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VOL. I. 




The inspiration of the Sacred Scriptures is 
either a fact, substantiated by ample testimony, 
or a miserable fallacy, which should be openly 
and utterly repudiated, as calculated only to de- 
lude. Such, however, is the accumulation of 
evidence on this point, that the former alterna- 
tive must be unequivocally admitted by every 
educated and unprejudiced man ; and the latter, 
or indeed any approximation to a doubt on the 
subject, entirely renounced. The canonical 
books of the Old and New Testament are the 
word of the living God. 

This conviction leads at once to the neces- 
sity of an accurate interpretation of the Scrip- 
tures as a divine record. Men ought not to be 
satisfied without attaining to a clear compre- 


hension of the substance of God's message. 
For if it is the word of God, of which there 
can be no legitimate doubt, then there must 
exist throughout the whole volume, as the pro- 
duct of one mind, one harmonious meaning 
consonant with the divine wisdom. And if it 
be a revelation from God to man, that meaning 
is intended to be ascertained, and may be as« 
certained by a diligent and humble application 
of the right means of knowledge. It ceases to 
be a revelation as far as it does not reveal, if 
the difficulty of comprehension lies in the terms 
of the message itself; and it impugns the 
divine wisdom to suppose that the impediment 
to discovering that which God intended to be 
discovered, is traceable to the mode in which 
it is expressed. 

From these principles it flows that the differ- 
ences yet existing among men, about the mean- 
ing of the inspired Scriptures, are criminal. 
Men are guilty of these differences of opinion. 
Had they adopted seriously and fully, and with 
that reverence for divine authority, which 
ertlancipates from prejudice, the right means of 


understanding that which God hasput on record, 
the supposed discrepancies with which that 
record has been rashly charged, and the con- 
flicting opinions entertained by different men, 
as deduced from the same words, would have 

With these views, every work which tends 
to establish and recommend sound principles 
of interpretation, should be received with thank- 
fulness. The German critics have done much. 
Though many of them have been deeply in 
error, others have deserved the thanks of the 
Christian world; — and, among the many valu- 
able treatises which have issued from the Ger- 
man Theological School, few rank higher 
than the unfinished production of Dr. Tittmann 
now presented to the English public. It pro- 
ceeds, with great judgment, on the soundest 
principles of interpretation ; and, in the course 
of an inquiry, conducted under the guidance 
of very superior acumen and erudition, it not 
only throws a valuable light on many passages 
of Scripture, but, which is peculiarly desirable 
as a part of the series of the Biblical Cabinet, 


it exhibits a very excellent example of the 
mode in which judicious, ripe, and well- train- 
ed scholars approach the sacred fountain of 
truth. And while, in many instances, it brings 
out satisfactorily the peculiar force of the pas- 
sage under discussion, it presents, collaterally, 
strong presumptive evidence, drawn from the 
extraordinary accuracy of the style of the sacred 
writers, that they were guided in their compo- 
sitions by a supernatural power. 

The object of Dr. Tittmann was to investi- 
gate the comparative force of those words in 
the New Testament which appear to be syno- 
nymous, i. e, which range under a common 
genus, as having one generic idea in common ; 
but which have each of them, additional to this, 
a specific difference of meaning. Of these he has 
given an extensive list; — and this work, as far 
as it has gone, consists of enlarged observations 
upon some of these synonyms. It is deeply to 
be regretted that the completion of so able and 
useful a work was prevented by the death of 
its author. 

To illustrate the specific force of each word. 


Dr. Tittmann has brought the whole of his 
extensive erudition, and the accumulated 
stores of a long life of painful application, to 
bear upon each successive object of inquiry. 
He has elicited from other writers, with great 
felicity, the exact meaning of each word ac- 
cording to the usus loquendi ; and he has shown, 
from sources of illustration altogether uncon- 
nected with the sacred writings, that the words 
used by our Lord, and by his inspired disci- 
ples, when taken in their most obviously cor- 
rect sense, were the best which could have 
been chosen ; and that if any other synonym 
had been adopted, instead of that which is 
given, it would not so accurately have ex- 
pressed the intended idea. 

A work so conducted and so remarkably ef- 
fective, though it has been broken oif in the 
midst, is a most valuable example to others 
who profess to interpret the Scriptures. It is 
" a pattern of well-doing." Many persons, it 
is to be lamented, approach very rashly the in- 
terpretation of the word of God, with very in- 
adequate preparation for it, and with little 


more specific thought on the subject than a 
ruling wish to find there the opinions which, 
under other influences, they have previously 
adopted. There are men, who have been re- 
gularly drilled in the creeds and catechetical 
exercises of the Calvinistic or the Arminian 
schools of theology, to whom this remark ap- 
plies. Their religious opinions are not drawn 
fresh from the living spring. They are rather 
the stamp and impress of those formularies, 
under the cramping pressure of which their 
minds rose to a stunted maturity. They have 
walked the round of a certain train of theolo- 
gical thought. They have acquired the con- 
viction, that certain formal dogmas are proved 
by certain texts, and they can fluently quote 
these common places in their regular routine. 
But this system is a barrier to improvement. 
Its disciples scarcely ever escape from the 
shackles of such an education. The genuine 
force of the Word is often repressed by it ; and 
hidden by the interpretation of earlier and less 
enliglitened days, authoritatively bound upon 
it. And the more accurate meaning, which 

translator's preface. xi 

might otherwise have been evident to men of 
such scholastic attainment, can never make its 
way against this rigid habit of interpreting ac- 
cording to the authorized human rule of faith. 

There are others, however, who are less 
endowed with learning and critical acumen, 
but who have either imbibed the narrow views 
of some modern particular sect, or sectarian 
leader ; or who have been thrown loose from a 
reverence for any systematic views of narrated 
truth ; and who seem to regard the Scriptures 
as the sands of an African river, in which truth 
lies scattered like so many unconnected grains 
of gold, and from whence each day's labour is 
to bring forth some new and independent dis- 
covery. To them the laws of interpretation 
are fetters not to be endured ; the same word, 
repeated even in the same sentence, does not 
necessarily retain the same sense ; and, liow^- 
ever a passage may be distorted, if it can be 
made to accord with the favourite fancy of the 
moment, this meaning is given forth with all 
the solemnity of an oracle. 

Now to both classes of students here de- 

xii translator's preface. 

scribed, and especially to the young, who may 
be unwittingly led to adopt the habits of either 
of these objectionable schools, the strict and 
steady perusal of Tittmann's work may be very 
profitable. It will give them practical expe- 
rience of the nature of sound interpretation. 
It will show them the character of mind best 
fitted for such inquiry, and the judgment and 
caution, and extensive and accurate reading, 
with which first-rate minds approach a task so 
intensely interesting and important. It will 
place before them some of the successful re- 
sults to which inquiries, so conducted, lead. 
And, in fact, a serious study of these few chap- 
ters may, with the divine blessing, lead to an 
enlarged and accurate investigation of the 
canon of revealed truth, and to a satisfactory 
conviction of the substance of its announce- 
ments, not drawn from the dogmatic assertions 
of human authority, or based on the inven- 
tions of an exuberant fancy; but flowing legi- 
timately and clearly, from a well-directed gram- 
matical exegesis of the averments of the in- 
s])ired book itself. 


On tlie immediate subject of the work, as 
far as it has gone, it would have been pre- 
sumption in the translator to have added any 
thing from his own limited resources. On 
some collateral topics a few notes have been 
appended. And, on one point, which the learn- 
ed author has scarcely touched, but which ap- 
peared to him materially to strengthen and 
confirm Dr. Tittmann's views, the translator 
has added, occasionally, a more enlarged an- 
notation. He has endeavoured to extend the 
inquiry into the force of a word, beyond the 
immediate use of it at the time when the New 
Testament was written, to an anterior period, 
when the same word existed in an earlier 
language, and in a different character. 

Ernesti says truly, (Biblical Cabinet, p. 27,) 
that " the usage of language is affected by 
many things, by the time, the religion, the 
sect or party, the habits of ordinary life, and 
the political institutions, all of which tend to 
form the character of the style." And that " the 
proper province of grammarians, the highest 
exercise of their art, consists in discovering 
what is the exact meaning of each word, at 


diflferent times, in different authors, and in dif- 
ferent styles." It is evident then, that even 
during the period in which one language 
flourishes, changes may and do occur in the 
meaning of words, and by the introduction 
of new words, derivative or otherwise. Hence 
an examination of the whole history and 
progress of the word in that one language be- 
comes necessary to bring out an accurate re- 
sult. But it must be ever remembered, that 
each language is not a separate and independ- 
ent existence. Each successive nation of the 
earth was originally a migrating colony, which 
brought a language with them ; and even 
after they were settled, their thinly peopled 
shores were still open to the ingress of other 
adventurers, the peculiarities of whose speech 
would blend with those of the earlier colonists. 
The English language is an illustration of this 
fact. It is a compound of Celtic, Gothic, 
Roman, Saxon, Danish, and French, and ne- 
cessarily, therefore, extends a scientific inves- 
tigation of the language into those which were 
spoken by the successive invaders of our island. 
And from this it will appear, that etymology 


is nothing more than an extension of the in- 
quiry, which Ernesti proposes, over a wider 
range of time and space. It is, in fact, tracing 
the history of the word, the original idea, and 
its various changes of form and modifications 
of thought, through the whole period of 
its existence, from the people among whom 
it is first discovered, down to more modern 

Doubtless, in a multitude of cases, evidence 
may be adduced of a word having undergone, 
from custom or accidental intiuence, a very 
important modification in its force; though it 
is scarcely in the nature of things that such 
changes should occur arbitrarily and without a 
traceable reason; and such variations are much 
less frequent and extensive than some persons 
imagine. But, in the pursuit of philological 
inquiries, when a word occurs but rarely in 
surviving writings, and real difficulty arises 
from the scantiness of the contemporary evi- 
dence, in fixing the precise force of the word 
at the period required, it is surely a matter 
of great moment to be able to show what was 


the meaning of the same word in ages an- 
terior to the period under discussion, and 
what is the meaning or derivation of that word 
still extant in modern languages or dialects. 

Ernesti admits this in some measure. He 
says, " There may be a deficiency of evidence 
as to the tisus loquendi in the particular age 
and author." (P. 80.) And he suggests, in such 
difficulties, among other aids, a consideration 
of " the analogy subsisting between similar 
languages, that is, between those which have 
sprung from a common origin, as the Hebrew, 
the Chaldee, the Syriac, the Arabian ; or like 
those which stand in the relation of parent or 
derivative, as the Greek and Latin." But the 
remedy is here timidly proposed. Ernesti 
does not take a full view of the subject. Has 
the Greek no parent ? Did that copious and 
well-arranged language, with all the beauties 
of its grammatical inflexion, spring up at once, 
and independently, from the Hellenic soil, a 
host of armed men ? If we can trace the pro- 
gress of Greek to the Italian shore, may we 
not trace back the Greek to something else ? 


Is the progress of language, anterior to the 
formation of the Greek, so completely involved 
in obscurity, that we can discover no connec- 
tion between the language of the Hellenic 
colonists and that of their Asiatic ancestors, 
whose language we know to have been a 
written language before Greek had a being ? 

Fair and cautious investigation shows, be- 
yond all question, that although the radical 
words of the Greek language have undergone 
considerable metamorphosis, they have their 
source in the languages spoken directly to the 
eastward of the Grecian territories; and that 
the etymons of Greek and Latin words are 
found in abundance in the roots of Hebrew 
and its cognate dialects. And, in fact, the 
connection between the language spoken by 
the diiferent divisions of the Shemitic and 
Japhetic tribes, emigrating westward, is so evi- 
dent, that they may all be regarded as dialects 
emanating from one common source, which 
may still be recognized as the basis of all 
European languages. 

In the 12th vol. of the Encyclopaedie Mo- 



derne, there is a short treatise on Etymology, 
by M. Champollion Figeac, which speaks of 
such inquiries as of great importance to litera- 
ture, and in which he states the principles on 
which the investigation should be conducted, 
and without which it must be vain. " Ignorer 
ces regies," he says, " c'est vouloir analyser 
chimiquement une substance solide en la bri- 
sant a coups de marteau." The substance of 
the rule on which he proceeds in the etymolo- 
gical analysis of words in present use, is to 
detach all grammatical terminations, and ini- 
tial augments, as prepositions, &c. to strip the 
word of all additions or alterations made for 
the sake of euphony ; and then he affirms, that 
when any word has been subjected to this 
j)rocess, there will generally remain a mono- 
syllable of two or three letters, which consti- 
tute the radical word. 

If, then, this mode of analysis which M. 
Champollion recommends, be adopted, it will 
be found that the great proportion of words 
in modern language are directly referrible to 
an oriental source: and that the radical word 

translator's preface. xlx 

so denuded is oriental. ChampoUion gives, as 
an instance, the word Individuellement ; meut, 
an adverbial termination, elle an adjectival ter- 
mination, in the negative proposition, di the 
sign of separation. There remains then only 
vidu or idu ; and this probably comes from 
video, which is s/5w, /3w, with the prefixed di- 
gamma, and this leads us at once to the He- 
brew ^T to know, or perceive. 

Take another instance : unencumbered, ed is a 
participial termination, en is formative of certain 
verbs, un is the negative prefix, in is a preposi- 
tion. After this denudation, there remains only 
cum ; which is the Hebrew Dp, to rise up, or 
to raise up ; and vv^hich word is still retained 
even in its simple form in our language ; 
coom, a heap, and comb, the erection of bees. 
French combler, Latin cumulus. 

We might pursue this to any extent. But 
the evidence goes beyond this. It may be 
shown, that very many oriental words of early 
origin have retained the same sense in several 
languages throughout the period of this world's 
history ; and that their progress, do'v\^n to the 


present time, may be distinctly traced. We 
must be limited here to one or two instances. 
^1^, in Hebrew, darkness, evening, the raven. 
In this sense, also, the word occurs in Chal- 
dee, Syriac, and Arabic. We meet with it in 
Greek, e^e/Soj, vesper, nox, caligo, and «g£?'w, tego^ 
whence the German, ^ra/;^, and English, grave. 
In the Latin it occurs as corvtis, Saxon, crav, 
English, crow, French, corbeau. Again, in 
another form, it appears in Saxon, hraefn, 
English, raven ; and then it branches out, from 
the habits of the bird, into Saxon, hraejian, to 
raven, to rob ; German, rauhen ; Belgic, roo~ 
ven ; Swedish, rqfiva ; old Latin, reffare; rapere^ 
rapina ; English, rob, rape, rapine, &c. &c. 

Another instance may be given in the word 
yh^i which word occurs in Hebrew and all its 
cognate dialects, in the sense to absorb, to swal- 
low, to devour ; vorax, edax, gula. In Gothic, 
and in all the families of the Gothic migration, 
it occurs in the form,Z>fl/y, venter, scortum, saccus. 
In the Celtic family also, balg, holg, builg, mean- 
ing venter, saccus, uterus, and balgum, sorbitio. 
In Latin, hulga, a bag, a budget. In English, 

translator's preface. xxi 

a bag, a boil, a blain, fScotticeJ a bealiiig ; to 
bilge, to bulge, to bulk, to blow, to bellow. In 
Latin bellua, balaena, Greek, /SsXoi/jj and (pccXccim, 
French baleine. In Latin, jf?6»Z/M0, Greek (SsB/iXog, 
iraXkaKri, &c. &C. 

Examples of this kind might be multiplied 
to any extent. The gradual course of a word 
maybe traced as an historic fact through several 
languages, in which the original generic sense 
has always controlled the specific signification 
throua:hout a series of aj^es. And it must be 
evident that, in discussing the force of syno- 
nyms, much assistance may be derived from a 
cautious reference to such sources of illustra- 
tion. If two synonymous words are under 
consideration, and the evidence in favour of 
the usus loquendi is but scanty, and intimates, 
without effectually establishing, the fact of a 
difference; it is a matter of no little moment, 
to be able to trace the word in question up to 
the earliest known period of its existence, and 
down to its remaining derivatives in modern 
times ; and to show that the idea entertained, 
as that which was justified by the usage, is 


comfirmed by the generic character and force 
of the word at all times; and probably also 
that the specific use of it, which is sought to 
be established, did exist in another line of 
migration from the east than the Hellenic. 

To this point, then, the Translator has ven- 
tured to apply a few observations, not because 
he aspires to associate any remarks of his with 
the pages of such a writer as Tittmann ; but 
because this systematic application of ety- 
mological inquiry to exegesis, has not yet 
been adequately tried ; and because experience 
teaches him that much may yet be done by 
this means, to illustrate difficult passages of 
Scripture. If the valuable glossaries of an- 
cient and modern languages, of which we are 
possessed, are examined, with a view to this 
mode of illustration, treasures of invaluable 
importance may yet be brought forth ; which, 
under the guidance of sound and well-weighed 
canons of application, may throw much new 
light upon rare words and obScure passages, 
both in the^ Hebrew and Greek Scriptures. 
And if these few hints shall turn the attention 


of superior linguists to the subject, the Trans- 
lator will not regret the intrusion of his own 
views on the public through the medium of 
these prefatory remarks. The subject is ex- 
tensive, and the matter for illustration abund- 
ant, and requiring ample space for detail. Here, 
however, it should not be carried further. 

Mr. Tittmann completed, before his death, 
another small portion of this work on the 
Synonyms. This, together with some other 
small tracts, on subjects intimately connected 
with the present treatise, it is the purpose of 
the Translator to give to the public at a future 

The second volume also will include a general 
list of the Synonyms of the New Testament, 
which was arranged by Tittmann, and printed 
with short notices attached occasionally to some 
of the words. 

Edinburgh, March 1, 1833 




Dr. John Aucjustus Henry Tittmann, was 
born on the 1st of August 1773, at Langersalza, 
ill Upper Saxony, at which place his father 
was then stationed as deacon in the church of 
St. Boniface. He was in infancy extremely 
delicate, but his health gradually improved, 
especially after the removal of his father to 
Wittenberg. Here his education commenced, 
and his progress was rapid. At fifteen years 
of age he gave the first public proof of his 
talents in an essay. " De Virgilio Homerum 
imitante." Enjoying the privilege of such 
teachers as Schrock, Antoni, Henrichs, Hiller, 
and especially the illustrious Pteiiihard, he 
pursued his studies successfully, taking the 


degree of M. A. in 1791. And in the year fol- 
lowing, having determined to devote himself 
to an academical life, he went to Leipsic and 
studied under Professors Morus, RosenmuUer, 
Keil and Wolf. In 1793, he defended from 
the chair a dissertation entitled, " De Consensu 
Philosophorum veterum in summo bono defi- 
niendo^^ and in the following month opened 
his first course of lectures. In 1795, he was 
made B. D. and was appointed to be the morn- 
ing preacher at the University Church. His 
prelections to the theological students were so 
very much approved, that, in the year 1796, 
he was appointed to an extraordinary professor- 
ship of Philosophy ; and in 1800 to a similar 
one in theology. In 1805, being just thirty- 
two years of age, he took the degree of doctor 
in divinity, and was admitted into the concilium 
professorum ; and having thus obtained a vote 
in the Theological faculty, he had the means 
of being useful to his pupils, of which he 
readily availed himself for those who merited 
his favour. 

On the death of Dr. Wolf in 1809, he was 


appointed the third regular professor of the 
University. In 1812, he became the assessor 
of the royal consistory. In 1815, he succeeded 
Rosenmuller as the second professor, and canon 
of Meissen ; and on the death of Dr. Keil in 
1818, he rose to the very honourable position 
of Academiae professor primarius ; and having 
passed also through the various intermediate 
grades of ecclesiastical honour, he was elected 
the Custos prelatus of the cathedral church at 
Meissen. These successive steps of honour- 
able elevation, present to us a very striking 
instance of the steady progress to respect and 
usefulness, of a man of real worth and talent. 
It is remarkable also, that in all these several 
stations, his talent for business was as eminent 
as his theological attainments. He was ever, 
in the midst of an active devotion to the most 
complicated duties, the ready counsellor of his 
pupils in all their various doubts and difficul- 
ties. His advice also was sought with much 
avidity in the filling up of ecclesiastical and 
academical charges ; and such was his accu- 
rate discernment of character, that he had 


scarcely ever reason to regret his recommen- 

In the several stations which he held, Dr. 
Tittmann continued to lecture, during a pe- 
riod of forty years, on various branches of 
theological study. He gave courses of lec- 
tures on the exegesis of the New Testament, 
on the method of theological study, on church 
history, on the evidences, the morality, the 
creeds, and the dogmar-c system of Christian- 
ity, all of which were highly valued. 

His system of exegesis led directly to the 
bringing out the meaning from the sacred text 
itself, independently of all consideration of the 
opinions of commentators. His course of 
lectures on the method of study extended 
through a period of seven years. The views 
contained in his lectures on Church History, 
are given to the world in his admirable work, 
called, " A Practical Exposition of the Evan- 
gelical Churches in the years 1530 and 1830."* 

■ Der Evangelische Kirche in Jahre 1530, und in Jahre 
Ul.iO, praymatisch dargesteUt. 


A very valuable tract from his pen on the 
same subject, appeared a few weeks before his 
death in the Journal of Historical Theology. 
In his lectures on the evidences of Christi- 
anity, he made use of a small work, entitled, 
" Thoughts on the Subject of a Defence of 
the Faith."*' His lectures on morals were 
deeply interesting; and nothing could be more 
beautiful than the simplicity of his teach- 
ing in dogmatic theology. It is to be re- 
gretted that a projected work on this subject, 
which he had commenced six times, but, in 
consequence of the difficulty of satisfying the 
rigid demands of his own accurate mind, had 
as often laid aside, was never completed. 
A few days before his death, he had mention- 
ed his intention of devoting himself to it in 
the following spring. 

In his lectures on " the Creeds," he used, as 
a text-book, his " Institutio Symbolica Ecclesiae 
Evangelicae^^* Lips, 1811. In the course of 
these prelections, he taught his pupils to en- 

*• Ideen su einer Apologie des Glauhens, 


tertain a due, but only a due regard for creeds, 
as human standards of religious opinion. And 
he drew, with delicate accuracy, the distinc- 
tions between the Lutheran creed and that of 
other churches. 

Tittmann's ability as a lecturer was ad- 
mitted by all who heard him. His manner 
was good, his style lucid and simple, and his 
readiness for extempore address great. He 
was remarkable also for his constant attention 
to the interests of his students, and for his 
great liberality, both with respect to the fees 
of the class, and the devotion of his time to the 
society of his students out of the class-room. 

The works of Tittmann are not very ex- 
tensive. They contain, however, much of the 
fruits of forty years of labour ; often giving, in 
a few sentences, matter which others would 
have expanded into a volume. And in addi- 
tion to those productions, which were strictly 
professional, he wrote many tracts and pamph- 
lets on ecclesiastical law. He contributed 
papers to the Antiquarian Society, and re- 


gularly, from the year 1822 to 1831, he wrote 
the preface to the Leipsic Missionary Report. 
Dr. Tittmann was, according to the German 
technical style of speaking, a supernaturalist ; 
and, however some of his views might for a 
short time, and by some persons be misunder- 
stood, he was decidedly opposed to what is 
on the continent of Europe called Rationalism. 
He drew the distinction calmly and wisely 
between the departments of reason and re- 
ligious submission to divine teaching. He 
vindicated the proper province of reason in 
judging of religious, as of all other truth ; and 
maintained that the reason cannot receive, as 
true, any thing which is really opposed to the 
eternal and universally recognized laws of 
truth, which God has given for man's general 
guidance. He held, therefore, that there was 
in Christianity nothing contrary to these laws 
and to sound reason. At the same time, he 
held it vain to affirm, that the statements of a 
religious dispensation were limited to matters 
which the human mind, by the force of its na- 


tural faculties, might have ascertained ; but 
that, besides the natural exercise of the reason- 
ing powers for the discovery of truth, there is 
still another source of religious knowledge, 
viz. the special teaching of the Infinite reason ; 
by means of which the finite created mind may 
receive truths with which formerly it was un- 
acquainted; that the Infinite mind, acting in 
the same way as we conceive him to act in his 
providential government, has, in the develop- 
ment of his purposes towards his creature man, 
from time to time made known certain reli- 
gious truths ; that this is the revelation of God; 
that it is in the Christian system ; and that it 
must be regarded as a supernatural revelation, 
and is properly called so, because its ultimate 
source is not nature, but the immediate teach- 
ing of that being who, in other respects, ope- 
rates ordinarily and regularly through the laws 
of nature ; and that consequently it were vain 
and absurd to attempt to base the doctrines 
of Christianity on metaphysical subtleties ; and 
that the only wise and safe course is to hold 


stedfastly by the teaching of Christ and his 

The habits of Dr. Tittmann were of course 
rigidly studious and industrious. He rose in 
his youth at four, and in later years at five, 
in the morning. The morning hours he passed 
till nine in his study. He then went to his 
class-room, where he taught till twelve. From 
twelve to one he wrote letters and read the 
papers. He dined early, and took a short rest. 
At three he received visitors. From four to 
six he attended various literary societies ; and 
then hastened again to his desk, at which he 
generally sat till eleven. 

He married a widow lady in the year 1811, 
by whom he had three children, two of whom 
still live. 

The outward frame of Tittmann was worthy 
to be the tabernacle of such a spirit as his. 
Benevolence beamed to the last from his blue 
and speaking eye ; and his whole figure was 
noble and commanding. Dr. Tittmann died 
of consumption, combined with other local 


affections. His general health began to wear 
a suspicious character in the month of October, 
yet, contrary to medical advice, he persisted 
in being carried in a sedan chair to the class- 
room, and continued to lecture three hours 
daily, until the 2d of December. From that 
day his strength rapidly failed, yet he only 
ceased from labour on the 23d, because his 
hands were too weak to hold the pen, and an 
inflammatory seizure in the throat prevented 
him from dictating. He died on the 30th. 
In the close of his illness he said one day, " I 
am a philosopher and a theologian, but never 
did I perceive so distinctly as now, that soul 
and body are two distinct things." Towards 
the evening of the 29th, he called for a mirror, 
saying, " I suspect I have got the Jacies hippocra- 
tica^ During the evening he seemed to dream ; 
and, in a plaintive accent, he said, " All I 
have now to do is to sleep." He revived a 
little, however, and in his last moments he 
imagined himself in the chair lecturing to his 
pupils ; he repeated the words with which he 


frequently concluded : " Sed Jiaec siifficiant ; 
Ji7iis, Jinis in fide ;" and so saying, he fell 

Happy and worthy of imitation, a life so 
actively and unremittingly devoted to the ser- 
vice of God, and the elucidation of his inspired 
word. And blessed they, who, according to 
their several ability, shall go and do likewise. 

List of the Author's works. 

Grundriss der Elementar Logik, nebst einer Ein- 
leitung in die philosophie. Leipzig, 1795. 

Theocles ein Gesprach iiber den Glauben an Gott. 
Leipzig, 1799. 

Theon oder iiber unsere HofFnungen nach dem 
Tode. Leipzig, 180L 

Lehrbuch der Homiletik. Breslau, 1804. 

Pragmatische Geschichte der Theologie und Re- 
ligion in der Protestantischen Kirche, wahrend 
der Zweiten Halfte des 18 Jahrhunderts Erstes 
Theil. Breslau, 1805. 

De rebus academicis epistola ad virum summe re- 
verendum perillustrem et excellentissimum Gottl. 
Adolph. Ernest. Nostitz et Taenkendorf. Lipsiae 


Ueber Supranaturalismus Rationalisnms et Atheis- 

mus. Leipzig 1816. 
Ueber die Vereinigung der Evangelischen Kirchen. 

Leipzig, 1818. 
Die protestation der Evangelischen Stande auf 

dem Reichstage zu Speyer im Jahre 1529. 

Leipzig, 1829. 
Confessio Fidei exhibita Imperatori Charles V. in 

Comitiis Augustae, MDXXX. ex primo Melanc- 

thonis editione recognita. Dresdae, 1829. 
Ueber die FixerungderStolgebuhren. Leipzig, 1831. 

PEiJ^OJSjiOS ^^ 


^ rr^^ THE ^-, y^ 






The anniversary of tliat day, my beloved 
fellow-citizens, is arrived, on which, with a 
view to do away a shameless traffic in indul- 
gences, Luther enkindled a flame, that all but 
enveloped the dome of St. Peter's. But this 
flame having declined together with the ponti- 
fical sovereignty of Rome, it becomes those 
Christians whose primitive rights the sacred en- 
ergy of Luther vindicated, to commemorate 
that day, not by idle triumphs, but by remem- 
bering the wise councils of that great man. It 
becomes them so to avail themselves of the be- 


iiefits wliicli he conferred, that they may be 
seen to hav^e been realized by judicious men, 
who do not merely boast themselves of their 
privileges, but use them wisely. Which 
course, as it has been often neglected by those 
who seemed to adhere to Lutheran views, so 
has it especially been the case with those who, 
forsaking the study of the interpretation of 
Scripture, have based their confidence on hu- 
man forms and ecclesiastical authority, and 
thus rashly overthrown one of Luther's wisest 
instructions. For no opinion of Luther was 
more prominent than that the divine doctrine 
must be drawn directly from the sacred fount 
itself; and he therefore especially recommend- 
ed the art of grammar and the study of the 
ancient languages; although it is generally 
supposed that, on account of his own educa- 
tion under a defective system, or from the 
multiplicity of duties by which he was subse- 
quently overwhelmed, he was, in common 
with the greatest men of that age, not tho- 
roughly trained to the subtleties of grammar. 
These subtleties, however, many in our day 
have learned to despise ; and, as if the subject 
were exhausted, they have turned to sophisti- 
cal disputation, and have learned to regard 
the whole business of the grammatic interpret- 


er as lying in determining' the vague signifi- 
cation of words, or in seeking out what they 
call the literal sense, but which they evidently 
do not understand. Of this folly, however, I 
will not now speak, as it is sufficiently evident 
that after such an improvement in letters as 
that which has recently taken place, the iiiertion 
of these men will scarcely be longer endured. 
But on that day which we are about to cele- 
brate, it will be gratifying to all to whom the 
divine doctrine and discipline are precious, to 
remember that saying which was ever in the 
mouth of Luther : the best grammarian is the 
lest theologian ; that is, he who not only knows 
the principles of the ancient languages, but 
also so perceives the general art of speaking, — 
than which nothing more sublime has been in- 
vented by the human mind, — ^to be reducible to 
common rules naturally based in reason, so that 
he is able rightly to expound all the memo- 
rials of talent, and to open the fathomless 
treasuries of human erudition, he is certainly 
best fitted to ascertain and to impart to others 
sacred truth. He is sadly mistaken who mea- 
sures the business of the interpreter by the 
vulgar mode of speaking, as if he had nothing 
to do but what boys learn at school. Although 
even the elementary rules of grammar are not 


to be despised; because, as Quinctillian sa^'^s, 
to those entering the interior of even this art, 
many subtle distinctions will appear, which 
are not only fitted to exercise the acumen of 
opening minds, but to test even the science 
and erudition of the best informed men. But 
most truly Hemsterhusius has said, to under- 
stand a language, that is, according to the 
common notion, to get all the words and forms 
of speech packed close in the brain, appears 
but an idle and profitless attainment. (See his 
Oration on uniting the Study of Mathematics 
and Philosophy with that of the Linguistic Art.) 
But while many things in respect to the 
grammatical interpretation of the New Testa- 
ment require a nicer accuracy than is general- 
ly thought necessary ; this is especially true of 
those words commonly called synonyms ; so 
that, unless the most accurate thought has 
been exercised on them, it is much to be 
feared that no language whatever can be 
thoroughly understood. For that which, in 
the study of language, is regarded as the high- 
est attainment, viz. to know whence, and for 
what reasons, certain names were given to cer- 
tain things, is of such a nature that it cannot 
be attained without the accurate examination 
of synonymous terms ; neither can an inter- 


preter remain ignorant of the origin and rea- 
son of them, unless he is himself willing to 
err in respect to the notions of things so ex- 
pressed in words, or carelessly to acquiesce in 
loose analogous significations, however rendered. 
That this nicety, however, in discriminating and 
explaining synonyms is yet wanting, both in 
many interpreters of the New Testament, and 
in almost all our Lexicons, is not surprising. 
For this is in all languages the most difficult 
branch of study, and the least elaborated ; and 
is, of course, so much more difficult as the 
times of the rise, perfection, and decline of a 
language are more remote from our own age ; 
and that, as the foundation and origin of parti- 
cular words fall into obscurity, the origin and 
relation of synonyms are less easily discovered. 
And although in the Greek language especial- 
ly, on account of the refinement and exuber- 
ance of the Greek mind, the accurate discri- 
mination of synonyms is extremely difficult, yet 
in explaining the writings of the New Testa- 
ment, the definite marking of cognate and si- 
milar words is, on two accounts, attended with 
still greater difficulty. In the first place^ be- 
cause the customary speech of those writers is 
more nearly allied to the style of vulgar life 
than to that of erudite men, which is governed 


by strict rules ; and also that on account of the 
multitude of new ideas to be expressed by 
means of words then in use, their task must 
have been difficult to any one, but especially 
to those who were strange to the habit of accu- 
rate speaking and writing. For the multitude 
of common minds, if, on the whole, they agree 
in certain general notions or ideas of things, 
care not to ascertain accurately what is the 
force of each word ; but make use of similar 
or analogous terms very promiscuously, and 
do little more than endeavour to express what 
they think in the readiest and most accessible 
terms. And hence they not only do not nice- 
ly discriminate between synonyms ; but they 
heap together similar words, the true and nice 
distinctions between which, even learned men 
too much neglect. The language of men in 
common life is certainly more vehement and 
less modified ; its terms are less nicely mea- 
sured, and it often affirms both indistinctly 
and rashly; which, if an interpreter lose sight 
of, he will often be seeking in the force of 
words for a meaning which never entered 
the mind of the author; ah error far too 
palpable in most of the interpreters of the 
New Testament. But, in explaining the sa- 
cred volume, the other point which we have 


noticed is not less important. For tliese wri- 
ters, in expressing new things, for which, in 
common parlance, suitable words were want- 
ing, made use of analogous words which would 
be clear and perspicuous to the men to whom 
they wrote, but which certainly present diffi- 
culty to others who are estranged from their 
modes and habits of thinking. For in respect 
to things of which a people have no notion, 
there must be in their language a want of 
words or signs for them ; and therefore if their 
range of knowledge is to be increased by new 
notions of new things, either new words must 
be coined, which ordinarily takes place in 
those things which strike the senses ; or foreign 
words must be borrowed, which is frequently 
done ; or the new idea is expressed as it best 
may, in analogous words then extant, whether 
in a simple or tropical sense. And that the 
Apostles have done this is no marvel, and 
surely not a ground of blame, seeing that the 
greatness and sublimity of the truths they 
tauy:ht, — truths mii^htier than the fetters of Ian- 
guage — could not endure the regulated preci- 
sion of established modes of speech. But, in 
explaining their writings, extreme caution is 
required, lest the interpreter, in rendering 
cognate and analogous words differing minute- 


ly from each other, should attribute to them 
the same sense, when they are used in a differ- 
ent one ; or should attach importance to the 
difference of sense, when they did not intend to 
do so. And truly this requires more caution 
than those who despise the niceties of gram- 
mar are willing to exercise ; and hence it is, 
that in explaining the books of the New Tes- 
tament, words which differ widely in meaning 
are assumed to be synonymous, while others 
which are allied to one common notion, are 
not acknowledged as synonymous, or are 
not explained with sufficient accuracy. And 
that I do not here speak unadvisedly, I will 
now endeavour to demonstrate. 

But, at the outset, we must determine what 
synonyms are. For many have written only 
ambiguously and defectively on this point ; 
and neither Ammonius,* Popma,'' or others, 
who have written on " similar or dissimilar ex- 
pressions," have adequately discussed the na- 
ture of synonyms. The philologists of our own 
country, who seem, by nature, fitted beyond 

" A writer of the fourth century. His work, De Simili- 
tudine ac differentia quarundam dictionum, was published 
at Paris, 1521, and London, 1637 T. 

^ See Ausonius Popma de differentiis verhorum item de 
usu antiquae locutionis. Lipsiae, 1734. — T. 


all Others, for the examination of such difficul- 
ties, have thrown the first light on this subject. 
Among these, after Stosch, Fischer, and Ade- 
lung, Eberhard is admitted to stand pre-emi- 
nent. We yet admire, however, the superior 
mind of Aristotle, who defined so subtilely and 
elegantly the notions of indefinite things, that 
he has given us a most perfect example of accu- 
rate speaking and thinking. He says, <s\)vm\j[xa^ c^v 
ro, Ts ho,aa xomv, zai 6 xard rouvo/xa Xoyog rrjg ovuiocg 6 
avTog. ohv ^mv, o, rs av^^oj-Tog xai 6 ^ovg. Synonyms, 
therefore, according to Aristotle, are those 
things which, having by nature a common ge- 
nus, are called by a common name. From 
these he distinguishes 6/a,wi/u/xa, which, though 
possessing a different nature, have a common 
generic name, oJov ^mv dv^^oj'Trog xa) to ys^ga/x/xft'ov 
Tovrojv ya^ ovo/JjO, f/jovov xoivhv, 6 ds Kara rovvo/Ma Xoyog 
rrig ovffiag srs^og (ante Categor. § 1, 2.)'' Whence 

° Far otherwise speaks Dionysius Thrax* (See Bekkeri 
Anecdot. vol. ii. p G36,) o/jccuvv/u,ov limv ovo/ua, ro xxrcc ToX" 
Xuv ofZMVvfico; Tt&if^ivov, oiov A't'a.; o l!iXix.f/.ei>vio; kxi A/«j o OiXia/s, 
fcvs S-ciXda-trio; ku) fjt,vi ynyivvi?. '2vv&i\vy.ov %i io-rt to Iv 'hta.(po^oi$ 
ovof/,oc(n TO ecvTO ^•yiXouv, olov uo^, ^I'Pog, fj^a^eci^ct, c^oc^*}, ^atryctvor. 
But the Scholiasts (ibid p. 867,) appear to diifer, unless we ex- 
amine them very accurately. Certainly grammarians say that 
the ofjcuvvfjca is a word common to diverse persons or things, 

» A grammarian resident at l< nodes, a disciple of Aristarchus, and wlio, 
according to Suidas, publislied some grammatical work?. — T. 


it appears, tliathe called those tilings synonyms 
wliieli bore a common generic name, and had 
in them also the same reason why the name 
was given. And so far the definition is good ; 
for it correctly intimates what they have in 
common. But one point is yet unnoticed, viz : 
that synonyms differ, and in what they differ. 
And, although this is almost an endless sub- 
ject; for synonyms differ in as many ways as 
there is room for distinctions in the same word; 
yet this must not be lost sight of, lest synonyms 
be confounded with words of precisely similar 
power and meaning. For it is to be under- 
stood, that synonyms are words of the same 
genus, but of different species, in which fact 
especially the nature of synonyms lies ; but, 
since all the species are not of the same mode, 
for some are subject directly to the genus, and 
others to the species, it becomes necessary to ex- 
plain accurately both the affinities and the diffe- 
rences which exist. Eustathius (on Iliad. 8, 20.) 
has spoken more fully, and it is as well to quote 

as Ala?, fiu;, xvMv, (poTvi^. but t-i«tt the ffv.ei vicet, i.s a similar 
sigiiificatiim conveyed l)y diverse wortis, o Ita -^kuovav evo/ad- 

yaviTi 'J hey diffe:', tlieref'.irej IVorn Aristotle, ^vho s;.ys that 
synonyms are not terms peculiar tu a ginius, but n mies of 
tliiiigs ranged in one common genus. 


his words, for Henry Stephen does not appear 
to have rij^htlv caught his meanino:. He 
says, s'^i 7MV 'Tra^o^vvofjbsvojv rh'^oojrruv, rsSdaoa roAjra 
Xsyzrai ov6[jjr/,roL rtaoa r(Z cro/fi-yi'* ^u/xog* yoXog' /j>^vtg' 
jcorcg' Si'i '^v^dog fih yokog raurd karir W(r-:r£5 xa/ ri 
xomncm /xg^' "O/JjTi^ov Xsyo/jAjyj opyrj' %al zlgi ra rota 
Tccvrcc, 6 '^■j/ihg 6 ^oXog xaJ r, h^yri 6\))/U)VV[JijCt xara rovg 
y^a/x/jj-xriyuovg' Kurcc d's rovg uXkovg <!roXvu>vv(j^a^ xa^a 
■/cocl TO' (Soorog' /jjho-]/' av'^^MTog. — xat ourcfj y^v) '/oXog 
'/.cii ooyri xcii '^v.'jjog TroXvojvv/jjOvcfiv sv ravrornr/ (jri/xaa/ag. 
These words very accurately express that which 
constitutes the nature of synonyms, viz : a cer- 
tain notion common to several words, in each of 
which a certain specific difference resides ; as 
there are four species of ooyrj, '^vfj.og' yJJKog^ ^55v/$* 
xoVog, all which may be predicated of an angry 
man ; but yet in each there is something by 
which it may be distinguished from the others. 
If, therefore, we regard the grammarians, syn- 
onyms are words contained under the same 
genus, but each of which has its peculiar species; 
so that, though they are all comprehended 
under one common notion, yet each has be- 
sides its distinguishing peculiarity. 

Synonyms are, however, of two kinds, of 
which the one may be called logical^ the other 
grammatical. And we would call those logical, 
in which there is a diverse notion of the forms 


or species which class under the same genus ; 
as in the example cited from Eustathius, ky^ 
is the g-enus, but the several species are ^v/Mog' 
-/Jkog' [Mtivig' %6rog' diverse certainly in their speci- 
fic nature, but cognate in one common and more 
general quality ; for all may be predicated 
of an angry man. We call these logical syno- 
nyms, because their relation lies in the reason 
of the thing, which interlinks many things with 
a common name or thing; or, as Aristole says, 
or/ ccvrog s6tiv 6 Tiara rovvof^a rrjg ohaiag Xoyog. But 
there are other synonyms which the older 
grammarians appear to have called -roXuwi/u/Aa, 
the synonyms of things, which, on various ac- 
counts, are called by various names, as ^ooHg' 
/As^o-vj/* av^oo)-7:og. These, as they differ, not in 
the notion of the thing expressed, but merely 
in the reason of the particular term given, may 
be called grammatical synonyms, unless some 
should prefer to call them etymological. For 
often many terms are appropriated to the same 
thing, which differ only in the etymology; as 
the same men are called, in a different relation, 
ai/^^wTo/, (S^oToi, /ui.iPQ-:rsg. But, if any one main- 
tains that such words should be excluded from 
the list of synonyms, I shall not object; since 
properly, those things only are synonymous 
which have, in fact, the same name as sub- 


jects to the same genus. And in this sense 
later writers have used the term. But since, 
to both kinds of words, this is common, that 
they are the signs of things which possess in 
common one generic distinction, they would 
not be altogether incorrectly called synonyms, 
by any one who wished to comprehend un- 
der one term this whole genus of cognate 
vocables. This, however, must not be conced- 
ed, that words which signify the same thing in 
the same mode, are to be accounted synonyms. 
For how many have erred who have classed 
together the (Suvu)vu[/.a and hodwa/xovvra. It is one 
thing to signify in some way the same object, 
it is another to have the same force, that is 
precisely the same meaning. Nor does Aquila 
Rom.^ (de avmwfila) speak altogether unadvised- 
when he says, we avail ourselves of this kind 
of elocution, when we consider one word not 
to express sufficiently the dignity and great- 
ness of the subject; and, therefore, introduce 
others having the same signification. But 
it is a very different matter what the Scholiast 
on Aristophanes says, £^o$ roTg 'jroinrcug cra^aXX^Xo/j 
Xs'^sffiv laoh'jvctf/jovaaig y^^r^G'bai, (vid. loh, Chr. G. 

^ I suppose the author means Peter de Aquila, or Aqui- 
lanus, who wrote, in 1737j a book, Questiones in quatuor 
libros sententiarum. — T. 


Ernesti Lexicon Technol. Graec. Rhetor, p. 334.) 
More correctly J. A. Ernesti, the ornament ot 
this university, taught in his Institutio Interpre- 
tis N. T.,* that " in the same language, or, at 
least, in the same dialect of it, among the same 
people, during the same age, there are no syn- 
onyms of words specifically applied ; if, how- 
ever, such exist in any language, they are the 
product of different dialects or periods." This 
remark is true, and worthy of much attention, 
if synonyms are to be regarded as equivalent 
words; the number of which will always be 
few in any language in proportion to its re- 
finement, as in Greek; for it may be fairly 
doubted, whether in a language so far refined, 
any words can be found of precisely the same 
force, i, e. which indicate the same thing, pre- 
cisely in the same way ; for although they 
may denote the same thing, as ^agiXsvg, avaf, 
Tv^avvog, or may signify the several species of 
the same genus, as ^'^og, ao^, (pdayam, yet they 
differ in certain points ; and, although the 
traces of this difference may be, by length of 
time and indiscriminate use, almost obliterat- 
ed ; yet they may be recovered from accurate 
writers, and can even be followed out by means 

• See Biblical Cabinet, vol. i. p. 50 T. 


of the etymology itself. Wherefore, great 
care should be taken, lest in words of this kind, 
which seem to mean the same thing, we ne- 
glect the specific diiference of meaning; and 
this especially in terms which relate to morals 
and to the affections of the mind ; which, al- 
though they, may appear very nearly allied, yet 
in degree, or mode, or in specific character, 
may, nevertheless, differ very widely. And 
this is, in fact, one of the most fruitful sources 
of synonyms. 

And hence, therefore, both in other books, 
and in the books of the New Testament, those 
words only can be regarded as synonyms, 
which have the same common notion, to which 
several species or modes are subjected; so 
that tliey may be all referred to the same ge- 
neric head ; but each, at the same time, so dis- 
tinctly differing that, as species, they may be 
accurately distinguished from the genus itself. 

There are, however, three kinds of words 
especially in the New Testament, which 
may be erroneously taken for synonyms; 
and concerning these I will speak shortly. 
The first class consists of those which signify 
either the cause or the effect; and are so much 
more likely to be regarded as synonyms, because 
the writers of the New Testament, as is very 


common in popular writing, are wont to unite 
very closely cause and effect. For example, 
writers of dogmatic theology are very apt to 
use promiscuously those words which are ap- 
plied by the sacred writers to the redemption 
of man, as /Xao/xog* Xvt^ov s^ayooaff/Mg' dixaiuffig' xa- 
raXkcLyn' o!.<pi<sig a/xagr/wr ; so that these words ap- 
pear to signify precisely the same thing, or, at all 
events, to be synonymous. And the three for- 
mer we might grant to be synonyms, although, 
even then, their specific difference should be 
noticed ; but the others which follow, differ 
widely from them. For these denote the ef- 
fects of the work of Christ — those benefits which 
flow through Christ to the real believer ; while 
the cause or reason why such benefits are re- 
ferred to Christ as their author, is expressed 
by those words, which show what Christ has 
done. For when the sacred writers say that 
Christ accomplished, /Xao/xo?, Xur^ov, s^ayo^afffios, 
they mean to express that which he did to ob- 
tain xaraXkayy]^ d/xalcoffig, aipsffig a/j^a^riuv. The 
Aixaluffig is the effect of iJayo^atf/Aog, and so is the 
xaTccXXayyj, and they who have considered it as 
synonymous with iXagf^og have greatly erred. 
For the xara'AXayr] is not referred to God, but 
to men ; it is the effect of the /Xao/xog and the 
a<peffig a/j^aprtuv. For after that men have ob- 


tained, through Christ, the assured hope of par- 
don and future happiness, nothing hinders their 
return to a state of gracious favour with God; 
and, that lifted up and encouraged by that hope, 
they should both cease to dread any thing from 
God towards themselves, and cease to act con- 
trary to his will. And although men are said 
to be ** enemies by wicked works," the force of 
this is not that God is angry with them ; al- 
though, on account of his perfect holiness, he 
cannot approve of human perverseness, nor 
grant to man a salvation for which he is utterly 
unfit ; but it is, that, men alienated from the 
love of virtue, and struggling against the sanc- 
tity of the divine laws, are in their thoughts, 
their course of life, and even in their fear, op- 
posed to the will of God, and are in despair of 
attaining a happy end ; than which, nothing 
can render man, who is "sold under sin," more 
wretched.^ But from this benefit which is re- 

^This is a most important theological dogma, brought out 
and illustrated by accurate scholarship. It lies at the basis of 
useful evangelical instruction. That which divineshave called 
thelaw-enmity onthe part of God towardsmen,hasbeen made 
too much of by some, in the face of the Gospel announce- 
ment, that " God was, in Christ, reconciling the world to him- 
self, and not imputing to men their trespasses." If men are 
to be encouraged to seek a better state, they must be shown, 
that the impediment does not lie in the religious system, 
but in their own wilful indifference and mistrust. — T. 


ferred to Christ, it follows that man may be 
reconciled to God. The a^sc/g a/y,apr/wv, pre- 
cedes, and then follows the TtaraXXayr,' Be- 
cause ^iog r]v Iv %^/<J'rw Ttodijjov xaraXXaco'wi' savruj, [/j7\ 
"hjoyiXjtihiwc, avToTg ra ira^aitrfj^iLCLra avruv it is now 
the duty of men to return to a state of grace 
with a holy God. dio/Mi^a oh vtso xi"^'^cv, xaraXXd- 
yfiTi rw %i(^ (2 Cor. V. 19, 20.) 

In the same way, ^/xa/wtf/g and a^piag afiainm 
are improperly regarded as synonyms. For 
dixatojffig is the whole gift of salvation ;^ but the 
aipsffig a/^a^r/wi/ is the cause and necessary condi- 
tion by which the hxamaig exists. Many pas- 
sages show that they thus differ as cause and 
effect, but those, especially in which they 
are plainly distinguished as to order of time, 
as Rom. iv. 25. But as these words have been 
taken for synonyms, it has, of course, happened 
that when they ought to be plainly subordinated 
one to the other, they have been treated as 
parallel in order, and by this means a serious 
confusion has been introduced into ideas of the 
first importance. For not even now, in ex- 
plaining the substance of the Gospel concern- 

s Rather, it is the putting man in such a state before God, 
forensically, as that all the practical realization of salvation 
from s>in and its consequences shall follow — T. 



ing the salvation accomplished by Christ, and 
really obtainable by men, do they altogether 
abstain from those formulae which, taking their 
rise from the Vulgate rendering of certain 
words, subsequently, when the Romish Church 
had obscured the true benefits of the death of 
Christ, were adopted almost of necessity by our 
own theologians ; and then, at length, con- 
trary to the plain meaning of the sacred writers, 
were received among the evangelic dogmata, 
and defended with more zeal than propriety ; 
and even now, are attempted to be justified. 
If any true evangelical theologian could per- 
suade himself, in explaining the doctrine of 
salvation, to use words which actually accord 
with the Greek, and not those uncertain am- 
biguous terms borrowed from the Vulgate, as 
justitia, justification satisfaction &c., he certainly, 
as doing much to place the evangelic doctrine 
in its true light, and to defend it from the de- 
filements of its enemies, would deserve much 
praise.'^ In the mean time, let us give dili- 

** It is almost impracticable to unravel the web which Ro- 
mish sophistry has woven around the truth to hide it. The 
ingenuity of ages has been devoted to this subject. For in- 
stance, the true notion of repentance has been almost en- 
tirely lost, through the false view which the Romanists have 
promulgated about penance. They have endeavoured to 
show that the very word comes horn poena^ punishment, and 


gence that the words which, in their teaching", 
the sacred writers have used, be understood in 
their true force and meaning. 

Another class of words in the New Testa- 
ment which have been mistaken for synonyms, 
is that of those which express the state or the 
action. In explaining these, error often is 
committed, when persons who know not the 
true force of the words, endeavour to excuse 
the rashness of their own interpretation by the 
supposed inaccuracy of diction in the sacred 
writers ; and thus confound those words which 
express the action with those which denote 
the state or condition of the thing. And if 
any one should say that this is of no moment ; 
for that in both words the notion of the same 
thing is dominant; it is easy to shew how 
greatly he is deceived. For, in the first place, 

that penance or repentance is a voluntary infliction for sin. 
But the fact is, that our word repent^ and the French se 
repentir, are not at all derived from this source, but from 
the Hebrew word niS)> ^^ ^"^^ ^ ^^^ this'etymological view 
of the word brings us away altogether from the false doc- 
trine of Rome, and exhibits to us the idea of repentance in 
its true light, and in perfect accordance with the New Tes- 
tament word for it, fitravoiei, a change of mind, a turning from 
sin to God. From the same source, we have the French word 
penie, inclination, and in our own language, pent-house, a 
sloping roof, inclining towards the main building — T. 


the words are of a different genus, and cannot 
therefore be accounted synonyms ; as, for ex- 
ample, creation and the thing created ; slaugh- 
ter and death ; who would call these synonyms ? 
Moreover, as the thought is widely different 
when we speak of a certain action, and when 
we speak of the state or conditk)n effected by 
that action, it is inevitable that many errors 
must arise if words of these different kinds 
are accounted synonymous. Yet this is a fault 
so frequent with our lexicographers, that I do 
not hesitate to affirm it to be a fruitful source 
of many serious errors. Examples of this may 
be found in those words especially which have 
their origin in a common root, as ^/xa/wc/g, o/xa/o- 
(f'jvn, and dixalu/^a, and many others; which, when 
they are referred to the same thing, are impro- 
perly regarded as synonyms, and are therefore 
frequently explained as if it were the same thing 
whether the Apostle had written 6/xa/w/xa or 
dr/caiudig. And this is still more objectionable 
when words of this class are used to express im- 
portant general notions, for the accurate setting 
forth of which customary language scarcely 
suffices. For in these cases it must often hap- 
pen, and most unfortunately for the ascertain- 
ing the Apostle's meaning, that words which 
describe the action are confounded with the 


idea of the state and condition of the thing 
acted on ; which, in passages where the sacred 
writers have spoken of the wickedness of the 
men of their generation not unfrequently oc- 

Finally, the third kind of synonyms which 
are erroneously assumed to exist in the New 
Testament, is more difficult of development. 
It embraces those words which so far signify 
the same thing, that they equally regard cer- 
tain persons, or certain times and places, and 
therefore are falsely assumed to be synony- 
mous, and are not explained as to their specific 
diiference, because a certain general notion is 
assumed as the basis of them all. There are 
many such words in the New Testament, 
which are used only of certain persons or of a 
certain time or place, each of which express 
a very different idea, although they have refe- 
rence to one and the same thing. Such are 

xr/tj^Jji/a/, dvazaivovff^ai, which, though they are 
all predicated of amendment of heart and life, 
yet they exhibit the notion so differently, that 
they cannot be accounted synonymous. Some 
indeed, as /mbtuvosTv, dyiuG^i^vai, express the com- 
mon notion of amendment; others, as sTiffr^s- 
f gcr^a/, dvoj^iv yivn^rtvai^ are spoken of a change 


in the Jews' mode of thinking and acting ; the 
rest, and indeed most words of this class, re- 
quire the improvement of the manners and 
life of men already corrupted and defiled by 
sinful association. And if these words are ac- 
counted synonymous, then they are all under- 
stood in one sense as of renewing, restoring, 
and, as it were, forming again human nature, 
when they ought to be understood of the 
amendment of the life of men already in exist- 
ence, and already corrupted; and any one 
capable of judging, will readily admit the con- 
fusion that must thus be introduced. For, 
although we are not disposed to deny that 
human nature, even at its best, needs the aid 
and discipline of the Holy Spirit, that it may 
obtain a blessed end; nay, we will readily 
grant that all the posterity of Adam must 
despair of eternal happiness, unless they 
steadily pursue that course which the sacred 
books prescribe, and which is most assuredly 
pointed out to them by inspiration ; yet this 
also we think evident, that no opinions have 
been held concerning man's moral state more 
dreadful, or which ought more justly to be 
mollified by the favourable use of ambiguous 
words, than those which apply the Scripture 
statements, concerning men in a state of actual 


corruption, to the moral state of human nature 
itself;^ and this arises from no other cause 
than that words, which were affirmed only of 
certain men in certain places and times, were, 
as if they involved the same general notion, 
regarded as synonymous. Certainly this will 
be granted by all, that a passage concerning 
man's moral improvement is usually treated as 
if it spoke indiscriminately of the new-born in- 
fant and of the worst man on earth. And we 

' It is to be feared that the author has, in these latter re- 
marks, allowed the benevolence of his feelings to carry him 
away from the line of accurate investigation which he 
prescribes, and in which he generally walks with much 
caution. The whole of this passage is far too general and 
loose in its statements, to warrant an almost sceptical view 
of the established theology of ages, upon some important 
points of doctrine. We must not receive even upon so respect- 
able an authority, the mere assertion that, Wiffr^i<fi(r6ai 
and civuhv yivvn&iivat are expressions only to denote a 
change from Judaism to Christianity; nor Avould it be a 
sound canon of criticism, that there is an ambiguity in 
doctrinal terms in the inspired writers, which should be 
thrown into the scale in favour of man's present moral con- 
dition as a fallen being. It is easy for perverted intellect, 
or unsound scholarship, to assume this ambiguity, and build 
on it a false and ruinous dogma ; and in fact, this is the 
fruitful source of most heretical opinions ; while, before the 
meridian light of such acumen as that which Mr. Tit- 
mann generally shows, all seeming ambiguity vanishes. 


might easily multiply sucli examples if we had 
room, or if more examples were needed to 
sustain a self-evident observation. So far how- 
ever I have spoken, lest the errors into which 
men fall respecting synonyms, should be ac- 
counted of little importance. The ills under 
which we suffer in this respect are undoubted- 
ly curable ; but they lie deeper than is gene- 
rally thought; nor will they be heard till, in 
compliance with the advice of Luther, we re- 
turn to the strict accuracy of grammatic inves- 

^ Certainly much of the wild theology, which, to the dis- 
grace of the Christian church in the 19th century, has dis- 
turbed the peace of its naembers, may be traced to the sad 
inaccuracy with which the word of God is read in the ori- 
ginal languages. Women and boys, and sometimes men, 
(see such publications as the Morning Watch, passim) with 
a little smattering of Greek and Hebrew, set up for critics 
and inventors of new views ; and so extensive is the want 
of a habit of strict exegetical interpretation, that not many 
of the pastors of the present day in our country, are pre- 
pared by the ponderous metal of a sound scholarship, to con- 
found and silence their frivolous and baseless speculations. 
The mists which they raise could not live in the light of 
such writings as this very able work on the synonyms of 
Scripture. — T. 



It is generally allowed, that one great diffi- 
culty in explaining old authors, lies in the 
accurate observation of the use of words. For, 
as in the grammatical laws of a language, no 
such rigid necessity exists, but that an occa- 
sional deviation may be permitted ; so in the 
use of coo^nate words, a still jrreater latitude of 
meaning obtains; for those laws arise from 
fixed causes, and cannot therefore be lost sight 
of, unless the causes themselves are removed, 
(although custom introduces many forms of 
speech which are contrary to the rule and 
genius of a language;) but the wider use of 
particular words is not controlled by certain 
laws, but is frequently so guided by custom, 
that not only at different periods, but in 
writers of the same period, the force of a word 
materially differs. And this justifies the 
masters of the hermeneutic school, when they 
affirm that, next to the grammatical and logical 
knowledge of a language, regard should be 
had, especially in rendering the older writers, 
to the usiis loquendi, or sense in which particu- 


lar words were received, both generally in the 
language in which the book is written, and 
specially in the writings of its author. And 
as this attempt is not without difficulty in 
common cases, so is that difficulty consider- 
ably increased in the examination of those 
writers, who have more frequently receded 
from the customary use of words, whether it 
be from ignorance of their own language, or 
that the novelty and magnitude of their sub- 
ject compelled them to a more lax applica- 
tion of the terms already in use. The writers 
of the New Testament Scriptures were of this 

In no class of words, however, is the diffi- 
culty greater than in those called synonyms; 
that is, in those which, although they may be 
referred to one common notion, yet each pre- 
sents some particular mode and specific mark- 
ing of the thing signified. For in regard to 
such words, not only must great care be taken 
lest many words should be falsely accounted 
synonymous; but the determining of those that 
really are synonymous, is rendered extremely 
difficult ; partly because in the natural pro- 
gress of language the specific force of a word 
is frequently changed; and partly because the 
sacred writers, freed from the ambition of mere 


human eloquence, have rather followed the 
leadings of a mind illumined by the divine 
spirit, than laboured after the beauties of an 
artificial eloquence. In noticing, therefore, 
the specific difference of particular synonyms, 
caution is required lest, in the interpretation 
of certain passages, we should search in them 
for more than the writer himself intended. 
At the same time, they appear to err greatly 
who, in forming lexicons of the New Testa- 
ment, do not at all regard the true relation of 
synonyms, but treat of words which are in a 
certain degree cognate, though really very 
diverse from each other, as if they were equi- 
valent and identical in their form and mean- 

For, although it must be granted that in all 
passages the distinction between synonyms 
cannot be so urged, as that we shall always 
gain much towards exhibiting the force of each 
passage, yet accurate interpretation requires 
that we should diligently notice the difference 
of words, lest in places in which the writer 
meant to convey different ideas, we should 
swerve from the sure rule of discrimination, 
and, by an ambiguous version, render the 
mind of the author yet more obscure. After 
repeated meditation on this subject, it seemed 


desirable to exhibit a specimen of a synony- 
mic lexicon of the New Testament ; and, for 
this purpose, we have chosen words which are 
least foreign to the character of these sacred 
days.* They all regard that moral habit of 
the human soul which is to be divinely 
wrought in it by the Holy Spirit. These are 
aya^os* dixaiog' dyiog, ayvog' offiog* h^og' xa^a^og* 
dxe^a/og* a-rXoD^* ax,ax.og' d/ns/M'rrog' a/xcofiog' avsT/X^j'Tr- 
rog, with their nouns. It will be evident to 
all, that in these words one common notion 
exists, to which may be referred whatever of 
moral excellence is desired in man ; yet in 
each there is a difference of mode, under which 
that excellence is regarded. All these terms 
may be predicated of the same man, yet we 
think of the same man differently, according 
as we use the one or the other of these ex- 
pletives. But they differ also between them- 
selves, as to the mode of expressing this su- 
periority of nature ; we will divide therefore 
the whole group of words into classes. 
dya^og' dixaiog. 

dya^og and dlxaiog agree, as either may be 
said of a person or a thing which is in a right 
state with regard to another, so that it is just 
what each one would wish it, and may justly 

' See page I . 


require it to be. Yet they differ. For tlie 
word aya^Lg regards the good or the benefit 
which springs from a good person or thing, but 
6/xa/os implies only that a thing is precisely what 
it should be, without any regard to the ques- 
tion whether good or evil may flow from it. 

For he is h'rA.oLioc, who observes the ^i^f-n (jus- 
tice). Therefore, God is %iirr\<; hixaiog, 2 Tim. 
iv. 8. for he will lender to every man accord- 
ing to his works. But that is called aya^og 
which in some way is profitable to men and 
supplies their wants," as dofji^ara dya^d, Mattb. 
vii. 11. dsvd^ov dya^ov, Matth. vii. 17. 7^ dyu^T], 
Luke viii. 8. dovXog dya^og, Matth. XXV. 21, 23. 
dsg-TToraig dya%Tg, 1 Pet. ii. 18. collated with Tit. 
ii. 5. Hence dya^oi and 'rrovri^oi are opposed, 
Matth. V. 45. and elsewhere. For the 'rovTj^oi 
do '^rovoi to others. And this is not contradict- 
ed in Matth. xxii. 10. cfvvyjyuyov 'TTovrjooug rt xal 
dyahohg. For it is ill rendered by some, men 

™ aya^'oi is, however, sometimes used not to express the qua- 
lities of the mind but of the person. In Exodus ii. 2. where 
it is said of Moses J^IH ^ID "'D? which the LXX. renders 
by uffriio?, Aquila uses a,ya.6o;. And aya^og is, in fact, some- 
times used in this sense in purer writers. So in Theocritus 
Idyl, xxiii. 2. rdv y/o^ipav ayetSoi. Wehave the same use of the 
com.raou notion of tlie word in our old adjective, goodly, as 
it ocrurs in Exodus ii. 2. that he was a goodly child. And 
again in 1 Samuel xvi. 12, where, in the Septuagint, it is 
uypJ'oi oouffiij our Version is, goodly to look to. — T. 


horn of a good or had race. For they are called, 
unworthy, as the parable plainly declares. And 
it would be both absurd and unjust, promis- 
cuously to invite men of any condition, and 
then when they were assembled, with severe 
rebuke to cast out those who were found to be 
of an inferior condition. In Romans vii. 1*2. 
the commandment is said to be both hixaia xai 
dya^h* the one, because it teaches nothing but 
what is just; the other, because it regards the 
happiness of those to whom it was given, v. 1«3. 
In the same way they are opposed in Rom. v. 
7, Scarcely for a righteous man (hixaku) would 
one die, but for a good man (a/a^ou) some 
would even dare to die. Though a man be 
free from crime, it is not necessary that he be 
freed from the risk of suffering ; but for a bene- 
ficent man, (Matth. xx, 15.) some would not 
hesitate to die. 

AiJicciog then, is of more extensive meaning 
than dya^og' for d/xaiog is one who follows the 
law of right and equity, whether it issues to 
others in good or ill ; but dycc^og is he who does 
good to others ; and even those who are vrovri^oi 
may sometimes " give good gifts," Matth. vii. 
II. But since the law of equity requires, that 
if it is allowable and possible we should do 
good to all, and not always use our own right, 


in which, certainly, real probity consists ; they 
also are called dixawt, who fulfil the offices of 
humanity, as well as those who observe strict 
justice. In the New Testament, therefore, 
not only is he who acts justly and blamelessly 
called hixaiog, Rom. iii. 10. (so it is affirmed of 
Christ, Acts iii. 14; vii. 52. 1 Pet. iii. 18.) but 
he also who is benign and tender, equitable and 
clement. So Joseph, Matth. i. 19., is said to 
be dizaiog, because he was unwilling to expose 
his wife to public ignominy ; and so God 
himself, because he pardons sinners, Rom. iii. 
26. 1 John i. 9. Many think that this sig- 
nification of dUaiog in the New Testament, 
springs from the Hebrew, in which pn^ often 
denotes the same with TDH." But even among 

" There can be no good ground for this idea. Among the 
scores of instances in which "T^liJ is rendered in the LXX. 
yixettos, we find but one instance in which that version puts 
ViKCito? for *7Dr7j ^^^' ^^ Isaiah Ivii. 1. x-a) oiv^^t; ViKOttoi ai^ovrut. 
And here there is no propriety in the rendering; it very impro- 
perly confounds two different words in the verse, and destroys 
its beauty. Our English version draws the correct distinction. 
" The righteous •T'^'^n^perisheth and no man layeth it to heart, 
and merciful men "IDH ^^^ taken away," &c. Certainly se- 
^ eral passages occur in which the LXX. renders the noun 
*lDn ^y ^i>taioffvv>i ; but even these generally would be bet- 
ter rendered more strictly according to the original notion 
of mercy in the Hebrew word. Gen. xix. 19. xx. 13. xxi. 23, 


tlie Greeks, dr/.u/og not only signifies just, he 
who observes the rii>]it, and constantly does 
what the law requires, but he also who ob- 
serves the duties of humanity. For lie who 
preserves the ^^V.rj, in ail things is equir(d)le, 
and never excessive ; he is lenient when called 
to punish ; he is mercilul when called to aid 
the wretched, even to his ov/n inconvenience. 
For diJcii requires not only, that we should ren- 
der to each his due, in which civil right con- 
sists, but that we should give liberally to each, 
as far as we are able, consistently with justice 
to others; for the ditference between justice 
and equity is altogether exploded from the law 
of morals. And as the notion of ^rz-ri orio-inates 
in the idea that things are equally distribut- 
ed, he is called d/zaiog who both observes that 
wdiich is lawful and right, and who does what 
virtue and equity require. Ruhnken on Xe- 
nophon, Memor. iv. 4, 5, says, " Aizaiog is 
spoken of a person or thing in whom nothing 
is excessive, nothing deficient, which is ade- 

&c. In die first case, our trausLitors have rendered it 
mercy, and in the other two, kindness. But, in fact, tl;f 
term oixaio; is only ap;tlied to men in such instances as tiie 
case of .Joseph referred to in the text, as indicative of that 
justice and equity out of which the exrevnal act of kindness 
and mercy, in question, is assumed to fimv. He was 2/;ta/of, 
and, tlierefoi-e, he was kind and merciful. — T. 



qiiate to its appointed functions, and perfect in 
its numbers. There is another notion akin to 
this, when that is said to be hiTtaiog which pre- 
serves uniformity and consistency in all its 
parts." Hence, in Xenoph. Cyrop. ii. "2. 26, 
a chariot is said not to be dlxaiog, that is, it 
would not keep an even course, when drawn 
by horses of unequal strength or swiftness. 
Wherefore, dizaiog often signifies that which is 
fit and suitable, as yn ^/?ta/a, in Pollux i. 227; 
and yridiov dixaiurarov Cyrop. viii. 3, 38,° is not 
the most fertile soil, but the most congenial. 
The Romans used justice or just in this sense, 
like the German gerecht, as expressing that 
which is proper and fit, that in which there is 
nothing defective or redundant. But the Jews, 
whose minds were imbued with the notion of 
civil justice, only when they sought the bless- 
ings of divine grace, had in view justice in its 
strictest sense, but were totally alien from the 
sublime moral feeling which we admire in that 
saying of our blessed Lord, which declares 
God only to be dya^og, good, that is the sum- 
mum honum. 

In the word bixaiog therefore, the notion of 
just, right, equitable, prevails. In the word 
ct/a^os, the notion of benefit and utility. 

° See Schneider's edition of Cyrop — T. 


ay log' dyvog oV/og^/sgog* d/Miocvrog' xaSa^o^ 
All these words so far agree, that they denote 
purity of mind, blamelessness, and integrity of 
spirit. They diiFer, therefore, from hixaiog and 
dya^og, for these have reference more imme- 
diately to the reason of acting It is possible 
for a man to be hlxaiog or dycc^og, who cannot 
be said to be dytog and dyvog. But, besides this, 
these words differ from each other in respect 
to the way in which that integrity of mind is 

ciytog and dyvog^ though they have the same 
etymological origin, differ in their use. For 
in dyvog the proper idea is, that the thing or 
person is pure, either in body or mind ; but the 
word ay log indicates more especially the reve- 
rence which is due to such a person or thing. 
dyvog properly denotes cleanliness of body, but 
subsequently, like many similar expressions 
or ideas, being transferred to the mind, it sig- 
fies mental purity. That is dyvov in which 
there is nothing impure. In the Orestes of 
Euripides, 1. 1621, dyvig yd^ uiu xiiicig- dX'A OX) 
rdg (p^zvag. Hippolyt. V. 316, 317, dyvdg (hiv, w 
-ra^ y}\ag aiiMarog <ps§iig ; Xs/^^ss fji^h dymiy (p^zv b 
i'yzi iLicKSihd 71. In the first place, it is used for 
chastity, 2 Cor. xi. 2. Tit. ii. 3. (Plato de Legg. 
viii. p. 647. E. (J^^-Xl^ l^'^^ 'xaihoyoviag Tjf^ioi, y.cci 


azriPCcroi ydfLuv rs ayvoi Zojsiv, In Homer it is the 
epithet applied to the goddesses, but only in 
the Odyssey.) Hence ava6T^o(pr, ayvr, \ Pet. 
iii. 2, is a pure life contaminated by no crimes ; 
and 1 Tim. v. 22, we have 6cci-jtw ayiov rriou, it 
being previously enjoined " neither to partake 
of other men's sins." In 2 Cor. vii. 11, 
xa,T&aT7)(fari kauroig ayvovg iivaih ruJ 'Tr^dy/nurii is not, 
as some have rendered it, contrary to the 
genius of the language, " Ye have proved 
yourselves to be pure from this crime." (For it 
is not said, uy-Cg h r.w, buta/vo's nvog and dyvog Tt) 
but, ye have proved in this matter, i. e. by this 
event, that ye are pure." Therefore, in 1 John 
iii. 3, God is said to be dy^og^ as he is free from 
all evil, and in James iii. 7. the wi&dom from 
above is said to be a/v/j, because it is most 
pure, and because he who is imbued with it 
has a pure mind; and they are in error who 
explain the passage as if that wisdom required 
and imparted purity : dyvog, therefore, espe- 
cially denotes the absence of all impurity. 

But dyiog more particularly regards that 
which is worthy of veneration and demands 
our reverence. For although dyjog is often 
used of sacred things, as soery; dyrr,^ Odyss. f v. 
2 ''9 ; for sacred rites ought especiiilly to be free 
from impurity ; yet dyiog is more directly used 


as a matter of custom, to express the notion 
of sanctity. For, it frequently happens, that 
words which bear a common origin, and there- 
fore seem to denote the same thing-, diverofe 
in their use to different sig-nifications, so that 
each has its peculiar and proper range of ap- 
plication : whilst this iversity cannot be traced 
to any difference of form in the word, but very 
frequently to the omnipotence .of custom. As 
there is no reason in the different form of 
the word, why 6cLo%i%6g and o'ap;t/vo; should so 
differ that (fcc^xmo? should be that which has a 
fleshly mind, even th .ugh it exists not in the 
flesh; but <rdf/img, that which is composed of 
flesh as a material, (whilst -rvsy^aar/xog denotes 
both a spiritual existence and a spiritual m.ind) 
and yet by no example could it be demon- 
strated that ffdoxmg denotes that which has both 
the mind and the nature, of the flesh. And, 
therefore, no number of manuscripts can sus- 
tain that reading in Rom. vii. 14.p ay/oj, there- 
fore, is rarely or never used by the Greek 
writers for that purity of mind, which theolo- 
gians have called sanctity, but it constantly de- 

P Rom. vii- 14., \yuTi <rd^xivcs (i/u,i. This is a various reading 
which is scarcely worth tfie remark, it is supported bv so 
few ]\ISS., except as it shows the accuracy of Titmann's ex. 
amination of the sacred text T 


notes that which is sacred and consecrated to 
the gods. That, however, in the books of the 
New Testament it should be used for sanctity 
of morals is not surprisin^r. For it is well 
known how carefid the Jews were to secure 
cleanliness in all their sacred rites. That 
could not be sacred which was in any way pol- 
luted. Hence, even in the word tnp the cog- 
nate notions of purity and sanctity exist, as 
will abundantly appear from an examination of 
Lev^it. xi. 43, 44, (compared with 1 Pet. i. 16,) 
Deut. xxiii. 14 ; 2 Sam. xi. 4 ; Exod. xix. 22 ; 2 
Chron. v. 11 ; Isa. Ixvi. 17.^ They are in er- 
ror, therefore, who affirm that the primitive 
notion of dy'og is, that which is set apart from 
vulgar and profane use, and consecrated to 

"* One or two seeming instances to the contrary occur in 
Scripture, in which the word JltfTp is used for a harlot, 
Genesis xxxviii. 21, compared with verse 15, where the more 
common word nj"l| is used for the same person. Here, evi- 
dently, the iJea of consecration is separated from that of 
purity. The JlttHp were the prostitutes consecrated to 
the service of heathen and idolatrous temples. See also 
Deut. xxiii. 17 ; Hosea iv. 14. The general use of the word 
^♦1p in Scripture, however, unites fioth the idea of sanctity 
and purity. And the anomaly in this other application of 
the word is explained by the common hahit of fallen man 
both to pollute sacred tilings, and to throw a veil of religious 
pretence over impurity ; in fact to substitute formal conse- 
cration for real holiness. T. 


peculiar uses, ayioc, is that which is sacred, and 
that only can be sacred w4iich is not unclean. 
And hence its various uses in the New Tes- 
tament may be accurately obtained. In 
that sense, which among the Greek writers 
is its proper force, viz. that which is sacred, 
which it is wicked to injure or contemn, a/zoj 
is spoken in the New Testament of things or 
persons sacred to God. Rom. xi. 16, 5J a'Ta|;^/?^ 
a/Za, Luke ii. 23, ayio)i Tuj '/.voluj xXyj^jjcsra/, of the 
prophets, Luke i. 70 ; Acts iii. '21; 2 Pet. i. 21 ; 
of the priesthood, 1 Pet. ii. 5 ; of the Apostles, 
Eph. iii. 5, 8; of the Angels, Matth. xxv. 31; 

1 Thess. iii. 13 ; of places. Acts vii. 33 ; espe- 
citdly of Jerusalem, Matth. iv. 5 ; and of the 
temple; 1 Cor. iii. 17 ; still more frequently, as 
Acts ix. 13, of Christians, (as in Daniel vii. 21. 
viii. 24. D'^^lp) Then, it is that which is to be 
venerated or treated with all honour, and pri- 
marily with respect to God, Apoc. iv. 8. John 
xvii. 11. Luke i. 49. dyid yoa:p'/i, Rom. i. 2. 
dia^/]xr} dyici, which it is impious to violate, 
Luke i. 72. 1 Cor. iii. 17. Then the idea of 
purity being added to this, it frequently de- 
notes that which is free from error and vice, 
or from actual defilement, I Pet. i. 15. 1 John 
ii. 20. Mark vi. 20. Ephes. i. 4. J Cor. vii. 34. 

2 Pet. iii. 12. And in 2 Pet. ii. 21, the com- 


iDhiKlment is called a/Za, not because it ir.ahci. 
Loiy, but because it is holy in itself, and ought 
to l<e inviolate. The use is similar in 2 lim. 
i. 9, y^Anffig o^y'oc ; for as xX^c/s involves the no- 
tion ot" inviting' to a certain thing, it follows, 
that with the addition of the adjective, it im- 
plies by the adjective, that thing to which 
invitation is given. And hence xXJjc/g ayia is 
not a calling which makes holy, or which con- 
tains in itself the energies of piety, still less 
does it mean the whole Christian doctrine, but 
it is the actual call to a life of sanctity ; tor 
they to whom the xXTiffig comes are invited that 
they may be clyioi, So Hebrews iii. 1, y^Aijcrtg 
i'TTovpamg, Nor is it inevident why the word dyiov 
is, in the New Testamenr, the almost constant 
epithet of the Spirit. Not that it is invariably as- 
sociated with tiie word '^rviv/j.a when something 
divine is signified. For sometimes cr^sD/xa stands 
alone, as Matth. xii. •31 ; 1 Cor. ii. 4; 1 Tim. iii. 
Ki; 1 Pet. iii. 18; John iii. 34, or the word ^soD is 
ad<led, as Matth. xii. 28; I Cor. vii. 40 ; or rov 
TUT^og, Matth. X. 20, compared with Luke xii. 
12. i^ut where ctyiov is added, 'rvsu/Ma always 
denotes something which has been wrought by 
diviue power, or the cause itself by which the 
effect is produced. In both classes of passages 
dym TO -rnv/Ma is said, not only because it is from 


Gocl, but because it is in its very nature di- 
vine ; and, therefore, entirely pure, holy, and 
worthy of reverence. 

offiog is, in its meaning, more nearly allied to 
ayvog, and h^k to dyiog; yet there is a difference. 
For o(^'og is properly, pure from all crime; one 
who has committed no crime, but religiously 
observes every sacred duty/ Therefore it does 
not denote integrity geiserally? but piety more 
especially, and the religious observance of 
offices of piety. o(Siog is pious. Wherefore 
o(ftog and d/jcaiog are often used together, the one 
denoting that which is holy, the other that 
which is right, as in Sophocles ov ^i/x/5 ou5' otyiov 
and in Josephus, A. I. viii. 9, 1, ^^a/ ruv dizaiuv 
xai offiojv 'i^yojv in Charit. i. 10. '^^og av'^^u-Trovg di- 
xaia xcci ir^hg ^scC's 061a. Schol. Euripides, Hec. 
V. 788. o^iog is, 6 crg^/ ra, Sg/a dr/caiog. So in 1'it. i. 
8. St. Paul, I 1 ira. ii. 8, rightly exhorts to 
lift up holy hands, ocfiovg, i. e. which have com- 
mitted no impiet : for truly enophon says, 
Atresil. xi. 2, rovg ?^sovg oiidiv tJttov offioig i^yoig r} 
ccyvcTg h^oTg riha^ai. God himself is in the New 
Testament said to be oV/og, as that holy being 
whom it is impious to dishonour. In Apoc. 
xvi. 5 ; Acts ii. 27, ra, offia means those pious 

Phavorinus, oirio;' h cri^) tcx. B^-Tx Vix,a,ioi.——T. 


duties which it were virtuous to perform, and 
wicked to neglect. But the word occurs in a 
peculiar sense in Acts xiii. 34, ^'^(Tw 'o/xTv ra 
Office Aa(3id ra rxicra. Many interpreters illustrate 
it by a reference of it to the Hebrew TDH, 
which the LXX frequently rendersby oV/og; and 
they think, therefore, that in this place ra osia. 
Aa(3id means the mercies promised to David 
by God, Isa. Iv. 3. But they never can pro- 
perly render otf/a by mercies or bounties. 
Paul speaks of a certain thing which it was 
predicted in Ps. xvi. 10, should happen to 
David, ov bu)6sig Tov offiov ffov idsTv dia(p'^o^uv. This 
thing, in the words of Isaiah, he calls ra 'Uia 
AaiSid. But in Isaiah it is a term expressive 
of the covenant that God was about to make 
with the Jewish people ; this covenant is call- 
ed office Aa/3/5, since properly it is made with 
David. w/xotfa AajSid, tug rov aioovog iroi/xdffu ro 
o-sojMa ffov Ps. Ixxxix. 3, 4. The 6V/a Aa^id was 
nothing more than the covenant made with 
David, who was at that time the head of the 
Jewish people. The very words of Isaiah 
which Paul quotes teach this ; and I will cove- 
nant with you an eternal covenant, ra Iffia Aa(3id 
ra •■ziffrd. The subsequent statement shews 
what covenant is intended, rd offia mffrd is the 
same as kxta mffrd in Homer. 


'lego's strictly denotes that which is conse- 
crated or sacred, as given or devoted to God.' 
Whence ac/so^a/ is to consecrate, and aproi 
they who are consecrated; and is frequently 
spoken of animals who are devoted to God 
and wander in a free pasture. (Synes. ii. ep. 57, 

^ojv,) Therefore in the word /sgoj, which is ac- 
curately rendered sacred, nothing is intended 
but that the person or thing is sacred to God, 
irrespective of mind or morals : but especially 
that it subserves a sacred purpose, as the tem- 
ple in the New Testament, as the sacred things 
themselves, in 1 Cor. ix. 13, and repeatedly 
in Homer and other writers. It is not used 
in the New Testament of moral habits. Those 
who, in this sense, are said to be sacred to 
God, are called ayioi. See Valesius ad Harpo- 
crat. p. 143. Valckenar. ad Ammon. p. 184, 
s. et vv. dd. ad Hesychius v. oa/ovg. Tay- 
lor, ad Aeschin. p. 50. 

Ka^ago's is used to express a mind or a life 
free from vice; and sometimes those things 
which they who use them do not defile them- 

* Suidas, lif/ov' alytoV) TM B-iM avarihifiivov, and the Editor 
of Suidas refers this definition to the Schol. on Aristopha- 
nes T. 


selves with, as Luke xi. 41 ; Matt, xxiii. 19 ; 
Rom. xiv. t>0; Tit. i. 15; Heb. x. 2'2. Now 

the'-yici^a^ov is that in which nothing sordid or 
base is intermixed, Matt. v. 8; Ko^aocc sunibnctg^ 
1 Tim. iii. 9, '^^rjff/Ciia xa^a^a, James i. 27. xa^a- 
§6g therefore is spoken of purity of mind> as 
ccyvog, and yet there is a degree of difference. 
For in ■/,a^r/.o6g it is implied that -there is no fo- 
reign admixture or addition that affects the use 
or the senses, so as to render the person or 
thing unfit or objectionable, as dirt or stain, 
odour, colour, or any useless thing whatever. 
The dying words of Cyrus, in the Cyroped. 
viii. 7, strikingly illustrate this idea, ovds yi 
o'Ttf/ig a.<pp(f)v 'idrai 7] -^v^r,, sTsidav rou a(ppovog ffu)fji^ctrog 
^'X^ /si^^jra/, ovds rovro erg rs/c/jta/* dXX' orav ax^uTog 
xai /ia^oiPog o vovg sxxoi^r, rors xa! (p^ovi/iUiTaTOv sixog 
a-jTov ihai. And as Xenoph. Oecon. x. 7, calls 
a body, xa^a^hv (Tiij/xa, not because it is free from 
defilement, but from every false adornment; so 
James uses ^frjcxs/a xa^aou for that in which 
there is no mixture of falsehood. Very nearly 
allied, however, to this word is d/xiavrog, which 
James, in this passage, uses in conjunction 
with xa^aoof, (Compare Heb. xiii. 4.) Yet if 
they had not been different in sense, they 
would not have been used together. Certain- 


ly to be xa^agog a man must be a/x/avrog. For 
unless he is immaculate he cannot be pure. In 
a/jjiavTog then we find the cause of the xa^a^og. 
y.ix'^a^jg then has a more extensive signification 
than ayvog. For to it the thought of impurity- 
is necessary. It is freedom from impurity ; 
but any thing may be said to be xa^a^og in 
which there is no foreign admixture, whether 
it be itself good or evil, ayvog is that which is 
not contaminated by any thing in itself really 
evil. But wine, though it be combined with 
the purest water, can no longer be said to be 
yM^ci^og. That which is ciyvog is necessarily xa- 
^a^^og' but many things that are oio^a^oi are far 
enough from being a /vol. 

These four words tht-n, if we use them in 
reference to the human soul and life, may be 
discriminated thus. Ka^a^og is pure from every 
thing which would change or corrupt the na- 
ture of the subject with which it is combined ; 
ciyvog is pure from every defilement of mind, 
0(7/0$ is pure from crime or impious deed ; ciyiog 
is that which, on account of integrity of mind 
and morals, is sacred to God aiid revered; and 
finally, h^k is simply that which is consecrated 
to, or set apart for God ; y.a^aoog is pure', imma- 
culate ; ayj-jg is chaste, clean, sinless ; oV/c; is 


pious; dy/og, holy, and %os, sacred or conse- 

dxs^aiog' acrXoDg* axaxoc* 
agree as far as they each denote a certain sim- 
plicity of mind; yet there is a difference be- 
tween them. 

For cc<x\ovg strictly is that in which there is 
nothing complex or perplexed, but, as it were, 
free from involvement, and therefore, plain and 
open." In Matth. vi. 22, and Luke xi. 34, the 

' It is not a little surprising that the actual use and ap- 
plication of these several words can be so distinctly and 
philosophically defined, seeing that their origin or etymology 
is so decidedly obscure. There miist have been distinct 
reason in their etymological history, for their specific appli- 
cation, in a sense so capable of definite insulation ; and yet 
this appears to be all but lost. «y/oj may come from ^|^ 
Festum, dies festus ; and hoo; or l^o;, from Q^H ^ verb 
which, in Hebrew, Chaldee, Syriac, and Arabic, means, set 
apart or devoted to God, as a victim, (and in this sense U^og 
is used by Greek writers, both of tbe temple, victim, sacred 
vases, omens, &c.) and probably tbe first and simple idea is 
■])7 the sacred fire. xuSu^'os may be derived from "T^^^ rec- 
tus, and in Chaldee, vasa, &c. polluta ad rectum et licitum 
usum aptare. af^ixvTos from nVQ' viscera, venter, intesti- 
na, whence the Latin, mingo. But after all, these etymo- 
logies are questionable ; and, to be established, would need a 
very strict investigation into other derivatives of the same 
roots still remaining in diflferent modern languages. — T. 

* As compounded of a privative and irXsw, plico — T. 


eye is properly called a-rXoDj, as seeing dis- 
tinctly without double or distracted vision. 
And to this is opposed the cxp'^ccXfj^hg 'rovrj^og, that 
is, which does not rightly perform its office, 
but sees dngroa/j^fMsvug, or distractedly. So the 
mind that is drawn different ways, as towards 
God and mammon, does not rightly perform its 
office ; but that which desires and follows after 
one thing only, as the chief good, that mind 
attains its object. There is in the word ccrrXoug 
the cognate notions of plain and straight; 
a'TrXovg is simple, because, in it there is nothing 
involved or intricate. In Plato, Hipp. Min* 
230. E. a-TXovg and uXri^yig are placed in con- 
nexion, and are put in opposition to 'roXvr^o'rog 
xal -^^/svdrjg. Themistius, Orat. xxii. attributes 
to friendship the (3Xsfj,fMa a-Xovv %ai yzwaTov. 
Hence it is not surprising, that frequently 
a'xXovg is associated with the idea of liberality ; 
1 Tim. Ivi. 173. cc'rXo'/x.ov zai rojv ovruv xoivuvikov. 
Lucian combines it with ysvmTog, in the same 
way as Horace, Epist. ii. 2. v. 193. simplex hi- 
larisque, and Tacitus Hist. Lib. iii. c. SQ. ine- 
rat tamen simplicitas et liberalitas. In this 
sense also ccrXorrig occurs in the New Testa- 
ment, Rom. xii. 8; 2 Cor. viii. 2. ix. 11. It 
denotes the candour of an ingenuous and sin- 
cere mind. 


But the nieiniing of dxs^awg is, not combined 
with many other thina;s as parts. For though 
the origin of this word may be doubtful,'^ since 
it is frequently confused with dx^r-ar- $, yet this 
is undoubtedly its true siii^nification. For it 
occurs in the Timaeus uxTj^aror 0/ xcc^a^or djt's- 
^aioiy 01 g'^w %rioog\ and riglitlv ; for he who is dy.i- 
^aiog may be said to be dx^^ccrog^ bein^ cor- 
rupted by no admixture ; and similarly, he 
who is dx'/iPccTo; may be said to be dzhouog^ for 
he would be corrupt uuless he were'^aocg. 
Either word, therefore, is frequently used of 
the same thing, and in the same sense. So in 
Euripid. in the Orestes, v. .568, and the Helen, 
V. 48, they are used indifferently in a similar 

^ I can scarcely regard the origin of this word as doubt- 
ful. The word x£^£6<a occurs in IMatth. v. and elsewhere, and 
Scapula gives as its meaning, eminentiae et apices in aliqua 
re, ut cornua, &c., and deduces it from' xi^ecg. Now xtoea is 
nothing but jT)"in from H^p evenit, occurrit, and thence, 
both in Hebrew and Chaldee, j^Tlp accidentia, casus. In 
Matth. V. it occurs in the sense of a little addition to the let- 
ters of tlie alphal'et. In the Arabic it occurs •• excoriatio, 


foedatio cutis, vibices. uki^ccios is, therefore, tree and clear 
from any extraneous addition, mark or stain. Phavorinui 
is very minute in his account of the word, uxiocnei, «x«*a», 
ekoxXn^ov. ff*!/u,atvii $£ xui rov 'i^u xri^us, xu) rov iiXtixotvri xeii 
iiyta, at.'Tto rov xk^aoi, xi^uiog, xcc) f^-ira rev cripfiTixou «A^«, t 


expression. The same X£;^og of Menelaus is, 
in one place, said to be preserved a-Zioaiog^ and in 
the other, ax'/^oarog. It does not, however, fol- 
low from this, that dy/soatog and azri^arog have 
the same meaning. It is one thing for two 
words to be predicated mutually of the same 
thing, since what the one accords with, the 
other may accord with also; and it is another 
thing for them to have precisely the same sig- 
nification. In the neglect of this diiference, 
the lexicographers of the New Testament have 
very frequently erred. But to return. 'Aks- 
^aiog, therefore, when it is spoken of mind, sig- 
nifies, simple, entirely free from false or evil 
admixture. Euripid. Orest. v. 912. Bvvsrhg Be 
'^(^ctJPcTv 6/m6(Js roTg Xoyoig '^sXojv, ' Azspaiog, avs-T/A'/j-rov 
rjffTcn^tojg j3iov, evidently in the same sense as 
Matth. X. 16. (ppovifMoi wg a/ o'l^g/j, xa/ a%\^atoi wg a) 
'TTi^isrioai I and Romans xvi 19. 6o(po'jg [mv s/g rh 
aya^v, d'/.i^aiovg ds sJg rh xaxoi/, i. e. wise towards 
that which is good, and free from all evil. 
Phil. ii. 15. a[jji[M,':rrot /tai dzs^aioi. 

Finally, ay^nog is he who is both free alto- 
gether from the influence of evil counsel xa/t/a, 
and who fears no evil from others, as it is com- 
monly said, simple and ingenuous, both these 
ideas exist in the word axa-aog ; one who 
neither purposes evil nor suspects it, since he 



is altogether alien to it. See Ruhnken. ad 
Tim. V. aytaxog. It does not denote every 
species of simplicity, but that ingenuous sim- 
plicity which exists in an upright mind, free 
from suspicions. So in Romans xvi. 18, 
igaTarSitf/ rag Tta^diag rojv d'/cd'/Cuv, Such men are 
easily deceived. Plato Alcibiad. ii. p. 81. o/ 
/xsv fx.iyciko'^'oyovg \_xcckovStv~\ oi ds siiy^^s/c. srs^ot ds 
dxd/iovg xai d'Trsi^ovg xal svsovgj Sometimes, how- 
ever, it is used in the former sense, to denote 
a man free from all evil, Heb. vii. 26. 

'AT^ovg therefore is free from all duplicity, 
d'/s^aiog, unmixed with evil, axaxog, free from 
all evil suspicion, d'n-Xovg is open, sincere, axs^a- 
log blameless, azaxog ingenuous ; and all of 
them imply simplicity. 

cifMSf/jTrog' a/jLu/j^og' (^dviT/XyiTrog' dvsyyikrjrog*^ 
riijjZfjjiTTog and afMoofiog are both expressions for 
freedom from blame ; they however differ. He 
is ufiifL'Trrogf in whom nothing is yet accounted 
wanting ; a/^w/xog, he in whom there is nothing 
reprehensible. Each is free from reprehen- 
sion : the former, as perfect and absolute in 
all his numerical parts ; the latter as devoid of 
error. Hence a law which is «,'xe/xTroc Heb. viii. 
7, is a law which cannot be found fault with, 

' Sep Plato I>i;^l. ex recensioiie Ilekkeri, Part I, vol. ii. 
p. 2-,Cy — T. 


because there is nothing wanting to it, which 
ought to be there ; it answers all the purposes 
of a law. Whilst, on the other hand, Peter, in 
Epist. 1. i. 19. speaks of Christ as of a lamb, 
a/xw/>{,oy %a} ad'Tti'Kou, inasmuch as he was without 
any spot of defilement. We have also in this 
sense, a/xw/xouc ytai aviyyXrjroxjg in Coloss. i. 22. 
Nor, does the sense of the word diifer in that 
very difficult passage in Hebrews ix. 14, h ^'cc 
crvsv/j^ccrog a/ojviov havrhv 'r^offrjvsyxiv u/JjOJ/j^ov tuj ^scT, 
where cH/jjoj/mq does not relate to a perfect ex- 
piation in which there is nothing wanting ; 
but this is the idea of the Apostle ; that we are 
to be purged from all impurity by the blood 
of Christ, who by the eternal spirit {i. e. by 
the hiivafLiv trnii axccrakvTou, Heb. vii. 16.) offer- 
ed himself a victim, uncontaminatedand imma- 
culate^ (omni macula carentem) and in Ephes. 

* That is, not that by the sanctifying influence of the 
Holy Spirit, operating as in the case of fallen and corrupt 
men, he succeeded to present, i. e. to make himself, without 
spot, notwithstanding his tendencies to sin ; an error which has 
lately crept in among us ; but that he being a divine person, 
and therefore immaculate anduncontaminate, did by the Holy 
Spirit offer himself a victim, and, on account of that imma- 
culacy, a fitting victim. This is a beautiful instance, in which 
accurate exegesis throws a very valuable light on a question, 
at once of much interest and much difficulty. Had the 
Christ been in his human nature corrupt and sinful, he 
could not be eif^ufios ; for that corrupt nature in us, is itself 


V. 27. the church is therefore said to be made 

roio-jTuv. For /xw/xo$ properly is a shame, stain, 
or disgrace, visibly attached to any thing. 

But the idea of the word u,'M/x'7rrog sets forth 
one who cannot be blamed, because nothing is 
wanting to him, for which, if wanting, he 
would deservedly incur blame. Hence in 
1 Thess. V. 23. Paul desires to be preserved 
afis/j.'rrug until the coming of the Lord, and in 
C. ii. 10. he says, off/ojg zat dixaiug xai a/xs/XTrwg 
vfj,7v kyivvr^YiiJjiv ; showing in the subsequent 
verse, that he had not failed in his duty to- 
wards one of them. He had acted d/jus/jbTrug 
because he had done no less than it was right 
that he should do. So d/xs/jj'TTug buoce. didovai, 
Xenoph. H. G. I, i. 10. a/xs/xcrrwg os^sc^ai rovg 
avd^ocg Cyrop. iv. 2. 18. a/^s/XTroi/ diTTD^ov Sympos. 
2, 2. Although, a/xs/xTro; is sometimes used 
in both senses, especially by the Attic writers, 
who, even in administering reproof, are more 
polished in their style than others. They 
seldom make use of the other word, because 
it wouM appear a higher style of praise to 

the (/.wfio?, or stain which renders us unacceptable in our- 
selves ; but in that holy thing wliich was conceived by the 
overshadowing of the Holy Ghost, we are fjt-v 'ixovva. ff-rTxaf, 
&c. He is, as a divine person from first to last, a,fjiufji,oi ; 
and we are so in him. — T, 


use a word, which not only implies that no 
spot or stain exists, but that nothing is want- 
ing which could properly be desired. 

dvsyxXrjTog and avsTiXri'Trrog are cognate words. 
He is GcvsyKXriTog who is not accused, and cannot 
properly be accused by any one. But in 1 
Tim. iii. 2. the Apostle, says the Christian 
Pastor should be avs-riXri'TrTog, i. e. one in whom 
no just cause of blame exists. Whilst in v. 
10. the word avsyxXriTog is used to infer, that in 
dox.i>Ma(f/a, i. e. as the result of public investiga- 
tion, in cler offentlichen umfrage^ he stands un- 
accused. For it was the custom even in 
apostolic times, to constitute the minister by 
the consent of the church, that is of the peo- 
ple.* The people therefore were interrogated, 

" It is surprising how far men's peculiar preconceived 
notions will carry them. The author sees a popular ap- 
pointment of a candidate to be a minister, in the mere po- 
pular investigation into character, even if the 'hoKtfJt.a.ffta, can 
be explained in that way. He loses sight of the iact, that 
the whole of the passage is an injunction to an individual, 
to Timothy, the prelate, v. 15. how he is to conduct him- 
self in the church of God, so that, c. v. 22, he may not 
lay hands rashly on any man, and become a partaker in 
other men's sins. The rule here laid down for the ^oKif^atna, 
even stretched to the uttermost, will be found very much in 
accordance with the church of England custom, of reading a 
paper in the congregation where the candidate customarily 
worshipped, called a si quis, intimating si quis, &c. If any 


as to whether any subject of reprehension was 
found in the candidate, and if he was found 
dvsyxXTirog he was ordained. Tiiis is the true 
observation of Grotius de imperio summar. 
potest, circa sacra c. 10. § 8. dvi'7riXr,'?rrog, i. e. 
who gives no cause for reprehension, m '7ragg;;^wv 
xarriyo^iag d(po^fjb7]v. (Schol. Thucyd. V. 17.) So 
1 Tim. iii. 2, and in vi. 14. d6<7ri\ov Ttdl dvimXri'^rrov ; 
dvs'TriXri'ZTog because dff<7riXog. The word, however, 
differs from the others. For as diMiJ.'xroi and a^w- 
(i^oi denote those who are not blamed, avsmXri'Trrog 
denotes one, who though he is blamed is un- 
deserving of it. In Lucian. Pise. 8. Tom. 1 
p. 377. a man blamed and accused, when call- 
ed on to defend himself says, £/' fJ'Sv n dbixuv (pat- 
vctifjjat — riv hi xa^a^og v/j^Tv xai dvimXTj-rog sii^iffxu/Mai. 
At times, however, this word is used in a more 
lax sense, regard being had only to the fact of 
blame, and not to the real force of the cause 
of it ; for the a^g^acrro/ and a/Aw,ao/, are but few, 
but the dvs'TTiXrj'rroi are few indeed. 

one knows any thing against him that he is to declare it. 
But all notion of authority on the part of the people, as 
founded on this passage of Scripture, in the matter is a mere 
invention. The scrutiny of character might be a popular 
matter, and the choice of ministers already ordained to be 
pastors of particular churches might be so too, and probably 
was ; but the ordination, as a matter of right, in the primi- 
tive church was entirely vested in the clerical order. — T. 



In a former notice of some obvious synonyms 
in the New Testament, it was observed that the 
distinction between synonymous terms, must 
not be so pressed in every instance, as that we 
shall be chiefly playing on the force of parti- 
cular terms ; yet that, in seeking an accurate 
interpretation, we should observe diligently 
the minute differences of w^ords, lest in ai^y 
passage in which the author aimed at a nice 
distinction of idea, it should be lost sight of 
through inaccuracy. This remark, however, 
in the hands of one little familiarized with the 
nicer beauties of style, may be easily so far 
perverted as to induce him to affirm, that all 
inquiry into the differences between synonyms 
is utterly useless. For, if even the sacred 
writers often use synonymous terms promis- 
cuously, and that it evidently matters little 
whether they used the one word or the other, 
it were scarcely worth while to attempt to dis- 
criminate accurately between them. And 
there are certainly many writers, who consi- 
der elegance of style to consist in the not fre- 
quently using the same word, but rather in 
substituting another, in an interchange of ana- 


logous terms, that the same word may not occur 
in the same period, or even in the same page ; 
although the example of the best writers 
shews that true elegance consists in the pre- 
cision with which each word is applied to ex- 
press its particular idea. For they who write 
accurately, do not use even the smallest par- 
ticles indiscriminately, however trivial the 
diiFerence between any two may appear ; nor 
do they hesitate to use the same word often in 
the same passage, if the same notion is to be 
conveyed ; for there are scarcely two words in 
any language, which signify precisely the same 
thing. But since many maintain the opinion, 
that the New Testament writers are not so 
elegant as some, and consider that they have 
used many similar words promiscuously, we 
grant to them this far, that the specific force 
of synonyms must not be pressed in every 
place, so that we should always expect to trace 
an emphatic sense ; or that we should curious- 
ly search out the difference of each word as 
conveying a special force to the passage ; for 
this is beyond the powers of the most able and 
polished writer ; yet at the same time we think 
that in the writings of men, who do not ap- 
pear so particular as others in the choice of 
words, the investigation of synonymous terms 
is more decidedly required. For those who 


labour tlieir style of writing closely, are wont 
to select words more for the sake of orna- 
ment, and therefore frequently indulge an in- 
terchange of synonyms; whilst they who are 
unpractised in writing as an art, generally use 
words which common custom has affixed to the 
thing that they mean; and hence it occurs, 
that men who make use of common language, 
accumulate in their compositions, a greater 
number of synonyms than more learned men; 
for they are accustomed to view each thing in 
its peculiarities, rather than to generalize and 
to abstract. And this custom must be diligent- 
ly noted in interpreting the sacred writers ; as 
it is too evident that, through neglect of it, 
commentators have rashly and carelessly ad- 
duced from their accurate and specific sen- 
tences, only some jejune and common .place 
thought. For it often happens, that although 
the sacred writers were strangers to that ele- 
gance of style which is formed artificially by 
study and practice, yet their true meaning 
cannot be ascertained, unless we accurately 
make out the precise and specific signification 
of every word used. This is especially true 
with respect to the particles, the force of which 
has been sadly neglected by the Lexicogra- 
phers of the New Testament. For instance, 
we read in the Lexicons that. 


ax^i and tJ^ix^i 
do not diiFer, and they adduce the authority of 
Eustathius, who says, p. 1062, ymrai rb ci^^ig a-ro 
rou /M^^tg d'7roj3oX7J rov "^ xcci r^crfi rov (pcovTjsvrog. Eus- 
tathius, however, means nothing more than that 
^Xi'^ is formed from fJ^s^^'s; not that they mean 
the same thing. For who would affirm that it 
would have been the same thing, if, in Rom. 
V. 13, 14, the Apostle had written /J^sxi' IH *'°" 
[JjOM a^jja^rict riv Iv xo^imu) and ver. 14) aTc^ 'Ada/M oiyji 
Mwffsw?. It must be generally evident that a 
different idea would then be expressed from 
that of the Apostle, who wrote a%^' voih^^x)' L e. 
before the law was brought in, and ij^'^x^i Mwtrsiog* 
2. e. until Moses had brought in the law. 
Rightly therefore is it written o^y^^i ycco vofj^ou 
afjja^ria r}v, for the a/xa^r/a existed before the 
law. But in ver. 14, it is said 3t3a(riXsvffsv b ^dva- 
^og M'SXi' Mwtfswg, not because death had ceased- 
to reign from the time of Moses, but because 
it continued through the whole of that period, 
(firj ovrog vo/jjow) which period closed with Moses. 
For neither did he wish to say that death 
reigned both before Moses and after Moses; 
but that it reigned before Moses, /j^^ ovrog vo/j^ov. 
Evidently then the word ax§' involves more 
especially the idea of the whole time or place 
in which any thing is done ; and the use of the 
genitive case denotes the thing or event be- 


fore which it is considered to be done; whilst 
/a£%p/ has respect rather to the end or close of the 
time or space within which any thing* is done. 
If, however, any one should think this distinc- 
tion more subtle than correct, let him remember 
that /^s%f^ is never put absolutely, but that a;^f/, 
as Eustathius has rightly observed, (Iliad, 't. 
1062, 48,) is very frequently put sivipliciter 
%arcc rovg craXa/oOg, to signify dtoXov. For what- 
ever is meant by ci^^t, as Iliad A. 522, n. 324, 
P. 599, that is understood to last during the 
whole implied space of time ; but in iW-^xig^ the 
terminius or close, whether of time or place, is 
desiderated ; and therefore it is always added.** 

If, therefore, a%g/ rmg occurs, it signifies the 
thing or the time before which any certain thing 
existed. So in Acts xx. 11, o/MiXyjaag oi^x^"^ ^^y'^if 
means that he continued with them subsequent- 
ly, before the dawn. And in ver. 4, (rui/smro 5s 
ahrw ay^^i ' A(Stag, signifies that they accompanied 
Paul before they came into Asia, and then 
preceded him, (-rgosX^oi/rsg*) Had it been f^'^x^i 
'A(r/ag, it would have been doubtful whether 

^ Once certainly in the Odyssey it occurs, vritrTHi et^^i 
xvi(f)eios, that both notions are intended to be expressed by 
the same particle. But in Iliad, Ni^l43. occurs fii^^t 
B^aXdffo-fis %iiXiv(riff6a,iy and Xl 128. tio f^ix^'? ohv^'of/.i)ios xat 
ax^va/v ffiiv iliai K^ec^tm' where it is plain that a totally dif- 
ferent sense would be brought out, if apc^i had been written 
instead of ff-ixi'- 


they left Paul. The writer did not intend to 
say that they only accompanied Paul into 
Asia, but that they went together with him so 
far, and then went forward to wait for him. 
So in passages in which a^f/ is joined to a 
verb, it has the notion of a certain period of 
duration, Gal. iii. 19, a%^'/5 oS £>3?j, Apoc. xv. 
16; xvii. 17. And Rom. xi. 25, «%?'? ou rb 
•rX-y^ow/xa Tuv s%u)v siffsX'^ri' i, e. SO loiiff as while 
the Gentiles are entering, not merely till they 
shall have entered. So also Acts xx. 6, we 
sailed and came to Troas, ^Xi"^ rji^^^uv 'jsvrs, be- 
fore five days had expired, i. e. on the fifth 
day. I am aware that both words are occa- 
sionally used for each other, as in Xenophon, 
Symp. iv. 37. crgp/stfr/ /xo/ xa/ sa^iovri ay^^i rov ,'xri crsi- 
vfjv a(pi%s(^at, %a] 'xmvri liiy^t' "^^^ l^^ '^I'^ft^f (if this 
is the true reading, though I strongly suspect 
that /^£%f' should be read in both instances.) 
But it does not follow from such an instance 
that both particles have precisely the same 
meaning ; but as we have before said, it is of 
the nature of synonyms, that they have refe- 
rence to the same thing, but in a different way. 
Some may affirm, however, that in the New 
Testament these two particles are used indis- 
criminately; for it is written in Matthew xi. 23, 
f/xs/i-av /x£//^/ rJjg ofi/MPov, and in Romans viii. 22, 


(yycrsva^s/ ay^n rov vvv. But these passages do not 
affect our rule. For, though we grant, that in 
the former instance, it might have been a%g/, 
yet this was not necessary, because the verb 
fismv implies state or condition, rather than ac- 
tion ; for he who remains to this day, has evi- 
dently continued through the former period, 
and has not even now perished, or he w^ould 
not have remained to this day. But in the 
other instance, if it had been written /J^^Xi' ''^^ 
vuv, the idea expressed would have been that 
the creature had groaned unto this day, and 
then had ceased ; for he who does any thing 
«,£;>/§/ r/i/og, is not thereby affirmed to do it longer 
than it has thus been asserted to have been 
done. The creation is, therefore, affirmed to 
sigh a^^i rov vuv, that is, to this day, and not 
even then to have ceased from sighing, which 
was precisely the sentiment that the Apostle 
intended to express. In the former passage, 
the duplex force of /'--s^f/ is given in the word 
fis'^siv. And if any one will accurately examine 
other passages on this principle, he will find 
that it is not a vain and unmeaning distinc- 
tion. For, in all the places of the New Tes- 
tament, when fJ^sx=' '^'^^^ occurs, the notion ex- 
ists, that the thing which is said to be done, 
is only done, or only endures fJ^^x^i rm<; up to 


a certain point of time, and then has an end, 
except in the one passage in Matthew already 
referred to. For, in Matthew xiii. 30, let 
both grow together, /w-s^^' rou ^s^/^/xol/, it is ma- 
nifest that the husbandman did not wish the 
tares to continue longer than till the time of 
harvest, as the subsequent statement shows. 
See also, Mark xiii. 30 ; Acts xx. 7 ; Romans 
XV. 19; Ephes.iv. 13; Phil. ii. 8, 30; 2 Tim. 
ii. 9 : 1 Tim. vi. 14 ; Heb. iii. 6, 14. xii. 4. 
For the common notion that /^e%f' denotes the 
intermediate time, yet so as not to exclude 
the consequent, cannot be proved from Rom. 
V. 14. (See Theodoret in loc.) For it is not 
intended here that death reigned also after 
the time of Moses ; but that it reigned before 
Moses, axi' v6/Mv, through the whole of that 
time until Moses ; although there being no law, 
sin was not charged. Two passages, however, 
viz. Matth. xxviii. 15, and Acts x. 30, may 
seem to oppose this ; but in the first instance, 
bii^ni->^i(^ri 6 Xoyog ovroc fJi^s^^i r^g (fyj/jus^ov, it is evi- 
dent that the saying, which was reported, and 
passed current to that day, was thenceforth 
manifested to be a fraud. And in the latter, al- 
though Cornelius affirmed that he was fasting, 
fj^Bx§i ra-!jrr,g rrjg oi^ag, there is then every proba- 
bility that his fast had terminated at that hour. 


as lie had called together his kinsfolk and ac- 
quaintance. And, although I would not stand 
out too strictly, if it should be said, that here, 
as in Xenophon, /^s%^/ is put for a;/f/, yet this 
which I have stated seems to be the very force 
of the language. For, if Cornelius had intend- 
ed to say that he had fasted for four successive 
days to the very hour when he met Peter, he 
should have said, not VfJ'^v, but s//x/ v7}(frivojv. 
Some may call these needless subtleties, and 
think that no good comes of such nice discrimi- 
nations ; but really, it is often in such minute 
observations as these that the religious reve- 
rence of the interpreter for the sacred writings 
appears ; for he who once conceives, that in 
explaining the sacred books he may acquiesce 
in any lax inaccurate explanation, will speedily 
lay aside all veneration for them, and learn 
as speedily to engraft his own views, and 
even the most dark and ill-founded notions 
upon the writings of the New Testament.'^ 

" This IS an invaluable remark, and founded upon a very- 
accurate, minute criticism, which directly illustrates its 
value. No man who has been much among the theolo- 
gians, so called, of the present day, will fail to perceive the 
importance of this observation, if his own mind has been in 
any measure trained to correct exegesis. The wild and in- 
terminably varied and varying notions of men on Scrip- 
tural truth, if they have not their source in this b.aljit of 
loose and inaccurate construing, at least, find in it their pa- 


But to return. It is written in Luke iv. 13, 

d'frsarrj d'Tr a'jrov 6 diufSoXog ay^^i xciiooxj. It was 
seen that tliis could not be rendered, for a cer- 
tain time. Therefore, the lexicographers say, 
that a%f/ denotes the same as the Latin usque^ 
and they render a%f/ ytai^ov, ah hoc ipso tempore. 
But they never can demonstrate a-)^oi xa/^oD nvog 
to be ah hoc tempore, nor that usque is used in 
that sense. For it is not said a%f/5 ccxierv^ di: 
aurou, but a%g/ Ttai^ou, But fJ^'^Xi' ^^'^^^ differs 
from d-^^i xcci^ov. In Heb. ix. 10, it is said, 
fjjsypi %aioov hio^^^iug si'izsifMva. i. e, sJg rev xa/^oi/ rov 
evsffrrjzora, v. 9. Therefore, fJ^sX:' ''ct/foD denotes 
up to a certain time, scil for sometime, as often 
/Msx^i Ttaiocovy /Jy'^Xi' '''"^^J (whence fJ^s^Pi rravrog, al- 
wa^^s, Charit. v. 4. Aristaenet. ii. 14.) s. eug 
xamZ (rmg) Sirac. i. 23, 24 ; Dan. vii. 12. ews 
yjovoM %ai zai^ov. But a%f/ xccido\j is fwj rsXovg, s. 
fLsxi' rsXovg. Clearly then a%f^ as we have be- 
fore said, denotes not the end, but the duration, 
or the whole period of time, in which the 
thing in question continues; but <^£%f' desig- 

bulum vitae. Doctrinal notions are formed anterior to cri- 
tical investigation, and then are vindicated and confirmed 
by the most extravagant and unjustifiable forcing of the 
words of eternal truth. And wherever this habit of mind 
has become established, the most polished and pointed shafts 
of enlightened criticism fall inefl^ectively from it, as arrows 
from the thick hide of the rhinoceros — T 


nates the end at whicli it ceases to be, unless 
some word be added, by the force of which the 
notion of a termination or close is removed, as 
in i^'^x^' 'TTccvTog. Nor does the rule fail in Acts 
xiii. 11, "Thou shalt be blind, not seeing 
the sun, ay^^^i xai^ou, which is commonly render- 
ed, until a certain time. But this is not the 
meaning of the words. It would then have 
been written fJ^'^x^i Tcai^ov. Nor have we any 
reason to conclude that Paul would indicate 
to him that he should only be blind for a cer- 
tain time. But we must now notice some 
other synonyms which have not, as yet, been 
accurately distinguished. 

dfdtog' a/oJviog, 
Agree, inasmuch as they denote a long conti- 
nuance of time, even perpetuity. But they 
differ; for didiog has a wider meaning than 
aioJvwg, For, since there are properly two no- 
tations of time, the past and the future, (for 
that which we call time present, is the whole 
of time, of whicli the past and the future are, 
as it were, forms.) dfdtog includes both,^ and 

^ This is the case with the Hebrew word Q^")^*, seculum, 
from O7375 to conceal. It applies equally to ages of time run- 
ning into the inconceivable, concealed and obscure, either with 
reference to the past or the future. One example out of 
many, will suffice, Ps. xc. 2, " Before the mountains were 



expresses an existence in all time past, and 
which yet has not an end; but ctiu)mg only that 
of which no end is conceived. Therefore, 
didiog sometimes denotes both, as Rom. i. 30, 
ai'diog avrov dxjvcc/j^ig xai ^s/OTrjg ; and sometimes 
that which, although it had a beginning, yet is 
not considered to have an end, as Jud. v. 6, 
dsg/MoTg didioig ; and Diodorus Sicul. i. 51, rdcpoug 
dfdiovg oixovg ^oo6ayo^i\jo-j6iv. 

On the contrary, dtu)mg, although it may ap- 
pear to be capable of denoting all duration 
throughout all ages ; yet strictly in the New 
Testament, it is used of duration through 
all future time. So continually it occurs 
in conjunction with l^ojn, 6oga, x^/c/j, n/Mn' 
Ttokacig' Xvr^oodig xX^j^oi/j^y-Za* jSaffiXsia' x^/'/xa*' tjp' 
(2 Cor. iv. 18, rd aidovta opposed to crPoVxa/^a.) 
Whence it is quite needless to argue about 
this word, and to show more fully that it is not 
always used absolutely of eternity. But there 
are passages in which aidjviog is applied to that 
which endures for a long period f as Rom. 

brought forth," &c. ^i^ Hfib^ d'?u>"i;^ d':''!;;;::') "from 

everlasting to everlasting thou an Ciod." It is somewhat 
remarkable that the Latin adverb, olim, which is the same 
word, Q7l^, has retained both senses fiom its etymon, 
and not only refers to past time but to future. " Et haec 
olitn meminisse juvabit." Virgil — T. 

" There is this tendency to excess in the human mind in 


xvi. 25, %foi/o/s a/Mvloig ffs(ri'yrifj/svov, 2 Tim. i. 9, 
ya^iv do^cTffocv t^o ^oovojv aJuviuv, Tit. i. 2. Nor is 
it necessary in these passages to recede from 
the meaning which usage has confirmed ; nor 
is any light derived from a comparison with 
the Hebrew. For in all these three passages 
Xi^voi alojvioi occurs. But these words do not 
mean ancient times, elapsed ages, as they are 
commonly rendered ; but enduring ages, un- 
terminated, of which no end is then actually 
contemplated. Therefore, the mystery x^oi/0/5 
a/ojvioic ffsffr/r,>j^svov, is that which has been un- 
known from unmeasured time, (diutissime, in 
ewiffen Zeiten.) But what can this form of 
speech mean : -^po ^oovuv a/wv/wv, if xi^^^' (^i'^vioi is 
ages or times past. It may easily be ren- 
dered, from the most distant times, (for this for- 

all nations. We are the creatvires of a day, and every 
thing is fading round us. And, although we have the idea of 
eternal duration, every thing connected with our experience, 
our joys, our aflfections, are fleeting and transitory. Man 
catches at the glimmering notion that he has of eternal du- 
ration, and loves to attach it to the perishing events and 
things around him. And hence the strongest expressions 
are used. If we love, it is, for ever ; if we convey or be- 
queath our estate, it is, for ever. And even in the He- 
brew Scriptures, the same word □7')^ which is used to ex- 
press the idea of eternity, is applied repeatedly in a secon- 
dary sense to express a long period of time. Exod. xii. 14. 
— T. 


mula can be referred to this idea,) but how, 
before the past ages, can be the same as, from 
the most ancient times, this they do not show, 
neither can they. The matter is very plain, 
aJdjviog is that which endures through the a/wv ; 
X^ovoi a/'wwo/, therefore, are those successive pe- 
riods which fill up or constitute the a/'wv or 
created time, and t^o ^^ovuv a/wwwv is before 
those remote times, before the longest time of 
which memory remains, heretofore, long ago. 
But this leads us to consider the terms ; 

And we doubt not, but that the remark will 
be made by some one, that these words so far 
differ, that they cannot be accounted synony- 
mous ; for, that w^a does not denote time ge- 
nerally, but only a definite part of the day, and 
that xa/^og, properly means, opportunity. Yet 
it is generally known that there are, in all 
languages, many words, to which usage and 
custom have affixed a force which was peculiar 
to other words, and have thus converted into 
synonyms, words which originally had a sepa- 
rate and specific signification. And in words 
of this kind, which are thus accounted synony- 
mous, this is the greatest difficulty, that the 
ascertaining the distinction between them as 
synonyms, depends mainly upon the accurate 


observation of the usage with respect to them ; 
for the reason of that difference is but seldom 
to be sought with success in their etymology/ 
especially among the New Testament writers. 
These words, therefore, so far agree, as that 
they have each in them a common notion of a 
time in which something is conceived to be, 
or to have been, done. Yet they differ ; for 
Xl^^^'i and a/wi' have the notion of indefinite 
time ; w^a denotes a certain and definite space 
of time, (as it were Ofos, terminus. %cct^6c. is the time, 
that is, the opportune point of time, the very 
time at which a thino^ should be done. But 
even x^(>vog and ai(Jjv differ ; for a/wv signifies an 

*^ I do not wish to attach too great importance to etymo- 
logy, for I am fully conscious, both of its difficulties, and of 
the dangers it presents to the student ; I admit, also, the force 
of the author's remark in the text. At the same time, I 
am satisfied that there are many words, the sense of which 
may be made out most accurately by reference to the ety- 
mon; and that there are synonyms, the distinctibpis be- 
tween which are preserved in the respective etymons. Take, 
for instance, Luke iii. 5. x«< Tav o^o? x,a.) (iouvo; Ta-Tuvcodri^iron. 
The distinction between the hill and the mountain is mark- 
ed in the Hebrew etymon, 'i^o; being from "^j;^ mons, mon- 
tana loca, and (-lovvo; from ^^J, dropping J), n;^, colUSj a 
hill, or banky which is the same word retained in English 
through the Anglo-Saxon, banc. And thus it stands in the 
Hebrew, which the LXX has rendered almost literally. 


indefinite course or flow of time, so tliat, if it is 
used simply, it is without the notion of an end 
or close; but %fovog denotes the time itself in its 
actuality, by which we perceive the succession 
of things. Therefore, it is said correctly, "x^d^ot 
ai'Jjviot ; but no one ever said, ciiuiv Xl^^"^'^' I^ the 
New Testament this holds good also. For a/wv 
always denotes the perpetuity of successional 
time, unless a definition of that time is added. 
Whence the formula zh tov aJcom ; and in Matth, 
xii. 3*2, it appears to be said of the whole pe- 
riod of a man's life on the earth ; but not 
so in Matth. xxviii. 20, eco/xa/ fn'^' vfLuv iwg 
rrig <r-jVTsXdag rov a/uvog; for here, as in 1 
Cor. X. 11, ffuvTsXsia rov aJuvog, is spoken of 
that change in the character of time, or of the 
age, up to which period the Lord had promised 
to be with his disciples.^ But in Ephes. ii. 7j 

s ivvriXua. rov ulorjoi, as it'occurs in the New Testament, 
does not denote the end, hut rather the consummation of th( 
a/«v, which is to be followed by a new age. So in Matth. 
xiii. 39, 40, 49, and xxiv. 3 ; which last ])assage, it is to be 
feared, may he misunderstood in applying it to the destruc- 
tion of the world. '1 he same idea exists in this formula in 
Hebrews ix. 26, which has its parallel in i'Jplus. i. 10, vXri- 

[ It were scarcely warranted to found any thing on the 
use of a term so vague by the Redeemer's yet ill-informed 
disciples. It must be remembered, that they were not 
teaching, in this insiaice, by inspiration, but asking in ig- 


a'luvcg lit^ypiMvoi, are ages to come. The Apos- 
tle, however, uses it, in this instance, to denote 
those, his own express and present times, in 
which was at length manifested, ver. 8, " the 
exceeding riches of grace." And I'rai'/hiLzvoi is 
not necessarily to be understood of time which 
is not yet present, but simply denotes a time 
which has followed another; as James v. 1, 
roLkaiitCfi^iai s'miy^oiMivoLi^ are calamities which are 
already present or thought to be so. 

So also the word "X^o^og is never used to ex- 
press a certain and definite time ; but when it 
occurs apparently in that sense, the force of 
the idea will not be found in the word ^^os'oj, 
but in the adjuncts. For, in two passages in 
Luke viii. 29, and xx. 9, where x°ovoi appears 
to signify years, there is another reason for it ; 
for %^oi/o5, as a sort of aggregate of times, 
by the usage of recent writers, has been put 
for the space of a year, as the most known and 
familiar aggregate of times ; in the same way 
as ci'^a is used loosely and popularly for the 

norance. Many such instances occur in the evangelic his- 
tory. Luke ix. 33. John xiv. 5, 22. On such passages no 
doctrine can be founded, any more than on the fallacious 
averments of Joi>'s friends ; nor any criticism on the use of 
terms by the disciples, in a pcpular and inaccurate sense^ 
except as to the usus loquendi.] — T. 


parts of a day.^ Yet xfovog by itself is not a 
specific limited time. And, in fact, it may 
well be doubted whether xi^m ixavoi should be 
rendered, many years. It is a frequent error 
in lexicons, that if a Greek word can be render- 
ed so as to make sense by any particular Latin 
word, they affirm that the two words have the 
same meaning; and hence the greatest mon- 
strosities have sprung up in the lexicons, es- 
pecially in respect to the prepositions. For who 
could ever be persuaded that s?t signifies ad, in, 
and cum^ or that sig could be de ; cc'jrh^ ad and in, 
and Ttard, ex, &c. ? 

Ka/po's always denotes a certain specific time, 
with the superadded notion of opportunity. 
( Ammonius says very accurately o [J^'^v nai^hg dt]XoT 
ntQidrfiTOL yoQvox), yojiwg 5g TotfJrTjra.) For that which 
i?} done opportunely, is understood to be done 
at a certain period of time ; wdiile that which 
is done rashly, and not at a fixed time, is al- 
most necessarily done inopportunely. Whence 
it occurs, that sometimes the word may be 
used indefinitely ; and yet it may be gathered 
from the whole tenor of the address, what that 
is of which the xa/gog is affirmed. So in Matth. 
xxvi. 18, -KCLioJag [JjOU eyyvg iffriVf the rou aTo^uvs/v 

^ See Du Canj^e Glossar. Med. et Inf. lat. and Hemster- 
husius ad Aristoph. Phil. 1084. 


is not, in fact, omitted, (for it is written 
6 jcoci^og /MOV, and not merely, o xa/^oj,) but from 
the very time in which he gave this injunction 
to his disciples, it might have been known 
what was o -/.aioog avrov. But when Tcaioog is com- 
bined with another word, then it does not de- 
note the opportunity of the thing ; but the 
whole formula does it, as xai^og avxojv, Mark xi. 
13, jccci^og rcov xa^'-ciov, Matth. xxi. 34, where the 
lexicons very incorrectly render -/Mi^og, the time 
of year. For y,ocio6g denotes any opportunity 
whatsoever, not only of time, but of place, and 
of the apt and convenient means for doing 
any thing ; as the notion of opportunity in- 
volves in it the notion of time. For, if the 
place is convenient for a certain act, then 
xai^og eujcai^og h^n, that it should be done there. 
If the thing itself is fit and convenient, it 
may then be made use of. Wherefore, we 
must not at once condemn the views of some, 
regarding Mark xi. 13, ou ycco f,v -/.ai^hg cuxw!/, that 
it refers to the opportunity of place ; ( Abresch. 
Lect Aristaenet. vol. i. p. 16, 17, Triller, ad 
Thorn. Ma^.ip. 490.) if, indeed, it be necessary 
to vindicate our Lord's act at all. Nor, indeed, 
would the excuse be sufficient, that the place 
was not suitable to that kind of fruit; if we 
iiould, for a moment, imagine that our Lord, 


disappointed in his expectation, had acted in 
an^er, a passion from which the divine mind 
is free. But, in fact, xa/^o/ is often said of any 
opportunity (as the Latins use tempera^) in 
which any thing can be conveniently done. 
I will also make one passing remark on the 
formula which occurs twice in the New Tes- 
tament, Ephes. V. 16, and Coloss. iv. 5, ijayo^a- 
Zpix^m Tov xai^ov. In both places the Apostle 
exhorts Christians to live prudently and cau- 
tiously; and, therefore, commands them s^ayopd- 
^str^a/ TOV %aiom. Luther renders this, sdiicket euch 
in die Zeit.^ This gives the idea certainly. In 
my view, however, s^ayopa^g(r^a/ rh xai^ov^ is, 
according to the manner of merchants who ac- 
curately examine goods, and choose the best, 
diligently to watch the time, and to make it 
our own, that we may over-rule or control it ; 
as Pindar well says of Damophilus, Pyth, iv. 
V. 509, £U vtv (j-hv xat^ov^ syvuziv ^sou'Tojv ds o/, ov 
d^darag, o-TrabsT. You are not to yield to time, 
and to serve it, but you may command it, and 
it shall do what you approve. And evidently 
this idea agrees best with the relation of both 
the passages.' 

^ So also Horn. xii. 11, he renders the words vS xai^oi ^ou- 
XivovTts, which reading, by tlie by, though admitted by Gries- 
bach, has always appeared to me d«tubtful. 

' The same formula occui's in the LXX. Dan ii. 8. Lu- 


But, since opportunity is generally fleeting, 
and of very short duration, as Pindar says, 
6 yao xai^oc ir^hg dv^^M'jrojv ^^cc^j /mst^ov i^-'^ there- 
fore, T^k xa/^o'i/ means, at a time, considered as 
no longer enduring than while the opportunity 
contemplated lasts; as Luke viii. 13, 0/ ^fog xolioov 
T/tfT-s uovrsg, are they who believed for a time, while 
it was convenient, and no danger threatened ; 
but Si' Jcoc/^'M 'TTSiPafffjuou u(pi(fravTai. And now we 
may explain that singular formula, which oc- 
curs in Apoc. xii. 14, xcufov %a) zai^oug %ai rifitffu 
xai^ou. It is usually rendered, three years and 
a half; and rightly; for the same space of 
time is, in ver. 6, and c. xi. 3, spoken of, as 
vjfjijsoag yp^at>g haxosiag l^yizovra; and in xi. 2, fJ'^vag. 
Tsffffotgdzovra dvo. But that this number is used 
for any space of time, according to the Hebrew 
mode, is evident, (see Eichhorn on Apoc. xi. 
2.) And, therefore, xa/^o's, in this place, is not 

ther renders it. " Ich sehe, dass ihr Frist suchet.^* But the 
idea is the same here also. " I know that you accurately 
watch the time." They knew that the king had forgotten his 
dream, and therefore, they asked him to tell it, not so much 
for the pui'pose of delay, as with a view to avoid the neces- 
sity of giving the interpretation. [The idea is, in my opi- 
nion, more directly expressed in the Chaldee, and well ren- 
dered in our English version. " I know that ye would gain 
the time." ^^22.1 ]1J^^^^ S^^Dl^* H pt emere, acquirere. ] 


a year, but is said of the time of a year. For 
there is a difference, when a word is predicated 
of this or that thing, and when it actually de- 
notes that thing. It is used in Dan. vii. 25 ; 
xii. 7. The LXXrendersit (compare ver. 11.)™ 
not of actual years, but of a certain indefinite 
period of time, according- to the usage of pro- 
phetic language ; for as to the true sense, this 
formula means no more than, aliquamdiu, a 
good while. Compare James v. 17. 

A similar reason obtains in respect to the 
word w^a. For, as w^a properly denotes a de- 
finite and limited time, we may understand 
from this, why it may be predicated of any 
certain specific period, although custom has 
appropria^d it specially to the hours of the day. 
Nor are tncy in the right, who say that it 

" The LXX has rendered the Chaldee word "ny which 
properly means, time, by xa/^oj, as Dan. ii. 8. iii. 5, 15. 
vii. 12, 'ius KCkt^ou Kce.) xai^os. the same word is also used for a 
year, in the iv. 13. vii. 25. xii. 7« And it is curious that the 
word which they have rendered in c. xii. 7» i's xai^o* xa) 
^fiitru Kui^ou, in c. iii. 5, 15, they have rendered u^et. But 
it is possible, that both in Daniel and the Apocalypse, this 
description of an indefinite time may arise out of a religious 
reverence for the number seven divided into two parts ; or, 
that it may be referred to that time during which the tem- 
pie, after it was profaned by Antiochus, was deserted by 
the Jews. SeeJosephus Bel. Jud.i. 1,2, proem. § 7- aud 2. 
Mark x. 3. See Grotius on Daniel vii. 25. 


means the least portion of time. For in such 
passages as Matth. viii. 13 ; ix. 22 ; x. 19. Luke 
xii.' 39, 46, no one would think that wga was a 
moment or mere point of time, when it is 
evident that he who affirms an event to occur, 
sv rfi ftigijc ix^'ivrii means a more definite time than 
if he had said sv tuj ^o6v(^ hslvcfj. And though 
T^bg w^ai/, may be rendered, a good while, in the 
same way as '^rfog ocai^ov, yet it were still incor- 
rect to say that w^a means any minute portion 
of time. Certainly when a small part of time 
is intended, the word w^a might be used, for 
it denotes a small part of the day ; and there- 
fore, '^fog M^av is the same as aliquod tempus, at 
some time; but it does not follow fr^|^this, that 
wpa is, a little time, generally, 'iflre is a dif- 
ference, however, between 'rrohg w^ai' and rr^hi 
xa/gov. For that which is said to endure, ir^hg 
u^ccv, is conceived not to last longer than till the 
hour is expired, i. e. for only a short time ; but 
that which is said to be done, -rgos jcaipov, is con- 
ceived as being done precisely up to another 
point of time. 

Another formula also differs from T^og Tcaipov, 
viz. '^i^g rov Tcaicov, It means, conveniently, as 
time shall permit. Lucian. i.Deor. Dial. iv. 209. 
The force of the article may be noticed in the 
formula, xara xc^i^ov Rom. v. 6. See Lucian, i. 


Hermot. x. 749. ^tam zaicov is, opportunely, 
in the needful time, to do it, that it be done 
rightly. When it is said that Christ xara 
^6v d'TTs'^avs, it does not mean, at a time fixed of 
God, but at an opportune time, ztir rechten Zeit ; 
when we were ac^ivzTg. If a definite or appointed 
time were meant, it would have been xara rh 
xaifov (a-jTov.) The Greeks, almost in the same 
sense, use s/g, opposed to '^fo xaioov, 1 Cor. 
iv. 9. Kaifog means, the moment of time, &%«, 
a portion of time. Therefore, '^^og xa/^ov is, at 
some certain time, (avf eine gewisse Zeit) coos 
w^ai/, for a short time, {aiifeine kurze Zeit) 

In Galatians ii. 5, ir^og u^av is ill rendered by 
some, a s if it were the same as '^^og xaifov w^ag, 
1 Thess^B^. For, rrpoc xaiohv o)pag, is not, for 
a short time, but, for that time, that particular 
period in which svsxo-^sv rj/j^ug 6 laravag. Luther 
gives it correctl)'', eine Weile s. eine Zeit lang, 
aliquamditi, for some while, for a specific pe- 
riod. And, finally, w^a, by itself, is never the 
opportune time, opportunity, as xa/cog; but some 
word is added, to define and specify that 
which is uncertain in the notion of w^a, time, 
as John ii.'4; xvi. 21 ; Mark xiv. 35; Johnxii. 
27. But these things are so manifest, that I 
need not add another word. And I know not 
how it is, that only in lexicons of the New Tes- 
tament such trifling exists. 


dvo/juioc' dd/KYifia, 
The discrimination of synonyms, which is 
at all times sufficiently difficult, is still more 
so in words applicable to disposition of mind. 
For as many virtues or vices are so nearly 
allied, that the difference cannot easily be 
pointed out, so the words which represent 
them are frequently used indiscriminately. 
It is, however, often very desirable to trace 
with accuracy that difference. The words 
above written, so far agree that they have the 
common notion of sin generally, yet they dif- 
fer. There is a greater degree of affinity be- 
tween d/xa^rla, d/Md^ryj/jba and 'Xa^uvroomL, They 
involve the notion of vice or f4H? which 
brings blame or injury. But in the first place 
dfxa^T/cc and d/xd^rrifj^a, differ. For d/xa^ria pro- 
perly denotes the innate vice, from which the 
dfid^rrif/^a springs." It is true that d^ap-'ia is in 

" It is worth while to endeavour to ascertain the real 
force of the word a^a^r/a, a word which, as 1'itmann states, 
is vised repeatedly for the evil act, but which is also used 
emphatically, « a^a^r/a, for the evil principle. Its root or 
primitive in Greek is probaidy a^«^« which trcaiaila renders, 
a duct or canal for water, by whicli water may flow down 
upon any place. This will bring it into near connexion 
with the Hebrew root "^^^ which is to speak or put forth, 


the New Testament used for the vicious act 
itself, as John viii. 21, 24 ; xvi. 8, 9 ; 2 Pet. i. 9, 
ii. 14;^ but the proper force of the word will 
be found in many places, especially in the se- 
venth and eighth chapters of Romans. Neither 
would any one inconsiderately affirm, that in 
John i. 29, a/xagr/a had its specific signification. 
Certainly the Saviour took away not only 
external sins and iniquities, but ^ aixa^ria the 
very corruption of the soul itself; for if this 
be not extirpated, mere propriety of outward 
conduct, which Melanchthon calls civil right- 
to cause to flow. The ufta^ria may be regarded as a stream 
of influence, flowing down upon the human race. There is, 
however, j|tother Hebrew word nearly allied to this : viz. 
*^Qn whioRot only carries the idea of an influence, but of 
an evil influence. In all the cognate dialects, Chaldee, 
Syriac, Arabic, Ethiopic, it has the idea of turpidity and 
impure commixtion and excitement, muddy confusion in 
water, acetous fermentation in wine, bitumen arising from 
hot natural springs, collection of mud or clay brought down 
by tumultuous waters, bitter and brackish waters, &c. 
And from hence we derive the Latin antarus and the 
French amere. The afia^Ticc is then a defiling influence, a, 
bitter principle, a principle of disturbance flowing down, 
upon the moral creation of God. It may be noticed, in cor- 
roboration of this etymology, that the word amar repeatedly 
occurs in Gaelic, as a river channel, a mill-course, a ditch or 
canal — T. 

^ Those places should be accurately distinguished from 
each other, in which « ufia^rla or afji-a^riat occur. 



eousness, would be utterly unavailing to real 
sanctity. In Rom. vii. 7, it is manifest that 
in the words, 6 vhjjjoc, a/xa^r/a ; aijjaoria is not the 
incitement to sin, but that which is in itself 
evil and vicious. Paul denies that the law is 
aiMaoria, but concedes properly that the law ex- 
cites to sin : %w^'S 7^2, vofMv a/xa^rla vix^d. But 
the whole argument in this chapter shows that 
d/xa^r/a is not the sin or transgression, but the 
corruption which is by nature in the soul. 
Some say that ^' d/^agr/a is put collectively 
for all sins, as we say, die siinde. But it is 
evident in the view of the Apostle, that the 
afLa^ricc is in US before the s-ri^vfMia ; and that 
for a time sin was dead, but that when the law 
reigned, sin gave rise to lust and he became 
xa^' v'TTs^lSoXriv a/j^a^TuXog. And therefore he 
does not understand ccfMcc^rla to be actual trans- 
gression, but, what all who know themselves 
must perceive, an innate corruption, and ro 
voiMov rrig d/xagr/ag sv ffa^yj. And in Rom. v. 12, 
sq. it is scarcely to be doubted that cL(j.aoria. is 
used in the same sense. The a{/.a^ria which 
came by one man,,^/' svo's. into the world, is dis- 
tinguished from TO Tov kvhg TagaTrw/xa ; and it is 
not said, that by to 'xaod-itTMiJ^a rou hog death came 
into the world, but d/xa^r/a, and by d//,aer/a 
death, and that death came upon all men, for 




that all have sinned, which could not be said if 
death to all arose from the act of Adam. Also 
it may be said with correctness, a//<a^r/av oux 
sXXoys/tT^a/, i^ri ovrog v6/mov, for it is vsx^oc yjM^lg roD 
lo/xoy ; but it could scarcely be said that sin is 
not imputed. For death reigned before Moses, 
(v. 14), seeing that all have sinned. 

They then are not to be justified, who af- 
firm that the sacred writers, not only in the 
same passage, but actually in the same for- 
mula, use the same word in two different senses. 
Such an ambiguity is utterly foreign to the 
simplicity of their writings. Even the fre- 
quent interpretation of Hebrews ix. 28, x^i^^ 
a/xagr/as h<p'^r,(iirai, without a piacular sacrifice, 
is scarcely warrantable. Besides afiaorla never 
denotes sacrifice for sins. For in Hebrews 

the expression is elliptical, and the full terms 
are ^uc/ai/ (s. 'rr^o<S(po^av v. 18.) tso/ a/^a^r/ag, 2. e, 
sacrifice offered because of sin. And there is 
no confirmation of the false rendering obtained, 
by comparing it with Rom. viii. 4, 'rrsix-^ug 'xt^i 
afiupTtagy i, e. he sent his Son on account of 
sin, that he might condemn, Tcarax^hp rriv 
aixa^riav. Now cri/x,^g/i/ 'Xi^i rtvog is SO plainly to 
send on account of any thing, that it is won- 
derful to see interpreters attempting to bring 


any thing further out of so plain and simple 
an expression. But ai^dprrtiMa is always used 
for the actual transgression. Mark iii. 28 ; 
iv. 12, Rom. iii. 25; 1 Cor. vi. 18. And ra^a- 
TTw/xa differs from both those former words ; 
for although Jerome's distinction is not correct, 
that ita^cL'XTiaiLa means the lapse towards sin, and 
aficii^ria, the completed act itself; yet in the 
word -raiacrrw/xa the notion inheres of sin rashly 
committed as by one unwilling to do an injury ; 
but in d/xagr/aand d/xa^r'/j^a the act is expressed 
which he who does, does willingly whether he 
errs in improperly thinking that he is doing 
right, or whether he acts under the impulse of 
passion. Elegantly therefore in Matth. vi. 
14, 15; xviii. 35, the word cra^d'^rw/xa is given 
in preference to the other two ; for it is a mil- 
der term tiian afi^a^ria as applicable to a single 
fault. In Ephes. ii. 1, both words occur. And 
sometimes, in fact, cra^dTrw/xa is used with re- 
ference to any transgression, as Rom. iv. 25 ; 
2 Cor. V. 19. But in the important state- 
ment in Rom. v. 12, and following verses, 
the distinction between d,(ia§ria and 'Tra^d'^'rdjfia 
had need to be accurately drawn ; and Paul 
draws it. For the 'rraoazori of Adam he calls, 
Tasacrrw/xa, v. 15, 17, 18, by which the d,iMa^ria 
came into the world ; and in verse 20, he says 


vo/xoj, 'Xa^sKjT^X^iv /Va ifkzovdgri rh 'Tra^d'xroiiJja' o5 ^^ 

wherefore? why does he not say, o5 ds s'xXiovags 
TO 'TTa^d'Trroj/Ma ? Evidently because it is effected 
by the law, that those sinful acts which were 
less criminal, as the mere result of imprudence 
or of error, now might become more criminal, 
inasmuch as they who commit them, know 
themselves to be sinning. But he says, 
s'TrXUvagsv tj df/^a^riw for the d/j^cc^ria d(po^/!Mriv 
XalSovffcc did rng broXng makes the individual xa^* 
u'?rs^[SoXriv d/j^a^ruXog. I am aware that too much 
stress must not be laid on tliese nice distinc- 
tions ; yet it is certainly more satisfactory to 
follow out, in interpreting the sacred books, 
these delicate distinctions of the force of terms, 
than blindly to acquiesce in an ambiguous and 
misty interpretation. Paul, with the same ac- 
curacy of speech, very tenderly in Rom. xi. 
11, when, speaking of the Jews rejecting 
Christ, calls that act rru^d^ruda, which our Lord 
in John xvi. 9, calls d/jLaorla. It would be a 
false interpretation to say, that 'raodTrroj/Ma in 
this place means the same thing as T^'^rrj^u^a, which 
has reference to their misery.^ 

P The etymology of the word ^rrnfia will not bear out 
the author's idea. It is derived from the Hebrew J^tOn> 


ddixta, however, and dvof^ia differ from all the 
others. For in them the general notion only 
of transgression or fault exists. But these 
words involve the nature of the act, on account 
of which it is faulty. That is ddma by which 
the dkonov is injured; that is dvofJa by which 
the law is violated. For as he properly is 
adixog, who is not what he ought to be, and 
therefore who violates right ; so ddixla is said of 
any impropriety which is repugnant to the 
dizatov. So 1 John V. 17, TttCa ddix'/a, dfj^a^ria. But 
in dvo/Mta the idea properly is the non-obser- 

peccarcj errare, and which occurs in the same sense in 
Syriac and Chaldee. In Arabic also lUf«». and ^ ^U^^ . 

And in the Ethiopic it is used not only in this sense, but in 
that which more commonly is attached to it in Greek, of 
deficit, indiguit, orhatus est. This etymology is confirmed 
also by the occurrence of the word in Greek, in l)0th forms 
of nTra.ofi,on and y\(riia.o, a difference evidently originating 
in the soft sound of JQ, in Hebrew, and ^ in Arabic, which 
slides easily either into the (T, or r. And in fact the domi- 
nant idea of rtTTo. or ^^c-a is that of moral inferiority. So 
ijTTMv ohov, rifftruv v^ovcov. Schleusner says, yiTToiir6a,i eleganter 
de iis usurpatur, qui cupiditatibus pravis indulgent et vitio- 
sitati serviunt. This, however, is the primary idea, and not, 
as he states, secondary and derived. The meaning therefore 
of rirr^f/.a, in the passage refered to, would be tijat of moral 
deterioration or depression in consequence of fault. " If 
their error be the riches of the world, and their degradation 
the enriching of the nations." — T 


vance or transgression of the law, whether the 
law be unknown or wilfully violated. He is 
civo/Mog, strictly speaking, who has not the law, 
Acts ii. 23. 1 Cor. ix. 21 ; and then subse- 
quently who regards not the law, and who 
violates the law. dvo/iia is the violation of law, 
ddixia the doing contrary to right. And ddr/Ja 
has the wider sense. It may be conceived of 
without a law, but there can be no ocvo/j^ia with- 
out ddr/Jo:. See Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4. 12, 13. 
Finally, ddir.r,//jcc is that which is done in dhmay 
which is unjustly done. Acts xviii. 14, xxiv. 
20. Apoc. xviii. 5. Xenoph. Memorab. ii. 2, 
3. a/ ToXg/^ S'TtI roTg (liyieroig dbixr,n>ast ^rifiiav Savaron 
TiirotrjXOKriv, ug cux av /Xct^r^vog KCizoij ^h(3uj rr,v dbtxtav 



All real adepts of the liermeneutic art have 
taught latterly, that, in interpreting old writ- 
ings, not only must regard be had to the commr.ii 
usage of words, but that the extreme nicety 
of discernment consisted in noticing diligently 
the mode of speaking peculiar to each author. 
This remark is more abundantly confirmed, in 
the rendering of the New Testament. At the 
same time, the observance of it is combined with 
greater difficulties than has been generally sup- 
posed. For in other Greek writers, the more 
ornamented style was conformed to the more 
polished forms of speech, which, though they 
may undergo some change from diversity of 
dialect, follow as to the use of words a perma- 
nent and unv-arying rule. But the style of 
the sacred writers, neither corrected by liter- 
ary study, nor by the practice of writing 
adapted to the modes of general and popular 
thought and diction ; and, as it were, over- 
whelmed by the greatness of those new an- 
nouncements, for the expression of which all 


wonted language would appear inadequate, 
renders the observation of the use of words 
more difficult, and requires a more minute 
scrutiny than that of works more artificially 
composed. This remark, which is applicable 
in many respects, is peculiarly so with refer- 
ence to the use of synonyms. For it was 
truly said, that he only could rightly under- 
stand and feel the elegance of the Greek 
WTiters, who could learn to distinguish the va- 
rious shades of style, by means of the synony- 
mous terms, as a delicate tint arising out of the 
intermixture of a multitude of subtle atomic 
particles. What then are we to do with those 
writers, of whom all agree that they were al- 
together strangers to those subtleties of com- 
position ; whilst many believe them to have 
been so barbarous, as scarcely to allow that 
they spoke the Greek language at all ? Cer- 
tainly if the sacred writers had no regard to 
the rules of the Greek language, especially to 
that of analogy, then their writings might be 
interpreted without any consideration of those 
rules ; so that he might be accounted the best 
interpreter of Holy Scripture, who, neglecting 
the laws of Greek composition, should investi- 
gate this barbarous mode of speech by the 
opinions and customs of this age. But that 


this were a most improper mode of procedure, 
is proved in a variety of ways, more especially 
by the diligent observation of the synonymous 
terms ; for this shows plainly that the style of 
the sacred writers, although very far from 
possessing Attic elegance, and full of those 
defects which may always be detected in those 
who have acquired a language by actual use, 
rather than by study, abounds with acute 
thought and accuracy of expression ; so that he 
who would attain to the full perception of the 
sublimity of the sacred writers, which shines 
most conspicuously in their simplicity, would 
do well to compare them with the compositions 
of those authors who have thought and spoken 
most acutely. 

And, in pursuing our inquiries, these sacred 
days will direct our choice of the words best 
suited for observation. For the great truth 
which, on the feast of our Lord's nativity, 
Christians would desire to commemorate, is 
contained in John iii. 16 : " God so loved, 
s^yacTTjcgv, the world that he gave his only begot- 
ten Son," &c. Let us direct our attention there- 
fore to this point, and consider what is the 
force of the word aya'Ttav which John uses, and 
in what respect it differs from the cognate 
word ^I'kuv, 


* A.y attar (piXsTv. 
The accordance in some measure of these 
two words, is sufficiently plain. But some 
deny that they at all differ, on the ground that 
words which express the same affection of mind, 
are frequently used indiscriminately. That they 
differ, however, will appear from the fact, that 
each word has certain meanings peculiar to it- 
self, and which the other will not admit. For 
if in both words the same precise idea existed, 
both would be used of the same things. But 
the usage is otherwise.^ For as ^/Xs/V properly 

*' ^iXos, from whence <pi}>.t7v, from (piu, or accordinn^ to 
others from -riku, to press, is he wiiom we embrace, kiss, 
cherish. Vid. Etymol. 794. 12.777- 778. Eustath. p. 1583. 
5G. (^iXuv' 76 ayKTav Kctt to rot; ^iiXiffiv a.(rTaZ,i(r6a,i, xul to ta 
X^i^i (rufi(iu.Xkuy. conf. 1799. 51. Vid. jLv. ?icheidius ad 
Leimep. Etjinolog. p. 10G3. But aya^rZv, which appears 
to be derived from uyau, aydcryi, denotes properly the love 
that springs from admiration and veneration ; and from this 
the other notions of the word flow, as to cherish, to receive 
kindly, to acquiesce, &c. Hesydiins gives correctly, (piktT. 
xccTu. •^'V^rtv u.yct'xa.. It is evident, therefore, why friend- 
ship is called ^/X/a not ayaTn. It denotes an intimate union 
of souls. 

[There is great probability that fikiTv, strictly to kiss, 
and vlu or tivcu, to drink, and tu^u to persuade, are all de- 
rivatives fnnn "^3, the mouth. And that ayawav, is derived 
from ^rii^ amare by the natural substitution of y, as a bar- 
der sound for the mere aspiration j^. M'e find in several pas- 
sages of Scripture, the word nUnj^j amor, which, by the 
accommodation of the sound of the second radical to the style 


means, to kiss, and dyaTav never has tKis sense, 
so has dya'Trav its peculiar meaning to he satis- 
fied, to acquiesce, in which sense <pt'ki7v is never 
used. Moreover, if these words were precise- 
ly similar, there would be no distinction made 
by the more elegant writers, as Xenophon, 
Plato and others. For although in the Me- 
morab. ii. 7, 9, 12, they are twice apparently 
interchanged tfti /-^si' s?c£/la5 (piX^ffug — Jxs/Va/ os a 
dycL'K7]6(i\jm' and a little further on, xa/ «/ //<£!< 
auriv i(piXovv, 6 d's avrdg ^yuTa, yet he would 
greatly err, who should conclude that Xeno- 
phon thus unthinkingly interchanged words of 
synonymous import, because he had used both 
words vicissively of the same persons. For if we 
inspect the passage more accurately, we shall 
readily perceive why Socrates should say to a 
man anxious about the support of his poorer 
relations ; Now when their indolence grieves 
you ours 6v sxiTvag <piXsTg, oun sxuvai trs; but if you 
would teach them to seek by labour to main- 
tain themselves, tfy A^si/ IxiTvag ^/Xjjcs/j, o^wi/ w^sX/- 
fLOXjg &sccvr(f) o'Scccfy sxsTvai ds Cs ayawrisoxiSiv, a/ff^ofisvat 
yjxi^ovrd <Si ccliraTc. There existed no cause of 

of Greek pronunciation, would give at once tlie word a.ya.'xvi. 
And this etymology of the two words accords with the ma- 
nifest disuiiction in their use. (piXiTv heing used to express 
the more direct demonstration of regard, aya-rav the princi- 
ple, or internal feeling of delectation and kindliness 7'.] 


mutual love; for neither could he love them 
w^ho in their poverty were only an annoy- 
ance to him, nor could they love him, when 
they saw him unwilling to support them. 
For there is no greater impediment to mu- 
tual love among relations, than the receiving of 
aid unwillingly given ; or the being compelled 
to give to the undeserving. But if he obeyed 
the" advice of Socrates, he might find that he 
would at length love them whom he had taught 
to be useful to himself, and that they might 
love him, when they perceived that he was no 
longer unwilling to take care of them. And 
then, that which Socrates predicted, took place, 
a/ [Liv wg xi^di/jjova s(p/XovVf 6 ds ug u^psXifiovg riya/Tra, 
We admit, therefore, that Xenophon adopted 
the interchange of the words ; but not blindly, 
or from a false regard to eloquence, which, by 
the mere variation of words, the imitators of 
ancient writers too eagerly sought. Certainly, 
if we rightly read the passage, Xenophon 
changed the terms, because he now wished to 
intimate what would occur after these women 
had understood that they would no longer be 
a burden to the man ; and that he also now 
perceived some probable fruit of their labour. 
For now they could really love him who, as a 
parent, nourished them ; he could affectionately 


regard them whom he saw worthy of his care. 
There is a similar passage in Dion. Cass. lib. 
xliv. sipiXTjcfan aurov ug -rars^a, x,cci rjya'xriffccrs ug sOgg- 
yerriv. But one, yet more important, occurs in 
Plato, Lysid. p. '215. A. "O ds fi'n dya'Trcpro, irug 
(p/Xov ; 6 ds fjjri rov dsofisvog, ovds ri ayct'^rwjj oiv ; 6 ds fiii 
d'ya'Truii^, ouS" av <piXoT. It is clear that (piXsTv de- 
notes the sense of love, but in the word d/aTa/ 
properly is implied the cause of the pXsTv, 
Properly, dyccTrav is to make much of any thing, 
to admire, either for utility sake, or some other 
reason, and then to wish well, to cherish, to 
regard ; but (piXzTv denotes the love which takes 
its rise naturally from the thing loved. But 
since love is frequently without reason, it oc- 
curs, at times, that (piXiTv is used in instances 
in which no just cause of love exists. 'Aya-rctv 
is never applied to an improper love. 

In the New Testament, certainly, passages 
occur in which dya'Trdv and pXsTv are used in- 
discriminately ; but there are others in which 
each is used in its own proper sense. Of the 
former class, are those in which Jesus is said 
(piXiTv and dyai:dy ; and Luke xi. 43, dya^itdn rr]v 
T^uToxa^sd^iav, for which the Evangelist says, in 
c. XX. 46, (piXsTv TYiv 'TT^ojr. But we must not class 
with these John xxi. 15, where, to the ques- 
tion, dycLitdg //,g -rXs/bv roiiruVf Peter replies, vcci 


xu^/g, g-j oJdag on pXu 6v And our Lord twice 
repeats the words of Peter, o/Xg/g //-£• i, e. dost 
thou so far love me ? It is, however, worthy 
of observation, that in the New Testament, 
men are never said, <piXiiv rh "^zh^ but ayacrav ; 
but God is said both ^/Xs/V and aywxav rovg dv^^w- 
Touc. For since, in the word (piXiTv the direct 
affection of the mind is expressed, but in aya- 
'5r<5ty the regard to any thing, as that which we 
venerate, it is the part of men ayarruai rh ^iov ; 
but of God, both ^/Xs/V can be affirmed, with re- 
spect to men, if they do rightly, John xvi. 27 ; 
and aya-rccv, when he wishes them good, and seeks 
their salvation. So, in John iii. 16, where ^ 
a/avTTj rou ^«oS is recorded, it is rightly said ^ya- 
TTjffgv 6 ^£og rh xoafjjov^ not s<piXsi; for it could not 
be affirmed of God, that he ^/Xg/V rbv xoff/xov, the 
world not being worthy of his love. Although 
it is used, therefore, when God is considered 
as approving men, yet an adequate cause is 
stated, or, at least, made apparent from the 
circumstances, v. c. John xvi. 27. In John xi. 
3, 5, 36, speaking of our Lord's love to Laza- 
rus, the words ®/Xg?!/ and dyu'rav are interchang- 
ed. For, in ver. 3, the sisters are recorded to 
have intimated to Jesus, ov ^/Ag?s, u(j%nT; and in 
ver. 36, it is said, that the men who saw his 
grief, said, /^s, crw; gf/Xs/ aurCv. Whilst, in ver. 


5, John adds viya'nci 5g o 'Irjffovg rov Ad^a^ov. But 
if we take all things into account, the reason 
will appear plain, why in this 5th verse John 
(lid not write s(piXsi but ^i/avra. For this love 
applies, not only to Lazarus^ but to his sisters, 
with reference to whom, a/acrai/ was the more 
correct expression. For the sense implied, is 
that of friendship or delectation, and not of 
tiiat kind of affection which is involved in the 
word (piXsTv when used of a woman. For, al- 
though <piXia especially denotes friendship, (for 
i^aig is the special word for love,) yet (piXsTv is 
never used of the friendship between the sexes, 
unless when the idea of love is conjoined. 

But, lest this should be considered as an 
over-nice distinction, we will refer to another 
example. In Matth. v. 43, it will be manifest 
why our Lord commands dyaTav rovg s^^^ovg, and 
not ^/Xg/v. For the ^/Xs/v, a virtuous man could 
not feel towards a bad man : but he miofht the 
dya'ff^v towards any man to whom God was 
willing to be beneficent. Love cannot be re- 
quired, but favour or kindness may. Kindness 
is a duty of humanity ; but love can exist only 
where there is congeniality of soul, (Luke vi. 
32, 35.) The Lord requires that we should 
feel kindly to an enemy, and seek as much as 
possible his benefit ; but he does not require 


that we should actually love bad men. On the 
contrary, when they are reproved, who. from 
an excessive desire to preserve life, lose sight 
of the real object of living-, John xii. 25, it is 
rightly said, 6 (piXuv r^v -^u^nv ccvrov. For he who 
is dyaTiiJv rrjv -^v^tiv, consults his real interest. 
But in Luke vii. 5, the Jews are recorded to 
have said, ayci-a rh 'i'^vog tj/j^uv, z. e. favoured, che- 
rished. Concerning Mark x. 21, 6 ds l-^eovg iiyd- 
TTi^sv ccvrov, interpreters have differed. But it is 
needless to invent a strange sense, as if dyu'Tr^v 
meant, to address with bland and friendly words, 
and then as nearly allied to it, to approve, to 
praise, which would rather be the force of <piXsTv. 
Besides, if our Lord had approved of the young 
man, he would not have added, that one thing 
yet more trying and difficult to overcome re- 
mained. For, when our Lord saw that he was 
not ill-disposed, yet that he confided too much 
in his possessions, with a view to his benefit, he 
added an admonition to which his covetousness 
would not submit. Jesus, therefore, riyd'rriffsv 
aurov, that is, meaning kindly to him, warned 
the rich man, that he might, at the same time, 
impress more fully the minds of his disciples. 

Briefly then, in fine, (pi^^iTv is to love, dywr^v 
is to regard ; in Latin, the one is amare, and the 
other dlliffere, which two words differ in the 


same manner. See Wetstein on John xi. 4, 
and Ciceron. ep. ad Dolabell, ix. 14. ad Attic. 
17. ad Div. xiii. 47. 

It will now be plain how it is that ^/Xs/v and 
ayd'K^y have each their peculiar signification ; 
that Q.ya'Trclv never means to kiss, p/Xg7v never to 
acquiesce, or to cherish with reverence. For 
although it may be doubted whether the radi- 
cal sense of ^/Xs/v is oscular i^ yet it is evident 
that this meaning accords best with the notion 
of love, but not with the notion of regard, in 
which reason rather than feeling reigns. On 
the contrary, the impetus of love, (o^z-o^ Lucian. 
Amor. ii. 438,) which exists in the word pXiTvy 
is not found in the mind of him who, aya'Tra, 
acquiesces, is satisfied when he attains that 
which he thinks worthy of his desire. Lastly, 
since, in the word a/ar^v exists the notion of 
admiring and reverencing, he is said properly, 
dya'xcfv^ who reverently or respectfully addresses 
or receives any one. The third word which 
the Greeks use for love, viz. s^ai', does not oc- 
cur in the New Testament. 

^ Aya^oi^yih* dya^o'TrotsTv, 

These words are so nearly allied, that they 
scarcely appear to differ. For the words of 
which they are composed, s^ydZ^ss'^cci and -ffo/g/v, 
frequently are not distinguishable in sense ; yet 



they differ. For dya^eoysTv is properly fgya- 
gstj^a/ TO dya^ov^ good occupation, bene agere^ to 
be doing good, whilst dyu'^o'TrohTv is, to do some 
good thing. In the word a/a^os^/g/i/, the action 
is regarded, the notion of acting; in the word 
aya^omnTv something more is considered, the 
doing some particular good. The same thing 
is done both by o dya^osoym and 6 dya%'7roiuv, viz. 
rb dya%v. But he who is said aya^o-ro/s/V is only 
considered the author of good, while he dya- 
^os^ys?; 2. e. while he is occupied with £§yois 
dya^oTg. It is not granted to all that they 
aya^ocro/sTi/, can eifect good; but there is no one 
who may not aya^osgys/v, occupy himself with 
good works. For, as in the verb hydZzG^ai is 
more especially understood, the labour of ac- 
complishing some object, so also dya^oz^yitv is 
to labour in doing good; but aya^ocro/g/P is to 
effect the good for which any one is dya^oi^yuv. 
In the New Testament, dya^oz^yzTv occurs 
but once, 1 Tim. vi. 18. It is commonly ren- 
dered henefacere, to be kind towards the poor. 
But it is questionable whether the notion of 
beneficence is there expressed, and not rather 
that of acting well ; for the notions of bene- 
ficence and liberality are in the following words: 
ivfMeradoTovg mat TtoivuvrAovg. Paul commands Ti- 
mothy to exhort the rich not to boast in their 


riches, but rather to place their hope in God ; 
and therefore he wishes them aya^oioyi7v to do 
well, -rXoyrs/v Iv hyoig d'ya%Tg, tO be rich in gOod 
works, to be sv^sra^orovg and Tcoivuvixovg that is, 
beneficent and liberal; and thus to lay up a 
real treasure to be enjoyed in another world. 
It will hence be plain that there is no reason 
for attaching the idea of beneficence to «/«- 


On the contrary, d'ya%'7roizTv is to effect some 
good, to do good acts, as opposed to bad acts. So 
in Mark iii. 4. Luke vi. 9, 33, 35, it is opposed 
to xaxovTo/g/i/. Nor, in the former place in Luke, 
is it exchanged for -^'^x^iv <rojffa/ — ocTroXhcci. But 
this is the example by which the general no- 
tion of d'ya%'7rois7v is illustrated. Hence also, 
in 1 Pet. ii. 15, it is said, that Christians may 
repel calumny by aya^oTo/oDcrsg, i. e. by a steady 
observance of those good deeds which are sub- 
sequently enumerated. In 1 Pet. iv. 10, dya- 
^Toita is properly beneficence. 

In fine, dya^osoyiTv is bene a^ere, gut handeln, 
to do well; aya^ovro/sTi', bene facere^ gutes thun, 
to do good. 

iXxus/v (sXxs;r} cxj'iiv. 

The older interpreters had evidently no little 
difficulty with John vi. 44; in which passage 
.the Lord says, o\}Oi}g h-ovarai sX^g/V -r^og ^as, lav aij 6 


■ra,rr,^, 6 Tg/x-vj/ag /xs, gXxi/tfr; avrov. For, silice the 
word sXxig/v is rendered trahere, to draw, they 
conceived that a notion of force was implied 
in it ; at least, those who defended the notion of 
the irresistible grace of God, thought so ; as if 
God led those who were predestined to salvation, 
even, notwithstanding their own reluctance, to 
faith in him. So even Calvin, following after 
Augustine, wrote : " Without controversy it is 
deducible from the words of John, that the 
hearts of the pious are so effectually governed 
by divine grace, that they follow with an in- 
flexible affection/ And, although they had 

'This point is not easily settled, even by tlie acute criti- 
cism of Mr. Titmann. iMeu are too easily biassed by their 
own predilections. For instance, in this very passage of 
Calvin's Institutes, on which Titmann seizes, in order to 
controvert the notion uf a constrained reluctan>.e on the 
part of the elect, it is evident that no such idea exists, or 
was intended to be expressed. It only arfirnis an invincible 
iniiiicnce o?i Ihe hearts of the pious. It assumes the pious 
turn and tendency, as co-existing with, coeval with, the in- 
fluence ; and this excludes the idea of reluctance and unwill- 
ingness, co-exisiing with the operations of effective grace. 
It s>huts out the idea of dragging altogether, bo difficult is 
it to settle controversial points, when, even with reference 
to the forte of terms, a writer of such peculiar acuteness 
misses the plain and direct meaning of his opponent. Suiely 
there is little more afHiUied in this sentence, given, as it is, 
in au insulated form from the writings of Caivin, than that 


the authentic interpretation of those former 
words given in ver. 65, whence it might be 
gathered that they meant only suv fj^'n fi dsdofj^svov 
avTM sK rou -rrocr^og fj^ov, yet they adhered to this 
notion of dragging, and, therefore, taught that 
he to whom God gave the grace to come to 
him, was so controlled that he could not resist, 
and that this was given only to the elect. Our 
theologians, who teach the universal grace of 
God, regarding it as a thing which may be re- 
sisted, maintain, that in the word sXxvsiv there 
is not necessarily the idea of a certain con- 
straint on the resisting and unwilling, but only 
the notion of leading and attracting.* Which, 

" They (i. e. the predestined to life) be called according to 
(Jod's purpose, by his spirit working in due season; ^ei/^ 
through grace, obey the calling, they are justified freely, they 
ure made the sons of God by adoption, they are made like 
t;ie image of his only-begotten Son, Jesus Christ, they walk 
religiously in good works ; and, at length, by God's mercv, 
they attain to everlasting felicity." Art. 17 of the Chuixh cf 
Kngland. Neither in the terms of this article, nor in the 
a'".ove extract from Calvin, does the idea exist, which Tit- 
m.'inn condemns, with justice, as unscriptural, of a divine 
violence dragging a still reluctant heart to a worship, half- 
siacere and half involuntary. — T. 

' Most proi;ably we are right, in tracing tXxveo, Ixxm, to 
"T7n> ambulavit, ivit, ire fecit, deducit. It has the san e 
fe;ise also in all the cognate dialects. It occurs also in 
CV. ildee, in the sense of vectigal, tribute drawn, and of the 
motions of the planets. The same general idea obtains 


as it may be shown by many passages of the 
Greek writers, so especially will it be made 
to appear, if the word is compared with <rugg/v, 
which is its synonym. 

In this respect the two words agree, that in 
both of them there is the idea of drawing ; i. e, 
of effecting that some thing, moved from its 
own place, should follow another. In this 
sense sXxusiv, (which very frequently means only 
to carri/ along witli, as in Euripid. Ion. v. 750,) 
is used in John xviii. 10; xxi. 6, 11. But so 
far they appear to differ, that in the word £?vxu£/v 
may be understood a certain drawing^ tending 
to a particular point ; in the word (r6^£/v, a conti- 
nuous and uninterrupted movement of the thing 
drawn. Wherefore, c^^onv is frequently used 
of those things which are drawn perpetually 

in Greek. It is used of the weight caTising the scale to de- 
scend ; and of any attractive influence by which one thing 
is caused to move towards another. So also aXxej derived 
from it, is the track or course along which any thing has 
passed, as the plough, a vessel, a serpent, an arrow. The 
oriental word has reached us through the Gothic migra- 
tion, in the German, umlch, peregrinus, (Walachia ?) and 
our own word, retaining the primitive sense, to walk. This 
etymology of Ikkvuv quite justifies the author's critical re- 
marks on it. 'J he word a-v^uv^ may be referred to "T)D, 
(lecessit, amovit, detraxit. In eXxJE/y, the original idea is, influ- 
ence causing motion ; in au^itv the leading notion is, separa- 
tion, aversion — T. 


on the ground, Lucian, i. Merced. Cond. 3. 
655. 'Trs^i/Mhocvrsg s^iX'/tofxsvov xai s/jj'Tr&'Trrj'yorog, rjd'/i 
ffv^o/Mvov 7tal TPog dvdy%rjv dyo/j^svov ogai/. Speaking 
of a man, as of a fish caught by the hook, and 
dragged along. Conf. i. CatapL 13. 635. ii. Luc. 
56. 6*24. In the same sense, Gv^drjv is used in 
Eurip. Rhes. v. 58. And so (Tup/xoj is spoken 
of a continual impetus, as (Suii^h yaXaZrigy vKpzruv, 
V. c. Leonid. Alex. Ep. xii. Anal. ii. J 92. and 
'T^r}<fryioojv i^aiffiovg ffvp/xovg, Aeschin. Axioch. § 17. 
Probably they differ, as our words zeihen and 
schleppen (zerren.) And, as German wTiters 
only use this word when it is peculiarly appli- 
cable to some act or work. (v. c. Sclilepptau and 
die Schleppe^ ffv^/jbcc,) so cu^s/i' is seldom found 
in Greek writers, except when the idea of 
drawing is combined with violence. The no- 
tion of violence is not necessarily inherent in 
either word; but it becomes attached to cuos/v, 
as it is inferred that the thing drawn, so follows 
as with reluctance or resistance, and as need- 
ing the application of a stronger force. The 
different notion is very evident in John xxi. 
ver. 6, 8, 11. For when the disciples, at their 
Lord's command, let down the net, outc 'in auro 
ikxh^OLi 'Icynjsav ccrro rou 'rXri'^ovg rcov /■^^(jpuv. But 
afterwards came the others, and then it is said, 
(^ii^ovTsg TO h'r/.r-jov rojv /p/^uwD. And, finally, when 


they were landed, Peter iiXxvcz rh dixTvov kiri rn^ 
yng. Where it may be readily seen why, in 
the second instance, John uses the word c'oouv. 
Nor can we say that both words are used con- 
cerning the same thing in the same sense, in 
Acts xvi. 19, I'i'k'/'Vffav sig rriv dyoodv; ActS xxi. 
30, siXxov alrov sjw rou hoov ; James ii. 6, sXxovm 
x^ljjdg iig rd xoirnoia ; and ActS viii. 3, tfugwv rs av- 
b?ag xa,i ^ji/a/>cas 'iraoththo-j ug (p'SkccTcrir Acts XlV. 
19, id'ooov i^oi -r5)5 -^ro'Xsw;* ActS Xvii. 6, ls\)0(iV s'^i 
rovg coX/raop/aj. Certainly in the former pas- 
sages there is not the notion of violence, but 
only that of efficacy, which cannot be separated 
from the idea of drawing. Often they are said 
to draw, who would prefer that the thing which 
they draw, as chains, calamities, &c. should not 
follow. The same form occurs in kXxvsiv rroda, 
and others ; whence it appears that in this 
word there exists only the simple notion of 
drawing, independently of the additional idea 
of violence, which is only adventitious, arising 
out of the circumstances. Nor in the form £>w- 
xus/i/ sig rnv dyoodv, s/g '/.Ptrrj^tov, is there the notion 
of violence ; as if the lictors were actually 
dragging the man to the forum, any more 
than in the Latin expression, in jus rapere. 
Which appears sufficiently in Acts xvi. 19, 
ilX'/.ViJav ii; Triv dyoodi irri rovg d^y^arug' xcci T^oca* 


yaywric, uvrovg roTg groocrrjyoTg, iiTov, In fact, cuouv 
is never used in that sense in which kXxvuv 
frequently is, that is, in the metaphorical 
sense in which it occurs in the above named 
passage in John, and in c. 12. ver. 32 ; and 
in which it is used by others. For, as i'kyMnv 
is frequently used of those who by speaking 
or other means attract others, that they may 
conform to their way ; so in these passages 
it means no more than to attract, to influence ; 
the opportunity being given to bring over to a 
side ; which is not done by violence, (frequently 
associated with the idea of drawing ;) but only 
by the rational inflexion of the wilL So in 
Lucian, i. Pise. 46. 613, he is said iXy.6[jjivog 'Trohg 
r7\v o'vp/v, who is moved by the sight of riches 
and indulgences proposed to him ; and i. Her- 
mot. 74. p. 817, L'TO rr^g dzoXou^/a? aXxo/^svoj, ig 
said of him who, under a false influence, be- 
lieves that to be true which is false. In the 
same manner, in James i. 14, it is said, \J'r^^ rn<i 
ibiag i-TTi^v/Mtag s^sX-/,6/jjSvog Kui dsXsaZ^o/xivog. (Conf. 
Aelian. Hist. Anim. vi. 31, and Aristaenet. 
Epist. ii. 21.) Hence it is used with refe- 
rence to sporting, concerning animals who are 
taken not by force but by guile. But (fvpsiv is 
not so used ; which is not surprising, if we are 
right in the idea that it rather means to drag 


after; (whence cv^f/^cc and Imffv^siv;) whilst in 
Rev. xii. 4, sX-z^nv and 'iXxhuv mean, to draw to, 
or with. And, therefore, if the compounds of 
eu^uv are not used strictly, they will not have 
the notion of drawing to, but of drawing away, 
driving, propelling. As Lucian elegantly says 

1. Nigrin. 16. p. 55, cra^acu^gra; aibujg xai d^irri xaJ 
bijcccioffvvrj. For craoacj^g/v and 'Trsotffv^siv are ap- 
plied to rivers or torrents, which with swollen 
waters drag down all opposing substances be- 
fore them. (See Hemsterhusius on this passage 
of Lucian.) 

Kamg' )/sog, 
Agree in this, that both are opposed to 
TccXaiog. But in itoCkaiog there are two ideas; 
it is used of that which was originated some 
time back, as o/^^gs rraXaiog, Luke v. 39, or of 
that which has existed long, and been in use, 
iljjdrm rtaXam, Matth. ix. 16. To the first 
sense nog is opposed ; to the last xamg. That 
is xa/vov which comes in the place of a thing 
that was formerly, and has not yet been used, 

2. e. new ; vsog is that which has only lately been 
originated, recent. 

That in the New Testament this notion of 
each word is distinctly preserved, appears from 
the references given in Lexicons. We will 
adduce a few instances: Matth. ix. 16. 17, 


ifjbdriov TocXcx.iov — 'TrXTj^M/jjO, x,cciv6v oivov vsov — daxovg 
vaXaiovg — xaivovg, (coiif. Mark ii. 21 ; Luke V. 
36). Our Lord does not say v^ovg dffxovg, nor 
ohov %(imi. But in Mattli. xxvi. 29, he says, 
yhw^ihoL ry\g d[M'7iXo'j xa/vov, because he refers to «w- 
other wine than that which he poured out then to 
his friends, not recent but different. For, as in the 
word xa/i/Jg is expressed that which has not been 
long, it follows that it must be other and dif- 
ferent from that which had been formerly. And 
we also, in speaking of wine, draw the distinc- 
tion between neic wine and recent wm^. Hence, 
the yXusoai xaivai in Mark xvi. 17, i. e. tongues 
not formerly used by the Apostles, are, in 
Acts ii. 4, called s^'^^a/, other tongues. Some 
add to this the notion of superiority; but it 
does not necessarily exist in ytamg, although it 
frequently arises out of the opposite term ; for 
often that which is worn by use is corrupted 
by age. Yet the viov and the Ttcimv are not al- 
ways better than the older. Therefore, neither 
in the formula %amv dfM'irsXcv yswri/j.a does the 
notion of superiority exist absolutely, nor in 
these: — Tca/v^i dia^rj'/.7i, Heb. viii. 8. 13; ix. 15, 
xaivri svToXrjj John xiv. 34. 

But Tcccmg and vsog are used interchangeably 
with the same word. For instance, y^aivr, ^/cc^j^xtj 
and vsa diu^'/jKYi Heb. xii. 24 ; /camg dv^^wrog Eph. 


ii. 15; iv. 23. et vsog uv'^pwrog Col. iii. 10. But al- 
though, xa/vT] bia^r,%n is always used, regard being 
had to the old covenants ; it is once only in 
this passage called via, as a recent covenant, 
only lately established, of which the Jews were 
now participants. For the same reason Paul, 
in Epist. to Colossians, speaks of the veo^ 
av^jwcrog, when he had been wont to say, xa/vos* 
For it is evident that regard is especially had 
in this place to the avayiwridig : the xamg 
oi)f^oM<7tog is one who differs from the former ; the 
vBog one which is dvaxaivovfisvog jcccr s/Kova roO 
xri(fav'7rog avrhv, renewed after the image of his 
Creator. On the contrary, Paul does not say, 
vsa xriffig but ?ca/v>3 (2 Cor. V. 15. 17 ; Gal. vi. 
15, Eph. ii. 15,) because in the word xr/V/g it- 
self, there is the notion of csor^s, newness. And 
the difference of which we speak may be ob- 
served in the use of the words amxamlv and 
dvaveovv, which occur in the New Testament. 
They are both rendered, to restore, to renew ; 
yet they differ. For who does not see in 2 
Cor. iv. 16, sgu^iv dv^^uTog dvaxutvovrai ^/xe^a xai 
jj/xsia, that the meaning is different from what 
it would have been, if the Apostle had written 
dvocvsourai. On the contrary, in Eph. iv. 23, it 
was correct to write c' xvsouSai roJ 'jviiiiMari ro\j 
voog u/xuv. For if in this latter passage he had 


written avaxa/voCJ^^a/, we should not gather what 
he wished us to know, that a new spirit should 
dwell in those who had put on the oca,mg av^^wcrog ; 
but there would have been a tautology, as ap- 
pears by what follows. But in the former 
place, dvaxumuTcci rj/J^s^'^ xal rj/jje^cf,, does not mean 
that the inner man is daily born anew, but that 
it daily acquires new strength, which previously 
it had not ; so that though the outer man perish, 
there is no need for the soul to despond. But 
properly in Rom. xii. *2, he writes ^asra/xo^^ouo^s 
rvi dvaxaivdJast rou voog vfMuv ; for this dvaxaivuffig is 
not the work of an hour, but of a whole life ; 
wherefore also baptism, ro Xovr^hv rng dvaxa;vw- 
tfsojj, as Luther says, must be brought into 
operation throughout the whole of life.* 

* This Is more easily said than explained. Even the 
great name of Luther will not make it the less obscure. 
The effect of a specific and terminated act may be realized 
throughout life; but how the act of baptism, which is com- 
pleted at the instant, can be continued through a lengthened 
period, is yet a difficulty calling for elucidation T. 



An accurate observation of synonyms is pecu- 
liarly useful and necessary, in cases where they 
occur in juxtaposition. This fact occurs in all 
writers, but is especially worthy of notice in 
the books of the New Testament, and that on 
two accounts ; first, because some think that 
this conjunction of synonyms may be neglect- 
ed in studying the writings of less elegant 
authors ; and, secondly, that many, in those 
places in which this accumulated junction of 
synonymous terms occur, have been accustom- 
ed to look for some emphasis or ornament. 
Both opinions, however, are false. For it is 
plain, that men who have acquired the lan- 
guage that they speak rather by custom than by 
study, more frequently make use of particular 
terms, which, taken together, go to express the 
universal or general notion present in their 
minds ; whence it happens that the full force 
of their meaning must be gathered from a close 
consideration of the whole synonymous terms 
which they have used, collectively. And the 
notion about ornament is equally unfounded. 


For, as the most elegant writers abstain from 
that kind of ornament which is merely verbal, 
so also should we take care, lest, in reading 
more simple writers, we conclude that words 
cognate as to a certain similitude of meaning, 
are introduced merely for ornament. For it 
is common enough to rapid writers to adopt a 
verbose style, which gratifies the idle and list- 
less reader, but gives disgust to a better taste. 
But more elegant authors never insert a word, 
except its sense is fitted to impart some new 
light or additional view to the subject; and 
which pleases, because it leads the mind to con- 
sider the same point in various ways ; so that 
the same topic, presented in different aspects, 
calls up in the mind of the reader dift'erent 
ideas respecting it. But less artificial writers, 
who are chiefly anxious to be understood by 
their readers, often use sentences of similar 
import or synonymous terras near together, 
not for the sake of ornament or variety, but 
that their readers may more fully apprehend 
the whole idea which they wish to convey." 

" I conceive this to be the primary source of that parallelism 
which is so celebrated among the Hebrew writers, especially 
in their poetical books, but in what mode, or by what laws, 
it is reg^ilated, has not been shown with sufficient accuracy. 
For that which Herder has written in his work, {yom Geist 


Hence not only among the New Testament 
writers, but among the more ancient Greek 
authors, and especially Homer, many passages 
occur in which synonymous words or sentences 
appear together; yet in vain would you seek 
for any intentional ornament, except that 
clearness which flows naturally from an accu- 
rate description of particular things, from 
which a general notion is derived. Yet they 
give pleasure, although not inserted by the 
author with that view; for although the enjoy- 
ment derived from mere ornament, would be 
lost if the writer abstained from the ornament, 
yet readers would not the less distinctly ap- 
prehend his meaning. But, in passages of this 
kind, the pleasure arises from this, that the 
writer has exhibited the matter by various 
terms of description to the eyes of the reader, 
not merely to. please him, but to state more 
precisely his own way of thinking about it. 

Before we demonstrate this by examples 
from the New Testament, it may be well to 
adduce a few instances from the writings of 
Homer, which will clearly illustrate my mean- 
ing ; an.l of the many that immediately suggest 

d^r hebr. Poesie, Tom. I. 0pp. p. 34. sgq.J has well explained 
the beauty and force of such parallelism, but lias not entered 
on the inquiry into its nature. 


themselves. I will select those to which 
parallel cases may be found in the New Tes- 
tament, [Mvuv^a 'TTZo our/ /xaXa hriv. Iliad, a. 416. et 
saep. n'Mg d' rjsXiog zarsdu xai stI xvicpag y^^^^s Iliad, 
a. 475. [jfiyct, yirjdsrai rid' zksaiozi. Iliad. /3. 27. 
vvsc'^iro xat xarsvzv(^sv. Iliad. /3. 112. o-^i/j^ov 
o-^l^iriXiffrov. Iliad. (3. 325. vr/triffrj zosicfgoov rs ysvi^rai. 
Iliad. 7. 92. ai<Syja dsidiorsg TtQLt ovsidsa ttoXX' a fMoi 
sgrU ib. 242. aiSXrirog -/.a} dvovrarog, Iliad. ^. 540. 
7J/j,j3ooTsg ovd' sTvysg, Iliad, s. 287. s^wp zal yJjoijcc 
ib. 488. ^dvzTv ttotimv s'Triff'TrsTv' Iliad, yj. 52. 
^ai/a-roi/ xa/ 'ror/Jbov sTiff'TrsTv, Iliad, v. 337. //.u^w 
smrsXXsai y/5s xsXsvsig' Iliad, x. 61. x^ab'tri rat ^u/x^s 
ayjjvwff, ibid. v. 220. 244. 319. (It only occurs 
in the Iliad in this instance, but in the Odyss. 
3,348. (T, 60.) our/ /xsrargsTo// oW dXzyll^o). Iliad, 
fjj* 238. 'Jrokiijjov 7ict.i hriioTYiroi.. Iliad, v. 250. 'TTok- 
i[jji^uv Vibl /xd;^£(T^a/. Iliad. X. 12. Wz[i>nv(xv o'ld* 
h<p6^r^iv, Iliad. £. 499. (Sfiaiv 'iyi (p^sg}, fMyids <ss X?]^rj 
aiosiTM. Iliad. ^. 33. our s'/oo/iai o-Srs /xsraXXw. Iliad, 
a. 553. In these passages any one will per- 
ceive, that there is no ornament nor any par- 
ticular emphasis ; yet we deny that this union 
of synonymous terms is altogether otiose and 
futile. Similar instances occur among more 
elegant writers, which need not be enumerat- 
ed ;^ and they are found also in the sacred 

* We may subjoin a few passages, not dissimilar to tl^o^e 



writings. In following out, therefore, this dis- 
cussion on the synonyms of the New Testa- 
ment which we have begun, w^e must seek 
from passages of a similar kind, some examples 
in order to demonstrate what course, in our 
opinion, should be taken, to ascertain the real 
mind of the writer, and to define accurately 
the force of his synonymous expressions. 

Paul writes in 1 Tim. ii. 2. /va ^'^s/xov %clI rjccj- 
yjw jSiov ; and correctly ; for both are to 
be desired ; for the two words agree in this, 
that in neither is there any thing of tumult, 
perturbation, agitation or solicitude ; yet they 
differ. He is rt<^'oyjog who makes no disturbance ; 
he is r,^z(J^og who is himself free from agitation 
or disturbance. That life therefore is na-oyjoi 
which excites no disturbance in others ; 
and that is ^f£,aos which is not disturbed by 
others.^ '^a-oyjog is evidently used in this sense 

t;f which we are about to speak. The following occur in 

Xeiiophon : cra.fji.a.'ru. kux.i(Ttu, ku) a'la^ia'rcCj ( yneg, 13. 11, 
KCiKaJ* KKt avai-S^iyv, Lyc 10. 6, uvor.TOJV xui pt-^oxiv^vvtiJV, Me- 
mor. 1. 3, 9, a^^iiov ku) uvu<piX\i tov (juf/uTOi, ih. 1. 2. 64, 
ifroocav xa.) af/.fi;^eiveov, ih. 2. 5. 3, uf/,\kiiecy xc.i puBv/uiiav, ib. 
3. 5, 5, 'X'a.ioivB-'ivTcts xui fjcaSovTUij opposed to ecroii^ivrov; 
Kcci ufj(.a.h75j ih. 4 1. 4. 

' The word navyux is derived from pt£/n (^^ovit, appelivi*, 
desiderium, aiul is, therefore, vifa tranqiullu, p/acida ,• a 


in 1 Pet. iii. 4, roX) 'jr^cfsog -/.at yjgv^iOD Tvev/xarog. 
Hence, r}(rv^a(siv is to rest, to do nothing; and 
it is said of those who make no reply, nor con- 
tradict further, as Luke xiv. 3. Acts xi. 18. 
xxi. 14, and 2 Thess. iii. 12. Paul exhorts 
those fxi^' Tjav^/ag soyd'i^sa'^ai, rov sccvtcov dpov 
sff%'ovrag, whom he heard drdzrojg <?rs^i'7raTsTv, [xr,oiv 
hydZpixivovg^ dXXd 'XSPiz^yccl^o/Mvovg, i. e. meddling 
with the affairs of others. (Aristid. p. 494.) 
Tjffv^tctv Tiyi 7iai iJjTibh 'Kz^^iaoydZiro, It is evident 
that ri<s\jyja is frequently used in the sense of 
silence, 1 Tim. ii. 11, 12, compared with i 
Cor. xiv. 34. "Uoi'Mog is seldom used; but the 
more common forms ^s/^a, riOifxaTog, rjos/xih, 
%£/x/^e;)/, have the meaning which v.^e have spe- 
cified ; although in these words the notion of 
tranquillity is often referred to external thingy ; 
for he who is himself quiet, i. e. free froin 
fear or other disturbing passions, does not a.i- 
noy others. And hence 5^(ru%/oj is often used 
in both senses. We will add a passage fiom 

placid lite accoi'uing with the desires and wishes, quiete 
fruens ; it is rather a pleasui-aide repose. "Hoiao; is from 
mV? and nnV' itudus, vacuus, evacuaius, cava, spelunca. 
From the same source is derived l^-ziftos, desert, and the 
words, eremite, Ilerm'd. And the idea, thereCore, which is 
conveyed by '/nyiy.'y; is rather that of vacuity of care.s, freedom 
from annoyance, the q^uiet of solitude T. 


Luclan, ii. Amor. 29. 429. i/w di ri(sx)yj\ i^nhasai 

rljnd, Orest. 1*217. Troad. 649.) They are in 
error who say that ^^iJ^og is the same as rif^^og. 
But Luther elegantly renders the words of 
Paul in the passage in question ; ein geruhigcs 
itnd stilles Lehen. For although we also use 
the words i^uhe, ruliig, and stille, still, promis- 
cuously; yet that a similar difference exists 
between them is made evident by those for- 
mulae, which necessarily require the one ra- 
ther than the other. 

fXjdysff^ar ttoXs/xs/V* /xdy^ar T.oksfiot. 
Among the former quotations from Homer, 
we gave 'roXs/jL{Z,nv r,cs [hdyid^cii. We must add 
to it rrhy.ziJ.oi n [jdyjii rs' Iliad, a. 177. £, 891. 
On the former passage Eustathius says, rb 
TToXs/xoi rs ihdycii rs, r\ 1% cra^aXX^Xoi/ S'/jXo/'ro auri, r\ 
xal bia<pood rig sffrt raTg Xst,s<fiv, i/ys [xayzrai fisv rig 
xai Xoyoig, ug xai tj Xoyo/xayia di^Xor xai avrhg ds 6 
<Kotrirrig /xsr oXiyct fi^ffi, iJ.ayj66a(xz\(/i Wacci. (v. 304.) 
xa/ aXXwj ^s t^^^YJi /-^sv, od)rr[ rj raiv rivd^uv avvncjSoXrj, 
Oi 'ToXi/xog '/.ai srri ca^ara^£wv xat f.cay//xou xaipov 
Xeysrat. yo7i(fifxov ds ojds xat ro '!:oXs[MiZsiv r,hs /xuys5^ai. 
And this view of Eustathius is confirmed by 
other writers, and by the Scriptures especially. 
Paul in 2 Tim. ii. 23, commands rcg fjLu^dg 


Zriryiffsig TaoatnTv, on yinaxii [jjd-^ag. In tlie same 
way lie exhorts Titus, iii. 9, [MUioag hi (^rjrjjtfs/s, 
xa/ ycviokoyicig, xocl igztg %a;/xayaj i/o/O/Z/taj 'rsPif(STcc(ro, 
In 2 Corinth, vii. 5, the a/ T^oj^-v aa;/a/ are not 
bodily calamities, but the actual contentions 
with which the Apostle had to encounter. 
Compare John vi. 52 ; 2 Tim. ii, 24 ; Act. vii. 
26, (Exod. ii. 13. D^iJ3.) nJ?.s/a<og, on the con- 
trary, and 'TroAiiMi'^iiv are said of battles and com- 
bats, which take place in the way of actual 
collision. The word is so used, metaphorically, 
certainly in Rev. ii. 16, ^oXs/x^trw /ast auroov b rf 
go/A^a/a rou 6T6[x,c/-og 'j^rrj. (comp. V. 12.) But it is 
never applied to verbal disputes. 

So far then they agree, that they denote 
contest, contention, fio-htin<j:: but cro'Xs/xo; and 
'xokiUjit)) are restricted to actual collision by 
physical force, it^^x^ and [jjdyjG'^ai apply to any 
contention of mind as well as body, even 
thouo^h it come not to blows. In the former 
the actual struggle is expressed: in the latter, 
it is sufficient to have the idea of such conten- 
tion as often leads to blows. For in the word 
(jjdyi.s'^cci there is not properly and necessarily 
the notion of physical collision, as appears 
from one passage of Homer. (Iliad, a, 298.) 
Xrl<S^ />£-£!' our; 'iyo)yi (La-^^ooiiicci i'ivixa xov^rii. I 


RtTon2;ly suspect tliat the original notion of 
this word was that of impetus, or force by 
which one rushes on another ;^ wherein the 
verb has only a middle termination. Hence 
/y^a%5<7^a/ T/vi simply rendered, is to be borne 
violently against any one, as Iliad. ^, 329. 
/Aa%a/ and iPidig are often joined as in the Iliad. 
C6, 177. £, 891. Xenoph. Hier. i. 38. A^a%?3 and 
IxdyjG^a! have a wide signification. 'rro'KiiJjoc and 
ToXsas?!/ are restricted to the idea of war. 

^ The suspicion of Titmann is well founded ; and this in- 
stance again ilhistrates the valiie of etymological inquiry. 
The original form of f/^oix'^ is more directly that of actual 
collision, than ^okiftes. It is derived from p73J, to swjife ,* 
which according to the form of all Hehrew words beginning 
with y drops; the first radical, and takes the formative Q; 
D^DI^; percutrentes HDD- pf"''c^(iipns. "Witli a slight va- 
riation it occurs in Chaldee J«^nD ^"'^ nHD' percussit and 
in Arabic ?>^ fidit ; and hence /u.a;^Ki^et, a sword, mactarg 

to slay, and dimicare to fight. From the same source, we 
have nocAiit in Latin ; and knocks through the Gothic. Un- 
questionably, therefore, the original notion ai fiaxv is a blow. 
voXifjuuv has reference rather to the general confusion of an 
extended contest, and is probnbly derived from 77^, con. 
fudit. miscuif. It WBS very natural for ^«;^:>j, which more 
simply expresses the idea of contest by collision, to be used 
in a fi.curative sense for every kind rf conflict. This is the 
natural course of language. 'X'oX'.fAiiv originallv expressed a 
more complex idea, and has been retained by custom in its 
proper meaning. Phavorinus, however, sfvs : TeXtui^tiv rXt 


(J'j/Ji^v^or TO axjTo (ro sv (ppovovvng.^ 
The passage in which these expressions oc- 
cur, is Philip, ii. 2. TLXTj^uigare /mu t^v p^a^aj/, /Va 
TO auro O^ovrjTi, rriv dhrriv ayd-rrriv i^ovrsg, (jvfj.-^v^oi, rb 
iv (p^ovovvTsg. The word <i■J/J:.■^lv^og occurs but 
once in the New Testament. It differs from 
fco-^v^og^ which Paul used in the same epistle, 
c ii. 20. For jffo-^v-^og is animated or moved 
in the same ivot/ ; Gv^i/.-^v^og, to think the same 
thing, to be of one mind. They may be gv^u,- 
4^X0/ who are not Iffo'^'v^of. For often men think 
the same thing, who diifer materially as to 
mind. The cu/^-^y^o;, are the same with 0/ 7-6 auro 
(poovovvrsg. But we must inquire into the diife- 
rence between rh aurb ^^ovg/vand rb h ^^ovsTv. For 
it cannot be credited that the Apostle would 
have so rashly introduced a mere tautology. 
Once only he writes rb h <p^ovsTv, and that in this 
passage. Six times he writes rb ahrb <p^ovsTv. Now, 
TO ahrb (p^ovm is to have the same opinion, to 
feel, to wish, to seek the same thing. So in 
Romans xii. 16, rb ahrb itg dXXrjXovg (p^ovovvrsg' 
Rom. XV. 5, rb ahrb (poovsTv h aXXj^Xo/g* 2 Cor. xui. 
11, rb ahrb (p^ovsTrs, s/gTjvsusrs. And again, in the 
Epistle to the Philippians, c. iii. 16, r'2 ahriZ 
cror^iTv %a\6'i, rh ahrb (p^oviTv^ if that is the true 
reading ; and iv. 2, rb ahrb cpPoviTv h xv^/m. We 
need hardly attempt to demonstrate that this 
formula is used by other writers in the same 


sense. But rh h (p^oviTi/, is to wish one thing 
only, to agree in seeking one thing only. 
The Apostle wishes the Philippians ro ahrh <p^o- 
«/v, 2. e. not to disagree, but to regard each 
other with the same mutual love, to be unani- 
mous, seeking one thing. For, if each sought 
something different, they could neither be 
6-Jij.-^-oyjjt^ nor would they have rr^v ahrnv dydrrnv. 
But the one thing [rh h) which he wished 
them all to mind, he explains in ver. 4, im ^^ 
iccxjTuv syMdrog CTiO'Trouvrsg, dXXd xa/ rd ers^uv sxaffrog. 
He wishes, therefore, all ffv,'j.'y\/{j^ovg Jmt, to h (ppo- 
vouvrag, while all minded or sought one thing 
only, the convenience of each other. For, if 
0/ crai/rss rd £avTU)v ^r,Tovffi, ver. 20, they could 
not be accordant; but if all agreed in one 
thing, that each should expressly seek the 
benefit of the others, they would certainly live 
in concord and in mutual love. 

Briefly, then, ro auro (p^ovzTv^ is to have the 
same mind ; (ru/x4'u;)/ov gJm/, is to think the same 
thing, to be of accordant mind; rh h <poon7v, 
is not to differ in council and purpose, but to 
seek one and the same object. 

CTCkdy^va' oJjcrio'jjOi. 

In the same clause of the Epistle to the 
Philippians, ver. 1, we read, s'/ T/]/a a-Tr'Ady^va, xai 
oljiTioijjot, rrXriPutffars /xou 7r,v yct-odv. If it were true, 
as is stated in the common lexicons to the 


New Testament, that cfkrLyjyai. is put meta- 
phorically for mercy, commiseration, Paul 
would have written tautologically. But that 
the word has a wider meaning, and that the 
notion of mercy only attaches to it adventi- 
tiously, will appear from Luke i. 78, (S'TrXa.yxvcc 
sXsovg, and Coloss. iii. 1*2, (j'TrXdy^'ja cixri^/j^uv. 
Certainly, as <r-7rXdy^m properly signifies the 
more noble viiicera, the heart, lungs, liver, &c. 
^(f-TrXdy^^vor 7] xaph'ia^^ V\^hence, iuS'-rrXayy^Joi and £'^fl'- 
'jtXayy^jia^ are terms for fortitude, so are all 
these terms figuratively assumed to express the 
more vehement feelings and passions, which are 
believed to arise more immediately from these 
viscera. Hence co-Xa^p^vot %p/j,aheiv T^hg hyhh 
Aristoph. Han, v. 868, and cciviav G^Xdyyvov So- 
phocl. Ajac. V. 995. A nd thus, the ac^jXay/yot are 
those who are destitute either of love and bene- 
volence, or of hate and anger, wg Xi^oi dvak'^rirot 
V'rd^^ovre;, zccrd to (jjTihh 'iyjiv hbuv 6vvctXyovv. — /j,ri 
sXsQUVTsg /MTidha, fjjsn <piXovvrsg, firid' oXug (poovTiZovng 
71 sTccivovvrojv ii -^syovrc/jv, yj d^/xoujTwv, ri oj^sXovvtmv, 
(Galen. deDopn. Hippocr. et Plat. iii. c. 4. Tom. 
V. 0pp. 316. ed Lips, we say herzlos^ heartless.) 
Luther renders c-TtXayyvc/. sXkvg, by herzliche 
Barmherzigkeit and H'TcXdyxva o}-a.ti^(iuv herzliches 

There is then a diiference between C'zXdyxjjci 
and oi7iri^,'j.oi The former denotes some vehe- 


inent affection or regard, ffro^y/j, as of parents 
towards children, which is tlie most intense af- 
fection, and on which account chihiren are 
called d'K'kayyjia in Philem. v. 12 ; and often 
elsewhere.* The latter properly denotes mercy, 
a sense of grief for the distresses of others. 
These words of Paul should be rendered, there- 
fore, If ye have any true love towards me, 
if any mercy. Luther writes, herzliche Liebe 
vnd Barmherzinheit. 

Let us now speak of the synonyms, 
'ikiog' oizriofiog' sXesTv' o/xrs/^stv 

O/xTi/^iiv and olzn^fjiog denote merely com- 
passion, a sense of unhappiness for the ills of 
o\\\QY^^ harmherzig seyn. Barmherzigkeit^ Mitlei- 
den ; but sXsoe, sXgs/V, denote the desire of reliev- 
ing the miserable. In these latter, then, there 
is something more than in the former, viz : the 
additional notion of beneficence, of aid, which 
he wdio is jXawv is prompt to apply. Pity 
is easily enough called up in the soul, but 
the iXiog is less frequently to be met with. 

* This is perhaps assumed too easily. The Apostle uses 
a strong expression indicative of his love to Timothy, but 
it would not follow from this, that the word which he uses 
means children, or, my child ; Theophylact thus para- 
plirases the passage : Msra i.ya.'prtis 'hi^xi olItov, fiaXXov Vt oIk 
ecvrnvy uXXa <ra ifia ffTXay^va.^ outoj yito ahrov KyetTu xeci Iv t? 
o^tj^y) T'.^i^'igtu. See Suicer's Thesaurus Ecclesiasticus on 
the word. — T. 


The LXX frequently renders TDn by sXsog, 
but for Om and p;^ it has oJxrei^nv. Hence 
also, sAiog and sXnTv (^ski'/i[jj06\)vri) are put, in the 
New Testament, for those benefits which are 
bestowed on the miserable ; but o/xr/^/AoV, never. 
The same observation may be made on that 
very remarkable passage, Rom. ix. 15, IXsrytfw 
ov av sXico xai o/xtsiotjcoj ov av c/xri/^w, compared 
with Exod. xxxiii. 19. He who is 6 iXso!'!/, strives 
to relieve the miserable, and does if he is 
able ; but he who limits himself to his compas- 
sion only, he is said, olTtni^st. The Latins ap- 
pear to express both notions by the words mis- 
ericors and misericordia, unless we are correct in 
distinguishing miseratio and misericordia, as 
that the first agrees with o/W/g/xo'sand ohrog^ the 
latter with gXsog. The passage, therefore, may 
be thus rendered, " I will succour whom 1 will 
to succour. I will pity whom I pity." Cer- 
tainly according to the mind of the Apostle ; 
for the Hebrew words have rather the sense 
of certain and perpetual favour and Divine aid, 
than of absolute will in the distribution of bless- 
ings. But they err greatly who think that they 
deduce from these words, that God wills not 
to save some. For what follows, a^a ovv oh roZ 
^sXovTog, ovds rov r^s^ovrog, dXXa rou sXsouvrog ^eou, 
has certainly not the force, that even though 
any one desires the favour of God, he cannot 


attain it, if God has negatived (noluerit) that 
he should attain it. For, in tlie case of one 
who gives a benefit, the accepted benefit must 
be referred to his benignity, not to our desire; 
we receive benefits, therefore, from the mercy 
and clemency of God, not for our own works 
or deservings. Therefore, it is rightly said, 
OX) Tou ^iXovrog, ovoi rov ro's'^ovrog, aXkct 70\j sXsovvrog 
^sov, scil. ro ^doia/xa; that is, the ;:^a5/(r/xa, a cpn- 
ferred benefit; cannot be referred to our eff'ort 
or merit, but to the mercy of God, for from 
thence it comes ; he favours and benefits whom 
he will. It does not follow, then, as some would 
have it, that even he who v/ishes cannot obtain, 
because God forbids the success of his prayer; 
but rather, what is most true, that labour as 
we may, it is by the grace of i3od we obtain 
the promise, and not by our own merit. It 
comes from God; he gives to the unworthy; 
some rejoice in it, some receiv^e it not. These 
fail of the promise, because they seek it not in 
the right way ; /V^a'/^X biujy.m v6,mv BiTtaioffuvyig, ug 
voiMov dixato<fuvr}g ovx s^^acs, or/ ovx. t'/c •■jriarsug, uXX' ug 
s^ spyoiiv vo/j^ov, ver. 31 ; those ovx rikirnikvoi, dXX' sXs- 
i^^svTsg, fjjij diu)X0VTsg dixuioffvvrjv, xaraX«/x/3avoL/<r/ djxui- 
offvvTjv, dixccioffvvrjv ds ttiV ex TiffTsug. Has then God 
so had mercy {sXisT) that those whom he willed 
not to save, ought to perish notwithstandino- 
diU)ycuj(Si rrjv dixaioffvvrjv. Certain it is, they do not 


obtain what they wish, because 'Q\Kov [j.h 3s&D 
'iyj)\j<st\\ dXX' oh xccr s'^/yvcom. Had they sought 
the true di7cato<fvvri, they would have obtained it, 
yet, at the same time, ou t^v rgs^/ovrog, d?.Xa roZ 
sXiouvrog, the ^ift woukl have been of God. I 
have often wondered, therefore, that those who 
hekl the notion of an absolute decree, have 
had recourse to these words for the support of 
their opinion. Certainly they have so under- 
stood the passage. It matters little, therefore, 
whether we seek or disregard the favour of 
God, if God only regard us ; for however any 
one may strive and seek to attain salvation, 
yet he cannot attain it unless God has v/ilied 
it. This is assuredly true, if God has nega- 
tived it ; but this idea is repugnant to right 
reason and true religion ; nor is it in the pas- 
sage in question.'' Certainly it becomes every 

^ All this is very accurately and judiciously stated. But 
the author is fiyhting with a man of straw. Which of the 
Calvinistic divines asserts, that man seeks to be made holy, 
and that a holy God has put a negative on his desire ? The 
great body of those divines who are advocates for the sove- 
reignty of God's grace, which man's natiiral Jieart impugns, 
and who wear the epithet, Calvinistic, as an opprobrious 
brand, go no further than the statement of Titmann ; and 
take the same view which he does, of the passage in ques- 
tion. There hcive been rash assertions on tlie subject of a 
decree of reprobation, but they were e^ er confined to a few. 


one versed in the language, to inquire how 
they establish the fact, that ^Jvui rmg signifies 
what they wish. For the word s<5ri is wanting. 
But what thiit is, which oux Isn rmg, they have 
not exphiined. Luther renders it, So liegt et 
nun nicht an dem, 8fc. Beza, " Election is not 
of him," &c. He completes this impersonal 
formula, by adding, rashly, the notion of elec- 
tion which was wanting. 1 say rashly, for in 
the whole chapter there is nothing said of the 
election of the schools, but only of the gift of 
divine blessings,*^ especially of calling to the 

It would be AvfcU, however, if the great body of Pelagians 
and Arminians could be i>roui;ht to adopt cordially the view 
laid dowii in the text. There would then be little material 
difference on this difficult point, within the limits of the 
Christian community. The grand testing question to man's 
proud heart is : Is God a sovereign from first to last in 
the gifis of grace, in the ro tkuiv ? — T. 

•^ Titmann has hardly been just to this passage of the di- 
vine word. It is clear that the point mooted is, who are the 
Israel, tlie tIxvcc rod B-ioV, ver. 7> 8. To illustrate this point, 
an example is given in the case of Jacob and Esau, in refe- 
rence to winch it is shewn, thfit the selection of Jacob to be 
the fa\'oured seed, was i^efore the children had done good or 
evil, according to the 9r^oB-z<rii Kar txkoy^v rov hou nat of 
works but of him that calleth And then comes, in veriO 16", 
the deduction from this exam[ile as applicaide to the v.hole 
argument, a^a, oZv oh toZ ^iXovroi &c. The ellipsis, then, 
cannot be the notion that Titmann has introduced, but 
must be of this kiud : So then, to be the child of (jJod, the 
child of promise, the true seed of Abraham, is not of Him 
that willeth, &c T. 


kingdom of Measiali, ver. 24. lllglitly, tliere- 
fore, is it rendered by Sciiott, " divine gifts do 
not depend on liiin vvlio seeks," &c., for ihcu 
rmg is 10 iuive cause in any thing, i. e. to be 
so conjoined with any thing, as that it is the 
cause of being or doing any thing. And 
hence, it is to owe one's origin to any one, to 
depend on any one, to be in the power of any 
one. Xenoph. Memor. i. 1. 9, To-jghiiravrarTiga^j- 
^^M-TTiVT^g yvojfj.rjg shai olo'jjhoug, bai'Mviav icpri. (Mark' 
xii. 23, r'mgcf/orZi'j hrai 55 yuvri.) Whether, there- 
fore, it be rendered, " It is not in the power," 
or, " it does not depend on," yet it means no 
more than that the efficient cause is the mercy 
of God. Lastly, we must be careful not to 
attach to the particle ai/, v. 15, the notion of 
uncertainty as to the will or determination, 
which there is no reason to suppose, that some 
persons have done. For the words ov av sXsm do 
not signify, quemcunque volaero, whosoever I 
may Vt'^ish, as if it were uncertain whether he 
wished or not ; but, si quern volo, he whom I 
wish. So that the true sense of the passage is, 
if I have pity on any one, I will have pity on 
him; and therefore it is not uncertain whether 
lie wills to pity, but it is most certain ; for 
that he had willed to be graciously present 
with Moses, lie had previously promised. So 


in Xenoph. Polit. ii. 6, sav y] croX/g bibo'iri oiJtodo/j.riac/.' 

i. e, those seeking the privileges of the city, 
who may appear worthy. Thucyd. vi. 14, 
og S.V for £/ Tig' and vi. 16, and ii. 44. Demosth. 
c. Neaer. 1383, 17. 

■^t^voidrar xaraXaXo/. 

In Rom. c. i. v. 30, 31. Paul enumerates 
tog'ether, ■^i^\jot(Srag^ za^raXaKo-jg' b^^iGTag^ b-7riP7}(pd~ 
vovg^ dXccC^ovag' d(rvv'^s70vg, d(f-7r6vdovg' dcropyovg, dvs' 
Xs7}fj.ovag. On each of which terms I will speak 

Yt%^i(STai and xraXdXoi so far agree, that they 
both mean, a calumniator. They differ how- 
ever; for the -^i^-joiGTng, is he who spreads ca- 
lumny secretly and whispers it in the ear,** 
xarakdXog is he who slanders openly. So they 
are distinguished in 2 Cor. xii. 20, on which 
place Suidas says, -^i^uoKSiUg' i) ruv Ta^ovruv xaxo- 
Xoyjocy 'TTccpoc TO) d-Tr'jgroX'jj' Kuster prefers d-ro'/ruv. 
But it makes little difference. The slander 

^ From *1J1D latuitj occultavit, and from the same source 
the Latin susurrus ; another instance of the Hebrew hard 
sound of f) being altered in two languages, into an 5 in the 

one, and an aspirated t, S, in the other. iV. B The same 

word, with the formative ^, rTI/^DD) ^^ *^^ original of 
fiufryi^tovy mystermm, mystery — T. 


traduces those who are present, sh rh oZg, the ab- 
sent publicly and doijj:. Theodoret says in loc. 
\|//^y3/(rra? Xeyg/ roug 'rfog rb ovg didXsyo/Msvovg xai 'jra- 
^(tvrag rivag Kccxcog dyoosvovrug- and on Romans i. 30, 
xaraXdXoif oi diocjSoXaTg zaru tu)v aTovruv ddsug 
xs^^rifxsvoi. The notion of accusation, bicc^dXkuvy 
is common to both. But in James iv. 11, 
xcLTokakuv dbik<poZ, %a.raXaXi7 ]jo[mov^ some think 
that xaraXakuv v6/mou means, to act contrary to 
the law. This is an error, for though we grant 
that sometimes, though rarely, the same word 
may be put successively in two diiFerent senses ; 
yet care must be taken, lest in searching for a 
meaning in the writings of the Apostles, we 
should conclude that this has been done con- 
trary to the usage of the word, and that thus 
we introduce uncertainty into the interpreta- 
tion. Evidently here xaraXaXirj vo/jlov is to slan- 
der the law itself. He who slanders his bro- 
ther is as if he slandered the law. The Apos- 
tle adds also, o rhv ddsX^phv XPivoov, rbv v6[i>ov x^mi. 
The law forbids to do either. - 

dXa^ovsi' V'7ripy](po!.vor (^v(3^i(rraiy 
' AXaZpvii and v'7r:pri(favoi occur together also in 2 
Tim. iii. 3. They agree so far that both are 
expressive of one who arrogates to himself 
more than he ought. But dXat^ovsta is more in 
speech, it is ostentation ; v'jn^riipavJa is pride 



united with contumely and contempt of others. 
'AXflft^oiv is a, vain-glorious boaster f i/Ts^^f avc$, he 
who prides himself on the things in which he 
excels, or thinks that he excels. The one is 
arrogance, the other pride. The aAa^wf puffs 
himself, because, as he admires himself, he seeks 
that others should admire him, withoutcalumni- 
ating or despising others ; but the •Jirsp^uyc? acts 
contemptuously and insolently to others. The 
one makes men laugh at him, but seldom moves 
their hatred ; the other excites the contempt, 
hatred, and anger of those whom he contemns. 
The one only boasts of his own merits, the other 
brings down the contempt of men on his own 
deeds. Casaubon. ad Theophr. p. 353. rightly 
says, that dXa^w and vm^Tj^avci differ in this, 
that the boaster extols himself without injuring 
others, and deceives himself, f^£.a-ara, Galat. vi. 
3; but the ^crg^Tjfavc? is contumelious, and des- 
pises every one but himself. As to the difference 
between dXa^ovivuv and Ts^crspsjEffSae/, which oc- 
curs in 1 Cor. xiii. 4. see Valckenar. ad Lennep. 
Etymol. ii. p. 764. dXa^ovsveiv is to boast falsely 

* 'AXa^aiJv IS derived from W7, linc/ua, and means the use 
of the tongue m a bad sense exclusively, either for detrac- 
tion or boasting. The old word, leasing, Psl. ir. 2. Eng- 
lish verttion, is from the same eouru« — T. 


of things that are false, but tspts^zUc^ui to boast 
conceitedly of things in themselves true. 

The v[3pigrat diflfer from both the former. 
These are the insolent, who, from pride, not 
only treat others with contempt, but with con- 
tumely and injury. The v3^i(jrr,i cares for no 
man, but thinks himself at liberty to act to- 
wards any one as he pleases ; who put forth 
their pride in injurious actions. Vid. Eustath. 
ad Odyss. a, p. 51. and Wettsten. ad N. T. 
ii. p. 28. The three words, therefore, differ 
in degree. In uXa^oveia there is no contempt, 
but only silly ostentation. In v-:prj:pavia, there 
is contempt of others and contumely. In C^^'i 
there is contempt with injury. Xenophon 
contrasts Gu):p^ovsg with ulB^iffrai. Cyrop. iii. 1. 
12. Ages. 10. 2, and the b'rrsi'npdvoi are contrast- 
ed with ra-iivoi in James iv. 6. 1 Pet. v. 5. 

To these words we may add a fourth, a-j'^ddrig, 
which occurs in Titus i. 7 ; 2 Pet. ii. 10. It 
signifies that viciousness of life which arises 
out of a self-satisfaction, that can approve of 
nothing but the doings of self. It designates 
him who does not accommodate himself to 
others; and is consequently unaccommodating 
and morose. Aristotle calls him d-JgzoXog. It 
is therefore often united with cxXyjfo? and ^^atruj ; 
as in Pet. ii. 10, with ro\fjjr,Ti]i, (Eunap. de 


L,eff. p. 217, rok[Jjrio6raTOi xa/ ah^dhig,') But in 
this passage roki^riral av'^adsig, are not the rash, 
who seek only to please themselves, but the 
petulant and cruel, who care for no one ; and 
certainly a bishop should not be aO^a^jjg, but 
mild and (fs/jbvog. 

d<f{j:'^sror ad'Trovhor 
So far are similar, that they prefer to live 
with others in enmity and strife, rather than in 
friendship and peace. But as the <rui/^;jx>j and 
the 6rrovbr\ differ, the one being made by those 
between whom there had been no previous 
enmity, the other being the covenanted termi- 
nation of war, at least for a time, so the se- 
veral adjectives will have a distinct meaning 
also. The «<r6^^gro/ are not, as is commonly 
stated, those who break a confederacy, but are 
rather those who will not come into a confe- 
deracy, nor be easily led to adopt pacific mea- 
sures, unvertrdglich. The utfTtovbot are they who 
will not make peace, but prefer interminable 
war, unversohnlich. The aGhv^zroi do nothing 
to preserve peace ; the a&xovboi do nothing to 
restore peace, ddtd7J^a7iror dcrovhi 'iTokiiJjog is im- 
placable war. But Demosthenes says dc-jv^i- 
rdjrarov rov cx^.ov, because they were dvo/xoXoyog 
and dff-j/M^ovoc as Harpocrates explains the ex- 


The difference between affro^yor dveXsyjfiovig 
may be readily traced from what has been al- 
ready said on the word sXiog. 

(^aijjOL^iTg^ darrjoixror dff'^svsTg' a^^ooffroi. 

The two former words occur together in 2 
Pet. iii. 16, a oi d/j^cc^iTg xcci d(rryjoixroi ffr^ijSXovfftv 
tig rriv id/xv ahrojv ditiiX^im. We may admit at 
once, that, if used in their proper sense, they 
are not synonymous. But as, in this passage, 
the dcrrigixroi may be those who are not yet suf- 
ficiently established in religious knowledge, 
they may properly be compared with the 
dn>a^iTg, The a/xa^s/f are those who have not 
learned that which they might and ought to 
have learned, who have not had proper instruc- 
tion and discipline. Xenoph. Mem. iv. 1. 4, 
iiraibi'j^evrag 7tai [j.a^ovrag — d'xaidsvrovg xai dfMcc^sTg, 
They are therefore the untutored ; but the 
d<sr^r/,Toi are they who have learned, but have 
not been adequately taught and confirmed, 
who yet need definite religious knowledge. 
It were scarcely necessary to notice this, but 
that interpreters have endeavoured to attach 
to the word a/xa^^js, the idea of perversity and 
impiety, with the view probably to justify the 
further afl[irmation of Peter, that they pervert 
the difficult passages of Paul's writings to their 
destruction. But what then should we say of 


the atfrj^e/xro/, unless we suppose that these also 
bear the blame of their own infirmity? For 
the ocTolXs/a is not the penalty of crime, but the 
evil which arises spontaneously from igno- 
rance, although that ignorance be blameless. 
They render dfxa^rjg, indocile ; but they could 
not easily justify this rendering, unwilling to 
be taught. The case is different, if it is said 
afia^r^g, s. dfj.a':^sffr£^og <:r^6g rt. But there is no 
need of this. For they who are so untaught 
and unstable, do pervert the ^urrvoTjra of Paul to 
their own hurt. They ought already to be 
ffotpoi yia./ reXs/Ci, 

But in 1 Corinth, xi. 30, aSsviTg -/.at t^hMdroi, 
are used together ; and they are rendered by 
Luther, Schwache und Kranke. If we give heed 
to the old grammarians, o^oMffroi and voffovvrsg 
differ ; and, on the contrary, dc^svsTg and o^'^m&toi 
appear to be identical in meaning, if we con- 
sider their composition. Yet they differ; for 
they are dSsvsTg who have not strength, infirm, 
imbecile ; they are a^huffroi the strength of 
whose powers has failed, languid, sick. Cicero 
de clar. or. 180. hifinna afqne ctiam acgra vale- 
tudinefuit. So in Xenoph. Apol. 30, o^puxrrog 
rnv -^iX'^v is he who is sick in spirit; but in 
Agesil. 9. 5, ao^sve/a -^^v^ng is weakness of mind, 
on account of which he avoids effort, as • ''wv 


aff^si/stfrarwi' ^rjoiuv ^iov /j^i/jjov/xsvcf. He is dff^Syrji 
who has naturally no strength. He is agpwtfro^ 
who has lost his strength by disease. 'Kennpk, 
Memo?', ii. 6. 12, o/ (pvffn dff^iviardroi rCJ ct^iMarit 
Id. Oeconom. 4. 2, tmv Cjiij^drm ^^jXi^po/ajvwv xa/ a/ 
•vj/oi;^;'// d^^ujaroTsoai ytyvovrai. Although it must 
be at the same time admitted that both are pre- 
dicated of the sick, both in the New Testa- 
ment and other writings. Many suppose that 
the notion of sickness is intended by the word 
xd/jbrnv in James v. 15, xa/^ 55 su^tj rr^q Titrrsuf 
syioi7 rh '/.diMvovrai especially because the word 
cL6%vu occurs in verse 14. And, therefore, 
the papists bring forward this passage to prove 
the sacrament of extreme unction. But 
although we should concede that Jtdf/jvuv may 
mean to be sick, (vid. Wetsten, ad N. T. ii. 
p. 680,) yet it may be doubted whether, in 
this instance, it does not mean distress of 
mind. Such is evidently its meaning in Heb. 
xii. »3, '"a fiTj xd/xrirs raTg -^-oyjug v/xuv, and Apocal. 
ii. 7. Tir/.o'jricixg dXX' ou zsx/Mrr/iag. For xa/xi/s/v pro- 
perly is to be labouring or distressed with any 
thing ; xd/Mvojv is he whose strength gives way 
in consequence of excessive labour ; whence 
ocdfiovrss and TCiXfjbrjTtorig (but not xd/xmrsg) are the 
dead, whose labours are ended. I do not press 
this conjecture, however, partly because it i« 


not altogether contrary to the truth that James 
may be teaching here in accordance with the 
forms and practices of the other Apostles, and 
with former custom ; and partly from the un- 
willingness to introduce a doubtful interpreta- 
tion ; for the passage, even in their own way, 
is of no avail to the Romanists. James advises 
the application of anointing, together Vvith 
prayer, for the healing of the sick ; they never 
administer extreme unction but when no hope 
of recovery remains ; and they never apply it 
with the view to recovery, but merely as a 
means of smoothing the path to heaven for the 
dying, as appears in the Catechismus Romanus/ 

*" The Cateclnsm of the Council of Trent, used by the 
authority of Pope Pius V. It has been recently translated 
into English by Professor Donovan of Maynooth, and the 
Latin copies are exceedingly scarce. A Protestant contro- 
versialist, however, must never confide in the English ver- 
sion without comparing it with the Latin, as Mr. Donovan's 
text is in many instances softened, according to the present 
policy of the Romanists, to meet the spirit of these times. 
The Latin only has the authority of the church; and iNir. 
Donovan's version will at any convenient season be thrown 
overboard. The whole tenor, however, of the teaching of 
the Roman Catechism, is completely at variance with the 
passage of James on which they profess to found their 
superstitious ceremony. Practically, their superstitious 
ceremony has no application whatever to the recovery 
of the sick. It is only regarded as a preliminary to death. 
It is called in the Catcchi.>>m " the sacrament of dyin^ 


persons ;" and its object is declared to I)e, ^' to calm the 
terror" attendant on death, and '■ to enable the soul to 
wait with cheerfulness" the coming event. This is surely 
in direct contrariety to a passage of Scripture which exhorts 
to pray, and the prayer of faith shall save tlie sick, and the 
Ivord shall raise him \ip. Extreme unction is never ad- 
ministered till all hope of the sick being raised up has 
vanished ; and, for such a ceremony, no scriptural authority 
can be adduced. — T, 



A WANT of mimite attention to the force of 
synonymous terms is not only a great impedi- 
ment to those who are seriously engaged in 
the interpretation of the New Testament; but 
also in a point of still greater magnitude gives 
rise to many doubts, which, although they may 
wear to the unlearned the semblance of import- 
ance, will yet be smiled at by men of philolo- 
gical attainment, who, as possessed of exten- 
sive erudition, well aware of the usage of 
words, and wont to proceed themselves with 
the greatest caution, consider that theologians, 
in interpreting Greek writings, often confound 
rashly all words and forms, and conceive that 
our lexicons are sadly wanting in sound prin- 
ciples. For some persons, when they find 
words, or forms of speech, in any book of the 
New Testament, which are rarely or never 
met with in the others, make use of them as a 
test in a still higher matter, and deny that the 
books in which such words are found can be 
written by the same author as those are in 


wliich similar things have been usually express- 
ed in other words. The Epistle to the He- 
brews affords a striking example of this won- 
drous subtilty of criticism. And they affirm 
of it, that, from its style of language, it must 
be set apart from all the other books of the 
New Testament ; for that it cannot possibly 
have been written by any one of the authors 
of the other books. Now, in this matter, we 
give them up at once, their axaj Xsyo'asi/a; but 
they must really allow us, in our explanation 
of synonymous terms, to make a few remarks 
on certain words and forms, which, in their es- 
timation, are not synonymous, but identical, 
}ffod-jm/j.ovvra ; and with respect to which they 
affirm so confidently that if Paul had written 
on these points he would certainly have made 
use of different words and forms of speech ; 
and, therefore, had he been the author of the 
Epistle to the Hebrews, he would have adopt- 
ed those words which are peculiar and familiar 
to his general style, and not those which are 
found exclusively in this epistle. 

When lately 1 commenced the interpreta- 
tion of the Epistle to the Hebrews, I ccime, at 
the very outset, into contact with the word 
AaXy}(fccg, ch. i. 1, concerning which many in- 


terpreters have differed as to the sense in 
which it is used by the Apostle. Those who 
delight in removing verbal difficulties to which 
they have themselves given rise, seem almost 
prepared to affirm, that the peculiar character 
of this Epistle may be known by the use of 
this word only. But let them point out what 
other word the Apostle could have used when 
he wished to say no other thing but that God 
had spoken. The four words which the Greeks 
used in this sense, and which are placed at the 
head of this section, are made use of in the 
New Testament; but of these no other but 
XaXs/V would have been properly fitted for this 
place. They agree so far, certainly, that they 
are spoken of those who utter words ; yet they 
differ materially. For XaXs/V is no other than 
to speak, (loqui) i. e. to utter words of any lan- 
guage, independently of any reason why they 
are uttered ; as we say the parrot speaks, be- 
cause it enunciates M'ords of human lanyfuaare. 
XaXsTv therefore, has no other force than the ut- 
terance of human voice. Rightly, therefore, 
they adduce the passage XaXg/V ci^iarcty Xsynv 
ddvvccroJrarog ; but they are quite in error who 
affirm that XaXiTv means to speak imprudently 
and inconsiderately. And the looseness and 
carelessness of lexicographers in admitting 


such observations is quite surprising. Many- 
passages occur in the New Testament in which 
this sense of imprudent and inconsiderate 
speech would be quite absurd, as Matt. ix. 18, 
compared with x. 19, 20. Hence XaXs/P r/w, 
and cr^os ri'ia. mean only to speak to any one, 
and XaXs/v iLircL rtvof to hold colloquy. And in 
James i. 19, ^sccbug zlg rh XaX^ca/ is, slow to speak, 
according to the Rabbinical proverb, " one 
mouth to speak with, but two ears to hear.'* 
Therefore, in this passage of the Epistle to the 
Hebrews, the same signification must be strict- 
ly adhered to as in all other places where it is 
predicated of the prophets, or of God himself^ 
as Luke xxiv. 25; Acts iii. 21, 24; Luke i. 
45, 55 ; Acts iii. 2 1 ; vii. 6 ; John ix. 29 ; 
Acts vii. 38, 44 ; viii. 26. They would hard- 
ly adduce what Phavorinus states from Am- 
monius, to show that XaXs^i^ means araxrui £X(psoiiv 
ra ^{ifjjara. For Ammonius says other philoso- 
phers (Plato he had named previously), 5/a/|£7j» 
ovruc' XaXsTv /mv rovg drdxrojg sx(psDovrag ovrrso ouv X6- 
yov diocXsysc'^ai ds roi/g (i,ir siriixzXiia.i Xsyovrag, This 
is in fact a rhetorical distinction. 

Xsys/f and s/Vg/i/ are so far similar that they 
hav^e the common notion of words and things 
which we enunciate to auditors, and commune 
respecting them ; and they differ therefore 


from >.a>wg/i', which simply implies the use of 
the human voice and of words. And often 
they are so made use of by the most elegant 
writers that they scarcely appear to differ. 
Yet they differ in the same degree as our 
reden and sagen. For Xs^^g/v has reference to 
the sentiment and the connexion of words; 
g/Vs/i' relates only to the words which any one 
has successively spoken. This difference may 
be learned from those passages in which the 
two words occur in juxtaposition. Xenoph. 
Oecon. iv. 23, ?ta/ o Avcavh^og. . £/Vg/V* ri Xiyug, 
pdvai, Cyrop. i. 4. 12, o) 'xaTdsg ii<7ror 'Trovra^ov Xiysig 
TO ir^ay^a. Cyrop. v. 1. 10, JtaXX/cra, g^?j. Xsyg/g* 
"•'TOTS [jjh bri TovT s}'7r6\'Tsg disXu^ri(fav. Cyrop. 
vi. 4. 19, g/ fJ'SV Tig ihrsTv ti (SovXsTai, Xs^utu. Lu- 
cian. Hermot. 8. i. p. 747. Mr^da^aojg, aXX' g/Vg 
0, Ti Kai y^syug. For in Xg^g/v the notion inheres 
of collecting (colUgendi) words in a sentence or 
oration, whence, Xoyog^ "koyKSixog^ &c. biakiysc^ai ; 
but in g/Vg/V the words only are considered 
which any one utters successively. Hence we 
may say, g/Vg/V Xo'/oi/, and "koyog of the oration it- 
self; but never Xg^g/i/ "khyov, or ^^/-ta. In the 
same way Xgyg/i/ and g/Vg/V are used in the New 
Testament, Luke xxi. 3, «??rgv* aXrl^ug Xsyoj. xxi. 
5, TivoJv XiyovTOJV <7:i^} to\j h^oZ — gJ-Trg. xxii. 34, o 3g 
g/Vg- Xsyw 601, and elsewhere ; and I suspect that it 


is possible to give a good reason why Xsyg/v', is 
used in some places and s/Vs/i/ in others. For when 
either v/ord is added to other words, as /dm Jts, 
eyoyyv^ov Xhyovng, &c. it may he observed that 
Xsynv is generally used, if in the word to which 
it is added, the notion of speaking already ex- 
ists ; but that if this is to be given as an ad- 
ditional notion, then sJmTv is used, Luke xxi. 
7, 8. s'TTTj^uTViffav XsyovTsg. (xxii. 64.) v. 12. sds7}'^i) 
avrov XiyMV. v. 21. ^e^avro dtcx.Xoyi^so^ai Xsyovrsg. v. 
30. syoyyvt^^ov Xsyovrsg. Contra. Luke xxii. 17, 
di^d/Mivog ii-TTc, v. 13. n-^ocru s/Vouv. v. 20. toujv s/Wg. 
And if it is found to be otherwise in some in- 
stances, it must be remembered that the sacred 
writers did not in all places observe the rules 
of elegant composition. Yet frequently when 
Xsynv appears to have been put for s/Vsiv it has 
not the meaning of speaking, but of thinking, 
feeling, commanding. So Mark. v. 28, ^-^olto 
Tou tiMccrm avrov' sXsys yd^, with the parallel passage 
in Matth. ix. 21, 'iXsys yd^ h'savrp. Matth. ix. 
23, 24, sX'^dJv — }d(jjv — 'iXsyiv auroTg- dvayjaoilri. 
There appears to be an opposition to this rule 
in the frequent form, aTrox^i'^itg — sJ-tts. But that 
d'TToxomff'^ai is rather to be referred to the mind 
than to the actual words, is evident from the 
passages in which it occurs, where no interro- 


gation precedes, which is often the case in the 
New Testament. So Luke xxii. 50, 51. And 
in Luke v. 31, our Lord answered the Pha- 
risees not in his own name, but in the name^ 
i. e. on the behalf of his Apostles. 

The word s^sTv only remains to be noticed. 
But this appears so far to differ from both s/Vg/V 
and Xgys/v, that it should neither be considered 
as relating to the words only of the speaker, 
nor to the speech only, but to the mind and 
will of the speaker. It has almost always the 
notion of denouncing, affirming, objecting, or 
commanding; or some other thing which in- 
volves the mind and will of the speaker. It 
is, in fact, to enunciate or give forth the 
thought. Examples occur in the Lexicons to 
the New Testament. But let students be care- 
ful not to admit the idea that g^s/V means some- 
times, to interrogate. It may be used of hini 
who utters his own mind, while he seeks to 
know the mind of another, as in the passages 
usually adduced, but simply and properly (per 
sc) it cannot mean, to interrogate. In the 
same way as Xsysiv may be, to deny, because it 
often occurs that o Xg/wv, denies, or as g/Vg/i/ may 
l)e to reproach, if it is followed by reproaches. 
In fine, XaXsTv is to speak or talk, i. e. to use 


human language, s/~£?y is to utter words suc- 
cessively, Xs^s/v is to say, and ffs/i/ is to express 

vs(pog' vs(psXyi, 

The word vs(pog occurs but once in the New 
Testament, Heb. xii. 1, togovtov s^ovTsg ir^oxiifiivov 
TjfMTv vs(pog fjbaoTv^Mv. Some therefore say, this 
word is peculiar to the writer of this epistle ; 
that the others use vs(p&Xyj : and thence they 
conjecture that Paul is not the author of the 
epistle, because he never, in speaking of a cloud, 
uses vs(pog, but vi(psXn. A short statement will 
be sufficient to show that we cannot make this 
use of the passage. 

The two words so far agree, that they sig- 
nify a dense and humid vapour, which veils the 
sky ; but they differ, inasmuch as vs(pog denotes, 
cloud, indefinitely, {das Geivolke), but vspXyi 
specific clouds, which, breaking from the mass, 
roll together in a certain form, (die Wolken.) 
For although in the most ancient writers, as 
Homer, they appear to be usedindiscriminately, 
^'■et certain traces of this difference appears. In 
Homer we find n<psXYi xvavsri and vs(pog xvdvsov, 
vs(psXn fMsXaim and vs(pog fxsXav, And certainly 
vi(pri is said in the same way as n^iXau But 
if the passages are accurately compared, 
this difference will be perceptible, that by I'spo; 


is intended an indefinite cloudy mass that 
covers the heavens, by vi<psXr) a particular dis- 
tinct cloud. And as rb n<pog is used for many in- 
distinct and confused portions, so ra vs<p7} may be 
used to denote many clouds, but collectively, the 
clouds, for the whole veil by which the heaven, or 
a great portion of it, is covered. Hence Homer 
uses vi(pia and not vzcpiXai to describe the abode 
of the gods. Iliad, v, v. 523, ciX^ oy a^ ax^w 
'OXvfMTifj vTo ^^L/fl'so/fl'/ vs<psg<jiv ^ffro, Two observa- 
tions here will suffice to point out the different 
force of these two words. The first regards 
the epithet of Jove, v£(psXr;'/s^&rns, For Jupiter 
is said to be e rag vi^sXng, not rd vsipri, (fuvdyuv. It 
could not be written without meaning in Iliad. 
©, V. 192. siig d' iXa^ o'j^ccvoi/ sv^uv h al^sgi xai 
vi<peXrigiv. For it might have been veiphffivy as in 

Iliad, g, V. 867. O/XOD VS(p£20aiV IdjV g/'g ov^avo\> SU^VV, 

Certainly it is, because he compels vB(peXag (h 
row vs^ovg) h al'^s^i, over which he rules, not rd 
npn s. rh vepog^ behind which the abode of deity 
is imagined. Then never do we find in Homer 
vifiXai (plural) with an adjective as, ^e^Jga cxioivra^ 
vifioiv £^i(3evvuvy vspseat y^^ucioiGi ; whilst, to the sin- 
gular, some epithet is frequently added, to 
describe the particular cloud. We can con- 
ceive of clouds of colour widely different, but 
the colour of rd vifaa (rb i'spog) is but one. It 


may be shown readily, that later writers have 
made the same distinction. A few examples will 
suffice. Lucian. Icaromen.ii. p. 776. Luna,says: 
y.a,\i Tiva, 'ibc/t avroov /j^Gi^ivovra. 75 xXsTrrovru yj ciXXo ri 
rokiMojvrcc vv/crspivdjrarov, iu^dg lT/<y-n'a<ra/A£v>j ro vs<pog, 
svsKaXv^dfMrjv. Here if vs(pog meant a cloud, he 
could not have written to /i(pog ; it must have 
been without the article, that it might be indicat- 
ed that the moon involved herself in some cloud. 
All will feel that he could not have written 
9} vspx^. Nor, elsewhere, is the article added to 
this word in the singular, unless a certain par- 
ticular cloud is intended, as 1 Cor. x. 1, 2. But 
ro vs(pog may be put absolutely, because it de- 
notes an indefinite and indistinct mass. In 
that delightful passage, therefore, of Euripides, 
(Phoen. V. 166.) which Schiller had probably 
in his mind, 'Avs/xwxsog s'/^s d^6>jLov vi(peXag iroeh 
f^avucraz/x/ 3/' ai^hog Toog s/xov o/xoysvsro^a, the article 
is wanting. But there is no need ^spog /xa^ru^wv 
g-n-zCvrw/As^a ; let US return from this digression. 

The Apostle could not write vsf gX?jv //.cc^ru^uv, 
he ought to say vz<pog. For the Greeks, when 
they would express a great assembled multi- 
tude, which can scarcely be numbered, always 
write vsfiog^ never vipXrj. Homer. Iliad, d, 274. 
•vj/, 133, vs^og Ts^wv. Iliad, g, 243, vs(pog ToXs/xoy. 
ib. V. 755. -^d^ojv vs:pog r,s TLokoim ; also vs^og os-vswy 


Aristopli. Avib. v. 296, vs(pog ar^ov^uv ib. v. 579. 
and many other instances. But in this sense 
never, as far as I know, is vs<p'iXr] found ; neither 
is it ever used in the New Testament for a 
multitude. Therefore, since the Apostle could 
not use another word, it is vain to adduce this 
passage in proof of a difference of style. For 
if we should concede, that he might have writ- 
ten cX^^o? /j^a^Tv^uv, yet the word vs(pog which he 
has used, in this sense cannot be compared 
with vs^sX?; ; neither is it necessary to suppose 
that this form is borrowed from the LXX, 
when it occurs among all writers, and that 
most frequently rare words and elegant forms 
of speech are found in those writers whose 
style is the least artificial; which forms, if they 
are found in any other writer whom he might 
have had before him, would still not give 
ground to suspect imitation; or to conjecture 
a common national origin of both writers ; un- 
less it were manifest also, that such words and 
forms were entertained by both, in some pe- 
culiar sense unknown to writers in general. 
Therefore, also, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, 
we must, in the first place, inquire, whether 
those forms of speech which, in the other books 
of the New Testament, are never or rarely found, 
and certainly not in the Epistles of Paul, are 


used in a peculiar sense and manner foreign to 
other writers, which only occurs in cases where 
the quotation is made from the Septuagint. 

But it bears still more closely on this point, 
that some think they have observed certain 
words, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, for 
which Paul, in a similar case, would have used 
different words ; although, if we accurately ex- 
amine the whole matter, it will appear that 
they are synonyms of the very same thing, but, 
which is of the nature and essence of syno- 
nyms, presented under a different aspect and 
mode of thought. 

Both these words occur often in the New Testa- 
ment. Paul uses them in Galat. iii. 9, in 
speaking of the law, diaraysig di' ayysXuv. Of 
this solemn interdict, Exod. xix. 12, 13, he 
thus speaks in the Epistle to the Hebrews, 
xii. 20, ouTc s(pz^ov TO diat^TsXXofjjivov, Some there- 
fore say S/arafftfs/!/ has the same meaning as 
diaarsXkiSai, but that Paul never uses the latter 
word; for that, in a similar case, he writes diccra- 
72/5, and that, therefore, had Paul been the 
author of the Epistle to the Hebrews he would 
have written in this instance as in others, rh 
harayh. All, however, will surely see it rash 
to assume that dtardgauv and diaarsXkis'^af have 


the same meaning ; and that if Paul had been 
speaking of this particular interdict he would 
have said rh dtaraysvf because elsewhere he had 
written o v6/Mog hccruyzig. But, before we show 
how these words differ, let us inquire of these 
persons whether they think Paul could have 
written 6 vo/^o? diccgrsXXo/juBvog. Surely they will 
aofree that he could not. For thouo^h the 
two words agree in this, that each word has 
the force of, disposing, yet they differ, inas- 
much as they signify a different mode of the 
same power. 

Aiardgasiv is SO to dispose matters that each 
is in its own place, or to put in order, to ar- 
range ; biagrsXXsff^ai properly is so to separate, 
that nothing should be in a wrong place or 
mode. Hence diaTuffffm is used for any ordi- 
nance or prescribed arrangement; dia(fTsXXia^a,i 
frequently denotes separation, interdict, bia- 
rdddsiv is to dispose, to constitute ; hicKSriXkuv to 
arrange in different parts, and, in the middle 
voice, d/affrsXXsSoci to interdict. Nor is it ca- 
sually used in this sense in the middle voice. 
See Matth. xvi. 20, hisaniXaro roTg /xa^/jra?; 7vci 
findivi s/ircfjffiv. Mark v. 43. (Luke viii. 56, rraoriy- 
yuXs iMYihivl il'Xi.Tv) ; vii. 36 ; ix. 9. In these pas- 
sages there is the notion of warning against an 
act, ^. e. interdicting. (One passage occurs, 


Acts XV. 24, where It appears to denote a man- 
date simply, as in Diodorus Siculus, xi. 38.) 
Hence, therefore, ro diaffrsXXo/Mivovj in this place, 
is an interdict ; which was the fact. But a very 
different meaning exists in the passage o vo/Mog 
diccrays/g ^/' dyysXov* viz. that the law is consti- 
tuted and disposed by the ministry of angels. ^ 
This is evident, if we look at the origin of the 
words. rd(y(fziv is properly to place in a certain 
juxtaposition or series ; (JrsXXsiv is, not to send, 
according to the lexicons, but, to put in a place, 
or to deposit in a place, whence arise the no- 
tions of preparing, arranging, &c. It is not si- 
milar to the German stellen. Hence rnXXsc^a/ 
d'xo rivog is to avoid a thing, as it were, to put 
oneself in another place, as 2 Thess. iii. 6, 
drsKksff^cci v/Mug ocTro 'Travrog ddsX(pou draxrwg Tsg/'^a- 
Tovvrog, The glossaries give it correctly in he. 
(TriXXeo^a/, d^pidrixG^ai^ dva^u^iTv. See also 2 Cor. 
viii. 20, arsXXo/xivoi rouro, (j^'/j rig v/Moig fxu/j,riffsrai. 
Erasmus is correct as to the sense, when he 

5 See a valuable paragraph on the word hxrayri, in Sui- 
cer's Ecclesiastical Thesaurus, a work of almost indispensa- 
ble importance to theological students. It is a mine of eru- 
dite and apt quotation, from which many have drawn the 
means of their pretensions to learning, without having the 
candour to admit their obligation to the lord of the soil. — 


says that the idea is taken from the fact of 
sailors avoiding a rock ; but it is, at the same 
time, an error in the scholiasts to say, that 
cnXkiSai properly relates to a voyage or a 
naval expedition. In the same way, Polybius 
says, viii. 17, ou h-ovaiMvm xa'^oXov r^v sx ri^g ffvvr}- 
^siag xarut,iojm oTsXXia^at, i, e. to remove or re- 
ject. Therefore, as amtsriKknv is to send away, 
to dismiss, amariXknv to repress or put down, 
TLaradTi'k'kiiv to suppress, (TutfreXXg/v to contract, or 
to arrange or confine in one place, so diagrsXXsiv 
is to allocate in different parts or places, to se- 
parate ; and therefore diaaTsXXB<^ai is spoken of 
an interdict, because he who interdicts from 
any thing is considered to do the same thing 
as if he actually separated him whom he inter- 
dicted, from that which he has interdicted. 
And this explains the use of the middle voice; 
for it often occurs that middle verbs, while the 
proper relative notion is preserved, are at the 
same time referred to an object. In this pas- 
sage, therefore, rh dia&rsXXo/jbsm means an inter- 
dict ; neither could the author of the Epistle, 
be he whom he may, have written diarsray/j^svov, 
I will add another instance which is wont to 
be adduced from the Epistle to the Hebrews. 

They say that in Hebrews vi. 17, 18, u/mrd^srog 


is used, and in vii. 24, aTa^a/3aroj, when in 
other books of the New Testament, and by 
Paul himself, ^s/Sa/oj would have been. But 
though sound philologists would smile at such 
a statement, let them bear with us while we 
touch this briefly. 'Acraoa/Saro; does not mean, 
as some say, immutable ; (for 'ra^ajScchsiv is in- 
correctly rendered to change,) but, that which 
does not pass away, or migrate ; ufy.srd'^srog, 
is that which is not changed ; (Si(3aiog that which 
remains in its place. It is true that there is in 
these words the common idea of firmness and 
constancy, as in axhnrog, dfMirdyJvrirog, kdociTog ; but 
he would err who should say that they so sig- 
nified the same thing that he who meant that 
which was dfisra^srog or a-^raga/Saro?, could say 
also that it was (3s(3atog. Certainly to express 
the notion which the Apostle had conceived in 
the former passage, vi. 17, 18, he ought to 
have written rh d/Mra^sTov rng ^ovXrjg aurov. For 
a^o-era^srog is constant and immutable, for it is 
frequently said of those things which consist 
and chaupfe not, but remain ever the same. 
But jSg/Sa/os is firm, immoveable, certain, fixed. 
If, therefore, he had written rb jSsiSccm rrjg /SouX^g, 
he would only have affirmed that the will of 
God is certain and fixed; but wlieri he wishes 
to affirm that it is immutable, that which is 


ever the same, and changes not with other 
things, then he uses o/z-sra^sroi/, as Diod. 
Sicul. xiii. 83, reads vofio-og d/Msra^rovg. xvi. 
69, dfjusTu^Tov 8ia:popav, i. 23, /(j^v^av -rr/Vr/i/ xai 
d/j.sTd%rov ; and other authors. On the contrary, 
when he wishes to say no more than firm, cer- 
tain, fixed, then Paul writes ^i(3aiog, as vi. 19, 
dyxv^U)/ TTig -^uyn^g d(5<(:akri re y.a} ^s(3aiav. iii. 6, 
Ta^^Tjffia ^sfSala. ix. 17, bia^r,7tri irri vex^oTg ^Ss/Sa/a, 
&c. Nor in the other passage, vii. 24, would he 
have written (SijSaia /g^wciv^j, but he ought to have 
written drrapdfSarog. He wished to say that the 
priesthood of Christ did not pass from one to 
another priest, for that Christ was a priest for 
ever, 2/5 rhv aJcova, and this notion was express- 
ed by the word d-iraod^arog. He might have 
said dhidboxpg ; but if he had written (3s^a/a, he 
would have been very wide of what he intend- 
ed ; nay, he would have spoken foolishly, for 
the Levitical priesthood itself was /3s/3a/05 but 
not d'xa^d^arog^ for that may be the one which is 
not the other, as a kingdom may be /Ss/Sa/oj; 
although it passes successively into other hands, 
bid rh ^avdruj xcoXvit^ai avrovg 'rra^afj.miv. Lastly, 
it is no ground for surprise that these words 
occur only in the Epistle to the Hebrews; for 
the same things are not treated of in all the 
Epistles. Neither has Paul demonstrated in 


his other epistles that the priesthood of Christ 
is perpetual, and not to pass to others. Other- 
wise it appears absolutely certain to us, that he 
would have used the word d-7raod(3cx,rog. Occu- 
menius, in loc. rightly adds, dbia,boy^ov, drsXsurovy 
for that which in the same respect remains 
now, is in that respect, without end, drsXsvrog, 

Several examples of synonyms might be ad- 
duced from the Epistle to the Hebrews, which 
by many persons would be accounted expres- 
sions of precisely equal force, and from which 
they would conclude rashly that the author 
had used peculiar terms in communicating the 
same idea, as v. c. s/'s ro dr/inxsg^ zlg rovg aiumg. 
d^sr'/jtr.'f, ':ra,7.a,i6rrig' ccvrirvjov, ffyjd'fj^sroyov thai, dst,oi,(T- 
'^ar oXiyojsiTv, xarcx,(poovi7'v' vh^og, sx 'Tropviiag ysvvi^^tig. 
/3^a;j/L) r/, -r^o; M^av ; and many others which are 
brought forward as a cumulative proof that in 
this Epistle the same ideas are very differently 
expressed from what they are in other books 
of the New Testament, and that therefore it is 
not probable that Paul was its author. One 
example may suffice, which properly does not 
belong to our subject, but yet is not very fo- 
reign to that subtilty of distinction which the 
discussion of synonyms requires. There are 
constructions of the same words, with different 
cases, whence it results that although the same 


tiling is intended, yet the mode of thought in 
which it is presented is different. Among 
these we may notice, 

x^arsTv rtvog and x^arsTv ri. 

These expressions are considered to mean 
the same thing ; and even the Lexicons do not 
notice the difference of the force of the two 
constructions. Seeing, therefore, that in the 
Epistle to the Hebrews, x^arsTv is only found 
twice with the genitive, but in the other 
Pauline Epistles always with an accusative, it 
is affirmed that this is idiomatic and peculiar to 
this epistle ; and that Paul in those passages 
would have written x^ccreTv with an accusative. 
They should, however, have inquired first, whe- 
ther x^arsTv really has the same meaning with 
either case ; and if not, then it is false that 
Tt^arsTv rivog is idiomatic in this epistle. For it 
is true, that in this epistle the word is not 
found with an accusative : (It occurs but twice 
altogether^ c. iv. 14, and vi. 18,) but the rea- 
son is, that the Apostle has only used the word 
where he wished to express that, which, to be 
understood by his readers, he must have writ- 
ten jcoars/v with a genitive construction. 

Generally speaking, with respect to words, 
which may be construed with an accusative or 
a genitive case, this rule appears to obtain ; 


that if they occur with an accusative, the re- 
lation is between them and the whole thing* in 
question ; if with a genitive, the relation is 
only to a part. So far, therefore, a difference 
appears between xocctzTv riv6g and K^anTv n that 
x^ars/v rmc, signifies only to take hold of a thing, 
or to possess it ; but x^ars/i/ n to have and to 
hold in his power. For although, %garr\(Scii rmg 
is often said of one who has possessed a cer- 
tain thing, and has it now under his power ;'^ 
yet I doubt w^hether passages occur in which 
7i2^ars7v ri is put simply for to take, to possess, 
as x^arg/p rmg occurs repeatedly (Luke viii. 54. 
Mark i. 31 ; v. 41 ; ix. 27. Matth. ix. 25,) ex- 
cept when the additional notion exists also of 
a certain force by which any one desires to 
seize a reluctant person, and bring him under 
control. So Matth. xiv. 3, ^arriaag rh'iMavv7\v, 

^ Fischer, in his Prolusions on the Faults of the existing 
Lexicons for tlie New Testament, p. 474. in remarking on 
the force of the word vToiTixZ^ca in 1 Cor. ix. 27, that it has 
the same power as vToriirTiiv and x^arsrv, says in a note. 
" In the same way as h)ve (Chariton vi. 3.) is said x^anlv rav 
B-i&iv, that is, to rule over them. For x^aruv differs from 
vix.Zv in this respect, that vix.xv means simply to conquer ; 
but K^ariiv so to conquer that the conquered party is subject- 
ed to, and in the power of the conqueror. Plato Orat. 12. 
Xen. Cyrop. vi. 1, 21."— T. 


sdriffsv. xviii. 28, '/.oarrjffag avrk I'KJiyz^ xxii. 6. 
x^UTTjaavng rovg douXovg v^oigav. XXVI. 4, /Va rhv 'irr 
Govv x,^arrjffM(fi 6oXw xai a'Troxrstvum, in wllich in- 
stances the accusative must be rendered in 
connexion with both verbs, as in Matth xii. 
11, x^arrj(j£i auTo xul hz^sT. And that this dis- 
tinction obtains among other- Greek writers, 
may be shown by examples. So in Sophocles 
Oed. Col. V. 1380. roi yu^ to gov ^cL'/.r,[j.a xai rovg 
(fovg '^^ovovg z^uTovg/v, i. e. tliey hold ; but immedi- 
ately afterwards in v. 1385, we find /-t^rs yr^g 
ifijcpyXio-j hool -/.^aTrisai, to bring into subjection. 
So in Aristophanes Avib. v. 419. xgars/V av J) rhv 
iy^^f^v, y; (piXoiffiv oj(psXi7v s^stv. The Scholiast says, 
ffri/xiiursov, on ro '/.^arsTv ffvvsra^Bv a/V/ar/x^, But 
this is made out by the text itself. The sense 
is : By which thou mayest control thine 
enemy, or benefit thy friends. For that the 
idea is, not that of conquering an enemy or 
reducing him to subjection, but rather that of 
having control over him, is made evident by 
the disjunctive conjunction ; for the opposition 
is not to the idea of procuring friends, but to 
that of doing them good. In the same way, it 
occurs in Xenophon. de Exped. Cyri. v. 6. 3, 
x'spara rou o^ovg v-^l^yjXa, a x^ursTv xars^ovrsg xai irdvu 
bk'r/oi dvvaivT av. In which the notion evidently 
is, not that of occupying, but of holding, ob- 


taining, in opposition to the enemy. Nor is 
this contradicted by a passage in Hist. Graeca 
vii. 3. 4, where the words, '^yvu ovx av buvd[Mzvog, 
ruv &r}(3aiuv s^ovrojv rriv axooroXiv, rrig iroXiojg x^arg/V, 
are rendered " since he knew that he could 
not retain the city in his power ;" according to 
a previous assertion, rov fih aarsoog sx^drei. I 
doubt, however, whether '^oXig and a<fru have the 
same meaning here. It is contrary to the 
elegant accuracy of Xenophon, that these two 
words should stand in juxtaposition in the same 
passage to express a similar idea. Doubtless 
'TToXig, in this passage, as is frequently the case 
in this author, means " the state."^ Euphron, 
therefore, understood, that although he occu- 
pied the city, he could not command the whole 
state, while the prefect Thebanus held the 
citadel, and he wished therefore to persuade 
the Thebans that they should eject the lead- 
ing men who were with him in the tower, and 
then give up the state to him, ('Tra^ahvmi rnv 
ToXiv.) The word occurs in a similar way in 
Thucyd. vi. 11, xai roug [uv, xaTi^ya(sdijjivoi, xoiv 

' PharorinuSj says tt'oXi;, kou o to-pto;, kx) ol KctroiKovvris. 
both the place and its inhabitants ; and the Lexicon Xeno- 
phonteum gives a number of instances, in which Xenophon 
has used the word expressly in the sense of civitas, or the 
state — T. 


xaT(i<S')(ptiJjiv, ruv si xal '/C^arTjgaifJi^cVf oia 'ffoXkov 
yi xccl '^oXXmv ovtuv, p^aXsTw^ otv oi^x^tv dvvaifis^a ; and 

at the end of the chapter, xi^ ^' 1^^ '^i'^^ ''"^ 
r'oyjjt.c, Tm svavriuv s'Ta/^so'Sa/, dXXa rag oiavotag z^arrj- 
gavrag Sag^s/i'. 

From these instances, it is evident that, in 
both places in the Epistle to the Hebrews, 
xparrjffai should be written with a genitive, for 
in both cases it denotes, to take, not to hold. 
For in c. vi. 18, it is said that God interposed 
a certain evidence of his unchangeable will, 
" that they might have strong consolation, 
who have fled for refuge to lay hold of the 
hope," &C. x^arr/Cfa/ rrig sX'Tridog. The xara(puy6vrsg 
are the wretched who grasp at this hope, as 
suppliants do the altar. (Eurip. Iphig. in 
Aul. V. 911.) Neither should f-r/ rbv ^eoi/, be sup- 
plied after x,ara(pvy6vTig, for they have fled to 
the hope itself, of which they had not yet be- 
come possessed. Nor must the word be com- 
pared with d'ro<pvyz7v in 2 Pet. ii. 20 ; but 
xara<p-jy6>rsg must be Strictly connected with 
x^arriffai as an infinitive is often joined with a 
verb, signifying motion or desire, Matth. xi. 
7, 8, 9. K^ctr^tra/ therefore, in this place, means 
not to retain, but to apprehend, to take hold, 
as in Acts xxvii. 13, W^avng TTJg 'Trgo^sasug xg- 
xparrjxivai " supposing that they had obtained 


their purpose." In tlie other passage the force 
of x^aTiTv is precisely the same, c. iv. 14, £%&v- 
Tsg ouv d^^iz^scc fizyav — x,^aToofMv rrig hiMoXoyicig. For 
c^oXoyia here does not denote the religion which 
we profess, but the paction or covenant, that 
which is agreed on. For in c. iii. 1, Jesus is 
said to be d'x6(STo\os xai d^^n^svg rrig bfjjdkoyiag, i. e. 
/Msgirng rng dia^yixrii, not because he is the teach- 
er of religion, but because, as a priest, he pro- 
vides that we should obtain rb ofioXoyovfjism, that 
is, the grace of God and salvation, concerning 
which the Apostle is treating. Hence, there- 
fore, x^arridai rrig oiMoXoyiag is not to be steadfast 
in the confession of our faith, according to the 
popular interpretation, but rather to act with 
all earnestness, so that we may obtain those 
blessings, of which our High Priest is the pro- 
curer, i. e, 'A^ccTYidcii rrig '^r^oxn/jjsvrjg sX'zidog. 

But if this criticism shall appear to some to 
have in it more of subtilty than truth, this, at 
least, I trust that equitable judges will con- 
cede to me, that when they exercise their own 
ingenuity in some deeper and more difficult 
crisis, they will permit to me, in turn, in tlie 
explication of words, the same degree of license 
which they claim for themselves. 




The right knowledge of particles, in which 
the Greek language abounds, is attended with 
much difficulty; but especially in those which, 
as they serve almost as a common, or at least 
very closely allied, mark of the relation which 
they express, are properly accounted syno- 
nyms. For although the degree in which 
they differ is often so subtle, that it seems to 
be not always preserved by men who write 
with less of accuracy and elegance, yet it must 
never be neglected, if we would strictly inves- 
tigate the meaning of the sacred writers. And 
though we know well the great need of cau- 
tion, lest we rashly judge the style of these 
men by the strict rules of elegant writing, or 
attempt to emend their composition by rigid 
grammatical rules; yet such is the force of 
custom in the use of words, that even unlearn- 
ed men are compelled to obey it ; and there- 
fore it will always be worth while to consider 
accurately, the peculiar and distinct force of 
each separate particle which they use. As an 
example we will refer to 


avsu* and ^w^/g 
which appear to differ so little, that it scarcely 
matters which is used in a sentence, when the 
idea to be expressed is the separation or ab- 
sence of one thing from another. For un- 
doubtedly they agree in this, that they both 
indicate that relation in which the object is 
regarded as separate or absent from the sub- 
ject. As if I command any one to do some- 
thing awu yoyyudfjjMV, 1 Pet. iv. 9. I wish all 
murmurings to be absent ; or when it is said of 
our Lord that he spoke oh %w^/s 'Tra^afSoXy^g Matt, 
xiii. 24; in the same way almost it would be 
thought, that he did not speak without a parable, 
and consequently there maybe those who would 
think, that in this passage it might have been 
written ovk sXdXu anu '7ra^a(3oXrig, But there is 
this difference between the two particles, that 
X^i'^ is referred to the subject as separated from 
the object; avsu is referred to the object .which 
is regarded as absent from the subject. When, 
therefore, I say a thing is done civsv rmg, I 
mean, that is done when this is not present ; 
but when I mean, that that Mdiich was done 
was not present with a certain thing, then I 
must say it was done x^i'^ ^"'°^' It ^s there- 
fore rightly said in Matth. x. 29, eV Ig avruv oh 
TiffiTrai svi r7]v ylfiv avsv rou irar^hg u/xwv, that is, not 


even a sparrow dies, so that the Father is not 
present, i. e. unconscious or unwilling. (See 
Ducker. ad Thucyd. iv. 78.) But if x^^'^ ^^^ 
been put instead of civiv, it would only have af'- 
iirmed that no swallow is absent from the Father, 
when it falls to the ground. In the same way 
we find civsv Xoyou 1 Pet. iii. 1, but %w^'? ^ti^^y 
1 Cor. iv. 8; Heb. xi. 40, and x(*io}g rnGTsug 
Heb. xi. 6 ; vii. 7. 20. For civsu T/Vrswg would 
be, without faith aiding and assisting ; but what 
he wished to say was, if any one was actually 
destitute of faith. And %w^/5 vfJ^^^v is not when 
we are not present with you, but when ye are 
actually separated from us. And if in Heb. 
xi. 40, it had been written //-j^ aveu tiimuv reXsioii^oJc/f 
the false assertion would have been made, 
" that these men might not without us, i. e. 
without our aid and volition, be blessed." But 
what was wished to be said was, that they 
should not be blessed otherwise than we, but 
even as we, through faith and piety, in the midst 
of calamities. The particle therefore must be 
X^i'Sy separately, apart from. 

The reason is quite evident also in John xv. 5, 
X^i^'i ^("'Ou ob d{jvaG% rtoiuv ovdsvy i, e, separate from 
me, eav [iTi (jjiivriTi sv sfio/f v. 4, 6, (conf. John i, 
3.) So Ephes. ii. 12, ^rg %w^/5 x^/trroD, i. e. ye 
were far from Christ, as the context shews, 


aTrjXkor^iojfxsvoi rrig 'TroXirziag rov 'id^arj'k. avrj X^iffrov 
^rs, would be only, Christ was not present with 
you. And hence, therefore, ovx sXdXsi p/w^/g cra- 
^ajSoXi^g could not be changed into avsv craga/SoX^g, 
for this would refer it to the word Taga^oX^g, 
when in fact %w^/? applies more directly to the 
speaker ; and civiy -raga/SoXJjs XaXsTv, if indeed it 
could be said at all, would signify that he spoke 
without a parable being present. Nor is this 
opposed by Rom. x. 14, %w^/? x^j^ucirovros. For 
tliough it might have been civsv xrj^vffffovrog, yet 
the whole formula required that which is writ- 
ten ; 'ffilja ds a%oi)6o\j6t x;wg/s xrjPvffffovrog, i. e. separat- 
ed from him who teaches ; for this appears to 
be the mind of the Apostle, rather than, if no 
teacher be present, as he is frequently inter- 
preted. But dxovsiv an\i XTj^vffaovrog would be — to 
hear alone, without a teacher. 

Besides, unless I am altogether mistaken, 
an abundant proof of this distinction lies in the 
fact, that %w^/$ is not only used with a genitive, 
but by itself, absolutely, as an adverb ; whilst 
avsv invariably has as its adjunct the genitive 
of the thing assumed to be absent. For since 
%wg/5 is referred to the subject, and avsv to the 
object, it is necessary that, to the particle civsuf 
the object should be added ; but x^i'^ expresses 
absolutely and alone the full idea of the rela- 


tion to be noted; and therefore the introduc- 
tion of the object is needless. So that we may 
say x^i'^ ^^^^'i or x^i'^ '^'''^^^ ''' 5 but we cannot 
say civsu sJvai, and dnv 'TToisni ; neither did the 
Greeks say civiu touTv, but civiu rivhg 'TTOisTv Tiva, as 
in that passage of Plato, rov; fisXkovrag itrr/atr^a/ 
avsu O'^ov av rrdw ysvvatou 'Xor/)ffiiv, So in the New 
Testament, John xx. 7, x^i'^ is used simply 
and alone, but not ccveu. 

But since it is to be feared that, in the in- 
terpretation of important passages of the New 
Testament, the notice of this distinction may 
be thought unnecessary, as though it were of 
no moment whether any one is noted as absent 
from a certain thing, or whether the thing is 
regarded as separated from him, we will ad- 
duce one example in those expressions so abun- 
dantly discussed, — viz. x^i'^ vh/xo-j, and x'^i'^ 
i^yojv, Rom. iii. 21, 28; iv. 6; vii. 8, 9; James 
ii. 20. Many have interpreted them as if Paul 
had said, tliat faith only is sufficient to a man's 
salvation, even though he lived wickedly ; and, 
therefore, that man, although he do the works 
of the law, yet is accepted on account of faith 
aJone ; which idea is not only opposed to Paul's 
statement, but even to that of James, with 
which Luther was somewhat dissatisfied. For 
when Paul said, in IlGrn. ii. 13, o/ %oinrul rou 


vhfiou dixaiu^rjaovrat^ he could not, after a short 
interval, have said also, that man shall be jus- 
tified, even though the works of the law are 
wanting. James, however, appears as if he 
were opposing that idea : for he writes s^ s'eywv 
dijccciovff'^cci av^^wrrov xa/ oiiK sz '7i<JriOi}c /mvov. But 
tlie accordance is complete if we only consider 
accurately the proper force of the two particles 
under discussion. If Paul had written, ccvsj 
gf/wv, then his sentence would have contained 
the notion with which he is charged, and the 
argument of James would be in contradiction 
to him. For, if it is true that man is justified 
aviv 'i^yuv, L e, works being aTtogether wanting 
or absent, then it follows, that works are not 
needed; that they may be wanting with per- 
fect safety ; and that is false which Paul has 
affirmed, rovg rroiriTag rov vof/^ov diTcaiovG^cn ; and the 
assertion of James would be false also, rrtv crieriv 
Yj^^k; ruv i^-yojv vsk^uv sJvai, But it is written, x^i'^ 
i^yuv, that it may not be supposed that works 
may be altogether wanting to him who has faith, 
but that his justification is separate from his 
works, ^. e. although he had not done the works. 
Therefore, as in the first instance (iii. 21,) it is 
rightly stated; vwi dl x^i'^ vdfLou dix,aioff'jvrj ^soD 
^^(pavs^urai, viz. that the divine compassion is ma- 
nifested separately from the law (as it were not 


in connexion with the law, for by the law, which 
all have violated, is manifested not the d/xaioffuvT}, 
but the wrath of God;) so also in another pas^ 
sage that Apostle has written, with equal correct- 
ness, hrA,aiov(^ai 'rlffrsi civ^^oj'rov, '/uolg 'hyojv vo/iov ; 
i. e. this di-Aamvvri is altogether separated from 
the works of the law, and therefore applies it- 
self to man, not because of the works of the 
law which he has done, (for he has not done 
them) but by faith. He does not say Bixawv^ 
ff^cci uv^^u-TTov 'TriGT'ci x^i'^ s^yooVf i. e. rfj ovjc syoiitsi^ ra. 
s^ycCf as James says ; but dUaiovc/^ou x^i^^ s^ojvy 
^idTify so that the hrKatocbvrj is shown not to be 
conjoined with the hy^' voiuv, (asif any one, be- 
cause he had done certain works of the law 
had therefore attained the hi%aio6-jvYi\) but simply 
by faith, although hitherto he had been utterly 
destitute of works. Wherefore, it is said, with 
equal accuracy in the third passage (iv. 6.) 
u. 6 '^sog Xoyi^iTai bixo(,iochn,v %w^/? 'ioyojv, i, e, al- 
though he have been destitute of works, in fact, 
although he has sinned, yet he describes him as 
blessed : fJbaxdoiog dvri^ u> ov [mti Xoyi^riTOLi xu^tog afut^ 
r'iOM. On the contrary, James has spoken of 
faith, which, %w^^5 rZiv s^yuv, is dead; that is^ 
xa^' sauT'^v, sdv fjj7\ s^yct ?;/>j. For rrtffrtg X'^i'^ ^^' 
s^yuv, is faith separate from works, tj qv ffwrj^yodcrcc 
ToTg e^yoig, as Paul writes in Rom. vii. 8, 9, x^i^^ 


vo(j*o\) ajMa^Tta nx^d, syoj be s^wv X^i'^ vo/iov iroTz, If 
it had been avsu \oilo\)^ both would have been 
false ; for, vsx^a ^' afMaoria 'igriy sin is dead, not be- 
cause the law is not present, but because sin is 
without the law; neither is the law the cause 
of sin, for the law is holy. And he did not 
live &nu vof/^ov, i. e. so that the law was not pre- 
sent, for the law was present, but he lived ig- 
norant of the law. As olvzu vCiiov 'xoisTv n is to act 
contrary to law, so Iriv avsv vofiov is to live con- 
trary to the law, or not to regard the law, to 
live as though there were no law. The Apostle 
says, that there was a time in which he lived 
unconstrained by the law, and in that time 
" sin was dead," but when he understood the 
precepts of the law, o\jxsTi%firiasic, then the power 
of evil arose in him. Chrysostom erroneously 
supposes (and is followed, as usual, by Theo- 
phylactj) that this refers to a time in which the 
law was not present with him. Truly, there- 
fore, Paul writes, £^ s'^/wv vofiov ov dixaioj^Tiffirat 
cracra (Tag^ hoomov avrou' 'Trdvreg yup T^f/i^cc^rov, but "^s- 
(pavhc/jreti vvv %wg/g vo/xou dixawffuvrj ^£oD, not restrict- 
ed by the law, without regard to the law; for 
if God had had respect to the law, he would 
not have given the dixccioavvrj, he would have 
punished. Therefore, X^i'^ i^yuv U,(juov bixaiovrai 
av^^u-TTog. But with equal truth James says, 


r},v mgrtv 'XJ/i^k £f7wy, i, e, free from works, is dead. 
For as all have come short of the glory of God, 
and therefore none 1^ %7*"' ^'^onovvrcct, shall be jus- 
tified by works, but by faith; so also faith should 
cvvs^'/iTv ToTg e^y.ig, and exhibit by acts its real 
and living energy. And this is the view of 
our church, as it is accurately shown by Me- 
lancthon in his Apologia. 

And hence students should be admonished 
in the use of common and popular lexicons, 
not to suppose that particles of the same kind 
mean precisely the same thing, because they 
are often rendered in the lexicons by the same 
Latin word ; for although 

ovTu and /A^-TTw 
are both rendered by nondum, yet undoubtedly 
they differ. For as ou and /^jj differ (on which 
point Hermann has written in his edition of 
Viger,) so also of necessity oDVw and f/^ri'ru will 
differ ; and so will their compounds ovxeri, /x,??- 
xsri, ovd's'TTors, //,)j3gcrore, &c. Neither would we re- 
gard it as a mere accident, that in Matth. xxiv. 
6, we have outw hri to rsXcg, in John ii. 4, o'j'ttoj 
rifcsi r, oo^cc fj^oVy but in Rom. ix. 11, /x^-^rw ya.^ 
yivvr\%vTO}-j /xrjd' 'r^a^uvrojv tI aya^hv tJ xaxov, and in 
Heb. ix. 8, /^t-JJ-^w crs^ave^wd^a/ rr,v ruv ccyiuv cdov. 
I n the two former passages, we have a nega- 
tion of the presence of a future thing. In the 


others, it is intimated, that one thing is done 
before that another thing is considered to be 
present, to which that appertains. If, there- 
fore, (which could scarcely have been), it had 
been written //-j^-^w ^'xs/ ri o^a fj^ov, it would have 
appeared uncertain whether that time would 
come, which many believed to be already pre- 
sent. But this was certain, that it would come, 
and it was beyond a doubt that the time was 
not yet come. The point denied, therefore, 
was, that the time was come. On the contrary, 
Paul could not have written ou'ttu ya^ yevri^svruv 
auruiv s^^s'^rj. For he did not wish to intimate 
that such a thing was said, when the children 
were not born, as if they were born, but that 
it was said with a direct reference to their not 
being born ; /^yids T^d^avrsg ri dya^ov ri %a%w. For 
the force of the argument lies in this, that in 
tlie decree of God all regard to fortuitous 
events is put out of the question. Wherefore 
if the Apostle had written ou-ttw yi\\r^h7(av^ he 
would have said, that the children were not 
born when this was said, yet that God knew 
that they were about to be born, and to act 
well or ill ; and therefore that God decreed 
concerning men yet not born, as though they 
were ; which idea is foreign to the mind of the 
Apostle, and has given rise to many painful 


discussions respecting the divine prescience. 
He wrote, therefore, /ajjtw, that the negation 
might be referred to the mind of God in the 
matter. There is a similar reason for the use 
of ,oo^vrw in the other passage, Heb. ix. 8. For 
it is not denied that the way was then opened ; 
but it is said that the Spirit taught this; and 
therefore the negation is not to be referred t-o 
tlie matter itself which was absent, but to the 
thought, for the Spirit admonished men not 
to think that the way was opened. If he 
had written outtu -rg^ai/g^wtf^a/, the notion of fu- 
ture time would have been introduced, as if the 
Spirit would teach that the odog rojv ay'im was not 
opened, but that it would be subsequently, 
wliich it is evident the Apostle did not mean. 
Besides, as ou negatives a thing simply, and m 
as regarded in the thought, (Hermann ad 
Viger. p. 807.) so also ourw and M'^oi differ in 
the same way. If I should say, ouVw roXtra^ 
speaking of any act, I deny that it is yet done, 
but I infer that it may be done hereafter; but 
if I say /A^-^rw I not only regard it as not done, 
but I doubt, or at least I do not in any M^ay 
imply, whether it shall yet be done at any 
time. I doubt, therefore, whether it could be 
said in the two passages formerly quoted ; 
/x^-Tw Ict] rb rsXogy and /O-^tw rixst 7} wpcc fiov, for by 


the particle /x^'tw the thought of the event oo- 
curring subsequently is put away. And there- 
fore in Xenoph. Memorab. iv. 4. 23, we find 
opposed to each other ra ax/>ta^ovra, ra fjjTi'joi 
axfi,dZpv7a and Tu 'xoL^rixfjja'x.dTa. Xenophon did not 
write ra ou'ttm ax{x>aCpvTa, because the time of the 
future oL-A.[i7] was not thought of, and therefore 
it occurs immediately afterwards, ra rwv [li] 
ci.x[j,aZ6)irM)) ov (fTTovdaTa. But to proceed. 

I liave at different times observed, that the 
lexicographers get into error in the explana- 
tion of compound words ; thinking that as tlm 
one common notion of the simple word exists 
in its compounds, therefore the compounds 
cannot differ between themselves. For al- 
though at times it may seem to matter little 
which compound word a writer makes use of 
in a particular place, yet it is often needful 
for us to consider what is the specific force of 

xara(p^ovsTv '^rs^Kp^ovsTv (y'7rs^(p^ovsTvy 
are either of them rendered, to despise, to con- 
temn, and so far they agree, that each signifies 
contempt. But the contempt of others is 
twofold in the cause and the mode of it, either 
when we think less of others than they deserve, 
or more of ourselves than we ought. The former 
idea would be expressed by ptara^govs/i/, the latr 


ter by '7rs^i(poovs7v, To this ■j'rs^<poovm stands nearly 
related, as appears from a passage in Aristo- 
phanes, (Nubb. V. 226, 227.) where Socrates 
says, de^o^aroj xai 'rrsPKp^ovu rhv T,ymy Strepsiades 
would malignantly turn this, gVe/r a-ri raJ^oD 
roui %0-jg v'rs^(p^ovsTg. For he had said rrs^t(p^ovsTvj 
which, as the Scholiast observes, di'rrXoarifiavrov 
sffrt, xai avri rou 'Tre^tcfxo'Tru), xal avri rov v<:re^(p^ovu. 
Strepsiades suggests therefore the word wrs^- 
(p^ovsTg, /Va dia^dXXr) rov 2oj'/C^drrjv ^^^(p^ovovvra ruv 
^eojv, as another Scholiast notices. For he 
who ^rsjv^^oj's?, 2. e. studiously and ambitiously 
seeks divine things, runs the risk of thinking 
that he knows more than the Deity, i, e, ^-^sg- 
(pooveT. They therefore are said, v're^(ppo)iiTv who 
appear to themselves to be wiser and more pru- 
dent than others. If it is said simply, as in 
Rom. xii. 3, /J^n V'7rso(pooviTv, cra^' o dsT(p^oveTv, it sig- 
nifies to think more of oneself than is right ; 
for the words <rap' o 8£T<p^oveTv, explain the word 
u'7r£§(p^onTv, so that unless the consent of the var- 
rious codices had confirmed the text, it might 
have been regarded as an explanatory gloss ; 
for a few codices omit it. The contrary to 
this is (Sctxp^oviTv : whence Hesychius writes, 'tte^/- 
(p^oveTg' m^i(roj(p^oviTg' u'rs^<p^oviTg. In Titus there- 
fore we find in c. ii. 15, 'ikiyyj avrovg fji^erd rraffrig 
smra/y^g, !Mr,biig mv TioKp^onirUy " warn them most 


seriously, with all authority, that no one think 
himself above the need of admonition." For 
if the admonition be only given xara cjyyvojfiriv 
(1 Cor. vii. 6,) it is to be feared lest the hear- 
ers should not regard it as applicable to them, 
and should treat it lightly. So also in Aeschi- 
nes, n^i^ <7rs^i(p^om roD "(^jlv. For he is foolish who 
despises life. Neither was this the notion of 
Socrates ; but he had learned from the instruc- 
tions of this wonderfully wise man, or/, n xarw, 
71 avu, svdatfiovsTv dsTrov /Ss/S/wxora sOrfs/Sw?, and there- 
fore he now feels himself to be superior, both 
to the pleasures of life and the fear of death, 
ars sig afi^shu ohov fi,ira(Srri<s6iMvov, But a little be- 
fore he had Stlid xara(p^ovri(fai b'jrs^SaXkovruv "^tj^iuv 
^!Cig. But Paul writes to Timothy, 1 Tim. iv. 
12, {JjYihiig Gou rr,i vidrrirog xaraip^ovsiru, let no man 
despise thy youth, but be thou an example. 
It were false to say that here xara^govg/P involves 
in it the having cause of contempt. The proper 
force of the word is evident in Matth. vi. 24, 
ri ivog av^g^gra/, xal rou krs^ov xaraOPOvsTg^ he will 
disregard, neglect the other. So in Rom. ii. 
4, T^s fiax^o^v/Jbiag rov ^iou %ara(p^oviTg, despisest 
thou, not knowing that the goodness of God, 
&c. In 1 Timothy vi. 2, it is used in the 
same sense, o] Tigrovg s^ovrag dsgrorag fin xara- 
(p^ovBiTcaffav^ on ddsX(poi g/Viv, dXXoe, /MaXXov dovXivnruffoiv, 


but elliptically, the object being omitted. 
Finally, when in Heb. xii. 2, Jesus is said, 
cL-oyjovr^c, xaTa(p^ovri<sagy it is manifest that the 
meaning is not that our Lord held himself 
above the force of contumely, but that he so 
disregarded or despised the shame, as that he 
was willing to endure the cross ; which is the 
real force of the word. 

Take another example of the words 
d^otXXarrs/v biaXkamir xctraXkamir aToxa- 

These compounds of aXkarniVy which means 
strictly to change, (as it were, to do different^ 
ly), either as to the thing itself, or the exter- 
nal condition and place of it, agree so far as 
this, that this original force of a change of state 
OT mind exists in them all; but they differ as 
to the mode of thought, and are therefore pro- 
perly accounted synonyms. 

For acraXXarrs/i/ properly is to remove, and 
dcraXXarrsffi^a; airo rivog is to set free from some- 
tiling; and therefore, in Heb. ii. 15, it is said 
of one who, by a certain cause, is delivered 
and absolved, whether by a friendly paction or 
a judicial sentence ; and more especially of the 
creditor or the accuser who dismisses the debtor 
or the guilty. So, Luke xii. 58, ^v rfj odu 66c 
s^yaolav d'xrjXXu^^ai d'X avroij, which is usually 


rendered " Give diligence, that thou mayst be 
delivered from him, lest he shoukl take thee to 
the judge." It differs from a(psivai; Demos- 
thenes pro Phorm. (p. 95*2, Reisk.) xa/' oVa r/s 
afjjxsv /y u--r7]XXa^iv et adv. Pantaen. (p. 966.) 
'TTsoI m av rig a^g/g xa) ccxaXkd^cig hxdZ^irar (vid. 
vv. dd. ad Harpocrat. v. d(pdg). It is worthy 
of notice also, that d-raXXdrrsiv is said not only 
of the creditor who sets free the debtor, but of 
the debtor who satisfies his creditor; which 
has been shown in many instances by Raphelius 
and Eisner'^ on the above passage, and in 
Dresigius de verbis mediis, p. 180. In this 
case, therefore, d':raXXdrrsSa,i must be under- 
stood of the debtor who, before he reaches the 
judge, would endeavour any how to satisfy 
his creditor, that he may let him go, and rather 
to sacrifice something than to stand a trial. 
And I rather agree with those who do not con- 
sider ^og s^yaffiav a Latinism, da operant^ (in 
which sense I never met with the word), but 

^ Eisner, on this passage, says, " Beza has rendered this 
incorrectly, ut libereris ah eo, when its real force is, that 
thou mayst depart from him," referring to Acts xix. 12, 
tuart a.'TTa.X'ka.aiTKrSa.i «ct' auruv rag voffovg ; or rather, " that 
you may be released by him, as appeased ;" and quotes, in 
support of this, Aristoph. Nubib. 1194. 



that it refers to the sum or compensation given 
to appease the creditor. The same idea exists 
in the parallel passage Matth. v. 25, i'ff^/ ilvouv 
TM- dvridixu) (fou. These words are rightly ex- 
plained by Zonaras, (p. 920, and Phavorimis), 
from an old commentator, xa^rahiyoM (j^aXXov adi- 
xg/o3a/; and hence it appears, that the word 
d'TraXkarrsiv does not involve in it properly the 
notion of reconciling or appeasing, unless it 
flows from the thought that he who is sent 
away satisfied is appeased. But this idea will 
appear more plainly in the words 

diccXXdrrnv and xaraXXdrrzjv, 
They, however, differ ; for diaXXdrrsiv is said 
of many, xctraWdrrm of one. The former is to 
cause a mutual enmity to cease, as in Xeno- 
phon, biaWdmiv rag 'XokifidiKSag cr^og dXkrjXovg iro- 
>-e/5. So it occurs once in the New Testament, 
Matth. V. 24, ^laKkdy^^i ru) ddsX<pu} ffov. It does 
not mean here, see that he be reconciled to 
thee, but, see that ye be reconciled to each 
other. It is not sufficient that he should be 
no longer angry, but that both parties should 
be on good terms. And hence, ^/aXXaxr^c is 
one who reconciles hostile parties. (See Hem- 
si crhusius ad Thom. Mag. v. dirjXXdyri.) Whilst 
y.ciraXkdrriDi is strictly, SO to act as that the 
opposite party may lay aside his enmity. Ac- 


curacy, therefore, required in the above pas- 
sage of Matthew, biaXkayri^i, not xaraWdyr^i ; 
for the latter refers but to one party ; the other 
to both. Neither is this contradicted by a pas- 
sage in Thucydides (iv. 59.), where the Scho- 
liast says, 7h hi TLCcraXkayrivai to hiuXXay^vai. For 
he does not say this without addition, and sim- 
ply; but 'TT^og dXXyjXovg zaraXXayrimty which is in 
fact BtaXXayj^vai. Hence, xaraXXayrif properly 
ill the singular, is not a mutual reconciliation, 
but the conciliating of one party. Nor does 
Aristophanes, Avibus, v. 1597, appear to us to 
have written rashly, 'tts^^ '^toXs/mio xarceXXa^^?, and 
not, as the Grammarians would have it, xara/.- 
Xa/wv. For ToXifj.og is taken collectively, as the 
one enmity of those parties warring, on the 
subsiding of which the war ceases, and dtaX- 
Xdrrovrai oi ToXs/xoD'yrgg. Certainly he could not 
have written -n-s^/ 'jroXiiioio dtaXXayuv, as it occurs 
in V. 1539, and v. 1584. So, in Romans xi. 
15, the vj d'TofSoXri ru)\> 'lovdatm is said to be xaraX- 
Xayn 7(,6(f,(iou, the putting away of the Jews is 
the means of reconciliation to others ; not that 
it is the cause of the union of Jews and Gen- 
tiles in the Christian community; for this 
would be unmeaning in itself, and foreign to 
the mind of the Apostle. Neither, in two 
other passages, Rom. v. 11, and 2 Cor. v. 18, 


1 9, does y.aruWay^ mean the remission of sins, 
as if God were appeased, and a mutual recon- 
ciliation takes place between God and man. 
In the former passage, undoubtedly, ^araXkayy^ 
means the actual reconciliation of men by the 
death of Christ; for we being enemies '/tarr^k- 
XdyrnMiv; and not that God %arr^Xa.yr\ rui xoff/M(jJ. 
In the other passage, the diaxovia, rng xccToKkctyni 
is not the office of teachins: the doctrine of the 
remission of sins, i. e. of the expiation ; but it is 
the office itself, as exercised by the Apostle, of ad- 
vising, exhorting, beseeching men, xaraXXdyrin 
rtZ %(Z, i. e. the office of effecting the xaraXkayri, 
For it is not that God was the enemy of men ; 
(John iii. 16,) nor was the object to be effected 
his reconciliation ; but that men being ^-x^i^' "^^^ 
^3oD, should return into favour with God; i. e. 
since by sin theyare become adverse to the divine 
sanctity, and possess a carnal mind inimical to 
God, (Rom. viii. 7, rh (poovTjfMot, rr^g ea^xhg g%^^a iig 
^eov,) and, therefore, have reason to fear his holy 
authority, (as it becomes those to do who have 
not been obedient to the law, and know that they 
cannot please God,) they may now return to 
favour with God ; that, as is well expressed by 
Morns, they should not only cease to fear for 
themselves respecting God, but that they 
should cease from their resistance to his autho- 


rity. We know how much it has obscured the 
doctrines of the Gospel, that interpreters have 
not distinguished with sufficient accuracy the 
words of sacred Scripture ; but it is most abun- 
dantly shown, by means of this very word, how 
necessary it is to observe the strict and proper 
force of all words. We should be careful also 
not to confound 7\affSiiv and xaraXXarrs/c. /Xac- 
^^5 is the cause for the which men may and 
ought 'AaraXkciyr^vcLi rw Ssw. Neither is Christ 
called 6 %(traXka66m^ as haXkactsm God and 
man; the word is applied to God himself, for 
truly it was God who was ^^ X?"^'^'? ''o'^/^o" y-ocrak- 
XatfCwv savTtjjf firi Xoyi^^ofisvog avroTg ra 'rra^aTTOj/xara, 
ahroj)). Wherefore, we must not suppose that 
these words are said av^owToTa^a;^ ; for nothing 
can be said more truly worthy of the holiness 
and wisdom of the Almiarhtv, than that which 
is contained in them ; except we rashly mix up 
with them the unfounded notion of an appeas- 
ing of the divine anger. 

But as the force of xaraXXaffu-s/v, inasmuch as it 
differs from diaXkd<f6siv, may be abundantly ga- 
thered from these passages of the New Testa- 
ment, so also may it be traced in other Greek 
writers. So in the Cyrop. vi. 6, 2, Orontes is 
said xccraXkaysig Kugw. Formerly he had made 
war on Cyrus, but now he dissembled with 


him, sm^oukivzi Kugw, and professed friendship. 
Cyrus, however, having discovered his deceit, 
complained of him, and ^gj/ai/ sXa(3ov %cl\ sSfiuxa. 
Joseph us Ant. lud. vi. 7, 4, rra^axaXsTv TJ^^aro rh» 
%0Vf x,ocraXkdTr2(^cct ruj 2avXuj kcli (a^ ypCki'iramiv 
vii. 8, 4, tC) gavrov 'xaibi xaraXkdyrj^i xa/ r/jv 'Tr^og 
aurov h^yriv a<psg' opp. ci'Trs^^sff^ai ruJ 'rraibi. And in 
Book iii. 15, 2, he says, that the Jews entreated 
Moses that he would be xaraXTuzxr^^S aOrwv ir^hg 
rhv ^soi', but tliat Moses refused, because God 
was not rashly, but deservedly angry with 
them. In Demosthenes we read, p. 189, 16, 
ed. Reisk. rovg "EXXrivag o^&i^ dso(j,£vovg btaXkaTtroUy 
i. c. who would conciliate the offended. Euri- 
pid. Iph. in Aul. v. 1157, oS got xaraXXu^^Tsa 
'TTipi es Ttai do/Mvg. conf. Helen, v. 1251. And in 
Sophocles, Ajac. v. 744, ^soTatv ug zaraXXd^^?} 
yJiXov. Schol. oVwg rriv g'^^^ai/ acro^rjra/. This is 
said of Ajax, who, through his insanity, was 
offended with the gods. Further examples are 

We have only now to notice aroxaraXXam/v, 
which only occurs twice in the New Testa- 
ment, Ephes. ii. 16, xa/ a-roxaraXXa^Tj rovg dfKp' 
orspovg sv m (Su)/j,ari ruJ ^£oJ. and Coloss. i. 20, xa/ 
0/' auTov aToxaraXXa^a/ ra, '^ravroc eig aurov. The 
meaning in the former passage is explained by 
the Apostle himself in v. 15, o frot^aag ru d{j^<p6ri^a 


«V ; in the latter by s/^rivoToiyimg, in both there is 
the same notion which we know to be the pro- 
per meaning of xaraXXdrrstv, For the notion 
of mutual alienation exists not so much in the 
word itself, as in the whole formula, as ma)'^ 
be gathered from v. 22. But then in the word 
u'TroxaraXXdrrsiv, there seems a greater force than 
in xaraXXuTTsiv ; for xaTaXXayivrsg, are they who 
return into favour with any one ; but acroxaraX- 
Xayevrsg, are they, M^ho so lay aside their 
enmity that amity follows ; nor does any im- 
pediment remain to their living accordantly 
sv hi GuifMuri^ the one head of which is Christ, 
Eph. i. 10, dvccTtzcpaXaiujaac^at rd irdvra h rui XoigTOj. 
For though in words compounded of two or 
more prepositions we must not expect to 
find proportional emphasis,' yet care must be 

' That is emphasis, says Quintillian, ^x. 2, where more 
is signified than is said ; or as he says elsewhere, viii. 3, the 
existence of a deeper thought, than that which words seem 
to express. Ernesti states more correctly, (See Bibl. ('abi- 
net, vol. i. p. 52.) "that emphasis is an accession to the ac- 
customed meaning of the word ; and he adds, in the next 
section, that no Avord is emphatic in itself; for every word 
has a certain definite meaning, and conveys a precise idea 
in which there can be no emphasis." And therefore em- 
phasis, or additional force, must not be looked for, unless we 
gather from the mind of the speaker, that some additional 
force is intended to be added to the customary force of the 
word, or that the writer evidently meant more than the 


taken, not to assume rashly that words of this 
kind mean only and precisely the same thing. 
The preposition a^-o has this force, that if it be 
added to a compound verb, it increases its 
power, and indicates that the thing intended 
by that word is done altogether absolutely, or 
in a greater degree. So ar2x5s;)^£(r^a/ is to ex- 
pect constantly, not only for a certain time, 
but even to the end, till the expected event 
happens, Rom. viii. 19 ; 1 Cor. i. 7. The 
same remark will apply to u'roTcaoadoxiTv, which 
Fischer labours to show (de Vit. Lex. N. T. 
p. 128.) does not differ from the simple word 
xocpadoxuv. We grant indeed, that emphasis 
must not be looked for, and that both words 
may be rendered by the same Latin word, ex- 
jnctare ; but we deny that the force and mean- 
ing of both words is precisely the same, or that 

word which he has used conveys. Therefore in comparing 
such words as KaocchoKUv, k'Kmcu^cchoKiW \Kh'i^i(T6a.k, kviKh't- 
^tcr^ai' o^i^tiv, I'^oo^l^iiv yivuerxiiv, T^oytvuffKUv^ we are not tO 
expect emphasis arising from the compound, but to inquire 
whether the comf>ound really in itself means more than 
the uncompounded word. But the whole figment about em- 
phasis, has arisen from the misunderstanding of compound 
words, as I have shown in my dissertation on the force of 
prepositions in compound words in the New Testament. 
Emphasis is not in a word, because it means more by itself 
than another word, but because he who uses it means more 
by it, than the word itself would convey. 


Polybius, sometimes writing d'TroxapadoxiTv, 
whilst in many other places he writes xcc^cc^oxiTvy 
had no design in dropping the preposition. 
Certainly in those places which are adduced, 
it appears manifest that a-Toxaga^oxs/v, is said of 
a man who expects an event, (as we say, ab- 
warten.) So on that passage, in Zonaras and 
Suldas, the word a'Troxa^adoxIa, which is attri- 
buted to Polybius, 6 ds xaSJjirro Iv r^ cragg/x/SoX^j, 
a<7roxa^adoxcov, o'ttoi xa} rhyyig p(;&jg>j<ro/ ra irgayiLCLra. 
And in Excerpt, de Legat. s. n. 9. (p. 23. ed. 
Ursin.) (ywsjSovXsvov avroJ, -TT^ifffSsurag 'Trsfcmiv sig rijv 
'PoofiTjv VTS^ (S\)iJjfjjayjag^ ha, [M,ri doxp ro7g xai^oTg svs- 
d^svuv d'TTOxa^otdoxsTv rriv Avri6')(ou ira^ovGiav and 
again (n. 3*2. p. 65.) : d'^rsxa^ccdoxn rovg h rng 
ToXswg, siti Tivog 'iffovrai yvui/xrig. In which passages, 
the notion here stated is very evident. Also in 
Polyb. xvi. 1, aTTSxa^adoxsi rev xhdvvov. (conf. 
Joseph. B. I. Hi. 7, 26.) 

But xa^adoxsTv, which Is properly to stretch 
forth the head, i. e. to direct the eyes to any 
thing, (as in Aristoph. Equit. v. 660, exa^a- 
doxriffiv %ig IfM r) (3ovXn -TrdXiv. Schol. d'ra/3X£\)^£v) means 
by itself, according to my opinion, to observe 
diligently what may be done or may happen, 
and thence, to expect. And therefore, Hesy- 
chius says, xa^adoxsr ir^ogdoxsT, sxds-^srat^ ri s'?nrr]oiT 
rh xi<paXuiov rov '^^dy^arog. And in thls, Zonaras 


the Etymol. Mag., Suidas, and TImaeus agree. 
Whence also, haxa^ahoxCv^ which word Toup. 
restores for the word xa^ahxttm Suidas, (See 
Emendat. in Suidam, p. ii.p. 310.) rnv roxr exehrjv 
dhx.a§adoxr}gafLev, that is, we passed the whole 
night through expecting. 

In this sense, xa^adoxsTv is used by Polybius 
and others, but all will see that it is scarcely 
possible, but that in thought we shall subjoin 
the additional notion, which I have said to be 
peculiar to acroxa^a^oxg/V, viz. the expectation 
of the event, or happening, of a certain thing; 
for he M^io is interested in that which may 
happen, diligently watches all that is done, 
and does not expect in the sense in which the 
word 'T^ogdjXiTv would be used, i. e. to await the 
event, as we say, erioarten ; but in the sense of 
observing, that he may consider what he should 
do, if the event occurs either the one wav or the 
other. It is used simply by Philo. (vita Mos. 
p. 604. ed. Paris.) speaking of the sister of 
Moses, /x/x^o'v uTTO^iv sxaoadoxsi ro drro^yjffo/LsvoVf 
which Clemens Alex, expresses by strsTrj^si rh 
a<!ro^ri(r6fMsvov. (vid. Diodor. Sic. xix. 16, Xenoph. 
Mem. iii. 5, 6.) In Herodotus vii. 168, we 
find, xa^ccdoxsovrsg tov ToXe/tLov tj <7r^ffssTai, See Valck- 
enar. who affirms that Diodorus Sic. speak- 
ing of the same thing, has written xa^adoxouvrsi 


rag rou ToXsfiou ^O'Trdg. That 'Tr^ogdoxsTv and xa^a- 
doxiTv differ, will appear from Euripides, Rhes. 
V. 144. ffaXTiyyog ccvdnv T^ogdoKuiv xaoaUxn, 

The word ccmjia^adox/a occurs twice in the 
New Testament; in Philipp. i. 20, xara r^y 
aroxa^adoKtccv xal sXmda fiov, and Romans viii. 19, 
35 aTToxa^aaox/a r^j xr/Vewg. In both places, the 
notion exists of an expected event. In the 
former passage, the Apostle said, however ill 
things went, yet he would be of good courage, 
because he knew on rovro avru) dTO^/jgirai tig 
auTvj^/av; and he calls this anticipated prosperous 
issue dmxa^adoxia, xa/ sXmg. And in the latter 
passage, the word could not properly be un- 
derstood in the force of '^r^ogdoxia, or simple ex- 
pectation. It would be sadly tame if it were 
so rendered, ^ d'rroxa^adoxio. rijg xr/<fsug r^v aToxd- 
>.u^j//v ru)V vim rov SsoD d<7rexde^irui, viz. the expec- 
tation of the creature (rns xrigsug) expects. It 
is rather the solicitous and anxious regard to, 
and desire of, the probable issue in afflictive 
circumstances, which looks for the d'xoxdXv-^if, 
Luther renders it well : das angstliche Harren, 
But students should be warned not to allow 
themselves to imagine, that in the explana- 
tions of words given by the old lexicographers, 
all the words which they thus put down to- 
gether have the same force and meaning ; for 


they frequently use synonymous terms"* to ex- 
plain an obscure word. Fischer is wrong in this 
respect when he endeavours to show that xa^a- 
doxia and d<roxa^ado%la do not differ. He brings 
forward the authority of Hesychius, who says, 
that airoxa^ahxia is <r^og5ox/a. But, to return to 
the word aToxaraXXarrs/v. In this passage is 
recorded that great and extensive conversion 
of the state of things on earth which God has 
decreed to effect by Christ, that all men, freed 
from pride, covetousness, and the love of foolish 
vanities, and at length reconciled to God, xarak- 
Xayhng t'Sj ^suj, encouraged by one hope, and 
seeking eternal life through one Saviour, should 
unite in one society or communion, sv svi ffui/xari, 
of which the Lord himself is the head, og rra^i- 
h^r\ dia ra '^a^a<:rru)fji,a<ra rjfiojv xai Tiyio^ri bia rr^v 
hi7(.aiu<siv TiiMuv, And if we do not yet see all 
nations, nor all professing Christians, realizing 
this wondrous benefit and blessing, though we 
do perceive cratfay r^v xrkiv gvgrevd^etv xai gvvudmiv 
cLy^^i rou vvv, let US cleave more earnestly to the 
amxccoadoxla xai eXrr/g of the Apostle ; and while 
not unduly confident of our own state, but cer- 
tainly not despairing of a prosperous issue in 

" That is, in the strict sense of the word synonym, as used 
l>y Titmann; words ranging together under a common 
^e.ius, but having each a specific difference. T. 


eternal felicity, a'Trixhy^ojin^ot. rnv vio^iffiav, rriv 
d'Tox.dXu'^iv Tojv viuv Tov ^sov. E/ yd^ '^)(^i'^' ovrsg 
xar^X?\.ay7j/Agv rui ^gw, did rou ^avdrov rov v/ov aurou, 
'TToXXu) fidXXov xaraXkaysMTig (fu^riffo/i/.s^a Iv rfj ^oj9] 
avToZ. For hereafter, -raca yj XTiatg d'xaXXayr,6ir(x,i 
r^g fiaraiorrirog by liim, by means of whom God 
has decreed dTOxaraXXd^ai rd itdvTci iJg aurov. 



Such is the abundance of words in the Greek 
language, which may be accounted synony- 
mous, that the further I proceed in these in- 
vestigations, I see less reason to hope that I 
shall bring them to a close. For while my 
advancing years admonish me, the work groAvs 
on my hand; and the limits of such a work 
seem inadequate to include the many subjects 
before me. I would not, however, willingly 
fail those who have not been altogether dissatis- 
fied with my labours, and therefore as yet I 
proceed in explaining the synonyms of the 
New Testament. 

I would speak, therefore, now of those syno- 
nyms which are of frequent occurrence, but to 
which much difficulty attaches, because the 
difference existing between them is so fre- 
quently lost sight of in common use, that it 
may be doubted whether even the more elegant 
Greek writers have always correctly observed it. 
I speak of those words which relate to the senses, 
and to things applicable to the senses, such 
as words of liearing, seeing, feeling, and others ; 


which, when they are transferred to express the 
acts of mind, assume a very varied force and 
character. It occurs in all languages, that the 
notions of things which pertain to the mind 
and its various offices, must be expressed by 
words which have their origin in the several 
powers of the external senses. But since in 
all perceptions there is a triple mode of percep- 
tion, either of the object perceived, or of the 
subject affected, or of the thought which arises 
from the relation of both, it follows that words 
drawn from the powers of the senses, when 
transferred to the mind, or from the relation of 
external things, may be used in all the various 
modes in which the mind is thus moved or 
affected; although all these several modes may 
be found conjoined in the same perception. 
Whence, it may arise, that words of this kind 
may appear to be capable of a promiscuous 
use, with no other object in view from their 
interchange except a certain gratification of 
elegant taste. So when Socrates, in Xeno- 
phon's Memorab. i. 4, 17, is related to 
have said, to chv fj,h o^a,aa duvas'^at s'Tri croXXcc ffrddia 
s^iTiveTi^aif rhv ci rou ^£ov 6(p'i^aX/Mhv aduvarov sJvai a/xa 
xdvra h^^r there are few but would think that 
the difference between ofj^u^a and o<p^aXfi6v waa 
such only, that it might have been written 


c/x/xa ^£oD and o^^aX/^ov ac^Pwcrou ; yet I am quite 
convinced that Xenophon did not in this in- 
stance avoid as a matter of mere elegance the 
repetition of the same word, but that the use 
of each was justified by its own peculiar force 
and meaning, o^^a^aoj may be applied to the 
deity, but liiy^(*' can only be applied with pro- 
priety to men. But let us notice other ex- 
jSXsTs/v %av ]hi'ir '(j'XTiS^cir ^iac^ar (^sw^sTv.) 

Since the eyes are not only " the light of 
the body," but the sedulous ministers and 
satellites of the mind also, it is not surprising 
that the Greeks should have so many words, 
v/hich relate properly to the use of the eyes. 
And the German language also, like the Greek, 
abounds in words which express the widely ex- 
tensive functions of the eyes. Of those which 
occur in the New Testament, we may consider 
their several relation to, and difi*erence from 
each other. 

jSXsvrg/i/ is a word of wide extent. It is sim- 
ply, to use the eyes, to see. He who has 
sight, /3Xe-g/. It is used of those who recover 
sight, Luke vii. 21 ; Matth. xv. 31 ; John ix. 
7. And often in the New Testament, rA 
/3X8'T<J/x£va are, the things seen by the eyes (o^ara 
are the things which may be seen). Hence 


in Mattli. v. 28, is simply to see or look at a 
woman, without reference to passion. That 
idea is expressed subsequently, 'Trohg rh sTi'^vfii^ffcj 
aurTjg. They who turn their eyes to any thing 
to look on it are said, s/'g n SKs'tthv ; as in Luke 
ix. 62, oudsig s-TrijSaXujv t7\v %s/^a ahrou I-tt a^or^ov, 
xccl (SKsxojv s}g ra h'xi(S(f}, ixt^irog huv s/'j rriv (SaffiXs/av 
Tov ^soy, which passage is generally, but im- 
properly rendered, " He who puts his hand 
to the plough, and then turns back.^' For they 
say, (3Xs-Tr£iv s/g rd omgoj is to revert, to rush 
back ; and they appeal to the Hebrew, in which 
words of seeing are sometimes used for 
journeying, as in Genesis xix. 26, where the 
word ZD^nij and she looked back, is to be un- 
derstood of the actual return, not only from its 
own force, but because of the explanation af- 
forded by Luke xvii. 32. But though it is 
probable that the wife of Lot not only looked 
back, but returned, and in that return was 
suffocated; yet it does not follow from this, 
that ^Xs-ntv £/'; m 6'xiffoj signifies to return, or 
that ^Ksrsiv signifies, to journey ; than which a 
more complete non sequitur could scarcely be 
found. In fact, the notion of return is neither 
required here, nor can it be admitted. For 
first, they have to insert the notion of the par- 
ticular time, ajid then, which is not found in 



the sentence; the composition of which requires 
that the time should be the same in which the 
man puts his hand to the plough and looks 
back. Besides, the person to which this re- 
lates, had asked permission, before he followed 
Christ, to bid his friends farewell, which would 
require him then actually to return home, 
whilst, at the same time, there existed in his 
mind the real intention of returning to follow 
the Lord Jesus, as others, v. 59, 60. It is not, 
therefore, the inconstancy and vacillation of 
the man that is thus reproved ; for he had 
said without hesitation, " Lord, I will follow 
thee ;" but that heavy and sensual mind, which 
even in such a crisis prevented the forgetful- 
ness of external things, and by which the desire 
for the kingdom of God is repressed and de- 
teriorated. Our Lord could not mean that this 
young man had already hegun the worh, which 
they affirm to be the meaning of o st/^uXuv rriv 
;i^£/^a abrov Iv a^or^ov, and then wished to leave it 
as unwilling to return. Neither of these ideas 
agree with the account of this well-disposed 
youth ; for he had not yet put his hand to the 
plough. And he was evidently wishing to re- 
turn to the Lord Jesus, that he might follow 
him altogether. To me it appears, that Christ 
used the image merely of a labourer, who with 


his hand actually on the plough, looks back, 
and therefore moves not onward with alacrity, 
but pauses in his course. The meaning of 
the passage would seem to be, That man is 
not fit for the kingdom of God, who hangs 
back and still hankers after those things, which 
he is bound to leave resolutely behind him. 
For ^Xs'Trm sig ti, properly means nothing more 
than turning the eyes to an object: as Xeno- 
phon. Anabas. iv. 1.15, ISXs-^ov iig ra opn, ^cci 7di 
ug a^ara ^dvra sffr/. It, however, means some- 
times to observe accurately with desire; as 
Matth. xxii. 16, and Mark xii. 14, ov ISXsjrsig iig 
'}r^6<S(t)'xov dv^Poj'Truy. See concerning this formula 
vv. dd. ad Lucian. i. M. D. p. 378. In the 
same way it may be transferred to the mintl. 
But it is sufficient to keep by the proper no- 
tion of the word, which corresponds with the 
German, sehen. Nor is it strange that /SXs^s/v, 
although it is used for the actual sense of see- 
ing, should not only be applied to things which 
do not see nor perceive the things placed be- 
fore them, as in Acts xxvii. 12; but is also 
affirmed of things to be perceived by other 
senses. Yet it cannot be said, that ^Xirsiv is, 
to hear. For in the passage (SXs'rovTag xu<povg 
XaXovvrag, we must not render it, hearing the 
dumb to speak, for then it would have been 


written XaXsTv; but it is properly seeing, for the 
word ^Xirovrag belongs not only to xu(povg, but 
to xuXko-jg and the other words in the sentence. 
Men may quote, Apoc. i. 12, sfriffr^s-^a /SXgTs/v 
rriv (puv^v 7^ rig sXdXrjtfs fj^ir s/ao-j. But even here, 
iSxirztv is not to hear. It were needless to say : 
" He turned to hear the voice," for he had 
heard it ; but he turned that he might ascertain 
from whence the voice came. Equally wide 
of the mark are the passages adduced from 
Greek writers. For in these the words oWecr^a/ 
and opjiv, do not mean to hear ; but to perceive 
mentally whether by seeing or hearing, as in 
Aeschylus. (Prom, vinct. v. 21.) // ovrs (po^^Vy 
ouTc rot fjt,o^(priv o-^si (conf. Sopliocl. Trach. v. 

That (SXsmiv only denotes the act of seeing, 
without any thought of the object presented 
to the sight, will appear also from the fact that 
/3Xg///^a does not signify the thing seen, as o^a/^a, 
but the eye, or the aspect in which we see. 
And hence, finally, we arrive at the explana- 
tion of that formula, which occurs twice in the 
New Testament, ^Xsmiv uto rmg. There it is 
said, that (SXs'xnv is to beware ; but, at the out- 
set, they rashly confound this formula with 
another, /^Xe^n-s /x^, from which it widely differs. 
But, besides this, it Is impossible to make out 


that (SXimiv d'TTo rivog means to beware for oneself; 
for he who wishes to beware of any thing does 
not turn his eyes from it, (as they say the 
swallow does), but steadily looks at the object 
to be avoided; ^Xs'ttsi ij^n -^ratf;^?! rt. But as /3Xe- 
irm iig n is to turn the eyes to a thing, so /SXs- 
cre/v d'TTo rmg is to turn away the eyes, as flying 
from it. In this formula, therefore, the idea 
is rather to avoid, and to fly from, than to be- 
ware of; and this is evident in Mark viii. 15, 
ogarg, ^Xs<xsrs uto rra Zptirig ruv cpa^tffa/Cfiv, i. e. be- 
ware of them, fly from them. Surely he would 
not twice say, beware ; but he wished his dis- 
ciples not to follow the hollow professions of 
these men, as xii. 38. And Matth. xvi. 6, 
o^arg, '7r^o6sy(^iTS dirh rrig XJ^iiY\g r. (p. But, in fact, 
these pages would not contain the examples, 
if we are to show how frequently all such for- 
mulae are confounded together in our lexi- 

The word ooav diff'ers from ^Xs-ttsi in this, that 
although it means to see, yet it is referred to 
the thing seen, or presented to the eye. ^Xsmi 
is said of one who uses his eyes, even though 
he sees nothing ; (^Xs^rovrgg ov ^Xs'Trovfff ;) 6^a, of 
one who sees something. Hence o^a/xa is tluit 
which is seen, ooaffig the species or form of the 
thing which falls on the eye, o^arov, that which 


it submitted to sight, which is visible. And o^av 
is never used absolutely, but as associated 
with the thought of that which is looked at. 
But as it becomes him who would avoid error 
or deception, diligently to circumspect and 
to observe all things, we may comprehend 
how these expressions, %«, o^ars, ooan fjuri sig- 
nify, take care, see that, beware lest. And 
in this way we explain Heb. viii. 5, %a 
rroi7]ffpg. Moses is warned to observe accurately 
the intended building, that it may be made ac- 
cording to the pattern. But when we say 
o^arSf h^an fin, we require those who are about 
to do any thing, to examine in the first place 
cautiously, lest they do that which they ought 
not to do. And although in both forms, o^are 
,'j^n and (SXzTsrs /^jj, the notion of being ware, 
exists ; yet they differ. For as SXecrere, with- 
out a negation, signifies only, use your eyes, 
that you may see correctly, as in 1 Cor. x. 18, 
Philip, iii. 2, so o^are has this force, that we 
command the eyes or the mind to turn to the 
object. It is said, therefore, correctly in Acts 
xxii. 26, ^^a r/ (MiXkug 'xonTv. And /SXecre could not 
have been used, for the centurion is admonish- 
ed that he may look at what he is about to 
do, lest he command a Roman citizen to be 
scourged. On the contrary, in Mark iv. 24, 


it is ^Xs'^rsrs 71 axousrg, for which in Luke viii. 
18j we have /Sxi-rers Tug dxov&rs, as in Ephes. v. 
15, /SXs'Tsrg 'TTUjg dxotfSciJg 'Trs^irrareTri, For in all 
these passages the proper force of the word is 
referred to the mind, and therefore /SXs-Trg/v may 
be joined with dx.ovsiv; but it could not have 
been, ogars r/ dxovsTs ; for o^ccv is always referred 
to the object seen, and no good writer would 
have used it otherwise. And as there is in the 
word ogav this force, which we call objective, 
hence it arises that it is joined with those pre- 
positions only, by which the thought is referred 
to the object seen. For in the compound word 
d(popdv there is a twofold force in the preposi- 
tion ; one, by which the force of the word is 
removed, so that it signifies, to look away, as 
in Cyrop. vii. 1. 36, Tama/v d(pooojvTac^ for they 
smote the backs of the Egyptians; another 
which intimates that the thing itself is removed 
from the subject to which the word refers. So 
Herodot. viii. 37, cItw^soi/ to }^6v. For it was to 
the Delphi, and not to the temple, that the bar- 
barians had approached, as the sequel shows. 
Although, therefore, it is allowable to say 
(Sksmiv d^o rmg, yet it would be absurd to say 
Q^dv diTo rmg. And if any one says that, in the 
interpretation of the New Testament, such 
subtilties are unnecessary, I would have him 


to consider why he would himself feel it im- 
proper to say, j8XsTS/v rhv ^soVf ISKstsiv rhv ^ars^a, 
speaking of the Deity, or (3Xi<n'siv sayrov, (^Xsrreiv 
slg avrov is a different matter,) or why the 
Greeks speaking of the situation of a region, 
&c., always use ^btsiv and never o^av. 

We come next to consider IdiTv, which so far 
differs from opoiv, that it must be referred rather 
to the mind of him who sees ; so that as o^at/ re- 
gards the object, /^s?i' should be referred in 
thought to the subject. No accurate observer 
will deny that this is the force of the word. 
For what other reason is there why the word 
idsTv does not occur even among the most an- 
cient writers in the present, whether it is used 
to denote seeing or knowing, except it be that 
there exists in it properly the notion of a thing 
past, from which that very thing arises, which 
is now thought to be, i. e. the having seen or 
known something ; and therefore now to know 
it and to have it ascertained ; whence it follows 
that oJda, idov, Jduvy have the notion of time pre- 
sent. Nor do I fear the adduction of some 
passages in Homer, in which the present time 
is read. For in these the word either has a 
future sense, as Iliad. ^, v. 18, i'va e'/dire ^ai/reg. 
<y, V. 53, xXDrg ~ 0^^' iv rradai 'E.'lbir dxovovffai. 
Odyss. /, V. 17, o(p^oc xai vfiug 'E'ibir ; or a passive 


sense, in which the idea is not that any one 
has seen a certain thing, but that this thing 
appeared to him, that it was seen, as Iliad, a, 

V. 228. TO ds roi xri^ s'ldsTai g/va/, ^, v. 559. itavrci h\ 
r ilhirai aorga. v, v. 98. vuv hy\ iihirai rj/ia^. ^, v. 472. 
ov fih fJ^oi xaxog i'ihrai, w, v. 197. ri roi (p^sffh rihrai 
sJvai, Hence also, s'l^og denotes not that which 
we see, to cl^a/xoc; but the image of the thing, 
the species or form presented to the mind. In 
this sense it occurs in 1 Thess. v. 22, «cro 'jravTog 
s'/doug Tovrjoou d^s-^sTs^ which some render, " ab- 
stain from every kind of evil." But Luther 
more correctly, meidet alien hosen Schein.^ For 
it might have been written according to the 
former rendering, cc'To ^avTog s'/dovg 'Trov^iag^ 
(Joseph. Antiq. x. 3, 1. See Wetstein in loc.) 
l^ut it should have been dirh cravrog zlbovg to\j 'Konr 
f iCI. But iihog Tovn^ov is a disreputable or wicked 
appearance or mode, as s^^og aKSy^^w in Euri- 
pides is an ungraceful form. On the other 
hand, in 2 Corinth, v. 7, the words 5/a T/Vrswg 
're^/'raroD/A£v, ou 6/a g/^oug, Luther has very ac- 
curately given, as to the general sense : wir 
leben im Glauhen nicht im Schauen. And in- 
terpreters say that in this place ^i^og is the same 

" The English version is, " from every appearance of 
evil," which accords with M. Titmann's view. It does 
not mean evil presented to us, but evil appearance or serr- 
hlance in us. — T. 


as oS^/c. Yet it may be doubted whether s/Sos 
has not still its proper sense : not only because 
it is never used for o-^/g ; but that the Apostle 
does not appear to have entertained this idea: 
we now believe these things only, but we do 
not see them, i. e. have not realized them. 
For he exhorts them to be cheerful, and to 
trust God, who gives the earnest of the Spirit, 
inasmuch as they know that now they are pil- 
grim exiles from God, and should therefore 
desire rather to be absent from the body, and 
to be present with the Lord. Finally, Tsp/'rarg/v 
bia T/arsug appears to differ from the expression 
^s^i-TrarsTv Iv rivi^ which sometimes occurs. For 
I doubt not but that these words may be ex- 
plained from usage among the Greeks, as 
Valkenar. has shown on Euripides, Phoeniss. 
(p. 177. to v. 482. compared with v. 1555,) so 
that ^sf/Targ/V hia mffrsug is shown to be equiva- 
lent to '^riffTivovra Te^/'TrccTsTv, ?. e. to live by faith. 
So in Aeschylus. Prometh. v. 120, tov rrasi '^io7; 
bi d-xiy^zia^ iX%vra, i. e. is hateful to the gods ; 
and in Euripides, Hippol. v. 1164, 5/ ly^^oLi 
(im rig vjv d(pr/a'evog, {, e. by my hostile mind, and 
in the Orestes v. 755, bta (p6^ou ya^ i^yofMai. So 
also in the Epist. to the Romans, c. iv. v. 11, 

rcliv mffrevovru))! di' dxPolSvffriac^ and xiv. 20, tuj 6iu 

rroogx6/M/j.arog l<f^iovTi. And in the same way we 


may explain that difficult passage in 2 Pet. iii. 
5, di' dJv 6 Ton Kog/xog vdari xuraxXvff'^sig d'TrdoXiro. 
See MarklandonLysias, p. 329. Reisk's edition. 
In fact £/^o$ is tlie external form and species of 
things, as is generally admitted ; and therefore 
di' s'/'dovg m^i-TTariiv is so to live, that the ^l^og is as 
it were the companion of our life, to live in- 
timately associated with the external form of 
things. But it becomes not the Christian to 
yearn after outward things, or to be ensnared 
by their glitter. It behoves him to seek higher 
things, and therefore '^abhouat /xaXXov Ixdrj/xricrat ix 
rov gu>/j,arog xai svdrj/MTjffai cr^og rov Kv^tov. 1 conceive 
the meaning of the passage, therefore, to be : 
Our life is governed by our immortal hope, 
not by the vain hope of present things, we 
prefer, however, to leave the body, that we may 
go into the presence of God. 

Between o^av and tdsTv there is a middle term, 
ocrrscrSa/. For it is referred, at the same time, to 
the object presented to the eye, and to the 
subject which sees and perceives. And hence 
it will appear why the word is only used in 
the passive and middle voice, and why it is 
not found in the present tense. For, as it does 
not denote the action of seeing, but the state 
of him to whose eye or mind the object is 
presented, the active power would not properly 


express this ; and therefore, the word must be 
in the middle or passive voice ; in the passive 
when any thing is said to be presented, or to 
appear to our mind; in the middle, when the 
thought is rather of some object presented to, 
or fixed in the eye or the mind, that we may 
perceive it. Whence also, it is put either in 
the past or the future, since the accurate notion 
of the word requires that that must be regard- 
ed as to have been done, or to be about to be 
done, by which we are to arrive at cognizance. 
For the specific power of this word is not that 
it denotes the action of seeing, but the state or 
affection of the mind to which the object is 
presented. It diff'ers, therefore, from the words 
/SXsTg/v and ooav, which denote the action of see- 
ing, and from ids7v, which is referred only to the 
subject. Nor are passages wanting in which 
this specific force of the word is evident. It is 
rightly said in Matthew v. 8, o-^ovrai rov %6v ; 
for this does not mean that they shall actually 
see God, which could not be ; but they shall 
truly comprehend and know him ; as I John 
iii. 2, o-^o/jjs^cc avTov xa^wj sffri, and Heb. xii. 14, 
X^i'5 ot^yiaff/jLov ovdsig o-^srai rhv xv^iov. For I doubt 
whether, in these words, o-^ovrai rhv ^soi/, we have 
the notion of a more familiar and nearer in- 
tercourse with God, as the lexicons tell us. 


I rather think they intimate the felicity of 
those who more accurately perceive and ap- 
preciate the wisdom, holiness, and love of God, 
which felicity can only be realized by the 
xa^cc^ol rfj Tta^bia. For truly is it said by Calli- 
machus, (in Apoll. v. 7. 9,) 6 Ssog ohx in /x-ax^av, 
yet oh 'Travrl <pa£mrai, uXX' o, ng sa^Xog. And 
therefore, when (Eurip. Bacch. v. 501,) Pen- 
theus inquires impiously, " Where is God?" 
he is answered deservedly, -Tra^' e^o-o/* av d' dci^r^g 
avrog we, ovx sioo^ag ; where i'i<so^av is the same as 
oVrgfl^a/, inne werden. Acutely, therefore, Plu- 
tarch (de Ei) says, that Apollo was uU^m roTg 
d^y^of/jsvoig /xai/^ai/g/i/ xa/ dia'7rv\i^dvi(^cci, A'/jXiov ds xai 
<i>ccyaTov, o/g ridri ri briXoZrai xal b'TTo^aivirai rrig dXvj' 
^g/ag. And Homer says, oh yd^ -rw irdvnasi %ol 
(paivovrai sva^ytTg. (Odyss. '^, V. 161.) 

It must not be denied, however, that the 
words oWgff^a/ and %av are sometimes inter- 
changed, so that oWgff^a/ appears to mean no 
more than o^av. So in Xenophon, (Cyneg. v. 
31.) [Socdi^ovra ds ovbstg sdoPaziv ovd' o-^srar, and in 
the New Testament it is often put for o^av, as 
Matth. xxiv. 30; xxvi. 64; John i. 51, 52; xi. 
40 ; Acts XX. 25. But it does not follow from 
this that it has the same force altogether as 
ofav, idiTv, ^Xs-TTsiv ; so that in any place in which 
it occurs, any one of these might be substituted. 


Nor do I fear the remark, that o'^noSa/ is used, 
because the words o^av and iidiTii would change 
the time from the future. For we have yet 
to learn why the future of opuv is unused, as 
the same verb is without the aorist.° 

' I rather think that we must look for the explanation of 
these irregularities and deficiencies in verbs of very early 
use, to their etymology rather than to the caprice of later 
nations, into which the word was introduced, in the neglect of 
certain tenses and inflections. The more simple explana- 
tion of these anomalies is, that the word has continued to 
be used in the later language, into which it has been de- 
rived, in the same tenses only in which it occurred in the 
primitive form, and has not undergone all the artificial 
grammatical inflections to which words of more recent for- 
mation were submitted. Such is probably the case in this 
instance. The Greek word o^au is one of the few remnants 
of the Hebrew word ni^^» '^ *^^* "^^^ word being com- 
posed of one consonant, and two almost, if not altogether, 
vowel sounds, would be a bad subject for all the niceties of 
Greek inflection; and hence, as more convenient words 
would readily occur, the word o^Sv^ except in the instances 
in which it would slide gradually into use in its primitive 
form, would be avoided. That the Hebrew word HJ^") 
has been thus brought into use in later languages is evident 
from other remnants of it. It is found in the English words 
ray and array, and the French, rayon. And it is the ety- 
mon of the Latin, ratioy and our English word, reason. Both 

in Chaldee and in Arabic, the word ^^^")> (S<\jf occurs in 
the sense of mental perception, understanding ; and it fs in 
this sense that it has been retained in the words ratio and 
reason. I have no doubt that an accurate examination of 


There is yet something more in the word 
oVrso^a/, because, as I have said, it should not be 
referred only to the object, but to the subject 
also. It may be sometimes written o-^si; as 
ijjiiZova TOVTUV o-^sr o-^ei r-^v do^ccv rov '^soUf when 
nothing more is intended than that something 
is to be seen. But Matth. xxvii. 4, and Acts 
xviii. 15, tfj) o%]^£/ and o>]^stf^s aCiro/ were written. 
For there is a difference between ffu o^a, and 
<ri) o^/g/. For (fv oga, is, look accurately, consi- 
der, examine ; but ^ri) o4/g/ is like the Latin, tu 
videris (from which formula, tu vide, differs.) 
It means, it is for you to examine, consider, re- 
gard. He who says a^o o^a commands it to be 
done ; he who says tfu o\)y£/ only permits another 
to do it, and denies that he himself will do it. 
Wherefore cy or aOro/ or some other pronoun is 
added, as putting away the duty from the speak- 
er ; for instance in Arrian diss. i. 17. o-^l/ovrai oi 
aXkoiy ii XvdiTiXsT auroTg cra^a (pvaiv g%£/v. This ap- 
pears distinctly in Acts xviii. 15, it ^^r^;aa IffTi 
iTi^l Xoyov — o-^i(j'^e avToi' for it is added %^ir^g yap 
iyu rovruv oy (SovXo/^at uvai. In this sense tfO oga 
is never found. 

We have yet to notice ^gatrSa/ and ^swfgri'. 
Both differ so far from the words noticed above, 

the defective Greek verbs, and their anomalous combina« 
tions, would fuUv bear out the remarks made above. — T. 


that they denote the intention of mind with 
which a man regards or contemplates an ob- 
ject. They are frequently used, therefore, 
when the desire of seeing is to be expressed. 
So Matth. xi. 7, ''/ sJ^X^srs ^gacatr^a/, i. e. ri 
igsX^ovrgg i^sXsrg ogav. Matth. xxii. 11. And in 
John xiv. 17, oV/ oh ^iu^iT ahro ohbs yivuxfxn auro, we 
must not render this simply, sees, knows, under- 
stands, (which is in the force of the word y/i'wffxg/, 
for it is a very unsound remark made by some, 
that in this place yivuxSTtziv and ^gw^g/i/ may be 
used for one another.) It should be translated, 
he did not studiously and attentively consider, 
and therefore he did not understand. For in 
Matth. vi. 1, 'TT^og rb '^sa^rivai auroTg (and Matth. 
xxiii. 5,) does not mean simply, to be seen, but 
to be seen with regard and admiration. There 
are passages undoubtedly in which ^sa(^ui 
means only to see, as Matth. xvi. 11 ; Luke v. 
27. But there are others in which the pecu- 
liar force is manifest, and in which it has al- 
ways the adjunct notion of the desire and in- 
tention to consider and know the thing looked 
at. In Rom. XV. 24, IXcr/i^w dia'Xo^svofMSvog ^ga- 
eaa^ai vfiag, Paul not only says that he would 
see them, but that he would look diligently 
into their affairs. So Lucian (Nigrin. 2. i. p. 
40.) jSouAo/j^ivog lUT^ov o^'^ak/JLuv ^id(fa(^a{ rivcCf i. e. 


coriveiiire. In Xenoph. Cyrop. v. 5. 1, 
^gatfa/jt-cvog TO grodrsvfj^ay and vii. 5 7, rs^dfii^a 
z,'jxX(jj rriv 'Ttoajv. sModxa/jjiv z. r. <7r6Xiv, would be, we 
looked at the city, wliich would not express 
the author's meaning. See also Hiero, 2. 5, 
^iSe, yvdo/jiYig ^eaff^a/ ytdXXiov Jj did ruv o(p'^akiJijOjv. Euri- 
pides Orestes, v. 909, SsSo^a/ 6' S.h -^^^'^ rh h- 
<j<7r6Triv Jdovra. What the older grammarians have 
said on the word ^suosTv is well known.P But 

P The peculiarity of the word B-tu^iTv is very beautifully 
illustrated by a reference to the etymology. This is one of 
those instances in which the more extensively the inquiry 
is carried on, the more bright and certain is the result. In- 
stead of wild and uncertain conjecture, we arrive at little 
short of demonstration and definite certainty. In the first 
place, there is evidently a close connection between the 
words S-a&z. video cum stupore, S-idof^ai, specto, contemplor, S-ja 
speciatio, B-Au, cum admiratione specto, (lonice) B-ta^iuj con- 
templor, and the Latin Tuco, Tueor, to behold, to look 
stedfastly. Both in the Latin and Greek word, there is the 
idea of stedfast considerate observing, and contemplation. 
The probability then is, that these words had a common 
origin. On turning to the ancient oriental tongues, we 
find the word, ntH ^^ed in Hel)rew, C^haldee and Syriac, 
very extensively in the sense, to see ; but generally in a still 
stronger sense, as intimating serious and intense contem- 
plation. In all these three cognate dialects, it signifies the 
seeing into obscure, mysterious, and future things : videns, 
propheia, or seer, attentio, consider alio, contemplatio, spectaiio 
cum voliptate. 

In the first place, we fiiid, on examination, some remains 



although it is true that ^iu^hg and ^sw^/a are 
frequently used with reference to sacred rites 
and ceremonies, yet it may be shown by many 

of the word J^]f} in this form, -with the previous guttural 
sound distinct, as in Gothic, kisawi ; in Francic and Ale- 
mannic, geseon ; in Greek ayd^ofiai' admiror ; in English, 
to gaze. All these words have the idea of stedfast looking 
or contemplation. But the union of the sound of H ^^^^ 
that of \ was so close, that the distinction was likely to be 
confounded and lost. We have some indication of this in 
the German word Schauen, spectare, to look at, and schau, a 
sight, an examination ; from whence the English word, 
show. And it appears that finally the sound of the py was 
dropped altogether ; when the word gradually assumed the 
form in which we are more familiar with it. The dental 
sound of ], has always been peculiarly liable to variation in 
the transfer of words to different dialects, as it may be pro- ■ 
nounced more hardly, or softly, or with aspiration. In all 
these several aspects, the word ntrij ^^ abbreviated n|, to 
see, is found. In the aspirated form we have Sa<y and all 
its derivatives, ^tclof^ai, B^avfiu, ^ot,vfjt.ccZ,u, B^iu^nv, &.c. And 
Ssoj, the name of God, is from this source : He that seeth. 
In the Gothic migration it assumed the soft sound ; Chaldee 
>in, ecce, see ! Anglo-Saxon seori, Belgic zien, German 

seiien, English, see, Eolic Greek, (rEaa^aa/, and ^£ff. (See Junius 
Glossarium Gothicum, p. 287.) And in the Thracian or 
Etruscan migration, which developed itself in the Latin 
language, the word occurs with the hardest sound of the 
dental, ttieo, tueor, intuitns ; and probably this will explain 
those other words which occur for the Deity, Tuito, (Taci- 
tus de Moribus Germanorum) Thoth or Theut, and the 
Gaelic, Ti'erna. They are all terms for the seer, or Him 


examples, that, by the most elegant Attic 
writers, the word ^smosTv is applied to any spec- 
tacle whatever, as passages quoted from Xeno- 
phon have proved. So also it is used repeat- 
edly in the New Testament, except that in 
one place (Acts ix. 7,) it appears to be put 
simply for ogav. In all others there is evidently 
the notion of considering with attention or ad- 
miration. It is the same in Acts vii. 56, ^£wg&> 
Toi/g ov^avovc dvsu}yfj.evovg ; although certainly the 
idea of joy and pleasure, which some inter- 
preters have assumed to exist there, cannot 
properly be found. Nor is this view of the 
word opposed by John viii. 51, '^dvarof ov fj^'n 
%u^r}<f7j i'lg rov aiuva, which is often compared 
with the formula formerly noticed, ^wj^v ovx 
o-^irai. For in that passage '^iojosTv does not 
mean to experience, to attain ; it says, ^swgg/P 

that seeth. After this extensive view of the etymology, it 
will be quite evident that the view of B^tu^tTv given in the 
text, as established by the usus loquendi, is quite accurate. 
It is justified by the original word, and by the force of the 
great majority of its derivatives in all languages. It is of 
little moment whether the word is a compound of S-e« and 
c^at or not. The peculiar force of it flows from the spe- 
cific meaning of its etymon nTH- — ^' ^' ^^ ^^ worthy of 
remark, en passant, how forcibly such etymological inquiry 
vindicates the Scripture account of the peopling of the world 
by migration from an oriental source and centre. — T. 


s/g rhv a/wva, " to look on or regard for ever ;'* 
and it could not have been o'TrnSai ^amrov ug 
rhv a/wi/a, since oVrsff^a/ is the act of a moment ; 
and how then could the sentence have meant 
to experience for ever? But since ^su^uv is 
not merely the act of an instant, (for the things 
on which we ^sw^s/i', are considered as con- 
templated for a lengthened period), therefore, 
this word is very properly made use of in con- 
junction with £/5 rhvaJcHiva. For this clause could 
not properly be rendered " he shall never die.'* 
For they also die who walk in the way of 
heavenly truth : but then their death is not 
s/g rh aima. Here, however, we must for the 
present pause. 



Many affections and conditions of tlie mind 
are so nearly allied, tliat they appear to differ 
in a very slight degree ; more especially as the 
mode in which they arise and show themselves 
is very similar. On this account, we find that 
many words by which the condition of mind 
is expressed are not only used indifferently by 
inaccurate writers and speakers, but even by 
lexicographers are rendered by the same Latin 
words, as if they had no difference; and, by 
these means, recent and raw scholars are misled 
to suppose that they are identical in meaning. 
But where terms are really synonymous, their 
force should be most minutely observed; for 
this is absolutely necessary to the right under- 
standing of the writers of the New Testament. 
Although, at the same time, it must be ad- 
mitted, that in the customary style of language 
which these men used, the difference between 
such words was not always observed, especially 
those which properly express the different 
grades of the same affection. For those whose 
affections are more easily moved would natu- 


rally use stronger language to express the 
emotions and habits of others; and in such in- 
stances a strict interpretation would lead at 
once to error. And this calls therefore for a 
more accurate observation of the specific force 
of each word, that it may be more certainly 
determined what precise meaning best ex- 
presses the idea in question. For often, when 
a writer has applied a word accurately in its 
specific sense, we do not perceive his real 
meaning; because only analogous notions of 
the same things occur to us, instead of the one 
accurate thought intended. Finally, in those 
words which denote any fault, we must take 
especial care lest we confound those which 
signify a defect of the mental powers with 
those which denote a fault of the will. There- 
fore, on the present occasion, I shall notice 
some synonyms of this class ; and I shall begin 
with two words, which, among those expressive 
of affections of the mind or will, are more ex- 
tensively used. In the New Testament, we 
frequently meet with 

Although Buttmann on Homer (Lexilogus 
i. p. 26,) has treated very accurately of these 
two words, I purpose to add a few remarks 
more directly relatino^ to their use in the New 


Testament. These words agree, inasmuch as 
they both mean, velle, to will ; and the lexicons 
more strictly theological, scarcely point out a 
difference between them. But as far as the 
decree of the mind by which we will, (and 
which the schools have called, volition,) differs 
from that propension of mind, by which we 
address ourselves to the thing which we have 
willed, so far ^sXs/i/ and /S&uXso-^a/ differ from 
each other. For '^s'kuv is simply, to will ; and 
has not in it the notion of propension. (3ovXi<^^ai, 
denotes the propension. And hence the 
word (SovXsff'^ai is very generally used to ex- 
press a variety of modes, by which the mind 
addresses itself to what the will has determined. 
This distinction, however, which I have marked, 
is in all the more elegant writers accurately ob- 
served. Who would suppose that Plato had writ- 
ten carelessly, and only with the desire of vary- 
ing the word, in a passage in the Gorgias, £/' /xsf 
doxsTf vvv iuf ds (SovXrjy sgau^ig. — obxouv orav /Soi/Xgff^t 
Ta^' s/xs ri'Asiv olxads — -Tag' e/xol To^ytag r-OLrakmi Ttai 
s'rridii^sra.i 7]fj,7v. — Eu Xsysig' dXk' d^a i^sX^trs/sv av 
Tj/jjTv diaXi-^^voci ; (SjvXofMai ydoTCu^id^ai '!rix^ a'jrov z. 
X. Certainly of Gorgias he rightly used the 
word s'bsXvjtfsiiv ; for Socrates doubted of the 
mere will of the Sophist, (wird er auch wollen ?) 
whether he will ; but sav ^2 ^ohXri is, if he de- 


sires, orav ^ovXsSs, if lie pleases, ^ovXofiai tv^sg^cu 
Trao aurov, I wish to know from him {ich wiinsche 
von ihm zu horen.) Xenophon Cyrop. i. 4, 10, 
rrwTa Xa/Swi' diadidov otuj ffv (SovXsi., xai ruv oOXor) 
oiroecc s%Xiig' And iv. 5. 12, (31.) coi hrrdoyjctVy 
{)hy^ oiTug av s^sXuGiv, a}X O'jrug av 6u (SovXtj, yjri(}^(Xi 
a'jToTg. And vii. 2. 4, (9.) Urao, w KgoTtrs, a^' civrs 
fjLOi SKiikriffuig gvfi(3cvA€\j(rai ; Ka/ ^o'okoiiMriV y av, i<p7\, 
aya^ov r/ sot tv^sTv. There is Something bland 
and respectful and courteous in the reply of 
Croesus, but in the question of Cyrus nothing 
but this : what is your will ? Whence it oc- 
curs often that he w^ho replies to such an in- 
terrogation, that he wills ; does not reply by 
XsXsiv but by (^ovXsci'^ai. I will add two passages 
from Euripides, which will illustrate the dif- 
ference I wish to point out. The first is in 
Iphig. Aul. V. 338, where Menelaus reproves 
the altered manner of Agamemnon, as widely 
differing from that which he dissembled, before 
he obtained the kingdom, ruj boKuv f/.h ohyl 
y^fiC,ojv, t'Sj ds I3o{jXs<^cci %Xcfjv. The other is in 
the Hyppolytus v. 1329, 1330, oudsig urravrav 
^ovXiToci ir^o^-jfMiaf, rrj rov ^iXovrog, dXX* d(pi6rufisff'^^ 
diu Arrian. Diss. Epict. i. 12. 13, ^o{jXo/j.&j 
y^d<pstv TO Asuvog ovo'jm uc %Xoi). And SO in Matth. 
]. 19, dlxaiog o)v xa/ firi ^sXuv ahrriv 'KaocLbnyfLiLridCLty 
k[ioviXr^y\ Xd^^CL d<::oXZ(Sai ahriiv. But in this use 


of these words, I think I perceive other traces 
of the specific sense of each.^ First, it is well 
known that (SovXsff'^ai 75 is frequently used in the 
sense of malle, to prefer, so that f.caXXov should 
he understood. But as far as I know, ^s'Xs/v is 
never so used. For the passages adduced in 
support of the notion appear to me insufficient. 
And first, we may notice in the New Testa- 
ment, 1 Cor. xiv. 19, d>X h sxxXrigicc %aoj 'ttsvts 
Xoyovg d/a rou voog fx^ov XaXi^(^ai, ha xal aXko\jg zarrr 
yjldo), ri /jbv^/oug Xoyovg h yXu)6(i'fi. But here, to my 
mind, the n must be referred rather to "jrs^rs than 
to ^sXw. I would, in the church, rather use five 
intelligible words, then ten thousand which 
were unintelh'gible. Another passage is in 
Xenophon de Mag. Equ. 9. 5, ok xa^vinu rh 

■^ The only truce of an oriental etymon of (hovXof^ai that I 
can find is, 7V3, a word existing in Hebrew and its cog- 
nate dialects, and implying complete power and authority, 
it is used in the sense of, dominus, maritus ; used of those 
who are understood to have the right to express a sovereign 
will. And all the derivatives of P>ouXof^a,i remaining in Latin 
and Gothic, and in modern languages, volo, wUgan, vouloir, 
ivollen, to will, are expressions of a positive determination. 
This rather makes against the distinction which the author 
has endeavoured to establish. At the same time, the usus lo- 
quendi might have affixed a specific sense to the Greek deri- 
vative. And this is very probable, for in this liuated sense 
we find in German the word ivillig, umviUi(/, implying pro- 
pension. Anglice, willing, unwillir.g — T. 


'fXTizoVf s^sXovgi rs\i?v d^yii^iov ug fi^ mTivsiv, in which 
they render s%Xo-j(H by malunt, they prefer ; 
f^aXXov being understood. But it is not ^i', but u)i 
M that follows, to make the sense : they would 
rather pay the fine than serve in the cavalry. 
And it may even be doubted in those passages 
in which /laXXov is inserted, ibid. 2. 8, and 9. 
fin. For in both it may be rendered, more 
freely, more readily, to fight or to counsel, as 
Cyrop. iv. 3. 1, {moXXov {jjuyoivr av, ti ra (piXrara 
'zaoeiTj. comp. Memorab. iv. 4, 17. The reason 
of this use of the word must be sought in its 
specific signification. For since ^'sXsiv means 
simply to wish, if 5i is added or understood, it 
would then signify, to wish this or that, v. c. 
^sXsic f^d^iff^ai ri (pvyuv. And if fJ^aXXov is added, 
it is not to be referred to ^iXuv ; but to the 
thing itself which is willed ; as appears in the 
passages already referred to. On the two pas- 
sages in Homer II. ^, 319. Od. a, 234. see 
Butmann, 1. c. p. 30. Justin. Mart. Apol. ii. 
SeXg/ yd^ 6 rrctrrio 6 ov^uviog rriv fLirdvoiav roD dfia^- 
tojXov, ri rrjv xoXadiv ai/roD, where Sylburg supplies 
fidXXofy and adduces ^sXm ru-^rig ffraXay/Mov n rri%v 
<p^£vuv. See Eustath. ad 11. p. 1363, 42. I add 
a passage from Epigr. Agathiae xxv. Anal. iii. 
43, s'^ti tfeo fJi'V^ov dxovsiv"ll^sXoVj ij xi^d^rjg xapov/j^ara 
AyjXfddog. But the Greek language was then 


declining, of which this is an example, among 
many others. 

A second proof of the specific signification 
of these words, is to be found in a different 
use of them, in passages where neither of them 
means properly, to will. There are many 
passages in which s'^sXnv appears to have the 
same force with duvaScci or fMsXXuv. Gregory of 
Corinth says, that this was Attic Greek. In 
this sense, however, the word was only applied 
to inanimate objects. For the observation of 
Buttmann (Addenda to Plato Charm, p. 60) 
is quite true, that ^sXstv for f^eXXstv or ^•jva^'^at, is 
only used respecting inanimate objects, and 
then only in a negative sense. For the pas- 
sages adduced do not prove that later writers 
have used it. Certainly Reisk ought not to 
adduce that passage from the 87th epigram of 
Macedonius. "E-rra^ov ay^J 'rd(poio %al vj^sXov 
avrog axoDca/, O/a Tsg MadfMviv, jMoT^av sfjJrtg aXo-^ov, 
For he did not hope that he should hear the 
death of his wife ; but he thought, since he had 
sneezed, that he heard the presage of her death ; 
(as we say, er wollte das selhst gehort, gesehn 
hahen.) And therefore the word cthrog is not 
to be pressed. Wherefore Schaefer, apud Gre- 
gorium, p. 135, has said, that we should read 
oh d-ovarat. Plato in Phaedr. p. 280. D. rd //,5» 


oyy %wg/a xa/ ra dsvdpo, ovdh fi l^iku dtdddKsiv, And 
Xenoph. Hist. Gr. v. 4. 61, roc 'xXoTa hsT^iv 
ovTciTi Tj^iXs 'TTa^a'TrXsTv. Memor. iii. 12. extr. ov 
yd^ s^'sXsi avrofioLrcc gJi/a/. So also it is assumed 
that in the New Testament John vii. 1, and 
Matth. ii. 18, ov ^sXsiv is put for ov dvvaa^oct. But 
there is no need in either case to abandon the 
proper meaning- of the word. In the former 
case he would not (noluit) stay in Judea, be- 
cause the Jews sought to kill him ; in the lat- 
ter, Rachel would not be comforted. (German, 
sie woUte sich nicht trosten lassen^) as in Gen. 
XXX vii. 35, ovx, tj^sXs '^a^axaksTff'^ai, Xsyuv, In the 
Hebrew, it is OTOnn^ IJ^Q*^")? i- e. she refused 
consolation.' Without the negative, however, 

' It is somewhat strange that Titmann did not refer to 
Jeremiah xxxi. 15, as the original of the quotation in 
Alatthew, and which completely bears out his idea. The 
words are □n^H'? ^J^^D7 refusing to be comforted. The 
word invariably occurs in the Hebrew Scriptures, in the 
sense of, determined refusal. And so in this case, it was 
not only that Rachel could not be comforted, because her 
children were not ; but she refused all consolation, of what- 
ever kind, from the bitter sense which she had of their loss. 
The full force of the word may be seen in Exod. ix. 2, 
^/^^^ TJ^Q-Q^^, if thou refuse to let them go. And see. 
ing that the meaning of 't^^f^ is so unequivocal, it is not at 
all probable that the LXX used ovk iiB-iXi in the umisual 
trnuae of ou luvetrai. The etymology of IJ^Q is probably the 


^s^^iv is rather to be wont, to suit, to become. 
Herodot. vii. 50. 1. 2, fJ^sydXa 'Tr^yiyf^ara fnydXoiffi 
l^gXs/ xfvduvoKfi xarai^ssff'^ai, (as we say: wollenun- 
ternommen sein) ; Callim. H. in Del. v. 4, Arfkog 
^ e^skii rot, T^uroe, (ps^sff^ai 'Ex fiovgsuv. conf. Aris- 
toph. Av. V. 532, et Raphel. ad Actor, ii. 12. 
And it is observed by some critics, as Valc- 
kenar, in the 2d vol. of his Opuscula, p. 307, 
on Mark vi. 5, that oux fibbmro is put for oi/x 
^^sXs, or ohx s^ovXsTo. And Henry Stephen had 
already remarked, App. deDial. Att. p. 50, that 
the Attics sometimes put dvvaSat for ^ovXsa^at. 
But although there may be passages in which 
a man might say ov dvmff^ccif because he had 
good reason to refuse, as in our language we 
say, we cannot, because we will not, I suspect 
none will be found in which ov duva(^ai has the 
same force with ov %Xuy. Certainly, in the 
passage quoted from Mark, there is no reason 
to abandon the usual meaning of the word. 
The words are, xa/ oOx ^dvmro sxsT ovdi/j^/av dvmfnv 
-Troi^gai. Evidently, as it is natural to admit 
that our Lord could have wrought miracles in 

word for negation, ^Ji^, and the formative Q ; and hence 
the whole force of the word is a substantive of direct nega- 
tion, submitted to the inflections of a verb, and carrying a 
strength of expression which no translation can give uitli- 
out circumlocution. — T. 


that place, if he would, it is said, oux r^duvaro, 
instead of ohx ri'^iXs. For of that which cannot 
honestly and rightly be done, we may say with 
propriety, that a good man is unable to do it, 
although he could, if he would. And there- 
fore, our Lord, although he was never without 
the power of working miracles, may be said 
properly to have been unable to do so among 
this people. For he never used the power of 
working miracles rashly, either in the presence 
of the wicked, or for the sole object of exciting 
a profitless surprise or admiration. He could 
not therefore work miracles there. He could 
not do so in accordance with his own wise 
moderation ; for, " because of their unbelief," 
this display of power would have been utterly 
useless. He would not, therefore, because he 
could not with propriety. The same explanation 
may be given of a passage in the Anabas. vii. 
2. 18, (t^y" rjdvvd/MTiv Zti)) etg aXXor^iav r^d'XiZccv drro- 
^Xs'TTuv, he could not, for he was ashamed. Some- 
times, however, another passage is brought 
forward: Book ii. 2. 6, tjv dk avrri i] Gr^arriyia 
c\jh'iv oKko dvva/Msvr], Jj d'rod^avat Jj acro^uyg/V ; in which 
they say that dum/nsvvi is put for ^sXeyca, i. e. it 
saw nothing else to be done. But there is no 
need to shrink from the usual meaning of the 
word. Certainly what the (sroarriyia looked for 


was already stated, that they might escape 
secretly and fly. Now, it is related that things 
took a turn for the better. He said therefore, 
the ar^oLTTiy'ia could do nothing else; but for- 
tune xdXX/ov Idr^urriyrias, Finally, in Cyrop. vi. 
4. 11, they adduce ou cr^off^gf sdvmvro ^sdaac^ou 
aiirov, because all were taken with the beauty 
of Panthea. TJiis distracted their attention, 
and prevented them from looking at her hus- 
band, i. e. they could not. 

But, to return ; ov ^gXs/v is sometimes the 
same in force with ou ^L/vac^a/ ; but (SovXec^af is 
never used for dvvaa'^ai ; and undoubtedly jSou- 
XsoSa/ and duvccc'^ai are often opposed to each 
other. Plat. Hipp. mai. p. 1259. A, ov^ oJa 
(SovXsrcci Tig, dXX' oia duvarai. Lucian. ii. Abd. 179, 
ou ^ovXofMUt dvvd/xivog, and J^V ^ovXecr^ai, [x^ dvmc^a/f 
ibid. p. 182. Aristot. Polit. v. 5. 9, w^rrg xai 
^ovXovra} fiaXXov xui hvvavrat viurs^i^tv, ibid. C. 8. 
Vid. Valckenar. ad Phalar. ep. xcvi. p. 272. 
In the New Testament, it is improperly ren- 
dered posse, valere, as Acts xvii. 15, x^/rv^g yd^ 
syM rovruv ou (3ovXof/.at ihai ; as Plat. Phileb. p. 38. 
C, ^ovXz(/^ai %^miv. It is rather nolo, I refuse, 
in the sense in which we say, Ich mag nicht, 
I may not. Such questions are not my duty. 
If it were a question of any crime (v. 14), then 
xara X6yov uv 7i\ise'^6/iriv v/jluv, I would hear you. 

2*24 THE SYXO^'YMS * 

In the word (SovXse^ai there is rather the notion 
of the mind desiring, choosing, propensed to, 
a particular object. Often, indeed, we desire 
and choose that which cannot be ; but to will 
impossibilities (ra ddvvara) is the part of fools. 
Often, therefore, ^ovXet^ai is only to choose, as 
av^poj-TTogf ^ovXerai, rouro xoti okrau Charit. iii. 9 ; 
vi. 6; Platon. Ion. p. 532 J). (3ovXot/Mr}y civ <re 
dXn^^ Xsysiv. et in Euthyd. p. 278. E, /3oyXo/igvo/ 
iu 'TT^uTTsiv, And it is never therefore used of 
brutes, as Ammonius has already observed. 
For since brutes destitute of reason cannot de- 
liberate whether an object is to be sought or 
avoided, in which is the force of (SovXeff^af, 
(whence ^ovXy;), but are led by the blind im- 
pulse of instinct or habit, they cannot be said 
jSovXsSai. Yet both ^eXuv and (SouXiSai are a|)- 
plied to inanimate things, especially in the 
way of interrogation, r/ ^sXg/, r/ ^ovXsrai rouro. 
The former occurs in the New Testament, 
Acts ii. 12, ri di ^sXo/ rovro zhai. Valckenar on 
Herod, iv. 131, says, that ri rovro (SoiiXsrai is 
more used, and ^ovXercn Xsysiv or ^^vai. But the 
mode in which they are used seems to differ. 
Certainly, when it is said, rl %Xsi rovro sJvai or 
Xeyg/v, the inquiry is made, what should or c;jfi 
this thing be or say ; as in that passage <>[ 
Herodotus and otliei-s, which Valckenar iip- 


proves, (teas soil das seyn s. iverden), almost 
similar to rl /jlsXXsi tqvto shut. So, in Euripid. 
Hippol. V. 865, 'i^oi Tj Xija/ diXrog '^di (J^oi. %Xii, 
Hut ri (SovXsrai rovro^ although it may be ren- 
dered in that way, what does this will? yet it 
seems to be in that particular sense, that it in- 
quires especially into the end or counsel of the 
thing, which is said (SovXsSai. If, therefore, it 
is said, ri jSo-jXirai rovro sJva/, the sense would be, 
to what does this tend ? icas soil das vorstellen 
s. hedeuten. For often ^ovXi^^ai zhat is said of 
those who wish to appear what really they are 
not, as in Lucian, ii. Alex. p. 214, concerning 
the woman, s^d(^fMov sV; dmi ^ovXo/jbsvTjv ; he could 
not have written i%Xov(jav; and hence it will 
appear why it is written ri m (SovXirai rovro, 
and never, if I remember accurately, ri aoi ^sas/ 
roijro. For there is in this interrogation a ques- 
tion as to the end and utility of the thing, as 
in Lucian, iii. p. 427, ri (SovXoivro ahr<Z r^X/xaDra/ 
yJoXixzg, rojv Xipu/Msojv /Vcc dvvafMVMv. audi. Dial. Mort. 
1). 446, cup/ 0^0), ri (SOI (SovXsrai ro g^wr>j/xa, i. e. tor 
what reason you ask this ? To what does the 
question tend? Compare also Hermot, p. 754. 
I have said that jSovXsc^ai denotes propension 
and inclination of the will. This is confirmed 
by a passage from James, c. i. 18, iSovXr^dg 
d-^iyM<iiv i'j^ag Xoyoj ahr^iiag. A parallel passage 


occurs in Plato, Legg. iv. p. 712, oTcv hr, n Xsyeir 
^o'jA'/j^s/j <p§dy' sri GaoUn^ov, One writer, however, 
most strangely supposes that (SovXr^ik is put 
elliptically for l3ovX7}%k h tiIuv. But Wahl. pro- 
perly compares it with z-jhoxr^tsag^ he hath be- 
gotten us, according to his good pleasure. 
Hence also (SovXiff^ai rd nvog means to favour 
the interests of any one. Thucyd. vi. 30. 
Certainly that person appears to liave been 
deceived by some passages of the Septuagint, 
where ^sXsiv kv timi is given as the rendering of 
the Hebrew ySJrr. But l3ovX£(^ai sv rm never 
occurs ; and it would be absurd. For, in the 
only passage, 1 Sam. xviii. 25, "]^dI? ySH T*K 
inQ2j in which the Septuagint has thus ren- 
dered the words, oh (SovXsrai 6 [SaffiXsvg kv do/Man, it 
is a weak version ; for, in fact, desire, and not 
good will, is expressed.' 

* Taylor, in his Hebrew Concordance, gives, as the meaning 
of the word yBH* desire, pleasure, delight ; and the simple 
rendering of this passage, according to the Hebrew idiom, 
is, " There is not delight to the king in dowry." And the 
force of this expression may be softened to meet the style 
of later languages, as it is in our version, " The king de- 
si rcth not dowry," and which has so far followed the Sep- 
tuagint. But that version has very needlessly retained the 
Hebraism inDU ^V rendering it £v lo/xaTi ; and has thus 
made the whole sentence weak and ineffective. It were 
better either to retain the simpler and more forcible style of 



And we must not refer to this formula the 
words of Paul in Coloss. ii. 18, (jj-riCilg b/xag y.aroi' 

ayy'ikuiv. Many interpreters connect ^sXwi/ with 
the preposition sh and render it, affecting humi- 
lity, and taking pleasure in it. But, in the 
first place, such a barbarous formula is un- 
known to the New Testament. In the next 
place, there is no need to increase the number 
of solecisms, while another and more probable 
interpretation is fairly open to us ; and finallvj 
as it had been stated in v. 16, fj^n ovv r/g v/ 
z'^tvsru sv B^u)ffn, it was in accordance with this 
to say, fMrjdiig v/juag xcx,ruj3^a(3ivircf) sv ra'7rsivo(p^oG{jvr,. 
Let no man, he says, judge you in external 
things, or deceive you by that ra-rs/vo^^ocui/Tj 
and ^oTjgxsia. And ^sXojv therefore is, in my 
opinion, intentionally, wittingly, (cojisulto,) sls in 

the original, or to transmute it altogether into the more 
modern mode of expression. Nothing, therefore, can here 
be made of the force of (io6kia-3-at Iv, for it is only a servile 
rendering of the Hebrew preposition ^. The sentence is 
" done into Greek," rather than translated. It may be re- 
marked also, that in almost every instance in which the 
IjXX has rendered V^H ^^Y (^ovXi^rBxi, the true force of the 
word goes beyond the Greek expression ; and implies not 
only propension of the will, but delectation, and emotion of 
the affections. See Deut. xxv. 7; Huth iii. 16; 1 Kings 
xxi. 6 T. 


Herodot. ix. c. 14, 'rr-J^oiMVOi bz raZra s^cv7',iUro 
^sXw;, £/xw$ rovTOvg 'ttpootov sXoi. For in the word 
^sXeiv there is the notion of the will itself, and 
that, separately from the notion of considera- 
tion and consequent propcnsion. He who does 
any thing %au^ does it at once spontaneously. 
He who does it jSyjXofjt^svog, determines to apply 
his mind to it, ^sXwv cro/co. I do it spontaneous- 
ly, freely : '^a<y%w, I deserve it; as 2 Peter iii. 
5, Xav^dm avrovg rovro '^sXovrag. But there is a 
difference from these forms of speech, when 
^gXw is put with an infinitive of another verb, 
as '^sXm 'TiroiiTv, It is often rendered as if it were 
pXiTv, to be wont, John viii. 44. In all words 
therefore compounded with 'MXir. there is the 
notion of spontaneity, but in those compounded 
with ^o{jXo/, that of option and propension. 
So in Plato de Legibus, I^ib. v. to (SouXrirov ts 
xai ixobam and rh dlSovXr^rov rs ■/.a/ axovaiov are put 
in opposition. The formula %av ^sXi^g, xav fir^ 
"^sXrii is well known. But xai/ fj.ii ^ovXp is never 
said. It is, therefore, doubtful whether in the 
New Testament "^sXnv ever means to desire, to 
choose, to be occupied or delighted with any 
thing, not even in Heb. x. 5, ^jfflav x,u} -TTPogp^dv 
ohx riWsXriCag, where the Hebrew would appear 
to warrant the notion of delight and oblecta- 


tlon.' Certainly Marcus Antoninus has used 
the word according to the Hebrew sense, x. 8, 

ou xoXaxsvs(/^a,i o'l ^zoi '^iXo\j(Siv, dXX' it,o[MOi6\JSai avroT; 
ra Xoyixa ircLvra. 

It has been observed, both by Eustathius and 
others, that tliese two words are synonyms. 
And in fact, that they are not used indifferent- 
ly in the New Testament, may be shown by 
those passages in which they occur together, 
Eph. iv. 31 ; Coloss. iii. 8 ; Rom. ii. 8 ; Apocal. 
xix. 15. We read also in Apoc. xvi. 19, 

^ The Apostle has, according to his usual practice, quoted 
from the Septuagint, as the established Greek versiou of the 
Scriptures ; in which certainly h^iXyiffa; does not give the 
whole force of Y£)n ; hut then it is somewhat remarkable, 
that the true meaning is given in the word iuloxynroc;, in verse 
6, and is repeated again in v. 8, as if the Apostle, seeing tlie 
comparative weakness of the LXX version, gave, from liis 
own knowledge of the Hebrew, the proper idea of delec- 
tation and pleasure, to complete the sense; for iuSok-zio-ccs is 
not the true meaning of the parallel word H/i^^ti^- iscl solars 
must be aware that there is a still more remarkable discre- 
pancy here between the quotation in the New Testament 
atid the Hebrew, on which it would be out of place to enter 
here : but certainly to those who hold, with the tran>lator, 
the view of the verbal inspiration of sacred Scripture, there 
is no point requiring more full and patient investigation 
than the quotations in tbe New Testament from the Sep- 
tuagint, or some otlier (J reek version of the Old Testament, 
and their discrepancy from tlie present Hebrew text 7', 


dvfLcg Trig o^yrjg which is generally considered to 
be an expression for extreme wrath. But 
young students should be on their guard 
airainst such observations, lest when two nouns 
are found together of which one is in the 
genitive case, and as it were dependent on the 
other, they conclude over hastily, either that 
this is a mere periphrasis, or an increment of 
the force of the word in the genitive. For 
although a substantive, followed by the geni- 
tive case, is often, both in Greek and other 
languages, put instead of an adjective, yet the 
true force of such an expression must be as- 
certained by the relation of the words them- 
selves; for, frequently, this mode is adopted 
more for the full description and amplification 
of the subject, than for the increased intensity 
of the thought. Fischer has collected many 
examples, th(,ugh some are foreign to the pur- 
pose, in Welleri Gram. Tom. iii. p. 269. It 
cannot, however, be shown, that if two syno- 
nyms are placed together, as &-j/Mog rrjg ooyrig, 
that it is meant to express the superlative de- 
<iTee of the one in the gfenitive case. For the 
case is very different, when two nouns of dif- 
ferent meaning are joined, in order to increase 
tiie force of the one, as ^yi>^og crv^og Heb. x. 27. 
In this place, therefore, ^-^/xof rrig hoyni means 


only the boiling of rage, as we say, Hitze des 

But, to return to the difference of these two 
words. It is commonly asserted from too 
great confidence in some grammarians, that 
o^yri and dv/juog so far differ, that 6v>Mg is exacer- 
bation of mind, anger kindling into existence ; 
o^yri is wrath daily enduring and inveterate. 
We are warned that this difference is not al- 
ways the case. And rightly enough, for in 
fact it is false. For dv/j,6g and o^y^ differ not 
as to the duration, but as to the nature of the 
feeling. For as &u,fju6g strictly means the soul, 
from the spirit which we breathe out ; it is sub- 
sequently used to express a more intense pas- 
sion of the mind as a more forcible exhalation. 
And therefore Sv/j.6g is thus described as oi^vb Trig 
QixSicag xa/ ^scsw; r^g -^uy^g. 'O^yrj^ however, de- 
notes anger, together with the desire of re- 
venge." Zeno says on Diogen. Laert. vii. 1 IS, 

" The word e^ysj is from 3")n' which in Hebrew, Chaldee, 
Syriac and Arabic, means to kill, and all the tumults of 
passion which terminate in killing. There are traces of it 
in modern languages, in the German word krieg, war, con- 
tention ; in the French word orgueil, which is properly, fierit, 
and the English word, rage. The idea therefore of san- 
guinary revenge, attaches etymologically to l^yri. The He- 
brew worJ nnri' ^^ expressive of a less violent feeling-, and 
it has been transmitted to us in the same qualified sense, 


'ZPogriKovTuc, For altlioiigli 6vfj,6g often issues in 
anger or rage, i. e. in the actual desire of 
punishing the injiirer, yet in the word con- 
sidered separately, there is not the notion of 
anger or passion, any more than in h^yn there 
is the idea of diuturnity. See Nemes. de 
Nat. Hum. c. 21. Xenophon says correctly 
(c7£|/ /c-r. 9. 2,) sVr/ dv/iog iWw o<u£^ o^y// a>'^^oucrw. 
eonf. §. 7. et de Venat. 10. 14. And hence 
we may understand why c^yv is often put in 
the New Testament for vengeance and punish- 
ment, but ^v/J^og never. Yet in 2 Cor. xii. 
20, O'ofMg is said to mean anger. It stands 
in connection with other terms s^s/'s, ^^Xo/, ^vfxoi, 
sDi^sTai, Tcara'AaXiai. But even here Ovfioi is rather 
the enmities of a morose and passionate man, 
[Fcindschaften^ Erhittermigen.) Plutarchus de 
Coriolano (init. p. 59. ed. Tubing, vol. ii.) 
^•j/mj7c d' axj TaXiv ^oojf^ivov ax^drotg xal (piXovsixiQctg 
drsp'Trroig, o\j hdhiov ovd' ivd^/j^offrov d\&i>(i)'!Toig avvuvat 
•raoiTyjv. And Aristotle in Problem. Sect. xxx. 
on the melancholic says, s^oonxoi xal i-jy/ivnrol 'rr^og 

ira, ire, irritate ; and aro, arsil, to burn. S-ii/zo;^ is probal)Iy 
from not co(/itatio, cogitavit, seferoclus (jeasit. It is auliuus, 
mind, the working and fermenting of mind, and putting it 
forth in external demonstration of strong feeling or passion. 
Tliis etymology justifies the remarks made by the autlun- 
upon the usage of the two words — T. 


To-j; O-jiMo-j^ x,ai ra; Imd-jfMia;, where evidently tlie 
idea of wratli is not at all intended. Other 
synonymous terms noticed by grammarians, 
do not occur in the New Testament. 

Both these words mean desire. But sm^v/xiM 
denotes rather the affection of mind, and sm^v/Ja 
the inward passion and concupiscence ; o^syo/ 
the appetite and tendency towards the external 
object. In sm'^u(j.ia only the mental desire is 
thought of (die Beyierde selbst) ; but ^sJ'J has 
conjoined with it the notion of the thing de- 
sired, ( Verlangen nach etwas.J So that e'7n&v/ji,nv 
may be used absolutely as Rom. vii. 7 ; xiii. 9, 
but o^'sysff'^M never. And although ops^s/g is 
sometimes used for appetites, without the notion 
appended of the objects desired, as Herodian, 
vi. 1.12, T-ag 6^'s'^sig ax/xa^oucaj iig cc/ff-^sag k-rti^-uiMtag^ 
(comp. i. 6. 6.) ; yet oosyzc^ai is never, to my 
knowledge, used absolutely and independently. 
For the same reason s'n'i^vfj.sTv rmg is to be moved 
with the desire or passion for any thing. The 
word in the genitive, placed in regimen with 
the noun sc/^u/x/a, denoting the seat or fountain 
of the fevT/^u/x/a; as in the New Testament fre- 
(juently s'Tri^vfjjia eao-Kog ; and especially in that 
difficult text John viii. 44. But o^i^'i riv6g denotes 
the object desired. So ^i^'s (saoxog would be the 


desire to eat flesh, (Verlangen nach Flelsch.) 
For that one passage in the Book of Wisdom, 
xxiii. 6, xoiX/ag o^s^ig xcci (fvvovdiacffjbog f/Jfj xaraXa- 
Serooaav fie, cannot be adduced, not only because 
the sayings of this writer are altogether without 
authority ; but also that ooe^ig xoiXiag may very 
properly be referred to the desire of filling the 
belly. It is well known that words in the ge- 
nitive, connected with another noun, frequently 
denote the object, not the subject. Modern 
grammarians have accumulated examples, and 
Hermann (on Viger, p. 877,) has shown the rea- 
son of this. But xoiXia may, in this passage, be 
used in the same sense in which it occurs in other 
passages of the LXX. as Job iii. 11, xxxi. 15, 
Genes, xxv. 23, with which cvvoufftaffiiog agrees. 
We must observe, in passing, that I'jn'^vfisTv 
and l-t^-JiMtct, are not always put for licentious 
passion, but for a virtuous and tender desire of 
the soul ; the wish for a real good, as Luke xxii. 
15, Phil. i. 23, 1 Tim. iii. 1. Finally, I'Tri'^viMth 
xara rivog, is not to be contrary to any thing, 
but, by passion, to be led contrary to any thing; 
as Gal. V. 17, ^7 <^cc|'^ s'lri^-j/MTxara rov '^viv/u^arog, to 
bi '::\vJiJ,a x,ara rng ffot^Kog, i. e. the tendency of the 
flesh is against the spirit, and of the spirit is 
Jigainst the flesh ; and raZra dvrixsirai aXkriXoigj 
these are opposed to each other (scil. gcco^ zoii 


Ti/so^a,) SO that ye cannot do the things that ye 

These words are similar ; for they all denote 
the affection of mind which arises out of the 
presentation of a new, unexpected, and great 
object to the eye or the mind. They differ, 
however, not only in degree, but in the nature 
of the affection. £x-X/;(ro'go^a/ has the most ex- 
tensive meaning. It is used of all things by 
which the mind is powerfully affected, not only 
with fear, sorrow, anger ; but also of those more 
pleasing objects, the aspect of which stimulates 
us in a pleasing manner to love, reverence, or 
delight.* P'requently, therefore, the cause by 
which any one exTXrimrcci is added. So Xenoph. 
Sympos, 4. 23, i^'^o 'rov s^urog i'yCTrXaysvra. Euripid. 
Hel. V. 1413. avd^hg •^ao^im hm'TrATiy/J^'^vriV' Rhes. 
V. 291. ^a/x/Ss/ sjCTrXayhrsg. Med. V. 8. £fwr/ Su/xoi/ 
sjcrXay&Tffa, In the New Testament it is ap- 
plied to auditors, l^i'r^'kdynaoL, stI rn biba-x/i a-jTou; 
and to the parents of Jesus, Luke ii. 48, 
idovreg aurov s^i'TrXdyrjaavy i. e. with joy and admira- 
tion, when they found him in the midst of the 
doctors. But sx^a/^Ss/cr^a/, which occurs three 

* Query, ^^73 admirabile esse vel Jieri, ■r>.r,(Tra>^ placeo, 
please. — T. 


times ill INIark, is applied to those who, by the 
sight or consideration of some great or fearful 
thing, are horrified ; not only because the object 
itself gives rise to fear, but also because the 
mind is scarcely able to conceive of its magni- 
tude. ^ So in Mark ix. 15, sv^iMg 6 oyXog Iddjv 
ahrh iJsi^a/x/S;^^?!, ?*. e. were astonished as any one 
is wont to be, when the object then spoken of 
is presented suddenly. In Mark xvi. 5, 6, it 
denotes wonder, coupled with fear. Finally, 
xiv. 33, it is said of our Lord ^'^Jaro gx^a/x/Ss/d-^a/ 
xat abriiMViiv (Matth. xxvi. 37, 7^.v'rsTa^ai xai ddrj/x.^ 
Luther has rendered this zu zittern und zu za- 
gen, in a way more adapted to customary 
speech than to the true force of the word; and 
not in accordance with our Lord's character, 
whose habit it was to regard his death as in- 
stant, and to foretel it. But when the hour of 
death arrived, it could not be but that his mind 
must be intensely affected by the immediate 
contemplation of a form of death, not only cruel, 
but of the severest suffering: not, as some older 
theologians have said, that he shrunk with fear 
from that death or those sufferings. For al- 
though it must be conceded to human nature, 
in its most resolute form, that the spirit, in such 

7 From HDJl' ^iralus est, obstupuit — T. 


a cfiisis, would be considerably aifected ; yet he 
who was conscious that he was in the path of 
duty, and who was endued with the very wisdom 
of Deity, and who knew himself to be commis- 
sioned by his Father expressly that he might 
die for the salvation of the human race, would 
regard all perturbation or dread as altogether 
.foreign to him and unworthy. They therefore 
write either in folly or in malice who choose to 
aver from such passages as this, that our Lord 
only understood, at a later period of his course, 
the necessity of his death, when he saw that 
either death must be submitted or the cause of 
truth betrayed; for that otherwise, he would 
not have been in such uneasiness if he had not 
hoped originally that the course of events would 
have been more prosperous. But of this I have 
spoken elsewhere. 

Finally, sJ/Vrac^a/ is said of those who, by 
any event, are so far disturbed that they are 
not quite in their senses, and know not what 
they think or say. In this sense it is often 
used in the New Testament. It occurs also in 
Mark iii. 21, sXs^oi/ y6i.o on s^sgrri ; where it does 
not mean that they said Jesus was out of his 
mind ; but they thought (this is often the force 
of iXiyov) that he was so pressed by the crowd 
as to lose his self-possession [ausser sich seyn.) 


For this was not the opinion of enemies, but 
of friends, ruv eras' avTov. This is evident from 
the connection axohcavng o'l i:a^ ccvrou — ri^sXov — 
iXsyov yd^. For in the midst of the gathering 
crowd of Galileans, he held a great disputation 
with the law}'ers who had followed him from Je- 
rusalem, V. 22 — 30. His friends, therefore, fear- 
ed on his account, lest any harm should happen 
to him, and therefore they went out to bring him 
in (x^arJjca/), andrescue him from the multitude. 
The word is used peculiarly in 2 Cor. v. 13, 
g/Vs yd^ st,sff'r7jfjbiv, ^sui' s'Irs (roj(p^ovov/jLev, v/tiTv. For 
there, since a man cannot think who has lost 
his self-possession, it is often said that eg/<rra<r- 
Sa/ is, in this place, to be excessive, to boast 
exceedingly. And this, because it is opposed 
to (rca<p§oveTv. But it can scarcely be so under- 
stood, for what would be the meaning there of 
s^taraff^ai ru ^c(p ? For how could it be said that 
he did this to God, or for God's sake ? Neither 
is it necessary to seek for an idea contrary 
to rw eu(p^ovs7v. 1 Cor. xiii. 8. xv. 11, 2. Thes. 
ii. 15. I suspect, therefore, that eJ/Vraff^a;, 
in this passage, means to yield to another, as 
to way, place, honour, to prefer another to one's 
self, in which it is not unfrequent in Greek 
writers. See obuv s^iaraSai, Xenoph. Sympos. 
iv. 31. And evidently so in Lucian, Sat. 7. 


iii. p. 390, %cl] s'^sffrriv tuJ Aii. Tlie sense, there- 
fore, will be, " If I yield willingly, (sv %aohia.) J 
do it for God's sake ;" for since ail tilings are of 
God, I arrogate nothing to myself; if I be- 
have with modesty sv T^ogw-rw it is for your 
sakes, to whom especially I would be useful. 
See note on Herodian, vol. viii. 8, 13. 

These words are generally supposed to dif- 
fer. They are both rendered, to care, to be 
solicitous ; except that in some passages of the 
New Testament it is said that fj^zoifi^av means to 
be too solicitous, to be over anxiously careful. 
For although both words carry the meaning of 
to care, yet they differ. For (p^ovrileiv means 
only to care, to aim, to meditate, to give dili- 
gence, that a thing may be done or be pre- 
sent. So it occurs once in the New Testa- 
ment, Titus iii. 8. ha (p^ovri^uei xaXwv 'i^yov 
'ff^ofaraG^aiy to be careful. But /j^z^ffivav is so to 
care, as to be truly solicitous that the thing 
should not be wanting.* Wherefore our Lord 

^ (p^ovTt^uv is from (p^eviw <Pq*iv ; and the proper idea there- 
fore is thought, consideration, the occupation of the mind with 
a subject of interest. /At^if/,y£v is derived from ■^"IQ amarum 
esse, amaritudine affecit ; which, in all the cognate dialects 
of the Hebrew, is used not only in the sense of bitter, phy- 
sically as a taste, but as bitterness of spirit, and fretful 
care and solicitude. — T. 


rightly warns his disciples, Matth. x. 19, m 

XakriCiTz, And also in Matth vi. 25, iJ^n /m^i/mvuts rf 
'\\>'XT\ u/Awv, i. e. be not solicitous, as if the things 
necessary to your life were about to fail you. 
And in verse 34, tm oh^ iM'-oiiJ,vr,6iT3 s}g rriv avpiov, 
be not solicitous about the morrow, so that 
although you know not what its events shall 
be, ye should so indulge mistrust as to increase 
by it the cares of to-day; 55 yc^i aupiov ^g^z/xv^cg/ 
ra kuvT^g, for on the morrow it shall be seen 
that no needful blessing shall be wanting. It 
is not a care, even an earnest and solicitous 
care, for future things, wliicli is reprehended ; 
but that diffidence which originates in empty 
and baseless pride, and which agitates the 
mind and torments it during the whole course 
of life with fretful anxiety about earthly things. 
This is meant by the jui^^i/j^mi roZ aicovog, which 
€'jijj<::viyo-j(it rh Xoyov. And therefore our Lord 
says (v. 32.) --rlwct raZra ra 'i%ri sT/^^rs/, i. e. as 
the most important and exclusively desirable; 
but as for you, (^>jr£?rs cr^wroi/ TYiV [SagiXs/av rou ^sov. 
In Themistius, Orat. 26, we find placed to- 
gether, (poovrigag Kal fMSsifivrjffug, xoci ToXXag v'jxrag 
oLv-zwug xotra/MXsrrjffug. See Wettstein on Matth. 
X. 19. ^3 iT/^s/i/, we render, y/Zr ctwas sorgen, but 
H,iHiLva,v^ sich eticas hiimmern. It is properly 


therefore in this passage written, m (xzgi^w.curv 
For this is the habit of the unbelieving mind, 
T-wv uTkruv xai /u^s/x-^i/ioi^uv. The affections of 
mind, however, which these words express are 
so nearly allied, that often one word appears 
to be permuted for the other. See Moeris, 
de Vocibus Atticis, v. fJi^s^if^v^Vy and the examples 
therein adduced. 



In the former chapter we spoke of a particu- 
lar class of synonyms. Some examples of this 
kind remain to be noticed. And of these I 
will now speak briefly. 

gTcXrj^og. avarrj^og. 
To many persons these two words appear to 
have little or no difference. They render either 
of them, by the terms, austere, hard, severe, 
harsh, inhuman. And so far certainly they 
agree, that neither character, so properly de- 
signated, has a regard to that which is equitable, 
but so uses his right, that he remits nothing, 
from a feeling of lenity or mercy. Yet they 
differ, (as in German our words streng and 
hart.) For he is ccucrrri^og, who although he is 
not altogether alien from the tenderness of 
humanity, yet represses it within him, because, 
under the force of reasons of justice, he thinks 
that nothing of his right, and of that which is 
due to him, should be conceded. But he is 
GxXTj^og, who asserts his right because the prin- 
ciple of humanity is wanting. The avffrn^o; 
would remit and indulge, but thinks that he 


ought not; the a'/.Xr}^6; has ito wish to do so. 
A father who is a\j<frv}^6g cannot be condemned, 
but a father who is axXriiog is a bad man. 

In Matth. xxv. 24, the same master is called 
axXri^og, whom the same servant, in Luke xix. 
21, is made to call aiidrrj^og. And hence it is 
concluded that the two words have the same 
meaning. We should take care, however, in 
treating parallel passages of this kind, if we 
find the same thing expressed in different 
words, not to conclude too hastily that the 
words do not differ in sense. This is a fre- 
quent error of lexicographers. For when two 
authors narrate the same fact in such a way, 
that they make use of different words, by which 
the general bearing of the narration is not af- 
fected, I ask on what ground are we entitled 
to affirm, that the two different words carry 
precisely the same meaning? So far we must 
admit, they are said, and may be said, of the 
same thing; but that they mean the same 
thing precisely is not yet proved. Neither, in 
the estimation of such men as the one men- 
tioned in the parable, is there any great dif- 
ference between a severe or strict master and 
a harsh and merciless one. He who is c>Ck^6g 
is deservedly blamed, as in Aristotle's Ethics, 
iv. 8, ay^m Jtai ajiXri^oi ; but the avgryj^og cannot 


be blamed. Plutarch. Quaest. Gr, cap. 40, 

xakhg 5s wk xa/ dixatog, ob^ ^rrqv riv Cuxp^ui* xal ciha- 
T'>' ■^•TTiog' %ir[(S7og* (-r^aur^js* Xf^jCTorjjg.) 
These words are the opposite of the two for- 
mer ones ; they agree as expressions of lenity 
of mind; yet they differ. J'or crgau^ is gentle, 
who endures all things with an even temper 
(sauftmiithig ;) n'^'og is mild, especially towards 
the faults of others (gelinde, mild;) %or\<irCi 
kindly, who wishes well, and desires to benefit 
others (yiitig,) Therefore in Matthew xxi. 5, 
jSaffiXrjg rr^avg is not benign, but gentle, tender, 
free from proud ferocity ; as in Pindar Pyth. 
iii. V. 124, j8a(f/Xgi)g 'Tr^aijg dsroTg, ov <p^ovsci)v dya^oTg. 
Compare Matthew xi. 29, on 'Tro^og uiii xal 
ra-xsivhg rfj xa^dlcc. And in 1 Peter iii. 4, '^r^ccC 
zai 7]-ji)yjov 'jTnviMa is a meek and quiet spirit. 
Finally, the -r^ae/g in Matthew v. 5, are free 
from that haughty self-sufficiency, in which the 
Jews made their boast of promised happiness ; 
and therefore, it is said x\v]^ovo/j.yjgov(fi rnv ynvy see 
Wetstein on this passage. The force of n'^iog 
may be sufficiently shown by one passage, 
I Thess. ii. 7, duvoi,,u.svoi b (Sd^st iJmi, ug •^ciCtcx/ 
droCTokoi^ s'/£vr}'^ rtTtoi iv fMsffui vfiuv, ug ccv r^o(pli 
^otX-ff^j rd savT^g rixva ; as in Homer, crarj?^ S ug 
riTiog n^v. ir^cfog denotes tenderness of spirit; 


^T/og the exhibition of that tenderness in bear- 
ing with others : (gelinde, mild bey der Behand- 
lung andrer.J In 2 Tim. ii. 24, the ser- 
vant of the Lord must not strive {i. e. about 
useless questions,) but ^V/ov uvai 'jrfog irdyrag, i. e. 
he must be gentle in bearing with the opinions 
of Others, didocKnxhv, avs'^ixccxov, iv it^adrriri 'TTaidiuovTa 
roug avTldiccTi%,(Msvoug. He is n-^'og who seeks to 
the utmost of his power, not to annoy or distress 
others. So we find ^V/a ^ag/^axa, Iliad. ^.212; 
and ^V/a uxsff/Mara, Aeschyl. Prometh. v. 481. 
And in Herodot. iii. 89, we find rj'xiog opposed 
to yoCkiirug. 

In the word x^^jcro; the presiding notion is 
benevolence, benignity. Our Lord says of the 
Father that he is %p>5tfrov l^\ ro\ig ayccokroug xat 
'Tovrj^oig, Luke vi. 35. For he who is Xi^'^^^^ i^ot 
only is kind to the good but to the eviL This 
injunction had preceded: Love your enemies. 
The d;)(^ag/(rro/ jtai irovri^oi are those who, regard- 
less of benefit received, act wickedly, and are 
to all ax^rjffroi. Compare Ephes. iv. 32, and 1 
Cor. XV. 32, and Wetstein's notes. Often al- 
so %,^<^7'o/ and Tovrj^oi are opposed to each other. 
In Matthew xi. 30, 6 ^vyog /xou ^g^jcro? xa} rb 
^opT/cv fjjov sXa(p^6v sffrt, it is commonly thought that 
Xirjcrog, is easy, pleasant. But I rather think 
that here also it is, benign. For the yoke of 


the law, especially in connexion with the tra- 
ditions and comments of the Pharisees was 
'TovTi^og ; ((po^T/ci dvff[3d<fTaKTa Matth. xxiii. 4, Luke 
xi. 46.) and yet it was a%f>j<rros; but the ^u/oj 
rou yj^idroZ was %;^Ji<rro5, ?. e. benign (ein ivohlthd- 
tiges Joch :J for he who bears it feels himself to 
be more blessed as he goes forward. But let 
young students be on their guard, lest they so 
conceive of the fo^rm eXccp^ov, as to suppose that 
the precepts of Christian duty are easy to be 
observed — which is very incorrect ; for it may 
be easy enough to abstain from certain meats ; 
but ^nv Tcara miv/Mcc, is not SO easy ; to overcome 
every rebellious passion, and constantly to obey 
the divine commandments, not by the fear of 
punishments or the hope of reward, but solely 
from the love of truth and virtue, and of the 
holy authority which commands it. And yet 
it may be said truly, hXasp^hv rh (poorlov, i. e. su(popov 
xa/ iu(Ba,araxrov, because it does not depress the 
soul, but nourishes and confirms it day by day ; 
so that daily it is made xi^'^'^^'^H^^ ^^' ^>-ot<p^or^og. 
For many are the xou^a to the narrow-minded 
man, especially if they are t'Trr^i^ffcc ; but (i(p(jor^r(x. 
zKiXi^io^ avdo'i, as in Lucian, 1. Merc. cond. 13. 
p. 669. But to return. In Romans ii. 4, it 
will be granted by all that rl xi^,gTov rov ^lou 
means the benevolence of God ; but then they 


say that %p?;(yror»jj in the New Testament, not 
only denotes benevolence or beneficence, as 
Rom. ii. 4, xi. '22, 2. Cor. vi. 5, &c., but also 
the benefit derived from benevolence, as in 
Ephes. ii. 7, crXoDroi/ rJjj "XJ^^iroQ avrov sv ^^rjffrorTjTi 
i<p' i]ijja.g h X^iffrui 'Ir.ffou. But in this passage %ag^? 
seems rather, as elsewhere, to express the be- 
nefit conferred on us, by divine benevolence, 
through Jesus Christ. In Titus iii. 4, also, 
who does not see that xf^jfyrorTj? denotes not the 
benefit but the benevolence ? If we are to give 
heed also to the lexicographers, even Jt/s/x^; 
does not diifer from those words of which we 
have spoken, for they render it mild, clement, 
indulgent, lenient, humane, and smsr/sta clemen- 
cy, humanity. But in smsix^g there is not the 
notionofamindmoderate, mild, merciful; which 
renders the three former words synonymous; 
but emsizTjg is rather one who is easy, yielding, 
not obstinate, (gefdllig, nachgiehig,) opposed 
to ycLkzitig^ But all this is well known. 
v^'^/og* a^^wv ai/oTjrog* cf.(S\)nroi* 
with the substantives 

All these words so far agree as they express 
a certain deficiency of intellect, whether this 
shows itself in thinking or acting. Yet they 
differ very widely. 


The word vriT^ioi; is properly expressive of age, 
and therefore it does not denote vice, absolutely; 
nor is it predicated properly of man only, but 
frequently it is used to express an incautious 
ingenuous man, unsuspicious of evil; it is put 
for that simplicity of mind which is so pleasing 
in youth. 

But since in adults this quality is deservedly 
reproved, as unworthy of a mature mind, it is 
used as a term of reproach towards those who 
think, feel, and act like children, when from 
their years they ought to have made further ad- 
vances. In the New Testament, however, it 
often occurs without the idea of reprehension. 
So Matth. xi. 25, Luke x. 21, Gal. iv. -3, Rom. 
ii. 20. Hence vrt'xtoi h x^ianZ 1 Cor. iii. 1. In 
the same way vyiTid^nv occurs 1 Cor. xiv. 20, 
fi^ reaihia yhzG^i ra7g <p^sffh, dXXa ttj xax/cc vfimdt^in, 
as in Xenoph. Ages. i. 17. TuTdccr^ ccTrdrri, in 
Ephes. iv. 14, they are called vti'zioi, who, like 
infants, are incautious and easily deceived. 
The word stands opposed to d\in^ riXnog v. J 5. 
(comp. Heb. v. 13.) 

The word a^p^aiv denotes one who does not 
rightly use his mental powers. And this is 
not always used in a bad sense. For what the 
lexicographers say, that it means foolish, sense- 
less, pagan, impious, villainous, and even ostcn- 


tatious, must be rejected, together with their 
other frequent trifling. It answers, in fact, to 
our word unverstdndig ; which is not only ap- 
plied to boys, but to any who, without actual 
blame, are destitute of the true knowledge of 
things ; and it is said sometimes without the 
idea of blame. So it occurs almost invariably 
in the New Testament. In Rom. ii. 20, -ra/- 
dsurrig a<p^6vuv and diddffjcaXog vriirim occur together ; 
and in 2 Cor. xi. 19, we read rih'zug yao anyj(^i 
ruv d(p^6vuvj (p^oviiMoi hng. Neither are the aip^ovsg, 
impious, or vain and insolent boasters ; for the 
(p^ovifMog, could not properly bear with such ; but 
they are rather men who find pleasure in light 
and trifling things ; and are called u(p^ovsg, be- 
cause they do not understand that such things 
are vain and perishing. Luke xii. 20, 21. 
Such men the ^^ovi/xoi not only bear with, but 
they may do so ridiugy i, e, without anger. In 
this sense Paul, in verse 16, calls himself ci(p^ojv^ 
because after the manner of men he boasted, 
sv d<p^o(f{jvr}, i. e. ug a<pDoov. For as they are ^^om/jt^oi 
who rightly estimate things around them, so men 
who are deceived by foolish vanities, yet boast 
themselves, are called a(p^ong. So in Xenophon 
Apol. wefind df^ontsri^a i] (J^iyakriyo^ia:.) and Sym- 
pos. 4. 55, they are called oc,<p^ong, who were 
pleased with the deceits of a Sicilian. la 


I Peter ii. 15, it is joined with uyvufflcf; which is 
put for the ignorance of men who are influenced 
by mere outward appearance. Commonly it is 
there interpreted, calumny, probably because it 
occurs thus, ^//-toDv rv ruv df^ovMv ayvuciav. But 
(pUMoZv in this passage is simply to coerce. 

The word avoTirog differs from both the former. 
It is foolish, stupid, either that which is really 
wanting in right reason, ( unvernunftig ) ; or that 
it is not properly called out; so that, although 
a man may appear to himself to follow a certain 
rule in acting, yet he is in fact guided by false 
rules, both in thought and action. Paul, there- 
fore, calls the Galatians dvoijroi; because, although 
they thought themselves very wise, they were, 
in fact, decidedly false teachers, and had re- 
turned to the old superstition. And the dvorjrot 
are rightly opposed to the (f6<poi; Rom. i. 14; 
and Titus iii. 3. ^M'iv yd^ Tore xai rj/XiTi dvo^roi, a. e. 
we followed a wrong course of living, not we 
were without a proper knowledge of religion. 
And when Jesus, Luke xxiv. 25, called his two 
disciples, dvorirovg xai ^eadiTg rfi xa^dla, it is plain 
that he could not, and would not, upbraid their 
weakness and slowness of intellect ; but he calls 
them dvor}roi, because they had formed from the 
Scriptures a false hope respecting the Messiah, 
and had consequently sunk into despondency. 


Luther well renders it : Thoren. Neither, as we 
lately observed, is (SpudsTg rfj xa^bia slow of mind 
or stupid : nor ^^abijg rp jta^d/cc taken by itself, 
incredulous ; but the whole formula (3^ccdiTg rfj x. 
Tou 'xiffnviiv, expresses an incredulous man, one 
hard of belief. For when /3^a66$ is said of the 
mind of man, the kind of slowness is determined 
by the rest of the sentence. A man may be 
either ^^advg sJg rh XaXJjCa/, ^oahug sJg b^yTjv. ( James 
i. 19.) sig TO (fuvisvai, sig ro cr/tfrei/g/i'. But jS^advg 
alone never means slowness of intellect or 
stupidity. Theophrastus rightly says, ch. 14. 
(27.) dvaiff^rjgiuv (S^ccdvrrira -^v^i^g sv Xoyoig xai 
<7r§d^s<fiVi which passage is sometimes adduced 
to show that (S^udvg means stupid. Polybius 
also, whom (iv. 8. 7.) they say had affirmed the 
Thessalonians to be dy^^rjgrovg xal ^oahTg useless 
and stupid, had said a little before that the same 
man was often ^vHruirarog xal ^oadurarog. Cer- 
tainly in both passages the word denotes slow- 
ness of action. But let students beware how 
they confide in examples brought from other 
writers. But to return. In 1 Tim. vi. 9, when 
the Apostle speaks of Im'^vfitai dvor}roi, he does 
not mean passions which make men mad, as 
some render it ; but which are themselves wild 
and irrational, as T^o^vf^ia ci<p^uv in Eurip. Here. 
Fur. V. 310. Compare Schol. on Aristoph. Nub. 


V. 426. avoia frequently means want of mind, 
not want of piety ; as Luke vi. 11, and 2 Tim. 
iii. 9 ; but the word dvorjffia, appears to agree 
more fully with the proper meaning of the 
word dvoi^rog ; of which word Moeris gives some 
examples on the word ?2X/^/o5. 

Finally, dffvvsrog expresses density and inap- 
titude of mind to perceive that which is true 
and just. For the M^ord d^vverog s. davvsrog, is 
used by the Greeks in two ways, both of a 
heavy and stupid man, who is wanting in in- 
tellectual acumen ; and of those things which 
are difficult of comprehension, and only to be 
apprehended by men of acuteness, by the 
shviToi. In this latter sense it does not occur in 
the sacred writings : See Valkenar on Euripid. 
Phoen. V. 1510; but in the former sense it is 
used both in the New Testament, and by other 
writers ; although it is somewhat surprising 
that the Greeks have used the same word 
both in the active and passive sense. And, 
in the same way, they use awsrog, both of him 
who readily and acutely perceives, and of the 
thing easily understood. There are some who 
affirm, that in Rom. i. 31, and x. 30, davvirog 
is wicked, wanting in true religion; but without 
:iny ground, except that in Suidas we find 
dffvArovg' roue d<rvvsldr,TOvg, But in the midst of 


an enumeration of particular vices, we could 
hardly expect to find the general notion of 
wickedness or improbity ; and in c. x. 30, 
s^vog dffvvsrov evidently means a people so far 
inferior to the Jews in understanding, as to be 
the object of contempt, (oux i^vog.) 

In fine, v^T/05 is one who is yet inexperienced, 
unknowing ; a<p^ct)v^ one who does not use his ra- 
tional powers; dvorjrog, who, although he appears 
toknow, yet thinks andacts perversely; dguvirog, 
one who, from density of mind, does not per- 
ceive truth and right. The fault of the dp^oveg is 
d<p^Qgvv7i, and the dvoTjroi, fioo^lccy in the v»jt/o/, ccrXorrjgy 
in the dtrui/gro/, dtruvsg/a. We will turn now, how- 
ever, to some other examples. 

tv(fi(3'/}c, ihXaBrig* zvcfs^siw svXd^six. 

These words are synonymous; for they are 
all used to express piety, Luke ii. 25, dvri^ dixaiog 
xal svXa^rjg. Acts X. 2, svffs^ns Jta/ (polSovfisvog rov 
^SQv. Heb. xii. 28, /*2ra atdovg evXajSi/ag, 1 
Tim. ii. 2, sv Tcdari ihgi^uct. xa; 6i(jj\i6Triri. Passages, 
however, occur, in which their several and 
special significations must be observed, svas^^g 
and i\)Xa^'/]g differ, inasmuch as svasjSrig express- 
es that reverence for the Deity which shows 
itself in actions, especially in the worship of 
God; but suXa/Sjj vindicates that disposition, which 
dreads and avoids the doing any thing contrary 


to right, and diligently labours, therefore, to 
fulfil all the duties of piety and humanity. 
iuXa(3r}i is the pious man, who is governed by 
the thought of the divine sanctity, and always 
fears lest he should do, or think, any thing op- 
posed to the divine will, gottesfiirclitig ; a God- 
fearing man ; but he is sucrs/S^g who shows that 
piety by acting, fromm. Hence guXa/Ss/a is that 
piety which governs the soul, Gottesfurcht ; 
fitfg/Sg/a is the energy of piety in the life, both 
internal and external, Frommigkeit^ Gottseligkeit, 
Luther properly renders 1 Tim. vi. 6, Ian hi 
fxooKSfLog fj/iyag ri ebdi^na fisra avTa^xeiui, wer gottse- 
lig ist. For true piety has this power, that life 
is rendered desirable, even though destitute of 
external prosperity ; and we find ourselves 
happy if it be only in an acquiescence in the 
providentialgovernment of God. Thatisei><r£/3£/a 
fiiT auragx£/a?. On the contrary, they are said 
to be most miserably in error, who are vofii^ovrsg 
iro^iff/j^hv iJvai rrjv svaejSnav, i. e. who look for mere 
earthly gain from their piety. It is piety Ater 
avra^xsiag which is gainful. And suffslSsia in this 
passage, does not mean the Christian religion 
which leads to piety. It is 57 ^ccr ivcs^nav didaffxa. 
X/'a V. 13, which is the institution for producing 
piety. N either is rh /J.V ar rj { ov Ti^g voas^iiag 1 Tim. 
iii. 16, as it is usually rendered, the mystery of 


religion, i.e. the Christian doctrine ; but fivgrri^iov 
TTii suffi^siag is that doctrine or matter to which 
all piety, i. e. Christian religion is to be referred. 
orvXos xai kdoaiai/Ma rrig dX^j^g/a;, namely, ^sog £fa- 
K£|cu^?3 sv (sa^xi %. X. That 6v<rsj3sia is that espe- 
cially which shows itself in the life, is evident 
from Acts xxii. 12 ; oivn^ su(f£(3rig xara rov v6/xov, as 
in Xenoph. Hist. Gr. i. 7, 10. %ara rov v6/mv, 
iugi^ovvng xai ivoexovvngj x^iveTn' Compare Acts 
xvii. 23, 2 Tim. iii. 5. Wherefore Peter, 2 
Epistle i. 6, exhorts Christians to show in their 
continence, patience, in their patience, sutri/Sgya, 
and in their gutrs/Ss/a, brotherly love. 

But as ivXa(3rjg properly denotes timidity and 
caution, it is so said of piety, as that it exhibits 
the effects of piety on the mind rather than the 
principle of the life of piety. It occurs in this 
sense in the passages quoted. But there are 
two places adduced in which it is supposed 
that roug suXajSiTg, means proselytes of the gate; 
who elsewhere are spoken of by the terms 
po/3ou//,gw/ and o'g/3o/xgvo/ rov ':^s6v. So Acts ii. 5. 
^tfav ds sv ' Is^ovgccXii/jiy xaroixovvrsg'lovdaToiy avd^sgsvXa- 
jSg7$, uTh 'TTavrog s^vovg rojv vTh rov ov^avov. But first, 
there is no reason why we should admit the 
idea of proselytes, since there is nothing said 
concerning these men which may not be said 
of Jews generally. For it is evident that o/ 


x'xrotxouvTsg sv 'Is^. avd^tg ivXa(3iT; are only men- 
tioned ; because Jews, not only those born in 
Palestine and speaking Hebrew, but all those 
who journeyed from different provinces to 
Jerusalem, and spoke different languages or 
dialects, each severally heard these Apostles, 
who were Galileans, speak r/MfTog iv rn ibia 
oiaXsKruj ajrwc, sv f\ lyivv7]^r,<iav. For when they 
are spoken of as xaro.xoZvng ev'li^ovgaXrjf^, this is 
understood, with little reason, to refer to those 
proselytes who are called 3^1/1 '^1^ ; and who 
certainly received this appellation, not because 
they dwelt in Jerusalem, but because they were 
permitted to sojourn among the Israelites ge- 
nerally. For these sojourners lived not only 
in Jerusalem, but throughout the whole of 
Palestine, and amongst the Jews scattered 
through all the various provinces of the Roman 
Empire. Besides, they are called lovbaToi which 
name was not applied to the mere sojourn- 
ing proselytes, but only to those who were 
proselytes of the covenant. Peter himself, 
calls them oivbozg JovdaTbi xcci ot jcaroixovvrsg ' ls^ov(faXr,fji, 
uTavrsg; but in v. 22, av^gg /V^a/jX/ra/. In v. 10, 
however, a distinction is drawn between kvboucn 
r« x(tl '^reog^'kvToi Finally, the whole line of ar- 
gument which Peter adopts, would have been 
inapplicable to the sojourners among them. 


whom the rulers of the Jews only required 
to observe the Noachic precepts; for Peter 
made use of examples which could only in- 
fluence those who had embraced the whole 
law. That the term cannot be referred to pro- 
selytes of the covenant may be understood 
from this, that these could neither be dis- 
tinguished from Jews by this term, neither 
could they be called Tcuroixovvrsg. For this word, 
if it indeed accords with the Hebrew term 
Uti^l/l, is applicable only to the sojourners, to 
whom the rest of the description does not ap- 
ply. They appear to me, therefore, to have 
been men, not born in Judea, yet of the 
Jewish nation, who were dwelling for a time 
at Jerusalem, among whom also it appears by 
V. 10, some were proselytes. For it is evident 
that JiarorAsTv may be affirmed of all the dwell- 
ers at Jerusalem, and not only of the sojourners, 
Acts i. 19. 

A second instance occurs of the use of the 
word ivXdCrjS, where civo^sg tuXa(3iTg are said to 
have buried Stephen. But there is no reason 
to suppose them proselytes either. And, 
lastly, there is a passage, Ileb. v. 7, in which 
svXd^iia appears to be said of anxiety of mind, 
xa/ iigay.out^iig drrh rng svXa^siag, This is render- 
ed : " and was heard and delivered from anxie- 


ty." But seeing* that by this view, the series 
of thought is manifestly interrupted, (offering 
up ardent prayers, he was freed and accom- 
plished a perfect obedience,) I would prefer 
to understand g'JXaCs/a in the sense of piety, 
for the sake of which he was heard. For he 
received this reward of true piety, that he ob- 
tained that for which he prayed. For he did 
not ask to be set free from the suffering of 
death, but that in the enduring of death, he 
might experience that constancy and perse- 
verance of mind which Luke relates to have 
been conferred on him, c. xxii. 4*2, 43. It 
would appear, therefore, that all these words 
Ko/Vg^ oJv whg 'i/ji^a^sv — v'Traxorjv, should be included 
in a parenthesis, that the other parts of the 
sentence may cohere together, dsrj^sig ir^og- 
eviyxag, s/gaxov^sii; — xa/ rsXs/w^g/g sysvsro a'iriog 
gurnoiug.. On this use of the preposition dcr6, 
see Abresch. Dilucid. Thuc. p. 144, and Morus 
ad Isocr. Paneg. p. 55. 

It is a groundless complaint which some 
persons have made, that some vocables in the 
New Testament are used so vaguely and in- 
definitely, that among their various meanings 
it is not always apparent which is to be at- 
tached to them in each particular instance. 
Whence it arises, that to the same vocable 


sometimes they affix the generic and some- 
times a certain specific signification. But any 
one may perceive that this woukl be an erro- 
neous mode of interpretation. For if a word de- 
notes any thing which has several forms united 
under one common genus, but different in 
species, it is certainly possible that the generic 
word may be predicated of each particular 
species ; but it would be very absurd to say, 
that the word denoted all the particulars which 
class under the one genus. It were ridiculous 
if any one in a German lexicon, among the 
meanings of the word Holz (wood), should 
enumerate all the species of wood as if they 
were expressed by the generic term ; and 
should state, that it sometimes means the 
genus and sometimes the several species 
which compose the genus, and then give all 
the different kinds of trees, as Bauholz, Brenn- 
holZi Nutzholz. And is it not then equally ridi- 
culous, when, in the lexicons to the New 
Testament, we see, affixed to any word, all the 
notions of the several things which are asso- 
ciated under it as separate species ? It is one 
thing for a word to be predicated of several 
things, because the common or generic notion 
inherent in it, applies to those several things ; 
it is another for that word to denote these se- 


veral specific things. The examples of this 
error are innumerable, but in this discussion 
a few will suffice. 

These words are said to have at times a 
wider signification than at others; and some- 
times to denote all improbity of manners and 
of life, at others, to represent only some spe- 
cial form of that general pravity. So that it 
must be sometimes doubtful wliat notion is in 
each place to be attached to the word. The 
cause, however, of such ambiguity and hesita- 
tion, must be sought not in the negligence or 
carelessness of the writers, but in the igno- 
rance of the true force of the word which they 
have used. These words may have been ac- 
counted synonymous, because each has the 
common notion of impurity of life — defiled by 
intemperate passions ; yet each has its specific 
and proper force, which, if we observe accu- 
rately, we need never remain in doubt as to 
the meaning in each particular instance. 

The word uxa^a^ffia has the most extensive 
meaning, for it denotes every kind of impurity 
of mind and conduct. But a^eX/s/a, and a<r<ur/a, 
although they also are truly axa^a^<r/a ; yet they 
denote a certain kind of dxa^a^ala only ; so that 
they cannot be permuted, as if it were the 


same thing whether dcsXyna, dauria, 'rogvs/a, or 
dxa^a^<r/a, dvo/xia were written ; and they are 
not so promiscuously used in the New Testa- 
ment. For axa^agtf/a is used to express any 
kind of mental or moral impurity or unclean- 
ness, and not merely impure passions and in- 
dulgences. So in 1 Thess. ii. 3, the cra^axX^ff/g 
is said to be made ovx. h 'TrXdvrjg, ovds Ig d'/M^cc^gicc^f 
oO^s Ix doXou, neither in error, nor by impure 
council, nor in guile ; and in c. iv. it is op- 
posed to dixaioffvvr]. And in Romans vi. 19, it 
is not synonymous with dvofj^Ia, but it is said 
generally of all impurity of life. The sense is, 
as ye formerly ^a^scrj^cars rd /uAXyj vfjjuv douXa rij 
axa^agtf/a xa/ r^ dvofx,ia^ i. e. to impurity, and to 
improbity, s/'s H" avo/x/av, so as to lead an im- 
pious and flagitious life; so now consecrate them 
to probity and virtue, (rf dtxaioffvrf}) sJg dyiag//^6v, 
that you may lead a pure and holy life. I 
know not but that the words ^h dvof^iav and s/s 
ayiagaov might be taken in connection with 
ira^icrricari', so that the sense would be, your 
members which formerly in the service of im- 
purity, were devoted to impiety, now ^oDXa r/f 
dixaioevvri, consecrate to holiness and chastity. 
There is a very similar passage in Ephes. iv. 
19, o'irmg <7rot,^sduKUV iaurovg rf, dgikyzia zlg l^yadiav 
d/ta^ap(ftag TatSrig h crXsoi'gJ/a. It seems, however, 


opposed to this, that rraoierdvai is joined some- 
times with the dative, as v. 16. 

The word acsXys/a differs from axa^a^Gia. 
dffiXyrjg is properly petulant, saucy, impudent ; 
one without modesty or retiredness, but who 
acts immoderately and with wantonness; and 
atfgXyg/a, therefore, is the forwardness and peev- 
ish impertinence of the dffsXyrig, and not the 
obscenity and uncleanness of lust. This is 
proved by innumerable passages, which, after 
Henry Stephen, the lexicographers have heap- 
ed together. See also Westein on New Tes- 
tament, vol. i. 588. In this sense it occurs in 
2 Cor. xii. 21, joined with axa^a^c/a and cro^vs/a, 
as in Cicero, pro Cael. 29, c. 12, there is a 
long harangue, de corrupteh's, de adulteriis, de 
pj'otervitate, de sumtibus. Rom. xiii. 13, [J^n 
xo/Tccig xai dasXyi/atg ; and in the list of vices 
given in Gal. v. 19. It is probably used to 
express filthy lust in 2 Peter ii. 7, 18; but in 
1 Peter iv. 3, it seems rather to intimate wan- 
tonness. It is doubtful in what sense it is 
specially intended in Mark vii. 22. xkorral, 
rrXeovs^iai, 'rrovrioicti, doXog, affiXyna, o^^aXjULog rrovri^ogy 
^Xa6(p7i(Ma, \j'7ri^r}<pavia, dip^offuvT}. It cannot mean 
lust, for it is classed with vices of another cha- 
racter, and that has been already noticed in v. 
21. The interpreters, therefore, generally 


render it injury; but it is rather insolence; the 
insolence of men, who, indulgent to their own 
passions, have no regard to that which is just 
and equal, but trample down every right of 
others, while they hurry on to their own ob- 
ject.* In this sense it often occurs, among 

■ 1 cannot trace satisfactorily the oriental root of this 
word. Probably if we could, we might arrive at a more 
distinct determination of its generic force, and thus reconcile 
the seeming discrepancy and obscurity which evidently at« 
tend it. There are traces of the original word in the 
whole of the Gothic family of languages. In the Gothic 
translation of the Gospel by Ulphilas, unselgam is the wicked. 
This word is still retained in German, unselig, miserable, 
fatal, condemned. And it occurs also without the negative 
particle, German selig, Danish salog, Anglo-Saxon saelig, in 
the sense of good, virtuous, and therefore in a secondary 
sense, happy. The Greek word a<riXyni is evidently com- 
pounded of the negative or privative a, and some oriental 
root corresponding in its consonants to the letters o-Xy, and 
identical with that word which came into Europe with the 
leaders of the Gothic migration, and which has retained its 
place even in modern times. If it shall be yet discovered 
through the film of some slight orthographical difference, it 
will most probably throw light upon the use of the Greek 
term. It is very probable that seligo^ in Latin is not a 
compound, as the Lexicons state of se and Ugo ; but is an- 
other form of the yet undiscovered etymon of selig. 

I am inclined to think that the original word is H/iJ 
which, in the Hebrew, is prospere fecit, profuit. It has the 
same sense in Chaldee and Syriac ; and in Arabic is not only 
used in this sense, but carries also the idea of worth and 


other writers, but especially in Polybius ; and 
in those passages which are sometimes com- 
pared with the text already quoted from Mark. 
In the same Way Demosthenes charges Philip 
with uffsXyna xa) -xXsovs^/a, He puts together 
also ds<f'?rortxu)g xai dffsXyojg^ u.(SO\.yZ)c, koc! TPCTTiroog, 
and also dcsXycog %al 'n'oXvnXo^g, as Aeschinus iu 
Ctesiphon, p. 78, 5. ^/a t?iv dgsXysiav rTig da'Trdvrjg. 
Nor does the word in the Epistle of Jude, v. 4, 
vary from the particular sense. For o/ da^itg, 
r^v roD ^£ou ruMOjv ydgi^ [Jjiran^hng sJg dffiXystay are 
not altogether the impious and wicked, but 
the wanton, the insolent, o) rhv xv^m 'IriffoZi 

Finally, d.<S'j)ria is properly the worthless de- 
bauchery of aman, who leads a desperate life, as 
ddojrog is a worthless man. (See Cicero Tusc. 
iii. 8, et Gellius vii. 11.) Hence it is general- 
ly said of the profligate and dissolute, whom 

excellence. ^Jlo recte habuit res, Prohus fuit homo ; In- 
teger, bonus, idoneus. It seems scarcely probable that a word 
should occur in the whole Gothic family of languages, and 
also in the cognate dialects of the mother tongue, expressing 
the same two ideas of worth and happiness, and composed 
of the aame radical sounds, without a derivative connection 
existing between them. If we have been thus led to a right 
view of the origin of the word aeriXytm, then the general 
idea attached to it is, that of a course of moral conduct 
contrary to right, and issuing in misery. — T. 


Cicero describes to the life in his Officiis ii. 55, 
and 16. So in Luke xv. 13. the prodigal son 
is said daurug X^v. And in Ephes. v. 18. m 
^s^iKTxsc^s o7vw, b u) sdTiv d(Twr/a, it is not spoken 
of every kind of wicked impurity, of which 
drunkenness is the fountain, but of ruinous de- 
bauchery particularly, f Leiderlichkeit, liber- 
tinism.) Paul also desires that no such person 
should be chosen to the pastorship, who had 
Tsxva sv '/.arrijogici d(fcii)Tiag rj avvToraxra, And in 1 
Peter iv. 3, the class of impure vices there 
spoken of is called in v. 4, dvd^u<rig dcwr/ag, as 
a sort of outpouring or cess-pool of debauchery. 
Compare Westein on Luke xv. vol. i. p. 758. 
There is no need for further examples in a 
case already sufficiently plain, so that this 
word might have been dismissed in a very 
few words, had it not, in some few instances, 
been used differently from its proper and spe- 
cific meaning. For there are two common 
places to which, in the explanation of words 
of this class, many interpreters have recourse ; 
for if the proper meaning of a writer, in any 
passage, does not appear sufficiently plain, 
they either conceive that he intends to express 
some unclean vice, or that he uses a general 
term for any kind of wickedness and impiety. 



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