over  the  Russian 
ships  to  them.  The  single  exception  in 
ocean  service  was  the  Wolf,  a  converted 
merchant  steamer,  that  had  a  success- 
ful career  in  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
during  1917-1918,  and  returned  home 
in  safety. 

On  April  6,  1917,  the  United  States 
declared  war  against  Germany.  A  de- 
stroyer and  patrol  fleet  was  rapidly 
prepared  and,  under  the  command  of 
Vice-Admiral  W.  S.  Sims,*  U.  S.  N., 
arrived  in  a  British  port  on  May  4  and 
joined  the  Allied  anti-submarine  forces. 
The  American  naval  patrol  in  Euro- 
pean waters  was  greatly  strengthened 
early  in  1918  by  the  dispatch  of  a  flotil- 
la of  submarines  and  destroyers.  Oth- 
er destroyers  and  patrol  vessels  con- 
tinued to  be  sent  to  the  war  zone  as  fast 
as  they  were  ready  for  service.  In  the 
months  of  April,  May,  and  June,  the 
American  forces  in  European  waters  es- 
corted 121  troopship  convoys  consist- 
ing of  773  ships  and  171  merchant  ship 
convoys  of  1763  ships.  German  sub- 
marines sank  three  transports  contain- 
ing a  large  number  of  American  troops, 
but  the  loss  of  life  was  small — 159  on 
the  Tuscania,  fifty-six  on  the  Moldavia, 
and  none  on  the  Persic.  About  360 
American  soldiers  were  lost  on  the 
Otranto,  which  was  injured  by  collision 
with  another  steamer  and  drifted  on  the 

*  Sims,  William  S.,  Vice  Admiral,  U.  S.  N., 
in  command  of  United  States  destroyers  in 
European  waters.  Born  (1858)  at  Port  Hope, 
Canada.  Graduated  from  United  States  Naval 
Academy  in  1880.  1897-1900  naval  attache  at 
Paris  and  Petrograd.  1902-09  inspector  of  tar- 
get practice  at  Bureau  of  Navigation  and  last 
two  years  of  this  period  naval  aid  to  president. 
Member  of  War  College  1911-13  and  1913-15 
commander  of  torpedo  flotilla  of  Atlantic 
coast.  In  1916  made  president  of  Naval  War 
College  and  commander  of  Second  Naval  Dis- 
trict. In  August,  1916,  made  rear  admiral. 
Made  vice  admiral  in  recognition  of  services 
rendered   abroad. 


rocks.  Several  American  transports 
were  sunk  on  the  return  trip  from 
France,  but  with  small  loss  of  life,  as 
they  carried  few  passengers,  and  most 
of  those  were  saved.  On  September  26, 
1918,  the  U.S.S.  Tampa  was  torpedoed 
and  sunk  with  all  hands  while  acting  as 
a  convoy  vessel ;  she  was  formerly  a  rev- 
enue cutter.  On  September  30,  theU.S.S. 
Ticonderoga  was  torpedoed  and  sunk ; 
eleven  officers  and  102  enlisted  men 
were  drowned,  three  officers  and  five  men 
were  saved,  and  two  officers  were  taken 
prisoners.  The  United  States  armored 
cruiser  San  Diego  was  sunk  by  striking 
a  mine  off"  the  Fire  Island  coast  on 
July  19,  1918.  Between  May  and  Oc- 
tober, 1918,  several  German  submarines 
operated  along  the  American  coast,  but 
the  vessels  sunk  were  chiefly  small  sail- 
ing craft,  and  the  total  tonnage  even 
of  these  was  small.  In  March,  1918, 
the  United  States  collier  Cyclops  dis- 
appeared from  the  sea  without  leav- 
ing a  trace.  Many  German  submarines 
were  sunk  by  armed  merchant  vessels 
and  destroyers — too  many  to  be  here 
enumerated.  One  transport  with  Amer- 
ican soldiers  on  board  sank  two  sub- 
marines on  the  same  day,  and  captured 
nine  of  the  crew  of  one  of  them.  On 
August  8,  a  German  submarine  sank 
the  French  armored  cruiser  Dupetit 
Thouars  (9367  tons);  450  of  her  offi- 
cers and  men  were  saved  by  United 
States  destroyers  which  came  to  her 
rescue. 

The  German  submarine  U-53,  which 
came  to  Newport  in  1916,  was  cap- 
tured by  the  French  about  the  end  of 

1917,  and  was  afterwards  successfully 
used  as  a  decoy  to  other  submarines. 
Minor  operations  were  of  almost  daily 
occurrence  in  this  area.     On  March  21, 

1918,  a  naval  action  occurred  off  Dun- 
kirk, between  British  and  French  de- 
stroyers and  a  German  destroyer  force. 


190 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Two  German  destroyers  and  two  tor- 
pedo boats  were  sunk.  On  March  22, 
monitors  bombarded  the  harbor  works 
at  Ostend.  On  April  25,  the  British 
attempted  to  sink  old  cruisers  loaded 
with  concrete  so  as  to  block  the  harbor 
entrances  of  Zeebrugge  and  Ostend. 
The  Zeebrugge  operation  was  success- 
ful, three  cruisers  being  sunk  so  as  to 
block  the  fairway,  but  the  Ostend  at- 
tempt failed.  A  second  attempt  at  Os- 
tend on  May  14  gave  better  results,  but 
was  not  satisfactory.  The  operations 
were  carried  out  with  extraordinary  de- 
termination and  courage  in  the  face  of 
murderous  fire  from  shore,  and  the  loss 
of  life  was  terrible,  but  their  work  made 
it  necessary  for  the  German  submarines 
and  destroyers  to  fall  back  to  bases  on 
the  German  coast,  and  greatly  reduced 
their  effectiveness.  On  April  17-18, 
German  destroyers  made  a  raid  on  the 
Flanders  coast,  and  about  the  same  time 
the  Cattegat  was  swept  clear  of  Ger- 
man patrols  by  a  British  destroyer 
flotilla.  On  May  15,  the  British  gave 
warning  of  a  new  mine  field  extending 
from  Norwegian  territorial  waters 
nearly  to  the  Orkneys  and  the  coast  of 
Scotland.  On  May  23,  the  transport 
Moldavia  was  sunk  and  fifty-three 
American  soldiers  were  drowned. 

The  Submarine  Campaign. — On  Jan. 
31,  1917,  the  German  government  an- 
nounced to  the  world  that  with  certain 
definite  limitations  a  ruthless  submarine 
warfare  was  to  be  carried  on  against 
all  ships.  For  details  see  section,  Neu- 
tral Nations,  United  States.  A  brief 
description  of  the  campaign  will  be 
given  here,  as  well  as  a  discussion  of 
the  methods  used  to  combat  it.  Up  to 
the  time  of  the  beginning  of  the  inten- 
sive warfare  the  amount  of  tonnage 
sunk  varied  according  to  the  British 
and  German  reports.  The  latter 
claimed  that  4,400,000  tons,  of  which 


3,000,000  were  British,  had  been  sunk 
by  Feb.  1,  1917.  The  British  Ad- 
miralty estimate  was  slightly  more  than 
3,000,000  tons,  both  British  and  other 
countries.  In  the  first  month  of  the 
new  warfare  Berlin  claimed  to  have 
sunk  368  vessels  of  781,500  tons.  These 
figures  varied  widely  from  those  given 
out  at  London,  which  claimed  that  only 
490,000  tons  had  been  sunk.  In  her 
warfare,  Germany  made  no  distinction 
between  neutral  and  enemy  ships.  Hos- 
pital ships  and  Belgian  relief  ships 
were  sunk  without  warning.  Three 
American  vessels  were  also  sunk. 

Starting  with  March,  1917,  the  Ad- 
miralties of  the  Allied  Countries  began 
to  report  the  submarine  sinkings  in  a 
general  way,  so  that  it  was  impossible 
to  gain  facts  as  to  tonnage  destroyed 
and  vessels  sunk.  The  Admiralty  of 
each  country  announced  the  number  of 
vessels  over  1600  tons  and  those  under 
1600  tons  sunk  each  week,  as  well  as 
the  number  of  arrivals  and  sailings. 
French  estimates  place  the  loss  of  ton- 
nage in  the  first  four  months  of  1917 
at  2,500,000,  which  was  more  than  the 
entire  tonnage  built  in  1916.  The 
weekly  and  monthly  losses  fluctuated 
considerably.  April,  June,  and  Decem- 
ber, 1917,  were  high  months,  while  July, 
August,  and  September  were  low 
months.  A  conservative  estimate  of  the 
total  tonnage  lost  during  1917  would 
be  approximately  6,500,000.  No  fig- 
ures were  published  concerning  the  loss 
of  submarines. 

The  methods  of  fighting  the  subma- 
rines were  many  and  varied.  Small  pa- 
trol boats  80  to  110  feet  long,  very 
fast,  and  mounted  with  small  guns,  pa- 
trolled the  coasts  of  the  Allied  countries 
with  great  regularity.  They  were  a 
hard  mark  to  hit  and  their  guns  were 
heavy  enough  to  destroy  the  frail  sub- 
marine.    All  merchantmen  were  armed 


NAVAL  OPERATIONS 


191 


with  guns  as  heavy  as  they  could  rea- 
sonably carry  and  were  supplied  with 
trained  naval  crews.  Most  of  them  were 
also  supplied  with  wireless  outfits  in  or- 
der to  call  for  help  if  necessary.  Aero- 
planes were  given  definite  routes  to  pa- 
trol and  they  did  effective  work,  inas- 
much as  they  were  able  to  see  a  sub- 
marine quite  a  distance  down  in  the 
water,  even  if  its  periscope  were  not 
showing  above  the  water.  They  would 
then  drop  a  bomb  on  it  or  would  signal 
to  a  destroyer,  which  would  come  and 
drop  a  depth  bomb,  which  was  timed 
to  explode  at  a  given  depth.  All  the 
Allied  destroyers  were  supplied  with 
depth  bomb  throwing  devices.  Another 
scheme  used  was  the  smoke  screen.  By 
means  of  chemical  action  a  dense  cloud 
of  heavy  smoke  could  be  thrown  around 
a  vessel,  which  would  hide  it  to  such 
an  extent  that  the  U-boat  would  be 
unable  to  aim  its  torpedo  with  any  de- 
gree of  accuracy.  Nets  were  also  used 
as  protections  across  the  mouths  of 
harbors  and  were  often  dragged 
through  a  given  area,  in  order  to  en- 
mesh a  submarine.  After  the  United 
States  entered  the  war  the  old-time  cus- 
tom of  convoying  ships  was  revived,  and 
to  this  is  probably  due  the  great  de- 
crease in  the  numbers  of  merchantmen 
sunk  in  the  latter  part  of  1917.  Lastly, 
the  indirect  method  of  building  tonnage 
faster  than  it  could  be  sunk  was  at- 
tempted by  rapidly  increasing  ship- 
building in  the  United  States  and  other 
Allied  and  neutral  nations. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  German 
government  determined  to  risk  every- 
thing on  the  submarine  campaign  to 
bring  the  war  to  a  successful  conclusion. 
It  must  have  known  that  the  United 
States  and  other  neutrals  would  not 
for  a  moment  stand  for  the  restriction 
of  the  use  of  the  high  seas.  The  En- 
tente Allies   reiterated  time  and   again 


that  Germany  would  ultimately  be 
beaten  because  her  chief  weapon,  the 
submarine,  had  not  proved  a  thorough 
success. 

On  September  1,  1918,  the  United 
States  Shipping  Board  estimated  that 
the  Allied  and  neutral  nations  had  lost 
21,404,913  deadweight  tons  of  ship- 
ping since  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
This  showed  that  Germany  had  main- 
tained an  average  destruction  of  about 
445,000  deadweight  tons  a  month. 
During  the  latter  months,  however,  the 
sinkings  had  fallen  considerably  below 
the  average  and  in  May,  1918,  Allied 
construction  passed  destruction  for  the 
first  time. 

The  following  table  shows  the  status 
of  world  tonnage  on  September,  1918. 
Figures  for  Germany  and  Austria  are 
excluded : 

Deadweight 
Tons 
Total  losses    (allied   and   neutral)    August,    1914- 

September  1,  1918.  . 21,404,913 

Total   construction    (allied   and   neutral)   August, 

1914-September  1,  1918 14,247,825 

Total  enemy  tonnage  captured  (to  end  of  1917) . .  .       3,795,000 

Excess  of  losses  over  gains 3,362,088 

Estimated  normal  increase  in  world's  tonnage  if 

war  had  not  occurred  (based  on  rate  of  annual 

increase,  1905-1914) 14,700,000 

Net  deficit  due  to  war 18,062,088 

World's  merchant  tonnage,  June  30,  1914  (Lloyd's 

Register) 73,634,328 

Anti-submarine  Operations. — T  h  e 
strategy  of  the  anti-submarine  cam- 
paign was  both  active  and  passive.  The 
active  part  consisted  of  the  destruction 
of  submarine  bases,  the  placing  of  mine 
fields  along  submarine  paths,  the  pa- 
trol and  search  of  the  seas.  Its  prin- 
cipal weapons  were  the  destroyer,  the 
patrol  boat,  the  Q-boat,  the  mine,  the 
net,  the  gun,  the  depth  mine,  the  depth 
bomb,  the  airplane,  the  dirigible,  and 
the  submarine.  The  passive  part  in- 
cluded the  convoy  system,  zigzag 
courses,  camouflage,  smoke  screens, 
painting  of  ships,  arming  of  merchant- 
men, and  the  placing  of  protective  mine 
fields  and  nets.  The  arming  of  mer- 
chantmen forced  the  submarine  to  give 


192 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


up  the  gun  for  the  torpedo  until  guns 
of  longer  range  and  larger  calibre  were 
mounted  on  submarines  of  greater  size. 
This  was  an  enormous  check  to  subma- 
rine activities,  and  just  as  it  was  being 
largely  overcome,  an  effective  convoy 
system  became  possible  through  the  con- 
stantly growing  number  of  vessels  suit- 
able for  convoy  duty.  The  develop- 
ment of  this  system  at  the  close  of  the 
war  was  rapidly  leading  up  to  an  al- 
most total  nullification  of  the  subma- 
rine, if  not  to  its  complete  destruction, 
as  the  new  destroyers  under  construc- 
tion in  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  were  completed.  The  failure 
of  protection  to  some  of  the  earlier 
convoys  in  no  way  qualifies  these  views, 
for  the  convoying  craft  in  every  case 
were  too  few  for  the  purpose,  while 
the  safe  transportation  of  the  Ameri- 
can army  by  means  of  adequate  convoy 
proves  the  case  beyond  reasonable 
doubt,  because  even  this  convoy  could 
have  been  improved  and  strengthened. 
A  completely  equipped  convoying  force 
of  destroyers,  airplanes,  and  dirigibles 
in  adequate  number  forms  nearly  a  sure 
barrier  to  the  submarine.  In  fact,  a 
group  of  merchant  vessels  so  protected 
might  profitably  have  advertised  its 
sailing  and  route  in  German  papers  in 
the  hope  that  German  submarines  would 
venture  to  attack,  and  meet  almost  sure 
destruction.  This  aspect  of  affairs  was 
undoubtedly  recognized  by  leading  Ger- 
man thinkers,  and  played  an  im- 
portant part  in  the  Teutonic  collapse, 
and  readiness  for  peace. 

Operations  in  the  Baltic.  Mine  lay- 
ing by  Germany  and  Russia  began  in 
the  Baltic  at  least  as  early  as  in  the 
North  Sea.  As  stated  in  the  remarks 
upon  North  Sea  operations,  the  Danes 
were  forced  by  Germany  to  close  the 
Baltic  by  mining  their  own  waters,  leav- 
ing  passages   only  known   to   the  Ger- 


man and  Danish  pilots,  except  close  in 
to  the  Swedish  coast.  German  mine 
fields  were  very  freely  spread  over  the 
southern  part  of  the  Baltic  in  addition 
to  covering  the  approaches  to  all  Ger- 
man ports.  Of  the  Russian  fields  less 
is  known,  but  it  is  certain  that  a  very 
large  number  of  Russian  mines  were 
placed,  particularly  in  the  gulfs  of 
Riga  and  Finland,  and  merchant  ves- 
sels and  others  were  warned  of  fields 
covering  the  Russian  coast  and  harbors 
south  of  Lat.  58°  50'  N.  and  east  of 
Long.  21  E. ;  also  of  mines  in  the  chan- 
nels of  the  Aland  Archipelago.  The 
difficulty  of  defending  Libau  and  Win- 
dau  against  the  German  army  was  thor- 
oughly understood  and  the  ships,  stores, 
and  munitions  held  at  these  ports  were 
transferred  to  Reval,  Helsingfors, 
Kronstadt,  and  Riga.  At  Libau  there 
is  a  dockyard  of  considerable  impor- 
tance, second  only  to  Kronstadt  in  its' 
capacity  for  repairs,  but  Windau  was 
a  torpedo-boat  base  only. 

As  soon  as  the  relations  with  Rus- 
sia became  strained,  German  ships  be- 
gan to  patrol  the  coast  from  Memel 
to  the  Gulf  of  Riga ;  on  August  4,  the 
light  cruiser  Augsburg  bombarded  Li- 
bau without  effecting  serious  damage, 
and  on  the  same  day,  a  German  expedi- 
tion took  possession  of  the  Island  of 
Aland,  which  lies  in  the  straits  con- 
necting the  Gulf  of  Bothnia  with  the 
Baltic  and  is  only  a  short  distance 
north  of  the  Gulf  of  Finland. 

On  August  27,  the  German  cruiser 
Magdeburg  ran  ashore  in  a  fog  on  the 
Island  of  Odensholm  and  was  blown  up 
to  avoid  capture  by  an  approaching 
Russian  naval  force.  It  was  reported 
that  early  in  September  Admiral  von 
Essen,  who  commanded  the  Russian 
fleet,  painted  a  number  of  his  vessels  to 
imitate  German  ships,  hoisted  German 
colors,  and  contrived,  in  foggy  weather, 


NAVAL  OPERATIONS 


193 


to  join  a  German  scouting-  expedition 
unsuspected.  At  a  convenient  moment 
he  opened  fire,  sank  one  German  cruiser 
(said  to  be  the  Augsburg),  and  badly 
damaged  another,  while  his  destroyers 
severely  handled  the  smaller  craft.  Be- 
fore the  Germans  fully  recovered  from 
their  surprise,  he  withdrew  his  force  and 
escaped  without  material  injury.  On 
September  24,  a  German  scouting  ex- 
pedition of  about  40  vessels  of  all  kinds 
appeared  before  Windau,  but  after  fir- 
ing a  few  shots  retired. 

On  December  12,  the  German  ar- 
mored cruiser  Friedrich  Karl  was  sunk 
by  a  mine  and  on  the  25th  the  old 
cruiser  Hertha  and  a  mine  layer  were 
attacked  by  Russian  cruisers  and  re- 
ported sunk.  The  Russian  submarines 
were  now  becoming  effective  and,  not- 
withstanding the  ice,  were  cruising  in 
the  Baltic ;  their  first  victim  was  a  Ger- 
man torpedo  boat  sunk  off  Cape  Moen, 
and,  at  about  the  same  time  and  place, 
the  German  cruiser  Gazelle  was  torpe- 
doed and  badly  injured.  During  the 
remainder  of  the  winter  and  the  early 
spring  the  ice  interfered  with  prose- 
cuting operations  of  importance. 

In  June,  1915,  the  Germans  began 
operations  along  the  coast  in  support 
of  the  land  forces.  While  endeavoring 
to  lay  mines  in  the  way  of  the  Ger- 
man fleet  a  Russian  mine  layer  was  dis- 
covered and  sunk.  On  July  2,  a  Rus- 
sian cruiser  squadron  drove  off  a  Ger- 
man light  cruiser  of  the  Augsburg  class 
and  several  destroyers  and  forced  the 
mine  layer  Albatross  to  run  ashore  in 
a  sinking  condition.  On  the  same  day 
a  British  submarine  is  reported  to  have 
sunk  a  battleship  of  the  Pommern  class. 

During  the  spring  and  summer  of 
1915,  the  Germans  busied  themselves  in 
repairing  and  reequipping  Libau  as  a 
naval  base  and  from  there  began  opera- 
tions against  Riga.     During  the  month 


of  August  they  made  several  attacks  in 
force,  but  all  failed.  The  Russian  gun- 
boats Sivoutch  and  Koreetz  were  de- 
stroyed and  at  least  one  German  de- 
stroyer was  sunk.  British  submarines 
had  now  reached  the  Baltic  in  consid- 
erable numbers,  passing  under  the  mine 
fields  or  through  the  Sound  and  along 
the  Swedish  coast.  Their  presence 
acted  as  a  strong  check  on  German 
operations,  especially  after  the  German 
armored  cruiser  Prinz  Adalbert  was 
sunk  (October  23)  off  Libau.  Early 
in  November,  a  British  cruiser  squadron 
escorted  a  flotilla  of  submarines  (esti- 
mates of  observers  range  from  10  to 
25)  as  far  as  the  Skaw  (north  point 
of  Denmark).  From  there  they  were 
accompanied  by  a  destroyer  flotilla  un- 
til well  past  Elsinore  and  safely  inside 
the  Baltic.  The  Germans  learned  of 
the  operation  too  late  to  prevent  it. 
They  had  already  placed  a  new  mine 
field  at  the  entrance  to  the  Sound  but 
the  British  seemed  to  have  been  able 
to  avoid  it. 

The  large  number  of  British  and 
Russian  submarines  in  the  spring  of 
1916  in  the  Baltic  were  said  to  have  not 
only  stopped  German  operations  to  the 
eastward  of  Danzig,  but  to  have  effect- 
ed a  completely  successful  blockade  of 
the  German  coast  against  vessels  com- 
ing from  Sweden,  many  of  which  had 
been  captured  and  sunk,  or  warned  and 
turned  back  (if  neutral),  while  a  large 
number  were  loaded  in  Swedish  ports 
but  were  afraid  to  venture  out.  This 
practically  completed  the  British  naval 
cordon  about  the  Central  Powers.  On 
November  7,  a  British  submarine  sank 
the  German  cruiser  Undine,  and  on  De- 
cember 19,  another  submarine  sank  the 
German  cruiser  Bremen  and  a  torpedo 
boat. 

For  the  chief  operation  of  the  Ger- 
man and  Russian  Baltic  fleets  in  1917, 


194 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


consult  Military  Operations,  Eastern 
Theatre. 

The  mutinous  spirit  in  the  German 
navy,  especially  aroused  by  forced  de- 
tails to  the  submarine  service,  was 
shown  at  an  uprising  among  the  sail- 
ors at  Kiel,  on  January  7,  1918,  in 
which  thirty-eight  officers  were  report- 
ed killed.  German  accounts  state  that 
the  sea  raider  Wolf  safely  reached  a 
home  port  (believed  to  be  Kiel)  about 
April  1,  after  fifteen  months  of  cruising 
in  the  Atlantic,  Pacific,  and  Indian 
Oceans.  During  the  spring  of  1918 
there  were  various  reports  of  the  blow- 
ing up  of  Russian  warships  to  prevent 
their  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  Ger- 
mans, but  the  reports  were  of  doubtful 
authenticity;  there  is,  however,  no 
doubt  that  the  commanding  officers  of 
the  British  submarines  at  Helsingfors 
blew  up  their  boats  in  April  or  May, 
and  escaped  through  Finland. 

Operations  in  the  Mediterranean.  On 
the  day  after  war  was  declared  the  Ger- 
man naval  force  in  the  Mediterranean 
bombarded  undefended  seaport  towns  in 
Algeria,  the  battle  cruiser  Goeben  firing 
upon  Philippeville  and  the  light  cruiser 
Breslau  upon  Bona.  They  then  pro- 
ceeded to  Messina,  Sicily,  where  they 
arrived  on  August  5.  Being  in  a  neu- 
tral port,  they  were  required  to  depart 
within  24  hours ;  so,  on  the  6th,  they 
left,  steering  south.  Evading  the  Brit- 
ish fleet  which  was  seeking  them,  they 
were  next  heard  of  in  the  Dardanelles, 
where  they  arrived  on  August  11.  Here 
they  behaved  to  neutral  steamers  in  a 
high-handed  way  which  indicated  Ger- 
man control  of  the  Turkish  government 
and  foreshadowed  the  course  taken  by 
Turkey  a  short  time  later.  To  avoid 
immediate  trouble  for  the  Ottoman  au- 
thorities they  were  supposedly  sold  to 
Turkey  and  renamed  Sultan  Selim  Javuz 
and  Medillu,  but  they  apparently  con- 


tinued in  command  of  German  officers 
and  retained  a  part  at  least  of  their 
German  crews. 

On  August  9,  Austria  declared  a 
blockade  of  the  Montenegrin  coast  and 
bombarded  Antivari.  About  the  same 
date  the  French  and  British  fleets  es- 
tablished a  blockade  of  the  Austrian 
coast  at  the  Strait  of  Otranto.  The 
Austrians  had  placed  mine  fields  all 
along  their  coast,  but  their  first  victim 
was  one  of  their  own  ships,  the  Baron 
Gautsch,  which  struck  a  mine  on  the 
14th  and  sank  at  once  with  a  loss  of 
67  lives.  About  the  middle  of  August, 
the  French  and  British  forces  swept  up 
the  Adriatic,  driving  the  Austrians  to 
the  northward.  They  then  attempted 
to  take  Cattaro  for  a  naval  base,  but 
lacked  the  military  force  for  a  garrison 
and  shore  operations,  and  therefore 
failed.  After  a  few  weeks  of  futile  bom- 
bardment of  Cattaro  and  the  Austrian 
positions  on  the  Dalmatian  coast  they 
returned  to  the  vicinity  of  Otranto 
Strait  but  continued  to  send  scouting 
expeditions  up  the  Adriatic. 

The  peculiar  behavior  of  Turkey  and 
the  reported  mining  of  the  Dardanelles 
caused  a  British  force  to  be  maintained 
in  that  region.  While  on  this  duty  the 
armored  cruiser  Warrior  ran  ashore 
and  was  injured  on  September  7.  On 
the  10th,  Turkey  abrogated  the  capitu- 
lations with  foreign  governments  and, 
during  the  latter  part  of  October,  per- 
mitted her  vessels  to  sink  Russian  ships 
of  war  and  attack  Odessa.  De  facto 
war  was  begun  by  the  Entente  Allies 
on  November  1 ;  on  the  5th,  Great  Brit- 
ain formally  declared  war  on  Turkey 
and  annexed  the  Island  of  Cyprus.  On 
December  18,  England  declared  a 
suzerainty  over  Egypt.  On  the  21st, 
the  French  submarine  Curie  was  sunk 
while  scouting  along  the  Austrian  coast. 
On  November  24,  Italy  landed  a  force 


NAVAL  OPERATIONS 


195 


at  Avlona  to  assist  her  protege  Essad 
Pasha  against  the  Albanian  insurrec- 
tionists. 

In  January,  1915,  a  Turkish  army 
of  about  12,000  men  and  six  batteries 
of  artillery  attempted  to  seize  the  Suez 
Canal  and  then  invade  Egypt,  where 
an  insurrection  had  broken  out  fostered 
by  Turkish  emissaries.  French  and 
British  vessels  patrolling  the  canal  suc- 
ceeded in  stopping  the  Turkish  ad- 
vance, and  the  operations  at  the  Dar- 
danelles then  forced  the  recall  of  all 
available  Turkish  troops  for  the  protec- 
tion of  Constantinople. 

On  February  21,  the  French  destroy- 
er Dague  was  sunk  by  a  mine  off  An- 
tivari.  On  April  28,  the  French  ar- 
mored cruiser  Leon  Gambetta  was  tor- 
pedoed by  the  Austrian  submarine  U-5 
and  sank  in  10  minutes.  Rear  Admiral 
Senes  and  all  the  officers  were  drowned, 
but  108  of  the  crew  were  picked  up  by 
French  destroyers. 

On  May  21,  Italy  declared  war  on 
Austria ;  on  the  same  day  Austrian  tor- 
pedo boats,  supported  by  the  light 
cruiser  Novara,  made  a  raid  on  the  Ital- 
ian coast,  where  they  were  first  met  by 
Italian  destro}rers  and  finally  driven  off 
by  Italian  cruisers.  The  Italian  de- 
stroyer Turbinia  was  sunk  early  in  the 
action.  On  June  10,  the  Italians  cap- 
tured Monfalcone  with  its  shipbuilding 
yards. 

On  June  17  occurred  a  duel  between 
an  Austrian  and  an  Italian  submarine. 
As  they  approached,  neither  had  any 
intimation  of  the  presence  of  the  other. 
The  Italian  boat,  the  Medusa,  came  to 
the  surface  first,  swept  the  horizon  with 
her  periscope  and,  finding  the  vicinity 
clear,  emerged.  A  few  minutes  later 
the  Austrian  decided  to  come  up.  When 
she  sent  up  her  periscope  she  saw  the 
Italian  boat  close  at  hand  and  imme- 
diately torpedoed  her.     An  officer  and 


four  men  of  the  Medusa  who  were  on 
deck  when  she  sank  were  made  prison- 
ers. On  July  1,  the  Austrian  subma- 
rine U-ll  was  sunk  by  a  French  aero- 
plane. U-ll  (860  tons)  was  lying  on 
the  surface  when  the  aeroplane  swooped 
down  to  within  45  feet  of  the  water  and 
dropped  two  bombs  on  the  deck  which 
caused  her  to  sink  almost  instantly. 

On  July  7,  the  Italian  armored 
cruiser  Amalfi  was  sunk  by  an  Austrian 
submarine  while  scouting  in  the  upper 
Adriatic ;  nearly  all  the  officers  and 
crew  were  saved.  On  July  18,  the 
armored  cruiser  Giuseppe  Garibaldi 
was  sunk  by  an  Austrian  submarine  and 
a  few  of  the  crew  were  drowned. 

The  advent  of  Italy  into  the  war 
completed  the  control  of  the  Adriatic 
by  the  Entente  Allies  and,  on  July  6, 
Italy  clinched  the  situation  by  a  procla- 
mation closing  it  to  all  merchant  ves- 
sels not  possessing  special  permits. 
Soon  after  the  loss  of  the  Garibaldi  the 
operations  of  the  Austrian  submarines 
were  much  hampered  by  the  destruc- 
tion of  their  base  on  Lagosta  Island  by 
the  French  destroyer  Bisson. 

On  or  about  August  13,  the  Austrian 
submarines  U-3  and  U-12  were  sunk  by 
the  Italians.  U-3  was  destroyed  by 
gunfire,  but  U-1%  was  sunk  in  a  duel 
with  an  Italian  submarine  which  tor- 
pedoed it.  According  to  a  report  from 
Berlin,  German  submarines  in  the  Medi- 
terranean had,  up  to  October  17,  sunk 
23  vessels,  including  four  British  trans- 
ports. 

On  September  28,  a  fire  broke  out  on 
the  Italian  battleship  Benedetto  Brin 
while  she  was  lying  at  anchor  in  Brindi- 
si  harbor.  The  fire  was  quickly  fol- 
lowed by  an  explosion  which  destroyed 
the  ship.  Of  her  complement  of  over 
800  officers  and  men,  only  8  officers  and 
379  men  are  known  to  have  been  saved. 

On  November  1,  British  torpedo  boat 


196 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


No.  96  was  sunk  in  collision  at  Gibral- 
tar. On  November  3,  the  British  trans- 
port Woodfield  was  sunk  by  a  subma- 
rine off  the  coast  of  Morocco ;  6  pas- 
sengers were  killed  and  14  wounded. 
About  the  same  time  the  transport  Mer- 
cian was  attacked  by  gunfire  from  a 
submarine  which  probably  had  expend- 
ed all  its  torpedoes.  The  Mercian  was 
not  sunk,  but  the  casualties  on  board 
included  23  killed,  50  wounded,  and  30 
missing.  On  November  4,  the  French 
troopship  Calvados  was  sunk  by  a  sub- 
marine and  between  the  6th  and  8th  a 
submarine  on  the  African  coast  sunk 
three  small  steamers,  two  Egyptian 
and  one  British.  So  far  as  reported 
only  53  of  the  800  troops  on  the  Cal- 
vados were  saved.  On  December  5,  the 
French  submarine  Fresnel  ran  aground 
while  endeavoring  to  attack  an  Aus- 
trian light  squadron.  She  was  de- 
stroyed and  her  complement  made  pris- 
oners. The  Austrians  report  that  at 
the  same  time  they  destroyed  a  small 
Italian  cruiser. 

During  the  month  of  December,  the 
Italians  landed  a  large  force  of  troops 
in  Albania.  The  expedition  was  most 
efficiently  guarded  against  submarines 
and  the  only  losses  were  the  destroyer 
Intrepido  and  the  troopship  Re  Um- 
berto,  which  struck  drifting  mines.  The 
loss  of  life  in  the  two  accidents  was 
43.  In  January,  1916,  a  cruiser  of 
the  Novara  type  was  sunk  by  the 
French  submarine  Foucault. 

The  Italian  dreadnought,  Leonardo 
da  Vinci,  blew  up  in  the  harbor  of  Ta- 
ranto  on  Aug.  2.  The  British  trans- 
port, Franconia,  was  torpedoed  on  Oct. 
5,  and  on  Oct.  9,  the  French  auxiliary 
cruiser,  Gallia,  was  similarly  sunk. 
The  British  ship  Britannic  was  sunk  by 
a  mine  in  the  iEgean  Sea  on  November 
21.  On  December  11,  the  Italian  bat- 
tleship,  Regina   Margherita,    struck   a 


mine  and  sank  and  675  lives  were  lost. 
In  1917,  huge  monitors  operated  suc- 
cessfully in  the  attack  on  the  Carso  and 
in  the  defense  of  Venice.  Light  Italian 
motor  boats  armed  with  torpedo  tubes 
were  able  to  sail  over  the  mine  fields  of 
Trieste  and  Pola,  and  in  December, 
1917,  they  entered  Trieste  harbor  and 
sank  two  cruisers  of  the  Wien  type. 

The  naval  operations  in  the  Adriatic 
during  the  year  1918  were  very  active. 
On  December  9,  1917,  Italian  torpedo 
boats  made  a  raid  on  Trieste,  and  sank 
the  small  battleship  Wien  (5500  tons), 
and  injured  another  of  the  same  class. 
On  April  22,  in  a  fight  between  two  Brit- 
ish and  five  Austrian  destroyers,  the 
former  were  reenforced,  and  the  latter 
retreated  to  Durazzo,  with  the  British 
in  pursuit.  On  May  15,  1918,  Italian 
torpedo  boats  made  a  raid  on  Pola,  and 
sank  the  new  dreadnought  battleship 
Tegetthoff  (20,000  tons),  and  on  June 
10,  in  a  similar  raid  sank  the  Szent  Ist- 
van,  and  injured  the  Prinz  Eugen — 
both  sister  ships  to  the  Tegetthoff.  On 
July  2,  a  flotilla  of  Italian  destroyers 
attacked  an  Austrian  light  cruiser  ac- 
companied by  destroyers  and  torpedo 
boats.  In  the  running  fight  that  fol- 
lowed the  cruiser  was  thought  to  have 
been  seriously  injured. 

Operations  in  the  Black  Sea  and  Dar- 
danelles. There  are  strong  grounds  for 
the  belief  that,  at  the  outbreak  of  war, 
the  Turkish  cabinet  was  opposed  to 
taking  part  in  it,  but  that,  as  time  went 
on,  the  German  influence  increased  un- 
til the  opposing  members  were  won  over, 
silenced,  or  driven  from  power.  Among 
other  significant  facts  it  may  be  noted 
that  the  mining  of  the  Dardanelles  was 
not  reported  until  August  19,  eight 
days  after  the  arrival  therein  of  the 
Goeben  and  Breslau.  On  October  10, 
Turkey  abrogated  the  capitulations 
with    foreign    powers    concerning    the 


NAVAL  OPERATIONS 


197 


jurisdiction  of  Turkish  courts.  By 
this  time,  doubtless  the  cabinet  had 
agreed  upon  its  action,  but  much  time 
was  required  to  mobilize  the  army,  and 
it  is  doubtful  if  the  cabinet  was  ready 
to  act  when  the  operations  of  the  Goe- 
ben and  the  Germanized  fleet  in  the 
Black  Sea  precipitated  matters.  The 
commander-in-chief  of  the  Turkish 
navy  was  now  Admiral  Souchon  (late 
of  the  Goeben  and  the  German  Medi- 
terranean squadron),  while  hundreds  of 
German  officers  and  3000  men  were  dis- 
tributed among  the  vessels  of  the  fleet. 
The  first  operations  took  place  on 
October  29,  when  the  Turkish  squadron 
bombarded  several  Russian  ports.  A 
destroyer  entered  Odessa  harbor,  tor- 
pedoed and  sank  the  gunboat  Donetz 
and  badly  injured  the  Kubanetz  (a 
sister  to  the  Donetz),  four  merchant 
steamers  (three  Russian  and  one 
French),  then  fired  upon  the  suburbs 
for  the  purpose  of  destroying  oil  tanks, 
but  set  fire  to  a  sugar  factory  instead. 
On  the  same  day  the  Medillu  (ex-Bres- 
lau)  bombarded  Theodosia,  seriously 
injuring  the  cathedral  and  other  build- 
ings ;  and  the  Hamidieh  threatened  to 
bombard  Novorossisk  if  the  city  refused 
to  surrender,  but  contented  herself  with 
embarking  the  Turkish  consul.  On 
their  way  to  Sebastopol  the  Turkish 
destroyers  sunk  the  Russian  mine  layer 
Pruth.  The  next  day  (October  30),  ac- 
companied by  destroyers,  the  Goeben 
bombarded  Sebastopol.  By  the  return 
fire  of  the  forts  she  was  so  badly  in- 
jured that  the  admiral  collected  the 
squadron  and  returned  to  Constantino- 
ple. On  November  7,  the  Medillu  bom- 
barded the  small  Russian  town  of  Poti, 
but  did  no  great  damage.  On  the  same 
day  Russian  forces  shelled  the  Turkish 
ports  of  Zonguidak  and  Koslu,  sinking 
at  the  former  place  three  transports 
loaded  with   aeroplanes,   artillery,   and 


uniforms  for  60,000  men;  a  colonel  of 
the  general  staff,  various  German  offi- 
cers, and  218  soldiers  were  made  pris- 
oners. On  November  17,  the  Russian 
squadron  bombarded  Trebizond,  but 
without  inflicting  much  damage. 

On  November  18  occurred  the  most 
important  naval  action  that  so  far  had 
taken  place  in  the  Black  Sea.  The  Rus- 
sian battleship  division,  returning  from 
a  cruise  off  the  Anatolian  coast,  was 
about  30  miles  from  Sebastopol  when 
the  Goeben  and  Breslau  were  sighted. 
The  Evstafi  opened  fire  at  about  8000 
yards ;  the  other  ships  following  suit 
quickly.  The  Russians  say  that  the 
Goeben  was  badly  injured  by  the 
Evstafi's  first  salvo  and  was  slow  in 
opening  fire;  and  that,  after  an  action 
lasting  14  minutes,  she  and  her  consort 
retreated  towards  Constantinople,  be- 
ing able  to  escape  through  their  su- 
periority in  speed.  As  the  Goeben  did 
not  appear  in  the  Black  Sea  for  some 
months  afterward,  the  report  of  her 
injuries  was  possibly  correct,  though 
Turkish  advices  stated  that,  some  lit- 
tle time  after  this  battle,  the  Goeben 
was  injured  by  striking  a  mine. 

Early  in  December  British  subma- 
rines began  to  make  their  way  through 
the  Dardanelles.  On  December  13,  the 
B-ll,  in  command  of  Lieut.  Norman  D. 
Holbrook,  entered  the  Dardanelles, 
dived  underneath  five  rows  of  mines  and 
torpedoed  and  sank  the  Turkish  battle- 
ship Messudieh.  This  brilliant  exploit 
was  soon  followed  by  others  of  a  simi- 
lar character. 

During  January  the  Russian  fleet 
sank  several  Turkish  vessels  in  the 
Black  Sea,  including  a  number  of  troop- 
ships and  transports,  and  shelled  the 
Turkish  naval  station  at  Sinope.  On 
the  17th  the  French  submarine  Saphir 
was  sunk  by  a  mine  in  the  Dardanelles. 

About  the  middle  of  February  the 


198 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


combined  British  and  French  fleets  be- 
gan their  fruitless  attempt  to  force  a 
passage  of  the  Dardanelles.  No  opera- 
tions in  the  whole  course  of  the  war 
were  so  poorly  conceived  and  so  ineffi- 
ciently carried  out.  It  is  hard  to  un- 
derstand the  folly  of  the  British  gov- 
ernment in  embarking  upon  such  an  ex- 
pedition. If  there  is  one  thing  that  is 
well  understood  in  naval  war  it  is  the 
absurdity  of  attacking  strong  forts  by 
ships  without  adequate  military  sup- 
port. Even  if  the  ships  can  drive  out 
the  garrison  it  will  return  as  soon  as 
the  bombardment  ceases.  Unless  the 
fortifications  are  badly  placed,  they 
cannot  be  wholly  destroyed  and  the 
ravages  of  bombardment  can  be  largely 
restored  by  a  few  days'  work.  Perma- 
nence of  victory  can  only  be  obtained 
by  occupying  the  works  as  soon  as  the 
defenders  are  expelled. 

But  this  was  not  all.  The  Turks  are 
an  unready  race.  When  the  operations 
began  they  had  not  more  than  10,000 
men  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula,  and 
these  were  inadequately  supplied.  The 
persistent  attack  of  the  Allied  fleet 
showed  the  Turks  that  their  enemies 
were  in  earnest  in  their  endeavor  to  open 
the  straits.  Therefore  the  army  on  the 
peninsula  was  immediately  increased  in 
numbers  until  it  is  believed  to  have 
reached  a  strength  of  over  200,000  men, 
and  supplies  of  all  kinds  were  rushed  to 
them.  When  the  Allies  finally  landed 
their  army  it  was  too  late ;  the  defend- 
ers were  ready  for  them.  Even  in  their 
landing  the  Allies  violated  all  strategic 
principles.  Instead  of  coming  with  an 
overwhelming  force  and  landing  near 
the  neck  of  the  peninsula,  where  they 
could  interrupt  if  not  destroy  the 
Turkish  communications,  they  landed 
inadequate  numbers  near  its  extremity. 
Any  gains  made  merely  drove  the  Turks 
nearer  to  their  base  and  strengthened 


their  means  of  resistance.  This  fatal 
mistake  was  not  due  to  the  army  or 
navy  on  the  ground,  but  to  the  lack  of 
equipment  of  the  expedition,  which  need- 
ed water  tanks,  water  carts,  hose, 
pumps,  and  other  means  of  supplying 
water  and  other  necessaries  and,  above 
all,  more  men.  The  net  loss  to  the  Al- 
lies was  100,000  men,  six  battleships, 
seven  submarines,  and  many  other  ves- 
sels ;  also  a  tremendous  loss  of  pres- 
tige, the  addition  of  Bulgaria  to  the  list 
of  their  enemies,  the  loss  of  Greece  and 
Rumania  to  their  side,  the  opening  of 
Turkey  to  supplies  of  men  and  muni- 
tions from  Germany,  a  vital  hampering 
of  Russian  operations  through  the  fail- 
ure to  open  the  straits  for  their  grain 
and  supplies,  a  renovation  of  the  Turk- 
ish army,  Turkish  courage,  and  Turkish 
determination,  the  destruction  of  Ser- 
bia, and  a  prolongation  of  the  war  by 
many  months.  The  only  gain  was  a  tem- 
porary recall  of  the  Turkish  troops  sent 
to  invade  Egypt.  As  this  expedition 
was  as  ill-planned  as  were  the  British 
operations  at  the  Dardanelles,  its  suc- 
cess was  impossible  and  its  recall  un- 
important. 

As  already  stated,  the  operations  be- 
gan in  February.  Several  bombard- 
ments of  the  forts  were  carried  out  and 
considerable  injury  inflicted  upon  them. 
The  ships,  much  hampered  by  bad 
weather  outside,  then  entered  the  straits 
for  closer  work.  On  March  18,  the 
British  battleships  Ocean  and  Irresisti- 
ble and  the  French  battleship  Bouvet 
were  sunk  by  mines  and  the  British  bat- 
tle cruiser  Inflexible  badly  injured  by 
gunfire.  The  plan  of  forcing  the  pas- 
sage by  battleships  was  then  given  up 
and  the  second  phase  of  the  operations 
soon  began.  In  the  meantime  the  Brit- 
ish submarine  AE-%  was  sunk  in  the  Sea 
of  Marmora,  the  E-15  run  ashore  and 
destroyed  in  the  Dardanelles,  and  the 


NAVAL  OPERATIONS 


199 


Turkish  cruiser  Medjidieh  sunk  by  a 
mine  near  Odessa  (she  was  refloated  in 
May  by  the  Russians).  Late  in  April 
the  British  and  French  troops  were 
landed  under  fire  at  the  Dardanelles. 
On  May  12,  the  British  battleship  Go- 
liath was  sunk  by  a  Turkish  destroyer 
in  a  night  attack ;  the  battleships  Tri- 
umph and  Majestic  were  sunk  by  sub- 
marines a  few  days  later,  the  former  on 
the  22d,  the  latter  on  the  27th.  The 
British  submarines  were  very  active  at 
this  time  in  the  Black  Sea  and  Sea  of 
Marmora,  sinking  many  vessels,  chiefly 
transports  and  troopships,  but  on  Aug- 
ust 8  they  sank  the  old  Turkish  bat- 
tleship Kheyr-ed-din  Barbarossa  and 
the  Turkish  gunboat  Berk-i-Satvet. 
The  commander  of  one  submarine  swam 
ashore  and  destroyed  a  bridge  on  the 
Turkish  line  of  communications ;  this 
was  done  in  the  actual  presence  of  the 
Turkish  patrol.  In  June  the  German 
U-51  was  sunk  in  the  Black  Sea  and  the 
German  submarine  base  at  Smyrna  de- 
stroyed. 

About  August  1,  the  French  subma- 
rine Mariotte  was  sunk.  During  the 
summer  many  British  transports  and 
troopships  were  destroyed  by  German 
submarines,  the  most  important  being 
the  troopship  Royal  Edward,  which  was 
sent  to  the  bottom  on  August  14  with 
the  loss  of  800  lives ;  but  the  sinking  of 
the  troopships  Ramazan  (Br.)  and  the 
Marquette  (Fr.)  were  disasters  almost 
equally  great. 

In  the  Black  Sea  the  Russians  seemed 
to  have  been  unable  to  blockade  or  cap- 
ture the  Medillu  (ex-Breslau)  or  the 
Hamidieh.  In  October  the  Sultan  Se- 
lim  Javuz  (ex-Goeben)  appeared  again 
in  the  Black  Sea  but  accomplished  noth- 
ing of  importance  and  seemed  to  be 
partly  disabled.  On  November  3,  the 
French  submarine  Turquoise  was  sunk 
by  gunfire  in  the  Sea  of  Marmora ;  on 


the  5th  the  British  submarine  E-20 
was  reported  missing  and  E-7  as  sunk. 
On  November  10,  the  British  destroyer 

Louis  was  sunk. 

i 

The  Dardanelles  operations  were  now 
admitted  to  be  a  failure,  and  the  Brit- 
ish began  to  transfer  their  troops  to 
Saloniki.  The  operations  in  the  Black 
Sea  still  continued  but  by  the  summer 
of  1916  had  become  of  no  special  im- 
portance since  the  Turkish  navy  had 
been  reduced  to  impotence.  On  Oct. 
20,  1916,  the  Imperatritsa  Marie,  a 
Russian  dreadnought,  blew  up.  In  1917 
over  200  Turkish  sailing  vessels  were 
destroyed  by  the  Russian  fleet. 

Many  of  the  officers  and  men  of  the 
Black  Sea  Fleet  refused  to  recognize 
the  authority  of  the  Bolshevik  leaders, 
Lenine  and  Trotsky.  This  resulted  in 
several  battles  between  the  two  factions 
which  usually  ended  disastrously  for 
the  anti-Bolshevik  men.  The  final  one 
of  several  massacres  consisted  in  the 
murder  of  sixty  officers,  and  an  un- 
known number  of  men,  who  resisted  the 
attempts  to  reduce  the  ship  to  impo- 
tence. This  completed,  the  ships  were 
surrendered  to  the  Germans  on  June  10, 
1918.  The  Turkish  cruiser  Medjidieh, 
which  had  been  sunk  in  action,  and 
afterwards  raised  and  repaired  by  the 
Russians,  was  returned  to  the  Turks. 

Cruiser  Operations  in  the  Atlantic, 
Pacific,  and  Indian  Oceans.  At  the 
outbreak  of  war  the  only  German 
vessels  beyond  the  reach  of  home  ports 
were  the  battle  cruiser  Goeben,  the  ar- 
mored cruisers  Scharnhorst  and  Gneise- 
nau,  the  fast  cruisers  Karlsruhe,  Bres- 
lau,  Emden,  Dresden,  Nurnberg,  Ko- 
nigsberg,  Leipzig,  and  a  number  of  small 
cruisers  and  gunboats.  To  these  were 
quickly  added  several  fast  merchant 
steamers,  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  der 
Grosse,  Kronprinz  Wilhelm,  Prinz  Eitel 
Friedrich,  Cap  Trafalgar,   and  Spree- 


200 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


wald.  These  had  their  armaments  on 
board  or  in  German  colonial  ports. 

The  operations  of  the  Goeben  and 
Breslau  are  described  elsewhere  in  this 
article.  The  Scharnhorst  and  Gneise- 
nau  were,  after  the  Goeben,  the  most 
important  vessels  on  the  list  and  were 
under  the  command  of  Vice  Admiral 
Count  von  Spee,  the  only  German  flag 
officer  outside  of  European  waters. 
After  the  commencement  of  hostilities 
these  vessels  were  first  heard  of  at  Ta- 
hiti, where  they  bombarded  the  port  of 
Papeete  and  sunk  the  French  gunboat 
Zelee.  The  Nurnberg,  after  cutting  the 
America-Australia  cable  at  Fanning 
Island,  joined  Von  Spee's  squadron. 
He  then  proceeded  to  the  west  coast 
of  South  America,  where  he  met  the 
Dresden  and  Leipzig. 

On  the  afternoon  of  Nov.  1,  1914, 
Rear  Admiral  Sir  Christopher  Cra- 
dock,  *  with  a  squadron  consisting  of 
the  armored  cruisers  Good  Hope  (14d- 
2g9.2,16g6-23k)  and  Monmouth  (10d- 
14g6-23k),  the  fast  light  cruiser  Glas- 
gow (4.8d-2g6,10g4-26k),  and  the 
armed  merchant  steamer  Otranto,  was 
off  the  Chilean  coast  searching  for  Ger- 
man cruisers.  The  old  battleship 
Canopus  (13d-4gl2-18k)  was  near  at 
hand  and  proceeding  to  a  rendezvous  to 
join  the  squadron.  About  4.20  p.  m. 
smoke  was  seen  to  the  northward  and 
soon  afterward  Von  Spee's  squadron, 
consisting  of  the  Scharnhorst  (11.4d- 
8g8.2,6g5.9-23k),  Gneisenau  (same), 
unarmored  cruisers  Dresden  (3.6d- 
10g4.1-24k),  Leipzig  (3.2d-10g4.1- 
28k),  and  Nurnberg  (3.4d-10g4.1- 
24k),  was  sighted  heading  south.     Cra- 

*  Sir  Chrtstopheb  Cradock  (1862-1914), 
born  at  Hartforth,  Yorkshire;  served  in  the 
Sudan,  China,  etc.;  rear  admiral  (1910); 
K.C.V.O.  (191?);  commander  of  training; 
squadron  (1912);  received  several  awards  for 
saving  life;  published  Sporting  Notes  in  the 
Far  East  (1889),  Wrinkles  in  Seamanship 
(1891),  Whispers  from  the  Fleet   (1907). 


dock  seems  to  have  much  overestimated 
the  fighting  power  of  his  squadron  (es- 
pecially in  the  heavy  sea  which  was  run- 
ning) or  underestimated  that  of  the 
Germans.  At  any  rate,  he  sent  a  wire- 
less message  to  the  Canopus  at  6.18 
saying:  "I  am  going  to  attack  the 
enemy  now,"  ordered  the  speed  increased 
to  17  knots,  and  headed  to  the  south- 
east, the  Germans  being  between  the 
British  and  the  coast.  At  7.03,  the 
enemy  opened  fire  at  about  11,500 
yards,  quickly  followed  by  the  British. 
The  superiority  of  the  German  ships 
was  at  once  apparent.  The  heavy  seas 
made  it  almost  impossible  to  work  the 
British  6-inch  guns  on  the  lower  decks 
(and  most  of  them  were  on  that  deck), 
and  one  of  the  Good  Hope's  9.2-inch 
pieces  was  put  out  of  action  very  early 
in  the  fight.  Fires  broke  out  in  the 
forward  turrets  of  the  Good  Hope  and 
Monmouth  at  about  the  third  German 
salvo,  possibly  from  accumulated  am- 
munition. At  7.50  a  tremendous  explo- 
sion occurred  on  the  Good  Hope  amid- 
ships, the  flames  reaching  an  altitude 
of  200  feet.  The  Monmouth  was  al- 
ready out  of  action,  down  by  the  head, 
and  leaking  badly.  The  night  had  be- 
come so  dark  that  for  some  time  the 
Germans  aimed  at  the  flames  on  the 
doomed  vessels,  both  of  which  had 
ceased  firing  altogether  before  8  o'clock. 
A  rain  squall  coming  up  added  to  the 
difficulty  of  pointing  the  guns,  so  Von 
Spee  signaled  the  light  cruisers  to  at- 
tack the  enemy's  ships  with  torpedoes. 
The  Good  Hope  could  not  be  found  and 
had  probably  gone  down,  but  the  Nurn- 
berg discovered  the  Monmouth  and,  by 
gunfire  at  close  range,  caused  her  to 
capsize.  In  the  darkness  and  thick 
weather  the  Glasgow  and  Otranto  got 
away  without  difficulty.  As  this  fight 
took  place  in  a  very  rough  sea,  it  is 
doubtful   if  the  Good  Hope  could  use 


NAVAL  OPERATIONS 


201 


more  than  four  of  her  sixteen  6-inch 
guns  or  the  Monmiouth  more  than  five 
of  her  14.  The  disabling  of  one  of  the 
9.2-inch  guns  of  the  flagship  by  a  lucky 
shot  hastened  the  catastrophe. 

The  result  of  the  action  created  a 
profound  excitement  in  Europe,  par- 
ticularly in  England,  and  added  much 
to  the  prestige  of  the  German  navy. 
The  British  Admiralty  immediately  took 
steps  to  meet  the  situation  by  secretly 
dispatching  a  squadron  under  Vice 
Admiral  Sturdee  in  pursuit  of  Von 
Spee.  This  consisted  of  the  battle 
cruisers  Invincible  (17d-8gl2-2!7k),  In- 
flexible (same),  the  armored  cruisers 
Carnarvon  (10.8d  -  4g7.5,  6g6- 23k), 
Cornwall  (same  as  Monmouth),  Kent 
(same),  the  fast  cruiser  Bristol  (sister 
to  the  Glasgow),  and  the  Macedonia 
(10,500  tons),  supply  steamer.  At 
some  rendezvous  on  the  South  American 
coast  they  were  joined  by  the  Canopus 
and  Glasgow.  About  8  o'clock  on  the 
morning  of  December  8,  while  Sturdee 
was  coaling  in  the  adjacent  harbors  of 
ports  William  and  Stanley,  Falkland 
Islands,  the  leading  ships  of  the  German 
squadron  were  sighted.  Knowing  noth- 
ing of  the  battle  cruisers,  the  Germans 
came  leisurely  on,  apparently  intent 
upon  destroying  the  wireless  station. 
At  9.20,  they  were  within  11,000  yards 
and  the  Canopus,  still  at  anchor,  opened 
fire  on  them  over  the  lowland.  They 
then  turned  to  the  southeast  to  rejoin 
the  main  body  which  immediately  pro- 
ceeded to  the  eastward  at  full  speed.  At 
9.45,  the  British  squadron  came  out  and 
started  in  chase.  About  1  p.m.  the  In- 
vincible and  the  Inflexible  began  firing 
on  the  rear  ships  of  the  German  column 
and  a  little  later  were  able  to  reach  the 
armored  vessels  and  leave  the  others  to 
the  cruisers.  About  3.30,  the  Scharn- 
Jwrst  changed  course  about  10  points 
(112.5  degrees)  to  starboard,  presum- 


ably to  bring  her  starboard  battery 
into  action,  because  of  injury  to  her 
port  guns,  or  to  repair  damages.  At 
4.04,  she  began  to  list  heavily  to  port 
and  at  4.17,  sank  with  all  hands.  The 
Gneisenau  continued  the  hopeless  fight, 
though  after  5  o'clock  she  was  hors  de 
combat.  At  6  p.m.,  she  heeled  very  sud- 
denly and  sank.  About  100  survivors 
were  picked  up.  These  state  that  the 
ammunition  had  given  out,  although  by 
the  time  it  was  exhausted  over  600  of 
the  complement  had  been  killed  or 
wounded.  Of  the  German  light  cruisers, 
the  Leipzig  was  sunk  by  the  fire  of  the 
Glasgow  and  Cornwall  about  9  p.m.  and 
the  Nurnberg  by  that  of  the  Kent  at 
7.27.  Seven  officers  and  18  men  were 
saved  from  the  two  ships ;  many  others 
lost  their  lives  through  being  chilled 
by  the  coldness  of  the  water.  The 
Dresden,  which  escaped,  was  discovered 
off  the  island  of  Juan  Fernandez  on 
March  14,  1915,  by  the  Glasgow,  Kent, 
and  auxiliary  cruiser  Orama.  After  an 
action  of  five  minutes'  duration  she  sur- 
rendered, but  was  on  fire  and  soon  after- 
ward blew  up.  The  Dresden's  cruise  as 
a  commerce  destroyer  was  not  very 
eventful.  After  leaving  the  West  In- 
dies she  sank  the  British  steamer 
Hyades  off  Pernambuco  about  August 
22  and  the  Holmwood  near  Rio  de 
Janeiro,  August  29.  After  her  escape 
from  the  battle  of  the  Falklands,  she 
sank  the  Conway  Castle  off  Chile  on 
February  27. 

Of  all  the  German  cruisers  the  Em- 
den  (3.6d-10g4.1-24k)  had  the  most 
spectacular  and  successful  career.  On 
August  1,  she  left  Tsingtao.  On  the 
6th  she  captured  a  vessel  of  the  Russian 
volunteer  fleet  and  sent  her  into  Tsing- 
tao. She  then  went  to  the  southward. 
On  September  16,  the  British  S.S. 
Kabinga  arrived  at  Calcutta  with  the 
crews  of  five  others  that  had  been  cap- 


202 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


tured  and  sunk  by  the  Emden,  which 
was  now  accompanied  by  the  German 
auxiliary  cruiser  M arkomannia  and  the 
Greek  collier  Pontoporos.  Several 
British  and  French  cruisers  were  at 
once  started  after  her.  On  September 
16,  she  coaled  in  False  Bay  and  on 
September  18,  sank  the  Clan  Mathe son. 
On  the  22d,  she  appeared  off  Madras 
and  shelled  and  set  fire  to  the  oil  tanks 
of  the  Burma  Oil  Company.  On  the 
24th,  she  reached  Pondicherry  after 
sinking  five  more  British  steamers.  On 
her  way  around  Ceylon,  in  three  days, 
she  sank  five  British  steamers  and  cap- 
tured a  collier  with  7000  tons  of  Welsh 
coal.  She  then  went  to  the  Maldive 
Islands,  which  she  left  on  October  1. 
She  spent  the  5th  to  the  10th  at  Diego 
Garcia,  Chagos  Islands,  cleaning  her 
bottom  and  boilers.  Leaving  her  ten- 
ders to  proceed  to  some  unknown  ren- 
dezvous, she  went  to  the  vicinity  of  the 
Laccadive  Islands,  where  she  sank  five 
steamers  and  a  dredger,  and  captured 
another  collier,  but  sank  it  also  after 
filling  her  bunkers.  On  October  16,  her 
tenders  were  captured  by  the  British 
cruiser  Yarmouth.  At  early  daylight 
of  October  29,  with  a  dummy  fourth 
smokepipe  she  entered  Penang  harbor 
(1700  miles  from  the  Laccadives),  her 
hostile  character  wholly  unsuspected, 
sank  the  Russian  cruiser  Jemtchug  and 
a  French  destroyer,  and  escaped  with- 
out injury.  On  November  9,  she  ap- 
proached the  Cocos  Islands  to  destroy 
the  wireless  station.  Before  she  could 
effect  a  landing,  the  operators  signaled 
her  appearance  broadcast  and  the  re- 
port was  picked  up  by  the  convoy  of 
some  Australian  troopships  bound  to 
the  Suez  Canal  and  not  far  away.  The 
cruiser  Sydney  (5.4d-8g6-26k)  was  de- 
tached to  chase  her,  and  came  in  sight 
while  the  Emden  was  waiting  for  her 
landing  party.     Leaving  these  men  be- 


hind, she  attempted  to  escape,  but  the 
Sydney  was  faster  and  carried  a  heavier 
battery  so  that  in  a  short  time  she  was 
badly  injured  and  forced  to  run  ashore. 
Of  the  361  in  her  complement,  all  ex- 
cept 10  officers  and  198  men  were  killed 
or  drowned.  Among  those  saved,  for- 
tunately, was  her  distinguished  captain, 
Commander  Karl  von  Muller,  whose 
conduct  throughout  the  cruise  was 
brave,  skillful,  and  chivalrous.  Dur- 
ing her  remarkable  career  of  94  days 
the  Emden  captured  or  sank  30  vessels, 
destroyed  $25,000,000  worth  of  enemy 
property,  almost  paralyzed  the  com- 
merce of  the  East,  and  had  19  war  ves- 
sels of  the  enemy  seeking  her. 

The  Konigsberg  (3.4d-10g4.1-24k) 
was  less  successful.  After  a  cruise  of 
two  months  along  the  South  African 
coast,  in  which  she  destroyed  several 
British  merchant  ships  and  the  small 
cruiser  Pegasus,  she  was  blockaded  in 
the  Rufiji  River,  German  East  Africa. 
After  several  attempts,  she  was  finally 
destroyed  by  a  British  expedition  on 
July  11,  1915. 

The  Karlsruhe  (4.8d-12g4.1-27k) 
operated  in  the  Atlantic.  Up  to  Oct. 
24,  1914,  she  had  captured  and  de- 
stroyed 17  British  vessels. 

Of  the  German  armed  merchant 
steamers,  the  Spreewald  was  captured 
by  the  armored  cruiser  Berwick  on  Sep- 
tember 12.  The  Kaiser  Wilhelm  der 
Grosse  had  a  still  shorter  career,  being 
sunk  on  Aug.  7,  1914,  by  the  British 
cruiser  Highflyer.  On  October  14,  the 
Cap  Trafalgar,  which  was  beginning  to 
interfere  with  the  British  trade  to  South 
America,  was  sunk  by  the  British  armed 
steamer  Carmania,  late  of  the  Cunard 
line.  The  Kronprinz  Wilhelm  and  the 
Prinz  Eitel  Friedrich,  after  long  and 
successful  cruises  as  commerce  destroy- 
ers, entered  United  States  waters  and 
were  interned   at   Norfolk.      The   U-53 


NAVAL  OPERATIONS 


203 


entered  the  harbor  of  Newport,  R.  I., 
Oct.  7,  1916,  delivered  a  letter  to  the 
German  Ambassador  and  torpedoed 
three  British  and  two  neutral  steam- 
ships just  outside  the  3-mile  limit.  In 
January,  1917,  a  raider  sank  30  ships 
worth  $20,000,000  in  the  South  Atlan- 
tic. In  August,  the  Seeadler  was 
wrecked  near  the  Fiji  Islands  after 
sinking  several  ships. 

Immediately  after  war  was  declared, 
the  Entente  Allies  began  perfecting  ar- 
rangements for  the  capture  of  German 
colonies.  On  Aug.  7,  Togoland  was 
seized  by  land  forces.  On  Aug.  27, 
Japan  declared  a  blockade  of  Kiaochow, 
and  on  Nov.  7,  Tsingtao,  the  German 
stronghold  in  China,  surrendered  to  the 
Allied  forces — chiefly  Japanese.  Early 
in  August,  a  New  Zealand  expedition 
sailed  for  Samoa.  At  Noumea,  the  con- 
voy— which  was  a  weak  one — became 
strengthened  by  the  battle  cruiser  Aus- 
tralia (19d-8gl2-27k)  and  the  cruiser 
Melbourne  (sister  to  the  Sydney)  of 
the  Australian  navy,  and  the  French 
armored  cruiser  Montcalm  (9.5d- 
2g7.6,8g6.4-21k).  The  expedition  ar- 
rived at  Apia  on  August  30  and  the 
German  Governor  surrendered  at  once 
as  he  had  practically  no  means  of  re- 
sistance. On  its  return  from  Samoa, 
the  Australian  squadron  captured  Her- 
bertshohe,  the  capital  of  the  Bismarck 
Archipelago,  and,  on  September  27, 
took  possession  of  the  town  of  Fried- 
rich  Wilhelm  in  Kaiser  Wilhelm's  Land 
(German  New  Guinea).  During  Sep- 
tember and  October,  Australian  and 
Japanese  expeditions  seized  the  remain- 
ing German  possessions  in  the  Ladrone, 
Marshall,  and  Caroline  Islands.  Late 
in  1917,  Japanese  sailors  were  landed 
in  Vladivostok  to  preserve  order  and 
protect  Japanese  subjects,  and  early 
in  1918  American  and  Japanese  troops 
were  sent  there  to  prevent  the  use  of 


the  port  and  railway,  and  the  seizure 
of  the  munitions  in  store  by  the  Bol- 
sheviki.  In  January,  1918,  German  offi- 
cers and  men  from  the  interned  German 
steamer,  Graf  von  Lilttwitz,  seized  a 
Dutch  submarine,  killing  one  of  the 
guard,  and  put  to  sea.  The  boat  was 
quickly  followed  by  Dutch  and  Allied 
cruisers,  but  her  subsequent  career  is 
unknown.  In  February,  the  German 
commerce-destroying  raider  Wolf  re- 
turned to  a  home  port  (believed  to  be 
Kiel)  after  a  cruise  of  fifteen  months 
in  the  Atlantic,  Pacific,  and  Indian 
Oceans,  in  which  she  destroyed  eleven 
ships  (six  British,  three  American,  one 
Japanese,  one  Spanish),  of  an  aggre- 
gate gross  tonnage  of  32,864.  The 
Wolfs  Cub  (ex-Igotz  Mendi),  which 
had  accompanied  her  as  a  lightly-armed 
auxiliary,  ran  ashore  on  the  Danish 
coast  and  was  wrecked.  In  February 
or  March,  a  gasoline  motor  boat,  the 
Alexander  Agassiz,  which  had  been 
previously  sold  to  unknown  purchasers 
and  fitted  out  at  Mazatlan  as  a  German 
raider,  was  seized  at  sea  by  an  Ameri- 
can patrol  ship,  and  carried  to  an 
American  port.  In  March,  a  mine  field 
in  which  the  mines  were  of  the  latest 
German  type,  was  discovered  off  the 
coast  of  New  South  Wales,  Australia. 
These  mines  were  presumably  laid  by 
some  "neutral"  vessel,  and  extended  for 
five  miles  along  the  ordinary  trade 
route.  Early  in  March,  1918,  one  of 
the  Wolfs  prizes,  the  Turritella,  which 
she  had  turned  into  a  mine-planter,  was 
discovered-  laying  mines  off  Perim 
Island,  at  the  entrance  to  the  Red  Sea. 
She  had  a  deck  force  of  Germans,  but 
had  retained  the  original  engineer's 
force  of  Chinese.  When  the  Germans 
saw  that  capture  was  inevitable,  they 
took  to  the  boats,  and  blew  up  the  ship, 
while  the  Chinese  were  still  below. 
They  were  taken  to  Bombay  to  be  tried 


204 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


for  murder.  On  July  12,  the  Japanese 
dreadnought  battleship  Kawachi  (20,- 
800  tons)  was  destroyed  by  an  in- 
ternal explosion  while  at  anchor  in  To- 
koyama  Bay;  the  entire  complement  of 
960  officers  and  men  are  said  to  have 
been  killed  or  drowned. 

For  a  discussion  of  blockade  and  the 
submarine  warfare  against  noncombat- 
ants,  see  the  section  in  this  article 
headed  Neutral  Nations. 

Naval  Strategy  of  the  War.  There 
is  much  reason  to  believe  that  Germany 
strongly  hoped  for  the  continued  neu- 
trality of  Great  Britain  and  her  origi- 
nal naval  plans  are  said  to  have  been 
based  on  this  supposition.  The  High 
Seas  fleet  was  off  the  coast  of  Norway, 
leaving  behind  it  in  the  Baltic  a  suffi- 
cient force  to  hold  the  Russian  navy  in 
check.  Had  England  not  entered  the 
war,  the  High  Seas  fleet  would  have 
proceeded  to  the  west  coast  of  France, 
defeated  the  inferior  French  fleet,  and 
established  a  base  for  the  landing  of  an 
army  of  large  size  in  the  French  rear. 
The  advent  of  England  changed  all 
this.  The  High  Seas  fleet  was  with- 
drawn to  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal  and 
a  submarine  warfare  begun.  With  this, 
it  was  hoped  to  reduce  the  British 
forces  to  a  size  that  would  render  vic- 
tory possible.  But  the  British  battle 
fleet  kept  behind  defenses  that  were  sub- 
marine proof  and  instituted  a  blockade 
and  antisubmarine  warfare  by  means  of 
unimportant  vessels.  Raids  in  force  on 
the  British  coast  only  served  to  bring 
into  view  the  battle-cruiser  squadron 
and  its  speed  and  skillful  handling  pre- 
vented submarines  from  scoring.  In  the 
meantime,  the  British  were  building 
battleships,  cruisers,  and  submarines  at 
a  rate  of  speed  that  the  Germans  could 
not  equal.  After  six  months,  during 
which  the  naval  conditions  were  becom- 
ing less  and  less  favorable  to  Germany, 


submarine  warfare  against  British  com- 
merce was  commenced,  but  this  failed 
seriously  to  check  British  trade  and 
was  almost  as  costly  to  Germany  as  to 
her  enemies.  The  Mediterranean  field 
was  then  exploited  as  affording  a  bet- 
ter chance  to  avoid  antisubmarine  war- 
fare and  giving  some  support  to  the 
Balkan  and  Asiatic  operations  ;  but  this 
transfer  of  submarine  activity  did  not 
seriously  hamper  the  Entente  Allies  or 
facilitate  their  own  work. 

The  total  effect  of  the  German  naval 
strategy  upon  the  conduct  of  the  war 
therefore  was  small  and  that  strategy 
may  be  regarded  as  a  failure.  Should 
England  strip  herself  of  effective  troops 
too  closely  at  any  time,  an  invasion 
might  be  attempted  as  a  last  resort.  A 
preliminary  success  would  add  to  the  in- 
vading army  all  the  German  prisoners 
in  England  and  they  would  only  need 
arms  and  ammunition  to  create  a  seri- 
ous condition  of  affairs.  To  secure 
such  a  result,  the  sacrifice  of  the  Ger- 
man fleet  might  not  be  too  great. 

The  main  principles  of  British  naval 
strategy  appeared  to  be:  (a)  to  hold 
the  German  fleet  blockaded  and  be  pre- 
pared at  all  times  to  give  battle  and 
bring  into  action  forces  superior  to  any 
which  may  have  to  be  met;  (b)  to  pro- 
tect the  British  coast  against  an  inva- 
sion in  force;  (c)  to  effect  a  commer- 
cial blockade  (not  declared)  of  Ger- 
many and  prevent  the  importation  of 
supplies  of  any  kind  or  the  exportation 
of  wares,  which  could  be  sold  for  cash 
or  exchanged  for  a  desirable  equivalent ; 
(d)  to  protect  British  trade  and  de- 
stroy all  German  cruisers  or  other  ves- 
sels that  might  interfere  with  it;  (e) 
to  facilitate  and  assist  in  the  military 
operations  of  the  Entente  Allies  and 
hamper  those  of  the  enemy. 

The  tactical  operations  occasionally 
failed    but    the    strategical    objectives 


NAVAL  OPERATIONS 


205 


were  attained  except  in  the  case  of 
the  Dardanelles.  The  mistakes  made 
in  this  dismal  failure  are  elsewhere  con- 
sidered. See  Operations  in  the  Black 
Sea  and  Dardanelles. 

Some  Naval  Lessons  of  the  War. 
Submarines. — The  exact  value  of  the 
submarine  as  a  weapon  of  war  is  not 
yet  determined  though  it  is  unquestion- 
ably great.  It  is  certainly  an  an- 
tagonist to  be  feared  by  all  surface 
ships,  but  it  is  by  no  means  so  danger- 
ous as  many  once  thought  it.  Its  most 
serious  weakness  is  its  vulnerability.  If 
rammed  with  much  force  or  struck  by 
a  single  small  shell  it  will  sink,  but 
double  hulls  and  submerged  water-tight 
decks  may,  in  future  large  boats,  greatly 
improve  their  ability  to  stand  punish- 
ment. While  it  is  being  improved  and 
rendered  more  effective  and  dangerous, 
so  are  its  foes.  The  most  important  of 
these  are  the  destroyer  and  the  aero- 
plane ;  but  under  certain  conditions  the 
wire  (in  many  cases,  tubing)  net  and 
the  swift  motor  boat  are  most  efficient. 
As  the  immediate  cause  of  destruction 
of  submarines  the  destroyer  ranks  first, 
but  the  aeroplane  can  sight  a  submarine 
when  too  deeply  immersed  to  show  her 
periscope  and  thus  warn  surface  ves- 
sels of  her  exact  locality ;  in  several 
instances  during  the  war,  aeroplanes 
sunk  submarines  by  dropping  bombs  on 
them.  Among  the  important  qualities 
of  the  submarine  are  its  suitability  for 
secret  scouting,  its  capacity  for  defense 
against  a  close  blockade,  and  its  avail- 
ability for  protecting  surface  ships 
against  the  enemy's  submarines. 

Battleships  and  Battle  Cruisers. — 
Battleships  did  not  receive  a  proper 
test  in  the  war.  Battle  cruisers  are  in 
great  favor  and  are  found  to  be  of  in- 
estimable value  in  many  ways,  but  they 
are  not  able  to  stand  very  much  pun- 
ishment. 


Torpedo. — The  German  short-range 
torpedo,  with  its  enormous  bursting 
charge,  is  a  very  deadly  weapon,  rarely 
failing  to  sink  the  enemy.  Long-range 
torpedoes  of  the  future  are  likely  to  be 
larger  than  existing  types  and  have 
heavier  bursting  charges.  Against  the 
disruptive  effect  of  so  great  an  amount 
of  explosive  no  method  of  subdivision 
of  hull  is  adequate  and  some  other 
means  must  be  devised  if  surface  battle- 
ships are  to  continue  in  use.  On  some 
of  their  old  cruisers  the  British  built 
external  coffer  dams  along  the  sides. 
These  greatly  reduced  the  speed  and 
their  efficiency  against  torpedoes  was 
not  tested  so  far  as  known. 

Old  Battleships  and  Cruisers. — All 
the  belligerent  navies  have  found  much 
use  for  old  ships  that  were  no  longer 
fit  for  their  designed  purposes.  In  fu- 
ture, such  craft  are  likely  to  be  retained 
much  longer  than  was  hitherto  consid- 
ered desirable. 

Monitors. — As  a  support  to  military 
operations,  light-draft  monitors  have 
proved  to  be  valuable.  Their  low  speed 
in  connection  with  small  draft  renders 
possible  adequate  hull  protection 
against  torpedoes,  and  their  draft  en- 
ables them  to  get  close  in  shore  where 
the  ordinary  battleships  could  not 
operate. 

Light  Cruisers  are  all  now  fitted  with 
thin  armor  belts  at  the  water  line  and 
the  value  of  this  is  said  to  have  been 
demonstrated,  especially  when  scouting 
against  destroyers.  The  necessity  of 
the  highest  practicable  speed  is  unques- 
tionable and  the  battery,  instead  of 
many  small  guns,  should  consist  of  a 
less  number  of  larger  ones. 

Bombardment  of  Forts. — The  futil- 
ity of  bombarding  forts  with  ships,  un- 
less an  adequate  landing  force  is  avail- 
able to  take  advantage  of  the  work  of 
the  ship's  guns,  has  been  conclusively 


206 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


shown  in  the  past  and  received  another 
convincing  proof  at  the  Dardanelles. 

Air  Craft. — The  value  of  air  craft  as 
scouts  for  their  fleet  was  clearly  demon- 
strated, and  further  important  uses  in- 
dicated, though  as  yet  untried.  As  de- 
tectors of  submarines,  aeroplanes  are 
invaluable  adjuncts  to  a  fleet.  Airships 
are  also  valuable,  but  as  constructed  at 
present,  large  ones  can  only  operate 
from  a  base  on  shore.  See  section  on 
Aerial  Operations. 

Big  Guns  and  High  Angle  of  Eleva- 


tion.— Perhaps  the  most  definite  of  the 
lessons  of  the  war  was  the  dominance  of 
the  big  gun.  Its  greater  range  and  de- 
structive power  gave  the  victory  in 
every  instance  at  sea  in  which  the  fight 
lasted  to  a  finish.  But,  in  the  battle  off 
the  Falklands,  the  high  elevation  which 
it  was  possible  to  give  the  German  8.2- 
inch  guns  enabled  them  to  open  fire 
almost  as  soon  as  the  12-inch  pieces  of 
their  opponents ;  and,  in  the  battles  in 
the  North  Sea,  the  advantage  of  high 
angle  of  elevation  was  again  noted. 


VI.     AERIAL  OPERATIONS 


The  outbreak  of  the  war  found  the 
Great    Powers    of    Europe    ready    and 
anxious  to  make  immediate  application 
of  aeronautics  to  their  respective  mili- 
tary and  naval  operations.      That  all 
were  inadequately  prepared  on  the  score 
of  equipment  and  trained  personnel  the 
opening  weeks  of  the  war  soon  showed, 
and  early  the  demands  likely  to  be  made 
on  the  aerial  services  were  clearly  in- 
dicated.     But  in  no  field  did  develop- 
ments follow  more  rapidly,  and  as  early 
as  the  Germans  undertook  the  invasion 
of  Belgium  and  France  it  was  realized 
that  aeroplane  and  airship  had  worked 
materially   to    change    the   nature    and 
scope    of    military    operations    and    to 
render  obsolete  tactics  and  movements 
that  long  had  prevailed  in  warfare.     By 
affording  to  scouts  and  intelligence  offi- 
cers a  complete  view  of  the  enemy's  ter- 
ritory, the  disposition  and  movement  of 
his  troops  and  fleets,  and  his  permanent 
or  even   his   most   temporary   defenses, 
surprise    or   flanking   movements    were 
rendered  practically  impossible.     With 
both    sides    adequately   informed    as    to 
the  forces  of  their  adversaries  through 
constant  aerial  scouting  and  reconnois- 
sance,     the    tendency    towards     trench 
fighting  and  the  protracted  sieges  and 
bombardments  of  the  western  front  was 
as  pronounced  as  it  was  inevitable.   The 
direction   and  control  of  fire   from   an 
observation  or  kite  balloon  or  aeroplane 
early  became  an  indispensable   feature 
of  the  work  of  the  artillery.     The  tacti- 
cal changes  wrought  by  the  use  of  air 
craft  were  stupendous,  and  the  service 
of  security  and  information  by   aerial 
observers  and  range  finding  for  the  ar- 


tillery became  essential  features  of  the 
everyday  work  of  the  forces  in  the  field. 
In  addition  there  were  raids  by  aero- 
plane and  airship  to  drop  explosive  or 
incendiary  bombs  on  fortified  positions, 
moving  columns,  railway  trains,  supply 
depots  or  munitions  works,  or  on  war- 
ships, submarines,  and  transports. 

Such  activities  on  the  part  of  the 
airmen  soon  became  so  valuable  in  a 
military  sense  that  the  prevention  of 
these  efforts  was  essential,  and  this  nat- 
urally led  to  the  development  of  the 
purely  combative  side  of  aerial  warfare, 
which  soon  passed  from  individual  duels 
in  the  air  to  savage  actions  often  at 
close  range  participated  in  by  a  num- 
ber of  aeroplanes  of  different  types, 
where  battle  tactics  of  an  elementary 
form  were  evolved  as  a  result  of  train- 
ing and  drill  to  secure  harmony  of 
action. 

Naturally  this  led  to  increased  arma- 
ment and  armoring  of  the  aeroplanes, 
and  the  calibre  of  the  rapid-fire  gun 
that  soon  took  the  place  of  the  auto- 
matic pistol  became  greater,  so  that  by 
1916  an  air  battle  was  indeed  a  serious 
matter,  and  the  protection  of  fuel  tanks 
and  machinery  and  the  design  of  ma- 
chines to  withstand  as  much  penetration 
of  the  wings  as  possible  figured  promi- 
nently, as  indeed  did  the  entire  question 
of  design  and  construction  for  power, 
carrying  capacity,  speed,  ease  of  ma- 
noeuvring, and  general  reliability.  Re- 
markable advances  were  realized,  along 
with  wholesale  demands  which  taxed  the 
facilities  for  manufacture  in  the  bellig- 
erent nations  as  well  as  in  America. 
Flying  corps  existing  in  armies  and 


207 


208 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


navies  were  on  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
greatly  augmented  and  preparations 
made  to  train  vast  numbers  of  aviators. 
It  was  estimated  that  the  various  bellig- 
erent nations  on  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  possessed  about  5,000  aeroplanes 
and  109  dirigibles.  Naturally  Ger- 
many, where  some  12  Zeppelins  and 
about  23  Parseval  and  Gross  airships 
and  about  1,000  aeroplanes  were  avail- 
able at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  was 
preeminent  as  regards  numbers  and 
trained  pilots  and  observers;  but  here 
the  policy  of  standardization  and  or- 
ganization contributing  so  much  to  her 
efficiency  in  other  fields  was  not  of  cor- 
responding avail.  A  year's  service,  even 
less,  demonstrated  that  much  of  the 
equipment  so  carefully  assembled  and 
standardized  soon  became  obsolete  and 
inferior  with  respect  to  the  rapid  de- 
velopments that  war  conditions  were 
bringing  out  for  the  Allies. 

While  the  Germans  had  trained  men 
in  their  aviation  corps  the  French,  with 
perhaps  some  31  airships  of  nonrigid  or 
semirigid  types  and  possibly  1200  mili- 
tary aeroplanes  of  different  design,  had 
fewer  enrolled  aviators  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  in  actual  service,  but  had 
a  large  number  of  expert  civilians  and 
their  machines  to  call  upon,  so  that 
soon  there  was  organized  a  body  of  men 
whose  equipment,  both  available  and 
rapidly  supplied,  represented  the  note 
of  progress  ever  peculiar  to  the  French 
in  this  field.  The  organization  and 
drill  of  the  various  units  was  done  with 
remarkable  military  skill  and  care. 

Great  Britain,  distinctly  inferior  in 
organization  and  equipment  as  well  as 
numbers,  for  its  aeroplanes  hardly  to- 
taled 500,  and  its  dirigibles  but  15,  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war  endeavored 
speedily  to  repair  these  deficiencies,  and 
while  the  defensive  efforts  to  repel  the 
Zeppelin  raids  were  crowned  with  but 


moderate  success,  British  aviators  at 
the  front  and  at  sea  achieved  a  good 
record.  Russia  with  16  small  airships 
and  perhaps  800  aeroplanes,  many  of 
which  were  in  poor  shape,  suffered  from 
an  inadequacy  of  equipment,  while  in 
Austria  and  Italy  from  the  outset  aerial 
war  was  waged  by  both  Powers  with  a 
fair  degree  of  preparation. 

Aerial  activity  in  war  became  not 
only  important  but  indispensable  under 
modern  conditions,  yet  it  did  not  have 
a  direct  and  primary  effect  on  the  prog- 
ress of  the  war  itself  comparable,  let 
us  say,  to  the  activity  of  the  submarine. 
Indirectly  the  influence  of  air  craft  on 
warfare  proved  enormous,  but  four 
years  of  experience  indicated  that  there 
was  but  little  direct  military  advantage 
in  the  attempts  at  wholesale  destruction 
of  noncombatants,  buildings,  and  ma- 
terial by  aeroplane  and  dirigible,  al- 
though in  the  summer  of  1916  the  dis- 
charge of  high  explosives  on  the  Ger- 
man trenches  aided  considerably  the  at- 
tacks of  the  Allies.  The  numerous  air 
raids  over  Great  Britain  resulted  in 
little  positive  military  advantage,  and 
the  "frightfulness"  that  they  were  to  in- 
spire soon  gave  way  to  a  feeling  of 
intense  irritation  on  the  part  of  the  in- 
vaded. That  they  were  solely  for  the 
purpose  of  destruction  by  way  of  re- 
prisal or  otherwise  was  not  believed  by 
many  military  and  naval  authorities, 
even  British,  who  urged  that  the  raids 
were  a  part  of  an  elaborate  and  highly 
developed  system  of  reconnoissance 
carried  on  in  connection  with  naval 
operations,  especially  by  submarines 
and  raiding  cruisers,  with  whom  they 
were  in  communication  through  wire- 
less. Nevertheless  these  raids  were  of 
special  significance,  as  they  indicated 
future  possibilities  in  the  way  of  inva- 
sion and  a  menace  tnat  was  ever  at 
hand,  and  naturally  they  bulk  large  in 


AERIAL  OPERATIONS 


209 


any  history  of  the  war.  Accordingly  it 
may  be  desirable  to  consider  some  of  the 
more  effective  raids  on  the  great  cities 
and  at  considerable  distances  from  home 
bases. 

Early  in  the  war  various  places  were 
attacked  with  bombs  dropped  from 
aeroplanes  and  dirigibles,  and  naturally 
such  incidents  aroused  widespread  in- 
terest for  their  novelty.  At  first  some 
pretense  was  made  to  comply  with  Ar- 
ticle 25,  Annex  to  Hague  Convention, 
Oct.  19,  1907,  which  declared  "The  at- 
tack or  bombardment,  by  whatever 
means,  of  towns,  villages,  dwellings,  or 
buildings  which  are  undefended,  is  pro- 
hibited." The  addition  of  the  words 
"by  whatever  means"  was  for  the  pur- 
pose of  making  it  clear  that  the  bom- 
bardment of  these  undefended  places 
from  balloons  or  aeroplanes  was  pro- 
hibited. This  rule  was  ratified  without 
reservations  among  other  countries  by 
Belgium,  France,  and  Great  Britain,  as 
well  as  the  United  States,  and  with 
reservations  by  Germany,  Russia,  and 
Austria.  The  declaration  (Oct.  18, 
1907)  to  prohibit  "for  a  period  extend- 
ing to  the  close  of  the  Third  Peace  Con- 
ference the  discharge  of  projectiles  and 
explosives  from  balloons  or  by  other 
new  methods  of  a  similar  nature"  was 
ratified  among  other  nations  by  Great 
Britain,  Belgium,  and  the  United  States. 
Germany,  France,  Austria,  and  Russia 
refused  to  ratify. 

It  was  claimed  that  cities  like  Paris 
and  London  were  in  reality  fortified 
camps,  or  equivalent  thereto,  and  as 
such  were  liable  to  attack  without  warn- 
ing; while  if  civilians  were  killed  when 
towns  supposed  to  contain  supply  sta- 
tions, railway  centres,  palaces,  or  head- 
quarters were  bombed  the  injuries  were 
to  be  considered  incidental  rather  than 
intended.  The  raid  of  the  Allies  on 
Freib§rg,  e.g.,  which  was  said  to  be  un- 


fortified, was  considered  by  the  Ger- 
mans an  act  in  violation  of  the  rules  of 
war  and  led  to  reprisals.  The  bombing 
of  hospitals  and  buildings  protected  by 
Red  Cross  flags  figured  also  in  the 
charges  and  recriminations  that  these 
aerial  attacks  provoked. 

In  the  early  weeks  of  the  war  a  Zep- 
pelin dropped  bombs  over  Antwerp,  and 
at  the  end  of  August  and  on  September 
1,  2,  and  3,  1914,  Taube  monoplanes 
made  daily  visits  to  Paris,  where,  as  in 
London,  all  street  and  other  lights  were 
extinguished  and  means  hastily  impro- 
vised to  defend  the  city  by  searchlight 
and  anti-aircraft  guns  as  well  as  to  or- 
ganize special  fire-fighting  facilities  to 
deal  with  the  results  of  incendiary 
bombs.  On  Oct.  11,  1914,  another  raid 
was  made  on  Paris  and  bombs  were 
dropped,  some  of  which  fell  on  the 
cathedral  of  Notre  Dame,  while  others 
damaged  streets,  sewers,  and  the  under- 
ground railway,  besides  causing  the 
deaths  of  some  three  persons  and  in- 
juries to  14.  In  the  meantime  the  aerial 
defense  of  the  city  was  being  developed, 
but  on  March  22,  1915,  another  raid 
was  made  on  Paris,  which,  while  result- 
ing in  little  damage,  nevertheless  em- 
phasized the  need  of  a  more  complete 
system  of  defense.  This  was  organized 
under  General  Hirschauer,  former  chief 
of  the  aeronautical  department,  and 
after  it  had  been  developed  Paris  was 
free  from  attack  for  many  months. 
There  was  a  system  of  central  control 
with  the  battle  front,  aviation  parks, 
and  other  stations  connected  by  tele- 
phone, and  frequent  anti-aircraft  bat- 
teries, many  mounted  on  high-speed  mo- 
tors, not  to  mention  searchlight  and 
observing  stations  equipped  with  micro- 
phonic detectors,  were  provided  at  care- 
fully chosen  points.  There  were  a  num- 
ber of  completely  equipped  aeroplane 
stations   each   ready   to   send   aloft   its 


210 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


complement  of  machines  at  a  moment's 
notice.  A  patrol  was  maintained  with 
the  aeroplanes  flying  at  different  levels, 
drilled  to  intercept  a  hostile  machine 
from  both  above  and  below. 

Naturally  an  air  attack  on  the  Brit- 
ish Isles  was  the  goal  aimed  at  by  the 
Germans.  Various  reconnoissances  were 
made  by  the  Germans  in  connection 
with  the  flights  on  the  western  front 
and  the  observation  of  the  British  navy, 
but  it  was  not  until  Dec.  5,  1914,  that 
the  reporting  of  a  German  aeroplane 
over  Dover  brought  home  to  the  British 
the  reality  of  aerial  danger.  On  Decem- 
ber 24,  bombs  were  dropped  on  Dover, 
and  the  following  day  a  German  biplane 
dropping  bombs  near  Chatham  was  en- 
gaged by  three  British  machines  and 
was  driven  down  the  Thames,  presum- 
ably to  its  destruction,  as  later  the  body 
of  a  German  aviator  was  found  near 
the  river  mouth.  But  the  first  serious 
raid  on  Britain  was  on  the  evening  of 
Jan.  19,  1915,  and  was  directed  against 
Yarmouth,  Sandringham,  and  other 
points  on  the  Norfolk  coast.  This  raid 
evidently  was  designed  to  test  the  capa- 
bilities of  the  Zeppelins  for  extended 
service,  yet  even  at  the  time  it  was 
thought  by  English  naval  critics  to  be 
for  the  purpose  of  securing  informa- 
tion as  to  the  British  fleet  and  for  pos- 
sible bomb  dropping  on  shipyards  and 
iron-works.  This  raid  was  but  a  begin- 
ning, for  by  June  1,  1915,  the  metro- 
politan section  of  London  was  reached 
and  considerable  damage  was  done,  four 
lives  being  lost,  while  on  June  6  another 
raid  attended  by  casualties  was  made 
on  the  east  coast  of  England,  and  again 
on  June  15,  on  this  last  16  persons  be- 
ing killed  and  40  injured.  Little  of  this 
nature  then  happened,  save  for  a  raid 
on  Harwich,  until  Aug.  9,  1915,  when  a 
raid  in  considerable  force  was  made, 
and  bombs  were  dropped   on  warships 


in  the  Thames,  on  London  docks,  on 
torpedo  boats  near  Harwich,  and  on 
military  posts  on  the  Humber.  This 
raid  was  the  forerunner  of  the  activity 
promised  by  Count  Zeppelin  in  the  pre- 
vious spring,  when  he  stated  that  by  the 
following  August  there  would  be  avail- 
able 15  airships  of  a  new  type.  The 
casualties  of  this  raid,  on  which  some 
five  airships  started,  were  stated  at  25, 
about  half  of  which  were  deaths,  while 
a  number  of  fires  were  set. 

Following  this  raid  came  one  on  the 
night  of  August  12  against  Harwich, 
where  6  were  killed  and  17  wounded, 
while  a  squadron  of  4  Zeppelins  in  an- 
other raid  over  the  English  east  coast 
killed  10  and  wounded  36  besides  dam- 
aging various  houses  and  other  build- 
ings. This  was  the  eighteenth  raid  on 
Great  Britain,  making  a  total  of  85 
killed  and  267  injured  by  bombs.  The 
attacks  of  the  Zeppelins  reached  per- 
haps a  climax  on  September  8-9  when 
the  heart  of  London  was  reached,  and 
the  Zeppelins  flying  over  Trafalgar 
Square  were  distinctly  visible  from  the 
street.  The  casualties  of  this  raid  were 
given  as  20  killed,  14  seriously  injured, 
and  74  slightly  wounded,  while  the  ma- 
terial damage  was  considerable.  These 
raids  continued  during  September  over 
parts  of  the  eastern  counties.  On  Octo- 
ber 13-14  London  was  again  attacked 
by  Zeppelins,  which,  fearful  of  search- 
light and  gunfire,  flew  very  high  with  a 
corresponding  effect  on  the  accuracy  of 
their  bomb  dropping.  The  roll  of  cas- 
ualties included  46  killed  and  114 
wounded.  For  a  few  months  now  there 
was  a  lull  in  the  aerial  attacks  on  Great 
Britain,  but  the  most  serious  raid  came 
on  the  night  of  Jan.  31,  1915,  when  six 
or  seven  Zeppelins  passed  over  the  mid- 
land counties,  dropping  over  300  bombs 
and  generally  terrorizing  the  inhabi- 
tants, the  aim  being  to  strike  a  blow  at 


AERIAL  OPERATIONS 


211 


the  industrial  centres.  Here  61  were 
killed  and  101  injured,  and  the  total 
number  of  the  killed  for  29  raids  since 
the  beginning  of  the  war  was  %66.  Be- 
ginning March  31,  1916,  air  raids  were 
made  over  Great  Britain  for  five  suc- 
cessive nights  and  not  only  the  eastern 
counties  but  even  Scotland  and  the 
northeast  coast  were  visited  and  bombs 
dropped.  In  one  of  these  raids  the 
Zeppelin  L-15  suffering  severely  from 
gunfire  was  forced  to  descend  and  was 
captured  by  the  British. 

The  aerial  defense  of  Great  Britain 
came  in  for  considerable  criticism  both 
within  and  without  Parliament  and  un- 
favorable comparison  with  that  main- 
tained in  France  was  made,  but  there 
were  fundamental  differences  in  the  na- 
ture of  the  problem.  Paris  was  behind 
a  carefully  guarded  military  frontier 
and  all  approaches  were  by  land,  while 
Great  Britain,  surrounded  by  water  and 
often  enveloped  in  fog,  presented  a 
much  better  opportunity  for  attack 
given  an  aeroplane  or  airship  that  could 
maintain  itself  in  air  long  enough  for 
a  sustained  flight.  Many  Englishmen 
urged  that  too  much  had  been  done  for 
defense  and  not  enough  in  the  way  of 
offensive  movements  against  the  Zeppe- 
lins in  their  home  ports  and  stations. 

Such  raids  as  those  described  stand 
out  apart  from  their  actual  military 
significance,  but  they  must  not  be  al- 
lowed to  eclipse  the  daily  routine  and 
the  ever-increasing  number  of  frequent 
combats  on  all  the  battle  fronts  of  this 
great  war.  What  was  remarkable  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  such  as  visits 
of  the  German  Taubes  to  Paris  in 
August,  1914,  or  the  bomb  dropping 
by  a  Zeppelin  on  Antwerp  on  September 
1,  of  the  same  year,  soon  became  com- 
monplace as  did  the  bombing  of  the  Ger- 
man hangars  at  Dusseldorf  and  Cologne 
by  the  Allies  later  in  the  month.     At- 


tacks on  Friedrichshafen  by  the  British 
and  on  Freiberg  by  the  French  fol- 
lowed, while  a  British  raid  on  Cuxhaven 
on  Dec.  25,  1914,  was  an  early  example 
of  a  number  of  aeroplanes  working  to- 
gether. Aerial  attacks  and  reconnois- 
sances  in  force  became  more  frequent, 
ever  on  a  larger  scale  and  with  greater 
elaboration  of  organization  as  well  as 
with  more  powerful  and  more  heavily 
armed  machines.  To  deprive  the  enemy 
of  the  services  of  aviators  and  machines 
and  to  prevent  their  use  for  purposes  of 
advantage  now  became  a  prime  military 
necessity  with  a  direct  bearing  on  oper- 
ations. Patrols  were  maintained  more 
effectively,  the  service  of  security  and 
information  carried  on  daily  in  spite  of 
hostile  interference,  while  for  the  gun- 
ners in  and  behind  the  trenches  ranges 
and  directions  were  observed  in  the  un- 
precedented bombardments  that  took 
place  from  time  to  time.  Bombing 
raids  by  aeroplanes  were  organized  on 
a  large  scale  by  the  French  especially 
with  their  heavier  machines  and  many 
of  these  were  very  successful.  While 
both  sides  continually  lost  many  aero- 
planes in  actual  fighting,  the  Germans 
suffered  severely  with  respect  to  their 
Zeppelins  by  accident  as  well  as  by  gun 
fire.  The  first  Zeppelin  to  succumb  as 
the  result  of  aeroplane  attack  was  on 
June  7,  1915,  when  a  Canadian  aviator, 
Sublieut.  R.  A.  J.  Warneford,  R.N.,  in 
a  Morane  monoplane  encountered  the 
German  airship  LZ-38  flying  at  a  height 
of  about  6,000  feet  between  Ghent  and 
Brussels.  Getting  directly  above  the 
Zeppelin  he  was  able  to  land  a  bomb 
squarely  on  the  envelope  so  that  the  re- 
sulting explosion  entirely  destroyed  the 
dirigible.  There  were  further  accidents 
to  the  German  Zeppelins  during  the  au- 
tumn and  early  winter  of  1915,  the  Rus- 
sians destroying  an  airship  by  artillery 
fire   near   Kalkun   on   the   Libau-Benin 


212 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Railway  on  December  5.  Another 
notable  achievement  was  the  bringing 
down  of  the  German  naval  Zeppelin 
LZ-77  by  an  incendiary  shell  from  a 
77-mm.  anti-aircraft  gun  of  a  French 
motor  section  at  Brabant-le-Roi  on  Feb. 
21,  1916.  The  shell  ignited  the  gas 
bag.  On  May  3  the  naval  Zeppelin 
L-W  was  forced  to  descend  on  the  Nor- 
wegian coast  where  it  was  blown  up  to 
preserve  neutrality,  while  on  May  5  one 
Zeppelin  was  destroyed  by  gunfire  from 
French  warships  over  Saloniki  and  an- 
other by  the  British  off  the  coast  of 
Schleswig-Holstein. 

Along  with  the  brilliant  feats  of  in- 
dividual aviators  there  was  developed 
a  tendency  towards  tactical  formations 
and  the  use  of  many  machines.  In 
August,  1915,  at  one  occasion  84 
French  aeroplanes  were  assembled  for 
flight  over  the  German  lines,  difference 
in  speed  and  armament  making  possi- 
ble tactical  dispositions  of  the  great- 
est advantage.  The  Germans  for  a  time 
had  some  machines  of  superior  arma- 
ment and  from  August,  1915,  heavier 
guns  and  armored  aeroplanes  figured 
and  operations  by  flotillas  became  more 
general,  these  including  the  use  of 
powerful  bombing  machines  accom- 
panied by  armored  scouts  for  their  pro- 
tection and  swift  flying  machines  for 
advanced  reconnoitring.  Air  craft  were 
also  used  at  sea  against  warships  and 
transports  and  in  August,  1915,  the 
Russians  employed  seaplanes  against  a 
German  gunboat  near  Windau  accom- 
panied also  by  a  Zeppelin  and  two  sea- 
planes. Aeroplanes  were  also  in  evi- 
dence in  the  south  and  east,  for  the 
Russians  attacked  Constantinople  in 
August,  dropping  bombs  on  the  harbor 
forts,  and  from  this  time  both  sides  were 
in  active  aerial  warfare  until  the  close 
of  the  Dardanelles  campaign.  On 
August  10   the  Russians  brought   sea- 


planes to  bear  in  repelling  the  landing 
of  German  troops  off  the  Gulf  of  Riga. 
Everywhere  there  was  aerial  activity 
and  damage  wrought  by  air  craft,  yet 
unavoidably  this  was  accompanied  by 
wholesale  destruction  of  machines  and 
losses  of  aviators.  As  samples  of  aerial 
attacks,  and  in  fact  but  little  more  here 
can  be  attempted,  mention  may  be  made 
of  the  bombing  of  a  poison  gas  plant 
at  Dornach  on  Aug.  26,  1915,  by  a 
French  aviator  and  a  bomb  attack  on 
the  royal  palace  at  Stuttgart,  a  step 
it  was  announced  taken  in  retaliation 
for  German  bomb  dropping  on  unforti- 
fied towns  and  civilians.  In  every  kind 
of  operations  air  craft  aided  as  at  the 
battle  in  the  attack  on  Artois  Sept.  25, 
1915,  when  the  British  airmen  were 
prominent,  and  later  at  Verdun  in  the 
spring  of  1916.  On  the  western  front 
in  April,  1916,  French  airmen  brought 
down  31  hostile  aeroplanes.  On  Octo- 
ber 3,  a  group  of  19  French  aeroplanes 
essayed  an  attack  on  Luxemburg,  where 
the  Kaiser  had  established  head- 
quarters. 

In  the  south,  Austrians  were  active 
against  Italy,  and  bombing  raids  were 
made  against  Brescia,  Verona,  Venice, 
Udine,  and  other  points,  while  the  Ital- 
ians in  turn  made  attacks  on  Austrian 
territory.  On  Nov.  28,  1915,  occurred 
the  first  battle  between  British  and  Ger- 
man seaplanes  near  Dunkirk  with  dam- 
ages to  both  sides,  while  on  November 
29  a  British  seaplane  destroyed  a  Ger- 
man submarine  off  the  Belgian  coast. 
Typical  of  a  day's  work  for  the  air- 
men may  be  mentioned  the  British  War 
Office  report  of  Dec.  19,  1915,  which 
announced  44  combats  in  the  air  on 
the  western  front.  In  April,  1916, 
French  airmen  on  the  western  front 
brought  down  31  hostile  aeroplanes, 
while  in  the  struggle  around  Verdun 
aeroplanes   of  both  sides  were  in  con- 


AERIAL  OPERATIONS 


213 


stant  service.  In  the  great  drive  of 
June  and  July,  1916,  the  Allies'  aero- 
planes participated  actively,  and  re- 
ports made  mention  of  extraordinary 
effects  attending  the  dropping  of  power- 
ful explosives  on  the  trenches.  The 
aeroplanes  also  made  many  raids  in  the 
rear.  Airmen  mostly  French  were  ac- 
tive with  the  eastern  army  in  the  Bal- 
kans where  the  intense  cold  put  many 
difficulties  in  their  way.  Around  the 
Suez  Canal  the  aeroplanes  were  invalu- 
able in  supplying  information  of  threat- 
ened movements. 

In  1916  everywhere  there  was  in- 
creased aerial  activity,  a  more  active 
patrol  service  was  maintained,  and  ac- 
tions were  frequent  and  serious.  At  sea 
aeroplanes  were  searching  out  for  sub- 
marines and  scouting,  and  employment 
of  airship  and  aeroplane  before  and  in 
a  large  naval  battle  for  scouting  and 
reconnoissance  in  a  manner  and  on  a 
scale  somewhat  corresponding  to  their 
use  on  land  found  a  notable  opportu- 
nity in  the  great  fight  off  Jutland  on 
May  31,  1916. 

The  year  1917  marked  the  ever-in- 
creasing importance  of  the  aeroplane 
as  a  military  asset.  It  has  been  called 
the  eyes  of  the  army  and  has  lived  up 
to  this  name  more  and  more  as  the 
great  battles  of  the  year  were  fought. 
In  the  battle  of  the  Somme  and  during 
the  great  German  retreat  General  Haig 
depended  on  his  air  service  to  find  out 
just  what  the  Germans  were  doing  and 
how  far  they  had  retreated.  It  ap- 
pears, however,  that  the  Germans  be- 
gan their  movement  without  being  dis- 
covered by  the  British.  We  find  the 
aeroplane  probably  used  to  its  greatest 
advantage  in  the  spring  and  summer 
campaigns  on  the  Italian  front  and  dur- 
ing their  retreat  to  the  Piave.  Fleets 
of  150  or  more  machines  would  fly  low 
to  the  ground  and  drop  bombs  on  form- 


ing troops,  lines  of  communications,  and 
munition  dumps,  or  they  would  rake  the 
enemy  with  machine  gun  fire.  Some  of 
the  giant  Caproni  planes  could  carry 
without  any  difficulty  10  or  more  men. 
One  of  the  interesting  outgrowths  of  in- 
creased aerial  activity  was  the  develop- 
ment of  the  "camouflage"  system.  This 
means  the  covering  of  trenches,  artil- 
lery and  other  things  of  military  value 
with  trees,  painted  scenes,  etc.,  so  that 
they  could  not  be  distinguished  from 
the  rest  of  the  landscape  from  the  air. 
These  were  of  particularly  great  value, 
inasmuch  as  airplanes  were  compelled 
to  stay  2  or  3  miles  in  the  air  as  anti- 
aircraft guns  were  improved. 

England  was  the  scene  of  many  air- 
ship and  aeroplane  raids  during  1917. 
The  first  one  occurred  on  the  night  of 
March  16-17.  The  last  one  previous 
to  this  occurred  in  November,  1916. 
The  southeastern  counties  were  at- 
tacked with  comparatively  little  ma- 
terial damage  and  no  military  damage 
whatever.  On  their  return  to  home  soil 
one  Zeppelin  was  brought  down  near 
Compiegne  by  French  anti-aircraft 
guns.  The  crew  of  30  was  killed.  On 
May  7  German  airplanes  dropped 
bombs  northeast  of  London  without 
doing  any  damage.  On  the  same  day 
the  Zeppelin  L-22  was  brought  down  in 
the  North  Sea  by  a  British  naval  plane. 

Between  May  23  and  June  16,  1917, 
five  aerial  attacks  were  made  on  Eng- 
land. In  almost  all  of  these  the  Ger- 
mans used  aeroplanes  instead  of  Zeppe- 
lins. In  one  attack  on  May  25,  76  men, 
women,  and  children  were  killed  and  174 
wounded.  Three  of  the  planes  were 
shot  down  as  they  were  homeward  bound 
across  the  channel.  Twenty  German 
planes  took  part  in  the  attack.  On 
June  5,  16  planes  bombarded  the  coast 
towns  in  Kent  and  Essex.  Two  more 
were  shot  down.     They  were  unable  to 


214 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


penetrate  the  outer  defenses  of  London. 
The  worst  raid  of  the  month  was  on 
June  13.  It  was  carried  out  in  broad 
daylight  and  resulted  in  the  death  of 
97  persons,  of  whom  26  were  school 
children,  and  the  wounding  of  437.  On 
June  16  two  Zeppelins  bombarded  the 
Kentish  Coast  and  killed  2  and  wounded 
16.  One  of  them  was  brought  down  in 
flames  on  British  soil  and  the  entire 
crew  was  killed. 

On  July  4  another  great  raid  was 
made  on  England.  Eleven  persons  were 
killed  and  36  injured  at  Harwich.  Two 
German  machines  were  lost.  London 
was  again  attacked  by  a  fleet  of  20  air- 
planes which  penetrated  all  the  defenses. 
Thirty-seven  people  were  killed  and  141 
injured  but  the  British  Admiralty  an- 
nounced that  while  the  material  damage 
was  heavy  the  military  damage  was 
practically  nothing.  Eleven  persons 
were  killed  and  26  wounded  when  two 
German  aeroplanes  dropped  bombs  on 
Felixstowe  and  Harwich  on  July  22. 
The  Essex  coast  was  raided  on  August 

12  with  a  loss  of  23  lives  and  50  in- 
jured. Two  hostile  machines  were  de- 
stroyed. On  August  22  Yorkshire, 
Dover,  Ramsgate,  and  Margate  were 
raided,  during  which  11  were  killed  and 

13  injured.  The  Germans  suffered  heav- 
ily in  this  raid,  losing  8  Gotha  ma- 
chines. On  September  3  bombs  were 
dropped  on  the  naval  station  at  Chat- 
ham, killing  108  and  wounding  92.  On 
the  moonlight  night  of  September  4, 
11  were  killed  and  62  hurt  in  a  raid  on 
London. 

Raids  were  made  by  German  airmen 
on  England  on  September  24,  25,  29, 
30,  and  October  1.  As  a  result  of  these 
52  were  killed  and  216  injured.  The 
Germans  carried  them  out  with  scarcely 
any  loss  to  themselves,  British  reports 
only  claiming  to  have  destroyed  two 
machines.     One  of  the  most  disastrous 


raids  from  the  German  point  of  view 
was  made  on  the  night  of  Oct.  19,  1917. 
At  least  11  Zeppelins  participated  and 
on  their  way  home,  five  were  lost  in 
French  territory.  One  was  captured 
undamaged  at  Bourbonne-les-Bains. 
Twenty-seven  were  killed  and  53 
wounded  as  a  result  of  this  raid.  On 
October  31,  30  aeroplanes  attacked 
London,  but  only  three  got  through  the 
defenses.  Eight  were  killed  and  21  in- 
jured. On  December  6,  25  Gotha 
planes  attacked  London,  killing  10  and 
injuring  31.  On  December  18,  20  aero- 
planes raided  Kent,  Essex,  and  London 
and  killed  10  and  wounded  70.  In 
these  last  two  raids,  three  planes  were 
forced  to  descend,  and  their  crews  were 
taken  prisoners.  A  careful  compilation 
of  British  government  reports  shows 
that  from  the  beginning  of  the  war  to 
Jan.  1,  1918,  616  persons  had  been 
killed  and  1,630  wounded. 

The  consensus  of  opinion  among  the 
Allied  nations  was  that  these  raids  were 
of  no  military  value  and  were  merely 
another  form  of  Germany's  "frightful- 
ness."  Public  opinion  in  England  and 
France  demanded  reprisals,  but  for 
physical  reasons  the  governments  re- 
fused to  heed  the  popular  clamor.  In- 
stead they  gave  their  attention  to  the 
aerial  bombardment  of  purely  military 
centres  such  as  the  submarine  bases  at 
Ostend  and  Zeebrugge  and  the  Krupp 
works  at  Essen.  France  made  one  or 
two  spasmodic  attempts  to  retaliate  by 
bombarding  towns  in  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine, but  they  met  with  comparatively 
little  success. 

It  would  be  impossible  in  a  work  of 
this  kind  to  attempt  to  describe  the 
engagements  in  the  air  over  the  battle- 
fronts.  Hundreds  of  them  occurred 
every  week  and  few  of  them  stood  out 
more  than  others  for  daring,  success, 
etc.     So  far  a  method  of  tactical  war- 


AERIAL  OPERATIONS 


215 


fare  had  not  been  evolved  by  either  of 
the  belligerent  sides.  The  engagements 
were  mostly  individual,  even  when  the 
machines  travelled  in  groups.  To  give 
an  idea  of  the  aeroplane's  activities,  it 
was  officially  reported  that  on  the  west- 
ern front  alone  717  machines  were 
brought  or  driven  down  in  April,  1917, 
713  in  May,  467  in  July,  and  704  in 
September.  Accurate  figures  are  not 
available  for  the  losses  on  the  other 
fronts. 

With  the  entrance  of  the  United 
States  into  the  war  it  was  felt  that  as 
soon  as  her  resources  were  available  the 
supremacy  of  the  air  would  pass  once 
and  for  all  to  the  Entente  Allies.  She 
devised  the  standardized  "Liberty  Mo- 
tor" which  was  supposed  to  contain  the 
best  points  of  all  the  foreign  aeroplanes 
in  one  engine. 

The  verdict  of  three  years'  use  of 
aeroplanes  and  airships  confirmed  in  the 
main  previous  theory  and  prediction. 
The  aeroplane  demonstrated  itself  an 
important  and  essential  element  of  mod- 
ern warfare  both  on  land  and  sea.  The 
airship,  which  in  the  hands  of  the  Ger- 
mans increased  vastly  in  efficiency  as 
the  war  progressed  and  was  found 
valuable  for  oversea  scouting  and  recon- 
noissance  and  bomb  dropping,  may 
cause  damage,  serious  and  costly ;  but 
that  it  contributed  anything  worth 
while  to  the  settlement  of  the  war  or 
greatly  affected  its  progress  or  outcome 
was  not  proven  by  three  years  of  use 
in  1914-17.  As  regards  relative  tech- 
nical or  military  advantage  by  Janu- 
ary, 1918,  it  was  more  difficult  to  say. 
The  aerial  services  of  the  Allies  in  or- 
ganization and  extent  had  developed  to 
a  greater  degree  than  those  of  the  Teu- 
tonic Powers  and  had  become  more  effi- 
cient with  ever-improved  machines  and 
heavier  armament,  but  throughout  the 
war    German    and    Austrian    aviators 


fought  most  valiantly,  and  the  limited 
success  achieved  by  the  Zeppelins  was 
due  to  their  inherent  nature  rather  than 
to  unskillful  operation. 

On  the  nights  of  January  21  and  24, 
1918,  British  aviators  carried  out  suc- 
cessful raids  over  Belgium  and  in  Ger- 
man Lorraine,  dropping  bombs  on 
Mannheim,  Treves,  Saabriicken,  Thion- 
ville.  During  the  month  of  Janu- 
ary the  Germans  and  Austrians  were 
particularly  active  in  carrying  raids 
over  the  Italian  lines.  Treviso  and 
Mestre  were  bombarded  on  January 
26 ;  Venice,  Padua,  Treviso,  and  Mestre, 
on  February  4  and  6,  and  on  the  latter 
date  Calliano  and  Bassano  were  also 
bombed.  The  Italian  war  office  an- 
nounced that  between  January  26  and 
February  7,  sixty-six  enemy  aircraft 
had  been  brought  down  in  the  battles 
over  the  Italian  lines.  On  the  night 
of  February  6,  an  Italian  airman 
dropped  a  ton  of  explosives  on  the 
enemy  aviation  grounds  at  Motta  di 
Livenza. 

London  was  attacked  on  the  night  of 
January  28  and  58  persons  were  killed 
and  173  wounded.  Another  raid  the 
next  night  killed  10  and  injured  the 
same  number.  On  the  30th,  Paris  was 
heavily  bombarded,  in  the  course  of 
which  45  persons  were  killed  and  207 
wounded.  During  a  raid  on  Venice  on 
February  26,  the  Churches  of  Santa 
Giustina,  San  Simeone,  Piccolo,  and  St. 
John  Chrysostom  were  badly  damaged. 
Naples  was  attacked  on  March  11. 
This  resulted  in  the  killing  of  16  and 
the  injuring  of  40. 

The  British  bombarded  Mainz  on 
March  9,  1918,  Stuttgart  on  March 
10,  Coblenz  on  the  12th,  Freiburg  on 
the  13th,  Zweibriicken  on  the  16th,  and 
Kaiserslauten  on  the  13th.  As  a  result 
of  these  raids  fires  and  explosions  were 
caused   in  munition  plants   and  motor 


216 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


works,  which  were  the  objectives  of  the 
British  airmen. 

A  raid  on  Paris  on  March  8,  1918, 
resulted  in  the  death  of  13  and  the  in- 
juring of  50.  Another  raid  which  oc- 
curred on  March  11  caused  the  death 
of  34  and  the  injuring  of  79.  Four 
German  machines  were  brought  down 
and  15  Germans  killed  or  captured. 
On  February  16  a  raid  on  London  re- 
sulted in  the  death  of  11  and  the  in- 
juring of  4.  A  second  raid  was  made 
on  the  next  night  and  15  killed  and  38 
wounded  were  the  casualties.  For  the 
third  successive  night  the  Germans  at- 
tempted to  raid  London  on  the  18th  but 
were  driven  off  without  doing  any  dam- 
age. On  March  7,  11  persons  were 
killed  and  46  injured  as  a  result  of  an- 
other raid  over  London.  The  Germans 
raided  the  northeast  coast  on  March 
13,  killing  5  and  injuring  9.  This  sec- 
tion was  raided  again  on  April  12  and 
5  persons  were  killed  and  15  injured. 

Italian  aviators  cooperating  with  the 
Allies  on  the  Western  Front,  bombed 
Metz  on  March  17  and  23,  1918,  and 
raided  the  railway  station  at  Thionville 
on  the  night  of  March  24.  Paris  was 
again  the  objective  on  April  12,  when 
26  were  killed  and  72  wounded.  Ital- 
ians raided  Pola,  Trent,  and  Trieste 
on  May  10,  and  British  forces  cooper- 
ating with  them  attacked  the  aviation 
grounds  at  Campo  Maggiore  (May  4) 
and   destroyed   14   Austrian   machines. 

On  May  3,  1918,  the  British  bom- 
barded Karlshutte  and  on  May  16 
brought  down  five  German  machines 
during  an  attack  on  Saarbriicken. 
British  seaplanes  attacked  Ostend, 
Westende,  and  Zeebrugge  successfully 
on  May  6.  As  an  example  of  the  strug- 
gles occurring  in  the  air  over  the  tre- 
mendous battles  raging  in  France  it 
might  be  noted  that  on  one  day  the 
British  brought  down  55  German  ma- 


chines and  on  another  46.  London  was 
again  attacked  on  May  19,  with  a  cas- 
ualty list  of  44  killed  and  179  wounded. 
The  British  succeeded  in  bringing  down 
five  German  airplanes.  Paris  was  at- 
tacked on  May  22  and  23,  and  June  1 
and  2.  These  raids  were  very  ineffective, 
only  4  persons  being  killed.  In  each 
instance  the  Germans  were  driven  off 
before  they  were  able  to  reach  the  city. 
One  German  machine  was  brought  down. 
Fourteen  persons  were  killed  and  40  in- 
jured as  a  result  of  an  Allied  air  raid 
over  Cologne  on  May  18.  Raids  were 
carried  out  by  the  Allies  over  railway 
stations  in  Lorraine  and  on  a  factory 
in  Mannheim  on  May  21  and  22.  The 
railway  station  was  destroyed  and  26 
persons  were  killed  in  Liege  on  May  26. 
On  the  night  of  June  1  and  for  the 
following  two  weeks  numerous  raids 
were  carried  out  over  the  German  bor- 
der towns  with  the  hope  of  destroying 
the  German  supply  lines  which  were 
feeding  the  military  machine  in  France. 
On  May  21,  the  British  announced  that 
more  than  1,000  German  machines  had 
been  brought  down  within  the  two  pre- 
ceding months. 

On  June  14,  1918,  the  first  American 
bombing  squadron  to  operate  behind  the 
German  front  raided  the  Baroncourt 
Railway  and  returned  safely.  A  second 
raid  was  carried  out  the  same  day  when 
Conflans  was  attacked.  The  Germans 
continually,  during  this  period,  carried 
out  raids  on  Allied  hospitals  behind 
the  lines  despite  the  fact  that  they  were 
clearly  marked.  Hundreds  of  men, 
women  and  children  were  killed  or 
wounded.  The  Germans  gave  as  the 
reason  for  this  that  the  Allies  were  ac- 
customed to  locate  their  ammunition 
dumps  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  hos- 
pitals so  as  to  make  them  immune  from 
attack.  This  charge  was  emphatically 
denied  by  the  Allies.     Paris  was  bom- 


AERIAL  OPERATIONS 


217 


barded  on  June  26  and  27  and  again 
on  July  1.  As  in  the  previous  raids 
very  little  damage  was  done  and  the 
loss  of  life  was  very  slight. 

On  June  25  and  July  5,  15,  and  16, 
1918,  British  aviators  attacked  Saar- 
briicken,  Karlsruhe,  Offenburg,  Mann- 
heim, Thionville,  and  Coblenz.  Several 
direct  hits  were  scored  on  railways, 
munition  factories,  and  chemical  plants. 
Six  tons  of  explosives  were  dropped  on 
Bruges,  Ostend  and  Zeebrugge  by 
British  naval  aircraft  between  July  4 
and  7.  Buildings  and  vessels  were 
struck.  According  to  the  British  offi- 
cial report  for  the  year  ending  June 
30,  1918,  British  aviators  had  brought 
down  4,102  enemy  aircraft  and  had  lost 
1,121  machines.  Naval  airmen  had 
brought  down  623  planes  and  had  lost 
1,094  machines.  On  July  17,  the  Ger- 
mans announced  that  during  the  month 
of  June  33  air  raids  had  been  made  by 
the  Allies  over  German  towns,  which  re- 
sulted in  the  death  of  34  persons  and 
the  severe  wounding  of  37. 

German  Zeppelins  appeared  again  in 
the  role  of  raiders  on  the  night  of 
August  5,  1918,  when  they  made  an  at- 
tempt to  raid  the  east  coast  of  England. 
One  machine  was  brought  down  40  miles 
at  sea,  another  was  damaged,  and  the 
third  was  compelled  to  return.  On  the 
12th,  a  Zeppelin  was  destroyed  off  the 
English  coast.  It  fell  in  flames.  On 
August  1,  many  tons  of  bombs  were 
dropped  on  the  railway  stations  of 
Stuttgart  and  Coblenz.  A  considerable 
amount  of  material  damage  resulted. 
Karlsruhe  was  successfully  attacked  on 
August  11,  and  the  chemical  and  air- 
plane works  at  Frankfurt  were  directly 
hit  in  the  course  of  a  raid  on  the  12th. 

Eight  Italian  airplanes  flew  across 
the  Alps  to  Vienna  and  dropped  litera- 
ture all  over  the  city.  Vienna  was  more 
than  600  miles  from  their  base  and  all 


except  one  returned  safely.  That  one 
was  compelled  to  land  on  account  of 
engine  trouble.  Gabriele  d'Annunzio 
was  in  command  of  the  squadron.  The 
Allies  bombarded  Constantinople  on 
July  27.  The  first  American-built  ma- 
chines carried  out  a  successful  flight 
over  the  German  lines  early  in  August. 
On  September  2,  fifteen  tons  of  bombs 
were  dropped  over  the  Rhine  towns  by 
Allied  aviators,  and  on  the  15th,  seven- 
teen more  tons  were  dropped  over  the 
Lorraine  front.  During  the  three  days 
of  September  14,  15  and  16  more  than 
eighty-seven  tons  of  bombs  were 
dropped  over  Metz  and  nearby  cities. 
Venice  was  attacked  on  August  22, 
Padua  on  August  25,  and  Paris  on  Sep- 
tember 16.  The  loss  of  life  was  com- 
paratively small  and  the  property  loss 
slight. 

On  the  night  of  October  9,  1918,  an 
expedition  of  more  than  350  planes 
bombarded  many  towns  in  the  American 
sector,  with  the  loss  of  only  one  man. 
American  activity  in  the  Argonne  sec- 
tor was  particularly  noticeable.  Dur- 
ing a  six-month  period  before  the  sign- 
ing of  the  armistice  it  is  estimated  that 
the  American  fliers  brought  down  over 
five  hundred  planes  with  a  loss  of  about 
seventy. 

During  the  war  the  air  raids  on  Eng- 
land caused  the  death  of  1,570  people 
and  the  injury  of  3,941.  Of  these 
4,750  were  civilians.  One  hundred  and 
ten  raids  were  carried  out  by  airships 
and  airplanes. 

Estimated  Participants  and  Casual- 
ties. The  following  facts  and  figures 
are  taken  from  the  New  York  Times 
Current  His  tori/  Magazine  and  were 
collected  from  official  data,  or  where 
that  was  not  obtainable  from  official 
estimates.  These  figures,  compiled  just 
shortly  after  the  close  of  the  war,  are 
subject  to  slight  change  owing  to  new 


218 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


lists  being  prepared  and  changes  made 
in  old  ones.  For  example,  the  casualty 
list  of  the  United  States  is  nearer  to 
300,000  than  the  figures  given  in  the 
table.  The  estimated  number  of  men 
mobilized  by  the  Allies  was  40,256,864 
as  compared  with  19,500,000  for  the 
Central  Powers.  Of  these  more  than 
7,000,000  were  killed  or  died  as  a  result 
of  the  war;  20,000,000  were  wounded, 
of  which  6,000,000  are  permanently  in- 
jured. In  addition  to  those  killed  di- 
rectly in  the  war  more  than  100,000 
were  killed  by  submarines  or  mines,  etc., 


on  the  high  seas,  or  by  air  raids,  or  in 
the  devastated  regions.  In  addition  to 
the  military  deaths  it  was  estimated 
that  over  9,000,000  people  lost  their 
lives  indirectly  as  a  result  of  the  war. 
This  figure  includes  4,000,000  Ar- 
menians, Syrians,  Jews,  and  Greeks 
massacred  or  starved  by  the  Turks ; 
4,000,000  deaths  beyond  normal  mor- 
tality of  influenza  and  pneumonia,  in- 
duced by  the  war;  and  1,085,441  Ser- 
bian dead  through  disease  or  massacre. 
The  following  table  is  taken  from  the 
above  mentioned  magazine. 


MOBILIZED  STRENGTH  AND  CASUALTY  LOSSES  OF  THE  BELLIGERENTS 

United  States  and  Associated  Nations 

Prisoners 

Nation                                                    Mobilized             Dead  Wounded  or 

Missing 

United  States 4,272,521                 67,813  192,483  14,363 

British  Empire 7,500,000              692,065  2,037,325  360,367 

France                                7,500,000           1,385,300  2,675,000  446,300 

Italy                                                     5,500,000              460,000  947,000  1,393,000 

Belgium        267,000                20,000  60,000  10,000 

Russia                               .               12,000,000           1,700,000  4,950,000  2,500,000 

Japan        800,000                      300  907  3 

Rumania                                                                             750,000              200,000  120,000  80,000 

Serbia      '      "                                                                        ...               707,343              322,000  28,000  100,000 

Montenegro 50,000                   3,000  10,000  7,000 

Greece             '                                                                                              230,000                 15,000  40,000  45,000 

Portugal ."".".".".'. '.'.'.'. 100,000                   4,000  15,000  200 

Total 39,676,864          4,869,478  11,075,715  4,956,233 

Central  Powers 

Germany 11,000,000           1,611,104  3,683,143  772,522 

Austria-Hungary 6,500,000              800,000  3,200,000  1,211,000 

Bulgaria                                                                          400,000              201,224  152,399  10,825 

Turkey 1,600,000              300,000  570,000  130,000 

Total                                            19,500,000           2.912,328  7,605,542  2,124,347 

Grand  Total 59,176,864           7.781,806  18,681,257  7,080,580 


Total 
Casualties 

274,659 

3,089,757 

4,506,600 

2,800,000 

90,000 

9,150,000 

1,210 

400,000 

450,000 

20,000 

100,000 

10,000 

20,892,226 


6,066,769 

5,211,000 

264,448 

1,000,000 

12,542,217 
33,434,443 


VII.     ALLEGED  ATROCITIES 


Throughout  the  territories  occupied 
by  the  Germans  destruction  of  towns 
and  villages  and  farmhouses  occurred 
regularly.  The  usual  explanation  given 
was  that  it  was  done  as  a  punishment. 
The  punishment  might  be  for  a  civilian's 
shooting  at  a  soldier ;  the  village  har- 
boring a  spy;  or  a  failure  to  meet  a 
requisition,  or  something  else.  With 
these  pillagings,  numbers  of  the  inhabi- 
tants were  shot.  The  innocent  suffered 
with  the  guilty. 

Diaries  taken  from  German  soldiers 
show  that  pillaging  was  carried  on  ex- 
tensively, the  soldiers  being  allowed  to 
drink  to  excess.  The  pamphlet  entitled, 
"German  Treatment  of  Conquered 
Territory,"  issued  by  the  Committee  on 
Public  Information  tells  of  the  experi- 
ences of  a  certain  count  and  countess. 
When  war  broke  out  they  were  caught 
in  their  chateau  by  the  first  onrush  of 
troops  and  nothing  happened  besides 
the  emptying  of  their  wine  cellars. 
When  the  second  wave  came  along  there 
was  another  demand  for  wine,  but  as 
the  whole  supply  had  been  carried  away 
they  could  not  comply  with  the  demand. 
The  Germans  were  not  convinced  and 
made  a  thorough  search  of  the  cellars, 
but  could  find  no  wine.  Still  convinced 
that  they  were  being  fooled  the  count 
and  countess  were  confined  for  three 
days  and  then  brought  out  and  stood 
before  a  firing  squad  and  threatened 
with  death  unless  they  told  where  the 
wine  was  hidden.  At  the  critical  mo- 
ment a  German  princeling  who  had 
visited  them  often  arrived  and  on  ap- 
pealing to  him  he  ordered  their  release. 
On  their  return  to  their  chateau  thev 


found  the  German  soldiers  packing  up 
porcelains  and  enamels  to  be  shipped  to 
Germany.  They  again  appealed  to  the 
prince,  who  told  them  that  the  soldiers 
could  not  be  prevented  from  taking 
away  little  souvenirs,  but  if  they  would 
pack  all  the  pieces  they  valued  most  in 
a  wardrobe  he  would  do  the  rest.  When 
the  countess  was  through  packing  the 
prince  asked  her  whether  she  was  sure 
that  all  the  best  pieces  had  been  packed 
away,  and  when  she  answered  that  they 
had  been  put  in  the  wardrobe,  he  turned 
to  his  orderly  and  said :  "Have  the 
wardrobe  sent  to  Berlin  for  me." 

The  German  authorities  systemati- 
cally exploited  Belgium  and  other  lands 
conquered  by  them.  This  was  done  with 
the  deliberate  purpose  of  crippling 
manufacturing  and  industry  in  these 
countries  to  forestall  future  competi- 
tion. This  is  the  so-called  "Rathenau 
Plan"  suggested  early  in  August,  1914, 
by  Dr.  Walter  Rathenau,  President  of 
the  General  Electric  Co.  of  Germany, 
and  was  to  "work  out  the  very  difficult 
and  new  problem  of  arranging  that 
there  should  be  no  want  of  raw  ma- 
terials for  the  conduct  of  the  war  and 
the  economic  life  of  the  nation.  .  .  . 
It  was  necessary  to  make  use  of  the 
stocks  of  raw  materials  of  these  three 
territories  (Belgium,  France,  Russia) 
for  the  domestic  economy  of  the  war 
.  .  .  the  difficulties  that  are  met  with  in 
keeping  to  the  rules  of  war  while  mak- 
ing these  requisitions  have  been  over- 
come. ...  A  system  of  collecting  sta- 
tions, of  depots  and  of  organizations 
for  distribution  was  arranged  which 
solved  the  difficulties  of  transportation, 


219 


220 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


infused  new  blood  into  industry  at  home 
and  gave  it  a  firmer  and  more  secure 
basis."  (Quotations  from  lecture  by 
Dr.  Rathenau.) 

In  a  protest  sent  to  the  State  Depart- 
ment by  the  Federation  of  Belgian  Steel 
and  Iron  manufacturers  the  statement 
is  made  that  a  certain  firm  had  the  con- 
tract for  removing  machinery  from  con- 
quered territory  to  Germany  and  to 
pick  out  those  machines  which  seemed 
most  useful  for  manufacture  of  Ger- 
man war  supplies  and  to  propose  seizure 
of  such  machinery.  All  kinds  of  ma- 
chinery was  removed  and  those  which 
could  not  be  removed  were  destroyed  by 
hammers  and  dynamite. 

From  October,  1914,  to  March,  1917, 
no  less  than  92  separate  ordinances  of 
the  General  Government  commanding 
the  declaration,  forced  sale,  or  confis- 
cation of  various  materials.  These  in- 
clude only  those  issued  by  the  Governor 
General  and  do  not  include  forced  sales 
ordered  by  officials  of  separate  bureaus. 

Germany  needed  vast  stocks  of  metal 
for  the  conduct  of  the  war  and  to  fill 
this  need  every  scrap  of  metal  that 
could  be  seized  in  the  conquered  coun- 
tries was  confiscated.  Decrees  were 
issued  ordering  the  inhabitants  to  de- 
clare amounts  of  certain  articles  in 
their  possession.  Failure  to  comply 
with  these  decrees  was  punished  by  fine 
and  imprisonment.  German  manufac- 
tures were  aided  by  the  German  gov- 
ernment in  obtaining  trade  secrets  from 
the  Belgians. 

Belgium.  Shortly  after  the  occupa- 
tion of  Belgium  by  the  Germans,  re- 
ports began  to  reach  the  outside  world 
of  shocking  atrocities  alleged  to  have 
been  committed  by  the  German  army 
during  the  invasion  and  subsequent  oc- 
cupation of  the  country.  To  ascertain 
if  possible,  whether  these  reports  were 
true,  the  government  of  Great  Britain 


appointed  a  commission  of  prominent 
English  statesmen  and  jurists  headed 
by  Viscount  Bryce  to  investigate  the 
matter.  Depositions  of  more  than 
1,200  persons  were  considered  by  the 
committee.  From  the  evidence  accumu- 
lated the  commission  reached  the  fol- 
lowing conclusions: 

1.  That  there  were  in  many  parts 
of  Belgium  deliberate  and  systematically 
organized  massacres  of  the  civil  popu- 
lation, accompanied  by  many  isolated 
murders  and  other  outrages. 

2.  That  innocent  men,  women  and 
children  in  large  numbers  were  mur- 
dered and  women  violated. 

3.  That  looting,  house  burning  and 
wanton  destruction  of  property  were 
ordered  and  countenanced  by  the  offi- 
cers of  the  German  army. 

4.  That  women  and  children  were 
used  as  a  shield  for  advancing  military 
forces. 

The  pamphlet  issued  by  the  Commit- 
tee on  Public  Information  entitled 
"German  War  Practices"  bears  out  the 
conclusions  drawn  by  the  commission 
headed  by  Viscount  Bryce.  Minister 
Whitlock  in  his  report  (September  12, 
1917)  to  the  Secretary  of  State  reports 
that  summary  executions  took  place  in 
Diriant.  There  was  no  semblance  of  a 
trial.  The  wives  and  children  of  the 
victims  were  forced  to  witness  the  exe- 
cutions. He  also  states  that  in  several 
cases  massacres  occurred  where  men, 
women  and  children  were  killed  without 
distinction  as  to  age. 

Diaries  found  on  dead  and  wounded 
soldiers  and  prisoners  tell  of  the  slaugh- 
ter of  defenseless  persons  in  which  they 
themselves  took  active  part  or  wit- 
nessed. Some  of  these  diaries  indicate 
that  their  writers  had  no  choice  in  the 
matter  but  had  to  obey  the  orders  given 
them. 

The  Germans  also  imposed  fines  and 


ALLEGED  ATROCITIES 


221 


made  levies  on  the  territory  under  their 
control  on  the  least  pretext.  Requisi- 
tions for  supplies  out  of  all  proportion 
to  the  resources  of  the  country  were 
levied.  One  small  village  of  1,500  in- 
habitants was  fined  500,000  francs  be- 
cause glass  was  found  on  the  road  and 
the  Germans  claimed  that  this  had  been 
placed  there  purposely  so  as  to  disable 
the  automobiles  used  by  the  Germans. 

The  Germans  adopted  the  policy  of 
requiring  municipalities  to  give  hos- 
tages for  the  good  conduct  of  inhabi- 
tants of  the  town  and  as  a  guarantee 
that  all  orders  or  regulations  issued 
by  the  military  commander  would  be 
carried  out.  These  hostages  were  se- 
lected from  among  the  prominent  peo- 
ple of  the  town.  Any  violation  of  regu- 
lations, or  attacks  made  upon  German 
soldiers  or  disorder  would  lead  to  the 
punishment  of  these  hostages,  which 
punishment  generally  was  shooting. 
No  account  was  taken  of  the  people 
who  caused  the  disorders.  They  might 
very  well  be  the  hoodlum  class,  but  that 
made  no  difference. 

Another  practice  adopted  by  the  Ger- 
mans was  to  force  Belgian  civilians  to 
walk  in  front  of  German  columns  when 
advancing  to  attack.  The  Belgians 
naturally  were  afraid  to  fire  for  fear  of 
shooting  their  own  flesh  and  blood.  In 
one  case  where  the  Germans  had  taken 
refuge  in  a  church  and  had  taken  with 
them  a  number  of  Belgian  women  and 
children  so  that  they  would  not  be  fired 
upon  the  Belgian  women  sent  a  boy  out 
during  the  night  with  word  to  the 
Belgians  to  fire  on  the  church,  for  they 
preferred  death  at  the  hands  of  their 
friends  rather  than  the  indignities  to 
which  they  were  subjected. 

During  the  war  the  German  govern- 
ment adopted  the  deliberate  policy  of 
deporting  men  and  women,  boys  and 
girls  and  of  forcing  them  to  work  for 


their  captors.  Often  they  were  com- 
pelled to  make  arms  and  munitions  for 
use  against  their .  allies  and  their  own 
flesh  and  blood.  Workingmen  were  im- 
prisoned and  otherwise  punished  for  re- 
fusing to  work  in  the  arsenals.  Depor- 
tations began  in  October,  1917,  in  the 
district  under  martial  law  and  at  Ghent 
and  at  Bruges,  and  soon  spread  all  over 
Belgium.  The  scenes  at  these  deporta- 
tions were  horrible.  The  wives  were 
not  permitted  to  bid  their  husbands 
good-bye  or  to  give  them  warm  cloth- 
ing for  the  trip,  as  usually  the  men  were 
called  together  without  any  intimation 
that  they  were  going  to  be  deported  and 
had  no  extra  clothes  with  them.  Pro- 
tests were  sent  by  Cardinal  Mercier  and 
various  municipalities.  The  German 
attitude  is  expressed  in  the  answer  to 
the  resolutions  of  the  Municipal  Coun- 
cil of  Tournai  by  Major-General  Hop- 
fer,  the  Commandant.  He  said  that  the 
military  authorities  order  the  city  to 
obey.  If  it  does  not  it  will  be  severely 
punished.  About  100,000  were  de- 
ported. The  United  States  government 
made  formal  protest  (December  5, 
1916).  The  Pope,  the  King  of  Spain, 
and  the  government  of  Switzerland  also 
protested  against  these  forced  deporta- 
tions as  against  all  international  law 
and  humanity. 

In  answer  to  these  charges  the  Ger- 
man government  issued  a  memorandum 
specifying  the  acts  of  civilians  in  Bel- 
gium, in  violation  of  the  rules  of  war. 
They  claimed  that  civilians  shot  at  Ger- 
man soldiers  from  private  houses  and 
mutilated  wounded  Germans,  and  that 
these  acts  justified  the  German  military 
authorities  in  their  acts  of  reprisal. 
Throughout  the  war  there  had  been 
various  aerial  attacks  on  hospitals,  and 
to  the  protests  of  the  Allies  the  Ger- 
mans answered  that  these  hospitals  were 
always   placed    near   huge    ammunition 


222 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


dumps  and  that  the  hospitals  were 
merely  cloaks  to  shield  them.  To  the 
protest  against  the  forced  deportations 
of  inhabitants  of  the  occupied  terri- 
tories the  Germans  answered  that  great 
numbers  of  able  bodied  laborers  were 
living  in  idleness  and  as  food  was  scarce 
in  these  areas  it  was  necessary  to  send 
them  far  to  the  rear  of  the  lines  where 
food  was  cheaper  and  more  plentiful. 

Great  resentment  was  aroused  in 
England  by  the  action  of  the  German 
military  authorities  in  executing  Miss 
Edith  Cavell,*  an  English  nurse,  who 
was  accused  of  utilizing  her  position  to 
assist  in  the  escape  of  Belgian,  French, 
and  British  soldiers  from  Belgium. 

Another  incident  which  caused  con- 
siderable adverse  criticism  of  the  Ger- 
man government  was  the  case  of  Car- 
dinal Mercier,f  Archbishop  of  Malines 
and  Roman  Catholic  Primate  of  Bel- 
gium. After  a  trip  through  the  devas- 
tated parts  of  Belgium  he  wrote  a  pas- 
toral letter  describing  the  conditions 
which  he  had  found.  In  passionate 
words  he  set  forth  the  evidence  of  ruined 
villages,  churches,  schools,  and  monas- 
teries destroyed.  Efforts  were  made  by 
the  German  authorities  to  suppress  the 
letter,  and  the  Cardinal  was  put  under 
restraint,    although    not    actually    im- 

*  Edith  Cavell  was  head  of  a  nurses'  train- 
ing school  in  Brussels;  as  a  nurse  did  much  for 
German  as  well  as  Allied  soldiers  in  European 
War.  The  American  Minister,  Brand  Whit- 
lock,  made  every  effort  to  have  her  life  spared. 
The  execution  roused  England  and  France  and 
was  commented  on  throughout  the  United 
States.  A  notable  memorial  service  was  held 
at  St.  Paul's,  London,  and  a  statue  of  Miss 
Cavell  by  Sir  George  Frampton  was  to  be 
erected   adjoining  Trafalgar  Square. 

f  Mercier,  Desire  Joseph,  Cardinal.  Born 
(1851)  at  Braline-l'Alleud,  Belgium.  Edu- 
cated at  Malines,  Paris  and  Leipsic.  Became 
priest  (1874);  taught  philosophy  (1877-82); 
Archbishop  of  Malines  and  Primate  of  Bel- 
gium (1906);  Cardinal  (1907).  Founded  and 
edited  Revue  Neoscolastique.  Wrote  on  meta- 
physics, philosophy,  and  psychology,  several 
of  his  works  translated  into  other  languages. 
Most  important  work  Les  Origines  de  la 
psychologie  contemporaine   (1897). 


prisoned  by  the  German  Governor  of 
Belgium,  Von  Bissing.  J  In  answer  to 
a  protest  made  by  the  Pope  the  German 
authorities  stated  that  all  restraints 
upon  the  Cardinal's  freedom  of  com- 
munication with  the  clergy  had  been 
removed. 

Armenia.  The  governments  of 
France,  Russia,  and  Great  Britain  is- 
sued the  following  joint  note  on  May 
23,  1915 :  "For  the  past  months  Kurds 
and  the  Turkish  population  of  Armenia 
have  been  engaged  in  massacring  Ar- 
menians with  the  help  of  the  Ottoman 
authorities.  Such  massacres  took  place 
about  the. middle  of  April  at  Erzerum, 
Dertshau,  Moush,  Zeitun,  and  in  all 
Cilicia.  The  inhabitants  of  about  100 
villages  near  Van  were  all  assassinated. 
In  the  town  itself  the  Armenian  quar- 
ter is  besieged  by  Kurds."  The  preach- 
ing of  a  holy  war  soon  after  this  in- 
creased the  massacres  to  such  an  extent 
that  the  Armenian  paper  Mshak  esti- 
mated that  only  200,000  of  the  race 
still  remained  in  the  country,  out  of  a 
total  of  1,200,000  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war,  and  that  850,000  had  been 
killed  or  enslaved  by  the  Turks  and 
200,000  had  migrated  to  Russia.  The 
United  States  placed  an  informal  re- 
quest before  the  German  Ambassador, 
asking  that  the  German  government  at- 
tempt to  alleviate  the  conditions  of  the 
Armenians.  An  informal  reply  said 
that  the  Armenian  reports  were  greatly 
exaggerated.  Charges  of  barbarous 
cruelty  were  laid  before  the  Sublime 
Porte  by  the  American  Ambassador, 
Morgenthau.  Turkey  filed  counter 
charges  at  Washington,  stating  that 
Russian   troops,   aided  by   Greeks   and 

%  Moritz  Ferdinand,  Baron  von  Bissing, 
born  (1844)  at  Bellmansdorf ;  rose  to  be  lieu- 
tenant general  (1897)  and  general  of  cavalry, 
commanding  the  Seventh  Army  Corps;  after 
invasion  of  Belgium  by  the  Germans  was  ap- 
pointed Military  Governor  of  the  country. 


ALLEGED  ATROCITIES 


223 


Armenians,  had  committed  acts  of 
cruelty  against  Moslems  in  the  Cau- 
casus region,  and  that  continual  revo- 
lutions incited  by  the  Allies  were  oc- 
curring in  Armenia. 

Despite  joint  diplomatic  protests 
Turkey  continued  her  atrocities  against 
the  Armenians  with  practically  un- 
abated zeal  down  to  the  close  of  the 
war.  Germany  repeatedly  refused  to 
interfere  in  any  way  whatsoever,  claim- 
ing that  she  had  no  control  over  the 
internal  government  of  the  Turks.  Al- 
though this  is  scarcely  in  accordance 
with  the  facts  in  the  case,  many  writers 
believe  that  the  reason  Germany  did  not 
intervene  was  because  she  feared  to 
estrange  Turkey  from  the  Central 
Powers.  The  horrible  acts  committed 
against  the  Armenians  caused  many  of 
the  latter  to  form  themselves  into 
guerilla  bands.  The  acts  of  retaliation 
of  these  few  unorganized  avengers  gave 
the  Turks  what  they  considered  a  logi- 
cal reason  for  the  continuation  of  the 
Armenian  massacres  and  other  acts  of 
violence  and  lust. 

Poland.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
Germany,  Austria,  and  Russia  at- 
tempted to  gain  the  loyal  support  of 
the  entire  Polish  nation  by  promises  of 
the  reestablishment  of  the  old  Polish 
Kingdom^  Poles  fought  against  each 
other  in  the  hopes  that  a  united  Poland 
would  result.  In  the  great  German 
drive  into  eastern  Russia  Poland  was 
crushed  and  the  inhabitants  suffered 
untold  hardships.  As  the  Russians  re- 
treated they  compelled  the  Poles  to 
abandon  their  homes  for  military  rea- 
sons. Any  villages  that  escaped  the 
Russians  were  almost  invariably  de- 
stroyed by  the  Germans.  It  is  esti- 
mated that  at  least  20,000  villages  were' 
wiped  out  and  that  over  200  towns  were 
completely  destroyed.  In  the  Gorlice 
district  the  Polish  Relief  Victims'  Fund 


estimate  that  during  the  18  months' 
campaign  1,500,000  noncombatants, 
caught  between  the  contending  armies, 
perished  from  hunger  and  disease.  The 
Rockefeller  Foundation  reported  that 
the  entire  civilian  population  faced  a 
famine.  The  poorer  classes  were  found 
to  be  existing  in  many  cases  on  meat- 
less soup  and  a  crust  of  bread.  There 
was  no  fuel  to  be  had  and  many  were 
frozen  to  death  during  the  winter  of 
1915-16.  Attempts  were  made  to  feed 
the  Polish  sufferers  through  an  Ameri- 
can committee,  but  Germany  and  Great 
Britain  could  not  agree  as  to  method. 

The  atrocities  committed  by  the  Ger- 
mans were  similar  to  those  committed 
by  them  in  Belgium  and  in  France. 
From  a  statement  prepared  by  Frederic 
C.  Walcott  (September,  1917)  for  the 
pamphlet  on  "German  War  Practices" 
issued  by  the  Committee  on  Public  In- 
formation the  following  facts  may  be 
gleaned:  In  Warsaw  the  German  gover- 
nor issued  a  proclamation  that  all  able- 
bodied  men  were  to  go  to  Germany  to 
work.  Those  refusing  to  go  were  not 
to  be  given  anything  to  eat.  Persons 
failing  to  comply  with  this  regulation 
would  be  dealt  with  according  to  Ger- 
man military  law.  After  the  war  ended 
and  the  downtrodden  Poles  secured  their 
freedom  and  independence  serious 
charges  were  made  against  them  in  cer- 
tain Allied  quarters,  maintaining  that 
the  new  Polish  government  was  directly 
responsible  for  the  carrying  out  of 
pogroms  against  the  Jews.  Paderewski, 
the  Polish  President,  vigorously  denied 
this  and  invited  an  Allied  Commission 
to  visit  his  country  and  examine  condi- 
tions there. 

Serbia.  The  conditions  in  Serbia 
were  practically  similar  to  those  in 
Poland.  Villages  and  towns  were  wiped 
out  in  the  face  of  the  German  drive 
through  the  Balkans.     After  the  first 


224 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


drive  of  the  Austrians  into  Serbia  fever 
epidemics  broke  out  all  over  the  coun- 
try. It  is  presumed  to  have  been  caused 
by  the  congestion  of  all  the  rural  popu- 
lation in  the  urban  districts  as  a  result 
of  the  war.  Hundreds  died  daily,  and 
in  many  places  it  was  impossible  to  bury 
all  the  victims.  Physicians  were  sent 
to  Serbia  by  the  Allies  and  hospital 
units  were  made  up  in  the  United  States 
and  sent  over.  Cholera  also  broke  out 
among  the  noncombatants  after  the 
German  drive.  It  was  caused  by  the 
shortage  of  food  and  the  bad  sanitary 
conditions,  the  people  being  forced  to 
herd  together  and  to  live  in  the  open. 
It  is  estimated  that  over  600,000  non- 
combatants  died  as  a  result  of  the 
plague  and  from  hunger. 

France.  The  procedure  here  was 
identically  as  in  Belgium.  The  system 
of  forced  labor  and  deportations  was 
duplicated.  All  its  attendant  horrors, 
brutalities,  and  callousness  were  there. 
In  the  districts  of  Tourcoing  and  Rou- 
baix  and  the  City  of  Lille  deportations 
were  made.  Probably  about  30,000 
were  deported.  The  reason  given  was 
that  food  supplies  were  short  and   if 


people  were  deported  some  distance  be- 
hind the  lines  they  could  receive  better 
care  where  food  is  more  abundant  and 
cheaper.  Notices  were  posted  for  volun- 
teers to  come  and  when  few  appeared 
the  Germans  resorted  to  forced  depor- 
tations. All  people  with  the  exception 
of  children  under  fourteen  and  their 
mothers,  and  also  of  old  people,  were 
required  to  prepare  themselves  for 
transportation  in  an  hour  and  a  half's 
time.  Each  person  was  permitted  to 
take  not  more  than  30  kilograms  of 
baggage  with  him. 

In  the  retreat  from  northern  France 
in  the  spring  of  1917  wanton  destruc- 
tion occurred.  Great  stretches  of  ter- 
ritory were  turned  into  dead  country. 
No  village  or  farmhouse  was  left  stand- 
ing; no  railway  track  or  embankment 
left;  trees  including  fruit  trees  were  de- 
stroyed and  wells  blown  up.  The  pur- 
pose of  the  Germans  seems  to  have  been 
to  turn  France  into  a  desert  so  that  for 
years  to  come  France  would  be  unable 
to  compete  commercially  and  indus- 
trially with  Germany.  The  ruined  re- 
gion in  France  begins  about  forty  miles 
north  of  Paris. 


VIII.     DESTRUCTION  OF  ART  AND  ARCHITECTURE 


The  great  war  saw  the  destruction  or 
mutilation  of  many  of  the  landmarks  of 
Europe  in  the  field  of  art  and  architec- 
ture. Charges  and  countercharges  were 
made  by  the  belligerents  of  deliberate 
attempts  to  destroy  these.  The  de- 
struction of  a  large  part  of  the  city  of 
Louvain,  including  its  church  of  St. 
Pierre,  the  University  of  Louvain,  and 
its  library  of  rare  books  and  manu- 
scripts, aroused  much  feeling  in  all  civil- 
ized countries. 

The  German  official  explanation  for 
the  destruction  of  Louvain  as  given  to 
the  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United 
States  was  that  the  Belgian  government 
had  organized  an  insurrection  of  the 
people  against  the  army.  Stores  of 
arms  had  been  established.  Interna- 
tional law  permits  people  to  organize 
to  repel  an  enemy,  but  arms  must  be 
openly  carried.  Louvain  had  surren- 
dered and  the  population  had  aban- 
doned all  resistance.  The  city  had  al- 
ready been  occupied  by  German  troops. 
Nevertheless  the  population  attacked 
troops  entering  the  city.  This  was 
proved  to  have  been  planned  long  before 
it  took  place.  Weapons  were  not  car- 
ried openly  and  women  and  girls  took 
part  in  the  attack  and  gouged  out  the 
eyes  of  wounded  German  soldiers.  The 
intensity  of  the  attack  is  shown  by  the 
fact  that  it  took  twenty-four  hours  for 
the  troops  to  overcome  resistance.  The 
city  was  destroyed  in  large  part  by  the 
conflagration  which  broke  out  after  the 
explosion  of  a  convoy  of  benzine,  which 
was  caused  by  shots  fired  during  the 
battle.  The  Imperial  Government  de- 
plored the  action  which  was  not  inten- 


tional, but  was  unavoidable.  The  Ger- 
man soldiers  were  conciliatory  and 
therefore  must  have  had  provocation. 
The  Belgian  people  and  the  Belgian 
government  must  bear  the  responsibility. 

The  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  gave  (August  28,  1914)  the 
following  account  of  the  events  leading 
to  the  destruction  of  the  city.  German 
soldiers  who  had  been  driven  back  in 
the  evening  retreated  in  disorder  on 
Louvain.  The  German  soldiers  who 
were  guarding  the  town,  who  mistook 
them  for  Belgians,  fired  upon  them. 
The  German  authorities  pretended  that 
Belgians  had  fired  on  the  soldiers,  al- 
though the  inhabitants  and  the  police 
had  been  disarmed  for  more  than  a  week 
and  the  commandant  ordered  the  de- 
struction of  the  town.  All  the  inhabi- 
tants were  ordered  to  leave  the  town. 
The  splendid  Church  of  St.  Pierre,  the 
markets,  the  university  and  its  scientific 
establishments  were  destroyed. 

Minister  Whitlock  gives  the  following 
version  of  events:  A  violent  fusillade 
broke  all  over  the  city,  German  soldiers 
firing  at  random  in  every  direction. 
Later  fires  broke  out  everywhere,  nota- 
bly in  the  University  building,  the  Li- 
brary, and  the  Church  of  St.  Peter.  On 
the  orders  of  chiefs  German  soldiers 
broke  open  houses  and  set  them  on  fire, 
shooting  inhabitants  who  tried  to  leave 
buildings.  The  Germans  made  the  usual 
claim  that  civilian  population  had  fired 
on  them  and  it  was  necessary  to  take 
these  measures  and  that  General  von 
Luttwitz  told  him  that  a  general  had 
been  shot  by  the  son  of  the  burgomas- 
ter.    But  the  burgomaster  had  no  son 


225 


226 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


and  no  officer  had  been  shot.  This  was 
the  repetition  of  a  tragedy  that  had  oc- 
curred at  Aerschot.  But  if  the  shoot- 
ing had  been  done  on  such  large  scale 
surely  there  must  be  convincing  evi- 
dence. But  no  evidence  is  given  beyond 
that  a  soldier  had  asserted:  Man  hat 
geschossen. 

The  case  of  Louvain  figured  largely 
in  the  American  press,  but  it  was  only 
one  of  numerous  similar  instances  where 
towns  and  villages  containing  gems  of 
art  and  architecture  had  been  burned 
and  many  of  their  inhabitants  shot  be- 
cause they  had  resisted  invaders. 

The  beautiful  cathedral  of  Rheims, 
dating  from  the  thirteenth  century, 
suffered  irreparable  damage  from  re- 
peated German  bombardments.  The 
Germans,  in  explanation  of  the  first 
bombardment,  maintained  that  the 
French  had  established  an  observation 
post  in  its  tower.  It  is  doubtful  if  the 
exquisite  carvings,  statuary,  and 
stained  glass  windows  can  ever  be  re- 
placed. Another  city  to  suffer  was 
Ypres.  Its  famous  Cloth  Hall  was 
seriously    damaged    during    the    heavy 


bombardments  of  the  Flanders  cam- 
paign. 

In  France  the  Chateau  of  Avricourt 
was  destroyed  by  the  Germans.  This 
is  one  of  the  class  of  buildings  covered 
in  the  international  agreements  between 
civilized  nations  safeguarding  historic 
buildings.  For  many  months  it  had 
been  the  home  of  Prince  Eitel,  the  sec- 
ond son  of  the  Kaiser.  In  spite  of  the 
protests  of  many  of  his  officers,  who 
said  that  his  acts  would  bring  disgrace 
to  the  German  name,  he  had  the  historic 
objects  in  the  chateau  carried  away. 
Then  he  himself  set  fire  to  the  building 
and  to  make  sure  that  it  would  be  com- 
pletely destroyed  he  had  it  blown  up  by 
dynamite. 

There  was  constant  danger  to  archi- 
tecture of  historical  interest  from  the 
frequent  aerial  attacks  on  cities.  For 
example,  during  an  Austrian  raid  on 
Venice  bombs  fell  on  the  Scalzi  Church. 
The  ceiling,  which  was  ornamented  with 
beautiful  sculpture  of  Tiepolo,  was 
crushed.  Historic  landmarks  of  Lon- 
don and  Paris  narrowly  escaped  damage 
from  Zeppelin  raids. 


IX.    NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR 


A  war  involving  all  of  the  great  in- 
dustrial nations  of  Europe  was  certain 
to  have  far-reaching  effects  upon  all 
neutral  nations.  The  complete  disloca- 
tion of  international  trade  and  the  clos- 
ing of  all  the  great  stock  markets  of  the 
world  gave  rise  to  financial  and  eco- 
nomic problems  which  were  absolutely 
unprecedented.  After  the  first  shock 
the  business  interests  gradually  ad- 
justed themselves  to  the  new  conditions. 
But  soon  it  became  apparent  that  prob- 
lems far  more  serious  than  those  pro- 
duced by  the  temporary  disturbance 
caused  by  the  outbreak  of  the  war  con- 
fronted the  neutral  nations.  To  the 
questions  of  neutral  trade,  contraband 
and  blockade,  which  had  arisen  in  pre- 
vious wars,  there  were  added  new  and 
more  vexing  problems  due  to  the  intro- 
duction of  new  methods  of  warfare,  es- 
pecially the  operation  of  the  submarines. 
United  States.  As  the  largest  and 
most  important  of  the  neutral  Powers, 
the  United  States  was  sure  to  be  vitally 
affected.  This  country  was  looked  to 
by  the  smaller  neutral  nations  to  cham- 
pion the  interests  of  all  neutrals. 
Moreover,  it  was  certain  that  the 
United  States  would  be  called  upon  to 
furnish  large  quantities  of  supplies  to 
the  belligerent  Powers.  Each  of  the 
belligerents  would  be  anxious  to  avail 
themselves  of  this  source  of  supply,  and 
each  in  turn  would  strive  to  prevent 
their  opponents  taking  advantage  of  it. 
Under  these  conditions  the  situation 
which  confronted  the  United  States  au- 
thorities in  attempting  to  maintain 
strict  neutrality  was  a  trying  one,  and 
the  problem  was  made  more  difficult  by 


the  attitude  of  groups  of  persons  in  this 
country  whose  sympathies  were  with 
one  or  the  other  of  the  belligerents  in 
Europe.  The  following  are  the  most 
important  questions  which  arose  involv- 
ing the  United  States  and  the  various 
European  Powers. 

Blockade  and  Neutral  Trade. — Dur- 
ing the  early  months  of  the  war  Great 
Britain  established  her  complete  con- 
trol of  the  seas,  except  in  so  far  as  it 
was  interrupted  by  the  operations  of 
the  German  submarines.  That  Great 
Britain  would  take  full  advantage  of 
her  sea  power  was  to  be  expected,  and 
that  in  so  doing  serious  difficulties 
would  arise  in  regard  to  the  rights  of 
neutral  nations  was  also  clear.  In  the 
first  place  there  was  the  always  vexed 
question  of  contraband.  There  was  no 
Hague  Convention  which  dealt  with  the 
question  of  conditional  and  absolute 
contraband.  As  the  Declaration  of 
London  was  declared  by  Great  Britain 
not  to  be  in  force,  the  question  had 
to  be  determined  by  the  general  rules 
of  international  law.  But  upon  this 
question  there  was  no  general  agree- 
ment among  the  nations.  Belligerent 
Powers  naturally  wished  to  extend  the 
list  of  contraband,  while  neutral  Powers 
quite  as  naturally  wished  to  restrict  it. 

A  more  serious  and  difficult  question 
affecting  neutrals  arose,  due  to  the  pe- 
culiar geographical  position  of  Ger- 
many. On  two  sides  the  country  was 
bounded  by  neutral  Powers  which 
touched  the  sea.  Through  Holland  and 
the  Scandinavian  countries  contraband 
might  be  shipped  from  the  United  States 
or  other  neutral  countries  to  Germanv 


227 


228 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


and  thus  nullify  England's  sea  power. 
The  problem  which  confronted  Great 
Britain  was  to  prevent  contraband  ar- 
ticles from  reaching  Germany,  while  at 
the  same  time  not  to  interfere  with 
legitimate  trade  between  neutral  coun- 
tries. Shortly  after  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities  Great  Britain  began  detain- 
ing American  ships  bound  for  neutral 
ports  on  the  ground  that  their  cargoes 
were  destined  for  the  enemy.  For  some 
months  the  United  States  government 
did  not  protest,  hoping  that  Great 
Britain  would  modify  her  policy. 
Finally  on  Dec.  26,  1914,  the  United 
States  addressed  a  communication  to 
Great  Britain,  calling  attention  to  the 
interference  by  the  latter  with  American 
commerce  with  neutral  nations,  on  the 
ground  that  goods  so  consigned  might 
reach  the  enemies  of  Great  Britain. 
The  United  States  authorities  contended 
that  "mere  suspicion  was  not  evidence 
and  doubts  should  be  resolved  in  favor 
of  neutral  commerce,  not  against  it." 
To  this  note  Great  Britain  replied  on 
Jan.  7,  1915,  that  that  country  had  not 
aimed  to  interfere  with  the  bona-fide 
trade  of  the  United  States  with  neutral 
countries,  but  figures  were  given  show- 
ing the  marked  increase  in  exports  of 
such  articles  as  rubber  and  copper  from 
the  United  States  to  neutral  countries 
contiguous  to  Germany.  It  was  stated 
that  with  such  figures  the  presumption 
was  very  strong  that  such  goods  were 
ultimately  destined  for  a  belligerent 
country.  The  note  further  stated  that 
Great  Britain  was  prepared  to  admit 
that  foodstuffs  should  not  be  seized 
without  the  presumption  that  they  were 
intended  for  the  armed  forces  of  the 
enemy.  In  regard  to  the  placing  of  cot- 
ton on  the  list  of  contraband  it  was 
stated  that  the  British  government  had 
not  contemplated  any  such  action. 
In    conclusion   the   British   government 


agreed  to  make  reparation  for  any  in- 
jury improperly  done  to  neutral  ship- 
ping. 

A  novel  question  arose  from  the  ac- 
tion of  the  German  government  in  plac- 
ing under  government  control  all  of  the 
food  supply  of  the  Empire.  The  Brit- 
ish government  declared  that  it  would 
be  impossible  under  these  conditions  to 
distinguish  between  food  intended  for 
the  civilian  population  of  Germany  and 
food  to  be  used  by  the  German  military 
forces.  In  view  of  this  situation  the 
British  government  stated  that  food- 
stuffs intended  for  consumption  in  Ger- 
many would  be  considered  contraband. 

For  some  months  after  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  Great  Britain  hesitated  to 
declare  a  blockade  of  German  ports. 
This  attitude  was  due,  in  part  at  least, 
to  the  recognized  difficulty  of  rendering 
such  a  blockade  effective,  in  view  of 
the  geographical  position  of  Germany, 
and  of  the  activities  of  submarines. 
But  events  forced  Great  Britain  to 
abandon  her  somewhat  anomalous  po- 
sition. On  March  1,  1915,  Mr.  As- 
quith  announced  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons that  Great  Britain  and  France, 
in  retaliation  upon  Germany  for  her 
declaration  of  the  "War  Zone"  around 
the  British  Isles  (see  below),  would  con- 
fiscate all  goods  of  "presumed  enemy 
destination,  ownership,  or  origin." 
Such  action,  of  course,  could  only  be 
justified  under  the  existing  rules  of  in- 
ternational law  on  the  presumption  that 
a  lawful  blockade  of  German  ports  had 
been  declared.  In  answer  to  an  inquiry 
from  the  American  government  as  to 
whether  such  a  blockade  was  contem- 
plated the  British  government  stated 
that  as  an  effective  "cordon  control- 
ling intercourse  with  Germany  had  been 
established  and  proclaimed,  the  impor- 
tation and  exportation  of  all  goods  to 
or  from  Germany  was,  under  the  ac- 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    229 


cepted  rules  of  blockade,  prohibited." 
The  British  government  further  de- 
fined the  radius  of  activity  of  the  French 
and  British  fleets  in  enforcing  the  block- 
ade as  European  waters  including  the 
Mediterranean.  It  was  further  stated 
that  they  would  refrain  from  exercis- 
ing the  right  to  confiscate  ships  and 
cargoes  for  breaches  of  the  blockade, 
and  restrict  their  claim  to  stopping 
cargoes  destined  to  or  coming  from  the 
enemy's  territory. 

In  an  extended  communication  ad- 
dressed to  the  British  government  by 
Secretary  Bryan  on  March  30,  1915, 
attention  was  called  to  the  unusual 
character  of  the  proposed  blockade  and 
the  interference  with  legitimate  neutral 
commerce  which  might  readily  result. 
The  United  States  government  was  will- 
ing to  concede  that  the  changed  condi- 
tions of  naval  warfare,  especially  the 
operations  of  submarines,  might  justify 
some  modification  of  the  old  form  of 
close  blockade,  but  it  was  unwilling  to 
concede  the  right  of  belligerents  to 
blockade  neutral  ports.  It  was  further 
pointed  out  that  alleged  illegal  acts  of 
Germany  could  not  be  offered  as  an 
excuse  for  unlawful  acts  on  the  part  of 
Great  Britain.  In  conclusion  it  was 
stated  that  the  German  Baltic  ports 
were  open  to  the  trade  of  the  Scandi- 
navian countries,  although  it  is  an  es- 
sential element  of  blockade  that  it  bear 
with  equal  severity  upon  all  neutrals. 

For  some  months  the  question  was 
allowed  to  remain  in  abeyance,  because 
more  serious  questions  had  arisen  in 
connection  with  Germany's  submarine 
warfare.  {See  belozv.)  It  was  clear, 
however,  that  irritation  at  the  con- 
tinued interference  by  Great  Britain 
with  American  commerce  was  constantly 
increasing.  On  Aug.  3,  1915,  the  State 
Department  at  Washington  published 
five    diplomatic    communications    which 


had  been  exchanged  between  the  two 
governments  relating  to  the  detention 
of  American  ships  and  cargoes.  In  re- 
sponse to  the  American  note  of  March 
30,  1915,  on  the  subject  of  the  restric- 
tions imposed  on  American  commerce 
by  the  British  Orders  in  Council,  Sir 
Edward  Grey  defended  the  Orders  on 
the  ground  that  it  was  necessary  for 
Great  Britain  and  her  Allies  to  take 
every  step  in  their  power  to  overcome 
their  common  enemy  in  view  of  the 
shocking  violation  of  the  recognized 
rules  and  principles  of  civilized  warfare 
of  which  she  had  been  guilty  during  the 
present  struggle.  He  further  denied 
that  the  Orders  in  Council  violated  any 
fundamental  principle  of  international 
law  by  applying  a  blockade  in  such  a 
way  as  to  cut  off  the  enemy's  commerce 
through  neutral  ports,  "if  the  circum- 
stances render  such  an  application  of 
the  principles  of  blockade  the  only 
means  of  making  it  effective."  It  was 
contended  that  the  only  question  that 
could  arise  in  regard  to  the  new  char- 
acter of  blockade  was  whether  the 
measures  taken  conform  to  "the  spirit 
and  principles  of  the  essence  of  the 
rules  of  war"  as  stated  in  the  Ameri- 
can note  of  March  30,  1915.  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  contended  that  there  was 
precedent  for  the  British  policy  in  the 
position  taken  by  the  United  States 
during  the  Civil  War.  In  order  to  pre- 
vent contraband  being  shipped  from 
neighboring  neutral  territory  to  the 
Confederacy  the  Federal  government  en- 
forced the  doctrine  of  the  continuous 
voyage  and  goods  destined  for  enemy 
territory  were  intercepted  before  they 
reached  the  neutral  ports  from  which 
they  were  to  be  reexported.  Such  ac- 
tion, moreover,  was  upheld  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  the  United  States  in 
the  case  of  the  Springbok.  The  main 
argument  of  the  British  government  was 


230 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


that  when  the  underlying  principles 
governing  blockade  and  contraband  are 
not  violated  it  is  permissible  to  adopt 
new  measures  of  enforcement. 

To  this  contention  the  United  States 
replied  with  a  vigorous  note  on  Oct. 
21,  1915.  It  was  stated  that  the  so- 
called  blockade  instituted  by  the  Allies 
was  "ineffective,  illegal  and  indefen- 
sible," that  the  "American  government 
cannot  submit  to  a  curtailment  of  its 
neutral  rights  and  that  the  United 
States  must  insist  that  the  relations  be- 
tween it  and  His  Majesty's  government 
be  governed,  not  by  a  policy  of  expedi- 
ency, but  by  those  established  rules  of 
international  conduct  to  which  Great 
Britain  in  the  past  has  held  the  United 
States  to  account." 

This  note  did  not  have  the  effect  of 
forcing  Great  Britain  to  modify  her 
blockade  policy.  On  the  contrary 
Great  Britain  served  notice,  on  March 
30,  1916,  that  thereafter  the  doctrine 
of  continuous  voyage  would  be  applied 
to  vessels  carrying  conditional  contra- 
band as  well  as  to  those  carrying  abso- 
lute contraband. 

On  April  25,  1916,  the  British  gov- 
ernment made  an  extended  reply  to  the 
protest  of  the  United  States.  It  was 
contended  that  the  practices  complained 
of  were  "judicially  sound  and  valid" 
and  that  the  relief  neutrals  sought  was 
to  be  obtained  by  mitigation  of  neces- 
sary hardships  rather  than  "by  abrupt 
change  either  in  theory  or  application 
of  a  policy  based  upon  admitted  prin- 
ciples of  international  law  carefully  ad- 
justed to  the  altered  conditions  of  mod- 
ern warfare."  The  note  further  stated 
that  "an  impartial  and  influential  com- 
mission" had  been  appointed  to  find 
ways  to  minimize  delays  and  pledged 
the  Allies  to  make  their  restraints  as 
little  burdensome  as  possible.  In  re- 
gard to  the  complaint  that  the  methods 


adopted  by  the  Allies  in  intercepting 
neutral  trade  had  not  hitherto  been 
employed  by  belligerents,  it  was  an- 
swered that  "new  devices  for  dispatch- 
ing goods  to  the  enemy  must  be  met  by 
methods  of  intercepting  such  trade." 
In  particular  it  was  pointed  out  that 
modern  conditions,  such  as  the  size  of 
the  steamships,  and  the  methods  of  con- 
cealing contraband,  made  it  no  longer 
feasible  to  search  ships  at  sea  and  justi- 
fied sending  vessels  into  port  for  search. 

At  great  length  the  note  discussed 
the  question  of  proofs  of  the  destina- 
tion of  contraband.  As  in  a  previous 
note  it  was  contended  that  figures  issued 
by  the  United  States  Department  of 
Commerce  showed  that  exports  from  the 
United  States  to  the  Scandinavian  coun- 
tries had  increased  threefold  since  the 
outbreak  of  the  war,  and  there  was 
strong  reason  to  believe  that  much  of 
this  increase  was  not  bona-fide  neutral 
trade.  It  was  pointed  out  that  large 
consignments  of  meat  had  been  made 
to  such  persons  as  dock  laborers, 
lightermen,  bakers,  etc.,  and  it  was  ob- 
vious that  such  consignments  were  sub- 
terfuges. In  view  of  these  facts  it  was 
contended  that  "no  belligerent  could  in 
modern  times  be  bound  by  a  rule  that 
no  goods  could  be  seized  unless  they 
were  accompanied  by  papers  which  es- 
tablished their  destination  to  an  enemy 
country.  To  press  such  a  theory  is 
tantamount  to  asking  that  all  trade  be- 
tween neutral  ports  shall  be  free,  and 
would  thus  render  nugatory  the  exercise 
of  sea  power  and  destroy  the  pressure 
which  the  command  of  the  sea  enables 
the  Allies  to  impose  upon  their  ene- 
mies." 

The  note  finally  denied  the  statement 
made  by  the  United  States  government 
that  the  blockade  was  ineffective.  It 
was  stated  that  it  is  doubtful  if  there 
had  ever  been  a  blockade  where  the  ships 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    231 


which  slipped  through  bore  such  a  small 
proportion  to  those  intercepted. 

In  1916  another  cause  of  dispute 
arose  between  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States.  On  July  18  the  British 
government  published  a  blacklist  of  82 
American  firms  and  individuals  under 
the  Enemy  Trading  Act,  which  forbid 
any  business  dealings  between  them  and 
British  citizens.  On  July  28  the  United 
States  protested  that  it  was  "inconsis- 
tent with  that  true  justice,  sincere  amity 
and  impartial  fairness  which  character- 
ize the  dealings  of  friendly  countries 
with  one  another."  Britain  replied  that 
the  act  concerned  only  its  government 
and  citizens  and  left  the  American 
names  on  the  blacklist. 

This  note  did  not  bring  the  questions 
at  issue,  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain,  any  nearer  to  a  settle- 
ment. It  was  evident  that  while  Great 
Britain  was  anxious  to  adopt  a  con- 
ciliatory policy  in  dealing  with  neutral 
commerce,  she  was  unwilling  to  concede 
the  principle  for  which  the  United 
States  contended,  viz.,  that  trade  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  neutral 
countries  should  not  be  interfered  with. 

Use  of  Neutral  Flags. — Early  in  the 
year  1915,  the  German  government 
made  representations  to  the  government 
of  the  United  States  that  British  ships 
were  making  use  of  neutral  flags  in  or- 
der to  escape  capture.  Particular  at- 
tention was  called  to  the  action  of  the 
captain  of  the  British  steamer  Lusi- 
tania  in  raising  the  United  States  flag 
when  approaching  British  waters,  and 
it  was  stated  that  orders  had  been  issued 
by  the  British  government  to  all  com- 
manders to  make  use  of  neutral  flags 
when  necessary.  On  Feb.  10,  1915,  the 
United  States  government  addressed  a 
note  to  the  British  government  calling 
attention  to  this  matter.  Without  dis- 
puting that  in  exceptional  cases  there 


was  precedent  for  the  use  of  neutral 
flags  by  merchant  vessels  to  escape  cap- 
ture, it  was  pointed  out  that  any  gen- 
eral use  of  the  American  flag  for  such 
purposes  would  endanger  American 
ships,  by  raising  the  presumption  that 
they  are  of  belligerent  nationality.  In 
answer  to  this  the  British  government 
stated,  on  Feb.  19,  1915,  that  English 
law  allowed  the  use  of  the  British  flag 
by  foreign  merchant  vessels  in  order  to 
escape  capture,  that  instances  were  on 
record  of  United  States  vessels  making 
such  use  of  the  English  flag  during  the 
American  Civil  War,  and  that  it  would 
be  unreasonable  to  deny  to  British  ves- 
sels at  the  present  time  a  similar  privi- 
lege. It  was  stated,  however,  that  the 
British  government  had  no  intention  of 
advising  their  merchant  shipping  to  use 
foreign  flags  as  a  general  practice. 

Interference  with  Mail. — A  deter- 
mined protest  was  also  made  by  the 
United  States  government  against  the 
interference  by  Great  Britain  with  neu- 
tral mail  in  transit  between  neutral 
ports.  It  was  contended  that  under 
The  Hague  Convention  postal  corre- 
spondence on  the  high  seas  is  inviol- 
able. To  this  protest  the  British  gov- 
ernment replied  that  this  provision  was 
not  intended  to  cover  the  shipment  of 
contraband  by  parcel  post,  and  in  or- 
der to  prevent  such  shipment  Great 
Britain  would  insist  upon  the  right  to 
examine  mail  packages  on  the  high 
seas. 

Submarine  Warfare  and  the  War 
Zone. — The  European  War  witnessed 
for  the  first  time  the  use  of  the  sub- 
marine on  a  large  scale  in  naval  war- 
fare. It  was  evident  that  the  introduc- 
tion of  this  new  weapon  would  give  rise 
to  a  number  of  novel  questions.  The 
frail  construction  of  these  boats  makes 
them  an  easy  prey,  if  seen,  for  war- 
ships  or  even   for  unarmed  merchant- 


232 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


men  which  might  sink  the  submarines' 
by  ramming  them.  These  conditions, 
it  was  contended,  make  it  necessary  for 
the  submarines  to  attack  quickly  and 
without  warning.  Furthermore  the  old 
method  of  capture  by  which  a  prize 
crew  was  placed  on  the  captured  ves- 
sel could  hardly  be  followed  by  the 
submarines  as  the  size  of  the  crew  was 
small  and  could  not  be  spared  for  this 
purpose.  The  only  feasible  method  of 
disposing  of  vessels  captured  by  sub- 
marines was  to  sink  them.  But  this 
raised  the  question  of  the  safety  of 
passengers  and  crew.  The  established 
rules  of  international  law  required  that 
merchant  vessels  could  not  be  sunk,  un- 
less they  attempted  to  escape,  until 
provision  was  made  for  the  safety  of 
passengers  and  crew.  The  United 
States  first  became  involved  in  the  is- 
sue when  on  February  4,  1915,  Ger- 
many declared  the  waters  around  the 
British  Isles  a  war  zone  after  Febru- 
ary 18,  1915.  It  declared  its  inten- 
tion of  sinking  every  enemy  merchant 
ship  found  in  the  zone  even  if  it  was 
impossible  to  save  the  crew  and  pas- 
sengers. It  also  stated  that  neutral 
ships  entering  the  war  zone  were  in 
danger. 

The  United  States  government 
promptly  took  notice  of  this  proclama- 
tion, and  on  February  10,  1915,  sent 
a  communication  to  the  German  gov- 
ernment calling  attention  to  the  seri- 
ous difficulties  that  might  arise  if  the 
policy  contemplated  were  carried  out, 
and  declaring  that  it  would  hold  the 
German  government  to  a  strict  ac- 
countability if  any  merchant  vessel  of 
the  United  States  was  destroyed  or 
citizens  of  the  United  States  lost  their 
lives.  In  reply  to  this  note  the  German 
government  stated  on  February  18, 
1915,  that,  in  view  of  the  illegal  meth- 
ods used  by  Great  Britain  in  prevent- 


ing commerce  between  Germany  and 
neutral  countries,  even  in  articles  which 
are  not  contraband  of  war,  the  Ger- 
man government  felt  justified  in  using 
all  means  within  its  power  to  retaliate 
on  England.  Complaint  was  made  of 
the  large  quantities  of  munitions  of 
war  which  were  being  sent  to  Great 
Britain,  and  it  was  stated  that  Ger- 
many intended  to  suppress  such  traf- 
fic with  all  means  at  its  disposal.  Fin- 
ally, it  was  suggested  that,  in  order  to 
avoid  mistakes,  all  American  vessels 
carrying  noncontraband  through  the 
war  zone  should  travel  under  convoy. 

In  order  to  avoid,  if  possible,  the 
very  serious  consequences  of  the  pro- 
posed German  naval  policy,  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  addressed  an 
identical  note  to  Great  Britain  and 
Germany  suggesting  an  agreement  be- 
tween these  two  powers  respecting  the 
conduct  of  naval  warfare.  The  memo- 
randum contained  the  following  sug- 
gestions: (1)  That  neither  power 
should  sow  floating  mines  on  the  high 
seas  or  in  territorial  waters,  and  that 
anchored  mines  should  be  placed  only 
in  cannon  range  of  harbors  for  defen- 
sive purposes,  and  that  all  mines  should 
bear  the  stamp  of  the  government 
planting  them,  and  be  so  constructed 
as  to  become  harmless  when  separated 
from  their  anchors.  (2)  That  neither 
should  use  submarines  to  attack  the 
merchant  vessels  of  any  nationality, 
except  to  enforce  the  right  of  visit 
and  search.  (3)  That  each  should  re- 
quire their  merchant  vessels  not  to  use 
neutral  flags  for  purposes  of  disguise. 

The  note  further  suggested  that  the 
United  States  government  designate 
certain  agencies  in  Germany  to  which 
foodstuffs  from  the  United  States 
should  be  sent,  and  that  the  German 
government  guarantee  that  such  food- 
stuffs be  used  for  noncombatants  only. 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    233 


Great  Britain  was  requested  to  agree 
not  to  put  foodstuffs  on  the  list  of  ab- 
solute contraband,  and  that  ships  of 
foodstuffs  sent  to  the  designated  con- 
signees in  Germany  should  not  be  inter- 
fered with. 

Nothing  of  practical  importance 
came  from  these  suggestions.  Germany 
replied,  accepting  some  and  rejecting 
others,  while  Great  Britain  reviewed 
the  alleged  violations  of  international 
law  and  defended  the  stoppage  of  food- 
stuffs destined  for  Germany  as  a  legiti- 
mate incident  of  the  blockade. 

Thus  matters  rested  pending  the 
first  case  in  which  an  American  vessel 
should  be  sunk  or  American  lives  lost. 
On  March  28,  1915,  news  was  received 
that  the  British  steamship  Falaba  had 
been  sunk  and  that  among  those  lost 
was  an  American  citizen,  Leon  C. 
Thrasher.  Accounts  differed  as  to  the 
actions  of  the  steamship  when  called 
upon  by  the  commander  of  the  sub- 
marine to  stop.  The  German  govern- 
ment defended  the  action  on  the  ground 
that  the  Falaba  had  attempted  to  es- 
cape after  being  warned,  and  that, 
upon  being  overhauled,  ten  minutes  had 
been  allowed  for  the  crew  and  the  pas- 
sengers to  take  to  the  lifeboats  before 
the  vessel  was  torpedoed.  While  this 
case  was  still  under  consideration  by 
the  United  States  government,  it  was 
reported  that  the  American  vessel 
Cuslving  had  been  attacked  by  a  Ger- 
man aeroplane  in  the  English  Channel 
on  April  29,  1915,  one  bomb  being 
dropped  on  the  ship  which  caused  some 
damage  but  no  loss  of  life.  Within 
two  days  word  was  received  that  the 
American  steamer  Gulflight  had  been 
attacked  by  a  German  submarine  off 
the  Scilly  Islands  on  May  1.  Two 
members  of  the  crew  and  the  captain 
died.  For  history  of  this  case  see  sec- 
tion, Sinking  of  the  Lusitania. 


The  submarine  controversy  took  a 
new  turn,  when  the  Deutschland,  a 
commerce-carrying  submarine,  entered 
the  port  of  Baltimore  on  July  9.  The 
question  immediately  arose  as  to  her 
status.  The  British  and  French  em- 
bassies made  strong  protests  about  her 
being  allowed  to  enter  an  American 
port,  claiming  that  she  was  potentially 
a  war  vessel.  The  State  Department 
announced  on  July  15  that  the  sub- 
mersible would  be  considered  a  mer- 
chantman. It  further  stated  that  she 
could  not  be  turned  into  a  war  vessel 
without  radical  changes  in  her  con- 
struction. Consequently  she  returned 
to  Bremen.  She  later-  completed  the 
round  trip  again,  her  port  of  arrival 
in  the  United  States  being  New  Lon- 
don, Conn. 

The  entire  world  was  startled  on 
January  31,  1917,  when  Germany  an- 
nounced to  neutral  countries  that  all 
restrictions  on  submarine  warfare  were 
to  be  removed  and  that  a  new  policy 
of  ruthless  undersea  activity  was  to  be 
carried  on  in  an  attempt  to  bring  Eng- 
land into  a  state  of  submission.  In  the 
note  sent  to  the  United  States  Ger- 
many stated  that  "the  attempt  of  the 
four  Allied  Powers  (Germany,  etc.)  to 
bring  about  peace  has  failed,  owing  to 
the  lust  of  conquest  of  their  enemies, 
who  desired  to  dictate  the  conditions 
of  peace.  .  .  .  To  the  wish  of  con- 
ciliation they  oppose  the  will  of  de- 
struction. They  desire  a  fight  to  the 
bitter  end.  .  .  . 

"In  brutal  contempt  of  internation- 
al law,  the  group  of  powers  led  by 
England  does  not  only  curtail  the  legi- 
timate trade  of  their  opponents  but 
they  also,  by  ruthless  pressure,  com- 
pel neutral  countries  either  altogether 
to  forego  every  trade  not  agreeable  to 
the  Entente  Powers  or  to  limit  it  ac- 
cording   to     their     arbitrary     decrees. 


234 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Thus  British  tyranny  mercilessly  in- 
creases the  sufferings  of  the  world;  in- 
different to  the  laws  of  humanity,  in- 
different to  the  protests  of  neutrals 
whom  they  severely  harm,  indifferent 
even  to  the  silent  longing  for  peace 
among  England's  own  Allies.  Each 
day  of  the  terrible  struggle  causes  new 
destruction,  new  sufferings.  Each  day 
shortening  the  war  will,  on  both  sides, 
preserve  the  life  of  thousands  of  brave 
soldiers  and  be  a  benefit  to  man- 
kind. .   .  . 

"After  attempts  to  come  to  an  un- 
derstanding with  the  Entente  Powers 
have  been  answered  by  the  latter  with 
the  announcement  of  an  intensified 
continuance  of  the  war,  the  Imperial 
government — to  serve  the  welfare  of 
mankind  in  a  higher  sense  and  not  to 
wrong  its  own  people — is  now  com- 
pelled to  continue  the  fight  for  exist- 
ence, again  forced  upon  it,  with  the  full 
employment  of  all  the  weapons  which 
are  at  its  disposal." 

Accompanying  this  note  were  two 
memoranda  which  described  the  new 
war  zones  and  the  conditions  under 
which  American  ships  might  sail.  The 
entire  coasts  of  England  and  France 
were  included  in  the  zone  as  well  as  the 
coastline  controlled  by  the  Allies  in  the 
Mediterranean  Sea.  Entrance  to  Eng- 
land was  along  a  narrow  lane  20 
miles  wide  leading  to  the  port  of  Fal- 
mouth. A  similar  lane  was  mapped  out 
for  approach  to  Greece.  Traffic  of 
regular  American  passenger  steamers 
was  permitted  if  they  followed  a  cer- 
tain course  and  bore  certain  distin- 
guishing marks,  laid  down  by  the  Ger- 
man government. 

The  publication  of  the  note  in  the 
United  States  brought  forth  a  storm 
of  protest  and  demanded  immediate  ac- 
tion. President  Wilson  addressed  Con- 
gress on  the  3d  of  February  concern- 


ing the  situation.  He  gave  a  brief 
sketch  of  the  relations  between  his  gov- 
ernment and  Germany  over  the  sub- 
marine controversy  and  stated  that  the 
latter  had  broken  its  pledges,  and  in 
accordance  with  his  principles  laid 
down  in  the  Sussex  case  (see  Question 
of  Armed  Merchantmen)  he  conclud- 
ed, "I  have  therefore  directed  the  Sec- 
retary of  State  to  announce  to  His 
Excellency  the  German  Ambassador 
that  all  diplomatic  relations  between 
the  United  States  and  Germany  are 
severed  and  that  the  American  Ambas- 
sador at  Berlin  will  be  immediately 
withdrawn."  Then  followed  a  period  of 
suspense  in  which  the  American  gov- 
ernment was  apparently  awaiting  an 
overt  act  before  taking  any  further 
measures.  Popular  indignation  was 
aroused  when  several  vessels,  carrying 
American  citizens,  were  torpedoed,  but 
no  one  of  them  constituted  the  overt 
act. 

The  President's  action  was  univer- 
sally and  enthusiastically  commended. 
To  a  large  portion  of  the  people  there 
came  with  it  a  sense  of  relief  at  the  ter- 
mination of  the  intolerable  situation, 
resulting  from  the  efforts  of  the  coun- 
try to  maintain  a  position  of  neu- 
trality in  the  face  of  continual  out- 
breaks on  the  part  of  Germany,  and 
an  almost  general  sympathy  with  the 
cause  of  the  Allies.  The  governors  of 
many  States  at  once  sent  messages  to 
the  President  assuring  him  that  he 
would  receive  their  hearty  and  undi- 
vided support.  The  President's  stand 
was  approved  by  his  predecessor,  Mr. 
Taft,  and  his  recent  rival  for  the 
Presidency,  Mr.  Hughes. 

Colonel  Roosevelt  at  once  volun- 
teered to  raise  a  division  of  troops,  if 
war  should  be  declared,  and  announced 
his  intention  of  going  to  the  front  with 
his  four  sons.     William  J.  Bryan  was 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    235 


the  only  prominent  opponent  of  the 
policy  of  maintaining  American  rights 
at  sea  if  necessary  by  war.  He  sug- 
gested a  postponement  of  the  question 
until  after  the  end  of  the  war.  He 
also  declared  that  Americans  should  be 
forbidden  to  travel  on  belligerent  ships, 
and  that  American  ships  should  be  for- 
bidden to  enter  the  war  zone.  He  fa- 
vored the  submission  of  the  question  of 
war  or  peace  to  a  popular  referendum. 

In  Congress  the  support  of  the 
President  was  practically  unanimous. 
Attention  was  at  once  given  to  the  con- 
sideration of  measures  already  intro- 
duced imposing  heavy  penalties  on  per- 
sons guilty  of  offenses  against  the 
neutrality  of  the  United  States. 

In  the  harbors  of  the  country,  espe- 
cially in  New  York  and  Boston,  there 
had  been  interned,  since  the  outbreak 
of  the  war,  a  large  number  of  German 
merchant  ships,  including  several  of 
the  largest  vessels  in  commission.  Pos- 
session was  at  once  taken  of  these  ves- 
sels by  the  American  authorities,  not, 
however,  in  many  cases,  before  they 
had  been  seriously  damaged  by  their 
former  crews  under  orders  from  the 
German  government. 

The  government  authorities  took 
charge  of  the  wireless  station  at  Say- 
ville,  Long  Island,  which,  during  the 
war,  had  been  the  most  important 
means  of  rapid  communication  be- 
tween Germany  and  the  United  States. 
All  diplomatic  representatives  from 
Germany,  including  consuls  and  con- 
suls' agents,  were  directed  to  return 
home  at  once. 

Measures  were  at  once  taken  by  all 
the  government  agencies  to  prepare  for 
the  war  which  seemed  now  inevitable. 
The  Council  of  National  Defense  took 
up  plans  for  the  mobilization  of  the 
industrial  forces  of  the  country,  and  to 
consider  the  offers  of  many  manufac- 


turers who  had  placed  their  plants  at 
the  disposal  of  the  government.  The 
Naval  Consulting  Board,  under  the 
presidency  of  Thomas  A.  Edison,  began 
the  consideration  of  new  methods  of 
dealing  with  submarines.  Efforts  to  en- 
list 25,000  recruits  for  the  navy  were  at 
once  begun.  The  President  and  his 
cabinet  began  the  preparation  of  meas- 
ures to  be  introduced  into  Congress  to 
meet  the  emergency. 

The  State  Department  forwarded  to 
the  American  representatives  in  neu- 
tral countries  the  announcement  of  the 
severance  of  diplomatic  relations  with 
Germany,  adding  these  instructions: 
"Say  also  that  the  President  is  reluct- 
ant to  believe  that  Germany  actually 
will  carry  out  her  threats  against  neu- 
tral commerce,  but,  if  it  be  done,  the 
President  will  ask  Congress  to  author- 
ize the  use  of  the  national  power  to 
protect  American  citizens  engaged  in 
their  peaceful  and  lawful  errands  on 
the  sea.  He  believes  it  will  make  for 
the  peace  of  the  world  if  other  neutral 
powers  may  find  it  possible  to  take 
similar  action." 

The  Senate,  on  February  7,  1917, 
passed  a  resolution,  by  a  vote  of  78  to 
5,  approving  "the  action  taken  by  the 
President  as  set  forth  in  his  address 
delivered  before  the  joint  session  of 
Congress." 

On  the  same  day  in  which  this  reso- 
lution was  passed  the  first  passenger 
steamer,  since  the  promulgation  of  the 
German  edict,  fell  a  victim  to  the  Ger- 
man blockade  about  the  British  Is- 
lands. This  was  the  steamer  Califor- 
nia, of  the  Anchor  Line,  on  her  way 
from  New  York  to  Glasgow.  She  was 
hit  by  a  torpedo  and  from  the  explo- 
sion which  followed  five  persons  were 
killed,  thirty-six  others  were  drowned, 
including  three  women  and  two  chil- 
dren. 


236 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


The  tension  which  followed  the  sev- 
erance of  diplomatic  relations  increas- 
ed as  the  days  went  on.  On  the  same 
day  on  which  diplomatic  relations  were 
severed,  the  American  steamship  Hou- 
satonic  was  sunk  by  a  German  sub- 
marine, after  warning  had  been  given. 
All  on  board  were  saved.  Following 
the  destruction  of  the  California,  came 
the  loss  of  the  two  British  steamers, 
the  Japanese  Prince  and  the  Montola, 
which  were  sunk  without  warning  by  a 
German  submarine.  On  board  the 
Japanese  Prince  were  thirty  Amer- 
ican cattlemen  who  were  all  saved.  On 
board  the  Montola  was  an  American 
doctor.  The  Lyman  M.  Law,  an 
American  sailing  vessel  loaded  with 
lumber,  on  her  way  from  Maine  to 
Italy,  was  sunk  by  a  submarine  off 
the  coast  of  Sardinia.  Seven  of  the 
crew  were  Americans.  The  attack 
was  made  without  warning,  and  after 
the  crew  had  left,  a  bomb  was  placed 
on  board  and  the  ship  was  destroyed. 
Much  more  serious  was  the  destruc- 
tion, on  February  25,  of  the  Cunard 
liner  Laconia,  which  was  torpedoed  in 
the  Irish  Sea  at  night.  Three  Amer- 
ican passengers,  two  of  whom  were 
women,  died  from  exposure  in  an  open 
boat  while  the  survivors  were  making 
their  way  toward  shore.  While  pub- 
lic feeling  grew  more  intense  day  by 
day,  the  President  remained  silent. 
Germany,  in  the  meantime,  made  ten- 
tative proposals  through  the  Swiss 
minister,  to  reopen  negotiations  with 
the  American  government.  It  may  be 
noted  here,  however,  that  these  over- 
tures were  bluntly  refused  by  the  Sec- 
retary of  State. 

As  we  have  already  noted,  upon  the 
rupture  of  diplomatic  relations,  the 
State  Department  notified  Ambassador 
Gerard  in  Berlin  to  ask  for  his  pass- 
ports.    At  this   time  Mr.  Gerard  was 


occupied  in  negotiating  with  the  Ger- 
man government  for  the  release  of  six- 
ty-two American  prisoners  taken  from 
ships  sunk  by  a  German  raider  in  the 
South  Atlantic,  and  taken  to  a  German 
port  on  one  of  the  captured  vessels,  the 
British  steamer  Yarrowdale.  As  these 
men  were  neutrals  Germany  had  no 
right  to  hold  them.  The  German  gov- 
ernment, however,  undertook  to  take 
advantage  of  the  situation  to  obtain 
concessions  from  the  American  govern- 
ment. Ambassador  Gerard,  in  the  days 
immediately  following  the  severance  of 
relations,  was  subjected  to  many  in- 
dignities by  the  German  authorities. 
His  mail  was  intercepted,  his  telephone 
cut  off,  and  telegraphic  facilities  denied 
him.  Efforts  were  made  also  to  force 
him  to  sign  a  protocol  revising  the 
treaties  of  1799  and  1828  with  the  ef- 
fect of  protecting  Germans  and  their 
interests  in  the  United  States  in  the 
event  of  war. 

Mr.  Gerard  was  finally  permitted  to 
leave  Berlin  February  10,  1917.  Amer- 
ican affairs  in  Germany  were  placed  in 
the  hands  of  the  Spanish  Ambassador. 
On  February  14,  Count  von  Bernstorff 
sailed  for  Germany  on  a  Danish  steam- 
er, guarantees  having  been  obtained 
from  the  Allied  countries  that  he  would 
have  safe  conduct. 

The  Yarrowdale  prisoners,  after 
various  delays,  were  finally  released  on 
March  8,  1917.  The  reason  for  their 
detention,  as  given  by  the  German  of- 
ficials, was  the  desire  to  ascertain  the 
attitude  to  be  taken  toward  German 
subjects  in  the  United  States. 

The  attitude  of  the  German-Amer- 
icans in  this  crisis  had  been  awaited 
with  some  anxiety.  As  a  class  these 
men  were  emphatic  in  expressing  their 
determination  to  uphold  the  hands  of 
the  American  government.  The  Ger- 
man-American National  Alliance   at  a 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    237 


meeting  of  delegates  from  twenty-eight 
States  held  in  Philadelphia,  adopted 
resolutions,  pledging  loyalty  to  the  gov- 
ernment in  peace  and  war.  There  was 
also  a  rush  of  applicants  for  naturali- 
zation on  the  part  of  these  residents. 
Certain  conspicuous  members  of  the 
German-American  Alliance,  however, 
identified  themselves  with  the  pacifists, 
and  favored  submitting  the  question  of 
war  to  a  national  referendum. 

Samuel  Gompers,  president  of  the 
American  Federation  of  Labor,  prom- 
ised that  the  members  and  officials  of 
the  federation  would  be  united  in  the 
support  of  the  government.  Woman 
suffrage  organizations  also  offered  their 
services  in  any  fields  where  they  might 
be  found  useful.  In  the  colleges  and 
universities  throughout  the  country  the 
training  of  students  for  the  various 
branches  of  the  military  and  naval  ser- 
vice was  at  once  begun. 

On  February  26,  President  Wilson 
again  went  before  Congress  and  re- 
quested "that  you  will  authorize  me  to 
supply  our  merchant  ships  with  defen- 
sive arms  should  that  become  necessary, 
and  with  the  means  of  using  them,  and 
to  employ  any  other  instrumentalities 
or  methods  that  may  be  necessary  and 
adequate  to  protect  our  ships  and  our 
people  in  their  legitimate  and  peaceful 
pursuits  on  the  seas." 

In  the  meantime  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives was  working  on  the  largest 
naval  appropriation  bill  in  the  history 
of  the  country.  The  bill  which  finally 
passed  the  House  by  a  vote  of  353  to 
23,  on  February  12,  appropriated 
$363,553,338.07.  The  bill  also  gave 
to  the  President  the  power  to  comman- 
deer shipyards  and  munition  plants  "in 
time  of  war  or  national  emergency." 
One  million  dollars  was  appropriated  to 
acquire  basic  patents  for  an  aeroplane 
suitable    for    government    work.      The 


Emergency  Act  passed  on  March  4  gave 
the  President  the  following  powers : 
"(1)  .  .  .  to  place  an  order  with  any 
person  for  .  .  .  war  material  as  the 
necessities  of  the  government  .  .  .  may 
require,  and  which  are  .  .  .  capable  of 
being  produced  by  such  person.  (2)' 
...  to  modify  or  cancel  any  existing 
contract  for  the  building,  production, 
or  purchase  of  .  .  .  war  material ;  and 
if  any  contractor  shall  refuse  .  .  .  the 
President  may  take  immediate  posses- 
sion of  any  factory  of  such  character. 

(3)  To  require  the  owner  or  occupier  of 
any  factory  in  which  .  .  .  Avar  mate- 
rial are  .  .  .  produced  to  place  at  the 
disposal  of  the  United  States  the  whole 
or  part  of  the  output  of  such  factory. 

(4)  To  requisition  or  take  over  for  use 
or  operation  by  the  government  any 
factory  or  any  part  thereof,  .  .  . 
whether  the  United  States  has  or  has 
not  any  contract  .  .  .  with  the  own- 
er .   .   ." 

The  Mexican  Note. — On  March  1, 
there  appeared  in  the  newspapers  of 
the  country  a  most  sensational  disclos- 
ure of  an  intrigue  between  Germany  and 
Mexico.  The  statement  was  issued  on 
the  authority  of  Secretary  of  State 
Lansing.  This  note  dispelled  from  the 
mind  of  the  public  any  hope  that  we 
might  still  keep  out  of  actual  warfare. 
The  note  was  dated  January  19,  1917, 
and  was  sent  to  Herr  von  Eckhardt, 
who  was  the  German  Minister  to  Mex- 
ico. It  stated  in  part:  "On  the  1st 
of  February  we  intend  to  begin  sub- 
marine warfare  unrestricted.  In  spite 
of  this  it  is  our  intention  to  endeavor 
to  keep  neutral  the  United  States  of 
America.  If  this  is  not  successful,  we 
propose  an  alliance  on  the  following 
basis  with  Mexico :  That  we  shall  make 
war  together  and  together  make  peace. 
We  shall  give  general  financial  support, 
and  it  is  understood  that  Mexico  is  to 


238 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


reconquer  the  lost  territory  in  New 
Mexico,  Texas,  and  Arizona.  The  de- 
tails are  left  to  you  for  settlement  .  .  . 
suggest  that  the  President  of  Mexico, 
on  his  own  initiative,  should  communi- 
cate with  Japan  suggesting  adherence 
at  once  to  this  plan.  At  the  same  time, 
offer  to  mediate  between  Germany  and 
Japan."  .  .  .  This  note  caused  wide- 
spread amazement  and  indignation 
throughout  the  entire  country.  Japan 
hastened  to  affirm  in  no  uncertain  tones 
that  she  had  absolutely  nothing  to  do 
with  the  whole  affair.  If  anything,  the 
note  strengthened  the  relationship  be- 
tween that  country  and  the  United 
States.  The  fact  that  only  a  few  days 
before  the  exposure  of  the  Zimmerman 
note  Carranza  had  sent  identical  notes 
to  all  the  American  republics,  including 
the  United  States,  asking  that  the  west- 
ern hemisphere  should  cease  to  send  any 
further  supplies  to  the  European  coun- 
tries, in  order  to  bring  about  a  speedier 
peace,  was  construed  in  the  United 
States  to  be  a  sure  sign  of  strong  Ger- 
man intrigue  in  the  Mexican  republic. 
President  Wilson  courteously  but  firmly 
refused  to  acquiesce  in  the  proposition. 
Armed  Neutrality. — The  President 
appeared  before  Congress  in  joint  ses- 
sion on  February  26,  1917,  and  asked 
for  authority  to  use  the  armed  forces  of 
the  United  States  to  protect  American 
rights  on  the  seas.  Effect  was  added  to 
his  appeal  by  the  fact  that  the  news  was 
received  while  the  President  was  on  his 
way  to  the  capitol  of  the  destruction  of 
the  Laconia  mentioned  above.  After 
summing  up  the  events  that  occurred 
since  the  severance  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions, he  said :  "In  sum,  therefore,  the 
situation  we  find  ourselves  in  with  re- 
gard to  the  actual  conduct  of  the  Ger- 
man submarine  warfare  against  com- 
merce and  its  effects  upon  our  own  ships 
and   people    is    substantially   the   same 


that  it  was  when  I  addressed  you  on  the 
3d  of  February,  except  for  the  tying  up 
of  our  shipping  in  our  own  ports  be- 
cause of  the  unwillingness  of  our  ship- 
owners to  risk  their  vessels  at  sea  with- 
out insurance  or  adequate  protection, 
and  the  very  serious  congestion  of  our 
commerce  which  has  resulted,  a  conges- 
tion which  is  growing  rapidly  more  and 
more  serious  every  day.  This  in  itself 
might  presently  accomplish,  in  effect, 
what  the  new  German  submarine  orders 
were  meant  to  accomplish,  so  far  as  we 
are  concerned.  .   .   . 

"You  will  understand  why  I  can 
make  no  definite  proposals  or  forecasts 
of  action  now,  and  must  ask  for  your 
supporting  authority  in  the  most  gen- 
eral terms.  The  form  in  which  action 
may  become  necessary  cannot  yet  be 
foreseen.  I  believe  that  the  people  will 
be  willing  to  trust  me  to  act  with  re- 
straint, with  prudence,  and  in  the  true 
spirit  of  amity  and  good  faith  that  they 
have  themselves  displayed  throughout 
these  trying  months,  and  it  is  in  that 
belief  that  I  request  that  you  will  au- 
thorize me  to  supply  our  merchant  ships 
with  defensive  arms  should  that  become 
necessary,  and  with  the  means  of  using 
them,  and  to  employ  any  other  instru- 
mentalities or  methods  that  may  be 
necessary  and  adequate  to  protect  our 
ships  and  our  people  in  their  legitimate 
and  peaceful  pursuits  on  the  seas. 

"I  request  also  that  you  will  grant 
me,  at  the  same  time,  along  the  powers 
I  ask,  a  sufficient  credit  to  enable  me  to 
provide  adequate  means  of  protection 
where  they  are  lacking,  including  ade- 
quate insurance  against  the  present  war 
risks." 

Immediately  following  the  request  of 
the  President,  the  Senate  and  the  House 
set  about  framing  bills  to  put  it  into  ef- 
fect. Congress  expired  on  March  4, 
1917,   and    there    remained   only   eight 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR   239 


days  in  which  to  debate  and  agree  to  a 
measure  which  was  certain  to  be  strong- 
ly opposed  by  the  pacifist  element  in 
Congress.  In  the  House,  this  opposi- 
tion did  not  assume  formidable  propor- 
tion. The  Armed  Ship  Bill  was  re- 
ported in  that  body  by  the  Foreign  Re- 
lations Committee.  On  February  28 
and  29,  1917,  debate  was  carried  on. 
The  bill  was  passed  before  adjourn- 
ment by  a  vote  of  403  to  13.  It  was  at 
once  sent  to  the  Senate,  and  was  sub- 
stituted for  the  bill  prepared  by  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs 
whose  provisions  conferred  larger  pow- 
ers upon  the  President.  Debate  on  the 
bill  began  in  the  Senate  on  March  1. 

Senator  La  Follette,  of  Wisconsin, 
objected  to  its  consideration,  and  would 
permit  the  debate  to  be  carried  on,  only 
on  condition  that  no  attempt  would  be 
made  to  pass  the  bill  before  the  next 
day.  Thus  a  day  was  lost,  and  this 
sealed  the  fate  of  the  measure.  It  was 
debated  continuously  on  March  2,  1917, 
and  debate  was  resumed  on  the  follow- 
ing day.  Senator  Stone,  chairman  of 
the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations, 
was  opposed  to  the  bill,  and  he  pro- 
posed an  amendment  excluding  muni- 
tion ships  from  armed  protection.  The 
chief  objection  to  the  bill,  however, 
came  from  a  group  of  Senators  repre- 
senting chiefly  western  States  who  pre- 
vented every  effort  made  for  limiting 
debate  or  setting  a  time  for  voting. 
When  the  supporters  of  the  bill  under- 
stood that  there  was  no  possibility  of 
its  passage,  they  signed  a  manifesto 
reading  as  follows :  "The  undersigned 
United  States  Senators  favor  the  pas- 
sage of  Senate  Bill  8322,  to  authorize 
the  President  of  the  United  States  to 
arm  American  merchant  vessels.  A  sim- 
ilar bill  already  has  passed  the 
House  by  a  vote  of  403  to  13.  Under 
the  rules  of  the  Senate,  allowing  unlim- 


ited debate,  it  now  appears  to  be  im- 
possible to  obtain  a  vote  prior  to  noon, 
March  4, 1917,  when  the  session  of  Con- 
gress expires.  We  desire  the  statement 
entered  in  the  record  to  establish  the 
fact  that  the  Senate  favors  the  legisla- 
tion and  would  pass  if  a  vote  could  be 
obtained. "  This  manifesto  was  signed 
by  seventy-five  Senators.  The  Senate 
continued  in  session  until  12  o'clock 
noon  on  March  4,  1917,  when  it  auto- 
matically adjourned,  the  session  having 
expired.  The  twelve  Senators  who  pre- 
vented the  passage  of  the  bill  were  La 
Follette  of  Wisconsin,  Norris  of  Ne- 
braska, Cummins  of  Iowa,  Kenyon  of 
Iowa,  Stone  of  Missouri,  Gronna  of 
North  Dakota,  Kirby  of  Arkansas,  Var- 
daman  of  Mississippi,  O'Gorman  of 
New  York,  Works  of  California,  Clapp 
of  Minnesota,  and  Lane  of  Oregon; 
seven  Republicans  and  five  Democrats. 

The  situation  brought  from  the 
President  the  indignant  protest  in  the 
form  of  a  public  statement  in  which  he 
denounced  the  actions  of  the  twelve 
Senators,  and  called  for  a  revision  of 
the  rules  of  the  Senate,  which  would  pre- 
vent a   repetition  of  the  performance. 

Although  the  President's  efforts  to 
receive  authority  from  Congress  for 
arming  merchant  ships  failed,  he  was 
able  to  accomplish  his  purpose  in  an- 
other way.  An  act  passed  in  1819  gov- 
erning piracy  at  sea  was  held  by  the  ad- 
visers of  the  President  to  give  the  re- 
quired authority.  This  statute  forbade 
American  merchant  men  to  defend 
themselves  against  commissioned  ves- 
sels of  a  nation  with  which  the  United 
States  was  at  "amity";  but  they  could 
resist  by  force  any  attacks  made  on 
them  by  other  armed  vessels.  In  other 
words,  this  legalized  resistance  to  pi- 
rates. It  was  held  that  Germany's  de- 
nial to  Americans  of  the  rights  of  the 
high    seas    was    inconsistent   with    true 


240 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


amity,  and  caused  her  war  vessels  to 
lose,  so  far  as  the  United  States  was 
concerned,  their  right  to  immunity  from 
attack,  both  under  international  law 
and  under  the  law  of  1819.  The  Presi- 
dent, as  commander-in-chief  of  the  army 
and  navy,  thereupon  determined  to  or- 
der the  armament  of  merchant  vessels 
in  so  far  as  they  desired  to  be  armed. 
The  following  memorandum  was  there- 
upon dispatched  to  the  foreign  govern- 
ments : 

"In  view  of  the  announcement  of  the 
Imperial  German  government  on  Janu- 
ary 31,  1917,  that  all  ships,  those  of 
neutrals  included,  met  within  certain 
zones  of  the  high  seas,  would  be  sunk 
without  any  precaution  taken  for  the 
safety  of  the  persons  on  board,  and 
without  the  exercise  of  visit  and  search, 
the  government  of  the  United  States 
has  determined  to  place  upon  all  Amer- 
ican merchant  vessels  sailing  through 
the  barred  areas  an  armed  guard  for 
the  protection  of  the  vessels  and  the 
lives  of  the  persons  on  board." 

In  the  meantime,  the  Senate  of  the 
Sixty-fourth  Congress  remained  in  exe- 
cutive session  in  order  to  devise  a  means 
of  preventing  a  repetition  of  the  sit- 
uation which  had  prevented  the  passage 
of  the  Armed  Merchant  Bill. 

The  President  was  inaugurated  for 
his  second  term  on  March  4,  1917.  His 
inaugural  address  was  given  up  mainly 
to  the  consideration  of  the  situation  as 
related  to  Germany. 

President  Wilson  on  March  9,  1917, 
issued  a  call  for  a  session  of  the  Sixty- 
fifth  Congress  to  assemble  on  April  16 
for  the  purpose  of  passing  appropria- 
tion measures  and  other  bills  necessary 
to  prepare  for  the  inevitable  event. 

German  submarines  continued  to  fire 
upon  and  sink  American  vessels  and  ves- 
sels which  had  Americans  aboard.  On 
March  12,  1917,  the  unarmed  steamer, 


Algonquin,  with  a  crew  of  27  men,  of 
whom  10  were  Americans,  was  sunk 
without  warning  by  a  German  submar- 
ine. Two  days  later  three  unarmed 
vessels,  the  City  of  Memphis,  Illinois, 
and  Vigilencia,  were  destroyed. 

It  was  obvious  that  a  state  of  armed 
neutrality  was  inadequate  to  meet  the 
serious  situation.  The  President  was 
confronted  with  the  necessity  of  im- 
mediately taking  more  drastic  action 
rather  than  continuing  to  pursue  meas- 
ures of  passive  defense.  At  a  Cabinet 
meeting  on  March  20  further  action 
was  discussed,  and  on  the  following 
day  the  President  issued  a  proclamation 
calling  upon  Congress  to  assemble  on 
April  2  instead  of  April  16  "to  receive 
a  communication  concerning  grave  mat- 
ters of  national  policy." 

In  the  meantime,  preparations  were 
steadily  going  forward.  The  Secretary 
of  War  made  a  contract  with  manufac- 
turers for  military  supplies  even  al- 
though such  expenditures  had  not  been 
authorized  by  Congress.  On  March  25 
the  President  called  for  the  Federal 
service  of  fourteen  National  Guard 
regiments  from  the  eastern  States.  Sev- 
eral of  these  States  had  already  put 
their  militia  on  a  war  footing.  The 
purpose  of  this  mobilization  was  to  pro- 
tect munition  plants,  bridges,  railways, 
and  other  endangered  property  from 
any  violations  that  might  arise  from 
the  present  international  crisis.  There 
were  also  organized  two  new  depart- 
ments of  the  regular  army,  the  north- 
eastern, comprising  the  New  England 
States,  and  the  southeastern,  includ- 
ing States  east  of  the  Mississippi. 

Each  day  the  government  received 
more  emphatic  assurance  of  support 
from  State  legislatures,  governors,  and 
members  of  Congress.  At  a  rally  in 
Madison  Square  Garden  in  New  York 
City,  resolutions   were  adopted  urging 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    241 


an  immediate  declaration  of  war  and 
the  enactment  of  universal  military  ser- 
vice. Elihu  Root  was  the  principal 
speaker- 
There  were  many  proofs  of  the  ac- 
tivities of  German  agents,  especially  in 
an  effort  to  use  the  territory  of  the 
United  States  as  a  basis  for  conspira- 
tors against  the  Allies.  In  Hoboken, 
N.  J.,  two  Germans,  Fritz  Kolb  and 
Hans  Schwartz,  were  arrested  for  stor- 
ing powerful  explosives  with  the  ap- 
parent intention  of  wrecking  munition 
plants.  In  Galveston,  Texas,  bombs 
were  discovered  on  board  a  grain  ship 
and  in  a  grain  elevator.  There  was 
discovered  in  Philadelphia  a  plot  in 
which  the  President  of  the  Machine 
Manufacturing  Company,  which  had 
performed  contracts  for  the  xVmerican 
navy,  had  conspired  with  the  captains 
of  interned  commerce  raiders  in  the 
port,  to  obtain  and  transmit  to  Ger- 
many secret  information  in  regard  to 
the  American  navy. 

The  President's  War  Message. — 
The  President  issued  a  call  for  the  New 
Congress  to  meet  in  special  session  on 
April  2.  He  had  attempted  to  get 
plenary  war  powers  from  the  old  Con- 
gress before  it  went  out  of  existence  but 
he  was  unable  to  do  so.  Probably  at  no 
time  in  our  history  has  a  congress  met 
to  face  such  a  crisis  as  the  one  that 
existed.  Congress  met  at  noon  on  the 
2d  of  April  and  at  8.30  p.m.  of  the 
same  day  President  Wilson  delivered  his 
war  message.  The  following  are  ex- 
tracts from  the  message :  "I  have  called 
the  Congress  into  extraordinary  session 
because  there  are  serious,  very  serious, 
choices  of  policy  to  be  made,  and  made 
immediately.  .  .  .  The  new  policy  (see 
note  of  February  1  above)  has  swept 
every  restriction  aside.  Vessels  of  every 
kind,  whatever  their  flag,  their  char- 
acter,   their    cargo,    their   destination, 


their  errand,  have  been  ruthlessly  sent 
to  the  bottom  without  warning  and 
without  thought  of  help  or  mercy  for 
those  on  board.  .  .  . 

"I  am  not  now  thinking  of  the  loss  of 
property  involved,  immense  and  serious 
as  that  is,  but  only  of  the  wanton  and 
wholesale  destruction  of  the  lives  of 
noncombatants,  .  .  .  engaged  in  pur- 
suits which  have  always,  .  .  .  been 
deemed  innocent  and  legitimate.  Prop- 
erty can  be  paid  for ;  the  lives  of  peace- 
ful and. innocent  people  cannot  be.  The 
present  German  warfare  against  com- 
merce is  a  warfare  against  man- 
kind.  .   .  . 

"The  German  government  denies  the 
right  of  neutrals  to  use  arms  at  all 
within  the  areas  of  the  sea  which  it  has 
prescribed,  even  in  the  defense  of  the 
rights  which  no  modern  publicist  has 
ever  before  questioned  their  right  to 
defend.  .  .  .  Armed  neutrality  is  inef- 
fectual enough  at  best ;  in  such  circum- 
stances and  in  the  face  of  such  pre- 
tensions it  is  worse  than  ineffectual;  it 
is  likely  only  to  produce  what  it  was 
meant  to  prevent ;  it  is  practically  cer- 
tain to  draw  us  into  the  war  without 
either  the  rights  or  the  effectiveness  of 
belligerents.   .  .  . 

"With  a  profound  sense  of  the  solemn 
and  even  tragical  character  of  the  step 
I  am  taking  and  of  the  grave  respon- 
sibilities which  it  involves,  but  in  un- 
hesitating obedience  to  what  I  consider 
my  constitutional  duty,  I  advise  that 
the  Congress  declare  the  recent  course 
of  the  Imperial  German  Government 
to  be  in  fact  nothing  less  than  war 
against  the  Government  and  the  people 
of  the  United  States ;  that  it  formally 
accept  the  status  of  belligerent  which 
has  thus  been  thrust  upon  it.  .  .  .  We 
have  no  quarrel  with  the  German  peo- 
ple. We  have  no  feeling  toward  them 
but  one  of  sympathy  and  friendship.   It 


242 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


was  not  upon  their  impulse  that  their 
government  acted  in  entering  this  war. 
It  was  not  with  their  previous  knowl- 
edge or  approval.   .  .  . 

"A  steadfast  concert  for  peace  can 
never  be  maintained  except  by  a  part- 
nership of  democratic  nations.  ...  It 
must  be  a  league  of  honor,  a  partner- 
ship of  opinion.  .  .  .  Only  free  people 
can  hold  their  purpose  and  their  honor 
steady  to  a  common  end  and  prefer  the 
interests  of  mankind  to  any  narrow 
interest  of  their  own.  .  .  .  The  world 
must  be  made  safe  for  democracy.  Its 
peace  must  be  planted  upon  the  tested 
foundations  of  political  liberty.  We 
have  no  selfish  ends  to  serve.  We  de- 
sire no  conquests,  no  dominion.  We 
seek  no  indemnities  for  ourselves,  no  ma- 
terial compensations  for  the  sacrifices 
we  shall  freely  make.  We  are  but  the 
champions  of  the  rights  of  mankind. 
We  shall  be  satisfied  when  those  rights 
have  been  made  as  secure  as  the  faith 
and  the  freedom  of  nations  can  make 
them.  .  .  . 

"To  such  a  task  we  can  dedicate  our 
lives  and  our  fortunes,  everything  that 
we  are  and  everything  that  we  have, 
with  the  pride  of  those  who  know  that 
the  day  has  come  when  America  is  priv- 
ileged to  spend  her  blood  and  her  might 
for  the  principles  that  gave  her  birth 
and  happiness  and  the  peace  which  she 
has  treasured.  God  helping  her,  she 
can  do  no  other." 

Congress  took  immediate  action  on 
this  address  by  the  President,  with  the 
result  that  on  April  6,  1917,  the  execu- 
tive signed  the  joint  resolution  of  the 
House  of  Representatives  and  the  Sen- 
ate to  the  effect  that  the  state  of  war 
thrust  upon  the  United  States  by  Ger- 
many was  formally  declared.  The 
President  was  also  given  power  to  call 
on  the  naval  and  military  forces  of  the 
United  States,  as  well  as  the  resources 


of  the  government,  to  bring  the  war  to  a 
successful  conclusion.  On  the  same  day 
President  Wilson  issued  a  proclama- 
tion to  the  people  of  the  country,  in 
which  he  called  upon  the  enemy  aliens 
to  abide  by  the  laws  of  the  United 
States  and  not  to  do  anything  which 
would  give  aid  and  comfort  to  the 
enemy.  If  they  followed  out  these  in- 
structions they  would  not  be  disturbed. 
Otherwise  they  could  be  apprehended, 
restrained,  secured,  and  removed  from 
the  country  as  alien  enemies. 

Prompt  action  followed  President 
Wilson's  signature  of  the  resolution. 
All  American  ships  at  foreign  stations 
and  the  governors  and  military  posts 
of  American  insular  possessions  were 
notified  by  wireless  of  the  existence  of 
war.  Orders  were  issued  by  the  navy 
department  for  the  mobilization  of  the 
fleet,  and  the  naval  reserve  was  called 
to  the  colors.  The  navy  at  once  pro- 
ceeded to  seize  all  radio  stations  in  the 
country.  Congress  voted  the  war  fund 
of  $100,000,000  for  the  use  of  the 
President  at  his  discretion.  One  of  the 
first  acts  of  the  government  was  to  seize 
every  German  and  Austrian  vessel  in 
the  harbors  of  the  country  and  its  pos- 
sessions. There  were  91  of  these,  ag- 
gregating 630,000  gross  tonnage.  The 
largest  group  was  in  New  York  har- 
bor. Here  were  27  vessels,  including 
the  Vaterland,  George  Washington, 
and  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II.  The  first 
of  these  was  the  largest  vessel  afloat. 
The  Austrian  vessels  seized  were  held 
subject  to  payment,  as  the  United 
States  was  not  at  war  with  Austria- 
Hungary.  The  immigration  author- 
ities took  charge  of  all  the  German  of- 
ficers and  crews  who  were  held  to  be  in 
the  status  of  intended  immigrants 
whose  eligibility  for  entrance  into  the 
country  was  in  question  until  the  end 
of  the  war.     This  decision  carried  with 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    243 


it  internment.  It  was  found  upon  exam- 
ination that  the  machinery  of  most  of 
the  German  ships  had  been  damaged  to 
prevent  their  being  used  as  transports, 
the  result  of  a  concerted  movement  un- 
der the  direction  of  the  German  govern- 
ment. This  dated  from  the  severance 
of  relations  on  February  3,  1917. 

Together  with  the  seizure  of  these 
ships  came  the  arrest  of  Germans  sus- 
pected of  being  spies.  Several  of  these 
had  already  been  convicted  of  violating 
American  neutrality,  and  were  at  lib- 
erty under  bond  pending  appeals.  Oth- 
ers were  under  indictment  and  awaiting 
trial.  The  remainder  were  suspected 
persons  who  had  long  been  watched  by 
the  Federal  authorities.  A  proclama- 
tion was  issued  by  the  President  warn- 
ing citizens  and  aliens  against  the  com- 
mission of  treason.  It  was  deemed  un- 
necessary to  intern  all  Germans  and 
German  reservists  and  they  were  noti- 
fied that  they  would  not  be  molested  so 
long  as  they  conducted  themselves  in 
accordance  with  American  law. 

Congress  continued  the  debate  of  war 
measures,  and  the  House,  on  April  14, 
passed  without  a  dissenting  vote,  a  bill 
providing  for  a  loan  of  $7,000,000,000. 

The  President,  on  the  following  day, 
issued  "a  call  to  service,"  in  which  he 
appealed  especially  to  the  agricultural 
and  industrial  workers  of  the  country 
to  put  their  utmost  efforts  to  aid  in 
providing  and  equipping  the  armies  in 
Europe.     He  said: 

"We  must  supply  abundant  food  not 
only  for  ourselves  and  for  our  armies 
and  our  seamen,  but  also  for  a  large 
part  of  the  nations  with  whom  we  have 
now  made  a  common  cause,  in  whose 
support  and  by  whose  sides  we  shall  be 
fighting. 

"We  must  supply  ships  by  the  hun- 
dreds out  of  the  shipyards  to  carry  to 
the  other  side  of  the  sea,  submarines  or 


no  submarines,  what  will  every  day  be 
needed  there,  and  abundant  materials 
out  of  our  fields  and  our  mines  and  our 
factories  with  which  not  only  to  clothe 
and  equip  our  own  forces  on  land  and 
sea,  but  also  to  clothe  and  support  our 
people,  for  whom  the  gallant  fellows  un- 
der arms  can  no  longer  work;  to  help 
clothe  and  equip  the  armies  with  which 
we  are  cooperating  in  Europe,  and  to 
keep  the  looms  and  manufactories  there 
in  raw  material;  coal  to  keep  the  fires 
going  in  the  ships  at  sea  and  in  the 
furnaces  of  hundreds  of  factories  across 
the  sea ;  steel  out  of  which  to  make  arms 
and  ammunition  both  here  and  there; 
rails  for  worn  out  railways  back  of  the 
fighting  fronts ;  locomotives  and  roll- 
ing stock  to  take  the  place  of  those 
every  day  going  to  pieces ;  mules, 
horses,  cattle  for  labor  and  for  mili- 
tary service ;  everything  with  which  the 
people  of  England  and  France  and 
Italy  and  Russia  have  usually  supplied 
themselves,  but  cannot  now  afford  the 
men,  the  materials,  or  the  machinery  to 
make." 

The  entry  of  the  United  States  into 
the  war  was  received  with  great  re- 
joicing by  the  people  of  the  allied 
countries.  Great  Britain  and  France 
at  once  made  arrangements  to  send  dele- 
gates to  a  war  council  at  Washington  in 
order  to  arrange  the  details  of  Amer- 
ican participation  and  to  negotiate  fur- 
ther loans  to  the  Allies. 

An  executive  order  made  public  on 
April  13  announced  the  establishment 
of  defense  areas  at  the  entrance  to  the 
chief  harbors  of  the  Atlantic  and  Pa- 
cific coasts,  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  the 
insular  colonies.  One  of  the  reasons 
for  the  restrictions  in  these  areas  was 
the  presence  of  German  commerce  raid- 
ers in  the  western  Atlantic. 

War  Preparations  by  the  Army  and 
Navy. — Long  before  the  declaration  of 


244 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


war  the  United  States  government  was 
engaged  in  putting  its  physical  forces 
into  first-class  condition.  On  March 
25,  an  executive  order  was  issued  in- 
creasing the  enlisted  personnel  of  the 
navy  to  87,000  men,  and  on  March  26, 
another  order  was  issued  to  increase  the 
Marine  Corps  to  17,400  men.  Imme- 
diately after  the  declaration  of  war  the 
entire  navy  was  placed  on  a  war  foot- 
ing. The  naval  militia,  the  naval  re- 
serves, and  the  coast  guards  passed  un- 
der the  control  of  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment. A  nation  wide  recruiting  cam- 
paign was  carried  on  to  bring  the  navy 
and  allied  services  up  to  their  war 
strength. 

A  large  fleet  of  "mosquito  craft"  was 
organized  to  patrol  United  States  wa- 
ters against  attack  by  German  subma- 
rines and  raiders.  At  first  this  was 
composed  of  privately  owned  power 
boats  that  were  purchased  by  or  given 
to  the  government.  These  were  later 
augmented  by  80-  and  110-foot  "chas- 
ers," built  of  wood,  fast,  and  carrying 
a  small  gun  fore  and  aft.  In  the  latter 
part  of  1917,  the  construction  of  these 
was  given  up,  because  of  their  inability 
to  stand  rough  seas  and  because  the 
Navy  Department  decided  the  money 
could  be  better  spent  on  fast  destroy- 
ers. Defensive  war  zones  around  the 
coastline  of  the  entire  United  States  and 
its  dependencies  were  laid  outv 

Plans  for  the  mobilization  of  the 
army  went  forward  just  as  rapidly  as 
those  for  the  navy.  Before  war  was  de- 
clared several  national  guard  units  were 
called  out  to  do  police  duties  at  bridges, 
etc.  The  War  Department  announced 
that  26  camps,  with  a  capacity  of  25,- 
000  men,  would  be  established  through- 
out the  country  for  the  giving  of  mili- 
tary instruction  to  civilians.  See  sec- 
tion on  Military  Operations. 

Council   of   National   Defense. — The 


economic  side  of  the  war  was  put  in 
the  hands  of  the  Council  of  National 
Defense,  which  consisted  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  President's  cabinet  and  a 
civilian  advisory  committee  composed 
of  business  men  and  leaders  of  indus- 
try. A  number  of  boards  were  ap- 
pointed consisting  of  a  group  of  ex- 
perts, who  were  to  organize  war  activi- 
ties along  special  lines.  The  Food 
Board  was  placed  under  the  charge  of 
Herbert  C.  Hoover,*  the  executive  head 
of  the  Belgian  Relief  Commission.  This 
board  was  to  take  such  measures  as 
would  conserve  the  food  supplies  of  the 
United  States,  and  at  the  same  time,  as 
far  as  possible,  supply  the  needs  of  the 
Allies.  It  also  dealt  with  questions  of 
food  shortages,  distributions,  mobiliza- 
tion of  agricultural  resources,  price 
control,  and  waste.  In  November,  1917, 
it  held  a  "conservation"  week  and  thou- 
sands of  families  received  conservation 
display  cards,  showing  that  they  would 
observe  "wheatless  and  meatless"  days 
to  aid  the  government.  Other  impor- 
tant boards  were  also  instituted.  A 
committee  of  five  was  appointed  to  di- 
rect the  operations  of  American  rail- 
ways during  the  war.  The  railways 
were  taken  over  by  the  government  on 
December  28,  1917.  A  General  Mu- 
nitions Board  had  charge  of  supplying 
munitions  and  equipment  to  the  army 
and  of  adjusting  the  question  of  wheth- 
er the  government  needed  a  man  more  in 
the  industrial  or  military  field.  The 
Economy  Board  was  organized  to  take 

*  Hoover,  Herbert  C.  National  Food  Ad- 
ministrator. Born  (1874)  at  West  Branch, 
Iowa.  Graduated  from  Leland  Stanford  Uni- 
versity (1895)  and  entered  mining  engineering 
beginning  as  a  common  laborer.  Became  rich 
through  the  development  of  gold  mines  in  Aus- 
tralia. Among  defenders  of  Tien-Tsin  during 
Boxer  rebellion.  After  that  engaged  in  min- 
ing. At  beginning  of  war  made  head  of  Com- 
mission for  Relief  in  Belgium.  On  entrance 
of  United  States  into  war  offered  post  of  Food 
Administrator  which  he  accepted  after  first 
declining. 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    245 


care  of  the  commercial  interests  of  the 
country  and  to  purchase  raw  materials 
for  the  government.  A  Medical  Board 
was  formed  by  many  prominent  physi- 
cians to  mobilize  and  organize  the  med- 
ical men  and  resources  of  the  country. 

The  Federal  Shipping  Board  was  one 
of  the  most  important  organizations  es- 
tablished. Its  problem  was  to  defeat 
the  submarine  by  building  a  vast  fleet 
to  transport  the  American  army  and 
great  quantities  of  supplies  to  Europe. 
It  was  organized  as  a  $50,000,000  cor- 
poration with  Colonel  Goethals  as  gen- 
eral manager.  It  was  to  build  1000 
wooden  ships  of  from  3000  to  5000 
tons  burden.  The  efficiency  of  this 
board  was  marred  by  continual  wran- 
glings  over  the  nature  of  the  vessels  to 
be  built.  The  result  was  several  changes 
in  the  personnel  of  the  board  with  an 
apparent  securing  of  harmony  of  ac- 
tion. 

Enemy  Aliens. — At  the  outbreak  of 
the  war  there  were  approximately  5,- 
000,000  enemy  aliens  in  the  United 
States.  An  official  proclamation  was 
issued  which  forbade  any  enemy  alien 
from  remaining  or  residing  "within  half 
a  mile  of  any  governmental  fort,  fac- 
tory, reservation,  base  of  supplies,  or 
any  land  used  for  war  purposes."  This 
act  was  not  carried  out  strictly  by  the 
United  States  marshal.  Permits  were 
granted  which  allowed  an  enemy  alien 
to  remain  in  the  prescribed  area  if  he 
obeyed  the  law.  The  gradual  unfold- 
ing of  vast  German  plots,  the  destruc- 
tion of  munition  factories,  incendiary 
burning  of  food  supplies  destined  for 
the  Allies,  and  the  activities  of  Amer- 
ican newspapers,  compelled  the  govern- 
ment to  take  more  stringent  action. 
Various  raids  were  executed  in  different 
sections  of  the  country  and  several  hun- 
dred "suspects"  were  interned.  The  re- 
sult was  that  in  November,  1917,  the 


President  ordered  all  enemy  aliens  to 
register,  and  gave  the  Attorney-General 
the  power  to  establish  forbidden  zones 
about  warehouses,  factories,  etc.  There 
were  to  be  no  exceptions  to  this  order. 
United  States  troops  were  also  pro- 
vided to  guard  the  waterfronts  of  sea- 
ports. 

An  alien  enemy  property  custodian 
was  appointed  by  President  Wilson,  the 
purpose  of  which  was  to  seize  all  prop- 
erty held  by  enemy  aliens  in  this  coun- 
try and  to  hold  them  in  trust  until  the 
close  of  the  war.  He  had  the  power 
to  administrate  them  in  any  way  that 
he  saw  fit.  The  total  number  of  enemy 
properties  taken  over  by  the  alien 
enemy  property  custodian,  A.  Mitchell 
Palmer,  during  the  first  sixteen  months 
of  its  existence,  amounted  to  35,400* 
with  a  total  value  of  more  than  $700,- 
000,000.  The  total  cost  of  the  admin- 
istration of  the  property  was  borne  by 
the  businesses  themselves  which  were 
taken  over  by  Mr.  Palmer.  Mr.  Palm- 
er's reports  showed  that  big  properties 
were  taken  over  such  as  the  Bosch  Mag- 
neto Works,  the  Passaic  Worsted  Mills, 
the  Bridgeport  Projectile  Company,  the 
Sayville  and  Tuckerton  wireless  sta- 
tions, and  the  Bayer  Chemical  concern. 
One  way  that  the  money  collected  was 
expected  to  be  used  is  in  paying  claims 
of  American  citizens  whose  property 
has  been  seized  by  members  of  the  Cen- 
tral Powers. 

As  each  enemy-owned  enterprise  was 
seized  an  effort  was  made  to  convert 
its  products  to  the  use  of  the  govern- 
ment in  the  war.  As  a  result,  Mr.  Pal- 
mer said:  "When  the  armistice  was 
signed  the  alien  property  custodian  was 
supplying  the  government  with  mag- 
netos for  airplanes  and  automobile  mo- 
tors, with  cloth  to  make  uniforms  for 
the  soldiers  and  the  dyes  with  which  the 
cloth  was  dyed,  with  medicines,  surgical 


246 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


instruments,  and  dressings,  with  music- 
al instruments,  with  ball  bearings,  tele- 
scopes, optical  instruments  and  engi- 
neering instruments,  with  cocoanut 
charcoal  for  the  making  of  gas  masks, 
with  glycerine  for  the  making  of  high 
explosives  and  a  large  number  of  other 
and  varied  products.  In  some  instances 
the  enemy-owned  corporations  under 
the  alien  property  custodian's  super- 
vision, were  running  100  per  cent  of 
their  capacity  on  government  busi- 
ness." 

Up  to  September  30,  1918,  the  cus- 
todian had  deposited  with  the  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury,  $54,801,475  ;  cash  with 
depositories,  $7,469;  stocks,  $167,801,- 
774;  bonds — other  than  investments 
made  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
$58,281,334;  mortgages,  $10,866,009; 
notes  receivable,  $6,130,682;  accounts 
receivable,  $57,559,207;  real  estate, 
$7,311,728;  general  businesses  and 
estates  in  operation  of  liquidation,  mer- 
chandise, miscellaneous  investments, 
etc.,  $85,484,979;  enemy  vessels,  $34,- 
193,690;  total,  $482,447,349. 

The  Draft  Act. — In  the  President's 
message  to  Congress  on  April  2  he  sub- 
mitted the  idea  of  raising  a  national 
army  by  conscription.  There  was  a 
strong  protest  against  this  in  both  the 
House  and  the  Senate,  but  after  a 
month's  debate  the  President's  idea  pre- 
vailed, and  on  May  18,  1917,  the  se- 
lective conscription  act  was  passed.  The 
President  by  proclamation  set  aside 
June  5  as  the  day  on  which  all  males 
who  had  reached  their  21st  but  not 
their  31st  birthday  were  to  register  for 
military  service.  Nine  million,  six  hun- 
dred and  fifty-nine  thousand,  three  hun- 
dred and  eighty-two  men  registered. 
This  included  aliens.  In  different  parts 
of  the  country  there  were  attempts  to 
avoid  the  law.  Many  of  the  delinquents 
were  given  another  opportunity  to  reg- 


ister and  some  of  the  recalcitrants  were 
arrested.  The  law  authorized  the 
President  to  appoint  a  local  exemption 
board  for  each  county  and  one  for  each 
30,000  population  in  cities  of  30,000 
or  more.  He  was  also  to  appoint  a 
board  for  each  Federal  Judicial  dis- 
trict, which  was  to  review  the  decisions 
of  the  local  boards.  The  President 
himself  was  the  final  court  of  appeal 
from  the  district  court.  The  exemption 
boards  were  to  be  composed  of  civilians 
only.  Those  specifically  exempted  by 
the  law  were  Federal  and  State  officials 
and  members  of  religious  sects  who  had 
conscientious  scruples  against  war.  The 
President  was  authorized  to  exempt 
"persons  engaged  in  industries,  includ- 
ing agriculture,  found  to  be  necessary 
to  the  maintenance  of  the  military  es- 
tablishments or  the  effective  operation 
of  the  military  forces  or  .  .  .  the  na- 
tional interest  during  the  emergency." 

The  cards  of  registrants  were  num- 
bered in  a  red  ink  serial  up  to  the  total 
number  in  the  district.  Alphabetical 
arrangement  was  forbidden.  Then  the 
numbers  were  drawn  at  Washington  and 
the  men  were  called  according  to  the 
drawing,  which  took  place  on  July  20. 
The  men  were  medically  examined  and 
those  who  were  physically  fit  and  not 
exempted  were  sent  to  some  one  of  the 
16  military  cantonments  constructed 
for  the  training  of  new  recruits.  Six 
hundred  and  eighty-seven  thousand 
were  called  in  the  first  draft.  After 
the  first  draft  was  completed  the  sys- 
tem of  selection  was  changed  (Novem- 
ber, 1917).  All  the  remaining  regis- 
trants were  divided  into  five  classes,  ac- 
cording to  liability  for  military  ser- 
vice. Those  in  the  first  class  were  to 
be  called  first,  those  in  the  second  next, 
and  so  on. 

During  the  year  1918  three  registra- 
tion days  were  set  aside  on  which  the 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    247 


various  classes  of  men  were  to  regis- 
ter. The  resolution  approved  on  May 
30,  1918,  provided  that  all  males  who 
had  reached  the  age  of  twenty-one  since 
the  original  registration  day,  June  5, 

1917,  should  register  for  military  ser- 
vice.   The  President  proclaimed  June  5, 

1918,  as  the  registration  day  for  this 
class  in  the  continental  United  States. 
As  a  result  of  this  registration  744,865 
young  men  were  enrolled.  A  second 
registration  day  was  proclaimed  in  the 
United  States  on  August  24,  1918, 
which  provided  for  the  enrollment  of  all 
males  who  had  reached  the  age  of  twen- 
ty-one since  June  5.  One  hundred  and 
fifty-seven  thousand  nine  hundred  and 
sixty-three  youths  were  thus  added  to 
the  potential  military  strength  of  the 
country. 

What  virtually  amounted  to  a  sec- 
ond selective  draft  act  was  approved 
which  provided  for  the  registration  of 
all  males  between  the  ages  of  eighteen 
and  forty-five,  with  the  exception  of 
those  who  had  already  registered  or  who 
were  in  the  military  or  naval  service  of 
the  United  States.  The  President  ap- 
proved this  act  on  August  31,  1918, 
and  proclaimed  September  12,  1918,  as 
the  registration  day.  Approximately 
13,000,000  men  were  enrolled.  Provost 
Marshal  General  Crowder  announced 
that  the  selectives  had  been  classified 
into  five  groups,  which  indicated  the 
order  in  which  they  were  to  be  called. 
A  summary  of  this  classification  fol- 
lows: 

Class  I. — (1)  Single  man  without  de- 
pendent relatives;  (2)  married  man  (or 
widower)  with  children,  who  habitually 
fails  to  support  his  family;  (3)  mar- 
ried man  dependent  on  wife  for  sup- 
port; (4)  married  man  (or  widower) 
with  children,  not  usefully  engaged; 
family  supported  by  income  indepen- 
dent of  his  labor;  (5)  men  not  included 


in  this  or  other  classes;  (6)  unskilled 
laborers. 

Class  II. — ( 1 )  Married  man  or  fath- 
er of  motherless  children  usefully  en- 
gaged, but  family  has  sufficient  income 
apart  from  his  daily  labor  to  afford 
reasonable  adequate  support  during  his 
absence;  (2)  married  man,  no  children, 
wife  can  support  herself  decently  and 
without  hardship;  (3)  skilled  farm  la- 
borer engaged  in  necessary  industrial 
enterprise;  (4)  skilled  industrial  la- 
borer engaged  in  necessary  agricultural 
enterprise. 

Class  III. — (1)  Man  with  foster  chil- 
dren dependent  on  daily  labor  for  sup- 
port; (2)  man  with  aged,  infirm,  or  in- 
valid parents  or  grandparents  depen- 
dent on  labor  for  support;  (3)  man 
with  brothers  or  sisters  incompetent  to 
support  themselves,  dependent  on  daily 
labor  for  support;  (4)  county  or  mu- 
nicipal officer;  (5)  firemen  or  police- 
men; (6)  necessary  artificers  or  work- 
men in  arsenals,  armories,  and  navy 
yards;  (7)  necessary  custom  house 
clerks;  (8)  persons  necessary  in  trans- 
mission of  mails;  (9)  necessary  em- 
ployees in  service  of  United  States ; 
(10)  highly  specialized  administrative 
experts;  (11)  technical  or  mechanical 
experts  in  industrial  enterprise;  (12) 
highly  specialized  agricultural  expert  in 
agricultural  bureau  of  State  or  nation ; 
(13)  assistant  or  associate  manager  of 
necessary  industrial  enterprise;  (14) 
assistant  or  associate  manager  of  nec- 
essary agricultural  enterprise. 

Class  IV. — (1)  Married  man  with 
wife  (and)  or  children  (or  widower  with 
children)  dependent  on  daily  labor  for 
support  and  no  other  reasonable  ade- 
quate support  available;  (2)  mariners 
in  sea  service  of  merchants  or  citizens 
in  United  States;  (3)  heads  of  neces- 
sary industrial  enterprises;  (4)  heads 
of  necessary  agricultural  enterprises. 


248 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Class  V.— (1)  Officers  of  States  or 
the  United  States;  (2)  regularly  or 
duly  ordained  ministers;  (3)  students 
of  divinity;  (4)  persons  in  military  or 
naval  service;  (5)  aliens;  (6)  alien 
enemies;  (7)  persons  morally  unfit; 
(8)  persons  physically,  permanently,  or 
mentally  unfit;  (9)  licensed  pilots. 

In  a  decision  handed  down  by  the 
United  States  Supreme  Court  on  Janu- 
ary 8,  1918,  the  constitutionality  of 
the  Selective  Service  Act  was  upheld. 

Missions  from  Abroad. — About  the 
middle  of  April,  the  expected  envoys 
from  France  and  Great  Britain  reached 
the  United  States.  The  British  mission 
was  headed  by  Arthur  James  Balfour, 
the  British  foreign  secretary,  and  in- 
cluded also  a  number  of  noted  military 
and  naval  officers  and  financiers.  On 
April  22  the  mission  arrived  in  Wash- 
ington to  confer  with  President  Wil- 
son. Simultaneously  with  the  arrival 
of  these  commissioners  to  the  United 
States  the  entry  of  this  country  into  the 
war  was  celebrated  in  England  where, 
on  April  20,  for  the  first  time  in  his- 
tory, a  foreign  flag  was  raised  over  the 
Houses  of  Parliament.  Both  Houses 
passed  the  following  resolution :  "This 
House  desires  to  express  to  the  govern- 
ment and  people  of  the  United  States 
of  America  their  profound  apprecia- 
tion of  the  action  of  their  government 
in  joining  the  Allied  Powers  and  thus 
defending  the  high  cause  of  freedom  and 
rights  of  humanity  against  the  gravest 
menace  by  which  they  ever  have  been 
faced." 

On  April  24,  the  war  commissioners 
from  the  French  republic  reached 
Hampton  Roads  and  at  once  proceeded 
to  Washington  on  the  President's 
yacht,  the  Mat/flower.  The  movements 
of  the  commission  had  been  kept  a  pro- 
found secret  in  order  to  prevent  any  in- 
terference of  their  progress.     As  soon 


as  their  presence  had  become  known, 
their  journey  to  Washington  became  a 
triumphal  procession.  It  was  prob- 
ably without  parallel  in  the  history  of 
the  United  States  since  the  visit  of 
Lafayette.  The  commission  was  head- 
ed by  Rene  Viviani,  former  premier,  and 
Marshal  Joffre,  former  commander  of 
the  French  armies.  The  latter  was  the 
figure  that  appealed  most  to  the  sym- 
pathies and  affections  of  the  American 
people,  and  this  was  displayed  on  every 
occasion  in  which  he  appeared.  Anoth- 
er noted  member  of  the  commission  was 
the  Marquis  de  Chambrun,  a  descend- 
ant of  Lafayette,  and  a  leader  in  the 
French  Chamber  of  Deputies.  The 
commission  on  reaching  Washington 
paid  its  respects  to  President  Wilson, 
and  at  once  began  to  take  counsel  with 
the  British  commissioners  and  with  the 
civil  and  military  heads  of  the  Amer- 
ican army  and  navy. 

The  Russian  revolution,  which  oc- 
curred in  February,  created  the  most 
sympathetic  feeling  and  interest  in  the 
United  States.  President  Wilson  at 
once  resolved  to  send  to  Russia  a  war 
mission,  to  consult  with  the  author- 
ities of  that  country  and  to  assist  in 
the  establishment  of  a  stable  govern- 
ment. Elihu  Root,  former  Secretary 
of  State,  was  appointed  chairman  of 
the  commission,  which  included  also  rep- 
resentatives of  the  army  and  navy,  fi- 
nancial and  transportation  systems. 
(See  above.) 

Following  the  conference  in  Wash- 
ington, the  French  commissioners  be- 
gan an  extensive  tour  in  the  Eastern 
and  Middle-western  States,  including  a 
visit  to  Chicago,  Kansas  City,  St.  Louis, 
Springfield,  111.,  Philadelphia,  New 
York,  and  Boston.  The  party  left 
Washington  on  May  3,  and  reached 
Chicago  on  the  following  day.  The 
commission  was   received  with  enthusi- 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    249 


asm  especially  in  Chicago.  Prior  to  set- 
ting out  on  this  journey,  the  British 
and  French  commissioners,  on  April 
29,  1917,  visited  Mt.  Vernon  to  pay 
their  respects  to  George  Washington. 
M.  Viviani  delivered  an  eloquent  oration 
on  the  significance  of  America's  en- 
trance into  the  great  war.  Mr.  Bal- 
four, as  representative  of  the  British 
mission,  also  made  a  notable  address. 
Following  their  visit  to  Mt.  Vernon,  the 
commissioners  met  tjhe  Senators  and 
Representatives  on  the  floor  of  Con- 
gress. It  became  known  at  this  time 
that  Marshal  JofFre  and  other  mem- 
bers of  the  French  commission  had  laid 
stress  upon  the  necessity  of  at  once 
sending  an  army  to  France.  In  a  state- 
ment issued  by  him,  he  expressed  his  be- 
lief that  American  recruits  could  be 
trained  behind  the  battle  lines  in 
France. 

The  French  commission,  following  its 
journey  through  the  Middle  West,  ar- 
rived, on  May  9,  1917,  in  New  York 
City,  where  elaborate  preparations  had 
been  made  for  their  reception.  They 
were  received  by  Mayor  Mitchel  at  City 
Hall,  where  a  great  throng  of  people 
had  gathered  to  welcome  them.  The 
commission  spent  several  days  in  the 
city,  and  wherever  its  members  appear- 
ed they  were  received  with  the  greatest 
evidence  of  enthusiasm.  Marshal  Jof- 
fre  attended  the  unveiling  in  Brooklyn 
of  a  memorial  tablet  to  Lafayette.  Co- 
lumbia University  conferred  upon  M. 
Viviani  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Laws. 
This  degree  was  also  conferred  upon 
Mr.  Balfour  in  his  absence. 

While  the  British  and  French  mis- 
sions were  being  honored  in  New  York 
City,  an  Italian  mission,  headed  by 
Prince  Ferdinand  of  Savoy,  and  includ- 
ing many  notable  persons,  among  whom 
was  William  Marconi,  the  famous 
scientist,    arrived   in    New    York   City. 


This  mission  went  at  once  to  Washing- 
ton where  it  began  conferences  with  the 
government  authorities.  On  June  4, 
1917,  the  mission  began  a  tour  of  the 
South,  Middle  West,  and  East,  includ- 
ing the  cities  of  Atlanta,  New  Orleans, 
Pittsburgh,  and  Chicago,  arriving  in 
New  York  City  on  June  12.  They  were 
everywhere  received  with  the  same  en- 
thusiasm with  which  the  French  and 
British  envoys  were  greeted. 

To  the  list  of  Allied  countries  which 
had  sent  missions  to  the  United  States, 
Belgium  was  now  added.  The  head  of 
the  commission  was  Baron  Ludovic 
Moncheur,  who  had  formerly  been  the 
Belgian  minister  in  Washington.  Other 
members  were  General  Leclerq,  Hector 
Carlier,  Mr.  Osterrieth,  and  Count 
Louis  d'Ursel.  On  June  18  President 
Wilson  received  the  commission,  and 
Baron  Moncheur  delivered  to  him  a  let- 
ter from  King  Albert  expressing  satis- 
faction at  the  entry  of  the  United 
States  into  the  war  and  appreciation  of 
American  aid  in  relieving  distress. 
Baron  Moncheur  also  delivered  an  elo- 
quent address  in  which  he  expressed  the 
gratitude  of  his  country  for  the  ser- 
vices rendered  by  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States.  To  this  the  President 
replied  in  fitting  terms.     He  said : 

"The  American  people  have  been  able 
to  understand  and  glory  in  the  un- 
flinching heroism  of  the  Belgian  people 
and  their  Sovereign,  and  there  is  not 
one  among  us  who  does  not  to-day  wel- 
come the  opportunity  of  expressing  to 
you  our  heartfelt  sympathy  and  friend- 
ship, and  our  solemn  determination  that 
on  the  inevitable  day  of  victory,  Bel- 
gium shall  be  restored  to  the  place  she 
has  so  richly  won  among  the  self-re- 
specting and  respected  nations  of  the 
earth." 

Following  the  reception  of  the  Bel- 
gian   commission,    came    a    commission 


250 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


from  Russia  headed  by  Boris  A.  Bakh- 
metieff.  The  Russian  and  Belgian  war 
mission  on  June  24,  1917,  visited  the 
tomb  of  Washington  at  Mt.  Vernon, 
where  Baron  Moncheur  and  Bakhmetieff 
delivered  appropriate  and  eloquent  ad- 
dresses. The  Belgian  mission,  on  June 
22,  was  received  by  the  Senate,  and 
Baron  Moncheur  addressed  that  body, 
and  was  warmly  received. 

A  mission  from  Rumania  was  received 
by  the  Secretary  of  State  on  July  2, 
1917.  It  was  headed  by  the  Rev.  Basil 
Lucaciu,  president  of  the  Rumanian 
League,  and  included  a  member  of  the 
Rumanian  army. 

A  special  Japanese  mission,  headed 
by  Viscount  Ishii,  Ambassador  extraor- 
dinary, arrived  in  the  United  States  in 
August,  1917.  The  mission  included, 
in  addition  to  Viscount  Ishii,  the  fol- 
lowing: Vice-Admiral  Takeshita,  Im- 
perial Japanese  Navy;  Ma j. -Gen.  Su- 
gano,  Imperial  Japanese  Army;  Mr. 
Masanao  Hamihara,  Consul  General  at 
San  Francisco;  Mr.  Matsuzo  Nagai, 
secretary  of  the  foreign  office ;  Com- 
mander Ando,  Imperial  Japanese  Navy ; 
Mr.  Tadenao  Imai,  vice  consul ;  Mr. 
Tashiro  Owaku,  secretary ;  Mr.  Doug- 
las L.  Dunbar,  American  secretary  to 
the  mission. 

The  mission,  on  August  14,  was  wel- 
comed by  Secretary  Lansing,  and  on 
August  21,  Viscount  Ishii  presented  his 
credentials,  as  Ambassador,  to  the 
President.  The  commission  afterward 
made  a  tour  of  the  principal  cities  of 
the  country. 

German  Intrigues  and  Propaganda. 
— Extraordinary  revelations  of  the  ac- 
tivities of  the  German  Foreign  Office, 
both  before  and  after  the  entry  of  the 
United  States  into  the  war,  aroused 
much  indignation.  These  revelations 
included  the  work  of  propaganda  in  the 
United   States   and  in  Mexico,   and  in 


several  of   the   South  American   coun- 
tries. 

The  Committee  on  Public  Informa- 
tion made  public  on  September  27, 
1917,  revelations  in  regard  to  German 
propaganda  in  the  United  States,  de- 
rived from  newspapers  seized  in  1916 
from  a  prominent  agent,  Wolf  von  Igel. 
This  man  established  an  office  in  New 
York  in  the  autumn  of  1914,  where  he 
carried  on  propaganda  work  in  its  most 
varied  forms.  In  April,  1916,  while 
von  Igel  was  preparing  papers  to  be 
transmitted  to  the  German  embassy  at 
Washington,  his  office  was  entered  by 
four  secret  service  agents,  who  put  him 
under  arrest,  and  took  charge  of  his 
papers.  Ambassador  Count  von  Bern- 
storff  protested  against  this  seizure, 
declaring  the  papers  seized  were  official, 
and  were  exempt  from  such  seizure. 
When  the  papers  were  examined,  they 
were  found  to  contain  evidence  which 
made  it  clear  that  German  agents  were 
violating  the  laws  of  the  United  States, 
planning  for  the  destruction  of  lives  and 
property  and  merchant  vessels  on  the 
high  seas,  forming  far-reaching  plots 
against  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  the 
United  States  and  Mexico ;  and  endeav- 
oring to  corrupt  American  writers  and 
lecturers.  A  special  system  was  main- 
tained under  the  guise  of  an  American 
Information  Bureau,  for  the  purpose 
of  stirring  up  labor  troubles  in  am- 
munition plants  and  was  engaged  in 
the  preparation  of  bombs  for  the  de- 
struction of  American  munition  facto- 
ries and  ships.  The  papers  included  let- 
ters to  von  Bernstorff  commending 
John  Devoy,  a  prominent  Irish-Amer- 
ican, as  a  valuable  man  for  carrying  on 
German  propaganda.  Reports  in  re- 
gard to  Devoy's  activities  were  also  in- 
cluded. A  letter  relating  to  Judge 
Cohalan  of  New  York  was  said  to 
show  that  he  had  offered  advice  in  re- 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    251 


gard  to  stirring  up  revolutions  in  Ire- 
land. Both  Devoy  and  Judge  Cohalan 
denied  any  guilty  connections  with  the 
German  government.  Evidence  was 
found  to  indicate  that  several  American 
citizens,  who  were  well  known  as  jour- 
nalists and  lecturers,  had  received  pay- 
ment from  German  authorities  for  pro- 
paganda work.  These  included  Edwin 
Emerson  and  F.  J.  Archibald,  who  was 
arrested  in  1916  while  carrying  impor- 
tant papers  to  Germany  from  the 
United  States.  The  documents  revealed 
through  this  seizure  were  of  the  great- 
est value  in  searching  for  evidence  of 
German  activities,  and  in  bringing 
about  the  arrest  of  many  suspected  per- 
sons. 

The  State  Department,  through  its 
secret  service,  discovered,  during  1917, 
that  messages  had  been  regularly  sent 
between  Argentina  and  Germany, 
through  the  medium  of  the  Swedish  min- 
ister to  Argentina,  and  that  the  Ger- 
man minister  in  Mexico  had  in  March, 
1916,  strongly  commended  the  work  in 
behalf  of  Germany  done  by  Folke  Cron- 
holm,  the  Swedish  Charge  d'Affaires  in 
Mexico.  He  recommended  a  decoration 
in  recognition  of  his  services. 

Much  more  sensational,  however,  was 
the  declaration  made  public  of  the  cor- 
respondence carried  on  by  Count  Lux- 
burg,  the  German  Charge  d'Affaires  at 
Buenos  Aires,  with  the  Foreign  Office  at 
Berlin  through  the  Swedish  legation  as 
a  medium  of  communication.  The  first 
of  these  messages  made  public  was  dated 
May  19,  1917.  After  detailing  the  re- 
lease of  certain  German  and  Austrian 
ships  by  the  Argentine  government,  and 
speaking  of  the  change  in  public  feeling 
in  Argentina  in  behalf  of  the  Germans, 
he  said: 

"This  government  will,  in  the  future, 
only  clear  Argentine  ships  as  far  as 
Las    Palmas.     I  beg    that    the    small 


steamers  Oran  and  Guazo,  thirty-first 
January  (meaning,  which  sailed  31), 
which  are  now  nearing  Bordeaux  with 
a  view  to  a  change  of  flag,  may  be 
spared  if  possible,  or  else  sunk  without 
a  trace  being  left  ('spurlos  versenkt')." 
Another  message  followed  on  July  3 : 

"I  learn  from  a  reliable  source  that 
the  Acting  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
who  is  a  notorious  ass  and  anglophile, 
declared  in  a  secret  session  of  the  Sen- 
ate, that  Argentina  should  demand  from 
Berlin  a  promise  not  to  sink  more  Ar- 
gentine ships.  If  not  agreed  to,  rela- 
tions would  be  broken  off.  I  recom- 
mend refusal,  and  if  necessary,  calling 
in  the  mediation  of  Spain." 

Other  messages  in  the  same  form  fol- 
lowed, showing  that  a  constant  com- 
munication had  been  carried  on  between 
Argentina  and  Germany  through  one 
source.  The  Swedish  government  de- 
nied any  wrong  intentions  or  acts,  but  a 
satisfactory  adjustment  had  not  been 
made  at  the  end  of  the  war.  On  Sep- 
tember 21,  the  Secretary  of  State  made 
public  the  following  message  from  von 
BernstorfF  to  the  Berlin  Foreign  Of- 
fice, dated  January  22,  1917: 

"I  request  authority  to  pay  out  up  to 
$50,000  in  order,  as  on  former  occa- 
sions, to  influence  Congress  through  the 
organization  you  know  of,  which  can 
perhaps  prevent  war.  I  am  beginning 
in  the  meantime  to  act  accordingly. 

"In  the  above  circumstances  a  public 
official  German  declaration  in  favor  of 
Ireland  is  highly  desirable,  in  order  to 
gain  the  support  of  Irish  influence 
here." 

The  publication  of  this  message 
created  a  profound  sensation  in  Con- 
gress. A  resolution  was  at  once  adopt- 
ed to  investigate  as  to  any  possible 
criminal  plans  in  German  activities  as 
indicated  by  this  note.  No  definite  ac- 
tion, however,  was  taken. 


252 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


On  September  22,  1917,  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  published  the  follow- 
ing: 

"In  view  of  inquiries  which  have  been 
made  as  to  whether  Count  Bemstorff 
knew  of  the  purpose  of  his  government 
to  renew  relentless  submarine  warfare 
when  he  sent  his  message  of  January 
22,  1917,  asking  authorization  to  ex- 
pend $50,0001,  I  can  state  that  the 
Department  of  State  possesses  conclu- 
sive evidence  that  on  or  before  Janu- 
ary 19,  Count  Bernstorff  had  received 
and  read  the  Zimmermann  telegram  to 
Minister  von  Eckhart  in  Mexico  which 
contained  the  following: 

"  'We  intend  to  begin  on  the  1st  of 
February  unrestricted  submarine  war- 
fare. We  shall  endeavor  in  spite  of  this 
to  keep  the  United  States  of  America 
neutral.' 

"Count  von  Bernstorff  was,  there- 
fore, fully  advised  of  the  intentions  of 
the  Imperial  government  at  the  time 
when  he  asked  for  authority  of  Berlin 
to  employ  funds  for  an  organization  to 
influence  Congressional  action  in  favor 
of  the  continued  neutrality  of  this  coun- 
try." 

On  December  21,  1917,  Secretary 
Lansing  made  public  another  series  of 
telegrams  exchanged  between  Count 
Luxburg  and  the  German  government 
through  the  Swedish  Minister.  These 
made  it  plain  that  the  German  govern- 
ment was  keeping  in  close  touch 
through  this  channel  with  happenings 
in  South  American  countries.  It  indi- 
cated also  the  strong  desire  of  the  Ger- 
man government  to  preserve  the  neu- 
trality of  this  country. 

One  of  the  most  daring  attempts  at 
propaganda  work  was  carried  on  by  a 
Levantine  adventurer,  Bolo  Pasha,  who 
came  to  the  United  States  with  the 
purpose  of  influencing  or  purchasing 
newspapers  in  behalf  of  German  propa- 


ganda. He  was  supplied  with  a  large 
amount  of  money  by  the  German  gov- 
ernment, and  large  sums  were  deposited 
with  a  banking  house  of  German  affilia- 
tions in  New  York  City.  On  his  arriv- 
al in  this  country,  Bolo  entered  into 
negotiations  with  Adolph  Pavenstedt, 
then  a  member  of  the  banking  house  of 
Amsinck  and  Co.  Pavenstedt  carried 
Bolo's  plans  to  Ambassador  Bernstorff, 
and  as  a  result,  the  German  Ambassa- 
dor directed  Hugo  Schmidt,  the  Ger- 
man financial  agent  in  America,  to  pay 
to  Bolo  $1,750,000. 

Bolo  secured  introductions  to  prom- 
inent men,  including  William  Randolph 
Hearst,  whom  he  convinced  that  he  was 
a  friend  of  France  and  was  carrying  on 
work  in  behalf  of  that  country.  It  was 
afterward  revealed  that  he  was  in  close 
relations  with  Senator  Humbert  of 
France,  who  received  large  sums  of 
money  from  the  German  funds  supplied 
Bolo.  The  intrigues  of  Bolo  Pasha 
were  revealed  through  an  investigation 
carried  on  by  Merton  Lewis,  the  at- 
torney-general of  New  York,  who  sent 
the  evidence  in  his  hands  to  the  French 
government.  Bolo's  work  was  carried 
on  not  only  in  the  United  States,  but  in 
Canada,  but  no  evidence  is  shown  that 
his  efforts  to  influence  or  purchase  pa- 
pers was  successful.     He  was  executed. 

Embargo  and  Blockade  of  German 
Trade. — The  problem  of  dealing  with 
neutral  countries  which  bordered  on 
Germany,  and  which  normally  obtained 
large  food  supplies  from  the  United 
States,  was  one  of  the  most  vexing  prob- 
lems with  which  the  American  govern- 
ment had  to  deal.  Extraordinary  in- 
crease in  these  imports  during  the  years 
of  the  war,  made  it  evident  that  these 
countries  were  supplying  immense  quan- 
tities of  stores  to  Germany,  and  thus 
prolonging  the  war.  The  President  is- 
sued a  proclamation  declaring  that  aft- 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    253 


er  August  30,  1917,  no  exports  from 
American  ports  could  be  shipped  to  any 
country  in  the  eastern  hemisphere  ex- 
cept under  a  license  granted  by  the  Ex- 
port Council.  This  restriction,  so  uni- 
versal in  application,  was  specifically 
aimed  at  the  European  neutral  coun- 
tries now  trading  with  Germany.  In 
an  explanatory  note  accompanying  the 
proclamation  the  President  said : 

"The  purpose  and  effect  of  this  proc- 
lamation is  not  export  prohibition,  but 
merely  export  control.  It  is  not  the 
intention  to  interfere  unnecessarily  with 
our  foreign  trade ;  but  our  own  domes- 
tic needs  must  be  adequately  safeguard- 
ed, and  there  is  the  added  duty  of  meet- 
ing the  necessities  of  all  of  the  nations 
at  war  with  the  Imperial  German  gov- 
ernment. 

"After  these  needs  are  met,  it  is  our 
wish  and  intention  to  minister  to  the 
needs  of  the  neutral  nations  as  far  as 
our  resources  permit.  This  task  will  be 
discharged  without  other  than  the  very 
proper  qualification  that  the  liberation 
of  our  surplus  products  shall  not  be 
made  the  occasion  of  benefit  to  the 
enemy,  either  directly  or  indirectly." 

The  embargo  was  later  modified  by 
the  removal  of  the  license  ban  from  a 
number  of  commodities  for  export  to 
countries  other  than  Germany,  her  al- 
lies, and  neutral  nations  bordering  on 
Germany.  The  effect  of  this  modifica- 
tion was  to  concentrate  the  embargo 
against  Holland,  Sweden,  Norway,  and 
Denmark,  the  countries  from  which  Ger- 
many secured  large  quantities  of  sup- 
plies. Holland  had  previously  entered 
into  an  agreement  with  Germany  which 
fixed  the  percentage  of  the  exports  from 
the  Netherlands  to  the  Central  Powers, 
and  to  the  nations  at  war  with  them. 
The  United  States  government  refused 
to  recognize  this  agreement  as  equit- 
able and  intimated  that  while  it  was  ob- 


served, no  American  commodities,  in- 
cluding foods,  cattle,  fodder,  and  dairy 
products  would  be  permitted  to  enter 
Holland.  Holland  clung  to  the  agree- 
ment in  order  to  obtain  coal  and  other 
commodities  from  Germany.  As  a  re- 
sult of  this  embargo,  a  large  number 
of  Dutch  and  other  neutral  vessels  load- 
ed with  grain  and  other  food  products, 
were  held  in  New  York  harbor  and  else- 
where. The  United  States  government 
refused  to  permit  them  to  sail  under 
conditions  which  enabled  the  cargo  to 
take  the  place  of  food  supplies  from 
Holland  to  Germany.  The  United 
States  proposed  that  these  ships  with 
the  cargo  be  sent  to  the  Allies  or  un- 
loaded for  American  use,  and  that  the 
vessels  be  placed  in  the  American  coast- 
wise trade.  The  Dutch  government  re- 
fused, fearing  the  attitude  that  Ger- 
many would  take  if  aid  was  given  to 
her  enemies.  There  were  in  all  eighty- 
four  Dutch  ships  held  idle  in  American 
ports  for  six  months,  and  they  entailed 
expenses  to  their  owners  exceeding 
twenty-five  million  dollars.  An  arrange- 
ment had  not  yet  been  arrived  at  at  the 
end  of  the  year. 

Financing  the  War. — The  United 
States  government  determined  to  raise 
the  money  necessary  for  the  conduct  of 
the  war  by  three  methods:  (1)   loans, 

(2)  revenue   under   the   existing  laws, 

(3)  new  taxation.  The  Treasury  De- 
partment decided  to  raise  the  money 
immediately  needed  by  means  of  bond 
issues.  Consequently  books  were  opened, 
offering  $2,000,000,000  worth  of  S1/^ 
per  cent  convertible  gold  bonds.  The 
loan  was  called  the  "Liberty  Loan." 
Subscriptions  closed  on  June  15,  1917. 
Amounts  were  allotted  to  each  of  the 
twelve  Federal  Reserve  districts  and  in 
practically  every  district  the  amount 
allotted  was  over-subscribed.  The  cam- 
paign was  carried  on  with  a  great  dis- 


254 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


play  of  posters,  ringing  of  bells,  and 
speeches  by  prominent  men.  There  were 
approximately  3,000,000  subscribers 
and  the  loan  was  oversubscribed  by  al- 
most $1,000,000,000.  Books  were  open- 
ed for  a  second  liberty  loan  on  October 
1,  1917.  These  offered  from  $3,000,- 
000,000  to  $5,000,000,000  worth  of  4 
per  cent  convertible  gold  bonds  bearing 
interest  from  November  15.  As  was  the 
case  with  the  first  Liberty  Loan,  the  sec- 
ond Liberty  Loan  bonds  were  enthusi- 
astically bought  by  the  American  peo- 
ple. The  maximum  amount  was  ap- 
proximately reached  by  means  of  10,- 
000,000  individual  subscriptions.  The 
War  Revenue  Act  as  passed  in  Sep- 
tember, 1917,  contained  drastic  taxa- 
tion measures.  An  additional  tax  and 
surtax  were  levied  on  incomes  and  a 
graduated  excess  profits  tax  on  corpor- 
ations, partnerships,  and  individuals 
was  put  in  operation.  Internal  taxes 
on  tobacco,  liquor,  transportation, 
amusements,  etc.,  and  an  increase  in 
postal  rates  were  expected  to  produce 
a  vast  revenue.  The  estimated  cost  of 
the  first  year  of  the  war  was  $18,500,- 
000,000.  For  other  information  see  sec- 
tion on  Financial  and  Economic  As- 
pects. 

President's  Address  to  Congress. — 
On  December  5,  1917,  President  Wilson 
delivered  a  very  important  message  to 
Congress.  He  emphasized  the  fact  that 
the  only  possible  peace  was  one  after  a 
military  victory,  when  it  would  be  ne- 
gotiated with  responsible  representa- 
tives of  the  German  people.  He  stated 
that  international  peace  after  the  war 
must  come  from  a  partnership  of  peo- 
ples and  not  of  governments.  America 
would  consider  the  war  won  when  the 
German  people  were  ready  to  agree  to  a 
settlement  based  on  justice  and  repara- 
tion of  wrongs  their  rulers  have  done. 
"Our  present  and  immediate  task  is  to 


win  the  war,  and  nothing  shall  turn  us 
aside  from  it  until  it  is  accomplished. 
Every  power  and  resource,  whether  of 
men,  or  money,  or  of  materials,  is  being 
devoted  and  will  continue  to  be  devoted 
to  that  purpose  until  it  is  achieved. 
Those  who  desire  to  bring  peace  about 
before  that  purpose  is  achieved  I  coun- 
sel to  carry  their  advice  elsewhere.  I 
will  not  entertain  it."  He  asked  for  a 
declaration  of  war  against  Austria  and 
it  was  declared  on  December  7.  His 
speech  created  a  profound  impression 
both  at  home  and  abroad. 

Sinking  of  the  Lusitania. — Before 
the  government  of  the  United  States  had 
formulated  any  action  in  connection 
with  these  cases  (see  above)  the  world 
was  shocked  at  the  terrible  news  that 
the  Cunard  Line  steamship  Lusitania 
had  been  sunk  on  May  7,  1915,  by 
a  German  submarine  off  Old  Head 
of  Kinsale  at  the  southeastern  point  of 
Ireland,  resulting  in  the  loss  of  1150 
lives,  of  whom  114  were  known  to  be 
American  citizens.  Prior  to  sailing  of 
the  Lusitania  from  New  York  on  her 
fatal  voyage,  an  advertisement  signed 
by  the  German  Embassy  appeared  in 
many  newspapers  warning  Americans 
of  the  danger  of  traveling  on  British 
vessels  through  the  war  zone. 

The  first  feeling  of  horror  at  the  ter- 
rible catastrophe  was  succeeded  by  a 
feeling  of  bitter  resentment. in  America 
at  what  appeared  to  be  a  ruthless  sacri- 
fice of  innocent  lives.  It  appeared,  at 
first,  as  if  a  break  between  the  United 
States  and  Germany  were  inevitable. 
President  Wilson  waited  six  days  before 
taking  definite  action,  stating  that  it 
was  important  to  act  with  deliberation 
as  well  as  with  firmness.  In  the  mean- 
time the  German  government,  on  May 
10,  1915,  sent  a  communication  to  the 
United  States  government  expressing 
its  sympathy  for  the  loss  of  American 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    255 


lives,  but  at  the  same  time  maintaining 
that  the  responsibility  rested  with  the 
British  government,  which  through  its 
plan  of  starving  the  civilian  population 
of  Germany  by  prohibiting  the  impor- 
tation of  foodstuffs,  had  forced  Ger- 
many to  resort  to  retaliatory  measures. 
It  was  further  claimed  that  British  mer- 
chant vessels  were  generally  armed, 
and  repeated  attempts  had  been  made 
by  such  vessels  to  ram  submarines. 
Finally  it  was  stated  that  the  Lusitania 
carried  a  large  quantity  of  ammunition 
in  her  cargo  and  warning  had  been  given 
by  Germany  that  such  vessels  were  lia- 
ble to  destruction. 

On  May  13, 1915,  the  eagerly  awaited 
statement  of  the  United  States  was  sent 
to  Germany.  With  a  dignity  and  an 
earnestness  which  the  gravity  of  the 
situation  called  for,  President  Wilson 
reviewed  the  series  of  acts  of  German 
submarine  commanders  culminating  in 
the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania,  which  he 
said  "the  government  of  the  United 
States  has  observed  with  growing  con- 
cern, distress,  and  amazement." 

Referring  to  the  claim  that  the  alleged 
illegal  acts  of  her  adversaries  justified 
Germany  in  adopting  retaliatory  meas- 
ures the  American  note  stated  that  the 
government  of  the  United  States  could 
not  admit  that  any  such  measures  were 
legal  which  infringed  the  clearly  estab- 
lished rights  of  neutrals  under  interna- 
tional law.  These  rights  include  the 
protection  of  the  lives  of  noncombatants 
traveling  on  unarmed  merchant  vessels 
and  the  right  of  neutrals  to  travel  on 
the  high  seas  wherever  their  legitimate 
business  calls  them.  In  view  of  these 
clearly  established  principles  the  note 
stated  that  "it  confidently  expects  the 
Imperial  German  government  will  dis- 
avow the  acts  of  which  the  government 
of  the  United  States  complains ;  that 
they   will   make   reparation    as    far    as 


reparation  is  possible  for  injuries  which 
are  without  measure,  and  that  they  will 
take  immediate  steps  to  prevent  the  re- 
currence of  anything  so  obviously  sub- 
versive of  the  principles  of  warfare,  for 
which  the  Imperial  German  government 
have  in  the  past  so  wisely  and  so  firmly 
contended."  In  conclusion  it  was  stated 
that  "the  Imperial  German  government 
will  not  expect  the  government  of  the 
United  States  to  omit  any  word  or  any 
act  necessary  to  the  performance  of  its 
sacred  duty  of  maintaining  the  rights 
of  the  United  States  and  its  citizens 
and  of  safeguarding  their  free  exercise 
and  enjoyment." 

Some  hope  was  felt  that  the  German 
government  would  disavow  the  act  when 
on  May  11,  1915,  a  note  was  issued 
explaining  its  attitude  with  respect  to 
American  and  other  neutral  ships  in 
the  war  zone.  It  stated  that  the  Ger- 
man government  had  no  intention  of  at- 
tacking such  neutral  ships  if  they  were 
guilty  of  no  hostile  act.  Even  if  such 
ships  carried  contraband  they  were  to 
be  dealt  with  according  to  the  rules  of 
international  law  applying  to  prize  war- 
fare. It  further  stated  that  if  a  neutral 
ship  should  be  destroyed  by  mistake 
the  German  government  would  "unre- 
servedly recognize  its  responsibility 
therefor."  While  this  did  not  cover 
the  question  involved  in  the  Lusitania 
case,  viz.,  the  right  of  neutrals  to  travel 
in  safety  on  merchant  vessels  under  a 
belligerent  flag,  nevertheless  it  was  a 
distinct  modification  of  the  policy  an- 
nounced in  the  proclamation  establish- 
ing the  war  zone. 

On  May  28,  1915,  the  German  gov- 
ernment submitted  a  note  defining  its 
position  in  regard  to  the  various  ques- 
tions raised  in  the  American  note. 
With  regard  to  the  cases  of  the  dish- 
ing and  the  Gulflight  it  was  stated  that 
an  investigation  was  in  progress  and  the 


256 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


results  of  this  investigation  would  be 
communicated  to  the  United  States  gov- 
ernment shortly.  (A  note  was  sent  by 
the  German  government  on  June  4, 
1915,  expressing  regrets  for  the  sinking 
of  the  Gulflight,  explaining  that  no  dis- 
tinct marks  were  seen  on  the  vessel  by 
which  she  could  be  identified.  Germany 
further  agreed  to  furnish  full  recom- 
pense for  the  damage  done.  In  regard 
to  the  Cushing  the  German  government 
asked  for  additional  information  in  the 
possession  of  the  American  government 
in  order  that  a  conclusion  might  be 
reached  in  the  matter.)  In  regard  to 
the  Falaba,  it  was  again  stated  that  the 
commander  had  disregarded  the  order 
to  lay  to  and  had  sent  up  rocket  signals 
for  help. 

Concerning  the  Lusitania,  the  Ger- 
man government  took  the  position  that 
the  government  of  the  United  States 
had  not  considered  all  of  the  material 
facts  in  the  case.  It  then  repeated  the 
charge  that  the  Lusitania  had  guns  on 
board  mounted  under  decks,  that  the 
British  government  had  issued  orders  to 
merchantment  to  ram  submarines,  and 
that  in  view  of  these  alleged  facts  the 
German  commanders  "were  no  longer  in 
a  position  to  observe  the  rules  of  cap- 
ture otherwise  usual."  It  was  further 
contended  that  the  Lusitania  carried 
large  quantities  of  ammunition  and  a 
number  of  Canadian  troops,  and  that 
the  German  government  was  justified  in 
destroying  war  munitions  destined  for 
the  enemy.  Finally  it  was  asserted  that 
the  rapid  sinking  of  the  Lusitania  was 
due  to  an  explosion  of  the  cargo  of 
ammunition.  (It  was  categorically 
denied  both  by  the  British  authorities 
and  the  American  port  officials  at  New 
York  that  the  Lusitania  carried  guns 
and  war  munitions.)  The  German  gov- 
ernment requested  the  American  govern- 
ment  to    carefully   consider   the    above 


statements  and  express  its  view  in  re- 
gard to  them  when  the  German  govern- 
ment agreed  to  make  a  final  statement 
as  to  its  position. 

It  was  at  this  juncture  in  the  nego- 
tiations that  Mr.  Bryan  resigned  as 
Secretary  of  State  on  the  ground  that 
he  was  unable  to  agree  with  the  Presi- 
dent as  to  the  proper  policy  to  pursue 
in  dealing  with  the  difficulties  with  Ger- 
many. The  two  points  upon  which  Mr. 
Bryan  in  his  letter  of  explanation  stated 
that  he  was  not  in  agreement  with  the 
President  were  (1)  as  to  submitting  the 
Lusitania  case  to  the  investigation  of 
an  international  commission  and  (2) 
as  to  warning  Americans  against  travel- 
ing on  belligerent  vessels  or  vessels 
carrying  cargoes  of  ammunition.  Mr. 
Bryan  held  that  the  questions  in  dis- 
pute should  be  considered  by  an  inter- 
national commission,  and  secondly,  that 
American  travelers  should  be  warned 
as  above  indicated. 

The  next  diplomatic  move  was  made 
on  June  9,  1915,  when  the  American 
government  replied  to  the  German  gov- 
ernment that  it  noted  with  satisfaction 
the  position  taken  by  the  latter  in  the 
cases  of  the  Cushing  and  Gulflight.  In 
regard  to  the  Falaba  the  United  States 
was  unwilling  to  admit  that  the  at- 
tempt on  the  part  of  the  merchantman 
to  escape  capture  altered  the  obliga- 
tion of  the  commander  of  the  attacking 
vessel  to  provide  for  the  safety  of  the 
lives  of  those  on  board  the  merchant- 
man. In  regard  to  the  statements  made 
by  Germany  that  the  Lusitania  was 
armed,  the  American  government  stated 
that  it  had  official  information  that  such 
was  not  the  case.  With  regard  to  the 
carrying  of  contraband  by  the  Lusi- 
tania, it  was  held  that  this  was  entirely 
irrelevant  to  the  question  of  the  legality 
of  the  methods  used  in  sinking  the  ves- 
sel.     Brushing    aside   these   extraneous 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    257 


issues,  the  American  government  took 
its  stand  firmly  on  the  ground  that  it 
was  "contending  for  nothing  less  high 
and  sacred  than  the  rights  of  human- 
ity," and  it  stated  that  it  "very  ear- 
nestly and  very  solemnly"  renewed  its 
representations  made  in  the  previous 
note. 

A  reply  to  this  note  came  from  the 
German  government  on  July  8,  1915. 
There  was  in  this  communication  little 
evidence  of  a  desire  to  meet  the  issue. 
There  were  the  usual  assertions  in  re- 
gard to  England's  inhuman  methods  of 
warfare  and  a  suggestion  for  guard- 
ing the  safety  of  American  vessels  in  the 
war  zone.  The  rejoinder  to  this  note 
sent  by  the  government  of  the  United 
States  on  July  21,  1915,  indicated  very 
clearly  that  it  considered  the  German 
communication  evasive  and  unsatisfac- 
tory. It  stated  once  more  in  the  clear- 
est manner  possible  the  real  question  at 
issue,  namely,  that  acts  of  reprisal 
against  an  enemy  are  indefensible  when 
they  deprive  neutrals  of  their  acknowl- 
edged rights.  The  note  further  gave 
pointed  evidence  that  the  United  States 
government  felt  that  the  discussion  had 
gone  far  enough  and  that  "it  cannot 
believe  that  the  Imperial  government 
will  longer  refrain  from  disavowing  the 
wanton  act  of  its  naval  commander." 
Despite  this  urgent  suggestion  from  the 
United  States  that  the  matter  should 
be  speedily  settled  the  negotiations 
dragged  on.  There  was  evidence,  how- 
ever, that  the  German  government  was 
attempting  to  find  some  solution  which 
would  concede  most  that  the  United 
States  was  contending  for  while  at  the 
same  time  avoid  the  appearance  of  be- 
ing humiliated.  For  example,  on  Sept. 
1,  1915,  Ambassador  von  Bernstorff, 
in  a  letter  to  the  new  Secretary  of 
State  Lansing,  gave  assurance  that 
German     submarines    would    not    sink 


any  more  liners  without  warning.  It 
is  to  be  noted  that  this  included  ships 
belonging  to  belligerents  as  well  as  neu- 
trals. Finally,  in  November,  the  Ger- 
man government  authorized  its  Am- 
bassador at  Washington  to  begin  ne- 
gotiations looking  to  a  settlement  of  all 
outstanding  issues  between  the  two  na- 
tions. 

While  the  negotiations  in  regard  to 
the  Lusitania  were  being  conducted, 
further  complications  arose  from  the 
continued  action  of  German  submarines 
and  commerce  destroyers.  The  sinking 
of  the  American  schooner  Wm.  P.  Frye 
by  the  German  auxiliary  cruiser  Prinz 
Eitel  Friedricli  led  to  an  exchange  of 
notes  in  which  Germany  finally  agreed 
to  pay  an  indemnity  for  the  loss  of  the 
vessel  and  cargo,  and  also  made  the 
important  stipulation  that  thereafter 
no  merchant  vessel  would  be  sunk  until 
the  safety  of  the  crew  and  passengers 
was  made  absolutely  certain. 

In  the  case  of  the  British  steamship 
Arabic,  sunk  by  a  German  submarine 
on  Aug.  19,  1915,  the  German  govern- 
ment at  first  refused  to  acknowledge 
any  obligation  in  the  matter,  as  it  was 
contended  that  the  Arabic  had  at- 
tempted to  ram  the  submarine.  Later, 
however,  the  German  government  agreed 
to  pay  an  indemnity  for  the  loss  of 
American  lives  on  the  Arabic  and  fur- 
ther stated  that  the  instructions  to  the 
commanders  of  submarines  had  been 
made  so  stringent  that  a  repetition  of 
incidents  similar  to  the  Arabic  was  con- 
sidered out  of  the  question.  Just  when 
it  appeared  that  the  issues  between  Ger- 
many and  the  United  States  which  had 
arisen  in  connection  with  the  operations 
of  the  submarines  were  about  to  be  set- 
tled, a  new  issue  appeared  which  seri- 
ously complicated  the  whole  situation. 

Question  of  Armed  Merchantmen. — 
It  had  long  been  a  recognized  right  un- 


258 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


der  international  law  for  merchant  ves- 
sels to  carry  armament  for  defensive 
purposes.  This  practice  dates  back  to 
the  days  of  piracy  and  privateers,  and 
the  armament  of  a  merchantman  was  in- 
tended for  purposes  of  defense  against 
these  irregular  enemies.  It  was  never 
contemplated  that  such  armament  would 
be  available  against  a  regular  man-of- 
war.  The  appearance  of  the  submarine, 
however,  changed  the  aspect  of  an  armed 
merchantman.  Even  small-calibre  guns 
would  be  effective  for  sinking  these  frail 
craft. 

The  German  government  contended 
that  Great  Britain  had  mounted  guns 
on  a  large  number  of  merchant  vessels 
and  had  issued  instructions  to  the  mas- 
ters of  such  vessels  to  attack  submarines 
which  approached  their  ships.  Under 
these  circumstances  the  German  govern- 
ment contended  that  such  vessels  were 
in  fact  men-of-war  and  might  be  sunk 
without  warning.  There  was  much 
force  in  this  argument,  and  the  United 
States  government  in  a  communication 
to  the  belligerent  Powers  stated  that,  in 
view  of  the  changed  conditions  of  war- 
fare and  the  disappearance  of  pirates 
and  privateers,  it  was  seriously  consid- 
ering regarding  all  armed  merchantmen 
as  vessels  of  war.  It  was  suggested  that 
the  belligerents  agree  that  submarines 
observe  the  rules  of  international  law 
and  at  the  same  time  that  all  armament 
should  be  removed  from  merchant 
vessels. 

While  this  note  was  being  considered 
by  the  belligerent  Powers,  matters  were 
brought  to  a  head  when  on  Feb.  10, 
1916,  the  governments  of  Germany  and 
Austria-Hungary  notified  the  United 
States  that  after  March  1,  1916,  armed 
belligerent  merchant  vessels  would  be 
sunk  without  warning  by  the  Teutonic 
Powers.  At  about  the  same  time  it 
became  known  that  the  Entente  Allies 


would  not  accept  the  compromise  sug- 
gestions proposed  by  the  United  States. 
This  new  development  in  the  subma- 
rine issue  aroused  serious  concern  in 
the  United  States.  There  was  a  strong 
sentiment  in  Congress  that  the  govern- 
ment should  carry  out  its  announced 
position  of  considering  all  armed  mer- 
chantmen as  vessels  of  war.  The  ad- 
ministration felt,  however,  that  as  the 
belligerent  Powers  had  declined  to  ac- 
cept its  suggestion  for  disarming  mer- 
chant vessels  it  was  not  within  its  right 
to  insist  upon  this  modification  of  in- 
ternational law.  For  a  time  it  appeared 
as  if  a  serious  breach  would  occur  be- 
tween Congress  and  the  Administration. 
Resolutions  were  introduced  in  both 
Houses  of  Congress,  calling  upon  the 
President  to  warn  Americans  not  to 
travel  on  armed  merchantmen.  The 
President  did  not  welcome  this  interven- 
tion of  Congress  in  the  conduct  of  ne- 
gotiations with  foreign  Powers,  and  in 
order  to  place  Congress  on  record,  he 
asked  for  and  received  what  in  effect 
was  a  vote  of  confidence  from  Congress. 

This  new  issue  once  more  delayed  the 
final  settlement  of  the  issues  between 
Germany  and  the  United  States.  The 
President  refused  to  continue  further 
the  negotiations  relative  to  the  Lusi- 
tania  case  until  Germany  gave  assur- 
ances that  the  submarine  warfare  would 
be  conducted  in  such  a  way  as  not  to 
imperil  Americans  traveling  on  the 
high  seas.  In  a  note  presented  to  the 
State  Department,  Feb.  16,  1916,  Ger- 
many recognized  her  liability  in  the 
Lusitania  affair.  She  promised  repara- 
tion and  said  that  submarine  operations 
(as  reprisals)  must  only  be  directed 
against  enemy  subjects. 

The  sinking  of  the  French  cross- 
channel  steamer  Sussex  aroused  seri- 
ous concern  in  the  United  States  in  view 
of  the  promises  which  had  been  made 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    259 


by  Germany.  In  a  communication  sent 
to  the  American  government  on  April 
10,  1916,  the  German  authorities  of- 
fered an  explanation  of  the  sinking  of 
several  vessels,  and  denied  responsibility 
for  the  sinking  of  the  Sussex.  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  in  order  to  bring  the  whole 
issue  to  a  final  settlement,  if  possible, 
sent  on  April  19, 1916,  a  communication 
to  Germany  which  was  clearly  in  the 
nature  of  an  ultimatum.  It  stated  that 
an  impartial  investigation  conclusively 
established  the  fact  that  the  steamer 
Sussex  was  sunk  without  warning  by  a 
torpedo  of  German  manufacture.  It 
then  reviewed  the  submarine  activities 
for  the  preceding  year  and  pointed  out 
how  submarine  commanders  had  con- 
tinued to  sink  merchant  vessels,  both 
belligerent  and  neutral,  without  warn- 
ing, despite  the  explicit  promises  of  the 
German  government.  In  conclusion  it 
was  stated  that  unless  the  German  gov- 
ernment "immediately  declare  and  effect 
an  abandonment  of  its  present  methods 
of  submarine  warfare  against  passenger 
and  freight-carrying  vessels,  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  can  have 
no  other  choice  but  to  sever  diplomatic 
relations  with  the  German  Empire  alto- 
gether." 

On  the  same  day  that  this  note  was 
sent,  President  Wilson,  before  the  two 
Houses  of  Congress,  read  a  message  in 
which  he  reviewed  the  course  of  nego- 
tiations in  connection  with  submarine 
warfare  and  informed  Congress  of  the 
nature  of  the  message  which  he  had  sent 
to  Germany. 

In  reply  to  this  note  the  German 
government  stated  that  it  was  possible 
that  the  Sussex  was  sunk  by  a  German 
submarine,  and  if  further  investigation 
should  establish  this  to  be  the  case  "the 
German  government  will  naft  fail  to 
draw  the  consequence  resulting  there- 
from."     On   the   other   hand   the   Ger- 


man authorities  denied  the  assertion 
made  in  the  American  note  that  there 
had  been  an  indiscriminate  destruction 
of  vessels  by  German  submarines.  They 
defended  the  activity  of  the  submarines 
as  a  legitimate  retaliation  for  the  al- 
leged violations  of  international  law  by 
Great  Britain.  However,  it  was  stated 
that  submarine  commanders  had  re- 
ceived further  instructions  to  the  fol- 
lowing effect:  "In  accordance  with  the 
general  principles  of  visit  and  search 
and  the  destruction  of  merchant  vessels 
recognized  by  international  law,  such 
vessels,  both  within  and  without  the 
area  declared  a  naval  war  zone,  shall 
not  be  sunk  without  warning  and  with- 
out saving  human  lives,  unless  the  ship 
attempt  to  escape  or  offer  resistance." 

While  this  was  a  substantial  agree- 
ment to  the  demand  of  the  United 
States,  the  note  went  on  to  say  that  Ger- 
many would  expect  the  United  States 
government  to  "demand  and  insist  that 
the  British  government  shall  forthwith 
observe  the  rules  of  international  law 
universally  recognized  before  the  war," 
and  in  case  the  British  government 
failed  to  do  so  "the  German  government 
would  then  be  facing  a  new  situation,  in 
which  it  must  reserve  to  itself  the  com- 
plete liberty  of  decision."  This  con- 
cluding statement  held  out  the  possi- 
bility of  a  renewal  of  submarine  warfare 
without  restrictions  in  case  Great 
Britain  did  not  modify  her  policy  of 
blockade. 

To  this  communication  the  United 
States  government  returned  an  immedi- 
ate reply,  stating  that  it  would  rely 
upon  a  "scrupulous  execution"  of  the 
new  policy  by  the  German  government. 
At  the  same  time  the  note  stated  that 
the  United  States  government  could  not 
agree  that  the  continuance  of  this  new 
policy  of  submarine  warfare  by  Ger- 
many was  "contingent  upon  the  conduct 


260 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


of  any  other  government  affecting  the 
rights  of  neutrals  and  noncombatants." 

Shipment  of  War  Munitions. — 
Shortly  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
large  orders  for  war  munitions  were 
placed  by  the  Entente  Allies  with  Amer- 
ican firms.  The  complete  control  of  the 
seas  by  the  British  and  French  fleets 
made  it  impossible  for  the  Teutonic 
Powers  to  obtain  similar  supplies. 
Comment  in  the  German  press  indicated 
that  the  feeling  in  Germany  was  very 
strong  that  the  United  States  was  not 
observing  a  strict  neutrality  by  allow- 
ing such  shipments.  On  April  4,  1915, 
Ambassador  Bernstorff  called  the  mat- 
ter to  the  attention  of  the  United  States 
government  officially.  He  maintained 
that  while  the  United  States  had  taken 
no  action  in  regard  to  alleged  violations 
of  international  law  by  Great  Britain 
in  interfering  with  neutral  trade,  it  had 
allowed  American  firms  to  supply  large 
quantities  of  war  munitions  to  Ger- 
many's enemies.  He  maintained  that 
conditions  in  the  present  war  were 
unique,  that  while  theoretically  arms 
might  be  shipped  from  the  United  States 
to  Germany,  practically  they  could  be 
sent  only  to  her  enemies.  A  real  spirit 
of  neutrality  called  for  the  stoppage  of 
a  trade  which  was  aiding  only  one  side. 

In  a  vigorous  reply  to  this  note  Presi- 
dent Wilson  set  forth  clearly  the  posi- 
tion of  the  United  States.  He  first 
called  attention  to  the  fact  that  her 
relations  with  England  could  not  be 
made  a  subject  of  discussion  with  a 
third  government.  With  regard  to  the 
shipment  of  arms  and  ammunition,  the 
President  pointed  out  that  any  change 
in  the  laws  of  neutrality  during  the 
progress  of  a  war  would  be  a  departure 
from  the  principle  of  strict  neutrality 
and  the  placing  of  an  embargo  on  the 
trade  in  arms  would  constitute  such  a 
change. 


In  reply  to  a  similar  protest  by  the 
Austro-Hungarian  government  on  Aug. 
1,  1915,  the  government  of  the  United 
States  on  Aug.  12,  1915,  made  an  ex- 
haustive statement  of  its  position.  It 
reiterated  the  statement  made  in  the 
reply  to  Germany  that  any  change  in 
the  rules  of  neutrality  made  during  a 
war  would  violate  the  spirit  of  neu- 
trality. In  addition  it  pointed  out  that 
it  had  never  been  the  policy  of  the 
United  States  to  maintain  a  large  mili- 
tary establishment  or  great  stores  of 
ammunition  and  had  depended  upon  the 
right  to  purchase  arms  and  ammunition 
from  neutral  Powers  in  time  of  war. 
To  prohibit  such  trade  would  compel 
every  nation  to  have  on  hand  sufficient 
munitions  of  war  to  meet  any  emer- 
gency, and  would  practically  make 
every  nation  an  armed  camp. 

Apart,  then,  from  any  question  of  the 
legality  of  an  embargo  on  arms,  the 
United  States  government  felt  that  it 
would  be  a  mistaken  policy  as  it  would 
deliberately  encourage  the  spirit  of 
militarism. 

Relations  with  Austria-Hungary. — 
During  the  year  1915  two  serious  dis- 
putes arose  involving  the  United  States 
and  Austria-Hungary.  The  first  of 
these  concerned  the  activities  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  to  the 
United   States,  Dr.   Theodor  Dumba.* 

On  Sept.  1,  1915,  James  F.  J.  Archi^ 
bald,  an  American  newspaper  corre^ 
spondent,  was  arrested  by  the  British 
authorities,  when  the  steamer  Rotter- 
dam put  into  Falmouth,  for  carrying 
dispatches  from  the  German  and  Aus- 
trian embassies  at  Washington  to  Ber- 

*  Constantin  Theodor  Dumba,  born  (1856)  in 
Vienna;  graduated  in  law  at  the  University  of 
Vienna  (1878)  and  then  studied  in  Paris;  en- 
tered Austrian  Foreign  Office  (1879);  Privy 
Councillor  (1908);  Ambassador  from  Austria  to 
the  United  States  from  1913  till  his  recall  on 
demand  of  the  United  States  government  in 
1915. 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    261 


lin  and  Vienna.  Among  the  papers  was 
a  letter  from  Dr.  Dumba,  suggesting  a 
plan  for  crippling  the  munition  fac- 
tories in  America  by  fomenting  strikes 
among  the  Austro-Hungarian  laborers 
in  these  factories.  Dr.  Dumba  admit- 
ted the  authenticity  of  the  documents 
and  defended  his  action  on  the  ground 
that  it  was  his  duty  to  bring  to  the 
attention  of  his  fellow  countrymen  em- 
ployed by  the  manufacturers  of  muni- 
tions that  they  were  engaged  in  enter- 
prises unfriendly  to  the  fatherland,  and 
that  the  Imperial  government  would  re- 
gard them  as  guilty  of  a  serious  crime, 
punishable  by  penal  servitude,  should 
they  return  to  their  own  country. 

This  explanation  proved  unsatisfac- 
tory to  the  American  government  and 
Secretary  Lansing  notified  the  Austrian 
government  that  as  Dr.  Dumba  had 
"conspired  to  cripple  legitimate  indus- 
tries of  the  people  of  the  United  States 
and  had  flagrantly  violated  diplomatic 
propriety  by  employing  an  American 
citizen  protected  by  an  American  pass- 
port as  a  secret  bearer  of  official  dis- 
patches through  the  lines  of  the  enemy 
of  Austria-Hungary,"  he  was  no  longer 
acceptable  to  the  United  States  as  the 
Ambassador  from  Austria-Hungary. 
In  answer  to  this  demand  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  government  agreed,  on  Sept. 
27,  1915,  to  recall  Dr.  Dumba. 

The  second  incident  involving  the  two 
countries  was  the  sinking  of  the  Italian 
steamer  Ancona  on  Nov.  7,  1915,  by  an 
Austrian  submarine.  The  Ancona  had 
attempted  to  escape  but  was  overhauled. 
It  was  charged  by  the  survivors  that  the 
submarine  continued  to  fire  after  the 
Ancona  had  stopped.  In  all  more  than 
200  lives  were  lost,  among  them  nine 
American  citizens.  In  a  vigorous  note 
the  government  of  the  United  States,  on 
Dec.  6,  1915,  demanded  that  the 
Austro-Hungarian    government    should 


disavow  the  act,  that  the  commander 
of  the  submarine  should  be  punished, 
and  that  an  indemnity  should  be  paid 
for  the  loss  of  the  lives  of  American 
citizens. 

To  this  the  Austro-Hungarian  gov- 
ernment replied  on  Dec.  15,  1915,  ask- 
ing for  more  specific  information  upon 
which  the  government  of  the  United 
States  based  its  charges.  On  Dec.  19, 
1915,  the  American  government  replied, 
stating  that  it  based  its  charges  on  the 
official  report  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Admiralty,  and  declined  further  to 
specify  the  additional  testimony  tend- 
ing to  corroborate  the  Admiralty's  re- 
port. The  incident  was  closed  by  the 
Austro-Hungarian  government  grant- 
ing practically  all  of  the  American  de- 
mands. In  a  note  sent  Dec.  29,  1915, 
it  was  stated  that  the  submarine  com- 
mander had  been  punished  for  not  tak- 
ing into  consideration  the  panic  aboard 
the  Ancona  which  rendered  disembark- 
ment  difficult.  It  agreed  that  Austria- 
Hungary  should  indemnify  American 
citizens  affected.  While  disclaiming  re- 
sponsibility for  lives  lost  by  the  shots 
which  were  fired  while  the  Ancona  was 
attempting  to  escape,  or  for  those  lost 
by  the  faulty  lowering  of  lifeboats,  Aus- 
tria agreed  not  to  press  for  proof  that 
the  American  lives  were  lost  through  the 
fault  of  the  submarine  commander,  and 
agreed  "to  extend  indemnities  to  those 
whose  cause  cannot  be  established."  In 
conclusion  the  note  stated  that  the 
Austro-Hungarian  government  "re- 
served to  itself  the  right  to  bring  up 
for  discussion  at  a  later  time  the  difficult 
questions  of  international  law  con- 
nected with  submarine  warfare." 

Public  Opinion  in  the  United  States. 
— Public  opinion  in  the  United  States 
was  sharply  divided  as  to  the  lessons 
to  be  drawn  from  the  war,  and  as  to  the 
policy  which  that  country  should  adopt. 


262 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


On  the  one  hand  a  vigorous  campaign 
was  inaugurated  to  strengthen  the  mili- 
tary and  naval  defenses  of  the  United 
States.  It  was  urged  with  great  ear- 
nestness that  the  war  had  demonstrated 
the  futility  of  military  unpreparedness 
and  that  the  United  States  was  in  par- 
ticular danger  because  of  her  great 
wealth  which  other  nations  would  covet. 
On  the  other  hand  it  was  urged  with 
equal  fervor  that  the  cause  of  the  war 
was  primarily  the  great  military  arma- 
ments in  Europe,  and  that  the  United 
States  would  make  a  great  mistake  by 
joining  in  the  competition  for  military 
preparedness.  It  was  pointed  out  by 
the  advocates  of  peace  that  the  ener- 
gies of  the  country  should  be  devoted 
to  finding  some  means,  if  possible,  to 
end  the  war,  and  to  further  the  plans 
for  preventing  future  struggles.  Per- 
haps the  most  noteworthy,  and  cer- 
tainly the  most  picturesque,  of  the 
efforts  of  the  pacifists  in  the  United 
States  was  the  expedition  organized  by 
Henry  Ford,  a  millionaire  automobile 
manufacturer,  to  go  to  Europe  to  dis- 
cover some  means  of  ending  the  war. 
A  liner  was  chartered  for  the  purpose. 
Included  in  the  party  of  about  150  were 
a  number  of  prominent  American  men 
and  women,  together  with  a  consider- 
able number  of  newspaper  and  maga- 
zine writers  and  moving-picture  men. 
The  United  States  authorities  let  it  be 
known  that  the  mission  was  in  no  sense 
officially  sanctioned,  while  the  Euro- 
pean countries  at  war  clearly  indicated 
that  the  expedition  was  not  welcome. 
Despite  these  discouragements  the 
party  sailed  on  Dec.  4,  1915.  During 
the  voyage  serious  discord  developed 
among  the  members  of  the  party.  The 
expedition  reached  Christiansand,  Nor- 
way, on  Dec.  18,  1915.  A  few  days 
later  it  was  announced  that  Mr.  Ford 
would  have  to  leave  the  party  and  re- 


turn to  America  because  of  illness.  The 
remainder  of  the  party  went  on  to  Co- 
penhagen, and  later  to  The  Hague, 
where  a  number  of  meetings  were  held 
with  delegates  from  other  neutral  coun- 
tries. The  expedition  accomplished 
nothing  of  importance  towards  ending 
the  war. 

President  Wilson,  in  order  to  get 
first-hand  information  concerning  the 
condition  of  affairs  in  the  belligerent 
countries,  sent  Edward  M.  House  * 
abroad  as  his  personal  confidential 
agent.  It  is  thought  that  the  Presi- 
dent was  seeking  to  discover  whether 
the  time  was  opportune  to  offer  media- 
tion.    (See  below.) 

Scandinavian  Countries.  Immediate- 
ly after  the  outbreak  of  the  European 
War  the  three  Scandinavian  countries 
declared  their  neutrality  and  the  gov- 
ernments of  Norway  and  Sweden  pub- 
lished identically  worded  explanatory 
communications  which  stated  that  the 
two  governments  had  agreed  to  main- 
tain their  neutrality  and  had  exchanged 
binding  assurances  with  a  view  to  pre- 
venting any  situation  arising  which 
Avould  precipitate  hostilities  between 
them. 

In  Sweden  there  was  a  strong  Ger- 
manophile  sentiment  among  the  military 
class,  which  is  in  reality  more  a  dislike 
of  Russia  than  a  love  of  Germany. 
This  anti-Russian  feeling  is  due  mainly 
to  the  fear  that  Russia  contemplates 
aggression  against  the  Scandinavian 
peninsula.  In  Denmark  and  Norway 
the  popular  sentiment  appeared  to  be 
favorable  to  Great  Britain.  The  geo- 
graphical  position   of   these   countries, 

*  Edward  Mandell  House,  born  (1858)  at 
Houston,  Tex.;  educated  at  Cornell  University; 
active  in  Democratic  politics  in  Texas  and  di- 
rector of  the  campaigns  of  many  successful 
Democratic  nominees  for  Governor  from  1892; 
himself  never  a  candidate  for  office;  confiden- 
tial adviser  of  President  Wilson  from  the  time 
that  Wilson  was  Governor  of  New  Jersey. 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    263 


especially  of  Denmark  and  Sweden, 
made  it  peculiarly  difficult  for  them  to 
maintain  their  announced  position  of 
neutrality.  They  controlled  the  en- 
trance to  the  Baltic  Sea  and  were  so 
situated  as  to  provide  easy  transit  to 
both  Russia  and  Germany. 

On  the  initiative  of  the  Swedish  gov- 
ernment a  conference  of  the  three  Scan- 
dinavian monarchs  was  held  at  Malmo, 
Sweden,  in  December,  1914.  It  was 
called  for  the  purpose  of  taking  counsel 
together  regarding  means  for  limiting 
and  counteracting  the  economic  diffi- 
culties imposed  on  the  three  countries 
by  the  war.  This  conference  was  fol- 
lowed by  the  issuance  of  an  identically 
worded  protest  to  the  nations  at  war 
against  their  measures  which  threatened 
neutral  commerce. 

The  interference  with  Swedish  trade, 
especially  by  Great  Britain,  led  to  the 
adoption  of  retaliatory  measures  on  the 
part  of  Sweden.  Embargoes  were  laid 
on  wood  pulp  and  other  commodities 
needed  by  the  Entente  Allies.  In  order 
to  reach  a  solution  of  the  question  of 
neutral  trade  Great  Britain,  in  July, 
1915,  sent  a  commission  to  Sweden. 
Some  months  later  it  was  stated  that 
a  satisfactory  arrangement  had  been 
made. 

A  second  conference  of  the  premiers 
and  foreign  ministers  of  the  three 
countries  was  held  in  March,  1916,  at 
Copenhagen  with  the  purpose  of 
strengthening  the  understanding  be- 
tween them.  It  was  reported  that  an 
agreement  had  been  reached  that  if  any 
one  of  the  three  nations  should  become 
involved  in  the  war,  the  other  two  would 
not  align  themselves  with  the  opposing 
belligerents.  It  was  further  decided 
that  at  the  proper  time  steps  should 
be  taken  by  the  three  Powers  in  con- 
junction with  other  neutrals  to  protect 
the  interests  of  neutrals  generally. 


The  transaction  of  foreign  commerce 
became  more  difficult  and  during  1917 
the  Danish  government  was  obliged  to 
import  for  its  own  account  foodstuffs 
and  provisions.  Industries  were  not 
permitted  to  go  beyond  certain  hours 
and  strict  economy  in  the  use  of  gas 
and  electricity  was  enforced. 

In  Noi'way  because  of  the  curtailment 
of  imports  by  the  United  States  as  a 
result  of  its  policy  of  restricting  im- 
ports to  neutral  countries  bordering  on 
Germany  an  agreement  was  made  be- 
tween the  two  countries  for  the  ship- 
ments of  certain  supplies  upon  guaran- 
tees being  given  that  would  prevent 
their  reexportation  to  Germany.  The 
agreement  also  provided  that  if  any  of 
the  supplies  were  shipped  to  other  coun- 
tries bordering  on  Germany,  Norway 
would  make  an  agreement  with  the  coun- 
try to  which  the  supplies  were  shipped 
that  no  such  would  be  shipped  to  Ger- 
many. Norway  was  the  first  of  the 
northern  European  neutrals  to  be  ra- 
tioned. When  the  United  States  broke 
off  diplomatic  relations  with  Germany, 
after  the  renewal  of  unrestricted  sub- 
marine warfare,  it  made  the  suggestion 
to  other  neutral  countries  that  they  fol- 
low its  example.  To  this  suggestion 
the  Swedish  government  replied  that 
such  method  was  contrary  to  its  prin- 
ciples of  policy. 

On  February  14,  1917,  it  was  an- 
nounced that  the  Scandinavian  powers 
after  a  consultation  lasting  a  week  held 
at  Stockholm  had  handed  identical  notes 
to  the  German  ministers  in  Denmark, 
Norway,  and  Sweden  protesting  against 
submarine  blockade,  refusing  to  admit 
its  legality,  and  holding  Germany  ac- 
countable for  damages.  On  November 
29,  1917,  a  conference  of  the  Scandi- 
navian Powers  was  held  at  Christiania 
on  the  invitation  of  King  Hakon  of 
Norway   and  King  Gustav   of  Sweden. 


264 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


The  meeting  was  explained  as  an  en- 
deavor of  the  three  Scandinavian  coun- 
tries to  find  means  of  self-defense 
against  the  Central  Powers.  During 
1917,  there  were  85  Danish  vessels  of 
66,000  net  tons  and  434  Norwegian 
vessels  of  687,000  gross  tons  sunk  by 
torpedoes,  mines,  or  gun  fire. 

In  Sweden  a  great  number  of  hunger 
demonstrations  occurred  all  over  the 
country.  In  many  cities  numbers  of 
bake-shops  were  plundered  by  women 
and  in  the  country  districts  bands  of 
men  demanded  that  the  farmers  turn 
over  to  them  their  reserve  supplies. 
Soldiers  joined  in  these  demonstrations. 
While  the  Parliament  was  in  session  in 
Stockholm  a  band  of  workmen  number- 
ing several  thousands  gathered  before 
the  building  to  demand  that  exports  be 
stopped  and  that  foodstuffs  be  better 
distributed.  Many  people  demanded  an 
immediate  commercial  agreement  with 
England.  The  Queen  was  especially  un- 
popular among  the  Socialists,  who 
called  her  the  German  Queen  of  Sweden, 
and  she  was  accused  of  causing  provi- 
sions to  be  smuggled  into  Germany. 

In  1918  the  Norwegian  government 
took  over  the  supply  of  breadstuff's  to 
provide  better  distribution.  The  rise  of 
prices  continued  in  all  the  Scandinavian 
countries.  In  Denmark  the  housing 
problem  caused  much  anxiety,  and  many 
people  had  to  purchase  houses  in  order 
to  secure  residences.  In  Copenhagen 
it  was  provided  that  no  rent  be  in- 
creased without  the  sanction  of  the 
Copenhagen  house  rent  board,  and  dur- 
ing the  year  February  23,  1917,  to  Feb- 
ruary 23,  1918,  the  cases  brought  be- 
fore the  board  numbered  24,000.  The 
expenses  of  a  working  family  of  five 
increased  from  2,000  kroner  in  July, 
1914,  to  3,635  kroner  in  July,  1918. 

Netherlands.  The  geographical  sit- 
uation   of    the    Netherlands    made    its 


relations  to  the  belligerents  even  more 
difficult  to  adjust  than  was  the  case  in 
the  Scandinavian  countries.  At  the 
outbreak  of  the  war  there  was  consider- 
able apprehension  in  Holland  that  their 
country  might  suffer  a  fate  similar  to 
that  of  Belgium.  The  authorities,  how- 
ever, determined  to  defend  the  neutral- 
ity of  Holland  to  the  best  of  their 
ability,  and  with  this  end  in  view  the 
Dutch  army  was  mobilized  and  sent  to 
th*e  frontiers.  These  military  measures, 
together  with  the  expenditures  made  in 
caring  for  a  large  number  of  Belgian 
refugees  who  fled  to  Holland,  entailed 
a  considerable  financial  burden  upon  the 
country.  In  common  with  other  neu- 
tral countries,  Holland  was  seriously 
affected  by  the  restrictions  placed  upon 
neutral  commerce,  especially  by  Great 
Britain.  As  Holland  offered  an  easy 
means  of  communication  with  Germany, 
Great  Britain  deemed  it  necessary,  in 
order  to  make  her  blockade  of  Germany 
effective,  to  adopt  some  measure  to  pre- 
vent neutral  goods  passing  through 
Holland  to  Germany.  With  this  end  in 
view  there  was  organized  a  company 
known  as  the  Netherlands  Overseas 
Trust,  to  which  was  to  be  consigned  all 
imports  which  might  be  of  use  to  Ger- 
many. This  company  agreed  to  dispose 
of  these  imports  so  that  none  should 
reach  Germany. 

The  war  curtailed  and  restricted  the 
commerce  of  the  country  and  to  supply 
the  needs  of  the  people  factories  were 
built.  As  a  result  Dutch  industry  was 
strengthened  and  will  have  a  permanent 
effect  on  the  foreign  commerce  of  the 
country. 

On  February  22,  1917,  seven  Dutch 
merchant  vessels  were  toi'pedoed  in  the 
North  Sea.  German  naval  regulations 
as  to  time  of  leaving  and  route  to  be 
followed  had  been  complied  with,  and 
after  a  discussion  of  several  months  the 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    265 


Dutch  government  received  satisfac- 
tion, Germany  promising  to  replace  the 
ships  sunk  by  ships  of  equal  value. 
The  feeling  among  the  Allies  was  that 
Germany  had  agreed  to  this  in  order 
not  to  push  Holland  too  far,  as  she  ob- 
tained supplies  from  her.  On  April 
21,  1917,  Holland  made  the  announce- 
ment that  she  would  remain  neutral 
during  the  war.  In  the  latter  half  of 
July,  1917,  German  and  Dutch  govern- 
ments discussed  the  economic  situation. 
The  problem  of  coal  and  credits  was  the 
most  important.  Germany  could  not 
export  more  than  200,000  tons  of  Ger- 
man and  50,000  tons  of  Belgian  coal, 
which  quantity  she  could  continue  to 
deliver  until  March  81,  1918.  To  ren- 
der the  rate  of  exchange  stable  Ger- 
many proposed  that  Holland  should 
place  at  her  disposal  a  definite  amount 
of  florins  for  the  coal  obtained  to  be 
covered  partly  by  cash  payment  and 
partly  by  credit,  the  credit  to  be  car- 
ried by  a  consortium  of  German  banks. 
On  September  11  of  the  same  year  it 
was  reported  that  England  was  ready 
to  deliver  180,000  tons  of  coal  monthly, 
if  Holland  would  place  180,000  tons  of 
shipping  space  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Belgian  Relief  Commission.  When  the 
States  General  convened  the  Queen  de- 
clared that  Holland  should  hold  herself 
ready  to  resist  any  infringement  of  her 
neuti'ality. 

During  the  year  1917,  the  neutral 
countries  bordering  on  Germany  gave 
rise  to  a  vexing  problem  to  the  United 
States.  Extraordinary  increase  in 
imports  to  these  countries  of  food  sup- 
plies made  it  evident  that  large  quan- 
tities were  sent  to  Germany.  Accord- 
ingly President  Wilson  issued  a  procla- 
mation (August  30,  1917)  that  no  food- 
stuffs could  be  sent  to  Europe  without 
a  license  granted  by  the  Export  Coun- 
cil.   A  later  modification  of  the  regula- 


tions resulted  in  the  concentration  of 
the  embargo  on  Holland  and  the  Scan- 
dinavian countries  from  whom  Germany 
received  large  quantities  of  supplies. 
Holland  had  an  agreement  with  Ger- 
many fixing  the  percentage  of  exports 
from  the  Netherlands  to  the  Central 
Powers.  The  United  States  intimated 
that  as  long  as  the  agreement  lasted 
no  American  commodities  would  be  per- 
mitted to  enter  Holland.  Holland 
needed  coal  and  other  commodities  from 
Germany  and  clung  to  the  agreement. 
As  a  result  of  this  embargo  large  num- 
bers of  Dutch  and  other  neutral  ves- 
sels were  held  in  American  harbors. 
The  United  States  refused  to  allow 
them  to  sail  under  conditions  which 
would  allow  their  cargoes  to  take  the 
place  of  food  supplies  shipped  to  Ger- 
many. The  United  States  proposed 
that  the  ships  and  their  cargoes  be  sent 
to  the  Allies  or  unloaded  for  American 
use  and  vessels  placed  in  American 
coastwise  trade.  The  Dutch  govern- 
ment, afraid  of  Germany's  attitude,  re- 
fused. Eighty-four  ships  were  thus  held 
up.  The  vessels  were  finally  allowed  to 
go  (August,  1918)  on  condition  that 
most  of  the  supplies  should  go  to  the 
relief  of  Belgium. 

The  restrictions  upon  commerce  by 
the  Allies  and  the  scarcity  of  bottoms 
during  1918,  had  a  depressing  effect  on 
Dutch  foreign  trade.  Factories  were 
closed  and  as  a  result  laborers  who 
lived  near  the  border  traveled  in  and 
out  of  Germany  daily  to  work  in  that 
country's  war  industries.  The  govern- 
ment was  forced  to  regulate  the  prices 
of  various  commodities  to  keep  them 
from  advancing  too  high.  A  number  of 
Dutch  vessels  were  sunk  by  submarines 
and  mines  and  one  was  confiscated  by 
a  German  prize  court.  Two  of  the 
steamers  sunk  by  submarines  belonged 
to  the  Holland-American  line  and  Ger- 


266 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


many  agreed  to  place  at  their  disposal 
an  equivalent  of  German  ships  interned 
in  Holland. 

The  Allied  need  of  more  shipping  re- 
sulted in  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  taking  over  all  Dutch  shipping. 
On  January  25,  1918,  a  temporary 
agreement  was  made  for  the  use  of 
Dutch  vessels  outside  of  the  submarine 
zone.  «The  Dutch  government  did  not 
live  up  to  its  part  of  the  agreement  be- 
cause of  pressure  brought  to  bear  on 
her  by  Germany.  The  President,  there- 
fore, on  March  20,  1918,  proclaimed 
that  Dutch  ships  be  at  once  employed 
in  American  service,  promising  ade- 
quate compensation  and  provision  for 
losses  by  enemy  attack.  Eighty-seven 
vessels  with  a  gross  tonnage  of  980,000 
were  thus  taken  over.  These  were  re- 
turned as  soon  as  possible  after  the 
signing  of  the  armistice. 

Switzerland.   The  situation  of  Switz- 
erland was  unique.     The  little  country 
was  completely  surrounded  by  the  na- 
tions at  war.     The  sympathies   of  the 
people  were  determined  by  their  racial 
affiliations.     There    are    three    distinct 
racial   groups   in   Switzerland,   namely," 
German,  French,  and  Italian,  of  which 
the  German  group  is  the  largest.     De- 
spite these  conflicting  sympathies,  the 
Swiss    authorities    were    determined    to 
maintain  the  neutrality  of  the  country, 
and  the   army  was   mobilized  in   order 
to  prevent   any  violation   of  this   neu- 
trality by  the  belligerent  Powers.     In 
dealing   with   the    problem    of   imports 
into  Switzerland,  the  Entente  Allies  fol- 
lowed much  the  same  policy  as  had  been 
adopted    in    Holland.      There   was    or- 
ganized a  company   called  the  Societe 
Suisse     de     Surveillance     Economique, 
through    whose    hands    imports    which 
might  be  of  service  to   Germany  were 
to  pass. 

In  1917  the  Federal  government  in 


order  to  obtain  the  requisite  food  sup- 
plies and  fuel  and  raw  materials  for 
Swiss  industries,  guaranteed  that  with 
certain  exceptions  neither  imports  from 
one  group  of  belligerents  or  articles 
manufactui'ed  from  them  shall  be  ex- 
ported in  any  form  to  a  country  in  the 
opposite  group.  In  the  latter  part  of 
1917,  the  Krupps  established  a  branch 
factory  at  Lucerne  with  a  capital  of 
30,000,000  marks. 

In  January,  1917,  there  were  fre- 
quent rumors  of  an  intention  on  the 
part  of  Germany  to  invade  Switzerland. 
The  French  government  on  January  5 
renewed  assurances  already  given  that 
it  would  respect  the  neutrality  of 
Switzerland.  The  Swiss  government 
took  measures  to  put  Switzerland  on 
guard.  On  April  14,  1917,  15,000 
workmen  met  in  Zurich  and  protested 
against  the  high  cost  of  living  and  de- 
manded a  government  monopoly  in  food 
supplies  and  their  distribution  at  fair 
prices.  In  the  autumn  of  1917  there 
were  persistent  rumors  in  the  press  of 
France  and  Germany  of  the  intentions 
on  the  part  of  the  other  country  to  vio- 
late the  neutrality  of  Switzerland. 
France  again  assured  Switzerland  of 
its  intention  to  respect  rigidly  and  hon- 
orably the  neutrality  of  Switzerland. 

In  June,  1918,  an  agreement  with 
Germany  in  regard  to  iron,  coal  and 
steel  was  published.  This  economic  con- 
vention was  to  last  nine  months  and  its 
main  provisions  were  as  follows :  Ger- 
many granted  to  Switzerland  permis- 
sion to  export  each  month  2,000,000 
tons  of  coal  and  10,000,000  tons  of  iron 
and  steel,  the  price  of  coal  to  be  on  the 
average  of  173V:>  francs  per  ton,  Ger- 
many consenting  to  a  rebate  of  40 
francs  a  ton  for  the  60,000  tons  which 
represented  domestic  consumption. 
Each  party  was  to  be  permitted  to  ex- 
port products  of  exchange  in  the  pro- 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    267 


portionate  quantity.  Switzerland  ac- 
cepted a  system  of  control,  under  the 
so-called  Switzerland  Fiduciary  Office, 
which  was  to  go  into  operation  July  15, 
1918,  and  which  was  to  be  responsible 
solely  to  the  Federal  Council.  It  was 
agreed  in  principle  that  Switzerland 
might  freely  make  use  of  German  coal 
in  manufactures  which  might  be  ex- 
ported, but  the  merchandise  manufac- 
tured from  German  coal  could  not  be 
sent  into  countries  at  war  with  it  unless 
it  was  shown  that  an  equal  amount  of 
non-German  coal  had  been  employed  in 
that  enterprise.  The  Germans  delayed 
the  negotiations  and  increased  their  de- 
mands, but  when  France  informed 
Switzerland  that  the  Allies  were 
ready  to  supply  her  with  85,000  tons 
of  coal  a  month,  Germany  hastened  to 
conclude  the  convention. 

On  September  13,  1918,  the  French 
government  abrogated  the  French-Swiss 
commercial  convention  of  1906.  This 
was  in  accordance  with  the  policy  of 
the  Entente  Allies  to  put  an  end  to  all 
treaties  containing  the  most  favored 
nation  clause. 

South  American  Countries.  All  of 
the  South  American  countries  were 
seriously  affected  by  the  outbreak  of 
the  European  War.  A  large  amount 
of  the  business  in  these  countries  was 
carried  on  by  European  credit  and  the 
dislocation  of  the  European  financial 
markets  seriously  crippled  the  business 
interests  in  South  America.  Moreover, 
a  large  part  of  the  export  trade  of  these 
countries  was  cut  off  and  emergency 
measures  had  to  be  adopted  to  relieve 
the  situation.  In  Chile  a  moratorium 
was  declared,  and  the  President  was 
empowered  to  extend  government  aid 
to  the  nitrate  industry,  the  most  impor- 
tant in  the  country.  Argentina  floated 
two  loans,  one  of  $15,000,000  and  the 
other    of    $25,000,000,    in    the    United 


States.  This  was  the  first  time  a  South 
American  country  had  negotiated  a 
loan  directly  in  the  United  States. 

Chile  became  involved  in  a  dispute 
with  the  belligerents  when,  on  April  2, 
1915,  the  German  cruiser  Dresden, 
which  had  entered  Chilean  waters  and 
had  been  ordered  interned,  was  sunk  by 
a  British  squadron.  Chile  demanded  an 
apology  from  Great  Britain  for  this 
violation  of  her  sovereignty  and  this  de- 
mand was  conceded.  Germany  sent  a 
sharply  worded  note  protesting  against 
the  acceptance  of  this  apology,  and 
Chile  replied  by  demanding  an  apology 
from  Germany  for  overstepping  the 
bounds  of  international  law  in  interven- 
ing in  a  question  which  involved  Chile's 
relations  with  another  Power.  After 
some  discussion  the  matter  was  ad- 
justed peaceably. 

Reception  of  the  Barred  Zone  Note. 
— The  issuance  of  the  barred  sea  zone 
note  on  Jan.  31,  1917,  created  a  pro- 
found impression  in  all  the  South  Amer- 
ican republics.  None  of  them,  however, 
seemed  ready  to  take  the  step  adopted 
by  the  United  States  government  and 
sever  diplomatic  relations.  Brazil  re- 
plied in  part:  "...  The  unexpected 
communication  we  have  just  received 
announcing  a  blockade  of  wide  extent 
of  countries  with  which  Brazil  is  con- 
tinually in  economic  relations  by  foreign 
and  Brazilian  shipping  has  produced  a 
justified  and  profound  impression 
through  the  imminent  menace  which  it 
contains  of  the  unjust  sacrifice  of  lives, 
the  destruction  of  property,  and  the 
wholesale  disturbance  of  commercial 
transactions.  .  .  .  For  these  reasons 
the  Brazilian  government,  in  spite  of 
its  sincere  and  keen  desire  to  avoid  any 
disagreement  with  the  nations  at  war, 
with  whom  it  is  on  friendly  terms,  be- 
lieves it  to  be  its  duty  to  protest  against 
this  blockade  and  consequently  to  leave 


268 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


entirely  with  the  Imperial  German  gov- 
ernment the  responsibility  for  all  acts 
which  will  involve  Brazilian  citizens, 
merchandise,  or  ships  and  which  are 
proved  to  have  been  committed  in  dis- 
regard of  the  recognized  principles  of 
international  law  and  the  conventions 
signed  by  Brazil  and  Germany." 

Chile  refused  outright  to  recognize 
the  legality  of  the  German  attempt  to 
establish  barred  zones  and  "conse- 
quently reserves  liberty  of  action  to 
protect  all  her  rights  in  the  event  of 
any  hostile  acts  against  her  ships." 
Argentina,  Peru,  Uruguay,  Bolivia, 
Panama,  and  Cuba  all  took  similar  ac- 
tion. The  keynote  of  their  replies  was 
that  any  act  on  the  part  of  Germany 
against  their  rights  as  neutrals  would 
be  considered  unfriendly. 

During  1918  the  attitude  of  Chile 
toward  the  war  was  a  subject  of  much 
comment,  for  it  was  not  understood  why 
she  was  so  firm  against  taking  any  part 
in  the  war.  This  seemed  to  be  the  re- 
sult in  the  first  place  of  a  belief  that 
German  military  power  could  never  be 
conquered.  Then  there  was  no  clear 
perception  of  the  economic  consequences 
of  the  war  in  case  of  a  German  victory. 
Nor  did  the  fear  of  German  imperial 
ambition  count  for  much,  for  what  was 
said  on  that  subject  by  the  Entente 
Allies  was  attributed  to  propaganda. 
Finally,  there  was  no  faith  whatever  in 
the  military  strength  of  the  United 
States. 

Soon  after  the  declaration  of  war  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Germany, 
Brazil  issued  a  proclamation  of  neu- 
trality as  between  those  two  nations, 
although  there  was  a  strong  party  in 
the  country  which  favored  a  declara- 
tion of  war  based  on  the  grounds  laid 
down  by  President  Wilson  of  the  United 
States.  She  kept  this  attitude  of  neu- 
trality  until   June   4,   1917,   when   the 


Brazilian  Ambassador  handed  to  the 
State  Department  at  Washington  a 
note  which  read  in  part,  "Brazil  ever 
was  and  now  is  free  from  warlike  ambi- 
tions, and,  while  it  always  refrained 
from  showing  any  impartiality  in  the 
European  conflict,  it  could  no  longer 
stand  unconcerned  when  the  struggle 
involved  the  United  States,  actuated  by 
no  interest  whatever  but  solely  for  the 
sake  of  international  judicial  order,  and 
when  Germany  included  us  and  the 
other  neutral  powers  in  the  most  violent 
acts  of  war."  Brazil  seized  about  150,- 
000  tons  of  German  merchant  vessels 
in  her  harbors  and  ordered  her  fleet  to 
cooperate  in  the  patrol  work  in  the 
southern  Atlantic. 

Brazil  declared  war  on  Germany  on 
Oct.  26,  1917,  and  immediately  took 
steps  against  her  large  German  popu- 
lation. She  annulled  all  contracts  en- 
tered into  for  public  works  with  Ger- 
mans, forbade  land  cessions  to  Ger- 
mans, took  over  the  control  of  German 
banks,  and  interned  all  German  sub- 
jects. Disorder  immediately  broke  out 
in  the  large  German  settlements  in 
southern  Brazil,  and  an  army  had  to  be 
sent  to  restore  order.  Shortly  after 
her  declaration  of  war  Secretary  of 
State  Lansing  (United  States)  pub- 
lished two  telegrams  from  Count  Lux- 
burg,  the  German  Charge  d'Affaires  at 
Buenos  Aires,  to  Berlin  through  the 
Swedish  legation,  stating  that  the  situ- 
ation in  Brazil  was  serious,  but  that  a 
visit  of  a  submarine  squadron  would 
materially  relieve  the  situation.  Brazil 
had  knowledge  of  these  before  she  de- 
clared war. 

By  the  end  of  1917  the  situation  in 
Argentina  was  very  acute.  On  Sept. 
8,  1917,  Secretary  of  State  Lansing 
published  telegrams  that  had  been  sent 
to  Berlin  in  cipher  through  the  inter- 
mediary of  the  Swedish   foreign   office. 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR   269 


The  first  one  under  the  date  of  May 
19,  1917,  states  that  in  the  future  Ger- 
many had  better  adopt  one  of  two  poli- 
cies with  regard  to  Argentine  ships. 
They  must  either  let  them  alone  or  sink 
them  without  leaving  a  trace  of  their 
sinking  (spurlos  versenkt).  In  a  tele- 
gram dated  July  9,  he  reiterated  the 
same  sentiments.  The  publication  of 
these  created  a  profound  impression  on 
the  country.  Mobs  gathered  in  the 
streets  of  the  capital,  German  houses 
were  wrecked  and  burned.  Troops  had 
to  be  called  out  to  quell  the  riots. 
Count  Luxburg  was  handed  his  pass- 
ports and  the  Argentine  Senate  passed 
a  resolution  asking  for  the  breaking  off 
of  relations  with  Germany.  President 
Irigoyen  refused  to  sanction  the  reso- 
lution even  after  it  had  been  passed  by 
both  houses.  He  announced  that  Ar- 
gentina would  maintain  her  neutrality 
as  long  as  Germany  lived  up  to  the 
pledge  given  in  October,  1917,  "to  rec- 
ognize the  Argentine  flag  and  respect 
the  nation  and  people."  The  country 
was  almost  in  a  state  of  civil  war  over 
the  question  of  whether  the  country 
should  go  to  war  or  not.  A  big  strike 
on  the  railroads  helped  to  mix  up  mat- 
ters further  and  to  put  the  state  in  a 
serious  plight. 

Costa  Rica  severed  diplomatic  rela- 
tions with  Germany  on  Sept.  21,  1917. 
On  October  6  the  Peruvian  government 
handed  his  passports  to  the  German 
minister.  On  October  10,  the  govern- 
ment announced  that  the  harbors  of 
Peru  were  opened  to  the  warships  of 
the  Allies.  On  October  8,  Ecuador  an- 
nounced that  the  minister  from  Peru 
who  was  also  minister  to  Ecuador  would 
not  be  received  in  that  country.  In 
December,  1917,  she  broke  off  diplo- 
matic relations  with  Germany  entirely. 
Uruguay  broke  off  relations  with  Ger- 
many on  October  7.     The  President  in 


his  address  to  the  Parliament  stated 
that  Uruguay  had  not  received  any 
harsh  treatment  at  the  hands  of  Ger- 
many but  that  the  country  should  join 
hands  with  those  fighting  for  justice 
and  democracy.  She  seized  almost  50,- 
000  tons  of  German  shipping  in  her 
harbors.  Paraguay  had  also  broken 
off  relations  with  Germany  soon  after 
the  publication  of  the  "barred  sea" 
note. 

In  December,  1917,  the  State  De- 
partment at  Washington  published  sev- 
eral more  telegrams  sent  to  Berlin  by 
way  of  the  Swedish  legation.  The  pur- 
port of  most  of  them  was  to  unify  the 
German  population  of  South  America, 
which  was  very  great,  and  organize 
them  against  the  South  American  re- 
publics. They  spoke  very  sneeringly 
of  the  people  of  South  America,  re- 
ferring to  them  one  time  as  Indians  with 
a  slight  veneer  over  them. 

Central  American  Countries.  The 
addition  of  the  United  States  to  the 
belligerents  profoundly  influenced  other 
neutral  states,  especially  the  South  and 
Central  American  republics.  Some  had 
suffered  from  the  German  submarine 
campaign  and  were  encouraged  to  fol- 
low the  lead  of  the  United  States  in 
breaking  with  Germany.  Others  who 
had  not  suffered  material  damage  were 
influenced  by  the  close  ties  which  bound 
them  to  the  United  States.  Of  the  lat- 
ter group  were  Cuba  and  Panama. 

On  April  7,  1917,  the  day  after  the 
declaration  of  war  by  the  United  States, 
a  war  resolution  passed  both  houses  of 
the  Cuban  Congress  and  signed  by  the 
President.  This  declared  that  a  state 
of  war  existed  between  Cuba  and  Ger- 
many from  that  date  and  the  Presi- 
dent was  authorized  to  use  the  military 
and  naval  forces  in  any  manner  he 
thought  necessary.  Four  German  and 
one  Austrian  vessel  were  seized  in  Cuban 


270 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


waters.  Toward  the  end  of  the  month 
a  mission  was  appointed  to  visit  the 
United  States  and  confer  with  the 
American  government  on  Cuba's  part 
in  the  war.  The  President  authorized 
the  issuance  of  $13,000,000  of  bonds  as 
a  war  loan  beginning  July  1  to  bear  in- 
terest at  not  more  than  six  per  cent. 
On  May  26,  1917,  several  revenue  meas- 
ures were  announced,  including  taxes 
on  sugar  and  the  net  income  of  mining 
and  engineering  companies.  On  August 
3,  1918,  the  Congress  passed  a  law  au- 
thorizing obligatory  military  service 
applying  to  all  male  Cubans  not  espe- 
cially exempted.  The  age  limit  was 
twenty-one  to  twenty-eight  years.  The 
army  was  to  be  composed  of  17,000  men 
and  the  necessary  officers.  A  reserve 
force  was  also  created,  the  number  to 
be  determined  later.  A  custodian  of 
enemy  property  was  created  on  Sep- 
tember 18,  1918.  Foreign  enemies  were 
defined  as  nations  of  an  enemy  coun- 
try ;  nationals  of  a  neutral  power  if 
they  violate  Cuban  laws  with  intent  of 
aiding  country  with  which  Cuba  is  at 
war;  persons,  societies,  etc.,  domiciled 
in  enemy  territory  and  maintaining 
commercial  relations  with  it ;  persons, 
societies,  etc.,  regardless  of  domicile 
whom  the  national  safety  or  war  neces- 
sities require  to  be  included  in  the  list 
of  enemies. 

Panama  also  followed  the  lead  of  the 
United  States  and  declared  war  against 
Germany  April  7,  1917,  the  day  after 
the  American  declaration. 

Toward  the  end  of  May,  1917,  al- 
leged proof  of  conspiracies  between 
German  agents  and  former  President 
Gonzales  were  made  public  in  Costa 
Rica.  Meanwhile  on  April  12  the  Costa 
Rican  government  had  placed  its  waters 
and  ports  at  the  disposal  of  the  United 
States  for  war  purposes.  On  April  26 
it   cancelled   the   letters   patent    of   all 


Germans  in  its  consular  service.  By 
this  time  a  guard  service  had  been  or- 
ganized along  the  coasts  and  boundaries 
as  a  protection  against  German  activi- 
ties. On  May  23,  1918,  it  formally 
declared  war  against  Germany. 

On  April  28,  1917,  martial  law  was 
declared  in  Guatemala  because  of  dis- 
turbances along  the  frontier  supposed 
to  be  of  German  origin.     On  April  18, 

1917,  diplomatic  relations  were  broken 
off    with    Germany    and    on    April   22, 

1918,  war  was  formally  declared 
against  her. 

Haiti  declared  war  against  Germany 
on  July  20,  1918,  because  of  the  tor- 
pedoing of  a  French  steamer  causing 
the  loss  of  eight  Haitians.  Nicaragua 
formally  declared  war  against  Germany 
on  May  7,  1918.  Honduras  declared 
war  against  Germany  on  July  19,  1918. 

China  and  Siam.  On  resumption  of 
unrestricted  submarine  warfare  China 
issued  a  protest  on  February  9,  1917, 
saying  that  diplomatic  relations  would 
be  broken  off  if  the  protest  was  not 
regarded.  On  the  breaking  of  diplo- 
matic relations  between  the  United 
States  and  Germany,  China  began  dis- 
cussing similar  action  and  on  March 
14  handed  the  German  Ambassador  his 
passports.  China  demanded  of  the  En- 
tente Allies  and  the  United  States  the 
suspension  of  the  Boxer  indemnities 
amounting  to  $30,000,000  a  year  and 
would  last  till  1940 ;  consent  of  the 
Powers  to  raise  her  import  duties ; 
their  consent  to  the  posting  of  troops 
at  Tientsin  and  on  the  Tientsin  railway 
and  in  the  neighborhood  of  thelegations. 
The  Allies,  anxious  to  have  China  enter 
the  war,  not  so  much  to  take  part  in 
the  fighting,  but  to  provide  a  reserve 
of  men,  had  already  promised  part  of 
these  concessions.  China  had  already 
supplied  100,000  laborers  and  farm 
hands  to  the  Entente  man-power,   for 


NEUTRAL  NATIONS  AT  BEGINNING  OF  WAR    271 


the  most  part  in  France,  and  the  drown- 
ing of  some  of  them  on  their  way  over 
on  the  Athos  and  other  boats  led  to  the 
first  protest  from  China  against  Ger- 
man methods. 

Difficulties  accompanied  the  breaking 
of  relations  with  Germany.  On  March 
4,  1917,  when  the  cabinet  decided  to 
follow  the  example  of  the  United  States, 
the  president  refused  approval  and  the 
prime  minister  and  several  of  the  other 
ministers  resigned.  Parliament  and  the 
vice-president  supported  the  cabinet. 
The  president  later  yielded  and  the 
prime  minister  returned  to  office.  The 
German  reply  to  the  Chinese  was  con- 
sidered unsatisfactory  and  on  the  same 
day  (March  10)  the  House  voted  to 
break  off  relations.  The  Senate  took  the 
same  action  on  the  following  day.  All 
merchant  ships  in  Shanghai  were  seized 
and  guards  placed  on  them.  Evidence 
of  intent  to  destroy  them  was  found. 

The  question  of  declaring  war  was 
now  debated  and  an  extended  discussion 
in  Parliament  went  on.  A  special  com- 
mission for  international  affairs  was 
appointed  to  report  on  the  subject. 
The  commission  decided  in  favor  of  en- 
try into  the  war.  A  secret  session  of 
Parliament  was  held  on  May  9,  1917, 
and  a  resolution  declaring  war  was  re- 
ferred to  a  standing  committee.  The 
Prime  Minister  urged  its  passage  and  a 
heated  debate  followed.  After  a  stormy 
session  the  House  of  Representatives 
refused  to  pass  the  resolution  on  May 
11  on  the  ground  mainly  that  the  war 
ought  not  be  entered  into  until  the  cabi- 
net was  reorganized.  A  mob  gathered 
around  the  Parliament  building  and 
threatened  violence  and  had  to  be  dis- 
persed by  troops.  On  May  19  the 
House  decided  not  to  consider  any 
war  measures  until  the  resignation  of 
the  prime  minister  and  the  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  cabinet.     A  deadlock  in  the 


House  and  Senate  on  the  war  question 
followed.  There  was  a  strong  demand 
in  and  out  of  Parliament  for  the  resig- 
nation of  the  prime  minister,  who  it 
was  feared,  in  case  of  war,  might  vio- 
late the  constitution  and  place  the 
power  in  the  hands  of  the  Conservative 
Military  Party.  On  the  other  hand  the 
military  governors  objected  to  his  dis- 
missal. 

On  May  29  it  was  announced  that  the 
military  governors  of  several  provinces 
had  declared  their  independence  of  the 
Central  government.  The  president 
was  forced  to  flee  and  the  Manchu 
dynasty  was  declared  reestablished. 
However,  the  government  recovered 
strength  and  the  emperor  was  forced 
to  abdicate  and  the  new  imperial  gov- 
ernment overthrown  July  8-12.  It  was 
claimed  that  the  Germans  were  respon- 
sible for  the  counter-revolution,  but  this 
was  not  established.  What  seems  more 
certain  is  that  the  revolution  was  con- 
nected with  international  affairs,  espe- 
cially with  the  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Japan  and  the  Rus- 
sian revolution.  The  Chinese  declara- 
tion of  war  checked  by  the  constitu- 
tional crisis  and  by  the  attempt  to 
restore  the  monarchy  was  unanimously 
decided  upon  by  the  cabinet  and  ap- 
proved by  the  president  on  August  5, 
1917. 

China  continued  sending  laborers  to 
Europe,  about  two-thirds  going  to 
England  and  one-third  to  France.  By 
the  close  of  August,  1918,  it  was  esti- 
mated that  from  4,000  to  5,000  work- 
ingmen  a  month  were  transported  to 
France  by  way  of  the  Suez  Canal  and 
that  150,000  were  at  work  on  French 
territory,  being  employed  in  munition 
plants,  in  quartermaster's  and  engineer- 
ing branches  of  the  army.  A  bureau  of 
immigration  was  established  to  look 
after  these  workingmen.     Two  special 


272 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


delegates  were  sent  to  England  and 
France  to  watch  over  them  and 
straighten  difficulties  that  might  pos- 
sibly arise  between  them  and  their  em- 
ployers. 

China  took  little  part  in  the  war.  It 
was  thought  that  with  the  suspension 
of  the  Boxer  indemnity  and  the  increase 
in  import  duties  China  would  develop 
industries  and  supply  the  Allies  with 
raw  materials.  Instead  the  Allies  com- 
plained the  resources  were  squandered 
in  civil  war.  The  Chinese  army  was  not 
properly  organized  and  did  not  take 
part  in  the  war.  The  appointment  of 
a  Chinese  ambassador  to  the  Papal  See 
indicated  a  desire  to  embarrass  the 
Allies.  China  did  not  deal  effectively 
with  German  intrigue  and  did  not  prop- 
erly supervise  enemy  property.  The 
Chinese  enemy  trading  act  though 
promulgated  was  not  enforced.  She 
was  informed  that  a  speedy  and  com- 
plete execution  of  the  agreement  was 
necessary  to  her  enjoying  equal  privi- 
leges with  the  Allies  at  the  peace  con- 
ference. 

Siam  declared  war  against  Germany 
and  Austria  on  July  27,  1917,  interning 
the  subjects  of  those  countries  and  seiz- 
ing the  enemy  ships.  For  a  long  time 
past  the  Entente  made  demands  on  her. 
After  the  war  broke  out  numbers  of 
Germans  in  the  Indo-Chinese  posses- 
sions of  France  and  the  Indian  terri- 


tories of  England  sought  refuge  in 
Siam.  They  recruited  bands  among  the 
natives  and  organized  movements 
against  the  Allies  and  the  government 
looked  on  apparently  indifferent. 
France  demanded  that  she  choose  be- 
tween the  Entente  Allies  and  their  ene- 
mies, and  Great  Britain,  which  before 
the  war  had  great  influence,  presented 
an  ultimatum  to  the  Siamese  govern- 
ment. The  break  with  Germany  fol- 
lowed. This  restored  order  to  the 
French  and  British  possessions  in  the 
East. 

Liberia.  The  trade  of  this  country 
was  conducted  almost  wholly  by  Ger- 
man residents  who  controlled  both  im- 
ports and  exports,  but  since  the  war 
began  operations  were  at  first  restricted 
and  later  almost  stopped  by  British 
war  measures  and  Liberia  was  nearing 
starvation,  according  to  official  dis- 
patches received  at  Washington  Febru- 
ary 4,  1917.  Relations  with  Germany 
were  broken  off  on  May  8.  This  was 
important  because  many  cables  had 
their  points  of  landing  in  Liberia  and 
had  been  used  by  German}7  as  a  base 
against  the  British.  War  was  declared 
on  August  4,  1917.  Compulsory  mili- 
tary service  during  the  war  was  set  up 
and  some  hundreds  of  laborers  were 
sent  to  France  for  war  work.  Vigorous 
action  was  taken  against  German 
citizens. 


X.     PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  STATEMENTS  OF  WAR  AIMS 


The  most  important  move  towards 
peace  occurred  in  December,  1916.  On 
the  12th  of  that  month,  Germany,  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, Turkey,  and  Bulgaria 
submitted  practically  identical  notes 
to  the  diplomatic  representatives  of  the 
United  States,  Switzerland,  and  other 
neutral  countries  as  well  as  to  the  Vati- 
can. No  terms  were  mentioned  but  the 
Allies  were  asked  "to  enter  forthwith 
into  peace  negotiations."  The  notes 
were  forwarded  to  the  Allies  without 
comment.  Russia  immediately  refused 
to  open  any  negotiations  whatever. 
Italy  and  France  made  similar  declara- 
tions. Lloyd  George,  the  new  premier 
of  England,  declared  that  little  could  be 
expected  of  the  peace  move  now  and 
that  "the  very  appeal  for  peace  was  de- 
livered ostentatiously  from  the  triumph- 
al chariot  of  Prussian  militarism." 

Rather  unexpectedly  the  United 
States,  on  December  18,  sent  a  note  to 
the  belligerent  nations  asking  them  "the 
precise  objects  which  would,  if  attained, 
satisfy  them  and  their  people  that  the 
war  had  been  fought  out."  Germany 
replied  on  December  26  that  the  only 
thing  she  was  willing  to  consider  was  a 
meeting  of  representatives  of  the  bel- 
ligerent nations  while  the  war  was  con- 
tinued. 

The  Allied  reply  was  received  on 
January  12,  1917.  It  was  a  compila- 
tion of  the  views  of  all  the  Entente 
Powers  and  demanded  (1)  restoration 
of  Belgium,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro 
with  indemnities;  (2)  evacuation  of  in- 
vaded territories  of  France,  Russia,  and 
Rumania  with  reparation;  (3)  reor- 
ganization of  Europe  under  guarantees 


to  insure  to  all  nations  respect  and  lib- 
erty of  development;  (4)  restitution  of 
territories  wrested  in  the  past  from  the 
Allies  by  force  or  against  the  people's 
will;  (5)  liberation  of  Slavs,  Ruman- 
ians, Italians,  and  Czecho-Slovaks  from 
foreign  domination;  (6)  enfranchise- 
ment of  population  subject  to  Turkey; 
(7)  expulsion  from  Europe  of  the  Ot- 
toman Empire.  This  note  effectively 
stopped  for  the  time  being  all  attempts 
to  bring  about  peace,  inasmuch  as  the 
world  realized  that  the  demands  of  the 
Allies  could  be  gained  only  on  the  bat- 
tlefield and  not  in  a  conference. 

Pope  Benedict's  Peace  Appeal. — In 
August,  1917,  Pope  Benedict  *  sent  an 
identical  note  to  all  the  belligerent  pow- 
ers on  the  subject  of  peace.  The  note 
as  translated  by  the  State  Department 
at  Washington  was  published  in  the 
American  newspapers  on  August  16. 
The  first  paragraphs  stated  that  the 
Pontificate  has  made  every  effort  to  re- 
main absolutely  impartial  and  thus 
espouse  the  cause  of  no  one  group  of 
belligerents.  It  relates  the  unsuccessful 
attempts  to  mediate  at  the  end  of  the 
first  year  of  the  war  and  then  states  the 
"base  of  a  just  and  lasting  peace."  .  .  . 
First,  the   fundamental  point  must  be 

*  Benedict  XV  (Giacomo  deixa  Chiesa). 
260th  Pope,  elected  September  3,  1914.  Born 
(1854)  in  Pagli,  diocese  of  Genoa.  Took  de- 
gree in  jurisprudence  at  University  of  Genoa. 
Ordained  a  priest  in  18T8.  In  1883  appointed 
secretary  to  the  Nunciature  at  Madrid.  On  re- 
turn to  Rome  made  permanent  Under  Secre- 
tary of  the  Secretariat  of  State.  Made  pre- 
late (1900),  consultor  of  Holy  Office  (1901), 
Archbishop  of  Bologna  (1907),  and  Cardinal 
(May,  1914).  Known  as  man  of  diplomacy, 
cool  and  level-headed.  Keen  reverence  for  all 
traditions  of  the  Vatican  and  foe  of  Modern- 
ism in  Church. 


273 


274 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


that  the  material  force  of  arms  shall 
give  way  to  the  moral  force  of  right, 
whence  shall  proceed  a  just  agreement 
of  all  upon  the  simultaneous  and  recip- 
rocal decrease  of  armaments,  accord- 
ing to  rules  and  guarantees  to  be  estab- 
lished, in  the  necessary  and  suffi- 
cient measure  for  the  maintenance  of 
public  order  in  every  State ;  then  tak- 
ing the  place  of  arms,  the  institution  of 
arbitration,  with  its  high  pacifying 
function,  according  to  rule  to  be  drawn 
in  concert  and  under  sanctions  to  be  de- 
termined against  any  State  which  would 
decline  either  to  refer  international 
questions  to  arbitration  or  to  accept  its 
awards." 

The  Pope  then  takes  up  the  question 
of  the  war,  and  suggests  absolute  free- 
dom of  the  seas.  He  also  asks  for  mu- 
tual restitution  of  all  territory  that  has 
changed  hands  during  the  war.  "As  re- 
gards territorial  questions,  as,  for  in- 
stance, those  that  are  disputed  by  Italy 
and  Austria,  by  Germany  and  France, 
there  is  reason  to  hope  that,  in  con- 
sideration of  the  immense  advantages  of 
durable  peace  with  disarmament,  the 
contending  parties  will  examine  them  in 
a  conciliatory  spirit,  taking  into  ac- 
count, as  far  as  is  just  and  possible, 
as  we  have  said  formerly,  the  aspira- 
tions of  the  population,  and,  if  occasion 
arises,  adjusting  private  opinions  to  the 
general  good  of  the  great  human  so- 
ciety." He  suggested  that  the  ques- 
tions of  the  Balkan  States,  Poland,  and 
Armenia  might  be  settled  on  the  same 
principles. 

The  press  in  Entente  countries  se- 
verely criticized  the  Pope's  appeal  on 
the  grounds  that  it  made  no  condemna- 
tion of  Germany's  atrocities,  the  inva- 
sion of  Belgium  and  the  submarine  war- 
fare. The  Pope  replied  to  this  by  stat- 
ing that  he  was  acting  as  a  peacemaker 
and  not  as  a  judge  and  that  if  he  at- 


tempted to  decide  which  set  of  bel- 
ligerents was  right  his  peace  attempt 
was  certain  to  be  a  failure. 

On  August  n,  1917,  President  Wil- 
son replied  to  the  Pope's  note  through 
Secretary  of  State  Lansing.  It  stated 
that,  "Our  response  must  be  based  upon 
the  stern  facts  and  upon  nothing  else." 
After  reviewing  the  methods  suggested 
in  the  Pope's  note,  the  President's  re- 
ply states :  "It  is  manifest  that  no  part 
of  this  programme  can  be  successfully 
carried  out  unless  the  restitution  of  the 
status  quo  ante  furnishes  a  firm  and 
satisfactory  basis  for  it.  The  object 
of  this  war  is  to  deliver  the  free  peo- 
ples of  the  world  from  the  menace  and 
the  actual  power  of  a  vast  military  es- 
tablishment controlled  by  an  irrespon- 
sible government  which,  having  secretly 
planned  to  dominate  the  world,  proceed- 
ed to  carry  out  the  plan  without  re- 
gard either  to  the  sacred  obligations  of 
treaty  or  the  long-established  practices 
and  long-cherished  principles  of  inter- 
national action  and  honor ;  which  choso 
its  own  time  for  the  war ;  delivered  its 
blow  fiercely  and  suddenly ;  stopped  at 
no  barrier  either  of  law  or  of  mercy ; 
swept  a  whole  continent  within  the  tide 
of  blood — not  the  blood  of  soldiers  only, 
but  the  blood  of  innocent  women  and 
children  also  and  of  the  helpless  poor; 
and  now  stands  balked  but  not  defeated, 
the  enemy  of  four-fifths  of  the  world. 
This  power  is  not  the  German  people. 
It  is  the  ruthless  master  of  the  German 
people.  .  .  .  They  (the  American  peo- 
ple) believe  that  peace  should  rest  upon 
the  rights  of  peoples,  not  the  rights 
of  governments — the  rights  of  peoples 
great  and  small,  weak  or  powerful — 
their  equal  right  to  freedom  and  secur- 
ity and  self-government  and  to  a  par- 
ticipation upon  fair  terms  in  the  eco- 
nomic opportunities  of  the  world,  the 
German    people    of    course    included   if 


PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  WAR  AIMS 


275 


they  will  accept  equality  and  not  seek 
domination.  .  .  .  We  cannot  take  the 
word  of  the  present  rulers  of  Germany 
as  a  guarantee  of  anything  that  is  to 
endure,  unless  explicitly  supported  by 
such  conclusive  evidence  of  the  will  and 
purpose  of  the  German  people  them- 
selves as  the  other  peoples  of  the  world 
would  be  justified  in  accepting.  With- 
out such  guarantees  treaties  of  settle- 
ment, agreements  for  disarmament, 
covenants  to  set  up  arbitration  in  the 
place  of  force,  territorial  adjustments, 
reconstitutions  of  small  nations,  if 
made  with  the  German  government,  no 
man,  no  nation  can  now  depend  on." 

President  Wilson's  reply  to  Pope 
Benedict  received  the  hearty  approval 
of  the  press  of  the  United  States.  Even 
the  German  papers  printed  in  that 
country  seemed  to  favor  the  note.  The 
Allies  of  the  United  States,  through 
their  statesmen  and  press,  endorsed  the 
stand  taken  and  the  more  enthusiastic 
of  them  hailed  Mr.  Wilson  as  the 
spokesman  of  the  Entente.  In  Germany 
the  government  and  pan-German  or- 
gans bitterly  attacked  the  President's 
note,  claiming  that  it  was  nonsense  to 
say  that  the  German  people  were  op- 
pressed by  an  irresponsible  government. 
They  cited  the  fact  that  the  entire  Ger- 
man people  had  time  and  time  again  re- 
peated that  they  stand  firmly  behind  the 
government.  The  Socialist  newspaper, 
Vorwarts,  stated  editorially,  "The  gov- 
ernment of  a  country  at  war  with  us  has 
a  perfect  right  to  demand  that  for  the 
conditions  under  which  peace  is  to  be 
concluded  the  people  themselves  shall  be 
the  guarantee."  Semi-official  organs  in 
France,  Great  Britain,  Italy,  and  Rus- 
sia announced  to  the  world  that  the  re- 
ply of  President  Wilson  represented 
their  own  attitude  toward  the  peace 
proposal. 

The  official  replies  of  the  German  and 


Austro-Hungarian  Empires  were  made 
public  on  September  22,  1917.  The 
main  theme  of  both  notes  was  identical. 
It  was  that  both  empires  agreed  with 
the  Pope's  desire  to  have  the  right  of 
might  give  way  to  moral  force.  Both 
stated  that  arbitration  with  efficient 
guarantees  should  follow  an  immediate 
disarmament  by  all  the  nations  of  the 
world.  Freedom  of  the  seas  and  the 
right  of  independent  economic  progress 
was  inalienable  to  all  nations.  The 
press  of  the  Entente  countries  passion- 
ately attacked  the  replies,  not  so  much 
because  of  what  was  contained  therein, 
but  because  of  what  was  not  said.  Noth- 
ing was  said  of  the  evacuation,  restitu- 
tion, and  indemnification  of  Belgium, 
nothing  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  nothing  of 
Poland,  Armenia,  Trentino,  etc.  Sub- 
sequent statements  by  German  diplo- 
mats refused  absolutely  to  debate  the 
question  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 

British  Statement  of  War  Aims. — 
At  the  beginning  of  1918  a  compre- 
hensive statement  of  British  Labor  war 
aims,  passed  by  official  representatives 
of  the  trade  unions  and  the  Labor  par- 
ty, was  made  public.  Its  effect  upon 
the  governments  of  Great  Britain  and 
the  other  Allies  was  immediately  per- 
ceptible and  it  continued  to  influence 
them  in  the  formulation  of  war  pur- 
poses throughout  the  year.  It  declared 
that  "whatever  may  have  been  the  ob- 
jects for  which  the  war  was  begun,  the 
fundamental  purpose  of  the  British  la- 
bor movement  is  that  the  world  may 
(henceforth  be  made  safe  for  democ- 
racy." It  opposed  any  attempt  to  turn 
the  war  into  a  war  of  conquest  and  de- 
clared that  it  should  not  be  prolonged 
for  a  single  day  after  the  conditions  for 
permanent  peace  could  be  obtained,  but 
it  held  that  certain  reparations  and  res- 
titutions were  necessary.  These  should 
be  based  on  the  principle  of  self-deter- 


276 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


mination  of  all  the  peoples   concerned 
and  should  seek  to  remove  the  causes  of 
future  conflict.     They  included:     Ger- 
man restoration  of  Belgium  to  complete 
independence,    and    reparation,    under 
the  direction  of  an  international  com- 
mission, of  the  wrong  done;  the  right 
of  the  people  of  Alsace-Lorraine  under 
the  protection  of  a   supernational  au- 
thority, or  League  of  Nations,  to  decide 
their  own  future  political   status ;  the 
support  of  the  claim  of  the  people  of 
Italian  blood  for  union  with  their  kins- 
folk, but  the   condemnation  of  Italian 
aims    of   conquest   or  imperialism;   the 
settlement    of    other    cases    in   dispute, 
such  as  those  of  Luxemburg,  the  Poles, 
and   others,   on   the   principle    of    self- 
determination     by     the     peoples;     the 
granting  to  the  Jews  of  all  lands  the 
same    rights    of    tolerance,    freedom   of 
residence,    and    equal    citizenship    that 
ought  to  be  accorded  to  all  the  inhabi- 
tants of  every  nation.     It  recommended 
that  Palestine  be   freed  from  Turkish 
domination  and  set  up  as  an  indepen- 
dent state,  under  international  guaran- 
tee, to  which  Jews  might  return  if  they 
desired ;  the  neutralization  of  Constan- 
tinople and  the  placing  of  it  along  with 
a  part  or  possibly  all  of  Asia  Minor 
under  an  impartial  administration ;  and 
the  reorganization  of  the  Balkans  by  a 
special  commission  or  an  international 
conference    on   the   principles    of:    (1) 
Self-determination  by  the  peoples  with- 
out regard  to  Austria,  Turkish,  or  oth- 
er alien  control;  (2)   independent  sov- 
ereignty of  the  predominant  nationali- 
ties;    (3)    universal   adoption    of    reli- 
gious freedom,  and  equal  citizenship  of 
all  races,  and  of  local  self-government ; 
(4)  a  customs  union  of  all  the  Balkan 
states;  (5)  a  federation  of  all  national 
Balkan  states  for  the  joint  voluntary 
arrangement    of    matters    of    common 
concern.      It    urged    the    abandonment 


by  all  the  belligerents  of  all  dreams  of 
African     Empire,     and     the     transfer 
of    the    present    colonies    to    a    super- 
national   authority   or  League   of   Na- 
tions.     As   to   plans   for    an   economic 
war  after  peace  was  secured,  the  Labor 
movement     declared    squarely     against 
them.      It  favored  government  control 
of  indispensable   commodities  for  some 
time  after  the  war  in  order  to  meet  the 
needs  of  the  whole  community ;  and  it 
held  that  homes,  factories,  and  farms 
destroyed  by  the  war  should  be  restored 
immediately  upon  the  return  of  peace. 
It  demanded  a  complete  judicial  inves- 
tigation of  the  charges  that  particular 
governments  had  ordered  and  particu- 
lar   officers     had    committed    acts     of 
cruelty,  violence,   theft,   and   other  of- 
fenses unjustified  in  the  common  usage 
of    war ;    and   it    recommended   that    a 
court  of  claims  arid  accusations  should 
be   set  up  in  the  interest  of  the  non- 
combatant  victims  of  such  inhumanity 
and     ruthlessness.     The     memorandum 
declared   emphatically   against   imperi- 
alism in  all  countries ;  and  favored  the 
complete  democratization  of  all  govern- 
ments, the  universal  abolition  of  com- 
pulsory military  service,  and  the  crea- 
tion of  a   supernational   authority,  or 
League  of  Nations,  endowed  with  law- 
making authority  and  with  power  to  en- 
force its  decrees. 

In  response  to  the  continued  demands 
that  the  Allies'  war  aims  be  distinctly 
declared,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  made  a 
statement  in  regard  to  them  in  an  ad- 
dress to  the  delegates  of  the  trade 
unions  on  January  5.  He  said  that  the 
war  aims  of  the  Allies  had  been  dis- 
cussed by  him,  the  leaders  of  the  La- 
bor party,  with  Mr.  Asquith,  Viscount 
Grey,  and  representatives  of  the  Do- 
minions. He  declared  in  the  first  place, 
that  the  Allies  were  not  fighting  against 
the  German  people,  and  were  not  seek- 


PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  WAR  AIMS 


277 


ing  and  had  never  sought  to  destroy 
or  disrupt  the  German  people  or  Ger- 
many, or  to  destroy  Austria-Hungary, 
or  to  seize  Constantinople,  or  to  de- 
prive Turkey  of  those  lands  which  are 
occupied  by  people  mainly  of  Turkish 
race.  He  then  outlined  the  purposes 
for  which  the  Allies  were  fighting.  They 
may  be  summarized  as  follows  : 

1. — Europe.  Complete  restoration, 
political,  territorial,  and  economic,  of 
the  independence  of  Belgium  and  such 
reparation  as  can  be  made  for  the  de- 
vastation of  its  towns  and  provinces. 

Restoration  of  Serbia,  Montenegro, 
and  the  occupied  parts  of  France,  Italy, 
and  Rumania. 

Complete  withdrawal  of  the  alien 
armies  and  reparation  for  the  injuries 
inflicted. 

Support  of  the  French  democracy  in 
their  demand  for  a  reconsideration  of 
the  great  wrong  of  1871,  when,  with- 
out regard  to  the  wishes  of  the  popu- 
lation, two  French  provinces  were  torn 
from  the  side  of  France  and  incorpo- 
rated in  the  German  Empire. 

An  independent  Poland,  comprising 
all  those  genuinely  Polish  elements  who 
desire  to  form  part  of  it,  an  urgent  ne- 
cessity for  the  stability  of  western 
Europe. 

Genuine  self-government  on  true 
democratic  principles  to  those  Austro- 
Hungarian  nationalities  who  have  long 
desired  it. 

Satisfaction  of  the  legitimate  claims 
of  the  Italians  for  union  with  those  of 
their  own  race  and  tongue. 

Justice  to  men  of  Rumanian  blood 
and  speech  in  their  legitimate  aspira- 
tions. 

II. — Asia,  and  Africa.  Constanti- 
nople to  remain  Turkish  capital. 

Passage  between  the  Mediterranean 
and  the  Black  Sea  to  be  international- 
ized. 


Arabia,  Armenia,  Mesopotamia, 
Syria,  and  Palestine  entitled  to  recog- 
nition of  their  separate  national  con- 
ditions. 

German  colonies  held  at  the  disposal 
of  a  conference  whose  decision  must 
have  primary  regard  to  the  wishes  and 
interests  of  the  native  inhabitants  of 
such  colonies. 

III. — In  General.  Reparation  for 
injuries  done  in  violation  of  internation- 
al law,  especially  as  regards  British 
seamen. 

The  establishment  of  some  interna- 
tional organization  of  an  alternative 
to  war  as  a  means  of  settling  interna- 
tional disputes. 

Sanctity  of  treaties  to  be  reestab- 
lished. 

A  territorial  settlement  to  be  secured 
based  on  the  right  of  self-determination 
or  the  consent  of  the  governed. 

The  creation  of  some  international 
organization  to  limit  the  burden  of  ar- 
maments and  diminish  the  probability 
of  war. 

President  Wilson's" Fourteen  Points" 
Message. — Soon  after  Lloyd  George 
had  made  this  brief  and  general  state- 
ment of  war  aims,  President  Wilson 
sent  to  Congress  (January  8)  an  im- 
portant message  which  set  forth  his 
peace  programme  in  considerable  de- 
tail, summing  up  the  essentials  of  a  final 
settlement  in  fourteen  points,  which  be- 
came the  subject  of  extensive  discussion 
in  the  closing  months  of  the  year.  The 
fourteen  points  he  stated  as  follows : 

I.  Open  covenants  of  peace,  openly  arrived 
at;  after  which  there  shall  be  no  private  in- 
ternational understandings  of  any  kind,  but 
diplomacy  shall  proceed  always  frankly  and 
in  the  public  view. 

II.  Absolute  freedom  of  navigation  upon 
the  seas,  outside  territorial  waters,  alike  in 
peace  and  in  war,  except  as  the  seas  may  be 
closed  in  whole  or  in  part  by  international 
action  for  the  enforcement  of  international 
covenants. 


278 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


III.  The  removal,  so  far  as  possible,  of  all 
economic  barriers  and  the  establishment  of 
an  equality  of  trade  conditions  among  all  the 
nations  consenting  to  the  peace  and  associating 
themselves    for  its   maintenance. 

IV.  Adequate  guarantees  given  and  taken 
that  national  armaments  will  be  reduced  to  the 
lowest  point  consistent  with  domestic  safety. 

V.  A  free,  open-minded,  and  absolutely  im- 
partial adjustment  of  all  colonial  claims,  based 
upon  a  strict  observance  of  the  principle  that 
in  determining  all  such  questions  of  sover- 
eignty the  interests  of  the  populations  con- 
cerned must  have  equal  weight  with  the  equi- 
table claims  of  the  Government  whose  title 
is   to  be   determined. 

VI.  The  evacuation  of  all  Russian  territory, 
and  such  a  settlement  of  all  questions  affecting 
Russia  as  will  secure  the  best  and  freest  co- 
operation of  the  other  nations  of  the  world 
in  obtaining  for  her  an  unhampered  and  un- 
embarrassed opportunity  for  the  independent 
determination  of»her  own  political  development 
and  national  policy,  and  assure  her  of  a  sin- 
cere welcome  into  the  society  of  free  nations 
under  institutions  of  her  own  choosing;  and, 
more  than  a  welcome,  assistance  also  of  every 
kind  that  she  may  need  and  may  herself  de- 
sire. The  treatment  accorded  Russia  by  her 
sister  nations  in  the  months  to  come  will  be 
the  acid  test  of  their  good  will,  of  their  com- 
prehension of  her  needs  as  distinguished  from 
their  own  interests,  and  of  their  intelligent 
and  unselfish  sympathy. 

VII.  Belgium,  the  whole  world  will  agree, 
must  be  evacuated  and  restored  without  any 
attempt  to  limit  the  sovereignty  which  she  en- 
joys in  common  with  all  other  free  nations. 
No  other  single  act  will  serve  as  this  will  serve 
to  restore  confidence  among  the  nations  in 
the  laws  which  they  have  themselves  set  and 
determined  for  the  government  of  their  rela- 
tions with  one  another.  Without  this  healing 
act  the  whole  structure  and  validity  of  inter- 
national   law    is    forever    impaired. 

VIII.  All  French  territory  should  be  freed 
and  the  invaded  portions  restored;  and  the 
wrong  done  to  France  by  Prussia  in  1871  in  the 
matter  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  which  has  unset- 
tled the  peace  of  the  world  for  nearly  fifty 
years,  should  be  righted,  in  order  that  peace 
may  once  more  be  made  secure  in  the  inter- 
est  of   all. 

IX.  A  readjustment  of  the  frontiers  of 
Italy  should  be  effected  along  clearly  recog- 
nizable lines  of  nationality. 

X.  The  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary,  whose 
place  among  the  nations  we  wish  to  see  safe- 
guarded and  assured,  should  be  accorded  the 
freest  opportunity  of  autonomous  development. 

XI.  Roumania,  Serbia  and  Montenegro 
should    be    evacuated;    occupied    territories    re- 


stored; Serbia  accorded  free  and  secure  access 
to  the  sea,  and  the  relations  of  the  several 
Balkan  states  to  one  another  determined  by 
friendly  counsel  along  historically  established 
lines  of  allegiance  and  nationality;  and  inter- 
national guarantees  of  the  political  and  eco- 
nomic independence  and  territorial  integrity 
of  the  several  Balkan  states  should  be  entered 
into. 

XII.  The  Turkish  portions  of  the  present 
Ottoman  Empire  should  be  assured  a  secure 
sovereignty,  but  the  other  nationalities  which 
are  now  under  Turkish  rule  should  be  assured 
an  undoubted  security  of  life  and  an  absolute- 
ly unmolested  opportunity  of  autonomous  de- 
velopment, and  the  Dardanelles  should  be  per- 
manently opened  as  a  free  passage  to  the 
ships  and  commerce  of  all  nations  under  in- 
ternational   guarantees. 

XIII.  An  independent  Polish  state  should 
be  erected  which  should  include  the  territories 
inhabited  by  indisputably  Polish  populations, 
which  should  be  assured  a  free  and  secure  ac- 
cess to  the  sea,  and  whose  political  and  eco- 
nomic independence  and  territorial  integrity 
shoidd  be  guaranteed  by  international  cove- 
nant. 

XIV.  A  general  association  of  nations  must 
be  formed,  under  specific  covenants,  for  the 
purpose  of  affording  mutual  guarantees  of  po- 
litical independence  and  territorial  integrity 
to  great  and  small  states  alike. 

The  President's  statement  was  sup- 
ported by  Congress  and  the  American 
press  with  surprising  unanimity.  Hard- 
ly any  criticism  of  it  appeared  at  the 
time.  In  Great  Britain  it  was  received 
with  enthusiasm,  as  definitely  stamping 
the  Allied  war  aims  with  American  ap- 
proval. It  was  declared  to  present  es- 
sentially the  same  conditions  as  those 
laid  down  by  Lloyd  George.  British 
labor  organizations  promptly  en- 
dorsed and  declared  their  unqualified 
support  of  a  continuance  of  the  war 
for  these  purposes.  In  the  French  press 
it  was  accepted  by  leading  journals  as 
an  expression  of  French  aims.  Lloyd 
George  answered  in  an  Anglo-French 
declaration  published  a  day  or  two  later 
accepting  its  principles.  Italy  appar- 
ently supported  it,  though  there  were 
some  suggestions  that  Italian  aspira- 
tions in  the  Adriatic  were  not  sufficient- 


PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  WAR  AIMS 


279 


ly  emphasized.  In  Russia  the  official 
Bolshevik  organ  denounced  the  Presi- 
dent as  the  representative  of  capitalism 
and  threw  suspicion  on  his  words  of 
good-will  toward  Russia. 

The  Central  Powers  on  War  Aims. — • 
On  January  25,  1918,  Count  von  Her- 
tling,  imperial  chancellor  of  Germany, 
and  Count  Czernin,  Austro-Hungarian 
foreign  minister,  made  their  answers  to 
the  statements  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and 
President  Wilson.  The  principal  points 
in  Count  von  Hertling's  reply  were  as 
follows :  The  Central  Powers  had  been 
the  first  to  favor  extensive  publicity  of 
diplomatic  agreements.  The  defensive 
alliance  between  Germany  and  Austria 
had  been  public  ever  since  1889,  where- 
as the  offensive  agreements  of  the  Al- 
lies were  disclosed  only  through  the 
present  war  and  chiefly  by  Russia's 
publication  of  her  secret  documents. 
The  Central  Powers  had  again  shown 
their  adherence  to  the  principle  by  the 
complete  publicity  which  had  been  given 
to  the  peace  negotiations  of  Brest- 
Litovsk.  Mr.  Wilson's  principle  of  ab- 
solute freedom  of  navigation  in  peace 
and  war  was  accepted  by  Germany, 
who,  however,  dissented  from  his  quali- 
fication that  this  rule  would  not  apply 
when  the  seas  should  be  closed  by  in- 
ternational action.  Germany  also  fully 
concurred  in  the  demand  that  there 
should  be  no  economic  war.  As  to  the 
reducing  of  armaments,  the  German 
government  considered  it  entirely  suit- 
able to  discussion.  In  regard  to  the 
impartial  adjustment  of  colonial  claims 
in  which  the  interests  of  the  peoples  con- 
cerned should  have  due  weight,  Ger- 
many believed  there  would  be  some  dif- 
ficulty in  applying  this  principle,  but 
that  for  the  present  Great  Britain 
should  come  to  an  understanding  with 
her  ally  as  to  the  nature  of  the  pro- 
posal.      Germany    demanded    uncondi- 


tionally the  reconstruction   of  the   co- 
lonial possessions  of  the  world.     To  the 
demand  that  all  the  Russian  territory 
be  evacuated,  and  that  Russia  have  full 
opportunity  for  self-development,  he  re- 
plied that  since  the  Allies  had  not  ac- 
cepted  the   proposal   to    take   part   in 
the  Brest-Litovsk  conference,  the  ques- 
tion concerned  only  Russia  and  the  Cen- 
tral Powers.     He  declared  in  regard  to 
Belgium  that  annexation  was  not  part 
of  the  German  plan  but  declined  to  dis- 
cuss the  Belgian  question  so  long  as  the 
Allies   refused   to   admit   that   the   only 
possible    basis    for    peace    negotiation 
was  the  integrity  of  the  territory  of  the 
Central  Powers.     In  regard  to  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  he  said  that  forcible  annexa- 
tion was  no  part  of  the  plan  of  Ger- 
many, but  that  Germany  and   France 
must  settle  the  question  between  them- 
selves  and  that  Germany  would  never 
consent   to   being  robbed  of  the  prov- 
inces.    The  invaded  portions  of  France 
were  a  "valuable  pawn"  in  the  hands  of 
Germany.      The    demand    of   President 
Wilson   that  the  non-Turkish   popula- 
tion in  the  Turkish  Empire  should  be 
assured  of  self-government  and  that  the 
Dardanelles     should     be     permanently 
opened,    he    dismissed    by    saying    that 
that  point  must  be  left  to  the  Turkish 
statesmen.     To  the  demand  for  an  in- 
dependent Poland  he  replied  that  it  was 
the   Central   Powers   that  had    rescued 
Poland  from  Russia's  despotism,  that 
therefore  it  was  the  business  of  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  to  settle  the  future  of  Po- 
land,  and  that  this   task   had  already 
well  advanced.      Finally,  in   regard   to 
the   League   of   Nations,   he   said   that 
after  all  other  questions  had  been  set- 
tled the  imperial  government  would  be 
glad  to  investigate  the  principle  of  such 
an  organization. 

Count  Czernin's   reply  went  further 
than  von  Hertling's  toward  meeting  the 


280 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


American  demands  and  the  inconsist- 
ency between  the  two  gave  rise  to  much 
comment  in  the  press,  especially  as  the 
German  foreign  minister  had  declared 
that  he  completely  agreed  with  the 
views  of  his  Austro-Hungarian  col- 
league. The  main  points  in  Count 
Czernin's  reply  were  as  follows :  He 
had  no  objection  to  make  to  the  plan  for 
open  diplomacy,  although  he  did  not  see 
how  it  could  be  executed.  He  was  en- 
tirely in  accord  with  the  President  on 
the  principle  of  absolute  freedom  of 
navigation.  He  approved  as  just  and 
reasonable  the  removal  of  economic  bar- 
riers. He  approved  heartily  the  Presi- 
dent's words  in  regard  to  reduction  of 
armaments.  As  to  Russian  territory, 
Austria  did  not  desire  for  herself  any 
of  the  Russian  land  and  said  that  be- 
tween the  diverging  views  of  the  Rus- 
sian and  German  delegates  in  regard  to 
the  western  provinces  and  Poland  a  mid- 
dle solution  must  be  found.  He  made 
no  specific  reference  to  Belgium  fur- 
ther than  to  say  that  Austria  would  de- 
fend the  possessions  of  her  ally  as  she 
would  her  own.  He  declared  that  Italy 
had  neglected  her  opportunity  to  ex- 
pand before  the  war  without  any  sac- 
rifice of  life  and  that  she  had  gone  into 
the  war  simply  with  a  view  to  her  own 
advantage.  He  refused  to  discuss  the 
demand  that  the  peoples  of  Austria- 
Hungary  should  have  an  opportunity 
for  self-development,  saying  that  he 
could  not  accept  advice  as  to  the  con- 
duct of  the  internal  administration  of 
Austria-Hungary.  In  regard  to  read- 
justment in  the  Balkans  on  lines  of 
nationality,  he  said  that  he  refused  to 
make  a  one-sided  concession  to  the  en- 
emy. He  dismissed  the  question  of 
Turkey's  status  with  the  same  general 
remark  that  he  had  applied  to  Belgium, 
namely,  that  Austria  would  defend  the 
possessions  of  her  war  ally.     He  agreed 


to  the  proposal  for  a  Polish  indepen- 
dent state,  saying  that  Austria-Hun- 
gary also  desired  it,  and  wished  Poland 
to  have  a  free  decision.  Finally  he 
said  that  the  idea  of  a  League  of  Na- 
tions would  probably  meet  with  no  op- 
position in  Austria. 

President  Wilson's  Reply  to  the  Cen- 
tral Poxmers. — In  an  address  to  Con- 
gress, February  11,  1918,  President 
Wilson  after  traversing  the  arguments 
of  Count  von  Hertling  and  Count  Czer- 
nin,  set  forth  four  principles  upon  the 
acceptance  of  which  a  discussion  of  the 
terms  of  peace  would  be  possible.  These 
were,  in  brief:  (1)  Each  part  of  the 
final  settlement  to  be  based  on  the  es- 
sential justice  of  that  particular  case. 
(2)  Peoples  and  provinces  not  to  be 
bartered  from  one  sovereignty  to  an- 
other as  if  they  were  chattels.  (3) 
Every  territorial  settlement  to  be  made 
in  the  interest  of  the  populations  con- 
cerned. (4)  National  aspirations  to  be 
satisfied  to  the  utmost  without  intro- 
duction or  perpetuating  elements  of  dis- 
cord. 

The  Sixtus  Letter. — As  noted  above, 
Count  Czernin  informed  the  city  coun- 
cil of  Vienna  that  he  agreed  to  the  four 
principles  laid  down  by  Mr.  Wilson  in 
his  address  of  February  11,  and  that 
only  Alsace-Lorraine  stood  in  the  way 
of  peace  with  France  and  thereupon 
Premier  Clemenceau  replied  that  such 
discussion  as  had  taken  place  had  been 
only  at  Austria's  instance.  M.  Cle- 
menceau published  later  the  celebrated 
"Sixtus  Letter,"  dated  March  31,  1917. 
This  had  been  sent  and  received  on  the 
condition  that  it  should  be  regarded  as 
confidential.  It  was  addressed  by  the 
Emperor  Charles  to  Prince  Sixtus  of 
Bourbon,  whom  it  requested  to  commu- 
nicate to  specified  French  officials  the 
Austrian  emperor's  desire  for  peace  and 
his    readiness    to    use    his    influence    to 


PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  WAR  AIMS 


281 


bring  it  about,  and  to  assure  the  grant- 
ing of  the  just  claims  of  France  in  re- 
gard to  Alsace-Lorraine  and  the  resto- 
ration of  Belgium  and  Serbia.  It  ap- 
pears to  have  been  discussed  by  Presi- 
dent Poincare  and  Premier  Clcmenceau 
together  with  a  committee  of  French 
deputies  and  also  by  King  George  and 
the  British  premier,  Lloyd  George,  but 
to  have  been  dismissed  as  insincere. 
These  points  were  brought  out  in  the 
British  parliament  on  May  16  in  a  re- 
ply of  the  British  foreign  minister,  Mr. 
A.  J.  Balfour,  to  the  questions  raised 
by  certain  members  of  parliament  who 
were  identified  with  the  policy  of  peace 
by  negotiations.  In  the  course  of  the 
discussion  at  that  time,  Mr.  Balfour 
said  that  the  government  was  ready  to 
listen  to  peace  proposals  if  they  were 
brought  forward  by  representatives  of  a 
country  with  which  England  was  at 
war. 

German  War  Aims. — To  the  message 
of  President  Wilson  on  February  11  set- 
ting forth  the  four  points  upon  which 
the  negotiations  might  be  based,  the 
German  chancellor,  von  Hertling,  had 
replied  that  the  four  points  were  ac- 
ceptable but  must  be  agreed  to  squarely 
by  all  the  belligerents.  The  inde- 
pendence of  Belgium  was  conceded,  but 
under  limitations  to  safeguard  the  in- 
terests of  Germany.  He  said  that  the 
subject  of  Alsace-Lorraine  was  not  de- 
batable and  he  declared  that  the  only 
obstacle  to  peace  was  British  imperial- 
ism. The  attitude  of  the  German  gov- 
ernment was  further  illustrated  by  the 
address  of  the  chancellor  in  the  German 
parliament  toward  the  end  of  June.  He 
said  that  the  proposal  of  the  Society 
of  Nations  after  the  war  would  be  in- 
jurious to  Germany.  He  said  that  he 
had  favored  the  four  principles  dis- 
cussed by  President  Wilson,  but  that 
from  the  views  of  the  Allies  as  expressed 


since  then,  it  was  manifest  that  a  peace 
based  upon  a  league  of  nations  would 
not  be  one  that  Germany  could  accept, 
for  Germany's  enemies  would  dominate 
it  and  isolate  her.  By  their  commer- 
cial rivalry  and  economic  pressure  they 
would  stifle  the  economic  life  of  Ger- 
many. On  June  24  the  Foreign  Min- 
ister von  Kiihlmann  in  the  course  of  an 
address  on  Germany's  war  aims  said  in 
effect  that  the  war  could  not  be  won  by 
arms  alone  and  that  peace  could  only 
be  had  by  negotiations.  This  aroused 
a  storm  of  protest  from  the  Pan-Ger- 
mans and  Germans  and  was  criticized 
from  other  points  of  view.  By  a  part 
of  the  Allied  press  it  was  regarded  as 
an  attempt  to  make  the  enemies  of  Ger- 
many believe  that  favorable  terms  could 
be  had  at  that  time,  whereas  later  Ger- 
many might  not  be  willing  to  accord 
them.  Von  Kiihlmann  afterwards  ex- 
plained his  words  as  meaning  that  while 
Germany  intended  to  persevere  until  she 
was  successful  in  a  military  sense,  diplo- 
matic arrangements  would  have  to  fol- 
low, and  he  hoped  the  Entente  Allies 
would  offer  terms  appropriate  to  the 
situation  and  satisfactory  to  Ger- 
many's vital  needs.  The  chancellor  de- 
fended von  Kiihlmann  from  the  attacks 
that  were  made  upon  him,  but  neverthe- 
less it  cost  him  his  post  and  he  resigned 
on  July  9,  being  succeeded  by  Admiral 
von  Hintzc.  In  spite  of  the  distrust  of 
von  Kiihlmann's  sincerity  and  in  spite 
of  the  attacks  made  upon  him  in  Ger- 
many, it  appeared  from  subsequent 
events  that  the  hopelessness  of  military 
victory  was  felt  by  a  large  and  increas- 
ing number  of  Germans.  Persons  con- 
versant with  German  affairs  reported 
later  that  they  had  observed  distinctly 
as  early  as  July  the  growing  conviction 
that  Germany  was  in  a  military  sense 
beaten.  In  the  debate  that  followed  von 
Kiihlmann's    speech,    the   leader   of   the 


282 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


minority  Socialists  made  a  bitter  attack 
upon  the  government,  blaming  it  for  its 
ruthlessness  in  the  matter  of  Belgium, 
its  aggressive  course,  its  imperialism,  its 
constant  misrepresentations  as  to  the 
war,  its  atrocious  conduct  in  Ukraine, 
etc.  He  pointed  to  one  instance  after 
another  in  which  the  government  had 
cheated  the  people  by  the  hope  of  suc- 
cess as  in  the  case  of  the  repeated  as- 
surance that  the  submarine  campaign 
would  lead  to  victory  and  the  frequent 
assertion  that  the  United  States  would 
not  enter  the  war. 

Other  Peace  Discussions  in  July, 
1918.— On  July  16  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  foreign  minister,  Baron  Burian, 
who  had  succeeded  Count  Czernin,  de- 
clared his  approval  in  the  main  to  the 
"four  new  points"  which  President  Wil- 
son had  stated  in  his  Mount  Vernon 
speech  on  July  4  and  his  readiness  to 
discuss  everything  except  what  applied 
to  the  territory  of  the  Dual  Monarchy. 
He  said  the  territorial  claims  of  the  Al- 
lies were  inadmissible  but  that  they 
alone  stood  in  the  way  of  a  settlement. 
Austro-Hungarian  internal  affairs  con- 
cerned Austria-Hungary  alone,  and 
their  discussion  by  the  Allies  was  "an 
offensive  of  irritation."  On  July  3, 
Lloyd  George  in  a  speech  to  the  Na- 
tional Union  of  Manufacturers  said  the 
longer  the  war  continued,  the  more  se- 
vere would  be  the  economic  terms  of 
the  peace;  that  the  fullest  possible  eco- 
nomic agreement  between  the  Allies  was 
necessary ;  and  that  Great  Britain  must 
come  to  a  complete  understanding  with 
her  Allies  and  with  her  own  Dominions 
in  regard  to  the  problem  of  raw  ma- 
terials and  transport.  He  declared  for 
trade  preference  within  the  empire.  On 
July  19,  the  French  National  Congress 
of  Socialists  passed  a  resolution  calling 
upon  the  government  to  revise  its  war 
aims,  denouncing  imperialism,  and  de- 


claring for  a  Wilson  peace.  It  also 
passed  a  resolution  demanding  immedi- 
ate negotiations  for  a  League  of  Na- 
tions. At  the  same  time  Lord  Lans- 
downe  gave  out  his  views,  which  attract- 
ed wide  attention  and  caused  sharp 
criticism  as  tending  toward  a  policy  of 
weakness.  He  said  that  the  world  was 
drained  of  men  and  money ;  that  the 
birth  rate  was  falling  off;  that  the  de- 
sire for  peace  was  widespread ;  and  that 
nevertheless  the  spokesmen  of  the  bel- 
ligerent powers  applied  themselves 
merely  to  recrimination.  He  believed 
that  now  was  the  time  for  peace  since 
the  moment  had  come  when  the  Allies 
were  showing  that  they  could  hold  their 
own  in  the  conflict  and  he  believed  any 
reasonable  proposal  should  be  consid- 
ered. 

Alsace-Lorraine  Question. — Early  in 
June  there  was  a  demonstration  in 
Switzerland  on  the  part  of  the  Alsace- 
Lorraine  residents.  Delegates  from  all 
of  the  Alsace-Lorraine  organizations  in 
Switzerland  met  in  assembly  in  Berne. 
The  committee  on  investigation  pre- 
sented a  report  urging  the  final  aban- 
donment of  any  idea  of  neutralization 
and  declared  for  unconditional  re-ab- 
sorption of  Alsace-Lorraine  in  France. 
Among  the  Alsatians  in  Switzerland 
were  many  who  had  fought  on  the  Ger- 
man side  during  the  war  and  there  were 
others  who  had  lived  in  Switzerland  a 
long  time  and  become  citizens.  They 
unanimously  expressed  the  wish  to  re- 
turn to  France  not  only  for  reasons  of 
sentiment  but  because  they  could  not 
see  any  other  guarantee  for  the  peace- 
ful development  of  Europe  in  the  fu- 
ture. Those  who  had  formerly  believed 
in  neutralization  seemed  to  have  come 
over  to  this  view.  Swiss  sentiment  in 
general  was  on  the  same  side.  The 
question  of  a  popular  decision  in  Al- 
sace-Lorraine was  much  discussed  dur- 


PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  WAR  AIMS 


283 


ing  the  year.  The  objections  raised 
against  the  plebiscite  were  as  follows: 
The  proper  field  for  the  action  of  uni- 
versal suffrage  was  in  the  election  to 
legislative  bodies  or  the  direct  vote  on 
measures  submitted  to  the  people  by 
parliament  as  in  the  referendum.  These 
decisions  might  be  changed  as  popu- 
lar opinion  varied,  but  when  a  popular 
vote  decides  the  question  of  nationality 
that  decision  must  be  regarded  as  final. 
Yet  such  a  vote  could  be  very  easily 
tampered  with,  and  perhaps  controlled 
in  the  interest  of  one  side.  The  plebi- 
scite was  generally  opposed  both  by  the 
French  and  the  Alsace-Lorrainers. 
Since  1871  an  inhabitant  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  had  not  been  free  to  express 
his  national  preference  and  even  now  in 
voting  he  would  be  haunted  by  the  mem- 
ory of  all  that  he  had  suffered  under 
the  military  dictatorship  during  the 
war,  and  he  would  think  with  dread  of 
the  revenge  which  Germany  would  take 
upon  the  minority  if  the  decision  were 
favorable  to  her.  Secrecy  of  the  bal- 
lot would  do  no  good,  for  during  many 
years  the  German  authorities  had  spied 
upon  and  ascertained  the  views  of  all 
the  natives.  In  these  circumstances  the 
weak  and  timid  would  all  vote  against 
their  convictions  and  their  real  senti- 
ments. A  good  many  of  them  would 
reason  thus :  If  I  displease  the  En- 
tente I  can  always  get  out  of  the  diffi- 
culty without  damage,  but  if  I  rouse 
the  anger  of  Germany,  woe  betide  me. 
In  favor  of  the  plebiscite  it  was  said 
that  it  would  bring  Germany  to  terms 
and  that  she  would  renounce  all  fur- 
ther claims.  Hence,  it  would  consoli- 
date the  peace.  To  this  it  was  replied 
that  Germany  would  never  submit  to  a 
vote  that  was  adverse  to  her.  The  lead- 
ers of  Germany  do  not  admit  the  right 
of  peoples  to  dispose  of  themselves  and 
they   are   opposed   to   a   genuine  plebi- 


scite. The  reason  why  they  consent  to 
a  consultation  of  the  people  is  because 
they  hope  to  bring  pressure  to  bear 
upon  the  vote  and  more  especially  be- 
cause they  expect  as  a  result  of  that 
concession  to  obtain  a  peace  which  will 
leave  them  enough  power  to  resume 
their  schemes  for  dominating  the 
world. 

In  a  debate  in  the  German  parlia- 
ment in  the  latter  part  of  June  the  Ger- 
man view  was  indicated.  One  of  the 
Socialist  deputies  said  we  must  not  be 
surprised  if  the  population  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine  is  to-day  full  of  hatred  and 
the  desire  for  revenge  against  Germany. 
Unless  Alsace-Lorraine  becomes  a  self- 
governing  member  of  the  state  we  shall 
lose  the  good-will  of  the  people,  even 
though  retaining  the  country.  If  one 
were  to  organize  to-day  a  plebiscite, 
four-fifths  of  the  people  would  choose 
for  France  if  only  to  get  rid  of  our 
oppressive  rule.  A  deputy  on  the  op- 
posite side  expressed  the  hope  that 
these  ideas  were  false,  but  he  added  that 
the  pro-German  tendency  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine  had  wholly  disappeared, 
doubtless  because  the  conviction  ob- 
tained among  the  people  that  the  En- 
tente would  come  out  victorious  in  the 
war.  In  England  at  about  the  same 
time  reference  was  made  to  the  attempt 
of  the  Germans  to  give  the  impression 
that  the  war  had  been  imposed  upon 
them  by  France  because  France  wished 
to  reconquer  Alsace-Lorraine  and  that 
the  claim  of  France  to  those  provinces 
was  the  only  thing  that  stood  in  the 
way  of  a  reasonable  peace.  This  was 
characterized  in  England  as  elsewhere 
among  the  Allies  as  merely  the  attempt 
of  Germany  to  cause  discord  among 
the  members  of  the  Entente.  As  soon 
as  the  armistice  was  signed  (November 
11),  the  French  government  began  to 
take  the  necessary  measures  for  the  for- 


284 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


mal  recovery  of  the  provinces,  and 
three  commissioners  were  appointed  to 
act  for  the  government  in  their  three 
respective  divisions,  namely,  Alsace, 
Upper  Alsace,  and  Lorraine.  Mean- 
while the  armies  of  the  Allies  had  al- 
ready occupied  parts  of  the  provinces 
in  their  advance  toward  Germany.  See 
above  under  Military  Operations. 

Dissensions  Among  the  Central  Pow- 
ers.— During  1918  there  was  much 
discussion  in  the  press  of  the  clash 
between  the  respective  ambitions  of 
the  Turkish  and  Bulgarian  govern- 
ments. It  was  evident  that  Ferdinand 
of  Bulgaria  aimed  at  leadership  in  the 
Balkans  and  that  he  had  not  consoled 
himself  for  the  check  of  1913,  when  he 
hoped  to  find  the  way  open  to  Con- 
stantinople. But  the  ambitions  of  the 
Turks  were  awakened  by  the  downfall 
of  Russia.  They  wished  to  control 
Russian  Armenia  and  to  gain  a  foot- 
hold in  the  Caucasus  and  were  believed 
to  be  coveting  the  Crimea,  with  the  ap- 
parent aim  of  turning  the  Black  Sea 
into  a  Turkish  lake.  These  designs 
alarmed  Bulgaria  and  the  conflict  in 
aims  between  the  two  governments  was 
brought  in  the  affair  of  the  Maritza 
on  one  hand  and  the  affair  of  the  Do- 
bruja  on  the  other.  The  treaty  of 
Bucharest  (see  above)  had  given  ab- 
solute possession  to  Bulgaria  of  only 
the  northern  part  of  the  Dobruja  and 
this  was  far  from  satisfying  her.  The 
least  she  expected  was  the  annexation 
of  the  whole  Dobruja.  This,  however, 
was  opposed  by  the  Turks ;  and  the 
German  government,  failing  to  bring 
the  two  rivals  into  harmony,  adopted 
the  policy  of  joint  control  for  north- 
ern Dobruja.  The  Bulgarians,  on  the 
other  hand,  refused  to  yield  to  the 
Turks  in  the  affair  of  the  Maritza.  On 
the  right  bank  of  this  river  the  Central 
Powers,  in  order  to  win  the  Bulgarians 


to  their  side,  had  obliged  the  Turks  to 
cede  to  Bulgaria  the  station  of  Adria- 
nople  in  1915,  and  the  main  line  to 
Constantinople  was  thus  left  at  the 
mercy  of  the  Bulgarians — a  situation 
highly  objectionable  to  the  Turks,  who 
therefore  demanded  the  revision  of  that 
agreement.  In  this  demand  they  were 
supported  by  the  Germans.  The  Bul- 
garians sharply  refused  and  in  one  of 
their  papers,  on  June  19,  a  writer  re- 
marked that  Bulgaria  was  surprised  at 
the  attitude  of  the  Turks,  who  seemed 
to  assume  that  agreements  between  al- 
lies were  merely  scraps  of  paper.  The 
German  government  apparently  was 
having  difficulty  in  keeping  the  peace 
with  them.  Her  policy  inclined  toward 
Turkey  and  this  was  explained  in  the 
press  of  the  Entente  Allies  on  the 
ground  that  Germany  wished  to  con- 
solidate her  power  all  the  way  from 
Constantinople  to  Bagdad.  Bulgaria's 
attitude,  on  the  other  hand,  was  dis- 
turbing and  her  czar  showed  little  in- 
clination to  work  for  the  King  of  Prus- 
sia. The  design  of  a  greater  Bulgaria 
threatened  Germany's  plan  for  the  con- 
trol of  the  routes  to  the  east.  That  is 
why  she  hesitated  to  surrender  the  whole 
of  the  Dobruja  and  encourage  Turkey 
to  claim  Adrianople. 

The  German  government  had  given 
Bulgaria  the  right  to  annex  eastern 
Serbia,  but  the  Bulgarian  government 
was  apparently  not  satisfied  with  that 
so  long  as  the  status  of  the  Dobruja 
was  not  determined  in  its  favor.  Tur- 
key had  insisted  that  the  question  of 
the  Dobruja  should  form  part  of  the 
whole  subject  of  the  Turkish-Bulgarian 
frontier  and  the  German  government 
for  the  present  consented  to  this.  The 
Turks  opposed  the  granting  of  the 
Dobruja  to  Bulgaria  so  long  as  the  lat- 
ter did  not  offer  any  compensation. 
While    the    Turkish-Bulgarian    dispute 


PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  WAR  AIMS 


285 


continued  the  German  government  took 
the  stand  that  it  could  not  settle  these 
questions  and  it  would  not  make  good 
its  alleged  promises  to  give  Bulgaria 
the  Greek  towns  of  Calvalla,  Drama, 
and  Seres.  At  this  time  the  Czar  Ferdi- 
nand was  reported  in  the  press  to  have 
taken  a  long  journey  in  foreign  parts 
and  this  was  supposed  to  mean  that  he 
had  gone  to  Berlin  to  press  his  claim. 
At  the  same  time  the  Bulgarian  prime 
minister,  M.  Radoslavoff,  who  was 
friendly  to  Germany,  resigned  and  was 
succeeded  by  an  anti-German,  M.  Mali- 
noff.  This  was  attributed  to  resent- 
ment at  Germany's  attitude  and  at  her 
niggardliness  in  provisioning  Bulgaria, 
where  the  food  situation  had  become 
critical.  Now  that  von  Hintze  had 
succeeded  to  von  Kiihlmann,  there 
seemed  a  better  chance  for  Bulgaria  be- 
cause von  Hintze  had  from  the  begin- 
ning shown  sympathy  with  the  Pan- 
German  element  and  the  Pan-Germans 
heartily  supported  Bulgaria's  claim 
both  to  the  Dobruja  and  to  the  Greek 
cities.  They  favored  the  plan  for  the 
greater  Bulgaria  of  the  future  which 
should  include  even  Saloniki. 

As  to  the  difficulty  between  Germany 
and  Turkey,  it  was  regarded  at  the 
beginning  of  August  to  be  so  acute  as 
to  threaten  a  rupture.  This,  however, 
seemed  improbable,  for  the  Young 
Turks  who  were  in  power  were  not  like- 
ly to  come  to  any  agreement  with  the 
Entente  Allies.  The  Allies  could  not 
recognize  a  government  which  was 
founded  upon  the  crimes  of  Enver,  Ta- 
laat  and  Djemal  and  which  still  held 
under  its  tyranny  the  Armenians  and 
Syrians.  The  Allies  would  have  to  in- 
sist upon  the  liberation  of  those  peo- 
ples and  to  this  the  Young  Turk  gov- 
ernment would  never  consent.  Compro- 
mise seemed  out  of  the  question.  Never- 
theless the  relations  between  Germany 


and  Turkey  appeared  to  be  far  from 
harmonious.  Germany  had  large  de- 
signs in  the  East  and  hoped  to  realize 
them  by  the  treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk, 
to  which  Turkey  had  agreed  in  return 
for  certain  concessions  in  the  Caucasus. 
But  now  that  Turkey  virtually  demand- 
ed the  sole  control  of  the  Black  Sea, 
which  would  eventually  bar  the  way  of 
Germany  toward  the  East,  there  was 
much  indignation  in  Germany,  where 
the  press  bitterly  denounced  what  they 
characterized  as  Ottoman  chauvinism. 
The  Turk  retorted  with  the  same  ar- 
guments for  their  course  in  the  Cau- 
casus as  the  Germans  had  employed  on 
behalf  of  an  independent  Flanders,  that 
is  to  say,  Turkey  argued  that  just  as 
the  Germans  had  undertaken  to  create 
an  independent  state  in  that  part  of 
Belgium  which  was  akin  to  them  in  race, 
so  the  Turks  wished  to  recognize  the 
movement  for  independence  on  the  part 
of  their  own  kinsmen  in  the  Caucasus. 
At  other  points  the  Turks  were  said  to 
have  ambitions  inconsistent  with  the 
purposes  of  Germany:  For  example, 
Germany  wished  the  Turks  to  drive  the 
British  from  occupied  territory,  espe- 
cially in  Mesopotamia,  but  the  Turks 
realized  that  the  task  was  too  great  and 
sought  objects  less  difficult  to  attain  in 
the  Caucasus,  Persia,  and  in  the  Black 
Sea.  The  German  press  reproached 
the  Turks  bitterly  for  this  policy,  say- 
ing that  instead  of  trying  to  encroach 
in  the  direction  of  the  Caspian  and 
Baku,  they  should  turn  their  efforts 
toward  Bagdad.  Turkey  was  accused 
even  of  coveting  the  Crimea  and  its 
ports  in  order  that  the  Ukraine  should 
not  become  a  Black  Sea  power  and  of 
aiming  to  secure  in  the  Caucasus  a  bar- 
rier against  Russia  in  the  East  in  or- 
der to  protect  Turkish  communications 
with  Persia.  In  short,  a  portion  of  the 
German  press  believed  that  Turkey  was 


286 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


aiming  to  turn  the  Black  Sea  into  a 
Turkish  lake  and  thereby  choke  off  all 
trade  from  European  Russia. 

The  chief  difficulty  between  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary  arose  from  the 
question  of  Poland.  The  Germans  had 
thought  that  von  Burian  would  be  less 
insistent  in  regard  to  Poland  than  his 
predecessor,  Czernin,  but  to  their  sur- 
prise he  had  declared  that  the  incor- 
poration of  the  Polish  kingdom  in  the 
Austro-Hungarian  monarchy  was  a 
vital  necessity.  In  the  German  press  it 
was  said  squarely  that  German  interests 
were  superior  to  Austrian  interests ; 
that  the  Germans  would  consider  the 
Polish  question  from  the  German  point 
of  view,  which  required  that  there 
should  be  a  strong  strategic  frontier. 
The  safety  of  Germany  was  the  first 
consideration.  The  Germans  had  not 
won  their  victories  in  order  to  be  en- 
circled on  the  east  by  a  Polish-Galician 
state.  Some  Pan-German  organs  de- 
manded that  the  Austro-Polish  solu- 
tion be  rejected  at  once.  They  said 
that  after  the  arrangement  following 
the  meeting  of  the  two  emperors  the 
German  public  had  believed  that  this 
Austro-Polish  plan  had  been  abandoned. 
Seldom,  they  said,  had  a  project  been 
rejected  more  unanimously  by  public 
opinion,  ■  and  they  complained  of  its 
revival.  The  Austrian  emperor  by  go- 
ing to  German  military  headquarters 
(May  12)  for  his  famous  interview  with 
the  kaiser  had  given  the  impression  that 
he  had  abandoned  his  Polish  claim. 
Shortly  after  he  had  returned  to  Vienna 
the  whole  project  reappeared.  It 
looked  as  if  there  was  a  real  disagree- 
ment between  the  governments  and  as 
if  Germany  had  been  deceived.  They 
demanded  that  the  two  governments 
promptly  come  to  an  agreement  for  the 
definite  settlement  of  Poland's  status 
so   that    the    Entente    Allies   would    be 


brought  face  to  face  with  it  as  an  ac- 
complished fact. 

As  time  went  on  it  became  apparent 
that  the  difficulties  between  Hungary 
and  Austria  were  growing  more  and 
more  serious.  Hungary  believed  her- 
self to  be  supported  by  Berlin.  A  Hun- 
garian journal  declared  Hungary  would 
have  the  right  even  to  interfere  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  Austria  and  added 
significantly  that  perhaps  even  now  the 
time  had  come  that  Berlin  and  Buda- 
pest would  have  to  interfere  and  insist 
that  Austria  should  pursue  a  policy 
faithful  to  the  Allies.  In  Germany 
there  seemed  from  the  newspapers  to 
be  strong  sympathy  with  Hungary, 
though  this  was  perhaps  for  the  pur- 
pose of  stirring  up  enmity  between  the 
two  parts  of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  For 
example,  a  German  newspaper  declared 
that  it  seemed  extremely  probable  that 
Austria  would  fall  to  pieces.  The 
Czechs,  Poles,  Southern  Slavs,  and 
other  races  with  very  divergent  aims 
were  all  struggling  for  their  complete 
independence,  and  feeling  themselves  too 
cramped  within  the  Austrian  state,  they 
were  sure  to  separate  sooner  or  later. 
A  German  journal  in  Berlin  declared 
that  the  only  salvation  for  Austria  was 
to  transform  herself  into  a  Federal 
state.  With  only  10,000,000  Germans, 
it  said,  against  18,000,000  non-Ger- 
mans there  would  necessarily  always  be 
hostility  on  the  part  of  the  latter.  The 
state  could  not  exist  unless  it  were 
transformed  into  a  Federal  organiza- 
tion. Thus,  part  of  the  German  press 
sustained  the  same  principle  that  Presi- 
dent Wilson  had  advocated,  but  this  was 
interpreted  by  the  press  of  the  Allies  as 
a  step  to  the  ultimate  organization  of 
the  nations  of  Austria  under  the  con- 
trol of  Germany.  With  Hungary  on 
her  side,  and  with  the  Slav  races  pla- 
cated, there  would  be  a  chance  for  Ger- 


PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  WAR  AIMS 


287 


many  to  work  out  a  system  of  control. 
Peace  Discussions  in  August  and 
September. — Mr.  Balfour,  the  British 
foreign  minister,  reaffirmed  British 
aims  in  an  address  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons early  in  August.  He  announced 
that  Great  Britain  would  not  consent 
to  the  return  of  the  German  colonies 
and  that  Germany  was  dominated  by 
the  moral  doctrine  of  the  mailed  fist. 
Dr.  Solf,  the  German  colonial  secre- 
tary, made  an  attack  on  the  Allied  at- 
titude on  August  20.  He  asked  where 
the  blame  lay.  He  said  that  the  enemy 
had  renounced  the  ideal  of  a  League 
of  Nations  inasmuch  as  he  had  decided 
upon  an  economic  war  against  Ger- 
many. He  said  that  the  German  gov- 
ernment had  already  declared  that  Bel- 
gium would  not  be  kept  by  Germany. 
This,  he  said,  disposed  of  the  preten- 
sion that  Belgium  was  at  present  a 
cause  of  the  war.  As  to  the  attack  on 
Germany's  eastern  policy,  he  said  that 
the  Brest-Litovsk  peace  was  made  by 
agreement  between  the  Russian  and 
German  governments  and  that  it  per- 
mitted the  frontier  peoples  of  Russia, 
after  centuries  of  oppression,  to  live 
their  own  lives ;  also,  that  the  only  dif- 
ference between  Russians  and  Germans 
in  regard  to  the  peace  had  to  do  with 
the  ways  and  means  of  conferring  in- 
dependence upon  these  border  peoples. 
The  Germans  insisted  upon  safeguards 
against  anarchy.  He  declared  that  the 
Brest-Litovsk  peace  was  the  framework 
of  a  policy  which  in  future  would  be  car- 
ried out.  He  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  enemy  would  not  want  peace 
by  negotiation  and  he  declared  that  he 
was  waging  a  war  for  plunder  and 
glory  and  was  carried  away  by  arro- 
gance. As  to  the  extreme  views  of  Ger- 
many, he  spoke  of  the  Pan-Germans  as 
a  small  group  without  influence  in  poli- 
tics and  without  influence  in  the  gov- 


ernment. Lord  Robert  Cecil  on  behalf 
of  England  issued  a  statement  in  an- 
swer to  Dr.  Solf.  He  denied  that  the 
Pan-German  element  was  without 
power,  pointing  to  the  fact  that  only 
a  few  weeks  before  von  Kuhlmann  was 
dismissed  for  saying  that  Germans 
could  not  have  everything  their  own 
way  and  Count  von  Hertling,  the  chan- 
cellor, had  to  make  an  explanation.  As 
to  Belgium,  the  chancellor  had  said  he 
looked  upon  it  as  a  pledge,  adding  that 
it  would  become  closely  related  in  com- 
mercial association  with  Germany.  As 
to  the  Brest-Litovsk  treaty,  it  was  evi- 
dent that  those  border  peoples  had  been 
so  constituted  as  to  have  as  little  in- 
dependence as  possible.  As  to  the  Ger- 
man colonies,  he  denied  the  moral  right 
of  Germany  to  be  a  protector  of  the 
colored  colonies ;  characterizing  their 
rule  as  brutal  and  callous.  During 
September  there  was  a  threefold  peace 
movement  on  the  part  of  the  Central 
Powers,  comprising  three  features: 
First,  a  note  from  the  Austro-Hunga- 
rian  government  to  all  other  govern- 
ments proposing  a  conference  to  discuss 
peace,  but  not  in  a  binding  manner ;  sec- 
ond, a  definite  offer  of  peace  to  Belgium 
by  Germany ;  third,  an  offer  to  the  Ger- 
man minister  in  Finland  to  refrain  from 
attacking  eastern  Karelia  on  condition 
that  the  Allies  withdraw  their  troops 
from  that  region  and  also  from  the 
whole'  Murmansk  coast.  The  most  im- 
portant of  these  moves  was  the  Austrian 
note.  This  declared  that  in  spite  of 
obstacles,  the  peace  discussion  had  made 
progress  and  that  almost  all  the  bel- 
ligerents had  again  and  again  expressed 
themselves  on  the  conditions  of  peace. 
The  attitude  had  gradually  changed 
and  the  differences  between  the  two 
sides  had  diminished.  It  was  manifest 
that  in  both  camps  there  was  a  growth 
of  the  desire   for  peace.      Remarks   of 


288 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Mr.  Balfour  were  cited  to  indicate  that 
the  Entente  Allies  had  abandoned  their 
demand  for  the  dismemberment  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Empire.  The  Cen- 
tral Powers  had  made  it  clear  that  they 
were  waging  a  war  of  defense.  Certain 
general  principles  were  practically  ac- 
cepted by  both  parties.  In  his  messages 
of  February  11  and  July  4  President 
Wilson  had  asserted  principles  which 
were  not  contradicted  by  his  allies  and 
which  were  not  likely  to  meet  objection 
from  the  Central  Powers.  Discussion 
of  the  subject  in  public  only  embit- 
tered opinion  and  served  no  practical 
purpose.  Statesmen  who  discussed  it 
publicly  were  obliged  to  exaggerate  lest 
they  should  endanger  the  interests  of 
their  country  in  the  prosecution  of  the 
war.  Therefore,  it  was  suggested  that 
a  discussion  should  take  place  between 
the  representatives  of  the  governments 
and  only  between  them.  Such  a  dis- 
cussion was  not  to  be  binding  and  there 
was  to  be  no  interruption  of  hostilities. 
Such  an  exchange  of  views  far  from  be- 
ing harmful  could  only  be  useful  to  the 
cause  of  peace.  The  reply  of  the  United 
States  government  to  this  overture  was 
as  follows :  "The  government  of  the 
United  States  has  repeatedly  and  with 
entire  candor  stated  the  terms  upon 
which  the  United  States  could  consider 
peace  and  can  and  will  entertain  no 
proposal  for  a  conference  upon  a  mat- 
ter concerning  which  it  has  made  its 
position  and  purpose  so  plain."  The 
German  proposal  to  Belgium  suggest- 
ed that  the  political  and  economic  inde- 
pendence of  Belgium  should  be  re- 
stored after  the  war  on  certain  condi- 
tions, namely,  those  set  forth  in  the 
memorandum  as  to  Germany's  pre-war 
commercial  treaties  with  Belgium  and 
the  cooperation  of  Belgium  in  trying  to 
secure  from  the  Allied  governments  the 
restoration    of    the    German    colonies. 


The  Austrian  note  contained  nothing 
about  restoration  or  reparation  and  it 
produced  no  effect  in  the  Allied  coun- 
tries. As  to  the  German  offer  in  re- 
gard to  eastern  Karelia,  it  was  pointed 
out  by  the  Allies  that  the  Germans  had 
few,  if  any,  troops  there  and  that  the 
proposal  really  came  to  nothing.  The 
net  result  of  this  peace  offensive  was 
practically  negligible. 

The  Approach  of  Peace:  The  Ger- 
man Crisis. — After  the  surrender  of 
Bulgaria  (see  military  section  above) 
the  demoralization  of  the  Central  Pow- 
ers was  soon  manifested.  On  Septem- 
ber 30  the  German  chancellor  von 
Hertling,  and  the  foreign  secretary, 
von  Hintze,  resigned,  and  Prince  Max 
of  Baden,  who  had  been  a  moderate  in 
politics,  was  appointed  chancellor  two 
days  later.  Dr.  W.  S.  Solf,  the  colo- 
nial secretary,  was  appointed  foreign 
secretary  and  a  coalition  ministry  was 
forced  of  which  two  Socialist  deputies, 
Scheidemann  and  Bauer,  and  two  Cen- 
trist deputies,  Groeber  and  Erzberger, 
were  members.  The  news  was  followed 
by  details  showing  a  radical  change  in 
the  German  political  system.  The  ma- 
jority parties  had  gained  control  of 
the  parliament  and  their  programme 
was  as  follows :  Adherence  to  the  prin- 
ciples set  down  in  the  government's  re- 
ply to  the  Pope's  note  of  August  1, 
1917;  a  declaration  that  Germany  is 
ready  to  join  the  league  of  nations  if 
it  comprises  all  states  and  is  based  on 
the  idea  of  equality,  etc. ;  a  plain  decla- 
ration as  to  the  restoration  of  Bel- 
gium and  an  agreement  in  regard  to  in- 
demnity ;  the  peace  treaties  hitherto 
concluded  not  to  stand  in  the  way  of 
a  conclusion  of  general  peace;  Alsace- 
Lorraine  to  be  an  independent  Federal 
state ;  electoral  reform  to  be  carried  out 
immediately  in  Prussia ;  strict  observ- 
ance    of     constitutional     responsibility 


PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  WAR  AIMS 


289 


and  the  summoning  of  government  rep- 
resentatives from  parliament ;  the  rules 
as  to  a  state  of  siege  to  be  amended 
in  order  to  protect  personal  liberty, 
right  of  meeting  and  freedom  of  the 
press.  In  an  address  to  the  Reichstag, 
the  new  chancellor  set  forth  this  pro- 
gramme and  declared  that  in  conform- 
ity with  the  imperial  decree  of  Septem- 
ber 30,  the  political  leadership  of  the 
empire  had  completely  changed.  He 
addressed  parliament  in  the  belief  that 
he  was  speaking  in  accordance  with  the 
will  of  the  majority  of  the  people. 
Henceforth  the  people  must  take  an 
active  part  in  deciding  their  destiny.  In 
other  words,  the  majority  of  the  freely 
elected  political  leaders  must  be  behind 
the  action  of  the  government.    He  said : 

"In  the  matter  of  international  policies,  I 
have  taken  a  clear  stand  through  the  manner 
in  which  the  formation  of  the  government 
was  brought  about.  Upon  my  motion,  leaders 
of  the  majority  parties  were  summoned  for 
direct  advice.  It  was  my  conviction,  gentle- 
men, that  unity  of  imperial  leadership  should 
be  assured  not  only  through  mere  schismatic 
party  allegiance,  but  by  the  different  members 
of  the  government.  I  considered  almost  still 
more  important  the  unity  of  ideas.  I  proceeded 
from  this  viewpoint  and  have,  in  making  my 
selections,  laid  greatest  weight  on  the  fact  that 
the  members  of  the  new  imperial  government 
stand  on  a  basis  of  a  just  peace  of  justice, 
regardless  of  the  war  situation,  and  that  they 
have  openly  declared  this  to  be  their  stand- 
point at  the  time  when  we  stood  at  the  height 
of  our  military  successes.  I  am  convinced  that 
the  manner  in  which  imperial  leadership  is  now 
constituted  with  cooperation  of  the  Reichstag 
is  not  something  ephemeral,  and  that  when 
peace  comes  a  government  cannot  again  be 
formed  which  does  not  find  support  in  the 
Reichstag  and  does  not  draw  its  leader  there- 
from." 

At  the  same  time  he  announced  the 
sending  of  a  message  of  peace  to  Presi- 
dent Wilson.  He  said  he  had  appealed 
to  the  President  because  in  the  latter's 
message  to  Congress  on  January  8, 
1918,  and  in  his  speech  of  September 
27,  he  had   proposals   which   Germany 


could  accept  as  a  basis  of  negotiation. 

German  and  American  Peace  Notes. 
— On  receipt  of  the  note,  October  5, 
1918,  the  people  throughout  the  United 
States  were  greatly  stirred  by  the  re- 
port that  Germany  had  accepted  the 
terms  of  peace  demanded  by  the  Allies. 
It  was  soon  found  that  the  rejoicing 
was  premature,  but  Germany  had, 
nevertheless,  taken  the  first  step  which 
led  to  the  conclusion  of  hostilities.  The 
note  requested  the  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America  to  take  steps 
for  the  restoration  of  peace,  to  notify 
all  belligerents  of  this  request,  and  to 
invite  them  to  delegate  plenipotentiaries 
for  the  purpose  of  taking  measures  to 
avoid  further  bloodshed.  It  declared 
that  the  German  government  accepted 
as  a  basis  for  peace  negotiations  the 
programme  laid  down  by  the  President 
of  the  United  States  in  his  message  to 
Congress  on  January  8,  1918,  and  in 
his  later  pronouncements,  especially  in 
his  address  of  September  27,  1918.  It 
asked  the  President  of  the  United 
States  to  bring  about  the  immediate 
conclusion  of  a  general  armistice  on 
land,  on  water,  and  in  the  air. 

On  October  8,  the  American  secre- 
tary of  state  returned  the  following  an- 
swer: 

"Before  making  reply  to  the  request  of  the 
Imperial  German  Government,  and  in  order 
that  that  reply  shall  be  as  candid  and  straight- 
forward as  the  momentous  interests  involved 
require,  the  President  of  the  United  States 
deems  it  necessary  to  assure  himself  of  the 
exact  meaning  of  the  note  of  the  Imperial 
Chancellor.  Does  the  Imperial  Chancellor  mean 
that  the  Imperial  German  Government  accept 
the  terms  laid  down  by  the  President  in  his 
address  to  the  Congress  of  the  United  States 
on  January  last  and  in  subsequent  addresses, 
and  that  its  object  in  entering  into  discus- 
sions would  be  only  to  agree  upon  the  practical 
details  of  their  application? 

"The  President  feels  bound  to  say  with  re- 
gard to  the  suggestion  of  an  armistice  that  he 
would  not  feel  at  liberty  to  propose  a  cessa- 
tion  of   arms   to   the   governments   with  which 


290 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


the  Government  of  the  United  States  is  asso- 
ciated against  the  Central  Powers  so  long  as 
the  armies  of  those  powers  are  upon  their  soil. 
The  good  faith  of  any  discussion  would  mani- 
festly depend  upon  the  consent  of  the  Central 
Powers  immediately  to  withdraw  their  forces 
everywhere  from  invaded  territory.  The  Pres- 
ident also  feels  that  he  is  justified  in  asking 
whether  the  Imperial  Chancellor  is  speaking 
merely  for  the  constituted  authorities  of  the 
empire  who  have  so  far  conducted  the  war. 
He  deems  the  answer  to  these  questions  vital 
from  every  point  of  view." 


In  reply  to  these  questions  by  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  Germany  sent  the  follow- 
ing message  on  October  12,  signed  by 
Dr.  Solf,  state  secretary  of  the  foreign 
office: 

"In  reply  to  the  questions  of  the  President 
of  the  United  States  of  America  the  German 
Government  hereby  declares:  The  German 
Government  has  accepted  the  terms  laid  down 
by  President  Wilson  in  his  address  of  Janu- 
ary 8  and  in  his  subsequent  addresses  on  the 
foundation  of  a  permanent  peace  of  justice. 
Consequently  its  object  in  entering  into  dis- 
cussions would  be  only  to  agree  upon  practi- 
cal details  of  the  application  of  these  terms. 
The  German  Government  believes  that  the 
Governments  of  the  powers  associated  with  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  also  take  the 
position  taken  by  President  Wilson  in  his  ad- 
dress. The  German  Government,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government, 
for  the  purpose  of  bringing  about  an  armis- 
tice, declares  itself  ready  to  comply  with 
the  propositions  of  the  President  in  regard  to 
evacuation. 

"The  German  Government  suggests  that  the 
President  may  occasion  the  meeting  of  a  mixed 
commission  for  making  the  necessary  arrange- 
ments concerning  the  evacuation.  The  pres- 
ent German  Government,  which  has  undertaken 
the  responsibility  for  this  step  toward  peace, 
has  been  formed  by  conferences  and  in  agree- 
ment with  the  great  majority  of  the  Reichstag. 
The  Chancellor,  supported  in  all  of  his  actions 
by  the  will  of  this  majority,  speaks  in  the 
name  of  the  German  Government  and  of  the 
German    people." 

The  United  States  secretary  of  state, 
under  date  of  October  14,  sent  the  fol- 
lowing reply : 

"The  unqualified  acceptance  by  the  present 
German  Government  and  by  a  large  majority 


of  the  German  Reichstag  of  the  terms  laid 
down  by  the  President  of  the  United  States  of 
America  in  his  address  to  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States  on  January  8,  1918,  and  in  his 
subsequent  addresses,  justifies  the  President 
in  making  a  frank  and  direct  statement  of  his 
decision  with  regard  to  the  communications 
of  the  German  Government  of  October  8  and 
12,  1918.  It  must  be  clearly  understood  that 
the  process  of  evacuation  and  the  conditions 
of  an  armistice  are  matters  which  must  be  left 
to  the  judgment  and  advice  of  the  military  ad- 
visers of  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
and  the  Allied  Governments,  and  the  President 
feels  it  his  duty  to  say  that  no  arrangement 
can  be  accepted  by  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  which  does  not  provide  abso- 
lutely satisfactory  safeguards  and  guarantees 
of  the  maintenance  of  the  present  military  su- 
premacy of  the  armies  of  the  United  States 
and  of  the  Allies  in  the  field.  He  feels  con- 
fident that  he  can  safely  assume  that  this  will 
also  be  the  j  udgment  and  decision  of  the  Allied 
Governments. 

"The  President  feels  that  it  is  also  his  duty 
to  add  that  neither  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  nor,  he  is  quite  sure,  the  Govern- 
ments with  which  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  is  associated  as  a  belligerent  will  con- 
sent to  consider  an  armistice  so  long  as  the 
armed  forces  of  Germany  continue  the  illegal 
and  inhumane  practices  which  they  persist  in. 
At  the  very  time  that  the  German  Govern- 
ment approaches  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  with  proposals  of  peace,  its  submarines 
are  engaged  in  sinking  passenger  ships  at  sea, 
and  not  the  ships  alone,  but  the  very  boats  in 
which  their  passengers  and  crews  seek  to  make 
their  way  to  safety;  and  in  their  present  en- 
forced withdrawal  from  Flanders  and  France 
the  German  armies  are  pursuing  a  course  of 
wanton  destruction  which  has  always  been  re- 
garded as  in  direct  violation  of  the  rules  and 
practices  of  civilized  warfare.  Cities  and  vil- 
lages, if  not  destroyed,  are  being  stripped  not 
only  of  all  they  contain,  but  often  of  their  very 
inhabitants.  The  nations  associated  against 
Germany  cannot  be  expected  to  agree  to  a  ces- 
sation of  arms  while  acts  of  inhumanity,  spoli- 
ation, and  desolation  are  being  continued  which 
they  justly  look  upon  with  horror  and  with 
burning  hearts. 

"It  is  necessary  also;  in  order  that  there 
may  be  no  possibility  of  misunderstanding, 
that  the  President  should  very  solemnly  call 
the  attention  of  the  government  of  Germany 
to  the  language  and  plain  intent  of  one  of 
the  terms  of  peace  which  the  German  govern- 
ment has  now  accepted.  It  is  contained  in  the 
address  of  the  President  delivered  at  Mount 
Vernon  on  July  4  last.     It  is  as  follows: 

"  'The  destruction  of  every  arbitrary  power 
anywhere  that  can  separately,  secretly,  and  of 


PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  WAR  AIMS 


291 


its  single  choice  disturb  the  peace  of  the  world; 
or,  if  it  cannot  be  presently  destroyed,  at  least 
its  reduction  to  virtual  impotency.' 

"The  power  which  has  hitherto  controlled  the 
German  nation  is  of  the  sort  here  described.  It 
is  within  the  choice  of  the  German  nation  to 
alter  it.  The  President's  words  just  quoted 
naturally  constitute  a  condition  precedent  to 
peace,  if  peace  is  to  come  by  the  action  of  the 
German   people   themselves. 

"The  President  feels  bound  to  say  that  the 
whole  process  of  peace  will,  in  his  judgment, 
depend  upon  the  definiteness  and  satisfactory 
character  of  the  guarantees  which  can  be 
given  in  this  fundamental  matter.  It  is  indis- 
pensable that  the  governments  associated 
against  Germany  should  know  beyond  a  perad- 
venture    with    whom    they    are    dealing. 

"The  President  will  make  a  separate  reply 
to  the  royal  and  imperial  government  of  Aus- 
tria-Hungary." 

Although  there  was  some  criticism 
of  this  course  in  the  United  States  dur- 
ing the  negotiations,  the  President's  di- 
plomacy appeared  to  meet  with  general 
approval  among  the  Allies  and  the  above 
note  was  received  by  the  press  of  the 
Allied  countries  with  especial  satisfac- 
tion. 

The  German  reply  to  the  President's 
note  of  October  11  was  as  follows: 

"In  accepting  the  proposal  for  an  evacuation 
for  occupied  territories  the  German  Govern- 
ment has  started  from  the  assumption  that  the 
procedure  of  this  evacuation  and  of  the  con- 
ditions of  an  armistice  should  be  left  to  the 
judgment  of  the  military  advisers,  and  that 
the  actual  standard  of  power  on  both  sides 
in  the  field  has  to  form  the  basis  for  ar- 
rangements safeguarding  and  guaranteeing 
this  standard.  The  German  Government  sug- 
gests to  the  President  that  an  opportunity 
should  be  brought  about  for  fixing  the  details. 
It  trusts  that  the  President  of  the  United 
States  will  approve  of  no  demand  which  would 
be  irreconcilable  with  the  honor  of  the  Ger- 
man people  and  with  opening  a  way  to  a  peace 
of  justice. 

"The  German  Government  protests  against 
the  reproach  of  illegal  and  inhumane  actions 
made  against  the  German  land  and  sea  forces 
and  thereby  against  the  German  people.  For 
the  covering  of  a  retreat  destructions  will  al- 
ways be  necessary,  and  they  are  carried  out 
in  so  far  as  is  permitted  by  international  law. 
The  German  troops  are  under  the  most  strict 
instructions   to  spare   private  property   and   to 


exercise  care  for  the  population  to  the  best 
of  their  ability.  Where  transgressions  occur 
in  spite  of  these  instructions  the  guilty  are 
being  punished.  The  German  Government  fur- 
ther denies  that  the  German  Navy  in  sinking 
ships  has  ever  purposely  destroyed  lifeboats 
with  their  passengers.  The  German  Govern- 
ment proposes  with  regard  to  all  those  charges 
that  the  facts  be  cleared  up  by  neutral  com- 
missions. 

"In  order  to  avoid  anything  that  might  ham- 
per the  work  of  peace,  the  German  Govern- 
ment has  caused  orders  to  be  despatched  to  all 
submarine  commanders  precluding  the  torpedo- 
ing of  passenger  ships,  without,  however,  for 
technical  reasons,  being  able  to  guarantee  that 
these  orders  will  reach  every  single  submarine 
at  sea  before  its  return.  As  a  fundamental 
condition  for  peace  the  President  prescribes 
the  destruction  of  every  arbitrary  power  that 
can  separately,  secretly  and  of  its  own  single 
choice  disturb  the  peace  of  the  world.  To 
this  the  German  Government  replies:  Hither- 
to the  representation  of  the  people  in  the 
German  Empire  has  not  been  endowed  with  an 
influence  on  the  formation  of  the  Govern- 
ment. The  Constitution  did  not  provide  for 
a  concurrence  of  representation  of  the  peo- 
ple in  decisions  of  peace  and  war.  These  con- 
ditions have  just  now  undergone  a  funda- 
mental change.  A  new  Government  has  been 
formed  in  complete  accordance  with  the  wishes 
(principle)  of  the  representation  of  the  peo- 
ple, based  on  equal,  universal,  secret,  direct 
franchise. 

"The  leaders  of  the  great  parties  of  the 
Reichstag  are  members  of  this  Government.  In 
the  future  no  Government  can  take  or  con- 
tinue in  office  without  possessing  the  confidence 
of  a  majority  of  the  Reichstag.  The  responsi- 
bility of  the  Chancellor  of  the  empire  to  the 
representation  of  the  people  is  being  legally 
developed  and  safeguarded.  The  first  act  of 
the  new  Government  has  been  to  lay  before 
the  Reichstag  a  bill  to  alter  the  Constitution 
of  the  empire  so  that  the  consent  of  the  repre- 
sentation of  the  people  is  required  for  de- 
cisions on  war  and  peace.  The  permanence  of 
the  new  system  is,  however,  guaranteed  not 
only  by  constitutional  safeguards  but  also  by 
the  unshakable  determination  of  the  German 
people,  whose  vast  majority  stands  behind 
these  reforms  and  demands  their  energetic  con- 
tinuance. 

"The  question  of  the  President — with  whom 
he  and  the  Governments  associated  against 
Germany  are  dealing — is  therefore  answered  in 
a  clear,  unequivocal  manner  by  the  statement 
that  the  offer  of  peace  and  an  armistice  has 
come  from  a  Government  which  is  free  from 
any  arbitrary  and  irresponsible  influence  and 
is  supported  by  the  approval  of  an  overwhelm- 
ing majority  of  the  German  people. 


292 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Prince  Max,  the  chancellor,  in  a 
speech  to  the  Reichstag  October  22  re- 
ferred to  the  necessity  of  a  "peace  of 
justice"  and  declared  that  it  was  Ger- 
many's duty  not  to  submit  to  a  peace 
of  violence  without  a  fight.  At  this 
stage  of  the  negotiations  the  American 
public  was  alarmed  lest  peace  should 
come  about  by  bargaining,  and  there 
was  a  loud  demand  for  "unconditional 
surrender."  Many  public  men,  espe- 
cially among  the  Republicans,  expressed 
suspicion  of  the  President's  course  and 
advocated  a  short,  sharp  reply  saying 
that  the  question  of  armistice  should 
be  referred  to  the  generals  in  the  field. 
The  American  government's  reply  to 
the  foregoing  German  note  was  as  fol- 
lows : 


"Having  received  the  solemn  and  explicit 
assurance  of  the  German  Government  that  it 
unreservedly  accepts  the  terms  of  peace  laid 
down  in  his  address  to  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States  on  January  8,  1918,  and  the  prin- 
ciples of  settlement  enunciated  in  his  subse- 
quent addresses,  particularly  the  address  of 
September  27,  and  that  it  desires  to  discuss  the 
details  of  their  application,  and  that  this  wish 
and  purpose  emanated,  not  from  those  who 
have  hitherto  dictated  German  policy  and  con- 
ducted the  present  war  on  German's  behalf  but 
from  Ministers  who  speak  for  the  majority  of 
the  Reichstag  and  for  an  overwhelming  major- 
ity of  the  German  peoples;  and  having  re- 
ceived also  the  explicit  promise  of  the  present 
German  Government  that  the  humane  rules  of 
civilized  warfare  will  be  observed  both  on  land 
and  sea  by  the  German  armed  forces,  the  Pres- 
ident of  the  United  States  feels  that  he  cannot 
decline  to  take  up  with  the  Governments  with 
which  the  Government  of  the  United  States  is 
associated  the  question  of  an  armistice. 

"He  deems  it  his  duty  to  say  again,  how- 
ever, that  the  only  armistice  he  would  feel 
justified  in  submitting  for  consideration  would 
be  one  which  should  leave  the  United  States 
and  the  powers  associated  with  her  in  a  posi- 
tion to  enforce  any  arrangements  that  may  be 
entered  into  and  to  make  a  renewal  of  hostil- 
ities on  the  part  of  Germany  impossible.  The 
President  has,  therefore,  transmitted  his  cor- 
respondence with  the  present  German  author- 
ities to  the  Governments  with  which  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  is  associated  as 
a  belligerent,  with  the  suggestion  that,  if  those 


Governments  are  disposed  to  effect  peace  upon 
the  terms  and  principles  indicated,  their  mil- 
itary advisers  and  the  military  advisers  of  the 
United  States  be  asked  to  submit  to  the  Gov- 
ernments associated  against  Germany  the  neces- 
sary terms  of  such  an  armistice  as  will  fully 
protect  the  interests  of  the  peoples  involved 
and  insure  to  the  associated  Governments  the 
unrestricted  power  to  safeguard  and  enforce 
the  details  of  the  peace  to  which  the  German 
Government  has  agreed,  provided  they  deem 
such  an  armistice  possible  from  the  military 
point  of  view.  Should  such  terms  of  armistice 
be  suggested,  their  acceptance  by  Germany  will 
afford  the  best  concrete  evidence  of  her  un- 
equivocal acceptance  of  the  terms  and  princi- 
ples of  peace  from  which  the  whole  action  pro- 
ceeds. 

"The  President  would  deem  himself  lacking 
in  candor  did  he  not  point  out  in  the  frankest 
possible  terms  the  reason  why  extraordinary 
safeguards  must  be  demanded.  Significant  and 
important  as  the  constitutional  changes  seem 
to  be  which  are  spoken  of  by  the  German  For- 
eign Secretary  in  his  note  of  October  20,  it 
does  not  appear  that  the  principle  of  a  Gov- 
ernment responsible  to  the  German  people  has 
yet  been  fully  worked  out  or  that  any  guar- 
antees either  exist  or  are  in  contemplation  that 
the  alterations  of  principle  and  of  practice  now 
partially  agreed  upon  will  be  permanent. 
Moreover,  it  does  not  appear  that  the  heart  of 
the  present  difficulty  has  been  reached.  It  may 
be  that  future  war  has  been  brought  under  the 
control  of  the  German  people,  but  the  present 
war  has  not  been,  and  it  is  with  the  present 
war  that  we  are  dealing.  It  is  evident  that  the 
German  people  have  no  means  of  commanding 
the  acquiescence  of  the  military  authorities  of 
the  empire  in  the  popular  will;  that  the  power 
of  the  King  of  Prussia  to  control  the  policy  of 
the  empire  is  unimpaired;  that  the  determinat- 
ing initiative  still  remains  with  those  who  have 
hitherto  been  the  masters  of  Germany. 

"Feeling  that  the  whole  peace  of  the  world 
depends  now  on  plain  speaking  and  straight- 
forward action,  the  President  deems  it  his  duty 
to  say,  without  any  attempt  to  soften,  what 
may  seem  harsh  words,  that  the  nations  of  the 
world  do  not  and  cannot  trust  the  word  of 
those  who  have  hitherto  been  the  masters  of 
German  policy,  and  to  point  out  once  more 
that  in  concluding  peace  and  attempting  to 
undo  the  infinite  injuries  and  injustices  of  this 
war  the  government  of  the  United  States  can- 
not deal  with  any  but  veritable  representatives 
of  the  German  people,  who  have  been  assured 
a  genuine  constitutional  standing  as  the  real 
rulers  of  Germany.  If  it  must  deal  with  the 
military  masters  and  the  monarchical  auto- 
crats of  Germany  now,  or  if  it  is  likely  to 
have  to  deal  with  them  later  in  regard  to  the 
international   obligations    of   the   German   Em- 


PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  WAR  AIMS 


293 


pire,  it  must  demand,  not  peace  negotiations, 
but  surrender.  Nothing  can  be  gained  by  leav- 
ing this  essential  thing  unsaid. 

On  October  27  Germany  requested 
proposals  for  an  armistice  in  the  fol- 
lowing note : 

"The  German  Government  has  taken  cogni- 
zance of  the  answer  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States.  The  President  is  aware  of  the 
far-reaching  changes  which  have  been  carried 
out  and  are  being  carried  out  in  the  German 
constitutional  structure,  and  that  peace  nego- 
tiations are  being  conducted  by  a  people's  Gov- 
ernment in  whose  hands  rests,  both  actually 
and  constitutionally,  the  power  to  make  the 
deciding  conclusions.  The  military  powers  are 
also  subject  to  it.  The  German  Government 
now  awaits  proposals,  for  an  armistice,  which 
shall  be  the  first  step  toward  a  just  peace  as 
the  President  has  described  it  in  his  proclama- 
tion." 

To  this  the  American  government  re- 
plied on  November  4 : 

"In  my  note  of  October  23,  1918,  I  advised 
you  that  the  President  had  transmitted  his  cor- 
respondence with  the  German  authorities  to  the 
Governments  with  which  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  is  associated  as  a  belligerent, 
with  the  suggestion  that  if  those  Governments 
were  disposed  to  accept  peace  upon  the  terms 
and  principles  indicated,  their  military  advisers 
and  the  military  advisers  of  the  United  States 
be  asked  to  submit  to  the  Governments  asso- 
ciated against  Germany  the  necessary  terms  of 
tuch  an  armistice  as  would  fully  protect  the 
Interests  of  the  peoples  involved  and  insure  to 
the  Associated  Governments  the  unrestricted 
power  to  safeguard  and  enforce  the  details  of 
the  peace  to  which  the  German  Government 
had  agreed,  provided  they  deem  such  an  armis- 
tice possible  from  the  military  point  of  view. 
The  President  is  now  in  receipt  of  a  memor- 
andum of  observations  by  the  Allied  Govern- 
ments on  this  correspondence,  which  is  as  fol- 
lows: 

"  'The  Allied  Governments  have  given  care- 
ful consideration  to  the  correspondence 
which  has  passed  between  the  President  of 
the  United  States  and  the  German  Govern- 
ment. Subject  to  the  qualifications  which 
follow,  they  declare  their  willingness  to  make 
peace  with  the  Government  of  Germany  on 
the  terms  of  peace  laid  down  in  the  Pres- 
ident's address  to  Congress  of  January,  1918, 
and  the  principles  of  settlement  enunciated 
in  his  subsequent  addresses.    They  must  point 


out,  however,  that  Clause  2,  relating  to  what 
is  usually  described  as  the  freedom  of  the 
seas,  is  open  to  various  interpretations,  some 
of  which  they  could  not  accept.  They  must, 
therefore,  reserve  to  themselves  complete 
freedom  on  this  subject  when  they  enter  the 
peace  conference.  Further,  in  the  conditions 
of  peace  laid  down  in  his  address  to  Con- 
gress of  January  8,  1918,  the  President  de- 
clared that  invaded  territories  must  be  re- 
stored as  well  as  evacuated  and  freed.  The 
Allied  Governments  feel  that  no  doubt  ought 
to  be  allowed  to  exist  as  to  what  this  pro- 
vision implies.  By  it  they  understand  that 
compensation  will  be  made  by  Germany  for 
all  damage  done  to  the  civilian  population 
of  the  Allies  and  their  property  by  the  ag- 
gression of  Germany  by  land,  by  sea  and 
from  the  air.' 

"I  am  instructed  by  the  President  to  say 
that  he  is  in  agreement  with  the  interpretation 
set  forth  in  the  last  paragraph  of  the  mem- 
orandum above  quoted.  I  am  further  in- 
structed by  the  President  to  request  you  to 
notify  the  German  Government  that  Marshal 
Foch  has  been  authorized  by  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  and  the  Allied  Govern- 
ments to  receive  properly  accredited  repre- 
sentatives of  the  German  Government  and  to 
communicate  to  them  terms  of  an  armistice. 
Accept,  sir,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my  high- 
est  consideration.      Robert   Lansing." 

Austrian  Peace  Move. — At  the  same 
time  that  Prince  Max  sent  the  German 
note  of  peace,  the  Swedish  government 
was  requested  by  the  Austro-Hungar- 
ian  goverment  to  submit  to  the  Presi- 
dent the  following  message  (October  7, 
1918): 

"The  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  which  has 
waged  war  always  and  solely  as  a  defensive 
war,  and  repeatedly  given  documentary  evi- 
dence of  its  readiness  to  stop  the  shedding  of 
blood  and  to  arrive  at  a  just  and  honorable 
peace,  hereby  addresses  itself  to  His  Lordship 
the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
and  offers  to  conclude  with  him  and  his  allies 
an  armistice  on  every  front  on  land,  at  sea  and 
in  the  air,  and  to  enter  immediately  upon  nego- 
tiations for  a  peace  for  which  the  fourteen 
points  in  the  message  of  President  Wilson  to 
Congress  of  January  8,  1918,  and  the  four 
points  contained  in  President  Wilson's  address 
of  February  12,  1918,  should  serve  as  a  founda- 
tion and  in  which  the  viewpoints  declared  by 
President  Wilson  in  his  address  of  September 
27,  1918,  will  also  be  taken  into  account." 


294 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


To  this  the  United  States  govern- 
ment replied  under  date  of  October  18, 
as  follows: 

"The  President  deems  it  his  duty  to  say  to 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  that  he  can- 
not entertain  the  present  suggestions  of  that 
Government  because  of  certain  events  of  ut- 
most importance  which,  occurring  since  the  de- 
livery of  his  address  of  the  8th  of  January  last, 
have  necessarily  altered  the  attitude  and  re- 
sponsibility of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States.  Among  the  fourteen  terms  of  peace 
which  the  President  formulated  at  the  time 
occurred   the   following: 

"10.  The  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary,  whose 
place  among  the  nations  we  wish  to  see  safe- 
guarded and  assured,  should  be  accorded  the 
freest  opportunity  of  autonomous  develop- 
ment. 

"Since  that  sentence  was  written  and  uttered 
to  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  has  recognized 
that  a  state  of  belligerency  exists  between  the 
Czecho-Slovaks  and  the  German  and  Austro- 
Hungarian  Empires,  and  that  the  Czecho- 
slovak National  Council  is  a  de  facto  belliger- 
ent Government  clothed  with  proper  authority 
to  direct  the  military  and  political  affairs  of 
the  Czecho-Slovaks.  It  has  also  recognized  in 
the  fullest  manner  the  justice  of  the  national- 
istic aspirations  of  the  Jugo-Slavs  for  freedom. 

"The  President  is  therefore  no  longer  at  lib- 
erty to  accept  the  mere  'autonomy'  of  these 
peoples  as  a  basis  of  peace,  but  is  obliged  to 
insist  that  they  and  not  he  shall  be  the  judges 
of  what  action  on  the  part  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Government  will  satisfy  their  aspira- 
tions and  their  conception  of  their  rights  and 
destiny  as  members  of  the  family  of  nations. 
Accept,  sir,  the  renewed  assurances  of  my 
highest   consideration.  Robert   Lansixg." 

At  the  same  time  the  Emperor 
Charles  issued  a  manifesto  declaring 
that  the  reconstruction  of  the  country 
must  begin  and  that  the  wishes  of  the 
Austrian  people  must  be  made  to  har- 
monize. Austria,  he  said,  would  become 
a  Federal  state  in  which  every  race 
should  form  its  own  national  state  with- 
in its  national  dominion.  He  also  ad- 
dressed a  message  to  the  army  and  fleet 
referring  to  the  plan  for  a  Federal 
state.  In  the  Hungarian  parliament 
there  was  a  declaration  on  the  part  of 
the  prime  minister  that  peace  must  be 


concluded  and  that  after  Austria  was 
organized  on  a  Federal  basis,  the 
Hungarian  state  would  organize  its  in- 
dependence, but  would  maintain  a 
personal  union  with  Austria.  Count  Mi- 
chael Karolyi  attacked  the  prime  min- 
ister, demanding  that  peace  negotia- 
tions be  opened  at  once.  Soon  after- 
wards Count  Tisza  declared  that  the 
country  must  admit  that  it  had  lost 
the  war  and  that  he  approved  of  the 
government  to  make  peace  on  President 
Wilson's  terms.  Count  Karolyi  at- 
tacked the  government's  foreign  policy 
from  the  beginning  of  the  war,  blaming 
it  for  bringing  on  the  war  and  speci- 
fying how  it  might  have  avoided  the 
conflict. 

On  October  28  the  Austro-Hunga- 
rian foreign  minister,  Count  Julius  An- 
drassy,  transmitted  through  the  Swe- 
dish government  the  following  reply : 


"In  reply  to  the  note  of  the  President,  Mr. 
Wilson,  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government, 
dated  October  18  of  this  year,  and  about  the 
decision  of  the  President  to  take  up,  with  Aus- 
tria-Hungary separately,  the  question  of  armis- 
tice and  peace,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment has  the  honor  to  declare  that  it  adheres 
both  to  the  previous  declarations  of  the  Presi- 
dent and  his  opinion  of  the  rights  of  the  peo- 
ples of  Austria-Hungary,  notably  those  of  the 
Czecho-Slovaks  and  the  Jugo-Slavs,  contained  in 
his  last  note.  Austria-Hungary  having  thereby 
accepted  all  the  conditions  which  the  President 
had  put  upon  entering  into  negotiations  on  the 
subject  of  armistice  and  peace,  nothing,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government, 
longer  stands  in  the  way  of  beginning  those  ne- 
gotiations. The  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
therefore  declares  itself  ready  to  enter,  without 
waiting  for  the  outcome  of  other  negotiations, 
into  negotiations  for  a  peace  betv/een  Austria- 
Hungary  and  the  Entente  States,  and  for  an 
immediate  armistice  on  all  the  fronts  of  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, and  begs  the  President,  Mr.  Wil- 
son, to  take  the  necessary  measures  to  that  ef- 
fect." 


The  Beginning  of  the  Collapse. — 
During  the  last  ten  days  of  October, 
when  the  notes  were  passing  between  the 
United  States  government  and  the  for- 


PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  WAR  AIMS 


295 


eign  offices  of  the  two  Germanic  powers, 
the  following  events  rapidly  succeeded 
one  another:    In  Germany  the  general 
staff  was  divided  on  the  question  of  the 
peace   offer,   Ludendorff  opposing  and 
Hindenburg  favoring.   Hindenburg  pre- 
vailed and  on  October  22  an  order  from 
the  German  general  headquarters  which 
had  been  captured  by  the  French  was 
made    public.      In    it    Hindenburg    de- 
clared his  approval  of  the  government's 
peace  offer  and  called  upon  the  army 
not  to  interfere  with  it.    Ludendorff  re- 
signed and  on  October  27  Gen.  von  Los- 
sing,  who  had  been  chief  of  staff  in  the 
battle  of  Arras  in  April,  1917,  was  an- 
nounced as  his  successor.  In  the  Reichs- 
tag Dr.  Solf,  the  foreign  secretary,  in 
response   to   inquiries,  declared  it   was 
the  government's  intention  to  carry  out 
honestly    the    principles    set    forth    by 
President  Wilson,  including  specifically 
the   Polish    and   Alsace-Lorraine   ques- 
tions.    Meanwhile  the  power  of  the  So- 
cialists   was    steadily    mounting.      The 
government   released    Herr   Liebknecht 
on  October  22.     The  Independent  So- 
cialist leader,  Haase,  demanded  in  the 
Reichstag  on  October  24  that  the  mon- 
archy give  way  to  a  republic  and  there 
was    evidence    that    the    working    class 
throughout  the  country  was  behind  him. 
In  the  Prussian  house  of  deputies  there 
was  sarcastic  comment  on  the  govern- 
ment's sudden  conversion  to  democracy, 
which  was   characterized   as   a   comedy 
that  foreign  governments  ought  to  see 
through;    militarism    and    imperialism 
were  declared  to  be   as   superfluous   as 
the  dynasty.     Mass  meetings  of  the  In- 
dependent Socialist  Democrats  were  re- 
ported throughout  all  Germany. 

In  Austria-Hungary  the  Hussarek 
ministry  resigned,  and  on  October  26 
it  was  announced  that  Dr.  Heinrich 
Lammasch,  an  advocate  of  peace,  would 
form  a  cabinet.     Meanwhile  a  movement 


for  a  new  German- Austrian  state  within 
the  empire  had  resulted  in  a  so-called 
Constituent    German    Assembly    which 
met  at  Vienna  on  October  21  and  unani- 
mously passed  a  resolution  declaring  it 
to  be  the  will  of  the  German  people  in 
Austria  to  determine  their  own  destiny 
and  form  an  independent  state.     By  the 
end  of  October  a  condition  of  anarchy 
was   reported  throughout  the  country. 
A  provisional  government  was   set  up 
and   a   republic   proclaimed.      The  em- 
peror abdicated  November  3.     In  Hun- 
gary the  movement  to  break  away  from 
Austria  proceeded  rapidly  and  on  Octo- 
ber 17  the  diet  adopted  a  resolution  de- 
claring   Hungary    independent    except 
for  the  union  in  the  person  of  the  em- 
peror.    Soon  afterwards  Count  Michael 
Karolyi   led  a  sharp   attack  upon   the 
ministry  and  demanded  the  resignation 
of  the   prime  minister,   Dr.   Wekherle. 
The  latter  resigned  on  October  25  and 
was  succeeded  by  Count  Apponyi.     The 
announcement   of  the  emperor's   inten- 
tion   to    concede    the    independence    of 
Hungary  produced  no  effect,  and  early 
in  November  the  diet,  now  styling  itself 
the  national  assembly,  proclaimed  Hun- 
gary   a    republic    with    Count    Michael 
Karolyi   as   prime   minister   of   foreign 
affairs.      Meanwhile   the   disintegration 
through  the  Slav  movements  for  separa- 
tion was  continuing.     The  Czecho-Slo- 
vak   provisional  government   sitting  in 
Paris  issued  a  formal  declaration  of  in- 
dependence, asserting  that  the  Czecho- 
slovaks would  no  longer  live  under  the 
direct  or  indirect  rule  of  the  violators 
of  Belgium,  that  they   repudiated   the 
Vienna  government's  promises  of  inde- 
pendence, and  that  no  one  among  them 
would  care  to  have  anything  to  do  with 
those  who  had  not  wished  to  do  justice 
to  them  or  to  the  Polish  and  Jugo-Slav 
nations.     There  were  violent  scenes  in 
the  diet  as  the  result  of  the  assertion 


296 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


of  a  Rumanian  deputy  that  henceforth 
the  Rumanians  of  Hungary  were  a  na- 
tion. The  resignation  of  Dr.  Wekherle 
had  followed  the  news  that  a  Croatian 
regiment  at  Fiume  had  disarmed  the 
Hungarian  Honved  (militia).  This 
movement  was  a  sequel  to  several  south- 
ern Slav  attempts  at  revolt  in  the  army 
and  navy,  notably  the  mutinies  among 
the  sailors  of  the  fleet  in  Italian  wa- 
ters in  the  latter  part  of  1917  at  Se- 
benico  and  Pola  and  in  February,  1918, 
at  Pola  and  Cattaro.  The  Croatian 
troops  after  the  revolt  at  Fiume  seized 
the  buildings  of  the  city.  All  Croatia 
meanwhile  was  in  revolt.  In  the  United 
States  a  great  Slavic  demonstration 
took  place  at  Independence  Hall,  Phila- 
delphia, October  27,  comprising  repre- 
sentatives of  eighteen  Slav  states  of 
Middle  Europe  with  a  population  of 
some  fifty  millions  and  representatives 
of  other  nationalities  under  alien  rule. 
Among  them  were  Poles,  Czechoslo- 
vaks, Jugo-Slavs,  Ukrainians,  Ukro- 
Russians,  Lithuanians,  Rumanians, 
Italian  Irredentists,  Unredeemed 
Greeks,  Zionists,  and  Albanians.  Mean- 
while preparations  were  made  for  an 
Allied  conference  at  Paris  where  Col. 
House,  as  the  personal  representative 
of  the  President,  arrived  on  October  26 
and  was  followed  by  the  British  prime 
minister,  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  and  Mr. 
Arthur  J.  Balfour,  secretary  for  for- 
eign affairs.  On  November  11  the 
armistice  with  Germany  was  signed. 
See  military  section  above. 

Although  the  above  evidences  of  dis- 
ruption in  Austria-Hungary  and  in 
Germany  were  reported  in  the  press, 
prominent  statesmen  in  the  countries  of 
the  Allies  continued  to  profess  the  be- 
lief that  the  peace  move  of  the  two 
Central  Powers  was  of  the  same  order 
as  previous  peace  moves  and  could  not 
be  regarded  in  any  other  light  than  as 


an  attempt  to  secure  an  advantage. 
The  belief  that  it  was  merely  part  of 
Germany's  and  Austria's  diplomatic 
strategy  continued  down  to  the  moment 
of  the  conclusion  of  the  armistice.  The 
complete  internal  disorganization  of  the 
two  Germanic  powers  during  October 
and  the  first  week  in  November  seemed 
not  to  be  in  the  least  appreciated  by 
many  of  the  leading  statesmen  in  spite 
of  the  numerous  signs. 

Dr.  Solf's  Appeal. — Shortly  after 
the  signing  of  the  armistice,  an  appeal 
was  addressed  by  Dr.  Solf  to  the  Allied 
governments,  comprising  among  others 
the  following  points :  The  conditions 
imposed  by  the  armistice,  he  said, 
threatened  the  economic  security  of  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine  and  its  relations 
with  German  territory  on  the  right 
bank.  Unless  those  conditions  were 
modified,  Germany  could  not  exist,  and, 
moreover,  the  peaceful  development 
which  was  beginning  in  Germany  would 
be  checked,  with  the  result  that  a  more 
or  less  Bolshevist  movement  would  take 
shape.  Hence  it  was  urged  that  normal 
intercourse  between  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine  and  the  rest  of  Germany  and 
with  foreign  countries  should  not  be  dis- 
turbed even  during  military  occupation. 
Then  followed  a  long  list  of  economic 
activities  that  Germany  desired  to  re- 
sume in  relation  to  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine,  including  permission  to  exploit 
as  hitherto  the  coal,  potash,  and  ore 
mines ;  to  transport  the  requisite  coal, 
ore,  and  potash ;  to  use  completely  the 
Rhine  for  transports  within  the  old 
boundary  of  the  German  Empire ;  to 
have  the  right  of  free  navigation  via 
Rotterdam  and  the  coast  for  provision- 
ing Germany ;  to  have  free  railway  traf- 
fic and  the  right  to  electric  power :  to 
allow  the  civil  and  military  organiza- 
tions on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  to 
continue  to  work,  etc. 


PEACE  PROPOSALS  AND  WAR  AIMS 


297 


At  the  same  time,  a  special  appeal 
was  made  to  the  United  States  govern- 
ment that  the  distress  was  urgent  and 
that  the  oppressive  terms  of  the  armis- 
tice were  making  the  situation  unbear- 
able ;.  that  anarchy  could  only  be  avoid- 
ed if  aid  were  quickly  given.  The  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  was  im- 
plored to  save  the  German  people  from 
starvation  and  anarchy  by  sending  en- 
voys to  the  Hague  or  some  other  place 
to  discuss  with  envoys  from  Germany 
details  as  to  how  American  aid  could 
be  given.  Still  another  appeal  was 
made  to  the  United  States  government 
requesting  the  President's  intervention 
on  behalf  of  the  German  civilians  in 
Turkey  who,  by  the  19th  article  of  the 
Anglo-Turkish  armistice,  were  required 
to  leave  the  Turkish  Empire — a  re- 
quirement that  would  cause  severe  hard- 
ship especially  to  the  poor  people  un- 
der German  care,  etc. 

France  and  Peace  Terms. — On  De- 
cember 30  Premier  Clemenceau  made  an 
important  address  in  the  chamber  of 
deputies,  in  the  course  of  which  he  re- 
plied to  various  criticisms,  especially 
in  regard  to  his  not  having  kept  the 
chamber  informed  as  to  what  was  going 
on.  He  said  if  he  had  told  the  cham- 
ber all  the  details  of  the  discussions  in 
regard  to  the  various  claims  of  the  pow- 
ers, he  would  have  been  the  worst  prime 
minister  in  Europe.  He  declared  that 
while  he  was  in  accord  with  President 


Wilson  on  some  points,  he  disagreed 
with  him  on  others ;  and  he  added  this 
statement,  which  was  regarded  as  high- 
ly significant  since  it  indicated  a  di- 
vergence of  view  between  the  French 
government  and  the  governments  of  the 
United  States  and  England.  He  said 
France  found  itself  in  a  particularly 
difficult  situation.  It  was  the  nearest 
country  to  Germany.  The  United 
States  was  at  a  distance  and  it  took  its 
own  time  in  entering  the  war.  England 
entered  immediately  upon  the  appeal  of 
Mr.  Asquith.  "We  have  suffered  and 
fought ;  our  men  have  been  mowed  down, 
and  our  cities  and  villages  destroyed. 
There  exists  an  old  system  of  alliance 
known  as  the  balance  of  power.  Every- 
body seems  to  condemn  it  now,  and 
nevertheless  if  England,  the  United 
States,  France,  and  Italy  had  agreed 
that  whatever  power  would  attack  any 
one  of  them,  it  would  be  equivalent  to 
a  declaration  of  war  upon  the  whole 
world,  this  war  would  never  have  taken 
place.  This  system,  moreover,  which  I 
have  not  renounced,  will  be  my  all-guid- 
ing thought  at  the  Peace  Conference  if 
your  confidence  sends  me  there."  He 
demanded  a  vote  of  confidence  saying 
that  if  there  were  any  doubt  as  to  the 
wisdom  of  leaving  him  in  control,  it 
should  be  settled  now.  The  vote  of 
confidence  was  accorded  by  an  over- 
whelming majority,  namely,  398 
against  93. 


XI.     RELIEF   MEASURES 


The  outbreak  of  the  European  War     Ambassador  at  Berlin  and  the  American 


very  soon  made  it  evident  that  millions 
of  innocent  victims  in  the  fighting  areas 
would  be  without  independent  means  of 
support  on  account  of  wholesale  de- 
struction of  property,  the  confiscation 
of  food  supplies,  and  the  paralysis  of 
industry.  This  was  first  illustrated  in 
Belgium,  where  it  was  estimated  that 
by  November,  1914,  over  6,000,000  peo- 
ple had  been  rendered  homeless  and 
1,500,000  destitute.  The  prosecution 
of  the  war,  however,  resulted  in  the 
creation  of  a  similar  situation  in  Rus- 
sian Poland,  Galicia,  and  in  Serbia. 
The  situation  in  Poland  was  even  worse 
than  that  in  Belgium.  Finally  the  un- 
precedented butchery  of  the  Armen- 
ians by  the  Turks  rendered  relief  for 
the  remnant  of  the  Armenian  popula- 
tion an  absolute  necessity. 

As  early  as  September,  1914,  relief 
organizations  began  to  be  formed  in 
the  United  States.  After  considerable 
duplication  at  first,  relief  committees 
gradually  were  systematized  under  cen- 
tral committees.  All  sorts  of  devices 
were  resorted  to,  including  appeals 
through  newspapers,  endless-chain , 
whist  parties,  fairs  and  bazaars,  the- 
atrical and  musical  performances, 
"tag"  days,  balls  and  fetes  of  various 
kinds,  and  appeals  through  churches 
and  other  organizations. 

Commission  for  Relief  in  Belgium. 
— This  was  the  most  extensive  relief  or- 
ganization, embracing  all  neutral  coun- 
tries. It  was  brought  into  existence 
through  the  activities  of  the  American 
and  Spanish  ambassadors  at  London 
and  ministers  at  Brussels,  the  American 


Minister  at  The  Hague.  There  were 
national  organizations  in  America, 
Spain,  Italy,  and  England,  besides  a 
most  extensive  distributory  organiza- 
tion in  Belgium  and  northern  France. 
It  carried  out  the  distribution  of  its 
aid  in  Belgium  through  the  Comite  Na- 
tional de  Secours  et  d'Alimentation. 
Similarly  on  account  of  the  devasta- 
tion in  the  occupied  French  territory 
the  Comite  d'Alimentation  du  Nord  de 
France  was  organized.  The  commis- 
sion had  assembling  depots  in  every 
State  in  the  United  States,  and  repre- 
sentative executives  in  all  but  about  12 
States. 

The  committee  secured  pledges  from 
England,  Holland,  and  Germany,  per- 
mitting the  transportation  of  food 
products  to  the  occupied  territory  and 
the  pledge  of  Germany  that  such  food 
would  not  be  confiscated  for  war  pur- 
poses. The  general  policy  of  the  com- 
mission was  to  cooperate  with  organi- 
zations of  every  sort  in  Belgium  and 
northern  France ;  local  committees  were 
brought  into  existence  in  almost  every 
commune  of  the  occupied  territory,  and 
over  these  were  district  and  provincial 
committees,  all  under  the  Comite  Na- 
tional. The  work  was  carried  out  un- 
der three  main  divisions :  the  Provision- 
ing Department ;  the  Financial  Relief 
and  Exchange  Department ;  and  the 
Benevolent  Department.  The  Provi- 
sioning Department  provided  food  for 
about  7,000,000  people  in  Belgium  and 
2,300,000  in  northern  France.  Food- 
stuffs were  sold  to  the  population  and 
the  profits  thus  secured  were  used  by 


298 


RELIEF  MEASURES 


299 


the  Benevolent  Department  for  the  care 
of  the  destitute.  Food  was  given  out 
through  a  system  of  canteens  covering 
all  Belgium,  meals  being  supplied  at  a 
per  capita  cost  of  only  eight  cents  a 
day.  There  were  also  baby  canteens, 
cheap  restaurants,  meals  for  school 
children,  and  in  some  cases  provision  of 
shelter.  Aid  was  also  given  to  or 
through  the  following:  a  committee  to 
aid  doctors  and  pharmacists  by  sup- 
plying medicines,  serums  and  other  ne- 
cessities ;  child  institutions  working  for 
the  better  feeding  of  infants,  the  aid 
of  private  and  public  orphanages,  and 
assistance  to  war  orphans  and  other 
homeless  children ;  the  treatment  of  in- 
digent consumptives ;  an  agricultural 
committee  to  control  the  supply  of  seeds 
and  fodder;  a  committee  for  the  aid 
and  protection  of  artists,  some  50,000 
lace  workers  (mostly  Belgian  women), 
destitute  foreigners,  and  refugees  from 
other  localities ;  a  committee  for  the  re- 
habilitation of  churches ;  local  work- 
rooms for  the  repair  of  clothing  for  the 
destitute;  and  miscellaneous  grants  for 
Cardinal  Mercier  for  trade  training  for 
maimed  soldiers,  and  for  maternity  hos- 
pitals. 

The  total  amount  of  money  entrusted 
to  the  commission  up  to  the  close  of  the 
war  was  about  $500,000,000,  which, 
with  the  exception  of  overhead  charges, 
were  spent  for  food  in  Belgium  and 
France.  The  British  and  French  gov- 
ernments contributed  more  than  $150,- 
000,000  for  relief  in  Belgium.  After 
the  diplomatic  break  between  the  United 
States  and  Germany  the  Dutch  took 
over  the  work  of  the  Commission. 

Belgian  Relief  Fund.  This  fund 
"for  women,  children  and  other  non- 
combatants"  had  its  headquarters  in 
New  York  City.  It  embraced  numerous 
local  committees,  including  one  in  every 
State.     Most  of  the  cash  received  was 


spent  for  food,  but  small  sums  were 
sent  to  refugees  in  Holland  and  to  war 
victims  in  the  unoccupied  parts  of  Bel- 
gium. 

Jewish  Relief.  On  account  of  the 
great  number  of  Jews  in  Poland  and 
other  parts  of  Europe  who  suffered  ex- 
treme privation  as  a  result  of  the  war, 
the  American  Jewish  Relief  Committee 
for  Sufferers  from  the  War  was  organ- 
ized in  New  York  City.  Towards  the 
close  of  the  year  1915,  a  most  active 
campaign  for  funds  was  undertaken. 
Local  committees  were  formed  in  cities 
throughout  the  country.  In  1916  a 
great  bazaar  was  held  in  New  York 
City  which  realized  about  $1,000,000. 

In  Great  Britain  was  formed  the  Rus- 
sian Jews'  Relief  Fund  for  the  aid  of 
Jews  in  Russia  and  Poland.  It  had 
branches  in  all  the  principal  cities.  By 
means  of  it  over  120  relief  centres  were 
feeding  every  day  more  than  200,000 
homeless  and  destitute  Jews. 

In  Russia  a  central  relief  committee 
at  Petrograd  sent  out  word  that  mili- 
tary authorities  had  forcibly  removed 
250,000  Jews  from  their  homes  in  the 
occupied  territory  and  that  200,000 
more  had  left  voluntarily.  The  com- 
mittee had  opened  employment  agencies 
in  31  cities  and  equipped  10  workshops. 
Hospitals,  asylums,  infirmaries,  and 
schools  were  opened. 

The  Federal  Council  of  Allied  War 
Charities  comprised  some  seventy-five 
organizations  of  varied  interest  and  na- 
tional in  scope.  It  was  created  as  a 
part  of  the  movement  to  coordinate  ac- 
tivities, decrease  duplication,  and  in- 
crease financial  responsibility  and  ef- 
ficiency. It  served  also  as  a  medium 
for  effecting  concerted  action  of  its 
constituents  with  the  Red  Cross.  The 
latter's  Committee  on  Cooperation  ex- 
tended an  invitation  to  the  war  relief 
bodies  to  become  auxiliaries  of  the  Red 


300 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Cross  and  this  was  accomplished  to 
some  extent.  The  individual  organiza- 
tions, however,  were  loath  to  surrender 
their  independence  either  in  the  collec- 
tion of  funds  or  in  the  machinery,  meth- 
ods, and  area  of  the  distribution  of 
benefits.  The  aggregate  membership  of 
the  bodies  in  the  Federal  Council  was 
over  2,000,000.  Its  members  had  sent 
a  total  of  more  than  $4,000,000  in  cash 
and  goods  for  relief  work  in  Europe 
since  the  war  began. 

Quakers  in  War  Relief.     Within  a 
few  months  after  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  Quakers  of  the  United  States  and 
England  began  relief  activities  among 
peasants  of  devastated  areas  in  France 
and  Belgium.    By  the  fall  of  1917  they 
had  erected  nearly  500  wooden  houses 
for  peasants   and   assisted  in   securing 
supplies  of  agricultural  implements  and 
tools,   seeds,  poultry,   rabbits,  etc.,   as 
well  as  household  furniture  and  uten- 
sils.    They  established  work-rooms  for 
farm    women,    convalescent    homes,    a 
small   general   hospital,    and   a   mater- 
nity hospital.      They  organized  indus- 
tries  and   recreation   among  the  thou- 
sands  of  Belgians  in  refuge  camps  in 
Holland.      Later    they    began    similar 
work  among  Russians  driven  from  home 
on  the  eastern  battle  line,  this  branch 
being  in  charge  of  the  American  Friends 
Service  Committee,  assisted  by  a  group 
of   English    Friends.      This    committee 
began  in  July,  1917,  also  the  training 
at    Haverford    College    of    100    young 
men  for  reconstruction  work  in  France, 
including  agriculture,  building,  repair- 
ing, sanitation,  medical  and  social  work. 
The  American  Ambulance  was   one 
of  the  most  important  relief  activities. 
It    organized    ambulance    sections    for 
work  in  different  parts  of  France,  and 
Italy,    and    at    Saloniki.      Ambulance 
drivers    were    secured    primarily    from 
American    colleges,    considerably    more- 


than   1,000   such  men  having  been   re- 
cruited.      The     American    Ambulance 
Field  Service  had  in  July,  1917,  eight- 
een sections  of  ambulances  serving  the 
French  army  with  staffs  totalling  700 
volunteers.     In  all  it  was  maintaining 
more  than  700  ambulances  at  the  front, 
in  reserve,  or  under  construction.     A 
branch     of     this     service,     ammunition 
transport,    had    nearly    80,000    auto- 
trucks   at   work.      This    latter   branch 
was    long    handicapped     for    lack     of 
capable    drivers,    but    by    mid-summer 
this  was  overcome,  three  reserve  groups 
of  forty  men  each  being  under  train- 
ing.     The  American  Ambulance   Hos- 
pital at  Paris  was  at  first  run  entirely 
by    voluntary    workers ;    it    was    after- 
wards  turned  over   to   the  Red   Cross. 
It  then  became  the  American  Military 
Hospital,     run    by    American    money, 
with  its  staff  drawn  from  various  coun- 
tries, partly  volunteer  and  partly  paid 
professional   physicians    and    surgeons. 
It    had    600    beds,    excellent    surgical 
equipment,    250   motor    ambulances,    a 
hospital    train   fitted   to    accommodate 
264    wounded    and    having    operating 
room,    sterilizing    plant,    diet    kitchen 
and  a  staff  of  doctors,  surgeons,  and 
nurses.     Another  feature  was  the  Mo- 
bile Field  Hospital  with  108  beds;  and 
still    another    the    Advance    Hospital 
near  the  front  at  Juilly-sur-Marne.    It 
organized    the    War    Relief     Clearing 
House  for  France  and  her  Allies  with 
its     American     headquarters     in     New 
York    and    its    Paris    headquarters    in 
the  house  of  the  former  ambassadors 
of  the  United  States  to  France.     This 
body  was   officially   recognized   by   the 
French  government  as  the  agency  for 
the  distribution  of  American  charity  in 
France.     It  was  given  free  transporta- 
tion by  the  French  government  for  all 
of   its   supplies    on   French   liners    and 
over  all  French  railways. 


RELIEF  MEASURES 


301 


Perhaps  the  most  important  other 
relief  activities  were  those  directed 
toward  Poland  and  Serbia.  To  a  large 
extent  Jewish  relief  funds  were  direct- 
ed toward  the  former  country.  There 
was  in  addition  the  Polish  Victims'  Re- 
lief Fund  with  headquarters  at  33 
West  Forty-second  Street,  New  York, 
Frank  A.  Vanderlip,  treasurer,  which 
had  collected  more  than  $1,150,000 
at  the  beginning  of  1919.  There  was 
also  the  Polish  Children's  Relief  Fund, 
37  East  Thirty-sixth  Street,  New 
York,  Mrs.  Louisa  Satterlee,  treasurer, 
which  had  collected  over  $50,000.  The 
Serbian  Relief  Committee  had  head- 
quarters at  70  Fifth  Avenue,  New 
York,  Murray  H.  Coggeshall,  treas- 
urer; it  had  secured  $450,000.  The 
American  Committee  for  Armenian  and 
Syrian  Relief,  1  Madison  Avenue,  New 
York,  and  Cleveland,  Ohio,  H.  Dodge, 
treasurer,  had  spent  many  millions  of 
dollars  and  was  at  the  close  of  the 
year  planning  a  drive  for  $30,000,000 
more.  The  Serbian  Aid  Fund  Cloth- 
ing Committee,  338  Madison  Avenue, 
New  York,  was  engaged  in  a  campaign 
for  500  tons  of  warm  clothing  to  be 
transmitted  through  the  Serbian  lega- 
tion at  Washington ;  while  the  Serbian 
Aid  Fund,  1  Madison  Avenue,  New 
York,  Otto  T.  Bannard,  treasurer,  had 
collected  over  $180,000. 

Some  of  the  other  principal  relief 
funds  with  their  headquarters,  treas- 
urers, and  collections  to  the  close  of 
1918  were  as  follows:  American  Com- 
mittee for  Devastated  France,  16  East 
Thirty-ninth  Street,  New  York,  Dr.  A. 
C.  Humphreys,  treasurer,  $501,592 ; 
American  Committee  for  Training 
Maimed  Soldiers,  Hotel  Biltmore,  New 
York,  Mrs.  Edmund  L.  Baylies,  $428,- 
763 ;  American  Fund  for  French 
Wounded,  73  Park  Avenue,  New  York, 
Mrs.    W.    P.    Bliss,    $567,693;    Amer- 


ican Students  Committee,  107  East 
Thirty-seventh  Street,  New  York,  H. 
R.  Sedgwick,  $131,293;  American 
Women's  Hospitals,  637  Madison  Ave- 
nue, New  York,  Dr.  Sue  Radcliffe, 
$310,029;  British  War  Relief  Associa- 
tion, 542  Fifth  Avenue,  New  York, 
Henry  Clews,  $171,258;  Christian  Re- 
lief in  France  and  Belgium,  105  East 
Twenty-second  Street,  New  York,  Al- 
fred R.  Kimball,  $155,419;  Duryea 
War  Relief,  9  East  Thirtieth  Street, 
New  York,  Charles  E.  Warren,  $218,- 
860 ;  Fatherless  Children  of  France, 
140  Broadway,  New  York,  Alexander 
J.  Hemphill,  $741,043;  Food  for 
France,  10  East  Fifty-eighth  Street, 
New  York,  Alexander  J.  Hemphill, 
$148,485;  Free  Milk  for  France,  675 
Fifth  Avenue,  New  York,  Henry  E. 
Cooper,  $98,237;  Italian  War  Relief 
Fund,  347  Madison  Avenue,  New  York, 
S.  R.  Bertron,  $43,730;  Lafayette 
Fund,  Hotel  Vanderbilt,  New  York, 
Francis  Roche,  $301,000;  Secours  Na- 
tional Fund,  16  East  Forty-seventh 
Street,  New  York,  Mrs.  Whitney  War- 
ren, $581,148;  Stage  Women's  War 
Relief,  366  Fifth  Avenue,  New  York, 
Mrs.  Shelley  Hull,  $178,321. 

Red  Cross.  This  society  was  put  to 
the  severest  test  it  ever  had  to  under- 
go. In  all  the  belligerent  countries, 
the  work  of  the  relief  committees  was 
supplemented  by  the  efficient  service 
rendered  by  the  Red  Cross  Society. 
The  American  National  Red  Cross  So- 
ciety rendered  greater  continuous  ser- 
vice than  was  ever  given  by  any  Red 
Cross  of  a  neutral  country  during  a 
foreign  war.  At  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  this  society  had  an  enrollment  of 
about  6,000  nurses  and  surgeons.  It 
sent  over  a  number  of  surgical  and 
sanitary  units  (a  unit  is  a  working 
force  of  3  surgeons  and  12  nurses  sent 
to  a  hospital,  together  with  the  neces- 


302 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


sary  supplies)  for  hospital  work  and 
the  relief  of  noncombatants.  An  enor- 
mous quantity  of  purchased  and  do- 
nated medical,  surgical,  and  hospital 
supplies,  bed  linen,  garments,  etc.,  were 
shipped  from  the  United  States  to 
practically  all  the  battle  fronts  by 
the  American  Red  Cross.  In  Serbia 
and  Montenegro  the  American  Red 
Cross,  in  conjunction  with  the  Rocke- 
feller Foundation,  suppressed  the  epi- 
demic of  typhus  fever  which  destroyed 
150,000  lives. 

United  War  Work  Drive.  One  of 
the  most  comprehensive  and  unique 
campaigns  for  relief  work  with  the 
military  forces  was  that  carried  out  in 
November,  1918,  in  combination  by  the 
National  War  Work  Council  of  the 
Young  Men's  Christian  Association, 
the  War  Work  Council  of  the  Na- 
tional Board  of  the  Young  Women's 
Christian  Association,  the  National 
Catholic  War  Council  (Knights  of  Co- 
lumbus), the  Jewish  Welfare  Board, 
the  American  Library  Association,  the 
Salvation  Army,  and  the  War  Camp 
Community  Service.  These  organiza- 
tions were  engaged  in  activities  dis- 
tinctly different  from  those  of  the 
bodies  treated  in  the  foregoing  para- 
graphs, inasmuch  as  their  work  was 
designed  primarily  to  maintain  the 
morale  of  soldiers  in  the  fields.  These 
seven  agencies  sought  a  total  of  $170,- 
500,000  to  be  distributed  as  follows: 
Y.  M.  C.  A.,  $100,000,000;  K.  of  C, 
$30,000,000;  Jewish  Welfare  Board, 
$3,500,000;  American  Library  Asso- 
ciation, $3,500,000;  Salvation  Army, 
$3,500,000;  War  Camp  Community 
Service,  $15,000,000.  This  was  the 
most  remarkable  campaign  of  money 
solicitation  ever  carried  out  in  the 
United  States.  It  was  organized  by 
experts  in  such  activities.  In  every 
community    an    organization   was    per- 


fected and  the  campaign,  which  lasted 
for  one  week  only,  was  carried  out 
with  vim  and  exceptional  thoroughness. 
Total  pledges  in  excess  of  the  amount 
originally  expected  were  secured. 

The  Near  East.  Next  to  Belgium  the 
most  important  relief  problems  at  the 
close  of  war  were  those  connected  with 
the  millions  of  destitute  persons  in  Ar- 
menia, Syria,  Russian  Caucasus,  Meso- 
potamia, Macedonia,  Egypt,  and  Pal- 
estine. Throughout  this  immense  area 
the  Red  Cross  did  not  maintain  any 
relief  system.  To  meet  these  problems 
the  American  Committee  for  Relief  in 
the  Near  East  was  organized  and  in- 
corporated by  act  of  Congress.  Among 
its  principal  organizers  were  Harry  G. 
Hoak,  William  G.  Willcox,  John  B. 
Breighton,  Mrs.  George  W.  Vander- 
bilt,  Mrs.  Nicholas  Murray  Butler, 
Mrs.  W.  Bourke  Cochran,  Mrs.  Adrian 
Iselin,  Mrs.  Ogden  Mills  Reid,  Mrs. 
Oren  Root,  Mrs.  W.  E.  Guggenheim, 
Charles  E.  Hughes,  Bishop  Greer,  and 
Rabbi  Wise.  It  began  at  once  to  for- 
mulate plans  for  an  extensive  campaign 
to  raise  $30,000,000  for  relief  work. 

Fraudulent  Charities.  From  time  to 
time,  from  the  very  beginning  of  war 
charities  in  the  fall  of  1914,  there  were 
exposures  of  fraudulent  promotions 
and  solicitations.  The  most  exten- 
sive exposure,  however,  was  the  result 
of  a  special  investigation  made  by  the 
District  Attorney  of  New  York  and 
made  public  at  the  close  of  1918.  He 
found  that  millions  of  war  charities 
had  been  stolen  and  announced  that 
his  investigation  was  the  means  of  re- 
covering $250,000  for  worthy  projects. 
He  recommended  Federal  investigation. 
His  study  led  to  the  indictment  of 
twenty-six  alleged  offenders,  a  number 
of  whom  were  convicted  by  the  end  of 
the  year.  It  was  shown  that  the  Na- 
tional Committee  of  Defence  had  esti- 


RELIEF  MEASURES 


303 


mated  that  the  American  people  had 
contributed  between  three  and  four 
billion  dollars  for  war  relief  work,  of 
which  about  60  per  cent  was  raised  in 
New  York.  The  investigation  showed 
that  many  persons  of  high  character 
and  great  prominence  had  carelessly 
lent  their  names  to  the  charitable  pro- 
motions of  "ex-convicts,"  "confidence 
men,"  "adventurers,"  and  "social  para- 
sites." The  "social  climber"  found  in 
ostentatious  philanthropy  and  patriot- 
ism means  of  acquiring  social  recogni- 
tion. Frequently  names  of  well-known 
persons  were  used  without  their  con- 
sent or  knowledge.  The  investigation 
showed  that  many  projects  made  con- 
tracts with  solicitors  whereby  the  lat- 
ter received  from  40  per  cent  to  85 
per  cent  of  all  their  collections.     The 


district  attorney  thought  that  worthy 
war  relief  societies  had  been  robbed 
of  $3,000,000  and  that  in  a  great 
many  cases  two-thirds  of  the  money 
collected  had  been  wasted  by  fraudu- 
lent or  careless  methods.  After  in- 
vestigating 534  organizations  he  clas- 
sified many  of  them  as  wasteful,  profit- 
eering, or  foolish  charities,  and  mis- 
cellaneous frauds.  He  declared:  "The 
field  of  war  relief  work  in  the  United 
States  presented  a  vast  jungle  of  forms 
and  fancies  as  various  as  the  human 
imagination  might  suggest."  Among 
those  classified  as  wasteful  he  enumer- 
ated the  Army  and  Navy  Bazaar,  the 
American  Ambulance  in  Russia,  Hol- 
land-American Home  for  Belgian  Wid- 
ows and  Orphans ;  and  the  French 
Restoration  Fund. 


XII.     FINANCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS 


In  ancient  times  wars  involved  the 
entire  male  population  and  frequently 
the  women  as  well  in  the  actual  fighting 
and  campaigning,  but  modem  wars 
affect  the  vast  majority  of  the  popu- 
lation, even  of  belligerent  nations,  only 
through  their  economic  relations.  The 
development  of  the  vast  mechanism 
called  into  operation  by  war  to-day 
has  however  required  such  immense 
financial  transactions  and  such  gigan- 
tic demands  upon  industrial  resources 
that  these  indirect  effects  in  the  Euro- 
pean War  were  felt  not  merely  by 
every  family  in  the  fighting  areas  but 
indeed  by  every  family  in  the  civilized 
world.  The  first  immediate  financial 
effect  of  the  outbreak  of  war  is  a  dis- 
turbance of  the  machinery  of  inter- 
national credit.  Foreign  investments 
frequently  aid  during  peace  in  restor- 
ing the  balance  of  trade,  but  in  this 
war  investment  movements  were  exact- 
ly reversed.  Thus  normally  the  great 
excess  of  United  States  exports  of 
merchandise  over  imports  is  offset  in 
large  part  by  foreign  investments  in 
American  securities.  But  the  war 
brought  a  sharp  reversal  of  this  proc- 
ess, the  New  York  Stock  Exchange 
being  deluged  with  orders  from  abroad 
to  sell  at  any  price.  The  outbreak  of 
hostilities  creates  a  desire  to  delay 
payment  of  obligations  owed  but  to 
insist  on  immediate  payment  of  those 
due.  Trade  temporarily  comes  to  a 
standstill  and  gold  shipments  become 
dangerous  and.  are  impeded  by  great 
advances  in  insurance  rates  and  by  the 
reluctance  of  its  holders  to  part  with 
it.      Moreover  so  paralyzing  was   the 


effect  of  the  war  at  the  moment  it 
began  that  a  temporary  cessation  of 
international  exchange  must  have  been 
inevitable.  The  greatest  force  of  these 
conditions  was  naturally  felt  at  Lon- 
don, the  world  centre.  Consequently 
we  find  there  the  government  taking 
most  extraordinary  measures  to  restore 
the  movement  of  exchange.  In  war 
as  in  times  of  financial  crisis  each  na- 
tion seeks  to  increase  its  gold  holdings. 
This  can  be  done  only  by  increasing 
exports,  decreasing  imports,  selling 
foreign  investments,  or  contracting  ob- 
ligations abroad.  Now  it  is  not  pos- 
sible for  belligerent  nations  to  increase 
their  exports  because  of  the  disturb- 
ance of  their  own  production,  the 
drafting  of  workers  into  the  armies, 
the  increased  demand  for  goods  due  to 
the  war,  and,  in  the  case  of  nations 
hostile  to  England,  the  control  of  the 
high  seas  by  the  British  fleet.  On  the 
other  hand  all  fighting  nations  experi- 
ence a  greatly  increased  demand  for 
goods,  especially  for  food  and  all  kinds 
of  military  supplies.  This  may  be  in 
part  offset,  and  vigorous  efforts  were 
made  in  all  countries  and  notably  in 
England,  France,  and  Germany  to  off- 
set this  in  part,  by  cutting  down  the 
consumption  of  articles  classed  as  lux- 
uries. The  great  reduction  of  trade  to 
and  from  the  Central  Powers  made 
their  foreign  exchange  problem  rela- 
tively simple,  though  the  rates  of  ex- 
change ran  heavily  against  them.  The 
Allies  on  the  other  hand  began  the  war 
with  rates  of  exchange  in  their  favor, 
mainly  owing  to  the  enormous  obliga- 
tions of  the  United  States.     This  sit- 


304 


FINANCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS 


505 


uation,  however,  was  within  a  few 
months  exactly  reversed  owing  to  the 
extensive  purchases  of  the  Allies  and 
the  great  volume  of  American  securi- 
ties sold  by  them.  So  unfavorable  be- 
came the  rate  and  so  necessary  were 
American  goods  that  international 
loans  of  unprecedented  size  were  ef- 
fected to  enable  the  Allied  Powers  to 
continue  their  purchases  in  the  Amer- 
ican market. 

Closely  involved  with  the  problem 
of  international  exchange  are  the  bank- 
ing institutions  and  their  rates  of  in- 
terest. In  addition,  however,  the  banks 
must  meet  great  internal  problems  con- 
nected with  currency,  the  flotation  of 
government  loans,  and  the  special 
problems  arising  from  the  unique  con- 
ditions in  internal  trade.  Currency 
systems  are  deeply  affected  though  less 
markedly  than  formerly  when  their 
basis  was  less  firmly  established.  Nev- 
ertheless the  shock  of  war  was  every- 
where so  pronounced  in  its  effect  upon 
instruments  of  credit  that  every  bellig- 
erent nation  and  the  United  States 
were  compelled  to  issue  additions  to 
their  outstanding  currency.  The  in- 
terruption of  foreign  trade  and  the 
consequent  dislocation  of  business  are 
reflected  in  the  movement  of  the  stock 
markets.  Almost  upon  the  instant 
that  hostilities  began  the  world's  stock 
exchanges  were  paralyzed.  The 
Bourses  at  Toronto  and  Madrid  closed 
July  28;  those  at  Vienna,  Budapest, 
Brussels,  Antwerp,  Berlin,  and  Rome 
on  July  29 ;  and  those  at  Paris,  St. 
Petersburg  (Petrograd),  Montreal, 
and  all  South  American  centres  on 
July  30.  This  threw  the  burden  of 
the  world's  stock  market  operations  on 
the  London  and  New  York  exchanges. 
The  former  of  these  closed  on  July 
31  for  the  first  time  in  its  history.  The 
governors  of  the  New  York  Exchange 


thus  faced  a  crucial  situation.  A 
panicky  state  of  mind  prevailed;  brok- 
ers were  deluged  with  orders,  especially 
from  abroad,  to  "sell  at  the  market" ; 
it  was  evident  that  to  remain  open 
meant  complete  demoralization.  Con- 
sequently this  exchange  also  was  closed 
on  July  31,  shortly  after  that  at  Lon- 
don. 

The  gradual  readjustment  of  indus- 
tries to  the  new  war  basis  is  another 
fundamental  aspect  of  its  effects.  Nev- 
er before  was  concerted  action  in  in- 
dustrial life  so  supremely  important  for 
the  outcome  of  a  trial  at  arms.  The 
war  brought  about  an  actual  mobiliza- 
tion of  industries  for  war  purposes  in 
every  belligerent  country.  Moreover 
the  productive  efforts  of  neutrals,  not 
merely  in  munitions  manufacture,  but 
in  many  lines,  were  tremendously  stim- 
ulated. The  productive  power  of  the 
entire  world  was  raised  almost  to  its 
highest  pitch  in  the  vast  attempt  at 
mutual  destruction  by  the  belliger- 
ents. Never  were  goods  produced  so 
abundantly  and  never  was  capital  de- 
stroyed so  rapidly  or  the  world  has- 
tened towards  pauperization  at  such 
a  pace.  The  nearly  complete  cessation 
of  exports  from  the  Central  Powers  in- 
volved a  violent  readjustment  in  many 
industries  previously  engaged  in  pro- 
ducing for  foreign  markets.  Among 
the  Allies  such  industries  were  less 
disturbed,  while  in  the  United  States 
and  other  neutral  countries  there  were 
numerous  transformations  due  not 
merely  to  the  development  of  munitions 
factories,  but  to  the  manufacture  of 
all  kinds  of  military  supplies,  and  the 
development  of  industries  for  supply- 
ing articles  previously  imported  from 
Germany  and  Austria  as  well  as  sup- 
plying the  similar  needs  of  other  neu- 
trals. Finally  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
was   speedily  followed  in  every  nation 


306 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


by  the  adoption  of  special  financial 
measures  for  supplying  the  needed  pub- 
lic funds  and  the  longer  the  war  con- 
tinued the  more  vital  became  the  ex- 
tent, variety,  and  basis  of  the  various 
war  loans.  The  foregoing — exchange, 
banking,  currency,  stock  market,  war 
loans,  and  the  readjustments  of  indus- 
try— constitute  the  principal  features 
of  the  effects  of  war  on  finance  and 
trade. 

International  Exchange  and  Banking 
Problems.  The  financial  problems  con- 
fronting the  bankers  and  traders  of 
Great  Britain  were  of  the  most  mo- 
mentous importance  for  the  trade  and 
commerce  of  the  world.  The  priority 
of  England  in  the  development  of  in- 
ternational trade  had  long  since  made 
London  both  the  financial  and  commer- 
cial centre  of  the  world.  In  conse- 
quence an  important  part  of  London 
financial  institutions  had  been  devoted 
to  settling  accounts  between  debtors 
and  creditors  in  all  parts  of  the  world. 
Here  are  included  the  accepting  houses, 
bill  brokers  and  discounters,  and  the 
banks.  The  immense  volume  of  this 
business  is  realized  when  it  is  known 
that  at  any  one  time  there  were  before 
the  war  about  $1,600,000,000  of  trade 
and  finance  bills  for  which  the  accept- 
ing houses  and  banks  were  liable,  many 
millions  falling  due  daily.  The  entire 
system  of  handling  international  ex- 
changes collapsed  early  in  August  and 
it  was  not  until  about  mid-September 
that  regular  quotations  of  rates  of 
exchange  again  appeared  in  London. 
Accepting  houses  and  joint-stock 
banks  faced  ruin  because  clients  for 
whom  acceptances  had  been  made  failed 
to  remit;  but  these  clients  themselves 
were  confronted  with  canceled  orders, 
cessation  of  trade,  stoppage  of  the 
supply  of  goods,  impossibility  of  re- 
mitting     and      similar      contingencies. 


The  discounters  and  bill  brokers  found 
themselves  with  large  quantities  of  dis- 
counted bills  on  hand  for  which  they 
could  not  be  reimbursed  and  at  the 
same  time  their  banks  were  calling  for 
a  return  of  loans.  Even  the  banks 
themselves  were  directly  involved 
through  the  possession  of  bills  which 
they  had  discounted.  Moreover  their 
loans  to  bill  brokers  were  counted  as 
quick  assets  and  the  embarrassment  of 
the  brokers  necessarily  weakened  the 
banks.  To  check  demands  upon  its  re- 
sources the  Bank  of  England  raised  its 
rate  to  10  per  cent. 

Before  this  situation  became  unman- 
ageable, the  government  on  August  2, 
two  days  before  its  own  declaration  of 
war,  declared  a  moratorium  on  bills  of 
exchange  to  last  one  month.  This 
checked  the  tendency  to  panic  by  giv- 
ing a  breathing  spell  during  which 
methods  and  means  of  handling  the 
problem  were  formulated. 

Nine  days  later  a  Treasury  state- 
ment announced  that  the  Bank  of  Eng- 
land would  rediscount  on  certain  terms 
any  "approved  bill"  before  it  became 
due;  and  that  acceptors  of  bills  would 
be  given  time  in  which  to  make  pay- 
ment but  would  be  required  to  pay  % 
per  cent  above  bank  rate  for  the  priv- 
ilege of  extension.  The  government 
suggested  that  the  bank  be  prepared 
to  approve  all  bills  customarily  dis- 
counted, "and  also  good  trade  bills, 
and  the  acceptances  of  such  foreign 
and  colonial  firms  and  bank  agencies  as 
are  established  in  Great  Britain,"  with 
the  understanding  that  the  govern- 
ment would  guarantee  the  bank  against 
loss.  On  September  5  another  Treas- 
ury statement  announced  that,  owing 
to  the  choking  of  the  exchange  mechan- 
ism by  premoratorium  bills,  acceptors 
would  be  lent  funds  for  paying  such 
bills  as  they  came  due,  and  that  any 


FINANCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS 


307 


unpaid  balance  of  such  loans  would  not 
be  pressed  "for  a  period  of  one  year 
after  the  close  of  the  war."  Thus  both 
old  and  new  acceptances  seemed  amply 
protected.  A  further  difficulty  was  met 
in  foreign  indebtedness.  On  November 
3  was  promulgated  a  plan  to  investi- 
gate solvent  traders  and  advance  them 
funds  up  to  50  per  cent  of  the  foreign 
debts  due  them.  Thus  every  obstacle 
to  the  resumption  of  exchange  business 
was  removed.  On  the  Continent  sim- 
ilar, but  less  stupendous,  problems  were 
to  be  met.  Moratoria  were  declared 
in  every  belligerent  country  except 
Germany,  and  in  some  neutral  coun- 
tries for  reasons  similar  to  the  fore- 
going. Germany  avoided  a  morator- 
ium mainly  because  of  her  isolation  and 
partly  by  the  stoppage  of  collections 
on  bills  owed  abroad.  In  both  France 
and  Germany,  as  in  England,  the  cen- 
tral banks  were  permitted  to  greatly 
enlarge  their  note  circulations  and  thus 
expanded  to  unprecedented  figures 
their  rediscounts  for  other  banks. 

The  most  serious  aspect  of  the 
American  financial  situation  and  the 
fundamental  cause  of  most  difficulties 
was  the  stupendous  debt  owing  to 
Europe  upon  the  outbreak  of  war. 
Although  this  country  had  normally  a 
trade  balance  of  about  one-half  bil- 
lion dollars  annually,  nevertheless  its 
indebtedness  for  interest  and  dividends, 
for  tourists'  expenditures,  for  freight, 
and*  other  items,  changed  the  great 
trade  surplus  into  a  net  debt.  Sir 
George  Paish,  an  international  au- 
thority who  was  sent  to  the  United 
States  in  October,  1914,  by  English 
bankers  to  expedite  the  payment  of 
these  obligations,  estimated  their  total 
at  $600,000,000.  This  included  more 
than  $100,000,000  of  short-term  loans 
which  ordinarily  could  have  been  easily 
renewed  or  met  by  fall  exports.  Abroad 


refuge  had  been  taken  behind  mora- 
toria; and  the  great  central  banks 
of  Europe  served  to  pool  resources  and 
control  operations,  while  in  the  United 
States  the  new  Federal  Reserve  System 
was  not  yet  in  working  order.  Al- 
though $45,000,000  in  gold  was  sent 
to  Europe  during  the  last  few  days 
of  July  and  the  first  week  of  August, 
sight  exchange  on  London  at  New 
York,  normally  $4.86  per  pound  ster- 
ling, rose  to  $5,  then  to  $6,  and  finally 
to  $7,  a  height  never  before  approach- 
ed, and  regular  exchange  was  not 
quoted  until  September  11.  A  special 
factor  in  aggravating  the  banking  dif- 
ficulties at  New  York  was  the  matur- 
ing early  in  the  fall  of  about  $82,- 
000,000  of  New  York  City  warrants 
held  in  London  and  Paris.  To  meet 
these  and  to  strengthen  the  city's  cred- 
it there  was  provided  a  loan  of  $100,- 
000,000  in  gold  to  which  every  bank 
and  trust  company  in  the  city  but  one 
contributed.  At  the  same  time  bank- 
ers of  the  country  created  a  "Gold 
Pool',  of  over  $100,000,000  to  meet 
urgent  mercantile  obligations  abroad, 
and  to  provide  gold  needed  for  export. 
It  was  composed  of  contributions  from 
banks  in  reserve  cities  in  proportion 
to  their  gold  holdings.  It  served  as  a 
guarantee  against  the  complete  col- 
lapse of  American  credit  abroad  and 
removed  from  the  banks  the  necessity 
of  seeking  refuge  behind  an  unofficial 
moratorium.  Portions  of  this  fund 
were  shipped  to  the  branch  of  the  Bank 
of  England  established  at  Ottawa,  Can- 
ada, to  serve  as  a  basis  for  exchange 
on  London.  The  sharp  rebound  of 
trade  towards  the  close  of  the  year, 
the  entrance  of  the  world  into  the 
American  market  for  goods  and  loans 
made  possible  the  dissolution  of  the 
"Gold  Pool"  in  January,  1915. 

The    exchange    situation    was    made 


308 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


particularly  difficult  by  the  great  re- 
duction of  the  export  trade,  especially 
the  exportation  of  cotton.  Moreover 
the  prosperity  of  the  South  was  seri- 
ously threatened  unless  some  means 
could  be  devised  whereby  cotton  could 
serve  as  a  basis  for  additional  credit. 
Congress  and  Secretary  McAdoo  au- 
thorized banks  to  issue  emergency  cur- 
rency on  the  basis  of  cotton  ware- 
house certificates.  About  the  same 
time  a  plan  for  a  Cotton  Loan  Pool 
was  devised  whereby  pledges  to  supply 
funds  to  be  loaned  through  Southern 
banks  to  cotton  growers  were  deposit- 
ed with  members  of  the  Federal  Re- 
serve Board  as  individuals.  By  the 
middle  of  November  more  than  $100,- 
000,000  was  thus  subscribed.  How- 
ever the  considerable  revival  of  the  ex- 
port trade  in  cotton  towards  the  close 
of  1914  together  with  the  great  im- 
provement of  internal  trade,  and  the 
bracing  effect  of  the  establishment  of 
the  Federal  Reserve  System  made  the 
cotton  pool  well-nigh  unnecessary.  It 
became  inoperative  in  January,  1915, 
only  $28,000  having  been  applied  for. 

The  rates  of  international  exchange 
reflect  the  conditions  both  of  trade 
and  of  credit.  At  New  York  the  rate 
on  London  was  not  regularly  quoted 
until  September  11,  when  the  cable 
transfer  rate  stood  at  $4.95,  par  of 
exchange  being  $4.86.  It  became  still 
more  unfavorable,  reaching  $4,975  in 
the  weeks  of  October  8  and  15.  It 
thereafter  fell  steadily,  reaching  par 
on  December  22.  It  continued  to  fall 
until  early  September,  1915,  when  it 
reached  $4.63.  It  was  partially  re- 
stored by  the  Anglo-French  loan,  but 
only  for  a  brief  period.  In  December 
the  British  government  began  to  bor- 
row or  purchase  American  and  Cana- 
dian securities  owned  by  English  citi- 
zens with  a  view  to  their  use  as  secur- 


ity for  loans  to  be  advanced  by  Amer- 
ican bankers  as  a  means  of  preventing 
further  declines  in  the  rate  of  ex- 
change. About  the  same  time  the  im- 
portation of  certain  luxuries  was  pro- 
hibited for  a  like  reason. 

At  Paris  the  rate  of  exchange  was 
slightly  unfavorable  to  London  during 
the  first  half  of  October,  no  rates  be- 
ing quoted  during  August  and  Sep- 
tember; it  gradually  declined  until 
November  26  and  thereafter  rose  con- 
tinuously, reaching  par  again  Febru- 
ary 19,  1915.  It  thereafter  continued 
to  become  slightly  more  unfavorable  to 
Paris  with  every  passing  week.  In 
May,  1916,  Finance  Minister  Ribot  be- 
gan the  collection  of  American,  Swiss, 
Dutch,  Scandinavian,  and  South  Amer- 
ican securities  to  be  used  as  a  basis 
for  credits  for  equalizing  exchange 
with  the  United  States.'  At  the  same 
time  the  government  announced  a  long 
list  of  articles  the  importation  of  which 
was  prohibited  partly  to  affect  ex- 
change rates. 

Almost  from  the  beginning  of  the 
war  rates  of  exchange  were  unfavor- 
able to  Berlin.  The  slight  volume  of 
foreign  trade  and  the  adjustment  of 
outstanding  accounts  early  brought 
the  rates  to  considerable  stability. 
Nevertheless  the  continued  purchases 
in  neighboring  neutral  countries  and 
the  steady  inflation  of  German  cur- 
rency brought  about  a  decline  of  Ger- 
man credit  in  the  later  months  of  1915. 
Thus  the  exchange  rate  at  New  York 
had  been  only  14  per  cent  unfavorable 
until  November,  1915,  when  it  dropped 
rapidly  to  26  per  cent  unfavorable. 
Similar  rapid  declines  brought  about 
rates  unfavorable  by  38  per  cent  at 
Amsterdam,  and  by  28  per  cent  at 
Zurich. 

As  stated  above  the  New  York  Stock 
Exchange    was    forced    to    close    very 


FINANCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS 


309 


quickly  after  the  closing  of  the  Lon- 
don Exchange.  This  naturally  dis- 
turbed the  banking  situation  since  con- 
siderable loans  were  based  on  stock  as 
collateral.  Such  collateral  is  general- 
ly most  fluid  of  all,  but  with  its  mar- 
ket closed  it  became  quite  solidified. 
The  banks,  however,  gradually  read- 
justed affairs  without  forcing  repay- 
ment of  loans  or  otherwise  unduly  dis- 
turbing a  delicate  situation.  The  re- 
opening of  the  Exchange  was  delayed 
in  part  to  prevent  the  resumption  of 
the  pressure  of  European  sellers  and 
the  consequent  increase  of  foreign  ob- 
ligations. The  Exchange  declared  the 
level  of  prices  on  July  30  the  official 
minimum,  and  on  this  basis  some 
transactions  were  carried  through  un- 
der the  direction  of  a  Committee  of 
Five.  In  this  manner  more  than  $100,- 
000,000  of  bonds  and  250,000  shares 
of  stock  were  transferred  by  the  end 
of  November.  In  Philadelphia  public 
auction  sales  of  stocks  and  bonds  were 
held  at  various  times,  prices  ranging 
not  far  below  those  of  July  30.  Grad- 
ually at  New  York  the  scope  of  ex- 
change business  was  enlarged ;  trans- 
actions in  a  restricted  list  of  bonds 
were  begun  on  November  28 ;  and  two 
weeks  later  trading  in  181  specified 
stocks  with  definitely  established  mini- 
mum prices  was  begun.  The  total  deal- 
ings, however,  on  the  New  York  Ex- 
change aggregated  only  47,899,000 
shares  for  the  year  1914,  slightly  more 
than  one-third  those  of  1912. 

With  the  opening  of  1915,  however, 
pessimism  gradually  disappeared  un- 
der the  revival  of  business  and  was  re- 
placed by  waves  of  speculative  fever 
in  the  stock  market.  This  was  notably 
true  in  April  when  21,000,000  shares 
were  transferred,  and  in  August,  Sep- 
tember, and  October,  26,000,000  shares 
being  transferred  in  the  latter  month. 


The  shares  of  the  munitions  companies 
were  popularly  known  as  "war  brides." 
Many  of  these  stocks  made  most  phe- 
nomenal advances  in  price  during  the 
year.  Less  speculative  interest  was 
shown  in  the  stocks  of  numerous  com- 
panies manufacturing  supplies  the  de- 
mand for  which  had  been  greatly  stim- 
ulated by  the  conditions  of  war.  More- 
over the  great  increase  in  the  volume 
of  railway  traffic,  which  towards  the 
close  of  1915  amounted  to  an  unpre- 
cedented congestion  of  freight  and 
the  refusal  of  numerous  roads  with  ter- 
minals on  the  Atlantic  seaboard  to  re- 
ceive additional  goods  for  export  dur- 
ing certain  periods,  resulted  in  ad- 
vances in  railway  stocks.  This  revival 
of  business  did  not  occur  soon  enough 
to  prevent  a  very  large  amount  of  rail- 
way mileage  from  going  into  the  hands 
of  receivers,  but  railway  stocks  in  gen- 
eral showed  advances  of  10  to  20 
points. 

The  bond  market  likewise  reflected 
the  great  abundance  of  capital  seeking 
investment.  While  advances  in  bond 
prices  were  not  remarkable,  there  was 
a  general  upward  movement  ranging 
from  1  to  6  per  cent  during  1915. 
Moreover  the  easy  money  market  re- 
sulted in  the  ready  flotation  of  an  un- 
usual amount  of  public  and  corpora- 
tion bonds. 

In  addition  to  the  foregoing  the 
American  market  absorbed  an  aston- 
ishing volume  of  securities  previously 
held  by  foreign  investors.  At  the  open- 
ing of  the  war  the  par  value  of  Amer- 
ican corporation  securities  owned 
abroad  was  variously  estimated  at 
from  $4,000,000,000  to  $6,000,000,- 
000.  The  most  authoritative  estimate 
showed  that  $620,000,000  of  these  se- 
curities were  repurchased  during  the 
first  five  months  of  1915 ;  the  estimate 
for  the  entire  year  was  that  not  less 


310 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


than  $1,000,000,000  of  such  stocks1 
and  bonds  were  transferred  to  Amer- 
ican investors.     See  below. 

Currency.      Every    country    in    war 
time  experiences  an  irresistible  demand 
for  increases  in  credit  instruments.  Not 
only    do    governments    issue    treasury 
notes  but  banks  are  certain,  as  in  times 
of  panic,  to  increase  their  note  issues. 
In  England  there  was  much  discussion 
of  a  proposed  "suspension  of  the  Bank 
Act,"    meaning   a    proposal    to    permit 
the    Bank    of    England    to    expand    its 
note  circulation  without  increasing  its 
reserves.      The  steps  devised   for   rees- 
tablishing   foreign    exchange    obviated 
this  measure,  though  Bank  of  England 
circulation  was  expanded  and  a  large 
volume    of   £1    and    5s    treasury    notes 
were  issued.     A  law  of  August  7  made 
riot  merely   these  treasury   notes   legal 
tender   but   also   postal   money   orders. 
Provision  was  also  made  for  the  issue 
of  certificates,  like  clearing-house  cer- 
tificates,   for    the    settlement    of    bank 
balances.      Finally    the    currency    and 
Bank  Notes  Act  authorized  the  Bank 
of    England    to    issue    to    depositary 
banks  notes  up  to  20  per  cent  of  their 
deposits     and     current    balances.       In 
May,   1916,  the  bank  held  $140,000,- 
000  in  gold  against  over  $500,000,000 
of  paper.     The  bank,  however,   owing 
to  its  command  of  the  entire  gold  pro- 
duction of  South  Africa  amounting  to 
about  $200,000,000  per  year,  was  en- 
abled to  make  extensive  gold  shipments 
to  the  United  States  and  at  the  same 
time    maintain    its    credit    unimpaired. 
In  France   the   government   authorized 
practically     unlimited    issues    by     the 
Bank  of  France  and  various  promises 
of  the  government  were  issued.      (See 
below,  Cost  of  the  War.)     It  was  esti- 
mated that  whereas  the  actual  inflation 
in    England    amounted    to    about    144 
per    cent   by   December,    1915,   it   was 


157  per  cent  in  France.  In  Germany, 
as  explained  below,  the  Darlehnskassen 
and  the  Kriegskreditbanken  notes  were 
based  on  property  of  various  kinds. 
These  tended  to  drive  gold  and  silver 
out  of  circulation  so  that  the  govern- 
ment authorized  the  Reichsbank  to  is- 
sue its  own  notes  in  exchange  for  them. 
At  the  same  time,  however,  the  bank 
was  instructed  to  refuse  to  pay  out 
gold  for  its  own  notes,  but  a  vigorous 
effort  was  made  to  increase  the  bank's 
gold  reserves.  This  reserve  was  thus 
increased  from  about  $300,000,000  in 
July,  1914,  to  $610,000,000  in  Janu- 
ary, 1916.  But  the  notes  for  which 
the  bank  was  responsible  had  increased 
from  $475,000,000  to  $1,560,000,000. 
Austria  and  Hungary  likewise  went 
speedily  to  a  paper  basis. 

The  breaking  down  of  the  mechanism 
of  international  credit  seemed  certain 
to  produce  a  panic  in  American  bank- 
ing circles.  The  American  banking 
system  was  individualistic  and  proverb- 
ially weak  under  strained  credit.  It 
failed  to  supply  additions  to  the  cur- 
rency at  times  when  most  needed.  The 
Federal  Reserve  System  was  particu- 
larly designed  to  remedy  this  weak- 
ness, but  in  August,  1914,  this  system 
had  not  been  finally  established.  After 
a  conference  of  bankers  and  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Treasury  at  New  York 
on  August  2  it  was  decided  to  issue 
emergency  currency  under  the  Aldrich- 
Vreeland  Act  as  modified  by  the  Fed- 
eral Reserve  Act  of  1913,  and  to  issue 
in  addition  clearing-house  certificates. 
Congress  responded  to  the  situation  by 
hurriedly  enacting  a  law  reducing  the 
tax  on  emergency  notes  for  the  first 
three  months  to  3  per  cent  and  in- 
creasing their  limit  to  125  per  cent  of 
capital  and  surplus.  Moreover  State 
banks  affiliated  with  the  reserve  sys- 
tem were  authorized  to  take  out  notes ; 


FINANCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS 


311 


and  cotton  and  tobacco  warehouse  re- 
ceipts were  made  a  legal  basis  for  note 
issues.  In  consequence  more  than 
$250,000,000  of  emergency  currency 
had  been  issued  by  September  1 ;  a  to- 
tal of  $384,500,000  of  such  notes  was 
issued  by  December  1.  Very  little  pub- 
licity was  given  to  the  issue  of  clear- 
ing-house certificates  in  principal  bank- 
ing centres  of  the  country,  but  $250,- 
000,000  of  them  were  issued.  Prac- 
tically all  of  the  emergency  currency 
and  the  clearing-house  certificates  were 
retired  by  the  end  of  January,  1915. 
Meanwhile  the  banking  and  credit  sit- 
uation had  been  materially  strength- 
ened indirectly  by  the  revival  of  trade 
and  directly  by  the  final  establishment 
of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  which 
was  in  full  working  order  by  November 
28,  1914.     See  below. 

Employment  and  Wages.  In  every 
nation  the  opening  of  hostilities  brought 
on  a  temporary  paralysis  of  trade,  mak- 
ing the  problem  of  unemployment  acute 
in  every  belligerent  country.  Special 
committees,  national  and  local,  and 
special  relief  funds  were  created  to 
meet  the  situation.  The  gradual  read- 
justment of  industry  to  a  war  basis 
and  the  recruiting  of  vast  armies,  how- 
ever, very  soon  solved  the  problem. 
In  Great  Britain  the  labor  problem 
was  greatly  complicated  by  the  re- 
quirements of  international  trade. 
There  were  not  merely  the  demands  of 
the  army  and  navy  for  equipment  and 
munitions,  but  the  immense  difficulty 
of  paying  for  greatly  increased  im- 
ports from  countries  to  which  exports 
were  reduced.  This  difficulty  was 
greatly  increased  by  the  requirement 
that  Great  Britain  aid  in  financing  her 
allies  and  colonies.  Consequently  the 
raising  of  an  army  at  home  was  di- 
rectly counter  to  her  financial  and  com- 
mercial  demands.      The  general   effect 


of  war  on  labor  was  stated  by  Glad- 
stone to  be  an  immense  stimulus  dur- 
ing war  with  enlarged  employment  and 
rise  in  wages,  but  excessive  labor  com- 
petition, severe  unemployment,  and 
reductions  in  wages  when  war  is  over. 
The  truth  of  the  first  part  of  this 
statement  was  made  manifest  in  1914. 
Very  shortly  in  every  country  there 
was  less  unemployment  than  in  times 
of  peace,  labor  shortage  actually  be- 
came acute,  wages  advanced,  and  great 
numbers  of  women  were  drawn  into 
unwonted  industrial  pursuits. 

At  the  outset  Great  Britain  was  more 
unfavorably  situated  with  regard  to 
the  manufacture  of  munitions  of  war 
than  France,  Germany,  or  Austria, 
Except  for  a  few  scattered  private 
firms,  a  few  small  governmental  estab- 
lishments working  for  both  army  and 
navy,  and  the  Woolwich  Arsenal  em- 
ploying about  10,000  men,  she  had  no 
munitions  factories  operating  in  July, 
1914.  Nevertheless  18  months  later 
the  entire  country  was  dotted  with 
such  factories,  their  creation  being  one 
of  the  striking  phenomena  of  the  war. 
The  astounding  demands  early  aroused 
the  existing  arm  makers  to  the  highest 
pitch  of  activity,  but  it  early  became 
evident  that  the  output  of  existing 
plants  would  be  inadequate.  By  Feb- 
ruary, 1915,  it  became  manifest  that 
heroic  measures  must  be  adopted  to  se- 
cure an  adequate  output.  Out  of  the 
delays  and  confusion  resulted  a  minis- 
terial crisis  in  May,  1915,  which  led 
to  the  formation  of  the  Ministry  of 
Munitions  with  Mr.  Lloyd-George  as 
its  head.  This  sought  to  develop  the 
latent  capacities  of  manufactures  in 
engineering  and  mechanical  trades. 
The  entire  country  was  divided  into 
eight  munitions  districts,  besides  two 
in  Scotland  and  two  in  Ireland,  with 
committees     in    principal    towns.       In 


312 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


March  the  Defense  of  the  Realm  Act 
had  authorized  the  government  to  com- 
mandeer any  factory  for  war  purposes. 
Under  this  Act  many  old  plants  had 
already  been  transformed  and  new  ones 
built,  equipped,  and  manned.  The 
Ministry  of  Munitions  was  needed, 
however,  to  bring  order  out  of  existing 
chaos  by  centralizing  responsibility 
and  control.  It  systematically  inves- 
tigated and  listed  every  available  fac- 
tory and  private  resource.  By  the 
close  of  1915  there  were  in  addition  33 
national  shell  factories  employing  from 
300  to  1,000  persons  each,  which  had 
been  created  at  government  expense  by 
adapting  existing  establishments.  At 
the  same  time  a  number  of  national 
projectile  factories  were  being  com- 
pleted to  manufacture  ammunition  for 
a  new  type  of  heavy  gun.  Gradually 
the  staff  of  the  munitions  office,  includ- 
ing over  3,000  persons  divided  among 
numerous  departments,  was  brought  to 
a  high  state  of  efficiency.  From  the 
first  a  source  of  great  embarrassment 
was  the  inadequacy  of  skilled  labor 
and  its  attitude  towards  the  training 
and  employment  of  unskilled  workers. 
This  problem  was  intensified  by  the 
enormous  enlargement  of  the  munitions 
industry,  and  was  not  alleviated  by  ex- 
tensive advertisement  for  machinists 
in  the  United  States.  It  was  estimated 
that  early  in  1916  this  business  alone 
employed  not  less  than  1,000,000 
workers.  Among  these  were  included 
about  300,000  women  who  were  found 
in  England,  as  in  France  and  Ger- 
many, to  be  capable  of  performing 
practically  every  kind  of  labor  re- 
quired in  munitions  making.  The  or- 
ganized skilled  workers  objected  to  the 
"dilution"  of  the  shops  by  unskilled 
and  semi-skilled  workers,  and  resorted 
to  strikes  and  other  interruptions.  Acts 
of    Parliament    very    considerably    re- 


duced the  privileges  of  labor  to  leave 
work  and  to  transfer  at  will,  but  spe- 
cial boards  for  adjusting  demands  were 
created  and  elaborate  rules  were  estab- 
lished to  protect  the  health  of  the 
workers,  especially  of  Avomen  and  chil- 
dren. 

Statistical  measures  of  the  amount 
of  unemployment  were  not  wanting. 
The  Labor  Gazette  gave  the  percent- 
age of  trade-union  members  unemployed 
in  June,  1914,  as  2.4;  it  rose  to  7.3 
in  August,  and  declined  steadily  there- 
after to  2.5  in  December,  1914,  and  to 
0.5  in  February,  1916.  Wages  showed 
little  advance  before  January,  1915, 
but  in  February  moved  sharply  upward 
in  engineering,  shipbuilding,  railway 
service,  docking,  and  carting,  and 
thereafter  the  advance  spread  to  all 
lines.  The  dearth  of  skilled  labor  re- 
sulted in  many  labor  tangles,  but  the 
government  and  trade-union  officials 
succeeded  in  maintaining  an  unusual 
degree  of  industrial  peace.  The  num- 
ber of  trade  disputes  in  1914  was  999, 
involving  448,529  workers  and  a  loss 
of  10,111,337  days  of  work;  while  in 
1915  they  numbered  only  674,  involv- 
ing 445,936  workers  and  a  loss  of  only 
2,929,700  days  of  work. 

The  French  Ministry  of  Labor  re- 
ported that  in  August,  1914,  only  48 
per  cent  of  establishments  and  58  per 
cent  of  workers  were  employed.  There 
was,  however,  a  continuous  improve- 
ment. By  October,  1915,  81  per  cent 
of  establishments  and  98  per  cent  of 
workers  were  employed.  In  metal 
manufactures  and  transportation  new 
workers  had  been  employed  in  num- 
bers nearly  sufficient  to  offset  those 
with  the  colors ;  and  this  was  partially 
true  of  food  and  chemical  industries. 
But  in  printing,  woodworking,  build- 
ing, glass  and  pottery  making,  and 
precious  metals  the  numbers  employed 


FINANCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS 


313 


at  the  later  date  were  less  than  half 
the  peace  normal.  As  in  England 
women  were  drawn  in  great  numbers, 
not  only  into  munitions  manufacture, 
but  into  many  lines  of  industry,  agri- 
culture, and  transportation. 

In  Germany  the  general  course  of 
events  was  very  similar  to  that  in  Eng- 
land and  France.  The  general  dis- 
location of  industry  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  brought  into  operation  con- 
certed action  not  merely  to  relieve  un- 
employment but  to  shift  industry  to  a 
war  basis.  The  amount  of  unemploy- 
ment among  trade  unions  was  22.4  per 
cent  at  the  end  of  August,  1914.  It 
dropped  to  15.7  per  cent  by  the  end  of 
September,  and  continued  steadily 
downward  to  7.2  per  cent  at  the  end  of 
December.  This,  however,  was  suf- 
ficiently above  normal  to  require  a 
special  appropriation  of  $125,000  per 
month  by  the  city  of  Berlin  to  relieve 
unemployment  during  the  winter  of 
1914-1915.  By  May,  1915,  trade- 
union  members  unemployed  numbered 
only  2.9  per  cent ;  by  September,  only 
2.5  per  cent,  at  which  percentage  it 
remained  until  February,  1916.  As  in 
other  countries  all  trades  engaged  di- 
rectly or  indirectly  in  the  production 
of  military  supplies  were  unusually 
prosperous,  were  employing  unusual 
numbers  of  workers,  and  paying  higher 
wages  than  before  the  war.  But  among 
hat  makers,  printers,  lithographers, 
bookbinders,  woodworkers,  and  porce- 
lain workers  the  percentage  of  unem- 
ployment was  considerably  higher  than 
normal.  The  employment  of  women 
was  very  extensive ;  their  number  in  un- 
accustomed pursuits  reached  500,000 
by  July,  1915;  they  were  found  in 
nearly  every  branch  of  industry. 

The  effect  of  the  war  upon  American 
industrial  conditions  was  most  remark- 
able.    The  impetus  of  the  new  demands 


set  up  by  the  war  began  to  be  felt  be- 
fore the  close  of  1914.  Early  in  1915 
feverish  activity  began  in  various 
branches  of  the  iron  and  steel  industry, 
in  the  production  of  copper,  lead,  spel- 
ter, and  other  metals,  and  in  all 
branches  of  munitions  manufacture. 
From  these  industries  the  impetus 
gradually  spread  to  all  allied  indus- 
tries and  to  those  engaged  in  manu- 
facturing such  articles  as  automobiles, 
railway  supplies,  boots  and  shoes,  blan- 
kets and  woolen  goods,  and  food  prod- 
ucts. While  in  the  fall  of  1914  unem- 
ployment had  been  extensive,  this  prob- 
lem gradually  disappeared,  with  the 
result  that  by  the  middle  of  1915  there 
was  an  actual  scarcity  of  labor  in  many 
lines,  especially  skilled  labor,  and 
wages  had  begun  to  advance.  Conse- 
quently by  the  fall  of  1915  the  tremen- 
dous stimulus  to  American  industry 
had  reached  all  branches  of  the  retail 
trade.  Estimates  of  war  orders  placed 
in  the  United  States  during  1915 
varied  widely,  ranging  all  the  way 
from  $1,000,000,000  to  $2,000,000,- 
000.  During  the  early  months  of  1915 
the  Allies  were  victimized  extensively 
by  smooth,  self-constituted,  and  often 
irresponsible  agents  of  manufacturers, 
and  by  other  speculating  intermedia- 
ries seeking  fortunes  in  commissions  on 
war  orders.  Occasionally  the  Allies 
were  defrauded  by  the  manufacturers 
themselves.  In  all  of  this  immense  war 
business  there  was  a  feverish  haste 
and  a  recklessness  in  expenditure  that 
involved  much  waste.  This  was  reduced, 
however,  by  the  development  by  the 
Allies  of  regular  channels  for  placing 
orders  and  by  an  elaborate  and  ex- 
tremely thorough  system  of  inspection 
of  products.     (See  below.) 

American  Foreign  Trade.  Not  only 
did  the  Allies  resort  to  the  United 
States  for  unprecedented  quantities  of 


314 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


goods  of  numerous  kinds,  but  Secre- 
tary of  Commerce  Redfield  pointed  out 
in  his  annual  report  for  1915  that  the 
demands  of  Canada,  Central  and  South 
America,  India,  the  Near  East,  South 
Africa,  and  indeed  every  part  of  the 
world  for  American  goods  had  in- 
creased. The  impetus  of  this  world- 
wide demand  was  scarcely  felt  during 
1914.  Consequently  the  exports  in 
that  year  differed  very  little  from 
those  of  the  preceding  years,  being 
slightly  less  than  in  1912  or  1913. 
For  the  calendar  year  1915,  however, 
the  exports  reached  the  remarkable 
figure  of  $3,547,480,372.  This  was  an 
excess  over  imports  of  $1,768,883,677, 
an  excess  more  than  two  and  one-half 
times  that  of  the  previous  maximum 
in  1913.  Net  importations  of  gold  ag- 
gregated $530,000,000  in  1916,  as 
compared  with  net  importations  of 
$420,000,000  in  1915.  The  fiscal  year, 
1916,  showed  imports  valued  at  $2,- 
197,883,510  and  exports  at  $4,333,- 
482,885;  1917,  imports,  $2,659,355,- 
185,  exports,  $6,290,048,394;  1918, 
imports,  $2,946,059,403;  exports,  $5,- 
928,285,641. 

The  immense  volume  of  American 
export  trade  created  an  unprecedented 
situation  in  the  shipping  world.  By 
the  fall  of  1915  the  quantity  of  goods 
for  export  actually  exceeded  the  car- 
rying capacity  of  merchant  vessels 
available,  in  spite  of  great  advances 
in  freight  rates  and  the  utilization  of 
every  type  of  craft  however  old.  Brit- 
ish experts  pointed  out  that  their  gov- 
ernment had  requisitioned  for  war  pur- 
poses not  less  than  50  per  cent  of  the 
tntire  British  merchant  fleet.  German 
submarine  activities  had  destroyed 
about  6  per  cent.  Moreover  the  large 
German  merchant  marine  was  practic- 
ally nonexistent.  Consequently  freight 
rates   first   doubled,    then    trebled    and 


quadrupled,  and  in  special  cases  ad- 
vanced as  much  as  900  per  cent  by  the 
spring  of  1916.  In  some  instances  a 
vessel  would  earn  its  entire  cost  on  a 
single  round  trip.  Antiquated  steam 
vessels  were  selling  at  prices  from  two 
to  five  times  their  value  before  the  war ; 
consequently  there  developed  unpre- 
cedented activity  in  American  ship- 
building yards.  By  April  1,  1916,  or- 
ders had  been  given  for  360  vessels 
with  a  tonnage  of  more  than  1,000,000, 
and  6,000,000  were  expected  in  1918. 

World  Trade.  The  war  seemed  des- 
tined to  have  permanent  and  far-reach- 
ing effects  upon  the  world's  commerce. 
In  America  active  measures  were  begun 
before  the  close  of  1915  to  strengthen 
the  American  hold  upon  new  markets 
and  to  increase  cooperation  in  foreign 
trade  after  the  war.  On  December  1, 
1915,  e.g.,  was  organized  the  American 
International  Corporation,  with  $50,- 
000,000  capital.  Its  purpose  was  to 
develop  trade  connections  in  foreign 
countries  and  promote  the  investment 
of  American  capital  abroad.  Its  or- 
ganization was  led  by  the  National 
City  Bank,  which  was  then  engaged  in 
establishing  branches  in  principal 
South  American  countries.  This  bank 
also  had  acquired  control  of  the  Inter- 
national Banking  Corporation  with  16 
banks  in  China,  Japan,  India,  the 
Philippines,  and  Panama.  The  Bureau 
of  Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce 
and  the  Federal  Trade  Commission  and 
numerous  business  organizations  de- 
voted much  attention  to  the  further- 
ance of  all  efforts  to  secure  a  firm 
grasp  of  markets  previously  held  by 
English  and  German  traders.  Similar- 
ly plans  were  formulated  early  in  1916 
for  systematic  study  of  the  demands  of 
Europe  during  the  period  of  recon- 
struction following  the  war.  Among 
the   Allies    every    effort    was    made   to 


FINANCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS 


315 


stamp  out  every  trace  of  German  eco- 
nomic penetration,  and  plans  were 
formulated  for  reducing  German  com- 
petition upon  the  restoration  of  peace. 
On  April  23,  1916,  there  opened  in 
Paris  the  International  Parliamentary 
Economic  Conference  of  the  Entente 
Allies  for  the  discussion  of  trade  agree- 
ments and  legislative  measures  designed 
to  reduce  German  competition  and 
facilitate  trade  among  the  Allies  and 
their  colonies.  From  Germany  it  was 
reported  that  systematic  measures 
were  being  taken  to  prosecute  most 
vigorously  efforts  to  regain  lost  trade. 
See  below. 

Foreign  Credits.  The  commanding 
importance  of  the  United  States  as  the 
greatest  neutral  market  of  the  world 
made  it  for  the  first  time  in  its  history 
a  lender  on  a  large  scale.  During  1915 
loans  aggregating  $1,000,000,000  were 
contracted  in  America  by  foreign  gov- 
ernments, more  than  four-fifths  of  the 
proceeds  being  expended  there  for  war 
supplies.  Loans  to  the  Canadian  Do- 
minion government,  eight  provinces, 
and  ten  cities,  aggregated  $147,000,- 
000.  Argentina  borrowed  $64,000,000 ; 
Switzerland,  $15,000,000 ;  Sweden,  $5,- 
000,000 ;  Norway,  $8,000,000 ;  Greece, 
$7,000,000;  notes  of  the  German 
Treasury  to  the  amount  of  $10,000,- 
000  were  sold  to  American  investors. 
Russia  secured  loans  for  $92,000,000 ; 
Italy  borrowed  $25,000,000;  but  the 
great  loans  were  those  contracted  by 
France  and  Great  Britain.  In  addi- 
tion to  the  Anglo-French  loan  of  $500,- 
000,000,  France  secured  $75,000,000 
on  notes,  bonds,  and  collateral ;  and 
London  banks  borrowed  $50,000,000. 
The  purpose  of  these  loans  was  to 
equalize  rates  of  exchange,  but  in  spite 
of  them  and  extensive  gold  shipments 
sterling  exchange  declined  to  $4.63  by 
September,  1915.    It  was  therefore  nec- 


essary for  British  financiers  to  restore 
a  more  normal  rate.  In  that  month  a 
commission  of  British  and  French  fi- 
nanciers came  to  the  United  States 
to  establish  a  credit  for  $750,000,000 
or  even  $1,000,000,000.  The  sum, 
however,  was  reduced  to  $500,000,000 
after  various  conferences.  A  syndicate 
was  formed  led  by  J.  P.  Morgan  & 
Company  which  took  the  loan  at  96  or 
on  a  basis  to  yield  an  average  of  5.75 
per  cent.  Early  in  1916  Argentina  se- 
cured an  additional  $15,000,000;  and 
Canada,  $75,000,000.    See  below. 

Prices  and  Food  Supplies.  Inevitably 
the  war  had  a  far-reaching  effect  upon 
the  movements  of  prices  throughout  the 
world.  War  not  only  destroys  existing 
property,  but  it  requires  the  creation 
and  consumption  of  goods  in  amounts 
immesnsely  greater  than  the  demands  of 
peace.  All  sorts  of  raw  materials  are 
required  in  unprecedented  amounts  and 
their  prices  together  with  those  of 
products  made  from  them  rise  corre- 
spondingly. The  most  striking  ad- 
vances were  those  of  copper,  nickel, 
lead,  zinc,  and  all  kinds  of  steel  prod- 
ucts, together  with  the  various  con- 
stituents used  in  the  manufacture  of 
explosives ;  but  even  more  important 
in  their  effect  upon  the  general  wel- 
fare of  the  inhabitants  not  only  of  bel- 
ligerent but  of  all  other  nations  was 
the  rise  in  the  prices  of  food  products. 
Thus,  e.g.,  the  price  of  copper  rose 
from  about  12  cents  to  nearly  30  cents 
per  pound;  cotton  doubled  in  value; 
and  food  prices  rose  so  extensively 
that  administrative  measures  to  regu- 
late them  were  undertaken  by  Austria, 
Bulgaria,  Denmark,  Egypt,  France, 
Germany,  Great  Britain,  Greece,  Hol- 
land, Italy,  Norway,  Russia,  Serbia, 
Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  and  Tur- 
key. Most  of  these  countries  prohibited 
the  exportation  of  foodstuffs.    In  most 


316 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


of  them  municipal  authorities  either 
alone  or  in  conjunction  with  national 
or  military  authorities  fixed  maximum 
prices. 

The  actual  extent  olf  the  rise  in 
prices  is  best  indicated  by  index  num- 
bers. For  the  United  States  Brad- 
street's  Index  rose  from  $8.7087  on 
August  1  to  $9.8495  on  August  15, 
1914.  It  dropped  during  the  next  10 
weeks  and  thereafter  rose  steadily  to 
$11.7598  on  April  1,  1916.  In  Great 
Britain  an  astonishing  rise  in  the  price 
of  coal  resulted  in  the  appointment 
of  a  commission  of  investigation  in 
March,  1915.  This  body  found  that  the 
increase  of  100  per  cent  or  more  was 
a  natural  consequence  of  the  recruit- 
ing of  nearly  250,000  miners  and  in- 
creases in  cost  of  transportation.  Ac- 
cording to  the  Board  of  Trade  Labour 
Gazette  retail  food  prices  advanced 
from  July,  1914,  to  March,  1916,  by 
45  per  cent  in  small  towns  and  51  per 
cent  in  large  towns,  an  average  of  48 
per  cent  for  the  United  Kingdom. 

The  greatest  interest  attached  to  the 
question  whether  Germany  could  be 
starved  into  submission.  Normally  the 
annual  excess  of  German  food  imports 
over  exports  is  considerable.  In  1912 
and  1913  this  excess  amounted  to  2,- 
000,000  tons  of  wheat,  3,000,000  tons 
of  barley,  1,000,000  tons  of  corn,  and 
500,000  tons  of  rice  and  potatoes. 
There  are  normally  also  large  imports 
of  meat  and  animal  products,  oil  cake, 
and  fodder.  Imports  amounted  to  about 
40  per  cent  of  the  annual  consumption 
of  meat  products,  and  20  to  30  per  cent 
of  grains  and  vegetable  products.  The 
war  cut  off  most  of  the  imports ;  the 
campaigns  in  East  Prussia  and  Alsace 
destroyed  crops  ;  agricultural  labor  was 
reduced;  North  Sea  fisheries  were 
closed ;  and  Chile  fertilizer  no  longer 
available.       Nevertheless     considerable 


supplies  were  still  derived  from  Hol- 
land, Scandinavia,  and  Switzerland,  and 
through  military  and  diplomatic  oper- 
ations large  supplies  of  grain  and  fod- 
der were  procured  from  Bulgaria  and 
Rumania.  Moreover  the  entire  eco- 
nomic resources  of  the  Empire  were 
mobilized  by  the  early  creation  of  an 
economic  general  staff,  "The  Division 
of  Raw  Materials  of  War,"  which  re- 
organized industry,  reduced  consump- 
tion, reclaimed  old  materials,  utilized 
b}7-products,  created  new  materials  and 
new  chemical  and  industrial  methods, 
erected  factories,  controlled  goods 
seized  by  the  armies  and  had  great 
powers  of  appraisal  and  price  fixing. 

By  January,  1915,  the  extravagance 
of  many  consumers,  the  speculation  in 
food  prices,  and  the  manipulation  of 
food  supplies  and  markets  induced  the 
government  to  extend  its  control.  On 
January  25  it  was  decreed  that  all  sup- 
plies of  wheat  and  rye  should  come  un- 
der control  of  the  War  Grain  Associa- 
tion ;  and  local  supplies  were  placed  in 
charge  of  Communal  Associations.  The 
consumption  of  cereals  was  brought  un- 
der the  supervision  of  an  Imperial  Dis- 
tributing Bureau.  In  February  a  sys- 
tem of  regulating  the  bread  supply  by 
bread  cards,  which  limited  the  weekly 
consumption  of  each  individual  or  fam- 
ily, was  instituted.  With  the  passage 
of  time  similar  regulations  were  ex- 
tended to  meat  and  vegetables,  and 
finally  in  May,  1916,  the  control  of  all 
food  supplies  was  placed  in  charge  of 
a  "food  dictator"  or  government  bu- 
reau. While  the  best  statistical  evi- 
dence seemed  to  indicate  that  food  sup- 
plies were  sufficient  to  meet  minimum  re- 
quirements there  was  some  evidence  that 
high  prices  led  to  serious  food  riots  and 
much  popular  discontent  late  in  1915 
and  in  1916.  According  to  the  Prus- 
sian official  Statistische  Korrespondenz 


FINANCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS 


317 


the  prices  of  20  important  food  prod- 
ucts rose  88.5  per  cent  from  July,  1914, 
to  Feb.  1,  1916. 

In  Vienna  official  reports  showed  an 
advance  of  112.9  per  cent  in  17  im- 
portant foods  from  July,  1914,  to  De- 
cember, 1915.  In  Italy  the  general 
level  of  food  prices  was  31.2  per  cent 
higher  in  December,  1915,  than  in  July, 

1914.  The  official  index  of  retail  food 
prices  in  Australia  advanced  31  per 
cent  from  July,  1914,  to  July,  1915 ; 
39  per  cent  to  August,  1915 ;  and  then 
fell,  being  31  per  cent  higher  in  No- 
vember, 1915,  than  in  July,  1914.  In 
New  Zealand  general  prices  rose  30  per 
cent  from  August,  1914,  to  December, 

1915,  inclusive.  Official  publications 
showed  that  in  Copenhagen  the  cost  of 
living  rose  24.2  per  cent  from  July, 
1914,  to  February,  1916;  for  food 
prices  alone  the  advance  was  33.4  per 
cent. 

The  Monthly  Labor  Review  for 
October,  1918,  gave  comparative  fig- 
ures of  changes  in  retail  prices  from 
July,  1914,  to  various  dates  in  1918  for 
a  considerable  number  of  countries.  If 
the  retail  price  level  of  July,  1914,  be 
considered  in  each  case  equal  to  100, 
then  the  retail  prices  of  22  foodstuffs 
in  the  United  States  advanced  to  125 
by  January,  1917;  157  by  January, 
1918 ;  and  159  by  June,  1918.  In  Aus- 
tralia 46  foods  advanced  to  125  by 
January,  1917;  129  by  January,  1918, 
and  131  by  March,  1918.  The  Austra- 
lian price  level  for  foods  did,  in  fact, 
change  little  after  July,  1915,  when  it 
was  131.  For  Vienna,  Austria,  figures 
were  not  abundant,  but  showed  that  18 
foods  rose  to  about  220  by  January, 
1916;  272,  by  January,  1917,  and  315 
foy  August,  1917.  Subsequent  com- 
parative figures  were  lacking.  In  Can- 
ada 29  foodstuffs  reached  a  level  of 
138  by  January,  1917;  167  by  Janu- 


ary, 1918,  and  172  by  June,  1918,  thus 
exceeding  the  advance  in  the  United 
States.  In  France,  13  foodstuffs,  in 
cities  over  10,000  population,  except 
Paris,  rose  to  123  by  July,  1915 ;  141, 
by  July,  1916;  184  by  July,  1917,  and 
232  by  April,  1918.  While  a  satisfac- 
tory index  for  Germany  was  wanting, 
it  was  found  that  19  foodstuffs  at  Ber- 
lin had  somewhat  more  than  doubled  in 
prices  between  July,  1914,  and  October, 

1916.  In  Great  Britain  the  index  of 
21  foodstuffs  doubled  between  July, 
1914,  and  June,  1917,  but  remained  al- 
most stationary  for  the  succeeding 
year.  The  index  of  24  articles  of  food 
for    Norway   had    doubled   by    March, 

1917,  when  the  index  was  204;  it  rose 
steadily  to  312  in  May,  1918.  For 
Sweden,  the  advance  was  less  sharp  than 
in  Norway ;  the  index  for  21  articles 
of  food  did  not  reach  200  until  Novem- 
ber, 1917 ;  for  May,  1918,  it  was  258. 
From  the  Labour  Gazette  (October, 
1918),  it  appears  that  the  cost  of  liv- 
ing in  Norway  had  advanced  during  the 
war  up  to  April,  1918,  by  at  least  140 
per  cent,  while  wages  had  advanced  only 
90  per  cent.  In  Sweden,  the  cost  of 
living,  based  on  the  average  family  bud- 
get, was  estimated  to  have  increased 
119  per  cent  during  the  same  period. 

Cost  of  the  War.  The  real  cost  of 
war  should  be  measured  in  terms  of 
the  sacrifices  of  the  people  engaged  in 
it  and  of  the  rest  of  the  world.  Such 
sacrifices  would  include  not  merely  the 
loss  of  lives  of  those  killed  in  combat, 
the  sufferings  of  the  wounded,  and  the 
increased  death  rate  both  during  and 
after  the  war  consequent  upon  injuries 
and  deprivations,  but  also  the  labors, 
hardships,  and  sufferings  imposed  upon 
the  soldiers  and  the  non-fighting  popu- 
lation both  during  actual  hostilities 
and  during  the  long  years  of  recupera- 
tion thereafter.     It  is  evident  that  such 


318 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


a  cost  cannot  be  computed.  Even  when 
measured  in  financial  terms  the  cost 
should  include  not  merely  the  huge  pub- 
lic expenditures  but  also  the  dislocation, 
misdirection,  and  destruction  of  produc- 
tive power,  both  of  labor  and  of  capital, 
and  the  destruction  of  private  and  pub- 
lic property,  works  of  art,  and  great 
historical  landmarks.  It  is  evident  that 
these  latter  items  can  be  only  roughly 
approximated.  Consequently  the  cost 
of  war  is  usually  stated  in  terms  of  gov- 
ernmental expenditures. 

The  approximate  per  capita  indebt- 
edness on  March  1  was :  Great  Britain, 
$242;  France,  $330;  Germany,  $177; 
Austria-Hungary,  $159;  Italy,  $87; 
and  Russia  (in  Europe),  $57. 

The  daily  cost  of  war  gradually  in- 
creased from  less  than  $40,000,000  per 
day  at  the  beginning  to  fully  $122,- 
500,000  per  day  to  January,  1918.  The 
following  table  estimates  total  and  daily 
costs,  exclusive  of  the  United  States. 


Country 

Cost  to 
Jan.  1,  1918 

Daily  cost 

$27,236,500,000 

18,405.000,000 

14,340,000,000 

7,650,000,000 

2,165,000,000 

$32,500,000 

17,000,000 

16,000,000 

Italv 

10,000,000 

Other  Allies 

3  000,000 

Total  for  Allies 

$69,796,500,000 

24,455,000,000 

10,475,000,000 

1,755,000,000 

$78,500,000 
27,000,000 

Turkey  and  Bulgaria.  .  .  . 

15.000,000 
2,000,000 

Central  Powers 

$36,685,000,000 

$44,000,000 

$106,481,500,000 

$122,500,000 

The  loans  of  the  various  belligerents 
from  the  beginning  of  the  war  to 
March  1,  1916,  aggregated  over  $29,- 
000,000,000.  Of  this  enormous  sum 
the  Allied  Powers  had  contracted  68  per 
cent  and  Great  Britain  alone  26  per 
cent  or  more  than  one-fourth.  British 
loans  included  the  first  war  loan  of 
$1,750,000,000  of  3l/o  per  cent  bonds 
on  a  basis  of  3.97  per  cent ;  the  second 
war  loan  of  $2,925,000,000  of  4y2  per 


cent  bonds  on  a  basis  of  4.58  per  cent ; 
and  treasury  bills  of  over  $2,000,000,- 
000.  There  were  also  included  loans 
for  Canada,  India,  and  Australia  ag- 
gregating over  $260,000,000,  one-half 
of  the  Anglo-French  loan  in  the  United 
States,  and  advances  to  Allies  and  col- 
onies exceeding  $2,000,000,000.  In  ad- 
dition to  the  above  the  English  Chancel- 
lor of  the  Exchequer  had  announced  in 
February,  1916,  that  an  additional  war 
credit  of  $2,500,000,000  was  immediate- 
ly needed,  bringing  the  English  total  of 
loans  to  over  $10,000,000,000.  The 
principal  item  for  France  was  the  Loan 
of  Victory  of  5  per  cents  at  87  to  yield 
5.75  per  cent  aggregating  $3,100,000,- 
000.  There  were  advances  from  the 
Bank  of  France  to  Feb.  17,  1916,  of 
$1,120,000,000;  bonds  and  notes  in 
London  of  $506,000,000;  and  one-half 
of  the  Anglo-French  loan,  besides  notes 
and  banking  credits  in  New  York 
amounting  to  $80,000,000.  France  had 
also  issued  national-defense  bonds  to 
the  amount  of  $1,392,584,000.  Russia 
had  issued  four  internal  loans  aggre- 
gating $1,545,000,000;  4  per  cent 
bonds  to  the  amount  of  $309,000,000 ; 
treasury  bills  at  5  per  cent  aggregat- 
ing $1,364,750,000;  and  had  con- 
tracted loans  in  England,  France, 
Japan,  and  the  United  States  to  com- 
plete her  total.  In  Italy  there  had  been 
three  issues  of  25-year  bonds  bearing 
4l/o  or  5  per  cent  in  the  aggregate 
amount  of  $1,190,000,000.  In  addition 
she  had  contracted  obligations  in  Eng- 
land for  $250,000,000  and  in  the  United 
States  for  $25,000,000.  France  and 
England  had  advanced  to  Belgium 
$218,000,000.  Japan  issued  a  loan  for 
$26,000,000  in  1914.  Serbia  had  se- 
cured $33,000,000  from  France. 

The  German  loans  began  with  a  5 
per  cent  issue  at  97.5  in  September, 
1914,  to  the  amount  of  $2,125,000,000. 


FINANCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS 


319 


A  second  issue  of  5  per  cents  at  98  in 
May,  1915,  totaled  $2,250,000,000.  A 
third  in  September,  1915,  at  99  aggre- 
gated $3,000,000,000.  The  fourth 
loan  bearing  5  per  cent  interest,  the 
books  for  which  were  closed  in  April, 
1916,  reached  $2,500,000,000.  Special 
banks  (Darlehnska~ssen)  were  estab- 
lished by  the  government  for  the  pur- 
pose of  advancing  money  on  securities 
of  various  kinds,  such  money  to  be  in- 
vested in  the  loans.  Similar  advances 
of  paper  money  (DarlehnsJcassen- 
sclieine)  were  made  on  goods  for  export 
but  unable  to  leave  Germany  during  the 
war.  In  some  cases  even  pledged  prop- 
erty, household  goods,  and  instruments 
of  trade  could  be  mortgaged  to  these 
banks  in  order  to  secure  funds  for  in- 
vestment in  the  war  loans.  In  the  sec- 
ond loan  the  bonds  of  the  first  loan  were 
accepted  in  part  payment;  but  the 
amount  of  such  transactions  was  not 
published.  In  the  third  loan  the  gov- 
ernment exchanged  its  obligations  for 
contracts  of  manufacturers  and  traders 
to  deliver  to  the  government  goods  of 
a  specified  value.  It  was  believed  by 
many  that  the  slight  resort  to  taxation, 
the  great  expansion  of  paper  currency, 
and  excessive  use  of  credit  were  unsound 
methods  of  war  finance. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  loans  includ- 
ed a  first,  second,  and  third  Austrian 
loan  aggregating  $1,782,000,000  and 
a  first  and  second  Hungarian  loan 
aggregating  $471,000,000  besides  loans 
contracted  in  Germany  to  the  amount 
of  $298,500,000.  The  actual  expend- 
itures, however,  of  the  Dual  Monarchy 
were  somewhat  shrouded  in  mystery. 
In  floating  their  loans  special  banks  and 
methods  similar  to  those  adopted  in 
Germany  were  used.  Turkey  contracted 
two  loans  in  Germany  amounting  to 
$214,000,000;  and  Bulgaria  borrowed 
$30,000,000  from  German  bankers. 


In  addition  to  the  foregoing  various 
neutral  countries  had  been  forced  to 
contract  loans  by  the  added  expend- 
itures made  necessary  by  the  war.  These 
amounted  to  $143,000,000  in  Holland; 
$40,000,000  for  Rumania;  $25,000,- 
000  for  Egypt;  $51,000,000  for  Swit- 
zerland; $28,000,000  for  Denmark; 
$24,800,000  for  Spain ;  $16,000,000  for 
Norway ;  $14,380,000  for  Sweden ;  and 
$8,000,000  for  Greece. 

The  Last  Two  Years  of  the  War. 
The  Wall  Street  Journal  computed  the 
total  outlay  of  all  nations  for  the  first 
three  full  years  of  war,  July,  1914,  to 
August,  1917,  at  90  billion  dollars. 
The  daily  cost  had  reached  $117,000,- 
000.  The  daily  cost  to  Great  Britain 
rose  to  about  $40,000,000  in  the  winter 
of  1916-17,  but  fell  off  nearly  $5,000,- 
000  by  mid-summer.  The  total  for  all 
belligerents  must  have  approximated  at 
least  122  billions  by  the  middle  of  1918. 

American  War  Finance.  The  Fed- 
eral war  finance  programme  was  pro- 
digious. Little  exact  knowledge  existed 
within  the  first  months  after  the  decla- 
ration of  war  of  the  total  disbursements 
that  would  be  required.  Even  as  late 
as  November  1  estimates  were  given  to 
the  papers  that  the  requirements  for 
the  fiscal  year  1917-18  would  range 
from  14  billion  dollars  to  19  billion 
dollars.  The  actual  appropriations  for 
war  purposes  made  by  the  64th  Con- 
gress, 2d  session,  were  $1,977,210,000. 
The  appropriations  made  by  the  1st 
session  of  the  65th  Congress  were  $16,- 
901,967,000.  There  were  in  addition 
authorized  contracts  for  $2,511,954,- 
000.  The  total  of  these  three  items  is 
$21,390,731,000.  Of  this  seven  billion 
dollars  was  to  be  lent  to  the  Allies  at  the 
rate  of  $500,000,000  per  month.  It 
was  not  known  even  in  December  how 
much  of  these  vast  appropriations 
would   be   actually    spent   before   June, 


320 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


1918.  It  did  not  seem  possible  in  view 
of  the  productive  capacity  of  the  coun- 
try for  the  government  to  spend  the 
entire  appropriation.  In  December 
there  was  much  agitation  over  the  de- 
lays in  production.  It  was  reported 
that,  although  the  government's  pro- 
gramme called  for  expenditures  of  one 
billion  dollars  in  October,  only  $450,- 
000,000  of  goods  could  be  produced. 
To  secure  funds  an  extensive  system  of 
new  taxes  was.  authorized  and  two  lib- 
erty loans  were  put  out  besides  short- 
term  Treasury  certificates  of  indebted- 
ness and  the  war  savings  stamps  de- 
scribed below.  Acts  authorizing  the 
issue  of  loans  were  passed  on  April  24 
and  September  24,  1917;  the  former 
called  for  seven  billion  dollars  of  bonds 
and  the  latter  for  $11,538,945,460  of 
bonds,  certificates,  and  savings  stamps. 
First  Liberty  Loan. — In  the  war 
revenue  act  of  April  24,  1917,  Congress 
had  authorized  the  borrowing  of  $7,- 
000,000,000,  of  which  three  billions 
were  to  be  invested  in  war  bonds  of 
the  Allies.  On  May  14, 1917,  Secretary 
of  the  Treasury  McAdoo  announced  the 
offering  of  the  first  Liberty  Loan  to 
consist  of  $2,000,000,000  of  30-year 
3I/0  per  cent  bonds.  These  bonds  were 
absolutely  exempted  from  all  Federal 
and  State  taxes  except  the  Federal  in- 
heritance tax.  They  were  made  con- 
vertible into  the  bonds  of  any  subse- 
quent issue  at  a  higher  rate  of  interest. 
In  order  to  secure  subscriptions  an  or- 
ganization was  perfected  with  the  twelve 
Federal  reserve  banks  as  the  central 
agencies  in  their  respective  districts. 
In  addition  to  the  twelve  district  com- 
mittees great  numbers  of  subcommit- 
tees, including  one  in  every  city  and 
town,  with  still  other  subordinate  com- 
mittees for  special  classes  or  groups  in 
each  community,  were  brought  into 
operation.     Numerous  avenues  of  pub- 


licity were  utilized.  Subscriptions  were 
closed  on  June  15  and  the  bonds  dated 
from  that  day  although  not  issued  un- 
til late  in  the  year.  Total  subscrip- 
tions from  more  than  4,000,000  persons 
were  $3,035,000,000.  Since  only  $2,- 
000,000,000  had  been  offered,  the  larger 
applications  were  reduced.  Each  re- 
serve district,  except  those  centering  at 
Kansas  City,  Minneapolis,  and  Atlanta, 
collected  subscriptions  in  excess  of  the 
allotment. 

The  Second  Liberty  Loan. — Sub- 
scriptions to  the  second  loan  were 
opened  October  1,  1917,  and  closed 
October  27.  The  minimum  amount  au- 
thorized was  three  billion  dollars  with 
the  proviso  that  one-half  of  any  ex- 
cess subscriptions  would  be  accepted. 
The  plan  called  for  payment  down  of 
2  per  cent,  18  per  cent  on  November 
15,  40  per  cent  on  December  15,  and 
40  per  cent  on  January  15,  1918.  The 
interest  rate  was  4  per  cent,  payable 
semi-annually  on  November  15  and 
May  15.  The  bonds  will  run  for  25 
years,  but  are  redeemable  at  the  option 
of  the  government  after  10  years. 
They  are  convertible  into  any  subse- 
quent war  issue  bearing  a  higher  rate  of 
interest  within  six  months  after  such 
issue  is  announced.  They  are  exempt 
from  State  and  local  taxation  except 
State  inheritance  taxes  and  the  "addi- 
tional" income  taxes ;  such  "additional" 
tax,  however,  applies  only  to  the  inter- 
est on  holdings  of  $5,000  or  more.  It 
was  believed  that  this  issue  was  by  these 
taxes  made  more  attractive  to  the  small 
investors.  The  same  thorough  organi- 
zation for  every  State  and  locality  was 
utilized  as  in  the  case  of  the  First  Lib- 
erty Loan.  There  were  also  numerous 
advertisements  by  billboards,  street 
cars,  newspapers,  magazines,  and  circu- 
lars ;  numerous  corporations  and  bank- 
ing   and    other    institutions    generally 


FINANCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS 


321 


urged  their  employees  or  constituencies 
to  subscribe.  Much  interest  and  enthu- 
siasm was  also  aroused  by  hundreds  of 
volunteer  canvassers  and  speakers. 

The  total  subscriptions  from  9,500,- 
000  persons  were  $4,617,532,300,  so 
that  the  actual  issue  was  $3,808,766,- 
150.  In  every  Federal  Reserve  Dis- 
trict the  minimum  allotment  was  over- 
subscribed, the  percentage  of  over- 
subscription ranging  from  somewhat 
less  than  4  per  cent  for  Dallas  to  62 
per  cent  for  Cleveland,  68  per  cent  for 
Richmond,  and  72  per  cent  for  New 
York ;  the  average  over-subscription 
was  54  per  cent.  In  determining  the 
allotments  it  was  decided  to  fill  all  sub- 
scriptions up  to  and  including  $50,000 
at  the  full  amount;  but  to  allow  only 
90  per  cent  of  subscriptions  between 
$50,000  and  $100,000,  but  no  allow- 
ance in  this  group  to  be  less  than  $50,- 
000 ;  75  per  cent  of  subscriptions  be- 
tween $100,000  and  $200,000,  but  no 
allotment  less  than  $90,000;  60  per 
cent  of  subscriptions  between  $200,000 
and  $1,000,000,  but  none  less  than 
$150,000;  50  per  cent  of  subscriptions 
between  $1,000,000  and  $8,000,000, 
but  no  allotment  less  than  $600,000 ; 
41.2  per  cent  of  subscriptions  between 
$8,000,000  and  $30,000,000,  but  not 
less  than  $4,000,000;  and  40.8152  per 
cent  of  a  subscription  for  $50,000,000. 
Treasury  certificates  which  were  out- 
standing to  the  amount  of  $2,320,493,- 
000,  due  at  different  dates  in  November 
and  December,  were  applicable  to  pur- 
chase of  these  bonds.  In  the  stock  mar- 
ket the  31/2  per  cent  Liberty  Bonds  had 
fluctuated  about  par  with  a  usually 
slight  discount  before  the  issue  of  the 
second  series.  Thereafter  the  3^8 
fluctuated  about  98-99  and  the  4s  about 
97-98. 

Third  Liberty  Loan. — On  April  6  the 
campaign  for  the  Third  Liberty  Loan 


was  launched  and  continued  until  May 
4.  During  this  period  18,376,815  peo- 
ple subscribed  to  $4,176,516,850  in 
bonds,  an  over-subscription  of  nearly 
40  per  cent.  These  bonds  are  of  shorter 
term  than  any  of  the  other  issues,  be- 
coming due  in  1928,  but  unlike  the  other 
issues  are  not  collectible  before  ma- 
turity. They  bear  4*4  per  cent  inter- 
est and  are  not  convertible,  thus  differ- 
ing from  the  First  and  Second  Loans, 
but  similar  in  this  respect  to  subse- 
quent issues.  Inheritance  taxes  are 
payable  with  these  bonds,  for  which 
purpose  they  are  receivable  at  par,  if 
they  have  been  held  for  six  months  prior 
to  death.  These  are  exempt  from  all 
State  and  local  taxation  but  are  sub- 
ject to  surtaxes,  inheritance  taxes,  and 
excess  and  war  profits  taxes,  on  hold- 
ings in  excess  of  $50,000. 

Fourth  Liberty  Loan. — The  largest 
sum  ever  raised  in  a  single  national  loan 
was  raised  in  the  drive  for  this  loan, 
which  extended  from  September  28  tq 
October  19.  The  vastness  of  the  efforts 
may  be  gleaned  from  the  fact  that  the 
Fifth  Federal  Reserve  District  alone 
mailed  $9,000,000  of  advertising  matter 
to  prospective  buyers ;  $6,989,047,000 
was  raised,  and  there  were  over  21,000,- 
000  subscribers.  But  while  the  number 
who  bought  was  unparalleled,  the 
greater  part  of  the  loan  was  taken  by 
the  wealthy.  For  instance,  in  the  New 
York  Federal  Reserve  District,  with 
3,604,101  subscribers,  2,279,165  sub- 
scriptions were  for  $50  bonds,  totaling 
but  $113,958,250,  whereas  967  of  the 
larger  subscribers  alone  invested  in 
$768,167,950  of  the  total,  of  slightly 
over  $2,000,000,000.  The  bonds  ma- 
ture in  1938  but  are  collectible  in  1933. 
Additional  exemption  is  granted  in  that 
the  interest  on  amounts  of  the  bonds 
not  in  excess  of  $30,000  is  not  subject 
to  surtaxes. 


322 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Fifth  Loan. — Before  the  close  of 
1918  plans  were  well  under  way  for  the 
floating  of  this  loan — the  Victory  Loan, 
as  it  was  to  be  called.  The  first  and 
second  issues  of  Treasury  Certificates 
of  indebtedness  in  anticipation  of  the 
Fifth  Loan  were  oversubscribed,  one  of 
the  subscribers  of  the  latter  issue  being 
the  Japanese  government.  These  cer- 
tificates bore  interest  at  4l/o  per  cent 
and  matured  May  6,  1919.  The  Vic- 
tory Loan  was  over-subscribed. 

Stabilizing  Market  Values. — With  a 
view  to  keeping  the  price  of  Liberty 
Bonds  from  dropping  below  par  pur- 
chases of  such  bonds  were  made  by  the 
treasury's  sinking  fund.  Until  Novem- 
ber 1,  $244,036,500  worth  of  bonds 
were  purchased  on  the  open  market  for 
$234,310,443,  making  an  average  price 
of  96  per  cent.  These  purchases  were 
made  in  accordance  with  the  act  of 
April  4, 1918,  which  authorized  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Treasury  to  buy  at  such 
prices  and  upon  such  terms  as  he  might 
prescribe.  This  did  not  prevent  a  con- 
siderable decline  in  market  values  of  all 
except  Liberty  lsts. 

War  Savings  Stamps. — For  the  pur- 
pose of  raising  funds  and  cultivating 
thrift  Congress  authorized  the  sale  of 
war  savings  stamps  in  two  denomina- 
tions, 25  cents  (thrift  stamps)  and  five 
dollars  (war  savings  stamps).  A 
Thrift  Card  was  furnished  having  space 
for  16  stamps ;  when  filled  this  could  be 
exchanged  for  a  $5  stamp  by  the  pay- 
ment of  12  cents  in  December,  1917, 
or  January,  1918 ;  thereafter  the  cost 
for  16  stamps  advanced  one  cent  per 
month.  These  large  stamps  could  be 
attached  to  a  War  Savings  Certificate 
which  had  spaces  for  20  stamps.  If 
this  was  filled  out  between  December 
1,  1917,  and  January  31,  1918,  at  a 
cost  of  $82.40,  the  government  would 
redeem    the    certificate    on   January    1, 


1923,  for  $100;  similarly  for  later 
dates.  All  stamps  and  certificates  ma- 
ture in  five  years  from  date  of  issue. 
The  difference  between  $4.12  and  $5.00 
is  the  interest  on  the  former  sum  for 
five  years  at  4  per  cent  compounded 
quarterly.  No  one  person  could  hold 
more  than  $1000  worth  of  these  certifi- 
cates, nor  purchase  more  than  $100 
worth  at  one  time.  The  stamps  were 
redeemable  at  the  post  office  at  any  time 
at  a  lessened  rate  of  interest.  To  carry 
out  the  plan  there  were  appointed  six 
Federal  directors,  giving  their  time  to 
the  work,  each  being  in  charge  of  two 
Federal  reserve  bank  districts.  There 
was  a  director  for  each  State  and  fur- 
ther organization  reaching  to  cities, 
counties,  and  towns.  The  national  com- 
mittee was :  Frank  A.  Vanderlip,  who 
resigned  the  presidency  of  the  National 
City  Bank  of  New  York  to  serve  with- 
out pay  as  chairman  of  this  committee ; 
Mrs.  George  Blass,  Chicago ;  Henry 
Ford,  Detroit ;  F.  A.  Delano,  Washing- 
ton ;  Eugene  Meyer,  Jr.,  New  York,  and 
Chas.  L.  Bayne,  Boston. 

The  sale  of  these  stamps  was  begun 
on  December  3,  1917,  under  the  super- 
vision of  the  National  War  Savings 
Committee.  This  met  with  compara- 
tively little  success  at  first,  there  being 
considerable  passive  and  some  active  op- 
position, and  in  the  opening  month  only 
$10,236,451  in  stamps  were  sold.  Great- 
er publicity,  however,  was  given  to  the 
stamps,  and  they  were  put  on  sale  at 
every  post  office  and  by  letter  carriers. 
In  addition  agents  for  the  sale  of  the 
stamps  were  appointed  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury,  these  numbering 
233,287  at  the  end  of  October,  1918, 
while  151,361  war  savings  societies, 
numbering  from  10  to  12,000  members 
each,  had  been  formed  by  November  1, 
1918. 

The  sales   gradually   increased  until 


FINANCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS 


323 


they  reached  their  maximum  in  July, 
1918,  during  which  months  $211,417,- 
942.61  of  stamps  were  disposed  of.  By 
November  1,  1918,  the  cash  receipts 
from  this  source  totaled  $834,253,- 
213.44,  representing  an  average  ma- 
turity value  of  a  little  over  $1,000,000,- 
000.  Few  persons  availed  themselves 
of  the  provision  allowing  for  the  re- 
demption of  the  stamps,  the  redemption 
constituting  less  than  1  per  cent,  of 
the  cash  receipts.  The  success  of  this 
experience  has  led  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  to  suggest  in  his  annual  re- 
port that  this  be  made  a  permanent 
part  of  the  scheme  of  the  nation's  finan- 
cing. On  September  24  an  act  was 
passed  permitting  the  individual  to  hold 
as  much  as  $1000  of  War  Savings 
Stamps  of  any  one  issue ;  this  super- 
seded the  previous  restriction  of  $1000 
of  stamps  of  all  issues.  This  act  also 
increased  the  total  of  stamps  authorized 
from  two  to  four  billion  dollars.  About 
the  same  time  Mr.  Frank  A.  Vander- 
lip,  who  had  for  a  year  given  up  his 
duties  as  president  of  the  National  City 
Bank  to  supervise  the  thrift  campaign, 
resigned  this  latter  function.  The 
work  was  incorporated  in  the  activities 
of  the  Treasury  Department. 

Treasury  Certificates. — In  order  to 
raise  immediate  cash  largely  for  the 
purpose  of  carrying  out  the  proposed 
loans  to  the  Allies,  the  Treasury  issued 
at  sixteen  different  times  the  varying 
amounts  of  temporary  certificates  of  in- 
debtedness. Their  total  amount  was 
$4,028,698,000 ;  only  $690,000,000 
issued  November  21,  1917,  bearing  4 
per  cent  interest  and  due  June  25, 
1918,  were  still  outstanding  at  the  close 
of  the  year.  Two  small  issues  on  March 
31  and  October  29,  1917,  bore  2  per 
cent  interest ;  2  issues  on  April  25  and 
May  10,  1917,  bore  3  per  cent;  2  on 
May  25  and  June  8,  1917,  bore  3*4  per 


cent ;  3  issues  on  August  9,  August  28, 
and  September  17,  1917,  bore  3y2  per 
cent ;  and  7  other  issues,  all  after  Sep- 
tember 26,  1917,  bore  4  per  cent.  Near- 
ly $2,500,000,000  of  these  certificates 
were  placed  through  the  Federal  reserve 
banks  at  New  York. 

Advance  to  Allies. — The  plan  of  the 
government  included  advances  to  the 
Allies  of  $500,000,000  per  month.  The 
first  advance  was  of  $200,000,000  to 
Great  Britain  on  April  25,  1917.  By 
the  close  of  the  year  the  total  advances 
had  reached  the  sum  of  $4,236,400,000, 
distributed  as  follows :  Great  Britain, 
$2,045,000,000;  France,  $1,285,000,- 
000;  Italy,  $500,000,000;  Russia, 
$325,000,000,  of  which  $5,000,000  was 
for  the  Rumanian  government ;  Bel- 
gium, $77,400,000 ;  and  Serbia,  $4,000,- 
000.  These  advances  were  made  on  the 
basis  of  the  obligations  of  foreign  gov- 
ernments purchased  by  the  Treasury. 
Loans  were  first  made  at  the  rate  of  3 
per  cent  per  annum,  but  soon  advanced 
to  3y±  per  cent  in  order  to  conform 
to  the  rates  paid  by  the  Treasury  on 
its  own  certificates  of  indebtedness. 
Following  the  flotation  of  the  first  Lib- 
erty Loan  the  rate  on  foreign  loans 
was  advanced  to  3^  per  cent ;  and 
finally  following  the  issue  of  the  second 
Liberty  Loan  the  rate  was  raised  to  41/4 
per  cent. 

Preceding  our  entrance  into  the  war 
it  had  been  the  practice  of  foreign  gov- 
ernments to  issue  loans  in  this  coun- 
try; subsequently  to  our  entrance,  in 
order  to  avoid  the  competition  of  for- 
eign governments  with  our  own,  the 
policy  of  making  loans  to  the  Allies  by 
the  government  itself,  as  indicated  in 
the  following  paragraphs,  was  adopted. 
It  was  estimated  that  previous  to  the, 
American  declaration  of  war  about 
$2,500,000,000  of  foreign  war  loans 
had  been  floated  in  this  country.     The 


324 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


only  variation   from  the  new   rule  was 
the    issue    by     the    British    Treasury 
through  the  firm   of   J.   P.   Morgan   & 
Company  of  90-day  discount  bills.     It 
was  planned  to  issue  about  $15,000,000 
of  bills  weekly  up  to  a  total  of  not  over 
$150,000,000.     In  fact,  the  total  issued 
was   only  $100,000,000;   this    amount, 
bearing  6   per   cent  interest,  was   out- 
standing at  the  close  of  the  year.     In 
addition,  the  same  firm  acting  for  the 
British   and  French  governments,   sold 
some  of  the  collateral  upon  which  pre- 
vious loans  had  been  based  and  repur- 
chased part   of  such  loans  themselves. 
Canada.       War    financing     occupied 
much  of  public  attention  in  Canada  dur- 
ing 1917.     On  February  8,  1917,  Pre- 
mier Borden  in  his  budget  speech  stated 
that  the  cost  of  the  war  had  exceeded 
all  expectations.     For  the  year  1917- 
18  the  estimated  military  and  naval  ex- 
penditures were   put   at   $433,000,000, 
compared    with    $217,000,000    for    the 
preceding  year  ;  $166,000,000  for  1915- 
16,  and  only  $61,000,000  for  1914-15. 
The  loans  of  the  year  included  the  third 
war  loan  of  $150,000,000  in  5  per  cent 
bonds  at  96,  issued  in  March,  1917.    A 
loan  of  $100,000,000  was  floated  in  the 
United  States  in  July,   1917,  through 
the  firm  of  J.  P.  Morgan  &  Company. 
This  was  the  only  foreign  loan  floated 
in  the  United  States  after  its  entrance 
into  the  war,  and  special  permission  for 
it  was  given  by  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury   McAdoo.      Finally    in    November, 
1917,  the  Victory  Loan  was  put  out, 
807,361    subscribers   asking  for  $417,- 
000,000.     The  loan  amounted  to  $400,- 
000,000,  in  the  form  of  5%  per  cent 
gold  bonds  in  three  series,  maturing  in 
1922,  1927,  and  1937.     The  flotation 
of  this  immense  loan  in  Canada  was  an 
evidence  of  sound  financial  conditions ; 
in    1916    two-thirds    of    the    Canadian 
loans,    Dominion    and    Provincial,    had 


been  floated  in  the  United  States,  where- 
as in  1917  only  slightly  more  than  one- 
fifth  were  sold  here.  In  connection  with 
war  financing,  Canada  began  early  in 
the  year  to  issue  savings  stamps  and 
certificates  on  a  plan  similar  to  that 
adopted  previously  in  Great  Britain 
and  later  in  the  United  States. 

In  trade  and  manufacturing  new 
high  points  were  reached. 

Exports  for  11  months  totaled 
$1,399,000,000,  as  compared  with 
$961,666,000  and  $521,953,000  for 
similar  periods  of  1916  and  1915.  Im- 
ports for  this  period  were  $943,500,- 
000,  as  compared  with  $698,709,000, 
and  $405,973,000  for  the  like  periods 
of  1916  and  1915.  There  was  thus  a 
favorable  balance  of  trade  of  nearly 
twice  that  of  1916  and  fully  three  times 
that  of  1915.  Crops  were  fairly 
abundant  and  prices  high.  Shipbuild- 
ing rapidly  advanced  on  both  coasts. 
Mineral  production  was  hampered  by 
labor  shortage  and  unrest  but  the  to- 
tal value  of  output  was  $200,000,000, 
as  against  $190,646,000  in  1914,  and 
$39,000,000  in  1916,  to  $35,000,000  in 
1917.  Various  new  industries,  notably 
potash,  toy-making,  and  dye  manufac- 
ture, developed  rapidly.  War  orders 
aggregating  about  $1,812,000,000  were 
placed  by  the  Imperial  Munitions 
Board. 

Canada's  Fifth  War  Loan  was  suc- 
cessful beyond  all  expectations.  The 
subscriptions  totaled  $695,389,000, 
while  the  maximum  asked  for  was  $600,- 
000,000  and  the  minimum  $300,000,- 
000 ;  the  government  accepted  the  max- 
imum asked  for.  Maturing  at  five  and 
fifteen  years,  the  bonds  become  due  on 
November  1,  1923  and  1933,  and  yield 
5l/o  per  cent  interest,  payable  semi- 
annually. The  bonds  may  be  convert- 
ed into  any  future  domestic  issues  of 
like    maturity    or    longer   made    during 


FINANCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS 


325 


the  war.  Unlike  the  later  liberty  issues 
in  the  United  States,  the  bonds  are  ex- 
empt from  taxes,  including  any  income 
tax  imposed  in  pursuance  of  legislation 
enacted  by  the  parliament  of  Canada. 
The  campaign  extended  from  October 
28  to  November  16,  1918,  and  there 
were  1,104,107  subscriptions.  The 
province  of  Ontario  had  542,648  sub- 
scribers for  $336,055,000.  In  the  en- 
tire Dominion  one  person  in  every  7.08 
subscribed  and  the  average  per  capita 
subscription  was  $88.91. 

Great  Britain.  The  great  financial 
and  commercial  strength  of  Great  Brit- 
ain showed  to  superior  effect  amidst 
the  tremendous  obstacles  of  the  third 
year  of  war.  Aggregate  war  expendi- 
tures reached  £4,200,000,000  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1917.  In  September,  1917,  the 
war  cost  above  the  normal  peace  bud- 
gets was  estimated  at  five  billion  pounds 
sterling  ($25,000,000,000)  and  yet  not 
the  slightest  feeling  of  uncertainty  had 
been  manifest  as  to  the  soundness  of  the 
financial  structure.  This  estimate,  made 
by  the  Select  Committee  on  National 
Expenditure,  showed  that  advances  to 
Allies  had  amounted  to  £1,321,000,000 
to  September,  1917.  The  deadweight 
national  debt  had  thus  been  increased 
by  about  £3,500,000,000  and  the  an- 
nual debt  charge  by  over  £200,000,000, 
or  a  billion  dollars.  It  was  estimated 
that  each  six  months  of  war  would  add 
£750,000,000,  exclusive  of  advances  to 
Allies,  to  the  debt  and  £45,000,000  to 
the  annual  debt  charge  (interest  at  5 
per  cent  and  sinking  fund  1  per  cent). 
The  total  war  credits  for  the  fiscal  year 
April,  1917,  to  March,  1918,  inclusive, 
were  £2,450,000,000.  There  were  quan- 
tities of  Treasury  bills  outstanding  at 
all  times,  their  volume  in  December 
being  £1,059,000,000.  As  elsewhere, 
prices  advanced  sharply.  The  London 
Economist  estimated  the  index  level  of 


general  prices  as  follows :  Average  for 
1901-5,  2200;  September  30,  1916, 
4423;  September  30,  1917,  5634.  As 
indicated  above,  British  purchases  in 
the  United  States  necessitated  large 
loans  from  the  United  States  govern- 
ment to  maintain  trade  balances.  In 
addition  for  the  same  purpose,  British 
owners  of  American  securities  were  es- 
timated to  have  sold  $1,750,000,000 
of  them  back  to  American  investors 
since  the  war  started.  The  high  rates 
of  interest  caused  British  Consols  to 
drop  in  January  to  51%,  their  lowest 
since  1803,  while  securities  in  general 
continued  to  shrink  in  market  values. 
The  London  Bankers'  Magazine  report- 
ed that  declines  in  the  market  values  of 
387  representative  stocks  amounted  to 
nearly  £158,000,000  for  the  year  and 
to  £771,000,000  since  July,  1914.  The 
high  level  of  trade  is  indicated  by  total 
exports  for  the  eleven  months  ending 
November  30,  1917,  of  £488,168,000, 
an  increase  of  4.6  per  cent  over  the 
same  period  of  1916  and  26  per  cent 
above  those  of  1915.  Imports  for  eleven 
months  were  £980,500,000,  or  12.2  per 
cent  for  the  same  period  of  1916,  and 
greatly  exceeding  any  previous  year. 
Re-exports,  however,  were  only  £66,- 
372,000  for  11  months,  a  decline  of  27.6 
per  cent  and  much  less  than  any  recent 
year. 

In  October,  1917,  Great  Britain  in- 
augurated its  system  of  continuous  sale 
of  bonds  known  as  National  War  Bonds 
and  sold  them  throughout  1918.  These 
consisted  of  5  per  cent  bonds  of  1922 
at  102,  of  1924  at  103,  and  of  1927 
at  105,  and  of  4  per  cent  bonds  of  1927. 
The  coupon  bonds  were  put  forth  in  de- 
nominations ranging  from  £50  to 
£5000  and  there  were  also  registered 
bonds  which  are  transferable  either  by 
deed  or  in  the  Bank  Transfer  Books. 
A  legal  tender  privilege  is  attached,  the 


326 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


bonds  being  accepted  at  par  and  ac- 
crued interest  by  the  commissioners  of 
inland  revenue  in  payment  of  death 
duties,  provided  bonds  were  held  for 
six  months  before  the  date  of  decease. 
Both  principal  and  interest  are  exempt 
from  all  British  taxation,  present  or 
future,  if  shown  to  be  in  the  beneficial 
ownership  of  persons  neither  domiciled 
nor  ordinarily  resident  in  the  United 
Kingdom.  Interest  on  the  4  per  cent 
bonds  is  exempt  from  British  income 
taxation  other  than  the  super  tax.  The 
5  per  cent  and  the  4  per  cent  bonds 
both  have  a  convertibility  feature. 
The  chancellor  pointed  out  that  in  the 
year  beginning  October  1,  1917,  over 
£1,120,000,000  had  been  invested  in 
war  bonds,  much  more  than  expected ; 
by  January  18,  1919,  the  total  had 
reached  £1,500,000,000.  The  advan- 
tage claimed  for  the  system  of  continu- 
ous borrowing  is  that  it  raises  more 
money  with  the  least  disturbance  of 
financial  conditions,  and  it  is  argued 
that  it  is  the  best  from  a  point  of  view 
of  financial  stability  after  the  war  is 
over. 

Through  its  representatives  in  the 
United  States,  J.  P.  Morgan  &  Com- 
pany, the  British  government  offered 
its  short  term  treasury  bills  through- 
out the  year,  these  bonds  selling  on  the 
market  at  5*/?  per  cent  at  the  beginning 
of  1918,  the  interest  increasing  to  6 
per  cent  for  the  greater  part  of  the 
year,  and  the  bonds  being  again  offered 
at  6  per  cent  during  1919.  During  the 
first  four  years  of  the  war  Great  Brit- 
ain had  borrowed  over  £5,900,000,000. 
The  total  indebtedness  of  Great  Brit- 
ain on  January  1,1919,  was  about  $40,- 
000,000,000,  over  44  per  cent  of  the 
national  wealth. 

Germany.  Financial  conditions  with- 
in the  Central  Powers  were  largely 
shrouded    in     mystery.       There    were, 


however,  many  indications  of  financial 
stress,  food  and  clothing  shortage,  and 
industrial  unrest.  The  war  finances 
were  a  prodigious  burden.  The  fifth 
war  loan  was  reported  in  April,  1917, 
to  have  produced  12,770,000,000  marks 
($3,192,000,000).  In  February,  1917, 
the  Reichstag  authorized  a  sixth  credit 
of  15  billion  marks  and  in  July  a  sev- 
enth of  like  amount.  The  sixth  loan 
was  reported  to  have  produced  $3,089,- 
000,000,  and  the  seventh  $3,156,000,- 
000.  This  last  called  out  5,213,000 
subscribers,  of  whom  3,233,000  made 
subscriptions  of  $50  or  less,  and  1,280,- 
000  others  subscribed  less  than  $250 
each.  The  total  number  of  subscribers 
was  less  than  for  the  fourth  and  fifth 
loans  and  greater  reliance  was  placed 
on  the  large  banks.  The  rapid  growth 
of  the  public  interest  charge,  the  al- 
most complete  absence  of  foreign  trade, 
and  the  concentration  of  industrial  ef- 
forts within  the  narrowest  range  of 
military  necessities  made  increasingly 
difficult  the  preservation  of  a  sound 
financial  structure.  In  addition,  in 
July,  1917,  Germany  assumed  respon- 
sibility for  war  expenditures  of  Bul- 
garia and  Turkey.  Numerous  reports 
indicated  increasing  food  scarcity  and 
the  efforts  of  the  authorities  to  supply 
fertilizers  and  seeds  and  stimulate  pro- 
duction. Nevertheless,  Mr.  Hoover  re- 
ported to  President  Wilson  in  May, 
1917,  that  the  Germans  could  not  be 
starved  into  surrender.  The  scarcity 
of  gold  and  silver  gave  great  concern 
because  of  the  unfavorable  trade  bal- 
ances with  neighboring  neutrals.  The 
Reichsbank  repeated  its  appeals  for 
gold  in  any  form  and  the  government 
threatened  to  demonetize  silver  if  it 
were  not  brought  out  of  hiding.  Loans 
were  secured  from  Switzerland  and  Hol- 
land largely,  according  to  report,  by 
threats   to    cut   off   their   coal   supply. 


FINANCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS 


327 


The  scarcity  of  clothing  necessitated 
government  regulation  and  the  issue  of 
clothing  cards. 

Plans  for  the  rehabilitation  of  the 
merchant  fleet  and  the  recovery  of  for- 
eign trade  made  much  progress.  It 
was  reported  that  a  merchant  fleet  was 
under  construction ;  that  the  govern- 
ment would  make  generous  allowances 
for  vessels  lost  during  the  war  and 
heavily  subsidized  shipping  after  the 
war;  and  that  similar  steps  would  be 
taken  with  reference  to  various  branches 
of  trade,  especially  toy-making  and 
dye-manufacture.  It  was  planned  also 
to  utilize  monopolies  of  buying  under 
government  direction  to  secure  raw  ma- 
terials. 

During  1918  the  German  government 
floated  two  war  loans,  the  eighth  and 
the  ninth.  The  eighth  loan,  offered  to 
the  public  from  March  18  until  April 
18,  consisted  of  bonds  bearing  5  per 
cent  interest  and  treasury  certificates 
bearing  4^/o  per  cent  interest.  These, 
as  in  the  two  preceding  loans,  were 
issued  at  98  and  the  amount  was  un- 
limited. They  were  dated  July  1,  1918, 
but  the  bonds  were  "unkundbar"  (or 
unannounceable)  until  October  1,  1924, 
whereas  the  treasury  certificates  ma- 
ture on  July  1,  1967,  but  subject  to 
drawings,  or,  at  the  option  of  the  gov- 
ernment, to  entire  redemption  at  par, 
on  or  after  July  1,  1927.  However, 
the  holder  of  the  certificates,  if  the  gov- 
ernment exercises  its  right  to  redeem, 
may  ask  for  4  per  cent  treasury  cer- 
tificates which  are  redeemable  by  draw- 
ing at  115.  The  bonds  were  issued,  as 
in  the  United  States,  in  coupon  bonds, 
being  in  denominations  ranging  from 
100  to  20,000  marks.  The  treasury 
certificates  were  in  series  in  coupon 
form,  in  denominations  of  1,000  to  20,- 
000  marks.  Both  the  bonds  and  certifi- 
cates of  this  and  previous  loans  could 


be  deposited  by  subscribers  in  the  se- 
curities department  of  the  Reichsbank, 
which  would  collect  and  forward  in- 
terest without  charge  until  October, 
1919.  In  the  campaign  for  the  raising 
of  the  funds  much  was  made  of  Wilson's 
assertion  that  the  United  States  was 
to  put  all  its  force  into  the  winning  of 
the  war.  A  total  of  15,001,425,000 
marks  (about  $3,520,000,000)  was  sub- 
scribed, which  sum  far  exceeded  the  sub- 
scription to  the  sixth  loan,  which  until 
then  held  the  record  of  13,120,000,000 
marks.  The  number  of  subscribers, 
6,510,278,  exceeded  the  number  for  any 
previous  loan  except  the  sixth,  to  which 
over  seven  million  subscribed. 

The  ninth  German  loan  met  with  much 
less  success.  In  accordance  with  the 
bill  introduced  into  the  Reichstag  for  a 
war  credit  of  fifteen  billion  marks,  a 
campaign  was  conducted  from  Septem- 
ber 23  until  October  23.  The  loan  was 
issued  as  in  the  two  preceding  war  loans 
in  the  form  of  5  per  cent  bonds  and  of 
41/0  per  cent  redeemable  treasury  cer- 
tificates, both  being  put  forth  at  98.  In 
its  other  essential  features  this  loan 
was  similar  to  the  preceding.  Accord- 
ing to  a  statement  attributed  to  the 
president  of  the  Imperial  Bank  the  to- 
tal subscription  amounted  to  10,433,- 
957,700  marks,  which  was  considerably 
less  than  called  for. 

Japan.  Japan  was  never  so  pros- 
perous as  in  1917.  Although  nominally 
a  belligerent,  her  trade  and  manufac- 
turing positions  were  those  of  a  neu- 
tral. She  nearly  monopolized  Oriental 
trans-Pacific  trade  and  built  up  a  thriv- 
ing commerce  with  much  of  the  rest  of 
the  world.  She  sent  trade  commissions 
to  all  important  countries,  opened  new 
steamship  lines  to  China,  Russia,  Aus- 
tralia, Africa,  North  and  South  Amer- 
ica, Europe,  India,  and  the  South  Sea 
Islands.      Her   shipyards   were  worked 


328 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


at  full  capacity.  Her  combined  im- 
ports and  exports  showed  a  value  double 
that  of  1914.  As  compared  with  1916, 
there  was  an  increase  of  over  50  per 
cent  in  exports  and  of  about  20  per 
cent  in  imports.  There  were  great  ad- 
vances in  commodity  prices,  resulting 
among  other  things  in  numerous  indus- 
trial disturbances.  Some  indication  of 
industrial  development  is  given  by  Ja- 
pan's importation  of  cotton  from  the 
United  States  to  the  amount  of  514,000 
bales  in  the  fiscal  year  1917,  as  com- 
pared with  484,000  bales  in  1916  and 
337,000  in  1914.  Her  total  exports 
for  fiscal  years  were:  1917,  $130,472,- 
000;  1916,  $74,470,000;  1915,  $41,- 
517,000. 

Japan,  like  the  United  States,  has 
stood  in  the  position  of  a  lender,  hav- 
ing furnished  financial  assistance  to  the 
extent  of  $742,298,000  to  Great  Brit- 
ain; $254,168,000  to  Russia;  and 
$155,569,000  to  France;  from  the  out- 
break of  the  war  until  the  end  of  April, 
1918.  A  national  loan  of  $25,000,000 
floated  during  1918  drew  forth  sub- 
scriptions exceeding  $67,500,000.  Bonds 
to  the  amount  of  $400,000,000  were  ex- 
pected to  be  issued  in  1918-19. 

France.  The  Fourth  French  War 
Loan  or  "Liberty  Loan"  was  opened 
for  subscription  October  20  and  re- 
mained open  until  November  24,  1918. 
The  bonds  of  nominal  value  of  100 
francs  were  issued  at  70.8  francs ;  with 
interest  set  at  4  per  cent  on  the  nomi- 
nal value  the  yield  is  approximately 
5%  per  cent.  By  December  31,  with 
final  results  of  the  campagin  not  yet 
known,  it  was  announced  that  the  sub- 
scriptions reached  a  nominal  total  of 
27,750,000,000  francs  or  a  real  value 
of  19,750,000,000  francs.  The  sum  by 
far  exceeds  the  amounts  raised  in  any 
previous  war  loans.  In  addition  France 
offered  a  new  form  of  short  term  obli- 


gations beginning  May  31,  1918.  These 
were  the  National  Defense  Notes,  which 
have  a  maturity  of  one  month  but  which 
may  be  extended  one  or  two  months  fur- 
ther. The  interest  set  at  3.6  per  cent 
the  first  month,  increases  to  3.9  per 
cent  the  second  month,  and  to  4  per 
cent  if  held  for  four  months.  The 
French  government's  borrowings  since 
the  outbreak  of  the  war  to  August  31, 
1918,  are  classed  as  follows :  Domestic, 
funded  loans,  32,187,000,000  francs; 
national  defense  treasury  bills,  26,453,- 
000,000  francs  ;  short  term  bonds,  679,- 
000,000  francs ;  advances  of  the  Bank 
of  France  and  the  Bank  of  Algeria,  19,- 
415,000,000  francs  ;  total  domestic,  78,- 
734,000,000  francs.  Foreign,  loans 
contracted  in:  England,  12,533,000,000 
francs;  United  States,  11,887,000,000 
francs;  Argentina,  471,000,000  francs; 
Spain,  326,000,000  francs;  Japan, 
197,000,000  francs;  Switzerland,  97,- 
000,000  francs ;  Holland,  Norway,  and 
Sweden,  147,000,000  francs;  total  for- 
eign, 25,678,000,000  francs. 

Australia.  During  1918  Australia 
floated  two  war  loans,  the  sixth  and 
the  seventh.  The  sixth  war  loan  cam- 
paign was  carried  on  from  February 
18  to  April  10  and  £20,000,000  in  bonds 
were  issued.  The  bonds  were  offered  so 
as  to  produce  interest  at  41/^  per  cent 
free  of  Federal  and  State  income  taxes 
and  of  any  levy  of  wealth  hereafter  to 
be  made.  There  was,  however,  an  al- 
ternative offer  of  5  per  cent  interest 
subject  to  Federal  but  not  to  State  in- 
come taxes — for  those  of  smaller  in- 
comes who  would  not  be  liable  to  the 
tax  and  to  whom  the  tax  free  consid- 
eration would  have  no  special  attrac- 
tion. The  bonds  are  accepted  at  par 
in  payment  of  probate  and  succession 
duty  due  the  Commonwealth.  Further, 
trustees  are  allowed  to  invest  in  them 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  price 


FINANCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  ASPECTS 


329 


at  the  time  of  investment  may  be  above 
or  below  par.  Provision  is  made  for 
the  purchasing  of  the  bonds  on  the  mar- 
ket by  the  treasurer  of  the  Common- 
wealth should  they  decline  in  price. 
The  subscriptions  which  in  aggregate 
were  £43,500,000,  more  than  doubled 
the  amount  asked  for.  Of  this  total 
only  £6,500,000  was  applied  for  at  the 
5  per  cent  rate. 

The  Seventh  Australian  War  Loan 
called  for  £40,000,000  and  the  cam- 
paign for  this  was  inaugurated  on  Sep- 
tember 16.  The  bonds  were  issued  at 
par  in  denominations  ranging  from  £10 
to  £1000  and  the  rate  of  interest  was 
fixed  at  5  per  cent.  Unlike  the  pre- 
ceding loans,  the  whole  issue  is  subject 
to  Federal,  though  not  to  state,  taxa- 
tion, and  it  is  of  short  duration,  the 
year  of  maturity  being  1923.  The 
number  of  applications  was  223,863 
(which  was  more  than  for  any  previ 
ous  loan)  and  subscriptions  amounted 
to  £42,667,640.  The  seven  war  loans 
floated  in  Australia  aggregated  £186,- 
994,940.  In  addition,  up  to  June  30, 
1918,  Australia  had  borrowed  from  the 
British  home  government  £38,000,000 
for  the  prosecution  of  the  war. 

New  Zealand.  In  the  early  part  of 
1918  New  Zealand  raised  another  war 
loan  of  £20,000,000.  This,  like  the 
preceding  loan,  had  a  compulsory  fea- 
ture whereby  if  the  set  sum  was  not 
obtained  persons  with  incomes  of  over 
£700  and  who  were  thus  able  to  sub- 
scribe but  failed  to  do  so  were  to  be 
fined,  and  later  compelled  to  put  sur 
plus  funds  in  war  bonds  receiving  only 
3  per  cent  interest.  The  compulsory 
provision  in  the  war  loan  of  New  Zea- 
land in  1917  was  probably  the  first  in- 
stance of  this  form  of  conscription  of 
wealth  in  the  belligerent  countries, 
though  resort  was  not  needed  to  this  be- 
cause there  were  enough  subscriptions. 


India.  India  continued  its  issue  of  its 
Post  Office  5-Year  Cash  Certificates  in 
1918,  these  being  offered  continuously 
since  April  1,  1917.  The  certificates 
are  dated  from  the  date  of  sale  and 
become  due  in  five  years,  thus  being 
very  similar  to  War  Savings  Certificates. 
These  certificates  may  be  cashed  at  any 
time  within  a  year  at  cost  price,  ano} 
thereafter  the  cash  value  increases  each 
quarter  year  until  maturity.  They  are 
issued  in  denominations  which  vary 
from  10  to  100  rupees  maturity  value. 
The  interest  at  5.13  per  cent  per  an- 
num is  compounded  quarterly  from  the 
date  of  purchase  and  paid  at  the  end  of 
the  five  years.  While  these  are  exempt 
from  the  income  tax,  the  maximum 
amount  that  an  individual  can  hold  is 
7500  rupees,  irrespective  of  the  amount 
of  other  kinds  of  bonds  held.  The  issue 
of  these  certificates  as  well  as  of  the 
5  per  cent  War  Loan  bonds  of  1929-47 
and  the  5%  per  cent  war  bonds  of 
1920-22,  was  authorized  by  the  gov- 
ernment of  India  on  March  1,  1917. 

Other  British  Colonies.  Newfound- 
land, the  Union  of  South  Africa,  the 
Malay  States,  and  the  Colony  of  Bar- 
bados, British  West  Indies,  all  raised 
loans   for  war  purposes  during  1918. 

Italy.  The  sum  raised  by  Italy  by 
its  Fourth  War  Loan  (its  fifth  loan 
since  the  outbreak  of  the  European 
War)  exceeded  by  far  the  amount  ob- 
tained in  any  previous  campaign.  From 
January  15  to  March  10  about  $1,160,- 
000,000  of  bonds  was  subscribed  for, 
as  compared  with  the  $500,000,000  of 
the  preceding  loan,  which  had  before 
held  the  record.  They  were  issued  at 
86.5,  with  the  interest  set  at  5  per  cent, 
but  had  no  definite  date  of  maturity. 
Coupon  bonds  in  denominations  from 
100  to  20,000  lire  were  exchangeable 
for  registered  bonds.  The  bonds  of  this 
loan  were  exempt  from  all  taxes   and 


330 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


enjoy  all  of  the  advantages  which  were  Loans  to  Allies.  The  American  gov- 
to  go  to  future  loans  during  the  war.  ernment,  after  its  entrance  into  the 
Neutral  Countries.  The  finances  of  war,  made  repeated  loans  to  associated 
neutral  countries  required  that  loans  be  belligerents  and  also  to  certain  neutrals, 
floated  to  meet  the  expenses  of  mobili-  These  advances  were  spent  in  this  coni- 
zation and  other  expenditures  occa-  try  for  food  and  supplies;  they  were 
sioned  by  the  war.  For  example,  be-  essential  to  the  equalization  of  interna- 
fore  Italy's  entrance  into  the  fray  it  tional  exchange.  They  were  based  on 
had  issued  a  mobilization  loan  and  the  obligations  of  foreign  governments 
Switzerland  put  forth  eight  and  Hoi-  purchased  by  the  United  States  treas- 
land  four  mobilization  loans.  ury ;  these  bore  rates  of  interest  con- 
Switzerland.  Switzerland's  eighth  forming  to  the  Liberty  Loans  and  in- 
mobilization  loan  was  opened  to  public  terim  certificates  of  the  treasury.  Pre- 
subscription  from  January  7  to  Janu-  vious  to  April,  1917,  foreign  loans  to 
ary  16,  1918.  The  bonds  were  issued  the  amount  of  $2,500,000,000  had  been 
at  100  in  denominations  ranging  from  placed  here  through  banking  houses  by 
100  to  5000  francs  in  coupon  bonds,  numerous  foreign  governments.  After 
Coupon  bonds  which  had  an  aggregate  America's  entrance  into  the  war  all  ad- 
par  value  of  over  1000  francs  could  be  vances  were  made  by  the  government, 
deposited  at  the  Federal  treasury  in  except  certain  short-term  British  treas- 
exchange  for  registered  certificates,  ury  notes  issued  through  J.  P.  Morgan 
The  bonds  are  redeemable  at  par  on  or  and  Company  and  certain  Canadian  ob- 
after  January  31,  1928,  upon  the  giv-  ligations.  By  January  15,  1919,  the 
ing  of  six  months'  notice.  Both  prin-  aggregate  loans  of  our  government  to 
cipal  and  interest  are  exempt  from  all  foreign  governments  were  $8,598,773,- 
taxes,  deduction  or  stamp  duty  of  the  702,  apportioned  as  follows:  Great 
Federal  government.  There  were  31,-  Britain,  $4,175,981,000;  France,  $2,- 
601  subscriptions,  totaling  $28,950,-  436,427,000;  Italy,  $1,310,000,000; 
000.  Russia,  $325,000,000  (all  previous  to 
The  Netherlands.  From  January  2  1918)  ;  Belgium,  $256,145,000;  Greece, 
to  January  4  Holland  disposed  of  its  $39,554,036;  Cuba,  $15,000,000;  Ser- 
fourth  mobilization  loan.  The  bonds  bia,  $12,000,000;  Rumania,  $6,666,- 
were  issued  at  100  and  the  interest  rate  666;  Liberia,  $5,000,000;  and  Czecho- 
was  fixed  at  4%  per  cent.  They  are  Slovaks,  $17,000,000. 
dated  February  1,  1918,  and  mature  Gross  Debts  of  Belligerents. — As 
forty  years  from  that  time,  with  the  published  by  the  Commercial  and  Finan- 
right  of  redemption  by  the  government  cial  Chronicle,  the  total  debts  of  bellig- 
at  any  time  after  August  1,  1919.  The  erents  on  January  1,  1919,  as  compared 
coupon  bonds  were  issued  in  denomina-  with  debts  August  1,  1914,  were  as  fol- 
tions  of  100,  500,  and  1000  florins,  the  lows  (six  figures  [000,000]  omitted): 
first  coupon  on  definitive  bonds  matur- 
ing on  February  1,  1919.     In  case  the  August     January 

i                                       •       ■                      i-i              t  1,1914        1,  1919 

voluntary  subscriptions  to  this  loan  did      united  states $1,000     $21,000 

not  amount  to  400,000,000  florins,  the  France.?.. ..".".'.".*.*.".".".'.'.'.".'.!".!".!!".!        6,500      30,000 

,  .j     j     -  ,  ,  .  Russia 4,600  27,000 

law  provided  tor  compulsory  subscrip-      itaiv  2,800       12,000 

.-  .  a  I    1  x     1AA    J  Germany 5,200  40,000 

tlOnS    tO     a    6    per    Cent    loan    at     100     tO        Austria-Hungary 3,700  24,000 

make  up  the  deficiency.  Totals $27,300    $194,000 


XIII.     THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE  AND  THE  TREATIES  OF  PEACE 


President  Wilson's  Visit  to  Europe. 
After  the  signing  of  the  armistice  all 
the  eyes  of  the  world  were  focused  on 
the  forthcoming  gathering  of  the  lead- 
ing diplomats  of  the  world  to  settle  the 
final  terms  of  peace.  On  November  18, 
the  President  announced  that  he  intend- 
ed to  sail  for  Europe  himself  in  order 
to  take  part  in  the  peace  discussion  be- 
cause he  felt  that  it  would  be  impossible 
for  him  to  handle  the  matter  success- 
fully by  cable.  On  November  29  the 
American  delegates  to  the  Peace  Con- 
ference were  announced  as  follows :  The 
President,  Robert  Lansing,  Secretary  of 
State,  Colonel  Edward  M.  House,  Hen- 
ry White,  former  Ambassador  to 
France,  General  Tasker  H.  Bliss,  mili- 
tary representative  of  the  United 
States  at  the  Inter- Allied  War  Council. 
President  Wilson,  in  his  farewell  address 
to  Congress  on  December  2,  stated  that 
the  Entente  governments  had  accepted 
the  principles  laid  down  in  his  "fourteen 
peace  points"  address  (see  above),  and 
that  it  was  only  reasonable  for  him  to 
be  present  at  the  conference  in  order  to 
interpret  some  of  them  as  well  as  to  offer 
suggestions  as  to  their  applications. 
The  President  and  his  party  sailed  for 
France  on  the  steamer  George  Wash- 
ington, on  December  4.  They  arrived 
at  Brest  on  December  13  and  went  to 
Paris  on  the  same  day.  They  were  re- 
ceived by  the  French  President  and 
other  high  dignitaries  and  the  President 
took  up  his  residence  at  the  palace  of 
Prince  Murat.  On  Christmas  Day, 
President  Wilson  visited  General  Persh- 
ing at  general  headquarters  and  ad- 
dressed American  troops.     On  Decem- 


ber 26  the  President  visited  England 
and  stayed  until  the  31st,  when  he  re- 
turned to  France.  Later  he  made  a 
trip  to  Italy.  His  visits  and  speeches 
were  everywhere  received  with  an  en- 
thusiasm and  acclaim  that  was  scarce- 
ly to  be  expected  from  a  continent  that 
had  just  passed  through  such  a  holo- 
caust. 

The  Peace  Conference.  The  Peace 
Conference  held  its  first  session  on  Jan- 
uary 18,  1919.  This  meeting  was  pre- 
ceded by  a  few  sessions  of  the  Inter- 
Allied  War  Council  and  two  formal 
meetings  between  President  Wilson  and 
the  ministers  and  ambassadors  from 
Great  Britain,  France,  Italy  and  Japan. 
Before  the  meeting  of  the  first  full  ses- 
sion it  was  announced  that  each  day  a 
formal  communique  would  be  issued  to 
the  press  concerning  the  doings  of  the 
congress  on  that  day.  It  was  also 
stated  that  delegates  had  promised  not 
to  discuss  with  members  of  the  press 
anything  that  had  taken  place  at  the 
sessions.  This  produced  a  formal  pro- 
test from  the  correspondents  present  at 
Paris.  They  were  finally  permitted  to 
attend  the  plenary  sessions  but  were 
informed  that  deliberations  would  be 
held  in  secret.  The  Peace  Conference 
held  its  sessions  in  the  Salle  de  la  Paix 
of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The 
following  joint  plan  was  issued  with 
reference  to  the  organization  of  the 
Peace  Conference. 

It  was  decided  that  the  United  States, 
the  British  Empire,  France,  Italy,  and 
Japan  should  be  represented  by  five 
delegates  apiece.  The  British  Dominions 
and  India,  besides,  shall  be  represented 


331 


332 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


as  follows:  Two  delegates  respectively 
for  Australia,  Canada,  South  Africa, 
and  India,  including  the  native  States, 
and  one  delegate  from  New  Zealand. 

Brazil  will  have  three  delegates.  Bel- 
gium, China,  Greece,  Poland,  Portugal, 
the  Czecho-Slovak  Republic,  Rumania, 
and  Serbia  will  have  two  delegates 
apiece,  Siam  one  delegate,  and  Cuba, 
Guatemala,  Haiti,  Honduras,  Liberia, 
Nicaragua,  and  Panama  one  delegate 
apiece. 

Montenegro  will  have  one  delegate, 
but  the  rules  concerning  the  designa- 
tion of  this  delegate  shall  not  be  fixed 
until  the  moment  when  the  political  situ- 
ation in  that  country  shall  have  been 
cleared  up. 

The  meeting  adopted  the  following 
two  general  principles : 

One — Each  delegation  being  a  unit, 
the  number  of  delegates  forming  it  shall 
have  no  influence  upon  its  status  at  the 
conference. 

Two — In  the  selection  of  its  delega- 
tion each  nation  may  avail  itself  of  the 
panel  system.  This  will  enable  each 
State  at  discretion  to  intrust  its  in- 
terests to  such  persons  as  it  may  desig- 
nate. 

The  adoption  of  the  panel  system 
will  in  particular  enable  the  British 
Empire  to  admit  among  its  five  dele- 
gates representatives  of  the  dominions, 
including  Newfoundland,  which  has  no 
separate  representation,  and  of  India. 

The  following  list  of  delegates  was 
announced. 

France — Georges  Clemenceau,*  Prime 

*  Clemenceau,  Georges  Benjamin  Eugene, 
born  (1841)  in  Mouilleron-en-Pareds  in  Ven- 
dee. Educated  as  physician,  drifted  into  poli- 
tics. In  1876  elected  to  Chamber  of  Deputies. 
Independent  from  beginning.  In  1880  founded 
daily  paper,  La  Justice.  Lost  seat  in  1893  be- 
cause suspected  being  in  Panama  scandal. 
Elected  Senator  in  1902.  Founded  L'Aurore 
to  champion  cause  of  Dreyfus.  In  1906  became 
Minister  of  the  Interior  and  shortly  after  pre- 


Minister ;  Stephen  Pichon,  Foreign  Min- 
ister; Louis  Klotz,  Finance  Minister; 
Andre  Tardieu,  French  High  Commis- 
sioner to  the  United  States,  and  Jules 
Cambon. 

Great  Britain — David  Lloyd  George, 
Prime  Minister;  Arthur  J.  Balfour, 
Foreign  Secretary;  Andrew  Bonar 
Law;  George  Nicoll  Barnes,  the  labor 
leader,  and  another  who  was  to  act  as 
alternate  delegate. 

United  States — Woodrow  Wilson, 
President  of  the  United  States ;  Robert 
Lansing,  Secretary  of  State;  Henry 
White ;  Colonel  Edward  M.  House ;  and 
General  Tasker  H.  Bliss. 

Italy — Vittorio  Orlando,  Prime  Min- 
ister; Baron  Sonnino,  Foreign  Secre- 
tary; Antonio  Salandra,  former  Pre- 
mier; Marquis  Salvago  Raggi,  and 
Signor  Stringher,  Minister  of  Finance. 

Japan — The  Marquis  Saionji,  for- 
mer Prime  Minister;  Baron  Makino, 
Baron  Chinda,  Baron  Matsui,  and 
Count  Hayashi. 

Brazil — Senator  Epitacio  Pessoa,  Dr. 
Pandia  Caloreras,  and  Deputy  Raoul 
Fernandez. 

Belgium — Paul  Hymans,  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs ;  Emile  Vandervelde, 
and  M.  Vandenheuvel. 

Serbia — Nikola  Pashitch,  former 
Prime  Minister,  and  M.  Trumbitch,  for- 
mer President  of  the  Dalmatian  Diet, 
who  will  alternate  with  Dr.  M.  R.  Ves- 
nitch,  Serbian  Minister  to  France,  and 
M.  Reber. 

Greece — Eleutherios  Venizelos,  Pre- 
mier, and  M.  Politis,  Foreign  Min- 
ister. 


mier.  Held  office  until  1909.  Power  con- 
tinued. Known  as  Destroyer  of  Ministries. 
Became  editor  of  L'Homme  Libre.  Is  stormy 
petrel  of  French  politics.  A  consistent  rad- 
ical. As  prime  minister  bitter  enemy  of  church. 
A  brilliant  writer  and  speaker.  Wrote  plays, 
novels,  philosophic  essays,  and  sociological 
studies. 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


333 


Rumania — M.  Bratiano,  Prime  Min- 
ister, and  M.  Mishr. 

Czechoslovakia — Dr.  Karl  Kramarcz, 
Premier,  and  M.  Benes,  Foreign  Min- 
ister. 

Poland — M.  Dmowski,  Polish  repre- 
sentative to  the  allied  Governments,  and 
a  second  delegate  representing  General 
Pilsudski. 

China — Lu  Cheng-Hsiang,  Foreign 
Minister,  and  one  other. 

Kingdom  of  the  Hedjaz — Two  dele- 
gates. 

Canada — Sir  Robert  Borden,  Pre- 
mier; Sir  George  Foster,  Minister  of 
Trade  and  Commerce,  with  others  of 
the  delegation  alternating. 

Australia — William  Morris  Hughes, 
Premier,  and  one  other. 

Union  of  South  Africa — General 
Louis  Botha  and  General  Jan  C.  Smuts. 

India — The  Maharajah  of  Bikaner 
and  Sir  S.  P.  Sinha. 

Siam — M.  Charoon,  Minister  to 
France,  and  one  other. 

New  Zealand — William  F.  Massey, 
Premier. 

Portugal — Ejas  Moniz. 

The  opening  session  of  the  Peace 
Conference  began  on  the  afternoon  of 
Saturday,  January  18,  1919,  at  three 
o'clock.  The  opening  address  was  made 
by  President  Poincare  of  France.  He 
greeted  those  present  and  then  paid  a 
warm  tribute  to  the  United  States  of 
America  and  the  other  republics  that 
had  come  into  the  war  to  defend  the 
ideals  of  democracy  and  liberty.  He 
said  that  the  war  was  a  rising  of  the 
oppressed  nations  of  the  earth  against 
those  of  the  Central  Powers  which  had 
held  them  in  submission  for  centuries. 
He  called  the  present  meeting  a  meet- 
ing of  free  peoples  and  stated  that  the 
Germanic  idea  of  conquest  had  been  de- 
feated forever.  He  finally  appealed  for 
a  League  of  Nations  which  would  make 


a  recurrence  of  the  past  holocaust  im- 
possible. His  concluding  paragraph 
was,  "You  are  assembled  in  order  to 
repair  the  evil  that  has  been  done  and 
to  prevent  a  recurrence  of  it.  You  hold 
in  your  hands  the  future  of  the  world. 
I  leave  you  gentlemen  to  your  grave 
deliberations  and  declare  the  Confer- 
ence of  Paris  open."  Immediately  af- 
ter the  President  of  France  had  con- 
cluded his  speech  President  Wilson  nom- 
inated Clemenceau  for  the  position  of 
Permanent  Chairman  of  the  Conference. 
His  nomination  was  seconded  by  Lloyd 
George  and  Baron  Sonnino  and  the  as- 
semblage ratified  it  unanimously.  Af- 
ter Clemenceau's  speech  of  acceptance, 
the  first  session  of  the  conference  came 
to  a  close  with  the  announcement  that 
a  League  of  Nations  would  be  the  first 
order  of  business  at  the  next  plenary 
session. 

A  Supreme  Council,  consisting  of  the 
two  senior  members  of  the  five  chief 
powers,  was  established.  It  held  its  first 
session  on  January  20,  and  adopted  a 
resolution  offered  by  President  Wilson 
concerning  the  situation  in  Russia.  All 
the  warring  factions  in  Russia  were  in- 
vited to  take  part  in  a  discussion  of 
the  differences  of  opinion  with  the  idea 
of  attempting  to  settle  them  and  thus 
restore  peace  and  quietude  over  the  vast 
area  seething  with  unrest.  The  meet- 
ing was  to  be  held  on  February  15  at 
the  Princes'  Island  about  12  miles  from 
Constantinople.  The  Bolsheviki,  and 
the  governments  of  Ukraine,  Crimea, 
Esthonia,  Lithuania,  and  the  Lettish 
republic  were  invited  to  attend.  Noth- 
ing however  came  of  this  suggestion  on 
the  part  of  the  Associated  Powers. 

The  League  of  Nations.  On  January 
25  the  Peace  Conference  adopted  a  reso- 
lution to  create  a  League  of  Nations. 
It  will  be  remembered  that  this  was 
one  of  President  Wilson's  famous  four- 


334 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


teen  peace  points.  President  Wilson 
was  named  chairman  of  the  committee 
which  was  to  draft  the  constitution  of 
the  proposed  League.  President  Wil- 
son read  his  plan  on  February  14  and 
on  the  next  day  he  sailed  for  the  United 
States.  During  the  meetings  of  the 
committee  which  drew  up  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  League  of  Nations  there 
arose  sharp  differences  of  opinion.  All 
of  these  differences  centred  around  the 
question  as  to  how  much  power  should 
be  given  to  the  League  to  enforce  its 
decisions.  The  French  held  out  for 
the  use  of  strong  military  power  to 
make  them  effective,  while  the  British 
and  American  delegates  declared  the 
League  should  have  only  a  modified 
form  of  authority,  such  as  economic 
restraints  and  the  like.  The  discussion 
arose  to  such  a  height  that  Premier 
Clemenceau  practically  appealed  to  the 
American  public  over  the  head  of  Pres- 
ident Wilson  through  the  agency  of 
the  Associated  Press.  This  action  was 
wildly  acclaimed  by  the  French  press 
and  the  latter  modified  its  demands  af- 
ter a  threat  was  made  to  remove  the 
seat  of  the  conference  to  another  city. 
A  compromise  was  effected  only  after 
the  British  and  American  delegates 
agreed  to  a  revision  of  the  armistice 
terms  which  assured  the  impossibility 
of  Germany  renewing  the  war  or  re- 
jecting the  peace  terms.  This  satis- 
fied the  French  and  Belgian  representa- 
tives and  the  work  of  the  committee  was 
considerably  lightened.  President  Wil- 
son read  the  text  of  the  Constitution  for 
the  League  of  Nations  which  was  pre- 
sented to  the  Plenary  Session  of  the 
Peace  Conference  on  February  14  as  a 
unanimous  report  of  the  committee.The 
following  day  President  Wilson  sailed 
for  America.  When  he  arrived  there 
and  presented  the  document  to  the 
American  public  it  was  received  rather 


coldly  and  this  resulted  in  the  making 
of  several  changes  in  the  original  text. 
When  the  President  again  went  to  Paris 
he  presented  several  changes  which  were 
adopted  by  the  Peace  Congress.  The 
following  presents  the  text  of  the 
League  of  Nations  as  finally  adopted. 
At  the  conclusion  of  the  constitution 
there  is  a  list  of  the  differences  added 
as  a  result  of  the  hostility  to  the  text 
in  its  original  form. 

TEXT  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NA- 
TIONS COVENANT. 

In  order  to  promote  international  coopera- 
tion  AND  TO  ACHIEVE   INTERNATIONAL  PEACE   AND 

security,  by  the  acceptance  of  obligations 
not  to  resort  to  war,  by  the  prescription  of 
open,  just  and  honorable  relations  between 
nations,  by  the  firm  establishment  of  the 
understandings  of  international  law  as 
to  actual  rule  of  conduct  among  govern- 
ments and  by  the  maintenance  of  justice 
and  a  scrupulous  respect  for  all  treaty 
obligations  in  the  dealings  of  organized 
peoples  with  one  another,  the  high  con- 
tracting parties  agree  to  this  covenant  of 
the  League  of  Nations. 

ARTICLE  ONE 

The  original  members  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions shall  be  those  of  the  signatories  which 
are  named  in  the  annex  to  this  covenant  and 
also  such  of  those  other  States  named  in  the 
annex  as  shall  accede  without  reservation  to 
this  covenant.  Such  accessions  shall  be  effected 
by  a  declaration  deposited  with  the  secretariat 
within  two  months  of  the  coming  into  force  of 
the  covenant.  Notice  thereof  shall  be  sent  to 
all    other    members    of    the    league. 

Any  fully  self-governing  State,  Dominion  or 
colony  not  named  in  the  annex  may  become  a 
member  of  the  league  if  its  admission  is  agreed 
by  two-thirds  of  the  assembly,  provided  that  it 
shall  give  effective  guarantees  of  its  sincere  in- 
tentions to  observe  its  international  obligations 
and  shall  accept  such  regulations  as  may  be 
prescribed  by  the  league  in  regard  to  its  mili- 
tary and  naval  forces  and  armaments. 

Any  member  of  the  league  may,  after  two 
years'  notice  of  its  intention  so  to  do,  with- 
draw from  the  league,  provided  that  all  its 
international  obligations  and  all  its  obligations 
under  this  covenant  shall  have  been  fulfilled 
at  the  time  of  its  withdrawal. 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


335 


ARTICLE  TWO 

The  action  of  the  league  under  this  covenant 
shall  be  effective  through  the  instrumentality 
of  an  assembly  and  of  a  council,  with  a  per- 
mament    secretariat. 

ARTICLE  THREE 

The  assembly  shall  consist  of  representatives 
of  the  members  of  the  league. 

The  assembly  shall  meet  at  stated  intervals, 
and  from  time  to  time  as  occasion  may  require, 
at  the  seat  of  the  league  or  at  such  other  place 
as  may  be  decided  upon. 

The  assembly  may  deal  at  its  meetings  with 
any  matter  within  the  sphere  of  action  of  the 
league  or  affecting  the  peace  of  the  world. 

At  meetings  of  the  assembly  each  member 
of  the  league  shall  have  one  vote,  and  may  have 
not  more  than  three  representatives. 

ARTICLE  FOUR 

The  council  shall  consist  of  representatives 
of  the  United  States  of  America,  of  the  British 
Empire,  of  France,  of  Italy  and  of  Japan, 
together  with  representatives  of  four  other 
members  of  the  league.  These  four  members 
of  the  league  shall  be  selected  by  the  assem- 
bly from  time  to  time  in  its  discretion.  Un- 
til the  appointment  of  the  representatives  of 
the  four  members  of  the  league  first  selected 
by  the  assembly,  representatives  of  (blank) 
shall  be  members  of  the  council. 

With  the  approval  of  the  majority  of  the 
assembly  the  council  may  name  additional  mem- 
bers of  the  league,  whose  representatives  shall 
always  be  members  of  the  council.  The  coun- 
cil with  like  approval  may  increase  the  num- 
ber of  members  of  the  league  to  be  selected  by 
the  assembly  for  representation  on  the  council. 

The  council  shall  meet  from  time  to  time  as 
occasion  may  require,  and  at  least  once  a  year, 
at  the  seat  of  the  league  or  at  such  other  place 
as  may  be  decided  upon. 

The  council  may  deal  at  its  meetings  with 
any  matter  within  the  sphere  of  action  of  the 
league  or  affecting  the  peace  of  the  world. 

Any  member  of  the  league  not  represented 
on  the  council  shall  be  invited  to  send  a  rep- 
resentative to  sit  as  a  member  at  any  meeting 
of  the  council  during  the  consideration  of 
matters  specially  affecting  the  interests  of  that 
member  of  the  league. 

At  meetings  of  the  council  each  member  of 
the  league  represented  on  the  council  shall  have 
one  vote,  and  may  have  not  more  than  one 
representative. 

ARTICLE  FIVE 

Except  where  otherwise  expressly  provided  in 
this  covenant,  decisions  at  any  meeting  of  the 
assembly    or   of   the   council   shall   require   the 


agreement  of  all  the  members  of  the  league 
represented  at  the  meeting. 

All  matters  of  procedure  at  meetings  of 
the  assembly  or  the  council,  the  appointment  of 
committees  to  investigate  particular  matters, 
shall  be  regulated  by  the  assembly  or  by  the 
council  and  may  be  decided  by  a  majority  of 
the  members  of  the  league  represented  at  the 
meeting. 

The  first  meeting  of  the  assembly  and  the 
first  meeting  of  the  council  shall  be  summoned 
by  the  President  of  the  United  States  of 
America. 

ARTICLE  SIX 

The  permanent  secretariat  shall  be  estab- 
lished at  the  seat  of  the  league.  The  secretariat 
shall  comprise  a  secretary-general  and  such 
secretaries  and  staff  as  may  be  required. 

The  first  secretary-general  shall  be  the  per- 
son named  in  the  annex;  thereafter  the  secre- 
tary-general shall  be  appointed  by  the  council 
with  the  approval  of  the  majority  of  the  as- 
sembly. 

The  secretaries  and  the  staff  of  the  secre- 
tariat shall  be  appointed  by  the  secretary-gen- 
eral  with  the  approval   of  the   council. 

The  secretary-general  shall  act  in  that  ca- 
pacity at  all  meetings  of  the  assembly  and  of 
the   council. 

The  expenses  of  the  secretariat  shall  be  borne 
by  the  members  of  the  league  in  accordance 
with  the  apportionment  of  the  expenses  of  the 
international  bureau  of  the  Universal  Postal 
Union. 

ARTICLE  SEVEN 

The  seat  of  the  league  is  established  at 
Geneva. 

The  council  may  at  any  time  decide  that  the 
seat  of  the  league  shall  be  established  else- 
where. 

All  positions  under  or  in  connection  with  the 
league,  including  the  secretariat,  shall  be  open 
equally  to  men  and  women. 

Representatives  of  the  members  of  the  league 
and  officials  of  the  league  when  engaged  on 
the  business  of  the  league  shall  enjoy  diploma- 
tic privileges  and  immunities. 

The  buildings  and  other  property  occupied 
by  the  league  or  its  officials  or  by  representa- 
tives attending  its  meetings  shall  be  inviola- 
ble. 

ARTICLE  EIGHT 

The  members  of  the  league  recognize  that  the 
maintenance  of  a  peace  requires  the  reduction 
of  national  armaments  to  the  lowest  point 
consistent  with  national  safety  and  the  enforce- 
ment by  common  action  of  international  obliga- 
tions. 

The  council,  taking  account  of  the  geograph- 
ical situation  and  circumstances  of  each,  shall 
formulate    plans    for    such   reduction    for    the 


336 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


consideration  and  action  of  the  several  Govern- 
ments. 

Such  plans  shall  be  subject  to  reconsidera- 
tion and  revision  at  least  every  ten  years. 

After  these  plans  shall  have  been  adopted 
by  the  several  governments,  limits  of  arma- 
ments therein  fixed  shall  not  be  exceeded  with- 
out the  concurrence  of  the  council. 

The  members  of  the  league  agree  that  the 
manufacture  by  private  enterprise  of  muni- 
tions and  implements  of  war  is  open  to  grave 
objections.  The  council  shall  advise  how  the 
evil  effects  attendant  upon  such  manufacture 
can  be  prevented,  due  regard  being  had  to  the 
necessities  of  those  members  of  the  league 
which  are  not  able  to  manufacture  the  muni- 
tions and  implements  of  war  necessary  for 
their  safety. 

The  members  of  the  league  undertake  to 
interchange  full  and  frank  information  as  to 
the  scale  of  their  armaments,  their  military  and 
naval  programmes  and  the  condition  of  such 
of  their  industries  as  are  adaptable  to  warlike 
purposes. 

ARTICLE  NINE 

A  permanent  commission  shall  be  consti- 
tuted to  advise  the  council  on  the  execution 
of  the  provisions  of  Articles  One  and  Eight 
and  on  military  and  naval  questions  generally. 

ARTICLE  TEN 

The  members  of  the  league  undertake  to 
respect  and  preserve,  as  against  external  ag- 
gression, the  territorial  integrity  and  existing 
political  independence  of  all  members  of  the 
league.  In  case  of  any  such  aggression  or  in 
case  of  any  threat  or  danger  of  such  aggres- 
sion the  council  shall  advise  upon  the  means 
by  which  this  obligation  shall  be  fulfilled. 

ARTICLE  ELEVEN 

Any  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether  imme- 
diately affecting  any  of  the  members  of  the 
league  or  not,  is  hereby  declared  a  matter 
of  concern  of  the  whole  league,  and  the 
league  shall  take  any  action  that  may  be 
deemed  wise  and  effectual  to  safeguard  the 
peace  of  nations.  In  case  any  such  emergency 
should  arise  the  secretary-general  shall,  on  the 
request  of  any  member  of  the  league,  forth- 
with summon  a  meeting  of  the  council. 

It  is  also  declared  to  be  the  fundamental 
right  of  each  member  of  the  league  to  bring 
to  the  attention  of  the  assembly  or  of  the 
council  any  circumstance  whatever  affecting 
international  relations  which  threatens  to  dis- 
turb either  the  peace  or  the  good  understand- 
ing between  nations  upon  which  peace  depends. 

ARTICLE  TWELVE 

The  members  of  the  league  agree  that  if 
there  should   arise  between  them  any  dispute 


likely  to  lead  to  a  rupture  they  will  submit 
the  matter  either  to  arbitration  or  to  inquiry 
by  the  council,  and  they  agree  in  no  case  to 
resort  to  war  until  three  months  after  the 
award  by  the  arbitrators  or  the  report  by  the 
council. 

In  any  case  under  this  article  the  award 
of  the  arbitrators  shall  be  made  within  a 
reasonable  time,  and  the  report  of  the  council 
shall  be  made  within  six  months  after  the 
submission  of  the  dispute. 

ARTICLE  THIRTEEN 

The  members  of  the  league  agree  that  when- 
ever any  dispute  shall  arise  between  them 
which  they  recognize  to  be  suitable  for  sub- 
mission to  arbitration  and  which  cannot  be 
satisfactorily  settled  by  diplomacy  they  will 
submit  the  whole  subject  matter  to  arbitra- 
tion. Disputes  as  to  the  interpretation  of  a 
treaty,  as  to  any  question  of  international  law, 
as  to  the  existence  of  any  fact  which  if  es- 
tablished would  constitute  a  breach  of  any 
international  obligation  or  as  to  the  extent  and 
nature  of  the  reparation  to  be  made  for  any 
such  breach  are  declared  to  be  among  those 
which  are  generally  suitable  for  submission  to 
arbitration.  For  the  consideration  of  any 
such  dispute  the  court  of  arbitration  to  which 
the  case  is  referred  shall  be  the  court  agreed 
upon  by  the  parties  to  the  dispute  or  stipu- 
lated in  any  convention  existing  between  them. 

The  members  of  the  league  agree  that  they 
will  carry  out  in  full  good  faith  any  award 
that  may  be  rendered  and  that  they  will  not 
resort  to  war  against  a  member  of  the  league 
which  complies  therewith.  In  the  event  of 
any  failure  to  carry  out  such  an  award  the 
council  shall  propose  what  steps  should  be 
taken  to  give  effect  thereto. 

ARTICLE  FOURTEEN 

The  council  shall  formulate  and  submit  to 
the  members  of  the  league  for  adoption  plans 
for  the  establishment  of  a  permanent  court  of 
international  justice.  The  court  shall  be  com- 
petent to  hear  and  determine  any  dispute  of 
an  international  character  which  the  parties 
thereto  submit  to  it.  The  court  may  also  give 
an  advisory  opinion  upon  any  dispute  or  ques- 
tion referred  to  it  by  the  council  or  by  the 
assembly. 

ARTICLE  FIFTEEN 

If  there  should  arise  between  members  of 
the  league  any  dispute  likely  to  lead  to  a  rup- 
ture which  is  not  submitted  to  arbitration  as 
above,  the  members  of  the  league  agree  that 
they  will  submit  the  matter  to  the  council. 
Any  party  to  the  dispute  may  effect  such 
submission  by  giving  notice  of  the  existence 
of   the    dispute    to   the    secretary-general,   who 


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337 


will  make  all  necessary  arrangements  for  a 
full  investigation  and  consideration  thereof. 
For  this  purpose  the  parties  to  the  dispute  will 
communicate  to  the  secretary-general,  as 
promptly  as  possible,  statements  of  their  case, 
all  the  relevant  facts  and  papers.  The  coun- 
cil may  forthwith  direct  the  publication 
thereof. 

The  council  shall  endeavor  to  effect  a  set- 
tlement of  any  dispute,  and  if  such  efforts  are 
successful  a  statement  shall  be  made  public 
giving  such  facts  and  explanations  regarding 
the  dispute,  terms  of  settlement  thereof  as 
the   council  may  deem  appropriate. 

If  the  dispute  is  not  thus  settled  the  coun- 
cil either  unanimously  or  by  a  majority  vote 
shall  make  and  publish  a  report  containing  a 
statement  of  the  facts  of  the  dispute  and  the 
recommendations  which  are  deemed  just  and 
proper  in   regard   thereto. 

Any  member  of  the  league  represented  on 
the  council  may  make  public  a  statement  of 
the  facts  of  the  dispute  and  of  its  conclu- 
sions  regarding  the   same. 

If  a  report  by  the  council  is  unanimously 
agreed  to  by  the  members  thereof  other  than 
the  representatives  of  one  or  more  of  the 
parties  to  the  dispute  the  members  of  the 
league  agree  that  they  will  not  go  to  war  with 
any  party  to  the  dispute  which  complies  with 
the   recommendations    of   the   report. 

If  the  council  fails  to  reach  a  report  which 
is  unanimously  agreed  to  by  the  members 
thereof,  other  than  the  representatives  of  one 
or  more  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  the 
members  of  the  league  reserve  to  themselves 
the  right  to  take  such  action  as  they  shall  con- 
sider necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  right 
and  justice. 

If  the  dispute  between  the  parties  is  claimed 
by  one  of  them,  and  is  found  by  the  council 
to  arise  out  of  a  matter  which  by  international 
law  is  solely  within  the  domestic  jurisdiction 
of  that  party,  the  council  shall  so  report,  and 
shall  make  no  recommendation  as  to  its  set- 
tlement. 

The  council  may  in  any  case  under  this 
article  refer  the  dispute  to  the  assembly.  The 
dispute  shall  be  so  referred  at  the  request  of 
either  party  to  the  dispute,  provided  that  such 
request  be  made  within  fourteen  days  after 
the  submission  of  the  dispute  to  the  council. 

In  any  case  referred  to  the  assembly  all  the 
provisions  of  this  article  and  of  Article  Twelve 
relating  to  the  action  and  powers  of  the 
council  shall  apply  to  the  action  and  powers 
of  the  assembly,  provided  that  a  report  made 
by  the  assembly,  if  concurred  in  by  the  rep- 
resentatives of  those  members  of  the  league 
represented  on  the  council  and  of  a  majority 
of  the  other  members  of  the  league,  exclusive 
in  each  case  of  the  representatives  of  the  par- 
ties to  the  dispute,  shall  have  the  same  force 


as  a  report  by  the  council  concurred  in  by 
all  the  members  thereof  other  than  the  repre- 
sentatives of  one  or  more  of  the  parties  to 
the  dispute. 

ARTICLE  SIXTEEN 

Should  any  member  of  the  league  resort  to 
war  in  disregard  of  its  covenants  under  Article 
Twelve,  Thirteen  or  Fifteen,  it  shall  ipso  facto 
be  deemed  to  have  committed  an  act  of  war 
against  all  other  members  of  the  league,  which 
hereby  undertake  immediately  to  subject  it  to 
the  severance  of  all  trade  or  financial  rela- 
tions, the  prohibition  of  all  intercourse  be- 
tween their  nationals  and  the  nationals  of  the 
covenant-breaking  member  of  the  league  and 
the  prevention  of  all  financial,  commercial,  or 
personal  intercourse  between  the  nationals  of 
the  covenant-breaking  member  of  the  league 
and  the  nationals  of  any  other  state,  whether  a 
member  of  the  league  or  not. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  council  in  such 
case  to  recommend  to  the  several  governments 
concerned  what  effective  military  or  naval 
forces  the  members  of  the  league  shall  sever- 
ally contribute  to  the  armaments  of  forces  to 
be  used  to  protect  the  covenants  of  the  league. 

The  members  of  the  league  agree,  further, 
that  they  will  mutually  support  one  another 
in  the  financial  and  economic  measures  which 
are  taken  under  this  article,  in  order  to  min- 
imize the  loss  and  inconvenience  resulting  from 
the  above  measures,  and  that  they  will  mu- 
tually support  one  another  in  resisting  any 
special  measures  aimed  at  one  of  their  number 
by  the  covenant-breaking  member  of  the  state, 
and  that  they  will  take  the  necessary  steps 
to  afford  passage  through  their  territory  to 
the  forces  of  any  of  the  members  of  the 
league  which  are  cooperating  to  protect  the 
covenants   of  the  league. 

Any  member  of  the  league  which  has  vio- 
lated any  covenant  of  the  league  may  be  de- 
clared to  be  no  longer  a  member  of  the  league 
by  a  vote  of  the  council  concurred  in  by  the 
representatives  of  all  the  members  of  the 
league  represented  thereon. 

ARTICLE  SEVENTEEN 

In  the  event  of  a  dispute  between  a  member 
of  the  league  and  a  state  which  is  not  a  member 
of  the  league  or  between  states  not  members 
of  the  league,  the  state  or  states  not  members  of 
the  league  shall  be  invited  to  accept  the  obliga- 
tions of  membership  in  the  league  for  the  pur- 
poses of  such  dispute,  upon  such  conditions 
as  the  council  may  deem  just.  If  such  invita- 
tion is  accepted  the  provisions  of  Articles 
Twelve  to  Sixteen  inclusive  shall  be  applied 
with  such  modifications  as  may  be  deemed 
necessary   by   the   council. 

Upon  such  invitation  being  given  the  council 


338 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


shall  immediately  institute  an  inquiry  into  the 
circumstances  of  the  dispute  and  recommend 
such  action  as  may  seem  best  and  most  effec- 
tual in  the  circumstances. 

If  a  state  so  invited  shall  refuse  to  accept 
the  obligations  of  membership  in  the  league 
for  the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  and  shall 
resort  to  war  against  a  member  of  the  league, 
the  provisions  of  Article  Sixteen  shall  be  ap- 
plicable as  against  the  state  taking  such  action. 

If  both  parties  to  the  dispute,  when  so 
invited,  refuse  to  accept  the  obligations  of 
membership  in  the  league  for  the  purposes  of 
such  dispute,  the  council  may  take  such 
measures  and  make  such  recommendations  as 
will  prevent  hostilities  and  will  result  in  the 
settlement  of  the  dispute. 

ARTICLE  EIGHTEEN 

Every  convention  or  international  engage- 
ment entered  into  henceforward  by  any  mem- 
ber of  the  league  shall  be  forthwith  registered 
with  the  secretariat  and  shall  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible be  published  by  it.  No  such  treaty  or 
international  engagement  shall  be  binding  until 
so  registered. 

ARTICLE  NINETEEN 

The  assembly  may  from  time  to  time  advise 
the  reconsideration  by  members  of  the  league 
of  treaties  which  have  become  inapplicable 
and  the  consideration  of  international  condi- 
tions whose  continuance  might  endanger  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

ARTICLE  TWENTY 

The  members  of  the  league  severally  agree 
that  this  covenant  is  accepted  as  abrogating 
all  obligations  or  understandings  inter  se  which 
are  inconsistent  with  the  terms  thereof,  and 
solemnly  undertake  that  they  will  not  here- 
after enter  into  any  engagements  inconsistent 
with  the  terms  thereof. 

In  case  members  of  the  league  shall,  before 
becoming  a  member  of  the  league,  have  under- 
taken any  obligations  inconsistent  with  the 
terms  of  this  covenant,  it  shall  be  the  duty 
of  such  member  to  take  immediate  steps  to 
procure   its   release    from   such   obligations. 

ARTICLE  TWENTY-ONE 

Nothing  in  this  covenant  shall  be  deemed 
to  affect  the  validity  of  international  engage- 
ments such  as  treaties  of  arbitration  or  re- 
gional understandings  like  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine for  securing  the  maintenance  of  peace. 

ARTICLE  TWENTY-TWO 

To  those  colonies  and  territories  which  as  a 
consequence  of  the  late  war  have  ceased  to  be 


under  the  sovereignty  of  the  States  which  for- 
merly governed  them,  and  which  are  inhabited 
by  peoples  not  yet  able  to  stand  by  them- 
selves under  the  strenuous  conditions  of  the 
modern  world,  there  should  be  applied  the 
principle  that  the  well  being  and  development 
of  such  peoples  form  a  sacred  trust  of  civili- 
zation, and  that  securities  for  the  perform- 
ance of  this  trust  should  be  embodied  in  this 
covenant. 

The  best  method  of  giving  practicable  effect 
to  this  principle  is  that  the  tutelage  of  such 
peoples  be  intrusted  to  advanced  nations  who, 
by  reason  of  their  resources,  their  experience 
or  their  geographical  position,  can  best  under- 
take this  responsibility,  and  who  are  willing 
to  accept  it,  and  that  this  tutelage  should  be 
exercised  by  them  as  mandatories  on  behalf 
of  the  league. 

The  character  of  the  mandate  must  differ 
according  to  the  stage  of  the  development  of 
the  people,  the  geographical  situation  of  the 
territory,  its  economic  condition  and  other 
similar   circumstances. 

Certain  communities  formerly  belonging  to 
the  Turkish  Empire  have  reached  a  stage  of 
development  where  their  existence  as  indepen- 
dent nations  can  be  provisionally  recognized 
subject  to  the  rendering  of  administrative 
advice  and  assistance  by  a  mandatory  until 
such  time  as  they  are  able  to  stand  alone. 
The  wishes  of  these  communities  must  be  a 
principal  consideration  in  the  selection  of  the 
mandatory. 

Other  peoples,  especially  those  of  central 
Africa,  are  at  such  a  stage  that  the  mandatory 
must  be  responsible  for  the  administration  of 
the  territory  under  conditions  which  will  guar- 
antee freedom  of  conscience  or  religion  sub- 
ject only  to  the  maintenance  of  public  order 
and  morals,  the  prohibition  of  abuses  such  as 
the  slave  trade,  the  arms  traffic  and  the  liquor 
traffic  and  the  prevention  of  the  establishment 
of  fortifications  or  military  and  naval  bases 
and  of  military  training  of  the  nations  for 
other  than  police  purposes  and  the  defence 
of  territory  and  will  also  secure  equal  oppor- 
tunities for  the  trade  and  commerce  of  other 
members    of    the    league. 

There  are  territories,  such  as  southwest 
Africa  and  certain  of  the  south  Pacific  islands, 
which,  owing  to  the  sparseness  of  their  popu- 
lation or  their  small  size  or  their  remoteness 
from  the  centres  of  civilization  or  their  geo- 
graphical contiguity  to  the  territory  of  the 
mandatory  and  other  circumstances,  can  be 
best  administered  under  the  laws  of  the  man- 
datory as  integral  portions  of  its  territory 
subject  to  the  safeguards  above  mentioned  in 
the  interests  of  the  indigenous  population. 
In  every  case  of  mandate  the  mandatory  shall 
render  to  the  council  an  annual  report  in  ref- 
erence to  the  territory  committed  to  its  charge. 


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339 


The  degree  of  authority,  control  or  admin- 
istration to  be  exercised  by  the  mandatory 
shall,  if  not  previously  agreed  upon  by  the 
members  of  the  league,  be  explicitly  defined 
in  each  case   by   the   council. 

A  permanent  commission  shall  be  constituted 
to  receive  and  examine  the  annual  report  of 
the  mandatories,  and  to  advise  the  council  on 
all  matters  relating  to  the  observance  of  the 
mandates. 

ARTICLE  TWENTY-THREE 

Subject  to  and  in  accordance  with  the  pro- 
visions of  international  conventions  existing 
or  hereafter  to  be  agreed  upon,  the  members 
of  the  league  (A)  will  endeavor  to  secure  and 
maintain  fair  and  humane  conditions  of  labor 
for  men,  women  and  children,  both  in  their 
own  countries  and  in  all  countries  to  which 
their  commercial  and  industrial  relations  ex- 
tend, and  for  that  purpose  will  establish  and 
maintain  the  necessary  international  organi- 
zations, (B)  undertake  to  secure  just  treat- 
ment of  the  native  inhabitants  of  territories 
under  their  control,  (C)  will  entrust  the 
league  with  the  general  supervision  over  the 
execution  of  agreements  with  regard  to  the 
traffic  in  women  and  children,  and  the  traffic 
in  opium  and  other  dangerous  drugs,  (D)  will 
entrust  the  league  with  the  general  supervi- 
sion of  the  trade  in  arms  and  ammunition  with 
the  countries  in  which  the  control  of  this  traffic 
is  necessary  in  the  common  interest,  (E)  will 
make  provision  to  secure  and  maintain  free- 
dom of  communication  and  of  transit  and 
equitable  treatment  for  the  commerce  of  all 
»  members  of  the  league.  In  this  connection  the 
special  necessities  of  the  regions  devastated 
during  the  war  of  1914-1918  shall  be  in  mind, 
(F)  will  endeavor  to  take  steps  in  matters  of 
international  concern  for  the  prevention  and 
control   of  disease. 

ARTICLE  TWENTY-FOUR 

There  shall  be  placed  under  the  direction  of 
the  league  all  international  bureaus  already 
established  by  general  treaties  if  the  parties  to 
such  treaties  consent.  All  such  international 
bureaus  and  all  commissions  for  the  regula- 
tion of  matters  of  international  interest  here- 
after constituted  shall  be  placed  under  the 
direction  of  the   league. 

In  all  matters  of  international  interest  which 
are  regulated  by  general  conventions  but  which 
are  not  placed  under  the  control  of  interna- 
tional bureaus  or  commissions  the  secretariat 
of  the  league  shall,  subject  to  the  consent  of 
the  council  and  if  desired  by  the  parties,  col- 
lect and  distribute  all  relevant  information 
and  shall  render  any  other  assistance  which 
may   be   necessary   or   desirable. 

The    council    may    include    as    part    of    the 


expenses  of  the  secretariat  the  expenses  of 
any  bureau  or  commission  which  is  placed 
under  the  direction  of  the  league. 

ARTICLE  TWENTY-FIVE 

The  members  of  the  league  agree  to  encour- 
age and  promote  the  establishment  and  co- 
operation of  duly  authorized  voluntary  na- 
tional Red  Cross  organizations  having  as  pur- 
poses improvement  of  health,  the  prevention 
of  disease  and  the  mitigation  of  suffering 
throughout  the   world. 

ARTICLE  TWENTY-SIX 

Amendments  to  this  covenant  will  take  ef- 
fect when  ratified  by  the  members  of  the 
league  whose  representatives  compose  tho 
council  and  by  a  majority  of  the  members  of 
the  league  whose  representatives  compose  the 
assembly. 

No  such  amendment  shall  bind  any  member 
of  the  league  which  signifies  its  dissent  there- 
from, but  in  that  case  it  shall  cease  to  be  a 
member    of   the    league. 

ANNEX  TO  THE  COVENANT 

One — Original  members  of  the  League  of 
Nations. 

Signatories   of   the   treaty   of  peace: 

United  States  Guatemala, 

of  America,         Hayti, 

Belgium,  Hedjaz, 

Bolivia,  Honduras, 

Brazil,  Italy, 

British  Empire,  Japan, 

Canada,  Liberia, 

Australia,  Nicaragua, 

South   Africa,  Panama, 

New   Zealand,  Peru, 

India,  Poland, 

China,  Portugal, 

Cuba,  Rumania, 

Czecho-Slovakia,  Serbia, 

Ecuador,  Siam, 

France*  Uruguay. 
Greece, 

States   invited   to    accede   to   the   covenant: 


Argentine 

Republic, 
Chile, 
Colombia, 
Denmark, 
Netherlands, 
Norway, 


Paraguay, 

Persia, 

Salvador, 

Spain, 

Sweden, 

Switzerland, 

Venezuela. 


Two — First   secretary-general   of  the  League 
of  Nations,  . 

The  first  secretary  of  the  League  of  Nations 
was    Sir    Eric    Drummond. 


340 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Important  changes  that  were  made 
in  the  new  constitution  of  the  League 
of  Nations  and  which  did  not  appear 
in  the  first  draft  may  be  summed  up 
briefly  as  follows. 

ARTICLE  I 

This  article  embodies  parts  of  the  old  Arti- 
cle VII.  It  goes  into  detail  regarding  the 
method  of  admitting  new  members  and  pro- 
vides for  withdrawal  from  the  League,  which 
was  not  mentioned  in  the  original  covenant. 

ARTICLE  II 

Originally  a  part  of  Article  I  this  gives 
the  name  of  "assembly"  to  the  representatives 
of  member  nations,  formerly  designated  as 
the  "body   of  delegates." 

ARTICLE  III 

This  includes  parts  of  the  old  Articles  I,  II 
and  III,  with  slight  alterations  and  has  refer- 
ence to  "members  of  the  League"  instead  of 
the  "high  contracting  parties."  This  change 
is   evident   throughout   the    draft. 

ARTICLE  IV 

That  part  of  the  old  Article  III  outlining 
the  structure  of  the  Council  is  contained  in 
this  article.  It  also  provides  that  the  member- 
ship  of   the   Council   may   be   increased. 

ARTICLE  V 

This  is  the  same  as  the  original  Article  IV 
except  that  the  first  paragraph  requires  unani- 
mous agreement  in  both  Council  and  Assembly, 
except  where   otherwise  provided. 

ARTICLE  VI 

This  is  a  substitute  for  the  old  Article  V. 
In  the  replaced  article  the  Council  was  to 
appoint  the  first  Secretary-General  and  ap- 
proval of  a  majority  of  the  Assembly  was  not 
required  for  appointment  of  his  successors. 

ARTICLE  VII 

Geneva  is  specifically  named  as  the  seat  of 
the  League,  with  the  Council  given  the  right 
to  change  it  at  any  time.  There  is  also  a  para- 
graph permitting  women  to  hold  positions  in 
the  League.  This  article  embodies  parts  of 
the  old  Articles  V  and  VI. 

ARTICLE  VIII 

While  this  article  was  largely  covered  by  the 
original  Article  VIII,  it  has  been  changed  to 
make  plain  that  reduction  of  armaments  must 
be   approved   by  the  nations   affected. 


ARTICLE  IX 

This  article  is  substantially  the  same  as  the 
original. 

ARTICLE  X 

Virtually  no  change  has  been  made  from 
the   old   article. 

ARTICLE  XI 

The  phrase,  "The  League  shall  take  any  ac- 
tion," originally  read,  "The  high  contracting 
parties  reserve  the  right  to  take  any  action." 

ARTICLE  XII 

Practically  no  change  has  been  made  in  this 
article. 

ARTICLE  XIII 
The  wording  has  been  slightly  changed. 

ARTICLE  XIV 

Provision  for  the  Court  to  give  an  advisory 
opinion  on   any   dispute   is  new. 

ARTICLE  XV 

Provision  has  been  made  for  excluding  do- 
mestic matters  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Council. 

ARTICLE  XVI 

Provision  is  made  for  removing  from  the 
League  any  member  which  has  violated  the 
covenant. 

ARTICLE  XVII 

Practically  unchanged. 

ARTICLE  XVIII 
This  was   formerly  Article  XXIII. 

ARTICLE  XIX 

Practically  the  same  as  the  old  Article 
XXIV. 

ARTICLE  XX 

Practically  the  same  as  the  old  Article 
XXV. 

ARTICLE  XXI 

This  article,  recognizing  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, is  new. 

ARTICLE  XXII 

This  is  only  slightly  changed  from  the  old 
Article  XIX.,  providing  only  that  nations  must 
be  willing  to  accept  the  mandatories  designated 
for  them. 

ARTICLE  XXIII. 

Reference  to  supervision  of  traffic  in  women 
and  children  and  in  drugs  is  entirely  new,  as 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


341 


is  the  preceding  clause  referring  to  treatment 
of  natives.  It  contains  portions  of  the  old 
Articles  XVIII  and  XXI  and  is  a  substitu- 
tion  for   the   original  Article  XXI. 

ARTICLE  XXIV 

Practically  the  same  as  the  old  Article 
XXII. 

ARTICLE  XXV 

Recognition  of  the   Red   Cross   is  new. 

ARTICLE  XXVI 

A  change  is  made  from  the  original  in  that 
amendments  may  be  made  by  a  "majority" 
vote  instead  of  a  three-fourths  vote  as  before. 

ANNEX 

The  Annex,  containing  a  list  of  the  charter 
members  and  the  nations  to  be  invited  to  join 
at   once,  is   new. 


The  German  Peace  Treaty.  After 
the  question  of  the  League  of  Nations 
was  disposed  of  for  the  time  being  the 
Peace  Conference  was  able  to  take  up 
the  financial  and  economic  problems 
that  the  war  had  brought  in  its  wake. 
A  Supreme  Economic  Council,  an  Eco- 
nomic Drafting  Commission  and  a  Fi- 
nancial Drafting  Commission  were  es- 
tablished to  enlighten  the  labors  of  the 
Peace  Conference  as  a  whole.  The  most 
prominent  financiers  and  economists  of 
the  Allied  nations  were  represented  on 
these  committees  and  they  were  a  tre- 
mendous assistance  in  the  ultimate  so- 
lution of  many  knotty  problems. 

The  question  of  reparation  was  one 
concerning  which  there  was  a  vast  di- 
versity of  opinion.  The  French  and 
British  averred  that  Germany  should 
pay  for  all  damages  in  full,  while  the 
American  delegation  held  that  the  Ger- 
mans should  only  be  responsible  for  the 
wanton  destruction  that  they  caused 
during  the  war.  This  would  mean  that 
Belgium,  Serbia,  Rumania,  and  parts 
of  northern  France  would  chiefly  benefit 
from  the  reparation  moneys,  while 
Great  Britain   and  the  United   States 


would  only  receive  damages  for  mari- 
time losses  and  in  the  case  of  Great 
Britain  for  aerial  losses. 

At  the  plenary  session  of  the  Con- 
ference of  the  Congress  on  March  1, 
financial  and  economic  subjects  were  re- 
ported by  the  two  committees  that  had 
them  in  charge.  On  the  same  day  Mar- 
shal Foch  presented  the  military  terms 
which  he  suggested  should  be  incorpor- 
ated in  the  treaty.  On  March  3,  the 
Conference  Committee  on  Reparation 
stated  that  it  estimated  that  Germany 
and  her  allies  should  pay  to  the  Entente 
Allies  $120,000,000,000. 

During  March  and  April  the  news 
that  sifted  through  from  behind  the 
closed  doors  of  the  Peace  Conference 
was  very  meagre.  The  Conference  had 
now  practically  resolved  itself  into 
meetings  between  Lloyd  George,  Clemen- 
ceau,  Orlando,  and  President  Wilson. 
They  were  practically  deciding  the  fate 
of  the  world. 

On  May  7,  1919,  the  Treaty  of  Peace, 
consisting  of  more  than  80,000  words, 
was  presented  to  the  German  delegates 
in  the  dining  hall  of  the  Trianon  Palace 
Hotel  at  Versailles.  The  chairman  of 
the  German  delegation,  which  consisted 
of  six  main  delegates  and  a  number  of 
specialists  in  various  fields,  was  Count 
Ulrich  Brockdorff-Rantzau.  The  Allied 
Peace  Treaty  naturally  was  received 
with  a  great  deal  of  hostility  in  Ger- 
many. The  press  was  particularly  bit- 
ter towards  it  and  everywhere  was 
heard  the  complaint  that  Germany  was 
betrayed  inasmuch  as  she  had  consented 
to  make  peace  on  the  terms  laid  down 
by  President  Wilson.  She  maintained 
that  these  "fourteen  points"  were  almost 
to  the  last  one  cast  aside  and  a  peace, 
based  on  the  principle  "to  the  victor 
belongs  the  spoils"  was  drawn  up.  Her 
protests  had  very  little  effect,  slight 
changes  being  made  in  the  text  of  the 


342 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


treaty  which  was  originally  handed  to 
her.  The  official  summary  of  the  treaty 
is  as  follows. 

THE  PREAMBLE 

The  preamble  names  as  parties  of  the  one 
part  the  United  States,  the  British  Empire, 
France,  Italy,  and  Japan,  described  as  the 
Five  Allied  and  Associated  Powers,  and  Bel- 
gium, Bolivia,  Brazil,  China,  Cuba,  Ecuador, 
Greece,  Guatemala,  Haiti,  the  Hedjaz,  Hon- 
duras, Liberia,  Nicaragua,  Panama,  Peru, 
Poland,  Portugal,  Rumania,  Serbia,  Siam, 
Czechoslovakia,  and  Uruguay,  who  with  the 
five  above  are  described  as  the  allied  and  asso- 
ciated powers,  and  on  the  other  part,  Germany. 

It  states  that:  bearing  in  mind  that  on  the 
request  of  the  then  Imperial  German  Govern- 
ment an  armistice  was  granted  on  Nov.  11, 
1918,  by  the  principal  Allied  and  Associated 
Powers  in  order  that  a  treaty  of  peace  might 
be  concluded  with  her,  and  whereas  the  allied 
and  associated  powers,  being  equally  desirous 
that  the  war  in  which  they  were  successively 
involved  directly  or  indirectly  and  which  origi- 
nated in  the  declaration  of  war  by  Austria- 
Hungary  on  July  28,  1914,  against  Serbia,  the 
declaration  of  war  by  Germany  against  Russia 
on  Aug.  1,  1914,  and  against  France  on  Aug. 
3,  1914,  and  in  the  invasion  of  Belgium, 
should  be  replaced  by  a  firm,  just,  and  durable 
peace,  the  plenipotentiaries  (having  communi- 
cated their  full  powers  found  in  good  and  due 
form)   have  agreed  as   follows: 

From  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present 
treaty  the  state  of  war  will  terminate.  From 
the  moment,  and  subject  to  the  provisions  of 
this  treaty,  official  relations  with  Germany,  and 
with  each  of  the  German  States,  will  be  re- 
sumed by  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers. 

SECTION  I 

LEAGUE     OF     NATIONS 

The  covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  con- 
stitutes Section  I  of  the  peace  treaty,  which 
places  upon  the  League  many  specific,  in  addi- 
tion to  its  general,  duties.  It  may  question 
Germany  at  any  time  for  a  violation  of  the 
neutralized  zone  east  of  the  Rhine  as  a  threat 
against  the  world's  peace.  It  will  appoint 
three  of  the  five  members  of  the  Sarre  Com- 
mission, oversee  its  regime,  and  carry  out 
the  plebiscite.  It  will  appoint  the  High 
Commissioner  of  Danzig,  guarantee  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  free  city,  and  arrange  for 
treaties  between  Danzig  and  Germany  and 
Poland.  It  will  work  out  the  mandatory  sys- 
tem to  be  applied  to  the  former  German  colo- 
nies, and  act  as   a  final   court  in  part  of  the 


plebiscites  of  the  Belgian-German  frontier, 
and  in  disputes  as  to  the  Kiel  Canal,  and 
decide  certain  of  the  economic  and  financial 
problems.  An  International  Conference  on 
Labor  is  to  be  held  in  October  under  its  direc- 
tion, and  another  on  the  international  control 
of  ports,  waterways,  and  railways  is  fore- 
shadowed. 

MEMBERSHIP 

The  members  of  the  League  will  be  the  sig- 
natories of  the  covenant  and  other  States  in- 
vited to  accede  who  must  lodge  a  declaration 
of  accession  without  reservation  within  two 
months.  A  new  State,  dominion,  or  colony 
may  be  admitted,  provided  its  admission  is 
agreed  by  two-thirds  of  the  assembly.  A 
State  may  withdraw  upon  giving  two  years' 
notice,  if  it  has  fulfilled  all  its  international 
obligations. 

SECRETARIAT 

A  permanent  secretariat  will  be  established 
at  the  seat  of  the  League,  which  will  be  at 
Geneva. 


The  Assembly  will  consist  of  representatives 
of  the  members  of  the  League,  and  will  meet 
at  stated  intervals.  Voting  will  be  by  States. 
Each  member  will  have  one  vote  and  not  more 
than  three   representatives. 


The  Council  will  consist  of  representatives 
of  the  Five  Great  Allied  Powers,  together  with 
representatives  of  four  members  selected  by 
the  Assembly  from  time  to  time;  it  may  co-opt 
additional  States  and  will  meet  at  least  once 
a  year.  Members  not  represented  will  be  in- 
vited to  send  a  representative  when  questions 
affecting  their  interests  are  discussed.  Vot- 
ing will  be  by  States.  Each  State  will  have 
one  vote  and  not  more  than  one  representa- 
tive. A  decision  taken  by  the  Assembly  and 
Council  must  be  unanimous  except  in  regard 
to  procedure,  and  in  certain  cases  specified  in 
the  covenant  and  in  the  treaty,  where  decisions 
will  be  by  a  majority. 

ARMAMENTS 

The  Council  will  formulate  plans  for  a  re- 
duction of  armaments  for  consideration  and 
adoption.  These  plans  will  be  revised  every 
ten  years.  Once  they  are  adopted,  no  member 
must  exceed  the  armaments  fixed  without  the 
concurrence  of  the  Council.  All  members  will 
exchange  full  information  as  to  armaments 
and  programs,  and  a  permanent  commission 
will  advise  the  Council  on  military  and  naval 
questions. 


By  Permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company 


CENTRAL  EUROPE  BEFORE  THE  WORLD  WAR 


By  Permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company 

CENTRAL  EUROPE    ACCORDING  TO  THE   PEACE   TREATIES   OF   1919 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


343 


PREVENTING    OF    WAR 

Upon  any  war,  or  threat  of  war,  the  Coun- 
cil will  meet  to  consider  what  common  action 
shall  be  taken.  Members  are  pledged  to  sub- 
mit matters  of  dispute  to  arbitration  or  in- 
quiry and  not  to  resort  to  war  until  three 
months  after  the  award.  Members  agree  to 
carry  out  the  arbitral  award  and  not  to  go 
to  war  with  any  party  to  the  dispute  which 
complies  with  it.  If  a  member  fails  to  carry 
out  the  award,  the  Council  will  propose  the 
necessary  measures.  The  Council  will  formu- 
late plans  for  the  establishment  of  a  perma- 
nent court  of  international  justice  to  deter- 
mine international  disputes  or  to  give  advisory 
opinions.  Members  who  do  not  submit  their 
case  to  arbitration  must  accept  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  Assembly.  If  the  Council,  less  the 
parties  to  the  dispute,  is  unanimously  agreed 
upon  the  rights  of  it,  the  members  agree  that 
they  will  not  go  to  war  with  any  party  to  the 
dispute  which  complies  with  its  recommenda- 
tions. In  this  case,  a  recommendation,  by  the 
Assembly,  concurred  in  by  all  its  members 
represented  on  the  Council  and  a  simple  ma- 
jority of  the  rest,  less  the  parties  to  the  dis- 
pute, will  have  the  force  of  a  unanimous 
recommendation  by  the  Council.  In  either 
case,  if  the  necessary  agreement  cannot  be 
secured,  the  members  reserve  the  right  to  take 
such  action  as  may  be  necessary  for  the 
maintenance  of  right  and  justice.  Members 
resorting  to  war  in  disregard  of  the  covenant 
will  immediately  be  debarred  from  all  inter- 
course with  other  members.  The  Council  will 
in  such  cases  consider  what  military  or  naval 
action  can  be  taken  by  the  League  collectively 
for  the  protection  of  the  covenants  and  will 
afford  facilities  to  members  co-operating  in 
this  enterprise. 

VALIDITY    OF    TREATIES 

All  treaties  or  international  engagements 
concluded  after  the  institution  of  the  League 
will  be  registered  with  the  secretariat  and  pub- 
lished. The  Assembly  may  from  time  to  time 
advise  members  to  reconsider  treaties  which 
have  become  inapplicable  or  involve  danger  to 
peace.  The  covenant  abrogates  all  obligations 
between  members  inconsistent  with  its  terms, 
but  nothing  in  it  shall  affect  the  validity  of 
international  engagements  such  as  treaties  of 
arbitration  or  regional  understandings  like  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  for  securing  the  maintenance 
of  peace. 

THE    MANDATORY    SYSTEM 

The  tutelage  of  nations  not  yet  able  to  stand 
by  themselves  will  be  intrusted  to  advanced 
nations  who  are  best  fitted  to  undertake  it. 
The  covenant  recognizes  three  different  stages 
of  development  requiring  different  kinds  of 
mandatories: 


(a)  Communities  like  those  belonging  to  the 
Turkish  Empire,  which  can  be  provisionally 
recognized  as  independent,  subject  to  advice 
and  assistance  from  mandatory  in  whose  se- 
lection they  would  be  allowed   a  voice. 

(b)  Communities  like  those  of  Central 
Africa,  to  be  administered  by  the  mandatory 
under  conditions  generally  approved  by  the 
members  of  the  League,  where  equal  oppor- 
tunities for  trade  will  be  allowed  to  all  mem- 
bers; certain  abuses,  such  as  trade  in  slaves, 
arms,  and  liquor  will  be  prohibited,  and  the 
construction  of  military  and  naval  bases  and 
the  introduction  of  compulsory  military  train- 
ing will  be  disallowed. 

(c)  Other  communities,  such  as  Southwest 
Africa  and  the  South  Pacific  Islands,  but  ad- 
ministered under  the  laws  of  the  mandatory 
as  integral  portions  of  its  territory.  In  every 
case  the  mandatory  will  render  an  anuual  re- 
port, and  the  degree  of  its  authority  will  be 
defined. 

GENERAL     INTERNATIONAL     PROVISIONS 

Subject  to  and  in  accordance  with  the  pro- 
visions of  international  convention,  existing  or 
hereafter  to  be  agreed  upon,  the  members  of 
the  League  will  in  general  endeavor,  through 
the  international  organization  established  by 
the  Labor  Convention,  to  secure  and  maintain 
fair  conditions  of  labor  for  men,  women  and 
children  in  their  own  countries  and  other  coun- 
tries, and  undertake  to  secure  just  treatment 
of  the  native  inhabitants  of  territories  under 
their  control;  they  will  entrust  the  League  with 
the  general  supervision  over  the  execution  of 
agreements  for  the  suppression  of  traffic  in 
women  and  children,  etc.:  and  the  control  of  the 
trade  in  arms  and  ammunition  with  countries  in 
which  control  is  necessary;  they  will  make  pro- 
vision for  freedom  of  communication  and  tran- 
sit and  equitable  treatment  for  commerce  of  all 
members  of  the  League,  with  special  reference 
to  the  necessities  of  regions  devastated  during 
the  war;  and  they  will  endeavor  to  take  steps 
for  international  prevention  and  control  of  dis- 
ease. International  bureaus  and  commissions 
already  established  will  be  placed  under  the 
League,  as  well  as  those  to  be  established  in 
the  future. 

AMENDMENTS    TO    THE    COVENANT 

Amendments  to  the  covenant  will  take  effect 
when  ratified  by  the  Council  and  by  a  majority 
of  the  Assembly. 

SECTION  II 

BOUNDARIES     OF    GERMANY 

Germany  cedes  to  France  Alsace-Lorraine, 
5,600  square  miles  to  the  southwest,  and  to  Bel- 
gium  two   small   districts    between    Luxemburg 


344 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


and  Holland,  totaling  382  square  miles.  She 
also  cedes  to  Poland  the  southeastern  tip  of 
Silesia  beyond  and  including  Oppela,  most  of 
Posen,  and  West  Prussia,  27,686  square  miles, 
East  Prussia  being  isolated  from  the  main  body 
by  a  part  of  Poland.  She  loses  sovereignty 
over  the  northeastern  tip  of  East  Prussia,  40 
square  miles  north  of  the  river  Memel,  and  the 
internationalized  areas  about  Danzig,  729  square 
miles,  and  the  Basin  of  the  Sarre,  738  square 
miles,  between  the  western  border  of  the 
Rhenish  Palatinate  of  Bavaria  and  the  south- 
east corner  of  Luxemburg.  The  Danzig  area 
consists  of  the  V  between  the  Nogat  and  Vis- 
tula Rivers  made  a  W  by  the  addition  of  a 
similar  V  on  the  west,  including  the  city  of 
Danzig.  The  southeastern  third  of  East  Prus- 
sia and  the  area  between  East  Prussia  and  the 
Vistula  north  of  latitude  53  degrees  3  minutes 
is  to  have  its  nationality  determined  by  popular 
vote,  5,785  square  miles,  as  is  to  be  the  case 
in  part  of  Schleswig,  2,787  square  miles. 

SECTION  III 


Germany  is  to  consent  to  the  abrogation  of 
the  treaties  of  1839,  by  which  Belgium  was 
established  as  a  neutral  State,  and  to  agree  in 
advance  to  any  convention  with  which  the  al- 
lied and  associated  Powers  may  determine  to 
replace  them.  She  is  to  recognize  the  full 
sovereignty  of  Belgium  over  the  contested  ter- 
ritory of  Moresnet  and  over  part  of  Prussian 
Moresnet,  and  to  renounce  in  favor  of  Bel- 
gium all  rights  over  the  circles  of  Eupen  and 
Malmedy,  the  inhabitants  of  which  are  to  be 
entitled  within  six  months  to  protest  against 
this  change  of  sovereignty  either  in  whole  or 
in  part,  the  final  decision  to  be  reserved  to  the 
League  of  Nations.  A  commission  is  to  settle 
the  details  of  the  frontier,  and  various  regula- 
tions for  change  of  nationality  are  laid  down. 

LUXEMBOURG 

Germany  renounces  her  various  treaties  and 
conventions  with  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxem- 
bourg, recognizes  that  it  ceased  to  be  a  part 
of  the  German  Zollverein  from  January  first 
last,  renounces  all  right  of  exploitation  of  the 
railroads,  adheres  to  the  abrogation  of  its  neu- 
trality, and  accepts  in  advance  any  interna- 
tional agreement  as  to  it  reached  by  the  allied 
and  associated  Powers. 

LEFT     BANK     OF     THE     RHINE 

As  provided  in  the  military  clauses,  Germany 
will  not  maintain  any  fortifications  or  armed 
forces  less  than  fifty  kilometers  to  the  east  of 
the  Rhine,  hold  any  manoeuvres,  nor  maintain 
any  works  to  facilitate  mobilization.  In  case 
of   violation,   "she   shall   be   regarded   as   com- 


mitting a  hostile  act  against  the  Powers  who 
sign  the  present  treaty  and  as  intending  to 
disturb  the  peace  of  the  world."  "By  virtue  of 
the  present  treaty,  Germany  shall  be  bound  to 
respond  to  any  request  for  an  explanation 
which  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations 
may  think  it  necessary  to  address  to  her." 

ALSACE-LORRAINE 

After  recognition  of  the  moral  obligation 
to  repair  the  wrong  done  in  1871  by  Germany 
to  France  and  the  people  of  Alsace-Lorraine, 
the  territories  ceded  to  Germany  by  the  Treaty 
of  Frankfort  are  restored  to  France  with  their 
frontiers  as  before  1871,  to  date  from  the  sign- 
ing of  the  armistice,  and  to  be  free  of  all  pub- 
lic debts. 

Citizenship  is  regulated  by  detailed  provisions 
distinguishing  those  who  are  immediately  re- 
stored to  full  French  citizenship,  those  who  have 
to  make  formal  applications  therefor,  and  those 
for  whom  naturalization  is  open  after  three 
years.  The  last  named  class  includes  German 
residents  in  Alsace-Lorraine,  as  distinguished 
from  those  who  acquire  the  position  of  Alsace- 
Lorrainers  as  defined  in  the  treaty.  All  public 
property  and  all  private  property  of  German 
ex-sovereigns  passes  to  France  without  pay- 
ment or  credit.  France  is  substituted  for  Ger- 
many as  regards  ownership  of  the  railroads  and 
rights  over  concessions  of  tramways.  The 
Rhine  bridges  pass  to  France  with  the  obliga- 
tion for  their  upkeep. 

For  five  years  manufactured  products  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  will  be  admitted  to  Germany 
free  of  duty  to  a  total  amount  not  exceeding 
in  any  year  the  average  of  the  three  years  pre- 
ceding the  war  and  textile  materials  may  be 
imported  from  Germany  to  Alsace-Lorraine 
and  re-exported  free  of  duty.  Contracts  for 
electric  power  from  the  right  bank  must  be 
continued  for  ten  years.  For  seven  years,  with 
possible  extension  to  ten,  the  ports  of  Kehl 
and  Strasbourg  shall  be  administered  as  a  sin- 
gle unit  by  a  French  administrator  appointed 
and  supervised  by  the  Central  Rhine  Commis- 
sion. Property  rights  will  be  safeguarded  in 
both  ports  and  equality  of  treatment  as  re- 
spects traffic  assured  the  nationals,  vessels, 
and  goods  of  every  country. 

Contracts  between  Alsace-Lorraine  and  Ger- 
mans are  maintained  save  for  France's  right 
to  annul  on  grounds  of  public  interest.  Judg- 
ments of  courts  hold  in  certain  classes  of  cases 
while  in  others  a  judicial  exequatur  is  first  re- 
quired. Political  condemnations  during  the 
war  are  null  and  void  and  the  obligation  to 
repay  war  fines  is  established  as  in  other  parts 
of  allied  territory. 

Various  clauses  adjust  the  general  provisions 
of  the  treaty  to  the  special  conditions  of  Al- 
sace-Lorraine, certain  matters  of  execution  be- 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


345 


ing   left   to   conventions  to   be  made  between 
France  and  Germany. 

THE    SABBE 

In  compensation  for  the  destruction  of  coal 
mines  in  Northern  France  and  as  payment  on 
account  of  reparation,  Germany  cedes  to 
France  full  ownership  of  the  coal  mines  of  the 
Sarre  Basin  with  their  subsidiaries,  accessories 
and  facilities.  Their  value  will  be  estimated 
by  the  Reparation  Commission  and  credited 
against  that  account.  The  French  rights  will 
be  governed  by  German  law  in  force  at  the 
armistice  excepting  war  legislation,  France  re- 
placing the  present  owners,  whom  Germany 
undertakes  to  indemnify.  France  will  continue 
to  furnish  the  present  proportion  of  coal  for 
local  needs  and  contribute  in  just  proportion 
to  local  taxes.  The  basin  extends  from  the 
frontier  of  Lorraine  as  reannexed  to  France 
north  as  far  as  Stwendell  including  on  the  west 
the  valley  of  the  Sarre  as  far  as  Sarre  Holzbach 
and  on  the  east  the  town  of  Homburg. 

In  order  to  secure  the  rights  and  welfare 
of  the  population  and  guarantee  to  France 
entire  freedom  in  working  the  mines  the  ter- 
ritory will  be  governed  by  a  commission  ap- 
pointed by  the  League  of  Nations  and  consist- 
ing of  five  members,  one  French,  one  a  native 
inhabitant  of  the  Sarre,  and  three  represent- 
ing three  different  countries  other  than  France 
and  Germany.  The  League  will  appoint  a 
member  of  the  Commission  as  Chairman  to  act 
as  executive  of  the  commission.  The  commis- 
sion will  have  all  powers  of  government  for- 
merly belonging  to  the  German  Empire, 
Prussia  and  Bavaria,  will  administer  the  rail- 
roads and  other  public  services  and  have  full 
power  to  interpret  the  treaty  clauses.  The  local 
courts  will  continue,  but  subject  to  the  Com- 
mission. Existing  German  legislation  will  re- 
main the  basis  of  the  law,  but  the  Commis- 
sion may  make  modification  after  consulting  a 
local  representative  assembly  which  it  will  or- 
ganize. It  will  have  the  taxing  power  but  for 
local  purposes  only.  New  taxes  must  be  ap- 
proved by  this  assembly.  Labor  legislation  will 
consider  the  wishes  of  the  local  labor  organi- 
zations and  the  labor  program  of  the  League. 
French  and  other  labor  may  be  freely  utilized, 
the  former  being  free  to  belong  to  French 
unions.  All  rights  acquired  as  to  pensions  and 
social  insurance  will  be  maintained  by  Ger- 
many and  the  Sarre  Commission. 

There  will  be  no  military  service  but  only 
a  local  gendarmerie  to  preserve  order.  The 
people  will  preserve  their  local  assemblies,  re- 
ligious liberties,  schools,  and  language,  but  may 
vote  only  for  local  assemblies.  They  will  keep 
their  present  nationality  except  so  far  as  indi- 
viduals may  change  it.  Those  wishing  to  leave 
will  have  every  facility  with  respect  to  their 
property.     The  territory  will  form  part  of  the 


French  customs  system,  with  no  export  tax  on 
coal  and  metallurgical  products  going  to  Ger- 
many nor  on  German  products  entering  the  ba- 
sin and  for  five  years  no  import  duties  on 
products  of  the  basin  going  to  Germany  or 
German  products  coming  into  the  basin.  For 
local  consumption  French  money  may  circu- 
late without  restriction. 

After  fifteen  years  a  plebiscite  will  be  held 
by  communes  to  ascertain  the  desires  of  the 
population  as  to  continuance  of  the  existing 
regime  under  the  League  of  Nations,  union 
with  France  or  union  with  Germany.  The 
right  to  vote  will  belong  to  all  inhabitants  over 
twenty  resident  therein  at  the  signature.  Tak- 
ing into  account  the  opinions  thus  expressed 
the  League  will  decide  the  ultimate  sovereign- 
ty. In  any  portion  restored  to  Germany  the 
German  Government  must  buy  out  the  French 
mines  at  an  appraised  valuation.  If  the  price 
is  not  paid  within  six  months  thereafter  this 
portion  passes  finally  to  France.  If  Germany 
buys  back  the  mines  the  League  will  deter- 
mine how  much  of  the  coal  shall  be  annually 
sold   to   France. 

SECTION  IV 

GERMAN    AUSTRIA 

Germany  recognizes  the  total  independence 
of  German  Austria  in  the  boundaries  traced. 

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 

Germany  recognizes  the  entire  independence 
of  the  Czechoslovak  State,  including  the  au- 
tonomous territory  of  the  Ruthenians  south  of 
the  Carpathians,  and  accepts  the  frontiers  of 
this  State  as  to  be  determined,  which  in  the 
case  of  the  German  frontier  shall  follow  the 
frontier  of  Bohemia  in  1914.  The  usual  stipu- 
lations as  to  acquisition  and  change  of  nation- 
ality  follow. 

POLAND 

Germany  cedes  to  Poland  the  greater  part  of 
Upper  Silesia,  Posen  and  the  province  of  West 
Prussia  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vistula.  A 
Field  Boundary  Commission  of  seven,  five  rep- 
resenting the  allied  and  associated  powers  and 
one  each  representing  Poland  and  Germany, 
shall  be  constituted  within  fifteen  days  of  the 
peace  to  delimit  this  boundary.  Such  special 
provisions  as  are  necessary  to  protect  racial, 
linguistic  or  religious  minorities  and  to  protect 
freedom  of  transit  and  equitable  treatment  of 
commerce  of  other  nations  shall  be  laid  down 
in  a  subsequent  treaty  between  the  principal 
allied   and  associated  powers   and   Poland. 

EAST    PRUSSIA 

The  southern  and  the  eastern  frontier  of 
East  Prussia  as  touching  Poland  is  to  be  fixed 


346 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


by  plebiscites,  the  first  in  the  regency  of  Allen- 
stein  between  the  southern  frontier  of  East 
Prussia  and  the  northern  frontier,  or  Regie- 
rungsbezirk  Allenstein  from  where  it  meets 
the  boundary  between  East  and  "West  Prussia 
to  its  junction  with  the  boundary  between  the 
circles  of  Oletsko  and  Augersburg,  thence  the 
northern  boundary  of  Oletsko  to  its  junction 
with  the  present  frontier,  and  the  second  in  the 
area  comprising  the  circles  of  Stuhm  and  Ro- 
senburg  and  the  parts  of  the  circles  of  Ma- 
rienburg  and  Marienwerder  east  of  the  Vis- 
tula. 

In  each  case  German  troops  and  authorities 
will  move  out  within  fifteen  days  of  the  peace, 
and  the  territories  be  placed  under  an  interna- 
tional commission  of  five  members  appointed 
by  the  principal  allied  and  associated  powers, 
with  the  particular  duty  of  arranging  for  a 
free,  fair  and  secret  vote.  The  commission 
will  report  the  results  of  the  plebiscites  to  the 
powers  with  a  recommendation  for  the  boun- 
dary, and  will  terminate  its  work  as  soon  as 
the  boundary  has  been  laid  down  and  the  new 
authorities  set  up. 

The  principal  allied  and  associated  powers 
will  draw  up  regulations  assuring  East  Prus- 
sia full  and  equitable  access  to  and  use  of  the 
Vistula.  A  subsequent  convention,  of  which 
the  terms  will  be  fixed  by  the  principal  allied 
and  associated  powers,  will  be  entered  into  be- 
tween Poland,  Germany  and  Danzig,  to  assure 
suitable  railroad  communication  across  Ger- 
man territory  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Vistula 
between  Poland  and  Danzig,  while  Poland 
shall  grant  free  passage  from  East  Prussia  to 
Germany. 

The  northeastern  corner  of  East  Prussia 
about  Memel  is  to  be  ceded  by  Germany  to  the 
associated  powers,  the  former  agreeing  to  ac- 
cept the  settlement  made,  especially  as  regards 
the  nationality  of  the  inhabitants. 


Danzig  and  the  district  immediately  about  it 
is  to  be  constituted  into  the  "free  city  of  Dan- 
zig" under  the  guarantee  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions. A  high  commissioner  appointed  by  the 
League  and  President  of  Danzig  shall  draw 
up  a  constitution  in  agreement  with  the  duly 
appointed  representatives  of  the  city,  and  shall 
deal  in  the  first  instance  with  all  differences 
arising  between  the  city  and  Poland.  The 
actual  boundaries  of  the  city  shall  be  delimited 
by  a  commission  appointed  within  six  months 
from  the  peace  and  to  include  three  represen- 
tatives chosen  by  the  allied  and  associated 
powers,  and  one  each  by  Germany  and  Poland. 
A  convention,  the  terms  of  which  shall  be  fixed 
by  the  principal  allied  and  associated  powers, 
shall  be  concluded  between  Poland  and  Danzig, 
which  shall  include  Danzig  within  the  Polish 
customs   frontiers,   though   a   free   area   in   the 


port;  insure  to  Poland  the  free  use  of  all  the 
city's  waterways,  docks  and  other  port  facili- 
ties, the  control  and  administration  of  the  Vis- 
tula and  the  whole  through  railway  system 
within  the  city,  and  postal,  telegraphic  and 
telephonic  communication  between  Poland  and 
Danzig;  provide  against  discrimination  against 
Poles  within  the  city,  and  place  its  foreign  re- 
lations and  the  diplomatic  protection  of  its 
citizens   abroad  in  charge   of  Poland. 


The  frontier  between  Germany  and  Den- 
mark will  be  fixed  by  the  self-determination 
of  the  population.  Ten  days  from  the  peace 
German  troops  and  authorities  shall  evacuate 
the  region  north  of  the  line  running  from  the 
mouth  of  the  Schlei,  south  of  Kappel,  Schles- 
wig,  and  Friedrichstadt  along  the  Eider  to  the 
North  Sea  south  of  Tonning;  the  "Workmen's 
and  Soldiers'  Councils  shall  be  dissolved,  and 
the  territory  administered  by  an  international 
commission  of  five,  of  whom  Norway  and  Swe- 
den shall  be  invited  to  name  two. 

The  commission  shall  insure  a  free  and  se- 
cret vote  in  three  zones.  That  between  the 
German-Danish  frontier  and  a  line  running 
south  of  the  Island  of  Alsen,  north  of  Flens- 
burg,  and  south  of  Tondern  to  the  North  Sea 
north  of  the  Island  of  Sylt,  will  vote  as  a  unit  * 
within  three  weeks  after  the  evacuation.  With- 
in five  weeks  after  this  vote  the  second  zone, 
whose  southern  boundary  runs, from  the  North 
Sea  south  of  the  Island  of  Fehr  to  the  Baltic 
south  of  Sygum,  will  vote  by  communes.  Two 
weeks  after  that  vote  the  third  zone  running 
to  the  limit  of  evacuation  will  also  vote  by 
communes.  The  international  commission  will 
then  draw  a  new  frontier  on  the  basis  of  these 
plebiscites  and  with  due  regard  for  geographi- 
cal and  economic  conditions.  Germany  will  re- 
nounce all  sovereignty  over  territories  north 
of  this  line  in  favor  of  the  Associated  Gov- 
ernments, who  will  hand  them  over  to  Den- 
mark. 

HELIGOLAND 

The  fortifications,  military  establishments, 
and  harbors  of  the  Islands  of  Heligoland  and 
Dune  are  to  be  destroyed  under  the  supervi- 
sion of  the  Allies  by  German  labor  and  at 
Germany's  expense.  They  may  not  be  recon- 
structed, nor  any  similar  fortifications  built  in 
the  future. 


Germany  agrees  to  respect  as  permanent  and 
inalienable  the  independency  of  all  territories 
which  were  part  of  the  former  Russian  Em- 
pire, to  accept  the  abrogation  of  the  Brest- 
Litovsk  and  other  treaties  entered  into  with 
the  Maximalist  Government  of  Russia,  to  rec- 
ognize  the    full    force   of   all   treaties   entered 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


347 


into  by  the  allied  and  associated  powers  with 
States  which  were  a  part  of  the  former  Rus- 
sian Empire,  and  to  recognize  the  frontiers 
as  determined  thereon.  The  allied  and  associ- 
ated powers  formerly  reserve  the  right  of  Rus- 
sia to  obtain  restitution  and  reparation  on  the 
principles  of  the  present  treaty. 

SECTION  V 

GERMAN     RIGHTS     OUTSIDE     EUROPE 

Outside  Europe,  Germany  renounces  all 
rights,  titles,  and  privileges  as  to  her  own  or 
her  allies'  territories  to  all  the  allied  and  as- 
sociated powers,  and  undertakes  to  accept 
whatever  measures  are  taken  by  the  five  allied 
powers  in   relation  thereto. 

COLONIES     AXD     OVERSEAS     POSSESSIONS 

Germany  renounces  in  favor  of  the  allied 
and  associated  powers  her  overseas  posses- 
sions with  all  rights  and  titles  therein.  All 
movable  and  immovable  property  belonging  to 
the  German  Empire,  or  to  any  German  State, 
shall  pass  to  the  Government  exercising  au- 
thority therein.  These  Governments  may  make 
whatever  provisions  seem  suitable  for  the  re- 
patriation of  German  nationals  and  as  to  the 
conditions  on  which  German  subjects  of  Euro- 
pean origin  shall  reside,  hold  property,  or 
carry  on  business.  Germany  undertakes  to 
pay  reparation  for  damage  suffered  by  French 
nationals  in  the  Cameroons  or  its  frontier  zone 
through  the  acts  of  German  civil  and  military 
authorities  and  of  individual  Germans  from 
the  1st  of  January,  1900,  to  the  1st  of  August, 
1914.  Germany  renounces  all  rights  under  the 
convention  of  the  4th  of  November,  1911,  and 
the  29th  of  September,  1912,  and  undertakes 
to  pay  to  France  in  accordance  with  an  esti- 
mate presented  and  approved  by  the  Repatria- 
tion Commission  all  deposits,  credits,  advances, 
&c,  thereby  secured.  Germany  undertakes  to 
accept  and  observe  any  provisions  by  the  al- 
lied and  associated  powers  as  to  the  trade  in 
arms  and  spirits  in  Africa  as  well  as  to  the 
General  Act  of  Berlin  of  1885  and  the  General 
Act  of  Brussels  of  1890.  Diplomatic  protec- 
tion to  inhabitants  of  former  German  colonies 
is  to  be  given  by  the  Governments  exercising 
authority. 


Germany  renounces  in  favor  of  China  all 
privileges  and  indemnities  resulting  from  the 
Boxer  Protocol  of  1901,  and  all  buildings, 
wharves,  barracks  for  munitions  of  warships, 
wireless  plants,  and  other  public  property  ex- 
cept diplomatic  or  consular  establishments  in 
the  German  concessions  of  Tientsin  and  Han- 
kow and  in  other  Chinese  territory  except  Kiao- 
Chau    and    agrees   to   return   to    China   at   her 


own  expense  all  the  astronomical  instruments 
seized  in  1900  and  1901.  China  will,  however, 
take  no  measures  for  disposal  of  German  prop- 
erty in  the  legation  quarter  of  Peking  without 
the  consent  of  the  powers  signatory  to  the 
Boxer   Protocol. 

Germany  accepts  the  abrogation  of  the  con- 
cessions at  Hankow  and  Tientsin,  China  agree- 
ing to  open  them  to  international  use.  Ger- 
many renounces  all  claims  against  China  or 
any  allied  and  associated  Government  for  the 
internment  or  repatriation  of  her  citizens  in 
China  and  for  the  seizure  or  liquidation  of 
German  interests  there  since  Aug.  14,  1917. 
She  renounces  in  favor  of  Great  Britain  her 
State  property  in  the  British  concession  at 
Canton  and  of  France  and  China  jointly  of  the 
property  of  the  German  school  in  the  French 
concession  at  Shanghai. 


Germany  recognizes  that  all  agreements  be- 
tween herself  and  Siam,  including  the  right  of 
extra-territoriality,  ceased  July  22,  1917.  All 
German  public  property,  except  consular  and 
diplomatic  premises,  passes  without  compensa- 
tion to  Siam,  German  private  property  to  be 
dealt  with  in  accordance  with  the  economic 
clauses.  Germany  waives  all  claims  against 
Siam  for  the  seizure  and  condemnation  of  her 
ships,  liquidation  of  her  property,  or  intern- 
ment of  her   nationals. 


Germany  renounces  all  rights  under  the  in- 
ternational arrangements  of  1911  and  1912  re- 
garding Liberia,  more  particularly  the  right 
to  nominate  a  receiver  of  the  customs,  and  dis- 
interests  herself  in  any  further  negotiations 
for  the  rehabilitation  of  Liberia.  She  regards 
as  abrogated  all  commercial  treaties  and  agree- 
ments between  herself  and  Liberia  and  rec- 
ognizes Liberia's  right  to  determine  the  status 
and  condition  of  the  re-establishment  of  Ger- 
mans  in  Liberia. 


Germany  renounces  all  her  rights,  titles,  and 
privileges  under  the  Act  of  Algeciras  and  the 
Franco-German  agreements  of  1909  and  1911, 
and  under  all  treaties  and  arrangements  with 
the  Sherifian  Empire.  She  undertakes  not  to 
intervene  in  any  negotiations  as  to  Morocco 
between  France  and  other  powers,  accepts  all 
the  consequences  of  the  French  protectorate 
and  renounces  the  capitulations;  the  Sherifian 
Government  shall  have  complete  liberty  of  ac- 
tion in  regard  to  German  nationals,  and  all 
German  protected  persons  shall  be  subject  to 
the  common  law.  All  movable  and  immovable 
German  property,  including  mining  rights, 
may  be  sold  at  public  auction,  the  proceeds  to 


348 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


be  paid  to  the  Sherifian  Government  and  de- 
ducted from  the  reparation  account.  Ger- 
many is  also  required  to  relinquish  her  in- 
terests in  the  State  Bank  of  Morocco.  All 
Moroccan  goods  entering  Germany  shall  have 
the  same  privilege  as  French  goods. 


Germany  recognizes  the  British  Protectorate 
over  Egypt  declared  on  Dec.  18,  1914,  and  re- 
nounces as  from  August  4,  1914,  the  capitu- 
lation and  all  the  treaties,  agreements,  etc., 
concluded  by  her  with  Egypt.  She  undertakes 
not  to  intervene  in  any  negotiations  about 
Egypt  between  Great  Britain  and  other  pow- 
ers. There  are  provisions  for  jurisdiction  over 
German  nationals  and  property  and  for  Ger- 
man consent  to  any  changes  which  may  be 
made  in  relation  to  the  Commission  of  Public 
Debt.  Germany  consents  to  the  transfer  to 
Great  Britain  of  the  powers  given  to  the  late 
Sultan  of  Turkey  for  securing  the  free  naviga- 
tion of  the  Suez  Canal.  Arrangements  for 
property  belonging  to  German  nationals  in 
Egypt  are  made  similar  to  those  in  the  case  of 
Morocco  and  other  countries.  Anglo-Egyp- 
tian goods  entering  Germany  shall  enjoy  the 
same    treatment    as    British    goods. 

TXJEKEY    AND    BULGARIA 

Germany  accepts  all  arrangements  which  the 
allied  and  associated  powers  make  with  Tur- 
key and  Bulgaria  with  reference  to  any  right, 
privileges  or  interests  claimed  in  those  coun- 
tries by  Germany  or  her  nationals  and  not 
dealt  with  elsewhere. 

SHANTUNG 

Germany  cedes  to  Japan  all  rights,  titles,  and 
privileges,  notably  as  to  Kiao-Chau,  and  the 
railroads,  mines,  and  cables  acquired  by  her 
treaty  with  China  of  March  6,  1897,  by  and 
other  agreements  as  to  Shantung.  All  German 
rights  to  the  railroad  from  Tsing-tao  to  Tsi- 
nan-fu,  including  all  facilities  and  mining 
rights  and  rights  of  exploitation,  pass  equally 
to  Japan,  and  the  cables  from  Tsing-tao  to 
Shanghai  and  Che-foo,  the  cables  free  of  all 
charges.  All  German  State  property,  movable 
and  immovable,  in  Kiao-Chau  is  acquired  by 
Japan  free  of  all  charges. 

SECTION  VI 
Sub-Section   IV 

MILITARY,    NAVAL    AND    AIR 

In  order  to  render  possible  the  initiation  of 
a  general  limitation  of  the  armaments  of  all 
nations,  Germany  undertakes  directly  to  ob- 
serve the  military,  naval,  and  air  clauses  which 
follow. 


MILITARY    FORCES 

The  demobilization  of  the  German  Army 
must  take  place  within  two  months  of  the 
peace.  Its  strength  may  not  exceed  100,000, 
including  4,000  officers,  with  not  over  seven 
divisions  of  infantry  and  three  of  cavalry,  and 
to  be  devoted  exclusively  to  maintenance  of  in- 
ternal order  and  control  of  frontiers.  Divi- 
sions may  not  be  grouped  under  more  than  two 
army  corps  headquarters  staffs.  The  great 
German  General  Staff  is  abolished.  The  army 
administrative  service,  consisting  of  civilian 
personnel  not  included  in  the  number  of  effec- 
tives, is  reduced  to  one-tenth  the  total  in  the 
1913  budget.  Employes  of  the  German  States, 
such  as  customs  officers,  first  guards,  and  coast 
guards,  may  not  exceed  the  number  in  1913. 
Gendarmes  and  local  police  may  be  increased 
only  in  accordance  with  the  growth  of  popula- 
tion. None  of  these  may  be  assembled  for 
military  training. 

ARMAMENTS 

All  establishments  for  the  manufacturing, 
preparation,  storage,  or  design  of  arms  and 
munitions  of  war,  except  those  specifically  ex- 
cepted, must  be  closed  within  three  months  of 
the  peace,  and  their  personnel  dismissed.  The 
exact  amount  of  armament  and  munitions  al- 
lowed Germany  is  laid  down  in  detail  tables, 
all  in  excess  to  be  surrendered  or  rendered  use- 
less. The  manufacture  or  importation  of  as- 
phyxiating, poisonous,  or  other  gases  and  all 
analogous  liquids  is  forbidden  as  well  as  the 
importation  of  arms,  munitions,  and  war  ma- 
terials. Germany  may  not  manufacture  such 
materials  for  foreign  governments. 

CONSCRIPTION 

Conscription  is  abolished  in  Germany.  The 
enlisted  personnel  must  be  maintained  by  vol- 
untary enlistments  for  terms  of  twelve  consec- 
utive years,  the  number  of  discharges  before 
the  expiration  of  that  term  not  in  any  year  to 
exceed  5  per  cent,  of  the  total  effectives.  Offi- 
cers remaining  in  the  service  must  agree  to 
serve  to  the  age  of  45  years,  and  newly  ap- 
pointed officers  must  agree  to  serve  actively 
for   twenty-five   years. 

No  military  schools  except  those  absolutely 
indispensable  for  the  units  allowed  shall  exist 
in  Germany  two  months  after  the  peace.  No 
associations  such  as  societies  of  discharged  sol- 
diers, shooting  or  touring  clubs,  educational  es- 
tablishments or  universities  may  occupy  them- 
selves with  military  matters.  All  measures  of 
mobilization  are   forbidden. 

FORTRESSES 

All  fortified  works,  fortresses,  and  field 
works    situated   in   German   territory   within   a 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


349 


zone  of  fifty  kilometers  east  of  the  Rhine  will 
be  dismantled  within  three  months.  The  con- 
struction of  any  new  fortifications  there  is  for- 
bidden. The  fortified  works  on  the  southern 
and  eastern   frontiers,  however,  may  remain. 


Interallied  commissions  of  control  will  see  to 
the  execution  of  the  provisions  for  which  a 
time  limit  is  set,  the  maximum  named  being 
three  months.  They  may  establish  headquar- 
ters at  the  German  seat  of  Government  and 
go  to  any  part  of  Germany  desired.  Germany 
must  give  them  complete  facilities,  pay  their 
expenses,  and  also  the  expenses  of  execution  of 
the  treaty,  including  the  labor  and  material 
necessary  in  demolition,  destruction  or  surren- 
der of  war  equipment. 


The  German  navy  must  be  demobilized  with- 
in a  period  of  two  months  after  the  peace. 
She  will  be  allowed  6  small  battleships,  6  light 
cruisers,  12  destroyers,  12  torpedo  boats,  and 
no  submarines,  either  military  or  commercial, 
with  a  personnel  of  15,000  men,  including  offi- 
cers, and  no  reserve  force  of  any  character. 
Conscription  is  abolished,  only  voluntary  serv- 
ice being  permitted,  with  a  minimum  period  of 
25  years  service  for  officers  and  12  for  men. 
No  member  of  the  German  mercantile  marine 
will  be  permitted  any  naval  training. 

All  German  vessels  of  war  in  foreign  ports 
and  the  German  high  sea  fleet  interned  at 
Scapa  Flow  will  be  surrendered,  the  final  dis- 
position of  these  ships  to  be  decided  upon  by 
the  allied  and  associated  powers.  Germany 
must  surrender  42  modern  destroyers,  50  mod- 
ern torpedo  boats,  and  all  submarines,  with 
their  salvage  vessels.  All  war  vessels  under 
construction,  including  submarines,  must  be 
broken  up.  War  vessels  not  otherwise  provid- 
ed for  are  to  be  placed  in  reserve,  or  used  for 
commercial  purposes.  Replacement  of  ships 
except  those  lost  can  take  place  only  at  the 
end  of  20  years  for  battleships  and  15  years 
for  destroyers.  The  largest  armored  ship  Ger- 
many will  be  permitted  will  be  10,000  tons. 

Germany  is  required  to  sweep  up  the  mines 
in  the  North  Sea  and  the  Baltic  Sea,  as  decid- 
ed upon  by  the  Allies.  All  German  fortifica- 
tions in  the  Baltic,  defending  the  passages 
through  the  belts,  must  be  demolished.  Other 
coast  defenses  are  permitted,  but  the  number 
and  calibre  of  the  guns  must  not  be  increased. 


During  a  period  of  three  months  after  the 
peace  German  high  power  wireless  stations  at 
Nauen,  Hanover,  and  Berlin  will  not  be  per- 
mitted to  send  any  messages  except  for  com- 
mercial purposes,  and  under  supervision  of  the 


allied    and    associated    Governments,    nor    may 
any  more  be  constructed. 


Germany  renounces  all  title  to  specified  cables, 
the  value  of  such  as  were  privately  owned 
being  credited  to  her  against  reparation  in- 
debtedness. 

Germany  will  be  allowed  to  repair  German 
submarine  cables  which  have  been  cut  but  are 
not  being  utilized  by  the  allied  powers,  and 
also  portions  of  cables  which,  after  having 
been  cut,  have  been  removed,  or  are  at  any  rate 
not  being  utilized  by  any  one  of  the  allied 
and  associated  powers.  In  such  cases  the  ca- 
bles, or  portions  of  cables,  removed  or  utilized 
remain  the  property  of  the  allied  and  associat- 
ed powers,  and  accordingly  fourteen  cables  or 
parts  of  cables  are  specified  which  will  not 
be  restored  to  Germany. 


The  armed  forces  of  Germany  must  not  in- 
clude any  military  or  naval  air  forces  except 
for  not  over  100  unarmed  seaplanes  to  be  re- 
tained till  Oct.  1  to  search  for  submarine  mines. 
No  dirigible  shall  be  kept.  The  entire  air  per- 
sonnel is  to  be  demobilized  within  two  months, 
except  for  1,000  officers  and  men  retained  till 
October.  No  aviation  grounds  or  dirigible  sheds 
are  to  be  allowed  within  150  kilometers  of  the 
Rhine,  or  the  eastern  or  southern  frontiers,  ex- 
isting installations  within  these  limits  to  be  de- 
stroyed. The  manufacture  of  aircraft  and 
parts  of  aircraft  is  forbidden  for  six  months. 
All  military  and  naval  aeronautical  material 
under  a  most  exhaustive  definition  must  be  sur- 
rendered within  three  months,  except  for  the 
100  seaplanes   already  specified. 

SUB-SECTION   VI 

PRISONERS    OF   WAR 

The  repatriation  of  German  prisoners  and  in- 
terned civilians  is  to  be  carried  out  without  de- 
lay and  at  Germany's  expense  by  a  commission 
composed  of  representatives  of  the  Allies  and 
Germany.  Those  under  sentence  for  offenses 
against  discipline  are  to  be  repatriated  without 
regard  to  the  completion  of  their  sentences. 
Until  Germany  has  surrendered  persons  guilty 
of  offenses  against  the  laws  and  customs  of 
war,  the  Allies  have  the  right  to  retain  selected 
German  officers.  The  Allies  may  deal  at  their 
own  discretion  with  German  nationals  who  do 
not  desire  to  be  repatriated,  all  repatriation  be- 
ing conditional  on  the  immediate  release  of  any 
allied  subjects  still  in  Germany.  Germany  is 
to  accord  facilities  to  commissions  of  inquiry 
in  collecting  information  in  regard  to  missing 
prisoners  of  war  and  of  imposing  penalties  on 
German  officials  who  have  concealed  allied  na- 


350 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


tionals.  Germany  is  to  restore  all  property  be- 
longing to  allied  prisoners.  There  is  to  be  a 
reciprocal  exchange  of  information  as  to  dead 
prisoners  and  their  graves. 


Both  parties  will  respect  and  maintain  the 
graves  of  soldiers  and  sailors  buried  on  their 
territories,  agree  to  recognize  and  assist  any 
commission  charged  by  any  allied  or  associate 
Government  with  identifying,  registering,  main- 
taining or  erecting  suitable  monuments  over 
the  graves,  and  to  afford  to  each  other  all  fa- 
cilities for  the  repatriation  of  the  remains  of 
their  soldiers. 

SUB-SECTION  VII 

RESPONSIBILITIES 

"The  allied  and  associated  powers  publicly 
arraign  William  II.  of  Hohenzollern,  formerly 
German  Emperor,  not  for  an  offense  against 
criminal  law,  but  for  a  supreme  offense  against 
international  morality  and  the  sanctity  of  trea- 
ties." 

The  ex-Emperor's  surrender  is  to  be  re- 
quested of  Holland  and  a  special  tribunal  set 
up,  composed  of  one  judge  from  each  of  the 
five  great  powers,  with  full  guarantees  of  the 
right  of  defense.  It  is  to  be  guided  "by  the 
highest  motives  of  international  policy  with  a 
view  of  vindicating  the  solemn  obligations  of 
international  undertakings  and  the  validity  of 
international  morality,"  and  will  fix  the  pun- 
ishment it  feels  should  be  imposed. 

Persons  accused  of  having  committed  acts  in 
violation  of  the  laws  and  customs  of  war  are  to 
be  tried  and  punished  by  military  tribunals  un- 
der military  law.  If  the  charges  affect  nation- 
als of  only  one  State,  they  will  be  tried  before 
a  tribunal  of  that  State;  if  they  affect  nation- 
als of  several  States,  they  will  be  tried  before 
joint  tribunals  of  the  States  concerned.  Ger- 
many shall  hand  over  to  the  associated  Gov- 
ernments, either  jointly  or  severally,  all  per- 
sons so  accused  and  all  documents  and  infor- 
mation necessary  to  insure  full  knowledge  of 
the  incriminating  acts,  the  discovery  of  the 
offenders,  and  the  just  appreciation  of  the  re- 
sponsibility. 

SECTION  VII 

REPARATION    AND    RESTITUTION 

"The  allied  and  associated  Governments  af- 
firm, and  Germany  accepts,  the  responsibility  of 
herself  and  her  allies,  for  causing  all  the  loss 
and  damage  to  which  the  allied  and  associated 
Governments  and  their  nationals  have  been  sub- 
jected as  a  consequence  of  the  war  imposed 
upon  them  by  the  aggression  of  Germany  and 
her  allies." 


The  total  obligation  of  Germany  to  pay,  as 
denned  in  the  category  of  damages,  is  to  be 
determined  and  notified  to  her  after  a  fair 
hearing  and  not  later  than  May  1,  1921,  by  an 
inter-allied  Reparation  Commission.  At  the 
same  time  a  schedule  of  payments  to  discharge 
the  obligation  within  thirty  years  shall  be  pre- 
sented. These  payments  are  subject  to  post- 
ponement in  certain  contingencies.  Germany 
irrevocably  recognizes  the  full  authority  of  this 
commission,  agrees  to  supply  it  with  all  the 
necessary  information  and  to  pass  legislation 
to  effectuate  its  findings.  She  further  agrees 
to  restore  to  the  Allies  cash  and  certain  articles 
which  can  be  identified. 

As  an  immediate  step  towards  restoration, 
Germany  shall  pay  within  two  years  20,000,- 
000,000  marks  in  either  gold,  goods,  ships,  or 
other  specific  forms  of  payment,  with  the  un- 
derstanding that  certain  expenses,  such  as  those 
of  the  armies  of  occupation  and  payments  for 
food  and  raw  materials,  may  be  deducted,  at 
the  discretion  of  the  Allies. 

Germany  further  binds  herself  to  repay  all 
sums  borrowed  by  Belgium  from  her  allies  as  a 
result  of  Germany's  violation  of  the  treaty  of 
1839  up  to  Nov.  11,  1918,  and  for  this  purpose 
will  issue  at  once  and  hand  over  to  the  Repa- 
ration Commission  5  per  cent,  gold  bonds  fall- 
ing due  in  1926. 

While  the  allied  and  associated  Governments 
recognize  that  the  resources  of  Germany  are 
not  adequate,  after  taking  into  account  perma- 
nent diminution  of  such  resources  which  will 
result  from  other  treaty  claims,  to  make  com- 
plete reparation  for  all  such  loss  and  damage, 
they  require  her  to  make  compensation  for  all 
damages  caused  to  civilians  under  seven  main 
categories : 

a.  Damages  by  personal  injury  to  civilians 
caused  by  acts  of  war,  directly  or  indirectly,  in- 
cluding  bombardments    from   the    air. 

b.  Damages  caused  to  civilians,  including  ex- 
posure at  sea,  resulting  from  acts  of  cruelty 
ordered  by  the  enemy,  and  to  civilians  in  the 
occupied   territories. 

c.  Damages  caused  by  maltreatment  of  pris- 
oners. 

d.  Damages  to  the  Allied  peoples  represented 
by  pensions  and  separation  allowances,  capital- 
ized at  the  signature  of  this  treaty. 

e.  Damages  to  property  other  than  naval  or 
military  materials. 

f.  Damages  to  civilians  by  being  forced  to 
labor. 

g.  Damages  in  the  form  of  levies  or  fines  im- 
posed by  the  enemy. 

"In  periodically  estimating  Germany's  capac- 
ity to  pay,  the  Reparation  Commission  shall 
examine  the  German  system  of  taxation,  first 
to  the  end  that  the  sums  for  reparation  which 
Germany  is  required  to  pay  shall  become  a 
charge  upon  all  her  revenues  prior  to  that  for 


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351 


the  service  or  discharge  of  any  domestic  loan; 
and  secondly,  so  as  to  satisfy  itself  that  in 
general  the  German  scheme  of  taxation  is  fully 
as  heavy  proportionately  as  that  of  any  of  the 
powers    represented   on   the   commission." 

"The  measures  which  the  allied  and  asso- 
ciated powers  shall  have  the  right  to  take,  in 
case  of  voluntary  default  by  Germany,  and 
which  Germany  agrees  not  to  regard  as  acts  of 
war,  may  include  economic  and  financial  pro- 
hibitions and  reprisals  and  in  general  such 
other  measures  as  the  respective  Governments 
may  determine  to  be  necessary  in  the  circum- 
stances." 

The  commission  shall  consist  of  one  repre- 
sentative each  of  the  United  States,  Great 
Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  Belgium,  and  in 
certain  cases  of  Japan  and  Serbia,  with  all 
other  allied  powers  entitled,  when  their  claims 
are  under  consideration,  to  the  right  of  pre- 
sentation without  voting  power.  It  shall  per- 
mit Germany  to  give  evidence  regarding  her 
capacity  to  pay,  and  shall  assure  her  a  just 
opportunity  to  be  heard.  It  shall  make  its 
headquarters  at  Paris,  establish  its  own  proce- 
dure and  personnel;  have  general  control  of 
the  whole  reparation  problem;  and  become  the 
exclusive  agency  of  the  Allies  for  receiving, 
holding,  selling  and  distributing  reparation  pay- 
ments. Majority  vote  shall  prevail,  except  that 
unanimity  is  required  on  questions  involving 
the  sovereignty  of  any  of  the  Allies,  the  can- 
cellation of  all  or  part  of  Germany's  obliga- 
tions, the  time  and  manner  of  selling,  distribu- 
ting, and  negotiating  bonds  issued  by  Germany, 
and  postponement  between  1921  and  1926  of 
annual  payments  beyond  1930  and  any  post- 
ponement after  1926  for  a  period  of  more  than 
three  years,  the  application  of  a  different  meth- 
od of  measuring  damage  than  in  a  similar  for- 
mer case,  and  the  interpretation  of  provisions. 
Withdrawal  from  representation  is  permitted 
on  twelve  months'  notice. 

The  Commission  may  require  Germany  to 
give  from  time  to  time,  by  way  of  guaranty, 
issues  of  bonds  or  other  obligations  to  cover 
such  claims  as  are  not  otherwise  satisfied.  In 
this  connection  and  on  account  of  the  total 
amount  of  claims,  bond  issues  are  presently  to 
be  required  of  Germany  in  acknowledgment  of 
its  debt  as  follows:  20,000,000,000  marks  gold, 
payable  not  later  than  May  1,  1921,  without  in- 
terest; 40,000,000,000  marks  gold  bearing  2y2 
per  cent,  interest  between  1921  and  1926,  and 
thereafter  5  per  cent.,  with  a  1  per  cent,  sink- 
ing fund  payment  beginning  1926;  and  an  un- 
dertaking to  deliver  40,000,000,000  marks  gold 
bonds  bearing  interest  at  5  per  cent.,  under 
terms  to  be  fixed  by  the  Commission. 

Interest  on  Germany's  debt  will  be  5  per  cent, 
unless  otherwise  determined  by  the  Commis- 
sion in  the  future,  and  payments  that  are  not 
made  in  gold  may  "be  accepted  by  the  Commis- 


sion in  the  form  of  properties,  commodities, 
businesses,  rights,  concessions,  &c."  Certificates 
of  beneficial  interest,  representing  either  bonds 
or  goods  delivered  by  Germany,  may  be  issued 
by  the  Commission  to  the  interest  power,  no 
power  being  entitled,  however,  to  have  its  cer- 
tificates divided  into  more  than  five  pieces.  As 
bonds  are  distributed  and  pass  from  the  con- 
trol of  the  Commission,  an  amount  of  Ger- 
many's debt  equivalent  to  their  par  value  is  to 
be  considered  as   liquidated. 


The  German  Government  recognizes  the  right 
of  the  Allies  to  the  replacement,  ton  for  ton 
and  class  for  class,  of  all  merchant  ships  and 
fishing  boats  lost  or  damaged  owing  to  the  war, 
and  agrees  to  cede  to  the  Allies  all  German 
merchant  ships  of  1,600  tons  gross  and  upward; 
one-half  of  her  ships  between  1,600  and  1,000 
tons  gross,  and  one-quarter  of  her  steam  trawl- 
ers and  other  fishing  boats.  These  ships  are 
to  be  delivered  within  two  months  to  the  Repa- 
ration Committee,  together  with  documents  of 
title  evidencing  the  transfer  of  the  ships  free 
from   encumbrance. 

"As  an  additional  part  of  reparation,"  the 
German  Government  further  agrees  to  build 
merchant  ships  for  the  account  of  the  Allies 
to  the  amount  of  not  exceeding  200,000  tons 
gross  annually  during  the  next  five  years. 

All  ships  used  for  inland  navigation  taken 
by  Germanj-  from  the  Allies  are  to  be  restored 
within  two  months,  the  amount  of  loss  not  cov- 
ered by  such  restitution  to  be  made  up  by  the 
cession  of  the  German  river  fleet  up  to  20  per 
cent,  thereof. 

DYESTUFFS    AND    CHEMICAL    DRUGS 

In  order  to  effect  payment  by  deliveries  in 
kind,  Germany  is  required,  for  a  limited  num- 
ber of  years,  varying  in  the  case  of  each,  to 
deliver  coal,  coal-tar  products,  dyestuffs  and 
chemical  drugs,  in  specific  amounts  to  the  Rep- 
arations Commission.  The  Commission  may  so 
modify  the  conditions  of  delivery  as  not  to 
interfere  unduly  with  Germany's  industrial  re- 
quirements. The  deliveries  of  coal  are  based 
largely  upon  the  principle  of  making  good 
diminutions  in  the  production  of  the  allied 
countries   resulting  from  the  war. 

Germany  accords  option  to  the  commission  on 
dyestuffs  and  chemical  drugs,  including  qui- 
nine, up  to  50  per  cent,  of  the  total  stock  in 
Germany  at  the  time  the  treaty  comes  into 
force,  and  similar  option  during  each  six 
months  to  the  end  of  1924  up  to  25  per  cent, 
of  the  previous  six  months'  output. 

DEVASTATED    AREAS 

Germany  undertakes  to  devote  her  economic 
resources  directly  to  the  physical  restoration  of 


352 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


the  invaded  areas.  The  Reparations  Commis- 
sion is  authorized  to  require  Germany  to  re- 
place the  destroyed  articles  by  the  delivery  of 
animals,  machinery,  &c,  existing  in  Germany, 
and  to  manufacture  materials  required  for  re- 
construction purposes;  all  with  due  considera- 
tion for  Germany's  essential  domestic  require- 
ments. 

Germany  is  to  deliver  annually  for  ten  years 
to  France  coal  equivalent  to  the  difference  be- 
tween the  annual  pre-war  output  of  Nord  and 
Pas  de  Calais  mines  and  the  annual  production 
during  the  above  ten-year  period.  Germany 
further  gives  options  over  ten  years  for  deliv- 
ery of  7,000,000  tons  of  coal  per  year  to  France 
in  addition  to  the  above  of  8,000,000  tons  to  Bel- 
gium and  of  an  amount  rising  from  4,500,000 
tons  in  1919  to  1920  to  8,500,000  in  1923  to 
1924  to  Italy  at  prices  to  be  fixed  as  prescribed 
in  the  treaty.  Coke  may  be  taken  in  place  of 
coal  in  the  ratio  of  three  tons  to  four.  Provi- 
sion is  also  made  for  delivery  to  France  over 
three  years  of  benzol,  coal  tar,  and  of  ammonia. 
The  Commission  has  powers  to  postpone  or  an- 
nul the  above  deliveries  should  they  interfere 
unduly  with  the  industrial  requirements  of 
Germany. 

Germany  is  to  restore  within  six  months  the 
Koran  of  the  Caliph  Othman,  formerly  at  Me- 
dina, to  the  King  of  the  Hedjaz,  and  the  skull 
of  the  Sultan  Okwawa,  formerly  in  German 
East  Africa,  to  his  Britannic  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment. 

The  German  Government  is  also  to  restore  to 
the  French  Government  certain  papers  taken 
by  the  German  authorities  in  1870,  belonging 
then  to  M.  Reuher,  and  to  restore  the  French 
flags  taken  during  the  war  of  1870  and  1871. 

As  reparation  for  the  destruction  of  the  Li- 
brary of  Louvain  Germany  is  to  hand  over 
manuscripts,  early  printed  books,  prints,  &c,  to 
the  equivalent  of  those  destroyed. 

In  addition  to  the  above  Germany  is  to  hand 
over  to  Belgium  wings,  now  in  Berlin,  belong- 
ing to  the  altar  piece  of  "The  Adoration  of 
the  Lamb,"  by  Hubert  and  Jan  van  Eyck,  the 
centre  of  which  is  now  in  the  Church  of  St. 
Bavon  at  Ghent,  and  the  wings,  now  in  Berlin 
and  Munich,  of  the  altar-piece  of  "The  Last 
Supper,"  by  Dirk  Bouts,  the  centre  of  which 
belongs  to  the  Church  of  St.  Peter  at  Louvain. 


Powers  to  which  German  territory  is  ceded 
will  assume  a  certain  portion  of  the  German 
pre-war  debt,  the  amount  to  be  fixed  by  the 
Reparations  Commission  on  the  basis  of  the 
ratio  between  the  revenue  and  of  the  ceded 
territory  and  Germany's  total  revenues  for  the 
three  years  preceding  the  war.  In  view,  how- 
ever, of  the  special  circumstances  under  which 
Alsace-Lorraine  was  separated  from  France  in 
1871,    when    Germany    refused    to    accept    any 


part  of  the  French  public  debt,  France  will 
not  assume  any  part  of  Germany's  pre-war 
debt  there,  nor  will  Poland  share  in  certain 
German  debts  incurred  for  the  oppression  of 
Poland.  If  the  value  of  the  German  public 
property  in  ceded  territory  exceeds  the  amount 
of  debt  assumed,  the  States  to  which  property 
is  ceded  will  give  credit  on  reparation  for  the 
excess,  with  the  exception  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 
Mandatory  powers  will  not  assume  any  Ger- 
man debts  or  give  any  credit  for  German  Gov- 
ernment property.  Germany  renounces  all 
right  of  representation  on,  or  control  of,  State 
banks,  commissions,  or  other  similar  interna- 
tional  financial   and   economic   organizations. 

Germany  is  required  to  pay  the  total  cost  of 
the  armies  of  occupation  from  the  date  of  the 
armistice  as  long  as  they  are  maintained  in 
German  territory,  this  cost  to  be  a  first  charge 
on  her  resources.  The  cost  of  reparation  is  the 
next  charge,  after  making  such  provisions  for 
payments  for  imports  as  the  Allies  may  deem 
necessary. 

Germany  is  to  deliver  to  the  allied  and  as- 
sociated powers  all  sums  deposited  in  Germany 
by  Turkey  and  Austria-Hungary  in  connection 
with  the  financial  support  extended  by  her  to 
them  during  the  war,  and  to  transfer  to  the 
Allies  all  claims  against  Austro-Hungary, 
Bulgaria,  or  Turkey  in  connection  with  agree- 
ments made  during  the  war.  Germany  confirms 
the  renunciation  of  the  Treaties  of  Bucharest 
and  Brest-Litovsk. 

On  the  request  of  the  Reparations  Commis- 
sion, Germany  will  expropriate  any  rights  or 
interests  of  her  nationals  in  public  utilities  in 
ceded  territories  or  those  administered  by  man- 
datories, and  in  Turkey,  China,  Russia,  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, and  Bulgaria,  and  transfer  them 
to  the  Reparations  Commission,  which  will 
credit  her  with  their  value.  Germany  guaran- 
tees to  repay  to  Brazil  the  fund  arising  from 
the  sale  of  Sao  Paulo  coffee  which  she  refused 
to  allow  Brazil  to  withdraw  from  Germany. 

SECTION  VIII 
Ten  Economic  Clauses 

customs 

For  a  period  of  six  months  Germany  shall 
impose  no  tariff  duties  higher  than  the  lowest 
in  force  in  1914,  and  for  certain  agricultural 
products,  wines,  vegetable  oils,  artificial  silk, 
and  washed  or  scoured  wool  this  restriction  ob- 
tains for  two  and  a  half  years  more.  For  five 
years,  unless  further  extended  by  the  League 
of  Nations,  Germany  must  give  most  favored 
nation  treatment  to  the  allied  and  associated 
powers.  She  shall  impose  no  customs  tariff  for 
five  years  on  goods  originating  in  Alsace-Lor- 
raine, and  for  three  years  on  goods  originating 
in   former   German   territory   ceded   to   Poland 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


353 


with  the  right  of  observation  of  a  similar  ex- 
ception  for  Luxemburg. 


Ships  of  the  allied  and  associated  powers 
shall  for  five  years  and  thereafter  under  con- 
dition of  reciprocity,  unless  the  League  of 
Nations  otherwise  decides,  enjoy  the  same 
rights  in  German  ports  as  German  vessels,  and 
have  most  favored  nation  treatment  in  fishing, 
coasting  trade,  and  towage  even  in  territorial 
waters.  Ships  of  a  country  having  no  sea- 
coast  may  be  registered  at  some  one  place 
within  its  territory. 

UNFAIR    COMPETITION 

Germany  undertakes  to  give  the  trade  of  the 
allied  and  associated  powers  adequate  safe- 
guards against  unfair  competition,  and  in  par- 
ticular to  suppress  the  use  of  false  wrappings 
and  markings,  and  on  condition  of  reciprocity 
to  respect  the  laws  and  judicial  decisions  of 
allied  and  associated  States  in  respect  of  re- 
gional appellations  of  wines  and  spirits. 

TREATMENT    OF    NATIONALS 

Germany  shall  impose  no  exceptional  taxes 
or  restriction  upon  the  nationals  of  allied  and 
associated  States  for  a  period  of  five  years 
and,  unless  the  League  of  Nations  acts,  for  an 
additional  five  years  German  nationality  shall 
not  continue  to  attach  to  a  person  who  has 
become  a  national  of  an  allied  or  associated 
State. 

MULTILATERAL   CONVENTIONS 

Some  forty  multilateral  conventions  are  re- 
newed between  Germany  and  the  allied  and  as- 
sociated powers,  but  special  conditions  are  at- 
tached to  Germany's  readmission  to  several. 
As  to  postal  and  telegraphic  conventions  Ger- 
many must  not  refuse  to  make  reciprocal 
agreements  with  the  new  States.  She  must 
agree  as  respects  the  radio-telegraphic  con- 
vention to  provisional  rules  to  be  communicated 
to  her,  and  adhere  to  the  new  convention  when 
formulated.  In  the  North  Sea  fisheries  and 
North  Sea  liquor  traffic  convention,  rights  of 
inspection  and  police  over  associated  fishing 
boats  shall  be  exercised  for  at  least  five  years 
only  by  vessels  of  these  powers.  As  to  the 
international  railway  union  she  shall  adhere  to 
the  new  convention  when  formulated.  China, 
as  to  the  Chinese  customs  tariff  arrangement 
of  1905  regarding  Whangpoo,  and  the  Boxer 
indemnity  of  1901;  France,  Portugal,  and  Ru- 
mania, as  to  The  Hague  Convention  of  1903, 
relating  to  civil  procedure,  and  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  as  to  Article  III.  of  the 
Samoan  Treaty  of  1899,  are  relieved  of  all 
obligations   toward   Germany. 


BILATERAL     TREATIES 

Each  allied  and  associated  State  may  renew 
any  treaty  with  Germany  in  so  far  as  consistent 
with  the  peace  treaty  by  giving  notice  within 
six  months.  Treaties  entered  into  by  Germany 
since  Aug.  1,  1914,  with  other  enemy  States, 
and  before  or  since  that  date  with  Rumania, 
Russia,  and  governments  representing  parts  of 
Russia  are  abrogated,  and  concessions  granted 
under  pressure  by  Russia  to  German  subjects 
are  annulled.  The  allied  and  associated  States 
are  to  enjoy  most  favored  nation  treatment 
under  treaties  entered  into  by  Germany  and 
other  enemy  States  before  Aug.  1,  1914,  and 
under  treaties  entered  into  by  Germany  and 
neutral   States   during  the  war. 

PREWAR    DEBTS 

A  system  of  clearing  houses  is  to  be  created 
within  three  months,  one  in  Germany  and  one 
in  each  allied  and  associated  State  which 
adopts  the  plan  for  the  payment  of  prewar 
debts,  including  those  arising  from  contracts 
suspended  by  the  war.  For  the  adjustment  of 
the  proceeds  of  the  liquidation  of  enemy  prop- 
erty and  the  settlement  of  other  obligations 
each  participating  State  assumes  responsibility 
for  the  payment  of  all  debts  owing  by  its  na- 
tionals to  nationals  of  the  enemy  States,  except 
in  cases  of  prewar  insolvency  of  the  debtor. 
The  proceeds  of  the  sale  of  private  enemy 
property  in  each  participating  State  may  be 
used  to  pay  the  debts  owed  to  the  nationals 
of  that  State,  direct  payment  from  debtor 
to  creditor  and  all  communications  relating 
thereto  being  prohibited.  Disputes  may  be  set- 
tled by  arbitration  by  the  courts  of  the  debtor 
country,  or  by  the  mixed  arbitral  tribunal. 
Any  ally  or  associated  power  may,  however, 
decline  to  participate  in  this  system  by  giving 
Germany  six  months'  notice. 

ENEMY   PROPERTY 

Germany  shall  restore  or  pay  for  all  private 
enemy  property  seized  or  damaged  by  her,  the 
amount  of  damages  to  be  fixed  by  the  mixed 
arbitral  tribunal.  The  allied  and  associated 
States  may  liquidate  German  private  property 
within  their  territories  as  compensation  for 
property  of  their  nationals  not  restored  or  paid 
for  by  Germany.  For  debts  owed  to  their 
nationals  by  German  nationals  and  for  other 
claims  against  Germany,  Germany  is  to  com- 
pensate its  nationals  for  such  losses  and  to 
deliver  within  six  months  all  documents  relat- 
ing to  property  held  by  its  nationals  in  allied 
and  associated  States.  All  war  legislation  as 
to  enemy  property  rights  and  interests  is  con- 
firmed and  all  claims  by  Germany  against  the 
allied  or  associated  Governments  for  acts  under 
exceptional    war    measures    abandoned. 

Prewar    contracts    between    allied    and    asso- 


354 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


dated  nationals  excepting  the  United  States, 
Japan,  and  Brazil  and  German  nationals  are 
cancelled  except  for  debts  for  accounts  already 
performed. 

AGREEMENTS 

For  the  transfer  of  property  where  the  prop- 
erty had  already  passed,  leases  of  land  and 
houses,  contracts  of  mortgages,  pledge  or  lien, 
mining  concessions,  contracts  with  governments 
and  insurance  contracts,  mixed  arbitral 
tribunals  shall  be  established  of  three  mem- 
bers, one  chosen  by  Germany,  one  by  the  asso- 
ciated States  and  the  third  by  agreement,  or, 
failing  which,  by  the  President  of  Switzerland. 
They  shall  have  jurisdiction  over  all  disputes 
as  to  contracts  concluded  before  the  present 
peace   treaty. 

Fire  insurance  contracts  are  not  considered 
dissolved  by  the  war,  even  if  premiums  have 
not  been  paid,  but  lapse  at  the  date  of  the  first 
annual  premium  falling  due  three  months  after 
the  peace.  Life  insurance  contracts  may  be 
restored  by  payments  of  accumulated  pre- 
miums with  interest,  sums  falling  due  on  such 
contracts  during  the  war  to  be  recoverable 
with  interest.  Marine  insurance  contracts  are 
dissolved  by  the  outbreak  of  war  except  where 
the  risk  insured  against  had  already  been  in- 
curred. Where  the  risk  had  not  attached,  pre- 
miums paid  are  recoverable,  otherwise  pre- 
miums due  and  sums  due  on  losses  are  recover- 
able. Reinsurance  treaties  are  abrogated  un- 
less invasion  has  made  it  impossible  for  the 
reinsured  to  find  another  reinsurer.  Any  allied 
or  associated  power,  however,  may  cancel  all 
the  contracts  running  between  its  nationals 
and  a  German  life  insurance  company,  the  lat- 
ter being  obligated  to  hand  over  the  proportion 
of  its  assets  attributable  to  such  policies. 


tion     into     force    by    enacting    within    twelve 
months   of  the  peace  the  necessary  legislation. 

RELIGIOUS     MISSIONS 

The  allied  and  associated  powers  agree  that 
the  properties  of  religious  missions  in  terri- 
tories belonging  or  ceded  to  them  shall  con- 
tinue in  their  work  under  the  control  of  the 
powers,  Germany  renouncing  all  claims  in  their 
behalf. 

SECTION  X 

GERMAN    WATERWAYS 

Belgium  is  to  be  permitted  to  build  a  deep 
draft  Rhine-Meuse  canal  if  she  so  desires 
within  twenty-five  years,  in  which  case  Ger- 
many must  construct  the  part  within  her  terri- 
tory on  plans  drawn  by  Belgium,  similarly  the 
interested  allied  governments  may  construct  a 
Rhine-Meuse  canal,  both,  if  constructed,  to 
come  under  the  competent  international  com- 
mission. Germany  may  not  object  if  the  Cen- 
tral Rhine  Commission  desires  to  extend  its 
jurisdiction  over  the  lower  Moselle,  the  upper 
Rhine,  or  lateral  canals. 

Germany  must  cede  to  the  allied  and  asso- 
ciated governments  certain  tugs,  vessels,  and 
facilities  for  navigation  on  all  these  rivers,  the 
specific  details  to  be  established  by  an  arbiter 
named  by  the  United  States.  Decision  will  be 
based  on  the  legitimate  needs  of  the  parties 
concerned  and  on  the  shipping  traffic  during 
the  five  years  before  the  war.  The  value  will 
be  included  in  the  regular  reparation  account. 
In  the  case  of  the  Rhine  shares  in  the  Ger- 
man navigation  companies  and  property  such 
as  wharves  and  warehouses  held  by  Germany 
in  Rotterdam  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  must 
be  handed  over. 


INDUSTRIAL   PROPERTY 

Rights  as  to  industrial,  literary,  and  artistic 
property  are  re-established.  The  special  war 
measures  of  the  allied  and  associated  powers 
are  ratified  and  the  right  reserved  to  impose 
conditions  on  the  use  of  German  patents  and 
copyrights  when  in  the  public  interest.  Ex- 
cept as  between  the  United  States  and  Ger- 
many, prewar  licenses  and  rights  to  sue  for 
infringements  committed  during  the  war  are 
cancelled. 

SECTION  IX 

OPIUM 

The  contracting  powers  agree,  whether  or  not 
they  have  signed  and  ratified  the  opium  conven- 
tion of  Jan.  23,  1912,  or  signed  the  special 
protocol  opened  at  The  Hague  in  accordance 
with  resolutions  adopted  by  the  third  opium 
conference  in   1914,  to  bring  the   said  conven- 


Germany,  in  addition  to  most  favored  na- 
tion treatment  on  her  railways,  agrees  to  co- 
operate in  the  establishment  of  through  ticket 
services  for  passengers  and  baggage;  to  ensure 
communication  by  rail  between  the  allied,  as- 
sociated, and  other  States;  to  allow  the  con- 
struction or  improvement  within  twenty-five 
years  of  such  lines  as  necessary;  and  to  con- 
form her  rolling  stock  to  enable  its  incorpora- 
tion in  trains  of  the  allied  or  associated  powers. 
She  also  agrees  to  accept  the  denunciation  of 
the  St.  Gothard  convention  if  Switzerland  and 
Italy  so  request,  and  temporarily  to  execute 
instructions  as  to  the  transport  of  troops  and 
supplies  and  the  establishment  of  postal  and 
telegraphic  service,  as  provided. 

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 

To  assure  Czechoslovakia  access  to  the  sea, 
special    rights    are    given   her   both    north    and 


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355 


south.  Toward  the  Adriatic  she  is  per- 
mitted to  run  her  own  through  trains  to  Fiume 
and  Trieste.  To  the  north,  Germany  is  to 
lease  her  for  ninety-nine  years  spaces  in  Ham- 
burg and  Stettin,  the  details  to  be  worked  out 
by  a  commission  of  three  representing  Czecho- 
slovakia,  Germany,  and   Great   Britain. 

THE    KIEL    CANAL 

The  Kiel  Canal  is  to  remain  free  and  open 
to  war  and  merchant  ships  of  all  nations  at 
peace  with  Germany,  subjects,  goods  and  ships 
of  all  States  are  to  be  treated  on  terms  of 
absolute  equality,  and  no  taxes  to  be  imposed 
beyond  those  necessary  for  upkeep  and  im- 
provement for  which  Germany  is  to  be  respon- 
sible. In  case  of  violation  of  or  disagreement 
as  to  those  provisions,  any  State  may  appeal 
to  the  League  of  Nations,  and  may  demand 
the  appointment  of  an  international  commis- 
sion. For  preliminary  hearing  of  complaints 
Germany  shall  establish  a  local  authority  at 
Kiel. 

SECTION  XI 

AERIAL     NAVIGATION 

Aircraft  of  the  allied  and  associated  powers 
shall  have  full  liberty  of  passage  and  landing 
over  and  in  German  territory,  equal  treatment 
with  German  planes  as  to  use  of  German  air- 
dromes, and  with  most  favored  nation  planes 
as  to  internal  commercial  traffic  in  Germany. 
Germany  agrees  to  accept  allied  certificates  of 
nationality,  airworthiness,  or  competency  or  li- 
censes and  to  apply  the  convention  relative 
to  aerial  navigation  concluded  between  the 
allied  and  associated  powers  to  her  own  air- 
craft over  her  own  territory.  These  rules  ap- 
ply until  1923,  unless  Germany  has  since  been 
admitted  to  the  League  of  Nations  or  to  the 
above  convention. 

SECTION  XII 

FREEDOM    OF    TRANSIT 

Germany  must  grant  freedom  of  transit 
through  her  territories  by  mail  or  water  to 
persons,  goods,  ships,  carriages,  and  mails  from 
or  to  any  of  the  allied  or  associated  powers, 
without  customs  or  transit  duties,  undue  de- 
lays, restrictions,  or  discriminations  based  on 
nationality,  means  of  transport,  or  place  of 
entry  or  departure.  Goods  in  transit  shall  be 
assured  all  possible  speed  of  journey,  espe- 
cially perishable  goods.  Germany  may  not) 
divert  traffic  from  its  normal  course  in  favor  of 
her  own  transport  routes  or  maintain  "control 
stations"  in  connection  with  transmigration 
traffic.  She  may  not  establish  any  tax  discrimi- 
nation against  the  ports  of  allied  or  associated 
powers;    must    grant    the    latter's    seaports    all 


factors  and  reduced  tariffs  granted  her  own  or 
other  nationals,  and  afford  the  allied  and  asso- 
ciated powers  equal  rights  with  those  of  her 
own  nationals  in  her  ports  and  waterways,  save 
that  she  is  free  to  open  or  close  her  maritime 
coasting  trade. 

FREE    ZONES    IN    PORTS 

Free  zones  existing  in  German  ports  on  Aug. 
1,  1914,  must  be  maintained  with  due  facilities 
as  to  warehouses,  and  packing,  without 
discrimination,  and  without  charges  except 
for  expenses  of  administration  and  use. 
Goods  leaving  the  free  zones  for  consumption 
in  Germany  and  goods  brought  into  the  free 
zones  from  Germany  shall  be  subject  to  the 
ordinary  import  and  export  taxes. 

The  Elbe  from  the  junction  of  the  Ultava, 
the  Ultava  from  Prague,  the  Oder  from  Oppa, 
the  Niemen  from  Grodno,  and  the  Danube  from 
Ulm  are  declared  international,  together  with 
their  connections.  The  riparian  states  must 
ensure  good  conditions  of  navigation  within 
their  territories  unless  a  special  organization 
exists  therefor.  Otherwise  appeal  may  be  had 
to  a  special  tribunal  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
which  also  may  arrange  for  a  general  inter- 
national  waterways   convention. 

INTERNATIONAL    RIVERS 

The  Elbe  and  the  Oder  are  to  be  placed 
under  international  commissions  to  meet  within 
three  months,  that  for  the  Elbe  composed  of 
four  representatives  of  Germany,  two  from 
Czechoslovakia,  and  one  each  from  Great 
Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  Belgium;  and  that 
for  the  Oder  composed  of  one  each  from 
Poland,  Russia,  Czechoslovakia,  Great  Britain, 
France,  Denmark,  and  Sweden.  If  any  ri- 
parian state  on  the  Niemen  should  so  request 
of  the  League  of  Nations,  a  similar  commis- 
sion shall  be  established  there.  These  commis- 
sions shall  upon  request  of  any  riparian  state 
meet  wilhin  three  months  to  revise  existing 
international    agreement. 

THE    DANUBE 

The  European  Danube  Commission  reassumes 
its  pre-war  powers,  but  for  the  time  being  with 
representatives  of  only  Great  Britain,  France, 
Italy,  and  Rumania.  The  upper  Danube  is  to 
be  administered  by  a  new  international  com- 
mission until  a  definitive  statute  be  drawn  up  at 
a  conference  of  the  powers  nominated  by  the 
allied  and  associated  governments  within  one 
year  after  the  peace.  The  enemy  governments 
shall  make  full  reparations  for  all  war  dam- 
ages caused  to  the  European  Commission;  shall 
cede  their  river  facilities  in  surrendered  terri- 
tory, and  give  Czechoslovakia,  Serbia,  and 
Rumania  any  rights  necessary  on  the  shores 
for   carrying  on   improvements   in  navigation. 


356 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


THE     RHINE    AND    THE     MOSELLE 

The  Rhine  is  placed  under  the  Central  Com- 
mission to  meet  at  Strasbourg  within  six 
months  after  the  peace,  and  to  be  composed  of 
four  representatives  of  France,  which  shall  in 
addition  select  the  President,  four  of  Germany, 
and  two  each  of  Great  Britain,  Italy,  Belgium, 
Switzerland,  and  the  Netherlands.  Germany 
must  give  France  on  the  course  of  the  Rhine 
included  between  the  two  extreme  points  of 
her  frontiers  all  rights  to  take  water  to  feed 
canals,  while  herself  agreeing  not  to  make 
canals  on  the  right  bank  opposite  France.  She 
must  also  hand  over  to  France  all  her  drafts 
and  designs  for  this  part  of  the  river. 

SECTION  XIII 

INTERNATIONAL  LABOR  ORGANIZATION 

Members  of  the  League  of  Nations  agree  to 
establish  a  permanent  organization  to  promote 
international  adjustment  of  labor  conditions, 
to  consist  of  an  annual  international  labor  con- 
ference  and  an  international  labor  office. 

The  former  is  composed  of  four  represen- 
tatives of  each  State,  two  from  the  Govern- 
ment, and  one  each  from  the  employers  and 
the  employed,  each  of  them  may  vote  individ- 
ually. It  will  be  a  deliberative  legislative  body, 
its  measures  taking  the  form  of  draft  conven- 
tions or  recommendations  for  legislation,  which, 
if  passed  by  two-thirds  vote,  must  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  lawmaking  authority  in  every 
State  participating.  Each  Government  may 
either  enact  the  terms  into  law;  approve  the 
principle,  but  modify  them  to  local  needs; 
leave  the  actual  legislation  in  case  of  a  Fed- 
eral State  to  local  legislatures;  or  reject  the 
convention  altogether  without  further  obliga- 
tion. 

The  international  labor  office  is  established 
at  the  seat  of  the  League  of  Nations  as  part 
of  its  organization.  It  is  to  collect  and  dis- 
tribute information  on  labor  throughout  the 
world  and  prepare  agenda  for  the  conference. 
It  will  publish  a  periodical  in  French  and 
English,  and  possibly  other  languages.  Each 
State  agrees  to  make  to  it  for  presentation  to 
the  conference  an  annual  report  of  measures 
taken  to  execute  accepted  conventions.  The 
governing  body,  in  its  Executive,  consists  of 
twenty-four  members,  twelve  representing  the 
Governments,  six  the  employers,  and  six  the 
employes,  to  serve  for  three  years. 

On  complaint  that  any  Government  has 
failed  to  carry  out  a  convention  to  which  it  is 
a  party,  the  governing  body  may  make  in- 
quiries directly  to  that  Government,  and  in 
case  the  reply  is  unsatisfactory,  may  publish 
the  complaint  with  comment.  A  complaint  by 
one  Government  against  another  may  be  re- 
ferred by  the  governing  body  to  a  commission 


of  inquiry  nominated  by  the  Secretary  General 
of  the  League.  If  the  commission  report  fails 
to  bring  satisfactory  action  the  matter  may  be 
taken  to  a  permanent  court  of  international 
justice  for  final  decision.  The  chief  reliance 
for  securing  enforcement  of  the  law  will  be 
publicity  with  a  possibility  of  economic  action 
in  the  background. 

The  first  meeting  of  the  conference  will  take 
place  in  October,  1919,  at  Washington,  to  dis- 
cuss the  eight-hour  day  or  forty-eight-hour 
week;  prevention  of  unemployment;  extension 
and  application  of  the  international  conven- 
tions adopted  at  Berne  in  1906,  prohibiting 
night  work  for  women,  and  the  use  of  white 
phosphorus  in  the  manufacture  of  matches; 
and  employment  of  women  and  children  at 
night  or  in  unhealthy  work,  of  women  before 
and  after  childbirth,  including  maternity  bene- 
fit, and   of  children   as   regards  minimum   age. 

LABOR    CLAUSES 

Nine  principles  of  labor  conditions  were  rec- 
ognized on  the  ground  that  "the  well-being, 
physical  and  moral,  of  the  industrial  wage 
earners  is  of  supreme  international  impor- 
tance." With  exceptions  necessitated  by  dif- 
ferences of  climate,  habits  and  economic  de- 
velopment. They  include:  the  guiding  principle 
that  labor  should  not  be  regarded  merely  as  a 
commodity  or  article  of  commerce;  the  right  of 
association  of  employers  and  employes;  a  wage 
adequate  to  maintain  a  reasonable  standard 
of  life;  the  eight-hour  day  or  forty-eight-hour 
week;  a  weekly  rest  of  at  least  twenty- four 
hours;  which  should  include  Sunday  wherever 
practicable;  abolition  of  child  labor  and  as- 
surance of  the  continuation  of  the  education 
and  proper  physical  development  of  children; 
equal  pay  for  equal  work  as  between  men  and 
women;  equitable  treatment  of  all  workers  law- 
fully resident  therein,  including  foreigners; 
and  a  system  of  inspection  in  which  women 
should  take  part. 

SECTION  XIV 

Guarantees 
western   europe 

As  a  guarantee  for  the  execution  of  the 
treaty  German  territory  to  the  west  of  the 
Rhine,  together  with  the  bridgeheads,  will  be 
occupied  by  allied  and  associated  troops  for  a 
fifteen  years'  period.  If  the  conditions  are 
faithfully  carried  out  by  Germany,  certain  dis- 
tricts, including  the  bridgehead  of  Cologne, 
will  be  evacuated  at  the  expiration  of  five 
years;  certain  other  districts  including  the 
bridgehead  of  Coblenz,  and  the  territories  near- 
est the  Belgian  frontier  will  be  evacuated  after 
ten    years,    and    the    remainder,    including    the 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


357 


bridgehead  of  Mainz,  will  be  evacuated  after 
fifteen  years.  In  case  the  Interallied  Repara- 
tion Commission  finds  that  Germany  has  failed 
to  observe  the  whole  or  part  of  her  obligations, 
either  during  the  occupation  or  after  the  fifteen 
years  have  expired,  the  whole  or  part  of  the 
areas  specified  will  be  reoccupied  immediately. 
If  before  the  expiration  of  the  fifteen  years 
Germany  complies  with  all  the  treaty  undertak- 
ings, the  occupying  forces  will  be  withdrawn 
immediately. 

EASTERN    EUROPE 

All  German  troops  at  present  in  territories 
to  the  east  of  the  new  frontier  shall  return  as 
soon  as  the  allied  and  associated  governments 
deem  wise.  They  are  to  abstain  from  all  requi- 
sitions and  are  in  no  way  to  interfere  with 
measures  for  national  defense  taken  by  the 
Government  concerned. 

All  questions  regarding  occupation  not  pro- 
vided for  by  the  treaty  will  be  regulated  by  a 
subsequent  convention  or  conventions  which 
will  have  similar  force  and  effect. 

SECTION  XV 

MISCELLANEOUS 

Germany  agrees  to  recognize  the  full  validity 
of  the  treaties  o*f  peace  and  additional  con- 
ventions to  be  concluded  by  the  allied  and  as- 
sociated powers  with  the  powers  allied  with 
Germany,  to  agree  to  the  decisions  to  be  taken 
as  to  the  territories  of  Austria-Hungary,  Bul- 
garia, and  Turkey,  and  to  recognize  the  new 
States  in  the  frontiers  to  be  fixed  for  them. 

Germany  agrees  not  to  put  forward  any 
pecuniary  claims  against  any  allied  or  asso- 
ciated power  signing  the  present  treaty  based 
on  events  previous  to  the  coming  into  force  of 
the  treaty. 

Germany  accepts  all  decrees  as  to  German 
ships  and  goods  made  by  any  allied  or  asso- 
ciated prize  court.  The  Allies  reserve  the  right 
to  examine  all  decisions  of  German  prize 
courts.  The  present  treaty,  of  which  the 
French  and  British  texts  are  both  authentic, 
shall  be  ratified  and  the  depositions  of  ratifi- 
cations made  in  Paris  as  soon  as  possible.  The 
treaty  is  to  become  effective  in  all  respects  for 
each  power  on  the  date  of  deposition  of  its 
ratification. 

The  German  delegates  and  those  of 
the  Entente  Allies  officially  signed  the 
treaty  of  peace  on  June  28,  1919. 
Ratifications  of  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles were  exchanged,  and  peace  be- 
tween Germany,  France,  Great  Brit- 
ain and  the  other  Allied  and  associated 


powers,  with  the  exception  of  the 
United  States,  became  effective  at  4 :16 
p.m.  January  10,  1920. 

The  ceremony  took  place  in  the  Clock 
Hall  at  the  French  Foreign  Ministry. 
Previously  Baron  Kurt  von  Lersner, 
head  of  the  German  mission,  signed  the 
protocol  of  November  1,  providing  for 
reparation  for  the  sinking  of  the  Ger- 
man warships  at  Scapa  Flow,  and  to 
insure  the  carrying  out  of  the  armi- 
stice terms.  The  signing  of  this  docu- 
ment took  place  in  the  office  of  the  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs.  Owing  to  the 
failure  of  the  United  States  to  ratify 
the  treaty,  the  American  Secretary  of 
State  served  notice  on  Germany  that 
the  conditions  of  the  armistice  still 
governed  the  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Germany. 

The  Shantung  Dispute.  One  of  the 
bitterest  disputes  that  arose  through- 
out the  entire  Peace  Conference  was  the 
discussion  concerning  what  should  be 
done  with  Shantung,  which  was  a  sphere 
of  influence  under  the  control  of  Ger- 
many before  the  war.  Japan  insisted 
that  it  be  turned  over  to  her  as  com- 
pensation for  what  she  had  done  toward 
winning  the  war.  The  chief  opponent 
of  this  scheme  was  President  Wilson. 
His  argument  was  that  China,  who  had 
been  a  faithful  ally  to  the  Entente 
cause,  should  not  be  made  to  suffer  in 
order  to  satisfy  another  ally.  Presi- 
dent Wilson  was  ultimately  forced  to 
concede  the  rich  province  to  Japan,  pre- 
sumably to  get  the  support  of  Japan 
for  the  League  of  Nations  idea.  Japan's 
chief  argument  was  that  she  had  driven 
the  Germans  from  this  territory  by 
military  force  and  that  inasmuch  as  it 
was  Germany's  before  she  was  certainly 
entitled  to  it  now.  President  Wilson 
was  unwilling  to  accede  to  this  point  of 
view  and  finally  accepted  what  amounted 
to    a    gentlemen's    agreement,    by    the 


358 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


terms  of  which  Japan  promised  to  re- 
turn the  disputed  territory  to  China 
upon  the  fulfillment  of  certain  condi- 
tions, i.  e.,  sign  the  treaty  immediately, 
giving  Shantung  to  Japan  without  for- 
mal reservation  and  make  an  agreement 
with  Japan  in  regard  to  the  disposition 
of  Shantung.  If  China  agreed  to  these 
conditions  then  Japan  would  withdraw 
her  troops  as  soon  as  practicable  and 
give  up  Shantung,  only  insisting  upon 
certain  economic  advantages. 

The  Fiume  Controversy.  The  Fiume 
controversy,  which  was  still  unsettled 
as  the  year  1919  drew  to  a  close,  was 
the  bitterest  which  presented  itself  at 
the  Peace  Conference.  The  dispute  cen- 
tred around  the  possession  of  the  port 
and  harbor  of  Fiume  and  parts  of  Dal- 
matia.  The  claims  of  Italy  were  coun- 
tered by  the  claims  of  Jugoslavia.  Italy 
claimed  that  inasmuch  as  the  majority 
of  the  citizens  of  Fiume  were  Italian  or 
of  Italian  origin,  the  city  naturally  be- 
longed to  Italy  under  the  principle  of 
self-determination.  President  Wilson, 
who  opposed  the  Italian  claims,  main- 
tained that  inasmuch  as  the  vast  ma- 
jority of  the  people  outside  of  the  city 
proper  were  Jugoslovaks,  the  city  it- 
self should  belong  to  that  newly  formed 
country.  Jugoslovakia  claimed  that 
her  commerce  would  be  ruined  before  it 
even  gained  a  foothold  if  Fiume  were 
given  to  the  Italians,  while  the  Ital- 
ians said  that  Fiume  was  a  necessity 
to  her  as  a  protection  against  the 
Austrians  and  the  desires  of  the  Jugo- 
slovaks who  had  been  unfriendly  to 
Italy  during  the  war  and  after  it  was 
over. 

The  Peace  Conference  worked  for 
weeks  to  bring  about  a  peaceful  settle- 
ment of  the  controversy.  Great  Brit- 
ain and  France,  tied  up  to  Italy  by  the 
secret  treaty  of  1915,  were  in  favor  of  a 
settlement  of  the  dispute  which  would 


be  favorable  to  Italy.  President  Wilson 
was  adamant  and  stated  on  April  23 
that  he  would  not  yield  on  the  Adriatic 
question.  As  a  result  of  this  speech, 
Orlando  and  the  other  Italian  delegates 
left  the  Peace  Conference  for  Rome. 
They  were  everywhere  received  with  pa- 
triotic fervor  and  their  action  seemed 
to  receive  the  unanimous  approval  of 
the  Italian  press  and  populace.  After 
an  address  to  the  Italian  Parliament 
(April  29),  Premier  Orlando  received 
a  vote  of  confidence  from  the  members. 
The  vote  was  382  to  40,  only  the  So- 
cialists refusing  to  acquiesce  in  the  Pre- 
mier's position.  The  Italian  delegation 
returned  to  Paris  on  May  6  on  their 
own  initiative.  The  press  stated  that 
they  had  been  invited  to  return  by 
Clemenceau  and  Lloyd  George.  Presi- 
dent Wilson  apparently  had  no  part  in 
the  request  for  their  return. 

The  Fiume  controversy,  still  un- 
settled by  the  Peace  Conference,  took 
another  amazing  turn  during  the  month 
of  September.  Gabriele  D'Annunzio, 
the  poet-aviator,  with  a  band  of  ap- 
proximately 9,000  followers  seized  the 
city  and  held  it  in  defiance  of  the  Italian 
government  and  against  the  wishes  of 
the  Entente  Allies.  The  Italian  gov- 
ernment on  several  occasions  ordered 
D'Annunzio  to  return  to  Rome  and  sub- 
mit himself  to  the  authorities  there. 
This  he  continually  refused  to  do.  An 
economic  blockade,  declared  against  him 
by  his  own  government,  proved  ineffec- 
tive because  he  was  apparently  able  to 
get  all  the  foodstuffs  that  he  needed. 
The  Italian  government  seemed  exceed- 
ingly loath  to  use  armed  forces  against 
him.  He  gradually  extended  his  power 
up  and  down  the  Dalmatian  coast  and 
as  the  year  1919  drew  to  a  close  war 
clouds  appeared  on  the  horizon  of  bat- 
tle scarred  Europe.  Even  as  the  great 
world  war  had  its  birth  in  the  Balkans, 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


359 


so  did  this  new  threat  of  another  strug- 
gle. 

Struggle  Over  the  Ratification  of  the 
Treaty  of  Peace  in  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States.  President  Wilson  pre- 
sented the  Treaty  of  Versailles  to  the 
Senate  of  the  United  States  on  July  10, 
1919.  He  stated  that  the  treaty  was 
a  world  settlement  and  that  the  United 
States  had  entered  the  war  on  a  differ- 
ent footing  from  all  European  coun- 
tries. He  summed  up  the  glorious  deeds 
of  the  American  army  on  the  battlefield 
and  stated  that  at  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence every  effort  was  made  to  realize 
the  hopes  of  freedom  of  the  nations 
which  had  been  succored  by  our  army. 
The  problem  of  the  Peace  Conference 
was  not  that  of  empires,  they  were  all 
bankrupt,  but  of  the  smaller  nations. 
From  this  theme  he  developed  the  idea 
of  a  League  of  Nations  and  the  neces- 
sity for  such  an  instrument  in  order 
to  guarantee  to  these  smaller  nations 
a  full  measure  of  political  and  eco- 
nomic liberty.  He  closed  his  appeal  for 
ratification  by  stating  that  the  United 
States  had  now  reached  her  majority 
as  a  world  power  and  that  she  must 
"show  the  way." 

The  treaty  debate  began  on  July  14 
and  continued  until  December,  when 
Congress  adjourned  without  ratifying 
it.  The  keynote  speech  of  the  admin- 
istration was  delivered  by  Senator 
Swanson  of  Virginia.  In  a  lengthy 
speech  he  asked  the  Senate  to  ratify 
the  treaty  as  it  stood.  Three  resolu- 
tions were  reported  on  the  same  day, 
which  opened  the  bitterest  fight  the  Sen- 
ate has  probably  seen.  Senator  Lodge 
called  upon  the  State  Department  for 
a  copy  of  the  alleged  secret  treaty  be- 
tween Germany  and  Japan.  Senator 
Borah  asked  for  the  report  of  some  of 
the  American  Peace  Commissioners  op- 
posing the  Shantung  agreement.     Sen- 


ator Johnson  asked  that  a  stenographic 
report  of  the  Peace  Conference  be  given 
to  the  Senate.  This  caused  a  wild  out- 
burst from  administration  followers. 

On  July  17,  President  Wilson  began 
a  series  of  conferences  with  Republi- 
can Senators  with  a  view  of  changing 
their  mind  toward  the  League  of  Na- 
tions. Apparently  the  President  was 
unable  to  change  the  point  of  view  of 
any  of  the  men  he  interviewed.  After 
these  meetings  the  Republicans  threat- 
ened to  hold  up  the  ratification  of  the 
entire  treaty  if  President  Wilson  did  not 
accept  certain  amendments  or  at  least 
reservations. 

Impetus  was  given  to  the  reservation 
idea  when  prominent  Republican  leaders 
like  Messrs.  Taft,  Hughes,  Root,  and 
Lodge  proposed  reservations  to  the 
League  of  Nations  that  they  believed 
would  be  acceptable  to  most  Repub- 
licans who  favored  a  League  of  Na- 
tions. Mr.  Hughes's  reservations,  which 
seemed  to  fit  in  with  those  of  Senator 
Lodge,  the  Chairman  of  the  Foreign 
Relations  Committee,  may  be  summa- 
rized as  follows : 

1.  That  on  giving  notice  of  its  in- 
tention to  withdraw  from  the  League, 
a  power  shall  cease  to  be  a  member  or 
subject  to  obligations  of  the  covenant 
at  the  time  specified  in  the  notice,  but 
that  such  withdrawal  shall  not  release 
that  power  from  debt  or  liability  there- 
tofore incurred. 

2.  That  questions  such  as  immigra- 
tion or  import  duties,  which  are  solely 
within  domestic  jurisdiction,  shall  not 
be  submitted  for  consideration  or  ac- 
tion by  the  League. 

3.  That  the  United  States  shall  not 
relinquish  its  traditional  attitude 
toward  purely  American  questions, 
which  shall  not  be  subject  to  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  League,  leaving  this  country 
free  to  oppose  acquisition  by  any  non- 


360 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


American  country  of  territory  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere. 

4.  That  under  Article  X.  the  United 
States  shall  assume  no  obligation  to 
undertake  any  military  expedition  or 
employ  its  armed  forces  on  land  or  sea 
unless  such  action  is  authorized  by 
Congress. 

An  important  conference  was  held  be- 
tween President  Wilson  and  the  Foreign 
Relations  Committee  on  August  19, 
when  practically  all  the  important 
points  of  the  League  and  the  peace 
treaty  came  up  for  discussion.  Presi- 
dent Wilson  said  that  the  article  which 
was  causing  the  most  serious  objection 
(X.)  was  drawn  by  himself  and  that 
American  forces  could  never  be  sent 
abroad  without  the  consent  of  Con- 
gress. He  said  that  he  would  have  pre- 
ferred another  solution  of  the  Shantung 
controversy,  but  that  he  was  handi- 
capped by  the  secret  treaties  between 
Great  Britain,  France  and  Japan,  the 
existence  of  which  he  was  ignorant. 
After  more  than  three  hours  of  ques- 
tioning, the  Republican  members  were 
still  opposed  to  ratification  without 
amendments  or  reservations.  The  Pres- 
ident suggested  the  use  of  "interpretive 
reservations"  which  would  not  be  a  spe- 
cific part  of  the  peace  treaty,  but  which 
would  bind  the  United  States  to  a  def- 
inite action.  He  desired  in  this  way 
to  make  no  changes  in  the  treaty  as 
it  then  stood.  This  solution  was  entire- 
ly unsatisfactory  to  the  opponents  of 
the  League. 

On  September  10,  the  Senate  Com- 
mittee reported  the  Peace  Treaty  to 
the  Senate.  The  majority  report  pre- 
sented it  with  thirty-eight  amendments 
and  four  reservations.  On  the  follow- 
ing day  the  minority  members  pre- 
sented their  report,  which  was  opposed 
to  reservations  and  amendments.  The 
bitter  attack  made  on  the  treaty  in  the 


Senate  determined  President  Wilson  to 
take  the  issue  directly  to  the  people. 
Consequently  he  started  on  a  tour  on 
September  3,  1919,  in  which  he  vigor- 
ously upheld  the  League  of  Nations 
Covenant  and  other  provisions  for  the 
Peace  Treaty.  His  itinerary  was  ab- 
ruptly halted  at  Wichita,  Kansas,  on 
September  26,  when  he  was  taken  seri- 
ously ill.  He  immediately  had  to  give 
up  all  public  duties  and  was  constantly 
attended  by  specialists. 

The  first  test  between  the  opposing 
forces  came  on  October  2,  when  the  Sen- 
ate defeated  the  35  amendments  pro- 
posed by  Senator  Fall  of  New  Mexico. 
The  purpose  of  these  amendments  was 
to  prevent  the  participation  by  the 
United  States  representatives  on  vari- 
ous commissions  created  by  the  Peace 
Conference.  The  average  vote  (when  a 
vote  was  taken)  was  about  2  to  1.  The 
vote  showed  fairly  plainly  that  the 
chances  of  securing  amendments  were 
very  slight  but  that  the  treaty  could 
not  be  ratified  without  reservations.  On 
October  16,  the  six  Lodge  amendments, 
giving  to  China  instead  of  to  Japan 
the  economic  privileges  taken  from  Ger- 
many, were  defeated  as  a  unit  by  the 
vote  of  55  to  35. 

On  October  22,  23,  and  24,  the  Sen- 
ate Foreign  Relations  Committee  adopt- 
ed fourteen  revised  amendments.  These 
were  designed  to  take  the  place  of 
those  adopted  on  September  10.  A 
preamble  was  also  adopted  by  the  com- 
mittee. The  text  of  the  preamble  and 
the  reservations  follows. 

TEXT    OF    RESERVATIONS 

PREAMBLE.— The  committee  also  reports 
the  following  reservations  and  understandings 
to  be  made  a  part  and  a  condition  of  the  reso- 
lution of  ratification,  which  ratification  is  not 
to  take  effect  or  bind  the  United  States  until 
the  said  following  reservations  and  understand- 
ings have  been  accepted  as  a  part  and  a  condi- 
tion  of   said   instrument   of  ratification  by  at 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


361 


least  three  of  the  four  principal  allied  and  as- 
sociated powers,  to  wit,  Great  Britain,  France, 
Italy  and  Japan: 

Reservation  No.  1. — The  United  States  un- 
derstands and  construes  Article  I.  that  in  case 
of  notice  of  withdrawal  from  the  League  of 
Nations,  as  provided  in  said  article,  the  United 
States  shall  be  the  sole  judge  as  to  whether  all 
its  international  obligations  and  all  its  obliga- 
tions under  the  said  covenant  have  been  ful- 
filled, and  notice  of  withdrawal  by  the  United 
States  may  be  given  by  a  concurrent  resolu- 
tion of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States. 

Reservation  No.  2. — The  United  States  as- 
sumes no  obligation  to  preserve  the  territorial 
integrity  or  political  independence  of  any  other 
country  or  to  interfere  in  controversies  between 
nations — whether  members  of  the  League  or 
not — under  the  provisions  of  Article  X.,  or  to 
employ  the  military  or  naval  forces  of  the 
United  States  under  any  article  of  the  treaty 
for  any  purpose,  unless  in  any  particular  case 
the  Congress,  which,  under  the  Constitution,  has 
the  sole  power  to  declare  war  or  to  authorize 
the  employment  of  the  military  or  naval  forces 
of  the  United  States,  shall,  by  act  or  joint 
resolution,  so  provide. 

Reservation  No.  3. — No  mandate  shall  be 
accepted  by  the  United  States  under  Article 
XXII.,  Part  1,  or  any  other  provision  of  the 
treaty  of  peace  with  Germany,  except  by  action 
of  the  Congress  of  the  United  States. 

Reservation  No.  j. — The  United  States  re- 
serves to  itself  exclusively  the  right  to  decide 
what  questions  are  within  its  domestic  juris- 
diction, and  declares  that  all  domestic  and 
political  questions  relating  wholly  or  in  part 
to  its  internal  affairs,  including  immigration, 
labor,  coastwise  traffic,  the  tariff,  commerce,  and 
the  suppression  of  the  traffic  in  women  and 
children,  and  in  opium  and  other  dangerous 
drugs,  and  all  other  domestic  questions,  are 
solely  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United 
States  and  are  not  under  this  treaty  to  be  sub- 
mitted in  any  way  either  to  arbitration  or  to 
the  consideration  of  the  Council  or  Assembly 
of  the  League  of  Nations  or  any  agency  there- 
of, or  to  the  decision  or  recommendation  of 
any  other  power. 

Reservation  No.  5. — The  United  States  will 
not  submit  to  arbitration  by  the  assembly  or 
the  council  of  the  League  of  Nations  (pro- 
vided for  in  said  treaty  of  peace)  any  ques- 
tions which  in  the  judgment  of  the  United 
States  depend  on  or  relate  to  its  long-estab- 
lished policy,  commonly  known  as  the  Monroe 
Doctrine;  said  doctrine  is  to  be  interpreted  by 
the  United  States  alone,  and  is  hereby  declared 
to  be  wholly  outside  the  jurisdiction  of  said 
League  of  Nations  and  entirely  unaffected  by 
any  provision  contained  in  the  said  treaty  of 
peace  with  Germany. 

Reservation  No.  6. — The  United  States  with- 


holds its  assent  to  Articles  156,  157,  and  158, 
and  reserves  full  liberty  of  action  with  respect 
to  any  controversy  which  may  arise  under  said 
articles  between  the  Republic  of  China  and  the 
Empire  of  Japan. 

Reservation  No.  7. — The  Congress  of  the 
United  States  by  law  will  provide  for  the  ap- 
pointment of  the  representatives  of  the  United 
States  in  the  assembly  and  the  council  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  and  may  in  its  discretion 
provide  for  the  participation  of  the  United 
States  in  any  commission,  committee,  tribunal, 
court,  council,  of  conference,  or  in  the  selection 
of  any  members  thereof  and  for  the  appoint- 
ment of  members  of  said  commission,  com- 
mittee, court,  council,  or  conference,  or  any 
other  representatives  under  the  treaty  of  peace, 
or  in  carrying  out  its  provisions  and  until  such 
participation  and  appointment  have  been  so 
provided  for,  and  the  powers  and  duties  of 
such  representative  so  defined,  no  person  shall 
represent  the  United  States  under  either  such 
said  League  of  Nations  or  the  treaty,  or  be 
authorized  to  perform  any  act  for  or  on  behalf 
of  the  United  States  thereunder,  and  no  citi- 
zen of  the  United  States  shall  be  elected  or 
appointed  as  a  member  of  said  commissions, 
committees,  courts,  councils,  or  conferences  ex- 
cept with  the  approval  of  the  Senate  of  the 
United   States. 

Reservation  No.  8. — The  United  States  un- 
derstands that  the  Reparations  Commission 
will  regulate  or  interfere  with  exports  from  the 
United  States  to  Germany,  or  from  Germany 
to  the  United  States,  only  when  the  United 
States  by  its  Congress  approves  such  regulation 
or  interference. 

Reservation  No.  9. — The  United  States  shall 
not  be  obligated  to  contribute  to  any  expenses  of 
the  League  of  Nations  or  secretariat  or  any 
commission,  committee,  or  conference  or  other 
agency,  organized  under  the  League  of  Nations, 
or  under  the  treaty,  or  for  the  purpose  of 
carrying  out  the  treaty  provisions,  unless  and 
until  an  appropriation  of  funds  available  for 
such  expenses  shall  have  been  made  by  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States. 

Reservation  No.  10. — If  the  United  States 
shall  at  any  time  adopt  any  plan  for  the  limi- 
tation of  armaments  proposed  by  the  council 
of  the  League  of  Nations  under  the  provisions 
of  Article  VIII.,  it  reserves  the  right  to  increase 
such  armament  without  the  consent  of  the 
council  whenever  the  United  States  is  threat- 
ened with  invasion  or  engaged  in  war. 

Reservation  No.  11. — The  United  States  con- 
strues subdivision  "C"  of  Article  XXIII.  to 
mean  that  the  League  shall  refuse  to  recognize 
agreements  with  regard  to  the  traffic  in  women 
and  children  and  that  the  League  shall  use 
every  means  possible  to  abolish  and  do  away 
with  such  practice. 

Reservation  No.  12. — The   United  States  re- 


362 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


serves  the  right  to  permit,  in  its  discretion,  the 
nationals  of  a  covenant-breaking  State,  as 
denned  in  Article  XVI.  of  the  covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  to  continue  their  commer- 
cial, financial,  and  personal  relations  with  the 
nationals  of  the  United   States. 

Reservation  No.  13. — The  United  States  de- 
clines to  accept  any  interest  as  trustee,  or  in 
her  own  right,  or  to  accept  any  responsibility, 
for  the  government  or  disposition  of  the  over- 
seas possessions  of  Germany  to  which  Germany 
renounces  her  right  and  titles  to  the  principal 
allied  and  associated  powers  under  Articles  119 
to   127,  inclusive. 

Reservation  No.  l/h — The  United  States  re- 
serves to  itself  exclusively  the  right  to  decide 
what  questions  affect  its  honor  or  its  vital 
interests  and  declares  that  such  questions  are 
not  under  this  treaty  to  be  submitted  in  any 
way  either  to  arbitration  or  to  the  considera- 
tion of  the  Council  or  the  Assembly  of  the 
League  of  Nations  or  any  agency  thereof,  or 
to  the  decision  or  recommendation  of  any  other 
power. 

Despite  the  efforts  made  by  the  Re- 
publicans and  the  Democrats  to  settle 
the  question  of  the  League  of  Nations 
and  the  entire  treaty  one  way  or  the 
other,  the  year  closed  without  ratifica- 
tion in  any  form.  When  the  long  ses- 
sion of  the  66th  Congress  came  to  a 
close  the  matter  remained  deadlocked. 

Alliance  Between  France  and  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States.  On  the 
same  day  that  the  Germans  concluded 
their  treaty  of  peace  with  the  Allies, 
France  concluded  treaties  with  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  which 
guaranteed  to  France  the  aid  of  both 
of  these  nations  if  there  was  any  ag- 
gressive act  on  the  part  of  Germany 
toward  that  republic.  A  provision  was 
contained  to  the  effect  that  the  treaties 
would  be  submitted  to  the  League  of 
Nations  and  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Parliaments  of  Great 
Britain  and  France  for  ratification. 

The  text  of  the  French-American 
treaty  is  as  follows : 

Considering  that  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica and  the  Government  of  the  French  Repub- 
lic are  equally  animated  by  a  desire  to  main- 
tain the  peace  of  the  world,  so  happily  restored 


by  the  treaty  signed  at  Versailles  on  June  28, 
which  put  an  end  to  the  war  begun  by  the  ag- 
gression of  the  German  Empire  and  terminated 
by  the  defeat  of  that  power,  and 

Considering  that  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica and  the  Government  of  the  French  Repub- 
lic, fully  convinced  that  an  unprovoked  aggres- 
sion directed  by  Germany  against  France 
would  not  only  violate  at  the  same  time  the 
letter  and  spirit  of  the  Versailles  Treaty,  to 
which  the  United  States  and  France  are  par- 
ties, thus  exposing  France  anew  to  the  intol- 
erable burden  of  unprovoked  war,  but  that 
such  aggression  on  the  act  reputed  by  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles  as  being  against  all  the 
powers  signatory  to  the  treaty  and  calculated 
to  trouble  the  peace  of  the  world,  involving 
inevitably  and  directly  the  States  of  Europe 
and  indirectly  the  entire  world,  as  experience 
has   amply   and   unhappily   demonstrated,   and 

Considering  that  the  United  States  of  Amer- 
ica and  the  Government  of  the  French  Repub- 
lic apprehend  that  the  stipulations  concerning 
the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  cannot  assure  im- 
mediately to  France,  on  the  one  hand,  and  to 
the  United  States,  on  the  other,  as  signatory 
powers  to  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  appropriate 
security  and  protection; 

Consequently,  the  United  States  of  America 
and  the  Government  of  the  French  Republic, 
having  decided  to  conclude  a  treaty  to  realize 
these  necessary  ends,  Woodrow  Wilson,  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  of  America,  and 
Robert  Lansing,  Secretary  of  State,  specially 
authorized  to  that  end  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  and  Georges  Clem- 
enceau,  President  of  the  Council  of  Ministers 
and  Minister  of  War,  and  Stephen  Pichon, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  specially  author- 
ized to  that  end  by  Raymond  Poincare,  Presi- 
dent of  the  French  Republic,  have  agreed  upon 
the   following: 

ARTICLE  I. — The  following  stipulations 
concerning  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  are  con- 
tained in  the  Peace  Treaty  signed  with  Ger- 
many at  Versailles,  June  28,  1919,  by  the 
United  States  of  America,  by  the  Government 
of  the  French  Republic,  and  by  the  British 
Empire,  among  other  pouiers: 

Article  42. — Germany  is  forbidden  to 
maintain  or  construct  any  fortifications 
either  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  or  on 
the  right  bank  to  the  west  of  a  line  drawn 
fifty  kilometers  to  the  east  of  the  Rhine. 

Article  43. — In  the  area  denned  above 
the  maintenance  and  the  assembly  of 
armed  forces,  either  permanently  or  tem- 
porarily, and  military  manoeuvres  of  any 
kind,  as  well  as  the  upkeep  of  all  perma- 
nent works  for  mobilization,  are  in  the 
same    way    forbidden. 

Article  44. — In  case  Germany  violates  in 
any    manner    whatever    the    provisions    of 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


363 


Articles  42  and  43  she  shall  be  regarded 
as  committing  a  hostile  act  against  the 
powers  signatory  of  the  present  treaty 
and  as  calculated  to  disturb  the  peace  of 
the  world. 

In  case  these  stipulations  should  not  assure 
immediately  to  France  appropriate  security 
and  protection,  the  United  States  of  America 
shall  be  bound  to  come  immediately  to  her  aid 
in  case  of  any  unprovoked  act  of  aggression 
directed  against  her  by  Germany. 

ARTICLE  2.— The  present  treaty,  couched 
in  terms  analogous  to  those  of  a  treaty  con- 
cluded on  the  same  date  and  to  the  same  end 
between  Great  Britain  and  the  French  Repub- 
lic, a  copy  of  which  is  hereto  annexed,  will 
not  enter  into  force  until  the  moment  when  the 
latter  is  ratified. 

ARTICLE  3. — The  present  treaty  must  be 
submitted  to  the  Council  of  the  Society  of 
Nations  and  must  be  recognized  by  the  council, 
deciding  if  occasion  arise  by  majority,  as  an 
engagement  in  conformity  with  the  covenant 
of  the  society.  It  will  remain  in  force  until, 
upon  demand  of  one  of  the  parties  to  the 
treaty,  the  council  deciding  if  occasion  arise 
by  a  majority,  finds  that  the  society  itself  as- 
sures sufficient  protection. 

ARTICLE  4.— The  present  treaty  shall  be- 
fore ratification  be  submitted  to  the  Chambers 
of  the  French  Parliament  for  approval  and  it 
shall  be  stibmitted  to  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States  of  America  at  the  same  time  as  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles  shall  be  submitted  for  as- 
sent to  ratification.  Ratifications  shall  be  ex- 
changed at  the  time  of  deposit  in  Paris  of  the 
ratifications  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  or 
as  soon  afterward  as  possible. 

The  agreement  between  England  and 
France,  the  text  of  which  was  also  given 
out,  corresponds  with  that  between  the 
United  States  and  France,  with  an  ad- 
ditional provision  that  the  treaty  im- 
poses no  obligation  upon  any  of  the 
dominions  of  the  British  Empire  unless 
and  until  it  be  approved  by  the  Parlia- 
ment of  each  dominion  interested. 

The  Polish  Treaty.  Another  impor- 
tant treaty  was  signed  on  the  same  day 
that  the  German  delegates  signed  the 
treaty  ending  the  great  world  war. 
This  was  the  treaty  with  Poland,  the 
terms  of  which  follow. 

The  United  States  of  America,  the  British 
Empire,   France,    Italy,    and   Japan,    the    prin- 


cipal allied  and  associated  powers,  on  the  one 
hand;  and  Poland,  on  the  other  hand: 

Whereas,  The  allied  and  associated  powers 
have,  by  the  success  of  their  arms,  restored  to 
the  Polish  Nation  the  independence  of  which 
it  had  been  unjustly  deprived;   and 

Whereas,  By  the  proclamation  of  March  30, 
1917,  the  Government  of  Russia  assented  to  the 
re-establishment  of  an  independent  Polish 
State;  and 

Whereas,  The  Polish  State,  which  now,  in 
fact,  exercises  sovereignty  over  those  portions 
of  the  former  Russian  Empire  which  are  in- 
habited by  a  majority  of  Poles,  has  already 
been  recognized  as  a  sovereign  and  important 
State  by  the  principal  allied  and  associated 
powers;   and 

Whereas,  Under  the  treaty  of  peace  con- 
cluded with  Germany  by  the  allied  and  asso- 
ciated powers,  a  treaty  of  which  Poland  is  a 
signatory,  certain  portions  of  the  former  Ger- 
man Empire  will  be  incorporated  in  the  terri- 
tory of  Poland;  and 

Whereas,  Under  the  terms  of  the  said  treaty 
of  peace,  the  boundaries  of  Poland  not  already 
laid  down  are  to  be  subsequently  determined 
by  the  principal  allied  and  associated  powers; 

The  United  States  of  America,  the  British 
Empire,  France,  Italy,  and  Japan,  on  the  one 
hand,  confirming  their  recognition  of  the  Polish 
State,  constituted  within  the  said  limits  as  a 
sovereign  and  independent  member  of  the  fam- 
ily of  nations  and  being  anxious  to  insure  the 
execution  of  the  provisions  of  Article  93  of  the 
said  treaty  of  peace  with  Germany; 

Poland,  on  the  other  hand,  desiring  to  con- 
form her  institutions  to  the  principles  of  lib- 
erty and  justice,  and  to  give  a  sure  guarantee 
to  the  inhabitants  of  the  territory  over  which 
she  assumed  sovereignty;  for  this  purpose  the 
following  representatives  of  the  high  contract- 
ing parties: 

The  President  of  the  United  States  of 
America;  his  Majesty  the  King  of  the  United 
Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  and  of 
the  British  dominions  beyond  the  seas,  Em- 
peror of  India;  the  President  of  the  French 
Republic;  his  Majesty  the  King  of  Italy;  his 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan,  and  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Polish  Republic,  after  having  ex- 
changed their  full  powers,  found  in  good  and 
due  form,  have  agreed  as   follows: 

CHAPTER  I 

ARTICLE  1.— Poland  undertakes  that  the 
stipulations  contained  in  Articles  2  and  8  of 
this  chapter  shall  be  recognized  as  fundamental 
law,  and  that  no  law,  regulation,  or  official 
action  shall  conflict  or  interfere  with  these 
stipulations,  nor  shall  any  law,  regulation,  or 
official   action  prevail  over  them. 

ARTICLE   2.— Poland  undertakes   to  assure 


364 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


full  and  complete  protection  to  life  and  lib- 
erty to  all  inhabitants  of  Poland,  without  dis- 
tinction of  birth,  nationality,  language,  race, 
or  religion. 

All  inhabitants  of  Poland  shall  be  entitled 
to  the  free  exercise,  whether  public  or  private, 
of  any  creed,  religion,  or  belief  whose  prac- 
tices are  not  inconsistent  with  public  order  or 
public  morals. 

ARTICLE  3. — Poland  admits  and  declares 
to  be  Polish  nationals  ipso  facto  Hungarian 
or  Russian  nationals  habitually  resident,  at  the 
date  of  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present 
treaty,  in  territory  which  is  or  may  be  recog- 
nized as  forming  part  of  Poland  under  the 
treaties  with  Germany,  Austria,  Hungary,  or 
Russia,  respectively,  but  subject  to  any  provi- 
sions in  the  said  treaties  relating  to  persons  who 
became  resident  in  such  territory  after  a  speci- 
fied date. 

Nevertheless,  the  persons  referred  to  above 
who  are  over  12  years  of  age  will  be  entitled 
under  the  conditions  contained  in  the  said 
treaties  to  opt  for  any  other  nationality  which 
may  be  open  to  them.  Option  by  a  husband 
will  cover  his  wife  and  option  by  parents  will 
cover  their  children  under  18  years  of  age. 

Persons  who  have  exercised  the  above  right 
to  option  must,  except  where  it  is  otherwise 
provided  in  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Germany, 
transfer  within  the  succeeding  twelve  months 
their  place  of  residence  to  the  State  for  which 
they  have  opted.  They  will  be  entitled  to  re- 
tain their  immovable  property  in  Polish  terri- 
tory. They  may  carry  with  them  their  movable 
property  of  every  description.  No  export 
duties  may  be  imposed  upon  them  in  connection 
with  the  removal  of  such  property. 

ARTICLE  4.— Poland  admits  and  declares 
to  be  polish  nationals,  ipso  facto  and  without 
the  requirement  of  any  formality,  persons  of 
German,  Austrian,  Hungarian,  or  Russian  na- 
tionality who  were  born  in  the  said  territory 
of  parents  habitually  resident  there,  even  if 
at  the  date  of  the  coming  into  force  of  the 
present  treaty  they  are  not  themselves  habit- 
ually  resident   there. 

Nevertheless,  within  two  years  after  the  com- 
ing into  force  of  the  present  treaty,  these 
persons  may  make  a  declaration  before  the 
competent  Polish  authorities  in  the  country  in 
which  they  are  resident,  stating  that  they  aban- 
don Polish  nationality,  and  they  will  then  cease 
to  be  considered  as  Polish  nationals.  In  this 
connection  a  declaration  by  a  husband  will  cover 
his  wife,  and  a  declaration  by  parents  will 
cover  their  children  under  18  years  of  age. 

ARTICLE  5. — Poland  undertakes  to  put  no 
hindrance  in  the  way  of  the  exercise  of  the 
right  which  the  persons  concerned  have,  under 
the  treaties  concluded  or  to  be  concluded  by 
the  allied  and  associated  powers  with  Germany, 
Austria,  Hungary,  or  Russia,  to  choose  whether 


or    not    they    will    acquire    Polish    nationality. 

ARTICLE  6.— All  persons  born  in  Polish 
territory  who  are  not  born  nationals  of  an- 
other State  shall  ipso  facto  become  Polish 
nationals. 

ARTICLE  7.— All  polish  nationals  shall  be 
equal  before  the  law  and  shall  enjoy  the  same 
civil  and  political  rights  without  distinction  as 
to    race,   language,   or   religion. 

Differences  of  religion,  creed,  or  confession 
shall  not  prejudice  any  Polish  national  in 
matters  relating  to  the  enjoyment  of  civil  or 
political  rights,  as  for  admission  to  public  em- 
ployments, functions,  and  honors,  or  the  exer- 
cise of  professions   and  industries. 

No  restriction  shall  be  imposed  on  the  free 
use  by  any  Polish  national  of  any  language 
in  private  intercourse,  in  commerce,  in  religion, 
in  the  press,  or  in  publications  of  any  kind, 
or  at  public  meetings. 

Notwithstanding  any  establishment  by  the 
Polish  Government  of  an  official  language,  ade- 
quate facilities  shall  be  given  to  Polish 
nationals  of  non-Polish  speech  for  the  use  of 
their  language,  either  orally  or  in  writing,  be- 
fore the  courts. 

ARTICLE  8.— Polish  nationals  who  belong 
to  racial,  religious,  or  linguistic  minorities  shall 
enjoy  the  same  treatment  and  security  in  law 
and  in  fact  as  the  Polish  nationals.  In  par- 
ticular they  shall  have  an  equal  right  to  estab- 
lish, manage,  and  control  at  their  own  expense 
charitable,  religious,  and  social  'institutions, 
schools  and  other  educational  establishments, 
with  the  right  to  use  their  own  language  and 
to  exercise  their   religion   freely  therein. 

ARTICLE  9.— Poland  will  provide,  in  the 
public  educational  system  in  towns  and  dis- 
tricts in  which  a  considerable  proportion  of 
Polish  nationals  of  other  than  Polish  speech  are 
residents,  adequate  facilities  for  insuring  that 
in  the  primary  schools  instruction  shall  be  given 
to  the  children  of  such  Polish  nationals  through 
the  medium  of  their  own  language.  This  pro- 
vision shall  not  prevent  the  Polish  Government 
from  making  the  teaching  of  the  Polish  lan- 
guage  obligatory   in   the   said   schools. 

In  towns  and  districts  where  there  is  a  con- 
siderable proportion  of  Polish  nationals  be- 
longing to  racial,  religious,  or  linguistic  minor- 
ities, these  minorities  shall  be  assured  an  equi- 
table share  in  the  enjoyment  and  application 
of  the  sums  which  may  be  provided  out  of 
public  funds  under  the  State,  municipal,  or 
other  budgets,  for  educational,  religious,  or 
charitable  purposes. 

The  provisions  of  this  article  shall  apply  to 
Polish  citizens  of  German  speech  only  in  that 
part  of  Poland  which  was  German  territory 
on  Aug.  1,  1914. 

ARTICLE  10. — Educational  committees  ap- 
pointed locally  by  the  Jewish  communities  of 
Poland  will,  subject  to  the  general  control  of 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


365 


the  State,  provide  for  the  distribution  of  the 
proportional  share  of  public  funds  allocated  to 
Jewish  schools  in  accordance  with  Article  9, 
and  for  the  organization  and  management  of 
these  schools. 

The  provision  of  Article  9  concerning  the  use 
of  language  in  schools  shall  apply  to  these 
schools. 

ARTICLE  11.— Jews  shall  not  be  compelled 
to  perform  any  act  which  constitutes  a  viola- 
tion of  their  Sabbath,  nor  shall  be  placed 
under  any  disability  by  reason  of  their  refusal 
to  attend  courts  of  law  or  to  perform  any 
legal  business  on  their  Sabbath.  This  provi- 
sion, however,  shall  not  exempt  Jews  from  such 
obligations  as  shall  be  imposed  upon  all  other 
Polish  citizens  for  the  necessary  purposes  of 
military  service,  national  defense,  or  the 
preservation  of  public  order. 

Poland  declares  her  intention  to  refrain 
from  ordering  or  permitting  elections,  whether 
general  or  local,  to  be  held  on  a  Saturday,  nor 
will  registration  for  electoral  or  other  pur- 
poses be  compelled  to  be  performed  on  a  Sat- 
urday. 

ARTICLE  12.— Poland  agrees  that  the  stip- 
ulations in  the  foregoing  articles,  so  far  as  they 
affect  persons  belonging  to  racial,  religious, 
or  linguistic  minorities,  constitute  obligations 
of  international  concern,  and  shall  be  placed 
under  the  guarantee  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
They  shall  not  be  modified  without  the  assent 
of  a  majority  of  the  Council  of  the  League  of 
Nations.  The  United  States,  the  British  Em- 
pire, France,  Italy,  and  Japan  hereby  agree  not 
to  withhold  their  assent  from  any  modification 
in  these  articles  which  is  in  due  form  assented 
to  by  a  majority  of  the  Council  of  the  League 
of  Nations. 

Poland  agrees  that  any  member  of  the  Coun- 
cil of  the  League  of  Nations  shall  have  the 
right  to  bring  to  the  attention  of  the  Council 
any  infraction,  or  any  danger  of  infraction, 
of  any  of  these  obligations,  and  that  the  council 
may  thereupon  take  such  action  and  give  such 
direction  as  it  may  deem  proper  and  effective 
in  the  circumstances. 

Poland  further  agrees  that  any  difference  of 
opinion  as  to  question  of  law  or  fact  arising 
out  of  these  articles,  between  the  Polish  Gov- 
ernment and  any  of  the  principal  allied  and 
associated  powers,  or  any  other  power  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
shall  be  held  to  be  a  dispute  of  an  international 
character  under  Article  14  of  the  Covenant  of 
the  League  of  Nations.  The  Polish  Govern- 
ment hereby  consents  that  any  such  dispute 
shall,  if  the  other  party  thereof  demands,  be 
referred  to  the  Permanent  Court  of  Interna- 
tional Justice.  The  decision  of  the  Permanent 
Court  shall  be  final  and  shall  have  the  same 
force  and  effect  as  an  award  under  Article  13 
of  the  covenant. 


CHAPTER  II 

ARTICLE  13.— Each  of  the  principal  allied 
and  associated  powers,  on  the  one  part,  and 
Poland  on  the  other  shall  be  at  liberty  to 
appoint  diplomatic  representatives  to  reside  in 
their  respective  capitals,  as  well  as  Consul 
Generals,  Consuls,  Vice  Consuls,  and  Consular 
Agents,  to  reside  in  the  towns  and  ports  of 
their  respective  territories. 

Consul  Generals,  Consuls,  Vice  Consuls,  and 
Consular  Agents,  however,  shall  not  enter  upon 
their  duties  until  they  have  been  admitted  in 
the  usual  manner  by  the  Government  in  the 
territory  of  which  they  are  stationed. 

Consul  Generals,  Consuls,  Vice  Consuls,  and 
Consular  Agents  shall  enjoy  all  the  facilities, 
privileges,  exemptions,  and  immunities  of  every 
kind  which  are  or  shall  be  granted  to  Consular 
officers  of  the  most  favored  nation. 

ARTICLE  14.— Pending  the  establishment 
of  a  permanent  tariff  by  the  Polish  Govern- 
ment, goods  originating  in  the  allied  and  as- 
sociated States  shall  not  be  subject  to  any 
higher  duties  on  importation  into  Poland  than 
the  most  favorable  rates  of  duty  applicable  to 
goods  of  the  same  kind  under  either  the  Ger- 
man, Austro-Hungarian,  or  Russian  customs 
tariffs  on  July  1,  1914. 

ARTICLE  15.— Poland  undertakes  to  make 
no  treaty,  convention,  or  arrangement,  and  to 
take  no  other  action,  which  will  prevent  her 
from  joining  in  any  general  agreement  for 
the  equitable  treatment  of  the  commerce  of 
other  States  that  may  be  concluded  under  the 
auspices  of  the  League  of  Nations  within  five 
years  from  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present 
treaty. 

Poland  also  undertakes  to  extend  to  all  the 
allied  and  associated  States  any  favors  or  privi- 
leges in  customs  matters  which  they  may  grant 
during  the  same  period  of  five  years  to  any 
State  with  which,  since  August,  1914,  the  Allies 
have  been  at  war,  or  to  any  State  which  may 
have  concluded  with  Austria  special  customs 
arrangements  as  provided  for  in  the  treaty  of 
peace  to  be  concluded  with  Austria. 

ARTICLE  16.— Pending  the  conclusion  of 
the  general  agreement  referred  to  above,  Po- 
land undertakes  to  treat  on  the  same  footing 
as  national  vessels,  or  vessels  of  the  most  fa- 
vored nation,  the  vessels  of  all  the  allied  and 
associated  States  which  accord  similar  treat- 
ment to  Polish  vessels. 

By  way  of  exception  from  this  provision,  the 
right  of  Poland  or  any  other  allied  or  associ- 
ated State  to  confine  her  maritime  coasting 
trade  to  national  vessels  is  expressly  reserved. 

ARTICLE  17. — Pending  the  conclusion,  un- 
der the  auspices  of  the  League  of  Nations,  of 
a  general  convention  to  secure  and  maintain 
freedom  of  communications  and  of  transit, 
Poland  undertakes  to  accord  freedom  of  tran- 


366 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


sit  of  persons,  goods,  vessels,  carriages,  wagons, 
and  mails  in  transit  to  or  from  any  allied  or 
associated  State  over  Polish  territory,  includ- 
ing territorial  waters,  and  to  treat  them  at  least 
as  favorably  as  the  persons,  goods,  vessels,  car- 
riages, wagons,  and  mails  respectively  of  Polish 
or  of  any  other  more  favored  nationality, 
origin,  importation,  or  ownership,  as  regards 
facilities,  charges,  restrictions,  and  all  other 
matters. 

All  charges  imposed  in  Poland  on  such  traffic 
in  transit  shall  be  reasonable,  having  regard 
to  the  conditions  of  the  traffic.  Goods  in  tran- 
sit shall  be  exempt  from  all  customs  or  other 
duties.  Tariffs  for  transit  traffic  across  Poland 
and  tariffs  between  Poland  and  any  allied  or 
associated  power,  involving  through  tickets  or 
waybills,  shall  be  established  at  the  request  of 
that  allied  or  associated  power. 

Freedom  of  transit  will  extend  to  postal, 
telegraphic,  and   telephonic  services. 

It  is  agreed  that  no  allied  or  associated 
power  can  claim  the  benefit  of  these  provisions 
on  behalf  of  any  part  of  its  territory  in  which 
reciprocal  treatment  is  not  accorded  with  re- 
spect to  the  same   subject  matter. 

If  within  a  period  of  five  years  from  the 
coming  into  force  of  the  present  treaty  no 
general  convention  as  aforesaid  shall  have  been 
concluded  under  the  auspices  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  Poland  shall  be  at  liberty  at  any  time 
thereafter  to  give  twelve  months'  notice  to  the 
Secretary  General  of  the  League  of  Nations 
to  terminate  obligations  of  this  article. 

ARTICLE  18. — Pending  the  conclusion  of  a 
general  convention  on  the  international  re- 
gime of  waterways,  Poland  undertakes  to  apply 
to  the  river  system  of  the  Vistula  (including 
the  Bug  and  the  Narest)  the  regime  applicable 
to  international  waterways  set  out  in  Articles 
332  to  337  of  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Ger- 
many. 

ARTICLE  19.— Poland  undertakes  to  ad- 
here, within  twelve  months  of  the  coming  into 
force  of  the  present  treaty,  to  the  international 
conventions  specified  in  Annex  I. 

Poland  undertakes  to  adhere  to  any  new  con- 
vention, concluded  with  the  approval  of  the 
Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  within  five 
years  of  the  coming  into  force  of  the  present 
treaty,  to  replace  any  of  the  international  in- 
struments specified  in  Annex  I. 

The  Polish  Government  undertakes  within 
twelve  months  to  notify  the  Secretary  Gen- 
eral of  the  League  of  Nations  whether  or  not 
Poland  desires  to  adhere  to  either  or  both  of 
the  international  conventions  specified  in 
Annex   II. 

Until  Poland  has  adhered  to  the  two  con- 
ventions last  specified  in  Annex  I.  she  agrees, 
on  condition  of  reciprocity,  to  protect  by  ef- 
fective measures  the  industrial,  literary,  and 
artistic  property  of  nationals  of  the  allied  and 


associated  States.  In  the  case  of  any  allied  or 
associated  State  not  adhering  to  the  said  con- 
ventions, Poland  agrees  to  continue  to  afford 
such  effective  protection  on  the  same  conditions 
until  the  conclusion  of  a  special  bilateral  treaty 
or  agreement  for  that  purpose  with  such  allied 
or  associated   State. 

Pending  her  adhesion  to  the  other  conven- 
tions specified  in  Annex  I.,  Poland  will  secure 
to  the  nationals  of  the  allied  and  associated 
powers  the  advantages  to  which  they  would  be 
entitled    under   the    said   conventions. 

Poland  further  agrees,  on  condition  of  reci- 
procity, to  recognize  and  protect  all  rights 
in  any  industrial,  literary,  or  artistic  property 
belonging  to  the  nationals  of  the  allied  and 
associated  States  now  in  force  or  which,  but  for 
the  war,  would  have  been  in  force  in  any  part 
of  her  territories  before  their  transfer  to 
Poland.  For  such  purposes  they  will  accord 
the  extensions  of  time  agreed  to  in  Articles 
307  and  308  of  the  treaty  with  Germany. 

ANNEX  I 

Telegraphic  and   Radio-Telegraphic 
Conventions 

International  Telegraphic  Convention  signed 
at   St.   Petersburg  July   10-22,   1875. 

Regulations  and  tariffs  drawn  up  by  the 
International  Telegraph  Conference  signed  at 
Lisbon  June  11,  1908. 

International  Radio-Telegraphic  Convention, 
July  5,  1912. 

Railway  Conventions 

Conventions  and  arrangements  signed  at 
Berne  on  Oct.  14,  1890,  Sept.  20,  1893,  July  16, 
1895,  and  Sept.  19,  1906,  and  the  current  sup- 
plementary provisions  made  under  those  con- 
ventions. 

Agreement  on  May  15,  1886,  regarding  the 
sealing  of  railway  trucks  subject  to  custom 
inspections,  and  protocol  of  May  18,  1907. 

Agreement  of  May  15,  1886,  regarding  the 
technical  standardization  of  railways,  as  modi- 
fied on  May  18,  1907. 

Sanitary  Convention 
Convention   of  Dec.   3,   1903. 

Other  Conventions 

Convention  of  Sept.  26,  1906,  for  the  sup- 
pression of  night  work  for  women. 

Convention  of  Sept.  26,  1906,  for  the  sup- 
pression of  the  use  of  white  phosphorus  in  the 
manufacture  of  matches. 

Conventions  of  May  18,  1904,  and  May  4, 
1910,  regarding  the  suppression  of  the  white 
slave   traffic. 

Convention  of  May  4,  1910,  regarding  the 
suppression  of  obscene  publications. 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


367 


International  conventions  of  Paris  of  March 
20,  1883,  as  revised  at  Washington  in  1911,  for 
the  protection  of  industrial  property. 

International  convention  of  Sept.  9,  1886, 
revised  at  Berlin  on  Nov.  13,  1908,  and  com- 
pleted by  the  additional  protocol  signed  at 
Berne  on  March  20,  1914,  for  the  protection 
of  literary  and  artistic   works. 

ANNEX  II 

Agreement  of  Madrid  of  April  14,  1891,  for 
the  prevention  of  false  indications  of  origin 
on  goods,  revised  at  Washington  in  1911,  and 
agreement  of  Madrid  of  April  14,  1891,  for 
the  international  registration  of  trade  marks, 
revised    at    Washington    in    1911. 

ARTICLE  20. — All  rights  and  privileges  ac- 
corded by  the  foregoing  articles  to  the  allied 
and  associated  States  shall  be  accorded  equally 
to  all  States  members  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions. 

The  present  treaty,  of  which  the  French  and 
English  texts  are  both  authentic,  shall  be  rati- 
fied. It  shall  come  into  force  at  the  same 
time  as  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Germany. 

The  deposit  of  ratifications  shall  be  made  at 
Paris. 

Powers  of  which  the  seat  of  the  Government 
is  outside  Europe  will  be  entitled  merely  to 
inform  the  Government  of  the  French  Repub- 
lic through  their  diplomatic  representative  at 
Paris  that  their  ratification  has  been  given.  In 
that  case  they  must  transmit  the  instrument  of 
ratification  as  soon  as   possible. 

A  proces-verbal  of  the  deposit  of  ratifica- 
tions will  be  drawn  up. 

The  French  Government  will  transmit  to  all 
the  signatory  powers  a  certified  copy  of  the 
proces-verbal   of   the   deposit   of   ratifications. 

ARTICLE  21. — Poland  agrees  to  assume  re- 
sponsibility for  such  proportion  of  the  Rus- 
sian public  debt  and  other  Russian  public  lia- 
bilities of  any  kind  as  may  be  assigned  to  her 
under  a  special  convention  between  the  prin- 
cipal allied  and  associated  powers  on  the  one 
hand  and  Poland  on  the  other,  to  be  prepared 
by  a  commission  appointed  by  the  above 
States.  In  the  event  of  the  commission  not 
arriving  at  an  agreement,  the  point  at  issue 
shall  be  referred  for  immediate  arbitration  to 
the  League  of  Nations. 

In  faith  whereof  the  above-named  plenipo- 
tentiaries have  signed  the  present  treaty. 

Done  at  Versailles,  [June  28,  1919,]  in  a  sin- 
gle copy  which  will  remain  deposited  in  the 
archives  of  the  French  Republic,  and  of  which 
authenticated  copies  will  be  transmitted  to  each 
of  the  signatory  powers. 

Austrian  Peace  Treaty.  The  treaty 
of  peace  between  Austria  and  the  Allied 


Powers  was  signed  at  St.  Germain-en- 
Laye,  a  suburb  of  Paris,  on  September 
10,  1919.  The  chief  signatory  for  Aus- 
tria was  Dr.  Karl  Renner,  the  Austrian 
Chancellor,  who  had  tried  every  means 
known  to  diplomacy  to  have  the  terms 
of  the  treaty  modified.  Despite  his  un- 
ceasing efforts  to  bring  about  funda- 
mental changes,  the  treaty  practically 
stood  as  originally  drafted.  On  Sep- 
tember 6,  the  Austrian  Assembly  by  a 
vote  of  97  to  28  decided  to  accept  the 
terms  of  the  treaty.  The  following 
digest  of  and  quotations  from  the  Aus- 
trian treaty  were  taken  from  the  Cur- 
rent History  magazine. 

The  treaty  consists  of  381  articles, 
making  181  pages  in  The  Congressional 
Record.  In  general  terms  it  follows  the 
scheme  of  the  German  treaty.  Part  I., 
consisting  of  the  first  twenty-six  arti- 
cles, is  the  League  of  Nations  covenant, 
already  published  as  part  of  the  treaty 
with  Germany,  which  Austria  likewise 
accepts,  though  she  may  not  become  a 
member  of  the  League  until  admitted 
by  vote  of  the  other  members. 

Part  II.  lays  down  in  detail  the  new 
boundaries  of  Austria.  The  frontiers 
with  Switzerland  and  Lichtenstein  re- 
main unchanged.  The  treaty  contains 
elaborate  clauses  covering  the  cession 
of  territory  to  Italy,  Poland,  Czecho- 
slovakia, and  Jugoslavia.  The  frontiers 
with  Italy,  the  Klagenfurt  area,  and 
Hungary  have  undergone  much  modifi- 
cation ;  that  with  Germany  remains  as 
before.  Boundary  commissions  are  to 
trace  the  various  new  lines,  to  fix  points 
left  undefined  by  the  treaty,  and  to  re- 
vise portions  defined  by  administrative 
boundaries.  The  various  States  in- 
volved are  pledged  to  furnish  all  pos- 
sible information  to  these  commissions. 

One  of  the  most  vital  parts  of  the 
treaty  is  that  entitled  "Political  Clauses 
for  Europe,"  referring  to  Austria's  rela- 


368 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


tions  with  neighbor  nations.  Article  88, 
which  forbids  annexation  of  Austria  by 
Germany,  save  with  the  consent  of  the 
League  of  Nations  Council,  has  a  direct 
connection  with  Article  61  of  the  Ger- 
man Constitution,  which  foreshadowed 
political  union  between  the  two  nations, 
and  which  the  Peace  Conference  com- 
pelled Germany  to  modify. 

Following  is  the  text  of  "Part  III.: 
Political  Clauses  for  Europe" : 

SECTION  I.— ITALY 

Article  36. — Austria  renounces,  so 
far  as  she  is  concerned,  in  favor  of  Italy 
all  rights  and  title  over  the  territory 
of  the  former  Austro-Hungarian  mon- 
archy situated  beyond  the  frontier  laid 
down  in  Article  27  (2)  and  lying  be- 
tween that  frontier,  the  former  Austro- 
Hungarian  frontier,  the  Adriatic  Sea, 
and  the  eastern  frontier  of  Italy  as 
subsequently  determined. 

Austria  similarly  renounces,  so  far 
as  she  is  concerned,  in  favor  of  Italy 
all  rights  and  title  over  other  territory 
of  the  former  Austro-Hungarian  mon- 
archy which  may  be  recognized  as  form- 
ing part  of  Italy  by  any  treaties  which 
may  be  concluded  for  the  purpose  of 
completing  the  present  settlement. 

A  commission  composed  of  five  mem- 
bers, one  nominated  by  Italy,  three  by 
the  other  principal  allied  and  associated 
powers,  and  one  by  Austria,  shall  be 
constituted  within  fifteen  days  from  the 
coming  into  force  of  the  present  treaty 
to  trace  on  the  spot  the  frontier  line 
between  Italy  and  Austria.  The  deci- 
sions of  the  commission  will  be  taken  by 
a  majority  and  shall  be  binding  on  the 
parties  concerned. 

Article  37. — Notwithstanding  the 
provisions  of  Article  269  of  Part  X., 
(Economic  Clauses,)  persons  having 
their  usual  residence  in  the  territories 
of  the  former  Austro-Hungarian  mon- 


archy transferred  to  Italy  who,  during 
the  war,  have  been  outside  the  territories 
of  the  former  Austro-Hungarian  mon- 
archy or  have  been  imprisoned,  in- 
terned or  evacuated,  shall  enjoy  the 
full  benefit  of  the  provisions  of  Articles 
252  and  253  of  Part  X.,  (Economic 
Clauses). 

Article  38. — A  special  convention 
will  determine  the  terms  of  repayment 
in  Austrian  currency  of  the  special  war 
expenditure  advanced  during  the  war  by 
territory  of  the  former  Austro-Hun- 
garian monarchy  transferred  to  Italy 
or  by  public  associations  in  that  terri- 
tory on  account  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian monarchy  under  its  legislation, 
such  as  allowances  to  the  families  of 
persons  mobilized,  requisitions,  billeting 
of  troops,  and  relief  to  persons  who 
have  been  evacuated. 

In  fixing  the  amount  of  these  sums 
Austria  shall  be  credited  with  the 
amount  which  the  territory  would  have 
contributed  to  Austria-Hungary  to 
meet  the  expenses  resulting  from  these 
payments,  this  contribution  being  cal- 
culated according  to  the  proportion  of 
the  revenues  of  the  former  Austro-Hun- 
garian monarchy  derived  from  the  ter- 
ritory in  1913. 

Article  39. — The  Italian  Government 
will  collect  for  its  own  account  the 
taxes,  dues,  and  charges  of  every  kind 
leviable  in  the  territories  transferred  to 
Italy  and  not  collected  on  Nov.  3, 1918. 

Article  40. — No  sum  shall  be  due  by 
Italy  on  the  ground  of  her  entry  into 
possession  of  the  Palazzo  Venezia  at 
Rome. 

Article  41. — Subject  to  the  provi- 
sions of  Article  204  of  Part  IX.,  (Fi- 
nancial Clauses,)  relative  to  the  acqui- 
sition of,  and  payment  for,  State  prop- 
erty and  possessions,  the  Italian  Gov- 
ernment is  substituted  in  all  the  rights 
which  the  Austrian  State  possessed  over 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


369 


all  the  railways  in  the  territories  trans- 
ferred to  Italy  which  were  administered 
by  the  Railway  Administration  of  the 
said  State  and  which  are  actually  work- 
ing or  under  construction. 

The  same  shall  apply  to  the  rights 
of  the  former  Austro-Hungarian  mon- 
archy with  regard  to  railway  and  tram- 
way concessions  within  the  above-men- 
tioned territories. 

The  frontier  railway  stations  shall  be 
determined  by  a  subsequent  agreement. 

Article  42. — Austria  shall  restore  to 
Italy  within  a  period  of  three  months 
all  the  wagons  belonging  to  the  Italian 
railways  which  before  the  outbreak  of 
war  had  passed  into  Austria  and  have 
not  returned  to  Italy. 

Article  43. — Austria  renounces  as 
from  Nov.  3,  1918,  on  behalf  of  herself 
and  her  nationals  in  regard  to  terri- 
tories transferred  to  Italy  all  rights  to 
which  she  may  be  entitled  with  regard 
to  the  products  of  the  aforesaid  terri- 
tories under  any  agreements,  stipula- 
tions, or  laws  establishing  trusts, 
cartels  or  other  similar  organizations. 

Article  44. — For  a  period  of  ten 
years  from  the  coming  into  force  of 
the  present  treaty  central  electric 
power  stations  situated  in  Austrian  ter- 
ritory and  formerly  furnishing  electric 
power  to  the  territories  transferred  to 
Italy  or,  to  any  other  establishment  the 
exploitation  of  which  passes  to  Italy 
shall  be  required  to  continue  furnishing 
this  supply  up  to  an  amount  corre- 
sponding to  the  undertakings  and  con- 
tracts in  force  on  Nov.  3,  1918. 

Austria  further  admits  the  right  of 
Italy  to  the  free  use  of  the  waters  of 
Lake  Raibl  and  its  derivative  water- 
course and  to  divert  the  said  waters  to 
the  basin  of  the  Korinitza. 

Article  45. — (1)  Judgments  ren- 
dered since  Aug.  4,  1914,  by  the  courts 
in  the  territory  transferred  to  Italy  in 


civil  and  commercial  cases  between  the 
inhabitants  of  such  territory  and  other 
nationals  of  the  former  Austrian  em- 
pire, or  between  such  inhabitants  and 
the  subjects  of  the  allies  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  monarchy,  shall  not  be  car- 
ried into  effect  until  after  indorsement 
by  the  corresponding  new  court  in  such 
territory. 

(2)  All  decisions  rendered  for  po- 
litical crimes  or  offenses  since  Aug.  4, 
1914,  by  the  judicial  authorities  of  the 
former  Austro-Hungarian  monarchy 
against  Italian  nationals,  including 
persons  who  obtain  Italian  nationality 
under  the  present  treaty,  shall  be  an- 
nulled. 

(3)  In  all  matters  relating  to  pro- 
ceedings initiated  before  the  coming 
into  force  of  the  present  treaty  before 
the  competent  authorities  of  the  terri- 
tory transferred  to  Italy,  the  Italian 
and  Austrian  judicial  authorities  re- 
spectively shall  until  the  coming  into 
force  of  a  special  convention  on  this 
subject  be  authorized  to  correspond 
with  each  other  direct.  Requests  thus 
presented  shall  be  given  effect  to  so  far 
as  the  laws  of  the  public  character 
allow  in  the  country  to  the  authorities 
of  which  the  request  is  addressed. 

(4)  All  appeals  to  the  higher  Aus- 
trian judicial  and  administrative  au- 
thorities beyond  the  limits  of  the  ter- 
ritory transferred  to  Italy  against  de- 
cisions of  the  administrative  or  judicial 
authorities  of  this  territory  shall  be 
suspended.  The  records  shall  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  authorities  against  whose 
decision  the  appeal  was  entered.  They 
must  be  transmitted  to  the  competent 
Italian  authorities  without  delay. 

(5)  All  other  questions  as  to  juris- 
diction, procedure,  or  the  administra- 
tion of  justice  will  be  determined  by  a 
special  convention  between  Italy  and 
Austria. 


370 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


SECTION     II.— SERB-CROAT-SLO- 
VENE STATE 

Article  46. — Austria,  in  conformity 
with  the  action  already  taken  by  the  al- 
lied and  associated  powers,  recognizes 
the  complete  independence  of  the  Serb- 
Croat-Slovene  State. 

Article  47. — Austria  renounces,  so 
far  as  she  is  concerned,  in  favor  of  the 
Serb-Croat-Slovene  State  all  rights  and 
title  over  the  territories  of  the  former 
Austro-Hungarian  monarchy  situated 
outside  the  frontiers  of  Austria  as  laid 
down  in  Article  27  of  Part  II.,  (Fron- 
tiers of  Austria,)  and  recognized  by  the 
present  treaty,  or  by  any  treaties  con- 
cluded for  the  purpose  of  completing 
the  present  settlement,  as  forming  part 
of  the  Serb-Croat-Slovene  State. 

Article  48. — A  commission  consisting 
of  seven  members,  five  nominated  by  the 
principal  allied  and  associated  powers, 
one  by  the  Serb-Croat-Slovene  State, 
and  one  by  Austria,  shall  be  constituted 
within  fifteen  days  from  the  coming  into 
force  of  the  present  treaty  to  trace  on 
the  spot  the  frontier  line  described  in 
Article  27  (4)  of  Part  II.,  (Frontiers 
of  Austria). 

The  decisions  of  the  commission  will 
be  taken  by  a  majority  and  shall  be 
binding  on  the  parties  concerned. 

Article  49. — The  inhabitants  of  the 
Klagenfurt  area  will  be  called  upon,  to 
the  extent  stated  below,  to  indicate  by 
a  vote  the  State  to  which  they  wish  the 
territory  to  belong. 

[The  definition  of  the  Klagenfurt 
boundaries,  and  a  boundary  division  of 
this  area  into  two  zones  for  the  taking 
of  the  plebiscite,  follow  here.] 

Article  50. — The  Klagenfurt  area 
will  be  placed  under  the  control  of  a 
commission  intrusted  with  the  duty  of 
preparing  the  plebiscite  in  that  area 
and  assuring  the  impartial  administra- 


tion thereof.  This  commission  will  be 
composed  as  follows :  Four  members 
nominated  respectively  by  the  United 
States,  Great  Britain,  France,  and 
Italy,  one  by  Austria,  one  by  the  Serb- 
Croat-Slovene  State ;  the  Austrian 
member  only  taking  part  in  the  delib- 
erations of  the  commission  in  regard  to 
the  second  zone,  and  the  Serb-Croat- 
Slovene  member  only  taking  part  there- 
in with  regard  to  the  first  zone.  The 
decisions  of  the  commission  will  be  taken 
by  a  majority. 

The  second  zone  will  be  occupied  by 
the  Austrian  troops  and  administered 
in  accordance  with  the  general  regula- 
tions of  the  Austrian  legislation. 

The  first  zone  will  be  occupied  by  the 
troops  of  the  Serb-Croat-Slovene  State 
and  administered  in  accordance  with 
the  general  regulations  of  the  legisla- 
tion of  that  State. 

In  both  zones  the  troops,  whether 
Austrian  or  Serb-Croat-Slovene,  shall 
be  reduced  to  the  numbers  which  the 
commission  may  consider  necessary  for 
the  preservation  of  order,  and  shall 
carry  out  their  mission  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  commission.  These  troops 
shall  be  replaced  as  speedily  as  pos- 
sible b}^  a  police  force  recruited  on  the 
spot. 

The  commission  will  be  charged  with 
the  duty  of  arranging  for  the  vote  and 
of  taking  such  measures  as  it  may  deem 
necessary  to  insure  its  freedom,  fair- 
ness, and  secrecy. 

In  the  first  zone  the  plebiscite  will 
be  held  within  three  months  from  the 
coming  into  force  of  the  present  treaty, 
at  a  date  fixed  by  the  commission. 

If  the  vote  is  in  favor  of  the  Serb- 
Croat-Slovene  State,  a  plebiscite  will 
be  held  in  the  second  zone  within  three 
weeks  from  the  proclamation  of  the 
result  of  the  plebiscite  in  the  first  zone, 
at  a  date  to  be  fixed  by  the  commission. 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


371 


If  on  the  other  hand  the  vote  in  the 
first  zone  is  in  favor  of  Austria,  no 
plebiscite  will  be  held  in  the  second  zone, 
and  the  whole  of  the  area  will  remain 
definitely   under  Austrian   sovereignty. 

The  right  of  voting  will  be  granted 
to  every  person  without  distinction  of 
sex  who : 

(a)  Has  attained  the  age  of  twenty 
years  on  or  before  Jan.  1,  1919; 

(b)  Has  on  Jan.  1,  1919,  his  or  her 
habitual  residence  within  the  zone  sub- 
jected to  the  plebiscite;  and, 

(c)  Was  born  within  the  said  zone, 
or  has  had  his  or  her  habitual  residence 
or  rights  of  citizenship  (pertinenza) 
there  from  a  date  previous  to  Jan.  1, 
1912. 

The  result  of  the  vote  will  be  deter- 
mined by  the  majority  of  votes  in  the 
whole  of  each  zone. 

On  the  conclusion  of  each  vote  the 
result  will  be  communicated  by  the  com- 
mission to  the  principal  allied  and  as- 
sociated powers,  with  a  full  report  as 
to  the  taking  of  the  vote,  and  will  be 
proclaimed. 

If  the  vote  is  in  favor  of  the  incor- 
poration either  of  the  first  zone  or  of 
both  zones  in  the  Serb-Croat-Slovene 
State,  Austria  hereby  renounces,  so  far 
as  she  is  concerned  and  to  the  extent 
corresponding  to  the  result  of  the  vote, 
in  favor  of  the  Serb-Croat-Slovene 
State  all  rights  and  title  over  these  ter- 
ritories. 

After  agreement  with  the  commission 
the  Serb-Croat-Slovene  Government 
may  definitively  establish  its  authority 
over  the  said  territories. 

If  the  vote  in  the  first  or  second  zone 
is  in  favor  of  Austria,  the  Austrian 
Government,  after  agreement  with  the 
commission,  will  be  entitled  definitively 
to  re-establish  its  authority  over  the 
whole  of  the  Klagenfurt  area,  or  in  the 
second  zone,  as  the  case  may  be. 


When  the  administration  of  the  coun- 
try, either  by  the  Serb-Croat-Slovene 
State  or  by  Austria,  as  the  case  may 
be,  has  been  thus  assured,  the  powers  of 
the  commission  will  terminate. 

Expenditure  by  the  commission  will 
be  borne  by  Austria  and  the  Serb-Croat- 
Slovene  State  in  equal  moieties. 

Article  51. — The  Serb-Croat-Slovene 
State  accepts  and  agrees  to  embody  in 
a  treaty  with  the  principal  allied  and 
associated  powers  such  provisions  as 
may  be  deemed  necessary  by  these  pow- 
ers to  protect  the  interests  of  inhabi- 
tants of  that  State  who  differ  from  the 
majority  of  the  population  in  race, 
language,  or  religion. 

The  Serb-Croat-Slovene  State  fur- 
ther accepts  and  agrees  to  embody  in 
a  treaty  with  the  principal  allied  and 
associated  powers  such  provisions  as 
these  powers  may  deem  necessary  to 
protect  freedom  of  transit  and  equita- 
ble treatment  of  the  commerce  of  other 
nations. 

Article  52. — The  proportion  and  na- 
ture of  the  financial  obligations  of  the 
former  Austrian  Empire  which  the 
Serb-Croat-Slovene  State  will  have  to 
assume  on  account  of  the  territory 
placed  under  its  sovereignty  will  be  de- 
termined in  accordance  with  Article  203 
of  Part  IX.,  (Financial  Clauses,)  of 
the  present   treaty.  .»*• 

Subsequent  agreements  will  decide  all 
questions  which  are  not  decided  by  the 
present  treaty  and  which  may  arise  in 
consequence  of  the  cession  of  the  said 
territory. 

SECTION  III.— CZECHOSLOVAK 
STATE 

Article  53. — Austria,  in  conformity 
with  the  action  already  taken  by  the 
allied  and  associated  powers,  recognizes 
the  complete  independence  of  the 
Czechoslovak  State,  which  will  include 


372 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


the  autonomous  territory  of  the  Ru- 
thenians  to  the  south  of  the  Carpathi- 
ans. 

Article  B4. — Austria  renounces  so 
far  as  she  is  concerned  in  favor  of  the 
Czechslovak  State  all  rights  and  title 
over  the  territories  of  the  former  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian  Monarchy  situated  out- 
side the  frontiers  of  Austria  as  laid 
down  in  Article  27  of  Part  II.,  (Fron- 
tiers of  Austria,)  and  recognized  in 
accordance  with  the  present  treaty  as 
forming  part  of  the  Czechoslovak 
State. 

Article  55. — A  commission  composed 
of  seven  members,  five  nominated  by  the 
principal  allied  and  associated  powers, 
one  by  the  Czechoslovak  State,  and  one 
by  Austria,  will  be  appointed  fifteen 
days  after  the  coming  into  force  of  the 
present  treaty  to  trace  on  the  spot  the 
frontier  line  laid  down  in  Article  27, 
(6,)  of  Part  II.,  (Frontiers  of  Aus- 
tria,) of  the  present  treaty. 

The  decisions  of  this  commission  will 
be  taken  by  a  majority  and  shall  be 
binding  on  the  parties  concerned. 

Article  56. — The  Czechoslovak  State 
undertakes  not  to  erect  any  military 
works  in  that  portion  of  its  territory 
which  lies  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Danube  to  the  south  of  Bratislava, 
(Pressburg. ) 

Article  57. — The  Czechoslovak  State 
accepts  and  agrees  to  embody  in  a 
treaty  with  the  principal  allied  and  as- 
sociated powers  such  provisions  as  may 
be  deemed  necessary  by  these  powers 
to  protect  the  interests  of  inhabitants 
of  that  State  who  differ  from  the  ma- 
jority of  the  population  in  race,  lan- 
guage, or  religion. 

The  Czechoslovak  State  further  ac- 
cepts and  agrees  to  embody  in  a  treaty 
with  the  principal  allied  and  associated 
powers  such  provisions  as  these  powers 
may   deem   necessary   to   protect   free- 


dom of  transit  and  equitable  treatment 
for  the  commerce  of  other  nations. 

Article  58. — The  proportion  and  na- 
ture of  the  financial  obligations  of  the 
former  Austrian  Empire  which  the 
Czechoslovak  State  will  have  to  assume 
on  account  of  the  territory  placed 
under  its  sovereignty  will  be  determined 
in  accordance  with  Article  203  of  Part 
IX.,  (Financial  Clauses,)  of  the  pres- 
ent treaty. 

Subsequent  agreements  will  decide  all 
questions  which  are  not  decided  by  the 
present  treaty  and  which  may  arise 
in  consequence  of  the  cession  of  the  said 
territory. 

SECTION  IV.— RUMANIA 

Article  59. — Austria  renounces,  so 
far  as  she  is  concerned,  in  favor  of  Ru- 
mania all  rights  and  title  over  such 
portion  of  the  former  Duchy  of  Buko- 
vina  as  lies  within  the  frontiers  of 
Rumania  which  may  ultimately  be  fixed 
by  the  principal  allied  and  associated 
powers. 

Article  60. — Rumania  accepts  and 
agrees  to  embody  in  a  treaty  with  the 
principal  allied  and  associated  powers 
such  provisions  as  may  be  deemed  neces- 
sary by  these  powers  to  protect  the 
interests  of  inhabitants  of  that  State 
who  differ  from  the  majority  of  the 
population  in  race,  language,  or  re- 
ligion. 

Rumania  further  accepts  and  agrees 
to  embody  in  a  treaty  with  the  prin- 
cipal allied  and  associated  powers  such 
provisions  as  these  powers  may  deem 
necessary  to  protect  freedom  of  transit 
and  equitable  treatment  for  the  com- 
merce of  other  nations. 

Article  61. — The  proportion  and  na- 
ture of  the  financial  obligations  of  the 
former  Austrian  Empire  which  Ru- 
mania will  have  to  assume  on  account 
of  the  territory  placed  under  her  sov- 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


373 


ereignty  will  be  determined  in  accord- 
ance with  Article  203  of  Part  IX.,  (Fi- 
nancial Clauses,)  of  the  present  treaty. 
Subsequent  agreements  will  decide  all 
questions  which  are  not  decided  by  the 
present  treaty  and  which  may  arise  in 
consequence  of  the  cession  of  the  said 
territory. 

SECTION  V.— PROTECTION  OF 
MINORITIES 

Article  62. — Austria  undertakes  that 
the  stipulations  contained  in  this  sec- 
tion shall  be  recognized  as  fundamental 
laws,  and  that  no  law,  regulation,  or 
official  action  shall  conflict  or  inter- 
fere with  these  stipulations,  nor  shall 
any  law,  regulation,  or  official  action 
prevail  over  them. 

Article  63. — Austria  undertakes  to 
assure  full  and  complete  protection  of 
life  and  liberty  to  all  inhabitants  of 
Austria,  without  distinction  of  birth, 
nationalty,  language,  race,  or  religion. 

All  inhabitants  of  Austria  shall  be 
entitled  to  the  free  exercise,  whether 
public  or  private,  of  any  creed,  religion, 
or  belief,  whose  practices  are  not  incon- 
sistent with  public  order  or  public 
morals. 

Article  64. — Austria  admits  and  de- 
clares to  be  Austrian  nationals  ipso 
facto  and  without  the  requirement  of 
any  formality  all  persons  possessing  at 
the  date  of  the  coming  into  force  of  the 
present  treaty  rights  of  citizenship, 
(pertinenza,)  within  Austrian  terri- 
tory who  are  not  nationals  of  any  other 
State. 

Article  65. — All  persons  born  in  Aus- 
trian territory  who  are  not  born  na- 
tionals of  another  State  shall  ipso  facto 
become  Austrian  nationals. 

Article  66. — All  Austrian  nationals 
shall  be  equal  before  the  law  and  shall 
enjoy  the  same  civil  and  political  rights 


without  distinction  as  to  race,  lan- 
guage, or  religion. 

Differences  of  religion,  creed,  or  con- 
fession shall  not  prejudice  any  Aus- 
trian national  in  matters  relating  to 
the  enjoyment  of  civil  or  political 
rights,  as  for  instance  admission  to 
public  employments,  functions,  and 
honors,  or  the  exercise  of  professions 
and  industries. 

No  restriction  shall  be  imposed  on 
the  free  use  by  any  Austrian  national 
of  any  language  in  private  intercourse, 
in  commerce,  in  religion,  in  the  press, 
or  in  publications  of  any  kind,  or  at 
public  meetings. 

Notwithstanding  any  establishment 
by  the  Austrian  Government  of  an  offi- 
cial language,  adequate  facilities  shall 
be  given  to  Austrian  nationals  of  non- 
German  speech  for  the  use  of  their  lan- 
guage, either  orally  or  in  writing,  be- 
fore the  courts. 

Article  67. — Austrian  nationals  who 
belong  to  racial,  religious,  or  linguistic 
minorities  shall  enjoy  the  same  treat- 
ment and  security  in  law  and  in  fact  as 
the  other  Austrian  nationals.  In  par- 
ticular, they  shall  have  an  equal  right 
to  establish,  manage,  and  control  at 
their  own  expense  charitable,  religious, 
and  social  institutions,  schools,  and 
other  educational  establishments,  with 
the  right  to  use  their  own  language 
and  to  exercise  their  religion  freely 
therein. 

Article  68. — Austria  will  provide  in 
the  public  educational  system  in  towns 
and  districts  in  which  a  considerable 
proportion  of  Austrian  nationals  of 
other  than  German  speech  are  resi- 
dents adequate  facilities  for  insuring 
that  in  the  primary  schools  the  instruc- 
tion shall  be  given  to  the  children  of 
such  Austrian  nationals  through  the 
medium  of  their  own  language.  This 
provision  shall  not  prevent  the  Austrian 


374 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Government  from  making  the  teaching 
of  the  German  language  obligatory  in 
the  said  schools. 

In  towns  and  districts  where  there  is 
a  considerable  proportion  of  Austrian 
nationals  belonging  to  racial,  religious, 
or  linguistic  minorities,  these  minorities 
shall  be  assured  an  equitable  share  in 
the  enjoyment  and  application  of  the 
sums  which  may  be  provided  out  of 
public  funds  under  the  State,  municipal, 
or  other  budgets  for  education,  reli- 
gious, or  charitable  purposes. 

Article  69. — Austria  agrees  that  the 
stipulations  in  the  foregoing  articles 
of  this  section,  so  far  as  they  affect 
persons  belonging  to  racial,  religious, 
or  linguistic  minorities,  constitute  obli- 
gations of  international  concern  and 
shall  be  placed  under  the  guarantee  of 
the  League  of  Nations.  They  shall  not 
be  modified  without  the  assent  of  a  ma- 
jority of  the  Council  of  the  League  of 
Nations.  The  allied  and  associated 
powers  represented  on  the  council  sev- 
erally agree  not  to  withhold  their  as- 
sent from  any  modification  in  these  ar- 
ticles which  is  in  due  form  assented  to 
by  a  majority  of  the  Council  of  the 
League  of  Nations. 

!  Austria  agrees  that  any  member  of 
the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations 
shall  have  the  right  to  bring  to  the 
attention  of  the  council  any  infraction, 
or  any  danger  of  infraction,  of  any  of 
these  obligations,  and  that  the  council 
may  thereupon  take  such  action  and 
give  such  direction  as  it  may  deem 
proper  and  effective  in  the  circum- 
stances. 

Austria  further  agrees  that  any  dif- 
ference of  opinion  as  to  questions  of 
law  or  fact  arising  out  of  these  articles 
between  the  Austrian  Government  and 
any  one  of  the  principal  allied  and  as- 
sociated powers  or  any  other  power, 
a  member  of  the  Council  of  the  League 


of  Nations,  shall  be  held  to  be  a  dis- 
pute of  an  international  character  un- 
der Article  14  of  the  covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations.  The  Austrian  Gov- 
ernment hereby  consents  that  any  such 
dispute  shall,  if  the  other  party  thereto 
demands,  be  referred  to  the  Permanent 
Court  of  International  Justice.  The 
decision  of  the  permanent  court  shall 
be  final  and  shall  have  the  same  force 
and  effect  as  an  award  under  Article 
13  of  the  covenant. 

SECTION    VI.— CAUSES     RELAT- 
ING TO  NATIONALITY 

Article  70. — Every  person  possess- 
ing rights  of  citizenship  (pertinenza) 
in  territory  which  formed  part  of  the 
territories  of  the  former  Austro-Hun- 
garian  monarch}'  shall  obtain  ipso  facto 
to  the  exclusion  of  Austrian  nationality 
the  nationality  of  the  State  exercising 
sovereignty  over  such  territory. 

Article  71. — Notwithstanding  the 
provisions  of  Article  70,  Italian  na- 
tionality shall  not,  in  the  case  of  terri- 
tory transferred  to  Italy,  be  acquired 
ipso  facto; 

(1)  by  persons  possessing  rights  of 
citizenship  in  such  territory  who  were 
not  born  there : 

(2)  by  persons  who  acquired  their 
rights  of  citizenship  in  such  territory 
after  May  24,  1915,  or  who  acquired 
them  only  by  reason  of  their  official 
position. 

Article  72. — The  persons  referred  to 
in  Article  71,  as  well  as  those  who  (a) 
formerly  possessed  rights  of  citizenship 
in  the  territories  transferred  to  Italy, 
or  whose  father,  or  mother  if  the  father 
is  unknown,  possessed  rights  of  citizen- 
ship in  such  territories,  or  (b)  have 
served  in  the  Italian  Army  during  the 
present  war,  and  their  descendants,  may 
claim  Italian  nationality  subject  to  the 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


375 


conditions  prescribed  in  Article  78  for 
the  right  of  option. 

Article  73. — The  claim  to  Italian  na- 
tionality by  the  persons  referred  to 
in  Article  72  may  in  individual  cases  be 
refused  by  the  competent  Italian  au- 
thority. 

Article  74. — Where  the  claim  to  Ital- 
ian nationality  under  Article  72  is  not 
made,  or  is  refused,  the  persons  con- 
cerned will  obtain  ipso  facto  the  nation- 
ality of  the  State  exercising  sovereignty 
over  the  territory  in  which  they  pos- 
sessed rights  of  citizenship  before  ac- 
quiring such  rights  in  the  territory 
transferred  to  Italy. 

Article  75. — Juridical  persons  estab- 
lished in  the  territories  transferred  to 
Italy  shall  be  considered  Italian  if  they 
are  recognized  as  such  either  by  the 
Italian  administrative  authorities  or  by 
an  Italian  judicial  decision. 

Article  76. — Notwithstanding  the 
provisions  of  Article  70,  persons  who 
acquired  rights  of  citizenship  after  Jan. 
1,  1910,  in  territory  transferred  under 
the  present  treaty  to  the  Serb-Croat- 
Slovene  State,  or  to  the  Czechoslovak 
State,  will  not  acquire  Serb-Croat-Slo- 
vene or  Czechoslovak  nationality  with- 
out a  permit  from  the  Serb-Croat-Slo- 
vene State  or  the  Czechoslovak  State 
respectively. 

Article  77. — If  the  permit  referred  to 
in  Article  76  is  not  applied  for,  or  is 
refused,  the  persons  concerned  will  ob- 
tain ipso  facto  the  nationality  of  the 
State  exercising  sovereignty  over  the 
territory  in  which  they  previously  pos- 
sessed rights  of  citizenship. 

Article  78. — Persons  over  18  years 
of  age  losing  their  Austrian  nationality 
and  obtaining  ipso  facto  a  new  nation- 
ality under  Article  70  shall  be  entitled 
within  a  period  of  one  year  from  the 
coming  into  force  of  the  present  treaty 
to  opt  for  the  nationality  of  the  State 


in  which  they  possessed  rights  of  citi- 
zenship before  acquiring  such  rights  in 
the  territory  transferred. 

Option  by  a  husband  will  cover  his 
wife  and  option  by  parents  will  cover 
their  children  under  18  years  of  age. 

Persons  who  have  exercised  the  above 
right  to  opt  must  within  the  succeeding 
twelve  months  transfer  their  place  of 
residence  to  the  State  for  which  they 
have  opted. 

They  will  be  entitled  to  retain  their 
immovable  property  in  the  territory  of 
the  other  State  where  they  had  their 
place  of  residence  before  exercising  their 
right  to  opt. 

They  may  carry  with  them  their  mov- 
able property  of  every  description.  No 
export  or  import  duties  may  be  imposed 
upon  them  in  connection  with  the  re- 
moval of  such  property. 

Article  79. — Persons  entitled  to  vote 
in  plebiscites  provided  for  in  the  present 
treaty  shall  within  a  period  of  six 
months  after  the  definitive  attribution 
of  the  area  in  which  the  plebiscite  has 
taken  place  be  entitled  to  opt  for  the 
nationality  of  the  State  to  which  the 
area  is  not  assigned. 

The  provisions  of  Article  78  relating 
to  the  right  of  option  shall  apply  equal- 
ly to  the  exercise  of  the  right  under 
this  article. 

Article  80. — Persons  possessing 
rights  of  citizenship  in  territory  form- 
ing part  of  the  former  Austro-Hunga- 
rian  monarchy,  and  differing  in  race 
and  language  from  the  majority  of  the 
population  of  such  territory,  shall  with- 
in six  months  of  the  coming  into  force 
of  the  present  treaty  severally  be  en- 
titled to  opt  for  Austria,  Italy,  Poland, 
Rumania,  the  Serb-Croat-Slovene  State, 
or  the  Czechoslovak  State,  if  the  major- 
ity of  the  population  of  the  State  se- 
lected is  of  the  same  race  and  language 
as   the  person  exercising  the   right  to 


376 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


opt.  The  provisions  of  Article  78  as 
to  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  option 
shall  apply  to  the  right  of  option  given 
by  this  article. 

Article  81. — The  high  contracting 
parties  undertake  to  put  no  hindrance 
in  the  way  of  the  exercise  of  the  right 
which  the  persons  concerned  have  under 
the  present  treaty,  or  under  treaties 
concluded  by  the  allied  and  associated 
powers  with  Germany,  Hungary  or  Rus- 
sia, or  between  any  of  the  allied  and 
associated  powers  themselves,  to  choose 
any  other  nationality  which  may  be 
open  to  them. 

Article  82. — For  the  purposes  of  the 
provisions  of  this  section,  the  status  of 
a  married  woman  will  be  governed  by 
that  of  her  husband,  and  the  status  of 
children  under  18  years  of  age  by  that 
of  their  parents-. 

SECTION  VII.—  CLAUSES  RELAT- 
ING TO  CERTAIN  NATIONS 

[Section  VII.  binds  Austria  to  accept 
all  allied  terms  relating  to  Belgium, 
Luxemburg,  Schleswig,  Turkey,  Bul- 
garia, and  the  Russian  States.] 

SECTION    VIII.— GENERAL    PRO- 
VISIONS 

Article  88. — The  independence  of 
Austria  is  inalienable  otherwise  than 
with  the  consent  of  the  Council  of  the 
League  of  Nations.  Consequently  Aus- 
tria undertakes  in  the  absence  of  the 
consent  of  the  said  Council  to  abstain 
from  any  act  which  might  directly  or 
indirectly  or  by  any  means  whatever 
compromise  her  independence,  particu- 
larly, and  until  her  admission  to  mem- 
bership of  the  League  of  Nations,  by 
participation  in  the  affairs  of  another 
power. 

Article  89. — Austria  hereby  recog- 
nizes and  accepts  the  frontiers  of  Bul- 
garia,  Greece,  Hungary,   Poland,   Ru- 


mania, the  Serb-Croat-Slovene  State, 
and  the  Czechoslovak  State  as  these 
frontiers  may  be  determined  by  the  prin- 
cipal allied  and  associated  powers. 

Article  90. — Austria  undertakes  to 
recognize  the  full  force  of  the  treaties 
of  peace  and  additional  conventions 
which  have  been  or  may  be  concluded 
by  the  allied  and  associated  powers 
with  the  powers  who  fought  on  the  side 
of  the  former  Austro-Hungarian  mon- 
archy, and  to  recognize  whatever  dis- 
positions have  been  or  may  be  made 
concerning  the  territories  of  the  former 
German  Empire,  of  Hungary,  of  the 
Kingdom  of  Bulgaria  and  of  the  Otto- 
man Empire,  and  to  recognize  the  new 
States  within  their  frontiers  as  there 
laid  down. 

Article  91. — Austria  renounces  so  far 
as  she  is  concerned  in  favor  of  the 
principal  allied  and  associated  powers 
all  rights  and  title  over  the  territories 
which  previously  belonged  to  the  for- 
mer Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  and 
which,  being  situated  outside  the  new 
frontiers  of  Austria  as  described  in 
Article  27  of  Part  II.,  (Frontiers  of 
Austria,)  have  not  at  present  been  as- 
signed to  any  State. 

Austria  undertakes  to  accept  the  set- 
tlement made  by  the  principal  allied 
and  associated  powers  in  regard  to 
these  territories,  particularly  in  so  far 
as  concerns  the  nationality  of  the  in- 
habitants. 

Article  92. — No  inhabitant  of  the 
territories  of  the  former  Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy  shall  be  disturbed  or 
molested  on  account  either  of  his  polit- 
ical attitude  between  July  28,  1914,  and 
the  definite  settlement  of  the  sovereign- 
ty over  these  territories,  or  of  the  de- 
termination of  his  nationality  effected 
by  the  present  treaty. 

Article  93. — Austria  will  hand  over 
without  delay  to  the  allied  and  associ- 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


377 


ated  Governments  concerned  archives, 
registers,  plans,  title-deeds,  and  docu- 
ments of  every  kind  belonging  to  the 
civil,  military,  financial,  judicial  or 
other  forms  of  administration  in  the 
ceded  territories.  If  any  one  of  these 
documents,  archives,  registers,  title- 
deeds  or  plans  is  missing,  it  shall  be  re- 
stored by  Austria  upon  the  demand 
of  the  allied  or  associated  Government 
concerned. 

In  case  the  archives,  registers,  plans, 
title-deeds  or  documents  referred  to  in 
the  preceding  paragraph,  exclusive  of 
those  of  a  military  character,  concern 
equally  the  administrations  in  Austria, 
and  cannot  therefore  be  handed  over 
without  inconvenience  to  such  adminis- 
trations, Austria  undertakes,  subject  to 
reciprocity,  to  give  access  thereto  to 
the  allied  and  associated  Governments 
concerned. 

Article  94. — Separate  conventions 
between  Austria  and  each  of  the  States 
to  which  territory  of  the  former  Aus- 
trian Empire  is  transferred,  and  each  of 
the  States  arising  from  the  dismember- 
ment of  the  former  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy,  will  provide  for  the  interests 
of  the  inhabitants,  especially  in  connec- 
tion with  their  civil  rights,  their  com- 
merce, and  the  exercise  of  their  profes- 
sions. 

PART     IV.— AUSTRIAN      INTER- 
ESTS OUTSIDE  EUROPE 

Article  95. — In  territory  outside  her 
frontiers  as  fixed  by  the  present  treaty 
Austria  renounces  so  far  as  she  is  con- 
cerned all  rights,  titles  and  privileges 
whatever  in  or  over  territory  outside 
Europe  which  belonged  to  the  former 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  or  to  its 
allies,  and  all  rights,  titles  and  privileges 
whatever  their  origin  which  it  held  as 
against  the  allied  and  associated  powers. 

Austria    undertakes    immediately    to 


recognize  and  to  conform  to  the  meas- 
ures which  may  be  taken  now  or  in  the 
future  by  the  principal  allied  and  asso- 
ciated powers,  in  agreement  where  neces- 
sary with  third  powers,  in  order  to  car- 
ry the  above  stipulation  into  effect. 

SECTION  I.— MOROCCO 

Article  96. — Austria  renounces  so 
far  as  she  is  concerned  all  rights,  titles 
and  privileges  conferred  on  her  by  the 
General  Act  of  Algeciras  of  April  7, 
1906,  and  by  the  Franco-German  agree- 
ments of  Feb.  9,  1909,  and  Nov.  4, 
1911.  All  treaties,  agreements,  ar- 
rangements and  contracts  concluded  by 
the  former  Austro-Hungarian  Mon- 
archy with  the  Sherifian  Empire  are  re- 
garded as  abrogated  as  from  Aug.  12, 
1914. 

In  no  case  can  Austria  avail  herself 
of  these  acts  and  she  undertakes  not  to 
intervene  in  any  way  in  negotiations 
relating  to  Morocco  which  may  take 
place  between  France  and  the  other 
powers. 

Article  97. — Austria  hereby  accepts 
all  the  consequences  of  the  establish- 
ment of  the  French  protectorate  in 
Morocco,  which  had  been  recognized  by 
the  Government  of  the  former  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy,  and  she  re- 
nounces so  far  as  she  is  concerned  the 
regime  of  the  capitulations  in  Morocco. 

This  renunciation  shall  take  effect  as 
from  Aug.  12,  1914. 

Article  98. — The  Sherifian  Govern- 
ment shall  have  complete  liberty  of  ac- 
tion in  regulating  the  status  of  Austrian 
nationals  in  Morocco  and  the  conditions 
in  which  they  can  establish  themselves. 

Austrian  protected  persons,  semsars, 
and  "associes  agricoles"  shall  be  con- 
sidered to  have  ceased,  as  from  Aug.  12, 
1914,  to  enjoy  the  privileges  attached 
to  their  status  and  shall  be  subject  to 
the  ordinary  law. 


378 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


Article  99. — All  movable  and  immov- 
able property  in  the  Sherifian  Empire 
belonging  to  the  former  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Monarchy  passes  ipso  facto  to 
the  Maghzen  without  compensation. 

For  this  purpose,  the  property  and 
possessions  of  the  former  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Monarchy  shall  be  deemed  to  in- 
clude all  the  property  of  the  crown, 
and  the  private  property  of  members 
of  the  former  royal  family  of  Austria- 
Hungary. 

All  movable  and  immovable  property 
in  the  Sherifian  Empire  belonging  to 
Austrian  nationals  shall  be  dealt  with 
in  accordance  with  Sections  3  and  4  of 
Part  X.  (Economic  Clauses)  of  the 
present  treaty. 

Mining  rights  which  may  be  recog- 
nized as  belonging  to  Austrian  nation- 
als by  the  Court  of  Arbitration  set  up 
under  the  Moroccan  Mining  Regula- 
tions shall  be  treated  in  the  same  way 
as  property  in  Morocco  belonging  to 
Austrian  nationals. 

Article  100. — The  Austrian  Govern- 
ment shall  insure  the  transfer  to  the 
person  nominated  by  the  French  Gov- 
ernment of  the  shares  representing  Aus- 
tria's portion  of  the  capital  of  the  State 
Bank  of  Morocco.  This  person  will 
repay  to  the  persons  entitled  thereto 
the  value  of  these  shares,  which  shall 
be  indicated  by  the  State  Bank. 

This  transfer  will  take  place  without 
prejudice  to  the  repayment  of  debts 
which  Austrian  nationals  may  have  con- 
tracted toward  the  State  Bank  of  Mo- 
rocco. 

Article  101. — Moroccan  goods  enter- 
ing Austria  shall  enjoy  the  treatment 
accorded  to  French  goods. 

SECTION  II.— EGYPT 

Article  102. — Austria  declares  that 
she  recognizes  the  protectorate  pro- 
claimed over  Egypt  by  Great  Britain 


on  Dec.  18,  1914,  and  that  she  re- 
nounces so  far  as  she  is  concerned  the 
regime  of  the  capitulations  in  Egypt. 

This  renunciation  shall  take  effect  as 
from  Aug.  12,  1914. 

Article  103. — All  treaties,  agree- 
ments, arrangements  and  contracts  con- 
cluded by  the  Government  of  the  for- 
mer Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  with 
Egypt  are  regarded  as  abrogated  as 
from  Aug.  12,  1914. 

In  no  case  can  Austria  avail  herself 
of  these  instruments,  and  she  undertakes 
not  to  intervene  in  any  way  in  negotia- 
tions relating  to  Egypt  which  may  take 
place  between  Great  Britain  and  the 
other  powers. 

Article  104. — Until  an  Egyptian  law 
of  judicial  organization  establishing 
courts  with  universal  jurisdiction  comes 
into  force,  provision  shall  be  made,  by 
means  of  decrees  issued  by  his  Highness 
the  Sultan,  for  the  exercise  of  jurisdic- 
tion over  Austrian  nationals  and  prop- 
erty by  the  British  Consular  tribunals. 

Article  105. — The  Egyptian  Govern- 
ment shall  have  complete  liberty  of  ac- 
tion in  regulating  the  status  of  Austrian 
nationals  and  the  conditions  under  which 
they  may  establish  themselves  in  Egypt. 

Article  106. — Austria  consents  so  far 
as  she  is  concerned  to  the  abrogation  of 
the  decree  issued  by  his  Highness  the 
Khedive  on  Nov.  28,  1904,  relating  to 
the  Commission  of  the  Egyptian  Public 
Debt,  or  to  such  changes  as  the  Egyp- 
tian Government  may  think  it  desirable 
to  make  therein. 

Article  107. — Austria  consents,  in  so 
far  as  she  is  concerned,  to  the  transfer 
to  his  Britannic  Majesty's  Government 
of  the  powers  conferred  on  his  Imperial 
Majesty  the  Sultan  by  the  convention 
signed  at  Constantinople  on  Oct.  29, 
1888,  relating  to  the  free  navigation  of 
the  Suez  Canal. 

She  renounces  all  participation  in  the 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


379 


Sanitary,  Maritime,  and  Quarantine 
Board  of  Egypt,  and  consents,  in  so  far 
as  she  is  concerned,  to  the  transfer  to 
the  Egyptian  authorities  of  the  powers 
of  that  board. 

Article  108. — All  property  and  pos- 
sessions in  Egypt  of  the  former  Austro- 
Hungarian  monarchy  pass  to  the 
Egyptian  Government  without  payment. 

For  this  purpose,  the  property  and 
possessions  of  the  former  Austro-Hun- 
garian  monarchy  shall  be  deemed  to  in- 
clude all  the  property  of  the  crown, 
and  the  private  property  of  members 
of  the  former  royal  family  of  Austria- 
Hungary. 

All  movable  and  immovable  property 
in  Egypt  belonging  to  Austrian  nation- 
als shall  be  dealt  with  in  accordance 
with  Sections  III.  and  IV.  of  Part  X., 
(Economic  Clauses,)  of  the  present 
treaty. 

Article  109. — Egyptian  goods  enter- 
ing Austria  shall  enjoy  the  treatment 
accorded  to  British  goods. 

SECTION  III.— SIAM 

Article  110. — Austria  recognizes,  so 
far  as  she  is  concerned,  that  all  treaties, 
conventions,  and  agreements  between  the 
former  Austro-Hungarian  monarchy 
and  Siam,  and  all  rights,  titles,  and 
privileges  derived  therefrom,  including 
all  rights  of  extraterritorial  jurisdic- 
tion, terminated  as  from  July  22,  1917. 

Article  111. — Austria,  so  far  as  she 
is  concerned,  cedes  to  Siam  all  her  rights 
over  the  goods  and  property  in  Siam 
which  belonged  to  the  former  Austro- 
Hungarian  monarchy,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  premises  used  as  diplomatic  or 
consular  residences  or  offices,  as  well  as 
the  effects  and  furniture  which  they  con- 
tain. These  goods  and  property  pass 
ipso  facto  and  without  compensation 
to  the  Siamese  Government. 

The    goods,    property,    and    private 


rights  of  Austrian  nationals  in  Siam 
shall  be  dealt  with  in  accordance  with 
the  provisions  of  Part  X.,  (Economic 
Clauses,)  of  the  present  treaty. 

Article  112. — Austria  waives  all 
claims  against  the  Siamese  Government 
on  behalf  of  herself  or  her  nationals 
arising  out  of  the  liquidation  of  Aus- 
trian property  or  the  internment  of 
Austrian  nationals  in  Siam.  This  pro- 
vision shall  not  affect  the  rights  of  the 
parties  interested  in  the  proceeds  of  any 
such  liquidation,  which  shall  be  gov- 
erned by  the  provisions  of  Part  X., 
(Economic  Clauses,)  of  the  present 
treaty. 

SECTION  IV.— CHINA 

Article  113. — Austria  renounces,  so 
far  as  she  is  concerned,  in  favor  of 
China  all  benefits  and  privileges  result- 
ing from  the  provisions  of  the  final 
protocol  signed  at  Peking  on  Sept.  7, 

1901,  and  from  all  annexes,  notes,  and 
documents  supplementary  thereto.  She 
likewise  renounces  in  favor  of  China 
any  claim  to  indemnities  accruing  there- 
under subsequent  to  Aug.  14,  1917. 

Article  114. — From  the  coming  into 
force  of  the  present  treaty  the  high 
contracting  parties  shall  apply,  in  so 
far  as  concerns  them  respectively : 

( 1 )  The    arrangement   of   Aug.    29, 

1902,  regarding  the  new  Chinese  cus- 
toms tariff. 

(2)  The  arrangement  of  Sept.  27, 
1905,  regarding  Whang-Poo,  and  the 
provisional  supplementary  arrange- 
ment of  April  4,  1912. 

China,  however,  will  not  be  bound  to 
grant  to  Austria  the  advantages  or 
privileges  which  she  allowed  to  the  for- 
mer Austro-Hungarian  monarchy  un- 
der these  arrangements. 

Article  115. — Austria,  so  far  as  she 
is  concerned,  cedes  to  China  all  her 
rights  over  the  buildings,  wharves  and 


380 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


pontoons,  barracks,  forts,  arms  and 
munitions  of  war,  vessels  of  all  kinds, 
wireless  telegraphy  installations  and 
other  public  property  which  belonged 
to  the  former  Austro-Hungarian  mon- 
archy, and  which  are  situated  or  may 
be  in  the  Austro-Hungarian  concession 
at  Tientsin  or  elsewhere  in  Chinese  ter- 
ritory. 

It  is  understood,  however,  that  prem- 
ises used  as  diplomatic  or  consular  resi- 
dences or  offices,  as  well  as  the  effects 
and  furniture  contained  therein,  are  not 
included  in  the  above  cession,  and,  fur- 
thermore, that  no  steps  shall  be  taken 
by  the  Chinese  Government  to  dispose 
of  the  public  and  private  property  be- 
longing to  the  former  Austro-Hunga- 
rian monarchy  situated  within  the  so- 
called  Legation  Quarter  at  Peking 
without  the  consent  of  the  diplomatic 
representatives  of  the  powers  which,  on 
the  coming  into  force  of  the  present 
treaty,  remain  parties  to  the  final  pro- 
tocol of  Sept.  7,  1901. 

Article  116. — Austria  agrees,  so  far 
as  she  is  concerned,  to  the  abrogation 
of  the  leases  from  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment under  which  the  Austro-Hungarian 
concession  at  Tientsin  is  now  held. 

China,  restored  to  the  full  exercise  of 
her  sovereign  rights  in  the  above  area, 
declares  her  intention  of  opening  it  to 
international  residence  and  trade.  She 
further  declares  that  the  abrogation  of 
the  leases  under  which  the  said  conces- 
sion is  now  held  shall  not  affect  the 
property  rights  of  nationals  of  allied 
and  associated  powers  who  are  holders 
of  lots  in  this  concession. 

Article  117. — Austria  waives  all 
claims  against  the  Chinese  Government 
or  against  any  allied  or  associated  Gov- 
ernment arising  out  of  the  internment 
of  Austrian  nationals  in  China  and 
their  repatriation.  She  equally  re- 
nounces, so  far  as  she  is  concerned,  all 


claims  arising  out  of  the  capture  and 
condemnation  of  Austro-Hungarian 
ships  in  China,  or  the  liquidation,  se- 
questration or  control  of  Austrian 
properties,  rights  and  interests  in  that 
country  since  Aug.  14,  1917.  This 
provision,  however,  shall  not  affect  the 
rights  of  the  parties  interested  in  the 
proceeds  of  any  such  liquidation,  which 
shall  be  governed  by  the  provisions  of 
Part  X.,  (Economic  Clauses,)  of  the 
present  treaty. 

MILITARY  AND  NAVAL  CLAUSES 

The  disarmament  of  Austria  is  re- 
quired in  as  great  detail  as  in  the  case 
of  Germany.  The  Austrian  Army  is 
not  to  exceed  30,000  men.  The  number 
of  guns  and  machine  guns  is  strictly 
limited,  mobilization  is  forbidden  and 
compulsory  military  service  is  abolished. 
Surplus  armament  and  munitions  must 
be  turned  over  to  the  Allies.  The  manu- 
facture of  arms  is  restricted  to  one  fac- 
tory controlled  by  the  State,  and  the 
use  of  gases  for  warfare  is  prohibited. 

The  Austrian  Navy  henceforth  will 
consist  of  three  patrol  boats  on  the 
Danube.  All  warships  and  submarines 
are  declared  finally  surrendered  to  the 
Allies  and  the  treaty  names  thirty-two 
cruisers  and  fleet  auxiliaries,  including 
the  President  Wilson,  (ex-Kaiser  Franz 
Joseph,)  which  are  to  be  disarmed  and 
treated  as  merchant  ships.  All  warships 
begun  must  be  broken  up. 

'Austria  will  not  be  allowed  to  main- 
tain any  military  or  naval  air  forces 
nor  any-  dirigibles,  and  all  such  equip- 
ment and  material  must  be  delivered  to 
the  Allies. 

The  disarmament  of  Austria  will  be 
carried  out  under  the  supervision  of  an 
interallied  commission,  on  which  the 
United  States  will  be  represented. 

The  repatriation  of  Austrian  prison- 
ers of  war  and  interned  civilians  is  fully 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


381 


provided  for  under  a  joint  commission. 
Austrians  accused  of  violating  the 
laws  and  customs  of  war  are  to  be  de- 
livered to  the  Allies  for  trial  by  military 
tribunals,  together  with  all  documentary 
evidence. 

REPARATIONS 

Details  of  reparations  to  be  made  by 
Austria  are  given  in  Part  VII.,  notably 
in  the  following  articles: 

Article  177. — The  allied  and  associ- 
ated Governments  affirm,  and  Austria 
accepts  the  responsibility  of  Austria 
and  her  allies  for  causing  the  loss  and 
damage  to  which  the  allied  and  associ- 
ated Governments  and  their  nationals 
have  been  subjected  as  a  consequence  of 
the  war  imposed  upon  them  by  the  ag- 
gression of  Austria-Hungary  and  her 
allies. 

Article  178. — The  allied  and  associ- 
ated Governments  recognize  that  the  re- 
sources of  Austria  are  not  adequate, 
after  taking  into  account  the  permanent 
diminutions  of  such  resources  which  will 
result  from  other  provisions  of  the  pres- 
ent treaty,  to  make  complete  reparation 
for  such  loss  and  damage. 

The  allied  and  associated  Govern- 
ments, however,  require  and  Austria 
undertakes  that  she  will  make  compensa- 
tion as  hereinafter  determined  for  dam- 
age on  to  the  civilian  population  of 
the  allied  and  associated  powers  and 
to  their  property  during  the  period  of 
the  belligerency  of  each  as  an  allied  and 
associated  power  against  Austria  by 
the  said  aggression  by  land,  by  sea,  and 
from  the  air,  and  in  general  damage  as 
defined  in  Annex  1  hereto. 

Article  179. — The  amount  of  such 
damage  for  which  compensation  is  to 
be  made  by  Austria  shall  be  determined 
by  an  interallied  commission  to  be 
called  the  Reparation  Commission  and 
constituted  in  the   form  and  with  the 


powers  set  forth  hereunder  and  in  an- 
nexed Nos.  II.-V.  inclusive  hereto.  The 
commission  is  the  same  as  that  provided 
for  under  Article  233  of  the  treaty  with 
Germany,  subject  to  any  modifications 
resulting  from  the  present  treaty.  The 
commission  shall  constitute  a  section  to 
consider  the  special  questions  raised  by 
the  application  of  the  present  treaty. 
This  section  shall  have  consultative 
power  only,  except  in  cases  in  which  the 
commission  shall  delegate  to  it  such 
powers  as  may  be  deemed  convenient. 

The  Reparation  Commission  shall 
consider  the  claims  and  give  to  the 
Austrian  Government  a  just  opportu- 
nity to  be  heard. 

The  commission  shall  concurrently 
draw  up  a  schedule  of  payments  pre- 
scribing the  time  and  manner  for  se- 
curing and  discharging  by  Austria  with- 
in thirty  years  dating  from  May  1, 
1921,  that  part  of  the  debt  which  shall 
have  been  assigned  to  her,  after  the 
commission  has  decided  whether  Ger- 
many is  in  a  position  to  pay  the  balance 
of*  the  total  amount  of  claims  presented 
by  Germany  and  her  allies  and  ap- 
proved by  the  commission.  If,  however, 
within  the  period  mentioned  Austria 
fails  to  discharge  her  obligations,  any 
balance  remaining  unpaid  may  within 
the  discretion  of  the  commission  be 
postponed  for  settlement  in  subsequent 
years,  or  may  be  handled  otherwise  in 
such  manner  as  the  allied  and  associ- 
ated governments  acting  in  accordance 
with  the  procedure  laid  down  in  this 
part  of  the  present  treaty  shall  deter- 
mine. 

MODIFICATION  POSSIBLE 

Article  180. — The  Reparation  Com- 
mission shall  after  May  1,  1921,  from 
time  to  time  consider  the  resources  and 
capacity  of  Austria  and,  after  giving 
her  representatives  a  just  opportunity 


382 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


to  be  heard,  shall  have  discretion  to  ex- 
tend the  date  and  to  modify  the  form 
of  payments,  such  as  are  to  be  provided 
for  in  accordance  with  Article  179,  but 
not  to  cancel  any  part  except  with  the 
specific  authority  of  the  several  Gov- 
ernments represented  on  the  commis- 
sion. 

Article  181. — Austria  shall  pay  in 
the  course  of  the  year  1919,  1920,  and 
the  first  four  months  of  1921,  in  such  in- 
stallments and  in  such  manner  (whether 
in  gold,  commodities,  ships,  securities 
or  otherwise)  as  the  Reparation  Com- 
mission may  lay  down,  a  reasonable  sum 
which  shall  be  determined  by  the  com- 
mission. 

Out  of  this  sum  the  expenses  of  the 
armies  of  occupation  subsequent  to  the 
armistice  of  Nov.  3,  1918,  shall  first 
be  met,  and  such  supplies  of  food  and 
raw  materials  as  may  be  judged  by  the 
Governments  of  the  principal  allied  and 
associated  powers  essential  to  enable 
Austria  to  meet  her  obligations  for  rep- 
aration may  also,  with  the  approval  of 
said  Government,  be  paid  for  out  of  the 
above  sum.  The  balance  shall  be  reck- 
oned toward  the  liquidation  of  the 
amount  due  for  reparation. 

ANNEXES 

Annex  No.  1  to  the  reparation  arti- 
cles schedules  in  detail  the  damages 
which  may  be  claimed  of  Austria  for 
injuries  to  persons  or  property  result- 
ing from  acts  of  war,  including  naval 
and  military  pensions  paid  by  the  Al- 
lies, and  also  including  repayment  of 
levies  or  fines  on  civilian  populations. 

Annex  No.  2  sets  forth  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  Reparation  Commission,  its 
procedure  in  assessing  damage  pay- 
ments by  Austria  and  the  financial  ar- 
rangements Austria  is  required  to  make 
to  secure  to  the  Allies  the  discharge  of 
its  obligations. 


Annex  No.  3  provides  for  the  replace- 
ment by  Austria  "ton  for  ton  (gross 
tonnage)  and  class  for  class  of  all  mer- 
chant ships  and  fishing  boats  lost  or 
damaged  owing  to  the  war,"  and  the 
Austrian  Government  cedes  to  the  Allies 
the  property  in  all  merchant  ships  and 
fishing  boats  "belonging  to  nationals  of 
the  former  Austrian  Empire." 

Under  Annex  No.  4  Austria  under- 
takes to  devote  her  economic  resources 
directly  to  the  physical  restoration  of 
invaded  allied  territory. 

In  partial  reparation  Austria  is  re- 
quired under  Annex  No.  5  to  make  an- 
nual deliveries  of  timber  and  manufac- 
tures of  iron  and  magnesite. 

Annex  No.  6  provides  for  the  renun- 
ciation to  Italy  of  all  Austrian  cables 
in  Italian  ports  and  of  other  specified 
cables  to  the  allied  powers. 

By  special  provisions  laid  down  by 
Article  191-196  (including  annex)  Aus- 
tria is  required  to  surrender  all  loot 
from  invaded  allied  territory,  particu- 
larly objects  of  art  and  historical  rec- 
ords taken  from  Italy  by  the  Haps- 
burgs,  not  only  in  this  but  in  previous 
wars.  Some  of  the  loot  from  Italy  which 
the  Austrians  are  required  to  return 
are  the  Crown  jewels  of  Tuscany  and 
the  private  jewels  of  the  Princess  Elec- 
tress  of  Medici  and  other  Medici  heir- 
looms removed  to  Vienna  in  the  eight- 
eenth century ;  the  furniture  and  silver 
plate  belonging  to  the  House  of  Medici 
and  the  "jewel  of  Aspasius"  in  pay- 
ment of  debt  owed  by  the  House  of  Aus- 
tria to  the  Crown  of  Tuscany,  and  also 
the  "ancient  instruments  of  astronomy 
and  physics  belonging  to  the  Academy 
of  Cimento,  removed  by  the  House  of 
Lorraine  and  sent  as  a  present  to  the 
cousins  of  the  imperial  house  of 
Vienna." 

This  annex  also  specifies  the  return 
to   Italy  of  "The  Virgin"  by  Andrea 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


383 


del  Sarto,  and  four  drawings  by  Cor- 
reggio  belonging  to  the  Pinacothek  of 
Modena  and  removed  in  1859  by  Duke 
Francis  V. ;  numerous  manuscripts  and 
rare  books  and  bronzes  stolen  from 
Modena  and  "objects  made  in  Palermo 
in  the  twelfth  century  for  the  Norman 
Kings  and  employed  in  the  coronation 
of  the  Emperors." 

Austria  also  is  required  to  restore  to 
Belgium  various  works  of  art  removed 
to  Vienna  in  the  eighteenth  century. 

To  Poland,  Austria  is  required  to  re- 
store the  gold  cup  of  King  Ladislas  IV., 
No.  1,114  of  the  Court  Museum  at 
Vienna. 

Czechoslovakia  will  get  back  many 
historical  documents  removed  by  Maria 
Theresa  and  works  of  art  taken  from 
the  Bohemian  royal  castles  by  various 
Austrian  Emperors  in  the  eighteenth 
century. 

The  remainder  of  the  treaty  is  taken 
up  by  financial,  economic,  legal,  river 
and  maritime,  transport,  labor  and  gen- 
eral miscellaneous  clauses  subsidiary  to 
the  main  provisions  of  the  treaty  sum- 
marized or  quoted  above.  These  sec- 
tions are  essentially  similar  to  those  in 
the  German  peace  treaty. 

THE  BULGARIAN  TREATY 

On  November  27,  1919,  the  treaty 
of  peace  between  the  Entente  Allies 
and  Bulgaria  was  signed  in  the  May- 
or's office  at  Neuilly,  near  Paris.  Al- 
though the  United  States  had  not  de- 
clared war  on  Bulgaria,  the  treaty  was 
signed  by  Frank  L.  Polk,  Henry 
White,  and  General  Bliss  for  that  coun- 
try. The  chief  Bulgarian  signature 
was  that  of  M.  Stambuliwsky,  the 
Prime  Minister  of  Bulgaria.  A  sum- 
mary of  the  terms  handed  Bulgaria  in 
the  middle  of  September  follows. 

Bulgaria  agrees  to — 


Reduce  her  army  to  20,000  men  and 
gendarmerie  to  10,000. 

Surrender  her  warships  and  subma- 
rines to  the  Allies. 

Recognize  the  independence  of  Jugo- 
slavia and  return  property  taken  from 
that  state  during  the  war. 

Cede  Western  Thrace  to  the  Allies 
for  future  disposition. 

Modify  her  frontier  at  four  places  in 
favor  of  Serbia  and  compensate  Serbia 
for  stolen  coal. 

Pay  $450,000,000  in  gold  as  repara- 
tion for  damages. 

Renounce  the  treaties  of  Brest- 
Litovsk  and  Bucharest. 

The  treaty  which  was  handed  to 
the  Bulgarian  delegation  in  Paris  fol- 
lowed the  same  general  plan  as  the  Aus- 
trian treaty.  Many  clauses  are  iden- 
tical with  the  Austrian  pact,  except  for 
the  substitution  of  names,  such  as  the 
League  of  Nations,  labor,  aerial  navi- 
gation, penalties,  prisoners  of  war  and 
graves. 

Minority  Races  Protected.  The  Bul- 
garians are  required  to  recognize  the 
independence  of  the  Serb,  Croats  and 
Slovene  state,  and  provisions  are  made 
to  change  the  nationality  of  the  inhabit- 
ants of  the  territory  formerly  Bulga- 
rian and  transferred  to  other  states. 
Provisions  are  made  for  protection  of 
the  minorities  of  race,  language,  na- 
tionality and  religion.  Within  three 
months  the  Bulgarians  are  required  to 
demobilize  the  army  and  substitute  vol- 
unteer enlistments. 

The  Bulgarian  army  is  reduced  to 
20,000  men,  exclusively  for  the  main- 
tenance of  order  and  frontier  control. 
The  manufacture  of  war  material  is  con- 
fined to  one  establishment,  the  other 
establishments  to  be  closed  or  converted. 

Bulgaria  agrees  to  return  to  Greece, 
Roumania  and  the  Serb,  Croat  and  Slo- 
vene state  the  records,  archives  and  ar- 


384 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


tides  of  historical  and  artistic  value 
which  were  taken  from  these  countries 
during  the  war,  and  livestock  shall  be 
returned  within  six  months.  As  special 
compensation  for  the  destruction  of  the 
Serbian  coal  mines  Bulgaria  shall  for 
five  years  deliver  50,000  tons  of  coal 
annually  to  the  Serb,  Croat  and  Slo- 
vene state. 

The  financial  clauses  are  similar  to 
those  of  the  Austrian  treaty  and  pro- 
vide priority  over  the  charges  against 
assets  of  Bulgaria  for  reparation  shall 
be  given  to  the  cost  of  all  armies  of 
occupation  of  the  Allies,  and  to  serv- 
ices of  the  external  pre-war  Ottoman 
public  debt.  Bulgaria  renounces  the 
benefits  of  the  Bucharest  and  Brest- 
Litovsk  treaties  and  agrees  to  sur- 
render the  moneys  and  securities  re- 
ceived according  to  those  treaties. 

Rumanian  Frontier  Unchanged.  The 
frontier  with  Rumania  remains  the  same 
as  before  the  war,  although  it  is  under- 
stood the  question  of  inducing  Ru- 
mania to  cede  to  Bulgaria  that  portion 
of  Dobrudja  which  is  wholly  Bulga- 
rian in  character  will  be  taken  up  later. 

In  the  Timok  Valley,  at  the  north, 
Bulgaria  cedes  to  Serbia  a  narrow  ter- 
ritory sufficient  to  provide  for  proper 
policing  of  the  important  Serbian  rail- 
way running  through  that  valley.  In 
the  vicinity  of  Dragoman  Pass  Bul- 
garia cedes  a  small  area,  sufficient  to 
protect  Nish  from  Bulgarian  attack.  A 
little  further  south,  in  the  vicinity  of 
Varanye,  where  the  Bulgarians  in  the 
war  occupied  the  only  railway  that 
makes  possible  the  defence  of  Northern 
Serbia,  Bulgaria  is  required  to  cede  a 
small  area  of  mountainous  territory 
sufficient  to  protect  the  Serbian  fron- 
tier from  similar  [word  missing]  in  the 
future.  At  the  south  of  this  frontier, 
where  a  projecting  lobe  of  the  Bulgarian 
territory  came  within  six  miles  of  the 


same  vital  railway,  Bulgaria  cedes  the 
western  projecting  lobe  to  Serbia,  so 
her  frontiers  are  removed  ten  or  twelve 
miles  eastward. 

Changes  in  South  Important.  The 
most  extensive  territorial  change  is 
to  the  south.  The  frontier  with  Greece 
remains  the  same,  except  for  slight  rec- 
tification to  afford  proper  protection 
to  the  Greek  town  Buk. 

It  is  stipulated  that,  whatever  solu- 
tion is  adopted  with  regard  to  West- 
ern Thrace,  an  economic  outlet  to  the 
iEgean  Sea  will  be  guaranteed  to  Bul- 
garia, the  powers  having  the  right  to 
return  all  or  part  of  the  territory  to 
Bulgaria,  transfer  part  to  Greece,  in- 
corporate the  remainder  with  Eastern 
Thrace  in  an  international  state,  or  to 
make  any  other  solution  ultimately 
agreed  upon. 

Greece  agrees  to  embody  in  a  treaty 
with  the  Allies  such  provisions  to  pro- 
tect the  interest  of  the  minorities  of 
race,  language  or  religion,  and  make 
provisions  necessary  to  protect  the 
freedom  of  transit  and  equitable  treat- 
ment of  the  commerce  of  other  na- 
tions. 

The  number  of  Bulgarian  gendarmes, 
customs  officials  and  other  armed 
guards  shall  not  exceed  10,000  and 
there  must  exist  only  one  military 
school.  The  importation  or  exportation 
of  arms,  munitions  and  war  materials 
of  all  kinds  is  forbidden. 

All  existing  Bulgarian  warships,  in- 
cluding submarines,  will  be  surrendered 
to  the  Allies  and  warships  or  subma- 
rines under  construction  will  be  broken 
up.  Construction  or  acquisition  of  any 
submarines,  even  for  commercial  pur- 
poses, will  be  forbidden.  All  naval 
arms,  munitions  and  other  war  material 
belonging  to  Bulgaria  at  the  date  of  the 
armistice  will  be  surrendered  to  the  Al- 
lies. 


THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 


385 


Bulgaria  may  have  no  military  or 
naval  air  forces,  including  dirigibles, 
must  demobilize  all  existing  air  forces 
within  two  months  and  must  surrender 
to  the  principal  Allied  and  associated 
powers  such  aviation  material. 

Bulgaria  recognizes  that  by  joining 
the  war  of  aggression  which  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary  waged  against 
the  Allied  and  associated  powers,  she 
caused  the  latter  losses  and  sacrifices 
of  all  kinds  for  which  she  ought  to 
make  adequate  reparation.  As  it  is  rec- 
ognized that  Bulgaria's  resources  are 
not  sufficient  to  make  adequate  repara- 
tion, the  reparation  agreed  upon,  two 
and  a  quarter  billion  francs  in  gold 
($450,000,000)  is  agreed  to  be  paid 
in  thirty-seven  years  in  half  yearly 
payments,  beginning  January  1,  1920. 

Payments  are  to  be  permitted 
through  the  inter-Allied  commission  to 
the  Reparation  Commission  created  by 
the  German  treaty.  The  inter-Allied 
commission  shall  consider  the  resources 
from  time  to  time  of  Bulgaria,  and  shall 
have  power  to  recommend  to  the  repara- 
tion commission  the  cancellation  or 
postponement  of  any  payments  to  be 
made  by  Bulgaria.  The  livestock  to  be 
surrendered,  totalling  73,126  animals, 
goes  to  Greece,  Rumania  and  the  Serb, 
the  Croat  and  Slovene  states. 

The  inter-Allied  commission  shall  be 
established  at  Sofia  as  soon  as  possible 
after  the  coming  into  force  of  the  pres- 
ent treaty.  The  commission  shall  con- 
sist   of    three    members    nominated    by 


Great  Britain,  France  and  Italy,  with 
a  right  to  withdraw  upon  six  months' 
notice.  Bulgaria  will  be  represented  by 
a  commissioner,  who  may  be  invited  to 
take  part  in  the  sittings  but  will  have 
no  vote.  Cost  and  expenses  of  the  com- 
mission will  be  paid  by  Bulgaria  and  will 
be  a  first  charge  on  the  revenues  pay- 
able to  the  commission. 

The  economic  clauses  are  of  the 
same  general  import  as  those  in  the 
Austrian  treaty,  except  that  for  one 
year  customs  duties  on  imports  from 
the  Allied  and  associated  states  will 
not  be  higher  than  the  favorable  duties 
when  the  war  began. 

Danube  is  Internationalized.  The 
general  provisions  of  the  ports,  water- 
ways and  railways  clauses  are  similar 
to  those  of  the  Austrian  treaty,  provid- 
ing that  Danube  is  to  be  international 
from  Ulm. 

The  European  commission  of  the 
Danube  shall  reassume  the  powers  it 
had  before  the  war,  but  with  only  rep- 
resentatives of  Great  Britain,  France, 
Italy  and  Rumania. 

All  disputes  which  may  arise  through 
carrying  out  provisions  of  these  clauses 
shall  be  settled  as  provided  by  the 
League  of  Nations  and  without  preju- 
dice to  the  obligations  of  the  present 
treaty.  Bulgaria  must  agree  to  any 
general  convention  in  regard  to  trans- 
portation concluded  within  five  years  by 
the  Allied  and  associated  powers  with 
the  approval  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
See  above. 


XIV.    BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Historical  Background:  Carleton  Hayes, 
History  of  Modern  Europe  (2  vols.,  New  York, 
1916);  A.  Bullard,  Diplomacy  of  the  Great 
War  (ib.,  1916);  Charles  Seymour,  Diplomatic 
Background  of  the  War  (New  Haven,  1916); 
B.  E.  Schmitt,  England  and  Germany,  1140- 
1914  (Princeton,  1916).  Histories  of  the  war: 
New  York  Times'  Current  History  Magazine 
(New  York,  monthly);  Nelson's  History  of  the 
War  (London,  1914  et  seq.);  F.  H.  Simonds, 
The  Great  War  (2  vols.,  ib.,  1915)  ;  Allen  and 
Whitehead,  The  Great  War  (Philadelphia, 
1915);  London  Times  History  of  the  War 
(London,  weekly) ;  Hilaire  Belloc,  General 
Sketch  of  the  European  War,  First  Phase  (ib., 
1915);  Gabriel  Hanotaux  (ed.),  Histoire  illus- 
tree  de  la  guerre  de  1914  (Bordeaux,  1914-15); 
Chronik  des  deutschen  Krieges,  vol.  i  (Munich, 
1915) ;  H.  F.  Helmolt,  Der  Weltkrieg  in  Bild- 
ern  und  Dokumenten  (Leipzig,  1915);  F.  A. 
Mumby,  The  Great  War:  A  History,  vols,  i-iii 
(London,  1915-16).  Documentary  collections 
and  criticisms:  Collected  Diplomatic  Docu- 
ments Relating  to  the  Outbreak  of  the  Euro- 
pean War  (London,  1915);  American  Journal 
of  International  Law,  vol.  ix  (New  York, 
1915);  E.  C.  Stowell,  The  Diplomacy  of  the 
War  of  1914,  vol.  i  (Boston,  1915),  containing 
an  exhaustive  analysis.  Causes  of  the  war — 
British  point  of  view:  E.  P.  Barker  and  others, 
"Why  we  are  at  War:  Great  Britain's  Case," 
in  Oxford  Pamphlets  (London,  1914);  J.  M. 
Beck,  The  Evidence  in  the  Case  (New  York, 
1915),  a  severe  indictment  of  Germany;  H.  A. 
L.  Fisher,  The  War:  Its  Causes  and  Issues 
(London,  1914);  R.  Muir,  Britain's  Case 
against  Germany  (Manchester,  1914) ;  J.  H. 
Rose,  Origins  of  the  War  (London,  1914); 
J.  H.  Muirhead,  German  Philosophy  in  Rela- 
tion to  the  War  (ib.,  1915).  German  point  of 
view:  H.  F.  Helmolt,  Die  geheime  Vorge- 
schichte  des  Weltkrieges  (Leipzig,  1914);  G.  S. 
Fullerton,  Why  the  German  Nation  has  Gone 
to  War  (Munich,  1914);  P.  Rohrbach,  Der 
Krieg  und  die  deutsche  Politik  (Dresden, 
1914);  J.  W.  Burgess,  The  European  War:  Its 
Causes,  Purposes,  and  Probable  Resirfts  (ib., 
1915).  French  point  of  view:  G.  Arnoult,  "Les 
origines  historiques  de  la  guerre,"  in  Pages 
d'histoire,  1914-15  (Paris,  1915);  Henri  Char- 
riaut,  Le  droit  contre  la  force  (ib.,  1915);  E. 
Denis,  La  guerre,  causes  immediates  et  loin- 
taines  (ib.,  1915).  Italian  point  of  view:  G.  A. 
Borgese,  Italia  e  Germania   (Milan,  1915);  G. 


Ferreno,  La  guerra  Europea:  studi  e  discorsi 
(ib.,  1915) ;  id.,  Le  origini  della  guerra  presente 
(ib.,  1915).  United  States  and  the  war:  Theo- 
dore Roosevelt,  America  and  the  World  War 
(New  York,  1915);  Norman  Angell,  America 
and  the  New  World  State  (ib.,  1915) ;  Hugo 
Miinsterberg,  The  War  and  America  (ib., 
1915);  R.  G.  Usher,  Pan-Americanism  (ib., 
1915);  Lange  and  Berry,  Books  on  the  Great 
War  (ib.,  1915-16).  Woodrow  Wilson,  Why 
We  Are  at  War  (New  York,  1917),  a  reprint 
of  the  president's  addresses  to  Congress,  etc.; 
G.  W.  Prothero,  German  Policy  Before  the 
War  (ib.,  1917);  K'ung  Yuan  Ku'suh,  The 
Judgment  of  the  Orient  (ib.  1917);  Gustave 
Le  Bon,  The  Psychology  of  the  Great  War 
(ib.  1917),  translated  by  E.  Andrews;  Count 
Ernst  zu  Reventlow,  The  Vampire  of  the  Con- 
tinent (ib.  1917),  translated  by  George  Chat- 
terton-Hill;  A.  H.  Granger,  England's  World 
Empire  (Chicago,  1917) ;  Jacques  Bainville, 
Italy  and  the  War  (New  York,  1917),  trans- 
lated by  Bernard  Miall;  David  J.  Hill,  The 
Rebuilding  of  Europe  (ib.,  1917).  Andre 
Cheradame,  The  Pan-German  Plot  Unmasked 
(New  York,  1917);  John  W.  Burgess,  Amer- 
ica's Relations  to  the  Great  War  (Chicago, 
1917);  David  Starr  Jordan,  Alsace-Lorraine 
(Indianapolis,  1917) ;  Ian  Hay,  Getting  To- 
gether (Garden  City,  1917);  Edmund  von 
Mach  (editor),  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 
Relating  to  the  Outbreak  of  the  War  (New 
York,  1917).  E.  de  Schelking,  Recollections 
of  a  Russian  Diplomat  (New  York,  1918);  H. 
C.  Woods,  The  Cradle  of  the  War  (New  York, 
1918);  Dr.  William  Miihlon,  The  Vandal  of 
Europe  (translated  by  William  L.  McPherson, 
New  York,  1918);  M.  Prince,  The  Creed  of 
Deutschtum  and  Other  War  Essays  (New 
York,  1918);  H.  J.  Suter-Lerch,  Germany  Her 
Own  Judge  (New  York,  1918);  J.  Adam,  The 
Schemes  of  the  Kaiser  (New  York,  1918);  J.  S. 
Bassett,  The  Lost  Fruits  of  Waterloo  (New 
York,  1918);  Karl  Lichnowsky,  The  Guilt  of 
Germany  (New  York,  1918) ;  J.  W.  Gerard, 
Face  to  Face  with  Kaiserism  (New  York, 
1918);  A.  G.  Keller,  Through  War  to  Peace 
(New  York,  1918);  M.  Smith,  Militarism  and 
Statecraft  (New  York,  1918);  T.  Tittoni,  Who 
Is  Responsible  for  the  War?  The  Verdict  of 
History  (Paris,  1918);  O.  A.  Marti,  Anglo- 
German  Rivalry  as  a  Cause  of  the  Great  War 
(Boston,  1918);  O.  Ferrara,  Causes  and  Pre- 
texts  of  the   World   War    (New  York,   1918); 


386 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


387 


F.  W.  Halsey,  Balfour,  Viviani,  and  Joffre 
(New  York,  1918) ;.  J.  B.  Scott,  A  Survey  of 
International  Relations  Between  the  United 
States  and  Germany  .  .  .  (Oxford,  1918); 
Princess  C.  Radziwill,  Rasputin  and  the  Rus- 
sian Revolution  (New  York,  1918)  ;  G.  Negu- 
lesco,  Rumania's  Sacrifice  (New  York,  1918); 
Ambassador  Morgenthau's  Story  (New  York, 
1918). 

Military  Operations.  General:  F.  H.  Si- 
monds,  The  Great  War:  The  First  Phase  (2d 
ed.,  New  York,  1914);  id.,  The  Great  War: 
The  Second  Phase  (ib.,  1915)  ;  Edmund  Dane, 
Trench  Warfare:  The  Effects  of  Spade-Power 
in  Modern  Battles  (London,  1915);  Joachim 
Delbriick,  Der  deutsche  Krieg  in  Feldpost- 
briefen,  vols,  i-vi  (Munich,  1915);  C.  W.  Bat- 
tine,  Military  History  of  the  War,  vol.  i  (Lon- 
don, 1916);  Wilhelm  Eisenberg,  Zum  Land- 
sturm  nach  Belgien  und  Nord-Frankreich 
(Brunswick,  1916).  In  the  West:  Sir  John 
French,  "Dispatches:  Official  Records  of  the 
Great  Battles  of  Mons,  the  Marne,  and  the 
Aisne,"  in  the  Graphic,  special  no.  1  (London, 
1914);  Pierre  Dauzet,  Guerre  de  1914:  de  Liege 
a  la  Marne,  avec  croquis  et  carte  en  couleur 
des  positions  successives  des  armies  (Paris, 
1915);  Le  martyre  de  Reims:  I'occupation  alle- 
mande,  le  bombardement  (parts  i-xxviii,  ib., 
1915);  La  campagne  de  I'armee  beige  (31  juil- 
let,  1914-ler  Janvier,  1915)  .  .  .  d'apres  les 
documents  ofpZciels  (ib.,  1915).  In  the  East: 
John  Morse,  An  Englishman  in  the  Russian 
Ranks:  Ten  Months'  Fighting  in  Poland  (Lon- 
don, 1915);  G.  R.  Fortescue,  Russia,  the  Bal- 
kans, and  the  Dardanelles  (ib.,  1915);  E.  Ser- 
man,  Mit  den  Turken  an  der  Front  (Berlin, 
1915) ;  Hermann  Blumenthal,  Galizien,  der 
Wall  im  Osten:  Kriegserzdhlungen  (2d  ed., 
Munich,  1915);  also  Oxford  Pamphlets  (Lon- 
don, 1914  et  seq.) ;  Daily  Telegraph  War  Books 
(ib.,  1914  et  seq.);  Daily  Chronicle  War  Li- 
brary (ib.,  1914  et  seq.).  In  the  Far  East: 
Jefferson  Jones,  The  Fall  of  Tsingtau,  with  a 
Study  of  Japan's  Ambitions  in  China  (Boston, 
1915);  Sir  Arthur  Conan  Doyle,  A  History  of 
the  Great  War  (London  and  New  York,  1917); 
F.  Coieman,  With  Cavalry  in  the  Great  War 
(Philadelphia,  1917);  Jules  Destrees,  Britain 
in  Arms  (New  York,  1917);  S.  Washburn,  The 
Russian  Advance  (New  York,  1917);  Freder- 
ick Palmer,  My  Second  Year  of  the  War  (New 
York,  1917);  E.  Y.  Priestman,  With  a  B.  P. 
Scout  in  Gallipoli  (New  York,  1917) ;  C. 
Snouck,  The  Revolt  in  Arabia  (ib.,  1917); 
Count  C.  de  Souza,  Germany  in  Defeat  (ib., 
1917);  H.  W.  Allen,  The  Unbroken  Line  (Lon- 
don, 1917);  H.  E.  Brittain,  To  Verdun  from 
the  Somme  (New  York,  1917);  R.  M.  McRae, 
Offensive  Fighting  (Philadelphia,  1918);  C.  Le 
Goffic,  General  Foch  at  the  Marne  (translated 
by  L.  Menzies,  New  York,  1918) ;  J.   Rouvier, 


Present  Day  Warfare  (New  York,  1918)  ;  R.  M. 
Johnston,  General  Foch  (New  York,  1918) ;  S. 
Lauzanne,  Fighting  France  (New  York,  1918) ; 
Mario  Alberti,  etc.,  Italy's  Great  War  and  Her 
National  Aspirations  (Milan,  1918);  W.  T. 
Massey,  The  Desert  Campaigns  (New  York, 
1918);  R.  Radiguet,  The  Winking  of  a  Modern 
Army  (ib.,  1918);  I.  F.  Marcosson,  The  Busi- 
ness of  War  (ib.,  1918);  P.  Azan,  The  War- 
fare of  To-day  (ib.,  1918);  F.  Dodd,  Generals 
of  the  British  Army  (ib.,  1918);  A.  T.  Clark, 
To  Bagdad  with  the  British  (ib.,  1918)  ;  F.  H. 
Simonds,  History  of  the  World  War  (ib., 
1918);  G.  Fortescue,  France  Bears  the  Burden 
(ib.,  1918);  The  Story  of  the  Anzacs  (Mel- 
bourne, 1918) ;  G.  Blanchon,  The  New  Warfare 
(New  York,  1918). 

Naval  Operations.  The  best  account  of  the 
naval  operations  of  the  war  is  given  in  Gli 
avvenimenti  navali  nel  conflitto  europeo  by  R. 
Mazzinghi.  This  is  a  monthly  supplement  to 
the  Rivista  Marittima  (Rome,  monthly).  The 
most  complete  accounts  published  in  English 
will  be  found  in  the  War  Notes  of  the  United 
States  Naval  Institute  Proceedings  (Annapo- 
lis, bimonthly).  See  also:  The  Battles  of  the 
South  Seas,  containing  the  Official  Narratives 
of  the  Three  Engagements,  published  by  the 
Yachting  Monthly  (London,  1915) ;  L.  C.  Corn- 
ford,  With  the  Grand  Fleet  (ib.,  1915);  Sir 
Ian  Hamilton,  Despatches  from  the  Darda- 
nelles (ib.,  1915)  ;  H.  Kirshhoff,  Der  Seekrieg, 
1914-15  (Leipzig,  1915) ;  O.  Guiheneuc,  Dread- 
naught  ou  submersible  (Paris,  1916) ;  T.  D. 
Parker,  Naval  Handbook  as  Bearing  on  Na- 
tional Defense  and  the  European  War  (San 
Francisco,  1916);  S.  Lake,  The  Submarine  in 
War  and  Peace  (New  York,  1918) ;  G.  Fiennes, 
Sea  Power  and  Freedom  (ib.,  1918) ;  W.  M. 
Dixon,  The  British  Navy  at  War  (ib.,  1918)*f 
J.  Leyland,  The  Achievement  of  the  British 
Navy  in  the  World  War  (ib.,  1918)  ;  W.  J.  Ab- 
bot, Aircraft  and  Submarines   (ib.,  1918). 

Aerial  Operations:  "Aeroplanes  et  dirigea- 
bles  de  nos  ennemis  et  de  nos  allies,"  in  Cor- 
respondant,  vol.  cclxi  (Paris,  1915);  W.  E. 
Dommett,  Aeroplanes  and  Airships,  Including 
Steering,  Propelling,  and  Navigating  Appara- 
tus .  .  .  (London,  1915);  Graham-White  and 
Harper,  "Zeppelin  Airships:  Their  Record  in 
the  War,"  in  Fortnightly  Review,  n.  s.,  vol. 
xcviii  (New  York,  1915);  id.,  Aircraft  in  the 
Great  War:  A  Record  and  Study  (Chicago, 
1915);  R.  P.  Hcarne,  Zeppelins  and  Super- 
Zeppelins  (New  York,  1916);  H.  Bannerman- 
Phillips,  "Progress  in  Aeronautics,"  a  monthly 
summary  in  the  United  Service  Magazine  (Lon- 
don, monthly) ;  for  abstracts  of  technical  and 
other  articles,  International  Military  Digest 
(ib.,  monthly,  1915  et  seq.);  Francis  A.  Col- 
lins, The  Air  Man  (New  York,  1917);  C.  D. 
Winslow.  With  the  French  Flying  Corps  (New 


388 


A  REFERENCE  HISTORY  OF  THE  WAR 


York,  1917);  J.  R.  McConnell,  Flying  for 
France  (ib.,  1917)  ;  E.  Middleton,  Aircraft  of 
To-day  and  of  the  Future  (ib.,  1918). 

Political,  Social  and  Economic  Aspects: 
W.  J.  Ashley,  "The  War  and  its  Economic  As- 
pects," in  Oxford  Pamphlets  (London,  1914) ; 
E.  J.  Schuster,  Efect  of  War  and  Moratorium 
on  Commercial  Transactions  (2d  rev.  ed.,  ib., 
1914);  E.  L.  M.  Meignen,  Les  contrats  et  fa 
guerre  (Paris,  1914) ;  G.  D.  H.  Cole,  Labour 
in  War  Times  (ib.,  1915);  containing  a  bib- 
liography; F.  W.  Hirst,  Political  Economy  of 
War  (ib.,  1915);  A.  W.  Kirkaldy  (ed.),  Credit 
Industry,  and  the  War  (ib.,  1915);  J.  E. 
Barker,  Modern  Germany:  Her  Political  and 
Economic  Problems,  her  Foreign  and  Domestic 
Policy  .  .  .  (5th  ed.,  ib.,  1915) ;  A.  L.  Bowley, 
Effect  of  the  War  on  the  External  Trade  of 
the  United  Kingdom  (Cambridge,  1915) ;  E.  J. 
Clapp,  Economic  Aspects  of  the  War:  Neutral 
Rights,  Belligerent  Claims,  and  American  Com- 
merce in  the  Years  191J/-1915  (New  Haven, 
1915) ;  Paul  Beauregard,  "La  vie  economique 
en  France  pendant  la  guerre  actuelle,"  in 
Pages  d'histoire,  1914-1915,  part  lxii  (Paris, 
1915);  F.  Blanc,  he  danger  national:  notre  sit- 
uation Sconomique  genSrale,  avant  la  guerre, 
pendant  la  guerre  (2d  ed.,  Saint-Etienne, 
1915);  Mario  Alberti,  "Adriatico  e  Mediter- 
raneo,"  in  Problemi  italiani,  No.  5  (2d  ed., 
Milan,  1915);  Friedrich  Lenz,  1st  Deutschlands 
Krieg  ein  Wirtschaftkrieg?  Ueber  die  okono- 
mischen  Griindlagen  des  deutsch-britischen 
Konflicts  (ib.,  1915);  Eduard  Kuhn,  Die 
Rechtsfolgen  der  Kriegswirren  in  der  Schweiz 
(Zurich,  1915);  J.  F.  Fraser,  Russia  of  To-Day 
(New  York,  1916) ;  T.  J.  Hughes,  State  Social- 
ism after  the  War  (Philadelphia,  1917) ;  J.  C. 
Brown,  The  Tarif  and  the  Coming  Trade 
War  .  .  .  (New  York,  1917);  I.  F.  Marcosson, 
The  War  after  the  War  (New  York,  1917); 
Phillipe  Millet,  Comrades  in  Arms  (New 
York,  1917);  Boyd  Cable,  Grapes  of  Wrath 
(ib.,  1917)  ;  H.  L.  Reed,  Serbia,  A  Sketch  (Bos- 
ton, 1917);  Bertrand  Russell,  Why  Men  Fight 
(New  York,  1917);  J.  B.  Pratt,  Democracy 
and  Peace  (Boston,  1917);  Emile  Boutroux, 
Philosophy  and  War  (New  York,  1917),  trans- 


lated by  F.  Rothwell;  Roland  Hugins,  The 
Possible  Peace  (ib.,  1917)  ;  E.  A.  Victor,  editor, 
Canada's  Future,  etc.,  (ib.,  1917)  ;  H.  G.  Wells, 
Italy,  France,  and  Great  Britain  at  War  (ib., 
1917);  Donald  Hankey,  A  Student  in  Arms 
(ib.,  1917) ;  A.  N.  Hyamson,  Palestine  (ib., 
1917)  ;  S.  Grumbach,  Germany's  Annexationist 
Aims  (trans,  by  J.  E.  Barker,  New  York, 
1918) ;  G.  D.  Herron,  Woodrow  Wilson  and 
the  World  Peace  (ib.,  1918);  G.  Stone  (ed- 
itor), Women  War  Workers  (ib.,  1918);  H. 
Fraser,  Women  and  War  Work  (ib.,  1918)  ;  D. 
Blumenthal,  Alsace-Lorraine  (ib.,  1918);  T. 
Marburg,  League  of  Nations  (ib.,  1918) ;  R. 
Goldsmith,  A  League  to  Enforce  Peace  (ib., 
1918) ;  E.  H.  Griggs,  The  Soul  of  Democracy 
(ib.,  1918);  A.  Petrunkevitch,  and  others,  The 
Russian  Revolution  (ib.,  1918) ;  I.  C.  Clarke, 
American  Women  and  the  World  War  (ib., 
1918);  A.  G.  Keller,  Through  War  to  Peace 
(ib.,  1918) ;  H.  L.  Gray,  War-Time  Control  of 
Industry  (ib.,  1918);  A.  Henderson,  The  Aims 
of  Labor  (ib.,  1918);  C.  W.  Ackerman,  Mex- 
ico's Dilemma  (ib.,  1918) ;  M.  Jastrow,  Jr., 
The  War  and  the  Coming  Peace  (Philadelphia, 
1918) ;  J.  Spargo,  Americanism  and  Social 
Democracy  (New  York,  1918);  Norman  An- 
gell,  The  Political  Conditions  of  Allied  Suc- 
cess (ib.,  1918);  W.  H.  P.  Faunce,  Religion 
and  War  (ib.,  1918);  W.  S.  Howe,  War  and 
Progress  (Boston,  1918);  S.  Herzog,  The  Fu- 
ture of  German  Industrial  Exports  (New 
York,  1918) ;  G.  F.  Nicolai,  The  Biology  of 
War  (ib.,  1918). 

Finance:  W.  R.  Lawson,  British  War  Fi- 
nance, 1914-15  (ib.,  1915);  W.  W.  Wall,  The 
War  and  our  Financial  Fabric  (ib.,  1915); 
Daniel  Bellet,  Comment  payer  les  frais  de 
guerre:  la  fortune  de  I'Allemagne  et  celle  des 
allies  (2d  ed.,  Paris,  1915) ;  Gaston  Jeze  and 
others,  ProbUmes  de  politiques  et  finances  de 
guerre  (ib.,  1915) ;  Ugo  Ancona,  "L'aspetto 
finanziario  della  guerra,"  in  Quaderin  delta 
guerra,  No.  21  (Milan,  1915) ;  Meisel  und 
Spiethoff,  Oesterreichs  finanzen  und  der  Krieg 
(2d  ed.,  Munich,  1915);  K.  Helfferich,  How 
Germany  Raises  Billions  (Eng.  trans.,  2d  ed., 
New  York,  1915). 


INDEX 


Aerial  Operations,  207 

Africa,    Campaigns   in,   174 

Agadir,  12 

Aisne  Offensive,  1917,  75 

Aisne   River,  2 

Albert   I.,   King  of  the   Belgians,  26 

Albrecht,  Duke  of  Wurttemberg,  45 

Algeciras  Conference,  10 

Allied   Unity,  80 

Alsace-Lorraine,   2;   5;   282 

Amance,    49 

American  Ambulance,  The,  300 

American  Expeditionary  Force,  80 

American  Foreign  Trade,  315 

American  War  Finance,  319 

Amiens,  2 

Anglo-French-American  Treaty,  362 

Anti-Submarine  Operations,  191 

Antwerp,  45 

Approach  to   Paris,  48 

Archangel,  3 

Argonne-Meuse  Offensive,  100 

Armed  Merchantmen,  Question  of,  257 

Armed  Neutrality,   (United  States),  238 

Armenia,  Atrocities  in,  222 

Armistices 

With  Austria-Hungary,   153 

With   Bulgaria,   159 

With  Germany,  106 

With  Turkey,  173 
Arras,  Battle  of,  74 

Art   and   Architecture,  Destruction  of,  225 
Artillery,  43 
Artois,   Battle  of,  60 
Asia  Minor,  4 

Asquith,  Henry  Herbert,  32 
Atrocities,   Alleged,   219 
Australia,  Finance,  328 
Austria-Hungary,  1  et  seq. 
Austria-Hungary,  Complete  Collapse  of,  153 
Austrian  Demands  on   Serbia,   19 
Austrian   Failure   in   Italy,  151 
Austrian   Peace  Move,  293 
Austro-Hungarian  Peace  Treaty,  367 

Bagdad,  4 

Bainsizza,  4 

Balkan  Wars,  12 

Baltic  Campaign,  119 

Baltic,  Naval  Operations  in,  192 

Battleships  and  Battle  Cruisers,  205 

Beatty,  Sir  David,  183 

Belgian  Neutrality,  Question  of,  24 

Belgium,  1  et  seq. 

Belgium,  German  Retreat  from,  104 

Belgium  Relief  Fund,  299 

Berchtold,  Count  von,  18 

Bernhardi,  Friedrich  von,  8 

Bethmann-Hollweg,  Theobald  von,  26 

Bibliography,   386 

Bismarck,  Prince  von,  6 


389 


Bissing,  Ferdinand  Baron  von,  222 
Black  Sea,  Naval  Operations  in,  196 
Blockade  and  Neutral  Trade,  227 
Bolsheviki,    130;    136 
Bosnia,   11 
Brazil,  268 

Brest-Litovsk,  Treaty  of,  131 
Brusiloff,   Alexei  Alexeievitch,   112 
Bucharest,  Treaty  of,  164 
Bukowina,  3 
Bulgaria,  1  et  seq. 
Bulgarian  Campaigns,  156 
Bulgarian  Peace  Treaty,  383 
Biilow,  Prince  von,  7 

Cadorna,  Count  Luigi,  144 

Calais,  54 

Cambrai,    Battle    around,   79 

Canada,  Finance,  324 

Carso  Plateau,  4 

Castelnau,  General  de,  45 

Casualties,  Estimated,  217 

Caucasus,  Campaigns  in,  164 

Cavell,  Edith,  222 

Central-American   Countries,  269 

Central  Powers,  1   et  seq. 

Champagne,  Battle  of,  62 

Charleroi,  2 

Charles   I,   King  of   Rumania,  31 

Chemin  des  Dames,  2 

Chile,  267 

China,  270 

Commission  for  Relief  in  Belgium,  298 

Compiegne,  54 

Concentration  of  Military  Forces,  40 

Concert  of  Powers,  9 

Congress  of  Vienna,  5-9 

Constantine    I,    King   of  Greece,  21 

Constituent  Assembly   (Russia),  140 

Coronel,  2 

Costa  Rica,  1 

Cost  of  the  War,  317 

Coudouriotis,  Admiral,  35 

Council  of  National  Defense,  244 

Craddock,  Sir  Christopher,  200 

Cramb,  John  Adam,  9 

Crown  Prince  of  Prussia,  45 

Cuba,  1 

Cyrenaica,  12 

Czecho-Slovakia,  36 

Czecho-Slovaks,  3 

Dardanelles,  166 

Dardanelles,  Naval  Operations  in,  196 

Debts  of  Belligerents,  330 

Declarations  of  War,  37 

Deimling,  General  von,  45 

Deutschland,  233 

Dixmude,  54 

Dobrudja,  3 

Dogger    Bank,   2 


390 


INDEX 


Draft  Acts,  United  States,  246 
Drang  nach  Oesten,  11 
Dubail,  General,  45 
Dubno,   3 
Dunkirk,    54 
d'Urbal,  General,  54 
Dwinsk,  3 

Eastern  Theatre,  Military,  109 

East  Prussia,  Invasion  of,  110 

Economic  Aspects  of  the  War,  304 

Economic  Causes  of  the  War,  14 

Egyptian  Campaigns,   164 

Embargo  and  Blockade  of  German  Trade,  252 

Emden,  201 

Emmich,  General  von,  45 

Employment  and  Wages,  311 

Enemy  Aliens,   (United  States),  245 

Entente  Allies,  1  et  seq. 

Equipment  of  the   Armies,  43 

Erzerum,  4 

Erzingan,  4 

Events  before  the  Marne,  48 

Falkenhayn,  General  von,  41 

Federal  Council  of  Allied  War  Charities,  299 

Ferdinand  I,  King  of  Bulgaria,  31 

Financial  Aspects  of  the  War,  304 

Finland,  135 

Fiume  Controversy,  358 

Flanders,  Battle  of,  77 

Foch,  Ferdinand,  86 

Forcing  the  Aisne  and  Marne,  90 

Foreign  Credits,  315 

"Fourteen  Peace  Points,"  277 

France,  1  et  seq. 

France,  Atrocities  in,  224 

France,  Finance,  328 

Francis  Ferdinand,  Archduke  of  Austria,  5;  18 

Fraudulent  Charities,  302 

French,  General  Sir  John,  55 

French  Three  Year  Law,  13 

Galicia,  Conquest  of,  112 

Galicia,  Second  Offensive  in,  115 

General  Strategy  and   Resources,  41 

German  and  American  Peace  Notes,  289 

German    Army    Bill    (1913),    13 

German   East   Africa,   4 

German    Intrigues    and    Propaganda,     (United 

States),  250 
German  Peace  Treaty,  341 
German   Southwest   Africa,  4 
German  Withdrawal,  The  (1917),  74 
Germany,  1  et  seq. 
Ghent,  53 

Giolitti,  Giovanni,  28 
Giuliano,  Marquis  di  San,  29 
Gorizia,  145 

Grand  Duke  Nicholas,  4 
Grand  Pre,  52 
Great  Britain,  1  et  seq. 
Great  Britain,  Finance,  325 
Greece,  33 

Grey,  Eir  Edward,  1  et  seq. 
Guatemala,   1 

Haig,  Sir  Douglas,  55 
Haiti,  1 


Hamadan,  4 

Hapsburg  Empire,  1  et  seq. 

Harden,  Maximilian,  16 

Hausen,   General   von,   45 

Heeringen,  General  von,  45 

Herzegovina,    11 

Hindenburg    Line,    Breaking   of,    102 

Hindenburg,  Paul  von  Beneckendorf,  111 

Honduras,  7 

Hoover,  Herbert,  244 

House,  Edward  Mandell,  262 

Howitzer,  43 

Industrial  Revolution,  14 

Intervention  in  Russia  and  Siberia,  141 

Invasion  of   Belgium,  46 

Invasion  of  France,  47 

Italian  Campaigns,  143 

Italian  Retreat,   1917,  149 

Italian   Spring  and   Summer   Campaigns,   1917, 

147 
Italy,  1  et  seq. 
Italy,  Finance,  329 

Japan,  1  et  seq. 
Japan,    Finance,   327 
Jerusalem,  4 
Jewish   Relief,  299 
Joffre,   General,   48 
Jutland,  2 

Kamerun,  4 

Kerensky,  Alexander,  124 

Kermanshah,  4 

Kiachow,  30 

Kluck,  General  von,  45 

Knocke,  54 

Krupps,  77 

Kut-el-Amara,  4 

La  Bassee,  53 

Ladies'  Way,  See  Chemin  des  Dames 

Laibach,  4 

Lambros,  Spyridon,  35 

Langemarck,  54 

Langle    de    Cary,   General,   51 

Lassigny,  53 

League  of  Nations,  The,  333 

Leman,  General,  46 

Lenine,  Nikolai,  125 

Lens,  2 

Liberia,  272 

Lichnowsky   Memorandum,  27 

Liebknecht,  Karl,  17 

Liege,  43 

Lille,  53 

Longwy,  47 

Loos,  Battle  of,  64 

Louvain,   46 

Lusitania,  Sinking  of  the,  254 

Lutsk,  3 

Luxemburg,  43 

Lys  River,  Battle  of  the,  87 

Lys  Salient,  Withdrawal  from,  102 

Machine  Guns,  44 
Mackensen,  General  von,  3 
Mail,  Interference  with,  231 
Manoury,  General,  48 
Marne,  First  Battle  of,  43 


INDEX 


391 


Marne,  Second  Battle  of,  93 

Masaryk,   Thomas  G.,  37 

Maubeuge,  45 

Maud'lmy,  General,  53 

Mediterranean,   Naval  Operations  in,  194 

Mercier,  Desire  Joseph,   Cardinal,  222 

Mesopotamian  Campaigns,  169 

Metternich,  Prince,  5 

Metz,  48 

Meuse  River,  2 

Mexican  Note,  237 

Military  Alliances,  8 

Military  Operations,  39 

Milyukov,  Paval   N.,   124 

Missions  from  Europe  to  the  United  States,  248 

Mobilization,  39 

Moltke,  Helmuth  von,  41 

Monastir,  3 

Monitors,  205 

Mons,    47 

Montenegro,  1 

Moritz,  Ritter  von  AufFenberg,  112 

Moroccan  Question,  10 

Motor    Trucks,    44 

Murman,  3 

Namur,  45 

National  Antagonisms,  5 

Naval  Lessons  of  the  War,  205 

Naval   Operations,  177 

Naval   Strategy  of  the  War,  204 

Navies,  Constitution  of,  177 

Netherlands,  The,  264 

Netherlands,  The,  Finance,  330 

Neutral  Flags,  Use  of,  231 

Neutral  Nations  at  Beginning  of  the  War,  227 

Neuve   Chapelle,    Battle   of,   58 

New  Zealand,  Finance,  329 

Nicaragua,  1 

Nicholas,  Grand  Duke,  110 

Nieuport,  54 

North  Sea,  Naval  Operations  in,  182 

Official  Papers,  21  et  seq. 
Ostend,  53 
Ourcq,  48 

Pacific,  German  Possessions  in,  176 
Pacific,  Naval  Operations  in,  199 
Palestine,  Campaigns  in,  171 
Panama,  Republic  of,  1 
Pan-Germanism,  7 
Pan-Serbianism,  18 
Pan-Slavism,  18 
Participants,  Estimated,  217 
Passchendaele,  54 
Peace  Conference,  331 
Peace  Proposals,  273 
Peace  Treaties 

Germany.   341 

Anglo-French-American,  362 

Poland,  363 

Austria-Hungary,  367 

Bulgaria,   383 
Peronne,  53 

Petain,  Henry  Philippe,  66 
Piave  River,  4 
Picardy,  Campaigns  in,  2 
Picardv,  Second  Battle  of,  82 
Plava,146 


Poelcapelle,   54 

Poineare,  Raymond,  24 

Poland,  Atrocities  in,  223 

Polish  Treaty,  363 

Pope  Benedict,  273 

Portugal,  36 

Prices  and  Food  Supplies,  315 

Pripet,  3 

Przemysl,  115 

Quakers    in   War   Relief,   300 

Ramscappelle,  56 

Ratification  of  Treaty  in  United  States  Senate, 

359 
Red  Cross,  301 
Relief  Measures,  298 
Rennenkampf,  Paul  K.,  110 
Resources   of  Combatants,  41 
Rheims,  2 
Rifles,  44 
Riga,    120 
Riga,  Fall  of,  129 
Riga,  Gulf  of,  2 
Rodoslavnoff,  Vaseil,  32 
Root   Mission   to   Russia,  125 
Roye,  53 

Ruffey,  General,  45 
Rumania,  39 

Rumanian  Campaigns,  160 
Rupprecht,    Crown    Prince    of    Bavaria,    45 
Russia,  1  et  seq. 
Russian  Poland,  3 
Russian   Revolution,   123 
Russo-Japanese  War,  10 

St.  Mihiel,  99 

St.  Quentin,  2 

Saloniki,  3 

San  Marino,  1 

Sarrail,  General,  49 

Scandinavian  Countries,  262 

Scheldt   River,  53 

Serbia,   1  et  seq. 

Serbia,  Atrocities  in,  223 

Serbian   Campaigns,   143 

Serbian    Reply   to    Austrian   Demands,   20 

Shantung  Dispute,  357 

Siam,  270 

Siberia,  3 

Sims,  William  S.,  Admiral,  189 

Sixtus  Letter,  280 

Skouloudis,    Stephanos,  34 

Soissons,  2 

Solf,  Dr.,  296 

Somme,  Battle  of,  72 

Sonnino,   Sidney,  Baron,  29 

South   American   Countries,  267 

Southeastern   Theatre,    Military,   164 

Southern    Theatre,    Military,    143 

Statements  of  War  Aims,*273 

Stiirmer,  Baron  von,  3 

Submarine  Campaign  and  Losses,  190 

Suez  Canal,  4 

Switzerland,  266 

Switzerland,  Finance,  330 

Tannenberg,  111 
Togoland,  4 
Tolmino,   145 


392 


INDEX 


Townshend,  General,  4 
Transylvania,  3 
Trebizond,  4 
Trentino,  4 
Trieste,  29 
Triple  Alliance,  28 
Triple  Entente,  10 
Tripoli,  12 
Trotzky,   Leon,   130 
Turco-Italian  War,  12 
Turkey,  1  et  seq. 
Turkish  Campaigns,   164 

Ukraine,  The,  132 
United  States,  1  et  seq. 
United  War  Work  Drive,  302 

Vardar    River,   3 
Venizelos,  Eleutherios,  33 


Verdun,  66;  76 
Vilna,  3 

War  Message  of  President  Wilson,  241 

Warsaw,  Battles  around,  114  et  seq. 

War  Zone,  231 

Western    Theatre,    Military   Operations, 

William  II.,  8 

William  of  Wied,  31 

World  Trade,  314 

Wytsehaete,  54 

Young  Turk  Revolution,  11 
Ypres,  Battle  of,  56 
Yser,  Battle  of  the,  54 

Zaimis,  Alexander,  34 
Zimmermann  Note,  237 
Zonnebeke,   54