jmiKfttiii
Hi
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
\ HUMAN SERVICES
\ Office of the Secretary
k Room 904
Jr 100 Cambridge Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02202
PUBLIC DOCUMENT .... .... No. 12.
Cammotttoeattl) of Utassatjjusttts.
REPORT
ATTORNEY- GENERAL
V„ » ~ „^~«T^ T * «tt * ^^ IK 1 QAO
BOSTON :
WRIGHT & POTTER PRINTING CO., STATE PRINTERS,
18 Post Office Square.
1902.
PUBLIC DOCUMENT .... .... No. 12.
€omm0nfo«attl) of Hfcissatjmsetts.
REPORT
ATTORNEY- G-E1STEK AL
Year ending January 15, 1902.
BOSTON :
WRIGHT & POTTER PRINTING CO., STATE PRINTERS,
18 Post Office Square.
1902.
Commotitomlifr ai ||Iassac^MSttis.
Office of the Attorney-General,
Boston, Jan. 15, 1902.
To the Honorable the President of the Senate.
I have the honor to transmit herewith my report for the
year ending this day.
Very respectfully,
HOSEA M. KNOWLTON,
Attorney-General.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
PAGE
Roster, vn
Appropriation and Expenditures, vin
Cases attended to by this Office, ix
Capital Cases, x
The Superior Court xviii
The Court of Land Registration, xix
Jury Service, xxi
Collateral Inheritance Taxes, xxn
Evidence in Land-damage Cases, xxm
Office of the Attorney-General, xxiv
Opinions, 1
Opinions upon Applications for Leave to file Informations, . 63
Informations at the Relation of the Treasurer, .... i
Informations at the Relation of the Commissioner of Corpora-
tions, v
Informations at the Relation of the Civil Service Commission-
ers, vi
Informations at the Relation of Private Persons, ... vi
Grade Crossings, vii
Corporate Applications for Dissolution, xvii
Corporations required without Suit to file Tax Returns, . . xviii
Corporations required without Suit to file Certificate of Condi-
tion, xxii
Collateral Inheritance Tax Cases, xxv
Public Charitable Trusts, lv
Land-damage Cases arising from the Alteration of Grade Cross-
ings, lvi
Suits conducted in Behalf of State Boards and Commissions, . lix
Metropolitan Park Commission, lix
Metropolitan Sewerage Commission, lxv
Metropolitan Water Board, lxvi
Massachusetts Highway Commission, lxxvi
Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners, . . . lxxvi
Miscellaneous Cases from Above Commissions, . . . lxxvii
Cases arising under the Act limiting the Height of Build-
ings, in the Vicinity of the State House, . . . lxxviii
State Board of Charity, lxxix
Miscellaneous Cases, lxxx
Corporation Tax Collections, xci
Miscellaneous Collections, xcviii
Extradition and Interstate Rendition, civ
Rules of Practice in Interstate Rendition, cviii
Cnmmontacaltb of ||tassax{)u$eits*
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL,
Rooms 225 and 226, State House.
Attorney- General.
HOSEA M. KNOWLTON of New Bedford.
Assistants.
FREDERICK E. HURD of Boston.
Special Assignments. — Land-damage Cases.
Abolition of Grade Crossings.
JAMES MOTT HALLOWELL of Medford.
Special Assignments. — Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board.
Harbor and Land Commissioners.
Heads of Departments.
FRANKLIN T. HAMMOND of Cambridge.
Special Assignments. — Public Charitable Trusts.
Land-damage Cases.
ARTHUR W. DeGOOSH of Cambridge.
Special Assignments. — Collateral Inheritance Tax.
Land-damage Cases.
FREDERICK H. NASH of Cambridge.
Special Assignments. — Legislative Committees.
Commissions and State Boards.
Prerogative Writs.
Insurance.
FREDERIC B. GREENHALGE of Lowell.
Special Assignments. — Extradition and Interstate Rendition.
State Board of Charity.
Corporations.
Collections.
Clerk.
LOUIS H. FREESE of Waltham.
viii ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 1902.
Statement of Appropriation and Expenditures.
Appropriation for 1901, $36,000 00
Expenditures.
For law library, .
For salaries of assistants, .
For additional legal services,
For clerk and stenographers,
For office expenses,
For court expenses,* .
Total expenditures,
Costs collected,
Net expenditure, .
473 19
15,600 00
826 00
4,674 18
4,819 27
3,308 14
129,700 78
882 93
$28,817 85
* Of this amount, $882.93 has been collected as costs of suits and paid to the
Treasurer of the Commonwealth.
Cmnmantooltlj nf ||liiS!mc!nts£tts+
Office of the Attorney-General,
Boston, Jan. 15, 1902.
To the General Court.
In compliance with Public Statutes, chapter 17, section 9,
I submit my report for the year ending this day.
The cases requiring the attention of the office during the
year, to the number of 2,349, are tabulated below : —
Bastardy complaints, 4
Collateral inheritance tax cases, 439
Corporate collections made without suit, 249
Corporation returns enforced without suit, 248
Dissolutions of corporations, voluntary petitions for, ... 70
Extradition and interstate rendition, 57
Grade crossings, petitions for abolition of, 169
Height of buildings, limitation of, cases arising therefrom, . . 34
Informations at the relation of the Civil Service Commissioners, . 2
Informations at the relation of the Commissioner of Corporations, 21
Informations at the relation of private persons, .... 4
Informations at the relation of the Treasurer and Receiver-Gen-
eral, 116
Indictments for murder, 18
Land-damage cases arising through the alteration of grade cross-
ings, 29
Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Harbor
and Land Commissioners, 6
Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Massa-
chusetts Highway Commission, 9
Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Metro-
politan Park Commission, 216
Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Metro-
politan Sewerage Commission, 23
Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Metro-
politan Water Board, 258
Miscellaneous cases arising from the work of the above-named
commissions, 16
Miscellaneous cases, 315
Public charitable trusts, 19
Settlement cases for support of insane paupers, .... 13
x ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Capital Cases.
Indictments for murder pending at the date of the last
annual report have been disposed of as follows : —
Luigi Storti of Boston, indicted in Suffolk County,
December, 1899, for the murder of Michele Calucci, at
Boston, Nov. 7, 1899. He was arraigned Dec. 27, 1899,
and pleaded not guilty. Peter S. Maher and Clarence W.
Rowley were assigned by the court as counsel for the defend-
ant. On June 25-July 1, 1900, the defendant was tried by
a jury before Bond and Lawton, J J. The result was a verdict
of guilty of murder in the first degree. Exceptions were
filed by counsel for the defendant, and were argued before
the Supreme Judicial Court at Boston, Nov. 19, 1900. The
exceptions were overruled Jan. 2, 1901, and on the fourth
day of January he was sentenced to death, the time of
execution being fixed, under St. 1898, c. 326, to take place
during the week beginning April 7, 1901.
On April 9, 1901, in consequence of the severe illness of
the prisoner, the Governor, by and with the advice of the
Council, respited his sentence, the term of the respite to
expire on Saturday, May 11, 1901.
April 13, 1901, the prisoner filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus and a petition for a writ of error in the Supreme
Judicial Court, alleging, among other things, that the pun-
ishment of death by electricity was a " cruel or unusual pun-
ishment," within Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights. These petitions were argued together, and the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied, and in the
petition for a writ of error the judgment of the Superior
Court was affirmed. These decisions were rendered May 7,
1901.
May 10, 1901, one day before the expiration of the respite
granted by the Governor, the prisoner filed in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, setting forth substantially
the same matters urged in the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
and some additional matters. This petition was heard by
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xi
the Circuit Court on May 11, 1901, and summarily denied.
The petitioner thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court of
the United States. This appeal was entered a few days be-
fore the adjournment of the court for the summer. A motion
was made by the Attorney-General to have the appeal dis-
missed as frivolous ; but owing to the requirements of the
rules of the court, that three weeks' notice must be given for
hearings upon such matters, it was impossible to have the
motion entertained before the adjournment of the court.
The case, therefore, went over until the October term, and
was assigned for argument on the twenty- eighth day of
October, 1901. A£ the beginning of the October term,
however, the petition, by agreement of the petitioner, was
dismissed.
On the twenty-third day of May, 1901, another petition
for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in the Circuit Court
of the United States, alleging, among other matters, that no
lawful respite had been granted by the Governor. It was
heard on the twenty-fourth day of May, 1901, and the peti-
tion was dismissed on the ground of want of jurisdiction in
the Circuit Court. An appeal was taken by the petitioner
to the Supreme Court of the United States. This appeal
was argued before the Supreme Court in November, and a
judgment dismissing the appeal was rendered in that court
on the second day of December, 1901.
Meanwhile, another petition for a writ of habeas corpus
was filed by the prisoner in the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, alleging that St. 1901, c. 520, relating to the
custody of convicts under sentence of death, was ex post
facto legislation, and therefore unconstitutional. This peti-
tion was forthwith heard upon its merits before Mr. Justice
Loring, and dismissed. The petitioner took an appeal to
the full bench of the court. The case was argued on the
fourth day of November, 1901, and on the thirteenth day
of November, 1901, the full bench confirmed the judgment of
Judge Loring and dismissed the petition.
During the pendency of these proceedings respites from
time to time were granted by the Governor. These respites
were against the objection and protest of the prisoner, who
contended that the Governor and Council had no authority
xii rATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
to grant* the same. The last respite expired on Dec. 14,
1901, and on the seventeenth day of December, 1901, all
legal proceedings having been concluded, — proceedings
unprecedented, it is believed, in novelty and character in this
Commonwealth, — the prisoner was executed, in pursuance
of his sentence. In the proceedings subsequent to the over-
ruling of the first bill of exceptions the prisoner was repre-
sented by William H. Stockbridge and G. Philip Wardner.
This was the first execution by electricity under the
provisions of St. 1898, c. 328.
Franciszek Umilian, indicted in Hampshire County,
June, 1900, for the murder of Karimierz Jedrusik, at
Granby, Dec. 31, 1899. On June 12, 1900, he was ar-
raigned, and pleaded not guilty. John B. O'Donnell of
Northampton was assigned by the court as counsel for the
defendant. On Oct. 1, 1900, the defendant was tried by a
jury before Sherman and Stevens, JJ. The result was a ver-
dict of guilty of murder in the first degree. Exceptions were
filed by counsel for the defendant, and allowed, and argued
Jan. 18, 1901. The exceptions were overruled Feb. 28,
1901, and on March 9, 1901, he was sentenced to death, the
time of execution being fixed, under St. 1898, c. 326, to take
place during the week beginning July 7, 1901. The trial of
the case was conducted by John C. Hammond, district
attorney.
The execution of sentence wTas respited from time to time,
at the request of counsel for the prisoner, to await the
result of the proceedings in the case of Luigi Storti, above
recited. The last respite expired Dec. 21, 1901, and tlfe
prisoner was executed on the 24th day of December, 1901.
Charles Alberto of Holyoke, indicted in Hampden
County, September, 1900, for the murder of Nathalie Al-
berto, at Holyoke, Sept. 2, 1900. On Dec. 31, 1900, he
was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. James E. Dunleavy
and David J. Walsh were assigned by the court as counsel
for the defendant. On Oct. 21, 1901, he was tried by .a jury
before Maynard and Lawton, J J. The result was a verdict
of guilty of murder in the second degree. On Oct. 22, 1901,
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xm
the prisoner was sentenced to State Prison for life. The
trial of the case was conducted by Charles L. Gardner, dis-
trict attorney.
Henry E. Parsons of Boston, indicted in Suffolk County,
July, 1900, for the murder of William T. Hammond, at
Boston, June 18, 1900. On Sept. 19, 1900, he was ar-
raigned, and pleaded not guilty. James A. McGeough and
Michael J. Dwyer were assigned by the court as counsel
for the defendant. On May 6-11, 1901, the defendant was
tried by a jury before Sheldon and Pierce, JJ. The result
was a verdict of not guilty. The case was in charge of
Oliver Stevens, district attorney.
Charles R. Eastman of Cambridge, indicted in Middle-
sex County, October, 1900, for the murder of Richard H.
Grogan, Jr., at Cambridge, July 4, 1900. He was arraigned
Oct. 26, 1900, and pleaded not guilty. Charles W. Bartlett
and Samuel J. Elder appeared as counsel for the defendant.
On April 22-May 11, 1901, the defendant was tried by a
jury before Gaskill and Aiken, J J. The result was a ver-
dict of not guilty. Up to a short time before the trial the
case had been in charge of District Attorney Frederick N.
Wier. On the day before the trial was appointed to begin,
owing to the illness of the district attorney, the Attorney-
General took charge of the case and conducted the trial
thereof, assisted by Mr. George A. Sanderson, assistant dis-
trict attorney.
Indictments for murder, found since the date of the last
annual report, have been disposed of as follows : —
Thomas J. Burns of Boston, indicted in Suffolk County,
in April, 1901, for the murder of Hannah E. Burns, at Bos-
ton, March 6, 1901. On May 27, 1901, he was arraigned
and pleaded not guilty. James P. Magenis was assigned by
the court as counsel for the defendant. On June 3, 1901,
he retracted his plea of not guilty, and pleaded guilty of
murder in the second degree. The plea was accepted by the
Commonwealth, and he was thereupon sentenced to State
xiv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Prison for life. The case was in charge of Oliver Stevens,
district attorney.
Panfilo Sussi of Boston, indicted in Suffolk County, in
August, 1901, for the murder of Antonio Paolillo, at Boston,
July 28, 1901. On Aug. 16, 1901, he was arraigned, and
pleaded not guilty. Peter S. Maher was retained by the
defendant as counsel. On Oct. 3, 1901, he retracted his
plea of not guilty, and pleaded guilty of manslaughter. The
plea was accepted by the Commonwealth, and he was there-
upon sentenced to State Prison for not more than six and
not less than four years. The case was in charge of Oliver
Stevens, district attorney.
Daniel Leary of Philadelphia, Penn., indicted in Berk-
shire County, September, 1901, for the murder of James W.
Fuller, at Pittsfield, July 17, 1901. Leary was an inmate
under sentence of the house of correction at Pittsfield, and
James W. Fuller, the man killed, was an officer of that in-
stitution. On Sept. 3, 1901, he was arraigned, and pleaded
not guilty. Herbert C. Joyner and Joseph Ward Lewis
were assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant.
On Dec. 2, 1901, the defendant was tried by a jury before
Sherman and Aiken, JJ. Experts, both in behalf of the
prosecution and of the defence, testified that he was insane,
and a verdict was rendered by the jury of "not guilty
by reason of insanity." Thereupon, under the provisions of
the statutes, he was committed to the Asylum for Insane
Criminals. The trial of the case was conducted by Charles
L. Gardner, district attorney.
Oscar W. Nelson of Worcester, indicted in Berkshire
County, January, 1901, for the murder of Gustav A. Erick-
son, at Worcester, Nov. 10, 1900. On Jan. 28, 1901, he
was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. David F. O'Connell
and Walter P. Hall were assigned by the court as counsel
for the defendant. On Feb. 25-29, 1901, the defendant was
tried by a jury before Hopkins and Stevens, JJ. The result
was a verdict of murder in the second degree. Exceptions
were filed by counsel for the defendant, and were argued
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xv
before the Supreme Judicial Court. The exceptions were
overruled Nov. 26, 1901, and on March 23, 1901, he was
sentenced to the State Prison for life. The trial of case was
conducted by Rockwood Hoar, district attorney.
John P„ Cummings of Worcester, indicted in Worcester
County, May, 1901, for the murder of John F. Reynolds,
at Worcester, May 1, 1901. On May 22, 1901, he was ar-
raigned, and pleaded guilty of murder in the second degree.
The plea was accepted by the Commonwealth, and on June
15, 1901, he was sentenced to State Prison for life. J. E.
Sullivan and John B. Ratigan were assigned by the court. as
counsel for the defendant. The case was in charge of Rock-
wood Hoar, district attorney.
Elizabeth A. Naramore of Barre, indicted in Worces-
ter County, May, 1901, for the murder of Ethel M. Nara-
more, at Barre, on March 21, 1901. On May 23, 1901, she
was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. Fred W. Blackmer
was assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. On
May 23, 1901, the defendant was tried by a jury before
Gaskill and Lawton, JJ. The result was a verdict of " not
guilty by reason of insanity ; " whereupon she was committed
to the Worcester Insane Hospital for life. The trial of
case was conducted by Rockwood Hoar, district attorney.
Benjamin H. Brown of Boston, indicted in Suffolk
County, August, 1901, for the murder of Alice M. Crowell,
at Boston, on July 21, 1901. On Aug. 16, 1901, he was
arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. William A. Morse was
assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. On
Dec. 17, 1901, he retracted his plea of not guilty, and
pleaded guilty of murder in the second degree. The plea
was accepted by the Commonwealth, and he was thereupon
sentenced to State Prison for life. The case was in charge
of Oliver Stevens, district attorney.
The following indictments for murder are now pending : —
John D. Cassells of Springfield, indicted in Hampden
County, May, 1901, for the murder of Mary J. Lane, at
xvi ATTORKEY-GEKERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Longmeadow, Feb. 26, 1901. On Sept. 5, 1901, he was
arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. Stephen S. Taft and
Dexter E. Tilley were assigned by the court as counsel for
the defendant. On Dec. 30, 1901, the defendant was tried
by a jury before Maynard and Hopkins, J J. The result
was a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. The
defendant has not yet been sentenced. The trial of the case
was conducted by Charles L. Gardner, district attorney.
Bernhard Palz of Holyoke, indicted in Hampden
County, September, 1901, for the murder of Helena Lederer
Fahring, at Holyoke, May 15, 1901. On Oct. 2, 1901, he
was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. Stephen J. Taft
and T. J. O'Connor have been assigned by the court as
counsel for the defendant.
John C. Best of Saugus, indicted for murder in Essex
County, January, 1901, for the murder of George E. Bailey,
at Saugus, Oct. 8, 1900. On Jan. 30, 1901, he was
arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. James H. Sisk and
Nathan D. A. Clarke were assigned by the court as counsel
for the defendant. On March 18-28, 1901, the defendant
was tried by a jury before Sherman and Fox, JJ. The
result was a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree.
Exceptions were filed by counsel for the defendant, which
were argued before the Supreme Judicial Court on Jan. 6,
1902. The trial of the case was conducted by the Attorney-
General, assisted by W. Scott Peters, district attorney.
Jane Toppan of Cambridge, indicted in Barnstable
County, December, 1901, for the murder of Mary D. Gibbs,
at Bourne, Aug. 12, 1901. On Dec. 6, 1901, she was
arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. Fred M. Bixby of
Brockton has been assigned by the court as counsel for the
defendant.
Jane Toppan of Cambridge, indicted in Barnstable
County, December, 1901, for the murder of Alden P.
Davis, at Bourne, Aug. 8, 1901. On Dec. 6, 1901, she was
arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. Fred M. Bixby has
been assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xvn
Jane Toppan of Cambridge, indicted in Barnstable
County, December, 1901, for the murder of Genevieve D.
Gordon, at Bourne, July 30, 1901. On Dec. 6, 1901, she
was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. Fred M. Bixby of
Brockton has been assigned as counsel for the defence.
Originally capital cases were tried before the full bench
of the Supreme Judicial Court. In the year 1872 the law
was amended so that two justices only of that court should
be required to sit. In 1891 the jurisdiction of capital cases
was transferred to the Superior Court, but in the statute
authorizing the change it was provided that three justices of
that court should preside at the trial. Later the number of
judges was reduced to two, and so the law now stands.
I see no good reason why the Legislature may not go
further, and provide that capital cases shall be tried like
other criminal cases, — before a single justice of the Su-
perior Court. The present law is undoubtedly a vestige
of the traditional methods of procedure, and is based upon
no adequate reasons. Trial before a single justice is the
method now in vogue in England, — the country from which
our principles of criminal law are derived. It is also the
method long since adopted in most States. Wherever it
exists, there is no demand for any change. The questions
of law to be ruled upon by the court in capital cases are for
the most part thoroughly established. They bring of them-
selves no unusual responsibilities to the court ; and, more-
over, the prisoner has the right of appeal upon all questions
of law, so that his rights are thereby secured.
On the other hand, there are good reasons why the change
suggested should be made. It is often difficult to arrange
for the presence of two justices. The most of them are con-
stantly occupied during the time of year when courts are
usually held, and, in order to arrange for the trial of a cap-
ital case, there must be an interruption in the regular work
of the court in some county.
It is important, in my judgment, that capital cases should
be promptly tried. All unnecessary delays should be
avoided. The court has recognized the importance of this
fact, and has responded in every instance, as promptly
xviii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
as circumstances would permit, to the request of the
Attorney-General for an early assignment, although the
difficulty of arranging for the presence of two justices has
caused some unavoidable delays. But if only one judge
were required, capital cases could be dealt with much more
expeditiously, and without more delays than are incidental
to other criminal cases.
Whatever will make justice simple, sure, without delay,
without unnecessary formality or hindrance, should be
encouraged. In that way, respect for law and confidence in
the certainty of its judgment is maintained. I recommend,
therefore, that the statutes be amended so that capital trials
may be held before one or more justices, instead of before
two or more, as the law now is.
The Superior Court.
This court was established in 1859, and originally consisted
of a chief justice and nine associate justices. At that time
the population of the State was about 1,200,000. To-day
the court consists of one chief justice and eighteen associate
justices. The population meanwhile has increased to more
than 2,500,000. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Superior
Court, during the forty years of its existence, has been pro-
portionately enlarged, until it is the principal trial court of the
Commonwealth. The result of the increase, both in the num-
ber of cases and in the extent of its jurisdiction, is that to-
day in many of the counties the trial of cases before the court
is unduly delayed, to the great inconvenience of suitors. I
am informed that some members of the bar of the city of
Boston have petitioned the Legislature for an increase in the
number of judges. I heartily endorse the petition. I rec-
ognize the undesirability of making the bench so large as to
be unwieldy ; but the growth of the Commonwealth cannot
be retarded or stopped by limiting the number of judges of
the courts.
The first day of the sessions of the court in most of the
counties is Monday. There are four exceptions : Suffolk,
Barnstable, Dukes County and Nantucket. As to the two
island counties, it requires a day's journey for the trial
justice to reach the town where the court is held, and those
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xix
counties may well be left as they are ; but there is no good
reason for having the first day of the session begin on Tues-
day either in Suffolk or in Barnstable. It takes one day out
of the work of the first week. I recommend that the statutes
be so changed that all sessions in those two counties shall
begin on Monday.
The Court of Land Registration.
This court was established by St. 1898, c. 562, and went
into operation Oct. 1, 1898. The purpose of the statute
creating the court was to get rid of the cumbersome, expen-
sive and medieval system of registration of deeds which has
come down to us from time immemorial, and which in time,
by the very accumulation of books must be abolished. From
the first this new system has encountered the violent, and
sometimes, I am constrained to say, unreasoning opposition
of certain classes of the community. Notwithstanding this
fact, and although registration by its methods are voluntary,
its jurisdiction has constantly increased, until to-day land
to the assessed value of over $2,500,000 has been brought
under its jurisdiction, and more than 1,000 certificates of
title have been issued. The s}^stem has been attacked both
in the State and the Federal courts. The jurisdiction of the
court has been sustained as constitutional iu Massachusetts ;
and similar statutes have been sustained in other States.
The Supreme Court of the United States has declined to in-
terfere, and has intimated that no appeal would lie to that
court excepting in favor of one actually aggrieved by its de-
crees without notice. Even such an appeal could not result
in annulling the decrees of the court excepting as to the
party aggrieved. The court would still exist, and its de-
crees as to all others would be binding.
It has been contended that registration by this court
endangers the security of title, especially in the remote
contingency that at some future time the law may be pro-
nounced unconstitutional. How absurd this objection is
may be better appreciated when it is considered that transfer
by deed in common form is not abolished. Every convey-
ance, of whatever nature, must still be made by deed. The
essential difference between the present system and the old
xx ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOET. [Jan.
one is that, instead of having the deeds copied into books
kept for the purpose, the deed itself is filed in the records of
the court ; and the further fact that under its decrees pos-
sible adverse claimants may be concluded, and the title to
the land conclusively established. The only attack upon
the court has been as to its ability to guarantee title. Even
if that guaranty should fail, the riling of deeds of convey-
ance in the records of the court, instead of recording them
in ponderous books, to be piled up until there is no room
to hold them, would of itself justify the existence of the
court.
Having thus created an important court of record having
possible jurisdiction over all the real estate of the Common-
wealth, the Commonwealth, in my judgment, should foster
the growth of the jurisdiction of the court, and, so far as
may be, relieve the other courts from questions affecting land
titles. It can well be, and in my opinion, should be, made
the real estate court of the Commonwealth, to the same ex-
tent as the probate court has jurisdiction over estates of
deceased persons.
To strengthen the hands of the court and increase its
jurisdiction, I submit the following recommendations: —
First. — To require savings banks, which are under the
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth by virtue of their charters,
to cause the title of land of over $20,000 in value, on
which they make loans, to be registered. This is similar to
a recommendation I made to a former Legislature.
Second. — To repeal chapter 182 of the Revised Laws.
This chapter, which is entitled " Proceedings for the Settle-
ment of Title to Land," authorizes proceedings in certain
cases to be taken in the Superior Court in order to quiet the
title to real estate. There is no reason why the Superior
Court should be longer troubled with this class of cases,
especially as the Commonwealth has created a court whose
primary and principal function is to settle such titles.
Every one of the petitions authorized by the chapter in
question may be brought as well in the Court of Land
Registration, and there be more speedily and expeditiously
disposed of; and the Superior Court, the docket of which
is already overcrowded, will be relieved of that class of liti-
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxi
gations. Furthermore, I see no reason why the Legislature
may not eventually go further, and require that all actions
relating to the title of real estate, such as writs of entry,
should be brought in the first instance in the Court of Land
Registration.
Third. — At present a general appeal lies from this court
to the Superior Court. This right of appeal may well be
limited to questions of fact, and to such as are within the
discretion of the court, and so guarded that only the par-
ticular question as to which the party appealing is aggrieved
shall be heard in the Superior Court.
Jury Service.
An experience of more than thirty years has strengthened
my conviction that trial by jury is the best method yet
devised to ascertain the truth of controversies in matters of
fact. There are those, mostly of the class that distrust,
because they do not appreciate, the instinctive wisdom of
the plain people of the community, who advocate the aboli-
tion of this method of trial. I am not one of those.
Instead of being abolished, as has been sometimes suggested,
I believe rather that the system, by the correction of some
existing defects, should be strengthened. I have already had
occasion to suggest the evils growing out of the present prac-
tice of requiring a long term of service. In many of the
counties jurymen once sworn are required to serve many
weeks. Such a length of continuous service is oftentimes
injurious if not actually disastrous to the business of the
jurymen. For this reason ingenious devices are resorted to
to escape the performance of jury duty, and the pressure of
private business is often accepted as a sufficient excuse by
the presiding justice.
Moreover, under the statutes many classes of men whose
services would be valuable are permanently exempt. The
result is that under existing laws juries are composed of men
whose business is so unimportant that it does not suffer by
the absence of the juryman and persons of leisure. The
active man of affairs and the professional man are seldom on
the panel. This, in my judgment, is wrong. The repre-
sentative jury should be made up of all classes of citizens,
xxii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
and especially of that class who bear the burdens of the
work of the world. This might be accomplished if the term
of service be reduced. There is no good reason why long
terms of service should be required of jurymen. It is not a
duty to be learned. All the schooling they need is the ex-
perience they have gathered in the conduct of their own
affairs. They are as competent the first day of the term as
they are after weeks of service. Indeed, the most impor-
tant of all cases, indictments for murder, are usually tried
by a jury impanelled for the first time for that special service.
I renew a recommendation which I had the honor to submit
to a former Legislature, — that the list of exemptions from
jury duty be largely reduced, that no excuses excepting
actual illness be accepted, and that the term of service of
the jurymen be limited to two weeks. No citizen, however
important his private affairs, can justly complain if he is
called upon to give this brief time to the public service once
in three years.
Collateral Inheritance Taxes.
In the case of Hooper v. Bradford, Treasurer, reported
in volume 178 of the Massachusetts Reports, it is decided
that a collateral legacy tax is to be computed upon the value
of the property as of the day of the death of the decedent.
There are a number of cases pending in which the time for
the payment of the tax upon certain legacies has been
extended under the provisions of the statute, for the reason
that it was impossible to tell, within the two years after the
death of the decedent, whether such legacies would vest
ultimately in persons who were not exempted from legacy
taxes. When such legacies shall vest in possession, there
may be difficulty in computing the value of property, if it
becomes necessary for the appraisers to ascertain the value
of the property under the rule adopted by the Supreme
Judicial Court.
In view of this decision and of the difficulties above sug-
gested, I recommend the enactment of a statute similar to
that in force in Pennsylvania. That statute provides as
follows: " In all cases where there has been or shall be a
devise, descent or bequest to collateral relatives or strangers,
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxm
liable to the collateral inheritance tax, to take effect in
possession, or come into actual enjoyment after the expira-
tion of one or more life estates, or a period of years, the tax
on such estates shall not be payable, nor interest begin to run
thereon, until the person or persons liable for the same shall
come into actual possession of such estate, by the termina-
tion of the estates for life or years, and the tax shall be
assessed upon the value of the estate at the time the right of
possession accrues to the owner as aforesaid : provided,
that the owner shall have the right to pay the tax at any
time prior to his coming into possession, and, in such cases,
the tax shall be assessed on the value of the estate at the
time of the payment of the tax, after deducting the value of
the life estate or estates for years."
Such a law is also in force in New York.
Evidence in Land-damage Cases.
In this class of cases it is permitted to aid the jury in
arriving at the cost of property taken by the estimation of
expert witnesses called for the purpose ; but under the exist-
ing rules of law one appraisal, the best known to the com-
munity, the most impartial and perhaps the most universally
relied upon, is excluded. I refer to the valuations of the
sworn assessors of the city or town in which the land lies.
These are valuations made by impartial officers, duly sworn,
and whose judgments are made a matter of record. Those
records are now inadmissible in evidence. The assessors
may, it is true, be summoned to testify ; but this is incon-
venient, and imposes an unnecessary burden upon them.
I recommend that provision be made by statute in all
land-damage cases authorizing the introduction by either
party of such sworn valuations as evidence, to be considered
by the jury, in connection with the other evidence in the
case. I have little doubt the assessors' valuations would in
many if not in most cases be relied upon by the jury in
preference to the evidence of paid experts, almost always,
and inevitably, though honestly, partial to the party employ-
ing them.
xxiv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 1902.
Office of the Attorney-General.
As will be seen by the table contained in this report, the
number of cases requiring attention during the past year was
2,349. Last year the number was 1,801. In 1894, the
first year of my incumbency of the office, the number was
549. The basis of enumeration is the same each year.
It thus appears that the volume of business receiving the
attention of the office has increased more than four-fold in
the last eight years, and that the increase even in the last
year has been very material.
This increase has necessitated the appointment of an addi-
tional assistant, and accordingly Mr. Frederic B. Greenhalge
of Lowell was appointed, and entered upon the discharge of
his duties on the first day of October.
In 1879 the salary of the Attorney-General was estab-
lished at $5,000, and this is the present salary of the office.
Meanwhile, the business, as I have shown, has enormously
increased. I have for some time been of the opinion that the
present salary is inadequate to the importance of the duties
performed ; but, having been re-elected, did not hitherto
deem I was justified in recommending an increase in my own
favor. That reason no longer exists. The number of assist-
ants, it is true, has been increased from two to six ; but,
notwithstanding this fact, the amount of the work which of
necessity devolves upon the Attorney-General personally is
very much greater than when I was first elected to the office.
It is, I think it will be conceded, proper that the salary of
the Attorney-General should approximate the salaries of the
justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, whose principal
officer he is. Their salaries have recently and very justly
been increased. A similar increase should be made in the
case of the Attorney-General ; and I so recommend.
Appended to this report are printed the principal opinions
prepared during the current year.
Respectfully submitted,
HOSEA M. KNOWLTON,
Attorney- General.
OPINIONS.
Commonivealtli' s Land — Deed — Restriction.
Where deeds from the Commonwealth to certain grantees of land formerly
belonging to the Commonwealth contain the stipulation that buildings
erected thereon " shall not, in any event, be used . . . for any mechani-
cal or manufacturing purposes," any use of the estates in question for
other than residential purposes would be a violation of the restriction.
Jan. 2, 1901.
Hon. Woodward Emery,
Chairman, Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners.
Dear Sir: — I have your letter of the 26th, submitting to this
office certain questions with regard to the construction of the stipu-
lations in the deeds of the Commonwealth that buildings erected
upon the Back Bay " shall not, in any event, be used for a stable,
or for any mechanical or manufacturing purposes."
It is stated in your letter that the specific inquiry arises from a
request by certain property owners who desire to learn " whether
they may lease their houses and premises, without violating the
stipulations aforesaid, for an}T of the following purposes : first, for
decorating of pottery, with a furnace in the cellar for baking it ;
second, for a boarding-house, on condition of placing a small power
engine for elevators and steam laundry apparatus, with the privilege
of extending the business of the laundry ; third, as a tailoring estab-
lishment, with a small power engine for elevators and to run the
sewing machines on all the floors."
I am of the opinion that any use of the estates in question for
other than residential purposes would be a violation of the stipula-
tions in the deed. Such a use of the premises does not exclude
the use of engines, boilers and machinery, so far as they may
properly be employed in connection with the use of the house as a
residence ; otherwise, if for purposes of trade or business.
If the proposed uses, as above quoted, are for the carrying on
of a business, and not incidental, merely, to the use of the house
as a residence, they come within the spirit of the stipulation and
are barred by its terms.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
State Contracts — Regulations regarding Award — Preference of
Home Industries.
With the exception of Pub. Sts., c. 221, §§ 54-58, there are no laws, rules
or regulations in regard to the awarding of State contracts.
There is no law containing any provision for the preference of home in-
dustry, in case some manufacturer of another State of the Union, or a
foreign firm, offers the lowest bid.
Jan. 4, 1901.
To His Excellency W. Murray Crane, Governor.
Dear Sir : — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of
the letter written to you by G-eorge de Szogy6ny, submitting cer-
tain inquiries in regard to contracts for public works and also the
employment of labor therein.
1. I know of no laws, rules or regulations relating to the award-
ing of State contracts for the construction of and repairs upon pub-
lic buildings, or for supplying the different articles of manufacture
needed by the different departments and by the State militia, ex-
cepting Pub. Sts., c. 221, §§ 54-58. These in substance provide
that contracts on account of the prisons of the Commonwealth shall
be made with the warden, in writing, subject to the approval of
the Prison Commissioners, and, further, that when, in the opinion
of the commissioners, it can be advantageously clone, the principal
articles purchased for the use of the prisons shall be contracted for
by the year, and that public notice shall be given of the articles
needed, the quality and quantity thereof, and the time and manner
of delivery; such proposals to be in writing and sealed. "The
persons offering the best terms, with satisfactory security for the
performance, shall be entitled to the contract, unless it appears to
the commissioners that it is not for the interest of the state to
accept any of the proposals," in which case no offer shall be ac-
cepted ; and the warden shall thereupon proceed to make contracts
in such way as can best be done for the interests of the Common-
wealth.
The foregoing answers the inquiry submitted, which relates only
to State contracts. I may, however, add that a statute enacted
in the year 1887 regulates with much particularity contracts made
by counties.
2. There is no law containing any provision for the preference
of home industry, in case some manufacturer of another State of
the Union or a foreign firm offers a lower bid.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12.
Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners — Authority to establish
Boundary Lines in Tide Waters.
The Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners is not authorized, under St.
1881, c. 196, § 1, to establish boundary lines in tide waters between
towns created after the passage of such statute.
Feb. 1, 1901.
Desmond FitzGerald, Esq., Chairman, Topographical Survey Commission.
Dear Sir: — I am of opinion that St. 1881, c. 196, § 1, does
not give the Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners authority
to establish boundary lines in tide waters between towns created
after the passage of the act. If this be so, the Board has no right
to establish the line between Bourne and Sandwich, the town of
Bourne having been created after the passage of the act, and legis-
lative action is necessary to establish such line.
No controversy arises upon the Buzzard's Bay side, the line
having been fixed by the Legislature. I may add that it would be
absurd to suppose that the Legislature intended to permit any part
of the shore line of Bourne to remain in the jurisdiction of Sand-
wich, notwithstanding the set-off of the town of Bourne.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General. •
Dogs — Injury to Domestic Animals — " Worrying."
Under Pub. Sts., c. 102, § 98, as amended by St. 1889, c. 454, providing
compensation for loss "by the worrying, maiming, or killing" of do-
mestic animals by dogs, any sort of attack by a dog, intended to frighten
a domestic animal, is " worrying " within the meaning of the statute.
Feb. 1, 1901.
Charles R. Prescott, Esq., Controller of County Accounts.
Dear Sir : — Your letter of January 3 states the following case :
a man was driving a horse on the highway when a dog suddenly
ran out and barked at the horse, causing him to rear, and when the
horse's foot came down, one of his legs was broken, so that it
became necessary to kill him.
The opinion of the Attorney-General is required upon the ques-
tion whether, upon these facts, the county is liable for damages
for the killing of the horse, under the provisions of Pub. Sts., c.
102, § 98, as amended by St. 1889, c. 454.
The statute provides that whoever suffers loss by the worrying,
maiming or killing of bis sheep, lambs, fowls or other domestic
animals, by dogs, may inform the officer of police ; and that there-
4 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
upon appraisers shall be appointed to appraise the damage, and
that a certificate of the damages found shall be returned to the
county treasurer, and the treasurer shall submit the same to the
county commissioners, who, after examination, shtfll issue an order
upon the treasurer for all or any part thereof as justice and equity
may require.
It is settled that a horse is a domestic animal within the mean-
ing of this statute. Osborn v. Selectmen of Lenox, 2 Allen, 207.
Whether the act of the dog in the case in question could be charac-
terized as " worrying," within the meaning of the word as used in
the statute, is a more difficult question. Undoubtedly the mean-
ing of the word as defined by lexicographers imputes seizing and
biting. In Osborn v. Lenox the horse was bitten by the dog, and
no question as to whether the acts of the dog constituted k' worry-
ing" arose.
I am of opinion, however, that any sort of attack by a dog, in-
tended to frighten a domestic animal, is " worrying," within the
meaning of the statute. It is not necessaiy to the remedial pur-
pose of the statute that injuries for which compensation is to be
made be limited to those caused by actual seizing and biting. In-
deed, in the case of some animals, as, for example, fowls, such a
limitation of the purpose of the meaning of the statute would en-
tirely defeat its purpose. The same word in statutes of other
States has been held to mean "running after, chasing, and bark-
ing at " Marshall v. Blackshire, 44 la. 475. See also Campbell
v. Brown, 1 Grant (Pa.), 82 ; Johnson v. McConnell, 80 Cal. 545.
I am of opinion, therefore, that the claim in question was one
which could properly be allowed under the statute.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General.
Insurance — Change from Assessment to " Old Line" Business —
Lien on Policy — Reserve — Asset.
Where an insurance company, in changing from an assessment to a level
premium business, enters into an agreement with the insured, by which
the latter exchanges an assessment for a new level premium policy, as
of the date of the original insurance, giving to the company a lien
upon the new policy for the amount of the reserve which would have
accumulated if such policy had been taken out at the time when the
assessment insurance was taken, the amount of the lien is not an asset
of the company, and is not to be credited to it as such.
It is therefore the duty of the Insurance Commissioner to regard the con-
tract as a contract of insurance for the face value of the policy, less the
amount of the lien created thereon.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 5
Feb. 1, 1091.
Hon. Frederick L. Cutting, Insurance Commissioner.
Dear Sir: — Your letter of January 4, after quoting St. 1900,
c. 363, providing that the Insurance Commissioner shall annually
compute the reserve liability of insurance companies and examine
the financial status of such companies, states that certain insurance
companies which, under the laws of Massachusetts, have been com-
pelled to change from assessment to level premium business, have
attempted to meet the difficulties arising from such change in the
following manner : —
No reserve was accumulated during the continuance of the as-
sessment policies ; and if such policies were to be exchanged for
level premium policies with the rate of premium fixed as of the age
when the original policy was taken out, the companies would not
have, and could never accumulate, a reserve sufficient to protect
the policy under the requirements of the Massachusetts statutes.
Accordingly, at the time of such exchange they induced the insured
to enter into an agreement by which the company was given a
lien upon the new policy for the amount of the reserve which they
ought to have on hand, regarding the level premium policy as
having been taken out at the time the assessment insurance was
placed.
The result of this arrangement is that a policy, for example,
which is nominally for $1,000, has charged against it, by the assent
of the insured, a sum of money (say, for example, $300) repre-
senting the amount of reserve which the company should have on
hand, assuming it to have been taken out when the assessment in-
surance policy was originally taken out.
The question submitted by your letter is whether you shall, as
contended by such companies, compute the amount of insurance
outstanding at the face value of the policy, and include among the
assets the liens in question.
The face value of the policy is reduced by the exact amount of
the lien so created ; so that, in the supposed case above stated, it
becomes, in effect, a contract for $1,000 less $300. This, obvi-
ously, is nothing more than a contract to pay $700. The policy
should, therefore, be regarded, for the purposes of your valuation,
as a policy for $700. It follows that the amount of the lien is not
an asset in the hands of the company, and is not to be credited to
it as such.
It is contended by the companies that the transaction in ques-
tion is, in effect, a loan upon the security of the policy, and that
it is to be so regarded in your computation. The difference,
however, between such loans and the arrangement in question
6 ATTORJNTEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
illustrates and confirms the soundness of the views I have ex-
pressed.
The real face of a policy of insurance is the amount which the
company would be bound to pay if the insured should die the day
the policy is taken out. This amount is not varied by subsequent
arrangements between the insured and the company. If, there-
fore, after the policy is written and delivered, the company makes
a loan, it does not diminish the face of the policy and has no effect
upon the valuation.
But, under the arrangement in question, the policy in its incep-
tion is insurance, not for the face value of the policy, but for the
net amount after deducting the amount of the lien. Real loans
are assets because the company's liability is diminished by the
amount of each loan ; but these alleged loans are not assets be-
cause the company was never liable for them.
I am of opinion, therefore, that it is your duty to decline to in-
flate the two sides of the account by taking the face of the policy,
upon the one hand, and regarding the lien as an asset, upon the
other hand ; but that you are to regard the contract what it is in
fact, to wit, insurance for the face of the policy less the amount of
the lien created thereon.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
Firemen — "Firemen's Relief Fund" — Persons impressed into
Service of Regular Fire Department.
Persons who have been impressed into the service of a regular organized
fire department of a city or town, and receive injuries while in the
performance of the duties required of them, are not entitled to relief
under the provisions of St. 1892, c. 177, relating to the "Firemen's
Relief Fund."
Feb. 5, 1901.
J. C. Crombie, Esq.,
Chairman, Board of Commissioners of the Firemen's Belief Fund.
Dear Sir: — Your letter of January 21 requires my opinion
upon the question whether certain persons referred to in the papers
annexed to the letter are entitled to relief under the provisions of
St. 1892, c. 177, relating to the Firemen's Relief Fund, of which
your Board has the disbursement.
It appears by the documents submitted that a disastrous fire
occurred in Foxborough in June last. Foxborough is a town which
had at the time an organized fire department. Some of the regular
members of the fire department were absent, and in consequence
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 7
of the fierceness of the fire the men in question were impressed
into the service by the engineers, and received their injuries while
performing the duties of firemen.
The chapter in question provides, in section 2, that the fund
shall be used " for the relief of firemen." It provides further, in
section 4, that members of incorporated protective departments
shall be eligible for benefits as well as " any person doing fire duty
at the request or upon the order of the authorities of any town
having no organized fire department."
It is obvious that the word " firemen" in the first section does
not mean any person who is engaged in extinguishing a fire.
Otherwise, there would have been no occasion for the language
above quoted in the fourth section, which includes, in addition to
" firemen," persons doing fire duty where there is no organized fire
department. It follows that the meaning of the word " firemen"
must be sought in the statutes.
Pub. Sts., c. 35, §§ 28-39, inclusive, authorize the selectmen of
a town to establish a fire department, and provide for the method
of creating the same. Section 31 limits the number of men to be
employed on the several engines, hose carriages, and hook and
ladder carriages, as well as in each fire company. These com-
panies, by section 32, may organize, elect officers, establish rules
and regulations, and annex penalties for the breach of the same.
They may also have certain exemptions from other public duties,
such as jury duty (Pub. Sts., c. 170, § 2). These rights and privi-
leges are doubtless conferred in consideration of the fact that they
have volunteered to hold themselves in readiness at all times,
seasonable or unseasonable, to perform what may often be a haz-
ardous and difficult task.
I see no reason to doubt that the purpose of the statute estab-
lishing the Firemen's Relief Fund was further to recognize their
services by compensating them for injuries received in the per-
formance of their duty. It was the intent of the Legislature to
encourage men to enlist in organized fire departments by holding
out the inducement of compensation.
It is otherwise with one who is impressed into service, upon a
single occasion, and who has not chosen to connect himself regu-
larly with the fire department. It seems to have been the purpose
of the Legislature carefully to exclude such persons and to extend
the relief provided by the statute only to regular members of the
fire department, where there is a fire department ; the only excep-
tion being in favor of persons doing fire duty in towns where there
is no such organized fire department. I am led to the conclusion,
therefore, that however meritorious the services of the persons in
8 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
question may have been, they are not entitled to relief from the
fund in charge of your Board.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners — Cape Cod Canal —
Approval of Plans.
The charter of the Cape Cod Canal, St. 1899, c. 448, § 4, imposes upon the
Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners the duty of determining in
what manner the canal shall be constructed, including all questions
relating to locks, tide-gates and other such structures.
Feb. 11, 1901.
Hon. Woodward Emery,
Chairman, Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners.
Dear Sir: — The charter of the Cape Cod Canal, St. 1899, c.
448, provides in section 4 that the corporation shall file with your
Board " a plan of the proposed location and a plan of the proposed
construction thereof." It is the duty of the Board thereupon to
hear the parties, require such modification, if any, as it may desire,
and to approve the plans as filed or as modified.
Section 6 provides that the joint Board of Harbor and Land
Commissioners and the Railroad Commissioners shall " determine
at what point or points the railroad of the old Colony Railroad
Company shall cross said canal by a drawbridge or bridges, or by
a tunnel or tunnels constructed under said canal." The section
further provides that the canal company shall construct its canal
" with such structures and appliances for its protection and use
as said joint Board may order, together with such bridge or bridges,
tunnel or tunnels, ferries and changes of highways, under the
supervision of said joint Board, as shall be in accordance with the
plans approved by them and in conformity with such orders as
they may make."
The precise question submitted by your letter of February 5 is
as follows : " Should this Board, under section 4, approve a plan
of construction which did not include a lock, or locks, or gates,
would it be in the power of the joint Board, under section 6, to
order such structures to be built? "
I very much doubt whether your Board has the right to my
opinion upon the question submitted. It is rather for the joint
Board, if a situation shall arise before that Board which will make
it material. But it may not be amiss for me to submit my views
as to the duty of your Board under section 4, above quoted. It
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 9
imposes, in my opinion, upon your Board the duty of determining
in what manner the canal shall be constructed. This includes all
questions relating to locks, tide-gates and other such structures.
You are to have in view the use of the canal for purposes of navi-
gation, and to determine what method of construction will be the
safest and most convenient in view of all the facts and probabili-
ties, including the probable rate of tide in the canal, and how far
its current may make navigation dangerous if unrestrained by
structures intended to prevent such movement.
You have no means of knowing, of course, whether the joint
Board will order the crossing in question to be effected by a tun-
nel or a bridge, but I assume that it is not unreasonable for you to
anticipate that bridges, either for the railroad or for highways,
will be necessary. In all events, the question of such probability
is before you, and it is your duty to" order the construction of the
canal in such manner as will provide for all these circumstances
and probabilities. The determination, therefore, of the question
of locks and gates is confided to the discretion of your Board.
The obvious purpose of section 6 is to submit to the joint Board
all questions concerning the crossing of the canal by the railroad
company. These questions are submitted to the joint Board rather
than to your Board, for the reason that they involve on the one
hand the considerations affecting railroad transportation, and those
affecting navigation on the other.
The precise question whether the joint Board will have jurisdic-
tion to order the construction of locks, in case you shall have ap-
proved plans which do not call for such structures, is one which
does not concern, in my judgment, your duty under section 4, and
which may well be determined when, if ever, it arises.
Very truly yours,
Hose a M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
Savings Banks — Authorized Investments — Guaranty.
An agreement to purchase first mortgage bonds for their face value at the
time and place of the maturity of such bonds is not equivalent to a
guaranty, as required by St. 1894, c. 317, § 21.
Feb. 12, 1901.
Hon. Starkes Whitox,
Chairman, Board of Commissioners of Savings Banks.
Dear Sir: — Among the investments by savings banks in this
Commonwealth authorized by St. 1894, c. 317, § 21, are the first
mortgage bonds of certain railroad companies, "guaranteed" by
certain other railroad companies (paragraph b).
10 ATTORXEY-GEKEKAL'S REPOET. [Jan.
What professes to be the guaranty of a bond by a railroad com-
pany coming within the description of the act is, in terms, an
agreement to purchase the bond at its face value at the time and
place of the maturity of the bond. The question submitted by
your Board is whether this agreement is equivalent to a guaranty.
I have already advised your Board (1 Opinions of Attorney-
General, 149) that any agreement which is equivalent in law to a
guaranty is within the spirit of the statute. I am unable, however,
to interpret the agreement in question as equivalent to a guaranty.
The essence of the agreement is time and place, whereas a guaranty
is not so limited. If the holder of the bond fails to present it for
purchase on the day and at the place named in the agreement, the
promisor is thereafterwards discharged. It would be otherwise as
to a guaranty.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney-General.
Cape Cod Canal — Harbor and Land Commissioners — Locks —
Jurisdiction of Joint Board.
Under the provisions of the charter of the Cape Cod and New York Canal
Company (St. 1899, c. 448), the jurisdiction of questions of location
and construction is confided to the Board of Harbor and Land Com-
missioners ; the joint Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners and
Railroad Commissioners, therefore, has no jurisdiction over the ques-
tion of locks, except in the matter of the crossing of the canal by the
Old Colony Railroad Company, as provided in section 6.
April 6, 1901.
Hon. James F. Jackson, Chairman, Board of Bailroad Commissioners.
Dear Sir : — Your letter of March 14 states that the plans of the
Boston, Cape Cod and New l'ork Canal Company have been ap-
proved by the Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners, in accord-
ance with the provisions of the charter of the company (St. 1899, c.
448, § 4), and are now before the joint Board of Harbor and Land
Commissioners and the Railroad Commissioners for action by the
Board under the provisions of section 6 of the same statute. Your
letter further states that the Board of Harbor and Land Commis-
sioners approved the plans " without having determined the neces-
sity of locks," and requires the opinion of the Attorney-General
upon the question whether, in view of that fact, the joint Board
has jurisdiction of the question of locks.
The jurisdiction of the joint Board is, in my judgment, in no
way dependent upon the action of the Board of Harbor and Land
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 11
Commissioners. The charter in separate sections (4 and 6) clearly
points out the duties devolving upon each Board, and the authority
and responsibility of each Board is to be found in those provisions.
Yours is not a board of appellate but rather of original jurisdiction.
In a letter to the Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners
dated Feb. 11, 1901, I pointed out what appeared to me to be the
duties of that Board in these words: " You are to have in view
the use of the canal for purposes of navigation, and to determine
what method of construction will be the safest and most convenient
in view of all the facts and probabilities, including the probable
rate of tide in the canal, and how far its current may make navi-
gation dangerous if unrestrained by structures intended to prevent
such movement."
To these views, after the re-examination made necessary by the
request of your Board for an opinion, I still adhere. The scheme
of the statute, although not always expressed in the clearest terms,
appears to me to be as follows : the company chartered must,
within four months, file with the Harbor and Land Commission-
ers a plan of the proposed location and " a plan of the proposed
construction thereof." I see no reason to doubt that the word
" construction " necessarily includes and was intended by the Legis-
lature to include all things appertaining to the construction of the
canal, including the question of locks, which, I take it, is one of
the most important questions touching the construction of a canal.
Before filing such plans the company must deposit with the
Treasurer of the Commonwealth the sum of two hundred thousand
dollars, to be held as security for the payment of damages occa-
sioned by the taking of land. If the plans are not approved by
the Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners, or if the modifica-
tions ordered by them are not acceptable to the company, it may
withdraw its deposit and forfeit its rights under the charter (sec-
tion 23). But if, on the other hand, it is content with the plans
of location and construction as finally approved by the Harbor and
Land Commissioners, the deposit cannot be withdrawn, and what-
ever future action the company may take, its deposit must remain
in the treasury.
It is apparent, therefore, that the question of the approval of the
plans by the Harbor and Land Commissioners is one of vital im-
portance to the company. If, for example, the plans as finally
adopted by that Board require a method of construction which, in
the opinion of the company, is too expensive to be profitable, the
opportunity is given it to abandon its project and receive its money
back. It has a right, therefore, to know, before going further, just
what is required of it in the way of location and construction.
12 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the question of location and
construction is confided to a Board which is presumed to be espe-
cially familiar with that subject, and which can adequately repre-
sent the interests of the Commonwealth and of the public. It is
the duty, therefore, of the Harbor and Land Commissioners to
settle all questions of construction, with one exception. That ex-
ception is the matter of the crossing of the canal by the railroad
company. The jurisdiction of this question is given to a joint
Board, consisting of the Railroad Commissioners on the one hand
and the Harbor and Land Commissioners on the other ; it being
presumed that conflicting questions between the railroad and the
canal are properly submitted to such a tribunal. Section 6, there-
fore, provides that such joint Board shall " determine at what point
or points the railroad of the Old Colony Railroad Company shall
cross said canal by a drawbridge or bridges, or by a tunnel or tun-
nels constructed under said canal." Such joint Board, after due
notice, " shall determine said questions, and the decision of a ma-
jority of said joint board shall be final. Said canal company shall
construct its canal with such structures and appliances for its pro-
tection and use as said joint Board may order, together with such
bridge or bridges, tunnel or tunnels, ferries, and changes of high-
ways, under the supervision of said joint Board, as shall be in ac-
cordance with plans approved by them."
All questions, therefore, which may arise concerning the manner
of the crossing of the canal by the railroad company, and they
only, are within the jurisdiction of the joint Board.
The determination of these questions may incidentally involve
the further question whether, for the protection of the canal on the
one hand or the railroad on the other, locks may be required, and
it is in that aspect only that your Board has to determine any ques-
tion concerning locks. Questions of navigation, of the velocity of
the tide, and all other matters incidental to the question of the
necessity of locks, are presumed to have been determined by the
Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners before the plans come
to your Board.
I do not forget that the words above quoted, " said canal com-
pany shall construct its canal with such structures and appliances
for its protection and use as said joint Board may order," taken
alone, might seem to give original jurisdiction to your Board of
the question of locks. But I cannot believe the Legislature in-
tended a divided responsibility. As I have already said, each
Board has its own duties in the matter. Your Board is concerned
only with the crossing of the railroad, and the words " structures
and appliances " must be taken in connection with the rest of the
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 13
section to refer only to the matters to which the section, as a
whole, relates. This is still more apparent from the fact that after
action by the Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners, the com-
pany, having elected to proceed, is not at liberty to withdraw and
to receive back its deposit. It is not to be presumed that the Leg-
islature having once given an opportunity to the company to take
back its deposit and withdraw from the enterprise, if the condi-
tions as to construction imposed by the Board having jurisdiction
of the matter are too onerous, should authorize another Board to
re-impose the same conditions, when the time for withdrawal has
elapsed.
I am of opinion, therefore, that the question of locks is not
before your Board excepting so far as the necessity of them may
arise in consequence of the method of crossing by the railroad com-
pany determined upon by the Board may require structures for the
protection of the canal and of the railroad company.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
Street Railways — Transportation of Letter Carriers — Constitu-
tional Law.
St. 1S97, c. 500, § 10, providing that the Boston Elevated Eailway Com-
pany may establish a five-cent fare, and that such fare shall not be
reduced by the Legislature for a period of twenty-five years, consti-
tutes a contract between the Commonwealth and the company. A
bill, therefore, requiring all street railways within the Commonwealth
to furnish transportation to letter carriers on duty, upon payment to
such companies by the United States of a fixed annual allowance,
would be unconstitutional, if it reduced fares below five cents, in so
far as it related to the Boston Elevated Railway Company, as a law
impairing the obligation of contracts.
April 12, 1901.
Hon. Rufus A. Soule, President of the Senate.
Dear Sir : — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a
copy of an order adopted by the honorable Senate on the tenth
day of April inst., requiring the opinion of the Attorney-General
upon the constitutionality of the bill relative to the transportation
of letter carriers by street railway companies (printed as House
document No. 257), as amended by the Senate.
The copy of the bill submitted in substance requires street rail-
way companies operating within the Commonwealth to furnish
transportation to all letter carriers of the United States while in
uniform and in the performance of their duties, upon the payment
each year, to the company or companies furnishing said transporta-
14 ATTOKNEY-GEKEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan.
tion, by the United States, of an amount equal to the so-called
44 standing allowance for car fare," as determined for the postal
fiscal year ending June 30, 1901 (plus any additional sum that
may be hereafter granted).
No statement of facts accompanies the order. I presume, how-
ever, I am expected to assume that if the bill becomes a law, its
provisions will require transportation of letter carriers at a rate
less than that collected from ordinary passengers ; for if the sum
allowed by the United States is equal to or greater than the revenue
derived by street railway companies from transportation of letter
carriers, no possible constitutional question can arise. In that
event, indeed, there would seem to be no occasion for the passage
of the act.
St. 1897, c. 500, § 10, provides that the Boston Elevated Rail-
way Company, which is the lessee of the West End Street Railway
Company, "may establish and take a toll or fare which shall not
exceed the sum of five cents for a single continuous passage in
the same general direction upon the roads owned, leased or oper-
ated by it ; and this sum shall not be reduced by the Legislature
during the period of twenty-five years from and after the passage
of this act." A proviso follows which, however, is not material to
the question submitted. This section, in my judgment, amounts to
a contract between the Commonwealth and the Boston Elevated
Railway Company, and that (excepting under the terms of the
proviso referred to) the Legislature may not, during the term
named in the statute, lawfully reduce fare below the sum of five
cents fixed by the statute, without violating the provision of the
United States Constitution (article 1, section 10), which forbids
a State to pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts.
I am of opinion, therefore, that the bill, so far as it concerns
the Boston Elevated Railway Company, is unconstitutional.
I apprehend that as to other street railways within the Common-
wealth the question of the constitutionality of the bill turns upon
two propositions, to wit : first, whether the bill, if it becomes a
law, will result in reducing the earnings of the company to such an
extent that it will operate to deprive them of their property with-
out due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States ; and second,
whether it denies the equal protection of the laws guaranteed to
citizens in the same amendment by discriminating in favor of a
certain class.
In 1900 a statute (chapter 197) was enacted by the Legislature
requiring the transportation of scholars of the public schools for
one-half of the rate charged to other passengers. A proceeding
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. U. 15
has been begun in the Circuit Court of the United States to test
the constitutionality of this statute upon the grounds above stated.
I have appeared in behalf of the Commonwealth, and the case is
still pending and undetermined. The circumstances of that case
are not in all respects the same as those which would arise under
the bill now submitted, but in general the determination of the
questions raised will depend upon the same considerations.
It will be my duty in that case to contend before the court that
the statute is constitutional. I am not, therefore, in a position
to consider the question with that degree of impartiality which
should be required of the Attorney-General in advising your honor-
able body upon questions of law. For these reasons, I beg to be
excused from answering the questions submitted, so far as relates
to a railway company other than the Boston Elevated Railway
Company before the determination by the court of the case now
pending.
I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Hosea M. Knowi,ton, Attorney -General.
Street Railways — Common Carriers of Goods — Constitutional
Lav:.
Legislation authorizing street railway companies to use their tracks in the
public highway as common carriers of goods, wares and merchandise
imposes no new servitude upon the owner of the fee of such highway,
and is therefore constitutional.
April 23, 1901.
Hon. Rufus A. Soule, President of the Senate.
Dear Sir : — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of an
order adopted by the honorable Senate on the 18th inst. requiring
the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the constitutionality of
legislation which authorizes street railway companies to use their
tracks in the public highways as common carriers of goods, wares
and merchandise. The only question involved is whether such use
of the tracks is a servitude not included in the original taking of
the street for a public highway. If it was not so included, then
the tracks could not be so used without additional compensation
to the owner of the fee of the street.
It has been determined by the Supreme Judicial Court in Pierce
v. Drew, 136 Mass. 75, that the erection and use of a line of elec-
tric telegraph upon a public way, and in Hoice v. West End Street
BaUway Company, 167 Mass. 46, that the maintenance of an elec-
tric railway operated by the overhead trolley system U3ed for the
16 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
carriage of passengers, are among the servitudes to which the land
of the owner becomes subject in consequence of the original taking
for the highway. In White v. Blanchard Co., 178 Mass. 363,
the construction and use of a horse railroad for freight purposes
on a highway was held not to entitle the owner of the fee in the
street to damages. In the opinion in Howe v. West End Street
Railivay Company, it was said by Chief Justice Field that " the use
made of a public way in the operation of an electric railway is of
the same general kind as that for which the way was originally laid
out, to wit, the transportation of persons and things from place to
place along the way."
Following the authority of these decisions, which, in my judg-
ment, are decisive of the present inquiry, I am of opinion that leg-
islation authorizing street railway companies to use their tracks in
the public highway as common carriers of goods, wares and mer-
chandise would be constitutional.
I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
Constitutional Laiv — Bate of Wages on Public Works — Cities and
Toiuns.
The Legislature may provide that whenever the Commonwealth, or
any county therein, enters into a contract with any person, firm or
corporation, for the doing of public work of any nature, it shall be
stipulated that such person, firm or corporation shall pay employees
no lower rate of wages per day than is paid by the Commonwealth, or
by such county, for similar work ; but such a provision, as affecting
cities and towns, would be unconstitutional, and cannot be cured by
making the provision operative only upon acceptance by a majority of
the voters of such cities and towns.
April 24, 1901.
Hon. James J. Myers, Speaker, House of Bepresenlatives.
Dear Sir : — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a
copy of an order adopted by the House of Representatives March
20, 1901, requiring the opinion of the Attorney-General upon 'the
question whether the several provisions of House bill No. 123 are in
accord with the Constitution of the Commonwealth and of the
United States. The bill in question provides, in substance, in
section 1, that whenever the Commonwealth, or any county, city
or town therein, enters into a contract with any person, firm or
corporation for the doing of public work of any nature, it shall be
provided in said contract that such person, firm or corporation shall
pay his or their employees no lower rate of wages per day than is
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. IT
paid by the Commonwealth for similar work, in case said contract
is made by a county, city or town. Section 2 fixes certain limita-
tions as to the hours of labor to be required by contractors under
the same circumstances. Section 6 provides that the act shall not
take effect, as to contracts made by the Commonwealth, until its
acceptance by the voters of the Commonwealth ; and as to contracts
made by the city or town, it shall not take effect unless accepted
by a majority of the voters of such city or town.
I see no reason to doubt that, so far as the act applies to con-
tracts made under the authority of the Commonwealth, it is consti-
tutional. The State as a sovereign may undoubtedly regulate the
terms upon which its agents shall employ labor. No question can
arise as to the rights of the contractor, for he is under no obliga-
tions to contract. If he does, he must submit to the terms imposed
by the other party to the contract, to wit, the Commonwealth or
its agents.
The same considerations undoubtedly govern the question of the
constitutionality of the statute so far as it applies to counties.
They have no other powers, rights or duties than are conferred by
the Legislature which creates them. They are mere political divi-
sions established for the more convenient administration of the
government of the Commonwealth.
I am of opinion, therefore, that so far as the act relates to the
Commonwealth and to the counties of the Commonwealth it does
not violate any provisions of the State or the Federal Constitution.
A far different question, however, arises as to so much of the bill
as relates to cities and towns. These provisions fix an arbitrary
price to be paid for labor by contractors for city or town work.
They also limit the hours of labor to be required by such con-
tractors. I assume that the price so fixed may be in excess of the
market price of such labor ; and that the hours of labor so estab-
lished are less than those usually fixed by private contracts.
Otherwise there would seem to be no occasion for the passage of
the bill.
If, therefore, the bill becomes a law, it will prohibit municipali-
ties from exercising that freedom of contract which is enjoyed by
other corporations and individuals ; it will operate to increase the
taxes of the citizens by requiring a larger expenditure for wages
than would otherwise be necessary, at the expense of the citizens
of the cities and towns affected by its provisions ; and will tend
to the benefit and profit of certain laborers to an extent not enjoyed
by laborers generally.
It would scarcely be disputed, I apprehend, that a law con-
taining such provisions, affecting private individuals and corpora-
18 ATTOEJNTEY-GEKEKAL'S KEPORT. [Jan.
tions, would be a violation of the liberties and privileges of citizens
under the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution
and under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion. In the exercise of the police power conferred by the Con-
stitution, many laws limiting the rights of citizens in the making
of contracts, and even prohibiting certain contracts, have been en-
acted by the General Court and sustained as constitutional by the
Supreme Judicial Court. Opinion of Justices, 163 Mass. 589.
But, so far as I am aware, since the beginning of constitutional
government no attempt has been made to fix by legislation an arbi-
trary price of any commodity, including labor, that may properly be
the subject of contract between parties. It may well be assumed
that any such interference with the rights of individuals and pri-
vate corporations would be pronounced to be beyond the scope of
legislative power.
Certain apparent exceptions to this general proposition rest
upon special considerations not applicable to the bill now under
consideration. Laws regulating the compensation to be charged
by public service corporations, such as common carriers and gas
companies, stand upon considerations wholly apart from the gen-
eral rule I have stated. Further examples of legislation of this
character are the statutes regulating the hours of employment of
women and minors in certain factories, and those limiting the num-
ber of hours persons may be employed in operating street railway
cars. Such laws are well within the authority conferred upon the
Legislature to enact all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
as they may be deemed to be for the good and welfare of the citi-
zens of the Commonwealth. But a statute attempting to fix the
price and hours of labor as between certain private contractors and
theiremployeescouldnotin my judgment be sustained as a legitimate
exercise of the police power contained in the Constitution. It
would tend to promote the pecuniary welfare of one class of
citizens at the expense of another class.
Is the case different when legislation of this character is at-
tempted as affecting the city or town? A municipality is, indeed,
in many respects a mere political division of the Commonwealth.
So far as it is intrusted with a part of the government of the
State and her citizens, it is wholly under the control of the
General Court. Politically, a town is the creature of the Common-
wealth. It may be enlarged, diminished, or even annexed to another
municipality. It may be governed, in whole or in part, by the offi-
cers of the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass.
375.
But a town (and in this term, for convenience, I include cities,
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 19
as well) may be said to exist in two capacities, — the one political
and governmental, and the other as a private corporation. I have
considered its standing as a political division of the Commonwealth ;
but it is, also, a corporation enjoying many of the rights and privi-
leges of other corporations. It may hold property to its own use,
and enter into contracts relating thereto. It may receive gifts for
municipal purposes and may raise money by taxation for the same
purposes, the expenditure of which is within its exclusive control.
Its property, however acquired, is its own, to which it has the
same rights as any other corporation or individual, and of which
it may not be deprived. It has the same liberty with respect to
contracts for municipal purposes not affecting matters of govern-
ment as a private person. For example, a statute requiring a town
to pay a price for its fire apparatus in excess of the price for which
such things could be bought in the open market would be clearly
objectionable.
The distinction between matters strictly municipal and those
that are governmental is to be clearly borne in mind. As an illus-
tration of this distinction, the Legislature has undoubtedly the
right, on the one hand, to fix the salary of public municipal offi-
cers, like the mayor, or even a policeman, but not the wages of
mere employees, who have no part in the government of the Com-
monwealth or of the town. They are the servants, not the officers,
of the town, and to regulate their wages would be to exercise a
control over the affairs of the town far different from that exercised
in fixing the salaries of public officers. This distinction is clearly
established by the courts. Opinion of Justices, 166 Mass. 589.
The bill in question, therefore, is an interference with the rights
of a town to manage its own municipal affairs in matters having
no connection with its political existence. It amounts, further-
more, indirectly, to the appropriation of its municipal property,
whether raised by taxation or otherwise, for the benefit of indi-
viduals. The bill is as much an invasion of those rights as it would
be of the rights of any other corporation.
The limitation of the provisions of the bill to contracts for pub-
lic works in no way affects these considerations. The expression
" public works " obviously applies to work done for the town as a
municipality. Such work is public only in the sense that it is done
for the benefit and use of the municipality.
I do not forget the further provision of the bill, that the act
shall not take effect in any town until accepted by the voters
thereof. But, in my judgment, this does not save it. It is not
wholly clear how far the Legislature may authorize a majority of
the voters of a town to impose on all its citizens a tax for private
20 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOET. [Jan.
purposes. Mead v. Acton, 139 Mass. 341 ; Opinion of Justices,
175 Mass. 599. The effect of the bill, notwithstanding, is to in-
crease arbitrarily the wages of the employee at the expense of the
town. It not only binds the minority voter, but, if accepted by
the town, it becomes binding for all time, and upon all future
voters who will have had no opportunity of election in the matter.
Even if the voters of the town can commit themselves to an unlaw-
ful expenditure of public funds, they cannot, in my judgment, bind
those who come after them.
Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that the bill, so far
as it relates to towns and cities, is unconstitutional. Whether
this conclusion be based upon the proposition that it takes away
the liberties and privileges of the municipality as a private corpora-
tion, or as authorizing the appropriation of the tax payers' money
for private purposes, or as legislation partial in its character,
makes but little difference. All these propositions are somewhat
intermingled, and rest ultimately upon the broad proposition that
the rights guaranteed to the citizen by the Constitution may not
be impaired.
I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Hosea M. Knovvlton, Attorney -General.
Pauper Law — Temporary Aid to Unsettled Paupers — Alloivance
in Case of Sickness.
Under St. 1898, c. 425, which provides that the Commonwealth shall reim-
burse to cities and towns money expended by them in temporary aid to
unsettled poor, if such sum does not exceed, except in case of sickness,
two dollars a week for each family during the months of May to Septem-
ber, inclusive, or three dollars a week for the months of October to
April, inclusive, the State Board of Charity may, in cases of sickness,
exceed the amount fixed therein.
Mat 14, 1901.
J. F. Lewis, M.D., Superintendent, State Adult Poor.
Dear Sir : — Your letter of March 23 recites that a State pau-
per residing in a city of the Commonwealth was aided by the city
from Aug. 7 to Dec. 31, 1900 ; that during this period she was ill,
but not so ill that " her health would have been endangered by
removal to the State Hospital ; " and that the city claims reimburse-
ment from the State for the medical attendance and medicines fur-
nished to her during her sickness. Due notice was given to the
State, as required by law.
The question submitted by your letter is as follows : " Does the
clause ' except in case of sickness,' seventh line of section 5, chap-
ter 425, Acts of 1898, permit the State Board of Charity to make
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 21
a larger allowance in this ca9e than three dollars a week for the
period of the pauper's sickness?"
The statute referred to provides that " A city or town may fur-
nish aid to poor persons found therein, having no lawful settle-
ment within the State, if the overseers of the poor deem it for the
public interest ; but, except in case of sickness, not for a greater
amount than two dollars a week for each family during the months
of May to September, inclusive, or three dollars a w^eek for the
months of October to April, inclusive."
I see no reason why your question should not be answered in
the affirmative. The statute limits the amount to be paid, but
expressly excepts cases of illness. I am aware that Pub. Sts., c.
86, § 26, as amended by St. 1898, c. 391, provides that expenses
in the case of persons whose health would be endangered by re-
moval to a hospital shall be reimbursed to the city or town " until
such sick person is able to be removed to the almshouse." But
this provision does not operate to prohibit the furnishing of med-
ical attendance to a State pauper, even in cases where removal
might be had. The State can at any time protect itself by order-
ing the removal of the pauper.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General.
Physicians and Surgeons — Practice of Medicine — Christian
Scientists, Osteopathists, etc.
Under a proposed bill relative to the registration of physicians and sur-
geons, which provides that it shall be a misdemeanor for an unreg-
istered physician or surgeon to practise or attempt to practise
medicine, or to hold himself out as a practitioner of medicine, it can-
not be held, as a matter of law, that pharmacists, osteopathists, clair-
voyants, etc., do not practise or attempt to practise medicine.
May 15, 1901.
H<m. James J. Myers, Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Dear Sir : — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a
copy of an order adopted by the honorable House of Representa-
tives May 3, 1901, requiring the opinion of the Attorney-General
upon a question therein submitted, which is as follows : —
"Does Senate bill No. 281 prevent pharmacists, osteopathists,
clairvoyants, or persons practising magnetic healing, mind cure,
massage methods, Christian science, or cosmopathic methods, from
treating patients by these various and respective methods, as is
now permitted under the law ? "
St. 1894, c. 458, is an act to provide for the registration of
22 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
physicians and surgeons. Section 10 of the act, as amended by
St. 1895, c. 412, provides that " whoever not being registered . . .
shall advertise or hold himself out to the public as a physician or
surgeon ... or appends to his name the letters ' M.D.,' or uses
the title of doctor, meaning thereby a doctor of medicine, shall be
punished," etc. Section 11 of the same statute (St. 1894, c. 458),
so far as it is material to the present question, is as follows : " This
act shall not apply ... to clairvoyants, or to persons practising
hypnotism, magnetic healing, mind cure, massage methods, Christian
science, cosmopathic or any other method of healing ; . . . pro-
vided such persons do not violate any of the provisions of section
ten of this act."
The language of section 11, above quoted, is somewhat peculiar.
Literally construed it declares that the classes of persons enumer-
ated shall not be affected by the act provided they do not violate
its penal provisions ; but it is scarcely necessary to say that so
long as a person does not violate the provisions of a law he is not
affected by it.
I am of opinion, however, that the section is to be more broadly
construed, and that it was the intention of the Legislature specifi-
cally to declare that the persons enumerated are not to be regarded
as holding themselves out to the public as physicians or surgeons so
long as they confine themselves to their specialties. Adopting this
construction of the section it is clear that under the original act the
persons enumerated could carry on their respective callings without
making themselves liable to the penal provisions of the statute.
The bill in question substitutes a new penal section for section 10
of the existing act; but it repeals section 11, and no similar pro-
vision is contained in the proposed bill, and I am of opinion that
this omission seriously endangers the situation of the persons
enumerated in section 11 of the existing law, for the reason that
if the bill becomes a law it may be claimed that in attempting to
heal persons by the methods employed in their respective callings
they are to be deemed to be engaged in the " practice of medicine."
In the broad sense of that term, it includes generally the art of
healing, by whatever method. I am not familiar with the methods
employed by the specialists enumerated. I can easily see, how-
ever, that it might be claimed, for instance, that one who under-
took to heal diseases by cosmopathic methods, whatever they may
be, might be deemed to be carrying on the " practice of medicine,"
and so come within the provisions of the bill. If, therefore, the
Legislature intends to insure to the classes of persons enumerated
in the question submitted the right to pursue their respective callings
without being required to be registered, they should be specifically
exempted from the general prohibitions of the bill.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 23
I may add that pharmacists are regulated by existing statutes.
These statutes give them no authority to practise medicine. The
bill in question gives them no additional powers.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
Agricultural Society — Bounty from the Commonwealth.
An agricultural society, in order to be entitled to bounty from the Com-
monwealth under the provisions of Pub. Sts., c. 114, § 1, must be
an organization local in its nature, composed chiefly of persons in-
terested in agricultural pursuits residing in the county within which
it is located, and must maintain a permanent place in the county for
its exhibitions, with the necessary buildings therefor.
May 17, 1901.
J. W. Stockwell, Esq., Secretary, State Board of Agriculture.
Dear Sir : — The opinion of the Attorney-General is desired
upon the question whether the New England Agricultural Society
is entitled to receive the bounty provided for by Pub. Sts., c. 114,
§ 1.
The society in question is incorporated under the laws of Massa-
chusetts, but it owns no real estate or buildings in this Common-
wealth, and its meetings are held in conjunction with those of other
agricultural societies, and may be at any favorable time or place,
either within or without the Commonwealth. It in no sense repre-
sents a county of the State, or any other geographical section.
I am of opinion that the society is not entitled to receive boun-
ties under the statute. An examination of all the provisions of
the chapter and of the history of legislation upon the subject makes
it clear that the agricultural societies referred to in the statutes of
the Commonwealth are local associations, whose purpose is to pro-
mote agricultural interests in the section of the State in which they
are located. In every instance in which such a society has been
admitted to the benefits provided by the statutes, it has been an
organization local in its nature, composed chiefly of persons inter-
ested in agricultural pursuits residing in the county where it is
located, and which has erected and maintained a permanent place
in the county for its exhibition buildings. The whole purpose of
legislation upon the subject had been to foster the interests of
agriculture by dividing the State into sections, usually counties,
in each of which a society has been incorporated and supported
mainly by those living in such county or subdivision of a county.
The section granting the bounty clearly makes it manifest that
the Legislature had in view societies having exhibition grounds
and buildings. The section is as follows : " Every incorporated
24 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
agricultural society which was entitled to bounty from the Com-
monwealth before the twenty-fifth day of May in the year eighteen
hundred and sixty-six, and every other such society whose exhibi-
tion grounds and buildings are not within twelve miles of those of
a society then entitled to bounty, and which has raised by contri-
bution of individuals and put out at interest on public or private
security, or invested in real estate, buildings, and appurtenances
for its use and accommodation, one thousand dollars, as a capital
appropriated for its uses, shall, except when otherwise determined
by the state board of agriculture as provided iu section three, be
entitled to receive in the month of October annually, out of the
treasury of the Commonwealth, two hundred dollars," etc.
The earliest statute upon the subject was St. 1818, c. 114, " An
act for the encouragement of agriculture and manufactures," which
contained, in section 1, a provision not unlike that in the Public
Statutes, requiring an invested capital of $1,000 before incorpo-
rated agricultural societies within the Commonwealth could receive
the bount}7 provided for. Section 2 provided that any agricultural
society formed under the act "within any county or counties in
this Commonwealth," in which no incorporated society at that time
existed, might, upon investing $1,000, partake of the bounty.
This section also contained the following provision: "provided,
always, that no agricultural society hereafter formed as aforesaid
shall be entitled to the benefits of this act, unless the same be
formed in a county or in an association of counties, including a
population of thirty thousand inhabitants." Section 6 of the same
statute provides that the act shall not extend to agricultural socie-
ties " formed in towns or in any circles of territory less than
counties."
The next statute was St. 1820, c. 49, which contained a provi-
sion authorizing the trustees of the incorporated agricultural socie-
ties, and such as might thereafter be incorporated, to fix and
define bounds and limits of sufficient extent for the erection of their
cattle sheds and yards. It also provided for other details respect-
ing the exhibitions which were to be held upon their grounds. It
further provided for the appointment of officers who were to give
efficiency to the rules and regulations for the preservation of good
order on the occasion of public cattle shows and exhibitions.
Both of these statutes show clearly that the Legislature did not
intend to pay a bounty to a society which did not own land and
buildings or give exhibitions within the Commonwealth. Pev.
Sts., c. 42, contains, in brief form, nearly all of the regulations
set forth in the above-quoted acts, together with additional provi-
sions relating to premiums, etc. All of these provisions were re-
enacted in the General Statutes, with some added requirements as
1902,] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 25
to filing certificates and making annual returns to the secretary of
the State Board of Agriculture. In this statute, also (section 16),
a time was prescribed when exhibitions by the different agricultural
societies entitled to receive the bounty provided for in section 1
should be held.
St. 1866, c. 189, provided that no agricultural society not draw-
ing a bounty from the State should hereafter be entitled to such
bounty, in case the grounds and buildings for holding exhibitions
of said society were within twelve miles of the grounds and build-
ings of any other society by law entitled to such bounty. It also
provided for the election of a delegate to the State Board of Agri-
culture by such societies as published their transactions and made
returns to the secretary of the State Board of Agriculture. These
provisions are practically re-enacted in Pub. Sts., c. 114, except
that the date for holding the exhibitions is regulated by a rule of
the State Board, and not by the statutes.
Furthermore, the same chapter (Pub. Sts., c. 114) which, in
section 1, regulates the bounty to be paid to such organizations,
provides in section 9 that "Every such society shall admit as
members upon equal terms, citizens of every town in the county in
which it is located, and all premiums offered shall be subject to the
competition of every citizen of such county."
Upon the consideration of all these statutes, I am clearly of the
opinion that the New England Agricultural Society is not within
the purview of the statute.
A similar question has been raised in respect to the Bay State
Agricultural Society. I am informed that this organization is simi-
lar in its purposes to the New England Agricultural Society. For
the reasons stated above, therefore, I am of opinion that this asso-
ciation is not entitled to bounties.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
Pauper Law — Settlement — Effect of Retroactive Statute.
A settlement acquired prior to 1860, which by its existence prevented the
acquisition of a settlement in the same place, comes within the excep-
tion contained in St. 1898, c. 425, § 2, and is not lost because the per-
son acquiring such settlement died before the passage of the statute.
May 17, 1901.
J. F. Lewis, M.D., Superintendent, State Adult Poor.
Dear Sir : — Your letter of April 4 requires the opinion of the
Attorney- General upon the settlement of a female pauper. The
facts stated in the letter are as follows : —
26 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan.
The pauper was born in 1813 and became insane when twenty
years of age, since which time she has been non compos mentis,
and has been a public charge of the city of Cambridge since Aug.
6, 1879. She acquired a settlement through her father, who owned
and occupied a freehold estate in Cambridge from 1811 to 1871,
the date of his death, gaining thereby a settlement under the pro-
visions of Pub. Sts., c. 83, § 1, cl. 4.
A pauper who is an idiot or insane, and therefore is not compe-
tent, though of age, to gain a settlement for himself, follows the
settlement of his mother. He is in the same situation as a minor
child, whose settlement, derived from his father, changes with that
of his father. Taunton v. Middleborough, 12 Met. 35, 38 ; Upton
v. Northbridge, 15 Mass. 237.
In the present case the pauper, having been insane since 1833,
could acquire no settlement of her own, and must depend entirely
upon that derived from her father, who was settled in Cambridge
by virtue of the ownership and occupancy of a freehold estate from
1811 to 1871.
St. 1898, c. 425, § 2, provides that Pub. Sts., c. 83, § 6, shall
be amended so as to read : "All settlements not fully acquired sub-
sequent to the first day of May in the year eighteen hundred and
sixty are hereby defeated and declared to be lost, except where the
existence of such settlement prevented a subsequent acquisition of
settlement in the same place."
It is clear that while the father gained his settlement prior to
1860 (1811-1860), the existence of the settlement so gained pre-
vented a subsequent acquisition of settlement in the same place
(1860-1871). There is no question that if he had been living at
the time of the passage of St. 1898, his settlement would not have
been lost under section 2.
I see no reason why the death of the father subsequent to the
period of time when his settlement would have been acquired, but
for the existence of the previous settlement, affects the question.
The situation had become complete when he died, and nothing in
the statute of 1898, expressly or by implication, makes any such
exception. In the case of Adams v. Ipswich, 116 Mass. 570,
where the facts under a similar statute were in all respects identi-
cal, although the question was not directly passed upon, no sug-
gestion was made either by counsel or by the court that the death
of the person whose settlement was defeated by a prior settlement
was material to the determination of the question.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 27
Co-operative Savings Banks — Directors — Proxy Voting.
The directors of a co-operative savings bank cannot legally vote by proxy.
Mat 27, 1901.
Starkes Whiton, Esq.,
Chairman, Board of Commissioners of Savings Banks.
Dear Sir: — Your letter of April 27, relating to the Pioneer
Co-operative Bank and to the Guardian Co-operative Bank, and
the votings of those corporations, appears to require no opinion of
law except upon the question whether directors may vote by proxy.
It is well settled that they cannot legally vote by proxy. Vide,
Cook on Stock and Stockholders, § 713a; lie Portuguese, etc., Co.,
L. R. 42, C. D. 160 ; Perry v. Tuscaloosa, etc., Co., 93 Ala. 364.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General.
Violation of Pharmacy Law — Plea of Nolo Contendere — Con-
viction.
A plea of nolo contendere, followed by a fine imposed by the court, is a
conviction within the meaning of St. 1896, c. 397, § 9.
June 5, 1901.
Amos K. Tilden, Secretary, Board of Begistration in Pharmacy.
Dear Sir : — Your letter of June 3 requires the opinion of the
Attorney-General upon the following question : " Is a plea of nolo
contendere, followed by a fine imposed by the court, a conviction
within the meaning of section 9, chapter 397, Acts of 1896?"
It is. White v. Creamer, 175 Mass. 567.
Yours respectfully,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General'.
Newbury port Bridge — Legal Title — Repair and Maintenance.
The title to the bridge over the Merrimack River, between the city of
Newburyport and the town of Salisbury, was vested, under the terms
of St. 1867, c. 296, § 7, in the county of Essex, by virtue of the
proclamation by the Governor, dated Aug. 22, 1868, declaring the
bridge to be free.
Since the bridge has become a public highway, however, questions relating
to its repair and maintenance, and the parties who shall contribute
thereto, are wholly within the discretion of the Legislature, and are to
be determined upon considerations in no way connected with the legal
ownership of the property.
28 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
June 6, 1901.
Hon. James J. Myers, Speaker of the House of Rejwesentatives.
Dear Sir : — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a
copy of an order adopted by the honorable House of Representa-
tives yesterday, requiring the opinion of the Attorney-General upon
the question whether the bridge over the Merrimack River between
the city of Newburyport and the town of Salisbury is the property
of the Commonwealth or the county of Essex.
So far as the history of the bridge is shown by the statutes of
the Commonwealth it is as follows: by St. 1825, c. 164, certain
persons were made a corporation by the name of the Proprietors of
the Newburyport Bridge, and were authorized to construct a bridge
over the Merrimack River between Newburyport and Salisbury.
I assume that the bridge in question was constructed by the corpo-
ration so chartered. It was provided in the charter, by section 4,
that after a period of forty years from the time when the bridge
was opened for travel it should revert to and become the property
of the Commonwealth. I have no information as to the time when
the bridge was opened for travel, but I assume that it was forty
years before the next act relating to the subject, which was in 1867.
In the year 1867, by chapter 296 of the Acts of that year, the
county commissioners were " authorized and empowered to lay out
as and for highways " certain bridges across the Merrimack River,
including the one in question. It was further provided in this act
that the damages, if any, to be paid to the proprietors of the
bridges specified in the act should be paid in the same manner as
damages occasioned by the laying out of highways ; that is to say,
by the county. Section 6 contained the unusual provision that the
several cities and towns in said county, or any of them, might con-
tribute to the county towards the payment of damages that might
be awarded to the proprietors of such bridges ; apparently leaving
the question of contribution, and the amount of the same, optional
with the cities and towns.
The important section of this act, so far as relates to the question
submitted, is section 7, the language of which is as follows : " Upon
evidence satisfactory to the governor and council that any one of
said bridges now or hereafter belonging to the Commonwealth has
been laid out as a highway according to the provisions of this act,
the governor shall by his proclamation declare such bridge free ;
and thereupon all property of the Commonwealth in such bridge
and in the appurtenances thereto shall vest in said county and in
said cities and towns contributing to the payment of damages in
the laying out of such bridge as a highway."
It was the obvious purpose of the Legislature by this section to
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 29
dispossess the Commonwealth of the legal title to the bridges
enumerated by vesting the same in the county, and in such cities
and towns as might, under the provisions of the section above
quoted, voluntarily contribute to the payment of the damages
awarded for taking the same. If no city or town contributed then
the county became the sole owner. But whether such contribution
was made by cities and towns or not, the Commonwealth was to
become dispossessed, and either the county alone, or the con-
tributing cities and towns together with the county were to hold
the title to the bridges taken.
Apparently no action was taken under this section ; for in the
next year (St. 1868, c. 309, § 8) the county commissioners were
commanded within sixty days after the passage of the act to lay
out as and for highways the same bridges which they were author-
ized and permitted to lay out by the statute of 1867. They were
further required to lay out the bridges enumerated in the manner
provided by law for the laying out of highways, and according to
the provisions of the statute of 1867, above referred to, so far
as the same were applicable. The statute of 1868 further required
the commissioners to apportion the damages sustained by the
proprietors of such bridges among such cities and towns as the
commissioners should determine were benefited by the laying out,
thus doing away with the voluntary contributions provided for by
the act of the previous year.
The bridge in question was laid out as a highway under the pro-
visions of this act. But none of the provisions of the statute of
1867 were repealed by the later statute, excepting those relating
to voluntary contributions for damages by the cities and towns. In
other respects the provisions of the statute of 1867 still remained
in force, including section 7, which provided that upon the procla-
mation of the Governor that the bridge had become free, the prop-
erty in it should vest in the county, and in such cities and towns
as had contributed to the payment of damages. As the title to the
property had reverted to the Commonwealth no damages were
awarded, and, therefore, no contributions were assessed upon or
received from any city or town. The proclamation by the Governor
declaring the bridge free was issued Aug. 22, 1868 ; and, there-
upon, under the terms of the statute, the title to the bridge vested
and is in the county of Essex.
It may not be improper for me to add, although strictly it is not
within the scope of the question submitted, that the legal title to
the bridge has no direct connection with the question of the
expediency of the enactment of the bill in question. The bridge
has become a public highway, and questions relating to its repair
30 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
and maintenance, and of the parties who shall contribute thereto,
are wholly within the discretion of the Legislature. It was deemed
expedient by the Legislature of 1867 to vest the title to the bridge
in the county, even though it does not appear that such title was
desired. But, nevertheless, the question who shall maintain the
bridge is to be determined upon considerations wholly disconnected
with the matter of legal ownership of the property.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners — Land covered by
Navigable Waters — Cession to United States.
Land at a distance of 200 feet below low-water mark, which is covered by-
water to a depth of 8 feet at mean low water, is " land covered by
navigable waters " within the meaning of Pub. Sts., c. 1, § 7, although
structures of loose stones have been erected thereon, and title thereto
may be conveyed to the United States by the Board of Harbor and
Land Commissioners under such statute.
June 25, 1901.
Hon. Woodward Emery,
Chairman, Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners.
Dear Sir : — Your letter of June 4 states that " under the pro-
visions of St. 1898, c. 441, and St. 1899, c. 155, the Board of
Harbor and Land Commissioners has cut a channel between Lake
Anthony at Cottage City and Vineyard Sound, about 5 feet deep
and 100 feet wide on the bottom, and has protected the same by
building two stone jetties on either side of the cut extending into
the sound about 200 feet beyond the low-water mark, reaching a
depth of about 8 feet at mean low water. . . . The United States
Lighthouse Board is willing to maintain lights on the ends of the
jetties. The ends of the jetties are built up (as are the entire
jetties) by loose stones piled up, through the interstices of which
the water readily flows."
The question submitted by your letter is whether the Board may
convey the land upon which the ends of the jetties have been
erected to the United States for the purpose of maintaining lights
and lighthouses thereon, it being one of the provisions of the U. S.
Rev. Sts. that no lighthouse shall be erected on any site until
" cession of jurisdiction over the same has been made to the
United States."
The authority of your Board is to be found in Pub. Sts., c. 1,
§ 7, which provides: "The board of harbor and land commis-
sioners, with the approval of the governor and council, may in
the name and behalf of the commonwealth convey to the United
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 31
States the title of the commonwealth to any tracts of land covered
by navigable waters, and necessary for the purpose of erecting
lighthouses, beacon lights, range lights, or other aids to naviga-
tion, or lightkeepers' dwellings, upon the application of any au-
thorized agent or agents of the United States : provided, that such
title shall revert to and revest in the commonwealth whenever
such land ceases to be used for such purposes."
There can be no doubt that the circumstances of the case bring
it within the provisions of this statute.
The jetties extend out 200 feet below low-water mark and reach
to a depth of 8 feet at mean low water. They are built of loose
stones, through the interstices of which the water readily flows.
The soil upon which the jetties rest is, therefore, the property of
the Commonwealth, and title to it may be conveyed by your Board
to the United States under the statute quoted and subject to the
conditions named therein.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
Civil Service — Chief Superintendent — Superintendent of City
Farm at Lowell,
By the terra " chief superintendent of a department," as used in Kule VI.,
Schedule B, Class 12, of the civil service rules, is intended an officer
who has the oversight and charge of the whole of the business of that
department and acts for and represents the head of the department in
every branch of its authority.
The superintendent of the City Farm at Lowell is not such an official, and
his election, in disregard of the rules of the Civil Service Commission,
is, therefore, illegal.
June 27, 1901.
Hon. Charles Theodore Russell,
Chairman, Civil Service Commissioners.
Dear Sir : — The charter of the city of Lowell (St. 1875, c. 173,
§ 29, as amended by St. 1894, c. 190) provides for a board of
overseers of the poor, and that " they may appoint a secretary and
superintendent, and such other subordinate officers as the ordi-
nances of the city may require, and may define the duties of said
officers." Acting under the authority of this statute the Board in
January elected one Robert B. Saunders to the position of superin-
tendent of the City Farm, displacing Albert Pindar, a veteran,
who, until then, was lawfully in office as such superintendent. No
requisition was made upon the Civil Service Commission, and
there was no pretence that the rules of the commission were com-
plied with, it being claimed or assumed that this office was not
within those rules.
32 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Rule VI., Schedule B, Class 12, enumerates as officers who must
be appointed under the civil service rules " superintendents, assist-
ant superintendents, deputies and persons, other than the chief
superintendents of departments, performing any of the duties of a
superintendent in the service of any city of the Commonwealth."
The office in question being that of a superintendent of the City
Farm of Lowell is within this classification, unless it is excepted
by the words "other than the chief superintendents of depart-
ments." I understand that it has been contended that the official
in question is to be regarded as the chief superintendent of a de-
partment within the meaning of those words as used in this rule,
and therefore exempt from the operation of the civil service rules.
But obviously the " chief superintendent of a department," as
that term is used in the rule quoted, is more than a mere " super-
intendent," for the latter is within the scope of the rules, while the
"chief superintendent of a department " is not within the rules.
The fact, therefore, that an officer is a superintendent does not of
itself bring him within the exception. By the term " chief super-
intendent of a department " must be intended an official who has
the oversight and charge of the whole of the business of that de-
partment, with full power of direction and management. He must
be one who acts for and represents the head of the department in
every branch of its authority.
The superintendent of the City Farm is not such an official.
While he may have, and probably does have, the entire charge and
superintendence of the City Farm, and the buildings and depart-
ments associated under it, he is, nevertheless, not the general
agent of all the matters relating to the poor department, and the
administration of the poor laws. The agents and representatives
of the board are by law two, a superintendent and a secretary.
The secretary, as I am informed, has charge, subject to the con-
trol of the board, of what is known as the out-door poor relief
funds, and distributes aid to those who are not inmates of any of
the institutions. On the other hand, the superintendent of the
poor farm has charge of those institutions. The duties of these
two officials are entirely separate. Neither of them can be said to
be the chief superintendent of the poor department.
The official in question, therefore, not being the "chief super-
intendent" of the poor department, within the meaning of that
expression as used in the civil service rules, is not exempt, and
must be chosen in accordance with the provisions of those rules.
It follows that the election of Saunders was illegal.
Yours truly,
Hose a M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 33
Registered Pharmacist — Clerk — Sixth-class License — Board of
Registration in Pharmacy.
The granting of a sixth-class license to a registered pharmacist who is
acting as a clerk in a pharmacy does not constitute a violation of the
pharmacy law requiring the Board of Registration in Pharmacy to in-
vestigate and notify the proper prosecuting officer, as provided in
St. 1896, c. 397, § 21.
June 28, 1901.
Amos K. Tilden, Esq., Secretary, Board of Begistration in Pharmacy.
Dear Sir : — Your letter of June 5 submits the following ques-
tion : "Upon complaint being made to the Board of Registration
in Pharmacy that a license of the sixth class has been granted to
a registered pharmacist acting as a clerk in a pharmacy, is such a
condition a violation of the pharmacy law, and is it the duty of
the Board of Registration in Pharmacy to investigate and notify
the proper prosecuting officer, as provided in section 21, chapter
397, Acts of 1896?"
There is no law against the granting of a license of the sixth
class to a registered pharmacist acting as a clerk in a pharmacy.
For aught that may appear in the granting of a license, the appli-
cant is proposing to carry on the business in his own name upon
receiving his license.
The prohibition of the statute, so far as it concerns your Board,
is the suffering or permitting by a registered pharmacist of the use
of his name or his certificate of registration by others in the con-
duct of the business of pharmacy, when he himself is not the owner
and actively engaged in such business.
It is certainly the duty of your Board to investigate any such im-
proper use of his certificate by a registered pharmacist, and to notify
the proper prosecuting officer of the fact if it be found to exist.
It may be that your Board has other things in mind in the question
submitted. If so, I can only reply, generally, that it is the duty
of your Board "to investigate all complaints of disregard, non-
compliance with, or violation of, the provisions " of the chapter.
I have quoted the language of the statute for I am unable to im-
prove on it. If complaints relate to matters not connected with
the statute in question, it is not your duty to make them, but you
are at liberty to do it, as is any other good citizen. But whenever
any provisions of the pharmacy statute are violated, it is certainly
your duty to investigate the matter and report it to the prosecut-
ing authorities.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General.
34: ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S KEPOET. [Jan.
Insurance — Insurance Broker — License — Clerk or Other Employee
of Broker.
A salaried clerk or other employee of a duly licensed insurance broker,
who is not himself so licensed, cannot lawfully do any of the acts for-
bidden to persons not licensed as insurance agents or brokers. He
cannot, under pretence of being a clerk, act as solicitor or broker of
insurance, excepting so far as such work is under the immediate direc-
tion of his employer and is incidentally a part of his work as clerk.
June 28, 1901.
Hon. Frederick L. Cutting, Insurance Commissioner.
Dear Sir : — Your letter of April 12 requires the opinion of the
Attorney-General upon the question whether one who is a salaried
clerk or other employee of a duly licensed insurance broker can
lawfully do any of the acts forbidden to persons not licensed as
insurance agents or brokers.
St. 1894, c. 522, § 87, provides as follows : " Any person not a
duly licensed insurance broker, who solicits insurance on behalf of
any insurance company, or transmits for a person other than himself
an application for or a policy of insurance to or from such com-
pany, or offers or assumes to act in the negotiation of such insur-
ance, shall be deemed an insurance agent within the intent of this
act, and shall thereby become liable to all the duties, requisitions,
liabilities and penalties to which an agent of such company is
subject."
By section 98 of the same act it is provided that : " Any person
who shall assume to act as an insurance agent or insurance broker
without license therefor as herein provided . . . shall be punished
by a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than five hundred
dollars for each offence."
The certificate issued under section 91 of the same chapter is
personal to the licensee, who must be found by the insurance com-
missioner to be a " suitable person." The licensee, therefore,
may not delegate his authority to an unlicensed person, even
though he be his clerk.
The distinction between what the employee may do and what he
ma}' not do is well stated in the opinion given to you, as you in-
form me by your letter, by a former attorney-general, to wit : u that
any clerk or employee who acted outside of his employer's office
in soliciting insurance, or doing the other things that constitute a
person an agent of an insurance company, would not be protected
by his employer's license ; while a clerk, or employed person,
doing the clerical work of an insurance office and waiting on the
customers at the counter, advising as to rates, delivering policies
and receiving pay therefor, and perhaps incidentally acting in the
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 35
negotiation of insurance, would not need a license, inasmuch as he
is acting as eye, ear, or hand of his employer, and is not known to
the insured in any responsible capacity."
In other words, the employee cannot lawfully be a solicitor or
broker of insurance, excepting so far as such work is under the
immediate direction of his employer and is incidentally a part of
his work as clerk.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
Massachusetts Highway Commission — State Highway — Nuisance
— Public Health.
The Massachusetts Highway Commission is not charged with any duties
relating to the preservation of the public health, aud therefore is not
required to take any action toward abating a nuisance upon a State
highway when such nuisance does not aftect the conditions of the
highway as a road structure.
June 28, 1901.
A. B. Fletcher, Esq., Secretary, Massachusetts Highway Commission.
Dear Sir : — Your letter of June 4 states that certain abutters
along the State highway in Leicester are discharging their house
sewerage into the gutter of the State road, thereby creating a
nuisance. The letter further states that the houses are very near
the road, and so situated as to make it difficult to maintain a sys-
tem of cesspools, and that the practice of discharging sewage
into the gutter has been going on for a long time, both before and
since the construction of the road by the Commonwealth.
The letter requires the advice of the Attorney-General as to the
duties of the Massachusetts Highway Commission upon this state
of facts.
The duties of your commission as to State highways are to keep
them in good repair and condition at the expense of the Common-
wealth. I assume that the discharges complained of do not affect
the condition of the highway as a road structure. Even if it were
otherwise, it is not entirely clear how far a person can be com-
pelled to prevent flowage of water from his premises to a highway.
The present question, however, arises by reason of the claim that
the discharges are injurious to the health of the public and thus
constitute a nuisance. With this aspect of the matter your Board
has nothing whatever to do. You are not charged with any duties
looking to the preservation of the public health or the prevention
of nuisances affecting the same.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
36 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S. REPORT. [Jan.
Co-operative Banks — Security — Collection of Loan.
If upon the forfeiture of the shares and the foreclosure of a mortgage
respectively pledged and executed by a stockholder in a co-operative
bank, to secure a loan from such bank, the amount realized therefrom
is not sufficient to discharge the loan, the balance remaining unpaid
becomes a debt which is presently due and may be recovered by suit
forthwith, like any other loan.
July 6, 1901.
Hon. Starkes Whiton,
Chairman, Board of Savings Bank Commissioners
Dear Sir: — Your letter of Feb. 25, 1901, encloses a copy of
the form of note and mortgage usually taken by co-operative banks
in this Commonwealth when advances are made by them upon
shares of the bank, and requires the opinion of the Attorney-Gen-
eral as to " whether or not under said form of note and mortgage,
in cases of foreclosure and sale, if the property did not bring suffi-
cient to pay the amount advanced by the bank, would it have a
claim on the maker of the note (as in cases of ordinary mortgages)
for the deficiency between the sale and the amount of the ad-
vance ?"
In order intelligently to answer this inquiry, it is necessary to
ascertain the precise nature of the contract expressed by the note
and mortgage, the forms of which are submitted with your letter.
The form of the note (which is followed in the condition of the
mortgage) is unusual. It is peculiar, I believe, to co-operative
banks. Many borrowers, who understand clearly that the bank
has loaned them money, secured by a mortgage, and payable in
monthly instalments, find it difficult to comprehend the somewhat
involved terms of the note they are required by the bank to sign.
The first difficulty grows out of the peculiar signification of
the word " share" as used in the note and mortgage. It is un-
like the ordinary share in a business corporation, in that the sub-
scriber for a share merely acquires by his contract with the bank
the right to continue to pay assessments on his so-called share
until the assessments paid by him, together with the interest
earned upon them, amounts to 8200, at which time that sum is
forthwith paid to him. That is to say, the word " share" means
only the right to contribute monthly to a given fund, to be used
by the bank for the purpose of making loans ; to be credited
with the amount of his contributions and the proportional part of
the interest earned upon such contributions, until the accumula-
tion reaches the sum of $200, when the whole amount is paid to
the subscriber, and his so-called share is at an end.
Another peculiarity of co-operative bank transactions lies in the
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 37
fact that there are no loans excepting to shareholders. The bor-
rower must subscribe for a number of shares at $200 each, suffi-
cient to equal the amount of his proposed loan. That is to say, if
he proposes to borrow $1,000, he must subscribe for five shares of
$200 each. These shares are forthwith pledged by him to the
bank for the amount of the advance. He undertakes to pay
monthly the interest on the amount of the advance, and the dues
and assessments appertaining to the shares. The contract of
pledge is terminated (unless sooner by the voluntary act of the
parties) when the accumulations of the shares make them worth
the full amount of $200. Then the shares of the borrower and his
obligations are discharged at the same time ; the value of the shares
being equal to the amount of the advance made to him.
Obviously, however, a loan made upon shares which represent
nothing but the right to contribute money is an insufficient secur-
ity, unless there is some adequate assurance that the dues upon the
shares will be paid, together with interest upon the advance. To
secure these two things the form of note submitted with your
letter has been devised. The contract of the note is, in substance,
an agreement by the borrowing shareholder that he will pay the
monthly dues on the shares, and the interest upon the loan, until
the shares shall reach the ultimate value of $200 each. The con-
dition of the mortgage is practically the same. It is not the re-
payment of the advance, but the payment of the interest upon the
advance and the dues upon the shares pledged as security for the
advance.
It is provided by Pub. Sts., c. 117, § 16, as amended by St.
1882, c. 251, that if the borrowing member fails to comply with
his contract to pay the dues upon his shares and interest upon his
advance, the directors may at their discretion declare the shares
forfeited. They shall thereupon charge the borrowing member
with the arrears of interest and dues upon the shares, and credit
him upon his loan with the value of the shares ; and may there-
upon, after a stated time, enforce "the balance of the account"
against the security. Under this provision of the statute, there-
fore, the mortgage may be foreclosed for the purpose of collecting
this balance. The inquiry in your letter supposes the case that
the mortgaged property may not sell under foreclosure for enough
to pay the balance of the account, and requires the opinion of the
Attorney-General upon what further rights the bank has upon the
borrowing member.
Notwithstanding the elaborate provisions in the note and in the
mortgage, by which the transaction is made to appear to be a sub-
scription for shares by the borrower, and an advance upon the
38 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
credit of them, with a mortgage to secure the balance unpaid upon
the shareholder, it is obvious that the transaction is, nevertheless,
in fact a loan, and these provisions are methods devised to permit
the paying of the loan in small instalments, and under circum-
stances which, as it is claimed by those interested in co-operative
banks, will allow the borrower in fact to get a lower rate of interest
on account of the investment by the bank of his partial payments
in other loans, in the profits of which he participates as a share-
holder.
But if the consideration in relation to the pledge of the shares
is broken, and the shares are forfeited, and the security of the
mortgage is exhausted, and ail these proceedings are not sufficient
to pay the loan, it is not discharged, remains due, and may be
collected by suit, like any other loan. The suit would not be
upon the note, nor upon any contract relating to the shares. The
declaration would be a common count for money loaned.
It is also obvious that when the shares are forfeited by the fault
of the borrower, the balance is presently due and may be collected
forthwith. There was no time fixed in the original loan for a re-
payment ; but by subscribing for and pledging shares he acquired
the right to discharge his loan by paying the assessments on his
shares until the value of the shares equalled the amount of the
loan. This right ceased when his shares were forfeited, and noth-
ing of the transaction remained but a loan, without time fixed
for repayment, and therefore due on demand.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
Insurance — Liability of Physician for Accident to Patient —
Accident Insurance Policy.
Injury or death caused by the mistake, inadvertence or error of a phy-
sician, is, so far as concerns the patient, an accident, and a policy
issued to physicians insuring them against loss from common law or
statutory liability for damage on account of bodily injuries, fatal or
non-fatal, suffered by any person or persons in consequence of any
alleged error or mistake made by the physician to whom such policy
is issued, is insurance against loss or damage on account of "bodily
injury or death by accident'' within the meaning of clause 5 of St.
1894, c. 522, § 29, and is therefore legal.
July 10, 1901.
Hon. Frederick L. Cutting, Insurance Commissioner.
Dear Sir: — Acts of 1894, c. 522, § 29, paragraph 5, provides
that insurance companies may be formed " to insure any person,
firm or corporation against loss or damage on account of the bodily
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 39
injury or death by accident of any person for which loss or damage
said person, firm or corporation is responsible." Section 77 of the
same chapter authorizes foreign companies under certain condi-
tions to transact in this Commonwealth any class of insurance
authorized by its laws. A foreign insurance company, which has
been admitted to do an accident business in this State under the
sections referred to, proposes to issue to physicians policies insur-
ing them " against loss from common law or statutory liability for
damage on account of bodily injuries, fatal or non-fatal, suffered
by any person or persons in consequence of any alleged error or
mistake made " by the physician to whom the policy is issued.
The question submitted in your letter of June 12, 1901, is
whether such a contract is within the authority of the statute
above quoted.
It is settled that insurance may be written covering accidents to
persons other than the assured. Employers' Liability Insurance
Company x. Merrill, 155 Mass. 404. It has also been held that
such a contract is not against public policy. American Casualty
Company's Case, 82 Md. 335.
There is nothing, then, to make this form of insurance illegal,
provided the statute is broad enough to authorize it. Whether
this be so depends upon the interpretation to be given to the word
" accident," as used in the statute.
In general, an accident may be said to be the operation of
chance. As the word is more commonly used it signifies an un-
desirable or unfortunate happening, an undesigned harm or injury.
In this broad sense any disease may be said to be an accident.
But the word as used in the statute is to be construed in accord-
ance with its surroundings. Throughout insurance statutes a dis-
tinction is made between death or injuries resulting from disease
and those which are the result of what are ordinarily called casual-
ties or accidents. Mere disease, therefore, is not an accident.
An aggravation, however, of the disease, caused by no fault of
the patient, but by a mistake, inadvertence or error of another, may
properly be termed an accident, so far as the patient is concerned.
This may be so even though the patient himself can make no
claim upon his own accident insurance policy. The ordinary ac-
cident insurance policies specifically except death or disability
caused, wholly or in part, by surgical operations or medical treat-
ment for disease. Most of them also further limit the use of the
word "accident" by barring cases where there are not some ex-
ternal marks of injury.
Bearing these considerations in mind, I see no good reason to
doubt that whenever a patient receives an injury, the proximate
40 ATTOKNEY-GEJSTEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan.
cause of which is the negligence of the physician, he may not as
properly be said to have been injured by accident, as an employee
who is thrown to the ground by a staging defective in consequence
of the negligence of his employer. The same is true, in my judg-
ment, of fatal injuries caused under the same circumstances. If
a man receives a wound, not of itself fatal, but which causes death
by what is commonly called blood-poisoning, this would be death
by accident. If a patient is treated by a physician who neglects
to use antiseptic precautions, and death results from such neglect,
it is still an accident so far as the patient is concerned, and one
for which the physician may be liable.
An employer whose negligence causes injury to his employee
may be held to pay damages therefor, either at common law or by
some statute. He may insure himself against such liability. A
physician whose negligence causes injury to his patient that would
not have happened to him if he had been skilful may be made to
pay the damages which result. I see no difference between insur-
ing the physician under such circumstances and the employer
whose negligence made him liable to his employee.
It is not necessary to consider whether there may not be cases
of liability by physicians for malpractice which could not be in-
sured against under the statute quoted. It is sufficient that some
cases where physicians are held liable at common law come within
the meaning of the statute as I interpret it, and therefore that the
form of policy cannot be pronounced illegal.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
Pauper Laws — Unsettled Woman — Retroactive Statute.
A female pauper, who, prior to 1860, acquired a derivative settlement
through her husband, was not an "unsettled woman" within the
retroactive provisions of St. 1874, c. 274, § 2, and St. 1878, c. 190, and
so could not acquire a settlement thereunder in her own right, and
therefore became, upon the passage of St. 1898, c. 425, § 2, cutting
off her derivative settlement, an unsettled woman.
July 30, 1901.
J. F. Lewis, M.D., Superintendent, State Adult Poor.
Dear Sir : — The pauper referred to in your letter of March 11
was born in 1819 and has been a widow since 1849. She acquired,
prior to 1860, a derivative settlement, through her husband, in
Salem. Since 1860 she has resided in Boston, but was aided at
the expense of Salem in the years 1864-1866 inclusive and in the
years 1875-1898 inclusive. During the years 1867-1874 inclusive
she received no aid, being then a resident of the city of Boston.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — JSTo. 12. 41
The question submitted by your letter is whether she is to-day
settled in Boston.
St. 1874, c. 274, provided in section 2 that a woman residing in
any place within the State for five years, without receiving relief
as a pauper, would gain a settlement in such place ; but in section
3 it was provided that no existing settlement should be changed by
the act, unless the entire residence accrued after its passage ; but
that as to unsettled persons the statute should be deemed to be
retroactive. This act, therefore, did not give her a settlement in
Boston, for she was not then an unsettled person, and the five
years' residence in Boston was before the enactment of the statute.
This statute was re-enacted in St. 1878, c. 190, and was extended
to married women who had no settlement derived by marriage, by
St. 1879, c. 242. Both of these later statutes were retroactive as
to unsettled women only. They did not operate, therefore, to
change her derivative settlement in Salem.
The re-enactment of these provisions in Pub. Sts., c. 83, § 1,
cl. 7, did not change the situation.
Up to the year 1898, therefore, the pauper had not acquired a
settlement in Boston and had not lost her settlement in Salem.
St. 1898, c. 425, however, provides that " all settlements not fully
acquired subsequent to the first day of May in the year 1860 are
hereby defeated and declared to be lost, except where the exist-
ence of such settlement prevented a subsequent acquisition of
settlement in the same place : provided, that whenever a settlement
acquired by marriage has been thus defeated, the former settle-
ment of the wife, if not defeated by the same provision, shall be
thereby revived."
This statute cut off her derivative settlement in Salem, and as
she would lose any settlement which she might have had before
marriage by the same provision, and so far as the facts show was
not prevented by her derivative settlement from gaining another in
Salem, she became under its provision, and is to-day, an unsettled
woman.
Very truly yours,
Hose a M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
Metropolitan Parks — Violation of Law — Fines.
The provision of St. 1901, c. 464, requiring that all fines recovered for
violation of the laws of the Commonwealth within the limits of lands,
roadways or boulevards under the care of the Metropolitan Park Com-
mission shall be accounted for and paid to the Treasurer of the Com-
monwealth, and by him placed to the credit of such commission, must
be limited to fines actually collected or received by the commission.
42 ATTOKKEY-GEKEPAL'S REPOET. [Jan.
Aug. 6, 1901.
John Woodbury, Esq., Secretary, Metropolitan Park Commission.
Dear Sir : — St. 1897, c. 121, § 2, provided as follows: "All
sums of money hereafter collected or received by said commission,
including sums received for rentals, sales, or use of property under
its care, and all fines recovered for violations of law within the
limits of the lands, roadways or boulevards under its care, shall
be accounted for and paid to the treasurer and receiver-general of
the Commonwealth, and shall be placed by him to the credit of and
added to the funds provided by law for meeting the expenses of said
commission, and may be expended by said commission in addition
to any loans or appropriations authorized for park purposes."
In an opinion given Sept. 15, 1898 (1 Op. Atty-Gen. 595)
I advised your Board that the phrase in the section, " all fines
recovered for violations of law within the limits of the lands,
roadways or boulevards " under the care of the Metropolitan Park
Commission, should be construed as including only such fines as
were recovered for violation of the rules and regulations made by
the park commission.
St. 1901, c. 464, repeals the section above quoted and substi-
tutes a new section therefor (section 1). The new section is
similar to the old in all respects excepting that in place of the
phrase " all fines recovered for violations of law within the limits
of the lands, roadways or boulevards under its care," the new
section substitutes the following, to wit: " all fines recovered for
violation of rules and regulations established by said commission
for the government and use of the lands, roadways or boulevards
under its care, or for violation of the laws of the Commonwealth
within the limits of said lands, roadways or boulevards."
Having expressly added " fines recovered for violation of rules
and regulations established by the commission " to "fines recovered
for violations of law within the limits of the lands, roadways or
boulevards," as provided in the repealed section, it was undoubt-
edly in the mind of the framers of the new statute that the latter
expression (which stood alone in the old statute) could no longer
be limited in its construction, as indicated in my former opinion,
basing this view upon the proposition that the statute would be
without meaning if two independent and connecting clauses referred
to the same matter.
There is much force in the suggestion. Statutes are not to be
construed as being without meaning unless there is no other possi-
ble alternative. But I am, nevertheless, of the opinion that the
statute of 1901 cannot be construed according to the obvious in-
tent of its framers.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT— No. 12. 43
In order to a full understanding of the questions involved, it is
necessary to consider some general rules of pleading and practice
in criminal law. An offence having no essential connection with
the place in which it is committed need not be alleged in criminal
pleading as having occurred at any particular place. There must
be an allegation of place, but the indictment or complaint is sup-
ported if it be shown that the offence was committed within the
county. Commonivealth v. Heffron, 102 Mass. 148; Common-
wealth v. Kern, 147 Mass. 595. In framing an indictment for
such offences, which comprise by far the greater number of those
known to criminal pleading, it is unnecessary to specify the exact
locality. By the well-settled rules of criminal pleading, it is suf-
ficient to allege that the offence was committed in a town within
the county.
Some offences, it is true, are local in their nature ; but even as
to them it is usually sufficient to name the town in which they were
committed. Common nuisances and liquor nuisances are exam-
ples of this class of offences.
This being so, it is obviously impossible for the clerk, whose
duty it is to transmit fines recovered, to know the locality in which
the crime was committed. As to some, it is often impossible to
designate a particular locality, like, for example, the offence of
writing and publishing a libel. If the case is tried before the
court and the clerk happens to be present, he may learn from the
testimony the locality of the offence, but very many cases are dis-
posed of by a plea of guilty, and there is no evidence presented to
the court which would give the clerk the desired information.
I am unable to construe a law as intending an impossibility.
Upon the construction claimed for the statute in question, it is the
duty of the clerk to see that fines recovered for all violations of law
committed on the parks and boulevards under the charge of your
commission shall be designated as such, in order that they may be
paid over in accordance with its terms. This the clerks cannot
do ; much less can the Treasurer of the Commonwealth, in the
absence of information from the clerks of courts, know what fines
received by him shall be paid over to the park fund, as required
by the statute.
Moreover, the matter of the disposition of fines recovered in
criminal proceedings has been the subject of many statutes, gen-
eral and special. Formerly all fines, in the absence of any special
provisions to the contrary, were paid over to the treasurer of the
county. Pub. Sts., c. 154, § 34. Much dissatisfaction arose on
account of this provision, it being claimed by town officers that in
many cases they were required to spend the money of the town to
44 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
detect and convict criminals without receiving any reimbursement,
the fines imposed going to the county. St. 1891, c. 416, accord-
ingly, provided that fines collected in the superior court should be
paid to the treasurer of the county, while fines collected in an in-
ferior court should be paid to the city or town in which the offence
was committed. It was deemed that this somewhat arbitrary divi-
sion would fairly adjust the balance between municipalities and
the county in the matter of criminal expenses on the one hand and
receipts from criminal cases on the other.
In addition to the general provisions referred to, there are nu-
merous special statutes regulating the disposition of fines. For ex-
ample, fines imposed for cruelty to animals shall, in certain cases,
be paid to the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to Animals. Pub. Sts., c. 207, § 58. Many statutes provide for
the payment of the whole or a portion of fines recovered in certain
cases to the informant. Fines imposed for non-support of a wife
may, in the discretion of the court, be paid to the wife.
But under the construction claimed, this statute, which is en-
titled "An act to define the disposition of money received by
the Metropolitan Park Commission from rentals and from other
sources," contains in its first section a single clause repealing, in
certain cases, all the general and special provisions of law above
referred to. Clerks of courts, searching the statutes for enact-
ments relating to the performance of their duties, would scarcely
expect to find under the above title an act so important to them.
I am unable to believe that the Legislature can be deemed to have
intended to enact so important a change in existing statutes in
this indirect and obscure way.
The only way in which the statute in my opinion can be con-
strued is in accordance with its title. In terms it is entitled an
act relating to disposition of moneys received by the park com-
mission. Literally construed the section in question is limited to
fines collected or received by the commission. Its provisions must
be limited to such fines. The fact, if it be a fact, that under exist-
ing laws no fines are received by the park commission, renders the
law useless. But even this result is preferable to a construction
of its terms which would make it a statute impossible to be en-
forced.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 45
Civil Service — Permanent Service — Probationary Period — Be
Facto Official.
The retention in the civil service after his period of probation is over,
without further appointment, of a certified candidate provisionally
appointed, is not a violation of the civil service rules.
Such de facto official having been certified as fit by the Civil Service Com-
mission, the requirements of the civil service law are satisfied.
Sept. 27, 1901.
Hon. Charles Theodore Russell,
Chairman, Board oj Civil Service Commissioners.
Dear Sir : — Your letter of July 24 requests the opinion of the
Attorney-General upon the following facts : certain men were duly
nominated and confirmed as members of the regular police force of
Lawrence for the probationary period of six months. The civil
service rules were complied with in their appointment. The pro-
bationary period has expired. At the end of that period the
mayor nominated them for permanent officers, and the board of
aldermen refused confirmation. They are still holding office, per-
forming all the duties and receiving pay therefor. Upon these
facts your letter requests my opinion upon the following in-
quiries : —
First. If, at the expiration of the six months' probationary
period, a police officer is not permanently appointed, does he
cease to be such officer?
Second. Upon the above statement of facts, are these ap-
pointees now legally acting as police officers in Lawrence ?
I am of opinion that these questions do not concern your Board.
The rules have been complied with in their original appointment.
It is true that Rule 37 provides that at the end of six months the
probationer shall be absolutely appointed or employed, or other-
wise to be deemed out of the service ; but the fact that the
officers in question are continuing to act after the expiration of
the probationary period, and without absolute appointment to the
regular service, is one which concerns the city of Lawrence and
not your commission. There is no violation of the civil service
rules. They are acting as de facto officials, but, in my opinion,
such action does not transgress any rule laid down by the commis-
sion. The men serving as such de facto officers had been certified
by your Board as fit, and the requirements of the civil service law
are satisfied.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
46 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Public Weighing — Platform Weighing Machine — Sealer of Weights
and Measures — Contents of Milk Jars.
A platform weighing machine, publicly placed for the purpose of allowing
a person to ascertain his weight upon the payment of a fee, is not used
for the purposes of commercial transactions, and is not within the
provisions of Pub. Sts., c. 65, requiring weights, measures or balances
for the purpose of selling goods, wares, merchandise or other com-
modities, or for public weighing, to be adjusted and sealed.
A sealer of weights and measures of a city or town has no authority to
seal a milk bottle of a size not prescribed by St. 1901, c. 360.
Sept. 27, 1901.
Hon. Edward S.Bradford, Treasurer and Receiver- General.
Dear Sir : — Your letter of Aug. 27, 1901, requires the opinion
of the Attorney-General upon two questions, the first of which is
as follows : —
First. Do the provisions of chapter 65, Public Statutes, or acts
in amendment thereof or in addition thereto, apply in any way to
a platform weighing scale publicly placed for the purpose of allow-
ing a person to ascertain his weight, such weight being registered
automatically only upon the payment of a fee?
The provisions of Pub. Sts., c. 65, entitled u Of weights and
measures," and the acts in amendment thereof, are intended to
secure honest dealing between buyer and seller by assuring to the
purchaser the use of correct weights and measures by the seller.
The machines referred to in your question are not used for the
purposes of commercial transactions. They are, therefore, not
within its provisions, and need not be sealed. It is scarcely neces-
sary to say that the expression " public weighing," in the chapter
referred to, relates to the weighing by sworn officials appointed for
that purpose of commodities which are bought and sold.
Second. Is it lawful for a sealer of weights and measures of a
city or town to seal a milk bottle holding a greater or less amount
than the authorized variation prescribed by chapter 360, Acts of
1901?
The chapter referred to (St. 1901, c. 360) was intended to
authorize the use of glass bottles and jars of certain sizes for the
distribution of milk and cream. The sizes so authorized are those
containing quarts and divisions and multiples thereof. The statute
does not authorize the sealing of jars or bottles of any other size.
The duties of the sealer are prescribed by the statute, and he has
no authority or discretion to seal any bottles or jars except those
specified.
Very truly yours,
Hose a M. Knowlton, Attorney- General.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 47
Treasurer of the Commonwealth — Millicent Library Corpora-
tion — Investment of Fund.
St. 1S93, c. 392, providing that the Treasurer of the Commonwealth may
receive and hold in trust the sum of $100,000 for the benefit of the
Millicent Library Corporation, for the purposes of a public library in
Fairhaven, in section 3 authorizes the Treasurer to purchase long-time
securities at a price above par, using so much of the income as is
necessary to pay the premium, in order to keep intact the principal of
such fund.
Sept. 27, 1901.
Hon. Edward S. Bradford, Treasurer and Receiver- General.
Dear Sir : — By St. 1893, c. 392, the Treasurer of the Com-
monwealth was authorized to receive and hold in trust the sum of
$100,000 " for the benefit of the Millicent Library Corporation,
for the purposes of a public library in Fairhaven." Investments
of the fund are to be made under the direction of the secretary of
the Board of Education and the Treasurer, — all such investments
to be subject to the approval of the Governor and Council. The
statute became operative during the current year by the payment
of the money to the Treasurer.
Your letter of September 16 states that it is desirable that the
fund be invested in long-time securities, — the purchase of which
is only possible by the payment of a premium, — and requests the
opinion of the Attorney-General upon the question whether the
Treasurer is authorized to expend any part of the income of
the fund for the payment of a necessary premium to make possible
the reinvestment of the fund in long-time securities at a par valua-
tion. The first investment of the fund was in securities at par or
less.
Section 3 of the act quoted provides as follows : ". . . The net
income of the said fund shall be determined after deducting all
necessary and proper expenses incurred in the administration of
said fund, and after reserving such amount of the gross income as
in the opinion of said commissioners is necessary to maintain the
principal of said fund intact."
This provision, in my judgment, authorizes you to purchase
long-time securities at a price above par, using the income so far
as necessary to pay the premium, so that only the par value shall
be charged to the principal of the fund. There can be no other
intelligent interpretation of its meaning.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
48 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan.
Insurance — License as Insurance Agent — Corporation.
A corporation is not a "person" within the meaning of St. 1894, c. 522,
§ 93, cl. 2, as amended by St. 1895, c. 59, § 2, providing that, upon
payment of a fee of ten dollars, the Insurance Commissioner may
issue to any " suitable person" a license to act as insurance broker.
Oct. 3, 1901.
Hon. Frederick L. Cutting, Insurance Commissioner.
Dear Sir: — St. 1894, c. 522, § 93, cl. 2, provides as follows:
" The insurance commissioner may, upon the payment of a fee of
ten dollars, issue to any person a certificate of authority to act as
an insurance broker to negotiate contracts of insurance or re-
insurance or place risks or effect insurance or reinsurance with
any qualified domestic insurance company or its agents, and with
the authorized agents in the Commonwealth of any foreign insur-
ance company duly admitted to do business in the Common-
wealth."
By St. 1895, c. 59, § 2, the section above quoted was amended
by inserting the word "suitable", so that the commissioner was
authorized to "issue to any suitable person" a license as insur-
ance broker.
By St. 189G, c. 448, it was provided that such licenses should
be limited to the residents of the Commonwealth, or to residents
of other States who granted like certificates to. residents of this
State.
Notwithstanding the able and ingenious brief by the attorney
for the corporation, petitioning for a license as an insurance broker,
I am of opinion that under this statute the Insurance Commissioner
is not authorized to issue a license as an insurance broker to a cor
poration organized under the laws of the State of Maine doing
business in this Commonwealth. There are many expressions
throughout the insurance statutes which appear to me to show that
the Legislature intended a personal license. Among the most
conclusive is section 111, which provides that a licensed insurance
broker who does certain things " shall be deemed guilty of simple
larceny." If I understand the meaning of the word " larceny" it
is not possible for a corporation, as such, to be guilty of that crime.
Obviously, if this be so the Legislature had in mind natural per-
sons only as licensed brokers.
I have not overlooked the fact that it was held by the supreme
judicial court in Enterprise Brewing Co. v. Grimes, 173 Mass. 252,
that a corporation may be licensed to sell intoxicating liquor. The
determination of that case, however, was based chiefly upon the
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 49
provisions of the statute under which such licenses are granted,
and the reasoning of the opinion does not apply to the statute
now under consideration.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
State House — Elevators — Local Inspection.
The elevators in the State House, so long as they are in charge of officers
of the Commonwealth designated therefor by the Legislature, are not
within the provision of St. 1901, c. 439, that certain construction
work and devices therein required shall, in the city of Boston, be
approved by the building commissioner.
Nov. 16, 1901.
Maj. Charles G. Davis, Sergeant-at-Arms.
Dear Sir: — Under St. 1901, c. 439, amending St. 1894, c.
481, it is provided that all elevator cars " shall be provided with
some suitable mechanical device whereby they will be securely
held in the event of an accident to the shipper rope or hoisting
machinery, or any similar accident." The statute contains other
provisions looking to the safety of elevator passengers. It further
provides that the construction work and devices so provided for
shall be approved in the city of Boston by the building commis-
sioner.
Your letter of November 5 requires the opinion of the Attorney-
General upon the question whether this statute is applicable to the
elevators in the State House.
The State House is the property of the Commonwealth, in charge
of officers authorized thereto by the Legislature of the Common-
wealth. It is not to be presumed that police regulations of the
character in question are intended to be applicable to officers of
the Commonwealth or to the property of the Commonwealth ; nor
that the Legislature, by such enactments, intended to limit the
authority of the Commonwealth over its own property, or to pro-
vide that a local officer should supervise the doings of its own
servants. See 1 Op. Attorney-General, 290; Attorney-General's
Report, 1899, page 50.
In my opinion, the elevators in the State House, so long as they
are in charge of officers of the Commonwealth provided by the
Legislature, are not within the provisions of the statute in question.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney-General.
50 ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S REPOET. [Jan.
Citizen — Unnaturalized Resident of a City.
An unnaturalized alien, resident in a city of this Commonwealth, is not a
" citizen" thereof.
Nov. 16, 1901.
J. F. Lewis, M.D., Superintendent, State Adult Poor.
Dear Sir : — The trustees of the Dickinson Hospital of North-
ampton have voted that the free benefits of the hospital shall be
applied to those persons " who are citizens who have legal settle-
ments in the towns of Northampton, Hatfield and Whately."
A patient was admitted to the Dickinson Hospital who was of
age, a native of Ireland, who came to the United States in June,
1900, and has lived in Northampton since. Your letter of October
18 requires the opinion of the Attorney-General upon the question
whether he was within the provisions of the vote above quoted.
The person in question was not a citizen of Northampton and
had no legal settlement therein. He was not even a citizen of the
United States. A resident is not necessarily a citizen.
Very truly yours,
Hose a M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
Civil Service — Chief Superintendent — School-house Custodian
in the City of Boston.
An officer with the title of " School-house custodian," appointed by the
school committee of the city of Boston, whose duties are "the gen-
eral supervision of janitors and the care of school property, excepting
that which comes within the jurisdiction of the committee of sup-
plies," is not a chief superintendent of any department, and is there-
fore within and subject to the civil service rules.
Nov. 16, 1901.
Hon. Charles Theodore Russell,
Chairman, Civil Service Commission.
Dear Sir: — Your letter of October 26 submits the question
whether a person appointed by the school committee of the city of
Boston to the position of school-house custodian is within the civil
service rules.
It appears by a letter from the secretary of the school committee
that the duties of the officer in question are " the general super-
vision of janitors and the care of school property, excepting that
which comes within the jurisdiction of the. committee on supplies."
The authority of the school committee to choose such an officer is
found in St. 1875, c. 241, § 4, authorizing the board to choose
" such other subordinate officers as they may deem expedient, and
shall define their duties."
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 51
The officer in question is clearly within the civil service rules, —
Rule 6, Schedule B, Class 12; to wit: ''Superintendents, as-
sistant superintendents, deputies and persons other than the chief
superintendents of departments, performing any of the duties of
superintendent in the service of any city of the Commonwealth."
The officer in question is not a " chief superintendent" of any de-
partment within the construction of this rule adopted in the
opinion of the Attorney-General dated June 27, 1901, but is a
person performing some of the duties of superintendent.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
Civil Service — Provisional Appointments.
Where provisional appointments are made to fill the places of men ap-
pointed from the certified list furnished by the Civil Service Com-
mission, and immediately suspended, such appointments are illegal.
Nov. 16, 1901.
Hon. Charles Theodore Russell,
Chairman, Civil Service Commission.
Dear Sir: — Your letter of Octobers requires the opinion of
the Attorney-General upon the question whether the action of the
superintendent of streets of Boston in appointing certain p.ersons,
in April of this year, to be inspectors of paving of the city of
Boston, was legal.
The facts as stated in your letter were that after making requisi-
tion upon the commission for twenty names of persons to be ap-
pointed to the position in question, and receiving a list of twenty,
from which list it was his duty to appoint twelve, he purported to
comply with the rules of the commission by appointing the required
number, immediately suspending them and proceeding to fill the
vacancies by provisional appointments.
There can be no doubt that such action was illegal. It was a
mere device to evade the law, and the provisional appointments so
made were illegal.
Very truly yours,
Hose a M. Knowlton, Attorney-General.
Trade-mark — Filing and Recording — Identical Trade-marks.
It is the duty of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, under St. 1895, c.
462, § 1, to refuse to receive or record a label which has already been
recorded, notwithstanding the fact that the class of goods dealt in
may be wholly dissimilar to the merchandise specified in the former
application.
52 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Dec. 5, 1901.
Hon. William M. Olin, Secretary of the Commonwealth.
Dear Sir: — The expression "The Klondike" has been duly
recorded by a person carrying on business in this Commonwealth,
as a label. In his certificate he specifies as follows: "General
class, wearing apparel ; particular description, suspenders."
Since the tiling of this label, application has been made for the
recording of the same term as a label, by a person who declares
that he intends to appropriate it to overcoats.
The question submitted is whether it is your duty to receive and
file the latter application.
I am of opinion that the words of the statute are so far con-
trolling as to forbid you to receive and record a label which has
already been filed and recorded, notwithstanding the fact that
the class of goods dealt in may be wholly dissimilar to the merchan-
dise specified in the former application.
St. 1895, c. 462, § 1, as amended by St. 1899, c. 359, § 1, per-
mits the adoption of a label " not previously owned or adopted
by any other person," and the latter part of the same section pro-
vides that the Secretary shall not record any label that would
reasonably be mistaken for a label already on record. If these
provisions be literally construed, the second applicant is not
entitled to have his label recorded.
I am aware that section 1 above quoted provides that the certifi-
cate of the applicant shall specify not only his class of business,
but also " the class of merchandise and the particular description
of goods comprised in such class to which " the label has been or
is intended to be appropriated. If this provision stood alone, it
might reasonably be argued that the applicant would be entitled to
use his label exclusively only for the particular class of goods
named in the certificate.
But in view of the express provisions of the statute above quoted,
I think that the provision requiring a specification of the class of
business and the particular goods in the class must be intended as
an identification and method of proof as to the use of the label
rather than as a limitation upon the ownership of it. If, for ex-
ample, one should register a label without specifying upon what
goods he had used or intended to use it, it might be difficult to
determine whether his allegation of previous use were true. This
construction reconciles the whole section and simplifies your duties.
It follows that having ascertained that the label now claimed has
already been recorded, it is your duty to refuse to act upon the
later application. See 1 Op. Attorney-General, 100.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
1902. J PUBLIC DOCUMENT — STo. 12. 53
State Paupers — Aid Furnished by Cities and Towns — Rendering
of Bill — Notice.
The rendering to the Commonwealth of a bill for aid furnished by a city
or town to a State pauper, as required by Pub. Sts., c. 86, § 43, does
not terminate the liability of the Commonwealth to make reimburse-
ment therefor so as to require a new notice from such city or town
if the aid is thereafter continued.
Dec. 23, 1901.
J. F. Lewis, M.D., Superintendent, State Adult Poor.
Dear Sir : — St. 1898, c. 425, § 5, amending Pub. Sts., c. 84,
§ 18, provides as follows : "A city or town may furnish aid to
poor persons found therein, having no legal settlement within the
state, if the overseers of the poor deem it for the public interest ;
but except in case of sickness, not for a greater amount than two
dollars a week for each family during the months of May to Sep-
tember inclusive, or three dollars a week for the months of October
to April inclusive, and the overseers shall in every such case give
immediate notice by mail to the state board of lunacy and charity,
which board shall examine the case, and should they direct dis-
continuance, shall remove such persons to the state almshouse or
to any state or place where they belong, when the necessities of
such persons or the public interest require such removal."
This section is in harmony with the general policy of legis-
lation in Massachusetts in the matter of public aid to persons
in distressed circumstances, which aims to secure immediate
relief, leaving the question of liability to be thereaf terwards deter-
mined. It further exemplifies another well-established prin-
ciple in the pauper legislation, which is, that persons in distress
shall not be removed to public almshouses until it clearly appears
that such removal is necessary. It is the duty of municipal
authorities, both under this and under other statutes, to render aid
at once. When the person so relieved is unsettled, notice of such
aid is to be given forthwith to the Commonwealth, in order that
the charge may be properly made to the State, and the question
of removal is left to the decision of the State Board; and the
liability of the State to the municipal authorities continues under
the statute until the person is no longer in need of assistance or
until the State causes the person so relieved to be taken to one of
its almhouses.
In the case submitted by }rour letter of August 8, a poor person
was first assisted by the authorities of the town Dec. 22, 1900;
notice was forthwith given to the Commonwealth ; no removal was
ordered by the State Board, and the assistance was continued until
54 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan.
Jan. 15, 1901 ; and a bill for assistance during that time has been
rendered to the State by the town authorities.
It would be clear, but for one circumstance which will be here-
after considered, that under these circumstances due notice having
been received by the State, and no action looking to the removal
of the pauper having been taken, the State would be liable for the
entire bill. The question is raised, however, by your letter,
whether the State is liable after Dec. 31, 1900, no new notice
having been given by the town after that date.
Whatever doubts exist upon the liability of the State arise upon
the consideration of Pub. Sts., c. 86, § 43, which provides as fol-
lows : "All accounts against the commonwealth for allowance
to counties, cities and towns, on account of state paupers, shall be
rendered to the state board on or before the third Wednesday of
January annually ; and shall be so made as to include all claims
for such charges up to the first day of said January, and, if ap-
proved by the board and certified by the auditor of accounts, shall
be paid from the treasury of the commonwealth."
It is suggested that if a bill be rendered by the town, including
all charges up to December 31, in compliance with this statute,
such a bill is presumed to be the closing of the account, and, con-
sequently, the termination by the town of temporary assistance, so
that if such assistance be continued beyond that period a new
notice to the State is necessary.
I am unable to appreciate the force of this contention. It may
be conceded that under ordinary circumstances the rendering of a
bill on behalf of the municipality is by implication a notice that
the assistance by the town has terminated, so that if the town be
called upon again to furnish assistance a new notice is necessary.
But a bill rendered in obedience to the statute last quoted carries
with it no such inference. The purpose of the statute obviously is
to enable the Treasurer to make up a financial statement of the
accounts of the Commonwealth for the year, so that all outstand-
ing liabilities up to that time may be known ; and the rendering
of a bill in compliance with this statute cannot be taken to have
any further significance. It is merely a statement that up to that
date the State is indebted to the town in the amount stated, and
nothing more. If, by way of illustration, a State required bills to
be rendered monthly, it would hardly be contended that compliance
with such a statute would make it necessary that a new contract of
liability should be made after the rendering of the monthly bill.
No unexpected liability can be said to devolve upon the Com-
monwealth by the failure of the town to give a new notice after
the end of the year. After the original notice is given, the authori-
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 55
ties of the Commonwealth are presumed to be fully informed of
the circumstances of the case, and of the condition of the pauper;
and if they have determined not to remove the person assisted, it
is for the reason that they deem it expedient to allow him to re-
main in the place where he is assisted. The mere fact of a bill
being rendered because of a statute requirement to that effect does
not change the situation and cannot operate to discharge the Com-
monwealth of its responsibility for the pauper.
I am of opinion, therefore, that the Commonwealth continues
liable, notwithstanding the rendering of the bill required by Pub.
Sts., c. 86, § 43.
The same considerations apply to a case arising under what is
commonly called the Sick State Poor Law.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General.
Great Ponds — Title to Islands — Board of Harbor and Land
Commissioners.
The title to islands within the area of great ponds is, in the absence of
any grant from the Legislature, or from the freemen of a town, prior
to 1647, in the Commonwealth, and the duties of the Board of Harbor
and Land Commissioners relating to such islands are prescribed by
Revised Laws, c. 96, § 3.
Jan. 7, 1902.
Hon. Woodward Emery,
Chairman, Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners.
Dear Sir: — Your letter of October 8 states that the Board of
Harbor and Land Commissioners desires to be informed " whether
or not islands in great ponds to which no private individual has
title are property of the Commonwealth, with reference to the
possession of which this Board has a duty to perform."
The term "great pond" has been used in the statutes of the
Commonwealth from time immemorial. It originally signified an
inland body of water consisting of ten acres (Colony Ordinance of
1647) ; but this area was subsequently increased, in the case of
the public right of fishing, to twenty acres (St. 1869, c. 384, § 7).
The original grants from the king, in the case of the Colony of
Plymouth and the Colony of Massachusetts Bay as well, gave to
the colony the title to all lands within the Commonwealth, includ-
ing great ponds. This provision was also incorporated into the
charter of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, and the title to such
lands and ponds, unless previously parted with, was, both before
and after the Revolution, in the State. " These charters [the
56 ATTOKNEY-GEJSTEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan.
several charters to the colonies and the Province] vested in the
grantees not only the right of soil, but also large powers of gov-
ernment and the prerogatives of the crown in the seashores, bays,
inlets, rivers and other property which were held from the use and
benefit of all the subjects." Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River,
147 Mass. 548, 554. See also Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 9 Gray
451, 483 ; Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53.
From a very early period the law of Massachusetts has treated
great ponds as of a character closely resembling tide waters, the
enjoyment of which for fishing, fowling and other purposes was
common to all, and the title in and lands under which could not be
made the subject of private ownership without special grant from
the Legislature. Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160 ; Ancient Charters,
148, 149. See also Commonwealth v. Vincent, 108 Mass. 441 ;
West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 7 Allen 158. Thus it was provided
in the Colony Ordinance of 1641 that every inhabitant should have
free fishing and fowling in any great ponds . . . within the pre-
cincts of the town where they dwelt, unless the freemen of the
town or the general court had provided otherwise. Body of Liber-
ties, 1641. Later, it was provided that no town should appro-
priate to any person or persons any great pond containing more
than ten acres. Ordinance of 1647.
These ordinances applied to all great ponds exceeding ten acres
in area which in 1647 had not been appropriated to particular per-
sons, either by the freemen of the town or by the General Court.
West Roxbury v. Stoddard, supra. The Commonwealth therefore
owns the great ponds as public property held in trust for public
purposes. It has the ownership of the soil, including, obviously,
the soil of islands within the area of such ponds, and also the right
to control and regulate the public uses to which the ponds shall be
applied. Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River, 147 Mass. 557.
In such ponds a grant bounded by the. pond extends only to low-
water mark. Waterman v. Johnson, 13 Pick. 261, 265 ; Paine v.
Woods, 108 Mass. 160. The proprietors of land bordering upon
the ponds have no rights in the soil or in the waters, unless it be
by grant from the Legislature. Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall
River, 147 Mass. 557.
It follows that the title to lands in great ponds is, in the absence
of any grant from the Legislature or from the freemen of a town,
prior to 1647, in the Commonwealth. Being lands the title to
which is in the Commonwealth, the duties of your Board relating
to the same are prescribed by Revised Laws, c. 96, § 3.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 57
Employee of Commonwealth — Salary — Additional Compensation.
An employee of the Commonwealth, who receives a salary from the State
treasury, cannot legally receive additional compensation for work
performed during the hours of employment for which such salary is
paid.
Jan. 7, 1902.
Rufus K. Wade, Esq., Chief of Massachusetts District Police.
Dear Sir : — The opinion of the Attorney-General is desired
upon the following state of facts : A clerk in the boiler inspection
department of your office receives a salary of $600 a year from the
State treasury, ' ' said sum to be paid out of the proceeds of the
fees received from examinations of applicants for licenses as engi-
neers and for inspection of boilers," St. 1898, c. 219. She has
also been employed by you for clerical work in connection with the
sale of forfeited liquors, for which she receives compensation at
the rate of $33 per month. This work is done during the regular
hours of business, that is to say, during the time for which she is
supposed to be compensated by the salary of $600 a year. The
question submitted is, whether she may lawfully be so employed.
I am not troubled by the provision in the Revised Laws, c. 18,
§ 11, that " a person shall not at the same time receive more than
one salary from the treasury of the Commonwealth." The un-
doubted intention of that statute was to prevent a person from
being employed in two positions at the same time, receiving
salary from each one. It does not prevent the payment of com-
pensation for extra services not rendered during the usual hours of
employment in the position for which the person is employed. It
has been the immemorial practice in the State House to permit the
employment of those receiving salaries, during extra hours and for
extra compensation. This, of course, would not apply to general
State officers, but only to clerks whose contract ordinarily is for
services during regular office hours. Moreover, although the com-
pensation paid in this case is deducted from the amount eventually
paid into the State treasury, the compensation paid to the clerk in
question is not paid " from the treasury of the Commonwealth,"
as provided in the statute.
But, upon another ground, I am of opinion that the employment
is unauthorized. The salary paid is for certain hours of work
each business day. Revised Laws, c. 6, § 58, provides that " sal-
aries payable from the treasury shall, unless otherwise provided, be
paid on the first day of each month, and shall be in full for all ser-
vices rendered to the Commonwealth by the persons to whom they
are paid." This section is to be construed as meaning that the
58 ATTOKNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
salary shall be in full for all the services rendered in the position
for which the person receiving the salary is employed, and does
not prohibit paying compensation for extra services having no
connection with the duties of that position. It is, however, incon-
sistent with the employment of a person in two capacities during
the time when the person so employed is presumed to be engaged
in the discharge of the duties of the office for which the salary
was paid.
For this reason I am of opinion that the person in question
cannot be paid for services rendered during the time for which she
is employed under the salary payable from the State treasury.
Very truly yours,
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General.
Gas Company — New England Gas and Coke Company — Unin-
corporated Association — Manufacture of Gas — Returns to
Gas and Electric Light Commissioners.
The New England Gas and Coke Company, an unincorporated association
of individuals, engaged in the manufacture and sale of gas to certain
corporations for the purpose of sale and distribution to the public by
the latter, is not itself engaged in the business of the sale and dis-
tribution of gas to consumers, and therefore is not subject to the
jurisdiction of the Gas and Electric Light Commissioners in the matter
of the returns prescribed by Revised Laws, c. 121.
Jax. 7, 1902.
Hon. Forrest E. Barker,
Chairman, Gas and Electric Light Commissioners.
Dear Sir : — In a letter to you dated Jan. 26, 1899, I had the
honor to advise your Board that in my opinion it had no jurisdic-
tion to require the New England Gas and Coke Company to make
the annual returns to the Board required by the statutes of gas
companies, or to furnish information touching the condition,
management and operation of the company. This opinion was
based upon the facts then submitted by your Board, to wit, that
the company in question was not a corporation, but only an asso-
ciation of individuals, and that it was not then engaged in the
manufacture of gas.
It now appears, however, that the company has installed a plant,
and is engaged, and during the past year has been engaged, in the
manufacture and sale of gas ; but it further appears that its entire
product is sold and delivered on its premises to the Massachusetts
Pipe Line Company, which in turn sells and delivers the gas so re-
ceived to companies in the city of Boston engaged in the sale and
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 59
distribution of gas to consumers. The opinion of the Attorney-
General is required, upon this state of facts, as to the liability of
the company under the provisions of the statutes relating to gas
and electric light companies, Revised Laws, c. 121. Certain of
the provisions of that chapter are by section 41 made applicable to
" all persons owning or operating works for the manufacture and
sale of gas for heating or illuminating purposes within the Com-
monwealth." Although the business of the company in question
is to not sell its product directly for .heating or illuminating pur-
poses, but to a corporation for the purpose of sale and distribution
by that corporation for those purposes, and is therefore not strictly
within the terms of section 41, yet, for the purposes of this
opinion, I assume that the language of the section is broad enough
to include the individuals composing the company in question.
They are an association of individuals not forming a corporation,
engaged in the manufacture and sale of gas intended to be used for
heating or illuminating purposes ; and, if the statute is to be taken
literally, they are bound to make returns to your Board, to permit
inspection of their books, to furnish information as to the conduct
of their business, and are subject to the orders of the Board as to
the quality of gas furnished by them and as to the price to be
charged by them therefor.
Upon the facts submitted, however, I am of opinion that they
are not within the scope of the statutes. I am led to this conclu-
sion by a consideration of the purpose and justification of the stat-
utes of the Commonwealth relating to the subject.
I do not deem it necessary to rest the justification for the regu-
lations exercised by your Board over gas companies upon the
proposition that they derive their authority from the Common-
wealth, and are therefore under its control as to the conduct of
their business. Speaking for myself, I see no reason why a corpo-
ration, whose charter is expressly made subject to all provisions of
general laws, does not thereby contract that it will be governed by
such provisions, at whatever cost to itself. I am aware, however,
that the weight of authority is that regulation by the State must
stop short of anything approaching that which may result in partial
or total confiscation of its property, even though such confiscation
be, by implication/ within the powers conferred by the statutes to
which, under its charter, it is made subject.
But there is another principle of law which amply sustains the
authority of the Legislature to make the regulations contained in
the statutes relating to gas and electric light corporations. Under
our frame of free'government, the Legislature has rarely attempted
to regulate or in any way to interfere with the business of the
60 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
individual, or to restrain or in any way to regulate the conduct of
bis affairs. This principle extends in general to corporations
which have no special relations with the public. But there is a
class of corporations, sometimes termed " quasi-public," but which
are more accurately termed "public-service" corporations, as to
which the Legislature has undertaken to regulate their business, so
far as such business relates to the public. Among these are cor-
porations operating steam or electric railways, those engaged in
telegraph or telephone business, and corporations carrying on the
business of selling and distributing gas and electricity for heating
and illuminating purposes. It is not accurate to say of such that
they serve the public. In a general way a grocer may be said to
serve the public, because he sells to all who come to his store.
But he may discriminate, and may refuse to sell only to such as
he chooses. The public-service corporations, on the contrary, un-
dertake to serve all members of the community who have occasion
to avail themselves thereof. In this respect they are analogous
to innkeepers and common carriers, whose business from time
immemorial has been subject to statutory regulation.
But the relations of public-service corporations to the public are
closer even than those of common carriers and innkeepers, for the
reason that the former enjoy franchises in public ways which could
not lawfully be granted to private individuals, or have the right
to take land of private individuals by condemnation proceedings
for the purposes of their business. By reason of these rights they
enjoy a practical monopoly, either in fact or by law, of the business
in which they are engaged. In consideration of these rights, they
must undertake to serve the public indiscriminately.
I am aware that in the case of Commonwealth v. Lowell Gas
Light Company, 12 Allen, 75, there is a dictum of Chief Justice
Bigelow, as follows : " They (gas companies) are not bound to sell
and dispose of it (their product) to any one either for public or pri-
vate use or consumption." This statement, however, has not been
followed in later decisions, and in the case of Evans v. Boston
Heating Company, 157 Mass. 37, and in the Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 155 Mass. 598, the soundness of this dictum is by implica-
tion questioned ; and it may be doubted whether, if the question
were presented directly, the court would not now hold that a gas
company in the enjoyment of public rights could not refuse to sell
its product to any member of the community complying with its
reasonable regulations. But, however that may be, all doubts as
to the duties of gas companies are settled by the statutes. Revised
Laws, c. 121, gives such companies, by section 26, a practical
monopoly of the streets occupied by them for the purposes of their
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 61
business ; and section 33 authorizes your Board to compel them
to furnish their product to any person or corporation applying
therefor.
Being thus in the service of the public, and in the eDJoyment of
a legal or actual monopoly, there can be no doubt of the right of
the Legislature to enact regulations for the protection of the cus-
tomer. There are many such regulations. Among other things,
your Board may prescribe how their books and accounts shall be
kept (section 29) ; it may require a gas company to supply its
product to a resident of the city within which it is located (section
33) ; it may make such regulations as it deems proper with relation
to the quality or price of gas furnished (section 34) and every gas
company must furnish to the Board a sworn statement, with such
details as the Board may require, of its indebtedness and financial
condition, the amount of its dividends, the names of its salaried
officers and the amount of salary paid to each (section 31). It
may also at any time investigate the affairs of a gas company,
examine its books and inquire into the conduct of its business.
Such regulations would be intolerable as applied to a private indi-
vidual carrying on business not connected with the public, but they
are amply justified upon the considerations stated.
For the same reasons, individuals who enjoy public rights and
undertake to carry on the business of selling and distributing to
consumers are properly made subject to the same regulations.
But when there is no possible relation between the gas manu-
facturer and the public, the justification for the regulation so
imposed is entirely wanting. Whether it was the purpose of the
Legislature to make the regulations imposed applicable to all in-
corporated gas companies, whether actually engaged in the busi-
ness of manufacturing and selling gas, it is unnecessary to
determine. But it is not to be presumed, unless the intention be
clearly expressed, that it was the purpose of the Legislature to
impose upon an individual enjoying no public rights, and having
no relations with the public, a supervision so extraordinary and
minute. The company in question has no rights in public high-
ways ; it makes no contracts and fixes no price with consumers.
There is no more occasion for supervision of their doings, in my
judgment, than there would be in supervising the condition and
operation of a coal company which supplies to a gas company the
material for producing its gas. The purposes for the enactment
of the statute entirely fail, and, while there is no express excep-
tion, it is, nevertheless, in my opinion, a reasonable construction
of the law to hold that it was not intended to cover a case like the
present.
62 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S EEPORT. [Jan.
It may be contended that this construction of the law operates
to prevent your Board from ascertaining the cost of the gas fur-
nished to the citizens of Boston by the companies distributing it.
Even if this objection were well taken, it is one which is to be
dealt with by the Legislature. But I see no such difficulty. It is
to be presumed that the commission is able to ascertain, either
upon its own knowledge or by the evidence of suitable experts,
what the gas furnished by the Boston companies ought to cost,
and to regulate the price accordingly. If the gas company has
made an improvident bargain with the New England Gas and Coke
Company, that is a matter which does not concern your Board,
and they must suffer the loss if the reasonable price of gas be fixed
by the Board at such a rate as makes it a losing contract. In
other words, if they are incorporated for the purpose of manufac-
turing gas, they must sell gas at what it ought to cost them to
manufacture it, plus a reasonable profit. If they see fit to employ
another person or association of persons to make their gas for
them, your duty is not altered thereby. It is not to investigate
the business of the contractor, but to regulate the price of the gas
supplied by the distributing company, regardless of their private
contract with the manufacturer.
I am of opinion, therefore, that the association of individuals
known as the New England Gas and Coke Company, not being
engaged in the business of the sale and distribution of gas to con-
sumers, is not subject to the jurisdiction of your Board.
Very truly yours,
Hose a M. Knowlton, Attorney-General.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 63
Opinions upon Applications for Leave to file
Informations in the Name of the
Attorney- General.
Attorney- General v. Selectmen of Holliston.
Member of Political Party — Caucus — Registrar of Voters.
A member of one of the principal political parties does not sever his con-
nection therewith by participating in a caucus of another party and
voting for certain candidates therein nominated, and his appoint-
ment to represent such party as registrar of voters is not illegal.
Nov. 16, 1901.
This was an application to the Attorney-General to file a peti-
tion for a writ of mandamus against Eugene A. York, a member
of the board of registrars of Holliston, who was appointed by the
selectmen as a Democrat under the provisions of St. 1898, c. 548.
Two others of the four members of the board were conceded to be
Republicans. The petition claimed that said P^ugene A. York is,
and, at the time of his appointment was, a Republican, and that
there being two other Republicans upon the board previously ap-
pointed, it was and is the dut}7 of the selectmen to remove him.
The petition was promoted by members of the Democratic town
committee. They had previously petitioned the selectmen to re-
move said registrar, and the petition had been refused by the
selectmen after a hearing.
The facts as they appeared at the hearing were practically not
in dispute. Eugene A. York, the registrar in question, had been
a Democrat in regular standing for many years as far back as
the time of the civil war, and had continuously voted the Demo-
cratic ticket, and taken part in the work of the party, up to the
fall of 1900. He was a member of the Democratic town committee
of Holliston for the three years ending in 1897.
In the fall of 1900 he was present at and participated in a
Republican caucus held in Holliston for the nomination of candi-
dates for the State ticket. His purpose was to secure the nomina-
tion of a friend of his who was a candidate for nomination upon
the Republican ticket. The person he voted for was nominated,
and York voted for the candidate so nominated at the State elec-
64 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan.
tion. Otherwise he voted the Democratic ticket. In the spring
of 1901, at a Republican caucus held for the nomination of candi-
dates for town offices, he again participated, and for a similar
purpose. He declared at the hearing, however, and the statement
was not challenged, that it was his purpose to vote at the coming
election for all the candidates of the Democratic party upon the
State ticket.
St. 1898, c. 548, § 91, provides that no person having voted in
the caucus of one political party shall be entitled to vote or take
part in the caucus of another political party within the ensuing
twelve months. The position of the petitioner is that under the
provisions of this statute York is estopped from claiming to be a
Democrat. But I am unable to construe the provisions relied
upon so narrowly. The purpose of the statute, in my opinion, is
to prevent one person from participating in the caucuses of two
political parties, and the consequent opportunities for fraud and
confusion which might result therefrom. It is not intended to
define conclusively the political status of the voter.
The statute relating to the appointment of registrars intends
that they shall be composed of men of different political parties.
It is well known that oftentimes a member of a political party may
disagree with some of its principles and may refuse to vote for
some of its candidates. The history of the Democratic party dur-
ing the last four years is a sufficient illustration of this proposition.
A man does not necessarily cease to be a Republican because he
votes occasionally for a Democratic candidate or because he is
unable to subscribe to some particular plank in the platform of his
party. If, on the whole, he allies himself continuously with one
of the principal political parties, he is, in my judgment, to be
deemed a member of that party within the meaning of the statute
under consideration. Jaquith v. Wellesley, 171 Mass. 138. In
this case the registrar complained of acted irregularly in voting in
a Republican caucus ; but while it may be true that an appoint-
ment might and perhaps should have been made of a man more in
sympathy with his party associates, I see no reason to suppose
that the courts would declare the appointment illegal. I therefore
decline to sign the petition.
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General.
Charles J. Flagg, for petitioner.
Joseph Dexter, for respondents.
1902.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — STo. 12. 65
Attorney-General v. Stoughton & Randolph Street Rail-
way Company.
Information — Attorney- General — Forfeiture of Charter — Wrong
to Public.
The Attorney-General will not sign an information in equity for the for-
feiture of the charter of a street railway corporation where the alleged
illegalities are slight and technical in their nature, and the public
suffers no substantial wrong therefrom.
Jan. 6, 1902.
This was an application to the Attorney-General for the filing
of a bill in equity by him against the Stoughton & Randolph
Street Railway Company for the forfeiture of its charter, and to
restrain it from occupying the highways of said towns with its
rails and cars.
It appeared at the hearing that the company in question was
organized under general laws, on the eighteenth day of July, 1899,
and a location was granted to it by the municipal authorities.
Under the provisions of the statutes of the Commonwealth the
corporate powers of a street railway company cease unless, within
eighteen months from the date of its certificate of establishment, it
has built and put in operation some portion of its road. (R. L.
c. 112, § 28.) This limitation expired Jan. 18, 1901. By St.
1901, c. 144, this time was extended to the first day of August,
1901. On the latter date a portion of its tracks had been laid, and
a car drawn by horses had made trips over the portion of the road
so constructed. It was not pretended that such trips were made
for the accommodation of the public. Indeed, it was conceded at
the hearing that whatever was done in the way of operating cars
prior to Aug. 1, 1901, the last date of limitation, was done by the
company not for the purpose of serving the public, but solely for
the purpose of saving its corporate rights ; and, if I deemed it
necessary to find whether there had been any substantial com-
pliance with the provisions of the statute, I should be constrained
to find against the company.
It further appeared that on the eleventh day of August, 1900,
the selectmen declared that the location of the road was forfeited
by its failure to comply with the conditions of the location. It
was not disputed that certain of the conditions set forth in the
location had not been complied with in form or in substance ; but
it appeared that subsequently the selectmen attempted to revive
the location and to waive the non-performance of the conditions of
the original location, without further notice, hearing or adjudica-
tion, as provided by the statutes in the case of original locations.
6Q ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 1902.
Upon these facts the petitioners contended, first, that its charter
was forfeited ; and, second, that its present location was void,
and that it had no right upon the streets.
I do not deem it necessary to pass upon the many and interest-
ing questions of law raised by the counsel for the petitioners upon
these facts, for, in my opinion, I am not called upon to exercise
the discretion vested in the Attorney-General in cases of this
character in favor of the petitioners. It appears that, in so far
as they had a right, the selectmen have waived all non-perform-
ance of conditions which had invalidated the location of the com-
pany, and have imposed certain new conditions, which have been
accepted, and are content with the situation. In pursuance of
its agreements with the selectmen of the several towns, it has
completed the construction of its tracks, to the satisfaction of the
Railroad Commissioners, and for some time the company has been
operating its road regularly with electric cars, and in a manner
to accommodate the travelling public.
Upon these facts, and in the absence of any complaint from the
town authorities, or even from the abutters (if it be conceded that
they have any ground of complaint to this office), I am of opinion
that the signing of this information would not accomplish any
useful public purpose. It is true that in many cases proceedings
may be properly instituted against individuals and corporations
who are doing acts prejudicial to the rights of the public, even
though the proceedings be asked for by persons who have private
interests only to subserve. But in this case no substantial wrong
is being done to the public. The road is being operated for the
accommodation of travellers substantially upon the location
granted by the selectmen, and in accordance with the purpose of
its original charter. Whether it is technically in the legal exercise
of its privileges is not a question which, in my opinion, the
Attorney-General is called upon to submit to the consideration of
the courts.
The application is therefore refused.
Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General.
Harvey H. Pratt, for the petitioners.
A. J. Self ridge, for the respondent.
LIST OF CASES
IN WHICH THE
Attorney- General
HAS APPEARED
During the Year 1901.
INFORMATIONS.
1. At the Relation of the Treasurer and Receiver-General.
(a) For the non-payment of corporation taxes for the year
1900, informations were brought against the —
Adams Print Works. Enjoined.
Agawam Ice Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
American Bell Telephone Company. Pending.
American Cultivator Publishing Company. Tax paid and infor-
mation dismissed.
Austin Furniture Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
B. L. Briggs Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
Bay State Chair Company, Incorporated. Tax paid and informa-
tion dismissed.
Bay State Mercantile Company. Enjoined.
Bay State Metal Works. Tax paid and information dismissed.
Beach and Clarridge Company. Tax paid and information dis-
missed.
Boston Paving Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
Boston Traveller Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
Cape Ann Granite Railroad Company. Enjoined.
Charles A. White Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
Chelsea Express Despatch Company. Tax paid and information
dismissed.
Childs & Kent Express Company. Tax paid and information
dismissed.
Cobb-Eastman Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
Columbia Engraving Company. Tax paid and information dis-
missed.
Consolidation Steamboat Company. Tax abated and information
dismissed.
Craig and Craig Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
Cunningham Engineering Company. Tax abated and information
dismissed.
Cunningham Lumber Company. Tax paid and information dis-
missed.
ii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Damon Brick Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
Dudley Feed and Mills Company. Tax paid and information dis-
missed.
E. H. Saxton Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
Eastern Printing and Engraving Company. Tax paid and infor-
mation dismissed.
Easton Street Railway Company. Tax paid and information dis-
missed.
Essex Paper Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
Floyd Rounds & Co., Corporation. Enjoined.
Franklin Educational Company. Tax paid and information dis-
missed.
Garratt-Ford Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
George H. Corbett Company. In bankruptcy. Tax paid.
George P. Staples & Co., Incorporated. Tax paid and informa-
tion dismissed.
Henry C. King Company. In bankruptcy. Tax paid.
Hub Express Company. Enjoined.
International Copper Syndicate Company. Enjoined.
Interstate Law Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
Iowa Light, Heat and Power Company. Tax paid and informa-
tion dismissed.
J. E. Peckham Manufacturing Company. Tax paid and informa-
tion dismissed.
J. P. & W. H. Emond, Incorporated. Tax paid and information
dismissed.
John D. Mack Machine Company. Enjoined.
Kearns & Co., Incorporated. Tax paid and information dis-
missed.
Kelly Shoe Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
Kimball Brothers Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
L. C. Richardson Company. Enjoined.
Lang & Jacobs Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
Martha's Vineyard Electric Light and Power Company. Tax paid
and information dismissed.
Massachusetts Investment Company. Tax paid and information
dismissed.
McLean Shoe Company. Tax abated.
Medway Electric Light and Power Company. Tax paid and
information dismissed.
Metropolitan Bolt Company. Tax paid and information dis-
missed.
New England Motor Company. Tax paid and information dis-
missed.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. iii
Norfolk Western Street Railway Company. Tax paid and infor-
mation dismissed. •
Noxon Manufacturing Company. Enjoined.
Olympic Amusement Company. Tax paid and information dis-
missed.
R. H. Long Shoe Manufacturing Company. Tax paid and in-
formation dismissed.
Re-New Lamp Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
Reycroft Pharmacy Company. Pending.
Rolf Provision and Grocery Company. Tax paid and information
dismissed.
Seymour-Knapp-Warren Company. Tax paid and information
dismissed.
Springfield Elevator and Pump Company. Tax paid and informa-
tion dismissed.
T. F. Little Oil Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
Thomas F. Phillips Company. Tax paid and information dis-
missed.
W. E. Rice Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
Wachusett Mills. Tax paid and information dismissed.
Walnut Publishing Company. Unable to get service.
Ware Street Railway Company. Unable to get service.
Weymouth & Braintree Publishing Company. Tax paid and in-
formation dismissed.
Weymouth Seam Face Granite Company. Tax paid and informa-
tion dismissed.
Woburn Light, Heat and Power Company. Tax paid and informa-
tion dismissed.
Woodward & Brown Piano Company. Tax paid and information
dismissed.
Ziegler Electric Company. Tax paid and information dismissed.
(b) For failure to file the tax return for the year 1901, re-
quired by section 38 of chapter 13 of the Public Statutes, informa-
tions were brought against the —
Argus Advertising Agency. Enjoined.
Atlantic Telegraph Company of Massachusetts. Return filed and
information dismissed.
Biddle & Smart Company, The. Return filed and information dis-
missed.
Boston Woods Motor Vehicle Company, The. Return filed and
information dismissed.
Bowler Gridley Company. Enjoined.
iv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Brightwood Brick Company. Return filed and information dis-
missed.
Burrell Manufacturing Company. Enjoined.
C. H. Black Company. Unable to get service.
Campbell Brothers Company. Return filed and information dis-
missed.
Church Publication Company. Unable to get service.
Composite Brake Shoe Company. Return filed and information
dismissed.
Connecticut Steam Stone Company. Return filed and information
dismissed.
Damon Safe and Iron Works Company. Return filed and informa-
tion dismissed.
De Cee Company. Enjoined.
De Silva Morine Company. Return filed and information dis-
missed.
Edward L. Smith Company. Return filed and information dis-
missed.
Gilman Snow Guard Company. Return filed and information dis-
missed.
Hero Cough Syrup Company. Enjoined.
Hoxie Mineral Soap Company. Unable to get service.
J. E. Peckham Manufacturing Company, The. Enjoined.
Junction Foundry Company. Return filed and information dis-
missed.
Lakeside Manufacturing Company. Return filed and information
dismissed.
Marshall Engine Company. Return filed and information dis-
missed.
Morning Mail Corporation. In bankruptcy.
Newton Machine Company. In bankruptcy.
Nonantum Company. In bankruptcy.
Norfolk Electric Light and Power Company. Return filed and in-
formation dismissed.
Nute-Hallett Company, Incorporated. Return filed and informa-
tion dismissed.
Oak Grove Creamery Company. Return filed and information
dismissed.
Olympic Amusement Company. Return filed and information dis-
missed.
Phillipston Street Railway Company. Return filed and informa-
tion dismissed.
Prospect Worsted Mills. In bankruptcy.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. v
Quinsiganiond Co-operative Baking Company. Return filed and
information dismissed.
Salem Telephone Company. Enjoined.
Sandy Bay Pier Company. Return filed and information dis-
missed.
Second Regiment Band, The. Return filed and information dis-
missed.
Sphinx, Company, The. Enjoined.
Standard Horse Shoe Company. Return filed and information
dismissed.
Thompson Milling Company. Enjoined.
Union Co-operative Coal Company. Enjoined.
Westfield Manufacturing Company. Return filed and information
dismissed.
William T. Gould Company. In bankruptcy.
Woodward & Brown Piano Company. Enjoined.
Worcester Textile Company. Return filed and information dis-
missed.
2. At the Relation of the Commissioner of Corporations.
For failure to file the certificate of condition required b}* section
54 of chapter 106 of the Public Statutes —
A. F. Towle & Son Company. Certificate filed and information
dismissed.
Block Plant Electric Light Company. Certificate filed and infor-
mation dismissed.
Boston Woods Motor Vehicle Company. Enjoined.
Burrell Manufacturing Company. Enjoined.
Cambridge Co-operative Society. Enjoined.
De Cee Company. Enjoined on tax return suit.
Franklin Educational Company. Certificate filed and information
dismissed.
Lawrence Supply Company. Enjoined.
Massachusetts Investment Company. Certificate filed and infor-
mation dismissed.
Morning Mail Corporation. Certificate filed and information dis-
missed.
New England Rubber Company. Certificate filed and information
dismissed.
Nonantum Company. In bankruptcy.
Old Colony Boot and Shoe Company. Certificate filed and infor-
mation dismissed.
vi ATTOKNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOKT [Jan.
Pittsfield Manufacturing Company. Certificate filed and informa-
• tion dismissed.
Prospect Worsted Mills. In bankruptcy.
Sutton Cranberry Company. Pending.
Thompson Milling Company. Enjoined on tax return suit.
University City Laundering Company, The. Certificate filed and
information dismissed.
Uxbridge Cotton Mills. Certificate filed and information dis-
missed.
Venezia Fire Proofing Company. Enjoined.
Watertown Machine Company. Certificate filed and information
dismissed.
3. 'At the Relation of the Civil Service Commissioners.
Saunders, Robert V., Attorney-General v. Petition for quo war-
ranto to try the title of the respondent to the office of super-
intendent of the city farm of Lowell. Pending.
Trehy, John W., Attorney-General ex rel. Board of Civil Service
Commissioners v. Information in the nature of quo ivarranto
to try the respondent's title to the office of almoner of the
city of Chicopee. Reserved for the Supreme Judicial Court.
Judgment of ouster. See 178 Mass. 186.
4. At the Relation of Private Persons.
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Vineyard Grove Company. Petition
for use of name in an information for an injunction restrain-
ing the said company from an alleged interference with the
rights of the public in a sea beach, and ordering the removal
of structures causing such alleged interference. Hearing.
Use of name granted. Henry S. Dewey appointed master.
Pending.
Attorney-General v. Onset Bay Grove Association. Information
in the nature of quo warranto to abate a public nuisance.
Use of name granted. Referred to Warren A. Reed, auditor.
Pending.
Attorney-General ex rel. Samuel E. Hull et als., Selectmen of
Millbury, v. Washburn & Moen Manufacturing Company.
Information in the nature of quo warranto to abate a nuisance.
Hearing. Use of name granted. Pending.
Attorney-General v. Levi E. Flint. Petition for quo warranto to
abate a public nuisance, caused by damming up the outlet
of a pond, thereby overflowing the highway. Application
pending.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. vii
GRADE CROSSINGS.
Notices have been served upon this department of the filing of
the following petitions for the appointment of special commission-
ers, under St. 1890, c. 428, relating to the abolition of grade
crossings : —
Barnstable County,
Bourne, Selectmen of, petitioners. Commissioners appointed.
Pending.
Harwich. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company,
petitioner. Pending.
Harwich, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending.
Wellfleet and Eastham, Directors of Old Colony Railroad Company,
petitioners. Petition for alterations and abolition of certain
grade crossings in Wellfleet and Eastham. Commissioners
appointed. Pending.
Berkshire County. ,
Hinsdale, Selectmen of, and Directors of Boston & Albany Rail-
road Company, petitioners. Petition for alteration of Bul-
lard's, Church Street and Pierce's grade crossings in Hinsdale.
Thomas W. Kenefick, William Sullivan and C. M. Ludden
appointed commissioners. Pending.
Pittsfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for
alteration of Holmes road crossing in Pittsfield. Pend-
ing.
Pittsfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, and Directors of Boston &
Albany Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for the
abolition of Hubbard and Gates avenues and Jason Street in
Pittsfield. Pending.
Richmond, Town of, and West Stockbridge, Town of, joint peti-
tioners. Crossings over Boston & Albany Railroad. Pend-
ing.
West Stockbridge. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hart-
ford Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for the aboli-
tion of grade crossings over the West Stockbridge Railroad
Corporation in West Stockbridge. Pending.
viii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
West Stockbridge. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad, peti-
tioners. Commissioners appointed. Pending.
West Stockbridge. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hart-
ford Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for the abolition
of "Potters Crossing," alias u Tymesons Crossing," in West
Stockbridge. Pending.
Williamstown, Town of, petitioner. Crossings over Fitchburg
Railroad. Commissioners appointed. Pending.
Bristol County.
Attleborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the aboli-
tion of crossings at Deanville, North Main, Bank, etc., streets.
Pending.
Attleborough. Directors of Old Colony Railroad Company, peti-
tioners. Commissioners appointed. Pending.
Dighton. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, peti-
tioner. Pending.
Dighton. Directors of New York, New Haven and Hartford
Railroad, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of cross-
ings at Railroad and Main streets. Discontinued by agree-
ment.
Easton. Directors of New York, New Haven and Hartford Rail-
road Company, petitioners. Pending.
Fall River, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Two petitions
consolidated. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
Company. Pending.
New Bedford, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Old Colony
Railroad and New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.
Pending.
Norton. Directors of Old Colony Railroad Company, petitioners.
Petition for abolition of grade crossing in Norton, near Norton
Furnace Station. Pending.
Somerset. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, peti-
tioner. Pending.
Taunton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the
abolition of grade crossings across Dean, Winter, West,
Britannia and Freemont streets, and Crane Avenue in Taun-
ton. Pending.
Taunton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Old Colony Rail-
road. Pending.
Taunton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the
abolition of Chase crossing on Middleborough and Rich-
mond streets. (This petition consolidated with the two pre-
ceding petitions.)
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. ix
Essex County.
Beverly. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad Company, peti-
tioners. Pending.
Haverhill, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the
abolition of Washington, Essex and Winter streets crossings
in Haverhill. Pending.
Ipswich. Boston & Maine Railroad Company, petitioners.
Pending.
Lynn, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli-
tion of Summer and Western avenues, etc., on Saugus
branch, and Market and other streets on main line, in Lynn.
Pending.
Manchester. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad Company,
petitioners. Pending.
Salisbury. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad Company,
petitioners. Petition for abolition of Hoks and Gerrish cross-
ing. Pending.
Swampscott, Selectmen of, petitioners. Commissioners appointed.
Hearing. Report partially confirmed. Pending.
Franklin County.
Greenfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
Allen Street crossing in Greenfield. Pending.
Greenfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of
Russell Street crossing in Greenfield. Pending.
Montague, Selectmen of, petitioners. Central Vermont Rail-
road Company and Fitchburg Railroad Company. Pend-
ing.
Northfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of
a grade crossing over the Connecticut River Railroad and
Central Vermont Railroad at River Street. Pending.
Hampden County.
Chester, Selectmen of, and Directors of Boston & Albany Rail-
road, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of the Huntington
Street and White Chop crossings in Chester. Commissioners
appointed. Pending.
Chester, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
"Huntington Road." Commissioners appointed. Pending.
Chicopee, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Crossings over
Connecticut River Railroad. Commissioners appointed.
Pending.
x ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Chicopee, Mayor and Aldermen of , .petitioners. Petition for the
abolition of grade crossings over the Connecticut River Rail-
road. Pending.
East Longmeadow, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the
abolition of Robeson's crossing in East Longmeadow. Pend-
ing.
East Longmeadow, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending.
Monson. Boston & Albany Railroad Company, petitioner. Hast-
ings', Butler's, Moran's and Silver Street crossings. Hearing.
Decree as to first and the last two crossings. Disagreement
as to second. Recommitted. Pending.
Palmer. Blanchard's, Tenney's and Breckenridge's crossings.
Boston & Albany Railroad Company, petitioners. Pending.
Palmer, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending.
Palmer, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of
Burley's crossing in Palmer. Pending.
Palmer. Boston & Albany Railroad Company, petitioners.
Cooley's crossing. Pending.
Palmer, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
Springfield road crossing in Palmer. Pending.
Springfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Bay Street,
Boston Road, Wilbraham Road, Alden and Hickory streets,
crossing the New York & New England Railroad. Commis-
sioners appointed. Pending.
Springfield. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company,
petitioners. Pasco Road. Pending.
Springfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Armory Street.
Pending.
Springfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Pasco Road.
Pending.
Springfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for
alteration of grade crossing on street leading from South
Street to South End bridge. Pending.
West Springfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Baldwin and Cold
Spring streets. Hearings. Report of commissioners filed.
Pending.
Westfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. North Elm Street. Pend-
ing.
Westfield. Boston & Albany Railroad Company, petitioner,
Cob win and Morse's crossing. Commissioners appointed.
Pending.
Westfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending.
Westfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for raising of Elm
Street bridge in Westfield. Pending.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xi
Westfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for tbe raising of
North Elm Street bridge. Pending.
(North) Wilbraham. Depot. Boston & Albany Railroad Com-
pany, petitioners. Pending.
Hampshire County.
Belchertown, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the alteration
of the " Holyoke Road" crossing in Belchertown. George
W. Wiggin, E. K. Turner and Fred D. Stanley appointed
commissioners. Pending.
Hatfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Connecticut River Railroad
Company and Boston & Maine Railroad Company. Pending.
Northampton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for
alteration of Laurel Park station grade crossing in Northamp-
ton. George W. Wiggin, E. K. Turner and Fred D. Stanley
appointed commissioners. Pending.
Northampton and Easthampton. Directors of Connecticut River
Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for alteration of
East Street and Lyman's crossings in Northampton and
Easthampton. George W. Wiggin, E. K. Turner and Fred
D. Stanley, commissioners. Pending.
Northampton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for
the alteration of crossings on Grove and Earle streets.
Pending.
Ware, Selectmen of, petitioners. Commissioners appointed.
Pending.
Ware, Selectmen of, petitioners. Commissioners appointed.
Pending.
Middlesex County.
Acton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of
crossing known as " Great Road." Pending.
Arlington. Selectmen of the town of Arlington, petitioners.
Pending.
Ashland. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company,
petitioners. Commissioners appointed. Pending.
Ayer, Selectmen of, and Directors of Fitchburg Railroad Com-
pany, petitioners. Pending.
Bedford, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of
the Concord road crossing in Bedford. Fred D. Stanley. H.
R. Coffin and Edmund K. Turner, commissioners. Pending.
Cambridge. Boston & Lowell Railroad Company, by its lessee
the Boston & Maine Railroad Company, petitioner. Pending.
Chelmsford, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition
of Princeton Street in Chelmsford. Pending.
xii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Concord, Selectmen of, and Directors of the Fitchburg Railroad
Company, petitioners. Pending.
Everett. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad Company, peti-
tioners. Petition for abolition of Broadway & Main Street
crossings in Everett. Pending.
Lexington, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
Grant Street crossing in Lexington. Pending.
Lincoln. Fitchburg Railroad Company, petitioner. Pending.
Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Pawtucket and
Church streets. Pending.
Maiden. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad Company, peti-
tioners. Petition for abolition of Med ford, Adams and
Charles streets grade crossing in Maiden. Pending.
Maiden, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli-
tion of Pleasant and Winter streets crossings in Maiden.
Pending.
Marlborough, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Fitchburg
Railroad Company. Pending.
Marlborough. Old Colony Railroad Company, petitioner. Fisher's
crossing. Pending.
Natick. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company, peti-
tioners. Three petitions pending.
Newton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Boston & Albany
Railroad Company. Argued before full court. Decision
made on accounting, Sept. 1, 1898. Pending.
Newton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the
abolition of Glenn Avenue, Langley Road, Institution Ave-
nue, Cypress, Centre, Rogers, Hyde, Walnut, Boylston and
Cook streets in Newton. Pending.
Newton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the
abolition of Oak, Linden and Mecham streets crossings in
Newton. Pending.
Newton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the
abolition of Concord Street and Pine Grove Avenue crossings
in Newton. Pending.
North Reading, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the aboli-
tion of Main Street crossing. Pending.
Somerville, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the
abolition of Somerville Avenue grade crossing in Somerville.
Pending.
Somerville, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Pending.
Somerville, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the
abolition of Park, Dane and Med ford streets grade crossings
in Somerville. Pending.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xiii
Wakefield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition
of Hanson Street grade crossing in Wakefield. Pending.
Waltham, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Fitchburg Rail-
road Company. Pending.
Watertown, Selectmen of, petitioners. Commissioners appointed.
Pending.
Norfolk County.
Braintree. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail-
road Company, petitioners. Pending.
Braintree. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail-
road Company, petitioners. Pending.
Canton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending.
Dedham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending.
East Bridgewater. Directors of Old Colony Railroad Company,
petitioners. Commissioners appointed. Disposed of.
Foxborougb, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition
of Nortb Street crossing in Foxborougb. Pending.
Hyde Park and Dedham. Three petitions consolidated. Pend-
ing.
Medway, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending.
Milton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Cen-
tral Avenue crossing. Pending.
Needham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for alteration of
Charles River Street crossing in Needham. Pending.
Norwood, Selectmen of, and New York & New England Railroad
Company, petitioners. Washington, Chapel and Guild streets
and Railroad Avenue. Hearings. Pending.
Sharon, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of
Depot Street crossing in Sharon. Pending.
Stoughton. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad Company, petitioners. Pending.
Walpole, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of
crossings at Oak, Main, Elm, etc., streets. Pending.
Plymouth County.
Abington. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail-
road Company, petitioners. Pending.
Brockton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Commissioners
appointed. Disposed of.
Hingham. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Com-
pany, petitioner. Pending.
Marshfield. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad, petitioners. Pending.
xiv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Middleborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending.
Scituate. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail-
road Company, petitioners. Petition for the alteration of
grade crossings at Water and Union streets. Pending.
Scituate, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending.
Suffolk County.
Boston. Directors of Old Colony Railroad Company, petitioners.
Tremont Street. Hearing. Pending.
Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Six petitions: —
1. Austin, Cambridge and Perkins streets, Charlestown, cross-
ing the tracks of the Boston & Maine Railroad Company.
Pending.
2. Same streets as above, crossing the tracks of the Eastern
Railroad Company. Pending.
3. Austin Street, Warren Avenue and Charles River Avenue,
Charlestown, crossing the tracks of the Fitchburg Railroad
Company. Pending.
4. Rutherford Avenue, Main Street and Chelsea Street, Charles-
town, crossing the tracks of the Boston & Lowell Railroad
Company. Pending.
5. Congress Street, South Boston, crossing the tracks of the
New York & New England Railroad Company. Pend-
ing.
6. Dorchester Avenue, Dorchester, crossing the tracks of the
Old Colony Railroad Company. Pending.
Boston. Directors of Old Colony Railroad Company, petitioners.
Codman Street, Boston. Pending.
Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. New England Rail-
road Company. Pending.
Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Pending.
Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Pending.
Dorchester Avenue, Boston. Directors of New York, New Haven
& Hartford Railroad Company, petitioners. Pending.
East Boston. Mayor and Aldermen of the city of Boston,
petitioners. Boston & Main Railroad Company, Boston &
Albany Railroad Company and Boston, Revere Beach & Lynn
Railroad Company. Pending.
Chelsea, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Crossings on
Chelsea bridge and Chelsea Bridge Avenue, over Boston &
Maine Railroad. Under St. 1892, c. 374. Commissioners
appointed. Hearing. Pending.
Revere, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Win-
throp Avenue crossing in Revere. Pending.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xv
Revere, Selectmen of, and Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad,
petitioners. Petition for consent to build bridge over Boston
& Maine Railroad tracks at TVinthrop Avenue, at a minimum
height of sixteen feet. Attorney-General waived right to be
heard.
Worcester County.
Athol, Selectmen of, petitioners. Commissioners appointed.
Pending.
Auburn, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending.
Auburn. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company, peti-
tioners. Pending.
Blackstone, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending.
Boylston, Selectmen of, petitioners. Commissioners appointed.
Pending.
Clinton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending.
Fitchburg, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the
abolition of grade crossings at Putnam Street in Fitchburg
over the Vermont Central Railroad and Massachusetts Central
Railroad. Pending.
Fitchburg, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Same as above,
at Laural Street. Pending.
Fitchburg, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Pending.
Gardner, Selectmen of, petitioners. Commissioners appointed.
Pending.
Gardner, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending.
Gardner, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for change of grade
at Union Street crossing in Gardner. Pending.
Holden, Selectmen of, petitioners. Fitchburg Railroad Company.
Pending.
Holden, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
Dawson's, Cedar Swamp, Wachusett Street and Blake Road
crossings in Holden. Chas. A. Allen, Arthur P. Rugg and
Henry G. Taft, commissioners.
Hubbardston, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
Depot road crossing in Hubbardston. Pending.
Leicester. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company,
petitioners. Pending.
Leominster, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending.
Millbury, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending.
Millbury, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending.
Northbridge. Selectmen of Northbriclge and Uxbridge, petition-
ers. Pending.
Northbridge, Selectmen of, petitioners (two petitions). Pend-
ing.
xvi ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Northborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the aboli-
tion of a grade crossing near " Westborough Hospital Sta-
tion." Pending.
Southborough. Old Colony Railroad Company, petitioner.
Pending.
Southborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition
of a grade crossing on road to Hopkinton in Southborough.
Pending.
Southborough, Selectmen of, and Directors of New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, petitioners. Pend-
ing.
Southborough. Directors of the New York, New Haven &
Hartford Railroad Company, petitioners. Pending.
Sutton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending.
Terapleton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending.
Uxbridge. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail-
road Company, as lessee of the Providence & Worcester Rail-
road Company, petitioners. Pending.
Warren. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company,
petitioners. Pending.
Warren. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company, peti-
tioners. Pending.
Westborough, Selectmen of, and Directors of Boston & Albany
Railroad Company, petitioners. (In this case a controversy
arose between the town and the Commonwealth as to the
respective amounts to be paid in the construction of the pro-
posed alterations. The case was argued before the commis-
sioners, and a decision rendered in favor of the claim made
by the Commonwealth.) Argued before full court. Report
of commissioners confirmed. Pending.
Worcester, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Millbrook, Gar-
den, Lincoln, Market, School, Thomas, Central, Exchange,
Summer and Shrewsbury streets. Pending.
Worcester. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company,
petitioners. Pending.
Worcester, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Grafton, Green,
Washington and Plymouth streets. Pending.
Worcester, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Hamilton and
Millbrook streets. Pending.
Worcester, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for
the alteration of crossings on Grafton, Green, Washing-
ton, Plymouth, Hammond, Gardner, Grand, Southgate and
Cambridge streets, and alteration of Union Station. Pend-
ing.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xvii
The following corporations having made voluntary application
to the Supreme Judicial Court for dissolution, and having given
the Attorney-General due notice of the petition, and the Tax Com-
missioner having certified that they were not indebted to the
Commonwealth for taxes, the Attorney-General waived right to
be heard : —
A. M. Gardner Hardware Company.
Amherst Telephone Company.
Anthony Bates Machine Company.
Atlantic Wharf Company.
Baker Lead Manufacturing Company.
Berkshire Ore Company.
Baldwinville Toy and Turning Company.
Boston Computing Scale Company.
Boston Horse Shoe Company.
Boston Paper Mills Company.
Brockton and Eureka Box Toe Company.
Breed and Bacheller Company.
Brookside Paper Manufacturing Company.
Buildings Cleaning Company.
Business Men's Athletic Club.
Carpet Loom Company.
Chadwick Plush Company.
Chase & Co. Corporation.
Charles River Embankment Company.
Central Market Company.
Chesterfield Co-operative Pearl Button Company.
Childs & Kent Express Company.
Citizens Building Company.
Clarendon Mills.
Connecticut River Paper Company.
Consumers Co-operative Association.
Cowell & Hall Manufacturing Company.
Dighton Rock Park Corporation.
Douglass Mills.
E. C. Manufacturing Company.
E. D. Shadduck Company.
Faulkner Mills.
Grafton, Upton & Milford Street Railway Company.
H. M. Kin ports Company.
Hampden Emery and Corundum Company.
Haskell Dawes Machine Company.
Horner Machine Company.
xviii ATTOKKEY-GENEKAL'S EEPOET. [Jan.
J. W. Kennan Company.
Jaynes & Chapin Cd.
John N. Rieger Company.
Kinsley Express Company.
Mandel Milling Company.
Massachusetts Mutual Fire Insurance Company.
Maverick Wharf Company.
Meyers Putz Pomade Company.
Mills Manufacturing Company.
Morrison Steamboat Company.
New Boston Aqueduct Company.
Northfield Telephone Company.
Palmer Carpet Company.
Pittsfield Electric Street Railway Company.
Pleasant Park and Fair Association.
Pocasset Hat Company.
R. Goss Company.
Red Cross Baking Powder Company.
Shoe and Leather Building Association.
Smith American Organ Company.
Springfield Knitting Compan}T.
Standard Furniture Company.
Stowe Bills & Hawley Company.
Taunton Rivet Company.
Union Cotton Gunning Company.
Union Wharf Com pan}'.
United States Knife and Cutlery Company.
W. S. Quimby Company.
Warren Boot and Shoe Company.
Washington Mills Company.
Wheeler Cotton Mills.
Worcester Excursion Car Company.
Wright Machine Company.
The following corporations, reported to this department by the
Tax Commissioner for delinquency in making their tax returns
under Pub. Sts., c. 13, § 38, have been compelled, without the
necessity of a suit at law, to comply with the statute : —
A. F. Towle & Son Co.
A. T. Fairbanks Confectionery Company.
Abram French Company.
Amesbury Opera House Company.
Arion Manufacturing Company.
Barnstable County Street Railway Company.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xix
Bay State Fuel Company.
Beacon Manufacturing Company.
Bennetts Information Company.
Blue Hill Granite Company.
Boston and Lynn Steamboat Express Company.
Boston Excursion Steamship Company.
Boston Paving Company.
Boston Steel and Iron Company.
Boston Trading and Export Compan}-.
Bristol County Street Railway Company.
Brockton Real Estate and Improvement Company.
Brookfield Brick Company.
Bryant Boot and Shoe Company.
C. B. Cook Laundry Company.
C. F. Eddy Company.
C. S. Grieves Paint Company.
Cantells Manufacturing Company.
Chemical Paper Company.
Child Acme Cutter and Press Company.
City Trust Company.
Columbia Electric Company.
Consolidated Law Cabinet, The.
Co-operative Printing Society.
Cottage City and Edgartown Traction Company.
Cygolf Shoe Company.
Daily News Company, The.
Damon Brick Company.
Davis & Buxton Stamping Company.
Donahoe's Magazine Company.
Dorchester Building Material Company.
Durgin Grocery and Provision Company.
E. Buxton & Son Co.
Eastern Bridge and Structural Company.
Eastern Electric Company.
Eastern Printing and Engraving Company.
Faneuil Watch Tool Company.
Fisk Manufacturing Company.
Fisk Rubber Company.
Fitchburg Machine Works.
Fitchburg Manufacturing Company.
Fore River Company.
Fosslitch Leather Company.
Fowle's Arlington Mills.
Franklin Educational Company.
xx ATTORNEY-GEKERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Fraprie-Douglass Company, The.
Gale Lumber Company.
Gardner Egg Carrier Company.
George D. Emerson Company.
George H. Wood Company.
Globe Nail Company.
Greenfield Recorder Company, The.
Gurney Heater Manufacturing Company.
H. L. Aldrich Company.
Hampden Trap Rock Company.
Hampshire & Worcester Street Railway Company, The.
Henry Woods Sons Company.
Holbrook Shoe Company, The.
Hollingsworth & Vose Co.
Holmes & Blanchard Co.
Holyoke Provision and Cold Storage Company.
Hood Rubber Company.
Horn Pond Branch Railroad Company.
Hunt Spiller Manufacturing Company.
Hutchins Narrow Fabric Company.
Interstate Law Company.
Investor Publishing Company.
Iowa Light, Heat and Power Company.
J. H. Williams Wall Paper Company, The.
J. P. & W. H. Emond, Incorporated.
John Dyke Company.
Kelly Shoe Company, The.
Kimball & Cary Co.
Kimball Brothers Company.
L. E. Knott Apparatus Company.
L. L. Brown Paper Company.
Lawrence & Methuen Street Railway Company.
Lawrence Supply Company.
Leicester Grocery Company.
Liberty Masonic Association.
Lowell Land Company.
Lyons & Alexander Co., The.
Lyons Granite Company.
Maiden Mail Company, The.
Marblehead Building Association.
Marlborough Gas Light Company.
Massachusetts Investment Company.
Massachusetts Real Estate Company.
Massachusetts Steam Wagon Company.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxi
McCarthy, Sheehy & Kendrick Co.
McLean Shoe Company.
Middleby Oven Company.
Middlesex Real Estate Association of Cambridge.
Miles F. Brennan Company.
Miscoe Spring Water Company.
Morrill Brothers Company.
New England Dredging Company.
New England Lamp Company.
New England Publishing Company, The.
New England Reed Company.
New England Structural Company.
Newport Transfer Express Company.
Norcross Brownstone Company.
Norfolk Blanket Cleansing Company.
Norwood, Canton & Sharon Street Railway Company.
O. T. Rogers Granite Company.
Pigeon Hill Granite Company.
Pittsfield Manufacturing Company.
Plymouth Preserving Company.
Pratt Manufacturing Company.
Rawson & Morrison ManufacturingaCompany.
Sanitary Fixture Company, The.
Shedd & Crane Leather Company.
Shreve, Crump & Low Co.
Smith Warren Company.
Springfield Brass Company.
Springfield Construction Company.
Springfield Steam Power Company.
Thomas J. Gavin Company.
Turners Falls Lumber Company.
United States Cord Company.
University City Laundering Company.
W. D. Wilmarth & Co., Corporation.
W. S. Reed Toy Company.
Waban Rose Conservatories.
Watertown Machine Company.
Wellington Piano Case Company.
Western Union Telegraph Company.
Westport Harbor Aqueduct Company.
Wheelman Company, The.
Whiting Manufacturing Company.
William Underwood Company.
Woburn Power Company.
xxii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Worcester Construction Company.
Worcester Last Company.
Zeigler Electric Company.
The following corporations, reported to this department by the
Commissioner of Corporations for delinquency in filing the certifi-
cate of condition for 1900 required by Pub. Sts., c. 106, § 54,
have been compelled, without the necessity of suit, to comply
withjthe statute : —
A. S. Rogers Shoe Company.
American Cultivator Publishing Company.
Amesbury Opera House Company.
Arlington Co-operative Association.
Bay State Improved Box Company.
Belisle Printing and Publishing Company.
Blake Manufacturing Company.
Blue Hill Granite Company.
Boston Oregon Mast Company.
Boston Spar Company.
Boston Thread and Twine Company.
Carlow & Putnam Co.
Columbia Electric Company.
Connecticut Steam Stone Company.
Daily News Company.
East Douglass Co-operative Association.
Fisher Churchill Company.
Fiske Wharf and Warehouse Company.
Fitchburg Machine Works.
Fowler Automatic Draft Regulator and Ventilator Com-
pany.
Gardner Music Hall Company.
George P. Staples & Co., Incorporated.
Glasgow Manufacturing Company.
Heroux the Clothier, Incorporated.
Iowa Light, Heat and Power Company.
J. P. Jordan Paper Company.
John F. Nickerson Company.
Lamprey Boiler Furnace Mouth Protector Company.
Lyons Granite Company.
Mansfield Co-operative Furnace Company.
Merrimack Clothing Company.
Middleby Oven Company.
Natick Gas Light Company.
National Needle Company.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxiii
New England & Savannah Steamship Company.
New England Dredging Company.
New England Rubber Company.
Nute-Hallett Company, Incorporated.
P. P. Emory Manufacturing Company.
Randall Faichney Company.
Robinson Iron Company.
Sandy Bay Pier Company.
Shady Hill Nursery Company.
Slater Woolen Company.
Springfield Drop Forging Company.
Springfield Elevator and Pump Company.
Taunton Evening News.
Union Desk Company.
Wade & Reed Co.
The following corporations, reported to this department by the
Commissioner of Corporations for delinquency in filing the certifi-
cate of condition for 1901 required by Pub. Sts., c. 106, § 54, have
been compelled, without the necessity of suit, to comply with the
statute : —
Adams Marble Company.
American Cultivator Publishing Company.
Amesbury Opera House Company.
Amherst Gas Company.
Arlington Co-operative Association.
Bay State Metal Works.
Beacon Manufacturing Company.
Boston Advertising Company.
Boston Paving Company.
Boston Spar Company.
Boston Trading and Export Company.
Brookfield Brick Company.
C. A. Edgarton Manufacturing Company.
Carter, Rice & Co., Corporation.
Crescent Worsted Company.
Damon Safe and Iron Works Company.
Dudley Mills.
East Douglass Co-operative Association.
Eastern Electric Company.
Eastern Printing and Engraving Company.
Fisk Rubber Company.
Fosslitch Leather Company.
Frank A. Hall Company.
xxiv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Fraser Dry Goods Company.
George D. Emerson Company.
Greenfield Machine Company.
Hill, Whitney & Wood Co.
Interstate Law Company.
J. P. Jordan Paper Company.
Kearns & Co., Incorporated.
Kelly Shoe Company.
Lyons & Alexander Co.
Mansfield Co-operative Furnace Company.
Massachusetts Investment Company.
Massachusetts Telephone and Telegraph Company.
Massachusetts Title Insurance Company.
Medfield Electric Light and Power Company.
Montague Co-operative Creamery Association.
Natick Citizen Printing Company.
New England Pharmacal Company.
Norfolk Blanket Cleansing Company.
Perry Laundry Company.
Plymouth Stove Foundry Company.
Reliance Manufacturing Company.
Rice Kendall Company, The.
Robbins Spring Water Company.
Rochdale Hall Company.
Shady Hill Nursery Company.
Simonds Rolling Machine Company.
Small, Maynard & Co., Incorporated.
Springfield Construction Company.
Twentieth Century Mining Company.
Union Furniture Company.
W. E. Rice Company, The.
Watertown Machine Company.
Weber Leather Company.
Wheelman Company, The.
Worcester Fire Appliance Company.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxv
Cases arising in the Probate Courts under
the Collateral Inheritance Tax Act.
[Statutes 1891, Chapter 425.]
Berkshire County.
Marcein, Mary L., estate of. Frank H. Wright, executor. Peti-
tion for extension of time for payment of tax. Assented to
extension.
Bristol County.
Adams, Stephen L., estate of. John F. Adams, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Beauvais, Joseph Arthur, estate of. Charles W. Clifford et als.,
executors. Petition for extension of time for payment of
tax. Assented to extension.
Bishop, Franklin H., estate of. Petition of George Kress to be
appointed executor. (The testator bequeathed his entire
estate to the Commonwealth.) No action taken.
Brown, Robert Carver, estate of. Ira N. Smith et al., executors.
Petition for license to pay tax on income in yearly instalments
and to postpone time for payment of tax on principal. At-
torney-General waived right to be heard.
Cartwright, Nancy G., estate of. Alma C. Coffin, executrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate* in Massachusetts.
Decree allowing petition.
Chase, Sarah. B., estate of. Benjamin S. C. Gifford, legatee.
Petition for appointment of appraisers. Agreed to appoint-
ment of W. B. N. Chase, Leonard N. Slade and Charles S.
Waring, appraisers.
Church, Alexander B., estate of. Frank S. Higgins, administra-
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Church, Harriet J., estate of. Sophia L. Wardwell, executrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Cornell, Jane R., estate of. William F. Cornell, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
xxvi ATTOKKEY-GEJSTEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan.
Cory, Seabury, estate of. George S. Homer et als., executors.
Petition for appraisal. Attorney-General waived right to
be heard on payment of tax.
Devereux, Robert William, estate of. Ruth S. Devereux et al.,
executors. Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Dikeman, Mary M. K., estate of. Mary A. Griswold, executrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Gifford, Elizabeth, estate of. Ezra Gifford et <xL, administrators.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Kinnicutt, Augusta, estate of. Daniel S. Bushee, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Decree allow-
ing petition.
Kinnicutt, Robert, estate of. Daniel S. Bushee, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Decree allow-
ing petition.
Livsey, Elizabeth K., estate of. Mary H. Richardson, execu-
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pend-
ing.
Mott, Jacob, Jr., estate of. Ada F. Mott, executrix. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Sherman, Nehemiah K., estate of. Edwin A. Cady, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Tuckerman, Robert, estate of. Harriet W. Tuckerman, execu-
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
White, William, estate of. Belle R. White, executrix. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Essex County.
Bartlett, Aroline E., estate of. Levi S. Bartlett, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Beede, Susan E., estate of. Cyrus A. Gove, administrator. Pe-
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen-
eral waived right to be heard.
Bradbury, Albert H., estate of. Frances A. Bradbury, adminis-
tratrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At-
torney-General waived right to be heard.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxvii
Bradley, John C, estate of. Charles H. Bradley, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Brewster, Lydia A., estate of. Isaac S. Brewster, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen-
eral waived right to be heard.
Brown, Sarah K., estate of. Edward H. Brown, executor. Pe-
tition for license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Bryant, Edna W., estate of. Daniel A. Kelly, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Butland, Hason, estate of. Daniel Butland, executor. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Carleton, James H., estate of. Henry S. Howe et als., petitioners.
Petition of determination of tax and extension of time of pay-
ment. Decree. Appeal taken to Supreme Judicial Court.
Decree of Probate Court affirmed. See Banker and Trades-
man, Oct. 30, 1901.
Carter, Sarah W., estate of. John L. Pressey, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Castle, Peter, estate of. Mary Castle, administratrix. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Chamberlain, Frederick W., estate of. Mary B. Chamberlain,
executrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Coggswell, Sarah F., estate of. Samuel W. Hopkinson, executor.
Petition for instructions. Pending.
Collins, John H., estate of. Frank T. Carr, executor. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Colwell, Clara Hobart, estate of. George A. Hamlin, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Condon, Robert W., estate of. James S. Condon, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate in this Com-
monwealth. Decree.
Currier, Mary J., estate of. John L. Pressey, executor. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Cushing, Zenas, estate of. Caroline L.Warner et al., executrices.
Petition for postponement of time for payment of tax.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
xxviii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan.
Davis, James, estate of. Epes Davis, administrator. Petition
for allowance of appraisers' fees. Attorney-General waived
right to be heard.
Dickey, Syrena, estate of. Uhert A. Killam et al., executors.
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Assented
to extension.
Dickson, Walter S., estate of. First Universalist Society, peti-
tioners. Petition for instructions. Pending.
Diman, Emily Stimson, estate of. Emily Diman, administratrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Downs, Henrietta A., estate of. George E. Downs, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Duncan, Caroline, estate of. John D. Bryant, executor. Claim
for inheritance tax and interest on several legacies, amount-
ing to $4,300. Pending.
Eaton, Calvin, estate of. James C. Eaton, administrator. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Field, Henry P., estate of. Bezeliel W. Burnham, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Follansbee, Ann M., estate of. James L. Rackleff, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Garden, Sarah P., estate of. Josiah F. Garden, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pend-
ing.
Garland, Emily A., estate of. Charles W. Garland, administra-
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At-
torney-General waived right to be heard.
Green, Stephen, estate of. Sarah H. Green, executor. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Hankerson, Alvin D., estate of. Charles M. Thompson, adminis-
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At-
torney-General waived right to be heard.
Hanson, Francis J., estate of. Charles F. Cate, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Hawkes, Maria S., estate of. Linda A. Annis, executrix. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxix
Hoag, Laura E., estate of. Clara A. Fletcher, executrix. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Hodgdon, Julia A., estate of. Peace P. Nichols, executrix. Pe-
tition for postponement of time for payment of tax. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
Hood, Martin H., estate of. Edward H. Sargent, executor. Pe-
tition for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Horton, Alfred, estate of. Ralph Bleecker Horton, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Hunt, Oliver, estate of. Sarah T. Hunt, executrix. Petition for
license to receive personal estate. -Attorney-General waived
right to be heard.
Ingalls, Mary C, estate of. Arthur H. Wilcomb, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Judkins, Elbridge G., estate of. Elbridge F. Judkins, adminis-
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At-
torney-General waived right to be heard.
Judkins, Joseph, estate of. Arthur B. Judkins, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Kaliher, Mary, estate of. Greenleaf K. Bartlett, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Lamprey, Lewis S., estate of. Geo. W. Sanborn, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Lamson, Asa B., estate of. F. H. Lamson et al., executors. Pe-
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen-
eral waived right to be heard.
Legro, Mary C, estate of. J. Q. A. TVentworth, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Locke, Jeremiah F., estate of. Hannah S. Locke, administratrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Locke, John B., estate of. Hannah L. Locke, administratrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Mace, Jacob M., estate of. Nellie I. Mace, executrix. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
xxx ATTOKNEY-GEJSTEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan.
Morrill, Sarah W., estate of. Thomas B. Twombly, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Moulton, Olive O., estate of. Henry M. Batchelder, executor.
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Extension
granted.
Newcomb, Fred H., estate of. George W. Clyde, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Page, Abigail L., estate of. Mary A. Page et aL, executors.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Disposed of
on payment of tax.
Palmer, Mary N., estate of. Daniel E. Palmer, administrator.
Petition for license 'to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Pike, Mary A., estate of. Charles W. Garland, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Piper, Sarah B., estate of. Daniel B. Piper, administrator. Pe-
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen-
eral waived right to be heard.
Pray, William M., estate of. J. E. S. Pray, administrator. Pe-
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen-
eral waived right to be heard.
Reed, Gratia S., estate of. Frank A. Rugg, executor. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Richardson, Marinda A., estate of. Albert H. Cheney, adminis-
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At-
torney-General waived right to be heard.
Roberts, Lydia E., estate of. John Tuttle, administrator. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Decree.
Roberts, Horatia G., estate of. John Tuttle, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu-
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Roby, Jeremiah H., estate of. Francis R. Drake, execu-
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At-
torney-General waived right to be heard on payment of
tax.
Runcllett, Alfred F., estate of. Martha A. Rundlett, executrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Sanborn, Charles H., estate of. Frank D. Sanborn, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu-
setts. Decree.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxxi
Smith, Alfred, estate of. Arthur H. Wilcomb, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Snow, Sophia J., estate of. Gorham Rogers, trustee. Petition
for license to sell certain shares of stock for the benefit of a
charitable trust. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Stockman, Dorothy F., estate of. James J. J. Sawyer, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Stone, Susan K., estate of. Mabel G. Parker, administratrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Street, Charles C, estate of. William E. Rogers, executor.
Petition to retain a certain sum in executor's hands to pay
tax if any becomes due. Attorney-General waived right to
be heard.
Taylor, John, estate of. Leonard M. Taylor, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Towle, Alfred, estate of. Susan M. Towle, executrix. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Towne, Asa P., estate of. George A. Woodbury, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Twiss, Nancy M., estate of. Albert E. Simpson, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts.
Dismissed.
Waldron, Sarah A., estate of. Daniel D. Waldron, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Webster, David, estate of. Dana Webster, executor. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Williams, Augustus, estate of. Hannah F. Clark, administratrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Winn, Alonzo N., estate of. George W. Paul, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Wood, Deborah, estate of. John S. Gile, administrator. Peti-
tion to compromise a claim against said estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Woodbury, Eliza J., estate of. Milton G. Woodbury, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate . Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
xxxii ATTOKJSTEY-GENEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan.
Franklin County.
Alexander, Amanda M., estate of. Joseph R. Colton et al.,
executors. Petition for instructions. Pending.
Hampden County.
Allen, George M., estate of. Eunice S. Allen et al., administra-
tors. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
Alvord, Eugenia C, estate of. Edward W. Chapin, executor.
Petition for appraisal and instructions. Decree.
Alvord, Mary, estate of. William P. McFarland, legatee. Peti-
tion for appointment of appraisers to reappraise. Appraisers
appointed. Attorney-General waived right to be heard on
return of appraisers.
Bailey, Stephen P., estate. Petition for appraisers to reappraise.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Cooley, Justin M., estate of. Eliza A. Peet et al., executors.
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
Crockett, Sarah L., estate of. H. L. Harding et al., executors.
Petition of Treasurer and Receiver-General to collect tax on
said estate. Pending.
Day, Laura A., estate of. Edwin F. Lyford, executor. Petition
for instructions. Decree.
DeForrest, Andrew W., estate of. Charles S. DeForrest et al.,
executors. Petition for extension of time for payment of
tax. Assented to postponement.
Henry, Julia A., estate of. James W. Kirkham, executor. Peti-
tion for extension of time or payment of tax. Assented to
extension.
Hull, Eliza E., estate of. Harry D. Hull, administrator. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Kellogg, Chester, estate of. Mary A. Kellogg et als., adminis-
trators. Petition for instructions. Disposed of.
Lawler, Mary, estate of. Petition for the appointment of David
F. McCarthy, executor. Attorney-General waived right to
be heard.
Leonard, Charles L, estate of. Frederick N. Leonard, legatee.
Petition for appointment of appraisers.
Lyon, Nancy M., estate of. Henry A. King, executor. Petition
for instructions. Disposed of.
Pyne, Desire A., estate of. Edward K. Bodwitha, executor.
Petition for instructions. Pending.
1902,] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxxiii
Renney, William, estate of. Niles Searles, executor. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Reynolds, Theodore, estate of. Frank H. King, legatee. Petition
for appointment of appraisers. Disposed of.
Smith, John M., estate of. Adelaide G. Smith, executrix. Peti-
tion for allowance of first account. Attorney-General waived
right to be heard.
Thompson, Maud P. Lena E. Wentworth, guardian. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Warner, George L., estate of. Frank W. Rising, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Hampshire County.
Back, Ellsworth, estate of. David Aldrich, administrator. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Merick, Helen M., estate of. Filelia Perkins, executrix. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Shumway, Estes, estate of. George A. Shumway, administrator.
Petition for abatement of interest on collateral inheritance
tax. Pending.
Taylor, Hiram, estate of. Carrie E. Taylor, executrix. Petition
to determine what legacies are subject to tax. Decree.
Middlesex County.
Ames, Mary C, estate of. Franklin T. Hammond, administrator
with the will annexed. Petition for instructions. Tax paid
and disposed of.
Banagan, James, estate of. Rose E. Banagan, administratrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Barrett, Mary J., estate of. James Cochran, administrator. Pe-
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorne}T-Gen-
eral waived right to be heard.
Bartlett, Hannah Colcord, estate of. James W. Bartlett, admin-
istrator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At-
torney-General waived right to be heard.
Batchelder, Rebecca H., estate of. Joseph W. Batchelder, admin-
istrator. Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
xxxiv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Berry, Eliza W., estate of. Charles H. Berry, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Blakely, Samuel, estate of. George H. Gale, executor. Petition
for extension of time of payment of tax. Tax paid and dis-
posed of.
Burnham, Josephine E., estate of. Frank Y. Burnham, adminis-
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At-
torney-General waived right to be heard.
Butler, John G., estate of. Aaron H. Latham et aL, executors.
Petition for allowance of final account and for leave to make
certain transfers. Attorney-General waived right to be
heard.
Buttrick, Daniel T., estate of. George E. Clarke, executor. Pe-
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen-
eral waived right to be heard.
Carey, Bridget, estate of. Nellie F. Carey, executrix. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Carlton, Electa M., estate of. Julia A. Dow et aZ., executors.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Chapman, Jane A., estate of. Herman B. Chapman, administra-
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
Chase, Nancy A., estate of. Henry H. Holt, executor. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Chisholm, James, estate of. Wilbur H. Sargent et aZ., trustees.
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Assented
to extension.
Clark, Jeremiah, estate of. John C. Bennett, executor. Petition
for instructions. Pending.
Conant, Rebecca H., estate of. Mabelle Conant Jordan, admin-
istratrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Connell, John W., estate of. Mary J. Ford, administratrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Conway, Mary, estate of. William Knight, administrator. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts.
Decree.
Cook, Josiah P., estate of. Mary H. Cook, executrix. Petition
for postponement of time for payment of tax. Assented to
postponement.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxxv
Cosey, John, estate of. Jerry Cosey et al., executors. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Cox, Rose, estate of. Thomas F. Gorman, administrator. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Cragin, Eliza H., estate of. Jacob F. Hall, executor. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Cragin, Samuel, estate of. Jacob F. Holt, administrator. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Crawford, John, estate of. Nettie M. Crawford, administratrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Crudden, Sarah, estate of. Richard Owen et al., executors. Pe-
tition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts.
Tax paid and disposed of.
Cushing, Henry G., estate of. W. H. Anderson et al., executors.
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney-
Gene-ral waived right to be heard.
Cutting, Lucinda K., estate of. Ella G. Holmes et al.', trustees.
Petition to extend time of payment of tax. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Davis, Benjamin J., estate of. George P. Davis, executor. Pe-
tition for allowance of executor's final account. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
DollofT, William J., estate of. John N. Thompson, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Driscoll, Mary, estate of. Mary I. Fisher, administratrix. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Efner, Sophia W., estate of. Lucy H. White, legatee. Petition
for appointment of appraisers. Attorney-General waived
right to be heard.
Ellis, Hiram, estate of. Ann E. Gale, administratrix. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Ferry, Frank A., estate of. Eugene H. Ferry, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu-
setts. Decree.
Flanders, Mary A., estate of. Frank Sargent, executor. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
xxxvi ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Ford, Daniel S., estate of. William A. Monroe, petitioner. Petition
for postponement of time for payment of tax on foreign chari-
table corporations. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Foss, Augustus B., estate of. Jacob E. Chickering, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Foster, Maria M., estate of. Edwin F. Foster, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Fuller, Cornelia, estate of. Mary A. Emery, administratrix. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Gill, James S., estate of. George H. Levey, trustee. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be beard.
Gill, Samuel, estate of. James S. Gill, administrator. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Goddard, Mary T., estate of. T. G. Frothingham et al.,
executors. Petition for instructions. Tax paid and disposed
of.
Gooding, Irenius, estate of. Mary B. Gooding, executrix. Peti-
tion for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Gray, Clarissa, estate of. Will H. Gray, administrator. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Gray, Henry N., estate of. Will H. Gray et al., executors.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Guild, Charles H., estate of. W. H. Furber, executor. Petition
for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Hall, Lewis, estate of. Lewis A. Hall et al., executors. Petition
for instructions. Tax paid and disposed of.
Hall, Osborn B., estate of. James J. Myers, administrator.
Petition for appointment of appraisers. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Harrington, Charles A., estate of. Charles H. Nelson et al.
executors. Petition for postponement of time for payment
of tax. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Harrington, Charles L., estate of. Charles H. Nelson et al.,
executors. Petition for extension of time for payment of
tax. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxxvii
Hawkes, Maria S., estate of. Linda A. Annis, executrix. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- General
waived right to be heard.
Hazen, Julia H. B., estate of. Daniel G. Brockway, adminis-
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate in
Massachusetts. Decree.
Keyes, Frederick A., estate of. Mary J. Keyes, executrix. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Kimball, Peter C, estate of. Edward Kimball, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Knight, Margaret C, estate of. Estella A. Clark, executrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Leamy, Grace, estate of. John Leamy, administrator. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Libby, Salome D., estate of. John McCrillis, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Littlehale, Rufus C, estate of. Sadie M. Littlehale, administra-
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Lovejoy, Sarah, estate of. Charles L. Perkham, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Lyford, Mary V., estate of. James H. Brock, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu-
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard on payment
of tax.
Lynch, John H., estate of. Henrietta K. Lynch, administratrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Marston, Gilman, estate of . Edwin G, Eastman, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
McCullough, Mary E., estate of. John McCullough, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
McLean, Isaac, estate of. Samuel A. McLean, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Moody, Elizabeth W., estate of. Horace Moody, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
xxxviii ATTOKNEY-GEJSTEKAL'S EEPOKT. [Jan.
Morrill, Julia S., estate of. Julian Avery Herrick, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Morrison, Clara A., estate of. Estella A. Quimby, executrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Murray, Susan, estate of. Thomas Wood, executor. Petition for
license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General waived
right to be heard.
Nason, Florence Williams, estate of. Harry B. Williams, peti-
tioner. Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Nelson, Nancy, estate of. Henry R. Tewksbury, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Nickerson, Jonas C, estate of. James P. Parmenter, adminis-
trator. Petition for instructions. Decree.
Osgood, Asa C, estate of. Frank D. Osgood, executor. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Osgood, Irena, estate of. Jacob Osgood, executor. Petition for
license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General waived
right to be heard.
Parks, George E., estate of. Lucy Ann Parks, executrix. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Peabody, Hattie N., estate of. Wilbur F. Cousens, administra-
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Perkins, James K., estate of. Alice M. Scheben, executrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Pinkham, Thomas H., estate of. Mary R. Pinkham, executrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Ramsey, John M., estate of. Eveline S. Wilder, administratrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Read, Lucy G., estate of. Richard Stone, executor. Petition for
extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Reed, Pamelia H., estate of. Ora E. Reed, administratrix. Pe-
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen-
eral waived right to be heard.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxxix
Richardson, Marinda A., estate of. Albert H. Cheney, adminis-
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At-
torney-General waived right to be heard.
Scudder, Gardner H., estate of. Mary Edgcomb et al., execu-
tors. Petition for appointment of appraiser. Agreed to ap-
pointment of Henry Ware as appraiser.
Searles, Solomon, estate of. Daniel F. Runnels, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
Geaeral waived right to be heard on payment of tax.
Shattuck, Emeline, estate of. James T. Bennett, administrator.
Petition for allowance of final account and distribution. At-
torney-General waived right to be heard.
Slocum, George E., estate of. Anna M. Slocum, executrix. Pe-
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Small, Orrin W., estate of. Henry M. Small, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Spalding, Mary N., estate of. George E. Clarke, executor. Pe-
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen-
eral waived right to be heard.
Stickney, Moses P., estate of. William B. C. Stickney, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Stoddard, Anna M., estate of. Adna B. Stoddard, administra-
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pend-
ing.
Stone, Zina E., estate of. Alfred P. Sawyer, executor. Petition
for instructions as to payment of collateral inheritance tax.
Tax paid and disposed of.
Tinker, Mary J., estate of. Charles W. Hobbs, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Topliff, Mahala J., estate of. Elijah M. Topliff, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Towne, Althea, estate of . James H. Fay, administrator. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Twiss, Nancy M., estate of. Albert E. Simpson, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Dis-
missed.
Webb, Calvin T., estate of. John W. Webb, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
xl ATTORJSTEY-GEJSTERAL'S EEPORT. [Jan.
Wheeler, John, estate of. Mary H. Wheeler, executor. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Whitcomb, Peter, estate of. Ephrairn B. Cobleigh, executor.
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Whitcomb, Peter, estate of. Ephrairn Cobleigh, executor. Peti-
tion for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Whitcomb, William E., estate of. Will A. Whitcomb, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Decree.
Wight, James, estate of. Adelaide M. Sheak et tils., executors.
Petition for extension of time for payment of inheritance tax.
Tax paid and disposed of.
Wiley, Mary W., estate of. Edwin P. Seaver, executor. Petition
for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Williams, Jerome W., estate of. Jedediah R. Gray et al., ad-
ministrators. Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Williams, Lovel, estate of. Eliza W. Lawrence, executrix. Peti-
tion for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Wilson, Royal, estate of. Charles C. Knight et al., executors.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Woodward, Ann, estate of. George G. Read, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney -
General waived right to be heard.
Woodbury, Anna M., estate of. George A. Whittemore, ex-
ecutor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At-
torney-General waived right to be heard.
Nantucket County.
Swain, Emily, estate of. Albert G. Brock, executors. Petition
to determine if certain societies named by testator are chari-
table institutions. Attorne3T-General waived right to be
heard.
Norfolk County.
Baker, Catherine S., estate of. Charles H. Marble, executor.
Petition for license to sell personal property. Attorney-
General assented to sale.
Bullard, Mary, estate of. Frederick D. Ely, executor. Petition
for instructions. Disposed of on payment of tax.
1902,] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xli
Parsons, Georgiana B., estate of. Arthur J. Parsons, executor.
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Rhines, Helen M., estate of. John B. Rhines, executor. Peti-
tion for extension of time of payment of collateral inheritance
tax. Tax paid and disposed of.
Risk, Thomas, estate of. Petition for license to receive personal
estate. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Tower, Abner J., estate of. "Wilmot J. Evans et al., executors.
Petition for allowance of executors' final account. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Plymouth County.
Chapman, James H., estate of. Imogene C. Hamilton, adminis-
tratrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Decree.
Keith, Priscilla D., estate of. Samuel E. Barrett, executor. Pe-
tition for instructions. Pending.
Perry, Edward Y., estate of. Morrill A. Phillips at al., execu-
tors. Petition for extension of time for payment of tax.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Reed, Edwin, estate of. Leonard A. Saville, executor. Petition
for postponement of time for payment of tax. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Reed, Pamelia H., estate of. Ora E. Reed, administratrix. Pe-
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen-
eral waived right to be heard.
Sweeney, William, estate of. George W. Folsom, Jr., executor.
Petition for instructions. Tax paid and disposed of.
Suffolk County.
Abbott, Lucinda M., estate of. Wilbur D. Spencer, adminis-
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At-
torney-General waived right to be heard.
Adams, Benjamin, estate of. Edward F. Adams, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Andrews, Erasmus Jones, estate of. Caroline F. Sanborn et al.,
executors and trustees. Petition for extension of time for
payment of tax. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Austin, Edward, estate of. Edward William Hooper et al.,
executors. Petition for instructions. Decree. Appealed to
Supreme Judicial Court. Decree of Probate Court affirmed.
59 N. E. Rep. 678.
xlii ATTOKNfeY-GENEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan.
Bain, Clara T., estate of. Edith M. Colby, administratrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Balch, Newton C, estate of. Harlan P. Cummings, adminis-
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At-
torney-General waived right to be heard.
Barry, David, estate of. John M. Mitchell, administrator. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Barry, John E., estate of. John M. Mitchell, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Bartlett, Aroline E., estate of. Levi S. Bartlett, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Bartlett, Hannah Colcord, estate of. James W. Bartlett, execu-
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
Batchelder, Nathaniel P., estate of. Francis M. Hughes, adminis-
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate in
Massachusetts. Decree.
Billings, Robert C, estate of. Thomas Minns et al., executors.
Bill in equity for instructions relating to a charitable trust.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Bowers, Henry E., estate of. New England Trust Company,
executor. Petition for extension of time for payment of tax.
Not entered.
Brigham, Peter B., estate of. Edmund O. Codman et al., peti-
tioners. Petition for the appointment of a trustee for the
purposes of a charitable trust. Attorney-General waived
right to be heard.
Brooks, Mary S., estate of. Frederick M. Brooks, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Brown, Abby, estate of. Clara B. Brown, administratrix. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts.
Decree.
Brown, Harold, estate of. Sophia Augusta Brown, executrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Brown, John Nicholas, estate of. Natalie Bayard Brown et al.,
executors. Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xliii
Brown, Sarah K., estate of. Edmund H. Brown, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Brown, Susan A., estate of. Charles P. Chase, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard on payment of tax.
Bruce, Catherine W., estate of. Jacob K. Lockman et al., execu-
tors. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
Call, Alvin F., estate of. Harriet A. Call, executrix. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Capstick, John, estate of. John H. Capstick et al.9 executors.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Carpenter, Jane J., estate of. Elias H. Peters, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Chamberlain, Frederick W., estate of. Mary E. Chamberlain,
executrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Charman, Ellen, estate of. George Knox Morice et als., executors.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Chessman, William H., estate of. Benj. F. Brown et als., exec-
utors. Petition for instructions. Tax paid and disposed of.
Cole, Mary E. W., estate of. Arthur M. Cole, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Coleman, Michael M., estate of. Lizzie E. Coleman, administra-
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa-
chusetts. Decree.
Crane, Philena T., estate of. William J. Stanton, trustee.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Crawford, John, estate of. Nettie M. Crawford, administratrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Dane, Charlotte F., estate of. Samuel M. Came, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Dimond, Charles C, estate of. George P. Furber, executor.
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
xliv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Dodge, Benjamin F., estate of. Charles B. Dodge et aL, adminis-
trators. Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Dodge, Martha E., estate of. Harvey Dodge, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
DollofT, William J., estate of. John N. Thompson, administra-
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
Dorr, Henry, estate of. Charles W. Lord, trustee. Petition for
license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General waived
right to be heard.
Driscoll, Sarah J., estate of. Margaret S. Driscoll, execu-
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pend-
ing-
Duncan, John, estate of. Cristy H. Duncan, administra-
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pend-
ing.
Dunn, Mary, estate of. Richard O'Brien, executor. Petition for
license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Earl, Elizabeth Jane King, estate of. David T. Brownell et al.,
executors. Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Eckley, Julia A., estate of. Thomas P. Peckham, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal* estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Eckley, Julia A., estate of. Thomas P. Peckham, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Eddy, Robert Henry, estate of. Charles U. Cotting et al, trus-
tees. Petition for decree that certain funds are not taxable,
testator having died in 1887. Attorney-General waived right
to be heard.
Edwards, John, estate of. Helen A. Edwards, executrix. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Edwards, Nathaniel P., estate of. Charles W. Edwards, adminis-
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Ellis, Hiram, estate of. Ann E. Gale, administratrix. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Emery, Lewis L., estate of. Martin A. Rockwood, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xlv
Falconer, George, estate of. Annie Falconer, executrix. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be beard.
Faulkner, Abby L. A., estate of. Charles B. Bowditch et al.,
executors. Petition for postponement of time for payment
of tax. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Fifield, Benjamin F., estate of. Etta L. Fifield, administratrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Fitts, James H., estate of. Mary C. Fitts, administratrix. Pe-
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen-
eral waived right to be heard.
Flanders, Hattie B., estate of. Edward G. Flanders, adminis-
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At-
torney-General waived right to be heard.
Ford, Mary, estate of. Patrick Shea, administrator. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Foster, Sarah H., estate of. Mary A. Foster, executrix. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Gay, Ezra M.r estate of. Charles H. Burns et aL, administrators.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard on payment of tax.
Gennaro, Joseph D., estate of. Elvira D. Gennaro, petitioner.
Petition for appointment of administrator. Patrick O'Laugh-
lin appointed administrator. Pending.
Gill, Samuel, estate of. James S. Gill, administrator. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Glynn, James, estate of. Louis H. Bristol, trustee. Petition for
license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General waived
right to be heard.
Glynn, Sarah, estate of. Arthur P. Rose, executor. Petition for
license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General waived
right to be heard.
Goodhue, Converse, estate of. Lorenzo D. Dunbar, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Gould, Sarah A., estate of. W. H. Gould et al, executors. Pe-
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Greenleaf, Wilmot, estate of. Herman E. Greenleaf, adminis-
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At-
torney-General waived right to be heard.
xlvi ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Grover, Helen M., estate of. Albert F. Conant, executor. Peti-
tion for instructions. Tax paid and disposed of.
Hardy, Nettie, estate of. Charles D. Austin, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Hawkins, Charles W., estate of. Laura P. Hawkins, administra-
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa-
chusetts. Decree.
Hayden, George H., estate of. Frank D. Hayden, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Hill, George W., estate of. George W. C. Hill, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Hills, Susan E., estate of. Thomas Quincy Browne, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Hillman, John, estate of. Patrick Roland, administrator. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Hilt, N. Emerson, estate of. Frederic W. Hilt, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Hinman, Robert S., estate of. Jennie E. Weld, administratrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Holmes, Hannah Maria, estate of. Frank T. Clawson, adminis-
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At-
torney-General waived right to be heard.
Hosmer, Edward B., estate of. Elizabeth S. Hosmer, executrix.
Petition for instructions and extension of time for payment
of tax. Decree.
Houghton, John C, estate of. Petition for license to re-
ceive personal estate. Attorney-General waived right to be
heard.
Howe, Irving A., estate of. D.J. Lord, administrator. Petition
of Treasurer and Receiver-General for payment of tax on
certain legacies. Pending.
Howe, Lucy M., estate of. Emeline M. Turner, executrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Hoyt, Emily, estate of. Joseph T. Bartlett, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Hyde, Sarah B., estate of. Andreas Blume el al., petitioners.
Petition for instructions. Pending.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xlvii
King, Elizabeth H., estate of. Charles S. Collins, adminis-
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pend-
ing.
Lamprey, Lewis S., estate of. Geo. W. Sanborn, executor. Pe-
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen-
eral waived right to be heard.
Learned, Catherine M., estate of. Kittie A. Lufkin, adminis-
tratrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pend-
ing.
Leavitt, George W., estate of. Jack Sanborn, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Legro, Mary C, estate of. J. Q. A. Wentworth, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Lowell, Eliza, estate of. George A. Safford et al., executors.
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu-
setts. Pending.
Mack, Thomas, estate of. Seth M. Milliken et al., executors.
Petition for allowance of first and final account. No action
taken.
Marion, Jennette A., estate of. George P. Marvin, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Mather, Clara F., estate of. Charles D. Mather, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Mauron, Mary L., estate of. F. H. Nichols et al., executors.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Maxwell, Joshua, estate of. Harriett Maxwell, administratrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
McDonald, Syrene, estate of. William H. Haskell, executor.
Petition for instructions. Pending.
McDougall, Elizabeth H., estate of. Hannah T. Pendleton, ad-
ministratrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate
in Massachusetts. Decree.
McMurphy, Lucy J., estate of. Thomas W. D. TTorthen, exec-
utor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
Morrill, Sarah W., estate of. Thomas B. Twombly, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
xlviii ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan.
Mower, Anna Josephine, estate of. William C. Bowers, executor
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney
General waived right to be heard.
Mower, Mandeville, estate of. Sarah E. Mower et als., adminis
trators. Petition for license to receive personal estate
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Myrick, Lucretia Barnard, estate of. Charles T. Carruth, admin
istrator. Petition for license to receive personal estate
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Nason, Waldo E., estate of. John E. Chalfield, administrator
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney
General waived right to be heard.
Nevins, David, estate of. Henry S. Shaw et als., executors
Petition for postponement of time for payment of tax
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Odlin, Augusta F., estate of. John H. Eobbins, executor. Peti-
tion for instructions as to payment of tax. Pending.
Packard, Julia A., estate of. George O. Packard, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Peabody, Sarah J., estate of. Amos Southwick, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Perkins, Frances M., estate of. Richard C. Humphreys, admin-
istrator. Petition for postponement of time for payment of
tax. Consented to postponement.
Perkins, James K., estate of. Alice M. Scheben, executrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Perley, Putnam, estate of. Fred J. Bicknell et aL, executors.
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Phelps, Lucy T., estate of. Edward A. Phelps et a?., executors.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Phillips, John H., estate of. Thomas A. Bassett, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Pierce, Rachael L., estate of. Harvey P. Holt, executor. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Pratt, Franklin S., estate of. Charles H. Pratt, executor. Peti-
tion for instructions. Pending.
Prosser, Levi, estate of. Augustus F. Scott et al, trustees.
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12.' xlix
Preston, Frances Marion, estate of. Thomas TV". Merrill, trustee.
Petition for instructions. Pending.
Purinton, Margaret P., estate of. Noble Maxwell, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Reed, Pamelia H., estate of. Ora E. Reed, administratrix. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Richards, Louise S., estate of. Charles S. Richards, administra-
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa-
chusetts. Pending.
Ricker, Joseph F., estate of. Stephen L. Bartlett et al., execu-
tors. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
Risk, Thomas, estate of. Thomas Francis Risk, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard on payment of tax.
Robinson, Susan A., estate of. Fred C. Peaslee, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Rogers, Daniel T., estate of. New York Life Insurance and
Trust Company, trustee. Petition for license to receive per-
sonal estate. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Rowse, Samuel TV., estate of. Ella A. Rowse et al., executors.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Rudd, Alice A., estate of. Stephen B. Meech, executor. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Sackett, Nancy Parks, estate of. Petition for license to receive
personal estate in Massachusetts. Tax paid and disposed of.
Scarlett, Joseph, estate of. Virginia J. Moore, petitioner. Peti-
tion for appointment of appraisers. Attorney-General waived
right to be heard on return of appraisers.
Searles, Solomon, estate of. Daniel F. Runnells, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard on payment of tax.
Shapleigh, James B., estate of. James H. Shapleigh, trustee.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Shepard, Oliver H., estate of. Louis C. Dawes, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
1 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Small, Orrin W., estate of. Henry M. Small, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Smead, Charles B., estate of. Frederick Z. Dickinson, admin-
istrator. Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Pending.
Smith, Charles Frederick, estate of. William R. Driver, executor.
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Smith, Mary Ann, estate of. William Smith, guardian. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Spaulding, George C, estate of. Albert M. Spaulding, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Spence, Virginia Waldron, estate of. RossN. Bowers, executrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Stacy, Eliza W., estate of. Mary J. Stacy, administratrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Stone, Narcissa, estate of. Ardon W. Coombs, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Sutton, Anne H., estate of. David Sutton, executor. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Sweeney, Ellen Towle, estate of. Henry L. Sweeney, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Thomas, Jane G., estate of. Stephen B. Meech, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard .
Thompson, Laforest H., estate of. W. W. Miles, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending.
Tobey, Elizabeth, estate of. Elizabeth W. Tobey, administratrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Tuckerman, Robert, estate of. Harriet W. Tuckerman, executrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Tyler, Rebecca S., estate of. Frederick W. Tyler, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. li
Upharn, Charlotte M., estate of. Elizabeth K. Farnam, adminis-
tratrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At-
torney-General waived right to be heard.
Varney, Frank R., estate of. Annie A. Varney, administratrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Wait, John E., estate of. Eben W. Jones, administrator. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Webb, Benjamin, estate of. Jacob Van V. Olcott et aZ., execu-
tors. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
Wells, Sarah E. P., estate of. Caroline M. Martin, executrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Wensley, George W., estate of. Robert S. Wensleyei al., execu-
tors. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
Wheeler, John, estate of. Mary H. Wheeler, executrix. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Wheeler, Roxana W., estate of. Helen W. Jenney, administra-
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
Wheelwright, Edward, estate of. Isaphene M. Wheelwright, ex-
ecutrix. Petition for instructions. Decree.
Whitney, William D., estate of. Elizabeth W. Whitney et al.,
executors. Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Wilson, Royal, estate of. Charles Emery Knight etal., executors.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Woodbury, Anna M., estate of. George A. Whittemore, execu-
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
Woodward, Abijah, estate of. Greenleaf C. George, trustee.
Petition for instructions. Tax paid and disposed of.
Worcester County.
Arthur, Adeline E., estate of. Charles H. Williams, administra-
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
lii ATTORNEY-GENERAL' S REPORT. [Jan.
Back, Ellsworth, estate of. David Alclrich, administrator. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Back, Ellsworth, estate of. David Aldrich, administrator. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Brigham, George O., estate of. Henry S. Knight, administrator.
Petition for appointment of appraisers. Assented to ap-
pointment Edwin B. Harvey, Francis E. Cary and Henry L.
Clemence, appraisers.
Buck, Horace B., estate of. Eliza A. Buck, executrix. Petition
for instructions. Pending.
Burnham, Fannie S., estate of. Augustus A. Scales, administra-
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
Colburn, Willard, estate of. E. M. Smith, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Connor, Timothy, estate of. Nelson H. TunniclirT, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Cuddihy, Patrick, estate of. James T. Canavan et al., petitioners.
Petition to amend inventory. Pending.
Davis, Ada C, estate of. George H. Davis, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Dowling, Daniel, estate of. Frederick M. Cole et al., executors.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Grubb, William, estate of. William J. Grubb, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Harrington, Betsy L., estate of. Irene L. Hardy, administratrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Heredeen, Tryphena, estate of. Henry Heredeen, executor.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Hobart, Eliza A., estate of. Nathaniel Hobart, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Holbrook, Susan J., estate of. George E. Holbrook et ah,
executors. Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Ho. 12. liii
Houghton, John C, estate of. Mary L. Houghton, executrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Howard, Jane R., estate of. Robert K. O'Neil, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Hubbard, Rodney A., estate of. Eliza J. Hubbard, administra-
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
Hurley, Helen, estate of. John J. Hurley, administrator. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Jackson, Michael C, estate of. Catherine A. Jackson, adminis-
tratrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
James, Alanson, estate of. Newman W. James, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Kimball, Edith H., estate of. E. M. Smith, executor. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Kinnicutt, Augusta, estate of. Daniel S. Bushee, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Lewis, Abbie M., estate of. Samuel M. Came, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Miller, Richard S., estate of. William M. Peckham, adminis-
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Mower, Caroline C, estate of. J. Russell Marble et aZ., trustees.
Petition for reappraisal. Pending.
Newton, Harvey, estate of. Charles J. Hooper et aZ., executors.
Petition for instruction and appraisal. Pending.
Osgood, Helen A., estate of. Jacob N. Davis, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Parker, M. Isadore, estate of. Evelyn L. Murdock Ward, peti-
tioner. Petition to declare appraisal void and ordering
reappraisal. Tax paid and disposed of.
Platts, Julia M., estate of. Charles F. Platts, executor. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
liv ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S EEPOET. [Jan.
Rice, Alice M., estate of. Charles M. Rice, executor. Petition
for instructions. Decree. Appealed by petitioner to Supreme
Judicial Court. Pending.
Ripley, Samuel B., estate of. Martha Ripley, executrix. Peti-
tion for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Robertson, James, estate of. James Robertson et al., executors.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Ruggles, Anson M., estate of. Margaret J. Ruggles, administra-
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
Runyan, Elizabeth S., estate of. Frank E. Gleason, adminis-
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Pending.
Sewall, Philip G., estate of. George Elkis, administrator. Peti-
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Sibley, Elizabeth A., estate of. Eugene L. Sibley, administrator.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Stearns, Benjamin F., estate of. Orsemor S. Holden, adminis-
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate.
Pending.
Swords, Charles R., estate of. Sarah M. Swords, executrix.
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Tarbell, Solon, estate of. Myra G. Tarbell, executrix. Petition
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lv
PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUSTS.
Essex County.
Essex Agricultural Society v. Massachusetts General Hospital
Corporation and the Attorney-General. Petition to sell real
estate and to apply the doctrine of cy-pres. Service accepted.
Petition dismissed. Petitioner appealed. Pending.
Mackay, Frances Mary, estate of. Hersey B. Goodwin et al.,
executors. Petition for leave to compromise a claim against
said estate. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Walcott, John B., estate of. Milton E. Smith et al., overseers of
the poor of Natick, trustees. Petition for license to sell cer-
tain shares of stock. Pending.
Suffolk County.
Bullard, George E., et al. Petition to sell real estate subject to a
charitable trust. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Bussey, Benjamin, estate of. Bill in equity to authorize trustees
of a public charitable trust to sell land. Pending.
Doane, Thomas, estate of. David B. Perry, trustee. Petition
for decree to fix collateral inheritance tax to be paid on
income to Doane College. Attorney-General waived right to
be heard.
Eckley, Frances A., estate of. Petition for appointment of
Gannet Wells as trustee. Attorney-General waived right to
be heard.
Franklin, Benjamin, estate of. Petition of the Attorney-General
for appointment of trustees under will of Benjamin Franklin.
Henry L. Higginson, Francis C. Welch, A. Shuman, Chas. T.
Gallagher, Rev. Chas. W. Duane, Stopford Brooke and Alex-
ander K. McLennan appointed trustees. Pending.
Liversidge, Thomas, estate of. Horatio N. Glover et al., peti-
tioners. Petition for the appointment of Clifton Rogers
Clapp as trustee. Attorney-General waived right to be
heard.
lvi ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan.
Mackey, Frances Mary, estate of. Petition for allowance of final
account of executor. Attorney-General waived right, to be
heard.
Messerve, HopleyT., estate of. George H. Penderghast, exec-
utor. Petition regarding a public charitable trust. Pend-
ing.
Murray, Patrick, estate of. Petition for appointment of a master
to devise a scheme for distribution of trust funds. Pending.
Smith, James, estate of. Attorney-General v. Abner C. Goodell,
administrator. An information asking the court to decree a
scheme for carrying out a public charity. Pending.
Thompson, Thomas, estate of. Minot, trustee, v. Attorney-
General. Bill in equity regarding a public charitable trust.
Pending.
Watterson, Robert C, estate of. Robert W. Lord, trustee.
Public charitable trust. Petition for leave to distribute a
portion of the estate. Pending.
Williams, Charles, estate of. John Ballantyne, executor. Peti-
tion for appointment of trustee for the purposes of a charitable
trust. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Worcester County.
Copeland, Ephraim, estate of. Malcolm G. Clark, trustee. Peti-
tion for license to sell land devised by testator for purposes
of a charitable trust. Attorney-General waived right to be
heard.
Fyfe, William E., estate of. Mary J. Fyfe, executrix. Petition
for decree declaring null and void a devise of real estate for
some benevolent object. Pending.
Fyfe, William E., estate of. Mary J. Fyfe, executrix. Bill in
equity relating to a charitable trust. Pending.
The following cases have been brought for alleged land damages
incurred in the alteration of grade crossings. The Commonwealth,
being obliged under the statutes to pay at least twenty-five per
cent, of the expenses incurred in the alteration of all grade cross-
ings, has in all cases been made a party thereto.
Mary Casey v. City of Northampton et als. Superior Court,
Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff.
Mary Simpson v. City of Northampton et als. Superior Court,
Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff.
F. R. Elwell v. City of Northampton et als. Superior Court,
Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — N o. 12. lvii
Elizabeth N. Thompson v. City of Northampton et ah. Superior
Court, Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff.
John A. Partridge v. City of Northampton et ah. Superior Court,
Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff.
William M. Trow v. City of Northampton et ah. Superior Court,
Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff.
Charles P. Damon v. City of Northampton et ah. Superior Court,
Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff.
John A. Kearns v. Connecticut River Railroad et ah. Superior
Court, Hampshire County. Dismissed.
Arthur C. Guilford v. New Haven & Northampton Company et ah.
Superior Court, Hampshire County. Dismissed.
William F. Kingsley v. City of Northampton et ah. Superior
Court, Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff.
Timothy Sullivan v. City of Northampton et ah. Superior Court,
Hampshire County. Dismissed.
William J. Hall v. City of Northampton et ah. Superior Court,
Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff.
Robert Mousey v. City of Northampton et ah. Superior Court,
Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff.
Martha E. Dickerson v. Boston & Maine Railroad et ah. Superior
Court, Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff.
John A. Keaines v. Boston & Maine Railroad et al. Superior
Court, Hampshire County. Dismissed.
Timothy Sullivan v. City of Northampton et ah. Superior Court,
Hampshire County. Dismissed.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. City of Boston et ah. Superior
Court, Suffolk County. Pending.
Cpmmonwealth of Massachusetts v. City of Boston et ah. Superior
Court, Suffolk County. Pending.
Robert Codman et ah. v. New England Railroad Company et ah.
Superior Court, Suffolk County. Pending.
City of Boston v. Boston Wharf Company et ah. Superior Court,
Suffolk County. Pending.
Bridget Ballentine et al. v. Town of Gardner. Superior Court,
Worcester County. Pending.
George H. Sprague v. Fitchburg. Superior Court, Worcester
County. Pending.
Putnam Machine Company v. Fitchburg. Superior Court, Worces-
ter County. Pending.
Levi W. Phelps v. Fitchburg Railroad. Superior Court, Middle-
sex County. Pending.
Susan C. Dickinson et al. v. Fitchburg. Superior Court, Worces-
ter County. Pending.
lviii ATTOKISTEY-GENEKAL'S KEPOET. [Jan.
Commonwealth v. Boston Terminal Company. Superior Court,
Suffolk County. Pending.
Commonwealth v. Boston Terminal Company. Superior Court,
Suffolk County. Pending.
Margaret Thompson et ah v. Gardner. Superior Court, Worces-
ter County. Judgment for plaintiff.
Frank Pierce et al. v. Gardner. Superior Court, Worcester County.
Judgment for plaintiff.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lix
Suits conducted by the Attorney- General in
Behalf of State Boards and Commissions.
The following cases have been reported to this department by
State boards and commissions, to be conducted by the Attorney-
General or under his direction, pursuant to the provisions of St.
1896, c. 490: —
1. Metropolitan Park Commission.
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land by the said
commission.
Essex County.
Hay, Allan, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Murphy, Michael, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Middlesex County.
Alther, Henry J., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Alther, Julia, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Ames, Nathaniel P., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Bean, Charlotte, et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Bench, John, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Bench, Thomas, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Bigelow, George B., trustee, v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury.
Billings, Mary Martina, v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Billings, Mary Martina, v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Blank, Philip J., v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Brackett, Albert, v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury.
Bragdon, Louis G., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Bridge, Edmund, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Brigham, Mary, et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Brusendorff, Victor, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Campbell, Catherine B., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Carret, James R., trustee, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Case, Moses, trustee, v. Boston & Maine Railroad Company.
Trial by jury.
Chandler, Frank E., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Chase, Edward M., v. Commonwealth. Settled.
lx ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan.
Chase, Juliana, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Chipman, George W., assignee, v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Clark, David O., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Clarke, Nathan D. A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Clarke, Nathan D. A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Clarke, Nathan D. A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Clarke, Nathan D. A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Connors, Hannah, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Corey, Henrietta E., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Corey, Henrietta E., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Craig, Isabel, v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Crehore, Frederick M., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Curtis, Charles P., trustee, under the will of John M. Williams,
v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Darcy, Christopher, v. Commonwealth. Settled.
DeCourcey, John J., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Dowd, Martha A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Dolan, John W., v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Dwyer, Michael F., v Commonwealth. Pending.
Dwyer, William, v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Early, James A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Gould, Alice A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Gould, Alice A., v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury.
Gould, Alice A., et al. v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury.
Gould, Alice A., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hadley, Benjamin, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hadley, Benjamin, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hadley, Benj., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hadley, Benj., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hadley, Benj., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hadley, Benj., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hale, Charles A., v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Hale, Edwin B., v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Hall, Charles A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Harrington, John A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hatch, George S., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hatch, George S., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hefler, Hannah J., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hemenway, Alfred, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hodges, Arthur J., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Holton, Amy W., v. Commonwealth. Pendiug.
Lawrence, Samuel C, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Lovewell, Harriet R., v. Commonwealth.
Lynde, A. Selwyn, administrator, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxi
Magoun, Margaret, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
McCarthy, Jeremiah, heirs of, v. Commonwealth. Settled.
McMahon, Rose A., v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury.
Niles, Sullivan, et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled.
O'Riorden, Patrick, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
O'Riorden, Patrick, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Peterson, Jacob J. S., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Pratt, Marland L., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Preston, Marion W., v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Quimby, Alfred W., v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Quimby, Alfred W., v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Rand, Arnold A., et als. v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Rand, Arnold A., et als. v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Rand, Arnold A., et als. v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Rand, Arnold A., et als. v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Reinhard, Adam, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Rich, Frederick L., v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Rich, Mabel C, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Robertson, John R., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Rogers, Frank R., et al., executors of Joseph F. Wilson, v. Com-
monwealth. Pending.
Rogers, Frank R., et al., executors of the estate of Joseph F.
Wilson, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Rogers, Frank R., et al., executors of the estate of Joseph F.
Wilson, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Rogers, Frank R., et al., executors of the estate of Joseph F.
Wilson, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Ross, Frances J., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Seaver, Ephraim Parker, et als. v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Seaverns, Susan P., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Sewall, George F., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Shanahan, Michael, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Smith, G. Edward, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Smith, G. Edward, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Snow, Edward L., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Stark, Annie M., v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Stevens, J. Elizabeth, et al., heirs of Richard Dexter,'^. Common-
wealth. Pending.
Stewart, Martha P., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Stewart, Martha P., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Stone, Joseph, et al. v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury.
Stone, Joseph, et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Sullivan, Daniel P., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Symmes, Arthur C, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
lxii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Travers, Michael, v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Waltham Gas Light Company v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Warren, Daniel, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Warren Institution for Savings et al. v. Commonwealth. Pend-
ing.
Welch, Albert W., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Wellington, James E., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Wellington, James E., et al., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pend-
ing.
Wells, Edwin H., et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Welsh, Willard, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Whitney, Alice F., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Whitney, Arthur E., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Whitney, John P., et al., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Woodworth, Sarah A., v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Norfolk County.
Bowditch, Ernest W., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Bowley, Anna M., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Bronsdon, Louis V., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Chase, Elvira M., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Dean, Henry M., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
DeLue, George B., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Denny, John W., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Devlin, Mary A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Fife, Margaret, v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Fox, Catherine, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Gallagher, Joseph EL, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Gray, Thomas H., v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury.
Hamblin, Howard M., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Harlow, William H., et als., executors, v. Commonwealth.
Pending.
Hawes, Charles E., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hayden, John E. V., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Higgins, Henry M., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Howe, Kittie M., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Kennedy, John, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Klous, Seaman, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
MacDonnell, Mary A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Mahoney, Dennis W., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Marron, Phillip, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
McGowan, Andrew, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
McGrath, Thomas, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
McKenna, Elizabeth, v. Commonwealth. Pending,
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxiii
Milton, Inhabitants of, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
New England Trotting Horse Breeders' Association v. Common-
wealth. Pending.
Ober, Louis P., v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Pierce, Frederick L., v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Pieno, James C, v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury.
Pope, Hannah C, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Putnam, George, et al., trustees of Henry L. Pierce, v. Com-
monwealth. Pending.
Reardon, Ellen, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Rice, Clifford H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Russell, James S., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Schultze, Gustav A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Scott, Jane W., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Seyter, "William G., v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Stack, John, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Stack, John, trustee, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Weil, Albert, v. Commonwealth. Settled.
White, Frances M. E., executrix. Settled.
Willcomb, George, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Plymouth County.
Foster, Charles H., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Grimes, George, v. Commonwealth. Settled.
McMahon, Mary A., v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Suffolk County.
Adams, Adoniram J., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Atkins, Florence R., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Bamford, Albert J., et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Boston & Revere Electric Street Railway Company v. Common-
wealth. Pending.
Boston & Revere Electric Street Railway Company v. Common-
wealth. Non-suited.
Clark, Theodore E., v. Commonwealth et al. Pending.
Conness, John, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Coughlin, Abbie F., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Donnelly, James J., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Dresser, Mary A. P., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Dresser, William R., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Emerson, Catherine, trustee, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Harvard College v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Hall, Francis J., et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
lxiv ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan.
Hazlett, John P., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Higgins, James, et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Hincke, Maria Anna, v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Jessop, Ann Elizabeth, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Jones, Alfred E., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Jones, Alfred E., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Jones, Charles A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Jones, Charles A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Jones, Francis A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Jones, Francis A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Jones, George H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Jones, George H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Jones, Robert J., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Jones, Robert J., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Jones, Sarah E., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Jones, Sarah E., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Lynn & Boston Railroad Company v. Commonwealth. Non-
suited.
Lynn & Boston Railroad Company v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Martine, Abba M., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Mayers, John H., executor, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. Com-
monwealth. Pending.
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. Com-
monwealth. Pending.
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. Com-
monwealth. Pending.
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. Com-
monwealth. Pending.
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. Com-
monwealth. Pending.
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. Com-
monwealth. Pending.
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. Com-
monwealth. Pending.
Putnam, Jane, et al. v. Boston, Revere Beach & Lynn Railroad
Company. Trial by sheriff's jury.
Putnam, Jane, et al. v. Boston & Maine Railroad Company. Trial
by sheriff's jury.
Rogers, Mary E., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Singleton, Mary E., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Skilton, Elizabeth A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Smith, Emma, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxv
Thayer, Joseph Henry, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Waclsworth, P. Briggs, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Wadsworth, Susan, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Wright, George F., et als. v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Wyman, George W., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
2. Metropolitan Sewerage Commission.
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages alleged
to have been sustained by the taking of rights and easements in
lands by said commission.
Middlesex County.
Stone, Joseph, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Norfolk County.
Flint, Charles L., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hunt, Henry W., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Scheffreen, Jacob, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Tyndale, Theodore H., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Veale, Peter P., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Suffolk County.
Boston v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Boston v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Boston v. Kingman et al. Pending.
Evangelical Lutheran Church for Works of Mercy v. Common-
wealth. Pending.
Finneran, William, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Harvard College v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Holyhood Cemetery Association v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Krug, John, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Nawn, Henry P., v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Noon, Margaret, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Richards, Annette, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Sheehan, John, v. Commonwealth. Referred to an auditor.
Pending.
Stone, Amos, et al. v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury.
Stone, Jasper W., et al., administrators, v. Commonwealth.
Pending.
Stone, Joseph, et al. v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury.
Stone, Joseph, et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Tuttle, Clarence E., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled.
lxvi ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
3. Metropolitan Water Board.
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages alleged
to have been sustained by the taking of rights and easements in
lands by said commission.
Middlesex Co u n ty .
Ballou, Chloe Ann, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Boston & Albany Railroad, petitioner. Pending.
Buck, William H., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Dunn, Johanna T., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Framingham Water Company v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Maiden v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Maiden, Medford and Melrose v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Medford v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Melrose v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Nashua River Paper Company et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Suffolk County.
Boston & Albany Railroad Company v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Mason, Jacob M., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Worcester County.
Allen, George S., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Arkwell, Edward, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Ayer, Eliza A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Bacon, Emory A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Bacon, Marinna, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Ballou, Chloe Ann, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Ballou, Chloe A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Barry, Ellen A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Bathrick, Dorothy P., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Bemis, Elevyn H., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Berlin, Andrew, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Bigelow Carpet Company v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Bigelow Carpet Company v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Bigelow Carpet Company v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Bigelow Carpet Company v. Commonwealth. Pending.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxvii
Bigelow, Arthur J., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Bigelow, Joseph M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Bigelow, Joseph M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Bond, Ellen, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Bond, Louis, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Bosworth, Effie M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Bourdon, Joseph, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Boyd, Andrew, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Boynton, Abigail, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Boynton, Henry A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Blunt, Isabelle M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Brigham, Eunice F., et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to com-
missioners. Pending.
Bruce, William M. ,-y. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Buck, Delia J., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Buck, William H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to auditor.
Pending.
Buck, William H., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Burke, Nellie E., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Burnham, Ella L., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Cather, William J., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Cavanaugh, Lawrence, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Dismissed.
Chandler, Charles H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to com-
missioners. Pending.
Chapman et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Chapman, Sarah, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Chapman, Walter E., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Chapman, Walter E., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
lxviii ATTOENEY-GEKEEAL'S EEPOET. [Jan.
Chase, Frances H., administratrix, v. Commonwealth. Referred
to commissioners. Pending.
Geary, Lawrence G., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Coolidge, William F., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Cooper, Joseph, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Cotting, Chas. U., et ah. v. Commonwealth. Referred to com-
missioners. Pending.
Cowee, Edward A., v. Metropolitan Water Board and Common-
wealth. Pending.
Cowee, Edward A., v. Metropolitan Water Board and Common-
wealth. Pending.
Cowee, Edward A., v. Metropolitan Water Board and Common-
wealth. Pending.
Cowee, Edward A., v. Metropolitan Water Board and Common-
wealth. Pending.
Cowee, Edward A., v. Metropolitan Water Board and Common-
wealth. Pending.
Cowee, Hattie L., v. Metropolitan Water Board and Common-
wealth. Pending.
Crooker, Ansel F., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Cunningham, Robert, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Cunliffe, John, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Cutting, Mary F., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Davis, John K., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Dee, John, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Dolan, Catherine, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Dolan, Catherine, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Dorr, James, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Dorr, James, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Dorr, James, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Dusoe, Charles, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxix
Earle, William A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Trial. Reserved for full court. Pending.
Fahey, Timothy, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Fairbanks, Edwin C, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Felt, Charles W., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Fiske, George A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Flagg, Geo. A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Flagg, Hannah E., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Fletcher, Elizabeth R., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Flint, Eunice J., i>. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Fowle, Waldo, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Frye, John A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to auditor. Pending.
Garfield, Silas, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Gavin, Catherine, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
George, Nathan D., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Goodale, Aaron, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Goodale, Francis W. M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to com-
missioners. Pending.
Goodale, Mary, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Goodney, Francis, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Harper, Edward A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission-
ers. Pending.
Harper, Edward A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission-
ers. Pending.
Harris, Charles M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission-
ers. Pending.
Harris, Melissa, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Haskell, John C, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Haskell, Maria A., v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury.
Hastings et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
lxx
ATTORKEY-GEJSTERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Hastings, Calvin H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Hastings, George R., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hastings, Henry L., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission-
ers. Pending.
Hastings, John C, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Hastings, John C, et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Hastings, Mary Lizzie, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Hawes, Frederick A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Heighway, George A., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Holland, Robert, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Holmes, George H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Holmes, George H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Houghton, Myron W., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Howe, Israel G., v. Commonwealth. Referred to auditor.
Pending.
Hudson, George C. F., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hudson, George C. F., et al. v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Hyde, George L.., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Jefts, Asis S., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Johnson, Addison, executor, v. Commonwealth. Referred to
auditor. Pending.
Johnson, Carl J., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Johnson, Charles S., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Johnson. Edward S., et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to com-
missioners. Pending.
Johnson, Edwin S., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission-
ers. Pending.
Johnson, William O., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Johnson, William 0., v. Metropolitan Water Board. Pending.
Kendall, George, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxxi
Kershaw, James H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission-
ers. Pending.
Keyes, George H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Keyes, Jonathan M., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Kittredge, Julia, et als. v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury.
Kittredge, Julia, v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury.
Knight, Henry G., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Lafrade, Peter, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Lafyette, Louisa, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Lambert, John, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners .
Dismissed.
Lawrence, Emma, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Lawrence, George D., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Lawrence, Lucretia, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission-
ers. Pending.
Laythe, Sarah A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Laythe, Sarah A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Leonard, Bridget, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Levi, Sarah, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Liberty, Pascal, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Dismissed.
Longley, George H., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Lord, Joseph M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Lord, Joseph M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Lovell, Alfred, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Lovell, Angeline E., et at. v. Commonwealth. Referred to com-
missioners. Pending.
Lovell, David B., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Lovell, Portland, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Lowe, Horace H., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
lxxii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Lozeau, Delia, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Luce, Mehitable, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Lucius, Jeremiah, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Lundren, Per Arvid, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Luurtsema, Gurt, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Luurtsema, Joaptje, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Lynch, John, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Lynch, Thomas, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Lynch, Thomas, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Mack, Cornelius, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Mackesey, Thomas, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
March, Harry E., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
McAndrew, Hannah, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
McNarnara, Austin D., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
McNamara, Ellen, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
McNamara, Thomas, et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to com-
missioners. Pending.
Merrill, Elizabeth A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Moore, Nellie F., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Moran, James, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Moran, Patrick T., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Morse, Amanda, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Mulcahy, Catharine, administratrix, v. Commonwealth. Referred
to commissioners. Pending.
Muzzy, Jonas, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Muzzy, Jonas, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Nashua River Paper Company et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred
to commissioners. Pending.
Nault, David, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxxiii
Newton, George B., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Newton. Silas, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Nichols, Charles E., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Nichols, Luke H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
O'Connor, Thomas H., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Olcott, John EL, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
O'Malley, Michael, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Ovenden, William C, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Padden, Margaret, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Phelps, Sarah A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Philbin. Tobias, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Pierce, Caroline, et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Pierce, Henry, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Potter, Jeremiah, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Prescott, John B. F., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Prescott, Martha E., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Redding, George L., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Reed et al. v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Reed, Alice N., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Reed, Charles H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Reed, Charles H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Reed, Elizabeth M., et al., executors, v. Commonwealth. Referred
to commissioners. Pending.
Reed, George D., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Rice, Almira F., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Rice, Mary C, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
lxxiv ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan.
Roach, James, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Russell, Ann Elizabeth, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Russell, Samuel S., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Ryan, Michael EL, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Ryan, Michael S.,v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Sargent, Margaret E., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Sawin, Charles B., v. Commonwealth. Referred to an auditor.
Pending.
Sawyer, Henry O., et als. v. Metropolitan Water Board and the
Commonwealth. Dismissed. Taken to full court on excep-
tions. See 178 Mass. 267.
Sawyer, Henry O., et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Sawyer, Ivers H., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Sawyer, Louise M., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Scanlon, Mary, et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission-
ers. Pending.
Schmidt, Christian, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Sears, Joshua M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to auditor.
Pending.
Sene, Eclid, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Sheldon, Augustus V., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Shepard, John, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Short, Harriett, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Sirabian, Kayazan, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Smith, Alice M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Smith, Artemas C, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission-
ers. Pending.
Smith, Charles E., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Snow, Antoine, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Snow Brothers v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Staples, William H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission-
ers. Pending.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxxv
Staples, William H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to com-
missioners. Pending.
Storms, William E., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Stott, James R., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Tatro, George, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Thomas, A. Mason, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission-
ers. Pending.
Tobin, Mary A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Tonry, Margaret F., v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury.
Toombs, Joseph E., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Toomey, John, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Toomey, John, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Valley, Abigail, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Waite, David P., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Waite, David P., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Warfield, Samuel R., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Warfield, Samuel R., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Warner, Mary J., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Warner, Mary J., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
W^est Boylston Manufacturing Company v. Metropolitan Water
Board. Pending.
Wheeler, Samuel M., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Whitaker, C. Wayland, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
White, Lucy, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Whiting, Alfred N., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. Pending.
Whittemore, John M., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Wilder, Francis A., et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to com-
missioners. Pending.
Wilder, Francis A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis-
sioners. * Pending.
Wilder, Harriet, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Wilson, James, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
lxxvi ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S EEPOKT. [Jan.
Wood, Ashley H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Wood, Willie B., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
Woods, James H., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
York, Eda F., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
York, Eda F., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners.
Pending.
4. Massachusetts Highway Commission.
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages alleged
to have been sustained by the taking of land by said commission.
Barnstable County.
Crowell, Thomas H., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Essex County.
Dane, Sarah E., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Wyman, Isaac C, v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury.
Franklin County.
Massamet Yarn Mills v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Middlesex County.
Hudson Co-operative Bank v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Rice, John E., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Plymouth County.
Taylor, Horace B., v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Suffolk County.
Haveland, J. B., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Worcester County.
Gould, Charlotte E., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
5. Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners.
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages caused
by the taking of land by said commissioners.
Suffolk County.
Bent, William H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
East Boston Company v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Jeffries, Anna L., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxxvii
Lamb, George, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Lamb, George, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Roxbury Central Wharf v. Commonwealth. Pending.
6. Miscellaneous Cases from Above Commissions.
Middlesex County.
Cambridge, Cemetery Commissioners of. Petition for leave to con-
vey to Park Commission a parcel of land dedicated for cemetery
purposes. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Crandall, H. Burr, v. Charles Price (superintendent). Action of
tort for conversion. Pending.
Suffolk County.
Bailey, James A., et als. Petition for appointment of commis-
sioners to apportion cost of maintenance of north metropoli-
tan sewerage system. Commissioners appointed. Report of
commissioners accepted.
Barnes, Frank P., v. Henry H. Sprague et al. Petition for writ
of mandamus against the Metropolitan Water Board. Peti-
tion denied.
Bent, William H., et al. v. Henry W. Swift et al. Pending.
Carahar, James A., et al. v. William B. de las Casas et al. Peti-
tion for an injunction to prevent Metropolitan Park Commis-
sioners from tearing down plaintiff's hotel at Nahant. Peti-
tion dismissed.
Connolly, Mary E., v. Charles G. Craib. Action of tort to
recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been
sustained by an employee of the contractor in the construc-
tion of the metropolitan sewer, the defendant being the
inspector employed by the Metropolitan Sewerage Commis-
sioners. Pending.
Flagg, John N., v. Edward S. Bradford, Treasurer. Action of
contract growing out of the taking by the Metropolitan Water
Board of the plaintiff's land. Petition dismissed. Reserved
for the full court.
Hanscom, Hervey A., et al., Cambridge v. Action of tort
growing out of accident caused by laying water pipes by
Metropolitan Water Board in Cambridge. Pending.
Hanscom, Hervey A., et al., Commonwealth v. Action of con-
tract growing out of accident caused by laying water pipes by
Metropolitan Water Board in Cambridge. Pending.
Jones, George H., et al. v. Metropolitan Park Commissioners.
Petition for a writ of certiorari on account of assessment of
betterments on land in Revere. Pending before Supreme
Judicial Court.
lxxviii ATTORNEY-GENES AL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Metropolitan Park Commissioners, petitioners. Petition for the
appointment of a commission to apportion the cost of main-
tenance of the parks system among the various cities and
towns within the metropolitan parks district. Charles Francis
Adams, John C. Hammond and Thomas M. Stetson ap-
pointed commissioners. Pending before Supreme Judicial
Court on report of commissioners.
Newton, Francis D., et al. v. Henry H. Sprague et als. Petition
in the nature of an action of tort to recover damages caused
by the alleged filling up of a well belonging to plaintiffs.
Pending.
Rohan, Mary, v. Commonwealth. Petition in the nature of an
action of tort for personal injuries alleged to have been
sustained in the construction of a section of the metropolitan
sewer. Pending.
Sheehan, John, v. Commonwealth. Breach of contract growing
out of construction of sewer in East Boston. Pending.
Southborough, Commonwealth v. Action of contract. Pending.
7. Cases arising under St. 1899, c. 457, " An Act to limit the
Height of Buildings in the Vicinity of the State House."
Abbott, Edwin H., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Abbott, Edwin H., trustee, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Beebe, E. Pierson, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Binney, Amos, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Binney, Arthur, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Binney, Henry P., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Brinton, Ferree, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. See 178
Mass. 199.
Cabot, Susan B., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Croft, Arthur, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Earl, Maria B., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Endicott, William, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Forbes, J. Malcom, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Frye, Emily J., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Goddard, George A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Gray, Francis C, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Heard, J. Theodore, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hollingsworth, Polly R., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Lewis, Elizabeth, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Lodge, Henry Cabot, administrator, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Loring, Anna P., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Paine, Robert Treat, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Paine, Robert Treat, et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Park, Theodore W., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxxix
Parker, Charles H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending before the
Supreme Judicial Court See 178 Mass. 199. Pending.
Parkman, George F., v. Commonwealth. Pending. See 178
Mass. 199.
Perry, Emily Gj-., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Prince, Gordan, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Read, Elise H., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Read, John, et al., trustees and executors, v. Commonwealth.
Pending.
Ritchie, Rosa G., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Robinson, Edith V., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Ruggles, Henry S., v. Commonwealth. Pendiug.
Warren, Fiske, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Way, Charles G., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
8. State Board of Charity.
(a) Actions of contract pending in the Superior Court to re-
cover charges for the support of insane paupers in State insane
hospitals, under the provisions of Pub. Sts., c. 87, § 32.
Middlesex County.
Cooper, Esau, Shaw v. Pending.
Suffolk County.
Boston, Phillips v. Pending.
Cambridge, Phillips v. Pending.
Knight, Abbie H., Bradford v. Pending.
Osgood, Frederick PL, Bradford v. Pending
Peabody, Marden v. Pending.
Reading, Phillips v. Pending.
Shillaber, D. H., Bradford v. Pending.
Stow, Phillips v. Pending.
Waltham, Bradford v. Pending.
Waltham, Marden v. Pending.
Wolfe, Arthur M., Bradford v. Pending.
Worcester, Phillips v. Pending.
(6) Bastardy complaints brought under Pub. Sts., c. 85.
Middlesex County.
Egnor, Belie, v. Arthur Wyman. Pending.
Harkins, Celia, v. Walter Harrington. Pending.
Sumner, Emma, v. Edward Hamlin. Pending.
Suffolk County.
Johnson, Julia R., v. Henry Williams. Pending.
lxxx ATTOENEY-GENEEAL'S EEPOET. [Jan.
MISCELLANEOUS CASES.
Ahem, Maurice, v. Newton & Boston Street Railway Company.
Bill in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States to
restrain the defendant from complying with the provisions of
St. 1900, c. 197, relative to the transportation of scholars in
the public schools by street railway companies. Pending.
Amesbury & Salisbury Gas Light Company. Penalty for exist-
ence of sulphuretted hydrogen in its gas. Pending.
Ayer Light, Heat and Power Company. Failure to file with the
Gas Light Commissioners the return required by St. 1886, c.
346, § 2, as extended by St. 1887, c. 382, § 2. Pending.
Bay State Beneficiary Association, Attorney-General ex rel. Insur-
ance Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial
Court for Suffolk County for an injunction and appointment
of a receiver. Injunction issued, and Henry C. Hyde, P^sq.,
and Henry C. Bliss, Esq., both of West Springfield, were
appointed temporary receivers. Pending.
Bay State Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Insurance Commis-
sioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk
County for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver.
Injunction issued, and Herbert Parker, Esq., appointed re-
ceiver. Pending.
Berkshire Health and Accident Association, Attorney-General ex
rel. Insurance Commissioner v. Petition for an injunction and
the appointment of a receiver. Injunction issued, and Alpheus
Sanford, Esq., of Boston, appointed receiver. Pending.
Boston v. Commonwealth. Petition for transfer of Herbert A.
Hector and Harry O. Hector, indigent children. Decree.
Boston v. Same. Sewer assessment on Rutherford Avenue,
Charlestown. Pending.
Boston v. Same. Petition for the transfer of Hyman Gold, an in-
digent child, having no settlement, to State Board of Charity.
Decree.
Boston, Commonwealth v. Petition for assessment of damages to
State Prison buildings, caused by the alteration of grade
crossings in Charlestown. Pending.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT— Ho. 12. lxxxi
Bragg, Henry W., et al. v. Commonwealth. Petition to Superior
Court for Suffolk County for allowance of claim of auditors
for examination into affairs of Massachusetts Benefit Life
Association. Pending.
Bridges, Benjamin F. (Warden, Massachusetts State Prison), v.
Edward D. Bean. Claim for goods furnished to the defend-
ant. Pending.
Brookfield Savings Bank, Savings Bank Commissioners v. Peti-
tion to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for an
injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction is-
sued, and George W. Johnson appointed receiver. Pending.
Brothership of Birsen Association, Attorney-General ex rel. v.
Petition for an injunction and a receiver. Injunction issued,
and David A. Ellis appointed receiver. Pending.
Brush Chemical Company. Failure to file return required by St.
1891, c. 341. Pending.
Burdett, Edward W., petitioner. Petition for a writ of habeas
cropus. Writ issued and petitioner discharged.
Cambridge, Bradford v. Claim for tide water displacement.
Pending.
Chaffee, Clara. Claim against the city of Newton for board at
Worcester Insane Hospital. Pending.
Chicopee, Water Commissioners of. Claim of violation of civil
service rules. Referred to District Attorney, Charles L.
Gardner. Pending.
Clinton Gas Light Company, Attorney-General v. Petition to the
Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for dissolution
and the appointment of a receiver under St. 1894, c. 476.
Pending.
Commonwealth Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Insurance Com-
missioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for
Suffolk County for an injunction and a receiver under the
provisions of St. 1894, c. 522, § 7. Injunction issued, and
William B. Stevens, Esq., appointed receiver. Pending.
Damon, George L. Claim for tide water displacement. Pending.
Danvers v. Trustees of Danvers Insane Hospital. Petition for
the appointment of three commissioners under St. 1898, c.
564, to determine the sum to be paid by the Commonwealth
for water provided to the Danvers Insane Hospital by the
town of Danvers. George A. Blaney, Edwin Dresser and
William Wheeler appointed commissioners. Pending.
Durkee, Elmer, v. Commonwealth. Action of contract growing
out of the purchase of goods by the plaintiff from the Danvers
Lunatic Hospital. Pending.
lxxxii ATTORNEY-GEKEKAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Eagle Life Association, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition for
an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction
issued, and Alfred F. Lilley, Esq., appointed receiver.
Pending.
Eagle Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Insurance Commissioner
v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County
for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunc-
tion issued, and R. D. Weston-Smith, Esq., of Boston, ap-
pointed receiver. Pending.
Ellis, George H., Attorney-General ex rel. Harbor and Land Com-
missioners v. Information in the Supreme Judicial Court for
Middlesex County to protect the waters of a great pond under
St. 1888, c. 318. Referred to a master. Pending.
Equitable Accident Insurance Association, Attorney-General v.
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for
an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction
issued, and Wade Keyes, Esq., of Boston, appointed receiver.
Pending.
Fall River, Mayor of, and Old Colony Railroad Company, Attor-
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition for a writ of mandamus to
compel the respondents to file in the registry of deeds certain
plans and documents required by St. 1900, c. 472. Applica-
tion withdrawn by agreement of parties.
Fidelity Benefit Association, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition
for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunc-
tion issued, and A. E. Denison appointed receiver. Pend-
ing.
Firemen's Fire Insurance Company, Insurance Commissioner v.
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for
an injunction to restrain the defendant from removing its
books and papers from the Commonwealth, and the appoint-
ment of a receiver to recover its capital stock distributed with-
out authority of law. Injunction issued. Defendant recovered
its capital stock and deposited it with the International Trust
Company, as trustee. Pending.
Framingham Savings Bank, Savings Bank Commissioners v. Pe-
tition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, under
St. 1894, c. 317, § 6, for an injunction and the appointment
of a receiver. Injunction issued, and P. H. Cooney and
A. V. Harrington appointed receivers. Pending.
Franklin Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Insurance Commis-
sioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suf-
folk County for an injunction and the appointment of a
receiver. Pending.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxxxiii
Fraternal Aid, Order of, Attorney-General ex rel. Insurance
Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for
Suffolk County for an injunction and the appointment of a
receiver. Injunction issued, and Winthrop H. Wade, Esq.,
of Boston, appointed receiver. Pending.
Globe Investment Company, Savings Bank Commissioners v.
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County,
under St. 1888, c. 387, for an injunction and the appointment
of a receiver. Injunction granted, and Henry A. Wyman
appointed receiver. Pending.
Gloucester Water Supply Company, Commonwealth v. Corpora-
tion tax for 1895. Pending.
Greylock Beneficiary Association, Insurance Commissioner v.
Petition to the Supreme Judical Court for Suffolk County,
under St. 1895, c. 340, for an injunction and the appointment
of a receiver. Injunction issued, and A. A. Folsom, of Chel-
sea, appointed receiver. Pending.
Guardian Life Insurance Company, Insurance Commissioner v.
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for
an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction
issued, and Frank D. Allen, Esq., appointed receiver. Pend-
ing.
Hampshire Savings Bank, Savings Bank Commissioners v. Peti-
tion to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for an
injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction
issued, and Richard W. Irwin, Esq., and Benjamin E. Cook,
Esq., appointed receivers. Pending.
Harmon, William P., v. Cattle Commissioners. Petition to the
Superior Court for Essex County for damages. Judgment
for defendant by agreement.
Haverhill Gas Light Company v. Gas and Electric Light Commis-
sioners et al. Bill in equity in the Circuit Court of the United
States to restrain the Board from carrying out an order to
decrease the price of gas in Haverhill. Pending.
Hebrew Workmen's Benevolent Society, Attorney-General v.
Petition for injunction for failure to file return required by
St. 1899, c. 442. Return filed.
Holliston, Selectmen of, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition for
a writ of mandamus to compel the placing of a democrat on
the board of registrars of voters. Petition denied.
Home Indemnity Corporation. Violation of St. 1901, c. 422, § 8.
Referred to the district attorney for Suffolk County.
Hough, Alexander B., Commonwealth v. Claim for board of
Julia F. Hough at Worcester Insane Hospital. Pending.
lxxxiv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Humbert First Artillery Mutual Benefit Association, Insurance
Commissioner v. Failure to make annual report to Insurance
Commissioner required by St. 1899, c. 442, § 19. Pending.
Independent Order Ahawas Israel, Attorney-General v. Petition
for injunction for failure to file return required by St. 1899,
c. 442. Return filed.
Italian Associates of Fall River, Insurance Commissioner v.
Failure to make annual report to Insurance Commissioner
required by St. 1899, c. 442, § 19. Pending.
Jablochkoff Electric Lighting Company of New England, Com-
missioner of Corporations v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial
Court for Suffolk County for dissolution under Pub. Sts.,
c. 106, § 65. Pending.
Kaiser Hat and Cap Company. Claim for corporation tax for
1897. Company in insolvency. Claim proved. Pending.
Kennedy, George C, Francis C. Welch, trustee. Claim for tide
water displacement. Pending.
Knight, Alice H., Westborough Insane Asylum v. Claim for
board of insane patient in hospital. Referred to N. N. Jones
of Newbury port for collection. Pending.
Knights of Justice, Order of, Insurance Commissioner v. Failure
to make annual report to Insurance Commissioner required by
St. 1899, c. 442, § 19. Pending.
Livingstone, Murray V. Claim for board of Margie A. Living-
stone in Westborough Insane Hospital. Pending.
Logan, John P., v. Charles Rice and the Commonwealth. Action
of contract. Superior Court for Franklin County. Pending.
MacDonald, John A., v. Commonwealth. Petition to the Supreme
Judicial Court for Suffolk County for a writ of error to reverse
a judgment rendered for the Commonwealth on an indictment
charging the plaintiff with forging and uttering certain checks.
Judgment affirmed. Reported in 173 Mass. 322. Case taken
to United States Supreme Court by writ of error. Judgment
confirmed. See 180 U. S. 311.
Masons Fraternal Accident Association of America, Attorney-
General v. Petition for an injunction and the appointment
of a receiver. Injunction issued, and Henry C. Bliss, Esq.,
appointed receiver. Pending.
Massachusetts Benefit Life Association, Attorney-General ex rel.
Insurance Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial
Court for Suffolk County for an injunction and the appoint-
ment of a receiver. Injunction issued, and Arthur Lord, Esq.,
and Alfred S. Wood worth, Esq., both of Boston, appointed
receivers. Pending.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxxxv
Massachusetts Masonic Life Association, Attorney-General ex rel.
Insurance Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial
Court for Suffolk County for an injunction and a receiver
under St. 1896, c. 515, § 6. Injunction issued, and Jonathan
Varnes, Esq., of Springfield, appointed receiver. Pending.
Massachusetts National Life Association, Attorney-General ex rel.,
Insurance Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial
Court for Suffolk County, under St. 1896, c. 515, § 6, for an
injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction
issued, and George Kress appointed receiver. Pending.
McDowell, J. F., claim against, for merchandise furnished by
State Prison. Pending.
McQuestin, Fred, Commonwealth v. Action in Superior Court
for Suffolk County for damages caused by tide water displace-
ment in Boston harbor. Judgment for defendant. Reserved
for full court. Pending.
Medway Electric Light and Power Company. Failure to file with
Gas Light Commissioners the return required by St. 1886,
c. 346, § 2, as extended by St. 1887, c. 387, § 2. Pending.
Melrose Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Insurance Commis-
sioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk
County for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver.
Injunction issued, and Alpheus Sanford, Esq., appointed
receiver. Pending.
Metcalf, Albert, Bradford v. Claim for tide water displacement.
Pending.
Middleborough v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
Company and the Commonwealth. Petition for damages in
the Superior Court for Plymouth County, growing out of tak-
ing of land for the purpose of abolishing grade crossings in
Middleborough. Pending.
Milford Electric Light and Power Company, Attorney-General v.
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for
dissolution and the appointment of a receiver, under St. 1894,
c. 476. Pending.
Miners Savings Bank, Savings Bank Commissioners v. Petition
to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for an
injunction and the appointment of a receiver under the provi-
sions of St. 1894, c. 317, § 6. Injunction issued. Pending.
Minnesota Savings Fund Investment Company v. Treasurer of the
Commonwealth. Bill in equity in Superior Court for Suffolk
County, asking for distribution of certain funds in the hands
of the State Treasurer. Marshal P. Thompson appointed
master. Pending.
lxxxvi ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Morgan, Jay H., Lyman School for Boys v. Action of contract
for services of boy placed out by trustees. Pending.
Munkley, James A., v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy.
Petition for a writ of certiorari. Hearing before a single
justice and reserved for full court. Petition dismissed.
See 60 N. E. Rep. 413.
Murphy, Clarence, v. Commonwealth. Petition to the Supreme
Judicial Court for a writ of error. Argued before full bench.
Decision ordering sentence to be reversed and petitioner to be
resentenced under the law as it was prior to the passage of St.
1895, c. 504. Reported in 172 Mass. 264. Prisoner sen-
tenced accordingly. Exceptions taken. Argued before full
bench. Exceptions overruled. Reported in 174 Mass. 369.
Case taken to United States Supreme Court by writ of error.
Writ denied. Reported in 177 U. S. 155.
Netherlands Fire Insurance Company, Attorney-General ex rel.
v. Violation of St. 1894, c. 522, § 20. Pending.
New England Mutual Accident Association, petitioners. Petition
for appointment of receiver. Thomas Weston, Esq., of Bos-
ton, appointed receiver. Pending.
Newburyport & Amesbury Horse Railroad Company. Railroad
Commissioners' tax, 1899. Pending.
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, Bradford v. Claim
for tide water displacement. Pending.
Norfolk county commissioners, Attorney-General v. Petition for
a writ of certiorari. Pending.
Northeastern Indemnity Association, Attorney-General ex rel. v.
Petition for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver.
Injunction issued, and F. C. Nash, Esq., appointed receiver.
Pending.
Northern Mutual Relief Association, Attorney-General ex rel.
Insurance Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial
Court for Suffolk County for an injunction and the appoint-
ment of a receiver. Injunction granted, and Samuel H. Hud-
son, of Boston, appointed receiver. Pending.
Nutting, Charles H., v. Commonwealth. Writ of error in Supreme
Court of the United States. Argued. Pending.
O'Reily, Richard P., v. Samuel Dalton et ah. Petition to the
Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for a writ of cer-
tiorari, claiming want of jurisdiction by the board appointed
under St. 1893, c. 367, § 65, in the matter of the reorganiza-
tion of the Eighth Regiment of Infantry, M. V. M. Pend-
ing.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxxxvii
Page, Herbert S., et a/., petitioners. Petition to the Probate
Court for Suffolk County for the appointment of a guardian
for Alvin Page, an insane person chargeable to the State.
Pending.
Parker, George. Claim for tide water displacement. Pending.
Peare, George R., v. Socialist Labor Party. Petition to the Mu-
nicipal Court for Suffolk County for an iuquest, under St.
1898, c. 548, § 305. Pending.
Pentila, Andrew, v. Bekkila Helgias and Joseph H. Scott (super-
intendent of the Massachusetts Reformatory). An action of
tort in the District Court for Middlesex County. Pending.
Phoenix Rattan Company et al., Joseph F. Scott (superintendent) v.
Action of contract in the Superior Court for Suffolk County.
Company petitioned into insolvency after entry of writ.
Edgar N. Hill, Esq., of Boston and Joseph F. Scott, Esq., of
Concord, appointed assignees. Claim proved. Pending.
Pittsfield Electric Street Railway Company. Petition by the Com-
monwealth for alteration of tracks of said railroad in Dal ton.
Pending.
Provident Savings Life Assurance Society of New York v. Fred-
erick L. Cutting, Insurance Commissioner. Petition for a
writ of mandamus. Hearing on demurrer. Reserved for full
court. Pending.
Rice, Fannie. Claim for board in Westborough Insane Hospital.
Pending.
St. Francis Benefit Association, Attorney-General v. Petition for
injunction for failure to file return required by St. 1899, c.
442. No action taken.
St. Jean Baptiste Society of North Adams, Attorney-General v.
Petition for injunction for failure to file return required by
St. 1899, c. 442. Return filed.
Sargent, Clara J., v. State Board of Lunacy and Charity. Supe-
rior Court, Essex County. Appeal on a complaint charging
neglect of children under St. 1882, c. 181. Pending.
Security Savings Bank, Board of Savings Bank Commissioners v.
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for
an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction
granted. Pending.
Simonds, Joel H., v. Massachusetts School for Feeble-minded et
als. Petition for an injunction and assessment of damages
caused by flowage of land. Pending.
Smith, Maurice, v. Commonwealth. Petition for a writ of error
to the Superior Court to revise sentence. Pending.
lxxxviii ATTORKEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Smith, Henry O., et als. v. Inhabitants of Leicester and the Com-
monwealth. Bill in equity in the Superior Court for Worcester
County to restrain town officers from raising money to pay
expenses for damages caused by construction of State high-
way in Leicester. Settled. i
Sibley, Richard C. Claim for tide water displacement. Pending.
South Shore Masonic Mutual Relief Association of Massachusetts,
Insurance Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial
Court for Suffolk County, under St, 1895, c. 340, for an in-
junction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction
issued and J. H. Flint appointed receiver. Pending.
Stone, Joseph, Bradford v. Claim for tide water displacement.
Pending.
Storti, Luigi, v. Commonwealth. Petition to the Supreme Judicial
Court for a writ of error to Superior Court and a writ of habeas
corpus to the Commonwealth. Reserved for the full court and
petition dismissed.
Storti, Luigi, v. Commonwealth. Petition to the Supreme Judicial
Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Petition denied.
Storti, Luigi, v. Commonwealth. Petition to the Circuit Court of
the United States for a writ of habeas corpus. Hearing and
petition denied. Appeal taken to the Supreme Court of the
United States. Decree of Circuit Court affirmed.
Storti, Luigi, petitioner. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court
for a writ of habeas corpus. Hearing and petition denied.
Reserved to full court. Petition dismissed.
Storti, Luigi, petitioner, for writ of habeas corpus. Petition to the
United States Circuit Court. Petition dismissed. Appeal
taken to the Supreme Court of the United States. Decree of
Circuit Court affirmed.
Suffolk Mutual Accident Association, Insurance Commissioner v.
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for
an injunction and the appointment of a receiver, under the
provisions of St. 1896, c. 515, § 6. Injunction issued, and
George S. Merrill appointed receiver. Pending.
Suffolk Masonic Mutual Relief Association, Attorney-General v.
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for an
injunction and the appointment of a receiver, under St. 1899,
c. 442, § 24. Injunction granted, and Edward T. Pigeon, Esq.,
secretary of the association, appointed receiver. Pending.
Suffolk Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Insurance Commissioner
v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County
for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver, under the
provisions of St. 1894, c. 522, § 7. Injunction issued, and
James C. Davis, Esq., appointed receiver. Pending.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxxxix
Sun Indemnity Assurance Society, Attorney-General v. Petition
for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunc-
tion issued, and Prescott Keyes, Esq., appointed receiver.
Pending.
Supreme Council of United Fellowship, Insurance Commissioner v.
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County,
under St. 1895, c. 340, for an injunction and the appointment
of a receiver. Injunction issued, and Oliver Storer, Esq., of
Boston, appointed receiver. Pending.
Taylor, Edgar B., et al. v. Robert Wilson and the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts. Action of contract. Pending.
Thuringer Fire Insurance Company v. Commonwealth et al. Bill
in equity in the Supreme Judicial Court to require the Treasurer
of the Commonwealth to transfer to the company certain
deposits. Decree.
Titcomb, George H., v. Cape Cod Ship Canal Company, George
A. Maiden, Treasurer, et al. Petition for injunction to re-
strain the Treasurer of the Commonwealth from the payment
of money under St. 1883, c. 259, and St. 1891, c. 397.
Pending.
Trehy, John W., Attorney-General ex rel. Board of Civil Service
Commissioners v. Information in the nature of quo warranto
to try the respondent's title to the office of almoner of the
city of Chicopee. Reserved for the Supreme Judicial Court.
United Industrials. Petition for failure to file return required by
St. 1884, c. 330. Pending.
Ware, Worcester Lunatic Hospital v. Action of contract for the
board of Hiram L. Wood, a patient in said hospital. Re-
ferred to the district attorney. Pending.
Wattles, Joseph W., Jr., et als., Attorney-General v. Petition
for an injunction to restrain the selectmen of Canton from
laying out and widening Washington Street in Canton. (This
petition was abandoned.)
Wells, Frank H. Claim for tide water displacement. Pend-
ing.
White, Etta W., petitioner. Petition to the Supreme Judicial
Court for Suffolk County for release from the Westborough
Insane Asylum. Remanded to asylum. Reported to Supreme
Judicial Court.
Wildey Casualty Company, Attorney-General ex rel. Insurance
Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for
Suffolk County for an injunction and the appointment of a
receiver. Injunction granted, and Archie N. Frost, Esq.,
of Lawrence, appointed receiver. Pending.
xc ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Williams, Henry Bigelow, et al. v. Attorney-General. Petition
to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of error
to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Pending.
Woburn, Board of Public Works of, Commonwealth v. Viola-
tion of civil service rules. Referred to the district attorney.
Pending.
Wolf, Herman, v. Boston, Suffolk County. Damage to horse,
caused by cave-in of street during the laying of pipes by the
Metropolitan Water Board. Settled.
Wollaston Land Association. Claim for tide water displacement.
Pending.
World Accident Insurance Company, Attorney-General ex rel.
Insurance Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial
Court for Suffolk County for an injunction and the appoint-
ment of a receiver. Injunction issued, and Thomas N.
Perkins, of Boston, appointed receiver. Pending.
1902.]
PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12.
xci
COLLECTIONS.
Collections have been made by this department as follows : —
Corporation taxes for the year 1900, overdue and referred
by the Treasurer of the Commonwealth to the Attorney-
General for collection, $164,177 92
Interest on same at penal rate of six per cent., . . . 1,419 22
Costs, 882 93
Miscellaneous, 7,823 34
Total, $174,303 41
The following table shows a detailed statement of the same : —
Collected on
Corporation Tax
Interest.
Total.
for 1900.
A. A. Mills Companv, .
$705 96
S3 53
$709 49
A B. & E. L. Shaw Company,
771 49
11 57
783 06
A. F. Towle & Son Company,
1,250 85
20 43
1,271 28
A. M McPhail Piano Company, .
1,065 24
-
1,065 24
A. L. Lewis Company, .
112 98
-
112 98
A. T. Fairbanks Confectionery
Company,
30 02
-
30 02
Abram French Company,
6,456 00
216 41
6,672 41
Agawam Ice Company,
64 56
1 10
65 66
American Citizen Company,
80 70
80
81 50
American Collection Agency,
16 14
10
16 24
American Cultivator Publishing
Company, .....
161 40
4 18
165 58
Amesbury & Hampton Street
Railway Company, .
807 00
4 03
811 03
Amesbury & Salisbury Gas Com-
panv, ......
416 41
6 25
422 66
Atlantic Telegraph Company of
Massachusetts, ....
80 70
-
80 70
Austin & Winslow-Gallagher Ex-
press Company,
60 52
1 01
61 53
Austin Furniture Company, .
291 97
5 82
297 79
B. L. Bragg Company, .
403 50
7 77
411 27
Barbour-Stockwell Companv,
161 40
2 49
163 89
Bav State Chair Company, Incor-
porated,
140 41
2 53
142 94
Bay State Construction Company,
25 82
13
25 95
xcii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOET.
[Jan.
Collected on
Account of
Corporation Tax
for 1900.
Interest.
Bay State Cordage Company,
Bay State Gas Company,
Bay State Improved Box Com
pany,
Bay State Metal Works,
Beach & Clarridge Company,
Belisle Printing and Publishing
Company, ....
Biddle & Smart Company, .
Blake Manufacturing Company,
Block Plant Electric Light Com
pany,
Blue Hill Granite Company,
Bolles & Wilde Company,
Bon Marche Dry Goods Company
Boston Advertising Company,
Boston Asphalt Company, .
Boston Book Company,
Boston Cycle Company,
Boston Dental M an uf acturing
Company, ....
Boston Fire Brick and Clay Retort
Manufacturing Company,
Boston Furnace Company, .
Boston Gas Light Company,
Boston Ice Cream Company,
Boston Paper Mills Company,
Boston Paving Company,
Boston Steel and Iron Company,
Boston Stitching and Plating Com
pany, . .
Boston Traveller Company,
Brackett's Market Corporation,
Brockway-Smith Corporation,
Brookfiefd Brick Company, .
Brooks Bank Note Company,
Brown & Simonds Company,
Bryant Boot and Shoe Company
Bui lard Camera Company, .
C. F. Eddy Company, .
C. F. Sampson Manufacturing
Company, ....
C. W. Tappan Shoe Company,
Campello Leather Company,
Carlow & Putnam Company,
Charles A. White Company,
Charles E. Lauriat Company,
Charles T. Brown Company,
Chelsea Express Despatch Com
pany,
Chequasset Lumber Company,
Chicopee Falls Wheel Company,
1224 34
23,304 54
117 82
225 96
637 53
48 42
106 52
80 70
23 00
222 48
508 41
1,049 10
19 36
371 22
1,210 50
193 «8
161 40
547 14
121 05
2,353 21
161 40
48 42
155 75
344 58
48 42
995 43
100 87
774 72
151 71
779 23
290 52
148 48
613 32
388 97
222 73
379 29
145 26
80 70
24 21
928 05
790 86
80 70
1,614 00
44 38
*1
100
1
7
12
17 00
24
59
30
1 11
8 47
7 34
33
1 86
11 71
3 22
1 bb
5 02
1 77
10 20
1 42
11
1
26
60
17
73
57
60
23
78
12
55
62
50
32
42
50
99
61
19
88
8225 46
23,405 52
119 23
233 36
654 53
48 66
108 11
*2 00
23 00
223 59
516 88
1,056 44
19 69
373 08
1,222 21
196 90
162 95
552 16
122 82
2,363 4L
162 82
48 42
158 35
349 75
49 15
1,017 00
102 47
785 95
152 49
782 35
295 07
149 10
622 82
388 97
222 73
385 61
145 26
80 70
24 63
934 55
802 85
82 31
1,640 19
45 26
1902.]
PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12.
xcm
Collected on
Account of
Corporation Tax
Interest,
Total.
for 1900.
Child & Acme Cutter and Press
Company,
$145 26
$2 18
|147 44
Childs & Kent Express Company,
71 01
1 35
72 36
Clicquot Club Bottling and Ex-
tract Company,
145 26
1 25
146 51
Coates Clipper Manufacturing
Company
218 69
3 29
221 98
Cobb-Eastman Company,
798 93
13 45
812 38
Coburn Stationery Company,
35 50
58
36 08
Colcord Richardson Company,
43 57
22
43 79
Columbia Electric Company,
137 19
2 20
139 39
Columbia Electric Engineering
Company,
16 14
07
16 21
Columbia Engineering Company,
116 20
2 21
118 41
Conway Electric Street Railway
Company,
395 67
6 19
401 86
Cottager Company,
193 68
2 90
196 58
Couch &Seeley Company, .
145 26
2 26
147 52
Craig & Craig Company,
242 10
4 05
246 15
Cunningham Lumber Company, .
121 05
2 32
123 37
Curtis & Pope Lumber Company,
3,197 33
31 97
3,229 30
D. M. Hazen Company,
113 78
57
114 35
Dalton Ingersoll Company, .
2,106 27
9 47
2,115 74
Damon Brick Company,
146 14
5 59
151 73
Danvers Gas Light Company,
121 05
80
121 85
David Myers Company,
80 70
1 25
81 95
Davis & Buxton Stamping Com-
pany
30 66
-
30 66
DeSilva Morine Company, .
24 21
27
24 48
Donahoe's Magazine Company, .
141 22
1 41
142 63
Dudley Feed Mills Company/
322 80
-
322 80
Dudley Mills
105 71
80
106 51
Dunne Lyceum Bureau,
16 14
21
16 35
Durgin Grocery and Provision
Company,
16 14
33
16 47
E. D. Shadduck Company, .
116 20
1 74
117 94
E. H Saxton Company,
161 40
2 68
164 08
E P. Sanderson Company, .
847 35
9 73
857 08
E. W. Noyes Company,
100 87
2 27
103 14
East Douglas Co-operative Asso-
ciation, . . . ...
20 17
03
20 20
Eastern Bridge and Structural
Company,
973 24
4 86
978 10
Eastern Cold Storage Company, .
169 47
85
170 32
Eastern Printing and Engraving
Company,
104 91
1 92
106 83
Easton Street Railway Company,
322 80
2 48
325 28
Empire Shoe Company,
181 57
91
182 48
Essex Paper Company,
147 93
2 36
150 29
Everett Co-operative Association,
80 70
81
81 51
Fairhaven Iron Foundry Com-
pany,
46 00
■"
46 00
xciv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Collected on
Account of
Corporation Tax
for 1900.
Interest.
Farrington Printing* Company,
Ferd F. French & Co., Limited,
Fifield Tool Company, .
Fosslitch Leather Company,
Frank H. Hall Company,
Franklin Educational Company,
Frederick Kendall Company,
French Carriage Company,".
Gardner Gas Fuel and Light Com
pany,
Garratt-Ford Company,
George H. Corbett Company,
George H. Wood Company, .
George P. Staples & Co., Incor
porated, ....
Georgetown, Rowley & Ipswich
Street Railway Company,
Gilman Snow Guard Company,
Gowdy & Remington Shoe Com
pany,
Graham Shoe Company,
Graton & Knight Manufacturing
Company, ....
Greenfield Recorder Company,
Gregory & Brown Company,
Grueby Faience Company, .
H. B. Smith Companj--, .
H. B. Stevens Company,
H. F. Ross Company, .
Hanover Printing Company,
Haverhill, Georgetown & Dan
vers Street Railway Company,
Heliotype Printing Company,
Hendee Manufacturing Company
Henry Woods Sons Company,
Henry C. King Company, .
Henry N. Clark Company, .
Highland Foundiw Company,
Home Guaranty Mutual Insur
ance Company, .
Horton Manufacturing Company
Hub Hosiery Mills, . '.
International Jupiter Steel Com
pany,
Interstate Law Company,
Iowa Light, Heat and Power
Company, ....
J. A. Cummings Printing Com
pany,
J A. Glass Company, .
J. E. Peckham Manufacturing
Company,
$56 49
1,210 50
335 06
225 96
45 19
50 00
16 14
649 63
202 36
193 68
96 84
145 26
726 30
2,020 72
40 35
242 10
242 10
11,785 42
80 7o
338 94
161 40
3,114 21
251 78
443 85
32 28
1,089 45
246 94
77 47
306 66
322 80
726 30
256 62
484 20
16 14
80 70
242 10
24 21
96 84
90 38
181 57
80 70
$0 34
13 72
6 37
2 03
72
1 55
26
3 25
3 04
3 98
2 18
13 80
11 11
60
3 75
1 21
2 65
2 58
5 95
3 55
72
5 40
1 56
30
2 72
5 45
1 28
7 25
26
41
3 75
3 97
1 48
3 14
1 31
$56 83
1,224 22
341 43
227 99
45 91
51 55
16 40
652 88
205 40
197 66
96 84
147 44
740 10
2,031 83
40 95
242 10
245 85
11,785 42
81 91
341 59
163 98
3,114 21
257 73
447 40
33 00
1,094 85
248 50
77 77
306 66
325 52
731 75
257 90
491 45
16 40
81 11
245 85
24 21
100 81
91 SQ
184 71
82 01
1902.]
PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12.
xcv
Collected on
Account of
Corporation Tax
Interest.
Total.
for 1900.
J. II Keenan Company,
$90 38
$0 45
$90 83
J. H. Rogers Carriage Company,
403 50
2 02
405 52
J. H. Williams Wall Paper Com-
pany
80 70
-
80 70
J. J. Warren Company,
765 03
3 57
768 60
J. P. & W. H. Emond, incorpo-
rated,
266 31
6 39
272 70
James H. Lamb Company, .
1,037 80
19 00
1,056 80
John C DeLaney Moulding Com-
pany
171 08
-
171 08
John Cavenaugh & Son Building
Moving Company, .
302 62
4 53
307 15
Johnson Manufacturing Com-
pany
1,600 00
20 69
1,620 69
Joss Brothers Company,
121 05
48
121 53
Journal Newspaper Company, .
807 00
3 63
810 63
Junction Water Company, .
28 24
50
28 74
Kearns & Co , incorporated,
24 21
48
24 69
Kelly Shoe Company, .
112 98
2 32
115 30
Kennedy & Sullivan Manufactur-
ing Company, ....
702 57
7 02
709 59
Kimball & Carey Company,
510 02
5 61
515 63
Kimball Brothers Company,
1,371 90
27 68
1,399 58
Kinsley Iron and Machine Com-
pany
1,426 77
14 27
1,441 04
Lang & Jacobs Company, .
100 87
1 91
102 78
Lawrence Supply Company,
64 56
-
64 56
Leicester Grocery Company,
96 84
1 21
98 05
Lewis F. Perry & Whitney Com-
pany.
847 35
3 70
851 05
Lewis J. Bird Company,
80 70
65
81 35
Lexington Print Works,
108 94
-
108 94
Lynn Ice Company,
800 54
15 88
816 42
Lynn News Publishing Company,
16 14
31
16 45
Lyons Granite Company,
83 92
42
84 34
Mansfield Co-operative Furnace
Company,
8 87
1 06
9 93
Martha's Vinevard Electric Light
and Power Company,
8 07
16
8 23
Massachusetts Construction Com-
pany
1,289 42
20 61
1,310 03
Massachusetts Investment Com-
pany,
161 40
3 82
165 22
Massachusetts Telephone and
Telegraph Company,
161 40
1 07
162 47
Mather Launch and Canoe Com-
pany,
74 24
37
74 61
Meadow Brook Farm Company, .
40 35
65
41 00
Medford Manufacturing Com-
pany,
64 56
32
64 88
Medway Electric Light and Power
Company,
80 70
72
81 42
xcvi ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Collected on
Account of
Corporation Tax
Interest.
Total.
for 1900.
Hellish & Byfield, incorporated, .
|524 55
$9 51
$534 06
Merrill Piano Company,
201 75
3 73
205 48
Merrill Electric ( ompany, .
89 57
1 35
90 92
Metropolitan Bolt Company,
48 42
85
49 27
Milford, Attleborough and Woon-
socket Street Railway Com-
pany
1,678 56
-
1,678 56
Milford Rubber Company, .
80 70
-
80 70
Miller Brothers & Co., Corpora-
tion,
645 60
10 00
655 60
Mills & Knight Company, .
484 20
5 80
490 00
Minards Liniment Manufacturing
Company,
480 97
2 41
483 38
Miscoe Spring Water Company, .
161 40
1 24
162 64
Morrison Steamboat Company, .
302 62
-
302 62
Mystic Wharf and Storage Com-
pany,
1,171 76
17 18
1,188 94
Natick Gas Light Company,
190 45
92
191 37
National Supply Company, .
161 40
81
162 21
New England Bolt and Nut Com-
pany
403 50
2 42
405 92
New England Motor Company, .
80 70
1 38
82 08
New England Publishing Com-
pany
403 50
2 02
405 52
New England Reed Company,
66 17
1 00
67 17
Newbury port Herald Company, .
69 40
76
70 16
Newton Machine Company, .
20 17
26
20 43
Nipmuck Paper Box Company, .
50 03
78
50 81
Norfolk Western Street Railway
Company,
363 15
-
363 15
Norris Livery Company,
80 70
40
81 10
North Carolina Mica Company, .
242 10
-
242 10
Nute Hallett Company,
36 31
54
36 85
Oak Hall Clothing Company,
1,251 65
6 25
1,257 90
Oliver & Howland Company,
303 43
-
303 43
Olympic Amusement Company, .
48 42
1 64
50 06
Packard & Evans Company,
121 05
1 82
122 87
Peoples Combination Clothing
Com pan}7,
242 10
3 63
245 73
Peoples Furniture Company,
64 56
1 03
65 59
Peoples Ice Company of Worces-
ter,
130 73
1 96
132 69
Perkins Wood Working Company,
76 66
1 25
77 91
Persons Manufacturing Company,
80 70
80
81 50
Pilgrim Iron Foundry Company, .
66 17
1 19
67 36
Pittsfield Journal Company,
64 56
26
64 82
Planet Manufacturing Company,
129 12
2 07
131 19
Plymouth Rubber Company,
43 57
-
43 57
Plymouth Stove Foundry Com-
pany,
103 29
1 07
104 36
Prentice Brothers Company,
1,193 55
13 12
1,206 67
Press Clipping Bureau,
80 70
1 04
81 74
1902,]
PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12.
XCVll
Collected on
Account of
Corporation Tax
Interest.
Total.
for 1900.
Putnam Company,
$322 80
$5 17
$327 97
R. A. Flanders Company,
597 18
597 18
R. Guastavino Company,
145 26
1 88
147 14
R. H. Long Shoe Manufacturing
Company,
403 50
7 88
411 38
Randal! Faichney Company,
153 33
2 42
155 75
Rawson & Morrison Manufactur-
ing Company, ....
1,005 52
4 35
1,009 87
Re-New Lamp Company,
161 40
2 74
164 14
Rey croft Pharmacy Company,
395 43
4 57
400 00
Riverdale Woolen Company,
40 51
63
41 14
Robbins Spring Water Company,
304 31
-
304 31
Rocky Neck Marine Railway
Company,
192 06
80
192 86
Rolf Provision and Grocery Com-
pany,
80 70
1 37
82 07
S. Armstrong Company,
185 61
1 55
187 16
S. M. Howes Company,
774 72
3 87
778 59
Samuel Ward Company,
919 98
3 98
923 96
Scandinavian Importing Com-
pany,
484 20
3 63
487 83
Seymour Knapp - Warren Com-
pany
20 17
34
20 51
Shady Hill Nursery Company, .
726 30
10 89
737 19
Shedd & Crane Leather Company,
807 00
4 04
811 04
Silas Pierce & Company, limited,
2,017 50
12 10
2,029 60
Simons Hatch & Whitten Com-
pany,
3,228 00
13 45
3,241 45
Slayter Jennings Company, .
274 38
1 60
275 98
Small, Maynard & Co., incorpo-
rated,
322 80
4 84
327 64
Smith & Lovett Company, .
322 80
1 94
324 74
South Boston Gas Light Company,
700 47
3 03
703 50
Southbridge Optical Company, ,
193 68
97
194 Q5
Springfield Construction Com-
pany,
142 03
2 67
144 70
Springfield Elevator and Pump
Company,
160 75
2 79
163 54
Springfield Supply Company,
16 14
-
16 14
Spy Company, ....
161 40
2 42
163 82
Standard Bottling and Extract
Company,
322 80
3 62
326 42
Stockbridge Marble Company,
62 94
31
63 25
Stoughton Gas and Electric Com-
pany,
234 03
3 51
237 54
Suffolk Engraving Company,
72 63
50
73 13
Swett & Lewis Company, .
80 70
_
80 70
T. A. Morris Machine Company, .
355 08
-
355 08
T. A. Peterson Company,
32 28
20
32 48
T. F. Little Oil Company, .
73 84
1 20
75 04
Tarbett Phemister Company,
88 77
88
89 65
Taunton Evening News,
32 28
1 47
33 75
xcviii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Collected on
Account of
Corporation Tax
Interest.
Total.
for 1900.
Thayer Woolen Company, .
$978 08
#4 02
$982 10
Thomas F. Phillips Company,
153 33
3 67
157 00
Thorp & Martin Company, .
435 78
2 61
438 39
Tileston Brothers Shoe Company,
242 10
2 42
244 52
Title Research and Credit Com-
pany,
19 36
-
19 36
Townsend Co-operative Broom
Company,
22 59
-
22 59
Victor R. F. Walker Company, .
16 14
2 25
18 39
W. E. Rice Company, .
225 96
4 52
230 48
W. S. Quimby Company,
1,149 97
17 19
1,167 16
Wachusett Mills, .
137 19
2 46
139 65
Wade & Reed Company,
48 20
-
48 20
Walton & Logan Compan}^, .
403 50
1 95
405 45
Warren, Brookfield & Spencer
Street Railway Company,
1,020 04
5 10
1,025 14
Wason Manufacturing Company,
1,394 49
6 97
1,401 46
Weber Leather Company, .
645 60
2 79
648 39
Western Union Telegraph Com-
pany,
15,943 38
63 77
16,007 15
Westfield Manufacturing Com-
pany,
83 84
1 26
85 10
Weymouth & Braintree Publish-
ing Company, ....
32 28
52
32 80
Weymouth Seam Face Granite
Company,
101 68
2 03
103 71
Whitall Manufacturing Company,
758 58
4 42
763 00
Whitney Jewelry Company,
40 35
60
40 95
William H. Burns Company,
2,111 11
28 50
2,139 61
William S. Hills Company, .
807 00
4 71
811 71
Woburn Light, Heat and Power
Company,
496 46
8 43
504 89
Woodward & Brown Piano Com-
pany,
60 52
1 93
62 45
Worcester Gazette Company,
48 42
25
48 67
Worcester Last Company, .
80 70
1 26
81 96
Worcester Optical Company,
83 92
1 26
85 18
Xylite Lubricating Company,
96 84
1 52
98 36
Ziegler Electric Company, .
484 20
15 17
499 37
$164,177 92
$1,419 22
$165,597 14
Miscellaneous Collections.
Adams Electric Light and Power Company, Gas and Electric
Light Commissioners1 tax, $11 65
American Cultivator Publishing Company, fee for filing cer-
tificates of condition, 10 00
American Marble Company, fee for filing certificate of condi-
tion 5 00
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xcix
Amesbury Opera House Company, fee for filing certificates of
condition, $10 00
Amherst Gas Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00
Arlington Co-operative Association, fee for filing certificate
of condition, 10 00
Ayer Light and. Power Company, fee for filing certificate of
condition, 5 00
Bay State Improved Box Company, fee for filing certificate
of condition, 5 00
Bay State Metal Works, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00
Beacon Manufacturing Company, fee for filing certificate of
condition, 5 00
Belisle Printing and Publishing Company, fee for filing cer-
tificate of condition, 5 00
Blake Manufacturing Company, fee for filing certificate of
condition, 5 00
Block Plant Electric Light Company, fee for filing certificate
of condition, 5 00
Block Plant Electric Light Company, Gas and Electric Light
Commissioners, tax for 1900, 25 54
Blue Hill Granite Company, fee for filing certificate of condi-
tion, 5 00
Boston Advertising Company, fee for filing certificate of con-
dition, 5 00
Boston Oregon Mast Company, fee for filing certificate of
condition, 5 00
Boston Paving Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00
Boston Spar Company, fee for filing certificates of condition, 10 00
Boston Thread and Twine Company, fee for filing certificate
of condition, • 5 00
Boston Trading and Export Company, fee for filing certificate
of condition, 5 00
Boston Traveller Company, fee for filing certificate of condi-
tion, ' 5 00
Brookfield Brick Company, fee for filing certificate of condi-
tion 5 00
C. A. Edgarton Manufacturing Company, fee for filing cer-
tificate of condition, 5 00
Carlow & Putnam Company, fee for filing certificate of condi-
tion, 5 00
Carter, Rice & Co. Corporation, fee for filing certificate of
condition, 5 00
Charman, Ellen, estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . . 978 00
Chelsea, assessment for tide water displaced, .... 59 21
Columbia Electric Company, fee for filing certificate of condi-
tion, 5 00
Connecticut Steam Stone Company, fee for filing certificate
of condition, 5 00
c ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Conway Electric Street Railway Company, Railroad Commis-
sioners' tax for 1900, $4 40
Crescent Worsted Company, fee for filing certificate of con-
dition 5 00
Cross, Anna B , estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . . 124 91
Daily News Company, fee for filing certificate of condi-
tion, 5 00
Damon Safe and Iron Works Company, fee for filing certifi-
cate of condition, 5 00
Dean, Charles W., & Co., Massachusetts Reformatory claim, . 25 00
Donoghue, Ann, board at Danvers Insane Asylum, . . . 130 88
Dudley Mills, fee for filing certificate of condition, . 5 00
East Douglas Co-operative Association, fee for filing certifi-
cates of condition, 10 00
Eastern Electric Company, fee for filing certificate of condi-
tion, 5 00
Eastern Printing and Engraving Company, fee for filing cer-
tificate of condition, 5 00
Eckley, Julia A., estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . . 122 92
Edison Electric Illuminating Company, assessment for tide
water displaced, 722 25
Fisher Churchill Company, fee for filing certificate of condi-
tion, 5 00
Fisk Rubber Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00
Fiske Wharf aad Warehouse Company, fee for filing certifi-
cate of condition, 5 00
Fosslitch Leather Company, fee for filing certificate of condi-
tion, 5 00
Fitchburg Machine Works, fee for filing certificate of condi-
tion, 5 00
Frank H. Hall Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00
Franklin Educational Campany, fee for filing certificate of
condition, 5 00
Fraser Dry Goods Company, fee for filing certificate of con- 5 00
dition, 5 00
Fowler Automatic Draft Regulator and Ventilator Company,
fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00
Gardner Gas Fuel and Light Company, Gas and Electric Light
Commissioners' tax for 1900, 12 46
Gardner Music Hall Company, fee for filing certificate of
condition, 5 00
George D.Emerson Company, fee for filing certificate of con-
dition, 5 00
Gilman Snow Guard Company, fee for filing certificate of
condition, 5 00
Greenfield Machine Company, fee for filing certificate of
condition, 5 00
George P. Staples & Co., incorporated, fee for filing certifi-
cate of condition, 5 00
1902,] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. ci
Glasgow Manufacturing Company, fee for filing certificate of
condition, §5 00
Grafton Electric Company, penalty for failure to file annual
report with Gas Commissioners on time, .... 10 00
H. M. Kinports Company, corporation taxes, 1897 and 1898, . 258 76
Hero Cough Syrup Company, fee for tiling certificate of con-
dition, 5 00
Heroux the Clothier, incorporated, fee for filing certificate of
condition, 5 00
Hill, Whitney & Wood Company, fee for filing certificate of
condition, 5 00
Hobbs Manufacturing Company, interest on corporation tax,
1900, v 1 32
Holbrook, Susan J., estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . 117 50
Holyoke Fire Insurance Company, return premium in re
J. F. Sullivan, 14 84
Interstate Law Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00
Iowa Light, Heat and Power Company, Gas and Electric Light
Commissioners' tax for 1900, 2 38
Iowa Light, Heat and Power Company, fee for filing certifi-
cate of condition, 5 00
J. P. Jordan Paper Company, fee for filing certificates of con-
dition, 10 00
John F. Nickerson Company, fee for filing certificate of con-
dition, 5 00
Kearns & Co., incorporated, fee for filing certificate of
condition, 5 00
Kelly Shoe Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, . 5 00
Lamprey Boiler Furnace Mouth Protector Company, fee for
filing certificate of condition, 5 00
Lyons Granite Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00
Lyford, Mary V., estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . . 85 62
Lyons & Alexander Company, fee for filing certificate of con-
dition, 5 00
Mansfield Co-operative Furnace Company, fee for filing cer-
tificates of condition, 10 00
Massachusetts Investment Company, fee for filing certificates
of condition, 10 00
Massachusetts Masonic Life Association, care and custody of
deposits, 13
Massachusetts Telephone and Telegraph Company, fee for
filing certificate of condition, 5 00
Massachusetts Title Insurance Company, fee for filing certi-
ficate of condition, 5 00
McDonald, John A., petitioner for writ of error, costs of
appeal 20 00
Meany, Thomas, use of Commonwealth's land in South Boston, 10 00
Medfield Electric Light and Power Company, fee for filing
certificate of condition, 5 00
cii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Merchants and Farmers Mutual Fire Insurance Company,
return premium in re J. F. Sullivan, $18 00
Merick, Helen M., estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . . 81 42
Merrimack Clothing Company, fee for filing certificate of
condition, 5 00
Middleby Oven Company, fee for filing certificate of condi-
tion, 5 00
Montague Co-operative Creamery Association, fee for filing
certificate of condition, 5 00
Moore Coombs Company, corporation tax for 1899, . . 110 46
Morning Mail Corporation, fee for filing certificate of condi-
tion, 5 00
Natick Citizen Printing Company, fee for filing certificate of
condition, 5 00
Natick Gas Light Company , fee for filing certificate of con-
dition, 5 00
New England Pharmacal Company, fee for filing certificate
of condition, 5 00
New England Rubber Company, fee for filing certificates of
condition, 10 00
New England & Savannah Steamship Company, fee for filing
certificate of condition, 5 00
New England Dredging Company, fee for filing certificate of
condition, 5 00
Norfolk Blanket Cleansing Company, fee for filing certificate
of condition, 5 00
Nute Hallett Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00
Old Colony Boot and Shoe Company, fee for filing certificates
of condition for 1901 10 00
P. P. Emory Manufacturing Company, fee for filing certifi-
cate of condition, 5 00
Pittsfield Coal Gas Company, penalty for failure to file annual
report with Gas Commissioners on time, .... 30 00
Perry Laundry Company, fee for riling certificate of condition, 5 00
Pittsfield Manufacturing Company, fee for filing certificate of
condition, o 00
Plymouth Stove Foundry Company, fee for filing certificate
of condition, 5 00
Randall Faichney Company, fee for filing certificate of con-
dition, 5 00
Reliance Manufacturing Company, fee for filing certificate of
condition, 5 00
Rice Kendall Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00
Robbins Spring Water Company, fee for filing certificate of
condition, 5 00
Robinson Iron Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00
Rochdale Hall Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00
Rudd, Alice A., estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . . 11150
Sandy Bay Pier Company, fee for filing certificate of condi-
tion, 5 00
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. ciii
Sargent, William M., Gas and Electric Light Commissioners'
tax for 1900 $1 77
Shad}' Hill Nursery Company, fee for filing certificates of
condition, 10 00
Simonds Rolling Machine Company, fee for filing certificate
of condition, 5 00
Slater Woolen Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00
Small, Maynard & Co., incorporated, fee for filing certificate
of condition, 5 00
Stoughton Gas and Electric Company, penalty for failure to
file annual report with Gas Commissioners on time, . . 5 00
South Hadley Falls Electric Light Company, penalty for fail-
ure to file annual report with Gas Commissioners on time, 5 00
Smith, John M., estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . . 100 00
Springfield Construction Company, fee for filing certificates
of condition, 10 00
Springfield Drop Forging Company, fee for filing certificate
of condition, 5 00
Springfield Elevator and Pump Company, fee for filing cer-
tificate of condition, 5 00
Stone, E. C.,for board of Roger Stone at Westborough Insane
Hospital, , 87 85
Steam and Power Company of Boston, penalty for failure to
file report with Gas Commissioners on time, ... 10 00
Sutton Cranberry Company, fee for filing certificate of condi-
tion, 5 00
Taunton Evening News, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00
Thomas, Jane G., estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . . 117 50
Union Desk Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, . 5 00
Union Furniture Company, fee for filing certificate of condi-
tion, 5 00
University City Laundering Company, fee for filing certificate
of condition, 5 00
Uxbridge Cotton Mills, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00
W. E. Rice Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, . 5 00
Wade & Reed Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00
Watertown Machine Compan}T, fee for filing certificates of
condition, - 10 00
Weber Leather Company, fee for filing certificate of condi-
tion, ..." 5 00
Wheelman Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, . 5 00
Whitney, Henry M., for tide water displaced in Charles River, 3,314 95
White, Holman & Co., assessment for tide water displaced, . 307 60
Woburn Light, Heat and Power Company, Gas and Electric
Light Commissioners1 tax for 1900, 74 42
Woodbury, Anna M., estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . 400 00
Worcester Fire Appliance Company, fee for filing certificate
of condition, 5 00
$7,823 34
CIV
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Luther H. Bailey,
N. Fisher, alias Frede
James Wade,
Anthony Koch, .
Louis R. Procke,
Thomas A. Packard,
A.G.Marshall, .
John McLaughin,
Henry L. Harrison,
Jeannette Brooks,
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cviii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
RULES OF PRACTICE IN INTERSTATE
RENDITION.
Every application to the Governor for a requisition upon the ex-
ecutive authority of any other State or Territory, for the delivery
up and return of any offender who has fled from the justice of this
Commonwealth, must be made by the district or prosecuting attor-
ney for the county or district in which the offence was committed,
and must be in duplicate original papers, or certified copies thereof.
The following must appear by the certificate of the district or
prosecuting attorney : —
(a) The full name of the person for whom extradition is asked,
together with the name of the agent proposed, to be properly
spelled.
(b) That, in his opinion, the ends of public justice require that
the alleged criminal be brought to this Commonwealth for trial, at
the public expense.
(c) That he believes he has sufficient evidence to secure the
conviction of the fugitive.
(d) That the person named as agent is a proper person, and
that he has no private interest in the arrest of the fugitive.
(e) If there has been any former application for a requisition
for the same person, growing out of the same transaction, it must
be so stated, with an explanation of the reasons for a second
request, together with the date of such application, as near as may
be.
(/) If the fugitive is known to be under either civil or criminal
arrest in the State or Territory to which he is alleged to have fled,
the fact of such arrest and the nature of the proceedings on which
it is based must be stated.
(g) That the application is not made for the purpose of enforc-
ing the collection of a debt, or for any private purpose whatever ;
and that, if the requisition applied for be granted, the criminal
proceedings shall not be used for any of said objects.
(h) The nature of the crime charged, with a reference, when
practicable, to the particular statute defining and punishing the
same.
1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT— No. 12. cix
(?) If the offence charged is not of recent occurrence, a satis-
factory reason must be given for the delay in making the applica-
tion.
1. In all cases of fraud, false pretences, embezzlement or for-
gery, when made a crime by the common law, or any penal code
or statute, the affidavit of the principal complaining witness or in-
formant, that the application is made in good faith, for the sole
purpose of punishing the accused, and that he does not desire or
expect to use the prosecution for the purpose of collecting a debt,
or for any private purpose, and will not directly or indirectly use
the same for any of said purposes, shall be required, or a sufficient
reason given for the absence of such affidavit.
2. Proof by affidavit of facts and circumstances satisfying the
Executive that the alleged criminal has fled from the justice of the
State, and is in the State on whose Executive the demand is
requested to be made, must be given. The fact that the alleged
criminal was in the State where the alleged crime was committed
at the time of the commission thereof, and is found in the State
upon which the requisition was made, shall be sufficient evidence,
in the absence of other proof, that he is a fugitive from justice.
3. If an indictment has been found, certified copies, in dupli-
cate, must accompany the application.
4. If an indictment has not been found by a grand jury, the
facts and circumstances showing the commission of the crime
charged, and that the accused perpetrated the same, must be
shown by affidavits taken before a magistrate. (A notary public
is not a magistrate within the meaning of the statutes.) It must
also be shown that a complaint has been made, copies of which
must accompany the requisition, such complaint to be accompa-
nied by affidavits to the facts constituting the offence charged by
persons having actual knowledge thereof, and that a warrant has
been issued, and duplicate certified copies of the same, together
with the returns thereto, if any, must be furnished upon an appli-
cation.
5. The official character of the officer taking the affidavits or
depositions, and of the officer who issued the warrant, must be
duly certified.
6. Upon the renewal of an application, — for example, on the
ground that the fugitive has fled to another State, not having been
found in the State on which the first was granted, — new or certi-
fied copies of papers, in conformity with the above rules, must be
furnished.
7. In the case of any person who has been convicted of any
crime, and escapes after conviction, or while serving his sentence,
ex ATTORNEY-GEKEKAL'S EEPOKT. [Jan. 1902.
the application may be made by the jailer, sheriff, or other officer
having him in custody, and shall be accompanied by certified
copies of the indictment or information, record of conviction and
sentence upon which the person is held, with the affidavit of such
person having him in custody, showing such escape, with the cir-
cumstances attending the same.
8. No requisition will be made for the extradition of any fugi-
tive except in compliance with these rules.
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