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Full text of "Report of the attorney general for the year ending .."

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF 
\ HUMAN SERVICES 

\ Office of the Secretary 

k Room 904 

Jr 100 Cambridge Street 
Boston, Massachusetts 02202 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT .... .... No. 12. 



Cammotttoeattl) of Utassatjjusttts. 



REPORT 



ATTORNEY- GENERAL 



V„ » ~ „^~« T ^ T * «tt * ^^ IK 1 QAO 






BOSTON : 
WRIGHT & POTTER PRINTING CO., STATE PRINTERS, 
18 Post Office Square. 
1902. 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT .... .... No. 12. 



€omm0nfo«attl) of Hfcissatjmsetts. 



REPORT 



ATTORNEY- G-E1STEK AL 



Year ending January 15, 1902. 







BOSTON : 
WRIGHT & POTTER PRINTING CO., STATE PRINTERS, 
18 Post Office Square. 
1902. 



Commotitomlifr ai ||Iassac^MSttis. 



Office of the Attorney-General, 
Boston, Jan. 15, 1902. 

To the Honorable the President of the Senate. 

I have the honor to transmit herewith my report for the 

year ending this day. 

Very respectfully, 

HOSEA M. KNOWLTON, 

Attorney-General. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

Roster, vn 

Appropriation and Expenditures, vin 

Cases attended to by this Office, ix 

Capital Cases, x 

The Superior Court xviii 

The Court of Land Registration, xix 

Jury Service, xxi 

Collateral Inheritance Taxes, xxn 

Evidence in Land-damage Cases, xxm 

Office of the Attorney-General, xxiv 

Opinions, 1 

Opinions upon Applications for Leave to file Informations, . 63 
Informations at the Relation of the Treasurer, .... i 
Informations at the Relation of the Commissioner of Corpora- 
tions, v 

Informations at the Relation of the Civil Service Commission- 
ers, vi 

Informations at the Relation of Private Persons, ... vi 

Grade Crossings, vii 

Corporate Applications for Dissolution, xvii 

Corporations required without Suit to file Tax Returns, . . xviii 
Corporations required without Suit to file Certificate of Condi- 
tion, xxii 

Collateral Inheritance Tax Cases, xxv 

Public Charitable Trusts, lv 

Land-damage Cases arising from the Alteration of Grade Cross- 
ings, lvi 

Suits conducted in Behalf of State Boards and Commissions, . lix 

Metropolitan Park Commission, lix 

Metropolitan Sewerage Commission, lxv 

Metropolitan Water Board, lxvi 

Massachusetts Highway Commission, lxxvi 

Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners, . . . lxxvi 
Miscellaneous Cases from Above Commissions, . . . lxxvii 
Cases arising under the Act limiting the Height of Build- 
ings, in the Vicinity of the State House, . . . lxxviii 

State Board of Charity, lxxix 

Miscellaneous Cases, lxxx 

Corporation Tax Collections, xci 

Miscellaneous Collections, xcviii 

Extradition and Interstate Rendition, civ 

Rules of Practice in Interstate Rendition, cviii 



Cnmmontacaltb of ||tassax{)u$eits* 



OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, 
Rooms 225 and 226, State House. 



Attorney- General. 
HOSEA M. KNOWLTON of New Bedford. 

Assistants. 
FREDERICK E. HURD of Boston. 
Special Assignments. — Land-damage Cases. 

Abolition of Grade Crossings. 

JAMES MOTT HALLOWELL of Medford. 
Special Assignments. — Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board. 
Harbor and Land Commissioners. 
Heads of Departments. 

FRANKLIN T. HAMMOND of Cambridge. 
Special Assignments. — Public Charitable Trusts. 
Land-damage Cases. 

ARTHUR W. DeGOOSH of Cambridge. 
Special Assignments. — Collateral Inheritance Tax. 
Land-damage Cases. 

FREDERICK H. NASH of Cambridge. 
Special Assignments. — Legislative Committees. 

Commissions and State Boards. 
Prerogative Writs. 
Insurance. 

FREDERIC B. GREENHALGE of Lowell. 
Special Assignments. — Extradition and Interstate Rendition. 
State Board of Charity. 
Corporations. 
Collections. 



Clerk. 
LOUIS H. FREESE of Waltham. 



viii ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 1902. 

Statement of Appropriation and Expenditures. 
Appropriation for 1901, $36,000 00 



Expenditures. 
For law library, . 

For salaries of assistants, . 

For additional legal services, 

For clerk and stenographers, 

For office expenses, 

For court expenses,* . 

Total expenditures, 
Costs collected, 

Net expenditure, . 



473 19 

15,600 00 

826 00 

4,674 18 

4,819 27 

3,308 14 

129,700 78 
882 93 

$28,817 85 



* Of this amount, $882.93 has been collected as costs of suits and paid to the 
Treasurer of the Commonwealth. 



Cmnmantooltlj nf ||liiS!mc!nts£tts + 



Office of the Attorney-General, 
Boston, Jan. 15, 1902. 
To the General Court. 

In compliance with Public Statutes, chapter 17, section 9, 
I submit my report for the year ending this day. 

The cases requiring the attention of the office during the 
year, to the number of 2,349, are tabulated below : — 

Bastardy complaints, 4 

Collateral inheritance tax cases, 439 

Corporate collections made without suit, 249 

Corporation returns enforced without suit, 248 

Dissolutions of corporations, voluntary petitions for, ... 70 

Extradition and interstate rendition, 57 

Grade crossings, petitions for abolition of, 169 

Height of buildings, limitation of, cases arising therefrom, . . 34 
Informations at the relation of the Civil Service Commissioners, . 2 
Informations at the relation of the Commissioner of Corporations, 21 
Informations at the relation of private persons, .... 4 
Informations at the relation of the Treasurer and Receiver-Gen- 
eral, 116 

Indictments for murder, 18 

Land-damage cases arising through the alteration of grade cross- 
ings, 29 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Harbor 

and Land Commissioners, 6 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Massa- 
chusetts Highway Commission, 9 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Metro- 
politan Park Commission, 216 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Metro- 
politan Sewerage Commission, 23 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Metro- 
politan Water Board, 258 

Miscellaneous cases arising from the work of the above-named 

commissions, 16 

Miscellaneous cases, 315 

Public charitable trusts, 19 

Settlement cases for support of insane paupers, .... 13 



x ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Capital Cases. 
Indictments for murder pending at the date of the last 
annual report have been disposed of as follows : — 

Luigi Storti of Boston, indicted in Suffolk County, 
December, 1899, for the murder of Michele Calucci, at 
Boston, Nov. 7, 1899. He was arraigned Dec. 27, 1899, 
and pleaded not guilty. Peter S. Maher and Clarence W. 
Rowley were assigned by the court as counsel for the defend- 
ant. On June 25-July 1, 1900, the defendant was tried by 
a jury before Bond and Lawton, J J. The result was a verdict 
of guilty of murder in the first degree. Exceptions were 
filed by counsel for the defendant, and were argued before 
the Supreme Judicial Court at Boston, Nov. 19, 1900. The 
exceptions were overruled Jan. 2, 1901, and on the fourth 
day of January he was sentenced to death, the time of 
execution being fixed, under St. 1898, c. 326, to take place 
during the week beginning April 7, 1901. 

On April 9, 1901, in consequence of the severe illness of 
the prisoner, the Governor, by and with the advice of the 
Council, respited his sentence, the term of the respite to 
expire on Saturday, May 11, 1901. 

April 13, 1901, the prisoner filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus and a petition for a writ of error in the Supreme 
Judicial Court, alleging, among other things, that the pun- 
ishment of death by electricity was a " cruel or unusual pun- 
ishment," within Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights. These petitions were argued together, and the 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied, and in the 
petition for a writ of error the judgment of the Superior 
Court was affirmed. These decisions were rendered May 7, 
1901. 

May 10, 1901, one day before the expiration of the respite 
granted by the Governor, the prisoner filed in the Circuit 
Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, setting forth substantially 
the same matters urged in the petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
and some additional matters. This petition was heard by 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xi 

the Circuit Court on May 11, 1901, and summarily denied. 
The petitioner thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court of 
the United States. This appeal was entered a few days be- 
fore the adjournment of the court for the summer. A motion 
was made by the Attorney-General to have the appeal dis- 
missed as frivolous ; but owing to the requirements of the 
rules of the court, that three weeks' notice must be given for 
hearings upon such matters, it was impossible to have the 
motion entertained before the adjournment of the court. 
The case, therefore, went over until the October term, and 
was assigned for argument on the twenty- eighth day of 
October, 1901. A£ the beginning of the October term, 
however, the petition, by agreement of the petitioner, was 
dismissed. 

On the twenty-third day of May, 1901, another petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in the Circuit Court 
of the United States, alleging, among other matters, that no 
lawful respite had been granted by the Governor. It was 
heard on the twenty-fourth day of May, 1901, and the peti- 
tion was dismissed on the ground of want of jurisdiction in 
the Circuit Court. An appeal was taken by the petitioner 
to the Supreme Court of the United States. This appeal 
was argued before the Supreme Court in November, and a 
judgment dismissing the appeal was rendered in that court 
on the second day of December, 1901. 

Meanwhile, another petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
was filed by the prisoner in the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, alleging that St. 1901, c. 520, relating to the 
custody of convicts under sentence of death, was ex post 
facto legislation, and therefore unconstitutional. This peti- 
tion was forthwith heard upon its merits before Mr. Justice 
Loring, and dismissed. The petitioner took an appeal to 
the full bench of the court. The case was argued on the 
fourth day of November, 1901, and on the thirteenth day 
of November, 1901, the full bench confirmed the judgment of 
Judge Loring and dismissed the petition. 

During the pendency of these proceedings respites from 
time to time were granted by the Governor. These respites 
were against the objection and protest of the prisoner, who 
contended that the Governor and Council had no authority 



xii r ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

to grant* the same. The last respite expired on Dec. 14, 
1901, and on the seventeenth day of December, 1901, all 
legal proceedings having been concluded, — proceedings 
unprecedented, it is believed, in novelty and character in this 
Commonwealth, — the prisoner was executed, in pursuance 
of his sentence. In the proceedings subsequent to the over- 
ruling of the first bill of exceptions the prisoner was repre- 
sented by William H. Stockbridge and G. Philip Wardner. 
This was the first execution by electricity under the 
provisions of St. 1898, c. 328. 

Franciszek Umilian, indicted in Hampshire County, 
June, 1900, for the murder of Karimierz Jedrusik, at 
Granby, Dec. 31, 1899. On June 12, 1900, he was ar- 
raigned, and pleaded not guilty. John B. O'Donnell of 
Northampton was assigned by the court as counsel for the 
defendant. On Oct. 1, 1900, the defendant was tried by a 
jury before Sherman and Stevens, JJ. The result was a ver- 
dict of guilty of murder in the first degree. Exceptions were 
filed by counsel for the defendant, and allowed, and argued 
Jan. 18, 1901. The exceptions were overruled Feb. 28, 
1901, and on March 9, 1901, he was sentenced to death, the 
time of execution being fixed, under St. 1898, c. 326, to take 
place during the week beginning July 7, 1901. The trial of 
the case was conducted by John C. Hammond, district 
attorney. 

The execution of sentence w T as respited from time to time, 
at the request of counsel for the prisoner, to await the 
result of the proceedings in the case of Luigi Storti, above 
recited. The last respite expired Dec. 21, 1901, and tlfe 
prisoner was executed on the 24th day of December, 1901. 

Charles Alberto of Holyoke, indicted in Hampden 
County, September, 1900, for the murder of Nathalie Al- 
berto, at Holyoke, Sept. 2, 1900. On Dec. 31, 1900, he 
was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. James E. Dunleavy 
and David J. Walsh were assigned by the court as counsel 
for the defendant. On Oct. 21, 1901, he was tried by .a jury 
before Maynard and Lawton, J J. The result was a verdict 
of guilty of murder in the second degree. On Oct. 22, 1901, 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xm 

the prisoner was sentenced to State Prison for life. The 
trial of the case was conducted by Charles L. Gardner, dis- 
trict attorney. 

Henry E. Parsons of Boston, indicted in Suffolk County, 
July, 1900, for the murder of William T. Hammond, at 
Boston, June 18, 1900. On Sept. 19, 1900, he was ar- 
raigned, and pleaded not guilty. James A. McGeough and 
Michael J. Dwyer were assigned by the court as counsel 
for the defendant. On May 6-11, 1901, the defendant was 
tried by a jury before Sheldon and Pierce, JJ. The result 
was a verdict of not guilty. The case was in charge of 
Oliver Stevens, district attorney. 

Charles R. Eastman of Cambridge, indicted in Middle- 
sex County, October, 1900, for the murder of Richard H. 
Grogan, Jr., at Cambridge, July 4, 1900. He was arraigned 
Oct. 26, 1900, and pleaded not guilty. Charles W. Bartlett 
and Samuel J. Elder appeared as counsel for the defendant. 
On April 22-May 11, 1901, the defendant was tried by a 
jury before Gaskill and Aiken, J J. The result was a ver- 
dict of not guilty. Up to a short time before the trial the 
case had been in charge of District Attorney Frederick N. 
Wier. On the day before the trial was appointed to begin, 
owing to the illness of the district attorney, the Attorney- 
General took charge of the case and conducted the trial 
thereof, assisted by Mr. George A. Sanderson, assistant dis- 
trict attorney. 

Indictments for murder, found since the date of the last 
annual report, have been disposed of as follows : — 

Thomas J. Burns of Boston, indicted in Suffolk County, 
in April, 1901, for the murder of Hannah E. Burns, at Bos- 
ton, March 6, 1901. On May 27, 1901, he was arraigned 
and pleaded not guilty. James P. Magenis was assigned by 
the court as counsel for the defendant. On June 3, 1901, 
he retracted his plea of not guilty, and pleaded guilty of 
murder in the second degree. The plea was accepted by the 
Commonwealth, and he was thereupon sentenced to State 



xiv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Prison for life. The case was in charge of Oliver Stevens, 
district attorney. 

Panfilo Sussi of Boston, indicted in Suffolk County, in 
August, 1901, for the murder of Antonio Paolillo, at Boston, 
July 28, 1901. On Aug. 16, 1901, he was arraigned, and 
pleaded not guilty. Peter S. Maher was retained by the 
defendant as counsel. On Oct. 3, 1901, he retracted his 
plea of not guilty, and pleaded guilty of manslaughter. The 
plea was accepted by the Commonwealth, and he was there- 
upon sentenced to State Prison for not more than six and 
not less than four years. The case was in charge of Oliver 
Stevens, district attorney. 

Daniel Leary of Philadelphia, Penn., indicted in Berk- 
shire County, September, 1901, for the murder of James W. 
Fuller, at Pittsfield, July 17, 1901. Leary was an inmate 
under sentence of the house of correction at Pittsfield, and 
James W. Fuller, the man killed, was an officer of that in- 
stitution. On Sept. 3, 1901, he was arraigned, and pleaded 
not guilty. Herbert C. Joyner and Joseph Ward Lewis 
were assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. 
On Dec. 2, 1901, the defendant was tried by a jury before 
Sherman and Aiken, JJ. Experts, both in behalf of the 
prosecution and of the defence, testified that he was insane, 
and a verdict was rendered by the jury of "not guilty 
by reason of insanity." Thereupon, under the provisions of 
the statutes, he was committed to the Asylum for Insane 
Criminals. The trial of the case was conducted by Charles 
L. Gardner, district attorney. 

Oscar W. Nelson of Worcester, indicted in Berkshire 
County, January, 1901, for the murder of Gustav A. Erick- 
son, at Worcester, Nov. 10, 1900. On Jan. 28, 1901, he 
was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. David F. O'Connell 
and Walter P. Hall were assigned by the court as counsel 
for the defendant. On Feb. 25-29, 1901, the defendant was 
tried by a jury before Hopkins and Stevens, JJ. The result 
was a verdict of murder in the second degree. Exceptions 
were filed by counsel for the defendant, and were argued 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xv 

before the Supreme Judicial Court. The exceptions were 
overruled Nov. 26, 1901, and on March 23, 1901, he was 
sentenced to the State Prison for life. The trial of case was 
conducted by Rockwood Hoar, district attorney. 

John P„ Cummings of Worcester, indicted in Worcester 
County, May, 1901, for the murder of John F. Reynolds, 
at Worcester, May 1, 1901. On May 22, 1901, he was ar- 
raigned, and pleaded guilty of murder in the second degree. 
The plea was accepted by the Commonwealth, and on June 
15, 1901, he was sentenced to State Prison for life. J. E. 
Sullivan and John B. Ratigan were assigned by the court. as 
counsel for the defendant. The case was in charge of Rock- 
wood Hoar, district attorney. 

Elizabeth A. Naramore of Barre, indicted in Worces- 
ter County, May, 1901, for the murder of Ethel M. Nara- 
more, at Barre, on March 21, 1901. On May 23, 1901, she 
was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. Fred W. Blackmer 
was assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. On 
May 23, 1901, the defendant was tried by a jury before 
Gaskill and Lawton, JJ. The result was a verdict of " not 
guilty by reason of insanity ; " whereupon she was committed 
to the Worcester Insane Hospital for life. The trial of 
case was conducted by Rockwood Hoar, district attorney. 

Benjamin H. Brown of Boston, indicted in Suffolk 
County, August, 1901, for the murder of Alice M. Crowell, 
at Boston, on July 21, 1901. On Aug. 16, 1901, he was 
arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. William A. Morse was 
assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. On 
Dec. 17, 1901, he retracted his plea of not guilty, and 
pleaded guilty of murder in the second degree. The plea 
was accepted by the Commonwealth, and he was thereupon 
sentenced to State Prison for life. The case was in charge 
of Oliver Stevens, district attorney. 

The following indictments for murder are now pending : — 

John D. Cassells of Springfield, indicted in Hampden 
County, May, 1901, for the murder of Mary J. Lane, at 



xvi ATTORKEY-GEKERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Longmeadow, Feb. 26, 1901. On Sept. 5, 1901, he was 
arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. Stephen S. Taft and 
Dexter E. Tilley were assigned by the court as counsel for 
the defendant. On Dec. 30, 1901, the defendant was tried 
by a jury before Maynard and Hopkins, J J. The result 
was a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. The 
defendant has not yet been sentenced. The trial of the case 
was conducted by Charles L. Gardner, district attorney. 

Bernhard Palz of Holyoke, indicted in Hampden 
County, September, 1901, for the murder of Helena Lederer 
Fahring, at Holyoke, May 15, 1901. On Oct. 2, 1901, he 
was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. Stephen J. Taft 
and T. J. O'Connor have been assigned by the court as 
counsel for the defendant. 

John C. Best of Saugus, indicted for murder in Essex 
County, January, 1901, for the murder of George E. Bailey, 
at Saugus, Oct. 8, 1900. On Jan. 30, 1901, he was 
arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. James H. Sisk and 
Nathan D. A. Clarke were assigned by the court as counsel 
for the defendant. On March 18-28, 1901, the defendant 
was tried by a jury before Sherman and Fox, JJ. The 
result was a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. 
Exceptions were filed by counsel for the defendant, which 
were argued before the Supreme Judicial Court on Jan. 6, 
1902. The trial of the case was conducted by the Attorney- 
General, assisted by W. Scott Peters, district attorney. 

Jane Toppan of Cambridge, indicted in Barnstable 
County, December, 1901, for the murder of Mary D. Gibbs, 
at Bourne, Aug. 12, 1901. On Dec. 6, 1901, she was 
arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. Fred M. Bixby of 
Brockton has been assigned by the court as counsel for the 
defendant. 

Jane Toppan of Cambridge, indicted in Barnstable 
County, December, 1901, for the murder of Alden P. 
Davis, at Bourne, Aug. 8, 1901. On Dec. 6, 1901, she was 
arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. Fred M. Bixby has 
been assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xvn 

Jane Toppan of Cambridge, indicted in Barnstable 
County, December, 1901, for the murder of Genevieve D. 
Gordon, at Bourne, July 30, 1901. On Dec. 6, 1901, she 
was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. Fred M. Bixby of 
Brockton has been assigned as counsel for the defence. 

Originally capital cases were tried before the full bench 
of the Supreme Judicial Court. In the year 1872 the law 
was amended so that two justices only of that court should 
be required to sit. In 1891 the jurisdiction of capital cases 
was transferred to the Superior Court, but in the statute 
authorizing the change it was provided that three justices of 
that court should preside at the trial. Later the number of 
judges was reduced to two, and so the law now stands. 

I see no good reason why the Legislature may not go 
further, and provide that capital cases shall be tried like 
other criminal cases, — before a single justice of the Su- 
perior Court. The present law is undoubtedly a vestige 
of the traditional methods of procedure, and is based upon 
no adequate reasons. Trial before a single justice is the 
method now in vogue in England, — the country from which 
our principles of criminal law are derived. It is also the 
method long since adopted in most States. Wherever it 
exists, there is no demand for any change. The questions 
of law to be ruled upon by the court in capital cases are for 
the most part thoroughly established. They bring of them- 
selves no unusual responsibilities to the court ; and, more- 
over, the prisoner has the right of appeal upon all questions 
of law, so that his rights are thereby secured. 

On the other hand, there are good reasons why the change 
suggested should be made. It is often difficult to arrange 
for the presence of two justices. The most of them are con- 
stantly occupied during the time of year when courts are 
usually held, and, in order to arrange for the trial of a cap- 
ital case, there must be an interruption in the regular work 
of the court in some county. 

It is important, in my judgment, that capital cases should 
be promptly tried. All unnecessary delays should be 
avoided. The court has recognized the importance of this 
fact, and has responded in every instance, as promptly 



xviii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

as circumstances would permit, to the request of the 
Attorney-General for an early assignment, although the 
difficulty of arranging for the presence of two justices has 
caused some unavoidable delays. But if only one judge 
were required, capital cases could be dealt with much more 
expeditiously, and without more delays than are incidental 
to other criminal cases. 

Whatever will make justice simple, sure, without delay, 
without unnecessary formality or hindrance, should be 
encouraged. In that way, respect for law and confidence in 
the certainty of its judgment is maintained. I recommend, 
therefore, that the statutes be amended so that capital trials 
may be held before one or more justices, instead of before 
two or more, as the law now is. 

The Superior Court. 

This court was established in 1859, and originally consisted 
of a chief justice and nine associate justices. At that time 
the population of the State was about 1,200,000. To-day 
the court consists of one chief justice and eighteen associate 
justices. The population meanwhile has increased to more 
than 2,500,000. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Superior 
Court, during the forty years of its existence, has been pro- 
portionately enlarged, until it is the principal trial court of the 
Commonwealth. The result of the increase, both in the num- 
ber of cases and in the extent of its jurisdiction, is that to- 
day in many of the counties the trial of cases before the court 
is unduly delayed, to the great inconvenience of suitors. I 
am informed that some members of the bar of the city of 
Boston have petitioned the Legislature for an increase in the 
number of judges. I heartily endorse the petition. I rec- 
ognize the undesirability of making the bench so large as to 
be unwieldy ; but the growth of the Commonwealth cannot 
be retarded or stopped by limiting the number of judges of 
the courts. 

The first day of the sessions of the court in most of the 
counties is Monday. There are four exceptions : Suffolk, 
Barnstable, Dukes County and Nantucket. As to the two 
island counties, it requires a day's journey for the trial 
justice to reach the town where the court is held, and those 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xix 

counties may well be left as they are ; but there is no good 
reason for having the first day of the session begin on Tues- 
day either in Suffolk or in Barnstable. It takes one day out 
of the work of the first week. I recommend that the statutes 
be so changed that all sessions in those two counties shall 
begin on Monday. 

The Court of Land Registration. 

This court was established by St. 1898, c. 562, and went 
into operation Oct. 1, 1898. The purpose of the statute 
creating the court was to get rid of the cumbersome, expen- 
sive and medieval system of registration of deeds which has 
come down to us from time immemorial, and which in time, 
by the very accumulation of books must be abolished. From 
the first this new system has encountered the violent, and 
sometimes, I am constrained to say, unreasoning opposition 
of certain classes of the community. Notwithstanding this 
fact, and although registration by its methods are voluntary, 
its jurisdiction has constantly increased, until to-day land 
to the assessed value of over $2,500,000 has been brought 
under its jurisdiction, and more than 1,000 certificates of 
title have been issued. The s}^stem has been attacked both 
in the State and the Federal courts. The jurisdiction of the 
court has been sustained as constitutional iu Massachusetts ; 
and similar statutes have been sustained in other States. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has declined to in- 
terfere, and has intimated that no appeal would lie to that 
court excepting in favor of one actually aggrieved by its de- 
crees without notice. Even such an appeal could not result 
in annulling the decrees of the court excepting as to the 
party aggrieved. The court would still exist, and its de- 
crees as to all others would be binding. 

It has been contended that registration by this court 
endangers the security of title, especially in the remote 
contingency that at some future time the law may be pro- 
nounced unconstitutional. How absurd this objection is 
may be better appreciated when it is considered that transfer 
by deed in common form is not abolished. Every convey- 
ance, of whatever nature, must still be made by deed. The 
essential difference between the present system and the old 



xx ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOET. [Jan. 

one is that, instead of having the deeds copied into books 
kept for the purpose, the deed itself is filed in the records of 
the court ; and the further fact that under its decrees pos- 
sible adverse claimants may be concluded, and the title to 
the land conclusively established. The only attack upon 
the court has been as to its ability to guarantee title. Even 
if that guaranty should fail, the riling of deeds of convey- 
ance in the records of the court, instead of recording them 
in ponderous books, to be piled up until there is no room 
to hold them, would of itself justify the existence of the 
court. 

Having thus created an important court of record having 
possible jurisdiction over all the real estate of the Common- 
wealth, the Commonwealth, in my judgment, should foster 
the growth of the jurisdiction of the court, and, so far as 
may be, relieve the other courts from questions affecting land 
titles. It can well be, and in my opinion, should be, made 
the real estate court of the Commonwealth, to the same ex- 
tent as the probate court has jurisdiction over estates of 
deceased persons. 

To strengthen the hands of the court and increase its 
jurisdiction, I submit the following recommendations: — 

First. — To require savings banks, which are under the 
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth by virtue of their charters, 
to cause the title of land of over $20,000 in value, on 
which they make loans, to be registered. This is similar to 
a recommendation I made to a former Legislature. 

Second. — To repeal chapter 182 of the Revised Laws. 
This chapter, which is entitled " Proceedings for the Settle- 
ment of Title to Land," authorizes proceedings in certain 
cases to be taken in the Superior Court in order to quiet the 
title to real estate. There is no reason why the Superior 
Court should be longer troubled with this class of cases, 
especially as the Commonwealth has created a court whose 
primary and principal function is to settle such titles. 
Every one of the petitions authorized by the chapter in 
question may be brought as well in the Court of Land 
Registration, and there be more speedily and expeditiously 
disposed of; and the Superior Court, the docket of which 
is already overcrowded, will be relieved of that class of liti- 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxi 

gations. Furthermore, I see no reason why the Legislature 
may not eventually go further, and require that all actions 
relating to the title of real estate, such as writs of entry, 
should be brought in the first instance in the Court of Land 
Registration. 

Third. — At present a general appeal lies from this court 
to the Superior Court. This right of appeal may well be 
limited to questions of fact, and to such as are within the 
discretion of the court, and so guarded that only the par- 
ticular question as to which the party appealing is aggrieved 
shall be heard in the Superior Court. 

Jury Service. 

An experience of more than thirty years has strengthened 
my conviction that trial by jury is the best method yet 
devised to ascertain the truth of controversies in matters of 
fact. There are those, mostly of the class that distrust, 
because they do not appreciate, the instinctive wisdom of 
the plain people of the community, who advocate the aboli- 
tion of this method of trial. I am not one of those. 
Instead of being abolished, as has been sometimes suggested, 
I believe rather that the system, by the correction of some 
existing defects, should be strengthened. I have already had 
occasion to suggest the evils growing out of the present prac- 
tice of requiring a long term of service. In many of the 
counties jurymen once sworn are required to serve many 
weeks. Such a length of continuous service is oftentimes 
injurious if not actually disastrous to the business of the 
jurymen. For this reason ingenious devices are resorted to 
to escape the performance of jury duty, and the pressure of 
private business is often accepted as a sufficient excuse by 
the presiding justice. 

Moreover, under the statutes many classes of men whose 
services would be valuable are permanently exempt. The 
result is that under existing laws juries are composed of men 
whose business is so unimportant that it does not suffer by 
the absence of the juryman and persons of leisure. The 
active man of affairs and the professional man are seldom on 
the panel. This, in my judgment, is wrong. The repre- 
sentative jury should be made up of all classes of citizens, 



xxii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

and especially of that class who bear the burdens of the 
work of the world. This might be accomplished if the term 
of service be reduced. There is no good reason why long 
terms of service should be required of jurymen. It is not a 
duty to be learned. All the schooling they need is the ex- 
perience they have gathered in the conduct of their own 
affairs. They are as competent the first day of the term as 
they are after weeks of service. Indeed, the most impor- 
tant of all cases, indictments for murder, are usually tried 
by a jury impanelled for the first time for that special service. 
I renew a recommendation which I had the honor to submit 
to a former Legislature, — that the list of exemptions from 
jury duty be largely reduced, that no excuses excepting 
actual illness be accepted, and that the term of service of 
the jurymen be limited to two weeks. No citizen, however 
important his private affairs, can justly complain if he is 
called upon to give this brief time to the public service once 
in three years. 

Collateral Inheritance Taxes. 

In the case of Hooper v. Bradford, Treasurer, reported 
in volume 178 of the Massachusetts Reports, it is decided 
that a collateral legacy tax is to be computed upon the value 
of the property as of the day of the death of the decedent. 

There are a number of cases pending in which the time for 
the payment of the tax upon certain legacies has been 
extended under the provisions of the statute, for the reason 
that it was impossible to tell, within the two years after the 
death of the decedent, whether such legacies would vest 
ultimately in persons who were not exempted from legacy 
taxes. When such legacies shall vest in possession, there 
may be difficulty in computing the value of property, if it 
becomes necessary for the appraisers to ascertain the value 
of the property under the rule adopted by the Supreme 
Judicial Court. 

In view of this decision and of the difficulties above sug- 
gested, I recommend the enactment of a statute similar to 
that in force in Pennsylvania. That statute provides as 
follows: " In all cases where there has been or shall be a 
devise, descent or bequest to collateral relatives or strangers, 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxm 

liable to the collateral inheritance tax, to take effect in 
possession, or come into actual enjoyment after the expira- 
tion of one or more life estates, or a period of years, the tax 
on such estates shall not be payable, nor interest begin to run 
thereon, until the person or persons liable for the same shall 
come into actual possession of such estate, by the termina- 
tion of the estates for life or years, and the tax shall be 
assessed upon the value of the estate at the time the right of 
possession accrues to the owner as aforesaid : provided, 
that the owner shall have the right to pay the tax at any 
time prior to his coming into possession, and, in such cases, 
the tax shall be assessed on the value of the estate at the 
time of the payment of the tax, after deducting the value of 
the life estate or estates for years." 

Such a law is also in force in New York. 

Evidence in Land-damage Cases. 

In this class of cases it is permitted to aid the jury in 
arriving at the cost of property taken by the estimation of 
expert witnesses called for the purpose ; but under the exist- 
ing rules of law one appraisal, the best known to the com- 
munity, the most impartial and perhaps the most universally 
relied upon, is excluded. I refer to the valuations of the 
sworn assessors of the city or town in which the land lies. 
These are valuations made by impartial officers, duly sworn, 
and whose judgments are made a matter of record. Those 
records are now inadmissible in evidence. The assessors 
may, it is true, be summoned to testify ; but this is incon- 
venient, and imposes an unnecessary burden upon them. 

I recommend that provision be made by statute in all 
land-damage cases authorizing the introduction by either 
party of such sworn valuations as evidence, to be considered 
by the jury, in connection with the other evidence in the 
case. I have little doubt the assessors' valuations would in 
many if not in most cases be relied upon by the jury in 
preference to the evidence of paid experts, almost always, 
and inevitably, though honestly, partial to the party employ- 
ing them. 



xxiv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 1902. 

Office of the Attorney-General. 

As will be seen by the table contained in this report, the 
number of cases requiring attention during the past year was 
2,349. Last year the number was 1,801. In 1894, the 
first year of my incumbency of the office, the number was 
549. The basis of enumeration is the same each year. 
It thus appears that the volume of business receiving the 
attention of the office has increased more than four-fold in 
the last eight years, and that the increase even in the last 
year has been very material. 

This increase has necessitated the appointment of an addi- 
tional assistant, and accordingly Mr. Frederic B. Greenhalge 
of Lowell was appointed, and entered upon the discharge of 
his duties on the first day of October. 

In 1879 the salary of the Attorney-General was estab- 
lished at $5,000, and this is the present salary of the office. 
Meanwhile, the business, as I have shown, has enormously 
increased. I have for some time been of the opinion that the 
present salary is inadequate to the importance of the duties 
performed ; but, having been re-elected, did not hitherto 
deem I was justified in recommending an increase in my own 
favor. That reason no longer exists. The number of assist- 
ants, it is true, has been increased from two to six ; but, 
notwithstanding this fact, the amount of the work which of 
necessity devolves upon the Attorney-General personally is 
very much greater than when I was first elected to the office. 
It is, I think it will be conceded, proper that the salary of 
the Attorney-General should approximate the salaries of the 
justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, whose principal 
officer he is. Their salaries have recently and very justly 
been increased. A similar increase should be made in the 
case of the Attorney-General ; and I so recommend. 

Appended to this report are printed the principal opinions 
prepared during the current year. 

Respectfully submitted, 

HOSEA M. KNOWLTON, 

Attorney- General. 



OPINIONS. 



Commonivealtli' s Land — Deed — Restriction. 

Where deeds from the Commonwealth to certain grantees of land formerly 
belonging to the Commonwealth contain the stipulation that buildings 
erected thereon " shall not, in any event, be used . . . for any mechani- 
cal or manufacturing purposes," any use of the estates in question for 
other than residential purposes would be a violation of the restriction. 

Jan. 2, 1901. 
Hon. Woodward Emery, 

Chairman, Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners. 

Dear Sir: — I have your letter of the 26th, submitting to this 
office certain questions with regard to the construction of the stipu- 
lations in the deeds of the Commonwealth that buildings erected 
upon the Back Bay " shall not, in any event, be used for a stable, 
or for any mechanical or manufacturing purposes." 

It is stated in your letter that the specific inquiry arises from a 
request by certain property owners who desire to learn " whether 
they may lease their houses and premises, without violating the 
stipulations aforesaid, for an} T of the following purposes : first, for 
decorating of pottery, with a furnace in the cellar for baking it ; 
second, for a boarding-house, on condition of placing a small power 
engine for elevators and steam laundry apparatus, with the privilege 
of extending the business of the laundry ; third, as a tailoring estab- 
lishment, with a small power engine for elevators and to run the 
sewing machines on all the floors." 

I am of the opinion that any use of the estates in question for 
other than residential purposes would be a violation of the stipula- 
tions in the deed. Such a use of the premises does not exclude 
the use of engines, boilers and machinery, so far as they may 
properly be employed in connection with the use of the house as a 
residence ; otherwise, if for purposes of trade or business. 

If the proposed uses, as above quoted, are for the carrying on 
of a business, and not incidental, merely, to the use of the house 
as a residence, they come within the spirit of the stipulation and 
are barred by its terms. 

Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General. 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



State Contracts — Regulations regarding Award — Preference of 
Home Industries. 

With the exception of Pub. Sts., c. 221, §§ 54-58, there are no laws, rules 
or regulations in regard to the awarding of State contracts. 

There is no law containing any provision for the preference of home in- 
dustry, in case some manufacturer of another State of the Union, or a 
foreign firm, offers the lowest bid. 

Jan. 4, 1901. 
To His Excellency W. Murray Crane, Governor. 

Dear Sir : — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of 
the letter written to you by G-eorge de Szogy6ny, submitting cer- 
tain inquiries in regard to contracts for public works and also the 
employment of labor therein. 

1. I know of no laws, rules or regulations relating to the award- 
ing of State contracts for the construction of and repairs upon pub- 
lic buildings, or for supplying the different articles of manufacture 
needed by the different departments and by the State militia, ex- 
cepting Pub. Sts., c. 221, §§ 54-58. These in substance provide 
that contracts on account of the prisons of the Commonwealth shall 
be made with the warden, in writing, subject to the approval of 
the Prison Commissioners, and, further, that when, in the opinion 
of the commissioners, it can be advantageously clone, the principal 
articles purchased for the use of the prisons shall be contracted for 
by the year, and that public notice shall be given of the articles 
needed, the quality and quantity thereof, and the time and manner 
of delivery; such proposals to be in writing and sealed. "The 
persons offering the best terms, with satisfactory security for the 
performance, shall be entitled to the contract, unless it appears to 
the commissioners that it is not for the interest of the state to 
accept any of the proposals," in which case no offer shall be ac- 
cepted ; and the warden shall thereupon proceed to make contracts 
in such way as can best be done for the interests of the Common- 
wealth. 

The foregoing answers the inquiry submitted, which relates only 
to State contracts. I may, however, add that a statute enacted 
in the year 1887 regulates with much particularity contracts made 
by counties. 

2. There is no law containing any provision for the preference 
of home industry, in case some manufacturer of another State of 
the Union or a foreign firm offers a lower bid. 

Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners — Authority to establish 
Boundary Lines in Tide Waters. 

The Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners is not authorized, under St. 
1881, c. 196, § 1, to establish boundary lines in tide waters between 
towns created after the passage of such statute. 

Feb. 1, 1901. 

Desmond FitzGerald, Esq., Chairman, Topographical Survey Commission. 

Dear Sir: — I am of opinion that St. 1881, c. 196, § 1, does 
not give the Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners authority 
to establish boundary lines in tide waters between towns created 
after the passage of the act. If this be so, the Board has no right 
to establish the line between Bourne and Sandwich, the town of 
Bourne having been created after the passage of the act, and legis- 
lative action is necessary to establish such line. 

No controversy arises upon the Buzzard's Bay side, the line 
having been fixed by the Legislature. I may add that it would be 
absurd to suppose that the Legislature intended to permit any part 
of the shore line of Bourne to remain in the jurisdiction of Sand- 
wich, notwithstanding the set-off of the town of Bourne. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General. • 



Dogs — Injury to Domestic Animals — " Worrying." 

Under Pub. Sts., c. 102, § 98, as amended by St. 1889, c. 454, providing 
compensation for loss "by the worrying, maiming, or killing" of do- 
mestic animals by dogs, any sort of attack by a dog, intended to frighten 
a domestic animal, is " worrying " within the meaning of the statute. 

Feb. 1, 1901. 
Charles R. Prescott, Esq., Controller of County Accounts. 

Dear Sir : — Your letter of January 3 states the following case : 
a man was driving a horse on the highway when a dog suddenly 
ran out and barked at the horse, causing him to rear, and when the 
horse's foot came down, one of his legs was broken, so that it 
became necessary to kill him. 

The opinion of the Attorney-General is required upon the ques- 
tion whether, upon these facts, the county is liable for damages 
for the killing of the horse, under the provisions of Pub. Sts., c. 
102, § 98, as amended by St. 1889, c. 454. 

The statute provides that whoever suffers loss by the worrying, 
maiming or killing of bis sheep, lambs, fowls or other domestic 
animals, by dogs, may inform the officer of police ; and that there- 



4 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

upon appraisers shall be appointed to appraise the damage, and 
that a certificate of the damages found shall be returned to the 
county treasurer, and the treasurer shall submit the same to the 
county commissioners, who, after examination, shtfll issue an order 
upon the treasurer for all or any part thereof as justice and equity 
may require. 

It is settled that a horse is a domestic animal within the mean- 
ing of this statute. Osborn v. Selectmen of Lenox, 2 Allen, 207. 
Whether the act of the dog in the case in question could be charac- 
terized as " worrying," within the meaning of the word as used in 
the statute, is a more difficult question. Undoubtedly the mean- 
ing of the word as defined by lexicographers imputes seizing and 
biting. In Osborn v. Lenox the horse was bitten by the dog, and 
no question as to whether the acts of the dog constituted k ' worry- 
ing" arose. 

I am of opinion, however, that any sort of attack by a dog, in- 
tended to frighten a domestic animal, is " worrying," within the 
meaning of the statute. It is not necessaiy to the remedial pur- 
pose of the statute that injuries for which compensation is to be 
made be limited to those caused by actual seizing and biting. In- 
deed, in the case of some animals, as, for example, fowls, such a 
limitation of the purpose of the meaning of the statute would en- 
tirely defeat its purpose. The same word in statutes of other 
States has been held to mean "running after, chasing, and bark- 
ing at " Marshall v. Blackshire, 44 la. 475. See also Campbell 
v. Brown, 1 Grant (Pa.), 82 ; Johnson v. McConnell, 80 Cal. 545. 

I am of opinion, therefore, that the claim in question was one 
which could properly be allowed under the statute. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General. 



Insurance — Change from Assessment to " Old Line" Business — 
Lien on Policy — Reserve — Asset. 

Where an insurance company, in changing from an assessment to a level 
premium business, enters into an agreement with the insured, by which 
the latter exchanges an assessment for a new level premium policy, as 
of the date of the original insurance, giving to the company a lien 
upon the new policy for the amount of the reserve which would have 
accumulated if such policy had been taken out at the time when the 
assessment insurance was taken, the amount of the lien is not an asset 
of the company, and is not to be credited to it as such. 

It is therefore the duty of the Insurance Commissioner to regard the con- 
tract as a contract of insurance for the face value of the policy, less the 
amount of the lien created thereon. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 5 

Feb. 1, 1091. 
Hon. Frederick L. Cutting, Insurance Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — Your letter of January 4, after quoting St. 1900, 
c. 363, providing that the Insurance Commissioner shall annually 
compute the reserve liability of insurance companies and examine 
the financial status of such companies, states that certain insurance 
companies which, under the laws of Massachusetts, have been com- 
pelled to change from assessment to level premium business, have 
attempted to meet the difficulties arising from such change in the 
following manner : — 

No reserve was accumulated during the continuance of the as- 
sessment policies ; and if such policies were to be exchanged for 
level premium policies with the rate of premium fixed as of the age 
when the original policy was taken out, the companies would not 
have, and could never accumulate, a reserve sufficient to protect 
the policy under the requirements of the Massachusetts statutes. 
Accordingly, at the time of such exchange they induced the insured 
to enter into an agreement by which the company was given a 
lien upon the new policy for the amount of the reserve which they 
ought to have on hand, regarding the level premium policy as 
having been taken out at the time the assessment insurance was 
placed. 

The result of this arrangement is that a policy, for example, 
which is nominally for $1,000, has charged against it, by the assent 
of the insured, a sum of money (say, for example, $300) repre- 
senting the amount of reserve which the company should have on 
hand, assuming it to have been taken out when the assessment in- 
surance policy was originally taken out. 

The question submitted by your letter is whether you shall, as 
contended by such companies, compute the amount of insurance 
outstanding at the face value of the policy, and include among the 
assets the liens in question. 

The face value of the policy is reduced by the exact amount of 
the lien so created ; so that, in the supposed case above stated, it 
becomes, in effect, a contract for $1,000 less $300. This, obvi- 
ously, is nothing more than a contract to pay $700. The policy 
should, therefore, be regarded, for the purposes of your valuation, 
as a policy for $700. It follows that the amount of the lien is not 
an asset in the hands of the company, and is not to be credited to 
it as such. 

It is contended by the companies that the transaction in ques- 
tion is, in effect, a loan upon the security of the policy, and that 
it is to be so regarded in your computation. The difference, 
however, between such loans and the arrangement in question 



6 ATTORJN T EY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

illustrates and confirms the soundness of the views I have ex- 
pressed. 

The real face of a policy of insurance is the amount which the 
company would be bound to pay if the insured should die the day 
the policy is taken out. This amount is not varied by subsequent 
arrangements between the insured and the company. If, there- 
fore, after the policy is written and delivered, the company makes 
a loan, it does not diminish the face of the policy and has no effect 
upon the valuation. 

But, under the arrangement in question, the policy in its incep- 
tion is insurance, not for the face value of the policy, but for the 
net amount after deducting the amount of the lien. Real loans 
are assets because the company's liability is diminished by the 
amount of each loan ; but these alleged loans are not assets be- 
cause the company was never liable for them. 

I am of opinion, therefore, that it is your duty to decline to in- 
flate the two sides of the account by taking the face of the policy, 
upon the one hand, and regarding the lien as an asset, upon the 
other hand ; but that you are to regard the contract what it is in 
fact, to wit, insurance for the face of the policy less the amount of 
the lien created thereon. 

Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



Firemen — "Firemen's Relief Fund" — Persons impressed into 
Service of Regular Fire Department. 

Persons who have been impressed into the service of a regular organized 
fire department of a city or town, and receive injuries while in the 
performance of the duties required of them, are not entitled to relief 
under the provisions of St. 1892, c. 177, relating to the "Firemen's 
Relief Fund." 

Feb. 5, 1901. 
J. C. Crombie, Esq., 

Chairman, Board of Commissioners of the Firemen's Belief Fund. 

Dear Sir: — Your letter of January 21 requires my opinion 
upon the question whether certain persons referred to in the papers 
annexed to the letter are entitled to relief under the provisions of 
St. 1892, c. 177, relating to the Firemen's Relief Fund, of which 
your Board has the disbursement. 

It appears by the documents submitted that a disastrous fire 
occurred in Foxborough in June last. Foxborough is a town which 
had at the time an organized fire department. Some of the regular 
members of the fire department were absent, and in consequence 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 7 

of the fierceness of the fire the men in question were impressed 
into the service by the engineers, and received their injuries while 
performing the duties of firemen. 

The chapter in question provides, in section 2, that the fund 
shall be used " for the relief of firemen." It provides further, in 
section 4, that members of incorporated protective departments 
shall be eligible for benefits as well as " any person doing fire duty 
at the request or upon the order of the authorities of any town 
having no organized fire department." 

It is obvious that the word " firemen" in the first section does 
not mean any person who is engaged in extinguishing a fire. 
Otherwise, there would have been no occasion for the language 
above quoted in the fourth section, which includes, in addition to 
" firemen," persons doing fire duty where there is no organized fire 
department. It follows that the meaning of the word " firemen" 
must be sought in the statutes. 

Pub. Sts., c. 35, §§ 28-39, inclusive, authorize the selectmen of 
a town to establish a fire department, and provide for the method 
of creating the same. Section 31 limits the number of men to be 
employed on the several engines, hose carriages, and hook and 
ladder carriages, as well as in each fire company. These com- 
panies, by section 32, may organize, elect officers, establish rules 
and regulations, and annex penalties for the breach of the same. 
They may also have certain exemptions from other public duties, 
such as jury duty (Pub. Sts., c. 170, § 2). These rights and privi- 
leges are doubtless conferred in consideration of the fact that they 
have volunteered to hold themselves in readiness at all times, 
seasonable or unseasonable, to perform what may often be a haz- 
ardous and difficult task. 

I see no reason to doubt that the purpose of the statute estab- 
lishing the Firemen's Relief Fund was further to recognize their 
services by compensating them for injuries received in the per- 
formance of their duty. It was the intent of the Legislature to 
encourage men to enlist in organized fire departments by holding 
out the inducement of compensation. 

It is otherwise with one who is impressed into service, upon a 
single occasion, and who has not chosen to connect himself regu- 
larly with the fire department. It seems to have been the purpose 
of the Legislature carefully to exclude such persons and to extend 
the relief provided by the statute only to regular members of the 
fire department, where there is a fire department ; the only excep- 
tion being in favor of persons doing fire duty in towns where there 
is no such organized fire department. I am led to the conclusion, 
therefore, that however meritorious the services of the persons in 



8 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

question may have been, they are not entitled to relief from the 
fund in charge of your Board. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners — Cape Cod Canal — 
Approval of Plans. 

The charter of the Cape Cod Canal, St. 1899, c. 448, § 4, imposes upon the 
Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners the duty of determining in 
what manner the canal shall be constructed, including all questions 
relating to locks, tide-gates and other such structures. 

Feb. 11, 1901. 
Hon. Woodward Emery, 

Chairman, Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners. 

Dear Sir: — The charter of the Cape Cod Canal, St. 1899, c. 
448, provides in section 4 that the corporation shall file with your 
Board " a plan of the proposed location and a plan of the proposed 
construction thereof." It is the duty of the Board thereupon to 
hear the parties, require such modification, if any, as it may desire, 
and to approve the plans as filed or as modified. 

Section 6 provides that the joint Board of Harbor and Land 
Commissioners and the Railroad Commissioners shall " determine 
at what point or points the railroad of the old Colony Railroad 
Company shall cross said canal by a drawbridge or bridges, or by 
a tunnel or tunnels constructed under said canal." The section 
further provides that the canal company shall construct its canal 
" with such structures and appliances for its protection and use 
as said joint Board may order, together with such bridge or bridges, 
tunnel or tunnels, ferries and changes of highways, under the 
supervision of said joint Board, as shall be in accordance with the 
plans approved by them and in conformity with such orders as 
they may make." 

The precise question submitted by your letter of February 5 is 
as follows : " Should this Board, under section 4, approve a plan 
of construction which did not include a lock, or locks, or gates, 
would it be in the power of the joint Board, under section 6, to 
order such structures to be built? " 

I very much doubt whether your Board has the right to my 
opinion upon the question submitted. It is rather for the joint 
Board, if a situation shall arise before that Board which will make 
it material. But it may not be amiss for me to submit my views 
as to the duty of your Board under section 4, above quoted. It 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 9 

imposes, in my opinion, upon your Board the duty of determining 
in what manner the canal shall be constructed. This includes all 
questions relating to locks, tide-gates and other such structures. 
You are to have in view the use of the canal for purposes of navi- 
gation, and to determine what method of construction will be the 
safest and most convenient in view of all the facts and probabili- 
ties, including the probable rate of tide in the canal, and how far 
its current may make navigation dangerous if unrestrained by 
structures intended to prevent such movement. 

You have no means of knowing, of course, whether the joint 
Board will order the crossing in question to be effected by a tun- 
nel or a bridge, but I assume that it is not unreasonable for you to 
anticipate that bridges, either for the railroad or for highways, 
will be necessary. In all events, the question of such probability 
is before you, and it is your duty to" order the construction of the 
canal in such manner as will provide for all these circumstances 
and probabilities. The determination, therefore, of the question 
of locks and gates is confided to the discretion of your Board. 

The obvious purpose of section 6 is to submit to the joint Board 
all questions concerning the crossing of the canal by the railroad 
company. These questions are submitted to the joint Board rather 
than to your Board, for the reason that they involve on the one 
hand the considerations affecting railroad transportation, and those 
affecting navigation on the other. 

The precise question whether the joint Board will have jurisdic- 
tion to order the construction of locks, in case you shall have ap- 
proved plans which do not call for such structures, is one which 
does not concern, in my judgment, your duty under section 4, and 
which may well be determined when, if ever, it arises. 
Very truly yours, 

Hose a M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



Savings Banks — Authorized Investments — Guaranty. 

An agreement to purchase first mortgage bonds for their face value at the 
time and place of the maturity of such bonds is not equivalent to a 
guaranty, as required by St. 1894, c. 317, § 21. 

Feb. 12, 1901. 
Hon. Starkes Whitox, 

Chairman, Board of Commissioners of Savings Banks. 

Dear Sir: — Among the investments by savings banks in this 
Commonwealth authorized by St. 1894, c. 317, § 21, are the first 
mortgage bonds of certain railroad companies, "guaranteed" by 
certain other railroad companies (paragraph b). 



10 ATTORXEY-GEKEKAL'S REPOET. [Jan. 

What professes to be the guaranty of a bond by a railroad com- 
pany coming within the description of the act is, in terms, an 
agreement to purchase the bond at its face value at the time and 
place of the maturity of the bond. The question submitted by 
your Board is whether this agreement is equivalent to a guaranty. 

I have already advised your Board (1 Opinions of Attorney- 
General, 149) that any agreement which is equivalent in law to a 
guaranty is within the spirit of the statute. I am unable, however, 
to interpret the agreement in question as equivalent to a guaranty. 
The essence of the agreement is time and place, whereas a guaranty 
is not so limited. If the holder of the bond fails to present it for 
purchase on the day and at the place named in the agreement, the 
promisor is thereafterwards discharged. It would be otherwise as 
to a guaranty. 

Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney-General. 



Cape Cod Canal — Harbor and Land Commissioners — Locks — 
Jurisdiction of Joint Board. 

Under the provisions of the charter of the Cape Cod and New York Canal 
Company (St. 1899, c. 448), the jurisdiction of questions of location 
and construction is confided to the Board of Harbor and Land Com- 
missioners ; the joint Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners and 
Railroad Commissioners, therefore, has no jurisdiction over the ques- 
tion of locks, except in the matter of the crossing of the canal by the 
Old Colony Railroad Company, as provided in section 6. 

April 6, 1901. 
Hon. James F. Jackson, Chairman, Board of Bailroad Commissioners. 

Dear Sir : — Your letter of March 14 states that the plans of the 
Boston, Cape Cod and New l'ork Canal Company have been ap- 
proved by the Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners, in accord- 
ance with the provisions of the charter of the company (St. 1899, c. 
448, § 4), and are now before the joint Board of Harbor and Land 
Commissioners and the Railroad Commissioners for action by the 
Board under the provisions of section 6 of the same statute. Your 
letter further states that the Board of Harbor and Land Commis- 
sioners approved the plans " without having determined the neces- 
sity of locks," and requires the opinion of the Attorney-General 
upon the question whether, in view of that fact, the joint Board 
has jurisdiction of the question of locks. 

The jurisdiction of the joint Board is, in my judgment, in no 
way dependent upon the action of the Board of Harbor and Land 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 11 

Commissioners. The charter in separate sections (4 and 6) clearly 
points out the duties devolving upon each Board, and the authority 
and responsibility of each Board is to be found in those provisions. 
Yours is not a board of appellate but rather of original jurisdiction. 

In a letter to the Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners 
dated Feb. 11, 1901, I pointed out what appeared to me to be the 
duties of that Board in these words: " You are to have in view 
the use of the canal for purposes of navigation, and to determine 
what method of construction will be the safest and most convenient 
in view of all the facts and probabilities, including the probable 
rate of tide in the canal, and how far its current may make navi- 
gation dangerous if unrestrained by structures intended to prevent 
such movement." 

To these views, after the re-examination made necessary by the 
request of your Board for an opinion, I still adhere. The scheme 
of the statute, although not always expressed in the clearest terms, 
appears to me to be as follows : the company chartered must, 
within four months, file with the Harbor and Land Commission- 
ers a plan of the proposed location and " a plan of the proposed 
construction thereof." I see no reason to doubt that the word 
" construction " necessarily includes and was intended by the Legis- 
lature to include all things appertaining to the construction of the 
canal, including the question of locks, which, I take it, is one of 
the most important questions touching the construction of a canal. 

Before filing such plans the company must deposit with the 
Treasurer of the Commonwealth the sum of two hundred thousand 
dollars, to be held as security for the payment of damages occa- 
sioned by the taking of land. If the plans are not approved by 
the Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners, or if the modifica- 
tions ordered by them are not acceptable to the company, it may 
withdraw its deposit and forfeit its rights under the charter (sec- 
tion 23). But if, on the other hand, it is content with the plans 
of location and construction as finally approved by the Harbor and 
Land Commissioners, the deposit cannot be withdrawn, and what- 
ever future action the company may take, its deposit must remain 
in the treasury. 

It is apparent, therefore, that the question of the approval of the 
plans by the Harbor and Land Commissioners is one of vital im- 
portance to the company. If, for example, the plans as finally 
adopted by that Board require a method of construction which, in 
the opinion of the company, is too expensive to be profitable, the 
opportunity is given it to abandon its project and receive its money 
back. It has a right, therefore, to know, before going further, just 
what is required of it in the way of location and construction. 



12 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the question of location and 
construction is confided to a Board which is presumed to be espe- 
cially familiar with that subject, and which can adequately repre- 
sent the interests of the Commonwealth and of the public. It is 
the duty, therefore, of the Harbor and Land Commissioners to 
settle all questions of construction, with one exception. That ex- 
ception is the matter of the crossing of the canal by the railroad 
company. The jurisdiction of this question is given to a joint 
Board, consisting of the Railroad Commissioners on the one hand 
and the Harbor and Land Commissioners on the other ; it being 
presumed that conflicting questions between the railroad and the 
canal are properly submitted to such a tribunal. Section 6, there- 
fore, provides that such joint Board shall " determine at what point 
or points the railroad of the Old Colony Railroad Company shall 
cross said canal by a drawbridge or bridges, or by a tunnel or tun- 
nels constructed under said canal." Such joint Board, after due 
notice, " shall determine said questions, and the decision of a ma- 
jority of said joint board shall be final. Said canal company shall 
construct its canal with such structures and appliances for its pro- 
tection and use as said joint Board may order, together with such 
bridge or bridges, tunnel or tunnels, ferries, and changes of high- 
ways, under the supervision of said joint Board, as shall be in ac- 
cordance with plans approved by them." 

All questions, therefore, which may arise concerning the manner 
of the crossing of the canal by the railroad company, and they 
only, are within the jurisdiction of the joint Board. 

The determination of these questions may incidentally involve 
the further question whether, for the protection of the canal on the 
one hand or the railroad on the other, locks may be required, and 
it is in that aspect only that your Board has to determine any ques- 
tion concerning locks. Questions of navigation, of the velocity of 
the tide, and all other matters incidental to the question of the 
necessity of locks, are presumed to have been determined by the 
Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners before the plans come 
to your Board. 

I do not forget that the words above quoted, " said canal com- 
pany shall construct its canal with such structures and appliances 
for its protection and use as said joint Board may order," taken 
alone, might seem to give original jurisdiction to your Board of 
the question of locks. But I cannot believe the Legislature in- 
tended a divided responsibility. As I have already said, each 
Board has its own duties in the matter. Your Board is concerned 
only with the crossing of the railroad, and the words " structures 
and appliances " must be taken in connection with the rest of the 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 13 

section to refer only to the matters to which the section, as a 
whole, relates. This is still more apparent from the fact that after 
action by the Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners, the com- 
pany, having elected to proceed, is not at liberty to withdraw and 
to receive back its deposit. It is not to be presumed that the Leg- 
islature having once given an opportunity to the company to take 
back its deposit and withdraw from the enterprise, if the condi- 
tions as to construction imposed by the Board having jurisdiction 
of the matter are too onerous, should authorize another Board to 
re-impose the same conditions, when the time for withdrawal has 
elapsed. 

I am of opinion, therefore, that the question of locks is not 
before your Board excepting so far as the necessity of them may 
arise in consequence of the method of crossing by the railroad com- 
pany determined upon by the Board may require structures for the 
protection of the canal and of the railroad company. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



Street Railways — Transportation of Letter Carriers — Constitu- 
tional Law. 

St. 1S97, c. 500, § 10, providing that the Boston Elevated Eailway Com- 
pany may establish a five-cent fare, and that such fare shall not be 
reduced by the Legislature for a period of twenty-five years, consti- 
tutes a contract between the Commonwealth and the company. A 
bill, therefore, requiring all street railways within the Commonwealth 
to furnish transportation to letter carriers on duty, upon payment to 
such companies by the United States of a fixed annual allowance, 
would be unconstitutional, if it reduced fares below five cents, in so 
far as it related to the Boston Elevated Railway Company, as a law 
impairing the obligation of contracts. 

April 12, 1901. 
Hon. Rufus A. Soule, President of the Senate. 

Dear Sir : — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a 
copy of an order adopted by the honorable Senate on the tenth 
day of April inst., requiring the opinion of the Attorney-General 
upon the constitutionality of the bill relative to the transportation 
of letter carriers by street railway companies (printed as House 
document No. 257), as amended by the Senate. 

The copy of the bill submitted in substance requires street rail- 
way companies operating within the Commonwealth to furnish 
transportation to all letter carriers of the United States while in 
uniform and in the performance of their duties, upon the payment 
each year, to the company or companies furnishing said transporta- 



14 ATTOKNEY-GEKEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 

tion, by the United States, of an amount equal to the so-called 
44 standing allowance for car fare," as determined for the postal 
fiscal year ending June 30, 1901 (plus any additional sum that 
may be hereafter granted). 

No statement of facts accompanies the order. I presume, how- 
ever, I am expected to assume that if the bill becomes a law, its 
provisions will require transportation of letter carriers at a rate 
less than that collected from ordinary passengers ; for if the sum 
allowed by the United States is equal to or greater than the revenue 
derived by street railway companies from transportation of letter 
carriers, no possible constitutional question can arise. In that 
event, indeed, there would seem to be no occasion for the passage 
of the act. 

St. 1897, c. 500, § 10, provides that the Boston Elevated Rail- 
way Company, which is the lessee of the West End Street Railway 
Company, "may establish and take a toll or fare which shall not 
exceed the sum of five cents for a single continuous passage in 
the same general direction upon the roads owned, leased or oper- 
ated by it ; and this sum shall not be reduced by the Legislature 
during the period of twenty-five years from and after the passage 
of this act." A proviso follows which, however, is not material to 
the question submitted. This section, in my judgment, amounts to 
a contract between the Commonwealth and the Boston Elevated 
Railway Company, and that (excepting under the terms of the 
proviso referred to) the Legislature may not, during the term 
named in the statute, lawfully reduce fare below the sum of five 
cents fixed by the statute, without violating the provision of the 
United States Constitution (article 1, section 10), which forbids 
a State to pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts. 

I am of opinion, therefore, that the bill, so far as it concerns 
the Boston Elevated Railway Company, is unconstitutional. 

I apprehend that as to other street railways within the Common- 
wealth the question of the constitutionality of the bill turns upon 
two propositions, to wit : first, whether the bill, if it becomes a 
law, will result in reducing the earnings of the company to such an 
extent that it will operate to deprive them of their property with- 
out due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States ; and second, 
whether it denies the equal protection of the laws guaranteed to 
citizens in the same amendment by discriminating in favor of a 
certain class. 

In 1900 a statute (chapter 197) was enacted by the Legislature 
requiring the transportation of scholars of the public schools for 
one-half of the rate charged to other passengers. A proceeding 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. U. 15 

has been begun in the Circuit Court of the United States to test 
the constitutionality of this statute upon the grounds above stated. 
I have appeared in behalf of the Commonwealth, and the case is 
still pending and undetermined. The circumstances of that case 
are not in all respects the same as those which would arise under 
the bill now submitted, but in general the determination of the 
questions raised will depend upon the same considerations. 

It will be my duty in that case to contend before the court that 
the statute is constitutional. I am not, therefore, in a position 
to consider the question with that degree of impartiality which 
should be required of the Attorney-General in advising your honor- 
able body upon questions of law. For these reasons, I beg to be 
excused from answering the questions submitted, so far as relates 
to a railway company other than the Boston Elevated Railway 
Company before the determination by the court of the case now 
pending. 

I have the honor to be, 

Very respectfully, 

Hosea M. Knowi,ton, Attorney -General. 



Street Railways — Common Carriers of Goods — Constitutional 

Lav:. 

Legislation authorizing street railway companies to use their tracks in the 
public highway as common carriers of goods, wares and merchandise 
imposes no new servitude upon the owner of the fee of such highway, 
and is therefore constitutional. 

April 23, 1901. 
Hon. Rufus A. Soule, President of the Senate. 

Dear Sir : — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of an 
order adopted by the honorable Senate on the 18th inst. requiring 
the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the constitutionality of 
legislation which authorizes street railway companies to use their 
tracks in the public highways as common carriers of goods, wares 
and merchandise. The only question involved is whether such use 
of the tracks is a servitude not included in the original taking of 
the street for a public highway. If it was not so included, then 
the tracks could not be so used without additional compensation 
to the owner of the fee of the street. 

It has been determined by the Supreme Judicial Court in Pierce 
v. Drew, 136 Mass. 75, that the erection and use of a line of elec- 
tric telegraph upon a public way, and in Hoice v. West End Street 
BaUway Company, 167 Mass. 46, that the maintenance of an elec- 
tric railway operated by the overhead trolley system U3ed for the 



16 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

carriage of passengers, are among the servitudes to which the land 
of the owner becomes subject in consequence of the original taking 
for the highway. In White v. Blanchard Co., 178 Mass. 363, 
the construction and use of a horse railroad for freight purposes 
on a highway was held not to entitle the owner of the fee in the 
street to damages. In the opinion in Howe v. West End Street 
Railivay Company, it was said by Chief Justice Field that " the use 
made of a public way in the operation of an electric railway is of 
the same general kind as that for which the way was originally laid 
out, to wit, the transportation of persons and things from place to 
place along the way." 

Following the authority of these decisions, which, in my judg- 
ment, are decisive of the present inquiry, I am of opinion that leg- 
islation authorizing street railway companies to use their tracks in 
the public highway as common carriers of goods, wares and mer- 
chandise would be constitutional. 

I have the honor to be, 

Very respectfully, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



Constitutional Laiv — Bate of Wages on Public Works — Cities and 

Toiuns. 

The Legislature may provide that whenever the Commonwealth, or 
any county therein, enters into a contract with any person, firm or 
corporation, for the doing of public work of any nature, it shall be 
stipulated that such person, firm or corporation shall pay employees 
no lower rate of wages per day than is paid by the Commonwealth, or 
by such county, for similar work ; but such a provision, as affecting 
cities and towns, would be unconstitutional, and cannot be cured by 
making the provision operative only upon acceptance by a majority of 
the voters of such cities and towns. 

April 24, 1901. 
Hon. James J. Myers, Speaker, House of Bepresenlatives. 

Dear Sir : — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a 
copy of an order adopted by the House of Representatives March 
20, 1901, requiring the opinion of the Attorney-General upon 'the 
question whether the several provisions of House bill No. 123 are in 
accord with the Constitution of the Commonwealth and of the 
United States. The bill in question provides, in substance, in 
section 1, that whenever the Commonwealth, or any county, city 
or town therein, enters into a contract with any person, firm or 
corporation for the doing of public work of any nature, it shall be 
provided in said contract that such person, firm or corporation shall 
pay his or their employees no lower rate of wages per day than is 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. IT 

paid by the Commonwealth for similar work, in case said contract 
is made by a county, city or town. Section 2 fixes certain limita- 
tions as to the hours of labor to be required by contractors under 
the same circumstances. Section 6 provides that the act shall not 
take effect, as to contracts made by the Commonwealth, until its 
acceptance by the voters of the Commonwealth ; and as to contracts 
made by the city or town, it shall not take effect unless accepted 
by a majority of the voters of such city or town. 

I see no reason to doubt that, so far as the act applies to con- 
tracts made under the authority of the Commonwealth, it is consti- 
tutional. The State as a sovereign may undoubtedly regulate the 
terms upon which its agents shall employ labor. No question can 
arise as to the rights of the contractor, for he is under no obliga- 
tions to contract. If he does, he must submit to the terms imposed 
by the other party to the contract, to wit, the Commonwealth or 
its agents. 

The same considerations undoubtedly govern the question of the 
constitutionality of the statute so far as it applies to counties. 
They have no other powers, rights or duties than are conferred by 
the Legislature which creates them. They are mere political divi- 
sions established for the more convenient administration of the 
government of the Commonwealth. 

I am of opinion, therefore, that so far as the act relates to the 
Commonwealth and to the counties of the Commonwealth it does 
not violate any provisions of the State or the Federal Constitution. 

A far different question, however, arises as to so much of the bill 
as relates to cities and towns. These provisions fix an arbitrary 
price to be paid for labor by contractors for city or town work. 
They also limit the hours of labor to be required by such con- 
tractors. I assume that the price so fixed may be in excess of the 
market price of such labor ; and that the hours of labor so estab- 
lished are less than those usually fixed by private contracts. 
Otherwise there would seem to be no occasion for the passage of 
the bill. 

If, therefore, the bill becomes a law, it will prohibit municipali- 
ties from exercising that freedom of contract which is enjoyed by 
other corporations and individuals ; it will operate to increase the 
taxes of the citizens by requiring a larger expenditure for wages 
than would otherwise be necessary, at the expense of the citizens 
of the cities and towns affected by its provisions ; and will tend 
to the benefit and profit of certain laborers to an extent not enjoyed 
by laborers generally. 

It would scarcely be disputed, I apprehend, that a law con- 
taining such provisions, affecting private individuals and corpora- 



18 ATTOEJNTEY-GEKEKAL'S KEPORT. [Jan. 

tions, would be a violation of the liberties and privileges of citizens 
under the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution 
and under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu- 
tion. In the exercise of the police power conferred by the Con- 
stitution, many laws limiting the rights of citizens in the making 
of contracts, and even prohibiting certain contracts, have been en- 
acted by the General Court and sustained as constitutional by the 
Supreme Judicial Court. Opinion of Justices, 163 Mass. 589. 
But, so far as I am aware, since the beginning of constitutional 
government no attempt has been made to fix by legislation an arbi- 
trary price of any commodity, including labor, that may properly be 
the subject of contract between parties. It may well be assumed 
that any such interference with the rights of individuals and pri- 
vate corporations would be pronounced to be beyond the scope of 
legislative power. 

Certain apparent exceptions to this general proposition rest 
upon special considerations not applicable to the bill now under 
consideration. Laws regulating the compensation to be charged 
by public service corporations, such as common carriers and gas 
companies, stand upon considerations wholly apart from the gen- 
eral rule I have stated. Further examples of legislation of this 
character are the statutes regulating the hours of employment of 
women and minors in certain factories, and those limiting the num- 
ber of hours persons may be employed in operating street railway 
cars. Such laws are well within the authority conferred upon the 
Legislature to enact all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, 
as they may be deemed to be for the good and welfare of the citi- 
zens of the Commonwealth. But a statute attempting to fix the 
price and hours of labor as between certain private contractors and 
theiremployeescouldnotin my judgment be sustained as a legitimate 
exercise of the police power contained in the Constitution. It 
would tend to promote the pecuniary welfare of one class of 
citizens at the expense of another class. 

Is the case different when legislation of this character is at- 
tempted as affecting the city or town? A municipality is, indeed, 
in many respects a mere political division of the Commonwealth. 
So far as it is intrusted with a part of the government of the 
State and her citizens, it is wholly under the control of the 
General Court. Politically, a town is the creature of the Common- 
wealth. It may be enlarged, diminished, or even annexed to another 
municipality. It may be governed, in whole or in part, by the offi- 
cers of the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 
375. 

But a town (and in this term, for convenience, I include cities, 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 19 

as well) may be said to exist in two capacities, — the one political 
and governmental, and the other as a private corporation. I have 
considered its standing as a political division of the Commonwealth ; 
but it is, also, a corporation enjoying many of the rights and privi- 
leges of other corporations. It may hold property to its own use, 
and enter into contracts relating thereto. It may receive gifts for 
municipal purposes and may raise money by taxation for the same 
purposes, the expenditure of which is within its exclusive control. 
Its property, however acquired, is its own, to which it has the 
same rights as any other corporation or individual, and of which 
it may not be deprived. It has the same liberty with respect to 
contracts for municipal purposes not affecting matters of govern- 
ment as a private person. For example, a statute requiring a town 
to pay a price for its fire apparatus in excess of the price for which 
such things could be bought in the open market would be clearly 
objectionable. 

The distinction between matters strictly municipal and those 
that are governmental is to be clearly borne in mind. As an illus- 
tration of this distinction, the Legislature has undoubtedly the 
right, on the one hand, to fix the salary of public municipal offi- 
cers, like the mayor, or even a policeman, but not the wages of 
mere employees, who have no part in the government of the Com- 
monwealth or of the town. They are the servants, not the officers, 
of the town, and to regulate their wages would be to exercise a 
control over the affairs of the town far different from that exercised 
in fixing the salaries of public officers. This distinction is clearly 
established by the courts. Opinion of Justices, 166 Mass. 589. 

The bill in question, therefore, is an interference with the rights 
of a town to manage its own municipal affairs in matters having 
no connection with its political existence. It amounts, further- 
more, indirectly, to the appropriation of its municipal property, 
whether raised by taxation or otherwise, for the benefit of indi- 
viduals. The bill is as much an invasion of those rights as it would 
be of the rights of any other corporation. 

The limitation of the provisions of the bill to contracts for pub- 
lic works in no way affects these considerations. The expression 
" public works " obviously applies to work done for the town as a 
municipality. Such work is public only in the sense that it is done 
for the benefit and use of the municipality. 

I do not forget the further provision of the bill, that the act 
shall not take effect in any town until accepted by the voters 
thereof. But, in my judgment, this does not save it. It is not 
wholly clear how far the Legislature may authorize a majority of 
the voters of a town to impose on all its citizens a tax for private 



20 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOET. [Jan. 

purposes. Mead v. Acton, 139 Mass. 341 ; Opinion of Justices, 
175 Mass. 599. The effect of the bill, notwithstanding, is to in- 
crease arbitrarily the wages of the employee at the expense of the 
town. It not only binds the minority voter, but, if accepted by 
the town, it becomes binding for all time, and upon all future 
voters who will have had no opportunity of election in the matter. 
Even if the voters of the town can commit themselves to an unlaw- 
ful expenditure of public funds, they cannot, in my judgment, bind 
those who come after them. 

Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that the bill, so far 
as it relates to towns and cities, is unconstitutional. Whether 
this conclusion be based upon the proposition that it takes away 
the liberties and privileges of the municipality as a private corpora- 
tion, or as authorizing the appropriation of the tax payers' money 
for private purposes, or as legislation partial in its character, 
makes but little difference. All these propositions are somewhat 
intermingled, and rest ultimately upon the broad proposition that 
the rights guaranteed to the citizen by the Constitution may not 
be impaired. 

I have the honor to be, 

Very respectfully, 

Hosea M. Knovvlton, Attorney -General. 



Pauper Law — Temporary Aid to Unsettled Paupers — Alloivance 
in Case of Sickness. 

Under St. 1898, c. 425, which provides that the Commonwealth shall reim- 
burse to cities and towns money expended by them in temporary aid to 
unsettled poor, if such sum does not exceed, except in case of sickness, 
two dollars a week for each family during the months of May to Septem- 
ber, inclusive, or three dollars a week for the months of October to 
April, inclusive, the State Board of Charity may, in cases of sickness, 
exceed the amount fixed therein. 

Mat 14, 1901. 

J. F. Lewis, M.D., Superintendent, State Adult Poor. 

Dear Sir : — Your letter of March 23 recites that a State pau- 
per residing in a city of the Commonwealth was aided by the city 
from Aug. 7 to Dec. 31, 1900 ; that during this period she was ill, 
but not so ill that " her health would have been endangered by 
removal to the State Hospital ; " and that the city claims reimburse- 
ment from the State for the medical attendance and medicines fur- 
nished to her during her sickness. Due notice was given to the 
State, as required by law. 

The question submitted by your letter is as follows : " Does the 
clause ' except in case of sickness,' seventh line of section 5, chap- 
ter 425, Acts of 1898, permit the State Board of Charity to make 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 21 

a larger allowance in this ca9e than three dollars a week for the 
period of the pauper's sickness?" 

The statute referred to provides that " A city or town may fur- 
nish aid to poor persons found therein, having no lawful settle- 
ment within the State, if the overseers of the poor deem it for the 
public interest ; but, except in case of sickness, not for a greater 
amount than two dollars a week for each family during the months 
of May to September, inclusive, or three dollars a w^eek for the 
months of October to April, inclusive." 

I see no reason why your question should not be answered in 
the affirmative. The statute limits the amount to be paid, but 
expressly excepts cases of illness. I am aware that Pub. Sts., c. 
86, § 26, as amended by St. 1898, c. 391, provides that expenses 
in the case of persons whose health would be endangered by re- 
moval to a hospital shall be reimbursed to the city or town " until 
such sick person is able to be removed to the almshouse." But 
this provision does not operate to prohibit the furnishing of med- 
ical attendance to a State pauper, even in cases where removal 
might be had. The State can at any time protect itself by order- 
ing the removal of the pauper. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General. 



Physicians and Surgeons — Practice of Medicine — Christian 
Scientists, Osteopathists, etc. 

Under a proposed bill relative to the registration of physicians and sur- 
geons, which provides that it shall be a misdemeanor for an unreg- 
istered physician or surgeon to practise or attempt to practise 
medicine, or to hold himself out as a practitioner of medicine, it can- 
not be held, as a matter of law, that pharmacists, osteopathists, clair- 
voyants, etc., do not practise or attempt to practise medicine. 

May 15, 1901. 
H<m. James J. Myers, Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Dear Sir : — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a 
copy of an order adopted by the honorable House of Representa- 
tives May 3, 1901, requiring the opinion of the Attorney-General 
upon a question therein submitted, which is as follows : — 

"Does Senate bill No. 281 prevent pharmacists, osteopathists, 
clairvoyants, or persons practising magnetic healing, mind cure, 
massage methods, Christian science, or cosmopathic methods, from 
treating patients by these various and respective methods, as is 
now permitted under the law ? " 

St. 1894, c. 458, is an act to provide for the registration of 



22 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

physicians and surgeons. Section 10 of the act, as amended by 
St. 1895, c. 412, provides that " whoever not being registered . . . 
shall advertise or hold himself out to the public as a physician or 
surgeon ... or appends to his name the letters ' M.D.,' or uses 
the title of doctor, meaning thereby a doctor of medicine, shall be 
punished," etc. Section 11 of the same statute (St. 1894, c. 458), 
so far as it is material to the present question, is as follows : " This 
act shall not apply ... to clairvoyants, or to persons practising 
hypnotism, magnetic healing, mind cure, massage methods, Christian 
science, cosmopathic or any other method of healing ; . . . pro- 
vided such persons do not violate any of the provisions of section 
ten of this act." 

The language of section 11, above quoted, is somewhat peculiar. 
Literally construed it declares that the classes of persons enumer- 
ated shall not be affected by the act provided they do not violate 
its penal provisions ; but it is scarcely necessary to say that so 
long as a person does not violate the provisions of a law he is not 
affected by it. 

I am of opinion, however, that the section is to be more broadly 
construed, and that it was the intention of the Legislature specifi- 
cally to declare that the persons enumerated are not to be regarded 
as holding themselves out to the public as physicians or surgeons so 
long as they confine themselves to their specialties. Adopting this 
construction of the section it is clear that under the original act the 
persons enumerated could carry on their respective callings without 
making themselves liable to the penal provisions of the statute. 

The bill in question substitutes a new penal section for section 10 
of the existing act; but it repeals section 11, and no similar pro- 
vision is contained in the proposed bill, and I am of opinion that 
this omission seriously endangers the situation of the persons 
enumerated in section 11 of the existing law, for the reason that 
if the bill becomes a law it may be claimed that in attempting to 
heal persons by the methods employed in their respective callings 
they are to be deemed to be engaged in the " practice of medicine." 
In the broad sense of that term, it includes generally the art of 
healing, by whatever method. I am not familiar with the methods 
employed by the specialists enumerated. I can easily see, how- 
ever, that it might be claimed, for instance, that one who under- 
took to heal diseases by cosmopathic methods, whatever they may 
be, might be deemed to be carrying on the " practice of medicine," 
and so come within the provisions of the bill. If, therefore, the 
Legislature intends to insure to the classes of persons enumerated 
in the question submitted the right to pursue their respective callings 
without being required to be registered, they should be specifically 
exempted from the general prohibitions of the bill. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 23 

I may add that pharmacists are regulated by existing statutes. 
These statutes give them no authority to practise medicine. The 
bill in question gives them no additional powers. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



Agricultural Society — Bounty from the Commonwealth. 

An agricultural society, in order to be entitled to bounty from the Com- 
monwealth under the provisions of Pub. Sts., c. 114, § 1, must be 
an organization local in its nature, composed chiefly of persons in- 
terested in agricultural pursuits residing in the county within which 
it is located, and must maintain a permanent place in the county for 
its exhibitions, with the necessary buildings therefor. 

May 17, 1901. 

J. W. Stockwell, Esq., Secretary, State Board of Agriculture. 

Dear Sir : — The opinion of the Attorney-General is desired 
upon the question whether the New England Agricultural Society 
is entitled to receive the bounty provided for by Pub. Sts., c. 114, 
§ 1. 

The society in question is incorporated under the laws of Massa- 
chusetts, but it owns no real estate or buildings in this Common- 
wealth, and its meetings are held in conjunction with those of other 
agricultural societies, and may be at any favorable time or place, 
either within or without the Commonwealth. It in no sense repre- 
sents a county of the State, or any other geographical section. 

I am of opinion that the society is not entitled to receive boun- 
ties under the statute. An examination of all the provisions of 
the chapter and of the history of legislation upon the subject makes 
it clear that the agricultural societies referred to in the statutes of 
the Commonwealth are local associations, whose purpose is to pro- 
mote agricultural interests in the section of the State in which they 
are located. In every instance in which such a society has been 
admitted to the benefits provided by the statutes, it has been an 
organization local in its nature, composed chiefly of persons inter- 
ested in agricultural pursuits residing in the county where it is 
located, and which has erected and maintained a permanent place 
in the county for its exhibition buildings. The whole purpose of 
legislation upon the subject had been to foster the interests of 
agriculture by dividing the State into sections, usually counties, 
in each of which a society has been incorporated and supported 
mainly by those living in such county or subdivision of a county. 

The section granting the bounty clearly makes it manifest that 
the Legislature had in view societies having exhibition grounds 
and buildings. The section is as follows : " Every incorporated 



24 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

agricultural society which was entitled to bounty from the Com- 
monwealth before the twenty-fifth day of May in the year eighteen 
hundred and sixty-six, and every other such society whose exhibi- 
tion grounds and buildings are not within twelve miles of those of 
a society then entitled to bounty, and which has raised by contri- 
bution of individuals and put out at interest on public or private 
security, or invested in real estate, buildings, and appurtenances 
for its use and accommodation, one thousand dollars, as a capital 
appropriated for its uses, shall, except when otherwise determined 
by the state board of agriculture as provided iu section three, be 
entitled to receive in the month of October annually, out of the 
treasury of the Commonwealth, two hundred dollars," etc. 

The earliest statute upon the subject was St. 1818, c. 114, " An 
act for the encouragement of agriculture and manufactures," which 
contained, in section 1, a provision not unlike that in the Public 
Statutes, requiring an invested capital of $1,000 before incorpo- 
rated agricultural societies within the Commonwealth could receive 
the bount} 7 provided for. Section 2 provided that any agricultural 
society formed under the act "within any county or counties in 
this Commonwealth," in which no incorporated society at that time 
existed, might, upon investing $1,000, partake of the bounty. 
This section also contained the following provision: "provided, 
always, that no agricultural society hereafter formed as aforesaid 
shall be entitled to the benefits of this act, unless the same be 
formed in a county or in an association of counties, including a 
population of thirty thousand inhabitants." Section 6 of the same 
statute provides that the act shall not extend to agricultural socie- 
ties " formed in towns or in any circles of territory less than 
counties." 

The next statute was St. 1820, c. 49, which contained a provi- 
sion authorizing the trustees of the incorporated agricultural socie- 
ties, and such as might thereafter be incorporated, to fix and 
define bounds and limits of sufficient extent for the erection of their 
cattle sheds and yards. It also provided for other details respect- 
ing the exhibitions which were to be held upon their grounds. It 
further provided for the appointment of officers who were to give 
efficiency to the rules and regulations for the preservation of good 
order on the occasion of public cattle shows and exhibitions. 

Both of these statutes show clearly that the Legislature did not 
intend to pay a bounty to a society which did not own land and 
buildings or give exhibitions within the Commonwealth. Pev. 
Sts., c. 42, contains, in brief form, nearly all of the regulations 
set forth in the above-quoted acts, together with additional provi- 
sions relating to premiums, etc. All of these provisions were re- 
enacted in the General Statutes, with some added requirements as 



1902,] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 25 

to filing certificates and making annual returns to the secretary of 
the State Board of Agriculture. In this statute, also (section 16), 
a time was prescribed when exhibitions by the different agricultural 
societies entitled to receive the bounty provided for in section 1 
should be held. 

St. 1866, c. 189, provided that no agricultural society not draw- 
ing a bounty from the State should hereafter be entitled to such 
bounty, in case the grounds and buildings for holding exhibitions 
of said society were within twelve miles of the grounds and build- 
ings of any other society by law entitled to such bounty. It also 
provided for the election of a delegate to the State Board of Agri- 
culture by such societies as published their transactions and made 
returns to the secretary of the State Board of Agriculture. These 
provisions are practically re-enacted in Pub. Sts., c. 114, except 
that the date for holding the exhibitions is regulated by a rule of 
the State Board, and not by the statutes. 

Furthermore, the same chapter (Pub. Sts., c. 114) which, in 
section 1, regulates the bounty to be paid to such organizations, 
provides in section 9 that "Every such society shall admit as 
members upon equal terms, citizens of every town in the county in 
which it is located, and all premiums offered shall be subject to the 
competition of every citizen of such county." 

Upon the consideration of all these statutes, I am clearly of the 
opinion that the New England Agricultural Society is not within 
the purview of the statute. 

A similar question has been raised in respect to the Bay State 
Agricultural Society. I am informed that this organization is simi- 
lar in its purposes to the New England Agricultural Society. For 
the reasons stated above, therefore, I am of opinion that this asso- 
ciation is not entitled to bounties. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



Pauper Law — Settlement — Effect of Retroactive Statute. 

A settlement acquired prior to 1860, which by its existence prevented the 
acquisition of a settlement in the same place, comes within the excep- 
tion contained in St. 1898, c. 425, § 2, and is not lost because the per- 
son acquiring such settlement died before the passage of the statute. 

May 17, 1901. 
J. F. Lewis, M.D., Superintendent, State Adult Poor. 

Dear Sir : — Your letter of April 4 requires the opinion of the 
Attorney- General upon the settlement of a female pauper. The 
facts stated in the letter are as follows : — 



26 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 

The pauper was born in 1813 and became insane when twenty 
years of age, since which time she has been non compos mentis, 
and has been a public charge of the city of Cambridge since Aug. 
6, 1879. She acquired a settlement through her father, who owned 
and occupied a freehold estate in Cambridge from 1811 to 1871, 
the date of his death, gaining thereby a settlement under the pro- 
visions of Pub. Sts., c. 83, § 1, cl. 4. 

A pauper who is an idiot or insane, and therefore is not compe- 
tent, though of age, to gain a settlement for himself, follows the 
settlement of his mother. He is in the same situation as a minor 
child, whose settlement, derived from his father, changes with that 
of his father. Taunton v. Middleborough, 12 Met. 35, 38 ; Upton 
v. Northbridge, 15 Mass. 237. 

In the present case the pauper, having been insane since 1833, 
could acquire no settlement of her own, and must depend entirely 
upon that derived from her father, who was settled in Cambridge 
by virtue of the ownership and occupancy of a freehold estate from 
1811 to 1871. 

St. 1898, c. 425, § 2, provides that Pub. Sts., c. 83, § 6, shall 
be amended so as to read : "All settlements not fully acquired sub- 
sequent to the first day of May in the year eighteen hundred and 
sixty are hereby defeated and declared to be lost, except where the 
existence of such settlement prevented a subsequent acquisition of 
settlement in the same place." 

It is clear that while the father gained his settlement prior to 
1860 (1811-1860), the existence of the settlement so gained pre- 
vented a subsequent acquisition of settlement in the same place 
(1860-1871). There is no question that if he had been living at 
the time of the passage of St. 1898, his settlement would not have 
been lost under section 2. 

I see no reason why the death of the father subsequent to the 
period of time when his settlement would have been acquired, but 
for the existence of the previous settlement, affects the question. 
The situation had become complete when he died, and nothing in 
the statute of 1898, expressly or by implication, makes any such 
exception. In the case of Adams v. Ipswich, 116 Mass. 570, 
where the facts under a similar statute were in all respects identi- 
cal, although the question was not directly passed upon, no sug- 
gestion was made either by counsel or by the court that the death 
of the person whose settlement was defeated by a prior settlement 
was material to the determination of the question. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 27 

Co-operative Savings Banks — Directors — Proxy Voting. 
The directors of a co-operative savings bank cannot legally vote by proxy. 

Mat 27, 1901. 
Starkes Whiton, Esq., 

Chairman, Board of Commissioners of Savings Banks. 

Dear Sir: — Your letter of April 27, relating to the Pioneer 
Co-operative Bank and to the Guardian Co-operative Bank, and 
the votings of those corporations, appears to require no opinion of 
law except upon the question whether directors may vote by proxy. 
It is well settled that they cannot legally vote by proxy. Vide, 
Cook on Stock and Stockholders, § 713a; lie Portuguese, etc., Co., 
L. R. 42, C. D. 160 ; Perry v. Tuscaloosa, etc., Co., 93 Ala. 364. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General. 



Violation of Pharmacy Law — Plea of Nolo Contendere — Con- 
viction. 

A plea of nolo contendere, followed by a fine imposed by the court, is a 
conviction within the meaning of St. 1896, c. 397, § 9. 

June 5, 1901. 
Amos K. Tilden, Secretary, Board of Begistration in Pharmacy. 

Dear Sir : — Your letter of June 3 requires the opinion of the 
Attorney-General upon the following question : " Is a plea of nolo 
contendere, followed by a fine imposed by the court, a conviction 
within the meaning of section 9, chapter 397, Acts of 1896?" 
It is. White v. Creamer, 175 Mass. 567. 
Yours respectfully, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General'. 



Newbury port Bridge — Legal Title — Repair and Maintenance. 

The title to the bridge over the Merrimack River, between the city of 
Newburyport and the town of Salisbury, was vested, under the terms 
of St. 1867, c. 296, § 7, in the county of Essex, by virtue of the 
proclamation by the Governor, dated Aug. 22, 1868, declaring the 
bridge to be free. 

Since the bridge has become a public highway, however, questions relating 
to its repair and maintenance, and the parties who shall contribute 
thereto, are wholly within the discretion of the Legislature, and are to 
be determined upon considerations in no way connected with the legal 
ownership of the property. 



28 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

June 6, 1901. 
Hon. James J. Myers, Speaker of the House of Rejwesentatives. 

Dear Sir : — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a 
copy of an order adopted by the honorable House of Representa- 
tives yesterday, requiring the opinion of the Attorney-General upon 
the question whether the bridge over the Merrimack River between 
the city of Newburyport and the town of Salisbury is the property 
of the Commonwealth or the county of Essex. 

So far as the history of the bridge is shown by the statutes of 
the Commonwealth it is as follows: by St. 1825, c. 164, certain 
persons were made a corporation by the name of the Proprietors of 
the Newburyport Bridge, and were authorized to construct a bridge 
over the Merrimack River between Newburyport and Salisbury. 
I assume that the bridge in question was constructed by the corpo- 
ration so chartered. It was provided in the charter, by section 4, 
that after a period of forty years from the time when the bridge 
was opened for travel it should revert to and become the property 
of the Commonwealth. I have no information as to the time when 
the bridge was opened for travel, but I assume that it was forty 
years before the next act relating to the subject, which was in 1867. 

In the year 1867, by chapter 296 of the Acts of that year, the 
county commissioners were " authorized and empowered to lay out 
as and for highways " certain bridges across the Merrimack River, 
including the one in question. It was further provided in this act 
that the damages, if any, to be paid to the proprietors of the 
bridges specified in the act should be paid in the same manner as 
damages occasioned by the laying out of highways ; that is to say, 
by the county. Section 6 contained the unusual provision that the 
several cities and towns in said county, or any of them, might con- 
tribute to the county towards the payment of damages that might 
be awarded to the proprietors of such bridges ; apparently leaving 
the question of contribution, and the amount of the same, optional 
with the cities and towns. 

The important section of this act, so far as relates to the question 
submitted, is section 7, the language of which is as follows : " Upon 
evidence satisfactory to the governor and council that any one of 
said bridges now or hereafter belonging to the Commonwealth has 
been laid out as a highway according to the provisions of this act, 
the governor shall by his proclamation declare such bridge free ; 
and thereupon all property of the Commonwealth in such bridge 
and in the appurtenances thereto shall vest in said county and in 
said cities and towns contributing to the payment of damages in 
the laying out of such bridge as a highway." 

It was the obvious purpose of the Legislature by this section to 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 29 

dispossess the Commonwealth of the legal title to the bridges 
enumerated by vesting the same in the county, and in such cities 
and towns as might, under the provisions of the section above 
quoted, voluntarily contribute to the payment of the damages 
awarded for taking the same. If no city or town contributed then 
the county became the sole owner. But whether such contribution 
was made by cities and towns or not, the Commonwealth was to 
become dispossessed, and either the county alone, or the con- 
tributing cities and towns together with the county were to hold 
the title to the bridges taken. 

Apparently no action was taken under this section ; for in the 
next year (St. 1868, c. 309, § 8) the county commissioners were 
commanded within sixty days after the passage of the act to lay 
out as and for highways the same bridges which they were author- 
ized and permitted to lay out by the statute of 1867. They were 
further required to lay out the bridges enumerated in the manner 
provided by law for the laying out of highways, and according to 
the provisions of the statute of 1867, above referred to, so far 
as the same were applicable. The statute of 1868 further required 
the commissioners to apportion the damages sustained by the 
proprietors of such bridges among such cities and towns as the 
commissioners should determine were benefited by the laying out, 
thus doing away with the voluntary contributions provided for by 
the act of the previous year. 

The bridge in question was laid out as a highway under the pro- 
visions of this act. But none of the provisions of the statute of 
1867 were repealed by the later statute, excepting those relating 
to voluntary contributions for damages by the cities and towns. In 
other respects the provisions of the statute of 1867 still remained 
in force, including section 7, which provided that upon the procla- 
mation of the Governor that the bridge had become free, the prop- 
erty in it should vest in the county, and in such cities and towns 
as had contributed to the payment of damages. As the title to the 
property had reverted to the Commonwealth no damages were 
awarded, and, therefore, no contributions were assessed upon or 
received from any city or town. The proclamation by the Governor 
declaring the bridge free was issued Aug. 22, 1868 ; and, there- 
upon, under the terms of the statute, the title to the bridge vested 
and is in the county of Essex. 

It may not be improper for me to add, although strictly it is not 
within the scope of the question submitted, that the legal title to 
the bridge has no direct connection with the question of the 
expediency of the enactment of the bill in question. The bridge 
has become a public highway, and questions relating to its repair 



30 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

and maintenance, and of the parties who shall contribute thereto, 
are wholly within the discretion of the Legislature. It was deemed 
expedient by the Legislature of 1867 to vest the title to the bridge 
in the county, even though it does not appear that such title was 
desired. But, nevertheless, the question who shall maintain the 
bridge is to be determined upon considerations wholly disconnected 
with the matter of legal ownership of the property. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners — Land covered by 
Navigable Waters — Cession to United States. 

Land at a distance of 200 feet below low-water mark, which is covered by- 
water to a depth of 8 feet at mean low water, is " land covered by 
navigable waters " within the meaning of Pub. Sts., c. 1, § 7, although 
structures of loose stones have been erected thereon, and title thereto 
may be conveyed to the United States by the Board of Harbor and 
Land Commissioners under such statute. 

June 25, 1901. 
Hon. Woodward Emery, 

Chairman, Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners. 

Dear Sir : — Your letter of June 4 states that " under the pro- 
visions of St. 1898, c. 441, and St. 1899, c. 155, the Board of 
Harbor and Land Commissioners has cut a channel between Lake 
Anthony at Cottage City and Vineyard Sound, about 5 feet deep 
and 100 feet wide on the bottom, and has protected the same by 
building two stone jetties on either side of the cut extending into 
the sound about 200 feet beyond the low-water mark, reaching a 
depth of about 8 feet at mean low water. . . . The United States 
Lighthouse Board is willing to maintain lights on the ends of the 
jetties. The ends of the jetties are built up (as are the entire 
jetties) by loose stones piled up, through the interstices of which 
the water readily flows." 

The question submitted by your letter is whether the Board may 
convey the land upon which the ends of the jetties have been 
erected to the United States for the purpose of maintaining lights 
and lighthouses thereon, it being one of the provisions of the U. S. 
Rev. Sts. that no lighthouse shall be erected on any site until 
" cession of jurisdiction over the same has been made to the 
United States." 

The authority of your Board is to be found in Pub. Sts., c. 1, 
§ 7, which provides: "The board of harbor and land commis- 
sioners, with the approval of the governor and council, may in 
the name and behalf of the commonwealth convey to the United 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 31 

States the title of the commonwealth to any tracts of land covered 
by navigable waters, and necessary for the purpose of erecting 
lighthouses, beacon lights, range lights, or other aids to naviga- 
tion, or lightkeepers' dwellings, upon the application of any au- 
thorized agent or agents of the United States : provided, that such 
title shall revert to and revest in the commonwealth whenever 
such land ceases to be used for such purposes." 

There can be no doubt that the circumstances of the case bring 
it within the provisions of this statute. 

The jetties extend out 200 feet below low-water mark and reach 
to a depth of 8 feet at mean low water. They are built of loose 
stones, through the interstices of which the water readily flows. 
The soil upon which the jetties rest is, therefore, the property of 
the Commonwealth, and title to it may be conveyed by your Board 
to the United States under the statute quoted and subject to the 
conditions named therein. 

Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



Civil Service — Chief Superintendent — Superintendent of City 
Farm at Lowell, 

By the terra " chief superintendent of a department," as used in Kule VI., 
Schedule B, Class 12, of the civil service rules, is intended an officer 
who has the oversight and charge of the whole of the business of that 
department and acts for and represents the head of the department in 
every branch of its authority. 

The superintendent of the City Farm at Lowell is not such an official, and 
his election, in disregard of the rules of the Civil Service Commission, 
is, therefore, illegal. 

June 27, 1901. 

Hon. Charles Theodore Russell, 

Chairman, Civil Service Commissioners. 

Dear Sir : — The charter of the city of Lowell (St. 1875, c. 173, 
§ 29, as amended by St. 1894, c. 190) provides for a board of 
overseers of the poor, and that " they may appoint a secretary and 
superintendent, and such other subordinate officers as the ordi- 
nances of the city may require, and may define the duties of said 
officers." Acting under the authority of this statute the Board in 
January elected one Robert B. Saunders to the position of superin- 
tendent of the City Farm, displacing Albert Pindar, a veteran, 
who, until then, was lawfully in office as such superintendent. No 
requisition was made upon the Civil Service Commission, and 
there was no pretence that the rules of the commission were com- 
plied with, it being claimed or assumed that this office was not 
within those rules. 



32 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Rule VI., Schedule B, Class 12, enumerates as officers who must 
be appointed under the civil service rules " superintendents, assist- 
ant superintendents, deputies and persons, other than the chief 
superintendents of departments, performing any of the duties of a 
superintendent in the service of any city of the Commonwealth." 

The office in question being that of a superintendent of the City 
Farm of Lowell is within this classification, unless it is excepted 
by the words "other than the chief superintendents of depart- 
ments." I understand that it has been contended that the official 
in question is to be regarded as the chief superintendent of a de- 
partment within the meaning of those words as used in this rule, 
and therefore exempt from the operation of the civil service rules. 

But obviously the " chief superintendent of a department," as 
that term is used in the rule quoted, is more than a mere " super- 
intendent," for the latter is within the scope of the rules, while the 
"chief superintendent of a department " is not within the rules. 
The fact, therefore, that an officer is a superintendent does not of 
itself bring him within the exception. By the term " chief super- 
intendent of a department " must be intended an official who has 
the oversight and charge of the whole of the business of that de- 
partment, with full power of direction and management. He must 
be one who acts for and represents the head of the department in 
every branch of its authority. 

The superintendent of the City Farm is not such an official. 
While he may have, and probably does have, the entire charge and 
superintendence of the City Farm, and the buildings and depart- 
ments associated under it, he is, nevertheless, not the general 
agent of all the matters relating to the poor department, and the 
administration of the poor laws. The agents and representatives 
of the board are by law two, a superintendent and a secretary. 
The secretary, as I am informed, has charge, subject to the con- 
trol of the board, of what is known as the out-door poor relief 
funds, and distributes aid to those who are not inmates of any of 
the institutions. On the other hand, the superintendent of the 
poor farm has charge of those institutions. The duties of these 
two officials are entirely separate. Neither of them can be said to 
be the chief superintendent of the poor department. 

The official in question, therefore, not being the "chief super- 
intendent" of the poor department, within the meaning of that 
expression as used in the civil service rules, is not exempt, and 
must be chosen in accordance with the provisions of those rules. 
It follows that the election of Saunders was illegal. 
Yours truly, 

Hose a M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 33 



Registered Pharmacist — Clerk — Sixth-class License — Board of 
Registration in Pharmacy. 

The granting of a sixth-class license to a registered pharmacist who is 
acting as a clerk in a pharmacy does not constitute a violation of the 
pharmacy law requiring the Board of Registration in Pharmacy to in- 
vestigate and notify the proper prosecuting officer, as provided in 
St. 1896, c. 397, § 21. 

June 28, 1901. 

Amos K. Tilden, Esq., Secretary, Board of Begistration in Pharmacy. 

Dear Sir : — Your letter of June 5 submits the following ques- 
tion : "Upon complaint being made to the Board of Registration 
in Pharmacy that a license of the sixth class has been granted to 
a registered pharmacist acting as a clerk in a pharmacy, is such a 
condition a violation of the pharmacy law, and is it the duty of 
the Board of Registration in Pharmacy to investigate and notify 
the proper prosecuting officer, as provided in section 21, chapter 
397, Acts of 1896?" 

There is no law against the granting of a license of the sixth 
class to a registered pharmacist acting as a clerk in a pharmacy. 
For aught that may appear in the granting of a license, the appli- 
cant is proposing to carry on the business in his own name upon 
receiving his license. 

The prohibition of the statute, so far as it concerns your Board, 
is the suffering or permitting by a registered pharmacist of the use 
of his name or his certificate of registration by others in the con- 
duct of the business of pharmacy, when he himself is not the owner 
and actively engaged in such business. 

It is certainly the duty of your Board to investigate any such im- 
proper use of his certificate by a registered pharmacist, and to notify 
the proper prosecuting officer of the fact if it be found to exist. 

It may be that your Board has other things in mind in the question 
submitted. If so, I can only reply, generally, that it is the duty 
of your Board "to investigate all complaints of disregard, non- 
compliance with, or violation of, the provisions " of the chapter. 
I have quoted the language of the statute for I am unable to im- 
prove on it. If complaints relate to matters not connected with 
the statute in question, it is not your duty to make them, but you 
are at liberty to do it, as is any other good citizen. But whenever 
any provisions of the pharmacy statute are violated, it is certainly 
your duty to investigate the matter and report it to the prosecut- 
ing authorities. 

Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General. 



34: ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S KEPOET. [Jan. 



Insurance — Insurance Broker — License — Clerk or Other Employee 

of Broker. 

A salaried clerk or other employee of a duly licensed insurance broker, 
who is not himself so licensed, cannot lawfully do any of the acts for- 
bidden to persons not licensed as insurance agents or brokers. He 
cannot, under pretence of being a clerk, act as solicitor or broker of 
insurance, excepting so far as such work is under the immediate direc- 
tion of his employer and is incidentally a part of his work as clerk. 

June 28, 1901. 
Hon. Frederick L. Cutting, Insurance Commissioner. 

Dear Sir : — Your letter of April 12 requires the opinion of the 
Attorney-General upon the question whether one who is a salaried 
clerk or other employee of a duly licensed insurance broker can 
lawfully do any of the acts forbidden to persons not licensed as 
insurance agents or brokers. 

St. 1894, c. 522, § 87, provides as follows : " Any person not a 
duly licensed insurance broker, who solicits insurance on behalf of 
any insurance company, or transmits for a person other than himself 
an application for or a policy of insurance to or from such com- 
pany, or offers or assumes to act in the negotiation of such insur- 
ance, shall be deemed an insurance agent within the intent of this 
act, and shall thereby become liable to all the duties, requisitions, 
liabilities and penalties to which an agent of such company is 
subject." 

By section 98 of the same act it is provided that : " Any person 
who shall assume to act as an insurance agent or insurance broker 
without license therefor as herein provided . . . shall be punished 
by a fine of not less than one hundred nor more than five hundred 
dollars for each offence." 

The certificate issued under section 91 of the same chapter is 
personal to the licensee, who must be found by the insurance com- 
missioner to be a " suitable person." The licensee, therefore, 
may not delegate his authority to an unlicensed person, even 
though he be his clerk. 

The distinction between what the employee may do and what he 
ma}' not do is well stated in the opinion given to you, as you in- 
form me by your letter, by a former attorney-general, to wit : u that 
any clerk or employee who acted outside of his employer's office 
in soliciting insurance, or doing the other things that constitute a 
person an agent of an insurance company, would not be protected 
by his employer's license ; while a clerk, or employed person, 
doing the clerical work of an insurance office and waiting on the 
customers at the counter, advising as to rates, delivering policies 
and receiving pay therefor, and perhaps incidentally acting in the 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 35 

negotiation of insurance, would not need a license, inasmuch as he 
is acting as eye, ear, or hand of his employer, and is not known to 
the insured in any responsible capacity." 

In other words, the employee cannot lawfully be a solicitor or 
broker of insurance, excepting so far as such work is under the 
immediate direction of his employer and is incidentally a part of 
his work as clerk. 

Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



Massachusetts Highway Commission — State Highway — Nuisance 
— Public Health. 

The Massachusetts Highway Commission is not charged with any duties 
relating to the preservation of the public health, aud therefore is not 
required to take any action toward abating a nuisance upon a State 
highway when such nuisance does not aftect the conditions of the 
highway as a road structure. 

June 28, 1901. 

A. B. Fletcher, Esq., Secretary, Massachusetts Highway Commission. 

Dear Sir : — Your letter of June 4 states that certain abutters 
along the State highway in Leicester are discharging their house 
sewerage into the gutter of the State road, thereby creating a 
nuisance. The letter further states that the houses are very near 
the road, and so situated as to make it difficult to maintain a sys- 
tem of cesspools, and that the practice of discharging sewage 
into the gutter has been going on for a long time, both before and 
since the construction of the road by the Commonwealth. 

The letter requires the advice of the Attorney-General as to the 
duties of the Massachusetts Highway Commission upon this state 
of facts. 

The duties of your commission as to State highways are to keep 
them in good repair and condition at the expense of the Common- 
wealth. I assume that the discharges complained of do not affect 
the condition of the highway as a road structure. Even if it were 
otherwise, it is not entirely clear how far a person can be com- 
pelled to prevent flowage of water from his premises to a highway. 
The present question, however, arises by reason of the claim that 
the discharges are injurious to the health of the public and thus 
constitute a nuisance. With this aspect of the matter your Board 
has nothing whatever to do. You are not charged with any duties 
looking to the preservation of the public health or the prevention 
of nuisances affecting the same. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



36 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S. REPORT. [Jan. 



Co-operative Banks — Security — Collection of Loan. 

If upon the forfeiture of the shares and the foreclosure of a mortgage 
respectively pledged and executed by a stockholder in a co-operative 
bank, to secure a loan from such bank, the amount realized therefrom 
is not sufficient to discharge the loan, the balance remaining unpaid 
becomes a debt which is presently due and may be recovered by suit 
forthwith, like any other loan. 

July 6, 1901. 
Hon. Starkes Whiton, 

Chairman, Board of Savings Bank Commissioners 

Dear Sir: — Your letter of Feb. 25, 1901, encloses a copy of 
the form of note and mortgage usually taken by co-operative banks 
in this Commonwealth when advances are made by them upon 
shares of the bank, and requires the opinion of the Attorney-Gen- 
eral as to " whether or not under said form of note and mortgage, 
in cases of foreclosure and sale, if the property did not bring suffi- 
cient to pay the amount advanced by the bank, would it have a 
claim on the maker of the note (as in cases of ordinary mortgages) 
for the deficiency between the sale and the amount of the ad- 
vance ?" 

In order intelligently to answer this inquiry, it is necessary to 
ascertain the precise nature of the contract expressed by the note 
and mortgage, the forms of which are submitted with your letter. 
The form of the note (which is followed in the condition of the 
mortgage) is unusual. It is peculiar, I believe, to co-operative 
banks. Many borrowers, who understand clearly that the bank 
has loaned them money, secured by a mortgage, and payable in 
monthly instalments, find it difficult to comprehend the somewhat 
involved terms of the note they are required by the bank to sign. 

The first difficulty grows out of the peculiar signification of 
the word " share" as used in the note and mortgage. It is un- 
like the ordinary share in a business corporation, in that the sub- 
scriber for a share merely acquires by his contract with the bank 
the right to continue to pay assessments on his so-called share 
until the assessments paid by him, together with the interest 
earned upon them, amounts to 8200, at which time that sum is 
forthwith paid to him. That is to say, the word " share" means 
only the right to contribute monthly to a given fund, to be used 
by the bank for the purpose of making loans ; to be credited 
with the amount of his contributions and the proportional part of 
the interest earned upon such contributions, until the accumula- 
tion reaches the sum of $200, when the whole amount is paid to 
the subscriber, and his so-called share is at an end. 

Another peculiarity of co-operative bank transactions lies in the 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 37 

fact that there are no loans excepting to shareholders. The bor- 
rower must subscribe for a number of shares at $200 each, suffi- 
cient to equal the amount of his proposed loan. That is to say, if 
he proposes to borrow $1,000, he must subscribe for five shares of 
$200 each. These shares are forthwith pledged by him to the 
bank for the amount of the advance. He undertakes to pay 
monthly the interest on the amount of the advance, and the dues 
and assessments appertaining to the shares. The contract of 
pledge is terminated (unless sooner by the voluntary act of the 
parties) when the accumulations of the shares make them worth 
the full amount of $200. Then the shares of the borrower and his 
obligations are discharged at the same time ; the value of the shares 
being equal to the amount of the advance made to him. 

Obviously, however, a loan made upon shares which represent 
nothing but the right to contribute money is an insufficient secur- 
ity, unless there is some adequate assurance that the dues upon the 
shares will be paid, together with interest upon the advance. To 
secure these two things the form of note submitted with your 
letter has been devised. The contract of the note is, in substance, 
an agreement by the borrowing shareholder that he will pay the 
monthly dues on the shares, and the interest upon the loan, until 
the shares shall reach the ultimate value of $200 each. The con- 
dition of the mortgage is practically the same. It is not the re- 
payment of the advance, but the payment of the interest upon the 
advance and the dues upon the shares pledged as security for the 
advance. 

It is provided by Pub. Sts., c. 117, § 16, as amended by St. 
1882, c. 251, that if the borrowing member fails to comply with 
his contract to pay the dues upon his shares and interest upon his 
advance, the directors may at their discretion declare the shares 
forfeited. They shall thereupon charge the borrowing member 
with the arrears of interest and dues upon the shares, and credit 
him upon his loan with the value of the shares ; and may there- 
upon, after a stated time, enforce "the balance of the account" 
against the security. Under this provision of the statute, there- 
fore, the mortgage may be foreclosed for the purpose of collecting 
this balance. The inquiry in your letter supposes the case that 
the mortgaged property may not sell under foreclosure for enough 
to pay the balance of the account, and requires the opinion of the 
Attorney-General upon what further rights the bank has upon the 
borrowing member. 

Notwithstanding the elaborate provisions in the note and in the 
mortgage, by which the transaction is made to appear to be a sub- 
scription for shares by the borrower, and an advance upon the 



38 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

credit of them, with a mortgage to secure the balance unpaid upon 
the shareholder, it is obvious that the transaction is, nevertheless, 
in fact a loan, and these provisions are methods devised to permit 
the paying of the loan in small instalments, and under circum- 
stances which, as it is claimed by those interested in co-operative 
banks, will allow the borrower in fact to get a lower rate of interest 
on account of the investment by the bank of his partial payments 
in other loans, in the profits of which he participates as a share- 
holder. 

But if the consideration in relation to the pledge of the shares 
is broken, and the shares are forfeited, and the security of the 
mortgage is exhausted, and ail these proceedings are not sufficient 
to pay the loan, it is not discharged, remains due, and may be 
collected by suit, like any other loan. The suit would not be 
upon the note, nor upon any contract relating to the shares. The 
declaration would be a common count for money loaned. 

It is also obvious that when the shares are forfeited by the fault 
of the borrower, the balance is presently due and may be collected 
forthwith. There was no time fixed in the original loan for a re- 
payment ; but by subscribing for and pledging shares he acquired 
the right to discharge his loan by paying the assessments on his 
shares until the value of the shares equalled the amount of the 
loan. This right ceased when his shares were forfeited, and noth- 
ing of the transaction remained but a loan, without time fixed 
for repayment, and therefore due on demand. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



Insurance — Liability of Physician for Accident to Patient — 
Accident Insurance Policy. 

Injury or death caused by the mistake, inadvertence or error of a phy- 
sician, is, so far as concerns the patient, an accident, and a policy 
issued to physicians insuring them against loss from common law or 
statutory liability for damage on account of bodily injuries, fatal or 
non-fatal, suffered by any person or persons in consequence of any 
alleged error or mistake made by the physician to whom such policy 
is issued, is insurance against loss or damage on account of "bodily 
injury or death by accident'' within the meaning of clause 5 of St. 
1894, c. 522, § 29, and is therefore legal. 

July 10, 1901. 
Hon. Frederick L. Cutting, Insurance Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — Acts of 1894, c. 522, § 29, paragraph 5, provides 
that insurance companies may be formed " to insure any person, 
firm or corporation against loss or damage on account of the bodily 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 39 

injury or death by accident of any person for which loss or damage 
said person, firm or corporation is responsible." Section 77 of the 
same chapter authorizes foreign companies under certain condi- 
tions to transact in this Commonwealth any class of insurance 
authorized by its laws. A foreign insurance company, which has 
been admitted to do an accident business in this State under the 
sections referred to, proposes to issue to physicians policies insur- 
ing them " against loss from common law or statutory liability for 
damage on account of bodily injuries, fatal or non-fatal, suffered 
by any person or persons in consequence of any alleged error or 
mistake made " by the physician to whom the policy is issued. 

The question submitted in your letter of June 12, 1901, is 
whether such a contract is within the authority of the statute 
above quoted. 

It is settled that insurance may be written covering accidents to 
persons other than the assured. Employers' Liability Insurance 
Company x. Merrill, 155 Mass. 404. It has also been held that 
such a contract is not against public policy. American Casualty 
Company's Case, 82 Md. 335. 

There is nothing, then, to make this form of insurance illegal, 
provided the statute is broad enough to authorize it. Whether 
this be so depends upon the interpretation to be given to the word 
" accident," as used in the statute. 

In general, an accident may be said to be the operation of 
chance. As the word is more commonly used it signifies an un- 
desirable or unfortunate happening, an undesigned harm or injury. 
In this broad sense any disease may be said to be an accident. 
But the word as used in the statute is to be construed in accord- 
ance with its surroundings. Throughout insurance statutes a dis- 
tinction is made between death or injuries resulting from disease 
and those which are the result of what are ordinarily called casual- 
ties or accidents. Mere disease, therefore, is not an accident. 
An aggravation, however, of the disease, caused by no fault of 
the patient, but by a mistake, inadvertence or error of another, may 
properly be termed an accident, so far as the patient is concerned. 

This may be so even though the patient himself can make no 
claim upon his own accident insurance policy. The ordinary ac- 
cident insurance policies specifically except death or disability 
caused, wholly or in part, by surgical operations or medical treat- 
ment for disease. Most of them also further limit the use of the 
word "accident" by barring cases where there are not some ex- 
ternal marks of injury. 

Bearing these considerations in mind, I see no good reason to 
doubt that whenever a patient receives an injury, the proximate 



40 ATTOKNEY-GEJSTEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 

cause of which is the negligence of the physician, he may not as 
properly be said to have been injured by accident, as an employee 
who is thrown to the ground by a staging defective in consequence 
of the negligence of his employer. The same is true, in my judg- 
ment, of fatal injuries caused under the same circumstances. If 
a man receives a wound, not of itself fatal, but which causes death 
by what is commonly called blood-poisoning, this would be death 
by accident. If a patient is treated by a physician who neglects 
to use antiseptic precautions, and death results from such neglect, 
it is still an accident so far as the patient is concerned, and one 
for which the physician may be liable. 

An employer whose negligence causes injury to his employee 
may be held to pay damages therefor, either at common law or by 
some statute. He may insure himself against such liability. A 
physician whose negligence causes injury to his patient that would 
not have happened to him if he had been skilful may be made to 
pay the damages which result. I see no difference between insur- 
ing the physician under such circumstances and the employer 
whose negligence made him liable to his employee. 

It is not necessary to consider whether there may not be cases 
of liability by physicians for malpractice which could not be in- 
sured against under the statute quoted. It is sufficient that some 
cases where physicians are held liable at common law come within 
the meaning of the statute as I interpret it, and therefore that the 
form of policy cannot be pronounced illegal. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



Pauper Laws — Unsettled Woman — Retroactive Statute. 

A female pauper, who, prior to 1860, acquired a derivative settlement 
through her husband, was not an "unsettled woman" within the 
retroactive provisions of St. 1874, c. 274, § 2, and St. 1878, c. 190, and 
so could not acquire a settlement thereunder in her own right, and 
therefore became, upon the passage of St. 1898, c. 425, § 2, cutting 
off her derivative settlement, an unsettled woman. 

July 30, 1901. 

J. F. Lewis, M.D., Superintendent, State Adult Poor. 

Dear Sir : — The pauper referred to in your letter of March 11 
was born in 1819 and has been a widow since 1849. She acquired, 
prior to 1860, a derivative settlement, through her husband, in 
Salem. Since 1860 she has resided in Boston, but was aided at 
the expense of Salem in the years 1864-1866 inclusive and in the 
years 1875-1898 inclusive. During the years 1867-1874 inclusive 
she received no aid, being then a resident of the city of Boston. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — JSTo. 12. 41 

The question submitted by your letter is whether she is to-day 
settled in Boston. 

St. 1874, c. 274, provided in section 2 that a woman residing in 
any place within the State for five years, without receiving relief 
as a pauper, would gain a settlement in such place ; but in section 
3 it was provided that no existing settlement should be changed by 
the act, unless the entire residence accrued after its passage ; but 
that as to unsettled persons the statute should be deemed to be 
retroactive. This act, therefore, did not give her a settlement in 
Boston, for she was not then an unsettled person, and the five 
years' residence in Boston was before the enactment of the statute. 
This statute was re-enacted in St. 1878, c. 190, and was extended 
to married women who had no settlement derived by marriage, by 
St. 1879, c. 242. Both of these later statutes were retroactive as 
to unsettled women only. They did not operate, therefore, to 
change her derivative settlement in Salem. 

The re-enactment of these provisions in Pub. Sts., c. 83, § 1, 
cl. 7, did not change the situation. 

Up to the year 1898, therefore, the pauper had not acquired a 
settlement in Boston and had not lost her settlement in Salem. 
St. 1898, c. 425, however, provides that " all settlements not fully 
acquired subsequent to the first day of May in the year 1860 are 
hereby defeated and declared to be lost, except where the exist- 
ence of such settlement prevented a subsequent acquisition of 
settlement in the same place : provided, that whenever a settlement 
acquired by marriage has been thus defeated, the former settle- 
ment of the wife, if not defeated by the same provision, shall be 
thereby revived." 

This statute cut off her derivative settlement in Salem, and as 
she would lose any settlement which she might have had before 
marriage by the same provision, and so far as the facts show was 
not prevented by her derivative settlement from gaining another in 
Salem, she became under its provision, and is to-day, an unsettled 

woman. 

Very truly yours, 

Hose a M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



Metropolitan Parks — Violation of Law — Fines. 

The provision of St. 1901, c. 464, requiring that all fines recovered for 
violation of the laws of the Commonwealth within the limits of lands, 
roadways or boulevards under the care of the Metropolitan Park Com- 
mission shall be accounted for and paid to the Treasurer of the Com- 
monwealth, and by him placed to the credit of such commission, must 
be limited to fines actually collected or received by the commission. 



42 ATTOKKEY-GEKEPAL'S REPOET. [Jan. 

Aug. 6, 1901. 
John Woodbury, Esq., Secretary, Metropolitan Park Commission. 

Dear Sir : — St. 1897, c. 121, § 2, provided as follows: "All 
sums of money hereafter collected or received by said commission, 
including sums received for rentals, sales, or use of property under 
its care, and all fines recovered for violations of law within the 
limits of the lands, roadways or boulevards under its care, shall 
be accounted for and paid to the treasurer and receiver-general of 
the Commonwealth, and shall be placed by him to the credit of and 
added to the funds provided by law for meeting the expenses of said 
commission, and may be expended by said commission in addition 
to any loans or appropriations authorized for park purposes." 

In an opinion given Sept. 15, 1898 (1 Op. Atty-Gen. 595) 
I advised your Board that the phrase in the section, " all fines 
recovered for violations of law within the limits of the lands, 
roadways or boulevards " under the care of the Metropolitan Park 
Commission, should be construed as including only such fines as 
were recovered for violation of the rules and regulations made by 
the park commission. 

St. 1901, c. 464, repeals the section above quoted and substi- 
tutes a new section therefor (section 1). The new section is 
similar to the old in all respects excepting that in place of the 
phrase " all fines recovered for violations of law within the limits 
of the lands, roadways or boulevards under its care," the new 
section substitutes the following, to wit: " all fines recovered for 
violation of rules and regulations established by said commission 
for the government and use of the lands, roadways or boulevards 
under its care, or for violation of the laws of the Commonwealth 
within the limits of said lands, roadways or boulevards." 

Having expressly added " fines recovered for violation of rules 
and regulations established by the commission " to "fines recovered 
for violations of law within the limits of the lands, roadways or 
boulevards," as provided in the repealed section, it was undoubt- 
edly in the mind of the framers of the new statute that the latter 
expression (which stood alone in the old statute) could no longer 
be limited in its construction, as indicated in my former opinion, 
basing this view upon the proposition that the statute would be 
without meaning if two independent and connecting clauses referred 
to the same matter. 

There is much force in the suggestion. Statutes are not to be 
construed as being without meaning unless there is no other possi- 
ble alternative. But I am, nevertheless, of the opinion that the 
statute of 1901 cannot be construed according to the obvious in- 
tent of its framers. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT— No. 12. 43 

In order to a full understanding of the questions involved, it is 
necessary to consider some general rules of pleading and practice 
in criminal law. An offence having no essential connection with 
the place in which it is committed need not be alleged in criminal 
pleading as having occurred at any particular place. There must 
be an allegation of place, but the indictment or complaint is sup- 
ported if it be shown that the offence was committed within the 
county. Commonivealth v. Heffron, 102 Mass. 148; Common- 
wealth v. Kern, 147 Mass. 595. In framing an indictment for 
such offences, which comprise by far the greater number of those 
known to criminal pleading, it is unnecessary to specify the exact 
locality. By the well-settled rules of criminal pleading, it is suf- 
ficient to allege that the offence was committed in a town within 
the county. 

Some offences, it is true, are local in their nature ; but even as 
to them it is usually sufficient to name the town in which they were 
committed. Common nuisances and liquor nuisances are exam- 
ples of this class of offences. 

This being so, it is obviously impossible for the clerk, whose 
duty it is to transmit fines recovered, to know the locality in which 
the crime was committed. As to some, it is often impossible to 
designate a particular locality, like, for example, the offence of 
writing and publishing a libel. If the case is tried before the 
court and the clerk happens to be present, he may learn from the 
testimony the locality of the offence, but very many cases are dis- 
posed of by a plea of guilty, and there is no evidence presented to 
the court which would give the clerk the desired information. 

I am unable to construe a law as intending an impossibility. 
Upon the construction claimed for the statute in question, it is the 
duty of the clerk to see that fines recovered for all violations of law 
committed on the parks and boulevards under the charge of your 
commission shall be designated as such, in order that they may be 
paid over in accordance with its terms. This the clerks cannot 
do ; much less can the Treasurer of the Commonwealth, in the 
absence of information from the clerks of courts, know what fines 
received by him shall be paid over to the park fund, as required 
by the statute. 

Moreover, the matter of the disposition of fines recovered in 
criminal proceedings has been the subject of many statutes, gen- 
eral and special. Formerly all fines, in the absence of any special 
provisions to the contrary, were paid over to the treasurer of the 
county. Pub. Sts., c. 154, § 34. Much dissatisfaction arose on 
account of this provision, it being claimed by town officers that in 
many cases they were required to spend the money of the town to 



44 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

detect and convict criminals without receiving any reimbursement, 
the fines imposed going to the county. St. 1891, c. 416, accord- 
ingly, provided that fines collected in the superior court should be 
paid to the treasurer of the county, while fines collected in an in- 
ferior court should be paid to the city or town in which the offence 
was committed. It was deemed that this somewhat arbitrary divi- 
sion would fairly adjust the balance between municipalities and 
the county in the matter of criminal expenses on the one hand and 
receipts from criminal cases on the other. 

In addition to the general provisions referred to, there are nu- 
merous special statutes regulating the disposition of fines. For ex- 
ample, fines imposed for cruelty to animals shall, in certain cases, 
be paid to the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Animals. Pub. Sts., c. 207, § 58. Many statutes provide for 
the payment of the whole or a portion of fines recovered in certain 
cases to the informant. Fines imposed for non-support of a wife 
may, in the discretion of the court, be paid to the wife. 

But under the construction claimed, this statute, which is en- 
titled "An act to define the disposition of money received by 
the Metropolitan Park Commission from rentals and from other 
sources," contains in its first section a single clause repealing, in 
certain cases, all the general and special provisions of law above 
referred to. Clerks of courts, searching the statutes for enact- 
ments relating to the performance of their duties, would scarcely 
expect to find under the above title an act so important to them. 
I am unable to believe that the Legislature can be deemed to have 
intended to enact so important a change in existing statutes in 
this indirect and obscure way. 

The only way in which the statute in my opinion can be con- 
strued is in accordance with its title. In terms it is entitled an 
act relating to disposition of moneys received by the park com- 
mission. Literally construed the section in question is limited to 
fines collected or received by the commission. Its provisions must 
be limited to such fines. The fact, if it be a fact, that under exist- 
ing laws no fines are received by the park commission, renders the 
law useless. But even this result is preferable to a construction 
of its terms which would make it a statute impossible to be en- 
forced. 

Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 45 



Civil Service — Permanent Service — Probationary Period — Be 

Facto Official. 

The retention in the civil service after his period of probation is over, 
without further appointment, of a certified candidate provisionally 
appointed, is not a violation of the civil service rules. 

Such de facto official having been certified as fit by the Civil Service Com- 
mission, the requirements of the civil service law are satisfied. 

Sept. 27, 1901. 
Hon. Charles Theodore Russell, 

Chairman, Board oj Civil Service Commissioners. 

Dear Sir : — Your letter of July 24 requests the opinion of the 
Attorney-General upon the following facts : certain men were duly 
nominated and confirmed as members of the regular police force of 
Lawrence for the probationary period of six months. The civil 
service rules were complied with in their appointment. The pro- 
bationary period has expired. At the end of that period the 
mayor nominated them for permanent officers, and the board of 
aldermen refused confirmation. They are still holding office, per- 
forming all the duties and receiving pay therefor. Upon these 
facts your letter requests my opinion upon the following in- 
quiries : — 

First. If, at the expiration of the six months' probationary 
period, a police officer is not permanently appointed, does he 
cease to be such officer? 

Second. Upon the above statement of facts, are these ap- 
pointees now legally acting as police officers in Lawrence ? 

I am of opinion that these questions do not concern your Board. 
The rules have been complied with in their original appointment. 
It is true that Rule 37 provides that at the end of six months the 
probationer shall be absolutely appointed or employed, or other- 
wise to be deemed out of the service ; but the fact that the 
officers in question are continuing to act after the expiration of 
the probationary period, and without absolute appointment to the 
regular service, is one which concerns the city of Lawrence and 
not your commission. There is no violation of the civil service 
rules. They are acting as de facto officials, but, in my opinion, 
such action does not transgress any rule laid down by the commis- 
sion. The men serving as such de facto officers had been certified 
by your Board as fit, and the requirements of the civil service law 
are satisfied. 

Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



46 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Public Weighing — Platform Weighing Machine — Sealer of Weights 
and Measures — Contents of Milk Jars. 

A platform weighing machine, publicly placed for the purpose of allowing 
a person to ascertain his weight upon the payment of a fee, is not used 
for the purposes of commercial transactions, and is not within the 
provisions of Pub. Sts., c. 65, requiring weights, measures or balances 
for the purpose of selling goods, wares, merchandise or other com- 
modities, or for public weighing, to be adjusted and sealed. 

A sealer of weights and measures of a city or town has no authority to 
seal a milk bottle of a size not prescribed by St. 1901, c. 360. 

Sept. 27, 1901. 
Hon. Edward S.Bradford, Treasurer and Receiver- General. 

Dear Sir : — Your letter of Aug. 27, 1901, requires the opinion 
of the Attorney-General upon two questions, the first of which is 
as follows : — 

First. Do the provisions of chapter 65, Public Statutes, or acts 
in amendment thereof or in addition thereto, apply in any way to 
a platform weighing scale publicly placed for the purpose of allow- 
ing a person to ascertain his weight, such weight being registered 
automatically only upon the payment of a fee? 

The provisions of Pub. Sts., c. 65, entitled u Of weights and 
measures," and the acts in amendment thereof, are intended to 
secure honest dealing between buyer and seller by assuring to the 
purchaser the use of correct weights and measures by the seller. 
The machines referred to in your question are not used for the 
purposes of commercial transactions. They are, therefore, not 
within its provisions, and need not be sealed. It is scarcely neces- 
sary to say that the expression " public weighing," in the chapter 
referred to, relates to the weighing by sworn officials appointed for 
that purpose of commodities which are bought and sold. 

Second. Is it lawful for a sealer of weights and measures of a 
city or town to seal a milk bottle holding a greater or less amount 
than the authorized variation prescribed by chapter 360, Acts of 
1901? 

The chapter referred to (St. 1901, c. 360) was intended to 
authorize the use of glass bottles and jars of certain sizes for the 
distribution of milk and cream. The sizes so authorized are those 
containing quarts and divisions and multiples thereof. The statute 
does not authorize the sealing of jars or bottles of any other size. 
The duties of the sealer are prescribed by the statute, and he has 
no authority or discretion to seal any bottles or jars except those 

specified. 

Very truly yours, 

Hose a M. Knowlton, Attorney- General. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 47 



Treasurer of the Commonwealth — Millicent Library Corpora- 
tion — Investment of Fund. 

St. 1S93, c. 392, providing that the Treasurer of the Commonwealth may 

receive and hold in trust the sum of $100,000 for the benefit of the 

Millicent Library Corporation, for the purposes of a public library in 

Fairhaven, in section 3 authorizes the Treasurer to purchase long-time 

securities at a price above par, using so much of the income as is 

necessary to pay the premium, in order to keep intact the principal of 

such fund. 

Sept. 27, 1901. 

Hon. Edward S. Bradford, Treasurer and Receiver- General. 

Dear Sir : — By St. 1893, c. 392, the Treasurer of the Com- 
monwealth was authorized to receive and hold in trust the sum of 
$100,000 " for the benefit of the Millicent Library Corporation, 
for the purposes of a public library in Fairhaven." Investments 
of the fund are to be made under the direction of the secretary of 
the Board of Education and the Treasurer, — all such investments 
to be subject to the approval of the Governor and Council. The 
statute became operative during the current year by the payment 
of the money to the Treasurer. 

Your letter of September 16 states that it is desirable that the 
fund be invested in long-time securities, — the purchase of which 
is only possible by the payment of a premium, — and requests the 
opinion of the Attorney-General upon the question whether the 
Treasurer is authorized to expend any part of the income of 
the fund for the payment of a necessary premium to make possible 
the reinvestment of the fund in long-time securities at a par valua- 
tion. The first investment of the fund was in securities at par or 
less. 

Section 3 of the act quoted provides as follows : ". . . The net 
income of the said fund shall be determined after deducting all 
necessary and proper expenses incurred in the administration of 
said fund, and after reserving such amount of the gross income as 
in the opinion of said commissioners is necessary to maintain the 
principal of said fund intact." 

This provision, in my judgment, authorizes you to purchase 
long-time securities at a price above par, using the income so far 
as necessary to pay the premium, so that only the par value shall 
be charged to the principal of the fund. There can be no other 
intelligent interpretation of its meaning. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



48 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 



Insurance — License as Insurance Agent — Corporation. 

A corporation is not a "person" within the meaning of St. 1894, c. 522, 
§ 93, cl. 2, as amended by St. 1895, c. 59, § 2, providing that, upon 
payment of a fee of ten dollars, the Insurance Commissioner may 
issue to any " suitable person" a license to act as insurance broker. 



Oct. 3, 1901. 
Hon. Frederick L. Cutting, Insurance Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — St. 1894, c. 522, § 93, cl. 2, provides as follows: 
" The insurance commissioner may, upon the payment of a fee of 
ten dollars, issue to any person a certificate of authority to act as 
an insurance broker to negotiate contracts of insurance or re- 
insurance or place risks or effect insurance or reinsurance with 
any qualified domestic insurance company or its agents, and with 
the authorized agents in the Commonwealth of any foreign insur- 
ance company duly admitted to do business in the Common- 
wealth." 

By St. 1895, c. 59, § 2, the section above quoted was amended 
by inserting the word "suitable", so that the commissioner was 
authorized to "issue to any suitable person" a license as insur- 
ance broker. 

By St. 189G, c. 448, it was provided that such licenses should 
be limited to the residents of the Commonwealth, or to residents 
of other States who granted like certificates to. residents of this 
State. 

Notwithstanding the able and ingenious brief by the attorney 
for the corporation, petitioning for a license as an insurance broker, 
I am of opinion that under this statute the Insurance Commissioner 
is not authorized to issue a license as an insurance broker to a cor 
poration organized under the laws of the State of Maine doing 
business in this Commonwealth. There are many expressions 
throughout the insurance statutes which appear to me to show that 
the Legislature intended a personal license. Among the most 
conclusive is section 111, which provides that a licensed insurance 
broker who does certain things " shall be deemed guilty of simple 
larceny." If I understand the meaning of the word " larceny" it 
is not possible for a corporation, as such, to be guilty of that crime. 
Obviously, if this be so the Legislature had in mind natural per- 
sons only as licensed brokers. 

I have not overlooked the fact that it was held by the supreme 
judicial court in Enterprise Brewing Co. v. Grimes, 173 Mass. 252, 
that a corporation may be licensed to sell intoxicating liquor. The 
determination of that case, however, was based chiefly upon the 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 49 

provisions of the statute under which such licenses are granted, 
and the reasoning of the opinion does not apply to the statute 
now under consideration. 

Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



State House — Elevators — Local Inspection. 

The elevators in the State House, so long as they are in charge of officers 
of the Commonwealth designated therefor by the Legislature, are not 
within the provision of St. 1901, c. 439, that certain construction 
work and devices therein required shall, in the city of Boston, be 
approved by the building commissioner. 

Nov. 16, 1901. 
Maj. Charles G. Davis, Sergeant-at-Arms. 

Dear Sir: — Under St. 1901, c. 439, amending St. 1894, c. 
481, it is provided that all elevator cars " shall be provided with 
some suitable mechanical device whereby they will be securely 
held in the event of an accident to the shipper rope or hoisting 
machinery, or any similar accident." The statute contains other 
provisions looking to the safety of elevator passengers. It further 
provides that the construction work and devices so provided for 
shall be approved in the city of Boston by the building commis- 
sioner. 

Your letter of November 5 requires the opinion of the Attorney- 
General upon the question whether this statute is applicable to the 
elevators in the State House. 

The State House is the property of the Commonwealth, in charge 
of officers authorized thereto by the Legislature of the Common- 
wealth. It is not to be presumed that police regulations of the 
character in question are intended to be applicable to officers of 
the Commonwealth or to the property of the Commonwealth ; nor 
that the Legislature, by such enactments, intended to limit the 
authority of the Commonwealth over its own property, or to pro- 
vide that a local officer should supervise the doings of its own 
servants. See 1 Op. Attorney-General, 290; Attorney-General's 
Report, 1899, page 50. 

In my opinion, the elevators in the State House, so long as they 
are in charge of officers of the Commonwealth provided by the 
Legislature, are not within the provisions of the statute in question. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney-General. 



50 ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S REPOET. [Jan. 



Citizen — Unnaturalized Resident of a City. 

An unnaturalized alien, resident in a city of this Commonwealth, is not a 
" citizen" thereof. 

Nov. 16, 1901. 
J. F. Lewis, M.D., Superintendent, State Adult Poor. 

Dear Sir : — The trustees of the Dickinson Hospital of North- 
ampton have voted that the free benefits of the hospital shall be 
applied to those persons " who are citizens who have legal settle- 
ments in the towns of Northampton, Hatfield and Whately." 

A patient was admitted to the Dickinson Hospital who was of 
age, a native of Ireland, who came to the United States in June, 
1900, and has lived in Northampton since. Your letter of October 
18 requires the opinion of the Attorney-General upon the question 
whether he was within the provisions of the vote above quoted. 

The person in question was not a citizen of Northampton and 
had no legal settlement therein. He was not even a citizen of the 
United States. A resident is not necessarily a citizen. 
Very truly yours, 

Hose a M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



Civil Service — Chief Superintendent — School-house Custodian 
in the City of Boston. 

An officer with the title of " School-house custodian," appointed by the 
school committee of the city of Boston, whose duties are "the gen- 
eral supervision of janitors and the care of school property, excepting 
that which comes within the jurisdiction of the committee of sup- 
plies," is not a chief superintendent of any department, and is there- 
fore within and subject to the civil service rules. 

Nov. 16, 1901. 
Hon. Charles Theodore Russell, 

Chairman, Civil Service Commission. 

Dear Sir: — Your letter of October 26 submits the question 
whether a person appointed by the school committee of the city of 
Boston to the position of school-house custodian is within the civil 
service rules. 

It appears by a letter from the secretary of the school committee 
that the duties of the officer in question are " the general super- 
vision of janitors and the care of school property, excepting that 
which comes within the jurisdiction of the. committee on supplies." 
The authority of the school committee to choose such an officer is 
found in St. 1875, c. 241, § 4, authorizing the board to choose 
" such other subordinate officers as they may deem expedient, and 
shall define their duties." 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 51 

The officer in question is clearly within the civil service rules, — 
Rule 6, Schedule B, Class 12; to wit: ''Superintendents, as- 
sistant superintendents, deputies and persons other than the chief 
superintendents of departments, performing any of the duties of 
superintendent in the service of any city of the Commonwealth." 
The officer in question is not a " chief superintendent" of any de- 
partment within the construction of this rule adopted in the 
opinion of the Attorney-General dated June 27, 1901, but is a 
person performing some of the duties of superintendent. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



Civil Service — Provisional Appointments. 

Where provisional appointments are made to fill the places of men ap- 
pointed from the certified list furnished by the Civil Service Com- 
mission, and immediately suspended, such appointments are illegal. 

Nov. 16, 1901. 
Hon. Charles Theodore Russell, 

Chairman, Civil Service Commission. 

Dear Sir: — Your letter of Octobers requires the opinion of 
the Attorney-General upon the question whether the action of the 
superintendent of streets of Boston in appointing certain p.ersons, 
in April of this year, to be inspectors of paving of the city of 
Boston, was legal. 

The facts as stated in your letter were that after making requisi- 
tion upon the commission for twenty names of persons to be ap- 
pointed to the position in question, and receiving a list of twenty, 
from which list it was his duty to appoint twelve, he purported to 
comply with the rules of the commission by appointing the required 
number, immediately suspending them and proceeding to fill the 
vacancies by provisional appointments. 

There can be no doubt that such action was illegal. It was a 
mere device to evade the law, and the provisional appointments so 
made were illegal. 

Very truly yours, 

Hose a M. Knowlton, Attorney-General. 



Trade-mark — Filing and Recording — Identical Trade-marks. 

It is the duty of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, under St. 1895, c. 
462, § 1, to refuse to receive or record a label which has already been 
recorded, notwithstanding the fact that the class of goods dealt in 
may be wholly dissimilar to the merchandise specified in the former 
application. 



52 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Dec. 5, 1901. 
Hon. William M. Olin, Secretary of the Commonwealth. 

Dear Sir: — The expression "The Klondike" has been duly 
recorded by a person carrying on business in this Commonwealth, 
as a label. In his certificate he specifies as follows: "General 
class, wearing apparel ; particular description, suspenders." 

Since the tiling of this label, application has been made for the 
recording of the same term as a label, by a person who declares 
that he intends to appropriate it to overcoats. 

The question submitted is whether it is your duty to receive and 
file the latter application. 

I am of opinion that the words of the statute are so far con- 
trolling as to forbid you to receive and record a label which has 
already been filed and recorded, notwithstanding the fact that 
the class of goods dealt in may be wholly dissimilar to the merchan- 
dise specified in the former application. 

St. 1895, c. 462, § 1, as amended by St. 1899, c. 359, § 1, per- 
mits the adoption of a label " not previously owned or adopted 
by any other person," and the latter part of the same section pro- 
vides that the Secretary shall not record any label that would 
reasonably be mistaken for a label already on record. If these 
provisions be literally construed, the second applicant is not 
entitled to have his label recorded. 

I am aware that section 1 above quoted provides that the certifi- 
cate of the applicant shall specify not only his class of business, 
but also " the class of merchandise and the particular description 
of goods comprised in such class to which " the label has been or 
is intended to be appropriated. If this provision stood alone, it 
might reasonably be argued that the applicant would be entitled to 
use his label exclusively only for the particular class of goods 
named in the certificate. 

But in view of the express provisions of the statute above quoted, 
I think that the provision requiring a specification of the class of 
business and the particular goods in the class must be intended as 
an identification and method of proof as to the use of the label 
rather than as a limitation upon the ownership of it. If, for ex- 
ample, one should register a label without specifying upon what 
goods he had used or intended to use it, it might be difficult to 
determine whether his allegation of previous use were true. This 
construction reconciles the whole section and simplifies your duties. 

It follows that having ascertained that the label now claimed has 
already been recorded, it is your duty to refuse to act upon the 
later application. See 1 Op. Attorney-General, 100. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



1902. J PUBLIC DOCUMENT — STo. 12. 53 



State Paupers — Aid Furnished by Cities and Towns — Rendering 
of Bill — Notice. 

The rendering to the Commonwealth of a bill for aid furnished by a city 
or town to a State pauper, as required by Pub. Sts., c. 86, § 43, does 
not terminate the liability of the Commonwealth to make reimburse- 
ment therefor so as to require a new notice from such city or town 
if the aid is thereafter continued. 

Dec. 23, 1901. 
J. F. Lewis, M.D., Superintendent, State Adult Poor. 

Dear Sir : — St. 1898, c. 425, § 5, amending Pub. Sts., c. 84, 
§ 18, provides as follows : "A city or town may furnish aid to 
poor persons found therein, having no legal settlement within the 
state, if the overseers of the poor deem it for the public interest ; 
but except in case of sickness, not for a greater amount than two 
dollars a week for each family during the months of May to Sep- 
tember inclusive, or three dollars a week for the months of October 
to April inclusive, and the overseers shall in every such case give 
immediate notice by mail to the state board of lunacy and charity, 
which board shall examine the case, and should they direct dis- 
continuance, shall remove such persons to the state almshouse or 
to any state or place where they belong, when the necessities of 
such persons or the public interest require such removal." 

This section is in harmony with the general policy of legis- 
lation in Massachusetts in the matter of public aid to persons 
in distressed circumstances, which aims to secure immediate 
relief, leaving the question of liability to be thereaf terwards deter- 
mined. It further exemplifies another well-established prin- 
ciple in the pauper legislation, which is, that persons in distress 
shall not be removed to public almshouses until it clearly appears 
that such removal is necessary. It is the duty of municipal 
authorities, both under this and under other statutes, to render aid 
at once. When the person so relieved is unsettled, notice of such 
aid is to be given forthwith to the Commonwealth, in order that 
the charge may be properly made to the State, and the question 
of removal is left to the decision of the State Board; and the 
liability of the State to the municipal authorities continues under 
the statute until the person is no longer in need of assistance or 
until the State causes the person so relieved to be taken to one of 
its almhouses. 

In the case submitted by } r our letter of August 8, a poor person 
was first assisted by the authorities of the town Dec. 22, 1900; 
notice was forthwith given to the Commonwealth ; no removal was 
ordered by the State Board, and the assistance was continued until 



54 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 

Jan. 15, 1901 ; and a bill for assistance during that time has been 
rendered to the State by the town authorities. 

It would be clear, but for one circumstance which will be here- 
after considered, that under these circumstances due notice having 
been received by the State, and no action looking to the removal 
of the pauper having been taken, the State would be liable for the 
entire bill. The question is raised, however, by your letter, 
whether the State is liable after Dec. 31, 1900, no new notice 
having been given by the town after that date. 

Whatever doubts exist upon the liability of the State arise upon 
the consideration of Pub. Sts., c. 86, § 43, which provides as fol- 
lows : "All accounts against the commonwealth for allowance 
to counties, cities and towns, on account of state paupers, shall be 
rendered to the state board on or before the third Wednesday of 
January annually ; and shall be so made as to include all claims 
for such charges up to the first day of said January, and, if ap- 
proved by the board and certified by the auditor of accounts, shall 
be paid from the treasury of the commonwealth." 

It is suggested that if a bill be rendered by the town, including 
all charges up to December 31, in compliance with this statute, 
such a bill is presumed to be the closing of the account, and, con- 
sequently, the termination by the town of temporary assistance, so 
that if such assistance be continued beyond that period a new 
notice to the State is necessary. 

I am unable to appreciate the force of this contention. It may 
be conceded that under ordinary circumstances the rendering of a 
bill on behalf of the municipality is by implication a notice that 
the assistance by the town has terminated, so that if the town be 
called upon again to furnish assistance a new notice is necessary. 
But a bill rendered in obedience to the statute last quoted carries 
with it no such inference. The purpose of the statute obviously is 
to enable the Treasurer to make up a financial statement of the 
accounts of the Commonwealth for the year, so that all outstand- 
ing liabilities up to that time may be known ; and the rendering 
of a bill in compliance with this statute cannot be taken to have 
any further significance. It is merely a statement that up to that 
date the State is indebted to the town in the amount stated, and 
nothing more. If, by way of illustration, a State required bills to 
be rendered monthly, it would hardly be contended that compliance 
with such a statute would make it necessary that a new contract of 
liability should be made after the rendering of the monthly bill. 

No unexpected liability can be said to devolve upon the Com- 
monwealth by the failure of the town to give a new notice after 
the end of the year. After the original notice is given, the authori- 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 55 

ties of the Commonwealth are presumed to be fully informed of 
the circumstances of the case, and of the condition of the pauper; 
and if they have determined not to remove the person assisted, it 
is for the reason that they deem it expedient to allow him to re- 
main in the place where he is assisted. The mere fact of a bill 
being rendered because of a statute requirement to that effect does 
not change the situation and cannot operate to discharge the Com- 
monwealth of its responsibility for the pauper. 

I am of opinion, therefore, that the Commonwealth continues 
liable, notwithstanding the rendering of the bill required by Pub. 
Sts., c. 86, § 43. 

The same considerations apply to a case arising under what is 
commonly called the Sick State Poor Law. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General. 



Great Ponds — Title to Islands — Board of Harbor and Land 
Commissioners. 

The title to islands within the area of great ponds is, in the absence of 
any grant from the Legislature, or from the freemen of a town, prior 
to 1647, in the Commonwealth, and the duties of the Board of Harbor 
and Land Commissioners relating to such islands are prescribed by 
Revised Laws, c. 96, § 3. 

Jan. 7, 1902. 
Hon. Woodward Emery, 

Chairman, Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners. 

Dear Sir: — Your letter of October 8 states that the Board of 
Harbor and Land Commissioners desires to be informed " whether 
or not islands in great ponds to which no private individual has 
title are property of the Commonwealth, with reference to the 
possession of which this Board has a duty to perform." 

The term "great pond" has been used in the statutes of the 
Commonwealth from time immemorial. It originally signified an 
inland body of water consisting of ten acres (Colony Ordinance of 
1647) ; but this area was subsequently increased, in the case of 
the public right of fishing, to twenty acres (St. 1869, c. 384, § 7). 

The original grants from the king, in the case of the Colony of 
Plymouth and the Colony of Massachusetts Bay as well, gave to 
the colony the title to all lands within the Commonwealth, includ- 
ing great ponds. This provision was also incorporated into the 
charter of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, and the title to such 
lands and ponds, unless previously parted with, was, both before 
and after the Revolution, in the State. " These charters [the 



56 ATTOKNEY-GEJSTEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 

several charters to the colonies and the Province] vested in the 
grantees not only the right of soil, but also large powers of gov- 
ernment and the prerogatives of the crown in the seashores, bays, 
inlets, rivers and other property which were held from the use and 
benefit of all the subjects." Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River, 
147 Mass. 548, 554. See also Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 9 Gray 
451, 483 ; Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53. 

From a very early period the law of Massachusetts has treated 
great ponds as of a character closely resembling tide waters, the 
enjoyment of which for fishing, fowling and other purposes was 
common to all, and the title in and lands under which could not be 
made the subject of private ownership without special grant from 
the Legislature. Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160 ; Ancient Charters, 
148, 149. See also Commonwealth v. Vincent, 108 Mass. 441 ; 
West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 7 Allen 158. Thus it was provided 
in the Colony Ordinance of 1641 that every inhabitant should have 
free fishing and fowling in any great ponds . . . within the pre- 
cincts of the town where they dwelt, unless the freemen of the 
town or the general court had provided otherwise. Body of Liber- 
ties, 1641. Later, it was provided that no town should appro- 
priate to any person or persons any great pond containing more 
than ten acres. Ordinance of 1647. 

These ordinances applied to all great ponds exceeding ten acres 
in area which in 1647 had not been appropriated to particular per- 
sons, either by the freemen of the town or by the General Court. 
West Roxbury v. Stoddard, supra. The Commonwealth therefore 
owns the great ponds as public property held in trust for public 
purposes. It has the ownership of the soil, including, obviously, 
the soil of islands within the area of such ponds, and also the right 
to control and regulate the public uses to which the ponds shall be 
applied. Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River, 147 Mass. 557. 
In such ponds a grant bounded by the. pond extends only to low- 
water mark. Waterman v. Johnson, 13 Pick. 261, 265 ; Paine v. 
Woods, 108 Mass. 160. The proprietors of land bordering upon 
the ponds have no rights in the soil or in the waters, unless it be 
by grant from the Legislature. Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall 
River, 147 Mass. 557. 

It follows that the title to lands in great ponds is, in the absence 
of any grant from the Legislature or from the freemen of a town, 
prior to 1647, in the Commonwealth. Being lands the title to 
which is in the Commonwealth, the duties of your Board relating 
to the same are prescribed by Revised Laws, c. 96, § 3. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney -General. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 57 



Employee of Commonwealth — Salary — Additional Compensation. 

An employee of the Commonwealth, who receives a salary from the State 
treasury, cannot legally receive additional compensation for work 
performed during the hours of employment for which such salary is 
paid. 

Jan. 7, 1902. 

Rufus K. Wade, Esq., Chief of Massachusetts District Police. 

Dear Sir : — The opinion of the Attorney-General is desired 
upon the following state of facts : A clerk in the boiler inspection 
department of your office receives a salary of $600 a year from the 
State treasury, ' ' said sum to be paid out of the proceeds of the 
fees received from examinations of applicants for licenses as engi- 
neers and for inspection of boilers," St. 1898, c. 219. She has 
also been employed by you for clerical work in connection with the 
sale of forfeited liquors, for which she receives compensation at 
the rate of $33 per month. This work is done during the regular 
hours of business, that is to say, during the time for which she is 
supposed to be compensated by the salary of $600 a year. The 
question submitted is, whether she may lawfully be so employed. 

I am not troubled by the provision in the Revised Laws, c. 18, 
§ 11, that " a person shall not at the same time receive more than 
one salary from the treasury of the Commonwealth." The un- 
doubted intention of that statute was to prevent a person from 
being employed in two positions at the same time, receiving 
salary from each one. It does not prevent the payment of com- 
pensation for extra services not rendered during the usual hours of 
employment in the position for which the person is employed. It 
has been the immemorial practice in the State House to permit the 
employment of those receiving salaries, during extra hours and for 
extra compensation. This, of course, would not apply to general 
State officers, but only to clerks whose contract ordinarily is for 
services during regular office hours. Moreover, although the com- 
pensation paid in this case is deducted from the amount eventually 
paid into the State treasury, the compensation paid to the clerk in 
question is not paid " from the treasury of the Commonwealth," 
as provided in the statute. 

But, upon another ground, I am of opinion that the employment 
is unauthorized. The salary paid is for certain hours of work 
each business day. Revised Laws, c. 6, § 58, provides that " sal- 
aries payable from the treasury shall, unless otherwise provided, be 
paid on the first day of each month, and shall be in full for all ser- 
vices rendered to the Commonwealth by the persons to whom they 
are paid." This section is to be construed as meaning that the 



58 ATTOKNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

salary shall be in full for all the services rendered in the position 
for which the person receiving the salary is employed, and does 
not prohibit paying compensation for extra services having no 
connection with the duties of that position. It is, however, incon- 
sistent with the employment of a person in two capacities during 
the time when the person so employed is presumed to be engaged 
in the discharge of the duties of the office for which the salary 
was paid. 

For this reason I am of opinion that the person in question 
cannot be paid for services rendered during the time for which she 
is employed under the salary payable from the State treasury. 
Very truly yours, 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General. 



Gas Company — New England Gas and Coke Company — Unin- 
corporated Association — Manufacture of Gas — Returns to 
Gas and Electric Light Commissioners. 

The New England Gas and Coke Company, an unincorporated association 
of individuals, engaged in the manufacture and sale of gas to certain 
corporations for the purpose of sale and distribution to the public by 
the latter, is not itself engaged in the business of the sale and dis- 
tribution of gas to consumers, and therefore is not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Gas and Electric Light Commissioners in the matter 
of the returns prescribed by Revised Laws, c. 121. 

Jax. 7, 1902. 
Hon. Forrest E. Barker, 

Chairman, Gas and Electric Light Commissioners. 

Dear Sir : — In a letter to you dated Jan. 26, 1899, I had the 
honor to advise your Board that in my opinion it had no jurisdic- 
tion to require the New England Gas and Coke Company to make 
the annual returns to the Board required by the statutes of gas 
companies, or to furnish information touching the condition, 
management and operation of the company. This opinion was 
based upon the facts then submitted by your Board, to wit, that 
the company in question was not a corporation, but only an asso- 
ciation of individuals, and that it was not then engaged in the 
manufacture of gas. 

It now appears, however, that the company has installed a plant, 
and is engaged, and during the past year has been engaged, in the 
manufacture and sale of gas ; but it further appears that its entire 
product is sold and delivered on its premises to the Massachusetts 
Pipe Line Company, which in turn sells and delivers the gas so re- 
ceived to companies in the city of Boston engaged in the sale and 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 59 

distribution of gas to consumers. The opinion of the Attorney- 
General is required, upon this state of facts, as to the liability of 
the company under the provisions of the statutes relating to gas 
and electric light companies, Revised Laws, c. 121. Certain of 
the provisions of that chapter are by section 41 made applicable to 
" all persons owning or operating works for the manufacture and 
sale of gas for heating or illuminating purposes within the Com- 
monwealth." Although the business of the company in question 
is to not sell its product directly for .heating or illuminating pur- 
poses, but to a corporation for the purpose of sale and distribution 
by that corporation for those purposes, and is therefore not strictly 
within the terms of section 41, yet, for the purposes of this 
opinion, I assume that the language of the section is broad enough 
to include the individuals composing the company in question. 
They are an association of individuals not forming a corporation, 
engaged in the manufacture and sale of gas intended to be used for 
heating or illuminating purposes ; and, if the statute is to be taken 
literally, they are bound to make returns to your Board, to permit 
inspection of their books, to furnish information as to the conduct 
of their business, and are subject to the orders of the Board as to 
the quality of gas furnished by them and as to the price to be 
charged by them therefor. 

Upon the facts submitted, however, I am of opinion that they 
are not within the scope of the statutes. I am led to this conclu- 
sion by a consideration of the purpose and justification of the stat- 
utes of the Commonwealth relating to the subject. 

I do not deem it necessary to rest the justification for the regu- 
lations exercised by your Board over gas companies upon the 
proposition that they derive their authority from the Common- 
wealth, and are therefore under its control as to the conduct of 
their business. Speaking for myself, I see no reason why a corpo- 
ration, whose charter is expressly made subject to all provisions of 
general laws, does not thereby contract that it will be governed by 
such provisions, at whatever cost to itself. I am aware, however, 
that the weight of authority is that regulation by the State must 
stop short of anything approaching that which may result in partial 
or total confiscation of its property, even though such confiscation 
be, by implication/ within the powers conferred by the statutes to 
which, under its charter, it is made subject. 

But there is another principle of law which amply sustains the 
authority of the Legislature to make the regulations contained in 
the statutes relating to gas and electric light corporations. Under 
our frame of free'government, the Legislature has rarely attempted 
to regulate or in any way to interfere with the business of the 



60 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

individual, or to restrain or in any way to regulate the conduct of 
bis affairs. This principle extends in general to corporations 
which have no special relations with the public. But there is a 
class of corporations, sometimes termed " quasi-public," but which 
are more accurately termed "public-service" corporations, as to 
which the Legislature has undertaken to regulate their business, so 
far as such business relates to the public. Among these are cor- 
porations operating steam or electric railways, those engaged in 
telegraph or telephone business, and corporations carrying on the 
business of selling and distributing gas and electricity for heating 
and illuminating purposes. It is not accurate to say of such that 
they serve the public. In a general way a grocer may be said to 
serve the public, because he sells to all who come to his store. 
But he may discriminate, and may refuse to sell only to such as 
he chooses. The public-service corporations, on the contrary, un- 
dertake to serve all members of the community who have occasion 
to avail themselves thereof. In this respect they are analogous 
to innkeepers and common carriers, whose business from time 
immemorial has been subject to statutory regulation. 

But the relations of public-service corporations to the public are 
closer even than those of common carriers and innkeepers, for the 
reason that the former enjoy franchises in public ways which could 
not lawfully be granted to private individuals, or have the right 
to take land of private individuals by condemnation proceedings 
for the purposes of their business. By reason of these rights they 
enjoy a practical monopoly, either in fact or by law, of the business 
in which they are engaged. In consideration of these rights, they 
must undertake to serve the public indiscriminately. 

I am aware that in the case of Commonwealth v. Lowell Gas 
Light Company, 12 Allen, 75, there is a dictum of Chief Justice 
Bigelow, as follows : " They (gas companies) are not bound to sell 
and dispose of it (their product) to any one either for public or pri- 
vate use or consumption." This statement, however, has not been 
followed in later decisions, and in the case of Evans v. Boston 
Heating Company, 157 Mass. 37, and in the Opinion of the Jus- 
tices, 155 Mass. 598, the soundness of this dictum is by implica- 
tion questioned ; and it may be doubted whether, if the question 
were presented directly, the court would not now hold that a gas 
company in the enjoyment of public rights could not refuse to sell 
its product to any member of the community complying with its 
reasonable regulations. But, however that may be, all doubts as 
to the duties of gas companies are settled by the statutes. Revised 
Laws, c. 121, gives such companies, by section 26, a practical 
monopoly of the streets occupied by them for the purposes of their 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 61 

business ; and section 33 authorizes your Board to compel them 
to furnish their product to any person or corporation applying 
therefor. 

Being thus in the service of the public, and in the eDJoyment of 
a legal or actual monopoly, there can be no doubt of the right of 
the Legislature to enact regulations for the protection of the cus- 
tomer. There are many such regulations. Among other things, 
your Board may prescribe how their books and accounts shall be 
kept (section 29) ; it may require a gas company to supply its 
product to a resident of the city within which it is located (section 
33) ; it may make such regulations as it deems proper with relation 
to the quality or price of gas furnished (section 34) and every gas 
company must furnish to the Board a sworn statement, with such 
details as the Board may require, of its indebtedness and financial 
condition, the amount of its dividends, the names of its salaried 
officers and the amount of salary paid to each (section 31). It 
may also at any time investigate the affairs of a gas company, 
examine its books and inquire into the conduct of its business. 
Such regulations would be intolerable as applied to a private indi- 
vidual carrying on business not connected with the public, but they 
are amply justified upon the considerations stated. 

For the same reasons, individuals who enjoy public rights and 
undertake to carry on the business of selling and distributing to 
consumers are properly made subject to the same regulations. 

But when there is no possible relation between the gas manu- 
facturer and the public, the justification for the regulation so 
imposed is entirely wanting. Whether it was the purpose of the 
Legislature to make the regulations imposed applicable to all in- 
corporated gas companies, whether actually engaged in the busi- 
ness of manufacturing and selling gas, it is unnecessary to 
determine. But it is not to be presumed, unless the intention be 
clearly expressed, that it was the purpose of the Legislature to 
impose upon an individual enjoying no public rights, and having 
no relations with the public, a supervision so extraordinary and 
minute. The company in question has no rights in public high- 
ways ; it makes no contracts and fixes no price with consumers. 
There is no more occasion for supervision of their doings, in my 
judgment, than there would be in supervising the condition and 
operation of a coal company which supplies to a gas company the 
material for producing its gas. The purposes for the enactment 
of the statute entirely fail, and, while there is no express excep- 
tion, it is, nevertheless, in my opinion, a reasonable construction 
of the law to hold that it was not intended to cover a case like the 
present. 



62 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S EEPORT. [Jan. 

It may be contended that this construction of the law operates 
to prevent your Board from ascertaining the cost of the gas fur- 
nished to the citizens of Boston by the companies distributing it. 
Even if this objection were well taken, it is one which is to be 
dealt with by the Legislature. But I see no such difficulty. It is 
to be presumed that the commission is able to ascertain, either 
upon its own knowledge or by the evidence of suitable experts, 
what the gas furnished by the Boston companies ought to cost, 
and to regulate the price accordingly. If the gas company has 
made an improvident bargain with the New England Gas and Coke 
Company, that is a matter which does not concern your Board, 
and they must suffer the loss if the reasonable price of gas be fixed 
by the Board at such a rate as makes it a losing contract. In 
other words, if they are incorporated for the purpose of manufac- 
turing gas, they must sell gas at what it ought to cost them to 
manufacture it, plus a reasonable profit. If they see fit to employ 
another person or association of persons to make their gas for 
them, your duty is not altered thereby. It is not to investigate 
the business of the contractor, but to regulate the price of the gas 
supplied by the distributing company, regardless of their private 
contract with the manufacturer. 

I am of opinion, therefore, that the association of individuals 
known as the New England Gas and Coke Company, not being 
engaged in the business of the sale and distribution of gas to con- 
sumers, is not subject to the jurisdiction of your Board. 
Very truly yours, 

Hose a M. Knowlton, Attorney-General. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 63 



Opinions upon Applications for Leave to file 

Informations in the Name of the 

Attorney- General. 



Attorney- General v. Selectmen of Holliston. 

Member of Political Party — Caucus — Registrar of Voters. 

A member of one of the principal political parties does not sever his con- 
nection therewith by participating in a caucus of another party and 
voting for certain candidates therein nominated, and his appoint- 
ment to represent such party as registrar of voters is not illegal. 

Nov. 16, 1901. 

This was an application to the Attorney-General to file a peti- 
tion for a writ of mandamus against Eugene A. York, a member 
of the board of registrars of Holliston, who was appointed by the 
selectmen as a Democrat under the provisions of St. 1898, c. 548. 
Two others of the four members of the board were conceded to be 
Republicans. The petition claimed that said P^ugene A. York is, 
and, at the time of his appointment was, a Republican, and that 
there being two other Republicans upon the board previously ap- 
pointed, it was and is the dut} 7 of the selectmen to remove him. 
The petition was promoted by members of the Democratic town 
committee. They had previously petitioned the selectmen to re- 
move said registrar, and the petition had been refused by the 
selectmen after a hearing. 

The facts as they appeared at the hearing were practically not 
in dispute. Eugene A. York, the registrar in question, had been 
a Democrat in regular standing for many years as far back as 
the time of the civil war, and had continuously voted the Demo- 
cratic ticket, and taken part in the work of the party, up to the 
fall of 1900. He was a member of the Democratic town committee 
of Holliston for the three years ending in 1897. 

In the fall of 1900 he was present at and participated in a 
Republican caucus held in Holliston for the nomination of candi- 
dates for the State ticket. His purpose was to secure the nomina- 
tion of a friend of his who was a candidate for nomination upon 
the Republican ticket. The person he voted for was nominated, 
and York voted for the candidate so nominated at the State elec- 



64 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 

tion. Otherwise he voted the Democratic ticket. In the spring 
of 1901, at a Republican caucus held for the nomination of candi- 
dates for town offices, he again participated, and for a similar 
purpose. He declared at the hearing, however, and the statement 
was not challenged, that it was his purpose to vote at the coming 
election for all the candidates of the Democratic party upon the 
State ticket. 

St. 1898, c. 548, § 91, provides that no person having voted in 
the caucus of one political party shall be entitled to vote or take 
part in the caucus of another political party within the ensuing 
twelve months. The position of the petitioner is that under the 
provisions of this statute York is estopped from claiming to be a 
Democrat. But I am unable to construe the provisions relied 
upon so narrowly. The purpose of the statute, in my opinion, is 
to prevent one person from participating in the caucuses of two 
political parties, and the consequent opportunities for fraud and 
confusion which might result therefrom. It is not intended to 
define conclusively the political status of the voter. 

The statute relating to the appointment of registrars intends 
that they shall be composed of men of different political parties. 
It is well known that oftentimes a member of a political party may 
disagree with some of its principles and may refuse to vote for 
some of its candidates. The history of the Democratic party dur- 
ing the last four years is a sufficient illustration of this proposition. 
A man does not necessarily cease to be a Republican because he 
votes occasionally for a Democratic candidate or because he is 
unable to subscribe to some particular plank in the platform of his 
party. If, on the whole, he allies himself continuously with one 
of the principal political parties, he is, in my judgment, to be 
deemed a member of that party within the meaning of the statute 
under consideration. Jaquith v. Wellesley, 171 Mass. 138. In 
this case the registrar complained of acted irregularly in voting in 
a Republican caucus ; but while it may be true that an appoint- 
ment might and perhaps should have been made of a man more in 
sympathy with his party associates, I see no reason to suppose 
that the courts would declare the appointment illegal. I therefore 
decline to sign the petition. 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General. 

Charles J. Flagg, for petitioner. 
Joseph Dexter, for respondents. 



1902.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — STo. 12. 65 



Attorney-General v. Stoughton & Randolph Street Rail- 
way Company. 

Information — Attorney- General — Forfeiture of Charter — Wrong 

to Public. 

The Attorney-General will not sign an information in equity for the for- 
feiture of the charter of a street railway corporation where the alleged 
illegalities are slight and technical in their nature, and the public 
suffers no substantial wrong therefrom. 

Jan. 6, 1902. 

This was an application to the Attorney-General for the filing 
of a bill in equity by him against the Stoughton & Randolph 
Street Railway Company for the forfeiture of its charter, and to 
restrain it from occupying the highways of said towns with its 
rails and cars. 

It appeared at the hearing that the company in question was 
organized under general laws, on the eighteenth day of July, 1899, 
and a location was granted to it by the municipal authorities. 
Under the provisions of the statutes of the Commonwealth the 
corporate powers of a street railway company cease unless, within 
eighteen months from the date of its certificate of establishment, it 
has built and put in operation some portion of its road. (R. L. 
c. 112, § 28.) This limitation expired Jan. 18, 1901. By St. 
1901, c. 144, this time was extended to the first day of August, 
1901. On the latter date a portion of its tracks had been laid, and 
a car drawn by horses had made trips over the portion of the road 
so constructed. It was not pretended that such trips were made 
for the accommodation of the public. Indeed, it was conceded at 
the hearing that whatever was done in the way of operating cars 
prior to Aug. 1, 1901, the last date of limitation, was done by the 
company not for the purpose of serving the public, but solely for 
the purpose of saving its corporate rights ; and, if I deemed it 
necessary to find whether there had been any substantial com- 
pliance with the provisions of the statute, I should be constrained 
to find against the company. 

It further appeared that on the eleventh day of August, 1900, 
the selectmen declared that the location of the road was forfeited 
by its failure to comply with the conditions of the location. It 
was not disputed that certain of the conditions set forth in the 
location had not been complied with in form or in substance ; but 
it appeared that subsequently the selectmen attempted to revive 
the location and to waive the non-performance of the conditions of 
the original location, without further notice, hearing or adjudica- 
tion, as provided by the statutes in the case of original locations. 



6Q ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 1902. 

Upon these facts the petitioners contended, first, that its charter 
was forfeited ; and, second, that its present location was void, 
and that it had no right upon the streets. 

I do not deem it necessary to pass upon the many and interest- 
ing questions of law raised by the counsel for the petitioners upon 
these facts, for, in my opinion, I am not called upon to exercise 
the discretion vested in the Attorney-General in cases of this 
character in favor of the petitioners. It appears that, in so far 
as they had a right, the selectmen have waived all non-perform- 
ance of conditions which had invalidated the location of the com- 
pany, and have imposed certain new conditions, which have been 
accepted, and are content with the situation. In pursuance of 
its agreements with the selectmen of the several towns, it has 
completed the construction of its tracks, to the satisfaction of the 
Railroad Commissioners, and for some time the company has been 
operating its road regularly with electric cars, and in a manner 
to accommodate the travelling public. 

Upon these facts, and in the absence of any complaint from the 
town authorities, or even from the abutters (if it be conceded that 
they have any ground of complaint to this office), I am of opinion 
that the signing of this information would not accomplish any 
useful public purpose. It is true that in many cases proceedings 
may be properly instituted against individuals and corporations 
who are doing acts prejudicial to the rights of the public, even 
though the proceedings be asked for by persons who have private 
interests only to subserve. But in this case no substantial wrong 
is being done to the public. The road is being operated for the 
accommodation of travellers substantially upon the location 
granted by the selectmen, and in accordance with the purpose of 
its original charter. Whether it is technically in the legal exercise 
of its privileges is not a question which, in my opinion, the 
Attorney-General is called upon to submit to the consideration of 
the courts. 

The application is therefore refused. 

Hosea M. Knowlton, Attorney- General. 

Harvey H. Pratt, for the petitioners. 
A. J. Self ridge, for the respondent. 



LIST OF CASES 



IN WHICH THE 



Attorney- General 



HAS APPEARED 



During the Year 1901. 



INFORMATIONS. 



1. At the Relation of the Treasurer and Receiver-General. 

(a) For the non-payment of corporation taxes for the year 
1900, informations were brought against the — 

Adams Print Works. Enjoined. 

Agawam Ice Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

American Bell Telephone Company. Pending. 

American Cultivator Publishing Company. Tax paid and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

Austin Furniture Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

B. L. Briggs Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Bay State Chair Company, Incorporated. Tax paid and informa- 
tion dismissed. 

Bay State Mercantile Company. Enjoined. 

Bay State Metal Works. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Beach and Clarridge Company. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 

Boston Paving Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Boston Traveller Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Cape Ann Granite Railroad Company. Enjoined. 

Charles A. White Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Chelsea Express Despatch Company. Tax paid and information 
dismissed. 

Childs & Kent Express Company. Tax paid and information 
dismissed. 

Cobb-Eastman Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Columbia Engraving Company. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 

Consolidation Steamboat Company. Tax abated and information 
dismissed. 

Craig and Craig Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Cunningham Engineering Company. Tax abated and information 
dismissed. 

Cunningham Lumber Company. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 



ii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Damon Brick Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Dudley Feed and Mills Company. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 

E. H. Saxton Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Eastern Printing and Engraving Company. Tax paid and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

Easton Street Railway Company. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 

Essex Paper Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Floyd Rounds & Co., Corporation. Enjoined. 

Franklin Educational Company. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 

Garratt-Ford Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

George H. Corbett Company. In bankruptcy. Tax paid. 

George P. Staples & Co., Incorporated. Tax paid and informa- 
tion dismissed. 

Henry C. King Company. In bankruptcy. Tax paid. 

Hub Express Company. Enjoined. 

International Copper Syndicate Company. Enjoined. 

Interstate Law Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Iowa Light, Heat and Power Company. Tax paid and informa- 
tion dismissed. 

J. E. Peckham Manufacturing Company. Tax paid and informa- 
tion dismissed. 

J. P. & W. H. Emond, Incorporated. Tax paid and information 
dismissed. 

John D. Mack Machine Company. Enjoined. 

Kearns & Co., Incorporated. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 

Kelly Shoe Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Kimball Brothers Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

L. C. Richardson Company. Enjoined. 

Lang & Jacobs Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Martha's Vineyard Electric Light and Power Company. Tax paid 
and information dismissed. 

Massachusetts Investment Company. Tax paid and information 
dismissed. 

McLean Shoe Company. Tax abated. 

Medway Electric Light and Power Company. Tax paid and 
information dismissed. 

Metropolitan Bolt Company. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 
New England Motor Company. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. iii 

Norfolk Western Street Railway Company. Tax paid and infor- 
mation dismissed. • 

Noxon Manufacturing Company. Enjoined. 

Olympic Amusement Company. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 

R. H. Long Shoe Manufacturing Company. Tax paid and in- 
formation dismissed. 

Re-New Lamp Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Reycroft Pharmacy Company. Pending. 

Rolf Provision and Grocery Company. Tax paid and information 
dismissed. 

Seymour-Knapp-Warren Company. Tax paid and information 
dismissed. 

Springfield Elevator and Pump Company. Tax paid and informa- 
tion dismissed. 

T. F. Little Oil Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Thomas F. Phillips Company. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 

W. E. Rice Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Wachusett Mills. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Walnut Publishing Company. Unable to get service. 

Ware Street Railway Company. Unable to get service. 

Weymouth & Braintree Publishing Company. Tax paid and in- 
formation dismissed. 

Weymouth Seam Face Granite Company. Tax paid and informa- 
tion dismissed. 

Woburn Light, Heat and Power Company. Tax paid and informa- 
tion dismissed. 

Woodward & Brown Piano Company. Tax paid and information 
dismissed. 

Ziegler Electric Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

(b) For failure to file the tax return for the year 1901, re- 
quired by section 38 of chapter 13 of the Public Statutes, informa- 
tions were brought against the — 

Argus Advertising Agency. Enjoined. 

Atlantic Telegraph Company of Massachusetts. Return filed and 
information dismissed. 

Biddle & Smart Company, The. Return filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Boston Woods Motor Vehicle Company, The. Return filed and 
information dismissed. 

Bowler Gridley Company. Enjoined. 



iv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Brightwood Brick Company. Return filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Burrell Manufacturing Company. Enjoined. 

C. H. Black Company. Unable to get service. 

Campbell Brothers Company. Return filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Church Publication Company. Unable to get service. 

Composite Brake Shoe Company. Return filed and information 
dismissed. 

Connecticut Steam Stone Company. Return filed and information 
dismissed. 

Damon Safe and Iron Works Company. Return filed and informa- 
tion dismissed. 

De Cee Company. Enjoined. 

De Silva Morine Company. Return filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Edward L. Smith Company. Return filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Gilman Snow Guard Company. Return filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Hero Cough Syrup Company. Enjoined. 

Hoxie Mineral Soap Company. Unable to get service. 

J. E. Peckham Manufacturing Company, The. Enjoined. 

Junction Foundry Company. Return filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Lakeside Manufacturing Company. Return filed and information 
dismissed. 

Marshall Engine Company. Return filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Morning Mail Corporation. In bankruptcy. 

Newton Machine Company. In bankruptcy. 

Nonantum Company. In bankruptcy. 

Norfolk Electric Light and Power Company. Return filed and in- 
formation dismissed. 

Nute-Hallett Company, Incorporated. Return filed and informa- 
tion dismissed. 

Oak Grove Creamery Company. Return filed and information 
dismissed. 

Olympic Amusement Company. Return filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Phillipston Street Railway Company. Return filed and informa- 
tion dismissed. 

Prospect Worsted Mills. In bankruptcy. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. v 

Quinsiganiond Co-operative Baking Company. Return filed and 
information dismissed. 

Salem Telephone Company. Enjoined. 

Sandy Bay Pier Company. Return filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Second Regiment Band, The. Return filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Sphinx, Company, The. Enjoined. 

Standard Horse Shoe Company. Return filed and information 
dismissed. 

Thompson Milling Company. Enjoined. 

Union Co-operative Coal Company. Enjoined. 

Westfield Manufacturing Company. Return filed and information 
dismissed. 

William T. Gould Company. In bankruptcy. 

Woodward & Brown Piano Company. Enjoined. 

Worcester Textile Company. Return filed and information dis- 
missed. 

2. At the Relation of the Commissioner of Corporations. 

For failure to file the certificate of condition required b}* section 
54 of chapter 106 of the Public Statutes — 

A. F. Towle & Son Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

Block Plant Electric Light Company. Certificate filed and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

Boston Woods Motor Vehicle Company. Enjoined. 

Burrell Manufacturing Company. Enjoined. 

Cambridge Co-operative Society. Enjoined. 

De Cee Company. Enjoined on tax return suit. 

Franklin Educational Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

Lawrence Supply Company. Enjoined. 

Massachusetts Investment Company. Certificate filed and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

Morning Mail Corporation. Certificate filed and information dis- 
missed. 

New England Rubber Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

Nonantum Company. In bankruptcy. 

Old Colony Boot and Shoe Company. Certificate filed and infor- 
mation dismissed. 



vi ATTOKNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOKT [Jan. 

Pittsfield Manufacturing Company. Certificate filed and informa- 
• tion dismissed. 

Prospect Worsted Mills. In bankruptcy. 

Sutton Cranberry Company. Pending. 

Thompson Milling Company. Enjoined on tax return suit. 

University City Laundering Company, The. Certificate filed and 
information dismissed. 

Uxbridge Cotton Mills. Certificate filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Venezia Fire Proofing Company. Enjoined. 

Watertown Machine Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

3. 'At the Relation of the Civil Service Commissioners. 

Saunders, Robert V., Attorney-General v. Petition for quo war- 
ranto to try the title of the respondent to the office of super- 
intendent of the city farm of Lowell. Pending. 

Trehy, John W., Attorney-General ex rel. Board of Civil Service 
Commissioners v. Information in the nature of quo ivarranto 
to try the respondent's title to the office of almoner of the 
city of Chicopee. Reserved for the Supreme Judicial Court. 
Judgment of ouster. See 178 Mass. 186. 

4. At the Relation of Private Persons. 

Attorney-General ex rel. v. Vineyard Grove Company. Petition 
for use of name in an information for an injunction restrain- 
ing the said company from an alleged interference with the 
rights of the public in a sea beach, and ordering the removal 
of structures causing such alleged interference. Hearing. 
Use of name granted. Henry S. Dewey appointed master. 
Pending. 

Attorney-General v. Onset Bay Grove Association. Information 
in the nature of quo warranto to abate a public nuisance. 
Use of name granted. Referred to Warren A. Reed, auditor. 
Pending. 

Attorney-General ex rel. Samuel E. Hull et als., Selectmen of 
Millbury, v. Washburn & Moen Manufacturing Company. 
Information in the nature of quo warranto to abate a nuisance. 
Hearing. Use of name granted. Pending. 

Attorney-General v. Levi E. Flint. Petition for quo warranto to 
abate a public nuisance, caused by damming up the outlet 
of a pond, thereby overflowing the highway. Application 
pending. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. vii 



GRADE CROSSINGS. 



Notices have been served upon this department of the filing of 
the following petitions for the appointment of special commission- 
ers, under St. 1890, c. 428, relating to the abolition of grade 
crossings : — 

Barnstable County, 
Bourne, Selectmen of, petitioners. Commissioners appointed. 

Pending. 
Harwich. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, 

petitioner. Pending. 
Harwich, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending. 
Wellfleet and Eastham, Directors of Old Colony Railroad Company, 

petitioners. Petition for alterations and abolition of certain 

grade crossings in Wellfleet and Eastham. Commissioners 

appointed. Pending. 

Berkshire County. , 

Hinsdale, Selectmen of, and Directors of Boston & Albany Rail- 
road Company, petitioners. Petition for alteration of Bul- 
lard's, Church Street and Pierce's grade crossings in Hinsdale. 
Thomas W. Kenefick, William Sullivan and C. M. Ludden 
appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Pittsfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
alteration of Holmes road crossing in Pittsfield. Pend- 
ing. 

Pittsfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, and Directors of Boston & 
Albany Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of Hubbard and Gates avenues and Jason Street in 
Pittsfield. Pending. 

Richmond, Town of, and West Stockbridge, Town of, joint peti- 
tioners. Crossings over Boston & Albany Railroad. Pend- 
ing. 

West Stockbridge. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hart- 
ford Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for the aboli- 
tion of grade crossings over the West Stockbridge Railroad 
Corporation in West Stockbridge. Pending. 



viii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

West Stockbridge. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad, peti- 
tioners. Commissioners appointed. Pending. 

West Stockbridge. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hart- 
ford Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of "Potters Crossing," alias u Tymesons Crossing," in West 
Stockbridge. Pending. 

Williamstown, Town of, petitioner. Crossings over Fitchburg 
Railroad. Commissioners appointed. Pending. 

Bristol County. 

Attleborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the aboli- 
tion of crossings at Deanville, North Main, Bank, etc., streets. 
Pending. 

Attleborough. Directors of Old Colony Railroad Company, peti- 
tioners. Commissioners appointed. Pending. 

Dighton. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, peti- 
tioner. Pending. 

Dighton. Directors of New York, New Haven and Hartford 
Railroad, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of cross- 
ings at Railroad and Main streets. Discontinued by agree- 
ment. 

Easton. Directors of New York, New Haven and Hartford Rail- 
road Company, petitioners. Pending. 

Fall River, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Two petitions 
consolidated. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad 
Company. Pending. 

New Bedford, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Old Colony 
Railroad and New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad. 
Pending. 

Norton. Directors of Old Colony Railroad Company, petitioners. 
Petition for abolition of grade crossing in Norton, near Norton 
Furnace Station. Pending. 

Somerset. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, peti- 
tioner. Pending. 

Taunton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of grade crossings across Dean, Winter, West, 
Britannia and Freemont streets, and Crane Avenue in Taun- 
ton. Pending. 

Taunton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Old Colony Rail- 
road. Pending. 

Taunton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of Chase crossing on Middleborough and Rich- 
mond streets. (This petition consolidated with the two pre- 
ceding petitions.) 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. ix 



Essex County. 

Beverly. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad Company, peti- 
tioners. Pending. 

Haverhill, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of Washington, Essex and Winter streets crossings 
in Haverhill. Pending. 

Ipswich. Boston & Maine Railroad Company, petitioners. 
Pending. 

Lynn, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Summer and Western avenues, etc., on Saugus 
branch, and Market and other streets on main line, in Lynn. 
Pending. 

Manchester. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad Company, 
petitioners. Pending. 

Salisbury. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad Company, 
petitioners. Petition for abolition of Hoks and Gerrish cross- 
ing. Pending. 

Swampscott, Selectmen of, petitioners. Commissioners appointed. 
Hearing. Report partially confirmed. Pending. 

Franklin County. 

Greenfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Allen Street crossing in Greenfield. Pending. 

Greenfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of 
Russell Street crossing in Greenfield. Pending. 

Montague, Selectmen of, petitioners. Central Vermont Rail- 
road Company and Fitchburg Railroad Company. Pend- 
ing. 

Northfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of 
a grade crossing over the Connecticut River Railroad and 
Central Vermont Railroad at River Street. Pending. 

Hampden County. 

Chester, Selectmen of, and Directors of Boston & Albany Rail- 
road, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of the Huntington 
Street and White Chop crossings in Chester. Commissioners 
appointed. Pending. 

Chester, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
"Huntington Road." Commissioners appointed. Pending. 

Chicopee, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Crossings over 
Connecticut River Railroad. Commissioners appointed. 
Pending. 



x ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Chicopee, Mayor and Aldermen of , .petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of grade crossings over the Connecticut River Rail- 
road. Pending. 

East Longmeadow, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of Robeson's crossing in East Longmeadow. Pend- 
ing. 

East Longmeadow, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Monson. Boston & Albany Railroad Company, petitioner. Hast- 
ings', Butler's, Moran's and Silver Street crossings. Hearing. 
Decree as to first and the last two crossings. Disagreement 
as to second. Recommitted. Pending. 

Palmer. Blanchard's, Tenney's and Breckenridge's crossings. 
Boston & Albany Railroad Company, petitioners. Pending. 

Palmer, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Palmer, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of 
Burley's crossing in Palmer. Pending. 

Palmer. Boston & Albany Railroad Company, petitioners. 
Cooley's crossing. Pending. 

Palmer, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Springfield road crossing in Palmer. Pending. 

Springfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Bay Street, 
Boston Road, Wilbraham Road, Alden and Hickory streets, 
crossing the New York & New England Railroad. Commis- 
sioners appointed. Pending. 

Springfield. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company, 
petitioners. Pasco Road. Pending. 

Springfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Armory Street. 
Pending. 

Springfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Pasco Road. 
Pending. 

Springfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
alteration of grade crossing on street leading from South 
Street to South End bridge. Pending. 

West Springfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Baldwin and Cold 
Spring streets. Hearings. Report of commissioners filed. 
Pending. 

Westfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. North Elm Street. Pend- 
ing. 

Westfield. Boston & Albany Railroad Company, petitioner, 
Cob win and Morse's crossing. Commissioners appointed. 
Pending. 

Westfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Westfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for raising of Elm 
Street bridge in Westfield. Pending. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xi 

Westfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for tbe raising of 
North Elm Street bridge. Pending. 

(North) Wilbraham. Depot. Boston & Albany Railroad Com- 
pany, petitioners. Pending. 

Hampshire County. 

Belchertown, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the alteration 
of the " Holyoke Road" crossing in Belchertown. George 
W. Wiggin, E. K. Turner and Fred D. Stanley appointed 
commissioners. Pending. 

Hatfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Connecticut River Railroad 
Company and Boston & Maine Railroad Company. Pending. 

Northampton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
alteration of Laurel Park station grade crossing in Northamp- 
ton. George W. Wiggin, E. K. Turner and Fred D. Stanley 
appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Northampton and Easthampton. Directors of Connecticut River 
Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for alteration of 
East Street and Lyman's crossings in Northampton and 
Easthampton. George W. Wiggin, E. K. Turner and Fred 
D. Stanley, commissioners. Pending. 

Northampton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
the alteration of crossings on Grove and Earle streets. 
Pending. 

Ware, Selectmen of, petitioners. Commissioners appointed. 
Pending. 

Ware, Selectmen of, petitioners. Commissioners appointed. 

Pending. 

Middlesex County. 

Acton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of 
crossing known as " Great Road." Pending. 

Arlington. Selectmen of the town of Arlington, petitioners. 
Pending. 

Ashland. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company, 
petitioners. Commissioners appointed. Pending. 

Ayer, Selectmen of, and Directors of Fitchburg Railroad Com- 
pany, petitioners. Pending. 

Bedford, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of 
the Concord road crossing in Bedford. Fred D. Stanley. H. 
R. Coffin and Edmund K. Turner, commissioners. Pending. 

Cambridge. Boston & Lowell Railroad Company, by its lessee 
the Boston & Maine Railroad Company, petitioner. Pending. 

Chelmsford, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of Princeton Street in Chelmsford. Pending. 



xii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Concord, Selectmen of, and Directors of the Fitchburg Railroad 
Company, petitioners. Pending. 

Everett. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad Company, peti- 
tioners. Petition for abolition of Broadway & Main Street 
crossings in Everett. Pending. 

Lexington, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Grant Street crossing in Lexington. Pending. 

Lincoln. Fitchburg Railroad Company, petitioner. Pending. 

Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Pawtucket and 
Church streets. Pending. 

Maiden. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad Company, peti- 
tioners. Petition for abolition of Med ford, Adams and 
Charles streets grade crossing in Maiden. Pending. 

Maiden, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Pleasant and Winter streets crossings in Maiden. 
Pending. 

Marlborough, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Fitchburg 
Railroad Company. Pending. 

Marlborough. Old Colony Railroad Company, petitioner. Fisher's 
crossing. Pending. 

Natick. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company, peti- 
tioners. Three petitions pending. 

Newton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Boston & Albany 
Railroad Company. Argued before full court. Decision 
made on accounting, Sept. 1, 1898. Pending. 

Newton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of Glenn Avenue, Langley Road, Institution Ave- 
nue, Cypress, Centre, Rogers, Hyde, Walnut, Boylston and 
Cook streets in Newton. Pending. 

Newton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of Oak, Linden and Mecham streets crossings in 
Newton. Pending. 

Newton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of Concord Street and Pine Grove Avenue crossings 
in Newton. Pending. 

North Reading, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the aboli- 
tion of Main Street crossing. Pending. 

Somerville, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of Somerville Avenue grade crossing in Somerville. 
Pending. 

Somerville, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Somerville, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of Park, Dane and Med ford streets grade crossings 
in Somerville. Pending. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xiii 

Wakefield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of Hanson Street grade crossing in Wakefield. Pending. 

Waltham, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Fitchburg Rail- 
road Company. Pending. 

Watertown, Selectmen of, petitioners. Commissioners appointed. 
Pending. 

Norfolk County. 

Braintree. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail- 
road Company, petitioners. Pending. 

Braintree. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail- 
road Company, petitioners. Pending. 

Canton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Dedham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending. 

East Bridgewater. Directors of Old Colony Railroad Company, 
petitioners. Commissioners appointed. Disposed of. 

Foxborougb, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of Nortb Street crossing in Foxborougb. Pending. 

Hyde Park and Dedham. Three petitions consolidated. Pend- 
ing. 

Medway, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Milton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Cen- 
tral Avenue crossing. Pending. 

Needham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for alteration of 
Charles River Street crossing in Needham. Pending. 

Norwood, Selectmen of, and New York & New England Railroad 
Company, petitioners. Washington, Chapel and Guild streets 
and Railroad Avenue. Hearings. Pending. 

Sharon, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of 
Depot Street crossing in Sharon. Pending. 

Stoughton. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Company, petitioners. Pending. 

Walpole, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of 
crossings at Oak, Main, Elm, etc., streets. Pending. 

Plymouth County. 

Abington. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail- 
road Company, petitioners. Pending. 

Brockton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Commissioners 
appointed. Disposed of. 

Hingham. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Com- 
pany, petitioner. Pending. 

Marshfield. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad, petitioners. Pending. 



xiv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Middleborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Scituate. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail- 
road Company, petitioners. Petition for the alteration of 
grade crossings at Water and Union streets. Pending. 

Scituate, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Suffolk County. 
Boston. Directors of Old Colony Railroad Company, petitioners. 

Tremont Street. Hearing. Pending. 
Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Six petitions: — 

1. Austin, Cambridge and Perkins streets, Charlestown, cross- 

ing the tracks of the Boston & Maine Railroad Company. 
Pending. 

2. Same streets as above, crossing the tracks of the Eastern 

Railroad Company. Pending. 

3. Austin Street, Warren Avenue and Charles River Avenue, 

Charlestown, crossing the tracks of the Fitchburg Railroad 
Company. Pending. 

4. Rutherford Avenue, Main Street and Chelsea Street, Charles- 

town, crossing the tracks of the Boston & Lowell Railroad 
Company. Pending. 

5. Congress Street, South Boston, crossing the tracks of the 

New York & New England Railroad Company. Pend- 
ing. 

6. Dorchester Avenue, Dorchester, crossing the tracks of the 

Old Colony Railroad Company. Pending. 

Boston. Directors of Old Colony Railroad Company, petitioners. 
Codman Street, Boston. Pending. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. New England Rail- 
road Company. Pending. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Dorchester Avenue, Boston. Directors of New York, New Haven 
& Hartford Railroad Company, petitioners. Pending. 

East Boston. Mayor and Aldermen of the city of Boston, 
petitioners. Boston & Main Railroad Company, Boston & 
Albany Railroad Company and Boston, Revere Beach & Lynn 
Railroad Company. Pending. 

Chelsea, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Crossings on 
Chelsea bridge and Chelsea Bridge Avenue, over Boston & 
Maine Railroad. Under St. 1892, c. 374. Commissioners 
appointed. Hearing. Pending. 

Revere, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Win- 
throp Avenue crossing in Revere. Pending. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xv 

Revere, Selectmen of, and Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad, 
petitioners. Petition for consent to build bridge over Boston 
& Maine Railroad tracks at TVinthrop Avenue, at a minimum 
height of sixteen feet. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 

Worcester County. 

Athol, Selectmen of, petitioners. Commissioners appointed. 
Pending. 

Auburn, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Auburn. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company, peti- 
tioners. Pending. 

Blackstone, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Boylston, Selectmen of, petitioners. Commissioners appointed. 
Pending. 

Clinton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Fitchburg, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of grade crossings at Putnam Street in Fitchburg 
over the Vermont Central Railroad and Massachusetts Central 
Railroad. Pending. 

Fitchburg, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Same as above, 
at Laural Street. Pending. 

Fitchburg, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Gardner, Selectmen of, petitioners. Commissioners appointed. 
Pending. 

Gardner, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Gardner, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for change of grade 
at Union Street crossing in Gardner. Pending. 

Holden, Selectmen of, petitioners. Fitchburg Railroad Company. 
Pending. 

Holden, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Dawson's, Cedar Swamp, Wachusett Street and Blake Road 
crossings in Holden. Chas. A. Allen, Arthur P. Rugg and 
Henry G. Taft, commissioners. 

Hubbardston, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Depot road crossing in Hubbardston. Pending. 

Leicester. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company, 
petitioners. Pending. 

Leominster, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Millbury, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Millbury, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Northbridge. Selectmen of Northbriclge and Uxbridge, petition- 
ers. Pending. 

Northbridge, Selectmen of, petitioners (two petitions). Pend- 
ing. 



xvi ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Northborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the aboli- 
tion of a grade crossing near " Westborough Hospital Sta- 
tion." Pending. 

Southborough. Old Colony Railroad Company, petitioner. 
Pending. 

Southborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of a grade crossing on road to Hopkinton in Southborough. 
Pending. 

Southborough, Selectmen of, and Directors of New York, New 
Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, petitioners. Pend- 
ing. 

Southborough. Directors of the New York, New Haven & 
Hartford Railroad Company, petitioners. Pending. 

Sutton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Terapleton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Pending. 

Uxbridge. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail- 
road Company, as lessee of the Providence & Worcester Rail- 
road Company, petitioners. Pending. 

Warren. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company, 
petitioners. Pending. 

Warren. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company, peti- 
tioners. Pending. 

Westborough, Selectmen of, and Directors of Boston & Albany 
Railroad Company, petitioners. (In this case a controversy 
arose between the town and the Commonwealth as to the 
respective amounts to be paid in the construction of the pro- 
posed alterations. The case was argued before the commis- 
sioners, and a decision rendered in favor of the claim made 
by the Commonwealth.) Argued before full court. Report 
of commissioners confirmed. Pending. 

Worcester, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Millbrook, Gar- 
den, Lincoln, Market, School, Thomas, Central, Exchange, 
Summer and Shrewsbury streets. Pending. 

Worcester. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company, 
petitioners. Pending. 

Worcester, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Grafton, Green, 
Washington and Plymouth streets. Pending. 

Worcester, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Hamilton and 
Millbrook streets. Pending. 

Worcester, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
the alteration of crossings on Grafton, Green, Washing- 
ton, Plymouth, Hammond, Gardner, Grand, Southgate and 
Cambridge streets, and alteration of Union Station. Pend- 
ing. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xvii 

The following corporations having made voluntary application 
to the Supreme Judicial Court for dissolution, and having given 
the Attorney-General due notice of the petition, and the Tax Com- 
missioner having certified that they were not indebted to the 
Commonwealth for taxes, the Attorney-General waived right to 
be heard : — 

A. M. Gardner Hardware Company. 

Amherst Telephone Company. 

Anthony Bates Machine Company. 

Atlantic Wharf Company. 

Baker Lead Manufacturing Company. 

Berkshire Ore Company. 

Baldwinville Toy and Turning Company. 

Boston Computing Scale Company. 

Boston Horse Shoe Company. 

Boston Paper Mills Company. 

Brockton and Eureka Box Toe Company. 

Breed and Bacheller Company. 

Brookside Paper Manufacturing Company. 

Buildings Cleaning Company. 

Business Men's Athletic Club. 

Carpet Loom Company. 

Chadwick Plush Company. 

Chase & Co. Corporation. 

Charles River Embankment Company. 

Central Market Company. 

Chesterfield Co-operative Pearl Button Company. 

Childs & Kent Express Company. 

Citizens Building Company. 

Clarendon Mills. 

Connecticut River Paper Company. 

Consumers Co-operative Association. 

Cowell & Hall Manufacturing Company. 

Dighton Rock Park Corporation. 

Douglass Mills. 

E. C. Manufacturing Company. 

E. D. Shadduck Company. 

Faulkner Mills. 

Grafton, Upton & Milford Street Railway Company. 

H. M. Kin ports Company. 

Hampden Emery and Corundum Company. 

Haskell Dawes Machine Company. 

Horner Machine Company. 



xviii ATTOKKEY-GENEKAL'S EEPOET. [Jan. 

J. W. Kennan Company. 

Jaynes & Chapin Cd. 

John N. Rieger Company. 

Kinsley Express Company. 

Mandel Milling Company. 

Massachusetts Mutual Fire Insurance Company. 

Maverick Wharf Company. 

Meyers Putz Pomade Company. 

Mills Manufacturing Company. 

Morrison Steamboat Company. 

New Boston Aqueduct Company. 

Northfield Telephone Company. 

Palmer Carpet Company. 

Pittsfield Electric Street Railway Company. 

Pleasant Park and Fair Association. 

Pocasset Hat Company. 

R. Goss Company. 

Red Cross Baking Powder Company. 

Shoe and Leather Building Association. 

Smith American Organ Company. 

Springfield Knitting Compan} T . 

Standard Furniture Company. 

Stowe Bills & Hawley Company. 

Taunton Rivet Company. 

Union Cotton Gunning Company. 

Union Wharf Com pan}'. 

United States Knife and Cutlery Company. 

W. S. Quimby Company. 

Warren Boot and Shoe Company. 

Washington Mills Company. 

Wheeler Cotton Mills. 

Worcester Excursion Car Company. 

Wright Machine Company. 

The following corporations, reported to this department by the 
Tax Commissioner for delinquency in making their tax returns 
under Pub. Sts., c. 13, § 38, have been compelled, without the 
necessity of a suit at law, to comply with the statute : — 

A. F. Towle & Son Co. 

A. T. Fairbanks Confectionery Company. 

Abram French Company. 

Amesbury Opera House Company. 

Arion Manufacturing Company. 

Barnstable County Street Railway Company. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xix 

Bay State Fuel Company. 

Beacon Manufacturing Company. 

Bennetts Information Company. 

Blue Hill Granite Company. 

Boston and Lynn Steamboat Express Company. 

Boston Excursion Steamship Company. 

Boston Paving Company. 

Boston Steel and Iron Company. 

Boston Trading and Export Compan}-. 

Bristol County Street Railway Company. 

Brockton Real Estate and Improvement Company. 

Brookfield Brick Company. 

Bryant Boot and Shoe Company. 

C. B. Cook Laundry Company. 

C. F. Eddy Company. 

C. S. Grieves Paint Company. 

Cantells Manufacturing Company. 

Chemical Paper Company. 

Child Acme Cutter and Press Company. 

City Trust Company. 

Columbia Electric Company. 

Consolidated Law Cabinet, The. 

Co-operative Printing Society. 

Cottage City and Edgartown Traction Company. 

Cygolf Shoe Company. 

Daily News Company, The. 

Damon Brick Company. 

Davis & Buxton Stamping Company. 

Donahoe's Magazine Company. 

Dorchester Building Material Company. 

Durgin Grocery and Provision Company. 

E. Buxton & Son Co. 

Eastern Bridge and Structural Company. 

Eastern Electric Company. 

Eastern Printing and Engraving Company. 

Faneuil Watch Tool Company. 

Fisk Manufacturing Company. 

Fisk Rubber Company. 

Fitchburg Machine Works. 

Fitchburg Manufacturing Company. 

Fore River Company. 

Fosslitch Leather Company. 

Fowle's Arlington Mills. 

Franklin Educational Company. 



xx ATTORNEY-GEKERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Fraprie-Douglass Company, The. 

Gale Lumber Company. 

Gardner Egg Carrier Company. 

George D. Emerson Company. 

George H. Wood Company. 

Globe Nail Company. 

Greenfield Recorder Company, The. 

Gurney Heater Manufacturing Company. 

H. L. Aldrich Company. 

Hampden Trap Rock Company. 

Hampshire & Worcester Street Railway Company, The. 

Henry Woods Sons Company. 

Holbrook Shoe Company, The. 

Hollingsworth & Vose Co. 

Holmes & Blanchard Co. 

Holyoke Provision and Cold Storage Company. 

Hood Rubber Company. 

Horn Pond Branch Railroad Company. 

Hunt Spiller Manufacturing Company. 

Hutchins Narrow Fabric Company. 

Interstate Law Company. 

Investor Publishing Company. 

Iowa Light, Heat and Power Company. 

J. H. Williams Wall Paper Company, The. 

J. P. & W. H. Emond, Incorporated. 

John Dyke Company. 

Kelly Shoe Company, The. 

Kimball & Cary Co. 

Kimball Brothers Company. 

L. E. Knott Apparatus Company. 

L. L. Brown Paper Company. 

Lawrence & Methuen Street Railway Company. 

Lawrence Supply Company. 

Leicester Grocery Company. 

Liberty Masonic Association. 

Lowell Land Company. 

Lyons & Alexander Co., The. 

Lyons Granite Company. 

Maiden Mail Company, The. 

Marblehead Building Association. 

Marlborough Gas Light Company. 

Massachusetts Investment Company. 

Massachusetts Real Estate Company. 

Massachusetts Steam Wagon Company. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxi 

McCarthy, Sheehy & Kendrick Co. 

McLean Shoe Company. 

Middleby Oven Company. 

Middlesex Real Estate Association of Cambridge. 

Miles F. Brennan Company. 

Miscoe Spring Water Company. 

Morrill Brothers Company. 

New England Dredging Company. 

New England Lamp Company. 

New England Publishing Company, The. 

New England Reed Company. 

New England Structural Company. 

Newport Transfer Express Company. 

Norcross Brownstone Company. 

Norfolk Blanket Cleansing Company. 

Norwood, Canton & Sharon Street Railway Company. 

O. T. Rogers Granite Company. 

Pigeon Hill Granite Company. 

Pittsfield Manufacturing Company. 

Plymouth Preserving Company. 

Pratt Manufacturing Company. 

Rawson & Morrison Manufacturing a Company. 

Sanitary Fixture Company, The. 

Shedd & Crane Leather Company. 

Shreve, Crump & Low Co. 

Smith Warren Company. 

Springfield Brass Company. 

Springfield Construction Company. 

Springfield Steam Power Company. 
Thomas J. Gavin Company. 
Turners Falls Lumber Company. 
United States Cord Company. 
University City Laundering Company. 
W. D. Wilmarth & Co., Corporation. 
W. S. Reed Toy Company. 
Waban Rose Conservatories. 
Watertown Machine Company. 
Wellington Piano Case Company. 
Western Union Telegraph Company. 
Westport Harbor Aqueduct Company. 
Wheelman Company, The. 
Whiting Manufacturing Company. 
William Underwood Company. 
Woburn Power Company. 



xxii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Worcester Construction Company. 
Worcester Last Company. 
Zeigler Electric Company. 

The following corporations, reported to this department by the 
Commissioner of Corporations for delinquency in filing the certifi- 
cate of condition for 1900 required by Pub. Sts., c. 106, § 54, 
have been compelled, without the necessity of suit, to comply 
withjthe statute : — 

A. S. Rogers Shoe Company. 
American Cultivator Publishing Company. 
Amesbury Opera House Company. 
Arlington Co-operative Association. 
Bay State Improved Box Company. 
Belisle Printing and Publishing Company. 
Blake Manufacturing Company. 
Blue Hill Granite Company. 
Boston Oregon Mast Company. 
Boston Spar Company. 
Boston Thread and Twine Company. 
Carlow & Putnam Co. 
Columbia Electric Company. 
Connecticut Steam Stone Company. 
Daily News Company. 
East Douglass Co-operative Association. 
Fisher Churchill Company. 
Fiske Wharf and Warehouse Company. 
Fitchburg Machine Works. 

Fowler Automatic Draft Regulator and Ventilator Com- 
pany. 
Gardner Music Hall Company. 
George P. Staples & Co., Incorporated. 
Glasgow Manufacturing Company. 
Heroux the Clothier, Incorporated. 
Iowa Light, Heat and Power Company. 
J. P. Jordan Paper Company. 
John F. Nickerson Company. 

Lamprey Boiler Furnace Mouth Protector Company. 
Lyons Granite Company. 
Mansfield Co-operative Furnace Company. 
Merrimack Clothing Company. 
Middleby Oven Company. 
Natick Gas Light Company. 
National Needle Company. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxiii 

New England & Savannah Steamship Company. 

New England Dredging Company. 

New England Rubber Company. 

Nute-Hallett Company, Incorporated. 

P. P. Emory Manufacturing Company. 

Randall Faichney Company. 

Robinson Iron Company. 

Sandy Bay Pier Company. 

Shady Hill Nursery Company. 

Slater Woolen Company. 

Springfield Drop Forging Company. 

Springfield Elevator and Pump Company. 

Taunton Evening News. 

Union Desk Company. 

Wade & Reed Co. 

The following corporations, reported to this department by the 
Commissioner of Corporations for delinquency in filing the certifi- 
cate of condition for 1901 required by Pub. Sts., c. 106, § 54, have 
been compelled, without the necessity of suit, to comply with the 
statute : — 

Adams Marble Company. 

American Cultivator Publishing Company. 

Amesbury Opera House Company. 

Amherst Gas Company. 

Arlington Co-operative Association. 

Bay State Metal Works. 

Beacon Manufacturing Company. 

Boston Advertising Company. 

Boston Paving Company. 

Boston Spar Company. 

Boston Trading and Export Company. 

Brookfield Brick Company. 

C. A. Edgarton Manufacturing Company. 

Carter, Rice & Co., Corporation. 

Crescent Worsted Company. 

Damon Safe and Iron Works Company. 

Dudley Mills. 

East Douglass Co-operative Association. 

Eastern Electric Company. 

Eastern Printing and Engraving Company. 

Fisk Rubber Company. 

Fosslitch Leather Company. 

Frank A. Hall Company. 



xxiv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Fraser Dry Goods Company. 

George D. Emerson Company. 

Greenfield Machine Company. 

Hill, Whitney & Wood Co. 

Interstate Law Company. 

J. P. Jordan Paper Company. 

Kearns & Co., Incorporated. 

Kelly Shoe Company. 

Lyons & Alexander Co. 

Mansfield Co-operative Furnace Company. 

Massachusetts Investment Company. 

Massachusetts Telephone and Telegraph Company. 

Massachusetts Title Insurance Company. 

Medfield Electric Light and Power Company. 

Montague Co-operative Creamery Association. 

Natick Citizen Printing Company. 

New England Pharmacal Company. 

Norfolk Blanket Cleansing Company. 

Perry Laundry Company. 

Plymouth Stove Foundry Company. 

Reliance Manufacturing Company. 

Rice Kendall Company, The. 

Robbins Spring Water Company. 

Rochdale Hall Company. 

Shady Hill Nursery Company. 

Simonds Rolling Machine Company. 

Small, Maynard & Co., Incorporated. 

Springfield Construction Company. 

Twentieth Century Mining Company. 

Union Furniture Company. 

W. E. Rice Company, The. 

Watertown Machine Company. 

Weber Leather Company. 

Wheelman Company, The. 

Worcester Fire Appliance Company. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxv 



Cases arising in the Probate Courts under 
the Collateral Inheritance Tax Act. 



[Statutes 1891, Chapter 425.] 

Berkshire County. 
Marcein, Mary L., estate of. Frank H. Wright, executor. Peti- 
tion for extension of time for payment of tax. Assented to 
extension. 

Bristol County. 

Adams, Stephen L., estate of. John F. Adams, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Beauvais, Joseph Arthur, estate of. Charles W. Clifford et als., 
executors. Petition for extension of time for payment of 
tax. Assented to extension. 

Bishop, Franklin H., estate of. Petition of George Kress to be 
appointed executor. (The testator bequeathed his entire 
estate to the Commonwealth.) No action taken. 

Brown, Robert Carver, estate of. Ira N. Smith et al., executors. 
Petition for license to pay tax on income in yearly instalments 
and to postpone time for payment of tax on principal. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Cartwright, Nancy G., estate of. Alma C. Coffin, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate* in Massachusetts. 
Decree allowing petition. 

Chase, Sarah. B., estate of. Benjamin S. C. Gifford, legatee. 
Petition for appointment of appraisers. Agreed to appoint- 
ment of W. B. N. Chase, Leonard N. Slade and Charles S. 
Waring, appraisers. 

Church, Alexander B., estate of. Frank S. Higgins, administra- 
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Church, Harriet J., estate of. Sophia L. Wardwell, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Cornell, Jane R., estate of. William F. Cornell, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 



xxvi ATTOKKEY-GEJSTEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 

Cory, Seabury, estate of. George S. Homer et als., executors. 
Petition for appraisal. Attorney-General waived right to 
be heard on payment of tax. 

Devereux, Robert William, estate of. Ruth S. Devereux et al., 
executors. Petition for license to receive personal estate. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Dikeman, Mary M. K., estate of. Mary A. Griswold, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Gifford, Elizabeth, estate of. Ezra Gifford et <xL, administrators. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Kinnicutt, Augusta, estate of. Daniel S. Bushee, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Decree allow- 
ing petition. 

Kinnicutt, Robert, estate of. Daniel S. Bushee, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Decree allow- 
ing petition. 

Livsey, Elizabeth K., estate of. Mary H. Richardson, execu- 
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pend- 
ing. 

Mott, Jacob, Jr., estate of. Ada F. Mott, executrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Sherman, Nehemiah K., estate of. Edwin A. Cady, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Tuckerman, Robert, estate of. Harriet W. Tuckerman, execu- 
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

White, William, estate of. Belle R. White, executrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Essex County. 

Bartlett, Aroline E., estate of. Levi S. Bartlett, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Beede, Susan E., estate of. Cyrus A. Gove, administrator. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen- 
eral waived right to be heard. 

Bradbury, Albert H., estate of. Frances A. Bradbury, adminis- 
tratrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxvii 

Bradley, John C, estate of. Charles H. Bradley, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Brewster, Lydia A., estate of. Isaac S. Brewster, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen- 
eral waived right to be heard. 

Brown, Sarah K., estate of. Edward H. Brown, executor. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Bryant, Edna W., estate of. Daniel A. Kelly, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Butland, Hason, estate of. Daniel Butland, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Carleton, James H., estate of. Henry S. Howe et als., petitioners. 
Petition of determination of tax and extension of time of pay- 
ment. Decree. Appeal taken to Supreme Judicial Court. 
Decree of Probate Court affirmed. See Banker and Trades- 
man, Oct. 30, 1901. 

Carter, Sarah W., estate of. John L. Pressey, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Castle, Peter, estate of. Mary Castle, administratrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Chamberlain, Frederick W., estate of. Mary B. Chamberlain, 
executrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Coggswell, Sarah F., estate of. Samuel W. Hopkinson, executor. 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Collins, John H., estate of. Frank T. Carr, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Colwell, Clara Hobart, estate of. George A. Hamlin, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Condon, Robert W., estate of. James S. Condon, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in this Com- 
monwealth. Decree. 

Currier, Mary J., estate of. John L. Pressey, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Cushing, Zenas, estate of. Caroline L.Warner et al., executrices. 
Petition for postponement of time for payment of tax. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 



xxviii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 

Davis, James, estate of. Epes Davis, administrator. Petition 
for allowance of appraisers' fees. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Dickey, Syrena, estate of. Uhert A. Killam et al., executors. 
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Assented 
to extension. 

Dickson, Walter S., estate of. First Universalist Society, peti- 
tioners. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Diman, Emily Stimson, estate of. Emily Diman, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Downs, Henrietta A., estate of. George E. Downs, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Duncan, Caroline, estate of. John D. Bryant, executor. Claim 
for inheritance tax and interest on several legacies, amount- 
ing to $4,300. Pending. 

Eaton, Calvin, estate of. James C. Eaton, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Field, Henry P., estate of. Bezeliel W. Burnham, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Follansbee, Ann M., estate of. James L. Rackleff, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Garden, Sarah P., estate of. Josiah F. Garden, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pend- 
ing. 

Garland, Emily A., estate of. Charles W. Garland, administra- 
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Green, Stephen, estate of. Sarah H. Green, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Hankerson, Alvin D., estate of. Charles M. Thompson, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Hanson, Francis J., estate of. Charles F. Cate, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Hawkes, Maria S., estate of. Linda A. Annis, executrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxix 

Hoag, Laura E., estate of. Clara A. Fletcher, executrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Hodgdon, Julia A., estate of. Peace P. Nichols, executrix. Pe- 
tition for postponement of time for payment of tax. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Hood, Martin H., estate of. Edward H. Sargent, executor. Pe- 
tition for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Horton, Alfred, estate of. Ralph Bleecker Horton, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Hunt, Oliver, estate of. Sarah T. Hunt, executrix. Petition for 
license to receive personal estate. -Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Ingalls, Mary C, estate of. Arthur H. Wilcomb, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Judkins, Elbridge G., estate of. Elbridge F. Judkins, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Judkins, Joseph, estate of. Arthur B. Judkins, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Kaliher, Mary, estate of. Greenleaf K. Bartlett, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Lamprey, Lewis S., estate of. Geo. W. Sanborn, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Lamson, Asa B., estate of. F. H. Lamson et al., executors. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen- 
eral waived right to be heard. 

Legro, Mary C, estate of. J. Q. A. TVentworth, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Locke, Jeremiah F., estate of. Hannah S. Locke, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Locke, John B., estate of. Hannah L. Locke, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Mace, Jacob M., estate of. Nellie I. Mace, executrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 



xxx ATTOKNEY-GEJSTEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 

Morrill, Sarah W., estate of. Thomas B. Twombly, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Moulton, Olive O., estate of. Henry M. Batchelder, executor. 
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Extension 
granted. 

Newcomb, Fred H., estate of. George W. Clyde, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Page, Abigail L., estate of. Mary A. Page et aL, executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Disposed of 
on payment of tax. 

Palmer, Mary N., estate of. Daniel E. Palmer, administrator. 
Petition for license 'to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Pike, Mary A., estate of. Charles W. Garland, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. 

Piper, Sarah B., estate of. Daniel B. Piper, administrator. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen- 
eral waived right to be heard. 

Pray, William M., estate of. J. E. S. Pray, administrator. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen- 
eral waived right to be heard. 

Reed, Gratia S., estate of. Frank A. Rugg, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Richardson, Marinda A., estate of. Albert H. Cheney, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Roberts, Lydia E., estate of. John Tuttle, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Decree. 

Roberts, Horatia G., estate of. John Tuttle, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Roby, Jeremiah H., estate of. Francis R. Drake, execu- 
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard on payment of 
tax. 

Runcllett, Alfred F., estate of. Martha A. Rundlett, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Sanborn, Charles H., estate of. Frank D. Sanborn, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Decree. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxxi 

Smith, Alfred, estate of. Arthur H. Wilcomb, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Snow, Sophia J., estate of. Gorham Rogers, trustee. Petition 
for license to sell certain shares of stock for the benefit of a 
charitable trust. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Stockman, Dorothy F., estate of. James J. J. Sawyer, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Stone, Susan K., estate of. Mabel G. Parker, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Street, Charles C, estate of. William E. Rogers, executor. 
Petition to retain a certain sum in executor's hands to pay 
tax if any becomes due. Attorney-General waived right to 
be heard. 

Taylor, John, estate of. Leonard M. Taylor, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Towle, Alfred, estate of. Susan M. Towle, executrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Towne, Asa P., estate of. George A. Woodbury, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Twiss, Nancy M., estate of. Albert E. Simpson, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Dismissed. 

Waldron, Sarah A., estate of. Daniel D. Waldron, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Webster, David, estate of. Dana Webster, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Williams, Augustus, estate of. Hannah F. Clark, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Winn, Alonzo N., estate of. George W. Paul, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Wood, Deborah, estate of. John S. Gile, administrator. Peti- 
tion to compromise a claim against said estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Woodbury, Eliza J., estate of. Milton G. Woodbury, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate . Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 



xxxii ATTOKJSTEY-GENEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 

Franklin County. 
Alexander, Amanda M., estate of. Joseph R. Colton et al., 
executors. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Hampden County. 

Allen, George M., estate of. Eunice S. Allen et al., administra- 
tors. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Alvord, Eugenia C, estate of. Edward W. Chapin, executor. 
Petition for appraisal and instructions. Decree. 

Alvord, Mary, estate of. William P. McFarland, legatee. Peti- 
tion for appointment of appraisers to reappraise. Appraisers 
appointed. Attorney-General waived right to be heard on 
return of appraisers. 

Bailey, Stephen P., estate. Petition for appraisers to reappraise. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Cooley, Justin M., estate of. Eliza A. Peet et al., executors. 
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Crockett, Sarah L., estate of. H. L. Harding et al., executors. 
Petition of Treasurer and Receiver-General to collect tax on 
said estate. Pending. 

Day, Laura A., estate of. Edwin F. Lyford, executor. Petition 
for instructions. Decree. 

DeForrest, Andrew W., estate of. Charles S. DeForrest et al., 
executors. Petition for extension of time for payment of 
tax. Assented to postponement. 

Henry, Julia A., estate of. James W. Kirkham, executor. Peti- 
tion for extension of time or payment of tax. Assented to 
extension. 

Hull, Eliza E., estate of. Harry D. Hull, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Kellogg, Chester, estate of. Mary A. Kellogg et als., adminis- 
trators. Petition for instructions. Disposed of. 

Lawler, Mary, estate of. Petition for the appointment of David 
F. McCarthy, executor. Attorney-General waived right to 
be heard. 

Leonard, Charles L, estate of. Frederick N. Leonard, legatee. 
Petition for appointment of appraisers. 

Lyon, Nancy M., estate of. Henry A. King, executor. Petition 
for instructions. Disposed of. 

Pyne, Desire A., estate of. Edward K. Bodwitha, executor. 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 



1902,] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxxiii 

Renney, William, estate of. Niles Searles, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Reynolds, Theodore, estate of. Frank H. King, legatee. Petition 
for appointment of appraisers. Disposed of. 

Smith, John M., estate of. Adelaide G. Smith, executrix. Peti- 
tion for allowance of first account. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Thompson, Maud P. Lena E. Wentworth, guardian. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Warner, George L., estate of. Frank W. Rising, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Hampshire County. 
Back, Ellsworth, estate of. David Aldrich, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 

waived right to be heard. 
Merick, Helen M., estate of. Filelia Perkins, executrix. Petition 

for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 

waived right to be heard. 
Shumway, Estes, estate of. George A. Shumway, administrator. 

Petition for abatement of interest on collateral inheritance 

tax. Pending. 
Taylor, Hiram, estate of. Carrie E. Taylor, executrix. Petition 

to determine what legacies are subject to tax. Decree. 

Middlesex County. 

Ames, Mary C, estate of. Franklin T. Hammond, administrator 
with the will annexed. Petition for instructions. Tax paid 
and disposed of. 

Banagan, James, estate of. Rose E. Banagan, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Barrett, Mary J., estate of. James Cochran, administrator. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorne} T -Gen- 
eral waived right to be heard. 

Bartlett, Hannah Colcord, estate of. James W. Bartlett, admin- 
istrator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Batchelder, Rebecca H., estate of. Joseph W. Batchelder, admin- 
istrator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 



xxxiv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Berry, Eliza W., estate of. Charles H. Berry, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Blakely, Samuel, estate of. George H. Gale, executor. Petition 
for extension of time of payment of tax. Tax paid and dis- 
posed of. 

Burnham, Josephine E., estate of. Frank Y. Burnham, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Butler, John G., estate of. Aaron H. Latham et aL, executors. 
Petition for allowance of final account and for leave to make 
certain transfers. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 

Buttrick, Daniel T., estate of. George E. Clarke, executor. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen- 
eral waived right to be heard. 

Carey, Bridget, estate of. Nellie F. Carey, executrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Carlton, Electa M., estate of. Julia A. Dow et aZ., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Chapman, Jane A., estate of. Herman B. Chapman, administra- 
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Chase, Nancy A., estate of. Henry H. Holt, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Chisholm, James, estate of. Wilbur H. Sargent et aZ., trustees. 
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Assented 
to extension. 

Clark, Jeremiah, estate of. John C. Bennett, executor. Petition 
for instructions. Pending. 

Conant, Rebecca H., estate of. Mabelle Conant Jordan, admin- 
istratrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Connell, John W., estate of. Mary J. Ford, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Conway, Mary, estate of. William Knight, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Decree. 

Cook, Josiah P., estate of. Mary H. Cook, executrix. Petition 
for postponement of time for payment of tax. Assented to 
postponement. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxxv 

Cosey, John, estate of. Jerry Cosey et al., executors. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Cox, Rose, estate of. Thomas F. Gorman, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Cragin, Eliza H., estate of. Jacob F. Hall, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Cragin, Samuel, estate of. Jacob F. Holt, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Crawford, John, estate of. Nettie M. Crawford, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Crudden, Sarah, estate of. Richard Owen et al., executors. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Tax paid and disposed of. 

Cushing, Henry G., estate of. W. H. Anderson et al., executors. 
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney- 
Gene-ral waived right to be heard. 

Cutting, Lucinda K., estate of. Ella G. Holmes et al.', trustees. 
Petition to extend time of payment of tax. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Davis, Benjamin J., estate of. George P. Davis, executor. Pe- 
tition for allowance of executor's final account. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

DollofT, William J., estate of. John N. Thompson, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Driscoll, Mary, estate of. Mary I. Fisher, administratrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Efner, Sophia W., estate of. Lucy H. White, legatee. Petition 
for appointment of appraisers. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Ellis, Hiram, estate of. Ann E. Gale, administratrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Ferry, Frank A., estate of. Eugene H. Ferry, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Decree. 

Flanders, Mary A., estate of. Frank Sargent, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 



xxxvi ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Ford, Daniel S., estate of. William A. Monroe, petitioner. Petition 
for postponement of time for payment of tax on foreign chari- 
table corporations. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Foss, Augustus B., estate of. Jacob E. Chickering, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Foster, Maria M., estate of. Edwin F. Foster, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Fuller, Cornelia, estate of. Mary A. Emery, administratrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Gill, James S., estate of. George H. Levey, trustee. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be beard. 

Gill, Samuel, estate of. James S. Gill, administrator. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Goddard, Mary T., estate of. T. G. Frothingham et al., 
executors. Petition for instructions. Tax paid and disposed 
of. 

Gooding, Irenius, estate of. Mary B. Gooding, executrix. Peti- 
tion for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Gray, Clarissa, estate of. Will H. Gray, administrator. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Gray, Henry N., estate of. Will H. Gray et al., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Guild, Charles H., estate of. W. H. Furber, executor. Petition 
for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Hall, Lewis, estate of. Lewis A. Hall et al., executors. Petition 
for instructions. Tax paid and disposed of. 

Hall, Osborn B., estate of. James J. Myers, administrator. 
Petition for appointment of appraisers. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Harrington, Charles A., estate of. Charles H. Nelson et al. 
executors. Petition for postponement of time for payment 
of tax. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Harrington, Charles L., estate of. Charles H. Nelson et al., 
executors. Petition for extension of time for payment of 
tax. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxxvii 

Hawkes, Maria S., estate of. Linda A. Annis, executrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- General 
waived right to be heard. 

Hazen, Julia H. B., estate of. Daniel G. Brockway, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate in 
Massachusetts. Decree. 

Keyes, Frederick A., estate of. Mary J. Keyes, executrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Kimball, Peter C, estate of. Edward Kimball, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Knight, Margaret C, estate of. Estella A. Clark, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Leamy, Grace, estate of. John Leamy, administrator. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Libby, Salome D., estate of. John McCrillis, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Littlehale, Rufus C, estate of. Sadie M. Littlehale, administra- 
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Lovejoy, Sarah, estate of. Charles L. Perkham, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Lyford, Mary V., estate of. James H. Brock, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard on payment 
of tax. 

Lynch, John H., estate of. Henrietta K. Lynch, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Marston, Gilman, estate of . Edwin G, Eastman, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

McCullough, Mary E., estate of. John McCullough, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

McLean, Isaac, estate of. Samuel A. McLean, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Moody, Elizabeth W., estate of. Horace Moody, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 



xxxviii ATTOKNEY-GEJSTEKAL'S EEPOKT. [Jan. 

Morrill, Julia S., estate of. Julian Avery Herrick, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Morrison, Clara A., estate of. Estella A. Quimby, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Murray, Susan, estate of. Thomas Wood, executor. Petition for 
license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Nason, Florence Williams, estate of. Harry B. Williams, peti- 
tioner. Petition for license to receive personal estate. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Nelson, Nancy, estate of. Henry R. Tewksbury, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Nickerson, Jonas C, estate of. James P. Parmenter, adminis- 
trator. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Osgood, Asa C, estate of. Frank D. Osgood, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Osgood, Irena, estate of. Jacob Osgood, executor. Petition for 
license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Parks, George E., estate of. Lucy Ann Parks, executrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Peabody, Hattie N., estate of. Wilbur F. Cousens, administra- 
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Perkins, James K., estate of. Alice M. Scheben, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Pinkham, Thomas H., estate of. Mary R. Pinkham, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Ramsey, John M., estate of. Eveline S. Wilder, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Read, Lucy G., estate of. Richard Stone, executor. Petition for 
extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Reed, Pamelia H., estate of. Ora E. Reed, administratrix. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen- 
eral waived right to be heard. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxxix 

Richardson, Marinda A., estate of. Albert H. Cheney, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Scudder, Gardner H., estate of. Mary Edgcomb et al., execu- 
tors. Petition for appointment of appraiser. Agreed to ap- 
pointment of Henry Ware as appraiser. 

Searles, Solomon, estate of. Daniel F. Runnels, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
Geaeral waived right to be heard on payment of tax. 

Shattuck, Emeline, estate of. James T. Bennett, administrator. 
Petition for allowance of final account and distribution. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Slocum, George E., estate of. Anna M. Slocum, executrix. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Small, Orrin W., estate of. Henry M. Small, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Spalding, Mary N., estate of. George E. Clarke, executor. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen- 
eral waived right to be heard. 

Stickney, Moses P., estate of. William B. C. Stickney, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Stoddard, Anna M., estate of. Adna B. Stoddard, administra- 
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pend- 
ing. 

Stone, Zina E., estate of. Alfred P. Sawyer, executor. Petition 
for instructions as to payment of collateral inheritance tax. 
Tax paid and disposed of. 

Tinker, Mary J., estate of. Charles W. Hobbs, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Topliff, Mahala J., estate of. Elijah M. Topliff, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Towne, Althea, estate of . James H. Fay, administrator. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Twiss, Nancy M., estate of. Albert E. Simpson, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Dis- 
missed. 

Webb, Calvin T., estate of. John W. Webb, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 



xl ATTORJSTEY-GEJS T ERAL'S EEPORT. [Jan. 

Wheeler, John, estate of. Mary H. Wheeler, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Whitcomb, Peter, estate of. Ephrairn B. Cobleigh, executor. 
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Whitcomb, Peter, estate of. Ephrairn Cobleigh, executor. Peti- 
tion for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Whitcomb, William E., estate of. Will A. Whitcomb, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Decree. 

Wight, James, estate of. Adelaide M. Sheak et tils., executors. 
Petition for extension of time for payment of inheritance tax. 
Tax paid and disposed of. 

Wiley, Mary W., estate of. Edwin P. Seaver, executor. Petition 
for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Williams, Jerome W., estate of. Jedediah R. Gray et al., ad- 
ministrators. Petition for license to receive personal estate. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Williams, Lovel, estate of. Eliza W. Lawrence, executrix. Peti- 
tion for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Wilson, Royal, estate of. Charles C. Knight et al., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Woodward, Ann, estate of. George G. Read, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney - 
General waived right to be heard. 

Woodbury, Anna M., estate of. George A. Whittemore, ex- 
ecutor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Nantucket County. 
Swain, Emily, estate of. Albert G. Brock, executors. Petition 
to determine if certain societies named by testator are chari- 
table institutions. Attorne3 T -General waived right to be 
heard. 

Norfolk County. 

Baker, Catherine S., estate of. Charles H. Marble, executor. 
Petition for license to sell personal property. Attorney- 
General assented to sale. 

Bullard, Mary, estate of. Frederick D. Ely, executor. Petition 
for instructions. Disposed of on payment of tax. 



1902,] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xli 

Parsons, Georgiana B., estate of. Arthur J. Parsons, executor. 
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Rhines, Helen M., estate of. John B. Rhines, executor. Peti- 
tion for extension of time of payment of collateral inheritance 
tax. Tax paid and disposed of. 

Risk, Thomas, estate of. Petition for license to receive personal 
estate. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Tower, Abner J., estate of. "Wilmot J. Evans et al., executors. 
Petition for allowance of executors' final account. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Plymouth County. 

Chapman, James H., estate of. Imogene C. Hamilton, adminis- 
tratrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. 
Decree. 

Keith, Priscilla D., estate of. Samuel E. Barrett, executor. Pe- 
tition for instructions. Pending. 

Perry, Edward Y., estate of. Morrill A. Phillips at al., execu- 
tors. Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Reed, Edwin, estate of. Leonard A. Saville, executor. Petition 
for postponement of time for payment of tax. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Reed, Pamelia H., estate of. Ora E. Reed, administratrix. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen- 
eral waived right to be heard. 

Sweeney, William, estate of. George W. Folsom, Jr., executor. 
Petition for instructions. Tax paid and disposed of. 

Suffolk County. 

Abbott, Lucinda M., estate of. Wilbur D. Spencer, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Adams, Benjamin, estate of. Edward F. Adams, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Andrews, Erasmus Jones, estate of. Caroline F. Sanborn et al., 
executors and trustees. Petition for extension of time for 
payment of tax. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Austin, Edward, estate of. Edward William Hooper et al., 
executors. Petition for instructions. Decree. Appealed to 
Supreme Judicial Court. Decree of Probate Court affirmed. 
59 N. E. Rep. 678. 



xlii ATTOKNfeY-GENEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 

Bain, Clara T., estate of. Edith M. Colby, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Balch, Newton C, estate of. Harlan P. Cummings, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Barry, David, estate of. John M. Mitchell, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Barry, John E., estate of. John M. Mitchell, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Bartlett, Aroline E., estate of. Levi S. Bartlett, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Bartlett, Hannah Colcord, estate of. James W. Bartlett, execu- 
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Batchelder, Nathaniel P., estate of. Francis M. Hughes, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate in 
Massachusetts. Decree. 

Billings, Robert C, estate of. Thomas Minns et al., executors. 
Bill in equity for instructions relating to a charitable trust. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Bowers, Henry E., estate of. New England Trust Company, 
executor. Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. 
Not entered. 

Brigham, Peter B., estate of. Edmund O. Codman et al., peti- 
tioners. Petition for the appointment of a trustee for the 
purposes of a charitable trust. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Brooks, Mary S., estate of. Frederick M. Brooks, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Brown, Abby, estate of. Clara B. Brown, administratrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Decree. 

Brown, Harold, estate of. Sophia Augusta Brown, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Brown, John Nicholas, estate of. Natalie Bayard Brown et al., 
executors. Petition for license to receive personal estate. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xliii 

Brown, Sarah K., estate of. Edmund H. Brown, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Brown, Susan A., estate of. Charles P. Chase, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard on payment of tax. 

Bruce, Catherine W., estate of. Jacob K. Lockman et al., execu- 
tors. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Call, Alvin F., estate of. Harriet A. Call, executrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Capstick, John, estate of. John H. Capstick et al. 9 executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Carpenter, Jane J., estate of. Elias H. Peters, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Chamberlain, Frederick W., estate of. Mary E. Chamberlain, 
executrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Charman, Ellen, estate of. George Knox Morice et als., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Chessman, William H., estate of. Benj. F. Brown et als., exec- 
utors. Petition for instructions. Tax paid and disposed of. 

Cole, Mary E. W., estate of. Arthur M. Cole, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Coleman, Michael M., estate of. Lizzie E. Coleman, administra- 
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa- 
chusetts. Decree. 

Crane, Philena T., estate of. William J. Stanton, trustee. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Crawford, John, estate of. Nettie M. Crawford, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Dane, Charlotte F., estate of. Samuel M. Came, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Dimond, Charles C, estate of. George P. Furber, executor. 
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 



xliv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Dodge, Benjamin F., estate of. Charles B. Dodge et aL, adminis- 
trators. Petition for license to receive personal estate. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Dodge, Martha E., estate of. Harvey Dodge, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

DollofT, William J., estate of. John N. Thompson, administra- 
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Dorr, Henry, estate of. Charles W. Lord, trustee. Petition for 
license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Driscoll, Sarah J., estate of. Margaret S. Driscoll, execu- 
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pend- 
ing- 
Duncan, John, estate of. Cristy H. Duncan, administra- 
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pend- 
ing. 

Dunn, Mary, estate of. Richard O'Brien, executor. Petition for 
license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Earl, Elizabeth Jane King, estate of. David T. Brownell et al., 
executors. Petition for license to receive personal estate. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Eckley, Julia A., estate of. Thomas P. Peckham, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal* estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Eckley, Julia A., estate of. Thomas P. Peckham, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Eddy, Robert Henry, estate of. Charles U. Cotting et al, trus- 
tees. Petition for decree that certain funds are not taxable, 
testator having died in 1887. Attorney-General waived right 
to be heard. 

Edwards, John, estate of. Helen A. Edwards, executrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Edwards, Nathaniel P., estate of. Charles W. Edwards, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Ellis, Hiram, estate of. Ann E. Gale, administratrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Emery, Lewis L., estate of. Martin A. Rockwood, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xlv 

Falconer, George, estate of. Annie Falconer, executrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be beard. 

Faulkner, Abby L. A., estate of. Charles B. Bowditch et al., 
executors. Petition for postponement of time for payment 
of tax. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Fifield, Benjamin F., estate of. Etta L. Fifield, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Fitts, James H., estate of. Mary C. Fitts, administratrix. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen- 
eral waived right to be heard. 

Flanders, Hattie B., estate of. Edward G. Flanders, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Ford, Mary, estate of. Patrick Shea, administrator. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Foster, Sarah H., estate of. Mary A. Foster, executrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Gay, Ezra M. r estate of. Charles H. Burns et aL, administrators. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard on payment of tax. 

Gennaro, Joseph D., estate of. Elvira D. Gennaro, petitioner. 
Petition for appointment of administrator. Patrick O'Laugh- 
lin appointed administrator. Pending. 

Gill, Samuel, estate of. James S. Gill, administrator. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Glynn, James, estate of. Louis H. Bristol, trustee. Petition for 
license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Glynn, Sarah, estate of. Arthur P. Rose, executor. Petition for 
license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Goodhue, Converse, estate of. Lorenzo D. Dunbar, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Gould, Sarah A., estate of. W. H. Gould et al, executors. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Greenleaf, Wilmot, estate of. Herman E. Greenleaf, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 



xlvi ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Grover, Helen M., estate of. Albert F. Conant, executor. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Tax paid and disposed of. 

Hardy, Nettie, estate of. Charles D. Austin, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Hawkins, Charles W., estate of. Laura P. Hawkins, administra- 
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa- 
chusetts. Decree. 

Hayden, George H., estate of. Frank D. Hayden, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Hill, George W., estate of. George W. C. Hill, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Hills, Susan E., estate of. Thomas Quincy Browne, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Hillman, John, estate of. Patrick Roland, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Hilt, N. Emerson, estate of. Frederic W. Hilt, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Hinman, Robert S., estate of. Jennie E. Weld, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Holmes, Hannah Maria, estate of. Frank T. Clawson, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Hosmer, Edward B., estate of. Elizabeth S. Hosmer, executrix. 
Petition for instructions and extension of time for payment 
of tax. Decree. 

Houghton, John C, estate of. Petition for license to re- 
ceive personal estate. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 

Howe, Irving A., estate of. D.J. Lord, administrator. Petition 
of Treasurer and Receiver-General for payment of tax on 
certain legacies. Pending. 

Howe, Lucy M., estate of. Emeline M. Turner, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Hoyt, Emily, estate of. Joseph T. Bartlett, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Hyde, Sarah B., estate of. Andreas Blume el al., petitioners. 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xlvii 

King, Elizabeth H., estate of. Charles S. Collins, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pend- 
ing. 

Lamprey, Lewis S., estate of. Geo. W. Sanborn, executor. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-Gen- 
eral waived right to be heard. 

Learned, Catherine M., estate of. Kittie A. Lufkin, adminis- 
tratrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pend- 
ing. 

Leavitt, George W., estate of. Jack Sanborn, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Legro, Mary C, estate of. J. Q. A. Wentworth, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Lowell, Eliza, estate of. George A. Safford et al., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Pending. 

Mack, Thomas, estate of. Seth M. Milliken et al., executors. 
Petition for allowance of first and final account. No action 
taken. 

Marion, Jennette A., estate of. George P. Marvin, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Mather, Clara F., estate of. Charles D. Mather, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Mauron, Mary L., estate of. F. H. Nichols et al., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Maxwell, Joshua, estate of. Harriett Maxwell, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

McDonald, Syrene, estate of. William H. Haskell, executor. 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 

McDougall, Elizabeth H., estate of. Hannah T. Pendleton, ad- 
ministratrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate 
in Massachusetts. Decree. 

McMurphy, Lucy J., estate of. Thomas W. D. TTorthen, exec- 
utor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Morrill, Sarah W., estate of. Thomas B. Twombly, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 



xlviii ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 

Mower, Anna Josephine, estate of. William C. Bowers, executor 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney 
General waived right to be heard. 
Mower, Mandeville, estate of. Sarah E. Mower et als., adminis 
trators. Petition for license to receive personal estate 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 
Myrick, Lucretia Barnard, estate of. Charles T. Carruth, admin 
istrator. Petition for license to receive personal estate 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 
Nason, Waldo E., estate of. John E. Chalfield, administrator 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney 
General waived right to be heard. 

Nevins, David, estate of. Henry S. Shaw et als., executors 
Petition for postponement of time for payment of tax 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Odlin, Augusta F., estate of. John H. Eobbins, executor. Peti- 
tion for instructions as to payment of tax. Pending. 

Packard, Julia A., estate of. George O. Packard, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Peabody, Sarah J., estate of. Amos Southwick, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Perkins, Frances M., estate of. Richard C. Humphreys, admin- 
istrator. Petition for postponement of time for payment of 
tax. Consented to postponement. 

Perkins, James K., estate of. Alice M. Scheben, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Perley, Putnam, estate of. Fred J. Bicknell et aL, executors. 
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Phelps, Lucy T., estate of. Edward A. Phelps et a?., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Phillips, John H., estate of. Thomas A. Bassett, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Pierce, Rachael L., estate of. Harvey P. Holt, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Pratt, Franklin S., estate of. Charles H. Pratt, executor. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Pending. 

Prosser, Levi, estate of. Augustus F. Scott et al, trustees. 
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12.' xlix 

Preston, Frances Marion, estate of. Thomas TV". Merrill, trustee. 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Purinton, Margaret P., estate of. Noble Maxwell, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Reed, Pamelia H., estate of. Ora E. Reed, administratrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Richards, Louise S., estate of. Charles S. Richards, administra- 
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa- 
chusetts. Pending. 

Ricker, Joseph F., estate of. Stephen L. Bartlett et al., execu- 
tors. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Risk, Thomas, estate of. Thomas Francis Risk, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard on payment of tax. 

Robinson, Susan A., estate of. Fred C. Peaslee, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Rogers, Daniel T., estate of. New York Life Insurance and 
Trust Company, trustee. Petition for license to receive per- 
sonal estate. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Rowse, Samuel TV., estate of. Ella A. Rowse et al., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Rudd, Alice A., estate of. Stephen B. Meech, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Sackett, Nancy Parks, estate of. Petition for license to receive 
personal estate in Massachusetts. Tax paid and disposed of. 

Scarlett, Joseph, estate of. Virginia J. Moore, petitioner. Peti- 
tion for appointment of appraisers. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard on return of appraisers. 

Searles, Solomon, estate of. Daniel F. Runnells, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard on payment of tax. 

Shapleigh, James B., estate of. James H. Shapleigh, trustee. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Shepard, Oliver H., estate of. Louis C. Dawes, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 



1 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Small, Orrin W., estate of. Henry M. Small, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Smead, Charles B., estate of. Frederick Z. Dickinson, admin- 
istrator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. 
Pending. 

Smith, Charles Frederick, estate of. William R. Driver, executor. 
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Smith, Mary Ann, estate of. William Smith, guardian. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Spaulding, George C, estate of. Albert M. Spaulding, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Spence, Virginia Waldron, estate of. RossN. Bowers, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Stacy, Eliza W., estate of. Mary J. Stacy, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Stone, Narcissa, estate of. Ardon W. Coombs, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Sutton, Anne H., estate of. David Sutton, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Sweeney, Ellen Towle, estate of. Henry L. Sweeney, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Thomas, Jane G., estate of. Stephen B. Meech, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard . 

Thompson, Laforest H., estate of. W. W. Miles, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Pending. 

Tobey, Elizabeth, estate of. Elizabeth W. Tobey, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Tuckerman, Robert, estate of. Harriet W. Tuckerman, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Tyler, Rebecca S., estate of. Frederick W. Tyler, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. li 

Upharn, Charlotte M., estate of. Elizabeth K. Farnam, adminis- 
tratrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Varney, Frank R., estate of. Annie A. Varney, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Wait, John E., estate of. Eben W. Jones, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Webb, Benjamin, estate of. Jacob Van V. Olcott et aZ., execu- 
tors. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Wells, Sarah E. P., estate of. Caroline M. Martin, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Wensley, George W., estate of. Robert S. Wensleyei al., execu- 
tors. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Wheeler, John, estate of. Mary H. Wheeler, executrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Wheeler, Roxana W., estate of. Helen W. Jenney, administra- 
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Wheelwright, Edward, estate of. Isaphene M. Wheelwright, ex- 
ecutrix. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Whitney, William D., estate of. Elizabeth W. Whitney et al., 
executors. Petition for license to receive personal estate. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Wilson, Royal, estate of. Charles Emery Knight etal., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Woodbury, Anna M., estate of. George A. Whittemore, execu- 
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Woodward, Abijah, estate of. Greenleaf C. George, trustee. 
Petition for instructions. Tax paid and disposed of. 



Worcester County. 
Arthur, Adeline E., estate of. Charles H. Williams, administra- 
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 



lii ATTORNEY-GENERAL' S REPORT. [Jan. 

Back, Ellsworth, estate of. David Alclrich, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Back, Ellsworth, estate of. David Aldrich, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Brigham, George O., estate of. Henry S. Knight, administrator. 
Petition for appointment of appraisers. Assented to ap- 
pointment Edwin B. Harvey, Francis E. Cary and Henry L. 
Clemence, appraisers. 

Buck, Horace B., estate of. Eliza A. Buck, executrix. Petition 
for instructions. Pending. 

Burnham, Fannie S., estate of. Augustus A. Scales, administra- 
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Colburn, Willard, estate of. E. M. Smith, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Connor, Timothy, estate of. Nelson H. TunniclirT, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Cuddihy, Patrick, estate of. James T. Canavan et al., petitioners. 
Petition to amend inventory. Pending. 

Davis, Ada C, estate of. George H. Davis, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Dowling, Daniel, estate of. Frederick M. Cole et al., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Grubb, William, estate of. William J. Grubb, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Harrington, Betsy L., estate of. Irene L. Hardy, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Heredeen, Tryphena, estate of. Henry Heredeen, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Hobart, Eliza A., estate of. Nathaniel Hobart, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Holbrook, Susan J., estate of. George E. Holbrook et ah, 
executors. Petition for license to receive personal estate. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Ho. 12. liii 

Houghton, John C, estate of. Mary L. Houghton, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Howard, Jane R., estate of. Robert K. O'Neil, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Hubbard, Rodney A., estate of. Eliza J. Hubbard, administra- 
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Hurley, Helen, estate of. John J. Hurley, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Jackson, Michael C, estate of. Catherine A. Jackson, adminis- 
tratrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

James, Alanson, estate of. Newman W. James, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Kimball, Edith H., estate of. E. M. Smith, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Kinnicutt, Augusta, estate of. Daniel S. Bushee, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Lewis, Abbie M., estate of. Samuel M. Came, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Miller, Richard S., estate of. William M. Peckham, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Mower, Caroline C, estate of. J. Russell Marble et aZ., trustees. 
Petition for reappraisal. Pending. 

Newton, Harvey, estate of. Charles J. Hooper et aZ., executors. 
Petition for instruction and appraisal. Pending. 

Osgood, Helen A., estate of. Jacob N. Davis, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Parker, M. Isadore, estate of. Evelyn L. Murdock Ward, peti- 
tioner. Petition to declare appraisal void and ordering 
reappraisal. Tax paid and disposed of. 

Platts, Julia M., estate of. Charles F. Platts, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 



liv ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S EEPOET. [Jan. 

Rice, Alice M., estate of. Charles M. Rice, executor. Petition 
for instructions. Decree. Appealed by petitioner to Supreme 
Judicial Court. Pending. 

Ripley, Samuel B., estate of. Martha Ripley, executrix. Peti- 
tion for extension of time for payment of tax. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Robertson, James, estate of. James Robertson et al., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Ruggles, Anson M., estate of. Margaret J. Ruggles, administra- 
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Runyan, Elizabeth S., estate of. Frank E. Gleason, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. 
Pending. 

Sewall, Philip G., estate of. George Elkis, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Sibley, Elizabeth A., estate of. Eugene L. Sibley, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Stearns, Benjamin F., estate of. Orsemor S. Holden, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate. 
Pending. 

Swords, Charles R., estate of. Sarah M. Swords, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Tarbell, Solon, estate of. Myra G. Tarbell, executrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lv 



PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUSTS. 



Essex County. 

Essex Agricultural Society v. Massachusetts General Hospital 
Corporation and the Attorney-General. Petition to sell real 
estate and to apply the doctrine of cy-pres. Service accepted. 
Petition dismissed. Petitioner appealed. Pending. 

Mackay, Frances Mary, estate of. Hersey B. Goodwin et al., 
executors. Petition for leave to compromise a claim against 
said estate. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Walcott, John B., estate of. Milton E. Smith et al., overseers of 
the poor of Natick, trustees. Petition for license to sell cer- 
tain shares of stock. Pending. 

Suffolk County. 

Bullard, George E., et al. Petition to sell real estate subject to a 
charitable trust. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Bussey, Benjamin, estate of. Bill in equity to authorize trustees 
of a public charitable trust to sell land. Pending. 

Doane, Thomas, estate of. David B. Perry, trustee. Petition 
for decree to fix collateral inheritance tax to be paid on 
income to Doane College. Attorney-General waived right to 
be heard. 

Eckley, Frances A., estate of. Petition for appointment of 
Gannet Wells as trustee. Attorney-General waived right to 
be heard. 

Franklin, Benjamin, estate of. Petition of the Attorney-General 
for appointment of trustees under will of Benjamin Franklin. 
Henry L. Higginson, Francis C. Welch, A. Shuman, Chas. T. 
Gallagher, Rev. Chas. W. Duane, Stopford Brooke and Alex- 
ander K. McLennan appointed trustees. Pending. 

Liversidge, Thomas, estate of. Horatio N. Glover et al., peti- 
tioners. Petition for the appointment of Clifton Rogers 
Clapp as trustee. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 



lvi ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 

Mackey, Frances Mary, estate of. Petition for allowance of final 
account of executor. Attorney-General waived right, to be 
heard. 

Messerve, HopleyT., estate of. George H. Penderghast, exec- 
utor. Petition regarding a public charitable trust. Pend- 
ing. 

Murray, Patrick, estate of. Petition for appointment of a master 
to devise a scheme for distribution of trust funds. Pending. 

Smith, James, estate of. Attorney-General v. Abner C. Goodell, 
administrator. An information asking the court to decree a 
scheme for carrying out a public charity. Pending. 

Thompson, Thomas, estate of. Minot, trustee, v. Attorney- 
General. Bill in equity regarding a public charitable trust. 
Pending. 

Watterson, Robert C, estate of. Robert W. Lord, trustee. 
Public charitable trust. Petition for leave to distribute a 
portion of the estate. Pending. 

Williams, Charles, estate of. John Ballantyne, executor. Peti- 
tion for appointment of trustee for the purposes of a charitable 
trust. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Worcester County. 

Copeland, Ephraim, estate of. Malcolm G. Clark, trustee. Peti- 
tion for license to sell land devised by testator for purposes 
of a charitable trust. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 

Fyfe, William E., estate of. Mary J. Fyfe, executrix. Petition 
for decree declaring null and void a devise of real estate for 
some benevolent object. Pending. 

Fyfe, William E., estate of. Mary J. Fyfe, executrix. Bill in 
equity relating to a charitable trust. Pending. 

The following cases have been brought for alleged land damages 
incurred in the alteration of grade crossings. The Commonwealth, 
being obliged under the statutes to pay at least twenty-five per 
cent, of the expenses incurred in the alteration of all grade cross- 
ings, has in all cases been made a party thereto. 

Mary Casey v. City of Northampton et als. Superior Court, 

Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff. 
Mary Simpson v. City of Northampton et als. Superior Court, 

Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff. 
F. R. Elwell v. City of Northampton et als. Superior Court, 

Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — N o. 12. lvii 

Elizabeth N. Thompson v. City of Northampton et ah. Superior 

Court, Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff. 
John A. Partridge v. City of Northampton et ah. Superior Court, 

Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff. 
William M. Trow v. City of Northampton et ah. Superior Court, 

Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff. 
Charles P. Damon v. City of Northampton et ah. Superior Court, 

Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff. 
John A. Kearns v. Connecticut River Railroad et ah. Superior 

Court, Hampshire County. Dismissed. 
Arthur C. Guilford v. New Haven & Northampton Company et ah. 

Superior Court, Hampshire County. Dismissed. 
William F. Kingsley v. City of Northampton et ah. Superior 

Court, Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff. 
Timothy Sullivan v. City of Northampton et ah. Superior Court, 

Hampshire County. Dismissed. 
William J. Hall v. City of Northampton et ah. Superior Court, 

Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff. 
Robert Mousey v. City of Northampton et ah. Superior Court, 

Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff. 
Martha E. Dickerson v. Boston & Maine Railroad et ah. Superior 

Court, Hampshire County. Judgment for plaintiff. 
John A. Keaines v. Boston & Maine Railroad et al. Superior 

Court, Hampshire County. Dismissed. 
Timothy Sullivan v. City of Northampton et ah. Superior Court, 

Hampshire County. Dismissed. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. City of Boston et ah. Superior 

Court, Suffolk County. Pending. 
Cpmmonwealth of Massachusetts v. City of Boston et ah. Superior 

Court, Suffolk County. Pending. 
Robert Codman et ah. v. New England Railroad Company et ah. 

Superior Court, Suffolk County. Pending. 
City of Boston v. Boston Wharf Company et ah. Superior Court, 

Suffolk County. Pending. 
Bridget Ballentine et al. v. Town of Gardner. Superior Court, 

Worcester County. Pending. 
George H. Sprague v. Fitchburg. Superior Court, Worcester 

County. Pending. 
Putnam Machine Company v. Fitchburg. Superior Court, Worces- 
ter County. Pending. 
Levi W. Phelps v. Fitchburg Railroad. Superior Court, Middle- 
sex County. Pending. 
Susan C. Dickinson et al. v. Fitchburg. Superior Court, Worces- 
ter County. Pending. 



lviii ATTOKISTEY-GENEKAL'S KEPOET. [Jan. 

Commonwealth v. Boston Terminal Company. Superior Court, 
Suffolk County. Pending. 

Commonwealth v. Boston Terminal Company. Superior Court, 
Suffolk County. Pending. 

Margaret Thompson et ah v. Gardner. Superior Court, Worces- 
ter County. Judgment for plaintiff. 

Frank Pierce et al. v. Gardner. Superior Court, Worcester County. 
Judgment for plaintiff. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lix 



Suits conducted by the Attorney- General in 
Behalf of State Boards and Commissions. 



The following cases have been reported to this department by 
State boards and commissions, to be conducted by the Attorney- 
General or under his direction, pursuant to the provisions of St. 
1896, c. 490: — 

1. Metropolitan Park Commission. 

Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages 

alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land by the said 

commission. 

Essex County. 

Hay, Allan, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Murphy, Michael, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Middlesex County. 
Alther, Henry J., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Alther, Julia, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Ames, Nathaniel P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Bean, Charlotte, et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Bench, John, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Bench, Thomas, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Bigelow, George B., trustee, v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 
Billings, Mary Martina, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Billings, Mary Martina, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Blank, Philip J., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Brackett, Albert, v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 
Bragdon, Louis G., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Bridge, Edmund, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Brigham, Mary, et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Brusendorff, Victor, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Campbell, Catherine B., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Carret, James R., trustee, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Case, Moses, trustee, v. Boston & Maine Railroad Company. 

Trial by jury. 
Chandler, Frank E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Chase, Edward M., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 



lx ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 

Chase, Juliana, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Chipman, George W., assignee, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Clark, David O., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Clarke, Nathan D. A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Clarke, Nathan D. A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Clarke, Nathan D. A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Clarke, Nathan D. A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Connors, Hannah, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Corey, Henrietta E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Corey, Henrietta E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Craig, Isabel, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Crehore, Frederick M., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Curtis, Charles P., trustee, under the will of John M. Williams, 

v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Darcy, Christopher, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
DeCourcey, John J., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Dowd, Martha A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Dolan, John W., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Dwyer, Michael F., v Commonwealth. Pending. 
Dwyer, William, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Early, James A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Gould, Alice A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Gould, Alice A., v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 
Gould, Alice A., et al. v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 
Gould, Alice A., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hadley, Benjamin, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hadley, Benjamin, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hadley, Benj., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hadley, Benj., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hadley, Benj., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hadley, Benj., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hale, Charles A., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Hale, Edwin B., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Hall, Charles A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Harrington, John A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hatch, George S., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hatch, George S., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hefler, Hannah J., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hemenway, Alfred, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hodges, Arthur J., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Holton, Amy W., v. Commonwealth. Pendiug. 
Lawrence, Samuel C, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Lovewell, Harriet R., v. Commonwealth. 
Lynde, A. Selwyn, administrator, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxi 

Magoun, Margaret, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

McCarthy, Jeremiah, heirs of, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

McMahon, Rose A., v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 

Niles, Sullivan, et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

O'Riorden, Patrick, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

O'Riorden, Patrick, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Peterson, Jacob J. S., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Pratt, Marland L., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Preston, Marion W., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Quimby, Alfred W., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Quimby, Alfred W., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Rand, Arnold A., et als. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Rand, Arnold A., et als. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Rand, Arnold A., et als. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Rand, Arnold A., et als. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Reinhard, Adam, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Rich, Frederick L., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Rich, Mabel C, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Robertson, John R., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Rogers, Frank R., et al., executors of Joseph F. Wilson, v. Com- 
monwealth. Pending. 

Rogers, Frank R., et al., executors of the estate of Joseph F. 
Wilson, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Rogers, Frank R., et al., executors of the estate of Joseph F. 
Wilson, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Rogers, Frank R., et al., executors of the estate of Joseph F. 
Wilson, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Ross, Frances J., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Seaver, Ephraim Parker, et als. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Seaverns, Susan P., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Sewall, George F., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Shanahan, Michael, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Smith, G. Edward, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Smith, G. Edward, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Snow, Edward L., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Stark, Annie M., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Stevens, J. Elizabeth, et al., heirs of Richard Dexter,'^. Common- 
wealth. Pending. 

Stewart, Martha P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Stewart, Martha P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Stone, Joseph, et al. v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 

Stone, Joseph, et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Sullivan, Daniel P., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Symmes, Arthur C, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 



lxii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Travers, Michael, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Waltham Gas Light Company v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Warren, Daniel, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Warren Institution for Savings et al. v. Commonwealth. Pend- 
ing. 

Welch, Albert W., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Wellington, James E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Wellington, James E., et al., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pend- 
ing. 

Wells, Edwin H., et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Welsh, Willard, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Whitney, Alice F., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Whitney, Arthur E., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Whitney, John P., et al., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Woodworth, Sarah A., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Norfolk County. 
Bowditch, Ernest W., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Bowley, Anna M., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Bronsdon, Louis V., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Chase, Elvira M., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Dean, Henry M., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
DeLue, George B., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Denny, John W., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Devlin, Mary A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Fife, Margaret, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Fox, Catherine, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Gallagher, Joseph EL, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Gray, Thomas H., v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 
Hamblin, Howard M., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Harlow, William H., et als., executors, v. Commonwealth. 

Pending. 
Hawes, Charles E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hayden, John E. V., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Higgins, Henry M., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Howe, Kittie M., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Kennedy, John, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Klous, Seaman, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
MacDonnell, Mary A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Mahoney, Dennis W., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Marron, Phillip, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
McGowan, Andrew, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
McGrath, Thomas, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
McKenna, Elizabeth, v. Commonwealth. Pending, 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxiii 

Milton, Inhabitants of, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

New England Trotting Horse Breeders' Association v. Common- 
wealth. Pending. 

Ober, Louis P., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Pierce, Frederick L., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Pieno, James C, v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 

Pope, Hannah C, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Putnam, George, et al., trustees of Henry L. Pierce, v. Com- 
monwealth. Pending. 

Reardon, Ellen, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Rice, Clifford H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Russell, James S., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Schultze, Gustav A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Scott, Jane W., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Seyter, "William G., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Stack, John, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Stack, John, trustee, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Weil, Albert, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

White, Frances M. E., executrix. Settled. 

Willcomb, George, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Plymouth County. 
Foster, Charles H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Grimes, George, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
McMahon, Mary A., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Suffolk County. 

Adams, Adoniram J., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Atkins, Florence R., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Bamford, Albert J., et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Boston & Revere Electric Street Railway Company v. Common- 
wealth. Pending. 

Boston & Revere Electric Street Railway Company v. Common- 
wealth. Non-suited. 

Clark, Theodore E., v. Commonwealth et al. Pending. 

Conness, John, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Coughlin, Abbie F., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Donnelly, James J., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Dresser, Mary A. P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Dresser, William R., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Emerson, Catherine, trustee, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Harvard College v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Hall, Francis J., et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 



lxiv ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 

Hazlett, John P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Higgins, James, et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Hincke, Maria Anna, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Jessop, Ann Elizabeth, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Jones, Alfred E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Jones, Alfred E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Jones, Charles A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Jones, Charles A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Jones, Francis A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Jones, Francis A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Jones, George H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Jones, George H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Jones, Robert J., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Jones, Robert J., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Jones, Sarah E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Jones, Sarah E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Lynn & Boston Railroad Company v. Commonwealth. Non- 
suited. 

Lynn & Boston Railroad Company v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Martine, Abba M., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Mayers, John H., executor, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. Com- 
monwealth. Pending. 

New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. Com- 
monwealth. Pending. 

New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. Com- 
monwealth. Pending. 

New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. Com- 
monwealth. Pending. 

New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. Com- 
monwealth. Pending. 

New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. Com- 
monwealth. Pending. 

New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. Com- 
monwealth. Pending. 

Putnam, Jane, et al. v. Boston, Revere Beach & Lynn Railroad 
Company. Trial by sheriff's jury. 

Putnam, Jane, et al. v. Boston & Maine Railroad Company. Trial 
by sheriff's jury. 

Rogers, Mary E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Singleton, Mary E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Skilton, Elizabeth A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Smith, Emma, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxv 

Thayer, Joseph Henry, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Waclsworth, P. Briggs, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Wadsworth, Susan, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Wright, George F., et als. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Wyman, George W., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

2. Metropolitan Sewerage Commission. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages alleged 
to have been sustained by the taking of rights and easements in 
lands by said commission. 

Middlesex County. 
Stone, Joseph, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Norfolk County. 
Flint, Charles L., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hunt, Henry W., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Scheffreen, Jacob, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Tyndale, Theodore H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Veale, Peter P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Suffolk County. 

Boston v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Boston v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Boston v. Kingman et al. Pending. 

Evangelical Lutheran Church for Works of Mercy v. Common- 
wealth. Pending. 

Finneran, William, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Harvard College v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Holyhood Cemetery Association v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Krug, John, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Nawn, Henry P., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Noon, Margaret, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Richards, Annette, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Sheehan, John, v. Commonwealth. Referred to an auditor. 
Pending. 

Stone, Amos, et al. v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 

Stone, Jasper W., et al., administrators, v. Commonwealth. 
Pending. 

Stone, Joseph, et al. v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 

Stone, Joseph, et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Tuttle, Clarence E., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 



lxvi ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

3. Metropolitan Water Board. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages alleged 
to have been sustained by the taking of rights and easements in 
lands by said commission. 

Middlesex Co u n ty . 
Ballou, Chloe Ann, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Boston & Albany Railroad, petitioner. Pending. 
Buck, William H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Dunn, Johanna T., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Framingham Water Company v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Maiden v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Maiden, Medford and Melrose v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Medford v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Melrose v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Nashua River Paper Company et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Suffolk County. 
Boston & Albany Railroad Company v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Mason, Jacob M., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Worcester County. 

Allen, George S., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Arkwell, Edward, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Ayer, Eliza A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Bacon, Emory A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Bacon, Marinna, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Ballou, Chloe Ann, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Ballou, Chloe A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Barry, Ellen A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Bathrick, Dorothy P., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Bemis, Elevyn H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Berlin, Andrew, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Bigelow Carpet Company v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Bigelow Carpet Company v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Bigelow Carpet Company v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Bigelow Carpet Company v. Commonwealth. Pending. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxvii 

Bigelow, Arthur J., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Bigelow, Joseph M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Bigelow, Joseph M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Bond, Ellen, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Bond, Louis, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Bosworth, Effie M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Bourdon, Joseph, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Boyd, Andrew, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Boynton, Abigail, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Boynton, Henry A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Blunt, Isabelle M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Brigham, Eunice F., et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to com- 
missioners. Pending. 

Bruce, William M. ,-y. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Buck, Delia J., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Buck, William H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to auditor. 
Pending. 

Buck, William H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Burke, Nellie E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Burnham, Ella L., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Cather, William J., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Cavanaugh, Lawrence, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Dismissed. 

Chandler, Charles H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to com- 
missioners. Pending. 

Chapman et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Chapman, Sarah, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Chapman, Walter E., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Chapman, Walter E., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 



lxviii ATTOENEY-GEKEEAL'S EEPOET. [Jan. 

Chase, Frances H., administratrix, v. Commonwealth. Referred 
to commissioners. Pending. 

Geary, Lawrence G., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Coolidge, William F., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Cooper, Joseph, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Cotting, Chas. U., et ah. v. Commonwealth. Referred to com- 
missioners. Pending. 

Cowee, Edward A., v. Metropolitan Water Board and Common- 
wealth. Pending. 

Cowee, Edward A., v. Metropolitan Water Board and Common- 
wealth. Pending. 

Cowee, Edward A., v. Metropolitan Water Board and Common- 
wealth. Pending. 

Cowee, Edward A., v. Metropolitan Water Board and Common- 
wealth. Pending. 

Cowee, Edward A., v. Metropolitan Water Board and Common- 
wealth. Pending. 

Cowee, Hattie L., v. Metropolitan Water Board and Common- 
wealth. Pending. 

Crooker, Ansel F., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Cunningham, Robert, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Cunliffe, John, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Cutting, Mary F., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Davis, John K., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Dee, John, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Dolan, Catherine, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Dolan, Catherine, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Dorr, James, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Dorr, James, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Dorr, James, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Dusoe, Charles, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxix 

Earle, William A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Trial. Reserved for full court. Pending. 

Fahey, Timothy, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Fairbanks, Edwin C, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Felt, Charles W., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Fiske, George A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Flagg, Geo. A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Flagg, Hannah E., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Fletcher, Elizabeth R., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Flint, Eunice J., i>. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Fowle, Waldo, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Frye, John A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to auditor. Pending. 

Garfield, Silas, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Gavin, Catherine, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

George, Nathan D., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Goodale, Aaron, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Goodale, Francis W. M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to com- 
missioners. Pending. 

Goodale, Mary, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Goodney, Francis, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Harper, Edward A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission- 
ers. Pending. 

Harper, Edward A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission- 
ers. Pending. 

Harris, Charles M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission- 
ers. Pending. 

Harris, Melissa, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Haskell, John C, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Haskell, Maria A., v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 

Hastings et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 



lxx 



ATTORKEY-GEJSTERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Hastings, Calvin H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Hastings, George R., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Hastings, Henry L., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission- 
ers. Pending. 

Hastings, John C, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Hastings, John C, et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Hastings, Mary Lizzie, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Hawes, Frederick A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Heighway, George A., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Holland, Robert, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Holmes, George H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Holmes, George H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Houghton, Myron W., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Howe, Israel G., v. Commonwealth. Referred to auditor. 
Pending. 

Hudson, George C. F., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Hudson, George C. F., et al. v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Hyde, George L.., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Jefts, Asis S., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Johnson, Addison, executor, v. Commonwealth. Referred to 
auditor. Pending. 

Johnson, Carl J., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Johnson, Charles S., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Johnson. Edward S., et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to com- 
missioners. Pending. 

Johnson, Edwin S., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission- 
ers. Pending. 

Johnson, William O., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Johnson, William 0., v. Metropolitan Water Board. Pending. 

Kendall, George, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxxi 

Kershaw, James H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission- 
ers. Pending. 

Keyes, George H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Keyes, Jonathan M., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Kittredge, Julia, et als. v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 

Kittredge, Julia, v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 

Knight, Henry G., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Lafrade, Peter, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Lafyette, Louisa, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Lambert, John, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners . 
Dismissed. 

Lawrence, Emma, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Lawrence, George D., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Lawrence, Lucretia, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission- 
ers. Pending. 

Laythe, Sarah A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Laythe, Sarah A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Leonard, Bridget, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Levi, Sarah, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Liberty, Pascal, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Dismissed. 

Longley, George H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Lord, Joseph M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Lord, Joseph M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Lovell, Alfred, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Lovell, Angeline E., et at. v. Commonwealth. Referred to com- 
missioners. Pending. 

Lovell, David B., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Lovell, Portland, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Lowe, Horace H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 



lxxii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Lozeau, Delia, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Luce, Mehitable, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Lucius, Jeremiah, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Lundren, Per Arvid, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Luurtsema, Gurt, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Luurtsema, Joaptje, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Lynch, John, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Lynch, Thomas, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Lynch, Thomas, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Mack, Cornelius, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Mackesey, Thomas, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

March, Harry E., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

McAndrew, Hannah, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

McNarnara, Austin D., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

McNamara, Ellen, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

McNamara, Thomas, et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to com- 
missioners. Pending. 

Merrill, Elizabeth A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Moore, Nellie F., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Moran, James, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Moran, Patrick T., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Morse, Amanda, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Mulcahy, Catharine, administratrix, v. Commonwealth. Referred 
to commissioners. Pending. 

Muzzy, Jonas, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Muzzy, Jonas, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Nashua River Paper Company et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred 
to commissioners. Pending. 

Nault, David, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxxiii 

Newton, George B., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Newton. Silas, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Nichols, Charles E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Nichols, Luke H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

O'Connor, Thomas H., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Olcott, John EL, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

O'Malley, Michael, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Ovenden, William C, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Padden, Margaret, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Phelps, Sarah A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Philbin. Tobias, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Pierce, Caroline, et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Pierce, Henry, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Potter, Jeremiah, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Prescott, John B. F., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Prescott, Martha E., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Redding, George L., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Reed et al. v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Reed, Alice N., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Reed, Charles H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Reed, Charles H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Reed, Elizabeth M., et al., executors, v. Commonwealth. Referred 
to commissioners. Pending. 

Reed, George D., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Rice, Almira F., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Rice, Mary C, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 



lxxiv ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S KEPOKT. [Jan. 

Roach, James, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Russell, Ann Elizabeth, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Russell, Samuel S., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Ryan, Michael EL, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Ryan, Michael S.,v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Sargent, Margaret E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Sawin, Charles B., v. Commonwealth. Referred to an auditor. 
Pending. 

Sawyer, Henry O., et als. v. Metropolitan Water Board and the 
Commonwealth. Dismissed. Taken to full court on excep- 
tions. See 178 Mass. 267. 

Sawyer, Henry O., et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Sawyer, Ivers H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Sawyer, Louise M., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Scanlon, Mary, et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission- 
ers. Pending. 

Schmidt, Christian, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Sears, Joshua M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to auditor. 
Pending. 

Sene, Eclid, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Sheldon, Augustus V., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Shepard, John, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Short, Harriett, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Sirabian, Kayazan, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Smith, Alice M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Smith, Artemas C, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission- 
ers. Pending. 

Smith, Charles E., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Snow, Antoine, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Snow Brothers v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Staples, William H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission- 
ers. Pending. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxxv 

Staples, William H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to com- 
missioners. Pending. 

Storms, William E., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Stott, James R., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Tatro, George, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Thomas, A. Mason, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission- 
ers. Pending. 

Tobin, Mary A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Tonry, Margaret F., v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 

Toombs, Joseph E., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Toomey, John, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Toomey, John, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Valley, Abigail, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Waite, David P., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Waite, David P., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Warfield, Samuel R., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Warfield, Samuel R., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Warner, Mary J., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Warner, Mary J., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

W^est Boylston Manufacturing Company v. Metropolitan Water 
Board. Pending. 

Wheeler, Samuel M., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Whitaker, C. Wayland, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

White, Lucy, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Whiting, Alfred N., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Whittemore, John M., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Wilder, Francis A., et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to com- 
missioners. Pending. 

Wilder, Francis A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. * Pending. 

Wilder, Harriet, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Wilson, James, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 



lxxvi ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S EEPOKT. [Jan. 

Wood, Ashley H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 

Pending. 
Wood, Willie B., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 

Pending. 
Woods, James H., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 
York, Eda F., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 

Pending. 
York, Eda F., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 

Pending. 

4. Massachusetts Highway Commission. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages alleged 
to have been sustained by the taking of land by said commission. 

Barnstable County. 
Crowell, Thomas H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Essex County. 
Dane, Sarah E., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Wyman, Isaac C, v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 

Franklin County. 
Massamet Yarn Mills v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Middlesex County. 
Hudson Co-operative Bank v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Rice, John E., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Plymouth County. 
Taylor, Horace B., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Suffolk County. 
Haveland, J. B., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Worcester County. 
Gould, Charlotte E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

5. Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages caused 
by the taking of land by said commissioners. 

Suffolk County. 
Bent, William H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
East Boston Company v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Jeffries, Anna L., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxxvii 

Lamb, George, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Lamb, George, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Roxbury Central Wharf v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

6. Miscellaneous Cases from Above Commissions. 
Middlesex County. 
Cambridge, Cemetery Commissioners of. Petition for leave to con- 
vey to Park Commission a parcel of land dedicated for cemetery 
purposes. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 
Crandall, H. Burr, v. Charles Price (superintendent). Action of 
tort for conversion. Pending. 

Suffolk County. 

Bailey, James A., et als. Petition for appointment of commis- 
sioners to apportion cost of maintenance of north metropoli- 
tan sewerage system. Commissioners appointed. Report of 
commissioners accepted. 

Barnes, Frank P., v. Henry H. Sprague et al. Petition for writ 
of mandamus against the Metropolitan Water Board. Peti- 
tion denied. 

Bent, William H., et al. v. Henry W. Swift et al. Pending. 

Carahar, James A., et al. v. William B. de las Casas et al. Peti- 
tion for an injunction to prevent Metropolitan Park Commis- 
sioners from tearing down plaintiff's hotel at Nahant. Peti- 
tion dismissed. 

Connolly, Mary E., v. Charles G. Craib. Action of tort to 
recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been 
sustained by an employee of the contractor in the construc- 
tion of the metropolitan sewer, the defendant being the 
inspector employed by the Metropolitan Sewerage Commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Flagg, John N., v. Edward S. Bradford, Treasurer. Action of 
contract growing out of the taking by the Metropolitan Water 
Board of the plaintiff's land. Petition dismissed. Reserved 
for the full court. 

Hanscom, Hervey A., et al., Cambridge v. Action of tort 
growing out of accident caused by laying water pipes by 
Metropolitan Water Board in Cambridge. Pending. 

Hanscom, Hervey A., et al., Commonwealth v. Action of con- 
tract growing out of accident caused by laying water pipes by 
Metropolitan Water Board in Cambridge. Pending. 

Jones, George H., et al. v. Metropolitan Park Commissioners. 
Petition for a writ of certiorari on account of assessment of 
betterments on land in Revere. Pending before Supreme 
Judicial Court. 



lxxviii ATTORNEY-GENES AL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Metropolitan Park Commissioners, petitioners. Petition for the 
appointment of a commission to apportion the cost of main- 
tenance of the parks system among the various cities and 
towns within the metropolitan parks district. Charles Francis 
Adams, John C. Hammond and Thomas M. Stetson ap- 
pointed commissioners. Pending before Supreme Judicial 
Court on report of commissioners. 

Newton, Francis D., et al. v. Henry H. Sprague et als. Petition 
in the nature of an action of tort to recover damages caused 
by the alleged filling up of a well belonging to plaintiffs. 
Pending. 

Rohan, Mary, v. Commonwealth. Petition in the nature of an 
action of tort for personal injuries alleged to have been 
sustained in the construction of a section of the metropolitan 
sewer. Pending. 

Sheehan, John, v. Commonwealth. Breach of contract growing 
out of construction of sewer in East Boston. Pending. 

Southborough, Commonwealth v. Action of contract. Pending. 

7. Cases arising under St. 1899, c. 457, " An Act to limit the 
Height of Buildings in the Vicinity of the State House." 

Abbott, Edwin H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Abbott, Edwin H., trustee, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Beebe, E. Pierson, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Binney, Amos, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Binney, Arthur, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Binney, Henry P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Brinton, Ferree, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. See 178 
Mass. 199. 

Cabot, Susan B., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Croft, Arthur, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Earl, Maria B., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Endicott, William, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Forbes, J. Malcom, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Frye, Emily J., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Goddard, George A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Gray, Francis C, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Heard, J. Theodore, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Hollingsworth, Polly R., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Lewis, Elizabeth, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Lodge, Henry Cabot, administrator, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Loring, Anna P., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Paine, Robert Treat, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Paine, Robert Treat, et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Park, Theodore W., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxxix 

Parker, Charles H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending before the 
Supreme Judicial Court See 178 Mass. 199. Pending. 

Parkman, George F., v. Commonwealth. Pending. See 178 
Mass. 199. 

Perry, Emily Gj-., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Prince, Gordan, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Read, Elise H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Read, John, et al., trustees and executors, v. Commonwealth. 
Pending. 

Ritchie, Rosa G., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Robinson, Edith V., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Ruggles, Henry S., v. Commonwealth. Pendiug. 

Warren, Fiske, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Way, Charles G., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

8. State Board of Charity. 
(a) Actions of contract pending in the Superior Court to re- 
cover charges for the support of insane paupers in State insane 
hospitals, under the provisions of Pub. Sts., c. 87, § 32. 

Middlesex County. 
Cooper, Esau, Shaw v. Pending. 

Suffolk County. 
Boston, Phillips v. Pending. 
Cambridge, Phillips v. Pending. 
Knight, Abbie H., Bradford v. Pending. 
Osgood, Frederick PL, Bradford v. Pending 
Peabody, Marden v. Pending. 
Reading, Phillips v. Pending. 
Shillaber, D. H., Bradford v. Pending. 
Stow, Phillips v. Pending. 
Waltham, Bradford v. Pending. 
Waltham, Marden v. Pending. 
Wolfe, Arthur M., Bradford v. Pending. 
Worcester, Phillips v. Pending. 

(6) Bastardy complaints brought under Pub. Sts., c. 85. 

Middlesex County. 
Egnor, Belie, v. Arthur Wyman. Pending. 
Harkins, Celia, v. Walter Harrington. Pending. 
Sumner, Emma, v. Edward Hamlin. Pending. 

Suffolk County. 
Johnson, Julia R., v. Henry Williams. Pending. 



lxxx ATTOENEY-GENEEAL'S EEPOET. [Jan. 



MISCELLANEOUS CASES. 



Ahem, Maurice, v. Newton & Boston Street Railway Company. 
Bill in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States to 
restrain the defendant from complying with the provisions of 
St. 1900, c. 197, relative to the transportation of scholars in 
the public schools by street railway companies. Pending. 

Amesbury & Salisbury Gas Light Company. Penalty for exist- 
ence of sulphuretted hydrogen in its gas. Pending. 

Ayer Light, Heat and Power Company. Failure to file with the 
Gas Light Commissioners the return required by St. 1886, c. 
346, § 2, as extended by St. 1887, c. 382, § 2. Pending. 

Bay State Beneficiary Association, Attorney-General ex rel. Insur- 
ance Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial 
Court for Suffolk County for an injunction and appointment 
of a receiver. Injunction issued, and Henry C. Hyde, P^sq., 
and Henry C. Bliss, Esq., both of West Springfield, were 
appointed temporary receivers. Pending. 

Bay State Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Insurance Commis- 
sioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk 
County for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. 
Injunction issued, and Herbert Parker, Esq., appointed re- 
ceiver. Pending. 

Berkshire Health and Accident Association, Attorney-General ex 
rel. Insurance Commissioner v. Petition for an injunction and 
the appointment of a receiver. Injunction issued, and Alpheus 
Sanford, Esq., of Boston, appointed receiver. Pending. 

Boston v. Commonwealth. Petition for transfer of Herbert A. 
Hector and Harry O. Hector, indigent children. Decree. 

Boston v. Same. Sewer assessment on Rutherford Avenue, 
Charlestown. Pending. 

Boston v. Same. Petition for the transfer of Hyman Gold, an in- 
digent child, having no settlement, to State Board of Charity. 
Decree. 

Boston, Commonwealth v. Petition for assessment of damages to 
State Prison buildings, caused by the alteration of grade 
crossings in Charlestown. Pending. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT— Ho. 12. lxxxi 

Bragg, Henry W., et al. v. Commonwealth. Petition to Superior 
Court for Suffolk County for allowance of claim of auditors 
for examination into affairs of Massachusetts Benefit Life 
Association. Pending. 

Bridges, Benjamin F. (Warden, Massachusetts State Prison), v. 
Edward D. Bean. Claim for goods furnished to the defend- 
ant. Pending. 

Brookfield Savings Bank, Savings Bank Commissioners v. Peti- 
tion to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for an 
injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction is- 
sued, and George W. Johnson appointed receiver. Pending. 

Brothership of Birsen Association, Attorney-General ex rel. v. 
Petition for an injunction and a receiver. Injunction issued, 
and David A. Ellis appointed receiver. Pending. 

Brush Chemical Company. Failure to file return required by St. 
1891, c. 341. Pending. 

Burdett, Edward W., petitioner. Petition for a writ of habeas 
cropus. Writ issued and petitioner discharged. 

Cambridge, Bradford v. Claim for tide water displacement. 
Pending. 

Chaffee, Clara. Claim against the city of Newton for board at 
Worcester Insane Hospital. Pending. 

Chicopee, Water Commissioners of. Claim of violation of civil 
service rules. Referred to District Attorney, Charles L. 
Gardner. Pending. 

Clinton Gas Light Company, Attorney-General v. Petition to the 
Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for dissolution 
and the appointment of a receiver under St. 1894, c. 476. 
Pending. 

Commonwealth Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Insurance Com- 
missioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for 
Suffolk County for an injunction and a receiver under the 
provisions of St. 1894, c. 522, § 7. Injunction issued, and 
William B. Stevens, Esq., appointed receiver. Pending. 

Damon, George L. Claim for tide water displacement. Pending. 

Danvers v. Trustees of Danvers Insane Hospital. Petition for 
the appointment of three commissioners under St. 1898, c. 
564, to determine the sum to be paid by the Commonwealth 
for water provided to the Danvers Insane Hospital by the 
town of Danvers. George A. Blaney, Edwin Dresser and 
William Wheeler appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Durkee, Elmer, v. Commonwealth. Action of contract growing 
out of the purchase of goods by the plaintiff from the Danvers 
Lunatic Hospital. Pending. 



lxxxii ATTORNEY-GEKEKAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Eagle Life Association, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition for 
an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction 
issued, and Alfred F. Lilley, Esq., appointed receiver. 
Pending. 

Eagle Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Insurance Commissioner 
v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County 
for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunc- 
tion issued, and R. D. Weston-Smith, Esq., of Boston, ap- 
pointed receiver. Pending. 

Ellis, George H., Attorney-General ex rel. Harbor and Land Com- 
missioners v. Information in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
Middlesex County to protect the waters of a great pond under 
St. 1888, c. 318. Referred to a master. Pending. 

Equitable Accident Insurance Association, Attorney-General v. 
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for 
an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction 
issued, and Wade Keyes, Esq., of Boston, appointed receiver. 
Pending. 

Fall River, Mayor of, and Old Colony Railroad Company, Attor- 
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition for a writ of mandamus to 
compel the respondents to file in the registry of deeds certain 
plans and documents required by St. 1900, c. 472. Applica- 
tion withdrawn by agreement of parties. 

Fidelity Benefit Association, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition 
for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunc- 
tion issued, and A. E. Denison appointed receiver. Pend- 
ing. 

Firemen's Fire Insurance Company, Insurance Commissioner v. 
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for 
an injunction to restrain the defendant from removing its 
books and papers from the Commonwealth, and the appoint- 
ment of a receiver to recover its capital stock distributed with- 
out authority of law. Injunction issued. Defendant recovered 
its capital stock and deposited it with the International Trust 
Company, as trustee. Pending. 

Framingham Savings Bank, Savings Bank Commissioners v. Pe- 
tition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, under 
St. 1894, c. 317, § 6, for an injunction and the appointment 
of a receiver. Injunction issued, and P. H. Cooney and 
A. V. Harrington appointed receivers. Pending. 

Franklin Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Insurance Commis- 
sioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suf- 
folk County for an injunction and the appointment of a 
receiver. Pending. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxxxiii 

Fraternal Aid, Order of, Attorney-General ex rel. Insurance 
Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for 
Suffolk County for an injunction and the appointment of a 
receiver. Injunction issued, and Winthrop H. Wade, Esq., 
of Boston, appointed receiver. Pending. 

Globe Investment Company, Savings Bank Commissioners v. 
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, 
under St. 1888, c. 387, for an injunction and the appointment 
of a receiver. Injunction granted, and Henry A. Wyman 
appointed receiver. Pending. 

Gloucester Water Supply Company, Commonwealth v. Corpora- 
tion tax for 1895. Pending. 

Greylock Beneficiary Association, Insurance Commissioner v. 
Petition to the Supreme Judical Court for Suffolk County, 
under St. 1895, c. 340, for an injunction and the appointment 
of a receiver. Injunction issued, and A. A. Folsom, of Chel- 
sea, appointed receiver. Pending. 

Guardian Life Insurance Company, Insurance Commissioner v. 
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for 
an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction 
issued, and Frank D. Allen, Esq., appointed receiver. Pend- 
ing. 

Hampshire Savings Bank, Savings Bank Commissioners v. Peti- 
tion to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for an 
injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction 
issued, and Richard W. Irwin, Esq., and Benjamin E. Cook, 
Esq., appointed receivers. Pending. 

Harmon, William P., v. Cattle Commissioners. Petition to the 
Superior Court for Essex County for damages. Judgment 
for defendant by agreement. 

Haverhill Gas Light Company v. Gas and Electric Light Commis- 
sioners et al. Bill in equity in the Circuit Court of the United 
States to restrain the Board from carrying out an order to 
decrease the price of gas in Haverhill. Pending. 

Hebrew Workmen's Benevolent Society, Attorney-General v. 
Petition for injunction for failure to file return required by 
St. 1899, c. 442. Return filed. 

Holliston, Selectmen of, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition for 
a writ of mandamus to compel the placing of a democrat on 
the board of registrars of voters. Petition denied. 

Home Indemnity Corporation. Violation of St. 1901, c. 422, § 8. 
Referred to the district attorney for Suffolk County. 

Hough, Alexander B., Commonwealth v. Claim for board of 
Julia F. Hough at Worcester Insane Hospital. Pending. 



lxxxiv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Humbert First Artillery Mutual Benefit Association, Insurance 
Commissioner v. Failure to make annual report to Insurance 
Commissioner required by St. 1899, c. 442, § 19. Pending. 

Independent Order Ahawas Israel, Attorney-General v. Petition 
for injunction for failure to file return required by St. 1899, 
c. 442. Return filed. 

Italian Associates of Fall River, Insurance Commissioner v. 
Failure to make annual report to Insurance Commissioner 
required by St. 1899, c. 442, § 19. Pending. 

Jablochkoff Electric Lighting Company of New England, Com- 
missioner of Corporations v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial 
Court for Suffolk County for dissolution under Pub. Sts., 
c. 106, § 65. Pending. 

Kaiser Hat and Cap Company. Claim for corporation tax for 
1897. Company in insolvency. Claim proved. Pending. 

Kennedy, George C, Francis C. Welch, trustee. Claim for tide 
water displacement. Pending. 

Knight, Alice H., Westborough Insane Asylum v. Claim for 
board of insane patient in hospital. Referred to N. N. Jones 
of Newbury port for collection. Pending. 

Knights of Justice, Order of, Insurance Commissioner v. Failure 
to make annual report to Insurance Commissioner required by 
St. 1899, c. 442, § 19. Pending. 

Livingstone, Murray V. Claim for board of Margie A. Living- 
stone in Westborough Insane Hospital. Pending. 

Logan, John P., v. Charles Rice and the Commonwealth. Action 
of contract. Superior Court for Franklin County. Pending. 

MacDonald, John A., v. Commonwealth. Petition to the Supreme 
Judicial Court for Suffolk County for a writ of error to reverse 
a judgment rendered for the Commonwealth on an indictment 
charging the plaintiff with forging and uttering certain checks. 
Judgment affirmed. Reported in 173 Mass. 322. Case taken 
to United States Supreme Court by writ of error. Judgment 
confirmed. See 180 U. S. 311. 

Masons Fraternal Accident Association of America, Attorney- 
General v. Petition for an injunction and the appointment 
of a receiver. Injunction issued, and Henry C. Bliss, Esq., 
appointed receiver. Pending. 

Massachusetts Benefit Life Association, Attorney-General ex rel. 
Insurance Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial 
Court for Suffolk County for an injunction and the appoint- 
ment of a receiver. Injunction issued, and Arthur Lord, Esq., 
and Alfred S. Wood worth, Esq., both of Boston, appointed 
receivers. Pending. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxxxv 

Massachusetts Masonic Life Association, Attorney-General ex rel. 
Insurance Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial 
Court for Suffolk County for an injunction and a receiver 
under St. 1896, c. 515, § 6. Injunction issued, and Jonathan 
Varnes, Esq., of Springfield, appointed receiver. Pending. 
Massachusetts National Life Association, Attorney-General ex rel., 
Insurance Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial 
Court for Suffolk County, under St. 1896, c. 515, § 6, for an 
injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction 
issued, and George Kress appointed receiver. Pending. 

McDowell, J. F., claim against, for merchandise furnished by 
State Prison. Pending. 

McQuestin, Fred, Commonwealth v. Action in Superior Court 
for Suffolk County for damages caused by tide water displace- 
ment in Boston harbor. Judgment for defendant. Reserved 
for full court. Pending. 

Medway Electric Light and Power Company. Failure to file with 
Gas Light Commissioners the return required by St. 1886, 
c. 346, § 2, as extended by St. 1887, c. 387, § 2. Pending. 

Melrose Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Insurance Commis- 
sioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk 
County for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. 
Injunction issued, and Alpheus Sanford, Esq., appointed 
receiver. Pending. 

Metcalf, Albert, Bradford v. Claim for tide water displacement. 
Pending. 

Middleborough v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad 
Company and the Commonwealth. Petition for damages in 
the Superior Court for Plymouth County, growing out of tak- 
ing of land for the purpose of abolishing grade crossings in 
Middleborough. Pending. 

Milford Electric Light and Power Company, Attorney-General v. 
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for 
dissolution and the appointment of a receiver, under St. 1894, 
c. 476. Pending. 

Miners Savings Bank, Savings Bank Commissioners v. Petition 
to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for an 
injunction and the appointment of a receiver under the provi- 
sions of St. 1894, c. 317, § 6. Injunction issued. Pending. 

Minnesota Savings Fund Investment Company v. Treasurer of the 
Commonwealth. Bill in equity in Superior Court for Suffolk 
County, asking for distribution of certain funds in the hands 
of the State Treasurer. Marshal P. Thompson appointed 
master. Pending. 



lxxxvi ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Morgan, Jay H., Lyman School for Boys v. Action of contract 
for services of boy placed out by trustees. Pending. 

Munkley, James A., v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy. 
Petition for a writ of certiorari. Hearing before a single 
justice and reserved for full court. Petition dismissed. 
See 60 N. E. Rep. 413. 

Murphy, Clarence, v. Commonwealth. Petition to the Supreme 
Judicial Court for a writ of error. Argued before full bench. 
Decision ordering sentence to be reversed and petitioner to be 
resentenced under the law as it was prior to the passage of St. 
1895, c. 504. Reported in 172 Mass. 264. Prisoner sen- 
tenced accordingly. Exceptions taken. Argued before full 
bench. Exceptions overruled. Reported in 174 Mass. 369. 
Case taken to United States Supreme Court by writ of error. 
Writ denied. Reported in 177 U. S. 155. 

Netherlands Fire Insurance Company, Attorney-General ex rel. 
v. Violation of St. 1894, c. 522, § 20. Pending. 

New England Mutual Accident Association, petitioners. Petition 
for appointment of receiver. Thomas Weston, Esq., of Bos- 
ton, appointed receiver. Pending. 

Newburyport & Amesbury Horse Railroad Company. Railroad 
Commissioners' tax, 1899. Pending. 

New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, Bradford v. Claim 
for tide water displacement. Pending. 

Norfolk county commissioners, Attorney-General v. Petition for 
a writ of certiorari. Pending. 

Northeastern Indemnity Association, Attorney-General ex rel. v. 
Petition for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. 
Injunction issued, and F. C. Nash, Esq., appointed receiver. 
Pending. 

Northern Mutual Relief Association, Attorney-General ex rel. 
Insurance Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial 
Court for Suffolk County for an injunction and the appoint- 
ment of a receiver. Injunction granted, and Samuel H. Hud- 
son, of Boston, appointed receiver. Pending. 

Nutting, Charles H., v. Commonwealth. Writ of error in Supreme 
Court of the United States. Argued. Pending. 

O'Reily, Richard P., v. Samuel Dalton et ah. Petition to the 
Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for a writ of cer- 
tiorari, claiming want of jurisdiction by the board appointed 
under St. 1893, c. 367, § 65, in the matter of the reorganiza- 
tion of the Eighth Regiment of Infantry, M. V. M. Pend- 
ing. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxxxvii 

Page, Herbert S., et a/., petitioners. Petition to the Probate 
Court for Suffolk County for the appointment of a guardian 
for Alvin Page, an insane person chargeable to the State. 
Pending. 

Parker, George. Claim for tide water displacement. Pending. 

Peare, George R., v. Socialist Labor Party. Petition to the Mu- 
nicipal Court for Suffolk County for an iuquest, under St. 
1898, c. 548, § 305. Pending. 

Pentila, Andrew, v. Bekkila Helgias and Joseph H. Scott (super- 
intendent of the Massachusetts Reformatory). An action of 
tort in the District Court for Middlesex County. Pending. 

Phoenix Rattan Company et al., Joseph F. Scott (superintendent) v. 
Action of contract in the Superior Court for Suffolk County. 
Company petitioned into insolvency after entry of writ. 
Edgar N. Hill, Esq., of Boston and Joseph F. Scott, Esq., of 
Concord, appointed assignees. Claim proved. Pending. 

Pittsfield Electric Street Railway Company. Petition by the Com- 
monwealth for alteration of tracks of said railroad in Dal ton. 
Pending. 

Provident Savings Life Assurance Society of New York v. Fred- 
erick L. Cutting, Insurance Commissioner. Petition for a 
writ of mandamus. Hearing on demurrer. Reserved for full 
court. Pending. 

Rice, Fannie. Claim for board in Westborough Insane Hospital. 
Pending. 

St. Francis Benefit Association, Attorney-General v. Petition for 
injunction for failure to file return required by St. 1899, c. 
442. No action taken. 

St. Jean Baptiste Society of North Adams, Attorney-General v. 
Petition for injunction for failure to file return required by 
St. 1899, c. 442. Return filed. 

Sargent, Clara J., v. State Board of Lunacy and Charity. Supe- 
rior Court, Essex County. Appeal on a complaint charging 
neglect of children under St. 1882, c. 181. Pending. 

Security Savings Bank, Board of Savings Bank Commissioners v. 
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for 
an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction 
granted. Pending. 

Simonds, Joel H., v. Massachusetts School for Feeble-minded et 
als. Petition for an injunction and assessment of damages 
caused by flowage of land. Pending. 

Smith, Maurice, v. Commonwealth. Petition for a writ of error 
to the Superior Court to revise sentence. Pending. 



lxxxviii ATTORKEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Smith, Henry O., et als. v. Inhabitants of Leicester and the Com- 
monwealth. Bill in equity in the Superior Court for Worcester 
County to restrain town officers from raising money to pay 
expenses for damages caused by construction of State high- 
way in Leicester. Settled. i 

Sibley, Richard C. Claim for tide water displacement. Pending. 

South Shore Masonic Mutual Relief Association of Massachusetts, 
Insurance Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial 
Court for Suffolk County, under St, 1895, c. 340, for an in- 
junction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction 
issued and J. H. Flint appointed receiver. Pending. 

Stone, Joseph, Bradford v. Claim for tide water displacement. 
Pending. 

Storti, Luigi, v. Commonwealth. Petition to the Supreme Judicial 
Court for a writ of error to Superior Court and a writ of habeas 
corpus to the Commonwealth. Reserved for the full court and 
petition dismissed. 

Storti, Luigi, v. Commonwealth. Petition to the Supreme Judicial 
Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Petition denied. 

Storti, Luigi, v. Commonwealth. Petition to the Circuit Court of 
the United States for a writ of habeas corpus. Hearing and 
petition denied. Appeal taken to the Supreme Court of the 
United States. Decree of Circuit Court affirmed. 

Storti, Luigi, petitioner. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court 
for a writ of habeas corpus. Hearing and petition denied. 
Reserved to full court. Petition dismissed. 

Storti, Luigi, petitioner, for writ of habeas corpus. Petition to the 
United States Circuit Court. Petition dismissed. Appeal 
taken to the Supreme Court of the United States. Decree of 
Circuit Court affirmed. 

Suffolk Mutual Accident Association, Insurance Commissioner v. 
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for 
an injunction and the appointment of a receiver, under the 
provisions of St. 1896, c. 515, § 6. Injunction issued, and 
George S. Merrill appointed receiver. Pending. 

Suffolk Masonic Mutual Relief Association, Attorney-General v. 
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for an 
injunction and the appointment of a receiver, under St. 1899, 
c. 442, § 24. Injunction granted, and Edward T. Pigeon, Esq., 
secretary of the association, appointed receiver. Pending. 

Suffolk Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Insurance Commissioner 
v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County 
for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver, under the 
provisions of St. 1894, c. 522, § 7. Injunction issued, and 
James C. Davis, Esq., appointed receiver. Pending. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. lxxxix 

Sun Indemnity Assurance Society, Attorney-General v. Petition 
for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunc- 
tion issued, and Prescott Keyes, Esq., appointed receiver. 
Pending. 

Supreme Council of United Fellowship, Insurance Commissioner v. 
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, 
under St. 1895, c. 340, for an injunction and the appointment 
of a receiver. Injunction issued, and Oliver Storer, Esq., of 
Boston, appointed receiver. Pending. 

Taylor, Edgar B., et al. v. Robert Wilson and the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts. Action of contract. Pending. 

Thuringer Fire Insurance Company v. Commonwealth et al. Bill 
in equity in the Supreme Judicial Court to require the Treasurer 
of the Commonwealth to transfer to the company certain 
deposits. Decree. 

Titcomb, George H., v. Cape Cod Ship Canal Company, George 
A. Maiden, Treasurer, et al. Petition for injunction to re- 
strain the Treasurer of the Commonwealth from the payment 
of money under St. 1883, c. 259, and St. 1891, c. 397. 
Pending. 

Trehy, John W., Attorney-General ex rel. Board of Civil Service 
Commissioners v. Information in the nature of quo warranto 
to try the respondent's title to the office of almoner of the 
city of Chicopee. Reserved for the Supreme Judicial Court. 

United Industrials. Petition for failure to file return required by 
St. 1884, c. 330. Pending. 

Ware, Worcester Lunatic Hospital v. Action of contract for the 
board of Hiram L. Wood, a patient in said hospital. Re- 
ferred to the district attorney. Pending. 

Wattles, Joseph W., Jr., et als., Attorney-General v. Petition 
for an injunction to restrain the selectmen of Canton from 
laying out and widening Washington Street in Canton. (This 
petition was abandoned.) 

Wells, Frank H. Claim for tide water displacement. Pend- 
ing. 

White, Etta W., petitioner. Petition to the Supreme Judicial 
Court for Suffolk County for release from the Westborough 
Insane Asylum. Remanded to asylum. Reported to Supreme 
Judicial Court. 

Wildey Casualty Company, Attorney-General ex rel. Insurance 
Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for 
Suffolk County for an injunction and the appointment of a 
receiver. Injunction granted, and Archie N. Frost, Esq., 
of Lawrence, appointed receiver. Pending. 



xc ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Williams, Henry Bigelow, et al. v. Attorney-General. Petition 
to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of error 
to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Pending. 

Woburn, Board of Public Works of, Commonwealth v. Viola- 
tion of civil service rules. Referred to the district attorney. 
Pending. 

Wolf, Herman, v. Boston, Suffolk County. Damage to horse, 
caused by cave-in of street during the laying of pipes by the 
Metropolitan Water Board. Settled. 

Wollaston Land Association. Claim for tide water displacement. 
Pending. 

World Accident Insurance Company, Attorney-General ex rel. 
Insurance Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial 
Court for Suffolk County for an injunction and the appoint- 
ment of a receiver. Injunction issued, and Thomas N. 
Perkins, of Boston, appointed receiver. Pending. 



1902.] 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



xci 



COLLECTIONS. 



Collections have been made by this department as follows : — 

Corporation taxes for the year 1900, overdue and referred 
by the Treasurer of the Commonwealth to the Attorney- 
General for collection, $164,177 92 

Interest on same at penal rate of six per cent., . . . 1,419 22 

Costs, 882 93 

Miscellaneous, 7,823 34 

Total, $174,303 41 

The following table shows a detailed statement of the same : — 





Collected on 








Corporation Tax 


Interest. 


Total. 




for 1900. 






A. A. Mills Companv, . 


$705 96 


S3 53 


$709 49 


A B. & E. L. Shaw Company, 


771 49 


11 57 


783 06 


A. F. Towle & Son Company, 


1,250 85 


20 43 


1,271 28 


A. M McPhail Piano Company, . 


1,065 24 


- 


1,065 24 


A. L. Lewis Company, . 


112 98 


- 


112 98 


A. T. Fairbanks Confectionery 








Company, 


30 02 


- 


30 02 


Abram French Company, 


6,456 00 


216 41 


6,672 41 


Agawam Ice Company, 


64 56 


1 10 


65 66 


American Citizen Company, 


80 70 


80 


81 50 


American Collection Agency, 


16 14 


10 


16 24 


American Cultivator Publishing 








Company, ..... 


161 40 


4 18 


165 58 


Amesbury & Hampton Street 








Railway Company, . 


807 00 


4 03 


811 03 


Amesbury & Salisbury Gas Com- 








panv, ...... 


416 41 


6 25 


422 66 


Atlantic Telegraph Company of 








Massachusetts, .... 


80 70 


- 


80 70 


Austin & Winslow-Gallagher Ex- 








press Company, 


60 52 


1 01 


61 53 


Austin Furniture Company, . 


291 97 


5 82 


297 79 


B. L. Bragg Company, . 


403 50 


7 77 


411 27 


Barbour-Stockwell Companv, 


161 40 


2 49 


163 89 


Bav State Chair Company, Incor- 








porated, 


140 41 


2 53 


142 94 


Bay State Construction Company, 


25 82 


13 


25 95 



xcii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S KEPOET. 



[Jan. 



Collected on 

Account of 

Corporation Tax 

for 1900. 



Interest. 



Bay State Cordage Company, 

Bay State Gas Company, 

Bay State Improved Box Com 

pany, 

Bay State Metal Works, 
Beach & Clarridge Company, 
Belisle Printing and Publishing 

Company, .... 
Biddle & Smart Company, . 
Blake Manufacturing Company, 
Block Plant Electric Light Com 

pany, 

Blue Hill Granite Company, 
Bolles & Wilde Company, 
Bon Marche Dry Goods Company 
Boston Advertising Company, 
Boston Asphalt Company, . 
Boston Book Company, 
Boston Cycle Company, 
Boston Dental M an uf acturing 

Company, .... 
Boston Fire Brick and Clay Retort 

Manufacturing Company, 
Boston Furnace Company, . 
Boston Gas Light Company, 
Boston Ice Cream Company, 
Boston Paper Mills Company, 
Boston Paving Company, 
Boston Steel and Iron Company, 
Boston Stitching and Plating Com 

pany, . . 
Boston Traveller Company, 
Brackett's Market Corporation, 
Brockway-Smith Corporation, 
Brookfiefd Brick Company, . 
Brooks Bank Note Company, 
Brown & Simonds Company, 
Bryant Boot and Shoe Company 
Bui lard Camera Company, . 
C. F. Eddy Company, . 
C. F. Sampson Manufacturing 

Company, .... 
C. W. Tappan Shoe Company, 
Campello Leather Company, 
Carlow & Putnam Company, 
Charles A. White Company, 
Charles E. Lauriat Company, 
Charles T. Brown Company, 
Chelsea Express Despatch Com 

pany, 

Chequasset Lumber Company, 
Chicopee Falls Wheel Company, 



1224 34 
23,304 54 

117 82 
225 96 
637 53 

48 42 
106 52 

80 70 

23 00 

222 48 

508 41 

1,049 10 

19 36 

371 22 

1,210 50 

193 «8 

161 40 

547 14 
121 05 
2,353 21 
161 40 
48 42 
155 75 
344 58 

48 42 
995 43 

100 87 
774 72 
151 71 
779 23 
290 52 
148 48 
613 32 
388 97 

222 73 

379 29 
145 26 
80 70 
24 21 
928 05 
790 86 

80 70 

1,614 00 

44 38 



*1 
100 

1 
7 



12 



17 00 



24 

59 
30 



1 11 

8 47 
7 34 
33 
1 86 
11 71 
3 22 

1 bb 

5 02 

1 77 

10 20 

1 42 



11 

1 
26 



60 
17 

73 
57 
60 
23 
78 
12 
55 
62 
50 



32 



42 
50 
99 

61 
19 

88 



8225 46 
23,405 52 

119 23 
233 36 
654 53 

48 66 
108 11 

*2 00 

23 00 
223 59 
516 88 

1,056 44 

19 69 

373 08 

1,222 21 

196 90 

162 95 

552 16 

122 82 

2,363 4L 

162 82 

48 42 
158 35 
349 75 

49 15 

1,017 00 
102 47 
785 95 
152 49 
782 35 
295 07 
149 10 
622 82 
388 97 

222 73 

385 61 

145 26 

80 70 

24 63 
934 55 
802 85 

82 31 

1,640 19 
45 26 



1902.] 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



xcm 





Collected on 
Account of 








Corporation Tax 


Interest, 


Total. 




for 1900. 






Child & Acme Cutter and Press 








Company, 


$145 26 


$2 18 


|147 44 


Childs & Kent Express Company, 


71 01 


1 35 


72 36 


Clicquot Club Bottling and Ex- 








tract Company, 


145 26 


1 25 


146 51 


Coates Clipper Manufacturing 








Company 


218 69 


3 29 


221 98 


Cobb-Eastman Company, 


798 93 


13 45 


812 38 


Coburn Stationery Company, 


35 50 


58 


36 08 


Colcord Richardson Company, 


43 57 


22 


43 79 


Columbia Electric Company, 


137 19 


2 20 


139 39 


Columbia Electric Engineering 








Company, 


16 14 


07 


16 21 


Columbia Engineering Company, 


116 20 


2 21 


118 41 


Conway Electric Street Railway 








Company, 


395 67 


6 19 


401 86 


Cottager Company, 


193 68 


2 90 


196 58 


Couch &Seeley Company, . 


145 26 


2 26 


147 52 


Craig & Craig Company, 


242 10 


4 05 


246 15 


Cunningham Lumber Company, . 


121 05 


2 32 


123 37 


Curtis & Pope Lumber Company, 


3,197 33 


31 97 


3,229 30 


D. M. Hazen Company, 


113 78 


57 


114 35 


Dalton Ingersoll Company, . 


2,106 27 


9 47 


2,115 74 


Damon Brick Company, 


146 14 


5 59 


151 73 


Danvers Gas Light Company, 


121 05 


80 


121 85 


David Myers Company, 


80 70 


1 25 


81 95 


Davis & Buxton Stamping Com- 








pany 


30 66 


- 


30 66 


DeSilva Morine Company, . 


24 21 


27 


24 48 


Donahoe's Magazine Company, . 


141 22 


1 41 


142 63 


Dudley Feed Mills Company/ 


322 80 


- 


322 80 


Dudley Mills 


105 71 


80 


106 51 


Dunne Lyceum Bureau, 


16 14 


21 


16 35 


Durgin Grocery and Provision 








Company, 


16 14 


33 


16 47 


E. D. Shadduck Company, . 


116 20 


1 74 


117 94 


E. H Saxton Company, 


161 40 


2 68 


164 08 


E P. Sanderson Company, . 


847 35 


9 73 


857 08 


E. W. Noyes Company, 


100 87 


2 27 


103 14 


East Douglas Co-operative Asso- 








ciation, . . . ... 


20 17 


03 


20 20 


Eastern Bridge and Structural 








Company, 


973 24 


4 86 


978 10 


Eastern Cold Storage Company, . 


169 47 


85 


170 32 


Eastern Printing and Engraving 








Company, 


104 91 


1 92 


106 83 


Easton Street Railway Company, 


322 80 


2 48 


325 28 


Empire Shoe Company, 


181 57 


91 


182 48 


Essex Paper Company, 


147 93 


2 36 


150 29 


Everett Co-operative Association, 


80 70 


81 


81 51 


Fairhaven Iron Foundry Com- 








pany, 


46 00 


■" 


46 00 



xciv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Collected on 

Account of 

Corporation Tax 

for 1900. 



Interest. 



Farrington Printing* Company, 
Ferd F. French & Co., Limited, 
Fifield Tool Company, . 
Fosslitch Leather Company, 
Frank H. Hall Company, 
Franklin Educational Company, 
Frederick Kendall Company, 
French Carriage Company,". 
Gardner Gas Fuel and Light Com 

pany, 

Garratt-Ford Company, 
George H. Corbett Company, 
George H. Wood Company, . 
George P. Staples & Co., Incor 

porated, .... 
Georgetown, Rowley & Ipswich 

Street Railway Company, 
Gilman Snow Guard Company, 
Gowdy & Remington Shoe Com 

pany, 

Graham Shoe Company, 

Graton & Knight Manufacturing 

Company, .... 
Greenfield Recorder Company, 
Gregory & Brown Company, 
Grueby Faience Company, . 
H. B. Smith Companj--, . 
H. B. Stevens Company, 
H. F. Ross Company, . 
Hanover Printing Company, 
Haverhill, Georgetown & Dan 

vers Street Railway Company, 
Heliotype Printing Company, 
Hendee Manufacturing Company 
Henry Woods Sons Company, 
Henry C. King Company, . 
Henry N. Clark Company, . 
Highland Foundiw Company, 
Home Guaranty Mutual Insur 

ance Company, . 
Horton Manufacturing Company 
Hub Hosiery Mills, . '. 
International Jupiter Steel Com 

pany, 

Interstate Law Company, 

Iowa Light, Heat and Power 

Company, .... 
J. A. Cummings Printing Com 

pany, 

J A. Glass Company, . 

J. E. Peckham Manufacturing 

Company, 



$56 49 
1,210 50 

335 06 

225 96 
45 19 
50 00 
16 14 

649 63 

202 36 

193 68 

96 84 

145 26 

726 30 

2,020 72 
40 35 

242 10 
242 10 

11,785 42 

80 7o 

338 94 

161 40 

3,114 21 

251 78 

443 85 

32 28 

1,089 45 

246 94 

77 47 

306 66 

322 80 

726 30 

256 62 

484 20 
16 14 
80 70 

242 10 
24 21 

96 84 

90 38 

181 57 

80 70 



$0 34 

13 72 

6 37 

2 03 
72 

1 55 
26 

3 25 


3 04 
3 98 


2 18 


13 80 


11 11 

60 


3 75 


1 21 

2 65 
2 58 


5 95 
3 55 

72 


5 40 
1 56 

30 


2 72 
5 45 
1 28 


7 25 
26 
41 


3 75 


3 97 


1 48 
3 14 


1 31 



$56 83 

1,224 22 

341 43 

227 99 

45 91 

51 55 

16 40 

652 88 



205 40 

197 66 

96 84 

147 44 

740 10 

2,031 83 
40 95 

242 10 
245 85 

11,785 42 

81 91 

341 59 

163 98 

3,114 21 

257 73 

447 40 

33 00 

1,094 85 

248 50 

77 77 

306 66 

325 52 

731 75 

257 90 

491 45 
16 40 

81 11 

245 85 
24 21 

100 81 

91 SQ 
184 71 

82 01 



1902.] 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



xcv 





Collected on 








Account of 








Corporation Tax 


Interest. 


Total. 




for 1900. 






J. II Keenan Company, 


$90 38 


$0 45 


$90 83 


J. H. Rogers Carriage Company, 


403 50 


2 02 


405 52 


J. H. Williams Wall Paper Com- 








pany 


80 70 


- 


80 70 


J. J. Warren Company, 


765 03 


3 57 


768 60 


J. P. & W. H. Emond, incorpo- 








rated, 


266 31 


6 39 


272 70 


James H. Lamb Company, . 


1,037 80 


19 00 


1,056 80 


John C DeLaney Moulding Com- 








pany 


171 08 


- 


171 08 


John Cavenaugh & Son Building 








Moving Company, . 


302 62 


4 53 


307 15 


Johnson Manufacturing Com- 








pany 


1,600 00 


20 69 


1,620 69 


Joss Brothers Company, 


121 05 


48 


121 53 


Journal Newspaper Company, . 


807 00 


3 63 


810 63 


Junction Water Company, . 


28 24 


50 


28 74 


Kearns & Co , incorporated, 


24 21 


48 


24 69 


Kelly Shoe Company, . 


112 98 


2 32 


115 30 


Kennedy & Sullivan Manufactur- 








ing Company, .... 


702 57 


7 02 


709 59 


Kimball & Carey Company, 


510 02 


5 61 


515 63 


Kimball Brothers Company, 


1,371 90 


27 68 


1,399 58 


Kinsley Iron and Machine Com- 








pany 


1,426 77 


14 27 


1,441 04 


Lang & Jacobs Company, . 


100 87 


1 91 


102 78 


Lawrence Supply Company, 


64 56 


- 


64 56 


Leicester Grocery Company, 


96 84 


1 21 


98 05 


Lewis F. Perry & Whitney Com- 








pany. 


847 35 


3 70 


851 05 


Lewis J. Bird Company, 


80 70 


65 


81 35 


Lexington Print Works, 


108 94 


- 


108 94 


Lynn Ice Company, 


800 54 


15 88 


816 42 


Lynn News Publishing Company, 


16 14 


31 


16 45 


Lyons Granite Company, 


83 92 


42 


84 34 


Mansfield Co-operative Furnace 








Company, 


8 87 


1 06 


9 93 


Martha's Vinevard Electric Light 








and Power Company, 


8 07 


16 


8 23 


Massachusetts Construction Com- 








pany 


1,289 42 


20 61 


1,310 03 


Massachusetts Investment Com- 








pany, 


161 40 


3 82 


165 22 


Massachusetts Telephone and 








Telegraph Company, 


161 40 


1 07 


162 47 


Mather Launch and Canoe Com- 








pany, 


74 24 


37 


74 61 


Meadow Brook Farm Company, . 


40 35 


65 


41 00 


Medford Manufacturing Com- 








pany, 


64 56 


32 


64 88 


Medway Electric Light and Power 








Company, 


80 70 


72 


81 42 



xcvi ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 





Collected on 








Account of 








Corporation Tax 


Interest. 


Total. 




for 1900. 






Hellish & Byfield, incorporated, . 


|524 55 


$9 51 


$534 06 


Merrill Piano Company, 


201 75 


3 73 


205 48 


Merrill Electric ( ompany, . 


89 57 


1 35 


90 92 


Metropolitan Bolt Company, 


48 42 


85 


49 27 


Milford, Attleborough and Woon- 








socket Street Railway Com- 








pany 


1,678 56 


- 


1,678 56 


Milford Rubber Company, . 


80 70 


- 


80 70 


Miller Brothers & Co., Corpora- 








tion, 


645 60 


10 00 


655 60 


Mills & Knight Company, . 


484 20 


5 80 


490 00 


Minards Liniment Manufacturing 








Company, 


480 97 


2 41 


483 38 


Miscoe Spring Water Company, . 


161 40 


1 24 


162 64 


Morrison Steamboat Company, . 


302 62 


- 


302 62 


Mystic Wharf and Storage Com- 








pany, 


1,171 76 


17 18 


1,188 94 


Natick Gas Light Company, 


190 45 


92 


191 37 


National Supply Company, . 


161 40 


81 


162 21 


New England Bolt and Nut Com- 








pany 


403 50 


2 42 


405 92 


New England Motor Company, . 


80 70 


1 38 


82 08 


New England Publishing Com- 








pany 


403 50 


2 02 


405 52 


New England Reed Company, 


66 17 


1 00 


67 17 


Newbury port Herald Company, . 


69 40 


76 


70 16 


Newton Machine Company, . 


20 17 


26 


20 43 


Nipmuck Paper Box Company, . 


50 03 


78 


50 81 


Norfolk Western Street Railway 








Company, 


363 15 


- 


363 15 


Norris Livery Company, 


80 70 


40 


81 10 


North Carolina Mica Company, . 


242 10 


- 


242 10 


Nute Hallett Company, 


36 31 


54 


36 85 


Oak Hall Clothing Company, 


1,251 65 


6 25 


1,257 90 


Oliver & Howland Company, 


303 43 


- 


303 43 


Olympic Amusement Company, . 


48 42 


1 64 


50 06 


Packard & Evans Company, 


121 05 


1 82 


122 87 


Peoples Combination Clothing 








Com pan} 7 , 


242 10 


3 63 


245 73 


Peoples Furniture Company, 


64 56 


1 03 


65 59 


Peoples Ice Company of Worces- 








ter, 


130 73 


1 96 


132 69 


Perkins Wood Working Company, 


76 66 


1 25 


77 91 


Persons Manufacturing Company, 


80 70 


80 


81 50 


Pilgrim Iron Foundry Company, . 


66 17 


1 19 


67 36 


Pittsfield Journal Company, 


64 56 


26 


64 82 


Planet Manufacturing Company, 


129 12 


2 07 


131 19 


Plymouth Rubber Company, 


43 57 


- 


43 57 


Plymouth Stove Foundry Com- 








pany, 


103 29 


1 07 


104 36 


Prentice Brothers Company, 


1,193 55 


13 12 


1,206 67 


Press Clipping Bureau, 


80 70 


1 04 


81 74 



1902,] 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



XCVll 





Collected on 








Account of 








Corporation Tax 


Interest. 


Total. 




for 1900. 






Putnam Company, 


$322 80 


$5 17 


$327 97 


R. A. Flanders Company, 


597 18 




597 18 


R. Guastavino Company, 


145 26 


1 88 


147 14 


R. H. Long Shoe Manufacturing 








Company, 


403 50 


7 88 


411 38 


Randal! Faichney Company, 


153 33 


2 42 


155 75 


Rawson & Morrison Manufactur- 








ing Company, .... 


1,005 52 


4 35 


1,009 87 


Re-New Lamp Company, 


161 40 


2 74 


164 14 


Rey croft Pharmacy Company, 


395 43 


4 57 


400 00 


Riverdale Woolen Company, 


40 51 


63 


41 14 


Robbins Spring Water Company, 


304 31 


- 


304 31 


Rocky Neck Marine Railway 








Company, 


192 06 


80 


192 86 


Rolf Provision and Grocery Com- 








pany, 


80 70 


1 37 


82 07 


S. Armstrong Company, 


185 61 


1 55 


187 16 


S. M. Howes Company, 


774 72 


3 87 


778 59 


Samuel Ward Company, 


919 98 


3 98 


923 96 


Scandinavian Importing Com- 








pany, 


484 20 


3 63 


487 83 


Seymour Knapp - Warren Com- 








pany 


20 17 


34 


20 51 


Shady Hill Nursery Company, . 


726 30 


10 89 


737 19 


Shedd & Crane Leather Company, 


807 00 


4 04 


811 04 


Silas Pierce & Company, limited, 


2,017 50 


12 10 


2,029 60 


Simons Hatch & Whitten Com- 








pany, 


3,228 00 


13 45 


3,241 45 


Slayter Jennings Company, . 


274 38 


1 60 


275 98 


Small, Maynard & Co., incorpo- 








rated, 


322 80 


4 84 


327 64 


Smith & Lovett Company, . 


322 80 


1 94 


324 74 


South Boston Gas Light Company, 


700 47 


3 03 


703 50 


Southbridge Optical Company, , 


193 68 


97 


194 Q5 


Springfield Construction Com- 








pany, 


142 03 


2 67 


144 70 


Springfield Elevator and Pump 








Company, 


160 75 


2 79 


163 54 


Springfield Supply Company, 


16 14 


- 


16 14 


Spy Company, .... 


161 40 


2 42 


163 82 


Standard Bottling and Extract 








Company, 


322 80 


3 62 


326 42 


Stockbridge Marble Company, 


62 94 


31 


63 25 


Stoughton Gas and Electric Com- 








pany, 


234 03 


3 51 


237 54 


Suffolk Engraving Company, 


72 63 


50 


73 13 


Swett & Lewis Company, . 


80 70 


_ 


80 70 


T. A. Morris Machine Company, . 


355 08 


- 


355 08 


T. A. Peterson Company, 


32 28 


20 


32 48 


T. F. Little Oil Company, . 


73 84 


1 20 


75 04 


Tarbett Phemister Company, 


88 77 


88 


89 65 


Taunton Evening News, 


32 28 


1 47 


33 75 



xcviii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 





Collected on 








Account of 








Corporation Tax 


Interest. 


Total. 




for 1900. 






Thayer Woolen Company, . 


$978 08 


#4 02 


$982 10 


Thomas F. Phillips Company, 


153 33 


3 67 


157 00 


Thorp & Martin Company, . 


435 78 


2 61 


438 39 


Tileston Brothers Shoe Company, 


242 10 


2 42 


244 52 


Title Research and Credit Com- 








pany, 


19 36 


- 


19 36 


Townsend Co-operative Broom 








Company, 


22 59 


- 


22 59 


Victor R. F. Walker Company, . 


16 14 


2 25 


18 39 


W. E. Rice Company, . 


225 96 


4 52 


230 48 


W. S. Quimby Company, 


1,149 97 


17 19 


1,167 16 


Wachusett Mills, . 


137 19 


2 46 


139 65 


Wade & Reed Company, 


48 20 


- 


48 20 


Walton & Logan Compan}^, . 


403 50 


1 95 


405 45 


Warren, Brookfield & Spencer 








Street Railway Company, 


1,020 04 


5 10 


1,025 14 


Wason Manufacturing Company, 


1,394 49 


6 97 


1,401 46 


Weber Leather Company, . 


645 60 


2 79 


648 39 


Western Union Telegraph Com- 








pany, 


15,943 38 


63 77 


16,007 15 


Westfield Manufacturing Com- 








pany, 


83 84 


1 26 


85 10 


Weymouth & Braintree Publish- 








ing Company, .... 


32 28 


52 


32 80 


Weymouth Seam Face Granite 








Company, 


101 68 


2 03 


103 71 


Whitall Manufacturing Company, 


758 58 


4 42 


763 00 


Whitney Jewelry Company, 


40 35 


60 


40 95 


William H. Burns Company, 


2,111 11 


28 50 


2,139 61 


William S. Hills Company, . 


807 00 


4 71 


811 71 


Woburn Light, Heat and Power 








Company, 


496 46 


8 43 


504 89 


Woodward & Brown Piano Com- 








pany, 


60 52 


1 93 


62 45 


Worcester Gazette Company, 


48 42 


25 


48 67 


Worcester Last Company, . 


80 70 


1 26 


81 96 


Worcester Optical Company, 


83 92 


1 26 


85 18 


Xylite Lubricating Company, 


96 84 


1 52 


98 36 


Ziegler Electric Company, . 


484 20 


15 17 


499 37 




$164,177 92 


$1,419 22 


$165,597 14 



Miscellaneous Collections. 

Adams Electric Light and Power Company, Gas and Electric 

Light Commissioners 1 tax, $11 65 

American Cultivator Publishing Company, fee for filing cer- 
tificates of condition, 10 00 

American Marble Company, fee for filing certificate of condi- 
tion 5 00 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xcix 

Amesbury Opera House Company, fee for filing certificates of 

condition, $10 00 

Amherst Gas Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00 

Arlington Co-operative Association, fee for filing certificate 

of condition, 10 00 

Ayer Light and. Power Company, fee for filing certificate of 

condition, 5 00 

Bay State Improved Box Company, fee for filing certificate 

of condition, 5 00 

Bay State Metal Works, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00 

Beacon Manufacturing Company, fee for filing certificate of 
condition, 5 00 

Belisle Printing and Publishing Company, fee for filing cer- 
tificate of condition, 5 00 

Blake Manufacturing Company, fee for filing certificate of 

condition, 5 00 

Block Plant Electric Light Company, fee for filing certificate 

of condition, 5 00 

Block Plant Electric Light Company, Gas and Electric Light 

Commissioners , tax for 1900, 25 54 

Blue Hill Granite Company, fee for filing certificate of condi- 
tion, 5 00 

Boston Advertising Company, fee for filing certificate of con- 
dition, 5 00 

Boston Oregon Mast Company, fee for filing certificate of 

condition, 5 00 

Boston Paving Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00 

Boston Spar Company, fee for filing certificates of condition, 10 00 

Boston Thread and Twine Company, fee for filing certificate 

of condition, • 5 00 

Boston Trading and Export Company, fee for filing certificate 

of condition, 5 00 

Boston Traveller Company, fee for filing certificate of condi- 
tion, ' 5 00 

Brookfield Brick Company, fee for filing certificate of condi- 
tion 5 00 

C. A. Edgarton Manufacturing Company, fee for filing cer- 
tificate of condition, 5 00 

Carlow & Putnam Company, fee for filing certificate of condi- 
tion, 5 00 

Carter, Rice & Co. Corporation, fee for filing certificate of 

condition, 5 00 

Charman, Ellen, estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . . 978 00 

Chelsea, assessment for tide water displaced, .... 59 21 

Columbia Electric Company, fee for filing certificate of condi- 
tion, 5 00 

Connecticut Steam Stone Company, fee for filing certificate 

of condition, 5 00 



c ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Conway Electric Street Railway Company, Railroad Commis- 
sioners' tax for 1900, $4 40 

Crescent Worsted Company, fee for filing certificate of con- 
dition 5 00 

Cross, Anna B , estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . . 124 91 

Daily News Company, fee for filing certificate of condi- 
tion, 5 00 

Damon Safe and Iron Works Company, fee for filing certifi- 
cate of condition, 5 00 

Dean, Charles W., & Co., Massachusetts Reformatory claim, . 25 00 

Donoghue, Ann, board at Danvers Insane Asylum, . . . 130 88 

Dudley Mills, fee for filing certificate of condition, . 5 00 

East Douglas Co-operative Association, fee for filing certifi- 
cates of condition, 10 00 

Eastern Electric Company, fee for filing certificate of condi- 
tion, 5 00 

Eastern Printing and Engraving Company, fee for filing cer- 
tificate of condition, 5 00 

Eckley, Julia A., estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . . 122 92 

Edison Electric Illuminating Company, assessment for tide 
water displaced, 722 25 

Fisher Churchill Company, fee for filing certificate of condi- 
tion, 5 00 

Fisk Rubber Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00 

Fiske Wharf aad Warehouse Company, fee for filing certifi- 
cate of condition, 5 00 

Fosslitch Leather Company, fee for filing certificate of condi- 
tion, 5 00 

Fitchburg Machine Works, fee for filing certificate of condi- 
tion, 5 00 

Frank H. Hall Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00 

Franklin Educational Campany, fee for filing certificate of 

condition, 5 00 

Fraser Dry Goods Company, fee for filing certificate of con- 5 00 

dition, 5 00 

Fowler Automatic Draft Regulator and Ventilator Company, 

fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00 

Gardner Gas Fuel and Light Company, Gas and Electric Light 

Commissioners' tax for 1900, 12 46 

Gardner Music Hall Company, fee for filing certificate of 

condition, 5 00 

George D.Emerson Company, fee for filing certificate of con- 
dition, 5 00 

Gilman Snow Guard Company, fee for filing certificate of 

condition, 5 00 

Greenfield Machine Company, fee for filing certificate of 
condition, 5 00 

George P. Staples & Co., incorporated, fee for filing certifi- 
cate of condition, 5 00 



1902,] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. ci 

Glasgow Manufacturing Company, fee for filing certificate of 

condition, §5 00 

Grafton Electric Company, penalty for failure to file annual 

report with Gas Commissioners on time, .... 10 00 

H. M. Kinports Company, corporation taxes, 1897 and 1898, . 258 76 

Hero Cough Syrup Company, fee for tiling certificate of con- 
dition, 5 00 

Heroux the Clothier, incorporated, fee for filing certificate of 

condition, 5 00 

Hill, Whitney & Wood Company, fee for filing certificate of 
condition, 5 00 

Hobbs Manufacturing Company, interest on corporation tax, 

1900, v 1 32 

Holbrook, Susan J., estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . 117 50 

Holyoke Fire Insurance Company, return premium in re 

J. F. Sullivan, 14 84 

Interstate Law Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00 

Iowa Light, Heat and Power Company, Gas and Electric Light 

Commissioners' tax for 1900, 2 38 

Iowa Light, Heat and Power Company, fee for filing certifi- 
cate of condition, 5 00 

J. P. Jordan Paper Company, fee for filing certificates of con- 
dition, 10 00 

John F. Nickerson Company, fee for filing certificate of con- 
dition, 5 00 

Kearns & Co., incorporated, fee for filing certificate of 
condition, 5 00 

Kelly Shoe Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, . 5 00 

Lamprey Boiler Furnace Mouth Protector Company, fee for 

filing certificate of condition, 5 00 

Lyons Granite Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00 

Lyford, Mary V., estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . . 85 62 

Lyons & Alexander Company, fee for filing certificate of con- 
dition, 5 00 

Mansfield Co-operative Furnace Company, fee for filing cer- 
tificates of condition, 10 00 

Massachusetts Investment Company, fee for filing certificates 

of condition, 10 00 

Massachusetts Masonic Life Association, care and custody of 

deposits, 13 

Massachusetts Telephone and Telegraph Company, fee for 

filing certificate of condition, 5 00 

Massachusetts Title Insurance Company, fee for filing certi- 
ficate of condition, 5 00 

McDonald, John A., petitioner for writ of error, costs of 

appeal 20 00 

Meany, Thomas, use of Commonwealth's land in South Boston, 10 00 

Medfield Electric Light and Power Company, fee for filing 

certificate of condition, 5 00 



cii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Merchants and Farmers Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 

return premium in re J. F. Sullivan, $18 00 

Merick, Helen M., estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . . 81 42 

Merrimack Clothing Company, fee for filing certificate of 
condition, 5 00 

Middleby Oven Company, fee for filing certificate of condi- 
tion, 5 00 

Montague Co-operative Creamery Association, fee for filing 

certificate of condition, 5 00 

Moore Coombs Company, corporation tax for 1899, . . 110 46 

Morning Mail Corporation, fee for filing certificate of condi- 
tion, 5 00 

Natick Citizen Printing Company, fee for filing certificate of 

condition, 5 00 

Natick Gas Light Company , fee for filing certificate of con- 
dition, 5 00 

New England Pharmacal Company, fee for filing certificate 
of condition, 5 00 

New England Rubber Company, fee for filing certificates of 

condition, 10 00 

New England & Savannah Steamship Company, fee for filing 

certificate of condition, 5 00 

New England Dredging Company, fee for filing certificate of 

condition, 5 00 

Norfolk Blanket Cleansing Company, fee for filing certificate 

of condition, 5 00 

Nute Hallett Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00 

Old Colony Boot and Shoe Company, fee for filing certificates 

of condition for 1901 10 00 

P. P. Emory Manufacturing Company, fee for filing certifi- 
cate of condition, 5 00 

Pittsfield Coal Gas Company, penalty for failure to file annual 
report with Gas Commissioners on time, .... 30 00 

Perry Laundry Company, fee for riling certificate of condition, 5 00 

Pittsfield Manufacturing Company, fee for filing certificate of 

condition, o 00 

Plymouth Stove Foundry Company, fee for filing certificate 

of condition, 5 00 

Randall Faichney Company, fee for filing certificate of con- 
dition, 5 00 

Reliance Manufacturing Company, fee for filing certificate of 

condition, 5 00 

Rice Kendall Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00 

Robbins Spring Water Company, fee for filing certificate of 

condition, 5 00 

Robinson Iron Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00 

Rochdale Hall Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00 

Rudd, Alice A., estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . . 11150 

Sandy Bay Pier Company, fee for filing certificate of condi- 
tion, 5 00 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. ciii 

Sargent, William M., Gas and Electric Light Commissioners' 

tax for 1900 $1 77 

Shad}' Hill Nursery Company, fee for filing certificates of 

condition, 10 00 

Simonds Rolling Machine Company, fee for filing certificate 

of condition, 5 00 

Slater Woolen Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00 

Small, Maynard & Co., incorporated, fee for filing certificate 

of condition, 5 00 

Stoughton Gas and Electric Company, penalty for failure to 

file annual report with Gas Commissioners on time, . . 5 00 

South Hadley Falls Electric Light Company, penalty for fail- 
ure to file annual report with Gas Commissioners on time, 5 00 
Smith, John M., estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . . 100 00 
Springfield Construction Company, fee for filing certificates 

of condition, 10 00 

Springfield Drop Forging Company, fee for filing certificate 

of condition, 5 00 

Springfield Elevator and Pump Company, fee for filing cer- 
tificate of condition, 5 00 

Stone, E. C.,for board of Roger Stone at Westborough Insane 

Hospital, , 87 85 

Steam and Power Company of Boston, penalty for failure to 

file report with Gas Commissioners on time, ... 10 00 
Sutton Cranberry Company, fee for filing certificate of condi- 
tion, 5 00 

Taunton Evening News, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00 
Thomas, Jane G., estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . . 117 50 
Union Desk Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, . 5 00 
Union Furniture Company, fee for filing certificate of condi- 
tion, 5 00 

University City Laundering Company, fee for filing certificate 

of condition, 5 00 

Uxbridge Cotton Mills, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00 

W. E. Rice Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, . 5 00 

Wade & Reed Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, 5 00 

Watertown Machine Compan} T , fee for filing certificates of 

condition, - 10 00 

Weber Leather Company, fee for filing certificate of condi- 
tion, ..." 5 00 

Wheelman Company, fee for filing certificate of condition, . 5 00 

Whitney, Henry M., for tide water displaced in Charles River, 3,314 95 
White, Holman & Co., assessment for tide water displaced, . 307 60 
Woburn Light, Heat and Power Company, Gas and Electric 

Light Commissioners 1 tax for 1900, 74 42 

Woodbury, Anna M., estate of, collateral inheritance tax, . 400 00 
Worcester Fire Appliance Company, fee for filing certificate 

of condition, 5 00 

$7,823 34 



CIV 



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Grand larceny, .... 
Obtaining goods by false pretences, 

Complaint 

Bigamy 


Grand larceny, .... 

Burglary, 

Obtaining property by false pretences 

Escaped convict 

Burglary, 

Larceny, 


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Luther H. Bailey, 
N. Fisher, alias Frede 
James Wade, 
Anthony Koch, . 


Louis R. Procke, 
Thomas A. Packard, 
A.G.Marshall, . 
John McLaughin, 
Henry L. Harrison, 
Jeannette Brooks, 


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New York, 
Illinois, 

Ohio 

Illinois, 
New York, 
Kentucky, . 
New Hampshire, 
Ohio, . 
New York, 
Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, . 


Date 

of 
Refer- 
ence. 




1901. 

Feb. 5, 

March 24 
May 11 
May G 
Julv 9 


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cviii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



RULES OF PRACTICE IN INTERSTATE 
RENDITION. 



Every application to the Governor for a requisition upon the ex- 
ecutive authority of any other State or Territory, for the delivery 
up and return of any offender who has fled from the justice of this 
Commonwealth, must be made by the district or prosecuting attor- 
ney for the county or district in which the offence was committed, 
and must be in duplicate original papers, or certified copies thereof. 

The following must appear by the certificate of the district or 
prosecuting attorney : — 

(a) The full name of the person for whom extradition is asked, 
together with the name of the agent proposed, to be properly 
spelled. 

(b) That, in his opinion, the ends of public justice require that 
the alleged criminal be brought to this Commonwealth for trial, at 
the public expense. 

(c) That he believes he has sufficient evidence to secure the 
conviction of the fugitive. 

(d) That the person named as agent is a proper person, and 
that he has no private interest in the arrest of the fugitive. 

(e) If there has been any former application for a requisition 
for the same person, growing out of the same transaction, it must 
be so stated, with an explanation of the reasons for a second 
request, together with the date of such application, as near as may 
be. 

(/) If the fugitive is known to be under either civil or criminal 
arrest in the State or Territory to which he is alleged to have fled, 
the fact of such arrest and the nature of the proceedings on which 
it is based must be stated. 

(g) That the application is not made for the purpose of enforc- 
ing the collection of a debt, or for any private purpose whatever ; 
and that, if the requisition applied for be granted, the criminal 
proceedings shall not be used for any of said objects. 

(h) The nature of the crime charged, with a reference, when 
practicable, to the particular statute defining and punishing the 
same. 



1902.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT— No. 12. cix 

(?) If the offence charged is not of recent occurrence, a satis- 
factory reason must be given for the delay in making the applica- 
tion. 

1. In all cases of fraud, false pretences, embezzlement or for- 
gery, when made a crime by the common law, or any penal code 
or statute, the affidavit of the principal complaining witness or in- 
formant, that the application is made in good faith, for the sole 
purpose of punishing the accused, and that he does not desire or 
expect to use the prosecution for the purpose of collecting a debt, 
or for any private purpose, and will not directly or indirectly use 
the same for any of said purposes, shall be required, or a sufficient 
reason given for the absence of such affidavit. 

2. Proof by affidavit of facts and circumstances satisfying the 
Executive that the alleged criminal has fled from the justice of the 
State, and is in the State on whose Executive the demand is 
requested to be made, must be given. The fact that the alleged 
criminal was in the State where the alleged crime was committed 
at the time of the commission thereof, and is found in the State 
upon which the requisition was made, shall be sufficient evidence, 
in the absence of other proof, that he is a fugitive from justice. 

3. If an indictment has been found, certified copies, in dupli- 
cate, must accompany the application. 

4. If an indictment has not been found by a grand jury, the 
facts and circumstances showing the commission of the crime 
charged, and that the accused perpetrated the same, must be 
shown by affidavits taken before a magistrate. (A notary public 
is not a magistrate within the meaning of the statutes.) It must 
also be shown that a complaint has been made, copies of which 
must accompany the requisition, such complaint to be accompa- 
nied by affidavits to the facts constituting the offence charged by 
persons having actual knowledge thereof, and that a warrant has 
been issued, and duplicate certified copies of the same, together 
with the returns thereto, if any, must be furnished upon an appli- 
cation. 

5. The official character of the officer taking the affidavits or 
depositions, and of the officer who issued the warrant, must be 
duly certified. 

6. Upon the renewal of an application, — for example, on the 
ground that the fugitive has fled to another State, not having been 
found in the State on which the first was granted, — new or certi- 
fied copies of papers, in conformity with the above rules, must be 
furnished. 

7. In the case of any person who has been convicted of any 
crime, and escapes after conviction, or while serving his sentence, 



ex ATTORNEY-GEKEKAL'S EEPOKT. [Jan. 1902. 

the application may be made by the jailer, sheriff, or other officer 
having him in custody, and shall be accompanied by certified 
copies of the indictment or information, record of conviction and 
sentence upon which the person is held, with the affidavit of such 
person having him in custody, showing such escape, with the cir- 
cumstances attending the same. 

8. No requisition will be made for the extradition of any fugi- 
tive except in compliance with these rules.