Commonwealth of Massachusetts "
ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT
1912
Public Document No. 12
^ije (HammatmealMi of Mssmti^usstis.
REPORT
ATTORNEY-GENERAL
Year ending January 15, 1913.
BOSTON:
WEIGHT & POTTER PRINTING CO., STATE PRINTERS,
18 Post Office Square.
1913.
^i)t iEommcnruealtl) of ilIao5acl)U5eit0-
Department of the Attorney-General,
Boston, Jan. 15, 1913.
To the Honorable Senate and House of Eepresentatives.
I have the honor to transmit herewith nw report for the
year ending this day.
Very respectfnlly,
JAMES M. SWIFT,
Attorney-General.
S1)C Comntonroealtf) of illaesacljusctt!
DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL,
State House.
Attorney-General.
JAMES M. SWIFT.
Assistants.
Frederic B. Greexhalge.
AxDREw Marshall.
Hexry M. Hutchixgs.
Walter A. Powers.
Engineer of Grade Crossings.
Hexry W. Hayes.
Chief Clerk.
Louis H. Freese.
Statement of Appropriation and Expenditures.
Appropriation for 1912, S45,000 00
Expenditures.
For law library, . 499 88
For salaries of assistants, 13,873 39
For expert services, . . 511 33
For clerks, 3,788 67
For office stenographers, 2,500 00
Telephone operator, 472 00
For messenger, 1,200 00
For expenses in the abolition of grade crossings : —
Salary of engineer, $3,288 15
Other expenses incidental thereto, . 878 00
4,166 15
For advertising unclaimed deposits, 4,487 31
For office expenses, . 2,617 14
For court expenses, . 6,423 73
Total expenditures, §40,539 60
Costs collected, 1,914 31
Net expenditures, S38,625 29
0ltr Ql0mm0ttm^altl| nf MaimtLtlivussttB.
Department of the Attorney-General,
Boston, Jan. 15, 1913.
To the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives.
In compliance with Revised Laws, chapter 7, section 8,
1 submit my report for the year ending this day.
The cases requiring the attention of this department dur-
ing the year, to the number of 6,793, are tabulated below: —
Corporate franchise tax cases, 587
Extradition and interstate rendition, 104
Grade crossings, petitions for aboUtion of, .99
Indictments for murder, 29
Inventories and appraisals, 233
Land Court petitions, 11
Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Harbor
and Land Commission, 4
Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Charles
River Basin Commission, 23
Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Massa-
cliusetts Highway Commission, 15
Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Met-
ropolitan Park Commission, 1
Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land bj^ the Met-
ropolitan Water and Sewerage Board, 14
Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the State
Board of Insanity, 7
Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the I\It.
Everett Reservation Commission, 1
Miscellaneous cases arising from the work of the above-named
commissions, 31
Miscellaneous cases, 460
Petitions for instructions under inheritance tax laws, ... 28
Public charitable trusts, ......... 140
Settlement cases for support of persons in State Hospitals, . 19
All other cases not enumerated above, which include suits to re-
quire the filing of returns by corporations and individuals and
the collection of money due the Commonwealth, . . 4,987
viii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Capital Cases.
Indictments for murder pending at the date of tlie last
annual report have been disposed of as follows : —
Chaeles Alesando, indicted in Hampden County, De-
cember, 1911, for the murder of Dominic Salvatore, at
Russell, on June 24, 1911. He was arraigned Dec. 26, 1911,
and pleaded not guilty. Richard J. Morrissey, Esq., was
assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. The de-
fendant was ordered to recognize in the sum of $1,000 for
appearance from time to time. The case was in charge of
District Attorney Christopher T. Callahan.
Haeey H. Butts, indicted in Suffolk County, July, 1911,
for the murder of Robert Williamson, at Boston, on June 21,
1911. He was arraigned July 12, 1911, and pleaded not
guilty. Joseph A. Dennison, Esq., and David E. Crawford,
Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel for the defend-
ant. The defendant later retracted his former plea, and
pleaded guilty to manslaughter. This plea was accepted by
the Commonwealth, and the defendant was sentenced to State
Prison for a term not exceeding fourteen nor less than twelve
years. The case was in charge of District Attorney Joseph
C. Pelletier.
Peter Cassetti, indicted in Norfolk County, December,
1911, for the murder of Nicholas Cassetti, at Weymouth, on
Oct. 1, 1911. He was arraigned Dec. 22, 1911, and pleaded
not guilty. John E. Crowley, Esq., was assigned by the court
as counsel for the defendant. On April 11, 1912, the defend-
ant retracted his former plan, and pleaded guilty to man-
slaughter. This plea was accepted by the Commonwealth,
and the defendant was sentenced to State Prison for a term
not exceeding nine nor less than seven years. The case was
in charge of District Attorney Albert F. Barker.
Harry Marshall and Lexa Cusumaxo, indicted in
Plymouth County, October, 1910, for the murder of Fran-
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. ix
cisco Cusumano, at Hull, on Sept. 18, 1910. They were
arraigned 'Noy. 29, 1910, and pleaded not guilty. Thomas J.
Grady, Esq., and William J. Coughlan, Esq., were assigned
by the court as counsel for the defendants. In February,
1911, the defendants were tried by a jury before Schofield, J.
The result was a verdict of guilty of murder in the first
degree. Motion of defendants for a new trial was denied,
and the defendants' exceptions were overruled by the Su-
preme Judicial Court. The defendants were thereupon sen-
tenced to death by electrocution during the week beginning
June 2, 1912. In the case of Lena Cusumano this sentence
was commuted to imprisonment for life by the Governor, by
and with the advice of the Council. In the case of Harry
Marshall sentence was executed June 6, 1912. The case
was in charge of District Attorney Albert F. Barker.
Chester S. Jordan, indicted in Middlesex County,
March, 1909, for the murder of Honora C. Jordan, at Somer-
ville, Sept. 1, 1908. He was arraigned April 15, 1909, and
pleaded not guilty. Charles W. Bartlett, Esq., Harvey H.
Pratt, Esq., and Jeremiah H. Sullivan, Esq., were assigned
by the court as counsel for the defendant. In April, 1909,
the defendant was tried by a jury before Stevens and Bell,
J J. The result was a verdict of guilty of murder in the first
degree. The defendant's motion for a new trial was denied,
and exceptions were overruled by the Supreme Judicial
Court. The defendant was thereupon sentenced to death by
electrocution during the week beginning March 12, 1911.
The case was taken to the Supreme Court of the United
States on writ of error. June 19, 1912, the writ of error was
dismissed, and the defendant remanded to the Superior
Court for sentence. June 21, 1912, the defendant was sen-
tenced to death by electrocution during the week beginning
Sept. 22, 1912, which sentence was executed Sept. 24, 1912.
The case was in charge of District Attorney John J. Higgins.
Silas IST. Phelps, indicted in Franklin County, July,
1910, for the murder of Emmet F. Haskins, at Monroe, on
June 12, 1910. He was arraigned July 12, 1910, and rear-
X ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
raigned July 21, 1910, and pleaded not guilty. William A.
Davenport, Esq., and Harry E. Ward, Esq., were assigned
by the court as counsel for the defendant. In November,
1910, the defendant was tried by a jury before Schofield, J.
The result was a verdict of guilty of murder in the first
degree. The defendant's exceptions were overruled, 'and the
defendant entered an appeal from an order overruling a
motion in arrest of judgment, which order was affirmed by
the Supreme Judicial Court, Oct. 20, 1911. On Oct. 25,
1911, the defendant was sentenced to death by electrocution
during the week beginning Dec. 31, 1911. An appeal from
this sentence was dismissed and the sentence affirmed by the
Supreme Judicial Court, Dec. 18, 1911; which sentence was
executed Jan. 26, 1912. The case was in charge of District
Attorney Richard W. Irwin.
Claeexce V. T. RiCHEsoN, indicted in Suffolk County,
October, 1911, for the murder of Avis W. Linnell, at Boston,
on Oct. 14, 1911. He was arraigned Nov. 13, 1911, and
pleaded not guilty. William A. Morse, Esq., and Philip R.
Dunbar, Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel for the
defendant. The defendant later retracted his former plea,
and pleaded guilty to murder in the first degree. This plea
was accepted by the Commonwealth, and the defendant was
sentenced to death by electrocution during the week begin-
ning May 19, 1912, which sentence was executed on May 21,
1912, The case was in charge of District Attorney Joseph
C. Pelletier.
Saverio Spang, indicted in Norfolk County, December,
1911, for the murder of Guiseppe Rucher, at Quincy, on
Dec. 3, 1911. He was arraigned Dec. 22, 1911, and pleaded
not guilty. Henry T. Richardson, Esq., was assigned by the
court as counsel for the defendant. In April, 1912, the
defendant was tried by a jury before Quinn, J. The result
was a verdict of guilty of manslaughter. The defendant was
thereupon sentenced to State Prison for a term not ex-
ceeding twelve nor less than ten years. The case was in
charo^e of District x\ttornev Albert E. Barker.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xi
Berteam G. Spexcek, indicted in Hampden County,
^laj, 1910, for the murder of Martha B. Blackstone, at
Springfield, on March 31, 1910. He was arraigned May 16,
1910, and pleaded not guilty. E. P. Stapleton, Esq., and
C. L. Young, Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel for
the defendant. On Sept. 17, 1910, the defendant was com-
mitted to the Bridgewater State Hospital for observation.
In November, 1911, he was tried by a jury before Crosby, J.,
the trial being conducted by Attorney-General James M.
Swift, assisted by the district attorney. The result was a
verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. The defend-
ant's motions for a new trial were denied, and exceptions
were overruled by the Supreme Judicial Court. The defend-
ant was thereupon sentenced to death by electrocution during
the week beginning Sept. 15, 1912, which sentence was exe-
cuted Sept. 17, 1912. The case was in charge of District
Attorney Christopher T. Callahan.
AjN':s"ie Tatosky, indicted in Plymouth County, June,
1911, for the murder of an infant child, at Abington, on May
3, 1911. She was arraigned June 14, 1911, and pleaded not
guilty. Eeb. 28, 1912, the defendant pleaded guilty to the
third count of the indictment, which charged concealment of
the death of said infant child. This plea was accepted by
the Commonwealth, and the defendant was sentenced to the
House of Correction for one year. The case was in charge
of District Attorney Albert E. Barker.
Indictments for murder found since the date of the last
annual report have been disposed of as follows : —
Joseph Caruso, indicted in Essex County, January, 1912,
for the murder of Anna Lo Pezzi, at Lawrence, on Jan. 29,
1912, He was arraigned May 16, 1912, and pleaded not
guilty. James H. Sisk, Esq., was assigned by the court as
counsel for the defendant. In September, 1912, the defend-
ant was tried by a jury before Quinn, J. The result was a
verdict of not guilty. The case Avas in charge of District
Attornev Henrv C. Attwill.
xii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
AxTOxio GiAxxETTi, iiidicted in Essex County, April,
1912, for the murder of Carmella Giannetti, at Saugus, on
Sept. 15, 1911. He was arraigned May 7, 1912, and pleaded
guilty to murder in the second degree. This plea was ac-
cepted by the Commonwealth, and the defendant was sen-
tenced to State Prison for life. E. M. Zottoli, Esq., was
assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. The case
was in charge of District Attorney Henry C. Attwill.
Lewis Keyes, indicted in Berkshire County, January,
1912, for the murder of Ernest Hays, at Washington, on
Nov. 4, 1911. He was arraigned Jan. 15, 1912, and pleaded
not guilty. P. J. Moore, Esq., was assigned by the court as
counsel for the defendant. On Jan. 19, 1912, the defendant
retracted his former plea, and pleaded guilty to murder in
the second degree. This plea was accepted by the Common-
wealth, and the defendant was sentenced to State Prison
for life. The case was in charge of District Attorney Chris-
topher T. Callahan.
GuisEPPE Lacaruba, indicted in Suffolk County, August,
1912, for the murder of Paolo DiCologero, at Boston, on
June 30, 1912. He was arraigned Aug. 12, 1912, and
pleaded not guilty. Thomas J. Grady, Esq., was assigned
by the court as counsel for the defendant. Sept. 16, 1912,
so much of the indictment as charged murder in the first
degree was nol 'prossed, leaving it to stand for murder in the
second degree, and the defendant was tried by a jury before
Raymond, J. The result was a verdict of guilty of murder
in the second degree, and the defendant was sentenced to
State Prison for life. The case was in charge of District
Attorney Joseph C. Pelletier.
Ella E. Libbey^ indicted in Middlesex County, June,
1912, for the murder of her illegitimate child, at Everett,
on May 2, 1912. She was arraigned June 17, 1912, and
pleaded not guilty. C. S. Warshauer, Esq., was assigned by
the court as counsel for the defendant. On June 20, 1912,
the defendant retracted her former plea, and pleaded guilty
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xiii
to murder in the second degree. This plea was accepted by
the Commonwealth, and the defendant was thereupon sen-
tenced to the Reformatory for Women. The case was in
charge of District Attorney John J. Higgins.
Fadlo Mallak, indicted in Berkshire County, January,
1912, for the murder of George E. Hoyt, at Adams, on July
22, 1911. Sept. 9, 1911, the defendant was adjudged insane
and was committed to the State Farm at Bridgewater. The
case was in charge of District Attorney Christopher T. Cal-
lahan.
Emma E. Mooshian, indicted in Essex County, January,
1912, for the murder of Simon Chiligerian, at Haverhill, on
Dec. 5, 1911. She was arraigned Jan. 23, 1912, and
pleaded guilty to murder in the second degree. This plea
was accepted by the Commonwealth, and the defendant was
sentenced to the Reformatory for Women. James H. Sisk,
Esq., and W. Scott Peters, Esq., were assigned by the court
as counsel for the defendant. The case was in chario'e of
District Attorney Henry C. Attwill.
&'
Raffaele Palma, indicted in Suffolk County, February,
1912, for the murder of Giovanni Megna, at Boston, on Jan.
7, 1912. He was arraigned Feb. 19, 1912, and pleaded not
guilty. Thomas J. Grady, Esq., was assigned by the court
as counsel for the defendant. In April, 1912, the defendant
was tried by a jury before Chase, J., and the result was a
verdict of guilty of manslaughter. The defendant was there-
upon sentenced to State Prison for a term not exceeding
twelve nor less than eight years. The case was in charge
of District Attorney Joseph C. Pelletier.
Arthur Phaxeuf, indicted in Bristol County, February,
1912, for the murder of Delia Phaneuf, at Fall River, on
Jan. 27, 1912. He was arraigned June 5, 1912, and pleaded
guilty to murder in the second degree. This plea was ac-
cepted by the Commonwealth, and the defendant was sen-
tenced to State Prison for life. Edward Higginson, Esq.,
xiv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
was assigned hj the court as counsel for the defendant. The
case was in charge of District Attorney Joseph T. Kenney.
LuiGi Peisco, indicted in Suffolk County, March, 1912,
for the murder of George Andrews, at Boston, on Feb. 22,
3 912. He was arraigned May 20, 1912, and pleaded guilty
•to manslaughter. This plea was accepted by the Common-
w^ealth, and the defendant Avas sentenced to State Prison for
a term not exceeding twenty nor less than fifteen years.
Jeremiah S. Sullivan, Esq., and Frank M. Prisco, Esq., were
assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. The
case was in charge of District Attorney Joseph C. Pelletier.
Feak^k E. Ryan, indicted in Middlesex County, January,
1912, for the murder of Georgianna M. L. Ryan, at Somer-
ville, on Dec. 26, 1911. He was arraigned Jan. 10, 1912,
and pleaded not guilty. Thomas F. Yahey, Esq., was as-
signed by the court as counsel. The defendant later retracted
his former plea, and pleaded guilty to murder in the second
degree. This plea was accepted by the Commonwealth, and
the defendant was sentenced to State Prison for life. The
case was in charge of District Attorney John J. Higgins..
Roc CO Salomone, indicted in Suffolk County, March,
1912, for the murder of Guiseppe Napolitano, at Boston, on
Feb. 9, 1912. He was arraigned April 6, 1912, and pleaded
not guilty. Frank M. Zottoli, Esq., was assigned by the
court as coimsel for the defendant. In April, 1912, the de-
fendant was tried by a jury before Chase, J. The result
was a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree, and
the defendant was sentenced to State Prison for life. The
case was in charge of District Attorney Joseph C. Pelletier.
The following indictments for murder are now pend-
ing:—
DoMEXico Bexixato, indicted in Middlesex County, Sep-
tember, 1912, for the murder of Giovannina Natoli, at Wal-
tham, on Nov. 21, 1911. He was arraigned Nov. 14, 1912,
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xv
and pleaded not guilty. John J. Mitchell, Esq., was assigned
by the court as counsel for the defendant. No further action
has been taken in this case. The case is in charge of District
Attorney John J. Higgins.
Stefan Borasky and Antone Kolek, indicted in Hamp-
den County, December, 1911, for the murder of Rose Aman-
sky, at Granville, on Sept. 27, 1911. They were arraigned
May 20, 1912, and pleaded not guilty. Joseph E. Carmody,
Esq., was assigned by the court as counsel for the defendants.
In June, 1912, the defendants w^ere tried by a jury before
King, J. The result was a verdict of guilty of murder in the
first degree. The motion of the defendants for a new trial
was denied. Aug. 1, 1912, suggestion of the death of the
defendant Antone Kolek was filed. The exceptions of the
defendant Stefan Borasky are now pending. The case is
in charge of District Attorney Christopher T. Callahan.
Jessie M. Chapman, indicted in Essex County, April,
1912, for the murder of Eva E. Ingalls, at Lynn, on March
G, 1912. She was arraigned May 7, 1912, and pleaded not
guilty. W. Scott Peters, Esq., appeared as counsel for the
defendant. No further action has been taken in this case.
The case is in charge of District Attorney Henry C. Attwill.
William A. Dorr, indicted in Essex County, April, 1912,
for the murder of George E. Marsh, at Lynn, on April 11,
1912. He was arraigned July 12, 1912, and pleaded not
guilty. C. Neal Barney, Esq., appeared as counsel for the
defendant. No further action has been taken in this case.
The case is in charge of District Attorney Henry C. Attwill.
LuiGi Melixazzo, indicted in Middlesex County, Septem-
ber, 1912, for the murder of Antonio Lando, at Waltham,
on Aug. 12, 1912. He was arraigned Sept. 12, 1912, and
pleaded not guilty. Frank M. Zottoli, Esq., was assigned by
the court as counsel for the defendant. No further action has
been taken in this case. The case is in charge of District
Attornev John J. Hiffo^ins.
xvi ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Nicholas Tsouklaris, indicted in Essex County, July,
1912, for the murder of George Kashouris, at Peabody, -on
May 3, 1912. He was arraigned July 12, 1912, and pleaded
not guilty. William H. Eay, Esq., was assigned by the
court as counsel for the defendant. No further action has
been taken in this case. The case is in charge of District
Attorney Henry C. Attwill.
Grade Crossixgs.
Construction has been in progress since the last report at
East Boston, Bourne, Clinton, Lowell, Lynn, Neponset, Som-
erville, Weston and Worcester, and 46 visits of inspection
to these various places have been made by the engineer of
grade crossings.
Eorty-six hearings before, and conferences with, special
commissioners and auditors have been attended by this de-
partment, either by the engineer of grade crossings or by an
assistant attorney-general.
Statements of expenditures, numbering 43, amounting
to $2,454,485.25, have been examined. Objection to items
amounting to $86,230.78 has been made, $5,105.43 of which
have been disallowed, and decisions as to $73,972.53 are
pending. Of objections made in previous years, $5,939.43
have been disallowed, m.aking a total amount disallowed dur-
ing the year of $11,044.86, and decisions are now pending
as to $166,575.69.
Plans have been prepared in two cases for presentation to
commissions.
The engineer of grade crossings has also been employed by
the Board of Railroad Commissioners a total of twenty-seven
and one-half days, under authority of St. 1911, c. 214.
Reclaiming SAvi^s^cfs Bak^iv Deposits.
LTnder the provisions of St. 1908, c. 590, § 57, it is pro-
vided that any person claiming a right to money deposited
with the Treasurer and Receiver-General, which has been
paid into the treasury of the Commonwealth under the pro-
visions of St. 1908, c. 590, § 56, that deposits that have
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — N a compliance with the decree
of the Supreme Judicial Court dated June 23, 1908, which en-
joined the New York, NeAV Haven & Hartford Railroad Company
from subscribing for or taking or holding, directly or indirectly, the
stock of the Springfield Street Railway Company, and from assum-
ing or exercising the franchise or privilege of subscribing for,
taking or holding the stock of such corporation.
Jan. 29, 1912.
Hon. Levi H. Greenwood, President of the Senate.
Sir: — On June 2, 1911, the General Court adopted an order
in the following terms : —
Ordered, That the Attorney-General report to the General Court,
not later than Jan. 15, 1912, whether the New York, New Haven
& Hartford Raih^oad Company has complied, with respect to the
Springfield Street Railway Company, with the order of the court,
as more particularly set out in a decree, under date of June 23,
1908, of the Supreme Judicial Court; and, if so, how said railroad
company has divested itself of its interest in said railway in accord-
ance with said decree.
With respect to the form of the order, it is to be observed that
the General Court has no authority to fix a limit of time within
which the Attorney-General shall discharge his statutory duty
of advising the General Court, or either branch of it. See II
Op. Atty.-Gen. 125, 405.
It may be doubted, also, whether the order as framed presents
any such question of law as is contemplated by the provision of
R. L., c. 7, § 7, that the Attorney-General " shall give his
opinion upon questions of law submitted to him by the governor
and council or by either branch of the general court," inasmuch
as no sufficient facts are presented to raise any question of law;
and the order apparently contemplates not so much a deter-
mination of a question of law as an investigation into existing
facts and a report thereon. Inasmuch, however, as it appear?
6 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
that certain facts with respect to the action of the New York,
iSTew Haven & Hartford Railroad Company in the premises
have been presented to the Board of Railroad Commissioners in
connection with a petition of the Springfield Street Railway
Company and the Western Massachusetts Street Railway Com-
pany and a petition of the Uxbridge & Blackstone Street Rail-
way Company and the Worcester & Blackstone Valley Street
Railway Company for the approval by such Board of proposed
consolidations of the companies joining in each of the respec-
tive petitions, upon which such Board has officially acted, and
the same facts were submitted to certain individual members
of the Committee on Railroads at the session preceding that at
which the order above quoted was adopted, in connection with
the passage of St. 1910, c. 601, authorizing the New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad Company to acquire, purchase, hold
and own the whole, or any part not less than half, of the
capital stock of the Berkshire Street Railway Company, it may
fairly be presumed that such facts were known to the General
Court. I shall, therefore, assume that the question of law in-
tended to be submitted by the order of the General Court was,
in substance, whether or not the acts of the New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad Company as presented to the Board
of Railroad Commissioners constitute a proper compliance with
the terms of the decree of June 23, 1908, referred to in said
order.
The history of the litigation between the Commonwealth and
the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company is
fully discussed in the reports of my predecessor to the General
Court for the years 1907 (p. xiii.) and 1908 (p. xv.). The
decree referred to was rendered upon an information in equity
brought by the Attorney-General under the provisions of St.
1906, c. 372, in substance alleging that the New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, a corporation duly organ-
ized under the laws of this Commonwealth for the purpose,
among others, of owning and operating a railroad therein, had
directly and indirectly subscribed for, taken and held the stock
and bonds and had guaranteed the bonds and dividends and
was then directly and indirectly holding the stock and bonds
and was guaranteeing the bonds and dividends of certain street
railway companies incorporated under the laws of this Common-
wealth, to wit, the Worcester & Southbridge Street Railway
Company, the Worcester & Blackstone Valley Street Railway
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 7
Company, the Worcester & Webster Street Eailway Company,
the Webster & Dudley Street Eailway Company, the Berkshire
Street Eailway Company and the Springfield Street Eailway
Company, and that the stock and bonds held and the bonds
and dividends guaranteed by said railroad company were so
held and guaranteed without authority from the General Court,
or any law thereof, and that the New York, New Haven &
Hartford Eailroad Company, by reason of the acts described,
had assumed and exercised and was assuming and exercising a
franchise and privilege and had transacted and was transact-
ing a kind of business not authorized by its charter or by the
laws of this Conunonwealth, to wit, the franchise and privilege
of acquiring, taking and holding the stock and bonds of such
domestic street railway corporations and of guaranteeing the
bonds and dividends of said corporations and of owning and
operating said street railway corporations and the business of
acquiring or purchasing said stock and bonds and of guarantee-
ing said bonds and dividends, and of owning and operating
street railway corporations, in violation of law and to the preju-
dice and damage of the Commonwealth. The petition then
concludes —
Wherefore, the Attorney-General prays the consideration of this
court in the premises, and that a writ of injunction issue restrain-
ing said New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Company
from the further use and enjoyment of said franchise and privilege
and from the further prosecution of the said business, and for
such other relief in the premises as equity and justice may require.
The decree, so far as it is material to the question now pre-
sented, is as follows : —
It is ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows : —
The defendant is, and its officers, directors, attorne^^s, agents and
employees, respectively and collectively, are hereby enjoined and
restrained : —
1. From subscribing for or taking, directly or indirectly, the
capital stock of the Worcester & Southbridge Street Railway Com-
pany, the Worcester & Blackstone Valley Street Eailway Companj^,
the Worcester & Webster Street Railway Company, the Web-
ster & Dudley Street Eailway Company, the Berkshire Street Eail-
way Company and the Spring-field Street Eailway Company, or
either of them, all being street railway corporations incorporated
8 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
under and by virtue of the laws of this Commonwealth, and men-
tioned in the information.
2. From assuming or exercising- the franchise or privilege of sub-
scribing for, or taking, directly or indirectly, the stock of said
street railway corporations, or either of them.
3. From holding, directly or indirectly, the stock of said street
railway corporations, or either of them, after the first day of July,
in the year 1909.
4. From assuming or exercising the franchise or privilege of
holding, directly or indirectly, the stock of said street railway cor-
porations, or either of them, after the first day of July, in the
year 1909.
Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall affect
existing leases executed in accordance with the provisions of chap-
ter 293 of the Acts of the year 1901 of this Commonwealth.
From this decree the defendant appealed, and the decree was
finally aflSrmed in Attorney-General v. New York, New Haven
& Hartford Railroad Co., 201 Mass. 370.
The state of facts to which this decree was applicable arose
as follows: the N'ew York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
Company, a consolidated corporation created by the concur-
rent legislation of the State of Connecticut and the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts, acquired in the years 1903 and 1904
all the shares of stock of the Worcester & Connecticut Eastern
Railway Company, which by appropriate legislation in the State
of Connecticut became, in part at least, a holding corporation
under the name of Consolidated Railway Company of Connecti-
cut. The Consolidated Railway Company of Connecticut in turn
acquired all or a majority of the stock of the domestic street
railway corporations named in the information of the Attorney-
General, except the Springfield Street Railway Company, of
which substantially all of the stock was acquired by a voluntary
association known as the Springfield Railway Companies, created
for that purpose and controlled by the Consolidated Railway
Company of Connecticut. The attention of the Legislature of
1905 having been directed to the situation so created with re-
spect to the ownership of the stock in domestic street railways,
and being advised by the then Attorney- General that the owner-
ship and control of the capital stock of street railway companies
incorporated in Massachusetts by the New York, New Haven &
Hartford Railroad Company or the Consolidated Railway Com-
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 9
pany of Connecticut was illegal (see II Op. Atty.-Gen. 570), an
inquiry into the facts relative to such acquisition was begun,
but no definite action was taken thereon. In the Legislature of
the following year the discussion was renewed; a bill entitled
"An Act relative to investments by railroad corporations in
street railway companies" was introduced but not finally
adopted, and St. 1906, c. 372, which authorized the Attorney-
General to proceed by an information in equity against any cor-
poration which assumed or exercised a franchise or transacted
a business not authorized by the laws of the Commonwealth, and
under which the information in the present case Avas brought,
was enacted. On June 26, 1906, before the conclusion of the
session of the Legislature for that year, the Consolidated Eail-
way Company of Connecticut sold and conveyed to the Xew
England Investment and Security Company, a voluntary as-
sociation, all of the stock, bonds and other securities held by it
in the Worcester & Southbridge Street Railway Company, the
Worcester & Blackstone Valley Street Eailway Company and
the Berkshire Street Eailway Company, and 102 shares of stock
in the Springfield Street Eailway Company, and also sold and
conveyed to said company all of its interest in the Springfield
Eailway Companies, which then held 19,253 shares of the stock
of the Springfield Street Eailway Company, which, with the
102 shares already referred to, were substantially all of the
shares of said stock. In 1907, under authority of an act of
the Connecticut Legislature (House Joint Eesolution Xo. 357)
the 'New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Company was
merged into the Consolidated Eailway Company of Connecticut,
and the consolidated corporation, by a later statute, became the
New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Company. So far
as I am aware the situation so established continued unchanged
until May 8, 1908, when the opinion in the case of Attornetj-
General v. New YorJc, Neiv Haven & Hartford Eailroad Co.,
198 Mass. 413, was handed do\ATi. In that decision the court
held, in substance, that the Consolidated Eailway Company of
Connecticut and the two voluntary associations, the Springfield
Eailway Companies and the New England Investment and Se-
curity Company, were all instrumentalities of the New York,
New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Company through which such
corporation acquired and OT\Tied and used the property of the
domestic street railway corporations named in the information.
10 ATTORNEY-GENERAL^S REPORT. [Jan.
*' with as complete control as it has over its locomotive engines,"
in violation of the provision of St. 1906, c. 463, Part IL, § 57,.
that —
A 'railroad corporation, unless authorized by the general court or
by the provisions of the following five sections, shall not directly
or indirectly subscribe for, take or hold the stock or bonds of or
guarantee the bonds or dividends of any other corporation.
The court further stated, on page 431, that —
From the findings and evidence in the very voluminous report
of the master, and notably from the testimony of Mr. Mellen, the
president of the voluntary associations, and the corporations, and
of Harmer, the secretary and comptroller of the New England
Investment and Security Company, it is plain that all the street
railway companies mentioned in the information are indirectly held
and controlled and managed in the interest of the defendant as.
absolutely and completely as it holds and manages its line of rail-
road between Springfield and New York.
It thus appeared that the precise situation to which the de-
cree above quoted was directed was an indirect and illegal con-
trol by the New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Com-
pany of the stock, bonds and other securities of the specified
domestic street railway corporations, effected through an owner-
ship by the New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Com-
pany of all of the stock of the Consolidated Railway Company
of Connecticut, which, in turn, controlled the Springfield Rail-
way Companies and the New England Investment and Security
Company, which held the legal title to the stock, bonds and other-
securities of such domestic street railway corporations.
The decree in terms enjoins and restrains the defendant, and
its officers, directors, attorneys, agents and employees, in two.
respects, — first, from subscribing for or taking either directly
or indirectly, and from assuming to exercise the franchise or
privilege of subscribing for or taking directly or indirectly, the
stock of the street railways included within its provisions; and
second, from holding directly or indirectly, and from assuming
the franchise or privilege of holding directly or indirectly, such
stock. Briefly stated, those enjoined must not, either directly
or indirectly, acquire or hold such stock. It is unnecessary to-
determine what should be deemed to constitute a direct acquisi-
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 11
tion or holding of the stock by the New York, New Haven &
Hartford Railroad Company or its officers, directors, attorneys,
agents and employees, since upon the facts in evidence the court
failed to find that the acquisition and holding were direct in
the first instance. With respect to an indirect subscription for
and taking of such stock subsequent to the date of the decree
no question appears to have been raised, and therefore the sole
inquiry presented for my determination is whether or not that
corporation has ceased to indirectly hold or control the stock of
the Springfield Street Eailway Company, the corporation named
in the order of the General Court.
In Attorney -General v. New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad Co., 198 Mass. 413, the court, at page 426, has defined
the words " subscribed for, take or hold " in St. 1906, c. 463,
Part II., § 57, as —
intended to include legal ownership of every kind. The word " indi-
rectly " covers other modes of holding than by taking or holding
the legal title. The words together cover every kind of proprietary
interest in the stock or bonds referred to. It is immaterial how or
where the legal title is held directly, if, indirectly, the railroad cor-
poration is the equitable or beneficial owner of it. What the Legis-
lature was seeking to prevent was influence in the management of
the subordinate corporation by the other corporation, however exer-
cised, and whether extending to absolute control or falling short
of it. With this in \iew, language was used in the statute to in-
clude every kind of beneficial ownership, however indirectly held.
The situation with respect to the indirect holding of the
stock by the New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Com-
pany was described at length by the court, at pages 426-431 : —
The master's summary of facts and the other findings that appear
in the report show how completely the defendant controls the street
railways in question. The capital stock of all of them but the
Springfield Street Railway Company was bought and held by
the Consolidated Railway Company, all of whose stock is held by the
defendant, and all of whose directors are the defendant's directors.
If we assume that this corporation was legally organized and is
legally maintained, so as to have a separate corporate existence,
it is in reality a piece of legal machinery owned and operated by
the defendant. Through this the defendant acquires and owns and
uses property with as complete control as it has over its locomo-
tive engines. If it does this indirectly, it does it as effectively as
12 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
if the ownership were direct. Through the direct purchase and
ownership of the street railway corporations, by its creature, the
Consolidated Railway Company, the defendant transgressed the
law as to all the street railway companies mentioned in the infor-
mation, except the Spring-field Street Railway Company, and is
«till transgressing in the same way as to the Worcester & Webster
Street Railway Company and the Webster & Dudley Street Rail-
■vvay Company, whose ownership is retained in the same form. Some
of these street railway companies have been dealt with directly by
the defendant, at different times, by votes of its directors while act-
ing in that capacity. The defendant's president is the president
of the Consolidated Railway Company and of all these street rail-
way companies, and he receives no compensation for the perform-
ance of these official duties, except his salary as president of the
defendant corporation.
The stock of the Springfield Street Railway Company was ac-
quired through action of the Consolidated Railway Company, whose
•directors voted that it " should be acquired by this company, and
that the plan for payment of the same, outlined by the president
be approved, namely, the establishment of a trust covering the issue
of $3,000,000 guaranteed trust certificates, and the sum of $1,500,000
of 4 per cent, debentures of this company." Here was the origin of
the Springfield Railway Companies, wiiich was established by
the Consolidated Railway Company as a part of a scheme for hold-
ing and controlling the stock of the Springfield Street Railway
Company. This is a voluntary association, consisting of a board
of trustees, of whom all but one are directors of the Consolidated
Railway Company and of the defendant corporation, who are des-
ignated as trustees in the declaration of trust, together with the
members of the firm of Lee, Higginson and Companj^ of Boston,
bankers, who are called subscribers. Under the instrument the trus-
tees assume no personal financial liability and have no beneficial
ownership, although they are the holders of the legal title to all
the property belonging to the association, and are the managers
of it. Lee, Higginson and Company are parties for the purpose
of disposing of preferred shares to be issued by the association, and
managing other matters of finance. As a part of the arrangement,
the Consolidated Railway Company entered into a contract with
Lee, Higginson and Company which, after the formal part, began
with a recital as f ollow^s : " Whereas, the Consolidated Railway
Company desires to acquire the whole or at least a majority of the
capital stock of the Spring-field Street Railway Company, and
desires Lee, Higginson and Company to offer to the stockholders of
said company $225 in cash per share, or $75 in cash per shai-e and
$150 in preferred stock of the Springfield Railway Companies
issued under a declaration of trust, dated March 15, 1905," etc. It
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 18;
was then agreed that the Consolidated Railway Company should
sell its 4 per cent, fifty-year debentures to the amount of $1,500,000
and Lee, Higginson and Company should buy not exceeding that
amount of these debentures at a price named, and should underwrite-
not exceeding $2,937,600 in amount of the preferred shares of the
Springfield Railway Companies at $100 per share. Then followed
this recital, " which sale of bonds, with cash to be paid by the-
Consolidated Railway Company, and underwriting, will "furnish
the funds necessary for the purchase of said street railway stock
at the price agreed upon," etc. It w^as then agreed that the Con-^
solidated Railway Company should forthwith issue, sell and de-
liver to Lee, Higginson and Company, the debentures, and that
there should be " formed a holding trust to be called the Spring-
field Railway Companies ... to acquire and hold the whole or at
least a majority of the capital stock of the Springfield Street Rail-
v;ay Company; which said trust shall issue at this time not exceed-
ing $2,937,600 of preferred shares, which shall be entitled to-
cumulative dividends at the rate of 4 per cent, per annum, payable,"
etc., — " and in case of liquidation, payment of the principal of
said preferred shares at the rate of $105 per share, to be guaran-
teed by the Consolidated Railway Company, and to be subject to-
call on any dividend date at the rate of $105 per share, as pro-
vided in the agreement of said Consolidated Railway Company with
the Springfield Railway Companies," etc. There was a provision
that Lee, Higginson and Company should underwrite at par so«
many of the preferred shares as should be necessary to acquire the
whole, or at least a majority of the stock of the Springfield Street
Railway Company at the price stated. There was then a provision
for an underwriting commission to be given to Lee, Higginson and
Company in full payment for their ser\dces. The expenses of form-
ing the trust and of carrying out the terms of the agreement were-
to be paid by the Consolidated Railway Company. Under this-
arrangement the stock of the Springfield Street Railway Company^
was acquired and turned over to the association, which consisted
of the trustees, with no financial interest, and the Consolidated
Railw^ay Company, which was then the beneficial owner of all the-
property. The common shares in the Springfield Railway Compa-
nies to the amount of $5,000,000, were to be delivered to the Con-
solidated Railw^ay Company as soon as a majority of the stock
of the Springfield Street Railway Company should be acquired.
The proceeds of all the preferred shares were to be accounted for
to the Consolidated Railway Company by Lee, Higginson and Com-
pany. The trust, including the accompanying contracts, was sim-
ply a machine, constnicted for the management of the property
and the business in the interest of the Consolidated Railway Com-
pany, which w^as the interest of the defendant corporation. As to*
14 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
sales made by Lee, Higginson and Company to third persons, and
as to the underwriting of Lee, Higginson and Company if that be
deemed a purchase by them of the preferred shares, the Consoli-
dated Railway Company is still indirectly the owner of the shares,
or at least of an interest in them. The Springfield Railway Com-
panies is not a corporation, although the parties, by their con-
tract, sought to obtain many of the advantages of a corporation
without its liabilities. See Hussey v. Arnold, 185 Mass. 202. All
who have any proprietary interest in it have rights of property as
indi\ddual owners, subject to such restraints upon the management
and use of it as are legally imposed by the contracts under which
it is held. They are equitable tenants in common. By the terms of
the agreement the association must be wound up and liquidated at
the end of twenty years and eleven months. If there are profits
from the enterprise, the Consolidated Railway Company will be
entitled to the whole of them. It held all the common shares, al-
though it has since turned them over to the New England Invest-
ment and Security Company. The other holders of the preferred
shares can receive only $105 per share as principal, with interest at
4 per cent. Any proceeds beyond that amount will go to the Con-
solidated Railway Company. If there is not enough in the prop-
erty to pay that, the Consolidated Railway Company must make
up the deficiency; for it guaranteed this amount to all of the pre-
ferred shares on liquidation. It can at any time wind up the asso-
ciation ; for by its contract it has retained a right to call and redeem
all the preferred shares on any dividend date at $105 per share.
The case is like that of an association that issues mortgage bonds
to be redeemed at $105 at maturity, with a right to call and redeem
them at any earlier time at the same rate. In such a case the bond-
holders have merely made a loan. The real beneficial owners of
the property are those who have agi^eed to pay the loan whereby
the property will be redeemed. The transfer of certificates to pur-
chasers of preferred shares is in the nature of a pledge. It seems
plain that the Consolidated Railway Company is indirectly the
holder and owner of everything belonging to the Springfield Rail-
^'ay Companies, subject to its relations to the New England Invest-
ment and Security Company to which we shall refer hereafter. As
the defendant owns all the stock of the Consolidated Railway Com-
pany, it is indirectly the holder and owner of the 19,253 preferred
shares of the Springfield Street Railway Company in the hands of
the trustees of the Springfield Railway Companies, as well as of
the right to redeem the preferred shares in the hands of purchasers.
The New England Investment and Security Company is a volun-
tary association similar to the Springfield Railway Companies,
although in terms it is of broader scope as to the property that
may be owned and the business that may be transacted. The decla-
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 15
ration of trust by which it was created was signed by seven of the
directors of the Consolidated Railway Company and of the defend-
ant corporation, who were designated as the trustees, and by the
Consolidated Eailway Company, and by a member of the firm of
Mackay and Company, bankers, who contracted to sell the preferred
shares, and by an assistant of the president of the numerous cor-
porations and the associations, who are designated together as
subscribers. The trustees have no financial interest and are under
no financial liability in regard to the property or business, but
they hold the legal title and act as managers, under the name of
the Kew England Investment and Security Company. They issued
preferred shares and common shares which represent the owner-
ship in the property and business of the association. The preferred
shares are guaranteed by the Consolidated Railway Company, prin-
-cipal and interest, as the shares of the Springfield Railway Compa-
nies are, and are subject to call in the same way, and are to be
redeemed at $105 per share when called, or when the affairs of the
association are liquidated. This guaranty was made at the request
•of the defendant corporation, which in turn gniaranteed the Con-
solidated Railway Company against loss from its guaranty. The
Consolidated Railway Company sold to the New England Invest-
ment and Security Company all the stocks and bonds which it held
of the Worcester & Southbridge Street Railway Company, the
Worcester & Blackstone Valley Street Railway Company, the
Worcester Railway and Investment Company, the Springfield Street
Railway Company and the Springfield Railway Companies, for the
sum of $10,000,000, which was paid by the promissory note of the
New England Investment and Security Company, and it guaranteed
the preferred shares of this company to the amount of $10,000,000,
at the request of the defendant corporation. The contract under
which the shares were issued and the g-uaranty was made, was
signed only by the New England Investment and Security Com-
pany, the Consolidated Railway Company and the New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad Company. In the last analysis, in
view of the ownership of one corporation by the other, the only
party that had any interest in the mattei-s covered by the contract
was the defendant corporation. There was a contract with Mackay
and Company for the sale of these shares, but they were all held
by Mackay and Company for the benefit of the Consolidated Rail-
way Company. At the time of the hearing there were 66,137
preferred shares held by Mackay and Company and owned by the
Railway Company. So far as relates to the questions with which we
are now concerned, there is no substantial difference between the
two voluntai-y associations. In each the equitable ownership is in
the Consolidated Railway Company which is entitled ultimately to
the profits from the management, if there are profits, on liquidation,
16 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
and which must make good the loss to the preferred shareholders if
there is a deficiency.
So far as affects the relations of the Consolidated Railway
Company with the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
Company, the only change in the situation dealt with by the
court in its opinion above quoted appears to be that occasioned
by the merger of the latter company into the former company,
which has already been referred to.
Since, under the laws of Connecticut, the two corporations
mentioned have been merged into a single consolidated corpora-
tion now known as the New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad Company, that corporation, in order to bring into ex-
istence the conditions which will constitute " a performance of
its duty to cease to hold or control either directly or indirectly
the stocks referred to in the information^' {Attorney-General v.
New Yorh, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 201 Mass.
370, 3T2), must divest itself of such holding or control, either
by disposing of all interest in the two voluntary associations or
by disposing of the stock of the street railway companies by a
hona fide sale or transfer. I am advised that the New York,
New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company has chosen the
former method, and has taken action to divest itself of all inter-
est in or control over the New England Investment and Security
Company,* w^hich, since June 26, 1906, has owned all of the
stock of the Springfield Railway Companies, which in turn held
substantially all of the shares of stock of the Springfield Street
Railway Company. This action is reported to me to be as fol-
lows : at the time of the decree most of the trustees and officers
of the New England Investment and Security Company were
also directors and officers of both the New York, New Haven &
Hartford Railroad Company and of the Consolidated Railway
Company of Connecticut. The present officers of the New Eng-
land Investment and Security Company are not corporate officers
or directors of the consolidated corporation known as the New
York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company. In addition,
the following action, as reported to me, has been taken by the
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company to di-
vest itself of the indirect ownership and control of the stock
of the several street railway companies named in the decree : —
1. The New Haven Company surrendered all the eonmion shares
of the New England Investment and Security Company issued to
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 17
it except 1,000. It has surrendered, also, all the right originally
reserved to it, when it surrendered such common shares, to again
demand their issue to it. It has also surrendered all right to demand
the issue to it of any additional common shares.
2. It has sold, without resei^vation or option of any kind, the
1,000 outstanding common shares. The purchasers thereof have
l^aid for the same and hold the same with an absolute title.
3. It has assigned and transferred to the New England Invest-
ment and Security Company all its originally resei^ed right to call
for redemption the preferred shares of the Springfield Railway
Companies.
4. It has assigned to the trustees for the time being deemed to
represent the common shareholders of the New England Investment
and Security Company, all its originally reserved right to call for
redemption the preferred shares of the New England Investment
and Security Company, and that right is now held by the trustees,
deemed to be appointed for the common shareholders, to be exer-
cised by such trustees only for the benefit of the holders of such
common shares.
5. It has accepted in lieu of its demand claim against the New
England Investment and Security Company, fifteen-year notes, unse-
cured except by covenants of the Investment Company not to dis-
pose of its existing assets without substituting other assets deemed
by the trustees to be of equivalent value, and not to pledge or
encumber its assets without equally securing by the instrument of
pledge or mortgage the fifteen-year notes issued by the Investment
Company.
6. Although advised that it was under no obligation so to do, the
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company has con-
tracted for the sale of all the fifteen-year notes so taken by it in
payment of its demand claim against the New England Investment
and Security Company.
7. It has sold to the New England Investment and Security Com-
pany all the bonds and promissory notes which it held of any of
the street railway companies mentioned in the information except-
ing the Worcester & Webster and Webster & Dudley companies, the
disposition of which is next hereinafter described.
8. The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company
has sold and transferred to the New England Investment and Secu-
rity Company all the stock, bonds, certificates of indebtedness and
other obligations of every kind which it held of the Worcester &
Webster and Webster & Dudley Street Railway companies, except
only such as had, prior to the beginning of the suit by the Attorney-
General against the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad,
or by its predecessors in title, been pledged to the New York Secu-
rity and Trust Company of New York, as trustee under the mort-
18 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
gage from the Worcester & Connecticut Eastern Railway Company,
as collateral security for an issue of mortgage bonds by said last-
named railway company, and as to the reversion or equity of
redemption in all stock, bonds and other obligations of said Worces-
ter & Webster and Webster & Dudley Street Railway companies so
pledged, said New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Com-
pany has executed a transfer and assignment of all its right
therein, subject only to the lien of the trustee under said mortgage.
The result of this action upon the part of the New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, as disclosed in the evi-
dence submitted to me and contained in the official declaration
and statement of the corporation made to the House of Repre-
sentatives for the year 1909 (House Document 1329), and in
the absence of any question as to the good faith of said cor-
poration, is to place the stock of the several street railway com-
panies mentioned in the decree in the ownership or control of
the New England Investment and Security Company, whose
trustees and officers are not connected as officers or directors
with the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company
and have entered into no agreement, trust or other undertaking
with such corporation with respect to their acts as officers or
trustees of the New England Investment and Security Company ;
and to terminate the ownership by the New York, New Haven &
Hartford Railroad Company of any shares of the stock of the
New England Investment and Security Company, either by sur-
rendering such stock to the association itself or by transferring
it to individuals, free of all trusts and under no agreement or
undertaking upon the part of the individuals to whom it w^as
transferred. (See House Document 1329, pp. 4, 5.)
Upon the information before me, therefore, I am of opinion
that by divesting itself of all interest in or control over the New
England Investment and Security Company, which through the
instrumentality of the Springfield Railway Companies owned
and controlled the Springfield Street Railway Company, the New
York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company has complied
with the decree of June 23, 1908, and in the manner above de-
scribed has divested itself of its interest in the Springfield
Street Railway Company.
I am, with great respect,
Yery truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
1913.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 19
Constitutional Law — Taxation — Appropriation of Public
Funds — Public Purpose — Relief of Destitute Families of
S trilling Employees.
A proposed resolve " That there be allowed and paid from the treasury
of the commonwealth the sum of ten thousand dollars to be ex-
pended . . . for the relief of destitute families of employees of the
factories at Lawrence, who were thrown out of work by the strike
in that city," contemplates an appropriation of money raised by
taxation for a purpose other than a public purpose, and if passed
would be unconstitutional.
Feb. 7, 1912.
Channing H. Cox, Esq., House Committee on Rules.
Dear Sir : — On behalf of the House Committee on Eules
you have requested my opinion as to the constitutionality of the
following resolve now pending before your committee : —
Resolved, That there be allowed and paid from the treasury of
the commonwealth the sum of ten thousand dollars, to be expended
under the direction of two persons, citizens of the city of Lawrence,
to be appointed by the governor, and to serve without compensa-
tion, for the relief of destitute families of employees of the fac-
tories at Lawrence who are thrown out of work by the strike in
that city. Any expenses necessarily incurred in carrying out the
provisions of this resolve shall be paid from the said sum.
The question presented resolves itself into an inquiry as to
whether the expenditure of money from the treasury of the
Commonwealth, raised by taxation, for the purposes of the re-
solve is an expenditure for a public purpose, it being a well-estab-
lished principle that money raised by taxation may be expended
only for a public purpose. See Lowell v. Oliver, 8 Allen, 247 ;
Mead v. Acton, 139 Mass. 341; Kingman v. Brockton, 153 Mass.
355; Opinion of the Justices, 155 Mass. 601; 186 Mass. 603;
and 190 Mass. 613. The words "public purpose,^' in the sense
herein used, were held in Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454, not to
include the purpose of an act which provided for the relief of
persons who had suffered loss by the fire of 1872, using, at page
472, the following language : —
As a judicial question the case is not changed by the magnitude
of the calamity which has created the emergency, nor by the great-
20 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
ness of the emergency or the extent and importance of the inter-
ests to be promoted. These are considerations affecting only the
propriety and expediency of the expenditure as a legislative ques-
tion. If the expenditure is, in its nature, such as will justify taxa-
tion under any state of circumstances, it belongs to the Legislature
exclusively to detennine whether it shall be authorized in the par-
ticular case; . . .
On the other hand, if its nature is such as not to justify taxation
in any and all cases in which the Legislature might see fit to give
authority therefor, no stress of circumstances affecting the expe-
diency, importance or general desirableness of the measure, and
no concurrence of legislative and municipal action, or preponder-
ance of popular favor in any particular case, will supply the ele-
ment necessary to bring it within the scope of legislative power.
An opinion to the same effect was given by Attorney-General
Malone in 1908 with reference to a proposed resolve providing
for the expenditure of money for the relief of sufferers from the
Chelsea fire.
The present resolve does not appear to have for its purpose
an expenditure of money which can be considered a public pur-
pose. Both its title and the terms of the resolve provide for aid
to be given to certain individuals. The fact that the individuals
may be many in number does not of itself make the purpose a
public one. In Lowell v. Boston, above cited, appears the fol-
lowing language : —
The incidental advantage to the public or to the State, which
results from the promotion of private interests and the prosperity
of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the
use of public money raised by taxation, or for which taxation may
become necessary.
The part of the decision in Mead v. Acton, above cited, also in
point is as follows : —
The direct primaiy object is to benefit individuals, and not the
public. In any view we can take of the statute, the payments it
contemplates are mere gratuities or gifts to individuals. ... A
statute conferring such power is unconstitutional, because it author-
izes raising money by taxation for the exclusive benefit of particu-
lar individuals, and appropriates money for a private purpose
which can only be raised and used for public objects. The right to
tax is the right to raise money by assessing the citizens for the
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 21
support of the government and the use of the State. The term
" taxation " imports the raising of money for public use, and
excludes the raising of it for private uses.
In my opinion the resolve submitted is clearly within the
principles and decisions hereinbefore referred to, and would pro-
vide for an unconstitutional appropriation of public funds.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
Sheriff — Right to require Assistance in Case of Actual or Im-
pending Riot, Tumult or Other Breach of the Peace —
Citizen — Militia — Precept.
Where there is imminent, impending danger of a riot or other breach
of the peace, the sheriff of any county may call such aid as a
man of ordinary prudence, firmness and activity in such situation
might think necessary to quell such riot or disturbance; or where
a tumult, riot or mob actually exists or is threatened he may, under
the provisions of St. 1908, c. 604, <§ 142, issue a precept direct-
ing any commander of a brigade, regiment, battalion, corps of
cadets or company within his jurisdiction " to appear at a time
and place therein specified, to aid the civil authority in suppressing
such violence and supporting the laws."
If, however, no riot or other breach of the peace actually exists or
is threatened, a sheriff has no authority to call upon citizens to
act as patrolmen or to do ordinary police duty.
Feb. 7, 1912.
Brig. Gen. Gardner W. Pearson^ Adjutant General.
Sir : — You have requested my opinion as to whether the
Sheriff of Essex County can be required to establish patrols and
police guards in the city of Lawrence to take the place of and
to perform the duties of the regular city police, the latter being
unable to preserve the peace. I am informed, and for the pur-
poses of this opinion assume, that there are no riots at present
in the city, and that troops are stationed there against such a
contingency. It is also stated that it is your desire to withdraw
the militia from the city as soon as possible, consistent with the
proper preservation of the peace and suppression of attempts to
violate the law of the Commonwealth.
The office of sheriff is one of the oldest known to the law, and
from earliest times he has been the chief officer for the preserva-
22 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
tion of the peace in his county. By R. L., c. 23, § 14, it is
provided : —
They [sheriffs] may require suitable aid in the execution of their
office in a criminal case, in the preservation of the peace, in the
apprehending or securing of a person for a breach of the peace
and in cases of escape or rescue of persons arrested upon civil
process.
The first use of the phrase " suitable aid " as above employed
appears in chapter 20 of the Acts of the Province of Massachu-
setts Bay in the year 1698. The phrase should be construed,
therefore, as giving the same authority as that of a sheriff under
the common law, in the light of which it is to be interpreted
unless otherwise modified by statute. Consideration of the de-
cisions in that regard discloses in each case a situation where
the breach of the peace was actually in progress, or where there
had been an outbreak just previously, with another disturbance
expected and imminent as a reasonable certainty. I am led to
the conclusion that in order to furnish cause for the sheriff to
exercise this extraordinary remedy under his common law au-
thority, there must be a necessity for it because of disorders
either existing at the time of his action or imminently threat-
ened, with apparent certainty to occur. In the exercise of this
function the sheriff apparently acts in a quasi-judicial capacity,
and his determination, so long as exercised within the reasonable
scope of his authority, cannot be questioned. Ela v. Smith,
5 Gray, 121.
In addition to E. L., c. 23, § 14, hereinbefore cited, E. L., c.
211 § 1, further provides: —
If twelve or more persons, being armed with clubs or other dan-
gerous weapons, or if thirty or more persons, whether armed or
not, are unlawfully, riotously or tumultuously assembled in a city or
towT^ the mayor and each of the aldermen of such city, each of
the selectmen of such town, every justice of the peace living in any
such city or town and the sheriff of the county and his deputies
shall go among the persons so assembled, or as near to them as
may be with safety, and in the name of the commonwealth com-
mand all persons so assembled immediately and peaceably to dis-
perse; and if they do not thereupon immediately and peaceably
disperse, each of said magistrates and officers shall command the
assistance of all persons there present in suppressing such riot or
unlawful assembly and aiTesting such persons.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 23
As there is no riot in progress, upon the assumption in your
inquiry, the situation is not Tvdthin the scope of this section.
In answer to the specific inquiiy, therefore, I am of the
opinion that unless a riot or other breach of the peace actually
exists, or there is immediate, impending danger thereof, the
sheriff has no power to call citizens from their own pursuits to
act as patrolmen or to do police duty; that is, to perform the
ordinaiT duties that are performed by police patrolmen of the
city of Lawrence. On the other hand, if there is imminent,
impending danger of a riot or other breach of the peace the
sheriff has the power and the duty to call such aid as a man of
ordinary prudence, firmness and activity in his situation would
think necessary to quell the disturbance. In case of threatened
riot our statutes provide a method in which he may proceed,
namely, to call upon the organized militia by precept issued to its
commander, under St. 1908, c. 604, § 142, which provides as
follows : —
In case of a tumult, riot, mob, or a body of men acting together
by force, to violate or resist the laws of the commonwealth, or when
such tumult, riot or mob is threatened, and the fact appears to the
commander-in-chief, to the sheriff of the county, to the mayor of
the city or the selectmen of the town, the commander-in-chief may
issue his order, or such sheriff, mayor or selectmen may issue a
precept, directed to any commander of a brigade, regiment, bat-
talion, corps of cadets or company, within their jurisdiction, direct-
ing him to order his coromand, or a part thereof, to appear at a
time and place therein specified, to aid the civil authority in sup-
pressing such violence and supporting the laws; which precept
shall be in substance as follows : —
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
To [insert the oflEicer's title] A.B., commanding [insert his command].
Whereas, it appears to [the sheriff, mayor or the selectmen] of the [county,
city or town] of , that [here state one or more of the causes above
mentioned] in our of , and that military force is neces-
sary to aid the civil authority in suppressing the same: Now, therefore, we
command you that you cause [your command, or such part thereof as may be
desired], armed and equipped with ammunition and with proper officers, to
parade at , on , then and there to obey such orders as
may be given according to law. Hereof fail not at your peril, and have you
there this precept with your doings returned thereon.
This precept shall be signed by such sheriff, mayor or selectmen,
and may be varied to suit the circumstances of the case; and a
copy of the same shall be immediately forwarded to the commander-
in-chief.
24 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
From this section the power of the sheriff and that of the
mayor appear to be the same. While this means may not be the
exclusive means to^be employed under such circumstances, never-
theless, in case of emergency it would be proper under this au-
thority for the sheriff to call upon the militia to aid him in the
execution of the duties of his office. It would appear, therefore,
that the militia might be called upon by the sheriff rather than to
be relieved by him by means of other persons summoned to take
the place of the militia. This action would largely be left to
the discretion and judgment of the sheriff, under the circum-
stances as they might appear.
Very truly yours,
James M. Sv7ift, Attorney- General.
Constitutional Law — Police Power — Regulation of Private
Business — Sale of Theatre Tickets.
The right of the Legislature under the police power to regulate the
conduct of a private business in respect to public safety or morals
does not extend to the regulation of the sale of tickets of admis-
sion to theatres and other places of amusement; and a proposed
bill requiring that such tickets shall have the price printed thereon
and that it shall be unlawful to sell or offer for sale any such
ticket for an amount in excess of the printed sum, if passed, would
be unconstitutional and void.
Feb. 15, 1912.
Clarence W. Hobbs, Jr., Esq., Clerk, Committee on the Judiciary.
Dear Sir : — On behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary
you have requested my opinion upon the constitutionality of
House Bill Xo. 967. This bill in substance provides that every
ticket for admission to a theatre, opera house, concert hall or
other place of public exhibition or amusement shall have printed
upon its face the price thereof; that no greater sum shall be
asked or received therefor ; and that it shall be unlawful for any
person, firm or corporation to sell or offer for sale any such
ticket for a sum in excess of that printed thereon.
Statutes of this character have been considered by the courts
of California {Ex parte Quarg, 149 Cal. 79) and of Illinois
{People V. Steele, 231 111. 340), and have been held unconsti-
tutional for the reason that the business of conducting a theatre
or other place of amusement is a private business, and while
such business may be regulated by the Legislature in respect to
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 25
public morals or safety, under the police power, the right of
regulation cannot be extended to the sale of tickets of admission
to places of amusement. Thus, in Ex parte Quarg, above cited
the court said, at page 81 : —
The police power is broad in its scope, but it is subject to the
just limitation that it extends only to such measures as are reason-
able in their application and which tend in some appreciable degree
to promote, protect or preserve the public health, morals or safety,
or the general welfare. The prohibition of an act which the court
•can clearly see has no tendency to affect, injure or endanger the
public in any of these particulai-s, and which is entirely innocent
in character, is an act beyond the pale of this limitation, and it
is therefore not a legitimate exercise of police power. The sale
of a theatre ticket at an advance upon the original purchase price,
or the business of reselling such tickets at a profit, is no more
immoral, or injurious to public welfare or convenience, than is the
•sale of any ordinaiy article of merchandise at a profit.
I have no doubt that the principles so declared are applicable
io the question now before me, and I am therefore of opinion
that, if passed. House Bill No. 967 would be unconstitutional
and void.
Very truly yours,
James M. Sv^ift, Attorney-General.
Massachusetts District Police — Chief — Boiler Inspection De-
partment — Chief Inspector.
St. 1906, c. 521, entitled " An Act to provide for the appointment of a
chief inspector of the boiler inspection department of the District
Police," which provides in section 1, in part, that " said chief in-
spector shall have superv^ision over the members of said boiler in-
spection department in order to secure the uniform enforcement
throughout the commonwealth of all acts relative to the inspection
of boilers and the examination of engineers and firemen," does
not create an independent department, and the action of such
chief inspector is under the jurisdiction and subject to the orders
of the Chief of the District Police.
Feb. 15, 1912.
Gen. J. H. Whitney, Chief of the District Police.
Dear Sir: — Under section 1 of chapter 521 of the Acts of
1906, an act to provide for the appointment of a chief inspector
26 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
of the boiler inspection department of the District Police, pro-
viding, in part, as follows : " Said chief inspector shall have
supervision over the members of said boiler inspection depart-
ment in order to secure the uniform enforcement throughout the
commonwealth of all acts relative to the inspection of boilers and
the examination of engineers and firemen," you have made the
following request for my opinion : —
To what extent has the chief of the District Police authority over
said chief inspector and members of this branch of the inspection
department of the District Police? That is to say: —
First. — Has the chief inspector authority to detail any or all
of the boiler inspectors for duty in any district of the Common-
wealth without obtaining permission from the Chief of the District
Police?
Second. — Has the chief inspector the authority to order such
inspectors, or any of them, from their districts to any other part of
the Commonwealth without obtaining permission from the Chief of
the District PoUce?
Third. — How far does the authority of the Chief of the District
Police extend over the duties, discipline and general conduct of
the chief inspector and inspectors of boilers?
You also further inquire as to whether " there exists a depart-
ment known as the ' boiler inspection department ' ".
In my opinion there is no provision of law which establishes
as a superior, independent department outside of the authority
of the Chief of the District Police a "boiler inspection depart-
ment."
By section 1 of chapter 108 of the Revised Laws the District
Police force is divided into two departments, to wit : the inspec-
tion department and the detective department. The boiler in-
spectors are appointed from the inspection department of the
District Police. In my opinion the action of the chief inspector
of the boiler inspection department, so called, is under the
jurisdiction and subject to the orders of a superior, the Chief
of the District Police.
Answering your questions specifically : —
The first should be answered in the negative, that is, the de-
tails made by the chief inspector would be subject to the ap-
proval or disapproval of the Chief of the District Police.
As to the second, the same answer should be made.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 27
As to the third, I am of the opinion that the authority of the
Chief of the District Police is the same over the chief boiler in^
spector as it is over the heads of the other divisions of the depart-
ment, that is, that he is the superior officer over all.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
Commonwealth — Employee — Veteran — Retirement — Con-
sent.
St. 1907, c. 458, § 1, providing that, with the consent of the Governor,,
a veteran of the civil war in the service of the Commonwealth, if
incapacitated for active duty, may be retired at one-half the rate
of compensation paid to him when in active service, was designed
not only to provide a pension for the person so retired, but also
to relieve the public service of persons unable to perform the duties
required of them, and if incapacitated for duty a veteran may be-
so retired without his consent and upon the request and recom-
mendation of the head of the department in which he is employed.
Feb. 16, 1912.
Gen. J. H. Whitxey, Chief of the District Police.
Dear Sir: — By a communication dated February 12 you
have requested my opinion upon the question whether, under the
provisions of St. 1907, c. 458, § 1, you are authorized to request
and recommend the retirement of any veteran employed in the
department who in your opinion is incapacitated to such a de-
gree as to render his retirement necessary for the good of the
service, irrespective of his desire to so retire.
The statute to which you have referred is as follows : —
A veteran of the civil war in the service of the commonwealth, if
incapacitated for active duty, shall be retired from active service,
with the consent of the governor, at one half the rate of compen-
sation paid to him when in active service, to be paid out of the
treasury of the commonwealth : provided, that no veteran shall be
entitled to be retired under the provisions of this act unless he shall
have been in the servdce of the commonwealth at least ten years.
But if, in the opinion of the governor and council, any veteran of
the civil war in said service is incapacitated to such a degree as to
render his retirement necessary for the good of the service, he may
so be retired at any time. A veteran retired under the provisions
of this act, whose term of service was for a fixed number of years,
shall be entitled to the benefits of the act without reappointment.
28 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
This statute is applicable to cases where a veteran of the civil
war in the service of the Commonwealth is incapacitated for
active duty, and in such cases is mandatory, and, besides provid-
ing a pension for the person retired, is obviously intended to
relieve the public service of persons unable to perform the duties
required of them. I am therefore of opinion that, with the con-
sent of the Governor, a veteran may be retired, if incapacitated
for active duty, without regard to the desire of such veteran in
the premises; and while the statute contains no express pro-
vision to that effect, I have no doubt that the head of a depart-
ment may properly request and recommend retirement in such
cases.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney- General.
Constitutional Law — Police Power — Regulation of Sale of
Goods, Wares and Merchandise made by Convict Labor in
Prison — Constitution of the United States — Commerce
Clause.
A proposed act requiring that all goods, wares and merchandise made by
convict labor in any prison, reformatory or jail in this or any other
State and brought into this Commonwealth, shall, before being ex-
posed for sale, be marked " Convict Made,'' and providing that any
person offering such goods for sale or having such goods in posses-
sion, without the printed label or mark, shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor, cannot be justified as a valid exercise of the police power;
and since it would constitute a burden or restriction upon interstate
commerce, and would therefore be in contravention of the commerce
clause (U. S. Const., Art. I., § VITI.) of the Federal Constitution,
would therefore be unconstitutional if enacted.^
March 8, 1912.
Charles T. Holt, Esq., House Chairman, Joint Committee on
Prisons.
Dear Sir : — Your committee has requested my opinion upon
the constitutionality of House Bill No. 833, entitled "An Act
relative to the marking of goods made in penal institutions,^^
and pro^dding, in substance, that all goods, wares and merchan-
dise made by convict labor in any prison, reformatory or jail in
this or any other State in which convict labor is employed and
imported, brought or introduced into the State of Massachusetts,
shall, before being exposed for sale, be branded, labelled or
marked " Convict Made ; " and that any person offering such
1 See 211 Mas8. 605.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 29
goods for sale, or having such goods in possession for that pur-
pose, without the brand, label or mark, shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding $1,000 nor less than $50, or by imprisonment for a
term not exceeding twelve months or by both fine and imprison-
ment.
I am of opinion that the proposed bill, if enacted, would be
unconstitutional for the reason that it is in contravention of the
commerce clause of the Federal Constitution (U. S. Const., Art.
I., § VIII) which provides that "the congress shall have power
... to regulate commerce . . . among the several states, . . P ,
since prison-made goods, when brought into the Commonwealth
from another State, become articles of interstate commerce, and,
as such, may not be discriminated against. Arnold v. Yanclers,
56 Ohio, 417. Since, for the reasons which are set forth at
length in the opinion of the court in the case of People v.
Hawhins, decided by the Court of Appeals of the State of New
York (157 N". Y. Eep. 1), the proposed legislation cannot be
justified as a valid exercise of the police power, it would con-
stitute a burden or restriction upon interstate commerce, and is
therefore unconstitutional.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
Constitutional Law — Qualification of Voters — Legislature —
Police Power — Regulation of Conduct of Elections.
The qualifications which shall entitle any person to vote or to be voted
for and the right to elect and to be elected to public office are de-
fined in Article IX. of the Declaration of Eights and Articles III.,
XX. and XXI. of the Articles of Amendment to the Constitution of
the Commonwealth.
The conduct of elections may be regulated by the Legislature under the
police power for the purpose of providing an easy and reasonable
mode of exercising the constitutional right preventing error and
fraud and securing order and regularity; but all such regulation
must be subordinate to the provisions of the Constitution and cannot
add to or diminish the qualifications of a voter as therein prescribed.
Whether or not the provisions of a proposed act which restrict the ex-
penditure of money or the contribution of any other valuable thing
in connection with an election by any person whether or not such
person is a candidate for public office, to traveling expenses incurred
by himself and to expenses for preparing, circulating and filing
nomination papers; to forbid, except in cases of age or physical
disability, the conveyance of any voter to the polls otherwise than
30 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
at his own expense, and require that if any person elected to oflfice,
or any member or agent, or his campaign committee, or any other
person acting in his or their interest or behalf, is convicted of any
violation of the law relating to corrupt practices at the primary at
which such candidate was named, or at the election at which he was
elected, such office shall be vacated and a new election shall be held
to fill it, are reasonable and necessary precautions against bribery,
fraud and other improper conduct in connection with elections and,
therefore, a protection to the constitutional right to elect and to be
elected to office, is primarily a question of fact and, therefore, a
proper subject for the determination of the Legislature.
It would seem, however, that the enforcement of such stringent regula-
tions as those above described could hardly be held to be a reasonable
regulation of the exercise of the right to take part in elections.
-A provision in the proposed act requiring that persons who, by reason of
age or physical infirmity, are unable to reach the polls without assist-
ance and are, therefore, transported to and from the polls shall,
before voting, make a statement under oath of such disability, is
clearly unconstitutional as imposing a qualification upon such persons
additional to those prescribed by the Constitution.
March 8, 1912.
Hon. Levi H. Greexwood, President of the Senate.
Dear Sir : — By an order dated February 27 the Honorable
Senate has requested my opinion upon four questions of law
•affecting the constitutionality of House Bill N'o. 1360, which
is entitled "An Act relative to election expenses." Section 1 of
this bill is designed to amend St. 1907, c. 560, § 316, as
amended by St. 1911, c. 679, § 1, by striking out the whole of
said section and substituting the following section : —
No person shall, in order to aid or promote his own or another's
nomination or election to a public office, directly or indirectly, him-
self or through another person, give, pay, expend or contribute, or
promise tQ give, pay, expend or contribute, any money or valuable
thing, except for expenses directly incurred and paid by a person
for travelling and for purposes properly incidental to travelling,
and for preparing, circulating and filing nomination papers; but
nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a person from
making a voluntary payment of money or a voluntary and uncondi-
tional promise of payment of money to a political committee for
the promotion of the pruiciples of the party which it represents
and for expenses properly incidental thereto.
Section 2 of the proposed bill purports to amend St. 1907, c.
560, § 317. The section as there set forth, however, has been
already amended by St. 1911, c. 679, § 2, and I assume that the
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 3l
proposed bill is applicable to the amended section. The present
amendment strikes out the whole of this section and in its place
provides that —
The mayor of each city and the selectmen of each town of two
thousand or more inhabitants in the coromonwealth shall, at each
primary and election, provide one conveyance for each voting pre-
cinct within their jurisdiction, to be used under the direction of the
presiding officer at each polling place in transporting to and from
the polls such persons only as by reason of age or physical infirmity
•are unable to reach the same without assistance. A record of all
persons so transported shall be kept by the presiding officer, and
he shall require from each before voting a statement under oath of
such physical disability. No voter shall be conveyed to the polls
otherwise than entirely at his own expense except as herein pro-
vided.
Section 6 of the proposed bill amends St. 1911, c. 679, § 6,
which provides that —
If a person elected to public office is convicted of any wilful
violation of the law relating to corrupt practices in connection with
the primary or election at which he was nominated or elected, his
office shall thereby be vacated, and a new election shall be held for
the purpose of filling the same.
•so that it shall read as follows : —
If a person elected to public office, or any member or agent of
his campaign committee, or any other person acting in his or their
interest or behalf, is convicted of any violation of the law relating
to corrupt practices in connection with the primary or election at
which he was nominated or elected, his office shall thereby be vacated,
and a new election shall be held for the purpose of filling the same.
The inquiries of the Honorable Senate with relation to the
provisions above quoted are as follows : —
1. Is the pro^'ision in section 1 of the bill printed as House Bill
Xo. 1360 constitutional, which forbids a candidate to incur any
expense in order to aid his nomination or election except as pro-
vided in lines 12 to 20 of said section?
2. Is the provision in the same section constitutional, which
extends the same prohibition to persons not candidates?
32 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan..
3. Is the provision in section 2 of the same bill constitutional,,
which provides that no voter shall be conveyed to the jdoIIs other-
wise than entirely at his own expense, except in case of physical
inability?
4. Is the provision of section 6 of the same bill constitutional^
which provides for vacating an election because of corrupt prac-
tices without proof of a candidate's knowledge or consent?
The qualifications which shall entitle any person to vote or to^
be voted for in this Commonwealth, and the right to elect or to
be elected to public office, which is consequent upon such qualifi-
cations, are clearly fixed and defined by the Constitution of Mas-
sachusetts, and the Legislature cannot add to or alter the former
or restrict or destroy the latter. Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass.
497, 499. The provisions of the Constitution of the Common-
wealth upon this subject are to be found, first, in Article IX. of
the Declaration of Eights, which declares that —
All elections ought to be free; and all the inhabitants of this
commonwealth, having such qualifications as they shall establish by
their frame of government, have an equal right to elect officers, and
to be elected, for public employments.
and second, in the Articles of Amendment to the Constitution
which prescribe the qualifications of voters, to be found in
Articles III., XX. and XXXL, of which it' is necessary to con-
sider only Article III. This article is as follows : —
Every male citizen of twenty-one years of age and upwards,,
excepting paupers and persons under guardianship, who shall have
resided within the commonwealth one year, and within the town
or district in which he may claim a right to vote, six calendar
months next preceding any election of governor, lieutenant-gov-
ernor, senators, or representatives, shall have a right to vote in such
election of Governor, lieutenant-governor, senators and representa-
tives; and no other person shall be entitled to vote in such elec-
tions.
The qualifications of voters being thus established, the con-
duct of elections may be regulated by the Legislature under
Article IV. of section I. of Chapter 1. of Part the Second of
the Constitution, by which full power and authority is con-
ferred upon the General Court —
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 33
from time to time to make, ordain and establish, all manner of
wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, statutes, and ordinances,
directions and instructions, either with penalties or without; so as
the same be not repugnant or contrary to this constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and w^elfare of this commonwealth,
and for the government and ordering thereof, and of the subjects
of the same, and for the necessary support and defence of the
government thereof ;
but all legislation must be subordinate to the provisions of the
Constitution already cited^ and cannot add to or diminish the
qualifications of a voter as therein prescribed. Kinneen v.
Wells, supra, p. 499; Blanchard v. Stearns, 5 Met. 298, 301;
Williams v. Whiting, 11 Mass, 424; Opinion of the Justices, 5
Met. 591, 592; Commonwealth v. Rogers, 181 Mass. 184, 186.
The power of the Legislature in the premises was well de-
scribed by Chief Justice Shaw in the case of Capen v. Foster,
12 Pick. 485, at page 488, where he stated —
And this court is of opinion that in all cases where the Consti-
tution has conferred a political right or privilege, and where the
Constitution has not particularly designated the manner in which
that right is to be exercised, it is clearly within the just and con-
stitutional limits of the legislative power to adopt any reasonable
and uniform regulations in regard to the time and mode of exer-
cising that right, which are designed to secure and facilitate the
exercise of such .right, in a prompt, orderly and convenient manner.
Such a construction would afford no warrant for such an exercise
of legislative power, as, under the pretence and color of regidating,
should subvert or injuriously restrain the right itself.
And see, Cole v. Tiicler, 164 Mass. 486.
The provision of the Constitution from w^hich the Legislature
derives the power to regulate the exercise of the right of fran-
chise is that which confers upon the General Court the police
power (see Commonwealth v. Danziger, 176 Mass. 290, 291,
and cases cited), and this power must always be reasonably
exercised. Commonivealth v. Bearse, 132 Mass. 542, 546; Com-
momvealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53.
From the principles above discussed, therefore, it is clear that
in passing upon the constitutionality of legislation w^iich aifects
the right of any person or persons to elect or to be elected to
public offices created by the Constitution or laws of the Com-
monw^ealth, it is necessarv to determine as a matter of fact
34 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
whether or not such legislation is intended to " provide ^ an
easy and reasonable mode of exercising the constitutional right ' ''
and is " calculated to prevent error and fraud, to secure order
and regularity in the conduct of elections, and thereby give
more security to the right itself/' Commonwealth v. Rogers,
181 Mass. 184, 186; citing Capen v. Foster, supra; Kinneen v.
Wells, supra; and Jaquith v. Wellesley, 171 Mass. 138, 143.
From the principles which I have already discussed it follows
that the proposed amendments will be constitutional only if
they are designed to afford and do afford an easy and reasonable
mode of exercising the constitutional right of participating in
elections, and are " calculated to prevent error and fraud, to
secure order and regularity of conduct of elections, and thereby
give more security to the right itself." It is to be observed that
the effect of the proposed legislation, taken as a whole, is to
restrict the expenditure of money or the contribution of any
other valuable thing in connection with an election, by any per-
son, whether or not such person is a candidate for public office,
to travelling expenses and expenses properly incident to travel
incurred by himself, and to expenses for preparing, circulating
and filing nomination papers; to forbid, except in the manner
designated, the conveyance of any voter to the polls except en-
tirely at his own expense; and to require that if any person
elected to office, or any member or agent of his campaign com-
mittee, or any other person acting in his or their interest or
behalf, is convicted of any violation of the law relating to cor-
rupt practices at the primary at which such candidate was
nominated or the election at which he was elected, such office
shall be vacated and a new election shall be held to fill it. The
provision in St. 1907, c. 560, § 316, as amended by section 1 of
the proposed bill, that the act shall not apply to voluntary pay-
ments or promises of pa^^ment of money to a political committee,
does not enlarge the field of permitted expenditure, for the
reason that except for the purposes already enumerated no
person is authorized to expend it, although the words ^^for the
promotion of the principles of the part}^ which it represents and
for expenses properly incidental thereto " may have been in-
tended to permit to political committees a greater freedom than
is given to individuals in the premises.
The question thus presented is primarily one of fact, and
therefore a proper subject for the determination of the Legis-
lature. The enactment of the proposed amendments would
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 35
have the effect of a determination by the General Court that
the regulations contained therein were not in its opinion a
restriction npon the exercise of the constitutional right affected,
but were reasonable and necessary precautions against bribery,
fraud and other improper conduct in connection with elections,
and therefore a protection of the right itself, and, as such,
would doubtless be entitled to great weight. See CommonweaWh
V. Bearse, 132 Mass. 542, 549; CommomueaUh v. Alger, 7 Cush.
53, 102. So far as I am at liberty to express my views upon
a question of this character, however, I am constrained to say
that in my opinion, by the enforcement of such stringent regu-
lations as those contained in the proposed bill, the right of every
citizen of the Commonwealth duly qualiiied to elect and to be
elected to public office would be seriously impaired and re-
stricted, since under such regulations a general election held
throughout the Commonwealth might be invalidated by the act
of a single person in violating even some minor provision of
the law relative to corrupt practices. A regulation of elections
which makes possible such a result can hardly be held to be a
reasonable regulation of the exercise of the right to take part in
elections, but is, rather, an injurious restraint and interference
with it. For the reasons stated, therefore, I am of opinion that
the proposed amendments referred to in each of the questions
submitted by the Honorable Senate do not constitute a reason-
able or necessary regulation of the constitutional right, are not
necessary for its protection, and, if passed, would therefore be
unconstitutional and void.
With respect to the second inquiry of the Honorable Senate,
which refers to section 2 of the proposed bill, there is a further
objection upon constitutional grounds, in that said section pur-
ports to require of certain persons otherwise qualified to vote,
as a preliminary to voting, an oath relative to their physical
condition^ which clearly constitutes a qualification additional
to those prescribed by the Constitution.
See Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497 : Riso7i v. Farr, 24 Ark.
161 : Davies v. McKeehy, 5 Nev. 369 ; Green v. Shumway, 39
N". Y. 418.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General
36 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Constitutional Laiv — Appropriation of Money Raised hy Taxa-
tion — Moral OhUgation — Repayment of Money paid
under Mistake of Fact or Law — New York, New Haven &
Hartford Railroad Company.
The fulfilment of a moral obligation upon the Commonwealth, created
by a claim growing out of general principles of right and justice
and based upon considerations of a moral or merely honorary nature,
such as would be binding on the conscience or honor of an individual,
is a public purpose, and money raised by taxation may be appro-
priated therefor although such claim could not be enforced by any
legal procedure.
A proposed resolve to provide for repayment by the Commonwealth of a
sum erroneously paid as taxes by the New York, New Haven & Hart-
ford Eailroad Company, if the Legislature determined that the facts
submitted in connection therewith imposed upon the Commonwealth
a moral obligation of the character heretofore recognized, would, if
passed, be constitutional.
March 12, 1912.
V. F. Jewett, Esq., Clerk of the Committee on Taxation.
Dear Sir : — Your commimication of March 6 states that
you desire my opinion " concerning the constitutionality of the
repa}Tnent of the franchise tax for 1910 to the New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad as set forth in House Bill No. 508.'^
The bill to which you refer is a proposed resolve to provide for
the repayment by the Commonwealth of a sum erroneously paid
as taxes by the New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad
Company, and is as follows : —
Whereas, on September fifteen, nineteen hundred and nine, the
New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company executed
an instrument purporting- to convey its real estate in Park Square
in the city of Boston to Moses Williams and others, as trustees, and
whereas the said trustees paid the tax on the said property levied
by the city of Boston for the year nineteen hundred and ten, the
said property being valued by the city at the sum of four million
four hundred and seventy-two thousand dollars, and whereas on
May sixteen, nineteen hundred and eleven, the supreme judicial
court of the commonw^ealth rendered a decision that the said deed
of conveyance was null and void, then making the said corporation
hable to repay the said tax to the said trustees and then also enti-
tling the said corporation to an abatement of part of the franchise
tax paid to the commonw^ealth by the said corporation for the year
nineteen hundred and ten, now. therefore, be it
Resolved, That the treasurer of the eommonv.^ealth shall pay to
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 37
the said corporation a sum equivalent to the sum which would have
been deducted from the franchise tax of the said corporation for
the year nineteen hundred and ten, had not the said deed of con-
veyance been made, with interest from the date of the payment
of the said tax in the year nineteen hundred and ten, until the date
when this resolve takes effect.
The facts upon which your inquiry is based are substantially
recited in the preamble to the proposed resolve. The New
York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company having in
its possession certain real estate formerly occupied as a station
at Park Square in the city of Boston, rendered unavailable for
railroad purposes by the erection of the terminal passenger sta-
tion and other changes made under the provisions of St. 1896,
c. 516, on Sept. 15, 1909, conveyed said real estate to certain
trustees, subject to the terms, conditions and trust contained in
a declaration of trust bearing the same date. These trustees,
who had full power in the premises, were to develop the prop-
erty and dispose of it for the benefit of the holders of shares,
which, to the number of 52,000, the trustees were authorized
to issue to the New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Com-
pany in payment for the real estate so conveyed. The tax in
question was assessed and paid under the provisions of St. 1909,
c. 490, Part III., §§ 40-13, and as the Park Square property
stood in the name of the trustees and was taxed to them by the
city of Boston, the New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad
Company did not include it in its statement of the works, struc-
tures, real estate, machinery, underground conduits, wires and
pipes o-^^Tied by it and subject to local taxation as required by
section 40 above referred to, and it was not, therefore, deducted
from the amount of the franchise tax as authorized by section
41. Upon May 16, 1911, the Supreme Judicial Court of the
Commonw^ealth, in the case of Williams v. Johnson, 208 Mass.
544, a proceeding brought by a stockholder of the New York,
New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Company, handed down a
decision holding that the disposition of the Park Square prop-
erty of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Com-
pany was iiltra vires, that the deed of said company to the
trustees w^as beyond the power of the corporation or the direc-
tors to make, and that the trustees took no valid title under it.
If the invalidity of the transfer of the title had been known at
the time when the tax for the year 1910 was assessed, the com-
38 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
pany would have been entitled to have the value of the Park
Square property deducted from the value of its corporate fran-
chise in determining the amount of franchise tax, and if such
invalidity had been discovered within six months after the
payment of said tax, the corporation might have secured a
proper deduction by a petition to the Supreme Judicial Court,
as provided in section TO of Part III. of chapter 490, but since
more than six months have elapsed from the date of payment of
the tax there is now no legal rem^edy open to the corporation.
Upon these facts, I reply to your specific inquiry as fol-
lows : —
It is well established that the Legislature may appropriate
money raised by taxation only for a public purpose. Lowell v.
Boston, 111 Mass. 454; Kingman et al., petitioners, 153 Mass.
566 ; Opinion of the Justices, 186 Mass. 603, 605 ; Opinion of
the Justices, 190 Mass. 611, 613.
Among those purposes which are generally recognized as pub-
lic, and for which money raised by taxation may be expended,
is the fulfilment of moral obligations, so-called, resting upon
the sovereign, which cannot be enforced or required by any legal
procedure; and it has been held that where a claim grows out
of general principles of right and justice and is based upon
considerations of a moral or merely honorary nature, such as
are binding on the conscience or the honor of an individual,
it may be fulfilled although the claim could obtain no recogni-
tion in a court of law. United States v. Realty Company, 163
U. S. 427, 440.
How far the Legislature of this Commonwealth may go in
recognizing moral obligations by the appropriation of money
raised by taxation has never been determined by the courts,
although in Eai'le v. Commonwealth, 180 Mass. 579, in speaking
of such an appropriation to be recovered as damages for a kind
of injury for which it was unnecessary to provide compensation,
Mr. Justice Holmes observed that " some latitude is allowed to
the Legislature. It is not forbidden to be just in some cases
where it is not required to be by the letter of paramount law."
Such obligations have been very generally recognized in the past
by legislative acts appropriating money to compensate individuals
for injuries received or property destroyed in the public service
(see, for example Resolves of 1910, c. 102; Resolves of 1909,
c. 137; Resolves of 1908, cc. 49, 52, 55, etc.) ; or to afford com-
pensation for other less definite and certain claims (see Resolves
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 39
of 1906, c. 61; Eesolves of 1905, c. 55; Eesolves of 1904, c. 49;
Eesolves of 1903, cc. 36, 77, 83; Eesolves of 1902, cc. 11, 57),
and no question appears to have been raised with respect to them.
This recognition has been expressly extended to the reim-
bursement for money paid into the treasury of the Common-
wealth under a misapprehension of fact. Thus, Eesolves of
1907, c. 19, provides for the payment to the town of Dalton of
$2,618.76, said amount "having been paid by the town . . .
for the support of a State charge under a misapprehension of
facts." And see Eesolves of 1904, c. 78. Even more closely in
point is Eesolves of 1907, c. 36, wdiich provided for reimbursing
the Mexican Central Eailway for taxes inadvertently assessed,
which had been paid into the treasury of the Commonwealth,
and for the recovery of one of which a petition had been brought
under St. 1903, c. 437, § 84, upon which the court had held
the assessment invalid. Mexican Central Railway v. Common-
ivealth, 192 Mass. 129.
Although the court has never precisely defined the limits of
the power of the General Court with respect to the recognition
of claims such as that presented by the proposed resolve in favor
of the Xew York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Company,
if the Legislature shall determine that the facts submitted ifi
connection with said resolve impose upon the Commonwealth a
moral obligation of the character of that recognized in the case
of the Mexican Central Eailway Company, or in other cases
cited where municipalities or individuals have been reimbursed
for money paid under a mistake of fact or law, I am of opinion
that it may make a sufficient appropriation to discharge said
obligation.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
Constitutio7ial Laiu — Elections — Voting Machines, Ballot
Boxes and Counting Apparatus — Examination by State
Ballot Law Commission — Delegation of Legislative Au-
thority.
A provision in a proposed act relating to the use of voting machines,
that " the State Ballot Law Commission shall also constitute the
State Board of Voting Machine Examiners, and shall at such times,
under such conditions and after such public notice as they shall
determine, examine voting machines, ballot boxes and counting ap-
paratus, and they shall make and file with the Secretary of the Com-
monwealth their report on such machines, ballot boxes and counting
40 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
apparatus as in their judgment conform to the requirements of law,
together with such written or printed descriptions and such drawings,
specifications and photographs as shall clearly identify such ma-
chines," does not vest in or impose upon the State Ballot Law Com-
mission any powers and duties which involve a delegation of
legislative authority which would be objectionable upon constitutional
grounds.
The provision above quoted does not directly require the State Ballot
Law Commission to approve only such machines as fulfil the require-
ments of the primary law, but indirectly requires such approval,
since they are required to make and file their report only on such
machines, ballot boxes and counting apparatus as in their judgment
conform to such requirements.
March 13, 1912.
John A. Curtix, Esq., Clerk, Committee on Election Laws.
Dear Sir : — By a vote, the Conmiittee on Election Laws has
submitted to me certain specific inquiries with relation to the
draft of an act now pending before said committee, entitled
"An Act relative to the examination and use of voting machines,
ballot boxes and counting apparatus." Section 1 of the proposed
draft amends section 186 of chapter 560 of the Acts of the year
1907 by striking out the whole of said section and inserting in
its place the following : —
No member of said commission (the state ballot law commission)
shall hold any public office except that of justice of the peace or
notary public, or be a candidate for public office, or member or
employee of any political committee, or have any pecuniary interest,
directly or indirectly, in any voting machine, ballot box or counting
apparatus. If any member of the commission shall be nominated
as a candidate for public office and shall not in writing decline said
nomination within three days, he shall be deemed to have vacated
his office as a member of said commission. The state ballot law
commission shall also constitute the state board of voting machine
examiners and shall, at such times, under such conditions, and after
such public notice as they shall determine, examine voting machines,
ballot boxes and counting apparatus, and they shall make and file
with the secretary of the commonwealth their report on such ma-
chines, ballot boxes and counting apparatus as in their judgment
conform to the requirements of law, together with such written or
printed descriptions, and such drawing-s, specifications and photo-
graphs as shall clearly identify such machines, and the secretary of
the commonwealth shall send a copy of each report on voting
machines to every city and town clerk. For the purpose of such
examination the said board may employ not more than three expert
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 41
machinists at a cost not exceeding ten dollars each for each day
emploj^ed, to be paid from the appropriation for the expenses of the
■commission.
Section 2 provides as follows : —
Voting machines shall furnish convenient, simple and satisfactory
means of voting and of ascertaining and recording the true result
thereof with facility and accuracy, special regard being given to
the prevention and detection of double voting; but no machine
•shall be approved which does not secure to the voter as much
secrecy in voting as is afforded by the use of the official ballot.
Ballot boxes shall have sufficient locks and keys or seal fastenings,
and shall contain mechanical devices for receiving, registering and
cancelling every ballot deposited thereon; but no such box shall
record any distinguishing number or mark upon a ballot. No
machine, ballot box or counting apparatus, except such as is ap-
proved in accordance with the provisions of this section, shall be
used at any election, primary or caucus in this commonwealth; nor
shall any such machines, ballot boxes or counting apparatus be
used except in accordance with the provisions of this act.
The questions submitted for my consideration are —
First. — As to the constitutionality of the provision delegating
the power to specify or to determine the requirements of voting
machines, especially as to whether the machines would fulfill the
requirements of our laws relating to primaries and elections.
Second. — Does the bill herewith submitted fully authorize and
compel the commissioners named in the bill to approve only such
machines as fulfill the requirements of our primary and election
laws?
and yon further state that —
If the bill does not, in your opinion, either in form or in sub-
stance fully cover the question that may arise, we should be very
glad to have you make suggestions and draft of a bill that would
fully cover the subject matter.
The purpose of the proposed bill is to vest in the State Ballot
Law Commission the power to examine voting machines, bal-
lot boxes and counting apparatus for the purpose of determining
whether or not such appliances conform to the requirements of
law which are substantially stated in section 2; and if the com-
42 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
mission determine that such appliances do conform to the-
requirements of law, it is made their duty to file with the-
Secretary of the Commonwealth their approval in writing thereof,,
together with a sufficient description to identify the particular
kind of voting machine, ballot box or counting apparatus ap-
proved.
Subject to the limitation that the qualifications which entitle
any person to vote in this Commonwealth and the right to
elect and to be elected to public office which is consequent upon
the possession of such qualifications, may not be altered or re-
stricted, the Legislature may adopt* any reasonable and uniform
regulations in regard to the time and manner of exercising the
right of voting, which are designed to secure and facilitate the
exercise of such right in a prompt, orderly and convenient man-
ner. Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. 485, 488 ; Kinneen v. ^Yells, 144
Mass. 497; Cole v. Tucker, 164 Mass. 486.
The regulations in the proposed act with respect to the use
of voting machines appear to be reasonable and uniform in
their application, and are, therefore, open to no objection upon
the ground that they constitute an interference with the con-
stitutional right "to elect officers, and to be elected, for public
employments.^' Art. IX., Declaration of Eights. Nor, in my
opinion, do the powers and duties vested in and imposed upon
the State Ballot Law Commission involve a delegation of the
legislative authority which would be objectionable upon consti-
tutional grounds. See Art. XXX., Declaration of Eights.
It is well established in this Commonwealth that while the
Legislature may not delegate the general power to make laws
conferred upon it by the Constitution, it may leave to a sub-
ordinate tribunal the determination of such details as the Leg-
islature cannot well determine for itself in the carrying" out of a
legislative act. Brodbine v. Revere, 182 Mass. 598, 602; Com-
montveaWh v. Sisson, 189 Mass. 247.
In the present instance, the examination of the various kinds,
of mechanical appliances for the purpose of determining which
and how many of them conform to the requirements of the
laws of the Commonwealth and may, therefore, be used in pri-
maries and elections, is clearly a detail of administration the
determination of which may properly be delegated by the Leg-
islature to a subordinate tribunal.
In reply to your second inquiry, I am of opinion that the
proposed act as submitted to me indirectly requires the State-
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 43
Ballot Law Commission to approve only such machines as ful-
fil the requirements of the primary and election law, but does
not directly do so, since they are required only to " make and
file with the secretary of the commonwealth their report on such
machines, ballot boxes and counting apparatus as in their judg-
ment . conform to the requirements of law." I suggest in the
interests of clearness that this provision be made to read that
" they shall file with the secretar}' of the commonwealth their
approval in writing of all machines, ballot boxes and counting
apparatus which in their judgment conform to the requirements
of law," and that the words " and of the preceding " be inserted
before the word " section " in line 15 of section 2 of the proposed
act.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
Board of Railroad Commissioners — Procedure — Questions of
Law or Fact — Rulings.
The provision of St. 1906, c. 463, Part III., § 157, that the Supreme
Judicial Court or the Superior Court shall have jurisdiction in equity
" to review, annul, modify or amend the rulings of any State board
or commission relative to street railways . . ." does not require the
Board of Railroad Conmiissioners to make formal rulings upon ques-
tions of law or issues of fact with respect to which the performance
of their duties does not call upon them to make a decision.
If, however, the determination of a question of law is involved in the
decision of the Board upon any matter of administration properly
before them, they may express such determination in the form of a
ruling.
March 19, 1912.
Hon. FEEDS^lDi^J. MacLeod, Chairman, Board of Railroad Com-
missioners.
Dear Sir : — You have requested my opinion as to whether it
is consistent with the functions of the Board of Eailroad Com-
missioners to make specific findings upon certain requests for
rulings presented to them by counsel under the circumstances
set forth in your communication of March 11, as follows: —
In a communication dated Nov. 16, 1910, Hon. Walter Parley
Hall, former chairman of this Board, requested the opinion of the
Attorney-General upon certain questions arising in connection with
two petitions then pending before this Board, one being the petition
of the city of Worcester for approval of authority granted to the
44 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Worcester Consolidated Street Railway Company to act as common
carrier of baggage and freight in that city, and the other being
the petition of the Worcester Merchants' Association that the
Worcester Consolidated Street Railway Company be required to
act as common carrier of baggage and freight in the city of Worces-
ter. In reply to this communication an opinion was rendered by
Hon. Dana Malone, Attorney-General at that time, under date of
Dec. 27, 1910.
On Nov. ^9, 1911, a conference was held by the Board in relation
to the pending petition of the Worcester Merchants' Association,
which was attended by representatives of the Worcester Merchants'
Association and of the Worcester Consolidated Street Railway Com-
pany, and also by Mr. E. H. Vaughan, representing the city of
Worcester. On Dec. 1, 1911, two sets of requests for rulings of
law were filed by Mr. Vaughan, copies of which are enclosed here-
with. Subsequently, on Dec. 4, 1911, the Board issued an order, a
copy of which is also enclosed.
The statute under which this proceeding was instituted is
St. 1907, c. 402, § 1, which provides that —
A street railway company may become a common carrier of news-
papers, baggage, express matter and freight in such cases, upon
such parts of its railway, and to such extent, in any city or town,
as, after public notice and a hearing, upon the petition of any inter-
ested party, the board of aldermen or the selectmen in such city
or town and the board of railroad commissioners shall by order
approve. If the board of aldermen or selectmen to whom such a
petition is presented act adversely thereon or fail to act within
sixty days from the date of the filing of such petition the petitioner
or any interested party may file such petition with the board of
railroad commissioners, who shall after public notice and a hearing
detennine whether public necessity and convenience require the
granting of such petition and shall make an order dismissing such
petition or requiring any street railway company named in such
jjetition to act as such common carrier in such cases, upon such parts
of its railway and to such extent, and under such regulations and
restrictions, as in the opinion of said railroad commissioners public
necessity and convenience require. Any street railway company
acting under authority hereof shall be subject to such regulations
and restrictions as may from time to time be made by the local
authorities aforesaid, with the approval of the railroad commis-
sioners, and shall also be subject to the provisions of all laws now
or hereafter in force relating to common carriers so far as they
shall be consistent herewith and with said reg-ulations and restric-
tions. The authority conferred upon any street railway company
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 45
b}' virtue of the provisions of this act may at any time be revoked
or terminated in any city or town or upon any part of its railway,
by the board of aldemien or selectmen with the approval of the
board of railroad commissioners.
The principal contentions of the city of Worcester were, first,
that the board of aldermen had not acted adversely and had not
neglected to act within the meaning of the statute above quoted,
and that the Board of Eailroad Commissioners should have con-
sidered the petition which was originally presented to the board
of aldermen and not the subsequent petition presented by the
Worcester Merchants' Association; and, second, that as matter
of law said Board was authorized to approve a limited franchise.
In accordance with the opinion of the Attorney-General herein-
before referred to, however, the Board took no action with re-
spect to the petition of the Worcester Consolidated Street
Eailway Company, upon which the board of aldermen had acted,
and issued an order in the usual form and without any limita-
tion as to the duration of the franchise upon the petition pre-
sented by the Worcester Merchants' Association.
The rulings submitted for my consideration are obviously in-
tended to raise the contentions of the city in various forms,
doubtless with a view to further proceedings under the provi-
sions of St. 1906, c. 463, Part III., § 157, which is as follows: —
The supreme judicial court or the superior court shall have
jurisdiction in equity, upon the petition of a street railway company,
or of the board of aldermen of a city or the selectmen of a town in
which the street railway is located, or of any interested party, to
compel the observance of and to restrain the violation of all laws
which govern street railway companies, and of all orders, rules and
regulations made in accordance with the provisions of this chapter
by the board of aldermen of a city, the selectmen of a town or the
beard of railroad commissioners, and to review, annul, modify or
amend the rulings of any state board or commission relative to
street railways as law and justice may require.
See Kilty v. Railroad Commissioners, 184 Mass. 310.
It may be doubted whether the use of the word " rulings " in
this section was intended to include rulings other than those
necessarily involved in or inferred from the determination of
administrative questions and the action of the Board consequent
thereon, but even if it may be extended to formal rulings upon
46 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
questions of law requested by parties, the statute does not pur-
port to require that such rulings shall be given by the Board.
Moreover, I am of opinion that since the Board of Railroad
Commissioners deal primarily with matters of administration,
it may be said to be in general inconsistent with their functions
to make formal rulings upon questions of law or issues of fact
upon which the performance of their duties does not require
them to make a decision. Upon the other hand, where the deter-
mination of a question of law is involved in the decision of the
Board upon any matter of administration properly before them,
I see no reason why they may not express such determination in
the form of a ruling, and to that extent the making of rulings
of law is consistent with the functions of the Board.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney -General.
Conviction — Plea of Nolo — Case placed on File — Game Laws
— Violation — Certificate of Begistration.
A plea of nolo where the case is placed on file and such plea is not fol-
lowed by a sentence or other form of final judgment, is not a " con-
viction " within the meaning of St. 1911, c. 614, § 11, which provides
that " everv person convicted of violating the game laws shall im-
mediately surrender to the officer who secures such conviction his
certificate of registration. . . .''
March 19, 1912.
Hon. George W. Field, Chairman, Oommissioners on Fisheries and
Game.
Dear Sir : — Your communication of March 9 refers to St.
1911, c. 614, § 11, which provides that —
Every person convicted of violating the game laws shall immedi-
ately surrender to the officer who secures such conviction his certifi-
cate of registration; and the officer shall forthwith forward said
certificate to the commissioners on fisheries and game, who shall
cancel the same and notify the clerk issuing the certificate of regis-
tration of the cancellation. No other certificate of registration
shall be issued to such person so convicted during a period of one
year after the date of conviction.
:and you inquire with reference thereto whether " in cases where
the defendant pleads nolo and the case is placed on file, is it,
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 47
in your opinion, a conviction within the meaning of the statute,
and should such a person be ineligible for a license within one
year ? "
In reply to this inquiry I have to advise you that in my
-opinion upon a plea of nolo, where the case is placed on file and
said plea is not followed by any sentence or other form of final
Judgment, the person so pleading is not convicted within the
meaning of the statute above cited, and the provision with re-
spect to the issuance of a certificate of registration is not appli-
cable.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
Riot or Other Disturbance of the Public Peace — County, City
or Town Authorities — Duties — Suitable Aid — Sheriff
— Mayor — Selectmen — Precept — Discretion.
The public authorities of a county, city or town, in cases of a public
disturbance with rioting or anticipated rioting, are required to use
the utmost of the powers within their control for the enforcement
of the laws and the preservation of the peace.
Since a sheriff, in cases where actual rioting exists or is imminently
threatened, may require, under the provisions of E. L., c. 23, § 14,
suitable aid in the preservation of the peace, he may under such
circumstances call such assistance as a man of ordinary prudence,
firmness and activity in his situation would think necessary to quell
the existing or threatened disturbance.
In cases of existing or threatened rioting, the sheriff of a county, the
mayor of a city or the selectmen of a town may issue a precept under
the provisions of St. 1908, c. 604, $§ 142-150, directed to any com-
mander of a brigade, regiment, battalion, corps of cadets, or company
within his or their jurisdiction, requiring such commander to appear
and aid the civil authority in suppressing violence and supporting
the laws, the issuance of such precept being governed by the exercise
of the sound discretion, good judgment and honesty of purpose of
the sheriff or other local officer or officers in determining as a matter
of fact whether or not the local police may be able to cope with the
existing or threatened situation.
March 20, 1912.
His Excellency Eugene N. Fobs, Governor.
Sir : — Under date of March 19 Your Excellency requests
my opinion upon the following question : —
In ease of a public disturbance, with rioting or anticipated riot-
ing, what are the rights and duties of town or city authorities, county
48 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
authorities (particularly the sheriff), the State police and the militia,
with reference to mamtaining order; and how far is it the duty of
the local authorities to go before calling on the State?
Taking up first the duties of town, city and county au-
thorities in a case such as is inquired of, they may be briefly
and comprehensively stated to be the enforcement of the laws
and the preservation of the peace. As to "how far is it the
duty of the local authorities to go before calling on the State,"
it is impossible to answer by giving any precise formula applicable
to every case, but it may be briefly stated to be the duty of the
local authorities to use the utmost of the powers within their
control in the enforcement of the laws and the preservation of
the peace. Our laws recognize, however, that there may be oc-
casions when town, city or county authorities may find it diffi-
cult or impossible in thus exercising their authority to perform
their full duty merely by the local officials. In the case of actual
rioting, from early times the sheriff has had authority as now
prescribed by E. L., c. 23, § 14, which provides as follows : —
They [sheriffs] may require suitable aid in the execution of their
office in a criminal case, in the preservation of the peace, in the
apprehending or securing of a person for a breach of the peace
and in cases of escape or rescue of persons arrested upon civil
process.
The first use of the phrase " suitable aid " as above employed'
appears in chapter 20 of the Acts of the Province of Massachu-
setts Bay in the year 1698. The phrase should be construed,
therefore, as giving the same authority as that of a sheriff under
the common law, in the light of which it is to be interpreted
unless otherwise modified by statute. Consideration of the de-
cisions in that regard discloses in each case a situation where
the breach of the peace was actually in progress, or where there
had been an outbreak just previously, with another disturbance
expected and imminent as a reasonable certainty. I am led to
the conclusion that in order to warrant the sheriff in exercising
this extraordinary remedy under his common-law authority,
there must be a necessity for it because of disorders either exist-
ing at the time of his action or imminently threatened, with
apparent certainty to occur.
In addition to R. L., c. 23, § 14, hereinbefore cited, E. L.,
c. 211, § 1, further provides: —
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 49
If twelve or more persons, being armed with clubs or other dan-
gerous weapons, or if thirty or more persons, whether armed or
not, are unlawfully, riotously or tumultuously assembled in a city
or town, the mayor and each of the aldermen of such city, each of
the selectmen of such town, every justice of the peace living in any
such city or town and the sheriff of the county and his deputies
shall go among the persons so assembled, or as near to them as may
be with safety, and in the name of the commonwealth command all
persons so assembled immediately and peaceably to disperse; and
if they do not thereupon immediately and peaceably disperse, each
of said magistrates and officers shall command the assistance of all
persons there present in suppressing such riot or unlawful assem-
bly and arresting such persons.
If there is, therefore, imminent, impending danger of a riot
or other breach of the peace, the sheriff has the power and the
duty to call such aid as a man of ordinary prudence, firmness
and activity in his situation would think necessary to quell the
disturbance. This use of the power to compel the aid and assist-
ance of citizens in general is to be used only to quell a riot,
but not to keep men for general police duty as occasion may
require.
With reference to anticipated rioting, as well as rioting al-
ready existing, the statutes have provided another method which
may be employed by either the selectmen of a town, the mayor
of a city or the sheriff of a county. These provisions are found
in St. 1908, c. 604, §§ 142-150, but so far as material to the
purposes of the present inquiry are contained in sections 142
to 145, which provide as follows : —
Section" 142. In case of a tumult, riot, mob, or a body of men
acting together by force to violate or resist the laws of the com-
monwealth, or when such tumult, riot or mob is threatened and the
fact appears to the commander-in-chief, to the sheriff of the county,
to the mayor of the city or to the selectmen of the town, the com-
mander-in-chief may issue his order, or such sheriff, mayor or select-
men may issue a precept, directed to any commander of a brigade,
regiment, naval brigade, battalion, squadron, corps of cadets or
company, within their jurisdiction, directing him to order his com-
mand, or a part thereof, to appear at a time and place therein speci-
fied to aid the civil authority in suppressing such violence and
supporting the laws; which precept shall be in substance as fol-
lows : —
50 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
To [insert the oflacer's title] A. B., commanding [insert his command].
Whereas, it appears to [the sheriff, mayor or the selectman] of the [county,
city or town] of , that [here state one or more of the causes above
mentioned] in our of , and that military force is
necessary to aid the civil authority in suppressing the same: Now, therefore, we
command you that you cause [your command, or such part thereof as may be
desired], armed and equipped with ammunition and with proper officers, to
parade at on , then and there to obey such orders as
may be given according to law. Hereof fail not at your peril, and have you
there this precept with your doings returned thereon.
This precept shall be signed by such sheriff, mayor or selectmen,
and may be varied to suit the circumstances of the case; and a copy
of the same shall immediately be forwarded by such sheriff, mayor
or selectmen to the commander-in-chief.
Section 143. The officer to whom the order of the commander-
in-chief or brigade commander, or such precept, is directed shall
forthwith order the troops therein called for to parade at the time
and place appointed, and shall immediately notify the commander-
in-chief of his order, directly in the most expeditious manner, and
by letter through the usual military channels.
Section 144. If an officer refuses or neglects to obey such
order or precept, or if any officer or soldier neglects or refuses to
obey an order issued in pursuance thereof, he shall be punished as
a court-martial may adjudge.
Section 145. Such troops shall appear at the time and place
appointed, armed, equipped, and with ball ammunition, and shall
obey and execute such orders as they have received, or such addi-
tional orders as they may then and there receive from the gov-
ernor, or from an officer serving under the provisions of section one
hundred and forty-two.
With reference to the propriety of calling out the militia
by the aforesaid precept by the selectmen of a town, the ma3^or
of a city or the sheriff of a county, the Supreme Judicial Court
has said, in the case of Ela v. Smith, 5 Gray, 121, in a learned
and exhaustive opinion covering generally the subject-matter of
the present inquiry : —
In exercising the authority thus conferred, the statute maizes it
the first duty of the mayor or other magistrate to determine whether
the occasion for calling out a military force exists. This depends
on a question of fact, which it is his exclusive duty to determine.
If it be made to appear to him that a tumult or riot is threatened,
he may then issue his precept. He is, in his official capacity, and
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 51
under the sanction of his oath of office, to examine and decide this
question. This provision of the statute clearly confers a judicial
power. Whenever the law vests in an officer or magistrate a right
of judgment, and gives him a discretion to determine the facts on
which such judgment is to be based, he necessarily exercises, within
the limits of his jurisdiction, a judicial authority. So long as he
acts within the fair scope of this authority he is clothed with all
the rights and immunities which appertain to judicial tribunals in
the discharge of their appropriate functions.
The same authority resting in the sheriff by the terms of the
statute as in the mayor of a city, the language of this decision
would equally apply to the powers and duties of the sheriff
in that regard. In said decision the court further said : —
It cannot be urged, as a valid argument against the recognition of
this authority in civil officers, that it is Hable to abuse, and may be
made the instrument of oppression. The great security against its
misuse and perversion is to be found in the discretion, good judg-
ment and honesty of purpose of those to whom important public
duties are necessarily entrusted. But the existence of such authority
is essential in a community where the first and most important use
of law consists in preserving and protecting persons and property
from unlawful violence.
To that part of Your Excellency's question which refers to
the rights and duties of various public authorities, " with refer-
ence to maintaining order," I can perhaps do no better than to
quote further from said decision, as follows: —
But while thus recognizing the authority of civil officers to call
out and use an armed force to aid in suppressing a riot or tumult
actually existing, or preventing one which is threatened, it must be
borne in mind that no power is conferred on the troops, when so
assembled, to act independently of the civil authority. On the con-
trary, they are called out, in the words of the statute, "to aid the
ei^dl authority," not to usurp its functions, or take its place. They
are to act as an armed police only subject to the absolute and exclu-
sive control and direction of the magistrates and other civil officers
designated in the statute, as to the specific duty or service which
they are to perform. The statute does not even enlarge the power
of the civil officers by giving them any militaiy authority; but only
places at their disposal, in the exercise of their appropriate and
legal functions, an organized, disciplined and equipped body of
men, capable of more efficient action in an emergency, and among
52 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
a multitude, than an ordinary police force. Nor can the magistrate
delegate his authority to the military force which he summons to
his aid, or vest in the military authorities any discretionary power
to take any steps or do any act to prevent or suppress a mob or
riot. They must perform only such service and render such aid
as is required by the civil officers. This is not only essential to
guard against the use of excessive force and the exercise of irrespon-
sible power; but it is required by the fundamental principles of
our Constitution, which provides that " the military power shall
always be held in an exact subordination to the civil authority, and
be governed by it." Declaration of Rights, Art. XVII. It does not
follow from this, however, that the military force is to be taken
wholly out of the control of its proper officers. They are to direct
its movements in the execution of the orders given by the ci\dl
officers, and to manage the details in which a specific service or duty
is to be performed. But the service or duty must be first pre-
scribed and designated by the civil authority.
It would therefore seem that the sheriff or other local officer
should use sound discretion, good judg-ment and honesty of
purpose in determining as a matter of fact whether or not the
local police were able to cope with a situation such as is re-
ferred to in the present inquiry. Acting with these considera-
tions in mind, such officer has the right to issue the precept
provided for in said section 142 of chapter 604 of the Acts of
1908.
The reference in said inquiry to "the State police^' I as-
sume to mean the District Police, provided for by chapter 108
of the Revised Laws, and amendments thereof and additions
thereto. Section 7 of said chapter provides as follows : —
The district police shall have and exercise throughout the com-
monwealth all the powers of constables, except the service of civil
process, and of police officers and watchmen. The governor may
at any time command their services in suppressing riots and in
preserving the peace; but, except as aforesaid, a member of the
inspection department shall not be required to perform any other
duties than such as pertain to an inspector of factories and public
buildings or to an inspector of steam boilers.
^Tiether or not the District Police shall be employed in a
case such as is inquired of is a matter of policy and discretion
to be determined by the exercise of the judgment of the person
upon whom the duty falls to so determine, under the circum-
1913.] PUBLIC . DOCUMENT — No. 12. 53
stances of each particular case. No specific rule or formula
can be definitely given beyond the use of the best judgment pos-
sible under the circumstances at the time.
I am, with great respect.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-GenemJ.
ConpimUonal Ikw — momy rq^^frmhy Taxation — Appropria-
tion — Public Purpose — Homes for Mechanics, Laborers or
Other Wage Earners.
A proposed bill authorizing the commission established by St. 1911, c.
607, to purchase in the name of the Massachusetts Homestead Com-
mission and " for the purpose of providing homes for mechanics,
laborers or other wage earners," and appropriating money therefor,
would be unconstitutional if passed, since it involves the expendi-
ture of public money for a private purpose.^
March 28, 1912.
Wilton B. Fay, Esq., Committee on Ways and Means.
Dear Sir : — On behalf of the Committee on Ways and
Means you have submitted for my consideration a draft of a bill
entitled " An Act to extend and define the duties of the Home-
stead Commission,^^ accompanying the special report of the
Homestead Commission, House Document No. 441, and have
orally brought to my attention certain inquiries with reference to
the constitutionality of the provisions of said bill, with the re-
quest that I advise your committee thereon.
With reference to that part of section 3 which provides as
follows : — •
The treasurer and receiver-general is authorized to loan the com-
mission from time to time such sums as it may certify to him in writ-
ing to be necessary to carry out the purposes of this act, except for
the expenses incurred under section five, from the funds deposited
by the savings banks in the treasury of the commonwealth under the
provisions of section fifty-six of chapter five hundred and ninety of
the acts of the year nineteen hundred and eight, and subject to the
restrictions of said act —
I am of the opinion that there is no constitutional objection.
Said money in the hands of the Treasurer is public money
available for public purposes, according to law. If the purpose
1 See 211 Mass. 624.
54 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
for which it is to be expended in this case is a lawful, public
purpose it may be deemed available, as provided in said section.
As to section 1 of said bill, which provides as follows : —
The commission established by chapter six hundred and seven of
the acts of nineteen hundred and eleven shall be authorized to pur-
chase in the name of the Massachusetts Homestead Commission a
tract or tracts of land for the purpose of providing homes for me-
chanics, laborers, or other wage-earners, and shall have authority to
sub-divide, improve, build upon, lease, rent, sell, re-purchase, manage,
and care for said tract or tracts and the buildings constructed thereon,
in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be determined
upon by the commission, due consideration being given to the projoer
laying out of streets, parks, garden areas, and buildings for recrea-
tion or other public jDurposes; and the commission shall make such
regulations, restrictions, and reservations in contracts, leases, deeds,
and otherwise as may be necessary for the protection of said tract or
tracts from any objectionable use. Each person holding property
under the jurisdiction of the commission shaU be the owner of at
least five shares of stock as hereinafter provided for, before being
permitted to occupy or acquire title to any of said real estate; pro-
vided, however, that the commission in exceptional cases may tempo-
rarily waive the aforesaid requirement as to ownership of stock
prior to occupancy —
different principles have to be considered. In the first place,
the purpose stated in said section is ^' providing homes for me-
chanics, laborers or other wage-earners." This limits the bene-
fits of said act to certain definite classes, thereby taxing the
public in general for a certain favored class, without disclosing
any substantial reason for such class legislation. If this objec-
tion should be cured by an amendment which included any citizen
instead of members of these particular classes, there remains the
further and more fundamental question as to whether the ex-
penditure provided for in this proposed act is an expenditure
for public purposes.
The principle governing such consideration was long ago
stated by the Supreme Court of this Commonwealth, in Loivell
V. Boston, 111 Mass. 454 (see, also, Loan Association v. Topelca,
20 Wall. 655; Attorney-General's Report, 1910, p. 43). Among
other things it was therein pointed out, at page 461 : —
It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure
which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 55
magnitude of the interests to be affected, nor the degTee to which the
general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare,
may be ultimately benefited by their promotion.
Applying the principle of that case to the bill under con-
sideration, it appears that the direct object of the expenditure
of the public money herein provided for is the purchase of land
and the erection of homes for laborers, mechanics and wage-
earners. The public benefit alleged is the improvement of the
health and morals of the community. It appears, however, that
this alleged public benefit is so remote and incidental that it
cannot outweigh the real character of the direct object of the
expenditure, which appears to be fundamentally for private
rather than public purposes.
While I am of the opinion that under the limitation of the
decisions as they now stand these provisions are unconstitutional,
it is impossible for me to say how far our Supreme Judicial
Court might go in approving legislation purporting to be en-
acted for the public welfare and for the betterment of health
and morals, it being in each case largely a question of degree.
There is at least grave doubt as to the constitutionality of said
section 1.
V Very truly yours,
James M: Swift, Attorney-General.
Town — Note payable ''during the Year 1912'' — Date of
Payment.
A note of a town payable " within the year 1912 " is in effect a note
payable at a futnre date certain, or earlier at the option of the
maker, and therefore does not comply with the requirement of St.
1910, c. 616, § 1, that a town note shall state " the date when it
will become due for payment."
April 3, 1912.
Charles F. Gettemy, Esq., Director^ Bureau of Statistics.
Dear Sir : — You have requested my opinion as to whether
you may " properly certify a note of a town made payable
Svithin the 3^ear 1912,' under the provisions of chapter 616,
Acts of 1910, section 1 of which provides that the note shall
state ' the date when it will become due for payment.' "
A note payable "within the year 1912" is, in effect, a note
payable at a future date certain, or earlier at the option of the
56 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
maker^ and so is not payable at any fixed or determinable future
time. Malioney v. Fitzpatriclh, 133 Mass. 151 ; Stults v. Silva,
119 Mass. 137; ^Yay v. Smith, 111 Mass. 523. And see
Richards v. Barlow, 140 Mass. 318. It does not comply, there-
fore, with the requirement of St. 1910, c. 616, § 1, that a town
note shall state " the date when it will become due for pa}'-
ment,^^ and you should not certify it.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
License — Engineer — Steam Boiler — Oiuner or User — Op-
eration — Unlicensed Person — Coal Shovelers.
The provision of E. L., c. 102, § 8, as amended by St. 1907, c. 373,
§ 1 and St. 1911, c. 562, $ 1, that "the owner or user of a steam
boiler or engine . . . shall not operate or cause to be operated a
steam boiler or engine for a period of more than one week, unless
the person in charge of and operating it is duly licensed," allows
such owner or user, in the exercise of good faith and in an un-
avoidable emergency, a period of one week within which to pro-
cure a person licensed in accordance with the requirements of law;
and by the use of such period, the owner or user is not thereafter
forever prohibited from availing himself under like conditions of
such allowance.
The provision of E. L., c. 102, § 80, as amended by St. 1911, c. 562,
§ 2, that " to work with a licensed person there may be employed
not more than one unlicensed person, who, in the presence and
under the personal direction of the licensed person, may operate
the appurtenances of a boiler or engine," does not require that coal
shovelers, whose sole duty consists in putting coal under the boiler,
should be licensed, since coal shovelers, or other persons performing
the duties of mere laborers in handling coal used in the operation
of a boiler or boilers, are not operating any appurtenances thereof.
April 8, 1912.
J. H. Whitxey, Esq., Chief of the District Police.
Dear Sir : — Under date of April 6 you have written me
with reference to sections 78, 79 and 80 of chapter 102 of the
Revised Laws, as^ amended by chapter 373 of the Acts of 1907
and by chapter 562 of the Acts of 1911, requesting my opinion
upon the following matters : —
First, the last clause of section 78 reads as follows : —
The OTVTier or user of a steam boiler or engine, other than boilers or
engines above excepted, shall not operate or cause to be operated a
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 57
steam boiler or engine for a period of more than one week, unless the
person in charge of and operating it is duly licensed.
Is it to be understood that the owner or user of a steam boiler or
engine,, who from necessity has employed a person not duly licensed
for a period of one week, is forever after prohibited from such pro-
vision of section 78 in connection with the use of the same boiler or
boilers; or could he be permitted, after a reasonable period of time,
to again take advantage of this provision?
Second, the last clause of section 80 reads as follows : —
provided, however, that to work with a licensed person there may be
employed not more than one unlicensed person who, in the presence and
under the personal direction of the licensed person, may operate the
appui'tenanees of a boiler or engine.
Under the provisions of this clause are we to understand that there
must be one licensed fireman who operates the appurtenances of a
boiler, and who is allowed one helper, who may be unlicensed, to
operate any appurtenances of a boiler or boilers, and also that an
unlimited number of coal shovelers may also be employed, whose
duty solely consists in putting coal under the boiler in a large boiler
plant?
In my opinion with reference to the first inquiry, your sug-
gestion of a possible construction that the owner or user of a
steam boiler, who had employed a person not licensed for the
period of one week, might be forever after prohibited from
taking advantage of the provision of section 78 in that regard,
would be a most unreasonable construction. Taking said sec-
tion 78 in connection with section 79, which provides that —
If such steam engine or boiler is found to be in charge of or oper-
ated by a person who is not a duly licensed engineer or fireman and,
after a lapse of one week from such time, it is again found to be
operated by a person who is not duly licensed, it shall be deemed
prima facie evidence of a violation of the provisions of the pre-
ceding section —
It is obvious that this provision was intended for emergencies,
so that a person in the exercise of good faith, and in an un-
avoidable emergency, might be allowed one week in which to
provide himself with a licensed person within the requirements
of the law. The object of the provision would not be accom-
plished if the right therein given is exhausted by its operation
for one week and then forever prohibited.
58 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
With reference to the second inquiry, the question seems to
be practically governed by an opinion of Attorney-General
Knowlton, II Op. Attys.-Gen., 62. I am of the opinion that
within the limits of your inquiry there must be one licensed
person, either fireman or engineer, who operates the appur-
tenances of a boiler, and who is allowed one helper who may
be unlicensed. There may also be an unlimited number of
coal shovelers, whose duty consists solely in putting coal under
the boiler. It was ruled in said opinion of Attorney-General
Knowlton "that licenses are not required for mere laborers,
whose duties require no skill and involve no responsibility."
Since that opinion the statute has been changed so that it
provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to have charge
of or to operate the appurtenances of a boiler as well as the
boiler or engine itself. This does not, in my opinion, change
the conclusion reached by Attorney- General Knowlton. I know
of no use of the word " appurtenances " which would include
coal within that term. Coal shovelers or coal bolsters, or other
persons performing duties of mere laborers with reference to
the coal used in the operation of boilers, are not in my opinion
operating any appurtenances thereof.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
Constitutional Law — Police Power — Competition — Purpose
to injure or destroy Business of a Rival — Discrimination
— Lowering of Prices in one Locality by a Person, Firm,
Association or Corporation engaged in Bushiess in Several
Localities — " Unfair Discrimination."
The purpose to injure or destroy the business of a rival by competition
is not illegal.
A proposed act providing that " any person, firm, association or corpo-
ration . . . engaged in the production, manufacture or distribution
of any commodity in general use, that shall intentionally, for the
purpose of destroying the business of a competitor in any locality,
discriminate between different sections ... of this Commonwealth,
or between purchasers, by selling such commodity at a lower rate
for such purpose in one section . . . than is charged in another
section . . . shall be deemed guilty of unfair discrimination, which
is hereby prohibited and declared unlawful", in effect renders
unlawful all competition in any locality entered into for the pur-
pose specified by a person, firm, association or corporation carrying
on business in more than one such locality.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 59
The prohibition in such proposed act is not limited to discrimination
entered upon maliciously or for the purpose of destroying the busi-
ness of competitors in order to create a monopoly or for any other
illegal purpose, and therefore discloses no suf&cient distinction be-
tween the acts of discrimination prohibited and other acts of dis-
crimination or competition not prohibited to justify such prohibition
as a valid exercise of the police power.
Such proposed act, therefore, if passed, would be unconstitutional and
void.
April 23, 1912.
John G. Brackett, Esq., Chairman of the Committee on Bills in the
Third Reading.
Dear Sir : — On behalf of the Committee on Bills in the
Third Eeading yon have submitted for my consideration a pro-
posed bill entitled "An Act to prohibit discrimination in the
sale of commodities," and requested my opinion upon its con-
stitutionality.
The first section of the bill in question is as follows : —
Any person, firm, association or corporation, foreign or domestic,
doing business in the commonwealth of Massachusetts and engaged
in the production, manufacture or distribution of any commodity in
general use, that shall intentionally, for the purpose of destroying the
business of a competitor in any locality, discriminate between differ-
ent sections, communities, towns or cities of this commonwealth, or
between purchasers, by selling such commodity at a lower rate for
such purpose in one section, community, town or city than is charged
for said commodity by the vender in another section, community,
town or city in the commonwealth, after making due allowance for
the difference, if any, in the grade or quality and in the cost of
transportation, shall be deemed guilty of unfair discrimination,
which is hereby prohibited and declared unlawful.
There are other sections which define offences, provide for
their prosecution and prescribe penalties, but in view of the
conclusion hereinafter stated it is unnecessary to refer to them
in detail.
The bill is undoubtedly designed to invoke the police power
to prohibit a discrimination in prices between different localities
in the Commonwealth, or between purchasers in different lo-
calities, where prices have been lowered in one locality for the
purpose of destroying the business of a competitor in such
locality, and in effect to render unlawful competition in a single
locality entered into by a person, firm, association or corporation
60 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
carrying on business in more than one locality. Like discrim-
ination, induced by any other purpose or motive, is not illegal.
The fundamental question presented by the inquiry of the
committee is, therefore, whether the definition of unfair dis-
crimination in the section of the bill above quoted is grounded
upon a reasonable distinction with reference to other forms of
discrimination or competition so as to permit a valid exercise
of the police power in the premises.
As above stated, discrimination is "unfair," and therefore
prohibited, only when it arises from a lowering of prices in a
given locality " intentionally, for the purpose of destroying the
business of a competitor ; " but since in the conduct of business
competition, which gives to one what it takes from another,
must inevitably result in the destruction in whole or in part
of the business of a rival, the specified purpose, to a greater
or less extent, is inseparable from all competition. In itself,
moreover, the purpose to injure the business of a rival by com-
petition is not illegal. Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 260;
Pla7it V. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 501; Bowen v. Matheson,
14 Allen, 499. And see Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. Ill,
134. And this is true even where the injury sought to be accom-
plished is the destruction of the business and the consequent
ruin of a competitor. Martell v. White, supra, p. 261. It fol-
lows, therefore, that neither the act of discriminating nor the
purpose which brings the act within the prohibition of the bill,
if separately considered, is illegal. On the contrary, the public
policy of the Commonwealth has recognized and justified com-
petition in business and has expressly declared that every con-
tract, agreement or combination which restrains or prevents
competition in the supply or price of any article or commodity
is against public policy and is illegal and void. St. 1908, c. 454.
See Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92; Commomvealth v.
Hunt, 4 Met. Ill, 134.
The police power extends to all matters which affect the lives,
limbs, health, comfort and welfare of all in their persons and
property {Commomvealth v. Bearce, 132 Mass. 542, 546) and
the Legislature may enact " such reasonable regulations as they
may judge necessary to protect public and private rights, and
to impose no larger restraints upon the use and enjoyment of
private property, than are in their judgment strictly necessary
to preserve and protect the rights of others." Commomvealth
V. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 102.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCOIEXT — No. 12. 61
There are, however, limitations upon this power. Thus, in
O'Keeffe v. SomerviUe, 190 Mass. 110, the court, in speaking
of the regulation of the ordinar}^ transactions of business (in
this case the imposition of an excise tax upon the selling or
giving of trading stamps in connection with the sale of articles,
which was held invalid), said, at page 114: —
One of the reasons why these methods are allowable is found in
the familiar principle that constitutional liberty means " the right
of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and work where
he will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue
any lawful trade or avocation." The restrictions upon conduct which
may be imposed in the exercise of the police power include every-
thing that may be necessary in the interest of the public health, the
public safety or the public morals, and they include nothing more.
These doctrines have often been discussed and elaborated, and it is
unnecessary to consider them at lengih in this case.
To constitute the bill now before me a proper exercise of the
police power, therefore, it must appear that the public health,
the public safety or the public morals require protection against
competition when it takes the form of a discrimination in the
price of a commodity between localities or purchasers in dif-
ferent localities which is unnecessary where competition does
not result in such discrimination. The right primarily pro-
tected is the right of the competitor in a locality against which
the discrimination is directed to be free from competition, a
right which does not exist at common law {^Valker v. Cronin,
107 Mass. 555; Martell v. ^Y^l^te, 185 Mass. 255), and which
contravenes the established public policy of the Commonwealth.
Such being the purpose and effect of the bill submitted to me,
I am constrained to say that in its present form it discloses no
sufficient distinction between the acts prohibited and other
forms of competition which the law not only permits but en-
courages, and that in my opinion, if enacted, it would not con-
stitute a valid exercise of the police power.
Legislation, substantially like the bill now before your com-
mittee, has been twice considered by courts of last resort. In
State V. Drayton, 82 ]^ebr. 254, a statute almost identical in
terms was upheld upon the ground that it '^ was enacted for
the purpose of suppljing a defect in the anti-trust laws of the
State," upon, an information charging that the defendant " did
unlawfully, maliciously and intentionally, for the purpose of
62 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
destroying the business of a competitor . . . discriminate be-
tween different sections of the State/' and both the prosecuting
officer and the court treated the statute as if the word " mali-
ciously '^ was a part of it, and as if the purpose which made the
discrimination unfair and therefore unlawful was the purpose
of destroying the business of a competitor " in order that the
wrongdoer may have a monopoly" (page 264).
In State v. Central Lumher Co., 24 So. Dak. 136, the statute
under consideration made discrimination unlawful when such
discrimination was for the purpose of " destroying the competi-
tion of any regular, established dealer ... or to prevent the
competition of any person who in good faith intends and at-
tempts to become such dealer," and the court again treated the
statute as if it were directed against monopolies.
If the bill in question were in terms directed against discrim-
ination entered upon maliciously or for the purpose of destroy-
ing business in order to create a monopoly, a very different
question would be presented, and if enacted, it might well be
treated as supplying a defect in the anti-trust laws of the Com-
monwealth. No such limitation, however, is to be found in it
in its present form. Section 1 doubtless includes a person, firm,
association or corporation which discriminates in prices for the
purpose of creating a monopoly, but it also extends to and in-
cludes persons who discriminate in the course of lawful and
proper competition, with the purpose of destroying the business
of competitors, so far as competition may destroy it, for their
own benefit, without any malicious or unlawful intent to injure
the public by creating a monopoly in the sale of the commodities
in which they deal. This unlawful purpose is, in my opinion,
essential to distinguish the acts sought to be prohibited and to
afford a reasonable basis for regulation under the police power.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
Constitutional Law — Amendment to Constitution — Taxation
— Wild or Forest Lands — Standing Wood and Timber.
A proposed constitutional amendment, giving to the General Court full
power and authority " to prescribe for wild or forest lands such
methods of taxation as will develop and conserve the forest resources
of the Commonwealth," if adopted would permit the enactment bv
the Legislature of taxation laws with reference to woodlands and
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 63
wood lots without regard to their size so long as said wood lots or
woodlands were wild and forest lands; that is, in a state of nature
and uncultivated except for the purpose of producing wood and
timber.
The term " wild or forest lands " does not include a tract of woodland
located within fenc^e premises of which the principal use is for
pasturage.
The technical signification of the term " wild or forest lands " has
never been established or defined by the courts of this Common-
wealth. The term " standing wood and timber " has not received,
either in the statutes of this Commonwealth or in the decisions of
the court, a fixed or technical definition of universal or even of
general application.
The proposed amendment to the Constitution, which would confer upon
the General Court full power and authority to prescribe for wild
or forest lands " such methods of taxation as will develop and
conserve the forest resources of the Commonwealth," would author-
ize the enactment of laws to provide that wild or forest lands should
be taxed without reference to the element of value contributed by
the growth thereon, and that the tax upon the value of such growth
might be reduced or altogether omitted in the determination of the
tax to be assessed upon said lands.
May 1, 1912.
Hon. Geaftox D. Gushing, Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives.
Sir : — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of an
order adopted by the Honorable House of Eepresentatives on
April 12, requesting my opinion upon certain questions '^ in
respect to the constitutional amendment^ relative to the taxation
of wild or forest lands, now pending in the House of Eepre-
sentatives and contained in House Resolve No. 1982." This
resolve, which was duly passed by the Legislature of last year,
is as follows : —
Full power and authority are hereby given and granted to the
general court to prescribe for wild or forest lands such methods of
taxation as wall develop and conserve the forest resources of the
commonwealth.
The specific questions submitted to me by the Honorable
House of Eepresentatives are as follows : —
1. Does the amendment as at present drafted include all wood lots
and woodlands irrespective of their size ?
2. Does the amendment as drawn discriminate against small wood
lots and include only large tracts of woodland?
64 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
3. Does the term " wild land " include small wood lots ?
4. Does the amendment as drawn permit the enactment of taxation
laws by the Legislature with reference to wood lots and woodlands
regardless of their size?
5. Does the term " wild or forest lands " include a tract of wood-
land located within fenced premises whose principal use is for pas-
turage ?
6. Is the term " wild or forest lands " a term of well-known legal
signification established by any decision of any court of last resort
in the United States ?
7. Is the term " standing wood and timber " a term of well-known
legal signification established by various decisions of courts of last
resort in the United States?
8. Does the amendment as drawn permit the enactment of laws to
tax the land and exempt or reduce the tax on the gTowing timber
which stands upon it?
The proposed amendment is broad in terms and is designed
to afford the Legislature comprehensive authority to adopt for
wild or forest lands such methods of taxation as in their judg-
ment may best develop and conserve the forest resources of the
Commonwealth. So far as I am aware, the term " wild' or
forest lands '^ has never been precisely defined by either the
court or the Legislature of this Commonwealth, but the term
" wild land " is well known to the law, and has been often dis-
cussed and its signification definitely determined in connection
with writs of dowser and writs of entry or actions of tort for
trespass. In these connections it has been defined as land in
a state of nature, and includes marsh land, sprout land and
woodland. Conner v. Shepherd, 15 Mass. 164; Webh v. Town-
send, 1 Pick. 21 ; Richmond Iron Worlcs v. Wadhams, 142 Mass.
569. Such land does not cease to be wild land, even when used
as an appendage to a cultivated farm for the purpose of pro-
curing fuel and timber. White v. Willis, 7 Pick. 143; White
V. Cutler, 17 Pick. 248. The term ^^ forest land" does not seem
to have been directly considered by the court. As used in the
proposed amendment, above quoted, however, it probably does
not differ greatly in meaning from the term ^^ wild land," which
precedes it. The word " forest," alone, has been defined to be —
A tract of land covered w^ith trees; a wood, usually one of con-
siderable extent ; a tract of woodland with or without enclosed inter-
vals of open and uncultivated gTound. — Century Dictionary and
Cyclopedia.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 65
In the case of White v. Cutler, 17 Pick. 2-18, Chief Justice
Shaw, in discussing the right of dower of a widow in wild and
uncultivated land, uses the terms " forest lands " and ^^ wood-
lands " interchangeably : —
These reasons apply as well to the case of a wood lot situated in
the midst of a cultivated country, as to forest lands in their original
state. But the chief justice, in delivering the opinion of the court in
this case {Conner v. Shepherd, 15 Mass. 164), takes care in terms to
limit its operation to the case of woodlands not used or connected
with a cultivated farm, or other improved estate.
It is well established that wild land does not lose its character
by being kept and used by its owners for the purpose of raising
wood for profit. White v. Cutler, 17 Pick. 248. See Slater v.
Jepherson, 6 Cush. 129 ; Morris v. Callanan, 105 Mass. 129. In
my opinion the term " wild land," as defined by the court, would
include forest land, with the possible exception that the term
" forest lands " may include land planted and cultivated for
the purpose of producing trees in sufficient numbers to consti-
tute such land forest land.
Replying specifically to the first, second, third and fourth
questions submitted by the Honorable House of Eepresentatives,
I am of opinion that the amendment as at present drafted
would permit the enactment by the Legislature of taxation laws
with reference to wood lots and woodlands, without regard to
their size, so long as said wood lots or woodlands were wild or
forest lands within the definition already made; that is, land
in a state of nature, and uncultivated except for the purpose
of producing wood and timber. It is to be observed that the
amendment as at present drafted is permissive only, and,
strictly speaking, cannpt be said to include or exclude any par-
ticular kind or class of wood lots or woodlands. The foregoing
answer, however, is based on the assumption that the Honorable
House of Representatives desires my opinion upon the question
of whether or not said amendment would permit the enactment
of laws which should include wood lots and woodlands without
reference to their extent.
It has been held upon a writ of dower that wood and pasture
land occupied as such and used in connection with a homestead
should not be considered as wild and uncultivated land (Shat-
tucJc V. Gragg, 23 Pick. 88), and it is, in my opinion, at least
66 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
doubtful if the term " wild or forest lands " would be held to
include a tract of woodland located within fenced premises, of
which the principal use was for pasturage. The question pre-
sented is chiefly one of fact, to be determined by the circum-
stances in each particular case. Speaking generally, however,
and upon the assumption that the principal use of the tract is
for pasturage, which is more or less inconsistent with the pro-
duction and growth of forests^ I am of opinion that the fifth
question of the Honorable House of Representatives should be
answered in the negative.
In respect to the sixth question of the Honorable House of
Representatives, I have already stated that the courts of this
Commonwealth have never established and defined the technical
signification of the term "wild or forest lands," and I am not
aware nor have I been advised of any decision of a court of
last resort in an}^ other State which establishes a general legal
signification of that precise term.
To the seventh inquiry submitted by the Honorable House
of Representatives I reply as follows : the terms " standing
wood " and " standing timber ''• have been frequently defined
by courts of last resort in the several States, but such decisions
have been directed to the construction of the respective terms
in specific legislative enactments, in deeds or grants, or in con-
tracts, and have defined such terms with reference to the con-
text in which they are found and to the purpose which the
instrument was designed to accomplish, and so do not establish
for them fixed and definite legal significations which would be
applicable wherever the words may be found. Thus, for ex-
ample, in Strout v. Harper, 72 Me. 270, where it was held that
in a deed a reservation of " all the standing wood upon the lot,
together with the right to enter and remove the same at any
time within three years," included trees, suitable for timber as
well as trees suitable only for fuel, the court saying (page
273): —
True, the word " wood " is often used to designate fuel. But when
so used it means fuel wholly, or, at least, partially, prepared for the
fire. The term " standing wood " cannot be so used. It can apply
only to trees. And when there is nothing in the context, or in any
other part of the deed, to indicate that it is used in a more limited
sense, we think it must be held to include all the trees, — trees suit-
able for timber as well as those fit only for firewood.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 67
And see Sliiffer v. Broadhead, 126 Penn. St. 260; Haskell v.
Ayers, 35 Mich. 89; ^Wilson v. State, 17 Tex. App. 393; O'Han-
lan V. Denvir, 81 Cal. 60 ; Donworth v. Sawyer, 94 Me. 242. In
this Commonwealth standing wood and timber are mentioned
occasionally in the statutes. See E. L., c. 134, § 11 ; c. 208, § 7 ;
St. 1869, c. 249. And more frequently in the decisions of the
court. See White v. Foster, 102 Mass. 375 ; DraJce v. Wells, 11
Allen, 141; Fletcher v. Livingston, 153 Mass. 388; Worthen v.
Garno, 182 Mass. 243. But the term " standing wood and tim-
ber " has not received, either in the statutes or in the opinions of
the court, a fixed or technical definition of universal, or even of
general, application.
The eighth inquiry of the Honorable House of Eepresenta-
tives is so phrased as to leave me in some doubt as to the exact
question upon which my opinion is desired. Limiting my reply
to the precise terms of said inquiry, however, I have to advise
the Honorable House of Eepresentatives that the proposed
amendment, which would confer upon the General Court full
power and authority to prescribe for wild or forest lands " such
methods of taxation as will develop and conserve the forest
resources of the Commonwealth," would doubtless authorize the
enactment of laws to provide that wild or forest lands should
be taxed without reference to the element of value contributed
by the growth thereon, and that the tax upon the value of such
growth might be reduced or altogether omitted in the deter-
mination of the tax to be assessed upon said lands.
I am, with great respect,
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
Gypsy and Brown-tail Moths — State Forester — Work of De-
struction of Moths — Co-operation with Private Individuals
— Supplies.
Under the provisions of St. 1905, c. 381, § 3, as amended by St. 1906,
c. 268, $ 1, and St. 1908, c. 591, § 1, providing that the superin-
tendent for the suppression of the gypsy and brown-tail moth,
among other things, " may act in co-operation with any person,
persons, corporation or corporations, including other states, the
United States or foreign governments," and " may devise, use and
require all other lawful means of suppressing or preventing said
moths," the State Forester, who succeeds to the powers of the
68 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
superintendent for the suppression of the gypsy and brown-tail
moth under the provisions of St. 1909, c. 263, when actually engaged
in the work of destroying such moths in a given locality may co-
operate with adjacent landowners, who are carrying on work upon
their own premises in conjunction with the public work, by furnish-
ing them at cost supplies to be actually used in such work, or may
authorize the local superintendent to furnish such supplies as his
agent.
May 13, 1912.
Frank W. Rane, Esq., State Forester.
Dear Sir : — Your letter of May 2 submits for my considera-
tion an inquiry as to whether, under the provisions of St. 1905,
c. 381, § 3, you are authorized to permit local superintendents
to sell supplies to property owners at cost, said supplies to be
used only for the purpose of suppressing the gypsy and brown-
tail moths on their own property. You state that with the
approval of the Governor you have already established a supply
store from which various articles used in the work of destroying
the gypsy and brown-tail moths are furnished at cost prices to
such cities and towns as are by law entitled to reimbursement
from the Commonwealth.
The section of the statute to which you refer, as amended
by St. 1906, c. 268, § 1, and St. 1908, c. 591, § 1, is as fol-
lows : —
The said superintendent shall act for the commonwealth in sup-
pressing said moths as public nuisances, in accordance with the pro-
visions of this act. For this purpose he shall establish an office and
keep a record of his doings and of his receipts and expenditures,
and may, subject to the approval of the governor, -make rules and
regulations governing all operations by cities, towns or individuals
under this act. He may employ such clerks, assistants and agents,
including expert advisers and inspectors, as he may deem necessary
and as shall be approved by the governor. He may make contracts
on behalf of the commonwealth; may act in co-operation with any
person, persons, corporation or corporations, including other states,
the United States or foreigm governments; may conduct investiga-
tions and accumulate and distribute information concerning said
moths; may devise, use and require all other lawful means of sup-
pressing or preventing said moths; may lease real estate when he
deems it necessary, and, with the approval of the board in charge,
may use any real or personal property of the commonwealth; may
at all times enter upon the land of the commonwealth or of a mu-
nicipality, corporation, or other owner or owners, and may use all
reasonable means in carrying out the purposes of this act; and, in
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 69
the undertaking's aforesaid, may, in accordance with the provisions
of this act, expend the funds appropriated or donated therefor; but
no expenditure shall be made or liability incurred in excess of such
appropriations and donations. The clerks, assistants and agents
employed by said superintendent may at all times, in carrying out
the purposes of this act, enter upon the land of the commonwealth
or of a municipality, corporation or other owner or owners.
By St. 1909, c. 263, the powers of the superintendent for the
destruction of gypsy and brown-tail moths were transferred to
the State Forester.
The section quoted vests the State Forester with broad powders,
and since, by St. 1905, c. 381, § 1, the pupae, nests, eggs and
caterpillars of the gypsy and brown-tail moths, as well as the
moths themselves, are declared to be public nuisances, I see
no reason to doubt that, when actually engaged in the work
of destroying such moths in any stage of their development in
a given locality, you may co-operate with, adjacent owners who
are carrying on, or may desire to carry on, private work upon
their own premises in conjunction with the public work by fur-
nishing them at cost supplies to be actually used in such work,
or may authorize a local superintendent to furnish them as
your agent.
Upon the other hand, I am of opinion that nothing in the
section should be construed to authorize the indiscriminate sale
of such supplies to private individuals upon the mere assump-
tion that they are to be used in connection with work upon the
premises of such individuals, and that the proper and safe rule
to follow in the premises, if such supplies are to be so fur-
nished, is to require them to be used upon work which is closely
connected with some public work of the same character, and
which may be subject to the general supervision of the State
Forester or his agents.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General
Constitutional Law — Appropriation of Money raised hy Taxa-
tion — Public Purpose — Reclamation and Sale of Wet
Lands — Eminent Domain — Gratuity.
A proposed act providing, in substance, for the taking by eminent
domain, at the assessed valuation thereof, of tracts of wet lands for
the purpose of reclamation, which, after such taking and reelama-
70 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
tion, are to be cultivated for two years by the State Board of
Agriculture and then sold at a price not less than the cost of such
land plus the cost of reclamation, one-half of any sums received in
excess of such total cost to be awarded to the original owner or
owners of the land sold, and appropriating therefor the sum of
$10,000, might be held to contemplate the accomplishment of a
public purpose which would warrant the exercise of the power of
eminent domain and the appropriation of money raised by taxa-
tion, if, as matter of fact, the development and distribution for
occupation of the land affected gave relief to a considerable and
thickly settled agricultural region, and affected beneficially the
community as a whole, throughout such region, as well as indi-
viduals who acquired the land itself.
So much of such proposed act as provides that one-half of any sum
received by the Commonwealth upon disposing of reclaimed land,
in excess of the cost of the land plus the cost of reclamation, shall
be awarded to the original owner or owners thereof authorizes a
payment which is in the nature of a gratuity, and would therefore be
unconstitutional.
May 16, 1912.
Hon. Levi H. Greenwood, President of the Senate.
Sir: — By an order dated April 25, 1912, the Honorable Sen-
ate has required my opinion npon the following questions of
law:— ^
1. If the bill entitled " An Act to provide for protecting the public
health and promoting the general welfare by the reclamation of wet
lands," now pending in the Senate (printed as House No. 7, and
amended by the Senate), should be enacted, would its provisions be
constitutional ?
2. Would it be constitutional to provide for the expenditure of
$10,000 from the treasury of the Commonwealth for the taking and
improving of wet lands by the State Board of Health and by the
Board of AgTiculture, and for the exemption from taxation of such
lands so long as the title thereto remains in the Commonwealth ?
3. Is it possible that section 2, and especially the provisions of
lines 6 and 7 of said section, providing that the rule of damages shall
be the assessed valuation, would be unconstitutional?
4. Is it possible that section 6, and especially the provisions of
line 5 of said section, providing that the Commonwealth may take,
own and operate deposits of marl and peat, would be unconstitu-
tional?
The proposed act is entitled " An Act to provide for protect-
ing the public health and promoting the general welfare by the
reclamation of wet lands," and is as follows : —
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 71
Section 1. The sum of ten thousand dollars is hereby appro-
priated, to be paid out of the treasury of the commonwealth from
the ordinary revenue of the current year, to constitute a fund called
the Wet Lands Reclamation Fund, the same to be expended under
the direction of the state boards of health and agriculture, in the
manner and for the puri30se hereinafter specified.
Section 2. The said board of health, with the approval of the
governor and council, may take for the purposes of this act any
tract or tracts of wet lands of two or more adjacent owners, except
salt marshes, together with such dry land, if any, as may be necessary
for access thereto, by eminent domain, at the assessed valuation of
said lands.
Any iDerson aggrieved by a taking as aforesaid may have his
damage assessed in the manner provided by law in respect to 'the
taking of land for public parks.
Title to lands so taken shall pass to the commonwealth, and they
shall be exempt from taxation until sold as hereinafter provided.
Section 3. The said board, acting through such agent or agents
as it shall appoint, shall proceed to drain and reclaim such lands,
and for that purpose may purchase such machinery and equipments
and execute such contracts, as the governor and council may approve,
employing so far as may be practicable the labor of prisoners under
regulations and conditions prescribed by the prison commissioners.
Section 4. When said lands, or any convenient part thereof, shall
have been drained and reclaimed, the board of agriculture shall cause
the same to be cultivated for not less than two successive seasons, in
such a manner as, in the opinion of the board, shall best demonstrate
the value thereof for agricultural uses.
Section 5. The said board of agriculture shall thereafter, at such
time or times as it shall deem expedient, offer such lands for sale, in
whole or in part, at a price not less than the cost of the land plus
the cost of reclaiming the same.
One half of any sums received in excess of such total cost, shall be
awarded to the original owner or owners of the land sold, and the
other half of such excess shall be turned in to the treasury of the
commonwealth until the original appropriation shall have been re-
funded. The remaining proceeds of such sales shall be returned to
the reclamation fund, to be used for the reclamation of successive
tracts in the manner hereinbefore provided.
Section 6. The town boards, acting jointly, may, in their dis-
cretion, reserve from sale any tracts containing marl, peat, or other
deposits of commercial value, by the exploitation of which the cost
of reclaiming the remainder may be reduced; and may lease or
operate such reserved portions in any manner approved by the gov-
ernor and council.
Section 7. This act shall take effect upon its passage.
72 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
The title of the bill recites that it is an act " to provide for
protecting the public health and promoting the general wel-
fare," but its provisions clearly contemplate not merely the
exercise of the police power of the Commonwealth for the pres-
ervation of the public health or safety, since, by its provisions,
the exercise is required of the governmental powers of eminent
domain and taxation (see §§ 1, 2). Xor is it an exercise of
the police power in providing reasonable regulations for the
general advantage of the owners of wet or swampy lands. See
R. L., c. 195, § 116; Coomes v. Burt, 22 Pick. 422; Day v.
Hurlhurt, 11 Met. 321; Sherman v. Toleij, 3 Allen, 7; Wurts
V. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606; Head v. Amoskeag Manfg. Co.,
113 U. S. 9. Acts of this character are not designed to accom-
plish a public purpose and do not involve an exercise
either of the power of eminent domain or of the power of taxa-
tion. Henry v. Thomas, 119 Mass. 583, 584; Lowell v. Boston,
111 Mass. 454. It is well established that these latter powers
may be invoked only where the purpose to be accomplished is
a public purpose. Loivell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454, 462 ; Talbot
V. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417; Opinion of the Justices, 182 Mass.
607; Opinion of the Justices, 155 Mass. 601.
The first and most important question presented by the
several inquiries of the Honorable Senate is whether or not the
purpose of the proposed bill is a public purpose. The purpose
stated in the title, that of protecting the public health, is not
conclusive, for the reason that the public health might well
be protected under the police power without recourse either to
the power of eminent domain or to the power of taxation, since,
if conditions warranted it, the wet lands might well be declared
a public nuisance, and so abated at the expense of the persons
benefited (see R. L., c. 75, §§ 75-85; Grace v. Board of Health
of Newton, 135 Mass. 490), or might be abated under a statute
like R. L., c. 195, § 116, upon the theory that all owners of
contiguous property of this character were common proprietors
and could be required to join in the work of reclamation and
to pay a reasonable and proportionate part of the expense. It
is obvious from a consideration of the bill, moreover, that the
taking of lands for the purpose of drainage, the purchase of
machinery for their development, and the experimental culti-
vation to " demonstrate the value thereof for agricultural uses,"
are not in any sense required for the protection of the public
health, and that the primary, if not the only, object of the bill
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 73
is to secure the reclamation of the lands and their development
so far as may be necessary to make them marketable. The pur-
pose of the act, then, may fairly be said to be the acquisition
and development of wet lands so as to make them, after develop-
ment, fit for profitable occupation by the people of the Com-
monwealth or such of the people as may have opportunity to
acquire them.
The exercise of the power of eminent > domain in connection
with the drainage of wet lands has been sustained. See Coster
V. Tide Water Co., 3 C. E. Green, 54, 518; State v. Blake,
7 Vroom, 447; Talhot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417. In the latter
case the court sustained a statute (St. 1860, c. 211) which pro-
vided that a considerable tract of land situated in different
towns and held by a large number of owners, which was flooded
by reason of a dam maintained by private persons, might be
reclaimed by the removal of the dam by commissioners ap-
pointed under the act, compensation being paid out of the
treasury of the Commonwealth to the persons by whom the
dam had been maintained. The court discusses at length
whether or not the purpose for which the power of eminent
domain was here exercised was a public purpose. Thus, at page
423 :~
lu many cases there can be no difficulty in determining whether an
appropriation of property is for a public or private use. If land is
taken for a fort, a canal or a highwaj^, it would clearly fall within
the first class; if it is transferred from one person to another or to
several persons solely for their peculiar benefit and advantage, it
would as clearly come within the second class. But there are inter-
mediate cases where public and private interests are blended together,
in which it becomes more difiicult to decide within which of the two
classes they may be properly said to fall. There is no fixed rule or
standard by which such cases can be tried and determined. Each
must necessarily depend upon its own peculiar circumstances. In
the present case there can be no doubt that every owner of meadow
land bordering on these rivers will be directly benefited to a gi-eater
or less extent by the reduction of the height of the plaintiffs' dam.
The act is therefore in a certain sense for a private use, and enures
directly to the individual advantage of such owners. But this is by
no means a decisive test of its validity. Many enterprises of the
highest public utility are productive of great and immediate benefits
to individuals. A railroad or canal may largely enhance the value of
private property situated at or near its termini ; but it is not for that
reason any less a public work, for the construction of which private
74 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
property may well be taken. We are therefore to look further into
the probable operation and effect of the statute in question, in order
to ascertain whether some public interest or benefit may not be
likely to accrue from the execution of the power conferred by it
upon the defendants. If any such can be found, then we are bound
to suppose that the act was passed in order to effect it. We are not
to judge of the wisdom or expediency of exercising the power to
accomplish the object. The Legislature are the sole and exclusive
judges whether the exigency exists which calls on them to exercise
their authority to take private property. If a use in its nature public
can be subserved by the appropriation of a portion of the plaintiffs'
dam in the manner provided by this act, it was clearly within the
constitutional authority of the Legislature to take it, and in the
absence of any declared purpose we must assume that it was taken
for such legitimate and authorized use.
The court, in sustaining the exercise of the power, referred to
the statutes providing for the improvement of meadows,
swamps and low lands as instances of the exercise of the power
of eminent domain for purposes like that in the case at bar
(page 428). The analogy, however, was denied in Lowell v.
Boston, supra (see page 468), although the case was followed
upon the principal question, the court, in Lotuell v. Boston, say-
ing (page 470) : —
The main question was, whether the relief of an extensive territory
of valuable lands, in a thickly settled agricultural region, from the
nuisance of flooding by the waters of a stream, caused by a single
dam below, constituted such an object of public concern as to justify
the exercise of the power by removing the dam. The court recognized
the difficulty that, so far as the removal of the dam benefited each
land owner, it was a private use which would not justify the exercise
of that power. But the obstruction in the stream injuriously affected
" so large a territory, situated in different towns, and owned by a
great number of persons," as to give it the character of a public
nuisance, the removal of which " would seem to come fairly within
the scope of legislative action." While we do not assent to the sug-
gestions in that opinion, that the general provisions of law for the
regulation of mills and the improvement of meadows are based upon
the constitutional power to appropriate private property under the
right of eminent domain, we accord fully with the judgment rendered
and the general principle upon which it is founded.
If the use to which the property is to be put is a public use,
the decision of the Legislature as to the necessity which re-
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 75
quires it to be taken is conclusive. Talbot v. Hudson, supra;
Miller v. Fitcliburg, 180 Mass. 32, 37. The question as to
whether or not the use is a public one, however, must ultimately
be decided by the court. Miller v. Fitcliburg, supra, page 37,
and cases cited. If the proposed bill benefits no one but the
present or prospective owners of the land taken, or if the only
benefit is in the profitable development and sale of the lands
themselves, the purpose of the statute would not, in my
opinion, be a public one. See Opinion of the Justices, 182 Mass.
605, 607; Opinion of the Justices, 155 Mass. 601. If, upon the
other hand, the development and distribution for occupation of
the lands affected gave relief to a considerable and thickly set-
tled agricultural region, and affected beneficially the community
as a whole throughout such region, as well as the individuals
who acquired the land itself, it would doubtless be held by the
court to be a public purpose which would justify the exercise
of the power of eminent domain. As I have stated, the ulti-
mate decision is for the court, but without definite knowledge
as to the land which may be affected or the resulting benefits
to the public as a whole, I am of opinion that I am not re-
quired to hold that the purpose of the act, as gathered from its
provisions alone, would necessarily be unconstitutional.
The first question of the Honorable Senate, however, extends
to and includes not only the general purpose of the act as stated
in sections 1 and 2, but also matters of detail comprehended in
other provisions, and I am therefore constrained to call atten-
tion to the provisions of section 5, that one-half of any sums
received by tho. Commonwealth, upon disposing of such lands,
in excess of the cost of the land plus the cost of reclamation,
shall be awarded to the original owner or owners of any such
land sold; and to say that in my opinion such provision is
clearly unconstitutional. By section 2 it is provided that the
State Board of Health, with the approval of the Governor and
Council, may take by eminent domain any tract of wet land
of two or more adjacent owners, at the assessed valuation
thereof, and that any person aggrieved by a taking as aforesaid
may have his damages assessed in the manner provided by law
with respect to the taking of land for public parks, and that
title to the land so taken shall pass to the Commonwealth. It
is clear that upon such taking the title passes to the Common-
wealth in fee, and the owner, having received compensation
under the provisions of section 2, has no further right, title or
76 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
interest in tlie land taken, and a payment to him of half of the
sum received in excess of the cost and expense of development
cannot be considered to be an expenditure of public money for
a public purpose, since the Commonwealth receives nothing in
return therefor, but would be in the nature of a gratuity. With
respect to the specific provision just considered, therefore, I
am of opinion that the proposed act is unconstitutional.
In reply to the second question of the Honorable Senate I
should say that, assuming that the purpose for which the land
is taken and the money appropriated was a public purpose
within the principles discussed in considering the first inquiry
of the Honorable Senate, the expenditure of $10,000 from the
treasury of the Commonwealth and the exemption of the land
from taxation, so long as the Commonwealth retains title, would
be constitutional.
Replying to the third inquiry of the Honorable Senate in
the precise terms of said inquiry, I am of opinion that it is
possible that the provision of section 2, that the rule of damages
shall be the assessed valuation, would be unconstitutional. In
exercising the power of eminent domain the Legislature has no
authority to designate an arbitrary amount which must be ac-
cepted by the person whose land is taken as damages for the
taking, or to prescribe rules or principles upon which damages
shall be computed. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United
States, 148 U. S. 312; In re Opinion of the Justices, 66 N. H.
629; Neiuhuryport Water Co. v. Neiohuryport, 85 Fed. Rep.
723. If the provision of section 2 that " said board of health
. . . may take . . . any tract or tracts of wet lands ... by
eminent domain, at the assessed valuation of said lands," is to
be regarded as an assessment of the damages occasioned by said
taking, it might well be found objectionable upon constitutional
grounds. The designation of a fixed sum to be paid as damages
for the taking of land by eminent domain, even where an al-
ternative is provided by an appeal to a jur}^ is, so far as I am
aware, without precedent; but if the amount so fixed may be
regarded as an offer of settlement which may or may not be
accepted by the person whose land is taken, and whose consti-
tutional rights to a just compensation for his property are
protected by a further provision that " any person aggrieved
by a taking as aforesaid may have his damages assessed in the
manner provided by law in respect to the taking of land for
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 77
public parks," the constitutional requirement in the premises
might be satisfied, since it is at least doubtful if any offer
or award is required where provision is made for an ultimate
determination of damages by a jur}^ See Hamlin v. New Bed-
ford, 143 Mass. 192; Bent v. Emerij, 173 Mass. 495; St. 1898,
c. 278, § 4. And see Attorney-General v. Old Colony Railroad,
160 Mass. 62, 90.
Again, replying in the precise phraseology of the fourth in-
quiry of the Honorable Senate, it is, in my opinion, possible
that section 6, and especially lines 5 and 6, would be unconsti-
tutional. If the exploitation and operation of marl, peat or
other deposits of commercial value would properly constitute an
entrance by the Commonwealth " as a competitor into the field
of industrial enterprise, with a view either to the profit that
could be made through the income to be derived from the busi-
ness, or to the indirect gain that might result to purchasers if
prices were reduced by governmental competition," it would
clearly be unconstitutional. Opinion of the Justices, 182 Mass.
605, 607. If, on the other hand, such exploitation and opera-
tion were merely temporary, undertaken in connection with the
development of other adjacent or similar lands acquired for
a public purpose, and were intended only for the purpose of
reducing the cost of reclaiming the remainder of such land,
such work might well be held to be a proper and incidental
element of economy in the general work of reclamation.
I am, with great respect,
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
Constitutional Laiu — Volunteer Militia — Adjutant General —
T,erm of Office.
The provision of chapter IL, section I., Article X. of the Constitution
of the Commonwealth, that " the governor shall appoint the adju-
tant general," does not impose a limitation upon the authority of
the General Court to fix and determine the tenure of office of the
adjutant general, and a provision in a proposed act having for its
purpose the revision of the organization of the volunteer militia,
that " the term of office of the adjutant general shall be five years
from the passage of this act," would not be unconstitutional.
78 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
May 20, 1912.
Hon. Graftox D. Cushixg, Speaker of the House of Eepresentor-
ilves.
Sir : — By an order adopted by the Honorable House of Rep-
resentatives on May 1, 1912, I am requested to inform the
Honse of Representatives whether in my opinion that provision
of House Bill No. 2221, entitled " An Act to revise the organi-
zation of the Massachusetts Volunteer Militia," which provides
that " the term of office of the adjutant general shall be five
years from the passage of this act," is constitutional and legal.
The proposed act, which amends St. 1908, c. 604, § 12, by
striking out the whole of said section and substituting a new
section therefor, among other things provides that —
The military and administrative staff of the commander-in-chief
shall consist of : —
The adjutant general, with the rank of brigadier general, who shall,
ex officio, be chief of staff, such officers of the United States army or
navy as may be detailed as assistant chiefs of staff, together with the
chiefs of the inspector general's department, judge advocate gen-
eral's department, quartermaster's department, subsistence depart-
ment, pay department, medical department and ordnance department.
The terms of office of the chiefs of the above named departments
shall be five years, as provided in chapter four hundred and forty-
nine of the acts of the year nineteen hundred and eleven (and the
term of office of the adjutant general shall be five years from the
passage of this act and he shall be eligible for reappointment).
The existing provision upon the subject is to be found in
St. 1908, c. 604, § 12: —
The staff of the commander-in-chief shall consist of : —
1 adjutant general, with the rank of brigadier general, who shall, ex-
officio, be chief of staff;
1 assistant adjutant general, with the rank of colonel ;
4 aides-de-cami3, each with the rank of major ;
6 aides-de-camp, to be selected from the commissioned ofificei^ of the
Massachusetts volunteer militia, but not to be relieved from duty
with their organizations while serving in this capacity.
In time of war the commander-in-chief may appoint such addi-
tional staff officers as the service may require, with such rank, not
higher than that of colonel, as he may designate. The above staff
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 79
officers, excepting the detailed aides-de-camp, shall be commissioned
and hold office until their successors are appointed and qualified, but
thej^ may be removed at any time by the commander-in-chief.
The precise inquiry of the Honorable House of Representa-
tives is, therefore, in substance, whether or not the General
Court may provide a fixed and definite term of office for the
adjutant general of the volunteer militia.
The pertinent provisions of the Constitution are contained in
chapter II., section 1, dealing with the powers and prerogatives
of the Governor. Article VII. constitutes the Governor the
commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and of all military
forces of the State, by sea and land, and vests in him full power,
by himself, or by any commander, or other officer or officers,
from time to time, to train, instruct, exercise and govern the
militia and navy. Article X. provides —
The captains and subalterns of the militia shall be elected by the
written votes of the train-band and alarm list of their respective
companies, the field officers of regiments shall be elected by the writ-
ten votes of the captains and subalterns of their respective regiments;
the brigadiers shall be elected, in like manner, by the field officers of
their respective brigades; and such officers, so elected, shall be com-
missioned by the governor, who shall determine their rank.
The legislature shall, by standing laws, direct the time and manner
of convening the electors, and of collecting votes, and of certifying
to the governor, the officers elected.
The major-generals shall be appointed by the senate and house of
representatives, each having a negative upon the other; and be com-
missioned by the governor.
And if the electors of brigadiers, field officers, captains or sub-
alterns, shall neglect or refuse to make such elections, after being
duly notified, according to the laws for the time being, then the gov-
ernor, with the advice of council, shall appoint suitable persons to
fill such offices.
The commanding officers of regiments shall appoint their adju-
tants and quartermasters; the brigadiers their brigade-majors; and
the major-generals their aids; and the governor shall appoint the
adjutant-general.
The governor, with advice of council, shall aj^point all officers of
the continental armj^, whom by the confederation of the United States
it is provided that this commonwealth shall appoint, as also aU officers
of forts and garrisons.
The divisions of the militia into brigades, regiments, and com-
panies, made in pursuance of the militia laws now in force, shall be
80 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
considered as the proper divisions of the militia of this common-
wealth, until the same shall be altered in pursuance of some future
law.
I am advised that doubt has arisen as to the power of the
Legislature to create a fixed term of office for the adjutant gen-
eral, in view of the arrangement and language of the provisions
of the Constitution above cited and of the distinction which
seems to be made between officers of the militia w^ho are
commissioned to command and officers who are appointed adju-
tants, quartermasters, brigade-majors and aids to major-gen-
erals, with whom the adjutant general is included in Article
X., and it is suggested that from the relation between an
adjutant and his commanding officer, a brigade-major and his
brigadier, an aid and his commanding general, and the adjutant
general and the commander-in-chief, a constitutional right is
to be inferred which is vested in the Governor, as commander-
in-chief, and in a major-general, brigadier or regimental com-
mander to appoint as adjutant general, aid, brigade-major,
adjutant or quartermaster, such eligible person as he may de-
sire, and that it would be in contravention of such constitutional
right to provide a fixed term of office for any of these officers.
The relations between a commanding officer and his personal
staff are doubtless so intimate and of such a character as to
render it desirable that such commanding officer should exercise
his personal judgment in the selection of the members of his
staff, and military custom appears to have recognized the pro-
priety of such action by the commanding officer in requiring as
matter of etiquette, upon a change of commanders, a voluntary
tender of the resignations of members of the staff of his pred-
ecessor. This custom has been at times recognized in the
statutes relating to the organization of the militia. (See R. S.,
c. 12, § 73.) It does not follow, however, that the existence
of such a custom, or even a recognition of it in the Constitution
in the apparent distinction between officers of the militia elected
to command and officers appointed to positions upon the staff
of a commanding officer, if such distinction amounts to recogni-
tion, must be given the force of a constitutional restriction upon
the power of the General Court to deal with the term or tenure
of staff appointments, or regarded as creating a modification, in
the case of such appointments, of the well-recognized principle
that where an office is established b}^ the Constitution without
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 81
provision as to the term or duty thereof the latter may be altered,
enlarged or modified in such manner as the Legislature may
deem to be for the public interest. Opinion of the Justices,
117 Mass. 603; Wales v. Belcher, 3 Pick. 508; see Taft v.
Adams, 3 Gray, 126 ; Const, of Mass., c. 1, § 1, Art. IV.
A careful consideration of the provisions of the Constitution
vrhich are material to this question discloses no intention upon
the part of the framers thereof to impose a limitation upon the
power of the General Court to fix and determine the tenure
of office of the adjutant general. Upon the contrary, the Jour-
nal of the Convention for Massachusetts Bay, 1779-80, shows
that in discussing the paragraph dealing with staff appoint-
ments, which was afterwards adopted, it was suggested that the
words " during pleasure " be inserted, and that the suggestion
was thereafter withdrawn and the paragraph accepted in its
present form. The purpose of the suggestion, and the meaning
of the words " during pleasure,'^ may be illustrated by quoting
from the constitution, submitted to the people by the General
Court of 1777-78 and rejected by popular vote, a provision
found in the 26th clause that "the Attorney-General, Sheriffs,
Registers of the Courts of Probate, Coroners, Notaries Public,
and Naval Officers, shall be appointed and hold their offices
during pleasure." The convention, therefore, upon considera-
tion and with intention, omitted from the clause of the Consti-
tution which relates to the appointment of staff officers any
express provision for the limitation which it is now argued must^
by implication be read into said clause.
The early statutes which deal with the organization of the
volunteer militia contain no provision from which may be in-
ferred a recognition that the tenure of office of either the ad-
jutant general or any other staff officer was to be during the
pleasure of his commanding officer (see St. 1809, c. 108) ; and
it is significant that the earliest provision relative to the dis-
charge or removal of staff officers (St. 1822, c. 92, § 16) was
enacted after the adoption in 1821 of Article IV. of the Amend-
ments to the Constitution, which, in part, provided that —
All officers commissioned to command in the militia may be re-
moved from office in such manner as the legislature may, by law,
prescribe —
and superseded a provision that —
82 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
No officer, duly commissioned to command in the militia, shall be
removed from his office, but by address of both houses to the gov-
ernor, or by fair trial in court-martial, pursuant to the laws of the
commonwealth for the time being —
and at the time w^hen the Legislature first assumed and exer-
cised the authority to provide for the discharge of militia
officers in a manner other than by fair trial in court-martial,
or by address of both houses to the Governor. See St. 1821,
c. 32, § 1; St. 1835, c. 144, §§ 2, 3; R. S., c. 12, §§ 67-73.
Moreover, there is nothing in the language of the constitu-
tional provision itself which requires a construction inconsistent
with an authority in the Legislature to determine the term of
office of the adjutant general or of any other staff officer (see
Avery v. Inhabitants of Tyringham, 3 Mass. 160), and in at
least one instance such power has been exercised by the Legis-
lature by providing, in Gen. Sts., c. 13, § 62, that "the adju-
tant general shall hold his office for the term of one year,"
subject to removal at any time by the commander-in-chief.
And see St. 1912, c. 268; St. 1911, c. 449.
For the reasons above stated, therefore, I am of opinion that
the provision of House Bill No. 2221, that the term of office
of the adjutant general shall be five years from the passage
thereof, would not be unconstitutional.
I am, with great respect.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
Constitutional Law — Governor — Veto — Duty to return Bill
with Objections thereto in Writing to the Branch in which
it originated — Return — Limit of Time.
Where certain bills, due under the provisions of Article II. of Section
I. of Chapter I. of the Constitution of the Commonwealth to be
returned on May 27 by the Governor, with his objections thereto
in writing, to the House of Eepresentatives, in which branch such
bills originated, were found, on the morning of May 28, on the
desk of the clerk of the House of Eepresentatives, and the speaker
of the House of Eepresentatives, on a point of order, ruled that
the vetoes were not properly returned until received by the clerk
at 8 o'clock upon the morning of May 28, and such bills were
transmitted by the clerk to the Secretary of the Commonwealth,
with a statement of the above facts, it is not the duty of the
Secretary to determine whether or not such bills were seasonably
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 83
returned, and he should receive and record them among the laws
of the current year, leaving the question of their validity to be
determined by the proper tribunal.
It would seem, however, that the duty devolving upon the Governor
under the provisions of Article II. of Section I. of Chapter I. of
the Constitution, if he has objection, to return a bill or resolve
within the prescribed period of time to the branch of the Legis-
lature in which it originated, should be performed with sufficient
formality to insure that the return shall be made to some proper
officer of the Senate or House of Eepresentatives, as the case may
be, if the branch to which the bill or resolve and the objections
are sent is not in session.
June 7, 1912.
Hon. Albert P. Langtry, Secretary of the C ommonwealth.
Dear Sir : — You desire my opinion as to whether or not it
is your duty to receive certain bills transmitted to you by the
clerk of the House of Eepresentatives under circumstances which
appear from a communication accompanying said bills to be as
follows : —
These acts and resolve were found on the desk of the clerk of the
House of Representatives on the morning of Tuesday, May 28, last.
They were due to be returned by His Excellency the Governor to the.
House of Representatives, in which branch they originated, with his
objections thereto in writing, on Monday, May 27.
At the session of the House on Tuesday, May 28, the speaker
called the attention of the House to the fact that these bills and
resolve had been found on the desk of the clerk of the House that
morning.
A point of order was raised that the bills and resolve and veto
messages were not properly before the House of Representatives,
not having been returned by the Governor within the five days al-
lowed under Article II. of Section I. of Chapter I. of the Constitu-
tion.
On this point of order the speaker ruled as follows : " the vetoes
were without question returned after the clerk's office was closed on
the last day during which, under Article II. of Section I. of Chapter
I. of the Constitution, three of the vetoes should apparently have
been returned. There is no official record whether the vetoes were
left in the clerk's office before or after midnight. The chair, there-
fore rules that simply leaving the papers in the clerk's office after it
is closed is not such a return to the House of Representatives of the
bills and resolves, with his objections thereto in writing, as is re-
quired by the Constitution, as the House can take cognizance of;
and that three of the vetoes were not properly returned until re-
ceived by the clerk at 8 o'clock this morning.'^
84 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
It is the duty of the Secretary of the Commonwealth, under
the provisions of R. L., c. 9, § 1 — •
at the close of each session of the general court, [to] collate and
cause to be printed in one volume, in style and arrangement as here-
tofore, the constitution of the commonwealth, the acts and resolves
passed, any amendments to the constitution agreed to during such
session, the governor's address and messages, a list of the changes
of names returned during the preceding year by the probate courts,
a list of the officers of the civil government of the commonwealth,
a table of changes in the general laws, and an index.
I assume, therefore, that your inquir}^, in substance, requires
my opinion as to whether or not you shall receive for record,
and include in the collated and printed volume of the acts and
resolves for the current year, the two bills and the resolve trans-
mitted to you in the manner hereinbefore described.
The ruling of the speaker, already quoted, appears to be based
upon the fact that there was before him " no official record
whether the vetoes were left in the clerk's office before or after
midnight ; '^ but the absence of such record is not, in nw opinion,
conclusive, for if the placing of the bills and the resolve upon
the desk of the clerk of the House of Representatives during the
absence of the clerk and after his office was closed for business
is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional provision that
the Executive shall return such bills and resolve, together with
his objections thereto in writing, to the branch of the Legislature
in which they originated, the hour or moment when they were
placed there may be established by competent proof. Gardner
V. The Collector, 6 AYall. (U. S.) 499, 511. And see United
States V. Allen, 36 Fed. Rep. 174; Lyo7is v. Woods, 153 U. S.
649, 663.
Since the fact, if it be a fact, may be established by proper
evidence, I shall assume for the purposes of your inquiry that
the several bills and resolve were placed upon the desk of the
clerk of the House of Representatives before midnight on Mon-
day, May 27, and within the period allowed therefor by the
Constitution. The present status of the bills and the resolve
in question, therefore, must depend upon whether or not they
have been duly " returned ^' to the House of Representatives.
The provision of the Constitution which is material in the
premises is Article II. of Section I. of Chapter I. of Part the
Second of the Constitution, which I quote : —
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 85
No bill or resolve of the senate or house of representatives shall
become a law, and have force as such until it shall have been laid
before the goveraor for his revisal; and if he, upon such revision,
approve thereof, he shall signify his approbation by signing the same.
But if he have any objection to the passing of such bill or resolve,
he shall return the same, together with his objections thereto, in
writing, to the senate or house of representatives, in whichsoever the
same shall have originated; who shall enter the objections sent down
by the governor, at large, on their records, and proceed to reconsider
the said bill or resolve. But if after such reconsideration, two-thirds
of the said senate or house of representatives, shall, notwithstanding
the said objections, agree to pass the same, it shall, together with the
objections, be sent to the other branch of the legislature, where it
shall also be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of the mem-
bers present, shall have the force of a law ; but in all such cases, the
votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays; and the
names of the persons voting for, or against, the said bill or resolve,
shall be entered upon the public records of the commonwealth.
And in order to prevent unnecessary delays, if any bill or resolve
shall not be returned by the governor within five days after it shall
have been presented, the same shall have the force of a law.
It has been held that a bill can be laid before the Governor
only by being presented to him personally. So in Opinion of
the Justices, 99 Mass. 636, in reply to an inquiry of the House
of Representatives as to whether a bill transmitted by the Sen-
ate to the Secretary of the Commonwealth during a temporary
absence of the Governor from the Commonwealth was properly
" laid before " the Governor prior to his return, the court
said : —
As the duty of revisal by the Governor is a pereonal duty, with
which he alone is intrusted when his chair is not vacant, it is neces-
sary that the bill should be laid before him personally. A bill is not
laid before him or presented to him, within the meaning and intent
of these provisions, by being sent from the Senate to the Secretary
of the Commonwealth. The Constitution makes the Secretary an in-
dependent officer, and prescribes his duties; and his possession of a
bill sent by the Senate to be presented to the Governor is not the
possession of the Governor.
A bill must be laid before the Governor, or the person who, for the
time being, is clothed with the powers of Governor under the Consti-
tution, for his revision. The individual whose duty it is to sign the
bill is entitled to have it before him, that he may have the opportunity
to sign it or return it with his objections thereto to the branch of the
86 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Legislature in which it originated. This bill does not appear to have
been so presented to any one, except by the statement that it was
returned unsigned on the 19th, with the Governor's objections.
This opinion is cited with approval in Farwell v. Boston,
192 Mass. 15, 19. In the latter case the then charter of the
city of Boston (St. 1851, c. 118, § 17) required an ordinance,
order, resolution or vote to be presented to the mayor, and pro-
vided that if such ordinance, order, resolution or vote " shall
not be returned by the mayor within ten days after it shall have
been presented the same shall be in force ; '' and it was held
that leaving a vote with a clerk in the mayor's office, in the
absence of the mayor, was not a presentation to that officer
within the meaning of the provision above quoted.
Beyond holding, in Opinion of the Justices, 135 Mass. 594,
that the Governor is not required to deliver a bill or resolve in
person, the courts of this Commonw^ealth do not appear to have
defined what constitutes returning a bill or resolve to the branch
of the Legislature in which it originated. In that opinion it
is said that the delivery by the Governor " of the message to the
private secretary, who is an officer provided for by statute, and
the proper organ of communication with the Legislature, with
directions to have it sent down, was the first step in its transmis-
sion to the House.*' In the case of Har pending v. Ilaight, 39
Cal. 189, however, the meaning of the word in a provision of
the constitution of California that " if any bill shall not be
returned within ten days after it shall have been presented to
him (the governor) . . . the same shall be a law, in like man-
ner as if he had signed it, unless the Legislature, by adjourn-
ment, prevent such return," was discussed at great length. It
there appeared that on the last day of the prescribed period the
Governor, by his messenger, sent to the Senate a bill which he
had declined to sign, with his objections thereto in writing.
Upon arriving at the Senate chamber, however, the messenger
discovered that the Senate had adjourned until the following
morning, and immediately returned both the bill and the mes-
sage to the Governor without attempting to deliver them to the
Senate or to deposit them with any officer of the Senate or with
any other person for its use, and they were thereafter retained
by the Governor. After referring to the constitutional require-
ment that a bill must, before becoming a law, be " presented to
the Governor," the court sa3^s, at page 199 : —
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 87
And so, upon the other hand, when we come to consider the cor-
responding duty of the Executive to ^' return " the bill to the Senate
in this case, we know by attending to the results to be' brought about
by such " return " that it must be a step taken by which his own time
for deliberation is ended and that for the deliberation of the Senate
is begun; that the bill itself must be put beyond the Executive pos-
session ; that it must be placed into the possession, actual or potential,
of the Senate itself; and that, as part of this return, the Executive
objections to the passage of the bill must be stated.
And again, at page 203 : —
It was the duty of the messenger to communicate to the Senate the
message which he bore from the Executive on that occasion. This
was to be done in the most direct manner that circumstances would
permit. It was impossible for him to immediately announce it to the
Senate, for that body was not in session. It had a right to be in
recess, if it desired so to be, and it was not in the power of the
Executive or his messenger to recall it to its sitting's. But its right to
be in recess was no greater or higher than was the right of the
Executive to return the bill in question for its reconsideration; nor
is there any reason why the free exercise of these admitted rights
upon the part of the Senate and Governor, respectively, should bring
them into collision. The Senate has the unqualified, constitutional
power to adjourn for three consecutive days. (Art. IV., See. 15,
Constitution.) It must often happen that these three days will in-
clude the last day allowed the Executive for the exercise of the veto
power against the passage of a particular Senate bill.
Now, if the mere fact of the recess of the Senate, thus constitu-
tionally taken, does operate to defeat, in a measure, the exercise of
the veto power conferred on the Executive by the Constitution, then
we have the strange spectacle of an irreconcilable conflict between the
several clauses of that instrument itself, by which the Senate, by the
mere exercise of its own admitted constitutional authority to adjourn,
violates the equally . clear constitutional right of the Executive to
have it kept in session.
T\''e are of opinion that the adjournment of the Senate on March
31 did not curtail the veto power of the Executive over the bill in
question, nor should it even have embarrassed him in its exercise.
The return should have been made in such manner as the circum-
stances would permit; it should, at all events, have left the bill and
message beyond the Executive control, and, if need be, in the im-
mediate custody of some proper person who would be likely to de-
liver it to the Senate at the first opportunity. The best return that
the circumstances would admit, would, in our judgment, be a proper
return. The maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia would be applicable
88 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
to such a condition of affairs. We know of no other imle, either,
upon which the clear right of the Governor to make the return to the
Senate can be reconciled with the equally clear right of the Senate
to be in recess at the time.
If the requirement of the Constitution that, before becoming
a law a bill or resolve must be laid before the Governor for his
revisal, can be met only by lajdng such bill or resolve before
hiin personally, it would seem that the corresponding duty de-
volving upon the Governor, if he has objection, to return such
bill or resolve within five days to the branch of the Legislature
in which it originated, should be performed with sufficient
formality to insure that the return shall be made to some proper
officer of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case
may be, if the body to which the bill or resolve and the objec-
tions are sent down is not in session. See Opinion of the
Justices, 45 N. H. 607, 610. Or at least to "the immediate
custody of some proper person who would be likely to deliver
it ... at the first opportunity." See Har pending v. Haight,
supra, p. 204.
In the case here under consideration, if a decision upon this
point were required by the inquiry submitted to me, I should
be inclined to accept the principles laid down in the cases cited,
and to hold that upon the facts before me the bills and the
resolve transmitted to you by the clerk of the House of Repre-
sentatives were not returned to that body before midnight on
May 27, and therefore were not returned within the five days
allowed therefor by the Constitution.
I am of opinion, however, that I am not required to pass upon
this question. The bills and the resolve to which your inquiry
is directed were transmitted to you by the clerk of the House
of Representatives, and are in your possession and custody as
the recording officer of the Commonwealth and the custodian
of its records; and you are officially advised that the House of
Representatives, in which they originated and to which they
should have been returned by the Executive, has declined to
receive them, upon the ground that they were not seasonably
returned to it. Under these circumstances it is not the duty
of the Secretary to determine whether or not the bills and the
resolve in question were in fact returned, or whether or not the
action of the House was warranted in the premises. He should
be sfuided bv the official record of the facts, and receive and
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 89
record the several bills and the resolve among the laws of the
current year, leaving the question of their validity to be deter-
mined by the proper tribunal.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
County Treasurers — Payments — Approval of Bill or Order —
Duty to ascertain Legality of Expenditures.
TJnder the provisions of E. L., c. 21, § 8, that " each county treasurer
shall collect, receive and safely keep all money belonging to the
county, and pay out the same in accordance with law," it is
the duty of a county treasurer to ascertain whether or not a pay-
ment which he is called upon to make, by an order or bill duly
approved by the county commissioners, may be made by him ac-
cording to law, and he is therefore required to satisfy himself
that the expense for which payment is to be made was legally
incurred in the first instance.
June 12, 1912.
Hon. Frank L. Dean, Controller of County Accounts.
Dear Sir : — In a letter dated May 13 you state that certain
payments by county treasurers, which are " irregular by reason
of there being no legal authority for their payment," have come
to your attention, and that with reference to such payments
"the claim made by certain treasurers is that their only lia-
bility is under chapter 21, sections 12 and 17 of the Revised
Laws, and that whatever bill comes to them, approved by the
commissioners, is for them to pay, unquestioned," and you de-
sire my opinion " as to whether the treasurer is responsible for
all improper payments made by him, or, if his responsibility
is limited by law, just what that limitation is."
The duty of a county treasurer as defined by E. L., c. 21, § 8,
is as follows : —
Each county treasurer shall collect, receive and safely keep all
money belonging to the county, and pay out the same in accordance
with law; but he shall not pay money to the county commissioners
or associate commissioners to be disbursed by them in behalf of the
county.
Section 9 provides that —
No payments, except of expenses in criminal prosecutions, of ex-
penses of the courts, of the compensation or salaries of county officers
90 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
established by law, of outstanding notes or bonds and of interest
thereon, shall be made by a treasurer except upon orders drawn and
signed by a majority of the county commissioners, certified by their
clerk and accompanied, except in the county of Suffolk, by the
original bills, vouchers or evidences of county indebtedness for which
payment is ordered, stating in detail the items and confirming such
bill or account. Said clerk shall not certify such orders until he has
recorded them in the records of the county commissioners.
Section 12 provides in part that —
The county treasurer may, before payment of an account rendered
against the county by a county officer, in writing require of him a
written statement of the specific provision of law authorizing it.
Said statement shall be filed with the vouchers. The treasurer shall
be personally liable for money paid out by him, except pajnnents
specifically required by law, unless there is an unexpended balance
of an appropriation made for the purpose sufficient for such pay-
ment, and he shall be personally liable for any money paid by him
without the voucher and certificate required by law, except as pro-
vided in section thirty-four.
The county treasurer is chiefly a disbursing oflBcer. Most of
the payments made by him are made upon orders issued by the
county commissioners or upon bills audited or allowed by said
commissioners or other public officers. See St. 1907, c. 170;
R. L., c. 158, § 8; R. L., c. 157, §§ 16, 17. In so far as the
expenses for the payment of which such orders are issued or bills
approved are incurred for purposes for which expense may
legally be incurred, I am of opinion that the county treasurer
may exercise no discretion, and may make pajment without
incurring responsibility in the premises. Upon the other hand,
it is clearly the duty of the county treasurer to ascertain whether
or not a payment which he is called upon to make by an order
or by a bill duly approved may be made by him according to law,
and this necessarily requires him' to satisfy himself that the ex-
pense for which the payment is to be made was legally incurred
in the first instance, and for this purpose he may require a writ-
ten statement of the specific provision of law by which any such
expense was authorized. See R. L., c. 21, § 12. If, upon the
face of the record presented by the voucher or certificate, it
clearly appears that there is no legal warrant for the expendi-
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 91
tures, no order of the county commissioners or no approval by
them or by any public officer of charges so incurred is sufficient
to warrant the payment.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General,
Vetei^an — Comimssioned Officer — Gratuity — Attorney — Fee.
St. 1912, c. 702, which in section 1 provides for a gratuity of $125
" for those veteran soldiers and sailors who volunteered their serv-
ices in the civil war," and in section 2 provides that such gratuity
" shall be paid to every person or his legal representatives . . . who
served in the army or navy of the United States to the credit of
the commonwealth during the civil war, . . ." includes commissioned
officers as well as enlisted men.
The Commission on Gratuities, established by section 3 of St. 1912, c.
702, is not required to make or to secure payment of the fee pre-
scribed by section 6 to any attorney or other person entitled thereto
for the prosecution of a claim for a gratuity under such statute.
July 8, 1912.
Hon. John E. White, Chairman ^ C ommission on Gratuities.
Dear Sir: — By a communication dated July 2, 1912, you
request my opinion upon two questions : first, whether St. 1912,
c. 702, entitled " An Act to provide for suitably rewarding cer-
tain veteran soldiers and sailors " should be construed to include
officers; and second, whether, under the provisions of section 6,
it is the duty of the commission to pay the fee therein provided
for.
The act above cited provides, in section 1, that —
For the purpose of promoting- the spirit of loyalty and patriotism,
and in recognition of the sacrifice made both for the commonwealth
and for the United States by those veteran soldiers and sailors who
volunteered their services in the civil war, and for the purpose of
promoting the public welfare, by giving visible evidence to this gen-
eration and future generations that, if danger should again threaten
the nation and the call should again come for men, Massachusetts
will not forget the gTeat service of those who volunteer, a gratuity
of one himdred and twenty-five dollars to each veteran is hereby
authorized to be paid from the treasury of the commonwealth under
the conditions hereinafter set forth.
92 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Section 2 is as follows : —
The gTatuity herein provided for shall be paid to every person, or
his legal representatives, not being a conscript or a substitute, and
not having received a bounty from the commonwealth or from any
city or town therein, who served in the army or navy of the United
States to the credit of the commonwealth during the civil war, and
was honorably discharged from such service, and is living at the time
of the passage of this act; it being intended and provided that the
said gift shall not be a bounty, nor a payment in equalization of
bounties, nor a payment for services rendered, nor a payment for
the purpose of making the result of their contracts of enlistment
more favorable to them because the contracts of other soldiers were
on better terms, but a testimonial for meritorious service such as the
commonwealth may rightly give, and such as her sons may honorably
accept and receive.
The latter section in terms provides that the gratuity " shall
be paid to every person . . . not being a conscript or a substi-
tute, and not having received a bounty from the commonwealth
or from any city or town therein, who served in the army or
navy of the United States to the credit of the commonwealth
during the civil war, and was honorably discharged from such
service, and is living at the time of the passage of this act/'
If, therefore, an officer can satisfy the commission that, not
being a conscript or a substitute, he has served in the army or
navy of the United States to the credit of the Commonwealth
during the civil war, and has been honorably discharged from
service, I am of opinion that he would be entitled to receive the
gratuity, notwithstanding that bounties were in the first instance
payable only to enlisted men. See St. 1864, cc. 48, 143, 211.
The present statute does not contemplate that the payment of
a gratuity under its terms shall be in lieu of boimty.
With respect to your second question, I am of opinion that
the commission is not required to make payments to an attorney
or other person entitled thereto for the prosecution of a claim
under the statute. Section 6, to which your communication
refers, is as follows : —
The fee for the prosecution of a claim under this act shall not
exceed the sum of five dollars; and the fee agreed upon between the
parties, not exceeding the said amount, shall be paid to the attorney
or other person entitled thereto out of the amount allowed on the
certificate of the commission allowing the same. Any attorney or
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 93
other person who demands or receives for his services any greater
compensation than the sum above specified shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor, and shall for every such offence be punished by a fine not
exceeding one hundred dollars or by imprisonment at hard labor for
a term not exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprison-
ment.
There is nothing in this section to impose upon the commis-
sion the duty to secure payment of the fee named therein to the
attorney or other person who may be entitled to it.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
License — Keeper of Hospital for Insane or F eelle-minded —
Suitable Person — Partnership.
Under the provisions of St. 1909, c. 504, § 24, that "the governor and
council may, upon the reconunendation of the state board of in-
sanity, license any suitable person to establish and keep a hospital
or private house for the care and treatment of the insane, epileptic,
feeble-minded, and persons addicted to the intemperate use of
narcotics or stimulants " a license may not be granted to a partner-
ship as such.
Aug. 12, 1912.
Charles E. Thompson. M.D., Executive Officer, State Board of
Insanity.
Dear Sir : — In behalf of the State Board of Insanity you
have requested my opinion upon the following question : —
Whether under section 24, chapter 504, Acts of 1909, the State
Board of Insanity is limited in its recommendations to individuals or
whether it can recommend that licenses be granted to partnerships.
The section of the statute referred to provides as follows : —
The governor and council may, upon the recommendation of the
state board of insanity, license any suitable person to establish and
keep a hospital or private house for the care and treatment of the
insane, epileptic, feeble-minded, and persons addicted to the intem-
perate use of narcotics or stimulants, and may at any time revoke
such license. No such recommendation shall be made unless the said
board is satisfied that the person applying therefor is a duly qualified
physician, as provided in section thirty-two, and has had practical
experience in the care and treatment of such patients. Any person
94 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
owning or maintaining such a hospital or private house on the date
of the passage of this act shall be entitled to maintain the same under
the provisions of law in force at that time, except that every such
hospital or house shall be subject to the visitation and supervision
of the state board of insanity.
The word " person/' as used in different statutes, varies much
in the comprehensiveness of its scope, and its meaning in any
particular statute must usually be determined by the context -
and by consideration of the object of the statute in which it is
used. It has sometimes been construed as including a corpora-
tion, an artificial person, and as used in some statutes it has
undoubtedly been sometimes held to include a copartnership.
Considering the word as it is used in the statute in question
with reference to its context and with reference to the purpose
of the statute, the term " suitable person " and the term " the
person applying therefor '^ in my opinion are to be considered
as referring to one and the same person, and since the Board,
in order to make its recommendation to the Governor and Coun-
cil, must state that the applicant for a license in addition to
being otherwise " suitable " is " a duly qualified physician, as
provided in section thirty-two," it becomes clear that the word
" person " was not intended to include a partnership as such,
since a partnership cannot be " a duly qualified physician."
Considering the meaning of the word with reference to the
clear purpose of the statute leads to the same conclusion. The
provisions of law requiring the license as a prerequisite to
the right to establish or keep such a hospital as is described in
the act were obviously to keep the control and management of
such hospitals under only such physicians as were deemed by
the Board to be suitable and duly qualified to conduct them.
If the word " person " were to be construed to include a part-
nership, and if the words " person applying therefor " were to
be construed as requiring simply that the one member of the
partnership who made the application should be a duly qualified
physician, the result would be not only that the application in
the name of the physician would not in fact be the application
of the partnership, but also the very object of the law might
be defeated because the physician might be the only physician
among the partners, or might be merely a nominal or silent
partner, or one of several partners having only an insignificant
part of the management of the hospital. In a previous opinion
to the Board I have advised that the only person entitled to be
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 95
licensed under the statute referred to was the responsible head
of such hospital or private house, that is, " the one who exer-
cises control or proprietorship of it." Opinion of Attorne}^-
General, Report for 1911, p. 15; Commonwealth v. Kimball,
105 Mass. 465, 467.
The opinion above expressed is, however, not to be construed
as holding that duly licensed individuals may not lawfully form
a partnership for the purpose of establishing or keeping such a
hospital. In other words', while your Board is, in my opinion,
not authorized to recommend for license a partnership, but must
limit its recommendations to individuals, the law does not ap-
pear to forbid the formation of a partnership by individuals,
each of whom is a duly qualified physician, and each of whom
has been deemed suitable to establish and keep such a hospital
by your Board, and each of whom has been duly licensed as an
individual for such work.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
Town — Indebtedness for Water Supply — Vote.
A town which has accepted by a two-thirds vote an act authorizing it
to supply itself and inhabitants with water, may incur indebted-
ness therefor only by compliance with the provision of R. L., c. 27,
§ 8, which requires a vote of two-thirds of the voters present and
voting at a town meeting to authorize incurring indebtedness for
such purpose.
Aug. 15, 1912.
Mr. William G. Grundy, Deputy Director, Bureau of Statistics.
Dear Sir : — You have requested my opinion as to " whether
a town which accepts by a two-thirds vote an act authorizing
it to supply itself and inhabitants with water may incur debt
therefor without being required to comply with the provisions
of R. L., c. 27, § 8, which makes necessary a two-thirds vote in
order that it may incur debt for such a purpose," and you have
informed me orally that your inquiry is made with a special
reference to the town of Merrimac, which, by St. 1903, c. 281,
was authorized to supply itself and its inhabitants with water.
Section 6 of that act is as follows : —
Said town may, for the purpose of paying the necessary expenses
and liabilities incurred under the provisions of this act, issue from
96 ATTORNEY-GENERAL^S REPORT. [Jan.
time to time bonds, notes or scrip to an amount not exceeding ninety
thousand dollars. Such bonds, notes or scrip shall bear on their
face the words, Town of Merrimac Water Loan, and shall be pay-
able at the exjDiration of periods not exceeding thirty years from
the date of issue, shall bear interest, payable semi-annually, at a
rate not exceeding four per cent per annum, and shall be signed by
the treasurer of the town and countersigned by the water commis-
sioners hereinafter provided for. Said town may sell such securities
at public or private sale, or pledge the^ same for money borrowed
for the purpose of this act, and upon such terms and conditions as
it may deem proper: provided, that such securities shall not be sold
for less than the par value thereof.
Section 14 is as follows : —
This act shall take full effect upon its acceptance by two thirds of
the legal voters of the town of Merrimac present and voting thereon
at a legal meeting called for the purpose within three years from its
passage; but the number of meetings so called in any one year shall
not exceed three; and for the purpose of being submitted to the
voters as aforesaid this act .shall take effect upon its passage.
Your question would seem to be answered by the application
of the principles stated in an opinion rendered to joiu depart-
ment July 7, 1911, in reply to a closely similar question.
The vote of the town to accept St. 1905, c. 281, is not to be
construed as a vote to issue bonds, notes or scrip. It is merely
an acceptance of the legal authority to issue bonds, notes or
scrip for the purposes of the act at such later time or times as
it shall in accordance with law vote to exercise that authority.
In the exercise of that authority the town must follow the stat-
utory requirements. So far as St. 1903, c. 281, prescribes the
details of such issue it is to be followed; in other respects the
general law must control. The special act does not state whether
the vote to issue bonds, notes or scrip shall be a majority or a
two-thirds vote. The matter is, therefore, governed by the pro-
visions of R. L., c. 27, § 8, which requires, that debts shall be
incurred only in the case of a town, by " a vote of two thirds
of the voters present and voting at a town meeting," and in the
case of a city, by a vote " of two thirds of all the members of
each branch of the city council."
It is. provided by E. L., c. 27, § 21, that where a city accepts,
by a vote of two-thirds of the legal voters, an act to supply it
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 97
with water a "vote of the majority of the members of each
branch of the city council" shall be sufficient to authorize the
issue of bonds. By implication, it appears from this provision
of law that a vote merely to accept the act is not sufficient to
authorize the issue of- bonds, and that the issue of bonds must
be authorized by a subsequent vote of the city or town. It also
appears by implication from this provision of the statutes that
in cases not within this exception a two-thirds vote is necessary
to authorize such an issue of bonds. There is no provision of
law authorizing a town which has accepted such an act to issue
bonds on a vote of less than two-thirds of the voters present and
voting at a town meeting.
Your question is, therefore, to be answered in the negative.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
Hours of Labor — Cities and Towns — Acceptance of Statute.
St. 1911, e. 494, providing in section 1 that " the service of all
laborers, workmen and mechanics, now or hereafter employed . . .
by any city or town which has accepted the provisions of section
twenty of chapter one hundred and six of the Eevised Laws, or of
section forty-two of chapter five hundred and fourteen of the acts
of the year nineteen hundred and nine, ... is hereby restricted
to eight hours in any one calendar day," is not in force in cities
and towns which have not accepted the provisions of E. L., c. 106,
§ 20, or of St. 1909, c. 514, § 42, but which had accepted the pro-
visions of St. 1899, c. 344, a corresponding provision of an earlier
law.
Aug. 15, 1912.
Gen. J. H. Whitney, Chief of the District Police.
Dear Sir : — You have requested my opinion as to whether
chapter 494 of the Acts of 1911 is applicable to and in force in
cities and towns which have not accepted the provisions of sec-
tion 20 of chapter 106 of the Eevised Laws or of section 42 of
chapter 514 of the Acts of 1909, but which had accepted the
provisions of chapter 344 of the Acts of 1899, a corresponding
provision of an earlier law.
Section 1 of said chapter 494 of the Acts of 1911 is in part as
follows : —
The service of all laborers, worlnnen and mechanics, now or here-
after employed by the commonwealth or by any county therein or
98 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
by any city or town which has accepted the provisions of section
twenty of chapter one hundred and six of the Re\ised Laws, or of
section forty- two of chapter five hundred and fourteen of the acts
of the year nineteen hundred and nine, or bj'- any contractor or sub-
contractor for or upon any public works of the commonwealth or of
any county tlierein or of any such city or town, is hereby restricted
to eight hours in any one calendar day, . . .
In my opinion this inquiry must be answered in the negative.
In section 20 of chapter 106 of the Revised Laws it is provided
that such laws should be applicable to cities and towns which
had accepted the provisions of that section, " or the correspond-
ing provisions of earlier laws." Chapter 514 of the Acts of
1909, which prohibited requesting or requiring, etc., any em-
ploj^ee to work more than eight hours in any one day, omitted
the foregoing phrase which had been contained in said section
20 of chapter 106 of the Revised Laws, providing only that it
should apply to cities which had accepted the provisions of sec-
tion 20 of chapter 106 of the Revised Laws and section 42 of
said chapter 514 of the Acts of 1909. In chapter 494 of the
Acts of 1911, in which the word "permit" was added to the
previous provisions of the act of 1909, it is also provided that
the act shall apply to cities and towns which had accepted the
provisions of said section 20 of chapter 106 of the Revised Laws
or of section 42 of chapter 514 of the Acts of 1909. It appears
clear, therefore, that in order to have chapter 494 of the Acts
of 1911 in force in any city or town, it must appear that such
city or town has accepted either the provisions of section 20 of
chapter 106 of the Revised Laws or section 42 of chaj^ter 514
of the Acts of 1909.
The earlier provisions of law were less stringent than the
more recent legislation hereinbefore cited, and it appears to me
to have been the intent of the Legislature, when they made the
law more drastic and added the recent provisions to the general
law making eight hours a legal day's work, to require cities and
towns to accept the provisions of these more recent enactments.
As this is a penal statute, and so must be strictly construed,
I am of opinion that the act in question is not in force in such
cities and towns as are covered by your inquiry.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, AUorneij-GeneraJ.
1913.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 99
WorJiinens Compensation Act — Employee — Commomvealth as
Employer.
The provisions of St. 1911, c. 751, which establishes a system for the
compensation of employees for personal injuries received in the
course of their employment, are not applicable to the Common-
wealth as an employer in its various departments nor to direct
employees of the Commonwealth.
Aug. 19, 1912.
David Sneddex, Esq., Commissioner, State Board of Education.
Dear Sir : — You have requested my opinion as to whether,
under the provisions of St. 1911, c. 751, known as '^ the work-
men's compensation act," the Massachusetts Board of Education
is required to insure teachers, janitors, engineers, working stu-
dents and others employed to do work about the grounds and
shops of certain educational institutions within the jurisdiction
of the Board, such, for example, as the normal schools. The
Massachusetts Agricultural College, to which you refer in your
letter, is not strictly a State institution, and I will, therefore,
confine myself to answering the question with reference to those
institutions in which the persons referred to are employed di-
rectly by the Commonwealth.
While in the words of the Supreme Judicial Court of the
Commonwealth, "the act in question involves a radical de-
parture in the manner of dealing with actions or claims for
damages for personal injuries received by employees in the
course of their employment from that which has heretofore pre-
vailed in this Commonwealth" (209 Mass. 607), it is not, in
my opinion, to be considered as involving a radical change in
the law as to what shall constitute claims or causes of action
against the Commonwealth or in the law prescribing the manner
of the prosecution of such claims.
The Commonwealth, since it is sovereign, may be impleaded
in its own courts only by its clearly expressed consent, and
claims against the Commonwealth may be prosecuted only in
the manner and upon the terms assented to by the Common-
wealth by clear legislative enactment.
The statute in question is not by express provision made ap-
plicable to the Commonwealth, and its provisions as to the
administration of the law are not consistent with an intention
by the legislative body that the act should apply to the Com-
100 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
monwealth as the employer in its various departments, or to
persons directly employed by the Commonwealth in those depart-
ments.
In my opinion, therefore, the statute in question is not to be
considered as applicable to the Commonwealth or to those di-
rectly employed by the Commonwealth within the field of the
jurisdiction of the State Board of Education.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
License to operate Automobile — Revocation — Conviction —
Judgment of Guilty placed on File.
The Massachusetts Highway Commission, under the provisions of St.
1909, c. 534, $ 22, that " a conviction of a violation of this sec-
tion shall be reported forthwith by the court or trial justice to the
commission, which shall revoke immediately the license of the per-
son so convicted," is warranted in treating a judgment of guilty
placed on file by the trial court as a conviction.
Sept. 17, 1912.
Hon. William D. Sohier, Chairman, Massachusetts Highway Com-
mission.
Dear Sir : — Your inquiry of August 27 in substance re-
quires my opinion upon the question whether or not a judgment
of guilty placed on file by the court constitutes a conviction
within the meaning of St. 1909, c. 534, § 22.
The section cited establishes, among other offences, that of
operating an automobile or motor cycle recklessly or so that
the lives and safety of the public may be endangered, and your
communication states that the judgment or finding of guilty
was upon facts tending to prove this offence. The section then
proceeds as follows : —
A conviction of a violation of this section shall be reported forth-
with by the court or trial justice to the commission, which shall re-
voke immediately the license of the person so convicted. If it ap-
pears by the records of the commission that the person so convicted
is the owner of a motor vehicle, or has exclusive control of any motor
vehicles as a manufacturer or dealer, the commission may revoke the
certificate of registration of all motor vehicles so exclusively owned
or controlled. Whenever any person so convicted appeals, the com-
mission shall suspend forthwith the license of the person so con-
victed, and shall order the license delivered to it, and shall not
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 101
reissue said license unless such person is acquitted in the appellate
court, or unless the commission in its discretion, after an investigation
or upon a hearing, decides to reissue it. No new license or certifi-
cate shall be issued by the commission to any person convicted of a
violation of this section until after sixty days from the date of such
final conviction, nor thereafter except in the discretion of the com-
mission.
The question is not free from difficulty. In MunTcley v. Hoyt,
179 Mass. 108, where it was provided in St.* 1896, c. 397, § 9,
that the Board of Eegistration in Pharmacy, after hearing,
might suspend the registration and certificate of a registered
pharmacist, or might revoke such registration and certificate
altogether, but which contained the proviso that " the license or
certificate of registration of a registered pharmacist shall not
be suspended or revoked for a cause punishable by law until
after conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction,^' the court
held that the placing of the case on file after a plea of guilty
was a sufficient conviction to warrant the suspension or revoca-
tion of the license. The court said, at page 111 : —
It is the intention of the statute to give a pharmacist charged with
a crime the right to a trial in the court having jurisdiction of his
offence, but if his guilt be there established so that the court may
impose sentence according to its powers, then it is sufficiently estab-
lished for the Board of Pharmacy to act upon their finding, and to
impose the penalty according to their powers.
And again, at page 113 : —
The problems before the respective tribunals are entirely different,
and, the guilt of the accused being established through conviction
by plea or verdict in the one and by the finding after a hearing in
the other, the accused is subject to such punishment as the respective
tribunals may lawfully impose, and the right of either to proceed
to judgment is not affected by the fact that the other sees fit to
decline to proceed to judgment.
And it appears to be well settled that in its ordinary legal sense
the word " conviction,'^ as used in the statutes of the Common-
wealth, signifies that the defendant has pleaded guilty or has
been found guilty by the verdict of a jury or the finding of a
court. I. Op. Atty.-Gen., 499 ; Commonwealth v. Lockwood,
109 Mass. 323. In some cases, however, the word is employed
102 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
in statutes to designate the judgment and sentence of the court
upon a verdict, finding or confession of guilt. Thus, in Coni-
monwealtli v. Kiley, 150 Mass. 325, under the provision of St.
1888, c. 392, that " the conviction by a court of competent juris-
diction of a person hcensed under the provisions of chapter one
hundred of the Public Statutes, for violation of any of the
provisions of said chapter, and the several acts in amendment
thereof, shall of itself make the license of said person void,^' the
court held that a verdict of guilty found by a jury in the Su-
perior Court, from which an appeal was taken, was not a con-
viction within the meaning of the statute above cited, and the
court said : —
Under this provision, the effect of a conviction of the kind named
is to deprive the defendant of a valuable right, without an oppor-
tunity for further trial or investigation. We are of opinion that
nothing less than a final judgment, conclusively establishing the guilt,
will satisfy the meaning of the word " conviction " as here used.
At any time before a final judgment of the court a motion in arrest
of judgment may be made, or the verdict may be set aside upon a
motion for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence,
or for other good cause; and, upon further proceedings, it may turn
out that the defendant is not guilty.
And see Commonwealth v. Gorliam, 99 Mass. 420; Fay v. Har-
lan, 128 Mass. 244.
The distinction between the case of Munkley v. Hoyt and the
case of CommoniveaWi v. Kiley, and other similar decisions,
appears to rest upon the fact that in the latter the conviction it-
self voids or revokes the license so that the loss of the license
in effect becomes a part of the sentence rather than a conse-
quence of the verdict or finding of guilty, whereas in the former
case the determination of the guilt of the licensee did no more
than confer jurisdiction upon an independent tribunal to pro-
ceed with a separate inquiry resulting in the revocation or sus-
pension of the license.
The case presented by the inquiry of the commission appears
to lie somewhere between the above decisions. Under the pro-
visions of section 22, above quoted, which are mandatory, the
commission is not vested with any discretion in the premises,
and their function in connection with the revocation of the li-
cense is purely ministerial, so that at least to the extent of
making the revocation of the license a necessary consequence of
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 103
the conviction of the licensee, the statute resembles that con-
sidered by the court in Commonwealth v. Kiley. Upon the
other hand, the provision of section 22 that " whenever any per-
son so convicted appeals^ the commission shall suspend forthwith
the license of the person so convicted," appears to contemplate
action upon the part of the commission before the final judg-
ment which constitutes a conviction as defined in Common-
wealth V. Kiley. The purpose of the section is undoubtedly to
protect the public against the reckless operation of automobiles
or motor cycles.
Taking into consideration that the purpose of section 22 is
to secure the safety of the public upon highways where auto-
mobiles and other motor vehicles may be operated at a high rate
of speed, it is apparent that there is sound and adequate reason
why a person who has pleaded or has been found guilty of reck-
less operation should not be permitted to continue operating
until a final judgment has been rendered in his case, but should
be forthwith deprived of his license, not as a punishment for
the offence but as a measure of protection to the public. This,
I am advised, is the view heretofore adopted by the commission
in dealing with similar case^'. AVliile the question cannot be said
to be entirely free from doubt, for the reasons above discussed
and in view of the purpose of the statute and the obvious con-
siderations of public safet}^ involved, I am of opinion that the
commission is so far warranted in treating a judgment of guilty
as a sufficient conviction to require the revocation of the license
of the person so convicted as not to be required to change the
policy already pursued by it, until the precise point has been
adjudicated otherwise by the courts.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General .
Trust Company — Savings Department — Payment of Fixed
Dividend requiring Transfer of Funds from General BanTc-
ing Fund of Company.
The provision of St. 1908, c. 520, § 3, that the accounts of the savings
department of a trust company " shall be kept separate and dis-
tinct from the general business of the corporation," prohibits the
promise of a fixed dividend or rate of interest upon money de-
posited in the savings department of a trust company, which for
its maintenance requires a transfer of funds from the general
banking department of the company to the savings department.
104 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Oct. 2, 1912.
Hon. Augustus L. Thorndike, Bank Commissioner.
Dear Sir : — Your letter of September 24 requires m}^ opin-
ion as to the authority of a trust company which has established
a savings department, under the provisions of St. 1908, c. 520,
to promise to pay a definite rate of interest or dividends upon
money deposited therein, any deficiency in the earnings of the
savings department to be made up by a transfer of funds neces-
sary to complete the required amount of dividends or interest
from the general banking department of the trust company.
St. 1908, c. 520, §§ 1, 2 and 3, are as follows: —
Sectiox 1. Every trust company soliciting or receiving deposits
(«) which may be withdrawn only on presentation of the pass-book
or other similar form of receipt which permits successive deposits
or withdrawals to be entered thereon; or {h) which at the option of
the trust company may be withdrawn only at the expiration of a
stated period after notice of intention to withdraw has been given ;
or {c) in any other way which might lead the public to believe that
such deposits are received or invested under the same conditions or
in the same manner as deposits in savings banks ; shall have a savings
department in which all business relating to such deposits shall be
transacted.
Section 2. All such deposits shall be special deposits and shall
be placed in said saving-s department, and all loans or investments
thereof shall be made in accordance with the statutes governing the
investment of deposits in savings banks. The duties of the board of
investment relative to the investment of such deposits shall be per-
formed by a board or committee appointed by the board of directors
of such corporation.
Section" 3. Such deposits and the investments or loans thereof
shall be appropriated solely to the security and payment of such
deposits, and shall not be mingled with the investments of the capital
stock or other money or property belonging to or controlled by such
corporation, or be liable for the debts or obligations thereof until
after the deposits in said savings department have been paid in full.
The accounts and transactions of said savings department shall be
kept separate and distinct from the general business of the corpora-
tion.
Section 5 of the same chapter provides that —
All income received from the investment of funds in said savings
department, after deducting the expenses and losses incurred in the
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 105
management thereof and such sums as may be paid to depositors
therein as interest or dividends, shall accrne as profits to such cor-
poration and may be transferred to its general funds.
It was the obvious purpose of the provisions of chapter 520,
abeve-^rrotedj to place a trust company, so far as possible, upon
the same footing as a savings bank, and to require that it be
conducted entirely separate from the general business of the
trust company by which it is maintained. This being so, I am
of opinion that the promise of a fixed dividend or rate of in-
terest upon money deposited in the savings department of a
trust company requiring for its maintenance a transfer of funds
from the general banking department of the company to the
savings department, is contrary to the provision of St. 1908,
c. 520, § 3, 'above cited, that the accounts and transactions of
the savings department shall be kept separate and distinct from
the general business of the company, and is therefore unauthor-
ized.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
Civil Service — Inspectors of Slaughtering.
Inspectors of slaughtering nominated and appointed under the pro-
visions of St. 1911, c. 297, § 6, as amended by St. 1911, c. 534,
§ 2, are included within the terms of Civil Service Eule 7, c. 11.
Oct. 21, 1912.
Mark W. Richardson, M.D., Secretary, State Board of Health.
Dear Sir : — In behalf of the State Board of Health you
have requested my opinion as to whether, in view of the provi-
sions of St. 1911, c. 297, and St. 1911, c. 534, relating to the
nomination, appointment and removal of inspectors of slaughter-
ing, the inspectors nominated and appointed under those pro-
visions of law in cities are subject to civil service law and rules.
St. 1911, c. 534, is entitled, ^^ An Act relative to the appoint-
ment of inspectors of slaughtering,'' and provides, in section 2,
as follows : —
Section six of chapter two hundred and ninety-seven of the acts
of the year nineteen hundred and eleven is hereby amended by strik-
ing out said section and inserting in place thereof the following : —
Section 6. For the purposes of this act inspectors shall be appointed,
106 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
shall be compensated, and may be removed in accordance with the
23rovisions of law relating- to inspectors of animals, except that the
appointment of such inspectors shall be made by the local boards of
health and except that in i-espect to such inspectors the state board
of health shall perform the duties and exercise the authority imposed
by law upon the chief of the cattle bureau of the state board of
agriculture in respect to inspectors of animals. The first appoint-
ments under this act shall be made within thirty days after its
passage.
The provisions of law relating to inspectors of animals re-
ferred to are contained in St. 1912, c. 608, § 6, providing —
The mayor and aldermen in cities, except Boston, and the selectmen
in towns shall annually, in March, nominate one or more inspectors
of animals, and before the first day of April shall send to the com-
missioner of animal industry the name, address and occupation of
each nominee. Such nominee shall not be appointed until approved
by the commissioner of animal industry.
The provisions of law, other than the civil service law, which
are now in force with reference to the nomination, appointment
and removal of inspectors of slaughtering may, therefore, be
said to be in substance as follows : the boards of health in cities,
except Boston, and the boards of health in towns shall annually,
in March, nominate one or more inspectors of slaughtering, and
before the first day of April shall send to the State Board of
Health the name, address and occupation of each nominee.
Such nominee shall not be appointed until approved by the
State Board of Health. The aforesaid officials of cities and
towns may remove any inspector, and shall thereupon immedi-
ately nominate another in his place and send notice thereof as
prescribed above. In all cities at least one of the inspectors of
slaughtering shall be a registered veterinary surgeon.
The question submitted, therefore, is whether, in spite of the
fact that the Legislature has made provision by the statutes
quoted for the nomination and appointment of inspectors of
slaughtering by boards of health in cities, and for the approval
by the State Board of Health of those appointed, and for the
immediate filling of any vacancy which may occur, and in these
statutes })as made no express reference to the civil service law
and rules, the position is nevertheless within the jurisdiction of
the Civil Service Commission.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 107
E. L., c. 19, authorizes the appointment of a civil service com-
mission, and provides that the commissioners shall from time
to time prepare rules regulating the selection of persons to fill
appointive positions in the government of the Commonwealth
and of the several cities thereof. Of the rules made under au-
thority of that provision of law, Civil Service Rule 7, providing
for the classification of the official service, includes, as class 11,
"Inspectors other than inspectors of work and persons doing
similar work, except railroad inspectors, in the service of the
Commonwealth or of any city thereof."
In my opinion the term '' inspectors,'' as used in the rule
quoted, is sufficiently broad to include inspectors appointed
under St. 1911, c. 534. The functions of the position of inspector
of slaughtering, and the nature of the office itself, are not such
as to bring the position within any of the general statutory ex-
ceptions from the application of the civil service law provided
by E. L., c. 19, § 9, and its amendments. The fact that the
successful performance of the work required in the position calls
for the special qualification of professional training does not in
itself except the position from the application of civil service
law and rules. I am not aware of any statute which specifically
excepts the office from the civil service law.
The position of inspector of slaughtering must, therefore, be
held to be within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commis-
sion unless it can be said that the provisions of St. 1911, c. 297,
and St. 1911, c. 534, show an intention on the part of the Legis-
lature so inconsistent with the intention to subject the position
to civil service law and rules as by implication to exempt the
office therefrom.
In my opinion the statute is not so to be construed. At the
time when the Statutes of 1911 were enacted inspectors in the
service of cities were in the classified list of the civil service
rules. The Legislature must be presumed to have known that
the inspectors whose appointment was provided for by the Stat-
utes of 1911 would be subjected to civil service law and rules
unless they were expressly exempted therefrom by action of the
Legislature. The Legislature is, therefore, in my opinion, to
be considered as having provided that the local boards of health
and the State Board of Health might respectively nominate,
appoint and approve, but only subject to existing laws. It is
to be noted that the effect of such construction is not to nullify
the power of nomination, appointment and approval bestowed
108 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
upon the local boards of health and the State Board of Health,
but merely to limit those powers to the extent that nominations
and appointments must be made from the certified list of the
Civil Service Commission, and the procedure with reference to
the nomination, appointment and removal of the officials in
question must be governed by civil service law and rules.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
Town — Notes — Certification — Director of Bureau of Sta-
tistics — Vote to authorize Selectmen to refund Debt
" wpon the Passage of an Act authorizing the Same/'
The vote of a town at a town meeting held on March 4, .1912, approving
the action of the selectmen in asking the Legislature to authorize
such town to refund its debt, and authorizing the selectmen " to
refund said debt upon the passage of an act of the Legislature
authorizing the same," does not constitute a valid acceptance of
the authority to refund the debt in question, conferred by a statute
passed on March 28 following, and the Director of the Bureau of
Statistics should not certify notes issued in accordance with such
vote.
Nov. 7, 1912.
Charles F. G-ettemy, Esq., Director, Bureau of Statistics.
Dear Sir : — You have requested my opinion as to what
action should be taken by you with reference to a series of notes
which the town of North Reading desires to issue under St.
1912, c. 343, and which have been presented to you for certifica-
tion under the provisions of St. 1910, c. 616, as amended by
St. 1912, c. 45.
The facts from which the question arises are as follows : in
the warrant for the town meeting of N'orth Reading, held on
March 4, 1912, appeared the following: —
Article 16. To see if the town w^ill approve of the action of the
selectmen in asking* the Legislature to authorize the town to refund
its debt amounting to $9,600, and will authorize the selectmen to
refund said debt upon the passage of an act of the Legislature au-
thorizing the same.
Pursuant to that article the town voted as follows : —
Article 16, Under Article 16, upon motion of Mr. A. G. Barber,
voted to approve the action of the selectmen in asking the Legisla-
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 109
tiire to authorize the town to refund its debt amounting to $9,600,
and to authorize the selectmen to refund said debt upon the passage
of an act of the Legisla'ture authorizing the same.
The act of the Legislature upon the subject-matter referred
to in the vote of the town was passed as St. 1912, c. 343, on
March 28, 1912, and took effect upon its passage. That act
provides as follows : —
Section 1. For the purpose of paying certain outstanding notes
amounting to nine thousand six hundred dollars, the town of North
i?eading is hereby authorized to borrow the said sum and to issue
notes therefor. One of the said notes shall be payable in each year
after the said loan is made, and the amount of the first nine notes so
issued shall be one thousand dollars each, and the amount of the
tenth note shall be six hundred dollars. The said notes shall be
signed by the treasurer and countersigTied by the selectmen of the
town, and shall bear interest at a rate not exceeding four and one
half per cent per annum. The money required to pay the interest
on said notes in each year, and that part of the principal which
becomes due in that year, shall be raised by taxation in the same
manner in which the other expenses of the town are provided for.
Section 2. This act shall take effect upon its passage.
The specific question presented by you is whether the vote
quoted above constitutes sufficient authority to warrant the issue
of the notes in question and their certification by you without
further vote of the town.
In my opinion the question is to be answered in the negative.
At the time when the town meeting was held, on March 4,
1912, I assume that the town had no existing authority to re-
fund the debt in question. It is at least clear that the vote of
the town on that date was not effective to authorize the refund-
ing of the debt under any other legislation than that of 1912.
The vote passed at the meeting of March 4, 1912, was an
attempt to anticipate authority which the town had not yet
acquired. At the time when the town thus purported to au-
thorize the exercise of authority which it expected the Legis-
lature to confer upon it the town did not know definitely that
any such authority would be conferred upon it or what the
measure or form of the authority conferred would be if con-
ferred. It was possible that the Legislature might grant the
authority in the terms asked by representatives of the town, or .
withhold it completely, or grant it with such qualifications and
110 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
conditions that the act when passed would not be acceptable to
the town.
Upon these facts the town cannot be considered to have ac-
cepted by valid action a grant of authority which had not in fact
been offered to it at the time of the vote and the form and terms
of which it could not foretell.
Furthermore, the vote itself is too indefinite in its provisions
to be effective. Since the act of March 28, 1912, had not been
passed when the vote was taken, and since there was no certainty
as to what the final form of the act might be, it is not permis-
sible to read into the vote of March 4, 1912, the provisions of
the act which was passed on March 28, 1912.
Considering the vote by itself, therefore, and apart from the
statute, as it must be considered, the vote appears to be entirely
lacking in any i^rovisions as to the rate of interest, the amount
of the proportionate payments, and the terms of the bonds or
notes to be issued. Such a vote, without a statute to be read
into it or construed with it, is inadequate to authorize the offi-
cials of the town to take the necessary steps for the issuing of
the notes in question.
There is no provision in St. 1912, c. 343, that the town treas-
urer or other officials of the town may issue the notes without
further vote of the town. Where the Legislature intends to
authorize such action by the town treasurer without further
vote of the town, it expresses that intention. St. 1912, c. 458,
is entitled, " An Act to authorize the town of Essex to refund
certain indebtedness," and section 3 of that statute provides as
follows : —
The treasurer of the town of Essex, with the approval of the
selectmen, is hereby authorized, without further vote of the town, to
incur indebtedness under the pro^dsions of this act for which said
town shall be liable, and to issue notes of the town therefor in ac-
cordance with law.
If chapter 343 of the Acts of 1912 contained such a provision
quite a different situation would be presented.
Upon the present state of facts, therefore, I have to advise
you that in my opinion you should not certify the series of notes
which has been presented to you for certification.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorney-General.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. Ill
Public Records — Records of Piihlic or Incorporated Hospitals
— Inspection.
Under the provisions of St. 1905, c. 330, § 3, that the records of hos-
pitals supported in whole or in part by contributions from the
Commonwealth or from any municipality, and incorporated hospi-
tals offering treatment to patients free of charge or conducted as
public charities, " shall not be open to public inspection until
they are produced in court by tlie person having the custody of
the same," the superintendent or other officer in charge of such
institution is not required or permitted to furnish any person with
a copy of any part of such record.
Nov. 22, 1912.
E. Y. ScRiBNER^ M.D., Superintendent, Worcester State Hospital.
Dear Sir : — I have received your letter stating that you have
received a request from an attorney representing a patient who
was formerly under the care of the Worcester State Hospital,
that you furnish a detailed record of the history of the patient's
case, and asking my opinion upon the questions, first, whether
you are compelled by law to furnish a copy of the records to the
person requesting it; and second, whether, if not compelled to
furnish such copy, it is lawful for you to furnish it if you
deem it best.
The answers to both questions are found in the provisions of
St. 1905, c. 330. The amended provisions are as follows: —
Section 1. Hospitals supported in whole or in part by contri-
butions from the Commonwealth or from any municipality, incor-
porated hospitals offering treatment to patients free of charge, and
incorporated hospitals conducted as public charities, shall keep
records of the cases under their care and the history of the same in
books kept for that jDurpose.
Section 2 [as ^amended by St. 1908, c. 269]. Such records, and
similar records kept prior to April twent^'^-fifth, nineteen hundred
and five, shall be in the custody of the person in charge of the hos-
pital, and shall be admissible as evidence in the courts of the Com-
monwealth as to all matters therein contained.
Section 3. Section seventeen of chapter thirty-five of the Revised
Laws shall not apply to such records, and they shall not be open to
public inspection until they are produced in court by the person
havhig the custody of the same.
You are, therefore, not only not compelled to furnish a copy
of the records, but by statutory provision the furnishing of such
112 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
copy is expressly prohibited, and the usual provision of law that
every person having the custody of public records shall at rea-
sonable times permit inspection 'of those records and furnish
copies thereof on payment of reasonable fees, is made inappli-
cable to the records of patients in a State insane hospital.
Very truly yours,
James M. Sv^ift, Attorney-General.
Lottery — Element of Chance — Voting Contest.
An arrangement or contract entered into by a foreign corporation
dealing in ponies, with certain merchants and managers of theatres
within the Commonwealth, by which each such merchant or man-
ager contracting with the pony company issues to every customer
for each 25 cents received 25 votes, which may be east by the
bearer in favor of any contestant in a contest in which the person
receiving the highest number of votes is entitled to a pony and
outfit from such company, involves no element of chance, and there-
fore does not constitute a lottery within the meaning of the several
sections of R. L., c. 214, which prohibit lotteries within the Com-
monwealth.
Nov. 22, 1912.
Gen. J. H. Whitney, Chief of the District Police.
Dear Sir : — You have requested my opinion as to whether
the operation of a certain arrangement entered into by various
managers of theatres and other buildings licensed by your de-
partment is subject to the provisions of the laws of this Com-
monwealth prohibiting setting up, promoting, permitting,
advertising, or in any manner participating or assisting in the
operation of a lottery.
The arrangement in question is substantially as follows : a
pony company of Ohio makes contracts with various theatre
owners and merchants by the terms of which a voting contest
is carried on in connection with the management of the theatre
or business for the purpose of advertising the ponies of the Ohio
company. Each theatre owner or merchant contracting with
the pony company issues to every customer for each 25 cents
received, either for admission tickets or for merchandise, 25
votes. These votes so received may be cast by the bearer in
favor of any contestant, and the contestant securing the highest
number of votes receives a pony and outfit from the Ohio com-
pany. In case of a tie the value of the pony and outfit is divided
among those having an equal number of votes.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 113
Without assuming to refer to all the provisions of Massachu-
setts law aimed at the prevention of the operation of lotteries,
most of which provisions are embodied in chapter 21-1 of the
Eevised Laws^ the following section may be cited as fairly illus-
trating the policy of the law upon the subject: —
Section 7. Whoever sets up or promotes a lottery for money, or
by way of lottery disposes of any property of value, or under the
pretext of a sale, gift or delivery of other property or of any right,
privilege or thing whatever disposes of or offers or attempts to dis-
pose of any property, with intent to make the disposal thereof de-
pendent upon or connected with chance by lot, dice, numbers, game,
hazard or other gambling device, whereby such chance or device is
made an additional inducement to the disposal or sale of said prop-
erty, and whoever aids either by printing or Avriting, or is in any
way concerned, in the setting up, managing or drawing of such lot-
tery, or in such disjDosal or otfer or attempt to dispose of property
by such chance or device, shall for each offence be punished by a fine
of not more than two thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not
more than one year.
" Lottery " is defined in the Century Dictionary as follows : —
1. Distribution of anything by lot ; allotment ; also, the drawing of
lots; determination by chance or fate; random choice; matter of
chance; as, the lottery of life. 2. A scheme for raising money by
selling chances to share in a distribution of prizes ; more specifically,
a scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance among persons
purchasing tickets, the correspondingly numbered slips or lots, rep-
resenting prizes or blanks, being drawn from a wheel on a day pre-
viously announced in connection with the scheme of intended prizes.
3. The lot or portion falling to one's share; a chance allotment or
prize.
In all these definitions chance is the essential element. If
the element of chance is absent the things which are necessary
to constitute a lottery are not present.
An analysis of the plan submitted as that operated under the
contract between the pony company and the theatre managers
and merchants fails to reveal any element of chance. Every-
thing is determined by a definite and invariable rule in advance,
except the question as to who shall receive the votes which are
cast, and that question is in no Avay determined by chance.
114 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Tickets of admission and articles of merchandise are for sale
to everybody. Everybody who pays 25 cents, or any multiple
thereof, either for tickets or merchandise receives a certain fixed
number of votes for each 25 cents paid. Each person having
received his votes is free to cast them for whomsoever he chooses,
and his own choice is determined absolutel}' and solely by his
own preference, which is expressed at his own volition. Whether
his personal choice proves to be the winner of the contest de-
pends not at all upon chance but merely upon whether a suffi-
cient number of other voters have exercised their will in the
same manner and given effect to the same preference, and that
question is determined not b}^ lot or by hazard but by the or-
dinary processes of arithmetic.
In my opinion, therefore, the arrangement in question is not
a lottery and is not within the scope of the description of the
kindred evils for the suppression of which provision is made
by chapter 214 of the Revised Laws, and its amendments.
While no similar arrangement appears to have been under
the consideration of the courts of this Commonwealth, a discus-
sion of a case very similar in its facts is to be found in the
opinion of the court in Qnatsoe v. Eggleston, 42 Ore. 315, in
which the court held that since " the award of the pianos which
are proposed to be given away as an inducement is not made
by chance or lot, but by the affirmative and conscious act and
will of the holders of tickets obtained with goods purchased at
the defendant's store," the scheme did not constitute a lottery.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, AUorney-General.
Insurance — Steam Boilers — Inspection hy Insurance Com-
panies — Certificate.
Under the provisions of St. 1907, c. 465, § 17, as amended by St. 1912,
c. 531, § 7, that " insurance companies engaged in the business of
inspecting and insuring steam boilers shall, after each internal
and external inspection, if the boiler and its appendages conform
to the rules formulated by the Board of Boiler Eules, and if they
deem the boiler to be in safe working condition otherwise, issue a
certificate of inspection . . . ," it is the duty of an insurance com-
pany making such inspection to issue a certificate upon each
inspection without regard to the purpose for which such inspection
is made.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 115
Dec. 1, 1912.
Gen. J. H. Whitxey, Chief of the District Police.
Dear Sir : — You have requested my opinion as to the con-
struction to be given to St. 1907, c. 465, § 17, as amended by
St. 1912, c. 531, § 7, with reference to the inspection of steam
boilers by insurance companies engaged in the business of in-
specting and insuring steam boilers within this Commonwealth.
The statute in its amended form prx)vides as follows : —
Insurance comiDanies engaged in the business of inspecting and
insuring steam boilers shall, after each internal and external inspec-
tion, if the boiler and its appendages conform to the rules formulated
by the board of boiler rules, and if they deem the boiler to be in safe
working condition otherwise, issue a certificate of inspection stating
the maximum pressure at which the boiler may be operated. This
maximum pressure shall be determined under the rules established
by the board of boiler rules.
It appears that certain companies duly authorized to insure
steam boilers in this Commonwealth from time to time inspect
boilers upon which the owners desire to place insurance, or in-
spect such boilers for the information of the owner or pro-
spective purchaser, and that these companies contend that they
are not required by the law to issue certificates after inspections
for such purposes.
Your question is whether the insurance companies authorized
to engage in the business of insuring and inspecting boilers in
this Commonwealth are required by the statute to issue a cer-
tificate of inspection after an inspection for such purposes as
those above mentioned.
The statute prescribes that after each internal and external
inspection, if the boiler and its appendages conform to the rules,
and if it is deemed to be in safe working condition otherwise,
a certificate of inspection shall be issued. The provision is not
that after every annual inspection, or that after every regular
inspection, or that after every inspection which the insurance
company chooses to designate as an inspection made in accord-
ance with the requirements of law a certificate shall be issued.
No exception is made by the terms of the statute. An inspection
is an inspection, whatever its object, and so far as appears from
the statute one internal and external inspection does not differ
from another. The statute does not fix any time for making
116 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
inspection?. It mereh' provides that inspections shall be made
at intervals of not more than one year. It is^ therefore, not
open to the insnrance companies to designate one of several
inspections as the inspection required by law, and to refuse to
issue a certificate upon any other inspection. It is not open to
the insurance companies to make distinctions between inspec-
tions which the statute itself does not make.
From the comj)rehensive language used in the statute it would
seem to have been the intent of the Legislature that the latest
inspection should be the one upon which the certificate in force
is based, and to have the certified condition of the boiler kept
up to date as closely as possible. That such was the intent of
the Legislature is also indicated by .the provisions of section 10
of chapter 465 of the Acts of 1907, which prescribe that every
insurance company shall forward to the chief inspector of
boilers, within fourteen days after each internal and external
inspection, reports of all boilers so inspected by it. That is
in efi^ect a requirement that the chief inspector of boilers shall
have the benefit of all information up to date which the insur-
ance companies have acquired in the transaction of their busi-
ness.
In my opinion, therefore, the interpretation given to the stat-
ute by you is correct, and the insurance companies are required
to issue a certificate after every inspection, whatever may have
been the object of or reason for the inspection.
Very truly yours,
James M. Swift, Attorneij-Gcneml.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 117
INDEX TO OPINIONS.
PAGE
Adjutant-General, term of office; constitutional law, . . . .77
Attorney, fee for obtaining gratuity, collection of, . . . .91
Attorney-General, order of General Court fixing limit of time for per-
formance of duty by, ........ 4
Automobile, license to operate, revocation of, .... . 100
Board of Railroad Commissioners, procedure of, rulings on questions of
law or fact, .......... 43
Cities and towns, acceptance of statute relating to hours of labor, . . 97
Duty of public authorities in, in case of riot, ..... 47
Ci\'il service, law and rules, inspectors of slaughtering included within, . 105
Commonwealth not included as employer under Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, .......... 99
Veteran employee of, involuntary retirement, . . . . 27
Compensation of legislative counsel and agents, returns of, . . .3
Constitution, amendment of, to provide for taxation of wild or forest
lands; constitutional law, ....... 62
Constitutional law, appropriation to fulfill moral obligation, repayment
of money paid under mistake of fact or law, . . . .36
Delegation of legislative authority to examine voting machines,
ballot boxes and counting apparatus, ..... 39
Duty of Governor to return bill with objections thereto in writing;
veto by Governor; return of bill to branch in which it origi-
nated, 82
Competition entered into for the purpose of injuring or destroying
the business of a rival; discrimination, ..... 58
Conduct of elections, ......... 29
Sale of prison-made goods, ........ 28
Police power, regulation of sale of theatre tickets, . . . .24
Public purpose; appropriation of money raised by taxation for
homes for mechanics, laborers or other wage earners, . . 53
' Public purpose; appropriation of money raised by taxation for
reclamation and sale of wet lands, ...... 69
Public purpose, appropriation of public funds for relief of destitute
families of striking employees, ...... 19
Term of office of Adjutant-General, ...... 77
Taxation of wild or forest lands, ....... 62
Conviction, game laws, violation of; plea of nolo where case is placed on
file 46
Judgment of guilty placed on file a, warranting revocation of license
to operate automobile, ........ 100
County, city or town authorities, duty of, in case of riot or other breach
of the peace, ......... 47
County commissioners, approval of bill or order does not warrant pay-
ment by county treasurers unless expenditure was legally in-
curred, .......... 89
County treasurers, duty to ascertain legality of expenditures, . . 89
118 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Discrimination by lowering of prices in one locality by a person, firm,
association or corporation engaged in business in several locali-
ties, prohibition of; constitutional law, ..... 58
District police, boiler inspection department subordinate to chief of, 25
Elections, examination by State Ballot Law Commission of voting ma-
chines, ballot boxes and counting apparatus used in; constitu-
tional law, .......... 39
Regulation of conduct of; qualifications of voters; constitutional law, 29
Fee of attorney for collecting gratuity for veteran, . . . .91
Governor, duty of, after veto, to return bill to branch in which it origi-
nated; constitutional law, ....... 82
Hospitals, public or incorporated, inspection of records of, . . .111
Hours of labor, acceptance of statute relating to, by cities and towns, . 97
Insane or feeble-minded, hospital for, license for keeper of, partnership, . 93
Insurance company, inspection of steam boilers to be certified, . .114
Legislative counsel and agents, returns of; compensation, ... 3
License for keeping hospital for insane or feeble-minded, partnership may
not receive, .......... 93
To operate automobile, revocation of; conviction, .... 100
To operate steam boiler, coal shovelers do not require, ... 56
To operate steam boiler, right of owner or user to operate through
an unlicensed person, ........ 56
Lottery, voting contest does not constitute, . . . . . .112
Marriage, notice of intention of; certificate of; entry, .... 1
Mechanics and laborers, homes for, appropriation of money raised by
taxation; constitutional law, ....... 53
Moths, gypsy and brown-tail, supplies furnished by State Forester to
private individuals for destruction of, . . . . .67
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, compliance of,
with decree of Supreme Judicial Court, ..... 4
Repayment to of money paid under mistake of fact or law; moral
obligation; constitutional law, ...... 36
Nolo, plea of, where case is placed on file, not a conviction of violation of
game laws, .......... 46
Note of town issued under vote authorizing selectmen to refund debt
"upon the passa,ge of an act authorizing the same" not to be cer-
tified by Director of Bureau of Statistics, . . . .108
Payable "during the year 1912," date of payment, ... 55
Notice of intention of marriage, certificate of entry, .... 1
Officer, commissioned, may receive gratuity provided for veterans, . .91
Partnership may not be licensed as keeper of hospital for insane or feeble-
minded, . ......... 93
Payments by county treasurers limited to expenses legally incurred, . 89
Prison-made goods, regulation of sale of; constitutional law, ... 29
Public records, inspection of records of public or incorporated hospital, . Ill
Railroad, New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, com-
pliance with decree of Supreme Judicial Court, ... 4
Riot or other breach of the peace, duty of public authorities; suitable
aid, 47
Right of sheriff to require assistance to suppress or avert, . .21
Rulings on questions of law or fact by Board of Railroad Commissioners, 43
Sherift', right of, to require assistance in case of actual or impending riot, 21
State Forester, co-operation with private individuals in destroying gypsy
and brown-tail moths, ........ 67
Steam boilers, inspection of by insurance company; certificate, . .114
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. IIO-
Taxation, appropriation of money raised by, to fulfill moral obligation;
constitutional law, ........ 36
Appropriation of public funds for relief of destitute families of strik-
ing employees; constitutional law, ...... 19
Money raised by, appropriation of, for homes of mechanics, laborers
or other wage earners; constitutional law, . . . .53
Of wild or forest lands; proposed constitutional amendment, . . 62
Theatre tickets, right of Legislature to regulate sale of; constitutional
law, ........... 24
Town, may incur indebtedness for water supply by two-thirds vote only, 95
Note oj, payable "during the year 1912," date of payment, . . 55
Notes issued under vote authorizing selectmen to refund debt "upon
the passage of an act authorizing the same;" certification by
Director of Bureau of Statistics, ...... 108
Trust company, savings department of, may not pay fixed dividends re-
quiring transfer of funds from general banking fund to com-
pany, . . 103
Water suppl3^ town may incur indebtedness for, only by two-thirds vote, . 95
Wet lands, reclamation and sale of, at public expense; constitutional
law, 69
Wood and timber, standing, definition of, . . . . . .62
Workmen's Compensation Act not applicable to Commonwealth, . . 99
Veteran, in employ of Commonwealth, retirement of without his consent, 27
Veterans, gratuities for, include commissioned officer, . . . .91
Veto, return of bill by Governor to branch in which it originated, . . 82
Voting contest does not constitute lottery, . . . , . .112
LIST OF CASES
IN WHICH THE
ATTORNEY-GEKERAL
HAS APPEARED
During the Yeah 1912,
GRADE CEOSSINGS.
Notices have been served upon this department of the filing
of the following 'petitions for the appointment of special com-
missioners for the abolition of grade crossings : —
Berkshire County.
Adams. Hoosac Valley Street Eailway Company, petitioners.
Petition for abolition of Commercial Street crossing in
Adams. George W. Wiggin, William W. McClench and
Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. Commis-
sioners^ report filed. Frank H. Cande appointed auditor.
Auditor's fourth report filed. Pending.
Great Barrington, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the
abolition of a grade crossing in the village of Housatonic in
said town. John J. Flaherty, Edmund K. Turner and
Stephen S. Taft appointed commissioners. Commissioners'
report filed. Frank N. Nay appointed auditor. Auditor's
third report filed. Pending.
Lanesborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition
of Valley Road and Glen Eoad crossings. Railroad Com-
missioners appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report
filed. Frank H. Cande appointed auditor. Auditor's first
report filed. Pending.
North Adams. Hoosac Valley Street Railway Company, peti-
tioners. Petition for abolition of Main Street crossing,
known as Braytonville crossing, in North Adams. Edmund
K. Turner, William W. McClench and Joseph P. Magenis
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed.
Frank H. Cande appointed auditor. Auditor's second re-
port filed. Pending.
North Adams, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition
for abolition of State Street and Furnace Street crossings.
Edmund K. Turner, David F. Slade and William G.
McKechnie appointed commissioners. Commissioners' re-
port filed. Pending.
Pittsfield, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for
abolition of Merrill crossing in Pittsfield. Thomas W. Ken-
124 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
nefick, Frederick L. Green and Edmund K. Turner ap-
pointed commissioners. Pending.
Stockbridge, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition
of " Eiver Eoad '' crossing in Stockbridge. James B. Car-
roll, Edward B. Bishop and Luther Dean appointed com-
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. AYade Ke3^es ap-
pointed auditor. Auditor's second report filed. Pending.
Stockbridge, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
South Street crossing. Railroad commissioners appointed
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. A. AV. DeGoosh
appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending.
Stockbridge. Berkshire Railroad, petitioner. Petition for aboli-
tion of Glendale station crossins^. Pendino:.
West Stockbridge, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for
abolition of grade crossing at Alban}^ Street. Pending.
Bristol County.
Attleborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition
of West Street, North Main Street and other crossings in
Attleborough. James R. Dunbar, Henry L. Parker and
William Jackson appointed commissioners. Commissioners'
report filed. Chas. P. Searle appointed auditor. Auditor's
seventh report filed. Pending.
Fall River, ]\rayor and xA.ldermen of, petitioners. Petition for
abolition of Brownell Street crossing and other crossings in
Fall River. John Q. A. Brackett, Samuel X. Aldrich and
Charles A. Allen appointed commissioners. Commissioners'
report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. Auditor's
nineteenth report filed. Pending.
Mansfield. Directors of Xew York, Xew Haven & Hartford
Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
grade crossing at North Main, Chauncey, Central, West,
School and Elm streets in Mansfield. Samuel L. Powers,
Stephen S. Taft and Wm. Jackson appointed commis-
sioners. George F. Swain appointed commissioner in place
of Wm. Jackson, deceased. Pending.
Xew Bedford, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for
abolition of certain grade crossings in Xew Bedford. George
F. Richardson, Horatio G. Herrick and Wm. AA^ieeler ap-
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Fred
E. Jones appointed auditor. Auditor's fifteenth report
filed. Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 125
Somerset. New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Com-
pany, petitioner. Petition for abolition of grade crossing at
Wilbur Avenue. James D. Colt, Henry H. Baker and
Louis Perry appointed commissioners. Commissioners' re-
port filed. Pending.
Swansea. New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Com-
pany, petitioner. Petition for abolition of grade crossing at
Kiver Eoad. James D. Colt, Henry H. Baker and Louis
Perry appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report
filed. Pending.
Taunton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for
abolition of grade crossings at Danforth and other streets in
Taunton. Thomas M. Babson, George F. Swain and Edwin
U. Curtis appointed commissioners. Charles H. Beckwith
appointed commissioner in place of Thomas M. Babson,
deceased. Pending.
Essex County.
Georgetown, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition
of grade crossing at Weston's Crossing. Pending.
Gloucester. Boston & Maine Eailroad, petitioner. Petition for
abolition of crossings at Magnolia Avenue and Brays cross-
ing. Arthur Lord, Moody Kimball and P. H. Cooney ap-
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. A.
W. De Goosh appointed auditor. Auditor's first report
filed. Pending.
Gloucester. Directors of Boston & Maine Eailroad, petitioners.
Petition for abolition of grade crossing between Washing-
ton Street and tracks of Boston & Maine Eailroad. Pend-
ing.
Haverhill, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for
abolition of Washington Street and other crossings in
Haverhill. George W. Wiggin, William B. French and Ed-
mund K. Turner appointed commissioners. Commissioners'
report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. E. A.
McLaughlin appointed auditor in place of Fred E. Jones,
deceased. Auditor's twelfth report filed. Pending.
Ipswich, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
High Street and Locust Street crossings. Geo. W. Wiggin,
Edmund K. Turner and William F. Dana appointed com-
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones ap-
pointed auditor. Auditor's third report filed. Pending.
126 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Lawrence. Boston & Maine Railroad, petitioner. Petition for
abolition of crossings at Chickering Street. Moody Kimball,
James C. Poor and John M. Grosvenor, Jr., appointed
commissioners. Petition withdrawn.
Lawrence, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for
abolition of crossing at Merrimac and other streets in
Lawrence. Robert 0. Harris, Edmund K. Turner and
Henry V. Cunningham appointed commissioners. Pending.
'Lynn, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli-
tion of Summer Street and other crossings on Saugus
branch of Boston & Maine Railroad and Market Street and
other crossings on main line. George W. Wiggin, Edgar R.
Champlin and Edmund K. Turner appointed commis-
sioners. Commissioners' report filed. Edward A. McLaugh-
lin appointed auditor. Auditor's second report filed. Pend-
ing.
Lynn, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli-
tion of grade crossings at Pleasant and Shepard streets, Gas
AMiarf Road and Commercial Street, on the Boston, Revere
Beach & Lynn Railroad. Pending.
Salem. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad, petitioners. Peti-
tion for the abolition of grade crossings at Bridge, Wash-
ington, Mill, North, Flint and Grove streets in Salem.
Patrick H. Cooney, George F. Swain and William A. Dana
appointed commissioners. Pending.
Salem, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli-
tion of Lafayette Street crossing in Salem. Pending.
Franklin County.
Deerfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
" Upper Wisdom Road " crossing. Edmund K. Turner, Cal-
vin Coolidge and Hugh P. Drysdale appointed commis-
sioners. Commissioners' report filed. Lj^man W. Griswold
appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending.
Greenfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition
of Allen and Russell streets crossings in Greenfield. Ed-
mund K. Turner, Walter P. Hall and Fred D. Stanley
appointed commissioners. Stephen S. Taft appointed au-
ditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending.
Greenfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
grade crossing at Silver Street. Stephen S. Taft, Henry
P. Field and Thomas J. O'Connor appointed commissioners.
Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 127
Northfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
crossing on road to South Vernon. Edmnnd K. Turner,
Charles W. Hazelton and Charles H. Innes appointed com-
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pending.
Hampden County.
Palmer, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
Burley's crossing in Palmer. Pending.
Kussell, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Mont-
gomer}^ Eoad crossing. Eailroad Commissioners appointed
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Thomas W.
Kennefick appointed auditor. Auditor's second report filed.
Pending.
Westfield, Attorney-General, petitioner. Petition for abolition
of grade crossings at Lane's and Lee's crossings in West-
• field. Patrick H. Cooney, Eichard W. Irwin and Franklin
T. Hammond appointed commissioners. Chas. E. Hibbard
appointed commissioner in place of Eichard W. Irwin, re-
signed. Pending.
Hampshire County.
Amherst, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
grade crossings at Whitne}^, High and Main streets. Eail-
road Commissioners appointed commissioners. Pending.
•Belchertown, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the aboli-
tion of crossing of road from Belchertown to Three Eivers
and road from Bondville to Ludlow. Edmund K. Turner,
F. G. Wooden and George P. O'Donnell appointed com-
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pending.
Easthampton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition
of grade crossing at Holyoke Eoad, Mt. Tom crossing.
Dismissed.
Middlesex County.
Acton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Great
Eoad crossing in Acton. Benj. W. Wells, George D. Bur-
rage and William B. Sullivan appointed commissioners.
Commissioners' report filed. Fred Joy appointed auditor.
Pending.
Belmont, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
crossings at AYaverley station. Thomas W. Proctor, Pat-
rick H. Cooney and Desmond FitzGerald appointed com-
missioners. Pending.
128 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Chelmsford, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
grade crossing at Middlesex Street. Pending.
Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo-
lition of Marble Street crossing. Pending.
Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo-
lition of Concord Street crossing. Pending.
Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. .Petition for the abo-
lition of Waverly Street crossing. Pending.
Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo-
lition of Bishop Street crossing. Pending.
Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo-
lition of HoUis and Wanshakum streets crossings. Pending.
Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo-
lition of Claflin Street crossing. Pending.
Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition
of grade crossing at Willis Crossing. Pending.
Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for abo-
lition of Middlesex and Thorndike streets crossings. Pend-
ing.
Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for abo-
lition of Boston Eoad or Plain Street, School, Walker and
Lincoln streets crossings. Arthur Lord, David F. Slade and
Henry A. Wyman appointed commissioners. Commissioners'
report filed. A. W. De Goosh appointed auditor. Audi-
tor's second report filed. Pending.
Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for abo-
lition of crossing at Western Avenue and Fletcher Street.
Pending.
Maiden. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad Company, peti-
tioners. Petition for abolition of Medford Street and other
crossings in Maiden. Geo. W. Wiggin, Robert 0. Harris
and Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. Com-
missioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor.
Auditor's fourth report filed. Pending.
i\ralden. Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for abo-
lition of Pleasant and Winter streets crossing in Maiden.
George W. Wiggin, Edmund K. Turner and Fred Joy ap-
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Win-
field S. Slocum appointed auditor. Auditor's fifth report
filed. Pending.
Marlborough, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for
abolition of Hudson Street crossing in Marlborough. Walter
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 129
Adams, Charles A. Allen and Alpheiis Sanford appointed
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pending.
Natick. Boston & Worcester Street Eailway Company, petition-
ers. Petition for alteration of Worcester Street crossing in
Natick. Geo. W. Wiggin, Edmund K. Turner and Larkin
T. Trull appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report
filed. Theo. C. Hurd appointed auditor. Auditor's second
report filed. Pending.
Xewton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the
abolition of Concord Street and Pine Grove Avenue cross-
ings in IN'ewton. George W. Wiggin, T. C. Mendenhall and
Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. Pending.
Newton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the
abolition of Glen Avenue and nine other crossings in New-
ton. Geo. W. Wiggin, T. C. Mendenhall and Edmund K.
Turner appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report
filed. Patrick H. Cooney appointed auditor. Auditor's
seventeenth report filed. Pending.
North Eeading, Selectman of, petitioners. Petition for aboli-
tion of Main Street crossing in North Eeading. Alpheus
Sanford, George N. Poor and Louis M. Clark appointed
commissioners. Eeport of commissioners filed. Thomas W.
Proctor appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed.
Pending.
Somerville, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for
abolition of Park Street, Dane Street, Somerville Avenue
and Medford Street crossings in Somerville. George W.
Wiggin, George P. Swain and James D. Colt appointed
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Patrick H.
Cooney appointed auditor. Auditor's eighth report filed.
Pending.
Wakefield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
Hanson Street crossing in W^akefield. Pending.
Waltham, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for
abolition of South Street crossing in Waltham. Geo. F.
Swain, and Geo. A. Sanderson appointed com-
missioners. Pending.
Waltham, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for
abolition of Moody Street, Main Street, Elm Street, Eiver
Street, Pine Street, Newton Street and Calvary Street
crossings in Waltham. Arthur Lord, Patrick H. Cooney
and George F. Swain appointed commissioners. Pending.
130 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Watertown, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
grade crossings at Cottage, Arlington, School, Irving and
other streets in Watertown. Pending.
Waj'land, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
grade crossing at State Road. Pending.
Weston, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
Church Street, Pigeon Hall and Concord Road crossings.
Railroad Commissioners appointed commissioners. Commis-
sioners' report filed. Joseph W. Lnnd, Esq., appointed
auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending.
Weston, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
grade crossings at Central Avenue, Conant Road, Church
and Yiles streets. P. H. Cooney, Louis A. Frothingham
and Andrew M. Lovis appointed commissioners. Pending.
Winchester, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the aboli-
tion of crossing at Winchester station square. George W.
Wiggin, George F. Swain and Arthur Lord appointed com-
missioners. Pending.
Nor folic County.
Braintree, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition
of the Pearl Street crossing at South Braintree. Patrick H.
Cooney, Frank N. Nay and George F. Swain appointed com-
missioners. Pending.
Braintree. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
grade crossing at School, Elm, River and Union streets in
Braintree. John L. Bates, Winfield S. Slocum and Arthur
H. Wellman appointed commissioners. Commissioners' re-
port filed. Pending.
Brookline. Directors of Boston & Albany Railroad Company,
petitioners. Petition for the abolition of Kerrigan Place
crossing in Brookline. William Sullivan, Henry M. Hutch-
ings and Wade Keyes appointed commissioners. Commis-
sioners' report filed. Henry M. Hutchings appointed
auditor. Auditor's second report filed. Pending.
Canton. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail-
road Compan}^, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Ded-
ham Road crossing in Canton. Samuel L. Powers, Stephen
S. Taft and Wm. Jackson appointed commissioners. Com-
missioners' report filed. Pending.
Dedham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of
Eastern Avenue and Dwight Street crossings in Dedham.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 131
x^lpheus Sanford, Charles Mills and J. Henry Eeed ap-
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Fred
E. Jones appointed auditor. Pending.
Foxborough. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford
Eailroad Companj^, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
grade crossing at Cohasset and Summer streets in Fox-
borough. Samuel L. Powers, Stephen S. Taft and Wm.
Jackson appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report
filed. Pending.
Hyde Park, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
Fairmount Avenue and Bridge Street crossings in Hyde
Park. Boyd B. Jones, Edmund K. Turner and Fred Joy
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed.
Thomas W. Proctor appointed auditor. Auditor's third re-
port filed. Pending.
Needham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
Charles Eiver Street crossing in Needham. Pending.
Norfolk. Agreement approved by the Eailroad Commissioners
for the abolition of crossing at Grove Street, near City
Mills station. Disposed of.
Quincy. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Eail-
road Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Saville
and Water streets crossings in Quincy. John L. Bates,
Winfield S. Slocum and Arthur H. Wellman appointed
commissioners. Pending.
Sharon. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Eail-
road Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of grade
crossing at Depot, Garden and Mohawk streets in Sharon.
Samuel L. Powers, Stephen S. Taft and Wm. Jackson ap-
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed.
Pending.
Walpole, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
Oak Street crossing and other crossings in Walpole. Dana
Malone, Edmund K. Turner and Henry A. W}Tiian ap-
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. N. L.
Sheldon appointed auditor. Auditor's fourth report filed.
Pending.
Westwood. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford
Eailroad Compan}-, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
Green Lodge Street crossing in Westwood. Samuel L.
Powers, Stephen S. Taft and Wm. Jackson appointed com-
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pending.
132 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Suffolk County.
Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli-
tion of Dudley Street crossing in Dorchester. Thomas Post,
Fred Joy and Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners.
Commissioners' report filed. James D. Colt appointed au-
ditor. Auditor's tenth report filed. Pending.
Boston. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company,
petitioners. Petition for abolition of Neponset and Granite
avenues crossings in Dorchester. Pending.
Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli-
tion of Freeport, Adams, Park^ Mill and Walnut streets and
Dorchester Avenue crossings. James E. Dunbar, Samuel
L. Powers and Thomas W. Proctor appointed commis-
sioners. Commissioners' report filed. Arthur H. Wellman
appointed auditor. Auditor's fifteenth report filed. Pend-
ing.
Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the
abolition of the Essex Street crossing in Brighton. George
W. Wiggin, William B. French and Winfield S. Slocum
appointed commissioners. Pending.
Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli-
tion of Blue Hill Avenue and Oakland Street crossings in
Boston. William B. French, Arthur H. Wellman and
George A. Kimball appointed commissioners. Commission-
ers' report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. Audi-
tor's twenty-first report filed. Pending.
Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli-
tion of all crossings in East Boston. George W. Wiggin,
William B. French and Edward B. Bishop appointed com-
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Winfield S. Slo-
cum appointed auditor. Auditor's fourteenth report filed.
Pending.
Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli-
tion of crossings at Saratoga, Maverick and Marginal
streets in East Boston. Railroad Commissioners appointed
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pending.
Revere, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Win-
throp Avenue crossing in Revere of the Boston, Revere
Beach & Lynn Railroad. Pending.
1913.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 133
Worcester County.
Clinton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
Sterling, Water, Main, High and Woodlawn streets cross-
ings. George W. Wiggin, William E. McClintock and
James A. Stiles appointed commissioners. Commissioners'
report filed. David F. Slade appointed auditor. Pending.
Fitchbnrg, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for
abolition of Eollstone Street crossing in Fitchbnrg. Ed-
mund K. Turner, Edwin U. Curtis and Ernest H. Vaughan
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed.
James A. Stiles appointed auditor. Auditor's fourth report
filed. Pending:
Harvard. Boston & Maine Eailroad, petitioner. Petition for
abolition of a grade crossing near Harvard station. Pend-
ing.
Holden, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
Dawson's crossing and Cedar Swamp crossing in Holden.
Charles A. Allen, Arthur P. Eugg and Henry G. Taft ap-
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. H.
L. Parker appointed auditor. Auditors second report filed.
Pending.
Hubbardston, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition
of Depot Eoad crossing in Hubbardston. Pending.
Leominster, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of
Water, Summer, Mechanic and Main streets crossings.
George W. Wiggin, George F. Swain and Charles D. Barnes
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed.
Pending.
Southborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition
of crossing on road from Southborough to Framingham.
Samuel W. McCall, Louis A. Frothingham and Eugene C.
Hultman appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report
filed and recommitted. Pending.
Southborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition
of Main Street crossing at Fayville in Southborough.
Pending.
West Boylston. Boston & Maine Eailroad Company, petitioners.
Petition for abolition of Prescott Street crossing. Pending.
Worcester, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for
abolition of crossings at Exchange, Central and Thomas
134 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
and other streets. Arthur Lord, George F. Swain and Fred
Joy appointed commissioners. Pending.
Worcester, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for
abolition of Grafton Street crossing and eight other cross-
ings, including alterations of Union Station. James R.
Dunbar, James H. Flint and George F. Swain appointed
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. James A.
Stiles appointed auditor. Auditor's fifty-sixth report filed.
Pending.
1913.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 135
CASES ARISING IN THE COURTS.
UNDER THE
x^CTS EELATIVE TO IXHERITANCE AND SUCCESSION TaXES.
Petitions for Instructions.
Bristol County.
Stavers, John W., estate of. Caroline Stavers, administratrix.
Disposed of.
Essex County.
Clines, Mary G., estate of. Catherine A. Laycoek, adminis-
tratrix. Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. Pend-
ing.
Meserve, Chastina S., estate of. James W. Leitch, executor.
Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. Pending.
Nichols, Mary C, estate of. Frank 0. Woods, executor. Pend-
ing.
Towne, Joseph H., estate of. Charles W. Richardson, trustee.
Decree.
Hampshire County.
Welton, Walter B., estate of. Henry W. Kidder, administrator.
Pending.
Middlesex County.
Blood, Benjamin F., estate of. Stanley E. Br^^ant et al., exec-
utors. Pending.
Bouton, Eliza J., estate of. Louis Bell et al., executors, peti-
tioners. Pending.
Perry, Emery B., estate of. Thomas Weston, executor. Pend-
ing.
Proudfoot, David, et al. v. Third Congregational Society in
Cambridge et al. Pending.
136 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
KorfoUc Countij.
Fisher, Charles H., estate of. Lvclia M. Fisher, executrix.
Pending.
Kaffenburgh, Isaac, estate of. Helene W. Kaffenbnrgh et ah.,
executors, petitioners. Pending.
Tobin, Ellen A., estate of. William Sullivan, executor. Pending.
Tobin, Lawrence, absentee, estate of. Howard A. Wilson, re-
ceiver, petitioner. Pending.
Plyrnouth County,
Blenkinsop, James S., estate of. John R. Mills, administrator.
Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. Pending.
Peirce, Harriot 0., estate of. Osgood Putnam, executor. Peti-
tion for abatement of inheritance tax. Pending.
Suffolk County.
Baker, Charlotte A., estate of. Frank N. Nay et ah., executors.
Decree.
Belknap, Henry, estate of. Francis Peabody, Jr., et al., execu-
tors. Decree.
Billings, Rebecca C, estate of. Smith, Charles Gaston, et al.,
trustees, v. Carl Youngren et al., executors. Pending.
Burnham, John A., estate of. William A. Burnham et al., peti-
tioners. Pending.
Dwight, Mary S., estate of. Grenville Clark et ah., petitioners.
Pending.
Frederick, Walter E., trustee, v. John C. Gra}', executor. Dis-
posed of.
Kell}^, Thomas, estate of. Harriet L. Kelly, petitioner. Pend-
ing.
Park, William D., estate of. Osmond S. Park, executor. Peti-
tion for abatement of inheritance tax. Pending.
Phillips, Charles H., estate of. Old Colony Trust Company,
executor, petitioner. Pending.
Sweetser, Frank D., estate of. Charles N. Barney, administrator
c. t. a. Reserved for full court. Rescript.
Worcestei' County.
Metcalf, Caleb B., estate of. George L. Clark, executor. Pend-
ing.
1913.] PUBLIC . DOCUMENT — No. 12. 137
Inventories.
Barnstable County.
Clark, Achsah S., estate of. Lewis F. Clark, administrator.
Final decree.
Matheson, Sarah A., estate of. Henry A. Ellis, administrator.
Dismissed.
Berkshire County.
Hall, E. George, estate of. George W. Hall, administrator.
Dismissed.
Eoberts, Herbert I., estate of. Lura M. Roberts, administratrix.
Pending.
Sperry, Caroline A., estate of. William H. Sperry, executor.
Dismissed.
Sperry, Charles Louis, estate of. William H. Sperry, adminis-
trator. Dismissed.
Tucker, Delia, estate of. Lucy E. Hawks, administratrix. Dis-
missed.
Tymeson, Edward, estate of. William E. Tymeson, adminstra-
tor. Dismissed.
Bristol County.
Crowley, Abby A., estate of. Charles L. Baker, administrator.
Dismissed.
Dufault, Albini J. U., estate of. Jos. A. Beauchmin, executor.
Dismissed.
Duffy, Michael, estate of. Annie Duffy, administratrix. Dis-
missed.
Fleming, Bridget, estate of. Mary Harrington, executrix. Dis-
missed.
Fortes, Jose F., estate of. Henry E. Woodward, administrator.
Pending.
Lopes, Guiadino, estate of. James F. Kiernan, administrator.
Dismissed.
O'Hara, Mary, estate of, Stei^hen O'Hara, administrator. Dis-
missed.
Sherman, William D., estate of. Emma L. Wood, executrix.
Dismissed.
Walsh, Arthur G., estate of. Mary J. Walsh, administratrix.
Dismissed.
Walsh, Patrick C, estate of. Annie M. Walsh, administratrix.
Pending.
138 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Essex County.
Adams, Isaac, estate of. Oliver E. Williams et cd., executors.
Dismissed.
Arey, Sylvanus R., estate of. Ida M. Arey, executrix. Dis-
missed.
Brown, Lucy E., estate of. Nellie Brown, administratrix.
Pending.
Burke, Catherine, estate of. Mary J. Burke, administratrix.
Dismissed.
Cleaves, Annie, estate of. Benjamin F. Cleaves, administrator.
Decree.
Cook, Katherine F., estate of. Thomas M. Cook, administrator.
Dismissed.
Crooker, John W., estate of. William W. Crooker, adminis-
trator. Dismissed.
Crowley, Peter, estate of. Dennis J. Crowley, executor. Dis-
missed.
Driscoll, Cornelius, estate of. Julia A. Driscoll, administratrix.
Pending.
Fessenden, Laura M., estate of. William E. Fessenden, admin-
istrator. Dismissed.
Foley, Winifred, estate of. John J. Foley, administrator. Dis-
missed.
Freytag, Oswald, estate of. John A. O'Mahoney, executor.
Dismissed.
Fuller, Addie, estate of. David T. Fuller, administrator. Dis-
missed.
Gay, Elizabeth L., estate of. John James Gay, administrator.
Dismissed.
Gould, George, estate of. Samuel Gould, administrator. Dis-
missed.
Green, Margaret, estate of. Thomas F. Little, executor. Dis-
missed.
Kyrouz, Eva T., estate of. Thomas N. Kyrouz, administrator.
Final decree.
Leone, Joseph, estate of. Alphonse Leone, administrator.
Pending.
McDonald, Patrick, estate of. Thomas D. Snow, administrator.
Dismissed.
McEvoy, Grace V., estate of. Catherine G. McEvoy, executrix.
Unable to locate. Dismissed without prejudice.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 139
Murray, Edward F., estate of. Frank J. Murray, administrator.
Dismissed.
Murra}^, James H., estate of. Alexander M. Murray, adminis-
trator. Dismissed.
bourse, Harrison, estate of. George L. Nourse, administrator.
Dismissed.
O'Brien, Nellie M., estate of. Thomas F. Little, executor. Dis-
missed.
Sanborn, Frank A., estate of. James W. Sullivan, adminis-
trator. Dismissed.
Smith, Ann, estate of. Sarah Gee, administratrix. Dismissed.
Sukaireck, Mary, estate of. Annie S. Saliba, executrix. Dis-
missed.
Sweeney, Eugene, estate of. Timothy A. Sweeney, adminis-
trator. Dismissed.
Tansey, Elsie 0., estate of. Thomas H. Tansey, administrator.
Decree.
Wainstain, Samuel, estate of. Benjamin Wainstain et al., ad-
ministrators. Dismissed.
Westwood, Charles E., estate of. Georgianna AYestwood, admin-
istratrix. Dismissed.
Wood, William H., estate. Minnie V. Wood, administratrix.
Dismissed.
Hampden County.
Bonelli, Arcangelo, estate of. Maria A. Bonelli, administratrix.
Dismissed.
Circosta, James, estate of. Salvatore Pagliaro, administrator.
Dismissed.
Clark, Edward W., estate of. [N'ettie B. Clark, administratrix.
Dismissed.
De Giacomo, Alfonso, estate of. Gaetano Poccardi, adminis-
trator. Pending.
Fee, Patrick C, estate of. Anna E. Fee, administratrix. Un-
able to locate. Dismissed without prejudice.
Kneil, Mary A., estate of. Arthur S. Kneil, administrator.
Dismissed.
Lipscomb, Frank, estate of. Margaret H. Shean, administra-
trix. Dismissed.
Melaszansky, Joseph, estate of. Ursula J. Melaszansky, admin-
istratrix. Pending.
Osborn, Martin, estate of. Susan M. Osborn, executrix. Dis-
missed.
140 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Ostigu}^ Marie Papineau, estate of. Clarisse Papineau Parent,
executrix. Pending.
Eoonev, John, estate of. Margaret Eoone}^ administratrix.
Pending.
Sullivan, Edward W., estate of. Jennie G. Sullivan, adminis-
trator. Dismissed.
Wright, Henry A., estate of. Cynthia A. Wright, administra-
trix. Dismissed.
Middlesex County.
Brouillette, Joseph P., estate of. Esmeralda M. Brouillette,
administratrix. Pending.
Buckley, Alice T., estate of. Thomas W. Buckle}^, administra-
tor. Dismissed.
Burke, Christopher, estate of. Elizabeth Burke, administratrix.
Dismissed.
Cahill, Elizabeth, estate of. Mary A. Kahn, administratrix.
Pending.
Cavanagh, Susan E., estate of. Susan F. Cavanagh, adminis-
tratrix. Dismissed.
Chadbourne, Marshall W., estate of. Addie Chadbourne, execu-
trix. Pending.
Corlew, Eollin H., estate of. Caroline A. Henderson, executrix.
Dismissed.
Dean, William H., estate of. Margaret E. Dean, administratrix.
Dismissed.
Dixon, Adam, estate of. Joseph K. Dixon, administrator. Dis-
missed.
Drago, Carmel, estate of. John Drago, administrator. Unable
to locate.
Eenton, Timoth}^, estate of. Mary Fenton, administratrix.
Dismissed.
Fish, Philip, estate of. Mary A. Fish, administratrix. Decree.
Fletcher, Mary J., estate of. Nancy M. Fletcher, executrix.
Pending.
Frotton, Peter E., estate of. Frank H. Frotton, administrator.
Pending.
Qradj, Mary, estate of. John E. Grady, executor. Dismissed.
Hall, Elvira A., estate of. Michael J. McDevitt, administrator.
Unable to locate. Dismissed without prejudice.
Homer, Elizabeth M., estate of. George H. Homer, adminis-
trator. Dismissed.
Kadra, Sadie M., estate of. Mallham M. Kadra, administrator.
Dismissed.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 141
Mann, Charles W., estate of. Arthur W. Mann, administrator.
Dismissed.
MeCollester, John Q. A., estate of. John F. McCollester, ad-
ministrator. Dismissed.
Morris, Letitia, estate of. Edith E. Tibbetts, executrix. Dis-
missed.
Neal, William T., estate of. Bridget G. Neal, executrix. Dis-
missed.
Nichols, Bessie M., estate of. George H. Xichols, administrator.
Dismissed.
Noel, Edward, estate of. Celina M. Noel, administratrix. Dis-
missed.
Pierlot, Annie F., estate of. Agnes J. Pierlot, administratrix.
Pending.
Quinlan, Johanna, estate of. Margaret T. Scannell, executrix.
Dismissed.
Quinn, Albert T., estate of. Salter W. Quinn, administrator.
Dismissed.
Eiggs, Lucy J., estate of. Blanche I. Eiggs, executrix. Dis-
missed.
Eoche, John J., estate of. Timothy J. Eoche, administrator.
Dismissed.
Eogers, Mary J., estate of. Annie Eogers, administratrix. Dis-
missed.
Eusso, Maria, estate of. Maria Marazzo, administratrix. Dis-
missed.
Sheehan, Patrick J., estate of. Hannah Sheehan, administra-
trix. Dismissed.
Slye, William J., estate of. Mary A. Slye, administratrix. Dis-
missed.
Sullivan, John, estate of. Alice F. Sullivan, executrix. Dis-
missed.
Norfolk County.
Carter, Helen E., estate of. Hallock H. Hill, administrator.
Dismissed.
Cleale, Edna C, estate of. Ernest L. Hill, administrator. Dis-
missed.
Coupal, Denise, estate of, Joseph Coupal, administrator. Dis-
missed.
Doble, Enoch H., estate of. Herbert F. Doble, special admin-
istrator. Dismissed.
Farnsworth, John L., estate of. Anna A. Farnsworth, admin-
istratrix. Dismissed.
142 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Ford^ Catherine, estate of. Martin J. Lee, administrator. Dis-
missed.
Gallivan, Elizabeth, estate of. John L. Gallivan, administrator.
Disposed of.
Garrity, Margaret T., estate of. Maria A. Garrity, executrix.
Dismissed.
Kelley, Ruth, estate of. Charles T. Kelley, administrator.
Final decree.
McDonnell, John A., estate of. Mary G. McDonnell, executrix.
Dismissed.
McGillicudd}^ Ellen, estate of. Eugene H. McGillicuddy, ad-
ministrator. Dismissed.
McPherson, Mary A., estate of. Duncan McPherson, adminis-
trator. Pending.
Moran, James F., estate of. Timothy Dolan, administrator.
Dismissed.
Sheehan, Ellen, estate of. John J. Sheehan, administrator.
Dismissed.
Yates, Joseph, estate of. Lorretto A. Yates, executrix. Dis-
missed.
Plymouth County.
Danahy, Abby, estate of. James E. Handrahan, executor. Dis-
missed.
Donovan, Julia, estate of. Hannah A. Shea, executrix. Dis-
missed.
Fish, Mary A., estate of. Florene A. Haskell, administratrix.
Dismissed.
Hickey, Catherine T., estate of. Margaret A. Hickey, adminis-
tratrix. Dismissed.
Lowr}^, Ann, estate of. Isabelle Crehan, administratrix. Final
decree.
Poole, Bradford, estate of. Ella F. Poole, administratrix. Dis-
missed.
Riley, Patrick, estate of. Bridget Riley, administratrix. Dis-
missed.
Russell, Patrick, estate of. William J. Coughlan et ah, exec-
utors. Dismissed.
Terr}^, :N"aomi, estate of. Sarah R. Collins, administratrix. Dis-
missed.
1913.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 143
Suffolk County.
Adolph, Joseph, estate of. Isaac Klein, adininistrator. Pend-
ing.
Ahearn, Maurice, estate of. Maiy E. Aliearn, administratrix.
Dismissed.
Allen, William A., estate of. Marion Boyd Allen, administra-
trix. Dismissed.
Almeida, Christiano F., estate of. Angelina F. Almeida, ad-
ministratrix. Pending.
Baxter, Albert, estate of. Elizabeth A. Baxter, administratrix.
Pending.
Becker, Philip, estate of. Bridget Becker, executrix. Dis-
missed.
Belanger, J. P. Paul, estate of. Marie Belanger, administra-
trix. Dismissed.
Bershinsk}^ John, estate of. Lihba Bershinsky, administratrix.
Pending.
Brehm, Charles W., estate of. Estella F. Brelim, administratrix.
Pending.
Brooks, Charles A., estate of. Mary J. Brooks, executrix. Dis-
missed.
Byrne, William P., estate of. Catherine M. Byrne, administra-
trix. Pending.
Chaplin, Matilda C, estate of. Samuel Chaplin, administrator.
Pending.
Clayton, Frank H., estate of. Minnie A. Clayton, executrix.
Dismissed.
Costello, Bridget, estate of. Bridget A. Costello, administratrix.
Dismissed.
Cote, Omer, estate of. Eose Cote, administratrix. Unable to
locate. Dismissed without prejudice.
Coughlin, Martha A., estate of. Timothy F. Callahan, adminis-
trator. Dismissed.
Daly, Michael, estate of. Ellen E. Murray, administratrix.
Pending.
De leso, Mcola, estate of. Cleonice De leso, administratrix.
Dismissed.
Donovan, Patrick, estate of. Margaret Donovan, administratrix.
Pending.
Driscoll, John J., estate of. Catherine Driscoll, administratrix.
Dismissed.
144 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Ehrenberg, Judah, estate of. Rachel Lea Ehrenberg, adminis-
tratrix. Dismissed.
Gerrish, Jennie L., estate of. Herbert W. Angier, administrator.
Dismissed.
Gleason, Michael J., estate of. Annie Gleason, administratrix.
Dismissed.
Goodale, George L., estate of. William P. Martin^ executor.
Dismissed without prejudice.
Gray, James N., estate of. Helen F. Eaton, administratrix.
Unable to locate. Dismissed without prejudice.
Gray, Mary D., estate of. William P. Gray, administrator.
Dismissed.
Griffith, Edward, estate of. George A. GrifiSth, administrator.
Dismissed.
Hall, Ellen F., estate of. Kate S. Gallagher, executrix. Dis-
missed.
Hanson, Mary N., estate of. Andrew Hanson, administrator.
Dismissed.
Hardy, Lylie M., estate of. Lucy B. Hoadley, administratrix.
Dismissed.
Harrington, Mary, estate of. Joseph A. Sheehan, administrator.
Final decree.
Hunt, William P., estate of. John C. Hunt, administrator.
Dismissed.
Jame, Rebecca, estate of. Barnet Jame, administrator. L'nable
to locate. Dismissed without prejudice.
Jordan, Lena, estate of. Frida Jordan, administratrix. Un-
able to locate. Dismissed without prejudice.
Kalis, Abraham, estate of. Joseph Kalis, administrator. L^n-
able to locate. Dismissed without prejudice.
Kelh^, Anna, estate of. Sarah Kelly, administratrix. Dis-
missed.
Kenney, Martin, estate of. James J. Kenney, administrator.
Dismissed.
Killeen, Daniel J., estate of. John B. Killeen, administrator.
Pending.
King, James T., estate of. Augusta King, administrator. Pend-
ing.
Londregan, Catherine, estate of. Eichard J. Ha^'den, executor.
Dismissed.
Lynch, Mary, estate of. John H. L3'nch, executor. Dismissed.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCOIEXT — Xo. 12. 145
Lynn, Gertrude, estate of. John J. Lynn, administratoi-. Dis-
missed.
Lyons, Maria, estate of. Charles F. Lyons, administrator.
Pending.
Madden, Stephen F.. estate of. Delia A. Madden, administra-
trix. Dismissed.
McGann, Patrick, estate of. Margaret Sheehan, administratrix.
Dismissed.
McHale, John F., estate of. Annie J. McHale, administratrix.
Pending.
Murphy, John E., estate of. Thomas Murphy, administrator.
Dismissed.
Oakman, Lizzie E.. estate of. Elmer P. Oakman, administrator.
Dismissed.
O'Brien, Jeremiah, estate of. George E. Hollf elder, adminis-
trator. Dismissed.
OTarrell, Mary M., estate of. John D. Carmody, executor.
Pending.
O'Xeil, John H., estate of. Elizabeth F. O'Xeil, administratrix.
Dismissed.
Ormsby, Anna, estate of. Henry S. Ormsby, administrator.
Dismissed.
Pare, Cyrille, estate of. Georgianna Pare, administratrix. Dis-
missed.
Percival, Rose B., estate of. Eosella A. Lynch, administratrix.
Dismissed.
Schaeff, Xannette, estate of. Henry Robinson, executor. Dis-
missed.
Shannon^ Helen, estate of. Harry W. James, administrator.
Dismissed.
Sharkey, Charles, estate of. George L. Sharkey, administrator.
Dismissed.
Silberg, Joseph, estate of. Samuel Silberg, administrator.
Pending.
Sinclair, Albert T., estate of. Curtis H. Waterman, executor.
Dismissed.
Singleton, Catherine, estate of. John J. Singleton, administra-
tor. L^nable to locate. Dismissed without prejudice.
Sir vain, Marcelin, estate of. Aglar Sirvain, executor. Pending.
Solari, Agostino, estate of. Maria Solari et ah, executors. Dis-
missed.
146 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Sribikr, Longina, estate of. Anastasia Sribikr, administratrix.
Unable to locate. Dismissed without prejudice.
Staloff, Louis, estate of. Lena Staloff, administratrix. Dis-
missed.
Sullivan, Daniel, estate of. William T. Sullivan, administrator.
Dismissed.
Sullivan, Daniel J., estate of. Annie T. Sullivan, executrix.
Pending.
Sullivan, Julia, estate of. Hannah Sullivan et al., administra-
tors. Dismissed.
Taylor, Mary A., estate of. Piobert Taylor, administrator. Dis-
missed.
Thorner, Elmina, estate of. Morris Thorner, administrator.
Dismissed.
Tobey, Horace, estate of. Mary E. Tobey, administratrix. Dis-
missed.
Tortorella, Francesca, estate of. Ignazio Tortorella, adminis-
trator. Pending.
Trainor, Kate, estate of. Annie L. O'Brien, administratrix.
Dismissed.
Tramontozzi, Constanzo, estate of. Charles A. Castle, adminis-
trator. Dismissed.
Trengove, William E., estate of. Charles T. Trengove, adminis-
trator. Dismissed.
Vincent, Alexander, estate of. William Aancent, administrator.
Dismissed without prejudice.
Vining, Ida L., estate of. Louis B. Yining, executor. Dis-
missed.
Wagner, Stephen G., estate of. Mary A. AVagner, administra-
trix. Unable to locate. Dismissed without prejudice.
Walenszius, Anthoney, estate of. Katorina Walenszius, adminis-
tratrix. Pending.
Ware, Agnes B., estate of. Clara E. Brown, administratrix.
Dismissed.
Warshansky, Samuel, estate of. Fannie Warshansky, adminis-
tratrix. Decree.
Wheelock, Oscar M., estate of. Winnifred I. T^Hieelock, adminis-
tratrix. Dismissed.
Williams, Michael, estate of. Katreine Williams, administra-
trix. Dismissed.
Williams, Sarah M., estate of. John H. Williams, administrator.
Dismissed without prejudice.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 147
Whiting, Elizabeth L., estate of. Edward L. Goodwin, adminis-
trator. Dismissed.
Whittemore, FrankHn P., estate of. Margaret E. Reed, ad-
ministratrix. Dismissed.
Wren, Cornelius, estate of. Edward C. Wren, administrator.
Unable to locate. Dismissed without prejudice.
Worcester County.
Curran, John J., estate of. Peter F. Curran, administrator.
Pending.
Delorme, INTarcisse D., estate of. George Delorme et als., exec-
utors. Dismissed.
Donoghue, John C, estate of. Charles F. Campbell, administra-
tor. Dismissed.
DorsQ}^, Catherine, estate of. Timothy Dorsey, administrator.
Dismissed.
Dufault, Louise M., estate of. Marie L. Duf ault, administratrix.
Dismissed.
Fox, Patrick, estate of. Mary Fox, executrix. Dismissed.
Gargulinski, Ignacy, estate of. Aniela Gargulinski, administra-
trix. Final decree.
Groezinger, Charles G., estate of. Charles F. Groezinger, ad-
ministrator. Pending.
Hill, Catherine, estate of. Thomas J. Hill, administrator.
Dismissed.
Hudson, Ellen A., estate of. Jennie A. Kelse}^, administratrix.
Dismissed.
Jurentkuff, Charles L., estate of. Bernice R. Jurentkuff, ad-
ministratrix. Dismissed.
Murphy, Patrick J., estate of. Wm. J. B. Murphy, adminis-
trator. Dismissed.
Sawyer, Warren E., estate of. Willie L. Sawyer, administrator.
Decree.
Steiman, David, estate of. Louis Steiman, administrator. Un-
able to locate. Dismissed without prejudice.
Sullivan, Catherine, estate of. Patrick O'Leary, administrator.
Dismissed.
Willard, George, estate of. Frank D. Willard, administrator.
Decree.
148 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUSTS.
Berl'shire County.
Lenox Library Association v. David Lj^dig et aJs. Bill of com-
plaint brought to confirm trust deeds. Pending.
Xewton, Maria H., estate of. A. Chalkley Collins, adminis-
trator^ petitioner. Petition for instructions. Pending.
Bristol County.
Delano, Edward, estate of. Fairhaven Benevolent Association,
petitioner. Petition for appointment as trustee. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Lothrop, Cyrus, estate of. Oliver Ames et al., executors. Peti-
tion for authority to transfer trust funds. Disposed of.
Matthes, Cornelia P., estate of. Charles E. Hunt, administrator.
Petition for instructions. Decree.
Matthes, Cornelia P., estate of. Charles R. Hunt, administrator.
Petition for instructions. Decree.
Winsor, Ellen A., estate of. Attleborough Hospital, petitioner.
Petition for appointment as trustee. x^ttorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Essex County.
Andover Theological Seminar}^, trustees of, v. Attorney- General.
Petition for instructions. Decree.
Atwood, Margaret, estate of. Henry B. Little et ah., peti-
tioners. Petition for appointment of petitioners as trus-
tees. Pending.
Barr, Henry, estate of. Salem Young Men's Christian Associa-
tion, petitioner. Petition for leave to apply the doctrine of
cy-pres to trust fund. Disposed of.
Essex Agricultural Society v. Massachusetts General Hospital
Corporation and the Attorney-General. Petition to sell
real estate and to apply the doctrine of cy-pres. Service
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 149
accepted. Petition dismissed. Petitioner appealed. Pend-
ing.
Essex Institute, petitioner. Petition for instructions. Decree.
Haskins, Leander M., estate of. Grafton Butman, petitioner.
Petition for appointment of trustee. Pending.
Hawkes, Mary B., estate of. Arthur F. Upton, executor, peti-
tioner. Petition for instructions. Disposed of.
Hawks, Esther H., estate of. Hannah T. Garret et ah, trustees,
petitioners. Petition for leave to adjust certain claims by
compromise. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Hawks, Esther H., estate of. Philip W. Ayres et ah, trustees,
petitioners. Petition for allowance of third and fourth ac-
counts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Hawks, Esther H., estate of. Alfred E. Chase, petitioner. Peti-
tion for appointment as trustee. Attorney-General waived
right to be heard.
Healy, Jeremiah J., estate of. Dennis Healy, executor. Peti-
tion for instructions. Pending.
Xeedham, Alice, estate of. Overseers of Salem Monthly Meet-
ing of Friends, petitioner. Petition for instructions. De-
cree.
Otis, Margaret Sigourney, estate of. Philip Dexter et ah, execu-
tors. Petition for instructions. Pending.
Eobbins, Mary B., estate of. Charles E. Sawj^er, trustee. Peti-
tion for instructions. Pending.
Smith, John, estate of. J. Duke Smith, trustee. Petition for
instructions. Pending.
FranMin County.
Durkee, Lauriston C, estate of. William G. Packard et ah,
trustees, petitioners. Petition for leave to mortgage real
estate. Attorney-General assented to the petition.
Field, Simeon A., estate of. Henry W. Montague, trustee. Peti-
tion for allowance of third account. Pending.
Hamilton, Kate E., estate of. Darwin F. Hamilton, adminis-
trator, petitioner. Petition for instructions. Disposed of.
Stratton, Abigail, estate of. Frank H. Montague et ah, trustees.
Petition for allowance of tenth account. Pending.
Williams, Ebenezer Hinsdale, estate of. Irving H. Childs, peti-
tioner. Petition for instructions. Disposed of.
150 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Hampden County.
Allen, Ethan, estate of. Springfield Safe Deposit and Trust
Company, trustee, petitioner. Petition for allowance of
third account. Pending.
Smith, David P., estate of. Edward H. Lathrop et ah, peti-
tioners. Petition for appointment of managers of trust
fund. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Smith, David P., estate of. City of Springfield et ah., peti-
tioners. Petition for instructions. Disposed of.
Hampshire County.
Dickson, Sarah, estate of. Henry S. Pease, town clerk and
treasurer of the town of Middlefield, petitioner. Petition
for authority to apply the doctrine of cy-pres. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Gaylord, George H., petitioner. Petition for termination of
trust fund created for Russell Society. Dismissed.
Moore, Philomela C, estate of. Herbert Sabin et ah, petitioners.
Petition for instructions. Decree.
Russell Church in Hadley. Francis S. Reynolds, trustee. Peti-
tion for instructions. Pending.
Middlesex County.
Abbott, Carrie P., estate of. Winthrop P. Stone, executor, peti-
tioner. Petition for instructions. Disposed of.
Badger, Mary E., estate of. George G. Averill, executor and
trustee, v. Charles W. Badger et als. Petition for authority
to adjust by compromise controversy in regard to will. Dis-
posed of.
Belknap, Harriett E., estate of. George E. Horr, petitioner.
Petition for appointment as trustee. Attorney- General
waived right to be heard.
Bennett, Eleanor, estate of. Joseph Jaquith et als., petitioners.
Petition for appointment of trustees. Decree.
Blood, Benjamin F., estate of. George G. Waite et al., petition-
ers. Petition for appointment as trustees. Attorney-Gen-
eral waived right to be heard.
Bugbee, Samuel W., et al. v. Attorney-General. Petition for
instructions. Pending.
Bull, Sara C, estate of. Joseph G. Thorp et al. v. John Lund
et al. Petition for instructions. Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 151
Copelancl, Sarah E., estate of. Alba A. Giles, executor. Peti-
tion for instructions. Decree.
Copeland, Sarah E., estate of. Alba A. Giles, executor. Peti-
tion for allowance of second account. Pending.
Hammond, George P., estate of. Elizabeth F. Johnson, execu-
trix, petitioner. Petition for instructions. Pending.
Hopkins, Lucretia A., estate of. James A. Bancroft, executor,
petitioner. Petition for instructions. Pending.
Litchfield, William, estate of. Henry W. Bragg, administrator.
Petition for instructions. Eescript.
Martin, Webster Warner, estate of. Wesley T. Lee et al., trus-
tees. Petition for allowance of eighth account. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Mellen, William H., estate of. Town of Framingham, peti-
tioner. Petition for authority to sell real estate. Pending.
Roberts, James H., estate of. Horace M. Bickford et ah, trus-
tees, petitioners. Petition for leave to expend part of trust
fund. Attorney- General waived right to be heard.
Shepard, Obed C, estate of. Charles H. Sherman, executor.
Petition for leave to adjust by compromise controversy in
regard to allowance of will. Eescript.
Tabor, Frances F., estate of. Charles S. Korris, executor. Peti-
tion for instructions. Eeserved for full court.
Thompson, Emulus, estate of. Melvin G. Eogers, administrator.
Petition for instructions. Pending.
Ward, Winthrop, estate of. Francis H. Brown et als., petition-
ers. Petition for appointment of trustees. Decree.
\Aliite, Daniel, estate of. Winslow Warren et al., trustees. Peti-
tion for allowance of sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth
accounts. Pending.
Whitney, Caroline A. E., estate of. Henry E. Llayes, adminis-
trator. Petition for allowance of third and final account.
Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Whitney, Caroline A. E., estate of. Charles A. Stone et al.,
trustees. Petition for allowance of second account. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
AYhitney, Edward, estate of. Charles A. Stone et al., trustees.
Petition for instructions. Decree.
Nantucket County.
Enas, Sally Maria, estate of. Lauriston Bunker, trustee, peti-
tioner. Petition for allowance of first account. Pending.
152 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Norfolk County.
Capen^ Elizabeth Fuller, estate of. Eben W. Keyes et ah, exec-
utors. Petition for instructions. Disposed of.
Lee, Henr}', estate of. Schuyler S. Bartlett, executor, petitioner.
Petition for instructions. Pending.
Mann, Jonathan, estate of. John F. Brown et ah, executors.
Petition for instructions. Final decree.
Mann, Jonathan, estate of. Carrie S. Leeds, petitioner. Peti-
tion for removal of trustee. Pending.
Medfield Ministerial Fund, Trustees of, v. Attorney- General.
Petition for instructions. Disposed of.
Sanderson, Julia A., estate of. Marshall L. Perrin, executor.
Petition for instructions. Decree.
Sanderson, Julia A., estate of. Marshall L. Perrin, executor.
Petition for authority to purchase an annuity for H. H.
Brown. Decree.
Wolcott, Harriet Frothingham, estate of. Philip Dexter et ah,
trustees. Petition for authority to transfer trust funds.
Disposed of.
Plymouth County.
Pitcher, James S. H., estate of. Oliver W. Cobh, trustee. Peti-
tion for distribution of trust estate. Decree.
Suifoll' County.
Agassiz, Alexander, estate of. Robert W. Hill, petitioner. Peti-
tion for appointment as trustee. Attorney-General waived
right to be heard.
Agassiz, Alexander, estate of. Robert W. Hill, trustee. Peti-
tion for allowance of first and final account. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Amory, Francis L, et ah v. Trustees of Amherst College et ah
Petition for instructions. Pending.
Ashton, Elisha V., estate of. Charles P. Curtis et ah, trustees.
Petition for allowance of fifth to eleventh accounts, inclu-
sive. Accounts allowed.
Atkins, Henry Holly. William Warren Vaughn et ah, trustees.
Petition for allowance of seventh to tenth accounts, inclu-
sive. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Boston Dispensary, petitioner. Petition for leave to sell real
estate. Disposed of.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 153
Bradstreet, Charlotte A., estate of. Moses Williams et ah, peti-
tioners. Petition for appointment as trustees. Decree.
Brigham, Pobert B., estate of. The New England Trust Com-
pany, trustee. Petition for allowance of first and second
accounts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Brown, Josiah W., estate of. Sewall F. Abbott et aJ., trustees.
Petitions for instructions. Pending.
Cazenove, Sarah Elizabeth, estate of. George H. Richards, trus-
tee. Petition for instructions. Decree.
Cazenove, Sarah Elizabeth, estate of. George H. Richards, trus-
tee, petitioner. Petition for leave to convey real estate.
Decree.
Gushing, Henriette J., estate of. Constance J. Bessey, execu-
trix. Petition for instructions. Pending.
Dodge, Theodore A., estate of. Caroline Donaldson et ah, peti-
tioners. Petition for appointment as trustees. Attornej^-
General waived right to be heard.
Drur}^ Michael, estate of. Charles E. Cotting, trustee. Petition
for allowance of first to seventh and final accounts, inclu-
sive. Accounts allowed.
Geyer, Mary French, estate of. George H. Gary, trustee, peti-
tioner. Petition for allowance of first account. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Gurney, Elizabeth F., estate of. Warren Avenue Baptist Church
V. Attorney-General. Petition for instructions. Pending.
Harris, George W., estate of. Edward J. Moriart}', petitioner.
Petition for appointment as trustee. Attorne^'-General
waived right to be heard.
Harvard College, President and Fellows of, v. Attorney-General.
Petition for authority to sell real estate. Disposed of.
Hawks, Esther H., estate of. Hannah T. Garret et ah, trustees,
petitioners. Petition for authority to convey trust estate.
Decree.
Haven, George, estate of. Herbert Parker et ah, trustees. Peti-
tion for instructions. Final decree.
Healy, Anna M., estate of. William Popes Trask, executor, peti-
tioner. Petition for instructions. Pending.
Hoffman, Florence P., estate of. Oscar B. Mowry et ah., trus-
tees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of twelfth and
thirteenth and final accounts. Attorney-General waived
right to be heard.
154 ATTORNF^Y-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Jackson^ James, estate of. Frederick C. Bowditch, trustee, peti-
tioner. Petition for allowance of first account. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Jackson, James, estate of. Frederick C. Bowditch, trustee, peti-
tioner. Petition for leave to sell personal estate belonging
to trust fund. Attorney- General waived right to be heard.
Lawrence, Abbott, estate of. John Lawrence et al., trustees,
petitioners. Petition for allowance of twenty-second ac-
count. Attorney- General waived right to be heard.
LeojDold Morse Home for Infirm Hebrews and Orphans v. Home
for Destitute Jewish Children, Inc. Petition for instruc-
tions. Decree.
Lincoln, Annie Preston, estate of. J. Ellwood Lee Company v.
The Grace Hospital. Petition brought by receivers to col-
lect legacy under will. Pending.
Liversidge, Thomas, estate of. Clift Rogers Clapp et ah, peti-
tioners. Petition for appointment of Clarence B. Hum-
phreys as trustee. Attorney-General assented to appoint-
ment.
Locke, Elbridge W., estate of. Otis Merriam et al., trustees,
petitioners. Petition for allowance of ninth and tenth ac-
counts. Attorney- General waived right to be heard.
Mabie, William I., et ah, v. Edwin S. Gardner and Attorney-
General. Petition for instructions regarding a public char-
itable trust under will of Mary Redding. Pending.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, petitioner. Petition for
leave to sell real estate. ilttorney-General waived right to.
be heard.
Moore, Hollis, estate of. George E. Cornwall, trustee, petitioner.
Petition for instructions. Disposed of.
Norcross, Margaret P., estate of. Edith C. Reichardt, peti-
tioner. Petition for appointment as trustee. Attorney-
General waives right to be heard.
Nute, Lewis W., estate of. John L. Xewell and Thomas L.
Wiles, petitioners. Petition for appointment as trustees.
Attorney- General waived right to be heard.
Patterson, Adoniram J., estate of. William ^. Swain, trustee,
petitioner. Petition for instructions. Disposed of.
Patterson, Adoniram J., estate of. William N. Swain, trustee,
petitioner. Petition for authority to sell real estate. Pend-
ing.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 155
Peterson, Ellen, estate of. Mary M. Anderson, petitioner. Peti-
tion for appointment of trustee." Pending.
Pine, James A., estate of. Frank W. Grinnell, trustee. Petition
for instructions. Decree.
Potter, Sarah E., estate of. Ne^y Bedford Free Public Library,
petitioner. Petition for instructions. Pending.
Protestant Episcopal Church, Trustees of Donations for the, v.
Attorney-General. Petition for leave to execute deed. Dis-
posed of.
Eead, Charles C, et at, v. The Frances E. Willard Settlement
et al. Petition for instructions. Pending.
Eust, I^ancy E., estate of. Henry A. Wyman et al, trustees.
Petition for instructions. Decree.
Saint PauFs Church in Boston, Wardens and \"estry of, v. At-
torney-General. Bill in equity for authority to transfer
trust funds held under the will of James Sullivan Warren
and under the will of Edward Tuckerman. Disposed of.
Saint PauFs Church in Boston, Proprietors of, v. Attorney-
General. Bill in equity for authority to transfer trust
funds held under the will of Elizabeth F. Harvey and
under the gift from the estate of Mary S. Ivettell. Dis-
posed of.
Saint PauPs Church in Boston, Wardens and Yestry of, v, At-
torney-General. Bill in equity for authority to transfer
trust funds held under the will of David Sears and under
the will of Edward Tuckerman. Disposed of.
Sawyer, Samuel E., estate of. Massachusetts Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, petitioner. Petition for
authority to transfer trust estate. Attorney- General waived
right to be heard.
Smith, James, estate of. Willard N. Poland, petitioner. Peti-
tion for appointment of trustee. Pending.
Smith, James, estate of. Samuel M. Jackson et al., trustees.
Petition for allowance of first and third accounts. Pend-
ing.
Thompson, Thomas, estate of. John F. Moors, petitioner. Peti-
tion for appointment of trustee. Decree.
Thorndike, George L., estate of. William A. Morrison et al,
trustees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of third and
fourth accounts. Pending.
Tyler Street Day N'ursery Company v. Attorney- General. Peti-
tion for instructions. Decree.
156 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Wellesley Boys' Club, E. K. Sawyer et ah., trustees of, petition-
ers. Petition for instructions. Disposed of.
"\Miitney, Sarah W., estate of. Charles A. Stone, trustee. Peti-
tion for leave to sell real estate. Pending.
Wilder, Mary C, estate of. Charles H. Blodgett et ah, execu-
tors. Petition for instructions. Decree.
Wilder, Mary C, estate of. Charles M. Blodgett et al., execu-
tors. Petition for allowance of first, second, third and final
accounts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Willard Hospital, The, v. The Frances E. Willard Settlement
et ah. Petition for instructions. Disposed of.
Willard Hospital v. Frances E. Willard Settlement et aJs. Peti-
tion for instructions. Pending.
Worcester County.
Abbott, Arminda P., estate of. AVheeler Poland, executor, peti-
tioner. Petition for instructions. Disposed of.
Bogle, Eosanna, estate of. Timothy H. Murphy, petitioner.
Petition for appointment as trustee. Attorney-General
waived right to be heard.
Brooks, Sarah, estate of. Thomas H. Russell, petitioner. Peti-
tion for appointment as trustee. Pending.
DeWitt, Alexander, estate of. First Congregational Church of
Oxford, petitioner. Petition for leave to expend balance of
trust fund. Decree.
Fuller, Dana L., estate of. Louie C. Fuller, executrix. Petition
for instructions. Pending.
Grout, Eliza P., estate of. Robert L. Carter et ah., trustees.
Petition for allowance of sixth account. Account allowed.
Grout, Eliza P., estate of. Robert L. Carter et ah., trustees.
Petition for allowance of seventh account. Attorney-Gen-
eral waived right to be heard.
Merriam, Sybil A., estate of. Leominster Hospital Association,
petitioner. Petition for authority to apply the doctrine of
cy-pres. Disposed of.
Murdock Fund, Trustees of, v. American Unitarian Association
et al. Petition for instructions. Disposed of.
Pierce, Ellen M., estate of. Joseph A. Lovering, administrator.
Petition for instructions. Decree.
Southgate, Isaac, estate of. Bertha Denny et al., petitioners.
Petition for appointment of Bertha Denny and Walter E.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 157
Watson as trustees. Attorney-General waived right to be
heard.
Stockwell, George K., estate of. Charles F. Stevens et ah, exec-
utors, petitioners. Petition for authorit,y to adjust by com-
promise controversy in regard to will. Pending.
AA^iitin, John C, estate of. Edward Whitin et al., petitioners.
Petition for appointment of Arthur F. Whitin, Josiah M.
Lasell and Chester W. Lasell as co-trustees. Attorney-
General waived right to be heard.
Williams, Henrv, estate of. Eeason T. Lee et als., trustees of
the Bethel African Methodist Episcopal Church, petitioners.
Petition for instructions. Pending.
Woodward, Angeline V., estate of. Horace A. Thissell, execu-
tor. Petition for appointment of Walter P. Bowers, John
S. Scully and Wellington E. Parkhurst as trustees. Attor-
ney-General waived right to be heard.
Worcester City Missionary Society v. Attorney-General. Peti-
tion for instructions. Disposed of.
158 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
SUITS CONDUCTED BY THE ATTORNEY-GENEEAL
Ix Behalf of State Boaeds axd Commissions.
The following cases have been reported to this department by
State boards and commissions, to be conducted by the Attorney-
General, or under his direction.
1. Metropolitan Park Commission.
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land by the said
commission.
Middlesex County.
Robinson, Sumner, et cd. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
2. Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board.
Petition to the Supreme Judicial and Superior Courts for
assessment of damages alleged to have been sustained by the
taking of land, and rights and easements in land, by said board.
Middlesex County.
Braman, Caroline R., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Ward, George A., et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Norfolk County.
Goddard, George A., v. Commonwealth. Settled.
Worcester County.
Allen, Byron D., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Allen, Byron D., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Bradley, Patrick, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Cutting, Louis, administrator, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Kendall, Sanford C, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Keyes, Henry F., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Knight, Asa E., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 159
"Welch, James E., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Wood, James H., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Wood, J. Frank, et ah. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Wood, J. Frank, et ah. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
3. M,\SSACHUSETTS HIGHWAY CO]\i:\IISSIOX.
Petitions to the Superior Court for a Jury to assess damages
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land, or injury to
land, by said commission. Under agreement with this Common-
wealth most of these cases are defended by the various towns in
which the land is situated.
Barnstable County.
Phillips, Martha B., et al., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pend-
ing.
Berlhshire County.
Connelly, William H., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Eogerson, Sophia, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Stevens, John A., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Bristol County.
Cooper, Frederick P., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Seabury, Phoebe W., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Talbot, Joseph, r. Commonwealth. Dismissed.
Essex County.
Bishop, Emeline, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Donovan, John, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Perley, Osborne, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hampshire County.
Flagg, Lucretia Taft, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Taft, Kate P., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Middlesex County.
Nourse, Joseph P., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Norfolk County.
Lay cock. Berry, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
McLaughlin_, ^ancy M., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled.
160 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
4. Board of Harbor axd Laxd Commissioners.
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land by said
commissioners.
Suffolk County. ,
Butler, Philip H., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
East Boston Company v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Lamb, George, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Lamb, George, et ah v. Commonwealth. Pending.
5. Charles River Basix Commissioners.
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages
alleged to have been sustained by tlie taking of land by said
commissioners.
Suffolk County.
Apthorp, Octave L., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Barstow, Catherine A., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Brown, Rebecca W., et al. r. Commonwealth. Pending.
Cotting, Charles E., et ah, trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Edmands, Katherine B., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Fields, Annie, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hooper, James R., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Hooper, Robert C, et ah v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Inches, Louise P., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Jewell, Edward, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Xiles, Sarah F., et ah v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Parker, George W., et ah v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Pierce, Katherine C, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Prince, Fannie L., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Prince, Lillian C, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Sears, Mary C, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Sears, Richard D., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Shaw, Francis, v. Commomvealth. Pending.
Tarbell, Arthur P., et ah v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Taylor, Georgianna 0., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Taylor, Mary M., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Whitne}^, Christiana S., et ah v. Commonwealth. Pending.
AYilliams, John D., trustee, r. Commonwealth. Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 161
6. State Board of Insanity.
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land by the said
board.
Suffolk County.
Beatty, John P., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Callahan, Frank J., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Callahan, George A., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Flint, James H., et al., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Holbrook, Wellington, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Kiley, Daniel J., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
Shea, Julia A., et als., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pending.
7. Mount Everett Reservation Commission.
BerJcsMre County.
MclSTaughton, Elizabeth T., v. Commonwealth. Pending.
8. Miscellaneous Cases from Abo\t: Commissions.
Essex County.
Cilley, Orran G., v. Cattle Bureau. Petition to recover the value
of cattle condemned by Cattle Bureau. Pending.
Reed, William H., v. Commonwealth. Claim for damages on
account of injury to horse on State highway in Gloucester.
Pending.
Tremblay, Paul, v. Commonwealth. Action of tort for injuries
caused by defect in State highway in East Boston. Pending.
Middlesex County.
International Automobile and Vehicle Tire Company v. Com-
monwealth. Petition to recover damages caused by con-
struction of bridge across Charles Eiver under St. 1903,
c. 391. Pending.
Whitney, Arthur E., v. Commonwealth. Bill in equity to enjoin
the Commonwealth from filling in Abajona Eiver in AYin-
chester. Disposed of.
Suffolk County.
Davis, James A., et al. v. Commonwealth et al. Petition to re-
cover for labor and materials used in construction of sewer.
Pending.
162 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
De las Casas, William B., et al. v. Sewer Commissioners of
Revere. Petition for injunction to restrain town from
obstructing sewer built by the Park Commission for bath
house. Pending.
Doherty, James, v. Edward W. Everson et al. and Metropolitan
Water and Sewerage Board. Action of tort. Damages
caused by blasting. Pending.
Doherty, James, v. Commonwealth. Petition for assessment of
damages caused by blasting for metropolitan sewer. Pend-
ing.
Eastman, Charles Albert, v. Board of Registration in Medicine.
Bill in equity to enjoin Board from revoking certificate.
Pending.
Ellinwood, Ralph R., Commonwealth v. Petition to restrain re-
spondent from infringing park regulations on Revere boule-
vard. Pending.
Franklin County Lumber Company et al. v. Commonwealth.
Claim for money due under contract. Pending.
G. M. Byrne Company v. Commonwealth., Suit for payment of
money claimed to be due on contract. Settled.
Gibbons, William H., v. Commonwealth. Damage caused by
blasting in construction of metropolitan sewer. Pending.
H. B. Smith Company v. Commonwealth. Claim for money due
under contract for Boston State Hospital. Pending.
Jenkins, Jennie L., v. Sumner Coolidge, M.D., superintendent
of Lakeville State Hospital. Suit to enforce the provisions
of written lease. Pending.
Kinmon, John J)., v. Commonwealth. Action of tort to recover
for injuries caused by defect in State highway in Salisbury.
Pending.
Lake, Alexander G., v. Commonwealth. Action of tort to recover
for injuries caused by defect in State highway in Natick.
Pending.
McGinniss, Margaret T., Commonwealth v. Bill in equity to re-
strain defendant from encroaching on land of the Common-
wealth. Pending.
National Contracting Company et al., Commonwealth v. Action
of contract to recover on bond. Pending.
Niland, Michael, v. Commonwealth. Petition for assessment of
damages caused by blasting for metropolitan sewer. Pend-
ing.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 163
Niland, Michael, v. Edward W. Everson et al. and Metropolitan
Water and Sewerage Board. Action of tort. Damages
caused by blasting. Pending.
Normile, Francis, v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al.
Petition for a jury to assess damages caused by construction
of sewer in Eoxbury. Pending.
Normile, Francis, v. Edward W. Everson & Co. and Henry H.
Sprague et al. Action of tort. Pending.
Old Colony Construction Company, Commonwealth v. Action
of contract to recover on bond. Pending.
Pacific Surety Company v. Commonwealth et al. Petition to
recover from McBride & Co. certain sums expended by pe-
titioner. Pending. ,
Smith, Frederick W., et al. v. Commonwealth. Claim for money
due under contract for Boston State Hospital. Pending.
Thomas, Herbert L., v. Commonwealth. Claim for money
alleged to be due under contract with Massachusetts High-
way Commission. Settled.
Thomas, Lyman P., v. Commonwealth et als. Action to re-
cover for labor and materials furnished in construction of
State highway. Final decree.
Waterproof Leatherboard Company, Henry H. Sprague et als.,
Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board, v. Bill of com-
plaint to restrain respondent from discharging factory
wastes into Beaver Dam Brook. Pending.
Worcester County.
Lamb, Aroline M., v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover dam-
ages caused by change in grade of highway in Boylston.
Pending.
9. State Boards of Charity and Insanity.
Actions of contract pending in the Superior Court to recover
charges for the support of persons in State hospitals.
Suffolk County.
Chapin, Treasurer, v. Charles A. Mullin. Pending.
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Franklin Balch. Settled.
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Boston. Pending.
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Boston. Pending.
164 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Boston. Pending.
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Boston. Pending.
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Boston. Settled.
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Joseph C. Colligan. Pending.
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Bertie L. Dow. Pending.
Stevens, Treasurer, v. John Grieneeks. Pending.
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Michael Harper, guardian. Pending.
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Lowell. Pending.
Stevens, Treasurer, v. New Bedford. Pending.
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Quinc}^ Settled.
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Emma C. Russell, guardian. Pending.
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Josiah Ryder. Pending.
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Thomas J. Sexton, guardian. Pending.
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Stoneham. Settled.
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Stoughton. Settled.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 165
MISCELLANEOUS CASES.
A. C. Lawrence Leather Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
A. C. Lawrence Leather Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
A. H. Geuting Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate-
ment of franchise tax for the year 1911. Final decree.
A. H. Geuting Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate-
ment of franchise tax for the year 1913. Final decree.
Abington Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits nnder St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending.
Acnshnet Co-operative Bank. Augustus L. Thorndike, Bank
Commissioner, petitioner. Petition for leave to accept offer
of settlement made by directors. Final decree.
Ahmeek Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Ahmeek Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Aldrich, Frank E., petitioner. Petition to register title to land
in Northfield. Pending.
Algomah Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
AUain, Marguerite, administratrix of the estate of Maxime T.
Allain, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in-
heritance tax. Pending.
Allouez Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the 3'ear 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Amalgamated Nevada Mines Company v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
166 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
American Agricultural Chemical Company, The, v. Common-
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911
paid by foreign corporation. Pending.
American Axe & Tool Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
American Axe & Tool Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
American Bank Note Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
American Brass Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
American Can Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
American Can Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
American Chicle Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
American Chicle Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
American Dyewood Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
American Dyewood Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
American Glue Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate-
ment of franchise tax for the 3'ear 1911. Final decree.
American Glue Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate-
ment of franchise tax for the j^ear 1912. Final decree.
American Hide and Leather Company v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
American Investment Securities Company v. Commonwealth.
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by for-
eign corporation. Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 167
American Investment Securities Company v. Commonwealth.
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by for-
eign corporation. Pending.
American Locomotive Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
American Locomotive Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
American Pneumatic Service Company v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
American Eadiator Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re^
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
American Eadiator Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
American Seating Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
American Soda Fountain Company, Attorney-General ex rel. v.
Dumping material into tide water. Pending.
American Soda Fountain Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the 3'ear 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
American Soda Fountain Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
American Steel and Wire Company of New Jersey v. Common-
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1910
paid by foreign corporation. Pending.
American Steel and Wire Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
American Steel and Wire Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the 3^ear 1912 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
American Sugar Eefining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
American Thread Company of ]^ew Jersey v. Common—
168 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911
paid by foreign corporation. Pending.
American Woolen Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the years 1909 and 1910 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
American Woolen Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Ames Shovel and Tool Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Amoskeag Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
Amoskeag Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
Anderson, Mary J., administratrix of the estate of Elizabeth P.
Anderson, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover
inheritance tax. Pending.
Andover Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending.
Androscoggin Mills, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Androscoggin Mills, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Androscoggin Mills, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the 3^ear 1912 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Arizona Commercial Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
Arlington Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Pending.
Armstrong Cork Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the jeav 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Armstrong Cork Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 169
Ashland Emery and Corundum Company v. Commonwealth.
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by for-
eign corporation. Pending.
Athol Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree.
Atlas Tack Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Attleborough Savings Bank, iVttorney- General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend-
ing.
Baltic Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending in the United States Supreme Court on writ of
error.
Baltic j\Iining Company v. Commonwealth, Petition to recover
excise tax for the 3'ear 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Baltic Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Barre Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending.
Bates Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Bates Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Bedard, Joseph, et ah. v. Attorney-General ex rel. Petition for
use of the Attornej^-GeneraFs name in an information iij
the nature of quo warranto to compel an accounting of
funds contributed by the public for needy strikers. Use of
name allowed.
Belding Bros. & Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the 3^ear 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Belding Brothers & Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the 3^ear 1912 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Benjamin Franklin Savings Bank, Franklin, Attorney- General
V. Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c.
590, 8 56. Decree.
170 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Bent, Lauretta H., executrix of the will of Lucius P. Bent,
Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance
tax. Decree.
Berkshire County Savings Bank, Pittsfield, Attorney-General v.
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Decree.
Berry Brothers, Ltd. v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Bingham Mines Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Blake & Knowles Steam Pump Works v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
Bleiler, Frederick, v. Commissioner of Animal Industry. Claim
for damages for death of horse. Pending.
Bohemia Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Boston & Northern Street Railway Company. Claim for amount
expended in relaying water pipes in Washington Street,
Lynn, destroyed by electric currents. Pending.
Boston & Worcester Street Railway Company v. Board of Rail-
road Commissioners. Petition for modification of ruling
by Railroad Commissioners. Pending.
Boston Ice Company, petitioner. Petition to register title to
land in Wakefield. Decree.
Boston Penny Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. De-
cree.
Boston Securities Company v. Commomvealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Braintree Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree.
Breakwater Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Brennan, James M., v. Charles E. Woodbury, Superintendent.
Action of tort for personal injuries. Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 171
Bridgewater Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend-
ing.
Briggs, Benjamin P., v. Elmer A. Stevens, Treasurer and Ee-
ceiver-General. Appeal from decree of Land Court. Pend-
ing.
Brighton Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits nnder St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Pending.
Bristol County Savings Bank, Taunton, Attorney-General v.
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Pending.
Broadway Savings Bank, Lawrence, Attorney-General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Pending.
Brookline Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending.
Brookside Mills v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise
tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. Pend-
ing.
Browne, Maud F., v. Charles T. Davis et at., judges of the Land
Court et al. Petition for writ of prohibition. ■ Pending.
Browning, King & Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Br3^ne, Andrew W., et ah. v. Commonwealth et al. Petition to
recover money in hands of Commonwealth. Pending.
Buick Motor Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Burr, Arthur E., trustee, v. Commonwealth. Action to recover
money held by Commonwealth, and belonging to H. P.
Cummings Company. Settled.
Bush, Samuel D., executor of the will of Martha E. Eichmond,
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance
tax. Pending.
Butler, Mary H., administratrix of the estate of Patrick But-
ler, Attorne}^- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in-
heritance tax. Decree.
Calhoun, C. C, v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Claim for
services in connection with Spanish war claims. Settled.
172 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jane
Calumet & Hecla Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Cambridgeport Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend-
ing.
Cambridge Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Decree.
Canada, Atlantic & Plant Steamship Company Ltd. v. Common-
wealth. Petition to recover excise taxes for the years 1905,
1906, 1907, 1908 and 1909 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Cape Ann Savings Bank, Gloucester, Attorney-General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Pending.
Cape Cod Five Cents Savings Bank, Harwich, Attorney-Gen-
eral V. Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908,
c. 590, § 56. Pending.
Centennial Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York v. New York
Central & Hudson River Railroad Company et ah. Peti-
tion to intervene in differential rate cases. Pending.
Champion Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpo-
ration. Pending.
Champion Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911. Paid by foreign corpo-
ration. Pending.
Charles H. Schieren Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo-
ration. Pending.
Charlestown Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v.
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Pending.
Chase, Stephen A., et al. v. Adam H. Dickey et al. Petition to
compel conveyance of real estate. Rescript.
Chattel Loan Company, E. Gerry Brown, Supervisor of Loan
Agencies, v. Bill in equity to enjoin defendant from charg-
ing rates of interest higher than ordered by plaintiff.
Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 173
Chelsea Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Two petitions for
withdrawal of deposits nnder St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. De-
crees.
Cheney Brothers v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise
tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. Pending.
Cheney Brothers v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise
tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pending.
Chicopee Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits nnder St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree.
Childs' Dining Hall Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Childs, George C, administrator of the estate of Ann E. Newell,
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance
tax. Decree.
Citizens Savings Bank, Fall Eiver, Attorney-General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Decree.
City Five Cents Savings Bank, Haverhill, Attorney- General v.
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Pending.
City Institution for Savings, Lowell, Attorney-General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Pending.
Clinton Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits nnder St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending.
Coblents, Salenda E., executrix of the will of Arthur A.^ Aver-
ille, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheri-
tance tax. Pending.
Columbian National Life Insurance Company v. Commonwealth.
Petitions for abatement of franchise tax paid in 1903, 1904,
1905, 1906 and 1907. Pending.
Commonwealth v. Boston. Action to recover money expended
in changing grade of Bowdoin Street. Settled.
Commonwealth v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad
Company. Action of tort for damage to property of Massa-
chusetts Eeformatory, caused by fire. Pending.
Commonwealth v. Worcester. To recover for land taken from
the Commonwealth. Pending.
Consolidated Eendering Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
174 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Consolidation Coal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for year 1909 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Consolidation Coal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending..
Consolidation Coal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Continental Gin Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Continental Gin Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Copper Range Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Copper Range Consolidated Company v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
Copper Range Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Crocker Institution for Savings, Turners Falls, Attorney-Gen-
eral V. Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908,
c. 590, § 56. Decree.
Cross, Grace E. Petition for habeas corpus. Petition dismissed
by agreement.
Cudahy Packing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Currier, John E., administrator of the estate of Caroline E.
Currier, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover
inheritance tax. Pending.
Curtis Publishing Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Curtis Publishing Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid b}^ foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Danvers Savings Bank, Attornej^-General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 175
Davis Sewing Machine Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Dean, John J., et al., executors of the will of Thomas H. Buck-
ley, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheri-
tance tax. Pending.
Dedham Institution for Savings, Attorney-General v. Petition
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Pending.
Dedham Institution for Savings, Attorney- General v. Petition
for withdrawal of deposits under E. L., c. 113, § 55. Pend-
ing.
Dennis, Edwin W., et al v. Thomas P. Boyle et als., Civil
Service Commission. Petition for writ of mandamus. Pe-
tition dismissed.
Dennison Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
for abatement of franchise tax for the year 1911. Final
decree.
Dennison Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
for abatement of franchise tax for the year 1912. Final
decree.
Dewe}^, Henry S., v. State Officers. Actions to replevy copies
of notes of proceedings in the case of Dewey v. Good Gov-
ernment Association. Pending.
Dolan, Arthur W., Eegister of Probate and Insolvency for the
County of Suffolk, petitioner. Petition for authority to
pay to the Treasurer and Eeceiver-General money deposited
with said register to secure payment of fees. Pending.
Donahue, Abbie A., executrix of the will of Abbie McDonald,
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance
tax. Pending.
E. H. Eollins & Sons v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Company v. Commonwealth.
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by
foreign corporation. Pending.
E. I. du Pont de Xemours Powder Company v. Commonwealth.
Petition to recover excise tax for the 3^ear 1912 paid by
foreign corporation. Pending.
Earl & Wilson v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise tax
for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pending.
176 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
East Boston Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend-
ing.
East Butte Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign
corporation.' Pending.
East Cambridge Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Pending.
Edgerly, Frank H., et al. v. Cattle Bureau. Bill to recover for
horse killed by order of Cattle Commissioner under E. L.,
c. 90. Pending.
Edwards Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Edwards Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the 3^ear 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Eliot Five Cents Savings Bank, Boston, Attorney-General v.
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Pending.
Elm River Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid b}^ foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Ennis, John D., et al., administrators of the estate of Edmund
Walsh, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in-
heritance tax. Pending.
Everett, Willard S., executor of the will of Elizabeth Davis,
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance
tax. Pending.
Essex Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending.
F. Blumenthal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Fairbanks Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Fairhaven Institution for Savings, Attorney-General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Decree.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 177
Fall Eiver Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Pending.
Fall Eiver Gas Works Company v. Board of Gas and Electric
Light Commissioners. Petition for certiorari. Eeserved
for full court.
Fall Eiver Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § bQ. Pend-
ing.
Farr Alpaca Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
franchise tax for the year 1911 paid by domestic corpora-
tion. Final decree.
Field, John Q. A., executor of the will of Caroline Wood, Attor-
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax.
Pending.
Fields, Annie, v. Charles Eiver Basin Commission. Bill to
enjoin Commonwealth from interfering with riparian rights
on Charles Eiver. Pending.
Fifield, George W., executor of the will of Euth S. Shaw, Attor-
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax.
Pending.
Fleshman, Mary E., administratrix of the estate of Hannah D.
Harrington, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to re-
cover inheritance tax. Final decree.
Foss-Hughes Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate-
ment of franchise tax. Pending.
Fowler, Charles F., executor of the will of Eliza E. Crocker,
Attorney- General ex rel. v. -Petition to recover inheritance
tax. Pending.
Foxborough Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend-
ing.
Franklin Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the 3^ear 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Franklin Savings Bank of the City of Boston, Attorney-Gen-
eral V. Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908,
c. 590, § 56. Decree.
Franklin Savings Institution, Attornej^-General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. De-
cree.
178 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Fraternal Accident Association of America, Attorney- General
ex rel. v. Information at the relation of the Insurance
Commissioner for violation of insurance laws. Injunction
issued and George Hoague appointed receiver.
Frontenac Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Frontenac Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Galvin, Stephen P., administrator of the estate of Calvin R.
Baker, Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in-
heritance tax. Pending.
Gamewell Fire Alarm Telegraph Company v. Commonwealth.
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by for-
eign corporation. Pending.
Gardner Gas, Fuel and Light Company, Commonwealth v. Ac-
tion to recover penalty on account of sulphuretted hydro-
gen in gas. Disposed of.
General Baking Powder Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Georgia Home Insurance Company v. Commonwealth. Action
to compel Treasurer and Receiver-General to return bond
deposited with him by said company. Pending.
Globe- Wernicke Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo-
ration. Pending.
Gorton-Pew Fisheries Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo-
ration. Pending.
Grant Nail and Supply Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover franchise tax for the year 1911 paid by
domestic corporation. Final decree.
Grant, Robert, Judge of Probate, v. William W. Risk et al.
Contract on bond as public administrator. Pending.
Gratiot Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Gratiot Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 179
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
Great Barrington Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Pending.
Great Western Cereal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Greenfield Savings Bank v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
tax for 1910. Eescript.
Greenfield Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree.
Griffin Wheel Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Griffin Wheel Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
H. J. Heinz Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
H. J. Heinz Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
H. W. Johns-Manville Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Hampden Savings Bank, Springfield, Attorney- General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Decree.
Harding, Herbert L., et a'L, executors of the will of Sara L.
Crockett, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover
inheritance tax. Final decree.
Harrington, Charles C, executor of the will of Elizabeth A.
Harrington, Attornej^-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover
inheritance tax. Pending.
Haverhill Gas Light Company, Attorney-General v. Informa-
tion in equity to restrain respondent from transferring its
franchises and property. Eeserved for full court.
Haverhill Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St, 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending.
180 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Hecker-Jones-Jewell Milling Company v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
Henry E. Miller & Sons Piano Company v. Commonwealth.
Petition for abatement of franchise tax for the year 1911.
Final decree.
Henry K. Wampole & Company, Inc., v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
Herbert, John, executor of the will of Edward T. Cowdrey, At-
torney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance
tax. Pending.
Herwig, Mary. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. Dismissed.
Hickey-Riedman Company, Attorney- General ex rel. v. Bill in
equity to enjoin defendant from discharging waste into
Assabet River. Disposed of.
Holyoke Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree.
Home Savings Bank, Boston, Attorney-General v. Two peti-
tions for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Decrees.
Hopkinton Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. De-
cree.
Houghton Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Howes Brothers Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Howes Brothers Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Hudson Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree.
Hyde Park Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend-
ing.
Institution for Savings in Newburyport, Attorney-General v.
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 181
Institution for Savings in Eoxbiiry, Attorney-General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Decree.
International Automobile and Vehicle Tire Company v. Com-
monwealth. Petition for damages to petitioner's property
caused by change of east branch of Charles Eiver by Park
Commission. Pending.
Isle Eoyale Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Jackson Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise
tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corporation. Pending.
Jackson Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise
tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. Pending.
James Cunningham Son & Company v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
Jenney, E. C, executor of the will of Maria P. Stark, Attorney-
General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax.
Pending.
John L. Whiting-J. J. Adams Company v. Commonwealth.
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by
foreign corporation. Pending.
John P. Squire Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
John P. Squire & Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Kenny, Thomas J., administrator d. h. n. of the estate of Joseph
H. Horgan, Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover
inheritance tax. Pending.
Keystone \yatch Case Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the 5^ear 1911 paid by foreign corpo-
ration. Pending.
Keystone Watch Case Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo-
ration. Pending.
King Philip Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo-
ration. Pending.
182 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Lake Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Lake Milling, Smelting and Refining Company v. Common-
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911
paid by foreign corporation. Pending.
Lake Superior Smelting Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Lamont-Corliss Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Lanston Monotype Machine Company v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
LaSalle Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
LaSalle Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Lanrium Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Lawrence Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend-
ing.
Lee Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for withdrawal
of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree.
Lehigh Valley Coal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Leland, Percy P., petitioner. Petition for registration of title
to land in Ashland. Pending.
Leland, Percy P., petitioner. Petition to register title to land
in Natick. Attorney- General waived right to be heard.
Leominster Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend-
ing.
Lever Brothers Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo-
ration. Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 183
Libby, George W., administrator of the estate of Oliver Libby,
Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance
tax. Pending.
Library Bureau v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise
tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pending.
Link-Belt Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover ex-
cise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Liquid Carbonic Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo-
• ration. Pending.
Little, George T., et at., executors of the will of Eachel E.
Thayer, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover
inheritance tax. Pending.
Locomobile Company of America, The, v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
Locomobile Company of America, The, v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
Lombard, Walter E., v. Eugene N. Foss, Governor, Commander-
in-Chief of the Massachusetts Volunteer Militia. Petition
for writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to order
a court of inquiry or court martial to investigate charges
preferred against the petitioner. Petition dismissed.
Lowell Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Pending.
Lowell Institution for Savings, Attorne}^- General v. Petition
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Pending.
Lyman, Charles E., v. Commissioners on Fisheries and Game.
Petition for annulment of an order of said commissioners.
Pending before full court. Rescript.
Lynn Institution for Savings, Attorney-General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend-
ing.
Mackey, Michael H., petitioner. Petition to register title to land
in Dorchester. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Mahar, Joseph P., executor of the will of Thomas J. Rehill,
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance-
tax. Pending.
184 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Manchester, Abraham, executor of the will of Abraham E. Man-
chester, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover
inheritance tax. Pending.
Maniton Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Manitou Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Marlborough Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend-
ing.
Martin L. Hall Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate-
ment of franchise tax. Pending.
Masonic Mutual Relief Association of Central Massachusetts,
Attorney- General ex rel. v. Information at the relation of
the Insurance Commissioner for violation of insurance laws.
Injunction issued and Alfred S. Pinkerton appointed re-
ceiver.
Massachusetts Catholic Order of Foresters v. Elmer A. Stevens,
Treasurer and Receiver-General. Petition for writ of man-
damus to compel respondent to deliver securities to peti-
tioner. Pending.
Massachusetts Consolidated Mining Company, The, v. Common-
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911
paid by foreign corporation. Pending.
Mayflower Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
McCann, Charles J., et al. v. Charles AYarren et als., Civil Serv-
ice Commissioners. Petition for writ of mandamus to
compel certification of the petitioners' names by the Civil
Service Commissioners. Decree. Appeal by petitioners.
McDonald, Theodore H., Insurance Commissioner of Connecti-
cut V. The ^tna Indemnity Company. Intervening peti-
tion of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Pending.
McGuirk, Ann, executrix of the will of Terrence Farley, Attor-
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax.
Pending.
Mclntire, Charles H., trustee under the will of Maria T. Clark,
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance
tax. Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 185
Mead-Morrison Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth.
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by
foreign corporation. Pending.
Mechanics Savings Bank, Holyoke, Attorney- General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Decree.
Mechanics Savings Bank, Lowell, Attorney-General v. Petition
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Pending.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise taxes for the years 1909 and 1910
paid by foreign corporation. Pending.
Michigan Smelting Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Middleborough, town of. Commonwealth v. Action to recover
penalty on account of sulphuretted hydrogen in gas. Dis-
posed of.
Middlesex Institution for Savings, Concord, Attorney-General
V. Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c.
590, § 56. Decree.
Midvale Steel Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Milford Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree.
Moore, Helen H., executrix of the will of George H. Moore,
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance
tax. Final decree.
Moore, William H., et al., executors of the will of Edward W.
Murray, Attorne^^-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in-
heritance tax. Pending.
Morgan, Thomas, et ah, executors of the will of Martha Frank-
land, Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inher-
itance tax. Pending.
Morse, Electra A., et al. v. David Ferguson et al. Action of
tort. Pending.
Murphy, James S., administrator c. t. a. of the estate of Charles
H. Young, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover
inheritance tax. Pending.
Murphy, Mary E., executor of the will of Delia Martin, Attor-
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax.
Pending.
186. ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Murphy, Michael, v. Harrie W. Pierce, Agent of the Commis-
sioner of Animal Industry. Claim for damages for death
of horse. Pending.
IST. K. Fairbank Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo-
ration. Pending.
N. K. Fairbank Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo-
ration. Pending.
Nantucket Institution for Savings, Attorney-General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Pending.
Nashua Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
Nashua Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
Natick Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Pending.
National Calfskin Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
National Calfskin Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
National Casket Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
National Contracting Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover under R. L., c. 201. Pending.
New Bedford Five Cents Saving Bank, Attorne}^- General v.
Five petitions for withdrawal of deposits under R. L., c.
113, § 55. Pending.
New Bedford Five Cents Saving Bank, Attorney-General v.
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Pending.
New Bedford Institution for Savings, Attorney-General v. Two
petitions for withdrawal of deposits under R. L., c. 113,
§ 55. Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 187
New Bedford Institution for Savings, Attorney-General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Pending.
Newburyport Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v.
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Pending.
New England Dressed Meat and Wool Company v. Common-
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1910
paid by foreign corporation. Pending.
New England Dressed Meat and Wool Company v. Common-
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912
paid by foreign corporation. Pending.
New England Maple Syrup Company v. Henry P. Walcott
et ah. Bill in equity for an injunction. Pending.
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. Com-
monwealth. Petition for abatement of franchise tax. De-
cree.
Northampton Institution for Savings, Attorney-General v. Pe-
tition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Decree.
North Easton Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend-
ing.
North End Savings Bank, Boston, Attorne3^-General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under E. L., c. 113, § 55.
Pending.
North End Savings Bank, Boston, Attorney-General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Pending.
North Packing and Provision Company v. Commonwealth. Pe-
tition to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
North Packing and Provision Company v. Commonwealth. Pe-
tition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
Northwestern Consolidated Milling Company, The, v. Common-
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911
paid by foreign corporation. Pending.
O^Connell, Joseph P., v. Commonwealth et al. Bill to recover
money in hands of Commonwealth belonging to Austin
Engineering and Construction Company. Disposed of.
188 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
O'Donolme, Lillie B., executrix of the will of Joseph J. O'Dono-
hue, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit-
ance tax. Pending.
Ohls, Frederick W., et al., State Board of Charity v. Action to
recover on bond. Pending.
Old Colony Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Old Colony Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Oliver Typewriter Compan}^, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Oliver Typewriter Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Orange Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree.
Osceola Consolidated Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
Osman, Charles P., v. Commonwealth et al. Bill in equity to
reach and apply funds in the hands of respondents.
Decree.
Oxford Linen Mills v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover ex-
cise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Parker, Galen A., executor of the will of Martha R. Temple,
Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance
tax. Pending.
Peoples Savings Bank, Worcester, Attorney-General v. Petition
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Pending.
Pepperell Manufacturing Company, The, v. Commonwealth.
Petition to recover excise tax for the 5^ear 1910 paid by
foreign corporation. Pending.
Pepperell Manufacturing Company, The, v. Commonwealth.
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by
foreign corporation. Pending.
Pepperell Manufacturing Company, The, v. Commonwealth.
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by
foreign corporation. Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 189
Pillsbury Flour Mills Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo-
ration. Pending.
Pocahontas Fuel Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Pope Manufacturing Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
Porter, Eose M., v. Frank H. Hardison. Action of tort. Pend-
ing.
Providence Ice Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the years 1910 and 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Providence Ice Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pending.
Provident Institution for Savings, Amesbury, Attorney-General
V. Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c.
590, § 56. Pending.
Plymouth Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Pending.
Plymouth Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending.
Quaker Oats Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Quincy, city of, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover
penalty for failure to instal water meters. Dismissed.
Eandall, George W., Attorney-General v. Petition for use of
Attorney-General's name in an information in the nature
of quo warranto to test the title to oflQce of the assessors of
the town of Plympton. Use of name refused.
Eegal Shoe Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Eice & Hutchins, Incorporated, v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpo-
ration. Pending.
Eice & Hutchins, Incorporated, v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
190 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Richardson Silk Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Richardson Silk Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Ritchie, Christina, v. Treasurer and Receiver-General. Action
of contract under R. L., c. 128, § 96. Pending.
Rockland-Rockport Lime Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Royal Arcanum, Supreme Council of, v. Elmer A. Stevens,
Treasurer and Receiver-General. Petition for mandamus
to compel the Treasurer and Receiver-General to deliver
securities deposited with him. Disposed of.
Russell-Miller Milling Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpo-
ration. Pending.
S. S. "White Dental Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth.
Petition to recover excise tax for the 3'ear 1911 paid by
foreign corporation. Pending in United States Supreme
Court on writ of error.
Salem Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Pending.
Salem Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending.
Salisbury Land and Improvement Company, petitioner. Peti-
tion for registration of land in Salisbury. Pending.
Saxonville Mills, petitioner. Petition for registration of land
in Eramingham. Pending.
Seager Engine Works v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Seamen's Savings Bank, Provincetown, Attorney-General v.
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Pending.
Seashipt Oyster System v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Seneca Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCmiENT — No. 12. 191
Shannon Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Shapleigh, Samuel B., executor of the will of Ellen L. Shap-
leigh, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inher-
itance tax. Pending.
Shelburne Falls Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Decree.
Shepard & Morse Lumber Company v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
Shepardson, Edgar A., et als. v. Eailroad Commissioners. Peti-
tion for writ of certiorari. Petition discontinued as to
Eailroad Commissioners.
Simpson, Frank E., petitioner. Petition for registration of
title to land in Framingham. Attorney-General waived
right to be heard.
Skehill, Patrick J., administrator of the estate of John E. Ske-
hill, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in-
heritance tax. Pending.
Smith & Dove Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth.
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by
foreign corporation. Pending.
South Boston Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. De-
cree.
Southbridge Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend-
ing.
South Lake Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo-
ration. Pending.
Springfield Breweries Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Springfield Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Pe-
tition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Decree.
Springfield Institution for Savings, Attorney- General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Decree.
192 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
Springfield Provision Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the 3^ear 1912 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
St. Mary's Mineral Land Company v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
Stafford Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise
tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. Pending.
Stetson, Emma F., administratrix c. t. a. of the estate of Albert
Stetson, Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover
inheritance tax. Final decree.
Stone, Ann Elizabeth, Attorney-General v. Information for col-
lection of inheritance tax. Pending.
Stone, Frank Victor, Attorney-General v. Information for col-
lection of inheritance tax. Pending.
Stone, Stephen Stoddard, Attorney-General v. Information for
collection of inheritance tax. Pending.
Stoneham Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorne3^-General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Decree.
Stoughton Mills, Incorporated, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Bill
in equity to enjoin defendant from discharging waste into
Neponset River. Pending.
Strosnider, John H., petitioner. Petition for writ of habeas
corpus. Petition dismissed by agreement.
Swift & Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise
tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pending.
Submarine Signal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo-
ration. Pending.
Suffolk Savings Bank, Boston, Attorney-General v. Two peti-
tions for withdrawal of deposits under R. L., c. 113, § 55.
Pending.
Suffolk Savings Bank, Boston, Attorney-General v. Petition
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Decree.
Sullivan, Joseph M., administrator of the estate of Willis F,
Day, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in-
heritance tax. Pending.
Superior Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 193
Swift & Co. V. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise tax
for the years 1910 and 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Tamarack Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Tarbell, Arthur P., v. Boston Athletic Association et al. Bill
in equity to enjoin defendant from building a boathouse on
Charles Eiver basin. Pending.
Taunton Savings Bank^ Attorney-General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending.
Templeton Savings Bank, Attorne^^-General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pend-
ing.
Tobe}^, William H., petitioner. Petition for registration of title
to land in New Bedford. Claim on behalf of Common-
wealth withdrawn.
Trimountain Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the j^ear 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Turley, Thomas J., et al., administrators of the estate of Mary
Benson, Attorne3^-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in-
heritance tax. Pending.
Union Copper Land and Mining ComjDany v. Commonwealth.
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by
foreign corporation. Pending.
Union Institution for Savings, Boston, Attorney-General v.
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Pending.
Union Savings Bank, Fall Eiver, Attorne3^-General v. Petition
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Pending.
Union Square Methodist Episcopal Church, petitioner. Peti-
tion to register title to land in Charlestown. Pending.
United States Radiator Corporation v. Commonwealth. Peti-
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign
corporation. Pending.
United States Worsted Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
United States Worsted Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
194 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
A^alvoline Oil Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Victoria Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the j^ear 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Victoria Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the 3'ear 1912. Pending.
Vining, Floretta, executrix of the will of Elizabeth Jacobs, At-
torney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance
tax. Pending.
W. L. Donglas Shoe Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo-
ration. Pending.
Wakefield Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree.
"Walcott, Etta R., administratrix of the estate of Etta Walcott,
Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance
tax. Dismissed.
Walen, William W., administrator of the estate of Almira C.
Walen, Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in-
heritance tax. Pending.
Walpole Rubber Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Walpole Rubber Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Waltham Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending.
Waltham Watch Company v. Commonwealth. Action to recover
corporation tax for 1908. Pending.
Walton, John E., executor of the will of Delia Walton, Attor-
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax.
Pending.
Ward-Corby Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
Wareham Savings Bank, Attorne3'-General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending.
Warren Brothers Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 195
Warren Five Cents Savings Bank, Peabody, Attorney-General
V. Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908,
c. 590, § 56. Pending.
Warren Institution for Savings, Boston, Attorney- General v.
Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590,
§ 56. Pending.
Webster Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, e. 590, § 56.
Pending.
Welch, Mary Ann, executrix of the will of Thomas Welch, At-
torney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance
tax. Pending.
Welch, William J., v. John A. Campbell. Action of tort. Pend-
ing.
Welch, William J., v. Hosea M. Quimby, superintendent. Ac-
tion of tort. Pending.
Wellfleet Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending.
Welsbach Street Lighting Company of America v. Common-
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911
l^aid by foreign corporation. Pending.
Welsh, Willard, petitioner. Petition to register title to land in
Wakefield. Attorney-General waived right to be heard.
Westborough Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree.
Westfield Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with-
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree.
Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Co. v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Weymouth Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. De-
cree.
Whitaker, Elbridge J., executor of the will of Oliver Everett,
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance
tax. Pending.
Whitall-Tatum Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
White Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation.
Pending.
196 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan.
White Pine Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the 3^ear 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
White Sewing Machine Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
William L. Gilbert Clock Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
William L. Gilbert Clock Company v. Commonwealth. Petition
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
Winchendon Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. De-
cree.
Winona Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora-
tion. Pending.
Winslow Brothers & Smith Company, Attorney-General ex rel. v.
Bill in equity to restrain defendant from discharging waste
into Neponset Eiver. Pending.
Woburn Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Pending.
Worcester County Institution for Savings, Worcester, Attorney-
General V. Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St.
1908, c. 590, § 56. Pending.
Worcester Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney- General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Pending.
Worcester Mechanics Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Decree.
Worcester North Savings Institution, Fitchburg, Attorney- Gen-
eral V. Petition for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908,
c. 590, § 56. Decree.
Woronoco Savings Bank, Westfield, Attorney- General v. Peti-
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56.
Decree.
Wyandot Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re-
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo-
ration. Pending.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 197
Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company, The, v. Common-
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911
paid by foreign corporation. Pending.
York Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax assessed on foreign corporation. Pending.
York Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor-
poration. Pending.
198
ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT.
[Jan.
COLLECTIONS.
Collections have been made by this department as follows : —
Corporation taxes for the j^ear 1911, overdue and referred
by the treasm^er of the Commonwealth to the Attornej"-
General for collection, S115,426 33
Interest, 947 13
Costs, 1,914 31
Miscellaneous, 122,927 99
Total, 8241,215 76
The following table show^s a detailed statement of the Corporation
Taxes: —
Collected on
Account
of Corporation
Interest.
Totals.
Tax for 1911.
A. B. Currier Company,
$307 49
$1 28
$308 77
A. Cunningham Drug Company, .
221 88
67
222 55
A. E. Gloyd Shoe Company,
44 82
76
45 58
A. H. Geuting Company,
190 77
76
191 53
A. Himmel Companj^, .
71 72
24
71 96
A. Homer Skinner Lumber Com-
pany,
573 76
3 16
576 92
A. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc., .
214 47
4 28
218 75
A. P. Downs Company,
96 28
2 18
98 46
A. S. Campbell Company,
55 22
16
55 38
Acme Company, Inc., .
17 42
1 20
18 62
Adams Square Company,
94 13
56
94 69
Airey & Place Company,
43 03
92
43 95
Albert Dwight Smith Company, .
44 08
16
44 24
Alberty Thompson Company,
53 79
-
53 79
Alfred H. Aldrich Company,
13 39
14
13 53
Alley & Emery, Inc.,
591 69
23 66
615 35
Almy Uniform Company,
103 09
31
103 40
American Belting and Tanning
Company,
263 57
1 05
264 62
American Cloak Company, .
134 31
40
134 71
American Co-operative Associa-
tion of New England,
5 37
03
5 40
American Cork Company, Inc., .
129 09
65
129 74
1913.]
PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12.
199
Collected on
Account
of Corporation
Interest.
Tax for 1911.
$44 82
$1 70
118 33
59
5 00
09
71 66
36
51 99
18
332 96
2 33
26 89
-
152 40
3 50
71 72
2 72
484 37
4 84
208 88
60
75 30
38
20 87
-
8 99
-
20 01
10
72 61
25
64 54
32
889 32
14 82
14 34
06
107 22
2 14
118 92
1 45
28 24
15
35 86
14
896 46
5 08
59 70
2 31
48 73
20
1,173 62
5 48
244 36
7 33
62 75
35
140 84
70
291 36
1 17
46 61
14
68 85
34
132 25
53
12 55
28
94 31
72
46 61
14
161 90
78
133 57
-
658 29
2 08
Totals.
American Cultivator Publishing
Company,
American Leather Goods Com-
pany, . _.
American-Mexican Company,
American Mineral Company,
American Narrow Fabric Com
pany, . .
American Oxidaze Company,
American Paper Stock Company
American Skate Company, .
American Stable Companj^, .
American Wholesale Grocery
Company, ....
American Woman's Shop, Inc.,
Appledore Hotel Corporation,
Archer & Co., Inc.,
Aristo Company,
Aroostook Farming and Lumber
Company, ....
Atlantic Rubber Company, .
Atlas Glue and Gelatine Company
Atwood-Mitchell Company, .
Austin Company, .
Austin Ford & Son Company,
Austin Furniture Company, .
Austin- Walker Company,
Auto Renting Company,
Automatic Appliance Company,
Automatic Gaslighting Equip
ment Companj^, .
Automobile Lighting Company,
B. F. Smith Construction Com-
pany,
B. Feinberg Sons Compan^^, .
Baer Clothing Company,
Bankers' Investment Company,
Bartlett Box and Lumber Com-
pany, .....
Barton-Child Company,
Baseball Magazine Company,
Bay State Calendar Company,
Beacon Finance Company, .
Belisle Printing and Publishing
Company, ....
Belle Bryce Gemmel Company,
Belmont Spring Water Company
Bent & Bush Company,
Berkshire Manufacturing Com-
pany, Pittsfield, .
$46 52
118 92
5 09
72 02
52 17
335 29
26 89
155 90
74 44
489 21
209 48
75 68
20 87
8 99
20 11
72 86
64 86
904 14
14 40
109 36
120 37
28 39
36 00
901 54
62 01
48 93
1,179 10
251 69
63 10
141 54
292 53
46 75
69
132
19
78
12 83
95 03
46 75
162 68
133 57
660 37
200
ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT.
[Jan.
-
Collected on
Account
of Corporation
Interest.
Totals.
Tax for 1911.
Bem^ Dodge Company,
$58 11
$0 85
S58 96
Blanchard & Co., Inc., .
277 68
1 38
279 06
Bonny Brae Farms, Inc.,
76 20
38
76 58
Boston Book Company,
1,237 17
10 42
1,247 59
Boston Brass Andiron Company, .
21 51
26
21 77
Boston Brokerage Company,
21 51
-
21 51
Boston Building Wrecking Com-
pany,
7 79
04
7 83
Boston Cycle and Sundry Com-
pany,
679 63
5 33
684 96
Boston Hay and Grain Com-
pany,
69 06
-
69 06
Boston Holding Company, .
80 00
40
80 40
Boston Ice Cream Company,
130 88
59
131 47
Boston Lighter Company,
134 65
67
135 32
Boston Mirror Company,
179 73
63
180 36
Boston Self-Locking Block Com-
pany,
21 51
67
21 58
Bow Ridge Development Com-
pany,
16 49
08
16 57
Brewer-Macauley Company,
5 37
-
5 37
Brighton Dressed Meat Company,
46 58
23
46 81
Brockton Die Company,
98 47
49
98 96
Brown-Binnian Company,
80 68
40
81 08
Brown Garage and Carriage
Company,
143 44
57
144 01
Bruce-Hibbard Electric Company,
407 90
2 04
409 94
Builders' Iron and Steel Com-
pany,
75 30
32
75 62
BuUard Company, ....
82 98
41
83 39
Bunkio Matsuki Corporation,
41 41
21
41 62
Burkinshaw Knife Company,
42 94
~
42 94
Burleigh & Martin, Inc.,
51 63
18
51 81
Burtworth Carpet Company,
130 92
-
130 92
Butman & Cressey Company,
301 22
1 51
302 73
CD. Wright Company,
89 65
1 26
90 91
C. E. Dustin Company,
72 58
29
72 87
C. G. Aldrich Company,
25 10
23
25 33
C. I. Nesmith Company,
37 65
19
37 84
C. J. Roadstrand Company,
177 05
59
177 64
C. P. Lovering Company,
62 75
25
63 00
C. W. Luce & Co., Inc.,
522 62
5 48
528 10
C. W. Stone Company, .
89 65
55
90 20
Cameron Car Company,
859 94
-
859 94
Campbell Company,
11 79
09
11 88
Canton Ice Company, .
78 89
40
79 29
Central Automobile Station
Company,
282 39
3 77
286 16
Central Cloak Company,
96 82
50
97 32
Central Drj^-Goods Company,
50 51
25
50 76
1913.:
PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12.
201
Collected on
Account
of Corporation
Tax for 1911.
Interest.
Totals.
Central Ice Manufacturing Com-
pany,
Centre Street Garage, Inc.,
Chapel IVIills Manufacturing Com
pany,
Charles D. Brown & Co., Inc.,
Charles H. Morey Company,
Charles S. Gove Company, .
Charles W. Blake Company, .
Charles West Lumber Company,
Chattel Loan Company,
Chenej^ & Thomson Company,
Citizens' Loan Association, .
Clapp-Eastham Company, .
Clinton Fruit Company,
Coates Clipper Manufacturing
Company, ....
Cobb & White Company,
Cochrane Manufacturing Com^
pany,
Cohen & Priest Company, .
Colhns Hardware Company,
Colonial Bed Company,
Colonial Interstate Express Com
pany,_
Columbia Comb Company, .
Columbia Securities Company,
Columbian Furniture Company,
Commercial Fibre Company,
Common Sense Gum Company,
Commonwealth Hospital,
Conduit and Cable Manufacturing
Company, ....
Connecticut Valley Street Railway
Company, ....
Consolidated Produce Company,
Consumers' Co-operative Com-
pany,
Coulter Coal and Lumber Com-
pany,
Creditors Adjustment Bureau
Inc.,
Crocker Drug Company,
Cross Street Shoe Store, Inc.,
Crown Novelty Company, .
Crown Packing Company, .
Culver-Steams Manufacturing
Company, ....
Cumings Theatre, Inc., .
Cummings Fish Company, .
$7 17
89 65
464 38
711 01
9 45
161 37
53 79
86 06
1,344 75
103 99
22 25
67 70
47 22
161 37
38 01
2,252 27
57 37
2,420 55
121 92
17 93
181 09
261 95
39 28
119 66
110 17
280 64
519 97
1,585 53
37 90
9 01
121 02
26 89
26 89
46 68
15 00
89 65
44 82
268 95
21 51
$0 03
2 13
2 09
3 79
05
81
27
40
11 43
52
11
23
18
2 09
19
7 88
58
35 52
61
48
6 00
42
5 14
3 97
4 20
1 56
4 75
51
21
21
14
21
19
45
18
42
S7 20
91 78
466 47
714 80
9 50
162 18
54 06
86 46
1,356 18
104 51
22 36
67 93
47 40
163 46
38 20
2,260 15
57 95
2,456 07
122 53
17 93
181 57
267 95
39 70
124 80
114 14
284 84
521 53
1,590 28
38 41
9 22
121 02
27 10
27 03
46 89
15 19
90 10
45 00
270 37
21 51
202
ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT.
[Jan.
Collected on
Account
of Corporation
Tax for 1911.
Interest.
Totals.
Cummings Machine Works, .
Curtis & Cameron, Inc.,
Curtis Drug Company, .
Cushing Medical Supply Com
pany,
D. Caro & Co., Inc.,
Dadmun Company,
Daley & Wanzer Allerton Express
Company, ....
Dalton-Ingersoll Manufacturing
Company, ....
D'Arcy & Sons Company,
Daudelin & Cotton, Inc.,
Davies Rose & Co., Ltd.,
Desmond-Hayden Shoe Com
pany,
Dill Cattle Companj'',
Dr. Hallock Drug Company,
Dodge Furniture Companj'-, .
Driscoll & Co., Inc.,
Dukelow & Walker Company,
Dunlap Cooke Company, Ltd.,
Dustbane Manufacturing Com
panv,
Dyke Mill, ....
E. C. Howard Company,
E. G. Tutein & Co., Inc., .
E. L. LeBaron Foundry Com-
pany, ^
E. L. Smith Company, .
E. R. Brown Beer Pump Com-
pany,
East Douglas Clothing Com-
of
pany,
Eastern Discount Company,
Eastern Electric Company
New Bedford,
Eastern Furniture Company,
Eastern Handle Company, .
Easthampton Elastic Web Com
pany,
Eaton Candy Company,
Eco Manufacturing Company,
Economy Drug Company, .
Edward Holden Company, .
Edward T. Harrington Company,
Eldridge Poultry Farm, Inc.,
Electric Maintenance Company,
Electric Weld Company,
Elk River Milling Company,
$194 77
80 68
14 34
161 37
7 17
129 09
177 23
869 96
1,079 49
22 86
179 30
58 81
100 00
43 03
357 70
71 72
43 03
367 56
383 70
12 28
215 16
146 30
39
80
2 59
90
4 05
2 51
1 35
40
22
1 07
21
20
1 47
8 44
06
64
73
32 48
19
107 58
3 98
45 75
1 13
18 82
_
8 49
06
71 72
1 25
13 71
-
47 96
67
166 74
—
32 27
32
42 94
19
43 03
13
125 22
2 88
132 37
66
162 23
81
15 95
-
113 51
28
34 65
—
$195 65
81 07
14 34
162 17
7 17
131 68
178 13
874 01
1,082 00
22 86
179 30
60 16
100 40
43 25
358 77
71 93
43 23
369 03
392 14
12 34
215 80
147 03
32 67
111 56
46 88
18 82
8 55
72 97
13 71
48 63
166 74
32 59
43 13
43 16
128 10
133 03
163 04
15 95
113 79
34 65
1913.1
PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12.
203
Collected on
Account
of Corporation
Interest.
Totals.
Tax for 1911.
Ellsworth Manufacturing Com-
pany,
$45 18
-
$45 18
Empire Woolen Company, .
66 69
$0 30
66 99
Essex Engraving Company, .
43 51
22
43 73
Everson Manufacturing Com-
pany,
228 28
1 18
229 46
Ewell-Cooper Company,
21 51
10
21 61
F. D. C. Manufacturing Com-
pany, Inc.,
35 86
-
35 86
F. H. Putnam Company,
89 65
45
90 10
F. L. Horton Manufacturing
Company,
117 31
58
117 89
F. R. Parker Company,
118 33
39
118 72
F. S. McDermott Company,
89 65
1 79
91 44
F. T. Morecombe White Com-
pany,
74 40
37
74 77
F. W. Flosdorf Company,
110 26
55
110 81
Fabrizio & Wingate Company,
17 93
07.
18 00
Fall River Granite Company,
20 11
30
20 41
Famous Ladies' Tailoring Com-
pany,
11 29
06
11 35
Felton-Turner Heating Company,
193 50
96
194 46
Finestone-Hahn Company, .
10 43
63
11 06
Fink Cigar Company, . . .
44 82
23
45 05
Finnish Socialistic Publishing
Company,
171 98
2 63
174 61
Fisher Bros. Companj^, .
144 33
72
145 05
Fisher Chrome Tanning Com-
pany,
50 00
25
50 25
Fiske Shoe and Leather Company,
373 84
1 87
375 71
Fitchburg Real Estate and Loan
Company,
90 18
1 34
91 52
Foan Brothers Company,
64 54
20
64 74
Framingham Commission House,
Inc.,
71 46
2 14
73 60
Frank A. Andrews Company,
201 24
8 84
210 08
Frank L. Perkins Company,
35 86
09
35 95
Frank P. Bennett & Co., Inc., .
125 51
50
126 01
Frank P. Brown Company, .
34 42
18
34 60
Franklin Clothing Company,
89 65
45
90 10
Franklin Mills Corporation, .
165 85
41
166 26
Fred A. Loud Companj^,
89 65
3 59
93 24
Fred F. Squire Company,
170 94
31
171 25
Fred S. and A. D. Gore Cor-
poration,
89 65
3 40
93 05
Fuller-Greene Company,
277 91
1 25
279 16
G. B. Lawrence Company, .
56 47
28
56 75
G. H. PoUey Company,
5 37
-
5 37
G. M. Hyams Company,
28 68
65
29 33
G. W. Peterson Company, .
8 96
12
9 08
204
ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT.
[Jan.
Collected on
Account
of Corporation
Interest.
Totals.
Tax for 1911.
Galassi Mosaic and Tile Com-
pany,
$51 96
$0 15
$52 11
Garnett Leather Company, .
92 73
46
93 19
Geddis Remedy Company, .
18 48
10
18 58
General Motor Company, . • .
5 37
-
5 37
General Sales Company,
35 66
18
35 84
Geo. A. Turner Company, .
53 79
27
54 06
Geo. B. Perkins Companj'-, .
8 60
-
8 60
Geo. C. Melville Company, .
268 95
81
269 76
Geo. C. Moore Wool Scouring
Mills,
206 19
1 03
207 22
Geo. D. Emerson Company,
717 20
2 15
719 35
Geo. F. Vester Company,
48 41
72
49 13
Geo. J. Kelly Company,
466 18
2 10
468 28
Geo. P. Bingham Company, .
89 65
41
90 06
Gilchrist Drug Company,
25 41
-
25 41
Globe Amusement Company,
129 09
1 64
130 73
Globe Clothing Company,
112 24
76
113 00
Gloucester Hospital, Inc.,
123 62
62
124 24
Golden Grain Farming Company,
22 40
12
22 52
Goldman Brothers Company,
62 75
86
63 61
Goodwin Company,
16 24
24
16 48
Gordon & Sparrow Company,
197 23
59
197 82
Coward's Market Company,
44 82
13
44 95
Graham Company,
67 23
33
67 56
Grand Amusement Company of
Holyoke, Mass., ....
89 65
-
89 65
Grand Shoe Company, .
48 41
2 08
50 49
Grandfield's Pharmacy, Inc.,
107 58
54
108 12
Grant Nail and Supply Company,
860 64
4 73
865 37
Grastorf Turner Company, .
7 53
-
7 53
Greenfield Recorder Company, .
22 41
12
22 53
Griffin Amusement Companj^,
35 86
18
36 04
Grimwood Tailoring Company, .
9 00
12
9 12
Grout Automobile Company,
716 30
3 25
719 55
Grueby Pottery Company, .
18 43
33
18 76
Guilford Kendrick & Ladd Com-
pany,
315 56
1 16
316 72
H. A. Johnson Company,
3,233 44
16 17
3,249 61
H. A. Rich Company, .
222 42
1 11
223 53
H. C. Girard Company,
150 61
75
151 36
H. D. Hall Company, .
26 89
13
27 02
H. M. Downs Printing Company,
17 48
10
17 58
H. M. Kinports Company, .
114 75
4 59
119 34
Halford Company, ....
26 89
11
27 00
Hailstone Electric Company,
69 92
35
70 27
Hampden Creamery Company, .
114 75
45
115 20
Hampden Shoe Company,
268 95
1 34
270 29
Harding Uniform and Regalia
Company,
258 19
10 33
268 52
1913.1
PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12.
205
Collected on
Account
of Corporation
Interest.
Totals.
Tax for 1911.
Harris & Lawcon, Inc., .
$896 50
$17 90
$914 40
Harry L. Cohen Company, .
89 11
-
89 11
Harvard Automobile Company, .
228 30
1 14
229 44
Haverhill Baseball and Athletic
Association,
8 60
-
8 60
Haverhill Motor Mart Inc., .
17 93
23
18 16
Healey Sewer Machine and Con-
struction Company, .
77 90
1 87
79 77
Heintzemann Press,
80 68
26
80 94
Henry F. Farrow Company, .
89 65
45
90 10
Henry F. Miller & Sons Piano
Company,
2,304 25
22 27
2,326 52
Henry H. Tuttle Companj^ .
470 66
1 88
472 54
Hertig Furnace Company, .
49 48
25
49 73
Hetherstone Importing Companj^,
425 83
1 99
427 82
Highland Drug and Chemical
Corporation, ....
14 34
15
14 49
Hillcrest Water Company, .
89 65
1 85
91 50
Hilton & Sons Express Company, .
76 02
-
76 02
Hinds' Hand Laundry Company,.
43 03
21
43 24
Hitchcock Supply Company,
596 38
2 25
598 63
Hodges Garage Company,
81 40
40
81 80
Hodgson, Kennard & Co., Inc., .
1,074 00
10 02
1,084 02
Hoffecker Company,
86 06
26
86 32
Holyoke Supply Company, .
233 09
70
233 79
Hooper Printing Company, .
100 40
50
100 90
Horace K. Turner Corporation, .
784 79
13 07
797 86
Hoyt Company, ....
403 42
2 00
405 42
Hub Mattress Company,
12 55
-
12 55
Hudson Hose Mender Company, .
88 53
26
88 79
Hudson Lithuanian Corporation, .
16 31
32
16 63
Huntt's Lunch Companj^,
448 25
1 76
450 01
Hutchins Organ Company, .
239 83
80
240 63
Ideal Dental Laboratory, Inc.,
26 89
15
27 04
Ima-Fibre Company,
22 14
11
22 25
Import and Export Associates,
32 27
51
32 78
Indian Mica Company, .
29 85
14
29 99
Inter-National Grocer^'- Company,
154 64
3 54
158 18
Inter-State Lumber Company,
242 05
1 21
243 26
Interstate Oil Company,
18 82
37
19 19
Inter-trust Security Company,
89 65
1 00
90 65
Investors Corporation Company, .
5 00
03
5 03
Isaac H. Dinner Company, .
35 86
18
36 04
Italian-American Corporation,
31 37
1 38
32 75
Italian Co-operative Market of
Lynn, Inc.,
26 89
14
27 03
Italian Importing Company, Inc.,
40 34
11
40 45
J. A. Keating Company,
197 23
2 63
199 86
J. B. Judldns Company,
836 12
2 09
838 21
J. D. Packard & Sons Company, .
161 37
64
162 01
206
ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT.
[Jan.
Collected on
Account
of Corporation
Tax for 1911.
Interest.
Totals
J. D. Putnam Sons Company,
J. E. Paris Company,
J. F. Williams Company,
J. G. Walker & Sons Corporation
J. H. Chandler Company,
J. H. Folkins Company,
J. K. Taylor Manufacturing Com
Pany,
J. L. Legein Ice Cream Company,
J. Xardi Company,
Jamaica Plain Auto Station, Inc
James B. Wood & Son Company,
James Barrett Manufacturing
Company, ....
James Donovan Slipper Com-
pany,
James Sunderland & Son Com-
pany,
Jeremiah Clark Machinery Com
pany,
Joe Cotter, Inc.,
John Cavanagh & Son Building
Moving Company,
John F. Ryan Company,
John J. Cluin Compaii}^,
Johnson Palm Leaf Goods Com
pany,
Joss Brothers Company,
Kaleva Co-operative Association,
Katzes &; Phelan Amusement
Company, ....
Keniston Engineering Company,
Kenney Brothers Company, .
King Mining Company,
Kinne}^ Heating and Supply
Company, ....
Kinsley Iron and Machine Com
pany,
Kleno Manufacturing Company,
Knox Automobile Company,
L. Diamond Company, .
L. W. Bigelow's Son Furniture
Company,
Lamere & Robinson Company,
Lang & Jacobs Company,
Langham Pharmacy,
Lawrence B. Smith Company,
La^^^:•ence Baseball Association,
LawTence Beverage Company,
Lawrence Dye Works Company,
$59 61
167 84
13 44
238 02
28 83
191 85
188 26
79 50
71 00
16 13
206 19
519 97
69 92
250 12
196 33
139 85
201 71
172 57
44 82
12 37
53 79
45 32
5 37
89 65
159 75
85 00
35 53
62 75
17 93
1,563 40
94 67
143 44
64 54
89 65
32 27
304 36
134 47
45 54
3,106 42
$0 84
18
1 19
4 53
56
40
1 63
20
1 90
15
1 50
7 84
41
3 63
23
07
86
17
07
45
48
2 98
16
13
11
8 86
47
57
1 10
40
15
1 52
3 33
22
15 53
$59 61
168 68
13 62
239 21
28 83
196 38
188 82
79 90
72 63
16 33
206 19
521 87
70 07
251 62
204 17
140 26
205 34
172 57
45 05
12 44
54 65
45 49
5 44
90 10
160 23
87 98
35 69
62 88
18 04
1,572 26
95 14
144 01
65 64
90 05
32 42
305 88
137 80
45 76
3,121 95
1913.]
PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12.
20:
Collected on
Account
of Corporation
Interest.
Totals.
Tax for 1912.
Leader, Inc.,
$66 34
$0 34
$66 68
Leavitt's Scotch Polish Company,
23 57
11
23 68
Leighton Roofing Company,
15 06
-
15 06
Leominster Novelty Company, .
93 23
1 40
94 63
Lewis F. Small, Inc.,
17 93
-
17 93
Liberty Lumber Company, .
306 87
1 53
308 40
LinscoU Motor Company,
292 25
1 61
293 86
Lithuanian Workers' Corporation,
14 30
-
14 30
London Harness Company, .
806 85
8 20
815 05
London Raincoat Company, .
80 68
35
81 03
Lord Publishing Company, .
91 44
2 19
93 63
Lovell's, Inc.,
71 72
19
71 91
Lucy Mill and Lumber Company,
11 97
05
12 02
Lunt Moss Company,
680 89
2 38
683 27
Lj^nch Company, ....
107 58
54
108 12
Lynch Heel Company, .
26 89
14
27 03
Lynn Public Market Company, .
61 67
31
61 98
Lynn Shoe Manufacturers' Asso-
ciation, Inc., ....
10 75
-
10 75
Lynn Storage Company,
170 33
3 00
173 33
Lyric Amusement Company,
156 97
66
157 63
M. Daly Company,
8 06
04
8 10
M. J. Silva Company, .
86 06
4 04
90 10
M. Marks Company,
53 79
16
53 95
MacDonald Ice Cream Company,
23 30
12
23 42
Macker-Tjder Company,
28 68
11
28 79
Magee Furnace Company, .
4,031 20
22 18
4,053 38
Maine State Creamery Company,
17 93
13
18 06
Majestic Company,
161 37
82
162 19
Maiden Grain Companj^,
111 16
56
111 72
Manhattan Company, .
35 86
82
36 68
Mansfield Cracker Company,
175 94
53
176 47
Mansfield Printing Company,
22 07
53
22 60
Manufacturers Shoe Trimming
Company,
52 00
30
52 30
Marshall-Hackel Company, .
15 72
23
15 95
Massachusetts 'Apple Orchard
Company,
5 20
03
5 23
Massachusetts Experimental and
Construction Company, .
25 31
11
25 42
Massachusetts Fuel Saving
Radiator Company, .
29 10
14
29 24
Massachusetts Piano Manufac-
^turing Companj^
91 47
46
91 93
Massachusetts Shoe Company,
129 09
65
129 74
Massasoit Company,
287 54
2 06
289 60
Matthew F. Sheehan Company, .
358 60
1 32
359 92
Maurice J. Borofsky Company, .
26 89
_
26 89
Mayflower Laundry Company, .
161 37
2 74
164 11
Maynard & Co., Inc., .
1,075 80
5 38
1,081 18
208
ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT.
[Jan.
Collected on
Account
of Corporation
Interest.
Totals.
Tax for 1911.
McLean-Jones Oil and Supply
Companj^,
$53 79
$0 27
S54 06
Mellish & Byfield Manufacturing
Company,
69 92
35
70 27
Merchants and Manufacturers
Credit Company,
1,332 19
5 99
1,338 18
Merrow Machine Company,
121 56
24
121 80
Messenger Printing and Pub-
lishing Company,
39 64
20
39 84
Metropolitan Lithograph and
Publishing Company,
251 02
8 11
259 13
Mica Varnish and Insulation
Company,
79 25
1 58
80 83
Milford Rubber Cement Com-
pany,
8 96
08
9 04
Miller Brothers, Inc.,
206 19
2 06
208 25
Mitchell Press, ....
11 11
29
11 40
Monarch Valve and Manufactur-
ing Company, ....
822 09
4 11
826 20
Moon Motor Companj^ of Boston,
268 95
1 79
270 74
Morse-Gemmell Company, .
17 96
23
18 19
Murphy Boot and Shoe Company,
304 55
2 74
307 29
Mutual Coal Company of
Fitchburg, Mass.,
31 87
49
32 36
National Envelope Seahng and
Stamping Machine Company, .
60 00
1 35
61 35
National Envelope Sealing and
Stamping Manufacturing Com-
pany,
214 03
5 18
219 21
National Matzo Company of
Boston,
53 34
2 13
55 47
National Textile Exposition, Inc.,
17 93
35
18 28
Navin & Kelly Companj^,
319 63
96
320 59
New Bedford Auto Company,
80 68
32
81 00
New Bedford Clothing and
Jewelry Company,
35 86
16
36 02
New Can Company,
233 09
8 33
236 42
New England Candle Company, .
14 52
08
14 60
New England Cloak and Suit
Company,
155 99
36
156 35
New England Directory Com-
pany,
15 07
23
15 30
New England Discount Company,
261 58
1 64
263 22
New England Gum Company,
26 89
11
27 00
New England Office Furniture
Company,
156 20
6 09
162 29
New England Reed Company,
569 45
2 28
571 73
New York Mattress Company, .
107 58
35
107 93
Norris F. Comley Conservatories, .
64 54
32
64 88
North Main JNIarket Company, .
71 72
36
72 06
1913.
PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12.
209
Collected on '
Account
of Corporation
Tax for 1911.
Totals.
Northampton Company,
Northampton Emery Wheel
Company, ....
Office Specialties de Luxe, Inc.
Office Specialty Company, .
Old South Lunch, Inc., .
Olympic Theatre Company, .
Oscar T. Gove Company, Inc.,
Oxidite ]\Ianufacturing Company
P. B. Sanford Company,
P. H. Prior Company, .
P. P. Emery Manufacturing Com-
pany, ^ . . . .
P. R. Glass Company, .
Parker & Page Company,
Patrons Co-operative Association,
Paye & Baker Manufacturing
Companj", ....
Payson Alitchell Company, .
Pean Medical Company,
Peoples Co-operative Grocery
Company, ....
Peoples Drug Store Company,
Peoples' Furniture Company,
Peoples' Trading Company, .
Perkins & Co., Inc.,
Phelps & Bradley Company,
Phoenix Securities Company,
Pickard Bros. jMotor Car Com
pany,
Pierce & Barnes Company, .
Pierson Pharmacy Company,
Pike Tobacco Company,
Pittsfield Baseball and Athletic
Association, Inc.,
Plunger Elevator Company, .
Plymouth Manufacturing Com-
psiny, The,
PljTuouth Rock Candy Company,
Plympton Manufacturing Com-
pany,
Polar Mining and Dredging Com-
pany,
Post Office Pharmacy, Inc., .
Prince ^ledicine Company, .
Prudential Sales Company, .
Purd}^ Shoe Company, .
Purity Confectionery Companj^
Queensbury Mills, .
Quincy Adams Quarry Company,
::.
_
$490 85
$2 29
94 07
39
19 90
10
53 79
1 23
44 82
22
134 47
67
24 22
14
30 48
15
250 64
90
139 02
_
123 68
7 91
1,443 36
7 22
38 87
19
621 72
2 69
107 58
54
26 89
-
30 66
60
24 20
12
107 58
62
26 89
46
248 43
7 34
448 25
2 24
6 45
18
1,065 93
_
17 93
09
143 44
72
36 57
50
42 67
85
89 29
60
86 97
44
71 72
2 86
199 90
90
300 00
3 14
53 79
54
44 82
18
60 45
1 20
53 79
-
46 61
1 07
2,833 58
42 50
43 03
17
$493 14
94 46
20 00
55 02
45 04
135 14
24 36
30 63
251 54
139 02
131 59
1,450 58
39 06
624 41
108 12
26 89
31 26
. 24 32
108 20
27 35
255 77
450 49
6 63
1,065 93
18 02
144 16
37 07
43 52
89 89
87 41
74 58
200 80
303 14
54 33
45 00
61 65
53 79
47 68
2,876 08
43 20
210
ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT.
[Jan.
- -...-..
Collected on
Account
of Corporation
Interest.
Totals.
Tax for 1911.
R. L. Cleveland Company, .
$448 25
$2 24
$450 49
R. M. Buckman & Co., Inc.,
23 57
54
24 11
Ralph F. Russell Company, .
87 08
1 21
88 29
Regal Laundry Company,
53 79
26
54 05
Remington Manufacturing Com-
pany,
8 06
14
8 20
Remington Tool and Machine
Company,
110 09
55
110 64
Revere Cloak and Suit Company,
46 61
23
46 84
Ricker Paint Company,
89 65
41
90 06
Riverside Japannery, Inc., .
241 01
1 32
242 33
Riverside Waist Companj^, .
35 86
18
36 04
Robert R. McNutt, Inc.,
67 23
3 56
70 79
Robinson-Brockway Manufactur-
ing Company, ....
130 88
39
131 27
Rosengard Furniture Company, .
129 09
33
129 42
Ross Brothers Company,
1,344 75
4 03
1,348 78
Royal Fibre Companj^, .
43 92
16
44 08
Royal Shoe Company, .
116 90
59
117 49
Ruff Bros. Company, .
170 65
2 38
173 03
Russ, Eveleth & Ingalls Com-
pany,
340 38
12 93
353 31
S. Lebow Company,
53 79
96
54 75
S. M. Howes Company,
1,846 79
9 23
1,856 02
S. W. Loomis Company,
347 37
1 73
349 10
Safety Gas Lighter Company,
38 72
18
38 90
Sagamore Engine Company,
Inc.,
101 30
2 55
103 85
St. Clairs', Inc., ....
301 65
1 35
303 00
Salem Press Company, .
62 75
24
62 99
Saskatchewan Investment Com-
pany,
52 40
16
52 56
Saunders Sales Company,
39 28
20
39 48
Scandinavian Co-operative Gro-
cery Union,
61 42
32
61 74
Seaside Foundry, Inc., .
6 27
-
6 27
Sectional Rubber Tire Company, .
105 85
32
106 17
Seth W. Fuller Company,
116 16
2 09
118 25
Shadduck & Normandin Com-
pany,
96 82
32
97 14
Sheedy Amusement Company,
22 50
33
22 83
Shultz-Goodwin Company, .
842 71
6 70
849 41
Silas Peirce& Co., Ltd.,
2,110 25
10 55
2,120 80
Small, Maynard & Co., Inc.,
1,075 80
3 59
1,079 39
Somerset Coal Company,
53 79
54
54 33
Somerville Lumber Company,
10 00
20
10 20
Soule Art Publishing Company, .
164 95
74
165 69
Southgate Machinerj^ Company, .
54 65
27
54 92
Southgate Press — T. W. Ripley
Companj^,
609 62
3 05
612 67
1913.
PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12.
211
Collected on
Account
of Corporation
Interest.
Totals.
Tax for 1911.
Spatula Publishing Company,
$39 44
$0 20
$39 64
Springfield Brazing Company,
5 37
03
5 40
Springfield Fruit and Produce
Company,
5 57
-
5 57
Springfield Specialty Company, .
22 71
-
22 71
Spurr Veneer Company,
165 85
86
166 71
Standard Jewelr}^ Company,
140 75
85
141 60
Standard Specialty Sales Com-
pany,
10 54
45
10 99
Standard Stoneware Company, .
23 12
12
23 24
State Electrical Manufacturing
Company,
18 28
32
18 60
Sterling Manufacturing Company,
10 54
05
10 59
Story Simmons Company,
47 69
23
47 92
Symonds & Poor Carbonator
Company,
501 57
26 09
527 66
T. H. O'Donnell & Co., Inc.,
161 37
3 22
164 59
T. W. O'Connor Company, .
48 41
-
48 41
Tarbett Machine Company, .
18 82
-
18 82
Tarr Marine Paint Company,
20 00
-
20 00
Taunton Evening News,
161 37
81
162 18
Taxi Motor Cab Company of
Boston,
475 14
2 38
477 52
Telepost Company of Massa-
chusetts,
17 93
-
17 93
Thayer Woolen Company, .
268 05
1 07
269 12
Therapeutic Publishing Company,
22 05
66
22 71
Thomas D. Gard Company, Inc., .
65 08
42
65 50
Thomas J. Shea Company, .
7 17
23
7 40
Tichnor Brothers, Inc., .
117 88
4 36
122 24
Tolland Company, ....
91 76
46
92 22
Trombly Jewelry Company, .
244 58
3 34
247 92
Tudor Press, Inc., ....
204 18
4 90
209 08
Union Commercial Paper Com-
pany, . . .
121 40
78
122 18
Union Curled Hair Company,
27 97
42
28 39
Union Furniture Company, .
140 33
70
141 03
Union Manufacturing and Drop
Forge Company,
133 72
2 09
135 81
Union Parlor Furniture Com-
pany,
44 82
16
44 98
Union Skewer Company,
8 96
14
9 10
United Cloak and Suit House
Company,
13 44
-
13 44
United Hospitals Drug Company,
(Inc.),
24 95
-
24 95
United States Column Company,
926 33
18 52
944 65
University Paper Box Company, .
215 16
1 44
216 60
V. A. Zorbas Confectionery Com-
pany, Inc.,
35 86
1 57
37 43
212
ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT.
[Jan.
Collected on
Account
of Corporation
Interest.
Totals.
Tax for 1911.
VacuiiTTi Glass Company,
$107 58
$0 43
$108 01
W. A. Buxton Machinery Com-
pany,
253 06
76
253 82
W. A. Norton Company,
35 86
18
36 04
W. B. Norris Corporation, .
13 48
-
13 48
W. F. Godber Company,
71 54
1 43
72 97
W. K. Farrington Press,
91 44
2 19
93 63
W. M. McDonald Company,
241 00
96
241 96
W. N. Roberts Company,
8 30
04
8 34
W. 0. Simmons Company, .
69 03
35
69 38
W. P. Goode Brush Company,
91 98
2 11
94 09
W. Pence Mitchell Hat Company,
15 24
06
15 30
W. T. Cardy & Sons Company, .
233 09
7 32
240 41
Wachtel-Pickert Company, .
151 54
53
152 07
Wadleigh Company,
118 55
59
119 14
Walbuck Crayon Company, .
37 65
19
37 84
Waldron Shoe Company,
334 84
2 23
337 07
Walker Bros. Dyeing and Bleach-
ing Company, . . ' .
26 89
14
27 03
Warren Garage Companj^, .
24 74
-
24 74
Warren Manufacturing Company,
33 33
1 07
34 40
Washburn Trucking Company, .
32 27
32
32 59
Waverly Liquor Company, .
53 79
1 00
54 79
Wellmade Can Company,
39 44
40
39 84
Whitcomb Jewelry Company,
15 27
-
15 27
White Store Corporation, Haver-
hill,
26 89
-
26 89
White Store (Inc.), .
87 58
26
87 84
Whiting Manufacturing Company,
Whittier Woodenware Company, .
141 64
537 90
71
2 69
142 35
540 59
Whittredge Bag Company, Inc., .
23 30
10
23 40
Wilbert E. Welch Company,
29 40
15
29 55
William Allen Sons' Company,
294 05
1 47
295 52
William Bourne & Son Piano
Company,
53 79
. 27
54 06
William L. Browne Electric
Company,
111 52
56
112 08
Wire-Bound Packing Case Com-
pany of Massachusetts,
153 30
77
154 07
Woman's Shop, Inc.,
349 63
1 04
350 67
Woodward-Reopell Company,
96 82
1 51
98 33
Worcester Horse Sale Company, .
5 00
30
5 30
Worcester Lithographing Com-
pany,
172 12
86
172 98
Woronoco Heating and Plumbing
Company,
89 65
1 80
91 45
Yo Yo Beverage Company, .
71 72
36
72 08
$115,426 33
$947 13
$116,373 46
1913.
PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12.
213
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PUBLIC DOCUIMENT — No. 12.
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220 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. ' [Jan.
EULES OF PKACTICE
In Interstate Rendition.
Every application to the Governor for a requisition upon the
executive authority of any other State or Territory, for the de-
livery up and return of any offender who has fled from the
justice of this Commonwealth, must be made by the district or
prosecuting attorney for the county or district in which the
offence was committed, and must be in duplicate original papers,
or certified copies thereof.
The following must appear by the certificate of the district or
prosecuting attorney : —
(a) The full name of the person for whom extradition is
asked, together with the name of the agent proposed, to be
properly spelled.
(b) That, in his opinion, the ends of public justice require
that the alleged criminal be brought to this Commonwealth for
trial, at the public expense.
(c) That he believes he has sufficient evidence to secure the
conviction of the fugitive.
(d) That the person named as agent is a proper person, and
that he has no private interest in the arrest of the fugitive.
(e) If there has been any former application for a requisition
for the same person growing out of the same transaction, it
must be so stated, with an explanation of the reasons for a'
second request, together with the date of such application, as
near as may be.
(/) If the fugitive is known to be under either civil or crim-
inal arrest in the State or Territory to which he is alleged to
have fled, the fact of such arrest and the nature of the pro-
ceedings on which it is based must be stated,
(g) That the application is not made for the purpose of en-
forcing the collection of a debt, or for any private purpose what-
ever; and that, if the requisition applied for be granted, the
criminal proceedings shall not be used for any of said objects.
1913.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT -No. 12. 221
{h) The nature of the crime charged, with a reference, when
practicable, to the particular statute defining and punishing the
same.
(i) If the offence charged is not of recent occurrence, a satis-
factory reason must be given for the delay in making the appli-
cation.
1. In all cases of fraud, false pretences, embezzlement or
forgery, when made a crime by the common law, or any penal
code or statute, the affidavit of the principal complaining wit-
ness or informant that the application is made in good faith,
for the sole purpose of punishing the accused, and that he does
not desire or expect to use the prosecution for the purpose of
collecting a debt, or for any private purpose, and will not di-
rectly or indirectly use the same for any of said purposes, shall
be required, or a sufficient reason given for the absence of such
affidavit.
2. Proof by affidavit of facts and circumstances satisfying
the Executive that the alleged criminal has fled from the jus-
tice of the State, and is in the State on whose Executive the
demand is requested to be made, must be given. The fact that
the alleged criminal was in the State where the alleged crime
was committed at the time of the commission thereof, and is
found in the State upon which the requisition was made, shall
be sufficient evidence, in the absence of other proof, that he is a
fugitive from justice.
3. If an indictment has been found, certified copies, in dupli-
cate, must accompany the application.
4. If an indictment has not been found by a grand jury, the
facts and circumstances showing the commission of the crime
charged, and that the accused perpetrated the same, must be
shown by affidavits taken before a magistrate. (A notary
public is not a magistrate within the meaning of the statutes.)
It must also be shown that a complaint has been made, copies
of which must accompany the requisition, such complaint to
be accompanied by affidavits to the facts constituting the offence
charged by persons having actual knowledge thereof, and that a
warrant has been issued, and duplicate certified copies of the
same, together with the returns thereto, if any, must be fur-
nished upon an application.
5. The official character of the officer taking the affidavits or
depositions, and of the officer who issued the warrant, must be
duly certified.
222 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 1913.
6. Upon the renewal of an application, — for example, on
the ground that the fugitive has fled to another State, not having
been found in the State on which the first was granted, — new
or certified copies of papers, in conformity with the above rules,
must be furnished.
7. In the case of any person who has been convicted of any
crime, and escapes after conviction, or while serving his sen-
tence, the application may be made by the jailer, sheriff, or other
officer having him in custody, and shall be accompanied by cer-
tified copies of the indictment or information, record of con-
viction and sentence upon which the person is held, with the
affidavit of such person having him in custody, showing such
escape, with the circumstances attending the same.
8. No requisition will be made for the extradition of any
fugitive except in compliance with these rules.
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