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Full text of "Report of the attorney general for the year ending .."

Commonwealth of Massachusetts " 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT 



1912 




Public Document No. 12 



^ije (HammatmealMi of Mssmti^usstis. 



REPORT 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL 



Year ending January 15, 1913. 




BOSTON: 

WEIGHT & POTTER PRINTING CO., STATE PRINTERS, 

18 Post Office Square. 

1913. 



^i)t iEommcnruealtl) of ilIao5acl)U5eit0- 



Department of the Attorney-General, 
Boston, Jan. 15, 1913. 

To the Honorable Senate and House of Eepresentatives. 

I have the honor to transmit herewith nw report for the 
year ending this day. 

Very respectfnlly, 

JAMES M. SWIFT, 

Attorney-General. 



S1)C Comntonroealtf) of illaesacljusctt! 



DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, 
State House. 



Attorney-General. 
JAMES M. SWIFT. 

Assistants. 
Frederic B. Greexhalge. 
AxDREw Marshall. 
Hexry M. Hutchixgs. 
Walter A. Powers. 



Engineer of Grade Crossings. 
Hexry W. Hayes. 



Chief Clerk. 
Louis H. Freese. 



Statement of Appropriation and Expenditures. 



Appropriation for 1912, S45,000 00 

Expenditures. 

For law library, . 499 88 

For salaries of assistants, 13,873 39 

For expert services, . . 511 33 

For clerks, 3,788 67 

For office stenographers, 2,500 00 

Telephone operator, 472 00 

For messenger, 1,200 00 

For expenses in the abolition of grade crossings : — 

Salary of engineer, $3,288 15 

Other expenses incidental thereto, . 878 00 

4,166 15 

For advertising unclaimed deposits, 4,487 31 

For office expenses, . 2,617 14 

For court expenses, . 6,423 73 

Total expenditures, §40,539 60 

Costs collected, 1,914 31 

Net expenditures, S38,625 29 



0ltr Ql0mm0ttm^altl| nf MaimtLtlivussttB. 



Department of the Attorney-General, 
Boston, Jan. 15, 1913. 

To the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives. 

In compliance with Revised Laws, chapter 7, section 8, 
1 submit my report for the year ending this day. 

The cases requiring the attention of this department dur- 
ing the year, to the number of 6,793, are tabulated below: — 

Corporate franchise tax cases, 587 

Extradition and interstate rendition, 104 

Grade crossings, petitions for aboUtion of, .99 

Indictments for murder, 29 

Inventories and appraisals, 233 

Land Court petitions, 11 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Harbor 

and Land Commission, 4 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Charles 

River Basin Commission, 23 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Massa- 

cliusetts Highway Commission, 15 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Met- 
ropolitan Park Commission, 1 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land bj^ the Met- 
ropolitan Water and Sewerage Board, 14 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the State 

Board of Insanity, 7 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the I\It. 

Everett Reservation Commission, 1 

Miscellaneous cases arising from the work of the above-named 

commissions, 31 

Miscellaneous cases, 460 

Petitions for instructions under inheritance tax laws, ... 28 
Public charitable trusts, ......... 140 

Settlement cases for support of persons in State Hospitals, . 19 

All other cases not enumerated above, which include suits to re- 
quire the filing of returns by corporations and individuals and 
the collection of money due the Commonwealth, . . 4,987 



viii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Capital Cases. 
Indictments for murder pending at the date of tlie last 
annual report have been disposed of as follows : — 

Chaeles Alesando, indicted in Hampden County, De- 
cember, 1911, for the murder of Dominic Salvatore, at 
Russell, on June 24, 1911. He was arraigned Dec. 26, 1911, 
and pleaded not guilty. Richard J. Morrissey, Esq., was 
assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. The de- 
fendant was ordered to recognize in the sum of $1,000 for 
appearance from time to time. The case was in charge of 
District Attorney Christopher T. Callahan. 

Haeey H. Butts, indicted in Suffolk County, July, 1911, 
for the murder of Robert Williamson, at Boston, on June 21, 
1911. He was arraigned July 12, 1911, and pleaded not 
guilty. Joseph A. Dennison, Esq., and David E. Crawford, 
Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel for the defend- 
ant. The defendant later retracted his former plea, and 
pleaded guilty to manslaughter. This plea was accepted by 
the Commonwealth, and the defendant was sentenced to State 
Prison for a term not exceeding fourteen nor less than twelve 
years. The case was in charge of District Attorney Joseph 
C. Pelletier. 

Peter Cassetti, indicted in Norfolk County, December, 
1911, for the murder of Nicholas Cassetti, at Weymouth, on 
Oct. 1, 1911. He was arraigned Dec. 22, 1911, and pleaded 
not guilty. John E. Crowley, Esq., was assigned by the court 
as counsel for the defendant. On April 11, 1912, the defend- 
ant retracted his former plan, and pleaded guilty to man- 
slaughter. This plea was accepted by the Commonwealth, 
and the defendant was sentenced to State Prison for a term 
not exceeding nine nor less than seven years. The case was 
in charge of District Attorney Albert F. Barker. 

Harry Marshall and Lexa Cusumaxo, indicted in 
Plymouth County, October, 1910, for the murder of Fran- 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. ix 

cisco Cusumano, at Hull, on Sept. 18, 1910. They were 
arraigned 'Noy. 29, 1910, and pleaded not guilty. Thomas J. 
Grady, Esq., and William J. Coughlan, Esq., were assigned 
by the court as counsel for the defendants. In February, 
1911, the defendants were tried by a jury before Schofield, J. 
The result was a verdict of guilty of murder in the first 
degree. Motion of defendants for a new trial was denied, 
and the defendants' exceptions were overruled by the Su- 
preme Judicial Court. The defendants were thereupon sen- 
tenced to death by electrocution during the week beginning 
June 2, 1912. In the case of Lena Cusumano this sentence 
was commuted to imprisonment for life by the Governor, by 
and with the advice of the Council. In the case of Harry 
Marshall sentence was executed June 6, 1912. The case 
was in charge of District Attorney Albert F. Barker. 

Chester S. Jordan, indicted in Middlesex County, 
March, 1909, for the murder of Honora C. Jordan, at Somer- 
ville, Sept. 1, 1908. He was arraigned April 15, 1909, and 
pleaded not guilty. Charles W. Bartlett, Esq., Harvey H. 
Pratt, Esq., and Jeremiah H. Sullivan, Esq., were assigned 
by the court as counsel for the defendant. In April, 1909, 
the defendant was tried by a jury before Stevens and Bell, 
J J. The result was a verdict of guilty of murder in the first 
degree. The defendant's motion for a new trial was denied, 
and exceptions were overruled by the Supreme Judicial 
Court. The defendant was thereupon sentenced to death by 
electrocution during the week beginning March 12, 1911. 
The case was taken to the Supreme Court of the United 
States on writ of error. June 19, 1912, the writ of error was 
dismissed, and the defendant remanded to the Superior 
Court for sentence. June 21, 1912, the defendant was sen- 
tenced to death by electrocution during the week beginning 
Sept. 22, 1912, which sentence was executed Sept. 24, 1912. 
The case was in charge of District Attorney John J. Higgins. 

Silas IST. Phelps, indicted in Franklin County, July, 
1910, for the murder of Emmet F. Haskins, at Monroe, on 
June 12, 1910. He was arraigned July 12, 1910, and rear- 



X ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

raigned July 21, 1910, and pleaded not guilty. William A. 
Davenport, Esq., and Harry E. Ward, Esq., were assigned 
by the court as counsel for the defendant. In November, 

1910, the defendant was tried by a jury before Schofield, J. 
The result was a verdict of guilty of murder in the first 
degree. The defendant's exceptions were overruled, 'and the 
defendant entered an appeal from an order overruling a 
motion in arrest of judgment, which order was affirmed by 
the Supreme Judicial Court, Oct. 20, 1911. On Oct. 25, 

1911, the defendant was sentenced to death by electrocution 
during the week beginning Dec. 31, 1911. An appeal from 
this sentence was dismissed and the sentence affirmed by the 
Supreme Judicial Court, Dec. 18, 1911; which sentence was 
executed Jan. 26, 1912. The case was in charge of District 
Attorney Richard W. Irwin. 

Claeexce V. T. RiCHEsoN, indicted in Suffolk County, 
October, 1911, for the murder of Avis W. Linnell, at Boston, 
on Oct. 14, 1911. He was arraigned Nov. 13, 1911, and 
pleaded not guilty. William A. Morse, Esq., and Philip R. 
Dunbar, Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel for the 
defendant. The defendant later retracted his former plea, 
and pleaded guilty to murder in the first degree. This plea 
was accepted by the Commonwealth, and the defendant was 
sentenced to death by electrocution during the week begin- 
ning May 19, 1912, which sentence was executed on May 21, 

1912, The case was in charge of District Attorney Joseph 
C. Pelletier. 

Saverio Spang, indicted in Norfolk County, December, 
1911, for the murder of Guiseppe Rucher, at Quincy, on 
Dec. 3, 1911. He was arraigned Dec. 22, 1911, and pleaded 
not guilty. Henry T. Richardson, Esq., was assigned by the 
court as counsel for the defendant. In April, 1912, the 
defendant was tried by a jury before Quinn, J. The result 
was a verdict of guilty of manslaughter. The defendant was 
thereupon sentenced to State Prison for a term not ex- 
ceeding twelve nor less than ten years. The case was in 
charo^e of District x\ttornev Albert E. Barker. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xi 

Berteam G. Spexcek, indicted in Hampden County, 
^laj, 1910, for the murder of Martha B. Blackstone, at 
Springfield, on March 31, 1910. He was arraigned May 16, 

1910, and pleaded not guilty. E. P. Stapleton, Esq., and 
C. L. Young, Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel for 
the defendant. On Sept. 17, 1910, the defendant was com- 
mitted to the Bridgewater State Hospital for observation. 
In November, 1911, he was tried by a jury before Crosby, J., 
the trial being conducted by Attorney-General James M. 
Swift, assisted by the district attorney. The result was a 
verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. The defend- 
ant's motions for a new trial were denied, and exceptions 
were overruled by the Supreme Judicial Court. The defend- 
ant was thereupon sentenced to death by electrocution during 
the week beginning Sept. 15, 1912, which sentence was exe- 
cuted Sept. 17, 1912. The case was in charge of District 
Attorney Christopher T. Callahan. 

AjN':s"ie Tatosky, indicted in Plymouth County, June, 

1911, for the murder of an infant child, at Abington, on May 
3, 1911. She was arraigned June 14, 1911, and pleaded not 
guilty. Eeb. 28, 1912, the defendant pleaded guilty to the 
third count of the indictment, which charged concealment of 
the death of said infant child. This plea was accepted by 
the Commonwealth, and the defendant was sentenced to the 
House of Correction for one year. The case was in charge 
of District Attorney Albert E. Barker. 

Indictments for murder found since the date of the last 
annual report have been disposed of as follows : — 

Joseph Caruso, indicted in Essex County, January, 1912, 
for the murder of Anna Lo Pezzi, at Lawrence, on Jan. 29, 

1912, He was arraigned May 16, 1912, and pleaded not 
guilty. James H. Sisk, Esq., was assigned by the court as 
counsel for the defendant. In September, 1912, the defend- 
ant was tried by a jury before Quinn, J. The result was a 
verdict of not guilty. The case Avas in charge of District 
Attornev Henrv C. Attwill. 



xii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

AxTOxio GiAxxETTi, iiidicted in Essex County, April, 
1912, for the murder of Carmella Giannetti, at Saugus, on 
Sept. 15, 1911. He was arraigned May 7, 1912, and pleaded 
guilty to murder in the second degree. This plea was ac- 
cepted by the Commonwealth, and the defendant was sen- 
tenced to State Prison for life. E. M. Zottoli, Esq., was 
assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. The case 
was in charge of District Attorney Henry C. Attwill. 

Lewis Keyes, indicted in Berkshire County, January, 
1912, for the murder of Ernest Hays, at Washington, on 
Nov. 4, 1911. He was arraigned Jan. 15, 1912, and pleaded 
not guilty. P. J. Moore, Esq., was assigned by the court as 
counsel for the defendant. On Jan. 19, 1912, the defendant 
retracted his former plea, and pleaded guilty to murder in 
the second degree. This plea was accepted by the Common- 
wealth, and the defendant was sentenced to State Prison 
for life. The case was in charge of District Attorney Chris- 
topher T. Callahan. 

GuisEPPE Lacaruba, indicted in Suffolk County, August, 
1912, for the murder of Paolo DiCologero, at Boston, on 
June 30, 1912. He was arraigned Aug. 12, 1912, and 
pleaded not guilty. Thomas J. Grady, Esq., was assigned 
by the court as counsel for the defendant. Sept. 16, 1912, 
so much of the indictment as charged murder in the first 
degree was nol 'prossed, leaving it to stand for murder in the 
second degree, and the defendant was tried by a jury before 
Raymond, J. The result was a verdict of guilty of murder 
in the second degree, and the defendant was sentenced to 
State Prison for life. The case was in charge of District 
Attorney Joseph C. Pelletier. 

Ella E. Libbey^ indicted in Middlesex County, June, 
1912, for the murder of her illegitimate child, at Everett, 
on May 2, 1912. She was arraigned June 17, 1912, and 
pleaded not guilty. C. S. Warshauer, Esq., was assigned by 
the court as counsel for the defendant. On June 20, 1912, 
the defendant retracted her former plea, and pleaded guilty 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xiii 

to murder in the second degree. This plea was accepted by 
the Commonwealth, and the defendant was thereupon sen- 
tenced to the Reformatory for Women. The case was in 
charge of District Attorney John J. Higgins. 

Fadlo Mallak, indicted in Berkshire County, January, 
1912, for the murder of George E. Hoyt, at Adams, on July 
22, 1911. Sept. 9, 1911, the defendant was adjudged insane 
and was committed to the State Farm at Bridgewater. The 
case was in charge of District Attorney Christopher T. Cal- 
lahan. 

Emma E. Mooshian, indicted in Essex County, January, 
1912, for the murder of Simon Chiligerian, at Haverhill, on 
Dec. 5, 1911. She was arraigned Jan. 23, 1912, and 
pleaded guilty to murder in the second degree. This plea 
was accepted by the Commonwealth, and the defendant was 
sentenced to the Reformatory for Women. James H. Sisk, 
Esq., and W. Scott Peters, Esq., were assigned by the court 
as counsel for the defendant. The case was in chario'e of 
District Attorney Henry C. Attwill. 



&' 



Raffaele Palma, indicted in Suffolk County, February, 
1912, for the murder of Giovanni Megna, at Boston, on Jan. 
7, 1912. He was arraigned Feb. 19, 1912, and pleaded not 
guilty. Thomas J. Grady, Esq., was assigned by the court 
as counsel for the defendant. In April, 1912, the defendant 
was tried by a jury before Chase, J., and the result was a 
verdict of guilty of manslaughter. The defendant was there- 
upon sentenced to State Prison for a term not exceeding 
twelve nor less than eight years. The case was in charge 
of District Attorney Joseph C. Pelletier. 

Arthur Phaxeuf, indicted in Bristol County, February, 
1912, for the murder of Delia Phaneuf, at Fall River, on 
Jan. 27, 1912. He was arraigned June 5, 1912, and pleaded 
guilty to murder in the second degree. This plea was ac- 
cepted by the Commonwealth, and the defendant was sen- 
tenced to State Prison for life. Edward Higginson, Esq., 



xiv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

was assigned hj the court as counsel for the defendant. The 
case was in charge of District Attorney Joseph T. Kenney. 

LuiGi Peisco, indicted in Suffolk County, March, 1912, 
for the murder of George Andrews, at Boston, on Feb. 22, 
3 912. He was arraigned May 20, 1912, and pleaded guilty 
•to manslaughter. This plea was accepted by the Common- 
w^ealth, and the defendant Avas sentenced to State Prison for 
a term not exceeding twenty nor less than fifteen years. 
Jeremiah S. Sullivan, Esq., and Frank M. Prisco, Esq., were 
assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. The 
case was in charge of District Attorney Joseph C. Pelletier. 

Feak^k E. Ryan, indicted in Middlesex County, January, 
1912, for the murder of Georgianna M. L. Ryan, at Somer- 
ville, on Dec. 26, 1911. He was arraigned Jan. 10, 1912, 
and pleaded not guilty. Thomas F. Yahey, Esq., was as- 
signed by the court as counsel. The defendant later retracted 
his former plea, and pleaded guilty to murder in the second 
degree. This plea was accepted by the Commonwealth, and 
the defendant was sentenced to State Prison for life. The 
case was in charge of District Attorney John J. Higgins.. 

Roc CO Salomone, indicted in Suffolk County, March, 
1912, for the murder of Guiseppe Napolitano, at Boston, on 
Feb. 9, 1912. He was arraigned April 6, 1912, and pleaded 
not guilty. Frank M. Zottoli, Esq., was assigned by the 
court as coimsel for the defendant. In April, 1912, the de- 
fendant was tried by a jury before Chase, J. The result 
was a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree, and 
the defendant was sentenced to State Prison for life. The 
case was in charge of District Attorney Joseph C. Pelletier. 

The following indictments for murder are now pend- 
ing:— 

DoMEXico Bexixato, indicted in Middlesex County, Sep- 
tember, 1912, for the murder of Giovannina Natoli, at Wal- 
tham, on Nov. 21, 1911. He was arraigned Nov. 14, 1912, 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xv 

and pleaded not guilty. John J. Mitchell, Esq., was assigned 
by the court as counsel for the defendant. No further action 
has been taken in this case. The case is in charge of District 
Attorney John J. Higgins. 

Stefan Borasky and Antone Kolek, indicted in Hamp- 
den County, December, 1911, for the murder of Rose Aman- 
sky, at Granville, on Sept. 27, 1911. They were arraigned 
May 20, 1912, and pleaded not guilty. Joseph E. Carmody, 
Esq., was assigned by the court as counsel for the defendants. 
In June, 1912, the defendants w^ere tried by a jury before 
King, J. The result was a verdict of guilty of murder in the 
first degree. The motion of the defendants for a new trial 
was denied. Aug. 1, 1912, suggestion of the death of the 
defendant Antone Kolek was filed. The exceptions of the 
defendant Stefan Borasky are now pending. The case is 
in charge of District Attorney Christopher T. Callahan. 

Jessie M. Chapman, indicted in Essex County, April, 
1912, for the murder of Eva E. Ingalls, at Lynn, on March 
G, 1912. She was arraigned May 7, 1912, and pleaded not 
guilty. W. Scott Peters, Esq., appeared as counsel for the 
defendant. No further action has been taken in this case. 
The case is in charge of District Attorney Henry C. Attwill. 

William A. Dorr, indicted in Essex County, April, 1912, 
for the murder of George E. Marsh, at Lynn, on April 11, 
1912. He was arraigned July 12, 1912, and pleaded not 
guilty. C. Neal Barney, Esq., appeared as counsel for the 
defendant. No further action has been taken in this case. 
The case is in charge of District Attorney Henry C. Attwill. 

LuiGi Melixazzo, indicted in Middlesex County, Septem- 
ber, 1912, for the murder of Antonio Lando, at Waltham, 
on Aug. 12, 1912. He was arraigned Sept. 12, 1912, and 
pleaded not guilty. Frank M. Zottoli, Esq., was assigned by 
the court as counsel for the defendant. No further action has 
been taken in this case. The case is in charge of District 
Attornev John J. Hiffo^ins. 



xvi ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Nicholas Tsouklaris, indicted in Essex County, July, 
1912, for the murder of George Kashouris, at Peabody, -on 
May 3, 1912. He was arraigned July 12, 1912, and pleaded 
not guilty. William H. Eay, Esq., was assigned by the 
court as counsel for the defendant. No further action has 
been taken in this case. The case is in charge of District 
Attorney Henry C. Attwill. 

Grade Crossixgs. 

Construction has been in progress since the last report at 
East Boston, Bourne, Clinton, Lowell, Lynn, Neponset, Som- 
erville, Weston and Worcester, and 46 visits of inspection 
to these various places have been made by the engineer of 
grade crossings. 

Eorty-six hearings before, and conferences with, special 
commissioners and auditors have been attended by this de- 
partment, either by the engineer of grade crossings or by an 
assistant attorney-general. 

Statements of expenditures, numbering 43, amounting 
to $2,454,485.25, have been examined. Objection to items 
amounting to $86,230.78 has been made, $5,105.43 of which 
have been disallowed, and decisions as to $73,972.53 are 
pending. Of objections made in previous years, $5,939.43 
have been disallowed, m.aking a total amount disallowed dur- 
ing the year of $11,044.86, and decisions are now pending 
as to $166,575.69. 

Plans have been prepared in two cases for presentation to 
commissions. 

The engineer of grade crossings has also been employed by 
the Board of Railroad Commissioners a total of twenty-seven 
and one-half days, under authority of St. 1911, c. 214. 

Reclaiming SAvi^s^cfs Bak^iv Deposits. 
LTnder the provisions of St. 1908, c. 590, § 57, it is pro- 
vided that any person claiming a right to money deposited 
with the Treasurer and Receiver-General, which has been 
paid into the treasury of the Commonwealth under the pro- 
visions of St. 1908, c. 590, § 56, that deposits that have 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xvii 

remained unclaimed for more than thirty years shall be so 
jDaid into the treasury, may bring a petition to establish such 
right in the Superior Court. It has been suggested that 
inasmuch as the original proceedings for payment of such 
deposits into the treasury of the Commonwealth is by peti- 
tion of the Attorney-General filed in the Probate Court, and 
the records of the cases are in that court, and such deposits 
are actually paid under decree of the Probate Court, the 
Probate Court and not the Superior Court is the proper 
court for the bringing of the petition under section 57 to 
have the money repaid by the Treasurer to the claimant. 
I concur with that suggestion, and recommend that legisla- 
tion be enacted which will provide for such change. 

Retuexs of Legislative Couxsel. 
A request of the Secretary of the Commonwealth for an 
opinion concerning the so-called " lobby returns act," relating 
to legislative counsel or agents (K. L., c. 3, §§ 24, 25 and 
30), caused me to consider these provisions and to render an 
opinion thereon, in substance, that the requirement of these 
provisions is not satisfied by the mere statement that counsel 
are employed at an annual salary, without stating any amount, 
and that the intent of the act was to require a complete and 
detailed statement of all expenses incurred or paid in con- 
nection with the employment of legislative counsel or agents, 
and that the requirements of this act could only be properly 
carried out by a statement of the amount of the annual salary 
or by a definite apportionment of the amount charged for 
legislative services. While this interpretation has been gen- 
erally accepted and observed, there have been differences of 
opinion expressed by certain counsel coming under said pro- 
visions, as to the enforceability of such interpretation of the 
enactments as they stand. In order to avoid possible con- 
tests in the courts in this regard these provisions should be 
amended in order to be effective in carrying out the purposes 
for which they were apparently intended ; that is, to make 
public the actual amount of expenditures on behalf of or 
concernino' lea'islation. I therefore recommend that some 



xviii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

amendment be passed bv the Legislature specifying the re- 
quirements above set forth, or making other provision that 
may appear to the Legislatnre better adapted to carry out 
the intent of those enactments. 

Department of the Attoeney-Gexeeae. 

The amonnt of work in this department has continued its 
consistent increase during the year. The number of cases 
requiring the attention of the office for 1911 was 5.338, which 
number has been increased during the past year to 6,793. 

Additional suits against the various savings banks in the 
Commonwealth have been instituted during the year to re- 
cover deposits which have been unclaimed for more than 
thirty years, under the provisions of St. 1907, c. 340, and 
St. 1908, c. 590, §§ 56 and 57, and the amount of $81,755.93 
has already been recovered by such actions, while final action 
in other cases is still pending. 

Eleven cases have been argued before the Supreme Judi- 
cial Court of the Commonwealth during the year. 

In the L^nited States Supreme Court the case of Jordan v. 
Commonwealth, involving important constitutional questions 
with reference to the ^lassachusetts criminal procedure, has 
been argued and disposed of, that court having sustained 
the decision of our Supreme Judicial Court in favor of the 
Commonwealth, and the sentence has been executed in ac- 
cordance with law. 

There are now pending in the LTnited States Supreme 
Court two cases which involve the constitutionality of the law 
of this Commonwealth concerning taxation of foreign cor- 
porations, said cases being Baltic Mining Company v. 
Cormiionwealth of Massachusetts and S. S. White Dental 
Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth of Massachu- 
setts. 

Demands upon this department during the year for in- 
vestigations and action involving matters that may be termed 
questions of general social welfare cause me to call attention 
to the fact, to which I referred in my last annual report, 
that this department as now constituted is not properly 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xix 

authorized or equipped to undertake any adequate investi- 
gation or action along these lines. If social, civic and politi- 
cal conditions in this Commonwealth are so changed that it 
is deemed advisable by the Legislature that the Attorney- 
General and his department should engage in such under- 
takings, I respectfully suggest that the policy of the laws by 
which the Attorney-General is now governed should be 
altered, and that broader powers and a largely increased 
appropriation of money be assigned to him by appropriate 
legislation. 

Two volumes of the official opinions of the Attorneys- 
General have already been printed, which contain the im- 
portant opinions from 1891 to 1905, inclusive, and which 
have come into general use as valuable books of reference. 
Since the last publication there have been rendered opinions 
enough to make a third volume, of uniform size and contents 
with the preceding volumes I and II. I therefore request 
that the Attorney-General be authorized by resolve of the 
Legislature to collate, edit and publish, in a volume prop- 
erly indexed and digested, such of the official opinions 
since the year 1905 as the Attorney-General may deem to be 
of public interest or useful for reference ; and that the edition 
so published may be distributed imder the supervision of the 
Attorney-General. An appropriation of $2,500 would prob- 
ably be adequate to cover the expense. 

To fill the vacancy created by the retirement of former 
Assistant Attorney-General Field at the beginning of the 
year, I appointed Mr. Walter A. Powers of Brookline, who 
has rendered valuable service to the department since his 
appointment. 

Annexed to this report are the principal opinions sub- 
mitted during the current year. 

Respectfully submitted, 

JAMES M. SWIFT, 

Attorney-General. 



OPINIONS. 



Marriage — Notice of Intention of Marriage — Entry — Cer- 
tificate. 

Under the provision of E. L., c. 151, § 16, as amended by St. 1911, c. 736, 
$ 1, that " persons who intend to be joined in marriage in this com- 
monwealth shall, not less than five days before their marriage, cause 
notice of their intention to be entered in the office of the clerk or 
registrar of the city or town in which they respectively dwell, or, if 
they do not dwell within the commonwealth, in the office of the clerk 
or registrar of the city or town in which they propose to have the 
marriage solemnized,'* and the provision of E. L., c. 151, § 53, as 
amended by St. 1911, c. 736, § 2, that " after the expiration of five 
days from the date of the entry of such intention the clerk or regis- 
trar shall deliver to the parties a certificate . . . , specifying the time 
when notice of the intention of marriage was entered with him . . .", 
delivery of the certificate should not be made until the expiration 
of five full days after the date of entry, excluding the day of such 
delivery and Sundays and holidays. 

Jan. 2, 1912. 

Hon. Albert P, Langtry, Secretary of the Commonwealth. 

Dear Sir : — You have requested my opinion as to the man- 
ner in which the time which must elapse between the entry of 
notice of intention of marriage and the issuing of the certificate 
thereof is to be computed. 

E. L., c. 151, § 16, as amended by St. 1911, c. 736, § 1, is 
as follows : — 

Persons who intend to be joined in marriage in this common- 
wealth shall, not less than five days before their maiTiage, cause 
notice of their intention to be entered in the office of the clerk or 
registrar of the city or town in which they respectively dwell, or, 
if they do not dwell within the commonwealth, in the office of the 
clerk or registrar of the city or town in which they propose to have 
the marriage solemnized. 

E. L., c. 151, § 23, as amended by St. 1911, c. 736, § 2, is, 
in part, as follows : — 



2 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

After the expiration of five days from the date of the entry of 
such intention the clerk or registrar shall deliver to the parties a 
certificate signed by him, specifying the time when notice of the 
intention of marriage was entered with him and all facts relative to 
the maiTiage which are required by law to be ascertained and 
recorded, except those relative to the jDerson by whom the marriage 
is to be solemnized. 

R. L., c. 151, § 25, as amended by St. 1911, c. 736, § 3, pre- 
scribes a penalty for the improper issuing of a certificate of 
intention of marriage. 

The language used in section 16, as amended, to describe the 
five days' period is different from that used in section 23, as 
amended. It describes, however, the same period of time, and 
must be construed in the same way. In computing the five 
days' period in accordance with section 23, as amended, the date 
of the entr}^ of intention must be excluded. Bemis v. Leonard, 
118 Mass. 502. The language clearly indicates that five days 
are to expire before the delivery of the certificate, that is, 
the day of such, delivery is to be excluded from the computation. 
Fractions of a day are, of course, to be disregarded (see H an- 
num V. Tourtellott, 10 Allen, 494), as a day means twenty- 
four hours and begins at midnight. As to Sunday, the gen- 
eral rule is that " when a statute fixes a limitation of time within 
which a particular act may or may not be done," if the time 
limited " is less than a week, Sunday is excluded." Cunning- 
ham V. Mahan, 112 Mass. 58, 59. I know of no reason why 
the general rule should not be applied to the statute in question. 
The meaning of this statute is that persons who are interested 
in an intended marriage are entitled to a reasonable opportunity 
on each of five days to examine the records in the office of 
the clerk or registrar of the city or to^vn for the notice of 
intention of such marriage. On Sunday the clerk or registrar 
is not required to keep his office open and his records are not 
ordinarily open to inspection. Similarly, he is not required to 
keep his office open on a legal holiday. R. L., c. 8, § 4, cl. 9. 
Such a holiday should, therefore, in my opinion, be excluded 
from the computation. See, however, my opinion to the Gov- 
ernor of the Commonwealth, under date of June 1, 1911. 
Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



1913.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



Legislative Counsel and Agents — Returns — Compensation. 

The provision of R. L., c. 3, $ 24, requiring the keeping of a docket 
for the entry of the names of legislative counsel and agents, that 
" such entries shall include the name and business address of the 
employer, the name, residence and occupation of the person em- 
ployed, the date of the employment or agreement therefor, the 
duration of the employment, . . . and the special subjects of leg- 
islation, if any, to which the employment relates," is satisfied by 
an entry that a person is so employed " on all matters of interest 
to the employer," unless the employment is for some special sub- 
ject of legislation. 

The provision of R. L., c. 3, § 24, above quoted, and the further pro- 
vision of section 30, that an employer " shall render to the secre- 
tary of the commonwealth a complete and detailed statement, under 
oath, of all expenses incurred or paid in connection with the em- 
ployment of legislative counsel or agents, or with promoting or 
opposing legislation," are not complied with by a statement that 
a person is employed as legislative counsel upon an annual salary 
without a statement either of the amount of such salary or of a fair 
apportionment thereof. 

Jan. 9, 1912. 
Hon. Albert P. Langtry, Secretary of the Commonwealth. 

Dear Sir : — You have requested my opinion with reference 
to E. L., c. 3, §§ 23, 34, 25 and 30, in substance as to whether 
a general statement that a legislative counsel or agent is em- 
ployed "on all matters of interest to said corporation," is in 
compliance with the law. 

Said section 24, after requiring the keeping of a docket in 
which shall be entered the names of legislative counsel and 
agents, provides that — 

Such. entries shall include the name and business address of the 
employer, the name, residence and occupation of the person em- 
ployed, the date of the employment or agreement therefor, the 
duration of the employment, if it can be determined, and the spe- 
cial subjects of legislation, if any, to which the employment re- 
lates. 

Under this section, in my opinion, no entry is required other 
than one such as " on all matters of interest to said corporation," 
unless said emplojmient is for some special subject of legislation. 
There may be a general employment other than employment in 
connection with specific legislation. Section 25, however, re- 
quires further entries, both by the employer and the employee. 



4 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Under the requirements of this section I am of the opinion that 
although the original employment may be general, a counsel 
or agent before acting with reference to any specific piece of 
legislation must make an entry of that specific legislation upon 
the docket. 

You also request my opinion in substance as to whether the 
return by a legislative counsel or agent of employment on an 
annual salary, which salary is not stated, is in compliance with 
the law. Said section 30 requires that the employer " shall ren- 
der to the secretary of the commonwealth a complete and de- 
tailed statement, under oath, of all expenses incurred or paid 
in connection with the employment of legislative counsel or 
agents, or with promoting or opposing legislation." This does 
not, in my opinion, require an employer to make a detailed 
payment for each particular service. The statute, however, is 
not complied with by a mere statement that the legislative 
counsel is employed upon an annual salary. If the service per- 
formed as legislative counsel or agent is substantial in amount, 
so that it must have been taken into consideration in fixing the 
amount of the annual salary, there is expense incurred within 
the meaning of the statute which should be made to appear in 
some manner. It is not clear just how this should be done in 
case no apportionment is made by the employer. If the annual 
salary is stated it would seem to cover the requirement of the 
statute, or if a fair apportionment of said salary was made, 
and that part apportioned to legislative work is returned, the 
provisions of the statute would seem to be fulfilled. A mere 
return of an annual salary, without stating any amount, is not, 
in my opinion, a compliance with the law. 
Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General, 



Attorney-General — Order fixing Limit of Time for Perform- 
ance of Duty to advise General Court — Street Railway 
Corporation — New York, Neiu Haven & Hartford Rail- 
road Company — Ownership and Control of Springfield 
Street Railway Company — ■ Supreme Judicial Court — 
Decree — ■ Compliance. 
The General Court has no authority to fix a limit of time within which 
the Attorney-General shall discharge his statutory duty of advis- 
ing the General Court or either branch of it. 
The action of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Com- 
pany in divesting itself of all interest in or control over the New 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 5 

England Investment and Security Company, which, through the 
instrumentality of the Springfield Railway Companies, owned and 
controlled the Springfield Street Railway Company, and by placing 
the stock of such street railway company in the ownership and 
control of the New England Investment and Security Company, 
whose trustees and officers are not connected as officers or direc- 
tors with the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Com- 
pany and have entered into no agreement, trust or other under- 
taking with said company, with respect to their acts as officers 
or trustees of the New England Investment and Security Company, 
if performed in good faith, constitutes a compliance with the decree 
of the Supreme Judicial Court dated June 23, 1908, which en- 
joined the New York, NeAV Haven & Hartford Railroad Company 
from subscribing for or taking or holding, directly or indirectly, the 
stock of the Springfield Street Railway Company, and from assum- 
ing or exercising the franchise or privilege of subscribing for, 
taking or holding the stock of such corporation. 

Jan. 29, 1912. 
Hon. Levi H. Greenwood, President of the Senate. 

Sir: — On June 2, 1911, the General Court adopted an order 
in the following terms : — 

Ordered, That the Attorney-General report to the General Court, 
not later than Jan. 15, 1912, whether the New York, New Haven 
& Hartford Raih^oad Company has complied, with respect to the 
Springfield Street Railway Company, with the order of the court, 
as more particularly set out in a decree, under date of June 23, 
1908, of the Supreme Judicial Court; and, if so, how said railroad 
company has divested itself of its interest in said railway in accord- 
ance with said decree. 

With respect to the form of the order, it is to be observed that 
the General Court has no authority to fix a limit of time within 
which the Attorney-General shall discharge his statutory duty 
of advising the General Court, or either branch of it. See II 
Op. Atty.-Gen. 125, 405. 

It may be doubted, also, whether the order as framed presents 
any such question of law as is contemplated by the provision of 
R. L., c. 7, § 7, that the Attorney-General " shall give his 
opinion upon questions of law submitted to him by the governor 
and council or by either branch of the general court," inasmuch 
as no sufficient facts are presented to raise any question of law; 
and the order apparently contemplates not so much a deter- 
mination of a question of law as an investigation into existing 
facts and a report thereon. Inasmuch, however, as it appear? 



6 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

that certain facts with respect to the action of the New York, 
iSTew Haven & Hartford Railroad Company in the premises 
have been presented to the Board of Railroad Commissioners in 
connection with a petition of the Springfield Street Railway 
Company and the Western Massachusetts Street Railway Com- 
pany and a petition of the Uxbridge & Blackstone Street Rail- 
way Company and the Worcester & Blackstone Valley Street 
Railway Company for the approval by such Board of proposed 
consolidations of the companies joining in each of the respec- 
tive petitions, upon which such Board has officially acted, and 
the same facts were submitted to certain individual members 
of the Committee on Railroads at the session preceding that at 
which the order above quoted was adopted, in connection with 
the passage of St. 1910, c. 601, authorizing the New York, New 
Haven & Hartford Railroad Company to acquire, purchase, hold 
and own the whole, or any part not less than half, of the 
capital stock of the Berkshire Street Railway Company, it may 
fairly be presumed that such facts were known to the General 
Court. I shall, therefore, assume that the question of law in- 
tended to be submitted by the order of the General Court was, 
in substance, whether or not the acts of the New York, New 
Haven & Hartford Railroad Company as presented to the Board 
of Railroad Commissioners constitute a proper compliance with 
the terms of the decree of June 23, 1908, referred to in said 
order. 

The history of the litigation between the Commonwealth and 
the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company is 
fully discussed in the reports of my predecessor to the General 
Court for the years 1907 (p. xiii.) and 1908 (p. xv.). The 
decree referred to was rendered upon an information in equity 
brought by the Attorney-General under the provisions of St. 
1906, c. 372, in substance alleging that the New York, New 
Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, a corporation duly organ- 
ized under the laws of this Commonwealth for the purpose, 
among others, of owning and operating a railroad therein, had 
directly and indirectly subscribed for, taken and held the stock 
and bonds and had guaranteed the bonds and dividends and 
was then directly and indirectly holding the stock and bonds 
and was guaranteeing the bonds and dividends of certain street 
railway companies incorporated under the laws of this Common- 
wealth, to wit, the Worcester & Southbridge Street Railway 
Company, the Worcester & Blackstone Valley Street Railway 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 7 

Company, the Worcester & Webster Street Eailway Company, 
the Webster & Dudley Street Eailway Company, the Berkshire 
Street Eailway Company and the Springfield Street Eailway 
Company, and that the stock and bonds held and the bonds 
and dividends guaranteed by said railroad company were so 
held and guaranteed without authority from the General Court, 
or any law thereof, and that the New York, New Haven & 
Hartford Eailroad Company, by reason of the acts described, 
had assumed and exercised and was assuming and exercising a 
franchise and privilege and had transacted and was transact- 
ing a kind of business not authorized by its charter or by the 
laws of this Conunonwealth, to wit, the franchise and privilege 
of acquiring, taking and holding the stock and bonds of such 
domestic street railway corporations and of guaranteeing the 
bonds and dividends of said corporations and of owning and 
operating said street railway corporations and the business of 
acquiring or purchasing said stock and bonds and of guarantee- 
ing said bonds and dividends, and of owning and operating 
street railway corporations, in violation of law and to the preju- 
dice and damage of the Commonwealth. The petition then 
concludes — 

Wherefore, the Attorney-General prays the consideration of this 
court in the premises, and that a writ of injunction issue restrain- 
ing said New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Company 
from the further use and enjoyment of said franchise and privilege 
and from the further prosecution of the said business, and for 
such other relief in the premises as equity and justice may require. 

The decree, so far as it is material to the question now pre- 
sented, is as follows : — 

It is ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows : — 
The defendant is, and its officers, directors, attorne^^s, agents and 
employees, respectively and collectively, are hereby enjoined and 
restrained : — 

1. From subscribing for or taking, directly or indirectly, the 
capital stock of the Worcester & Southbridge Street Railway Com- 
pany, the Worcester & Blackstone Valley Street Eailway Companj^, 
the Worcester & Webster Street Railway Company, the Web- 
ster & Dudley Street Eailway Company, the Berkshire Street Eail- 
way Company and the Spring-field Street Eailway Company, or 
either of them, all being street railway corporations incorporated 



8 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

under and by virtue of the laws of this Commonwealth, and men- 
tioned in the information. 

2. From assuming or exercising- the franchise or privilege of sub- 
scribing for, or taking, directly or indirectly, the stock of said 
street railway corporations, or either of them. 

3. From holding, directly or indirectly, the stock of said street 
railway corporations, or either of them, after the first day of July, 
in the year 1909. 

4. From assuming or exercising the franchise or privilege of 
holding, directly or indirectly, the stock of said street railway cor- 
porations, or either of them, after the first day of July, in the 
year 1909. 

Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall affect 
existing leases executed in accordance with the provisions of chap- 
ter 293 of the Acts of the year 1901 of this Commonwealth. 

From this decree the defendant appealed, and the decree was 
finally aflSrmed in Attorney-General v. New York, New Haven 
& Hartford Railroad Co., 201 Mass. 370. 

The state of facts to which this decree was applicable arose 
as follows: the N'ew York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad 
Company, a consolidated corporation created by the concur- 
rent legislation of the State of Connecticut and the Common- 
wealth of Massachusetts, acquired in the years 1903 and 1904 
all the shares of stock of the Worcester & Connecticut Eastern 
Railway Company, which by appropriate legislation in the State 
of Connecticut became, in part at least, a holding corporation 
under the name of Consolidated Railway Company of Connecti- 
cut. The Consolidated Railway Company of Connecticut in turn 
acquired all or a majority of the stock of the domestic street 
railway corporations named in the information of the Attorney- 
General, except the Springfield Street Railway Company, of 
which substantially all of the stock was acquired by a voluntary 
association known as the Springfield Railway Companies, created 
for that purpose and controlled by the Consolidated Railway 
Company of Connecticut. The attention of the Legislature of 
1905 having been directed to the situation so created with re- 
spect to the ownership of the stock in domestic street railways, 
and being advised by the then Attorney- General that the owner- 
ship and control of the capital stock of street railway companies 
incorporated in Massachusetts by the New York, New Haven & 
Hartford Railroad Company or the Consolidated Railway Com- 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 9 

pany of Connecticut was illegal (see II Op. Atty.-Gen. 570), an 
inquiry into the facts relative to such acquisition was begun, 
but no definite action was taken thereon. In the Legislature of 
the following year the discussion was renewed; a bill entitled 
"An Act relative to investments by railroad corporations in 
street railway companies" was introduced but not finally 
adopted, and St. 1906, c. 372, which authorized the Attorney- 
General to proceed by an information in equity against any cor- 
poration which assumed or exercised a franchise or transacted 
a business not authorized by the laws of the Commonwealth, and 
under which the information in the present case Avas brought, 
was enacted. On June 26, 1906, before the conclusion of the 
session of the Legislature for that year, the Consolidated Eail- 
way Company of Connecticut sold and conveyed to the Xew 
England Investment and Security Company, a voluntary as- 
sociation, all of the stock, bonds and other securities held by it 
in the Worcester & Southbridge Street Railway Company, the 
Worcester & Blackstone Valley Street Eailway Company and 
the Berkshire Street Eailway Company, and 102 shares of stock 
in the Springfield Street Eailway Company, and also sold and 
conveyed to said company all of its interest in the Springfield 
Eailway Companies, which then held 19,253 shares of the stock 
of the Springfield Street Eailway Company, which, with the 
102 shares already referred to, were substantially all of the 
shares of said stock. In 1907, under authority of an act of 
the Connecticut Legislature (House Joint Eesolution Xo. 357) 
the 'New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Company was 
merged into the Consolidated Eailway Company of Connecticut, 
and the consolidated corporation, by a later statute, became the 
New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Company. So far 
as I am aware the situation so established continued unchanged 
until May 8, 1908, when the opinion in the case of Attornetj- 
General v. New YorJc, Neiv Haven & Hartford Eailroad Co., 
198 Mass. 413, was handed do\ATi. In that decision the court 
held, in substance, that the Consolidated Eailway Company of 
Connecticut and the two voluntary associations, the Springfield 
Eailway Companies and the New England Investment and Se- 
curity Company, were all instrumentalities of the New York, 
New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Company through which such 
corporation acquired and OT\Tied and used the property of the 
domestic street railway corporations named in the information. 



10 ATTORNEY-GENERAL^S REPORT. [Jan. 

*' with as complete control as it has over its locomotive engines," 
in violation of the provision of St. 1906, c. 463, Part IL, § 57,. 
that — 

A 'railroad corporation, unless authorized by the general court or 
by the provisions of the following five sections, shall not directly 
or indirectly subscribe for, take or hold the stock or bonds of or 
guarantee the bonds or dividends of any other corporation. 

The court further stated, on page 431, that — 

From the findings and evidence in the very voluminous report 
of the master, and notably from the testimony of Mr. Mellen, the 
president of the voluntary associations, and the corporations, and 
of Harmer, the secretary and comptroller of the New England 
Investment and Security Company, it is plain that all the street 
railway companies mentioned in the information are indirectly held 
and controlled and managed in the interest of the defendant as. 
absolutely and completely as it holds and manages its line of rail- 
road between Springfield and New York. 

It thus appeared that the precise situation to which the de- 
cree above quoted was directed was an indirect and illegal con- 
trol by the New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Com- 
pany of the stock, bonds and other securities of the specified 
domestic street railway corporations, effected through an owner- 
ship by the New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Com- 
pany of all of the stock of the Consolidated Railway Company 
of Connecticut, which, in turn, controlled the Springfield Rail- 
way Companies and the New England Investment and Security 
Company, which held the legal title to the stock, bonds and other- 
securities of such domestic street railway corporations. 

The decree in terms enjoins and restrains the defendant, and 
its officers, directors, attorneys, agents and employees, in two. 
respects, — first, from subscribing for or taking either directly 
or indirectly, and from assuming to exercise the franchise or 
privilege of subscribing for or taking directly or indirectly, the 
stock of the street railways included within its provisions; and 
second, from holding directly or indirectly, and from assuming 
the franchise or privilege of holding directly or indirectly, such 
stock. Briefly stated, those enjoined must not, either directly 
or indirectly, acquire or hold such stock. It is unnecessary to- 
determine what should be deemed to constitute a direct acquisi- 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 11 

tion or holding of the stock by the New York, New Haven & 
Hartford Railroad Company or its officers, directors, attorneys, 
agents and employees, since upon the facts in evidence the court 
failed to find that the acquisition and holding were direct in 
the first instance. With respect to an indirect subscription for 
and taking of such stock subsequent to the date of the decree 
no question appears to have been raised, and therefore the sole 
inquiry presented for my determination is whether or not that 
corporation has ceased to indirectly hold or control the stock of 
the Springfield Street Eailway Company, the corporation named 
in the order of the General Court. 

In Attorney -General v. New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Co., 198 Mass. 413, the court, at page 426, has defined 
the words " subscribed for, take or hold " in St. 1906, c. 463, 
Part II., § 57, as — 

intended to include legal ownership of every kind. The word " indi- 
rectly " covers other modes of holding than by taking or holding 
the legal title. The words together cover every kind of proprietary 
interest in the stock or bonds referred to. It is immaterial how or 
where the legal title is held directly, if, indirectly, the railroad cor- 
poration is the equitable or beneficial owner of it. What the Legis- 
lature was seeking to prevent was influence in the management of 
the subordinate corporation by the other corporation, however exer- 
cised, and whether extending to absolute control or falling short 
of it. With this in \iew, language was used in the statute to in- 
clude every kind of beneficial ownership, however indirectly held. 

The situation with respect to the indirect holding of the 
stock by the New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Com- 
pany was described at length by the court, at pages 426-431 : — 

The master's summary of facts and the other findings that appear 
in the report show how completely the defendant controls the street 
railways in question. The capital stock of all of them but the 
Springfield Street Railway Company was bought and held by 
the Consolidated Railway Company, all of whose stock is held by the 
defendant, and all of whose directors are the defendant's directors. 
If we assume that this corporation was legally organized and is 
legally maintained, so as to have a separate corporate existence, 
it is in reality a piece of legal machinery owned and operated by 
the defendant. Through this the defendant acquires and owns and 
uses property with as complete control as it has over its locomo- 
tive engines. If it does this indirectly, it does it as effectively as 



12 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

if the ownership were direct. Through the direct purchase and 
ownership of the street railway corporations, by its creature, the 
Consolidated Railway Company, the defendant transgressed the 
law as to all the street railway companies mentioned in the infor- 
mation, except the Spring-field Street Railway Company, and is 
«till transgressing in the same way as to the Worcester & Webster 
Street Railway Company and the Webster & Dudley Street Rail- 
■vvay Company, whose ownership is retained in the same form. Some 
of these street railway companies have been dealt with directly by 
the defendant, at different times, by votes of its directors while act- 
ing in that capacity. The defendant's president is the president 
of the Consolidated Railway Company and of all these street rail- 
way companies, and he receives no compensation for the perform- 
ance of these official duties, except his salary as president of the 
defendant corporation. 

The stock of the Springfield Street Railway Company was ac- 
quired through action of the Consolidated Railway Company, whose 
•directors voted that it " should be acquired by this company, and 
that the plan for payment of the same, outlined by the president 
be approved, namely, the establishment of a trust covering the issue 
of $3,000,000 guaranteed trust certificates, and the sum of $1,500,000 
of 4 per cent, debentures of this company." Here was the origin of 
the Springfield Railway Companies, wiiich was established by 
the Consolidated Railway Company as a part of a scheme for hold- 
ing and controlling the stock of the Springfield Street Railway 
Company. This is a voluntary association, consisting of a board 
of trustees, of whom all but one are directors of the Consolidated 
Railway Company and of the defendant corporation, who are des- 
ignated as trustees in the declaration of trust, together with the 
members of the firm of Lee, Higginson and Companj^ of Boston, 
bankers, who are called subscribers. Under the instrument the trus- 
tees assume no personal financial liability and have no beneficial 
ownership, although they are the holders of the legal title to all 
the property belonging to the association, and are the managers 
of it. Lee, Higginson and Company are parties for the purpose 
of disposing of preferred shares to be issued by the association, and 
managing other matters of finance. As a part of the arrangement, 
the Consolidated Railway Company entered into a contract with 
Lee, Higginson and Company which, after the formal part, began 
with a recital as f ollow^s : " Whereas, the Consolidated Railway 
Company desires to acquire the whole or at least a majority of the 
capital stock of the Spring-field Street Railway Company, and 
desires Lee, Higginson and Company to offer to the stockholders of 
said company $225 in cash per share, or $75 in cash per shai-e and 
$150 in preferred stock of the Springfield Railway Companies 
issued under a declaration of trust, dated March 15, 1905," etc. It 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 18; 

was then agreed that the Consolidated Railway Company should 
sell its 4 per cent, fifty-year debentures to the amount of $1,500,000 
and Lee, Higginson and Company should buy not exceeding that 
amount of these debentures at a price named, and should underwrite- 
not exceeding $2,937,600 in amount of the preferred shares of the 
Springfield Railway Companies at $100 per share. Then followed 
this recital, " which sale of bonds, with cash to be paid by the- 
Consolidated Railway Company, and underwriting, will "furnish 
the funds necessary for the purchase of said street railway stock 
at the price agreed upon," etc. It w^as then agreed that the Con-^ 
solidated Railway Company should forthwith issue, sell and de- 
liver to Lee, Higginson and Company, the debentures, and that 
there should be " formed a holding trust to be called the Spring- 
field Railway Companies ... to acquire and hold the whole or at 
least a majority of the capital stock of the Springfield Street Rail- 
v;ay Company; which said trust shall issue at this time not exceed- 
ing $2,937,600 of preferred shares, which shall be entitled to- 
cumulative dividends at the rate of 4 per cent, per annum, payable," 
etc., — " and in case of liquidation, payment of the principal of 
said preferred shares at the rate of $105 per share, to be guaran- 
teed by the Consolidated Railway Company, and to be subject to- 
call on any dividend date at the rate of $105 per share, as pro- 
vided in the agreement of said Consolidated Railway Company with 
the Springfield Railway Companies," etc. There was a provision 
that Lee, Higginson and Company should underwrite at par so« 
many of the preferred shares as should be necessary to acquire the 
whole, or at least a majority of the stock of the Springfield Street 
Railway Company at the price stated. There was then a provision 
for an underwriting commission to be given to Lee, Higginson and 
Company in full payment for their ser\dces. The expenses of form- 
ing the trust and of carrying out the terms of the agreement were- 
to be paid by the Consolidated Railway Company. Under this- 
arrangement the stock of the Springfield Street Railway Company^ 
was acquired and turned over to the association, which consisted 
of the trustees, with no financial interest, and the Consolidated 
Railw^ay Company, which was then the beneficial owner of all the- 
property. The common shares in the Springfield Railway Compa- 
nies to the amount of $5,000,000, were to be delivered to the Con- 
solidated Railw^ay Company as soon as a majority of the stock 
of the Springfield Street Railway Company should be acquired. 
The proceeds of all the preferred shares were to be accounted for 
to the Consolidated Railway Company by Lee, Higginson and Com- 
pany. The trust, including the accompanying contracts, was sim- 
ply a machine, constnicted for the management of the property 
and the business in the interest of the Consolidated Railway Com- 
pany, which w^as the interest of the defendant corporation. As to* 



14 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

sales made by Lee, Higginson and Company to third persons, and 
as to the underwriting of Lee, Higginson and Company if that be 
deemed a purchase by them of the preferred shares, the Consoli- 
dated Railway Company is still indirectly the owner of the shares, 
or at least of an interest in them. The Springfield Railway Com- 
panies is not a corporation, although the parties, by their con- 
tract, sought to obtain many of the advantages of a corporation 
without its liabilities. See Hussey v. Arnold, 185 Mass. 202. All 
who have any proprietary interest in it have rights of property as 
indi\ddual owners, subject to such restraints upon the management 
and use of it as are legally imposed by the contracts under which 
it is held. They are equitable tenants in common. By the terms of 
the agreement the association must be wound up and liquidated at 
the end of twenty years and eleven months. If there are profits 
from the enterprise, the Consolidated Railway Company will be 
entitled to the whole of them. It held all the common shares, al- 
though it has since turned them over to the New England Invest- 
ment and Security Company. The other holders of the preferred 
shares can receive only $105 per share as principal, with interest at 
4 per cent. Any proceeds beyond that amount will go to the Con- 
solidated Railway Company. If there is not enough in the prop- 
erty to pay that, the Consolidated Railway Company must make 
up the deficiency; for it guaranteed this amount to all of the pre- 
ferred shares on liquidation. It can at any time wind up the asso- 
ciation ; for by its contract it has retained a right to call and redeem 
all the preferred shares on any dividend date at $105 per share. 
The case is like that of an association that issues mortgage bonds 
to be redeemed at $105 at maturity, with a right to call and redeem 
them at any earlier time at the same rate. In such a case the bond- 
holders have merely made a loan. The real beneficial owners of 
the property are those who have agi^eed to pay the loan whereby 
the property will be redeemed. The transfer of certificates to pur- 
chasers of preferred shares is in the nature of a pledge. It seems 
plain that the Consolidated Railway Company is indirectly the 
holder and owner of everything belonging to the Springfield Rail- 
^'ay Companies, subject to its relations to the New England Invest- 
ment and Security Company to which we shall refer hereafter. As 
the defendant owns all the stock of the Consolidated Railway Com- 
pany, it is indirectly the holder and owner of the 19,253 preferred 
shares of the Springfield Street Railway Company in the hands of 
the trustees of the Springfield Railway Companies, as well as of 
the right to redeem the preferred shares in the hands of purchasers. 
The New England Investment and Security Company is a volun- 
tary association similar to the Springfield Railway Companies, 
although in terms it is of broader scope as to the property that 
may be owned and the business that may be transacted. The decla- 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 15 

ration of trust by which it was created was signed by seven of the 
directors of the Consolidated Railway Company and of the defend- 
ant corporation, who were designated as the trustees, and by the 
Consolidated Eailway Company, and by a member of the firm of 
Mackay and Company, bankers, who contracted to sell the preferred 
shares, and by an assistant of the president of the numerous cor- 
porations and the associations, who are designated together as 
subscribers. The trustees have no financial interest and are under 
no financial liability in regard to the property or business, but 
they hold the legal title and act as managers, under the name of 
the Kew England Investment and Security Company. They issued 
preferred shares and common shares which represent the owner- 
ship in the property and business of the association. The preferred 
shares are guaranteed by the Consolidated Railway Company, prin- 
-cipal and interest, as the shares of the Springfield Railway Compa- 
nies are, and are subject to call in the same way, and are to be 
redeemed at $105 per share when called, or when the affairs of the 
association are liquidated. This guaranty was made at the request 
•of the defendant corporation, which in turn gniaranteed the Con- 
solidated Railway Company against loss from its guaranty. The 
Consolidated Railway Company sold to the New England Invest- 
ment and Security Company all the stocks and bonds which it held 
of the Worcester & Southbridge Street Railway Company, the 
Worcester & Blackstone Valley Street Railway Company, the 
Worcester Railway and Investment Company, the Springfield Street 
Railway Company and the Springfield Railway Companies, for the 
sum of $10,000,000, which was paid by the promissory note of the 
New England Investment and Security Company, and it guaranteed 
the preferred shares of this company to the amount of $10,000,000, 
at the request of the defendant corporation. The contract under 
which the shares were issued and the g-uaranty was made, was 
signed only by the New England Investment and Security Com- 
pany, the Consolidated Railway Company and the New York, New 
Haven & Hartford Railroad Company. In the last analysis, in 
view of the ownership of one corporation by the other, the only 
party that had any interest in the mattei-s covered by the contract 
was the defendant corporation. There was a contract with Mackay 
and Company for the sale of these shares, but they were all held 
by Mackay and Company for the benefit of the Consolidated Rail- 
way Company. At the time of the hearing there were 66,137 
preferred shares held by Mackay and Company and owned by the 
Railway Company. So far as relates to the questions with which we 
are now concerned, there is no substantial difference between the 
two voluntai-y associations. In each the equitable ownership is in 
the Consolidated Railway Company which is entitled ultimately to 
the profits from the management, if there are profits, on liquidation, 



16 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

and which must make good the loss to the preferred shareholders if 
there is a deficiency. 

So far as affects the relations of the Consolidated Railway 
Company with the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad 
Company, the only change in the situation dealt with by the 
court in its opinion above quoted appears to be that occasioned 
by the merger of the latter company into the former company, 
which has already been referred to. 

Since, under the laws of Connecticut, the two corporations 
mentioned have been merged into a single consolidated corpora- 
tion now known as the New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Company, that corporation, in order to bring into ex- 
istence the conditions which will constitute " a performance of 
its duty to cease to hold or control either directly or indirectly 
the stocks referred to in the information^' {Attorney-General v. 
New Yorh, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 201 Mass. 
370, 3T2), must divest itself of such holding or control, either 
by disposing of all interest in the two voluntary associations or 
by disposing of the stock of the street railway companies by a 
hona fide sale or transfer. I am advised that the New York, 
New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company has chosen the 
former method, and has taken action to divest itself of all inter- 
est in or control over the New England Investment and Security 
Company,* w^hich, since June 26, 1906, has owned all of the 
stock of the Springfield Railway Companies, which in turn held 
substantially all of the shares of stock of the Springfield Street 
Railway Company. This action is reported to me to be as fol- 
lows : at the time of the decree most of the trustees and officers 
of the New England Investment and Security Company were 
also directors and officers of both the New York, New Haven & 
Hartford Railroad Company and of the Consolidated Railway 
Company of Connecticut. The present officers of the New Eng- 
land Investment and Security Company are not corporate officers 
or directors of the consolidated corporation known as the New 
York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company. In addition, 
the following action, as reported to me, has been taken by the 
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company to di- 
vest itself of the indirect ownership and control of the stock 
of the several street railway companies named in the decree : — 

1. The New Haven Company surrendered all the eonmion shares 
of the New England Investment and Security Company issued to 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 17 

it except 1,000. It has surrendered, also, all the right originally 
reserved to it, when it surrendered such common shares, to again 
demand their issue to it. It has also surrendered all right to demand 
the issue to it of any additional common shares. 

2. It has sold, without resei^vation or option of any kind, the 
1,000 outstanding common shares. The purchasers thereof have 
l^aid for the same and hold the same with an absolute title. 

3. It has assigned and transferred to the New England Invest- 
ment and Security Company all its originally resei^ed right to call 
for redemption the preferred shares of the Springfield Railway 
Companies. 

4. It has assigned to the trustees for the time being deemed to 
represent the common shareholders of the New England Investment 
and Security Company, all its originally reserved right to call for 
redemption the preferred shares of the New England Investment 
and Security Company, and that right is now held by the trustees, 
deemed to be appointed for the common shareholders, to be exer- 
cised by such trustees only for the benefit of the holders of such 
common shares. 

5. It has accepted in lieu of its demand claim against the New 
England Investment and Security Company, fifteen-year notes, unse- 
cured except by covenants of the Investment Company not to dis- 
pose of its existing assets without substituting other assets deemed 
by the trustees to be of equivalent value, and not to pledge or 
encumber its assets without equally securing by the instrument of 
pledge or mortgage the fifteen-year notes issued by the Investment 
Company. 

6. Although advised that it was under no obligation so to do, the 
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company has con- 
tracted for the sale of all the fifteen-year notes so taken by it in 
payment of its demand claim against the New England Investment 
and Security Company. 

7. It has sold to the New England Investment and Security Com- 
pany all the bonds and promissory notes which it held of any of 
the street railway companies mentioned in the information except- 
ing the Worcester & Webster and Webster & Dudley companies, the 
disposition of which is next hereinafter described. 

8. The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company 
has sold and transferred to the New England Investment and Secu- 
rity Company all the stock, bonds, certificates of indebtedness and 
other obligations of every kind which it held of the Worcester & 
Webster and Webster & Dudley Street Railway companies, except 
only such as had, prior to the beginning of the suit by the Attorney- 
General against the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 
or by its predecessors in title, been pledged to the New York Secu- 
rity and Trust Company of New York, as trustee under the mort- 



18 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

gage from the Worcester & Connecticut Eastern Railway Company, 
as collateral security for an issue of mortgage bonds by said last- 
named railway company, and as to the reversion or equity of 
redemption in all stock, bonds and other obligations of said Worces- 
ter & Webster and Webster & Dudley Street Railway companies so 
pledged, said New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Com- 
pany has executed a transfer and assignment of all its right 
therein, subject only to the lien of the trustee under said mortgage. 

The result of this action upon the part of the New York, New 
Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, as disclosed in the evi- 
dence submitted to me and contained in the official declaration 
and statement of the corporation made to the House of Repre- 
sentatives for the year 1909 (House Document 1329), and in 
the absence of any question as to the good faith of said cor- 
poration, is to place the stock of the several street railway com- 
panies mentioned in the decree in the ownership or control of 
the New England Investment and Security Company, whose 
trustees and officers are not connected as officers or directors 
with the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company 
and have entered into no agreement, trust or other undertaking 
with such corporation with respect to their acts as officers or 
trustees of the New England Investment and Security Company ; 
and to terminate the ownership by the New York, New Haven & 
Hartford Railroad Company of any shares of the stock of the 
New England Investment and Security Company, either by sur- 
rendering such stock to the association itself or by transferring 
it to individuals, free of all trusts and under no agreement or 
undertaking upon the part of the individuals to whom it w^as 
transferred. (See House Document 1329, pp. 4, 5.) 

Upon the information before me, therefore, I am of opinion 
that by divesting itself of all interest in or control over the New 
England Investment and Security Company, which through the 
instrumentality of the Springfield Railway Companies owned 
and controlled the Springfield Street Railway Company, the New 
York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company has complied 
with the decree of June 23, 1908, and in the manner above de- 
scribed has divested itself of its interest in the Springfield 
Street Railway Company. 

I am, with great respect, 

Yery truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



1913.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 19 



Constitutional Law — Taxation — Appropriation of Public 
Funds — Public Purpose — Relief of Destitute Families of 
S trilling Employees. 
A proposed resolve " That there be allowed and paid from the treasury 
of the commonwealth the sum of ten thousand dollars to be ex- 
pended . . . for the relief of destitute families of employees of the 
factories at Lawrence, who were thrown out of work by the strike 
in that city," contemplates an appropriation of money raised by 
taxation for a purpose other than a public purpose, and if passed 
would be unconstitutional. 

Feb. 7, 1912. 
Channing H. Cox, Esq., House Committee on Rules. 

Dear Sir : — On behalf of the House Committee on Eules 
you have requested my opinion as to the constitutionality of the 
following resolve now pending before your committee : — 

Resolved, That there be allowed and paid from the treasury of 
the commonwealth the sum of ten thousand dollars, to be expended 
under the direction of two persons, citizens of the city of Lawrence, 
to be appointed by the governor, and to serve without compensa- 
tion, for the relief of destitute families of employees of the fac- 
tories at Lawrence who are thrown out of work by the strike in 
that city. Any expenses necessarily incurred in carrying out the 
provisions of this resolve shall be paid from the said sum. 

The question presented resolves itself into an inquiry as to 
whether the expenditure of money from the treasury of the 
Commonwealth, raised by taxation, for the purposes of the re- 
solve is an expenditure for a public purpose, it being a well-estab- 
lished principle that money raised by taxation may be expended 
only for a public purpose. See Lowell v. Oliver, 8 Allen, 247 ; 
Mead v. Acton, 139 Mass. 341; Kingman v. Brockton, 153 Mass. 
355; Opinion of the Justices, 155 Mass. 601; 186 Mass. 603; 
and 190 Mass. 613. The words "public purpose,^' in the sense 
herein used, were held in Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454, not to 
include the purpose of an act which provided for the relief of 
persons who had suffered loss by the fire of 1872, using, at page 
472, the following language : — 

As a judicial question the case is not changed by the magnitude 
of the calamity which has created the emergency, nor by the great- 



20 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

ness of the emergency or the extent and importance of the inter- 
ests to be promoted. These are considerations affecting only the 
propriety and expediency of the expenditure as a legislative ques- 
tion. If the expenditure is, in its nature, such as will justify taxa- 
tion under any state of circumstances, it belongs to the Legislature 
exclusively to detennine whether it shall be authorized in the par- 
ticular case; . . . 

On the other hand, if its nature is such as not to justify taxation 
in any and all cases in which the Legislature might see fit to give 
authority therefor, no stress of circumstances affecting the expe- 
diency, importance or general desirableness of the measure, and 
no concurrence of legislative and municipal action, or preponder- 
ance of popular favor in any particular case, will supply the ele- 
ment necessary to bring it within the scope of legislative power. 

An opinion to the same effect was given by Attorney-General 
Malone in 1908 with reference to a proposed resolve providing 
for the expenditure of money for the relief of sufferers from the 
Chelsea fire. 

The present resolve does not appear to have for its purpose 
an expenditure of money which can be considered a public pur- 
pose. Both its title and the terms of the resolve provide for aid 
to be given to certain individuals. The fact that the individuals 
may be many in number does not of itself make the purpose a 
public one. In Lowell v. Boston, above cited, appears the fol- 
lowing language : — 

The incidental advantage to the public or to the State, which 
results from the promotion of private interests and the prosperity 
of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the 
use of public money raised by taxation, or for which taxation may 
become necessary. 

The part of the decision in Mead v. Acton, above cited, also in 
point is as follows : — 

The direct primaiy object is to benefit individuals, and not the 
public. In any view we can take of the statute, the payments it 
contemplates are mere gratuities or gifts to individuals. ... A 
statute conferring such power is unconstitutional, because it author- 
izes raising money by taxation for the exclusive benefit of particu- 
lar individuals, and appropriates money for a private purpose 
which can only be raised and used for public objects. The right to 
tax is the right to raise money by assessing the citizens for the 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 21 

support of the government and the use of the State. The term 
" taxation " imports the raising of money for public use, and 
excludes the raising of it for private uses. 

In my opinion the resolve submitted is clearly within the 
principles and decisions hereinbefore referred to, and would pro- 
vide for an unconstitutional appropriation of public funds. 
Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



Sheriff — Right to require Assistance in Case of Actual or Im- 
pending Riot, Tumult or Other Breach of the Peace — 
Citizen — Militia — Precept. 

Where there is imminent, impending danger of a riot or other breach 
of the peace, the sheriff of any county may call such aid as a 
man of ordinary prudence, firmness and activity in such situation 
might think necessary to quell such riot or disturbance; or where 
a tumult, riot or mob actually exists or is threatened he may, under 
the provisions of St. 1908, c. 604, <§ 142, issue a precept direct- 
ing any commander of a brigade, regiment, battalion, corps of 
cadets or company within his jurisdiction " to appear at a time 
and place therein specified, to aid the civil authority in suppressing 
such violence and supporting the laws." 

If, however, no riot or other breach of the peace actually exists or 
is threatened, a sheriff has no authority to call upon citizens to 
act as patrolmen or to do ordinary police duty. 

Feb. 7, 1912. 
Brig. Gen. Gardner W. Pearson^ Adjutant General. 

Sir : — You have requested my opinion as to whether the 
Sheriff of Essex County can be required to establish patrols and 
police guards in the city of Lawrence to take the place of and 
to perform the duties of the regular city police, the latter being 
unable to preserve the peace. I am informed, and for the pur- 
poses of this opinion assume, that there are no riots at present 
in the city, and that troops are stationed there against such a 
contingency. It is also stated that it is your desire to withdraw 
the militia from the city as soon as possible, consistent with the 
proper preservation of the peace and suppression of attempts to 
violate the law of the Commonwealth. 

The office of sheriff is one of the oldest known to the law, and 
from earliest times he has been the chief officer for the preserva- 



22 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

tion of the peace in his county. By R. L., c. 23, § 14, it is 
provided : — 

They [sheriffs] may require suitable aid in the execution of their 
office in a criminal case, in the preservation of the peace, in the 
apprehending or securing of a person for a breach of the peace 
and in cases of escape or rescue of persons arrested upon civil 
process. 

The first use of the phrase " suitable aid " as above employed 
appears in chapter 20 of the Acts of the Province of Massachu- 
setts Bay in the year 1698. The phrase should be construed, 
therefore, as giving the same authority as that of a sheriff under 
the common law, in the light of which it is to be interpreted 
unless otherwise modified by statute. Consideration of the de- 
cisions in that regard discloses in each case a situation where 
the breach of the peace was actually in progress, or where there 
had been an outbreak just previously, with another disturbance 
expected and imminent as a reasonable certainty. I am led to 
the conclusion that in order to furnish cause for the sheriff to 
exercise this extraordinary remedy under his common law au- 
thority, there must be a necessity for it because of disorders 
either existing at the time of his action or imminently threat- 
ened, with apparent certainty to occur. In the exercise of this 
function the sheriff apparently acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, 
and his determination, so long as exercised within the reasonable 
scope of his authority, cannot be questioned. Ela v. Smith, 
5 Gray, 121. 

In addition to E. L., c. 23, § 14, hereinbefore cited, E. L., c. 
211 § 1, further provides: — 

If twelve or more persons, being armed with clubs or other dan- 
gerous weapons, or if thirty or more persons, whether armed or 
not, are unlawfully, riotously or tumultuously assembled in a city or 
towT^ the mayor and each of the aldermen of such city, each of 
the selectmen of such town, every justice of the peace living in any 
such city or town and the sheriff of the county and his deputies 
shall go among the persons so assembled, or as near to them as 
may be with safety, and in the name of the commonwealth com- 
mand all persons so assembled immediately and peaceably to dis- 
perse; and if they do not thereupon immediately and peaceably 
disperse, each of said magistrates and officers shall command the 
assistance of all persons there present in suppressing such riot or 
unlawful assembly and aiTesting such persons. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 23 

As there is no riot in progress, upon the assumption in your 
inquiry, the situation is not Tvdthin the scope of this section. 

In answer to the specific inquiiy, therefore, I am of the 
opinion that unless a riot or other breach of the peace actually 
exists, or there is immediate, impending danger thereof, the 
sheriff has no power to call citizens from their own pursuits to 
act as patrolmen or to do police duty; that is, to perform the 
ordinaiT duties that are performed by police patrolmen of the 
city of Lawrence. On the other hand, if there is imminent, 
impending danger of a riot or other breach of the peace the 
sheriff has the power and the duty to call such aid as a man of 
ordinary prudence, firmness and activity in his situation would 
think necessary to quell the disturbance. In case of threatened 
riot our statutes provide a method in which he may proceed, 
namely, to call upon the organized militia by precept issued to its 
commander, under St. 1908, c. 604, § 142, which provides as 
follows : — 

In case of a tumult, riot, mob, or a body of men acting together 
by force, to violate or resist the laws of the commonwealth, or when 
such tumult, riot or mob is threatened, and the fact appears to the 
commander-in-chief, to the sheriff of the county, to the mayor of 
the city or the selectmen of the town, the commander-in-chief may 
issue his order, or such sheriff, mayor or selectmen may issue a 
precept, directed to any commander of a brigade, regiment, bat- 
talion, corps of cadets or company, within their jurisdiction, direct- 
ing him to order his coromand, or a part thereof, to appear at a 
time and place therein specified, to aid the civil authority in sup- 
pressing such violence and supporting the laws; which precept 
shall be in substance as follows : — 

Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 
To [insert the oflEicer's title] A.B., commanding [insert his command]. 

Whereas, it appears to [the sheriff, mayor or the selectmen] of the [county, 
city or town] of , that [here state one or more of the causes above 

mentioned] in our of , and that military force is neces- 

sary to aid the civil authority in suppressing the same: Now, therefore, we 
command you that you cause [your command, or such part thereof as may be 
desired], armed and equipped with ammunition and with proper officers, to 
parade at , on , then and there to obey such orders as 

may be given according to law. Hereof fail not at your peril, and have you 
there this precept with your doings returned thereon. 

This precept shall be signed by such sheriff, mayor or selectmen, 
and may be varied to suit the circumstances of the case; and a 
copy of the same shall be immediately forwarded to the commander- 
in-chief. 



24 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

From this section the power of the sheriff and that of the 
mayor appear to be the same. While this means may not be the 
exclusive means to^be employed under such circumstances, never- 
theless, in case of emergency it would be proper under this au- 
thority for the sheriff to call upon the militia to aid him in the 
execution of the duties of his office. It would appear, therefore, 
that the militia might be called upon by the sheriff rather than to 
be relieved by him by means of other persons summoned to take 
the place of the militia. This action would largely be left to 
the discretion and judgment of the sheriff, under the circum- 
stances as they might appear. 

Very truly yours, 

James M. Sv7ift, Attorney- General. 



Constitutional Law — Police Power — Regulation of Private 
Business — Sale of Theatre Tickets. 

The right of the Legislature under the police power to regulate the 
conduct of a private business in respect to public safety or morals 
does not extend to the regulation of the sale of tickets of admis- 
sion to theatres and other places of amusement; and a proposed 
bill requiring that such tickets shall have the price printed thereon 
and that it shall be unlawful to sell or offer for sale any such 
ticket for an amount in excess of the printed sum, if passed, would 
be unconstitutional and void. 

Feb. 15, 1912. 
Clarence W. Hobbs, Jr., Esq., Clerk, Committee on the Judiciary. 

Dear Sir : — On behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary 
you have requested my opinion upon the constitutionality of 
House Bill Xo. 967. This bill in substance provides that every 
ticket for admission to a theatre, opera house, concert hall or 
other place of public exhibition or amusement shall have printed 
upon its face the price thereof; that no greater sum shall be 
asked or received therefor ; and that it shall be unlawful for any 
person, firm or corporation to sell or offer for sale any such 
ticket for a sum in excess of that printed thereon. 

Statutes of this character have been considered by the courts 
of California {Ex parte Quarg, 149 Cal. 79) and of Illinois 
{People V. Steele, 231 111. 340), and have been held unconsti- 
tutional for the reason that the business of conducting a theatre 
or other place of amusement is a private business, and while 
such business may be regulated by the Legislature in respect to 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 25 

public morals or safety, under the police power, the right of 
regulation cannot be extended to the sale of tickets of admission 
to places of amusement. Thus, in Ex parte Quarg, above cited 
the court said, at page 81 : — 

The police power is broad in its scope, but it is subject to the 
just limitation that it extends only to such measures as are reason- 
able in their application and which tend in some appreciable degree 
to promote, protect or preserve the public health, morals or safety, 
or the general welfare. The prohibition of an act which the court 
•can clearly see has no tendency to affect, injure or endanger the 
public in any of these particulai-s, and which is entirely innocent 
in character, is an act beyond the pale of this limitation, and it 
is therefore not a legitimate exercise of police power. The sale 
of a theatre ticket at an advance upon the original purchase price, 
or the business of reselling such tickets at a profit, is no more 
immoral, or injurious to public welfare or convenience, than is the 
•sale of any ordinaiy article of merchandise at a profit. 

I have no doubt that the principles so declared are applicable 
io the question now before me, and I am therefore of opinion 
that, if passed. House Bill No. 967 would be unconstitutional 
and void. 

Very truly yours, 

James M. Sv^ift, Attorney-General. 



Massachusetts District Police — Chief — Boiler Inspection De- 
partment — Chief Inspector. 

St. 1906, c. 521, entitled " An Act to provide for the appointment of a 
chief inspector of the boiler inspection department of the District 
Police," which provides in section 1, in part, that " said chief in- 
spector shall have superv^ision over the members of said boiler in- 
spection department in order to secure the uniform enforcement 
throughout the commonwealth of all acts relative to the inspection 
of boilers and the examination of engineers and firemen," does 
not create an independent department, and the action of such 
chief inspector is under the jurisdiction and subject to the orders 
of the Chief of the District Police. 

Feb. 15, 1912. 
Gen. J. H. Whitney, Chief of the District Police. 

Dear Sir: — Under section 1 of chapter 521 of the Acts of 
1906, an act to provide for the appointment of a chief inspector 



26 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

of the boiler inspection department of the District Police, pro- 
viding, in part, as follows : " Said chief inspector shall have 
supervision over the members of said boiler inspection depart- 
ment in order to secure the uniform enforcement throughout the 
commonwealth of all acts relative to the inspection of boilers and 
the examination of engineers and firemen," you have made the 
following request for my opinion : — 

To what extent has the chief of the District Police authority over 
said chief inspector and members of this branch of the inspection 
department of the District Police? That is to say: — 

First. — Has the chief inspector authority to detail any or all 
of the boiler inspectors for duty in any district of the Common- 
wealth without obtaining permission from the Chief of the District 
Police? 

Second. — Has the chief inspector the authority to order such 
inspectors, or any of them, from their districts to any other part of 
the Commonwealth without obtaining permission from the Chief of 
the District PoUce? 

Third. — How far does the authority of the Chief of the District 
Police extend over the duties, discipline and general conduct of 
the chief inspector and inspectors of boilers? 

You also further inquire as to whether " there exists a depart- 
ment known as the ' boiler inspection department ' ". 

In my opinion there is no provision of law which establishes 
as a superior, independent department outside of the authority 
of the Chief of the District Police a "boiler inspection depart- 
ment." 

By section 1 of chapter 108 of the Revised Laws the District 
Police force is divided into two departments, to wit : the inspec- 
tion department and the detective department. The boiler in- 
spectors are appointed from the inspection department of the 
District Police. In my opinion the action of the chief inspector 
of the boiler inspection department, so called, is under the 
jurisdiction and subject to the orders of a superior, the Chief 
of the District Police. 

Answering your questions specifically : — 

The first should be answered in the negative, that is, the de- 
tails made by the chief inspector would be subject to the ap- 
proval or disapproval of the Chief of the District Police. 

As to the second, the same answer should be made. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 27 

As to the third, I am of the opinion that the authority of the 
Chief of the District Police is the same over the chief boiler in^ 
spector as it is over the heads of the other divisions of the depart- 
ment, that is, that he is the superior officer over all. 
Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



Commonwealth — Employee — Veteran — Retirement — Con- 
sent. 

St. 1907, c. 458, § 1, providing that, with the consent of the Governor,, 
a veteran of the civil war in the service of the Commonwealth, if 
incapacitated for active duty, may be retired at one-half the rate 
of compensation paid to him when in active service, was designed 
not only to provide a pension for the person so retired, but also 
to relieve the public service of persons unable to perform the duties 
required of them, and if incapacitated for duty a veteran may be- 
so retired without his consent and upon the request and recom- 
mendation of the head of the department in which he is employed. 

Feb. 16, 1912. 

Gen. J. H. Whitxey, Chief of the District Police. 

Dear Sir: — By a communication dated February 12 you 
have requested my opinion upon the question whether, under the 
provisions of St. 1907, c. 458, § 1, you are authorized to request 
and recommend the retirement of any veteran employed in the 
department who in your opinion is incapacitated to such a de- 
gree as to render his retirement necessary for the good of the 
service, irrespective of his desire to so retire. 

The statute to which you have referred is as follows : — 

A veteran of the civil war in the service of the commonwealth, if 
incapacitated for active duty, shall be retired from active service, 
with the consent of the governor, at one half the rate of compen- 
sation paid to him when in active service, to be paid out of the 
treasury of the commonwealth : provided, that no veteran shall be 
entitled to be retired under the provisions of this act unless he shall 
have been in the servdce of the commonwealth at least ten years. 
But if, in the opinion of the governor and council, any veteran of 
the civil war in said service is incapacitated to such a degree as to 
render his retirement necessary for the good of the service, he may 
so be retired at any time. A veteran retired under the provisions 
of this act, whose term of service was for a fixed number of years, 
shall be entitled to the benefits of the act without reappointment. 



28 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

This statute is applicable to cases where a veteran of the civil 
war in the service of the Commonwealth is incapacitated for 
active duty, and in such cases is mandatory, and, besides provid- 
ing a pension for the person retired, is obviously intended to 
relieve the public service of persons unable to perform the duties 
required of them. I am therefore of opinion that, with the con- 
sent of the Governor, a veteran may be retired, if incapacitated 
for active duty, without regard to the desire of such veteran in 
the premises; and while the statute contains no express pro- 
vision to that effect, I have no doubt that the head of a depart- 
ment may properly request and recommend retirement in such 
cases. 

Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney- General. 



Constitutional Law — Police Power — Regulation of Sale of 
Goods, Wares and Merchandise made by Convict Labor in 
Prison — Constitution of the United States — Commerce 
Clause. 

A proposed act requiring that all goods, wares and merchandise made by 
convict labor in any prison, reformatory or jail in this or any other 
State and brought into this Commonwealth, shall, before being ex- 
posed for sale, be marked " Convict Made,'' and providing that any 
person offering such goods for sale or having such goods in posses- 
sion, without the printed label or mark, shall be guilty of a misde- 
meanor, cannot be justified as a valid exercise of the police power; 
and since it would constitute a burden or restriction upon interstate 
commerce, and would therefore be in contravention of the commerce 
clause (U. S. Const., Art. I., § VITI.) of the Federal Constitution, 
would therefore be unconstitutional if enacted.^ 

March 8, 1912. 

Charles T. Holt, Esq., House Chairman, Joint Committee on 

Prisons. 
Dear Sir : — Your committee has requested my opinion upon 
the constitutionality of House Bill No. 833, entitled "An Act 
relative to the marking of goods made in penal institutions,^^ 
and pro^dding, in substance, that all goods, wares and merchan- 
dise made by convict labor in any prison, reformatory or jail in 
this or any other State in which convict labor is employed and 
imported, brought or introduced into the State of Massachusetts, 
shall, before being exposed for sale, be branded, labelled or 
marked " Convict Made ; " and that any person offering such 

1 See 211 Mas8. 605. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 29 

goods for sale, or having such goods in possession for that pur- 
pose, without the brand, label or mark, shall be guilty of a mis- 
demeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine not 
exceeding $1,000 nor less than $50, or by imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding twelve months or by both fine and imprison- 
ment. 

I am of opinion that the proposed bill, if enacted, would be 
unconstitutional for the reason that it is in contravention of the 
commerce clause of the Federal Constitution (U. S. Const., Art. 
I., § VIII) which provides that "the congress shall have power 
... to regulate commerce . . . among the several states, . . P , 
since prison-made goods, when brought into the Commonwealth 
from another State, become articles of interstate commerce, and, 
as such, may not be discriminated against. Arnold v. Yanclers, 
56 Ohio, 417. Since, for the reasons which are set forth at 
length in the opinion of the court in the case of People v. 
Hawhins, decided by the Court of Appeals of the State of New 
York (157 N". Y. Eep. 1), the proposed legislation cannot be 
justified as a valid exercise of the police power, it would con- 
stitute a burden or restriction upon interstate commerce, and is 
therefore unconstitutional. 

Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



Constitutional Law — Qualification of Voters — Legislature — 
Police Power — Regulation of Conduct of Elections. 

The qualifications which shall entitle any person to vote or to be voted 
for and the right to elect and to be elected to public office are de- 
fined in Article IX. of the Declaration of Eights and Articles III., 
XX. and XXI. of the Articles of Amendment to the Constitution of 
the Commonwealth. 

The conduct of elections may be regulated by the Legislature under the 
police power for the purpose of providing an easy and reasonable 
mode of exercising the constitutional right preventing error and 
fraud and securing order and regularity; but all such regulation 
must be subordinate to the provisions of the Constitution and cannot 
add to or diminish the qualifications of a voter as therein prescribed. 

Whether or not the provisions of a proposed act which restrict the ex- 
penditure of money or the contribution of any other valuable thing 
in connection with an election by any person whether or not such 
person is a candidate for public office, to traveling expenses incurred 
by himself and to expenses for preparing, circulating and filing 
nomination papers; to forbid, except in cases of age or physical 
disability, the conveyance of any voter to the polls otherwise than 



30 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

at his own expense, and require that if any person elected to oflfice, 
or any member or agent, or his campaign committee, or any other 
person acting in his or their interest or behalf, is convicted of any 
violation of the law relating to corrupt practices at the primary at 
which such candidate was named, or at the election at which he was 
elected, such office shall be vacated and a new election shall be held 
to fill it, are reasonable and necessary precautions against bribery, 
fraud and other improper conduct in connection with elections and, 
therefore, a protection to the constitutional right to elect and to be 
elected to office, is primarily a question of fact and, therefore, a 
proper subject for the determination of the Legislature. 

It would seem, however, that the enforcement of such stringent regula- 
tions as those above described could hardly be held to be a reasonable 
regulation of the exercise of the right to take part in elections. 

-A provision in the proposed act requiring that persons who, by reason of 
age or physical infirmity, are unable to reach the polls without assist- 
ance and are, therefore, transported to and from the polls shall, 
before voting, make a statement under oath of such disability, is 
clearly unconstitutional as imposing a qualification upon such persons 
additional to those prescribed by the Constitution. 

March 8, 1912. 
Hon. Levi H. Greexwood, President of the Senate. 

Dear Sir : — By an order dated February 27 the Honorable 
Senate has requested my opinion upon four questions of law 
•affecting the constitutionality of House Bill N'o. 1360, which 
is entitled "An Act relative to election expenses." Section 1 of 
this bill is designed to amend St. 1907, c. 560, § 316, as 
amended by St. 1911, c. 679, § 1, by striking out the whole of 
said section and substituting the following section : — 

No person shall, in order to aid or promote his own or another's 
nomination or election to a public office, directly or indirectly, him- 
self or through another person, give, pay, expend or contribute, or 
promise tQ give, pay, expend or contribute, any money or valuable 
thing, except for expenses directly incurred and paid by a person 
for travelling and for purposes properly incidental to travelling, 
and for preparing, circulating and filing nomination papers; but 
nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a person from 
making a voluntary payment of money or a voluntary and uncondi- 
tional promise of payment of money to a political committee for 
the promotion of the pruiciples of the party which it represents 
and for expenses properly incidental thereto. 

Section 2 of the proposed bill purports to amend St. 1907, c. 
560, § 317. The section as there set forth, however, has been 
already amended by St. 1911, c. 679, § 2, and I assume that the 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 3l 

proposed bill is applicable to the amended section. The present 
amendment strikes out the whole of this section and in its place 
provides that — 

The mayor of each city and the selectmen of each town of two 
thousand or more inhabitants in the coromonwealth shall, at each 
primary and election, provide one conveyance for each voting pre- 
cinct within their jurisdiction, to be used under the direction of the 
presiding officer at each polling place in transporting to and from 
the polls such persons only as by reason of age or physical infirmity 
•are unable to reach the same without assistance. A record of all 
persons so transported shall be kept by the presiding officer, and 
he shall require from each before voting a statement under oath of 
such physical disability. No voter shall be conveyed to the polls 
otherwise than entirely at his own expense except as herein pro- 
vided. 

Section 6 of the proposed bill amends St. 1911, c. 679, § 6, 
which provides that — 

If a person elected to public office is convicted of any wilful 
violation of the law relating to corrupt practices in connection with 
the primary or election at which he was nominated or elected, his 
office shall thereby be vacated, and a new election shall be held for 
the purpose of filling the same. 

•so that it shall read as follows : — 

If a person elected to public office, or any member or agent of 
his campaign committee, or any other person acting in his or their 
interest or behalf, is convicted of any violation of the law relating 
to corrupt practices in connection with the primary or election at 
which he was nominated or elected, his office shall thereby be vacated, 
and a new election shall be held for the purpose of filling the same. 

The inquiries of the Honorable Senate with relation to the 
provisions above quoted are as follows : — 

1. Is the pro^'ision in section 1 of the bill printed as House Bill 
Xo. 1360 constitutional, which forbids a candidate to incur any 
expense in order to aid his nomination or election except as pro- 
vided in lines 12 to 20 of said section? 

2. Is the provision in the same section constitutional, which 
extends the same prohibition to persons not candidates? 



32 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.. 

3. Is the provision in section 2 of the same bill constitutional,, 
which provides that no voter shall be conveyed to the jdoIIs other- 
wise than entirely at his own expense, except in case of physical 
inability? 

4. Is the provision of section 6 of the same bill constitutional^ 
which provides for vacating an election because of corrupt prac- 
tices without proof of a candidate's knowledge or consent? 

The qualifications which shall entitle any person to vote or to^ 
be voted for in this Commonwealth, and the right to elect or to 
be elected to public office, which is consequent upon such qualifi- 
cations, are clearly fixed and defined by the Constitution of Mas- 
sachusetts, and the Legislature cannot add to or alter the former 
or restrict or destroy the latter. Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 
497, 499. The provisions of the Constitution of the Common- 
wealth upon this subject are to be found, first, in Article IX. of 
the Declaration of Eights, which declares that — 

All elections ought to be free; and all the inhabitants of this 
commonwealth, having such qualifications as they shall establish by 
their frame of government, have an equal right to elect officers, and 
to be elected, for public employments. 

and second, in the Articles of Amendment to the Constitution 
which prescribe the qualifications of voters, to be found in 
Articles III., XX. and XXXL, of which it' is necessary to con- 
sider only Article III. This article is as follows : — 

Every male citizen of twenty-one years of age and upwards,, 
excepting paupers and persons under guardianship, who shall have 
resided within the commonwealth one year, and within the town 
or district in which he may claim a right to vote, six calendar 
months next preceding any election of governor, lieutenant-gov- 
ernor, senators, or representatives, shall have a right to vote in such 
election of Governor, lieutenant-governor, senators and representa- 
tives; and no other person shall be entitled to vote in such elec- 
tions. 

The qualifications of voters being thus established, the con- 
duct of elections may be regulated by the Legislature under 
Article IV. of section I. of Chapter 1. of Part the Second of 
the Constitution, by which full power and authority is con- 
ferred upon the General Court — 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 33 

from time to time to make, ordain and establish, all manner of 
wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, statutes, and ordinances, 
directions and instructions, either with penalties or without; so as 
the same be not repugnant or contrary to this constitution, as they 
shall judge to be for the good and w^elfare of this commonwealth, 
and for the government and ordering thereof, and of the subjects 
of the same, and for the necessary support and defence of the 
government thereof ; 

but all legislation must be subordinate to the provisions of the 
Constitution already cited^ and cannot add to or diminish the 
qualifications of a voter as therein prescribed. Kinneen v. 
Wells, supra, p. 499; Blanchard v. Stearns, 5 Met. 298, 301; 
Williams v. Whiting, 11 Mass, 424; Opinion of the Justices, 5 
Met. 591, 592; Commonwealth v. Rogers, 181 Mass. 184, 186. 
The power of the Legislature in the premises was well de- 
scribed by Chief Justice Shaw in the case of Capen v. Foster, 
12 Pick. 485, at page 488, where he stated — 

And this court is of opinion that in all cases where the Consti- 
tution has conferred a political right or privilege, and where the 
Constitution has not particularly designated the manner in which 
that right is to be exercised, it is clearly within the just and con- 
stitutional limits of the legislative power to adopt any reasonable 
and uniform regulations in regard to the time and mode of exer- 
cising that right, which are designed to secure and facilitate the 
exercise of such .right, in a prompt, orderly and convenient manner. 
Such a construction would afford no warrant for such an exercise 
of legislative power, as, under the pretence and color of regidating, 
should subvert or injuriously restrain the right itself. 

And see, Cole v. Tiicler, 164 Mass. 486. 

The provision of the Constitution from w^hich the Legislature 
derives the power to regulate the exercise of the right of fran- 
chise is that which confers upon the General Court the police 
power (see Commonwealth v. Danziger, 176 Mass. 290, 291, 
and cases cited), and this power must always be reasonably 
exercised. Commonivealth v. Bearse, 132 Mass. 542, 546; Com- 
momvealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53. 

From the principles above discussed, therefore, it is clear that 
in passing upon the constitutionality of legislation w^iich aifects 
the right of any person or persons to elect or to be elected to 
public offices created by the Constitution or laws of the Com- 
monw^ealth, it is necessarv to determine as a matter of fact 



34 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

whether or not such legislation is intended to " provide ^ an 
easy and reasonable mode of exercising the constitutional right ' '' 
and is " calculated to prevent error and fraud, to secure order 
and regularity in the conduct of elections, and thereby give 
more security to the right itself/' Commonwealth v. Rogers, 
181 Mass. 184, 186; citing Capen v. Foster, supra; Kinneen v. 
Wells, supra; and Jaquith v. Wellesley, 171 Mass. 138, 143. 

From the principles which I have already discussed it follows 
that the proposed amendments will be constitutional only if 
they are designed to afford and do afford an easy and reasonable 
mode of exercising the constitutional right of participating in 
elections, and are " calculated to prevent error and fraud, to 
secure order and regularity of conduct of elections, and thereby 
give more security to the right itself." It is to be observed that 
the effect of the proposed legislation, taken as a whole, is to 
restrict the expenditure of money or the contribution of any 
other valuable thing in connection with an election, by any per- 
son, whether or not such person is a candidate for public office, 
to travelling expenses and expenses properly incident to travel 
incurred by himself, and to expenses for preparing, circulating 
and filing nomination papers; to forbid, except in the manner 
designated, the conveyance of any voter to the polls except en- 
tirely at his own expense; and to require that if any person 
elected to office, or any member or agent of his campaign com- 
mittee, or any other person acting in his or their interest or 
behalf, is convicted of any violation of the law relating to cor- 
rupt practices at the primary at which such candidate was 
nominated or the election at which he was elected, such office 
shall be vacated and a new election shall be held to fill it. The 
provision in St. 1907, c. 560, § 316, as amended by section 1 of 
the proposed bill, that the act shall not apply to voluntary pay- 
ments or promises of pa^^ment of money to a political committee, 
does not enlarge the field of permitted expenditure, for the 
reason that except for the purposes already enumerated no 
person is authorized to expend it, although the words ^^for the 
promotion of the principles of the part}^ which it represents and 
for expenses properly incidental thereto " may have been in- 
tended to permit to political committees a greater freedom than 
is given to individuals in the premises. 

The question thus presented is primarily one of fact, and 
therefore a proper subject for the determination of the Legis- 
lature. The enactment of the proposed amendments would 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 35 

have the effect of a determination by the General Court that 
the regulations contained therein were not in its opinion a 
restriction npon the exercise of the constitutional right affected, 
but were reasonable and necessary precautions against bribery, 
fraud and other improper conduct in connection with elections, 
and therefore a protection of the right itself, and, as such, 
would doubtless be entitled to great weight. See CommonweaWh 
V. Bearse, 132 Mass. 542, 549; CommomueaUh v. Alger, 7 Cush. 
53, 102. So far as I am at liberty to express my views upon 
a question of this character, however, I am constrained to say 
that in my opinion, by the enforcement of such stringent regu- 
lations as those contained in the proposed bill, the right of every 
citizen of the Commonwealth duly qualiiied to elect and to be 
elected to public office would be seriously impaired and re- 
stricted, since under such regulations a general election held 
throughout the Commonwealth might be invalidated by the act 
of a single person in violating even some minor provision of 
the law relative to corrupt practices. A regulation of elections 
which makes possible such a result can hardly be held to be a 
reasonable regulation of the exercise of the right to take part in 
elections, but is, rather, an injurious restraint and interference 
with it. For the reasons stated, therefore, I am of opinion that 
the proposed amendments referred to in each of the questions 
submitted by the Honorable Senate do not constitute a reason- 
able or necessary regulation of the constitutional right, are not 
necessary for its protection, and, if passed, would therefore be 
unconstitutional and void. 

With respect to the second inquiry of the Honorable Senate, 
which refers to section 2 of the proposed bill, there is a further 
objection upon constitutional grounds, in that said section pur- 
ports to require of certain persons otherwise qualified to vote, 
as a preliminary to voting, an oath relative to their physical 
condition^ which clearly constitutes a qualification additional 
to those prescribed by the Constitution. 

See Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497 : Riso7i v. Farr, 24 Ark. 
161 : Davies v. McKeehy, 5 Nev. 369 ; Green v. Shumway, 39 
N". Y. 418. 

Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General 



36 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Constitutional Laiv — Appropriation of Money Raised hy Taxa- 
tion — Moral OhUgation — Repayment of Money paid 
under Mistake of Fact or Law — New York, New Haven & 
Hartford Railroad Company. 

The fulfilment of a moral obligation upon the Commonwealth, created 
by a claim growing out of general principles of right and justice 
and based upon considerations of a moral or merely honorary nature, 
such as would be binding on the conscience or honor of an individual, 
is a public purpose, and money raised by taxation may be appro- 
priated therefor although such claim could not be enforced by any 
legal procedure. 

A proposed resolve to provide for repayment by the Commonwealth of a 
sum erroneously paid as taxes by the New York, New Haven & Hart- 
ford Eailroad Company, if the Legislature determined that the facts 
submitted in connection therewith imposed upon the Commonwealth 
a moral obligation of the character heretofore recognized, would, if 
passed, be constitutional. 

March 12, 1912. 
V. F. Jewett, Esq., Clerk of the Committee on Taxation. 

Dear Sir : — Your commimication of March 6 states that 
you desire my opinion " concerning the constitutionality of the 
repa}Tnent of the franchise tax for 1910 to the New York, New 
Haven & Hartford Railroad as set forth in House Bill No. 508.'^ 
The bill to which you refer is a proposed resolve to provide for 
the repayment by the Commonwealth of a sum erroneously paid 
as taxes by the New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad 
Company, and is as follows : — 

Whereas, on September fifteen, nineteen hundred and nine, the 
New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company executed 
an instrument purporting- to convey its real estate in Park Square 
in the city of Boston to Moses Williams and others, as trustees, and 
whereas the said trustees paid the tax on the said property levied 
by the city of Boston for the year nineteen hundred and ten, the 
said property being valued by the city at the sum of four million 
four hundred and seventy-two thousand dollars, and whereas on 
May sixteen, nineteen hundred and eleven, the supreme judicial 
court of the commonw^ealth rendered a decision that the said deed 
of conveyance was null and void, then making the said corporation 
hable to repay the said tax to the said trustees and then also enti- 
tling the said corporation to an abatement of part of the franchise 
tax paid to the commonw^ealth by the said corporation for the year 
nineteen hundred and ten, now. therefore, be it 

Resolved, That the treasurer of the eommonv.^ealth shall pay to 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 37 

the said corporation a sum equivalent to the sum which would have 
been deducted from the franchise tax of the said corporation for 
the year nineteen hundred and ten, had not the said deed of con- 
veyance been made, with interest from the date of the payment 
of the said tax in the year nineteen hundred and ten, until the date 
when this resolve takes effect. 

The facts upon which your inquiry is based are substantially 
recited in the preamble to the proposed resolve. The New 
York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company having in 
its possession certain real estate formerly occupied as a station 
at Park Square in the city of Boston, rendered unavailable for 
railroad purposes by the erection of the terminal passenger sta- 
tion and other changes made under the provisions of St. 1896, 
c. 516, on Sept. 15, 1909, conveyed said real estate to certain 
trustees, subject to the terms, conditions and trust contained in 
a declaration of trust bearing the same date. These trustees, 
who had full power in the premises, were to develop the prop- 
erty and dispose of it for the benefit of the holders of shares, 
which, to the number of 52,000, the trustees were authorized 
to issue to the New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Com- 
pany in payment for the real estate so conveyed. The tax in 
question was assessed and paid under the provisions of St. 1909, 
c. 490, Part III., §§ 40-13, and as the Park Square property 
stood in the name of the trustees and was taxed to them by the 
city of Boston, the New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad 
Company did not include it in its statement of the works, struc- 
tures, real estate, machinery, underground conduits, wires and 
pipes o-^^Tied by it and subject to local taxation as required by 
section 40 above referred to, and it was not, therefore, deducted 
from the amount of the franchise tax as authorized by section 
41. Upon May 16, 1911, the Supreme Judicial Court of the 
Commonw^ealth, in the case of Williams v. Johnson, 208 Mass. 
544, a proceeding brought by a stockholder of the New York, 
New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Company, handed down a 
decision holding that the disposition of the Park Square prop- 
erty of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Com- 
pany was iiltra vires, that the deed of said company to the 
trustees w^as beyond the power of the corporation or the direc- 
tors to make, and that the trustees took no valid title under it. 
If the invalidity of the transfer of the title had been known at 
the time when the tax for the year 1910 was assessed, the com- 



38 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

pany would have been entitled to have the value of the Park 
Square property deducted from the value of its corporate fran- 
chise in determining the amount of franchise tax, and if such 
invalidity had been discovered within six months after the 
payment of said tax, the corporation might have secured a 
proper deduction by a petition to the Supreme Judicial Court, 
as provided in section TO of Part III. of chapter 490, but since 
more than six months have elapsed from the date of payment of 
the tax there is now no legal rem^edy open to the corporation. 

Upon these facts, I reply to your specific inquiry as fol- 
lows : — 

It is well established that the Legislature may appropriate 
money raised by taxation only for a public purpose. Lowell v. 
Boston, 111 Mass. 454; Kingman et al., petitioners, 153 Mass. 
566 ; Opinion of the Justices, 186 Mass. 603, 605 ; Opinion of 
the Justices, 190 Mass. 611, 613. 

Among those purposes which are generally recognized as pub- 
lic, and for which money raised by taxation may be expended, 
is the fulfilment of moral obligations, so-called, resting upon 
the sovereign, which cannot be enforced or required by any legal 
procedure; and it has been held that where a claim grows out 
of general principles of right and justice and is based upon 
considerations of a moral or merely honorary nature, such as 
are binding on the conscience or the honor of an individual, 
it may be fulfilled although the claim could obtain no recogni- 
tion in a court of law. United States v. Realty Company, 163 
U. S. 427, 440. 

How far the Legislature of this Commonwealth may go in 
recognizing moral obligations by the appropriation of money 
raised by taxation has never been determined by the courts, 
although in Eai'le v. Commonwealth, 180 Mass. 579, in speaking 
of such an appropriation to be recovered as damages for a kind 
of injury for which it was unnecessary to provide compensation, 
Mr. Justice Holmes observed that " some latitude is allowed to 
the Legislature. It is not forbidden to be just in some cases 
where it is not required to be by the letter of paramount law." 
Such obligations have been very generally recognized in the past 
by legislative acts appropriating money to compensate individuals 
for injuries received or property destroyed in the public service 
(see, for example Resolves of 1910, c. 102; Resolves of 1909, 
c. 137; Resolves of 1908, cc. 49, 52, 55, etc.) ; or to afford com- 
pensation for other less definite and certain claims (see Resolves 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 39 

of 1906, c. 61; Eesolves of 1905, c. 55; Eesolves of 1904, c. 49; 
Eesolves of 1903, cc. 36, 77, 83; Eesolves of 1902, cc. 11, 57), 
and no question appears to have been raised with respect to them. 

This recognition has been expressly extended to the reim- 
bursement for money paid into the treasury of the Common- 
wealth under a misapprehension of fact. Thus, Eesolves of 
1907, c. 19, provides for the payment to the town of Dalton of 
$2,618.76, said amount "having been paid by the town . . . 
for the support of a State charge under a misapprehension of 
facts." And see Eesolves of 1904, c. 78. Even more closely in 
point is Eesolves of 1907, c. 36, wdiich provided for reimbursing 
the Mexican Central Eailway for taxes inadvertently assessed, 
which had been paid into the treasury of the Commonwealth, 
and for the recovery of one of which a petition had been brought 
under St. 1903, c. 437, § 84, upon which the court had held 
the assessment invalid. Mexican Central Railway v. Common- 
ivealth, 192 Mass. 129. 

Although the court has never precisely defined the limits of 
the power of the General Court with respect to the recognition 
of claims such as that presented by the proposed resolve in favor 
of the Xew York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Company, 
if the Legislature shall determine that the facts submitted ifi 
connection with said resolve impose upon the Commonwealth a 
moral obligation of the character of that recognized in the case 
of the Mexican Central Eailway Company, or in other cases 
cited where municipalities or individuals have been reimbursed 
for money paid under a mistake of fact or law, I am of opinion 
that it may make a sufficient appropriation to discharge said 
obligation. 

Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



Constitutio7ial Laiu — Elections — Voting Machines, Ballot 
Boxes and Counting Apparatus — Examination by State 
Ballot Law Commission — Delegation of Legislative Au- 
thority. 
A provision in a proposed act relating to the use of voting machines, 
that " the State Ballot Law Commission shall also constitute the 
State Board of Voting Machine Examiners, and shall at such times, 
under such conditions and after such public notice as they shall 
determine, examine voting machines, ballot boxes and counting ap- 
paratus, and they shall make and file with the Secretary of the Com- 
monwealth their report on such machines, ballot boxes and counting 



40 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

apparatus as in their judgment conform to the requirements of law, 
together with such written or printed descriptions and such drawings, 
specifications and photographs as shall clearly identify such ma- 
chines," does not vest in or impose upon the State Ballot Law Com- 
mission any powers and duties which involve a delegation of 
legislative authority which would be objectionable upon constitutional 
grounds. 
The provision above quoted does not directly require the State Ballot 
Law Commission to approve only such machines as fulfil the require- 
ments of the primary law, but indirectly requires such approval, 
since they are required to make and file their report only on such 
machines, ballot boxes and counting apparatus as in their judgment 
conform to such requirements. 

March 13, 1912. 
John A. Curtix, Esq., Clerk, Committee on Election Laws. 

Dear Sir : — By a vote, the Conmiittee on Election Laws has 
submitted to me certain specific inquiries with relation to the 
draft of an act now pending before said committee, entitled 
"An Act relative to the examination and use of voting machines, 
ballot boxes and counting apparatus." Section 1 of the proposed 
draft amends section 186 of chapter 560 of the Acts of the year 
1907 by striking out the whole of said section and inserting in 
its place the following : — 

No member of said commission (the state ballot law commission) 
shall hold any public office except that of justice of the peace or 
notary public, or be a candidate for public office, or member or 
employee of any political committee, or have any pecuniary interest, 
directly or indirectly, in any voting machine, ballot box or counting 
apparatus. If any member of the commission shall be nominated 
as a candidate for public office and shall not in writing decline said 
nomination within three days, he shall be deemed to have vacated 
his office as a member of said commission. The state ballot law 
commission shall also constitute the state board of voting machine 
examiners and shall, at such times, under such conditions, and after 
such public notice as they shall determine, examine voting machines, 
ballot boxes and counting apparatus, and they shall make and file 
with the secretary of the commonwealth their report on such ma- 
chines, ballot boxes and counting apparatus as in their judgment 
conform to the requirements of law, together with such written or 
printed descriptions, and such drawing-s, specifications and photo- 
graphs as shall clearly identify such machines, and the secretary of 
the commonwealth shall send a copy of each report on voting 
machines to every city and town clerk. For the purpose of such 
examination the said board may employ not more than three expert 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 41 

machinists at a cost not exceeding ten dollars each for each day 
emploj^ed, to be paid from the appropriation for the expenses of the 
■commission. 

Section 2 provides as follows : — 

Voting machines shall furnish convenient, simple and satisfactory 
means of voting and of ascertaining and recording the true result 
thereof with facility and accuracy, special regard being given to 
the prevention and detection of double voting; but no machine 
•shall be approved which does not secure to the voter as much 
secrecy in voting as is afforded by the use of the official ballot. 
Ballot boxes shall have sufficient locks and keys or seal fastenings, 
and shall contain mechanical devices for receiving, registering and 
cancelling every ballot deposited thereon; but no such box shall 
record any distinguishing number or mark upon a ballot. No 
machine, ballot box or counting apparatus, except such as is ap- 
proved in accordance with the provisions of this section, shall be 
used at any election, primary or caucus in this commonwealth; nor 
shall any such machines, ballot boxes or counting apparatus be 
used except in accordance with the provisions of this act. 

The questions submitted for my consideration are — 

First. — As to the constitutionality of the provision delegating 
the power to specify or to determine the requirements of voting 
machines, especially as to whether the machines would fulfill the 
requirements of our laws relating to primaries and elections. 

Second. — Does the bill herewith submitted fully authorize and 
compel the commissioners named in the bill to approve only such 
machines as fulfill the requirements of our primary and election 
laws? 

and yon further state that — 

If the bill does not, in your opinion, either in form or in sub- 
stance fully cover the question that may arise, we should be very 
glad to have you make suggestions and draft of a bill that would 
fully cover the subject matter. 

The purpose of the proposed bill is to vest in the State Ballot 
Law Commission the power to examine voting machines, bal- 
lot boxes and counting apparatus for the purpose of determining 
whether or not such appliances conform to the requirements of 
law which are substantially stated in section 2; and if the com- 



42 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

mission determine that such appliances do conform to the- 
requirements of law, it is made their duty to file with the- 
Secretary of the Commonwealth their approval in writing thereof,, 
together with a sufficient description to identify the particular 
kind of voting machine, ballot box or counting apparatus ap- 
proved. 

Subject to the limitation that the qualifications which entitle 
any person to vote in this Commonwealth and the right to 
elect and to be elected to public office which is consequent upon 
the possession of such qualifications, may not be altered or re- 
stricted, the Legislature may adopt* any reasonable and uniform 
regulations in regard to the time and manner of exercising the 
right of voting, which are designed to secure and facilitate the 
exercise of such right in a prompt, orderly and convenient man- 
ner. Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485, 488 ; Kinneen v. ^Yells, 144 
Mass. 497; Cole v. Tucker, 164 Mass. 486. 

The regulations in the proposed act with respect to the use 
of voting machines appear to be reasonable and uniform in 
their application, and are, therefore, open to no objection upon 
the ground that they constitute an interference with the con- 
stitutional right "to elect officers, and to be elected, for public 
employments.^' Art. IX., Declaration of Eights. Nor, in my 
opinion, do the powers and duties vested in and imposed upon 
the State Ballot Law Commission involve a delegation of the 
legislative authority which would be objectionable upon consti- 
tutional grounds. See Art. XXX., Declaration of Eights. 

It is well established in this Commonwealth that while the 
Legislature may not delegate the general power to make laws 
conferred upon it by the Constitution, it may leave to a sub- 
ordinate tribunal the determination of such details as the Leg- 
islature cannot well determine for itself in the carrying" out of a 
legislative act. Brodbine v. Revere, 182 Mass. 598, 602; Com- 
montveaWh v. Sisson, 189 Mass. 247. 

In the present instance, the examination of the various kinds, 
of mechanical appliances for the purpose of determining which 
and how many of them conform to the requirements of the 
laws of the Commonwealth and may, therefore, be used in pri- 
maries and elections, is clearly a detail of administration the 
determination of which may properly be delegated by the Leg- 
islature to a subordinate tribunal. 

In reply to your second inquiry, I am of opinion that the 
proposed act as submitted to me indirectly requires the State- 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 43 

Ballot Law Commission to approve only such machines as ful- 
fil the requirements of the primary and election law, but does 
not directly do so, since they are required only to " make and 
file with the secretary of the commonwealth their report on such 
machines, ballot boxes and counting apparatus as in their judg- 
ment . conform to the requirements of law." I suggest in the 
interests of clearness that this provision be made to read that 
" they shall file with the secretar}' of the commonwealth their 
approval in writing of all machines, ballot boxes and counting 
apparatus which in their judgment conform to the requirements 
of law," and that the words " and of the preceding " be inserted 
before the word " section " in line 15 of section 2 of the proposed 
act. 

Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



Board of Railroad Commissioners — Procedure — Questions of 
Law or Fact — Rulings. 

The provision of St. 1906, c. 463, Part III., § 157, that the Supreme 
Judicial Court or the Superior Court shall have jurisdiction in equity 
" to review, annul, modify or amend the rulings of any State board 
or commission relative to street railways . . ." does not require the 
Board of Railroad Conmiissioners to make formal rulings upon ques- 
tions of law or issues of fact with respect to which the performance 
of their duties does not call upon them to make a decision. 

If, however, the determination of a question of law is involved in the 
decision of the Board upon any matter of administration properly 
before them, they may express such determination in the form of a 
ruling. 

March 19, 1912. 

Hon. FEEDS^lDi^J. MacLeod, Chairman, Board of Railroad Com- 
missioners. 
Dear Sir : — You have requested my opinion as to whether it 
is consistent with the functions of the Board of Eailroad Com- 
missioners to make specific findings upon certain requests for 
rulings presented to them by counsel under the circumstances 
set forth in your communication of March 11, as follows: — 

In a communication dated Nov. 16, 1910, Hon. Walter Parley 
Hall, former chairman of this Board, requested the opinion of the 
Attorney-General upon certain questions arising in connection with 
two petitions then pending before this Board, one being the petition 
of the city of Worcester for approval of authority granted to the 



44 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Worcester Consolidated Street Railway Company to act as common 
carrier of baggage and freight in that city, and the other being 
the petition of the Worcester Merchants' Association that the 
Worcester Consolidated Street Railway Company be required to 
act as common carrier of baggage and freight in the city of Worces- 
ter. In reply to this communication an opinion was rendered by 
Hon. Dana Malone, Attorney-General at that time, under date of 
Dec. 27, 1910. 

On Nov. ^9, 1911, a conference was held by the Board in relation 
to the pending petition of the Worcester Merchants' Association, 
which was attended by representatives of the Worcester Merchants' 
Association and of the Worcester Consolidated Street Railway Com- 
pany, and also by Mr. E. H. Vaughan, representing the city of 
Worcester. On Dec. 1, 1911, two sets of requests for rulings of 
law were filed by Mr. Vaughan, copies of which are enclosed here- 
with. Subsequently, on Dec. 4, 1911, the Board issued an order, a 
copy of which is also enclosed. 

The statute under which this proceeding was instituted is 
St. 1907, c. 402, § 1, which provides that — 

A street railway company may become a common carrier of news- 
papers, baggage, express matter and freight in such cases, upon 
such parts of its railway, and to such extent, in any city or town, 
as, after public notice and a hearing, upon the petition of any inter- 
ested party, the board of aldermen or the selectmen in such city 
or town and the board of railroad commissioners shall by order 
approve. If the board of aldermen or selectmen to whom such a 
petition is presented act adversely thereon or fail to act within 
sixty days from the date of the filing of such petition the petitioner 
or any interested party may file such petition with the board of 
railroad commissioners, who shall after public notice and a hearing 
detennine whether public necessity and convenience require the 
granting of such petition and shall make an order dismissing such 
petition or requiring any street railway company named in such 
jjetition to act as such common carrier in such cases, upon such parts 
of its railway and to such extent, and under such regulations and 
restrictions, as in the opinion of said railroad commissioners public 
necessity and convenience require. Any street railway company 
acting under authority hereof shall be subject to such regulations 
and restrictions as may from time to time be made by the local 
authorities aforesaid, with the approval of the railroad commis- 
sioners, and shall also be subject to the provisions of all laws now 
or hereafter in force relating to common carriers so far as they 
shall be consistent herewith and with said reg-ulations and restric- 
tions. The authority conferred upon any street railway company 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 45 

b}' virtue of the provisions of this act may at any time be revoked 
or terminated in any city or town or upon any part of its railway, 
by the board of aldemien or selectmen with the approval of the 
board of railroad commissioners. 

The principal contentions of the city of Worcester were, first, 
that the board of aldermen had not acted adversely and had not 
neglected to act within the meaning of the statute above quoted, 
and that the Board of Eailroad Commissioners should have con- 
sidered the petition which was originally presented to the board 
of aldermen and not the subsequent petition presented by the 
Worcester Merchants' Association; and, second, that as matter 
of law said Board was authorized to approve a limited franchise. 
In accordance with the opinion of the Attorney-General herein- 
before referred to, however, the Board took no action with re- 
spect to the petition of the Worcester Consolidated Street 
Eailway Company, upon which the board of aldermen had acted, 
and issued an order in the usual form and without any limita- 
tion as to the duration of the franchise upon the petition pre- 
sented by the Worcester Merchants' Association. 

The rulings submitted for my consideration are obviously in- 
tended to raise the contentions of the city in various forms, 
doubtless with a view to further proceedings under the provi- 
sions of St. 1906, c. 463, Part III., § 157, which is as follows: — 

The supreme judicial court or the superior court shall have 
jurisdiction in equity, upon the petition of a street railway company, 
or of the board of aldermen of a city or the selectmen of a town in 
which the street railway is located, or of any interested party, to 
compel the observance of and to restrain the violation of all laws 
which govern street railway companies, and of all orders, rules and 
regulations made in accordance with the provisions of this chapter 
by the board of aldermen of a city, the selectmen of a town or the 
beard of railroad commissioners, and to review, annul, modify or 
amend the rulings of any state board or commission relative to 
street railways as law and justice may require. 

See Kilty v. Railroad Commissioners, 184 Mass. 310. 

It may be doubted whether the use of the word " rulings " in 
this section was intended to include rulings other than those 
necessarily involved in or inferred from the determination of 
administrative questions and the action of the Board consequent 
thereon, but even if it may be extended to formal rulings upon 



46 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

questions of law requested by parties, the statute does not pur- 
port to require that such rulings shall be given by the Board. 
Moreover, I am of opinion that since the Board of Railroad 
Commissioners deal primarily with matters of administration, 
it may be said to be in general inconsistent with their functions 
to make formal rulings upon questions of law or issues of fact 
upon which the performance of their duties does not require 
them to make a decision. Upon the other hand, where the deter- 
mination of a question of law is involved in the decision of the 
Board upon any matter of administration properly before them, 
I see no reason why they may not express such determination in 
the form of a ruling, and to that extent the making of rulings 
of law is consistent with the functions of the Board. 
Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney -General. 



Conviction — Plea of Nolo — Case placed on File — Game Laws 
— Violation — Certificate of Begistration. 

A plea of nolo where the case is placed on file and such plea is not fol- 
lowed by a sentence or other form of final judgment, is not a " con- 
viction " within the meaning of St. 1911, c. 614, § 11, which provides 
that " everv person convicted of violating the game laws shall im- 
mediately surrender to the officer who secures such conviction his 
certificate of registration. . . .'' 

March 19, 1912. 

Hon. George W. Field, Chairman, Oommissioners on Fisheries and 

Game. 
Dear Sir : — Your communication of March 9 refers to St. 
1911, c. 614, § 11, which provides that — 

Every person convicted of violating the game laws shall immedi- 
ately surrender to the officer who secures such conviction his certifi- 
cate of registration; and the officer shall forthwith forward said 
certificate to the commissioners on fisheries and game, who shall 
cancel the same and notify the clerk issuing the certificate of regis- 
tration of the cancellation. No other certificate of registration 
shall be issued to such person so convicted during a period of one 
year after the date of conviction. 

:and you inquire with reference thereto whether " in cases where 
the defendant pleads nolo and the case is placed on file, is it, 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 47 

in your opinion, a conviction within the meaning of the statute, 
and should such a person be ineligible for a license within one 
year ? " 

In reply to this inquiry I have to advise you that in my 
-opinion upon a plea of nolo, where the case is placed on file and 
said plea is not followed by any sentence or other form of final 
Judgment, the person so pleading is not convicted within the 
meaning of the statute above cited, and the provision with re- 
spect to the issuance of a certificate of registration is not appli- 
cable. 

Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



Riot or Other Disturbance of the Public Peace — County, City 
or Town Authorities — Duties — Suitable Aid — Sheriff 
— Mayor — Selectmen — Precept — Discretion. 

The public authorities of a county, city or town, in cases of a public 
disturbance with rioting or anticipated rioting, are required to use 
the utmost of the powers within their control for the enforcement 
of the laws and the preservation of the peace. 

Since a sheriff, in cases where actual rioting exists or is imminently 
threatened, may require, under the provisions of E. L., c. 23, § 14, 
suitable aid in the preservation of the peace, he may under such 
circumstances call such assistance as a man of ordinary prudence, 
firmness and activity in his situation would think necessary to quell 
the existing or threatened disturbance. 

In cases of existing or threatened rioting, the sheriff of a county, the 
mayor of a city or the selectmen of a town may issue a precept under 
the provisions of St. 1908, c. 604, $§ 142-150, directed to any com- 
mander of a brigade, regiment, battalion, corps of cadets, or company 
within his or their jurisdiction, requiring such commander to appear 
and aid the civil authority in suppressing violence and supporting 
the laws, the issuance of such precept being governed by the exercise 
of the sound discretion, good judgment and honesty of purpose of 
the sheriff or other local officer or officers in determining as a matter 
of fact whether or not the local police may be able to cope with the 
existing or threatened situation. 

March 20, 1912. 
His Excellency Eugene N. Fobs, Governor. 

Sir : — Under date of March 19 Your Excellency requests 
my opinion upon the following question : — 

In ease of a public disturbance, with rioting or anticipated riot- 
ing, what are the rights and duties of town or city authorities, county 



48 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

authorities (particularly the sheriff), the State police and the militia, 
with reference to mamtaining order; and how far is it the duty of 
the local authorities to go before calling on the State? 

Taking up first the duties of town, city and county au- 
thorities in a case such as is inquired of, they may be briefly 
and comprehensively stated to be the enforcement of the laws 
and the preservation of the peace. As to "how far is it the 
duty of the local authorities to go before calling on the State," 
it is impossible to answer by giving any precise formula applicable 
to every case, but it may be briefly stated to be the duty of the 
local authorities to use the utmost of the powers within their 
control in the enforcement of the laws and the preservation of 
the peace. Our laws recognize, however, that there may be oc- 
casions when town, city or county authorities may find it diffi- 
cult or impossible in thus exercising their authority to perform 
their full duty merely by the local officials. In the case of actual 
rioting, from early times the sheriff has had authority as now 
prescribed by E. L., c. 23, § 14, which provides as follows : — 

They [sheriffs] may require suitable aid in the execution of their 
office in a criminal case, in the preservation of the peace, in the 
apprehending or securing of a person for a breach of the peace 
and in cases of escape or rescue of persons arrested upon civil 
process. 

The first use of the phrase " suitable aid " as above employed' 
appears in chapter 20 of the Acts of the Province of Massachu- 
setts Bay in the year 1698. The phrase should be construed, 
therefore, as giving the same authority as that of a sheriff under 
the common law, in the light of which it is to be interpreted 
unless otherwise modified by statute. Consideration of the de- 
cisions in that regard discloses in each case a situation where 
the breach of the peace was actually in progress, or where there 
had been an outbreak just previously, with another disturbance 
expected and imminent as a reasonable certainty. I am led to 
the conclusion that in order to warrant the sheriff in exercising 
this extraordinary remedy under his common-law authority, 
there must be a necessity for it because of disorders either exist- 
ing at the time of his action or imminently threatened, with 
apparent certainty to occur. 

In addition to R. L., c. 23, § 14, hereinbefore cited, E. L., 
c. 211, § 1, further provides: — 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 49 

If twelve or more persons, being armed with clubs or other dan- 
gerous weapons, or if thirty or more persons, whether armed or 
not, are unlawfully, riotously or tumultuously assembled in a city 
or town, the mayor and each of the aldermen of such city, each of 
the selectmen of such town, every justice of the peace living in any 
such city or town and the sheriff of the county and his deputies 
shall go among the persons so assembled, or as near to them as may 
be with safety, and in the name of the commonwealth command all 
persons so assembled immediately and peaceably to disperse; and 
if they do not thereupon immediately and peaceably disperse, each 
of said magistrates and officers shall command the assistance of all 
persons there present in suppressing such riot or unlawful assem- 
bly and arresting such persons. 

If there is, therefore, imminent, impending danger of a riot 
or other breach of the peace, the sheriff has the power and the 
duty to call such aid as a man of ordinary prudence, firmness 
and activity in his situation would think necessary to quell the 
disturbance. This use of the power to compel the aid and assist- 
ance of citizens in general is to be used only to quell a riot, 
but not to keep men for general police duty as occasion may 
require. 

With reference to anticipated rioting, as well as rioting al- 
ready existing, the statutes have provided another method which 
may be employed by either the selectmen of a town, the mayor 
of a city or the sheriff of a county. These provisions are found 
in St. 1908, c. 604, §§ 142-150, but so far as material to the 
purposes of the present inquiry are contained in sections 142 
to 145, which provide as follows : — 

Section" 142. In case of a tumult, riot, mob, or a body of men 
acting together by force to violate or resist the laws of the com- 
monwealth, or when such tumult, riot or mob is threatened and the 
fact appears to the commander-in-chief, to the sheriff of the county, 
to the mayor of the city or to the selectmen of the town, the com- 
mander-in-chief may issue his order, or such sheriff, mayor or select- 
men may issue a precept, directed to any commander of a brigade, 
regiment, naval brigade, battalion, squadron, corps of cadets or 
company, within their jurisdiction, directing him to order his com- 
mand, or a part thereof, to appear at a time and place therein speci- 
fied to aid the civil authority in suppressing such violence and 
supporting the laws; which precept shall be in substance as fol- 
lows : — 



50 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 

To [insert the oflacer's title] A. B., commanding [insert his command]. 

Whereas, it appears to [the sheriff, mayor or the selectman] of the [county, 
city or town] of , that [here state one or more of the causes above 

mentioned] in our of , and that military force is 

necessary to aid the civil authority in suppressing the same: Now, therefore, we 
command you that you cause [your command, or such part thereof as may be 
desired], armed and equipped with ammunition and with proper officers, to 
parade at on , then and there to obey such orders as 

may be given according to law. Hereof fail not at your peril, and have you 
there this precept with your doings returned thereon. 

This precept shall be signed by such sheriff, mayor or selectmen, 
and may be varied to suit the circumstances of the case; and a copy 
of the same shall immediately be forwarded by such sheriff, mayor 
or selectmen to the commander-in-chief. 

Section 143. The officer to whom the order of the commander- 
in-chief or brigade commander, or such precept, is directed shall 
forthwith order the troops therein called for to parade at the time 
and place appointed, and shall immediately notify the commander- 
in-chief of his order, directly in the most expeditious manner, and 
by letter through the usual military channels. 

Section 144. If an officer refuses or neglects to obey such 
order or precept, or if any officer or soldier neglects or refuses to 
obey an order issued in pursuance thereof, he shall be punished as 
a court-martial may adjudge. 

Section 145. Such troops shall appear at the time and place 
appointed, armed, equipped, and with ball ammunition, and shall 
obey and execute such orders as they have received, or such addi- 
tional orders as they may then and there receive from the gov- 
ernor, or from an officer serving under the provisions of section one 
hundred and forty-two. 

With reference to the propriety of calling out the militia 
by the aforesaid precept by the selectmen of a town, the ma3^or 
of a city or the sheriff of a county, the Supreme Judicial Court 
has said, in the case of Ela v. Smith, 5 Gray, 121, in a learned 
and exhaustive opinion covering generally the subject-matter of 
the present inquiry : — 

In exercising the authority thus conferred, the statute maizes it 
the first duty of the mayor or other magistrate to determine whether 
the occasion for calling out a military force exists. This depends 
on a question of fact, which it is his exclusive duty to determine. 
If it be made to appear to him that a tumult or riot is threatened, 
he may then issue his precept. He is, in his official capacity, and 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 51 

under the sanction of his oath of office, to examine and decide this 
question. This provision of the statute clearly confers a judicial 
power. Whenever the law vests in an officer or magistrate a right 
of judgment, and gives him a discretion to determine the facts on 
which such judgment is to be based, he necessarily exercises, within 
the limits of his jurisdiction, a judicial authority. So long as he 
acts within the fair scope of this authority he is clothed with all 
the rights and immunities which appertain to judicial tribunals in 
the discharge of their appropriate functions. 

The same authority resting in the sheriff by the terms of the 
statute as in the mayor of a city, the language of this decision 
would equally apply to the powers and duties of the sheriff 
in that regard. In said decision the court further said : — 

It cannot be urged, as a valid argument against the recognition of 
this authority in civil officers, that it is Hable to abuse, and may be 
made the instrument of oppression. The great security against its 
misuse and perversion is to be found in the discretion, good judg- 
ment and honesty of purpose of those to whom important public 
duties are necessarily entrusted. But the existence of such authority 
is essential in a community where the first and most important use 
of law consists in preserving and protecting persons and property 
from unlawful violence. 

To that part of Your Excellency's question which refers to 
the rights and duties of various public authorities, " with refer- 
ence to maintaining order," I can perhaps do no better than to 
quote further from said decision, as follows: — 

But while thus recognizing the authority of civil officers to call 
out and use an armed force to aid in suppressing a riot or tumult 
actually existing, or preventing one which is threatened, it must be 
borne in mind that no power is conferred on the troops, when so 
assembled, to act independently of the civil authority. On the con- 
trary, they are called out, in the words of the statute, "to aid the 
ei^dl authority," not to usurp its functions, or take its place. They 
are to act as an armed police only subject to the absolute and exclu- 
sive control and direction of the magistrates and other civil officers 
designated in the statute, as to the specific duty or service which 
they are to perform. The statute does not even enlarge the power 
of the civil officers by giving them any militaiy authority; but only 
places at their disposal, in the exercise of their appropriate and 
legal functions, an organized, disciplined and equipped body of 
men, capable of more efficient action in an emergency, and among 



52 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

a multitude, than an ordinary police force. Nor can the magistrate 
delegate his authority to the military force which he summons to 
his aid, or vest in the military authorities any discretionary power 
to take any steps or do any act to prevent or suppress a mob or 
riot. They must perform only such service and render such aid 
as is required by the civil officers. This is not only essential to 
guard against the use of excessive force and the exercise of irrespon- 
sible power; but it is required by the fundamental principles of 
our Constitution, which provides that " the military power shall 
always be held in an exact subordination to the civil authority, and 
be governed by it." Declaration of Rights, Art. XVII. It does not 
follow from this, however, that the military force is to be taken 
wholly out of the control of its proper officers. They are to direct 
its movements in the execution of the orders given by the ci\dl 
officers, and to manage the details in which a specific service or duty 
is to be performed. But the service or duty must be first pre- 
scribed and designated by the civil authority. 

It would therefore seem that the sheriff or other local officer 
should use sound discretion, good judg-ment and honesty of 
purpose in determining as a matter of fact whether or not the 
local police were able to cope with a situation such as is re- 
ferred to in the present inquiry. Acting with these considera- 
tions in mind, such officer has the right to issue the precept 
provided for in said section 142 of chapter 604 of the Acts of 
1908. 

The reference in said inquiry to "the State police^' I as- 
sume to mean the District Police, provided for by chapter 108 
of the Revised Laws, and amendments thereof and additions 
thereto. Section 7 of said chapter provides as follows : — 

The district police shall have and exercise throughout the com- 
monwealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil 
process, and of police officers and watchmen. The governor may 
at any time command their services in suppressing riots and in 
preserving the peace; but, except as aforesaid, a member of the 
inspection department shall not be required to perform any other 
duties than such as pertain to an inspector of factories and public 
buildings or to an inspector of steam boilers. 

^Tiether or not the District Police shall be employed in a 
case such as is inquired of is a matter of policy and discretion 
to be determined by the exercise of the judgment of the person 
upon whom the duty falls to so determine, under the circum- 



1913.] PUBLIC . DOCUMENT — No. 12. 53 

stances of each particular case. No specific rule or formula 
can be definitely given beyond the use of the best judgment pos- 
sible under the circumstances at the time. 
I am, with great respect. 

Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-GenemJ. 

ConpimUonal Ikw — momy rq^^frmhy Taxation — Appropria- 
tion — Public Purpose — Homes for Mechanics, Laborers or 
Other Wage Earners. 
A proposed bill authorizing the commission established by St. 1911, c. 
607, to purchase in the name of the Massachusetts Homestead Com- 
mission and " for the purpose of providing homes for mechanics, 
laborers or other wage earners," and appropriating money therefor, 
would be unconstitutional if passed, since it involves the expendi- 
ture of public money for a private purpose.^ 

March 28, 1912. 
Wilton B. Fay, Esq., Committee on Ways and Means. 

Dear Sir : — On behalf of the Committee on Ways and 
Means you have submitted for my consideration a draft of a bill 
entitled " An Act to extend and define the duties of the Home- 
stead Commission,^^ accompanying the special report of the 
Homestead Commission, House Document No. 441, and have 
orally brought to my attention certain inquiries with reference to 
the constitutionality of the provisions of said bill, with the re- 
quest that I advise your committee thereon. 

With reference to that part of section 3 which provides as 
follows : — • 

The treasurer and receiver-general is authorized to loan the com- 
mission from time to time such sums as it may certify to him in writ- 
ing to be necessary to carry out the purposes of this act, except for 
the expenses incurred under section five, from the funds deposited 
by the savings banks in the treasury of the commonwealth under the 
provisions of section fifty-six of chapter five hundred and ninety of 
the acts of the year nineteen hundred and eight, and subject to the 
restrictions of said act — 

I am of the opinion that there is no constitutional objection. 
Said money in the hands of the Treasurer is public money 
available for public purposes, according to law. If the purpose 

1 See 211 Mass. 624. 



54 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

for which it is to be expended in this case is a lawful, public 

purpose it may be deemed available, as provided in said section. 

As to section 1 of said bill, which provides as follows : — 

The commission established by chapter six hundred and seven of 
the acts of nineteen hundred and eleven shall be authorized to pur- 
chase in the name of the Massachusetts Homestead Commission a 
tract or tracts of land for the purpose of providing homes for me- 
chanics, laborers, or other wage-earners, and shall have authority to 
sub-divide, improve, build upon, lease, rent, sell, re-purchase, manage, 
and care for said tract or tracts and the buildings constructed thereon, 
in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be determined 
upon by the commission, due consideration being given to the projoer 
laying out of streets, parks, garden areas, and buildings for recrea- 
tion or other public jDurposes; and the commission shall make such 
regulations, restrictions, and reservations in contracts, leases, deeds, 
and otherwise as may be necessary for the protection of said tract or 
tracts from any objectionable use. Each person holding property 
under the jurisdiction of the commission shaU be the owner of at 
least five shares of stock as hereinafter provided for, before being 
permitted to occupy or acquire title to any of said real estate; pro- 
vided, however, that the commission in exceptional cases may tempo- 
rarily waive the aforesaid requirement as to ownership of stock 
prior to occupancy — 

different principles have to be considered. In the first place, 
the purpose stated in said section is ^' providing homes for me- 
chanics, laborers or other wage-earners." This limits the bene- 
fits of said act to certain definite classes, thereby taxing the 
public in general for a certain favored class, without disclosing 
any substantial reason for such class legislation. If this objec- 
tion should be cured by an amendment which included any citizen 
instead of members of these particular classes, there remains the 
further and more fundamental question as to whether the ex- 
penditure provided for in this proposed act is an expenditure 
for public purposes. 

The principle governing such consideration was long ago 
stated by the Supreme Court of this Commonwealth, in Loivell 
V. Boston, 111 Mass. 454 (see, also, Loan Association v. Topelca, 
20 Wall. 655; Attorney-General's Report, 1910, p. 43). Among 
other things it was therein pointed out, at page 461 : — 

It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure 
which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 55 

magnitude of the interests to be affected, nor the degTee to which the 
general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, 
may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. 

Applying the principle of that case to the bill under con- 
sideration, it appears that the direct object of the expenditure 
of the public money herein provided for is the purchase of land 
and the erection of homes for laborers, mechanics and wage- 
earners. The public benefit alleged is the improvement of the 
health and morals of the community. It appears, however, that 
this alleged public benefit is so remote and incidental that it 
cannot outweigh the real character of the direct object of the 
expenditure, which appears to be fundamentally for private 
rather than public purposes. 

While I am of the opinion that under the limitation of the 
decisions as they now stand these provisions are unconstitutional, 
it is impossible for me to say how far our Supreme Judicial 
Court might go in approving legislation purporting to be en- 
acted for the public welfare and for the betterment of health 
and morals, it being in each case largely a question of degree. 
There is at least grave doubt as to the constitutionality of said 
section 1. 

V Very truly yours, 

James M: Swift, Attorney-General. 



Town — Note payable ''during the Year 1912'' — Date of 

Payment. 
A note of a town payable " within the year 1912 " is in effect a note 

payable at a futnre date certain, or earlier at the option of the 

maker, and therefore does not comply with the requirement of St. 

1910, c. 616, § 1, that a town note shall state " the date when it 

will become due for payment." 

April 3, 1912. 
Charles F. Gettemy, Esq., Director^ Bureau of Statistics. 

Dear Sir : — You have requested my opinion as to whether 
you may " properly certify a note of a town made payable 
Svithin the 3^ear 1912,' under the provisions of chapter 616, 
Acts of 1910, section 1 of which provides that the note shall 
state ' the date when it will become due for payment.' " 

A note payable "within the year 1912" is, in effect, a note 
payable at a future date certain, or earlier at the option of the 



56 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

maker^ and so is not payable at any fixed or determinable future 
time. Malioney v. Fitzpatriclh, 133 Mass. 151 ; Stults v. Silva, 
119 Mass. 137; ^Yay v. Smith, 111 Mass. 523. And see 
Richards v. Barlow, 140 Mass. 318. It does not comply, there- 
fore, with the requirement of St. 1910, c. 616, § 1, that a town 
note shall state " the date when it will become due for pa}'- 
ment,^^ and you should not certify it. 
Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



License — Engineer — Steam Boiler — Oiuner or User — Op- 
eration — Unlicensed Person — Coal Shovelers. 

The provision of E. L., c. 102, § 8, as amended by St. 1907, c. 373, 
§ 1 and St. 1911, c. 562, $ 1, that "the owner or user of a steam 
boiler or engine . . . shall not operate or cause to be operated a 
steam boiler or engine for a period of more than one week, unless 
the person in charge of and operating it is duly licensed," allows 
such owner or user, in the exercise of good faith and in an un- 
avoidable emergency, a period of one week within which to pro- 
cure a person licensed in accordance with the requirements of law; 
and by the use of such period, the owner or user is not thereafter 
forever prohibited from availing himself under like conditions of 
such allowance. 

The provision of E. L., c. 102, § 80, as amended by St. 1911, c. 562, 
§ 2, that " to work with a licensed person there may be employed 
not more than one unlicensed person, who, in the presence and 
under the personal direction of the licensed person, may operate 
the appurtenances of a boiler or engine," does not require that coal 
shovelers, whose sole duty consists in putting coal under the boiler, 
should be licensed, since coal shovelers, or other persons performing 
the duties of mere laborers in handling coal used in the operation 
of a boiler or boilers, are not operating any appurtenances thereof. 

April 8, 1912. 
J. H. Whitxey, Esq., Chief of the District Police. 

Dear Sir : — Under date of April 6 you have written me 
with reference to sections 78, 79 and 80 of chapter 102 of the 
Revised Laws, as^ amended by chapter 373 of the Acts of 1907 
and by chapter 562 of the Acts of 1911, requesting my opinion 
upon the following matters : — 

First, the last clause of section 78 reads as follows : — 

The OTVTier or user of a steam boiler or engine, other than boilers or 
engines above excepted, shall not operate or cause to be operated a 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 57 

steam boiler or engine for a period of more than one week, unless the 
person in charge of and operating it is duly licensed. 

Is it to be understood that the owner or user of a steam boiler or 
engine,, who from necessity has employed a person not duly licensed 
for a period of one week, is forever after prohibited from such pro- 
vision of section 78 in connection with the use of the same boiler or 
boilers; or could he be permitted, after a reasonable period of time, 
to again take advantage of this provision? 

Second, the last clause of section 80 reads as follows : — 

provided, however, that to work with a licensed person there may be 
employed not more than one unlicensed person who, in the presence and 
under the personal direction of the licensed person, may operate the 
appui'tenanees of a boiler or engine. 

Under the provisions of this clause are we to understand that there 
must be one licensed fireman who operates the appurtenances of a 
boiler, and who is allowed one helper, who may be unlicensed, to 
operate any appurtenances of a boiler or boilers, and also that an 
unlimited number of coal shovelers may also be employed, whose 
duty solely consists in putting coal under the boiler in a large boiler 
plant? 

In my opinion with reference to the first inquiry, your sug- 
gestion of a possible construction that the owner or user of a 
steam boiler, who had employed a person not licensed for the 
period of one week, might be forever after prohibited from 
taking advantage of the provision of section 78 in that regard, 
would be a most unreasonable construction. Taking said sec- 
tion 78 in connection with section 79, which provides that — 

If such steam engine or boiler is found to be in charge of or oper- 
ated by a person who is not a duly licensed engineer or fireman and, 
after a lapse of one week from such time, it is again found to be 
operated by a person who is not duly licensed, it shall be deemed 
prima facie evidence of a violation of the provisions of the pre- 
ceding section — 

It is obvious that this provision was intended for emergencies, 
so that a person in the exercise of good faith, and in an un- 
avoidable emergency, might be allowed one week in which to 
provide himself with a licensed person within the requirements 
of the law. The object of the provision would not be accom- 
plished if the right therein given is exhausted by its operation 
for one week and then forever prohibited. 



58 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

With reference to the second inquiry, the question seems to 
be practically governed by an opinion of Attorney-General 
Knowlton, II Op. Attys.-Gen., 62. I am of the opinion that 
within the limits of your inquiry there must be one licensed 
person, either fireman or engineer, who operates the appur- 
tenances of a boiler, and who is allowed one helper who may 
be unlicensed. There may also be an unlimited number of 
coal shovelers, whose duty consists solely in putting coal under 
the boiler. It was ruled in said opinion of Attorney-General 
Knowlton "that licenses are not required for mere laborers, 
whose duties require no skill and involve no responsibility." 

Since that opinion the statute has been changed so that it 
provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to have charge 
of or to operate the appurtenances of a boiler as well as the 
boiler or engine itself. This does not, in my opinion, change 
the conclusion reached by Attorney- General Knowlton. I know 
of no use of the word " appurtenances " which would include 
coal within that term. Coal shovelers or coal bolsters, or other 
persons performing duties of mere laborers with reference to 
the coal used in the operation of boilers, are not in my opinion 
operating any appurtenances thereof. 
Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



Constitutional Law — Police Power — Competition — Purpose 
to injure or destroy Business of a Rival — Discrimination 
— Lowering of Prices in one Locality by a Person, Firm, 
Association or Corporation engaged in Bushiess in Several 
Localities — " Unfair Discrimination." 
The purpose to injure or destroy the business of a rival by competition 

is not illegal. 
A proposed act providing that " any person, firm, association or corpo- 
ration . . . engaged in the production, manufacture or distribution 
of any commodity in general use, that shall intentionally, for the 
purpose of destroying the business of a competitor in any locality, 
discriminate between different sections ... of this Commonwealth, 
or between purchasers, by selling such commodity at a lower rate 
for such purpose in one section . . . than is charged in another 
section . . . shall be deemed guilty of unfair discrimination, which 
is hereby prohibited and declared unlawful", in effect renders 
unlawful all competition in any locality entered into for the pur- 
pose specified by a person, firm, association or corporation carrying 
on business in more than one such locality. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 59 

The prohibition in such proposed act is not limited to discrimination 
entered upon maliciously or for the purpose of destroying the busi- 
ness of competitors in order to create a monopoly or for any other 
illegal purpose, and therefore discloses no suf&cient distinction be- 
tween the acts of discrimination prohibited and other acts of dis- 
crimination or competition not prohibited to justify such prohibition 
as a valid exercise of the police power. 

Such proposed act, therefore, if passed, would be unconstitutional and 
void. 

April 23, 1912. 

John G. Brackett, Esq., Chairman of the Committee on Bills in the 
Third Reading. 

Dear Sir : — On behalf of the Committee on Bills in the 
Third Eeading yon have submitted for my consideration a pro- 
posed bill entitled "An Act to prohibit discrimination in the 
sale of commodities," and requested my opinion upon its con- 
stitutionality. 

The first section of the bill in question is as follows : — 

Any person, firm, association or corporation, foreign or domestic, 
doing business in the commonwealth of Massachusetts and engaged 
in the production, manufacture or distribution of any commodity in 
general use, that shall intentionally, for the purpose of destroying the 
business of a competitor in any locality, discriminate between differ- 
ent sections, communities, towns or cities of this commonwealth, or 
between purchasers, by selling such commodity at a lower rate for 
such purpose in one section, community, town or city than is charged 
for said commodity by the vender in another section, community, 
town or city in the commonwealth, after making due allowance for 
the difference, if any, in the grade or quality and in the cost of 
transportation, shall be deemed guilty of unfair discrimination, 
which is hereby prohibited and declared unlawful. 

There are other sections which define offences, provide for 
their prosecution and prescribe penalties, but in view of the 
conclusion hereinafter stated it is unnecessary to refer to them 
in detail. 

The bill is undoubtedly designed to invoke the police power 
to prohibit a discrimination in prices between different localities 
in the Commonwealth, or between purchasers in different lo- 
calities, where prices have been lowered in one locality for the 
purpose of destroying the business of a competitor in such 
locality, and in effect to render unlawful competition in a single 
locality entered into by a person, firm, association or corporation 



60 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

carrying on business in more than one locality. Like discrim- 
ination, induced by any other purpose or motive, is not illegal. 

The fundamental question presented by the inquiry of the 
committee is, therefore, whether the definition of unfair dis- 
crimination in the section of the bill above quoted is grounded 
upon a reasonable distinction with reference to other forms of 
discrimination or competition so as to permit a valid exercise 
of the police power in the premises. 

As above stated, discrimination is "unfair," and therefore 
prohibited, only when it arises from a lowering of prices in a 
given locality " intentionally, for the purpose of destroying the 
business of a competitor ; " but since in the conduct of business 
competition, which gives to one what it takes from another, 
must inevitably result in the destruction in whole or in part 
of the business of a rival, the specified purpose, to a greater 
or less extent, is inseparable from all competition. In itself, 
moreover, the purpose to injure the business of a rival by com- 
petition is not illegal. Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 260; 
Pla7it V. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 501; Bowen v. Matheson, 
14 Allen, 499. And see Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. Ill, 
134. And this is true even where the injury sought to be accom- 
plished is the destruction of the business and the consequent 
ruin of a competitor. Martell v. White, supra, p. 261. It fol- 
lows, therefore, that neither the act of discriminating nor the 
purpose which brings the act within the prohibition of the bill, 
if separately considered, is illegal. On the contrary, the public 
policy of the Commonwealth has recognized and justified com- 
petition in business and has expressly declared that every con- 
tract, agreement or combination which restrains or prevents 
competition in the supply or price of any article or commodity 
is against public policy and is illegal and void. St. 1908, c. 454. 
See Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92; Commomvealth v. 
Hunt, 4 Met. Ill, 134. 

The police power extends to all matters which affect the lives, 
limbs, health, comfort and welfare of all in their persons and 
property {Commomvealth v. Bearce, 132 Mass. 542, 546) and 
the Legislature may enact " such reasonable regulations as they 
may judge necessary to protect public and private rights, and 
to impose no larger restraints upon the use and enjoyment of 
private property, than are in their judgment strictly necessary 
to preserve and protect the rights of others." Commomvealth 
V. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 102. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCOIEXT — No. 12. 61 

There are, however, limitations upon this power. Thus, in 
O'Keeffe v. SomerviUe, 190 Mass. 110, the court, in speaking 
of the regulation of the ordinar}^ transactions of business (in 
this case the imposition of an excise tax upon the selling or 
giving of trading stamps in connection with the sale of articles, 
which was held invalid), said, at page 114: — 

One of the reasons why these methods are allowable is found in 
the familiar principle that constitutional liberty means " the right 
of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and work where 
he will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue 
any lawful trade or avocation." The restrictions upon conduct which 
may be imposed in the exercise of the police power include every- 
thing that may be necessary in the interest of the public health, the 
public safety or the public morals, and they include nothing more. 
These doctrines have often been discussed and elaborated, and it is 
unnecessary to consider them at lengih in this case. 

To constitute the bill now before me a proper exercise of the 
police power, therefore, it must appear that the public health, 
the public safety or the public morals require protection against 
competition when it takes the form of a discrimination in the 
price of a commodity between localities or purchasers in dif- 
ferent localities which is unnecessary where competition does 
not result in such discrimination. The right primarily pro- 
tected is the right of the competitor in a locality against which 
the discrimination is directed to be free from competition, a 
right which does not exist at common law {^Valker v. Cronin, 
107 Mass. 555; Martell v. ^Y^l^te, 185 Mass. 255), and which 
contravenes the established public policy of the Commonwealth. 
Such being the purpose and effect of the bill submitted to me, 
I am constrained to say that in its present form it discloses no 
sufficient distinction between the acts prohibited and other 
forms of competition which the law not only permits but en- 
courages, and that in my opinion, if enacted, it would not con- 
stitute a valid exercise of the police power. 

Legislation, substantially like the bill now before your com- 
mittee, has been twice considered by courts of last resort. In 
State V. Drayton, 82 ]^ebr. 254, a statute almost identical in 
terms was upheld upon the ground that it '^ was enacted for 
the purpose of suppljing a defect in the anti-trust laws of the 
State," upon, an information charging that the defendant " did 
unlawfully, maliciously and intentionally, for the purpose of 



62 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

destroying the business of a competitor . . . discriminate be- 
tween different sections of the State/' and both the prosecuting 
officer and the court treated the statute as if the word " mali- 
ciously '^ was a part of it, and as if the purpose which made the 
discrimination unfair and therefore unlawful was the purpose 
of destroying the business of a competitor " in order that the 
wrongdoer may have a monopoly" (page 264). 

In State v. Central Lumher Co., 24 So. Dak. 136, the statute 
under consideration made discrimination unlawful when such 
discrimination was for the purpose of " destroying the competi- 
tion of any regular, established dealer ... or to prevent the 
competition of any person who in good faith intends and at- 
tempts to become such dealer," and the court again treated the 
statute as if it were directed against monopolies. 

If the bill in question were in terms directed against discrim- 
ination entered upon maliciously or for the purpose of destroy- 
ing business in order to create a monopoly, a very different 
question would be presented, and if enacted, it might well be 
treated as supplying a defect in the anti-trust laws of the Com- 
monwealth. No such limitation, however, is to be found in it 
in its present form. Section 1 doubtless includes a person, firm, 
association or corporation which discriminates in prices for the 
purpose of creating a monopoly, but it also extends to and in- 
cludes persons who discriminate in the course of lawful and 
proper competition, with the purpose of destroying the business 
of competitors, so far as competition may destroy it, for their 
own benefit, without any malicious or unlawful intent to injure 
the public by creating a monopoly in the sale of the commodities 
in which they deal. This unlawful purpose is, in my opinion, 
essential to distinguish the acts sought to be prohibited and to 
afford a reasonable basis for regulation under the police power. 
Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



Constitutional Law — Amendment to Constitution — Taxation 
— Wild or Forest Lands — Standing Wood and Timber. 

A proposed constitutional amendment, giving to the General Court full 
power and authority " to prescribe for wild or forest lands such 
methods of taxation as will develop and conserve the forest resources 
of the Commonwealth," if adopted would permit the enactment bv 
the Legislature of taxation laws with reference to woodlands and 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 63 

wood lots without regard to their size so long as said wood lots or 
woodlands were wild and forest lands; that is, in a state of nature 
and uncultivated except for the purpose of producing wood and 
timber. 

The term " wild or forest lands " does not include a tract of woodland 
located within fenc^e premises of which the principal use is for 
pasturage. 

The technical signification of the term " wild or forest lands " has 
never been established or defined by the courts of this Common- 
wealth. The term " standing wood and timber " has not received, 
either in the statutes of this Commonwealth or in the decisions of 
the court, a fixed or technical definition of universal or even of 
general application. 

The proposed amendment to the Constitution, which would confer upon 
the General Court full power and authority to prescribe for wild 
or forest lands " such methods of taxation as will develop and 
conserve the forest resources of the Commonwealth," would author- 
ize the enactment of laws to provide that wild or forest lands should 
be taxed without reference to the element of value contributed by 
the growth thereon, and that the tax upon the value of such growth 
might be reduced or altogether omitted in the determination of the 
tax to be assessed upon said lands. 

May 1, 1912. 

Hon. Geaftox D. Gushing, Speaker of the House of Representa- 
tives. 
Sir : — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of an 
order adopted by the Honorable House of Eepresentatives on 
April 12, requesting my opinion upon certain questions '^ in 
respect to the constitutional amendment^ relative to the taxation 
of wild or forest lands, now pending in the House of Eepre- 
sentatives and contained in House Resolve No. 1982." This 
resolve, which was duly passed by the Legislature of last year, 
is as follows : — 

Full power and authority are hereby given and granted to the 
general court to prescribe for wild or forest lands such methods of 
taxation as wall develop and conserve the forest resources of the 
commonwealth. 

The specific questions submitted to me by the Honorable 
House of Eepresentatives are as follows : — 

1. Does the amendment as at present drafted include all wood lots 
and woodlands irrespective of their size ? 

2. Does the amendment as drawn discriminate against small wood 
lots and include only large tracts of woodland? 



64 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

3. Does the term " wild land " include small wood lots ? 

4. Does the amendment as drawn permit the enactment of taxation 
laws by the Legislature with reference to wood lots and woodlands 
regardless of their size? 

5. Does the term " wild or forest lands " include a tract of wood- 
land located within fenced premises whose principal use is for pas- 
turage ? 

6. Is the term " wild or forest lands " a term of well-known legal 
signification established by any decision of any court of last resort 
in the United States ? 

7. Is the term " standing wood and timber " a term of well-known 
legal signification established by various decisions of courts of last 
resort in the United States? 

8. Does the amendment as drawn permit the enactment of laws to 
tax the land and exempt or reduce the tax on the gTowing timber 
which stands upon it? 

The proposed amendment is broad in terms and is designed 
to afford the Legislature comprehensive authority to adopt for 
wild or forest lands such methods of taxation as in their judg- 
ment may best develop and conserve the forest resources of the 
Commonwealth. So far as I am aware, the term " wild' or 
forest lands '^ has never been precisely defined by either the 
court or the Legislature of this Commonwealth, but the term 
" wild land " is well known to the law, and has been often dis- 
cussed and its signification definitely determined in connection 
with writs of dowser and writs of entry or actions of tort for 
trespass. In these connections it has been defined as land in 
a state of nature, and includes marsh land, sprout land and 
woodland. Conner v. Shepherd, 15 Mass. 164; Webh v. Town- 
send, 1 Pick. 21 ; Richmond Iron Worlcs v. Wadhams, 142 Mass. 
569. Such land does not cease to be wild land, even when used 
as an appendage to a cultivated farm for the purpose of pro- 
curing fuel and timber. White v. Willis, 7 Pick. 143; White 
V. Cutler, 17 Pick. 248. The term ^^ forest land" does not seem 
to have been directly considered by the court. As used in the 
proposed amendment, above quoted, however, it probably does 
not differ greatly in meaning from the term ^^ wild land," which 
precedes it. The word " forest," alone, has been defined to be — 

A tract of land covered w^ith trees; a wood, usually one of con- 
siderable extent ; a tract of woodland with or without enclosed inter- 
vals of open and uncultivated gTound. — Century Dictionary and 
Cyclopedia. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 65 

In the case of White v. Cutler, 17 Pick. 2-18, Chief Justice 
Shaw, in discussing the right of dower of a widow in wild and 
uncultivated land, uses the terms " forest lands " and ^^ wood- 
lands " interchangeably : — 

These reasons apply as well to the case of a wood lot situated in 
the midst of a cultivated country, as to forest lands in their original 
state. But the chief justice, in delivering the opinion of the court in 
this case {Conner v. Shepherd, 15 Mass. 164), takes care in terms to 
limit its operation to the case of woodlands not used or connected 
with a cultivated farm, or other improved estate. 

It is well established that wild land does not lose its character 
by being kept and used by its owners for the purpose of raising 
wood for profit. White v. Cutler, 17 Pick. 248. See Slater v. 
Jepherson, 6 Cush. 129 ; Morris v. Callanan, 105 Mass. 129. In 
my opinion the term " wild land," as defined by the court, would 
include forest land, with the possible exception that the term 
" forest lands " may include land planted and cultivated for 
the purpose of producing trees in sufficient numbers to consti- 
tute such land forest land. 

Replying specifically to the first, second, third and fourth 
questions submitted by the Honorable House of Eepresentatives, 
I am of opinion that the amendment as at present drafted 
would permit the enactment by the Legislature of taxation laws 
with reference to wood lots and woodlands, without regard to 
their size, so long as said wood lots or woodlands were wild or 
forest lands within the definition already made; that is, land 
in a state of nature, and uncultivated except for the purpose 
of producing wood and timber. It is to be observed that the 
amendment as at present drafted is permissive only, and, 
strictly speaking, cannpt be said to include or exclude any par- 
ticular kind or class of wood lots or woodlands. The foregoing 
answer, however, is based on the assumption that the Honorable 
House of Representatives desires my opinion upon the question 
of whether or not said amendment would permit the enactment 
of laws which should include wood lots and woodlands without 
reference to their extent. 

It has been held upon a writ of dower that wood and pasture 
land occupied as such and used in connection with a homestead 
should not be considered as wild and uncultivated land (Shat- 
tucJc V. Gragg, 23 Pick. 88), and it is, in my opinion, at least 



66 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

doubtful if the term " wild or forest lands " would be held to 
include a tract of woodland located within fenced premises, of 
which the principal use was for pasturage. The question pre- 
sented is chiefly one of fact, to be determined by the circum- 
stances in each particular case. Speaking generally, however, 
and upon the assumption that the principal use of the tract is 
for pasturage, which is more or less inconsistent with the pro- 
duction and growth of forests^ I am of opinion that the fifth 
question of the Honorable House of Representatives should be 
answered in the negative. 

In respect to the sixth question of the Honorable House of 
Representatives, I have already stated that the courts of this 
Commonwealth have never established and defined the technical 
signification of the term "wild or forest lands," and I am not 
aware nor have I been advised of any decision of a court of 
last resort in an}^ other State which establishes a general legal 
signification of that precise term. 

To the seventh inquiry submitted by the Honorable House 
of Representatives I reply as follows : the terms " standing 
wood " and " standing timber ''• have been frequently defined 
by courts of last resort in the several States, but such decisions 
have been directed to the construction of the respective terms 
in specific legislative enactments, in deeds or grants, or in con- 
tracts, and have defined such terms with reference to the con- 
text in which they are found and to the purpose which the 
instrument was designed to accomplish, and so do not establish 
for them fixed and definite legal significations which would be 
applicable wherever the words may be found. Thus, for ex- 
ample, in Strout v. Harper, 72 Me. 270, where it was held that 
in a deed a reservation of " all the standing wood upon the lot, 
together with the right to enter and remove the same at any 
time within three years," included trees, suitable for timber as 
well as trees suitable only for fuel, the court saying (page 
273): — 

True, the word " wood " is often used to designate fuel. But when 
so used it means fuel wholly, or, at least, partially, prepared for the 
fire. The term " standing wood " cannot be so used. It can apply 
only to trees. And when there is nothing in the context, or in any 
other part of the deed, to indicate that it is used in a more limited 
sense, we think it must be held to include all the trees, — trees suit- 
able for timber as well as those fit only for firewood. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 67 

And see Sliiffer v. Broadhead, 126 Penn. St. 260; Haskell v. 
Ayers, 35 Mich. 89; ^Wilson v. State, 17 Tex. App. 393; O'Han- 
lan V. Denvir, 81 Cal. 60 ; Donworth v. Sawyer, 94 Me. 242. In 
this Commonwealth standing wood and timber are mentioned 
occasionally in the statutes. See E. L., c. 134, § 11 ; c. 208, § 7 ; 
St. 1869, c. 249. And more frequently in the decisions of the 
court. See White v. Foster, 102 Mass. 375 ; DraJce v. Wells, 11 
Allen, 141; Fletcher v. Livingston, 153 Mass. 388; Worthen v. 
Garno, 182 Mass. 243. But the term " standing wood and tim- 
ber " has not received, either in the statutes or in the opinions of 
the court, a fixed or technical definition of universal, or even of 
general, application. 

The eighth inquiry of the Honorable House of Eepresenta- 
tives is so phrased as to leave me in some doubt as to the exact 
question upon which my opinion is desired. Limiting my reply 
to the precise terms of said inquiry, however, I have to advise 
the Honorable House of Eepresentatives that the proposed 
amendment, which would confer upon the General Court full 
power and authority to prescribe for wild or forest lands " such 
methods of taxation as will develop and conserve the forest 
resources of the Commonwealth," would doubtless authorize the 
enactment of laws to provide that wild or forest lands should 
be taxed without reference to the element of value contributed 
by the growth thereon, and that the tax upon the value of such 
growth might be reduced or altogether omitted in the deter- 
mination of the tax to be assessed upon said lands. 

I am, with great respect, 

Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



Gypsy and Brown-tail Moths — State Forester — Work of De- 
struction of Moths — Co-operation with Private Individuals 
— Supplies. 
Under the provisions of St. 1905, c. 381, § 3, as amended by St. 1906, 
c. 268, $ 1, and St. 1908, c. 591, § 1, providing that the superin- 
tendent for the suppression of the gypsy and brown-tail moth, 
among other things, " may act in co-operation with any person, 
persons, corporation or corporations, including other states, the 
United States or foreign governments," and " may devise, use and 
require all other lawful means of suppressing or preventing said 
moths," the State Forester, who succeeds to the powers of the 



68 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

superintendent for the suppression of the gypsy and brown-tail 
moth under the provisions of St. 1909, c. 263, when actually engaged 
in the work of destroying such moths in a given locality may co- 
operate with adjacent landowners, who are carrying on work upon 
their own premises in conjunction with the public work, by furnish- 
ing them at cost supplies to be actually used in such work, or may 
authorize the local superintendent to furnish such supplies as his 
agent. 

May 13, 1912. 

Frank W. Rane, Esq., State Forester. 

Dear Sir : — Your letter of May 2 submits for my considera- 
tion an inquiry as to whether, under the provisions of St. 1905, 
c. 381, § 3, you are authorized to permit local superintendents 
to sell supplies to property owners at cost, said supplies to be 
used only for the purpose of suppressing the gypsy and brown- 
tail moths on their own property. You state that with the 
approval of the Governor you have already established a supply 
store from which various articles used in the work of destroying 
the gypsy and brown-tail moths are furnished at cost prices to 
such cities and towns as are by law entitled to reimbursement 
from the Commonwealth. 

The section of the statute to which you refer, as amended 
by St. 1906, c. 268, § 1, and St. 1908, c. 591, § 1, is as fol- 
lows : — 

The said superintendent shall act for the commonwealth in sup- 
pressing said moths as public nuisances, in accordance with the pro- 
visions of this act. For this purpose he shall establish an office and 
keep a record of his doings and of his receipts and expenditures, 
and may, subject to the approval of the governor, -make rules and 
regulations governing all operations by cities, towns or individuals 
under this act. He may employ such clerks, assistants and agents, 
including expert advisers and inspectors, as he may deem necessary 
and as shall be approved by the governor. He may make contracts 
on behalf of the commonwealth; may act in co-operation with any 
person, persons, corporation or corporations, including other states, 
the United States or foreigm governments; may conduct investiga- 
tions and accumulate and distribute information concerning said 
moths; may devise, use and require all other lawful means of sup- 
pressing or preventing said moths; may lease real estate when he 
deems it necessary, and, with the approval of the board in charge, 
may use any real or personal property of the commonwealth; may 
at all times enter upon the land of the commonwealth or of a mu- 
nicipality, corporation, or other owner or owners, and may use all 
reasonable means in carrying out the purposes of this act; and, in 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 69 

the undertaking's aforesaid, may, in accordance with the provisions 
of this act, expend the funds appropriated or donated therefor; but 
no expenditure shall be made or liability incurred in excess of such 
appropriations and donations. The clerks, assistants and agents 
employed by said superintendent may at all times, in carrying out 
the purposes of this act, enter upon the land of the commonwealth 
or of a municipality, corporation or other owner or owners. 

By St. 1909, c. 263, the powers of the superintendent for the 
destruction of gypsy and brown-tail moths were transferred to 
the State Forester. 

The section quoted vests the State Forester with broad powders, 
and since, by St. 1905, c. 381, § 1, the pupae, nests, eggs and 
caterpillars of the gypsy and brown-tail moths, as well as the 
moths themselves, are declared to be public nuisances, I see 
no reason to doubt that, when actually engaged in the work 
of destroying such moths in any stage of their development in 
a given locality, you may co-operate with, adjacent owners who 
are carrying on, or may desire to carry on, private work upon 
their own premises in conjunction with the public work by fur- 
nishing them at cost supplies to be actually used in such work, 
or may authorize a local superintendent to furnish them as 
your agent. 

Upon the other hand, I am of opinion that nothing in the 
section should be construed to authorize the indiscriminate sale 
of such supplies to private individuals upon the mere assump- 
tion that they are to be used in connection with work upon the 
premises of such individuals, and that the proper and safe rule 
to follow in the premises, if such supplies are to be so fur- 
nished, is to require them to be used upon work which is closely 
connected with some public work of the same character, and 
which may be subject to the general supervision of the State 
Forester or his agents. 

Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General 



Constitutional Law — Appropriation of Money raised hy Taxa- 
tion — Public Purpose — Reclamation and Sale of Wet 
Lands — Eminent Domain — Gratuity. 
A proposed act providing, in substance, for the taking by eminent 
domain, at the assessed valuation thereof, of tracts of wet lands for 
the purpose of reclamation, which, after such taking and reelama- 



70 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

tion, are to be cultivated for two years by the State Board of 
Agriculture and then sold at a price not less than the cost of such 
land plus the cost of reclamation, one-half of any sums received in 
excess of such total cost to be awarded to the original owner or 
owners of the land sold, and appropriating therefor the sum of 
$10,000, might be held to contemplate the accomplishment of a 
public purpose which would warrant the exercise of the power of 
eminent domain and the appropriation of money raised by taxa- 
tion, if, as matter of fact, the development and distribution for 
occupation of the land affected gave relief to a considerable and 
thickly settled agricultural region, and affected beneficially the 
community as a whole, throughout such region, as well as indi- 
viduals who acquired the land itself. 
So much of such proposed act as provides that one-half of any sum 
received by the Commonwealth upon disposing of reclaimed land, 
in excess of the cost of the land plus the cost of reclamation, shall 
be awarded to the original owner or owners thereof authorizes a 
payment which is in the nature of a gratuity, and would therefore be 
unconstitutional. 

May 16, 1912. 
Hon. Levi H. Greenwood, President of the Senate. 

Sir: — By an order dated April 25, 1912, the Honorable Sen- 
ate has required my opinion npon the following questions of 
law:— ^ 

1. If the bill entitled " An Act to provide for protecting the public 
health and promoting the general welfare by the reclamation of wet 
lands," now pending in the Senate (printed as House No. 7, and 
amended by the Senate), should be enacted, would its provisions be 
constitutional ? 

2. Would it be constitutional to provide for the expenditure of 
$10,000 from the treasury of the Commonwealth for the taking and 
improving of wet lands by the State Board of Health and by the 
Board of AgTiculture, and for the exemption from taxation of such 
lands so long as the title thereto remains in the Commonwealth ? 

3. Is it possible that section 2, and especially the provisions of 
lines 6 and 7 of said section, providing that the rule of damages shall 
be the assessed valuation, would be unconstitutional? 

4. Is it possible that section 6, and especially the provisions of 
line 5 of said section, providing that the Commonwealth may take, 
own and operate deposits of marl and peat, would be unconstitu- 
tional? 

The proposed act is entitled " An Act to provide for protect- 
ing the public health and promoting the general welfare by the 
reclamation of wet lands," and is as follows : — 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 71 

Section 1. The sum of ten thousand dollars is hereby appro- 
priated, to be paid out of the treasury of the commonwealth from 
the ordinary revenue of the current year, to constitute a fund called 
the Wet Lands Reclamation Fund, the same to be expended under 
the direction of the state boards of health and agriculture, in the 
manner and for the puri30se hereinafter specified. 

Section 2. The said board of health, with the approval of the 
governor and council, may take for the purposes of this act any 
tract or tracts of wet lands of two or more adjacent owners, except 
salt marshes, together with such dry land, if any, as may be necessary 
for access thereto, by eminent domain, at the assessed valuation of 
said lands. 

Any iDerson aggrieved by a taking as aforesaid may have his 
damage assessed in the manner provided by law in respect to 'the 
taking of land for public parks. 

Title to lands so taken shall pass to the commonwealth, and they 
shall be exempt from taxation until sold as hereinafter provided. 

Section 3. The said board, acting through such agent or agents 
as it shall appoint, shall proceed to drain and reclaim such lands, 
and for that purpose may purchase such machinery and equipments 
and execute such contracts, as the governor and council may approve, 
employing so far as may be practicable the labor of prisoners under 
regulations and conditions prescribed by the prison commissioners. 

Section 4. When said lands, or any convenient part thereof, shall 
have been drained and reclaimed, the board of agriculture shall cause 
the same to be cultivated for not less than two successive seasons, in 
such a manner as, in the opinion of the board, shall best demonstrate 
the value thereof for agricultural uses. 

Section 5. The said board of agriculture shall thereafter, at such 
time or times as it shall deem expedient, offer such lands for sale, in 
whole or in part, at a price not less than the cost of the land plus 
the cost of reclaiming the same. 

One half of any sums received in excess of such total cost, shall be 
awarded to the original owner or owners of the land sold, and the 
other half of such excess shall be turned in to the treasury of the 
commonwealth until the original appropriation shall have been re- 
funded. The remaining proceeds of such sales shall be returned to 
the reclamation fund, to be used for the reclamation of successive 
tracts in the manner hereinbefore provided. 

Section 6. The town boards, acting jointly, may, in their dis- 
cretion, reserve from sale any tracts containing marl, peat, or other 
deposits of commercial value, by the exploitation of which the cost 
of reclaiming the remainder may be reduced; and may lease or 
operate such reserved portions in any manner approved by the gov- 
ernor and council. 

Section 7. This act shall take effect upon its passage. 



72 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

The title of the bill recites that it is an act " to provide for 
protecting the public health and promoting the general wel- 
fare," but its provisions clearly contemplate not merely the 
exercise of the police power of the Commonwealth for the pres- 
ervation of the public health or safety, since, by its provisions, 
the exercise is required of the governmental powers of eminent 
domain and taxation (see §§ 1, 2). Xor is it an exercise of 
the police power in providing reasonable regulations for the 
general advantage of the owners of wet or swampy lands. See 
R. L., c. 195, § 116; Coomes v. Burt, 22 Pick. 422; Day v. 
Hurlhurt, 11 Met. 321; Sherman v. Toleij, 3 Allen, 7; Wurts 
V. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606; Head v. Amoskeag Manfg. Co., 
113 U. S. 9. Acts of this character are not designed to accom- 
plish a public purpose and do not involve an exercise 
either of the power of eminent domain or of the power of taxa- 
tion. Henry v. Thomas, 119 Mass. 583, 584; Lowell v. Boston, 
111 Mass. 454. It is well established that these latter powers 
may be invoked only where the purpose to be accomplished is 
a public purpose. Loivell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454, 462 ; Talbot 
V. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417; Opinion of the Justices, 182 Mass. 
607; Opinion of the Justices, 155 Mass. 601. 

The first and most important question presented by the 
several inquiries of the Honorable Senate is whether or not the 
purpose of the proposed bill is a public purpose. The purpose 
stated in the title, that of protecting the public health, is not 
conclusive, for the reason that the public health might well 
be protected under the police power without recourse either to 
the power of eminent domain or to the power of taxation, since, 
if conditions warranted it, the wet lands might well be declared 
a public nuisance, and so abated at the expense of the persons 
benefited (see R. L., c. 75, §§ 75-85; Grace v. Board of Health 
of Newton, 135 Mass. 490), or might be abated under a statute 
like R. L., c. 195, § 116, upon the theory that all owners of 
contiguous property of this character were common proprietors 
and could be required to join in the work of reclamation and 
to pay a reasonable and proportionate part of the expense. It 
is obvious from a consideration of the bill, moreover, that the 
taking of lands for the purpose of drainage, the purchase of 
machinery for their development, and the experimental culti- 
vation to " demonstrate the value thereof for agricultural uses," 
are not in any sense required for the protection of the public 
health, and that the primary, if not the only, object of the bill 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 73 

is to secure the reclamation of the lands and their development 
so far as may be necessary to make them marketable. The pur- 
pose of the act, then, may fairly be said to be the acquisition 
and development of wet lands so as to make them, after develop- 
ment, fit for profitable occupation by the people of the Com- 
monwealth or such of the people as may have opportunity to 
acquire them. 

The exercise of the power of eminent > domain in connection 
with the drainage of wet lands has been sustained. See Coster 
V. Tide Water Co., 3 C. E. Green, 54, 518; State v. Blake, 
7 Vroom, 447; Talhot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417. In the latter 
case the court sustained a statute (St. 1860, c. 211) which pro- 
vided that a considerable tract of land situated in different 
towns and held by a large number of owners, which was flooded 
by reason of a dam maintained by private persons, might be 
reclaimed by the removal of the dam by commissioners ap- 
pointed under the act, compensation being paid out of the 
treasury of the Commonwealth to the persons by whom the 
dam had been maintained. The court discusses at length 
whether or not the purpose for which the power of eminent 
domain was here exercised was a public purpose. Thus, at page 
423 :~ 

lu many cases there can be no difficulty in determining whether an 
appropriation of property is for a public or private use. If land is 
taken for a fort, a canal or a highwaj^, it would clearly fall within 
the first class; if it is transferred from one person to another or to 
several persons solely for their peculiar benefit and advantage, it 
would as clearly come within the second class. But there are inter- 
mediate cases where public and private interests are blended together, 
in which it becomes more difiicult to decide within which of the two 
classes they may be properly said to fall. There is no fixed rule or 
standard by which such cases can be tried and determined. Each 
must necessarily depend upon its own peculiar circumstances. In 
the present case there can be no doubt that every owner of meadow 
land bordering on these rivers will be directly benefited to a gi-eater 
or less extent by the reduction of the height of the plaintiffs' dam. 
The act is therefore in a certain sense for a private use, and enures 
directly to the individual advantage of such owners. But this is by 
no means a decisive test of its validity. Many enterprises of the 
highest public utility are productive of great and immediate benefits 
to individuals. A railroad or canal may largely enhance the value of 
private property situated at or near its termini ; but it is not for that 
reason any less a public work, for the construction of which private 



74 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

property may well be taken. We are therefore to look further into 
the probable operation and effect of the statute in question, in order 
to ascertain whether some public interest or benefit may not be 
likely to accrue from the execution of the power conferred by it 
upon the defendants. If any such can be found, then we are bound 
to suppose that the act was passed in order to effect it. We are not 
to judge of the wisdom or expediency of exercising the power to 
accomplish the object. The Legislature are the sole and exclusive 
judges whether the exigency exists which calls on them to exercise 
their authority to take private property. If a use in its nature public 
can be subserved by the appropriation of a portion of the plaintiffs' 
dam in the manner provided by this act, it was clearly within the 
constitutional authority of the Legislature to take it, and in the 
absence of any declared purpose we must assume that it was taken 
for such legitimate and authorized use. 

The court, in sustaining the exercise of the power, referred to 
the statutes providing for the improvement of meadows, 
swamps and low lands as instances of the exercise of the power 
of eminent domain for purposes like that in the case at bar 
(page 428). The analogy, however, was denied in Lowell v. 
Boston, supra (see page 468), although the case was followed 
upon the principal question, the court, in Lotuell v. Boston, say- 
ing (page 470) : — 

The main question was, whether the relief of an extensive territory 
of valuable lands, in a thickly settled agricultural region, from the 
nuisance of flooding by the waters of a stream, caused by a single 
dam below, constituted such an object of public concern as to justify 
the exercise of the power by removing the dam. The court recognized 
the difficulty that, so far as the removal of the dam benefited each 
land owner, it was a private use which would not justify the exercise 
of that power. But the obstruction in the stream injuriously affected 
" so large a territory, situated in different towns, and owned by a 
great number of persons," as to give it the character of a public 
nuisance, the removal of which " would seem to come fairly within 
the scope of legislative action." While we do not assent to the sug- 
gestions in that opinion, that the general provisions of law for the 
regulation of mills and the improvement of meadows are based upon 
the constitutional power to appropriate private property under the 
right of eminent domain, we accord fully with the judgment rendered 
and the general principle upon which it is founded. 

If the use to which the property is to be put is a public use, 
the decision of the Legislature as to the necessity which re- 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 75 

quires it to be taken is conclusive. Talbot v. Hudson, supra; 
Miller v. Fitcliburg, 180 Mass. 32, 37. The question as to 
whether or not the use is a public one, however, must ultimately 
be decided by the court. Miller v. Fitcliburg, supra, page 37, 
and cases cited. If the proposed bill benefits no one but the 
present or prospective owners of the land taken, or if the only 
benefit is in the profitable development and sale of the lands 
themselves, the purpose of the statute would not, in my 
opinion, be a public one. See Opinion of the Justices, 182 Mass. 
605, 607; Opinion of the Justices, 155 Mass. 601. If, upon the 
other hand, the development and distribution for occupation of 
the lands affected gave relief to a considerable and thickly set- 
tled agricultural region, and affected beneficially the community 
as a whole throughout such region, as well as the individuals 
who acquired the land itself, it would doubtless be held by the 
court to be a public purpose which would justify the exercise 
of the power of eminent domain. As I have stated, the ulti- 
mate decision is for the court, but without definite knowledge 
as to the land which may be affected or the resulting benefits 
to the public as a whole, I am of opinion that I am not re- 
quired to hold that the purpose of the act, as gathered from its 
provisions alone, would necessarily be unconstitutional. 

The first question of the Honorable Senate, however, extends 
to and includes not only the general purpose of the act as stated 
in sections 1 and 2, but also matters of detail comprehended in 
other provisions, and I am therefore constrained to call atten- 
tion to the provisions of section 5, that one-half of any sums 
received by tho. Commonwealth, upon disposing of such lands, 
in excess of the cost of the land plus the cost of reclamation, 
shall be awarded to the original owner or owners of any such 
land sold; and to say that in my opinion such provision is 
clearly unconstitutional. By section 2 it is provided that the 
State Board of Health, with the approval of the Governor and 
Council, may take by eminent domain any tract of wet land 
of two or more adjacent owners, at the assessed valuation 
thereof, and that any person aggrieved by a taking as aforesaid 
may have his damages assessed in the manner provided by law 
with respect to the taking of land for public parks, and that 
title to the land so taken shall pass to the Commonwealth. It 
is clear that upon such taking the title passes to the Common- 
wealth in fee, and the owner, having received compensation 
under the provisions of section 2, has no further right, title or 



76 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

interest in tlie land taken, and a payment to him of half of the 
sum received in excess of the cost and expense of development 
cannot be considered to be an expenditure of public money for 
a public purpose, since the Commonwealth receives nothing in 
return therefor, but would be in the nature of a gratuity. With 
respect to the specific provision just considered, therefore, I 
am of opinion that the proposed act is unconstitutional. 

In reply to the second question of the Honorable Senate I 
should say that, assuming that the purpose for which the land 
is taken and the money appropriated was a public purpose 
within the principles discussed in considering the first inquiry 
of the Honorable Senate, the expenditure of $10,000 from the 
treasury of the Commonwealth and the exemption of the land 
from taxation, so long as the Commonwealth retains title, would 
be constitutional. 

Replying to the third inquiry of the Honorable Senate in 
the precise terms of said inquiry, I am of opinion that it is 
possible that the provision of section 2, that the rule of damages 
shall be the assessed valuation, would be unconstitutional. In 
exercising the power of eminent domain the Legislature has no 
authority to designate an arbitrary amount which must be ac- 
cepted by the person whose land is taken as damages for the 
taking, or to prescribe rules or principles upon which damages 
shall be computed. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United 
States, 148 U. S. 312; In re Opinion of the Justices, 66 N. H. 
629; Neiuhuryport Water Co. v. Neiohuryport, 85 Fed. Rep. 
723. If the provision of section 2 that " said board of health 
. . . may take . . . any tract or tracts of wet lands ... by 
eminent domain, at the assessed valuation of said lands," is to 
be regarded as an assessment of the damages occasioned by said 
taking, it might well be found objectionable upon constitutional 
grounds. The designation of a fixed sum to be paid as damages 
for the taking of land by eminent domain, even where an al- 
ternative is provided by an appeal to a jur}^ is, so far as I am 
aware, without precedent; but if the amount so fixed may be 
regarded as an offer of settlement which may or may not be 
accepted by the person whose land is taken, and whose consti- 
tutional rights to a just compensation for his property are 
protected by a further provision that " any person aggrieved 
by a taking as aforesaid may have his damages assessed in the 
manner provided by law in respect to the taking of land for 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 77 

public parks," the constitutional requirement in the premises 
might be satisfied, since it is at least doubtful if any offer 
or award is required where provision is made for an ultimate 
determination of damages by a jur}^ See Hamlin v. New Bed- 
ford, 143 Mass. 192; Bent v. Emerij, 173 Mass. 495; St. 1898, 
c. 278, § 4. And see Attorney-General v. Old Colony Railroad, 
160 Mass. 62, 90. 

Again, replying in the precise phraseology of the fourth in- 
quiry of the Honorable Senate, it is, in my opinion, possible 
that section 6, and especially lines 5 and 6, would be unconsti- 
tutional. If the exploitation and operation of marl, peat or 
other deposits of commercial value would properly constitute an 
entrance by the Commonwealth " as a competitor into the field 
of industrial enterprise, with a view either to the profit that 
could be made through the income to be derived from the busi- 
ness, or to the indirect gain that might result to purchasers if 
prices were reduced by governmental competition," it would 
clearly be unconstitutional. Opinion of the Justices, 182 Mass. 
605, 607. If, on the other hand, such exploitation and opera- 
tion were merely temporary, undertaken in connection with the 
development of other adjacent or similar lands acquired for 
a public purpose, and were intended only for the purpose of 
reducing the cost of reclaiming the remainder of such land, 
such work might well be held to be a proper and incidental 
element of economy in the general work of reclamation. 

I am, with great respect, 

Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



Constitutional Laiu — Volunteer Militia — Adjutant General — 
T,erm of Office. 

The provision of chapter IL, section I., Article X. of the Constitution 
of the Commonwealth, that " the governor shall appoint the adju- 
tant general," does not impose a limitation upon the authority of 
the General Court to fix and determine the tenure of office of the 
adjutant general, and a provision in a proposed act having for its 
purpose the revision of the organization of the volunteer militia, 
that " the term of office of the adjutant general shall be five years 
from the passage of this act," would not be unconstitutional. 



78 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

May 20, 1912. 

Hon. Graftox D. Cushixg, Speaker of the House of Eepresentor- 

ilves. 

Sir : — By an order adopted by the Honorable House of Rep- 
resentatives on May 1, 1912, I am requested to inform the 
Honse of Representatives whether in my opinion that provision 
of House Bill No. 2221, entitled " An Act to revise the organi- 
zation of the Massachusetts Volunteer Militia," which provides 
that " the term of office of the adjutant general shall be five 
years from the passage of this act," is constitutional and legal. 

The proposed act, which amends St. 1908, c. 604, § 12, by 
striking out the whole of said section and substituting a new 
section therefor, among other things provides that — 

The military and administrative staff of the commander-in-chief 
shall consist of : — 

The adjutant general, with the rank of brigadier general, who shall, 
ex officio, be chief of staff, such officers of the United States army or 
navy as may be detailed as assistant chiefs of staff, together with the 
chiefs of the inspector general's department, judge advocate gen- 
eral's department, quartermaster's department, subsistence depart- 
ment, pay department, medical department and ordnance department. 

The terms of office of the chiefs of the above named departments 
shall be five years, as provided in chapter four hundred and forty- 
nine of the acts of the year nineteen hundred and eleven (and the 
term of office of the adjutant general shall be five years from the 
passage of this act and he shall be eligible for reappointment). 

The existing provision upon the subject is to be found in 
St. 1908, c. 604, § 12: — 

The staff of the commander-in-chief shall consist of : — 

1 adjutant general, with the rank of brigadier general, who shall, ex- 
officio, be chief of staff; 

1 assistant adjutant general, with the rank of colonel ; 

4 aides-de-cami3, each with the rank of major ; 

6 aides-de-camp, to be selected from the commissioned ofificei^ of the 
Massachusetts volunteer militia, but not to be relieved from duty 
with their organizations while serving in this capacity. 

In time of war the commander-in-chief may appoint such addi- 
tional staff officers as the service may require, with such rank, not 
higher than that of colonel, as he may designate. The above staff 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 79 

officers, excepting the detailed aides-de-camp, shall be commissioned 
and hold office until their successors are appointed and qualified, but 
thej^ may be removed at any time by the commander-in-chief. 

The precise inquiry of the Honorable House of Representa- 
tives is, therefore, in substance, whether or not the General 
Court may provide a fixed and definite term of office for the 
adjutant general of the volunteer militia. 

The pertinent provisions of the Constitution are contained in 
chapter II., section 1, dealing with the powers and prerogatives 
of the Governor. Article VII. constitutes the Governor the 
commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and of all military 
forces of the State, by sea and land, and vests in him full power, 
by himself, or by any commander, or other officer or officers, 
from time to time, to train, instruct, exercise and govern the 
militia and navy. Article X. provides — 

The captains and subalterns of the militia shall be elected by the 
written votes of the train-band and alarm list of their respective 
companies, the field officers of regiments shall be elected by the writ- 
ten votes of the captains and subalterns of their respective regiments; 
the brigadiers shall be elected, in like manner, by the field officers of 
their respective brigades; and such officers, so elected, shall be com- 
missioned by the governor, who shall determine their rank. 

The legislature shall, by standing laws, direct the time and manner 
of convening the electors, and of collecting votes, and of certifying 
to the governor, the officers elected. 

The major-generals shall be appointed by the senate and house of 
representatives, each having a negative upon the other; and be com- 
missioned by the governor. 

And if the electors of brigadiers, field officers, captains or sub- 
alterns, shall neglect or refuse to make such elections, after being 
duly notified, according to the laws for the time being, then the gov- 
ernor, with the advice of council, shall appoint suitable persons to 
fill such offices. 

The commanding officers of regiments shall appoint their adju- 
tants and quartermasters; the brigadiers their brigade-majors; and 
the major-generals their aids; and the governor shall appoint the 
adjutant-general. 

The governor, with advice of council, shall aj^point all officers of 
the continental armj^, whom by the confederation of the United States 
it is provided that this commonwealth shall appoint, as also aU officers 
of forts and garrisons. 

The divisions of the militia into brigades, regiments, and com- 
panies, made in pursuance of the militia laws now in force, shall be 



80 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

considered as the proper divisions of the militia of this common- 
wealth, until the same shall be altered in pursuance of some future 
law. 

I am advised that doubt has arisen as to the power of the 
Legislature to create a fixed term of office for the adjutant gen- 
eral, in view of the arrangement and language of the provisions 
of the Constitution above cited and of the distinction which 
seems to be made between officers of the militia w^ho are 
commissioned to command and officers who are appointed adju- 
tants, quartermasters, brigade-majors and aids to major-gen- 
erals, with whom the adjutant general is included in Article 
X., and it is suggested that from the relation between an 
adjutant and his commanding officer, a brigade-major and his 
brigadier, an aid and his commanding general, and the adjutant 
general and the commander-in-chief, a constitutional right is 
to be inferred which is vested in the Governor, as commander- 
in-chief, and in a major-general, brigadier or regimental com- 
mander to appoint as adjutant general, aid, brigade-major, 
adjutant or quartermaster, such eligible person as he may de- 
sire, and that it would be in contravention of such constitutional 
right to provide a fixed term of office for any of these officers. 
The relations between a commanding officer and his personal 
staff are doubtless so intimate and of such a character as to 
render it desirable that such commanding officer should exercise 
his personal judgment in the selection of the members of his 
staff, and military custom appears to have recognized the pro- 
priety of such action by the commanding officer in requiring as 
matter of etiquette, upon a change of commanders, a voluntary 
tender of the resignations of members of the staff of his pred- 
ecessor. This custom has been at times recognized in the 
statutes relating to the organization of the militia. (See R. S., 
c. 12, § 73.) It does not follow, however, that the existence 
of such a custom, or even a recognition of it in the Constitution 
in the apparent distinction between officers of the militia elected 
to command and officers appointed to positions upon the staff 
of a commanding officer, if such distinction amounts to recogni- 
tion, must be given the force of a constitutional restriction upon 
the power of the General Court to deal with the term or tenure 
of staff appointments, or regarded as creating a modification, in 
the case of such appointments, of the well-recognized principle 
that where an office is established b}^ the Constitution without 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 81 

provision as to the term or duty thereof the latter may be altered, 
enlarged or modified in such manner as the Legislature may 
deem to be for the public interest. Opinion of the Justices, 
117 Mass. 603; Wales v. Belcher, 3 Pick. 508; see Taft v. 
Adams, 3 Gray, 126 ; Const, of Mass., c. 1, § 1, Art. IV. 

A careful consideration of the provisions of the Constitution 
vrhich are material to this question discloses no intention upon 
the part of the framers thereof to impose a limitation upon the 
power of the General Court to fix and determine the tenure 
of office of the adjutant general. Upon the contrary, the Jour- 
nal of the Convention for Massachusetts Bay, 1779-80, shows 
that in discussing the paragraph dealing with staff appoint- 
ments, which was afterwards adopted, it was suggested that the 
words " during pleasure " be inserted, and that the suggestion 
was thereafter withdrawn and the paragraph accepted in its 
present form. The purpose of the suggestion, and the meaning 
of the words " during pleasure,'^ may be illustrated by quoting 
from the constitution, submitted to the people by the General 
Court of 1777-78 and rejected by popular vote, a provision 
found in the 26th clause that "the Attorney-General, Sheriffs, 
Registers of the Courts of Probate, Coroners, Notaries Public, 
and Naval Officers, shall be appointed and hold their offices 
during pleasure." The convention, therefore, upon considera- 
tion and with intention, omitted from the clause of the Consti- 
tution which relates to the appointment of staff officers any 
express provision for the limitation which it is now argued must^ 
by implication be read into said clause. 

The early statutes which deal with the organization of the 
volunteer militia contain no provision from which may be in- 
ferred a recognition that the tenure of office of either the ad- 
jutant general or any other staff officer was to be during the 
pleasure of his commanding officer (see St. 1809, c. 108) ; and 
it is significant that the earliest provision relative to the dis- 
charge or removal of staff officers (St. 1822, c. 92, § 16) was 
enacted after the adoption in 1821 of Article IV. of the Amend- 
ments to the Constitution, which, in part, provided that — 

All officers commissioned to command in the militia may be re- 
moved from office in such manner as the legislature may, by law, 
prescribe — 

and superseded a provision that — 



82 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

No officer, duly commissioned to command in the militia, shall be 
removed from his office, but by address of both houses to the gov- 
ernor, or by fair trial in court-martial, pursuant to the laws of the 
commonwealth for the time being — 

and at the time w^hen the Legislature first assumed and exer- 
cised the authority to provide for the discharge of militia 
officers in a manner other than by fair trial in court-martial, 
or by address of both houses to the Governor. See St. 1821, 
c. 32, § 1; St. 1835, c. 144, §§ 2, 3; R. S., c. 12, §§ 67-73. 

Moreover, there is nothing in the language of the constitu- 
tional provision itself which requires a construction inconsistent 
with an authority in the Legislature to determine the term of 
office of the adjutant general or of any other staff officer (see 
Avery v. Inhabitants of Tyringham, 3 Mass. 160), and in at 
least one instance such power has been exercised by the Legis- 
lature by providing, in Gen. Sts., c. 13, § 62, that "the adju- 
tant general shall hold his office for the term of one year," 
subject to removal at any time by the commander-in-chief. 
And see St. 1912, c. 268; St. 1911, c. 449. 

For the reasons above stated, therefore, I am of opinion that 
the provision of House Bill No. 2221, that the term of office 
of the adjutant general shall be five years from the passage 
thereof, would not be unconstitutional. 

I am, with great respect. 

Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



Constitutional Law — Governor — Veto — Duty to return Bill 
with Objections thereto in Writing to the Branch in which 
it originated — Return — Limit of Time. 

Where certain bills, due under the provisions of Article II. of Section 
I. of Chapter I. of the Constitution of the Commonwealth to be 
returned on May 27 by the Governor, with his objections thereto 
in writing, to the House of Eepresentatives, in which branch such 
bills originated, were found, on the morning of May 28, on the 
desk of the clerk of the House of Eepresentatives, and the speaker 
of the House of Eepresentatives, on a point of order, ruled that 
the vetoes were not properly returned until received by the clerk 
at 8 o'clock upon the morning of May 28, and such bills were 
transmitted by the clerk to the Secretary of the Commonwealth, 
with a statement of the above facts, it is not the duty of the 
Secretary to determine whether or not such bills were seasonably 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 83 

returned, and he should receive and record them among the laws 
of the current year, leaving the question of their validity to be 
determined by the proper tribunal. 
It would seem, however, that the duty devolving upon the Governor 
under the provisions of Article II. of Section I. of Chapter I. of 
the Constitution, if he has objection, to return a bill or resolve 
within the prescribed period of time to the branch of the Legis- 
lature in which it originated, should be performed with sufficient 
formality to insure that the return shall be made to some proper 
officer of the Senate or House of Eepresentatives, as the case may 
be, if the branch to which the bill or resolve and the objections 
are sent is not in session. 

June 7, 1912. 

Hon. Albert P. Langtry, Secretary of the C ommonwealth. 

Dear Sir : — You desire my opinion as to whether or not it 
is your duty to receive certain bills transmitted to you by the 
clerk of the House of Eepresentatives under circumstances which 
appear from a communication accompanying said bills to be as 
follows : — 

These acts and resolve were found on the desk of the clerk of the 
House of Representatives on the morning of Tuesday, May 28, last. 
They were due to be returned by His Excellency the Governor to the. 
House of Representatives, in which branch they originated, with his 
objections thereto in writing, on Monday, May 27. 

At the session of the House on Tuesday, May 28, the speaker 
called the attention of the House to the fact that these bills and 
resolve had been found on the desk of the clerk of the House that 
morning. 

A point of order was raised that the bills and resolve and veto 
messages were not properly before the House of Representatives, 
not having been returned by the Governor within the five days al- 
lowed under Article II. of Section I. of Chapter I. of the Constitu- 
tion. 

On this point of order the speaker ruled as follows : " the vetoes 
were without question returned after the clerk's office was closed on 
the last day during which, under Article II. of Section I. of Chapter 
I. of the Constitution, three of the vetoes should apparently have 
been returned. There is no official record whether the vetoes were 
left in the clerk's office before or after midnight. The chair, there- 
fore rules that simply leaving the papers in the clerk's office after it 
is closed is not such a return to the House of Representatives of the 
bills and resolves, with his objections thereto in writing, as is re- 
quired by the Constitution, as the House can take cognizance of; 
and that three of the vetoes were not properly returned until re- 
ceived by the clerk at 8 o'clock this morning.'^ 



84 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

It is the duty of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, under 
the provisions of R. L., c. 9, § 1 — • 

at the close of each session of the general court, [to] collate and 
cause to be printed in one volume, in style and arrangement as here- 
tofore, the constitution of the commonwealth, the acts and resolves 
passed, any amendments to the constitution agreed to during such 
session, the governor's address and messages, a list of the changes 
of names returned during the preceding year by the probate courts, 
a list of the officers of the civil government of the commonwealth, 
a table of changes in the general laws, and an index. 

I assume, therefore, that your inquir}^, in substance, requires 
my opinion as to whether or not you shall receive for record, 
and include in the collated and printed volume of the acts and 
resolves for the current year, the two bills and the resolve trans- 
mitted to you in the manner hereinbefore described. 

The ruling of the speaker, already quoted, appears to be based 
upon the fact that there was before him " no official record 
whether the vetoes were left in the clerk's office before or after 
midnight ; '^ but the absence of such record is not, in nw opinion, 
conclusive, for if the placing of the bills and the resolve upon 
the desk of the clerk of the House of Representatives during the 
absence of the clerk and after his office was closed for business 
is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional provision that 
the Executive shall return such bills and resolve, together with 
his objections thereto in writing, to the branch of the Legislature 
in which they originated, the hour or moment when they were 
placed there may be established by competent proof. Gardner 
V. The Collector, 6 AYall. (U. S.) 499, 511. And see United 
States V. Allen, 36 Fed. Rep. 174; Lyo7is v. Woods, 153 U. S. 
649, 663. 

Since the fact, if it be a fact, may be established by proper 
evidence, I shall assume for the purposes of your inquiry that 
the several bills and resolve were placed upon the desk of the 
clerk of the House of Representatives before midnight on Mon- 
day, May 27, and within the period allowed therefor by the 
Constitution. The present status of the bills and the resolve 
in question, therefore, must depend upon whether or not they 
have been duly " returned ^' to the House of Representatives. 

The provision of the Constitution which is material in the 
premises is Article II. of Section I. of Chapter I. of Part the 
Second of the Constitution, which I quote : — 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 85 

No bill or resolve of the senate or house of representatives shall 
become a law, and have force as such until it shall have been laid 
before the goveraor for his revisal; and if he, upon such revision, 
approve thereof, he shall signify his approbation by signing the same. 
But if he have any objection to the passing of such bill or resolve, 
he shall return the same, together with his objections thereto, in 
writing, to the senate or house of representatives, in whichsoever the 
same shall have originated; who shall enter the objections sent down 
by the governor, at large, on their records, and proceed to reconsider 
the said bill or resolve. But if after such reconsideration, two-thirds 
of the said senate or house of representatives, shall, notwithstanding 
the said objections, agree to pass the same, it shall, together with the 
objections, be sent to the other branch of the legislature, where it 
shall also be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of the mem- 
bers present, shall have the force of a law ; but in all such cases, the 
votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays; and the 
names of the persons voting for, or against, the said bill or resolve, 
shall be entered upon the public records of the commonwealth. 

And in order to prevent unnecessary delays, if any bill or resolve 
shall not be returned by the governor within five days after it shall 
have been presented, the same shall have the force of a law. 

It has been held that a bill can be laid before the Governor 
only by being presented to him personally. So in Opinion of 
the Justices, 99 Mass. 636, in reply to an inquiry of the House 
of Representatives as to whether a bill transmitted by the Sen- 
ate to the Secretary of the Commonwealth during a temporary 
absence of the Governor from the Commonwealth was properly 
" laid before " the Governor prior to his return, the court 
said : — 

As the duty of revisal by the Governor is a pereonal duty, with 
which he alone is intrusted when his chair is not vacant, it is neces- 
sary that the bill should be laid before him personally. A bill is not 
laid before him or presented to him, within the meaning and intent 
of these provisions, by being sent from the Senate to the Secretary 
of the Commonwealth. The Constitution makes the Secretary an in- 
dependent officer, and prescribes his duties; and his possession of a 
bill sent by the Senate to be presented to the Governor is not the 
possession of the Governor. 

A bill must be laid before the Governor, or the person who, for the 
time being, is clothed with the powers of Governor under the Consti- 
tution, for his revision. The individual whose duty it is to sign the 
bill is entitled to have it before him, that he may have the opportunity 
to sign it or return it with his objections thereto to the branch of the 



86 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Legislature in which it originated. This bill does not appear to have 
been so presented to any one, except by the statement that it was 
returned unsigned on the 19th, with the Governor's objections. 

This opinion is cited with approval in Farwell v. Boston, 
192 Mass. 15, 19. In the latter case the then charter of the 
city of Boston (St. 1851, c. 118, § 17) required an ordinance, 
order, resolution or vote to be presented to the mayor, and pro- 
vided that if such ordinance, order, resolution or vote " shall 
not be returned by the mayor within ten days after it shall have 
been presented the same shall be in force ; '' and it was held 
that leaving a vote with a clerk in the mayor's office, in the 
absence of the mayor, was not a presentation to that officer 
within the meaning of the provision above quoted. 

Beyond holding, in Opinion of the Justices, 135 Mass. 594, 
that the Governor is not required to deliver a bill or resolve in 
person, the courts of this Commonw^ealth do not appear to have 
defined what constitutes returning a bill or resolve to the branch 
of the Legislature in which it originated. In that opinion it 
is said that the delivery by the Governor " of the message to the 
private secretary, who is an officer provided for by statute, and 
the proper organ of communication with the Legislature, with 
directions to have it sent down, was the first step in its transmis- 
sion to the House.*' In the case of Har pending v. Ilaight, 39 
Cal. 189, however, the meaning of the word in a provision of 
the constitution of California that " if any bill shall not be 
returned within ten days after it shall have been presented to 
him (the governor) . . . the same shall be a law, in like man- 
ner as if he had signed it, unless the Legislature, by adjourn- 
ment, prevent such return," was discussed at great length. It 
there appeared that on the last day of the prescribed period the 
Governor, by his messenger, sent to the Senate a bill which he 
had declined to sign, with his objections thereto in writing. 
Upon arriving at the Senate chamber, however, the messenger 
discovered that the Senate had adjourned until the following 
morning, and immediately returned both the bill and the mes- 
sage to the Governor without attempting to deliver them to the 
Senate or to deposit them with any officer of the Senate or with 
any other person for its use, and they were thereafter retained 
by the Governor. After referring to the constitutional require- 
ment that a bill must, before becoming a law, be " presented to 
the Governor," the court sa3^s, at page 199 : — 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 87 

And so, upon the other hand, when we come to consider the cor- 
responding duty of the Executive to ^' return " the bill to the Senate 
in this case, we know by attending to the results to be' brought about 
by such " return " that it must be a step taken by which his own time 
for deliberation is ended and that for the deliberation of the Senate 
is begun; that the bill itself must be put beyond the Executive pos- 
session ; that it must be placed into the possession, actual or potential, 
of the Senate itself; and that, as part of this return, the Executive 
objections to the passage of the bill must be stated. 

And again, at page 203 : — 

It was the duty of the messenger to communicate to the Senate the 
message which he bore from the Executive on that occasion. This 
was to be done in the most direct manner that circumstances would 
permit. It was impossible for him to immediately announce it to the 
Senate, for that body was not in session. It had a right to be in 
recess, if it desired so to be, and it was not in the power of the 
Executive or his messenger to recall it to its sitting's. But its right to 
be in recess was no greater or higher than was the right of the 
Executive to return the bill in question for its reconsideration; nor 
is there any reason why the free exercise of these admitted rights 
upon the part of the Senate and Governor, respectively, should bring 
them into collision. The Senate has the unqualified, constitutional 
power to adjourn for three consecutive days. (Art. IV., See. 15, 
Constitution.) It must often happen that these three days will in- 
clude the last day allowed the Executive for the exercise of the veto 
power against the passage of a particular Senate bill. 

Now, if the mere fact of the recess of the Senate, thus constitu- 
tionally taken, does operate to defeat, in a measure, the exercise of 
the veto power conferred on the Executive by the Constitution, then 
we have the strange spectacle of an irreconcilable conflict between the 
several clauses of that instrument itself, by which the Senate, by the 
mere exercise of its own admitted constitutional authority to adjourn, 
violates the equally . clear constitutional right of the Executive to 
have it kept in session. 

T\''e are of opinion that the adjournment of the Senate on March 
31 did not curtail the veto power of the Executive over the bill in 
question, nor should it even have embarrassed him in its exercise. 
The return should have been made in such manner as the circum- 
stances would permit; it should, at all events, have left the bill and 
message beyond the Executive control, and, if need be, in the im- 
mediate custody of some proper person who would be likely to de- 
liver it to the Senate at the first opportunity. The best return that 
the circumstances would admit, would, in our judgment, be a proper 
return. The maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia would be applicable 



88 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

to such a condition of affairs. We know of no other imle, either, 
upon which the clear right of the Governor to make the return to the 
Senate can be reconciled with the equally clear right of the Senate 
to be in recess at the time. 

If the requirement of the Constitution that, before becoming 
a law a bill or resolve must be laid before the Governor for his 
revisal, can be met only by lajdng such bill or resolve before 
hiin personally, it would seem that the corresponding duty de- 
volving upon the Governor, if he has objection, to return such 
bill or resolve within five days to the branch of the Legislature 
in which it originated, should be performed with sufficient 
formality to insure that the return shall be made to some proper 
officer of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case 
may be, if the body to which the bill or resolve and the objec- 
tions are sent down is not in session. See Opinion of the 
Justices, 45 N. H. 607, 610. Or at least to "the immediate 
custody of some proper person who would be likely to deliver 
it ... at the first opportunity." See Har pending v. Haight, 
supra, p. 204. 

In the case here under consideration, if a decision upon this 
point were required by the inquiry submitted to me, I should 
be inclined to accept the principles laid down in the cases cited, 
and to hold that upon the facts before me the bills and the 
resolve transmitted to you by the clerk of the House of Repre- 
sentatives were not returned to that body before midnight on 
May 27, and therefore were not returned within the five days 
allowed therefor by the Constitution. 

I am of opinion, however, that I am not required to pass upon 
this question. The bills and the resolve to which your inquiry 
is directed were transmitted to you by the clerk of the House 
of Representatives, and are in your possession and custody as 
the recording officer of the Commonwealth and the custodian 
of its records; and you are officially advised that the House of 
Representatives, in which they originated and to which they 
should have been returned by the Executive, has declined to 
receive them, upon the ground that they were not seasonably 
returned to it. Under these circumstances it is not the duty 
of the Secretary to determine whether or not the bills and the 
resolve in question were in fact returned, or whether or not the 
action of the House was warranted in the premises. He should 
be sfuided bv the official record of the facts, and receive and 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 89 

record the several bills and the resolve among the laws of the 
current year, leaving the question of their validity to be deter- 
mined by the proper tribunal. 

Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



County Treasurers — Payments — Approval of Bill or Order — 
Duty to ascertain Legality of Expenditures. 

TJnder the provisions of E. L., c. 21, § 8, that " each county treasurer 
shall collect, receive and safely keep all money belonging to the 
county, and pay out the same in accordance with law," it is 
the duty of a county treasurer to ascertain whether or not a pay- 
ment which he is called upon to make, by an order or bill duly 
approved by the county commissioners, may be made by him ac- 
cording to law, and he is therefore required to satisfy himself 
that the expense for which payment is to be made was legally 
incurred in the first instance. 

June 12, 1912. 

Hon. Frank L. Dean, Controller of County Accounts. 

Dear Sir : — In a letter dated May 13 you state that certain 
payments by county treasurers, which are " irregular by reason 
of there being no legal authority for their payment," have come 
to your attention, and that with reference to such payments 
"the claim made by certain treasurers is that their only lia- 
bility is under chapter 21, sections 12 and 17 of the Revised 
Laws, and that whatever bill comes to them, approved by the 
commissioners, is for them to pay, unquestioned," and you de- 
sire my opinion " as to whether the treasurer is responsible for 
all improper payments made by him, or, if his responsibility 
is limited by law, just what that limitation is." 

The duty of a county treasurer as defined by E. L., c. 21, § 8, 
is as follows : — 

Each county treasurer shall collect, receive and safely keep all 
money belonging to the county, and pay out the same in accordance 
with law; but he shall not pay money to the county commissioners 
or associate commissioners to be disbursed by them in behalf of the 
county. 

Section 9 provides that — 

No payments, except of expenses in criminal prosecutions, of ex- 
penses of the courts, of the compensation or salaries of county officers 



90 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

established by law, of outstanding notes or bonds and of interest 
thereon, shall be made by a treasurer except upon orders drawn and 
signed by a majority of the county commissioners, certified by their 
clerk and accompanied, except in the county of Suffolk, by the 
original bills, vouchers or evidences of county indebtedness for which 
payment is ordered, stating in detail the items and confirming such 
bill or account. Said clerk shall not certify such orders until he has 
recorded them in the records of the county commissioners. 

Section 12 provides in part that — 

The county treasurer may, before payment of an account rendered 
against the county by a county officer, in writing require of him a 
written statement of the specific provision of law authorizing it. 
Said statement shall be filed with the vouchers. The treasurer shall 
be personally liable for money paid out by him, except pajnnents 
specifically required by law, unless there is an unexpended balance 
of an appropriation made for the purpose sufficient for such pay- 
ment, and he shall be personally liable for any money paid by him 
without the voucher and certificate required by law, except as pro- 
vided in section thirty-four. 

The county treasurer is chiefly a disbursing oflBcer. Most of 
the payments made by him are made upon orders issued by the 
county commissioners or upon bills audited or allowed by said 
commissioners or other public officers. See St. 1907, c. 170; 
R. L., c. 158, § 8; R. L., c. 157, §§ 16, 17. In so far as the 
expenses for the payment of which such orders are issued or bills 
approved are incurred for purposes for which expense may 
legally be incurred, I am of opinion that the county treasurer 
may exercise no discretion, and may make pajment without 
incurring responsibility in the premises. Upon the other hand, 
it is clearly the duty of the county treasurer to ascertain whether 
or not a payment which he is called upon to make by an order 
or by a bill duly approved may be made by him according to law, 
and this necessarily requires him' to satisfy himself that the ex- 
pense for which the payment is to be made was legally incurred 
in the first instance, and for this purpose he may require a writ- 
ten statement of the specific provision of law by which any such 
expense was authorized. See R. L., c. 21, § 12. If, upon the 
face of the record presented by the voucher or certificate, it 
clearly appears that there is no legal warrant for the expendi- 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 91 

tures, no order of the county commissioners or no approval by 
them or by any public officer of charges so incurred is sufficient 
to warrant the payment. 

Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General, 



Vetei^an — Comimssioned Officer — Gratuity — Attorney — Fee. 

St. 1912, c. 702, which in section 1 provides for a gratuity of $125 
" for those veteran soldiers and sailors who volunteered their serv- 
ices in the civil war," and in section 2 provides that such gratuity 
" shall be paid to every person or his legal representatives . . . who 
served in the army or navy of the United States to the credit of 
the commonwealth during the civil war, . . ." includes commissioned 
officers as well as enlisted men. 

The Commission on Gratuities, established by section 3 of St. 1912, c. 
702, is not required to make or to secure payment of the fee pre- 
scribed by section 6 to any attorney or other person entitled thereto 
for the prosecution of a claim for a gratuity under such statute. 

July 8, 1912. 
Hon. John E. White, Chairman ^ C ommission on Gratuities. 

Dear Sir: — By a communication dated July 2, 1912, you 
request my opinion upon two questions : first, whether St. 1912, 
c. 702, entitled " An Act to provide for suitably rewarding cer- 
tain veteran soldiers and sailors " should be construed to include 
officers; and second, whether, under the provisions of section 6, 
it is the duty of the commission to pay the fee therein provided 
for. 

The act above cited provides, in section 1, that — 

For the purpose of promoting- the spirit of loyalty and patriotism, 
and in recognition of the sacrifice made both for the commonwealth 
and for the United States by those veteran soldiers and sailors who 
volunteered their services in the civil war, and for the purpose of 
promoting the public welfare, by giving visible evidence to this gen- 
eration and future generations that, if danger should again threaten 
the nation and the call should again come for men, Massachusetts 
will not forget the gTeat service of those who volunteer, a gratuity 
of one himdred and twenty-five dollars to each veteran is hereby 
authorized to be paid from the treasury of the commonwealth under 
the conditions hereinafter set forth. 



92 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Section 2 is as follows : — 

The gTatuity herein provided for shall be paid to every person, or 
his legal representatives, not being a conscript or a substitute, and 
not having received a bounty from the commonwealth or from any 
city or town therein, who served in the army or navy of the United 
States to the credit of the commonwealth during the civil war, and 
was honorably discharged from such service, and is living at the time 
of the passage of this act; it being intended and provided that the 
said gift shall not be a bounty, nor a payment in equalization of 
bounties, nor a payment for services rendered, nor a payment for 
the purpose of making the result of their contracts of enlistment 
more favorable to them because the contracts of other soldiers were 
on better terms, but a testimonial for meritorious service such as the 
commonwealth may rightly give, and such as her sons may honorably 
accept and receive. 

The latter section in terms provides that the gratuity " shall 
be paid to every person . . . not being a conscript or a substi- 
tute, and not having received a bounty from the commonwealth 
or from any city or town therein, who served in the army or 
navy of the United States to the credit of the commonwealth 
during the civil war, and was honorably discharged from such 
service, and is living at the time of the passage of this act/' 
If, therefore, an officer can satisfy the commission that, not 
being a conscript or a substitute, he has served in the army or 
navy of the United States to the credit of the Commonwealth 
during the civil war, and has been honorably discharged from 
service, I am of opinion that he would be entitled to receive the 
gratuity, notwithstanding that bounties were in the first instance 
payable only to enlisted men. See St. 1864, cc. 48, 143, 211. 
The present statute does not contemplate that the payment of 
a gratuity under its terms shall be in lieu of boimty. 

With respect to your second question, I am of opinion that 
the commission is not required to make payments to an attorney 
or other person entitled thereto for the prosecution of a claim 
under the statute. Section 6, to which your communication 
refers, is as follows : — 

The fee for the prosecution of a claim under this act shall not 
exceed the sum of five dollars; and the fee agreed upon between the 
parties, not exceeding the said amount, shall be paid to the attorney 
or other person entitled thereto out of the amount allowed on the 
certificate of the commission allowing the same. Any attorney or 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 93 

other person who demands or receives for his services any greater 
compensation than the sum above specified shall be guilty of a mis- 
demeanor, and shall for every such offence be punished by a fine not 
exceeding one hundred dollars or by imprisonment at hard labor for 
a term not exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprison- 
ment. 

There is nothing in this section to impose upon the commis- 
sion the duty to secure payment of the fee named therein to the 
attorney or other person who may be entitled to it. 
Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



License — Keeper of Hospital for Insane or F eelle-minded — 
Suitable Person — Partnership. 

Under the provisions of St. 1909, c. 504, § 24, that "the governor and 
council may, upon the reconunendation of the state board of in- 
sanity, license any suitable person to establish and keep a hospital 
or private house for the care and treatment of the insane, epileptic, 
feeble-minded, and persons addicted to the intemperate use of 
narcotics or stimulants " a license may not be granted to a partner- 
ship as such. 

Aug. 12, 1912. 

Charles E. Thompson. M.D., Executive Officer, State Board of 

Insanity. 
Dear Sir : — In behalf of the State Board of Insanity you 
have requested my opinion upon the following question : — 

Whether under section 24, chapter 504, Acts of 1909, the State 
Board of Insanity is limited in its recommendations to individuals or 
whether it can recommend that licenses be granted to partnerships. 

The section of the statute referred to provides as follows : — 

The governor and council may, upon the recommendation of the 
state board of insanity, license any suitable person to establish and 
keep a hospital or private house for the care and treatment of the 
insane, epileptic, feeble-minded, and persons addicted to the intem- 
perate use of narcotics or stimulants, and may at any time revoke 
such license. No such recommendation shall be made unless the said 
board is satisfied that the person applying therefor is a duly qualified 
physician, as provided in section thirty-two, and has had practical 
experience in the care and treatment of such patients. Any person 



94 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

owning or maintaining such a hospital or private house on the date 
of the passage of this act shall be entitled to maintain the same under 
the provisions of law in force at that time, except that every such 
hospital or house shall be subject to the visitation and supervision 
of the state board of insanity. 

The word " person/' as used in different statutes, varies much 
in the comprehensiveness of its scope, and its meaning in any 
particular statute must usually be determined by the context - 
and by consideration of the object of the statute in which it is 
used. It has sometimes been construed as including a corpora- 
tion, an artificial person, and as used in some statutes it has 
undoubtedly been sometimes held to include a copartnership. 

Considering the word as it is used in the statute in question 
with reference to its context and with reference to the purpose 
of the statute, the term " suitable person " and the term " the 
person applying therefor '^ in my opinion are to be considered 
as referring to one and the same person, and since the Board, 
in order to make its recommendation to the Governor and Coun- 
cil, must state that the applicant for a license in addition to 
being otherwise " suitable " is " a duly qualified physician, as 
provided in section thirty-two," it becomes clear that the word 
" person " was not intended to include a partnership as such, 
since a partnership cannot be " a duly qualified physician." 

Considering the meaning of the word with reference to the 
clear purpose of the statute leads to the same conclusion. The 
provisions of law requiring the license as a prerequisite to 
the right to establish or keep such a hospital as is described in 
the act were obviously to keep the control and management of 
such hospitals under only such physicians as were deemed by 
the Board to be suitable and duly qualified to conduct them. 

If the word " person " were to be construed to include a part- 
nership, and if the words " person applying therefor " were to 
be construed as requiring simply that the one member of the 
partnership who made the application should be a duly qualified 
physician, the result would be not only that the application in 
the name of the physician would not in fact be the application 
of the partnership, but also the very object of the law might 
be defeated because the physician might be the only physician 
among the partners, or might be merely a nominal or silent 
partner, or one of several partners having only an insignificant 
part of the management of the hospital. In a previous opinion 
to the Board I have advised that the only person entitled to be 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 95 

licensed under the statute referred to was the responsible head 
of such hospital or private house, that is, " the one who exer- 
cises control or proprietorship of it." Opinion of Attorne}^- 
General, Report for 1911, p. 15; Commonwealth v. Kimball, 
105 Mass. 465, 467. 

The opinion above expressed is, however, not to be construed 
as holding that duly licensed individuals may not lawfully form 
a partnership for the purpose of establishing or keeping such a 
hospital. In other words', while your Board is, in my opinion, 
not authorized to recommend for license a partnership, but must 
limit its recommendations to individuals, the law does not ap- 
pear to forbid the formation of a partnership by individuals, 
each of whom is a duly qualified physician, and each of whom 
has been deemed suitable to establish and keep such a hospital 
by your Board, and each of whom has been duly licensed as an 
individual for such work. 

Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



Town — Indebtedness for Water Supply — Vote. 
A town which has accepted by a two-thirds vote an act authorizing it 
to supply itself and inhabitants with water, may incur indebted- 
ness therefor only by compliance with the provision of R. L., c. 27, 
§ 8, which requires a vote of two-thirds of the voters present and 
voting at a town meeting to authorize incurring indebtedness for 
such purpose. 

Aug. 15, 1912. 

Mr. William G. Grundy, Deputy Director, Bureau of Statistics. 

Dear Sir : — You have requested my opinion as to " whether 
a town which accepts by a two-thirds vote an act authorizing 
it to supply itself and inhabitants with water may incur debt 
therefor without being required to comply with the provisions 
of R. L., c. 27, § 8, which makes necessary a two-thirds vote in 
order that it may incur debt for such a purpose," and you have 
informed me orally that your inquiry is made with a special 
reference to the town of Merrimac, which, by St. 1903, c. 281, 
was authorized to supply itself and its inhabitants with water. 

Section 6 of that act is as follows : — 

Said town may, for the purpose of paying the necessary expenses 
and liabilities incurred under the provisions of this act, issue from 



96 ATTORNEY-GENERAL^S REPORT. [Jan. 

time to time bonds, notes or scrip to an amount not exceeding ninety 
thousand dollars. Such bonds, notes or scrip shall bear on their 
face the words, Town of Merrimac Water Loan, and shall be pay- 
able at the exjDiration of periods not exceeding thirty years from 
the date of issue, shall bear interest, payable semi-annually, at a 
rate not exceeding four per cent per annum, and shall be signed by 
the treasurer of the town and countersigned by the water commis- 
sioners hereinafter provided for. Said town may sell such securities 
at public or private sale, or pledge the^ same for money borrowed 
for the purpose of this act, and upon such terms and conditions as 
it may deem proper: provided, that such securities shall not be sold 
for less than the par value thereof. 

Section 14 is as follows : — 

This act shall take full effect upon its acceptance by two thirds of 
the legal voters of the town of Merrimac present and voting thereon 
at a legal meeting called for the purpose within three years from its 
passage; but the number of meetings so called in any one year shall 
not exceed three; and for the purpose of being submitted to the 
voters as aforesaid this act .shall take effect upon its passage. 

Your question would seem to be answered by the application 
of the principles stated in an opinion rendered to joiu depart- 
ment July 7, 1911, in reply to a closely similar question. 

The vote of the town to accept St. 1905, c. 281, is not to be 
construed as a vote to issue bonds, notes or scrip. It is merely 
an acceptance of the legal authority to issue bonds, notes or 
scrip for the purposes of the act at such later time or times as 
it shall in accordance with law vote to exercise that authority. 
In the exercise of that authority the town must follow the stat- 
utory requirements. So far as St. 1903, c. 281, prescribes the 
details of such issue it is to be followed; in other respects the 
general law must control. The special act does not state whether 
the vote to issue bonds, notes or scrip shall be a majority or a 
two-thirds vote. The matter is, therefore, governed by the pro- 
visions of R. L., c. 27, § 8, which requires, that debts shall be 
incurred only in the case of a town, by " a vote of two thirds 
of the voters present and voting at a town meeting," and in the 
case of a city, by a vote " of two thirds of all the members of 
each branch of the city council." 

It is. provided by E. L., c. 27, § 21, that where a city accepts, 
by a vote of two-thirds of the legal voters, an act to supply it 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 97 

with water a "vote of the majority of the members of each 
branch of the city council" shall be sufficient to authorize the 
issue of bonds. By implication, it appears from this provision 
of law that a vote merely to accept the act is not sufficient to 
authorize the issue of- bonds, and that the issue of bonds must 
be authorized by a subsequent vote of the city or town. It also 
appears by implication from this provision of the statutes that 
in cases not within this exception a two-thirds vote is necessary 
to authorize such an issue of bonds. There is no provision of 
law authorizing a town which has accepted such an act to issue 
bonds on a vote of less than two-thirds of the voters present and 
voting at a town meeting. 

Your question is, therefore, to be answered in the negative. 
Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



Hours of Labor — Cities and Towns — Acceptance of Statute. 
St. 1911, e. 494, providing in section 1 that " the service of all 
laborers, workmen and mechanics, now or hereafter employed . . . 
by any city or town which has accepted the provisions of section 
twenty of chapter one hundred and six of the Eevised Laws, or of 
section forty-two of chapter five hundred and fourteen of the acts 
of the year nineteen hundred and nine, ... is hereby restricted 
to eight hours in any one calendar day," is not in force in cities 
and towns which have not accepted the provisions of E. L., c. 106, 
§ 20, or of St. 1909, c. 514, § 42, but which had accepted the pro- 
visions of St. 1899, c. 344, a corresponding provision of an earlier 
law. 

Aug. 15, 1912. 

Gen. J. H. Whitney, Chief of the District Police. 

Dear Sir : — You have requested my opinion as to whether 
chapter 494 of the Acts of 1911 is applicable to and in force in 
cities and towns which have not accepted the provisions of sec- 
tion 20 of chapter 106 of the Eevised Laws or of section 42 of 
chapter 514 of the Acts of 1909, but which had accepted the 
provisions of chapter 344 of the Acts of 1899, a corresponding 
provision of an earlier law. 

Section 1 of said chapter 494 of the Acts of 1911 is in part as 
follows : — 

The service of all laborers, worlnnen and mechanics, now or here- 
after employed by the commonwealth or by any county therein or 



98 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

by any city or town which has accepted the provisions of section 
twenty of chapter one hundred and six of the Re\ised Laws, or of 
section forty- two of chapter five hundred and fourteen of the acts 
of the year nineteen hundred and nine, or bj'- any contractor or sub- 
contractor for or upon any public works of the commonwealth or of 
any county tlierein or of any such city or town, is hereby restricted 
to eight hours in any one calendar day, . . . 

In my opinion this inquiry must be answered in the negative. 
In section 20 of chapter 106 of the Revised Laws it is provided 
that such laws should be applicable to cities and towns which 
had accepted the provisions of that section, " or the correspond- 
ing provisions of earlier laws." Chapter 514 of the Acts of 
1909, which prohibited requesting or requiring, etc., any em- 
ploj^ee to work more than eight hours in any one day, omitted 
the foregoing phrase which had been contained in said section 
20 of chapter 106 of the Revised Laws, providing only that it 
should apply to cities which had accepted the provisions of sec- 
tion 20 of chapter 106 of the Revised Laws and section 42 of 
said chapter 514 of the Acts of 1909. In chapter 494 of the 
Acts of 1911, in which the word "permit" was added to the 
previous provisions of the act of 1909, it is also provided that 
the act shall apply to cities and towns which had accepted the 
provisions of said section 20 of chapter 106 of the Revised Laws 
or of section 42 of chapter 514 of the Acts of 1909. It appears 
clear, therefore, that in order to have chapter 494 of the Acts 
of 1911 in force in any city or town, it must appear that such 
city or town has accepted either the provisions of section 20 of 
chapter 106 of the Revised Laws or section 42 of chaj^ter 514 
of the Acts of 1909. 

The earlier provisions of law were less stringent than the 
more recent legislation hereinbefore cited, and it appears to me 
to have been the intent of the Legislature, when they made the 
law more drastic and added the recent provisions to the general 
law making eight hours a legal day's work, to require cities and 
towns to accept the provisions of these more recent enactments. 
As this is a penal statute, and so must be strictly construed, 
I am of opinion that the act in question is not in force in such 
cities and towns as are covered by your inquiry. 
Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, AUorneij-GeneraJ. 



1913.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 99 



WorJiinens Compensation Act — Employee — Commomvealth as 

Employer. 

The provisions of St. 1911, c. 751, which establishes a system for the 
compensation of employees for personal injuries received in the 
course of their employment, are not applicable to the Common- 
wealth as an employer in its various departments nor to direct 
employees of the Commonwealth. 

Aug. 19, 1912. 
David Sneddex, Esq., Commissioner, State Board of Education. 

Dear Sir : — You have requested my opinion as to whether, 
under the provisions of St. 1911, c. 751, known as '^ the work- 
men's compensation act," the Massachusetts Board of Education 
is required to insure teachers, janitors, engineers, working stu- 
dents and others employed to do work about the grounds and 
shops of certain educational institutions within the jurisdiction 
of the Board, such, for example, as the normal schools. The 
Massachusetts Agricultural College, to which you refer in your 
letter, is not strictly a State institution, and I will, therefore, 
confine myself to answering the question with reference to those 
institutions in which the persons referred to are employed di- 
rectly by the Commonwealth. 

While in the words of the Supreme Judicial Court of the 
Commonwealth, "the act in question involves a radical de- 
parture in the manner of dealing with actions or claims for 
damages for personal injuries received by employees in the 
course of their employment from that which has heretofore pre- 
vailed in this Commonwealth" (209 Mass. 607), it is not, in 
my opinion, to be considered as involving a radical change in 
the law as to what shall constitute claims or causes of action 
against the Commonwealth or in the law prescribing the manner 
of the prosecution of such claims. 

The Commonwealth, since it is sovereign, may be impleaded 
in its own courts only by its clearly expressed consent, and 
claims against the Commonwealth may be prosecuted only in 
the manner and upon the terms assented to by the Common- 
wealth by clear legislative enactment. 

The statute in question is not by express provision made ap- 
plicable to the Commonwealth, and its provisions as to the 
administration of the law are not consistent with an intention 
by the legislative body that the act should apply to the Com- 



100 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

monwealth as the employer in its various departments, or to 
persons directly employed by the Commonwealth in those depart- 
ments. 

In my opinion, therefore, the statute in question is not to be 
considered as applicable to the Commonwealth or to those di- 
rectly employed by the Commonwealth within the field of the 
jurisdiction of the State Board of Education. 
Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



License to operate Automobile — Revocation — Conviction — 

Judgment of Guilty placed on File. 
The Massachusetts Highway Commission, under the provisions of St. 
1909, c. 534, $ 22, that " a conviction of a violation of this sec- 
tion shall be reported forthwith by the court or trial justice to the 
commission, which shall revoke immediately the license of the per- 
son so convicted," is warranted in treating a judgment of guilty 
placed on file by the trial court as a conviction. 

Sept. 17, 1912. 

Hon. William D. Sohier, Chairman, Massachusetts Highway Com- 
mission. 

Dear Sir : — Your inquiry of August 27 in substance re- 
quires my opinion upon the question whether or not a judgment 
of guilty placed on file by the court constitutes a conviction 
within the meaning of St. 1909, c. 534, § 22. 

The section cited establishes, among other offences, that of 
operating an automobile or motor cycle recklessly or so that 
the lives and safety of the public may be endangered, and your 
communication states that the judgment or finding of guilty 
was upon facts tending to prove this offence. The section then 
proceeds as follows : — 

A conviction of a violation of this section shall be reported forth- 
with by the court or trial justice to the commission, which shall re- 
voke immediately the license of the person so convicted. If it ap- 
pears by the records of the commission that the person so convicted 
is the owner of a motor vehicle, or has exclusive control of any motor 
vehicles as a manufacturer or dealer, the commission may revoke the 
certificate of registration of all motor vehicles so exclusively owned 
or controlled. Whenever any person so convicted appeals, the com- 
mission shall suspend forthwith the license of the person so con- 
victed, and shall order the license delivered to it, and shall not 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 101 

reissue said license unless such person is acquitted in the appellate 
court, or unless the commission in its discretion, after an investigation 
or upon a hearing, decides to reissue it. No new license or certifi- 
cate shall be issued by the commission to any person convicted of a 
violation of this section until after sixty days from the date of such 
final conviction, nor thereafter except in the discretion of the com- 
mission. 

The question is not free from difficulty. In MunTcley v. Hoyt, 
179 Mass. 108, where it was provided in St.* 1896, c. 397, § 9, 
that the Board of Eegistration in Pharmacy, after hearing, 
might suspend the registration and certificate of a registered 
pharmacist, or might revoke such registration and certificate 
altogether, but which contained the proviso that " the license or 
certificate of registration of a registered pharmacist shall not 
be suspended or revoked for a cause punishable by law until 
after conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction,^' the court 
held that the placing of the case on file after a plea of guilty 
was a sufficient conviction to warrant the suspension or revoca- 
tion of the license. The court said, at page 111 : — 

It is the intention of the statute to give a pharmacist charged with 
a crime the right to a trial in the court having jurisdiction of his 
offence, but if his guilt be there established so that the court may 
impose sentence according to its powers, then it is sufficiently estab- 
lished for the Board of Pharmacy to act upon their finding, and to 
impose the penalty according to their powers. 

And again, at page 113 : — 

The problems before the respective tribunals are entirely different, 
and, the guilt of the accused being established through conviction 
by plea or verdict in the one and by the finding after a hearing in 
the other, the accused is subject to such punishment as the respective 
tribunals may lawfully impose, and the right of either to proceed 
to judgment is not affected by the fact that the other sees fit to 
decline to proceed to judgment. 

And it appears to be well settled that in its ordinary legal sense 
the word " conviction,'^ as used in the statutes of the Common- 
wealth, signifies that the defendant has pleaded guilty or has 
been found guilty by the verdict of a jury or the finding of a 
court. I. Op. Atty.-Gen., 499 ; Commonwealth v. Lockwood, 
109 Mass. 323. In some cases, however, the word is employed 



102 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

in statutes to designate the judgment and sentence of the court 
upon a verdict, finding or confession of guilt. Thus, in Coni- 
monwealtli v. Kiley, 150 Mass. 325, under the provision of St. 
1888, c. 392, that " the conviction by a court of competent juris- 
diction of a person hcensed under the provisions of chapter one 
hundred of the Public Statutes, for violation of any of the 
provisions of said chapter, and the several acts in amendment 
thereof, shall of itself make the license of said person void,^' the 
court held that a verdict of guilty found by a jury in the Su- 
perior Court, from which an appeal was taken, was not a con- 
viction within the meaning of the statute above cited, and the 
court said : — 

Under this provision, the effect of a conviction of the kind named 
is to deprive the defendant of a valuable right, without an oppor- 
tunity for further trial or investigation. We are of opinion that 
nothing less than a final judgment, conclusively establishing the guilt, 
will satisfy the meaning of the word " conviction " as here used. 
At any time before a final judgment of the court a motion in arrest 
of judgment may be made, or the verdict may be set aside upon a 
motion for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence, 
or for other good cause; and, upon further proceedings, it may turn 
out that the defendant is not guilty. 

And see Commonwealth v. Gorliam, 99 Mass. 420; Fay v. Har- 
lan, 128 Mass. 244. 

The distinction between the case of Munkley v. Hoyt and the 
case of CommoniveaWi v. Kiley, and other similar decisions, 
appears to rest upon the fact that in the latter the conviction it- 
self voids or revokes the license so that the loss of the license 
in effect becomes a part of the sentence rather than a conse- 
quence of the verdict or finding of guilty, whereas in the former 
case the determination of the guilt of the licensee did no more 
than confer jurisdiction upon an independent tribunal to pro- 
ceed with a separate inquiry resulting in the revocation or sus- 
pension of the license. 

The case presented by the inquiry of the commission appears 
to lie somewhere between the above decisions. Under the pro- 
visions of section 22, above quoted, which are mandatory, the 
commission is not vested with any discretion in the premises, 
and their function in connection with the revocation of the li- 
cense is purely ministerial, so that at least to the extent of 
making the revocation of the license a necessary consequence of 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 103 

the conviction of the licensee, the statute resembles that con- 
sidered by the court in Commonwealth v. Kiley. Upon the 
other hand, the provision of section 22 that " whenever any per- 
son so convicted appeals^ the commission shall suspend forthwith 
the license of the person so convicted," appears to contemplate 
action upon the part of the commission before the final judg- 
ment which constitutes a conviction as defined in Common- 
wealth V. Kiley. The purpose of the section is undoubtedly to 
protect the public against the reckless operation of automobiles 
or motor cycles. 

Taking into consideration that the purpose of section 22 is 
to secure the safety of the public upon highways where auto- 
mobiles and other motor vehicles may be operated at a high rate 
of speed, it is apparent that there is sound and adequate reason 
why a person who has pleaded or has been found guilty of reck- 
less operation should not be permitted to continue operating 
until a final judgment has been rendered in his case, but should 
be forthwith deprived of his license, not as a punishment for 
the offence but as a measure of protection to the public. This, 
I am advised, is the view heretofore adopted by the commission 
in dealing with similar case^'. AVliile the question cannot be said 
to be entirely free from doubt, for the reasons above discussed 
and in view of the purpose of the statute and the obvious con- 
siderations of public safet}^ involved, I am of opinion that the 
commission is so far warranted in treating a judgment of guilty 
as a sufficient conviction to require the revocation of the license 
of the person so convicted as not to be required to change the 
policy already pursued by it, until the precise point has been 
adjudicated otherwise by the courts. 
Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General . 



Trust Company — Savings Department — Payment of Fixed 
Dividend requiring Transfer of Funds from General BanTc- 
ing Fund of Company. 

The provision of St. 1908, c. 520, § 3, that the accounts of the savings 
department of a trust company " shall be kept separate and dis- 
tinct from the general business of the corporation," prohibits the 
promise of a fixed dividend or rate of interest upon money de- 
posited in the savings department of a trust company, which for 
its maintenance requires a transfer of funds from the general 
banking department of the company to the savings department. 



104 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Oct. 2, 1912. 
Hon. Augustus L. Thorndike, Bank Commissioner. 

Dear Sir : — Your letter of September 24 requires m}^ opin- 
ion as to the authority of a trust company which has established 
a savings department, under the provisions of St. 1908, c. 520, 
to promise to pay a definite rate of interest or dividends upon 
money deposited therein, any deficiency in the earnings of the 
savings department to be made up by a transfer of funds neces- 
sary to complete the required amount of dividends or interest 
from the general banking department of the trust company. 

St. 1908, c. 520, §§ 1, 2 and 3, are as follows: — 

Sectiox 1. Every trust company soliciting or receiving deposits 
(«) which may be withdrawn only on presentation of the pass-book 
or other similar form of receipt which permits successive deposits 
or withdrawals to be entered thereon; or {h) which at the option of 
the trust company may be withdrawn only at the expiration of a 
stated period after notice of intention to withdraw has been given ; 
or {c) in any other way which might lead the public to believe that 
such deposits are received or invested under the same conditions or 
in the same manner as deposits in savings banks ; shall have a savings 
department in which all business relating to such deposits shall be 
transacted. 

Section 2. All such deposits shall be special deposits and shall 
be placed in said saving-s department, and all loans or investments 
thereof shall be made in accordance with the statutes governing the 
investment of deposits in savings banks. The duties of the board of 
investment relative to the investment of such deposits shall be per- 
formed by a board or committee appointed by the board of directors 
of such corporation. 

Section" 3. Such deposits and the investments or loans thereof 
shall be appropriated solely to the security and payment of such 
deposits, and shall not be mingled with the investments of the capital 
stock or other money or property belonging to or controlled by such 
corporation, or be liable for the debts or obligations thereof until 
after the deposits in said savings department have been paid in full. 
The accounts and transactions of said savings department shall be 
kept separate and distinct from the general business of the corpora- 
tion. 

Section 5 of the same chapter provides that — 

All income received from the investment of funds in said savings 
department, after deducting the expenses and losses incurred in the 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 105 

management thereof and such sums as may be paid to depositors 
therein as interest or dividends, shall accrne as profits to such cor- 
poration and may be transferred to its general funds. 

It was the obvious purpose of the provisions of chapter 520, 
abeve-^rrotedj to place a trust company, so far as possible, upon 
the same footing as a savings bank, and to require that it be 
conducted entirely separate from the general business of the 
trust company by which it is maintained. This being so, I am 
of opinion that the promise of a fixed dividend or rate of in- 
terest upon money deposited in the savings department of a 
trust company requiring for its maintenance a transfer of funds 
from the general banking department of the company to the 
savings department, is contrary to the provision of St. 1908, 
c. 520, § 3, 'above cited, that the accounts and transactions of 
the savings department shall be kept separate and distinct from 
the general business of the company, and is therefore unauthor- 
ized. 

Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



Civil Service — Inspectors of Slaughtering. 
Inspectors of slaughtering nominated and appointed under the pro- 
visions of St. 1911, c. 297, § 6, as amended by St. 1911, c. 534, 
§ 2, are included within the terms of Civil Service Eule 7, c. 11. 

Oct. 21, 1912. 
Mark W. Richardson, M.D., Secretary, State Board of Health. 

Dear Sir : — In behalf of the State Board of Health you 
have requested my opinion as to whether, in view of the provi- 
sions of St. 1911, c. 297, and St. 1911, c. 534, relating to the 
nomination, appointment and removal of inspectors of slaughter- 
ing, the inspectors nominated and appointed under those pro- 
visions of law in cities are subject to civil service law and rules. 

St. 1911, c. 534, is entitled, ^^ An Act relative to the appoint- 
ment of inspectors of slaughtering,'' and provides, in section 2, 
as follows : — 

Section six of chapter two hundred and ninety-seven of the acts 
of the year nineteen hundred and eleven is hereby amended by strik- 
ing out said section and inserting in place thereof the following : — 
Section 6. For the purposes of this act inspectors shall be appointed, 



106 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

shall be compensated, and may be removed in accordance with the 
23rovisions of law relating- to inspectors of animals, except that the 
appointment of such inspectors shall be made by the local boards of 
health and except that in i-espect to such inspectors the state board 
of health shall perform the duties and exercise the authority imposed 
by law upon the chief of the cattle bureau of the state board of 
agriculture in respect to inspectors of animals. The first appoint- 
ments under this act shall be made within thirty days after its 
passage. 

The provisions of law relating to inspectors of animals re- 
ferred to are contained in St. 1912, c. 608, § 6, providing — 

The mayor and aldermen in cities, except Boston, and the selectmen 
in towns shall annually, in March, nominate one or more inspectors 
of animals, and before the first day of April shall send to the com- 
missioner of animal industry the name, address and occupation of 
each nominee. Such nominee shall not be appointed until approved 
by the commissioner of animal industry. 

The provisions of law, other than the civil service law, which 
are now in force with reference to the nomination, appointment 
and removal of inspectors of slaughtering may, therefore, be 
said to be in substance as follows : the boards of health in cities, 
except Boston, and the boards of health in towns shall annually, 
in March, nominate one or more inspectors of slaughtering, and 
before the first day of April shall send to the State Board of 
Health the name, address and occupation of each nominee. 
Such nominee shall not be appointed until approved by the 
State Board of Health. The aforesaid officials of cities and 
towns may remove any inspector, and shall thereupon immedi- 
ately nominate another in his place and send notice thereof as 
prescribed above. In all cities at least one of the inspectors of 
slaughtering shall be a registered veterinary surgeon. 

The question submitted, therefore, is whether, in spite of the 
fact that the Legislature has made provision by the statutes 
quoted for the nomination and appointment of inspectors of 
slaughtering by boards of health in cities, and for the approval 
by the State Board of Health of those appointed, and for the 
immediate filling of any vacancy which may occur, and in these 
statutes })as made no express reference to the civil service law 
and rules, the position is nevertheless within the jurisdiction of 
the Civil Service Commission. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 107 

E. L., c. 19, authorizes the appointment of a civil service com- 
mission, and provides that the commissioners shall from time 
to time prepare rules regulating the selection of persons to fill 
appointive positions in the government of the Commonwealth 
and of the several cities thereof. Of the rules made under au- 
thority of that provision of law, Civil Service Rule 7, providing 
for the classification of the official service, includes, as class 11, 
"Inspectors other than inspectors of work and persons doing 
similar work, except railroad inspectors, in the service of the 
Commonwealth or of any city thereof." 

In my opinion the term '' inspectors,'' as used in the rule 
quoted, is sufficiently broad to include inspectors appointed 
under St. 1911, c. 534. The functions of the position of inspector 
of slaughtering, and the nature of the office itself, are not such 
as to bring the position within any of the general statutory ex- 
ceptions from the application of the civil service law provided 
by E. L., c. 19, § 9, and its amendments. The fact that the 
successful performance of the work required in the position calls 
for the special qualification of professional training does not in 
itself except the position from the application of civil service 
law and rules. I am not aware of any statute which specifically 
excepts the office from the civil service law. 

The position of inspector of slaughtering must, therefore, be 
held to be within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commis- 
sion unless it can be said that the provisions of St. 1911, c. 297, 
and St. 1911, c. 534, show an intention on the part of the Legis- 
lature so inconsistent with the intention to subject the position 
to civil service law and rules as by implication to exempt the 
office therefrom. 

In my opinion the statute is not so to be construed. At the 
time when the Statutes of 1911 were enacted inspectors in the 
service of cities were in the classified list of the civil service 
rules. The Legislature must be presumed to have known that 
the inspectors whose appointment was provided for by the Stat- 
utes of 1911 would be subjected to civil service law and rules 
unless they were expressly exempted therefrom by action of the 
Legislature. The Legislature is, therefore, in my opinion, to 
be considered as having provided that the local boards of health 
and the State Board of Health might respectively nominate, 
appoint and approve, but only subject to existing laws. It is 
to be noted that the effect of such construction is not to nullify 
the power of nomination, appointment and approval bestowed 



108 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

upon the local boards of health and the State Board of Health, 
but merely to limit those powers to the extent that nominations 
and appointments must be made from the certified list of the 
Civil Service Commission, and the procedure with reference to 
the nomination, appointment and removal of the officials in 
question must be governed by civil service law and rules. 
Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



Town — Notes — Certification — Director of Bureau of Sta- 
tistics — Vote to authorize Selectmen to refund Debt 
" wpon the Passage of an Act authorizing the Same/' 
The vote of a town at a town meeting held on March 4, .1912, approving 
the action of the selectmen in asking the Legislature to authorize 
such town to refund its debt, and authorizing the selectmen " to 
refund said debt upon the passage of an act of the Legislature 
authorizing the same," does not constitute a valid acceptance of 
the authority to refund the debt in question, conferred by a statute 
passed on March 28 following, and the Director of the Bureau of 
Statistics should not certify notes issued in accordance with such 
vote. 

Nov. 7, 1912. 

Charles F. G-ettemy, Esq., Director, Bureau of Statistics. 

Dear Sir : — You have requested my opinion as to what 
action should be taken by you with reference to a series of notes 
which the town of North Reading desires to issue under St. 
1912, c. 343, and which have been presented to you for certifica- 
tion under the provisions of St. 1910, c. 616, as amended by 
St. 1912, c. 45. 

The facts from which the question arises are as follows : in 
the warrant for the town meeting of N'orth Reading, held on 
March 4, 1912, appeared the following: — 

Article 16. To see if the town w^ill approve of the action of the 
selectmen in asking* the Legislature to authorize the town to refund 
its debt amounting to $9,600, and will authorize the selectmen to 
refund said debt upon the passage of an act of the Legislature au- 
thorizing the same. 

Pursuant to that article the town voted as follows : — 

Article 16, Under Article 16, upon motion of Mr. A. G. Barber, 
voted to approve the action of the selectmen in asking the Legisla- 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 109 

tiire to authorize the town to refund its debt amounting to $9,600, 
and to authorize the selectmen to refund said debt upon the passage 
of an act of the Legisla'ture authorizing the same. 

The act of the Legislature upon the subject-matter referred 
to in the vote of the town was passed as St. 1912, c. 343, on 
March 28, 1912, and took effect upon its passage. That act 
provides as follows : — 

Section 1. For the purpose of paying certain outstanding notes 
amounting to nine thousand six hundred dollars, the town of North 
i?eading is hereby authorized to borrow the said sum and to issue 
notes therefor. One of the said notes shall be payable in each year 
after the said loan is made, and the amount of the first nine notes so 
issued shall be one thousand dollars each, and the amount of the 
tenth note shall be six hundred dollars. The said notes shall be 
signed by the treasurer and countersigTied by the selectmen of the 
town, and shall bear interest at a rate not exceeding four and one 
half per cent per annum. The money required to pay the interest 
on said notes in each year, and that part of the principal which 
becomes due in that year, shall be raised by taxation in the same 
manner in which the other expenses of the town are provided for. 

Section 2. This act shall take effect upon its passage. 

The specific question presented by you is whether the vote 
quoted above constitutes sufficient authority to warrant the issue 
of the notes in question and their certification by you without 
further vote of the town. 

In my opinion the question is to be answered in the negative. 

At the time when the town meeting was held, on March 4, 
1912, I assume that the town had no existing authority to re- 
fund the debt in question. It is at least clear that the vote of 
the town on that date was not effective to authorize the refund- 
ing of the debt under any other legislation than that of 1912. 

The vote passed at the meeting of March 4, 1912, was an 
attempt to anticipate authority which the town had not yet 
acquired. At the time when the town thus purported to au- 
thorize the exercise of authority which it expected the Legis- 
lature to confer upon it the town did not know definitely that 
any such authority would be conferred upon it or what the 
measure or form of the authority conferred would be if con- 
ferred. It was possible that the Legislature might grant the 
authority in the terms asked by representatives of the town, or . 
withhold it completely, or grant it with such qualifications and 



110 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

conditions that the act when passed would not be acceptable to 
the town. 

Upon these facts the town cannot be considered to have ac- 
cepted by valid action a grant of authority which had not in fact 
been offered to it at the time of the vote and the form and terms 
of which it could not foretell. 

Furthermore, the vote itself is too indefinite in its provisions 
to be effective. Since the act of March 28, 1912, had not been 
passed when the vote was taken, and since there was no certainty 
as to what the final form of the act might be, it is not permis- 
sible to read into the vote of March 4, 1912, the provisions of 
the act which was passed on March 28, 1912. 

Considering the vote by itself, therefore, and apart from the 
statute, as it must be considered, the vote appears to be entirely 
lacking in any i^rovisions as to the rate of interest, the amount 
of the proportionate payments, and the terms of the bonds or 
notes to be issued. Such a vote, without a statute to be read 
into it or construed with it, is inadequate to authorize the offi- 
cials of the town to take the necessary steps for the issuing of 
the notes in question. 

There is no provision in St. 1912, c. 343, that the town treas- 
urer or other officials of the town may issue the notes without 
further vote of the town. Where the Legislature intends to 
authorize such action by the town treasurer without further 
vote of the town, it expresses that intention. St. 1912, c. 458, 
is entitled, " An Act to authorize the town of Essex to refund 
certain indebtedness," and section 3 of that statute provides as 
follows : — 

The treasurer of the town of Essex, with the approval of the 
selectmen, is hereby authorized, without further vote of the town, to 
incur indebtedness under the pro^dsions of this act for which said 
town shall be liable, and to issue notes of the town therefor in ac- 
cordance with law. 

If chapter 343 of the Acts of 1912 contained such a provision 
quite a different situation would be presented. 

Upon the present state of facts, therefore, I have to advise 
you that in my opinion you should not certify the series of notes 
which has been presented to you for certification. 
Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorney-General. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. Ill 



Public Records — Records of Piihlic or Incorporated Hospitals 
— Inspection. 

Under the provisions of St. 1905, c. 330, § 3, that the records of hos- 
pitals supported in whole or in part by contributions from the 
Commonwealth or from any municipality, and incorporated hospi- 
tals offering treatment to patients free of charge or conducted as 
public charities, " shall not be open to public inspection until 
they are produced in court by tlie person having the custody of 
the same," the superintendent or other officer in charge of such 
institution is not required or permitted to furnish any person with 
a copy of any part of such record. 

Nov. 22, 1912. 

E. Y. ScRiBNER^ M.D., Superintendent, Worcester State Hospital. 

Dear Sir : — I have received your letter stating that you have 
received a request from an attorney representing a patient who 
was formerly under the care of the Worcester State Hospital, 
that you furnish a detailed record of the history of the patient's 
case, and asking my opinion upon the questions, first, whether 
you are compelled by law to furnish a copy of the records to the 
person requesting it; and second, whether, if not compelled to 
furnish such copy, it is lawful for you to furnish it if you 
deem it best. 

The answers to both questions are found in the provisions of 
St. 1905, c. 330. The amended provisions are as follows: — 

Section 1. Hospitals supported in whole or in part by contri- 
butions from the Commonwealth or from any municipality, incor- 
porated hospitals offering treatment to patients free of charge, and 
incorporated hospitals conducted as public charities, shall keep 
records of the cases under their care and the history of the same in 
books kept for that jDurpose. 

Section 2 [as ^amended by St. 1908, c. 269]. Such records, and 
similar records kept prior to April twent^'^-fifth, nineteen hundred 
and five, shall be in the custody of the person in charge of the hos- 
pital, and shall be admissible as evidence in the courts of the Com- 
monwealth as to all matters therein contained. 

Section 3. Section seventeen of chapter thirty-five of the Revised 
Laws shall not apply to such records, and they shall not be open to 
public inspection until they are produced in court by the person 
havhig the custody of the same. 

You are, therefore, not only not compelled to furnish a copy 
of the records, but by statutory provision the furnishing of such 



112 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

copy is expressly prohibited, and the usual provision of law that 
every person having the custody of public records shall at rea- 
sonable times permit inspection 'of those records and furnish 
copies thereof on payment of reasonable fees, is made inappli- 
cable to the records of patients in a State insane hospital. 
Very truly yours, 

James M. Sv^ift, Attorney-General. 



Lottery — Element of Chance — Voting Contest. 
An arrangement or contract entered into by a foreign corporation 
dealing in ponies, with certain merchants and managers of theatres 
within the Commonwealth, by which each such merchant or man- 
ager contracting with the pony company issues to every customer 
for each 25 cents received 25 votes, which may be east by the 
bearer in favor of any contestant in a contest in which the person 
receiving the highest number of votes is entitled to a pony and 
outfit from such company, involves no element of chance, and there- 
fore does not constitute a lottery within the meaning of the several 
sections of R. L., c. 214, which prohibit lotteries within the Com- 
monwealth. 

Nov. 22, 1912. 

Gen. J. H. Whitney, Chief of the District Police. 

Dear Sir : — You have requested my opinion as to whether 
the operation of a certain arrangement entered into by various 
managers of theatres and other buildings licensed by your de- 
partment is subject to the provisions of the laws of this Com- 
monwealth prohibiting setting up, promoting, permitting, 
advertising, or in any manner participating or assisting in the 
operation of a lottery. 

The arrangement in question is substantially as follows : a 
pony company of Ohio makes contracts with various theatre 
owners and merchants by the terms of which a voting contest 
is carried on in connection with the management of the theatre 
or business for the purpose of advertising the ponies of the Ohio 
company. Each theatre owner or merchant contracting with 
the pony company issues to every customer for each 25 cents 
received, either for admission tickets or for merchandise, 25 
votes. These votes so received may be cast by the bearer in 
favor of any contestant, and the contestant securing the highest 
number of votes receives a pony and outfit from the Ohio com- 
pany. In case of a tie the value of the pony and outfit is divided 
among those having an equal number of votes. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 113 

Without assuming to refer to all the provisions of Massachu- 
setts law aimed at the prevention of the operation of lotteries, 
most of which provisions are embodied in chapter 21-1 of the 
Eevised Laws^ the following section may be cited as fairly illus- 
trating the policy of the law upon the subject: — 

Section 7. Whoever sets up or promotes a lottery for money, or 
by way of lottery disposes of any property of value, or under the 
pretext of a sale, gift or delivery of other property or of any right, 
privilege or thing whatever disposes of or offers or attempts to dis- 
pose of any property, with intent to make the disposal thereof de- 
pendent upon or connected with chance by lot, dice, numbers, game, 
hazard or other gambling device, whereby such chance or device is 
made an additional inducement to the disposal or sale of said prop- 
erty, and whoever aids either by printing or Avriting, or is in any 
way concerned, in the setting up, managing or drawing of such lot- 
tery, or in such disjDosal or otfer or attempt to dispose of property 
by such chance or device, shall for each offence be punished by a fine 
of not more than two thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not 
more than one year. 

" Lottery " is defined in the Century Dictionary as follows : — 

1. Distribution of anything by lot ; allotment ; also, the drawing of 
lots; determination by chance or fate; random choice; matter of 
chance; as, the lottery of life. 2. A scheme for raising money by 
selling chances to share in a distribution of prizes ; more specifically, 
a scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance among persons 
purchasing tickets, the correspondingly numbered slips or lots, rep- 
resenting prizes or blanks, being drawn from a wheel on a day pre- 
viously announced in connection with the scheme of intended prizes. 
3. The lot or portion falling to one's share; a chance allotment or 
prize. 

In all these definitions chance is the essential element. If 
the element of chance is absent the things which are necessary 
to constitute a lottery are not present. 

An analysis of the plan submitted as that operated under the 
contract between the pony company and the theatre managers 
and merchants fails to reveal any element of chance. Every- 
thing is determined by a definite and invariable rule in advance, 
except the question as to who shall receive the votes which are 
cast, and that question is in no Avay determined by chance. 



114 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Tickets of admission and articles of merchandise are for sale 
to everybody. Everybody who pays 25 cents, or any multiple 
thereof, either for tickets or merchandise receives a certain fixed 
number of votes for each 25 cents paid. Each person having 
received his votes is free to cast them for whomsoever he chooses, 
and his own choice is determined absolutel}' and solely by his 
own preference, which is expressed at his own volition. Whether 
his personal choice proves to be the winner of the contest de- 
pends not at all upon chance but merely upon whether a suffi- 
cient number of other voters have exercised their will in the 
same manner and given effect to the same preference, and that 
question is determined not b}^ lot or by hazard but by the or- 
dinary processes of arithmetic. 

In my opinion, therefore, the arrangement in question is not 
a lottery and is not within the scope of the description of the 
kindred evils for the suppression of which provision is made 
by chapter 214 of the Revised Laws, and its amendments. 

While no similar arrangement appears to have been under 
the consideration of the courts of this Commonwealth, a discus- 
sion of a case very similar in its facts is to be found in the 
opinion of the court in Qnatsoe v. Eggleston, 42 Ore. 315, in 
which the court held that since " the award of the pianos which 
are proposed to be given away as an inducement is not made 
by chance or lot, but by the affirmative and conscious act and 
will of the holders of tickets obtained with goods purchased at 
the defendant's store," the scheme did not constitute a lottery. 
Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, AUorney-General. 



Insurance — Steam Boilers — Inspection hy Insurance Com- 
panies — Certificate. 

Under the provisions of St. 1907, c. 465, § 17, as amended by St. 1912, 
c. 531, § 7, that " insurance companies engaged in the business of 
inspecting and insuring steam boilers shall, after each internal 
and external inspection, if the boiler and its appendages conform 
to the rules formulated by the Board of Boiler Eules, and if they 
deem the boiler to be in safe working condition otherwise, issue a 
certificate of inspection . . . ," it is the duty of an insurance com- 
pany making such inspection to issue a certificate upon each 
inspection without regard to the purpose for which such inspection 
is made. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 115 

Dec. 1, 1912. 
Gen. J. H. Whitxey, Chief of the District Police. 

Dear Sir : — You have requested my opinion as to the con- 
struction to be given to St. 1907, c. 465, § 17, as amended by 
St. 1912, c. 531, § 7, with reference to the inspection of steam 
boilers by insurance companies engaged in the business of in- 
specting and insuring steam boilers within this Commonwealth. 
The statute in its amended form prx)vides as follows : — 

Insurance comiDanies engaged in the business of inspecting and 
insuring steam boilers shall, after each internal and external inspec- 
tion, if the boiler and its appendages conform to the rules formulated 
by the board of boiler rules, and if they deem the boiler to be in safe 
working condition otherwise, issue a certificate of inspection stating 
the maximum pressure at which the boiler may be operated. This 
maximum pressure shall be determined under the rules established 
by the board of boiler rules. 

It appears that certain companies duly authorized to insure 
steam boilers in this Commonwealth from time to time inspect 
boilers upon which the owners desire to place insurance, or in- 
spect such boilers for the information of the owner or pro- 
spective purchaser, and that these companies contend that they 
are not required by the law to issue certificates after inspections 
for such purposes. 

Your question is whether the insurance companies authorized 
to engage in the business of insuring and inspecting boilers in 
this Commonwealth are required by the statute to issue a cer- 
tificate of inspection after an inspection for such purposes as 
those above mentioned. 

The statute prescribes that after each internal and external 
inspection, if the boiler and its appendages conform to the rules, 
and if it is deemed to be in safe working condition otherwise, 
a certificate of inspection shall be issued. The provision is not 
that after every annual inspection, or that after every regular 
inspection, or that after every inspection which the insurance 
company chooses to designate as an inspection made in accord- 
ance with the requirements of law a certificate shall be issued. 
No exception is made by the terms of the statute. An inspection 
is an inspection, whatever its object, and so far as appears from 
the statute one internal and external inspection does not differ 
from another. The statute does not fix any time for making 



116 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

inspection?. It mereh' provides that inspections shall be made 
at intervals of not more than one year. It is^ therefore, not 
open to the insnrance companies to designate one of several 
inspections as the inspection required by law, and to refuse to 
issue a certificate upon any other inspection. It is not open to 
the insurance companies to make distinctions between inspec- 
tions which the statute itself does not make. 

From the comj)rehensive language used in the statute it would 
seem to have been the intent of the Legislature that the latest 
inspection should be the one upon which the certificate in force 
is based, and to have the certified condition of the boiler kept 
up to date as closely as possible. That such was the intent of 
the Legislature is also indicated by .the provisions of section 10 
of chapter 465 of the Acts of 1907, which prescribe that every 
insurance company shall forward to the chief inspector of 
boilers, within fourteen days after each internal and external 
inspection, reports of all boilers so inspected by it. That is 
in efi^ect a requirement that the chief inspector of boilers shall 
have the benefit of all information up to date which the insur- 
ance companies have acquired in the transaction of their busi- 
ness. 

In my opinion, therefore, the interpretation given to the stat- 
ute by you is correct, and the insurance companies are required 
to issue a certificate after every inspection, whatever may have 
been the object of or reason for the inspection. 
Very truly yours, 

James M. Swift, Attorneij-Gcneml. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 117 



INDEX TO OPINIONS. 



PAGE 

Adjutant-General, term of office; constitutional law, . . . .77 

Attorney, fee for obtaining gratuity, collection of, . . . .91 

Attorney-General, order of General Court fixing limit of time for per- 
formance of duty by, ........ 4 

Automobile, license to operate, revocation of, .... . 100 

Board of Railroad Commissioners, procedure of, rulings on questions of 

law or fact, .......... 43 

Cities and towns, acceptance of statute relating to hours of labor, . . 97 

Duty of public authorities in, in case of riot, ..... 47 

Ci\'il service, law and rules, inspectors of slaughtering included within, . 105 
Commonwealth not included as employer under Workmen's Compen- 
sation Act, .......... 99 

Veteran employee of, involuntary retirement, . . . . 27 

Compensation of legislative counsel and agents, returns of, . . .3 

Constitution, amendment of, to provide for taxation of wild or forest 

lands; constitutional law, ....... 62 

Constitutional law, appropriation to fulfill moral obligation, repayment 

of money paid under mistake of fact or law, . . . .36 

Delegation of legislative authority to examine voting machines, 

ballot boxes and counting apparatus, ..... 39 

Duty of Governor to return bill with objections thereto in writing; 
veto by Governor; return of bill to branch in which it origi- 
nated, 82 

Competition entered into for the purpose of injuring or destroying 

the business of a rival; discrimination, ..... 58 

Conduct of elections, ......... 29 

Sale of prison-made goods, ........ 28 

Police power, regulation of sale of theatre tickets, . . . .24 

Public purpose; appropriation of money raised by taxation for 

homes for mechanics, laborers or other wage earners, . . 53 

' Public purpose; appropriation of money raised by taxation for 

reclamation and sale of wet lands, ...... 69 

Public purpose, appropriation of public funds for relief of destitute 

families of striking employees, ...... 19 

Term of office of Adjutant-General, ...... 77 

Taxation of wild or forest lands, ....... 62 

Conviction, game laws, violation of; plea of nolo where case is placed on 

file 46 

Judgment of guilty placed on file a, warranting revocation of license 

to operate automobile, ........ 100 

County, city or town authorities, duty of, in case of riot or other breach 

of the peace, ......... 47 

County commissioners, approval of bill or order does not warrant pay- 
ment by county treasurers unless expenditure was legally in- 
curred, .......... 89 

County treasurers, duty to ascertain legality of expenditures, . . 89 



118 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Discrimination by lowering of prices in one locality by a person, firm, 
association or corporation engaged in business in several locali- 
ties, prohibition of; constitutional law, ..... 58 

District police, boiler inspection department subordinate to chief of, 25 

Elections, examination by State Ballot Law Commission of voting ma- 
chines, ballot boxes and counting apparatus used in; constitu- 
tional law, .......... 39 

Regulation of conduct of; qualifications of voters; constitutional law, 29 
Fee of attorney for collecting gratuity for veteran, . . . .91 

Governor, duty of, after veto, to return bill to branch in which it origi- 
nated; constitutional law, ....... 82 

Hospitals, public or incorporated, inspection of records of, . . .111 

Hours of labor, acceptance of statute relating to, by cities and towns, . 97 
Insane or feeble-minded, hospital for, license for keeper of, partnership, . 93 
Insurance company, inspection of steam boilers to be certified, . .114 

Legislative counsel and agents, returns of; compensation, ... 3 
License for keeping hospital for insane or feeble-minded, partnership may 

not receive, .......... 93 

To operate automobile, revocation of; conviction, .... 100 

To operate steam boiler, coal shovelers do not require, ... 56 
To operate steam boiler, right of owner or user to operate through 

an unlicensed person, ........ 56 

Lottery, voting contest does not constitute, . . . . . .112 

Marriage, notice of intention of; certificate of; entry, .... 1 

Mechanics and laborers, homes for, appropriation of money raised by 

taxation; constitutional law, ....... 53 

Moths, gypsy and brown-tail, supplies furnished by State Forester to 

private individuals for destruction of, . . . . .67 

New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, compliance of, 

with decree of Supreme Judicial Court, ..... 4 

Repayment to of money paid under mistake of fact or law; moral 

obligation; constitutional law, ...... 36 

Nolo, plea of, where case is placed on file, not a conviction of violation of 

game laws, .......... 46 

Note of town issued under vote authorizing selectmen to refund debt 
"upon the passa,ge of an act authorizing the same" not to be cer- 
tified by Director of Bureau of Statistics, . . . .108 

Payable "during the year 1912," date of payment, ... 55 

Notice of intention of marriage, certificate of entry, .... 1 

Officer, commissioned, may receive gratuity provided for veterans, . .91 

Partnership may not be licensed as keeper of hospital for insane or feeble- 
minded, . ......... 93 

Payments by county treasurers limited to expenses legally incurred, . 89 

Prison-made goods, regulation of sale of; constitutional law, ... 29 
Public records, inspection of records of public or incorporated hospital, . Ill 
Railroad, New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, com- 
pliance with decree of Supreme Judicial Court, ... 4 
Riot or other breach of the peace, duty of public authorities; suitable 

aid, 47 

Right of sheriff to require assistance to suppress or avert, . .21 

Rulings on questions of law or fact by Board of Railroad Commissioners, 43 
Sherift', right of, to require assistance in case of actual or impending riot, 21 
State Forester, co-operation with private individuals in destroying gypsy 

and brown-tail moths, ........ 67 

Steam boilers, inspection of by insurance company; certificate, . .114 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. IIO- 



Taxation, appropriation of money raised by, to fulfill moral obligation; 

constitutional law, ........ 36 

Appropriation of public funds for relief of destitute families of strik- 
ing employees; constitutional law, ...... 19 

Money raised by, appropriation of, for homes of mechanics, laborers 

or other wage earners; constitutional law, . . . .53 

Of wild or forest lands; proposed constitutional amendment, . . 62 

Theatre tickets, right of Legislature to regulate sale of; constitutional 

law, ........... 24 

Town, may incur indebtedness for water supply by two-thirds vote only, 95 
Note oj, payable "during the year 1912," date of payment, . . 55 

Notes issued under vote authorizing selectmen to refund debt "upon 
the passage of an act authorizing the same;" certification by 
Director of Bureau of Statistics, ...... 108 

Trust company, savings department of, may not pay fixed dividends re- 
quiring transfer of funds from general banking fund to com- 
pany, . . 103 

Water suppl3^ town may incur indebtedness for, only by two-thirds vote, . 95 
Wet lands, reclamation and sale of, at public expense; constitutional 

law, 69 

Wood and timber, standing, definition of, . . . . . .62 

Workmen's Compensation Act not applicable to Commonwealth, . . 99 

Veteran, in employ of Commonwealth, retirement of without his consent, 27 
Veterans, gratuities for, include commissioned officer, . . . .91 

Veto, return of bill by Governor to branch in which it originated, . . 82 

Voting contest does not constitute lottery, . . . , . .112 



LIST OF CASES 



IN WHICH THE 



ATTORNEY-GEKERAL 



HAS APPEARED 



During the Yeah 1912, 



GRADE CEOSSINGS. 



Notices have been served upon this department of the filing 
of the following 'petitions for the appointment of special com- 
missioners for the abolition of grade crossings : — 

Berkshire County. 

Adams. Hoosac Valley Street Eailway Company, petitioners. 
Petition for abolition of Commercial Street crossing in 
Adams. George W. Wiggin, William W. McClench and 
Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. Commis- 
sioners^ report filed. Frank H. Cande appointed auditor. 
Auditor's fourth report filed. Pending. 

Great Barrington, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of a grade crossing in the village of Housatonic in 
said town. John J. Flaherty, Edmund K. Turner and 
Stephen S. Taft appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. Frank N. Nay appointed auditor. Auditor's 
third report filed. Pending. 

Lanesborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of Valley Road and Glen Eoad crossings. Railroad Com- 
missioners appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 
filed. Frank H. Cande appointed auditor. Auditor's first 
report filed. Pending. 

North Adams. Hoosac Valley Street Railway Company, peti- 
tioners. Petition for abolition of Main Street crossing, 
known as Braytonville crossing, in North Adams. Edmund 
K. Turner, William W. McClench and Joseph P. Magenis 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Frank H. Cande appointed auditor. Auditor's second re- 
port filed. Pending. 

North Adams, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition 
for abolition of State Street and Furnace Street crossings. 
Edmund K. Turner, David F. Slade and William G. 
McKechnie appointed commissioners. Commissioners' re- 
port filed. Pending. 

Pittsfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Merrill crossing in Pittsfield. Thomas W. Ken- 



124 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

nefick, Frederick L. Green and Edmund K. Turner ap- 
pointed commissioners. Pending. 

Stockbridge, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of " Eiver Eoad '' crossing in Stockbridge. James B. Car- 
roll, Edward B. Bishop and Luther Dean appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. AYade Ke3^es ap- 
pointed auditor. Auditor's second report filed. Pending. 

Stockbridge, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
South Street crossing. Railroad commissioners appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. A. AV. DeGoosh 
appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Stockbridge. Berkshire Railroad, petitioner. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Glendale station crossins^. Pendino:. 

West Stockbridge, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of grade crossing at Alban}^ Street. Pending. 

Bristol County. 

Attleborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of West Street, North Main Street and other crossings in 
Attleborough. James R. Dunbar, Henry L. Parker and 
William Jackson appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. Chas. P. Searle appointed auditor. Auditor's 
seventh report filed. Pending. 

Fall River, ]\rayor and xA.ldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Brownell Street crossing and other crossings in 
Fall River. John Q. A. Brackett, Samuel X. Aldrich and 
Charles A. Allen appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. Auditor's 
nineteenth report filed. Pending. 

Mansfield. Directors of Xew York, Xew Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at North Main, Chauncey, Central, West, 
School and Elm streets in Mansfield. Samuel L. Powers, 
Stephen S. Taft and Wm. Jackson appointed commis- 
sioners. George F. Swain appointed commissioner in place 
of Wm. Jackson, deceased. Pending. 

Xew Bedford, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of certain grade crossings in Xew Bedford. George 
F. Richardson, Horatio G. Herrick and Wm. AA^ieeler ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Fred 
E. Jones appointed auditor. Auditor's fifteenth report 
filed. Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 125 

Somerset. New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Com- 
pany, petitioner. Petition for abolition of grade crossing at 
Wilbur Avenue. James D. Colt, Henry H. Baker and 
Louis Perry appointed commissioners. Commissioners' re- 
port filed. Pending. 

Swansea. New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Com- 
pany, petitioner. Petition for abolition of grade crossing at 
Kiver Eoad. James D. Colt, Henry H. Baker and Louis 
Perry appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 
filed. Pending. 

Taunton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of grade crossings at Danforth and other streets in 
Taunton. Thomas M. Babson, George F. Swain and Edwin 
U. Curtis appointed commissioners. Charles H. Beckwith 
appointed commissioner in place of Thomas M. Babson, 
deceased. Pending. 

Essex County. 

Georgetown, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of grade crossing at Weston's Crossing. Pending. 

Gloucester. Boston & Maine Eailroad, petitioner. Petition for 
abolition of crossings at Magnolia Avenue and Brays cross- 
ing. Arthur Lord, Moody Kimball and P. H. Cooney ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. A. 
W. De Goosh appointed auditor. Auditor's first report 
filed. Pending. 

Gloucester. Directors of Boston & Maine Eailroad, petitioners. 
Petition for abolition of grade crossing between Washing- 
ton Street and tracks of Boston & Maine Eailroad. Pend- 
ing. 

Haverhill, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Washington Street and other crossings in 
Haverhill. George W. Wiggin, William B. French and Ed- 
mund K. Turner appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. E. A. 
McLaughlin appointed auditor in place of Fred E. Jones, 
deceased. Auditor's twelfth report filed. Pending. 

Ipswich, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
High Street and Locust Street crossings. Geo. W. Wiggin, 
Edmund K. Turner and William F. Dana appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones ap- 
pointed auditor. Auditor's third report filed. Pending. 



126 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Lawrence. Boston & Maine Railroad, petitioner. Petition for 
abolition of crossings at Chickering Street. Moody Kimball, 
James C. Poor and John M. Grosvenor, Jr., appointed 
commissioners. Petition withdrawn. 

Lawrence, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of crossing at Merrimac and other streets in 
Lawrence. Robert 0. Harris, Edmund K. Turner and 
Henry V. Cunningham appointed commissioners. Pending. 

'Lynn, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Summer Street and other crossings on Saugus 
branch of Boston & Maine Railroad and Market Street and 
other crossings on main line. George W. Wiggin, Edgar R. 
Champlin and Edmund K. Turner appointed commis- 
sioners. Commissioners' report filed. Edward A. McLaugh- 
lin appointed auditor. Auditor's second report filed. Pend- 
ing. 

Lynn, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of grade crossings at Pleasant and Shepard streets, Gas 
AMiarf Road and Commercial Street, on the Boston, Revere 
Beach & Lynn Railroad. Pending. 

Salem. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad, petitioners. Peti- 
tion for the abolition of grade crossings at Bridge, Wash- 
ington, Mill, North, Flint and Grove streets in Salem. 
Patrick H. Cooney, George F. Swain and William A. Dana 
appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Salem, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Lafayette Street crossing in Salem. Pending. 

Franklin County. 

Deerfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
" Upper Wisdom Road " crossing. Edmund K. Turner, Cal- 
vin Coolidge and Hugh P. Drysdale appointed commis- 
sioners. Commissioners' report filed. Lj^man W. Griswold 
appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Greenfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of Allen and Russell streets crossings in Greenfield. Ed- 
mund K. Turner, Walter P. Hall and Fred D. Stanley 
appointed commissioners. Stephen S. Taft appointed au- 
ditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Greenfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at Silver Street. Stephen S. Taft, Henry 
P. Field and Thomas J. O'Connor appointed commissioners. 
Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 127 

Northfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
crossing on road to South Vernon. Edmnnd K. Turner, 
Charles W. Hazelton and Charles H. Innes appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pending. 

Hampden County. 

Palmer, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Burley's crossing in Palmer. Pending. 

Kussell, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Mont- 
gomer}^ Eoad crossing. Eailroad Commissioners appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Thomas W. 
Kennefick appointed auditor. Auditor's second report filed. 
Pending. 

Westfield, Attorney-General, petitioner. Petition for abolition 
of grade crossings at Lane's and Lee's crossings in West- 
• field. Patrick H. Cooney, Eichard W. Irwin and Franklin 
T. Hammond appointed commissioners. Chas. E. Hibbard 
appointed commissioner in place of Eichard W. Irwin, re- 
signed. Pending. 

Hampshire County. 

Amherst, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossings at Whitne}^, High and Main streets. Eail- 
road Commissioners appointed commissioners. Pending. 

•Belchertown, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the aboli- 
tion of crossing of road from Belchertown to Three Eivers 
and road from Bondville to Ludlow. Edmund K. Turner, 
F. G. Wooden and George P. O'Donnell appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pending. 

Easthampton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of grade crossing at Holyoke Eoad, Mt. Tom crossing. 
Dismissed. 

Middlesex County. 

Acton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Great 
Eoad crossing in Acton. Benj. W. Wells, George D. Bur- 
rage and William B. Sullivan appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. Fred Joy appointed auditor. 
Pending. 

Belmont, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
crossings at AYaverley station. Thomas W. Proctor, Pat- 
rick H. Cooney and Desmond FitzGerald appointed com- 
missioners. Pending. 



128 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Chelmsford, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at Middlesex Street. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo- 
lition of Marble Street crossing. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo- 
lition of Concord Street crossing. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. .Petition for the abo- 
lition of Waverly Street crossing. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo- 
lition of Bishop Street crossing. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo- 
lition of HoUis and Wanshakum streets crossings. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo- 
lition of Claflin Street crossing. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of grade crossing at Willis Crossing. Pending. 

Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for abo- 
lition of Middlesex and Thorndike streets crossings. Pend- 
ing. 

Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for abo- 
lition of Boston Eoad or Plain Street, School, Walker and 
Lincoln streets crossings. Arthur Lord, David F. Slade and 
Henry A. Wyman appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. A. W. De Goosh appointed auditor. Audi- 
tor's second report filed. Pending. 

Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for abo- 
lition of crossing at Western Avenue and Fletcher Street. 
Pending. 

Maiden. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad Company, peti- 
tioners. Petition for abolition of Medford Street and other 
crossings in Maiden. Geo. W. Wiggin, Robert 0. Harris 
and Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. Com- 
missioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. 
Auditor's fourth report filed. Pending. 

i\ralden. Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for abo- 
lition of Pleasant and Winter streets crossing in Maiden. 
George W. Wiggin, Edmund K. Turner and Fred Joy ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Win- 
field S. Slocum appointed auditor. Auditor's fifth report 
filed. Pending. 

Marlborough, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Hudson Street crossing in Marlborough. Walter 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 129 

Adams, Charles A. Allen and Alpheiis Sanford appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pending. 

Natick. Boston & Worcester Street Eailway Company, petition- 
ers. Petition for alteration of Worcester Street crossing in 
Natick. Geo. W. Wiggin, Edmund K. Turner and Larkin 
T. Trull appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 
filed. Theo. C. Hurd appointed auditor. Auditor's second 
report filed. Pending. 

Xewton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of Concord Street and Pine Grove Avenue cross- 
ings in IN'ewton. George W. Wiggin, T. C. Mendenhall and 
Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Newton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of Glen Avenue and nine other crossings in New- 
ton. Geo. W. Wiggin, T. C. Mendenhall and Edmund K. 
Turner appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 
filed. Patrick H. Cooney appointed auditor. Auditor's 
seventeenth report filed. Pending. 

North Eeading, Selectman of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Main Street crossing in North Eeading. Alpheus 
Sanford, George N. Poor and Louis M. Clark appointed 
commissioners. Eeport of commissioners filed. Thomas W. 
Proctor appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. 
Pending. 

Somerville, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Park Street, Dane Street, Somerville Avenue 
and Medford Street crossings in Somerville. George W. 
Wiggin, George P. Swain and James D. Colt appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Patrick H. 
Cooney appointed auditor. Auditor's eighth report filed. 
Pending. 

Wakefield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Hanson Street crossing in W^akefield. Pending. 

Waltham, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of South Street crossing in Waltham. Geo. F. 
Swain, and Geo. A. Sanderson appointed com- 
missioners. Pending. 

Waltham, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Moody Street, Main Street, Elm Street, Eiver 
Street, Pine Street, Newton Street and Calvary Street 
crossings in Waltham. Arthur Lord, Patrick H. Cooney 
and George F. Swain appointed commissioners. Pending. 



130 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Watertown, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossings at Cottage, Arlington, School, Irving and 
other streets in Watertown. Pending. 

Waj'land, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at State Road. Pending. 

Weston, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Church Street, Pigeon Hall and Concord Road crossings. 
Railroad Commissioners appointed commissioners. Commis- 
sioners' report filed. Joseph W. Lnnd, Esq., appointed 
auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Weston, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossings at Central Avenue, Conant Road, Church 
and Yiles streets. P. H. Cooney, Louis A. Frothingham 
and Andrew M. Lovis appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Winchester, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the aboli- 
tion of crossing at Winchester station square. George W. 
Wiggin, George F. Swain and Arthur Lord appointed com- 
missioners. Pending. 

Nor folic County. 

Braintree, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of the Pearl Street crossing at South Braintree. Patrick H. 
Cooney, Frank N. Nay and George F. Swain appointed com- 
missioners. Pending. 

Braintree. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at School, Elm, River and Union streets in 
Braintree. John L. Bates, Winfield S. Slocum and Arthur 
H. Wellman appointed commissioners. Commissioners' re- 
port filed. Pending. 

Brookline. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company, 
petitioners. Petition for the abolition of Kerrigan Place 
crossing in Brookline. William Sullivan, Henry M. Hutch- 
ings and Wade Keyes appointed commissioners. Commis- 
sioners' report filed. Henry M. Hutchings appointed 
auditor. Auditor's second report filed. Pending. 

Canton. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail- 
road Compan}^, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Ded- 
ham Road crossing in Canton. Samuel L. Powers, Stephen 
S. Taft and Wm. Jackson appointed commissioners. Com- 
missioners' report filed. Pending. 

Dedham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of 
Eastern Avenue and Dwight Street crossings in Dedham. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 131 

x^lpheus Sanford, Charles Mills and J. Henry Eeed ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Fred 
E. Jones appointed auditor. Pending. 

Foxborough. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Eailroad Companj^, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at Cohasset and Summer streets in Fox- 
borough. Samuel L. Powers, Stephen S. Taft and Wm. 
Jackson appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 
filed. Pending. 

Hyde Park, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Fairmount Avenue and Bridge Street crossings in Hyde 
Park. Boyd B. Jones, Edmund K. Turner and Fred Joy 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Thomas W. Proctor appointed auditor. Auditor's third re- 
port filed. Pending. 

Needham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Charles Eiver Street crossing in Needham. Pending. 

Norfolk. Agreement approved by the Eailroad Commissioners 
for the abolition of crossing at Grove Street, near City 
Mills station. Disposed of. 

Quincy. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Eail- 
road Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Saville 
and Water streets crossings in Quincy. John L. Bates, 
Winfield S. Slocum and Arthur H. Wellman appointed 
commissioners. Pending. 

Sharon. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Eail- 
road Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of grade 
crossing at Depot, Garden and Mohawk streets in Sharon. 
Samuel L. Powers, Stephen S. Taft and Wm. Jackson ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Pending. 

Walpole, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Oak Street crossing and other crossings in Walpole. Dana 
Malone, Edmund K. Turner and Henry A. W}Tiian ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. N. L. 
Sheldon appointed auditor. Auditor's fourth report filed. 
Pending. 

Westwood. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Eailroad Compan}-, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Green Lodge Street crossing in Westwood. Samuel L. 
Powers, Stephen S. Taft and Wm. Jackson appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pending. 



132 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Suffolk County. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Dudley Street crossing in Dorchester. Thomas Post, 
Fred Joy and Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. James D. Colt appointed au- 
ditor. Auditor's tenth report filed. Pending. 

Boston. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, 
petitioners. Petition for abolition of Neponset and Granite 
avenues crossings in Dorchester. Pending. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Freeport, Adams, Park^ Mill and Walnut streets and 
Dorchester Avenue crossings. James E. Dunbar, Samuel 
L. Powers and Thomas W. Proctor appointed commis- 
sioners. Commissioners' report filed. Arthur H. Wellman 
appointed auditor. Auditor's fifteenth report filed. Pend- 
ing. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of the Essex Street crossing in Brighton. George 
W. Wiggin, William B. French and Winfield S. Slocum 
appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Blue Hill Avenue and Oakland Street crossings in 
Boston. William B. French, Arthur H. Wellman and 
George A. Kimball appointed commissioners. Commission- 
ers' report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. Audi- 
tor's twenty-first report filed. Pending. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of all crossings in East Boston. George W. Wiggin, 
William B. French and Edward B. Bishop appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Winfield S. Slo- 
cum appointed auditor. Auditor's fourteenth report filed. 
Pending. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of crossings at Saratoga, Maverick and Marginal 
streets in East Boston. Railroad Commissioners appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pending. 

Revere, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Win- 
throp Avenue crossing in Revere of the Boston, Revere 
Beach & Lynn Railroad. Pending. 



1913.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 133 



Worcester County. 

Clinton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Sterling, Water, Main, High and Woodlawn streets cross- 
ings. George W. Wiggin, William E. McClintock and 
James A. Stiles appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. David F. Slade appointed auditor. Pending. 

Fitchbnrg, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Eollstone Street crossing in Fitchbnrg. Ed- 
mund K. Turner, Edwin U. Curtis and Ernest H. Vaughan 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
James A. Stiles appointed auditor. Auditor's fourth report 
filed. Pending: 

Harvard. Boston & Maine Eailroad, petitioner. Petition for 
abolition of a grade crossing near Harvard station. Pend- 
ing. 

Holden, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Dawson's crossing and Cedar Swamp crossing in Holden. 
Charles A. Allen, Arthur P. Eugg and Henry G. Taft ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. H. 
L. Parker appointed auditor. Auditors second report filed. 
Pending. 

Hubbardston, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of Depot Eoad crossing in Hubbardston. Pending. 

Leominster, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Water, Summer, Mechanic and Main streets crossings. 
George W. Wiggin, George F. Swain and Charles D. Barnes 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Pending. 

Southborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of crossing on road from Southborough to Framingham. 
Samuel W. McCall, Louis A. Frothingham and Eugene C. 
Hultman appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 
filed and recommitted. Pending. 

Southborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of Main Street crossing at Fayville in Southborough. 
Pending. 

West Boylston. Boston & Maine Eailroad Company, petitioners. 
Petition for abolition of Prescott Street crossing. Pending. 

Worcester, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of crossings at Exchange, Central and Thomas 



134 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

and other streets. Arthur Lord, George F. Swain and Fred 
Joy appointed commissioners. Pending. 
Worcester, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Grafton Street crossing and eight other cross- 
ings, including alterations of Union Station. James R. 
Dunbar, James H. Flint and George F. Swain appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. James A. 
Stiles appointed auditor. Auditor's fifty-sixth report filed. 
Pending. 



1913.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 135 



CASES ARISING IN THE COURTS. 



UNDER THE 



x^CTS EELATIVE TO IXHERITANCE AND SUCCESSION TaXES. 



Petitions for Instructions. 
Bristol County. 
Stavers, John W., estate of. Caroline Stavers, administratrix. 
Disposed of. 

Essex County. 

Clines, Mary G., estate of. Catherine A. Laycoek, adminis- 
tratrix. Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. Pend- 
ing. 

Meserve, Chastina S., estate of. James W. Leitch, executor. 
Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. Pending. 

Nichols, Mary C, estate of. Frank 0. Woods, executor. Pend- 
ing. 

Towne, Joseph H., estate of. Charles W. Richardson, trustee. 
Decree. 

Hampshire County. 
Welton, Walter B., estate of. Henry W. Kidder, administrator. 
Pending. 

Middlesex County. 

Blood, Benjamin F., estate of. Stanley E. Br^^ant et al., exec- 
utors. Pending. 

Bouton, Eliza J., estate of. Louis Bell et al., executors, peti- 
tioners. Pending. 

Perry, Emery B., estate of. Thomas Weston, executor. Pend- 
ing. 

Proudfoot, David, et al. v. Third Congregational Society in 
Cambridge et al. Pending. 



136 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



KorfoUc Countij. 

Fisher, Charles H., estate of. Lvclia M. Fisher, executrix. 
Pending. 

Kaffenburgh, Isaac, estate of. Helene W. Kaffenbnrgh et ah., 
executors, petitioners. Pending. 

Tobin, Ellen A., estate of. William Sullivan, executor. Pending. 

Tobin, Lawrence, absentee, estate of. Howard A. Wilson, re- 
ceiver, petitioner. Pending. 

Plyrnouth County, 

Blenkinsop, James S., estate of. John R. Mills, administrator. 
Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. Pending. 

Peirce, Harriot 0., estate of. Osgood Putnam, executor. Peti- 
tion for abatement of inheritance tax. Pending. 

Suffolk County. 

Baker, Charlotte A., estate of. Frank N. Nay et ah., executors. 
Decree. 

Belknap, Henry, estate of. Francis Peabody, Jr., et al., execu- 
tors. Decree. 

Billings, Rebecca C, estate of. Smith, Charles Gaston, et al., 
trustees, v. Carl Youngren et al., executors. Pending. 

Burnham, John A., estate of. William A. Burnham et al., peti- 
tioners. Pending. 

Dwight, Mary S., estate of. Grenville Clark et ah., petitioners. 
Pending. 

Frederick, Walter E., trustee, v. John C. Gra}', executor. Dis- 
posed of. 

Kell}^, Thomas, estate of. Harriet L. Kelly, petitioner. Pend- 
ing. 

Park, William D., estate of. Osmond S. Park, executor. Peti- 
tion for abatement of inheritance tax. Pending. 

Phillips, Charles H., estate of. Old Colony Trust Company, 
executor, petitioner. Pending. 

Sweetser, Frank D., estate of. Charles N. Barney, administrator 
c. t. a. Reserved for full court. Rescript. 

Worcestei' County. 
Metcalf, Caleb B., estate of. George L. Clark, executor. Pend- 
ing. 



1913.] PUBLIC . DOCUMENT — No. 12. 137 

Inventories. 
Barnstable County. 

Clark, Achsah S., estate of. Lewis F. Clark, administrator. 
Final decree. 

Matheson, Sarah A., estate of. Henry A. Ellis, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Berkshire County. 

Hall, E. George, estate of. George W. Hall, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Eoberts, Herbert I., estate of. Lura M. Roberts, administratrix. 
Pending. 

Sperry, Caroline A., estate of. William H. Sperry, executor. 
Dismissed. 

Sperry, Charles Louis, estate of. William H. Sperry, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Tucker, Delia, estate of. Lucy E. Hawks, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Tymeson, Edward, estate of. William E. Tymeson, adminstra- 
tor. Dismissed. 

Bristol County. 

Crowley, Abby A., estate of. Charles L. Baker, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Dufault, Albini J. U., estate of. Jos. A. Beauchmin, executor. 
Dismissed. 

Duffy, Michael, estate of. Annie Duffy, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Fleming, Bridget, estate of. Mary Harrington, executrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Fortes, Jose F., estate of. Henry E. Woodward, administrator. 
Pending. 

Lopes, Guiadino, estate of. James F. Kiernan, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

O'Hara, Mary, estate of, Stei^hen O'Hara, administrator. Dis- 
missed. 

Sherman, William D., estate of. Emma L. Wood, executrix. 
Dismissed. 

Walsh, Arthur G., estate of. Mary J. Walsh, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Walsh, Patrick C, estate of. Annie M. Walsh, administratrix. 
Pending. 



138 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Essex County. 

Adams, Isaac, estate of. Oliver E. Williams et cd., executors. 
Dismissed. 

Arey, Sylvanus R., estate of. Ida M. Arey, executrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Brown, Lucy E., estate of. Nellie Brown, administratrix. 
Pending. 

Burke, Catherine, estate of. Mary J. Burke, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Cleaves, Annie, estate of. Benjamin F. Cleaves, administrator. 
Decree. 

Cook, Katherine F., estate of. Thomas M. Cook, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Crooker, John W., estate of. William W. Crooker, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Crowley, Peter, estate of. Dennis J. Crowley, executor. Dis- 
missed. 

Driscoll, Cornelius, estate of. Julia A. Driscoll, administratrix. 
Pending. 

Fessenden, Laura M., estate of. William E. Fessenden, admin- 
istrator. Dismissed. 

Foley, Winifred, estate of. John J. Foley, administrator. Dis- 
missed. 

Freytag, Oswald, estate of. John A. O'Mahoney, executor. 
Dismissed. 

Fuller, Addie, estate of. David T. Fuller, administrator. Dis- 
missed. 

Gay, Elizabeth L., estate of. John James Gay, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Gould, George, estate of. Samuel Gould, administrator. Dis- 
missed. 

Green, Margaret, estate of. Thomas F. Little, executor. Dis- 
missed. 

Kyrouz, Eva T., estate of. Thomas N. Kyrouz, administrator. 
Final decree. 

Leone, Joseph, estate of. Alphonse Leone, administrator. 
Pending. 

McDonald, Patrick, estate of. Thomas D. Snow, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

McEvoy, Grace V., estate of. Catherine G. McEvoy, executrix. 
Unable to locate. Dismissed without prejudice. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 139 

Murray, Edward F., estate of. Frank J. Murray, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Murra}^, James H., estate of. Alexander M. Murray, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

bourse, Harrison, estate of. George L. Nourse, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

O'Brien, Nellie M., estate of. Thomas F. Little, executor. Dis- 
missed. 

Sanborn, Frank A., estate of. James W. Sullivan, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Smith, Ann, estate of. Sarah Gee, administratrix. Dismissed. 

Sukaireck, Mary, estate of. Annie S. Saliba, executrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Sweeney, Eugene, estate of. Timothy A. Sweeney, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Tansey, Elsie 0., estate of. Thomas H. Tansey, administrator. 
Decree. 

Wainstain, Samuel, estate of. Benjamin Wainstain et al., ad- 
ministrators. Dismissed. 

Westwood, Charles E., estate of. Georgianna AYestwood, admin- 
istratrix. Dismissed. 

Wood, William H., estate. Minnie V. Wood, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Hampden County. 

Bonelli, Arcangelo, estate of. Maria A. Bonelli, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Circosta, James, estate of. Salvatore Pagliaro, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Clark, Edward W., estate of. [N'ettie B. Clark, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

De Giacomo, Alfonso, estate of. Gaetano Poccardi, adminis- 
trator. Pending. 

Fee, Patrick C, estate of. Anna E. Fee, administratrix. Un- 
able to locate. Dismissed without prejudice. 

Kneil, Mary A., estate of. Arthur S. Kneil, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Lipscomb, Frank, estate of. Margaret H. Shean, administra- 
trix. Dismissed. 

Melaszansky, Joseph, estate of. Ursula J. Melaszansky, admin- 
istratrix. Pending. 

Osborn, Martin, estate of. Susan M. Osborn, executrix. Dis- 
missed. 



140 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Ostigu}^ Marie Papineau, estate of. Clarisse Papineau Parent, 

executrix. Pending. 
Eoonev, John, estate of. Margaret Eoone}^ administratrix. 

Pending. 
Sullivan, Edward W., estate of. Jennie G. Sullivan, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Wright, Henry A., estate of. Cynthia A. Wright, administra- 
trix. Dismissed. 

Middlesex County. 

Brouillette, Joseph P., estate of. Esmeralda M. Brouillette, 
administratrix. Pending. 

Buckley, Alice T., estate of. Thomas W. Buckle}^, administra- 
tor. Dismissed. 

Burke, Christopher, estate of. Elizabeth Burke, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Cahill, Elizabeth, estate of. Mary A. Kahn, administratrix. 
Pending. 

Cavanagh, Susan E., estate of. Susan F. Cavanagh, adminis- 
tratrix. Dismissed. 

Chadbourne, Marshall W., estate of. Addie Chadbourne, execu- 
trix. Pending. 

Corlew, Eollin H., estate of. Caroline A. Henderson, executrix. 
Dismissed. 

Dean, William H., estate of. Margaret E. Dean, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Dixon, Adam, estate of. Joseph K. Dixon, administrator. Dis- 
missed. 

Drago, Carmel, estate of. John Drago, administrator. Unable 
to locate. 

Eenton, Timoth}^, estate of. Mary Fenton, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Fish, Philip, estate of. Mary A. Fish, administratrix. Decree. 

Fletcher, Mary J., estate of. Nancy M. Fletcher, executrix. 
Pending. 

Frotton, Peter E., estate of. Frank H. Frotton, administrator. 
Pending. 

Qradj, Mary, estate of. John E. Grady, executor. Dismissed. 

Hall, Elvira A., estate of. Michael J. McDevitt, administrator. 
Unable to locate. Dismissed without prejudice. 

Homer, Elizabeth M., estate of. George H. Homer, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Kadra, Sadie M., estate of. Mallham M. Kadra, administrator. 
Dismissed. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 141 

Mann, Charles W., estate of. Arthur W. Mann, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

MeCollester, John Q. A., estate of. John F. McCollester, ad- 
ministrator. Dismissed. 

Morris, Letitia, estate of. Edith E. Tibbetts, executrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Neal, William T., estate of. Bridget G. Neal, executrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Nichols, Bessie M., estate of. George H. Xichols, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Noel, Edward, estate of. Celina M. Noel, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Pierlot, Annie F., estate of. Agnes J. Pierlot, administratrix. 
Pending. 

Quinlan, Johanna, estate of. Margaret T. Scannell, executrix. 
Dismissed. 

Quinn, Albert T., estate of. Salter W. Quinn, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Eiggs, Lucy J., estate of. Blanche I. Eiggs, executrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Eoche, John J., estate of. Timothy J. Eoche, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Eogers, Mary J., estate of. Annie Eogers, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Eusso, Maria, estate of. Maria Marazzo, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Sheehan, Patrick J., estate of. Hannah Sheehan, administra- 
trix. Dismissed. 

Slye, William J., estate of. Mary A. Slye, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Sullivan, John, estate of. Alice F. Sullivan, executrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Norfolk County. 

Carter, Helen E., estate of. Hallock H. Hill, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Cleale, Edna C, estate of. Ernest L. Hill, administrator. Dis- 
missed. 

Coupal, Denise, estate of, Joseph Coupal, administrator. Dis- 
missed. 

Doble, Enoch H., estate of. Herbert F. Doble, special admin- 
istrator. Dismissed. 

Farnsworth, John L., estate of. Anna A. Farnsworth, admin- 
istratrix. Dismissed. 



142 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Ford^ Catherine, estate of. Martin J. Lee, administrator. Dis- 
missed. 

Gallivan, Elizabeth, estate of. John L. Gallivan, administrator. 
Disposed of. 

Garrity, Margaret T., estate of. Maria A. Garrity, executrix. 
Dismissed. 

Kelley, Ruth, estate of. Charles T. Kelley, administrator. 
Final decree. 

McDonnell, John A., estate of. Mary G. McDonnell, executrix. 
Dismissed. 

McGillicudd}^ Ellen, estate of. Eugene H. McGillicuddy, ad- 
ministrator. Dismissed. 

McPherson, Mary A., estate of. Duncan McPherson, adminis- 
trator. Pending. 

Moran, James F., estate of. Timothy Dolan, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Sheehan, Ellen, estate of. John J. Sheehan, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Yates, Joseph, estate of. Lorretto A. Yates, executrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Plymouth County. 

Danahy, Abby, estate of. James E. Handrahan, executor. Dis- 
missed. 

Donovan, Julia, estate of. Hannah A. Shea, executrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Fish, Mary A., estate of. Florene A. Haskell, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Hickey, Catherine T., estate of. Margaret A. Hickey, adminis- 
tratrix. Dismissed. 

Lowr}^, Ann, estate of. Isabelle Crehan, administratrix. Final 
decree. 

Poole, Bradford, estate of. Ella F. Poole, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Riley, Patrick, estate of. Bridget Riley, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Russell, Patrick, estate of. William J. Coughlan et ah, exec- 
utors. Dismissed. 

Terr}^, :N"aomi, estate of. Sarah R. Collins, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 



1913.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 143 



Suffolk County. 

Adolph, Joseph, estate of. Isaac Klein, adininistrator. Pend- 
ing. 

Ahearn, Maurice, estate of. Maiy E. Aliearn, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Allen, William A., estate of. Marion Boyd Allen, administra- 
trix. Dismissed. 

Almeida, Christiano F., estate of. Angelina F. Almeida, ad- 
ministratrix. Pending. 

Baxter, Albert, estate of. Elizabeth A. Baxter, administratrix. 
Pending. 

Becker, Philip, estate of. Bridget Becker, executrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Belanger, J. P. Paul, estate of. Marie Belanger, administra- 
trix. Dismissed. 

Bershinsk}^ John, estate of. Lihba Bershinsky, administratrix. 
Pending. 

Brehm, Charles W., estate of. Estella F. Brelim, administratrix. 
Pending. 

Brooks, Charles A., estate of. Mary J. Brooks, executrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Byrne, William P., estate of. Catherine M. Byrne, administra- 
trix. Pending. 

Chaplin, Matilda C, estate of. Samuel Chaplin, administrator. 
Pending. 

Clayton, Frank H., estate of. Minnie A. Clayton, executrix. 
Dismissed. 

Costello, Bridget, estate of. Bridget A. Costello, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Cote, Omer, estate of. Eose Cote, administratrix. Unable to 
locate. Dismissed without prejudice. 

Coughlin, Martha A., estate of. Timothy F. Callahan, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Daly, Michael, estate of. Ellen E. Murray, administratrix. 
Pending. 

De leso, Mcola, estate of. Cleonice De leso, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Donovan, Patrick, estate of. Margaret Donovan, administratrix. 
Pending. 

Driscoll, John J., estate of. Catherine Driscoll, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 



144 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Ehrenberg, Judah, estate of. Rachel Lea Ehrenberg, adminis- 
tratrix. Dismissed. 

Gerrish, Jennie L., estate of. Herbert W. Angier, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Gleason, Michael J., estate of. Annie Gleason, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Goodale, George L., estate of. William P. Martin^ executor. 
Dismissed without prejudice. 

Gray, James N., estate of. Helen F. Eaton, administratrix. 
Unable to locate. Dismissed without prejudice. 

Gray, Mary D., estate of. William P. Gray, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Griffith, Edward, estate of. George A. GrifiSth, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Hall, Ellen F., estate of. Kate S. Gallagher, executrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Hanson, Mary N., estate of. Andrew Hanson, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Hardy, Lylie M., estate of. Lucy B. Hoadley, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Harrington, Mary, estate of. Joseph A. Sheehan, administrator. 
Final decree. 

Hunt, William P., estate of. John C. Hunt, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Jame, Rebecca, estate of. Barnet Jame, administrator. L'nable 
to locate. Dismissed without prejudice. 

Jordan, Lena, estate of. Frida Jordan, administratrix. Un- 
able to locate. Dismissed without prejudice. 

Kalis, Abraham, estate of. Joseph Kalis, administrator. L^n- 
able to locate. Dismissed without prejudice. 

Kelh^, Anna, estate of. Sarah Kelly, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Kenney, Martin, estate of. James J. Kenney, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Killeen, Daniel J., estate of. John B. Killeen, administrator. 
Pending. 

King, James T., estate of. Augusta King, administrator. Pend- 
ing. 

Londregan, Catherine, estate of. Eichard J. Ha^'den, executor. 
Dismissed. 

Lynch, Mary, estate of. John H. L3'nch, executor. Dismissed. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCOIEXT — Xo. 12. 145 

Lynn, Gertrude, estate of. John J. Lynn, administratoi-. Dis- 
missed. 

Lyons, Maria, estate of. Charles F. Lyons, administrator. 
Pending. 

Madden, Stephen F.. estate of. Delia A. Madden, administra- 
trix. Dismissed. 

McGann, Patrick, estate of. Margaret Sheehan, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

McHale, John F., estate of. Annie J. McHale, administratrix. 
Pending. 

Murphy, John E., estate of. Thomas Murphy, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Oakman, Lizzie E.. estate of. Elmer P. Oakman, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

O'Brien, Jeremiah, estate of. George E. Hollf elder, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

OTarrell, Mary M., estate of. John D. Carmody, executor. 
Pending. 

O'Xeil, John H., estate of. Elizabeth F. O'Xeil, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Ormsby, Anna, estate of. Henry S. Ormsby, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Pare, Cyrille, estate of. Georgianna Pare, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Percival, Rose B., estate of. Eosella A. Lynch, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Schaeff, Xannette, estate of. Henry Robinson, executor. Dis- 
missed. 

Shannon^ Helen, estate of. Harry W. James, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Sharkey, Charles, estate of. George L. Sharkey, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Silberg, Joseph, estate of. Samuel Silberg, administrator. 
Pending. 

Sinclair, Albert T., estate of. Curtis H. Waterman, executor. 
Dismissed. 

Singleton, Catherine, estate of. John J. Singleton, administra- 
tor. L^nable to locate. Dismissed without prejudice. 

Sir vain, Marcelin, estate of. Aglar Sirvain, executor. Pending. 

Solari, Agostino, estate of. Maria Solari et ah, executors. Dis- 
missed. 



146 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Sribikr, Longina, estate of. Anastasia Sribikr, administratrix. 
Unable to locate. Dismissed without prejudice. 

Staloff, Louis, estate of. Lena Staloff, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Sullivan, Daniel, estate of. William T. Sullivan, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Sullivan, Daniel J., estate of. Annie T. Sullivan, executrix. 
Pending. 

Sullivan, Julia, estate of. Hannah Sullivan et al., administra- 
tors. Dismissed. 

Taylor, Mary A., estate of. Piobert Taylor, administrator. Dis- 
missed. 

Thorner, Elmina, estate of. Morris Thorner, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Tobey, Horace, estate of. Mary E. Tobey, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Tortorella, Francesca, estate of. Ignazio Tortorella, adminis- 
trator. Pending. 

Trainor, Kate, estate of. Annie L. O'Brien, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Tramontozzi, Constanzo, estate of. Charles A. Castle, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Trengove, William E., estate of. Charles T. Trengove, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Vincent, Alexander, estate of. William Aancent, administrator. 
Dismissed without prejudice. 

Vining, Ida L., estate of. Louis B. Yining, executor. Dis- 
missed. 

Wagner, Stephen G., estate of. Mary A. AVagner, administra- 
trix. Unable to locate. Dismissed without prejudice. 

Walenszius, Anthoney, estate of. Katorina Walenszius, adminis- 
tratrix. Pending. 

Ware, Agnes B., estate of. Clara E. Brown, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Warshansky, Samuel, estate of. Fannie Warshansky, adminis- 
tratrix. Decree. 

Wheelock, Oscar M., estate of. Winnifred I. T^Hieelock, adminis- 
tratrix. Dismissed. 

Williams, Michael, estate of. Katreine Williams, administra- 
trix. Dismissed. 

Williams, Sarah M., estate of. John H. Williams, administrator. 
Dismissed without prejudice. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 147 

Whiting, Elizabeth L., estate of. Edward L. Goodwin, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Whittemore, FrankHn P., estate of. Margaret E. Reed, ad- 
ministratrix. Dismissed. 

Wren, Cornelius, estate of. Edward C. Wren, administrator. 
Unable to locate. Dismissed without prejudice. 

Worcester County. 

Curran, John J., estate of. Peter F. Curran, administrator. 
Pending. 

Delorme, INTarcisse D., estate of. George Delorme et als., exec- 
utors. Dismissed. 

Donoghue, John C, estate of. Charles F. Campbell, administra- 
tor. Dismissed. 

DorsQ}^, Catherine, estate of. Timothy Dorsey, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Dufault, Louise M., estate of. Marie L. Duf ault, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Fox, Patrick, estate of. Mary Fox, executrix. Dismissed. 

Gargulinski, Ignacy, estate of. Aniela Gargulinski, administra- 
trix. Final decree. 

Groezinger, Charles G., estate of. Charles F. Groezinger, ad- 
ministrator. Pending. 

Hill, Catherine, estate of. Thomas J. Hill, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Hudson, Ellen A., estate of. Jennie A. Kelse}^, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Jurentkuff, Charles L., estate of. Bernice R. Jurentkuff, ad- 
ministratrix. Dismissed. 

Murphy, Patrick J., estate of. Wm. J. B. Murphy, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Sawyer, Warren E., estate of. Willie L. Sawyer, administrator. 
Decree. 

Steiman, David, estate of. Louis Steiman, administrator. Un- 
able to locate. Dismissed without prejudice. 

Sullivan, Catherine, estate of. Patrick O'Leary, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Willard, George, estate of. Frank D. Willard, administrator. 
Decree. 



148 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUSTS. 



Berl'shire County. 

Lenox Library Association v. David Lj^dig et aJs. Bill of com- 
plaint brought to confirm trust deeds. Pending. 

Xewton, Maria H., estate of. A. Chalkley Collins, adminis- 
trator^ petitioner. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Bristol County. 

Delano, Edward, estate of. Fairhaven Benevolent Association, 
petitioner. Petition for appointment as trustee. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Lothrop, Cyrus, estate of. Oliver Ames et al., executors. Peti- 
tion for authority to transfer trust funds. Disposed of. 

Matthes, Cornelia P., estate of. Charles E. Hunt, administrator. 
Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Matthes, Cornelia P., estate of. Charles R. Hunt, administrator. 
Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Winsor, Ellen A., estate of. Attleborough Hospital, petitioner. 
Petition for appointment as trustee. x^ttorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Essex County. 

Andover Theological Seminar}^, trustees of, v. Attorney- General. 
Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Atwood, Margaret, estate of. Henry B. Little et ah., peti- 
tioners. Petition for appointment of petitioners as trus- 
tees. Pending. 

Barr, Henry, estate of. Salem Young Men's Christian Associa- 
tion, petitioner. Petition for leave to apply the doctrine of 
cy-pres to trust fund. Disposed of. 

Essex Agricultural Society v. Massachusetts General Hospital 
Corporation and the Attorney-General. Petition to sell 
real estate and to apply the doctrine of cy-pres. Service 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 149 

accepted. Petition dismissed. Petitioner appealed. Pend- 
ing. 

Essex Institute, petitioner. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Haskins, Leander M., estate of. Grafton Butman, petitioner. 
Petition for appointment of trustee. Pending. 

Hawkes, Mary B., estate of. Arthur F. Upton, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for instructions. Disposed of. 

Hawks, Esther H., estate of. Hannah T. Garret et ah, trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for leave to adjust certain claims by 
compromise. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Hawks, Esther H., estate of. Philip W. Ayres et ah, trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for allowance of third and fourth ac- 
counts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Hawks, Esther H., estate of. Alfred E. Chase, petitioner. Peti- 
tion for appointment as trustee. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Healy, Jeremiah J., estate of. Dennis Healy, executor. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Pending. 

Xeedham, Alice, estate of. Overseers of Salem Monthly Meet- 
ing of Friends, petitioner. Petition for instructions. De- 
cree. 

Otis, Margaret Sigourney, estate of. Philip Dexter et ah, execu- 
tors. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Eobbins, Mary B., estate of. Charles E. Sawj^er, trustee. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Pending. 

Smith, John, estate of. J. Duke Smith, trustee. Petition for 
instructions. Pending. 

FranMin County. 

Durkee, Lauriston C, estate of. William G. Packard et ah, 
trustees, petitioners. Petition for leave to mortgage real 
estate. Attorney-General assented to the petition. 

Field, Simeon A., estate of. Henry W. Montague, trustee. Peti- 
tion for allowance of third account. Pending. 

Hamilton, Kate E., estate of. Darwin F. Hamilton, adminis- 
trator, petitioner. Petition for instructions. Disposed of. 

Stratton, Abigail, estate of. Frank H. Montague et ah, trustees. 
Petition for allowance of tenth account. Pending. 

Williams, Ebenezer Hinsdale, estate of. Irving H. Childs, peti- 
tioner. Petition for instructions. Disposed of. 



150 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Hampden County. 

Allen, Ethan, estate of. Springfield Safe Deposit and Trust 
Company, trustee, petitioner. Petition for allowance of 
third account. Pending. 

Smith, David P., estate of. Edward H. Lathrop et ah, peti- 
tioners. Petition for appointment of managers of trust 
fund. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Smith, David P., estate of. City of Springfield et ah., peti- 
tioners. Petition for instructions. Disposed of. 

Hampshire County. 

Dickson, Sarah, estate of. Henry S. Pease, town clerk and 
treasurer of the town of Middlefield, petitioner. Petition 
for authority to apply the doctrine of cy-pres. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Gaylord, George H., petitioner. Petition for termination of 
trust fund created for Russell Society. Dismissed. 

Moore, Philomela C, estate of. Herbert Sabin et ah, petitioners. 
Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Russell Church in Hadley. Francis S. Reynolds, trustee. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Pending. 

Middlesex County. 

Abbott, Carrie P., estate of. Winthrop P. Stone, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for instructions. Disposed of. 

Badger, Mary E., estate of. George G. Averill, executor and 
trustee, v. Charles W. Badger et als. Petition for authority 
to adjust by compromise controversy in regard to will. Dis- 
posed of. 

Belknap, Harriett E., estate of. George E. Horr, petitioner. 
Petition for appointment as trustee. Attorney- General 
waived right to be heard. 

Bennett, Eleanor, estate of. Joseph Jaquith et als., petitioners. 
Petition for appointment of trustees. Decree. 

Blood, Benjamin F., estate of. George G. Waite et al., petition- 
ers. Petition for appointment as trustees. Attorney-Gen- 
eral waived right to be heard. 

Bugbee, Samuel W., et al. v. Attorney-General. Petition for 
instructions. Pending. 

Bull, Sara C, estate of. Joseph G. Thorp et al. v. John Lund 
et al. Petition for instructions. Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 151 

Copelancl, Sarah E., estate of. Alba A. Giles, executor. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Decree. 

Copeland, Sarah E., estate of. Alba A. Giles, executor. Peti- 
tion for allowance of second account. Pending. 

Hammond, George P., estate of. Elizabeth F. Johnson, execu- 
trix, petitioner. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Hopkins, Lucretia A., estate of. James A. Bancroft, executor, 
petitioner. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Litchfield, William, estate of. Henry W. Bragg, administrator. 
Petition for instructions. Eescript. 

Martin, Webster Warner, estate of. Wesley T. Lee et al., trus- 
tees. Petition for allowance of eighth account. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Mellen, William H., estate of. Town of Framingham, peti- 
tioner. Petition for authority to sell real estate. Pending. 

Roberts, James H., estate of. Horace M. Bickford et ah, trus- 
tees, petitioners. Petition for leave to expend part of trust 
fund. Attorney- General waived right to be heard. 

Shepard, Obed C, estate of. Charles H. Sherman, executor. 
Petition for leave to adjust by compromise controversy in 
regard to allowance of will. Eescript. 

Tabor, Frances F., estate of. Charles S. Korris, executor. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Eeserved for full court. 

Thompson, Emulus, estate of. Melvin G. Eogers, administrator. 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Ward, Winthrop, estate of. Francis H. Brown et als., petition- 
ers. Petition for appointment of trustees. Decree. 

\Aliite, Daniel, estate of. Winslow Warren et al., trustees. Peti- 
tion for allowance of sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth 
accounts. Pending. 

Whitney, Caroline A. E., estate of. Henry E. Llayes, adminis- 
trator. Petition for allowance of third and final account. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Whitney, Caroline A. E., estate of. Charles A. Stone et al., 
trustees. Petition for allowance of second account. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

AYhitney, Edward, estate of. Charles A. Stone et al., trustees. 
Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Nantucket County. 
Enas, Sally Maria, estate of. Lauriston Bunker, trustee, peti- 
tioner. Petition for allowance of first account. Pending. 



152 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Norfolk County. 

Capen^ Elizabeth Fuller, estate of. Eben W. Keyes et ah, exec- 
utors. Petition for instructions. Disposed of. 

Lee, Henr}', estate of. Schuyler S. Bartlett, executor, petitioner. 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Mann, Jonathan, estate of. John F. Brown et ah, executors. 
Petition for instructions. Final decree. 

Mann, Jonathan, estate of. Carrie S. Leeds, petitioner. Peti- 
tion for removal of trustee. Pending. 

Medfield Ministerial Fund, Trustees of, v. Attorney- General. 
Petition for instructions. Disposed of. 

Sanderson, Julia A., estate of. Marshall L. Perrin, executor. 
Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Sanderson, Julia A., estate of. Marshall L. Perrin, executor. 
Petition for authority to purchase an annuity for H. H. 
Brown. Decree. 

Wolcott, Harriet Frothingham, estate of. Philip Dexter et ah, 
trustees. Petition for authority to transfer trust funds. 
Disposed of. 

Plymouth County. 

Pitcher, James S. H., estate of. Oliver W. Cobh, trustee. Peti- 
tion for distribution of trust estate. Decree. 

Suifoll' County. 

Agassiz, Alexander, estate of. Robert W. Hill, petitioner. Peti- 
tion for appointment as trustee. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Agassiz, Alexander, estate of. Robert W. Hill, trustee. Peti- 
tion for allowance of first and final account. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Amory, Francis L, et ah v. Trustees of Amherst College et ah 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Ashton, Elisha V., estate of. Charles P. Curtis et ah, trustees. 
Petition for allowance of fifth to eleventh accounts, inclu- 
sive. Accounts allowed. 

Atkins, Henry Holly. William Warren Vaughn et ah, trustees. 
Petition for allowance of seventh to tenth accounts, inclu- 
sive. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Boston Dispensary, petitioner. Petition for leave to sell real 
estate. Disposed of. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 153 

Bradstreet, Charlotte A., estate of. Moses Williams et ah, peti- 
tioners. Petition for appointment as trustees. Decree. 

Brigham, Pobert B., estate of. The New England Trust Com- 
pany, trustee. Petition for allowance of first and second 
accounts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Brown, Josiah W., estate of. Sewall F. Abbott et aJ., trustees. 
Petitions for instructions. Pending. 

Cazenove, Sarah Elizabeth, estate of. George H. Richards, trus- 
tee. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Cazenove, Sarah Elizabeth, estate of. George H. Richards, trus- 
tee, petitioner. Petition for leave to convey real estate. 
Decree. 

Gushing, Henriette J., estate of. Constance J. Bessey, execu- 
trix. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Dodge, Theodore A., estate of. Caroline Donaldson et ah, peti- 
tioners. Petition for appointment as trustees. Attornej^- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Drur}^ Michael, estate of. Charles E. Cotting, trustee. Petition 
for allowance of first to seventh and final accounts, inclu- 
sive. Accounts allowed. 

Geyer, Mary French, estate of. George H. Gary, trustee, peti- 
tioner. Petition for allowance of first account. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Gurney, Elizabeth F., estate of. Warren Avenue Baptist Church 
V. Attorney-General. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Harris, George W., estate of. Edward J. Moriart}', petitioner. 
Petition for appointment as trustee. Attorne^'-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Harvard College, President and Fellows of, v. Attorney-General. 
Petition for authority to sell real estate. Disposed of. 

Hawks, Esther H., estate of. Hannah T. Garret et ah, trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for authority to convey trust estate. 
Decree. 

Haven, George, estate of. Herbert Parker et ah, trustees. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Final decree. 

Healy, Anna M., estate of. William Popes Trask, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Hoffman, Florence P., estate of. Oscar B. Mowry et ah., trus- 
tees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of twelfth and 
thirteenth and final accounts. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 



154 ATTORNF^Y-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Jackson^ James, estate of. Frederick C. Bowditch, trustee, peti- 
tioner. Petition for allowance of first account. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Jackson, James, estate of. Frederick C. Bowditch, trustee, peti- 
tioner. Petition for leave to sell personal estate belonging 
to trust fund. Attorney- General waived right to be heard. 

Lawrence, Abbott, estate of. John Lawrence et al., trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for allowance of twenty-second ac- 
count. Attorney- General waived right to be heard. 

LeojDold Morse Home for Infirm Hebrews and Orphans v. Home 
for Destitute Jewish Children, Inc. Petition for instruc- 
tions. Decree. 

Lincoln, Annie Preston, estate of. J. Ellwood Lee Company v. 
The Grace Hospital. Petition brought by receivers to col- 
lect legacy under will. Pending. 

Liversidge, Thomas, estate of. Clift Rogers Clapp et ah, peti- 
tioners. Petition for appointment of Clarence B. Hum- 
phreys as trustee. Attorney-General assented to appoint- 
ment. 

Locke, Elbridge W., estate of. Otis Merriam et al., trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for allowance of ninth and tenth ac- 
counts. Attorney- General waived right to be heard. 

Mabie, William I., et ah, v. Edwin S. Gardner and Attorney- 
General. Petition for instructions regarding a public char- 
itable trust under will of Mary Redding. Pending. 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, petitioner. Petition for 
leave to sell real estate. ilttorney-General waived right to. 
be heard. 

Moore, Hollis, estate of. George E. Cornwall, trustee, petitioner. 
Petition for instructions. Disposed of. 

Norcross, Margaret P., estate of. Edith C. Reichardt, peti- 
tioner. Petition for appointment as trustee. Attorney- 
General waives right to be heard. 

Nute, Lewis W., estate of. John L. Xewell and Thomas L. 
Wiles, petitioners. Petition for appointment as trustees. 
Attorney- General waived right to be heard. 

Patterson, Adoniram J., estate of. William ^. Swain, trustee, 
petitioner. Petition for instructions. Disposed of. 

Patterson, Adoniram J., estate of. William N. Swain, trustee, 
petitioner. Petition for authority to sell real estate. Pend- 
ing. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 155 

Peterson, Ellen, estate of. Mary M. Anderson, petitioner. Peti- 
tion for appointment of trustee." Pending. 

Pine, James A., estate of. Frank W. Grinnell, trustee. Petition 
for instructions. Decree. 

Potter, Sarah E., estate of. Ne^y Bedford Free Public Library, 
petitioner. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Protestant Episcopal Church, Trustees of Donations for the, v. 
Attorney-General. Petition for leave to execute deed. Dis- 
posed of. 

Eead, Charles C, et at, v. The Frances E. Willard Settlement 
et al. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Eust, I^ancy E., estate of. Henry A. Wyman et al, trustees. 
Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Saint PauFs Church in Boston, Wardens and \"estry of, v. At- 
torney-General. Bill in equity for authority to transfer 
trust funds held under the will of James Sullivan Warren 
and under the will of Edward Tuckerman. Disposed of. 

Saint PauFs Church in Boston, Proprietors of, v. Attorney- 
General. Bill in equity for authority to transfer trust 
funds held under the will of Elizabeth F. Harvey and 
under the gift from the estate of Mary S. Ivettell. Dis- 
posed of. 

Saint PauPs Church in Boston, Wardens and Yestry of, v, At- 
torney-General. Bill in equity for authority to transfer 
trust funds held under the will of David Sears and under 
the will of Edward Tuckerman. Disposed of. 

Sawyer, Samuel E., estate of. Massachusetts Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, petitioner. Petition for 
authority to transfer trust estate. Attorney- General waived 
right to be heard. 

Smith, James, estate of. Willard N. Poland, petitioner. Peti- 
tion for appointment of trustee. Pending. 

Smith, James, estate of. Samuel M. Jackson et al., trustees. 
Petition for allowance of first and third accounts. Pend- 
ing. 

Thompson, Thomas, estate of. John F. Moors, petitioner. Peti- 
tion for appointment of trustee. Decree. 

Thorndike, George L., estate of. William A. Morrison et al, 
trustees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of third and 
fourth accounts. Pending. 

Tyler Street Day N'ursery Company v. Attorney- General. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Decree. 



156 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Wellesley Boys' Club, E. K. Sawyer et ah., trustees of, petition- 
ers. Petition for instructions. Disposed of. 

"\Miitney, Sarah W., estate of. Charles A. Stone, trustee. Peti- 
tion for leave to sell real estate. Pending. 

Wilder, Mary C, estate of. Charles H. Blodgett et ah, execu- 
tors. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Wilder, Mary C, estate of. Charles M. Blodgett et al., execu- 
tors. Petition for allowance of first, second, third and final 
accounts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Willard Hospital, The, v. The Frances E. Willard Settlement 
et ah. Petition for instructions. Disposed of. 

Willard Hospital v. Frances E. Willard Settlement et aJs. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Pending. 

Worcester County. 

Abbott, Arminda P., estate of. AVheeler Poland, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for instructions. Disposed of. 

Bogle, Eosanna, estate of. Timothy H. Murphy, petitioner. 
Petition for appointment as trustee. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Brooks, Sarah, estate of. Thomas H. Russell, petitioner. Peti- 
tion for appointment as trustee. Pending. 

DeWitt, Alexander, estate of. First Congregational Church of 
Oxford, petitioner. Petition for leave to expend balance of 
trust fund. Decree. 

Fuller, Dana L., estate of. Louie C. Fuller, executrix. Petition 
for instructions. Pending. 

Grout, Eliza P., estate of. Robert L. Carter et ah., trustees. 
Petition for allowance of sixth account. Account allowed. 

Grout, Eliza P., estate of. Robert L. Carter et ah., trustees. 
Petition for allowance of seventh account. Attorney-Gen- 
eral waived right to be heard. 

Merriam, Sybil A., estate of. Leominster Hospital Association, 
petitioner. Petition for authority to apply the doctrine of 
cy-pres. Disposed of. 

Murdock Fund, Trustees of, v. American Unitarian Association 
et al. Petition for instructions. Disposed of. 

Pierce, Ellen M., estate of. Joseph A. Lovering, administrator. 
Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Southgate, Isaac, estate of. Bertha Denny et al., petitioners. 
Petition for appointment of Bertha Denny and Walter E. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 157 

Watson as trustees. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 

Stockwell, George K., estate of. Charles F. Stevens et ah, exec- 
utors, petitioners. Petition for authorit,y to adjust by com- 
promise controversy in regard to will. Pending. 

AA^iitin, John C, estate of. Edward Whitin et al., petitioners. 
Petition for appointment of Arthur F. Whitin, Josiah M. 
Lasell and Chester W. Lasell as co-trustees. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Williams, Henrv, estate of. Eeason T. Lee et als., trustees of 
the Bethel African Methodist Episcopal Church, petitioners. 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Woodward, Angeline V., estate of. Horace A. Thissell, execu- 
tor. Petition for appointment of Walter P. Bowers, John 
S. Scully and Wellington E. Parkhurst as trustees. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Worcester City Missionary Society v. Attorney-General. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Disposed of. 



158 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



SUITS CONDUCTED BY THE ATTORNEY-GENEEAL 

Ix Behalf of State Boaeds axd Commissions. 



The following cases have been reported to this department by 
State boards and commissions, to be conducted by the Attorney- 
General, or under his direction. 

1. Metropolitan Park Commission. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages 
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land by the said 
commission. 

Middlesex County. 
Robinson, Sumner, et cd. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

2. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board. 
Petition to the Supreme Judicial and Superior Courts for 
assessment of damages alleged to have been sustained by the 
taking of land, and rights and easements in land, by said board. 

Middlesex County. 
Braman, Caroline R., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Ward, George A., et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Norfolk County. 
Goddard, George A., v. Commonwealth. Settled. 

Worcester County. 
Allen, Byron D., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Allen, Byron D., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Bradley, Patrick, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Cutting, Louis, administrator, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Kendall, Sanford C, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Keyes, Henry F., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Knight, Asa E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 159 

"Welch, James E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Wood, James H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Wood, J. Frank, et ah. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Wood, J. Frank, et ah. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

3. M,\SSACHUSETTS HIGHWAY CO]\i:\IISSIOX. 

Petitions to the Superior Court for a Jury to assess damages 
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land, or injury to 
land, by said commission. Under agreement with this Common- 
wealth most of these cases are defended by the various towns in 
which the land is situated. 

Barnstable County. 
Phillips, Martha B., et al., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pend- 
ing. 

Berlhshire County. 
Connelly, William H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Eogerson, Sophia, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Stevens, John A., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Bristol County. 
Cooper, Frederick P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Seabury, Phoebe W., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Talbot, Joseph, r. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

Essex County. 
Bishop, Emeline, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Donovan, John, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Perley, Osborne, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Hampshire County. 
Flagg, Lucretia Taft, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Taft, Kate P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Middlesex County. 
Nourse, Joseph P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Norfolk County. 
Lay cock. Berry, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
McLaughlin_, ^ancy M., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 



160 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

4. Board of Harbor axd Laxd Commissioners. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages 
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land by said 
commissioners. 

Suffolk County. , 

Butler, Philip H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
East Boston Company v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Lamb, George, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Lamb, George, et ah v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

5. Charles River Basix Commissioners. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages 
alleged to have been sustained by tlie taking of land by said 
commissioners. 

Suffolk County. 
Apthorp, Octave L., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Barstow, Catherine A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Brown, Rebecca W., et al. r. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Cotting, Charles E., et ah, trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Edmands, Katherine B., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Fields, Annie, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hooper, James R., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hooper, Robert C, et ah v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Inches, Louise P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Jewell, Edward, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Xiles, Sarah F., et ah v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Parker, George W., et ah v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Pierce, Katherine C, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Prince, Fannie L., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Prince, Lillian C, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Sears, Mary C, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Sears, Richard D., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Shaw, Francis, v. Commomvealth. Pending. 
Tarbell, Arthur P., et ah v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Taylor, Georgianna 0., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Taylor, Mary M., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Whitne}^, Christiana S., et ah v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
AYilliams, John D., trustee, r. Commonwealth. Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 161 

6. State Board of Insanity. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages 
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land by the said 
board. 

Suffolk County. 
Beatty, John P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Callahan, Frank J., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Callahan, George A., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Flint, James H., et al., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Holbrook, Wellington, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Kiley, Daniel J., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Shea, Julia A., et als., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

7. Mount Everett Reservation Commission. 

BerJcsMre County. 
MclSTaughton, Elizabeth T., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

8. Miscellaneous Cases from Abo\t: Commissions. 

Essex County. 

Cilley, Orran G., v. Cattle Bureau. Petition to recover the value 

of cattle condemned by Cattle Bureau. Pending. 
Reed, William H., v. Commonwealth. Claim for damages on 
account of injury to horse on State highway in Gloucester. 
Pending. 
Tremblay, Paul, v. Commonwealth. Action of tort for injuries 
caused by defect in State highway in East Boston. Pending. 

Middlesex County. 

International Automobile and Vehicle Tire Company v. Com- 
monwealth. Petition to recover damages caused by con- 
struction of bridge across Charles Eiver under St. 1903, 
c. 391. Pending. 

Whitney, Arthur E., v. Commonwealth. Bill in equity to enjoin 
the Commonwealth from filling in Abajona Eiver in AYin- 
chester. Disposed of. 

Suffolk County. 
Davis, James A., et al. v. Commonwealth et al. Petition to re- 
cover for labor and materials used in construction of sewer. 
Pending. 



162 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

De las Casas, William B., et al. v. Sewer Commissioners of 
Revere. Petition for injunction to restrain town from 
obstructing sewer built by the Park Commission for bath 
house. Pending. 

Doherty, James, v. Edward W. Everson et al. and Metropolitan 
Water and Sewerage Board. Action of tort. Damages 
caused by blasting. Pending. 

Doherty, James, v. Commonwealth. Petition for assessment of 
damages caused by blasting for metropolitan sewer. Pend- 
ing. 

Eastman, Charles Albert, v. Board of Registration in Medicine. 
Bill in equity to enjoin Board from revoking certificate. 
Pending. 

Ellinwood, Ralph R., Commonwealth v. Petition to restrain re- 
spondent from infringing park regulations on Revere boule- 
vard. Pending. 

Franklin County Lumber Company et al. v. Commonwealth. 
Claim for money due under contract. Pending. 

G. M. Byrne Company v. Commonwealth., Suit for payment of 
money claimed to be due on contract. Settled. 

Gibbons, William H., v. Commonwealth. Damage caused by 
blasting in construction of metropolitan sewer. Pending. 

H. B. Smith Company v. Commonwealth. Claim for money due 
under contract for Boston State Hospital. Pending. 

Jenkins, Jennie L., v. Sumner Coolidge, M.D., superintendent 
of Lakeville State Hospital. Suit to enforce the provisions 
of written lease. Pending. 

Kinmon, John J)., v. Commonwealth. Action of tort to recover 
for injuries caused by defect in State highway in Salisbury. 
Pending. 

Lake, Alexander G., v. Commonwealth. Action of tort to recover 
for injuries caused by defect in State highway in Natick. 
Pending. 

McGinniss, Margaret T., Commonwealth v. Bill in equity to re- 
strain defendant from encroaching on land of the Common- 
wealth. Pending. 

National Contracting Company et al., Commonwealth v. Action 
of contract to recover on bond. Pending. 

Niland, Michael, v. Commonwealth. Petition for assessment of 
damages caused by blasting for metropolitan sewer. Pend- 
ing. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 163 

Niland, Michael, v. Edward W. Everson et al. and Metropolitan 
Water and Sewerage Board. Action of tort. Damages 
caused by blasting. Pending. 

Normile, Francis, v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. 
Petition for a jury to assess damages caused by construction 
of sewer in Eoxbury. Pending. 

Normile, Francis, v. Edward W. Everson & Co. and Henry H. 
Sprague et al. Action of tort. Pending. 

Old Colony Construction Company, Commonwealth v. Action 
of contract to recover on bond. Pending. 

Pacific Surety Company v. Commonwealth et al. Petition to 
recover from McBride & Co. certain sums expended by pe- 
titioner. Pending. , 

Smith, Frederick W., et al. v. Commonwealth. Claim for money 
due under contract for Boston State Hospital. Pending. 

Thomas, Herbert L., v. Commonwealth. Claim for money 
alleged to be due under contract with Massachusetts High- 
way Commission. Settled. 

Thomas, Lyman P., v. Commonwealth et als. Action to re- 
cover for labor and materials furnished in construction of 
State highway. Final decree. 

Waterproof Leatherboard Company, Henry H. Sprague et als., 
Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board, v. Bill of com- 
plaint to restrain respondent from discharging factory 
wastes into Beaver Dam Brook. Pending. 

Worcester County. 
Lamb, Aroline M., v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover dam- 
ages caused by change in grade of highway in Boylston. 
Pending. 

9. State Boards of Charity and Insanity. 
Actions of contract pending in the Superior Court to recover 
charges for the support of persons in State hospitals. 

Suffolk County. 
Chapin, Treasurer, v. Charles A. Mullin. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Franklin Balch. Settled. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Boston. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Boston. Pending. 



164 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Boston. Pending. 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Boston. Pending. 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Boston. Settled. 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Joseph C. Colligan. Pending. 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Bertie L. Dow. Pending. 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. John Grieneeks. Pending. 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Michael Harper, guardian. Pending. 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Lowell. Pending. 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. New Bedford. Pending. 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Quinc}^ Settled. 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Emma C. Russell, guardian. Pending. 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Josiah Ryder. Pending. 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Thomas J. Sexton, guardian. Pending. 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Stoneham. Settled. 

Stevens, Treasurer, v. Stoughton. Settled. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 165 



MISCELLANEOUS CASES. 



A. C. Lawrence Leather Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

A. C. Lawrence Leather Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

A. H. Geuting Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate- 
ment of franchise tax for the year 1911. Final decree. 

A. H. Geuting Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate- 
ment of franchise tax for the year 1913. Final decree. 

Abington Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits nnder St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending. 

Acnshnet Co-operative Bank. Augustus L. Thorndike, Bank 
Commissioner, petitioner. Petition for leave to accept offer 
of settlement made by directors. Final decree. 

Ahmeek Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Ahmeek Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Aldrich, Frank E., petitioner. Petition to register title to land 
in Northfield. Pending. 

Algomah Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

AUain, Marguerite, administratrix of the estate of Maxime T. 
Allain, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 

Allouez Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the 3'ear 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Amalgamated Nevada Mines Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 



166 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

American Agricultural Chemical Company, The, v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

American Axe & Tool Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

American Axe & Tool Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

American Bank Note Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

American Brass Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

American Can Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

American Can Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

American Chicle Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

American Chicle Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

American Dyewood Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

American Dyewood Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

American Glue Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate- 
ment of franchise tax for the 3'ear 1911. Final decree. 

American Glue Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate- 
ment of franchise tax for the j^ear 1912. Final decree. 

American Hide and Leather Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

American Investment Securities Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 167 

American Investment Securities Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 

American Locomotive Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

American Locomotive Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

American Pneumatic Service Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

American Eadiator Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re^ 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

American Eadiator Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

American Seating Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

American Soda Fountain Company, Attorney-General ex rel. v. 
Dumping material into tide water. Pending. 

American Soda Fountain Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the 3'ear 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

American Soda Fountain Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

American Steel and Wire Company of New Jersey v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1910 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

American Steel and Wire Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

American Steel and Wire Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the 3^ear 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

American Sugar Eefining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

American Thread Company of ]^ew Jersey v. Common— 



168 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

American Woolen Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the years 1909 and 1910 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

American Woolen Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Ames Shovel and Tool Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Amoskeag Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Amoskeag Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Anderson, Mary J., administratrix of the estate of Elizabeth P. 
Anderson, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Andover Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending. 

Androscoggin Mills, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Androscoggin Mills, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Androscoggin Mills, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the 3^ear 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Arizona Commercial Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Arlington Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 

Armstrong Cork Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the jeav 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Armstrong Cork Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 169 

Ashland Emery and Corundum Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 

Athol Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree. 

Atlas Tack Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Attleborough Savings Bank, iVttorney- General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend- 
ing. 

Baltic Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending in the United States Supreme Court on writ of 
error. 

Baltic j\Iining Company v. Commonwealth, Petition to recover 
excise tax for the 3'ear 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Baltic Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Barre Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending. 

Bates Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Bates Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Bedard, Joseph, et ah. v. Attorney-General ex rel. Petition for 
use of the Attornej^-GeneraFs name in an information iij 
the nature of quo warranto to compel an accounting of 
funds contributed by the public for needy strikers. Use of 
name allowed. 

Belding Bros. & Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the 3^ear 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Belding Brothers & Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the 3^ear 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Benjamin Franklin Savings Bank, Franklin, Attorney- General 
V. Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 
590, 8 56. Decree. 



170 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Bent, Lauretta H., executrix of the will of Lucius P. Bent, 
Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Decree. 

Berkshire County Savings Bank, Pittsfield, Attorney-General v. 
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Decree. 

Berry Brothers, Ltd. v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Bingham Mines Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Blake & Knowles Steam Pump Works v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Bleiler, Frederick, v. Commissioner of Animal Industry. Claim 
for damages for death of horse. Pending. 

Bohemia Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Boston & Northern Street Railway Company. Claim for amount 
expended in relaying water pipes in Washington Street, 
Lynn, destroyed by electric currents. Pending. 

Boston & Worcester Street Railway Company v. Board of Rail- 
road Commissioners. Petition for modification of ruling 
by Railroad Commissioners. Pending. 

Boston Ice Company, petitioner. Petition to register title to 
land in Wakefield. Decree. 

Boston Penny Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. De- 
cree. 

Boston Securities Company v. Commomvealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Braintree Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree. 

Breakwater Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Brennan, James M., v. Charles E. Woodbury, Superintendent. 
Action of tort for personal injuries. Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 171 

Bridgewater Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend- 
ing. 

Briggs, Benjamin P., v. Elmer A. Stevens, Treasurer and Ee- 
ceiver-General. Appeal from decree of Land Court. Pend- 
ing. 

Brighton Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits nnder St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 

Bristol County Savings Bank, Taunton, Attorney-General v. 
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Pending. 

Broadway Savings Bank, Lawrence, Attorney-General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Pending. 

Brookline Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending. 

Brookside Mills v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. Pend- 
ing. 

Browne, Maud F., v. Charles T. Davis et at., judges of the Land 
Court et al. Petition for writ of prohibition. ■ Pending. 

Browning, King & Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Br3^ne, Andrew W., et ah. v. Commonwealth et al. Petition to 
recover money in hands of Commonwealth. Pending. 

Buick Motor Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Burr, Arthur E., trustee, v. Commonwealth. Action to recover 
money held by Commonwealth, and belonging to H. P. 
Cummings Company. Settled. 

Bush, Samuel D., executor of the will of Martha E. Eichmond, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Butler, Mary H., administratrix of the estate of Patrick But- 
ler, Attorne}^- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Decree. 

Calhoun, C. C, v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Claim for 
services in connection with Spanish war claims. Settled. 



172 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jane 

Calumet & Hecla Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Cambridgeport Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend- 
ing. 

Cambridge Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Decree. 

Canada, Atlantic & Plant Steamship Company Ltd. v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise taxes for the years 1905, 
1906, 1907, 1908 and 1909 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Cape Ann Savings Bank, Gloucester, Attorney-General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Pending. 

Cape Cod Five Cents Savings Bank, Harwich, Attorney-Gen- 
eral V. Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, 
c. 590, § 56. Pending. 

Centennial Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York v. New York 
Central & Hudson River Railroad Company et ah. Peti- 
tion to intervene in differential rate cases. Pending. 

Champion Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Champion Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911. Paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Charles H. Schieren Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Charlestown Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. 
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Pending. 

Chase, Stephen A., et al. v. Adam H. Dickey et al. Petition to 
compel conveyance of real estate. Rescript. 

Chattel Loan Company, E. Gerry Brown, Supervisor of Loan 
Agencies, v. Bill in equity to enjoin defendant from charg- 
ing rates of interest higher than ordered by plaintiff. 
Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 173 

Chelsea Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Two petitions for 
withdrawal of deposits nnder St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. De- 



crees. 



Cheney Brothers v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 
Cheney Brothers v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 
Chicopee Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits nnder St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree. 
Childs' Dining Hall Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 
Childs, George C, administrator of the estate of Ann E. Newell, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Decree. 
Citizens Savings Bank, Fall Eiver, Attorney-General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Decree. 
City Five Cents Savings Bank, Haverhill, Attorney- General v. 
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Pending. 
City Institution for Savings, Lowell, Attorney-General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 
Clinton Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits nnder St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending. 
Coblents, Salenda E., executrix of the will of Arthur A.^ Aver- 
ille, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheri- 
tance tax. Pending. 
Columbian National Life Insurance Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petitions for abatement of franchise tax paid in 1903, 1904, 
1905, 1906 and 1907. Pending. 
Commonwealth v. Boston. Action to recover money expended 

in changing grade of Bowdoin Street. Settled. 
Commonwealth v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad 
Company. Action of tort for damage to property of Massa- 
chusetts Eeformatory, caused by fire. Pending. 
Commonwealth v. Worcester. To recover for land taken from 

the Commonwealth. Pending. 
Consolidated Eendering Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 



174 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Consolidation Coal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for year 1909 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Consolidation Coal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending.. 

Consolidation Coal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Continental Gin Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Continental Gin Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Copper Range Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Copper Range Consolidated Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Copper Range Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Crocker Institution for Savings, Turners Falls, Attorney-Gen- 
eral V. Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, 
c. 590, § 56. Decree. 

Cross, Grace E. Petition for habeas corpus. Petition dismissed 
by agreement. 

Cudahy Packing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Currier, John E., administrator of the estate of Caroline E. 
Currier, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Curtis Publishing Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Curtis Publishing Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid b}^ foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Danvers Savings Bank, Attornej^-General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 175 

Davis Sewing Machine Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 
Dean, John J., et al., executors of the will of Thomas H. Buck- 
ley, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheri- 
tance tax. Pending. 
Dedham Institution for Savings, Attorney-General v. Petition 
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 
Dedham Institution for Savings, Attorney- General v. Petition 
for withdrawal of deposits under E. L., c. 113, § 55. Pend- 
ing. 
Dennis, Edwin W., et al v. Thomas P. Boyle et als., Civil 
Service Commission. Petition for writ of mandamus. Pe- 
tition dismissed. 
Dennison Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
for abatement of franchise tax for the year 1911. Final 
decree. 
Dennison Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
for abatement of franchise tax for the year 1912. Final 
decree. 
Dewe}^, Henry S., v. State Officers. Actions to replevy copies 
of notes of proceedings in the case of Dewey v. Good Gov- 
ernment Association. Pending. 
Dolan, Arthur W., Eegister of Probate and Insolvency for the 
County of Suffolk, petitioner. Petition for authority to 
pay to the Treasurer and Eeceiver-General money deposited 
with said register to secure payment of fees. Pending. 
Donahue, Abbie A., executrix of the will of Abbie McDonald, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 
E. H. Eollins & Sons v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 
E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 
E. I. du Pont de Xemours Powder Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the 3^ear 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 
Earl & Wilson v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise tax 
for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 



176 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

East Boston Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend- 
ing. 

East Butte Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign 
corporation.' Pending. 

East Cambridge Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition 
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 

Edgerly, Frank H., et al. v. Cattle Bureau. Bill to recover for 
horse killed by order of Cattle Commissioner under E. L., 
c. 90. Pending. 

Edwards Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Edwards Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the 3^ear 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Eliot Five Cents Savings Bank, Boston, Attorney-General v. 
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Pending. 

Elm River Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid b}^ foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Ennis, John D., et al., administrators of the estate of Edmund 
Walsh, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 

Everett, Willard S., executor of the will of Elizabeth Davis, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Essex Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending. 

F. Blumenthal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Fairbanks Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Fairhaven Institution for Savings, Attorney-General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Decree. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 177 

Fall Eiver Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 

Fall Eiver Gas Works Company v. Board of Gas and Electric 
Light Commissioners. Petition for certiorari. Eeserved 
for full court. 

Fall Eiver Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § bQ. Pend- 
ing. 

Farr Alpaca Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
franchise tax for the year 1911 paid by domestic corpora- 
tion. Final decree. 

Field, John Q. A., executor of the will of Caroline Wood, Attor- 
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Fields, Annie, v. Charles Eiver Basin Commission. Bill to 
enjoin Commonwealth from interfering with riparian rights 
on Charles Eiver. Pending. 

Fifield, George W., executor of the will of Euth S. Shaw, Attor- 
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Fleshman, Mary E., administratrix of the estate of Hannah D. 
Harrington, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to re- 
cover inheritance tax. Final decree. 

Foss-Hughes Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate- 
ment of franchise tax. Pending. 

Fowler, Charles F., executor of the will of Eliza E. Crocker, 
Attorney- General ex rel. v. -Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Foxborough Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend- 
ing. 

Franklin Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the 3^ear 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Franklin Savings Bank of the City of Boston, Attorney-Gen- 
eral V. Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, 
c. 590, § 56. Decree. 

Franklin Savings Institution, Attornej^-General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. De- 
cree. 



178 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Fraternal Accident Association of America, Attorney- General 
ex rel. v. Information at the relation of the Insurance 
Commissioner for violation of insurance laws. Injunction 
issued and George Hoague appointed receiver. 

Frontenac Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Frontenac Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Galvin, Stephen P., administrator of the estate of Calvin R. 
Baker, Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 

Gamewell Fire Alarm Telegraph Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 

Gardner Gas, Fuel and Light Company, Commonwealth v. Ac- 
tion to recover penalty on account of sulphuretted hydro- 
gen in gas. Disposed of. 

General Baking Powder Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Georgia Home Insurance Company v. Commonwealth. Action 
to compel Treasurer and Receiver-General to return bond 
deposited with him by said company. Pending. 

Globe- Wernicke Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Gorton-Pew Fisheries Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Grant Nail and Supply Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover franchise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
domestic corporation. Final decree. 

Grant, Robert, Judge of Probate, v. William W. Risk et al. 
Contract on bond as public administrator. Pending. 

Gratiot Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Gratiot Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 179 

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Great Barrington Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition 
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 

Great Western Cereal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Greenfield Savings Bank v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
tax for 1910. Eescript. 

Greenfield Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree. 

Griffin Wheel Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Griffin Wheel Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

H. J. Heinz Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

H. J. Heinz Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

H. W. Johns-Manville Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Hampden Savings Bank, Springfield, Attorney- General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Decree. 

Harding, Herbert L., et a'L, executors of the will of Sara L. 
Crockett, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Final decree. 

Harrington, Charles C, executor of the will of Elizabeth A. 
Harrington, Attornej^-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Haverhill Gas Light Company, Attorney-General v. Informa- 
tion in equity to restrain respondent from transferring its 
franchises and property. Eeserved for full court. 

Haverhill Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St, 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending. 



180 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Hecker-Jones-Jewell Milling Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Henry E. Miller & Sons Piano Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition for abatement of franchise tax for the year 1911. 
Final decree. 

Henry K. Wampole & Company, Inc., v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Herbert, John, executor of the will of Edward T. Cowdrey, At- 
torney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Herwig, Mary. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. Dismissed. 

Hickey-Riedman Company, Attorney- General ex rel. v. Bill in 
equity to enjoin defendant from discharging waste into 
Assabet River. Disposed of. 

Holyoke Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree. 

Home Savings Bank, Boston, Attorney-General v. Two peti- 
tions for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Decrees. 

Hopkinton Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. De- 
cree. 

Houghton Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Howes Brothers Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Howes Brothers Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Hudson Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree. 

Hyde Park Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend- 
ing. 

Institution for Savings in Newburyport, Attorney-General v. 
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 181 

Institution for Savings in Eoxbiiry, Attorney-General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Decree. 

International Automobile and Vehicle Tire Company v. Com- 
monwealth. Petition for damages to petitioner's property 
caused by change of east branch of Charles Eiver by Park 
Commission. Pending. 

Isle Eoyale Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Jackson Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Jackson Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

James Cunningham Son & Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Jenney, E. C, executor of the will of Maria P. Stark, Attorney- 
General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

John L. Whiting-J. J. Adams Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

John P. Squire Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

John P. Squire & Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Kenny, Thomas J., administrator d. h. n. of the estate of Joseph 
H. Horgan, Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Keystone \yatch Case Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the 5^ear 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Keystone Watch Case Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

King Philip Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 



182 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Lake Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Lake Milling, Smelting and Refining Company v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Lake Superior Smelting Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Lamont-Corliss Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Lanston Monotype Machine Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

LaSalle Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

LaSalle Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Lanrium Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Lawrence Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend- 
ing. 

Lee Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for withdrawal 
of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree. 

Lehigh Valley Coal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Leland, Percy P., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Ashland. Pending. 

Leland, Percy P., petitioner. Petition to register title to land 
in Natick. Attorney- General waived right to be heard. 

Leominster Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend- 
ing. 

Lever Brothers Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 183 

Libby, George W., administrator of the estate of Oliver Libby, 
Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Library Bureau v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Link-Belt Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover ex- 
cise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Liquid Carbonic Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
• ration. Pending. 

Little, George T., et at., executors of the will of Eachel E. 
Thayer, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Locomobile Company of America, The, v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Locomobile Company of America, The, v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Lombard, Walter E., v. Eugene N. Foss, Governor, Commander- 
in-Chief of the Massachusetts Volunteer Militia. Petition 
for writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to order 
a court of inquiry or court martial to investigate charges 
preferred against the petitioner. Petition dismissed. 

Lowell Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition 
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 

Lowell Institution for Savings, Attorne}^- General v. Petition 
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 

Lyman, Charles E., v. Commissioners on Fisheries and Game. 
Petition for annulment of an order of said commissioners. 
Pending before full court. Rescript. 

Lynn Institution for Savings, Attorney-General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend- 
ing. 

Mackey, Michael H., petitioner. Petition to register title to land 
in Dorchester. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Mahar, Joseph P., executor of the will of Thomas J. Rehill, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance- 
tax. Pending. 



184 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Manchester, Abraham, executor of the will of Abraham E. Man- 
chester, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Maniton Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Manitou Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Marlborough Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend- 
ing. 

Martin L. Hall Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate- 
ment of franchise tax. Pending. 

Masonic Mutual Relief Association of Central Massachusetts, 
Attorney- General ex rel. v. Information at the relation of 
the Insurance Commissioner for violation of insurance laws. 
Injunction issued and Alfred S. Pinkerton appointed re- 
ceiver. 

Massachusetts Catholic Order of Foresters v. Elmer A. Stevens, 
Treasurer and Receiver-General. Petition for writ of man- 
damus to compel respondent to deliver securities to peti- 
tioner. Pending. 

Massachusetts Consolidated Mining Company, The, v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Mayflower Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

McCann, Charles J., et al. v. Charles AYarren et als., Civil Serv- 
ice Commissioners. Petition for writ of mandamus to 
compel certification of the petitioners' names by the Civil 
Service Commissioners. Decree. Appeal by petitioners. 

McDonald, Theodore H., Insurance Commissioner of Connecti- 
cut V. The ^tna Indemnity Company. Intervening peti- 
tion of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Pending. 

McGuirk, Ann, executrix of the will of Terrence Farley, Attor- 
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Mclntire, Charles H., trustee under the will of Maria T. Clark, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 185 

Mead-Morrison Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Mechanics Savings Bank, Holyoke, Attorney- General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Decree. 

Mechanics Savings Bank, Lowell, Attorney-General v. Petition 
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise taxes for the years 1909 and 1910 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Michigan Smelting Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Middleborough, town of. Commonwealth v. Action to recover 
penalty on account of sulphuretted hydrogen in gas. Dis- 
posed of. 

Middlesex Institution for Savings, Concord, Attorney-General 
V. Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 
590, § 56. Decree. 

Midvale Steel Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Milford Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree. 

Moore, Helen H., executrix of the will of George H. Moore, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Moore, William H., et al., executors of the will of Edward W. 
Murray, Attorne^^-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 

Morgan, Thomas, et ah, executors of the will of Martha Frank- 
land, Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inher- 
itance tax. Pending. 

Morse, Electra A., et al. v. David Ferguson et al. Action of 
tort. Pending. 

Murphy, James S., administrator c. t. a. of the estate of Charles 
H. Young, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Murphy, Mary E., executor of the will of Delia Martin, Attor- 
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 



186. ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Murphy, Michael, v. Harrie W. Pierce, Agent of the Commis- 
sioner of Animal Industry. Claim for damages for death 
of horse. Pending. 

IST. K. Fairbank Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

N. K. Fairbank Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Nantucket Institution for Savings, Attorney-General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Pending. 

Nashua Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Nashua Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Natick Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition 
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 

National Calfskin Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

National Calfskin Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

National Casket Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

National Contracting Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover under R. L., c. 201. Pending. 

New Bedford Five Cents Saving Bank, Attorne}^- General v. 
Five petitions for withdrawal of deposits under R. L., c. 
113, § 55. Pending. 

New Bedford Five Cents Saving Bank, Attorney-General v. 
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Pending. 

New Bedford Institution for Savings, Attorney-General v. Two 
petitions for withdrawal of deposits under R. L., c. 113, 
§ 55. Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 187 

New Bedford Institution for Savings, Attorney-General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 

Newburyport Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. 
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Pending. 

New England Dressed Meat and Wool Company v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1910 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

New England Dressed Meat and Wool Company v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

New England Maple Syrup Company v. Henry P. Walcott 
et ah. Bill in equity for an injunction. Pending. 

New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. Com- 
monwealth. Petition for abatement of franchise tax. De- 
cree. 

Northampton Institution for Savings, Attorney-General v. Pe- 
tition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Decree. 

North Easton Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend- 
ing. 

North End Savings Bank, Boston, Attorne3^-General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under E. L., c. 113, § 55. 
Pending. 

North End Savings Bank, Boston, Attorney-General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 

North Packing and Provision Company v. Commonwealth. Pe- 
tition to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

North Packing and Provision Company v. Commonwealth. Pe- 
tition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Northwestern Consolidated Milling Company, The, v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

O^Connell, Joseph P., v. Commonwealth et al. Bill to recover 
money in hands of Commonwealth belonging to Austin 
Engineering and Construction Company. Disposed of. 



188 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

O'Donolme, Lillie B., executrix of the will of Joseph J. O'Dono- 
hue, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Ohls, Frederick W., et al., State Board of Charity v. Action to 
recover on bond. Pending. 

Old Colony Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Old Colony Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Oliver Typewriter Compan}^, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Oliver Typewriter Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Orange Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree. 

Osceola Consolidated Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Osman, Charles P., v. Commonwealth et al. Bill in equity to 
reach and apply funds in the hands of respondents. 
Decree. 

Oxford Linen Mills v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover ex- 
cise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Parker, Galen A., executor of the will of Martha R. Temple, 
Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Peoples Savings Bank, Worcester, Attorney-General v. Petition 
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 

Pepperell Manufacturing Company, The, v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the 5^ear 1910 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Pepperell Manufacturing Company, The, v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Pepperell Manufacturing Company, The, v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 189 

Pillsbury Flour Mills Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Pocahontas Fuel Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Pope Manufacturing Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Porter, Eose M., v. Frank H. Hardison. Action of tort. Pend- 
ing. 

Providence Ice Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the years 1910 and 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Providence Ice Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Provident Institution for Savings, Amesbury, Attorney-General 
V. Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 
590, § 56. Pending. 

Plymouth Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 

Plymouth Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending. 

Quaker Oats Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Quincy, city of, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
penalty for failure to instal water meters. Dismissed. 

Eandall, George W., Attorney-General v. Petition for use of 
Attorney-General's name in an information in the nature 
of quo warranto to test the title to oflQce of the assessors of 
the town of Plympton. Use of name refused. 

Eegal Shoe Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Eice & Hutchins, Incorporated, v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Eice & Hutchins, Incorporated, v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 



190 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Richardson Silk Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Richardson Silk Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Ritchie, Christina, v. Treasurer and Receiver-General. Action 
of contract under R. L., c. 128, § 96. Pending. 

Rockland-Rockport Lime Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Royal Arcanum, Supreme Council of, v. Elmer A. Stevens, 
Treasurer and Receiver-General. Petition for mandamus 
to compel the Treasurer and Receiver-General to deliver 
securities deposited with him. Disposed of. 

Russell-Miller Milling Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

S. S. "White Dental Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the 3'ear 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending in United States Supreme 
Court on writ of error. 

Salem Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition 
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 

Salem Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending. 

Salisbury Land and Improvement Company, petitioner. Peti- 
tion for registration of land in Salisbury. Pending. 

Saxonville Mills, petitioner. Petition for registration of land 
in Eramingham. Pending. 

Seager Engine Works v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Seamen's Savings Bank, Provincetown, Attorney-General v. 
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Pending. 

Seashipt Oyster System v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Seneca Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCmiENT — No. 12. 191 

Shannon Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Shapleigh, Samuel B., executor of the will of Ellen L. Shap- 
leigh, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inher- 
itance tax. Pending. 

Shelburne Falls Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition 
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Decree. 

Shepard & Morse Lumber Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Shepardson, Edgar A., et als. v. Eailroad Commissioners. Peti- 
tion for writ of certiorari. Petition discontinued as to 
Eailroad Commissioners. 

Simpson, Frank E., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Framingham. Attorney-General waived 
right to be heard. 

Skehill, Patrick J., administrator of the estate of John E. Ske- 
hill, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 

Smith & Dove Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

South Boston Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. De- 
cree. 

Southbridge Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend- 
ing. 

South Lake Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Springfield Breweries Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Springfield Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Pe- 
tition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Decree. 

Springfield Institution for Savings, Attorney- General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Decree. 



192 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Springfield Provision Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the 3^ear 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

St. Mary's Mineral Land Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Stafford Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Stetson, Emma F., administratrix c. t. a. of the estate of Albert 
Stetson, Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Final decree. 

Stone, Ann Elizabeth, Attorney-General v. Information for col- 
lection of inheritance tax. Pending. 

Stone, Frank Victor, Attorney-General v. Information for col- 
lection of inheritance tax. Pending. 

Stone, Stephen Stoddard, Attorney-General v. Information for 
collection of inheritance tax. Pending. 

Stoneham Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorne3^-General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Decree. 

Stoughton Mills, Incorporated, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Bill 
in equity to enjoin defendant from discharging waste into 
Neponset River. Pending. 

Strosnider, John H., petitioner. Petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. Petition dismissed by agreement. 

Swift & Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Submarine Signal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Suffolk Savings Bank, Boston, Attorney-General v. Two peti- 
tions for withdrawal of deposits under R. L., c. 113, § 55. 
Pending. 

Suffolk Savings Bank, Boston, Attorney-General v. Petition 
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Decree. 

Sullivan, Joseph M., administrator of the estate of Willis F, 
Day, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 

Superior Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 193 

Swift & Co. V. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise tax 
for the years 1910 and 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Tamarack Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Tarbell, Arthur P., v. Boston Athletic Association et al. Bill 
in equity to enjoin defendant from building a boathouse on 
Charles Eiver basin. Pending. 

Taunton Savings Bank^ Attorney-General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending. 

Templeton Savings Bank, Attorne^^-General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend- 
ing. 

Tobe}^, William H., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in New Bedford. Claim on behalf of Common- 
wealth withdrawn. 

Trimountain Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the j^ear 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Turley, Thomas J., et al., administrators of the estate of Mary 
Benson, Attorne3^-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 

Union Copper Land and Mining ComjDany v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Union Institution for Savings, Boston, Attorney-General v. 
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Pending. 

Union Savings Bank, Fall Eiver, Attorne3^-General v. Petition 
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 

Union Square Methodist Episcopal Church, petitioner. Peti- 
tion to register title to land in Charlestown. Pending. 

United States Radiator Corporation v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

United States Worsted Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

United States Worsted Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 



194 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

A^alvoline Oil Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Victoria Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the j^ear 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Victoria Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the 3'ear 1912. Pending. 

Vining, Floretta, executrix of the will of Elizabeth Jacobs, At- 
torney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

W. L. Donglas Shoe Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Wakefield Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree. 

"Walcott, Etta R., administratrix of the estate of Etta Walcott, 
Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Dismissed. 

Walen, William W., administrator of the estate of Almira C. 
Walen, Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 

Walpole Rubber Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Walpole Rubber Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Waltham Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending. 

Waltham Watch Company v. Commonwealth. Action to recover 
corporation tax for 1908. Pending. 

Walton, John E., executor of the will of Delia Walton, Attor- 
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Ward-Corby Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Wareham Savings Bank, Attorne3'-General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending. 

Warren Brothers Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 195 

Warren Five Cents Savings Bank, Peabody, Attorney-General 
V. Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, 
c. 590, § 56. Pending. 

Warren Institution for Savings, Boston, Attorney- General v. 
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, 
§ 56. Pending. 

Webster Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, e. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 

Welch, Mary Ann, executrix of the will of Thomas Welch, At- 
torney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Welch, William J., v. John A. Campbell. Action of tort. Pend- 
ing. 

Welch, William J., v. Hosea M. Quimby, superintendent. Ac- 
tion of tort. Pending. 

Wellfleet Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending. 

Welsbach Street Lighting Company of America v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 
l^aid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Welsh, Willard, petitioner. Petition to register title to land in 
Wakefield. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Westborough Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree. 

Westfield Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree. 

Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Co. v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Weymouth Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. De- 
cree. 

Whitaker, Elbridge J., executor of the will of Oliver Everett, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Whitall-Tatum Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

White Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 



196 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

White Pine Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the 3^ear 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

White Sewing Machine Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

William L. Gilbert Clock Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

William L. Gilbert Clock Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Winchendon Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. De- 
cree. 

Winona Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Winslow Brothers & Smith Company, Attorney-General ex rel. v. 
Bill in equity to restrain defendant from discharging waste 
into Neponset Eiver. Pending. 

Woburn Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 

Worcester County Institution for Savings, Worcester, Attorney- 
General V. Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 
1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending. 

Worcester Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Pending. 

Worcester Mechanics Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Decree. 

Worcester North Savings Institution, Fitchburg, Attorney- Gen- 
eral V. Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, 
c. 590, § 56. Decree. 

Woronoco Savings Bank, Westfield, Attorney- General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Decree. 

Wyandot Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 197 

Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company, The, v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

York Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax assessed on foreign corporation. Pending. 

York Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 



198 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 



COLLECTIONS. 



Collections have been made by this department as follows : — 

Corporation taxes for the j^ear 1911, overdue and referred 
by the treasm^er of the Commonwealth to the Attornej"- 

General for collection, S115,426 33 

Interest, 947 13 

Costs, 1,914 31 

Miscellaneous, 122,927 99 

Total, 8241,215 76 

The following table show^s a detailed statement of the Corporation 
Taxes: — 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1911. 






A. B. Currier Company, 


$307 49 


$1 28 


$308 77 


A. Cunningham Drug Company, . 


221 88 


67 


222 55 


A. E. Gloyd Shoe Company, 


44 82 


76 


45 58 


A. H. Geuting Company, 


190 77 


76 


191 53 


A. Himmel Companj^, . 


71 72 


24 


71 96 


A. Homer Skinner Lumber Com- 








pany, 


573 76 


3 16 


576 92 


A. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc., . 


214 47 


4 28 


218 75 


A. P. Downs Company, 


96 28 


2 18 


98 46 


A. S. Campbell Company, 


55 22 


16 


55 38 


Acme Company, Inc., . 


17 42 


1 20 


18 62 


Adams Square Company, 


94 13 


56 


94 69 


Airey & Place Company, 


43 03 


92 


43 95 


Albert Dwight Smith Company, . 


44 08 


16 


44 24 


Alberty Thompson Company, 


53 79 


- 


53 79 


Alfred H. Aldrich Company, 


13 39 


14 


13 53 


Alley & Emery, Inc., 


591 69 


23 66 


615 35 


Almy Uniform Company, 


103 09 


31 


103 40 


American Belting and Tanning 








Company, 


263 57 


1 05 


264 62 


American Cloak Company, . 


134 31 


40 


134 71 


American Co-operative Associa- 








tion of New England, 


5 37 


03 


5 40 


American Cork Company, Inc., . 


129 09 


65 


129 74 



1913.] 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



199 



Collected on 




Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Tax for 1911. 




$44 82 


$1 70 


118 33 


59 


5 00 


09 


71 66 


36 


51 99 


18 


332 96 


2 33 


26 89 


- 


152 40 


3 50 


71 72 


2 72 


484 37 


4 84 


208 88 


60 


75 30 


38 


20 87 


- 


8 99 


- 


20 01 


10 


72 61 


25 


64 54 


32 


889 32 


14 82 


14 34 


06 


107 22 


2 14 


118 92 


1 45 


28 24 


15 


35 86 


14 


896 46 


5 08 


59 70 


2 31 


48 73 


20 


1,173 62 


5 48 


244 36 


7 33 


62 75 


35 


140 84 


70 


291 36 


1 17 


46 61 


14 


68 85 


34 


132 25 


53 


12 55 


28 


94 31 


72 


46 61 


14 


161 90 


78 


133 57 


- 


658 29 


2 08 



Totals. 



American Cultivator Publishing 

Company, 

American Leather Goods Com- 



pany, . _. 
American-Mexican Company, 
American Mineral Company, 
American Narrow Fabric Com 



pany, . . 
American Oxidaze Company, 
American Paper Stock Company 
American Skate Company, . 
American Stable Companj^, . 
American Wholesale Grocery 

Company, .... 
American Woman's Shop, Inc., 
Appledore Hotel Corporation, 
Archer & Co., Inc., 
Aristo Company, 
Aroostook Farming and Lumber 

Company, .... 
Atlantic Rubber Company, . 
Atlas Glue and Gelatine Company 
Atwood-Mitchell Company, . 
Austin Company, . 
Austin Ford & Son Company, 
Austin Furniture Company, . 
Austin- Walker Company, 
Auto Renting Company, 
Automatic Appliance Company, 
Automatic Gaslighting Equip 

ment Companj^, . 
Automobile Lighting Company, 
B. F. Smith Construction Com- 



pany, 

B. Feinberg Sons Compan^^, . 
Baer Clothing Company, 
Bankers' Investment Company, 
Bartlett Box and Lumber Com- 



pany, ..... 
Barton-Child Company, 
Baseball Magazine Company, 
Bay State Calendar Company, 
Beacon Finance Company, . 
Belisle Printing and Publishing 

Company, .... 
Belle Bryce Gemmel Company, 
Belmont Spring Water Company 
Bent & Bush Company, 
Berkshire Manufacturing Com- 
pany, Pittsfield, . 



$46 52 

118 92 

5 09 

72 02 

52 17 
335 29 

26 89 
155 90 

74 44 

489 21 
209 48 

75 68 
20 87 

8 99 

20 11 
72 86 
64 86 

904 14 
14 40 

109 36 

120 37 
28 39 
36 00 

901 54 

62 01 

48 93 

1,179 10 
251 69 

63 10 
141 54 



292 53 
46 75 
69 

132 



19 

78 



12 83 

95 03 

46 75 

162 68 

133 57 

660 37 



200 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 



- 


Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1911. 






Bem^ Dodge Company, 


$58 11 


$0 85 


S58 96 


Blanchard & Co., Inc., . 


277 68 


1 38 


279 06 


Bonny Brae Farms, Inc., 


76 20 


38 


76 58 


Boston Book Company, 


1,237 17 


10 42 


1,247 59 


Boston Brass Andiron Company, . 


21 51 


26 


21 77 


Boston Brokerage Company, 


21 51 


- 


21 51 


Boston Building Wrecking Com- 








pany, 


7 79 


04 


7 83 


Boston Cycle and Sundry Com- 








pany, 


679 63 


5 33 


684 96 


Boston Hay and Grain Com- 








pany, 


69 06 


- 


69 06 


Boston Holding Company, . 


80 00 


40 


80 40 


Boston Ice Cream Company, 


130 88 


59 


131 47 


Boston Lighter Company, 


134 65 


67 


135 32 


Boston Mirror Company, 


179 73 


63 


180 36 


Boston Self-Locking Block Com- 








pany, 


21 51 


67 


21 58 


Bow Ridge Development Com- 








pany, 


16 49 


08 


16 57 


Brewer-Macauley Company, 


5 37 


- 


5 37 


Brighton Dressed Meat Company, 


46 58 


23 


46 81 


Brockton Die Company, 


98 47 


49 


98 96 


Brown-Binnian Company, 


80 68 


40 


81 08 


Brown Garage and Carriage 








Company, 


143 44 


57 


144 01 


Bruce-Hibbard Electric Company, 


407 90 


2 04 


409 94 


Builders' Iron and Steel Com- 








pany, 


75 30 


32 


75 62 


BuUard Company, .... 


82 98 


41 


83 39 


Bunkio Matsuki Corporation, 


41 41 


21 


41 62 


Burkinshaw Knife Company, 


42 94 


~ 


42 94 


Burleigh & Martin, Inc., 


51 63 


18 


51 81 


Burtworth Carpet Company, 


130 92 


- 


130 92 


Butman & Cressey Company, 


301 22 


1 51 


302 73 


CD. Wright Company, 


89 65 


1 26 


90 91 


C. E. Dustin Company, 


72 58 


29 


72 87 


C. G. Aldrich Company, 


25 10 


23 


25 33 


C. I. Nesmith Company, 


37 65 


19 


37 84 


C. J. Roadstrand Company, 


177 05 


59 


177 64 


C. P. Lovering Company, 


62 75 


25 


63 00 


C. W. Luce & Co., Inc., 


522 62 


5 48 


528 10 


C. W. Stone Company, . 


89 65 


55 


90 20 


Cameron Car Company, 


859 94 


- 


859 94 


Campbell Company, 


11 79 


09 


11 88 


Canton Ice Company, . 


78 89 


40 


79 29 


Central Automobile Station 








Company, 


282 39 


3 77 


286 16 


Central Cloak Company, 


96 82 


50 


97 32 


Central Drj^-Goods Company, 


50 51 


25 


50 76 



1913.: 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



201 



Collected on 

Account 

of Corporation 

Tax for 1911. 



Interest. 



Totals. 



Central Ice Manufacturing Com- 
pany, 

Centre Street Garage, Inc., 

Chapel IVIills Manufacturing Com 
pany, 

Charles D. Brown & Co., Inc., 

Charles H. Morey Company, 

Charles S. Gove Company, . 

Charles W. Blake Company, . 

Charles West Lumber Company, 

Chattel Loan Company, 

Chenej^ & Thomson Company, 

Citizens' Loan Association, . 

Clapp-Eastham Company, . 

Clinton Fruit Company, 

Coates Clipper Manufacturing 
Company, .... 

Cobb & White Company, 

Cochrane Manufacturing Com^ 
pany, 

Cohen & Priest Company, . 

Colhns Hardware Company, 

Colonial Bed Company, 

Colonial Interstate Express Com 
pany,_ 

Columbia Comb Company, . 

Columbia Securities Company, 

Columbian Furniture Company, 

Commercial Fibre Company, 

Common Sense Gum Company, 

Commonwealth Hospital, 

Conduit and Cable Manufacturing 
Company, .... 

Connecticut Valley Street Railway 
Company, .... 

Consolidated Produce Company, 

Consumers' Co-operative Com- 
pany, 

Coulter Coal and Lumber Com- 



pany, 

Creditors Adjustment Bureau 

Inc., 

Crocker Drug Company, 
Cross Street Shoe Store, Inc., 
Crown Novelty Company, . 
Crown Packing Company, . 
Culver-Steams Manufacturing 

Company, .... 
Cumings Theatre, Inc., . 
Cummings Fish Company, . 



$7 17 
89 65 

464 38 

711 01 
9 45 

161 37 

53 79 

86 06 

1,344 75 

103 99 
22 25 
67 70 
47 22 

161 37 

38 01 

2,252 27 

57 37 

2,420 55 

121 92 

17 93 
181 09 
261 95 

39 28 
119 66 
110 17 
280 64 

519 97 

1,585 53 
37 90 

9 01 

121 02 

26 89 
26 89 
46 68 
15 00 
89 65 

44 82 

268 95 

21 51 



$0 03 


2 13 


2 09 


3 79 


05 


81 


27 


40 


11 43 


52 


11 


23 


18 


2 09 


19 


7 88 


58 


35 52 


61 


48 


6 00 


42 


5 14 


3 97 


4 20 


1 56 


4 75 


51 


21 


21 



14 
21 
19 
45 

18 
42 



S7 20 
91 78 

466 47 

714 80 

9 50 

162 18 
54 06 
86 46 

1,356 18 

104 51 

22 36 

67 93 

47 40 

163 46 

38 20 

2,260 15 

57 95 

2,456 07 

122 53 

17 93 

181 57 
267 95 

39 70 
124 80 
114 14 
284 84 

521 53 

1,590 28 
38 41 

9 22 

121 02 

27 10 
27 03 
46 89 
15 19 
90 10 

45 00 

270 37 

21 51 



202 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 



Collected on 

Account 

of Corporation 

Tax for 1911. 



Interest. 



Totals. 



Cummings Machine Works, . 
Curtis & Cameron, Inc., 
Curtis Drug Company, . 
Cushing Medical Supply Com 
pany, 

D. Caro & Co., Inc., 
Dadmun Company, 

Daley & Wanzer Allerton Express 

Company, .... 
Dalton-Ingersoll Manufacturing 

Company, .... 
D'Arcy & Sons Company, 
Daudelin & Cotton, Inc., 
Davies Rose & Co., Ltd., 
Desmond-Hayden Shoe Com 

pany, 

Dill Cattle Companj'', 
Dr. Hallock Drug Company, 
Dodge Furniture Companj'-, . 
Driscoll & Co., Inc., 
Dukelow & Walker Company, 
Dunlap Cooke Company, Ltd., 
Dustbane Manufacturing Com 

panv, 

Dyke Mill, .... 

E. C. Howard Company, 

E. G. Tutein & Co., Inc., . 

E. L. LeBaron Foundry Com- 
pany, ^ 

E. L. Smith Company, . 

E. R. Brown Beer Pump Com- 
pany, 

East Douglas Clothing Com- 



of 



pany, 

Eastern Discount Company, 
Eastern Electric Company 

New Bedford, 
Eastern Furniture Company, 
Eastern Handle Company, . 
Easthampton Elastic Web Com 

pany, 

Eaton Candy Company, 
Eco Manufacturing Company, 
Economy Drug Company, . 
Edward Holden Company, . 
Edward T. Harrington Company, 
Eldridge Poultry Farm, Inc., 
Electric Maintenance Company, 
Electric Weld Company, 
Elk River Milling Company, 



$194 77 
80 68 
14 34 

161 37 

7 17 

129 09 

177 23 

869 96 

1,079 49 

22 86 

179 30 

58 81 
100 00 

43 03 
357 70 

71 72 

43 03 
367 56 

383 70 

12 28 

215 16 

146 30 



39 

80 

2 59 

90 

4 05 
2 51 



1 35 
40 
22 

1 07 
21 
20 

1 47 

8 44 
06 
64 
73 



32 48 


19 


107 58 


3 98 


45 75 


1 13 


18 82 


_ 


8 49 


06 


71 72 


1 25 


13 71 


- 


47 96 


67 


166 74 


— 


32 27 


32 


42 94 


19 


43 03 


13 


125 22 


2 88 


132 37 


66 


162 23 


81 


15 95 


- 


113 51 


28 


34 65 


— 



$195 65 
81 07 
14 34 

162 17 

7 17 

131 68 

178 13 

874 01 

1,082 00 

22 86 

179 30 

60 16 
100 40 

43 25 
358 77 

71 93 

43 23 
369 03 



392 14 

12 34 
215 80 
147 03 

32 67 
111 56 

46 88 

18 82 
8 55 

72 97 

13 71 
48 63 

166 74 

32 59 

43 13 

43 16 

128 10 

133 03 

163 04 

15 95 

113 79 

34 65 



1913.1 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 



203 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1911. 






Ellsworth Manufacturing Com- 








pany, 


$45 18 


- 


$45 18 


Empire Woolen Company, . 


66 69 


$0 30 


66 99 


Essex Engraving Company, . 


43 51 


22 


43 73 


Everson Manufacturing Com- 








pany, 


228 28 


1 18 


229 46 


Ewell-Cooper Company, 


21 51 


10 


21 61 


F. D. C. Manufacturing Com- 








pany, Inc., 


35 86 


- 


35 86 


F. H. Putnam Company, 


89 65 


45 


90 10 


F. L. Horton Manufacturing 








Company, 


117 31 


58 


117 89 


F. R. Parker Company, 


118 33 


39 


118 72 


F. S. McDermott Company, 


89 65 


1 79 


91 44 


F. T. Morecombe White Com- 








pany, 


74 40 


37 


74 77 


F. W. Flosdorf Company, 


110 26 


55 


110 81 


Fabrizio & Wingate Company, 


17 93 


07. 


18 00 


Fall River Granite Company, 


20 11 


30 


20 41 


Famous Ladies' Tailoring Com- 








pany, 


11 29 


06 


11 35 


Felton-Turner Heating Company, 


193 50 


96 


194 46 


Finestone-Hahn Company, . 


10 43 


63 


11 06 


Fink Cigar Company, . . . 


44 82 


23 


45 05 


Finnish Socialistic Publishing 








Company, 


171 98 


2 63 


174 61 


Fisher Bros. Companj^, . 


144 33 


72 


145 05 


Fisher Chrome Tanning Com- 








pany, 


50 00 


25 


50 25 


Fiske Shoe and Leather Company, 


373 84 


1 87 


375 71 


Fitchburg Real Estate and Loan 








Company, 


90 18 


1 34 


91 52 


Foan Brothers Company, 


64 54 


20 


64 74 


Framingham Commission House, 








Inc., 


71 46 


2 14 


73 60 


Frank A. Andrews Company, 


201 24 


8 84 


210 08 


Frank L. Perkins Company, 


35 86 


09 


35 95 


Frank P. Bennett & Co., Inc., . 


125 51 


50 


126 01 


Frank P. Brown Company, . 


34 42 


18 


34 60 


Franklin Clothing Company, 


89 65 


45 


90 10 


Franklin Mills Corporation, . 


165 85 


41 


166 26 


Fred A. Loud Companj^, 


89 65 


3 59 


93 24 


Fred F. Squire Company, 


170 94 


31 


171 25 


Fred S. and A. D. Gore Cor- 








poration, 


89 65 


3 40 


93 05 


Fuller-Greene Company, 


277 91 


1 25 


279 16 


G. B. Lawrence Company, . 


56 47 


28 


56 75 


G. H. PoUey Company, 


5 37 


- 


5 37 


G. M. Hyams Company, 


28 68 


65 


29 33 


G. W. Peterson Company, . 


8 96 


12 


9 08 



204 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1911. 






Galassi Mosaic and Tile Com- 








pany, 


$51 96 


$0 15 


$52 11 


Garnett Leather Company, . 


92 73 


46 


93 19 


Geddis Remedy Company, . 


18 48 


10 


18 58 


General Motor Company, . • . 


5 37 


- 


5 37 


General Sales Company, 


35 66 


18 


35 84 


Geo. A. Turner Company, . 


53 79 


27 


54 06 


Geo. B. Perkins Companj'-, . 


8 60 


- 


8 60 


Geo. C. Melville Company, . 


268 95 


81 


269 76 


Geo. C. Moore Wool Scouring 








Mills, 


206 19 


1 03 


207 22 


Geo. D. Emerson Company, 


717 20 


2 15 


719 35 


Geo. F. Vester Company, 


48 41 


72 


49 13 


Geo. J. Kelly Company, 


466 18 


2 10 


468 28 


Geo. P. Bingham Company, . 


89 65 


41 


90 06 


Gilchrist Drug Company, 


25 41 


- 


25 41 


Globe Amusement Company, 


129 09 


1 64 


130 73 


Globe Clothing Company, 


112 24 


76 


113 00 


Gloucester Hospital, Inc., 


123 62 


62 


124 24 


Golden Grain Farming Company, 


22 40 


12 


22 52 


Goldman Brothers Company, 


62 75 


86 


63 61 


Goodwin Company, 


16 24 


24 


16 48 


Gordon & Sparrow Company, 


197 23 


59 


197 82 


Coward's Market Company, 


44 82 


13 


44 95 


Graham Company, 


67 23 


33 


67 56 


Grand Amusement Company of 








Holyoke, Mass., .... 


89 65 


- 


89 65 


Grand Shoe Company, . 


48 41 


2 08 


50 49 


Grandfield's Pharmacy, Inc., 


107 58 


54 


108 12 


Grant Nail and Supply Company, 


860 64 


4 73 


865 37 


Grastorf Turner Company, . 


7 53 


- 


7 53 


Greenfield Recorder Company, . 


22 41 


12 


22 53 


Griffin Amusement Companj^, 


35 86 


18 


36 04 


Grimwood Tailoring Company, . 


9 00 


12 


9 12 


Grout Automobile Company, 


716 30 


3 25 


719 55 


Grueby Pottery Company, . 


18 43 


33 


18 76 


Guilford Kendrick & Ladd Com- 








pany, 


315 56 


1 16 


316 72 


H. A. Johnson Company, 


3,233 44 


16 17 


3,249 61 


H. A. Rich Company, . 


222 42 


1 11 


223 53 


H. C. Girard Company, 


150 61 


75 


151 36 


H. D. Hall Company, . 


26 89 


13 


27 02 


H. M. Downs Printing Company, 


17 48 


10 


17 58 


H. M. Kinports Company, . 


114 75 


4 59 


119 34 


Halford Company, .... 


26 89 


11 


27 00 


Hailstone Electric Company, 


69 92 


35 


70 27 


Hampden Creamery Company, . 


114 75 


45 


115 20 


Hampden Shoe Company, 


268 95 


1 34 


270 29 


Harding Uniform and Regalia 








Company, 


258 19 


10 33 


268 52 



1913.1 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



205 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1911. 






Harris & Lawcon, Inc., . 


$896 50 


$17 90 


$914 40 


Harry L. Cohen Company, . 


89 11 


- 


89 11 


Harvard Automobile Company, . 


228 30 


1 14 


229 44 


Haverhill Baseball and Athletic 








Association, 


8 60 


- 


8 60 


Haverhill Motor Mart Inc., . 


17 93 


23 


18 16 


Healey Sewer Machine and Con- 








struction Company, . 


77 90 


1 87 


79 77 


Heintzemann Press, 


80 68 


26 


80 94 


Henry F. Farrow Company, . 


89 65 


45 


90 10 


Henry F. Miller & Sons Piano 








Company, 


2,304 25 


22 27 


2,326 52 


Henry H. Tuttle Companj^ . 


470 66 


1 88 


472 54 


Hertig Furnace Company, . 


49 48 


25 


49 73 


Hetherstone Importing Companj^, 


425 83 


1 99 


427 82 


Highland Drug and Chemical 








Corporation, .... 


14 34 


15 


14 49 


Hillcrest Water Company, . 


89 65 


1 85 


91 50 


Hilton & Sons Express Company, . 


76 02 


- 


76 02 


Hinds' Hand Laundry Company,. 


43 03 


21 


43 24 


Hitchcock Supply Company, 


596 38 


2 25 


598 63 


Hodges Garage Company, 


81 40 


40 


81 80 


Hodgson, Kennard & Co., Inc., . 


1,074 00 


10 02 


1,084 02 


Hoffecker Company, 


86 06 


26 


86 32 


Holyoke Supply Company, . 


233 09 


70 


233 79 


Hooper Printing Company, . 


100 40 


50 


100 90 


Horace K. Turner Corporation, . 


784 79 


13 07 


797 86 


Hoyt Company, .... 


403 42 


2 00 


405 42 


Hub Mattress Company, 


12 55 


- 


12 55 


Hudson Hose Mender Company, . 


88 53 


26 


88 79 


Hudson Lithuanian Corporation, . 


16 31 


32 


16 63 


Huntt's Lunch Companj^, 


448 25 


1 76 


450 01 


Hutchins Organ Company, . 


239 83 


80 


240 63 


Ideal Dental Laboratory, Inc., 


26 89 


15 


27 04 


Ima-Fibre Company, 


22 14 


11 


22 25 


Import and Export Associates, 


32 27 


51 


32 78 


Indian Mica Company, . 


29 85 


14 


29 99 


Inter-National Grocer^'- Company, 


154 64 


3 54 


158 18 


Inter-State Lumber Company, 


242 05 


1 21 


243 26 


Interstate Oil Company, 


18 82 


37 


19 19 


Inter-trust Security Company, 


89 65 


1 00 


90 65 


Investors Corporation Company, . 


5 00 


03 


5 03 


Isaac H. Dinner Company, . 


35 86 


18 


36 04 


Italian-American Corporation, 


31 37 


1 38 


32 75 


Italian Co-operative Market of 








Lynn, Inc., 


26 89 


14 


27 03 


Italian Importing Company, Inc., 


40 34 


11 


40 45 


J. A. Keating Company, 


197 23 


2 63 


199 86 


J. B. Judldns Company, 


836 12 


2 09 


838 21 


J. D. Packard & Sons Company, . 


161 37 


64 


162 01 



206 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 



Collected on 

Account 

of Corporation 

Tax for 1911. 



Interest. 



Totals 



J. D. Putnam Sons Company, 

J. E. Paris Company, 

J. F. Williams Company, 

J. G. Walker & Sons Corporation 

J. H. Chandler Company, 

J. H. Folkins Company, 

J. K. Taylor Manufacturing Com 
Pany, 

J. L. Legein Ice Cream Company, 

J. Xardi Company, 

Jamaica Plain Auto Station, Inc 

James B. Wood & Son Company, 

James Barrett Manufacturing 
Company, .... 

James Donovan Slipper Com- 
pany, 

James Sunderland & Son Com- 



pany, 

Jeremiah Clark Machinery Com 

pany, 

Joe Cotter, Inc., 

John Cavanagh & Son Building 

Moving Company, 
John F. Ryan Company, 
John J. Cluin Compaii}^, 
Johnson Palm Leaf Goods Com 

pany, 

Joss Brothers Company, 
Kaleva Co-operative Association, 
Katzes &; Phelan Amusement 

Company, .... 
Keniston Engineering Company, 
Kenney Brothers Company, . 
King Mining Company, 
Kinne}^ Heating and Supply 

Company, .... 
Kinsley Iron and Machine Com 

pany, 

Kleno Manufacturing Company, 
Knox Automobile Company, 
L. Diamond Company, . 
L. W. Bigelow's Son Furniture 

Company, 

Lamere & Robinson Company, 
Lang & Jacobs Company, 
Langham Pharmacy, 
Lawrence B. Smith Company, 
La^^^:•ence Baseball Association, 
LawTence Beverage Company, 
Lawrence Dye Works Company, 



$59 61 

167 84 

13 44 

238 02 

28 83 
191 85 

188 26 
79 50 
71 00 

16 13 
206 19 

519 97 

69 92 

250 12 

196 33 

139 85 

201 71 
172 57 

44 82 

12 37 
53 79 

45 32 

5 37 

89 65 

159 75 

85 00 

35 53 

62 75 

17 93 
1,563 40 

94 67 

143 44 

64 54 

89 65 

32 27 

304 36 

134 47 

45 54 

3,106 42 



$0 84 

18 

1 19 

4 53 

56 

40 

1 63 

20 



1 90 
15 

1 50 

7 84 
41 

3 63 

23 

07 

86 
17 

07 
45 

48 

2 98 

16 

13 
11 

8 86 
47 

57 

1 10 

40 

15 

1 52 

3 33 
22 

15 53 



$59 61 
168 68 

13 62 
239 21 

28 83 
196 38 

188 82 
79 90 
72 63 
16 33 

206 19 

521 87 

70 07 

251 62 

204 17 
140 26 

205 34 
172 57 

45 05 

12 44 
54 65 
45 49 

5 44 

90 10 

160 23 

87 98 

35 69 

62 88 

18 04 

1,572 26 

95 14 

144 01 

65 64 

90 05 

32 42 

305 88 

137 80 

45 76 

3,121 95 



1913.] 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



20: 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1912. 






Leader, Inc., 


$66 34 


$0 34 


$66 68 


Leavitt's Scotch Polish Company, 


23 57 


11 


23 68 


Leighton Roofing Company, 


15 06 


- 


15 06 


Leominster Novelty Company, . 


93 23 


1 40 


94 63 


Lewis F. Small, Inc., 


17 93 


- 


17 93 


Liberty Lumber Company, . 


306 87 


1 53 


308 40 


LinscoU Motor Company, 


292 25 


1 61 


293 86 


Lithuanian Workers' Corporation, 


14 30 


- 


14 30 


London Harness Company, . 


806 85 


8 20 


815 05 


London Raincoat Company, . 


80 68 


35 


81 03 


Lord Publishing Company, . 


91 44 


2 19 


93 63 


Lovell's, Inc., 


71 72 


19 


71 91 


Lucy Mill and Lumber Company, 


11 97 


05 


12 02 


Lunt Moss Company, 


680 89 


2 38 


683 27 


Lj^nch Company, .... 


107 58 


54 


108 12 


Lynch Heel Company, . 


26 89 


14 


27 03 


Lynn Public Market Company, . 


61 67 


31 


61 98 


Lynn Shoe Manufacturers' Asso- 








ciation, Inc., .... 


10 75 


- 


10 75 


Lynn Storage Company, 


170 33 


3 00 


173 33 


Lyric Amusement Company, 


156 97 


66 


157 63 


M. Daly Company, 


8 06 


04 


8 10 


M. J. Silva Company, . 


86 06 


4 04 


90 10 


M. Marks Company, 


53 79 


16 


53 95 


MacDonald Ice Cream Company, 


23 30 


12 


23 42 


Macker-Tjder Company, 


28 68 


11 


28 79 


Magee Furnace Company, . 


4,031 20 


22 18 


4,053 38 


Maine State Creamery Company, 


17 93 


13 


18 06 


Majestic Company, 


161 37 


82 


162 19 


Maiden Grain Companj^, 


111 16 


56 


111 72 


Manhattan Company, . 


35 86 


82 


36 68 


Mansfield Cracker Company, 


175 94 


53 


176 47 


Mansfield Printing Company, 


22 07 


53 


22 60 


Manufacturers Shoe Trimming 








Company, 


52 00 


30 


52 30 


Marshall-Hackel Company, . 


15 72 


23 


15 95 


Massachusetts 'Apple Orchard 








Company, 


5 20 


03 


5 23 


Massachusetts Experimental and 








Construction Company, . 


25 31 


11 


25 42 


Massachusetts Fuel Saving 








Radiator Company, . 


29 10 


14 


29 24 


Massachusetts Piano Manufac- 








^turing Companj^ 


91 47 


46 


91 93 


Massachusetts Shoe Company, 


129 09 


65 


129 74 


Massasoit Company, 


287 54 


2 06 


289 60 


Matthew F. Sheehan Company, . 


358 60 


1 32 


359 92 


Maurice J. Borofsky Company, . 


26 89 


_ 


26 89 


Mayflower Laundry Company, . 


161 37 


2 74 


164 11 


Maynard & Co., Inc., . 


1,075 80 


5 38 


1,081 18 



208 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1911. 






McLean-Jones Oil and Supply 








Companj^, 


$53 79 


$0 27 


S54 06 


Mellish & Byfield Manufacturing 








Company, 


69 92 


35 


70 27 


Merchants and Manufacturers 








Credit Company, 


1,332 19 


5 99 


1,338 18 


Merrow Machine Company, 


121 56 


24 


121 80 


Messenger Printing and Pub- 








lishing Company, 


39 64 


20 


39 84 


Metropolitan Lithograph and 








Publishing Company, 


251 02 


8 11 


259 13 


Mica Varnish and Insulation 








Company, 


79 25 


1 58 


80 83 


Milford Rubber Cement Com- 








pany, 


8 96 


08 


9 04 


Miller Brothers, Inc., 


206 19 


2 06 


208 25 


Mitchell Press, .... 


11 11 


29 


11 40 


Monarch Valve and Manufactur- 








ing Company, .... 


822 09 


4 11 


826 20 


Moon Motor Companj^ of Boston, 


268 95 


1 79 


270 74 


Morse-Gemmell Company, . 


17 96 


23 


18 19 


Murphy Boot and Shoe Company, 


304 55 


2 74 


307 29 


Mutual Coal Company of 








Fitchburg, Mass., 


31 87 


49 


32 36 


National Envelope Seahng and 








Stamping Machine Company, . 


60 00 


1 35 


61 35 


National Envelope Sealing and 








Stamping Manufacturing Com- 








pany, 


214 03 


5 18 


219 21 


National Matzo Company of 








Boston, 


53 34 


2 13 


55 47 


National Textile Exposition, Inc., 


17 93 


35 


18 28 


Navin & Kelly Companj^, 


319 63 


96 


320 59 


New Bedford Auto Company, 


80 68 


32 


81 00 


New Bedford Clothing and 








Jewelry Company, 


35 86 


16 


36 02 


New Can Company, 


233 09 


8 33 


236 42 


New England Candle Company, . 


14 52 


08 


14 60 


New England Cloak and Suit 








Company, 


155 99 


36 


156 35 


New England Directory Com- 








pany, 


15 07 


23 


15 30 


New England Discount Company, 


261 58 


1 64 


263 22 


New England Gum Company, 


26 89 


11 


27 00 


New England Office Furniture 








Company, 


156 20 


6 09 


162 29 


New England Reed Company, 


569 45 


2 28 


571 73 


New York Mattress Company, . 


107 58 


35 


107 93 


Norris F. Comley Conservatories, . 


64 54 


32 


64 88 


North Main JNIarket Company, . 


71 72 


36 


72 06 



1913. 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



209 



Collected on ' 
Account 
of Corporation 
Tax for 1911. 




Totals. 



Northampton Company, 

Northampton Emery Wheel 
Company, .... 

Office Specialties de Luxe, Inc. 

Office Specialty Company, . 

Old South Lunch, Inc., . 

Olympic Theatre Company, . 

Oscar T. Gove Company, Inc., 

Oxidite ]\Ianufacturing Company 

P. B. Sanford Company, 

P. H. Prior Company, . 

P. P. Emery Manufacturing Com- 
pany, ^ . . . . 

P. R. Glass Company, . 

Parker & Page Company, 

Patrons Co-operative Association, 

Paye & Baker Manufacturing 
Companj", .... 

Payson Alitchell Company, . 

Pean Medical Company, 

Peoples Co-operative Grocery 
Company, .... 

Peoples Drug Store Company, 

Peoples' Furniture Company, 

Peoples' Trading Company, . 

Perkins & Co., Inc., 

Phelps & Bradley Company, 

Phoenix Securities Company, 

Pickard Bros. jMotor Car Com 



pany, 

Pierce & Barnes Company, . 

Pierson Pharmacy Company, 

Pike Tobacco Company, 

Pittsfield Baseball and Athletic 
Association, Inc., 

Plunger Elevator Company, . 

Plymouth Manufacturing Com- 
psiny, The, 

PljTuouth Rock Candy Company, 

Plympton Manufacturing Com- 
pany, 

Polar Mining and Dredging Com- 
pany, 

Post Office Pharmacy, Inc., . 

Prince ^ledicine Company, . 

Prudential Sales Company, . 

Purd}^ Shoe Company, . 

Purity Confectionery Companj^ 

Queensbury Mills, . 

Quincy Adams Quarry Company, 



::. 


_ 


$490 85 


$2 29 


94 07 


39 


19 90 


10 


53 79 


1 23 


44 82 


22 


134 47 


67 


24 22 


14 


30 48 


15 


250 64 


90 


139 02 


_ 


123 68 


7 91 


1,443 36 


7 22 


38 87 


19 


621 72 


2 69 


107 58 


54 


26 89 


- 


30 66 


60 


24 20 


12 


107 58 


62 


26 89 


46 


248 43 


7 34 


448 25 


2 24 


6 45 


18 


1,065 93 


_ 


17 93 


09 


143 44 


72 


36 57 


50 


42 67 


85 


89 29 


60 


86 97 


44 


71 72 


2 86 


199 90 


90 


300 00 


3 14 


53 79 


54 


44 82 


18 


60 45 


1 20 


53 79 


- 


46 61 


1 07 


2,833 58 


42 50 


43 03 


17 



$493 14 
94 46 
20 00 
55 02 
45 04 
135 14 
24 36 

30 63 
251 54 

139 02 

131 59 

1,450 58 

39 06 

624 41 
108 12 

26 89 

31 26 
. 24 32 

108 20 

27 35 
255 77 
450 49 

6 63 

1,065 93 

18 02 

144 16 

37 07 

43 52 

89 89 

87 41 
74 58 

200 80 

303 14 
54 33 
45 00 
61 65 
53 79 
47 68 
2,876 08 
43 20 



210 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 



- -...-.. 


Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1911. 






R. L. Cleveland Company, . 


$448 25 


$2 24 


$450 49 


R. M. Buckman & Co., Inc., 


23 57 


54 


24 11 


Ralph F. Russell Company, . 


87 08 


1 21 


88 29 


Regal Laundry Company, 


53 79 


26 


54 05 


Remington Manufacturing Com- 








pany, 


8 06 


14 


8 20 


Remington Tool and Machine 








Company, 


110 09 


55 


110 64 


Revere Cloak and Suit Company, 


46 61 


23 


46 84 


Ricker Paint Company, 


89 65 


41 


90 06 


Riverside Japannery, Inc., . 


241 01 


1 32 


242 33 


Riverside Waist Companj^, . 


35 86 


18 


36 04 


Robert R. McNutt, Inc., 


67 23 


3 56 


70 79 


Robinson-Brockway Manufactur- 








ing Company, .... 


130 88 


39 


131 27 


Rosengard Furniture Company, . 


129 09 


33 


129 42 


Ross Brothers Company, 


1,344 75 


4 03 


1,348 78 


Royal Fibre Companj^, . 


43 92 


16 


44 08 


Royal Shoe Company, . 


116 90 


59 


117 49 


Ruff Bros. Company, . 


170 65 


2 38 


173 03 


Russ, Eveleth & Ingalls Com- 








pany, 


340 38 


12 93 


353 31 


S. Lebow Company, 


53 79 


96 


54 75 


S. M. Howes Company, 


1,846 79 


9 23 


1,856 02 


S. W. Loomis Company, 


347 37 


1 73 


349 10 


Safety Gas Lighter Company, 


38 72 


18 


38 90 


Sagamore Engine Company, 








Inc., 


101 30 


2 55 


103 85 


St. Clairs', Inc., .... 


301 65 


1 35 


303 00 


Salem Press Company, . 


62 75 


24 


62 99 


Saskatchewan Investment Com- 








pany, 


52 40 


16 


52 56 


Saunders Sales Company, 


39 28 


20 


39 48 


Scandinavian Co-operative Gro- 








cery Union, 


61 42 


32 


61 74 


Seaside Foundry, Inc., . 


6 27 


- 


6 27 


Sectional Rubber Tire Company, . 


105 85 


32 


106 17 


Seth W. Fuller Company, 


116 16 


2 09 


118 25 


Shadduck & Normandin Com- 








pany, 


96 82 


32 


97 14 


Sheedy Amusement Company, 


22 50 


33 


22 83 


Shultz-Goodwin Company, . 


842 71 


6 70 


849 41 


Silas Peirce& Co., Ltd., 


2,110 25 


10 55 


2,120 80 


Small, Maynard & Co., Inc., 


1,075 80 


3 59 


1,079 39 


Somerset Coal Company, 


53 79 


54 


54 33 


Somerville Lumber Company, 


10 00 


20 


10 20 


Soule Art Publishing Company, . 


164 95 


74 


165 69 


Southgate Machinerj^ Company, . 


54 65 


27 


54 92 


Southgate Press — T. W. Ripley 








Companj^, 


609 62 


3 05 


612 67 



1913. 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



211 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1911. 






Spatula Publishing Company, 


$39 44 


$0 20 


$39 64 


Springfield Brazing Company, 


5 37 


03 


5 40 


Springfield Fruit and Produce 








Company, 


5 57 


- 


5 57 


Springfield Specialty Company, . 


22 71 


- 


22 71 


Spurr Veneer Company, 


165 85 


86 


166 71 


Standard Jewelr}^ Company, 


140 75 


85 


141 60 


Standard Specialty Sales Com- 








pany, 


10 54 


45 


10 99 


Standard Stoneware Company, . 


23 12 


12 


23 24 


State Electrical Manufacturing 








Company, 


18 28 


32 


18 60 


Sterling Manufacturing Company, 


10 54 


05 


10 59 


Story Simmons Company, 


47 69 


23 


47 92 


Symonds & Poor Carbonator 








Company, 


501 57 


26 09 


527 66 


T. H. O'Donnell & Co., Inc., 


161 37 


3 22 


164 59 


T. W. O'Connor Company, . 


48 41 


- 


48 41 


Tarbett Machine Company, . 


18 82 


- 


18 82 


Tarr Marine Paint Company, 


20 00 


- 


20 00 


Taunton Evening News, 


161 37 


81 


162 18 


Taxi Motor Cab Company of 








Boston, 


475 14 


2 38 


477 52 


Telepost Company of Massa- 








chusetts, 


17 93 


- 


17 93 


Thayer Woolen Company, . 


268 05 


1 07 


269 12 


Therapeutic Publishing Company, 


22 05 


66 


22 71 


Thomas D. Gard Company, Inc., . 


65 08 


42 


65 50 


Thomas J. Shea Company, . 


7 17 


23 


7 40 


Tichnor Brothers, Inc., . 


117 88 


4 36 


122 24 


Tolland Company, .... 


91 76 


46 


92 22 


Trombly Jewelry Company, . 


244 58 


3 34 


247 92 


Tudor Press, Inc., .... 


204 18 


4 90 


209 08 


Union Commercial Paper Com- 








pany, . . . 


121 40 


78 


122 18 


Union Curled Hair Company, 


27 97 


42 


28 39 


Union Furniture Company, . 


140 33 


70 


141 03 


Union Manufacturing and Drop 








Forge Company, 


133 72 


2 09 


135 81 


Union Parlor Furniture Com- 








pany, 


44 82 


16 


44 98 


Union Skewer Company, 


8 96 


14 


9 10 


United Cloak and Suit House 








Company, 


13 44 


- 


13 44 


United Hospitals Drug Company, 








(Inc.), 


24 95 


- 


24 95 


United States Column Company, 


926 33 


18 52 


944 65 


University Paper Box Company, . 


215 16 


1 44 


216 60 


V. A. Zorbas Confectionery Com- 








pany, Inc., 


35 86 


1 57 


37 43 



212 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1911. 






VacuiiTTi Glass Company, 


$107 58 


$0 43 


$108 01 


W. A. Buxton Machinery Com- 








pany, 


253 06 


76 


253 82 


W. A. Norton Company, 


35 86 


18 


36 04 


W. B. Norris Corporation, . 


13 48 


- 


13 48 


W. F. Godber Company, 


71 54 


1 43 


72 97 


W. K. Farrington Press, 


91 44 


2 19 


93 63 


W. M. McDonald Company, 


241 00 


96 


241 96 


W. N. Roberts Company, 


8 30 


04 


8 34 


W. 0. Simmons Company, . 


69 03 


35 


69 38 


W. P. Goode Brush Company, 


91 98 


2 11 


94 09 


W. Pence Mitchell Hat Company, 


15 24 


06 


15 30 


W. T. Cardy & Sons Company, . 


233 09 


7 32 


240 41 


Wachtel-Pickert Company, . 


151 54 


53 


152 07 


Wadleigh Company, 


118 55 


59 


119 14 


Walbuck Crayon Company, . 


37 65 


19 


37 84 


Waldron Shoe Company, 


334 84 


2 23 


337 07 


Walker Bros. Dyeing and Bleach- 








ing Company, . . ' . 


26 89 


14 


27 03 


Warren Garage Companj^, . 


24 74 


- 


24 74 


Warren Manufacturing Company, 


33 33 


1 07 


34 40 


Washburn Trucking Company, . 


32 27 


32 


32 59 


Waverly Liquor Company, . 


53 79 


1 00 


54 79 


Wellmade Can Company, 


39 44 


40 


39 84 


Whitcomb Jewelry Company, 


15 27 


- 


15 27 


White Store Corporation, Haver- 








hill, 


26 89 


- 


26 89 


White Store (Inc.), . 


87 58 


26 


87 84 


Whiting Manufacturing Company, 
Whittier Woodenware Company, . 


141 64 
537 90 


71 

2 69 


142 35 
540 59 


Whittredge Bag Company, Inc., . 


23 30 


10 


23 40 


Wilbert E. Welch Company, 


29 40 


15 


29 55 


William Allen Sons' Company, 


294 05 


1 47 


295 52 


William Bourne & Son Piano 








Company, 


53 79 


. 27 


54 06 


William L. Browne Electric 








Company, 


111 52 


56 


112 08 


Wire-Bound Packing Case Com- 








pany of Massachusetts, 


153 30 


77 


154 07 


Woman's Shop, Inc., 


349 63 


1 04 


350 67 


Woodward-Reopell Company, 


96 82 


1 51 


98 33 


Worcester Horse Sale Company, . 


5 00 


30 


5 30 


Worcester Lithographing Com- 








pany, 


172 12 


86 


172 98 


Woronoco Heating and Plumbing 








Company, 


89 65 


1 80 


91 45 


Yo Yo Beverage Company, . 


71 72 


36 


72 08 




$115,426 33 


$947 13 


$116,373 46 



1913. 



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ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT, 



[Jan. 





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1913.1 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



217 



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220 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. ' [Jan. 



EULES OF PKACTICE 

In Interstate Rendition. 



Every application to the Governor for a requisition upon the 
executive authority of any other State or Territory, for the de- 
livery up and return of any offender who has fled from the 
justice of this Commonwealth, must be made by the district or 
prosecuting attorney for the county or district in which the 
offence was committed, and must be in duplicate original papers, 
or certified copies thereof. 

The following must appear by the certificate of the district or 
prosecuting attorney : — 

(a) The full name of the person for whom extradition is 
asked, together with the name of the agent proposed, to be 
properly spelled. 

(b) That, in his opinion, the ends of public justice require 
that the alleged criminal be brought to this Commonwealth for 
trial, at the public expense. 

(c) That he believes he has sufficient evidence to secure the 
conviction of the fugitive. 

(d) That the person named as agent is a proper person, and 
that he has no private interest in the arrest of the fugitive. 

(e) If there has been any former application for a requisition 
for the same person growing out of the same transaction, it 
must be so stated, with an explanation of the reasons for a' 
second request, together with the date of such application, as 
near as may be. 

(/) If the fugitive is known to be under either civil or crim- 
inal arrest in the State or Territory to which he is alleged to 
have fled, the fact of such arrest and the nature of the pro- 
ceedings on which it is based must be stated, 

(g) That the application is not made for the purpose of en- 
forcing the collection of a debt, or for any private purpose what- 
ever; and that, if the requisition applied for be granted, the 
criminal proceedings shall not be used for any of said objects. 



1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT -No. 12. 221 

{h) The nature of the crime charged, with a reference, when 
practicable, to the particular statute defining and punishing the 



same. 



(i) If the offence charged is not of recent occurrence, a satis- 
factory reason must be given for the delay in making the appli- 
cation. 

1. In all cases of fraud, false pretences, embezzlement or 
forgery, when made a crime by the common law, or any penal 
code or statute, the affidavit of the principal complaining wit- 
ness or informant that the application is made in good faith, 
for the sole purpose of punishing the accused, and that he does 
not desire or expect to use the prosecution for the purpose of 
collecting a debt, or for any private purpose, and will not di- 
rectly or indirectly use the same for any of said purposes, shall 
be required, or a sufficient reason given for the absence of such 
affidavit. 

2. Proof by affidavit of facts and circumstances satisfying 
the Executive that the alleged criminal has fled from the jus- 
tice of the State, and is in the State on whose Executive the 
demand is requested to be made, must be given. The fact that 
the alleged criminal was in the State where the alleged crime 
was committed at the time of the commission thereof, and is 
found in the State upon which the requisition was made, shall 
be sufficient evidence, in the absence of other proof, that he is a 
fugitive from justice. 

3. If an indictment has been found, certified copies, in dupli- 
cate, must accompany the application. 

4. If an indictment has not been found by a grand jury, the 
facts and circumstances showing the commission of the crime 
charged, and that the accused perpetrated the same, must be 
shown by affidavits taken before a magistrate. (A notary 
public is not a magistrate within the meaning of the statutes.) 
It must also be shown that a complaint has been made, copies 
of which must accompany the requisition, such complaint to 
be accompanied by affidavits to the facts constituting the offence 
charged by persons having actual knowledge thereof, and that a 
warrant has been issued, and duplicate certified copies of the 
same, together with the returns thereto, if any, must be fur- 
nished upon an application. 

5. The official character of the officer taking the affidavits or 
depositions, and of the officer who issued the warrant, must be 
duly certified. 



222 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 1913. 

6. Upon the renewal of an application, — for example, on 
the ground that the fugitive has fled to another State, not having 
been found in the State on which the first was granted, — new 
or certified copies of papers, in conformity with the above rules, 
must be furnished. 

7. In the case of any person who has been convicted of any 
crime, and escapes after conviction, or while serving his sen- 
tence, the application may be made by the jailer, sheriff, or other 
officer having him in custody, and shall be accompanied by cer- 
tified copies of the indictment or information, record of con- 
viction and sentence upon which the person is held, with the 
affidavit of such person having him in custody, showing such 
escape, with the circumstances attending the same. 

8. No requisition will be made for the extradition of any 
fugitive except in compliance with these rules.