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Full text of "Report of the attorney general for the year ending .."



'ommonwealth of Massachusetts 



ATTORNEY-CxENERAL'S REPORT 



1904 






PUBLIC DOCUMENT .... .... No. 12. 



Commonwcaltlj .of |$assac|}us*tts. 



REPORT 



ATTORNEY- GENERAL 



Year ending January 18, 1905. 




BOSTON : 
WRIGHT & POTTER PRINTING CO., STATE PRINTERS, 
18 Post Office Square. 
1905. 



Comm0uixrtaItIj nf l|tassax|j:u:s£fis. 



Office of the Attorney-General, 

Boston, Jan. 18, 1905. 

To the Honorable the President of the Senate. 

I have the honor to transmit herewith my report for the 

year ending this day. 

Very respectfully, 

HERBERT PARKER, 

Attorney- General. 



TABLE OP CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

Roster, vii 

Appropriation and Expenditures, viii 

Cases attended to by this Office, ix 

Capital Cases, x 

The Courts, xiv 

Imprisonment in Bastardy Cases, xv 

Grade Crossings, . . . xvi 

Collateral Legacy and Succession Tax, xvii 

The Land Court, . xvii 

Office of the Attorney-General, xviii 

Opinions, 1 

Informations at the Relation of the Treasurer, .... 77 
Informations at the Relation of the Commissioner of Corpora- 
tions, . • • • 81 

Informations at the Relation of Private Persons, .... 84 

Applications refused and otherwise disposed of, . . . . 85 

Grade Crossings, 86 

Land-damage Cases arising from the Alteration of Grade Cross- 
ings, 101 

Corporate Applications for Dissolution, 103 

Corporations required without Suit to file Tax Returns, . . 105 

Corporations required without Suit to file Certificate of Condition, 109 

Collateral Inheritance Tax Cases, 113 

Public Charitable Trusts 137 

Suits conducted in Behalf of State Boards and Commissions, . 141 

Metropolitan Park Commission, 141 

Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board, .... 143 

Massachusetts Highway Commission, 147 

Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners, . . . .148 

Miscellaneous Cases from Above Commissions, . . . 149 
Cases arising under the Act limiting the Height of Buildings 

in the Vicinity of the State House, * 153 

State Board of Charity, 154 

State Board of Health, 155 

Miscellaneous Cases, . . . 156 

Corporation Tax Collections, 175 

Miscellaneous Collections, 179 

Extradition and Interstate Rendition 180 

Rules of Practice in Interstate Rendition, 183 



€0ntm0ntomttIj oi $$assatljits*tts. 



OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, 
State House. 



Attorney- General. 
HERBERT PARKER. 



Assistants. 



Robert G. Dodge. 
Arthur W. DeGoosh. 



Frederick H. Nash. 
Frederic B. Greenhalge. 



Law Clerk. 
Fred T. Field. 

Chief Clerk. 
Louis H. Freese. 



viii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 1905. 



Statement oe Appropriation and Expenditures. 



Appropriation for 1904, $40,000 00 

Expenditures. 

For law library, $636 35 

For salaries of assistants, 14,808 33 

For additional legal services, * 3,224 81 

For clerks, 3,793 39 

For stenographers, 2,345 00 

For messengers, 1,280 60 

For office expenses, 2,853 43 

For court expenses,* 2,456 46 

Total expenditures, $31,398 37 

Costs collected, 775 59 

Net expenditure, $30,622 78 



* Of this amount $775.59 has been collected as costs of suits and paid to the 
Treasurer of the Commonwealth. 



Cimmfltitalilj of ifitasacfpxstfo 



Office of the Attorney-General, 

Boston, Jan. 18, 1905. 
To the General Court. 

In compliance with Kevised Laws, chapter 7, section 8, 
I submit my report for the year ending this day. 

The cases requiring the attention of the office during the 
year, to the number of 1,969, are tabulated below : — 

Bastardy complaints, 4 

Collateral inheritance tax cases, 344 

Corporate collections made, 164 

Corporation returns enforced without suit, 314 

Dissolutions of corporations, voluntary petitions for, ... 45 

Extradition and interstate rendition, - 54 

Grade crossings, petitions for abolition of, 139 

Health, State Board of, petitions against, 21 

Height of buildings, limitation of, cases arising therefrom, . . 20 
Informations at the relation of the Commissioner of Corporations, 65 
Informations at the relation of private persons, . . . . 1 1 
Informations at the relation of the Treasurer and Receiver-Gen- 
eral, 126 

Indictments for murder, 17 

Land-damage cases arising through the alteration of grade cross- 
ings, 13 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Harbor 

and Land Commissioners, ° 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Massa- 
chusetts Highway Commission, 31 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Metro- 
politan Park Commission, °6 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Metro- 
politan Water and Sewerage Board, 131 

Miscellaneous cases arising from the work of the above-named 

commissions, 62 

Miscellaneous cases, 293 

Public charitable trusts, 44 

Settlement cases for support of insane paupers, . . ■ • 1° 



x ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Capital Cases. 
Indictments for murder pending at the date of the last 
annual report have been disposed of as follows : — 

George William Herbert, alias Huber, indicted in 
Berkshire County, January, 1903, for the murder of Ger- 
trude Ottillie Bertha Rentall, at Monterey, Sept. 14, 1902. 
He was arraigned July 21, 1908, and pleaded not guilty. 
William Turtle and Charles Giddings were assigned by the 
court as counsel for the defendant. On Jan. 11, 1904, the 
defendant retracted his former plea of not guilty and pleaded 
guilty of murder in the second degree. This plea was ac- 
cepted by the government, and the defendant was thereupon 
sentenced to State Prison for life. The case was in charge 
of District Attorney John F. Xoxon. 

Rosario Disano of Stoughton, indicted in Norfolk County, 
September, 1903, for the murder of Hiram H. Poole, at 
Canton, Aug. 2, 1903. He was arraigned Sept. 11, 1903, 
and pleaded not guilty. James E. Cotter and Frank Keezer 
were assigned bv the court as counsel for the defendant. 
This indictment was nol prossed on Sept. 20, 1904, and the 
defendant was indicted for murder in the second degree. 
On the latter indictment he was arraigned and pleaded 
guilty on April 28, 1904, and sentenced to State Prison for 
life. The case was in charge of District Attorney Asa P. 
French. 

Selmar Akerson of Quincy, indicted in Norfolk County, 
December, 1903, for the murder of her infant child, at 
Quincy, Sept. 10, 1903. She was arraigned Dec. 14, 1903, 
and pleaded not guilty. On April 5, 1904, the defendant 
retracted her former plea of not guilty and pleaded guilty 
to manslaughter. This plea was accepted by the govern- 
ment, and thereupon the defendant was sentenced to the 
Reformatory Prison for Women for an indefinite period. 
This case was in charge of District Attorney Asa P. French. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xi 

John E. Gallagher of Taunton, indicted in Bristol 
County, February, 1900, for the murder of Joseph F. 
McMahon, at Taunton, Nov. 21, 1899. He was arraigned 
April 22, 1903, and pleaded not guilty. Milton Reed and 
Harold F. Hathaway were assigned as counsel for the de- 
fendant. The indictment for murder was nol prossed and 
the defendant was indicted for murder in the second degree. 
On Feb. 16, 1904, he was tried upon this indictment and 
found guilty, and sentenced to State Prison for life. The 
case was in charge of District Attorney James M. Swift. 

Indictments for murder, found since the date of the last 
annual report, have been disposed of as follows : — 

Emanuel T. Burnett of Boston, indicted in Suffolk 
County, April, 1904, for the murder of Martha Chandler, 
at Boston, March 23, 1904. He was arraigned April 15, 
1904, and pleaded not guilty. James H. Wolff was assigned 
by the court as counsel for the defendant. On May 20, 
1904, the defendant retracted his former plea and pleaded 
guilty of murder in the second degree. This plea was ac- 
cepted by the government, and thereupon the defendant 
was sentenced to State Prison for life. The case was in 
charge of District Attorney Oliver Stevens. 

Cyrus L. Ryan, indicted in Plymouth County, February, 
1904, for the murder of Quong Sing, at Hanover, Jan. 28, 
1904. He was arraigned Feb. 4, 1904, and pleaded not 
guilty. Fred M. Bixby, Esq., and John F. Callanan, Esq., 
were assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. 
In June, 1904, the defendant was tried by a jury, before 
Hardy and Stevens, JJ. The result was a verdict of murder 
in the second degree. On June 15, 1904, the defendant 
was sentenced to State Prison for life. The case was in 
charge of District Attorney Asa P. French. 

Eugene LaForrest Stafford, indicted in Suffolk 
County, March, 1904, for the murder of May ner B. Trussell, 
at Boston, on Feb. 17, 1904. He was arraigned Sept. 10, 



xii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

L904, and pleaded not guilty. Hiram P. Harriman, Esq., 
and John F. Duffy, Esq., were assigned by the court as 
counsel for the defendant. On Nov. 3, 1904, the indictment 
was nol prossed. The case was in charge of District At- 
torney Oliver Stevens. 

William A. Parker, indicted in Suffolk County, May, 
1904, for the murder of Eleanora Cobb, at Boston, April 8, 
1904. He was arraigned May 11, 1904, and pleaded not 
guilty. F. J. Daggett, Esq., and E. F. McClennen, Esq., 
were assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. 
On Oct. 22, 1904, the defendant retracted his former plea 
of not guilty and pleaded guilty of murder in the second 
degree. This plea was accepted by the government, and 
thereupon he was sentenced to State Prison for life. The 
case was in charge of District Attorney Oliver Stevens. 

William PmLLirs, indicted in Suffolk County, Septem- 
ber, 1904, for the murder of Edward Murray, at Boston, 
Aug. 23, 1904. He was arraigned Sept. 20, 1904, and 
pleaded not guilty. Thomas J. Barry, Esq., was assigned 
by the court as counsel for the defendant. On Nov. 15, 
1904, the defendant retracted his former plea of not guilty 
and pleaded guilty of murder in the second degree. This 
plea was accepted by the government, and thereupon he 
was sentenced to State Prison for life. The case was in 
charge of District Attorney Oliver Stevens. 

Ray C. Johnson, indicted in Suffolk County, February, 
1904, for the murder of Sarah A. Peters, at Boston, Jan. 5, 
1904. He was arraigned Feb. 11, 1904, and pleaded not 
guilty. John J. Walsh, Esq., and John F. Lynch, Esq., 
were assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. 
On June 27, 1904, so much of the indictment as charged 
murder in the first degree was nol prossed, and the defend- 
ant was tried by a jury before Bond, J., on the charge of 
murder in the second decree. The result was a verdict of 
guilty, and the defendant was sentenced to State Prison for 
life. The case was in charge of District Attorney Oliver 
Stevens. 



1905.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xiii 

Joseph A. Hastings, indicted in Essex County, May, 
1904, for the murder of Dora T. Trask, at Beverly, March 
3, 1904. He was arraigned May 31, 1904, and pleaded 
not guilty. Edward F. Carney, Esq., and Alden P. White, 
Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel for the defend- 
ant. On Jan. 9, 1905, the defendant retracted his former 
plea and pleaded guilty of murder in the second degree. 
This plea was accepted by the government, and thereupon 
he was sentenced to State Prison for life. The case was 
in charge of District Attorney "W. Scott Peters. 

The following indictments for murder are now pending : — 

Angles Snell, indicted in Bristol County, Novem- 
ber, 1903, for the murder of Tillinghast Kirby. He was 
arraigned Nov. 18, 1903, and pleaded not guilty. Hugo 
A. Dubuque and James P. Doran were assigned by the 
court as counsel for the defendant. In September, 1904, 
the defendant was tried by a jury before Aiken and Scho- 
field, JJ. The result was a verdict of guilty of murder in 
the first degree. On Sept. 30, 1904, the defendant filed ex- 
ceptions, which are still pending. The trial was conducted 
b}^ the Attorney-General, with District Attorney James 
M. Swift. 

Nocholas Di Flavio, indicted in Essex County, May, 
1904, for the murder of Giacomo Grassi, at Haverhill, May 
8, 1904. He was arraigned May 19, 1904, and pleaded not 
guilty. No further action has been taken in this case. 
The case is in charge of District Attorn ev W. Scott Peters. 

Joseph H. Seaton, indicted in Hampden County, May, 
1904, for the murder of Estelle Taylor, at Springfield, 
March 11, 1904. He was arraigned May 9, 1904, and 
pleaded not guilty. Edward A. McClintock was assigned 
by the court as counsel for the defendant. No further 
action has been taken in this case. The case is in charge of 
District Attorney John F. Noxon. 

Chaeles L. Tucker, indicted in Middlesex County, 
June, 1904, for the murder of Mabel Page, at Weston, 



xiv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

March 31, 1904. He was arraigned June 16, 1904, and 
pleaded not guilty. James H. Vahey, Esq., and Charles 
H. Innes, Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel for 
the defendant. Trial, conducted for the Commonwealth by 
the Attorney-General, with District Attorney George A. 
Sanderson and Assistant District Attorney Hugh Bancroft, 
was entered upon Jan. 2, 1905. 

Antonio Caracciolo, indicted in Hampden County, 
December, 1904, for the murder of Giuseppe La Rosa, at 
Springfield, Nov. 13, 1904. The defendant has not yet 
been arraigned. This case is in charge of District Attorney 
John F. Noxon. 

Henry F. Bolles, indicted in Norfolk County, Decem- 
ber, 1904, for the murder of Annie M. Bolles and Joseph 
McMurray, at Brookline, Oct. 17, 1904. He was arraigned 
Dec. 22, 1904, and pleaded not guilty. Thomas E. Grover, 
Esq., and Frederick G. Katzmann, Esq., were assigned by 
the court as counsel for the defendant. No further action 
has been taken. The case is in charge of District Attorney 
Asa P. French. 

The Courts. 

The pressure of business upon the several courts of the 
Commonwealth is constantly increasing, and some further 
steps in the direction of relief are much to be desired. 
The law now provides (Revised Laws, chapter 158, section 
10) that upon attaining the age of seventy a justice of 
either the Supreme Judicial Court or the Superior Court 
may resign, thereafter receiving during the remainder of 
his life an amount equal to three-fourths of the salary 
received bv him at the time of his resignation. A similar 
provision is applicable to justices of such courts whose re- 
tirement is caused by disability. 

I suggest for your consideration whether it may not be 
advisable to so amend existing statutes as to make available 
the services of a justice so retired, with his consent and 
upon request of the chief justice of the court from which he 
has retired, for specific causes and for such periods as his 
health and inclination may permit. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xv 

By Revised Laws, chapter 156, section 5, the Supreme 
Judicial Court is given original and concurrent jurisdiction 
with the Superior Court of actions of contract and replevin 
in which the damages demanded or the property claimed 
exceed in actions brought in the county of Suffolk $4,000, 
and in actions brought in other counties $1,000. 

The tendency of recent legislation has been in the direc- 
tion of making the Supreme Judicial Court a tribunal of 
appellate jurisdiction, and in accordance with this policy 
I recommend that such court be relieved of the burden of 
the trial of cases of contract and replevin by the repeal of 
the section above referred to. The number of cases brought 
under this section has become a serious inconvenience to 
the court, and there appears to be no good reason why this 
section should be longer retained. 

Imprisonment in Bastardy Cases. 

Under Revised Laws, chapter 82, regulating the prosecu- 
tion of bastardy complaints, the defendant, after examination 
in the inferior court and in default of bail, may be com- 
mitted to prison to await further proceedings in the Superior 
Court. The complainant, however, is under no duty to 
continue the prosecution of her complaint in that court, and 
the defendant, if without competent legal advice and with- 
out means, is subjected to the hardship of an indefinite im- 
prisonment, there being no officer now authorized to take 
steps for his relief or to call the attention of the court to his 
unfortunate condition so that he may be discharged. 

It has been called to my attention that under these cir- 
cumstances cases of genuine hardship have arisen, and I 
recommend that legislation be enacted making it the duty 
of district attorneys, probation officers or other proper 
authorities, upon notification from jailers or heads of penal 
institutions that the confinement of a defendant in bastardy 
proceedings has been unreasonably prolonged, to report the 
fact of such confinement to the Superior Court, which, after 
suitable investigation, may order the discharge of the person 
so confined. 



xviii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 1905. 

of encumbrances and petitions to discharge mortgages, and 
this jurisdiction is made original and exclusive. 

Doubt has arisen as to the construction of the statute of 
1904 with relation to the jurisdiction of cases pending in 
the Superior Court at the time of its enactment. I there- 
fore recommend such amendatory legislation as shall dis- 
tinctly provide that jurisdiction as to all cases pending 
when the new act became operative shall be retained by the 
courts in which they were so pending. 

Office of the Attorney-General. 

The increasing volume of business transacted by the office 
of the Attorney-General and the increased amount of ex- 
penses occasioned thereby have necessitated increased expen- 
ditures from time to time, and the provision of Revised 
Laws, chapter 6, section 35, limiting the amount which 
officers expending money in behalf of the Commonwealth 
may have advanced from the treasury to the sum of $150 
at any one time, has in some instances caused serious incon- 
venience in the administration of the department. There 
are already many exceptions to the restriction imposed by 
the section above quoted, and I recommend that it be 
further amended to permit the Attorney-General to have 
advanced to him the sum of $500 at any one time in place 
of the amount now prescribed by law. 

On the first day of September, 1904, Mr. Ralph A. Stewart, 
after more than three years of faithful and efficient service 
as Assistant Attorney-General, resigned that position to 
enter upon private practice. His performance of the duties 
devolving upon him was always characterized by conspicu- 
ous ability, and his constant and conscientious devotion to 
the welfare of the Commonwealth merits the highest com- 
mendation. No appointment has as yet been made to fill 
the vacancy created by the resignation of Mr. Stewart. 

Annexed to this report are the principal opinions prepared 
during the current year. 

Respectfully submitted, 



HERBERT PARKER, 

Attorney -General. 



OPINIONS. 



Hours of Labor — Employees of the Commonwealth — "Office 

Work." 

R. L.,c. 106, § 19, providing that "nine hours shall constitute a clay's 
work for all laborers, workmen and mechanics who are employed by 
or in behalf of the commonwealth," does not include employees whose 
duties are of such a character as to bring them within the term " office 
work," and the hours of labor for employees so engaged may be deter- 
mined by the period of service required for the proper performance 
of the work of the department in which they are employed. 

Jan. 27, 1904. 
Hon. Henry S. Pritchett, Chairman, Charles River Basin Commission. 

Dear Sir : — Your inquiry is directed to the question whether 
or not there exists any statutory regulation which fixes the hours 
of labor of employees of your commission " engaged in office work." 

St. 1903, c. 229, amending R. L., c. 18, § 13, provides that : — 

The offices of all the departments of the state government shall be 
open to the public for the transaction of business daily, except on Sun- 
days and legal holidays, from nine o'clock in the forenoon until five 
o'clock in the afternoon, except on Saturdays, when they may be closed 
at twelve o'clock, noon. The treasurer and receiver general shall not 
be required to keep his office open for the receipt and payment of money 
later than two o'clock in the afternoon. 

The word " departments " as above used has no technical sig- 
nification and applies as well to any distinct division of the 
executive branch of the government as to the departments of 
the Secretary, Treasurer and Receiver-General, and other admin- 
istrative offices of the Commonwealth. See R. L., c. 18; P. S., 
c. 21. There is no apparent reason, therefore, why the section 
above quoted should not be applicable to the Charles River Basin 
Commission. But the requirement that offices of the several 
departments of the Commonwealth shall be open for business 
during the hours specified is intended for the benefit of such mem- 
bers of the public as may be brought into business relations with 
such departments, and is not in any sense a regulation of the hours 
of labor of the employees therein. If, in the opinion of those to 
whose responsibility and discretion the business of such depart- 



2 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

ment is intrusted, the labor of the employees within the hours 
specified in the section above quoted is sufficient to accomplish, 
with due care and diligence, the business of the department, the 
hours of labor for employees who perform office work may well be 
made to coincide with the period during which, under St. 1903, 
c. 229, the office of the department must be kept open for business. 
On the other hand, I am aware of no statutory regulation which 
would prevent the heads of the several departments of the Com- 
monwealth from requiring a longer period of service from employees 
engaged in office work, if such additional service should be neces- 

OCT ' 

sary for the proper performance of the work of the department. 

There is in R. L., c. 106, § 19, a provision to the effect that 
" nine hours shall constitute a day's work for all laborers, work- 
men and mechanics who are employed by or in behalf of the com- 
monwealth, or of any county, city or town therein. . . ." While 
this section obviously applies to all laborers, workmen and me- 
chanics who may be employed by your commission, in my opinion 
it is not to be construed to extend to or include employees whose 
duties are of such a character as to be properly within the term 
" office work." 

Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney- General. 



Licenses — Engineers and Firemen — Citizenship and Residence 

of Applicant. 

An applicant for a license under the provisions of R. L., c. 102, § 81, to act 
as engineer or fireman, is entitled to be examined, and, if found com- 
petent, to receive his license, notwithstanding the fact that he is not a 
citizen of this Commonwealth and that his residence therein appears 
to be only temporarv. 

Feb. 4, 1904. 

Joseph E. Shaw, Esq., Deputy Chief, Massachusetts District Police. 

Dear Sir: — R. L., c. 10*2, § 81, provides in part as follows: 
u Whoever desires to act as engineer or fireman shall apply for a 
license therefor to the examiner of engineers for the city or town 
in which he resides or is employed." 

Your communication states that under this statute a person has 
presented himself to one of the inspectors of police in your depart- 
ment for the purpose of being examined as to his qualifications as 
an engineer. The applicant has lived in the State since last 
November, and it is stated that the evident purpose of the applica- 
tion is to obtain a license *' supposedly to be used as a recom- 
mendation for employment in some other State." Under these 
circumstances you desire to be informed whether, under the exist- 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 3 

iag law, the inspector may examine, and, if qualified, issue to such 
applicant a license. You further inquire how the word " resident" 
as used in this statute is to be construed. 

In general, a resident of a particular locality is one whose place 
of abode is there and who has no present intention of removing 
therefrom. So in Lawson v. Adlard, 46 Minn. 243, the court 
say: "To put it concisely, a 'resident' of a place is one who 
dwells in that place for some continuance of time for business or 
other purposes, although his domicile may be elsewhere." 

In the statutes of the Commonwealth the word 4t resident " has 
been commonly identified with the word " inhabitant," and a some- 
what restricted construction has been given to it, inhabitants and 
residents being construed to mean citizens. See Opinion of the 
Justices, 7 Mass. 523. This construction, however, is not the only 
one which may be given to the term, as is intimated in Lee v. 
City of Boston, 2 Gray, 484, 490, where it is said that " the words 
4 inhabitant ' and ' resident,' ' inhabitancy ' and 4 residence,' are 
commonly, though not invariably, used in the Constitution and 
laws of this Commonwealth as synonymous. There are a few 
passages in them where ' residents ' has a somewhat broader sig- 
nificance than ' inhabitants,' and designates a class of persons who 
have no domicile within the State. Thus, where the Constitution 
confers authority upon the General Court to impose and levy 
assessments, rates and taxes upon all * the inhabitants of and per- 
sons resident and estates lying within the Commonwealth,' it is 
apparent that the phrase 'persons resident' includes individuals 
who have no permanent home here, and are not strictly inhabitants 
of the State." 

In the present instance I am of opinion that the word " resides " 
is used with a more general signification than that of citizenship, 
and that the statute does not restrict application for licenses there- 
under to citizens of the Commonwealth. The obvious purpose of 
the act is to secure the safety of the public by requiring persons 
assuming to take charge of steam boilers and engines to demon- 
strate their fitness for such work, and has no necessary reference 
to the question of their domicile or citizenship. I cannot believe 
that the statute intended to distinguish between citizens and per- 
sons temporarily resident in the Commonwealth, and to exclude 
all persons except citizens from the business of operating steam 
boilers or engines ; and, in my judgment, the word " resides " as 
used in R. L., c. 102, § 81, is to be construed in connection with 
the word " employed," and is of effect only to designate and 
establish the particular examiner to whom the applicant shall pre- 
sent himself. 



4 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

In the particular case before me, therefore, I am of opinion that 
the applicant is entitled to be examined and to receive a license, 
provided he successfully passes the required examination. 
Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney -General. 



Commonwealth's Land — Conveyance — Board of Harbor and 
Land Commissioners. 

The Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners, under the provisions of 
R. L., c. 96, § 3, has no general authority to convey land belonging to 
the Commonwealth. 

March 23, 1904. 

Hon. Woodward Emery, Chairman, Board of Harbor and Land Com- 
missioners. 

Dear Sir : — You inquire whether, under the provisions of 
R. L., c. 96, § 3, your Board is authorized to sell and convey to 
the Old Colony Street Railway Company certain land on Mount 
Hope Bay in the city of Fall River. 

R. L., c. 96, § 3, is as follows : — 

Said board shall, except as otherwise provided, have charge of the 
lands, rights in lands, flats, shores and rights in tide waters belonging 
to the commonwealth, and shall, as far as practicable, ascertain the 
location, extent and description of such lands ; investigate the title of 
the commonwealth thereto ; ascertain what parts thereof have been 
granted by the commonwealth ; the conditions, if any, on which such 
grants were made, and whether said conditions have been complied 
with ; what portions have been encroached or trespassed on, and the 
rights and remedies of the commonwealth relative thereto : prevent 
further encroachments and trespasses; ascertain what portions of such 
lands may be leased, sold or improved with benefit to the commonwealth 
and without injury to navigation or to the rights of riparian owners ; 
and may lease the same for periods not exceeding five years. It may 
make contracts for the improvement, filling, sale, use or other disposi- 
tion of the lands at and near South Boston known as the Commonwealth 
Flats, may lease any portion thereof with or without improvements 
thereon, for such periods and upon such terms as it shall deem best, 
may regulate the taking of material from the harbor and fix the lines 
thereon for filling said lands, and shall cause a general plan of said 
lands to be prepared, whereon it shall designate the portions which in 
its opinion should be devoted to railway and commercial purposes and 
those which should be devoted to general purposes. All conveyances, 
contracts and leases made under the provisions of this section shall be 
subject to the approval of the governor and council. 

The Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners was created by 
St. 1879, c. 263, with all the powers of the previously existing 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 

and separate boards of Harbor Commissioners and Land Commis- 
sioners. Undoubtedly, at the time when this statute was passed 
the Board of Land Commissioners had authority to convey land 
of the Commonwealth subject, in general, to the approval of the 
Governor and Council. See Gen. St., c. 5, § 15 ; Res. 1859, 
cc. 52, 103; Gen. St., c. 15, § 23. 

In the revision of 1882, however, embodied in P. S., c. 19, § 3, 
the authority to sell land belonging to the Commonwealth was 
omitted from the section defining the powers of the Board of 
Harbor and Land Commissioners, and as it now exists in R. L., 
c. 96, § 3, which is a practical re-enactment of P. S., c. 19, § 3, 
no such authority is conferred, except in the case of lands at or 
near South Boston, known as the Commonwealth Flats. In view 
of the fact that this authority to sell disappears in 1882 and was 
not re-enacted in the Revised Laws, which now govern the action 
of the Board, it is interesting to observe that in the case of the 
lands above referred to, such authority is specifically given, and 
the use of the word " sale" in that connection, in my opinion, is 
of weight to show that it was intentionally omitted in the earlier 
provisions of R. L., c. 96, § 3. 

In spite of the able and exhaustive brief of counsel for the 
petitioner for the execution of such sale, therefore, I am of opinion 
that the Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners is not author- 
ized to convey to the Old Colony Street Railway Company land 
situated in or near the city of Fall River, and that if such a sale 
is desirable, competent authority must be secured to effect it. 
Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney-General. 



Insurance — Burial Association — Foreign Corporation. 

A so-called " burial association " which assesses its members, and, upon the 
death of a member, furnishes the services of an undertaker and the 
supplies incidental to a funeral to the value of $100, is an insurance 
company within the meaning of R. L., c. 118, § 65, and is subject to 
the provisions of the insurance laws. 

Such an association, incorporated under the laws of a foreign State, would 

uot be permitted to enter the Commonwealth under the provisions of 

R. L., c. 126, § 2, relating to foreign corporations, for the purpose of 

doing the business for which it was incorporated. 

April 1, 1904. 

Hon. Frank M. Heath, Chairman, Committee on Insurance. 

Sir : — I have the honor to reply to your inquiries submitted to 
me in the following form of question : — 

" 1. Is a burial association an insurance corporation within the 



6 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

meaning of the laws of this State, and subject to our laws relat- 
ing to insurance corporations ? " 

You state that the burial association referred to in your inquiry 
is conducted as follows : " It has a president, secretary, treasurer 
and board of directors. Members are elected by the directors. 
The conditions of membership are that each member shall pay a 
certain sum as an enUy fee, and that he shall also pay any assess- 
ment. Assessments are limited to 12 cents, assessable upon the 
death of an adult member, and 7 cents, assessable upon the death 
of a child member. If there is sufficient money in the treasury to 
pay burial expenses upon the death of a member there is no assess- 
ment. Upon the death of a member no sum of money is paid to 
his family or representatives, but the contract of membership pro- 
vides that an undertaker, employed by the association, shall fur- 
nish all that is required for the burial, at a cost estimated to be 
$100 in the case of an adult and $50 in the case of a child. There 
is no limit to the number of members other than as stated above. 
Each member must be a resident of the State, and membership 
may be limited to residents of a particular city or town." 

Section 65 of chapter 118 of the Revised Laws provides that 
" all corporations, associations, partnerships or individuals doing 
business under any charter, compact, agreement, or statute of this 
or any other state, involving the payment of money or other thing 
of value to families or representatives of policy and certificate 
holders or members, conditioned upon the continuance or cessa- 
tion of human life, shall be deemed to be life insurance companies, 
and shall be subject to the provisions of the insurance laws." 

The association whose case is presented by your statement as- 
sesses its members, and upon the death of a member furnishes the 
services of an undertaker and the supplies incidental to a funeral 
to the value of $100. It is, therefore, in my opinion, an insurance 
company. Such an association, incorporated in another State, 
upon complying with the laws relating to foreign corporations, 
would not be entitled to do business here. 

You further inquire whether the United States Burial League, a 
copy of whose contract you have forwarded to me and which is 
herewith returned, would be allowed to enter the Commonwealth 
under the laws relating to foreign corporations, and do the busi- 
ness for which they have been incorporated in the State of New 
Jersey. This inquiry I must answer in the negative. 
Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney- General . 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



Registered Pharmacist — Suspension of License or Certificate of 
Registration — Conviction. 

The Board of Registration in Pharmacy, under R. L., c. 76, § 17, which 
provides in part that "the license or certificate of registration of a 
registered pharmacist shall not be suspended for a cause punishable 
by law until after his conviction by a court of competent jurisdic- 
tion," may suspend the certificate of registration or license of a 
registered pharmacist who has been duly found guilty of the illegal 
sale of intoxicating liquors and sentenced to pay a fine therefor and 
who has paid such fine, notwithstanding the fact that exceptions 
thereto have been filed and allowed and are still pending for argument 
before the Supreme Judicial Court. 

Apkil 22, 1904. 

C. F. Nixon, Esq., Secretary, Board of Registration in Pharmacy. 

Dear Sir : — The Board of Registration in Pharmacy requests 
the opinion of the Attorney-General upon the following state of 
facts : a pharmacist was found guilty of illegal selling of intoxi- 
cating liquors, and sentenced to pay a fine thereon. He paid this 
fine and filed exceptions, which were allowed and are still pending 
in the Supreme Judicial Court awaiting argument ; the specific 
question submitted being, is there, upon such state of facts, a 
conviction within the meaning of R. L., c. 76, § 17, which is as 
follows : — 

If the full board sitting at such hearing finds the person guilty, the 
board may suspend the effect of the certificate of his registration as a 
pharmacist for such term as the board fixes, but the license or certificate 
of registration of a registered pharmacist shall not be suspended for a 
cause punishable by law until after his conviction by a court of compe- 
tent jurisdiction. 

I am of opinion that there is upon the facts presented such a 
conviction as is contemplated by the statute authorizing the Board 
of Registration in Pharmacy to suspend a license or certificate of 
registration of such pharmacist. The word " conviction" is used 
in our statutes in two different senses, and in the statute above 
quoted it is to be taken in its more usual sense, that is, as mean- 
ing " the confession of the accused in open court or verdict re- 
turned against him by the jury which ascertains and publishes the 
fact of his guilt," and does not necessarily contemplate a sentence 
of the court. 

It has been held that the intention of the statute is to give a 
pharmacist charged with a crime the right to a trial in the court 
having jurisdiction of his offence, but if his guilt be there estab- 
lished so that the court may impose sentence according to its 
powers, then it is sufficiently established for the board of pharmacy 



8 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

to act upon their finding and to impose the penalty according to 
their powers. 

Upon the facts submitted to me it would seem that the guilt of 
the defendant was so far established as to empower the court to 
impose a sentence, and, indeed, it appears that the court, in the 
exercise of that power, had imposed sentence and rightly so, not- 
withstanding the exceptions, taken, under the provisions of R. L., 
c. 220, § 3. 

A like rule of construction of the word ''conviction" is dis- 
closed in the opinion of the court in Commomvealth v. Lockwood, 
109 Mass. 323, where it was held that the Governor, with the 
advice of the Council, might grant a pardon of an offence after 
verdict of guilty, and before sentence, and while exceptions allowed 
by the judge were pending in the Supreme Court for argument. 
This decision was made having regard to the provision of the 
Constitution, which refers to the pardoning power in the following 
language: "The power of pardoning offences, except such as 
persons may be convicted of before the senate by an impeachment 
of the house, shall be by the governor, by and with the advice of 
council ; but no charter of pardon, granted by the governor, with 
the advice of the council before conviction, shall avail the party 
pleading the same . . . ," from which it appears that a conviction 
upon which alone the power to pardon must rest may exist before 
sentence of the court is imposed. 

I am therefore of opinion that upon the facts stated your Board 
may hold that a conviction, within the meaning of R. L., c. 76, 
§ 17, appears upon which a suspension of the license or certificate 
of the party so convicted may be made. 
Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney- General. 



Go-operative Bank — Consolidation — Rights of Minority — Con- 
stitutional Lav. 

The Legislature has no power to compel the minorit}' members in an 
existing co-operative bank, which is not a stock corporation, to sur- 
render their interest in such bank in exchange for an interest in a con- 
solidated bank, as prescribed in House Bill No. 1181; but if enacted, 
the provisions of such bill will govern the rights of all members of 
co-operative banks organized after its passage, and will serve to 
authorize the consolidation of existing co-operative banks, if such 
consolidation is assented to by all the members. 

April 22, 1904. 

Hon. Guy A. Ham, Chairman, Committee on Bills in the Third Beading. 

Sir : — Your committee desires my opinion on the constitution- 
ality of House Bill No. 1181, which authorizes the consolidation 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 9 

of two or more co-operative banks doing business in the same city 
or town. 

The bill provides for the consolidation of such co-operative 
banks in the following manner : If two-thirds of the members of 
each bank in writing approve of the consolidation, and if two- 
thirds of the members present and voting, at a special meeting 
duly called, vote in favor of consolidation, and if the Board of 
Savings Bank Commissioners approve, an order may be passed by 
the Board requiring the consolidation. Such order shall provide 
that the assets of the merged bank be turned over to the continu- 
ing bank, and that the latter assume all liabilities accrued on the 
former's outstanding shares. As to the rights of the shareholders 
in the merged bank, it provides : " No more shares shall be sold 
by or in behalf of a bank or banks so taken over, and for every 
share of such bank or banks there shall be issued to the holder 
thereof a share of the continuing bank of the series of the nearest 
and lower value, and the difference in the values of the old share 
and the new share so issued shall be paid forthwith to the said 
owner in cash ; provided that such a new share, issued to take the 
place of a pledged share of the terminating bank, shall be issued 
as a share pledged under the original loan, and the said difference 
in value shall either be paid in cash to the owner of the pledged 
share or be credited on his original loan at the election of the con- 
tinuing bank." 

The effect of a consolidation upon the interests of a dissenting 
member should be carefully noted. When he took a share of 
stock in the A co-operative bank, he thereby agreed to pay to that 
bank $1 per month until there should stand to his credit from his 
payments and the profits derived from the use of his money the 
sum of $200, or until the share shall be withdrawn or forfeited. 
He might withdraw at any time before pledging his share, and 
receive, under certain restrictions, the money standing to his credit. 
If he should fall in arrears upon his monthly payments, and so 
continue more than six months, his share, at the option of the 
directors, might be forfeited, and he be paid the value of his 
share less a small fine for being in arrears. 

Should this bill become law, according to its terms a two-thirds 
majority of the members of the A bank, acting with two-thirds 
of the members of the B bank, could compel a dissenting member 
in the former bank to make his monthly payments to the latter 
bank or else withdraw his share. The by-laws and rules of the 
B bank would govern him instead of those of the bank of which 
he originally became a member. If he takes a share in the B 
bank, the share given him is of the series having a value next 
below that of the series in the A bank, to which his old share 



10 ATTORXEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

belonged. The difference in value between the exchanged share 
and the new one, arising from the fact that the member had paid 
in more on the share in the A bank than the share in the B bank 
being of a later series credits him with, is given to him in cash, 
or, if he is a borrowing member, may be credited to him on his 
loan. Then if he does not keep up his payments on the new 
share, he ceases to be a member, and if he is a borrowing member, 
his security will be foreclosed. 

It is apparent that the situation is different from that presented 
by a consolidation of ordinary public service corporations having 
fully paid shares, wherein there is a provision for buying, at their 
properly determined value, the shares of dissenting stockholders. 
In such a case the shares of the minority are taken from them, 
under legislative authority, upon payment of just compensation. 
Here no provision is made for taking their interest in the A bank 
at a properly appraised value paid by the B bank. The members 
are transferred, with their executory obligations, from one to the 
other. We have, therefore, no need to consider the power of the 
Legislature, in view of the public good to be derived from a merger 
of two banks, to require the property of the minority to be taken 
and paid for. See Black v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Co., 24 
N. J. Eq. 455. 

The question is whether the Legislature may, with the approval 
of two-thirds of the members of each corporation, compel a dis- 
senting member to enter into a new contract with a different cor- 
poration. 

At the beginning of the discussion certain uncontrovertible 
propositions may be stated. 

It is not within the power of a co-operative bank, organized 
under the general laws, to consolidate with another without the 
consent of the Legislature. N. Y., etc., Canal Co. v. Fulton Bank, 
7 Wend. 412; Noyes, Intercorporate Relations, §§ 17, 18. 

It is within the power of a co-operative bank created by special 
charter to consolidate with another only when its charter permits it. 
Since the present bill applies to all co-operative banks, in con- 
sidering its validity we need not investigate the charters of such 
co-operative banks as were created by special acts. 

The power to merge with another similar institution is not one 
of the implied powers in furtherance of the objects of a co-opera- 
tive bank. When a person enters one bank as a member of the 
association, he agrees to be bound by such acts as the majority 
may decide as advisable within the scope of the corporate purposes. 
He does not agree that the corporation may transfer all its liabilities 
and assets, including its contract with him, to another corporation. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 11 

Clearwater v. Meredith, 1 Wall. 25 ; McCray v. Junction R.R. 
Co., 9 Ind. 358 ; Botts v. Simpsonville, etc., Turnpike Co., 88 Ky. 
54; Oldtown & Lincoln R.R. Co. v. Veazie, 39 Me. 580. 

So far as the right of the State to object to such departure from 
the corporate purposes goes, that may be waived by the Legislature 
in passing an act authorizing consolidation upon unanimous vote 
of the members of both banks. The Legislature, however, has no 
power to waive for an individual shareholder his right to object 
that the corporation is transgressing the limits of its powers. 
When he invested his money in the co-operative bank he author- 
ized the majority to act for him within the scope of its chartered 
powers. The transfer of his contractual right to another co-opera- 
tive bank he did not authorize. 

The discharge of one contracting party and the substitution of a 
new one are a serious impairment of the obligation of his contract. 
See Hamilton Mutual Insurance Company v. Hobart, 2 Gray, 543. 

It being established that the consolidation is a vital departure 
from the purposes for which the constituent banks were organized, 
the important question is as to the effect of R. L., c. 109, § 3 : 
"Every act of incorporation passed since the eleventh day of 
March in the year eighteen hundred and thirty-one shall be subject 
to amendment, alteration or repeal by the general court. All cor- 
porations which are organized under general laws shall be subject 
to such laws as may be hereafter passed affecting or altering their 
corporate rights or duties or dissolving them." 

Did the existence of this act at the time of the creation of the 
constituent co-operative banks have the effect of making their 
members agree in advance to whatever changes of purpose the 
Legislature might authorize, no matter how radical? 

The doctrine of certain cases is that by virtue of this reserved 
power the dissenting shareholder in a stock corporation may be 
bound by a change the effect of which would otherwise be to re- 
lease him. See Durfee v. Old Colony, etc., R.R. Co., 5 Allen, 
230 ; Bvffalo and New York City R.R. Co. v. Dudley, 14 N. Y. 
336. But 1 believe this view to be erroneous. Such power was 
reserved by the Legislature on account of the decision in the Dart- 
mouth College case, that a charter is a contract within the meaning 
of the constitutional provision that no State shall pass a law im- 
pairing the obligation of a contract. This decision was supposed 
to deprive the States of that power of control over corporations 
which the public welfare demanded. 

Accordingly, nearly all the States passed laws reserving the 
power of amending or repealing charters, but this power was never 
reserved for the purpose of enabling a corporation to alter in a 



12 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

radical manner the contract between its shareholders or for the 
purpose of enabling the corporation to impair a contract between 
itself and its members. It was solely to avoid the effect of the 
decision that the charter itself was a contract between the State 
and the corporation. The Legislature under this power may im- 
pose new duties and new restraints upon corporations in the pros- 
ecution of enterprises already undertaken, whether they should be 
assented to or not. But the Legislature cannot impose upon the 
minority of a corporation the duty of embarking in a new enter- 
prise or of substituting their contracts with one corporation for 
similar contracts with another. All the Legislature may do is to 
grant the power, and then it is for the corporation to accept it or 
not, as it pleases. The right, therefore, to bind dissenting stock- 
holders derives no additional support from the fact that the power 
of amending the charter had been reserved by the Legislature, but 
depends essentially upon the question whether the change is of 
such a character that it may be deemed so far in furtherance of the 
original undertaking and incident to it as to be fairly within the 
power of the corporation to bind its individual members by its 
corporate assent, or whether it is such a departure from the orig- 
inal purpose that no member should be deemed to have authorized 
the corporation to assent to it for him. See Kenosha, etc., R.R. 
Co. y. Marsh, 17 Wis. 13; Dow v. Northern R.R., 67 N. H. 1; 
Mills v. Central R.R. Co., 41 N. J. Eq. 1 ; N. H. & Derby R.R. 
Co. v. Chapman, 38 Ct. 56, 71 ; Zabriskie v. Hackensack, etc., 
R.R. Co., 18 N. J. Eq. 178. In the last case the court said : 
" The object and purpose of these provisions are so plain and so 
plainly expressed in the words that it seems strange that any doubt 
could be raised concerning it. It was a reservation to the State 
for the benefit of the public, to be exercised by the State only. 
The State was making what had been decided to be a contract, 
and it reserved the power of change by altering, modifying or 
repealing the contract. Neither the words, nor the circumstances, 
nor apparent objects for which this provision was made, can, 
by any fair construction extend it to giving a power to one part 
of the corporators as against the other, which they did not have 
before." 

I should advise that this latter view is the correct one, and that 
the reserved power gives the Legislature merely the right to amend 
the charters of corporations as between corporation and State, not 
as between the majority and minority within the corporation, with- 
out hesitation, except for the fact of two Massachusetts decisions. 
Durfee v. Old Colony, etc., R.R. Co., 5 Allen, 230; Hale v. 
Cheshire R.R., 161 Mass. 443. The reasoning of the Massa- 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 13 

chusetts court in the former case is based upon the assumption that 
the reservation by the State of the power to alter, amend or repeal 
the charter of a corporation is intended not merely for the protec- 
tion of the public, but also to enable the Legislature to authorize 
a corporation to engage in new enterprises solely for its own bene- 
fit and whether any interests of the public are concerned or not. 
If the reasoning is sound, then the Legislature might authorize a 
majority of the stockholders of a manufacturing company to engage 
in banking, insurance or railroading against the dissent of the 
minority. Under this doctrine the money invested by a stock- 
holder in a corporation, and his contract with it, are at the mercy 
of the Legislature and a majority of the stockholders. I quote 
from the language of the court, Bigelow, C.J., page 243 et seq. : 
" When, therefore, it is expressly provided between the Legislature 
on the one hand and the corporation on the other, as a part of the 
original contract of incorporation, that the former may change or 
modify or abrogate it or any portion of it, it cannot be said that 
any contract is broken or infringed when the power thus reserved 
is exercised with the consent of the artificial body of whose original 
creation and existence such reservation formed an essential part. 
The stockholder cannot say that he became a member of the cor- 
poration on the faith of an agreement made by the Legislature 
with the corporation, that the original act of incorporation should 
undergo no change except with his assent. Such a position might 
be asserted with more plausibility if there was an absence of a 
clause in the original act of incorporation providing for an altera- 
tion in its terms. In such a case it might perhaps be maintained 
that there was a strong implication that the charter should remain 
inviolate, and that the holders of shares invested their property in 
the corporation relying upon a contract entered into between it 
and the Legislature that the provisions of the act creating it should 
remain unchanged. But it is difficult to see how such a construc- 
tion can be put on a contract which contains an express stipulation 
that it shall be subject to amendment and alteration. If it be 
asked by whom such amendment or alteration is to be made, the 
answer is obvious : by the parties to the contract, the Legislature 
on the one hand and the corporation on the other ; the former ex- 
pressing its intention by means of a legislative act, and the latter 
assenting thereto by a vote of the majority of the stockholders, 
according to the provisions of its charter. It is nothing more than 
the ordinary case of a stipulation that one of the parties to a 
contract may vary its terms with the assent of the other contract- 
ing party. In such case, all persons claiming derivative rights or 
interests under the original contract, with notice of its terms, 



14 ATTORNEY-GEXERALS REPORT. [Jan. 

would be bound by the amendment or alteration to which the 
parties should agree. . . . It is a mistake, therefore, to say that 
the contract of a stockholder with a corporation established under 
our statutes binds the latter to undertake no new enterprise and 
engage in no business or operation other than that contemplated 
by the original charter. This interpretation puts aside the express 
provision authorizing an amendment or alteration of the act of 
incorporation, and gives it no effect against a stockholder without 
his assent, although he bought his stock or subscribed for his 
shares subject to the legal effect of such a stipulation. The 
infirmity of the argument in behalf of the plaintiff is that it admits 
that an amendment may be legal and valid as to the corporation, if 
they assent to it by a vote of the majority, while at the same time 
it sets it aside as against the stockholder who refuses to sanction 
it, on the ground that as to him it is illegal and void. But we 
cannot see how the amendment can be said to be legal and illegal 
uno et eodemjfotu. If it is valid as to the corporation, for the 
reason that they have accepted and approved it according to the 
provisions of their charter, it would seem that it must also be 
binding on the stockholder, who has agreed that his rights and 
interests in the corporation shall be regulated and controlled by a 
vote of a majority, acting in conformity to the original constitution 
of the corporation, and within the scope of its corporate powers. 
The real contract into which the stockholder enters with the cor- 
poration is that he agrees to become a member of an artificial 
body which is created and has its existence by virtue of a contract 
with the Legislature, which may be amended or changed with the 
consent of the company, ascertained and declared in the mode 
pointed out by law. Having, by virtue of the relation which 
subsists between himself and the corporation as a holder of shares, 
assented to the terms of the original act of incorporation, he can- 
not be heard to say that he will not be bound by a vote of the 
majority of the stockholders accepting an amendment or alterations 
of the charter made in pursuance of an express authority reserved 
to the Legislature, and which by such acceptance has become 
binding on the corporation." 

This reasoning is unsound because it leaves out of sight the con- 
tract made by the shareholders of a corporation with each other, 
which is the basis of incorporation, and considers the charter only 
as a contract with the State. The decision, however, is not neces- 
sarily inconsistent with the true view. The new enterprise which 
a dissenting stockholder sought to enjoin was an extension of the 
railroad from Fall River to Newport by building as far as the 
State line and taking a lease of the Rhode Island railroad. This 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 15 

was f airty within the purposes of the Old Colony charter and gave 
no cause of complaint to a stockholder. It was a slight enlarge- 
ment of the corporate purposes, not a deviation from them. The 
State waived the right which it possesses over public service cor- 
porations to object to the enlargement of the corporate purpose. 
The court, indeed, observed this distinction between that case and 
one like the present, saying, at page 246 : " Jt was urged, as a 
grave objection against the doctrine above stated, that it puts the 
minority of the stockholders of a corporation entirely within the 
control of the Legislature and a majority of the stockholders, and 
that there would be no limit or restraint placed on the exercise of 
the power, so that corporations might be diverted to purposes and 
objects wholly foreign to those for which they were originally 
established, and stockholders might be made to participate against 
their will in undertakings which they never contemplated and which 
they deemed inexpedient or ruinous. . . . No such question arises 
in the present case, inasmuch as the additional acts, the validity 
of which is called into controversy by the plaintiff, do not empower 
the defendants to engage in any undertaking essentially different 
in kind from that which was embraced in the original acts by 
which their corporate existence under their present name was 
authorized and established." 

And again, on page 241, the court calls attention to another 
distinction which exists between that case and the present : " Nor 
are we called on to determine the effect which such a legislative act 
would have upon a previously existing executory contract entered 
into with the corporation ; as, for instance, an agreement to sub- 
scribe for stock and to become a member of a corporate body, 
created or to be established for certain distinct and designated 
objects. No such question arises in the present case. The plain- 
tiff had no executory agreement with the defendants at the time 
the act in question was passed by the Legislature, or when it was 
approved and accepted by a legal vote of the corporation." 

In Hale v. Cheshire Railroad, 161 Mass. 443, it was held that 
a minority stockholder in the Cheshire railroad which, without his 
objection, had consolidated with the Fitchburg railroad by author- 
ity of the Legislature was bound by the terms of the consolidation 
and could not have an accounting of his share of the assets of the 
Cheshire railroad as upon a dissolution. The court said : " Dis- 
senting stockholders are bound by the vote of the majority, acting 
in good faith and within legislative sanction. It was within the 
constitutional power of the Legislature to authorize the consolida- 
tion. If the plaintiffs had any ground for complaint as to the 
terms of the plan of consolidation, they should have tried to pre- 



16 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

vent its going into effect. They virtually concede, however, that 
the Legislature might sanction a consolidation which should go 
into effect against their protest. Since the consolidation has gone 
into effect, they cannot now maintain a claim for better terms to 
themselves than have been voted." 

There is no further discussion of the broad question involved, 
and, indeed, no point was raised in argument except how much 
the plaintiff was entitled to receive for his stock. Manifestly, the 
court could not make a different contract as to that from the one 
which the corporation, of which he was a member, had made when 
he conceded that the corporation had a right to make it. 

I, therefore, conclude that the Legislature has no power to 
compel the minority in an existing co-operative bank, which is not 
a stock corporation, to give up their interest in it for an interest 
in a consolidated bank in the manner prescribed by this bill. 
This is not saying, however, that the bill as it stands is unconsti- 
tutional. If enacted, it certainly will govern the rights of all 
members of co-operative banks organized after its passage. Even 
as to existing banks, it authorizes their consolidation, and, if all 
the members assent, a consolidation under it will be binding upon 
all. See Nugent v. Supervisors, 19 Wall. 249 ; Dickinson v. Con- 
solidated Traction Co., 114 Fed. 232, 252. 
Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney -General. 



Taxation — Foreign Express Company — Interstate Commerce. 

St. 1903, c. 437, § 75, imposing an excise tax upon foreign corporations 
admitted to transact business within this Commonwealth under the 
provisions of section 58 of such statute, is not applicable to an express 
company organized under the laws of a foreign State and receiving no 
goods in Massachusetts for delivery within the Commonwealth, the 
business transacted by such company being interstate commerce, and 
as such exempt under the Constitution of the United States, Article I, 
§ 8, from State regulation and control. 

April 25, 1904. 

Hon William D. T. Trefry, Commissioner of Corporations. 

Dear Sir : — In your letter of February 4 you desire my opinion 
upon the question whether an express company organized under 
the laws of a foreign State and receiving no goods in Massachu- 
setts for delivery at other points within the Commonwealth is 
liable to a tax under St. 1903, c. 437, § 75. 

The business of such company is interstate commerce, and is 
exempt under the federal constitution from State regulation and 
control. The State may not attach conditions to the right of 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 17 

transacting it beyond local regulations made in the proper exercise 
of the police power. It may not enjoin the corporation from the 
transaction of its business. See Western Union Telegraph Com- 
pany v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530, 554 ; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 
141 U. S. 47; Opinion of the Attorney- General, June 5, 1903. 

The corporation is liable, however, to be taxed upon all its 
property, both tangible and intangible, within the jurisdiction of 
the Commonwealth in return for the protection which its property 
receives under our laws. While indirectly affecting interstate 
commerce, taxation is not considered as a burden on its free 
exercise. Pittsburgh, etc., Railway Company v. Backus, 154 U. S. 
421 ; Adams Express Company v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194; Western 
Union Telegraph Company v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460. 

The franchise of the corporation is property, and not being 
derived from the United States is subject to taxation either 
directly or indirectly. Atlantic & Pacific Telegraph Company v. 
Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160, 163, and citations. In assessing a 
tax upon such corporation the State is not restricted to the prop- 
erty physically located within its limits, but since the value of this 
property is enhanced by the manner of its use in connection with 
the system of the company's business throughout the country, it 
may tax the corporation upon a proportion of its total value, in- 
cluding all its franchises, if such proportion is based upon the 
property within the State. Adams Express Company v. Ohio, 165 
U. S. 194; Adams Express Company v. Ohio (on petition for re- 
hearing), 166 U. S. 185; Adams Express Company v. Kentucky, 
166 U. S. 171. 

Further, the court has held that the form of the tax is not 
essential. It may be framed as an excise tax upon the privilege 
of doing business within the State, provided the exaction be not 
susceptible of exceeding the sum which might be levied directly 
on its property, and that payment be not made a condition prece- 
dent to the right to carry on the business, but that the enforcement 
of the tax be left to the ordinary means devised for the collection 
of taxes. The ascertainment of the amount, whatever the tax be 
called, must be made dependent in fact on the value of the corpora- 
tion's property situated within the State. Postal Telegraph Cable 
Company v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688 ; Maine v. Grand Trunk Rail- 
way Company, 142 U. S. 217 ; New York v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658. 

The tax in question is imposed in the following terms : — 

Section 75. Every foreign corporation of the classes described in 
section fifty-eight shall, in each year, at tiie time of filing its annual cer- 
tificate of condition, pay to the treasurer and receiver general, for the use 



18 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

of the commonwealth, an excise tax to be assessed by the tax commis- 
sioner of one hundredth of one per cent, of the par value of its author- 
ized capital stock as stated in its annual certificate of condition ; but it 
may deduct from such tax the amount of taxes upon property paid by 
it to any city or town in the commonwealth during the preceding year, 
and the amount of such excise tax shall not in any one year exceed the 
sum of two thousand dollars. 

This tax is not founded in any way upon the property of the com- 
pany situated in Massachusetts. It can only be regarded as an 
excise tax based upon the fact of doing business in the Com- 
monwealth. Pratt v. Street Commissioners of Boston, 139 Mass. 
559, 562. Like the tax held invalid in Leloupy. Mobile, 127 U. S. 
640, which overruled Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479, it affects 
all the property of the corporation, wherever situated. While it is 
far smaller in amount than a valid property tax might be, yet the 
mode of assessment cannot be sustained if we apply it to this cor- 
poration. The Legislature might make the tax any percentage of 
the capital stock it desired, and in case of ordinary foreign cor- 
porations such tax would be valid, subject only to the requirement 
of the Massachusetts Constitution that it be a reasonable excise. 
But in taxing a corporation which is engaged wholly in the business 
of interstate and foreign commerce, the amount of tax must be 
based upon the company's property subject to the jurisdiction of 
this Commonwealth. 

I therefore advise that the tax imposed by section 75 does not 
apply to the company in question. 
Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney-General. 



Corporation — Organization beyond the Limits of the Common- 
wealth. 

Persons associating together under the provisions of St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 9, 
10, to form a business corporation, may not legally hold the meet- 
ing at which the organization of such corporation is to be effected 
beyond the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth. 

April 28, 1904. 

Hon. William D. T. Trkfry, Commissioner of Corporations. 

Dear Sir: — In answer to your inquiry as to whether or not 
" the associates who form a corporation under the provisions of 
chapter 437 of the Acts of 1903, sections 9 and 10, may hold the 
meeting for organization outside the Commonwealth," I have to 
advise you that in my opinion such meeting ma}' not be held 
beyond the limits of the Commonwealth. 

The statute above referred to contains, it is true, no express 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 19 

provision with regard to the place where such first meeting shall 
be held, but the doctrine that a corporation can have no legal ex- 
istence beyond the limits of the sovereignty by which it is created 
is well established. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Peters, 519. 
The precise issue presented by your inquiry has been passed upon 
in many jurisdictions, with the uniform result, that an organiza- 
tion effected beyond the jurisdiction of the State by virtue of whose 
law the incorporation is authorized has been held to be void 
and without effect. Miller v. Ewer, 27 Maine, 509 ; Smith v. 
Silver Valley Mining Co., 64 Maryland, 85; Gamp v. Bryne, 41 
Missouri, 525 ; and see 1 Op. Atty-Gen., 185. 

This conclusion is strengthened by the provisions of St. 1903, 
c. 437, § 18, that the clerk of a corporation organized thereunder 
shall be a resident of the Commonwealth ; and in section 20, that 
all meetings of the stockholders shall be held within its limits. 

These provisions, although not in themselves decisive of the 
question submitted, in my judgment tend to show that the Legis- 
lature did not contemplate that any of the meetings of a Massa- 
chusetts corporation should be held beyond the jurisdiction of the 
Commonwealth. 

Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney-General. 



Constitutional Law — Hours of Labor on Public Works. 

It would seem, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, that a proposed bill regulat- 
ing the hours of labor of workmen employed by the Commonwealth, 
by the several counties and by certain cities and towns, or by persons 
contracting with the Commonwealth, the counties and such cities and 
towns, would not, if enacted, be open to objection upon constitutional 
grounds. 

May 6, 1904. 

Hon. Louis A. Frothingham, Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Sir : — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of an order 
of the Honorable House of Representatives passed on the second 
day of May, 1904, which is of the tenor following : " Ordered, that 
the Attorney-General be requested to furnish to the House of 
Representatives his opinion as to the constitutionality of the pro- 
visions of House Bill No. 1320, which regulates the hours of labor 
of workmen employed by the Commonwealth, or by any county, or 
by certain cities and towns, or by persons contracting with the 
Commonwealth or with any county or with certain cities and 
towns," with which order the bill referred to was transmitted to 
me. The act referred to is substantially the same in its provisions 
as that which received my consideration in an opinion under date 



20 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

of June 15, 1903, and the attention of my predecessor, Attorney- 
General Knowlton, in his opinion of April 24, 1901. 

I have the honor to advise the House of Representatives that in 
my opinion the bill is constitutional, so far as it applies to the 
Commonwealth. So far as it applies to municipalities and counties 
within the Commonwealth, the reasons for holding it to be uncon- 
stitutional as in effect taking property without compensation and 
without due process of law, and as authorizing the appropriation 
of taxpayers' money for private purposes, have been already set 
forth in the opinions above referred to. 

Since the last opinion of the Attorney-General above cited, a 
majority of the Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion 
written by Mr. Justice Harlan, have decided that an act of the State 
of Kansas, similar in its provisions to the act now submitted to 
me, did not conflict with the fourteenth amendment of the federal 
Constitution. The Chief Justice and Justices Brewer and Peck- 
ham dissented from the opinion of the court above cited. 

Though the opinion is by a divided court, and though the adjudi- 
cation of the majority is not necessarily or conclusively binding 
upon the courts of the Commonwealth, since the decision of that 
majority was in favor of the constitutionality of the Kansas act, 
it is, nevertheless, manifest that the decision itself must be of com- 
manding if not controlling influence upon other tribunals. I should, 
therefore, deem it presumptuous and perhaps an exhibition of un- 
due hardihood if I assumed to reaffirm my former opinion, which 
is approved by a minority of the justices of the United States 
Supreme Court. 

It is to be noted that since the decision of the Supreme Court 
of the United States in the Kansas case (Atkin v. Kansas, 191 
U. S. 207), an elaborate and most carefully considered decision 
has been made by the Court of Appeals of New York in Ryan v. 
the City of New York, 111 N. Y. 271. The majority of that 
court hold to the view of the majority of the Supreme Court 
of the United States in the Kansas case. O'Brien, Bartlett 
and Vann, JJ., however, dissent in a long opinion based upon the 
same reasons which have influenced the Attorneys-General of Mas- 
sachusetts in their opinions upon the unconstitutionality of the 
legislation embodied in the act now referred to me. 

In view of the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States and of the appellate court of New York above cited, I must 
advise the Honorable House of Representatives that there now 
appears judicial determination of high authority holding that the 
proposed legislation is within the constitutional limitations. 
Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney- General. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 21 



Pauper — Disease dangerous to Public Health — Removal to State 
Hosjntal — Expenses of Transportation. 

The State Board of Charity is authorized by R. L., c. 85, § 14, to direct 
the local authorities to remove to the State Hospital a State pauper 
found within the limits of their jurisdiction who is afflicted with the 
disease of leprosy; and in case such removal is ordered, the expense 
of transportation must in the first instance be borne by the town, 
which is entitled to subsequent reimbursement from the Common- 
wealth " for the excess over thirty miles by the usual route, at a rate 
not exceeding three cents a mile," in accordance with the provisions 
of R. L., c. 85, § 9. 

May 10, 1904. 

J. F. Lewis, M.D., Superintendent, State Adult Poor. 

Dear Sir : — You request my opinion upon the following 
questions relating to the removal to the State Hospital of an 
unsettled pauper now resident in the town of Harwich, and stated 
to be infected with a disease which is diagnosed as leprosy. 

1. Has the State Board of Charity any authority, under the 
statutes, to order his removal from the town of Harwich? 

2. If the above interrogatory is answered in the affirmative, and 
the State Board of Charity orders the removal by the authorities 
of the town of Harwich, should the expenses of such removal be 
borne by the Commonwealth? 

It is my opinion that the State Board of Charity has authority 
to order the removal of such pauper to the State Hospital. 
R. L., c. 85, § 14, provides : — 

No city or town officer shall send to the state hospital any person 
who is infected with smallpox or other disease dangerous to the public 
health, or, except as provided in section ten, any other sick person whose 
health would be endangered by removal ; but all such persons who are 
liable to be maintained by the commonwealth shall be supported during 
their sickness by the city or town in which they are taken sick, and 
notice of such sickness shall be given in writing to the state board of 
charit)', which may examine the case and, if found expedient, order the 
removal of the patient ; but such notice in the case of sick persons whose 
health would be endangered by such removal shall be signed by the 
overseers of the poor or by a person appointed by them by special vote, 
who shall certify, after personal examination, that in their or his opinion 
such removal at the time of his application for aid would endanger his 
health. A city or town officer who knowingly violates the provisions of 
this section shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty nor more 
than one hundred dollars. 

The natural interpretation of this statute is, that " all such per- 
sons who are liable to be maintained by the commonwealth " 
includes " any person who is infected with smallpox or other 



22 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

disease dangerous to the public health" as well as "any other 
sick person whose health would be endangered by removal." 
Moreover, the language of the requirement that " such notice in 
the case of sick persons whose health would be endangered by 
such removal shall be signed by the overseers of the poor . . . 
who shall certif} 7 . . . that . . . such removal . . . would en- 
danger his health," implies an intent of the Legislature that 
notice be required in the case of both classes of persons ; and if 
the provision as to notice so applies, the provision as to ordering 
removals is also applicable. 

Such seems to be the meaning of the section as it stands, and 
whatever may be the effect of Acts of 1902, c. 213, § 1, providing 
that " notice shall be given to the state board of health in accord- 
ance with the provisions of section fifty-two of chapter seventy- 
five of the Revised Laws," which section is as follows : — 

If the board of health of a city or town has had notice of a case of 
smallpox, diphtheria, scarlet fever or of any other disease dangerous to 
the public health therein, it shall within twenty-four hours thereafter 
give notice thereof to the state board of health statino; the name and the 
location of the patient so afflicted, and the secretary thereof shall forth- 
with transmit a copy of such notice to the state board of charity, — 

on the requirement of notice, it certainly does not repeal or revise 
the provision conferring authority to remove a pauper. Nor do 
the statutes providing for the care of persons infected with dis- 
eases dangerous to the public health (see R. L., c. 75, §§ 35 to 
58, inclusive; Acts of 1902, c. 206) contain anything inconsistent 
with this view of the law. 

It is my opinion, in reply to your second inquiry, that the town 
must bear the expense in the first place, and that the Common- 
wealth must reimburse such town for the expense of transporta- 
tion, for the excess over thirty miles by the usual route. R. L., 
c. 85, § 9, provides : — 

Cities and towns may, at their own expense, send to the state hospital, 
to be maintained at the public charge, all paupers who may fall into 
distress therein, and who have no settlement within the commonwealth. 
The city or town shall be reimbursed by the commonwealth, upon bills 
approved by the state board of charity, for the expense of transportation 
of each state pauper thus sent, for the excess over thirty miles by the 
usual route, at a rate not exceeding three cents a mile. 

It appears from this statute that the town or city sending a 
State pauper to the State Hospital is entitled to be reimbursed for 
a part of the expense incurred. Payment for transportation ex- 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 23 

penses was authorized in Acts of 1852, c. 275, § 8, in the original 
statute establishing State almshouses. The first provision for 
payment applied to all paupers sent to such institutions, and no 
exception to the operation of the statute authorizing removals was 
made in the case either of persons whose health would be endan- 
gered or of those who were infected with dangerous diseases. 
Later statutes, beginning in 1855, made these exceptions. See 
Acts of 1855, c. 445, § 2 ; Acts of 1865, c. 162 ; P. S , c. 86, § 25 ; 
Acts of 1885, c. 211; R. L., c. 85, § 14; Acts of 1887, c. 440; 
R. L., c. 85, § 10; Acts of 1903, c. 213. In Acts of 1865, c. 162, 
and succeeding acts, including R. L., c. 85, § 14, authority is 
given to the Board of Charity, in either one of these exceptional 
cases, to "examine the case, and, if found expedient, order the 
removal of the patient." It is to be noted that the removal is to 
be " ordered," not made, by the Board, which leads to the conclu- 
sion that an order of the Board of Charity merely puts the case, 
otherwise within the exception, on the same footing as a case not 
within the exception. This being true, the provision for reim- 
bursement under R. L., c. 85, § 9, applies to a case in which the 
Board of Charity has ordered the removal. Additional ground for 
this interpretation appears in the fact that no greater reason 
appears why a town should bear the expense of transportation of 
a pauper within the special classes than of one who is not, and 
that it may fairly be assumed that the statutes regarding the ex- 
ceptional cases were passed for the protection of the health of 
pauper and public, rather than with any idea of changing the 
burden of the expense of transportation. 
Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney- Geneva}. 



Statute of Limitations — Assessment of Compensation for Dis- 
placement of Tide Water. 

The statute of limitations does not run against the Commonwealth in the 
matter of the assessment and collection of the tax imposed under 
R. L., c. 96, § 23, upon the displacement of tide water. 

May 11, 1904. 
Hon. Woodward Emery, Chairman, Board of Harbor and Land Com- 
missioners. 

Dear Sir : — The Harbor and Land Commissioners ask the 
opinion of the Attorney-General whether the statute of limitations 
will run against the Commonwealth in the assessment and collec- 
tion of a tax for tide-water displacement under R. L., c. 96, § 23. 

The statute is as follows : — 



24 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Section 23. The amount of tide water which is displaced by any 
structure below high water mark, or by *any filling of flats, shall be 
ascertained by the board, which shall require the persons who cause such 
displacement to make compensation therefor by excavating, under its 
direction, between high and low water mark in some part of the same 
harbor a basin for a quantity of water equal to that displaced; or by 
paying in lieu of such excavation an amount assessed by said board, 
not exceeding thirty-seven and one-half cents per cubic yard of water 
displaced ; or by improving the harbor in any other manner satisfactory 
to the board; and the money shall be paid into the treasury of the 
commonwealth, and be reserved as a compensation fund for such 
harbor. The income thereof may be used under the direction of the 
board for the improvement of the harbor. An assessment for tide 
water which has been displaced may be recovered in an action of con- 
tract in the name of the treasurer and receiver general. 

R. L., c. 202, § 2: — 

The following actions shall, except as otherwise provided, be com- 
menced only within six years next after the cause of action accrues: 

First, Actions of contract founded upon contracts or liabilities, express 
or implied. ... 

Section 17 : — • 

The limitations of the preceding sections of this chapter . . . shall 
apply to actions brought by the commonwealth or for its benefit. 

When does the Commonwealth's right of action to collect an 
assessment for a displacement of tidewater accrue? Before the 
assessment of the Harbor and Land Commissioners the Treasurer 
has no legal means of ascertaining the amount of the Common- 
wealth's claim and cannot sustain an action. His right, therefore, 
accrues at the date of the assessment. He must bring suit to 
collect the assessment within six years after it was levied. 

No cause of action accrues to the Commonwealth until the 
Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners has made the assess- 
ment. Is the Board required to assess within six years after the 
displacement of tide water? The statute does not in terms limit 
the time. 

The situation is somewhat similar to the case of an obligation 
which becomes fixed only upon the making of a demand. The 
doctrine has been stated by many courts that a person who is en- 
titled to a payment after a demand which he may make when he 
chooses is bound to make demand within a reasonable time in 
order to preserve his rights as against the statute of limitations. 
In Shaiv v. Silloway, 145 Mass. 503, it was said that this question 
had not been considered in Massachusetts. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 25 

In Campbell v. Whoriskey, 170 Mass. 63, the court said : — 

It has sometimes been held, or seemingly assumed, that, even if many 
years are permitted to elapse without a demand, the statute will not 
begin to run until the demand is made. . . . Under this doctrine, carried 
to its extreme limit, a liability to a suit upon a claim might continue for 
an indefinitely long time. The extreme doctrine in the other direction 
is that the " cause of action accrues for the purpose of setting the statute 
in motion as soon as the creditor by his own act, and in spite of the 
debtor, can make the demand payable." ... In some of the cases it is 
held that a demand must be made within a reasonable time, and that a 
reasonable time will not in any event extend beyond the statute period 
for bringing such an action ... In Codman v. Rogers, 10 Pick. 112, 
120, Mr. Justice Wilde said: "A demand must be made within a 
reasonable time ; otherwise the claim is considered stale, and no relief 
will be granted in a court of equity. What is to be considered a reason- 
able time for this purpose does not appear to be settled by any precise 
rule. It must depend on circumstances. If no cause for delay can be 
shown, it would seem reasonable to require the demand to be made 
within the time limited by the statute for bringing the action There 
is the same reason for hastening the demand that there is for hasten- 
ing the commencement of the action ; and in both cases the same 
presumptions arise from delay." Although he was merely stating the 
doctrine of laches in a suit in equity, his language has been quoted and 
referred to in several of the cases above cited as stating the true prin- 
ciple applicable to actions at law. . . . 

We are of opinion that the true principle is that the time when the 
demand must be made depends upon the construction to be put upon 
the contract in each case. If the contract requires a demand without 
language referring to the time when the demand is to be made, it is as 
if the words "within a reasonable time" were found in it. AVhat is a 
reasonable time is a question of law, to be determined in reference to 
the nature of the contract and the probable intention of the parties as 
indicated by it. Where there is nothing to indicate an expectation that 
a demand is to be made quickly, or that there is to be delay in making 
it, we are of opinion that the time limited for bringing such an action 
after the cause of action accrues should ordinarily be treated as the time 
within which a demand must be made. See Jameson v. Jameson, 72 Mo. 
640. Such a rule seems fairly to apply the principles and analogies of 
the statute of limitations to the contract of the parties, and it is in 
accordance with the weight of authority in this Commonwealth and 
elsewhere. 

This doctrine of the Massachusetts court applies the priuciple 
of the statute of limitations by analogy to a case not included in 
the statute. It is an extension of the equitable doctrine of laches 
to a situation arising at common law. The question is whether 
this principle should be applied against the Commonwealth so that 
the Treasurer's action, brought to recover an assessment, must 



26 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

fail if a board over which he has no control neglected to levy the 
assessment within six years after the displacement. 

It is a general principle that a right in behalf of the Common- 
wealth does not fail because of the laches of its officers. State v. 
Brewer, 64 Ala. 287 ; Eaehnlen v. Commonwealth, 13 Penn. State, 
617; State v. Sponaugle, 45 West Va. 415. Compare Common- 
wealth v. Bala, etc., Turnpike Company, 153 Penn. State, 47. 

The statute of limitations itself could not defeat the right of the 
Commonwealth except that it is expressly applied to actions by 
the Commonwealth in R. L., c. 202, § 17. The Commonwealth 
has all the rights and prerogatives of a sovereignty until by statute 
it yields them up. One of these prerogatives is expressed in the 
maxim " Nullum temjms occurrit regi." 

I am inclined to the view, there being no authority upon either 
side of the narrow question, that the principle of the statute of 
limitations should not by analogy be extended to bar this right of 
the Commonwealth to levy an assessment which is not expressly 
limited in time. In any event, if the Treasurer desires to bring 
suit within six years to recover an assessment levied more than six 
years after a displacement, the question whether he may maintain 
such action is worthy of a test case. 
Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney -General. 



Constitutional Law — Obligations of Contract — East Boston 
Tunnel — Bonds — Tolls. 

St. 1897, c. 500, § 17, which authorizes the construction by the Boston 
Transit Commission of the East Boston Tunnel, and its subsequent 
lease to the Boston Elevated Railway Company at an annual rental 
fixed thereby and payable to the city of Boston, by pledging such 
rental together with the tolls which the city is directed to collect from 
persons passing through such tunnel, " to meet the principal and inter- 
est of the bonds issued to pay for the construction of said tunnel," and 
expressing such pledge upon the face of the bonds v as one of the 
terms thereof," creates a valid contract between the city of Boston 
and the purchasers of such bonds which cannot be impaired by subse- 
quent legislation ; and House Bill No. 1192, w T hich abolishes such tolls 
and instead thereof requires the city of Boston to set aside from the 
compensation received by it from the Boston Elevated Railway Com- 
pany under St. 1897, c. 500, § 10, a sum equal to the amount which it 
would have received from such tolls, to be pledged in like manner to 
meet the principal and interest of the bonds, for the reason that it 
varies the terms of such contract by substituting for the source of 
income pledged to secure the bondholders another and different source 
of income, is unconstitutional and void. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 27 

May 16, 1904. 
Hon. Albion F. Bemis, Chairman, Committee on Metropolitan Affairs. 

Dear Sir : — The committee on metropolitan affairs has re- 
quested my opinion upon the constitutionality of House Bill No. 
1192, entitled u An Act relative to the payment of tolls in the East 
Boston tunnel." 

This bill is intended to amend St. 1897, c. 500, § 17, which 
authorizes the construction of the East Boston tunnel, and con- 
tains the provision that upon the completion of the tunnel the 
Rapid Transit Commission shall execute a lease thereof in writing 
to the Boston Elevated Railway Company, for a term expiring 
twenty-five years from the date of the passage of the act, at an 
annual rental equal to three-eighths of one per cent, of the gross 
receipts for each year ending September 30, of all lines owned, 
leased or operated by the corporation, to be paid to the city of 
Boston on or before the last day of November in each year, which 
rental shall be in full compensation for the exclusive use of said 
tunnel by said corporation, its sub-lessees, successors or assigns. 
Such other terms and conditions may be incorporated in the lease 
as may be agreed upon by the commission and the corporation, or, 
in case of disagreement, as shall be determined by the Board of 
Railroad Commissioners. 

The material part of the section is as follows : — 

Said city shall collect from each person passing through said tunnel 
in either direction a toll of one cent : provided, however, that if in any 
year ending on the thirtieth day of September the receipts from such 
tolls, together with the rental above-provided for, amount to a sum so 
in excess of the interest and sinking fund requirements of said bonds 
for that year that the board of railroad commissioners is of opinion that 
the toll may be reduced, said board shall on petition of ten citizens of 
said city establish such reduced toll for the period of one year from the 
first day of January next ensuing, as will in its opinion yield an amount 
sufficient to meet, with said rental, said interest and sinking fund re- 
quirements for that year; or said board may altogether discontinue 
such toll when it is of opinion that such rental alone is sufficient to 
meet said requirements ; but any such reduction shall be carried into 
effect by a provision for the sale of tickets, and the cash fare shall con- 
tinue to be one cent. The whole amount of such tolls and of said 
rentals is hereby pledged to meet the principal and interest of the bonds 
issued to pay for the construction of said tunnel or tunnels, and this 
pledge shall be expressed on the face of such bonds as one of the terms 
thereof ; provided, however, that after such tolls have been discontinued 
if said rentals shall for any year ending on the thirtieth day of Sep- 
tember yield an amount more than sufficient to meet the interest and 
sinking fund requirements of said bonds for such year such excess over 
said requirements shall be regarded as general revenue of said city. In 



28 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

case in any year the rentals and tolls above-provided for shall not yield 
a sufficient amount to meet said interest and sinking fund requirements 
the compensation received by said city under section ten of this act shall 
be applied so far as may be necessary toward meeting such require- 
ments. Said corporation shall be the agent of said city to collect such 
tolls under such arrangements as shall be agreed upon by said city and 
said corporation, or in case of disagreement, as shall be determined by 
the board of railroad commissioners. 

House Bill No. 1192 amends this section by striking out the 
provision above quoted with regard to the collection by the city 
of a toll of one cent, to be collected from each person pass- 
ing through the tunnel in either direction, and enacting in place 
thereof the following : — 

Said city shall set aside from the compensation received by said city 
under section ten of this act a toll of one cent for each person passing 
through said tunnel in either direction. 

Section 10, herein referred to, provides that the Boston Elevated 
Railway Company may establish a maximum toll or fare of five 
cents, which sum shall not be reduced by the Legislature during 
the period of twenty-five years from and after the passage of this 
act, and further provides for a payment as compensation for the 
privileges therein granted and for the use and occupation of the 
public streets, squares and places by the lines of elevated and sur- 
face railroad owned, leased and operated by the corporation of an 
annual sum, the amount of which is to be determined by the 
amount of the annual dividend paid in each year, as therein pro- 
vided. '-The above sum shall be paid into the treasury of the 
Commonwealth and distributed among the different cities and 
towns in proportion to the mileage of elevated and surface main 
track reckoned as single track which is owned, leased and operated 
by said corporation and located therein." 

The question submitted is whether or not the change made by 
House Bill No. 1192 is unconstitutional as impairing obligations of 
contract. 

A consideration of the statutes above referred to in my opinion 
clearly shows that no obligation of contract subsisting between the 
Commonwealth and the Boston Elevated Railway Company is 
impaired or affected by the proposed amendment, and the bill, if 
unconstitutional, must be so by reason of the existence of a con- 
tract between the cit} T and the purchasers of the bonds referred to 
in sections 17 and 18, which is impaired by its provisions. 

The first question to be determined, therefore, is whether or not 
such a contract exists. Section 17 provides that the city shall 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 29 

collect a toll of one cent from each person passing through the 
tunnel in either direction, and for an annual rental of three-eighths 
of one per cent, of the gross annual earnings of the corporation, 
the amount received from both these sources being pledged to meet 
the principal and interest of bonds issued to pay for the work of 
constructing such tunnel. This pledge is expressed upon the face, 
and forms one of the terms of each of such bonds, and, in my 
opinion, constitutes a valid contract between the city and the bond- 
holders, the obligations of which cannot be impaired by any sub- 
sequent legislation. 

The second question to be considered is whether the change 
proposed to be made by House Bill No. 1192 is an impairment of 
the obligation created by this contract. 

It is to be observed that the pledge above referred to is ob- 
viously designed to afford security for the full and timely payment 
of the principal and interest of the bonds issued to pay for the 
work of constructing the tunnel by specifically devoting a certain 
income to that purpose. If the income as assigned exceeds the 
amount necessary, the surplus may be treated as the general reve- 
nue of the city of Boston. If, on the other hand, the specified 
sources are not sufficient to provide the necessary sum, a third 
source of income is made available, namely, the income received 
by the city as compensation for the use of the public streets, ways 
and places, under the provisions of section 10. If, after experi- 
ment, it appears to the Board of Railroad Commissioners that the 
tolls and rental exceed the amount required for principal and in- 
terest of the bonds issued by the city, they may reduce the toll by 
making provision for the sale of tickets, though cash fares must 
still be paid in the same amount by passengers ; and if the rental 
alone becomes sufficient for the specified purposes, the tolls may 
be discontinued. 

House Bill No. 1192 in effect abolishes one source of income, 
viz., the tolls, and provides that the amount which would have 
been furnished to the city from such tolls shall be payable out of 
the compensation received by the city under section 10. This 
may or may not diminish or materially affect the sources of income 
available as security for the bonds issued, since the amount re- 
ceived as compensation under section 10 by the city may or may 
not be sufficient to provide for all deficits which may exist from 
year to year in the rental, the significant effect of the provision 
being to abolish the tolls entirely. This, in my judgment, consti- 
tutes a material interference with and impairment of the obligation 
of contract between the city and the bondholders created by sec- 
tion 17. If the effect of the proposed legislation were merely to 



30 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

substitute one security for another of equal value, it would be, if 
compulsory, objectionable on constitutional grounds ; if the com- 
pulsory substitution be to provide a security of less value than the 
original, or one of a lower grade, it certainly conflicts with con- 
stitutional requirements. 

It is forcibly argued by those in favor of House Bill No. 1192 
that the change suggested is merely one of bookkeeping, trans- 
ferring the liability to pay the amount due as tolls from the general 
public to the city of Boston, and designating the sum from which 
it is to be drawn, and that as regards the bondholders, the contract 
is not in any respect affected. 

It appears, however, upon careful consideration, that the change 
is more material than the petitioners admit. 

Section 17 provides a scheme for meeting the interest and sink- 
ing fund requirements of the bonds issued which involves the set- 
ting aside of a certain fixed and definite income as it accrues, and 
dedicating and appropriating the same directly and in specie, to 
meet the bond obligations ; and further provides that the tolls paid 
by the public shall be discontinued upon certain contingencies set 
forth by the Board of Railroad Commissioners. This scheme and 
these conditions may well have been, and in my opinion were, 
considerations of weight with those intending to purchase bonds, 
when coupled with the distinct pledge that the receipts from such 
sources should be set aside for meeting the obligations of the bonds, 
and for this reason the conditions prescribed are material to the 
contract and formed a consideration for the purchase of the bonds. 

The adjudicated cases upon this subject seem clearly to recog- 
nize the principle that the power of taxation as it existed at the 
time when the contract was made becomes a part of the contract, 
and, if necessary, can be availed of by the creditor under such 
contract without regard to subsequent legislation. Von Hoffman v. 
Otty of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 ; Balls County Court v. United States, 
105 U. S. 733, 738 ; Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289. In these 
cases the power to tax was the general power of taxation vested 
in a municipality, and the courts, in substance, held that if under 
subsequent changes in the method of taxation and in the classes 
of property to be taxed the income derived from such taxation was 
insufficient to meet the requirements of the contract, the obligation 
of contract was impaired to the extent of the deficiency thus 
created. 

Where a special tax levy or a special fund raised by taxation is 
made security for the payment of contract obligations, the creditor 
may insist upon payment from that source, notwithstanding the 
repeal of the law by which it was established. Seibert v. Lewis, 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 31 

122 U. S. 284, 290 ; Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 11 U. S. 716. 
A contract of this character is discussed in Louisiana v. Pillsbury, 
105 U. S. 278, at pp. 287, 288 : — 

These provisions, until the bonds were accepted, were in the nature 
of proposals to the creditors of the old city, of the municipalities and of 
Lafayette. The State in effect said to them : the city will give these 
bonds, running for the period designated, and drawing interest, in ex- 
change for your demands ; and as security for the payment of interest, 
and the gradual redemption of the principal, the city shall annually, in 
January, levy a special tax for that purpose to the amount of f 650,000. 
The provisions were designed to give value to the proposed bonds in 
the market of the country, and necessarily operated as an inducement 
to the creditors to take them. When the bonds were issued and taken 
by the creditors, a contract was consummated between them and the 
city as fully as if all the provisions had been embodied as express stipu- 
lations in the most formal instrument signed by the parties. On the 
one hand, the creditors surrendered their debts against the former 
municipalities; and, on the other hand, in consideration of the sur- 
render, the city gave to them its bonds, which carried the pledge of an 
annual tax of a specified amount for the payment of the interest on 
them, and ultimately of the principal. The annual tax was the security 
offered to the creditors ; and it could not be afterwards severed from 
the contract without violating its stipulations, any more than a mortgage 
executed as security for a note given for a loan could be subsequently 
repudiated as forming no part of the transaction. Nearly all legislative 
contracts are made in a similar way. The law authorizes certain bonds 
to be issued, or certain work to be done upon specified conditions. 
When these are accepted, a contract is entered into imposing the duties 
aud creating the liabilities of the most carefully drawn instrument em- 
bodying the provisions. Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; 
Hurtman v. Greenhow, 102 U. S. 672; People v. Bond, 10 Cal. 563; 
Brooklyn Park Commissioners v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234. 

The case now under consideration appears to be identical in 
principle with those decisions which deal with a specific source of 
income appropriated to the discharge of the obligation incurred 
under the contract; and there are a number of decisions which 
deal with facts substantially like those under discussion. 

In Liquidators v. Municipality, 6 La. Ann. 21, an act of Legis- 
lature was passed in the State of Louisiana to provide for the 
payment of the debts of a municipal corporation, which author- 
ized the creation of a sinking fund which was to be deposited and 
to be applied as specified in the act. In cases where creditors, 
acting thereunder, had surrendered the evidences of their debts 
and received new bonds, for the payment of which the fund was 
pledged, it was held not competent for a subsequent Legislature, 
in providing for the payment of the corporate debts, to give a dif- 



32 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

ferent destination to the sinking fund by changing the depositary 
of the fund, such change being held to be an impairment of the 
obligation of the contract. In Fazende v. City of Houston, 34 
Fed. Rep. 95, where a municipal corporation, under an ordinance 
authorized by its charter, issued bonds to provide for erecting a 
market-house, and agreed in the bonds that the revenue from the 
market should be devoted to the payment of the interest on the 
bonds and to the formation of a sinking fund for their redemption, 
it was held that the city could make no other disposition of such 
revenue. So in Brooklyn Park Commissioners v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 
234, where bonds were issued by a municipality to raise funds for 
the payment of lands for a park, and the lands were specifically 
pledged for such payment, it was held that a subsequent act of 
Legislature authorizing a sale of such lands, free of trust and of 
existing liens under the original act, could not be sustained, such 
act being an impairment of the obligation of contract. See also 
Dillingham v. Hook, 32 Kan. 185. In City of St. Louis v. Sheilds, 
52 Mo. 351, the facts were substantially like those now before me. 
The court held that, upon the repeal of a statute which authorized the 
city of St. Louis to raise money, by the issue of bonds, for harbor 
improvements and the construction of wharves, and established a 
wharf tax upon all real estate in such city, which, together with 
the revenue derived from the wharves after completion, was 
pledged to meet the payment of interest and to provide for the 
establishment of a sinking fund for the redemption of the bonds, 
no contractual relation existed as between the city and the State, 
and no obligation of contract was impaired by such repeal. It is 
to be observed, however, that the bondholders were not before the 
court, and it is intimated in the opinion that were "the bond- 
holders asking for a protection of their rights and showing that 
the collection of their debts was impaired, a different case would 
be presented;" and in Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black (U. S.), 
510, to the same effect the bondholders were not before the court. 
I am therefore of opinion that in so far as House Bill No. 1192 
is designed to change the conditions and scheme of payment, and 
the obligations to secure the same under which the bonds issued 
to pay for the construction of the East Boston tunnel were sold, 
and which formed a consideration in such sale, it is unconsti- 
tutional. 

Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney- General. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 33 



Banking — Receipt of Money on Deposit — Certificates of De- 
posit — Business Corporation. 

The receipt of money on deposit at interest and the issuance of certificates 
of deposit therefor is " banking " within the meaning of R. L., c. 115, 
and such business is forbidden to a corporation organized under the 
provision of St. 1903, c. 437, relating to business corporation. 

June 11, 1904. 
Warren E. Locke, Esq., Chairman, Board of Commissioners of Savings 

Banks. 

Dear Sir : — Your letter of January 20 submits for my con- 
sideration certain circulars and other advertisements issued by 
the Equitable Banking Company of Boston, soliciting deposits of 
money for periods of one, two or three years, and offering to pay 
interest thereon at six per cent., together with an extract from 
the charter of such corporation, and you inquire whether such 
charter "permits of their advertising for deposits and issuing 
certificates of deposits after the manner of a national bank." 
Inasmuch, however, as the Board of Commissioners of Savings 
Banks, as such, are not concerned with, or authorized to inquire 
as to, the charter powers of the Equitable Banking Company, 
unless some question presents itself which relates to the business 
of banking, I conceive your inquiry to be directed rather to the 
question whether receiving money on deposit at interest, and issu- 
ing certificates of deposit, is in fact conducting a banking busi- 
ness, and, if so, whether such business is permitted by the charter 
of the company. 

The Equitable Banking Company is a Massachusetts corpora- 
tion incorporated under the provisions of St. 1903, c. 437, known 
as the " Business Corporation Law." Section 1 of this chapter 
provides that it " shall not apply to corporations organized under 
general or special laws of this Commonwealth for the purpose of 
carrying on within the Commonwealth the business of a bank, 
savings bank, co-operative bank, trust company, surety or indem- 
nity company, safe deposit company," etc. The business which 
the corporation is authorized by its charter to carry on is as 
follows : — 

To carry on a general mercantile, mining and brokerage business, and 
also to carry on the business of buying and selling wages, salaries, con- 
tracts, accounts, notes, drafts and other choses in action, and to purchase 
the same at a price consistent with the security offered. Also to raise 
money either by the issue of bonds or on a mortgage, to organize cor- 
porations to buy or acquire other corporations, syndicates or business. 
Also the acquiring of any property, real or personal, such as mining, 



34 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

mining rights, land, buildings, machinery, tools, patents, patent rights, 
leases or licenses essential or convenient for such business, and gener- 
ally to do any and all things necessary or incident thereto, but not to 
carry on any business within the Commonwealth prohibited by the laws 
of Massachusetts under the act relating to business corporations. 

Since St. 1903, c. 437, expressly exempts from the operations 
of its provisions corporations organized for the purpose of carry- 
ing on the business of banking, such business being regulated by 
R. L., c. 115, I am of opinion that the Equitable Banking Com- 
pany is not authorized to carry on a banking business in this 
Commonwealth, and if the receipt of money on deposit, and the 
issuance of certificates of deposit and the payment of interest on 
the money so deposited is banking, the corporation has exceeded 
its charter powers. 

A bank is defined to be an institution, usually incorporated, 
with power to issue promissory notes intended to circulate as 
money, or to receive the money of others on general deposit, to 
form a joint fund, to be used by the institution for its own bene- 
fit, for one or more of the purposes of making temporary loans 
and discounts, of dealing in notes, foreign and domestic bills of 
exchange, coin, bullion, credits and the remission of money, with 
the additional privilege of receiving special deposits and making 
collections for the holders of negotiable paper, if the institution 
sees fit to engage in such business. "Practically, a bank is a 
place where deposits are received and paid out on checks, and 
money is loaned on security." Morse on " Banks and Banking ," 
4th ed., par. 2. The receipt of money on deposit and the creation 
thereby of a fund which may be used by the institution for its own 
benefit, is, therefore, an important function of the business of 
banking. 

A certificate of deposit is " the written acknowledgment of the 
bank that it has received from a certain person a certain sum on 
deposit." Morse on " Banks and Banking" 4th ed., par. 297. 
Such certificates differ from promissory notes, not only because 
the certificate must be returned or tendered before payment be- 
comes due, but also because it is in itself a declaration that a 
certain fund has been deposited which is payable to the depositor, 
or his order, on the return of the certificate ; and such certificates 
are issued " with the design that they shall be used as money and 
taken with as much confidence as the bills of the bank." Shute 
v. Pacific National Bank, 136 Mass. 487. 

In view of the nature of such certificates and the use to which 
they are intended to be put, I am of opinion that the authority to 
issue them must be held to be strictly limited to banks or other 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 35 

similar corporations organized under and regulated by the statutes 
applicable to the business of banking, and that a corporation 
organized under the provisions of St. 1903, c. 437, as a business 
corporation, has no authority to receive money on deposit and to 
issue certificates therefor. 

Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney- General. 



Constitutional Law — Veto Power of Executive — Legislature — 
Passage of Bill or Resolve over Veto — Two-thirds of Branch 
originating Measure. 

The Constitution of Massachusetts, Part II., chapter I., article II., by- 
providing that where the veto power of the Executive is exercised, the 
bill or resolve, with his objection thereto in writing, shall be returned 
to that branch of the Legislature in which such bill or resolve origi- 
nated, two-thirds of which branch may upon reconsideration agree to 
pass the same, and if approved in the other branch by two-thirds of 
the members present, it shall have the force of a law, — imposes upon 
that branch of the Legislature in which a particular act originates a 
different relation to and responsibility for such act from that attaching 
to the other branch, and requires that "two-thirds of the said Senate 
or House of Representatives," whichever may have originated the 
measure, should be two-thirds of the full membership thereof, and not 
merely two-thirds of the members present, as in the case of the re- 
maining branch. 

It follows that St. 1904, c. 458, which originated in the House of Repre- 
sentatives and which was therein passed over the veto of the Execu- 
tive by a two-thirds vote of the members then present but not by a 
two-thirds vote of its entire membership, was not passed over such 
veto in accordance with the provision of the Constitution (Part II., 
chapter I., article II.), and is null and void. The Treasurer has no 
authority, therefore, to issue the bonds authorized and required by 
the terms of such statute. 

July 11, 1904. 

Hon. Edward S. Bradford, Treasurer and Receiver- General. 

Sir : — I have the honor to acknowledge your communication of 
June 15, in which you ask my opinion as to the " constitutionality 
and legality" of chapter 458 of the Acts of 1904, which com- 
munication has had my attention and study since its receipt. 

I am advised that the act in question originated in the House of 
Representatives, and I am informed that after the said act had 
been returned to that body by His Excellency the Governor, with- 
out his approval and accompanied by his reasons therefor, it ap- 
pears by the journal of the House that two-thirds of its entire 
membership did not vote affirmatively to pass the said act not- 
withstanding the Executive veto. I am further informed that 



36 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

two-thirds of the members of the House present and voting did, 
however, affirmatively vote to pass the act notwithstanding the 
veto. 

The question you raise is one of very serious importance. I 
take it to comprise an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the 
law, assuming it to have been duly enacted, as well as the question 
whether, as matter of law, it has been enacted at all in view of the 
Executive veto. 

If the statute has been lawfully enacted, I am of opinion that I 
should not be justified in declaring it to be unconstitutional. The 
Supreme Judicial Court must determine that question if it be 
raised. I therefore confine my attention, investigation and dis- 
cussion to the more specific inquiry and the more important, in 
view of my duty, whether it was in law enacted in view of the 
facts which I accept as above stated. 

The constitutional provisions upon which this question must be 
determined are to be found in chapter I., article II., of Part the 
Second of the Constitution of this Commonwealth, the material 
part of which is to be found in the paragraphs defining the veto 
power of the Executive, the language being : — 

But if he have any objection to the passing of such bill or resolve, he 
shall return the same, together with his objections thereto in writing, to 
the senate or house of representatives, in whichsoever the same shall 
have originated; who shall enter the objections sent down by the 
governor, at large, on their records, and proceed to reconsider the said 
bill or resolve. But if after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the said 
senate or house of representatives, shall, notwithstanding the said objec- 
tions, agree to pass the same, it shall, together with the objections, be 
sent to the other branch of the legislature, where it shall also be recon- 
sidered, and if approved by two-thirds of the members present, shall 
have the force of a law. 

There is an obvious difference in the phraseology defining the 
reconsideration and re-enactment of a law, notwithstanding the 
Executive veto, with regard to the two branches of the Legisla- 
ture, the one in which the act originated and the other whose 
action supplements that of the branch in which the law had its 
origin ; in the case of the branch originally acting it being required 
that there must be an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the said 
Senate or House of Representatives, and in the other case, the 
affirmative vote required being two-thirds of the members present. 
Whether the omission is the one requirement of the word " present " 
and its appearance in the other be intentional or accidental, suggests 
the first line of inquiry which my investigation pursues. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 37 

The presumption must be that the terms and provisions of the 
Constitution find place through the intent of its framers rather 
than through accident or inattention. I must therefore conclude 
that the difference of phraseology in the two sections above cited 
was intentional, and my inquiry is, in consequence, confined to 
the question whether this difference of phrase leads to a necessary 
difference of vote in the two houses required to enact a law, not- 
withstanding the veto of the governor. 

That the attention of the framers of the Constitution was 
directed especially to this section is apparent from the report of 
the constitutional convention of 1779-80. The report of that con- 
vention, which is very incomplete and unsatisfactory, states that a 
motion was made to insert the words " being equal in numbers to 
those present at the passing thereof." The report does not state 
at what point in the section these words were to be inserted. The 
convention, however, declared in favor of the paragraph in its 
present form. See Journal of the Convention, 1779-80, Boston, 
1832. 

The records of the constitutional convention of 1853 present an 
interesting and suggestive discussion of the question before me 
though it furnishes no decisive authority. Debates in Massachu- 
setts Convention, 1853, volume III., page 662 et seq. A commit- 
tee of the convention reported a revision of article IV., by which 
revision the word " present" was inserted and made applicable to 
the vote required for enactment after a veto, by the body in which 
the act originated. It was contended by Mr. Lord of Salem that the 
insertion of the word effected a palpable alteration of the Constitu- 
tion which was beyond the authority of the reporting committee. 
Upon a question of order, whether the report, by reason of the 
change of phrase, did transcend the authority of the committee, 
the presiding officer of the convention ruled that it did not, since, 
in the opinion of the chair, "the insertion of the word ' present' 
does not change the substance of the article ; the experience of the 
chair has been invariably that a question has been considered set- 
tled on receiving the assent of two-thirds of the members present 
and voting thereon. The chair does not therefore regard it as 
changing the substance of the article." Mr. Lord earnestly and 
forcibly argued that the inserted word "present" did change the 
meaning of the Constitution, and he was opposed to such insertion 
both because it was beyond the authority and province of the com- 
mittee as well as upon the broader ground that it diminished the 
vote required to override an Executive veto. He thereupon moved 
that the report of the committee be amended by striking out the 
word " present." The question was taken upon this motion, and 



38 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

upon a division the vote stood, ayes 63, noes 162, and Mr. Lord's 
amendment was rejected. 

The Constitution, with article IV. containing the inserted word 
" present," was adopted by the convention, but the new draft of 
the Constitution was rejected by popular vote. It thus appears 
that an attempt to amend the Constitution by the insertion of a 
word claimed by some to be only a change of phrase without 
change of meaning, and by others to be a change of substance, 
failed of accomplishment through the disapproval of the people, 
and so the attempt to remove the doubt of construction, if it were 
only such, failed ; and it is also obvious that the express provision 
requiring only a two-thirds vote of members present for the pas- 
sage of an act over the Governor's veto, if such were a change in 
the constitutional requirement, was not ratified by the popular 
assent. 

Article XXXIII. of Amendments to the Constitution, adopted 
Nov. 3, 1891, is as follows : — 

A majority of the members of each branch of the General Court shall 
constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, but a less number 
may adjourn from day to day, and compel the attendance of absent 
members. All the provisions of the existing Constitution inconsistent 
with the provisions herein contained are hereby annulled. 

This amendment does not, in my opinion, affect the question 
before me or aid in its determination. None of the pre-existing 
provisions of the Constitution affecting this question are incon- 
sistent with, or in consequence annulled by, those of this amend- 
ment, which merely defines what shall constitute a quorum for the 
transaction of business in either branch of the General Court, and 
was evidently directed to and in amendment of article IX. of 
chapter I. of section II. and article IX. of chapter I. of section 
III. of the Constitution. 

A constitutional requirement fixing the minimum vote necessary 
for affirmative action upon a specific proposition or question is not, 
in my opinion, affected by a provision designating the limit of 
attendance without which ordinary business cannot be transacted. 
Unless an amendment revises the whole subject embraced by the 
previous constitutional provision the latter cannot be held to have 
been repealed by implication, especially as it may be given, as in 
this case, full effect without conflict or inconsistency with the sub- 
sequent amendment. See Harnden v. Gould, 126 Mass. 413. 

I have examined the reported rulings of presiding officers of the 
House and Senate upon the construction of the constitutional 
provision under consideration, and it appears to have been held 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 39 

that in the branch first taking action a vote of two-thirds of the 
members present is sufficient to pass a bill notwithstanding a veto. 
Clifford, S., 1862, page 625; Bullock, II., 1862, page 586. But 
such decisions, not being upon the construction of the rules of 
the Senate or House but upon the organic law superior to and con- 
trolling all legislative action, can neither be final, nor, indeed, be 
held to carry any authority beyond that of the learning and sound 
wisdom of the eminent gentlemen who declared them. 

The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley, in County of 
Cass v. Johnston, 95 U. S. 370, most forcefully presents reasons 
bearing high intrinsic authority of a great jurist, to the effect that 
in the absence of qualifying or limiting words a constitutional 
requirement of a specific vote of a given body means such vote of 
the entire body, not such proportion of the members thereof as 
may at any assumed moment participate in the vote. 

The opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley appears to me consonant 
with the true principle governing this inquiry, and would by itself . 
justify grave doubt whether, in the case before me, a two-thirds 
vote of members present in the house of origin of the bill satisfied 
the requirement of the Constitution, even if the phrase of require- 
ment were identical as applied to action in both houses, and this 
view is directly sustained in the case of State v. Gould, 31 Minn. 
189. 

There are authorities, however, which hold that the word 
*' house," where context, subject or condition suggests or induces 
such conclusion, is to be construed as meaning a quorum of such 
house. Southworth v. Palmyra & Jackson Railroad Company, 2 
Mich. 287 ; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650. The reason upon 
which these decisions rest is absent from the case before us, since 
it is here apparent that peculiar responsibility and gravity attach 
to that vote which is to nullify an Executive veto, and it is there- 
fore to be distinguished from routine action incident to the mere 
transaction of ordinary legislative business. Again, the context 
under consideration before us exhibiting a difference in phrase 
forbids that generalization of reason which carried the opinion of 
the court in the cases above cited. In the construction of stat- 
utes, and much more so in that of the Constitution, it is the safe 
method to give effect to the particular words. When in the same 
sentence different words are used, the courts of law will presume 
that they were used in order to express different ideas. Parkin- 
son v. State, U Md. 184, 197. 

Where there is such difference of phrase as that plainly before 
us, that difference must be held to have an intentional significance 
which I certainly cannot and shall not assume to ignore by any 



40 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

rule of construction which holds that the word " present " in the 
second clause and absent in the first is mere heedless surplusage* 
the result of a want of consideration or inattention on the part of 
the framers of the Constitution, or the result of an incapacity that 
must await the charitable constructive assistance of commentators 
of a later day. I am of opinion that our Constitution took its 
vigor at the moment of its adoption and in the very phrase of its 
expression, and that no one of its provisions can be discarded, or 
that phrases of different form and import are yet to be held as of 
the same intent by any authority, save that of the decision of that 
tribunal to which its construction was by its own precept committed, 
the Supreme Judicial Court. 

I cannot doubt that the courts will recognize a distinction in the 
phrases about which our inquiry centres, and unless it shall be 
held that these apparent distinctions are, nevertheless, to be con- 
strued as of the same effect and tenor, it must follow that an act 
can be passed, notwithstanding the Executive veto, only in the 
event that two-thirds of the entire membership of the house in 
which the act originated shall vote to pass the same, notwithstand- 
ing the veto ; as it must certainly be held that the act may be 
passed, notwithstanding such veto, by the other house if two- 
thirds of the members present so vote. 

I think, in view of such obvious difference in phraseology and 
apparently of such significance, it must be left to the courts of 
competent jurisdiction alone to declare that the framers of the 
Constitution nevertheless intended that no distinction should exist. 
A careful search of the reports of judicial construction has failed 
to disclose to me any such declaration ; indeed, I have been able 
to discover no adjudication directly bearing upon this issue. I am 
therefore left to pursue such lines of reasoning as appear to me 
to be sound and conclusive, realizing that however they may so 
appear to me, they must still fail to carry that authority which can 
alone settle and determine the important question which your 
inquiry presents. But since you have sought, and may feel that 
you must govern your official action by, such opinion as I can 
render to you, I deem it my duty to suggest some of the reasons 
which guide me to the conclusion which I submit. 

Assuming that full weight must be given to each and all of the 
provisions of the Constitution, and assuming that each is there 
inserted for a purpose, for every clause and word even of a stat- 
ute shall be presumed to have some force and effect (see Opinion 
of the Justices, 22 Pick. 573 ; Browne v. Turner, 174 Mass. 150, 
160), I conclude that the framers of the Constitution intended 
that that branch of the Legislature in which the act in question 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 41 

originated should hold a different relation and responsibility to it 
than that attaching to the action of the other branch, and it well 
may be as it indeed appears, that the Constitution intended that 
an act could be passed over the Executive veto only in the event 
that that house which was responsible for its original adoption 
had, on reconsideration after an Executive veto, passed it by a 
vote of two-thirds of its entire membership, and that such enact- 
ment, notwithstanding an Executive veto, should not depend upon 
the hazard of an attendance at the time of such final action meas- 
ured by a mere quorum of the body. This line of reasoning of 
course presupposes, as I do, that the constitutional intent was 
that passage, notwithstanding a veto, should require a larger vote 
than that dependent upon a mere two-thirds of a quorum. 

Taking up for a moment an analysis of the provisions relating 
to action by that house other than the one in which the act origi- 
nated, I proceed to consider whether its requirements can be so 
construed as to be equivalent to or of like effect with those relat- 
ing to the house of the origin of the bill, and it seems to me mani- 
fest that the vote required in the former case is obviously less 
than that required in the latter ; nor can the two provisions be 
made, by any process of reasoning apparent to me, to be of the 
same significance. 

Whether there was or was not good or sound reason for the ap- 
parent difference of requirement set forth in the Constitution is 
certainly beyond the legitimate field of my inquiry. If such a dis- 
tinction appears and is held to be conclusive of the intent of the 
Constitution, it must and will be recognized and enforced by the 
courts, resulting, if my line of reasoning be accurate, in judicial 
declaration that unless two-thirds of the entire membership of the 
house of the origin of the bill vote affirmatively to pass it, not- 
withstanding a veto, there has been no enactment in law, and the 
supposed statute is in consequence a mere nullity. 

Entertaining the opinion which I do and which I have herein 
stated, I must declare to you that in my opinion the act to which 
you call my attention is without validity, and is in law as if it had 
never appeared upon our statute book. In reaching this conclu- 
sion, I am not unmindful that a law duly enacted should be 
presumed to be constitutional until the courts of competent juris- 
diction have finally otherwise decided, but it is to be observed that 
the question submitted to me and by me considered is not whether 
there was constitutional authority for this enactment vested in the 
Legislature, but whether the Legislature has acted within the lim- 
itations and according to the authority of the Constitution in the 
assumed passage of the act ; in other words, I do not deal with the 



42 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

construction of the act itself with relation to constitutional ques- 
tions, but 1 confine myself wholly to an inquiry as to the construc- 
tion of the Constitution itself upon which the existence rather than 
the validity of the act is to be determined. 

I therefore am constrained to advise you, in conclusion, that 
there is grave doubt whether you have any official authority or 
power to issue instruments which, upon their face and in form, 
shall declare an obligation of the Commonwealth. The issuance 
of bonds in tenor and form binding upon the State must have, in 
their inception, clear, unquestioned and unassailable authority. 
Upon the state of facts which I have assumed, and upon that con- 
struction of the Constitution to which my own judgment leads me, 
I am required to say that such authority does not, in my opinion, 
exist.* 

Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney- General. 



Insurance — Authority of Foreign Fire Insurance Corporation 
to do Business within the Commonwealth — Revocation — 
Reinsurance. 

When it appears that a foreign fire insurance corporation admitted to do 
business in this Commonwealth has reinsured risks on Massachusetts 
property in fire insurance companies not so admitted, without filing 
the affidavit required by R. L., c. 118, § 83, to the effect that the amount 
of insurance adequate to protect the property could not be obtained 
in companies regularly admitted to do business in Massachusetts, the 
Insurance Commissioner may, under R. L., c. 118, § 20, revoke the 
authority of the corporation to carry on business here, notwithstanding 
that the contract of reinsurance was made and was to be performed 
beyond the limits of the Commonwealth. 

July 21, 1904. 

Hon. Frederick L. Cutting, Insurance Commissioner . 

Dear Sir : — In your letter of July 1 you desire my opinion 
whether, upon the facts disclosed in the examination by your 
department of a foreign fire insurance corporation, you have power 
to revoke the company's authority to transact business in Massa- 
chusetts. 

The corporation, which was admitted to Massachusetts in 1891, 
has, at its general offices in the city of New York, reinsured risks 
on Massachusetts property in companies which have not been 
authorized to do business in Massachusetts, no affidavit having 
been filed, in accordance with R. L., c. 118, § 83, that the amount 

* For a very fall and instructive discussion of the origin and history of the 
veto power, see opinion of Nott, J., in United States v. Weil et al., 29 C. Cls. R. 
523. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 43 

of insurance necessary to protect the property could not be pro- 
cured in admitted companies. In each case the contract of re- 
insurance was made and was to be performed in New York city. 
R. L., c. 118, § 20, provides in part as follows : — 

If a compan} 7 directly or indirectly reinsures a risk taken b} T it on any 
property located in this commonwealth in a company not duly author- 
ized to transact business herein, . . . the insurance commissioner may 
revoke its authority to transact business in this commonwealth. 

This statute does not limit such action by the Insurance Com- 
missioner to acts done by the company within this Commonwealth ; 
its intention is to prevent, so far as it may, the insurance of Massa- 
chusetts property by companies not under the control or supervision 
of this Commonwealth. It purports to authorize the Insurance 
Commissioner to revoke the company's authority, although the 
ground of revocation is an act done outside this jurisdiction. The 
question is whether this statute thus construed is constitutional. 

While the Legislature has no right to require an owner of prop- 
erty situated in Massachusetts to insure it only in authorized com- 
panies (Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578), the right of the 
Legislature to dictate terms upon which a foreign company may 
reinsure its risks as a condition of remaining here rests upon a 
different and valid foundation. A person owning property here 
has a right to insure it in such company as he chooses, provided 
the forbidden act of insurance takes place outside the jurisdiction. 
Since the contract of insurance, if made outside the jurisdiction, 
for the sake of the owner is not to be interfered with, the other 
party to the contract, the insurance company, is sheltered by the 
owner's privilege, but in case of reinsurance, neither the insuring 
company nor the reinsuring company, when not authorized to do 
business here, is guaranteed by the Constitution the right to make 
that contract. The owner of the property and his rights are not 
to be considered, since the contract of reinsurance is entirely 
between the two foreign companies, there being no relation be- 
tween the owner and the reinsuring company. 

The State may prohibit foreign insurance companies entirely 
from doing business within its limits. It may then impose such 
conditions as it pleases upon the doing of business, and upon 
failure to perform the conditions it may refuse authority to do 
business or revoke an authority once given. Paul v. Virginia, 
8 Wall. 168; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410; Hooper v. Cali- 
fornia, 155 U. S. 648 ; Manchester Fire Insuraiice Company v. 
Herriott, 91 Fed. 711. 

In Waters-Pierce Oil Company v. Texas, 111 U. S. 28, a Texas 



44 ATTORNEY-GENERALS REPORT. [Jan. 

statute provided that every foreign corporation violating its pro- 
visions should forfeit its right to do business in Texas. The 
Attorney-General proceeded against a foreign corporation which 
was authorized to do business in the State for forfeiture of that 
right. In the United States Supreme Court the corporation con- 
tended that the statute limited its right to make contracts and took 
away its property without due process of law. The court sus- 
tained the forfeiture which had been declared by the State court, 
observing: " What right of contracting has it in the State of 
Texas? This is the only inquiry, and it cannot find an answer 
in the rights of natural persons." See also Blake v. McGlung, 172 
U. S. 239 ; Orient Insurance Company v. Dagys, 172 U. S. 557. 

It is no objection to the exercise by the Insurance Commissioner 
of the power given him by this statute that his reason for revoking 
the authority of the company is that the company has done an act 
outside the jurisdiction which the Commonwealth cannot effectually 
prohibit by penal laws, having no extra-territorial effect. Since 
insurance is not interstate commerce, the State may deprive a 
foreign company of the right to do business within its limits for 
any reason that it deems proper. 

In Doyle v. Continental Insurance Company, 94 U. S. 535, the 
Supreme Court of the United States held that an injunction to 
restrain the Insurance Commissioner from revoking the license of 
a foreign insurance company must be denied. In that case the 
license was revoked for the reason that the company removed a 
case from the State to the federal court, in violation of a State 
statute providing that in case of such removal its license should 
be cancelled. The company, as a condition of its license, had 
been required to agree not to remove any case. Though the 
agreement was void (Insurance Company v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445), 
and a similar statute applying to a corporation or individual hav- 
ing a right to do business in the State would be unconstitutional 
as denying a right guaranteed by the federal Constitution (see 
Barron v. Bumside, 121 U. S. 186, 199), a majority of the court 
held that since a foreign insurance company has no constitutional 
right to do business within the State, it was justifiable to give the 
corporation the option either to stay out or to deny itself a federal 
right. 

I therefore conclude that the statute authorizes you to revoke 
the license of the foreign insurance company for the reasons stated, 
and that the statute is valid though indirectly prohibiting acts done 
outside the State, since under it the corporation had an option to 
stay out of the State or comply with the statute. 
Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney- General. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 45 



Insurance — Fraternal Beneficiary Association — Foreign Cor- 
poration — Admission to CommonioeaWi — Mortuary Assess- 
ment Mates, 

A foreign fraternal beneficiary association which was not doing business 
in the Commonwealth on May 23, 1901, and which does not at the time 
of its application have in force mortuary assessment rates not lower 
than those indicated as necessary by the National Fraternal Congress 
Mortality Tables, as required by R. L., c. 119, § 13, may not be admitted 
to carry on business within this Commonwealth. 

July 22, 1904. 

Hon. Frederick L. Cutting, Insurance Commissioner. 

Dear Sir : — In your letter of April 27, you request my opinion 
whether the Supreme Lodge, Ancient Order of United Workmen, 
a foreign fraternal beneficiary corporation, may be admitted to do 
business in this Commonwealth. 

The Supreme Lodge was incorporated in Kentucky in 1873. In 
1878 it entered Massachusetts and established here subordinate 
lodges. In 1883 one of these subordinate lodges, called the Grand 
Lodge, Ancient Order of United Workmen, was incorporated 
under the Massachusetts laws. Although an independent fraternal 
beneficiary corporation, the Grand Lodge continued to affiliate 
with the Supreme Lodge and contribute to its support in a manner 
afterwards expressly made legal by St. 1899, c. 442, § 15 (R. L., 
c. 119, § 10). In 1886 the charter of the Supreme Lodge was 
withdrawn, and the Supreme Lodge continued to exist as a volun- 
tary association until 1899, when it was incorporated under the 
laws of Texas. It is to-day a Texas corporation. 

During the period from 1886 to 1899, while the Supreme Lodge 
was a foreign voluntary association, the Grand Lodge, the Massa- 
chusetts corporation, continued in business in Massachusetts and 
is still transacting business here. 

The important feature of these dates to be noted is that during 
the period from 1886 to 1899 the Supreme Lodge was a foreign 
unincorporated association. 

The law regulating the admission of a foreign fraternal bene- 
ficiary corporation is R. L., c. 119, § 13 : — 

No such corporation which was not doing business in this common- 
wealth on the twent}^third day of May in the year nineteen hundred and 
one shall hereafter be admitted to do such business in this common- 
wealth unless it shall have adopted and have in force mortuary assess- 
ment rates which are not lower than those then indicated as necessary 
by the " National Fraternal Congress Mortality Tables." 

Two questions arise : — 

(1) Wasthe Supreme Lodge doing business in Massachusetts 
on May 23, 1901? 



46 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

(2) If not, has the Supreme Lodge in force mortuary assess- 
ment rates not lower than those indicated as necessary by the 
National Fraternal Congress Mortality Tables? 

To discover whether the foreign body as well as the Massachu- 
setts corporation was doing business here on May 23, 1901, it is 
necessary to look at the history of the statutes relative to such 
foreign corporations and associations. 

St. 1888, c. 429, §11, provided : — 

Fraternal beneficiary corporations, associations or societies organized 
under the laws of another state, now transacting in this commonwealth 
business as herein denned, and which now report or which shall report 
when requested to the insurance department, may continue such business 
without incorporating under this act, by conforming in other respects to 
the foregoing provisions and to the requirements of section thirteen of 
this act. 

This section was repeated substantially in St. 1890, c. 341, § 11. 
In 1892 a special act (chapter 40) was passed, providing as 
follows : — 

Section eleven of chapter four hundred and twenty-nine of the acts of 
the year eighteen hundred and eighty-eight, as amended by section one 
of chapter three hundred and forty-one of the acts of the year eighteen 
hundred and ninety, is hereby amended by striking out, in the first and 
second lines, the words " associations or societies ", and adding to the 
section at the end thereof the following : — ... The transaction of the 
business defined in this act, by any corporation, association, partnership 
or individuals, unless organized or admitted as provided herein, is for- 
bidden. 

Since at the time of the passage of the St. 1892, c. 40, the 
Supreme Lodge was an association and not a corporation, from 
and after the passage of that act the Supreme Lodge had no right 
to continue in business in Massachusetts. The right previously 
existing, of a foreign unincorporated association thus taken away, 
was never restored. See St. 1894, c. 367, § 10 ; St. 1898, c. 474, 
§ 13 ; St. 1899, c. 442, § 18 ; St. 1901, c. 422, § 18 ; R. L., c. 119, 
§ 13. 

Since St. 1892, c. 40, destroyed the right of such an association 
to continue in business in Massachusetts without being admitted 
according to law, I advise you that you have no authority to admit 
the Supreme Lodge to Massachusetts now unless it shall appear that 
it has adopted and has in force mortuary assessment rates which 
are not lower than those indicated as necessary by the National 
Fraternal Congress Mortality Tables. It becomes necessary, 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 47 

therefore, to consider whether its mortuary assessment rates are 
high enough. 

Taking the National Fraternal Congress Mortality Tables and 
interest at four per cent, which is the same rate used by the 
Fraternal Congress and by this company in its computations, 
I find that the level premium required at age twenty is $10.57; 
that is, one entering the company at age twenty must pay $10.57 
at the beginning of each year in order that the company may have 
on hand $1,000 with which to pay his benefit certificate when he 
dies at the time appointed in the mortality table. A portion of 
this premium goes the first year for current insurance, a larger 
portion for reserve. To illustrate : suppose one thousand enter at 
age twenty and remain until death ; during the first year a small 
proportion of them will die ; enough money is taken from the 
premiums of those who live to make up in addition to the premiums 
received from those who die the amount of those losses ; the 
balance goes to reserve. The next year more of each premium 
goes to pay current mortality and less to reserve. After many 
years all the annual premiums will be required to pay the increas- 
ing death losses, and, in addition, sums must be taken from the 
reserve. Finally, the last man _of the one thousand dying, there 
will be exactly $1,000 left of the reserve to pay his certificate. 
Obviously, the accumulation of a reserve is necessary to keep the 
company solvent. Under the section of the statute which 1 am 
considering (§ 13), a company must " have in force" rates which 
are not lower than those indicated as " necessary " by these tables. 
Necessary for what? This can only mean necessary for keeping 
the company in a condition of solvency so that it may meet the 
losses, assuming that members will die as fast as and no faster 
than the tables predict. This phrase inevitably implies that the 
rates must be sufficient to produce a sufficient reserve if the mem- 
bers die according to the mortality rate of the tables. These rates, 
moreover, must be kept in force. The company must collect them. 

It has been suggested that the statute does not require a fra- 
ternal corporation to collect any reserve, that it may continue, 
since the enactment of this provision (St. 1901, c. 422, § 18), as 
before to assess merely for current mortality, the effect of this 
provision being simply to set a maximum limit upon the assess- 
ments which it may call, and my attention is called to the earlier 
requirement codified in the same statute as section 7, that such 
company may collect, in addition to a death fund amounting to 
three assessments on all the members, an emergency fund not 
exceeding at any time five per cent, of the aggregate face value of 
its outstanding certificates. In brief, one section of the chapter, 



48 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 



the earlier in original enactment, limits the death fund arbitrarily 
to a percentage of the face value of the certificates in force, while 
another section, later in enactment, requires, by its necessary con- 
struction, that a death fund be accumulated by a company organ- 
ized or admitted subsequent to May 23, 1901, large enough to 
keep the company mathematically solvent, according to the Na- 
tional Fraternal Congress Tables. This being a flat contradiction, 
I advise that the earlier arbitrary limit of section 7 must yield to 
the later scientific adjustment of the rates in section 13, and can 
be applied only to companies organized or admitted before that 
date. 

The annual level premium which a company must collect and 
hold for death claims at age twenty is, then, $10.57. This in- 
creases each year, until at age fifty-five it is $40.83. 

What are the rates of the Supreme Lodge, Ancient Order of 
United Workmen, throughout these ages? At age twenty the rate 
is said to be $12.60, leaving out of sight the guaranty fund which 
will be discussed later. At age fifty-five it is said to be $50.40, 
and at each intermediate age the rate is said to be greater than the 
corresponding rate required by the National Fraternal Congress 
Tables. 

But the rates, thus arranged in parallel columns, — 





N. F. C. 


A. O. U. W. 


Age 20, 


$10 57 


$12 60 


Age 21 


10 87 


12 96 


Age 55, 


40 83 


50 40 


Age 59, 


50 47 


50 40 



are not really parallel ; they do not stand for the same thing re- 
spectively ; $10.57 in the National Fraternal Congress column 
means that $10.57 is paid in advance to the company as a yearly 
premium ; $12.60 in the Ancient Order of United Workmen column 
means that, if the company sees fit to collect twelve monthly as- 
sessments of $1.05 each, it will have taken from the member dur- 
ing the year $12.60. But, in fact, the Ancient Order of United 
Workmen collects only eight or nine of the monthly assessments, 
so that the rate which it enforces is less than the National Fraternal 
Congress rate. 

It seeks to justify this failure to collect rates equal to those in- 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. ;i- 

dicated as necessary by the National Fraternal Congress Mortality 
Tables by pointing out that it gives its members the benefit of the 
company's gain in mortality over that of the tables by assessing 
only enough to cover the reserve element of the annual premium 
and the actual mortality of the year. Instead of collecting the 
whole premium and returning to each member his share of the 
company's gain from vitality, in the form of a dividend, as mutual 
old line companies are supposed to do, it declares a dividend to its 
members by failing to assess them for more than is actually needed, 
in addition to the reserve. 

There is no authority in the fraternal law for paying dividends 
to members in any mode. Formerly, such corporation would as- 
sess only from hand to mouth, relying on " new blood " to support 
the business. The inevitable result was the freezing out of old 
members or insolvency, — often both. There was no occasion for 
dividends and none were authorized. Indeed, there is an express 
provision that the whole benefit fund shall be used only for the 
payment of death and disability benefits (§ 7). Now, a new com- 
pany or a newly admitted company is required to have in force 
rates based on these mortality tables. In order to give members 
the benefit of a gain in actual over predicted mortality, that pro- 
vision of section 7 must be changed by legislation. 

A similar criticism applies to the classified rates of the Supreme 
Lodge, under which members are insured on the renewable term 
plan, instead of the level plan, paying a higher rate during each 
successive term of five years until they reach the age of thirty- 
five, when, if they remain in the order, they are required to pay 
the level rate of $50.40 thereafter. Under this system a man of 
twenty pays a maximum of $6 in assessments during the year ; 
a man of fifty- four a maximum of $18 ; a man of fifty-five a 
maximum of $50.40. While these amounts are higher than the 
National Fraternal Congress rates for the corresponding ages, they 
are not rates which are enforced. 

Thus far, I have discussed only the rates up to age fifty-five. 
Thereafter the so-called rate of the Supreme Lodge continues 
$50.40 until the end of the table, while the rate required by the 
National Fraternal Congress Mortality Tables increases with rapid- 
ity ; so that while one who enters at sixty must pay a level rate of 
$53.34, one entering at sixty-five must pay $72.32, and at seventy 
$97.91. 

The company argues that this makes no difference since it has 
in force a by-law prohibiting the admission of members above the 
age of fifty-five. But the members who are insured by the com- 
pany are at present of all ages, and only a few of them since their 



50 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

entry into the order have paid the rates necessary to keep the 
order solvent under the National Fraternal Congress Tables. That 
the rates may be not lower than those indicated as necessary by 
the tables, each member must pay in from the time the law takes 
effect enough to create the reserve required to carry out his con- 
tract of insurance. It is not sufficient that the company makes its 
rates high enough for those it admits for the future, while carry- 
ing old men whose present rates are not high enough to insure the 
fulfilment of their contracts. At the time of changing from the 
old way to the new the company must treat those who entered 
under the old-fashioned system and have paid only for their cur- 
rent insurance as new members, and charge them the rates suitable 
to their ages when the change is made. Those members are like 
persons insured in an old line company, who carry yearly renew- 
able term insurance whereby they pay each year the current cost 
of insurance ; at any given time they must pay the rate of attained 
age, not the rate of age of entry. Whether they are given in ex- 
change a step-rate or a level rate, it must be that applicable to 
their attained age. 

If at and since the age of entry the members had been paying 
National Fraternal Congress rates, there would of course be no 
occasion for raising their rates now. But as they have only been 
paying current insurance they must begin paying the National 
Fraternal Congress rates fitting the ages which they have attained 
at the time the law goes into effect upon the company. 

I advise you, therefore, that even were the company to begin 
now to collect rates equal to the National Fraternal Congress rates 
from all members below the age of fifty-nine, the age when the 
National Fraternal Congress rate begins to exceed the so-called 
Ancient Order of United Workmen rate, it could not be admitted 
to do such business in this Commonwealth. 

In this connectiou should be noted the contention of the Supreme 
Lodge that its " guaranty fund" obviates the need of collecting 
from all members the necessary rates. The company has calcu- 
lated the deficiency arising from the cause just discussed, and has 
established to meet it an additional rate which it assesses upon the 
members under the age of fifty-five. At the time of each assess- 
ment of the beneficiary rate it makes an additional assessment 
which goes to the guaranty fund. The present value of the guar- 
anty assessments which may be laid, if all the members stay in the 
order and pay them, is said to be in excess of the present value of 
the deficiencies. Thus the compauy increases the premiums of the 
young to make up for the lack of sufficient premiums from the old. 

The efficacy of this method depends upon the persistence of those 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 51 

who are to pay the extra rates. Its object will be defeated by the 
lapsing of members under the age of fifty-five. Obviously, the 
persistent members will be those whose rates are paid in part by 
others, while those who are expected to bear their brothers' bur- 
dens may not remain and " cheerfully pay," as the company sug- 
gests that they are doing at present. This method is therefore 
open to the same objections as the old-fashioned method of collect- 
ing a dollar all around when a member dies ; it depends for suc- 
cess upon the constant support of young men. 

I advise you that collection of rates from one class of members 
to pay the cost of insuring another class is not equivalent to the 
enforcement of rates not lower than those indicated as necessary 
by the National Fraternal Congress Mortality Tables. 

The problem of adjusting the finances of an existing fraternal 
company so that it may have a reasonable chance of keeping out 
of the hands of a receiver, it having members of all ages, of whom 
the older ones cannot be expected to pay according to their attained 
ages, is, indeed, difficult. It is a problem which the Legislature 
has not attempted to solve for the companies now doing business 
in Massachusetts. But in this statute it has shown its determina- 
tion that the problem be not increased in size by admitting to do 
business here foreign companies which are not on their own feet, 
whose members are not paying, each for himself, rates which are 
adequate to keep their insurance good according to the mortality 
rate assumed in the National Fraternal Congress Tables. 
Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney -General. 



Statute — Construction of General and Particular — Regulation 
of Fisheries in Swan Pond River. 

St. 1895, c. 203, § 1, authorizing the selectmen of the town of Dennis to 
"prescribe the times, places and manner of taking herring or ale- 
wives, perch, salmon, eels and trout in Swan Pond River" and certain 
tributaries thereof, does not vest in the selectmen of Dennis any 
power to make rules or regulations which are inconsistent with the 
general statutes relating to fisheries, whether or not such statutes 
were enacted after the passage of St. 1895, c. 203. 

July 29, 1904. 

Hon. J. W. Collins, Chairman, Commissioners on Fisheries and Game 

Dear Sir : — You desire my opinion upon the question whether 
St. 1895, c. 205% entitled "An Act to regulate the fisheries in 
Swan Pond River," and providing that the selectmen of the town 
of Dennis may prescribe the times, places and manner of taking 
herring or alewives, perch, salmon, eels and trout in Swan Pond 



52 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

River, permits the selectmen to authorize the use of implements 
for taking such fish forbidden by the general laws. 
St. 1904, c. 308, provides : — 

Whoever draws, sets, stretches or uses a drag net, set net, purse net, 
seine or trawl, or whoever sets or uses more than ten hooks for fishing, 
in any pond, or aids in so doing, shall be punished by a fine of not less 
than twenty nor more than fifty dollars. The provisions of this section 
shall not affect the rights of riparian proprietors of ponds mentioned in 
section twenty-three or the corporate rights of any fishing company. 

St. 1895, c. 203, § 1, is as follows : — 

The selectmen of the town of Dennis, or a majority of them, shall an- 
nually, on or before the twentieth day of April in each year, prescribe 
the times, places and manner of taking herring or alewives, perch, 
salmon, eels and trout in Swan Pond river, at the mouth thereof or in the 
ponds and streams connected therewith, and they may appoint some 
suitable person or persons to take the same, and shall fix the compensa- 
tion to be paid therefor ; or may grant permits to suitable persons, being 
inhabitants of said town, to catch any of said fish in the said river or the 
ponds and streams connected therewith, and fix the compensation to be 
paid to said town for such permits, and shall determine the quantity of 
said fish which each family in said town shall receive from such catches, 
and establish the price therefor; and may sell, at auction or otherwise, 
the right of fishing in said river and its waters to one or more persons, 
for a term of not more than five years at one sale, upon such terms and 
conditions as the said town or said selectmen may direct: provided, that 
nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any person, being 
an inhabitant of said town, from taking fish with natural or artificially 
baited hook and hand line, under such regulations as said selectmen 
may prescribe. 

Section 4 provides the penalty for taking fish in the designated 
waters " at any time or place or in any manner other than may be 
allowed by said selectmen." 

Section 5 provides that if any boat, vessel or craft is found 
with more fish on board than is allowed by the selectmen, u or if 
any person or persons with any such boat, vessel or craft, shall be 
detected in taking or in attempting to take any of said fish in any 
manner different from that prescribed by said selectmen or with 
seines, nets or with other instrument of a kind different from that 
established by said selectmen," the selectmen may seize the vessel 
in order that it may be attached and made answerable for the 
fines. The selectmen of Dennis allege that under this statute 
they are exempted from the operation of all general laws regulat- 
ing fishing throughout the Commonwealth. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 53 

I am of opinion that chapter 203 of the Acts of 1895 did not 
vest in the selectmen of the town of Dennis any absolute or irrev- 
ocable authority with relation to the fisheries, nor authorize the 
making of rules and regulations in contravention of the general 
laws governing fisheries throughout the Commonwealth. 

Under the present law it appears that the use of seines or nets 
in ponds is throughout the Commonwealth illegal and forbidden, 
and it cannot be that the selectmen of Dennis may, under any 
assumed authority of the act of 1895 above stated, authorize fish- 
ing in a manner prohibited by the Revised Laws in the waters of 
Swan Pond River, if such waters are in fact within the prohibition 
of that law. The special power given to the selectmen goes no 
further than to permit them to make such local rules and regula- 
tions as are not inconsistent with the geueral statutes, and the 
Legislature in enacting the special law did not intend to then or 
thenceforward divest itself of authority over the waters specified 
in the act ; on the contrary, I am of opinion that it was contem- 
plated that further legislation might be had without control or limi- 
tation by reason of the special act. 

It would follow, in my opinion, that subsequent legislation 
applicable to the subject-matter would regulate, modify or control 
the provisions of the earlier statute, and the authority of the town 
thereafter could be executed only within and consistently with 
such general laws as should be from time to time in effect. The 
rights conferred by St. 1895, c. 203, are not abrogated in their 
entirety by the provisions of the Revised Laws, but the authority 
under the earlier act must be subject to the provisions of the 
general laws. 

Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney -General. 



State Board of Publication — Statistics — Approval of Publication. 

Statistics, or figures, specifically required by law to be set forth and pub- 
lished in the reports of officers or heads of departments of the Com- 
monwealth are not subject to the jurisdiction of the State Board of 
Publication as defined by St. 1904, c. 388, § 2, which provides that 
boards, commissions and heads of departments shall not incorporate 
any statistics into the documents relating to their several departments 

without first securing the approval of such Board. 

Sept. 21, 1904. 

William N. Davenport, Esq., Secretary, State Board of Publication. 

Dear Sir: — The State Board of Publication in substance de- 
sires to know whether specific statistics required to be set forth 
and published in the reports of officials or departments of the Com- 



54 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

m on wealth, under the provisions of general or special laws, are 
now within the supervisory jurisdiction of the State Board of 
Publication as defined by section 2 of chapter 388 of the Acts of 
1904, which section is as follows : — 

Boards, commissions and heads of departments having charge of 
preparing and printing documents relating to their various departments 
shall not incorporate therein any statistics unless the same shall be 
approved by the state board of publication. 

I am of opinion that this section must be restricted in its applica- 
tion to those statistics which are not specifically required by legis- 
lation to be embodied in the report under consideration. And I 
am further of opinion that where there is a specific statutory re- 
quirement for the publication in the report of any commission or 
official of particular statistics, such statistics must be published, 
and the duty of publication is imposed upon the official or com- 
mission by statute. In my judgment the statute of 1904 above 
referred to cannot and ought not to be so construed as by indirec- 
tion to modify, alter or remove a specific official duty imposed by 
law upon any officer or servant of the Commonwealth. 

It seems to me, therefore, perfectly clear that the jurisdiction 
of the Board of Publication does not extend so far as to author- 
ize or permit that board to restrict or prohibit the publication 
of specific statistics required by pre-existing law. If the Board of 
Publication have any jurisdiction in such premises, it must be 
limited to an examination of such statistics, and to the determina- 
tion whether or not they comply with the provisions of law relating 
thereto. The Board might, if it appeared that the statistics offered 
for publication exceeded the legal requirement, reduce them to the 
limit of such* requirement, but it is indeed doubtful whether even 
this power is vested in the Board of Publication, since their author- 
ity in general is supervisory and clearly not intended to limit or 
control those publications which the law has otherwise specifically 
required. 

Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney-General. 



Clerk oj the Courts — Vacancy — Clerk of the Superior Court for 
the County of Suffolk. 

The phrase "clerk of the courts" in R. L., c. 11, § 277, which provides 
that in case of a vacancy in the office of clerk of the courts the Gov- 
ernor shall cause precepts to be issued for an election to fill such 
vacancy at the next annual State election for which precepts can be 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 55 

seasonably issued, extends to and includes the office of clerk of the 
Superior Court for the county of Suffolk, and it is therefore the duty 
of the Governor, upon proper representation that a vacancy in such 
office exists, to issue his precept for an election to fill such vacancy at 
the next annual State election for which such precept may be season- 
ably issued. 

Sept. 27, 1904. 
His Excellency John L. Bates, Governor. 

S IR : — I have the honor to acknowledge Your Excellency's com- 
munication under date of Sept. 12, 1904, in which you advise me 
that you are informed that the Secretary of the Commonwealth 
has received official notification from the Superior Court for the 
county of Suffolk of the death of Clerk Joseph A. Willard, and 
that, in accordance with the statute, an appointment has been 
made by the judges to fill the vacancy. You further instruct me 
that "the question has arisen as to whether or not the appoint- 
ment made by the judges under the statute is until such time as an 
election can be held to fill the vacancy under a precept issued by 
the Governor, or whether the appointee fills the vacancy for the 
unexpired term for which the late Mr. Willard was elected." 
Your Excellency further states that you have been requested to 
issue a precept for an election, and that you desire my opinion as 
to whether or not under the statute the duty so to do devolves 
upon you. 

It is a fundamental principle that when a vacancy exists in a 
public office a person appointed to fill that vacancy will, in the 
absence of express or necessarily implied provisions to the con- 
trary, hold such office during the unexpired term of the original 
incumbent. The person appointed to the vacancy in the office of 
clerk of the Superior Court, therefore, will continue in office until 
the qualification of his successor after the annual State election in 
1906, unless the Legislature has otherwise provided. See R. L., 
c. 11, § 318 : — 

At the annual state election in the year nineteen hundred and six, and 
in every fifth year thereafter, a clerk of the supreme judicial court for 
the county of Suffolk and two clerks of the superior court, one for civil 
and one for criminal business, shall be chosen by the voters in said 
county ; and, by the voters in each of the other counties, a clerk of the 
courts who shall act as clerk of the supreme judicial court, of the 
superior court and of the county commissioners. 

Since the adoption in 1855 of the Nineteenth Amendment of the 
Massachusetts Constitution, by virtue of a law enacted in 1856 
(St. 1856, c. 173), clerks of the county courts who, prior to that 
act had been appointed by the justices, have been elected at the 



56 ATTORNEY-GENERALS REPORT. [Jan. 

annual State elections for periods of five years. The statute pro- 
vides for the filling of vacancies, in general, by election at the 
annual State election following the vacancy. Its present form is 
as follows (R. L., c. 11, § 277) : — 

Upon a failure to choose a district attorney, clerk of the courts, regis- 
ter of probate and insolvency or sheriff, the governor shall cause pre- 
cepts to be issued to the proper officers, directing them to call meetings 
of the voters on the day appointed therein, for the election of such 
officer. 

Upon a vacancy by removal or otherwise in any of the above-named 
offices, he shall in like manner cause precepts to be issued for an elec- 
tion to fill such vacancy at the next annual state election for which pre- 
cepts can be seasonably issued. 

. . . Upon a vacancy in the office of clerk of the courts in any county, 
or of the clerk of the supreme judicial court in the county of Suffolk, 
the justices of said court may appoint a clerk who shall hold the office 
until a clerk is elected and qualified. 

Upon a vacancy in the office of a clerk of the superior court in the 
county of Suffolk, the justices of said court may appoint a clerk. 

The first question is, whether in the last two clauses of this sec- 
tion a distinction is made in the manner of filling the vacancy in 
the office of the clerk of the Superior Court and the manner of 
filling a vacancy in the office of clerk of the Supreme Judicial 
Court in Suffolk County. This part of the section appears in the 
Public Statutes as follows (P. S., c. 159, § 7) : — 

If a vacancy occurs in the office of clerk of the courts in any county, 
or of the clerk of the supreme judicial court in the county of Suffolk, 
the justices of said court or a majority of them may appoint a clerk, who 
shall hold the office until the next annual election, or until another is 
elected or appointed in his stead. Upon a vacancy in the county of 
Suffolk in the office of a clerk of the superior court, the justices of that 
court shall in like manner appoint a clerk for a similar term. 

In my opinion there is no intention manifested in the compilation 
of this statute into the section of the Revised Laws above quoted 
to change the provisions of the Public Statutes. A vacancy in the 
office of a clerk of the Superior Court is to be filled in the same 
manner as a vacancy in the office of clerk of the Supreme Judicial 
Court in Suffolk County. See also St. 1890, c. 423, §§ 190, 250 \ 
St. 1893, c. 417, § 218; St. 1898, c. 548, § 315. 

The remaining question is, whether the clerk of the Superior 
Court of Suffolk County for civil business is a " clerk of the 
courts," within the fair meaning of this statute. If not, there is 
no authority for issuing a precept for an election to fill a vacancy 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 57 

in his office, and the vacancy must be filled at the next quin- 
quennial election. 

In each county other than Suffolk there is one officer who is 
clerk of both the Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Court. 
He has always been designated as " clerk of the courts." In 
Suffolk County there are three clerks, one for each of the three 
county courts ; each is clerk of one of the courts and is a clerk of 
the courts ; no one of them is, to speak with the utmost strictness, 
" clerk of the courts." 

It may be argued that the Legislature has distinguished between 
the ancient and well-defined office of "clerk of the courts" and 
the special offices in Suffolk County of more restricted jurisdiction 
and authority, namely, the clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court 
and the two clerks, the one upon the civil and the other upon the 
criminal side of the Superior Court ; that in the former case a 
specific provision has been made for a special election, while in the 
latter case such specific provision has been omitted. 

Since, however, the phraseology of the Revised Laws is open to 
different meanings, and no reason can be suggested why the Legis- 
lature should have intended such a distinction in the manner of 
filling vacancies in Suffolk County, it is proper to trace the history 
of this statute, in order to discover what the intention of the 
Legislature is. 

Throughout the several codifications of the statute, including 
the General Statutes of 1860, the same ambiguity of language is 
present, but in the original enactment of 1856 the meaning is 
clear that a vacancy in Suffolk County is to be filled exactly as in 
the other counties. 

St. 1856, c. 173 : — 

Sect. 2. At the annual election in November, in the year one thou- 
sand eight hundred and fifty-six, and at the annual election in November 
of every fifth year thereafter, the legal voters of the several cities and 
towns in each county, excepting in the county of Suffolk, shall choose 
by ballot for their respective counties, a clerk, who shall act as clerk of 
the supreme judicial court, and the court of common pleas, within and 
for the county for which he shall be chosen ; and at the same time the 
legal voters of the county of Suffolk shall choose by ballot for said 
county of Suffolk, a clerk of the supreme judicial court, a clerk of the 
superior court, and a clerk of the municipal court of said county. 

Sect. 9. In case a vacancy shall, from any cause, occur in the office 
of any of the clerks of courts hereinbefore mentioned, the judges of 
the said several courts, or a majority of the same, may appoint a suit- 
able person to fill such office, who shall hold the same until the annual 
election in November next thereafter, or until another is chosen or ap- 



58 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

pointed in his stead : and at said annual election next thereafter, an elec- 
tion by ballot shall be had, to fill said office for such unexpired term as 
may exist, in the same manner as is hereinbefore provided for the elec- 
tion of said clerks. 

These sections, together with the amendment of St. 1859, c. 196, 
§ 9, making a civil and a criminal division of the Superior Court in 
Suffolk County, were codified in- the General Statutes of 1850, as 
follows (Gen. St., c. 10) : — 

Sect. 3. In the year eighteen hundred and sixty-one and every fifth 
year thereafter, there shall be elected by the voters in the county of Suf- 
folk, a clerk of the supreme judicial court for said county, and two 
clerks of the superior court for said county, one for the civil, and one 
for the criminal, business, and by the voters in each of the other coun- 
ties a clerk of the courts for the county, who shall act as clerk of the 
supreme judicial court, the superior court, and the county commissioners. 
Such clerks shall hold their offices for five years from the first Wednes- 
day of January following their election, unless sooner removed as pro- 
vided by law. 

Sect. 10. If on the da} T s aforesaid there is a failure to elect a district- 
attorney, clerk of the courts, register of probate and insolvency, sheriff, 
or commissioner of insolvency, in any district or county, the governor 
shall by proclamation declare such failure and order a new election to 
be had on such day as he shall appoint, and shall continue so to order 
such elections until a choice is effected. 

Sect. 13. If a person elected to either of the offices mentioned in 
section ten is removed therefrom, or otherwise vacates the same, an elec- 
tion to fill such office for the remainder of his term shall be ordered by 
the governor, and shall be had on the Tuesday next after the first Mon- 
day of November. 

The difficulty arises from the fact that section 13 refers to a 
vacancy in one of the offices mentioned in section 10, in which the 
phrase is "clerk of the courts," instead of section 3, which 
enumerates specifically the three clerks in Suffolk County as well 
as the clerks in the other counties. This reference to a vacancy in 
the office of a clerk of the courts was not, in my opinion, an inten- 
tional exclusion of the clerks of the Suffolk County courts. By 
using the general phrase " clerk of the courts " the compilers do 
not intend thus to change the provisions of the statute of 1856. 
My opinion is strengthened by the fact that the commissioners 
who compiled this revision, in their note upon this chapter, com- 
mented upon a change which they made in section 13, and were 
silent as to any alteration of meaning in this respect. 

Their note is as follows : — 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 59 

Sect. 13. The act of 1856, chapter 173, provides for appointments to 
fill vacancies, and that the persons appointed shall hold until the annual 
election in November next thereafter, or until another is chosen or ap- 
pointed. It then provides that an election shall be had to fill the 
vacancy at "the said annual election thereafter.'" As a vacancy may 
occur so near the time of the annual election that it would not generally 
be known, the commissioners have provided that the vacancy shall be 
filled at the time of the annual election without confining it to the next 
one, and that warrants therefor shall be issued. 

I therefore advise Your Excellency that it is your duty, under 
the statutes, to cause a precept to be issued for an election to fill 
this vacancy at the next annual State election for which such pre- 
cept can be seasonably issued. 
I am, with great respect, 

Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney- General. 



Marine Insurance — Automobile. 

An automobile may, within the provisions of R. L., c. 118, § 29, be insured 
against the perils of the sea and other perils usually insured against 
by marine insurance, including risks of inland navigation and trans- 
portation, whether such automobile is being transported upon a rail- 
road car or a vessel, or upon its own wheels. 

Oct. 8, 1904. 

Hon. Frederick L. Cutting, Insurance Commissioner. 

Dear Sir : — Your letter of August 24 requests my opinion 
whether an insurance company, domestic or foreign, authorized to 
transact the business of marine insurance in this Commonwealth, 
may issue a policy of insurance on an automobile, under a marine 
form of policy instead of on the Massachusetts standard form of 
fire insurance policy. 

Section 29, chapter 118 of the Revised Laws provides that a 
company duly authorized to transact the business of marine insur- 
ance may " insure upon the stock or mutual plan vessels, freights, 
goods, money, effects, and money lent on bottomry, or respondentia, 
against the perils of the sea and other perils usually insured against 
by marine insurance, including risks of inland navigation and 
transportation." 

The Legislature has prescribed no standard form of marine 
insurance policy. The form used by the company in question pro- 
vides as follows : — 

Touching the adventure and perils which the said company is con- 
tented to bear and take upon itself in this voyage, they are of the seas, — 
fire, barratry of the master (unless the insured be an owner of the ves- 



60 ATTORNEY-GENERALS REPORT. [Jan. 

sel) and of the mariners, and all other losses and misfortunes which 
have or shall come to the damage of the said property or any part there- 
of, to which insurers are liable by the rules and customs of insurance in 
Boston, subject to the conditions and provisions contained or referred to 
by clauses in this policy. 

To the marine form of policy is attached a rider insuring the 
automobile within the limits of the United States, including while 
in building, on road, ferry or inland steamer, or on a coastwise 
steamer bound from a United States port to a United States port, 
covering loss or damage to the automobile caused by fire, also 
covering, while on board railroad cars, against the risk of fire and 
derailment of the cars only, and while on board steamers against 
marine perils only (including fire). 

I am of opinion that an automobile may be thus insured against 
the perils of the sea and other perils usually insured against by 
marine insurance, including risks of inland navigation and trans- 
portation, whether the automobile is being transported upon a rail- 
road car, a vessel, or upon its own wheels. 
Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney- General. 



Charles River Basin Commission — Removal of Craigie Bridge — 

Taking. 

Under the provisions of St. 1903, c. 465, providing that the Charles River 
dam, the construction of which is authorized thereby, " shall occupy 
substantially the site of the present Craigie bridge, which shall be 
removed by the commission,*' the Charles River Basin Commission 
is not required to make a taking of the existing bridge before pro- 
ceeding with its removal. 

Oct. 8, 1904. 

Hon. Henry S. Pritchett, Chairman, Charles Biver Basin Commission. 

Dear Sir : — Your letter of September 23 requests my opinion 
as to whether or not it will be necessary for you to make a taking 
of Craigie bridge across the Charles River in order to carry out the 
work which you are authorized to do by St. 1903, c. 465. Section 
3 of that act provides that the Charles River dam w ' shall occupy 
substantially the site of the present Craigie bridge, which shall be 
removed by the commission." Craigie bridge is a portion of the 
public highway, and as it now exists was built by commissioners 
under St. 1873, c. 199, the expense thereof being paid equally by 
the cities of Boston and Cambridge. The expense of maintenance 
is also shared equally by those cities. St. 1898, c. 467, § 14. 

St. 1903, c. 465, § 3, provides that the Charles River dam shall 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 61 

not be less than one hundred feet in width at water level, and " a 
part thereof shall be a highway and the remainder thereof shall be 
a highway, or park or parkway, as the commission shall determine. 
. . . The part of the dam used as a highway shall be maintained 
and operated in the same manner as the Cambridge bridge, and 
under the laws now or hereafter in force relating to said bridge." 
In other words, the part of the dam used as a highway is to be 
maintained and operated by a board of two commissioners, one 
appointed by the mayor of the city of Boston and one by the mayor 
of the city of Cambridge, exactly as the present Craigie bridge is 
maintained and operated under St. 1898, c. 467, § 14. By the 
act of 1903 the Legislature temporarily took the control of Craigie 
bridge out of the hands of the board of bridge commissioners and 
gave it into the hands of your commission, for the purpose of re- 
moving it and of building a new bridge in its place. By section 9 
the expense of that work will be borne by the two cities, and the 
control over the new bridge, when you have finished it, will be 
vested in the board of bridge commissioners. A similar plan was 
adopted for rebuilding the West Boston bridge by St. 1898, c. 467. 
The rights of the two cities are the same as though the Legis- 
lature had authorized the board of commissioners having control 
of the bridge to rebuild it at the expense of the cities, in which 
case no taking would be necessary. The present structure was 
built in that way, and the constitutionality of legislation of that 
character has been for a long time recognized. Carter v. Cam- 
bridge & Brookline Bridge Proprietors, 104 Mass. 236. 

I am of opinion, therefore, that your commission should not 
make a taking of the present Craigie bridge, but should proceed to 
remove it and rebuild the highway across the river in accordance 
with the provisions of your enabling act. 
Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney -General. 



Domestic Animals — Contagious Diseases of Cottle — Cattle 

Bureau. 

The powers vested under the provisions of R. L., c. 90, as amended by 
St. 1902, c. 116, in the officers of the Cattle Bureau with relation to 
contagious diseases of cattle are not to be extended by implication to 
contagious diseases other than those enumerated in R. L., c. 90, § 4. 

Oct. 10, 1904. 
Austin Peters, Esq., Chief of the Cattle Bureau. 

Dear Sir: — Your letter of July 19 calls for my opinion upon 

the question whether a disease of the eye, known as enzootic ophthal- 



62 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

mia, which has attacked certain cattle in the town of Westborough, 
is a contagious disease within the meaning of the definition of 
that term contained in R. L., c. 90, § 4. The disease in question is 
stated to be apparently contagious but not dangerous to the 
animals attacked by it, or to the health of persons who may be 
brought into contact with it. Upon these facts you inquire specifi- 
cally whether there is any legal authority in the chapter above 
referred to, as amended by St. 1902, c. 116, § 3, for isolating and 
forbidding the sale of animals from herds where such disease 
exists, until the danger of contagion is over. 

Assuming that the disease in question is in no respect dangerous 
to mankind, I am of opinion that you have no jurisdiction in the 
premises. The evident purpose of the statute was to protect and 
preserve the health of persons purchasing the several products 
derived from domestic cattle ; and it was not intended to relieve 
the owner of cattle from the responsibility of their care and main- 
tenance or to preserve the health of the cattle themselves. The 
diseases specifically enumerated in section 28 of chapter 90 of 
the Revised Laws appear to be contagious diseases which affect the 
products derived from cattle, either milk or meat, and through 
them the health and safety of the persons by whom they are con- 
sumed. The powers vested in the officers of the Cattle Bureau, in 
the case of the contagious diseases enumerated in the statute, are 
very broad, and for that reason are not, in my opinion, to be ex- 
tended by implication to diseases other than those specifically 
mentioned in section 28. 

Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney-General. 



Person injected with Contagious Disease — Transportation beyond 
the Borders of the Commonwealth for Care and Treatment. 

There is no existing provision of law by virtue of which a person found 
within this Commonwealth suffering with a contagious or infectious 
disease may, without his consent, be transported beyond the borders 
of the Commonwealth, to be there confined and treated for such 
disease. 

Oct. 14, 1904. 

Leonard Huntress, M.D., Trustee, State Hospital and State Farm. 

Dear Sir : — You seek my opinion in behalf of your Board by 
an inquiry as follows : Whether under any existing law of the Com- 
monwealth there is authority by virtue of which a person found 
within this Commonwealth suffering with a contagious or infectious 
disease known as leprosy may be transported, without his consent, 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 63 

beyond the borders of this Commonwealth, to be there confined 
and treated for such disease. 

There is no provision of statute which in terms authorizes such 
transportation, confinement and treatment. R. L., c. 85, §§ 23 
and 24, provide for the transportation of paupers to any other 
State, or to any place beyond the sea " where they belong." This, 
however, is a different matter from the deportation for the purpose 
of confinement and treatment, under the control of officers of this 
Commonwealth. 

R. L., c. 75, § 46, as amended by Acts of 1902, c. 206, § 2, pro- 
vides for the removal of persons infected with contagious disease 
in the following language : — 

A magistrate authorized to issue warrants in criminal cases may issue 
a warrant directed to the sheriff' of the count}' or his deputy, or to any 
constable or police officer, requiring them under the direction of the 
board to remove any person who is infected with contagious disease, or 
to impress and take up convenient houses, lodging, nurses, attendants 
and other necessaries. The removal authorized by this section may be 
made to any hospital in an adjoining city or town established for the 
reception of persons having smallpox or other disease dangerous to 
the public health, provided the assent of the board of health of the city 
or town to which such removal is to be made shall first have been 
obtained. 

Control over inmates of the State Hospital is conferred upon the 
trustees of such hospital by R. L., c. 85, § 18. 

The trustees of the state hospital shall have and exercise the same 
powers relative to pauper inmates and their property as towns and 
overseers of the poor have relative to paupers supported or relieved by 
them. 

The power of overseers of the poor relative to the relief and 
support of paupers is fixed in part by R. L., c. 81, § 2. 

The overseers of the poor shall have the care and oversight of all 
such poor and indigent persons so long as they remain at the charge of 
their respective cities or towns, and shall see that they are suitably re- 
lieved, supported and employed, either in the workhouse or almshouse, 
or in such other manner as the city or town directs, or otherwise at the 
discretion of said overseers. They may remove to the almshouse such 
children as are suffering destitution from extreme neglect of dissolute 
or intemperate parents or guardians, except as hereinafter provided. 

This statute does not give overseers of the poor power to remove 
from the Commonwealth paupers having settlements in the Com- 
monwealth without their consent ( Westfield v. Southwick, 17 Pick. 
68 ; Deerfield v. Greenfield, 1 Gray, 514 ; see also Smith v. Peabody, 



64 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

106 Mass. 262). and the same limitation must attach to the powers 
of the trustees of the State Hospital. 

There is, moreover, one general principle of interpretation which 
disposes of the whole question. In the absence of express words, 
or distinct implications, the presumption is that statutes have no 
extraterritorial effect. And this is true even in those cases where 
it would be in the power of the Legislature to give to statutes such 
an effect. 

As to whether it would be in the power of the Legislature to 
provide for the removal from the Commonwealth, and the confine- 
ment and treatment without the Commonwealth, of a person 
afflicted with leprosy, who is unwilling to be removed, I express 
no opinion. It appears, however, that neither by express words 
nor by distinct implication do the statutes above quoted authorize 
such removal, confinement and treatment, and that consequently, 
according to the principles stated, the field for the exercise of the 
powers conferred is limited by the territorial boundaries of the 
Commonwealth. 

Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney-General. 



Insurance — Fire Insurance — Massachusetts Standard Policy — 
Modification — " Riders " — " Binding Slips " — Insurance 
Commissioner — Duties. 

R. L., c. 118, § 60, does not forbid the making of a special contract incon- 
sistent with the terms of the standard form of fire insurance policy 
therein contained, and in clause 7 expressly provides for such modi- 
fication of the standard form as the parties themselves may choose 
to make; it follows, therefore, that a separate slip or "rider," com- 
plying with the provisions of statute applicable thereto, may provide 
for cancellation upon less than the ten days' notice required by the 
standard form. 

A fire insurance company is not required to make temporary insurance by 
means of " binding slips," by which an agent is authorized to cover 
property with insurance from the moment of application until the 
applicant either receives his policy or is notified of the rejection of 
his risk, and such insurance may be terminated in any manner agreed 
upon by the parties. 

The Insurance Commissioner is not required to pass upon or consider 
questions relating to the form or contents of the "binding slips" 

above mentioned. 

Oct. 31, 1904. 
Hon. Frederick L. Cutting, Insurance Commissioner. 

Dear Sir : — In your letter of September 14 you ask varioug 
questions as to the right of a fire insurance company doing busi- 
ness in Massachusetts to provide for the cancellation of its con- 






1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 65 

tracts of insurance upon Massachusetts property, in a manner 
other than that prescribed by the standard form of policy contained 
in section 60 of chapter 118 of the Revised Laws. 

No fire insurance company shall issue fire insurance policies on prop- 
erty in this commonwealth, other than those of the standard form herein 
set forth, except as follows : 

Seventh, A company may write upon the margin or across the face of 
a policy, or write, or print in type not smaller than long primer, upon 
separate slips or riders to be attached thereto, provisions adding to or 
modifying those contained in the standard form; and all such slips, 
riders and provisions must be signed by the officers or agent of the 
company so using them. 

The language of the standard form in respect to cancellation is 
as follows : — 

This policy may be cancelled at any time at the request of the insured, 
who shall thereupon be entitled to a return of the portion of the above 
premium remaining, after deducting the customary monthly short rates 
for the time this policy shall have been in force. The company also 
reserves the right, after giving written notice to the insured, and to any 
mortgagee to whom this policy is made payable, and tendering to the 
insured a ratable proportion of the premium, to cancel this policy as to 
all risks subsequent to the expiration of ten days from such notice, and 
no mortgagee shall then have the right to recover as to such risks. 

You ask : " Would it be lawful for a company to avail itself of 
the privilege granted by the ' Seventh ' clause of section 60, chap- 
ter 118 of the Revised Laws, by using 'separate slips or riders' 
amending the time allowed for the cancellation of a policy to a 
shorter period than the stated ' ten days ' ? " 

The Legislature has not attempted to make the provisions of the 
standard form compulsory upon insurer or insured, nor to make 
such form the sole permissible form of contract. Section 60, above 
quoted, does not forbid the making of a special contract embody- 
ing terms inconsistent with the terms contained in the standard 
form ; indeed, it provides for such modifications of the standard 
form as the parties may choose to make (clause Seventh, quoted 
above) . The apparent purpose of the Legislature was to establish 
an approved form of contract upon which the insured might con- 
fidently rely without the necessity of considering special stipula- 
tions which might be obscure or of doubtful import as to the 
obligations or limitations of the contract. I answer the above 
question, therefore, in the affirmative. A rider complying with the 



66 ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

provisions of the statute relating thereto may permit of a cancella- 
tion upon less than the ten days' notice required by the standard 
form. 

Your remaining questions refer to the " binding slips " used by 
fire insurance companies, by means of which the agent is author- 
ized to cover property with insurance from the moment of applica- 
tion until the company accepts the risk and issues a policy, or 
rejects the risk and notifies the applicant of its rejection. You 
ask in varying forms whether such temporary insurance may be 
terminated by less than ten days' notice to the applicant. 

"If a binder is issued or given by an authorized company or 
agent, which binder stipulates that it may be cancelled or revoked 
by the party issuing or granting the same, at a less time than the 
' ten days ' fixed by law, would such act constitute a violation of 
law, or, if not an actual violation, would the company have a legal 
right to abrogate or abridge the legal rights which are secured to 
the insured by the enactment or conditions of the ' standard ' form 
of policy? 

" Could a binder as described as above be considered as legal, 
provided the ten days' allowance be ivaived by the agreement of 
both parties, assurer and assured ? " 

The universal custom of covering property while the insurance 
company is determining whether to issue a policy or not is con- 
venient, and, indeed, a practical necessity in business, but no law 
compels the company to make this preliminary agreement, and if 
it be made, no law prescribes what its terms must be. It is not 
even required to be in writing. Since there is no legal obligation 
upon the company to make temporary insurance even for a moment, 
the company may "bind" such insurance for as long or as short a 
time as the parties may agree upon. You have, therefore, no 
duty to see to the form of these binding slips. 

I answer your questions, specifically, as follows : The act of 
giving a binding slip, providing that the temporary contract 
evidenced by it may be terminated by notice within less than ten 
days, is not a violation of law. The law, as I have stated above, 
does not forbid the making of terms inconsistent with those of the 
standard policy. 

I next consider the following question : " Does the giving of a 
parole agreement, or the issuance of a binder, constitute, theoret- 
ically at least, a contract, to be governed by the terms and agree- 
ments as fixed by the 'standard form of policy' herein referred 
to?" 

If the binding slip does not provide for its own termination, the 
question whether the insurance contract evidenced by it may be 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 67 

cancelled on reasonable notice, or whether, since the applicant 
and the company have made no inconsistent agreements, his 
property is insured pending the issuance of the policy according 
to the terms of the standard form, is one of great interest, upon 
which the decisions are not in accord. See Lipman v. Niagara 
Fire Ins. Co., 121 N. Y. 454; Karelsen v. Sun Fire Office, 122 
N. Y. 545; Hicks v. British Amer. Ass. Co., 162 N. Y. 284; 
Campbell v. Amer. Fire Ins. Co., 73 Wis. 100 ; Baile v. St. Josejjh 
F. & M. Ins. Co., 73 Mo. 371 ; Neb., etc., Ins. Co. v. Seivers, 27 
Neb. 541. This interesting question, however, in nowise concerns 
your official duty. 

Lastly : ' ; Can a parole agreement or binder which by its terms 
fixes the time at which it is to remain in force at a longer term 
than ten days be cancelled by the company without giving the in- 
sured the ten days' notice required by the 4 standard form ' ? " 

The question whether a binding slip purporting to cover for 
thirty days may be cancelled upon notice, and if so, upon what 
notice, is also one which concerns only the parties to the contract. 
Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney- General. 



Commitment — Person committed to Workhouse — Labor. 

The word "commitment," as used in R. L., c. 30, § 21, providing that 
" every person who has been committed to a workhouse shall, if able 
to work, be kept diligently employed in labor during the term of his 
commitment," is to be broadly interpreted, and such provision is ap- 
plicable not only to persons committed to a workhouse by a court but 
also to persons placed therein subject to the care and oversight of over- 
seers of the poor, and without a technical commitment. 

Nov. 21, 1904. 
John D. Wells, Esq., Clerk, State Board of Charity. 

Dear Sir: — You request the opinion of the Attorney-General 
as to whether the words "every person who has been committed to 
a workhouse," in section 21 of chapter 30 of the Revised Laws, 
apply to all of the several classes of "persons" mentioned in 
section 1 of the same chapter. 

R. L., c. 30, § 1, provides : — 

A city or town may erect or provide a workhouse or almshouse for 
the employment and support of indigent persons maintained by or receiv- 
ing alms from it; of j^ersons who, being able to work and not having 
estate or means otherwise to maintain themselves, refuse or neglect to 
work; of persons who live a dissolute, vagrant life and exercise no 
ordinary calling or lawful business ; of persons who spend their time 



68 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

and property in public houses to the neglect of their proper business or 
who, by otherwise misspending their earnings, are likely to become 
chargeable to the city or town ; and of other persons sent thereto under 
any provisions of law. 

Section 21 provides : — 

Every person who has been committed to a workhouse shall, if able to 
work, be kept diligently employed in labor during the term of his com- 
mitment. If he is idle and does not perform such reasonable task as is 
assigned, or if he is stubborn and disorderly, he shall be punished accord- 
ing to the orders and regulations established by the directors. 

The inmates of workhouses are of two classes : first, those per- 
sons who are committed thereto by order of court (R. L., c. 208, 
§30; c. 212, §§ 39, 46, 54, 55, 59) ; second, those who are sup- 
ported therein as paupers under the care of overseers of the poor, 
but who have not been committed by an order of court (R. L., 
c. 81, § 2). Many of the persons enumerated in R. L., c. 30, § 1, 
above quoted, are included within the second class. It therefore 
becomes important to determine whether the words "commit- 
ment" and "committed," in R. L., c. 30, § 21, are to be inter- 
preted narrowly, as meaning commitment by order of court, for if 
they are so to be interpreted it follows that certain persons enu- 
merated in R. L.,c. 30, § 1, namely, those within the second class 
above indicated, are exempt from the provisions of section 21. 

I am of opinion, however, that the words are not to be so nar- 
rowly interpreted. "Commitment" and "committed" do not 
necessarily have technical meanings. See Gummington v. Ware- 
ham, 9 Cush. 585 ; Commonwealth v. Barker, 133 Mass. 399, and 
statutes therein construed. In defining them reference may be 
had to the earlier statutes, for words in an act are to be given the 
same meaning which they had in earlier acts in pari materia, in 
the absence of anything to show a contrary intent. Reiche v. 
Smythe, 13 Wall. 162; Greenleaf v. Goodrich, 101 U. S. 281, 
semble. 

In the section of the original workhouse statute, in which the 
provisions of R. L., c. 30, § 21, appear, the words "committed" 
and " commitment" were not used in a technical sense, but were 
applied to the sending of persons to the workhouse by overseers 
of the poor. 

Province Laws, 1743-44, c. 12, § 11, provided: — 

That no town shall be at charge for the support or relief of any per- 
son committed to said house, who was not sent .thither by the overseers 
belonging to such town ; nor any person orderly committed to it shall 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 69 

be discharged from it but by the overseers by whom he was committed, 
or by the overseers, at a general meeting, or otherwise by the justices 
of the court of general sessions of the peace, in the same county, upon 
application to them made for that purpose ; and every person so com- 
mitted, if fit and able to work, shall be held and kept stric[k]tly and 
dil[l]igently [i] [e]mployed in labour during his or her abode there; 
and in case they be idle, and shall not duly perform such task or stint as 
shall be reasonably assign'd them, or shall be stubborn and disorderly, 
shall be punish [e]d according to the orders that shall be made for the 
ruling, governing, and punishing of the persons there to be committed, 
not repugnant to the laws of this province 

The same statute provided that the overseers in any town "be 
and they are hereby directed and empowered to commit to such 
house . . . any person or persons . . . that hereafter in this act 
are declared liable to be sent thither." The persons so declared 
liable to be sent to the workhouse were enumerated in nearly the 
same terms as are used in R. L., c. 30, § 1. In Acts of 1788, 
c. 30, these provisions remained practically the same in form and 
substance. The revision of the laws in 1836 (R. S., c. 16) 
changed the form of the statute, and the form at that time adopted 
has, with minor changes, been retained (G. S., c. 22; P. S., 
c. 33), though many new provisions relative to commitments to 
workhouses for misdemeanors have been made. 

There is, however, nothing which to my mind sufficiently strongly 
indicates any other intent as to the meaning of " committed " and 
" commitment" to rebut the inference from the way in which the 
words were used in the earlier statutes. The disappearance of 
the provision authorizing overseers to commit was doubtless due 
to the fact that it seemed to be unnecessary in view of the pro- 
vision which was enacted in 1788 and now appears in R. L., c. 81, 
§ 2, giving overseers the power to see that poor and indigent per- 
sons "are suitably relieved, supported or employed either in the 
workhouse or almshouse, or in such other manner as the city or 
town directs, or otherwise at the discretion of said overseers." 
The omission of the word "so" ("thus" in St.J788) before 
" committed " in St. 1743-44, was required by the change in the 
form of the statute and by the intention to include within the scope 
of the provision persons committed under authority of later acts 
by order of court ; but there was nothing in it tending to limit the 
application of the provision to such persons. The use of the 
expression " witliin the time for which he was committed," in 
the section relating to discharges, and the expression " during the 
term of his commitment," in the section to be construed, is not 
inconsistent with a situation where some of the persons referred 



70 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

to are committed for definite, some for indefinite, periods ; and the 
addition of the words " or received," in Gen. St., c. 22, § 17, and 
later revisions, to the provision requiring the master of each work- 
house to keep a register " of the names of the persons committed," 
was hardly sufficient to impress upon the words " committed " and 
" commitment," wherever they occur, a technical meaning which 
they certainly did not have in the early statutes dealing with the 
same subject. 

It seems, therefore, that these words should be broadly inter- 
preted, and consequently that the requirement of diligent employ- 
ment in labor, in section 21, applies to all persons enumerated in 
section 1. This conclusion is further supported by the provision 
of section 16, that cities and towns may provide implements, etc., 
" for the employment of inmates " of workhouses, and by the pro- 
vision of section 1, above quoted, that " a city or town may erect 
or provide a workhouse . . . for the employment ... of indigent 
persons." 

Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney -General. 



Great Ponds — Sources of Water Supply — Rules and Regulations 
of State Board of Health — Commissioners of Fisheries and 
Game — Duty to stock with Food Fish. 

Rules and regulations established by the State Board of Health under the 
provisions of R. L., c. 75, § 113, "to prevent the pollution and to 
secure the sanitary protection of all such waters as are used as sources 
of water supply," are police regulations, and, in the case of a great 
pond so used, will limit and control the right of the public to the use 
thereof for boating, fishing or other like purposes, so far as such use 
by the public is inconsistent with the use of such pond as a source of 
water supply. 

Where rules and regulations established by the State Board of Health under 
the provisions of R. L., c. 75, § 113, relating to a great pond, used as 
a source of water supply, forbid to the public fishing, boating or bath- 
ing therein or taking ice therefrom, the provisions of R. L., c. 91, § 19, 
directing the Commissioners of Fisheries and Game, upon petition 
duly made as prescribed, to cause the waters of any great pond to be 
stocked with food fish, and to make reasonable regulations relative to 
the fishing therein, is not applicable, and such commissioners are not 
required to act thereunder. 

Nov. 25, 1904. 

Hon. Joseph "W. Collins, Chairman, Commissioners of Fisheries and 

Game. 

Dear Sir : — You have required my opinion upon the effect 
which certain rules and regulations made by the State Board of 
Health under R. L., c. 75, § 113, may have upon the duty of the 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 71 

fish and game commission, under the provisions of R. L., c. 91, 
§ 19. 

R. L., c. 75, § 112, is as follows: — 

The state board of health shall have the general oversight and care 
of all inland waters and of all streams and ponds used by any city, 
town or public institution or by any water or ice company in this com- 
monwealth as sources of water supply and of all springs, streams and 
water courses tributary thereto. It shall be provided with maps, plans 
and documents suitable for such purposes and shall keep records of all 
its transactions relative thereto. 

Section 113 reads : — 

Said board may cause examinations of such waters to be made to 
ascertain their purity and fitness for domestic use or their liability to 
impair the interests of the public or of persons lawfully using them or 
to imperil the public health. It may make rules and regulations to 
prevent the pollution and to secure the sanitary protection, of all such 
waters as are used as sources of water supply. 

R. L., c. 91, § 19, provides that : — 

The commissioners, upon the petition of the mayor and aldermen of a 
city or of the selectmen of a town within which a great pond or a por- 
tion thereof is situated, or of thirty or more inhabitants thereof, shall 
cause the waters of such pond to be stocked with such food fish as they 
judge to be best suited to such waters. They shall thereupon prescribe, 
for a period not exceeding three years, such reasonable regulations 
relative to the fishing in such ponds and their tributaries, with such 
penalties, not exceeding twenty dollars for one offence, as they deem to 
be for the public interest, and shall cause such regulations to be en- 
forced. Five hundred dollars shall be annually appropriated by the 
commonwealth to carry out the provisions of this section. 

This section was amended by St. 1903, c. 274, which authorized 
the commission to restock such ponds with food fish. 

The facts submitted in your communication are applicable to 
North Watuppa Pond and its tributaries, which is used by the city 
of Fall River as a source of water supply. 

Acting under the authority of R. L., c. 75, § 113, the State 
Board of Health has made certain rules and regulations governing 
North Watuppa Pond and its tributaries, of which only section 14 
is material to the present question. 

14. No person shall bathe in, and no person shall, unless permitted 
by a special regulation or by a written permit of the Watuppa water 
board of the city of Fall River, fish in, or send, drive or put any animal 
into North Watuppa Pond, so called, said pond being in the city of Fall 



72 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

River and the town of Westport and used by said city as a source of 
Mater supply. No person other than a member of said Watuppa water 
board, its officers, agents or employees, or public officers whose duties 
may so require, shall, unless so permitted by regulation or permit of 
said Board, enter or go, in any boat, skiff, raft or other contrivance, on 
or upon the water of said pond, nor shall enter or go upon, or drive any 
animal upon, the ice of said pond. 

Your letter also states that the board of health for the city of 
Fall River has also established rules and regulations relating to 
North Watuppa Pond, in substance like those above quoted ; but 
inasmuch as it is the clear intendment of R. L., c. 75, §§ 112 to 
130, to place the entire regulation of sources of water supply 
within the sole jurisdiction of the State Board of Health, I do not 
regard the local regulations referred to as material upon the mat- 
ter of your inquiry. It is true that local boards may still control 
and abate nuisances which may be found within their jurisdiction 
and upon or adjacent to great ponds, whether or not such ponds 
are used as sources of water supply (see Stone v. Heath, 179 Mass. 
388) ; but there is no statutory authority for the establishment by 
them of any permanent rules or regulations relating to sources of 
water supply. Such regulations, therefore, can have no effect 
upon the duties of the fish and game commission. 

The power of the State Board of Health to make rules and regu- 
lations is conferred in order "to prevent the pollution and to 
secure the sanitary protection " of great ponds which are used as 
sources of water supply. This is a police regulation, and in so far 
as such rules and regulations are necessary for the preservation 
of the purity of the water, they will control the provisions of gen- 
eral statutes regulating the rights of the public in great ponds. 
On the other hand, the fact that a great pond has been taken as a 
source of water supply does not in and of itself necessarily deprive 
the public of the right of fishing, or, indeed, of any other right 
which may be exercised without interfering with the use of the 
pond as a source of water supply. See Rockport v. Webster. 174 
Mass. 385; Opinion of Attorney-General, Dec. 6, 1900, Attorney- 
GeneraVs Report, 1900, p. 111. 

It must be assumed, therefore, that the rules and regulations 
made by the State Board of Health under authority of R. L., c. 75, 
§ 113, were based upon some finding or adjudication by such board 
that the use of the waters so regulated by the public for boating, 
fishing or taking ice, is or is likely to become a source of pollution 
and an injury to the water taken therefrom for the purposes of 
water supply, in which case the rules and regulations are author- 
ized and are binding upon the public. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 73 

It remains to consider the effect of this rule or regulation upon 
R. L., c. 91, § 19. This statute is mandatory and imposes a duty 
upon the Commissioners of Fisheries and Came to stock the waters 
of a great pond whenever a petition of the prescribed character is 
addressed to them ; yet, if the requirement of the section is abso- 
lute, it would follow, in the case of North Watuppa Pond, that 
upon petition they would be required to stock such pond without 
the authority to use a boat, if a boat were necessary, in distrib- 
uting the fish, and the petitioners would not be permitted to derive 
any benefit therefrom unless the permission of the Watuppa water 
board of the city of Fall River was obtained. Moreover, it is 
within the bounds of possibility that at any time the State Board 
of Health may absolutely forbid fishing and boating, and thus 
render the operation of stocking such pond not only useless to the 
public, but, conceivably, injurious to the waters of the pond as a 
source of water supply. 

In view of these contradictions it seems to me impossible to 
hold that any duty under R. L., c. 91, § 19, rests upon your com- 
mission to stock a pond used as a source of water supply, and 
upon the public enjoyment of which rules and regulations of the 
State Board of Health similar to those under consideration have 
been imposed. In other words, a great pond which is set apart as 
a source of water supply is, in a measure, withdrawn from the 
status of a great pond, and all public rights attaching thereto are 
subordinated to the single use to which the Legislature has devoted 
it. It is true that to a limited extent other public rights therein 
may be still exercised, but the jurisdiction of the fish and game 
commission is so seriously affected that, in my opinion, the man- 
datory language of section 19 would not be applicable, and the 
commission must be permitted to use its discretion in determining 
whether or not, in consideration of the existing rules and regula- 
tions of the State Board of Health, it is advisable or proper to 
comply with a petition for stocking such a great pond. 
Very truly yours, 

Herbert Parker, Attorney -General. 



LIST OF CASES 



IN WHICH THE 



Attorney- General 



HAS APPEARED 



During the Year 1904. 



INFORMATIONS. 



1. At the Relation of the Treasurer and Receiver-General. 
(a) For the non-payment of corporation taxes for the year 
1903, informations were brought against the — 

A. F. Stowe Manufacturing Company. Tax paid and information 
dismissed. 

A. W. Dunton Printing Company. Tax paid and information dis- 

missed. 

American Collection Agency. Enjoined. 

American Cultivator Publishing Company. Tax paid and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

Apsley Rubber Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Austin & Winslow-Gallagher Express Company. Tax paid and 
information dismissed. 

B. L. Bragg Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 
Bankers' Investment Company. Information dismissed. 
Blue Hill Granite Company. Pending. 

Boston & Haverhill Despatch Company. Tax paid and informa- 
tion dismissed. 

Boston Co-operative Cloak Manufacturing Company. Enjoined. 

Boston Cycle and Sundry Company. Tax paid and information 
dismissed. 

Boston Embossing and Tape Company. Enjoined. 

Boston Stitching and Plaiting Company. Tax paid and informa- 
tion dismissed. 

Boston Traveller Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Bristol County Street Railway Company. Pending. 

Bush Market Company. Enjoined. 

Butterfield Gold Mining and Milling Company. Enjoined. 

Chelsea Express Despatch Company. Tax paid and information 
dismissed. 

Concord & Boston Street Railway Company. Tax paid and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

Concord, Maynard & Hudson Street Railway Company. Tax paid 
and information dismissed. 

Craig & Craig Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 



78 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Cunningham Lumber Company. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 

Dane & AVashburn Company. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 

Davis & Buxton Stamping Company. Tax paid and information 
dismissed. 

Electric Storage Battery Company. Pending. 

Empire Shoe Company. Enjoined. 

Francis H. Drew Company. Enjoined. 

French Canadian Co-operative Association. Enjoined. 

George P. Bingham Company. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 

Graham Shoe Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

H. B. Stevens Company. Enjoined. 

H. L. Aldrich Company. Pending. 

Hampshire & Worcester Street Railway Company. Tax (1903) 
paid and information dismissed. 

Hampshire & Worcester Street Railway Company. Pending. 

Holyoke Thread Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Household Furniture Company. Enjoined. 

International Jupiter Steel Company. Enjoined. 

J. P. & W. H. Emond, Incorporated. Tax paid and information 
dismissed. 

J. W. Calnan Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Kimball Brothers Company. Tax abated and information dis- 
missed. 

Lowell & Boston Street Railway Company. Pending. 

Lynn Ice Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Massachusetts Brick Company. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 

Medfield & Medway Street Railway Company. Tax paid and in- 
formation dismissed. 

Metropolitan Bolt Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Middlesex Real Estate Association of Cambridge. Tax paid and 
information dismissed. 

Mutual Mail Order Company. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 

National Finance Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

New England Electric Railroad Construction Company. Enjoined. 

Norfolk Western Street Railway Company. Tax (1902) paid 
and information dismissed. 

Olympic Amusement Company. Enjoined. 

People's Ice Company of Worcester. Tax paid and information 
dismissed. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 79 

Press Clipping Bureau. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Randall-Faichney Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Seal & Smith Company. Enjoined. 

Sevigne Bread Wrapper Company. Enjoined. 

Shady Hill Nursery Company. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 

Sprague Car Appliance Company. Enjoined. 

Springfield Construction Company. Tax paid and information 
dismissed. 

Spy Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

Suffolk Towboat Company. Tax paid and information dismissed. 

United States Credit Company. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 

United States Garbage Reduction Company. Tax paid and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

Weymouth Seam-face Granite Company. Tax paid and informa- 
tion dismissed. 

William Allen & Sons Company. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 

Wm. Bourne & Sons Piano Company. Tax paid and information 
dismissed. 

Worcester Umbrella Company. Tax paid and information dis- 
missed. 

Yam Leather Company. Enjoined. 

(6) For failure to file the tax return for the year 1904, re- 
quired by St. 1903, c. 437, § 48, informations -were brought against 
the — 

A. F. Stowe Manufacturing Company. Enjoined. 

A. G. Moore Company. Return filed and information dismissed. 

Altamonte Springs Company. Return filed and information dis- 
missed. 

American Machine Manufacturing Company. Return filed and in- 
formation dismissed. 

Amesbury Opera House Company. Return filed and information 
dismissed. 

Applied Arts Guild Company. Return filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Berkshire Tack Company. Return filed and information dismissed. 

Boston Cycle and Sundry Company. Return filed and information 
dismissed. 

Chino Park Amusement Company. Pending. 

Coates Clipper Manufacturing Company. Return filed and infor- 
mation dismissed. 



80 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Colonial Theatre Company. Enjoined. 

Commonwealth Hygienic Ice Company. Pending. 

Consolidated Law Cabinet. Return filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Douglass Hotel Company. Enjoined. 

Electric Cable Joint Company. Return filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Erudite Press. Return filed and information dismissed. 

F. S. Smith Shoe Company. Pending. 

H. E. Webster Company. Return filed and information dismissed. 

Havana Auto Company. Enjoined. 

Hero Cough Syrup Company. Information dismissed. 

Hill & Proctor Company. Enjoined. 

Home Science Publishing Company. Unable to get service. 

Hoyt L. Conary Company. Enjoined. 

International Confectionery and Manufacturing Company. Un- 
able to get service. 

J. A. Glass Company. Information dismissed. 

J. P. & W. H. Emond, Incorporated. Return filed and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

John C. DeLaney Moulding Company. Return filed and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

John S. Flynn Company. Information dismissed. 

L. A. Ryan Company. Return filed and information dismissed. 

Lee Process Bakery and Lunch Company. Pending. 

Martha's Vineyard Electric Street and Power Company. Return 
filed and information dismissed. 

Martha's Vineyard Street Railway Company. Return filed and 
information dismissed. 

Massachusetts Guarantee Company. In hands of receiver. 

Messervy Ice Cream and Confectionery Company. Pending. 

Modern Shoe Repairing Company. Return filed and information 
dismissed. 

Morrison Grocery Company. Return filed and information dis- 
missed. 

New England Manufacturers' Association. Enjoined. 

New England Manufacturing Company. Return filed and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

Nute-Hallett Company, Incorporated. Return filed and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

O. T. Rogers Granite Company. Information dismissed. 

Pean Medical Company. Return filed and information dismissed. 

Pearsons Drug Company. Return filed and information dismissed. 

Pilgrim Iron Foundry Company. Information dismissed. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 81 

Play Publishing Corporation. Pending. 

Ranclall-Faichney Company. Return filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Royal Tailoring Company. Information dismissed. 

South End Hardware Company. Pending. 

Springfield Construction Company. Return filed and information 
dismissed. 

Templeton Street Railway Company. Return filed and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

Thomas Pattison Company. Unable to get service. 

Traveller Publishing Company. Information dismissed. 

Unexcelled Pen Company. Enjoined. 

United Bakers' and Grocers' Association. Pending. 

W. K. Farrington Press. Return filed and information dismissed. 

West End Baking Company. Enjoined. 

Weymouth Seam-face Granite Company. Return filed and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

Worcester Automobile Company. Return filed and information 
■ dismissed. 

2. At the Relation of the Commissioner of Corporations. 
For failure to file the certificate of condition for the year 1904, 
required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 45, 66. 

Acme Road Machinery Company. Certificate filed and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

American Citizen Company. Certificate filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Atlas Fireproofi ng Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

Aztec Gold and Copper Mining Company. Certificate filed and 
information dismissed. 

Bay State Shoe and Leather Company. Certificate filed and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

Beacon Manufacturing Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

Beacon Publishing Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

Block Plant Electric Light Company. Certificate filed and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

Boston Leasehold Company. Enjoined. 

Bridgewater Electric Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

Building Trades Credit Agency. Information dismissed. 

Burrows Lighting and Heating Company of America. Enjoined. 



82 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Cambridge Knitting Mills. Certificate filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Campello Leather Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

Cape Ann Machine Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

Columbia Specialty Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

Consolidated Law Cabinet. Certificate filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Dillon Machine Company. Certificate filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Doctor Ray Medicine Company. Enjoined. 

Electric Storage Battery. Pending. 

Exposition Amusement Company. Certificate filed and informa- 
tion dismissed. 

Exposition Amusement Company. Pending. 

Fisher-Churchill Company. Certificate filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Franklin Park Land and Improvement Company. Enjoined. 

Frederick J. Quinby Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

Golden King Mining and Investment Company. Information dis- 
missed. 

Greenfield Eecorder Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

•Guatemala Investment and Mining Company. Information dis- 
missed. 

Hampden Hotel Company. Certificate filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Hanover Printing Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

Hill & Proctor Company. Enjoined. 

Holmes Beef and Provision Company. Certificate filed and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

Inter City Umbrella Renting Company. Enjoined. 

J. H. Dalton Company. Pending. 

J. J. Cuddihy Stone Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

Jefferson, Taylor & Walkup Company. Enjoined. 

Jewett Piano Company. Enjoined. 

L. E. Knott Apparatus Company. Certificate filed and informa- 
tion dismissed. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 83 

L. J. Richards Company. Certificate filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Lawrence Baseball Association. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

Leicester Water Power Company. Certificate filed and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

Marlier & Company, Limited. Enjoined. 

Mining Bureau Publishing Company. Enjoined. 

Morrill Brothers Company. Enjoined. 

Newburyport Herald Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

New England Electric Manufacturing Company. Unable to get 
service. 

New England Manufacturing Company. Certificate filed and in- 
formation dismissed. 

Page Electric Company. Certificate filed and information dis- 
missed. 

Page Electric Company. Certificate filed and information dis- 
missed. 

People's Ice Company of Worcester. Certificate filed and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

Plymouth Stove Foundry Company. Enjoined. 

Quinsigamond Lake Steamboat Company. Certificate filed and 
information dismissed. 

R. H. Long Shoe Manufacturing Company. Certificate filed and 
information dismissed. 

Randall-Faichney Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

Revere House Lessees Company. Enjoined. 

Robbins Spring Water Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

Rotary Motor Vehicle Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

S. A. Ryan Company. Certificate filed and information dismissed. 

Sanitary Manufacturing Company. Certificate filed and informa- 
tion dismissed. 

Shady Hill Nursery Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

Sheldon Brothers Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 

South End Hardware Company. Pending. 

Standard Fishing Rod Company. Certificate filed and information 
dismissed. 



84 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Weymouth Light and Power Company. Certificate filed and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

Weymouth Water Power Company. Certificate filed and infor- 
mation dismissed. 

3. At the Relation of Private Persons. 

Attorney-General ex rel. v. Vineyard Grove Company. Petition 
for use of name in an information for an injunction restrain- 
ing the said company from an alleged interference with the 
rights of the public in a sea beach, and ordering the removal 
of structures causing such alleged interference. Henry S. 
Dewey appointed master. Pending. 

Attorney-General v. Onset Bay Grove Association. Information 
in the nature of quo warranto to abate a public nuisance. 
Referred to Warren A. Reed, auditor. Pending. 

Attorney-General ex rel. Samuel E. Hull et als., Selectmen of 
Millbury, v. Washburn & Moen Manufacturing Company. 
Information in the nature of quo warranto to abate a nuisance. 
Pending. 

Attorney-General ex rel. v. Fiskdale Mills. Petition for an injunc- 
tion to restrain the respondent from interfering with the 
waters of Alum Pond, a great pond. Pending. 

Attorney-General ex rel. v. John F. Hutchinson et al. Informa- 
tion in the nature of quo warranto to try the title of the 
respondent to the office of selectman of Lexington. Final 
decree and judgment for petitioner. 

Attorney-General ex rel. v. Mayor and City Council of Cambridge. 
Petition for mandamus to compel the respondents to discharge 
the duties imposed upon them by law. Alternative writ of 
mandamus issued. 

Attorney-General ex rel. v. Patrick A. Collins et al. Petition for 
a writ of mandamus to compel city of Boston to construct a 
street to a width of forty feet. Petition dismissed. 

Attorney-General ex rel. v. Joseph M. Reed. Information in the 
nature of quo loarranto filed in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Essex to try the respondent's title to the 
office of school committeeman in the town of Rockport. Use 
of name granted. Pending. 

Attorney-General ex rel. v. Old Colony Street Railway Company. 
Petition for use of name of Attorney-General to restrain the 
respondent corporation from laying tracks in certain streets 
in Taunton. Use of name granted. Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 85 

4. Applications refused and otherwise disposed of. 
Attorney-General v. Joseph N. Peterson et al. Information in 

nature of quo warranto to try the title of the respondents to 

the office of sewer commissioners for the city of Salem. Use 

of name denied. 
Martin F. Cavanagh v. Mayor of Boston and Fire Commissioner. 

Petition in the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of 

Suffolk for the use of the name of the Attorney-General for 

a writ of mandamus. Use of name denied. 



86 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



GRADE CROSSINGS. 



Notices have been served upon this department of the filing of 
the following petitions for the appointment of special commission- 
ers for the abolition of grade crossings : — 



b' 



Barnstable County. 

Bourne, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Bourne Neck crossing. James E. Cotter, Eben D. Crocker 
and Rufus A. Soule appointed commissioners. Commission- 
ers' report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. Auditor's 
second report filed. Pending. 

Harwich. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail- 
road Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Main 
Street crossing. Alpheus Sanford, Prescott Keyes and Harry 
Southworth appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 
filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. Auditor's report 
filed. Pending. 

Wellfleet and Eastham. Directors of Old Colony Railroad Com- 
pany, petitioners. Petition for abolition of certain grade 
crossings in Wellfleet and Eastham. George L. Rogers, 
Louis A. Frothingham and Franz H. Krebs appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Wade Keyes ap- 
pointed auditor. Auditor's second report filed. Pending. 

Berkshire County. 

Adams. Hoosac Valley Street Railway Company, petitioners. 
Petition for abolition of Commercial Street crossing in Adams. 
George W. Wiggin, W. W. McClench and Edward K. Turner 
appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Great Barrington, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of a grade crossing in the village of Housatonic 
in said town. John J. Flaherty, Edmund K. Turner and 
Stephen S. Taft appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Hinsdale, Selectmen of, and Directors of Boston & Albany Rail- 
road Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Bul- 
lard's Church Street and Pierce's grade crossings in Hinsdale. 
Thomas W. Kennefick, William Sullivan and Charles M. 
Ludden appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 87 

filed. Ralph H. Ellis appointed auditor. Auditor's second 
report filed. Pending. 

Lee, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Lang- 
don's crossing in Lee. Wade Keyes, Thomas W. Kennefick 
and Luther Dean appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. Pending. 

Lenox, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of grade 
crossings in Lenox. Fred Joy, Louis A. Frothingham and 
Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. Commission- 
ers' report filed. J. Mott Hallowell appointed auditor. 

North Adams. Hoosac Valley Street Railway Company, petition- 
ers. Petition for abolition of Main Street crossing, known 
as Braytonville crossing, in North Adams. Edmund K. 
Turner, W. W. McClench and Joseph P. Magenis appointed 
commissioners. Pending. 

Pittsfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, and Directors of Boston & 
Albany Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of Hubbard and Gates avenues and Jason Street 
crossings in Pittsfield. Thomas W. Kennefick, William 
Sullivan and Charles M. Ludden appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. Patrick J. Ashe appointed 
auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Pittsfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Merrill crossing in Pittsfield. Thomas W. 
Kennefick, Frederick L. Green and Edmund K. Turner ap- 
pointed commissioners. Pending. 

Pittsfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Holmes Road crossing. William W. McClench, 
Charles N. Clark and Edmund K. Turner appointed commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Richmond and West Stockbridge, Selectmen of, petitioners. Joint 
petition for abolition of Griffin and Arnold's crossings in 
Richmond and West Stockbridge. Joseph Bennett, Charles 
Almy and John C. Crosby appointed commissioners. Clif- 
ford Brigham, auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Stockbridge, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of "River Road" crossing in Stockbridge. J. B. Carroll, 
E. B. Bishop and Luther Dean appointed commissioners. 
Pending. 

West Stockbridge. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hart- 
ford Railroad Company et a/., petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of State line crossing in West Stockbridge. Richard 
W. Irwin, Henry W. Ashley and Edmund K. Turner appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Frank H.Cande 
appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 



88 ATTORNEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

West Stockbridge. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hart- 
ford Railroad Company et oZ., petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Potter's crossing in West Stockbridge. Richard 
W. Irwin, Henry W. Ashley and Edmund K. Turner ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. F. H. 
Cande appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pend- 
ing. 

Williamstown. Hoosac Valley Street Railway Company, petition- 
ers. Petition for the abolition of a grade crossing in Williams- 
town, near the Fitchburg Railroad station. Edmund K. 
Turner, W. W. McClench and Charles N. Clark appointed 
commissioners. Pending. 

Bristol Count]!. 

Attleborough. Directors of Old Colony Railroad, petitioners. 
Petition for abolition of South Main Street crossing in 
Attleborough. George W. Wiggin, A. P. Martin and C. A. 
Allen appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
C. H. Cooper appointed auditor. Auditor's third report filed. 
Pending. 

Attleborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
West Street, North Main Street and other crossings in Attle- 
borough. James R. Dunbar, H. L. Parker and William 
Jackson appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 
filed. Pending. 

Easton. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad 
Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of crossing at 
Eastondale. James E. Cotter, Wm. Rankin and Chas. D. 
Bray appointed commissioners. Fred Joy appointed auditor. 
Auditor's fourth report filed. Pending. 

Fall River, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Brownell Street crossing and other crossings in 
Fall River. John Q. A. Brackett, Samuel N. Aldrich and 
Charles A. Allen appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. Auditor's 
thirteenth report filed. Pending. 

New Bedford, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of certain grade crossings in New Bedford. George 
F. Richardson, Horatio G. Herrick and Wm. Wheeler ap- 
pointed commissioners. Pending. 

Taunton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of grade crossings in Taunton. William B. French, A. C. 
Southworth and Edward B. Bishop appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. 
Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 81) 

Essex County. 

Haverhill, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Washington Street and other crossings in Haver- 
hill. George W. Wiggin, William B. French and Edmund 
K. Turner appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Ipswich. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad Company, peti- 
tioners. Petition for abolition of Underhill crossing in 
Ipswich. George W. Wiggin, A. D. Bosson and Edmund 
K. Turner appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 
filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. Auditor's first 
report filed. Pending. 

Ipswich, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of High 
Street crossing. Geo. W. Wiggin, Edmund K. Turner and 
William F. Dana appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Lynn, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Summer Street and other crossings on Saugus branch 
of Boston & Maine Railroad and Market Street and other 
crossings on main line. George W. Wiggin, Edgar R. Champ- 
lin and Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Manchester. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad Company, 
petitioners. Petition for the abolition of the Summer Street 
crossing in Manchester. George P. Sanger, Edward B. 
Bishop and Chas. A. Putnam appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. Andrew Fiske appointed audi- 
tor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Swampscott, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of Burrill Street crossing. Henry Wardwell, Charles W. Gay 
and Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. Commis- 
sioners' report filed. Charles A. Say ward appointed auditor. 
Pending. 

Franklin Count'/. 

Deerfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Sprouts crossing on Main Street, Deerfield. Timothy G. 
Spaulding, Edmund K. Turner and Franklin T. Hammond 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Pending. 

Greenfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of Russell Street crossing in Greenfield. Edmund K. Turner, 
Walter P. Hall and Fred D. Stanley appointed commission- 
ers. Pending. 

Greenfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of Allen Street crossing in Greenfield. Edmund K. Turner, 
Walter P. Hall and Fred D. Stanley appointed commission- 
ers. Pending. 



90 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Northfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
River Street crossing in Northfield. Alpheus Sanford, 
Charles W. Hazelton and Newell D. Winter appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Dana Malone 
appointed auditor. Auditor's first and supplemental reports 
filed. Pending. 

Hampden County. 

Chester, Selectmen of, and Directors of Boston & Albany Rail- 
road Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Hunt- 
ington Road in Chester. Charles E. Hibbard, William 
Sullivan and Wm. P. Martin appointed commissioners. Com- 
missioners' report filed. Ralph W. Ellis appointed auditor. 
Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Chester, Selectmen of, and Directors of Boston & Albany Rail- 
road Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Hunt- 
ington Street and White Chop crossing in Chester. Charles 
E. Hibbard, William Sullivan and William P. Martin ap- 
pointed commissioners. Thos. W. Kennefick appointed audi- 
tor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Chicopee, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for abo- 
lition of Plainfield and Exchange Street crossings and other 
crossings in Chicopee. Geo. W. Wiggin, Edmund K. Tur- 
ner and Fred D. Stanley appointed commissioners. Com- 
missioners' report filed. Timothy G. Spaulding appointed 
auditor. Auditor's fourth report filed. Pending. 

Palmer, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Palmer and Belchertown Road crossing in Palmer. T. M. 
Brown, Chas. E. Hibbard and Henry G. Taft appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Stephen S. Taft 
appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Palmer, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Bur- 
ley's crossing in Palmer. Pending. 

Palmer, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Springfield Road crossing, otherwise known as the Wire Mill 
crossing, in Palmer. William Turtle, Frederick L. Greene 
and John W. Mason appointed commissioners. Commission- 
ers' report filed. Pending. 

Springfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Bay State Road and other crossings in Spring- 
field. George W. Richardson, Marshall Wilcox and George 
W. Wiggin appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 
filed. Charles W. Bosworth appointed auditor. Auditor's 
first report filed. Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 91 

Springfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Pasco Road crossing in Springfield. Joseph 
Bennett, Samuel M. Cook and John A. Aiken appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. L. E. Hitch- 
cock appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pend- 
ing. 

Springfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of South End Bridge crossing in Springfield. John 
TV". Corcoran, John J. Flaherty and George F. Swain ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pend- 
ing. 

Westfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for raising of 
bridge over Elm Street in Westfield. Thomas W. Proctor, 
John B. O'Donnell and Edmund K. Turner appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. J. Mott Hallowell 
appointed auditor. Pending. 

Westfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for raising bridge 
over North Elm Street in Westfield. Ceo. W. Wiggin, Fred- 
erick L. Greene and Edmund K. Turner appointed commis- 
sioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pending. 

Westfield. Boston & Albany Railroad Company, petitioners. 
Petition for abolition of Coburn's and Morse's crossings in 
Westfield. Charles M. Ludden, William Sullivan and Rich- 
ard W. Irwin appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. Ralph W. Ellis appointed auditor. Auditor's 
first report filed. Pending. 

'Westfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of 
North Elm Street crossing in Westfield. Charles E. Hib- 
bard, Joseph Bennett and George W. Wiggin appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Ralph W. 
Ellis appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pend- 
ing. 

Hampsh ire County. 

Belchertown, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Holyoke Road crossing in Belchertown. George W. Wiggin, 
Fred D. Stanley and Edmund K. Turner appointed commis- 
sioners. Commissioners' report filed. Stephen S. Taft ap- 
pointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Belchertown, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of Leache's crossing in Belchertown. Augustus W. Locke, 
George W. Johnson and Joseph Bennett appointed commis- 
sioners. Commissioners' report filed. William H. Clapp 
appointed auditor. Auditor's report filed. Pending. 



92 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Northampton. Directors of Connecticut River Railroad Com- 
pany, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Lyman's crossing 
in Northampton. George W. Wiggin, Fred D. Stanley and 
Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. L. E. Hitchcock appointed auditor. Auditor's 
second report filed. Pending. 

Northampton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Laurel Park station crossing in Northampton. 
George W. Wiggin, Fred D. Stanley and Edmund K. Turner 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Arthur 
S. Kneil appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. 
Pending. 

Northampton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Grove Street and Earl Street crossings in North- 
ampton. Frederick L. Greene, S. S. Taft and James M. 
Sickman appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 
filed. William P. Hayes appointed auditor. Pending. 

Ware, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Gibbs 
crossing in Ware. George F. Tucker, George F. Kimball 
and Lawson Sibley appointed commissioners. Commission- 
ers' report filed. John W. Mason appointed auditor. Pend- 
ing. 

Ware, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Maple 
Street and Gilbertville Road crossings in Ware. Alpheus 
Sanford, Everett C. Bumpus and William W. McClench ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. John 
W. Mason appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. 
Pending. 

Middlesex Conn ty . 

Acton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Great 
Road crossing in Acton. Benj. W. Wells, Howard M. Lane 
and William B. Sullivan appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Acton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of May- 
nard Road crossing in Acton. Edmund K. Turner, Edward 
F. Blodgett and Wade Keyes appointed commissioners. 
Pending. 

Arlington, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Grove Street crossing and other crossings in Arlington. 
Alpheus Sanford, Edmund K. Turner and S. Everett Tinkham 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Fred 
Joy appointed auditor. Auditor's third report filed. Pend- 
ing. 

Ayer, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Main 
Street crossing in Ayer. S. K. Hamilton, Theodore C. Hurd 
and Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 93 

Ayer, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of West 
Main and Park streets crossing in Ayer. Frank P. Goulcling, 
Charles A. Allen and Anson D. Fessenden appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Theodore C. Hurd 
appointed auditor. Auditor's second report filed. Pending. 

Bedford, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Con- 
cord Road crossing in Bedford. Fred D. Stanley, H. R. 
Coffin and Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. Theodore C. Hurd appointed 
auditor. First and final report of auditor filed. 

Belmont, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Brighton Street, Concord Avenue and Trapelo Road crossings 
in Belmont. Pending. Theodore C. Hurd, Fred Joy and 
George F. Swain appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Cambridge. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad Company, 
petitioners. Petition for abolition of Prison Point Street 
crossing in Cambridge. Henry S. Milton, Edward B. Bishop 
and Henry G. Taft appointed commissioners. Commission- 
ers' report filed. Theodore C. Hurd appointed auditor. 
Auditor's third report filed. Pending. 

Chelmsford, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Princeton Street crossing in Chelmsford. Edmund K. Tur- 
ner, Frederick W. Dallinger and Charles F. Worcester ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. W. C. 
Dillingham appointed auditor. Pending. 

Concord, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Oliver Rice crossing and Hosmer's crossing in Concord. 
Theodore C. Hurd, William Sullivan and Percy G. Bolster 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Henry 
L. Parker appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. 
Pending. 

Everett. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad Company, 
petitioners. Petition for abolition of crossings at Broadway 
and Main Street in Everett. George W. Wiggin, Edmund K. 
Turner and Robert S. Gray appointed commissioners. Com- 
missioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. 
Auditor's fifth report filed. Pending. 

Lexington, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Grant Street crossing in Lexington. Alpheus Sanford, 
Edmund K. Turner and S. Everett Tinkham appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pending. 

Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Middlesex and Thorndike streets crossings. Pending. 

Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Boston Road and Plain Street crossings. Pending. 



94 ATTORNEY-GENERALS REPORT. [Jan. 

Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of School and Walker streets crossings. Pending. 

Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Lincoln Street crossing. Pending. 

Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of Middlesex, Thorndike and Lincoln streets and Boston Road 
grade crossings. Pending. 

Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Pawtucket Street crossing and other crossings in 
Lowell. George W. Wiggin, John W. Ellis and Samuel L. 
Minot appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
P. H. Cooney appointed auditor. Auditor's second report 
filed. Pending. 

Maiden. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad Company, peti- 
tioners. Petition for abolition of Medford Street and other 
crossings in Maiden. Geo. W. Wiggin, Robert O. Harris 
and Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. Commis- 
sioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. 
Auditor's second report filed. Pending. 

Maiden, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for abo- 
lition of Pleasant and Winter streets crossing in Maiden. 
Pending. 

Marlborough, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Hudson Street crossing in Marlborough. Walter 
Adams, Charles A. Allen and Alpheus Sanford appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pending. 

Natick. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company, peti- 
tioners. Petition for abolition of Marion Street crossing 
and other crossings in Natick. George W. Wiggin, Larkin 
T. Trull and Joseph Bennett appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. Theodore C. Hurd appointed 
auditor. Auditor's seventh report filed. Pending. 

Natick. Boston & Worcester Street Railway Company, petitioners. 
Petition for alteration of Worcester Street crossing in Natick. 
Geo. W. Wiggin, Edmund K. Turner and Larkin T. Trull 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Theo. C. Hurd appointed auditor. Auditor's first report 
filed. Pending. 

Newton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of Concord Street and Pine Grove Avenue crossings 
in Newton. George W. AViggin, T. C. Mendenhall and 
Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Newton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for abo- 
lition of Oak Street and Linden Street crossings in Newton. 
Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 95 

Newton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of Glen Avenue and nine other crossings in Newton. 
Geo. W. Wiggin, T. C. Mendenhall and Edmund K. Turner 
appointed commissioners. Pending. 

North Reading, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of Main Street crossing in North Reading. Alpheus Sanford, 
George N. Poor and Louis M. Clark appointed commissioners. 
Report of commissioners filed. Pending. 

Somerville, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Park Street, Dane Street and Medford Street 
crossings in Somerville. Pending. 

Somerville, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Somerville Avenue grade crossing in Somerville. 
Pending. 

Wakefield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Hanson Street crossing in Wakefield. Pending. 

Waltham, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for abo- 
lition of South Street crossing in Waltham. Geo. F. Swain, 
Arthur P. Rugg and Geo. A. Sanderson appointed commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Waltham, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for abo- 
lition of Moody Street, Main Street, Elm Street, River Street, 
Pine Street, Newton Street and Calvary Street crossings in 
Waltham. Arthur P. Rugg, William F. Dana and George F. 
Swain appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Norfolk County. 

Braintree, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of 
the Pearl street crossing at South Braintree. Pending. 

Brookline. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company, 
petitioners. Petition for the abolition of Kerrigan Place 
crossing in Brookline. William Sullivan, Henry M. Hutchins 
and Wade Keyes appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Dedham. Directors of the Old Colony Railroad Company, peti- 
tioners. Petition for the abolition of River Street and Whit- 
ing Avenue crossings. Augustus P. Martin, Charles A. Allen 
and Fred Joy appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. C. H. Cooper appointed auditor. Auditor's 
supplemental report filed. Pending. 

Dedham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of 
Eastern Avenue and D wight Street crossings in Dedham. 
Alpheus Sanford, Charles Mills and J. Henry Reed appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones 
appointed auditor. Pending. 



96 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Dedham, Selectmen of, and Directors of New York, New Haven 
& Hartford Railroad Company, petitioners. Petitions for 
abolition of East Street, Walnut Street and Vernon Street 
crossings in Dedham, consolidated with petitions to abolish 
Milton Street crossing in Hyde Park. Samuel N. Aldrich, 
E. B. Bishop and H. C. Southworth appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. 
Auditor's twelfth report filed. Pending. 

Hyde Park and Dedham, consolidated petitions. See Dedham. 

Hyde Park, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Fairmount Avenue and Bridge Street crossings in Hyde Park. 
Pending. 

Medway, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Vil- 
lage Street crossing in Medway. Arthur Lyman, George D. 
Burrage and Alpheus Sanford appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. Edmund H. Talbot appointed 
auditor. Auditor's second report filed. Pending. 

Milton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Cen- 
tral Avenue crossing in Milton. Pending. 

Needham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Charles River Street crossing in Needham. Pending. 

Norwood, Selectmen of, and Directors of New York, New Haven 
& Hartford Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Chapel Street, Washington Street and Guild 
Street crossings in Norwood. Henry A. W} 7 man, James F. 
C. Hyde and Charles E. C. Breck appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. Albert A. Avery appointed 
auditor. Auditor's seventh report filed. Pending. 

Sharon, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Depot 
Street crossing in Sharon. William B. Durant, Fred Joy and 
Charles D. Bray appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Walpole, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Oak 
Street crossing and other crossings in Walpole. Dana Ma- 
lone, Edmund K. Turner and Henry A. Wyman appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. H. L. Sheldon 
appointed auditor. Pending. 

Plymouth County. 
Abington. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Central Street crossing in Abington. Alpheus Sanford, 
Erastus Worthington, Jr., and Edward B. Bishop appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones 
appointed auditor. Auditor's second report filed. Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 97 

Hingharn. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail- 
road Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Rockland 
Street crossing in Hingham. Winfield S. Slocum, Alpbeus 
Sanford and Henry C. Sonthworth appointed commissioners. 
Pending. 

Marshfield. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
crossing near Marshfield station. Alpheus Sanford, J. Albert 
Brackett and Frank T. Daniels appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed audi- 
tor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Middleborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of Centre Street, Grove Street and Main Street crossings in 
Middleborough. Alpheus Sanford, Edward B. Bishop and 
Samuel H. Hudson appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. Auditor's 
fourth report filed. Pending. 

Scituate. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail- 
road Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Water 
Street and Union Street crossings in Scituate. Arthur H. 
Wellman, Edmund K. Turner and Oscar A. Marclen appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones 
appointed auditor. Auditor's second report filed. Pending. 

Suffolk County. 

Boston. Directors of Old Colony Railroad Company, petitioners. 
Petition for abolition of Tremont Street crossing in Boston. 
Samuel N. Aldrich, H. C. Southworth and Edward B. Bishop 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Fred 
E. Jones appointed auditor. Auditor's twenty-first report 
filed. Reported to full court on question of interest claimed 
by railroad company. Decree of Superior Court affirmed. 
Pending. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Dorchester Avenue crossing in Boston. F. N. Gillette, 
Charles S. Lilley and Charles Mills appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. Fred Joy appointed auditor. 
Auditor's twenty-eighth report filed. Pending. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Austin Street, Cambridge Street and Perkins Street 
crossings in Charlestown. Henry S. Milton, Edward B. 
Bishop and Henry G. Taft appointed commissioners. Com- 
missioners' report filed. Fred Joy appointed auditor. Audi- 
tor's sixth report filed. Pending. 



98 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Boston. Directors of Old Colony Railroad Company, petitioners. 
Petition for abolition of Codman Street crossing in Boston. 
George W. Wiggin, Charles A. Allen and William M. Butler 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Henry 
S. Milton appointed auditor. Auditor's second report filed. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of the Essex Street crossing in Brighton. George 
W. Wiggin, William B. French and Winfield S. Slocum ap- 
pointed commissioners. Pending. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Blue Hill Avenue and Oakland Street crossings in 
Boston. William B. French, Arthur H. AYellman and George 

A. Kimball appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 
filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. Auditor's four- 
teenth report filed. Pending. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of all crossings in East Boston. George W. Wiggin, 
William B. French and Edward B. Bishop appointed commis- 
sioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pending. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Congress Street crossing in Boston. George W. 
Wiggin, Edward B. Bishop and Charles A. Allen appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones 
appointed auditor. Auditor's twenty-third report filed. Pend- 
ing. 

Revere, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Win- 
throp Avenue crossing in Revere. George W. Wiggin, Everett 
C. Bumpus and Charles D. Bray appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed audi- 
tor. Auditor's second report filed. Pending. 

Worcester Count?/. 
Auburn, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 

Chapin's crossing in Auburn. Harvey N. Shepard, George 

K. Tufts and Charles A. Allen appointed commissioners. 

Commissioners' report filed. A. J. Bartholomew appointed 

auditor. Pending. 
Boylston, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 

crossing over road between Boylston and Clinton. William 

B. Durant, Edward B. Bishop and O. W. Rugg appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Chas. R. John- 
son appointed auditor. Auditor's report filed. Pending. 

Clinton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Ster- 
ling, Water, Main and Woocllawn streets crossings. Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 99 

Fitchburg, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Laurel Street crossing in Fitchburg. Frank P. 
Goulding, Charles A. Allen and Charles M. Thayer appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. George S. Taft 
appointed auditor. Auditor's third report filed. Pending. 

Fitchburg, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Putnam Street crossing in Fitchburg. Frank P. 
Goulding, Charles A. Allen and Charles M. Thayer appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. George S. Taft 
appointed auditor. Auditor's third report filed. Pending. 

Gardner, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Union Street crossing in Gardner. Frank P. Goulding, 
Charles A. Allen and Franklin L. Waters appointed commis- 
sioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pending. 

Holden, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Daw- 
son's crossing and Cedar Swamp crossing in Holden. Charles 
A. Allen, Arthur P. Rugg and Henry G. Taft appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pending. 

Hubbardston, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Depot Road crossing in Hubbardston. Pending. 

Leominster, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Water Street crossing. Pending. 

Leominster, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Summer Street crossing. Pending. 

Leominster, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of Mechanic Street crossing. Pending. 

Leominster, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of Main Street crossing. Pending. 

Leominster, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Lancaster Street crossing in Leominster. Alpheus Sanford, 
Charles A. Allen and Seth P. Smith appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed audi- 
tor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Millbury, Selectmen of, and Selectmen of Sutton, consolidated 
petition for abolition of Daniels crossing in Millbury and 
Yellow House crossing in Sutton. James E. Cotter, Alpheus 
Sanford and Charles A. Allen appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed audi- 
tor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Northborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of Westborough Hospital station crossing in Northborough. 
Thomas Post, William Wheeler and Alpheus Sanford ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pend- 
ing. 



100 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Northbridge and Uxbridge, joint petition of Selectmen of. Peti- 
tion for abolition of Whitin's station crossing. Alpheus 
Sanford, Edward B. Bishop and Harry C. Southwortb ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Fred 
E. Jones appointed auditor. Auditor's fourth report filed. 
Pending. 

Southborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
crossing on road from Southborough to Framingham. Pend- 
ing. 

Southborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of crossing on road leading from Southborough to Hopkinton. 
George C. Travis, James W. McDonald and William Sullivan 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Theodore C. Hurd appointed auditor. Auditor's third report 
filed. Pending. 

Southborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Main Street crossing at Fayville in Southborough. Pending. 

Sutton and Millbury, consolidated petition of Selectmen of both 
towns. See Millbury. 

Templeton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Baldwinsville crossing in Templeton. Charles Brimblecom, 
Charles A. Allen and Edward P. Chapin appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Henry L. Parker 
appointed auditor. Auditor's second report filed. Pend- 
ing. 

Uxbridge. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail- 
road Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of grade 
crossings in Uxbridge. George W. Wiggin, Timothy G. 
Spaulding and Albert F. Noyes appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed audi- 
tor. Auditor's fourth report filed. Pending. 

Warren. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company, peti- 
tioners. Petition for abolition of South Street crossing in 
Warren. George W. Wiggin, Wm. L. Clark and Joseph 
Bennett appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 
filed. William B. Harding appointed auditor. Auditor's 
second report filed. Pending. 

Westborough, Selectmen of, and Directors of Boston & Albany 
Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Main Street and Summer Street crossings in Westborough. 
George W. Wiggin, George N. Smalley and Joseph Ben- 
nett appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
H. L. Parker appointed auditor. Auditor's third report filed. 
Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 101 

Worcester, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Grafton Street crossing and eight other crossings, 
including alterations of Union Station. James R. Dunbar, 
Henry P. Moulton and George F. Swain appointed commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Worcester, Mayor aud Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Hamilton Street crossing in Worcester. Augus- 
tus P. Martin, James D. Colt and Edmund K. Turner ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. James 
A. Stiles appointed auditor. Auditor's report filed. Pend- 
ing. 

Worcester. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company, 
petitioners. Petition for abolition of Webster Street, Lud- 
low Street, Sutton Lane and Heard Street crossings in 
Worcester. Harvey N. Shepard, Frederick Brooks and 
Joseph S. Ludlani appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. James A. Stiles appointed auditor. Auditor's 
amended second report filed. Pending. 

The following cases have been brought for alleged land damages 
incurred in the alteration of grade crossings. The Commonwealth, 
being obliged under the statutes to pay at least twenty-five per 
cent, of the expenses incurred in the alteration of all grade cross- 
ings, has in all cases been made a party thereto. 

Balleutine et al. v. Town of Gardner. Superior Court, Worcester 
County. Pending. 

Boston et als. v. Boston Wharf Company. Superior Court, 
Suffolk County. Pending. 

Codman et als. v. New England Railroad Company et als. Superior 
Court, Suffolk County. Pending. 

Commonwealth v. Boston. Superior Court, Suffolk County. Pend- 
ing. 

Connell v. Boston & Maine Railroad Company et al. Superior 
Court, Middlesex County. Pending. 

Dickinson et al. v. Fitchburg. Superior Court, Worcester County. 
Pending. 

Dolan, Ellen, et al. v. Belchertown et al. Superior Court, Hamp- 
shire County. Pending. 

Maiden v. Boston & Maine Railroad Company. Superior Court, 
Middlesex County. Pending. 

Phelps v. Fitchburg Railroad Company. Superior Court, Middle- 
sex County. Pending. 



102 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Putnam Machine Company v. Fitchborg. Superior Court, Worces- 
ter County. Pending. 

Sanford, George E., v. Belchertown et al. Superior Court, Hamp- 
shire County. Pending. 

Sprague v. Fitchburg. Superior Court, Worcester County. Pend- 
ing. 

Stack v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company 
et al. Superior Court, Hampshire County. Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 103 



DISSOLUTION OF CORPORATIONS. 



The following corporations having made voluntary application 
to the Supreme Judicial Court for dissolution, and having given 
the Attorney-General due notice of the petition, and the Tax 
Commissioner having certified that they were not indebted to the 
Commonwealth for taxes, the Attorney-General waived right to 
be heard : — 

A. L. Decatur Company. 
Ames Manufacturing Company. 
A. W. Darling Woolen Company. 
Bigelow Carpet Company. 
Boston Advertising Company. 
Boston Hard Fibre Company. 
Boston Stereotype Foundry. 
Bracketts Market Corporation. 
Brown & Simpson Company. 
Crossman Edge Tool Company. 
Dandy Rubber Heel Company. 
Dennis, Thompson Pierce Company. 

E. Wesson Adams Company. 
Earl Cranberry Company. 

Eastern Construction Company of Boston. 

F. E. Smith Fibre Bobbin and Spool Corporation. 
Falmouth Water Company. 

Family Supply Co-operative Association. 

Fitts Land and Power Company. 

Free Press Publishing Company. 

Goodman Leavitt Yatter Company. 

Greek Supply Company. 

Haverhill Dairy Depot Co-operative. 

Holbrook Manufacturing Company. 

Home Guarantee Mutual Insurance Company. 

I. P. Harris Company. 

John Rhodes Warp Company. 

Lawrence Dry Goods Company. 



104 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan, 

Lincoln Mill Grain and Feed Company. 

Linden Paper Company. 

Merchants Co-operative Coupon Company. 

Mitchell Paper Company. 

Morgan Motor Company. 

O'Donnell & Gillbride Company. 

Ridgway Furnace Company. 

Salem & South Danvers Oil Company. 

Sawyer Leather Machinery Company. 

Scandinavian Importing Company. 

Shepard Novelty Company. 

Talcum Mineral Company. 

Tremont Mutual Fire Insurance Company. 

Vacucleaner Company. 

W. C. Langley Furniture Company. 

William Lummus Company. 

Williston & Knight Company. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 105 



RETURNS OF CORPORATIONS, 



The following corporations, reported to this department by the 
Tax Commissioner for delinquency in making their tax returns 
under St. 1903, c. 437, § 45, have been compelled, without the 
necessity of a suit at law, to comply with the statute : — 

Abbotts Menthol Plaster Company. 

Acme Wire Mattress Company. 

Advertiser Newspaper Company. 

Aldrich Manufacturing Company. 

Allen & Fox Express Company. 

Allen Higgins Company. 

Alonzo E. Blanchard Company. 

Alpha Investment Company. 

American Bridge and Structural Preserving Company. 

American Citizen Company. 

American Collection Agency (enjoined on 1903 tax). 

American Watch Tool Company. 

Andover Press, Limited. 

Angle Toe Shank Company. 

Atlantic Gasoline Engine Company. 

Attleboro Trust Company. 

Bakers and Brokers Service Company. 

Barnstable Water Company. 

Bay State Bottling Company. 

Bay State Wholesale Company. 

Beacon Publishing Company. 

Belmont Coal Company. 

Biddle & Smart Company. 

Block Plant Electric Light Company. 

Boston & Nova Scotia Woolen Mills Company, Limited. 

Boston & Suburban Express Company. 

Boston Colograph Company. 

Boston Co-operative Cloak Manufacturing Company. 

Boston Electric Company. 

Boston Ice Cream and Baking Company. 



106 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan 

Boston Mirror Company. 

Boston Pharmacy Company. 

Boston Traveller Company. 

Boston Warehouse and Leasing Company. 

Boston Workingmen's Co-operative Association. 

Brown & Simonds Company. 

Burleigh Rock Drill Company. 

Caloric Transfer Company. 

Cambridge Baking Company. 

Cambridge Lumber Company. 

Campello Leather Company. 

Cape Poge Ferry Company. 

Century Light Company of America. 

Chapin-Crane Coal Company. 

Chelmsford Foundry Company. 

Chelmsford Gas Light Company. 

Chelsea Express Despatch Company. 

Chestnut Hill Real Estate Association. 

Citizens Loan Association. 

Cold Spring Grocery Company. 

Coldwell-Gildard Company. 

Combination Manufacturing Company. 

Consolidated Box Machine Company. 

Consolidated Clothing Company. 

Conway Water Company. 

Craig & Craig Company. 

Crocker Drug Company. 

Cunningham Lumber Company. 

Daily Mail Publishing Company. 

Daniel Russell Boiler Works, Incorporated. 

Dan vers Centre Building Association. 

Dickerman & Company. 

Dillon Machine Company. 

Doctor Heighman Medicine Company. 

E. A. Hall Publishing Company. 

E. Gerry Emmons Corporation. 
Eastern Sandstone Company. 
Everett Gas Company. 

F. A. Bassette Company. 

Farmers Mutual Telephone Company. 
. Florence Manufacturing Company. 
Franklin Park Land and Improvement Company. 

G. H. Cutting Granite Company. 
Gazette Publishing Company. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 107 

Gilman Snow Guard Company. 

Glasgow Company. 

Golden Manufacturing Company. 

Graham Shoe Company. 

Greenfield Recorder Company. 

Greenwich Bleachery. 

Grosvenor Woolen Company. 

Grueby-Faience Company. 

Guyer Hat Company. 

H. F. Ross Company. 

H. M. Kinports Company. 

Hadley Water Company. 

Hampden Photo Engineering Company. 

Harrington Press. 

Henry Woods Sons Company. 

Hogg Carpet Company. 

Holyoke Provision and Cold Storage Company. 

Home Soap Company. 

Horse Neck Beach Street Railway Company. 

Howland Piano Company. 

Hubley Manufacturing and Supply Company. 

Huguenot Mills Company. 

Hutchins Narrow Fabric Company. 

J. W. Hobart Company. 

Jackson Advertising Agency. 

James H. Jacobs Company. 

Kennedy & Sullivan Manufacturing Company. 

Lewis J. Bird Company. 

Lynch Brothers Leather Company. 

Lynn Aqueduct Company. 

Lyons & Alexander Company. 

M. Crowne Company. 

Maiden Mail Company. 

Marblehead Building Association. 

Massachusetts Contracting Company. 

McBarron Iron and Steel Company. 

McCaul Brass Foundry Company. 

Mechanical Improvement Company. 

Mechanics Iron Foundry Company. 

Milford Steam Heat Power and Refrigeration Company. 

National Finance Company. 

Nantucket Electric Company. 

National Pharmacy Company. 

New Can Company. 



108 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

New England Bedding Company. 

New England Electric Railroad Construction Company. 

New England Shirt Company. 

Norcross Brown Stone Company. 

Norton & Taunton Street Railway Company. 

Osceola Manufacturing Company. 

P. P. Emory Manufacturing Company. 

Peabody Granite Company. 

Peoples Coal, Ice and Lumber Company. 

Persons Manufacturing Company. 

Pittsfield Co-operative Store. 

Plymouth Stove Foundry Company. 

Preferred Mercantile Company of Boston. 

Prentice Brothers Company. 

Puritan Cloak and Clothing Company. 

Purity Ice Company. 

R. Gustavino Company. 

Railway Track Sander Company. 

Robinson Luce Company. 

Rockland Factory Building Association. 

Rounds & Dennison Manufacturing Company. 

S. A. Freeman Company. 

Saviugs and- Trust Publishing Company. 

Sawyer Drug Company. 

Sarranilla Transportation Company. 

Shady Hill Nursery Company. 

Shepley & Smith Contracting Company. 

South Bay Improvement Company. 

Springfield Co-operative Union Laundry Company. 

Staple Heeling Company. 

Star Credit Clothing Company. 

State Manufacturing Company. 

Sterling Slipper Company. 

Suffolk Co-Press. 

Suffolk Lumber Company. 

Taunton Evening News. 

Telegram Publishing Company. 

Times Publishing Company. 

Transcontinental Refrigerator Company. 

Union Express Company. 

Union Glass Company. 

Union Hall Association. 

United States Credit Company. 

Vacuum Cleaner Company. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT- No. 12. 109 

Vienna Baking Company. 
Wachnsett Mills. 

Wakefield Real Estate and Building Company. 
Walpole Emery Mills. 
Warren & Monks Company. 
Warren Lumber and Fuel Company. 
West Chop Steamboat Company. 
Weymouth Light and Power Company. 
Weymouth Water Power Company. 
William A. Clark Coal Company. 
Worcester Fire Appliance Company. 
Worcester Umbrella Company. 

The following corporations, reported to this department by the 
Commissioner of Corporations for delinquency in filing the certificate 
of condition for 1904, required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 45, 66, 
have Ijeen compelled, without the necessity of suit, to comply with 
the statute : — 

A. H. Demond Company. 

A. O. Speare Company. 
Albert Culver Company. 
Altamonte Springs Company. 
American and Sun Publishing Company. 
American Bank Note Company. 
American Camera Manufacturing Company. 
American Mason Safety Tread Company. 
American Stave and Cooperage Company. 
Ashland Emery and Corundum Company. 
Associated Wool Growers Company. 
Atlantic Gasoline Engine Company. 
Atlantic Telegraph Company of Massachusetts. 
Atlas Shoe Company. 

B. F. Sturtevant Company. 

Bailey & Blendinger Manufacturing Company. 

Baker Hunnewell Company. 

Ball Bearing Company. 

Bay State Construction Company. 

Bay State Co-operative Bench Show Association. 

Bay State Distilling Company. 

Beacon Shoe Company. 

Bemis Mills. 

Boston Baking Powder Company. 

Boston Blower Company. 



110 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Boston Bread and Bread Crumb Company. 

Boston Credit Company. 

Boston Dairy Company. 

Boston Excursion Steamboat Company. 

Boston Fire Despatch Company. 

Boyd & Corey Boot and Shoe Manufacturing Company. 

Bridgewater Water Company. 

Brockton Industrial Corporation. 

Burnett Paint Company. 

Burnetts Information Company. 

C. S. Benner Corporation. 

C. W. Russell Company. 

Chartered Company of Lower California. 

Chelsea Express Despatch Company. 

Clark Bobbin Company. 

Colman Co-operative Company. 

Commonwealth Optical Company. 

Commonwealth Securities Company. 

Courier-Independent Publishing Company. 

Credit Clearing House. 

Denison Brothers Company. 

Dillon Machine Company. 

Dunbar Driftwood Blaze Company. 

Duparquet, Huot & Monense Company. 

E. R. Brown Beer Pump Company. 
Eastern Egg Company. 

F. W. Dunnell Composite Leather Company. 
Fisher-Churchill Company. 

Fitchburg Hardware Company. 
Flagg Manufacturing Company. 
Fore River Company. 
Fowles Arlington Mills. 
Frank H. Hall Company. 
Franklin Telegraph Company. 

G. H. Cutting Granite Company. 
George F. Quigley Company. 
George W. Stafford Company. 

Globe Dyeing and Bleaching Company. 

Grau stein & Company. 

Greenwich Bleachery. 

H. A. Hanscom Company. 

Hadley Mills. 

Hanover Printing Company. 

Hatch Accumulator Company. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. Ill 

Hay ward & Litch Express Company. 
Hingham Seamface Granite Company. 
Hosmer Codding Company. 
Hutchins Narrow Fabric Company. 
Indian Orchard Elax Company. 
Ingersoll-Sargent Drill Company. 
J. P. & W. H. Emond, Incorporated. 
John H. Woodbury Dermatological Institute. 
Joseph Stevens Heirs, Incorporated. 
Kendall Building Company. 
Kinnear Manufacturing Company. 
L. E. Boyden Company. 
Laconia Car Company. 

Lalauce & Grosjean Manufacturing Company. 
Lehigh & Wilkes Barre Coal Company. 
Lumsden & VanStone Company. 
M. 8. Hiller & Sons. 
Magnetic Electric Company. 
Magoun Leather Company. 
Marlboro Times Publishing Company. 
Martha's Vineyard Electric Light and Power Company. 
Massachusetts Real Estate Company. 
Meade Roofing and Cornice Company. 
Medfield Water Company. 
Meisterschaft Publishing Company. 
Mutual Mail Order Company. 
Nantasket Steeple Chase Company. 
National Casket Company. 
National Conduit and Cable Company. 
New England Amusement Company. 
New England Audit Company. 
New England Consolidated Ice Companies. 
•News Publishing Company of Framingham. 
Norfolk Oil Company. 
Nute-Hallett Company, Incorporated. 
O. T. Rogers Granite Company. 
Oriental Powder Mills. 
Parry Macomber Company. 

Pentucket Variable Stitch Sewing Machine Company. 
Pepperell Building Company. 
Pepperell Manufacturing and Building Company. 
Place Box Company. 
Playano Manufacturing Company. 
Prentice Brothers Company. 



112 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan, 

Puritan Securities Company. 

Purity Soap Company. 

R. J. Todd Company. 

Record Publishing Company. 

Roebling Construction Company. 

Rubber Soled Leather Shoe Company. 

Samuel Pierce Organ Pipe Company. 

Sargent, Conant & Co., Incorporated. 

Scandinavian Importing Company. 

Smith Warren Company. 

Southern Coast Lumber Company. 

Springfield Construction Company. 

Springfield Elevator and Pump Company. 

Springfield Machine Screw Company. 

Staudish Hall Company. 

Stevens Type and Press Company. 

Stockbridge Machine Company. 

Sumner Manufacturing Company. 

Suspension Transportation Company. 

Sutton Cranberry Company. 

Title Research and Credit Company. 

Troy White Granite Company. 

U. S. Appraisal Company. 

Underfeed Stoker Company of America. 

Union Metallic Paint Company. 

United Shoe Stock Company. 

United States Automatic Machine Company. 

University City Laundering Company. 

W. C. Young Manufacturing Company. 

W. H. Blake Steam Pump Company. 

W. W. Cobb Shoe Stock Company. 

Warren & Monks Company. 

Weymouth Light and Power Company. 

Weymouth Seam-face Granite Company. 

Worcester Automobile Company. 

Worcester Fire Appliance Company. 

Worcester Gazette Company. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 113 



CASES ARISING IN THE PROBATE COURTS 

UNDER THE 

Collateral Inheritance Tax Act. 



Berkshire County. 
Gay lord, William H., estate of. Evelyn F. Gay lord et al., 
administrators. Petition for instructions. No action taken. 

Bristol County. 

Bowen, Charles H., estate of. George L. Cooke, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Pending. 

Bullock, James, estate of. Mary A. Loughlin, executrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Chafee, Mary F., estate of. Zechariah Chafee, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Durfee, Amey B., estate of. Samuel S. Durfee, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Pending. 

Fry, Edward, estate of. F. Josephine Fry, executrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Hoffman, Elizabeth, estate of. Francis B. Hoffman, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Pending. 

Mould, Christopher A., estate of. Wm. C. Parker, administrator. 
Petition for allowance of final account and transfer to foreign 
executor. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Palmer, Eveline L., estate of. Edward S. Adams, executor. 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Peckham, Nancy H., estate of. Benjamin Greene, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 



114 ATTORNEY-GENERALS REPORT. [Jan. 

Pitman, William H., estate of. Margaret Pitman, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Ramos, Frank Roza, estate of. Marian Roza Ramos, administra- 
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa- 
chusetts. Attorne}7-General waived right to be heard. 

Rounds, Joseph, estate of. John T. Cook, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Simmons, Abram G., estate of. Nellie F. Simmons, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Slocum, Phoebe B., estate of. George F. Tucker et aZ., execu- 
tors. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Smith, Mary A., estate of. Edward F. Danforth, trustee. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Stevenson, Mary B., estate of. Wm. W. Stevenson, administra- 
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa- 
chusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Taber, Mary W., estate of. Chas. E. Chase, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Wakefield, Horace, estate of. Montague W. Taylor et als., ex- 
ecutors. Petition for license to receive personal estate in 
Massachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

White, Isaac G., estate of. Emerson F. Ash, executor. Petition 
for instructions. Pending. 

Wilson, Mary L., estate of. Everett J. Wallace, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Essex County. 

Anderson, Hannah D., estate of. George M. Anderson, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate in 
Massachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Anderson, John M., estate of. Wallace A. Chisholm, trustee. 
Petition for reappraisal. Frederick Gate appointed appraiser. 

Berry, Judith, estate of. Lizzie Hawes, administratrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Blodget, Henry, estate of. Henry Blodget, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 115 

Broughton, Daniel S., estate of. John S. Rand, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Pending. 

Brown, Elizabeth M., estate of. David B. Kimball et al., execu- 
tors. Petition for reappraisal. George H. W. Hayes ap- 
pointed appraiser. 

Brown, Eunice, estate of. John W. Brown, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Brown, George K., estate of. Harry E. Brown, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Brown, John T., estate of. Jacob F. Brown, executor. Petition 
for instructions regarding collateral inheritance tax. Pend- 
ing. 

Bunker, John F., estate of. Geo. L. Chase, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard on payment of tax. 

Chapman, Jacob, estate of. Henry A. Shute, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard on payment of 
tax. 

Chase, Elihu F., estate of. Joseph S. Howe, executor. Petition 
for instructions. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Chase, Philip A., estate of. Alice B. Chase et al., executors. 
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Assented 
to petition. 

Clark, Hiram M., estate of. Sarah J. Clark, executrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Cloutman, Ellen B., estate of. Frances Browne, executrix. Peti 
tion for postponement of time for payment of tax. Pending 

Colby, Susan E., estate of. Sarah A. Prescott, administratrix 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Cote, Lucy E., estate of. James H. Curtis, administrator. Peti 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Currier, Anna A., estate of. Irving M. Heath, administrator 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Dickson, Walter S., estate of. First Universalist Society, peti 
tioners. Petition for instructions. Pending before full 
court. Rescript. See 185 Mass. 310. 



116 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Dodge, Harriet P., estate of. Arthur M. Dodge et al., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Dow, Abram, estate of. Wm. S. Dow, executor. Petition for 
license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Durant, Sophia T., estate of. Winifred F. Beacham, administra- 
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa- 
chusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Felton, Hannah R., estate of. Samuel P. Willard et al., execu- 
tors. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa- 
chusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Fernald, Abbie J., estate of. Mary F. Bickum, executrix. Peti- 
tion for allowance of private claim against estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. ' 

Fisher, Moses B., estate of. Theron P. Fisher, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Fletcher, Clara A., estate of. George M. Fletcher, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Fowler, Oliver P., estate of. Chas. A. Fowler, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Greene, Elizabeth S., estate of. Chas. J. Pollard, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard on pay- 
ment of tax. 

Griffin, John, estate of. Roger I. Howe, administrator. Petition 
for allowance of first and final account. Assented to petition. 

Hale, Anna H., estate of. Catherine L. Hall, executrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Hayes, Cyrus E., estate of. Frank P. Hayes, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Kelly, Patrick, estate of. Martin W. Lydou, executor. Petition 
for reappraisal. Assented to appointment of Michael H. 
Scanlan as appraiser. 

Lancaster, Harriet W., estate of. Guy E. Covey, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Little, Phebe B., estate of. Carrie B. Sargent et al., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 117 

Locke, Sarah A., estate of. Abbot Norris, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Mace, John F., estate of. George P. Mace, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Mack, William, estate of. David Moore et aL, executors. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Pending. 

Marchant, Frances R., estate of. Bernard P. Mimmack, admin- 
istrator. Petition for license to receive personal estate 
in Massachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 

Maroin, Ella M., estate of. E. M. Smith, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Maynard, Daniel H., estate of. George H. Maynard et al., execu- 
tors. Petition for postponement of time for payment of tax. 
Assented to petition. 

Merrill, Margaret C, estate of. Millard F. Emery, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Miller, Sarah J., estate of. George Miller, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Moulton, Alvin A., estate of. Hannah M. Moulton, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Murphy, Cornelius, estate of. Dennis W. Murphy, administrator. 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Murray, Betsey, estate of. Edwin Stone, executor. Petition for 
license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Nichols, Mary C, estate of. Frank 0. Woods, executor. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Pending. 

Nowell, James, estate of. Nathaniel J. Head, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard on payment of 
tax. 

Nowell, Samuel, estate of. Nathaniel J. Head, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard on payment of 
tax. 

Parsons, Sarah D., estate of. Maria S. Parsons et al., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 



118 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Peabody, Louisa D., estate of. Francis S. Parker, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Pendexter, Mary A., estate of. Cordelia H. Snow, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard on pay- 
ment of tax. 

Pierce, Abigail P., estate of. William W. Hatch, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Pierce, Hiram P., estate of. William W. Hatch, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Prescott, Richard L., estate of. Edgar S. Prescott, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Randall, Elizabeth A., estate of. James L. Gibson, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Sanborn, Charles H., estate of. Lucy M. Sanborn, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Saunders, John R., estate of. Elizabeth G. Saunders, adminis- 
tratrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate in 
Massachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Scannell, John, estate of. John T. Scannell, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Simpson, Albert E., estate of. Norman B. Simpson, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Sloan, David, estate of. James E. Sloan, administrator. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Smith, Anna C, estate of. George S. Thompson, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Pending. 

Smothers, Jonathan, estate of. Francis A. Newell, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Stiles, Joseph W., estate of. Harriet J. Stiles, executrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 119 

Swett, Mary A., estate of. Irving M. Heath, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Tilton, Mary A., estate of. Chas. W. Tilton, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Towle, Ann, estate of. Nellie M. Pickering, executrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Towne, Joseph H., estate of. Rosina C. Towne, executrix. 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Twombly, Sarah F., estate of. Win. A. Plumer, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Walker, Caroline A., estate of. Alphonso Robinson, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Webster, Benjamin P., estate of. Perley C. Robinson, admin- 
istrator. Petition for license to receive personal estate 
in Massachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 

Whitehouse, Clara L. , estate of. Martha L. Whitehouse, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Wood, Asa A., estate of. Frank H. Wood, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

York, Betsey P., estate of. John W. York, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Franklin County. 

Green-Hare, Elizabeth J. H., estate of. George E. Taylor, exec- 
utor. Petition for instructions. No tax claimed. 

Hall, Elizabeth J. H., estate of. George E. Taylor, executor. 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Mattoon, John L., estate of. Charles H. Green et aL, executors. 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Hampden County. 
Arnold, Cynthia A., estate of. Everett P. Russell, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 



120 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Babcock, W. Sumner, estate of. Nathaniel R. Bronson, executor. 
Petition for instructions. Attorney-General waived right to 
be heard on payment of tax. 

Ballantine, Sarah D., estate of. Frank L. Chapman, trustee. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Brewer, Cynthia A., estate of. Arthur B. West et als., executors. 
Petition for allowance of final account. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Burt, Elizabeth, estate of. Daniel Burt, executor. Petition for 
license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard on payment of tax. 

Carroll, Henrietta, estate of. Henry A. King et aL, executors. 
Petition for appraisal. W. C. Simons appointed appraiser. 

Chase, Cornelia S., estate of. Springfield Safe Deposit and Trust 
Company, administrators, with will annexed. Petition for 
instructions. Decree. 

Coolbroth, Mary L., estate of. George F. Gould, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard on pay- 
ment of tax. 

Crockett, Sara L., estate of. H. L. Harding et al, executors. 
Petition of Treasurer and Receiver-General to collect tax on 
said estate. Pending. 

Davis, Samuel A., estate of. Franklin C. Davis, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Pending. 

Goldthwait, Mary R., estate of. Frank H. Goldthwait, executor. 
Petition for allowance of final account. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Gowdy, Horace C, estate of. Horace N. Clark, executor. Peti- 
tion for allowance of final account. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Greenleaf, Elizabeth C, estate of. George W. Cate, executor. 
Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Hooker, Jane W., estate of. Frederick H. Judd, executor. Peti- 
tion for allowance of second and final account. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

McCann, Maria T., estate of. Frederick H. Stebbins, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard on pay- 
ment of tax. 

Mitchell, Annie B., estate of. Edward D. Ferguson, executor. 
Petition for instructions. Decree. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 121 

Peabody, Sarah Fisk, estate of. John E. Keith, executor. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Pending. 

Pierson, Olivia, estate of. Julian S. Allen, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard on payment of 
tax. 

Poore, Charles K., estate of. Zora Poore, administratrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Poor, Mary J., estate of. John T. Tackett, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Schofield, Chas. M., estate of. Columbus S. Schofield, guardian. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Snow, Elmira L., estate of. Minnie J. Snow, executrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Pending. 

Southworth, Elizabeth W., estate of. Ida S. Griffin, executrix. 
Petition for allowance of final account. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Strickland, Rial, estate of. Elizabeth H. Strickland et ah, execu- 
tors. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa- 
chusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard on 
payment of tax. 

Willard, Helen S., estate of. Daniel W. Willard, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Hampshire County. 

Chandler, Mary W., estate of. Wm. E. Chandler et al., adminis- 
trators. Petition for license to receive personal estate in 
Massachusetts. Attorney- General waived right to be heard. 

Cook, Christine, estate of. Valentine Cook, Jr., et al., petitioners. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney- General waived right to be heard. 

Fallon, Mary, estate of. Ann Jane McAlister, executrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Middlesex County. 
Adams, Henry W., estate of. Nancy J. Adams, executrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Pending. 



122 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Baker, Ellen S., estate of. Leavitt C. Howe, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Barrell, George O., estate of. George Manent, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Belanger, Louis, estate of. Marie Belanger, executrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Blodgett, Clarissa S., estate of. Morris S. Blodgett, administra- 
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa- 
chusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Britton, Relief D., estate of. Wilson A. Averill, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard on payment of tax. 

Butler, Celia A., estate of. John F. Butler, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Pending. 

Campbell, Rebecca Ann, estate of. Charles F. Smith, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Pending. 

Chamberlain, Eliza J., estate of. William C. Crane, administra- 
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa- 
chusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard on 
payment of tax. 

Chamberlin, Frank N., estate of. Helen J. Chamberlin, execu- 
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa- 
chusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Choate, Charles, estate of. Isaac Sprague, trustee. Petition for 
instructions regarding distribution of funds and payment of 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Clark, Mary G., estate of. Byron P. Bixby, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard on payment of 
tax. 

Clarke, Ephraim H., estate of. Clara J. Clarke, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Clarke, Rufus A., estate of. George E. Clarke, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Crabtree, Maria L., estate of. Alfred B. Crabtree et al, execu- 
tors. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa- 
chusetts. Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 123 

Crippen, Susan J., estate of. Lila J. Layng, executrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Curnington, John Rowe, estate of. James S. Hill, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Currier, Chas. W., estate of. E. Alonzo, executor. Petition for 
license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Dearborn, Sam. G., estate of. Frank A. Dearborn et aZ., execu- 
tors. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa- 
chusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

DePaul, Louise, estate of. Mike DePaul, administrator. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

DeWitt, Sarah J., estate of. Perez Babbage, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Diman, Emily S., estate of. Emily Diman, administratrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Pending. 

Downing, Mary L., estate of. Fayette F. Downing, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Evans, Ada M., estate of. Martha I. Webster, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Farley, Jefferson, estate of. Charlotte M. Farley, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Farr, Betsey M., estate of. Warren G. Chase, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Pending. 

Field, Carl F., estate of. Dana D. Field, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
" Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Fleming, Edwin, estate of. Vernon E. Carpenter, executor. Pe- 
tition for instructions. Decree. 

Ford, Daniel S., estate of. Wm. S. Monroe et al., executors. 
Petition for decree to relieve estate from liens on account of 
tax. Assented to petition. 

Gale, Lilla S., estate of. George P. Gale, administrator. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 



124 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Gerrish, Ann, estate of. David J. Dunlop, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Gibson, Jesse, estate of. Hannah F. Gibson, executrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Gilman, Emma Philles Goodwin, estate of. Joseph Thayer Gilman, 
administrator. Petition for license to receive personal estate 
in Massachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Glover, Emeline A., estate of. David A. Starrett, executor. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Goggin, Mary L., estate of. Clarence L. Goggin, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Green, Sarah M., estate of. Alfred S. Kimball, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Halrose, Manuel, estate of. John A. Howe, Jr., administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Handrahan, John P., estate of. Mary Handrahan, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Harris, Laura M., estate of. Josiah M. Fletcher et a/., execu- 
tors. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa- 
chusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Havens, Chas. E., estate of. Ellen A. Havens, executrix. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Hoar, Calvin A., estate of. Harry A. Crawford, trustee. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Pending. 

Hobbs, Martha D., estate of. Chas. W. Hobbs, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Holsten, Harmon K., estate of. John K. Holsten, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Pending. 

Hopkins, Mary, estate of. Willard Bill, Jr., executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Kane, Hannah, estate of. Augustus W. Shea, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 125 

Kane, Thomas H., estate of. Augustus W. Shea, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Keody, Mary A., estate of. Edward J. Keody, executor. 
Petition for reappraisal. Franklin Enslin appointed ap- 
praiser. 

Knox, Sarah A., estate of. John B. Nasb, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Lawrence, Lucy W., estate of. Lucy W. Davis, trustee. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Decree. 

Lyon, Sophia J., estate of. Chas. W. Hobbs, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard on payment 
of tax. 

McAllister, Mary G., estate of. Mary G. Harris, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

McDonald, Helen M. Willey, estate of. Ernest L. Morandi, 
executor. Petition for instructions. Answer filed claiming 
tax. Decree. 

Montague, Mary E., estate of. Chas. H. Montague et al., execu- 
tors. Petition for reappraisal. James P. Richardson ap- 
pointed appraiser. 

Nash, Susan Caroline, estate of. Wm. B. Rotch, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Nickerson, Thomas, estate of. Andrew Nickerson et als., execu- 
tors. Petition for allowance of executors' compensation for 
services. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

O'Connell, Bridget, estate of. Wm. Page, executor. Petition for 
license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Page, J. Frank, estate of. Mary J. Flanders, executrix. Peti- 
tion for reappraisal. James J. Kirwin appointed appraiser. 

Page, Maria M., estate of. Wm. A. Page, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Pettee, William H., estate of. Sybil C. Pettee, executrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Pickering, Lucy M., estate of. Chas. L. Pulsifer, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate in 
Massachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 



126 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Raymond, Julius, estate of. George Raymond, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Richardson, Chandler R., estate of. Augustus E. Scott, executor. 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Rollins, Eliza A., estate of. A. Herbert Rollins, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Rose, George, estate of. Sarah A. Rose, executrix. Petition for 
license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Sargent, Franklin W., estate of. Harriet E. Sargent, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Pending. 

Searle, Chas. J., estate of. Frank W. Searle, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Seavey, Clara A., estate of. Chas. L. Seavey, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Seavey, Joseph A., estate of. Chas. W. Hobbs, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Shanley, Hester E., estate of. James H. Macomber, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate in 
Massachusetts. Pending. 

Shea, John B., estate of. Margaret B. Shea, executrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Shepard, Andrew N., estate of. Harry A. Shepard et al., execu- 
tors. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa- 
chusetts. Pending. 

Smith, Lewis E., estate of. Howard Revere Smith, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Snow, Emily A., estate of. Sophia H. Wilder et al., adminis- 
trators. Petition for license to receive personal estate in 
Massachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard 
on payment of tax. 

Tarbell, Louisa F., estate of. Delora T. Kimball, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Tenney, Isabella B., estate of. Alonzo C. Tenney, executor. 
Petition for instructions. Decree. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 127 

Tileston, Sarah Ann, estate of. Petition of the Treasurer and 
Receiver-General to determine amount of inheritance tax due. 
Pending before Supreme Judicial Court on appeal. 

Tucker, George W., estate of. John E. French, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Pending. 

Tukey, Patrick, estate of. Henry H. Chamberlain, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Upton, Isaac J., estate of. Augusta P. Upton, executrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Wentworth, Ann, estate of. George P. Lawrence, administrator. 
Petition for reappraisal. James J. Kirwin appointed ap- 
praiser. 

Wiggin, Olive, estate of. Acldie M. Beede et al., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard on pay- 
ment of tax. 

Willoby, Cornelia L., estate of. Fred C. Willoby etal., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Norfolk County. 

Johnson, Andrew E., estate of. Caroline E. Hobbs, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Morse, Edwin B., estate of. Isabel Ward Towle, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

O'Connell, Margaret, estate of. Mary O'Sullivan et al., execu- 
trices. Petition for license to receive personal estate in 
Massachusetts. Pending. 



Plymouth County. 
Stevens, Charles E., estate of (Bradford, treasurer, v. Stevens, 
executor). Petition for instructions. Rescript. See 185 
Mass. 439. 

Suffolk County. 
Anthony, Bertha, estate of. Frederick D. Runells, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 



128 ATTOKNEY-GENEKAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Atherton, Maria F., estate of. Henry H. Hastings, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Barrell, George O., estate of. George Manent, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard on pay- 
ment of tax. 

Bean, Lizzie P., estate of. Homer Martin Bean, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Bettinger, Cora M., estate of. John J. Bettinger, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Billings, Robert C., estate of. Thomas Minns, executor. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Pending. 

Blaisdell, Stephen J., estate of. Chas. E. Bourne etal., executors. 
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Assented 
to petition. 

Brew, George Magnus, estate of. Agnes E. I. Brew, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Bridge, Charlotte M., estate of. Thomas H. Looker, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard on payment of 
tax. 

Bullard, Enoch P., estate of. Harold C. Bullard, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Burnham, Edward P., estate of. Lucy T. Russell, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard on payment of 
tax. 

Burr, Susan H., estate of. Sarah E. Raymond Fitzwilliam, exec- 
utrix. Petition for license to receive personal estate in 
Massachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard 
on payment of tax. 

Cameron, Mabel Myers, estate of. Henry L. Cameron, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Clawson, Augusta Holmes, estate of. Frank T. Clawson, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate in 
Massachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Codman, Maria P., estate of. Robert M. Morse et al., executors. 
Petition for instructions to determine the amount of the col- 
lateral legacy tax. Pending. 



11)05.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 129 

Colby, Silas, estate of. Sarah I. Colby, administratrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Crombie, Susan F., estate of. Wm. A. Pierce, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard on payment of tax. 

Cross, Hannah J., estate of. Weltha A. Cross, executrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Cummings, Sarah A., estate of. Daniel B. Cummings, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate in 
Massachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Currier, Nancy J., estate of. Emery R. Currier, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Curtis, Lucy P., estate of. Voranus C. Plummer, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Daniell, Reuben, estate of. George C. Brackett, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard on payment of tax. 

Darrach, Florrie, estate of. Duncan Darrach, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Delano, Jane V., estate of. Chas. J. Bell, executor. Petition for 
license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Dunlop, Robert, estate of. Albert Spencer et a/., administrators. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Everett, Edward, estate of. Mary A. A. Everett, petitioner. 
Petition for appointment of trustee to sell real estate. As- 
sented to appointment of Cora A. Benneson as trustee. 

Flint, David B., estate of. Almeno J. Flint et als., trustees. 
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Pending. 

Ford, William E., estate of. Daniel B. Hallet et aZ., executors. 
Petition for reappraisal. Stanley M. Bolster appointed ap- 
praiser. 

Fosdick, Sarah Elizabeth, estate of. M. D. Tennant, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Foster, Martha Prince, estate of. Stephen B. Meech, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard on pay- 
ment of tax. 



130 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Gates, Aubyne H., estate of. Frank B. True, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

George, Caroline, estate of. Greenleaf C. George, executor. 
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Assented 
to petition. 

Greele, Louisa M., estate of. Arthur B. Titcomb, executor. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard on payment of tax. 

Harder, William W., estate of. Mary H. Wallace, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Hart, Charles, estate of. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company, 
executor. Petition for license to receive personal estate in 
Massachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard 
on pa} r ment of tax. 

Hart, Susanna M., estate of. Lydia J. Segee, petitioner. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Pending. 

Hecht, Jacob H., estate of. Lina F. Hecht et al., petitioners. 
Petition for postponement of time for. payment of tax. 
Assented to petition. 

Herrick, Susan E., estate of. Chas. A. Harris, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Pending. 

Howe, Irving A., estate of. D. J. Lord, administrator. Petition 
of Treasurer and Receiver-General for payment of tax on 
certain legacies. Pending. 

James, Hannah P., estate of. Faith A. Bullard, executrix. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard on payment of tax. 

Kimball, Emma E., estate of. Daniel E. Kimball, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Lewis, John E., estate of. Chas. E. Lewis, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Littlefield, Julia A., estate of. C. M. G. Harwood, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Lord, Eunice, estate of. Henry J. Merrill, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Loring, Wm. B., estate of. John H. Colby et al., executors. 
Petition for extension of time for payment of tax. Assented 
to petition. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 131 

Mallon, Mary F., estate of. G. Philip Wardner, executor. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 

Martin, Margaret L., estate of. Julius C. Tibbetts, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Pending. 

McDuffee, Lydia Frances, estate of. Horace Everett McDuffee, 
administrator. Petition for license to receive personal estate 
in Massachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 

Means, Chas. T., estate of. Elizabeth A. Means, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Merrill, John M., estate of. Annie M. Howe, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Merrill, Susan C, estate of. Asa Merrill, executor. Petition for 
license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Mills, Mary B., estate of. Charles H. Pray, administrator. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Moore, Lucius, estate of. Union Trust Company, trustee. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Morrill, Sarah W., estate of. Thomas B. Twombly, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Morris, Eliza B., estate of. Mary P. Barker, executrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Murphy, Lucy A., estate of. Wm. M. Murphy, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Nutter, Horatio G., estate of. Edwin U. Curtis, trustee. Petition 
for reappraisal. Thomas G. Joyce appointed appraiser. 

Page, Smith W., estate of. Ernest H. Howe, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Pending. 

Park, Mary Augusta, estate of. Jabez Elson Park, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Parker, Olin, estate of. Chas. O. Parker, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 



132 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S KEPORT. [Jan. 

Pierce, Mary F., estate of. Mary W. Holmes et al., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Pending. 

Porter, Edward, estate of. Charles E. Furman, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Pryor, C. Elizabeth, estate of. Mary H. Whitney et aZ., execu- 
tors. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Mas- 
sachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Putnam, Hiram B., estate of. Harriet Putnam, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney- General waived right to be heard. 

Reed, Margaret E., estate of. Maud S. Ham, executrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Richards, Amasa S., estate of. Richard C. Humphreys, execu- 
tor. Petition for reappraisal. Stanley M. Bolster appointed 
appraiser. 

Robinson, Henry C, estate of. Edward M. Robinson, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate in 
Massachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Simpson, Elizabeth E., estate of. Maria Simpson Ford, execu- 
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Mas- 
sachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard on 
payment of tax. 

Smith, Louisa S., estate of. Albert E. Grant, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard on payment of tax. 

Snow, Emily A., estate of. Sophia H. Wilder et aL, adminis- 
trators. Petition for license to receive personal estate in 
Massachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard 
on payment of tax. 

Stiles, Hannah S., estate of. Ada C. Parshley, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney- General waived right to be heard on pay- 
ment of tax. 

Tapley, Gilbert C, estate of. Chas. T. Moulton et al., adminis- 
trators. Petition for license to receive personal estate in 
Massachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard 
on payment of tax. 

Thompson, Andrew W., estate of. Edwin H. C. Thompson, 
administrator. Petition for license to receive personal estate 
in Massachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. i33 

Torr, Mary C, estate of. Charles C. Torr, administrator. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Torrey, Edwin H., estate of. Florence A. Young, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Walker, George S., estate of. AnnaF. Walker, executrix. Peti- 
tion for postponement of time for payment of tax. Assented 
to postponement. 

Warren, Joseph H., estate of. Chas. M. Warren, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Wayland, Francis, estate of. Geo. D. Watrouse et al., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Wayland, Hepsey S., estate of . Frederick E. Field, administra- 
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa- 
chusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Weare, Julia M., estate of. Chas. W. Tapley et al., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Pending. 

Welsh, Patrick, estate of. Hugh Davy, administrator. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Wescott, Jeremiah, estate of. Lucy Ann Wescott, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Whitehouse, Clara L., estate of. Martha L. Whitehouse, execu- 
trix. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa- 
chusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Whitcomb, Henry F., estate of. Chas. W. Tuttle, executor. 
Petition for postponement of time for payment of tax. 
Assented to petition. 

Whitcomb, Henry F., estate of. Chas. W. Tuttle, executor. 
Petition for reappraisal. Stanley M. Bolster appointed ap- 
praiser. 

Wilcox, George S., estate of. Julia A. Wilcox, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Worcester, Edwin D., estate of. Edwin D. Worcester, Jr., execu- 
tor. Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massa- 
chusetts. Pending. 

Zeigler, Peter, estate of. Theodore H. Tyndale, public adminis- 
trator. Petition for instructions. Pending. 



134 ATTORNEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Worcester County. 

Aldricb, Arvin, estate of. Forrest W. Hall, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Baker, Artemas, estate of. Calvin B. Perry, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Browning, Chas. L., estate of. Louis P. Browning, executor. 
Petition for instructions and postponement of time for pay- 
ment of tax. Assented to petition. 

Bruce, George, estate of. Wm. Moore, executor. Petition for 
license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Caldwell, Mabelle K., estate of. George W. Caldwell, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate in 
Massachusetts. Pending. 

Carpenter, Sarah A., estate of. Chas. H. Leonard, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard on payment of tax. 

Carville, Christiana, estate of. Addie A. Dow, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Chapman, Charles F., estate of. Harry F. Chapman et aZ., ad- 
ministrators. Petition for license to receive personal estate 
in Massachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 

Curtis, Morrill H., estate of. Orrin T. Curtis, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard on payment of tax. 

Daoust, Joseph, estate of. Emma Daoust, executrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Donovan, Patrick, Jr., estate of. Dennis Donovan, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Drew, John G., estate of. J. Horace Drew, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Durkee, Eveline O., estate of. Wallace L. Durkee, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Fife, Daniel J., estate of. Lizzie H. Fife, administratrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 135 

Gale, John H., estate of. Edward Stebbins, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney- General waived right to be heard. 

Goodwin, Sylvia E. C, estate of. Chas. L. Goodwin, adminis- 
trator. Petition for license to receive personal estate in 
Massachusetts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Ivory, James, estate of. Sarah M. Ivory, executrix. Petition 
for license to sell real estate in Massachusetts. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Jones, Frederick, estate of. Caroline F. Jones, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Kendall, Melvina H., estate of. Adna E. Kendall, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Kenyon, Lucy A., estate of. Frank B. Tracy, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

King, Sophia, estate of. Ellen S. Milliken, administratrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Kingsbury, Eli P., estate of. Horace Kingsbury, executor. Pe- 
tition for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Levy, Ella A., estate of. Chas. F. Lamb, executor. Petition for 
license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Marsh, Jacob H., estate of. Gertrude M. Fuller, administratrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney- General waived right to be heard. 

McLane, Leander, estate of. George P. Hadley, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Milliken, Samuel K., estate of. James A. Milliken, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Nash, Mary A., estate of. Nellie Nash, executrix. Petition for 
license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Nims, Sarah M. W., estate of. Ernest A. Nims, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Oberer, Fidel, estate of. Frank A. Oberer, executor. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 



136 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Otis, Fred W., estate of. Mary A. Otis, administratrix. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Parker, Augusta A., estate of. George Parker, executor. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Peaslee, George W., estate of. Ella D. Norris et al., executors. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Prentice, Ira, estate of. Amos J. Blake, administrator. Petition 
for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Richardson, Clovis, estate of. William E. Wheelock, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Ripley, Emily B., estate of. Petition for reappraisal. Charles 
P. Adams appointed appraiser. 

Robillard, Jean Baptiste, estate of. L. Emile Robillard, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Robinson, Eliza M , estate of. Harry C. Hammond, executor. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Sawtell, Elizabeth, estate of. Adaliza C. Leathe, executrix. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Stowell, John E., estate of. Hattie G. Stowell, executrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Torrey, Mary M., estate of. Chas. H. Hersey, administrator. 
Petition for license to receive personal estate in Massachu- 
setts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Warren, Elvira, estate of. Elsie Warren, administratrix. Peti- 
tion for license to receive personal estate in Massachusetts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Weeks, George W., estate of. George P. Taylor et al., executors. 
Petition for postponement of time for payment of tax. 
Pending. 

Weeks, George W., estate of. New England Cotton Manufac- 
turers' Association, petitioners. Petition for instructions. 
Decree. 

Wheelock, Jerome, estate of. Worcester Safe Deposit and Trust 
Company, petitioner. Petition for instructions. Pending. 
Decree. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 137 



PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUSTS. 



BerksJi ire Coun ty . 

Owen, Charles M., estate of. James M. Barker et a/., trustees. 
Petition for instructions. Attorney-General waived right to 
be heard. 

Bristol County. 

Attorney-General ex rel. v. Julia A. Briggs, executrix. Petition 
in equity for appointment of Fairhaven as trustee of Abner 
Pease fund. 

Ricketts, James, estate of. Petition of overseers of the poor of 
Fairhaven and Attorney-General to sell certain estate in 
trust. Decree. 

Essex County. 

Essex Agricultural Society v. Massachusetts General Hospital 
Corporation and the Attorney-General. Petition to sell real 
estate and to apply the doctrine of cy-pres. Service accepted. 
Petition dismissed. Petitioner appealed. Pending. 

First Baptist Society v. J. Brainard Wilson et at. and Attorney- 
General. Bill in equity for instructions under will of Edward 
H. Wilson for sale of trust property. Pending. 

Kimball, Nathaniel Tenney, estate of. Ella F. Kimball, executrix. 
Petition for instructions regarding a charitable trust. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Phillips Academy Trustees v. Attorney-General et als. Bill in 
equity to devise scheme for carrying out a trust under the will 
of Samuel Phillips. Pending. 

Sheehan, Mary S., estate of. Denis Donoghue, trustee. Petition 
for instructions regarding bequest to St. Mary's Roman Cath- 
olic Church. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

St. John's Church of Lawrence, petitioner. Petition for appoint- 
ment of trustees under a charitable trust. Assented to peti- 
tion. 

Young Men's Christian Association of Merrimac, petitioners. 
Petition for leave to sell real estate held in trust. Pending. 



138 ATTORXEY-CtEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Hampden County. 

Boland, Catherine E., estate of. John F. Fogan, trustee. Peti- 
tion for leave to sell real estate left for charitable purposes. 
Assented to petition. 

Boland, James J., estate of. John F. Fogan, trustee. Petition 
for leave to sell real estate left for charitable purposes. As- 
sented to petition. 

Elliott, Augusta C, estate of. Church of Christ v. Charles H. 
Barrows et al. Petition to pay over trust funds. Answer 
filed. Decree. 

Hamilton, John F., estate of. John O. Hamilton, trustee. Peti- 
tion for instructions regarding the disposition of trust funds. 
Pending. 

Middlesex Co u n ty . 

Blaisdell, Susan A., estate of. Harry A. Brown, executor. Peti- 
tion for instructions regarding a public charitable trust. 
Decree. 

Carter, Sabra, estate of. Chester W. Clark, administrator, v. 
Attorney-General. Bill in equity for instructions. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Choate, Charles, estate of. John M. Harlow, trustee. Petition 
for instructions regarding a charitable trust. Pending. 

Goodnow, Nancy, estate of. Deacons of Tabernacle Baptist 
Church, petitioners. Petition for appointment of trustees 
and sale of trust estate. Assented to petition. 

Greenleaf , James, estate of. Richard H. Dana, trustee, v. Richard 
H. Dana et cd. Petition for instructions. Rescript. See 185 
Mass. 156. 

John Street Congregational Church Society v. John Street Church 
et al. Petition for instructions as to disposition of certain 
funds held in trust. Pending. 

Osgood, George C, et al. v. John Z. Rogers et al. Bill in equity 
to determine the disposition of the Rogers fund. Rescript. 
See 186 Mass. 238. 

Osgood, George C, et al. v. Charles R. Blaisdell et al. Petition 
for instructions under will of Sarah C. Kershaw. Pending. 

Norfolk County. 

Kingsbury, Charlotte, estate of. Frederick D. Ely et a?., trustees. 
Petition for leave to sell real estate held in trust for charitable 
purposes. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 139 

Plymouth Comity. 

Peterson, Deborah C, et al. v. Unitarian Ladies' Aid Society. 
Pending. 

Suffolk County. 

Billings, Robert C, estate of. Minns et al. v. Billings et al. Bill 
in equity in the Supreme Judicial Court for instructions. 
Rescript. See 183 Mass. 126. 

Brigham, Peter Bent, estate of. Herbert F. Brigham, petitioner. 
Appeal from circuit court. Bill dismissed. 

Bussey, Benjamin, estate of. Bill in equity to authorize trustees 
of a public charitable trust to sell land. Decree. 

Codman, Edmund D., et al. v. Herbert F. Brigham and Attorney- 
General et al. Bill in equity to determine the validity of 
certain provisions under the will of Peter Bent Brigham. 
Rescript, Jan. 7, 1905. 

Eisk, Photius, estate of. Theodore H. Tyndale, trustee. Peti- 
tion for discharge of surety on bond. Assented to petition. 

Hood, George H., et al. v. Massachusetts Baptist Missionary So- 
ciety, Attorney-General and Treasurer. Bill in equity for 
instructions regarding a charitable trust. Decree. 

Mabie, William I., et al. v. Edwin S. Gardner and Attorney- 
General. Petition for instructions regarding a public chari- 
table trust under will of Mary Redding. Pending. 

Minot, Robert S., et al., executors, v. Attorney-General et al. 

Minot, Robert S., trustee, v. Attorney-General et als. Petition 
for instructions regarding a charitable trust under the will of 
Luther Goodnow. Decree. 

Minot, William, v. Attorney-General et al. Petition for instruc- 
tions under the will of Thomas Thompson for carrying out 
certain trusts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Sears, Francis B., trustee of Widows' Fund of Trinity Church. 
Petition to sell real estate. Attorney-General waived right to 
be heard. 

Stone, Stephen S., estate of. Trustees of Westford Academy, 
petitioners. Petition for leave to apply certain trust funds. 
Pending. 

Thompson, Thomas, estate of. Minot, trustee, v. Attorney-Gen- 
eral. Bill in equity regarding a public charitable trust. 
Decree. 

Tufts College, trustees, v. Boston et al. Petition to sell certain 
real estate given for charitable purposes under the will of 
Sylvanus Packard. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 



140 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Williams, Charles, estate of. John Ballantyne, Jr., executor. 
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for instructions. 
Decree. 

Worcester County. 

Allen, Sarah F., estate of. Clifford A. Cook, petitioner. Peti- 
tion for appointment of trustee. Assented to petition. 

Bowker, Mary B., estate of. Asa A. Westcott, trustee. Petition 
for leave to sell real estate given for charitable purposes. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Conlan, Winifred M., estate of. Thomas D. Beaven et al. Peti- 
tion for appointment of trustee. Assented to petition. 

Cuddihy, Patrick, estate of. Thomas D. Beaven et al. Petition 
for appointment of trustee. Assented to petition. 

Dodd, Susan F., estate of. Arthur W. Dwyer, petitioner. Peti- 
tion for appointment of trustee under charitable trust. 
Assented to appointment of Arthur W. Dwyer, trustee, with- 
out sureties. 

Gibbs, Ellen, estate of. Henry Hagne, executor. Petition for 
perpetual care of burial lot. Assented to petition. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 141 



SUITS CONDUCTED BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL 

In Behalf of State Boards and Commissions. 



The following cases have been reported to this department by 
State boards and commissions, to be conducted by the Attorney- 
General or under his direction, pursuant to the provisions of St. 
1896, c. 490: — 

1. Metropolitan Park Commission. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages 
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land by the said 
commission. 

Essex County. 

Murphy, Michael, v. Commonwealth. Pending before Supreme 
Judicial Court on exceptions. 

Middlesex County. 
Bean, Charlotte, et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending before full 

court. Rescript. See 186 Mass. 348. 
Carret, James R., trustee, v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 
Clark, David O., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Cordingly, William S., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Curtis, Charles P., trustee, under the will of John M. Williams, v. 

Commonwealth. Pending. 
Dresser, Mary A. P., v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 
Dresser, William R., v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 
Dwyer, Michael F., v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 
Hemenway, Alfred, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Jackson, Walton P. L., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Lawrence, Samuel C, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Lyon, Weltha G., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
McSweeney, Eugene G., v. Commonwealth. Pending before full 

court. Rescript. See 185 Mass. 371. 
Neilan, Mary, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
O'Hara, Daniel, et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Rawson, Warren W., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Viles, Alden E., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Viles, Daniel F., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Whitney, John R., et al., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 



142 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



NorfolkC ounty. 

Carter, Charles L., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Guy, Charles W., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Klous, Seman, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Klous, Seman, v. Commonwealth. Trial before auditor. Pending 
before Supreme Judicial Court on exceptions. 

Mahoney, Dennis W., et al. v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 

Meek, William T., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. Com- 
monwealth. Pending. 

New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. Com- 
monwealth. Pending. 

Rice, Harry L., v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 

Scott, Jane W., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Scott, Jane W., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Suffolk' County. 

Bamford, Albert J., et als. v. Commonwealth. Trial before audi- 
tor. Settled. 

Boston & Revere Electric Street Railway Company v. Common- 
wealth. Pending. 

Boston, City of, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Conness, John, v. Commonwealth. Trial b} 7 jury. Reserved for 
full court. Rescript. See 184 Mass. 541. 

Hall, Frances J., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Hall, Frances J., et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Jessop, Ann Elizabeth, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Lynn & Boston Railroad Company v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Mayers, John H. , executor, v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 

Proctor, George F., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Read, Augustine H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Ring, Constant Q., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Rogers, Mary E., v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 

Ryan, F. Henrietta, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Skilton, Elizabeth A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to auditor. 
Settled on auditor's award. 

Skilton, Elizabeth A. } v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Somerby, Juliana H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Streeter, Susan S. T., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Wadsworth, P. Briggs, v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 

Wadsworth, Susan, v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 

White, Daniel L., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

White, Daniel L., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 143 

Wyman, George W., v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 
Young, Elizabeth E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Young, Elizabeth E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

2. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board. 
Petitions to the Supreme Judicial and Superior Courts for as- 
sessment of damages alleged to have been sustained by the taking 
of land, and rights and easements in land, by said Board. 

Middlesex County. 

Bennett, Anna M., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Bowditch, Elizabeth F., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Buck, William H., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Cameron, Katherine S., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Childs, Eliza M., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Dooley, Edward, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Dutton, Harry, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Dwyer, William, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Eichorn, Mary C, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Foster, Francis A., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Framingham Water Company v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Gilmore, Agnes E., executrix, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Hasenfus, Clemense, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Irving, Anthony, et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Jackson, Samuel M., et al., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pend- 
ing. 

Maiden v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. Pending. 

Maiden, Melford and Melrose v. Commonwealth. Referred to 
commissioners. Pending. 

Medford, City of, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Medford v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. Pending. 

Melrose v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. Pending. 

Milton, Henry S., et al., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Perkins, Robert F., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Perry, Ralph L., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Preston, Marion W., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Reeves, Walter E., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Shaw, Francis, v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 

Skinner, Caroline E., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Walker, Elmira S., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Ward, George A., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Ward, Geo. A., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Warren, Charles A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 



144 ATTORNEY-GENERALS REPORT. [Jan. 

Whitney, John R., et al. v. Commonwealth et al. Referred to a 

master. Pending. 
Williams, Lombard, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Young, Charlotte W., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Norfolk County. 
Hodgkinson, Charles C, v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 
Lowell, Charles, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Rice, Harry L., v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 

Suffolk County. 
Gibbons, William H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Holyhoojd Cemetery Association v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Worcester County. 

Allen, George S., v. Commonwealth. Reserved for full court. 
Pending. 

American Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Commonwealth. 
Settled. 

American Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Commonwealth. 
Settled. 

Bacon, Emory A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Bacon, Marinna, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Barnes, Israel L., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Berlin, Andrew, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Settled. 

Boyd, Andrew, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Settled. 

Bradley, Patrick, v. Commonwealth. Referred to Ernest H. 
Vaughan, George A. Sanderson and Charles E. Ware, com- 
missioners. Pending. 

Bruce, William M., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Buck, William EL, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Buck, William H., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Burgess, Thomas H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Burpee, Edgar W., executor, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Burpee, Julia A. F., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Carville, Clarence, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Carville, Clarence, v. Commonwealth et al. Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 145 

Chapman et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Chapman, Sarah, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Settled. 

Chapman, Walter E., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Chapman, Walter E., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Clemons, Benjamin H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to an audi- 
tor. Pending. 

Cotting, Chas. U., et als. v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Settled on award of commissioners. 

Counter, Fred, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Dee, John, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners* 
Settled. 

Dolan, Catherine, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Settled. 

Dorr, James, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pendiug. 

Dorr, James, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Dorr, James, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Dusoe, Charles, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Fitch, Andrew L., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Flagg, Geo. A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Foster, Amanda, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Goodale, Aaron, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Haskell, John C, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Settled. 

Hastings, George R., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Hennis, Michael, et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Hills, Arthur T., administrator, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Hills, Arthur T., administrator, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Houghton, Robert C, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Houghton, Robert C, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Houghton, Robert C, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Huntington, Whitman M., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Johnson, Addison F., executor, v. Commonwealth. Referred to 
auditor. Settled. 

Johnson, Charles S., v. Commonwealth. Referred to auditor. 
Pending. 

Johnston, Robert, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 



146 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Johnston, Robert, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Joyce, Bridget M., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Kershaw, James H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission- 
ers. Pending. 

Keyes, George H., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Settled. 

Keyes, Henry F., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Lafrade, Peter, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Settled. 

Landy, Chas. C, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Lawrence, George D., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Levi, Sarah, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Lienhardt, Andrew, v. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board. 
Dismissed. 

Longley, George H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Lovell, Angeline E., et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to com- 
missioners. Settled. 

Lovell, David B., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Lundren, Per Arvid, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Mackesey, Thomas, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Moran, John E., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Nault, David, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Settled. 

Newton, Silas, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Settled. 

O'Brien, John F., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Ohnsman, Alexander, v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 

Peters, Stephen R., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Prescott, Martha E., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Roger, William, et al. v. Metropolitan Water Board. Settled. 

Sawiu, Charles B., v. Commonwealth. Referred to an auditor. 
Pending. 

Sirabian, Kayazan, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission- 
ers. Pending. 

Smith, Artemns C, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Settled. 

Stone, John E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Sweeney, Austin, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Tay, Ida E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Thomas, A. Mason, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commission- 
ers. Settled.. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 147 

Tobin, Mary A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Settled. 

Tonry, Margaret F., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Tyson, Caroline E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Warfield, Samuel R., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Settled. 

Warfield, Samuel R., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Warner, Mary J., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Warner, Mary J., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Warner, William H., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Welch, James E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

West Boylston v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

West Boylston v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

White, Lucy, v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Whiting, Alfred N., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Wilder, Francis A., et al. v. Commonwealth. Referred to com- 
missioners. Settled. 

Wilder, Francis A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commis- 
sioners. Settled. 

Wood, Lucy A., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Pending. 

Wood, Willie B., v. Commonwealth. Referred to commissioners. 
Settled. 

3. Massachusetts Highway Commission. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for a jury to assess damages 
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land, or injury to 
land, by said commission. Under agreement with the Common- 
wealth most of these cases are defended by the various towns in 
which the land is situated. 

Barnstable County. 
Crowell, Thomas H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Bristol County. 
Davis, Charles H., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Lynch, George, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Ryder, Nancy G., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Seabury, Henry C, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Seabury, Phoebe W., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 



148 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Essex County. 
Dow, Clara B., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Dow, Granville S., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Flanders, Betsey S., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Flanders, Betsey S., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Salem Savings Bank v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Franklin County. 

Hale, Francis A., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Wait, Myra J., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Hampden County. 
Alvord, Edwin H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Barnes, Alice V., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Hafey, James J., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Middlesex County. 
Donovan, James H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Fisher, Caroline F., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Griffin, John, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hudson Co-operative Bank v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Temple, Theodore, v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Thimineur, Joseph, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Norfolk County. 

Richards, John M., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Wellington, Margaret J., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Plymouth County. 
Daly, Julia M., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Mclntire, Bernard, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Worcester County. 
Haas, Mary A., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Loring, John S., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Sullivan, Timothy J., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Twiss, Michael F., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Warren, Alice E. M., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

4. Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages caused 
by the taking of land by said commissioners. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 149 

Plymouth County. 
Damon, John B., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Suffolk County. 
Bent, William H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Trial by jury. 
Butler, Philip H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Lamb, George, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Lamb, George, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

5. Miscellaneous Cases from Above Commissions. 
Bristol County. 

Chace, Charles A., trustee, v. Commonwealth et als. Action of 
tort for damages caused by defects in State highway. Pend- 
ing. 

Seabury, Henry, v. Wm. R. Farnham et al. Petition for injunc- 
tion to restrain defendants from entering upon plaintiff's 
premises in construction of State highway. Dismissed. 

Seabury, Henry, v. Wm. R. Farnham et al. Action of tort for 
damages. Dismissed. 

Essex County. 
Hagerty, Hannah, administratrix of estate of Thomas Meehan, 
v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Lynn & Boston Rail- 
road et al. Action of tort to recover damages for personal 
injuries received on State highway. Dismissed. 

Middlesex County. 

Bogigian, Hagop, Commonwealth v. Action of tort for trespass. 
Settled. 

Bogigian, Helen J. C, Commonwealth v. Information to restrain 
trespass on Commonwealth's land. Settled. 

Bradford, Edward S., Treasurer and Receiver-General, v. Charles 
A. Hall. Action of contract to collect betterments assessed 
by Metropolitan Park Commissioners. Settled. 

Bradford, Edward S., Treasurer and Receiver-General, v. Mary 
A. Dowd. An action of contract to collect betterments as- 
sessed by Metropolitan Park Commissioners. Settled. 

Cosgrove, Thomas E., Commonwealth v. Bill of complaint to 
compel defendant to remove buildings from line established 
by park commission. Pending. 

Crowley, Patrick, estate of. Petition to enforce performance to 
convey real estate. Decree. 



150 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Gilmore, Jerome, administrator of estate of Alexander Gilmore, 
v. Dennis Shannahan et al. and Metropolitan Water and 
Sewerage Board, trustees. Action of tort to recover dam- 
ages for personal injuries. Pending. 

Mulready, William, Commonwealth v. Bill of complaint to 
require defendant to remove buildings from line established 
by park commission. Pending. 

Murray, John B., v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Lynn 
& Boston Railroad et al. Action of tort to recover damages 
for personal injuries received on State highway. Pending. 

Pike, Sophia F., v. Metropolitan Park Commissioners. Action of 
tort to recover for personal injuries to plaintiff. Settled. 

Norfolk County. 
National Contracting Company et al., Commonwealth v. Action 
of contract to recover on bond. Pending. 

Suffolk County. 
Baker, Catherine A., v. Henry H. Sprague et al. Action of tort 

for damages caused by use of impure water furnished by 

water board. Pending. 
Baker, Fred W., v. Henry H. Sprague et al. Action of tort for 

damages caused by use of impure water furnished by water 

board. Pending. 
Baker, Freda E., v. Henry H. Sprague et al. Action of tort for 

damages caused by use of impure water furnished by water 

board. Pending. 
Baker, Walter J., v. Henry H. Sprague et al. Action of tort for 

damages caused by use of impure water furnished by water 

board. Pending. 
Bent, William H., et al. v. Henry W. Swift et al. Action of tort 

growing out of taking by Harbor and Land Commissioners 

of land and flats in South Bay. Pending. 
Boston, City of, v. Commonwealth. Petition under R. L., c. 12, 

§12, St. 1903, c. 161, to recover taxes on land taken by water 

board. Pending. 
Chadwick, Everett D., v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. 

Bill in equity to determine party entitled to award by 

Metropolitan Park Commission for land taken in Milton. 

Settled. 
Conness, John, v. Commonwealth. Petition for a writ of certi- 
orari to quash betterments assessed by Metropolitan Park 

Commissioners. Disposed of. 
Connolly, Mary E., v. Charles G. Craib. Action of tort to 

recover damages for personal injuries. Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 151 

Davis, James A., et al. v. Commonwealth et al. Petition to 

recover for labor and materials used in construction of sewer. 

Pending. 
Dings, Emma, v. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board. 

Action of tort. Damage caused by impure water furnished 

by the defendant. Pending. 
Dings, Martin, v. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board. 

Action of tort. Damages caused by impure water furnished 

by defendant. Pending. 
Doherty, James, v. Edward W. Everson et al. and Metropolitan 

Water and Sewerage Board. Action of tort. Damages caused 

by blasting. Pending. 
Doherty, James, v. Commonwealth. Petition for assessment of 

damages caused by blasting for metropolitan sewer. Pending. 
Doherty, Mary, v. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board et al. 

Action of tort. Damage caused by use of impure water 

furnished by defendant. Pending. 
Doherty, Mary E., v. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board 

et al. Action of tort. Damage caused by use of impure 

water furnished by the defendant. Pending. 
Duffy, Bernard, v. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board. 

Action of tort. Damages caused by impure water furnished 

by defendant. Pending. 
Duffy, Bernard, administrator of the estate of Joanna Duffy, v. 

Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board. Action of tort. 

Damage caused by impure water furnished by defendant. 

Pending. 
Duffy, Edward, v. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board. 

Action of tort. Damage caused by impure water furnished 

by defendant. Pending. 
Duffy, Joseph H., v. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board. 

Action of tort. Damage caused by impure water furnished 

by defendant. Pending. 
Duffy, Mary R., v. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board. 

Action of tort. Damage caused by impure water furnished 

by the defendant. Pending. 
Duffy, Maurice, v. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board. 

Action of tort. Damage caused by impure water furnished 

by the defendant. Pending. 
Duffy, William J., v. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board. 

Action of tort. Damage caused by impure water furnished 

by the defendant. Pending. 
Dunican, Anna L., v. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board. 

Action of tort. Damages caused by impure water furnished 

by defendant. Pending. 



152 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Galvin, Nellie B., Commonwealths. Petition to compel the re- 
moval of buildings projecting upon park reservation. 
Decree. 

Hanscom, Hervey A., et aZ., Cambridge v. Action of tort grow- 
ing out of accident caused by laying water pipes by Metro- 
politan Water Board in Cambridge. Pending before full 
court. Rescript. See 186 Mass. 54. 

Hanscom, Hervey A., et a/., Commonwealth v. Action of con- 
tract growing out of accident caused by laying water pipes by 
Metropolitan Water Board in Cambridge. Pending. 

Hurley, John J., Commonwealth v. Bill of complaint to compel 
defendant to remove part of building encroaching on land of 
Commonwealth. Pending. 

Jones, J. Edwin, et al. v. Commonwealth. Petition for assessment 
of damages caused by breach of contract to construct high- 
level sewer in West Roxbury. Settled. 

Jones, J. Edwin, et al. v. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board. 
Action of tort. Damages caused by breach of contract to con- 
struct high-level sewer in West Roxbury. Settled. 

Jones, Richard, v. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board et al. 
Action of tort. Damage caused by use of impure water fur- 
nished by defendants. Pending. 

Mason, Jacob M., v. Commonwealth. Action of tort. Personal 
injury growing out of construction of Metropolitan Water 
Works. Dismissed. 

Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board v. Leroy E. Coolidge. 
Bill in equity to prevent pollution of waters of Whitehall 
Pond in Hopkinton. Disposed of. 

Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board v. City of Marlborough. 
Petition for injunction to restrain the city of Marlborough 
from polluting the water supply. Dismissed. 

Niland, Michael, v. Commonwealth. Petition for assessment of 
damages caused by blasting for metropolitan sewer. Pend- 
ing. 

Niland, Michael, v. Edward W. Everson et al. and Metropolitan 
Water and Sewerage Board. Action of tort. Damages 
caused by blasting. Pending. 

Normile, Francis, v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. Pe- 
tition for a jury to assess damages caused by construction of 
sewer in Roxbury. Pending. 

Normile, Francis, v. Edward W. Everson & Co. and Henry H. 
Sprague et al. Action of tort. 

Old Colony Construction Company, Commonwealth v. Action of 
contract to recover on bond. Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 153 

Peirce, Alice, v. Commonwealth. Damages caused by accident to 
plaintiff on Massachusetts State highway in Wenham. Pend- 
ing. 

Rohan, Mary, v. Commonwealth. Petition in the nature of an 
action of tort for personal injuries alleged to have been sus- 
tained in the construction of a section of the metropolitan 
sewer. Settled. 

Sprague, Henry H., et al. v. James Dorr. Bill in equity for an 
injunction to prevent the pollution of Quinapoxet River. 
Pending before full court. Rescript. See 185 Mass. 10. 

Urquhart, Carrie S., v. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board 
et al. Action of tort. Damage caused by impure water fur- 
nished by the defendant. Pending. 

Urquhart, Edwin N., v. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board 
et al. Action of tort. Damage caused by use of impure 
water furnished by defendant. Pending. 

Urquhart, N. Jefferson, v. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage 
Board et al. Action of tort. Damage caused by impure 
water furnished by the defendant. Pending. 

Worcester County. 
Fitch, Andrew L., v. Commonwealth. Action of tort to recover 
for damage to land and water rights in West Boylston caused 
by the takings of the Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board. 
Pending. 

6. Cases arising under St. 1899, c. 457, " An Act to limit the 

Height of Buildings in the Vicinity of the State House." 
Dexter, Elsie, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Dexter, Elsie, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Dexter, Philip, et a,!, v. Commonwealth. Settled on award of 

commissioners. 
Dexter, Philip, et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled on award of 

commissioners. 
Dexter, Philip, et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled on award of 

commissioners. 
Forbes, J. Malcom, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Goddard, George A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Gray, Francis C, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Heard, J. Theodore, et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Hollingsworth, Polly R., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Lewis, Elizabeth, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Loring, Anna P., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Parker, Charles H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 



154 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Peabody, Francis, et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Perry, Emily G., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Prince, Lucy Maria, et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Read, Elsie H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Read, John, et al., trustees and executors, v. Commonwealth. 
Settled. 

Ritchie, Rosa G., v. Commonwealth. Settled on award of com- 
missioners. 

Warren, Fiske, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

7. State Board of Charity. 

(a) Actions of contract pending in the Superior Court to re- 
cover charges for the support of insane paupers in. State insane 
hospitals, under the provisions of R. L., c. 87. 

Middlesex County. 
Commonwealth v. Wayland. Pending. 
Shaw, Treasurer, v. Esau Cooper. Pending. 

Suffolk County. 
Bradford, Treasurer, v. Geo. W. Green, administrator. Settled. 
Bradford, Treasurer, v. Alice H. Knight. Pending. 
Bradford, Treasurer, v. Waltham. Pending. 
Bradford, Treasurer, v. AValtham. Pending. 
Harden, Treasurer, v. AValtham. Pending. 
Phillips, Treasurer, v. Reading. Settled. 
Phillips, Treasurer, v. Stow. Settled. 

(b) Bastardy complaints brought under R. L., c. 82. 

Middlesex Co un ty . 
Brent, Mary, v. Homer C. Chaffee. Pending. 

Suffolk County. 
Johnson, Julia R., v. Henry Williams. Pending. 
McCormick, Mary C, v. Harry Ward. Settled. 

11 o rcester County. 
Carr, Margaret, v. Allen J. Warner. Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT— Xo. 12. 155 

8. State Board of Health. 
Appeals taken to the Superior Court from the rules and orders 
of the State Board of Health, under R. L., c. 75, § 119. 

Ashley, C. S., v. State Board of Health. Settled. 
Canedy, Z. L., v. State Board of Health. Settled. 
Cook, C. A., v. State Board of Health. Settled. 
Dean, Randall, v. State Board of Health. Settled. 
DeMoranville, C. A., v. State Board of Health. Settled. 
Dunbar, Herman A., v. State Board of Health. Settled. 
Hathaway, N. C, v. State Board of Health. Settled. 
Howland, O., v. State Board of Health. Settled. 
Lawry, L. G., v. State Board of Health. Settled. 
Mackie, William A., v. State Board of Health. Settled. 
Nelson, John H., v. State Board of Health. Reserved for Supreme 

Judicial Court. Rescript. See 186 Mass. 330. 
Nelson, S. T., v. State Board of Health. Settled. 
Parker, Edward, et al. v. State Board of Health. Settled. 
Perry, A. E., v. State Board of Health. Settled. 
Perry, A. E., trustee, v. State Board of Health. Settled. 
Pratt, Mary H., v. State Board of Health. Settled. 
Sampson, I., v. State Board of Health. Settled. 
Staples, N. C, v. State Board of Health. Settled. 
White, A. F., v. State Board of Health. Settled. 
Wright, William L., v. State Board of Health. Settled. 



156 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



MISCELLANEOUS CASES. 



Ahern, Maurice, v. Newton & Boston Street Railway Company. 
Bill in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States to 
restrain the defendant from complying with the provisions of 
St. 1900, c. 197, relative to the transportation of scholars in 
the public schools by street railway companies. Pending. 

American Brake Shoe and Foundry Company. Failure of foreign 
corporation to file certificate of condition. Pending. 

American Can Company v. Commonwealth. Petition under St. 
1903, c. 437, § 84, to recover tax paid by foreign corporation. 
Reserved for consideration of full court. 

American Can Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
back corporation tax. Pending. 

American Electric Tape Company. Failure of foreign corporation 
to file first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. 
Disposed of. 

American Legion of Honor, Supreme Council, Attorney-General 
ex rel. v. Petition for injunction and receiver under R. L., 
c. 119. Henry A. AYyrnan appointed receiver. 

American Order of Druids, Attorney-General v. Petition for an in- 
junction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction issued, 
and John W. Worthington appointed receiver. Final decree. 

American Union Oil and Refining Company. Failure of foreign 
corporation to file first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, 
§§ 58, 60. Disposed of. 

American Union Oil and Refining Company. Failure of foreign cor- 
poration to file with the Commissioner of Corporations papers 
required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. Disposed of. 

American Unitarian Association v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
Superior Court for a jury to assess damages sustained to 
property on Bowdoin Street, caused by lowering of grade. 
Pending. 

American Writing Paper Company et aZ., Attorney- General v. 
Petition for an injunction to restrain respondents from dump- 
ing material into tide water. Discontinued as to American 
Writing Paper Company. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 157 

Amesbury & Salisbury Gas Light Company. Penalty for exist- 
ence of sulphuretted hydrogen in its gas. Pending. 

Amesbury Publishing Company. Failure of foreign corporation 
to file certificate of condition. Pending. 

Andrews, George F. Claim for board of David W. Andrews at 
Westborough Insane Hospital. Pending. 

Arlington Gas Light Company. Violation of R. L., c. 58, § 14. 
Gas of said company less than sixteen candle-power. Re- 
ferred to town counsel. Penalty paid to Winchester. 

Athol Gas and Electric Company. Violation of R. L., c. 58, § 14. 
Gas of said company contained sulphuretted hydrogen. Re- 
ferred to town counsel. Penalty paid town. 

Atlantic Mutual Life Insurance Company, Insurance Commis- 
sioner v. Petition for an injunction and the appointment of 
a receiver. Dismissed, the company's charter having expired. 

Atlas Mutual Insurance Company, Frederick L. Cutting, Insur- 
ance Commissioner, v. Petition for injunction and receiver. 
Franklin T. Hammond appointed receiver. Pending. 

Atwater, William C, v. William M. Olin, Secretary of the Com- 
monwealth, et ah Bill in equity, under the statute licensing 
coal dealers, to restrain the Secretary of the Commonwealth 
from issuing a license to William C. Atwater & Co. Incor- 
porated. Pending. 

Avon Manufacturing Company. Failure of foreign corporation to 
file first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. Dis- 
posed of. 

Ayer Light, Heat and Power Company. Failure to file with the 
Gas Light Commissioners the return required by St. 1886, 
c. 346, § 2, as extended by St. 1887, c. 382, § 2. Pending. 

Bank of Commerce of Virginia, assignee of Herbert R. Leonard, 
v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Petition to recover from 
Commonwealth for material furnished to contractor under con- 
tract with Harbor and Land Commissioners. R. D. Weston- 
Smith appointed master. Settled.. 

Barker, Annie E. Claim for tide water displaced in Boston har- 
bor. Pending. 

Bauton Automobile Company. Failure of foreign corporation to 
file first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. 
Pending. 

Bay State Beneficiary Association, Attorney-General ex rel. In- 
surance Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Suffolk County for an injunction and appointment 
of a receiver. Injunction issued, and Henry C. Hyde, Esq., 
of West Springfield, appointed temporary receiver. Pending. 



158 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Berkshire Health and Accident Association, Attorney-General ex 
rel. Insurance Commissioner v. Petition for an injunction 
and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction issued, and 
Alpheus Sanford, Esq., of Boston, appointed receiver. 
Final decree. 

Berwind-White Coal Mining Company. Failure of foreign cor- 
poration to file first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 
60. Pending. 

Blake, Martha L., v. Commonwealth. Petition to Superior Court 
for damages caused by lowering the grade of Bowdoin Street. 
Pending. 

Boston & Amesbury Manufacturing Company. Failure of foreign 
corporation to file first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, 
§§ 68, 60. Pending. 

Boston v. Commonwealth. Sewer assessment on Rutherford 
Avenue, Charlestown. Pending. 

Boston, City of. Claim for tide water displaced in Fort Point 
channel. Disposed of. 

Boston Mosaic Company. Failure of foreign corporation to file 
certificate of condition. Pending. 

Boston Mutual Life Insurance Company. Violation of anti-rebate 
law, R. L., c. 118, § 68. Referred to district attorney of 
Suffolk County for action. 

Boston Society of New Jerusalem v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Boston Terminal Company, Commonwealth v. Superior Court, 
Suffolk County. Reserved for full court. Rescript. See 
185 Mass. 281. Settled. 

Boston Terminal Company, Commonwealth v. Superior Court, 
Suffolk County. Reserved for full court. Rescript. See 
185 Mass. 281. Settled. 

Boston Yacht Club, petitioner. Petition to the Court of Land 
Registration to register title to land in Marblehead. Pend- 
ing. 

Boyle, John, v. Hollis M. Blackstone, Superintendent State Farm. 
Action of contract for labor performed by plaintiff while an 
inmate of the State Farm. Pending. 

Bragg, Henry W., et al. v. Commonwealth. Petition to Superior 
Court for Suffolk County for allowance of claim of auditors 
for examination into affairs of Massachusetts Benefit Life 
Association. Dismissed. 

Bridges, Benjamin F. (Warden Massachusetts State Prison), v. 
Edward D. Bean. Claim for goods furnished to the defend- 
ant. Disposed of. 

Brigham, Levi H., In re. Petition for habeas corpus. Writ 
issued. 



1905. j PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 159 

Brockton Gas Light Company. Violation of R. L., c. 53, § 14. 
Gas of said company less than sixteen candle-power. Re- 
ferred to city. Penalty paid. 

Brookline Firemen's Relief Association. Failure to file return 
with Insurance Commissioner. Disposed of. 

Brownville Maine Slate Company. Failure of foreign corporation 
to file certificate of condition. Pending. 

Brush Chemical Company. Failure to file return required by St. 
1891, c. 341. Disposed of. 

Butterfield Gold Mining and Milling Company. Failure of for- 
eign corporation to file certificate of condition. Disposed of. 

Cambridge, Bradford v. Claim for tide water displacement. 
Settled. 

Cambridge, City of, Commonwealth v. Claim for board of 
paupers. Pending. 

Cambridge Gas Light Company. Violation of R. L., c. 58, § 14. 
Gas of said company contained an excess of sulphur. Pen- 
alty paid to Somerville and Cambridge. 

Cambridge Gas Light Company. Penalty under R. L., c. 58, § 14. 
Placed on file. 

Carbonating Apparatus Company. Failure of foreign corporation 
to file certificate of condition. Pending. 

Chaffee, Clara. Claim against the city of Newton for board at 
Worcester Insane Hospital. Pending. 

Chapman, Roscoe E., v. Trustees of Massachusetts Hospital for 
Dipsomaniacs and Inebriates. Claim for services. Pending. 

Chase, Henry L. Claim for baker's oven sold by Westborough 
Insane Hospital. Placed on file. 

Chelsea Express Despatch Company. Claim for fees required for 
filing certificates of condition. Settled. 

Chelsea Gas Light Company. Violation of R. L., c. 58, § 14. 
Gas of said company less than sixteen candle-power. Re- 
ferred to city. 

Chelsea Mutual Benefit Association, Attorney-General ex rel. 
Insurance Commissioner v. Petition for injunction and re- 
ceiver. Injunction issued and George T. Roberts appointed 
receiver. Pending. 

Chester Goodale Marble Company. Failure of foreign corpora- 
tion to file certificate of condition. Pending. 

Clinton Gas Light Company, Attorney-General v. Petition to the 
Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for dissolution and 
the appointment of a receiver under St. 1894, c. 476. Dis- 
missed. 

Cohen, Simon. Petitioner for writ of habeas corpus. Petition 
denied. 



160 ATTORXEY-GEXERALS REPORT. [Jan. 

Collins, ' Joseph W., et al. v. James B. Hamblin. Petition to 
require the respondent to construct a fishway in dam on 
Acushnet River. Pending. 

Columbia Electric Compaq. Claim for corporation tax, 1901. 
Company in bankruptcy. Claim proved. Pending. 

Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. City of Boston et als. Superior 
Court, Suffolk County. Pending. 

Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. City of Boston et als. Superior 
Court, Suffolk County. Pending. 

Commonwealth Optical Company. Filing false returns. Referred 
to District Attorney Rockwood Hoar. 

Consolidated Sole Fastening Machine Company. Failure of 
foreign corporation to file first papers required by St. 1903, 
c. 437, §§ 58, 60. Disposed of. 

Corporate-Agent Company. Failure of foreign corporation to file 
certificate of condition. Pending. 

Curtis Manufacturing Company, petitioner. Petition to the Court 
of Land Registration to register the title to land on Curtis 
Pond. Pending. 

dishing, Lawrence B., et al. v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
Superior Court for damages caused by widening Bowdoin 
Street. Pending. 

Cutter, Olin W., v. Commonwealth. Petition for damages grow- 
ing out of construction of armories in Cambridge and New 
Bedford. Pending. 

Cutting, Frederick L., Insurance Commissioner, v. The Charles 
River Mutual Insurance Company. Petition for injunction. 
Decree. 

Damon, George L. Claim for tide-water displacement. Pend- 
ing. 

Delsarte Manufacturing and Supply Company. Failure of foreign 
corporation to file first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, 
§§ 58, 60. Pending. 

Dennis, Town of. Claim for board of Nellie F. Hillborn at Taun- 
ton Insane Hospital. Disposed of. 

Dexter, AVilliam A., et al. v. Commonwealth. Petition to Superior 
Court for a jury to assess damages caused by taking land on 
Mt. Vernon Street, Boston. Settled. 

Dinsmore Manufacturing Company. Failure of foreign corpora- 
tion to file certificate of condition. Pending. 

Dougherty, John O. Claim for board of Margaret O. Dougherty 
at Westborough Insane Asylum. Pending. 

Drucker, Walter A. Claim for Gas and P^lectric Light Commis- 
sioners' tax. Disposed of. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 1C1 

Dyson, Joseph M., v. Felix R. Wendelschafer. Petition for in- 
junction to restrain the defendant from using the Worcester 
Theatre. Injunction issued. 

Eagle Life Association, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition for 
an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction 
issued, and Alfred F. Lilley, Esq., appointed receiver. 
Pending. 

East Boston Company, petitioner. Petition to Court of Land 
Registration for registration of title to petitioner's land. 
Pending. 

Eastern Commission and Importing Company. Failure of foreign 
corporation to file certificate of condition. Pending. 

Eastern Massachusetts Masonic Mutual Relief Association, Attor- 
ney-General v. Petition for an injunction and the appoint- 
ment of a receiver. Injunction issued, and Eugene C. Upton 
appointed receiver. Final decree. 

Electric Light and Power Company of Abington and Rockland. 
Penalty for filing annual report late. Pending. 

Ellis, George H., Attorney-General ex rel. Harbor and Land Com- 
missioners v. Information in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
Middlesex County to protect the waters of a great pond 
under St. 1888, c. 318. Referred to a master. Pending. 

Eppens, Smith & Weemann Company. Failure of foreign cor- 
poration to file certificate of condition. Pending. 

Federal Stock and Grain Company. Failure of foreign corpora- 
tion to file first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. 
Disposed of. 

Fidelity Benefit Association, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition 
for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunc- 
tion issued, and A. E. Denison appointed receiver. Pend- 
ing. 

Firemen's Fire Insurance Company, Insurance Commissioner v. 
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for 
an injunction to restrain the defendant from removing its 
books and papers from the Commonwealth, and the appoint- 
ment of a receiver to recover . its capital stock distributed 
without authority of law. Injunction issued. Defendant 
recovered its capital stock and deposited it with the Interna- 
tional Trust Company, as trustee. Pending. 

Fottler, Lucy Ann, et al. v. Commonwealth. Petition to Superior 
Court for damages caused by lowering grade of Bowdoin 
Street. Pending. 

Foxboro Foundry Company. Failure of foreign corporation to 
file certificate of condition. Pending. 



162 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Franklin Mining Company. Failure of foreign corporation to file 
first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. Pending. 

Fraternal Aid, Order of, Attorney-General ex rel. Insurance Com- 
missioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for 
Suffolk County for an injunotion and the appointment of a 
receiver. Injunction issued, and Winthrop H. Wade, Esq., 
of Boston, appointed receiver. Pending. 

Freligh, E. V. Claim for board of Mary E. Freligh at West- 
borough Insane Hospital. Pending. 

Gardner Gas, Fuel and Light Company. Penalty for filing annual 
report late. Pending. 

Gas and Electric Protective Company. Failure of foreign corpo- 
ration to file certificate of condition. Pending. 

Gauley Coal Land Company. Failure of foreign corporation to 
file certificate of condition. Pending. 

George H. Sampson Co. v. Commonwealth et als. Bill of com- 
plaint. Pending. 

George H. Wood Company. Attorney-General v. Petition for an 
injunction to restrain respondent from dumping material into 
tide water. Pending. 

Globe Investment Company, Savings Bank Commissioners v. 
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, 
under St. 1888, c. 387, for an injunction and the appointment 
of a receiver. Injunction granted, and Henry A. Wyman 
appointed receiver. Pending. 

Globe Newspaper Company v. Commonwealth. Writ of error. 
Pending. 

Gloucester Water Supply Company, Commonwealth v. Corpora- 
tion tax for 1895. Pending. 

Gold Tunnel Durango Bay Mining Company. Foreign corporation 
tax for 1901 and 1902. Pending. 

Golden Rule Alliance, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition for an 
injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction 
issued, and William H. Preble appointed receiver. Pending. 

Goodridge, Clara L., et a/., executors, v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion for assessment of damages for taking by Commonwealth 
of leasehold estate on Mt. Vernon Street. Settled. 

Gough, Patrick J., v. Commonwealth. Writ of error. Pending. 

Greenfield, Town of. Claim for board of James Kingston at 
Northampton Insane Hospital. Pending. 

Greenfield, Town of. Failure to file assessors' return. Disposed of. 

Greensboro Electric Company. Failure of foreign corporation to 
file first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. Dis- 
posed of. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 163 

Guardian Life Insurance Company, Insurance Commissioner v. 
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for 
an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction 
issued, and Frank D. Allen, Esq., appointed receiver. Pend- 
ing. 

Hagar Shoe Machinery Company. Failure of foreign corporation 
to file first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. 
Disposed of. 

HaLlwood Cash Register Company. Failure of foreign corporation 
to file certificate of condition. Pending. 

Hampden Trust Company, Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. 
Petition for injunction and receiver. Injunction issued and 
Wm. W. McClench and Henry H. Bosworth made permanent 
receivers. Pending. 

Hampshire Savings Bank, Savings Bank Commissioners v. Peti- 
tion to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for an 
injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction 
issued, and Richard W. Irwin, Esq., and Benjamin E. Cook, 
Esq., appointed receivers. Pending. 

Hanson Creek Lead Mines Company. Claim for mining taxes for 
years 1900, 1901 and 1902. Pending. 

Hanson, Lydia W., v. Commonwealth. Petition for damages 
caused by lowering grade of Bowdoin Street. Pending. 

Haverhill Gas Light Company v. Gas and Electric Light Commis- 
sioners et al. Bill in equity in the Circuit Court of the United 
States to restrain the Board from carrying out an order to 
decrease the price of gas in Haverhill. Pending. 

Hendry, Frank H., Commonwealth v. Petition to recover money 
paid by Preferred Mercantile Company. Pending. 

Herrick, Frederick W., Attorney-General v. Petition in equity to 
gain possession of Snake Island in Chebacco Lake. Referred 
to Alden P. White, auditor. Pending. 

Hersey, Albert A., v. Commonwealth et als. Bill in equity to re- 
cover for labor and materials furnished in construction of 
metropolitan sewer in Melrose. Pending. 

Hill, Mary, petitioner. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. Pe- 
tition dismissed on hearing. 

Holyoke v. Commonwealth. Petition to reimburse the city of 
Holyoke for board of pauper. Settled. 

Hough, Alexander B., Commonwealth v. Claim for board of 
Julia F. Hough at Worcester Insane Hospital. Pending. 

Hudson, Pelham & Salem Street Railway Company. Failure of 
foreign corporation to file first papers required by St. 1903, 
c. 437, §§ 58, 60. Disposed of. 



164 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Humbert First Artillery Mutual Benefit Association, Insurance 
Commissioner v. Failure to make annual report to Insurance 
Commissioner required by St. 1899, c. 442, § 19. Disposed of. 

Hurley, Timothy, v. Commonwealth. Writ of error. Pending. 

Hutchinson, Ida. Claim for services of nurse furnished by the 
Westborough Training School for Nurses. Pending. 

Hyde Park Electric Light Company. Penalty for filing annual 
report late. Pending. 

Independent Order Ahawas Israel, Attorney-General ex rel. v. 
Petition for injunction. Injunction issued. 

Industrial Casualty Company, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Peti- 
tion for injunction and receiver. Jeremiah Smith, Jr., 
appointed receiver. 

Ingliss, William T., et al. v. Commonwealth. Petition to Superior 
Court for a jury to assess damages sustained to property on 
Bowdoin Street, caused by lowering of grade. Settled. 

International Rubber and Trading Company. Failure of foreign 
corporation to file first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, 
§§ 58, 60. Disposed of. 

Iowa Light, Heat and Power Company. Failure to file annual 
return with Board of Gas and Electric Light Commissioners. 
Placed on file. 

Iowa Light, Heat and Power Company. Claim for Gas and Elec- 
tric Light Commissioners' tax. Placed on file. 

Italian Associates of Fall River, Insurance Commissioner v. 
Failure to make annual report to Insurance Commissioner 
required by St. 1899, c. 442, § 19. Pending. 

Jacobson, Henning, v. Commonwealth. Petition for a writ of 
error to the Superior Court in the matter of the constitu- 
tionality of the vaccination statutes. Rescript. See 183 
Mass. 242. Pending before United States Supreme Court. 

John Stuart Company. Failure of foreign corporation to file first 
papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. Pending. 

Jones & LeBaron. Failure of foreign corporation to file first 
papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. Disposed of. 

Journal for Investors Company. Failure of foreign corporation 
to file first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. 
Disposed of. 
Kaiser Hat and Cap Company. Claim for corporation tax for 

1897. Company in insolvency. Claim proved. Pending. 
Kelly, Michael J., et al. v. John Walsh et al., trustees. Action 

of contract. Trustees discharged. 
Kennedy, George C, et al., Bradford, Treasurer, v. Claim for tide- 
water displacement. Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 165 

Knight, Alice H., Westborough Insane Asylum v. Claim for 
board of insane patient in hospital. Referred to N. N. Jones 
of Newburyport for collection. Pending. 

Knights of Justice, Order of, Insurance Commissioner v. Failure 
to make annual report to Insurance Commissioner required by 
St. 1899, c. 442, § 19. Pending. 

LaMoss, Ervin, v. Commonwealth. Petition to Superior Court 
for a jury to assess damages sustained to property on Bow- 
doin Street caused by lowering of the grade of Bowdoin 
Street. Pending. 

Lee, Thompson Company. Failure of foreign corporation to file 
certificate of condition. Pending. 

Livingstone, Murray V. Claim for board of Margie A. Living- 
stone in Westborough Insane Hospital. Pending. 

Lyman, Mary E. Claim for board of Albert C. Lyman in West- 
borough Insane Hospital. Pending. 

Maiden and Melrose Gas Light Company. Violation of R. L., 
c. 58, § 14. Gas of said company contained sulphuretted 
hydrogen. Placed on file. 

Maiden and Melrose Gas Light Company. Violation of R. L., 
c. 58, § 14. Gas of said company contained excess of sulphur. 
Referred to city. Penalty paid to Maiden. 

Maiden Electric Company. Claim for Gas and Electric Light 
Commissioners' tax. Pending. 

Manning, J. C, claim against, for damage to State highway. 
Placed on file. 

Marblehead Savings Bank, Savings Bank Commissioners v. Peti- 
tion for injunction. Decree of injunction. 

Marlborough Gas Light Company. Violation of R. L., c. 58, 
§ 14. Gas of said company less than sixteen candle-power. 
Referred to city solicitor. 

Masons Fraternal Accident Association of America, Attorney- 
General v. Petition for an injunction and the appointment 
of a receiver. Injunction issued, and Henry C. Bliss, Esq., 
appointed receiver. (James B. Carroll has been appointed 
receiver in place of Mr. Bliss, who has died.) Final decree. 

Massachusetts Masonic Life Association, Attorney-General ex rel. 
Insurance Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial 
Court for Suffolk County for an injunction and a receiver 
under St. 1896, c. 515, § 6. Injunction issued, and Jonathan 
Barnes, Esq., of Springfield, appointed receiver. Pend- 
ing. 

McArthur Brothers Company. Failure of foreign corporation to 
file certificate of condition. Pending. 



166 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

McDowell, J. F., claim against, for merchandise furnished by 
State Prison. Pending. 

McEvoy, John W., Public Administrator, v. Charles F. Wyman, 
Russian Vice-Consul. Appeal from decree of Probate Court 
appointing John W. McEvoy public administrator to admin- 
ister the estate of Julius Sapoquick. Pending. 

McQuesten, George, petitioner. Petition to the Court of Land 
Registration to register title to land in Marblehead. Pend- 
ing. 

Meany, Thomas. Claim for use of Commonwealth's laud in South 
Boston. Placed on file. 

Medway Electric Light and Power Company. Failure to file with 
Gas Light Commissioners the return required by St. 1886, 
c. 346, § 2, as extended by St. 1887, c. 387, § 2. Pend- 
ing. 

Melrose Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Insurance Commis- 
sioner y. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk 
Count}' for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. 
Injunction issued, and Alpheus Sanford, Esq., appointed 
receiver. Pending. 

Metcalf, Albert, Bradford v. Claim for tide-water displacement. 
Appeal taken to full court. Rescript. See 185 Mass. 205. 

Metropolitan Electric Third Rail and Traction Company. Failure 
of foreign corporation to file with Commissioner of Corpora- 
tions the papers required by R. L., c. 126, § 4. Referred to 
Oliver Stevens, district attorney. Disposed of. 

Middleborough v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad 
Company and the Commonwealth. Petition for damages in 
the Superior Court for Plymouth County, growing out of tak- 
ing of land for the purpose of abolishing grade crossings in 
Middleborough. Pending. 

Miles Morgan Cigar Company. Failure of foreign corporation to 
file certificate of condition. Pending. 

Milford Electric Light and Power Company, Attorney-General v. 
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for 
dissolution and the appointment of a receiver, under St. 1894, 
c. 476. Dismissed. 

Milford Gas Light Company. Violation of R. L., c. 58, § 14. 
Gas of said company less than sixteen candle-power. Re- 
ferred to town selectmen. 

Montague Electric Light and Power Company. Penalty for filing 
annual report late. Pending. 

Moody, Convers. Claim for board of Augusta A. Moody in West- 
borough Insane Hospital. Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 167 

Morgan, Jay H., Lyman School for Boys v. Action of contract 
for services of boy placed ont by trustees. Pending. 

Mount Hope Ferry Company. Failure to file return with Commis- 
sioner of Corporations. Pending. 

Mt. Pleasant Quarry Company. Failure of foreign corporation to 
file first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. Dis- 
posed of. 

Mystic Wharf and Storage Company, Attorney-General v. Peti- 
tion for an injunction to restrain respondent from dumping 
material into tide water. Pending. 

Nantucket Electric Company. Penalty for filing annual report 
late. Pending. 

National Contracting Company. Failure of foreign corporation to 
file first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. 
Disposed of. 

National Surety Company, Attorney-General v. Information to 
require defendant to pay fine incurred by false statement on 
bond. Penalty paid and petition dismissed. 

Neall, Frank L., et al. v. Commonwealth et al. Bill of complaint 
to establish a lien on funds held by treasurer under R. L., 
c. 118, § 94. Pending. 

New England Association. Failure of foreign corporation to file 
with the Commissioner of Corporations the papers required by 
R. L., c. 126, § 4. Referred to Oliver Stevens, district 
attorney. Disposed of. 

New England Benefit Association of Milford, Attorney-General 
ex rel. v. Petition for an injunction and the appointment of 
a receiver. John W. Worthington of Boston appointed 
receiver. Final decree. 

New England Electric Trades Association. Failure of foreign 
corporation to file certificate of condition. Pending. 

New England Metal Company. Failure of foreign corporation to 
file certificate of condition. Pending. 

Newburyport & Amesbury Horse Railroad Company. Railroad 
Commissioners' tax, 1899. Disposed of. 

Newburyport, City of. Claim for board of Margaret H. Knight 
at Westborough Insane Hospital. Pending. 

Newburyport Gas and Electric Co. Violation of R. L., c. 08, 
§ 14. Gas of said company less than sixteen candle-power. 
Referred to mayor of Newburyport. 

Niles Trust Estate. Claim for Gas and Electric Light Com- 
missioners' tax. Pending. 

North American Trust, Attorney-General v. Violation of R. L., 
c. 73, §§ 7, 8, and St. 1904, c. 427. Dismissed. 



168 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Northeastern Indemnity Association, Attorney-General ex rel. v. 
Petition for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. 
Injunction issued, and F. C. Nash, Esq., appointed receiver. 
Final decree. 
Northern Mutual Relief Association, Attorney-General ex rel. 
Insurance Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial 
Court for Suffolk County for an injunction and the appoint- 
ment of a receiver. Injunction granted, and Samuel H. Hud- 
son of Boston appointed receiver. Pending. 

O'Connell, Bernard D., v. Albert Mason et al. Action of tort in 
the Circuit Court of the United States. Bill dismissed. 

O'Connell, Bernard D., v. Albert Mason et al. Writ of error. 
Judgment of Circuit Court affirmed. 

O'Reily, Richard P., v. Samuel Dalton et als. Petition to the 
Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for a writ of cer- 
tiorari, claiming want of jurisdiction by the board appointed 
under St. 1893, c. 367, § 65, in the matter of the reorganiza- 
tion of the Eighth Regiment of Infantry, M. V. M. Pending. 

Order of New England, Attorney-General v. Petition for an 
injunction and receiver. Burton P. Gray appointed receiver. 
Final decree. 

Paine, Robert Treat, v. Commonwealth. Petition to Superior 
Court for a jury to assess damages sustained to property on 
Mt. Vernon Street, caused b} 7 the lowering of the grade of 
Mt. Vernon Street. Pending. 

Peare, George R., v. Socialist Labor Party. Petition to the 
Municipal Court for Suffolk County for an inquest, under 
St. 1898, c. 548, § 305. Pending. 

Pentila, Andrew, v. Bekkila Helgias and Joseph H. Scott (super- 
intendent of the Massachusetts Reformatory). An action of 
tort in the District Court for Middlesex County. Disposed of. 

People's Gas and Electric Company of Stoneham. Violation of 
R. L., c. 58, § 14. Gas of said company contained sul- 
phuretted hydrogen. Referred to town counsel. 

Peterson, Jacob J. S., Wm. B. de las Casas et al. v. Petition for 
injunction to restrain respondent from cutting ice in Charles 
River in Waltham. Pending. 

Phoenix Bridge Company. Failure of foreign corporation to file 
first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. Dis- 
posed of. 

Phoenix Iron Company. Failure of foreign corporation to file 
first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. Dis- 
posed of. 

Pittsburg Steel Construction Company. Failure of foreign cor- 
poration to file certificate of condition. Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 169 

Pittsfield Coal Gas Company. Violation of R. L., c. 58, § 14. 
Gas of said company contained twenty grains of sulphur. 
Referred to town for action. Penalty paid to town of Dalton. 

Pittsfield Electric Street Railway Company. Petition by the Com- 
monwealth for alteration of tracks of said railroad in Dalton. 
Pending. 

Plomo Specialty Manufacturing Company. Failure of foreign cor- 
poration to file first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, 
§§ 58, 60. Pending. 

Plymouth Gas Light Company. Penalty for filing annual report 
late. Pending. 

Polish Fraternal Benefit Society of St. Stainslaw Bishop, Incorpo- 
rated. Failure to file return with Insurance Commissioner. 
Pending. 

Portuguese Beneficent Association of St. Michael the Archangel, 
Incorporated. Failure to file return with Insurance Com- 
missioner. Disposed of. 

Preferred Mercantile Company of Boston, Attorney-General v. 
Information in nature of quo warranto to annul charter for 
misuse. Pending. 

Progressive Fraternity, Incorporated, Attorney- General ex rel. v. 
Petition for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. 
Injunction issued, and John W. Worthington appointed re- 
ceiver. Final decree. 

Prudential Home Purchasing Association, Attorney-General v. 
Petition for injunction and receiver. Injunction issued, and 
Burton Payne Gray appointed receiver. Final decree. 

Pugwash Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company. Failure 
of foreign corporation to file first papers required by St. 1903, 
c. 437, §§ 58, 60. Unable to locate. 

Queen Bee Gold Mining Company. Failure of foreign corporation 
to file certificate of condition. Pending. 

Quincy Granite Quarries Company. Failure of foreign corporation 
to file certificate of condition. Pending. 

R. I. Sherman Manufacturing Company. Violation of St. 1903, 
c. 95, as to use of great seal of Commonwealth. Referred to 
District Attorney Oliver Stevens. 

Radford, Harry L., v. Commonwealth. Petition for damages 
caused by injury to automobile on State highway. Dismissed. 

Revere, Town of. Failure to file assessors' return. Disposed of. 

Rice, Fannie. Claim for board in Westborough Insane Hospital. 
Pending. 

Richards, Albin M., Treasurer of the Commonwealth, v. Action 
of contract for tide water displaced in Mystic River. Dis- 
posed of. 



170 ATTORNEY-GENERALS REPORT. [Jan. 

Rosa Marie Sugar Company. Failure to file papers required of a 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Royal Exchange Assurance, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Infor- 
mation to recover penalties incurred under insurance laws. 
Settled. 

S. T. MaDan Company, Commonwealth v. Action of contract to 
recover for goods bought of Massachusetts State Prison. 
Pending. 

Safety Appliance Equipment Company. Failure of foreign cor- 
poration to file with Commissioner of Corporations papers 
required by R. L., c. 126, § 4. Referred to Oliver Stevens, 
district attorney. Disposed of. 

Salem, City of, Commonwealth v. Action of tort to recover 
penalty. Disposed of. 

Salem Gas Light Company. Violation of R. L., c. 58, § 14. 
Gas of said company less than sixteen candle-power. Penalty 
paid to Salem. 

Sargent, Clara J., v. State Board of Lunacy and Charity. Supe- 
rior Court, Essex County. Appeal on a complaint charging 
neglect of children under St. 1882, c. 181. Pending. 

Scully, John T., v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover amount 
paid by plaintiff for tide water displaced in Mystic River. 
Appeal to Supreme Judicial Court dismissed. Pending in 
Superior Court. 

Scully, John T. Claim for tide water displaced in the Charles 
River. Pending. 

Sherman, Everett F. Claim for board of Daniel W. Andrews in 
Westborough Insane Hospital. Pending. 

Shoe and Leather Mercantile Agency, Benjamin F. Bridges, 
Warden, v. State Prison claim. Pending. 

Sibley, Richard C. Claim for tide-water displacement. Dis- 
posed of. 

Smith, Maurice, v. Commonwealth. Petition for a writ of error to 
the Superior Court to reverse sentence. Pending. 

Society of Holy Mary of Carpignano, etc. Failure to file return 
with Insurance Commissioner. Disposed of. 

South Deerfield Gas Company. Failure to file annual report on 
time. Pending. 

South Hadley Gas Company. Penalty for filing annual report 
late. Pending. 

South Shore Masonic Mutual Relief Association of Massachusetts, 
Insurance Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial 
Court for Suffolk County, under St. 1895, c. 340, for an in- 
junction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction 
issued, and J. H. Flint appointed receiver. Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 171 

Spencer Gas Company. Violation of R. L., c. 58, § 14. Gas of 
said company contained sulphuretted hydrogen. Pending. 

Spencer, H. Warren, claim against, for board of Emma Wales at 
Massachusetts Hospital for Epileptics. Pending. 

St. Joseph Brotherhood Benefit Association, Incorporated. Fail- 
ure to file return with Insurance Commissioner. Disposed of. 

Starkey, Amos, Commonwealth v. Action to recover money paid 
by Preferred Mercantile Company. Pending. 

Stillings et aZ., Preferred Mercantile Company, Attorney-General 
v. Information in equity. Preliminary injunction issued. 

Stone, Joseph, Bradford v. Claim for tide water displacement. 
Reserved for consideration of- full court. Rescript. See 
185 Mass. 205. 

Sudilkover Benefit Society, Incorporated. Failure to file return 
with Insurance Commissioner. Unable to locate. 

Suffolk Masonic Mutual Relief Association, Attorney-General v. 
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County for 
an injunction and the appointment of a receiver, under St. 
1899, c. 442, § 24. Injunction granted, and Edward T. 
Pigeon, Esq., secretary of the association, appointed receiver. 
Final decree. 

Suffolk Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Insurance Commissioner 
v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County 
for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver, under the 
provisions of St. 1894, c. 522, § 7. Injunction issued, and 
James C. Davis, Esq., appointed receiver. Final decree. 

Sun Indemnity Assurance Society, Attorney-General v. Petition 
for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction 
issued, and Prescott Keyes, Esq., appointed receiver. Pending. 

Supreme Council of United Fellowship, Insurance Commissioner v. 
Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, 
under St. 1895, c. 340, for an injunction and the appointment 
of a receiver. Injunction issued, and Oscar Storer, Esq., of 
Boston, appointed receiver. Pending. 

Tarr, Caroline D. Claim for board of Thomas L. Tarr atDanvers 
Insane Hospital. Pending. 

Taunton Safe Deposit and Trust Company, Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts v. Petition for injunction and appointment of 
receiver. Frederick S. Hall appointed receiver. 

Taylor, Edgar B., et al. v. Robert Wilson and the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts. Action of contract. Pending. 

Templeton Street Railway Company, Wm. E. McClintock et als., 
Massachusetts Highway Commission v. Petition for manda- 
tory writ of injunction to compel compliance with orders of 
board changing location of tracks of said company. Pending. 



172 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Templeton Street Railway Company, Commonwealth v. Petition 
for mandamus. Pending. 

Thomaston Face and Ornamental Brick Company. Failure of 
foreign corporation to file with the Commissioner of Corpora- 
tions papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. Pend- 
ing. 

Titcomb, George H., v. Cape Cod Ship Canal Company, George 
A. Harden, Treasurer, et al. Petition for injunction to re- 
strain the Treasurer of the Commonwealth from the payment 
of money under St. 1883, c. 259, and St. 1891, c. 397. 
Pending. 

Tres Hermanas Gold Hining Company. Failure of foreign corpo- 
ration to file certificate of condition. Pending. 

Tufts, Nathan, et al. Claim for tide water displaced in the Hystic 
River. Pending. 

Twichell, Seth, v. Commonwealth et als. Action of contract. 
Pending. 

Union Paving Company. Failure of foreign corporation to file 
certificate of condition. Pending. 

Union Trust Company, Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Peti- 
tion for injunction and receiver. Charles F. Choate, Jr., and 
Samuel W. McCall appointed receivers. Pending. 

Union Waxed and Parchment Paper Company. Failure of foreign 
corporation to file certificate of condition. Pending. 

Union Wheelwright Company. Failure of foreign corporation to 
file first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. Dis- 
posed of. 

United and Consolidated Cigar and Tobacco Company. Failure 
of foreign corporation to file first papers required by St. 1903, 
c. 437, §§ 58, 60. Disposed of. 

United Brotherhood, Independent Order of Worcester, Incorpo- 
rated, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition for injunction 
and the appointment of a receiver. Injunction issued and 
Simon G. Friedman appointed receiver. Pending. 

United Fountain Pen Company. Failure of foreign corporation 
to file first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. 
Disposed of. 

United Industrials. Petition for failure to file return required by 
St. 1884, c. 330. Pending. 

United States v. Certain Land in Hull. Petition to condemn land 
in Hull. Pending. 

United States Peat-Coal Company. Failure of foreign corpora- 
tion to file certificate of condition. Pending. 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 173 

Upton Machine Company. Failure of foreign corporation to file 
first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. Dis- 
posed of. 

Vose, Julien W. Proceedings to abate filling of tide water with- 
out a license. Pending. 

W. S. Rendle Company. Failure of foreign corporation to file 
certificate of condition. Pending. 

Walton Self-Locking Block Company. Failure of foreign cor- 
poration to file first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, 
§§ 58, 60. Disposed of. 

Ware, Worcester Lunatic Hospital v. Action of contract for the 
board of Hiram L. Wood, a patient in said hospital. Re- 
ferred to the district attorney. Pending. 

Watertown, Town of. Claim for board of Thomas Ladd at 
Worcester Insane Hospital. Pending. 

Wendelschaefer, Felix, v. Joseph E. Shaw, Chief Massachusetts 
District Police. Bill in equity praying for relief from orders 
of building inspector of District Police. Pending. 

Wendmuth, E. R. Claim for board of Ethel W. Wendmuth at 
Hospital for Epileptics. Pending. 

Wells, Frank H. Claim for tide-water displacement. Pending. 

Westborough Insane Hospital v. New York, New Haven & Hart- 
ford Railroad Company. Claim for damages to property of 
hospital caused by collision at Talbot. Pending. 

Whall, H. B. Claim for board of Fannie L. B. Whall at West- 
borough Insane Hospital. Pending. 

Wilcox Manufacturing Company. Failure of foreign corporation 
to file first papers required by St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 58, 60. 
Pending. 

Wildey Casualty Company, Attorney-General ex ret. Insurance 
Commissioner v. Petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for 
Suffolk County for an injunction and the appointment of a 
receiver. Injunction granted, and Archie N. Frost, Esq., of 
Lawrence, appointed receiver. Pending. 

Williams, Fred, In re. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. Peti- 
tion dismissed. 

Winchester Printing Company. Fee for filing certificate of condi- 
tion. Pending. 

Wollaston Land Association. Claim for tide-water displacement. 
Pending. 

Worcester & Connecticut Eastern Railway Company. Failure of 
foreign corporation to file first papers required by St. 1903, 
c. 437, §§ 58, 60. Papers filed. 



174 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Worcester, City of. Claim for board of Charlotte D. Whitconib 

at Worcester Insane Hospital. Pending. 
Worcester Conservatories. Failure of foreign corporation to file 

certificate of condition. Pending. 
Wyinan, Ida Belle, Commonwealth v. Action to recover money 

paid by Preferred Mercantile Co. Pending. 
Young Men's Hebrew Benefit Association, Incorporated. Failure 

to file return with Insurance Commissioner. Disposed of. 



1905.] 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



175 



COLLECTIONS. 



Collections have been made by this department as follows : — 

Corporation taxes for the year 1903, overdue and referred 
by the Treasurer of the Commonwealth to the Attorney- 
General for collection, $62,476 16 

Interest, 945 60 

Costs, 775 59 

Miscellaneous, 112,096 59 

Total, $176,293 94 

The following table shows a detailed statement of the same : — 





Collected on 








Account of 
Corporation Tax 


Interest. 


Totals. 




for 1903. 






A. F. Stowe Manufacturing Com- 








pany, 


$201 12 


- 


$201 12 


A. W. Dunton Printing Com- 








pany, 


57 40 


$2 00 


59 40 


Allen-Higgins Company, . 


1,665 94 


6 39 


1,672 33 


American Citizen Company, 


92 18 


92 


93 10 


American Cultivator Publishing 








Company, .... 


125 70 


2 24 


127 94 


Andover Press, Limited, 


71 23 


36 


71 59 


Apsley Rubber Company, . 


6,214 60 


88 04 


6,302 64 


Atlantic Telegraph Company 








of Massachusetts, . 


83 80 


83 


84 63 


Austin & Winslow-Gallagher 








Express Company, . 


83 80 


1 42 


85 22 


Ayer Tanning Company, . 


431 57 


1 94 


433 51 


B. L. Bragg Company, 


419 00 


7 53 


426 53 


Bay State Card and Paper Com- 








pany, 


804 48 


6 68 


811 16 


Bay State Thread Works, . 


658 66 


3 29 


661 95 


Boston & Haverhill Despatch 








Company, .... 


83 80 


1 40 


85 20 


Boston Cycle and Sundry Com- 








pany, 


301 68 


7 13 


308 81 


Boston Leather Binding Com- 








pany, 


92 18 


92 


93 10 


Boston Mirror Company, . 


167 60 


1 84 


169 44 


Boston Steel and Iron Company, 


595 81 


5 56 


601 37 


Boston Stitching and Plaiting 








Company, .... 


50 28 


85 


51 13 


Boston Traveller Company, 


299 66 


5 28 


304 94 



176 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 



Collected on 

Account of 

Corporation Tax 

for 1903. 



Totals. 



Bracketts Market Corporation, . 


$20 95 


- 


|20 95 


Brennan Boot and Shoe Com- 








pany, 


113 13 


$1 05 


114 18 


Brock way-Smith Corporation, . 


1.0S9 40 


10 00 


1,099 40 


Builders Iron and feteel Com- 








pany, 


83 80 


83 


84 63 


C. \V. Russell Company, . 


50 28 


42 


50 70 


Caloric Transfer Company, 


41 90 




41 90 


Cape Ann Machine Company, . 


142 46 


- 


142 46 


Carlo w & Putnam Company, 


83 80 


36 


84 16 


Charles E. Lauriat Company, . 


838 00 


5 86 


843 86 


Chelsea Express Despatch Com- 








pany, 


83 80 


2 01 


85 81 


Codman & Hall Company, . 


670 40 


41 34 


711 74 


Cold Spring Grocery Company, 


11 73 


- 


11 73 


Columbian National Life Insur- 








ance Company, 


2,891 10 


60 23 


2,951 33 


Concord & Boston Street Rail- 








way Company, 


209 50 


10 02 


219 52 


Concord, Maynard & Hudson 








Street Railway Company, 


962 02 


32 30 


994 32 


Craig & Craig Company, . 


100 56 


1 81 


102 37 


Cunningham Lumber Company, 


103 91 


- 


103 91 


Dalton Ingersoll Company, 


1,860 36 


17 67 


1,878 03 


Dane & Washburn Company, . 


110 61 


4 52 


115 13 


Davis & Buxton Stamping Com- 








pany, 


48 60 


1 01 


49 61 


Dillon Machine Company, . 


125 70 


57 


126 27 


Doctor Ray Medicine Company, 


16 76 


40 


17 16 


E. H. Mahoney Chair Company, 


113 13 


57 


113 70 


E. H. Saxton Company, 


83 80 


76 


84 56 


E. P. Sanderson Company, 


963 70 


9 32 


973 02 


Educational Publishing Com- 








pany 


117 32 


78 


118 10 


Empire Shoe Company, 


402 24 


22 12 


424 36 


Falk & Nathan Cigar Company, 


83 80 


- 


83 80 


Frank H. Hall Company, . 


46 92 


50 


47 42 


Frederick J. Quimby Company, 


787 72 


7 88 


795 60 


Gardner Gas, Fuel and Light 








Company, .... 


94 52 


43 


94 95 


Garret-Ford Company, 


189 38 




189 38 


George P. Bingham Company, . 


335 20 


14 40 


349 60 


Gilchrist Company, . 


3,352 00 


16 76 


3,368 76 


Gilman Snow Guard Company,. 


29 33 




29 33 


Graham Shoe Company, 


435 76 


7 40 


443 16 


Greenfield Recorder Company, . 


42 73 


43 


43 16 


Gregory & Brown Company, 


335 20 


9- 40 


344 60 


Grueby-Faience Company, 


167 60 


1 17 


168 77 


H. F. Ross Company, . 


259 78 


1 60 


261 38 


H. M. Kinports Company. . 


53 63 


1 12 


54 75 


Hampshire & Worcester Street 








Railway Company (1902), . 


1,034 95 


219 75 


1,254 70 


Harrington Press, 


87 15 


55 


87 70 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — 


No. 12. 


177 




Collected on 








Account of 
Corporation Tax 


Interest. 


Totals. 




for 1903. 






Hampshire & Worcester Street 








Railway Company, . 


$952 86 


- 


$952 86 


Heath Telephone Company, 


301 68 


$1 51 


303 19 


Henry N. Clark Company, 


653 64 


6 20 


659 84 


Hinckley Rendering Company, . 


110 61 


66 


111 27 


Holly Whip Company, 


17 46 


18 


17 64 


Holyoke Thread Company, 


100 56 


7 11 


107 67 


Idea Press, ..... 


41 90 


41 


42 31 


J. D. Jewett Company, 


502 80 


5 92 


508 72 


J. F. Kimball Company, . 


838 00 


7 97 


845 97 


J. H. Williams Wall Paper Com- 








pany, 


125 70 


- 


125 70 


J. Maddock Company, 


150 84 


1 51 


152 35 


J. P. & W. H. Emond, Incorpo- 








rated, 


251 40 


12 06 


263 46 


J. W. Calnan Company, 


41 90 


41 


42 31 


John C. DeLaney Moulding 








Company, .... 


217 88 


2 17 


220 05 


Kennedy & Sullivan Manufac- 








turing Company, 


701 90 


3 05 


704 95 


Klein's Pharmacy, 


419 00 


3 91 


422 91 


Lawrence Equitable Co-oper- 








ative Society, .... 


231 70 


- 


231 70 


Lewis J. Bird Company, . 


83 80 


42 


84 22 


Lynde Bros. Box Company, 


239 66 


2 39 


242 05 


Lynn Ice Company, . 
Macdonald Company, 


836 32 


35 96 


872 28 


83 80 


- 


83 80 


Massachusetts Brick Company, . 


129 89 


6 16 


136 05 


Mayo Contracting Company, 


83 80 


56 


84 36 


Medtield & Medvvay Street Rail- 








way Company, 


377 10 


15 45 


392 55 


Mellish & Byfield Company, In- 








corporated, .... 


486 04 


6 63 


492 67 


Metropolitan Bolt Company, 


16 76 


68 


17 44 


Middlesex Real Estate Associa- 








tion of Cambridge, . 


51 95 


73 


52 68 


Mill River Electric Light Com- 








pany, 


140 78 


' - 


140 78 


Morrison Grocery Company, 


201 12 


96 


202 08 


Mutual Mail Order Company, . 


33 52 


57 


34 09 


National Finance Company, 


83 80 


1 75 


85 55 


New England Dredging Com- 








pany, 


500 00 


- 


500 00 


New England Publishing Com- 








pany, 


419 00 


3 84 


422 84 


New England Reed Company, . 


98 88 


94 


99 82 


Newark Shoe Company, . 


83 80 


54 


84 34 


Newbury port Herald Company, 


21 78 


26 


22 04 


Newton Graphic Publishing 








Company, .... 


155 86 


78 


156 64 


Norcross Brownstone Company, 


764 25 


3 82 


768 07 


Nute-Hallett Company, Incor- 








porated, ..... 


15 08 




15 08 



178 



ATTORNEY-GENERALS REPORT. 



[Jan. 





Collected on 








Account of 

Corporation Tax 

for 1903. 


Interest. 


Totals. 


Oxylectric Cured Fish Company, 


$125 70 


_ 


$125 70 


Pemberton Law Station er} T Com- 








pany, 


83 80 


- 


83 80 


People's Coal, Ice and Lumber 








Company, .... 


335 20 


$3 35 


338 55 


People's Combination Clothing 








Company, .... 


251 40 


2 63 


254 03 


People's Ice Company of 








Worcester, .... 


50 76 


66 


51 42 


Perkins Wood Working Com- 








pany, 


87 99 


44 


88 43 


Press Clipping Bureau, 


83 80 


1 17 


84 97 


R. Guastavino Company, . 


192 74 


1 77 


194 51 


Randall-Faichney Company, 


402 24 


16 48 


418 72 


Randolph Clothing Company, . 


117 32 


- 


117 32 


Rawson & Morrison Manufac- 








turing Company, . 


3,641 94 


16 39 


3,658 33 


He-New Lamp Company, . 


444 14 


2 66 


446 80 


Richard Briggs Company, . 


2,011 20 


10 05 


2,021 25 


S. Armstrong Company, . 


184 36 


92 


185 28 


Seal & Smith Company, . 


85 47 


- 


85 47 


Shady Hill Nursery Company, . 


586 60 


9 97 


596 57 


Silas Pierce & Company, Lim- 








ited, 


2,099 19 


15 05 


2,114 24 


South End Hardware Company, 


67 04 


67 


67 71 


Spatula Publishing Company, . 


92 18 


75 


92 93 


Springfield Construction Com- 








pany 


149 16 


- 


149 16 


Spy Company, .... 


67 04 


1 19 


68 23 


Standard Extract Company, 


88 82 


44 


89 26 


Suffolk Tow boat Company, 


241 34 


- 


241 34 


T. F. Little Oil Company, . 


16 76 


24 


17 00 


Tarbett-Phemister Company, 


92 18 


1 32 


93 50 


Taunton Evening News, . 


243 02 


6 98 


250 00 


Telegram Publishing Company, 


33 52 


33 


33 85 


Train Smith Company, 


838 00 


3 63 


841 63 


United States Credit Company, . 


167 60 


- 


167 60 


W. B. Clarke Company, 


502 80 


2 26 


505 06 


W. D. Parlin Hardware Com- 








pany 


419 00 


4 00 


423 00 


Wagner Spring Bed Manufac- 








turing Company, 


95 53 


47 


96 00 


Waltham Watch Tool Company 








of Springfield, 


33 52 


31 


33 83 


W T ason Mfg. Company, 


1,330 74 


5 99 


1,336 73 


Weymouth Seam-face Granite 








Company, .... 


105 58 


1 79 


107 37 


William Allen & Sons Com- 








pany 


362 01 


5 94 


367 95 


William Bourne & Sons Piano 








Company, .... 


167 60 


3 27 


170 87 


William C. Norcross Company, 


301 68 


1 51 


303 19 


William H. Burns Company, 


3,326 86 


31 61 


3,358 47 



1905.] 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



179 



Collected on 

Account of 

Corporation Tax 

for 1903. 



Totals. 



Wilson Jewelry Company, 

Worcester & Ilolden Street Rail- 
way Company, 

Worcester Automobile Com- 
pany, 

Worcester Umbrella Company, . 



$402 24 
504 47 

33 52 

268 16 



$3 21 



2 68 



$405 45 
504 47 

33 52 

270 84 



$62,476 16 



$945 60 



$63,421 76 



Miscellaneous Collections. 

Boston, City of, displacement of tide water, .... $1,000 00 

Boston Terminal Company, 94,000 00 

Cogswell, Jonathan, estate, interest on inheritance tax, . 832 20 

Columbia Electric Company, corporation tax, 1901, . . 121 35 

Coolidge, L. E., estate, penalty for failure to file annual re- 
port on time, 5 00 

Doughty, Charles, estate, penalty for failure to file annual 

report on time, 5 00 

Framingham, Town of, claim for the board of patients at 

Westborough Insane Hospital, 103 43 

Globe Worsted Mills, corporation tax, 1900, .... 342 16 

H. H. Mayhew Company, fee for filing certificates of condi- 
tion for 1902 and 1903, 10 00 

Harriman, John E., claim for the board of Sarah W. Harri- 

man at Westborough Insane Hospital, .... 20 72 

Holly Whip Company, fee for filing certificates of condition 

for 1903 and 1904, 10 00 

Holyoke Thread Company, fee for filing certificate of con- 
dition for 1903, 1 20 

Newton, City of, costs recovered in suit of Newton Rubber 

Works v. Commonwealth, 19 79 

Newton Rubber Works et aL, costs recovered in suit, . 19 79 

North Attleboro Gas Light Company, penalty for failure to 
file annual report on time, 5 00 

Royal Exchange Assurance, penalties for violation of 

statutes, 15,000 00 

South Deerfield Gas Company, penalty for failure to file 

annual report on time, 5 00 

Worcester, City of, claim for the board of Antonio Kalat at 
Worcester Insane Hospital, 71 04 

Worcester Textile Company, corporation tax, 1902, interest 

and costs, 534 91 



$112,096 59 



180 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



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1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 183 



RULES OF PRACTICE 

In Interstate Rendition. 



Every application to the Governor for a requisition upon the ex- 
ecutive authority of any other State or Territory, for the delivery 
up and return of any offender who has fled from the justice of this 
Commonwealth, must be made by the district or prosecuting attor- 
ney for the county or district in which the offence was committed, 
and must be in duplicate original papers, or certified copies thereof. 

The following must appear by the certificate of the district or 
prosecuting attorney : — 

(a) The full name of the person for whom extradition is asked, 
together with the name of the agent proposed, to be properly 
spelled. 

(6) That, in his opinion, the ends of public justice require that 
the alleged criminal be brought to this Commonwealth for trial, at 
the public expense. 

(c) That he believes he has sufficient evidence to secure the 
conviction of the fugitive. 

(d) That the person named as agent is a proper person, and 
that he has no private interest in the arrest of the fugitive. 

(e) If there has been any former application for a requisition 
for the same person, growing out of the same transaction, it must 
be so stated, with an explanation of the reasons for a second 
request, together with the date of such application, as near as 
may be. 

(/) If the fugitive is known to be under either civil or criminal 
arrest in the State or Territory to which he is alleged to have fled, 
the fact of such arrest and the nature of the proceedings on which 
it is based must be stated. 

(g) That the application is not made for the purpose of enforc- 
ing the collection of a debt, or for any private purpose whatever ; 
and that, if the requisition applied for be granted, the criminal 
proceedings shall not be used for any of said objects. 

(h) The nature of the crime charged, with a reference, when 
practicable, to the particular statute defining and punishing the 
same. 



184 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

(i) If the offence charged is not of recent occurrence, a satis- 
factory reason must be given for the delay in making the applica- 
tion. 

1. In all cases of fraud, false pretences, embezzlement or for- 
gery, when made a crime by the common law, or any penal code 
or statute, the affidavit of the principal complaining witness or 
informant, that the application is made in good faith, for the sole 
purpose of punishing the accused, and that he does not desire or 
expect to use the prosecution for the purpose of collecting a debt, 
or for any private purpose, and will not directly or indirectly use 
the same for any of said purposes, shall be required, or a sufficient 
reason given for the absence of such affidavit. 

2. Proof by affidavit of facts and circumstances satisfying the 
Executive that the alleged criminal has fled from the justice of the 
vState, and is in the State on whose Executive the demand is 
requested to be made, must be given. The fact that the alleged 
criminal was in the State where the alleged crime was committed 
at the time of the commission thereof, and is found in the State 
upon which the requisition was made, shall be sufficient evidence, 
in the absence of other proof, that he is a fugitive from justice. 

3. If an indictment has been found, certified copies, in dupli- 
cate, must accompany the application. 

4. If an indictment has not been found by a grand jury, the 
facts and circumstances showing the commission of the crime 
charged, and that the accused perpetrated the same, must be 
shown by affidavits taken before a magistrate. (A notary public 
is not a magistrate within the meaning of the statutes.) It must 
also be shown that a complaint has been made, copies of which 
must accompany the requisition, such complaint to be accompa- 
nied by affidavits to the facts constituting the offence charged by 
persons having actual knowledge thereof, and that a warrant has 
been issued, and duplicate certified copies of the same, together 
with the returns thereto, if any, must be furnished upon an appli- 
cation. 

5. The official character of the officer taking the affidavits or 
depositions, and of the officer who issued the warrant, must be 
duly certified. 

6. Upon the renewal of an application, — for example, on the 
ground that the fugitive has fled to another State, not having been 
found in the State on which the first was granted, — new or certi- 
fied copies of papers, in conformity with the above rules, must be 
furnished. 

7. In the case of any person who has been convicted of any 
crime, and escapes after conviction, or while serving his sentence, 



1905.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT— No. 12. 185 

the application may be made by the jailer, sheriff, or other officer 
having him in custody, and shall be accompanied by certified 
copies of the indictment or information, record of conviction and 
sentence upon which the person is held, with the affidavit of such 
person having him in custody, showing such escape, with the cir- 
cumstances attending the same. 

8. No requisition will be made for the extradition of any fugi- 
tive except in compliance with these rules.