(navigation image)
Home American Libraries | Canadian Libraries | Universal Library | Community Texts | Project Gutenberg | Biodiversity Heritage Library | Children's Library | Additional Collections
Search: Advanced Search
Anonymous User (login or join us)
Upload
See other formats

Full text of "Report of the attorney general for the year ending .."

ITTORNEY- GENERAL'S REPOB 



1914 



Public Document 



No. 12 



(2lt|( QlDmmnttm^aUti ttf MunButlfiXBtttjSL 



REPORT 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL 



Year ending January 20, 1915. 




BOSTON: 

WEIGHT & POTTEE FEINTING CO., STATE PEINTEES, 

32 DEENE STEEET. 

1915. 



Ql\)t €0tnm0nwealth of illaseacljueetts 



Department of the Attorney -General, 
Boston, Jan. 20, 1915. 

To the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives. 

I have the honor to transmit herewith my report for the 
year ending this day. 

Very respectfully, 

THOMAS J. BOYNTOJS^, 

Attorney-General. 



^l)t iHommaniucaltli of iflassacljusetts 



DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, 
State House. 



A ttorney-G eneral. 
THOMAS J. BOYNTON. 

Assistants. 
Thomas P. Riley. 
Roger Sherman Hoar. 
Leon R. Eyges. 
Arthur E. Seagrave. 
John W. Corcoran. 
James J. Bacigalupo. 



Chief Clerk. 
Louis H. Freese. 



Statement of Appropriation and Expenditu 



RES. 



Appropriation for 1914, |-q qqq 



00 



Expendit2(res. 

For law library, $1,108 30 

For salaries of assistants, 18 722 o& 

For clerks, ... - o^a 4a 

' 0,304 44 

For office stenographers, 3 OQS 07 

For telephone operator, o'^S 00 

For expenses in ice investigation, 1 309 45 

For expenses in the abohtion of grade crossings: — 

Salary of engineer, |;[9q 3^ 

Other expenses incidental thereto, . 208 15 

398 53 

For office expenses, . . . 7 510 94 

For court expenses, . . - pm 00 

^ ' 0.6OI 22 

Total expenditures, $43,699 63 

Costs collected, 2,470 62 

Net expenditures, $41,228 91 



®1|? (Enmmottutfaltli of fMaasarl^ua^tta 



Department of the Attorney-General, 
Boston, Jan. 20, 1915. 

To the Honorable Senate and House of Bepreseniatives. 

In compliance with Kevised Laws, chapter 7, section 8, 
I submit my report for the year ending this day. 

The cases requiring the attention of this department dur- 
ing the year, to the number of 0,356, are tabulated below: — 

Corporate francliise tax cases, 795 

Extradition and interstate rendition, 122 

Grade crossings, petitions for abolition of, 98 

Indictments for murder, 40 

Inventories and appraisals, 168 

Land Court petitions, 68 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land b}^ the Harbor 

and Land Commission, 4 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Charles 

River Basin Commission, 23 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Massa- 
chusetts Highwa}^ Commission, 22 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the 

Directors of the Port of Boston, 2 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Met- 
ropolitan Water and Sewerage Board, 7 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the State 

Board of Insanity, 6 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the Mt. 

Everett Reservation Commission, 1 

Land-damage cases arising from the taking of land by the 

Armorj^ Commissioners, 2 

Miscellaneous cases arising from the work of the above-named 

commissions, 29 

jMiscellaneous cases, 519 

Petitions for instructions under inheritance tax laws, ... 49 

Public charitable trusts, . . 107 

Settlement cases for support of persons in State Hospitals, . 28 
All other cases not enumerated above, which include suits to re- 
quire the fihng of returns by corporations and individuals and 
the collection of money due the Commonwealth, . . . 4,266 



viii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Capital Cases. 
Indictments for murder pending at the date of the last 
annual report have been disposed of as follows: — 

Theresa Bernard, indicted in Suffolk County, Novem- 
ber, 1913, for the murder of John R. Bernard, on Oct. 6, 
1913. She was arraigned Nov. 13, 1913, and pleaded not 
guilty. Richard S. Teeling, Esq., was assigned by the court 
as counsel for the defendant. On April 14, 1914, the de- 
fendant was committed to the Massachusetts School for the 
Feeble-minded. The case was in charge of District Attorney 
Joseph C. Pelletier. 

John F. Branagan, indicted in INIiddlesex County, June, 
1913, for the murder of Bridget Hall, at Natick, on May 24, 
1913. He was arraigned June 19, 1913, and pleaded not 
guilty. Edward L. ]McManus, Esq., was assigned by the 
court as counsel for the defendant. On Sept. 9, 1913, the 
indictment was nol prossed and the defendant placed on 
probation. The case was in charge of District Attorney 
Wilham J. Corcoran. 

John Bufulini, indicted in Essex County, July, 1913, 
for the murder of Emilio Marchocci, at Swampscott, on July 
14, 1913. He was arraigned July 16, 1913, and pleaded not 
guilty. James H. Sisk, Esq., and William H. Sisk, Esq., 
were assigned by the court as counsel. On Feb. 24, 1914, 
the defendant retracted his former plea, and pleaded guilty 
to murder in the second degree. This plea was accepted by 
the Commonwealth, and the defendant was sentenced to 
State Prison for a term not exceeding fifteen years nor less 
than ten years. The case was in charge of District Attorney 
Henry C. Attwill. 

Anna Catania, indicted in Suffolk County, October, 1913, 
for the murder of Agrippino Capra, at Boston, on Oct. 3, 
1913. She was arraigned Oct. 15, 1913, and pleaded not 
guilty. Maurice Caro was assigned by the court as counsel 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. ix 

for the defendant. In June, 1914, the defendant was tried 
by a jury before Chase, J. The result was a verdict of not 
guilty. The case was in charge of District Attorney Joseph 
C. Pelletier. 

DoMENico D'Allessandro, indicted in Suffolk County, 
September, 1913, for the murder of Antonio Burgio, at Bos- 
ton, on July 28, 1913. He was arraigned Sept. 9, 1913, 
and pleaded not guilty. Thomas J. Grady, Esq., was as- 
signed by the court as counsel for the defendant. In Janu- 
ary, 1914, the defendant was tried by a jury before Aiken, 
C.J. During the progress of the trial the defendant retracted 
his former plea, and pleaded guilty to manslaughter. This 
plea was accepted by the Commonwealth, and the defendant 
vvas sentenced to State Prison for a term not exceeding 
seventeen years nor less than fifteen years. The case was 
in charge of District Attorney Joseph C. Pelletier. 

SuPRiAXO DA SiLVA, indicted in Plymouth County, Octo- 
ber, 1913, for the murder of Joquin Esteves, at Plymouth, 
on Aug. 1, 1913. He was arraigned Feb. 6, 1914, and pleaded 
guilty to manslaughter. This plea was accepted by the 
Commonwealth, and the defendant was sentenced to State 
Prison for a term not exceeding six years nor less than five 
years. John P. Vahey, Esq., was assigned by the court 
as counsel for the defendant. The case was in charge of 
District Attorney Albert F. Barker. 

^YILLIAM A. Dorr, indicted in Essex County, April, 1912, 
for the murder of George E. Marsh, at Lynn, on April 11, 
1912. He was arraigned July 12, 1912, and pleaded not 
guilty. C. Neal Barney, Esq., appeared as counsel for the 
defendant. In February, 1913, the defendant was tried by 
a jury before Quinn, J. The result was a verdict of guilty 
of murder in the first degree. The defendant's exceptions 
were overruled by the Supreme Judicial Court. The defend- 
ant was thereupon sentenced to death by electrocution 
during the week beginning Sunday, March 22, 1914, which 
sentence was executed March 24, 1914. The case was in 
charge of District Attorney Henry C. Attwill. 



X ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Sam Kales^t'ian, indicted in Middlesex County, September, 
1913, for the murder of Andrew Saul, at Watertown, on 
July 12, 1913. John H. Casey, Esq., ^Yas assigned by the 
court as counsel for the defendant. The defendant was 
arraigned Jan. 13, 1914, and pleaded guilty to murder in the 
second degree. This plea was accepted by the Common- 
wealth, and the defendant was sentenced to State Prison for 
life. The case was in charge of District Attorney William J. 
Corcoran. 

. William Kaminski, indicted in Middlesex County, No- 
vember, 1913, for the murder of John Scannell, at Cam- 
bridge, on Sept. 29, 1913. John H. Hurley, Esq., and John 
F. McDonald, Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel 
for the defendant. He was arraigned Nov. 17, 1913, and 
pleaded guilty to murder in the second degree. This plea 
was accepted by the Commo wealth, and the defendant was 
sentenced to State Prison for life. The case was in charge 
of District Attorney William J. Corcoran. 

Samuel Powers, indicted in Hampden County, Decem- 
ber, 1913, for the murder of Minnie Powers, at Springfield, 
on May 4, 1913. He was arraigned Dec. 22, 1913, and 
pleaded not guilty. Edward A. McClintock, Esq., was as- 
signed by the court as counsel for the defendant. Later the 
defendant retracted his former plea, and pleaded guilty to 
murder in the second degree. This plea was accepted by the 
Commonwealth, and the defendant was sentenced to State 
Prison for life. The case was in charge of District /Attorney 
Christopher T. Callahan. 

James R. Sutherland, indicted in Plymouth County, 
June, 1913, for the murder of Winifred Sutherland, at 
Whitman, on April 28, 1913. He was arraigned June 4, 
1913, and pleaded not guilty. William F. Kane, Esq., and 
James T. Kirby, Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel 
for the defendant. On Feb. 13, 1914, the defendant re- 
tracted his former plea, and pleaded guilty to murder in the 
second degree. This plea was accepted by the Common- 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



XI 



wealth, and the defendant was sentenced to State Prison for 
life. The case was in charge of District Attorney Albert F. 
Barker. 

Indictments for murder found since the date of the last 
annual report have been disposed of as follows: — 

NiSHAN M. Aprahanian and ]\Ianoog Garabedian, 
indicted in jNIiddlesex County, March, 1914, for the murder 
of Ismayel Izmerly Oglilo, at Watertown, on Feb. 16, 1914. 
They were severally arraigned March 13, 1914, and pleaded 
guilt}' to manslaughter. This plea was accepted by the 
Commonwealth, and the defendants were sentenced to the 
^Massachusetts Reformatory for the term of five years and 
one month. Edward L. McManus, Esq., and Christopher 
J. Muldoon, Jr., Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel 
for the defendants. The case was in charge of District 
Attorney William J. Corcoran. 

Alonzo Bell, indicted in Bristol County, November, 
1914, for the murder of Jesse Watts. He was arraigned 
Dec. 2, 1914, and pleaded guilty to murder in the second 
degree. This plea was accepted by the Commonwealth, and 
the defendant was sentenced to State Prison for life. The 
case was in charge of District Attorney Joseph T. Kenney. 

Joseph W. Blais, indicted in Middlesex County, June, 
1914, for the murder of Celanire Blais, at Lowell, on June 
27, 1914. He was arraigned Sept. 29, 1914, and pleaded 
not guilty. William A. Hogan, Esq., was assigned by the 
court as counsel for the defendant. On Sept. 29, 1914, the 
defendant was adjudged insane, and was committed to the 
Bridgewater State Hospital. The case was in charge of 
District Attorney William J. Corcoran. 

Tho:\l\s Bombard, indicted in Worcester County, August, 
1914, for the murder of Erhardt Reithel, at Auburn, on 
July 9, 1914. He was arraigned Aug. 31, 1914, and pleaded 
not guilty. John H. INIeagher, Esq., and Charles F. Camp- 



xii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

bell, Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel for the de- 
fendant. In October, 1914, the defendant was tried by a 
jury before Sanderson, J. The result was a verdict of guilty 
of murder in the second degree. The defendant was there- 
upon sentenced to State Prison for life. The case was in 
charge of District Attorney James A. Stiles. 

John A. Collins, indicted in Suffolk County, May, 1914, 
.for the murder of Agnes E. Colhns, at Boston, on April 18, 
1914. He was arraigned Aug. 26, 1914, and pleaded guilty 
to manslaughter. This plea was accepted by the Common- 
wealth, and the defendant was sentenced to State Prison for 
a term not exceeding eleven years nor less than eight years. 
William R. Scharton, Esq., was assigned by the court as 
counsel for the defendant. The case was in charge of 
District Attorney Joseph C. Pelletier. 

Daniel J. Cooper, indicted in Worcester County, Jan- 
uary, 1914, for the murder of Alfred G. Bradish, at Upton, 
on Oct. 4, 1913. He was arraigned Feb. 5, 1914, and pleaded 
not guilty. John E. Swift, Esq., William A. ^Murray, Esq., 
and Austin E. Livingstone, Esq., were assigned by the court 
as counsel for the defendant. In May, 1914, the defendant 
was tried by a jury before Dubuque, J. The result was a 
verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. The de- 
fendant's exceptions were overruled by the Supreme Judicial 
Court, and he was sentenced to death by electrocution. 
On Dec. 15, 1914, said sentence was commuted to life im- 
prisonment. The case was in charge of District Attorney 
James A. Stiles. 

Gaetano DeVaio and Virginia Barbato, indicted in 
Essex County, July, 1914, for the murder of Gaetano Bar- 
bato, at Beverly, on July 4, 1914. They were severally 
arraigned Oct. 6, 1914, and pleaded not guilty. Michael L. 
Sullivan, Esq., William H. McSweeney, Esq., and John J. 
Higgins, Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel for the 
defendants. In November, 1914, the defendants were tried 
by a jury before Sanderson, J. The result was a verdict of 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xiii 

not guilty. The case was in charge of District x\ttorney 
Henry C.Attwill. 

]Marcellino Faria, indicted in Bristol County, June, 
1914, for the murder of Alice G. Faria. He was arraigned 
June 9, 1914, and pleaded not guilty. On Dec. 3, 1914, the 
defendant retracted his former plea, and pleaded guilty to 
murder in the second degree. This plea was accepted by the 
Commonwealth, and the defendant was sentenced to State 
Prison for life. The case was in charge of District Attorney 
Joseph T. Kenney. 

Peter Goncalves, indicted in Plymouth County, October, 
1914, for the murder of Vincent Goncalves, at Halifax, on 
Aug. 16, 1914. He was arraigned Oct. 16, 1914, and pleaded 
not guilty. John P. Vahey, Esq., and William T. Way, Esq., 
were assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. On 
Oct. 30, 1914, the defendant retracted his former plea, and 
pleaded guilty to manslaughter. This plea was accepted by 
the Commonwealth, and the defendant was sentenced to 
State Prison for a term not exceeding ten years nor less than 
eight years. The case was in charge of District Attorney 
Albert F. Barker. 

George W. LeFave, indicted in Essex County, April, 
1914, for the murder of Walter P. Hills, at Peabody, on 
April 3, 1914. He was arraigned May 14, 1914, and pleaded 
not guilty. S. Howard Donnell, Esq., was assigned by the 
court as counsel for the defendant. On Nov. 16, 1914, the 
defendant retracted his former plea, and pleaded guilty to 
murder in the second degree. This plea was accepted by the 
Commonwealth, and the defendant was sentenced to State 
Prison for life. The case was in charge of District Attorney 
Henry C. Attwill. 

Francesco P. Llizza, Guiseppe Llizza and Baldassarre 
LrizzA, indicted in ^Jiddlesex County, September, 1914, for 
the murder of Pietro Titone, at Framingham, on July 22, 
1914. They were severally arraigned Sept. 29, 1914. Fran- 



xiv ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

cesco P. Luizza and Guiseppe Liiizza pleaded guilty to man- 
slaughter, and Baldassarre Luizza pleaded not guilty. These 
pleas were accepted by the Commonwealth. Francesco P. 
Luizza was sentenced to -State Prison for a term not exceed- 
ing fifteen years nor less than ten years; Guiseppe Luizza 
was sentenced to the House of Correction for the term of six 
months; and the indictment against Baldassarre Luizza 
was nol pressed. Edward C. Creed, Esq., and Thomas J. 
Grady, Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel for the 
defendants. The case was in charge of District Attorney 
William J. Corcoran. 

Charles Matrony, indicted in Bristol County, February, 
1914, for the murder of Annie Walsh. He was arraigned 
Feb. 13, 1914, and pleaded guilty to murder in the second 
degree. This plea was accepted by the Commonwealth, and 
the defendant was sentenced to State Prison for life. The 
case was in charge of District Attorney Joseph T. Kenney, 

Lawrence Robinson, indicted in Suffolk County, June, 
1914, for the murder of Thomas J. X^orton, at Boston, on 
June 19, 1914. He was arraigned Jane 26, 1914, and pleaded 
not guilty. John H. Blanchard, Esq., and H. C. Blanchard, 
Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel for the defend- 
ant. On July 20, 1914, trial by a jury before Keating, J., 
was commenced. During the progress of the trial the de- 
fendant committed suicide, and the case was taken from the 
jury. The case was in charge of District Attorney Joseph C. 
Pelletier. 

Charles F. Starrett, indicted in Middlesex County, 
June, 1914, for the murder of Elizabeth Starrett, at Everett, 
on March 29, 1914. He was arraigned June 22, 1914, and 
pleaded not guilty. John J. Higgins, Esq., was assigned by 
the court as counsel for the defendant. On June 26, 1914, 
the defendant was adjudged insane, and was committed to 
the Worcester State Hospital. The case was in charge of 
District Attorney William J. Corcoran. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xv 

William B. Sweeney, indicted in Middlesex County, 
June, 1914, for the murder of Minnie Sweeney, at Dracut, 
on INIarch 19, 1914. He was arraigned June 12, 1914, and 
pleaded not guilty. William A. Hogan, Esq., was assigned 
by the court as counsel for the defendant. On June 24, 
1914, the defendant was adjudged insane, and was com- 
mitted to the Worcester State Hospital. The case was in 
charge of District Attorney William J. Corcoran. 

Bedros Takdarian, Garabed Barbarian and John 
Aydanian, indicted in Essex County, April, 1914, for the 
murder of John K. Shamlian, at Lawrence, on Feb. 9, 1914. 
They were severally arraigned Oct. 14, 1914, and pleaded 
not guilty. William F. Moyes, Esq., Michael S. O'Brien, 
Esq., and Harry R. Lawrence, Esq., were assigned by the 
court as counsel for the defendants. On Nov. 16, 1914, the 
defendants severally retracted their former pleas and pleaded 
guilty to murder in the second degree. These pleas were 
accepted by the Commonwealth, and the defendants were 
sentenced to State Prison for life. The case was in charge 
of District Attorney Henry C. Attwill. 

James J. Thorpe, indicted in Hampden County, INIay, 
1914, for the murder of ]\Jary Thorpe, at Holyoke, on April 
9, 1914. The defendant was adjudged insane, and was com- 
mitted to the Bridgewater State Hospital for observation. 
The case was in charge of District Attorney James O'Shea. 

Pasquale Torchio, indicted in Plymouth County, Feb- 
ruary, 1914, for the murder of Vincenzo Russo, at Brockton, 
on Jan. 31, 1914. He was arraigned Feb. 6, 1914, and 
pleaded not guilty. John F. McDonald, Esq., and Walter 
L Lane, Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel for the 
defendant. On June 12, 1914, the defendant retracted his 
former plea, and pleaded guilty to manslaughter. This plea 
was accepted by the Commonwealth, and the defendant 
was sentenced to State Prison for a term not exceeding eight 
years nor less than five years. The rase was in charge of 
District Attornev Albert F. Barker. 



xvi ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

BiASO Valestriko, indicted in Suffolk County, September, 
1914, for the murder of Margurito Valestrino, at Boston, on 
Aug. 6, 1914. He was arraigned Dec. 12, 1914, and pleaded 
guilty to murder in the second degree. This plea was 
accepted by the Commonwealth, and the defendant was 
sentenced to State Prison for life. John C. Crowley, Esq., 
was assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. 
The case Avas in charge of District Attorney Joseph C. 
Pelletier. 

The following indictments for murder are now pending: — 

Cleophas Blaxchard, indicted in Bristol County, 
X'^ovember, 1914, for the murder of Malvina Blanchard. 
The defendant has not yet been arraigned. The case is in 
charge of District iVttorney Joseph T. Kenney. 

Albert H. Brodeur, indicted in Hampden County, 
December, 1913, for the murder of Matilda Case, at Spring- 
field, on Sept. 20, 1913. He was arraigned March 18, 1914, 
and pleaded not guilty. Richard J. iNIorrissey, Esq., was 
assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. Xo 
further action has been taken in this case. The case is in 
charge of District Attorney Clarence P. X^iles. 

Giovanni Cinicolo and Maria Sonzino, indicted in 
Suffolk County, October, 1914, for the murder of Antonio 
Sonzino, at Boston, on Sept. 17, 1914. They were severally 
arraigned Oct. 19, 1914, and pleaded not guilty. Thomas J. 
Grady, Esq., and F. ]M. Zottoli, Esq., were assigned by the 
court as counsel for the defendants. X^o further action has 
been taken in this case. The case is in charge of District 
Attorney Joseph C. Pelletier. 

Alphonso Collura, indicted in ^Middlesex County 
X'ovember, 1914, for the murder of Salvatore Pulsseli, at 
Groton, on Oct. 4, 1914. The defendant has not yet been 
arraigned. The case is in charge of District Attorney 
William J. Corcoran. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xvii 

Ghvout Moodian, indicted in Middlesex County, 
November, 1914, for the murder of Zilfo Alie, at Tyngs- 
borough, on Oct. 22, 1914. He was arraigned Nov. 18, 
1914, and pleaded not guilty. AV. D. Regan, Esq., was 
assigned by the court as counsel for the defendant. No 
further action has been taken in this case. The case is in 
charge of District Attorney William J. Corcoran. 

John Poulacas, indicted in Hampden County, December, 
1914, for the murder of Mary Pappaspiropoulis, at Holyoke, 
on Dec. 11, 1914. He was arraigned Dec. 29, 1914, and 
pleaded not guilty. James O'Shea, Esq., and Laurence J. 
Montgomery, Esq., were assigned by the court as counsel 
for the defendant. No further action has been taken in this 
case. The case is in charge of District Attorney Clarence 
P. Niles. 

Anton Retkovitz, indicted in Bristol County, June, 1914, 
for the murder of Domka Peremebida. He was arraigned 
June 12, 1914, and pleaded not guilty. Frank M. Silvia, 
Esq., and Harold E. Clarkin, Esq., were assigned by the 
court as counsel for the defendant. In November, 1914, 
the defendant was tried by a jury before Dubuque, J. The 
result was a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. 
The time for filing exceptions by the defendant has been ex- 
tended to March 1, 1915. The case is in charge of District 
Attorney Joseph T. Kenney. 

William Roy, indicted in Hampden County, September, 
1914, for the murder of an infant male child, at Springfield, 
on Jan. 15, 1914. He was arraigned Sept. 24, 1914, and 
pleaded not guilty. John T. ^Nloriarty, Esq., was assigned 
by the court as counsel for the defendant. No further 
action has been taken in this case. The case is in charge of 
District Attorney Clarence P. Niles. 

FiNTON Thompson, indicted in Bristol County, June, 
1913, for the murder of Maria Colbaert. No further action 
has been taken in this case. The case is in charge of 
District Attorney Joseph T. Kenney. 



xviii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Ralph V. Villiers, indicted in Bristol County, June, 
1913, for the murder of Charles S. Mawhinney. The de- 
fendant has been committed to the Bridgewater State Hospi- 
tal pending determination of his sanity. The case is in 
charge of District Attorney Joseph T. Ivenney. 

Grade Crossings. 

Construction has been in progress since the last report at 
Clinton, Lynn and Westfield, and eight visits of inspection 
have been made by the engineer representing this depart- 
ment. Twenty-five hearings before commissioners and 
auditors have been attended by him. 

Statements of expenditures, numbering 35, amounting to 
$1,240,446.85, have been examined. Objection to items, 
amounting to $197,095.32, has been made, $68,762.91 of 
which has been withdrawn or disallowed, and decisions as to 
$81,174.64 are pending. Of objections made in previous 
years items amounting to $140,299.59 have been disallowed 
or withdrawn. 

The following statement shows in detail the expenditures 
which have been examined from Jan. 1, 1909, to date, the 
amounts objected to and their disposal. During that period 
273 statements, amounting to $11,835,998.96, have been 
examined. Objections to items, amounting to $703,086.59, 
have been made, $328,989.67 of which has been disallowed 
or withdrawn, and decisions as to $144,532.94 are pending. 



1915.1 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



XIX 



I I 

i k 

§ s 

"I J 

1-S CO 



CO ?S 









CO 






M S 



CO 



^0 >^ 



<» 














1 








-th 


CO 


-*< 


■^ 




. 








CO 


o 


CO 


C5 




Pend- 
ing 

Jan. 1 
1915. 


' 


1 


' 


CO 

CO 


s 


s 


CO 












CO 

oo 














CO 


(M 


00 


Tfl 


2 


1 








m 






s 


1 


03 


Tt< 


CO 


->* 


■<*< 


^ 


o 


r-i 


Dis- 
allowed 
or with- 
drawn. 


oo 


-* 




CO 




05 


>ra 






lO 


f- 




o 




04 




n 


CO 


CO 


o 


o 


CO 


s 




^ 


o 




en 




r-^ 


o 






co" 


00 


oT 


CO 


CO 


oT 








oo 






CO 


g 




1 














^ 




1 


^ 


^ 


00 


C<l 


00 




CO 




_ 


00 


1—1 






CO 




r- 




Pend- 
ing 

Jan. 1 
1914. 


o> 


CO 


CO 


s 


s? 


' 


o 




u 


o 


00 


o 


oT 




CO 


eo 






00 


CO 


■o 




c^ 


s 
















s^ 


i'^'5? 








Cfl 


IC 




jv. 












lO 




o 




5 ° ^ i 






1 


i 




1 


1 




^is-^ 








^ 


nn" 




s 






^ 


t^ 


oo 


CO 






05 




- 


CO 






«:> 






CO 




Pend- 
ing 

Jan. 1 
1913. 




CO 


CO 


s 


' 


' 


lO 




C<1 


^. 


<>) 


o 






"I 




^ 




^ 


t^ 






2 


















» 


Dis- 
allowed 
or with- 
drawn. 




lO 


oo 


CO 






CO 






I>: 


CO 


■>:»< 






00 




1 


o 


CJ5 




1 


1 


Tj< 






u 


co_ 


2 






o 
















^ 


i 




^ 


N 


OS 








s 




. 


CO 


>« 


CO 








o 




Pend- 
ing 

Jan. 1 
1912. 






i 






1 


00 


s 
















^ 


Dis- 
allowed 
or with- 
drawn. 


05 
CO 


j; 


^ 






' 


§ 




CO 


§5 


"oo 

OS 


' 


' 




s 




^ 




o" 








•* 


















s 






cq 


^ 










CO 




1 


o 












CO 




Pend 
ing 

Jan. 1 
1911. 


05 


t^ 


1 


1 


1 


1 


CO 




s- 


c<r 










00 




^ 














o 
















©& 


0> 




o 


»o 










lo 


'^ 


Dis- 
allowed 
or with- 
draivn. 


t- 


<M 










05 




o 


oo 

CO 


' 


1 


' 


' 


ts 




o 


















_5._ 












^ 




1 


^ 












t^ 




1 


o 












05 




end 
ing 
,n. 1 
910. 




' 


1 


1 


1 


1 






§ 












s 


, 


Ph"^- 


CO 












lO 


2 
















m 


1 


Dis- 

lowed 
with- 
rawn. 


§ 

oo 

o 


, 


1 


1 


1 


1 


§ 

oo 

o 




c^. 












cq_ 




1 -SS^ 


s 












s 






CO 


^ 


a> 


oo 


CO 


cq 


05 


, 


Q _i 1 


o 


■ <r> 


00 


t- 


05 


CO 




9. 


adet 

[terns 
noun 
ig to - 


CO 


o 


05 


o 


tr- 


lO 


CO 


« 




C) 


oo 


CO 


io 






'S. 


t^ 


CO 


CO 
00 


CO 




2- 


co" 


s^a.s 




00 


CO 


00 


o 


o> 


o 




^ 












^ 






c^ 


o 


^ 


lO 


CO 


lO 


o 




lli 




lO 


lO 


Ol 


t^ 


00 


cs> 




to 


c-« 


o 


lO 


oo 


CO 


00 




t- 






00 


o 


-* 


OS 






■-*, 


CO 


"^. 


t-^ 


'*. 


a> 




^m 2 


■^ 


CO 


(m" 


•^ 


o 




lO 




(M 


OS 


oo 


»o 










CO 






■*. 






oo 




'o '^ 


















(m" 


(M 


c^ 


oi 












^ 












^ 


•s^ua 


raa^B^S 


o 


g 


00 


^ 


^ 


^ 


g 




JO jaquinj^ 














oa 




•jTsax 


§ 


o* 


^- 


c<r 


co 


-£ 


1 




1 2 


o 


o 


o 


o 


o 


1 



XX ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Service on Commissions. 

My immediate predecessor in office, Hon. James M. Swift, 
took occasion to protest in the last annual report of this 
department against the practice of appointing the Attorney- 
General to commissions charged with the investigation of 
matters not connected with the work of this department. I 
desire to renew that protest. The duties of this ofHce are 
confined to legal matters. The work is sufficient to occupy 
the entire time of the Attorney-General, and it interferes to a 
great degree with the work of the department to have such 
additional burdens placed upon him. 

During my term of office I have been required to serve as 
a member of three commissions. I renew the suggestion of 
my predecessor that "all these commissions have the right 
to call upon the Attorney-General and his department for 
assistance in any matters involving legal considerations in 
connection with their deliberations, and I further respect- 
fully suggest that the Attorney-General should not be re- 
quired to serve as a member of such commissions to the 
detriment of the legal work of his department." 

Public Warehouses. 
A number of complaints have come to this department 
against certain unlicensed public warehouses, claiming that 
the complainants have no redress against the proprietors, as 
they have omitted to give bond as required by chapter 69 of 
the Revised Laws. This chapter, although it authorizes 
doing business with a license, does not expressly prohibit 
doing business without a license, nor does it provide the 
means of preventing unauthorized business nor penalties for 
the transaction thereof. Accordingly, I recommend the 
passage of the accompanying bill in order that chapter 69 
may be given full force and effect. 

Haverhill Gas Case. 
The Haverhill gas case, which had been long pending, and 
in which numerous hearings had been had and a great vol- 
ume of testimony taken during the administration of my 
predecessor, has been closed. In view of the familiarity of 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxi 

my predecessor with the case I retamed his services therein. 
After several further hearings the gas company withdrew its 
petition wherein the company sought to enjoin the Board of 
Gas and Electric Light Commissioners from enforcing its 
order, and the order of the Board, reducing the price of gas 
in Haverhill to 80 cents per thousand feet, became there- 
upon effective. 

Land Court Cases. 

This department has handled 68 Land Court cases, in 
which the public rights in beaches, great ponds and rivers 
were involved. 

It was the custom to enter the appearance of the Attorney- 
General in such cases, thus frequently holding up deserving 
cases until the Attorney-General could be got to assent to the 
form of decree. Under my administration a system has 
been devised whereby decrees are entered automatically 
preserving the public rights, upon the mere filing of the 
Attorney-General's answer, without further trouble to this 
department or to the parties. 

I now recommend that the public rights be protected by 
statute. The bill which I propose is declaratory in form, so 
as to guard against the courts construing it as an implied 
legislative interpretation to the effect that in all past cases 
these public rights have been lost. 

The statute creating the Land Court provides in effect 
that whenever the rights of any one are cut off, without his 
neglect, by registration of title in another, the injured party 
may sue and recover damages from an assurance fund made 
up of small payments by those who register title to their 
land. The Land Court was created in 1898, and yet so care- 
ful have been its judges and examiners that only one suit has 
yet been tried against the assurance fund. It fell to my lot 
to defend that suit, and the care of the Land Court was 
vindicated by a verdict for the defendant. 

Federal Liens. 

Congress recently enacted a law to the effect that in any 
State which would provide for the registration of Federal 
tax liens, such liens should not be effective unless filed in the 
registry of deeds. With the income tax now in effect, any 



xxii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

purchaser of a parcel of land may find it encumbered by a 
Federal lien. To have to look this matter up in the Federal 
court is an unnecessary burden on our citizens. The passage 
of the accompanying act, modeled after our mechanic's lien 
statute, will furnish a simple relief from this burden. 

National Mercantile Company, Limited. 

This company, having its home office in Vancouver, B. C, 
was at the opening of the present administration doing a 
quasi lottery business, having two offices in this Common- 
wealth and operating in violation of the banking law. This 
company was doing a fraudulent business, taking the money 
of the poor on the promise of enabling them to buy and own 
homes, and was advertising all over the United States that 
it was chartered under the "old blue laws" of the State of 
iNIassachusetts, "whose rigid supervision and strict juris- 
diction over all companies within its boundaries is well 
known all over the entire world." 

I caused criminal proceedings to be instituted against the 
agents of this company, one of whom left the State with 
charges pending against himi; the other was convicted and 
sentence suspended that he might turn State's evidence. 
By decree of the Supreme Judicial Court on Oct. 9, 1914, the 
company was enjoined from the further prosecution of its 
business in Massachusetts. I have co-operated with the 
authorities in other States and given the matter such pub- 
licity as I could, as a result of which the Canadian govern- 
ment has denied the company the use of the mails, and its 
business is now closed. 

Notwithstanding our success in prosecuting this company 
it is my opinion that the Massachusetts law is at present 
inadequate to cope with such a company if it chose to put 
up a real fight. Accordingly, I recommend that the Legis- 
lature pass the accompanying bill. 

Tax Cases. 
At the beginning of the present administration there were 
pending against the Commonwealth 297 suits by foreign 
corporations to recover excise taxes alleged to have been 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxiii 

illegally assessed, involving $168,962. The preceding ad- 
ministration had just won two test cases in the United States 
Supreme Court, but these cases did not cover the entire 
ground. Accordingly, nine more test cases were presented 
at the March sitting of the Supreme Judicial Court. The 
decision was handed down Oct. 7, 1914. This decision 
establishes, so far as a decision of the Supreme Judicial Court 
of the Commonwealth can establish, the right of the Com- 
monwealth to tax any foreign corporation that engages in 
any local business whatever within its borders. Counsel for 
the corporations that were parties to this litigation have, 
however, taken out writs of error in the United States 
Supreme Court, and accordingly I have not pressed other 
cases in the hands of the same counsel. All other remaining 
cases have been settled on the basis of the decision of the 
Supreme Judicial Court. 

A suit by the Bellows Falls Power Company, which was 
brought under the previous administration, has been argued 
before the Supreme Judicial Court and is still pending. 

Anderson Bridge Case. 

Among the pending cases at the beginning of this ad- 
ministration was the suit of the Brighton Abattoir and one 
of its tenants to recover alleged damages for cutting them 
off from the sea by the building of the Anderson bridge on 
the Charles River without a draw. None of their real estate 
was taken, and they are claiming in damages to the land, 
which is still intact, a sum several times its assessed value. 
I have expended much time and money in resisting 
their claim. The case has been on trial before a special 
commission of three, appointed by the court, numerous 
hearings have been had, and the trial is now nearly com- 
pleted. 

Pollution of Neponset River. 

Progress has been made with the suit that has been for 
several years pending against Winslow Bros. & Smith Com- 
pany on account of the alleged pollution of the w^aters of 
Hawes Brook and Neponset River by the waste from their 
plant. After several hearings an agreement has been reached 



xxiv ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

whereby the company has undertaken to construct the 
filter recommended by the engineer of the State Board of 
Health, which it is believed will obviate the entire difficulty 
so far as this plant is concerned, construction to begin not 
later than April 15, 1915. 

Publication of the Opinions of the Attorney-General. 
I recommend that an appropriation of S2,500 be made for 
the purpose of continuing the publication of the opinions of 
the Attorney-General, there being now a sufficient number 
to fill a volume of ordinary size. 

Revision of Statutes. 
I also recommend that measures be taken at this session 
of the Legislature to provide for the revision, codification 
and arrangement of the statutes. I am aware that the time 
that has elapsed since the last revision is not so great as has 
usually been allowed to elapse between revisions of the 
statutes; but if the work of revision is undertaken now it 
will be several years before it will be finished. There is 
need of revision now and the need will become greater with 
each succeeding year. The last general revision, known as 
the Revised Laws of Massachusetts, went into effect on the 
first day of January, 1902. The resolve providing for that 
revision was approved April 28, 1896. Thus it will be seen 
that nearly six years elapsed between the date of the adop- 
tion of the resolve providing for the revision and the date on 
which the Revised Laws went into effect. During the period 
between Jan. 1, 1902, and January 1 of the present year the 
volume of legislation has been far greater than it has been 
during any equal period of time in the history of the Com- 
monwealth. During this period there have been many 
radical changes in the statutes, both by the amending process 
and also by original enactment. It is believed that every 
one of the 225 chapters of the Revised Laws has been 
affected to some extent by subsequent legislation, and by 
far the greater number have been changed in numerous and 
important particulars. Statutes amendatory of the Revised 
Laws have themselves been again and again amended, so 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxv 

that it is only by the exercise of great care and the loss of 
much time that the exact condition of the statutes may be 
ascertained. 

Department of the Attorney-General. 

The number of official opinions I have given during the 
year is 252. 

The total number of matters requiring the attention of the 
department was 6,356. The number of hearings attended 
was 75. The number of cases tried in the Probate Court 
was 23. The number of cases tried in the Superior Court 
with jury was 3. The number of cases tried in the Superior 
Court without jury was 5. One case was tried before the 
United States District Court. During the year 18 cases have 
been argued before the Supreme Judicial Court of the Com- 
monwealth, 1 before the Circuit Court of Appeals of the 
United States, and 1 before the Supreme' Court of the United 
States. 

In closing my official connection with this department I 
desire to express my profound appreciation of the loyalty, 
fidelity and efficiency of my assistant attorneys-general, 
Thomas P. Riley, Esq., Roger Sherman Hoar, Esq., Leon R. 
Eyges, Esq., Arthur E. Seagrave, Esq., John W. Corcoran, Esq. 
and James J. Bacigalupo, Esq., all of whom have served the 
Commonwealth with great ability and devotion; and I wish 
further to express my appreciation of the fidelity and effi- 
ciency with which all of the employees of the department 
have discharged their duties during my incumbency of the 
office. 

Annexed to this report are such of the opinions rendered 
during the current year as it is thought should be published, 
and drafts of bills the enactment of which is herein rec- 
ommended. 

Respectfully submitted, 

THOMAS J. BOYNTON, 

Attorney-General. 



xxvi ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



PEOPOSED LEGISLATION. 



An Act relative to Public Warehousemen. 
Be it enacted, etc., as follows: 

Section 1. No person shall keep and maintain a public warehouse 
for the storage of goods, wares and merchandise, unless he is licensed 
and has given bond under the provisions of section one of chapter 
sixty-nine of the Revised Laws. 

Section 2. The penalty for Aioiation of the preceding section shall 
be not less than ten nor more than two hundred dollars for each day 
during which such violation continues, or any other sum, not greater 
than the maximum penalty, which the court may deem just and equi- 
table. Such penalty may be recovered by an information in equity in 
the name of the attorney-general, brought in the supreme judicial 
court in the county of Suffolk. Upon such information, the court may 
issue an injunction restraining the further maintenance of the ware- 
house named therein, until such time as the proprietor shall give a 
bond and secure a hcense. 

An Act Declaratory of Legal Incidents in Registered Land. 
Be it enacted, eic, as follows: 

Section 1. The term '' burdens and incidents which attach by 
law to unregistered land", as used in section sixty-nine of chapter one 
hundred and twenty-eight of the Revised Laws, includes- , and the term 
^'encumbrances except those noted in the certificate", as used in sec- 
tion thirtj^-eight of said chapter, does not include: public rights below 
mean high water mark in land bordering on tide water, public rights 
in headlands, public rights in any river or stream or in the bed thereof, 
pubhc rights in any great pond or in the use thereof as a great pond 
or of access thereto, building restrictions established by pubUc authori- 
ties, and all other pubhc rights and incidents inland which need not 
appear of record in the registry of deeds, whether such rights and in- 
cidents are vested in the pubhc at large or in some portion thereof, or 
in the Commonwealth or some constituted authority. 

Section 2. This act shall take effect upon its passage. 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxvii 



An Act to authorize the Filing of Notices of Federal Tax 
Liens with Registrars of Deeds and Assistant Recorders 
OF THE Land Court. 

Be it enacted, etc., as follows : 

Section 1. The notice of a federal tax. lien on real estate under 
the pro\'isions of section three thousand one hundred and eighty-six 
of the Re\dsed Statutes of the United States, as amended by an act 
approved the fourth day of March in the year nineteen hundred and 
thirteen, may be filed wdth the register of deeds for the county or dis- 
trict wherein the land subject to such lien is situated. 

Section 2. Such notice shall be recorded and duly indexed, or, 
if intended to affect registered land, shall, in lieu of recording, be filed 
and registered in the office of the assistant recorder for the registry 
district in which the land is situated. 

Section 3. The fee for the fihng and recording or registering of a 
notice under this chapter shall be fifty cents. 

Section 4. This act shall take effect upon its passage. 

An Act to regulate the Business of selling So-called Un- 
secured Installment Contracts. 

Be it enacted, etc., as follows: 

Section 1. Except corporations fulfiUing the requirements of this 
chapter, or the agents of such corporations, no person shall transact 
witliin the commonwealth, and no domestic corporation unless it ful- 
fills the requirements of this chapter, shall transact anj^'here, the 
business of selling so-called unsecured installment contracts, herein- 
after referred to as "'such business." 

Section 2. Wherever they occur in this act, the foilo^\^ng words 
shall be construed as follows : — 

"Selling" shall mean issuing, negotiating, selling, receiving an order 
in reply to which a contract is sent, or dehvering a contract in reply .to 
an order. 

"Contract" shall mean a bond, note, certificate, contract, obli- 
gation, pass-book, or any other chose in action evidenced bj^ writing. 

"Installment contract" shall mean a contract for which the contract 
payment or purchase price is to be paid, or payable, in installments, 
or on which only a partial payment of the contract paj^ment or purchase 
price, or of the face, par or capital value is made at the time of selUng. 

"Unsecured installment contract" shall mean an installment con- 
tract, under which the promise given to the person who paj^s or is to 
pay the purchase price or installments, is not, at the time of the per- 
formance of the first act comprised mthin the foregoing definition of 
"selling," secured by property, real or personal, of a fair cash value of 
more than the face, par or capital value of the contract. 



xxviii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

''No person shall transact" shall mean that no person shall transact, 
or hold himself out as transacting or as entitled, licensed or authorized 
to transact. 

'^ Person" shall mean person, firm, association, exchange or cor- 
poration. 

"Holds out" shall mean holds out or permits the holding out of. 

"The corporation" shall mean any specific corporation seeking to 
transact such business. 

"The commissioner" shall mean the bank commissioner, appointed 
under the provisions of section one of chapter two hundred and four 
of the acts of the year nineteen hundred and six. 

Section 3. No corporation shall transact such business unless it 
shall have at least one hundred thousand dollars of capital stock fully 
paid in. Such capital shall be for the equal benefit and protection of 
all its investors and shall be deposited in trust with the treasurer and 
receiver-general of the commonwealth, or with the duly authorized 
officer of some other state of the United States. Such deposit shall 
consist of cash or of state or municipal securities or of securities ap- 
proved by the commissioner, and worth at least one hundred thousand 
dollars. If the deposit is made wdth the officer of some other state of 
the United States, the corporation shall not transact such business, 
unless it shall have filed with the commissioner a statement from such 
officer under his official seal, showing that he, as such officer, holds 
said deposit in trust for the equal benefit and protection of all the 
investors in said corporation, describing the items of securities so 
held, and showing that such officer is satisfied that said securities are 
w^orth one hundred thousand dollars, but such official statement shall 
not preclude the commissioner from examining and investigating the 
securities so held and from ascertaining himself the value of said 
securities. The value as determined by the commissioner shall be 
final. 

Section 4. A corporation making such deposit with the treasurer 
and receiver-general shall be entitled to the income thereof, and may 
froin time to time, with the consent of the commissioner, change, in 
whole or in part, the deposited securities for cash, or for other securi- 
ties of equal value, authorized by this chapter or approved by the 
commissioner. The treasurer and receiver-general may return to the 
corporation any such deposit, if the commissioner shall state in wTiting 
that the corporation has ceased to do business in this state, and is 
under no obhgation to any contract-holder or other person in this 
state or elsew^here for whose benefit such deposit was made. A cor- 
poration that has made such deposit, or the commissioner, or any 
creditor, may bring in the supreme judicial Court for Suffolk county a 
petition in equity to enforce, administer or terminate the trust created 
by such deposit. If such petition is brought by any person other than 
the commissioner, the commissioner shafi be named as a party re- 
spondent. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. xxix 

Section 5. No corporation shall transact such business, unless it 
shall have received from the commissioner a license, issued as follows: 
AVhen the deposit has been made or the official statement has been 
filed, as required by section three, if the commissioner after an exami- 
nation of the assets and liabifities of the corporation, is satisfied that 
it is in a sound financial condition, and if the corporation is otherwise 
duly qualified under the laws of this state to transact its business 
herein, he shall issue to the corporation a license to transact such 
business within tliis state. Every ^uch license shall expire on the 
thirty-first day of December succeeding the date of its issuance, unless 
renewed by the commissioner. The corporation shall pay to the com- 
missioner a fee of five dollars for the origmal issuance of each license 
and two dollars for each renewal. All fees paid to the commissioner 
under the provisions of this chapter shall be accounted for by him in 
the same manner as other fees collected by him. 

Section 6. Whenever the commissioner may deem it to be prudent 
for the protection of investors in this state, he may \isit personally 
or by a competent examiner or examiners whom he shall appoint, any 
corporation transacting such business, and thoroughly inspect and 
examine its affairs, and ascertam its financial condition and whether it 
has compUed with the provisions of law. The proper charges incurred 
in the examination of the corporation, includmg the expenses of the 
commissioner and the expenses and compensation of his assistants 
employed therein, shall be paid by the corporation. For the purposes 
aforesaid, the commissioner or the person or persons making the ex- 
amination shall have free access to all the books and papers of the 
corporation which relate to its business, and to the books and papers 
kept by any of its agents; and may administer oaths to, and examine 
as witnesses, the directors, officers and agents of said corporation, and 
any other person, relative to its affairs, transactions and condition. 

Section 7. Each corporation transacting such business shall annu- 
ally, on or before the fifteenth day of January, file in the office of the 
commissioner a report which shall exhibit its financial condition on 
the thiriy-first day of December of the previous year, and its business 
of that year, and shall at any other time, upon the written request of 
the commissioner, file a supplemental report of its financial condition 
and business done. For cause, the commissioner may extend the 
time for filing the annual report, but not to a date later than the fifteenth 
day of February. Such reports shall be in such forms as may be es- 
tabhshed from time to time by the commissioner, and shall be sworn 
to by the president and secretary of the corporation, or, in their absence, 
by two of its principal officers, empowered to act in their stead. For 
filing each annual report the corporation shall pay to the commissioner 
a fee of five dollars. A corporation which neglects to file its annual 
report with the commissioner mthin the lime required, shall forfeit 
one hundred dofiars for each day during which such neglect continues. 



XXX ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Section 8. If the commissioner is of opinion upon examination 
or otherwise that a person who is transacting such business is in an 
unsound financial condition, or if he finds that such person has failed 
to comply with the law, or that the officers or agents of such person 
have refused to submit to examination or to perform any legal obUga- 
tion relative thereto, he shall suspend the hcense, if any, granted to 
such person, its officers or agents, and shall cause notice of the lack of 
authority of such person to transact business to be published in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the commonwealth; and no new 
business shall thereafter be done by such person in the commonwealth, 
or anj^iere in the case of a domestic corporation, while such default 
or disabihty continues, nor until the authority of such person to do 
business is restored by the commissioner, or by the court as hereinafter 
provided. The commissioner shall forthwith notify such person of 
such suspension or lack of authority and shall specify in the notice the 
cause thereof and the particulars of any alleged violation of law. 
The supreme judicial court for Suffolk County, uppn petition in equitj^ 
by such person brought \\dthin tliirty days after receipt of said notice, 
shall hear and determine the question as to whether such person lacks 
authority to transact such business or whether cause for suspension 
exists, and shall make any appropriate order or decree therein. The 
statutes and rules relative to petitions in equity shall govern such 
proceedings. 

Section 9. The supreme judicial court for Suffolk County shall 
have jurisdiction, in equity, on petition of the commissioner or of any 
interested person, to enjoin the unauthorized transaction of such 
business, to enforce any of the pro\dsions of this chapter, or to ai3point 
a receiver or receivers to take possession of the property and effects 
of any unlicensed, suspended or financially unsound person, who is 
or has been transacting such business, and to settle his affairs, subject 
to the order of the court. If such petition is brought by any person 
other than the commissioner, the commissioner shall be named as a 
party respondent. 

Section 10. Whoever sells or attempts to sell an unsecured in- 
stallment contract, unless issued by a corporation duly licensed under 
this chapter, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and liable to a fine of 
not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or to 
imprisonment for not more than six months, or to both such fine and 
imprisonment. 

Section 11. Whoever transacts the business of reselling unsecured 
installment contracts, unless issued bj^ a corporation duly licensed 
under this chapter, shaU be guilty of a misdemeanor and fiable to a 
fine of not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, 
or to imprisonment for not more than six months, or to both such fine 
and imprisonment. 

Section 12. Whoever does any business act m aid of the transaction 
of such business, and whoever holds out liimseK as an agent, agency, 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. xxxi 

officer, or employee in the transaction of such business, or holds out 
his address as an office or place of business in aid of the transaction of 
such business, except on behalf of a corporation duly licensed under 
tliis chapter, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and liable to a fine of 
not less than one hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or to 
imprisonment for not more than six months, or to both such fine and 
imprisonment. 

Section 13. No unsecured installment contract shall be sold in the 
commonwealth, or sold anj^vhere by a domestic corporation, unless 
it shall provide that, after one-fourth of the total amount of install- 
ments therein required has been paid, and in any event after install- 
ments for two full years have been paid thereon, in case of default in 
the payment of any subsequent installment, the contract shall not be 
forfeited, but a paid-up contract shall be given to the holder of the 
contract, of not less than the full amount paid thereon less any amount 
paid by the person selling the contract on account thereof, said paid- 
up contract to mature at the same date as the original contract; and 
no such contract shall pro^dde for the payment of profits in the form 
of dividends or otherwise, except from earnings, nor for the payment 
of airy part of the pajTnents made by the holder of any such contract 
in force, to the holder of any other such contract. 

Section 14. No unsecured installment contract shall be sold in 
the commonwealth, or sold anywhere by a domestic corporation, until 
a copy of the form thereof shall have been filed at least thirty days 
with the commissioner; nor if the commissioner within said thirty 
days notifies the person issuing or filing said copy that in his opinion 
said form does not comply with the requirements of the laws of the 
commonwealth. 

Section 15. The sale of any unsecured installment contract which 
does not conform to the requirements of the two preceding sections, 
or which is issued by a person not duly hcensed under this chapter, 
shall be voidable by the purchaser and the purchaser shall be entitled 
to recover from the person selhng the same in an action of contract all 
instalhnents paid thereon, vdth. legal interest from the date of each 
payment. 

Section 16. Any corporation making a report which is false in 
any material part, shall be guiltj^ of a misdemeanor and be hable to a 
fine of not less than five hundred nor more than five thousand dollars. 

Section 17. Whoever wilfully or negligently subscribes or makes 
oath to a report which is false in any material part, shall be hable to 
a fine of not less than five hundred nor more than five thousand dol- 
lars; and whoever wilfully makes oath to a report which is false in 
any material part, shall in addition be guilty of perjury. 

Section 18. Any person violating any pro\dsion of this chapter 
for which no penalty is specificaUy provided shall be punished by a fine 
of not more than five hundred dollars. 



xxxii ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 1915. 

Section 19. Nothing contained in tliis chapter shall be construed 
as prohibiting sales by agents of corporations duly licensed or as pro- 
hibiting the resale of contracts once lawfully sold, except contracts 
resold in \dolation of the provisions of section eleven. 

Section 20. The proAdsions of this chapter shall not apply to 
contracts issued by a person who is subject to the provisions of the 
general banking laws or the general insurance laws of this state; nor 
to contracts issued by a person for the purpose of raising money for 
his principal business, if his principal business is other than the issuance 
or seUing of unsecured installment contracts. 

Section 21. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed 
as legalizing a lottery. 

Section 22. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the pro- 
visions of this act are hereby repealed. 

Section 23. This act shall take effect upon its passage. 



OPINIONS. 



Surgery — Unauthorized Operations, when permitted. 

A surgical operation which is immediately necessary for the preservation 
of life or health may be performed without the consent of the patient 
if it is impracticable to secure such consent or the consent of any one 
authorized to speak for him. 

Jan. 26, 1914. 

H. Louis Stick, M.D., Superintendent, Worcester State Asylum. 

Dear Sir: — In response to your inquiry in regard to a 
surgical operation upon an inmate of your hospital, I have to 
say that there is, as you are doubtless well aware, a well settled 
rule ot law that in all cases in which a patient is in full possession 
of his faculties and able to consult about his condition, his 
consent is a necessary prerequisite to a surgical operation by 
his physician. In cases where an emergency arises calling for 
immediate action for the preservation of life or health of the 
patient, and it is impracticable to obtain his consent or the 
consent of any one authorized to speak tor him, it is the duty 
of the physician to perform such operation as good surgery de- 
mands without such consent. The only case that will justify 
surgical operation without consent is "necessity for immediate 
action for the preservation of life or health." It does not 
seem to me that the case you state falls within this class, and, 
in my opinion, you should not operate without the consent 
of a legally appointed guardian. 

Yours respectfully, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



District Police — Transfer to Board of Labor and Industries — 
May be retransferred. 

St. 1913, c. 610, § 1, providing for appointment by the Governor in case 
of vacancies in the two inspection departments of the District Police, 
did not repeal St. 1913, c. 424, § 1, permitting inspectors of factories 
and public buildings of the District Police who were transferred to 
the State Board of Labor and Industries from being transferred to the 
building department of the District Pohce to fill vacancies, upon 
their request. 



2 ATTORXFA'-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Jan. 28, 1914. 
Gen. J. H. Whitney, Chief of the District Police. 

Dear Sir: — You ask my opinion as to whether the pro- 
visions of section 1 of chapter 610 of the Acts of 1913 re- 
pealed that part of section 1 of chapter 424 of the Acts of 
1913 which relates to the transfer of certain inspectors from 
the service of the State Board of Labor and Industries to 
the building department of the District Police. 

That part of section 1 of chapter 424 of the Acts of 1913 
to which you refer reads as follows: — 

The inspectors of factories and pubUc buildings of the district 
pohce who were transferred to the state board of labor and industries, 
estabhshed by chapter seven hundred and twenty-six of the acts of 
the year nineteen hundred and twelve, shall, upon their request in 
writing to the governor, be transferred to the building department 
of the district police to fill any vacancies in that department which 
may occur after the first day of June in the year nineteen hundred and 
thirteen. 

This act was approved April 2, 1913, and took effect upon 
its passage. That part of said section 1 of chapter 610 of 
the Acts of 1913 relating to appointments to the two inspec- 
tion departments of the District Police reads as follows: — 

All future vacancies in either of the two departmencs estabhshed 
by this act shall be filled by the governor, subjec^ to existing laws 
governing the appointment of the chief, deputy chiefs and members 
of the detective and inspection departments of the district police, by 
appointment to the department in which the vacancy occurs. 

The last-mentioned act was approved May 8, 1913, and also 
took effect upon its passage. The fact that the Legislature 
had in mind the provisions of chapter 424 when chapter 610 
was enacted was evidenced by the fact that appointments 
to be made under the provisions of chapter 610 are to be 
made "subject to existing laws governing the appointment 
of the chief, deputy chiefs and members of the detective and 
inspection departments of the district police." 

These words clearly indicate that the Legislature did not 
intend to change chapter 424 in so far as it affected the rights 
of those inspectors who might desire, upon their written re- 
quest to the Governor, to be transferred to the building in- 
spection department of the District Police. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 3 

In case a vacancy occurs in the building department of 
the District PoUce, as suggested in your letter, the Governor 
may make an appointment in accordance with the provisions 
of chapter 610 of the Acts of 1913, but subject, however, to 
the right of anj- one who has been an inspector of factories 
and public buildings of the District Police, and who has been 
transferred to the State Board of Labor and Industries, upon 
his request in writing to the Governor, to be appointed to 
fill such vacanc}'. 

It is my opinion that section 1 of chapter 610 of the Acts 
of 1913 did not repeal that part of section 1 of chapter 424 
of the Acts of 1913 hereinbefore quoted. 
Yours respectfully, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Employment of Minors — Employment of Women — Stenographers 
and Bookkeepers. 

Minors who are employed as bookkeepers, stenographers, clerks or clerical 
assistants are within the provisions of St. 1913, c. 831, an act regulat- 
ing the labor of minors. 

The law relative to the employment of women as stenographers, book- 
keepers and in similar clerical positions was not changed by St. 
1913, c. 758. 

Jan. 28, 1914. 

Robert N. Turner, Esq., Commissicner of Labor. 

Dear Sir: — Referring to your inquiry addressed to this 
office under date of Oct. 8, 1913, I understand your first 
question to be: Are minors who are employed as bookkeepers, 
stenographers, clerks or clerical assistants within the provi- 
sions of chapter 831 of the Acts of 1913? 

The words of limitation and prohibition in the various 
sections of chapter 831 are, *'no minor . . . shall be employed or 
permitted to work," and the construction of the statute depends 
upon the scope of the words "employed or permitted to work." 

The word "employed" has been defined as "the act of 
doing a thing and being under contract or orders to do it." 
United States v. Morris, 14 Peters, 464, 475. The word may 
be further defined as, "involved in action of body or mind; 
kept in service." 

The word "work" may fairly be said to be a generic term 
that includes every kind of human employment. 

The manifest purpose of this statute is to carefully limit 
the hours of employment of minors and to protect them from 



4 . ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

the dangers, physical and moral, of certain occupations named 
therein. It is my opinion that minors who are within the 
ages specified in the various sections of this chapter, and are 
employed as bookkeepers, stenographers, clerks or clerical 
assistants, are within the provisions of this statute. 

Your second question, as I understand it, is: Did the 
enactment of chapter 758 of the Acts of 1913 make any change 
in the law in regard to the hours of employment of women 
who are employed as stenographers, bookkeepers or in other 
similar clerical positions? 

As suggested in your letter of inquiry, the controlling and 
descriptive words in the later statute, "employed in laboring," 
are the same that were used in the earlier one, so that in this 
important particular there is no change. It is my opinion 
that the law as to the employment of women who are above 
the age of twenty-one years as stenographers, bookkeepers 
and in other similar clerical positions was not changed by 
the enactment of chapter 758 of the Acts of 1913. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Constitutional Law — Governor — Commutation oj Life Sentence. 

The Governor has constitutional authority, with the advice of the Council, 
to commute sentences of life imprisonment to imprisonment for a 
term of years. 

Jan. 28, 1914. 
His Excellency David I. Walsh, Governor of the ComrnonweaUh. 

Sir: — You request my opinion upon the following ques- 
tion: "Have I, under the laws oi this Commonwealth, the 
power or right to carry out a recommendation oi the Parole 
Board, the Advisory Board of Pardons, which Board after 
investigation recommends as follows: that the Governor now 
commute a sentence from imprisonment for life to imprison- 
ment for the term of twenty years." 

The pardoning power is conferred upon the executive power 
by the Constitution of the Commonwealth. Article VIII, 
section I, chapter II of part the second of the Constitution 
provides that — 

The power of pardoning offences, except such as persons may be 
convicted of before the senate by an impeachment of the house, shall 
be in the governor, by and with the advice of council. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 5 

The words "the power of pardoning offences" are compre- 
hensive. They include not onlj- that absolute release from 
the penalty which is referred to commonly as a pardon, but 
those lesser exercises of clemency which are described as con- 
ditional pardon, commutation of sentence and respite of sen- 
tence. The only authority for the executive department of 
the government to mitigate or release from sentence for crime 
is this language of the Constitution. The Governor is clothed 
with authority to act in that respect only "by and with the 
advice of council." The unmistakable meaning of these 
words is that he can act only in conformity to the advice of 
the Council. He may decline to take action although the 
Council advise him to do so. Responsibility for granting a 
pardoji rests upon the Governor, and he cannot be compelled 
to take such action by the Council. The granting of a full 
or a partial pardon is the result of concurrent action by both 
the Governor and Council. Neither alone can take effective 
action. Both must agree before the Constitution is satisfied. 
The same principle applies whether the act be a complete or 
a modified pardon. A commutation of sentence, which is 
the substitution of a lighter for a more severe punishment, 
is an exercise of the pardoning power, and must be in ac- 
cordance with the Constitution. It is an act of the Governor 
which becomes effective only when concurred in by the Coun- 
cil. See Opinion of the Justices, 14 Mass. 472; Opinion of 
the Justices, 210 Mass. 610. **The commutation of a sentence 
is a pardon upon condition that the convict voluntarily sub- 
mits to a lighter punishment." Opinion of the Justices, 190 
Mass. 616, 621. 

It is my opinion, therefore, that the Governor may, with 
the advice ot the Council, commute the sentence of a prisoner 
from life imprisonment to a term sentence, the commutation to 
become effective if petitioned for by the prisoner or accepted 
by him. 

Yours respectiully, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Engineers — Firemen — Special License — Eiwployment — 
Vacations. 

Under St. 1911, c. 562, § 8, a special license issued to an engineer or fire- 
man before the passage of the act becomes null and void whenever 
the holder ceases to be employed on the plant specified in said license. 

Under St. 1911, c. 562, § 8, the words "ceases to be employed" mean a 
complete severance from one's employment, and not absences on 
account of a vacation, illness or leave of absence. 

Jan. 28, 1914. 
Gen. J. H. Whitney, Chief of the District Police. 

Dear Sir: — You request my opinion upon certain ques- 
tions based upon section 8 of chapter 562 of the Acts of 1911, 
which provides as follows: — 

This act shall take effect on the first day of January in the year 
nineteen hundred and twelve, and a license in force on the first day 
of January in the year nineteen hundred and twelve shall continue 
in force until it is suspended or revoked for the incompetence or un- 
trustworthiness of the licensee, except that a special license shall not 
continue in force after the holder thereof ceases to he employed on 
the plant specified in the license. A hcense in force on the first day 
of January in the year nineteen hundred and twelve may be exchanged 
for a license of the same class under this act at any time thereafter, 
on application to the boiler inspection department of the district 
police, upon forms to be furnished by said department. The appli- 
cant shall make oath to the statements contained in the said applica- 
tion, and the members of the boiler inspection department of the 
district police are hereby authorized to administer the oath. 

Your questions are — 

First. — A man was granted a special license in 1910, before the 
enactment of section 2 of chapter 562, Acts of 1911, which amended 
section 81 of chapter 102 of the Revised Laws by striking out the entire 
section and inserting a new section in place thereof, part of which 
reads as shown in itahcs above. The question now arises Avhether 
such licensee, having been licensed prior to the enactment of section 2, 
chapter 562, Acts of 1911, comes within the provisions of this clause; 
that is to say, whether such license continues in force if he should 
cease to be employed on the plant specified thereon, the license ha\dng 
been granted prior to such amendment. 

Second. — Under the provisions of the statutes, prior to Jan. 1, 
1912, it was necessary that an engineer's or fireman's license should 
be renewed every three years; but, under the provisions of the statute 
above quoted, a license in force on the first day of January, 1912, 
continued in force, and, therefore, does not have to be renewed. By 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 7 

the same provisions a licensee could exchange such license for a new 
license if he so desired. In the event of your deciding the first inquiry 
in the affirmative, would the fact of such man having exchanged such 
license bring him fully within the provisions of the statute above 
quoted? 

Third. — If such licensee does come within the provisions of the 
statute above quoted, so far as relates to the license continuing in 
force only so long as he shall continue to be employed on the plant 
specified in the license, would the fact of his having been granted a 
leave of absence, extending for a period of six months or more for the 
purpose of visiting in Europe, be considered as his having ceased to 
be employed on the plant specified in the license, although his name 
was retained on the roll of employees and he was again employed on 
the plant specified immediately upon his return to this country ? 

Referring now to your first question, when the Legislature 
enacted section 8 above quoted, and provided that "a license 
in force on the first day of January in the year nineteen 
hundred and twelve shall continue in force until it is suspended 
or revoked for the incompetence or untrustworthiness of the 
licensee," it very clearly and evidently intended to, and did, 
make an exception in regard to special licenses by following 
the language last above quoted with these words: "except that 
a special license shall not continue in force after the holder thereof 
ceases to he employed on the plant specified in the license." 

It is my opinion that a special license issued before the 
enactment of chapter 562 of the Acts of 1911 becomes null 
and void w^henever the holder of it ceases to be employed 
on the plant specified therein. 

The answer to your second question is included in the 
answer to your first, and I assume that as the answer to your 
first question is negative, no further answer is required to the 
second. 

Taking up your third question, I have to say that the words 
"ceases to be employed," as used in the statute above quoted, 
with reference to the holder of a special license, mean a com- 
plete severance from his employment. An employee who is 
absent from the plant where he is employed, on a vacation, 
on account of illness or on leave of absence, even for a period, 
of six months, his name being retained on the roll of em- 
ploj^ees. has not, in my opinion, ceased to be employed in 
the sense intended by the statute, and his license, therefore^ 
remains in force. 

Yours respectfully, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General, 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Agricultural Societies. 

Under R. L., c. 124, § 1, providing that certain agricultural societies 
may receive bounties from the Commonwealth if not within twelve 
miles from the grounds of another such society, the distances should 
be computed on the way of travel from one point to another. 

Jan. 29, 1914. 
State Board of Agriculture. 

Gentlemen: — Under date of January 28, you have written 
me as follows: — 

Referring to section 1 of chapter 124 of the Revised Laws, as 
amended by chapter 133 cf the Acts of the year 1909, the State Board 
of Agriculture hereby requests your opinion as to whether, in line 6 
and again in line 25 of said section, the distance of twelve miles should 
be interpreted to mean in a straight line or by the shortest highway 
between the two points in question. 

The statute in question provides that — 

Every incorporated agricultural society which was entitled to bounty 
from this commonwealth before the twenty-fifth day of May in the 
year eighteen hundred and sixty-six, and every other such society 
whose exhibition grounds and buildings are not within twelve miles 
of those of a society which was then entitled to bounty 

may under certain conditions receive a bounty from the 
Commonwealth. 

The obvious purpose of establishing the twelve-mile limit 
was to prevent the growth of too many of such societies in 
the same locality, wdth the consequent division of effort. No 
good public purpose would be served by construing this limit 
as a bee-line limit. What possible objection could there be 
to the existence of two societies ten miles apart in a bee-line 
through impassable mountains, although one hundred miles 
apart by road! The statute evidently contemplates twelve 
miles of farmer's travel, the case being analogous to that of a 
statute or court rule providing that depositions may be taken 
of witnesses living more than a certain number of miles from 
court, which statutes and rules obviously contemplate the dis- 
tance that the witness would have to travel. See Jennings 
V. Menaugh, 118 Fed. 612, and cases cited. 

Our Supreme Judicial Court has held that, in the case of a 
statute which prohibits the granting of a liquor license for 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 9 

**any building or place on the same street within four hun- 
dred feet of any building occupied in whole or in part as a 
public school," "the four hundred feet between them are to 
be determined by measuring the nearest point of each house 
to the other." Commonwealth \. Jones, 142 Mass. 573, 576. 

This decision may, however, be differentiated. The four 
hundred feet restriction is either purely arbitrary, or at most is 
based on a general consideration of the concomitants ot prox- 
imity, including sight, smell, noise, the general effect on a neigh- 
borhood, as well as mere accessibility. But no consideration 
except that of accessibility can well be the reason for a long 
limit, such as the twelve-mile distance in the statute in ques- 
tion. 

It is my opinion, therefore, that the twelve-mile distance 
in chapter 133 of the Acts of 1909 is to be computed on the 
way of travel from one point to the other. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Constitutional Law — Justice of the Peace — Notary Public. 

An act providing that "all members of the Massachusetts bar are hereby 
made justices of the peace and notaries public" would be unconsti- 
tutional. 

Jan. 31, 1914. 
To ike Committee on Legal Affairs. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion as to 
whether House Bill No. 515, if enacted, would be constitu- 
tional. This bill is in the following terms: — 

Section 1. All members of the Massachusetts bar are hereby 
made justices of the peace and notaries public, ^\dth all the privileges, 
powers and duties belonging to said offices. 

Section 2. A certificate from the clerk of the supreme court, 
who shall keep a record of such members, shall be proof that the 
person mentioned therein is such a member and a justice of the peace 
and notary public. 

Section 3. This act shall take effect upon its passage. 

"By the Constitution of the Commonwealth the office of 
justice of the peace is a judicial office." Opinion of the 
Justices, 107 Mass. 604. 



10 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Article IX of section I of chapter II of part the second of 
the Constitution provides, in part, that — 

All judicial officers . . . shall be nominated and appointed l:)y the 
governor, by and with the advice and consent of the council. 

Article III of chapter III of part the second of the Constitu- 
tion provides as follows: — 

In order that the people may not suffer from the long continuance 
in place of smy justice of the peace who shall fail of discharging the 
important duties of his office with abihty or fideUty, all commissions 
of justices of the peace shaU expire and become void, in the term of 
seven years from their respective dates; and, upon the expiration 
of any commission, the same may, if necessary, be renewed, or another 
person appointed, as shall most conduce to the well-being of the com- 
monwealth. 

As to the appointment of notaries public, the fourth amend- 
ment to the Constitution provides that — 

Notaries public shall be appointed by the governor in the same 
manner as judicial officers are appointed, and shall hold their offices 
during seven j^ears, unless sooner removed by the governor, with the 
consent of the council, upon the address of both houses of the legisla- 
ture. 

In view of the provisions of the Constitution above quoted, 
I have to advise you that in my opinion this bill, if enacted, 
would be unconstitutional. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-GeneraL 



Public Records — Illegitimate Children. 

Under R. L., c. 29, § 1, par. 2, it is unlawful for a city or town clerk to 
use the term "illegitimate" in the record of a birth of a child unless 
the illegitimacy has been legally determined or admitted by the sworn 
statement of both the father and mother of the child. 

Feb. 2, 1914. 
Henry E. Woods, Esq., Coynmissioner of Public Records. 

Dear Sir: — You request my opinion in regard to the 

record of the birth of a child born to an unmarried woman. 

The statute dealing with the subject of registration of births, 

paragraph 2 of section 1 of chapter 29 of the Revised Laws, 

is as follow^s: — 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 11 

In the record of births, the date of the record, the date of birth, 
the place of birth, the name of the child, the sex and color of the child, 
the names and places of birth of the parents, including the maiden 
name of the mother, the occupation of the father, and the residence 
of the parents. In the record of the birth of an illegitimate child the 
name of, and other facts relating to, the father shall not be recorded 
except at the request in writing of both father and mother. The term 
" illegitimate '^ shall not be used in the record of a birth unless the 
illegitimacy has been legally determined, or has been admitted by the 
sworn statement of both the father and mother. 

I note that the town clerk in his letter to you writes : " Now 
as a matter of fact this child is illegitimate and must be so 
recorded." I respectfully suggest that you call his attention 
to the fact that he is forbidden by the statute to use the term 
"illegitimate" in the record unless the illegitimacy has been 
legally determined or has been admitted by the sworn state- 
ment of both the father and mother. I advise that the town 
clerk expunge the erroneous record already made, making the 
expunging a matter of record, and that he then make a record 
oi the birth of the child in accordance with the provisions of 
the statute. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Civil Service — Sealer oj Weights and Measures. 

R. L. c. 62, § 18, is not repealed by St. 1909, c. 382, in so far as that section 
requires annual appointment of sealers and deputy sealers of weights 
and measures in cities and towns of over ten thousand inhabitants; 
and although such sealers and their deputies are protected by civil 
service laws from being lowered in rank or compensation or removal 
from office, the term of their office is not extended. 

Feb. 5, 1914. 
Thure Hanson, Esq., Commissioner of Weights and Measures. 

Dear Sir: — You request my opinion upon the following 
questions, to wit: — 

1. Does section 2 of chapter 382 of the Acts of the year 1909 
have the effect of repealing section 18 of chapter 62 of the Revised 
Laws in so far as that section requires annual appointment of sealers 
and deputy sealers of weights and measures in cities and towns of over 
ten thousand inhabitants, who are included in the classified civil 
service by the provisions of said chapter 382 of the Acts of 1909? 



12 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

2. Are sealers and deputy sealers in cities and towns of over ten 
thousand inhabitants protected by existing laws in reference to civil 
service, so that they shall be retained in office during good behavior, 
regardless of the change of municipal administration? 

Chapter 382 of the Acts of 1909 is as follows: — 

Section 1. The civil service commissioners may prepare rules, 
which shall take effect when approved by the governor and council 
in the manner provided by law, for including within the classified 
civil service all principal or assistant sealers of weights and measures 
holding office by appointment under any city or any town of over ten 
thousand inhabitants, whether such officers are heads of principal 
departments or not, and also for including within the said service the 
inspectors of weights and measures of the commonwealth. 

Section 2. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith are 
hereby repealed. 

Section 18 of chapter 62 of the Revised Laws, to which 
you refer, provides as follows: — 

The mayor and aldermen of cities and the selectmen of towns shall 
annually, in March or April, appoint one or more sealers of weights 
and measures, or one sealer and one or more deputy sealers to act under 
the direction of the sealer, and they may also appoint gangers of liquid 
measures; and may at any time remove such sealers, deputy sealers 
and gangers, and appoint others in their places. 

Section 18 not being expressly repealed by chapter 382 of 
the Acts of 1909 in the particulars to which you refer, the 
question arises as to whether it has been repealed by other 
legislation, and as to whether it was repealed by that chapter 
by implication. 

Looking to other legislation, we find that the Legislature of 
1904, by chapter 314 of the acts of that year, enacted that — 

Every person holding office or emplojTnent in the public service of 
the Commonwealth or in any county, city or town thereof, classified 
under the civil service rules of the Commonwealth, shall hold such 
office or employment and shall not be removed therefrom, lowered in 
rank or compensation, or suspended, or, w^ithout his consent, transferred 
from such office or employment to any other except for just cause and 
for reasons specifically given in writing. 

After the passage of this act the cases of Smith v. Mayor 
of Haverhill, 187 Mass. 323, and of Lahar v. Eldridge, 190 
Mass. 504, were passed upon by the Supreme Court, and it 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 13 

was held that this statute did not extend the term of an 
officer appointed for a specified number of years, but related 
to the removal or the lowering in rank or compensation, or 
suspension or transfer of such an officer within the term for 
which he had been appointed. In the first-mentioned case 
the court said: — 

Any other construction would enlarge an appointment for a terai 
of years into a life tenure, provided it was a classified office under the 
civil service rules. 

This ruling left police officers, in many cities in the Com- 
monwealth, to be appointed annually or for some other stated 
term. To remedy this condition of affairs as to police officers 
chapter 210 of the Acts of 1906 was enacted, providing in 
substance that police officers shall hold office during good 
behavior; but the operation of that act is limited to police 
officers. No similar legislation has been enacted in regard 
to sealers of weights and measures and their assistants or 
deputies or in regard to inspectors. 

By section 1 of chapter 624 of the Acts of 1911 it is pro- 
vided that — 

Every person now holding or hereafter appointed to an office classi- 
fied under the civil service rules of the commonwealth, . . . whether 
appointed for a definite or stated term, or otherwise, who is removed 
therefrom, lowered in rank or compensation, or suspended, or, without 
his consent, transferred from such office or employment to any other, 
may . . . bring a petition in the pohce, district or municipal court, etc. 

This statute clearly recognizes the fact that appointments in 
the classified civil service may be made for a definite or stated 
term. 

Coming now to the question as to w^hether section 18 of 
chapter 62 of the Revised Laws was repealed by chapter 382 
of the Acts of 1909 by implication, we find that chapter 382 
makes no provision whatever as to the time when or the 
term for which appointments shall be made. It is clear that 
the provisions of section 18 of chapter 62 of the Revised Laws, 
to the effect that "the maj'or and aldermen of cities and the 
selectmen of towns shall annually, in March or April, appoint 
one or more sealers of weights and measures," etc., are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of chapter 382 of the Acts of 
1909, and therefore remain in force. I am of the opinion that 



14 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

section 2 of chapter 382 of the Acts of 1909 does not have the 
effect of repealing section 18 of chapter 62 of the Revised Laws 
in so far as that section requires annual appointment of 
sealers and deputy sealers of weights and measures in cities 
and towns of over ten thousand inhabitants, who are included 
in the classified civil service by the provisions of said chapter 
382 of the Acts of 1909. 

In reply to your second question I have to say that in my 
opinion sealers of weights and measures and their deputies 
in cities of over ten thousand inhabitants are protected by 
existing civil service laws as to being lowered in rank or com- 
pensation or removed from office during the term for which 
they have been appointed, but, as I have already indicated, 
the term of their office is not, in my opinion, extended by 
reason of the provisions of chapter 382 of the Acts of the year 
1909. 

Yours respectfully, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Corporations — Contracts — Typewritten Signature — Tests of 

Samples. 

A typewTitten signature of a corporation by a duly authorized agent to 
a proposal for a contract is valid. 

In case of doubt in the construction of a contract, reference may be had 
to the specifications as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the 
parties. 

"Where a contract for the sale of coal of a certain grade provides that 
samples "will be taken until the total quantity amounts to about 
1,000 pounds and shall represent not more than 500 tons of coal," 
and the samples are thus taken on deliveries of any part of 500 tons, 
if the coal thus tested is below the standard, penalties may be exacted 
as the contract provides. 

WTiere penalties are exacted under a contract for the sale of coal, of 1 per 
cent, in price for every 1 per cent, below the Thermal Unit analysis 
specified, the per cent, (including fractions) of price decrease as exactly 
equals the per cent, of deficiency, must be calculated. 

Feb. 6, 1914. 
E. V. ScRiBNER, M.D., Superintendent, Worcester State Hospital. 

Dear Sir: — You have requested my advice upon certain 
questions that have arisen in regard to a contract made and 
entered into on the twenty-eighth day of May, 1913, by the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, acting by the trustees of 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 15 

your institution, party of the first part, and the People's Coal 
Company of Worcester, party of the second part, in regard 
to the purchase of a quantity of coal by the Commonwealth 
from the People's Coal Company, and for the sale and delivery 
of said coal to the Commonwealth by said company. 

You ask first: "Is this proposal, having only typewritten 
signatures, legal?" 

Generally speaking, the validity of a signature depends not 
upon the instrument but upon the intention with which it 
was made. If the intention of the signer is to make a con- 
tract or a proposal for a contract a typewritten signature may 
be valid and binding. In those cases in which the signature 
is made by an agent, and this is necessarily the case whenever 
a corporate signature is required, the question always arises 
as to the authority of the agent to make the signature. I 
assume that in this case the person signing the proposal was 
duly authorized to do so by the People's Coal Company, with 
the intent to make a valid signature to the proposal, and 
therefore that the signature is valid. 

Your second question is: "Does the fact that the clause 
'Data to establish a basis for payment,' as named on said 
proposal, was not incorporated in the contract, eliminate from 
consideration the figures therein named, or is said proposal a 
part and parcel of said contract?" 

While we must look to the contract for a determination 
of the rights of the parties to it, still, in case of doubt as to 
its construction, reference may be had to the specifications as 
an aid in interpreting the contract and in ascertaining the 
intention of the parties. Applying this principle to the case 
in hand we find in the typewritten contract, under the head of 
"Price," on page 3, the following: — 

(a) Should the British Thermal Units be less by more than two 
per cent. (2%) than those specified in the analysis, the price shall be 
decreased one per cent. (1%) tor every one per cent. (1%) they lall 
below the said B. T. U. after allowing the said two per cent. (2%). 

Here the analysis is distinctly referred to, yet there is no 
analysis shown in the contract, and the only analysis known 
to have been considered between the parties is the one set 
out in the specifications, to which we have to resort to ascer- 
tain what the analj^sis referred to is. Referring to the speci- 
fications, we find on page 3, under the head "Proximate 
Analysis," the following: — 



16 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT [Jan. 

The following is the approximate analysis of the coal it is proposed 
to furnish : — 

Moisture, .90 

Volatile matter, 20.10 

Fixed carbon, 73 . 14 

Ash, 0.86 

B. T. U., 14,961 

Sulphur, 1.25 

Temperature at which ash fuses, 2700 

This analysis, clearly referred to in the contract, and found 
in the specifications, undoubtedly affords the proximate stand- 
ard of the coal to be furnished to your institution by the 
People's Coal Company, and indicates that 14,900 B. T. U. 
was adopted as the standard from which percentages were to 
be computed. I note your statement that the People's Coal 
Company contends that 14,600 B. T. U. is the figure from 
which the percentage should be figured. That this construc- 
tion is untenable is clearly shown by the specifications, at 
page 1, under the heading "Causes for Rejection," and by 
the typewritten contract, the language used in the contract 
being identical with that used in the specifications, and is as 
follows: "Coals containing less than 14,600 B. T. U. shall be 
subject to rejection." This part of the contract evidently 
means that coal having 14,600 B. T. U. or more may not be 
rejected but must be accepted, while coal that runs below 
that standard may at the discretion of the trustees be rejected; 
in other words, the language last above quoted establishes for 
the purpose of this contract the line above w^hich coal must 
be accepted, even though at a reduced price, and below which 
coal may be actually rejected, and does not and was not in- 
tended to fix the basis upon which the percentage for reduction 
in price is to be computed. 

Your third question is: "Under the heading of 'Sampling' 
are these words: 'Such a sample will be taken until the total 
quantity amounts to about 1,000 pounds, and shall represent 
not more than 500 tons of coal.' If the sample am^ounts to 
the required number of pounds, may w^e not penalize, if nec- 
essary to exact penalties, on lesser quantities than 500 tons?" 

The language of the contract bearing directly upon the 
point to w^hich your question is addressed is, " Such a sample 
will be taken until the total quantity amounts to about 1,000 
pounds, and shall represent not more than 500 tons of coal." 



1195.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 17 

The only limitation upon the quantity to be tested is that it 
shall not represent more than 500 tons. I am of the opinion 
that if the sample amounts to the required number of pounds 
you may test any quantity of coal delivered up to 500 tons, 
and if the coal thus tested is found to be below the standard 
fixed by the contract, may exact such penalties as the con- 
tract provides. 

I am also requested by H. Louis Stick, M.D., superintend- 
ent of the Worcester State Asjdum, to advise as to which of 
the following bases the decreases of price should be computed 
upon: — 

1. One per cent, of price decrease for every 1 per cent, or major 
fraction thereof of deficiency of B. T. U. 

2. One per cent, for every full 1 per cent, of deficiency. 

3. Exactly the same per cent., including fractions of price decrease, 
as there is deficienc}^ 

It is my opinion that such reduction should be computed 
in accordance with the third suggestion; that is, the rate per 
cent, of decrease in price should be precisel}^ the same, in- 
cluding fractions of 1 per cent., as the rate per cent, of defi- 
ciency in B. T. U., after allowing the 2 per cent, reduction 
provided for in that part of the contract above quoted. 
Very trul}^ yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General 



Civil Service — Age Limit. 

Under St. 1908, c. 375, § 1, a person above the age of fifty years is not 
eligible for appointment as inspector of factories and public buildings. 

Feb. 9, 1914. 
Warren P. Dudley, Esq., Secretary, Civil Service Commission. 

Dear Sir: — You ask my opinion upon the following ques- 
tion: "Is a man, not a veteran, who is above the age of fifty 
3'ears and not otherwise disqualified, eligible for appointment 
as an inspector of factories and public buildings as a member 
of the inspection department of the District Police if he was 
placed on the eligible list by the Civil Service Commission 
before he was above the age of fiftv years?" 



18 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Section 1 of chapter 375 of the Acts of 1908 provides that — 

A person who is not above the age of fift^^ years, if otherwise quah- 
fied, shall be eligible for appointment as an inspector of factories and 
public buildings, as a member of the inspection department of the 
district police. 

This statute is still in force and does not relate to the time 
a person passes a civil service examination nor to the time of 
going on the eligible list, but to the age of the person at the 
time of appointment. 

I am of the opinion that this statute makes persons above 
the age of fift}^ years ineligible for appointment to the position 
of inspector of factories and public buildings, and that the 
rule is not affected by the date of the examination for ap- 
pointment. 

Very trul}' yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Bureau of Statistics — Cities and Towns — Debt Limit — Emer- 
gency Appropriations. 

Under St. 1912, c. 75, § 1, it is the duty of the director of the Bureau of 
Statistics to determine whether certain appropriations of cities or 
towns are emergency appropriations within the provisions of St. 
1913, c. 719, § 5, cl. lo. 

Feb. 11, 1914. 

Charles F. Gettemy, Esq., Director of the Bureau of Statistics. 

Dear Sir: — The town of Chelmsford having voted ''that 
the town borrow the sum of $1,500 on a promissory note for 
that amount to be signed in its name and behalf by the town 
treasurer, payable in three installments of $500 each in one, 
two and three years from date thereof, with interest at a rate 
not exceeding 5 per cent, per annum, payable semiannualh', 
such note to be countersigned by the selectmen, and the pro- 
ceeds used to pay for the purchase of fire hose and equipment 
of same for the Chelmsford fire department, to be used by 
the town for fire purposes, and that the ownership will be 
and remain in the name of the town of Chelmsford, and 
that said money is to be expended for the town by a com- 
mittee of three, consisting of the present chief of the Chelms- 
ford Center fire department, one member of the Chelmsford 
Center water board, to be named by said board, and one 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 19 

other to be named b}' said chief and said member of the 
water board," and the treasurer of that town haying for- 
warded to you for certification a promissory note of the town 
drawn in conformity to this vote, you ask my opinion as to 
whether a loan of this character rnay properly be construed 
as coming within the authority of clause 15 of section 5 of 
chapter 719 of the Acts of 1913. 

So far as it relates to your question, the provision of the 
section referred to is that — 

Cities and tounis may incur debt, within the limit of indebtedness 
prescribed in this act, . . . 

For extreme emergency appropriations involving the health or 
safety of the people or their property. 

I do not find that the word "emergency" has been given 
any definition in law that takes it out of its ordinary meaning. 
The word is defined by Webster as ''any event or occasional 
combination of circumstances which calls for immediate action 
to remedy pressing necessit}^" The word is further defined 
as "a sudden or unexpected happening; an unforeseen occur- 
rence or condition." (Century Dictionary.) These definitions 
are as useful as any I have found in the books. The words 
used in statutes are usually to be understood in their ordinary 
signification. 

Your authority in the matter of certifying notes of mu- 
nicipalities appears to be set forth in section 1 of chapter 45, 
Acts of 1912, as follows: — 

That said director [referring to the director of the Bureau of Statis- 
tics shall not certify any note as provided for in this act if it shall 
appear that the provisions of law relating to municipal indebtedness 
in the making of said note have not been properly complied with. 

Whether a case of extreme emergency exists in any case 
like that now under consideration is a question of fact for the 
director of the Bureau of Statistics to determine. It is a 
matter for investigation. The statutes have, in my opinion, 
placed upon your office the authority to decide, and the re- 
sponsibility of deciding, the question. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



20 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Constiiutional Law — Liberty of the Press — Drunkenyiess. 

A law which forbids the pubHcation of the name of a person arrested for 
drunkenness would be unconstitutional. 

Feb. 11, 1914. 
Committee on Legal Affairs. 

Gentlemen: — You have asked my opinion whether House 
Bill No. 665 "would interfere with the right of the press to 
free publication." 

Section 1, which contains the gist of the proposed legisla- 
tion, is as follows: — 

No person shall print or publish, or cause or permit to be printed 
or published, the name of any person arrested, arraigned, or tried for 
or convicted of drunkenness, unless such person shall be arrested, ar- 
raigned or tried for or con\dcted of some other ofTense in connection 
with the offense of drunkenness. 

The provision of our Constitution relative to freedom of the 
press is as follows: — 

The liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a 
state; it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this commonwealth. 
(Bill of Rights, Art. XVI.) 

Our Supreme Judicial Court has said: — 

The obvious intent of this provision was to prevent the enactment 
of license laws, or other direct restraints upon publication, leaving 
individuals at liberty to print, without the previous permission of any 
officer of goverimaent, subject to responsibihty for the matter printed. 
Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick. 206, 219. 

In other words, there can be no censorship of news, even 
by general law^s. The intention of that article of the Bill of 
Rights was to preserve from interference by legislation or in- 
junction in the future, the common-la^v rights of the press as 
they then existed. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., 
pages 512, 513. 

There is a fundamental principle of common law that the 
publication of legal proceedings is privileged. 

^'Though the publication of such proceedings may be to the dis- 
advantage of the particular individual concerned, j^et it is of vast 
importance to the pubhc that the proceedings of courts of justice 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 21 

should be universally known. The general advantage to the country 
in having these proceedings made public, more than counterbalances 
the inconveniences to the private persons whose conduct may be the 
subject of such proceedings." . . . 

The chief advantage to the country which we can discern, and 
that which we understand to be intended by the foregoing passage, 
is the security which publicity gives for the proper administration of 
justice. ... It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place 
under the public eye, . . . because it is of the highest moment that 
those who administer justice should always act under the sense of 
public responsibility, and that everj^ citizen should be able to satisfy 
himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is 
performed. Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394. 

This common-law^ right to publish legal proceedings is pro- 
tected by the constitutional provision above quoted. 

But under the police power, the Legislature may pass 
"statutes required to protect the public morals or general 
welfare of the people" without infringing on this right. 8 
Cyc. 892. 

However, it is difficult to see how the bill in question would 
fall within that class of statutes. It is therefore my opinion 
that the proposed legislation, if enacted, would be uncon- 
stitutional. 

Very truly j'ours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Labor — Twenty-Jour Hours' Rest in Seven Days. 

It is unlawful to permit the taking of inventories by employees during the 
twenty-four hour rest period required to be given to employees in 
seven consecutive days, under the provisions of St. 1913, c. 619. 

Feb. 11, 1914. 
Robert N. Turner, Esq., Commissioner of Labor. 

Dear Sir: — If I understand your letter of Feb. 6, 1914, 
you desire an opinion from this office upon the following 
question: — 

Are employers of labor in manufacturing estabhshments required by 
law to give to persons in their employ who work regularly six days in 
a week twenty-four consecutive hours of rest, or may employees who 
have worked regularly the six working days of the week be required 
to assist in taking an inventory on Sundaj^? 



22 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

The law in regard to this question is contained in chapter 
619 of the Acts of 1913, which provides as follows: — 

Section 1. Every employer of labor, whether a person, partner- 
ship or corporation, engaged in carrying on any manufacturing or 
mercantile estabhshment in this conunonwealth as hereinafter defined, 
shall allow every person, except those specified in section two, employed 
in such manufacturing or mercantile establishment at least twenty- 
four consecutive hours of rest in every seven consecutive days. No 
employer shall operate any such manufacturing or mercantile estab- 
lishment on Sunday, unless he shall have complied with the provisions 
of section three; but this act shall not authorize any work on Sunday 
not now authorized by law. 

Section 2. This act shall not apply to (a) janitors; (6) watch- 
men; (c) employees whose duties include no work on Sunday other 
than (1) setting sponges in bakeries; (2) caring for five animals; (3) 
maintaining fires; (4) caring for macliinery; (5) employees engaged 
in the preparation, printing, publication, sale or delivery of newspapers; 
(6) any labor called for bj^ an emergency that could not reasonably 
have been anticipated. 

Your question is confined to manufacturing establishments. 
The term ''manufacturing establishments" is defined by St. 
1909, c. 514, § 17, to mean "any premises, room or place 
used for the purpose of making, altering, repairing, orna- 
menting, finishing or adapting for sale any article or part 
of an article." 

B}' section 5 of chapter 619 of the Acts of 1913 it is pro- 
vided that — 

In this act "manufacturing establishments" and "mercantile estab- 
Ushments" shall have the meaning defined in section seventeen of 
chapter five hundred and fourteen of the acts of the year nineteen 
hundred and nine, except that neither of said terms shall be held to 
include establishments used for the manufacture or distribution of 
gas, electricity, milk or water, hotels, restaurants, drug stores, livery 
stables, or garages. 

I assume that in using the term "manufacturing estab- 
lishments" you refer to such establishments as are within 
this definition and are not within the exceptions above men- 
tioned. 

The language of the statute is too clear to admit of a pos- 
sible misunderstanding: "every employer of labor, . . . en- 
gaged in carrying on an}^ manufacturing or mercantile estab- 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 23 

lishment in this commonwealth as hereinafter defined, shall 
allow every person, except those specified in section two, 
employed in such manufacturing or mercantile establishment 
at least twenty-four consecutive hours of rest in every seven 
consecutive days." This is the language of the statute. I 
do not know how your question can be more clearly answered. 
The language is not ambiguous. 

No one regards the work of taking an inventory as rest, 
nor can the taking of an inventory in the ordinary course 
of business be regarded as *' labor called for by an emergency 
that could not reasonably have been anticipated," within the 
provisions of section 2 of chapter 619, above quoted. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Constitutional Law — Newspapers. 

A law to prohibit contracts by publishers appointing local sole agents for 
the sale of periodicals would be unconstitutional. 

Feb. 13, 1914. 

Committee on Legal Affairs. 

Gentlemen: — Your inquiry of February 12 received rela- 
tive to the constitutionality of House Bill No. 229, entitled 
" An Act relative to the sale of newspapers and periodicals." 
The purpose of this act appears to be to prohibit contracts 
by publishers appointing local sole agents for the sale of peri- 
odicals. 

The Constitution of Massachusetts enumerates among the 
natural, inalienable rights of men the right "of acquiring, 
possessing, and protecting property." Bill of Rights, Art. I. 

The Constitution of the United States protects ''life, liberty 
and property." U. S. Const. Amendments, Arts. V and XIV. 

These provisions of State and Federal Constitutions pro- 
tect freedom of contract. As our Supreme Judicial Court has 
expressed it, " the right to acquire, possess and protect prop- 
erty includes the right to make reasonable contracts." Com- 
vionwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 121. 

These rights, however, are subject to limitations, arising under the 
proper exercise of the police power. . . . The nature of the police 
power and its extent, as applied to conceivable cases, cannot easily be 
stated with exactness. It includes the right to legislate in the interest 



24 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

of the public health, the public safety and the public morals. ... If 
we are to include in the definition, as many judges have done, the right 
to legislate for the public welfare, this term should be defined with 
some strictness, so as not to include everything that might be enacted 
on grounds of mere expediency. Commonwealth v. Strauss, 191 
Mass. 545, 550. 

It is difficult to see how the proposed bill falls within the 
police power. The practice which it prohibits is not con- 
trary to public policy as laid down in the past by the primary 
tribunal of public policy, to wit, the Legislature. The laws 
prohibiting contracts w^hich bind a buyer to buy exclusively 
of the seller contain provisos expressly excepting contracts of 
the sort aimed at in the proposed bill. See the following 
quotations : — 

But the provisions of this section shall not prohibit the appointment 
of agents or sole agents for the sale of, nor the making of contracts 
for the exclusive sale of, goods, wares or merchandise. (R. L., 
c. 56, § 1.) 

Provided, that nothing in this act shall be construed to prohibit the 
appointment of agents or sole agents to sell or lease machinery, tools, 
implements or appliances. (St. 1907, c. 469, § 1.) 

The Supreme Judicial Court, in holding one of these statutes 
constitutional, laid stress on the fact that the statute does 
not prohibit the appointment of sole agents, and that it 
allows contracts for the exclusive sale of goods. Common- 
wealth V. Strauss, supra, p. 551. 

There is nothing in the nature of periodicals to distinguish 
them from other goods with respect to the practice aimed at 
in the proposed bill. A general law^ prohibiting the appoint- 
ment of local sole agents would tend to hamper trade without 
producing any appreciable general benefit to the citizens of 
the Commonwealth. 

It is my opinion that the proposed bill, if enacted, would be 
unconstitutional. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 25 



Labor — Eight-hour Day — Contract Work. 

On public work for the State, performed outside the Commonwealth, 

citizens of this State must be given the preference. 
The eight-hour law has no extra-territorial effect. 

Feb. 13, 1914. 

Hon. P. H. CoRR, Chairman, Board of Panama-Pacific Managers for 

Massachusetts. 

Dear Sir: — Your Board requests my opinion upon the 
following questions, namely: — 

1. Is there anything in the Massachusetts laws requiring us to em- 
ploy citizens or residents of Massachusetts on contract work of this 
kind outside of the State? 

2. Is there anything in the Massachusetts laws which requires that 
men employed on this kind of work shall not labor more than a certain 
number of hours a day? 

Taking up your first question, I find that section 21 of 
chapter 514 of the Acts of 1909 is as follows: — 

In the employment of mechanics and laborers in the construction 
of public works by the commonwealth, or by a county, city or town, 
or by persons contracting therewith, preference shall be given to citizens 
of the commonwealth, and, if they cannot be obtained in sufficient 
numbers, then to citizens of the United States; and every contract for 
such works shall contain a provision to this effect. Any contractor 
who knowingly and walfully violates the provisions of this section shall 
be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars for each 
offence. 

This statute clearly requires that in the construction of 
public works by the Commonwealth preference by given (1) 
to citizens of this Commonwealth, and (2) to citizens of the 
United States. While it is probable that in the enactment 
of this statute the Legislature had in contemplation only 
public works within the Commonwealth, still, it seems to me 
that a building of the kind to be erected, by your Board in 
San Francisco may also be considered a public work con- 
structed by the Commonwealth, and I am of the opinion that 
a contract made by your Board for the construction of such 
building should contain the clause provided for in the section 
of the statute above quoted. It should not be understood, 
how^ever, that such a provision in the contract will obligate 



26 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

the contractor to transport men from Massachusetts to San 
Francisco, but that it will require the contractor, whenever 
a citizen of this Commonwealth desires to work at the same 
terms upon which other men are employed by the contractor 
in the kind of work applied for, to give such citizen the pref- 
erence; that is, generally speaking, that other things being 
equal, a citizen of this Commonwealth must be given work 
in preference to anybody else, and failing to find a sufficient 
number of citizens of Massachusetts to do the work in hand, 
the contractor must give a like preference to citizens of the 
United States. 

Taking up now your second question, I find that sections 
1 and 2 of chapter 494 of the Acts of 1911, being the eight- 
hour law of this Commonwealth, provide as follows: — 

Section 1. The service of all laborers, workmen and mechanics, 
now or hereafter employed bj- the commonwealth or by any county 
therein or by any city or town which has accepted the provisions of 
section twenty of chapter one hundred and six of the Revised Laws, 
or of section forty-two of chapter five hundred and fourteen of the acts 
of the 3^ear nineteen hundred and nine, or by anj^ contractor or sub- 
contractor for or upon any public works of the commonwealth or of 
any county therein or of any such city or town, is hereby restricted 
to eight hours in any one calendar day, and it shall be unlawful for any 
officer of the conmionwealth or of any county therein, or of any such 
city or town, or for any such contractor or sub-contractor or other 
person whose duty it shall be to employ, direct or control the service 
of such laborers, workmen or mechanics to require or permit any such 
laborer, workman or mechanic to work more than eight hours in any 
one calendar dsLV, except in cases of extraordinary emergency. Danger 
to property, life, public safety or public health only shall be considered 
cases of extraordinarj^ emergency within the meaning of this section. 
In cases where a Saturday half holiday is given the hours of labor upon 
the other working days of the week may be increased sufficiently to 
make a total of fortj^-eight hours for the week's work. Threat of loss 
of employment or to obstruct o'r prevent the obtaining of employment 
or to refrain from employing in the future shall each be considered to 
be "requiring" within the meaning of this section. Engineers shall 
be regarded as mechanics within the meaning of this act. 

Section 2. Every contract, excluding contracts for the purchase 
of material or supplies, to which the commonwealth or any county 
therein or any city or town which has accepted the provisions of section 
twenty of chapter one hundred and six of the Revised Laws, is a party 
which may involve the emploj^ment of laborers, workmen or mechanics 
shall contain a stipulation that no laborer, workman or mechanic 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 27 

working ivifhm this commonwealth, in the employ of the contractor, 
sub-contractor or other person doing or contracting to do the whole 
or a part of the work contemplated by the contractor shall be requested 
or required to work more than eight hours in any one calendar day, 
and every such contract which does not contain this stipulation shall 
be null and void. 

The laws of a State have no extra-territorial effect. The 
labor laws of California wdll govern as to the hours of labor 
that may be required of men in that State. The Legislature 
evidently considered this phase of the question in enacting 
sections 1 and 2 of chapter 494 of the Acts of 1911 above 
quoted. Section 2 expressly provides that "every contract, 
excluding contracts for the purchase of material or supplies, 
to which the commonwealth ... is a party which may in- 
volve the employment of laborers, workmen or mechanics shall 
contain a stipulation that no laborer, workman or mechanic 
working within this commonwealth shall be required," etc., 
clearly limiting the provisions of this section to work done or 
to be done in this Commonwealth. If your Board contracts 
to have any work done in this Commonwealth, of course all 
the statutes above quoted will certainly apply to all such 
contracts. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Board of Registration in Pharmacy — Registered Pharmacists 

— Hospitals. 

Under St. 1913, c. 705, the Board of Registration in Pharmacy should pass 
on each apphcation for a permit to do drug business, and may not 
adopt a set of rules to govern generally. 

Hospitals and dispensaries need not have registered pharmacists when in 
charge of competent physicians. 

Feb. 14, 1914. 

Mr. Albert J. Brunelle, Secretary, Board of Registration in Pharmacy. 
Dear Sir: — You request my opinion upon two ques- 
tions: — 

1. Whether, under chapter 705 of the Acts of 1913, the Board of 
Registration in Pharmacy has the right to adopt rules specifying what 
kind of persons, firms and corporations they may deem qualified to 
conduct a drug store; and if they do not deem a person, firm or cor- 



28 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

poration qualified to conduct a drug store can the Board refuse the 
permit designated in said act? 

2. Does chapter 76 of the Revised Laws make it necessarj^ for hos- 
pitals and dispensaries to have registered pharmacists in charge of 
their drug dispensing departments? 

Taking up your second question first, I have to say that 
in my opinion chapter 76 of the Revised Laws does not make 
it necessary for hospitals and dispensaries to have registered 
pharmacists in charge of their drug-dispensing departments. 
The purpose of the law was to place the dispensing of drugs 
and medicines in the hands of persons skilled in that kind of 
business, so that it might at all times be intelligently and 
safely done. In dispensaries and hospitals this part of the 
business is always in the hands of a competent physician 
and the need of a registered pharmacist does not exist. 

Referring now to your first question, section 3 of chapter 
705 of the Acts of 1913 reads as follows: — 

The board of registration in pharmacy shall, upon application, issue 
a permit to keep open a store for the transaction of the retail drug 
business to such persons, firms and corporations as the board may 
deem quahfied to conduct such a store. The application for such a 
permit shall be made in such manner and in such form as the board 
shall determine. A permit issued as herein provided shall be exposed 
in a conspicuous place in the store for which the permit is issued and 
shall expire on the first day of January follo\\dng the date of its issue. 
The fee for the permit shall be one dollar. 

Section 4 of the same chapter provides that — 

No such permit shall be issued for a corporation to keep open a store 
for the transaction of the retail drug business, unless it shall appear 
to the satisfaction of the said board that the management of the drug 
business in such store is in the hands of a registered pharmacist. 

The two sections above quoted place upon the Board of 
Registration in Pharmacy the duty of passing upon each ap- 
plication for a permit. The statute indicates that the Board 
may establish rules as to the form and manner in which ap- 
plication for a permit shall be made. As a practical matter 
it would be very difficult to establish rules which should deter- 
mine w^hether an applicant should have a permit or not. It 
is my opinion that the statute requires the Board to act upon 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 29 

each application, and does not authorize the Board to make 
a set of rules to stand in the place of its judgment. 

You further ask: "Can the Board refuse the permit des- 
ignated in said act?" To that I have to say that in my 
opinion it is the duty of the Board to refuse a permit to all 
persons, firms or corporations who in the judgment of the 
Board are not qualified to conduct such a store. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-GeneraL 



Insurance Commissioner — Insurance Companies — Investments, 

The words "funded indebtedness," as used in St. 1907, c. 576, § 37, cl. 3, 
are not synonymous with " contingent liability," and investments by 
insurance companies in railroad mortgage bonds are lawful where the 
capital stock of such railroad corporation equals at least one-third of 
its funded indebtedness. 

Feb. 16, 1914. 
Hon. Frank H. Harbison, Insurance Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — You request my opinion as to the right of 
domestic insurance companies to invest in the mortgage bonds 
of the Michigan Central Railroad Company under conditions 
which you state as follows: "The last published balance sheet 
of said railroad showed capital stock of $18,738,000 and 
funded debt, including debentures and equipment certificates, 
of $43,316,174. This latter figure, however, does not include 
$14,000,000 Detroit River Tunnel Company first mortgage 
bonds, which are guaranteed principal and interest by the 
Michigan Central Railroad, nor does this amount appear in 
the balance sheet of the Michigan Central Railroad." You 
further state that in practical eft'ect these bonds of the Detroit 
River Tunnel Company are an obligation of the Michigan 
Central Railroad; since that is the only company that operates 
the tunnel, and all payments of interest and principal must 
come eventually from it. I am further informed by your 
office that the property of the Detroit River Tunnel Company 
has been leased to the Michigan Central Railroad Company 
for nine hundred and ninety-nine years. You do not state, 
however, and I do not know, whether the Detroit River 
Tunnel Company still keeps up its corporate existence or has 
surrendered its charter. I assume that this company is still 
in existence, that it pursues its rights under the lease and 



30 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

collects and receives its rentals from the Michigan Central 
Railroad Company, and that it is a real corporate entity. 

Clause 3 of section 37 of chapter 576 of the Acts of 1907, 
quoted in your letter, provides that domestic insurance com- 
panies may under certain circumstances invest — 

In the bonds or notes of any railroad or street railway corporation 
incorporated or located wholly or in part in Massachusetts, or in the 
mortgage bonds of any railroad corporation located wholly or in part 
in any state of the United States whose capital stock equals at least 
one third of its funded indebtedness, which has paid regularly for the 
five years next preceding the date of such investment all interest 
charges on said funded indebtedness, and which has paid for such 
period regularly dividends of at least four per cent per annum upon 
all its issues of capital stock, or in the mortgage bonds of any railroad, 
railway or terminal corporation which have been, both as to principal 
and interest, assumed or guaranteed by any such railroad or railway 
corporation. 

This leads, first, to the inquiry, What is funded indebted- 
ness? The word ''funded" has been defined as, — 

Existing in the form of bonds bearing regular interest; constituting 
or forming part of the permanent debt of a government or corporation 
at a fixed rate of interest. (Century Dictionary.) 

The term ''funded debt," "even in common parlance, is 
never made use of to describe an ordinary debt growing out 
of a transaction with one individual and represented by a 
single instrument. It is essential to the idea of a funded debt, 
even under the broadest use of the term, that the debt should 
be divided into three parts or shares, represented by different 
instruments, so that such parts or shares may be readily 
transferable." Ketchum v. City of Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 356. 

Taking these definitions of the word "funded" in connec- 
tion with the w^ord "indebtedness," it becomes evident that 
funded indebtedness is a very diiferent thing from contingent 
liability. In the question you submit there appears to be 
nothing more than a contingent liability of the Michigan 
Central Railroad Company so far as the bonds of the Detroit 
River Tunnel Company are concerned; that is, the railroad 
company will have to pay if the tunnel company fails to 
meet its obligation. So far as we are informed, the Detroit 
River Tunnel Company is still in existence, and the rentals 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 31 

reserved to it in the lease of its property are regularly paid, 
and ma}^ be supposed to be sufficient to provide for the pay- 
ment of its liabilities. It is my opinion, upon the information 
at hand, that the bonds of the Detroit River Tunnel Company 
are not a part of the funded indebtedness of the Michigan 
Central Railroad Company, and that within the limitations 
fixed by our statutes insurance companies may invest in the 
mortgage bonds of the Michigan Central Railroad Company. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



State Board of Health — Local Boards of Health — Inspectors 
of Slaughtering. 

A local board of health cannot lawfully nominate one of its own members 
as inspector of slaughtering, and the State Board of Health is within 
its rights in refusing to approve a nomination so made. 

Feb. 17, 1914. 

Mark W. Richardson, M.D., Secretary, State Board of Health. 

Dear Sir: — You ask my opinion upon certain facts which 
in your communication to this department under date of 
Oct. 28, 1911, you stated as follows: — 

In accordance with chapters 297 and 534 of the Acts of 1911, the 
board of health of a certain to\vn has nominated as inspector of 
slaughtering one of its omti meml^ers. In other words, two members 
of the local board of health have voted for the third to fill this office 
as inspector of slaughtering. In this position, the nominee has been 
a party to his own appointment to a position in which he will have to 
pass upon the character of his own work and upon the amount of the 
compensation which he is to derive from it. 

The question at issue is, can such an appointment be considered 
legal b}^ tliis Board? 

The statute conferring authority upon your Board in regard 
to the approval of nominations of inspectors of slaughtering 
is to be found in section 2 of chapter 534 of the Acts of 1911, 
which provides as follows: — 

For the purposes of this act inspectors shall be appointed, shall be 
compensated, and may be removed in accordance with the provisions 
of law^ relating to inspectors of animals. The first appointments under 
this act shall be made \\dthin thirty days after its passage. 



32 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

By this statute the duties of the State Board of Health in 
respect to inspectors of slaughtering are the same that were 
imposed by law upon the chief of the Cattle Bureau of the 
State Board of Agriculture in respect to inspectors of animals. 

The duties of the chief of the Cattle Bureau in this respect 
are set forth in chapter 143 of the Acts of 1911, section 1 of 
which reads as follows: — 

The mayor and aldermen in cities, except Boston, and the selectmen 
in towTis shall annually, in March, nominate one or more inspectors 
of animals, and before the first day of April shall send to the chief of 
the cattle bureau of the state board of agriculture the name, address 
and occupation of each nominee. Such nominee shall not be appointed 
until approved by the chief of the cattle bureau of the state board of 
agriculture. The aforesaid officials of cities and towns may remove 
any inspector, and shall thereupon immediately nominate another in 
his place and send notice thereof as prescribed above. 

The statute last quoted clearly provided that no nominee 
could be appointed an inspector of animals until approved by 
the chief of the Cattle Bureau, and under the provisions of 
the statute above quoted I am of the opinion that a nominee 
for the position of inspector of slaughtering cannot be ap- 
pointed until he is approved by your Board. I am aware 
that since the enactment of the statute last above quoted 
the office of chief of the Cattle Bureau has been abolished and 
another office created to which the duties of the chief of the 
Cattle Bureau and the Board of Cattle Commissioners have 
been transferred, but this last-mentioned change in the statute 
cannot make any difference as to your authority. As the 
law now stands I am of the opinion that the question of ap- 
proving or refusing to approve the appointment of an in- 
spector of slaughtering is one that rests entirely within the 
sound discretion and judgment of your Board. 

You state, however, that the claim is made that under the 
statute "the only duty which the State Board of Health has 
to perform in relation to the approval or disapproval of the 
appointment of local inspectors of slaughtering is to pass upon 
their qualifications to perform the duties of that office; that 
when the State Board of Health is satisfied that any nominee 
is by training and experience qualified to fulfil the duties of 
the office it has exhausted its power in the matter, and has 
no right to question the legality of the act of the local board 
of health in nominating one of its own members." I do not 



1915] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 33 

think the duties of the State Board of Health in respect to 
this class of appointments are confined within such narrow 
limits; but if it is so, the element of self-interest in the ap- 
pointee goes directly to the question of his qualification to 
properly discharge the duties of the position. In the case of 
Gaw V. Ashley, 195 Mass. 173, where the question was as to 
whether under a city ordinance the board of health of the 
city of New Bedford could lawfully and properly elect one 
of themselves to the office of quarantine physician, the 
Supreme Court said: — 

We are of opinion that they could not. The ordinance contemplates 
the existence of a relation between the physician and the board which 
requires that he shall not be a member of it. He is to make frequent 
reports to the board, and from time to time is to make recommenda- 
tions. His charges to the sick are to be only such as the board ap- 
proves. His personal interest in these charges is inconsistent vAih. 
the proper performance of liis duty, as a member of the board of health, 
to fix their amount, in the interest of the public and for the protection 
of his patients. 

There is very ancient and high authority for the assertion 
that a man cannot serve two masters. 

It is my opinion that the action of the State Board of 

Health in refusing to approve nominations for the office of 

inspector of slaughtering, on the ground that the nominees 

were members of the local board of health, w^as legally correct. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Bureau of Statistics — Certification of Town Notes. 

Under St. 1913, c. 719, the director of the Bureau of Statistics may certify 
notes of a fire district where the district has comphed with the spirit 
and purpose of the statute, even though statutory language was not 
followed in the vote providing for such notes. 

Feb. 19, 1914. 
Charles F. Gettemy, Esq., Director of the Bureau of Statistics. 

Dear Sir: — You request an opinion from this department 
upon the following question: Ought the director of the 
Bureau of Statistics to certify under the provisions of chapter 
719 of the Acts of 1913 a promissory note of Greenfield Fire 
District No. 1, issued in accordance with an article in the 



34 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

warrant for a meeting of the voters of said district, and in 
accordance with a vote of the meeting held under and by 
virtue of said warrant, but which does not expressly provide 
that the debt incurred " shall be made payable from the rev- 
enue of the financial year in which the same is to be in- 
curred "? 

You state that the article in the warrant and the vote taken 
thereon are as follows: — 

Article 4- — To see if the district will vote to l^orrow an}^ sum or 
sums of money appropriated under the foregoing articles. 

Voted, That the district borrow the sum of five thousand dollars 
($5,000), giving a note of the district in payment therefor, signed by 
the treasurer and countersigned by the prudential committee, and 
paj^able November 1, 1914, with interest not to exceed 4^ per cent 
per annum. 

The statute, section 3 of chapter 719 of the Acts of 1913, 
provides for temporary loans in anticipation of the revenue 
of the financial year in which the debt is incurred and ex- 
pressly made payable therefrom by such vote. 

I gather from your letter that the note submitted for cer- 
tification is drawn in accordance with the vote above set 
forth.; that the debt represented by the note is incurred for 
the only purpose for which the fire district is authorized to 
incur debt; and that the only possible way in which it can 
be paid at maturity' is from the revenue of the current year. 
You further state that **the note seems to all intents and pur- 
poses to be a note issued in anticipation of taxes." 

The vote did not follow the precise language of the statute, 
and the real question is whether this departure from the exact 
language of the statute places upon the director of the Bureau 
ol Statistics the duty of refusing to certify the note issued in 
pursuance of it. 

In this instance, although the district did not follow^ the 
exact words of the statute, it did follow its spirit and pur- 
pose. A very ancient writer has said: — 

It is not the words of the .law but the internal sense of it that makes 
the law, and our law, like all others, consists of two parts, namely, 
of body and soul. The letter of the law is the body of the same, and 
the sense and reason of the law are the soul of the law. . . . And it 
often happens that when you know the letter j'ou know not the sense, 
for sometimes the sense is more confined and contracted than the 
letter, and sometimes it is more large and extensive. (2 Plowden, 445.) 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 35 

The intention of the Legislature was to compel the munici- 
pal corporations of the State to adopt the policy of paying as 
they go, and to restrain them from incurring any debt except 
for certain specified purposes. 

Greenfield Fire District No. 1 has in this instance complied 
with the spirit and purpose of the statute. To refuse to 
certify the note in question would put the district to the 
trouble and expense of holding another meeting to. pass a vote 
slightly different in words from the vote it has already passed 
but of exactly the same purpose and intention. 

In such cases as this the rule applies that the spirit and 
reason of the law will prevail over its letter. It is my opinion 
that you may properly and lawfully certify the note in ques- 
tion. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Civil Service — Fire Department — Promotion. 

Under St. 1913, c. 487, a call fireman is eligible to appointment as a member 
of the permanent force of firemen, under certain conditions, without 
being subject to civil service rules, but such call fireman carlnot legally 
be promoted to the office of captain of such permanent force. 

Feb. 19, 1914. 

Warren P, Dudley, Esq., Secretary, Civil Service Commission. 

Dear Sir: — You ask my opinion upon the following ques- 
tion: May a call fireman be appointed captain in a perma- 
nent force of firemen, under the provisions of chapter 487 of 
the Acts of 1913? 

Section 1 of that act provides as follows: — 

Cities and towns which have a call or part call fire department which 
now is or may hereafter be subject to the civil service rules may, on 
the recommendation of the board of engineers of the fire department 
or of the officer or board having charge of the fire department, appoint 
as members of the permanent force without civil service examination 
any persons who have served as call men or part call men for five or 
m^ore successive years : provided, that such persons are certified by the 
city or town pM'sician to be competent physically for the duty. If 
there is no city or iovm physician, then the said certification shall be 
made by a phj'-sician designated for the purpose by the board of engi- 
neers or other authority, as aforesaid. 



36 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Prior to the enactment of this statute promotion or transfer 
from the call to the permanent fire force of a city or town 
could be made only after an open competitive examination 
(Civil Service Rule No. 38, cl. 2), and the promotion, if 
granted, was to the lowest grade of the permanent force. By 
section 1 of chapter 487 of the Acts of 1913, above quoted, 
five or more successive years of service as a call fireman, 
together with the certificate of the city or town physician or 
of such other physician as may be designated for the purpose 
by the board of engineers or other authority, is substituted 
for the competitive examination provided in that part of 
Civil Service Rule No. 38 above referred to. 

While the question is not entirely free from difficulty, it is 
my opinion that the Legislature did not intend to make a 
call fireman eligible to appointment as captain in the perma- 
nent force, but, subject to the conditions specified in the 
statute, to appointment as a member of the permanent fire- 
men force; and I am also of the opinion that under the pro- 
visions of the statute referred to a call fireman cannot legally 
be promoted directly to the office of captain in the permanent 
fire-fighting force of a city or town. 

It is perhaps needless to say that after a call fireman be- 
comes a member of the permanent force he is eligible for 
promotion like any other member of that force, in accordance 
with the provisions of the Civil Service Rules. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Commissioners on Fisheries and Game — City and Town Clerks 
— Custody of Registration Books. 

Books of hunters' certificates of registration should be retained by the 
respective city and town clerks, and the Commissioners on Fisheries 
and Game have no authority to demand their return. 

Feb. 24, 1914. 

Dr. George W. Field, Chairman, Commissioners on Fisheries and Game. 
Dear Sir: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following question: Have the Commissioners on Fisheries 
and Game authority, under chapter 614 of the Acts of 1911, 
as amended by chapter 379 of the Acts of 1912, to demand 
the return to them of books of hunters' certificates of regis- 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 37 

tration furnished by the commissioners to town and city 
clerks? 

Section 9 of chapter 614 of the Acts of 1911 provides as 
follows : — 

Every city and to\\Ti clerk shall report all such registration in books 
kept for that purpose, wliich books shall be open to public inspection 
during the usual office hours of such clerk, and subject to audit and 
inspection by the commissioners on fisheries and game, by the state 
auditor, or by their agents, at all times; and said clerk shaU, on the 
first Monday of every month, pay to the board of commissioners on 
fisheries and game all money received by him for the said registrations, 
except the recording fees which he is entitled to retain, as provided 
in section six, together with a receipted bill for fees due and received 
in accordance mth section six of this act, issued during the month 
preceding. All remittances shall be made by certified check, United 
States post office money order, express money order or lawful money 
of the United States. The board of commissioners on fisheries and 
game shall, in accordance with the provisions of section fifty-six of 
chapter six of the Revised Laws, pay to the treasurer and receiver 
general all money received by them for the said registrations issued 
during the previous month, and shall furnish him with a list of the 
number and kind of registrations recorded by each city and town clerk 
during the previous month. 

This section makes provision that the books in question 
shall be subject "to public inspection during the usual hours 
of such clerk," and subject to audit and inspection by the 
Commissioners on Fisheries and Game, by the State Auditor 
or by their agents, at all times, but does not provide for the 
return of the books in question to your commission. The 
statute apparently intends that the books shall be retained by 
the respective town and city clerks, in whose offices they are 
to be open to audit by the proper authorities and to public 
inspection. 

I am of the opinion that the Commissioners on Fisheries 
and Game have not authority to demand the return of books 
of hunters' certificates furnished by them to town and city 
clerks. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attoniey -General. 



38 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Civil Service — Planning Board of the City of Boston. 

St. 1913, c. 494, creating planning boards in cities and providing for ap- 
pointments to such boards by the mayors, subject to approval by the 
council, does not repeal St. 1909, c. 486, § 9, requiring action by the 
Civil Service Commission on Boston appointments. 

Feb. 24, 1914. 

Warren P. Dudley, Esq., Secretary, Civil Service Commission. 

Dear Sir: — You ask my opinion upon the follovi^ing 
question: "As the law now stands are appointments by the 
mayor of Boston to the planning board of that city to be con- 
firmed by the city council or approved by the Civil Service 
Commission?" The question is whether chapter 494 of the 
Acts of 1913 repealed the provisions of sections 9 and 10 of 
chapter 486 of the Acts of 1909 in so far as they relate to 
appointments to a city planning board of the city of Boston. 

Section 9 of chapter 486 of the Acts of 1909, being the 
charter of the city of Boston, is as follows: — 

All heads of departments and members of municipal boards, in- 
cluding the board of street commissioners, as their present terms of 
office expire (but excluding the school committee and those officials 
by law appointed by the governor), shall be appointed by the 
mayor without confirm.ation by the city council. They shall be 
recognized experts in such work as may devolve upon the incumbents 
of said offices, or persons specially fitted by education, training or 
experience to perform the same, and (except the election com- 
missioners, who shall remain subject to the provisions of existing 
laws) shall be appointed without regard to party affifiation or to 
residence at the time of appointment except as hereinafter provided. 

Section 10 of the same chapter, after making provision for 
certain forms of certificates of appointment, provides that the 
certificate (meaning the certificate of appointment above referred 
to) — 

shall be filed with the city clerk, who shall thereupon forward a certi- 
fied copy to the civil service commission. The commission shall 
immediately make a careful inquiry into the qualifications of the 
nominee under such rules as the}'' maj', with the consent of the governor 
and council, establish, and, if they conclude that he is a competent 
person with the requisite qualifications, they shall file with the city 
clerk a certificate signed by at least a majority of the commission that 
they have made a careful inquiry into the qualifications of the ap- 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 39 

pointee, and that in their opinion he is a recognized expert, or that he 
is quahfied by education, training or experience for said office, as the 
case may be, and that they approve the appointment. 

This section further provides that upon filing of the certificate 
of approval the appointment shall become operative. Section 
10 has been amended by chapter 550 of the Acts of 1912, but 
not in an}' way affecting the provisions above quoted. 

Chapter 494 of the Acts of 191.3 provides that every town 
having a population of more than ten thousand at the last 
preceding national or State census, and every cit\' in the Com- 
monwealth, shall create a board to be known as the planning 
board. It further provides that — 

In cities, the said board shall be appointed bj^ the mayor, subject 
to confirmation by the council, and in cities under a commission form 
of government, so called, the members of the board shall be appointed 
by the governing bod}^ of the city. 

It has been stated as a general rule of law governing such 
cases as are suggested by your question, that — 

When the provisions of a general law, appUcable to the entire State, 
are repugnant to the provisions of a previously enacted special law, 
applicable in a particular locality only, the passage of such general 
law does not operate to modify or repeal the special law, either in 
whole or in part, unless such modification or repeal is provided for 
by express words, or arises b}^ necessary imphcation. (Cyc, Vol. 36, 
p. 1090.) 

The point involved was considered by the Supreme Judicial 
Court of this Commonwealth in the case of Broicii v. Loivell, 
8 Met. 172, and the court, speaking by Chief Justice Shaw, 
said: — 

That a subsequent legislative act repeals all prior acts repugnant 
to it, is a principle which results from the unlimited nature of legisla- 
tive power. The last expression of the legislative will must be carried 
into effect, as the law of the land; and if, on its true construction, it 
is direct^ repugnant to any prior act, it necessarily annuls it, because 
both cannot exist together. But, to have this effect, it must appear 
that the legislative \yiU. was so exercised; or, in other words, that it 
was the intention of the Legislature, that the subsequent act should 
so operate, notmthstanchng any repugnancy to former acts. It may 
happen that acts of special legislation may be made in regard to a 
place, gro^A-ing out of its peculiar wants, condition, and circumstances; 



40 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

as formerly various acts were passed in relation to the town of Boston. 
Afterwards, a general act may be passed, having some of the same 
purposes in view, extending them generally to all the towns of the 
Commonwealth, with provisions adapted to the condition of all towns. 
It would be a question depending upon a careful comparison of the 
two acts, and the objects intended to be accomplished, whether the 
general act must be deemed an imphed repeal of the special prior act. 
In general, we should think it would require pretty strong terms in the 
general act, shomng that it was intended to supersede the special acts, 
in order to hold it to be such a repeal. 

This language was referred to and quoted with approval in 
Cojjeland v. Springfield, 166 Mass. 498. 

In the case last cited the question was whether a provision 
of the charter of the city of Springfield, conferring authority 
upon the city to cause sidewalks to be made and repaired 
and to assess the whole expense upon the abutters, was re- 
pealed b}^ the provisions of chapter 444 of the Acts of 1895, 
to the effect that the board having power to establish side- 
walks in any city may construct or complete walks in any 
street where public convenience reciuires it and may assess 
upon abutters not more than one-half of the expense. 

The court in that case held that the special provision of 
the city charter had not been repealed by the later enact- 
ment, and cited many authorities. 

If the later enactment is evidently intended to supersede 
all prior acts of the matter in hand, and to comprise in itself 
the sole and complete system of legislation on that subject, 
it must, as the last expression of the legislative will, prevail. 

Turning now to an examination and comparison of the two 
statutes in question, we find that the object and purpose of 
chapter 494 of the Acts of 1913 is to provide that cities and 
towns shall have a planning board, and that the matter of 
confirmation of appointments to such boards is a mere detail 
or adjunct to the general plan;- while the object, purpose and 
intent of sections 9 and 10 of chapter 486 of the Acts of 1909, 
so far as their purpose can be gathered from their language, 
was to establish such a system as would insure to the city of 
Boston expert service from the heads of all city departments 
and from the members of all municipal boards, and to this 
end a special system for an examination as to the qualifications 
of appointees and approval of appointments to those leading 
positions in the government of the city by the Civil Service 
Commission was provided for. The purpose, intent and object 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 41 

that prompted the two enactments in question were so widely 
different that I cannot believe it to have been the intention of 
the Legislature of 1913, in the enactment under consideration, 
to make any change in the method of appointment and con- 
firmation to any municipal board of the city of Boston. 

It is my opinion that appointments to the planning board 
of the city of Boston are within the provisions of sections 9 
and 10 of chapter 486 of the Acts of 1909, and that your 
Board has the same duty and authority as to such appoint- 
ments that it has in respect to appointments to other mu- 
nicipal boards of that city. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Atforney-GeneraL 



Liquor Law — Licenses rendered void, when — Conviction — - 

Appeal. 

The provisions of R. L. c. 75, § 107, rendering a liquor license void upon 
conviction of the licensee, do not apply while an appeal on conviction 
in a lower court is pending, 

Feb. 25, 1914. 

Mark W. Richardson, M.D., Secretary, State Board of Health. 

Dear Sir: — You ask my opinion as to whether a license 
granted under the provisions of section 100 of chapter 75 of 
the Revised Laws is rendered void by the conviction of the 
person holding the license in a police or district court of a 
violation of section 106 of said chapter, an appeal from said 
conviction having been taken which is still pending. 

Section 107 of chapter 75 of the Revised Laws provides 
as follows : — 

A conviction under the provisions of the preceding section of any 
person licensed under the provisions of section one hundred shall 
render his license void, and no new license shall be granted to him for 
the balance of the term. 

The word "conviction," as used in this section, is evidently 
used as implying a final judgment and sentence of the court 
upon a verdict or confession of guilt. Under the provisions 
of the statute last above quoted, the effect of a conviction of 
the kind therein named is to deprive the person convicted 
of a valuable right without an opportunity for further trial 
or investigation. It is very readily apparent that the trial in 



42 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

the appellate court may result in establishing the innocence 
of the accused, in which case the license ought not to become 
void but to remain in force. It is my opinion that in the 
circumstances disclosed by your inquiry the license in ques- 
tion does not become void while an appeal is pending. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, AUomey-General. 



Labor — Police Officers — Chauffeurs. 

Chauffeurs employed as drivers of a police patrol, and receiving pay as 
such, are subject to the laws regulating the hours of labor of chauffeurs 
and not of police officers, even though they are special police officers 
by appointment and serve as such without pay. 

Feb. 25, 1914. 

Robert N. Turner, Esq., Commissioner of Labor. 

Dear Sir: — I have your letter with inquiry from the chief 
of police in Xewton in which he says: — 

1 am emploj'ing two chauffeurs as drivers of the auto patrol, one 
of whom works from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m., the other from 6 p.m. to 8 a.m. 
the follo\^^ng morning. These men are citizen operators, but are ap- 
pointed special pohce without pay and draw their salaries as chauf- 
feurs. 

Will j^ou kindh'' inform me if the fact that they are police officers 
makes their emplo\Tnent of over eight hours a day legal, or am I violat- 
ing the labor law? 

The chief of police does not state whether the city of Xewton 
has accepted the provisions of the eight-hour law, so called. 
I assume, however, that it has done so. As I understand the 
letter of the chief the two men mentioned are not employed 
as policemen but as chauffeurs, they draw no salary as police 
officers but are paid for the work they actually perform, and 
are classified on the pay roll as chauffeurs and not as police 
officers. 

It is my opinion that the hours of labor of these men 
should be governed by the kind of service for which they are 
actually employed and paid, and the fact that they are special 
police officers without pay does not, in my opinion, affect the 
number of hours of labor that shall constitute for them a 
day's work. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorncy-GeneraL 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 43 



Board of Education — Transportation of Pupils — '* Preceding 
Year" defined. 

Where towns or cities under St. 1913, c. 396, are required to provide trans- 
portation for high school pupils attending school in other towns or 
cities, the statute is not to be construed as authorizing towns to pro- 
vide board for such pupils. 

Under St. 1913, c. 396, the words "the preceding year" refer to the fiscal 
school year as used in St. 1913, c. 356. 

Feb. 25, 1914. 

State Board of Education. 

Gentlemen: — You ask for an opinion upon questions that 
have arisen with regard to certain provisions of chapter 396 
of the Acts of 1913, as follows: — 

1. In some instances, parents whose children are attending high 
schools in other to^^Tls or cities than that of their residence are asking 
school committees to make payment for the board of these children. 
Can such a claim be recognized as coming T\dthin the term ''transpor- 
tation" as used in the act? 

2. A statement is desired as to the meaning of the term ''the 
preceding year^' as found in lines 18 and 24 of this act. Does the 
year mean the fiscal year of the to\Mi? 

In July, 1914, towTis w^ll send to the Board of Education statements 
of amounts paid for transportation, under this act, for the school year 
ending June 30, 1914; in such a case, is reimbursement to be based 
upon the payments from local taxation for schools for the town year 
closing before July 1, 1914, or for the town year closing before 
July 1, 1913? 

Replying to your first question, I have to say that in view 
of the statutory rule that "words and phrases shall be con- 
strued according to the common and approved usage of the 
language," it is my opinion that a claim made by reason of 
payment for board of children cannot be recognized as coming 
within the term "transportation" as used in the statute above 
referred to. 

You have also requested a construction of the phrase " the 
preceding year" in the same statute. 

By another act of 1913, namely, chapter 356, the annual 
return by school committees to the State Commissioner of 
Education of the amount raised and expended by each town 
for school purposes, although made annually at the close of the 
school year, refers to the taxes of the last preceding fiscal year. 

The statute before me provides, in the case of the amount 
paid for out-of-to^vn high school education, for a return 



44 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

within thirty days of the expenditure. But as payment be- 
tween towns is by custom always made at the close of the 
school year, the statutory requirement amounts to a require- 
ment for annual returns at the close of each school year. 

The statute before me does not provide for annual reim- 
bursements, or for any form of returns, in the case of the 
amount paid for transportation. Nevertheless, I understand 
that, in conformity with the custom as to high school reim- 
bursement, and in conformity with the statutory requirement 
as to all other returns, the State Commissioner of Education 
requires an annual return by school years at the close of each 
school year, and makes an annual reimbursement on the basis 
of such return. 

Thus we have annually at the close of the school year two 
returns, one showing the amount paid for transportation 
during the last school year, the other showing the amount 
expended for the support of public schools during the last 
fiscal year. The most reasonable rule would appear to be to 
reimburse the towns on the basis of the two returns which 
are due together. 

Considered in connection with the custom, it is my opinion 
that the words "the preceding year," in chapter 396 of the 
Acts of 1913, should be construed as referring to the same 
year as the words "the fiscal year last preceding the date 
of the certificate," in chapter 356. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Constitutional Law — Cities arid Toums — Ice. 

A law enacted by the Legislature authorizing cities and towns to cut, 
store and sell ice from reservoirs and ponds owned or controlled by 
.such cities and towns would be unconstitutional, and such cities and 
towns may not acquire or hold property for such purposes. 

Feb. 26, 1914. 
To the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives. 

Gentlemen: — You have required my opinion upon the 
following questions: — 

First. — • Is it within the constitutional power of the General Court 
to enact a law conferring upon a city or town within the Common- 
wealth the power, acting by its water commissioners, to cut, store and 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 45 

sell ice from reservoirs and ponds o^^aied or controlled b}^ such city or 
toT^^l in connection with its water supply? 

Second. — Is it \\ithin the constitutional power of the General Court 
to enact a law conferring upon a city or town within the Common- 
wealth the power to cut ice in the reservoirs and ponds owned or con- 
trolled by such cit}" or town, and to store the ice and to sell it at whole- 
sale or retail, and to fix and collect rates to be paid therefor, and to 
acquire by lease or purchase and to hold property, lands and ease- 
ments for said purposes? 

Third. — Is it within the constitutional power of the General Court 
to enact a law conferring upon a city which o^^^lS and operates a system 
for supplying its inhabitants with water, acting by its water commis- 
sioners, the power to cut ice in the reservoirs, ponds and other sources 
of water supply owaied and controlled bj'- such cit}^, and to store the 
ice so cut and to sell the same at prices fixed by the water commis- 
sioners? 

The real question is: May a city be authorized by the 
Legislature to cut, store and sell ice from reservoirs, ponds 
and other sources of water supply owned or controlled by 
such city or town; in other w^ords, may a city or town deal 
in ice cut and harvested from reservoirs or ponds which it 
owns or controls? 

In recent years it has become more and more urgent to 
have the municipalities, under legislative sanction, construct, 
maintain and operate public utilities, and to regulate the 
operation and to control the rates of charges for commodities 
furnished or services rendered to the public. In England and 
in some of the European countries the scope of municipal 
operations has been greatly extended, and these operations 
are known under the name of "municipal trading." In the 
United States, however, the limitations and restrictions placed 
upon legislative authority by the written Constitutions of the 
respective States has formed an obstacle w^hich has prevented 
the development of municipal trading to any degree that even 
attempts to approach the extent to which it has gone in 
England. (Dillon on Municipal Corporations.) 

The test of constitutionality is whether the service proposed 
is a public service. 

If such a business as is suggested by these questions is to 
be carried on it must be by money raised by taxation, and it 
is settled in this Commonwealth "that the Legislature can 
authorize a city or town to tax its inhabitants only for public 
purposes." Opinion of the Justices, 155 Mass. 598. 



46 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Great difficulty has been found in clearly defining a public 
purpose, and in the opinion last cited the learned justices 
said: — 

It is not easy to determine in every case whether a benefit conferred 
upon many individuals in a community can be called a public service 
within the meaning of the rule that taxes can be laid only for public 
purposes. 

Again, the justices of the Supreme Court have said: — 

It is impossible to define wdth entire accuracy all the characteristics 
which distinguish a public service and a public use from services and 
uses that are private. {Opinion of the Justices, 150 Mass. at p. 595.) 

The Legislature of 1892 requested the opinion of the jus- 
tices of the Supreme Court as to whether the Legislature 
could constitutionally authorize a city or tow^n to buy coal 
and wood in excess of its ordinary requirements for the pur- 
pose of selling such excess to its own citizens. Several ques- 
tions of the same import were propounded to the justices. 
In response to these inquiries the justices said, in part, that 
the question — 

must be determined by considering whether the carrying on of such 
a business for the benefit of the inhabitants can be regarded as a public 
service. This inquiry underlies all the questions on which our opinion 
is required. If such a business is to be carried on, it must be with 
money raised by taxation. It is settled that the Legislature can 
authorize a city or town to tax its inhabitants only for public purposes. 
This is not only the law of this Commonwealth, but of the States 
generally and of the United States. {Opinion of the Justices, 155 
Mass. 601.) 

The Legislature of 1903 required the opinion of the justices 
upon various questions in regard to the purchase of coal 
and w^ood as fuel by a city or town, in excess of its ordi- 
nary requirements, for the purpose of selling such excess so 
purchased to its inhabitants or others (1) at cost, (2) at less 
than cost, or (3) at a profit. In a discussion of the principles 
involved the learned justices said: — 

There is nothing materially different between the proposed estab- 
lishment of a governmental agenc}^ for the sale of fuel and the estab- 
lishment of a hke agency for the sale of other articles of daily use. The 
business of selhng fuel can be conducted easily by individuals in com- 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 47 

petition. It does not require the exercise of any governmental func- 
tion, as does the distribution of water, gas and electricity, which in- 
volves the use of the public streets and the exercise of the right of 
eminent domain. It is not important that it should be conducted as 
a single large enterprise with supplies emanating from a single source, 
as is required for the economical management of the kinds of business 
last mentioned. It does not even call for the investment of a large 
capital, but it can be conducted profitably by a single individual of 
ordinary means. {Opinion of the Justices, 182 Mass. 605.) 

In the opinion last above cited the justices further said: — 

Until wdthin a few years it generally has been conceded, not only 
that it would not be a public use of money for the government to 
expend it in the estabhshment of stores and shops for the purpose of 
carrying on a business of manufacturing or selling goods in competi- 
tion with individuals, but also that it would be a perversion of the 
function of government for the State to enter as a competitor into 
the field of industrial enterprise, with a view either to the profit that 
could be made through the income to be derived from the business, 
or to the indirect gain that might result to purchasers if prices were 
reduced by governmental competition. There may be some now who 
believe it would be well if business was conducted by the people col- 
lectively, living as a community, and represented by the government 
in the management of ordinary industrial affairs. But nobody con- 
tends that such a system is possible under our Constitution. It is 
plain, however, that taxation of the people to establish a city or town 
in the proprietorship of an ordinary mercantile or manufacturing busi- 
ness would be a long step towards it. If men of property, owning 
coal and wood yards, should be compelled to pay taxes for the estab- 
lishment of a rival coal yard by a city or town, to furnish fuel at cost, 
they would thus be forced to make contributions of money for their 
own impoverishment; for if the coal yard of the city or town was 
conducted economically, they would be driven out of business. A 
similar result would follow if the business of furnishing provisions and 
clothing, and other necessaries of life, were taken up by the govern- 
ment; and men who now earn a livelihood as proprietors would be 
forced to work as employees in stores and shops conducted by the 
public authorities. {Opinion of the Justices, 182 Mass. at p. 607.) 

In 1907 a bill to authorize the city of Holyoke to ''cut and 
harvest ice from any great pond or river in its limits, and from 
any ponds or reservoirs used by the municipality as a water 
supply, and to store and sell the same at wholesale to the 
inhabitants of the city" was submitted by the Governor to 
the then Attorney-General, Hon. Dana Malone, whose opinion 



48 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

was that the bill referred to could not constitutionally be 
enacted. 

I am unable to differentiate between the business of dealing 
in coal and fuel and other necessaries of life and the business 
of cutting, harvesting and selling ice. The fact that in the 
instances specified in the questions submitted to me the ice 
is to be cut from reservoirs, ponds or other sources of water 
supply owned or controlled by the city or town cutting, 
storing and selling it, does not, in my opinion, materially 
change the legal aspect of these questions. 

In view of the opinions of the justices and of my learned 
predecessor, above quoted, and of the provisions of the Con- 
stitution, I am constrained to the conclusion that all the 
questions submitted to me in this inquiry must be answered 
in the negative, and that such legislation as is suggested by 
these inquiries, if enacted, would be unconstitutional. 
Very respectfully, 

Thomas J. Botnton, Attorney-General. 



State Hospitals — Boards of Trustees — Salaries of Officers — 
When subject to Approval of Governor and Council. 

Where offices are created in connection with State institutions under St. 
1909, c. 504, either directly or by action of the trustees, salaries to be 
paid persons holding such offices must be approved by the Governor 
and Council. 

March 3, 1914. 

His Excellency David I. Walsh, Governor of the Commonwealth. 

Sir: — You have requested my opinion as to who, among 
the appointees of a board of trustees of one of the State hos- 
pitals, are persons whose salaries are subject to approval by 
the Governor and Council under the provisions of section 18 
of chapter 504 of the Acts of 1909. Section 17 of the same 
chapter has some bearing upon the answer to your inquiry, 
and provides in part as follows: — 

The trustees of each institution shall have charge of the general 
interests thereof, and shall see that its affairs are conducted according 
to law and to the by-laws and regulations established by them. 

Section 18 provides as follows: — 

They shall appoint a superintendent who shall be a phj^sician and 
who shall constantly reside at the institution, assistant physicians, 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 49 

one of whom in each institution for the insane in which women are 
received as patients and in which more than two assistant physicians 
are employed shall be a woman, and a treasurer who shall give bond for 
faithful performance of his duties; shall appoint or make provision in 
by-laws for appointing such officers as in their opinion may be neces- 
sary for conducting efficiently and economically the business of the 
institution; and shall determine, subject to the approval of the gov- 
ernor and council, the salaries of all the officers. All their appoint- 
ments shall be made in such a manner, with such restrictions and for 
such terms, as the by-laws may prescribe. . . . The trustees shall also 
establish by-laws and regulations, with suitable penalties, for the gov- 
ernment of the institutions, and shall provide for a monthly inspection 
and trial of the fire apparatus belonging to the institutions, and for 
the proper organization and monthly drill of the officers and employees 
in its use. 

This question was propounded to one of my predecessors in 
office, the Hon. Dana Malone, and I quote his opinion in 
full: — 

It is evident that the word "officers" is used in the statute in a spe- 
cial sense, and that for a position in the hospital to be an "office," 
witliin the meaning of the statute providing that the trustees shall 
appoint "such officers as in their opinion may be necessary for con- 
ducting efficiently and economically the business of the institution," 
it is not necessary that the position should have all the attributes of an 
office considered as a public office. 

In my opinion, the intent of the statute is that the Governor and 
Council shall have submitted to them for their approval the proposed 
compensation of all persons who hold positions in the institution 
which are created as positions by the trustees, and who are paid salaries, 
as distinguished from those persons who do not hold distinct posi- 
tions and are employed for wages. 

While I agree with the views and conclusion of my learned 
predecessor, I will add that this statute, to my mind, dis- 
tinguishes clearly between officers and employees of the in- 
stitutions. The statute creates and provides for several offices 
in each institution. It establishes the office of superintendent, 
of assistant physicians and of treasurer, and it confers upon 
the board of trustees authority to create offices in addition to 
those specified in the statute, under such title, in such num- 
ber and of such character as in their opinion may be necessary 
for conducting efficiently and economically the business of 
the institution, and also authorizes them to make appoint- 
ments to the offices they have created; and under its pro- 



50 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

visions the salaries pertaining to offices created by the statute 
itself or by act of the board of trustees are all subject to the 
approval of the Governor and Council. The by-laws made by 
the trustees in pursuance of the provisions of the statute, 
or the records of the proceedings of the trustees, should show 
every office created by them. If, for instance, the board of 
trustees, acting under the authority granted by the statute, 
has created the office of chief engineer, the salary attached 
to that office is subject to the approval of the Governor and 
Council. If, however, the board of trustees has not created 
that office, then the Governor and Council have no concern 
with the salary paid to the man employed as chief engineer. 
In the one case he becomes an officer under the statute, whose 
salary must be subject to the approval of the Governor and 
Council, and in the other he is simply an employee, with 
w^hose salary the Governor and Council have no concern. 

I have not the by-laws or other records of proceedings of the 
board of trustees before me, and am therefore unable to render 
a more definite opinion upon the matter you have in hand. 

The question whether the chief engineers or the book- 
keepers are officers or employees is, in my opinion, to be de- 
termined by reference to the action of the board of trustees 
in establishing offices under the statute. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attornei/-General. 



Board of Education — Residence of Minors for School Purposes. 

The word "residence," under St. 1911, c. 471, § 7, relating to applicants 
for admission to an industrial, agricultural or household arts school, 
means the actual residence of such applicants. 

March 10, 1914. 

State Board of Education. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion relative to 
the meaning of the words "residence" and "resides" as used 
in section 7 of chapter 471 of the Acts of 1911. You make 
reference in your communication to certain cases of "par- 
ticular difficulty," as where pupils who are in attendance upon 
the evening industrial school in Boston move to an adjoining 
city or town. 

Each case of this class depends so much upon its own circumstances 
that it is difficult to find authorities for anything more than a few 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 51 

general positions which are plain and well understood." {Sears v. 
Bosio7i, 1 Met. 250.) 

It is said that one is a resident of a place from which his 
departure is indefinite as to time, definite as to purpose; and 
for this purpose he has made the place his temporary home. 
53 Fed. Rep. 311. 

The word ''residence" has been defined as meaning "per- 
sonal presence in a fixed and permanent abode." Where a 
resident of a particular place goes to another place or country, 
the great question whether he has ceased to be a resident of 
one place and become a resident of another will depend 
mainly upon the question, to be determined from all the cir- 
cumstances, whether the new residence is temporary or per- 
manent, whether it is occasional, for the purpose of a visit, 
or of accomplishing a temporary object, or whether it is for 
the purpose of continued residence and abode until some new 
resolution be taken to remove. Sears v. Boston, supra. 

The word "residence" is used in different senses. Gen- 
erally, in the laws relating to taxation, voting and settlement, 
it means the same as domicil; and usually it means the same 
in the law^ of divorce, although with a well-recognized excep- 
tion. 

Generally speaking, the question as to what constitutes 
residence is mainly a question of fact, and the element of 
intention enters into it. The residence must be both actual 
and intended. In re Dr. Munroe, 5 Mad. Ch. R. 379. 

Actual residence and the intention to remain there permanently or 
for an indefinite time without any fixed or certain purpose to return 
to the former place of abode are required to constitute a change of 
domicil. {Winans v. Winans, 205 Mass. 388, 391.) 

And the intention may even be to reside for a definite 
term of years, as in the case of a minister (McCrary, Elec- 
tions, 559), or of a mechanic, day laborer or student. Lyman 
V. Fiske, 17 Pick. 231. 

Each successive domicil continues, until changed by acquiring 
another. {Opinion of the Justices, 5 Met. 587.) 

That is to say, one never has at any given time more than 
one place of domicil; and until one's purpose to change his 



52 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

place of domicil or residence has become fixed, he cannot be 
said to have abandoned a former residence. Oliveri v. Atkin- 
son, 168 Mass. 28; Worcester v. Wilbraham, 13 Gray, 586. 

Your concern, however, is chiefly as to the residence of 
minors. The residence of a minor follows that of the father, 
if he is living, and of the mother if the father is dead. Ille- 
gitimate children take the residence of the mother. 14 Cyc. 
843-4. So that it becomes necessary in many cases that you 
consider the residence of the father, or of the mother if the 
father is dead. 

In the case of a person above the age of twenty-one years 
parental support is immaterial unless accompanied by other 
facts tending to show legal residence with the parents. 

The word "residence" as used in the statutes referred to 
in your communication seems to have a somewhat different 
signification than in any of the cases I have referred to. 

I note your statement to the effect that you have ruled 
that "every child shall have a right to attend the public 
schools of the city or town where he actually resides," and 
that actual residence in a municipality constitutes the appli- 
cant a resident, for the purposes of chapter 471 of the Acts 
of 1911. I am of the opinion that this rule is correct. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Harbor and Land Commissioners — Jurisdiction over Ice 
Cutting on Great Ponds. 

The Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners has no jurisdiction over 
the cutting of ice on great ponds, but under R. L., c. 96, §§18 and 25, 
has authority tq permit ice-harvesting structures to encroach on such 
ponds or to abate as nuisances structures erected without a license. 

Makch 11, 1914. 
Board of Harbor and Land Commissioners. 

Gentlemen: — You have inquired whether your Board 
has any jurisdiction with reference to the cutting of ice on 
great ponds belonging to the Commonwealth. 

By the law of Massachusetts, great ponds, not appropriated before 
the Colony Ordinance of 1647 to private persons, are pubUc property, 
the right of reasonablj^ using and enjoying which, for taking ice for 
use or sale, as well as for fishing and fowling, boating, skating, and 
other lawful purposes, is common to all, and in the water or ice of which, 
or in the land imder them, the owners of the shores have no peculiar 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 53 

rights, except bj^ grant from the Legislature, or bj^ prescription, which 
imphes a grant. {Hittinger v. Eames, 121 Mass. 539, 546.) 

It is too well settled to be disputed that the property in the great 
ponds is in the Commonwealth; that the public have the right to use 
them for fishing, fowling, boating, skating, cutting ice for use or sale, 
and other lawful purposes ; and that the owners of the shores have no 
exclusive rights in them except by a grant of the Legislature. ... 

The right to cut ice is common to all the public. {People's Ice 
Co. V. Davenport, 149 Mass. 322, 324.) 

The right to cut ice therefrom for use or sale is common to all, and 
the owners of the shores have no peculiar right in the water or ice, or 
in the land under them, except by grant of the Legislature, or by pre- 
scription from which a grant is to be implied. {Gage v. Stemkrauss, 
131 Mass. 222.) 

Persons have "no peculiar title or right in the pond by 
virtue of being lessees of an ice house and land upon the 
shore." RowcJl v. Doyle, 131 Mass. 474, 476. 

I have been unable to find that there has been any delega- 
tion by the Legislature to your Board of the powder to limit 
the public right to take ice from great ponds. By section 18 
of chapter 96 of the Revised Laws your Board may author- 
ize the encroachment on great ponds for the purpose of build- 
ing structures to be used in ice taking, but such license 
would, of course, confer no exclusive right to take ice. 

Under section 25 of said chapter your Board can abate 
as a nuisance any such structures erected without license. 
See Attorney-General Y. Ellis, 198 Mass. 91. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-Gerieral. 



Board of Registration in Pharmacy — Corporations — Drug 

Stores. 

Under St. 1913, c. 705, § 4, a drug store, if managed by a registered pharma- 
cist, may be owned by a corporation some of whose stockholders are 
not registered pharmacists. 

March 13, 1914. 
State Board of Registration in Pharmacy. 

Gentlemen: — In your communication of recent date you 
state that "the Board of Registration in Pharmacy has been 
petitioned by the Massachusetts State Pharmaceutical Asso- 
ciation to refuse permits to such new stores as have among 
their stockholders unregistered persons actively engaged in 
the business of pharmacy. See § 2, c. 720, Acts of 1913; 



54 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

also c. 705, Acts of 1913." And you add that "information 
is respectfully asked if the Board can comply with said peti- 
tion, provided the store is under the direct supervision of a 
registered stockholder." 

I take it that your inquiry relates to corporations that de- 
sire to open and keep open drug stores, and which have 
among their stockholders persons who are not registered 
pharmacists but who are nevertheless actively engaged in the 
business of pharmacy'. 

It is difficult to understand, in view of the provisions of 
the law and the penalties involved, how any unregistered 
person can now be activel}^ engaged in the business of phar- 
macy. 

It may be well to consider just what that business is. 
"Pharmacy" is defined as meaning — 

1. The art or practice of preparing, preserving, and compounding 
medicines, and of dispensing them according to the formulae or pre- 
scriptions of medical practitioners. 

2. The occupation of an apothecary" or pharmaceutical chemist. 

3. A place where medicines are prepared and dispensed; a drug 
store; an apothecary's shop. (Century Dictionary.) 

It will be noted that the definition relates solely to drugs 
or medicines and the compounding and dispensing of the 
same, and contains no reference to any one of the great num- 
ber of articles of ordinary merchandise now to be found on 
sale in stores where the business of pharmacy or the drug 
business is carried on. 

Section 1 of chapter 705 of the Acts of 1913 defines the 
term "drug business," as used in that act, as follows: — 

The term "drug business" as used in this act shall mean the sale of 
opium, morphine, heroin, codeine or other narcotics, or any salt or 
compound thereof, or am- preparation containing the same, or cocaine, 
alpha or beta eucaine, or any sjmthetic substitute therefor, or any 
salt or compound thereof, or any preparation containing the same, and 
the said term shall also mean the compounding and dispensing of 
physicians' prescriptions. 

Said chapter further provides in sections 2, 3 and 4 as 
follows: — 

Section 2. No store shall be kept open for the transaction of the 
retail drug business unless it is registered with and a permit therefor 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUIVIENT — No. 12. 55 

has been issued by the board of registration in pharmacy as herein 
provided. 

Section 3. The board of registration in pharmacj^ shall, upon 
application, issue a permit to keep open a store for the transaction of 
the retail drug business to such persons, firms and corporations as the 
board may deem qualified to conduct such a store. The application for 
such a permit shall be made in such manner and in such form as the 
board shall determine. A permit issued as herein provided shall be 
exposed in a conspicuous place in the store for which the permit is 
issued and shall expire on the first day of January following the date of 
its issue. The fee for the permit shall be one dollar. 

Section 4. No such permit shall be issued for a corporation to keep 
open a store for the transaction of the retail drug business, unless it 
shall appear to the satisfaction of the said board that the management 
of the drug business in such store is in the hands of a registered phar- 
macist. 

The section last above quoted makes special provision in 
regard to permits to corporations, and provides that no such 
permit shall be issued to a corporation unless it shall appear 
to the satisfaction of your Board that the management of the 
drug business in the store of the corporation is in the hands 
of a registered pharmacist. 

In the sale of the stock of a corporation, some and possibly 
a large part of it will naturally pass into the ownership of 
persons who are not registered pharmacists. The purpose of 
the statute is to protect the public from the dangers that 
would be occasioned by the compounding and dispensing of 
medicines and drugs by ignorant and unskilled persons. Under 
the provisions of section 4 of the statute above quoted it is 
clear that if and when it shall appear to the satisfaction of 
your Board that the management of the drug business in the 
store for which a permit is sought is in the hands of a reg- 
istered pharmacist, the measure of safety required by the 
law has been attained and the provisions of the statute are 
satisfied. It is not to be expected that all the stockholders of 
a corporation, even though it be organized for the special 
purpose of carrying on the drug business, will be registered 
pharmacists; and the fact that some stockholder in such a 
corporation is unlawfully engaged in the drug business would 
not seem to be a sufficient reason for refusing a permit. 

The Board of Registration in Pharmacy is, in my opinion, 
required under the statute of 1913 to act in good faith on 
each and every application made to it for a permit, and to 



56 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

grant permits only to such persons, firms and corporations 
as it may deem qualified to conduct a store for the trans- 
action of the retail drug business as defined in the statute. 
Very truh^ yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Civil Service — Assistant Assessors of the City of Boston. 

St. 1913, c. 484, requiring appointments of first assistant assessors in the 
city of Boston to be subject to civil service does not affect the pro- 
visions of St. 1894, c. 276, relating to assistant assessors other than 
first assistants. 

March 17, 1914. 

Civil Service Commission. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following questions: — 

First. — Are section 13 of chapter 19 of the Re\4sed Laws and 
chapter 276 of the Acts of 1894 inconsistent with the provisions of 
chapter 484 of the Acts of 1913, and therefore repealed? 

Second. — If the above question is answered in the negative is there 
SLiiy violation of said section 13 of chapter 19 of the Revised Laws if, 
in its endeavor to carry out the provisions of each of the above-men- 
tioned acts relating to the appointment of assistant assessors, the Civil 
Ser\ice Commissioners make inquiries of the applicants as to their 
politics and certify" to fill vacancies accordingly? 

Chapter 276 of the x\cts of 1894 provides as follows: — 

In the city of Boston the assistant assessors shall be appointed in 
equal numbers from the two leading political parties, for each grade of 
assistant, and shall be assigned to the various assessment districts so 
that the assistant assessors assigned to any district shall equally repre- 
sent such parties. 

Section 13 of chapter 19 of the Revised Laws provides in 
part : — 

No question in any examination shall relate to, and no appointment 
to a position or selection for emplo^^nent shall be affected by, political 
or religious opinions or affiliations. 

Chapter 484 of the Acts of 1913 provides: — 

Section 1. All appointments of first assistant assessors in the city 
of Boston shall be for an indeterminate period, and shall be subject 
to the civil service rules established under the provisions of chapter 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 57 

nineteen of the Revised Laws and acts in amendment thereof and in 
addition thereto. 

Section 2. First assistant assessors in the cit}^ of Boston holding 
office at the time of the passage of this act shall continue to hold office 
as if appointed under this act. 

Section 3. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent herewith are hereby 
repealed. 

The intention of the Legislature in the enactment of chap- 
ter 484 of the Acts of 1913 was, first, to secure the retention 
in office of those then holding positions of first assistant 
assessors of the city of Boston, and second, to provide that 
appointments to those positions should in the future be 
made in accordance with the civil service law and the rules 
made in pursuance of that law by 3'our commission. Chap- 
ter 276 of the Acts of 1894 and chapter 484 of the Acts of 
1913 both have relation to the city of Boston and to the 
office of first assistant assessors. The purpose and intention 
of the later enactment are certainly not consistent w^th the 
purpose of chapter 276 of the Acts of 1894, and therefore 
repeal the provisions of the earlier statute so far as that 
statute relates to the appointment of first assistant assessors. 
It is my opinion that this repeal goes no farther than the office 
of first assistant assessors, and that assistant assessors other 
than the first may be appointed by the mayor of Boston in 
accordance with the provisions of chapter 276 of the Acts 
of 1894. I am also of the opinion that the provisions of 
section 13 of chapter 19 of the Revised Law^s are not affected 
or in any way modified by the provisions of chapter 484 of 
the Acts of 1913. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boyntox, Attorney-General. 



Labor and Industries — Siietion Shuttle. 

The use of the suction shuttle in factories, by whatever device it is operated, 
is forbidden under St. 1911, c. 281, § 1. 

March 17, 1914. 
State Board of Labor and Industries. 

Gentlemen: — Your communication of March 10, as I 
understand it, requests my opinion upon the following ques- 
tion: May the proprietor of a cotton factory use the suction 



58 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

shuttle, so called, provided he furnishes the employee using 
the shuttle with a hook for threading it, making threading 
by suction unnecessary? 

Section 1 of chapter 281 of the Acts of 1911 provides as 
follows : — 

It shall be unlawful for anj^ proprietor of a factorj^ or any officer or 
agent or other person to require or permit the use of suction shuttles, 
or any form of shuttle in the use of which any part of the shuttle or 
any thread is put in the mouth or touched by the lips of the operator. 
It shall be the duty of the state board of health to enforce the provi- 
sions of this act. 

The danger attending the use of shuttles of this type 
would be avoided by the use of a hook for threading them, 
but the Legislature regarded this type of shuttle as so objec- 
tionable that it enacted that it should be unlawful for any 
proprietor of a factory or any officer or agent or other person 
to require or permit its use. A change in the method of 
using the shuttle in no way alters the statute. I am of the 
opinion that the use of the suction shuttle, by whatever 
device it is operated, is unlawful, and will be so until the 
statute is changed. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Aitorney-General. 



Board of Agriculture — Prizes. 

Under St. 1913, c. 96, the State Board of Agriculture has authority to issue 
prizes, in its discretion, for the best system of farm bookkeepiDg and 
the best plan of a dairy barn. 

M.^BCH 17, 1914. 

State Board of Agriculture. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following question: Is the Dairy Bureau of the State Board 
of Agriculture empowered by chapter 96 of the Resolves of 
1913 to award cash prizes for the best system of farm book- 
keeping, open to the world, and for the best plan of a dairy 
barn, open to the world? 

The evident purpose of this resolve is that stated in its 
title, — " to provide for the encouragement of dairying and 
the production of milk and dairy products of superior qual- 
ity." The resolve provides that this may be done by offering 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 59 

prizes: (1) for the best kept stables, (2) the lowest bacteria 
counts, (3) the best quality of milk, (4) or otherwise, as the 
Board may determine; (5) b}- demonstrations illustrating the 
best methods of dairying; (6) by agents who shall instruct the 
citizens of the Commonwealth in matters of stable construc- 
tion and management and dairy methods in general; (7) by 
the distribution of literature giving information in regard to 
the best methods of dairying, and especially in regard to the 
production of clean milk; and (8) and lastly, "in such other 
manner as the Board may deem best for the encouragement 
of dairying and the production of clean milk." 

This resolution confers upon the Board of Agriculture 
authority to proceed in its own discretion, either by the means 
suggested in the resolution or by such other means and 
methods as in its judgment will in the greatest degree make 
for the encouragement of dairying and the production of 
milk and dairy products of superior quality. The only limi- 
tation upon the exercise of the discretion of the Board is 
the necessary one that applies to all cases of the kind, — that 
it be exercised in good faith. 

The scope of the resolution under which you act in this 
matter is limited to the encouragement of dairjdng, etc. It may 
be a matter of serious consideration whether a system of farm 
bookkeeping falls within the purpose of the resolution. How- 
ever, as, in my opinion, your Board is the final judge of that 
question, I offer no further suggestion of my own upon this 
point. 

It is my opinion that if the Board of Agriculture, in the 
exercise of its discretion and judgment, believes the purposes 
sought by the enactment of chapter 96 of the Resolves of 
1913 will be best served by awarding cash prizes for the best 
system of farm bookkeeping and for the best plan of a dairy 
barn, the competition to be open to the world, it has author- 
ity to offer and award such prizes. 
Very trul}^ yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



60 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Annulment of Marriage — Payment of Alimony. 
Courts cannot make provision for alimony upon annulment of marriage. 

March 23, 1914. 

Commitlee on Social Welfare. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following question: "In case of a petition for nullity of mar- 
riage does the court now have power to make provision for 
the support of the wife?" 

The statute, R. L., c. 151, § 11, provides, among other 
things, that in suits for annulling a marriage a libel may be 
filed in the same manner as a libel for divorce, and that "all 
the provisions of chapter one hundred and fiftj-two relative 
to libels for divorce shall, so far as appropriate, apply to 
libels under the provisions of this section." 

The real question, then, is, "To what extent are the pro- 
visions of chapter 152, relative to decrees for the payment of 
alimony, appropriate to proceedings for the annulment of a 
marriage?" 

It may aid us to reach a sound conclusion in regard to this 
matter if we consider briefly the character and results of 
actions for divorce and actions for nullity. The action for 
divorce is based upon the fact of a valid marriage. The action 
for nullity is based upon the fact that there has been no 
valid marriage. In its consequences a sentence or decree of 
nullit}^ differs materially from a decree of divorce. The 
latter assumes the validity of the marriage. If the marriage 
was not valid, no decree of divorce could be made, and the 
operation of the divorce is entirely prospective; while a 
decree of nullity is retroactive in that it renders the marriage 
void from the beginning, and nullifies all its legal results. 
The parties are to be regarded as if no marriage had ever 
taken place. They are single persons, if they were single 
before. Their rights of property as between themselves are 
to be viewed as having never been affected by the marriage. 

The right to alimony upon the granting of a decree of 
divorce from the bond of matrimony- is purely statutory. 
At the common law, alimony was awarded only in those 
cases in which the marriage relation continued, that is, in 
cases of divorce from bed and board; and no alimony could 
be awarded upon a divorce from the bond of matrimony. 
Davol V. Davol, 13 Mass. 264; Jones v. Jo7ies, IS Me. 308. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 61 

Apart from any consideration of our statute, it may be 
said that as a general proposition a woman, upon a sentence 
of nullity, is not entitled to permanent alimony, although 
some authorities hold that. she is entitled to alimony pendente 
lite. 2 Bishop on Marriage, Separation and Divorce, § 1597. 

This question does not appear to have been passed upon 
by our Suprem.e Judicial Court, the nearest approach to it 
being found in the case of Adams v. Holt, 214 Mass. 77. It 
is worthy of note that counsel for the wife in this case, being 
confronted by the question you have propounded and having 
occasion to give it most careful consideration, evidently con- 
cluded that a claim for alimony could not be sustained, and 
therefore asked for compensation for services, which was 
refused. 

In rendering its decision in the case just referred to the 
court said: — 

It has been held that relief in the nature of alimony cannot be 
afforded except as an incident in connection with a divorce. 

And cited Adams v. Adams, 100 Mass. 365; Parker v. 
Parker, 211 Mass. 139. 

To the same effect are the cases of Page v. Page, 189 Mass. 
85, and Shaimon v. Shannon, 2 Gray, 285. 

While these cases may be said not to be absolutely con- 
clusive in regard to the question before me, inasmuch as 
none of them presented precisely the same issue, still, the 
trend of the Massachusetts decisions referred to, when taken 
into consideration with the essential differences between an 
action for divorce and an action for annulment of marriage, 
the difference in results between decrees for divorce and 
decrees of nullity, and the fact that alimony is incident to 
suits for divorce and is not incident to suits of nullity, are 
certainly sufficient to create very grave doubt as to whether 
alimony can be granted in an action of nullity. 

I am of the opinion that the provisions of our statute in 
regard to alimony are not appropriate to an action of nullity, 
and that for this reason the court in actions of nullity cannot 
make provision for the support of the wife. The question is 
not, however, free from difficulty, and the bill submitted with 
your question would undoubtedly clear this question of all 
doubt and uncertainty. 

Very trul}^ yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney -General. 



62 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Constitutional Law — Liberty of the Press — Publication of 
Names of Drugs taken with Suicidal Intent. 

A law prohibiting the pubhcation of the name of any drug, chemical, etc., 
taken with suicidal intent would be unconstitutional as interfering 
with the Hberty of the press. 

March 24, 1914. 

Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion as to 
whether House Bill No. 1145, if enacted, would be con- 
stitutional. 

The proposed bill reads as follows: — 

Whoever publishes, or causes to be published, in any newspaper or 
magazine, or in any other public manner, the name of any drug, chem- 
ical, or medicinal preparation when the same has been taken by any 
person with suicidal intent, or when any such drug, chemical or medi- 
cinal preparation has been intentionally or unintentionally administered 
or applied to any human being or beast, shall be punished b}^ a fine of 
not less than ten dollars and not more than one hundred dollars, or 
shall be imprisoned in a jail or house of correction for a term not ex- 
ceeding one year, or shall be punished by both such fine and imprison- 
ment. 

The question presented is whether this bill, if enacted, 
will be an unlawful interference with the liberty of the press. 

By the first amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States the liberty of the press is secured against restraint, it 
being provided that Congress shall make no law abridging 
the freedom of speech or of the press. The Constitution of 
this Commonw^ealth, by Article XVI. of the Declaration of 
Rights, secures the liberty of the press in the following 
language: — 

The liberty of the press is essential to the securit}" of freedom in a 
state: it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this commonwealth. 

Notwithstanding the fact that the liberty of the press is 
thus secured against restraint, it is true that it is a right that 
may not be abused. He who uses it is responsible for its 
abuse. 

The liberty of the press, not its licentiousness, is the construction 
which a just regard to the other parts of the Constitution and to the 
wisdom of those who framed it, requires. {Commonwealth v. Blanding, 
3 Pick. 304.) 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 63 

That the licentiousness of the press, not its liberty, may be 
restrained by the exercise of the police power seems to be 
well settled, as in the familiar instances forbidding the pub- 
lication and sale of a newspaper devoted to the publication 
of scandal and immorality, of the prohibition of blasphemous 
publications, the exclusion of obscene matter from the mails, 
and various other enactments. It has ever been the aim of 
our government to maintain and preserve to the press the 
full enjoyment of the right secured to it by the Constitution, 
and to restrain and prevent the abuse of that right. Our 
problem is to determine how far this right extends; to locate 
the line of demarcation at which liberty leaves off and where 
license begins. 

It may be said by way of premise that the phrase "liberty 
of the press" includes a great deal more than the right to 
discuss freely political and governmental questions. It is a 
right the enjoyment of which is not confined solely to those 
who publish books, pamphlets and periodicals. It embodies 
the right of every individual citizen to be informed. Liberty 
of speech and of the press is the liberty to know, to utter, to 
publish and to argue freely upon all questions of public in- 
terest, whether political, religious, social, moral, literary, 
scientific, industrial or financial. Necessarily the field of use- 
fulness and of responsibility of the press increases with every 
advance of human knowledge. The position occupied by the 
press in the modern social and business world has been well 
described, and its legal limitations to a great degree indicated, 
by Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations, 
wherein, speaking of the press, he says: — 

Through it, and by means of the electric telegraph, the public pro- 
ceedings of every civilized countr}^, the debates of the leading legis- 
lative bodies, the events of war, the triumphs of peace, the storms in 
the phj^sical world, and the agitations in the moral and mental, are 
brought home to the knowledge of every reading person, and, to a 
verj^ large extent, before the day is over on which the events have taken 
place. And not public events merely are discussed and described, but 
the actions and words of public men are made public property; and 
any person sufficiently eminent or notorious to become an object of 
pubhc interest will find his movements chronicled in this index of the 
times. Every party has its newspaper organs; every shade of opinion 
on political, religious, literary, moral, industrial, or financial questions 
has its representative; every locality has its press to advocate its claims 
and advance its interests, and even the days regarded as sacred have 



64 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

their special papers to furnish reading suitable for the time. The news- 
paper is also the medium by means of which all classes of the people 
communicate T^ath each other concerning their wants and desires, and 
through which thej^ offer their wares and seek bargains. As it has 
gradually increased in value, and in the extent and variety of its con- 
tents, so the exactions of the communitj^ upon its conductors have 
also increased, until it is demanded of the newspaper publisher that he 
shall daily spread before his readers a complete summary of the events 
transpiring in the world, public or private, so far as those readers can 
reasonably be supposed to take an interest in them; and he who does 
not comply ^ath this demand must give wsiy to him who will. 

The newspaper is also one of the chief means for the education of 
the people. The highest and the lowest in the scale of intelligence 
resort to its columns for information; it is read bj^ those who read 
nothing else, and the best minds of the age make it the medium of 
communication \\ath each other on the highest and most abstruse 
subjects. 

The proposed bill, if enacted, will certainly trench upon 
some of the functions of a free press as described in the 
passage last above quoted. This measure, if enacted, w^ill 
prohibit to some extent the spread of information beneficial 
to many people by showing them w^hat to avoid in the use of 
drugs, chemicals and medicinal preparations. It will tend, 
also, to prevent the dissemination not only of know^ledge 
about poisons, but of their antidotes as well. Its effect 
would be to prevent in some measure the publication of those 
precautionary suggestions that appear in the press in cases 
where poison is administered or taken by mistake, — sugges- 
tions that are really useful to many members of society. If 
it be said that some misguided or w^eak-minded persons make 
bad use of the information contained in publications which it 
is the purpose of this bill to prevent, the answer is that every 
kind of useful knowledge is at times misused and abused, to 
the great injury of individuals and of the community. 

This measure must be considered in the light of the rule 
that — 

The constitutional libertj^ of speech and of the press, as we under- 
stand it, implies a right to freely utter and publish whatever the citizen 
may please, and to be protected against any responsibihty for so doing, 
except so far as such pubhcations, from their blasphemy, obscenity, 
or scandalous character, may be a public offence, or as by their false- 
hood and malice they may injuriously affect the standing, reputation, 
or pecuniary interests of individuals. (Gooley on Constitutional 
Limitations, 5th ed., p. 521.) 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 65 

Entertaining no doubt whatever that the press may be 
held in check whenever its publications violate the rule above 
stated, I am of the opinion that the measure you have sub- 
mitted to me is obnoxious to the provisions of the Con- 
stitution securing the liberty of the press, and that if enacted 
it would be unconstitutional. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-GeneraL 



Milk and Cream — Sealed Bottles — Use for Other Purposes. 

Under R. L., c. 62, § 43, as amended by St. 1909, c. 531, it is not unlawful 
to make use of glass bottles and jars which have been sealed as measures 
of milk and cream for other purposes, but they may not be used again 
as such measures without being resealed. 

March 30, 1914. 

Commissioner of Weights and Measures. 

Dear Sir: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following question: Is it lawful for an}^ person or firm to use 
a bottle which is marked according to the provisions of sec- 
tion 43 of chapter 62 of the Revised Law^s for any other 
purpose than that of the sale of milk or cream? 

Section 43 of chapter 62 of the Revised Laws, as amended 
by chapter 531 of the Acts of 1909, provides in part as 
follows : — 

Glass bottles or jars which are used for the distribution of milk 
or cream to consumers, . . . shall be sealed as measures under the 
pro\dsions of section twenty-one or by the manufacturer. All dealers 
in milk or cream who use glass bottles or jars for the distribution 
of milk or cream to consumers, which have not been sealed by the 
manufacturer, shall bring in such bottles or jars to the office of the 
sealer of weights and measures in their respective cities and towms, to be 
sealed as aforesaid; but no fee shall be charged or received for sealing 
them. If a bottle or jar has once been sealed bj^ the sealer of weights 
and measures or by the manufacturer, it shall not in any case be neces- 
sary to have it sealed again at any time while it is used for the dis- 
tribution of milk or cream to consumers. Glass bottles or jars sealed 
under the provisions of this section shall not be legal measures except 
for the distribution of milk or cream to consumers. 

The foregoing provisions of the statute, so far as they 
relajte to the subject-matter of your inquiry, relate to the use 
of bottles marked in accordance with the statute as con- 



66 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

tainers of milk. In chapter 462 of the Acts of 1910 there is 
a prohibition of the reuse of paper or fiber bottles and jars 
in the sale and delivery of milk or cream. Your inquiry, 
however, relates to the use of glass bottles and jars. 

I find nothing in the statutes to which you refer to pro- 
hibit the use of a milk bottle or jar marked as required by 
law, for any proper purpose, except that so long as it is used 
in the milk or cream business it must be used as the statutes 
require. The statutory provisions that "glass bottles or jars 
sealed under the provisions of this section shall not be legal 
measures except for the distribution of milk or cream to 
consumers," seems to contemplate the possible use of such 
bottles and jars outside the milk or cream business. 

The facts stated in your letter do not, in my opinion, 
disclose a violation of law. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boyntox, Aitorncy-Gencral. 



Constitutional Law — Highways — Licensing of Motor Vehicles 
in Towns by Selectmen. 

A law providing that it is unlawful to operate motor vehicles in a town 
without a license from the selectmen is constitutional. 

March 31, 1914. 

Committee on Towns, House of Representatives. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
constitutionality of House Bill No. 1562, entitled, '*An Act 
to regulate the operation of automobiles and motor vehicles 
in the town of Nantucket." 

The only provisions of the bill about which any consti- 
tutional question can arise are contained in section 1, which 
reads as follows: — 

It shall be unlawful to operate automobiles or motor vehicles of any 
kind on any highway or tow^nway in the town of Nantucket \\dthout a 
license from the selectmen of said town, which license may contain 
any provision not inconsistent wdth any general law now or hereafter 
in force relating to automobiles or motor vehicles. Any such license 
ma}^ be revoked by the selectmen for cause. The fee to be paid for 
such heense shall be not less than ten dollars. 

No specific objection to the constitutionality of this- bill 
has been presented to m.e, but the first question that suggests 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 67 

itself in this regard is as to the authority of the Legislature 
over public ways. 

The Constitution of the Commonwealth vests in the Leg- 
islature "full power and authority . . . from time to time to 
make, ordain, and establish, all manner of wholesome and 
reasonable orders, laws, statutes, and ordinances, directions 
and instructions, either with penalties or without; so as the 
same be not repugnant or contrary to this constitution, as 
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of this com- 
monwealth, and for the government and ordering thereof, 
and of the subjects of the same." 

In the exercise of the authority vested in it by the Consti- 
tution the Legislature has provided for the laying out and 
construction of public ways, either by means of authority 
conferred upon a commission of the Commonwealth, as the 
State Highway Commission, or, in some instances, county 
commissioners, or by authority conferred upon cities and 
towns. It would seem to be too late to question the general 
authority of the Legislature to regulate the use of the high- 
ways in Massachusetts. Generally speaking, the highways 
within and through the State are in fact constructed by au- 
thority of the State itself, and the State has full power to 
provide all proper regulations of police to govern the action 
of persons using them. Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 
7th ed., p. 860. 

In this Commonwealth the Legislature has always exercised 
its authority in such manner as seemed necessary or proper 
to regulate the use of the highways. Among the familiar 
instances of such legislative regulation are: the law of the 
road that when persons meet on a bridge or way, traveling 
with carriages, wagons, carts, sleds, sleighs, bicycles or other 
vehicles, each shall seasonably drive his carriage to the right; 
that the driver of a carriage or other vehicle passing a car- 
riage or other vehicle shall drive to the left; that no person 
shall travel on a bridge or way with a sleigh or sled drawn by 
a horse unless there are at least three bells attached to some 
part of the harness (R. L., c. 54, §§ 1, 2 and 3); that the 
driver of every vehicle on a bridge or way, public or private, 
where there is not an unobstructed view of the road for at 
least one hundred yards shall keep his vehicle on the right of 
the middle of the traveled part of such bridge or way. (St. 
1908, c. 512, § 1.) So, too, it was long ago held that the 



68 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

speed of travel may be regulated with a view to safe 
use and general protection and to prevent a public nuisance. 
Commonwealth v. Worcester, 3 Pick. 461; Commonwealth v. 
Stodder, 2 Cush. 562. And the Legislature has provided that 
one may not allow his beasts to run at large on a public way. 
Commonwealth v. Curtis, 9 Allen, 266. The riding of bicycles 
on sidewalks is prohibited. R. L., c. 52, §§ 9, 10, 11 and 12. 
The construction of bicycle paths in the highway and the reser- 
vation of spaces for the use of horseback riders in certain 
parts of public ways has been authorized. R. L., c. 48, § 45. 

The Legislature has power to authorize, and has authorized, 
certain obstructions in highways which would otherwise be a 
public nuisance, such as the laying of railroad tracks. Com- 
monwealth v. Old Colony &: Fall River R.R. Co., 14 Gray, 93; 
Springfield v. Connecticut River R.R. Co., 4 Cush. 71. And 
the Legislature may grant a power to take land already 
appropriated and in use as a public way for another public 
use. Springfield v. Cormecticut River R.R. Co., 4 Cush. 71; 
Boston V. Brookline, 156 Mass. 172; Newton v. Newton, 188 
Mass. 226. 

Many other instances of the exercise of legislative authority 
in the control and regulation of the use of highways might 
be cited. 

Legislation has also been enacted directly regulating the 
use of automobiles and motor vehicles on public ways, and 
also authorizing various boards, towns and cities to make 
by-laws and ordinances in regard to the same matter; and 
the constitutionality of this legislation has been sustained by 
the Supreme Judicial Court. An instance of legislation of 
this kind is to be found in chapter 203 of the Acts of 1907, 
which provides that — 

Any person who operates an automobile or motor vehicle, and any 
owner of an automobile who permits such machine to be operated in or 
over any highway or private way laid out under authority of law or 
otherwise, from which automobiles or motor vehicles are excluded, 
pro\dded notice of such exclusion is conspicuously posted at the en- 
trance to such way, shall be liable to any or all of the provisions and 
penalties pro\dded in section nine of chapter four hundred and seventy- 
three of the acts of the year nineteen hundred and three, as amended 
by section three of chapter four hundred and twelve of the acts of the 
year nineteen hundred and six, for violation of the laws regulating the 
use of automobiles and the conduct of operators thereof. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 69 

This act has been re-enacted in and superseded by section 
15 of chapter 534 of the Acts of 1909, and is now in force. 
Its operation on the island of Nantucket may, however, be 
prevented by the proviso contained in section 17 of said 
chapter, to the effect that — 

No ordinance, by-law or regulation now in force upon the island of 
Nantucket relating to the use or operation of motor vehicles shall be 
affected bj^ the provisions of this act. 

I have not before me the ordinances or by-laws of the town 
of Nantucket, and am therefore unable to say whether this 
section is in force in Nantucket or not. 

In the case of Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 199 Mass. 542, 
the constitutionality of chapter 203 of the Acts of 1907 and 
of the sections therein referred to come into question. Acting 
under the provisions of this statute the selectmen of Ashfield 
duly posted notices excluding automobiles from certain high- 
ways within their jurisdiction, and the defendant, disregarding 
the notices, drove his automobile upon and over one of the 
ways thus posted and from which automobiles were excluded. 
In its discussion of the constitutional right of the Legislature 
to enact such a law the court said: — 

Automobiles are vehicles of great speed and power, whose appear- 
ance is frightful to most horses that are unaccustomed to them. The 
use of them introduces a new element of danger to ordinary travellers 
on the highways, as well as to those riding in the automobiles. In 
order to protect the public great care should be exercised in the use of 
them. Statutory regulation of their speed while running on the high- 
ways is reasonable and proper for the promotion of the safety of the 
public. It is the duty of the Legislature, in the exercise of the police 
power, to consider the risks that arise from the use of new inventions 
applying the forces of nature in pre^dously unknown ways. The gen- 
eral principle is too famiUar to need discussion. It has been apphed 
to automobiles in different States with the approval of the courts. 
Commonwealth v. Boijd, 188 Mass. 79. Christy v. Elliott, 216 111. 31. 
People V. Schneider, 139 Mich. 673. People v. MacWilliams, 86 N. Y. 
Supp. 357. 

It seems too plain for discussion that, with a view to the safety of 
the public, the Legislature may pass laws regulating the speed of such 
machines when running upon highwaj^s. The same principle is applica- 
ble to a determination by the Legislature that there are some streets 
and ways on which such machines should not be allowed at all. In 
some parts of the State, where there is but little travel, public neces- 
sity and convenience have required the construction of waj^s which 



70 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

are steep and narrow, over which it might be difficult to run an auto- 
mobile, and where it would be very dangerous for the occupants if 
automobiles were used upon them. In such places it might be much 
more dangerous for travellers with horses and with vehicles of other 
kinds if automobiles were allowed there. No one has a right to use 
the streets and public places as he chooses, without regard to the 
safety of other persons who are rightty there. In choosing his vehicle, 
every one must consider whether it is of a kind which will put in peril 
those using the streets differently in a reasonable wa3^ In parks and 
cemeteries and private grounds, where narrow roads with precipitous 
banks are sometimes constructed for carriages dra-s\Ti by horses, it has 
been a common practice to exclude automobiles altogether, chiefly 
because of the danger of their frightening horses. 

The general principle referred to was applied long ago to a different 
kind of vehicle, in Commonwealth v. Sf odder, 2 Cush. 562, a case which 
relates to an ordinance of the city of Boston, prescribing the streets on 
which certain omnibuses might be run and excluding them from other 
streets. ... 

The right of the Legislature, acting under the police power, to pre- 
scribe that automobiles shall not pass over certain streets or public 
wa^^s in a city or town, seems to us well established both upon prin- 
ciple and authority. 

So far, then, as the power and authority of the Legislature 
is concerned, I am of the opinion that the proposed bill is 
within the provisions of the Constitution. 

It may, how^ever, be urged that the power of the Legis- 
lature to regulate the use of highways cannot be delegated 
to a board of selectmen. This question also has been dis- 
cussed by the Supreme Judicial Court. It received very full 
consideration in the case of Brodbine v. Revere, 182 Mass. 598. 
In that case the question at issue w^as as to the constitu- 
tionality of section 3 of chapter 288 of the Acts of 1894, 
conferring authority upon the Metropolitan Park Commis- 
sioners to make rules and regulations for the government and 
use of the roadways or boulevards under their care, "breaches 
whereof shall be breaches of the peace and punishable as 
such in any court having jurisdiction of the same." It w^as 
contended that this was an unconstitutional attempt to dele- 
gate legislative power. In speaking of this c^uestion the 
court said: — 

It is well established in this Commonwealth and elsewhere that the 
Legislature cannot delegate the general power to make law^s conferred 
upon it by a Constitution hke that of Massachusetts. (Citing numerous 
authorities.) 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 71 

The court further said: — 

This doctrine is held bj^ the courts ahnost universally. 

There is a well-known exception to it, resting upon conditions 
existing from ancient times in most of the older States of the Union, 
which the Constitutions of the States general^ recognize, namely, the 
existence of town or other local governmental organizations which 
have alwa^^s been accustomed to exercise self-government in regard to 
local police regulations and other matters affecting peculiarly the in- 
terests of their own inhabitants. On this account the determination 
of matters of this kind has been held to be a proper exercise of local 
self-government which the Legislature may commit to a city or town. 
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 108 Mass. 27. Stone v. Charlestown, 114 
Mass. 214. Opinion of the Justices, 160 Mass. 586. People v. Albertson, 
55 N. Y. 50. Gloversville v. Hoicell, 70 N. Y. 287, State v. Morris County 
7 Vroom, 72. . . . It is very clear, where the people of a city or town 
have become so numerous that the management of their municipal 
affairs can be conducted conveniently only by a representative body 
like a city council, that municipal legislation, such as making ordinances 
and regulations as to local matters affecting the health, safety, and con- 
venience of the people, may be intrusted to the people's chosen repre- 
sentatives in a city government. Hence city councils are usually 
authorized to pass ordinances, as voters of towns adopt by-laws. In 
this Commonwealth legislation has gone further than this. Apparently 
on grounds of expediency amounting almost to necessity, the making 
of rules and regulations for the preservation of the public health has 
been intrusted to boards of health in towns as well as in cities, and to a 
State board of health, and a violation of the rules established by city 
or town boards has long been and is now punishable in the courts. . . . 
The validity of these statutes, which has long been recognized, stands 
upon one or both of two grounds. They may be considered as being 
within the principle permitting local self-government as to such matters, 
the board of health being treated as properly representing the inhab- 
itants in making regulations, which often are needed at short notice 
and which could not well be made, in all kinds of cases, by the voters 
in town meetings assembled. Perhaps some of these statutes may 
also be justified constitutionally on the ground that the work of the 
board of health is onl}^ a determination of details in the nature of 
administration, which may be by a board appointed for that purpose, 
and that the substantive legislation is that part of the statute which 
prescribes a penalty for the disobedience of the rules which they make 
as agents performing executive and administrative duties. 

Again the court says: — 

There is also a strong ground for the contention that the quoted 
language of the statute simply leaves to the board the administration 
of details which the Legislature cannot well determine for itself, and 



72 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

which it may therefore leave to the determination of a subordinate 
tribunal, and that the substance of the legislation is found in that 
part of the statute which prescribes punisliment for disregard of the 
regulations so determined. 

This decision is cited with approval in Commonwealth v. 
Kingsbury, 199 Mass. 542. See also, Crouminshield v. Crown- 
inshield, 187 Mass. 221; Nelson v. State Board of Health, 186 
Mass. 330. 

The authorities above cited seem quite sufficient to show 
the authority and power of the Legislature to control and 
regulate the use of the highways of the Commonwealth, and 
that the Legislature may in the exercise of its discretion con- 
fer upon towns or other local governmental organizations 
matters affecting peculiarly the interests of their own inhab- 
itants and matters of local police regulation. 

I note further that the proposed bill, subject to a limita- 
tion as to general laws now or hereafter in force, and as to 
the minimum fee to be charged for a license under it, leaves 
the amount of license fee and the provisions of the license to 
be fixed by the selectmen of Nantucket. Legislation of this 
precise character, so far as the fixing of license fee is con- 
cerned, was considered by the Supreme Judicial Court, and 
its constitutionality sustained in the case of Boston v. Schaffer, 
9 Pick. 415. In that case it was urged that a statute granting 
authority to the mayor and aldermen of the city of Boston 
to license theaters, "on such terms and conditions as to them 
may seem just and reasonable," was unconstitutional; but the 
court held the statute to be valid, and sustained the action 
taken by the mayor and aldermen of Boston under its pro- 
visions. 

In the consideration of this proposed measure of legisla- 
tion I must and do assume that the Legislature, in its passage 
(if it is passed), judged its enactment to be for the good and 
welfare of the Commonwealth, and that the action of the 
selectmen of Nantucket, in determining the provisions of the 
license and the amount of the license fee, will be reasonable. 

I am of the opinion that the proposed bill, if enacted, will 
be constitutional. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boyntox, Attorney-General. 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMEXT — No. 12. 73 



Trust Coiwpanies — Vse of icord "Bank" as j^art of Business 

Name. 

There is no statutory prohibition of the use of the word "bank" as a part 

of the business name of a trust company. 

March 31, 1914. 
Hon. Augustus L. Thorndike, Bank Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — You request my opinion upon the following 
question: — 

A trust companj^ incorporated under the laws of this Commonwealth, 
and acting under chapter 116 of the Revised Laws, wishes to change 
its name so that it will be known as a bank and trust company. 

Will you please advise me if, in j^our opinion, a trust company by 
using the word ''bank" as part of its name would be conflicting with 
the laws under which it is operating. Also would it be in conflict with 
chapter 115 of the Revised Laws if a trust company which is operating 
under another statute should designate itself as a bank. 

Section 3 of chapter 116 of the Revised Laws, as amended 
~by section 1 of chapter 491 of the Acts of 1909, provides in 
part: — 

No person or association and no bank or corporation, except trust 
companies incorporated as such in this commonwealth, shall use in 
the name or title under which his or its business is transacted the 
words "Trust Company" even though said words may be separated 
in such name or title by one or more other words, or advertise or put 
forth a sign as a trust company or in Miy wa}^ solicit or receive deposits 
as such. 

Section 16 of chapter 590 of the Acts of 1908, as amended 
by section 4 of chapter 491 of the Acts of 1909, provides: — 

No corporation, either domestic or foreign, and no person, partner- 
ship or association except savings banks and trust companies incor- 
porated under the laws of this commonwealth, or such foreign banking 
corporations as were doing business in this commonwealth and were 
subject to examination or supervision of the commissioner on June 
first, nineteen hundred and six, shall hereafter make use of any sign 
at the place where its business is transacted having thereon any name, 
or other word or words indicating that such place or office is the place 
or office of a savings bank. Nor shall such corporation, person, part- 
nership or association make use of or circulate anj^ wTitten or printed 
or partly \\Titten and partly printed paper whatever, having thereon 
any name, or other word or words, indicating that such business is the 
business of a savings bank; nor shall any such corporation, person, 



74 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

partnership or association, or anj^ agent of a foreign corporation not 
having an established place of business in this commonwealth, solicit 
or receive deposits or transact business in the way or manner of a 
savings bank, or in such a way or manner as to lead the public to be- 
lieve, or as in the opinion of the commissioner might lead the public 
to believe, that its business is that of a savings bank. Nor shall any 
person, partnership, corporation or association except co-operative 
banks incorporated under the laws of this commonwealth and corpora- 
tions described in the first sentence of this section hereafter transact 
business under any name or title which contains the words "bank" 
or ''banking," as descriptive of said business. 

The statutes seem to prohibit the use of the name "trust 
company" by any but a corporation that is in fact a trust com- 
pany, but also seems to contemplate the possible use of other 
words as a part of the name of the corporation in combina- 
tion with the words "trust company." There is a real dis- 
tinction between a bank and a trust company, although 
many of the functions of the two kinds of corporations are 
the same. I do not, however, find any prohibition of the use 
of the word "bank" in connection with the words "trust 
company," and am of the opinion that the word "bank" 
may be used as part of the corporate name with the words 
"trust company," so far as any strictly legal question is con- 
cerned. Whether as a matter of policy the use of the name 
ought to be permitted is a matter not for the consideration 
of this department. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Constitutional Law — Taxation of Industries — Exemptions. 

A law exempting manufacturing property from taxation for a term of 
years, when authorized by local authorities, would be unconstitutional. 

April 3, 1914. 
To the Honorable House of Representatives. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
constitutionality of House Bill No. 1386, which amends chap- 
ter 12 of the Revised Laws by inserting after section 6 thereof 
the following sections: — 

Section 7. The voters of any city or town may vote to exempt, 
or may authorize the city or town council or board of aldermen of 
such city or town to exempt from taxation for a period not exceeding 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 75 

ten j^ears, such manufacturing property as msiy thereafter be located 
in said city or town in consequence of such exemption, and the land 
on which such property is located. 

Section 8. Property so exempted under the preceding section 
shall not, during such period of exemption, be liable to taxation while 
such property is used for the purposes for which it was so located. 

By the Constitution of the Commonwealth, Part Second, 
Chapter L, Section I., Article IV., the General Court is em- 
powered — 

To impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, 
rates, and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and persons resident, 
and estates lying, mthin the said commonwealth; and also to impose 
and levy reasonable duties and excises upon any produce, goods, wares, 
merchandise, and commodities, wiiatsoever, brought into, produced, 
manufactured, or being within the same; . . . 

And while the pubhc charges of government, or any part thereof, 
shall be assessed on polls and estates, in the manner that has hitherto 
been practised, in order that such assessments may be made ^vith 
equahty, there shall be a valuation of estates witliin the commonwealth, 
taken anew once in every ten years at least, and as much oftener as 
the general court shall order. 

These are the only provisions of the Constitution directly 
affecting the subject of taxation. The Constitution contains 
certain provisions in regard to taxation for specific purposes, 
recognizing the importance of the public worship of God and 
of instruction in piety, religion and morality, and also in 
regard to the encouragement of literature and science, the 
diffusion of education among the people, and the promotion 
of general benevolence and public and private charity. 

It is said that — 

As taxation of the people may be imposed for these objects, prop- 
erty used for literary, educational, benevolent, charitable or scientific 
purposes may weU be exempted from taxation. Such exemptions do 
not prevent the taxation of the people from being proportional and 
equal. {Opinion of the Justices, 195 Mass. 607.) 

The general purpose of the constitutional provision above quoted is 
to put the burdens of government equally upon all the people, in pro- 
portion to their ability to bear them. {Opinion of the Justices, supra.) 

To exempt a new" industry from taxation, as provided in 
this proposed bill, would in some, and probably in many, 
instances result, in eft'ect, in taxing an old established Indus- 



76 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

try to aid in establishing a competitor in business. The 
exemption of any property from taxation results in the dis- 
proportionate taxation of the other property in the same 
taxing district, and as the Constitution permits only propor- 
tional taxation, all property within the Commonwealth, which 
is owned and held in such a way that it ought to be available 
to its owner to increase his ability and enlarge his duty in 
defraying the expenses of the government, must be subjected 
by law to the annual tax levy. 

The statute exempting property from taxation is unconstitutional 
unless it applies only to property already taxed in some other way, 
or to property devoted to a public or semi-public use, or to property 
of insignificant value and of such a character that it may be supposed 
to be owned by every one alike. (Nichols on Taxation in Massa- 
chusetts, § 39.) 

The result of my examination of the Constitution and the 
authorities under it is that I am of the opinion that this bill 
will, if enacted, be unconstitutional. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attoniey -General. 



Treasurer and Receiver-General — Bonds — Names of Purchasers. 

The Treasurer and Receiver-General is not required to disclose the names 
of purchasers of State bonds. 

April 3, 1914. 

Hon. Frederick W. Mansfield, Treasurer and Receiver-General. 

Dear Sir: — You ask my opinion upon the following ques- 
tion: Is the State Treasurer required by any existing law, 
or is it proper for him, to disclose the names and addresses of 
purchasers of tax-exempt State bonds? 

I have to say that while it might under some circumstances 
become the right of the State Auditor to demand such in- 
formation, when it would also become the duty of the Treas- 
urer and Receiver-General to give it to the Auditor, and while 
the Governor and Council would, in my opinion, have author- 
ity to demand and receive such information, I am clearly of 
the opinion that there is no law requiring that names of pur- 
chasers of tax-exempt bonds from the State Treasurer and 
Receiver-General be made public. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 77 

Your question goes further and requests my opinion as to 
the propriety of making such disclosure. While this is some- 
what beyond the scope of my duties, I may say that inasmuch 
as the bonds are tax-exempt there seems to be no reason why 
the general public should be informed as to who the purchasers 
of these securities may be. The publication of a list of names 
and adresses of the purchasers could not be useful to any one 
except to intermeddlers, curiosity seekers and those who are 
generally busy with other men's matters. I think no bonding 
house would disclose the names of its customers, and that to 
publish a list of names would be to disturb the confidence 
that ought to exist between buyer and seller in a matter of 
this kind. If these bonds were taxable, and the question 
should arise as to giving information to local boards of asses- 
sors, an entirely different question would be presented. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



ClerJiS of Court — Naturalization Fees. 

Clerks of court are not entitled to naturalization fees except such portion 
as is necessary for additional clerical assistance, travel and other 
expenses while acting under the naturalization act. 

April 3, 1914. 
Frank L. Dean, Esq., Controller of County Accounts. 

Dear Sir: — You have requested ni}^ opinion upon the 
following question: Have clerks of courts the right to retain 
for their own use and benefit one-half of the naturalization 
fees, under the naturalization laws of the United States and 
the laws of this Commonwealth? 

Section 37 of chapter 165 of the Revised Laws provides 
that — 

The annual salaries of clerks (meaning clerks of courts) shall be 
in full compensation for all services rendered by them in the civil or 
criminal courts, to the county commissioners, in making any returns 
required by law or in the performance of any other official duty ex- 
cept for such clerical assistance as may be allowed under the pro- 
visions of the following section. 

It is clearly the meaning of this section that the salaries of 
clerks of courts are to be in full of all compensation for their 
official services. This section is supplemented by chapter 253 



78 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

of the Acts of 1908, which makes elaborate provision for the 
keeping of an exact account of all fees received by clerks of 
courts or by any assistant or other person in their offices or 
employment, for any acts done or services rendered in con- 
nection with their said offices, and provides that they shall, 
on or before the tenth day of each month, pay over to the 
treasurer of the county, or to such other officer as may be 
entitled to receive them, all fees received during the preceding 
calendar month, and shall render an account thereof under 
oath, but subject to the proviso that — 

The said clerks may retain that part of any moneys received by 
them under or by authority of the naturahzation laws of the United 
States which they shall certify under oath to the treasurers of their 
respective counties have actually been expended by them for clerical 
assistance, travel and other expenses, while acting under said laws. 

The United States naturalization act of June 29, 1906, 
provides — 

That exclusive jurisdiction to naturalize aliens as citizens of the 
United States is hereby conferred upon the following specified courts: 

United States circuit and district courts now existing . . . ; also 
all courts of record in any State or territor}'' now existing, or which 
may hereafter be created, ha\dng a seal, a clerk, and jurisdiction in 
actions at law or equity, or law and equity, in which the amount in 
controversy is unlimited. 

It is further provided in section 13 of that act — 

That the clerk of each and everj^ court exercising jurisdiction in 
naturahzation cases shall charge, collect, and account for the following 
fees in each proceeding: 



The clerk of any court collecting such fees is hereby authorized to 
retain one-half of the fees collected by him in such naturahzation pro- 
ceeding; the remaining one-haK of the naturalization fees in each 
case collected by such clerks, respectively, shall be accounted for in 
their quarterly accounts, which they are hereby required to render 
the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, and paid over to 
such Bureau within thirty days from the close of each quarter in each 
and ever}^ fiscal j^ear. . . . 

In addition to the fees herein required, the petitioner shall, . . . 
deposit ^dth and pay to the clerk of the court . . . Provided, That 
the clerks of courts exercising jurisdiction in naturalization proceedings 
shall be permitted to retain one-half of the fees in any fiscal year up 
to the sum of three thousand dollars. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 79 

The question, then, is, may clerks of courts of this Com- 
monwealth having jurisdiction in naturalization cases, not- 
withstanding the provisions of the State statute that their 
salaries shall be in full compensation for their services, and 
that they must account for and pay over all fees as above set 
forth, retain for their own emolument one-half the naturaliza- 
tion fees received by them, less the amount actually paid by 
them for clerical assistance, travel and other expenses while 
acting under the naturalization laws? 

The apparent conflict of laws has been productive of some 
contrariety of opinion. Under date of May 24, 1907, Hon. 
Dana Malone, then Attorney-General, rendered an opinion 
on this question to the effect that — 

Clerks of courts cannot retain for their own use one-haK of said 
naturalization fees received by them under the naturalization laws of 
the United States, as their duties and powers are prescribed by the laws 
of this Commonwealth, and they perform the duties required by the 
United States naturahzation act by virtue of their offices as clerks of 
courts of this Commonwealth, and not through appointment by the 
United States, and our law especially requires that all naturalization 
fees be paid over to the treasurer of the county. 

The same question arose in the case of Hampden County 
V. Robert 0. Morris, 207 Mass. 167, and the Supreme Judicial 
Court decided that clerks of courts may retain one-half of the 
naturalization fees received by them, first paying from these 
fees for all additional clerical force required in performing the 
duties imposed by the naturalization act. 

Under date of Jan. 5, 1914, the Supreme Court of the United 
States handed down a decision, covering the precise point 
under consideration, in the case of Mulcrery et al. v. City and 
County of San Francisco. The plaintiff in error was elected 
county clerk and became ex officio clerk of the Superior Court, 
a court having jurisdiction of naturalization cases. The city 
charter under which he was elected provided that "the 
salaries provided in this charter shall be in full compensation 
for all services rendered." In its opinion the court said: — 

On the merits the case presents no difficulty. It involves only the 
construction of the act of Congress already referred to above. We 
accept the State court's construction of the charter of the city and 
count}" of San Francisco. Indeed, its clearness leaves no room for 
construction. The salary it pro^ddes is declared to be "in full compen- 
sation for all services rendered." And it is pro\nded that "every 



80 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

officer shall pay all moneys coming into liis hands as such officer, no 
matter from what source derived or received, into the treasury of the 
city and county." The pro\isions are complete and comprehensive, 
and express Mulcrev;^^'s contract wdth the city, the performance of 
which his office imposed upon him; and, of course, the fees received 
by him in naturahzation proceedings, because he was clerk of the 
Superior Court, were in compensation for official acts, not personal 
acts. 

... If it be granted that he was made an agent of the national 
government, his relations to the city were not thereby changed. He 
was still its officer, receiving fees because he was — not earning them 
otherwise or receiving them otherwise, but under compact with the 
city to pay them into the city treasury within twenty-four hours 
after their receipt. 

... He was given office accommodations, clerks to assist him, and 
yet contends that notwithstancUng such equipment and assistance, 
notwithstanding his compact, he may retain part of the revenues of 
his office as fees for his own personal use. We cannot yield to the con- 
tention; nor do we think the act of Congress compels it. The act 
does not purport to deal wdth the relations of a State officer with the 
State. To so construe it might raise serious questions of power, and 
such questions are always to be avoided. We do not have to go to 
such lengths. The act is entirely satisfied wdthout putting the officers 
of a State in antagonism to the laws of the State — the laws which 
give them their official status. It is easily construed and its purpose 
entirely accomplished by requiring an accounting of one-half of the 
fees to the United States, leaving the other half to whatever disposi- 
tion may be pro\dded by the State law. Counsel cite some State de- 
cisions which have construed the act of Congress as giving a special 
agency to the clerks of the State courts, and as receiving their powers 
and rights from the national enactment. The reports of the Depart- 
ment of Commerce and Labor are quoted from, which, it is contended, 
exhibit by their statistics and recommendations the necessity of na- 
tional control. State decisions expressing a contrarj^ view are frankly 
cited. This contrariety of opinion we need not further exliibit by a 
review of the cases. We have expressed our construction of the act, 
and it is entirely consonant ^vith the purpose of the act and national 
control over naturalization. 

The Supreme Judicial Court of this Commonwealth has 
alw^ays recognized the Supreme Court of the United States as 
the final arbiter as to the meaning of Federal statutes and as 
to questions arising under the Federal Constitution. Com- 
monwealth V. People's Express Co., 201 Mass. 564. 

This principle is now universally accepted throughout the 
country, and in one form or another has received the sanction 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 81 

of our Supreme Judicial Court in numerous instances. Braynard 
V. Marshall, 8 Pick. 194; Simss Case, 7 Cush. 285; Eliot v. 
McCormick, 144 Mass. 10; Cheslcij v. Naritasket Beach Steam- 
boat Co., 179 Mass. 469; Opinion of the Justices, 207 Mass. 
601; Opinion of the Justices, 208 Mass. 619; Commonwealth v. 
Phelps, 210 Mass.^78. 

A decision of the Supreme Court of the United States as to 
the meaning of a Federal statute is a declaration of the law 
of the land, binding upon judges of State courts and upon 
individual citizens, and stands as such until overruled or 
modified by the court that made it, or until the law is changed 
by the legislative arm of the Federal government. 

I am therefore of the opinion that clerks of courts are not 
entitled to retain any portion of the naturalization fees that 
may be paid to them, except as specified in the statute, to pay 
for additional clerical assistance, travel and other expenses 
while acting under the naturalization act. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Constitutional Law — Grade Crossings — Powers of Legislature. 

The Legislature has authority to fix the time for the filing of a report by 
a grade crossing commission. 

April 3, 1914. 
Hon. Calvin Coolidge, President of the Senate. 

Dear Sir: — The Senate has transmitted to me an order 
which reads as follows: — 

Whereas, There is pending in the Senate a resolve to expedite the 
filing of a report relative to the abohtion of the grade crossing in the 
center of the town of Winchester, printed as House Document No. 214; 
and 

Whereas, There is a question as to whether this resolve is not an 
interference by the legislative power with the judicial power, within 
the terms of Article XXX of the Declaration of Rights; it is therefore 

Ordered, That the opinion of the Attorney-General be requested 
by the Senate as to whether this resolve, if enacted, will be constitu- 
tional. 

The powers and duties of the court with relation to the 
pending grade crossing matter — 

belong to that class not strictly judicial, but partaking both of the 
judicial and the executive character, like those of laying out liighways 



82 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

and assessing damages therefor, superintending the administration 
and distribution of the estates of insolvent debtors, and many others 
which might be named, the exercise and control of which may be vested 
by the Legislature at its discretion, unless restrained by specific con- 
stitutional provisions, either in judges appointed by the Governor and 
holding during good behavior, or in commissioners or other officers 
appointed or elected in such manner and holdin§^ for such terms as 
the Legislature may prescribe. {New London Northern R.R. v. 
Boston & Albany R.R., 102 Mass. 386, 387.) 

As the whole subject of the crossing of highways by railroads 
can from time to time be regulated by the Legislature, the Legisla- 
ture can, even after a final decree has been rendered, make other 
provisions, and require the crossings to be constructed in a manner 
different from that established by the decree. The Legislature can 
amend the statutes under which this proceeding has been commenced, 
and if the amended act is made applicable to the pending proceeding 
and is valid, the court in rendering a final decree must proceed in 
accordance wdth the statutes as amended, {hi re Northampton, 158 
Mass. 299, 302.) 

If it is to be treated as special legislation prescribing new rules and 
additional provisions for making a public improvement in substitu- 
tion for those under which the court and commissioners have been 
acting, it was within the power of the Legislature to enact it. {Provi- 
dence Steamboat Co. v. Fall River, 183 Mass. 535, 540.) 

Thus the Legislature has full jurisdiction of grade crossing 
matters, except that it may not direct w^hat order or finding 
shall be made by the court or a commission. But the Legis- 
lature may make an order or finding which the court or a 
commission could have made in a matter pending, and may 
direct the court to proceed as though the court or commission 
had made the order or finding. This is a fine distinction, as 
was pointed out in the dissenting opinions in the above quoted 
cases. Nevertheless, it is apparently law. 

A statute setting the time for the report of the commission 
may be construed as an amendment to, or as a substitute for 
part of, section 36 of Part I. of chapter 463 of the Acts of 
1906, and as such may be supported under the principles laid 
down in the above quoted cases. 

It is therefore my opinion that the resolve in question 
would be constitutional. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 83 

Schoolhouses — Use for Municipal and Other Purposes — 
Liability for Damages. 

No liability attaches to a city or town for damages caused by defects or 
negligence in or around public school property while said property 
is used strictly for municipal purposes. 

April 6, 1914. 

Committee on Education. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion on the 
legality, advisability and value of adding to section 1 of 
House Bill No. 803 the following clause: "such use shall not 
be construed to impose any additional liability on the city or 
town," so that this section W'ould read: — 

For the purpose of promoting the usefulness of the pubhc school 
property the school committee of an}^ city or town ma}" conduct such 
educational and recreation acti\aties in or upon school property under 
its control, and shall allow the use thereof by indi\4duals and asso- 
ciations, subject to such regulations as the school committee shall es- 
tablish, for such educational, recreation, social, civic, philanthropic 
and similar purposes as the committee may deem to be for the interest 
of the community, provided that such use shall not interfere or be 
inconsistent with the use of the premises for school purposes. Such 
use shall not be construed to impose any additional liabiUtj' on the 
city or town. 

A city or tow^n is not answerable in damages for the acts or 
neglect of its public officers in the discharge of their official 
functions, nor for injuries to individuals caused by defects or 
negligence in or around a schoolhouse or yard, because the 
maintenance of schools is a public function. 28 Cyc. 1308. 

In a case W'here the plaintiff fell and w^as seriously injured 
by reason of an unsafe staircase in a schoolhouse, the de- 
fendant w-as held not liable, for the reason last stated. Hill 
v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344. 

Similar decisions are to be found in Sullivan v. Boston, 126 
Mass. 540, and Bigeloic v. Randolph, 14 Gray, 541. 

But where a city or tow^n lets for hire a building erected for 
municipal purposes, it is liable for an injury caused by a 
defect or w'ant of repair in the building, or for the negligence 
of its agents or servants in the maintenance of the building. 
28 Cyc. 1308. 

So in the case of Little v. Holyoke, 177 Mass. 114, the city 
was held liable in an action for personal injuries caused by the 
plaintiff falling down a flight of stairs in a hall of the de- 



84 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

fendant city. The city occasionally let the hall for public 
gatherings, and on the evening in question the hall was let for 
the purposes of an entertainment to be given by the lessee. 

Of similar import is the case of IV or den v. New Bedford, 131 
Mass. 23. 

The proposed legislation apparently contemplates the 
letting of public school property for hire, subject to such regu- 
lations as the school committee shall establish, for such edu- 
cational, recreation, social, civic, philanthropic and similar pur- 
poses as the committee may deem to be for the interest of the 
community; and the question arises, can a city or town acting 
under the provisions of this act be exempted from liability for 
an injury caused by a defect or want of repair in the building 
or other property let, or by act or neglect of its servants and 
agents? To state the question another w^ay, can the Legisla- 
ture exempt cities and towns from liability for injuries incurred 
during the use of school buildings for some purposes? 

The Constitution of Massachusetts guarantees a certain 
remedy for all injuries or wrongs. Declaration of Rights, 
Art. XL Statutes in conflict with this article necessarily are 
void. Hu7jt V. Lucas, 99 Mass. 404. 

No question of vested rights is involved. We have not 
here the c^uestion as to whether vested rights of action may be 
interfered with, but rather, whether rights of action may be 
prevented from accruing. Article XL of the Constitution, 
above cited, is merely an assertion of the old common-law 
rule that for every wrong there must be a remedy. As I have 
already stated, one of the exceptions to this rule is that a 
municipality is not liable for injuries caused by a municipal 
use of municipal property. For the Legislature to exempt 
municipalities further would be in conflict with Article XL of 
the Declaration of Rights. To exempt municipalities and not 
exempt private concerns doing the same business of renting 
halls would be an unconstitutional discrimination. 

Is the contemplated use strictly a municipal use? If so, 
exemption from liability by statute is unnecessary. If not 
a municipal use, exemption is impossible. 

It is respectfully suggested that the bill be so phrased as to 
make it clearly appear that the use of school property per- 
mitted by it shall be municipal. The addition of the proposed 
clause may tend to support this construction. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Aitomey-Genercd. 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 85 



Labor — Construction of Puhlic Works. 

Under St. 1909, c. 514, § 21, the phrase "construction of pubhc works" 
refers to actual building operations and not to the work of preparing 
material. 

April 8, 1914. 

Robert N. Turner, Esq., Commissioner of Labor. 

Dear Sir: — You have requested my opinion on the fol- 
lowing question: — 

A general contractor, engaged in the construction of a public build- 
ing for one of the cities of the Commonwealth, has made a contract 
for the special preparation of a portion of the material to be used in 
the construction of the said building with a subcontractor from out- 
side the Commonwealth, w4io was the lowest bidder. The work on 
the said material in adapting it for use in the building is being done 
outside the Commonwealth, and by persons not citizens of Massachu- 
setts. The general contractor knew at the time the contract was made 
that the work was to be done in this way and by such persons. More- 
over, the contract with the subcontractor contains no provision that 
in the emplojnuent of mechanics or laborers preference shall be given 
to citizens of Massachusetts or citizens of the United States. 

Will you kindly advise whether or not in your opinion the above 
facts constitute a violation of the Acts of 1909, chapter 514, section 21? 

Section 21 of chapter 514 of the Acts of 1909 reads as 
follows: — ■ 

In the emploj^ment of mechanics and laborers in the construction 
of pubhc works by the commonwealth, or by a county, city or town, 
or by persons contracting therewith, preference shall be given to cit- 
izens of the commonwealth, and, if they cannot be obtained in suffi- 
cient numbers, then to citizens of the United States; and every con- 
tract for such works shall contain a provision to this effect. Any 
contractor who kno^vingly and wilfully violates the provisions of this 
section shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dol- 
lars for each offence. 

The question hinges on the meaning of the words "con- 
struction of public works." This phrase was interpreted by 
Attorney-General Dana Malone, in 1906, to include only the 
actual building operations. III. Op. Atty.-Gen. 9. The literal 
meaning of the word "construction" is "putting together." 

An early precedent is found in 1 Kings VI., VII., in which 
it is stated that King Solomon's Temple "was built of stone 
made ready at the quarry; and there was neither hammer nor 



86 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

axe nor any tool of iron heard in the house, while it was in 
building.'' 

Your very letter of inquiry refers to the contractor as 
engaged in the construction of the building, and to the sub- 
contractor as engaged in the preparation of material to be 
used in the construction. 

I am of opinion that the words "construction of public 
works" were used by the Legislature with the intention that 
they be narrowly construed, and that the facts as stated in 
your letter do not constitute a violation of the statute. 
Very truly ypurs, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Commissioners on Fisheries and Game — Expenses. 

Traveling expenses incurred on strictly official business, but no other 
expenses, may be allowed the Commissioners on Fisheries and Game. 

April 9, 1914. 
Hon. Frank H. Pope, Auditor of the Commonwealih. 

Dear Sir: — In your letter requesting an opinion from this 
department as to whether certain bills for expenses presented 
for allowance by members of the Commission on Fisheries and 
Game should be allowed, you state that "in the case of one of 
the members making regular trips from his home by way of 
Highland station to Boston he seeks to charge the State for 
fares between his home and his Boston office, where he tran- 
sacts private business, on the days on which he performs any 
business for the State;" that "another contention of the Com- 
mission is that as their duties are not all performed in the office 
in the State House, they are entitled to traveling expenses 
from their homes to Boston on days when the State's business 
requires them to visit any place in Boston outside of the office 
in the State House;" and further, that certain members of 
the Commission on Fisheries and Game "visit the State 
House almost daily, and contend that should there be business 
of the commission requiring them to visit any other place in 
Boston than the office in the State House, they should be 
allowed expenses for traveling from their homes, and also for 
their midday meal on those days." 

In many instances special provision has been made for the 
payment of traveling and other expenses necessarily incurred 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 87 

in the service of the Commonwealth. Thus it was provided 
that each member of the former Board of Cattle Commis- 
sioners should receive "... his actual travelling expenses which 
have been necessarily incurred;" that members of the State 
Board of Charity shall receive "... their travelling and other 
necessary expenses." So, too, that each member of the Civil 
Service Commission shall be paid "... his travelling and other 
expenses incurred in the performance of his official duties." 

The law covering the payment of expenses of members of 
the Commission on Fisheries and Game is found in section 54 
of chapter 6 of the Revised Laws, and the rule governing the 
payment of such expenses is found in the words, "shall be 
allowed their actual reasonable expenses incurred in the per- 
formance of such duties." 

No case has arisen under this provision of the statute for 
determination by the Supreme Judicial Court of this Common- 
wealth. The case of Richardson v. Staie, a case involving a 
similar question, was decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio 
in 1902. The purpose of the action was to determine whether 
money paid to Richardson out of the county treasury as com- 
pensation for his services as county commissioner was illegally 
paid, and if so, to recover judgment for the same. The Ohio 
statute is as follows: — 

Each county commissioner shall be allowed three dollars for each 
day that he is employed in his official duties, and five cents per mile 
for his necessary travel, for each regular or called session, not exceed- 
ing one session each month, or twelve in any one j^ear, and five cents 
per mile when traveling within their respective counties on official 
business, to be paid out of the count}^ treasury on the warrant of the 
county auditor; . . . and when necessarily engaged in attending to 
the business of the county pertaining to Ms office under the direction 
of the board, and when necessary to travel on official business out of 
his county, shall be allowed, etc. 

In its decision of the case the court said: — 

It must be conceded that the $3 per day allowed the commissioner 
is the limit of his compensation for liis day's work, in whatever way it 
may be performed in the discharge of his official duties. He cannot 
lawfull}^ claim that the county is also bound to pay his board or other 
personal expenses. And the "mileage" allowed him is intended to 
compensate him for expenses of his travel on official business. ... To 
make such expenses an additional burden on the pubfic funds would 
require a plain and unequivocal provision of the statute. An intention 
to do so will not be inferred. . . . The expenses authorized to be paid 



88 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

a commissioner under the provision of the statute in question are, we 
think, official expenses only, as distinguished from those which per- 
tain to his personal comforts and necessities. . . . The purpose of 
the provision was to reimburse him when, in the language of the statute, 
the money had been "actually paid in the discharge of his official 
duty.". . . It is a fair inference that, if it had been intended to re- 
imburse the commissioner for expencUtures of this character, the Leg- 
islature would have expressed that intention in plain terms. It is 
well settled that the compensation of pubhc officers cannot be enlarged, 
by implication, bej^ond the terms of the statute. 

The last sentence quoted from the opinion of the Ohio 
court undoubtedly states correctly the rule of law to be ap- 
plied in cases like those stated in your letter of inquiry. A 
member of this commission, traveling from his place of resi- 
dence to his own office or other place where he regularly car- 
ries on his own business, and to which he is going for that 
purpose, cannot be said to be traveling on the business of the 
Commonwealth so as to enable hinj to charge traveling or 
other expenses; and this is so even though he may transact 
at his own place of business during the day some item of 
official business. The expense is not incurred in the perform- 
ance of his official duty; and the same rule of necessity ap- 
plies to your question in regard to charges made for meals at 
the place of residence or place of business of members of the 
commission. Nor, in my opinion, are members of the com- 
mission w^ho receive an annual salary or its equivalent, when 
on duty in Boston, and w^ho happen in the course of their 
official duties to have to go to some part of the city other 
than the office provided by the Commonwealth for their use, 
entitled by that fact to charge to the Commonwealth the ex- 
pense of their midday meals. It is to be presumed that they 
would have the midday meal if they remained in the office 
provided by the Commonwealth. It is reasonably apparent 
that the expense of the midday meal is not increased by 
reason of the fact that their duties call them outside of the 
office provided by the Commonwealth. I think, however, 
they may properly charge traveling expenses, as trolley fares 
paid out by them in going about the city on strictly official 
business. 

It is my opinion that the items specified in your letter of 
inquiry should not be allowed. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 89 



Constituiional Law — Regulation of Sale of Tickets to Places of 

Amusement. 

It is not within the constitutional powers of the Legislature to provide 
regulations for the sale of tickets to places of amusement. 

April 10, 1914. 
Committee on Mercantile Affairs. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion as to 

whether the substitute suggested by Mr. Caro for House 
Bill No. 236, relative to the sale of tickets of admission to 

places of amusement, would be constitutional. Mr. Caro's 
bill reads as follows: — 

It shall be a condition of any license hereafter granted by any city 
or town, or by any other public authority, for any pubUc entertain- 
ment, that tickets of admission to the same shall not be sold to an}^ 
dealer in such tickets, or to any other person, mth the intent or knowl- 
edge that such tickets shall be resold to individual purchasers; or 
with the intent or knowledge that such tickets shall be disposed of in 
any manner at a price exceeding the price for which they were sold, 
or exceeding the price advertised for such tickets by the person, firm, 
or corporation issuing the same. If the said condition is \iolated by 
any licensee, the license shall thereupon be revoked by the authority 
granting the same; and it is hereby made the duty of the licensing 
authority to see that the said condition is complied with. 

It was ruled by my predecessor, Hon. James M. Swift, in 
an opinion to the House committee on the judiciary, Feb. 15, 
1912, that — 

The business of conducting a theatre or other place of amusement 
is a private business, and while such business may be regulated by the 
Legislature in respect to public morals or safety, under the pohce 
power, the right or regulation cannot be extended to the sale of tickets 
of admission to places of amusement. (III. Op. Atty.-Gen. 491, 
492.) 

He quotes from the leading case on the subject, as follows: — 

The sale of a theatre ticket at an advance upon the original pur- 
chase price, or the business of reselling such tickets at a profit, is no 
more immoral, or injurious to public welfare or convenience, than is 
the sale of an ordinary article of merchandise at a profit. {Ex -parte 
Quarg, 149 Cal. 79, 81.) 



90 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

The Legislature has certain powers of regulation and has 
not certain other powers of regulation, and the distinction be- 
tween these two sorts of powers remains the same, regardless 
of the manner in which the Legislature seeks to enforce these 
powers. Direct statutory prohibition or indirect prohibition 
by means of conditions in licenses are merely methods of en- 
forcement, and do not go to the root of the question of legis- 
lative powers. 

It is therefore my opinion that the proposed regulation of 
the sale of tickets to places of amusement is unconstitutional, 
regardless of the method by which its enforcement is sought. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Insurance Company — Investments — Pecuniary Interest of 

Officers. 

A person who has an interest in real estate, but solely as trustee for another, 
may lawfully serve on the investment committee of an insurance 
company which places a loan on said real estate. 

April 10, 1914. 
Hon. Frank H. Harbison, Insurance Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — You request my opinion upon the following 
statement: — 

If a person as a trustee holds a parcel of real estate which, with 
certain other parcels, is exchanged for stock in a corporation which 
was organized for the purpose of acquiring such land, and the directors 
of an insurance company, one member of which is the aforesaid trustee, 
who is also a member of the insurance company's finance committee, 
negotiates a mortgage loan with said real estate corporation, can that 
director and member of the finance committee of the insurance com- 
pany be held to have acted in violation of the statute (St. 1907, c. 576, 
§ 26, par. 4)? 

That paragraph provides that — 

All investments and deposits of the funds of the company shall be 
made in its corporate name, and no director or other officer thereof, 
and no member of a committee having any authority in the invest- 
ment or disposition of its funds, shall accept, or be the beneficiary of, 
either directly or remotely, any fee, brokerage, commission, gift or 
other consideration for or on account of any loan, deposit, purchase, 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 91 

sale, pajTiient or exchange made bj^ or in behalf of such company, or 
be pecuniarily interested in any such purchase, sale or loan, either as 
borrower, principal, co-principal, agent or beneficiary except that, if 
a policy holder, he shall be entitled to all the benefits accruing under 
the terms of his contract. 

An examination of the law, apart from the statute, may be in 
some degree helpful in determining the effect of the statute. It 
is settled beyond question that the directors of corporations are 
bound in their official capacity, to act in an entire good faith. 
They are to be regarded as trustees for the shareholders, and 
are held to strict fidelity to their trust. They are bound to 
exercise their powers for the benefit of the corporation only, 
and cannot deal for themselves and for the corporation in one 
and the same transaction. A director cannot with propriety 
vote in the board of directors upon a matter affecting his own 
private interest any more than a judge can sit in his own 
case. It has been held by some courts that a director cannot 
contract with his company, and that such contracts are void; 
and courts that have not gone to this extreme have held that 
contracts between directors and corporations, though not void, 
are always to be subjected to the closest scrutiny, and are 
voidable unless made in that entire good faith which the law 
demands of this species of fiduciary. Nye v. Storer, 168 Mass. 
53; Warren v. Para Rubber Shoe Co., 166 Mass. 97. 

In the case you have stated the director was not a party to 
the contract, and cannot be said to have accepted or to have 
been the beneficiary of, either directly or remotely, any fee, 
brokerage, commission, gift or other consideration for or on 
account of the loan. It is true that by reason of his position 
as a director of the insurance company, and as a member of 
its finance committee, he w^as a factor in determining whether 
this loan should be made and the terms upon which it should 
be made, but you state that he held the real estate in ques- 
tion as trustee, and if that is so, in exchanging his real estate 
for stock in a corporation he simply changed the form of the 
trust property. It hardly need be said that a trustee cannot 
by a sale or exchange of trust property acquire property of 
his own. If he exchanged the real estate w^hich he held in 
trust for stock in a real estate corporation, the stock which 
came to his hands in the course of this transaction was im- 
pressed with the same trust under which he held the real 
estate. He was not an officer of the real estate corporation, 



92 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

and any gain or benefit accruing to the stock of that corpora- 
tion in his hands was not at all to his personal profit or bene- 
fit, but for the benefit of his cestid que trust; so that I do not 
see how it could be held that the trustee was pecuniarily in- 
terested in the loan either as borrower, principal, co-principal, 
agent or beneficiary. 

The statute to which you refer is penal and is to be strictly 
construed, and even though he held the stock in his own right, 
it is very difficult to see how he could be held liable under 
this statute. 

I am of the opinion that your inquiry must be answered in 
the negative. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney -General. 



Surety Companies — Bonds — Renewals. 

A surety company bond may be renewed and its term extended by a 
separate instrument properly executed. 

April 11, 1914. 

Hon. Frederick W. Mansfield, Treasurer and Receiver-General. 

Dear Sir: — You have requested my opinion as to whether 
or not certificates of renewal furnished and executed by a 
bonding company that is surety on a bond executed and filed 
in accordance with the requirements of chapter 656 of the 
Acts of 1910, is adequate and sufficient to renew a bond. 

Chapter 656 of the Acts of 1910 relates to persons, partner- 
ships, associations or corporations engaged in the collection 
business and conducting a collection agency, bureau or office 
in this Commonwealth, and requires that every such person, 
partnership, association or corporation shall file a bond with 
the Treasurer and Receiver-General. 

Your query is whether the certificate of renewal is sufficient 
to renew and keep in force a bond the term of which has ex- 
pired or is about to expire. 

In its popular sense the word "renew" means '*to refresh, 
revive or rehabilitate an expiring or declining subject, but not 
appropriate to describe the making of a new contract or the 
creation of a new existence; to re-establish a particular con- 
tract or another period of time; to restore to its former con- 
ditions; to make again; to make over, to re-establish; or to 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 93 

rebuild." 34 Cyc. 1331. The word "renewal" in its broadest 
sense means "that which is made anew or re-established; a 
change of something old for something new; the establish- 
ment of the particular contract for another period of time; 
imparting continued or new force and effect; the substitution 
of a new right or obligation for another of the same nature." 
In the case of Strouse v. American Credit Indcmniiy Co., 91 
Md. 244, 257, the court in deciding a question involving this 
point used this language: — 

A- renewal of the certificate of the United States Credit System 
Company means the same certificate with all the stipulations con- 
tained for another year, or another certificate to cover another year 
identical in every word and figure with the certificate it succeeded. 

I would suggest that in the use of a certificate of renewal 
the principal as well as the surety on the bond be made a 
party. The form of the certificate of renewal in question did 
not accompany your inquiry, and I am therefore unable to 
pass upon its sufficiency, but I have no doubt that a bond 
may be renewed and its term extended to cover such period 
of time as may be agreed upon by a separate instrument prop- 
erly executed. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney -General. 



Cities and Towns — Public Documents. 

Cities and towns have no authority to dispose of such books, reports and 
laws as have been received from the Commonwealth under St. 1908, 
c. 142, §§ 1 and 2. 

April 13, 1914. 

Henry E. Woods, Esq., Ccmmissioner of Public Records. 

Dear Sir: — You ask my opinion upon the following ques- 
tion : Have cities or towns authority to dispose of the copies of 
the series of public documents which they do not care to retain? 

Sections 1 and 2 of chapter 142 of the Acts of 1908 are as 
follows: — 

Section 1. Each city and town shall provide a suitable place, or 
places, to be approved by the commissioner of public records, for the 
preservation and convenient use of all books, reports and laws re- 
ceived from the commonwealth; and for every month's neglect so 
to do shall forfeit ten dollars. 



94 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Section 2. Said books, reports and laws shall be in the custody 
or control of the city or town clerk, unless the city council or select- 
men shall, by vote, designate some other officer, the town counsel or 
other person to have said custody or control of either all or part of the 
same. 

This chapter makes it the duty of all our cities and towns 
to take care of all the books, reports and laws that may be 
bestow^ed upon them by the Commonwealth, and requires of 
them the task of providing a suitable place for the preserva- 
tion and convenient use of all such books, reports and laws. 
The authority conferred and the duty created by this statute 
are to preserve and keep. The only relief against this burden- 
some situation, that I have been able to find, is contained in 
chapter 422 of the Acts of 1908, wherein it is enacted that — 

In case a city or town at any annual city or town election shall vote 
not to receive the series of public documents, and the commissioner of 
public records shall report to the secretary of the commonwealth 
that in his opinion such city or town is unable to make suitable pro- 
vision for the care and use of such documents, he may discontinue 
sending such documents to such city or town. 

I regret to say that I am forced to the opinion that towns 
and cities have no authority to dispose of the books, reports 
and laws specified in chapter 142 of the Acts of 1908, above 
quoted, in any other w^ay than to provide a suitable place for 
their preservation and convenient use, except as provided by 
chapter 422 of the Acts of 1908. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Civil Service — Sealer of Weights and Measures in Lowell. 

The sealer of weights and measures in Lowell is not subject to civil service 

rules, 

April 13, 1914. 

Civil Service Commission. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following questions : — 

First. — Was the enactment of chapter 645 of the Acts of 1911 in 
effect a repeal of the provisions of chapter 382 of the Acts of 1909, 
and, therefore, does it exempt this position in the city of Lowell from 
the operation of the civil service law and rules? 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 95 

Second. — Does the fact that bj^ said section 39 of chapter 6-)^ of 
the Acts of 1911 providing for the election by the municipal council 
of a sealer of weights and measures exempt the office from civil service 
classification in view of the provisions of section 9 of chapter 19 of the 
Revised Laws above referred to? 

Section 9 of chapter 19 of the Revised Laws exempts from 
civil service classification judicial officers and all officers elected 
by the people or whose appointment is subject to confirmation 
by a city council. 

Under the authority conferred by chapter 382 of the Acts 
of 1909 the Cfvil Service Commission prepared and promul- 
gated a rule of classification w^hich became effective Sept. 1, 
1909, and which reads as follows: — 

Rule 7. 

Class 6. — All principal or assistant sealers of weights and meas- 
ures holding office by appointment under any city, or any town of over 
ten thousand inhabitants, whether such officers are heads of principal 
departments or not, and also the inspectors of weights and measures 
of the Commonwealth. 

By section 37 of chapter 645 of the Acts of 1911, which 
is an act to amend the charter of the city of Lowell, it is pro- 
vided : — 

There shall be the following administrative officers, who shall per- 
form the duties prescribed by law for them, respectively, ... as the 
municipal council may prescribe, ... a sealer of weights and meas- 
ures. 

Section 39 of the last-mentioned chapter provides that — 

The municipal council shall have the power to elect the adminis- 
trative officers named in section thirty-seven. . . . 

Section 66 of said chapter provides: — ■ 

All special acts and parts of special acts inconsistent herewith are 
hereby repealed, and no general act or part of a general act incon- 
sistent herewith shall hereafter apply to the city of Lowell. . . . 

The provisions of Rule 7, above quoted, relate to sealers of 
weights and measures holding office by appointment, w^hile the 
charter of the citv of Low^ell makes the office of sealer of 



96 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

weights and measures in that city elective. If we give to the 
rule made by the Civil Service Commission the force and 
effect of law, yet the provision of the charter is a later enact- 
ment, making a special and exceptional provision in regard to 
the office of sealer of weights and measures in the city of 
Lowell, and apparently is intended to deal with the whole 
subject of election to the office of sealer of weights and meas- 
ures in that city. The provisions of the chapter are also en- 
tirely inconsistent with the civil service rule. It is my opinion, 
therefore, that the charter of the city of Lowell, by reason of 
the special provisions it contains, exempts the position of 
sealer of weights and measures in that city from civil service 
classification. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney -General. 



Constitutional Law — Trading Stamps — Excise Tax — License 

Fees. 

A law requiring the payment of a license fee of $6,000 per annum by any 
firm furnishing trading stamps with any sale of goods would be un- 
constitutional. 

April 17, 1914. 

Co7nmittee on Mercantile Affairs. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion as to the 
constitutionality of House Bill No. 1643, entitled "An Act 
relative to the use of stamps, coupons and similar devices for 
or with the sale of goods, wares and merchandise." 

This bill provides that every person, firm or corporation 
furnishing stamps, coupons, tickets, certificates, cards or other 
similar devices to any other person, firm or corporation to use 
in, with or for the sale of any goods, wares or merchandise 
shall be required to obtain annually "a separate license from 
the auditor of each county wherein such furnishing or selling 
or using shall take place, for each and every store or place of 
business in that county owned or conducted by such person, 
firm or corporation, from which such furnishing or selling or 
in which such using shall take place." By section 2 of this 
bill it is provided that the sum of $6,000 per license shall be 
paid, and in addition to this, that every person, firm or 
corporation who shall use any stamps, coupons, tickets, 
certificates, cards or other similar devices in, with or for the 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 97 

sale of any goods, wares or merchandise, which shall entitle 
the purchaser receiving the same to procure from any person, 
firm or corporation any goods, wares or merchandise free of 
charge or for less than the retail market price thereof, must 
also obtain a like license and must also pay a license fee of 
S6,000 a year. 

It would appear that the provisions of this bill are so broad 
that a person receiving any stamps, coupons, tickets or other 
similar devices, who should use them for the purpose of pro- 
curing any goods, wares or merchandise, is also required by 
this bill to procure a similar license from the county auditor 
and to pay the license fee of $6,000. 

The taxing power vested by the Constitution in the Legis- 
lature is contained in section lY. of article I. of chapter I. of 
the Constitution, and is expressed in the following language: — 

Full power and authority are hereby given and granted to the said 
general court ... to impose and le\y proportional and reasonable 
assessments, rates, and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and persons 
resident, and estates Ij^ing, within the said commonwealth; and also 
to impose and levy reasonable duties and excises upon any produce, 
goods, wares, merchandise, and commodities, whatsoever, brought 
into, produced, manufactured, or being within the same. 

It is readily apparent that the methods of taxation provided 
by the Constitution are, first, by proportional and reasonable 
assessments, rates and taxes upon the inhabitants of and 
persons resident and estates lying within the Commonwealth; 
and second, as the State may not since the adoption of the 
Federal Constitution levy duties on imports, by reasonable 
excises upon any produce, goods, wares, merchandise and 
commodities. 

That the constitutionality of the proposed measure cannot 
be sustained under the constitutional provision in regard to 
the levy of proportional rates and taxes upon the inhabitants 
and persons resident and estates lying within the Common- 
wealth is so evident as to render comment or discussion un- 
necessary. 

The question then arises, Can this proposed bill be sustained 
as an exercise of the power to levy reasonable excises? 

The Constitution places two limitations upon the authority 
of the Legislature to levy excise taxes: (1) that they must be 
reasonable, and (2) that they may be levied only upon 



98 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

produce, goods, wares, merchandise and commodities. Port- 
land Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 252. 

Clearly, the use of stamps, coupons or certificates referred 
to in the bill before me, if subject to an excise tax under the 
provision of the Constitution last above quoted, is so because 
it falls under the head of "commodities," and the question to 
be determined is whether the method of transacting business 
with or by the use of stamps, coupons, certificates or other 
similar devices is a commodity. 

The Legislature of 1904 passed an act imposing an excise 
tax on the business of selling, giving or delivering trading 
stamps, checks, coupons or other similar devices, and the case 
of O'Keeffe v. SomerriUe, 190 Mass. 110, was an action brought 
to test the validity of that statute. The plaintiff in that case 
used trading stamps in his business and paid under protest to 
the city of Somerville the excise tax provided by the statute, 
and then brought suit to recover back the amount so paid. 
The Supreme Judicial Court in its decision in that case 
said: — 

The first and principal question before us is whether the right to 
conduct the business, in the manner described in the first section 
(of that statute) is a commodity within the meaning of the constitution. 

And said further: — 

It is not necessary in the present case to determine the meaning of 
the word "commodities," in reference to every possible apphcation 
of it, but we are of opinion that it is not broad enough to include every 
occupation which one may follow, in the exercise of a natural right, 
without aid from the government, and without affecting the rights 
or interests of others in such a way as properly to call for governmental 
regulation. Whatever may be done by the Congress of the United 
States under its general power to levy excise taxes (see Thomas v. 
United States, 192 U. S. 363) we are of opinion that, under the limita- 
tion to commodities, the General Court of Massachusetts cannot levy 
an excise tax upon the business of a husbandman or an ordinary 
mechanic. If this is not the necessary effect of the decision in Gleason 
V. McKay, uhi supra, it certainly is intimated by the language of the 
court in the opinion. 

In the statute before us the selfing or giving of trading stamps, in 
connection with the sale of articles, can hardly be considered a business 
in itself; but the business which the statute seeks to reach is the selling 
of articles under an arrangement to deliver stamps as a part of the 
sale, or as an accompaniment of it. The statute includes sales of 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 99 

articles of every kind, and it describes the delivery of stamps in terms 
that include deliveries which, under the decisions of this court, are 
entirely unobjectionable in law. Commonwealth v. Sisson, 178 Mass. 
578. Commonwealth v. Emerson, 165 Mass. 146. Such deliveries have 
generally been considered permissible in connection with the sale of 
articles, in the exercise of a common right, and many cases have been 
decided which invalidate statutes or ordinances intended to prevent 
such deliveries. People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389. People v. Zimmer- 
man, 102 App. Div. (N. Y.) 103. Ex parte McKenna, 126 Cal. 429. 
State V. Dalton, 22 R. I. 77. Long v. State, 74 Md. 565. Young v. 
Commonwealth, 101 Va. 853. 

And further: — 

One of the reasons why these methods are allowable is found in the 
familiar principle that constitutional liberty means "the right of one 
to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, 
to earn his livehhood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful 
trade or avocation." The restrictions upon conduct which may be 
imposed in the exercise of the poHce power include ever3i:hing that 
may be necessary in the interest of the public health, the public safety 
or the public morals, and they include nothing more. These doctrines 
have often been discussed and elaborated, and it is unnecessary to 
consider them at length in this case. In applying them to the business 
mentioned in this statute, no reason appears for the imposition of an 
excise tax upon the business of selling articles with an accompaniment 
of stamps which entitle the vendee to other property. 

It has been further said by our Supreme Court that the 
mere exercise of a natural right in the performance of labor of 
the simplest kind, or in making an ordinary simple contract, 
is not a commodity within the meaning of the Constitution. 
pillion of the Justices, 196 Mass. 625, 629. 

The business or the method of doing business at which this 
bill is aimed is not, then, according to the decisions of the 
Supreme Judicial Court, a commodity, and therefore is not 
and cannot be subject to an excise tax. 

It may be urged, however, that the purpose of this bill is 
not to levy an excise tax but to regulate by means of a license 
the management and conduct of the method of transacting 
business by or with the use of trading stamps or other similar 
devices. It is to be borne in mind that this method of doing 
business has been repeatedly held by our Supreme Judicial 
Court to be lawful. Commonwealth v. Emerson, 165 Mass. 146; 
Commonwealth v. Sisson, 178 Mass. 578. And that if the 



100 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

stamps, coupons or other similar devices mentioned in this 
bill are used in such a way as to constitute a lottery or game 
of chance, such use may be punished under criminal statutes 
already in existence. And it should be further borne in mind 
that it is the constitutional right of persons in this Common- 
wealth to acquire and possess property and to transact 
legitimate business. Declaration of Rights, Art. I. 

Coming now to the consideration of the question of the 
authority of the Legislature to impose license fees, the rule is 
that — 

If the Legislature has power to prohibit a certain act altogether [as, 
for instance, the sale of intoxicating liquor] it may estabhsh a pecuniary 
imposition upon its performance intended as a substantial prohibition 
or as a drastic limitation of the number of persons who will perform 
the act; if, however, the Legislature has no power to prohibit the act 
it cannot estabhsh a pecuniary imposition really intended as a prohi- 
bition. . . . 

When the Legislature has neither the power to prohibit nor to tax 
a certain act, but the act is of such a nature that a reasonable inspec- 
tion is necessary for the pubhc welfare, the Legislature may impose a 
license fee and prohibit the performance of the act until the fee is 
paid, but in such a case the fee may cover only the cost of inspection. 
(Nichols on Taxation in Massachusetts, pp. 4 and 5; Cyc, Vol. 38, 
p. 927.) 

The method of doing business by or with the use of stamps, 
coupons or other similar devices is one which the Legislature 
has no authority under the Constitution to prohibit, and since 
it is not a commodity no excise tax can be levied upon it. 
The license fee fixed in the proposed bill is greatly in excess of 
any probable cost of inspection of the business, and is evi- 
dently intended to prohibit the transaction of a business that 
the Supreme Court has held to be lawful. 

My conclusion is that the proposed bill, if enacted, will be 
unconstitutional. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 101 



Wrentham State School — Rights of Trustees in Mail addressed 

to Inmates. 

Trustees of the Wrentham State School may exercise discretion in pre- 
venting dehvery of objectionable mail to inmates. 
Valuable enclosures in mail addressed to inmates of Wrentham State 
School must be delivered or returned. 

April 18, 1914. 
Trustees of the Wrentham State School. 

Gentlemen: — You ask my opinion upon the following 
questions: — 

What are the rights of the trustees to open mail addressed to inmates 
of the Wrentham State School? If the contents of letters addressed 
to the inmates of the W^rentham State School are, in the opinion of the 
superintendent, objectionable, what are the powers of the school in 
the matter? May the letter be destroyed or must it be returned to 
the sender, or must it be delivered? What are the rights of the trustees 
as to letters sent out by the inmates of the institution? Have they 
the right to open such letters, and if the contents are objectionable 
destroy them? 

Section 7 of chapter 504 of the Acts of 1909 provides that — 

The board shaU have general supervision of all public and private 
institutions and receptacles for insane, feeble-minded or epileptic 
persons or for persons addicted to the intemperate use of narcotics or 
stimulants, and the Hospital Cottages for Children, and when so 
directed by the governor may assume and exercise the powers of the 
board of trustees of said state institutions in any matter relative to 
the management thereof. The board shall have the same powers 
relative to state charges in institutions or other places under its super- 
vision and to their property as are vested in towns and overseers of 
the poor relative to paupers supported or relieved by towns. 

By section 85 of this chapter it is further provided: — 

All patients in any institution under the supervision of the state 
board of insanity shall be allowed, subject to the regulations of the 
board, to write freely to the board, and letters so written shall be 
forwarded, unopened, by the superintendent or person in charge of 
the institution to said board for such disposition as it shall consider 
right; and the board may send any letters or other communications 
to any patients in anj^ of said institutions whenever it may consider it 
proper so to do. All other letters to or from the patient may be sent 
as addressed or to his legal or natural guardian or most interested 
friend. 



102 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Your inquiry raises a question under the Federal postal 
laws. The assistant attorney-general for the Post-office De- 
partment, in an opinion rendered under date of Feb. 6, 1894, 
ruled that the authorities of an insane asylum are required to 
exert a proper discretion in the matter of delivering mail to 
the inmates and in preventing the transmission of letters in- 
tended for delivery by such inmates to other persons, especially 
so when the interests or the recovery of patients might be in- 
jured or the safe administration of the affairs of the institution 
interfered with. 

Section 85 of the statute above quoted confers authority 
upon the State Board of Insanity to supervise the correspond- 
ence of all patients in institutions over which they exercise 
control, of which your institution is one. The language of 
this section is so clear as to make explanation or comment 
unnecessary. 

Referring to your question as to postage and money en- 
closed in letters to patients, it is my opinion that in any case 
where it is inadvisable to deliver the money or stamps or 
other valuable enclosure found in a letter to the person 
addressed, it should be returned to the sender. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney -General. 



Commissioner of Corporations — Inspection of Tax Returns. 

Only such persons as may have occasion to inspect tax returns for the 
purpose of assessing or collecting taxes have a right to inspect tax 
returns of Massachusetts corporations. 

April 22, 1914. 

Albert J. Brunelle, Esq., Secretary, Board of Registration in Pharmacy. 

Dear Sir: — Under date of April 17 you state that the 
Board of Registration in Pharmacy respectfully requests an 
order from this department to the Commissioner of Corpora- 
tions to permit a representative of your Board to inspect the 
franchise tax return of the Jaynes Drug Company, to enable 
your Board to act intelligently upon the applications of the 
Jaynes Drug Company for permits to operate drug stores and 
certificates for sixth-class liquor licenses. 

The statute, section 40 of Part III. of chapter 490 of the 
Acts of 1909, as amended, provides as follows with reference 
to the annual return to be filed by domestic corporations: — 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 103 

Such return shall be filed with the tax commissioner. In the case 
of domestic business corporations the whole of said return, and in the 
case of other corporations so much of said return as relates to the profit 
or loss which has resulted from the business of the corporation shall be 
open only to the inspection of the tax commissioner, his deputy, clerks 
and assistants, and such other officers of the commonwealth as may have 
occasion to inspect it for the purpose of assessing or collecting taxes. 

It occurs to me that your Board in making this request may 
have thought that the Jaynes Drug Company is a foreign 
corporation. It is in fact a Massachusetts corporation, and 
its return to the Tax Commissioner is subject to the provisions 
of the statute above quoted. Under this statute the onh^ 
persons authorized to examine the return are the Tax Com- 
missioner and his clerks and assistants and such other officers 
of the Commonwealth as may have occasion to inspect it for 
the purpose of assessing or collecting taxes. 

In my opinion it is not within the jurisdiction or authority 
of the Attorney-General to make such an order as your Board 
has requested. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney -General. 



Board of Agriculture — Poultry Premium Bounty. 

An incorporated poultry association is entitled, under St. 1909, c. 428, 
to receive aid from the Poultry Premium Bounty Fund for one annual 
exhibition only. 

Unincorporated associations are not entitled to receive aid from the 
Poultry Premium Bounty Fund. 

April 22, 1914. 

John C. Graham, Esq., Head of Poultry Department, Massachusetts 
Agricultural College. 

Dear Sir: — You ask my opinion upon the following 
questions: — 

First, under the provisions of the statute can a State poultry associa- 
tion, incorporated, hold more than one exhibition of poultry during 
a year and receive a part of the poultry premium bounty based on the 
total number of entry fees received by the association in competition 
with the local incorporated associations; and second, would a local 
unincorporated branch of a State association be entitled to draw upon 
the Poultry Premium Bounty Fund if such local branch held a poultry 
show^ or exhibit annually during the months of November, December 
or January? 



104 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

The statute governing this matter is found in chapter 428 
of the Acts of 1909, and is as follows: — 

Section 1. The sum of one thousand dollars shall be paid annually 
in the month of August from the treasury of the commonwealth to 
the board of agriculture, which shall be known as a Poultry Premium 
Bounty, and shall be used by said board to encourage and improve 
the breeding of poultry. Said bounty shall be distributed by said 
board among the poultry associations hereinafter designated, during 
the month of September of each year, on the basis of the total entry 
fees received by such associations, respectively, during the year pre- 
ceding that time, as hereinafter provided, and the sum so distributed 
shall be used by such associations for the purpose of enabling them to 
hold annual exhibitions of poultry and for the pa>Tnent of premiums 
onty. The board may make such rules as it may deem suitable for 
carrying out the provisions of this act; and any part of said bounty 
not distributed hj the board in any year shall be repaid by it to the 
treasurer and receiver general. 

Section 2. No association shall be entitled to any part of said 
bounty unless it shall have been incorporated under the laws of the 
commonwealth for the purposes, principally, of holding exhibitions of 
poultry within the commonwealth. 

Section 3. No association shall be entitled to an}^ part of said 
bounty unless it shall certify to the board of agriculture, not later than 
the first day of July, under the oath of the president and secretary 
of such association, that it has held an exhibition of poultry during 
the months of November, December or January preceding said cer- 
tificate, the amount of the entry fees paid to the association for such 
exhibition, and that the association is in need of aid to enable it to 
continue its exhibitions of poultry, together with such other facts as 
the board may request. 

It is my opinion that an incorporated poultry association is 
entitled to receive aid from the Poultry' Premium Bounty 
Fund for one show or exhibit annually, and that if a greater 
number of shows are given by an incorporated association no 
claim can be sustained for a payment from the premium fund 
for the additional exhibitions; and this would apply to your 
proposed corporation as well as to any other. 

Second, it is my opinion that under this statute an un- 
incorporated association is not entitled to receive aid from the 
Poultry Premium Bounty Fund. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boyntox, Attorney -General. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 105 



Divorce Certificate — Marriage License. 

The certificate of divorce or copy of such record required to be filed with 
town or city clerks, under St. 1912, c. 535, need not be in the English 
language. 

April 22, 1914. 

Hon. Frank J. Donahue, Secretory of the Commonwealth. 

Dear Sir: — You ask if it is necessary that the divorce 
certificate or certified cop}' of record presented to a town or 
city clerk by a divorced person seeking a marriage license 
under the provisions of chapter 535 of the Acts of 1912 be in 
the English language. 

I am of the opinion that it is the law that such certificate 
or cop\' of record need not be in English, but must neces- 
sarih' be in the language of the court issuing the decree. The 
town or city clerk must be convinced, by a translation or 
otherwise, that the certificate or copy of record shows that a 
divorce has been granted in accordance with the statement of 
the person applying for the marriage license. The certificate 
or copy of record must also be attached to the marriage 
license if one is issued, and becomes a part of the license, and 
with this the requirements of the statute are satisfied. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorriey-General. 



Pardons — Expiration of Prison Term. 

Where the term of a prisoner expires on Sunday by reason of a pardon 
issued by the Governor and Council, the prisoner should be discharged 
on the preceding Saturday. 

April 24, 1914. 

Gen. Benjamin F. Bridges, Warden, State Prison. 

Dear Sir: — I am in receipt of the following request for 
an opinion: — 

Section 130, chapter 225 of the Revised Laws reads as follows: 
"A prisoner whose term expires on Sunday shall be discharged on 
the preceding Saturday." I have received a pardon issued by the 
Governor and Council on April 8, a part of which reads as follows: 
"Now Know Ye, That, upon full consideration of the premises, We 
do hereby pardon the said offence and release him, the said . . . 
on April 26, 1914, from any further imprisonment under the sen- 



106 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

tence aforesaid, and do order that he be discharged accordingly:" 
I am somewhat in doubt just when to release him, — whether the 
section 130 above quoted applies to the pardon or not, and I respect- 
fully ask your opinion in the matter. 

The question involved is whether the date set in the par- 
don is strictly and technically the expiration of the prisoner's 
**term." Section 132 of the chapter referred to in your letter 
relates to pardons, and states of the Governor's pardon 
warrant, "Such warrant shall be obeyed and executed, in- 
stead of the sentence originally awarded." 

In my opinion the effect of such warrant is to substitute a 
new and shorter term for the original term of imprisonment. 
The term of the prisoner in question, as shortened by the 
warrant recited in your letter, expires on Sunday, April 26, 
1914. The prisoner should therefore be discharged on the 
preceding Saturday. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Savings Banks — Investments — Municipal Bonds. 

Savings banks may invest in city bonds in certain States where "money 
and credits" of said city, added to the last assessed valuation, bring 
the valuation of the taxable property therein within the provisions of 
St. 1912, c. 580, § 1, /. 

April 28, 1914. 

Hon. Augustus L. Thorndike, Bank Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — You have asked my opinion on the following 
subject: — 

In the official debt statement of the city of Minneapolis, Minn., 
the city comptroller has not included in the amount of the last valua- 
tion of property for assessment of taxes the amount of "money and 
credits" that are assessed under chapter 285, Laws of Minnesota, 
1911. This amounts to more than $41,000,000. The city of Minne- 
apohs has issued additional bonds which throws the net indebtedness 
more than 7 per cent, of the assessed valuation, if the amount of 
"money and credits" is not included in the total valuation. This 
department requests that you give it your opinion if the city of Minne- 
apolis could include in its total valuation the amount of the assessed 
value of "money and credits," and by so doing would it comply with 
subdivision e of clause second, section 68, chapter 590, Acts of 1908? 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 107 

I assume, both from your mention of " 7 per cent." and 
from the fact that Minneapolis has more than 100,000 popu- 
lation, that you are inquiring about / rather than about e, 
as stated in your letter. 

Subdivisions e, f and g, as amended by section 1 of chapter 
580 of the Acts of 1912, read as follows: — 

e. In the legally authorized bonds of the states of New York, Penn- 
sjdvania, Ohio, Indiana, Ilhnois, jMichigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, 
Missouri and Iowa, and of the District of Columbia, and in the legally 
authorized bonds for municipal purposes, and in the refunding bonds 
issued to take up at maturity bonds which have been issued for other 
than municipal purposes, but on which the interest has been fully 
paid, of any city of the aforesaid states which has at the date of such 
investment more than thirty thousand inhabitants, as estabhshed by 
the last national or state census, or city census certified to by the 
city clerk or treasurer of said city and taken in the same manner as 
a national or state census, preceding such investment, and whose net 
indebtedness does not exceed five per cent of the valuation of the 
taxable property therein, to be ascertained bj^ the last preceding 
valuation of property therein for the assessment of taxes. 

/. In the legally authorized bonds of the states of California, Dela- 
ware, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon and Washington, and in the 
legally authorized bonds for municipal purposes or in refunding bonds 
which have been issued for other than municipal purposes, but on 
which the interest has been fully paid, of any city of the states of 
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentuck}^ 
Massachusetts, Maine, Mar^dand, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin, 
which has at the date of such investment more than one hundred 
thousand inhabitants, established in the same manner as is provided 
in subdivision e of this clause, and whose net indebtedness does not 
exceed seven per cent, of the valuation of the taxable property therein, 
established and ascertained as provided in subdivision e of this clause. 

g. In the subdivisions d, e and / of this clause the words "net in- 
debtedness" mean the indebtedness of a county, city, town or district, 
omitting debts created for supplying the inhabitants with water and 
debts created in anticipation of taxes to be paid within one year, and 
deducting the amount of sinking funds available for the pajTnent of 
the indebtedness included. 

Section 1 of the Minnesota statute cited by you contains 
the meat of the whole statute, and reads as follows: — 

"Money" and "credits," as the same are defined in section 798, 
Revised Laws of 1905, are hereby exempted from taxation other than 



108 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

that imposed by this act, and shall hereafter be subject to an annual 
tax of three mills on each dollar of the fair cash value thereof. 

I learn from other sources than your letter of inquiry that 
the bonded indebtedness of Minneapolis, including the issue 
in question and excluding the water debt and sinking funds, 
is $15,933,250.82; that the valuation of taxable property, 
exclusive of money and credits, is $219,609,553; and that 
$41,072,125 of money and credits is taxable under the provi- 
sions of the act cited by you. 

The question beiore me is whether the fact that the tax 
laid on money and credits is limited by law to $3 a thousand 
precludes the inclusion of money and credits in determining 
the valuation of the taxable property of the city. This limit 
is practically the only distinction between this class of prop- 
erty and the other property, classed as realty and personalty. 
Money and credits are listed for taxation just as other per- 
sonalty is listed. The lists are required to be verified, and 
are tested as to completeness and accuracy in the usual \ysiy. 
The assessment is reviewed and equalized the same as others. 

Were it not for the tax limit there would be nothing to dif- 
ferentiate this class of property from other personalty. Does 
the limit make any real difference with respect to the Massa- 
chusetts law relative to legal investments for savings banks? 

The determination of the question requires an inquiry into 
the object of the establishment by the Legislature of the 
maximum ratio between city indebtedness and valuation. If 
this ratio was intended as an accurate test of the degree of 
solvency of the city, then, obviously, property which is only 
available to a limited extent to satisfy the city's obligations 
should not be given as much weight as property which is tax- 
able, and therefore available, up to its entire value. 

But it is my opinion that the purpose of the ratio is rather 
to establish a mere arbitrary measure. In this opinion I am 
fortified by the fact that the measure of size is just such a 
measure. The bonds of a Minnesota cit}- of 29,999 inhab- 
itants are not legal investment, no matter how solvent it is. 
The bonds of a Minnesota city having one more inhabitant 
are. If a Minnesota city has 99,999 inhabitants, and its tax 
exceeds, by a single mill, 5 per cent, of its valuation, its bonds 
are not legal investment. Add a single inhabitant, and its 
bonds thereby become legal investment, and thousands of 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 109 

dollars more in bonds may be issued, for the allowable ratio 
has thereby jumped to 7 per cent. All this points to the ratio 
being a mere arbitrary measure. Therefore the words *' tax- 
able property" should be construed broadly. If the Legisla- 
ture wished to restrict the meaning to "taxable property 
unlimitedly available for paj-ment of the same," or some 
similar phrase, the Legislature should have done so expressly. 
Broadly speaking, money and credits are taxable property. 
That point has been determined by the Attorney-General of 
Minnesota. In certain counties of that State the county 
auditors are paid as salaries sums "regulated by the assessed 
valuation of real and personal property for purposes of taxation 
in their respective counties." In answer to an inquiry from the 
State public examiner as to whether money and credits should 
be included in estimating the assessed valuation for the pur- 
pose of determining salaries, the State law department said: — 

Your inquiry is answered in the affirmative. Moneys and credits 
are given an assessed valuation, and although the local tax rate is not 
applied to such valuation, they are nevertheless personal property 
having an assessed value, and for the above specified purpose must be 
included in personal property valuations. (Minnesota Attorney- 
General's Report, 1910-12, p. 256.) 

It is therefore my opinion that the city of Minneapolis may 
include in its total valuation the amount of the assessed value 
of money and credits, within the meaning of subdivision / of 
clause second of section 68 of chapter 590 of the Acts of 1908, 
and amendments thereto. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Prisons — Violation of Parole — Determination of Duration of 

Sentence. 

Although a prisoner released on parole has been returned for breach of 
same, if his conduct while in prison has been perfect he is entitled to 
the usual deduction of six days for every month of imprisonment. 

April 28, 1914. 
Board of Prison Commissioners. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following statement and inquiry: — 

A prisoner was committed to the State Prison Feb. 27, 1893, 
having been sentenced thereto for a term of twenty-five years for 



no ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

being an habitual criminal. Dec. 20, 1900, he was released upon 
parole, and returned to the prison Oct. 10, 1901, for having violated 
the conditions of the same. He was again released upon parole 
April 9, 1909, and again returned Sept. 22, 1909, for another violation 
of parole. 

During the entire time that he has served in the prison his conduct 
there has been perfect, he never having been punished for violation of 
prison rules. 

Will you kindly favor the commissioners with your opinion as to 
when this man's sentence expires, less the time off due him for good 
conduct in the prison? 

The statutes governing this case are to be found in sec- 
tions 2 and 3 of chapter 435 of the Acts of 1887 and sections 
20 and 22 of chapter 222 of the Public Statutes, w^hich appear 
without substantial change in sections 113, 116 and 129 of 
chapter 225 of the Revised Laws, section 129 having been 
amended in 1903. 

The first question to be determined is whether the violation 
of the conditions of his permit by the prisoner is to be re- 
garded as the breaking or violation of a rule of the prison. 
If it is to be so regarded, then the question of how much 
shall be taken off the deductions from his term of imprison- 
ment for good behavior rests entirely with your Board. But 
I am of the opinion that it is not to be so regarded. The 
permit is granted by the Governor and Council upon such 
terms and conditions as they prescribe, and it does not appear 
to have been a condition of the permit that the prisoner 
while at liberty must observe the rules of the prison, nor does 
it appear that the terms and conditions upon which the per- 
mit w^as granted were intended to have the force of prison 
rules or to stand in place of such rules. The prisoner, so far 
as I am informed, had no notice that a violation of the con- 
ditions of his permit would be taken as the violation of a 
rule of the prison. The language of the statute, "they may 
issue to him a permit to be at liberty" is inconsistent with 
the idea that he is to be subject to penalties for a breach of 
the conditions of his permit as for a breach of the rules of 
the prison; besides, the statute fixes the penalty for a viola- 
tion of the terms of his permit, namely, that the permit itself 
is forfeited, and that for such violation he shall be returned to 
the prison, and that the time he has been at liberty shall 
not be taken into consideration in computing the term of his 
imprisonment. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. Ill 

Now, leaving out of the account the fact that this prisoner 
has twice violated the terms and conditions of his permit to 
be at liberty, as not constituting a violation of any prison 
rule, we come to the question of deductions to be made from 
the term of his imprisonment for good conduct in prison. 
The question may arise as to whether such a deduction can 
be claimed by the prisoner as a matter of legal right, or 
whether it rests in the discretion of your Board. The ques- 
tion was before the Supreme Judicial Court in the case of 
Murphy v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 264, and, in rendering 
its decision, the court said: — 

It seems to us that . . . the convict was and is entitled to deductions 
for good conduct, and to a permit to be at liberty for the time thus 
deducted, as a matter of right rather than of favor. The object was 
to furnish an incentive to good conduct while the con\dct was in con- 
finement, by offering him a reward therefor. 

You state tha^t the conduct of this prisoner during his en- 
tire term in prison has been perfect. It is my op^inion that 
it is his legal right to have deducted from his term of im- 
prisonment six days for every month thereof, and that your 
Board should grant the prisoner, upon such terms as you may 
deem proper, a permit to be at liberty during the time so 
deducted from his sentence. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Aitorney-General. 



Corporations — Increase of Capital Stock — Filing Fees. 

Corporations must pay a filing fee of one- twentieth of one per cent, on 
all increases of capital stock, and every increase and decrease must 
be separately considered. 

April 29, 1914. 

Hon. Frank J. Donahue, Secretary of the Commonwealth. 

Dear Sir: — A business corporation organized under the 
provisions of chapter 437 of the Acts of 1903, with an author- 
ized capital stock of $17,000,000, consisting of $7,000,000 of 
common stock and the balance in preferred stock, having 
paid the fees as required by law, by a proper vote reduced 
its common stock to $700,000, and immediately authorized 



112 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

an increase of its common stock by the amount of $4,300,000. 
You request my opinion as to whether a tax of one-twentieth 
of one per cent, on the $4,300,000 increase should be levied 
as a filing fee under the provisions of section 89 of said 
chapter. 

Sections 42 and 43 of chapter 437 of the Acts of 1903 
relate, respectively, to the increase or reduction of the capital 
stock of corporations, and provide as follows: — 

Section 42. If an increase in the total amount of the capital 
stock of any corporation shall have been authorized by vote of its 
stockholders in accordance with the provisions of section forty, the 
articles of amendment shall also set forth: (a) the total amount of 
capital stock already authorized; (6) the amount of stock already 
issued for cash payable by instalments and the amount paid thereon; 
and the amount of full paid stock already issued for cash, property, 
services or expenses; (c) the amount of additional stock authorized; 
(d) the amount of such stock to be issued for cash, property, services 
or expenses, respectively; (e) a description of said property and a 
statement of the nature of said services or expenses, in the manner 
required by the provisions of section eleven. 

Section 43. If a reduction of the capital stock of any corporation 
shall have been authorized by its stockholders in accordance with the 
provisions of section forty, the articles of amendment shall also set 
forth (a) the total amount of capital stock already authorized and 
issued; (6) the amount of the reduction and the manner in which it 
shall be effected; (c) a copy of the vote authorizing the reduction. 
No reduction of capital stock shall be lawful which renders the cor- 
poration banki'upt or insolvent, but the capital stock may be reduced 
b}^ the surrender by everj^ stockholder of his shares and the issue to 
him in lieu thereof of a proportional decreased number of shares, if 
the assets of such corporation are not reduced thereby, without creating 
any liabilit}^ of the stockholders of such corporation in case of the 
subsequent bankruptcy of such corporation. 

The fees for filing and recording the certificate required by 
law for an increase of capital stock are fixed by section 89 of 
said chapter, as amended b}^ section 2 of chapter 396 of the 
Acts of 1907, which reads as follows: — 

The fee for filing and recording the certificate required by section 
forty-two providing for an increase of capital stock shall be one 
twentieth of one per cent, of the amount by which the capital is in- 
creased. 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 113 

Section 90 of said chapter 437 provides as follows: — 

The fees for filing all other certificates, statements or reports re- 
quired by law shall be five dollars for each certificate, statement or 
report, but no fee shall be paid for filing the annual tax return required 
by section forty-eight. 

The reduction and the increase of the capital stock of this 
corporation, though made by votes as nearly simultaneous in 
point of time as it was possible to make them, still constitute 
two separate and distinct transactions. Xo question appears 
to have been raised as to the payment of the filing fee for the 
certificate showing a reduction of the capital stock, but this 
was no more a distinct transaction than the act of increasing 
the stock. 

It has been the unvarying practice since the enactment of 
the present law to charge the statutory- fee in every instance 
of an increase in capital stock whenever made, and the 
statute makes no provision for exemptions or exceptions 
under any circumstances. 

It lias been suggested that $4,000,000 of the $4,300,000 
increase is to be exchanged for a like amount of second pre- 
ferred stock, and that therefore the filing fee should be com- 
puted only on the $300,000. It is not apparent how the dis- 
position to be made by the corporation of the capital stock 
acquired by this increase can affect the statutory requirement 
in regard to the paN'ment of the fee for filing and recording 
the certificate of increase. 

It is my opinion that in this case a filing fee of one-twenti- 
eth of one per cent, of $4,300,000 must be paid by the cor- 
poration. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boyntox, AUomey-GeneraL 



Damages — Liability of Commonwealth to Riparian Proprietors. 

A riparian proprietor who is damaged by the construction of a bridge 
which cuts off his access to the sea has no right of action against the 
Commonwealth, 

April 29, 1914. 

Committee on Metropolitan Afairs. 

Gentlemen: — Upon the petition and statement of facts 
of John Stuart of Quincy, transmitted to me with House 



114 ATTORXFA -GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Bill Xb. 1172, you have requested my opinion in regard to 
the following questions: — 

1. Has the petitioner suffered any damage for which the Common- 
wealth is liable? 

2. If the Commonwealth is lial3le, for what should the petitioner 
be compensated? 

The claim of the petitioner against the Commonwealth is 
well set forth in his petition, which is as follows: — 

The undersigned, citizen of Quincy, respectfully represents that he 
maintains a boat-building plant, with facilities as well for storing 
boats, located on Sachem Brook, so called, in said Quincy, which is 
crossed by a drawless bridge constructed by the Metropolitan Park 
Commission, in accordance with chapter 124 of the Acts of 1904, to 
connect the Quincy Shore Drive; that for many years prior to the 
construction of said bridge your petitioner had the unobstructed use 
of the channel of said Sachem Brook, in connection ^\'ith his business 
as aforesaid; that he objected to the construction of said bridge, 
belie^Ting that it Mould result in an injury to his said business and 
property; and that he was given assurance that said bridge would be 
so constructed as not to interfere with the free passage of boats there- 
under, but that since the construction of said bridge the tides have 
washed into said channel sand and material used in the construction 
of the parkway adjacent to said bridge, so that each year since said 
bridge was constructed your petitioner has suffered great damage by 
reason of said inability to use said channel uninterruptedly as there- 
tofore; and that no provision has been made by the Commonwealth 
for the payment of such damages. 

Wherefore, your petitioner prays for the enactment of legislation 
to recompense him for injury to his business and property, caused as 
aforesaid. 

From the petition and statement of facts it appears that 
Sachem Brook is a small stream flowing into Quincy Bay, 
so called, and that the tide ebbs and flows in the channel of 
this brook for a considerable distance, and that at low tide 
the channel is almost entirely drained of water. The peti- 
tioner's place of business is located on the shore of Sachem 
Brook, on tidewater, and at some time the Metropolitan Park 
Commission, by virtue of authority conferred upon it by 
chapter 124 of the Acts of 1904, built a drawless bridge over 
Sachem Brook below the plant of the petitioner. That chapter 
is entitled, " An Act to authorize the Metropolitan Park 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMEXT — Xo. 12. 115 

Commission to construct a drawless bridge over Sachem 
Brook, so called, in the Quincy Shore Reservation," and 
provides as follows: — 

Section 1. The metropolitan park commission is hereby au- 
thorized to construct a drawless bridge over that part of Sachem 
brook, so called, in Quincy, lying within the lands acquired by said 
commission by takings or otherwise for Quincy shore reservation. 

Sectiox 2. No action shall be taken relative to the construction 
of said bridge until the plan therefor has been approved by the board 
of harbor and land commissioners. 

Section 3. This act shall take effect upon its passage. [Approved 
February 27, 1904. 

The petitioner's place of business l)eing located on tide- 
water, and the bridge of which he complains having been 
constructed by authority of the Legislature, the question 
arises, has the petitioner, even though he has been injured as 
he claims to have been, any legal claim against the Com- 
monwealth for damages? 

Questions exactly parallel to the one under consideration 
have been repeatedly passed upon by the Supreme Judicial 
Court, and have been uniformly decided against the respec- 
tive claimants. It is said that — 

The Legislature may authorize the use of public streams for any 
public purpose without compensating riparian proprietors thereby 
injured. It may cut off the access of riparian owners to the sea by 
authorizing the construction of a bridge, \\ith or without a draw, or 
across a stream below their lands. Such authorization is the regu- 
lation of public rights and an owner has no private right in the stream 
even if he has enjoyed twenty years' use or if he is the only wharf 
owner upon it. (Nichols on Land Damages, § 5, at pp. 12-13.) 

In a case in which the facts were that the petitioners 
owned a tidewater mill from which they alleged they had 
hitherto derived great emolument and advantage, and that 
their property was damaged by the location and construction 
of the Boston & IMaine Railroad across the mouth of the creek 
at the head of which the petitioners' mill was situated; that 
the railroad company had greatly obstructed and impeded the 
flow of tidewater into the petitioners' milldam; that by the 
location and construction of the railroad' through the peti- 
tioners' milldam the respondents had greatly obstructed and 



116 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

prevented the tidewater, which overflowed the meadow and 
land above the pond, from flowing back into the pond; that 
in consequence of these obstructions the petitioners' mills 
could not be worked as effectually as before; and that the 
railroad company, by the location and construction of its 
road, had greatly injured the premises of the petitioners for 
the purposes of a wharf, — the court, speaking by Chief 
Justice Shaw, said : — 

The question was as to the right of riparian proprietors upon salt 
water, over an open tract of flats from which the tide wholly ebbs, 
and lying between upland territory and na\^gable water, kept open 
and unobstructed for the free flow and reflow of the tidewater, for 
their mills or for navigation. This was a question of law, depending 
on the general laws of property, the colony ordinance in regard to 
flats, the usages of the country, and judicial decisions, and was proper 
to be decided as a question of law. And we are of opinion, as matter 
of law, that the petitioners had no right, as riparian proprietors, to 
have their flats kept open and unobstructed for the purposes stated, 
and that the jury should have been so instructed; also, that the pe- 
titioners, as tide mill owners, had no right, either as against the public 
or as against conterminous and adjacent proprietors, to have their 
flats kept open, but only to the flow of water in the channel l^elow 
low-water mark, and where the tide does not ebb. The adjoining 
proprietor, to the extent of one hundred rods, maj'- build solid structures, 
and thus obstruct the flow and reflow of the tide, ^\'ithout objection, 
provided he does not wholly cut off his neighbor's access to his house 
or land; and if the mill owner or conterminous proprietor suffers in 
consequence, it is damnum absque injuria. The pubhc have a right 
to regulate the use of public navigable waters for purposes of passage; 
and the erection of a bridge with or without a draw, by the authority 
of the Legislature, is the regulation of a public right, and not the 
deprivation of anj^ private right, which can be ground for damages. 
So far, therefore, as the railroad erected l^y authority of the Legis- 
lature affected the right of the petitioners to pass or repass to and 
from their lands and wharves ^dth vessels, it was a mere regulation 
of a public right, and not a taking of private property for a public 
use, and gave the petitioners no claim for damages. (Davidson v. 
Boston & Maine R.R., 3 Cush. 93.) 

In a similar case the court again said : — 

The petitioners owned the wharf and land against which the westerly 
end of said bridge was built, and they claimed damages for the injury 
to their estate by the said bridge, by impeding the access to their 
wharf by vessels, and by occupying the space which would have served 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 117 

the purpose of a vessel's berth, lying at their wharf. The judge de- 
cided that they could maintain no such claim, and rejected the evi- 
dence offered in support of it, to which the petitioners excepted. This 
court are of opinion that this decision was right. As we understand 
the facts, this bridge passes over the channel only, which is part ot 
the public domain; being a navigable channel from which the tide 
does not ebb, the Legislature had the right to authorize the bridge, 
and did authorize both the bridge and the continuance of it. If the 
petitioners sustained any loss by it, it was a damage arising from a 
partial impediment in the use of a public right, a damage sustained 
by them in common with all the rest of the community, and for which 
they could have no claim for damage. They had no right to occupy 
that part of the channel as a vessel's berth, because it was upon a 
public navigable stream, and if occupied in fact more extensively by 
them than by others, it would be by sufferance, and not as of right. 
(Boston & Worcester R.R. Corpn. v. Old Colony R.R. Corjm., 12 Gush. 
605.) 

In another case of like character the plaintiff alleged that 
he owned and used a wharf and other property on Monu- 
ment River, a navigable stream and arm of the sea, in the 
town of Sandwich, and that the defendant on or about June 
0, 1873, ''wrongfully, unjustly and unlawfully built, or caused 
to be built and constructed a l)ridge, without a draw, across 
said river, below said land and wharf, and between it and the 
sea, and so low and near the river as to prevent the plaintiff 
from navigating said river and using said land and wharf as 
aforesaid; that the defendant refused and neglected, and 
still refuses and neglects to provide a draw in and for said 
bridge, although often requested so to do l)y the plaintiff'; 
that, by reason of the building and constructing of said 
bridge, he has been prevented from using his said land and 
wharf for the purposes of trading and landing and shipping 
grain, flour, wood and various other kinds of goods, wares 
and merchandise, and storing the same, and mooring vessels, 
and for w^harfage and wharf purposes generally, and for the 
purposes for which it was previously used, and has been and 
is greatly damaged and injured, and particularly has been 
and is greatly damaged and injured, in his said land and 
wharf and business." In this case the court, speaking by 
Chief Justice Gray, said : — 

The act of the defendant, for which the plaintiff in various counts 
seeks compensation, is the building of a bridge across a navigable 
stream and arm of the sea. The direct iniurv alleged is to the navi- 



118 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

gation of the stream, to which the plaintiff is entitled only in common 
with the w^hole pubhc; and the remedy for that injury is by indict- 
ment, and not b}^ private action. The fact that the plaintiff alone 
now navigates the stream, or has a wharf thereon at which he carries 
on business, only shows that the present consequential damage to 
him may be greater in degree than to others, but does not show that 
the injury is different in kind, or that other riparian proprietors and 
the rest of the public may not, whenever they use the stream, suffer 
in the same way. The case has no analogy to those in which an ob- 
struction in a naA^gable stream sets back the water upon the plaintiff's 
land, or, being against the front of his land, entireh^ cuts off his access 
to the stream, and thereby causes a direct and peculiar injury to his 
estate, or in which the carrying on of an offensive trade creates a 
nuisance to the plaintiff. Blood v. Xashua ci* Lowell Railroad, 2 Gray, 
137; Lawrence v. Fairhaven, o Gray, 110; Brightman v. Fairhaven, 
7 Gray, 271; Willard v. Cambridge, 3 Allen, 574; Wessori v. Washbuni 
Iron Co., 13 Allen, 95; Brayton v. Fall River, 113 Mass. 218; Lyon v. 
Fishmongers' Co., 1 App. Cas. 662. {Blackwell v. Old Colony R.R. 
Co., 122 Mass. 1.) 

These cases have ])een followed in later decisions of the 
Supreme Court: Stimso)i v. Inhabitants of Brookline. 197 
Mass. 568, 573; Home for Aged Women v. Commomvcalth, 
202 Mass. 422, 428; Dwyer v. Xew York, Xrw Haven d' Hart- 
ford R.R. Co., 209 Mass. 419, 421. 

The petitioner states that he objected to the construction 
of the bridge across Sachem Brook. Even though he did ob- 
ject, that fact is in this case of no legal consequence. His 
objection was addressed to the sound discretion and judg- 
ment of the Legislature, whose decision was final. 

It is claimed that the petitioner wrote a letter in which he 
referred to an agreement made between himself and Mr. 
Emery and the Metropolitan Park Commission, but it is to 
be noted that no one had authority to make an agreement 
with the petitioner on behalf of the Commonwealth; and the 
petitioner loses no rights by reason of any negotiations with 
Mr. Emery or any member of the Park Commission for the 
reason that there was no process of law by which the peti- 
tioner could have prevented or even hindered the building of 
the bridge. 

My attention has been directed to certain cases cited by 
counsel for the petitioner, and I have examined all the cases 
he has referred to, but I do not find one among them that is 
parallel to the case under consideration. In each of the cases. 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 119 

cited in hehalf of the petitioner the damage suffered was 
special and peculiar, while the damage alleged by the peti- 
tioner in this case is precisely the same in kind and character 
as that complained of in the cases hereinl)efore cited, and this 
petitioner is subject to the rule of law established by those 
cases. The damage alleged by the petitioner is caused by 
the interference with the navigation of Sachem Brook, a 
thing to which he is entitled only in common with the whole 
public. The fact, if it be a fact, that he alone now navigates 
the stream or has a boat-building establishment thereon at 
which he carries on business, only shows that the present 
consequential damage to him is greater in degree than to 
others, but does not show that the injury is different in kind 
or that other riparian proprietors and the rest of the public 
may not whenever they use the stream suffer in the same way. 
In such a case a private action cannot be maintained. 

I am therefore of the opinion that the petitioner has not 
suffered any damage for which the Commonwealth is liable. 
Your first question being answered in the negative, your 
second question requires no further consideration. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boyntox, Aitomcij-GeneraL 



Legislature — Eligibility of Members to Office. 

Members of the Legislature may be appointed, during their term of office, 
to an office not created by them during said term. 

April 30, 1914. 

His Excellency David I. Walsh, Governor of the Commonwealth. 

Sir: — You have requested my opinion upon the following 
question: — 

Can the Governor lawfully appoint a meml^er of the present Legis- 
lature to a State board or commission, as, for example, the Commission 
on Economy and Efficiency? 

Section 21 of chapter 3 of the Revised Laws provides as 
follows: — 

No member of the general court shall, during the term for ^\-hich he 
is elected, be ehgible to any office under the authority of the common- 
wealth created during such term, except an office to be filled by vote 
of the people. 



120 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Commenting upon this section of the statute, Attorney- 
General Knowlton said : — 

The obvious purpose of the statute is to remove from a member of 
the Legislature any temptation to be influenced in his vote by reason 
of the possibihty that he may be a candidate for the place created by 
the Legislature of which he is a member. (L Op. Atty.-Gen., 347.) 

On May 14, 1912, Attorney-General Swift gave an opinion 
to the Governor on the following question: "Whether a mem- 
ber of the present Legislature would be eligible to appoint- 
ment on the Industrial Accident Board, so called, created by 
an act of the Legislature of 1911, which act was amended by 
the Legislature of 1912." The question was raised that there 
was no clause in the amending bill which would exempt 
from its operation the proA'isions of section 21 of chapter 3 
of the Revised Laws. I quote from Attorney-General Swift's 
opinion: — 

The Industrial Accident Board was created by chapter 751 of the 
Acts of 1911. A member of this jTar's Legislature is, therefore, not 
ineligible by reason of section 21 of chapter 3 of the Revised Laws, 
except for appointment to an office created during the present term 
of the Legislature. . . . (The amendment to chapter 751 of the Acts 
of 1911, estabhshing the Board, does not in terms repeal or strike out 
the provisions of the act of 1911.) 

... It, therefore, does not abolish the Board of three members 
created by said act of 1911, but merely creates a Board of five instead 
of three members by an addition of two members; nor does the change in 
salary and in term of office made by the amendment operate to abohsh 
the three commissionerships created under said act of 1911. These 
are mere changes in detail which cannot affect the existence of the 
office itself. Familiar illustrations of this rule are various acts passed 
increasing the number of justices of our courts and increasing their 
salaries. It has never been contended that such amendments abohshed 
existing offices, nor could it be successfulh' so contended, in my judg- 
ment. There are, therefore, three commissionerships which were 
created by the act of 1911, to which a member of this year's Legislature 
would be eligible to appointment so far as the operation of said section 
21 of chapter 3 of the Revised Laws is concerned. 

As the rule of law seems to me to have been correctly 
stated by my predecessors, I make no further comment. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boyntox, Aitorney-General. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 121 



Constitutional Law — Corporations — Rights of Minority Stock- 
holders. 

A law requiring foreign corporations doing business in IMassaehusetts to 
give minorit}' stockholders representation on their boards of directors 
would be unconstitutional. 

May U, 1914. 
Committee on Bills in the Third Reading. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion as to the 
constitutionality of House Bill No. 1166, which is entitled 
*' An Act to provide that minority stockholders of corporations 
doing business in Massachusetts may be represented on 
boards of directors." Sections 1 and 2 of this act are as 
follows: — 

Section 1. Every corporation created by, or organized under, 
the laws of this commonwealth, and every corporation established, 
organized or chartered under the laws of another state or country, 
and engaging or continuing in any kind of business in this common- 
wealth, shall be subject to the provisions of this act. 

Section 2. At the annual meeting for the election of officers of 
any corporation mentioned in section one, stockholders who are resi- 
dents of Massachusetts and who hold stock to an amount equal in 
the aggregate to twenty-five per cent of the entire outstanding capi- 
tal stock of the corporation, hereinafter called minority stockliolders, 
shall have the right to nominate one director of such corporation and 
to have him elected as a director, provided they comply with the re- 
quirements of the succeeding sections of this act. 

Sections 3 and 4 provide the methods to be pursued by the 
minority stockholders of a corporation, to secure representa- 
tion on its board of directors. The fifth and last section of 
this act provides heavy penalties for its violation, and that 
an\' corporation that has violated any of its provisions may 
be enjoined from the prosecution of its business until it has 
complied with the provisions of this act. 

Corporations are creations of the law. Their organization, 
control, conduct and dissolution may all be directed by 
statute. Since the decision of the Dartmouth College case 
the statutes of the Commonwealth have carefully preserved to 
the Legislature the right to change the provisions of law in 
regard to corporate rights. The Business Corporation Act, so 
called, enacted in 1903, provides that it shall apply — 



122 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

(rt) To all corporations having a capital stock and established for 
the purpose of carrying on business for profit heretofore or hereafter 
organized under general laws of the commonwealth. 

(b) To all such corporations heretofore created under special laws 
of the commonwealth, except so far as its provisions are inconsistent 
with the provisions of any such special laws enacted l^efore the eleventh 
day of March in the year eighteen hundred and thirty-one as are not 
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the general court. 

Section 2 of this chapter provides that corporations organ- 
ized under general laws shall be subject to the provisions of 
all laws hereafter enacted which may affect or alter their 
corporate rights or duties or which may dissolve them. 

The bill before me proposes a very radical innovation in 
the methods heretofore and now in force in regard to the 
election of directors of corporations, but the regulation pro- 
posed is one that is, in my opinion, within the authority of 
the Legislature to make as to all domestic corporations 
except such as were organized under the provisions of special 
laws enacted before the eleventh day of March in the year 
1831, and whose charters are not subject to amendment, 
alteration or repeal by the General Court. 

Taking up the question of applying the proposed legisla- 
tion to foreign corporations doing business in this Common- 
wealth, it may be noted that a corporation can exist only by 
force of the statute or other law of the state or country in 
which it is created; that the laws of a state or country have 
no extraterritorial force, and operate in another state or 
country only on the principle of comity; and that a corpora- 
tion is conclusiveh^ presumed to be a resident of the state or 
country under whose law it w^as created. Bank of Augusta v. 
Earle, 13 Pet. 519; 19 Cyc. 1218; Thompson on Corporations, 
§^ 7875 and 7876. 

A corporation organized under the laws of one state or 
country is not a citizen within that provision of section 2 of 
Article IV. of the Constitution of the United States which 
provides that " the citizens of each state shall be entitled to 
all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states," 
nor is it within that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Federal Constitution which provides that "no state shall 
make or enforce any law w^hich shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States." A corporation, 
therefore, can exercise none of its functions, franchises or 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 12.3 

privileges in any State other than that in which it is organized 
except by the comity and consent of that other state. Bank 
of Augusta v. Earlr, 13 Pet. 519; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 
168; Clark on Corporations, 2d ed., 604. 

It follows that with the exception of those foreign corpora- 
tions whose business transactions in this Commonwealth are 
within the interstate commerce clause of the Federal Constitu- 
tion the Legislature may prescribe the terms and conditions 
upon which they may do business here. It is within the power 
of a state in its discretion to exclude from its territory all 
foreign corporations except those whose transactions within 
its borders fall within the commerce clause, so called, of the 
Federal Constitution. Clark on Corporations, 2d ed. 605; Myers 
V. Manhattan Bank, 20 Ohio 301; Runyan v. Coster's Lessee, 
14 Pet. 122; Starkweather v. American Bible Society, 72 111. .50. 

It may be thought that a different rule should prevail as 
to foreign corporations that have already complied with the 
law of this Commonwealth, and, having received permission 
to do business here, have invested their capital and estab- 
lished themselves in business here. There is a large number 
of corporations of this class. In cases that have arisen where 
corporations have been similarly situated it has been argued 
that having complied with the laws in force at the time they 
entered the state, and having established themselves in busi- 
ness, the state in which they have thus lawfully established 
themselves cannot without just cause revoke the permission 
granted them to carry on their ])usiness within its borders. 
But the rule of law seems to be that a state has the absolute 
right to entirely exclude a foreign corporation from its territory 
or, having given it a license to do business within the state, to 
revoke it in its discretion for good cause or without any cause 
at all, and its motive in so doing is not open to inquiry. 

Subject to the exception already noted as to interstate com- 
merce, the corporation has no constitutional right to trans- 
act its business in any other state than that of its creation, 
and hence its exclusion therefrom violates no constitutional 
right. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28; State v. 
Standard Oil Co., 61 Neb. 28; Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 
94 U. S. 535. 

A state cannot interfere with the internal affairs of a foreign 
corporation. It cannot direct how the officers of a foreign 
corporation shall be chosen; and I have discussed thus at 
length the right of a state to exclude foreign corporations 



124 ATIWINEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

because the conditions imposed by this proposed measure of 
legislation, while in form directing the manner in which 
directors of corporations organized in other states or coun- 
tries doing business here shall be elected, are in truth and in 
fact terms of exclusion from the Commonwealth. The terms 
imposed by this bill are impossible of performance by foreign 
corporations for the reason that such corporations must elect 
their directors in the manner provided by the laws of the state 
in which they are organized, and cannot do otherwise, for 
the law of that state is the very law of their being. 

It has been suggested that the enactment of such a statute 
as is here proposed is likely to provoke retaliatory legisla- 
tion by other states. While this is probably true, it does 
not present a constitutional objection to the bill. The pro- 
visions of this bill are broad enough to include corporations 
organized and located outside the Commonwealth and whose 
transactions within it are those of interstate commerce. In 
its present form this bill, so far as it relates to corporations 
organized prior to March 11, 1831, under special laws, and 
whose charters are not subject to alteration or repeal by the 
Legislature, is obnoxious to the provision of the Federal Con- 
stitution that "no state shall pass any law impairing the 
obligation of contracts." Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 
Wheat. 636. And so far as its terms apply to corporations 
organized outside the Commonwealth, and whose transactions 
within it are solely those of interstate commerce, it is obnoxious 
to the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. 

It is my opinion that this bill, if enacted, will be un- 
constitutional. ^ 
\'ery truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boyxtox, Attorney-GeneraL 



Constitutional Laic — Eminent Domain — Interstate Streams. 

A law authorizing a city in this Commonwealth to take water from an 
interstate stream, and providing compensation for damages to non- 
residents, is constitutional. 

May is, 1914. 

Committee on Water Supply. 

Gentlemex: — You have requested my opinion as to the 
constitutionality of House Bill No. 2279, as amended, being 
an act to authorize the city of Fitchburg to increase its water 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 125 

supply. This bill is drawn in all essential particulars in con- 
forniit\^ with other similar measures that have been enacted 
from time to time in this Commonwealth, and makes provi- 
sion for the compensation of all persons wdiose property may 
be taken under its provisions or injured by acts done under 
its authority. 

Upon its face the bill is entirely free from any constitu- 
tional objection, but the remonstrants against this bill raise 
the point that it provides for a taking by right of eminent 
domain of the waters of an unnavigable, interstate stream, 
'the Souhegan River, a stream that has its source in Massa- 
chusetts and flows into New^ Hampshire; and that as the flow 
of water in that river will be greatly diminished if the proposed 
taking is made, and the property of riparian ow^ners, citizens 
of New Hampshire, along the course of the stream in that 
state will be damaged thereby, therefore the bill, if enacted, 
will be unconstitutional. 

The bill is not obnoxious to any provision of the Consti- 
tution of this Commonwealth. It provides for compensa- 
tion in damages to any person or corporation, whether within 
or without the Commonw^ealth, entitled to damages under its 
provisions if they fail to agree with said city as to the amount 
of damages sustained, and makes further specific provision 
for damages to parties outside the Commonwealth in the 
following language: — 

Owners of property situated without the commonwealth which is 
damaged by anything done by the city under the authorit}^ of this 
act may file their petitions for damages in the office of the clerk of 
the superior court for the county of Middlesex or for the county of 
Worcester. 

So that a remedy is provided for every one whose property is 
injured by the operations that may be carried on under au- 
thority of this act. 

In the consideration of this question my attention has been 
directed to two cases, — first, that of Pine et als. v. New 
York City, 112 Fed. Rep. 98 (185 U. S. 93); and second, 
that of Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46. 

In the case of Pine et als. v. New York City the facts were 
that the Legislature of the State of New^ York passed an act 
authorizing New York City to take the waters of Byram 
River, a non-navigable stream which has its source in the 
State of New^ York, and at some distance from its source 



126 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

flows into and across the State of Connecticut and empties 
into Long Island Sound. X^'ew York City, proceeding under 
the act, built a dam across Byram River in the State of Xew 
York and diverted so much of the water as to greatly dimin- 
ish the flow of the stream in Connecticut, whereby the prop- 
erty of the plaintiffs was damaged; and as the city failed to 
agree with the plaintiffs as to the amount of damages they 
had suffered, the plaintiffs brought suit in equity in the 
Circuit Court of the United States, praying for an injunction 
to restrain the city from diverting the waters of that stream. 
The Circuit Court granted the injunction as prayed for, and 
the case was taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals. 

The question of the constitutionality of the Xew York 
statute, while not discussed at length in the opinion rendered 
in the Circuit Court of Appeals, was evidently considered, 
for the majority opinion sustaining the decision of the Cir- 
cuit Court contains the statement that "the diversion of 
water at one point is a taking of the property of riparian 
owners below the point of diversion, and falls within the 
constitutional protection." As above indicated, the opinion 
of the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case was rendered by 
a divided court, one of the three judges who heard the case 
dissenting. Judge AYheeler, who wrote the dissenting opinion, 
said : — 

The defendant has done nothing in question here outside of the 
State of New York; the deprivation of water complained of was 
wholly within that state; and, if the plaintiffs have any rights in the 
water taken, they exist within that state, and were subject to and 
taken under the eminent domain of that state. The plaintiffs have 
come into this court because they are citizens of another State, and 
not because their land through which the}' derive their rights to the 
water taken is situated in another state. . . . 

Thus these parties have a common interest in the water in question, 
which the defendant has taken under the law of the State, and not as 
a trespasser. It seems to be famihar law that, when an injunction is 
applied for to restrain such a taking, the damages will be ascertained, 
and the injunction withheld on making papnent. 

This case was then taken to the Supreme Court of the 
United States. That court did not take up the question of 
the constitutionality of the X'^ew York statute, but ruled that 
the plaintiffs had been guilty of laches in bringing their suit, 
and because of this reversed the decision of the lower court 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMEXT — No. 12. 127 

and made a decree leaving to New York City the right to 
continue the diversion of the water of the river, the plaintiffs 
to have compensation in damages. In this case it is to he 
remarked that the question of the constitutionality of the act 
authorizing New York City to take the waters of Byram 
River was undoubtedly before the Supreme Court. If un- 
constitutional, no degree of negligence by the plaintiffs in 
bringing their suit could have cured the defect. If the act 
was unconstitutional it was void from the beginning, yet the 
court, having the question before it, decided the case, not in 
entire accordance with the grounds of either the majority or 
the dissenting opinion rendered in the Circuit Court of Ap- 
peals, but upon a principle of equity that left the parties in 
the same position they would have occupied had the dis- 
senting opinion of Judge Wheeler prevailed. 

In the second case above mentioned the State of Kansas 
filed in the Supreme Court of the United States a bill in 
equity against the State of Colorado, alleging therein that 
the State of Colorado, acting directly by herself as well as 
indirectly through private persons and corporations thereto 
licensed by the State of Colorado, was depriving and threat- 
ening to deprive the State of Kansas of all the water hereto- 
fore accustOQied to flow in the Arkansas River; that this was 
threatened not only by the impounding and the use of the 
water at the river's source, but as it flows after reaching the 
river. It was alleged that injury was being, and would be, 
thereby inflicted on the State of Kansas as an individual 
owner of land in the Arkansas River valley, and on all the 
inhabiT:ants of the State, and especially on the inhabitants of 
that part of the State lying in the Arkansas River valley. 
After disposing of certain preliminary matters the Supreme 
Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Brewer, said: — 

Turning now to the controversy as here presented, it is whether 
Kansas has a right to the continuous flow of the waters of the Arkansas 
River, as that flow existed before any human interference therewith, 
or Colorado the right to appropriate the waters of that stream so as 
to prevent that continuous flow, or that the amount of the flow is 
subject to the superior authority and supervisory control of the United 
States. While several of the defendant corporations have answered, 
it is unnecessary to specially consider their defences, for if the case 
against Colorado fails it fails also as against them. Colorado denies 
that it is in any substantial manner diminishing the flow of the Arkansas 
River into Kansas. If that be true, then it is in no way infringing 



128 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

upon the rights of Kansas. If it is diminishing that flow has it an 
absolute right to determine for itself the extent to which it will diminish 
it, even to the entire appropriation of the water? And if it has not 
that absolute right is the amount of appropriation that it is now 
making such an infringement upon the rights of Kansas as to call for 
judicial interference? Is the question one soleh^ between the States 
or is the matter subject to national legislative regulation, and, if the 
latter, to what extent has that regulation been carried? Clearh^ this 
controvers}' is one of a justiciable nature. The right to the flow of a 
stream was one recognized at common law, for a trespass upon which 
a cause of action existed. 

The court further said: — 

The question of the extent and the limitations of the rights of the 
two States becomes a matter of justiciable dispute between them, 
and this court is called upon to settle that dispute in such a way as 
will recognize the equal rights of both and at the same time establish 
justice between them. 

Again, the court said: — 

■ Now the question arises between two States, one recognizing 
generalh^ the common-law rule of riparian rights and the other pre- 
scribing the doctrine of the pubhc ownership of flo\ving water. Neither 
State can legislate for or impose its own polic\' upon the other. A 
stream flows through the two and a controversy is presented as to the 
flow of that stream. It does not follow, however, that because Congress 
cannot determine the rule which shall control between the two States 
or because neither State can enforce its own pohcy upon the other, 
that the controversy ceases to be one of a justiciable nature, or that 
there is no power which can take cognizance of the controversy and 
determine the relative rights of the two States. Indeed, the disagree- 
ment, coupled ^A-ith its effect upon a stream passing through the two 
States, makes a matter for investigation and determination by this 
court. 

Referring to the principles of common law applicable to 
this case the court said : — 

For after all, the common law is but the accumulated expressions 
of the various judicial tribunals in their efforts to ascertain what is 
right and just between individuals in respect to private disputes. As 
Congress cannot make compacts between the States, as it cannot, 
in respect to certain matters, by legislation compel their separate 
action, disputes between them must be settled either by force or else 
by appeal to tribunals empowered to determine the right and wrong 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 129 

thereot. Force under our system of government is eliminated. The 
clear language of the Constitution vests in this court the power to 
settle those disputes. We have exercised that power in a variet}' of 
instances, determining in the several instances the justice of the dispute. 
Nor is our jurisdiction ousted, even if, because Kansas and Colorado 
are States sovereign and independent in local matters, the relations 
between them depend in any respect upon principles of international 
law\ International law is no alien in this tribunal. In The Paquete 
Habana, 175 U. S. 677, Mr. Justice Gray declared: — 

International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and ad- 
ministered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often 
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their de- 
termination. 

And in delivering the opinion on the demurrer in this case Chief 
Justice Fuller said : — 

Sitting, as it were, as an international, as well as a domestic tribunal, 
we apply Federal law, State law, and international law, as the exigencies 
of the pai'ticular case may demand. 

In the further discussion of the case and of the evidence 
submitted the court said: — 

It cannot be denied in view of all the testimony . . . that the 
diminution of the flow of water in the river by the irrigation of Colorado 
has Vv^orked some detriment to the southwestern part of Kansas, and 
yet when we compare the amount of this detriment with the great 
benefit which has ob^^ousty resulted to the counties in Colorado, it 
w^ould seem that equahty of right and equity between the two States 
forbids any interference with the present withdrawal of water in 
Colorado for purposes of irrigation. 

In finally disposing of this case the court said: — 

The decree will also dismiss the IdIII of the State of Kansas as against 
all the defendants, without prejudice to the right of the plaintiff to 
institute new proceedings whenever it shaU appear that through a 
material increase in the depletion of the waters of the Arkansas b}^ 
Colorado, its corporations or citizens, the substantial interests of 
Kansas are being injured to the extent of destrojdng the equitable 
apportionment of benefits between the two States resulting from the 
flow of the river. 

The case of BrickcU v. Haicrhill Aqueduct Co., 142 Mass. 
394, was an action of tort for diverting and obstructing a 
watercourse, thereby preventing water from flowing through 



130 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

the plaintiff's land. The diversion of the water occurred in 
Massachusetts. The plaintiff was a citizen of Massachusetts, 
but the property, the injury of which he complained, was 
located in New Hampshire. The court in that case, speaking 
by Chief Justice Morton, said : — 

We do not deem it important that the land of the plaintiff which 
was injured was outside of the limits of this State. The language of 
the act is general, and puts all water rights upon the same footing, 
and applies to a proprietor outside the State. Such proprietor certainly 
has no greater rights than the citizen whose lands or water rights 
within the State are injured by the acts of the defendant under the 
authority of the Legislature. 

The rule of the common law as to the rights of riparian 
owners has been frequently stated, and may be expressed in 
the following language: — 

The primary right of every riparian proprietor is to have the natural 
and customary flow of the stream without obstruction or change. 

This primary right is subject to the modification that — 

The right to flowing water is now well settled to be a right incident 
to property in the land; it is a right puhlici juris, of such a character 
that whilst it is common and equal to all through whose land it runs, 
and no one can obstruct or divert it, yet, as one of the beneficial gifts 
of Providence, each proprietor has a right to a just and reasonable 
use of it as it passes through his land; and so long as it is not wholly 
obstructed or diverted, or no larger appropriation of the water running 
through it is made than a just and reasonable use, it cannot be said 
to be wrongful or injurious to a proprietor lower down. 

This is the rule between persons who are riparian proprie- 
tors on the same stream, and prevails until a public necessity 
arises, when, like every other individual right of property, it 
gives way to the public need. In some of the western States, 
as shown by the case of Kansas v. Colorado, the common- 
law rule, even as applied to interstate streams, yields and is 
modified b}^ the great necessity of irrigating vast tracts of 
arid and desert land; and even though the public necessity 
arises in another State, the rule as to private ownership 
yields to it. The irrigation of waste and desert lands in Col- 
orado may be and undoubtedly is a matter of transcendent 
importance, but who can measure or estimate the importance 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 131 

of an adequate supply of pure water for the use of the 
crowded, evergrowing industrial centers of the east? If the 
common-law rule yields as to interstate streams in the one 
case, it certainly ought to yield in the other. In each case 
the rule as to individual owners should yield to public neces- 
sity. 

It has been suggested that the city of Fitchburg does not 
need this supply. Of this question the Legislature must be 
the judge. In passing upon the question submitted to me I 
assume that the need exists. 

It has been further suggested that in the case of Kansas 
V. Colorado, above cited, the State of Kansas was not an indi- 
vidual owner, and that the case did not therefore decide the 
issues that would be involved in a suit by a citizen of Kansas 
against the State of Colorado; but, as I have stated above, 
Kansas in its bill of complaint set up the fact that it was an 
owner of land in the Arkansas valley which was damaged by 
the operations of Colorado. The court itself noted the fact 
that "Kansas asserts a pecuniary interest as owner of certain 
tracts along the banks of the Arkansas River, and as the 
owner of the bed of the stream." Kansas v. Colorado, 206 
U. S. at p. 98. But the court, in view of the fact that the 
jurisdiction of the court might be invoked by the State, as 
parens pairice, trustee, guardian or representative of all or a 
considerable portion of its citizens, deemed it unnecessary to 
stop to consider especially the rights of private ownership. 

The objection to this bill seems to grow out of the idea that 
each State is a sovereign power. To a limited extent this 
is true; but however complete the rights and attributes of 
sovereignty of the States may have been before they en- 
tered the L^nion, there can be no question that when they 
entered the L^nion large and important attributes of sov- 
ereignty were surrendered by the States. The States may not 
lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports; may not 
make war upon each other or upon a foreign country; may 
not make treaties with each other or with foreign countries; 
and in cases of differences of a justiciable nature arising 
between them the Supreme Court of the United States is 
empowered to adjudicate between them. Rhode Island v. 
Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657; Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 
208; Ka?isas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46. 

In a word, the States of this L^nion form a nation. 



132 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

If this bill passes, and the waters of the Souhegan River 
are taken by the city of Fitchburg, citizens of New Hamp- 
shire whose property is injured by the taking, by reason of 
diverse citizenship, may at their election bring action under 
the provisions of this bill in the courts of the Commonwealth, 
or may bring suit in the District Court of the United States 
against the city, or may induce the State of New Hampshire 
to bring suit in the Supreme Court of the United States 
against this Commonw^ealth. I repeat that this bill does not 
present the case of taking or injuring the property of any 
person and leaving him without a remedy. This measure is 
in harmon}' with other legislation of this Commonwealth in 
regard to securing a water supply for cities, notably, with the 
legislation providing for the taking of the south branch of the 
Nashua River, an interstate stream, as a supply for the met- 
ropolitan water district. If this bill is unconstitutional, then 
the metropolitan water act, being chapter 488 of the Acts of 
1895, was and is unconstitutional, and the acts done under its 
provisions were without authority. 

In view of the trend of judicial decisions, and of the course 
of legislation in this Commonwealth, which has stood for 
years unchallenged, I am of the opinion that this bill, if 
enacted, will be constitutional. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Constitutional Law — Freedom of Contract — Plumbers. 

A law providing that permits to perform plumbing work shall be issued 
only to master plumbers, and that all work done under such permits 
shall be performed only by master plumbers or their designated 
journeymen plumbers, would be unconstitutional. 

May 21, 1914. 
To the Honorable Senate. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following question of law: — 

Is it within the constitutional power of the General Court to enact 
a law providing that permits to perform plumbing work shall be 
issued only to master plumbers, and that all work done under such 
permits shall be performed only b}^ the master plumber himself or 
by such journeymen plumbers as he may directly employ and super- 
vise? 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 133 

You have submitted with your inquiry a copy of House 
Bill No. 1347, entitled "An Act relative to the supervision of 
plumbing." 

The question of constitutionality arises in regard to the 
first and second sections of the bill, which read as follows: — 

Section 1. The words ''master plumber," as used in chapter one 
hundred and three of the Revised Laws, shall be deemed to mean a 
person who holds a Massachusetts state master plumber's license or 
certificate, and who has a regular established place of business con- 
veniently situated and open for business during regular business hours, 
and who himself or by journeymen in his employ performs plumbing 
work for property owners, agents or tenants. 

Section 2. Permits to perform plumbing work shall be issued 
only to master plumbers as herein defined, and all work done under 
such permit shall be performed by the master plumber himself or 
by such journeymen plumbers as he may directly employ and super- 
vise. 

A ''journeyman" is defined to be a workman or mechanic 
who has served his apprenticeship, — specifically, a qualified 
mechanic employed in the exercise of his trade as distinguished 
from a master mechanic or foreman. 

This bill, if enacted, would prevent a journeyman plumber 
from making a contract to put the plumbing into a building 
or to take any other job of plumbing whatever, for the reason 
that no perm.it to do the work could lawfully be issued to 
him. And the bill goes further and would prevent a master 
plumber who was so unfortunate as not to have a regular 
established place of business, kept open for business during 
regular business hours, from making contracts for plumbing; 
and master plumbers who have regular places of business kept 
open for business during regular business hours, and whose 
places of business are not conveniently situated, are not to be 
regarded as master plumbers under the provisions of this bill, 
and would also fall within its prohibition. Thus this bill is 
not for a whole class, but its evident aim and object is to 
create a class within a class; that is, out of those who hold 
licenses as master plumbers it proposes to create a class of 
master plumbers. 

Article I. of Part the First of the Constitution of this 
Commonwealth declares: — 

All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential 
and unaUenable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of 



134 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, 
possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and 
obtaining their safety and happiness. 

Now there are certain fundamental rights of every citizen 
which are recognized in the organic law of all our free American 
States. A statute which violates any of these rights is uncon- 
stitutional and void, even though the enactment of it is not 
expressly forbidden. Commonwealth v. Pefry, 155 Mass. 117. 

Under the police power, legislation to protect the health, 
morals or safety of the community may be enacted, but that 
power does not extend beyond these limits, and legislation 
under the police power must bear a genuine relation to some 
one of the three subjects named. It necessarily follows that 
only such regulations will be sustained as are in fact necessary 
to the preservation of the public health, morals or safety, 
and the courts w^ill declare arbitrary provisions invalid. 
Cotter v. Doty, 5 Ohio, 393. 

If, then, it be admitted that for the preservation of the 
public health men who seek to work at the business of plumb- 
ing should be required to pass an examination and procure a 
license, that comes far short of justifying an interference with 
the way in which a man who has passed the examination and 
obtained a license shall conduct his business. Nor does such 
an admission afford a reason for prohibiting such a man from 
carrying on his business as he sees fit in regard to location, 
and in ever^^ other particular, so long as he is within the law. 

This proposed bill, if enacted, will interfere with the freedom 
of contract of journeymen plumbers, and, as above indicated, 
of certain master plumbers and of such property owners as 
may desire to make a contract for plumbing with a journey- 
man plumber or with a master plumber who has no regular 
place of business or whose place of business may, in the judg- 
ment of some one whose personality is not disclosed by the 
bill, be inconveniently located. 

Freedom of contract is not expressly mentioned in the 
Constitution, but the Supreme Judicial Court has declared 
that the right to acquire, possess and protect property, as set 
forth in Article I. of the Constitution, above cjuoted, includes 
the right to make reasonable contracts which shall be under 
the protection of the law. Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 
117. The Constitution declares that all men have an un- 
alienable right of seeking and obtaining their safety and 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 135 

happiness. Included in this right is the right to liberty in 
the choice of occupation, and to conduct and advertise it in 
any legitimate manner and subject only to such restraints 
as are necessary to the health, morals and safety of the 
community. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Dexter v. 
Blackdcn, 93 Me. 473; People v. Cold well, 168 N. Y. 671; 
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578. 

"Liberty," as that term is used in the Constitution, means 
not only freedom of the citizen from servitude and restraint, 
but is deemed to embrace the right of every man to be free 
in the use of his powers and faculties and to adopt and pursue 
such avocation or calling as he may choose, subject only to 
the restraints necessary to secure the common welfare. 
Frorer v. People, 141, 111. 171; Commonwealth v. Perry, supra; 
People V. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389; Ruhstrat v. People, 49 
L. R. A. 181. 

Our Supreme Judicial Court has said: — 

Constitutional hberty means ''the right of one to use bis faculties 
in all lawful ways, to live and work where he vnli, to earn his livelihood 
in any lawful calhng, and to pursue any la\^'ful trade or avocation." 
{O'Keeffe v. SomerviUe, 190 Mass. 110.) ^ 

For one to be a master plumber within the provisions of 
this proposed measure he must have a regular established 
place of business conveniently situated. To whom must it be 
conveniently situated? Whose convenience is referred to in 
the bill? Whose convenience must a man consult in setting 
up his plumber's shop, and whose judgment is to prevail as to 
whether the business is conveniently situated or not? This 
provision, if enacted, will constitute a gross violation of the 
constitutional guaranty of personal liberty. 

Article IV. of Section I. of Chapter I. of Part the Second 
of the Constitution confers authority on the General Court to 
make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and 
reasonable orders, laws, statutes and ordinances. The pro- 
vision of this bill last referred to is so clearly unreasonable as, 
in my opinion, to be inimical to this provision of the Con- 
stitution. 

It is my opinion that your question must be answered in 
the negative, and that this bill, if passed, will be unconsti- 
tutional. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



136 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Worhincns Compensation Act — Cities and Towns — Gypsy and 
Brown-tail Moth Suppression. 

The Commonwealth is not required to reimburse cities and towns which 
have adopted the workmen's compensation act and have incurred 
expenses on account of injuries sustained by employees while em- 
ployed in suppression of gypsy and brown-tail moths. 

May 25, 1914. 
Hon. Frank H. Pope, Auditor of the Commonwealth. 

Dear Sir: — You have requested my opinion on the 
following question : — 

Are cities and towns that have adopted the workmen's compensation 
act entitled to be reimbursed for expenses incurred by them on account 
of injuries sustained by their employees while employed in the sup- 
pression of gyps J' and brown-tail moths? 

Section 1 of chapter 521 of the Acts of 1907 provides that — 

When any city or town shall have expended within its hmits city 
or town funds to an amount in excess of five thousand dollars in any 
one fiscal year, in suppressing g}'psy or brown-tail moths, the common- 
wealth shall reimburse such city or town to the extent of fifty per 
cent of such excess above said five thousand dollars. 

A more liberal rule is established by statute as to small 
towns. 

By section 6 of chapter 807 of the Acts of 1913, which 
provides for the adoption of the workmen's compensation act 
by certain cities and towns, the following provision is made 
in regard to employees of the Commonwealth: — 

For the purposes of this act all laborers, workmen and mechanics 
paid by the commonwealth, but serving under boards or commissions 
exercising powers within defined districts, shall be deemed to be in 
the service of the commonwealth. 

In the case presented b\' your inquiry it appears that the 
laborers or workmen engaged in the suppression of gypsy or 
brow^n-tail moths in cities and towms are employed by such 
cities and towns, and are neither employed nor paid by the 
Commonwealth. The State is therefore under no obligation 
to pay for injuries sustained by such laborers unless such 
expense is authorized by chapter 521 of the Acts of 1907, and 
that act, in my opinion, does not contain such a provision. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMEXT — Xo. 12. 137 

The Commonwealth is required under the law to reimburse 
cities and towns to the extent of 50 per cent, of the excess 
above $5,000 expended by them for suppressing gypsy or 
brown-tail moths, not for expenses incurred by reason of 
injury to an employee. It is my opinion that your question 
must be answered in the negative. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boyxton, Attorney-General. 



Minors — Hours of Labor — Liability of Employers and Parents. 

Under St. 1913, c. 831, an employer of a minor, who has been duly notified 
that such employee is being employed for a greater number of hours 
per week than is authorized by statute, is criminally liable. 

Under St. 1913, c. 831, a parent, guardian or custodian of a minor em- 
ployed for a greater number of hours per week than is authorized by 
statute is criminally liable without notice. 

May 2.5, 1914. 

State Board of Labor and Industries. 

Gentlemen: — You request my opinion upon the following 
question: — 

May a minor, under sections 8 and 9 of chapter 831 of the Acts of 
1913, work six days in one estabhshment and on the seventh day 
work for another employer in connection with another mercantile 
establishment? For example, may a minor fifteen years of age work 
six days a week, with a total of forty-eight hours, for a department 
store, and on the seventh da}^ work six hours in connection with a 
mercantile estabhshment at a summer resort? 

I assume from the wording of your question that the two 
employers are entirely independent of each other, that neither 
has any interest whatever in the business of the other, and 
that there is no collusion between them. You do not state 
(and I therefore assume) that the employer for whom the boy 
works on Sunday has not had any notice that the boy has 
been employed regularly during the six working days of the 
week. 

Under such circumstances there can hardly be any criminal 
liability on the part of either employer. 

You do not state whether the boy in question has any 
parent, guardian or custodian. Under the circumstances I beg 
to direct your attention to sections 20 and 23 of chapter 831 
of the Acts of 1913, which provide as follows: — 



138 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Section 20. Any person who, whether b}^ himself or for others, 
or through agents, servants or foremen employs, induces or permits 
any minor to work contrary to any of the provisions of this act, shall 
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, for a first offence, be 
punished by a fine of not less than ten dollars nor more than fifty 
dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than thirty days, or by both 
such fine and imprisonment; and for a second or subsequent offence, 
by a fine of not less than fifty dollars nor more than two hundred 
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than sixty days, or by both 
such fine and imprisonment. 

The employment of any minor in violation of any provision of this 
act after the person emplojnng such minor has been notified thereof 
in writing by any authorized inspector, school attendance officer or 
truant officer, shall constitute a separate offence for every day during 
which the employment continues. 

Section 23. Any parent, guardian or custodian having a minor 
under his control, who compels or permits such minor to work in 
violation of any provision of this act, or who knowingly certifies to 
any materially false statement for the purpose of obtaining the illegal 
emploA^ment of such minor, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, 
and, upon conviction, shall for the first offence be punished by a fine 
of not less than two dollars nor more than ten dollars, or by imprison- 
ment for not more than five daj^s, or by both such fine and imprison- 
mnent; and for a second or subsequent offence he shall be punished by 
a fine of not less than five dollars nor more than twenty-five dollars, 
or by imprisonment for not more than ten days, or by both such fine 
and imprisonment. 

By causing the proper notice to be given under section 20 
to the employer for whom the boy works on Sunday it seems 
clear that you would make that employer liable if he did not 
cease to employ the boy on that day. The parent, guardian 
or custodian of the boy would seem to be liable without an}' 
notice from an inspector or other official. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Aitorney-General. 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 139 



Constitutional Laic — Boston Transit Coviinission — Extension 
of Term of Office by Legislature. 

It is within the constitutional authority of the Legislature to extend the 
term of office of officers created by an act of the Legislature. 

May 26, 1914. 
To the House of Representatives. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion as to the 
constitutionality of Senate Bill No. 102, entitled "An Act 
to extend the term of office and to define the duties of the 
members of the Boston Transit Commission." Its provisions 
are as follows: — 

Section 1. The term of office of the members of the Boston transit 
commission is hereby extended for three years from the first day of 
July in the year nineteen hundred and fourteen. 

Section 2. The powers, duties and compensation of said com- 
mission during said term of three yesirs shall be the same as are specified 
in chapter five hundred and forty-eight of the acts of the year eighteen 
hundred and ninetj^-four and in acts in amendment thereof or in 
addition thereto, except as hereinafter provided. Any vacancy in 
said commission shall be filled in the manner provided in said chapter 
five hundred and fortj^-eight. 

It is suggested that the provisions of this bill, if enacted, 
may interfere with the executive functions of the Governor. 

The Governor is the supreme executive magistrate of the 
Commonwealth. Mass. Const., c. II., § L, art. I. But the 
power to make appointments is not necessarily a function of 
or an appurtenance to the executive office. In the Consti- 
tutions of the States of the Union there appears to be no 
distinct rule as to the distribution of authority to make ap- 
pointments to office. Some States confer upon the Executive 
a much larger measure of power in this respect than others. 
The Constitution of this Commonwealth provides that all 
judicial officers shall be nominated and appointed by the 
Governor by and with the advice and consent of the Council. 
Mass. Const., c. II., § I., art. IX. The fourth amendment to 
the Constitution provides that notaries public shall be ap- 
pointed by the Governor in the same manner as judicial 
officers are appointed. The Governor is also given power 
under certain circumstances to make appointments to fill 
vacancies in certain executive offices. 



140 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

The Constitution confers upon the Legislature large powers 
in the matter of appointments to civil office. By Article IV. 
of Section I. of Chapter I. of the Constitution full power and 
authority are given and granted to the General Court — 

... to name and settle annuall}^, or provide by fixed laws for the 
naming and setthng, all civil officers within the said commonwealth, 
the election and constitution of whom are not hereafter in this form 
of government otherwise provided for. 

Since the adoption of the Constitution the Legislature has 
in repeated instances enacted laws changing the term or 
tenure of a civil office. Several of these acts in litigation 
have been carried to the Supreme Judicial Court, and the 
constitutionality of legislation of this kind has always been 
sustained. 

In the case of Taft v. Adams, 3 Gray, 126, Chief Justice 
Shaw said: — 

Where an office is created by law, and one not contemplated, nor 
its tenure declared by the Constitution, but created by law solely 
for the public benefit, it may be regulated, limited, enlarged or termi- 
nated by law, as pubhc exigency or policy may require. 

See, also. Opinion of ihe Justices, 117 Mass. 603, 604; 
Donaghy v. Macy, 167 Mass. 178; Opinion of the Justices, 
165 Mass. 599. 

In the case of Barnes v. Mayor of Chicopee, a case in which 
the plaintiff Barnes sought to be reinstated in the office of 
chief of police of the city of Chicopee, from which office he 
claimed to have been wrongfully removed, Chief Justice Rugg 
said: — 

It is within the power of the Legislature to lengthen or shorten the 
tenure of such an office or to place its incumbents under operation of 
the civil service law. {Barnes v. Mayor of Chicopee, 213 Mass. 1.) 

In a New York case it was said that — 

Where an office is created by statute it is wholly within the control 
of the Legislature. The term, the mode of appointment and the 
compensation maj^ be altered at pleasure. {Connor v. City of New 
York, 2 Sandford, 355.) 

This case was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the State 
of New York. (1 Selden, 285.) 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 141 

While these cases may not be precisely in point, they indi- 
cate the trend of judicial opinion upon questions very similar 
in character to the one presented by this bill. 

The offices of the members of the Boston Transit Com- 
mission are not among those named in the Constitution but 
fall within the class of civil officers specified in Article IV. 
of Section I. of Chapter I. of the Constitution, above quoted. 
This commission was created, not by the Constitution itself 
but by act of the Legislature. 

The result of my examination of this question and of the 
authorities is that this bill, if enacted, will not, in my opinion, 
interfere with any constitutional right or function of the 
Governor. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General 



Cities and Towns — Municipal Debts — Bonds and Notes. 

A town or city has no authority to issue notes or bonds for the purpose of 
refunding sums of money previously raised and expended for mu- 
nicipal purposes. 

June 10, 1914. 

Charles F. Gettemy, Esq., Director of the Bureau of Statistics. 

Dear Sir: — You have submitted copies of the records of 
certain votes passed by town meetings of the town of Swamp- 
scott, among others, of a vote adopted at the last annual 
town meeting of that town, and have asked to be advised 
whether the statute may properly be construed by you as 
permitting the town of Swampscott to incur indebtedness 
under the vote passed at the annual town meeting held 
Feb. 16, 1914. The warrant for that meeting contained the 
following article: — 

Article 41. — To see if the town will vote to refund to the treasury 
the sum of $4,200 expended for lajdng water pipes in Crosman Avenue 
and for replacing water pipes on Galloupe's Point, and making ap- 
propriations therefor. 

Under this article the town voted as follows: — 

To adopt the report of the ways and means committee appro- 
priating the sum of $4,200 for the purpose of refunding to the treasury 
the amount expended in laying water pipes in Crosman Avenue and 
replacing the water pipes at Galloupe's Point, and that this sum be 
raised by the issuance of notes or bonds of the town. 



142 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Sections 5 and 6 of chapter 719 of the Acts of 1913 and 
chapter 634 of the Acts of 1913 specify the purposes for 
which cities and towns may incur debt other than temporary 
loans; and section 7 of chapter 719 prohibits the incurrence 
of debt b}' cities and towns for purposes other than those 
specified by statute, and reads as follows: — 

Cities and towns shall not incur debt for any purpose or for any 
period of time other than as specified in this act or in chapter six hun- 
dred and thirty-four of the acts of the year nineteen hundred and 
thirteen, and the proceeds of any sale of bonds or notes, except 
premiums, shall be used only for the purposes specified in the author- 
ization of the loan: provided, however, that transfers of unexpended 
amounts may be made to other accounts to be used for similar purposes. 

The purpose for which it is proposed to incur this in- 
debtedness is not one specified or permitted by the statute, 
and falls clearly within the prohibition of section 7 last above 
quoted. 

The case presented by your inquiry seems to afford a very 
close parallel to the case of Chapin et al. v. Town of Lincoln, 
recently decided b\' the Supreme Judicial Court. It appeared 
in that case that the tenth article of the warrant for the 
town meeting held by adjournment in the town of Lincoln on 
March 8, 1913, was as follows: — 

To see if the town will issue water bonds pursuant to the Acts of 
1907, chapter 476, and reimburse the treasury on account of money 
paid from the treasury pending an issue of bonds on account of pay- 
ments for water construction purposes. 

Under this article it was voted — 

That the town treasurer be authorized and directed to issue the 
bonds of the town for the sum of $6,000, each bond to be for $500. 

In its opinion in this case the court said: — 

The single justice has made a finding that the purpose of issuing 
bonds under this vote was to reimburse the town for sums that had been 
appropriated in earher years for three extensions of the water works 
of the town: one of the extensions having been made under an article 
of the annual meeting of March, 1911, and the other two under articles 
of the annual meeting of March, 1912. And he has expressly found 
that all of these extensions ''had been made and paid for before the 
vote of March 8, 1913, from money raised by taxation." 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCOIEXT — Xo. 12. 143 

In neither of these three instances did the town express Siny in- 
tention to provide funds for the proposed municipal improvement by- 
borrowing money under its water acts. Sts. 1872, c. 188; 1907, c. 476. 
It did not even undertake to vote that the money in the towTi treasury 
should be used temporarily for water purposes "pending an issue of 
bonds," as it appears to have done on some other occasions. In fact, 
in the second and most important case, when it appropriated S4,267, 
specific pro\dsion was made for the pa^^nent of this sum without an 
issue of bonds, namel.v, by using the special water works sinking 
fund and the receipts from the water works. 

There is no indebtedness incurred or contemplated b}' the town to 
warrant the proposed loan. There is no unfmided debt on account 
of the extensions referred to. It does not follow that because the 
to^Ti might have borrowed money for these extensions at the time 
they were voted, it can do so now after they are paid for. See St. 
1913, c. 719, as amended by St. 1914, c. 143. . . . 

We are in accord with the opinion of the single justice, that an 
injunction should issue as praj^ed for, restraining the respondents 
from issuing bonds under the vote passed March 8, 1913. 

This statement of the law covers veiy fully your inquiry. 
So far as appears from the statement of facts with which 
you accompany your inquiry the town of Swampscott, like 
the town of Lincoln in the case above referred to, has in- 
curred no indebtedness nor is any contemplated to justify the 
proposed loan. In the Swampscott case, as in the Lincoln 
case, the purpose is to refund or reimburse the treasury for 
money already expended, which, as above stated, is not one 
of the purposes for which the statute permits indebtedness to 
be incurred. 

In matters of this kind the only safe rule is the rule of 
strict construction. Municipal corporations are simply agencies 
of government for certain well-defined purposes, and discharge 
such functions only as are conferred upon them by law. To 
permit the issue of commercial paper by towns and cities for 
purposes not authorized by statute would expose investors to 
loss and taxpayers to the expense of tedious and vexatious 
litigation. 

It is my opinion that your c|uestion must be answered in 
the negative. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



U4 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



State Board of Education — Textile Schools. 

The Commissioner of Education has statutory powers over all educational 
work supported in v/hole or in part by the Commonwealth, includinji; 
textile schools. 

June 10 1911. 
Commission on Economy and Efficiency. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion as to the 
nature and scope of the supervisory powers possessed by the 
State Board of Education, with special reference to State 
aided or supported textile schools, and as to the need of 
further legislative definition of such supervisory powers. 

The supervisory powers of the Board of Education over 
textile schools seem to be vested in the Commissioner of 
Education and his deputies. Chapter 421 of the Acts of 
1913 provides as follows: — 

The board shall appoint a commissioner of education whose term 
of office shall be live years, and may fix his salary at such sum as the 
governor and council shall approve. Said commissioner may at any 
time be removed from office by a vote of six members of the board. 
He shall exercise the powers and perform the duties now conferred or 
imposed by law on the secretary of the board of education. He shall 
be the executive officer of the board, shall have super\dsion of all 
educational work supported in whole or in part by the commonwealth, 
and shall report thereon to the board, and, when so authorized by the 
board, ma}^ approve bills for expenditures from appropriations and 
funds placed under the direction of the board. The board shall also 
appoint two deputy commissioners, one of Avhom shall be especially 
qualified to deal with industrial education. The powders, duties, 
salaries and terms of office of said deputy commissioners shall be such 
as may be established from time to time by the board, but the board 
may, by a vote of six members thereof, remove from office at any 
time either of said deputy commissioners. The board may be allowed 
for rent, salaries of the commissioner, the deputies, agents, assistants 
and clerical service, and for traveUing and other necessary expenses 
of the commissioner, the deputies, agents, and of the board incurred 
in the performance of their official duties, such sum as shall be appro- 
priated by the general court annually, paj'-able out of the treasury of 
the commonwealth. 

This statute gives the Commissioner of Education ample 
supervisory powers over all educational work supported in 
whole or in part by the State, which certainly includes textile 
schools, whether supported wholly by the State or receiving 
aid from the Commonwealth, and by this statute it is made a 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 145 

part of the duty of the Commissioner of Education to report 
to the State Board as to all educational work under his 
supervision. 

The statute provides for two deputy commissioners of 
education, and requires that one of them shall be especially 
qualified to deal with industrial education. While this phrase 
undoubtedly applies to those schools devoted to vocational 
education, so called, in the various cities and towns, it also 
includes textile schools. 

There is certainly sufficient statutory authority now to 
warrant the Commissioner of Education in supervising and 
making report upon textile schools. The question of the need 
of further legislation in regard to this matter is for the legis- 
lative branch of the State government to determine, and not 
for this department. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Constitutional Law — Great Ponds — Regulation of the Price 

of Ice. 

A law authorizing a commission to fix the price at which ice shall be sold 
when such ice has been taken from great ponds of the Common- 
wealth, or from bodies of water under the control of such commission, 
would be constitutional. 

June 12, 1914. 

To the Honorable Senate. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following question: — 

Is it within the constitutional power of the General Court to enact 
a law authorizing a board or commission of the Commonwealth to 
fix the price at which ice shall be sold to famihes by individuals or 
corporations, when such ice has been taken from ponds or other bodies 
of water under the supervision and control of said board or com- 
mission? 

In making answer to your inquiry two questions are pre- 
sented for examination: First, as to rights of individual 
ownership, if any, in the public waters, chiefly and perhaps 
entirely for the purposes of your inquiry in great ponds of the 
Commonwealth; and second, as to the extent of the authority 
of the Legislature over these bodies of water. 



146 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

The title to the great ponds was taken by the sovereign 
power, and their use granted to the people by a very early 
colonial ordinance, and except for certain special grants has 
remained to this day as it was fixed by the colonial ordinance. 

By section 16 of the Bodie of Liberties, supposed to have 
been enacted in 1641, it was provided that — 

Every Inhabitant that is an howse holder shall have free fishing 
and fowhng in any great ponds and Bayes, Coves and Rivers, so 
farre as the sea ebbes and flowes within the presincts of the towne 
where they dwell, unlesse the free men of the same Towne or the 
GeneraU Court have otherwise appropriated them, provided that 
this shall not be extended to give leave to any man to come upon 
others proprietie -s^ithout there leave. 

This ordinance was at some time between 1641 and 1647 
amended so as to provide: — 

Every Inhabitant who is an householder shall have free fishing and 
fowling in any great ponds, bayes Coves and Rivers, so farr as the Sea 
ebbs and flowes, within the precincts of the towne where they dwell, 
unles the freemen of the same Town or the General Court have 
otherwise appropriated them. Provided that no Totvti shall appro- 
priate to any particular person or persons; any great Pond containing 
more than ten acres of land, and that no man shall come upon anottiers 
propriety T\ithout their leave othenAnse then as hereafter expressed. 
The which clearly to determine, It is Declared, That in all Creeks, 
Coves and other places, about and upon Salt-water, where the Sea 
ebbs and flowes, the proprietor of the land adjoining, shall have pro- 
priety to the low-water-mark, where the Sea doth not ebb above a 
hundred Rods, and not more wheresoever it ebbs further. Provided 
that such proprietor shall not by this Hberty, have power to stop or 
hinder the passage of boates or other vessels, in or through any Sea, 
Creeks or Coves, to other mens houses or lands. And for great Ponds 
lying in common, though "within the bounds of some To'wti, it shall be 
free for any man to fish and fowle there, and may pass and repass 
on foot through any mans propriet}^ for that end, so the}' trespass not 
upon any mans Corn or Meddow. 

From the time of this later enactment great ponds in this 
Commonwealth have been and still are public property. 
Efforts have been made from time to time b}^ individuals to 
establish rights of private ownership in great ponds, and 
cases involving claims of private ownership have in repeated 
instances been carried to the Supreme Judicial Court. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 147 

In the case of Fay v. Salem & Danvers Aqueduct Co., Ill 
Mass. 27, the petitioner sought to recover damages for the 
taking of water from Spring Pond, a pond having an area of 
about sixty acres, for its aqueduct, whereby the dwelling 
house of the petitioner situated on the shore of said pond 
would become uncomfortable and unfit for habitation. The 
court held that "by the law of Massachusetts great ponds are 
public property," and further said that the petitioners had 
no title "except that derived from deeds of lands partly 
surrounding the pond on the side opposite the outlet, and 
bounded 'by the pond.' The title acquired b}^ such deeds 
extended only to low-water mark, and did not effect the rights 
of the public in the pond," and dismissed the petition. Fay 
V. Salem <i' Danvers Aqueduct Co., Ill Mass. 27. 

In another case action was brought by certain private 
parties seeking to restrain another individual from cutting and 
harvesting ice in Fresh Pond, which has an area of about one 
hundred and eighty-three acres. It appeared that the riparian 
owners of the entire shore of Fresh Pond had by agreement 
between themselves apportioned to each a certain part of the 
area of the pond; that these proprietors generally cut ice to 
be shipped and also to supply the local demand; and that 
the business was very large, employing at times more than a 
thousand men. The Supreme Judicial Court declared that — 

By the law of Massachusetts, great ponds, not appropriated before 
the colony ordinance of 1647 to private persons, are pubhc property, 
the right of reasonably using and enjoying which, for taking ice for 
use or sale, as weU as for fishing and fowling, boating, skating, and 
other lawful purposes, is common to all, and in the water or ice of 
which, or in the land under them, the owners of the shores have no 
peculiar right, except by grant from the Legislature, or by prescription, 
which implies a grant. Anc. Chart. 148. Cummings v. Barrett^ 10 
Cush. 186; West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 7 Allen, 158; Paine v. Woods, 
108 Mass. 160; . . . Fay v. Salem & Danvers Aqueduct Co. Ill Mass. 
27. {Hittinger v. Fames, 121 Mass. 539.) 

In the case of Rockport v. Webster, 174 Mass. 385, the town 
of Rockport, having taken the waters of Cape Pond for a 
water supply, sought to prevent the defendant from taking 
ice therefrom. The defendant replied that he had been for 
years a riparian owner of land upon the shore of said pond, 
with an established ice business thereon consisting in the 



148 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

cutting and preparing of ice for sale. In the discussion of this 
phase of the case the Supreme Court said: — 

While it is true that the defendant is a riparian owner of lands upon 
the shores of the pond, with an established business of cutting and 
storing ice for sale, still, in the absence of any grant from the Legis- 
lature, or by prescription, he has no peculiar right thus to cut ice, 
and he must stand or fall in that respect with the general public. 
Hittinger v. Fames, 121 Mass. 539. (Rockport v. Webster, 174 Mass. 
385, 390.) 

To the effect that there are no private rights of property in 
great ponds is the case of SiJrague v. Minon, 195 Mass. 581. 

The authorities are uniform and entirely conclusive against 
the assertion of rights of private ownership in any of the great 
ponds; and there is therefore no constitutional objection to 
the proposed regulation upon the ground that it may interfere 
with private ownership. 

Taking up the question as to the authority of the Legis- 
lature to enact the proposed legislation, it again appears that 
a considerable number of cases involving this right of the 
Legislature have been passed upon by the Supreme Judicial 
Court. 

In the case of Fay v. Salem & Danxers Aqueduct Co., above 
cited, the court declared not only that great ponds are public 
property, but that their use for "taking water or ice, as w^ell 
as for fishing, fowling, bathing, boating or skating, may be 
regulated or granted by the Legislature at its discretion." 

In repeated instances the Commonwealth has leased the 
fishing rights in great ponds to certain individuals to the ex- 
clusion of all others. In passing upon a case in which the de- 
fendant set up his right to fish in a great pond in disregard of 
such a lease executed by the Commonw^ealth, the Supreme 
Court, referring to the ordinance hereinbefore quoted, said: — 

This ancient ordinance, in its amended form, is the foundation of 
our law upon this subject. While it prohibits the towns from granting 
away great ponds, it expressly affirms their power to regulate the 
fisheries, both in such ponds and in tidewaters, and that of the Legis- 
lature to dispose either of great ponds (as well of bays, coves and rivers 
within the ebb and flow of the tide), or of the common rights of fishing 
and fowling in them. It has ever since been held that the right of 
fishing, both in the tidewaters and in the great ponds, belongs to the 
public, unless otherwise appropriated by the Legislature, or l^y the 
towns acting under its authority. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 149 

In the further discussion of this question the court said: — 

The power of the Legislature of the Commonwealth over the public 
rights of na\dgation and fishing in any waters wthin its boundaries is 
unrestricted, provided it does not interfere with the power to regulate 
commerce, conferred upon the general government by the Constitution 
of the United States. Cooky y- Philadelphia Board of Wardens, 12 
How. 299; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wallace, 713. The Legislature 
of a State has the power to regulate the time and manner of fishing in 
the sea within its limits; and, according to the opinions of most re- 
spectable judges, may even grant exclusive rights of fishing at par- 
ticular places in tidewater. Burnham v. Webster, 5 Mass. 266; Diin- 
ham V. Lamphere, 3 Gray, 268; Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71. . . . 
In those waters, whether within or beyond the ebb and flow of the 
tide, which are not na\dgable from the sea for any useful purpose, 
there can be no restriction upon its authority to regulate the public 
right of fishing, or to make any grants of exclusive rights which do 
not impair other private rights already vested. Nickerson v. Brackett, 
10 Mass. 212; Cleaveland v. Norton, 6 Cush. 380; Russell v. Russell, 
15 Gray, 159. {Commonwealth v. Vincent, 108 Mass. 441.) 

In many instances the Legislature has granted the control of 
the waters of great ponds to corporations, with authority to 
sell the water for domestic use. The right of the Legislature 
to regulate the price at which water from a great pond may 
be sold by such a corporation appears to be fully recognized 
in the case of Gardner Water Co. v. Inhahitants of Gardner, 
185 Mass. 190. The facts in that case, briefly stated, were 
that the Gardner Water Company, having established itself 
in the business of taking water from Crj^stal Lake and selling 
it to the residents of Gardner, and the town desiring to take 
over the corporate property of the w^ater company, a board 
of commissioners was appointed to ascertain and determine the 
value of the corporate property. The commissioners reported 
that the corporation — . 

was entitled, whenever the town of Gardner should take advantage 
of the option of purchase granted to it by section 9, to the fair value 
at that time of the right to use and sell the waters of Crj^stal Lake 
(and any other waters that may have been acquired by the company 
under the provisions of sections 2 and 3) for the purpose of furnishing 
the inhabitants of the town of Gardner with water for the purposes 
enumerated in section 1; subject to the right of the State to regulate 
the rates charged by the company (but not to establish rates so low 
as to be obnoxious to the provisions of the State or Federal Consti- 
tutions), to authorize competition (either pubhc or private) from 



150 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

water sources other than those held by the compan}^, to revoke the 
companj^'s right to use the pubhc wa^^s of Gardner for its pipes and 
hydrants (thus leaAdng the company with the right only to sell its 
waters wholesale to a distributing company or the town, or to dis- 
tribute through pipes laid exclusively on private land), to revoke the 
company's charter, to dispose of any part of the waters of the lake 
not required for the supply of the inhabitants of Gardner, to control, 
lease, or sell the use of the lake for fishing, boating, ice cutting, and 
other purposes not interfering with its use for a water supply in Gardner, 
to control the operations of the com.pany and its use of the water of 
the lake to the extent reasonably necessarj^ to protect the purity of 
the water, and other\\dse to exercise over the company the ponce 
power of the State within the limits set by the State and Federal 
Constitutions. . . . 

In adopting this basis of valuation we assume that the Legislature 
contemplated that the town, in purchasing the property, rights and 
pri\dleges of the company, would act in its private or proprietary 
capacity as a business corporation, and that the price should be fixed 
as if the purchase authorized by section 9 was to be made by a private 
corporation. 

We include in the expression "water rights," as used in this ruling, 
all the rights, privileges and franchises obtained by the company 
under its charter to sell and distribute the waters of Crystal Lake in 
the town of Gardner, except the right to lay and maintain pipes, etc., 
in the public streets, the right to take property by eminent domain, 
and the other rights considered separately below in 7. 

In valuing the company's water sources as defined above, the 
control and rights of the State in or over the same as therein set forth 
are to be borne in mind, as also the probability or improbability that 
these powers will in fact be exercised. 

To that part of the report above quoted the town objected, 
upon the ground that "a grant by the State of rights in or 
to the lake or the waters thereof which entitled the company 
to a valuation on the basis set forth in the report would 
deprive the public of that beneficial use to which it is en- 
titled." It should be noted that one element in the basis of 
valuation was the right of the State to regulate the rates 
charged by the company, but not to establish rates so low as 
to be obnoxious to the provisions of the State and Federal 
Constitutions. The Supreme Judicial Court held that there 
was no error in the part of the report of the commissioners 
that was objected to. 

There is no doubt that control of the great ponds in the 
public interest is in the Legislature that represents the public. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 151 

It may regulate and change these public rights or take them 
away altogether to serve some paramount interest. Sprague 
V. Minon, 195 Mass. 581. 

Such legislation may be enacted under the sovereign power 
of the State to control and regulate our public rights. Sprague 
V. Minon, supra. 

The right of the individual citizen to the use of the great 
ponds for the purpose of cutting and harvesting ice is a right 
that exists by virtue of the grant contained in the ancient 
ordinance above set forth. It is a public grant, and it is the 
settled law of this Commonwealth that in making any public 
grant the State may impose such terms as it sees fit, and 
where no contractual relations are established between the 
grantee and the Commonwealth it may impose such regu- 
lations upon the grant after it is made as it sees fit. It may 
relieve the grantee from the payment of any damages for the 
taking of public property, or it may require compensation to 
be made to private persons where no legal right has been 
interfered with, as in the case where land is taken, for rail- 
roads and other public works. Rockport v. JVebster, 174 
Mass. 385; Parker v. Boston c& Maine R.R., 3 Cush. 107; 
Trovjbridge v. Brookline, 144 Mass. 139. 

This statement might be further elaborated by reference to 
familiar instances of the imposition of terms and regulations 
upon a public grant or franchise. 

The enactment of such a regulation does not involve the 
Commonwealth nor any municipality within it in the business 
of harvesting and selling ice. 

It is my opinion that the enactment of such a law as is 
suggested by your inquiry would be simply the regulation of 
a public right by the imposition of terms upon the grant of 
the right to take ice from great ponds to be sold to con- 
sumers, and that such a statute, if enacted, would not be 
obnoxious to any provision of the Constitution. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-GeneraL 



152 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Constitutional Laiv — Contracts — Boston Consolidated Gas 
Company. 

St. 1906, c. 422, does not constitute a contract between the Common- 
wealth and the Boston Consolidated Gas Company, and the Legis- 
lature has authority to alter the provisions regulating the price of 
gas. 

June 22, 1914. 

To the House of Representatives. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following question: — 

Whether or not the provisions of chapter 422 of the Acts of the year 
1906 constitute a contract between the Commonwealth and the Boston 
ConsoUdated Gas Company; and whether the provisions of the said 
chapter relating to the price of gas may lawlfulty be changed by the 
General Court without the assent of said company. 

In connection with your request for an opinion you have 
submitted a cop}' of House Bill No. 1674, amending chapter 
422 of the Acts of 1906. That part of said chapter that 
would be affected by the passage of House Bill No. 1674 is as 
follows: — 

Section 1. From and after the thirtieth day of June in the year 
nineteen hundred and six, the standard price to be charged bj^ the 
Boston Consolidated Gas Company for gas supplied to its customers 
shall be ninety cents per one thousand cubic feet, which price shall 
not thereafter be increased except as hereinafter provided. From and 
after the said date the standard rate of dividends to be paid by said 
companj^ to its stockliolders shall be seven per cent per annum on the 
par value of its capital stock, wiiich rate shall not thereafter be in- 
creased except as hereinafter provided. 

Section 2. If during any year ending on the thirtieth daj^ of 
June the maximum net price per thousand cubic feet charged bj^ the 
company has been less than the standard price, the company may 
during the following j^ear declare and pay di\adends exceeding the 
standard rate in the ratio of one fifth of one per cent, for every one 
cent of reduction of said maximum net price below the standard 
price. 

Chapter 422 of the Acts of 1906 operated as an amendment 
of the original charter granted to the Boston Consolidated 
Gas Company. 

The answer to your entire inquiry, therefore, will be settled 
by the determination of the single question. Did the enact- 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 153 

ment of chapter 422 of the Acts of 1906 and its acceptance by 
the Boston Consolidated Gas Company constitute a contract 
between the Commonwealth and that company? 

Beyond any question, if a contract was made the proposed 
bill, if enacted, would be unconstitutional; and also beyond 
any question, if a contract was not created between the two 
parties the rates to be charged by the company may be further 
regulated b}^ the Legislature, subject only to the provision 
that they must not be fixed at so low a rate as to be really 
confiscatory. A contract between the State and a public 
service corporation is a very different thing from the enact- 
ment of a statute by the State regulating the conduct and 
management of, and fixing maximum rates to be charged to 
the public by, the corporation. 

Your question arises under the Federal Constitution. It 
has been said that — 

The term ''contract" is used in the (Federal) Constitution in its 
ordinary sense, as signifying the agreement of two or more minds, for 
considerations proceeding from one to the other, to do, or not to do, 
certain acts. Mutual assent to its terms is of its very essence. 
(Louisiana v. Pilshury, 105 U. S. 278.) 

The charter of a corporation created by the State is a 
contract, and is in all particulars inviolable, unless in the 
charter itself, or in some general or special law subject to 
which it was taken, there is a power reserved to the Legis- 
lature to alter, amend or repeal. Commonwealth v. New 
Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, 339; Charles River Bridge v. Warren 
Bridge, 7 Pick. 344. 

The original charter of the Boston Consolidated Gas Com- 
pany, St. 1903, c. 417, contains no provision for its alteration, 
amendment or repeal by the Legislature, nor does chapter 422 
of the Acts of 1906, referred to in your inquiry, contain such 
a provision; but wdien those acts were passed it was the 
general law of the Commonwealth that every act of in- 
corporation should be subject to amendment. Section 3 of 
chapter 109 of the Revised Laws provides that "every act of 
incorporation passed since the eleventh day of March in the 
year eighteen hundred and thirty-one shall be subject to 
amendment." 

This statute, first introduced into the general legislation of the 
Commonwealth by St. 1830, c. 81, and re-enacted in the Rev. Sts., c. 44, 



154 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

par. 23, and the Gen. Sts., c. 68, par. 41, has been as much a part of 
all charters since granted as if inserted therein; and was manifestly 
adopted mth the intention of reser^dng for the future a fuller parha- 
mentary or legislative power than would otherwise be consistent with 
the effect to be allowed to the special terms of particular charters, 
under the judicial construction of the constitutional prohibition against 
impairing the obhgation of contracts. The extent of the power re- 
served by such an enactment has been the subject of some diversity 
of judicial opinion, and a definition of its extreme Hmit is not necessary 
to this case. It is sufficient now to say that it is estabhshed by adjudi- 
cations which we cannot disregard, and the principles of which we 
fully approve, that it at least reserves to the Legislature the authority 
to make any alteration or amendment in a charter granted subject to 
it, that will not defeat or substantially impair the object of the grant, 
or any rights which have vested under it, and that the Legislature 
may deem necessary to secure either that object or other pubhc or 
private rights. {Commissioners on Inland Fisheries v. Holyoke Water 
Power Co., 104 Mass. 446, 451.) 

It is a famiUar rule that pubhc grants will be strictly construed 
against the grantee, and rights conferred by a pubhc grant ^\^ll not 
be extended beyond the clear meaning of the language in which they 
are made. Grants of franchises are usually prepared by those in- 
terested in them and submitted to the Legislatures with a view to 
obtain the most hberal grant obtainable; and for this and other reasons 
such grants should be in plain language, certain, definite in nature 
and contain no ambiguity in their terms, and will be strictly construed 
against the grantee. {Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400.) 

Referring to the strictness with which charters granted 
are to be construed, the courts have laid down the doctrine 
that the State is to be held to have granted only such powers 
or immunities as are specifically or unequivocally stated, or as 
are unavoidably implied therein. Willoughby on the Consti- 
tution, Vol. II, p. 898. 

The Supreme Court of the United States has said of this 
class of cases: — 

The rule of construction is that it shall be construed most strongly 
against the corporation. Every^ reasonable doubt is to be resolved 
adversely. Nothing is to be conceded but what is given in umnis- 
takable terms or by an imphcation equally clear. The afl&rmative 
must be shown. Silence is negation, and doubt is fatal to the claim. 
{Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659.) 

Coosaiv Mining Co. v. South Carolina, 144 U. S. 550; Knovville 
Water Co. v. Knoxville, 200 U. S. 22. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 155 

It has been further decided that a grant of power to fix 
its charges, provided they be not in excess of a specified rate 
in the charter of a corporation, does not prevent the State 
from afterward fixing lower rates than those established by 
tlie corporation. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Smith, 
128 U. S. 174. And that generally the reservation by the 
State of a power to amend or revoke the charter carries with 
it a power to regulate the charges that may be made. Peik 
V. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 94 U. S. 164. 

Applying the rules above stated to the construction of 
chapter 422 of the Acts of 1906, it becomes instantly apparent 
that the Commonwealth did not enter into any agreement 
that it would not further regulate the rates to be charged by 
the Boston Consolidated Gas Company. Such a contract is 
neither clearly expressed in nor fairly to be implied from the 
language of that chapter. That the State did not make a 
contract not to further regulate the charges and rates of the 
Gas Company is conclusively shown by section 9 of chapter 
422 of the Acts of 1906, which provides that the rates charged 
by the company may be either raised or lowered upon certain 
applications, therein provided for, to the Board of Gas and 
Electric Light Commissioners. 

Without further discussion of this matter I have to say 
that it is my opinion that the provisions of chapter 422 of the 
Acts of 1906 did not and do not constitute a contract be- 
tween the Commonwealth and the Boston Consolidated Gas 
Company; and that, subject to the rule above stated, the 
provisions of that chapter relating to the price of gas may 
lawfully be changed by the General Court without the 
assent of that company. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



State Forester — Sales of Wood and Lumber. 

Under St. 1908, c. 478, monej^s received by the State Forester for the 
Commonwealth, on account of wood and lumber sold by him, must 
be paid to the State Treasurer, and cannot be credited to the For- 
ester's department. 

June 24, 1914. 

Mr. H. O. Cook, Assistant Forester. 

Dear Sir: — You ask in your letter of June 22 if money 
turned into the State treasurv by the State Forester, which 



156 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

had been received b\' your department from sales of cordwood 
and lumber, may be credited by the State Treasurer to the 
State Forester's approprialion. You suggest that this in part 
would compensate for the expense of removing this material, 
which is now borne by the department and met by the annual 
appropriation. 

Chapter 478 of the x\cts of 1908 provides for the purchase 
and acceptance of gifts of land for reforestation. Sections 4 
and 5 of that chapter are as follows : — 

Section 4. Land acquired under the provisions of this act shall 
be under the control and management of the state forester who may, 
subject to the approval of the governor and council, cut and sell 
trees, wood and other produce therefrom. 

Section o. All moneys received b}^ or payable to the common- 
wealth or any one acting on its behalf under the provisions of this act 
shall be paid into the treasur}^ of the commonwealth. 

The language of the statute warrants but one construction, 
namely, that all money received from sales of trees, wood and 
other produce must be accounted for and turned over to the 
State Treasurer. The only way by which these moneys could 
be credited to your department, and thereby added to your 
available funds, would be by an extra appropriation. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-Gcnerd. 



Constihitional Law — Railroads — Guaranty of Bonds. 

It is within the constitutional authority of the Legislature to provide that 
the Commonwealth shall guarantee bonds of a railroad company. 

June 22, 1914. 
Committee on Bills in the Third Reading. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion as to the 
constitutionality of House Bill No. 745, and your inquiry 
contains the statement that the bill appears to be one which 
provides that the Commonwealth shall guarantee the bonds of 
a private enterprise. I assume, therefore, that the source of 
the doubt arising in your minds as to the constitutionality of 
the bill is indicated by this statement. 

No principle of law is better settled in this Commonwealth 
than that which forbids the use of money raised by taxation 
for a private purpose. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 157 

But the preamble to this bill states that the purpose of the 
bill is to secure the building of the railroad described in 
chapter 556 of the Acts of the year 1907, as amended and 
extended by chapter 707 of the Acts of the year 1912, and in 
order to furnish new freight and passenger railroad lines for 
the State of Massachusetts and the city of Boston, to be 
operated in the interests of the people of said State and city, 
and to connect with existing lines at Providence, Fall River 
and other points. The bill itself, when read in connection 
with the statutes referred to, bears out the recital of the 
preamble. 

Railroads are held to be built for the public use, whether 
the right to take land or the right to grant pecuniary aid to 
them is considered. The Legislature of this Commonwealth 
has granted aid to railroad corporations from the treasury of 
the Commonwealth. Prince v. Crocker, 166 Mass. 347. 

Repeated instances of this are found in our legislation. 
For example, aid was extended to the Western Railroad 
Corporation (St. 1836, c. 131), to the Troy & Greenfield Rail- 
road Corporation (St. 1854, c. 226), to the Williamsburg & 
North Adams (St. 1867, c. 321), and to the Lee & New 
Haven (St. 1868, c. 313). The Legislature has also in a 
number of instances authorized cities and towns to furnish 
aid to railroad companies by subscribing to stock or other- 
wise. The constitutionality of such legislation has not been 
brought into direct controversy before the Supreme Court, 
but indirectly has been recognized. Kittredge v. North Brook- 
field, 138 Mass. 286; Commonwealth v. Williamstown, 156 
Mass. 70. And elsewhere it has been established by such a 
weight of judicial authority that it must be regarded as 
settled. Prince v. Crocker, 166 Mass. 347, 361. See, also, 
Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678; Railroad Co. v. Otoe, 16 
Wall. 667; Piiie Grove Toumship v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666; 
Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 4th ed., §§ 153, 158, 508. 

Thus the building of the subway in the city of Boston for 
the carriage of such passengers as paid the regular fare was 
held to be for a public use; and it was further held to be 
within the constitutional power of the Legislature to order or 
sanction taxation for it. Prince v. Crocker, 166 Mass. 347, 
361. 

It is my opinion that the railroad described in this bill, if 
built, must, like all other railroads, be regarded as constructed 



158 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. IJan. 

for public use; that the Legislature has the right to extend 
to it the direct financial aid of the Commonwealth; and that 
the proposed bill, if enacted, will be constitutional. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Contracts — Public Works — Labor. 

The provisions of St. 1914, c. 474, regulating wages of employees on public 
works, do not apply to contracts made prior to the taking effect of 
the statute. 

June 25, 1914. 

State Board of Labor and Industries. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following question: — 

Do the provisions of chapter 474 of the Acts of 1914 apply to con- 
tracts made before the fifth day of June, 1914, that being the date upon 
which that chapter went into effect? 

This chapter reads as follows: — 

Section 1. Section twenty-one of chapter five hundred and 
fourteen of the acts of the year nineteen hundred and nine is herebj- 
amended by inserting after the word "effect", in the eighth line, the 
words : — The wages for a day's work paid to mechanics employed in 
such construction of pubhc works shall be not less than the customarj^ 
and prevailing rate of wages for a day's work in the same trade or 
occupation in the locaUty, city or town where such public works are 
constructed, — so as to read as f oIIoavs : — Section 21 . In the em- 
ployment of mechanics and laborers in the construction of public 
works by the commonwealth, or by a county, city or. town, or by 
persons contracting therewith, preference shall be given to citizens 
of the conmionwealth, and, if they cannot be obtained in sufficient 
numbers, then to citizens of the United States; and every contract 
for such works shall contain a provision to this effect. The wages for 
a day's work paid to mechanics employed in such construction of 
pubhc works shall be not less than the customary^ and prevaihng rate 
of wages for a day's work in the same trade or occupation in the lo- 
cality, city or town where such public works are constructed. Any 
contractor who knowingly and wiLfuMy violates the provisions of this 
section shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred 
dollars for each offence. 

Section 2. The board of labor and industries shall enforce the 
provisions of this acf, and in case of any dispute that may arise upon 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 159 

public works as to the customaiy and prevailing rate of wages the 
board of labor and industries shall investigate the wages in the trade 
or occupation in the locahty, city or town where such pubhc works 
are under construction and decide what rate of wages shall be paid 
upon such works. 

This statute relates to the employment of mechanics and 
laborers in the construction of public works by the Common- 
wealth, and to the rate of wages to be paid by contractors 
doing such work. 

The contracts of a State w^ith individuals are to be con- 
strued in the same manner and have the same binding effect 
upon the parties thereto as the contracts of private parties. 
36 Cyc. 880, par. G. 

A State has no more right than an individual to modify or 
rescind a contract entered into by it unless such right has 
been reserved. 36 Cyc. 880, par. H. 

In Boston Molasses Co. v. Commonwealth, 193 Mass. 389, 
Sheldon, J., says as follow^s: — 

The State, in all its contracts and dealings with individuals, must 
be adjudged and abide by the rules which govern in determining the 
rights of private citizens contracting and deahng with each other. 
There is not one law for the sovereign and another for the subject; 
but, when the sovereign engages in business and the conduct of business 
enterprises, and contracts with individuals, although an action may 
not lie against the sovereign for a breach of the contract, whenever 
the contract, in any form, comes before the courts, the rights and 
obligations of the contracting parties must be adjusted upon the 
same principles as if both contracting parties were private persons. 
Both stand upon equality before the law, and the sovereign is merged 
in the dealer, contractor and suitor. 

In an opinion by the Attorney-General, given June 28, 
1911, to the Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board, where 
a contract was made prior to the act of the Legislature limit- 
ing the employment of men to eight hours a day, it was held 
by the Attorney-General that the contractor had the right 
to employ men according to the terms of the contract, and 
that the terms of this contract will not be changed by the 
passage of the act in question. The statute would be un- 
constitutional if construed to abrogate or interfere with the 
terms of this contract. 

There is nothing in chapter 474 of the Acts of 1914 indi- 
cating any intention that it should apply to contracts made 



160 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

before that chapter would take effect, and such a provision, 
if made, would undoubtedly constitute a violation of that 
provision of the Federal Constitution which prohibits any 
State from enacting a law impairing the obligation of con- 
tracts. 

It is my opinion that this chapter does not apply to the 
class of contracts referred to in your inquiry. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General 



Contracts — Bids — Right of Rejection. 

Where a public commission, in advertising for bids on a proposed contract, 
reserves the right to reject any and all bids, no liability attaches in 
case any of the lowest bids are rejected. 

June 26, 1914. 

State House Building Commission. 

Gentlemen: — In your communication of recent date, you 
state in substance that in advertising for bids for contracts 
for the State House extension you reserved the right to reject 
any and all bids, and you request my opinion upon the follow- 
ing question: "If the Board shall now reject an}^ of the lowest 
bidders will such rejected bidders have any recourse at law?" 

This question received judicial consideration in the case of 
Colorado Paving Co. v. Murphy, 37 L. R. A. 630. In this 
case Murphy brought a bill in equity seeking to enjoin the 
Colorado Paving Company and the mayor and certain other 
officials of the city of Denver from entering into a contract 
for the paving of a certain street in Denver. The city au- 
thorities had advertised for bids for a contract for this work, 
and had reserved the right to reject any and all bids. Murphy 
was the lowest bidder and his bid was rejected. The court 
said: — 

''Wherever an action is brought for a breach of duty imposed by 
statute, the party bringing it must show that he had an interest in the 
performance of the duty, and that the duty was imposed for his benefit. 
But where the duty was created or imposed for the benefit of another, 
and the advantage to be derived to the party prosecuting, by its 
performance, is merely incidental and no part of the design of the 
statute, no such right is created as forms the subject of an action." 

It is upon this principle that it is now settled by the great weight 
of authority that the lowest bidder cannot compel the issue of a writ 
of mandamus to force the officers of a municipalitj' to enter into a 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 161 

contract with him. (Citing High, Extr. Legal Rem. § 92, and other 
authorities.) And the courts hold that he cannot maintain an action 
at law for damages for their refusal to enter into the contract. Talbot 
Paving Co. v. Detroit (Mich.), 3 Det. L. N. 268; East River Gaslight 
Co. V. Donnelly, 93 N. Y. 557. This principle is as fatal to a suit in 
equity as to an action at law. It goes not to defeat any particular 
cause of action, but to defeat the right to any rehef. Nor is this an 
unjust or inequitable result. One who offers to contract to do work 
for a city which he knows has the right to reject his bid ought not to 
have the power to compel that city to enter into a contract with him 
simply because it decides to make a contract for the same work with 
his rival. He knowingly puts the labor and expense of preparing his 
bid at the hazard of the city's action. It is admitted that, if the city 
rejects all bids, he has no rights, no equities; and we fail to see how its 
acceptance of another's bid can give to the unsuccessful bidder any 
greater right than he would have had if all bids had been rejected. 
{Colorado Paving Co. v. Murphy, 37 L. R. A. 630, 635.) 

In a case involving the same principle the Supreme Court 
of Missouri said: — 

In the case in hand the advertisement has the following caption: 
" Proposals for the erection of the new high school building on Grand 
Avenue." But the opening hues of the official statement, which 
follows, show that the caption refers to the proposals to be received, 
and is not intended to describe the effect of the advertisement as a 
whole. If there was otherwise any doubt on this point, it is set at rest 
b}^ the last sentence, viz., "The board reserves the right to reject any 
or all bids." That language demonstrates the nature of the advertise- 
ment as a mere invitation for offers for a contract. As such it did not 
lay the foundation of a completed contract. It was merely the open- 
ing of negotiations for a contract. ... No claim is advanced in the 
petition looking to a recovery for fraud or deceit in making the pro- 
posals for bids. It is, indeed, asserted that the defendant rejected 
the plaintiffs' bid "without cause, arbitrarity and capriciously, through 
favoritism and bias." But, if the defendant had the absolute right to 
reject an}^ and all bids, no cause of action would arise to plaintiffs 
because of the motive which led to the rejection of their bid. The 
right to reject the bids was unconditional. Defendant was entitled 
to exercise that right for any cause it might deem satisfactorj'-, or even 
without any assignable cause. Whatever its rules or practice as to 
the acceptance of bids may have been, plaintiffs' rights cannot be 
justly held to be greater than those conferred by the published ad- 
vertisement on which their bid was made. {Anderson v. Board of 
President and Directors of Public Schools, 26 L. R. A. 707, 712.) 



162 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

It is my opinion that under the circumstances described in 
your letter the rejection of any bid would not give the bidder 
whose offer was rejected any right of action against the 
Commonwealth nor against the members of your Board, 
either in their official capacity or as individuals. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Constitutional Laiv — Railroads — Regulation of Compensation 

of Employees. 

It is not within the constitutional powers of the Legislature to compel 
railroads to give certain employees two days' rest in a month with 
full compensation. 

June 29, 1914. 

His Excellency David I. Walsh, Governor of the Commonwealth. 

Sir: — In response to your oral inquiry in reference to the 
bill now before you providing for two days' rest in a month 
for certain employees with full compensation, I refer you to 
an opinion rendered March 25, 1914, to the committee on 
railroads on a similar measure. House Bill No. 453. 

The leading case in this Commonwealth upon that principle 
that relates to freedom of contract is Commonwealth v. Ferry, 
155 Mass. 117. A statute had been enacted which provided 
that no employer should impose a fine upon, or withhold the 
wages or any part of the wages of, an employee engaged in 
weaving, for imperfections that may arise during the process 
of weaving. The court, speaking by Chief Justice Knowlton, 
say : — 

The act recognizes the fact that imperfections may arise in weaA^ing 
cloth, and it is evident that a common cause of such imperfections 
may be the neghgence or want of skill of the weaver. When an em- 
ployer has contracted with his employee for the exercise of skill and 
care in tending looms, it forbids the withholding of am^ part of the 
contract price for non-performance of the contract, and seeks to com- 
pel the payment of the same price for work which in quahty falls far 
short of the requirements of the contract as for that which is properly 
done. . . . 

... It might well be held that, if the Legislature should determine 
it to be for the best interests of the people that a certain class of em- 
ployees should not be permitted to subject themselves to an arbitrary 
imposition of a fine or penalty by their employer, it might pass a law 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 163 

to that effect. But when the attempt is to compel pa3'ment under a 
contract of the price for good work when only inferior work is done, a 
different question is presented. 

There are certain fundamental rights of every citizen which are 
recognized in the organic law of all our free American States. A 
statute which violates any of these rights is imconstitutional and 
void, even though the enactment of it is not expressly forbidden. 
Article I. of the Declaration of Rights in the Constitution of Massa- 
chusetts enumerates among the natural, unahenable rights of men the 
right ''of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property." Article 
I., § 10, of the Constitution of the United States provides, among 
other things, that no State shall pass any "law impairing the obhgation 
of contracts." The right to acquire, possess and protect property 
includes the right to make reasonable contracts, which shall be under 
the protection of the law. 

... If the statute is held to pemiit a manufacturer to hire weavers, 
and agree to pay them a certain price per yard for weaving cloth with 
a proper skill and care, it renders the contract of no effect when it 
requires him, under a penalty, to pay the contract price if the emploj^ee 
does his work neghgently and fails to perform his contract. For it 
is an essential element of such a contract that full payment is to be 
made only when the contract is performed. If it be held to forbid 
the making of such contracts, and to permit the hiring of weavers 
only upon terms that prompt payment shall be made of the price for 
good work, however badly their work may be done, and that the 
remedy' of the employer for their derelictions shall be only b}^ suits 
against them for damages, it is an interference with the right to make 
reasonable and proper contracts in conducting a legitimate business, 
which the Constitution guarantees to every one when it declares that 
he has a "natural, essential, and unalienable" right of "acquiring, 
possessing, and protecting property." (Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 
Mass. 117.) 

A statute attempting to fix the price and hours of labor as between 
certain private contractors and their employees could not in my judg- 
ment be sustained as a legitimate exercise of the police power con- 
tained in the Constitution. It would tend to promote the pecuniary 
welfare of one class of citizens at the expense of another class. (II. 
Op. Atty.-Gen. 267.) 

The case of Commonwealth v. Perry has been cited with 
approval in our own Commonwealth and by the Supreme 
Court of Missouri in the case of State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 
and by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Braceville 
Coal Co. y. The People of the State of Illinois, 147 III. 66. In 
the last-mentioned case it is said: — 



164 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

The privilege of contracting is both a hberty and a property right, 
and if A is denied the right to contract and acquire property in the 
manner which he has hitherto enjoyed under the law, and which 
B, C and D are still allowed by the law to enjoy, it is clear that he is 
deprived of both hberty and property to the extent that he is thus 
denied the right to contract. The man or the class forbidden the 
acquisition or enjoyment of property in the manner permitted the 
community at large would be deprived of liberty in particulars of 
primary importance to his or their pursuit of happiness. 

It is evident that if the Legislature may constitutionally 
enact a law that an employer must pay an employee for two 
days' labor in every month that is not performed, it may also 
enact a statute providing that employees must work two days 
in a month without pay, the unconstitutionality of which 
would be very readily apparent to every thinking individual. 
Such an enactment as is proposed interferes, both with the 
personal liberty of the citizen and with the right of freedom 
of contract. In my opinion such an act would also be 
obnoxious to that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the Constitution of the United States, to the effect that 
**no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law." 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Boston, Cape Cod (& Neiv York Canal Company — Deposit 
with State Treasurer. 

Under St. 1899, c. 448, the deposit of $200,000 with the State Treasurer 
as security for land damages cannot be applied for any other purpose 
or taken by virtue of an execution. 

June 30, 1914. 

Hon. Frederick W. Mansfield, Treasurer and Receiver-General. 

Dear Sir: — You have requested my opinion as to whether 
the moneys deposited with the Treasurer and Receiver- 
General of the Commonwealth by the Boston, Cape Cod & 
New York Canal Company, under the provisions of chapter 
448 of the Acts of 1899, are a proper fund out of which to 
pay an execution issued by the Superior Court in and for the 
county of Barnstable in favor of Valina T. Bassett, judgment 
creditor, and against the Boston, Cape Cod & New York 
Canal Company, judgment debtor. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 165 

Sections 23, 24 and 25 of the chapter referred to provide as 
follows : — 

Section 23. This act shall be null and void unless said canal 
company shall, within four months from the passage of this act, and 
before the filing of the plan of the proposed location as provided in 
section four, deposit with the treasurer of the commonwealth the sum 
of two hundred thousand dollars in cash or in United States govern- 
ment bonds, as security for all damages for the taking of land by said 
company; which money or bonds shall be subject to attachment or 
levy upon any legal process issued in behah of any person against said 
company for the recovery of damages for taking such land. . . . 

Section 24. All persons whose lands shall be taken by con- 
demnation for the location of said canal as filed by said canal company 
under the provisions of section four of this act shall, within six months 
after the fihng of such location in the registry of deeds for the county 
of Barnstable, file with the county commissioners of the county of 
Barnstable a written statement, setting forth substantially the quantity 
of land so taken, and the amount of damages so claimed by them, 
respectively, for the taking thereof, and the county commissioners' 
shall thereupon, after giving to all parties interested such notice as 
they shall deem sufficient, determine and award the amount of damages 
to which such persons are entitled. 

Section 25. Any party dissatisfied with the award of the count}^ 
commissioners may, at any time within one year after the date of 
such award, apply by petition to the superior court of the county of 
Barnstable for a jury to assess the damages, and like proceedings 
shall be had therein as in proceedings for damages for laying out rail- 
roads. The treasurer of the commonwealth is hereby empowered and 
directed, upon the fihng with him of a certified copy of the final decree 
as appears of record in any such proceeding, to pay to the parties 
appearing by such decree to be entitled thereto, or their legal repre- 
sentatives, the sum of money set forth in said decree. 

The funds deposited with the Treasurer and Receiver-General 
by the canal company are subject to attachment or levy upon 
legal process for one purpose only; that is, to satisfy claims for 
land damages. The funds above specified were deposited with 
the Treasurer and Receiver-General for this single purpose. 

By section 24 above quoted all persons whose lands were 
taken or condemned for the location of the canal were re- 
quired, within six months after the filing in the registr}" of 
deeds for the county of Barnstable of the proper instruments 
showing the location of the canal, to file with the county com- 
missioners of that county a written statement setting forth 
substantially the quantity of land taken and the amount of 



166 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

damages claimed by such persons, respectively. Upon the filing 
of such statement the county commissioners were required to 
make an award of the amount of damages to Avhich such 
persons were entitled. After this any party dissatisfied with 
the award of the commissioners might within one year bring 
his petition to the Superior Court of Barnstable County to 
have his damages assessed by a jury; and the Treasurer and 
Receiver-General is empowered and directed, upon the filing 
with him of a certified copy of the final decree as appears of 
record in any such proceeding, to pay to the parties appearing 
by such decree to be entitled thereto, or to their legal repre- 
sentatives, the sum of money set forth in said decree. 

The copy of the execution submitted does not disclose 
whether the cause of action of the judgment creditor therein 
named was the taking of land by the defendant company or 
something else; but the funds in the hands of the Treasurer 
and Receiver-General can be used only to pay land damages. 
No certificate accompanies this execution. Before the Treas- 
urer and Receiver-General pays any claim against the canal 
company there should be filed with him a certified copy of the 
final decree in the proceeding in which payment is claimed. 
The execution presented is not such a certified copy as the 
statute requires, and does not show compliance with the 
various steps required by the statute. 

It is my opinion that as the matter now stands the Treas- 
urer and Receiver-General should not pay this execution, and 
that this claim cannot properly be paid out of the fund above 
mentioned until compliance with the terms of the statute is 
shown. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Civil War Veteran — Gratuities — Re-enlistment as Substitute. 

Under St. 1912, c. 702, as amended by St. 1913, c. 4.43, a Massachusetts 
veteran who served as a volunteer in the civil war and was honorably 
discharged is not debarred from receiving a gratuity from the Com- 
monwealth by reason of subsequent service as a substitute. 

July 1, 1914. 
Commission on Gratuities. 

Gentlemen: — You state that you have on file a claim 
made by a veteran who served as a volunteer in the civil war 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 167 

from July, 1S62, to September, 1863, and that by reason of 
this service he would be entitled to the gratuity provided by 
chapter 702 of the Acts of 1912, but that in August, 1864, 
he re-enlisted as a substitute, from which service he was dis- 
charged in August, 1867; and you ask my opinion on the 
following question: "Does the fact of his second service as a 
substitute debar the veteran from any benefit under this act?" 
The first section of the chapter above referred to contains 
a very clear and emphatic declaration of the intention and 
purpose of the Legislature in its enactment. That section 
reads as follows: — 

For the purpose of promoting the spirit of loyalty and patriotism, 
and in recognition of the sacrifice made both for the commonwealth 
and for the United States by those veteran soldiers and sailors who 
volunteered their services in the civil war, and for the purpose of pro- 
moting the public welfare, by giving visible evidence to this generation 
and future generations that, if danger should again threaten the nation 
and the call should again come for men, Massachusetts will not forget 
the great service of those who volunteer, a gratuity of one hundred 
and twenty-five dollars to each veteran is hereb}^ authorized to be 
paid from the treasury of the commonwealth under the conditions 
hereinafter set forth. 

Section 2 of said act, as amended by chapter 443 of the Acts 
of 1913, provides as follows: — 

The gratuity herein provided for shall l)e paid to every person, or 
his legal representative, not l:)eing a conscript or a substitute, and 
not having received a bounty from the commonwealth or from any 
city or town therein, who served in the army or navy of the United 
States to the credit of the commonwealth during the civil war, or who 
served in the army or navy of the United States during the civil war 
and was an actual bona fide resident of the commonwealth at the time 
of his enhstment, or who served in a mihtary organization from or 
raised by the commonwealth, and was honorably discharged from 
such service, and is living at the time of the passage of this act; it 
being intended and provided that the said gift shall not be a bounty, 
nor a payment in equalization of bounties, nor a payment for services 
rendered, nor a payment for the purpose of making the result of their 
contracts of enlistment more favorable to them because the contracts 
of other soldiers were on better terms, but a testimonial for meritorious 
service such as the commonwealth may rightly give, and such as her 
sons may honorabh' accept and receive. 



168 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

I assume that the applicant was at the time of his enhst- 
ment an actual bona fide resident of the Commonwealth; that 
he was honorably discharged; and that there is no reason 
why he should not receive the gratuity provided by this act 
except the fact that after serving his country as a volunteer, 
and after being honorably discharged from the service, not 
having received a bounty from the Commonwealth or from 
any city or town therein, he voluntarily re-entered the coun- 
try's service as a substitute. 

The statement of the reasons suggested for rejecting the 
claim of this applicant indicates quite clearly what the answer 
to your question ought to be. Here is a man who did not 
wait for any financial consideration but who offered his 
services freely to the defence of the Union, whose only fault 
is, that having earned an honorable discharge, he was willing 
to do still further service for his country, and that on entering 
the service the second time he took the place of some one 
who would at best have been an unwilling soldier. To reject 
this claim for such a reason would, in my opinion, be entirely 
contrary to the plain provisions of the statute, and in this 
and all similar cases would defeat its spirit and purpose. 
The statute bars those whose only service was as conscripts 
or substitutes, not those who after honorable service as vol- 
unteers may have re-enlisted as substitutes. 

It is my opinion that the claim referred to in your question, 
and all other like claims, should be allowed. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Constitutional Law — Salem Fire — Authority of Legislature 
to grant Relief. 

It is within the constitutional authority of the Legislature to grant such 
relief to sufferers from a public disaster as may be deemed necessary 
for the protection of the health and safety of the people. 

July 3, 1914. 
His Excellency David I. Walsh, Governor of the Commonwealth. 

Sir: — In response to your oral inquiry whether the Legis- 
lature has authority under the Constitution to appropriate 
money to be placed in the hands of a commission and- loaned 
to sufferers by the Salem fire, to aid them in rebuilding their 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 169 

homes and places of business, I have to sa}^ that the subject- 
matter covered by your inquiry was very carefully and fully 
considered by the Supreme Judicial Court in the case of 
Lowell V. Boston, 111 Mass. 454, a case that grew out of 
legislation for the relief of sufferers by the great Boston fire 
of 1872 The act in question, St. 1872, c. 364, provided for 
the issue by the cit^' of Boston of an issue of bonds to an 
amount not exceeding $20,000,000; and for the appointment 
of a commission authorized to loan the proceeds of the bonds 
so issued, in sums such as they should determine, to the 
owners of land, the buildings upon which were burned by the 
fire in Boston on the ninth and tenth days of November, 
1872. In a discussion which seems to cover every point raised 
by your inquiry the court said: — 

It is a question, not of municipal authority, but of legislative power. 
The point of difficulty is not as to the distribution of the burden by 
allowing it to be imposed upon a limited district within the State, 
but as to the right of the Legislature to impose or authorize anj^ tax 
for the object contemplated by this statute. 

The power to le\y taxes is founded on the right, duty and responsi- 
bility to maintain and administer all the governmental functions of 
the State, and to provide for the public weKare. To justify any 
exercise of the power requires that the expenditure which it is in- 
tended to meet shaU be for some pubhc service, or some object which 
concerns the public welfare. The promotion of the interests of indi- 
viduals, either in respect of property or business, although it may 
result incidentally in the advancement of the public welfare, is, in its 
essential character, a private and not a public object. However 
certain and great the resulting good to the general pubhc, it does not, 
by reason of its comparative importance, cease to be incidental. The 
incidental advantage to the public, or to the State, which results from 
the promotion of private interests, and the prosperity of private enter- 
prises or business, does not justify their aid by the use of public money 
raised by taxation, or for which taxation may become necessary. 
It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure 
which must determine its vahdity, as justif^dng a tax, and not the 
magnitude of the interests to be affected, nor the degree to which 
the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, 
may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. 

The ultimate end and object of the expenditure, as indicated by 
the provisions of the statute itself, is '4o insure the speedy rebuilding 
on said land." 

The general result may indeed be thus stated collectively, as a single 
object of attainment; but the fund raised is intended to be appro- 



170 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

priated distributiveh^ by separate loans to numerous individuals, each 
one of which will be independent of any relation to the others, or to 
any general purpose, except that of aiding indi\idual enterprise in 
matters of private business. The property thus created will remain 
exclusively private property, to be devoted to private uses at the 
discretion of the o\Miers of the land; with, no restriction as to the 
character of the buildings to be erected, or the uses to which they 
shall be devoted; and with no obligation to render any service or duty 
to the Commonwealth, or to the city, — except to repay the loan, — 
or to the community at large or any part of it. If it be assumed that 
the private interests of the o\^^lers will lead them to re-establish ware- 
houses, shops, manufactories, and stores; and that the trade and 
business of the place will be enlarged or revived by means of the facil- 
ities thus provided ; still, these are considerations of private interest, 
and, if expressly declared to be the aim and purpose of the act, they 
would not constitute a pubhc object, in a legal sense. 

As a judicial question the case is not changed by the magnitude of 
the calamity which has created the emergency; nor by the greatness 
of the emergency, or the extent and importance of the interests to be 
promoted. These are considerations affecting only the propriety and 
expediency of the expenditure as a legislative question. If the ex- 
penditure is, in its nature, such as ^all justify taxation under any state 
of circumstances, it belongs to the Legislature exclusively to determine 
vdiether it shall be authorized in the particular case; and however 
slight the emergency, or limited or unimportant the interests to be 
promoted thereby, the court has no authority to revise the legislative 
action. 

On the other hand, if its nature is such as not to justify taxation 
in any and all cases in which the Legislature might see fit to give 
authority therefor, no stress of circumstances affecting the expediency, 
importance or general desirableness of the measure, and no con- 
currence of legislative and municipal action, or preponderance of 
popular favor in any particular case, tniII supph" the element necessary 
to bring it within the scope of legislative power. 

The expenditure authorized by this statute being for private and 
not for public objects, in a legal sense, it exceeds the constitutional 
power of the Legislature; and the city cannot la^\iulh' issue the bonds 
for the purposes of the act. {Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454, 460, 472.) 

This decision has never been overruled or in any degree 
limited or at all criticized by any later decision of the Supreme 
Judicial Court. It has been many times cited with approval, 
and I quote from an Opinion of the Justices, 204 Mass. 607, 
611, a reference to this case, after quoting a portion of the 
opinion above set forth, and saying that the statement of the 
law in the case of Lowell v. Boston is clear and accurate: — 



1915] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 171 

It has governed all later decisions upon kindred questions in this 
Commonwealth. Opinion of the Justices, 155 Mass. 598. Mead v. 
Acton, 139 Mass. 341. It is the law of the Supreme Court of the 
United States as laid down in an able and exhaustive opinion by Mr. 
Justice Miller, in Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, in which 
it was held that a statute authorizing a town to issue its bonds in aid 
of a manufacturing enterprise was invahd. It has been followed by 
that court in later cases. Parkersbtirg v. Brown, 106 U. S. 487. Cole 
V. LaGrange, 113 U. S. 1. Missouri Pacific Railway v. Nebraska, 164 
U. S. 403. It has been apphed in different forms in a variety of cases 
in courts all over the United States. Opinion of the Justices, 58 Maine, 
590. Allen v. Jay, 60 Maine, 124. Markley v. Mineral City, 58 Ohio 
St. 430. State v. Osawkee Township, 14 Kans. 418. Central Branch 
Union Pacific Railroad v. Smith, 23 Kans. 745. Coates v. Campbell, 
37 Minn. 498. Deering & Co. v. Peterson, 75 Minn. 118. Minnesota 
Sugar Co. v. Iverson, 91 Minn. 30. Eufaula v. McNab, 67 Ala. 588. 
Manning v. Devil's Lake, 13 No. Dak. 47. Michigan Sugar Co. v. 
Auditor General, 124 Mich. 674. Deal v. Mississippi County, 107 
Mo. 464. Feldman & Co. v. City Council of Charleston, 23 S. C. 57. 
Sutherland-Innes Co. v. Evart, 30 C. C. A. 305. 

Without further discussion of this ciuestion I may say that 
the decisions of our Supreme Court above quoted unquestion- 
ably express the law^ covering your inquiry as it stands to- 
day, and are conclusive as to the power of the Legislature 
to authorize the loan of any part of the public funds of the 
Commonwealth for individual or private use, and preclude 
the possibility of such action. These considerations, however, 
relate to the matter of rebuilding the city. 

But other and more important considerations arise as to 
the condition of things now existing at Salem. A great 
calamity has befallen, one w^hich, while it affects more keenly 
the residents of the stricken city and those w^ho without 
warning have been thrown out of employment and stripped 
of their w^orldly possessions, is still a disaster in which every 
citizen of the Commonwealth shares. Such a condition as 
now exists in Salem presents a public emergenc}', one that 
justifies and demands the exercise of the constitutional power 
of the government in making proper provision for the health 
and safety of the people. 

When a great public disaster has occurred leaving thousands 
of people without food, shelter or emplo^'ment, it is un- 
thinkable that the hands of the government of the Common- 
wealth are so tied as to render it utterly supine and powerless 



172 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

to render aid, and that the sufferers must of necessity be left 
to the haphazard of private charity. The local authorities 
are necessarily practically powerless in the presence of such 
great destruction and suffering. The condition of things so 
suddenly precipitated, the claims of humanity, and the good 
of the Commonwealth call for immediate and extraordinary 
relief. It is my opinion that the Legislature has power under 
the Constitution to appropriate money from the funds of the 
Commonwealth to be used under such direction and super- 
vision as it may deem proper for providing proper food, 
clothing and shelter for the sufferers by the Salem fire during 
such period of time as may be deemed necessary, as a measure 
for the protection of the health and safety of the people, 
and for the promotion of the general welfare. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney -General. 



Labor — Eight-hour Day — Police Drivers. 

Civilians employed as hostlers or drivers in the Boston police department 
are within the provisions of St. 1911, c. 494, § 1, restricting employ- 
ment of certain persons to eight hours in a calendar day, but police 
officers detailed to perform the work of drivers or hostlers are not so 
restricted. 

July 8, 1914. 

State Board of Labor and Industries. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following questions: — 

First, are civilians employed as hostlers or drivers for the police 
department of the city of Boston mthin the provisions of chapter 494 
of the Acts of 1911? 

Second, are police officers who are detailed to perform the work of 
drivers and hostlers of the police department of the city of Boston 
entitled to the benefit of the eight-hour law? 

Section 1 of chapter 494 of the Acts of 1911 provides as 
follows: — 

The service of all laborers, workmen and mechanics, now or here- 
after employed by the commonwealth or by any county therein or by 
any city or town which has accepted the provisions of section twenty 
of chapter one hundred and six of the Revised Laws, or of section 
forty-two of chapter five hundred and fourteen of the acts of the year 
nineteen hundred and nine, or by any contractor or sub-contractor 
for or upon any public works of the commonwealth or of any county 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 173 

therein or of any such city or town, is hereby restricted to eight hours 
in any one calendar day, and it shall be unlawful for any officer of the 
commonwealth or of any county therein, or of any such city or town, 
or for any such contractor or sub-contractor or other person whose 
duty it shall be to employ, direct or control the ser\dce of such laborers, 
workmen or mechanics to require or permit any such laborer, work- 
man or mechanic to work more than eight hours in any one calendar 
day, except in cases of extraordinary emergency. Danger to propert\^, 
life, public safety or pubUc health only shall be considered cases of 
extraordinar}^ emergency ^\'ithin the meaning of this section. In 
cases where a Saturday half holiday is given the hours of labor upon 
the other working days of the week may be increased sufficiently to 
make a total of forty-eight hours for the week's work. Threat of 
loss of employment or to obstruct or prevent the obtaining of em- 
plojTnent or to refrain from emplojdng in the future, shall each be con- 
sidered to be ^'requiring" \\dthin the meaning of this section. Engi- 
neers shall be regarded as mechanics ^\athin the meaning of this act. 

Your letter does not state, and I am not informed, whether 
the city of Boston has accepted the provisions of the eight- 
hour law, but for the purposes of this opinion I assume that 
it has done so. 

In answer to the first c^uestion I have to say that it is my 
opinion that civilians employed as hostlers or drivers for the 
police department of the city of Boston are within the pro- 
A'isions of section 1 of chapter 494 of the Acts of 1911. 

In answer to your second question I have to say that it is 
my opinion that regular officers of the police department de- 
tailed to perform the duties of hostlers and drivers of that 
department are not within the provisions of the eight-hour 
law. They have a civil service rating as patrolmen, and draw 
salaries as police officers and not as hostlers or drivers. 
Yours truly, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney -General. 



Clerks of Courts — Assistant Clerks — Clerks Pro Tempore. 

Unless an assistant clerk of court is appointed clerk pro tempore in the 
absence of the clerk, such assistant is not entitled to any increase 
in his regular sala^3^ 

July 13, 1914. 

Hon. Frank L. Dean, Controller of County Accounts. 

Dear Sir: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following question: — 



174 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

When an assistant clerk of a police, district or municipal court is 
appointed clerk -pro tempore is he entitled to the salary of the clerk 
while holding such position? 

R. L., c. 160, §§ 11, 12 and 70, provide: — 

Section 11. The clerk of a police, district or municipal court 
may, subject to the approval of the justice, from time to time appoint 
one or more assistant clerks, who shall be removable at his pleasure 
or at the pleasure of the court, for whose official acts the clerk shall 
be responsible and who shall be paid by him unless they receive salaries 
which may be allowed and fixed by law. 

Section 12. In case of the absence, death or removal of a clerk 
of a pofice, district or municipal court, the court may appoint a clerk 
pro tempore, who shall act until the clerk resumes his duties or until 
the vacanc}^ is filled. 

Section 70. Clerks pro tempore of police, district and municipal 
courts shall receive from the county as compensation for each day's 
service an amount equal to the rate by the day of the salary of the 
clerk; but compensation so paid to a clerk pro tempore for service, 
in excess of thirty days in any one calendar year, shall be deducted 
bv the county treasurer from the salarv of the clerk. 



St. 1906, c. 256, provides: — 

Section 1. In case of the absence, death or removal of an assistant 
clerk of a pohce, municipal or district court, other than the municipal 
court of the city of Boston, whose office is estabhshed by law, the 
clerk, subject to the approval of the justice, may appoint an assistant 
clerk pro tempore, who shall act until the assistant clerk resumes his 
duties or until the vacancy is filled, and who shall receive from the 
county as compensation for each day's service an amount equal to 
the rate by day of the salary of the assistant clerk; but compensation 
so paid to an assistant clerk pro tempore for service, in excess of twenty 
days in any one calendar year, shall be deducted by the county treas- 
urer from the salary of the assistant clerk. 

There is nothing in the law w^hich prohibits the appointment 
of an assistant clerk of a court to the office of clerk pro tempore, 
but it is my opinion that the two positions are incompatible and 
cannot be held by one person at one and the same time. 
When an assistant clerk accepts an appointment as clerk pro tem- 
pore he vacates the position of assistant clerk, and is entitled to 
receive from the county as compensation for each day's service 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 175 

an amount equal to the rate by the day of the salary of the clerk. 
Upon the expiration of his term as clerk pro tempore he is, of 
course, again eligible to appointment as assistant clerk. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Aitorncy-Gcncral. 



Registers of Deeds — Salaries. 

Salaries of registers of deeds are to be readjusted each year in accordance 
with the classifications provided in St. 1904, c. 452. 

July 24, 1914. 
Frank L. Dean, Esq., Controller of County Accounts. 

Dear Sir: — You ask my opinion as to the proper method 
of determining the salary of the register of the Franklin 
Registry of Deeds, in view of the fact that the receipts of 
said registry in 1913 exceeded $3,000. 

Chapter 452 of the Acts of 1904 established the salaries of 
registers and assistant registers throughout the Common- 
wealth. Certain classifications were made: Class A, where 
the yearly receipts for the five years preceding the year 1903 
amounted to $3,000 or more, and where the register was given 
an initial salary of $1,600 plus a sum equal to 15 per cent, of 
said receipts; Class B, where the receipts were between $1,500 
and $3,000, with an initial salary of $900 plus 40 per cent.; 
Class C, where the receipts were less than $1,500 per year, 
with a salary equal to the receipts and not less than $600. 
Several registries were mentioned by name and the salaries 
stated. 

Section 2 of that chapter reads as follows: — 

The salaries of registers of deeds and assistant registers of deeds 
hereinbefore specified shall be readjusted in Januarj--, nineteen hun- 
dred and six, and every five years thereafter, upon the basis of the 
average yearly receipts of the respective registries for the five preceding 
3'ears, in accordance with the classification set forth in section one. 

This was amended by chapter 682 of the Acts of 1913, as 
follows: — 

Section 1. Chapter four hundred and fifty-two of the acts of the 
year nineteen hundred and four is hereby amended by striking out 
section two and inserting in place thereof the following: — Section 2. 
The salaries of registers of deeds and assistant registers of deeds here- 



176 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

inbefore specified shall be readjusted in January, nineteen hundred 
and fourteen, and in the month of January of each year thereafter, 
upon the basis of the receipts of the respective registries for the year 
preceding, every such readjustment to be in accordance ^\^th the 
classification set forth in section one. 

Section 2. This act shall take effect upon its passage. 

The plain purport of the recent enactment was to readjust 
the salaries each year, the readjustment to be in accordance 
with the classification set forth in the prior act, and by 
classification is meant that all registries whose receipts are 
more than $3,000 in the year shall be in Class A; those whose 
receipts are between $1,500 and $3,000 shall be in Class B, 
etc. It was not intended that a registry named as a Class 
B registry in the 1904 act should remain so if it had attained 
the rank of a Class A registry. 

As the Franklin Registry is now in Class A, the salary of 
the register must be determined by the Class A rate, namely, 
$1,600 plus 15 per cent, of the receipts. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General . 



Savings Bariks — Boards of Investment — Mortgages. 

The position held by a member of a board of investment of a savings 
bank becomes vacant in sixty days after such member holds, either 
personally or as trustee, property mortgaged to said bank. 

July 27, 1914. 
Hon. Augustus L. Thorxdike, Bank Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — In a recent communication you state that 
you have received a letter from one of the savings banks in 
the Commonwealth which reads as follows: — 

For several years we have had a mortgage on a piece of property 
which has now been sold to an association known as The Twenty-five 
Associates. One of the trustees of The Twenty-five Associates, in 
whom the title of the property is vested and by whom the papers 
assuming the mortgage are signed, is a member of our board of in- 
vestment. Would there be Siny objection to our continuing this 
mortgage under the circumstances? 

You ask for an opinion upon the cjuestion raised by the 
bank, and further inquire if this loan is taken by the bank, 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT— Xo. 12. 177 

whether it woukl be a violation of section 44 of chapter 590 
of the Acts of 1908. 

The bank does not state whether the mortgage in question 
is now due or whether it still has some time to run. If the 
mortgage is underdue it cannot be foreclosed until maturity. 
It might be assigned; but if held by the bank the position of 
the member of the board of investment who has become a 
trustee of The Twenty-five Associates will become vacant in 
sixty days from the time when he became such trustee, under 
the provisions of the section above referred to. With this 
member off the board of investment, only the usual business 
question will be present, either as to holding the mortgage or 
renewing it. If, however, the mortgage has matured and the 
question under consideration is really as to its renewal, I am 
of the opinion that this cannot be done legally while any 
member of the board of investment holds title to the 
mortgaged property, whether in his own right or as a trustee; 
and that this is so whether he holds as a sole trustee or as a 
member of a body of trustees. The making of a loan by a 
savings bank to a trustee or to a body of trustees, one of 
whom is a member of the board of investment of the bank, 
would, in my opinion, constitute a violation of the provisions 
of section 44 of chaptet 590 of the Acts of 1908. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boyxtox, Attorney Geivral. 



State Board of Health — Civil Service. 

The powers and duties of the State Board of Health are retained until the 
Department of Health is organized. 

The secretary of the State Board of Health ceases to hold office upon the 
abolition of the Board. 

Employees of the State Board of Health holding offices not created by 
statute hold office until removed or until their successors are ap- 
pointed. 

July 28, 1914. 

State Board of Health. 

Gentlemex: — You have requested my opinion upon the 

following questions: — 

First. — Will its previously existing powers and duties reside in 
the State Board of Health until the new Department of Health is 
organized? 



178 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Second. — Will the secretary of the State Board of Health continue 
to hold office until the organization of the new Health Department? 

Third. — In case the office of secretary to the State Board of Health 
ceases to exist on Aug. 6, 1914, would the official known as "assistant 
to the secretary" (not under Civil Service Rules) share in the status 
of the secretary or would he continue to hold office as an emploj^e 
"under section 7 of chapter 792, Acts of 1914"? 

The State Board of Health was appointed and holds office 
under the provisions of section 1 of chapter 75 of the Revised 
Laws. This section is expressly repealed by section 8 of 
chapter 792 of the Acts of 1914. 

This act contains no provision as to the time when it shall 
take effect, and your first ciuestion is really whether section 8 
takes effect on the passage of the bill or falls w^ithin the pro- 
visions of section 1 of chapter 8 of the Revised Laws, w^hich 
section reads as follows: — 

A statute shall take effect throughout the commonwealth, unless 
otherwise expressly provided therein, on the thirtieth day next after 
the day on wliich it is approved by the governor, or is otherwise passed 
and approved, or has the force of a law, conformably to the constitution. 

The rule established by the section last quoted is a statutory 
rule, and may be repealed or altered by statute, and it may 
be argued that in case of a repealing statute the later enact- 
ment takes effect immediately, and repeals by implication 
the provisions of section 1 of chapter 8 of the Revised Laws, 
above ciuoted, in so far as the particular later enactment is 
concerned; but it should be noted that repeals by implication 
are not favored. 

It is presumed that the Legislature does not intend to 
make unnecessary changes in the pre-existing body of law. 
The construction of a statute w^ill, therefore, be such as to 
avoid any change in the prior laws bej^ond what is necessary 
to effect the specific purpose of the act in question. Manuel 
V. Manuel, 13 Ohio St. 450; Sykes v. ,S/. Louis & S. F. R.R. 
Co., 127 Mo. App. 326; State v. Hooker, 22 Okla. 712. 

It is in the last degree improbable that the Legislature 
would depart from the general system of law without ex- 
pressing its intention with irresistible clearness. Maxwell on 
Interpretation of Statutes, 2d ed. 96. 

It is my opinion, therefore, that the repeal of sections 1, 
2 and 3 of chapter 75 of the Revised Laws does not take effect 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 179 

until the thirtieth day next after the day on which chapter 
792 of the Acts of 1914 was approved. 

It is also my opinion that when the new law goes into effect, 
and the statute under which the State Board of Health now 
exists is abolished, the official powers and duties of the State 
Board of Health come to an end and expire with the statute 
under which that Board was appointed. 

In response to your second question I have to say that the 
secretary of the Board holds his office by virtue of the pro- 
visions of section 3 of chapter 75 of the Revised Laws. This 
section provides for the election of a secretary "who will be 
the executive officer and shall hold office during the pleasure 
of the board." This section is repealed by section 8 of 
chapter 792 of the Acts of 1914, and while this chapter pro- 
vides for the retention of the employees of the State Board of 
Health it makes no provision for the retention of any member 
of the Board nor of its officers The secretary, being the 
executive officer of the Board, it is my opinion that when 
chapter 792 of the Acts of 1914 takes effect, and the State 
Board of Health ceases to exist, the secretary of the Board of 
Health will cease to hold office. 

Referring now to your third inquir^^ which relates to the 
position of assistant secretary of your Board, it appears that 
this is not an office created under the provisions of sections 
1, 2 and 3, or either or any of them, and that the assistant 
secretary is an employee of your Board and is within the 
provisions contained in section 7 of chapter 792 of the Acts 
of 1914, to the effect that all present employees shall be con- 
tinued in office until their successors are appointed and 
qualified or until removed by the commissioner. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boyntox, Attorney-General. 



Labor — Public JJorks — Citizens. 

Under St. 1914, c. 900, where a city has a fist of United States citizens 
eligible for employment in the street department, it is the duty of the 
city to discharge noncitizen employees, although their employment 
commenced prior to the enactment of the statute. 

Aug. 3, 1914. 

Civil Service Commission. 

Gentlemen: — You state that citizens of the city of 
Newton complain that there are employed in the street de- 



180 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

partment of that city a number of persons who are not 
citizens of the United States and insist that under the pro- 
visions of section 4 of chapter 600 of the Acts of 1914 the 
commission take steps to enforce the dismissal of these non- 
citizens. You further state that it appears upon investigation 
that in most of the cases the noncitizen employees referred to 
were appointed long prior to the enactment of chapter 600 of 
the Acts of 1914, and you ask my opinion as to whether your 
commission should insist upon the discharge of these non- 
citizens who were appointed prior to the passage of this act. 
The statute referred to provides as follows: — 

Section 1. In all work of any branch of the service of the com- 
monwealth, or of any city or town therein, citizens of the common- 
wealth shall be given preference. 

Section 2. The civil ser\ace commission shall not place upon its 
lists an}^ person not a citizen of the United States. 

Section 3. If an appointing officer, because of the non-existence 
of a fist of ehgible appointees, appoints under provisional authority 
from the civil service commission a person not a citizen of the United 
States, he shall discharge the person so appointed and appoint from 
the eligible list whenever the civil service commission establishes a 
list of the proper class. 

Section 4. Whenever the attention of the civil service commission 
shall be caUed b}' complaint on the part of any citizen of the common- 
wealth to the employment of a non-citizen when there is a list of 
eligibles existing, the commission shall take steps to enforce the dis- 
ixdssal of such non-citizens and the appointment in his place from 
the suitable ehgible list. 

Section 5. Whenever it shall appear that am' appointing officer 
has had due notice of unlawful employment of a non-citizen and that 
the said appointing officer has continued such emplojmient for ten 
days after such notice, he shall be subject to a fine of not less than ten 
nor more than one hundred dollars for each offence. 

Section 6. This act shall take effect upon its passage. 

This statute seems to have been enacted with a double 
purpose. Sections 1, 2 and 3 relate to appointments; sections 
4 and 5 to employment. I assume that the employees to 
which you refer are laborers. The act is not, in my opinion, 
retroactive so as to affect the legality of appointments made 
prior to its enactment, but section 4 relates to continuous em- 
ploj'ment after the passage of the act. For a man to be 
registered on the civil service list by a city and designated 
or appointed as a laborer is one thing; continuous employ- 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 181 

ment is quite another. This section does not relate to things 
past, but provides that whenever after its enactment the 
attention of the Civil Service Commission shall be called by 
complaint on the part of any citizen of the Commonwealth 
to the employment of a noncitizen when there is a list of 
eligibles existing, action shall be taken to enforce the dis- 
missal of such noncitizen. 

It is my opinion that in the case stated, if the city of 
Xewton has a list of eligibles made up of citizens as required 
by the provisions of this act, it is the duty of your Board to 
insist upon the discharge of the noncitizens whose employ- 
ment is complained of. 

Yours truly, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



County Commissioners — Expenses — Controller of County 
Accounts. 

County commissioners may be allowed reimbursement for expenses, under 
St. 1911, c. 162, only such sums as are expended in the performance 
of official duty, whether within or without the Commonwealth, if such 
expenses are reasonable and proper in amount. 

Aug. 4, 1914. 

Frank L. Dean, Esq., Controller of County Accounts. 

Dear Sir — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following question : — 

IVIay expenses of county commissioners incurred outside the limits 
of the Commonwealth be allowed by the controller of county accounts? 

The statute governing this matter (section 1 of chapter 162 
of the Acts of 1911) provides as follows: — 

An itemized statement of the actual and proper cost to the com- 
missioners for transportation and other necessary expenses incurred 
in the performance of their official duties shall on the first day of 
each month be certified by them to the controller of county accounts 
who shall audit and if correct certify the same to the county treasurer 
who shall reimburse the commissioners for such expenses from the 
county treasury. 

The question does not appear to be as to the place where the 
expense is incurred, but whether the item charged represents 
the proper cost or expense to the commissioners of trans- 



182 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

portation or other necessary expenses incurred in the per- 
formance of their official duties. The test is not whether the 
duty is to be discharged or performed within this Common- 
wealth or outside of it, but whether the expense charged was 
incurred in the performance of official duty, and whether it is 
reasonable and proper in amount. 

You enclose correspondence containing an inquiry whether 
the expenses of county commissioners in attending the Con- 
gress of the American Prison Association should be allowed. 
Admitting that the commissioners by attending the congress 
would gain much useful and important information, it is still 
my opinion that attending the Congress of the American 
Prison Association could not be regarded as official business, 
and therefore that expenses incurred in attending that or 
other similar gatherings cannot properly be allowed except in 
cases where a special appropriation has been made. The rule 
which you state you have hitherto followed seems to me to be 
correct. 

Ver}^ truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Labor — Materials and Supplies — Eight-hour Day. 

Wood finish, doors, casings, etc., purchased in the open market under a 
contract to which the Commonwealth is a party, and which enter 
into the construction of a building, are materials and supplies, and 
St. 1911, c. 494, § 2, providing an eight-hour day for employees on 
State work, does not apply. 

Aug. 12, 1914. 

State Board of Labor and Industries. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion on the 
following question: — 

Are wood finish, doors, casings and other wood-trim material or 
suppfies within the meaning of the provisions of section 2 of chapter 
494 of the Acts of 1911? 

That section reads as follows: — 

Every contract, excluding contracts for the purchase of material 
or suppfies, to which the commomvealth or any county therein or 
any cit}^ or to\^^l which has accepted the provisions of section twenty' 
of chapter one hundred and six of the Revised Laws, is a party wiiich 
may involve the emploj^ment of laborers, workmen or mechanics 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 183 

shall contain a stipulation that no laborer, workman or mechanic 
working within this commonwealth, in the employ of the contractor, 
sub-contractor or other person doing or contracting to do the whole 
or a part of the work contemplated by the contractor shall be re- 
quested or required to work more than eight hours in any one calendar 
da}^, and everj^ such contract wliich does not contain this stipulation 
shall be null and void. 

Your question possibly arises from the fact that you con- 
sider wood trim, wood finish, doors and casings as a finished 
product. They may be so, but it is true that many other 
kinds of material going into the construction of a building, 
and properly falling under the head of material or supplies, 
are also finished products. Such things as nails, putty, paint 
and many other kinds of articles represent somebody's finished 
product. The}" are, however, part of the necessary material 
of the building. If wood finish doors, casings and other 
wood trim are purchased of a manufacturer in the open 
market under a contract to which the Commonwealth or any 
tow^n or city having adopted the provisions of the eight-hour 
law is a party, they are, in my opinion, to be regarded as 
material or supplies within the meaning of the statute above 
referred to. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Board of Education — Fraviingham Normal ScJiool — Laundry^ 

A resolve providing for the erection and furnishing of a dormitory in a 
normal school does not authorize the equipment of a laundry. 

Aug. 12, 1914. 
State Board of Education. 

Gentlemen: — You have submitted a copy of chapter 141 
of the Resolves of 1914, and you ask *'if there is an\Hhing in 
this act which would prevent this Board from equipping a 
laundry in connection with this building." 

The resolve referred to reads as follows: — 

Resolved, That there be allowed and paid out of the treasury of the 
commonwealth a sum not exceeding one hundred and forty-five thou- 
sand dollars, to be expended at the state normal school at Framingham, 
under the direction of the board of education, for erecting and furnish- 



184 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

ing a new dormitory, for additional sewer beds and drains, for repairs 
to the heating plant and the installation of new boilers, and for engi- 
neers' and architects' fees. 

The appropriation is made for the specific purposes named 
in the act. Those purposes are (1) to erect and furnish a new 
dormitory; (2) for additional sewer beds and drains; (3) for 
repairs to the heating plant and the installation of new 
boilers; and (4) for engineers' and architects' fees. 

The question seems to be whether the word "dormitory" 
may properly include equipping a laundry. The w^ord 
"dormitory" is defined as — 

A place, building, or room to sleep in. . . . That part of a boarding- 
school or other institution where the inmates sleep, usually a large 
room, either open or di\ided by low partitions, or a series of rooms 
opening upon a common hall or corridor: in American colleges, 
sometim.es an entire building divided into sleeping-rooms. (Century 
Dictionary.) 

The word "dormitory" has been held not to include a dining 
hall. Hillsdale College v. Rideout, 82 Mich. 94. By the same 
reasoning it would not include a laundry. 

It is not what is contained in but what is omitted from this 
act that creates your difficulty. Your Board may lawfully 
exercise in this matter only such authority' as is conferred upon 
it by the Legislature, and this act does not, in my opinion, 
confer authority to equip a laundry. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney -Gene red. . 



District Police — Building Inspectors — Revocation of Certificates. 

Certificates of the proper equipment of buildings, issued under St. 1913, 
c. 65^ § 25, may be revoked by the inspector for the district where 
said buildings are located, whether such inspector issued the original 
certificate or not. 

Aug. 17, 1914. 

Gen. J. H. Whitney, Chief of the District Police. 

Dear Sir: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following question : — 

May an inspector of the building inspection department of the 
District PoHce revoke a certificate issued bj^ his predecessor in office, 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 185 

under the provisions of section 25 of chapter 655 of the Acts of 1913, 
to the owner, lessee or occupant of a builcUng in the district of said 
inspector? 

The section of the statute above referred to provides as 
follows: — 

Section 25. Except as is otherwise provided by law, the inspectors 
shall from time to time examine all buildings wdthin their respective 
districts which are subject to the provisions of this act. If, in the 
judgment of any such inspector, sudi building conforms to the require- 
ments of this act for buildings of its class, he shall issue to the owner, 
lessee or occupant thereof, or of any portion thereof used in the manner 
described in section twenty of this act, a certificate to that effect, 
specifying the number of persons for whom the egresses and means 
of escape from fu-e are sufficient. Such certificate shall continue in 
force for not more than five years after its date, but so long as it con- 
tinues in force it shall be conclusive evidence of a comphance by the 
person to whom it is issued with the provisions of this act. It shall 
be void if a greater number of persons than is therein specified are 
accommodated or employed or assemble, lodge or reside within such 
building or portion thereof, or if such building is used for any purposes 
materially different from the purpose or purposes for wliich it was 
used at the time of the granting thereof, or if its interior arrangement 
is materially altered, or if any egresses or means of escape from fire 
in such building at the time of granting the said certificate are rendered 
unavailable or are material^ changed. The certificate may be re- 
voked by such inspector at any time upon written notice to the holder 
thereof or to the occupant of the premises for which it was granted, 
and shall so be revoked if, in the opinion of the inspector, circumstances 
have so changed that the existing egresses and means of escape are 
not proper and sufficient. A copy of said certificate shall be kept 
posted in a conspicuous place upon each story of such building by the 
occupant of the premises covered thereb3\ 

The certificate provided for by this section, so long as it 
remains in force, is conclusive evidence of a compliance with 
the statute by the owner, lessee or occupant of the building 
for which it was issued, but the certificate may be revoked- by 
the inspector at any time upon written notice to the holder 
of it or to the occupant of the premises for which it was 
granted. No question can arise as to the power of the in- 
spector issuing the certificate to revoke it, but your question 
refers to a situation that arises when an inspector having 
issued such a certificate dies or leaves the service or is trans- 
ferred to another district. 



186 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

The Legislature in enacting this statute did not, in my 
opinion, intend that it should be necessary that the same 
individual who issued the certificate should be the only one 
who could possibly revoke it. It is my opinion, therefore, 
that w^hile such a certificate may not be revoked by an in- 
spector other than the one who issued it, who may, by 
chance or upon some sudden exigency, be in the district, it 
may be revoked at any time upon notice in writing by the 
inspector for the district in which the building is located 
without regard to the personality or individuality of the in- 
spector. In other words, the fact that the inspector who 
issued the license is not the same person who revokes it is 
not material so long as it was issued by the inspector for the 
district in which the building is situated and is revoked by 
the inspector for the same district. As this answers your 
first question in the affirmative, consideration of your second 
question becomes unnecessary. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Directors of the Port of Boston — Time devoted to Work. 

Under St. 1914, c. 712, each member of the Directors of the Port of Boston 
is required to devote the regular working hours of every working day 
to the work of the Board. 

Aug. 19, 1914. 

Hon. Edward F. McSweeney, Chairman, Directors of the Port of Boston. 
Dear Sir: — You have requested my opinion as to the 
proper construction to be placed upon that part of chapter 
712 of the Acts of 1914, entitled "An Act relative to the 
Directors of the Port of Boston," which relates to the time 
to be devoted to the work of the Directors of the Port by the 
respective members of the Board. Section 1 of the chapter 
referred to provides as follows: — 

The governor, with the advice and consent of the council, shall 
appoint three persons who shall constitute a board to be known as 
the Directors of the Port of Boston, hereinafter called the directors. 
The terms of office of the persons first appointed by the governor shall 
be so arranged and designated at the time of their appointment that 
the term of one member shall expire in three 3^ears, one in two years 
and one in one year from the first day of July, nineteen hundred and 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 187 

fourteen. Annually thereafter the governor shall appoint one member 
to serve for three years, as the term of an}'- member expires. Any 
vacancy occurring among the directors shall be filled for the unexpired 
term by the governor. The governor shaU designate one member as 
chairman and another as secretary, whose duties shall be those custom- 
arily performed by chairmen and executive secretaries. Each member 
shall devote his entire time to the work of the directors. Each member 
shall receive an annual salary of six thousand dollars. 

Your inquiry relates solely to the following sentence: 
"Each member shall devote his entire time to the work of the 
directors." 

It is provided by law that "in construing statutes . . . 
words and phrases shall be construed according to the common 
and approved usage of the language." R. L., c. 8, § 4. 

Applying this rule of construction it hardly need be said 
that the phrase "entire time," as used in the statute, refers to 
the usual and regular time for work, and has no relation to 
any time other than the regular hours of labor; and the con- 
struction of this statute depends upon the common and 
approved usage of the word "entire." It has been said that 
"the best lexicographers define 'entire' to be the whole, un- 
divided, not participated in with others." Hcathman v. Hall, 
3 Iredell, 414. 

This word is more fully defined as "whole; unbroken; un- 
diminished; perfect; not mutilated; . . . full; complete; un- 
divided; wholly unshared, undisputed, or unmixed." (Century 
Dictionary.) 

Applying the statutory rule of construction above stated to 
the statute in question, it is my opinion that the provisions of 
chapter 712 of the Acts of 1914 require that each member of 
the Directors of the Port of Boston shall devote the regular 
working hours of every working day to the work of the Board. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



188 ATTORNEY-GENERAL^S REPORT. [Jan. 



Liquor Laic — Common-law Right to enter a Nolle Prosequi. 

The common-law authority of district attorneys to enter a nolle prosequi 
m prosecutions for violation of liquor laws is prohibited by R. L., 
c. 100, § 55. 

Aug. 26, 1914. 

Hon. William J. Corcoran, District Attorney for the Northern District, 

Cambridge. 

Dear Sir: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following question : — 

Does R. L., c. 100, § 55, regulating the disposition of prosecutions 
for violation of law relative to intoxicating liquors, constitute a pro- 
hibition of the connnon-law authority of the district attorney to 
enter a nolle prosequi in such cases? 

The Constitution of Massachusetts, Chapter VI., Article VI., 
provides that — 

All the laws which have heretofore been adopted, used, and approved 
in the Province, Colony, or State of Massachusetts Baj^, and usually 
practised on in the courts of law% shall stiU remain and be in full force, 
until altered or repealed by the legislature; such parts only excepted 
as are repugnant to the rights and liberties contained in this consti- 
tution. 

This provision of the Constitution served in the first place 
to preserve in the Commonwealth a body of law and a system 
of legal procedure during the time that must necessarily 
elapse between the adoption of the Constitution and the 
enactment and adoption of such other body of laws and 
methods of procedure as the Legislature might determine 
upon. 

It is perfectly clear that the common law and the laws 
adopted by the province, colony or state of Massachusetts 
Bay are subject to revision and repeal at the will of the 
Legislature. At the common law a district attorney might 
enter a nolle prosequi in cases of violation of the laws in regard 
to intoxicating liquors. And here the statute comes in with 
the provision that — 

A prosecution for the violation of any provision of law relative to 
intoxicating liquors shall not, unless the purposes of justice require 
such disposition, be placed on file or disposed of except by trial and 
judgment according to the regular course of criminal proceedings. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 189 

It shall be otherwise disposed of only upon motion in writing stating 
specifieaUy the reasons therefor and verified by affidavit if facts are 
relied on. If the court or magistrate certifies in writing that he is 
satisfied that the cause rehed on exists and that the interests of public 
justice require the allowance thereof, such motion shall be allowed 
and said certificate shall be filed in the case. (R. L., c. 100, § 55.) 

A statute is the written expression of the legislative wall. It is the 
positive declaration of what the law shall be by that branch of the 
government possessing legislative functions, . . . When duly enacted 
it becomes controlling in respect to the matter to which it properly 
relates, and unless transcribing certain fixed constitutional limitations, 
its effect is absolute until again changed bj'- like legislative authority. 
(36 Cyc. 941.) 

A statute is impUedly repealed by a subsequent one revising the 
w^hole subject-matter of the first; Bartlett v. King, 12 Mass. 545; 
Nichols V. Squire, 5 Pick. 168; and in the case of a statute revising the 
common law, the impUcation is at least equally strong. {Common- 
wealth V. Cooky, 10 Pick. 37.) 

Section 55 of chapter 100 of the Revised Laws was 
evidently intended to revise and change the statute and 
the common law in regard to prosecutions for violation of 
law relative to intoxicating liquors. It is true that a nolle 
prosequi is not specifically mentioned in this section. But 
entering a nolle prosequi is one way of disposing of a prose- 
cution of this kind, and the statute provides that such a 
prosecution shall not, unless the purposes of justice require 
such disposition, be placed on file or disposed of except by 
trial and judgment according to the regular course of criminal 
proceedings. And if the purposes of justice require that such 
a prosecution be placed on file or otherwise disposed of without 
trial, this section contains elaborate provisions for bringing 
the fact to the attention of the court and for such action as 
the court may deem proper. 

It is my opinion that section 55 of chapter 100 of the Re- 
vised Law^s does prohibit the exercise of the common-law 
authority of the district attorney to enter a nolle prosequi 
in prosecutions for violation of any provision of law relative 
to intoxicating liquors. 

Ver}' trul}' 3'ours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



190 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Highway Commission — Contract. 

Under a statute authorizing the construction of a street, and providing 
for a "roadway above the finished subgrade of wood block pavement 
upon a cement base, or some other suitable material," the last clause 
refers to the base, and does not warrant the use of pavement other 
than wood block. 

The Highway Commission, in the absence of statutory direction, has 
authority to exercise its discretion as to the materials to be used in 
any work. 

' Aug. 31, 1914. 

Massachusetts Highway Commission. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following questions: — 

(1) Has this Commission authority, under the provisions of section 
5 of chapter 778 of the Acts of 1913 relating to the construction of 
Humphrey Street in the Town of Swampscott, to change, by agree- 
ment with the contractor, the contract and specification heretofore 
made for paving said street w^ith wood block upon a cement base so 
that said street may be paved with some material other than w^ood 
block? (2) Has this Commission in constructing certain approaches 
to Humphrey Street authority to use any material other than wood 
block for paving? 

Chapter 778 of the Acts of 1913 is entitled "An Act relative 
to the laying out and construction of Humphrey Street in the 
tow^n of Sw^ampscott." This chapter contains full and elaborate 
provisions for the preparation of plans and specifications for 
the laying out and construction of Humphrey Street in the 
town of Sw^ampscott, for the approval of such plans and 
specifications by county commissioners for the county of 
Essex and the selectmen of the town of Swampscott, for the 
la3^ing out of said street, the acquisition of such lands as may 
be necessary in order to carry this act into effect, for the pay- 
ment of damages and for other things incident to and at- 
tendant upon the laying out and construction of a public way 
that is expected and intended to be a thoroughfare. 

Your questions seem to be founded upon or to arise in re- 
gard to the provisions of section 5 of this chapter, which pro- 
vides as follows: — 

Upon the completion of the layout of said Humphrey street as afore- 
said, the Massachusetts highway commission shall construct said 
street to the finished subgrade line, and shall construct sidewalks 
wdth curbs, the necessary retaining walls, and all necessary means of 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 191 

drainage, including any changes which may be necessary in the present 
underground structures and connections, and shall build a roadway 
above the finished subgrade of wood block pavement upon a cement 
base, or some other suitable material, from a line eighteen inches 
outside the car tracks to the sidew^alk curb on each side, in accordance 
with said plans and specifications. 

Does the expression "and shall build a roadway above the 
finished subgrade of wood block pavement upon a cement 
base, or some other suitable material," as used in section 5, 
limit your board to the use of w^ood block as the only paving 
material it may lawfully use in the construction of this street? 

In construing, a statute the effort always is to ascertain and 
carry out the intention of the Legislature. It is ever to be 
borne in mind, however, that the intention of the law^-making 
power is to be ascertained by a careful examination and a 
reasonable construction of the language of the statute and 
not by a construction founded upon mere arbitrary rule or 
conjecture. 

In one case it was said by a judge of great learning that — 

Our decision may perhaps in this particular case operate to defeat 
the object of the statute but it is better to abide by this consequence 
than to put upon it a construction not warranted by the words of the 
act in order to give effect to what we may suppose to have been the 
intention of the Legislature. (Lord Tenterden in King v. Inhabitants 
of Barham, 8 Barn. & C. 99.) 

It has been suggested that in the phrase "and shall build 
a roadway above the finished subgrade of w^ood block pave- 
ment upon a cement base or some other suitable material" 
the words "or some other suitable material" relate back to 
and include the words 'Svood block pavement" as well as to 
the words "cement base," the claim being that this phrase 
as it stands means the same and is to be given the same effect 
that it ^vould have if it read "shall build a roadway above the 
finished subgrade of w^ood block pavement or some other 
suitable material, upon a cement base or some other suitable 
material." 

It is suggested that the fact that a comm.a is found after 
the word "base" is of some peculiar force and significance in 
the construction of this statute. While punctuation may be 
resorted to as an aid, it is at best of slight value in the in- 



192 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

terpretation of vStatutes and has been more frequently dis- 
regarded entirely than resorted to for assistance. 

The Supreme Court of the United States has said that — 

Punctuation is a most fallible standard by which to interpret a 
writing; it may be resorted to when all other means fail; but the court 
will first take the instrument bj^ its four corners, in order to ascertain 
its true meaning; if that is apparent on judicially inspecting the 
whole, the punctuation will not be suffered to change it. {Ewing v. 
Burnet, 11 Pet. 41.) 

In the interpretation of written instruments, very little consideration 
is given by the courts to the punctuation, and it is never allowed to 
interfere with or control the sense and meaning of the language used. 
The words emploj^ed must be given their common and natural effect, 
regardless of the punctuation or grammatical construction. (Black 
on Interpretation of Laws, §§ 86-88.) 

The Supreme Judicial Court of this Commonwealth, in a 
case in which the punctuation of the draft of a bill as passed 
by the Legislature to be engrossed was urged in support of a 
certain theory of statutory- construction, said: — 

It is unnecessary to resort to the draft of the biU as passed to be 
engrossed, in order to explain the statute as actualty engrossed, for 
the general rule is that punctuation is no part of a statute. Barrington 
on Sts. (oth ed.) 439, note. 3 Dane Ab. 558. Dwarris on Sts. (2d 
ed.) 601. {Gushing v. Worrick, 9 Gray, 382.) 

Again, in the case of Martin v. Glcason, 139 Mass. 183, the 
Supreme Judicial Court, speaking by Allen, J., began its opinion 
deciding the case with these words: — 

Disregarding punctuation, as may properly be done in construing 
a statute. 

The same doctrine was laid down by the Supreme Judicial 
Court in the case of Browne v. Turner, 174 Mass. 150. 
In another case the Supreme Judicial Court said: — 

Although it has been held that punctuation may be disregarded 
{Cusking v. Worrick, 9 Graj^, 382, 385), it may be resorted to as an 
aid in construction when it tends to throw light on the meaning. 
{Commonwealth v. Kelley, 177 Mass. 221.) 

In a later case the Supreme Judicial Court has again de- 
clared that punctuation may be disregarded entirely or re- 
sorted to as an aid in construction, and that it is at best only 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 193 

an aid in construction. Friherg v. Builders' Iron & Steel Co., 
201 Mass. 458. 

Taking up the construction of the phrase above quoted 
without regard to its punctuation, we find that the ordinary 
and usual rule of construction in cases like the one presented 
by your first question has been declared by the Supreme 
Judicial Court in the following language: — 

The ordiniViy rule of construction in a case like this confines the 
exception to the last antecedent. . . . See also Bidlard v. Chandler, 
149 Mass. 532. {Commonwealth v. Kclley, 177 Mass. 221.) 

The words of the statute under consideration are to be read 
in their ordinary and usual significance. They acquire no 
new, strange or technical meaning because found in a statute. 
The phrasing of the sentences of the statute is to be given 
the same force that would be given to sentences of like 
phrasing in other writings. The position of the words in the 
phrase above referred to, in which a succession of particulars 
is followed by an exception apparently single in purpose, is, 
in m}^ opinion, of sufficient force to control the meaning of the 
phrase and make it subject to the ordinary rule of con- 
struction, that the exception refers to the last antecedent 
only, which in the sentence referred to is "cem.ent base." 
I am aware that this rule, like most rules of construction, is, 
under certain circumstances, subject to modification, but the 
statute before me presents, in my opinion, a proper case for the 
application of the ordinary rule as established by the Supreme 
Judicial Court as stated above. 

It is therefore my opinion that your commission is not 
authorized by chapter 778 of the Acts of 1913 to use any 
material for paving Humphrey Street other than wood block. 

Referring to j^our second question, which relates to the 
material to be used for paving the approaches to Humphrey 
Street, we find that no provision for such approaches was made 
by chapter 778 of the Acts of 1913. The authority to lay out 
and construct the approaches v.^as conferred on your com- 
mission by chapter 398 of the Acts of 1914. By section 1 of 
the last-mentioned act your commission is authorized "to 
prepare forthwith or to include in its plans and specifications 
for the layout and construction of Humphrey street in the 
town of Swampscott, in accordance with the provisions of 
chapter seven hundred and seventy-eight of the acts of the 



194 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

year nineteen hundred and thirteen, plans and specifications 
for such suitable approaches at either end of said Humphrey 
street as it may deem proper." 

It has been urged that the words "in accordance with the 
provisions of chapter seven hundred and seventy-eight of the 
acts of the year nineteen hundred and thirteen" mean that 
the construction of the approaches must in all particulars be 
identical with the construction of Humphrey Street, and that 
if the commission is bound by chapter 778 of the Acts of 1913 
to use only wood block for paving that street it is bound to use 
the same material only for paving the approaches to the street. 

It is to be observed, how^ever, that the words "in accordance 
with" do not necessarily relate to the construction of the 
approaches but to plans and specifications that have been, or 
that may be, made for the layout and construction of 
Humphrey Street in the town of Swampscott in accordance 
with chapter 778 of the Acts of 1913. 

The last part of the sentence above quoted from chapter 398 
of the Acts of 1914, "for such suitable approaches at either end 
of said Humphrey street as it [the commission] may deem 
proper," confers upon your commission authority for the 
exercise of a broad discretion as to what are or will be suitable 
approaches, and as to what your commission may deem 
proper. It is my opinion that your commission is authorized 
to exercise its judgment and discretion as to the material to 
be used for paving the approaches to Humphrey Street. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Aitorney -General. 



Sealers of Weights and Measures — Signatures. 

The signatures of sealers or deputy sealers of weights and measures on 
sealed scales should be in the handwriting of the officer who affixes 
the seal, and not a printed facsimile of his signature. 

Sept. 24, 1914. 
Thure Hanson, Esq., Commissioner of Weights and Measures. 

Deak Sir: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following question: — 

Would it be legal for the Sealer of Weights and Measures, or deputy 
sealer, to use a seal . . . with his name printed thereon, or should he 
sign his name, together with date, in his own handwriting, at the 
time of sealing a scale or other device? 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 195 

Your question relates entirely to the necessity of a signature 
in the handwriting of the officer whose official act is to be 
attested by the signature. 

Clause 25 of section 5 of chapter 8 of the Revised Laws 
provides that — 

The words ''written" and "in writing" may include printing, en- 
graving, lithographing and any other mode of representing words and 
letters; but if the written signature of a person is required by law, it 
shall always be his own handwriting or, if he is unable to write, his 
mark. 

In a discussion of this provision of the statute the Supreme 
Court of the Commonwealth has said: — 

We think it was intended to require a signature in the proper hand- 
writing of a person only in those cases where, by express language, or 
b}'^ usage, or by implication arising from the nature of the document 
to be signed, a written signature is required by- law, as the direct 
personal act of the person whose name is to be signed. Numerous 
instances of this character are to be found in the Constitution and 
statutes. For example, a certain oath is required to be taken and 
subscribed by every person chosen or appointed to any office (Amend. 
to Mass. Const., Art, VI.); and the oaths of the Governor, Lieutenant 
Governor and Councillors are to be taken and subscribed in the presence 
of the two houses of assembly. Const. Mass., Pt. II., c. VL, art. I. 
For various statutes respecting the taking and subscribing of oaths by 
different officers, by insolvent debtors, and by poor debtors, see Pub. 
Sts., c. 14, § 55; c. 18, §§ 10, 14; c. 21, §§ 3, 4; c. 27, § 88; c. 157, 
§ 76; c. 158, §§ 2, 6; c. 162, § 38. Various certificates also are to be 
made by different public officers, which according to usage bear their 
signatures in their own handwriting, such as certificates of the ac- 
knowledgment of deeds, and of the taking of oaths. See Pub. Sts., 
c. 27, § 88; c. 120, § 6; c. 150, § 5; c. 157, § 77; c. 162, §§ 1, 2, 17, 
19, 40; c. 169, §§ 40, 48. Commissioners to take acknowledgments 
in other States and in foreign countries must file in the office of the 
Secretary of the Commonwealth impressions of their seals, together 
with their oaths of office and their signatures. This must necessarily 
impty signatures in the proper handwriting of such commissioners. 
Another illustration is found in the Twentieth Amendment to the 
Constitution, though this was not adopted till after the establishment 
of the statutory rule under consideration. This amendment provides 
that no person shall have the right to vote or be eligible to office who 
shall not be able to read the Constitution in the English language, 
and write his name. A signature in the proper handwriting of the 
voter or officer is plainly contemplated. 



196 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

The fact that you ask this question indicates that the use 
of facsimiles of the signatures of your officers is of doubtful 
legality, while there is no doubt whatever if the genuine 
signature is used. The signature of the Sealer or deputy 
sealer upon such a seal as the one submitted with your 
inquiry is the attestation of an official act. It is an official 
signature. Clearly, the safe practice is in ever}^ instance to 
require the signature in the handwriting of the official who is 
acting, and this, it seems to me, is required by usage. While 
the Ciuestion may not be entirely free from doubt, it is my 
opinion that the official signatures in cases of the kind covered 
by your question should be in the handwriting of the officer 
who affixes the seal. 

Very trul\^ yours, 

Thomas J. Boyntox, Attorney-General. 



Cold Storage Eggs — Sales in Storage — Interstate Shipments. 

Under St. 1913, c. 538, as amended by St. 1914, c. 545, eggs which are in 
cold storage when sold, and which are to remain until called for by 
the purchaser, need not be marked until withdrawn from storage. 

Cold storage eggs withdrawn for sale for consumption within the State 
or for export are required to be marked, under the statute. 

Sept. 29, 1914. 
William C. Hanson, M.D., Acting Commissioner of Health. 

Dear Sir: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following questions : — 

I. Suppose A owns 1,000 cases of eggs in a storage warehouse in 
Boston, and sells 500 cases to-day to B, it being understood that B 
is still to allow the eggs to be kept in storage until such time as 
he needs them; must A mark these eggs in storage "cold storage 
eggs"? 

II. If A sells to-day 500 cases of eggs in storage to B, whose business 
is in Newport, R. I., and the eggs are delivered into a car switched 
into the warehouse, must these eggs be marked ''cold storage eggs," 
it being imderstood that Rhode Island has no cold storage law? 

III. Must all shipments to another State of eggs that have been 
cold stored be marked "cold storage eggs"? 

The statute (section 1 of chapter 538 of the Acts of 1913, 
as amended by chapter 545 of the Acts of 1914) provides 
that — 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 197 

Whenever eggs that have been in cold storage are sold at wholesale 
or retail, or offered or exposed for sale, the basket, box or other con- 
tainer in which the eggs are placed shall be marked plainly and con- 
spicuously with the w^ords " cold storage eggs," or there shall be attached 
to such container a placard or sign having on it the said words. If 
eggs that have been in cold storage are sold at retail or offered or 
exposed for sale without a container, or placed upon a counter or 
elsewhere, a sign or placard, having the words "cold storage eggs" 
plainly and conspicuoush' marked upon it, shall be displayed in, upon 
or immediately above said eggs; the intent of this act being that cold 
storage eggs sold or offered or exposed for sale shall be designated in 
such a manner that the purchaser will know that they are cold storage 
eggs. The display of the words '^ cold storage eggs," as required by 
this act, shall be in letters not less than one inch in height and shall be 
done in such a manner as is approved by the state board of health. 

Your questions relate to the sale of eggs which are at the 
time of sale in cold storage. The language of the statute is, 
"whenever eggs that have been in cold storage are sold," etc. 
The intention of the Legislature in the enactment of this 
legislation was to protect the public against the sale of cold 
storage eggs for those of a more desirable quality. 

You call attention to the self-evident fact that eggs that 
are in cold storage have been in cold storage. Notwithstand- 
ing this very apparent fact, I have to say that in m^^ opinion 
the statute in regard to marking containers and in regard to 
placards and signs applies to eggs that have been in cold 
storage and have been withdrawn from cold storage for the 
purpose of sale or to be offered or exposed for sale, and that 
the words "eggs that have been in cold storage," as used in 
this statute, do not relate to eggs that are in cold storage 
when sold or offered for sale. 

The purpose of this statute is set forth in the statute itself 
in the following words: "the intent of this act being that cold 
storage eggs sold or offered or exposed for sale shall be desig- 
nated in such a manner that the purchaser will know that 
they are cold storage eggs." Obviously, when eggs are sold 
while actually in cold storage, the facts as to storage are 
necessarily known to both buyer and seller, and the oppor- 
tunity for fraud as to the fact of storage in such a case does 
not exist. It is onh' when eggs in cold storage are withdrawn 
therefrom that opportunity is offered for fraud in their sale. 
I therefore answer your first inquiry in the negative; and the 
answer to this question, with the views above set forth, seems 



198 ATTORNEY-GENERAUS REPORT. [Jan. 

also to dispose of your second inquiry, and further comment 
seems unnecessary. 

In response to your third question I have to say that 
whenever eggs that have been in cold storage and have been 
withdrawn therefrom are sold or exposed or offered for sale 
in this Commonwealth, whether for consumption here or for 
export, the containers of such eggs must be marked as re- 
quired by statute. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, AUorney-Gencral. 



Civil Service — Inspectors of Masonry Consiruction — Building 

Inspectors. 

Under St. 1914, c. 540, it is the duty of the Civil Service Commissioners 
to certify for positions as inspectors of masonry construction only 
persons who have had practical experience as journeymen masons, 
but the provisions of this statute do not apply to the position of a 
building inspector unless his principal duty is the inspection of 
masonry construction. 

Oct. 6, 1914. 

Civil Service Commission. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following questions: — 

First. ■ — Is it the duty of the Civil Service Commission to certify 
for positions as inspectors of masonry construction only persons who 
have had practical experience as journeymen masons, or may it certify 
persons who without any experience as journejanen masons have 
acquired a knowledge of masonrj^ construction by working as foremen, 
civil engineers, or architects, or other lines of employment which 
would give them a knowledge of masonry construction? 

Second. — In certifying for the position of building inspectors in 
the different cities and toA\Tis of the Commonwealth, is it the duty of 
the commission to certify only such persons as have had practical 
experience as journeymen masons? 

The statute in regard to this matter (chapter 540 of the 
Acts of 1914) provides as follows: — 

Sectiox 1. Persons employed by the commonwealth, or by any 
metropolitan board or commission, or bj?^ an}' county, city or town, 
as inspectors of masonry construction, shall have had at least three 
j^ears' practical experience in masonry construction, but shall not be 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 199 

required to have technical knowledge as engineers, architects or drafts- 
men, unless thej^ have other duties for which such knowledge is neces- 
sary. The provisions of this section shall apply only to persons whose 
principal duty is the inspection of masonrj^ construction, consisting 
of stone, brick or substitutes therefor. 

The answer to your question depends upon the definition 
given to the phrase ''practical experience." The w^ord 
"practical," so far as its definition is necessary in the con- 
sideration of this question, rnay be defined as "relating or 
pertaining to action, practice, or use: opposed to theoretical, 
speculative or ideal, (a) Engaged in practice or action; con- 
cerned w^ith material rather than ideal considerations, (b) 
Educated by practice or experience; as, a practical gardener, 
(c) Derived from experience; as practical skill; practical knowl- 
edge, (d) Used, or such as may advantageously be used, 
in practice. . . . (e) Exemplified in practice." "Experience" 
is defined as "a trial, proof, experiment, experimental knowl- 
edge. The state or fact of having made trial or proof, or of 
having acquired knowledge, wisdom, skill, etc., by actual 
trial or observation; also, the knowledge so acquired; personal 
and practical acquaintance with anything." 

"Experience," then, may be gained either by actual trial or 
by observation. "Practical experience" clearly means experi- 
ence gained by actual trial, that is, by the actual manual 
performance of work in masonry construction. This definition 
coincides precisely with the popular use of the term "practical 
experience." It is provided by clause 3 of section 4 of chapter 
8 of the Revised Laws that — 

Words and phrases shall be construed according to the common 
and approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases 
and such others as may have acquired a pecuhar and appropriate 
meaning in the law shall be construed and understood according to 
such meaning. 

The popular use of the word "practical," as applied to 
various callings, as, a practical gardener, practical mechanic, 
practical farmer, coincides exactly with the definition and con- 
struction above given. 

I have not found any decision of the Supreme Court de- 
fining the phrase "practical experience." My attention has 
been directeil to the case of State v. Starkey, 49 Minn. 503, 
and to the case of People v. Board of Aldermen, 42 N. Y. 



200 ATTORNF.Y-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Supp. 545, but a distinction may readily be drawn between 
each of these cases and the question now under consideration. 

It is my opinion that under this statute your commission 
should certify for positions as inspectors of masonry construc- 
tion only such persons as have had three years' experience 
as journeymen masons. 

In answer to your second question I have to call your 
attention to the language of the statute itself: "the provisions 
of this section shall apply only to persons whose principal duty 
is the inspection of masonry- construction, consisting of stone, 
brick or substitutes therefor." This seems to me to clearly 
answer your question. The fact that a building inspector of a 
city or town may at some time be required to inspect masonry 
construction does not affect the matter of his qualification for 
appointment unless his principal duty is the inspection of that 
kind of work. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, AUorney-General. 



Civil Service — Foremen and Inspectors — Vacancies. 

Whenever the Civil Service Commission is required to certify a list of 
names of persons by reason of a vacancy' in the position of foreman 
or inspector in any department, it must, when practicable, include the 
name of one person serving as a laborer or mechanic in such depart- 
ment. 

Oct. 21, 1914. 

Civil Service Commission. 

Gentlemen: — You ask for a construction by the Attorney- 
General of chapter 479 of the Acts of 1914, and whether your 
commission shall certify for each vacancy the name of one 
person who is serving as a laborer or mechanic in any de- 
partment, or whether the person to be certified must have had 
special experience in the service required in the position which 
he is to fill. 

The statute is clear and is, I think, to be taken literally. 
It reads as follows: — 

Whenever an appointing officer or board shall make requisition 
upon the civil service commission to fill a vacancy or vacancies in 
the position of foreman or inspector, and a request is made in said 
requisition for the certification of persons having had experience in 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 201 

the department from which the requisition comes, the commission 
shall, so far as may be practicable, include among the names certified 
the name of at least one person for each vacancy who is serving as 
a laborer or mechanic in such department. 

The w^ords "persons having had experience in the depart- 
ment" are not, in my opinion, to be taken to mean experience 
in some special work of the department. The last clause of 
section 1 — "the commission shall, so far as may be practi- 
cable, include among the names certified the name of at least 
one person for each vacancy who is serving as a laborer or 
mechanic in such department" — should be construed exactly 
as it reads; that is, any person serving as a laborer or me- 
chanic in such department is eligible to certification. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boyxton, Attorney-General. 



Board of Education — Superintendency Union — Towns. 

Under St. 1914, c. 556, only such towns as are required to join a superin- 
tendency union are required to belong to such a union. 

Nov. 12, 1914. 
Massachusetts Board of Education. 

Gentlemen: — I am in receipt of your letter making 
inquiry as follows : — 

Chapter 556 of the Acts of 1914 places upon the Board of Education 
the responsibility of estabUshing standards of organization, equip- 
ment and instruction for high schools maintained by the towns re- 
quired to belong to a superintendency union. In the discharge of 
this duty the Board finds it is necessary to secure the opinion of the 
Attorney-General as to the interpretation of the phrase ''required to 
belong to a superintendency union." 

In my opinion the words in question refer only to towms 
required to join a union; i.e., to the towns enumerated in 
section 43 of chapter 42 of the Revised Laws. The fact that 
other towns which have the option to join a union or not, 
may, by joining voluntarily, render themselves forever bound 
to that union, does not classify them as towns "required to 
belong to a superintendency union." 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boyntox, Attorney-General. 



202 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Metropolitan Park Commission — Deeds — Mercantile Purposes. 

A waiting room used for the sale of ice cream, soda, etc., comes within 
the restriction in a deed of land prohibiting the use of a building for 
mercantile purposes. 

Where similar building restrictions are attached to different portions of 
a tract of land, each grantee has a right in the nature of an easement, 
which may be enforced against the grantee of another lot. 

Nov. 19, 1914. 
Metropolitan Park Commission. 

Gentlemen: — You have submitted to me various inquiries 
relative to a certain deed of Eugene G. Ayer. The facts are 
briefly as follows : when your Board constructed Fellsway West, 
under the authority of chapter 288 of the Acts of 1894, all of 
the deeds which you obtained from the owners of land taken 
imposed certain restrictions on the remaining land of the own- 
ers. These restrictions contained substantially the following 
language: — 

No building erected or placed upon said premises shall be used for 
a livery or pubhc stable or for any mechanical, mercantile or manu- 
facturing purposes. 

Such a deed was received from Eugene G. Ayer. He now 
proposes to erect a building on his land covered by these re- 
strictions, to be used as a general waiting room for the 
traveling public, and for the sale of ice cream, soda, cigars and 
tobacco, and such light commodities as are usually sold in 
street railway waiting rooms, and for the purposes of a drug 
store. 

You have requested my opinion on the following four 
points : — 

I. Would the use of this building, as set forth in the petition of 
Mr. Ayer, be for mechanical, mercantile or manufacturing purposes, 
and in \nolation of said restrictions ? 

II. Would a building of the nature and cost above set forth be 
erected and maintained in violation of said restrictions ? 

III. Has this Board authority under any circumstances to release 
this land from the operation of restrictions imposed in the manner 
above set forth? 

IV. What would be the effect on the authority of the Board to 
enforce similar restrictions on other lands abutting on said Fellsway 
West, if it has authority to and should release the land of Ayer in 
question from the operation of the particular restrictions referred to 
above? 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 203 

With regard to the first point I will say that our Supreme 
Judicial Court has recently quoted with approval the following 
definitions : — 

The word "merchant" is defined in the Century Dictionarj^ as "one 
who is engaged in the business of buying commercial commodities 
and selling them again for the sake of profit, especially one who buys 
and sells in quantity or by wholesale," or "a shopkeeper or store- 
keeper;" and "mercantile" is defined thus: "Of or pertaining to 
merchants or the traffic carried on by merchants; having to do with 
trade or commerce, trading, commercial." {Carr v. Riley, 198 Mass. 
70, 75.) 

Both that definition and the common acceptance of the 
word clearly show that the use of the building as contemplated 
by Mr. Ayer is for mercantile purposes. 

With regard to the second point I will say that it naturally 
follows, from the answer to your first question, that such a 
building would violate the restrictions. 

With regard to the third point. 

It is a famiUar principle of law, wliich has been apphed in many 
cases, that when one makes deeds of different portions of a tract of 
land, each containing the same restriction upon the lot convcA^ed, 
which is imposed as a part of a general plan for the benefit of the 
several lots, such a restriction not only imposes a habihty upon the 
grantee of each lot as between him and the grantor, but it gives him 
a right in the nature of an easement, which vdW be enforced in equity 
against the grantee of one of the other lots, although there is no 
direct, contractual relation between the two. {Evans v. Foss, 194 
Mass. 513, 515.) 

The principle should be the same when the restrictions are 
imposed by deeds from the various owners to a central 
authority instead of from one person to various owners. The 
other abutters on Fellsway West who have given deeds similar 
to that of Mr. Ayer have a right in Mr. Ayer's land in the 
nature of an easement which your Board cannot release. I 
therefore answer your third question in the negative. 

The answer to the third inquiry disposes of the fourth. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boyntox, Attorney-General. 



204 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Teachers' Retirement Act — Evening Schools. 

A teacher who resigned in 1911 as principal of a public school, but who 
has since been employed in evening school work, is not eligible for 
retirement under the provisions of St. 1913, c. 832, 

Nov. 25, 1914. 
Edmund S. Cogswell, Esq., Secretary, Teachers' Retirement Board. 

Dear Sir: — You have asked my opinion as to whether 
the facts relating to the petition of Mr. Dwight Clark for a 
pension come within the scope of the teachers' retirement act 
(St. 1913, c. 832). The facts as we understand them are as 
follows: Mr. Dwight Clark, eighth-three years of age, has 
been connected with the teaching force of the city of Spring- 
field for fifty-one years. Because of failing health Mr. Clark 
resigned his principalship in June, 1911, but the school board 
intended to continue Mr. Clark's service in the public schools, 
and engaged him in evening school work for the two years 
following. Since September, 1913, Mr. Clark has been re- 
employed in the day school service. 

Paragraph (5) of section 6 of this act provides — 

Any teacher who shall have become a member of the retirement 
association under the provisions of paragraph numbered (2) of section 
three, and who shall have served fifteen years or more in the pubhc 
schools of the commonwealth, not less than five of which shall im- 
mediately precede retirement. . . . 

The word "teacher," as used in this act, is defined in section 
1, paragraph (4), to mean "any teacher, principal, supervisor 
or superintendent employed b}'' a school committee, or board 
of trustees, in a public day school within the commonwealth." 

The words "public school" are defined, in section 1, 
paragraph (5), to mean "any day school conducted within 
this commonwealth under the order and superintendence 'of a 
duly elected school committee and also any day school con- 
ducted under the provisions of chapter four hundred and 
seventy-one of the acts of the year nineteen hundred and 
eleven." 

The language of the statute with relation to a consideration 
of the questions involved in this particular case admits of 
only one interpretation, namely, that a teacher before he is 
eligible for a pension "shall have served fifteen years or more 
in the public schools of the commonwealth, not less than five 



1915] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 205 

of which shall immediately precede retirement." The language 
of the statute specifically precludes the presumption that 
service in the evening schools is included within the scope of 
the public school service. It follows, therefore, that Mr. 
Clark's service in the evening schools was not a remedy for 
the interruption of his service in the public school service, and 
the two years devoted to the evening schools cannot be 
reckoned in as a period of his service in the public schools 
within the meaning of the w^ords as used in the statute. 

I note what you say about the intention of the school 
board being to continue Mr. Clark in the public school 
service, but I am limited and confined by the statutory 
definitions and prescriptions which require service in the 
public day schools, and which make no provision for evening 
school work, so that permanent and continuous employment 
in an evening school is neither a substitute nor a remedy for 
the lack of the required continuous service in day school work. 

I again refer you to the definition of the words "teacher" 
and "public schools" as defined specifically for the purposes 
of this act. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, AUorney-Gcncral. 



t Internal Revenue — Tax on Insurance Policies — Rebates. 

Under the Federal internal revenue law insurance companies are required 

to pay the tax on policies. 
If the tax on insurance policies is added by insurance companies to the 

premiums it would be a violation of the anti-rebate law for agents to 

pay the amount of the tax. 

Dec. 4, 1914. 
Hon. Frank H. Hardison, Insurance Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — I have received from you a request in the 
following language : — 

The new internal revenue law, which goes into effect on December 1 
next, puts a tax upon insurance policies thereafter issued. I beg to 
inquire whether fire insurance companies may, under the law, collect 
the amount of this tax from the policjdiolders without making it a 
part of the consideration or premium for the policies? 

Also whether, if the answer to this question is that the companies 
TUdiY collect the tax from the policyholders as^ a separate matter from 
the premium, agents who pay the tax instead of collecting it from their 
customers would be guilty of rebating? 



206 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

The Federal act of Oct. 22, 1914, contains the following 
provisions : — 

Sec. 6. That if any person or persons shall make, sign, or issue, or 
cause to be made, signed, or issued, any instrument, document, or 
paper of any kind or description whatsoever, without the same being 
duly stamped . . . such person or persons shall be deemed guiltj^ of 
a misdemeanor, . . . 

Sec. 11. That any person or persons who shall register, issue, sell, 
or transfer, or who shall cause to be issued, registered, sold, or 
transferred, any instrument, document, or paper of any kind or de- 
scription whatsoever mentioned in Schedule A of this Act, without 
the same being duly stamped, . . . shall be deemed guilty of a mis- 
demeanor, . . . 

Schedule A. 
Stcmip Taxes. 

Insurance: Each policy of insurance . . . upon property of any 
description . . . made by any person, association, or corporation, 
upon the amount of premium charged, one-half of 1 cent on each 
doUar or fractional part thereof: Provided, That purely cooperative or 
mutual fire insurance companies or associations carried on by the 
members thereof solely for the protection of their o^m property and 
not for profit shall be exempted from the tax herein provided : . . . 

Each policy of insurance ... of indemnity for loss, damage, or 
liability issued, or executed, or renewed by any person, association, 
company, or corporation, . . . upon the amount of premium charged, 
one-half of 1 cent on each dollar or fractional part thereof. i 

Briefly, the Federal law in question imposes a stamp tax 
on certain insurance policies. From sections 6 and 11, above 
quoted, it is clear that the tax is on the person issuing the 
policy. This is made more clear by the fact that the proviso 
above quoted exempts certain companies, rather than exempt- 
ing their policies or their customers. Thus the tax is for the 
insurance companies to pay. 

But from this it does not follow that the companies may 
not pass the tax along. 

Insurance companies, however, have no authority in law to 
charge their customers for a part of their running expenses, 
except as such expenses are included in and form a part of 
the consideration paid for insurance. If this tax could be 
passed on, as such, to the customers, so could local taxes, 
office rent, etc. The charging of doctors' fees for examinations 
of applicants is no precedent, for there an actual service is 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 207 

rendered; and, in fact, it is usual not to charge such fees if 
the policy is finally written. 

There is, however, no legal limit on premiums in Massa- 
chusetts, the only requirements being that they be uniform 
and that they be set forth in the policy. Therefore, an insur- 
ance company may lawfully add, as a part of the premium, 
the amount of the Federal tax; that is, the premium to be 
paid for insurance may be increased by that amount, but the 
company cannot charge the Federal tax in addition to the 
premium. 

In the case of fire insurance companies, St. 1911, c. 493, 
provides a board of appeals, with recommendatory powers. 
I suggest that as to this class of companies this board has 
authority to pass upon the question of including the Federal 
tax in the premiums, and to make such recommendations as 
may seem meet. 

With respect to the anti-rebate law, I will say that if the 
tax is included in the premium it would clearly be rebating for 
the agent to pay it. But, if not so included, the agent has 
merely paid an obligation of the company, which cannot pos- 
sibly be a rebate to the customer. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boyxtox, Attorney-General. 



Civil Service — Department of Fire Prevention Commissioner. 

Under St. 1914, c. 795, the appointees in the department of the Fire Pre- 
vention Commissioner are subject to the provisions of the civil service 
law and rules. 

Dec. 7, 1914. 

Civil Service Commission. 

Gextlemen: — You have requested my opinion as to the 
status under civil service requirements of the appointees in 
the department of the Fire Prevention Commissioner. R. L., 
c. 19, § 9, provides as follows: — 

Judicial officers and officers elected by the people or by a citj^ council, 
or whose appointment is subject to confirmation by the executive 
council or city council of any city, officers, elected by either branch of 
the general court and the appointees of such officers, heads of principal 
departments of the commonwealth or of a city, the employees of the 
treasurer and receiver general, of the board of commissioners of savings 
banks, and of the treasurer and collector of taxes of any city, two em- 



208 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

ployees of the city clerk of any city, teachers of the piibhc schools, the 
secretaries and confidential stenographers of the governor, or of the 
mayor of any city, police and fire commissioners and chief marshals, 
or chiefs of police and fire departments, shall not be affected as to their 
selection or appointment by any rules made as aforesaid; but, with the 
above exception, such rules shall apply to members of police and fire 
departments. 

Acts of 1914, chapter 795, entitled *' An Act to provide for 
the better prevention of fires throughout the metropolitan 
district," in section 1 defines certain words. At the end of 
section 2 it is provided as follows: — 

Subject to the approval of the governor and council, the commis- 
sioner shall be provided with suitable offices suitably furnished and 
equipped for the performance of his duties. Subject to the approval 
of the governor and council, the commissioner may employ such clerks, 
stenographers and office employees, engineering and legal assistance 
as he may deem necessarj^ 

It is a general rule of statutory construction, to be applied 
under proper conditions and with important limitations, that 
the express mention of one person, thing or consec{uence is 
tantamount to the express exclusion of all others. Black on 
Interpretation of Laws, p. 219. 

It would seem that "proper conditions" and "important 
limitations" are observed for the purpose of applying this 
particular principle to the case in hand. The section of the 
Revised Laws above quoted having expressly mentioned the 
persons and classes of persons who shall be exempt from the 
civil service requirements, it must be taken that the appointees 
about whom you inquire cannot be exempt unless they fall 
within a class or group mentioned expressly in the section of 
the Revised Laws above quoted. 

Obviously, the only phrase or clause mentioning a class into 
which they could fall is "whose appointment is subject to con- 
firmation by the executive council." The only ground upon 
which it could be contended that the appointees in question 
may fall within the class coming under this phrase is that the 
phrase "subject to the approval of the governor and council," 
in St. 1914, c. 795, means the same thing that the phrase 
"subject to confirmation by the executive council" means in 
the quoted section of the Revised Laws. This contention is 
not w^ell taken. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 209 

In an opinion rendered by one of 1113' learned predecessors, 
Hon. Dana Malone, upon a similar matter, he said: — 

I am of opinion that the approval of the employment and compensa- 
tion of clerks in the several departments of the Commonwealth is not 
an exercise of this function (meaning the function of confirmation of 
appointments exercised by the Executive Council, provided for by the 
Constitution and mentioned in the above-quoted section of the Revised 
Laws), even as designated in R. L., c. 19, § 9, and is rather an approval 
by the Council, acting with the Executive, of a scheme for proposed 
appointments and expenditures, than a confirmation of the particular 
appointment to be made. 

I see no reason to differ from the opinion of my predecessor. 
It follows, therefore, that the proposed appointments are not 
exempt from the requirements of the civil service. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Aitorncy-Gcncnd. 



Public Schools — Tuition of Xourcsidcut Pupils. 

Where pupils are attending school in a town other than that of their resi- 
dence, the cost of such attendance should be computed on the average 
expense for each pupil in that school, and not on the average expense 
for pupils in such town. 

Dec. 9, 1914. 

State Board of Charity. 

Gentlemen: — I am in receipt of your letter requesting my 
interpretation of St. 1913, c. 779, § 4. A State minor ward 
between the ages of five and fifteen years has been placed else- 
where than in his own home by the State Board of Charity, 
and is receiving tuition in the public schools of that town. 
The school committee has expressed its desire for reimburse- 
ment at the so-called "average expense rate." 

You ask: — 

Shall the amount reimbursed by the State in this case be an amount 
equal to the average expense for each pupil in the particular school 
which the State minor ward is attending, or shall it be an amount 
equal to the average expense per pupil in all of the pubUc schools of 
the said town? 

The language of the statute seems perfectly clear on this 
point. The w^ords are, "an amount equal to the average ex- 
pense for each pupil of such school." It is to be noted that 



210 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

the word "school" is singular and not plural. Although the 
word "such" has apparently no antecedent in the paragraph 
containing it, and although this paragraph refers to "attend- 
ance of ever}^ such child in the public schools," yet preceding 
paragraphs of the same section contain the word "school" in 
the singular. The first paragraph contains the words "attend 
school," "attending school," "such school." The second para- 
graph contains the words "attend school," "admission to a 
school." Only in the paragraph in question is the word 
"school" used in the plural. 

In the paragraph relative to reimbursement for transporta- 
tion it is clear that the average expense to the individual 
school in question is contemplated. 

Taking all these matters together it is my opinion that the 
words "such school" in the third paragraph refer to the par- 
ticular school which the child in question attends. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Prison Commissioner — Prison Camp — Labor. 

Under R. L., c. 225, §§63 and 65, the employment of prisoners at the Prison 
Camp is limited to the reclamation and improvement of waste places, 
the cultivation of lands and the preparing of material for road building. 

Dec. 10, 1914. 
Board of Prison Commissioners. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following questions: — 

First. Is emplo>anent of prisoners at the Prison Camp limited to 
reclaiming land and to road building? 

Second. If such employment is not limited, is it within the power 
vested in the Prison Commissioners to establish at said Prison Camp 
such industries, in addition to reclaiming land and road building, as in 
their opinion are best suited to the institution and its inmates? 

R. L., c. 225, §§ 63 and 65, provide as follows: — 

Section 63. The governor and council may purchase or otherwise 
take in fee smy parcel of waste or unused land, not exceeding one thou- 
sand acres in area, for the purpose of reclaiming, improving and dis- 
posing of it for the benefit of the commonwealth. When land has been 
so taken, the governor and council shall cause a description thereof as 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 211 

certain as is required in an ordinary conveyance of land to be filed in 
the registry of deeds for the county or district in which the land lies, 
with a statement, signed by the governor, that it is taken on behalf of 
the commonwealth for the purposes described in this section. The act 
and time of filing such description shall be considered the act and time 
of taking such land, and shall be sufficient notice to all persons that the 
land has been so taken. The title to such land shall then vest in the 
commonwealth. 

Section 65. After such land has been so taken, the prison com- 
missioners, with the approval of the governor and council, shall cause 
iron buildings of cheap construction to be erected thereon for the ac- 
commodation of not more than one hundred prisoners. When such 
buildings are ready for occupancy, the governor may issue his proclama- 
tion establishing on such land a temporary industrial camp for pris- 
oners, and the prison commissioners may appoint a superintendent 
thereof, who shall hold his office at their pleasure, give such bond as 
they require, receive such salary as they determine and who shall have 
the custody of all prisoners removed thereto. The superintendent, 
with the approval of the prison commissioners, may appoint and 
determine the compensation of assistants, and they shall hold their 
office at his pleasure. 

Section 66 of chapter 225 of the Revised Laws contained an 
explicit provision that prisoners at a camp should be employed 
in reclaiming and improving land and in preparing material 
for road building, but this section was expressly repealed by 
section 5 of chapter 243 of the Acts of 1904, while section 1 of 
that act provides as follows: — 

Prisoners who are removed to the temporar}^ industrial camp for 
prisoners shall be governed and employed there under regulations made 
by the prison commissioners. The Massachusetts highway commission 
and the board of agriculture shall from time to time, at the request of 
the prison commissioners, give to them such information as may enable 
them to prosecute to the best advantage the work of reclaiming and 
improving waste land and of preparing material for road building by 
hand labor. 

It will be seen that the provision of section 66 of chapter 
225 of the Revised Laws, above referred to, was omitted in 
the revision of that section, and as the law now stands pris- 
oners in the Prison Camp and Hospital shall be governed and 
emplo3'ed there under regulations made by the Prison Com- 
missioners. 



212 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

The authority of your commission appears to be limited by 
section 1 of chapter 633 of the Acts of 1913, which provides 
as follows: — 

During all times in which outdoor labor is practicable, inmates of 
psnal institutions who are required to labor shall be employed, so far 
as is possible, in the reclamation of waste places, and in cultivating 
lands for raising produce to be used in pubhc institutions. Prisoners so 
employed shall be at all times in the custod}^ and under the direction of 
the prison officers. 

The intention and purpose of the Legislature to make the 
work of reclaiming land and preparing material for road 
building the principal industries at the Prison Camp are 
indicated by the provisions of section 1 of chapter 243 of the 
Acts of 1904, to the effect that the Highway Commission and 
the Board of Agriculture shall, upon request of your Board, 
give such information as may enable you to prosecute to the 
best advantage the work of reclaiming and improving waste 
land, etc., as well as by section 1 of chapter 633 of the Acts 
of 1913, above quoted. But I do not think that as the stat- 
utes now^ stand your Board is absolutely precluded from em- 
ploying prisoners at the Prison Camp in suitable lines of 
industry other than the reclamation and improvement of land 
and preparing material for road building at such times as it 
may be found impracticable to carry on this work. 

I note that road building is mentioned in both your ques- 
tions. May I suggest that preparing material for road build- 
ing is the industry named in the statute. 

It is my opinion that the employment of prisoners at the 
Prison Camp is limited to the reclamation and improvement 
of waste places, the cultivation of lands for raising produce 
to be used in public institutions, and preparing material for 
road building, during all the time when outdoor labor is 
practicable, and that your Board may provide for such period 
of time as outdoor work is not practicable such employment 
as is best suited to the welfare of the prisoners. 
Very truh' yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General . 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 213 



Co-operative Banks — Loans — Reduction of Rate. 

A co-operative bank authorized by its by-laws to dispense with offering its 
money for bids, and in lieu thereof to loan money at not less than 5 
per cent., as fixed by its directors, may reduce the rate of interest to 
any rate not less than 5 per cent, to a borrower who applied for and 
received a loan at a fixed rate, fixed by the board of directors when 
the loan was made. 

Dec. 16, 1914. 

Hon. Augustus L. Thorndike, Bank Commissioner. 

Dear Sir: — You have requested my opinion upon the 

following question: — 

In a case in which a co-operative bank is authorized by its by-laws 
to loan its money at such rate of interest, not less than 5 per cent, per 
annum, as may be fixed from time to time by its directors, in lieu of 
offering money for bids, may such bank reduce the rate of interest to a 
borrow^er who applied for and received a loan at the rate so fixed by the 
board of directors when the loan was made, or can the rate be reduced 
only in cases where the bank offers its money for bids? 

St. 1912, c. 62.3, §§ 19 and 26, provide as follows: — 

Section 19. The funds accumulated, after due allowance for all 
necessary expenses and the payment of shares, shall, at each stated 
monthly meeting, be offered to applicants according to the premium 
bid by them for priority of right to a real estate or share loan, which 
shall consist of a percentage charged on the amount loaned in addition 
to interest, at a rate not less than five per cent per annum, payable in 
monthly instalments. If the corporation so provides in its by-laws, the 
bid for loans shall, instead of a premmm, be a rate of annual interest 
not less than five per cent per annum payable in monthly instalments 
upon the amount desired. Any such corporation may, when so author- 
ized by its by-laws, dispense with the offering of its money for bids, and 
in lieu thereof may loan its money at such rate of interest not less than 
five per cent per annum or interest and premium as may be fixed, from 
time to time, by the board of directors, in which case the priority of 
right to a loan shall be decided by the priority of the approved apphca- 
tions therefor. Such bids or rates shall include the whole interest to be 
paid and may be at any rate not less than five per cent per annum. 

Section 26. If a borrower purchases money at a lower rate than 
that paid by him on an existing loan, secured by a mortgage, for the 
purpose b}^ him declared of reducing the premium or rate of interest 
upon said loan, a new mortgage shall not be required, but an agreement 
in writing for the reduction of said premium or rate of interest, signed 
by the borrower and the treasurer of the bank, with the written approval 



214 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

of the president, shall be valid, and shall not impair or otherwise affect 
the existing mortgage; and thereafter the borrower shall make the 
monthly pajnnents on the loan in accordance with the terms of said 
agreement, and the amount of money previously so purchased by him 
maj^ be resold by the banlv at the same meeting. 

Your question appears to have been suggested, in part at 
least, by the use of the phrase in the statute, "if a borrower 
purchases money," etc., in section 26, and by the idea that 
one who obtains a loan of money by bidding for it purchases 
the money, and that one who borrows money at a rate of 
interest not less than 5 per cent, fixed by the directors of the 
bank is not one who purchases. 

The answer to your question, then, turns, in part at least, 
upon the scope and meaning of the word *' purchase" as used 
in the statute. This word is defined as — 

A tenn including ever>^ mode of acquisition of estate known to the 
law, except that by which an heir on the death of his ancestor becomes 
substituted in his place as owner by operation of law. (Bouvier's Law 
Dictionary.) 

The word "purchase" is further defined as — 

Acquisition; the obtaining or procuring of something by effort, 
labor, sacrifice, work, conquest, art, etc., or by the payment of money 
or its equivalent; procurement; acquirement. (Century Dictionar\\) 

These definitions indicate that the word "purchase" is not 
confined in its meaning to the process of bidding for some- 
thing, nor to the acquisition of property b}' the payment of 
money, but to many other and different transactions; and 
that one who procures a loan from a bank at a rate of interest 
fixed by its directors is just as truly a purchaser of a loan as 
the man who procures a loan by bidding for it. 

Your question may have been suggested also, in some part 
at least, by the fact that in those cases in which the bank 
loans its money at a rate fixed by the directors a written ap- 
plication is made for the loan; but the man who bids for the 
loan makes application for a loan at the rate named in his 
bid. 

It is my opinion that a co-operative bank authorized by its 
by-laws to dispense with offering its money for bids, and in 
lieu thereof to loan money at a rate of interest not less than 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCOIEXT — Xo. 12. 215 

5 per cent., fixed from time to time by its directors, may 
reduce the rate of interest to any rate not less than 5 per cent, 
per annum to a borrower who applied for and received a loan 
at a rate fixed by the board of directors when the loan was 
made, and that all the provisions of section 26 of chapter 623 
of the Acts of 1912 apply to such a transaction. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Constitutional Law — Cities — Charters — General Act. 

The Legislature has no authority to enact a general municipal corporation 
act, giving cities the right to adopt one of several forms of* charters, 
vrithout further special legislative enactment. 

Authority to legislate so as to amend a citj^ charter cannot be granted to a 
city. 

It is within the power of the Legislature to enact a general act giving cities 
the right to change, alter, consolidate, create or abolish departments 
without special legislation in each particular instance. 

The Legislature has power to authorize a city to choose by vote between 
two or more charters, and may provide that a form of charter once 
adopted shall remain in force for a fixed term of years. 

Dec. 18, 1914. 
Joint Special Committee on City Charters. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following questions: — 

1. Can the Legislature enact a general municipal corporation act, 
the effect of which ^^ill be to pennit cities to adopt one of several forms 
of charters set forth in such municipal corporation act \^-ithout further 
special enactment on the part of the Legislature? 

2. Can the Legislature in such act or otherwise make provision for 
changes in existing charters without further special enactment on the 
part of the Legislature; i.e., leave the charter in the main as heretofore 
granted, but giving authority to make changes in minor provisions? 

3. Can the Legislature enact a general act which will give to cities 
the right to change, alter, consohdate, create or abohsh departments as 
convenience or exigency demands, without fm'ther special legislation 
in each particular instance? 

4. Can pro^dsion be made in the general act above referred to that 
when a municipahtj^ has rejected one of the several forms therein set 
forth, the same shall not again be available; i.e., voted upon, for a 
fixed termx of years thereafter ? 

{a) It accepted, that no other form shall be acted upon for a fixed 
term of years thereafter. 



216 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Article IV. of Section I. of Chapter I. of Part the Second of 
the Constitution of Massachusetts provides as follows: — 

Full power and authorit}' are hereby given and granted to the said 
general court, from time to time to make, ordain, and estabhsh, all 
manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, statutes, and 
ordinances, directions and instructions, either with penalties or with- 
out; so as the same be not repugnant or contrary to this constitution, 
as they shall judge to be for the good and wehare of this commonwealth, 
and for the government and ordering thereof, and of the subjects of the 
same. . . . 

Article II. of the Amendments to the Constitution pro- 
vides: — 

The general court shall have full power and authority to erect and 
constitute municipal or city governments, in any corporate town or 
to^Mis in this commonwealth, and to grant to the inhabitants thereof 
such powers, privileges, and immunities, not repugnant to the consti- 
tution, as the general court shall deem necessary or expedient for the 
regulation and government thereof, and to prescribe the manner of 
calhng and holding pubhc meetings of the inhabitants, in wards or 
otherwise, for the election of officers under the constitution, and the 
manner of returning the votes given at such meetings. Provided, that 
no such government shall be erected or constituted in any town not 
containing twelve thousand inhabitants, nor unless it be ^\^th the con- 
sent, and on the apphcation of a majority of the inhabitants of such 
town, present and voting thereon, pursuant to a vote at a meeting duly 
warned and holden for that purpose. And pro^^ded, also, that all 
by-laws, made by such municipal or city government, shall be subject, 
at all times, to be annulled by the general court. 

Under the constitutional provisions above quoted it is my 
opinion that the special action of the Legislature is necessary 
to the erection and constitution of city governments. Indeed, 
no such government can be erected or constituted in any 
town unless it be with the consent and upon the application 
of a majority of the inhabitants of such town. That is, the 
inhabitants of a town who desire to have a city government 
instituted in their municipality cannot, in my opinion, be per- 
mitted or authorized to adopt a form of charter and establish 
a city government without first making the application to the 
General Court provided for in Article II. of the Amendments 
to the Constitution; and to establish a city government this 
must be followed by some action of the General Court in ac- 
cordance with the provisions of the Constitution for the 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 217 

establishment of a city government. It is my opinion, there- 
fore, that your first question, as it stands, must be answered 
in the negative. It would be possible, however, for the Gen- 
eral Court to establish two or more standard forms of charter, 
and upon each and every application for a charter or for a 
change of charter to enact a special law submitting these 
different forms, or some of them, to the choice by vote of the 
people of the municipality concerned. 

Referring now to your second question, I have to say that 
it is my opinion that the authority to legislate so as to amend 
its charter cannot be granted to a city under our present 
Constitution. 

In response to your third inquiry I have to say that such a 
provision as this question contemplates may be incorporated 
in the charter of a city, and might, in my opinion, be incor- 
porated in a general act. It will, of course, occur to 3'ou that 
such an act would have no permanence but would be subject 
to amendment and repeal at the pleasure of the Legislature. 

In answer to your fourth inquiry I have to sa}^ that if the 
Legislature authorizes the people of a city or town to choose 
by vote between two or more charters, it may, in my opinion, 
provide that the rejected form or forms shall not again be 
submitted to the people of the city wherein the rejection has 
taken place, nor be voted upon for a fixed term of years after 
such rejection; and that a form of charter once accepted and 
adopted shall remain in force for a fixed term of years after 
such acceptance or adoption. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney -General. 



Schools — Domicil of Parent — Tuition. 

The domicil of the parent of a minor attending school is the domicil of the 
minor, and the city of such domicil is responsible for the tuition of the 
child. 

Dec. 24, 1914. 

State Board of Education. 

Gentlemen: — In your letter of recent date you state the 
following case: — 

It appears that a child resides during the spring and fall months in a 
town adjoining a city in which the father of the child is a legal voter. 



218 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

The child attends school in the city. Said city claims that the town in 
which the child resides should pay tuition during the time of such resi- 
dence. The town claims that the city, by virtue of the fact that the 
father of the child is a legal voter therein, is responsible for all the 
schooling of the child. 

You ask to be advised as to the solution of the question 
whether the city or the town is right in the claims above 
stated. 

I assume that the domicil of the father is, for all purposes, 
in the city in which he is a voter. It is a well-established rule 
of law^ that the domicil of a child follows that of the father. 
An infant, being no7i sui juris, is incapable of fixing his domi- 
cil, which therefore, during his minority, follow^s that of the 
father, provided such child is legitimate, and the mere separa- 
tion of the parents does not affect the application of the rule. 
14 Cyc, pp. 843-844. 

By application of this rule it follows that since the father of 
the child has his domicil in the city, the city is responsible for 
the schooling of the child. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boyxton, Attomey-GcneraL 



Teachers' Retirement Board — Suhstitute Teachers. 

Only such substitute teachers as are duly elected and regular 1^^ employed on 
a salary are entitled to participate in the teachers' retirement fund, 
under St. 1913, c. 832. 

Dec. 31, 1914. 

Teachers' Retirerneiit Board. 

Gentlemen: — I am in receipt of your letter requesting 
an opinion as to whether substitute service performed by 
former teachers in the public schools is service within the 
meaning of paragraph 5 of section 6 of chapter 832 of the 
Acts of 1913. 

The definition of "teacher" in the act might be broad 
enough to include call substitutes. St. 1913, c. 832, § 1, 
par. 4. 

But the act must be taken as a whole. The act contem- 
plates that the members shall be on a regular salary, and shall 
serve throughout the school year. This is clearly shown by 
the follow^ing proviso: — 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 219 

When the total sum of assessments on the salary of any member at 
the rate established by the retirement board would amount to more 
than one hundred dollars or less than thirty-five dollars for any school 
year, such member shall in lieu of assessments at the regular rate be 
assessed one hundred dollars a year or thirty-five dollars a j^ear as the 
case may be, pa3'able in equal instalments to be assessed for the num- 
ber of months during which the schools of the community in which such 
member is em^ployed are commonly in session. (St. 1913, c. 832, § 5, 
par. 2.) 

Even construing the definition by itself, the word "em- 
ployed" may mean regularly employed. The United States 
Supreme Court has ruled: — 

The terms "officers" and "empWees" both, alike, refer to those in 
regular and continual service. Within the ordinarj^ acceptation of the 
terms, one who is engaged to render service in a particular transaction 
is neither an officer nor an emploj^ee. The}^ imply continuity of ser\dce, 
and exclude those employed for a special and single transaction. 
{LoiiisviUe R.R. Co. v. Wilson, 138 U. S. 501, 505.) 

This interpretation is strengthened by the rest of the act 
before us. The act would be unw^orkable if it applied to call 
substitutes. For if the act so applied it w^ould be impossible to 
draw a line at any one point between those who were called 
for constant service and those who were called for only one 
day. The absurdity of applying the minimum assessment of 
$35 to a substitute who w^orks only one day is apparent. 
Equally apparent is the absurdity of placing a substitute who 
serves a few days a year for thirty years on a par with a 
teacher who serves steadily for thirty years, with respect to 
receiving an annuity of S300 under section 6, paragraph 5. 
It is therefore my opinion that the act applies only to teachers 
in regular salaried positions. 

You say wdth respect to call substitutes — 

None of these teachers has been elected as permanent substitute at a 
guaranteed salarj^ bj^ the school committees, and the amount of com- 
pensation is entirety on a per diem basis for actual day's service ren- 
dered. 

Teachers of this class cannot, in my opinion, be regarded as 
eligible to participation in the benefits of the retirement system. 
I understand, however, that there are substitute teachers in 
the Commonwealth who are duly elected as such by the 



220 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

school boards, whose entire time throughout the school year 
is devoted to teaching, and who are paid a regular salary. 
Substitute teachers of the last-named class are, in my opinion, 
entitled to participate in the retirement system, and may, of 
course, properly become members of the retirement associa- 
tion. This ruling makes the act apply, as above stated, only 
to teachers in regular salaried positions. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Public Institutions — Water Pipes — Highivays — Grant by 
Selectmen. 

Selectmen of towns may authorize the laying of water pipes in streets by 
trustees of a public institution. 

Jan. 5, 1915. 
Trustees of Hospitals for Consumptives. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following question: — 

Is it necessary to have the Legislature authorize the Board of Trus- 
tees to lay a water pipe in highways in Lakeville, or would it be sufficient 
for the board of selectmen to grant this franchise? 

Chapter 459 of the Acts of 1903 provides as follows: — 

Section 1. The mayor and aldermen of a city and the selectmen of 
a town may, upon terms and conditions prescribed by them, authorize 
persons and corporations to la}^ pipes and conduits for the conversance 
of w^ater under any public way in such city or town : provided, however, 
that nothing in this act shall authorize persons or corporations to supply 
water to persons or corporations other than themselves, in any city or 
town, in which a municipal water plant is established, except with the 
consent of the board or authority having charge of such water plant in 
such city or town. 

R. L., c. 8, § 5, cl. 16, provides that the word "person" 
may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate. 

It is my opinion that the authorization of the board of 
selectmen would be entirely sufficient. If, how^ever, the select- 
men will not grant you the authority needed, I would suggest 
that you apply to the Legislature for such authority as you 
may need. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 221 



Cities and Towns — School Departments — Manual Training 
Schools — Liability for Accidents. 

Cities and towns conducting manual training schools in compliance with 
law, and deriving no pecuniary benefit therefrom, are not liable in 
damages for injuries resulting to pupils from accidents, nor are school 
officers so liable except for their own wrongful conduct or negligence. 

Jan. 6, 1915. 
State Board of Education. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following question: — 

Is either the school department of a city or the city itself hable in 
damages for personal injury to pupils resulting from accidents in the 
manual training work in the schools? 

By the provisions of section 9 of chapter 42 of the Revised 
Laws ''the teaching of manual training" as a part of the ele- 
mentary and high school system is required by law in all 
towns and cities having a population of 20,000 or more. It 
will be seen that it is not optional with a city or tow^n having 
the required population to establish a department of manual 
training or not, as it may see fit. The law is mandatory. 
Manual training must be made a part of the educational sys- 
tem of every such city or town. The city or town derives no 
pecuniary profit or benefit from the manual training depart- 
ment. The school officers are not the agents of the city but 
are public officers whose duty it is to perform and discharge 
certain functions as required by law. A municipalit}' is not 
liable in damages for the acts of its public officers. 

The rule relating to the subject-matter of your question has 
been stated in the following language: — 

Whether the neglected duty involves a liabilit}^ depends, in the 
judgment of the court, upon the nature of the duty; that is to saj^, 
whether it is imposed for the pecuniar}^ profit or other special advantage 
of the city, — • if so, the city is hable; or whether it is a dutj^ imposed 
upon the city as a public instrumentafity of the State, without pecuniary 
or other special advantage to the city, — if so, the city is not liable. 
(Dillon on Municipal Corporations, Vol. IV., § 1643.) 

See, also, Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344. 

The city or town conducting a manual training school in 
strict compliance with the requirements of the law, and deriv- 



222 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

ing no pecuniary benefit therefrom, will not, in my opinion, be 
liable in damages for injuries resulting to pupils from accidents 
in such department; ncr will the school officers be liable except 
for injuries caused by their own wrongful act or negligence. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney-General. 



Labor — Right to fine Employees for Damages. 

Except in certain cases prohibited by statute, employers of labor may, 
where provision is made in the contract of employment, lawfully with- 
hold money, due employees as wages, to cover damage to the employer 
caused by the negligent or wTongful act of the employee. 

Jan. 6, 1915. 

State Board of Labor and Industries. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following question: — 

Have emplo3'ers of labor the right to fine employees for damage done 
by them, as in the breaking of dishes, spoihng goods in process of manu- 
facture or damage to machinery? 

A servant is directly liable to his master for any damage 
occasioned by his negligence or misconduct in connection with 
his work, whether such damage be directly to the property of 
the master or arises from compensation which he has been 
obliged to make to third persons for injuries sustained by 
them through the negligence or misconduct of the servant. 
26 Cyc, p. 1023. 

In a case in which the plaintiff sued a subcontractor on 
work done for the plaintiff, charging the subcontractor with 
negligence, the Supreme Judicial Court said: — 

It is immaterial whether the defendants are to be regarded as the 
servants and agents of the plaintiff or as contractors under the principal 
contractor, which the defendants contend w^as the case. In either in- 
stance they owed the plaintiff the duty of not injuring his property by 
their neglect or wrongful acts. If they were the plaintiff's servants and 
their negligent actions caused injury to his building, they would be hable 
to him for the damage. (Bacon's Abridgement, Master and Servant, M.) 

Smith, Master and Servant, 4th ed. 134, and cases cited; 
White V. Phillipston, 10 Met. 108; Walcott v. Swampscott, 
1 Allen, 101; Bickford v. Richards, 154 Mass. 163. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 223 

If, then, dishes are broken or goods spoiled in process of 
manufacturing or damage is done to machinery through the 
negligence or misconduct of the employee, the employee is 
directly liable to the employer for the damage so caused. 
There seems to be no doubt that where it is made a part of 
the contract of employment that such damages shall be ad- 
justed and taken out of the wages of the employee, the con- 
tract is lawful and may be enforced. Gallagher v. Hathaway 
Mfg. Co., 172 Mass. 230. 

There is a statute in regard to fines imposed on weavers 
which need not be discussed here, but I have found no 
statute in regard to fines imposed by employers in any other 
industry. 

It is not to be understood that fines may be imposed arbi- 
trarily or at the mere whim or caprice of the employer, but 
for a just cause and to a fair and just amount. In cases in 
which the contract of employment provides for it, the em- 
ployer may, in my opinion, lawfully withhold money due the 
employee as wages to cover damages to the employer caused 
by the negligent or wrongful act of the employee. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney -General. 



Cities and Towns — Public Domain — Sales. 

Land acquired for a public domain under St. 1914, c. 564, cannot be sold or 

used for any purpose not specified in the act without the authority of 

the Legislature. 
Land acquired by a city or town for a public domain, and placed under the 

management of the State Forester, must be maintained at the expense 

of such city or town. 

Jan. 8, 1915. 
F. W. Raxe, Esq., State Forester. 

Dear Sir: — You ask whether under the provisions of 
section 1 of chapter 564 of the Acts of 1914 a town or city 
having taken land for a public domain has the right to dispose 
of the land by sale or by making use of it for purposes other 
than the culture of forest trees; and second, in case the State 
Forester is given supervision of such public domain by the 
town, under section 2 of said chapter, whether the cost of 
control and management should be paid by the town or by 
the Forester's department. 



224 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

The provisions of the first two sections of said act, so far as 
material, are as follows: — 

Section 1 . A town ... or a city . . . may take or purchase land 
within their limits, which shall be a public domain, and may appropri- 
ate money and accept gifts of money and land therefor; . . . Such 
public domain shall be devoted to the culture of forest trees, or to the 
preservation of the water supply of such city or town and the title 
thereto shall vest in the city or town in which it lies. 

Section 2. The city or town forester in each city or town . . . 
shall have the management and charge of all such pubhc domain in 
that city or town . . . But a town ... or a city . . . may place all 
such pul^lic domain within its limits under the general supervision and 
control of the state forester, who shall thereupon, upon notification 
thereof, make regulations for the care and use of such public domain 
and for the planting and cultivating of trees therein, and the city or 
town forester in such case and his keepers, under the supervision and 
direction of the state forester, shall be charged with the duty of enforcing 
all such regulations and of performing such lal^or therein as may be 
necessar}^ for the care and maintenance thereof. . . . 

Lands acquired under this act cannot, in my opinion, be 
sold by the town or used for any purpose other than the cul- 
ture of forest trees or for the preservation of the water supply 
of the city or town making the taking, without first obtaining 
permission or authority from the Legislature to make the sale 
or to change the use. 

In response to your second question I have to say that the 
only difference in the regulation of such public domains as is 
contemplated by placing them under the supervision and con- 
trol of the State Forester in accordance with the provisions of 
section 2, above quoted, is to secure the advantage of a 
trained forester over the planting and cultivation of trees. 
The public domains still remain the property of the city or 
town, and all expenses must be defrayed by the city or town 
even though supervision and control have been vested in the 
State Forester. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boyntox, Attorncii-Gcncral. 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT— Xo. 12. • 225 



Employment of Labor — Building Laws. 

A building containing two or more establishments, each estabUshment em- 
ploying less than ten persons but in the aggregate ten or more persons, 
comes within the provisions of St. 1913, c. 655, §§15 and 20. 

Jan. 12, 1915. 
Gen. J, H. Whitney, Chief of the District Police. 

Dear Sir: — You ask: — 

Would a building containing two or more establishments, each em- 
ploying less than ten persons but in the aggregate ten or more 
persons, come within the provisions of sections 15 and 20 of chap- 
ter 655 of the Acts of 1913? 

You have quoted from the two sections the language most 
directly relating to your inquiry, as follows: — 

Section 15. No building which is designed to be used, in whole or 
in part, and no building in which alteration shall be made for the pur- 
pose of using it, or continuing its use, in whole or in part, as a public 
building, pubhc or private institution, schoolhouse, church, theatre, 
special hall, public hall, miscellaneous hall, place of assemblage or 
place of pubhc resort, or as a factory, workshop or mercantile or 
other establishment and to have accommodations for ten or more 
emploj^ees. . . . 

Section 20. A building which is used, in whole or in part, as a 
public building, public or private institution, schoolhouse, church, 
theatre, special hall, public hall, miscellaneous hall, place of assemblage 
or place of pubhc resort, and a building in which ten or more persons 
are employed in a factory, workshop, mercantile or other establish- 
ment. . . . 

In each of the foregoing quotations from the statute the 
clause "a factory, w^orkshop, mercantile or other establish- 
ment" might be regarded as indicating one shop or factory, 
etc., as the object at which the law is aimed, but the real pur- 
pose of the statute is the preservation of life and safety. The 
mischief aimed at is the crow^ding of people together, not 
necessarily in a single Avorkshop but in a single building, under 
such circumstances as to make their condition one of danger 
in case of fire unless proper safeguards are adopted. To say 
that though there are a hundred workmen employed in a 
building, \ et so long as not more than nine are employed in 
any one shop or factory the building is not subject to the 



226 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

inspection laws of the Commonwealth, would be to defeat the 
purpose of those laws in most important particulars. The 
clause above quoted was undoubtedly intended to, and does, 
relate to the building in which the factory, workshop or other 
place of employment may be located, and whenever ten or 
more persons are employed in a building, whether employed 
in one shop or factory or divided between two or more places 
within the building, that building is subject to the provisions 
of the two sections to which you refer. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Attorney -Gene red. 



Loan Agencies — Expenses of Loans — Interest. 

Under St. 1911, c. 727, actual expenses actually incurred by the lender may 
be collected of a debtor. 

Although the addition of actual expenses to the interest collected by a loan 
agency from a debtor would make the cost to the borrower more than 
3 per cent, per month, the transaction is lawful under St. 1911, c. 727. 

Jan. 18, 1915. 

George C. Neal, Esq., Deputy Chief of the District Police, Acting Super- 
visor of Loan Agencies. 

Dear Sir: — You have requested my opinion upon the 
following questions: — 

(1) Under the Acts of 1911, chapter 727, and amendments thereto, 
can the supervisor of loan agencies require by regulation the borrower 
in negotiating a loan of less than $300 to pay any expense incurred by 
the lender connected with the making of such loan? 

(2) If such expense may be demanded by regulation can the amount 
of such expense, together with the interest placed on the loan, exceed the 
sum of 3 per cent, a month? 

The authority of the Supervisor of Loan Agencies in regard 
to making regulations is contained in section 4 of chapter 727 
of the Acts of 1911, which provides as follows: — 

The supervisor shall, from time to time, estabhsh regulations respect- 
ing the granting of hcenses and the business carried on by the licensees, 
and b}^ loan companies and associations estabhshed by special charter. 
He shall either personally, or by such assistants as he may designate, 
at least once a year, and oftener if he deems it necessar3^ investigate the 
affairs of such licensees, companies and associations and for that pur- 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 227 

pose shall have free access to the vaults, books and papers thereof, and 
shall ascertain the condition of the business, and whether it has been 
transacted in compliance with the provisions of law and the regulations 
made hereunder. The supervisor may, if he deems it expedient, cause 
an examination of the said books and business to be made by an ac- 
countant whom he may select, and the cost of any such examination 
shall be paid by the person, corporation or association whose books are 
so examined. 

His authority to establish rates of interest rests in the pro- 
visions of section 7 of the same chapter, which provides as 
follows: — 

The supervisor shall estabhsh the rate of interest to be collected, and 
in fixing said rate shall have due regard to the amount of the loan and 
the nature of the security and the time for which the loan is made; but 
the rate shall, in no case, exceed three per cent a month; and no licensee 
or company or association to which this act applies, shall charge or 
receive upon any loan a greater rate of interest than that fixed by the 
supervisor. 

The statute does not in terms declare that any expense 
charge shall or may be made by the lender and collected from 
the borrower; neither does the statute in terms prohibit such 
a charge. 

Statutes of the character of the one under consideration are 
framed and enacted with relation to some existing business, 
and this is true of chapter 727 of the Acts of 1911. It is a 
matter of very common knowledge that for many years prior 
to the passage of this statute, in the business of making small 
loans it was the custom of individuals and concerns to make 
a charge against borrowers to cover alleged expenses, and this 
statute, while it does not contain express provision allowing 
such charges, does contain provisions in which mention is 
made of expenses, in such terms as, in my opinion, to raise a 
fair implication that it was the intention of the Legislature 
to leave the law in such condition that actual expenses in- 
curred in making small loans might still be charged to and 
collected from the borrow^er. 

Section 3 of the statute, as amended contains the following 
provisions: — 

In prosecutions under this act, the amount to be paid upon any loan 
of three hundred dollars or less for interest or expenses shall include all 
sums paid or to be paid by or on behalf of the borrower for interest, 



228 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

brokerage, recording fees, commissions, services, extension of loan, for- 
bearance to enforce payment, and all other sums charged against or 
paid or to be paid by the borrower for making or securing or directly or 
indirectly relating to the loan, and shall include all such sums when pa^d 
by or on behalf of or charged against the borrower for or on account of 
making or securing the loan, directly or indirectly, to or by any person, 
partnership, corporation, or association other than the lender, if such 
payment or charge was known to the lender at the time of making the 
loan, or might have been ascertained by reasonable inquir5\ Any 
person, partnership, corporation or association directly or indirectly 
engaging in the business of negotiating, arranging, aiding or assisting 
the borrower or lender in procuring or making loans of three hundred 
dollars or less for which the amount paid or to be paid for interest and 
expenses, including all amounts paid or to be paid to any othe-r party 
therefor, exceeds in the aggregate an amount equivalent to twelve per 
cent per annum, whether such loans are actually made by such person, 
partnership, corporation or association, or by another party or parties, 
shall be deemed to be engaged in the business of making small loans 
and shall be subject to the provisions of this act. 

Section 10, as amended, provides as follows: — 

Anj^ person, partnership, corporation or association violating any 
provision of this act or any regulation made hereunder or any rule or 
order made by the supervisor, shall be subject to a fine of not more than 
five hundred dollars, and the license may be suspended or revoked by 
the supervisor. Anj^ loan upon which a greater rate of interest or ex- 
pense is charged or received, than is allowed by this act and the regu- 
lations made hereunder, may be declared void by the supreme judicial 
court or the superior court in equity upon petition by the person to 
whom the loan was made. 

The words "interest" and "expenses" as they occur in this 
chapter are evidently not intended to cover one and the same 
thing. The word "interest" is defined by authorities to mean 
the sum paid for the use of money, and as used in this chapter 
means nothing else. The word "expense" is defined as — 

A laying out or expending; the disbursing of money; emplo^mient 
and consumption, as of time or labor. (Century Dictionary.) 

As used in this statute the word means expense of this kind 

on the part of the lender in and about the making of a loan. 

In construing statutes we are bound by the rule that — 

AVords and phrases shall be construed according to the common and 
approved usage of the language. (R. L., c. 8, § 4, cl. 3rd.) 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 229 

The application of this rule to the construction of this 
statute makes it apparent that the two words "interest" and 
"expenses" mean two different things. "Expenses," as the 
word is here used, means actual expense, — expense that is 
actually and necessarily involved in the transaction of making 
the loan and is incurred and charged in good faith. It does 
not mean an arbitrary charge to be made whether actual 
expense is incurred or not, nor can this term be lawfully used 
to cover a charge and collection of a sum that is beyond the 
actual expense incurred, or to cover a charge where there was 
no actual expense. Authority to make regulations does not 
confer authority to regulate in contravention of the meaning 
and intention of the statute itself. 

If by your first question you intended to ask whether the 
Supervisor of Loan Agencies has authority to impose upon the 
borrower of a sum less than three hundred dollars the pay- 
ment of a sum of money as expense in making the loan, with- 
out regard to the question whether any expense has been in- 
curred by the lender, it is my opinion that the supervisor has 
not that authority. It is my opinion that under the authority 
of section 4 above quoted the supervisor has no authority to 
require that any sum whatever be paid by the borrower as a 
charge for the expense of making the loan, but under the stat- 
ute the supervisor has authority to regulate charges made by 
the lender for expenses. He has authority to prevent the abuse 
of the opportunity to make charges of that kind, and as it is 
not possible for the supervisor to examine the details and cir- 
cumstances attendant upon the making of each and every 
loan, he may make regulations, not requiring the payment of 
a stated sum as expenses, but requiring that only actual ex- 
penses necessarily incurred in the making of the loan be 
charged by the lender. 

In response to your second question I have to say that in 
cases where only expenses actually and necessarily incurred in 
making the loan are charged to the borrower, even though the 
expenses together with interest on the loan make the cost to 
the borrower more than 3 per cent, a month, the transaction 
is, in my opinion, lawful. 

Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Atforney-General. 



230 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Charitable Corporations — Educational Institutions — Returns. 

Although an institution for the education of the deaf may be essentially an 
educational institution, it may also be a charitable institution within 
the meaning of St. 1903, c. 402, and thereby be required to make an 
annual report to the State Board of Charity. 

Jan. 18, 1915. 

State Board of Charity. 

Gentlemen: — You have requested the opinion of the 
Attorney-General upon the following question: — 

Under the provisions of chapter 402 of the Acts of 1903 is the Clarke 
School for the Deaf required to make an annual report to the State 
Board of Charity? 

Chapter 402 of the Acts of 1903 provides as follows: — 

A charitable corporation whose personal property is exempt from 
taxation under the provisions of clause three of section five of chapter 
twelve shall annually, on or before the first day of November, make to 
the state board of charity a written or printed report for its last finan- 
cial year, showing its property, its receipts and expenditures, the whole 
number and the average number of its beneficiaries and such other in- 
formation as the board may require. 

Corporations whose personal property is exempt from taxa- 
tion are designated in Revised Laws, chapter 12, section 5, 
clause 3 id, as follows: — 

The personal propert}^ of hterarj^, benevolent, charitable and scien- 
tific institutions and of tempei'ance societies incorporated within this 
commonwealth, the real estate owned and occupied by them or their 
officers for the purposes for which they are incorporated, and real estate 
purchased by them with the purpose of removal thereto, until such 
removal, but not for more than two years after such purchase. Such 
real or personal property shall not be exempt if any of the income or 
profits of the business of such corporation is divided among the stock- 
holders or members, or is used or appropriated for other than literary, 
educational, benevolent, charitable, scientific or rehgious purposes, nor 
shall it be exempt for any year in which such corporation wilfully omits 
to bring in to the assessors the list and statement required by section 
fortv-one. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 231 

Chapter 125 of the Revised Laws deals with the formation 
of corporations for charitable and other purposes. Section 2 
thereof provides in part: — 

Such corporation may be formed for any educational, charitable, 
benevolent or rehgious purpose; for the prosecution of any antiquarian, 
historical, hterary, scientific, medical, artistic, monumental or musical 
purpose; for establishing and maintaining libraries; for supporting any 
missionary enterprise having for its object the dissemination of religious 
or educational instruction in foreign countries; for promoting temper- 
ance or morality in this commonwealth. . . . 

In connection with the general subject I submit section 19 
of chapter 39 of the Revised Laws, which reads as follow^s: — 

The governor may, upon the request of the parents or guardians and 
with the approval of the board, send such deaf persons as he considers 
proper subjects for education, for a term not exceeding ten years, but, 
upon hke request and with, hke approval, he may continue for a longer 
term the instruction of meritorious pupils recommended by the princi- 
pal or other chief officer of the school of which they are members, to the 
American School, at Hartford, for the Deaf, in the state of Connecticut, 
to the Clarke School for the Deaf at Northampton, to the Horace Mann 
School at Boston, or to any other school for the deaf in the common- 
wealth, as the parents or guardians may prefer; and with the approval 
of the board he maj^, at the expense of the commonwealth, make such 
provision for the care and education of children who are both deaf and 
bhnd as he may deem expedient. No distinction shall be made on ac- 
count of the wealth or poverty of such children or their parents. No 
such pupil shall be withdrawn from such institutions or schools except 
with the consent of the authorities thereof or of the governor; and the 
expenses of the instruction and support of such pupils in such institu- 
tions or schools, including their necessary travelhng expenses, whether 
daily or otherwise, shall be paid by the commonwealth; but the parents 
or guardians of such children may pay the whole or any part of such 
expense. 

If there is an}' difficulty in reaching a prompt conclusion in 
this case it is due to the failure of the statutes to distinguish 
between purely charitable and purely educational institutions. 
In the broad sense an institution of learning may be said to be 
a charitable institution, and gifts to colleges or similar cor- 
porations are upheld as charitable gifts. This is true even 
though such institutions make no pretence of being charitable 
in the narrow sense, and though their doors open to admit 
rich and poor alike. 



232 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

It is not confined to mere almsgiving or tlie relief of poverty and 
distress, but has a wider signification, which embraces the improvement 
and promotion of the happiness of man. {Molly Varnum Chapter, 
D. A. R. V. Lowell, 204 Mass. 487.) 

Gifts to colleges and other educational institutions, for the advance- 
ment of learning or to aid necessitous students in procuring an educa- 
tion, are charitable even if the donee may derive revenue from other 
investments and from students who are able to pay. {Mount Herman 
Boys' School v. GUI, 145 Mass. 139.) 

In the case of Nciv England Sanitarium v. Stoncham, 205 
Mass. 335, at 341, the court says: — 

It may be conceded that a trust for the exclusive benefit of the least 
wealthy of a well-to-do or prosperous class could not be sustained as a 
charity under the St. of 43 Eliz. c. 4. Attorney-General v. Northumber- 
land, L. R. 7 Ch. D. 745. But the controlhng purpose may be none 
the less charitable, even if those who need no pecuniary aid are either 
directly or indirectlj^ benefited. A hospital established for the free 
treatment of poor patients may receive payments from rich persons who 
are permitted to avail themselves of its benefits. Every charity created 
for the gratuitous treatment and relief of disease, or the phj^sical infirmi- 
ties of the indigent, or other purposes enumerated in this statute, or if 
not enumerated, which are held to come within its spirit and intend- 
ment, in a large sense helps and aids the community, \vithout regard to 
the social rank or pecuniary condition of its members. 

In the Century Dictionary a ''charitable institution" is de- 
fined as, "A foundation for the relief of a certain class of 
persons by alms, education, or care, especially a hospital." 
Again: "A gift in trust for promoting the welfare of the com- 
munity or of mankind at large, or some indefinite part of it, 
as an endowment for a public hospital, school, church or 
library. ..." 

Charit}", in its legal sense, comprises four principal divisions, — • 
trusts for the relief of poverty, trusts for the advancement of education, 
trusts for the advancement of religion, and trusts for other purposes 
beneficial to the community not falling under any of the preceding 
heads. (Bouvier's Law Dictionar}^, ''Charitable Uses, Charities.") 

Before the Statute of 43 Elizabeth, chapter 4, money given 
for the education of youth and the support of schools was 
recognized in England as given for a charitable use. Since the 
Statute of 43 P^lizabeth, chapter 4, educational institutions 
furnishing tuition free of charge or for a smaller sum than 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 233 

actual cost have })een declared in a certain sense charitable 
trusts. Chief Justice Shaw said: — 

That a gift designed to promote the public good, by the encourage- 
ment of learning, science and the useful arts, without any particular 
reference to the poor, is regarded as a charit}', is settled by a series of 
judicial decisions, and regarded as the settled practice of a court of 
equit5^ {American Academy of Arts and Sciences v. Harvard College, 
12 Gray, 582.) 

Other courts have entertained similar views. 

Nor has it ever been supposed in this country, that an institution 
established for the purposes of education is not a charity within the 
meaning of the law, because it sheds its blessings, like the dews of 
heaven, upon the rich as well as the poor. {Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23.) 

It has been asserted, however, that there is a recognized dis- 
tinction between strictly educational institutions and chari- 
table institutions. In a minority opinion in State v. Board of 
Control, 85 Minn. 189, the court said: — 

It is, howevei", now the settled law in all jurisdictions in which the 
statute of Elizabeth is in force that a gift or devise for the advancement 
of education, even if it be made without reference to the poor, is a 
charity, within the law of charitable uses. It was necessary for courts 
of equity to so define ''charity" in order to sustain such gifts or devises, 
and not permit them to lapse. The cause justified the definition. But 
the broad, common-sense, and popular distinction between ''education" 
and "charity" has always been recognized by the courts of this coun- 
tr}', except in cases involving the doctrine of charitable uses, or the 
taxation of property held for such uses. It is true that the statute of 
Ehzabeth expressly declared that the maintenance of schools of learning 
and free schools was a charity; but the fact is not significant, for at 
that time there were not, and never had been, any free schools in 
England, except those maintained by the charity of the church or other 
organizations. It was not until after the commencement of the reign of 
Queen Victoria that the government began seriously to recognize that 
it was any part of the duty of the State to provide for the education of 
all of her citizens. Prior to that time the cause of education was in 
fact, as well as in law, a charity. 

In the same opinion the justice said: — 

I cannot beheve that the Legislature, in adopting the title of the 
statute in question, intended to reject the usual and popular meaning 
of the word "charitable, " and substitute therefor the ancient and moss- 



234 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

covered definition of '^ charity" which the chancery court invented 
centuries ago for the purpose of sustaining charitable uses, and thereby 
classify the State normal schools and the State university as charitable 
institutions. . . . Now, as conclusively^ demonstrated, . . . the con- 
stitutional, legislative, executive, and popular classification of such in- 
stitutions is, and always has been, in this State, based, upon the popular 
and common-sense distinction between education and charity. In such 
classification our institutions of learning are classified by themselves 
as "educational institutions," and our institutions for defectives are 
also separately classified as "charitable institutions." 

While the court in the above case divided on the main 
point in issue, there seems to have been no division on the 
point involved in the question here On page 192 the minority 
opinion further states: — 

We need not cite definitions from the lexicographers to show what, 
in the present age, are generally understood to be "charitable" and 
what "educational" institutions, but it may be stated that the former 
are usually defined as founded "for the rehef of certain classes of per- 
sons by alms, education, or care; especially a hospital;" as "institu- 
tions estabhshed for the help of the needy;" as "pertaining to charity; 
springing from or intended for charity;" while the latter are institutions 
founded for the express purpose of instructing the youth of our land 
along mental and physical lines, such instruction not being granted as 
a bounty, but as of right. 

If we were compelled solely to rely upon these definitions, they would 
be quite sufficient to justify the assertion that our educational institu- 
tions are not charitable, within any of the definitions, but the paramount 
question here is an entirely different one. We are called upon to ascer- 
tain what should be understood when these words are used in the 
statutory jurisprudence of this State; and, as a consequence, what 
would their use by the Legislature suggest or convey to the reader of 
such a title. To what institutions have these terms been applied, and 
how have they been used? An examination for this purpose should 
lead to but one conclusion, in my judgment, namely, that the words 
"charitable institutions" mean institutions, supported in whole or in 
part at the expense of the State, for the rehef of the indigent, the defec- 
tive, and the unfortunate, — institutions in which the State dispenses 
and administers charity to those dependent upon it, and the inmates of 
which (victims of misfortune) are the beneficiaries and recipients of 
charity. 

In People V. New York, 161 N. Y. 233, it was contended 
that as the defendant corporation had been given legal capac- 
ity to take and administer gifts and bequests under the Statute 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 235 

of 43 Elizabeth, and under the general rules applicable to 
trusts, it was a charitable institution. To this claim the court 
answered: — 

It is said that this corporation, in order to promote the objects of its 
incorporation, has been given legal capacity to take and administer 
gifts and bequests that would be called charitable under the statute of 
EHzabeth and under general rules of law applicable to trusts, and all 
that is quite true. But it is an error to conclude that a corporation 
must necessarily be of a charitable nature because it has capacity to 
take and administer such gifts. A very large class of corporations may 
do that, without affording the slightest ground for an argument that 
they are or must be charitable institutions or corporations. Colleges, 
academies and nearly all institutions of learning or of a literary char- 
acter, and even cities, villages and other municipal corporations, may 
take and administer such gifts ; but that fact cannot in the least affect 
their true character, or convert them into charitable institutions. 
Again, it was said: ''It is only necessary to add that if we were to hold 
that every corporation with capacity to take and administer such a 
gift or bequest is a charitable institution within the meaning of the 
Constitution and the statute, we would have to include a great number 
of corporations whose objects are entirely foreign to any work of charity, 
even in the broadest sense. Capacity to take a bequest proceeding from 
charitable motives is no real test of the class to which the corporation 
taking it belongs." 

A similar question to the one at issue arose in People v. 
Fitch, 154 N. Y. 14. In this case it was decided that an insti- 
tution for the blind was such a charitable corporation as 
would come under the supervision of the State Board of 
Charities. At page 26 the court said: — 

The relator is, doubtless, to an extent, an educational institution. 
But that fact alone does not justify the conclusion that it is not a 
charitable institution within the meaning and intent of the Constitution 
and statutes. An institution may be in a sense educational and at the 
same time be wholly or partly charitable, as the education and mainte- 
nance of indigent pupils, while being educated, may be the subject of 
charity as well as support alone. An institution may be both educa- 
tional and charitable, and if so, it falls within the provisions of the Con- 
stitution and statutes, as it is to be observed that the provisions are 
that the board of charities shall visit and inspect all institutions which 
are of a charitable character or design, and, hence, to fall within that 
description, it is not necessary that the institution shall be wholly chari- 
table. It need only be an institution which is wholly or partly chari- 
table in its character and purpose. 



236 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Nor is the fact that institutions for the instruction of the bhnd are 
made subject to the visitation of the superintendent of pubhc instruc- 
tion controlhng in determining this question. It may be conceded that 
this institution is partially educational and subject to the visitation of 
the superintendent of public instruction, and yet by no means follow 
that it is not an institution which is charitable in its character and 
purpose, and, therefore, also subject to the visitation of the board of 
charities, as the Constitution provides that the visitation by the board 
of charities is not exclusive of any visitation then provided by law, 
which would clearly include the visitation by the superintendent of 
public instruction. . 

Another case in point is that of Asylum v. Phocni.v Bank, 
4 Conn. 172. Here a corporation had for its sole object the 
education and instruction of the deaf and dumb, which sup- 
ported and instructed indigent persons of that class gratui- 
tously, received a pecuniary compensation from pupils of 
abilit}' to make it, derived its means of dispensing charity 
from the donations of individuals and of the public, and ap- 
plied its funds exclusively to the general object of its institu- 
tion. The court said, at pages 177-8: — 

The American Asylum may, with the strictest propriety, be defined, 
an incorporated school for charitable purposes. It is a school, which is a 
generic term, denoting an institution for instruction or education; and 
from the nature of its object, is a private incorporation. Its objects and 
operations are all of a private character; and the donations of States to 
aid in effectuating them, do not, in the minutest degree, change its 
nature. The institution is exclusively ''for charitable purposes;" its 
sole object being to pour instruction into the minds of the deaf and 
dumb; to elevate them from the lowest degradation of intellect to the 
dignity of inteUigent, and fit them to become moral and rehgious beings ; 
to open their blind eyes, and unstop their deaf ears; and to accomphsh 
this, through the means of funds, derived from the gratuities of the be- 
nevolent. A purpose so honorable and noble, and free from the dross of 
self-interest, brings the American Asylum peculiarly within the spirit, 
as it is ob\'iously within the letter, of the law, which authorizes a com- 
pulsorv subscription of the stock of the Phoenix Bank. The Asylum, in 
no sense of the expression, is a money-making institution. All its funds 
are necessarily applicable to the charitable object of educating the deaf 
and dumb; and this is done gratuitously, except so far as the power of 
doing is enlarged, by the sums paid for instruction, by the rich and able. 
By this operation, the funds of the institution are not absorbed, but 
augmented; the charitable object of the As3dum is not diminished, but 
promoted; and the nature of it is not changed, but pursued. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 237 

It is my opinion that the Clarke School for the Deaf is a 
charitable institution within the meaning of chapter 402 of the 
Acts of 1903, and that a report should be made annually to 
the State Board of Charity. The Clarke School was incor- 
porated for the purpose of benefiting a class of defectives who 
are most seriously handicapped in their struggle for existence 
and in their participation in the blessings of life. Such was 
the noble end of the founders of the school, and these pur- 
poses and aims have never been lost sight of by those having 
the care and education of this weaker portion of our society. 
To suggest that such an institution is not charitable would 
seem to cast a reflection on the school and all those interested 
in its achievements. That it is also an educational institution 
in no way lessens its charitable nature. There would seem to 
be no reason why many institutions may not be both chari- 
table and educational, and the fact that this school, by reason 
of its educational features, submits a report to the State Board 
of Education is no reason in itself why it ought not to report 
likewise to the State Board of Charity. 

It might also be argued that the Legislature intended to 
give the State Board of Charity supervision over all institu- 
tions which exercise a control over the weaker elements of 
society, as a guard against the abuse of the confidence reposed 
in them by the contributing public, and as a protection to the 
unfortunates intrusted to their care, the latter being obviously 
handicapped in any effort to protect themselves. 
Very truly yours, 

Thomas J. Boynton, Atiomcy-GeneraL 



238 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



INDEX TO OPINIONS. 



PAGE 

Agricultural societies, bounties; interpretation of 12-mile restriction, . 8 
Agriculture, Board of, authority to award prizes for system of farm book- 
keeping and plan of dairy barn. ...... 58 

Alimony, provision for, on annulment ot marriage, 
Assessors, first assistant, of Boston, civil service rules, . 
Automobiles and motor vehicles, regulation of operation in the town of 
Nantucket; constitutional law, ..... 

Boards of health, appointment of member as inspector of slaughtering 
approval by State Board of Health, .... 

Bond, certificate of renewal of, ...... • 

Boston, Cape Cod & New York Canal Company, deposit with Treasurer 
and Receiver-General, ....... 

Boston Transit Commission, extension of term of office; constitutional 
law, ........•• 

Building laws, application of, building containing two or more establish 

ments each employing less than ten persons, . 
Call fireman, appointment to permanent force without civil service exam 
ination, captain, ........ 

Certificate, increase of capital stock, filing fee, .... 

Issued by building inspectors, revocation, .... 

Of renewal, bond filed with State Treasurer, .... 

Charitable corporations, educational institutions, returns, 
Charters, general municipal corporation act ; constitutional law. 
Cities and towns, bonds and notes, municipal debts, 

Liability of, for injuries resulting from accidents in manual training 
schools, ......... 

Sales of land acquired for a public domain; supervision of State 
Forester, expenses, ....... 

Citizens of the United States, employment of, by a city, discharge of 
non-citizens, civil service, ...... 

Civil service, appointment of call fireman to position of captain of per 
manent force without civil service examination. 
Certification of laborer or mechanic having had experience in the de- 
partment making requisition, to fill vacancy in position of fore- 
man or inspector, ......... 200 

Citizens of United States, employment of, by a city, discharge of 

non-citizens, . . . . . . . . .179 

Department of Health, employees of State Board of Health, . 
Eligibility of person above fifty years of age for appointment as in 

spector of factories and public buildings. 
First assistant assessors of Boston, ..... 

Inspectors of masonry construction, building inspectors, . 
Sealers of weights and measures, election of, provided for by city 
charters, ......... 

Tenure of office of, in certain towns, annual appointment, 
Ci\'il Service Commission, approval of appointments to planning board 

of Boston, .......... 38 



60 
56 

66 

31 
92 

164 

139 

225 

35 
111 
184 

92 
230 
215 
141 

221 

223 

179 

35 



177 

17 

56 

198 

94 
11 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 239 



Civil war veteran, gratuities, re-enlistment as substitute, 
Clerks of court, assistant clerks, clerks pro tempore, 

Naturalization fees, ........ 

Cold-storage eggs, sales in storage, interstate shipments, 
Commutation of life sentence to imprisonment for a term of years; con 
stitutional law, ........ 

Constitutional law, appropriation of public funds for relief of sufferers by 
Salem fire, ......... 

Authority of cities and towns to harvest and sell ice. 
Authority to enact general municipal corporation act; power of city 
to amend charter, ....... 

Authority to fix time for filing report by grade crossing commission, 

Authority to take water from interstate stream, damages to non 

residents, ......... 

Boston Transit Commission, extension of term of, . 
Guaranty by Commonwealth of bonds of a railroad corporation. 
Members of the bar to be made justices of the peace and notaries 
public, ......... 

Newspapers and periodicals, sole agents for the sale of, . 
Plumbers, interference with freedom of contract. 
Publication of name of drugs or chemicals taken with suicidal intent, 
Publication of name of person arrested for drunkenness, . 
Regulation of automobiles and motor vehicles in the town of Nan 
tucket, ......... 

Regulation of compensation of employees of railroads. 
Regulation of corporations, representation of minority stockholders on 
boards of directors, ....... 

Regulation of price of gas, Boston Consolidated Gas Company, con 
tract, .......... 

Regulation of price of ice, great ponds, ..... 

Regulation of sale of tickets to places of amusement, 
Taxation of industries, exemptions, ..... 

Trading stamps, excise taxes, license fees, .... 

Contract, reference to specifications as an aid in interpreting, 

Rejection of bids, liability, ....... 

Co-operative banks, loans, reduction in rate of interest, 
Corporations, certificate of increase of capital stock, filing fee. 

Representation of minority stockholders on boards of directors, con- 
stitutional law, ........ 

County commissioners, reimbursement of expenses. 

Directors of the Port of Boston, interpretation of "entire time to the work 
of the directors," ........ 

District Police, inspector of factories and public buildings, transfer from 
State Board of Labor and Industries, .... 

Divorce certificate presented by divorced person seeking marriage license 
English language, ....... 

Drugs or chemicals, publication of name of, when taken with suicidal in- 
tent, constitutional law, ...... 

Drunkenness, publication of name of person arrested for; constitutional 
law, .......... 

Education, Board of, supervisory powers, textile schools supported or 
aided by Commonwealth, . . . . 

Employees, fines imposed for damage caused bj' their negligence or mis- 
conduct, ......... 

In manufacturing or mercantile establishments; twenty-four hours 
rest in every seven days, ...... 



PAGE 

166 
173 

77 
196 



168 
44 

215 
81 

124 
139 
156 

9 

23 

132 

62 

20 

66 
162 

121' 

152 

145 

89 

74 

96 

14 

160 

213 

111 

121 
181 

186 



105 

62 

20 

144 

222 

21 



240 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



Expenses for travel, etc., necessarily incurred by persons in the service of 

the Commonwealth, allowance of, . . . . . .86 

Fines imposed upon employees for damage caused by their negligence or 

misconduct, ......... 222 

Fire Prevention Commissioner, appointees subject to civil service rules, . 207 

Fisheries and Game, Commissioners on, retention by city and town clerks 

of hunters' certificates of registration, ..... 36 
Traveling expenses, reimbursement, ...... 86 

Framingham Normal School, erection and furnishing of dormitory; 

laundry 183 

Gas, regulation of price of, contract, Boston Consolidated Gas Company; 

constitutional law, ........ 152 

Glass bottles or jars used in the distribution of milk or cream; use for 

other purposes, ......... 65 

Grade crossing, authority of Legislature to fix time for filing of report by 

commission; constitutional law, . . . . . .81 

Great ponds, authority of Harbor and Land Commissioners to limit public 

right to take ice, ......... 52 

Health, Department of, employees of State Board of Health, civil service, 177 

Health, State Board of, right to refuse approval of appointment by local 
board of health of one of its own members as inspector of slaugh- 
tering, 31 

Highways, discretion of Massachusetts Highway Commission as to mate- 
rials to be used in construction of, . . . . . .190 

Hospitals and dispensaries, registered pharmacists in charge of drug-dis- 
pensing departments, ........ 27 

Hospitals, State, salaries of appointees of trustees, subject to approval of 

Governor and Council, ........ 48 

Hours of labor, chauffeurs employed as drivers of police patrol, 8-hour 

law, ........... 42 

Drivers or hostlers in Boston police department, police officers, 8-hour 

law, 172 

Employees in manufacturing or mercantile establishments; twenty- 
four hours' rest in every seven days, . . . . .21 

Employment of citizens or residents of Massachusetts on public works 

outside the State ; 8-hour law, ...... 25 

Materials and supplies used in public works, 8-hour law, . . 182 

Minors, employed as bookkeepers, stenographers, clerks and clerical 

assistants, .......... 3 

Minors, liability of employers and parents, notice, .... 137 

Hunters' certificates of registration, books of; retention by city and town 

clerks, 36 

Ice, cutting of, on great ponds; jurisdiction of Harbor and Land Commis- 
sioners, .......... 52 

Harvesting and selling of, by cities and towns; constitutional law, . 44 
Regulation of price of, taken from great ponds; constitutional law, . 145 

"Illegitimate," use of term in record of the birth of a child, ... 10 

Imprisonment, term of, expiring on Sunday, prisoner to be discharged 

when, ........... 105 

Insane hospital, State, duty of trustees as to mail of inmates, . . 101 

Inspector of buildings, eligibility of person above fifty years of age for 

appointment as, . . . , . . . . .17 

Revocation of certificates issued by, . . . . . .184 

Transfer from State Board of Labor and Industries to District Police, 1 

Inspector of masonry construction, actual experience as journeyman 

mason, .......... 198 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 241 



Inspector of slaughtering, appointment by local board of health of one of 

its members, approval by State Board of Health, . . .31 

Insurance company, pecuniary interest of member of finance committee 

in investments, ......... 90 

Investments in mortgage bonds; "funded indebtedness," "contin- 
gent liability," ......... 29 

Insurance policies, internal revenue tax thereon, rebates, . . . 205 

Intoxicating liquors, violation of laws relative to; entry oi nolle prosequi, . 188 
Justices of the peace, all members of the bar to be made such; constitu- 
tional law, .......... 9 

Labor, construction outside the Commonwealth of materials to be used in 

public works, ......... 85 

Legislature, members of, eligibility for appointment to office, . .119 

Liability of city or town for damages for personal injuries when school- 
houses are used for municipal and other purposes, ... 83 
License, special, engineer's or fireman's, termination of; continuous em- 
ployment, .......... 6 

Status during pendency of appeal on conviction of licensee for viola- 
tion of its terms, . . . . . . . . .41 

Trading stamps, fees; constitutional law, ..... 96 

Loan agencies, expenses of loans, interest, ...... 226 

Lowell, sealer of weights and measures of, civil service rules, . . .94 

Mail of inmates of State insane hospital, duty of trustees, . . .101 

Manual training schools, liability of cities and towns for injuries resulting 

from accidents, . . . . . . . . .221 

Massachusetts Highway Commission, discretion as to materials to be 

used in construction of highways, ...... 190 

Metropolitan Park Commission, authority to release land abutting on 

parkway from operation of restrictions, ..... 202 

Milk or cream, use of glass bottles or jars used in the distribution thereof, 

use for other purposes, ........ 65 

Minors, hours of employment of, as bookkeepers, stenographers, clerks 

and clerical assistants, ........ 3 

Liability of employers and parents as to hours of labor, notice, . . 137 

Naturalization fees, portion that may be retained by clerks of courts, . 77 

Newspapers and periodicals, sole agents for sale of; constitutional law, . 23 
Notaries public, all members of the bar to be made such; constitutional 

law, 9 

Officers appointed by trustees of State hospitals, salaries, approval by 

Governor and Council, ........ 48 

Parole, violation of, duration of sentence of prisoner, .... 109 

Pharmacists, registered, in hospitals and dispensaries, . . . .27 

Stockholders in corporation; application for permit, ... 53 

Pharmacy, Board of Registration in, duty to pass upon each application 

for permit to do drug business, ...... 27 

Planning board of Boston, approval by Civil Service Commission of ap- 
pointments to, ......... 38 

Plumbers, interference with freedom of contract; constitutional law, . 132 

Police officers, special, chauffeurs employed as drivers of police patrol, 

hours of labor, ......... 42 

Poultry associations, aid from poultry premium bounty fund, . . 103 

Prison Camp, employment of prisoners, limitations, . . . .210 

Public documents, disposition of, by cities and towns^ . . • .93 

Public institution, authority of trustees to lay water pipes in streets, . 220 

Public records, use of the term "illegitimate" in record of the birth of a 

child 10 



242 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



PAGE 

Public works, construction of materials and supplies, S-hour law, . . 182 

Construction of materials outside the Commonwealth by non-citizens, 85 
Employment of citizens or residents of Massachusetts thereon out- 
side the Commonwealth, ...... 

Wages of laborers and mechanics employed thereon, 
Railroad corporation, guaranty by Commonwealth of bonds of; constitu- 
tional law, ......... 

Railroad employees, regulation of compensation; constitutional law. 

Rebates, internal revenue tax on insurance policies, 

Registers of deeds, adjustment of salaries, ..... 

Residence of applicants for admission to industrial schools, 

Restrictions, authority of Metropolitan Park Commission to release land 

abutting on parkway from operation of , . 
Riparian proprietors, liability of Commonwealth for damages caused by 
construction of bridge, ....... 

Salaries of appointees of trustees of State hospitals, approval by Governor 
and Council, ........ 

Salem fire, appropriation of public funds; constitutional law, . 
Savings bank, board of investment, property held by member thereof and 
mortgaged to bank, ....... 

Investments, municipal bonds, ...... 

Schoolhouses, use for municipal and other purposes; liability of city or 
town for damages for personal injuries, .... 

Schools, domicil of parent, responsibility for tuition of pupil, . 
Residence of applicants for admission to industrial schools. 
Transportation of pupils to cities and towns other than that of resi- 
dence; claims for board; returns of school committees as to 
expenditures for preceding year, ..... 

Tuition of nonresident pupils, average expense for each pupil, . 
Sealers of weights and measures, exemption from civil service rules, city 
charter, ......... 

Tenure of office, deputy sealers, civil service, .... 

Use of printed facsimile signature, ..... 

Shuttles, suction, use of, in factories, ...... 

Signature, printed facsimile, use of, bj^ sealers and deputy sealers of weights 
and measures, ........ 

Typewritten, validity of, ...... . 

State bonds, duty of the Treasurer and Receiver-General as to disclosing 
names of purchasers of, ...... 

State Forester, receipts from sales of trees, wood, etc., disposition of. 

Supervision of land acquired by cities and towns for public domain, 
expenses, ......... 

Statistics, Bureau of, certification of town notes by Director, irregularity 
in form of vote of town, . . . . . 

Determination by Director as to necessity for emergency appropria- 
tions by towns, ........ 

Superintendency Union, towns required to belong to, . 
Surgical operations on inmates of State institutions without the consent 
of the patient, ........ 

Tax returns, inspection of, for purposes other than assessment or collection 
of taxes, ......... 

Taxation of industries, exemptions; constitutional law, . 
Teachers' Retirement Fund, interruption of service, effect of, . 

Substitute teachers, participation in, .... . 

Textile schools supported or aided by Commonwealth, supervisory powers 
of Board of Education, ....... 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 243 



PAGE 

Tickets to places of amusement, power of Legislature to regulate sale of; 

constitutional law, ........ 89 

Town notes, certification by Director of Bureau of Statistics, irregularity 

in form of vote, ......... 33 

Towns, emergency appropriations, determination of Director of Bureau 

of Statistics as to necessity for, . . . . . .18 

Trading stamps, license to be obtained from county auditors; license fees; 

constitutional law, ........ 96 

Transportation of pupils attending school in cities or towns other than 

that of residence; claims for board, ..... 43 

Trust companies, use of word "bank" as part of business name, . . 73 

Tuition of minor, responsibility for; domicil, . . . . .217 

Water, authority to take, from interstate stream; damages to property 

of nonresidents, ......... 124 

Water pipes in streets, authority of trustees of public institutions to lay, . 220 

Workmen's Compensation Act, gypsy and brown-tail moth suppression, 
cities and towns, reimbursement for expenses incurred for per- 
sonal injuries, ......... 136 



LIST OF CASES 



IN WHICH THE 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL 



HAS APPEARED 



DuEis"G THE Year 1914. 



GEADE CROSSINGS. 



Notices have been serve^ upon this department of the filing 
of the following petitions for the appointment of special com- 
missioners for the abolition of grade crossings : — 

BerTcsMre County. 

Adams. Hoosac Valley Street Railway Company, petitioners. 
Petition for abolition of Commercial Street crossing in 
Adams. George W. Wiggin, William W. McClench and 
Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. Commis- 
sioners' report filed. Frank H. Cande appointed auditor. 
Auditor's fourth report filed. Disposed of. 

Great Barrington, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of a grade crossing in the village of Housatonic in 
said town. John J. Flaherty, Edmund K. Turner and 
Stephen S. Taft appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. Frank N. Nay appointed auditor. Auditor's 
third report filed. Disposed of. 

Lanesborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of Valley Eoad and Glen Eoad crossings. Eailroad Com- 
missioners appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 
filed. Frank H. Cande appointed auditor. Auditor's sec- 
ond report filed. Pending. 

North Adams. Hoosac Valley Street Eailway Company, peti- 
tioners. Petition for abolition of Main Street crossing, 
Imown as Braytonville crossing, in North Adams. Edmund 
K. Turner, William W. McClench and Joseph P. Magenis 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Frank H. Cande appointed auditor. Auditor's second re° 
port filed. Disposed of. 

North Adams, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition 
for abolition of State Street and Furnace Street crossings. 
Edmund K. Turner, David F. Slade and William G, 
McKechnie appointed commissioners. Commissioners' re- 
port filed. Pending. 



248 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Pittsfield;, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Merrill crossing in Pittsfield. Thomas W. Ken- 
nefick, Frederick L. Green and Edmimd K. Turner ap- 
pointed commissioners. Pending. 

Stockbridge, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of " Eiver Eoad " crossing in Stockbridge. James B. Car- 
roll, Edward B. Bishop and Luther Dean appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Wade Keyes ap- 
pointed auditor. Auditor's second report filed. Disposed 
of. 

Stockbridge, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
South Street crossing. Railroad commissioners appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. A. W. DeGoosh 
appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Stockbridge. Berkshire Railroad, petitioner. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Glendale station crossing. Pending. 

West Stockbridge, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of ^rad'e crossing at Albany Street. James D. 
Cote. Charles W. Bosworth and James L. Tighe appointed 
commissioners. Pending. 

Bristol County. 

Attleborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of West Street, North Main Street and other crossings in 
Attleborough. James R. Dunbar, Henry L. Parker and 
William Jackson appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. Chas. P. Searle appointed auditor. Auditor's 
seventh report filed. Disposed of. 

Fall River, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Brownell Street crossing and other crossings in 
Fall River. John Q. A. Brackett, Samuel N". Aldrich and 
Charles A. Allen appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. Auditor's 
nineteenth report filed. Disposed of. 

Mansfield. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at North Main, Chauncey, Central, West, 
School and Elm streets in Mansfield. Samuel L. Powers, 
Stephen S. Taft and Wm. Jackson appointed commis- 
sioners. George F. Swain appointed commissioner in place 
of Wm. Jackson, deceased. Pending. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 249 

New Bedford, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of certain grade crossings in New Bedford. George 
F. Eichardson, Horatio G. Herrick and Wm. Wheeler ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Fred 
E. Jones appointed auditor. Auditor's fifteenth report 
filed. Disposed of. 

Somerset. New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Com- 
pany, petitioner. Petition for abolition of grade crossing at 
Wilbur Avenue. James D. Colt, Henry H. Baker and 
Louis Perry appointed commissioners. Commissioners' re- 
port filed. Edward A. Thurston appointed auditor. Audi- 
tor's first report filed. Pending. 

Swansea. New York, New Haven & Hartford Eailroad Com- 
pany, petitioner. Petition for abolition of grade crossing at 
Eiver Eoad. James D. Colt, Henry H. Baker and Louis 
Perry appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 
filed. Edward A. Thurston appointed auditor. Auditor's 
first report filed. Pending. 

Taunton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of grade crossings at Danforth and other streets in 
Taunton. Thomas M. Babson, George F. Swain and Edwin 
U. Curtis appointed commissioners. Charles H. Beckwith 
appointed commissioner in place of Thomas M. Babson, 
deceased. Commissioners' report filed. James A. Stiles 
appointed auditor. Pending. 

Essex County. 

Gloucester. Boston & Maine Eailroad, petitioner. Petition for 
abolition of crossings at Magnolia Avenue and Brays cross- 
ing. Arthur Lord, Moody Kimball and P. H. Cooney ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. A. 
AV. DeGoosh appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. 
Pending. 

Gloucester. Directors of Boston & Maine Eailroad, petitioners. 
Petition for abolition of grade crossing between Washing- 
ton Street and tracks of Boston & Maine Eailroad. Pend- 
ing. 

Haverhill, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Washington Street and other crossings in 
Haverhill. George W. Wiggin, William B. French and Ed- 
mund K. Turner appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. E. A. 



250 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

McLaughlin appointed auditor in place of Fred E. Jones, 
deceased. Auditor's fifteenth report filed. Pending. 

Ipswich, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
High Street and Locust Street crossings. Geo. W. Wiggin, 
Edmund K. Turner and William F. Dana appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Fred E. Jones ap- 
pointed auditor. E. A. McLaughlin appointed auditor in 
place of Fred E. Jones, deceased. Auditor's fourth report 
filed. Pending. 

Lawrence, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of crossing at Merrimac and other streets in 
Lawrence. Robert 0. Harris, Edmund K. Turner and 
Henry V. Cunningham appointed commissioners. Pending. 

L}Tin, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Summer Street and other crossings on Saugus 
branch of Boston & Maine Railroad and Market Street and 
other crossings on main line. George W. Wiggin, Edgar R. 
Champlin and Edmund K. Turner appointed commis- 
sioners. Commissioners' report filed. Edward A. McLaugh- 
lin appointed auditor. Auditor's third report filed. Pend- 
ing. 

Lynn, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of grade crossings at Pleasant and Shepard streets. Gas 
A^Tiarf Road and Commercial Street, on the Boston, Revere 
Beach & Lynn Railroad. Pending. 

Salem. Directors of Boston & Maine Railroad, petitioners. Peti- 
tion for the abolition of grade crossings at Bridge, Wash- 
ington, Mill, North, Flint and Grove streets in Salem. 
Patrick H. Cooney, George F. Swain and William A. Dana 
appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Salem, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Lafayette Street crossing in Salem. Pending. 

Franhlin County. 

Deerfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
" Upper Wisdom Road " crossing. Edmund K. Turner, Cal- 
vin Coolidge and Hugh P. Drysdale appointed commis- 
sioners. Commissioners' report filed. Lyman W. Griswold 
appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Erving, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing on the road leading from Millers Falls to 
Northfield. Pending. 



1915.J PUBLIC DOCraiEXT — No. 12. 251 

Greenfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of Allen and Eussell streets crossings in Greenfield. Ed- 
mund K. Turner, Walter P. Hall and Fred D. Stanley 
appointed commissioners. Stephen S. Taft appointed au- 
ditor. Auditor^s first report filed. Pending. 

Greenfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at Silver Street. Stephen S. Taft, Henry 
P. Field and Thomas J. O'Connor appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. Pending. 

Northfield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
crossing on road to South Vernon. Edmund K. Turner, 
Charles W. Hazelton and Charles H. Innes appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. James J. Irwin 
appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Hampden County. 

Palmer, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Burley's crossing in Palmer. Pending. 

Russell, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Mont- 
gomery Eoad crossing. Eailroad Commissioners appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Thomas "W. 
Kennefick appointed auditor. Auditor's third report filed. 
Pending. 

Westfield, Attorney-General, petitioner. Petition for abolition 
of grade crossings at Lane's and Lee's crossings in West- 
field. Patrick H. Cooney, Richard W. Irwin and Franklin 
T. Hammond appointed commissioners. Chas. E. Hibbard 
appointed commissioner in place of Richard W. Irwin, re- 
signed. Commissioners' report filed. Walter F. Frederick 
appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 

Hampshire County. 

Amherst, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossings at Whitney, High and Main streets. Rail- 
road Commissioners appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Belchertown, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the aboli- 
tion of crossing of road from Belchertown to Three Rivers 
and road from Bondville to Ludlow. Edmund K. Turner, 
F. G. Wooden and George P. O'Donnell appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Wm. H. Feiker 
appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. Pending. 



252 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Middlesex County. 

Acton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Great 
Eoad crossing in Acton. Benj. W. Wells, George D. Bur- 
rage and William B. Sullivan appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. Fred Joy appointed auditor. 
Pending. 

Belmont, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
crossings at Waverley station. Thomas W. Proctor, Pat- 
rick H. Cooney and Desmond FitzGerald appointed com- 
missioners. Pending. 

Chelmsford, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at Middlesex Street. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo- 
lition of Marble Street crossing. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo- 
lition of Concord Street crossing. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo- 
lition of Waverly Street crossing. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo- 
lition of Bishop Street crossing. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo- 
lition of Hollis and Waushakum streets crossings. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abo- 
lition of Claflin Street crossing. Pending. 

Framingham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of grade crossing at Willis Crossing. Pending. 

Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for abo- 
lition of Middlesex and Thorndike streets crossings. George 
F. Swain, Patrick H. Cooney and Nelson H. Brown ap- 
pointed commissioners. Pending. 

Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for abo- 
lition of Boston Eoad or Plain Street, School, Walker and 
Lincoln streets crossings. Arthur Lord, David F. Slade and 
Henry A. Wyman appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. A. W. DeGoosh appointed auditor. Audi- 
tor's eighth report filed. Pending. 

Lowell, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for abo- 
lition of crossing at Western Avenue and Fletcher Street. 
Pending. 

^Jalden, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for abo- 
lition of Pleasant and Winter streets crossing in Maiden. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 253 

George W. Wiggin, Edmund K. Turner and Fred Joy ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Win- 
field S. Slocum appointed auditor. Auditor's sixth report 
filed. Pending. 

Marlborough, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Hudson Street crossing in Marlborough. Walter 
Adams, Charles A. Allen and Alpheus Sanford appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pending. 

Xewton, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of Concord Street and Pine Grove Avenue cross- 
ings in Newton. George W. Wiggin, T. C. Mendenhall and 
Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. Pending. 

North Eeading, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Main Street crossing in North Eeading. Alpheus 
Sanford, George N. Poor and Louis M. Clark appointed 
commissioners. Eeport of commissioners filed. Thomas W. 
Proctor appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. 
Pending. 

Somerville, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Park Street, Dane Street and Medford Street 
crossings' in Somerville. George W. Wiggin, George F. 
Swain and James D. Colt appointed commissioners. Com- 
missioners' report filed. Patrick H. Cooney appointed audi- 
tor. Auditor's tenth report filed. Pending. 

Somerville, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Somerville Avenue crossing in Somerville. 
George W. Wiggin, George F. Swain and James D. Colt 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Patrick H. Cooney appointed auditor. Auditor's ninth 
report filed. Pending. 

Wakefield, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Hanson Street crossing in Wakefield. Pending. 

Waltham, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of South Street crossing in Waltham. Geo. F. 
Swain, and Geo. A. Sanderson appointed com- 
missioners. Pending. 

Waltham, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Moody Street, Main Street, Elm Street, Eiver 
Street, Pine Street, Newton Street and Calvary Street 
crossings in Waltham. Arthur Lord, Patrick H. Cooney 
and George F. Swain appointed commissioners. Pending. 



254 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Watertown, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossings at Cottage, Arlington, School, Irving and 
other streets in Watertown. Pending. 

Wayland, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at State Eoad. George F. Swain, Harvey 
E. Shepherd and Arthur ^Y. DeGoosh appointed commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

AYeston, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Church Street, Pigeon Hill and Concord Eoad crossings. 
Railroad Commissioners appointed commissioners. Commis- 
sioners' report filed. Joseph W. Lnnd, Esq., appointed 
auditor. Auditor's third report filed. Disposed of. 

Weston, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossings at Central Avenue, Conant Eoad, Church 
and Viles streets. P. H. Cooney, Louis A. Frothingham 
and Andrew M. Lovis appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Winchester, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the aboli- 
tion of crossing at Winchester station square. George W. 
Wiggin, George F. Swain and Arthur Lord appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pending. 

Norfolk County, 

Braintree, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition 
of the Pearl Street crossing at South Braintree. Patrick H. 
Cooney, Frank IST. Nay and George F. Swain appointed com- 
missioners. Pending. 

Braintree. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Eailroad Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at School, Elm, Eiver and Union streets in 
Braintree. John L. Bates, Winfield S. Slocum and Arthur 
H. Wellman appointed commissioners. Commissioners' re- 
port filed. Pending. 

Brookline. Directors of Boston & Albany Eailroad Company, 
petitioners. Petition for the abolition of Kerrigan Place 
crossing in Brookline. William Sullivan, Henry M. Hutch- 
ings and Wade Keyes appointed commissioners. Commis- 
sioners' report filed. Henry M. Hutchings appointed 
auditor. Auditor's second report filed. Disposed of. 

Canton. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Eail- 
road Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Ded- 
ham Eoad crossing in Canton. Samuel L. Powers, Stephen 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 255 

S. Taft and Wm. Jackson appointed commissioners. Com- 
missioners report filed. Recommitted. Pending. 

Dedham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for the abolition of 
Eastern Avenue and Dwight Street crossings in Dedham. 
Alpheus Sanford, Charles Mills and J. Henry Reed ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Fred 
E. Jones appointed auditor. Pending. 

Dover, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of grade 
crossing at Springdale Avenue and Dedham and Haven 
streets. Public Service Commission appointed commis- 
sioners. Pending. 

Foxborough. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossing at Cohasset and Summer streets in Fox- 
borough. Samuel L. Powers, Stephen S. Taft and Wm. 
Jackson appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 
filed. Recommitted. Pending. 

Hyde Park, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Fairmount Avenue and Bridge Street crossings in Hyde 
Park. Boyd B. Jones, Edmund K. Turner and Fred Joy 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Thomas W. Proctor appointed auditor. Auditor's third re- 
port filed. Pending. 

Needham, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Charles River Street crossing in Needham. Pending. 

Quincy. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail- 
road Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Saville 
and Water streets crossings in Quincy. John L. Bates, 
Winfield S. Slocum and Arthur H. Wellman appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Pending. 

Sharon. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford Rail- 
road Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of grade 
crossing at Depot, Garden and Mohawk streets in Sharon. 
Samuel L. Powers, Stephen S. Taft and Wm. Jackson ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Re- 
committed. Pending. 

Walpole, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Oak Street crossing and other crossings in Walpole. Dana 
Malone, Edmund K. Turner and Henry A. Wyman ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. N. L. 
Sheldon appointed auditor. Auditor's fourth report filed. 
Disposed of. 



256 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Westwood. Directors of New York, New Haven & Hartford 
Railroad Company, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Green Lodge Street crossing in Westwood. Samuel L. 
Powers, Stephen S. Taft and Wm. Jackson appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Recommitted. 
Pending. 

Plymouth County. 

Rockland, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
grade crossings at Union and other streets in Rockland. 

Suffolk County. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Dudley Street crossing in Dorchester. Thomas Post, 
Fred Joy and Edmund K. Turner appointed commissioners. 
Commissioners' report filed. James D. Colt appointed au- 
ditor. Auditor's tenth report filed. Pending. 

Boston. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, 
petitioners. Petition for abolition of Neponset and Granite 
avenues crossings in Dorchester. Pending. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Freeport, Adams, Park^ Mill and Walnut streets and 
Dorchester Avenue crossings. James R. Dunbar, Samuel 
L. Powers and Thomas W. Proctor appointed commis- 
sioners. Commissioners' report filed. Arthur H. Wellman 
appointed auditor. Auditor's twentieth report filed. Pend- 
ing. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for the 
abolition of the Essex Street crossing in Brighton. George 
W. Wiggin, William B. French and Winfield S. Slocum 
appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of Blue Hill Avenue and Oakland Street crossings in 
Boston. William B. French, Arthur H. Wellman and 
George A. Kimball appointed commissioners. Commission- 
ers' report filed. Fred E. Jones appointed auditor. Audi- 
tor's twenty-first report filed. Pending. 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of all crossings in East Boston. George W. Wiggin, 
William B. French and Edward B. Bishop appointed com- 
missioners. Commissioners' report filed. Winfield S. Slo- 
cum appointed auditor. Auditor's seventeenth report filed. 
Pending:. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 257 

Boston, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for aboli- 
tion of crossings at Saratoga, Maverick and Marginal 
streets in East Boston. Eailroad Commissioners appointed 
commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. Kobert 0. 
Harris appointed auditor. Auditor's first report filed. 
Pending. 

Bevere, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of Win- 
throp Avenue crossing in Severe of the Boston, Kevere 
Beach & Lynn Eailroad. Pending. 

Worcester County. 

Clinton, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Sterling, Water, Main, High and Woodlawn streets cross- 
ings. George W. Wiggin, William E. McClintock and 
James A. Stiles appointed commissioners. Commissioners' 
report filed. David F. Slade appointed auditor. Frederic 
B. Greenhalge appointed auditor in place of David F. Slade 
deceased. Auditor's sixth report filed. Pending. 

Fitchburg, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 
abolition of Eollstone Street crossing in Fitchburg. Ed- 
mund K. Turner, Edwin U. Curtis and Ernest H. Vaughan 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
James A. Stiles appointed auditor. Auditor's fifth report 
filed. Disposed of. 

Harvard. Boston & Maine Eailroad, petitioner. Petition for 
abolition of a grade crossing near Harvard station. Pend- 
ing. 

Holden, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Dawson's crossing and Cedar Swamp crossing in Holden. 
Charles A. Allen,- Arthur P. Eugg and Henry G. Taft ap- 
pointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. H. 
L. Parker appointed auditor. Auditor's second report filed. 
Pending. 

Hubbardston, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of Depot Eoad crossing in Hubbardston. Pending. 

Leominster, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 
Water, Summer, Mechanic and Main streets crossings. 
George W. Wiggin, George F. Swain and Charles D. Barnes 
appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. 
Eecommitted. Pending. 

Southborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 
of crossing on road from Southborough to Framingham. 



258 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Samuel W. McCall, Louis A. Frothingham and Eugene C. 

Hultman appointed commissioners. Commissioners' report 

filed and recommitted. Pending, 
Southborough, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 

of Main Street crossing at Fayville in Southborough. 

Pending. 
Soutlibridge^ Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition 

of grade crossings at Foster, Central and Hook streets. 

George F. Swain, P. H. Cooney and William F. Garcelon 

appointed commissioners. Pending. 
Webster, Selectmen of, petitioners. Petition for abolition of 

grade crossing at Main Street. Pending* 
West Boylston. Boston & Maine Railroad Company, petitioners. 

Petition for abolition of Prescott Street crossing. Pending. 
Worcester, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 

abolition of crossings at Exchange, Central and Thomas 

and other streets. Arthur Lord, George F. Swain and Fred 

Joy appointed commissioners. Pending. 
Worcester, Mayor and Aldermen of, petitioners. Petition for 

abolition of Grafton Street crossing and eight other cross- 
ings, including alterations of Union Station. James E. 

Dunbar, James H. Flint and George F. Swain appointed 

commissioners. Commissioners' report filed. James A. 

Stiles appointed auditor. Auditor's sixty-eighth report 

filed. Pending. 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCOIEXT — Xo. 12. 259 



CASES ARISING IN THE COURTS 

UNDER THE 

Acts relative to Ixheritaxce axd Succession Taxes. 



Petitions for Instructions. 

Barnstable County. 
Dyer, Henry K., estate of. James P. Warbasse et al._, executors, 
petitioners. Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Berli shire County. 

Barnard, Anna Eliza, estate of. Joseph R. Walker, administra- 
tor c. t. a., petitioner. Pending. 

Smith, Henry L., estate of. Harry Smith, executor, petitioner. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Bristol County. 
Borden, Matthew C. D., estate of. Bertram H. Borden et ah., 
executors, petitioners. Pending. 

Essex County. 

Clines, Mary G., estate of. Catherine A. Laycock, administra- 
trix, petitioner. Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Hoyt, William P., estate of. Charles N'eal Barney, executor, 
petitioner. Pending. 

Lane, Annie B., estate of. Helen N. Allen, executrix, petitioner. 
Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. Decree. 

Meserve, Chastina S., estate of. James W. Leitch, executor, 
petitioner. Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Nichols, Mary C, estate of. Frank 0. Woods, executor, peti- 
tioner. Pending. 



260 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. • [Jan. 

Smith, Robert I., estate of. Sheridan U. Grant, administrator 
c. t. a., petitioner. Petition for abatement of inheritance 
tax. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Hampden Comity. 

Bates, Henry C, estate of. Charles H. Barrows, executor, peti- 
tioner. Decree. 

Bellamy, Charles J., estate of. Asher Allen, administrator c. t. a., 
petitioner. Pending. 

George, Julinah R. C, estate of. Allen Webster, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. Pend- 
ing. 

Moore, Margaret, estate of. Charles H. Barrows, executor, peti- 
tioner. Decree. 

Hampshire County. 
Welton, Walter B., estate of. Henry W. Kidder, administrator, 
petitioner. Pending. 

Middlesex County. 

Aspell, Mary Louise, estate of. Jane L. Quinn, petitioner. 
Decree. 

Bancroft, Frederick, estate of. John F. Moors, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. Decree. 

Barker, Felicia H., estate of. Maria Barker, executrix, peti- 
tioner. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Bouton, Eliza J., estate of. Louis Bell et ah, executors, peti- 
tioners. Rescript. 

Cronin, William P., estate of. Ha-nnah J. Thomassin, executor, 
petitioner. Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Hobart, William D., estate of. Clarence P. Weston, administra- 
tor c. t. a., petitioner. Petition for abatement of inherit- 
ance tax. Decree. 

Palmer, Edward H., estate of. Emily M. Palmer et als., exec- 
utors, petitioners. Pending. 

Perry, Emery B., estate of. Thomas Weston, executor, peti- 
tioner. Pending. 

Proudfoot, David, et al. v. Third Congregational Society in 
Cambridge et al. Decree. 

Scott, Julia A., estate of. Emma E. Doty, executrix, petitioner. 
Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. Pendinof. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 261 

Slater, Andrew C, estate of. Joseph T. Brown et al., executors, 
jDetitioners. Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

AVolfe, Georgette Enieline, estate of. Newton Trust Company, 
administrator, petitioner. Decree. 

Norfolk County. 

Hill, William H., estate of. William H. Hill et ah, trustees, 
petitioners. Decree. 

Mchols, Luc}^, estate of. Edward H. Xichols et aJ., administra- 
tors, petitioners. Petition for abatement of inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Tobin, Ellen A., estate of. William Sullivan, executor, peti- 
tioner. Pending. 

Tobin, Lawrence, absentee, estate of. Howard A. Wilson, re- 
ceiver, petitioner. Pending. 

Plymouth County. 

Blenkinsop, James S., estate of. John E. Mills, administrator, 
petitioner. Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Killoran, Catherine, estate of. Harry W. Flagg, administrator. 
Decree. 

Low, Cordelia A., estate of. John F. Low, executor, petitioner. 
Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. Attorney-Gen- 
eral waived right to be heard. 

Peirce, Harriot 0., estate of. "Osgood Putnam, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. Pending. 

Suffolk County. 

Amorv, Arthur, estate of. Ingersoll Amory, trustee, petitioner. 
Decree. 

Babcock, Lucy F., estate of. Joseph C. Hagar, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Bliss, Cornelius X., estate of. Cornelius N". Bliss, Jr., et ah., 
executors, petitioners. Petition for abatement of inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Bliss, Cornelius X., estate of. Cornelius X. Bliss, Jr., et dls., 
executors, petitioners. Pending. 



262 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Burnham, John A.^ estate of. William A. Burnham et ah, peti- 
tioners. Decree. 

Butler, Joanna C, estate of. Wilfred Bolster, executor, peti- 
tioner. Pending. 

Dwight, Mary S., estate of. Grenville Clark et als., petitioners. 
Rescript. 

Henderson, Charles W., estate of. Martha J. Henderson, execu- 
trix, petitioner. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Murdoch, James, estate of. Archibald C. Jurdan et ah, execu- 
tors, petitioners. Attorney- General waived right to be 
heard. 

Park, William D., estate of. Osmond S. Park, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for abatement of inheritance tax. Pend- 
ing. 

Single, Anna Katharina, estate of. Frank Ganter, executor, 
petitioner. Submitted to determination of the court. 

Skinner, Eliza B., estate of. George A. Gardner et ah, trustees, 
petitioners. Pending. 

Tucker, Lawrence, estate of. Robert H. Gardiner et ah, execu- 
tors, petitioners. Petition dismissed. 

Worcester County. 
Buss, Ellen M., estate of. Joseph A. Tjovering, trustee, peti- 
tioner. Pending. 

Invextoeies. 
Berhsliire County. 

Dale}^, Eliza, estate of. Edward A. Fisher, administrator. 
Pending. 

Hall, Sidney L., estate of. Mary R. Hall, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Roberts, Herbert L, estate of. Lura M. Roberts, administratrix. 
Pending. 

Williams, Frederick S., estate of. Edward P. Williams, admin- 
istrator. Dismissed. 

Bristol County. 

Atwood, Lizzie, estate of. Elizabeth M. Tripp, executrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Benson, Susan F., estate of. Azuba A. Bumpus, administrator. 
Dismissed. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 263 

Grilo, Augusto T., estate of. Maria de Estrella Grilo, admin- 
istratrix. Dismissed. 

Hargreaves, Eobert, estate of. Margaret E. Hargreaves, admin- 
istratrix. .Dismissed. 

McFarlane, Eobert, estate of. William James McFarlane, ad- 
ministrator. Dismissed. 

McKenna, Patrick P., estate of. James P. Kiernan, administra- 
tor. Dismissed. 

Murphy, Mary A., estate of. Bridget T. Lord, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Olson, Clara S., estate of. Carl A. Olson, administrator. Dis- 
missed. 

Percival, Amanda M., estate of. Charles X. Kichmond, admin- 
istrator. Dismissed. 

Pokross, Jennie, estate of. Israel Pokross, administrator. Dis- 
missed. 

Sullivan, Mary E., estate of. Anna M. Sullivan, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Essex County. 

Antiello, Gaetana, estate of. Samuele Antiello, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Birenbaum, Etta, estate of. Joseph Birenbaum, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Brown, Lucy E., estate of. Nellie Brown, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Burrill, Louise, estate of. Augustus L. Burrill, administrator. 
Pending. 

Cahill, Martin, estate of. E. B. O^Brien, administrator. Dis- 
missed. 

Crowley, Plindy, estate of. Michael P. Haven, executor. Dis- 
missed. 

Goldthwait, Edward 0., estate of. Clarence £. Goldthwait, exec- 
utor. Dismissed. 

Green, William F., estate of. Margaret Green, administratrix. 
Decree. 

Hennessy, William, estate of. Margaret A. Hennessey, admin- 
istratrix. Dismissed. 

Ilewett, Peter H., estate of. John C. Kane, executor. Dis- 
missed. 

Holdsworth, L. C, estatje of. Lillian A. Edgar, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 



264 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Lyons, Sadie F., estate of. Frank H. Lyons, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Magee, John A., estate of. Bella H. Magee, executrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Magner, Matthew J., estate of. Annie T. Magner, administra- 
trix. Pending. 

Pike, Hattie K., estate of. Grace E. Beard, administratrix 
c. t. a. Dismissed. 

Prescott, Angusta S., estate of. William F. Moyes, admin- 
istrator. Dismissed. 

Rosenthal, Victor, estate of. Ida Rosenthal, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Thompson, Annie B., estate of. Moses W. Thompson, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Franl-Jm County. 
Devino, Louis E., estafe of. Joseph H. Devino, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Hampden Couniy. 

Bien venue, Albina, estate of. Laura A. Renand, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Boucher, Edgar A., estate of. Joseph E. Boucher, adminis- 
trator. ■ Dismissed. 

De Giacomo, Alfonso, estate of. Gaetano Poccardi, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Easton, George A., estate of. Minnie E. Hannum, adminis- 
tratrix. Dismissed. 

GritBn, Eugene, estate of. Thomas Griffin, administrator. Dis- 
missed. 

Guiel, Conrad, estate of. Louis Guiel, administrator. Dis- 
missed. 

Harrington, Mary E., estate of. Margaret L. Harrington, ad- 
ministratrix. Dismissed. 

Kennier, Bartholomew, estate of. Catherine Kennier, admin- 
istratrix. Dismissed. 

Melaszansky, Joseph, estate of. L^rsula J. Melaszansky, admin- 
istratrix. Pending. 

Moriarty, Dennis, estate of. Xorah Moriarty, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 265 

Ilampsliire County. 
Charron, Alfred J., estate of. Cordelia Charron, executrix. 
Dismissed. 

Middlesex County. 

Bartlett, Charles C, estate of. Lewis H. Lovering, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Bedell, Isabelle J., estate of. ]\relanctlion Bedell, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Browne, Caroline L., estate of. George H. Browne, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Calef, Helen M., estate of. Susan M. Barker, administratrix. 
Pending. 

Calivas, Christos, estate of. Caliron Calivas, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Campbell, Thomas D., estate of. Ella R. Campbell, adminis- 
tratrix. Dismissed. 

Cavanaugh, Mary, estate of. Bridget Maher, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Chadbourne, Marshall W., estate of. Addie Chadbourne, execu- 
trix. Pending. 

Collins, Frank H., estate of. Ida I. Collins, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Conners, Ellen, estate of. John P. Conners, executor. Dis- 
missed. 

Crocker, Mae S., estate of. Philander R. Crocker, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Donahoe, Bridget, estate of. Philip ]\IcLaughlin, executor. 
Dismissed. 

Edmands, Hannah B., estate of. George E. Crafts, administra- 
tor. Dismissed. 

Gilchrist, Isabella L, estate of. John J. Briggs et al., executors. 
Dismissed. 

Haderbolets, Joseph, estate of. Mary C. Haderbolets, adminis- 
tratrix. Dismissed. 

Hill, Charles IT., estate of. Aphia C. F. Hill, executor. Dis- 
missed. 

Howard, Joseph W., estate of. Henry C. liache, executor. Dis- 
missed. 

Johnson, Caroline, estate of. Francis B. Burns, administrator. 
Dismissed. 



266 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Lambert^ Alvian L., estate of. William J. Lambert, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Lang, Augustus M., estate of. Harriet E. Lang, executrix. 
Dismissed. 

Lathe, Leonora F., estate of. Leonora M. Lockhart, adminis- 
tratrix. Dismissed. 

Marcbant, Helen L, estate of. Henry J. Marcbant, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

McCall, Bridget, estate of. Joseph L. Keogh, executor. Dis- 
missed. 

Nelson, Charles, estate of. Arthur E. Nelson, executor. Dis- 
missed. 

Pace, John, estate of. Nellie L. Pace, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Pullen, John F., estate of. Harriet L. Pullen, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Eevelle, John J., Jr., estate of. John J. Revelle, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Eobard, Samuel E., estate of. Catherine King, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Sebastiano, Rigoli, estate of. Antonio Paladino, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Shanney, AYilliam, estate of. Patrick Shanney, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Sheehan, Grace E., estate of. George M. Shechan, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Stiles, Diantha L., estate of. William H. Durkee, executor. 
Dismissed. 

Storti, Soccorso, estate of. Sal)atina Storti, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Thompson, William G., estate of. Mary T. Thompson, adminis- 
tratrix. Dismissed. 

Touello, Angelo, estate of. Emiliano Touello, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Norfolh County. 

Davies, John C, estate of. Mary Delilah Da vies, administra- 
trix. Dismissed. 

Kannally, Richard H., estate of. Ellen F. Kannally, adminis- 
tratrix. Dismissed. 

Lockney, Johanna, estate of. Joseph A. Sheehan, administrator. 
Dismissed. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 267 

McPherson, Mary A., estate of. Duncan McPherson, adminis- 
trator. Pending. 

Pasqualone, Francisco^ estate of. J. J. McAnarney, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Pederson, Maria, estate of. John A. Johnson, executor. Dis- 
missed. 

Record, Delphina K., estate of. Sarah A. Waterman, executrix. 
Dismissed. 

Shackett, Adrianna, estate of. Joseph Shackett, administrator, 
c. t. a. Dismissed. 

Wenstrom, Oscar A., estate of. Oscar F. Wenstrom, administra- 
tor. Dismissed. 

Plymouth County. 

Bardwell, Emma M., estate of. Josiah Bardwell, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Brown, Augusta W., estate of. Frank L. Brown, executor. Dis- 
missed. 

Morse, Amos, estate of. Julia M. Pollard, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Suffolk County. 

Amory, Francis, estate of. George A. Goddard et al., adminis- 
trators. Dismissed. 

Barrett, John J., estate of. Delia L. Barrett, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Bartholomew, Susan W., estate of. Sarah B. James, administra- 
trix. Decree. 

Baxter, Albert, estate of. Elizabeth A. Baxter, administratrix. 
Pending. 

Blodgett, Minnie L., estate of. Clement B. Blodgett, adminis- 
trator. Pending. 

Boleisha, Kazimerz C, estate of. Mary Boleisha, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Bullard, Mary, estate of. Annie M. Fitzgerald, executrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Byrne, William P., estate of. Catherine M. Byrne, administra- 
trix. Pending. 

Campbell, Patrick J., estate of. John J. Campbell, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Case}^ Frank, estate of. Abbie Casey, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 



268 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Cliajjlin, Matilda C, estate of. Samuel Chaplin, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Clifford, Mary A., estate of. James E. Clifford, executor. Dis- 
missed. 

Collins, Ellen L. E., estate of. Henry S. Ormsby, executor. 
Dismissed. 

Crane, Lida D., estate of. i^aron M. Crane, executor. Dis- 
missed. 

Crowley, Dennis, estate of. William A. H. Crowley, administra- 
tor. Dismissed. 

Cunningham, William, estate of. James J. Heggie, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Daly, Michael, estate of. Ellen E. Murray, administratrix. 
Pending. 

Damelio, Antonio, estate of. Rose Damelio, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Damelio, Michael, estate of. Genovario Damelio, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Davis, Nicholas J., estate of. Matilda Davis, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Dizwegeleski, Julius, estate of. William W. Clarke, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Dorini, Celestina, estate of. Antonio Dorini, administrator. 
Pending. 

English, Hortense B., estate of. Mary A. Tennyson, adminis- 
tratrix. Dismissed. 

Evers, Erank, estate of. Michael Evers, administrator. Dis- 
missed. 

Fiori, Angelo, estate of. Maria Eiori, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Flaherty, Margaret, estate of. Margaret J. Burns, administra- 
trix. Dismissed. 

Galligan, Brian B., estate of. Richard J. Galligan, administra- 
tor. Decree. 

Giacobbe, Marianna, estate of. Santo Giacobbe, administrator. 
Pending. 

Gibbons, Bernard, estate of. Ellen Gibbons, executrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Griffin, John P., estate of. Irene J. Griffin, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Hart, John H., estate of. William H. Hart, administrator. 
Dismissed. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 269 

Hirshberg, Max, estate of. Louis Schwartz, administrator. Dis- 
missed. 

Holmes, Olive E., estate of. M. Sumner Holbrook, administra- 
tor. Dismissed. 

Johnston, Catharine G., estate of. Julian E. Johnstone, execu- 
tor. Dismissed. 

Kilday, 'Thomas, estate of. Patrick Kilday, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Kilroy, Mary E., estate of. Martin J. Kilro}^, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Lane, John, estate of. Francis W. Lane, administrator. Dis- 
missed. 

Lehmann, Frank G., estate of. James W. Colgan, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Lehmann, Michael, estate of. James W. Colgan, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Littig, Katherine, estate of. Henry Zepp, executor. Dismissed. 

Lucy, Ellen M., estate of. Daniel J. Lucy, administrator. Dis- 
posed of. 

Moriarty, Patrick J., estate of. Edward P. Barry, administra- 
tor. Dismissed. 

O'Brien, Cornelius, estate of. Catherine A. Xash, administra- 
trix. Dismissed. 

O'Earrell, Mary M., estate of. John D. Carmody, executor. 
Dismissed. 

O'Hara, Margaret, estate of. John O'Hara, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

O'Xeil, Ellen, estate of. John O'Xeil, administrator. Dis- 
missed. 

Palma, Cosima, estate of. Xunzio Santaniello, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Peterson, Peter, estate of. Christina Peterson, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Poulos, Thomas, estate of. Amanda Teresa Poulos, adminis- 
tratrix. Dismissed. 

Eeddish, Mary E., estate of. Agnes T. Reddish, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Richardson, Frank, estate of. Willard P. Lombard, administra- 
tor. Dismissed. 

Ridge, John, estate of. Catherine Ridge, administratrix. Dis- 
missed. 



270 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Santoorj, Samuel, estate of. Margaret Mikaelian, executrix. 
Dismissed. 

Scannell, David J., estate of. Margaret J. Scannell, adminis- 
tratrix. Dismissed. 

Shea, Mary A., estate of. John F. Shea, administrator. Pend- 
ing. 

Simpson, Louis A., estate of. Vincent B. Simpson, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Sirvain, Marcelin, estate of. Aglar Sirvain, executor. Dis- 
missed. 

Smith, Sarah M., estate of. A. DeFilippo, executor. Dismissed. 

Stedman, Elizabeth, estate of. Edward Hall, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Sullivan, Daniel J., estate of. Annie T. Sullivan, executrix. 
Dismissed. 

Sullivan, Jeremiah, estate of. Julia Y. Smith, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Tow, Annie, estate of. William E. Burke, executor. Dismissed. 

Wilbur, George A., estate of. Louis T. Wilbur, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Woixestei' County. 

Copp, Charles D., estate of, Isabel C. Copp, executrix. Pend- 
ing. 

Decuyper, Charles L., estate of. Hortense Deeuyper, adminis- 
tratrix. Dismissed. 

Falvey, Richard S., estate of. Nellie L. Lynch, executrix. Dis- 
missed. 

Gaudreau, Adelaide, estate of. Adelard Gaudreau, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 

Hartwell, Eveline E., estate of. Susan R. Hartwell, adminis- 
tratrix. Dismissed. 

Hosmer, Leaffie A., estate of. Merrill Mills Hammond, admin- 
istrator c. t. a. Dismissed. 

Kennedy, Thomas F., estate of. Rose Kennedy, administratrix. 
Dismissed. 

Leary, John J., estate of. Timothy J. Leary, administrator. 
Dismissed. 

Mahoney, James J., estate of. Frank J. Mahoney, adminis- 
trator. Dismissed. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 271 

Mroczska. Maryjanna, estate of. Thomas Mroczska, executor. 

Dismissed. 
Oliveri, Leonardo, estate of. Carmina Oliveri, administratrix. 

Dismissed. 
Setaro, Christopher, estate of. John B. Setaro, administrator. 

Dismissed. 
Steinecke, Henr}-, estate of. Julia Steinecke, administratrix. 

Dismissed. 



272 ATTORXEY-GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



PUBLIC CHAEITABLE TRUSTS. 

Berlisliire Countij. 
Camp, Daniel A., estate of. James B. Turner, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for instructions. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Bristol County. 
Freese, John AYesley, estate of. Helen M. Freese, executrix, 

petitioner. Petition for instructions. Decree. 
Oldfield, Charles T., et al. v. Attorney-General. Petition for 

instructions. Pending. 
White, John, estate of. Irani ^. Smitli, executor, petitioner. 

Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Essex Count y. 

Atwood, Margaret, estate of. Henry B. Little et als., peti- 
tioners. Petition for appointment of petitioners as trus- 
tees. Pending. 

Barr, Henry, estate of. Salem Young Men's Christian Associa- 
tion, petitioner. Petition for authority to sell real estate. 
Decree. 

Beach, Persis A., estate of. Edward F. Childs et ah., formerly 
trustees of the First Methodist Episcopal Church of Law- 
rence, petitioners. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Bonne}^, Nellie H., estate of. George W. Noyes, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for instructions. Submitted to determina- 
tion of the court. 

Cliftondale Chapel x\ssociation. J. Arthur Eaddin, petitioner. 
Petition for appointment of trustee. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Cliftondale Chapel Association. J. Arthur Eaddin, trustee, pe- 
titioner. Petition for license to sell real estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Corliss, Mary, estate of. George H. Carleton, administrator 
c. t. a., petitioner. Petition for instructions. Decree. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 273 

Dole's Pasture Burying Ground Corporation, petitioner. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Submitted to determination of the 
court. 

Gile, David, estate of. Cliarles E. Sawyer, petitioner. Petition 
for appointment of trustee. Attorney-General waived right 
to be heard. 

Hahn, Eliza J., estate of. Charles A. Cross, trustee, petitioner. 
Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Haskins, Leander M., estate of. Grafton Butman, petitioner. 
Petition for appointment of trustee. Pending. 

Hawks, Esther H., estate of. Hannah T. Carret et als., trus- 
tees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of sixth account. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Moore, Martha, estate of. Mary Barker, executrix, petitioner. 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Moseley, Julia M., estate of. Oliver H. Perry et ah, executors. 
Petition for instructions. Submitted to determination of 
the court. 

Moseley, Julia M., estate of. Oliver H. Perry et al., executors, 
petitioners. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Smith, Joseph ^N"., estate of. Henry B. Sprague et ah, executors, 
petitioners. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Stearns, Artemas W., estate of. John P. Sweeney et ah, trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for allowance of first account. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Wingate, Charles, estate of. Charles P. Parker et ah, petitioners. 
Petition for appointment of trustees. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Wingate, Charles, estate of. Charles P. Parker et ah., trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for license to sell real estate. At- 
torney-General waived right to be heard. 

Franl-Jin County. 
Belcher, Eliza, and Mary A. Belcher, estates of. Osgood L. 

Leach et ah, trustees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of 

first account. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 
Delano, Lucy J., estate of. Thomas F. Harrington, petitioner. 

Petition for appointment of trustee. Attorney-General 

waived right to be heard. 
Durkee, Lauriston C, estate of. William G. Packard et ah, 

trustees. Petition to have part of estate set out in fee. 

Attornev-General waived riorht to be heard. 



274 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Fields Simeon A., estate of. Henry W. Montague, trustee, peti- 
tioner. Petition for allowance of third account. Pending. 

Stratton, Abigail, estate of. Frank H. Montague et ah, trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for allowance of tenth account. Pend- 
ing. 

Tilton, Chauncev B., estate of. Otis Hagar et als., trustees, v. 
Attorney-General et al. Petition for modification of de- 
cree. Submitted to determination of the court. 

Hampden County. 

Chapin, Emily J., estate of. Carlos M. Gage, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Conner, Lydia T., estate of. James C. S. Taber, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Dearborn, Danville A., estate of. American Baptist Home Mis- 
sion Society, petitioner. Petition for authority to sell real 
estate. Decree. 

Harkins, Catherine, estate of. John T. Madden, petitioner. 
Petition for appointment of trustee. Attorney-General 
waii'ed right to be heard. 

Monson Academy, Trustees of, v. Attorney-General. Petition 
for instructions. Submitted to the determination of the 
court. 

Moseley, Jane A., estate of. Peter King, petitioner. Petition 
for instructions. Pending. 

Scott, Mary E., estate of. Asbury Methodist Episcopal Church, 
petitioner. Petition for appointment of trustee. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Taylor, Ethan, estate of. Springfield Safe Deposit and Trust 
Company, trustee. Petition for allowance of fourth ac- 
count. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Winter, Sarah J., estate of. Thomas W. Kenefick, executor, pe- 
titioner. Petition for instructions. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Winter, Sarah J., estate of. Wesson Memorial Hospital, peti- 
tioner. Petition for appointment of trustee. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Winter, Sarah J., estate of. Wesson Memorial Hospital, trus- 
tee, petitioner. Petition for authority to sell real estate. 
Pendins:. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 275 

Hampshire County. 

Goodwin, Moses G., trustee under a deed of trust from Carroll 
J. Hasbrook^ petitioner. Petition for authority to transfer 
real estate. Submitted to determination of the court. 

Pusseli Church in Hadley. Francis S. Reynolds^ trustee. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Pending. 

Middlesex Countij. 

Barrett, Martha L., estate of. Frank E. Sircom et als., execu- 
tors, petitioners. Submitted to determination of the court. 

Bugbee, Samuel W., et al. v. Attorney-General. Petition for 
instructions. Pending. 

Bull, Sara C, estate of. Joseph G. Thorp et al. v. John Lund 
et al. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Child, Lydia Maria, estate of. Eleanor G. May, petitioner. Pe- 
tition for leave to transfer trust fund. Dismissed. 

Copeland, Sarah E., estate of. Alba A. Giles, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for allowance of second account. Pending. 

Donaghey, Henry, estate of. William E. Whitney et al. v. Annie 
J. Davenport et al. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Hammond, George P., estate of. EHzabeth F. Johnson, execu- 
trix, petitioner. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Manning, Lucinda, estate of. Petition for appointment of trus- 
tee. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Martin, Webster Warner, estate of. Wesley T. Lee et al., trus- 
tees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of ninth account. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

McEvoy, Elizabeth, estate of. Thomas A. McAvoy, trustee, pe- 
titioner. Petition for allowance of first and final account. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Mellen, William H., estate of. Tow^n of Framingham, petitioner. 
Petition for authority to sell real estate. Pending. 

Eoby, Christopher, estate of. George F. Snow et al., trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for allowance of sixteenth account. 
Attorney-General w'aived right to be heard. 

Simonds, Marshall, estate of. Town of Burlington r. Attorney- 
General. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Tabor, Frances F., estate of. Charles S. Norris, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for allowance of first and final account. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Talbot, Isabella W., estate of. Adelbert L. Wait et al., petition- 
ers. Petition for appointment of trustees. Pending. 



276 ATTORNEY -GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Thompson, Emulus, estate of. Melvin G. Rogers, administrator, 
petitioner. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

White, Daniel, estate of. AVinslow Warren et ah, trustees, peti- 
tioners. Petition for allowance of sixteenth, seventeenth 
and eighteenth accounts. Pending. 

Norfolk County. 

Brigham, Elizabeth F., estate of. New England Trust Com- 
pany et ah., trustees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of 
first account. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Brigham, Elizabeth F., estate of. New England Trust Com- 
pany et als., trustees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of 
second account. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Lee, Henry, estate of. Schuyler S. Bartlett, executor, petitioner. 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Mann, Jonathan, estate of. John F. Brown et ah, executors, 
petitioners. Petition for instructions. Rescript. 

Mann, Jonathan, estate of. Carrie S. Leeds, petitioner. Peti- 
tion for removal of trustee. Pending. 

Quincy, City of, v. James M. Swift, Attorney-General, et ah. 
Petition for authority to sell land held in trust and reinvest 
proceeds. Pending. 

Plymouth County. 
Edgar, James, estate of. Emery M. Low, petitioner. Petition 

for appointment of trustee. Assented to appointment of 

trustee. 
Perritt, Dora, estate of. Henry W. Barnes, administrator c. t. a. 

Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Sujfolk County. 

Amory, Francis I., et ah v. Trustees of Amherst College et ah 
Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Bartlett, Schuyler S., v. William Endicott et ah Petition for in- 
structions. Decree. 

Bird, John H., estate of. Charles T. Gallagher et ah, trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for allowance of fortieth account. 
Pending. 

Brigham, Robert B., estate of. New England Trust Company, 
trustee. Petition for allowance of third account. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 277 

Dewing Memorial v. Attorney-General. Petition for leave to sell 
real estate. Decree. 

Franklin Square House v. A ttorne}^- General. Petition for au- 
thority to sell real estate. Submitted to determination of 
the court. 

Geyer, Mary French, estate of. George H. Car}', trustee, peti- 
tioner. Petition for allowance of first and second accounts. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Gregerson, Mary E., estate of. Zachariah Chafee, trustee, peti- 
tioner. Petition for allowance of first and final account. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Hall, Conray P., et al., trustees, v. Attorney-General. Petition 
for instructions. Pending. 

Hanim, Sarah A., estate of. James W. Moore, administrator 
c. t. a. petitioner. Petition for instructions. Submitted to 
determination of the court. 

Healy, x\nna M., estate of. William Eopes Trask, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Lang, Betsey E., estate of. Enoch Foster, trustee, petitioner. 
Petition for allowance of third and final account. Account 
allowed. 

Lawrence, Abbott, estate of. John Lawrence et ah, trustees, pe- 
titioners. Petition for allowance of twenty-fourth account. 
Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Liversidge, Thomas, estate of. Eichard C. Humphreys et ah., 
trustees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of twenty-sixth 
to thirty-third accounts, inclusive. Attorney-General 
waived right to be heard. 

Liversidge, Thomas, estate of. Clift Eogers Clapp et ah., trus- 
tees, petitioners. Petition for authority to sell real estate. 
Pending. 

Locke, Elbridge W., estate of. Otis Merriam et al., trustees, pe- 
titioners. Petition for instructions. Dismissed. 

Lowe, Janet M., et al. v. Leopold Morse Home for Infirm He- 
brews et al. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Mabie, William L, et al. v. Edwin S. Gardner and the Attorney- 
General. Petition for instructions regarding a public char- 
itable trust under will of Mary Eedding. Pending. 

Eanlett, Leonard B., estate of. Dana D. Holbrook, executor, 
petitioner. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

Eefuge in the City of Boston, The, v. The Bethesda Society. 
Petition for instructions. Decree. 



278 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Sargent, Anna Coombs, estate of. Edmund D. Codman, execu- 
tor, petitioner. Petition for instructions. Attorney-Gen- 
eral waived right to be heard. 

Society for Promoting Theological Education, The, v. Attor- 
ney-General. Petition for leave to sell real estate. Sub- 
mitted to determination of the court. 

Soren, George Wales, estate of. Lucy E. Buffington, petitioner. 
Petition for appointment of trustee. Decree. 

Sterling, Virginia A., estate of. AVilliam H. Ballon et al., exec- 
utors, petitioners. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Thompson, Thomas, estate of. Richards M. Bradley et ah, 
trustees, petitioners. Petition for allowance of second 
account. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Warren Avenue Baptist Church v. Attorney-General. Petition 
for authority to use a certain trust fund. Pending. 

White, Joseph H., ct al. v. Attorney-General. Petition for in- 
structions. Submitted to determination of the court. 

Whitne}^, Sarah W., estate of. Charles A. Stone, trustee, peti- 
tioner. Petition for allowance of first and second accounts. 
Accounts allowed. 

Whitney, Sarah W., estate of. Charles A. Stone, trustee, peti- 
tioner. Petition for authority to sell real estate. Attorney- 
General waived right to be heard. 

Withee, Josiah E., estate of. Daniel S. Davis, executor, peti- 
tioner. Petition for instructions. Pending. 

^Yorcester County. 

Bartlett, Nancy, estate of. Chester F. Williams, petitioner. 
Petition for appointment of trustee. Attorney- General 
waived right to be heard. 

Bemis, George, estate of. Myron A. Young et als., trustees, pe- 
titioners. Petition for allowance of first and second ac- 
counts. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Cummings, Lurinda, estate of. Moses P. Greenwood, executor, 
petitioner. Petition for instructions. Decree. 

Eames, Mary E., estate of. Mount Yernon Cemetery Associa- 
tion, petitioner. Petition for authority to transfer trust 
fund. Attorney- General waived right to be heard. 

Grout, Eliza P., estate of. Robert L. Carter et als., trustees, 
petitioners. Petition for allowance of ninth account. At- 
tornev-General waived risrht to be heard. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 279 

Meagher, Luke, estate of. John W. Sheehan, executor. Petition 
for appointment of trustee. Attorney-General assented to 
petition. 

Newton, Kate L., et als. v. Harry W. Fay et als. Petition for 
instructions. Submitted to determination of the court. 

Pierce, Sarah J., estate of. D. Oscar Putnam et als., petition- 
ers. Petition for authority to transfer trust funds. Attor- 
ney-General waived right to be heard. 

Upton, George C, estate of. Edwin Upton, petitioner. Peti- 
tion for instructions. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 

Williams, Henry, estate of. Eeason T. Lee et als., trustees, v. 
Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States et al. Pe- 
tition for instructions. Decree. 



280 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



SUITS CONDUCTED BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 

Ix Behalf of State Boards axd Commissions. 



The following cases have been reported to this department by 
State boards and commissions, to be conducted by the Attorney- 
General, or under his direction. 

1. Metropolitax Water axd Sewerage Board. 
Petition to the Supreme Judicial and Superior Courts for 
assessment of damages alleged to have been sustained by the 
taking of land, and rights and easements in land, by said board. 

Middlesex County. 
Stoneham, Town of, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Ward, George A., et als. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

^Vorcester County. 
Allen, Byron D., v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 
Allen, Byron D., v. Commlonwealth. Dismissed. 
Bradley, Patrick, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 
Cutting, Louis, administrator, v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 
Wood, J. Frank, et als. v. Commonwealth. Dismissed. 

2. Massachusetts Highway Commission^. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for a jury to assess damages 
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land, or injury to 
land, by said commission. Under agreement with this Common- 
wealth most of these cases are defended by the various towns in 
which the land is situated. 

Barnstable County. 
Gibbs, E. Porter, r. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Wagner, Jeanette, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 281 

BerJcsJiire County. 
Connelly, William H., r. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Eogerson, Sophia, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Stevens, John A., ct al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Hampshire County. 
Flagg, Lucretia Taft, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Xash, Harlan E., et al. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Taft, Kate P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Middlesex County. 
Hogan, James J., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Howe, Louis P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Huntington, Herbert E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
McGee, John P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Mower, Clara I., v. Commonwealth. Settled, 
bourse, Joseph P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Norfolk County. 
Ireson, Jennie E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Jordan, S. Annie, r. Commonwealth. Pending. 
York, Addie A., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Suffolk County, 
Jones, Lizzie E., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Jones, Lizzie E., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
"Williams, William, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

Worcester County. 
Mahan, Annie T., et als. v. Commonwealth. Settled. 
Pay, Foster S., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

3. Board of Harbor and Laxd Commissioners. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages 
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land by said 
commissioners. 

Suffolk Comity. 
Butler, Philip H., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
East Boston Company v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Lamb, George, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Lamb, George, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 



282 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

4. Charles River Basin Commissioners. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages 
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land by said 
commissioners. 

Suffolk County. 
Apthorp, Octave L., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Barstow, Catherine A., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Brown, Rebecca W., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Cotting, Charles E., et al., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Edmands, Katherine B., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Fields, Annie, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hooper, James R., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Hooper, Robert C, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Inches, Louise P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Jewell, Edward, t'. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Niles, Sarah F., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Parker, George W., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Pierce, Katherine C, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Prince, Fannie L., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Prince, Lillian C, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Sears, Mary C, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Sears, Richard D., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Shaw, Francis, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Tarbell, Arthur P., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Taylor, Georgianna 0., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Taylor, Mary M., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Whitney, Christiana S., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Williams, John D., trustee, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

5. Armory Commissioners. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages 
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land by the said 
board. 

Berlshire County. 
Pittsfield & North Adams Railroad et al. v. Commonwealth. 
Pending. 

Essex County. 
Griffin, Henry, v. Commonwealth. Pending, 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 283 



6. State Board of Insanity. 
Petitions to the Superior Court for assessment of damages 
alleged to have been sustained by the taking of land by the said 
board. 

Suffollc County. 
Beatty, John F., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Callahan, George A., et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Flint, James H., et al., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Holbrook, Wellington, et al. v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Kiley, Daniel J., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 
Shea, Julia A., et als., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

7. Mount Everett Reservation Commission. 

Berkshire County. 
Macnaughton, Elizabeth P., v. Commonwealth. Pending. 

8. Directors of the Port of Boston. 
Suffolk County. 
Codman, Edmund D., et al., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pend- 
ing. 
Haskins, Elizabeth S., et al., trustees, v. Commonwealth. Pend- 
ing. 

9. Miscellaneous Cases from Above Commissions. 
Essex County. 
Peed, William H., v. Commonwealth. Claim for damages on 
account of injury to horse on State highway in Gloucester. 
Pending. 
Trembla}^, Paul, v. Commonwealth. Action of tort for injuries 
caused by defect in State highway in East Boston. Pending. 

Middlesex County. 
International Automobile and Vehicle Tire Company v. Com- 
monwealth. Petition for damages to petitioner's property 
caused by change of east 1)ranch of Charles Eiver by Park 
Commission. Pending. 



284 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

McFarland, Mark, v. Edward J. Doyle. Claim for damages ab- 
leged to have been caused b}' collision with motorcycle 
owned by the Metropolitan Park Commission. Settled. 

SuffolJv County. 

Davis, James A., et al. v. Commonwealth et ah Petition to re- 
cover for labor and materials used in construction of sewer. 
Pending. 

De las Casas, William B., et al. v. Sewer Commissioners of 
Revere. Petition for injunction to restrain town from 
obstructing sewer built by the Park Commission for bath 
house. Pending. 

Dickey, Leroy "W., v. Commonwealth et al. Claim for money 
due the petitioner for materials furnished Joseph Wagen- 
bach & Son in the constmction of a section of State high- 
way in Dracut. Pending. 

Doherty, James, v. Edward W. Everson et al. and Metropolitan 
Water and Sewerage Board. Action of tort. Damages 
caused by blasting. Pending. 

Doherty, James, v. Commonwealth. Petition for assessment of 
damages caused by blasting for metropolitan sewer. Pend- 
ing. 

Ellinwood, Ralph E., Commonwealth v. Petition to restrain re- 
spondent from infringing park regulations on Revere boule- 
vard. Pending. 

Ellis, William H., v. Commonwealth. Claim for compensation 
for removing auto truck from Charles River Basin. 
Settled. 

Gibbons, William H., v. Commonwealth. Damage caused by 
blasting in construction of metropolitan sewer. Pending. 

H. B. Smith Company v. Commonwealth. Claim for money due 
under contract for Boston State Hospital. Pending. 

Hildreth Granite Company v. Commonwealth et al. Claim for 
money due the petitioner for materials furnished P. Rosetti 
& Sons in the construction of a section of State highway 
in Revere. Pending. 

Kinmond, John D., v. Commonwealth. Action of tort to recover 
for injuries caused by defect in State highway in Salisbury. 
Disposed of. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCOIEXT — Xo. 12. 285 

Lake, Alexander G., v. Commonwealth. Action of tort to recover 
for injuries caused by defect in State highway in Natick. 
Pending. 

McGinniss, Margaret T., Commonwealth r. Bill in equity to re- 
strain defendant from encroaching on land of the Common- 
wealth. Pending. 

Mereno, Andrew, et ah, Henry P. Walcott et als., v. Petition 
for an injunction enjoining the respondents from violating 
certain rules established by the Metropolitan Water and 
Sewerage Board. Injunction issued. 

Xational Contracting Company et al., Commonwealth v. Action 
of contract to recover on bond. Pending. 

Niland, Michael, v. Commonwealth. Petition for assessment of 
damages caused by blasting for metropolitan sewer. Pend- 
ing. 

Xiland, Michael, v. Edward W. Everson et al. and Metropolitan 
Water and Sewerage Board. Action of tort. Damages 
caused by blasting. Pending. 

Xormile, Francis, v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. Pe- 
tition for a jury to assess damages caused by construction 
of sewer in Eoxbury. Pending. 

Xormile, Francis, v. Edward W. Everson & Co. and Henry H. 
Sprague et aJ. Action of tort. Pending. 

O'Connell, Dennis F., v. Michael J. McGawley et als. Bill of 
complaint to restrain the respondent McGawley from assign- 
ing his interest in a contract entered into with the Metro- 
politan Park Commission. Pending. 

Old Colony Construction Company, Commonwealth v. Action 
of contract to recover on bond. Pending. 

Pacific Surety Company v. Commonwealth et al. Petition to 
recover from McBride & Co. certain sums expended by pe- 
titioner. Pending. 

Smith, Frederick W., et al. v. Commonw^ealth. Claim for money 
due under contract for Boston State Hospital. Pending. 

Waterproof Leatherboard Company, Henry H. Sprague et als., 
Metropolitan Water and Sewerage Board, v. Bill of com- 
plaint to restrain resjoondent from discharging factory 
wastes into Beaver Dam Brook. Pending. 

Waterproofing Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Claim for 
money due for labor performed on Psychopathic Hospital. 
Pending. 



286 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



10. State Boards of Charity and Insaxity. 

Actions of contract pending in tiie Superior Court to recover 
charges for the support of persons in State hospitals. 

Suffolk County. 
Mansfield, Treasurer, v. Adams, town of. Settled. 
Mansfield, Treasurer, v. Horatio N". Allin, executor of the will 

of Abbie N. Tilton. Settled. 
Mansfield, Treasurer, v. Franklin, town of. Settled. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Warren M. Andrews. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Franklin Batch, administrator of the 

estate of Benjamin H. Potter. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Boston, cit}' of. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Boston, city of. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Boston, city of. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Boston, city of. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Charles F. Bushby. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Caroline R. Clasby. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Caroline E. Clasby. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Mary E. Clasby. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Joseph C. Colligan. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. John J. Cronin, administrator of the 

estate of Mary Murphy. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Fall River, city of. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. John Grieneeks. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Michael Harper, guardian. Settled. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Lowell, city of. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. New Bedford, city of. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Newton, city of. Settled. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Newton, city of. Settled. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Emma C. Russell, guardian. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Rutland, town of. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Josiah Ryder. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Thomas J. Sexton, guardian. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, r. Julia Tully. Pending. 
Stevens, Treasurer, v. Louise C. Westcott. Pending. 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMEXT — No. 12. 287 



MISCELLANEOUS CASES. 



Abbott, Lillian, administratrix of the estate of Eunice M. Ab- 
bott, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inher- 
itance tax. Pending. 

Acme White Lead and Color Works v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1914 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Adams, Fannie A., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Billerica. Pending. 

Ahmeek Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Ahmeek Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Ahmeek Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Aldrich, Frank E., petitioner. Petition to register title to land 
in Xorthfield. Pending. 

Algomah Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Algomah Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Allouez Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Allouez Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Amalgamated Xevada Mines Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 



288 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Amalgamated Nevada Mines Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

American Agricultural Chemical Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

American Agricultural Chemical Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

American Agricultural Chemical Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

American Axe and Tool Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

American Axe and Tool Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

American Bank Note Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Final decree. 

American Bank Note Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Final decree. 

American Brass Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid hy foreign corpora- 
tion. Final decree. 

American Brass Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Final decree. 

American Can Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

American Can Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

American Can Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 
American Can Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1914 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pendinor. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 289 

American Chicle Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

American Chicle Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

American Dyewood Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

American Dyewood Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

American Hide and Leather Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

American Hide and Leather Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

American Investment Securities Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 

American Investment Securities Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 

American Investment Securities Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 

American Laundry Machinery Company v. Commonwealth. Pe- 
tition to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign 
corporation. Final decree. 

American Piano Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

American Pneumatic Service Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

American Pneumatic Service Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

American Eadiator Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pinal decree. 



290 ATTORXEY-^GEXERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

American Radiator Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the 3'ear 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Final decree. 

American Radiator Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Final decree. 

American Steel and Wire Company of Xew Jersey v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1910 
paid by foreign corporation. Final decree. 

American Steel and Wire Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Final decree. 

American Steel and Wire Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Final decree. 

American Steel and Wire Company of Xew Jersey v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid 
by foreign corporation. Final decree. 

American Thread Company of Xew Jersey v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Final decree. 

American Thread Company of Xew Jersey v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Final decree. 

American Woolen Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the years 1909 and 1910 paid by foreign 
corporation. Final decree. 

American Woolen Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Final decree. 

American Woolen Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Final decree. 

Ames Shovel and Tool Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
23oration. Pending. 

Ames Shovel and Tool Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Ames Shovel and Tool Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 291 

Amoskeag Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Amoskeag Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Anderson, Mary J., administratrix of the estate of Elizabeth P. 
Anderson, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Arizona Commercial Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the j^ear 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Arlington Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, p. 56. 
Decree. 

Armstrong Cork Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the 3'ear 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Armstrong Cork Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Armstrong Cork Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Asbestos Protected Metal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
for abatement of franchise tax. Pending. 

Ashland Emery and Corundum Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 

Ashland Emery and Corundum Company v. Commonwealth. Pe- 
tition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Ashland Emery and Corundum Company v. Commonwealth. Pe- 
tition to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 

Atlas Tack Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Atlas Tack Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the j^ear 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 



292 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

B. F. Goodrich Com23any v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corporation. 
Final decree. 

B. T. Babbitt v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise tax 
for the year 1914 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Babb, George W. P., executor of the will of Hannah D. Gaynor, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Ball, Eustace H., executor of the will of Harriet S. Ball, Attor- 
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Final decree. 

Baltic Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Baltic Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Barney, Alanson S., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Nantucket. Attorney- General waived right 
to be heard. 

Barrett, Josephine, et ah, petitioners. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Dennis. Pending. 

Bates Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Bates Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Beaman, Charles Hall, executor of the will of Charles Henry 
Beaman, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Final decree. 

Belding Brothers & Co. v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Belding Brothers & Co. v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Belding, Eainsford W., et als., petitioners. Petition for registra- 
tion of title to land. Attorney-General waived right to be 
heard. 

Bellows Falls Power Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for 
abatement of franchise tax. Pending. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 293 

Bentlev, Alice L., executrix of the will of Eli E. Bentley, Attor- 
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 
Berry Brothers, Ltd. v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 
Berry Brothers, Ltd. v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 
Bingham Mines Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 
Blair, Frank AY., administrator of the estate of Mary F. Blair, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 
Blake & Knowles Steam Pump Works v. Commonwealth, Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 
Bliss, Elmer J., et al., executors of the will of Eosilla Gould, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 
Bohemia Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 
Boston & Corbin Copper and Silver Mining Company v. Com- 
monwealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 
Boston & N'orthern Street Eailway Company. Claim for amount 
expended in relaying water pipes in Washington Street, 
Lynn, destroyed by electric currents. Pending. 
Boston & Eoxbury Mill Corporation, petitioner for dissolution. 
Petition of the Commonwealth for leave to intervene. Pend- 
ing. 
Boston & Worcester Street Eailway Company v. Board of Eail- 
road Commissioners. Petition for • modification of ruling 
by Eailroad Commissioners. Pending. 
Boston Bedding Supply Company v. Commonwealth et al. Peti- 
tion for assessment of damages alleged to have been caused 
by the passage of legislation restricting the right to draw 
water from the Charles Eiver during certain seasons. Pend- 
ing. 



294 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Boston Sand & Gravel Company, petitioner. Petition for regis- 
tration of title to land in Scituate. Decree. 

Boston Securities Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid hy foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Boston Securities Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Bosw^orth, Charles 0., executor of the will of John P. Campion, 
Attorne3^-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Boulevard Trust Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for 
abatement of tax on deposits in savings department of trust 
company. Pending. 

Bourne, Inhabitants of, v. Public Service Commission et ah 
Petition for writ of certiorari. Pending. 

Bowles, Francis T., petitioner. Two petitions for registration of 
title to land in Barnstable. Attorney-General waived right 
to be heard on both petitions. 

Bowman, Joseph W., v. Commonwealth. Petition for writ of 
error. Pending. 

Brackett, Arthur L., v. Commonwealth. Petition for assessment 
of damages caused by the erection of the Anderson Bridge. 
Charles K. Darling, John T. Swift and Joseph A. Conry 
appointed commissioners. Pending. 

Brady, Francis P., administrator d. h. n, of the estate of Bridget 
German, Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Final decree. 

Breakwater Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Breakwater Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Bresnan, John H., administrator of the estate of Bridget Wall, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Bresnan, John H., administrator of the estate of Patrick Wall, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 295 

Briggs, Benjamin F., v. Elmer A. Stevens, Treasurer and Ee- 
ceiver-General. Appeal from decree of Land Court. Pend- 
ing. 

Brooks, Sarah H., et ah, executors of the will of Mary E. Braoks, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Brooks, William W., administrator of the estate of George S. 
Smith, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Final decree. 

Brookside Mills v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. Pend- 
ing. 

Brookside Mills v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corporation. Pend- 
ing. 

Brookside Mine v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pend- 
ing. 

Browning, Harry A., administrator of the estate of Harvey C. 
Browning, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Final decree. 

Browning, King & Co. v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Bryne, Andrew W., et als. r. Commonwealth et al. Petition to 
recover monev in hands of Commonwealth. Pendino^. 

Bulkelev, "Morgan C, et al. v. Xew York, New Haven & Hart- 
ford Eailroad Company and the Public Service Commis- 
sion. Petition for annulment of an order of the Public 
Service Commission approving the issue of certain deben- 
ture bonds by the Xew York, Xew Haven & Hartford Rail- 
road Company. Rescript. 

Bullard, John C, executor of the will of Justina Dennison, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Bullard, John C, executor of the will of Sarah J. Hills, Attor- 
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Final decree. 

Bullard, John D., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Hvde Park. Pendino-. 



296 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Bunzel, Gustave, Attorney- General ex rel. v. Bill in equity to 
restrain the respondent from conducting the business of 
slaughtering in Lexington. Pending. 

Burke, Edmund, administrator of the estate of John Kelley, 
Attorney-General ex rel. r. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Burke, William E., administrator of the estate of Margaret A. 
Evans, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Decree. 

Butchers' Slaughtering and Melting Association v. Common- 
wealth. Petition for assessment of damages caused by the 
erection of the Anderson Bridge. Charles K. Darling, John 
T. Swift and Joseph A. Conry appointed commissioners. 
Pending. 

Caldwell, C. Chester, et ah, executors of the will of Joanna 
Caldwell, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Final decree. 

Calumet k Hecla Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Calumet & Hecla Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Cambridgeport Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for 
withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Decree. 

Campbell, Henry W., administrator of the estate of Sarah P. 
Graves, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Dismissed. 

Campbell, Louise H., et al., petitioners. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Wareham. Pending. 

Campbell, Louise H., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Wareham. Pending. 

Canada, Atlantic & Plant Steamship Company Ltd. v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise taxes for the years 1905, 
1906, 1907, 1908 and 1909 paid by foreign corporation. 
Final decree. 

Carmichael, James H., executor of the will of Oliver E. Willis, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 297 

Casey, John F., v. Mar}' A. Smith et ah. Bill of complaint for 
a writ of injunction enjoining the respondents from using 
or occupying certain buildings located in Fitcliburg, im- 
properly constructed. Disposed of. 

Case}^, Mary N., et al., trustees, petitioners. Petition for regis- 
tration of title to land in Billerica. Pending. 

Centennial Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corjDoration. Pending. 

Centennial Copper Mining Company r. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York v. New York 
Central & Hudson Eiver Eailroad Company et als. Peti- 
tion to intervene in differential rate cases. Disposed of. 

Champion Copper Company r. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

ChamjDion Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Champion Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Charles H. Schieren Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the jeav 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Final decree. 

Charlestown Trust Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for 
abatement of tax on deposits in savings department of trust 
company. Pending. 

Chase, "William E., et ah., petitioners. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Newburyport. Decree. 

Chelsea Day Nursery and Children's Home v. Eufus S. Frost 
General Hospital. Bill of complaint to com^Dcl defendant to 
perform contract. Disposed of. * 

Cheney Brothers v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Cheney Brothers v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Chicopee, city of, v. Commonwealth. Claim for difference in 
amount of monev allowed bv the State Board of Charity 



298 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

and amount expended by the town in treatment of typhoid 
patients. Pending. 

Children's Health Fund, Attorney-General v. Information in 
the nature of quo warranto to test the right of the corpora- 
tion to continue to exercise its franchise as a charitable cor- 
poration. Disposed of. 

Childs' Dining Hall Comj^any v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Childs^ Dining Hall Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Churchill, Susan A., executrix of the will of John B. Churchill, 
Attorney-General ex reh v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Disposed of. 

City Institution for Savings, Lowell, Attorney-General i'. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Decree. 

Clapp, George W., executor of the will of Elmira S. Hinman, At- 
torney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Clark, Mary M., executrix of the will of Elizabeth N. Clark, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Columbian National Life Insurance Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petitions for abatement of franchise tax paid in 1903, 1904, 
1905, 1906 and 1907. Pending. 

Commonwealth v. Worcester. To recover for land taken from 
the Commonwealth. Pending. 

Consolidation Coal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1909 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Disposed of. 

Consolidation Coal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Final decree. 

Consolidation Coal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Final decree. 

Continental Gin Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 299 

Continental Gin Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 jDaid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Continental Gin Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 191 J: paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Continental Mills v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Copper Eange Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Copper Eange Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Copper Eange Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Copper Eange Consolidated Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Copper Eange Consolidated Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Copper Eange Consolidated Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Costello, Michael W., executor of the will of Catherine Costello, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Creaden, William T., administrator of the estate of Nellie Eear- 
don, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Crossett, Lewis A., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Cohasset. Pending. 

Cudahy Packing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Curtis Publishing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Decree. 



300 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Curtis Publishing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Decree. 

Curtis Publishing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Decree. 

Damon, Daniel E., executor of the will of Maria L. Thompson, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Davis Sewing Machine Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Davis Sewing Machine Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Dean, John J., et ah, executors of the will of Thomas H. Buck- 
ley, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Dewey, Henry S., v. State Officers. Actions to replevy copies 
of notes of proceedings in the case of Dewey v. Good Gov- 
ernment Association. Pending. 

Dineen, Timothy, executor of the will of Julia Dineen, x\ttor- 
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

di Pesa, Alfred, petitioner. Petition for registration of title to 
land. Pending. 

Dolan, Peter T., executor of the will of Nellie Young, Attorney- 
General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. De- 
cree. 

Donahue, Abbie A., executrix of the will of Abbie McDonald, 
Attorney-General ex rel. r. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Dorchester Trust Company r. Commonwealth. Petition for 
abatement of tax on deposits in savings department of trust 
company. Pending. 

Draper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corporation. Final 
decree. 

Drohan, John, executor of the will of Anastasia Clapp, Attor- 
ney-General ex rel. r. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 301 

Buddy, Josei^li H., jDetitioner. Petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. Pending before the full court. 

Dunham, Etta E., petitioner. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
Dismissed. 

Eagleston, Allen P., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Gay Head. Pending. 

East Boston Company v. Directors of the Port of Boston. Writ 
of entry. Pending. 

East Butte Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Easl Butte Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

East Butte Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

East Cambridge Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition 
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Decree. 

Eastman, Charles Albert, v. Board of Eegistration in Medicine. 
Bill in equity to enjoin Board from revoking certificate. 
Pending. 

Edgerly, Erank H., et ah v. Cattle Bureau. Bill to recover for 
horse killed by order of Cattle Commissioner under E. L., 
c. 90. Pending. 

Edwards Manufacturing Company i\ Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Edwards Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 i^aid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Elm Eiver Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Ennis, John D., et al., administrators of the estate of Edmund 
Walsh, Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 

Everton, Elfonso L, administrator of the estate of Charles H. 
Dimond, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 



302 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

F. Blumenthal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Fairbanks Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Fairbanks Company r. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Farley, John, executor of the will of Maria A. Giddings, Attor- 
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Final decree. 

Farr Alpaca Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate- 
ment of franchise tax for the year 1912. Pending. 

Farwell, John W., petitioner. Petition to register title to land 
in Melrose. Attorney-General waived right to be heard. 

Fidelity Trnst Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate- 
ment of tax on deposits in savings department of trust 
company. Pending. 

Field, John Q. A., executor of the will of Caroline Wood, Attor- 
nej'-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Fields, Annie, v. Charles Eiver Basin Commission. Bill to 
enjoin Commonwealth from interfering with riparian rights 
on Charles River. Pending. 

Fishley, Cora 0., executrix of the will of Edward E. Fishley, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Fitts, Frank E., executor of the will of Harriet X. Fitts, Attor- 
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Final decree. 

Fleming, Henry E., v. State Board of Health. Appeal from an 
order of the State Board of Health in regard to the use of 
ice cut from Flax Pond. Pending. 

Foss-Hughes Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate- 
ment of franchise tax. Pending. 

Fowler, Charles F., executor of the will of Eliza E. Crocker, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Framingham Trust Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for 
abatement of tax on deposits in savings department of trust 
company. Pending. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 303 

Franklin County Trust Company v. Commonwealtli. Petition 
for abatement of tax on deposits in savings department of 
trust company. Pending. 

Franklin Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the 3'ear 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Franklin Mining Company r. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the 3'ear 1913 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Frazer, Charles F., executor of the will of Emma T. Cotton, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Free Home for Consumptives, Attorney-General v. Information 
in the nature of quo warranto to annul the charter of the 
respondent because of the misuse of its charter privileges 
and franchises. Dismissed. 

Frontenac Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Frontenac Copper Company r. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Fuller, Edgar S., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Falmouth. Pending. 

Galena Signal Oil Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Galena Signal Oil Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpoi'a- 
tion. Pending. 

Gamash, David, petitioner. Petition for registration of title to 
land in Ludlow. Pending. 

Gamewell Fire Alarm Telegraph Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 

Gamewell Fire Alarm Telegraph Company v. Commonwealtl]. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 

Genzale, Michelina, petitioner. Petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. Petition dismissed. 



304 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Georgia Home Insurance Company v. Commonwealth, xlction 
to compel Treasurer and Receiver-General to return bond 
deposited with him by said company. Pending. 

Gorton-Pew Fisheries Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Gorton-Pew Fisheries Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Grace, William F., administrator of the estate of Nora Kelly, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Grant, Robert, Judge of Probate, v. William W. Risk et al. 
Contract on bond as public administrator. Pending. 

Gratiot Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Gratiot Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Gratiot Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Great Western Cereal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the 3'ear 1910 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Griffith, Mary, executrix of the will of Christopher Foster, At- 
torney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Gutta-Percha and Rubber Manufacturing Company v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Hale, Josiah L., executor of the will of Pauline H. Patterson, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 305 

Hamlin, Katharine B., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Marion. Pending. 

Harmon, Eollin, H., Judge of Probate, v. Samuel D. Hildretli 
et al. Action to recover on administrators' bond. Pending. 

Harrington, Charles C, executor of the will of Elizabeth A. 
Harrington, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Hastings, George A., r. Commonwealth. Petition to recover un- 
claimed bank deposit in the hands of the Treasurer. Dis- 
posed of. 

Hatch, Elizabeth M., et ah, petitioners. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Bourne. Pending. 

Havens, Jennie E., administratrix of the estate of Katherine L. 
Mooney, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Final decree. 

Haverhill Gas Light Company v. Forrest E. Barker et cds., Board 
of Gas and Electric Light Commissioners et al. Bill of 
complaint brought in the United States Circuit Court to 
restrain the Board of Gas and Electric Light Commissioners 
from enforcing an order in regard to the price of gas. 
Disposed of. 

Haverhill Gas Light Company, Attorney-General v. Informa- 
tion in equity to restrain respondent from transferring its 
franchises and property. Eescript. 

Healy, Mary, executrix of the will of Patrick Healy, Attorney- 
General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Hecker-Jones-Jewell Milling Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Hecker-Jones-Jewell Milling Company r. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Hecker-Jones-Jewell Milling Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1918 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Henry K. Wampole & Co., Inc., i'. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Hewitt, Fred L., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Salisburv. Decree. 



306 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Hill, Annie Leslie, petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Webster. Pending. 

Hill, Sarah T., executor of the will of Pvowena Hill, Attorney- 
General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Final decree. 

Holden, Maria, executrix of the will of Alice Maher, Attorney- 
General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Final decree. 

Holden, Nicholas F., v. Civil Sen'ice Commission. Petition for 
writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to authorize 
the reinstatement of the petitioner as a member of the police 
department of Worcester. Pending. 

Hollingsworth, Ellis, petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Marblehead. Decree. 

Holmes, Thankful A., executrix of the will of James Churchill, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Holt, Frank W., administrator of the estate of Elizabeth C. 
Moulton, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Dismissed. 

Hong, Harry Eng, jDetitioner. Petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. Rescript from Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing 
petition. 

Houghton Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Houghton Coj^per Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Houghton, Neidhard H., administrator of the estate of Julius 
H. Houghton, Attorne}'- General ex rel. v. Petition to re- 
cover inheritance tax. Pending. 

Hoyt, Grover C, v. Alfred W. Donovan et als., Petition for 
writ of mandamus to compel the State Board of Labor and 
Industries to reinstate the petitioner as its secretary. Re- 
served for the full court. 

Ingraham, Leonidas H., executor of the will of Mary A. Ingra- 
ham, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Final decree. 

International Paper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1914 jDaid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 307 

Isle Eo3'ale Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Isle Eoyale Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Jackson Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Jackson Company r. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Jackson, Ethel M., administratrix of the estate of George F. 
Bailey, Attorney-General ex reJ. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Final decree. 

Jacob Dold Packing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

James Cunningham Son & Co., v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

James Cunningham Son & Co., v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Jaynes Drug Company v. William S. Flint et als., constituting 
the Board of Eegistration in Pharmacy. Petition for writ 
of mandamus to compel said Board to grant a permit to 
the petitioner to transact a retail drug business in Pittsfield. 
Writ issued. 

Jenney, E. C, executor of the will of Maria P. Stark, Attorney- 
General ex rel. v.. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Jennings, Malachi L., administrator of estate of Mary McGee- 
han, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

John L. Whiting-J. J. Adams Company v. Commonwealth. Pe- 
tition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

John L. Whiting-J. J. Adams Company v. Commonwealth. Pe- 
tition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Johnson, Susan M., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Tisbury. Decree. 



308 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

JudkinSj C. Ernest^ executor of the will of Gertrude I. Sawyer, 
Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Kelley, Hannah, executrix of the will of Martin T. Walsh, Attor- 
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Dismissed. 

Kelly, Charles A., et ah., executors of the will of Anna. E, Mon- 
gan, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Final decree. 

Kempton, Francis H., administrator of the estate of Maria M. 
Lindsey, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Dismissed. 

Kernwood Country Club, petitioner. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Salem. Pending. 

Keyes, Charles D., administrator d. h. n. of the estate of Eliza 
A. DeShon, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Decree. 

Keymes, William, administrator of the estate of James Keymes, 
V. Commonwealth. Petition to recover bank deposit in the 
hands of the Treasurer. Pending. 

Keystone Watch Case Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Final decree. 

Keystone Watch Case Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the 3'ear 1913 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Final decree. 

Keystone Watch Case Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1914 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Final decree. 

King Philip Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Laedlein, Abby M., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Framingham. Attorney-General waived right to 
be heard. 

Lafayette Savings Bank, Augustus L. Thorndike, Bank Commis- 
sioner, V. Information to restrain the respondent from 
further prosecution of its business. Pending. 

Lake Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCOIEXT — No. 12. 309 

Lake Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Lake Milling, Smelting and Eefining Company v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Lake Milling, Smelting and Eefining Company v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Lake Superior Smelting Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Lamont-Corliss Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Lamont-Corliss Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Lamson Consolidated Store Service Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Lanston Monotype Machine Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Lanston Monotype Machine Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Lanston Monotype Machine Company r. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Lanston Monotype Machine Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1914 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

LaSalle Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

LaSalle Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 
LaSalle Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending:. 



310 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

LaSalle Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the 3'ear 1913 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Laurinm Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Laurinm Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Lawrence Trnst Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate- 
ment of tax on deposits in savings department of trust 
company. Pending. 

Lawton, Isaac M., executor of the will of Daniel T. Lawton, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Lee, Charles F., trustee, petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Beverly. Decree. 

Leland, Percy F., petitioner. Petition for registration of title to 
hind in Ashland. Decree. 

Lever Brothers Com^Dany v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Lever Brothers Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Libby, George ^Y., administrator of the estate of Oliver Libby, 
Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Library Bureau r. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Final 
decree. 

Lilu'ary Bureau v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corporation. Final 
decree. 

Liquid Carbonic Company, The, r.. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Liquid Carbonic Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pendinor. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 311 

Liquid Carbonic Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Lithuanian Alliance of America, Attorney-General ex rel. v. 
Information at the relation of the Insurance Commissioner 
for violation of insurance laws. Injunction issued. 

Locomobile Company of America v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Locomobile Company of America r. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Locomobile Company of America v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign 
corporation. 

Long, John D., petitioner. Petition for registration of title to 
land in Hingham. Pending. 

Lowell Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition 
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Decree. 

Lowell Institution for Savings, Attorney-General r. Petition 
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Decree. 

Lundagen, Mary, executrix of the will of Lawrence Lundagen, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Lyons, John P., Attorney-General v. Petition for the use of the 
Attorney-General's name in an information in the nature of 
quo warranto to test the right of the respondent to be 
granted a permit to transport intoxicating liquors in the 
city of Brockton. Use of name allowed. 

Maguire, William C, executor of the will of Margaret Dowden, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Decree. 

Mahar, Joseph P., executor of the will of Thomas J. Eehill, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Mahone}^, Patrick, executor of the will of John Hart, Attorney- 
General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Final decree. 



312 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Mallev, Edward B., executor of the will of Dennis F. McCloskey, 
Attorne3'-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Manchester^ Abraham, executor of the will of Abraham E. Man- 
chester, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 

Manitou Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Manitou Mining Com23any v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Mann, Edwin M., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land. Pending. 

Marchant, Charles B., executor of the will of Edna L. Hinckley, 
Attorne3'-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company of America v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1913 
paid by foreign corporation. Final decree. 

Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company of America v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1914 
paid by foreign corporation. Final decree. 

Marlborough Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for 
withdrawals of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. De- 
cree. 

Massachusetts Catholic Order of Foresters v. Elmer A. Stevens, 
Treasurer and Receiver-General. Petition for writ of man- 
damus to compel respondent to deliver securities to peti- 
tioner. Disposed of. 

Massachusetts Consolidated Mining Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Massachusetts Consolidated Mining Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Boston Society of Natu- 
ral History, et als. Petition brought in the Land Court 
for instructions as to certain alleged easements in land 
bounded by Berkeley, Boylston, Clarendon and Newbury 
streets, Boston. Decree. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 313 

Massachusetts Trust Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for 
abatement of tax on deposits in savings department of 
trust company. Pending. 

Mayflower Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for tlie year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Mayflower Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

McCann, Charles J., et al. v. Charles Warren et ah.. Civil Serv- 
ice Commissioners. Petition for writ of mandamus to 
compel certification of the petitioners' names by the Civil 
Service Commissioners. Decree. Appeal by petitioners. 

McCauley, George D., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Springfield. Pending. 

McClusky, Clara B., executrix of the will of Annie B. Dunn, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Dismissed. 

McDonald, Theodore H., Insurance Commissioner of Connecti- 
cut, V. The ^tna Indemnity Company. Intervening peti- 
tion of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Pending. 

McGee, Patrick S., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Attleborough. Pending. 

McGuirk, Ann, executrix of the will of Terrence Farley, Attor- 
ne3'-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Mclntire, Charles H., trustee under the will of Maria T. Clark, 
Attornej'-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

McLoughlin, Francis J., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Becket. Attorney-General waived right to 
be heard. 

Mead-Morrison Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the 3^ear 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Final decree. 

Mechanics Savings Bank, Lowell, Attorney-General v. Petition 
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Decree. 

Medford Trust Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for abate- 
ment of tax on deposits in savings department of trust com- 
pany. Pending. 



314 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise taxes for the years 1909 and 1910 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Frank H. Hardison, 
Insurance Commissioner. Petition for review. Reserved 
for full court. Pending. 

Michigan Smelting Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Midvale Steel Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Midvale Steel Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Moore, Mary, executrix of the will of Ellen M. Aston, Attorney- 
General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Final decree. 

Moore, William H., et dl., executors of the will of Edward W. 
Murray, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 

Morgan, William M., et ah, administrators of the estate of 
Charles A. Mitchell, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to 
recover inheritance tax. Final decree. 

Morrill, Ellen A., et al., executors of the will of Emetine E. 
Coolidge, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Disposed of. 

Murphv, Mary E., executor of the will of Delia Martin, Attor- 
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Murphy, Mary L., executrix of the will of Annie M. Crowdle, 
x^ttorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Decree. 

Murphy, Michael, v. Harrie W. Pierce, Agent of the Commis- 
sioner of Animal Industry. Claim for damages for death 
of horse. Pending. 

Murray, James H., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Salisbury. Pending. 

X. K. Fairbank Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Final decree. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 315 

N. K. Fairbank Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Final decree. 

N^. Iv. Fairbank Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corporation. 
Final decree. 

Xantucket Cranberry Company, petitioner. Six petitions for 
registration of title to land in Nantucket. Pending. 

Nashua Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Nashua Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Natick Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition 
for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Decree. 

National Casket Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

National Casket Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

National Contracting Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover under E. L., c. 201. Pend'ing. 

National Mercantile Compan}^ Limited, xlttorney-General v. 
Information in the nature of quo ivarranto for violation of 
St. 1904, c. 427. Injunction issued. 

New England Maple Syrup Company v. Henry P. Walcott 
et als. Bill in equity for an injunction. Pending. 

Newport Fisheries, Ice and Cold Storage Company v. Common- 
wealth. Petition for abatement of franchise tax for the 
year 1912. Pending. 

Newton, Frank B., v. Commonwealth. Petition for assessment 
of damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of the 
erection of a bridge across the Neponset Eiver. Pending. 

Nickerson, Horace W., et al., petitioners. Petition for registra- 
tion of title to land in Barnstable. Pending. 

Norcross, Joseph E., administrator of the estate of Charles F. 
Aldrich, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Decree. 



316 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Norman, Archibald AY., administrator of the estate of AYalter 
Albert Norman v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover bank 
deposit in hands of the Treasurer. Decree. 

North End Savings Bank, Boston, Attorney-General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits nnder E. L., c. 113, § 55. 
Decree. 

Northwestern Consolidated Milling Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Northwestern Consolidated Milling Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Northwestern Consolidated Milling Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 

Noyes, George E., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Swampscott. Pending. 

Nye, Helen M. S., executrix of the will of Sarah E. Lane, At- 
torney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

O'Connor, James B., administrator. of the estate of Patrick H. 
O'Connor, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Final decree. 

O'Donohue, Lillie B., executrix of the will of Joseph J. O'Dono- 
hue, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inherit- 
ance tax. Pending. 

Odd Fellows Beneficial Corporation of Southern Massachusetts, 
Attorney- General ex rel. v. Information at the relation of 
the Insurance Commissioner for violation of insurance laws. 
Injunction issued. 

Old Colony Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Old Colony Coj^per Company r. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Old Colony Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Old Colony Trust Company v. Commonwealth. Petition for 
abatement of tax on deposits in savings department of trust 
company. Pending. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 317 

Oliver Typewriter Comj^any v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending". 

Oliver Typewriter Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Oliver Typewriter Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Oliver Typewriter Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1914 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Order United Hebrews of America, Attorney-General ex rel. v. 
Information at the relation of the Insurance Commissioner 
for violation of insurance laws. Injunction issued and 
Eleazer Freedman, Esq., appointed temporary receiver. 

Osceola Consolidated Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Osceola Consolidated Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Osceola Consolidated Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Owens, Fannie M., administratrix of the estate of Lucy Jones, 
Petitioner. Petition to recover bank deposit in hands of 
the Treasurer. Decree. 

Oxford Linen Mills v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover ex- 
cise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Dismissed. 

Oxford Linen Mills v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Dis- 
missed. 

Parker, Galen A., executor of the will of Martha E. Temple, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Parmenter, Freeman A., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Dover. Decree. 

Patten, Ina F., administratrix of the estate of Carrie M. Fitz, 
xlttorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 



318 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Perkins, Charles F., administrator of the estate of Amos E. 
Aldrich, iVttorney-General ex reJ. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Decree. 

Pierce, George H., et al., petitioners. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Manomet. Pending. 

Pillsbury Flour Mills Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Pillsbury Flour Mills Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Pillsbury Flour Mills Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 191-1 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Piper, Edith B., executrix of the will of Frederick B. Fanning, 
Attorney-General ex rel. r. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Piatt, James C, et al., executors of the will of Margaret J. 
Piatt, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Final decree. 

Plymouth County Trust Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
for abatement of tax on deposits in savings department of 
trust company. Pending. 

Pocahontas Fuel Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign coq^ora- 
tion. Final decree. 

Poole, Clara I., petitioner. Petition for registration of title to 
land in Weymouth. Pending. 

Pope Manufacturing Company, The, v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Powers, James F., Attorney-General r. Petition for use of the 
Attorney-Generars name in an information in the nature of 
quo warranto to test the respondent's right to act as over- 
seer of outdoor work in the city of Brockton. Use of name 
allowed. 

Purinton, Charles S., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Plymouth. Pending. 

Quaker Oats Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 



1915,] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 319 

Quaker Oats Company v. Commomvealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Quirk, Charles L, executor of the will of William Byrne, Attor- 
ney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Eamsdell, Hattie, petitioner. Petition for writ of habeas corpus 
for discharge of Elton Eamsdell et ah. from the custody of 
the State Board of Charity. Petition dismissed. 

Eatlibun, Charles B., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Canton. Decree. 

Eedfern, Mary E., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Swampscott. Pending. 

Eeed, Andrew P., et ah, petitioners. Petition in equity for re- 
moval of certain restrictions on land, Xantasket Beach 
Eeservation. Decree. 

Eegal Shoe Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Eegal Shoe Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Eeilly, Margaret, executrix of the will of John Eeilly, Attorney- 
General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Final decree. 

Eeilley, William J., et ah, executors of the will of Charles A. 
Goessman, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Eice & Hutchins, Incorporated, v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Eice & Hutchins, Incorporated, v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Eichards, Fred J., et ah, petitioners. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Springfield. Pending. 

Eichardson Silk Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Eichardson Silk Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 



320 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Richardson Silk Compan}^ v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1913 paid hy foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Richmond, Charles P., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Wareham. Decree. 

Riley, Richard G., v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Writ of 
error to the Superior Court of Bristol County to set aside a 
conviction for violation of the law governing the employ- 
ment of women in factories. Mandate from Supreme Court 
of the United States. 

Ripley, Mary Ella, executrix of the will of Sarah B. King, At- 
torney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Ritchie, Christina, v. Treasurer and Receiver-General. Action 
of contract under R. L., c. 128, § 96. Pending. 

Roche, Teresa G., administratrix of the estate of Mary A. Roche, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Rockland-Rockport Lime Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Rogers, Harlow H., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Marlboro. Attorne3'-General waived right to be 
heard. 

Ross, John H., petitioner. Petition for registration of title to 
land in Hingham. Pending. 

Rouillard, Cora L., executrix of the will of Sarah A. Gillett, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Dismissed. 

Russell, Herbert J., et ciL, executors of the will of George H. 
Russell, Attorne3-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Dismissed. 

Russell-Miller Milling Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Russell-Miller Milling Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

S. S. White Dental Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 321 

Saxonville Mills, petitioiier. Petition for registration of land 
in Framingham. Decree. 

Schaefer, Gustav, petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Billerica. Pending. 

Scott, Joseph P., et ah, administrators of the estate of Eobert 
W. Scott, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Pending. 

Seager Engine Works v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Sealshipt Oyster System v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Sealshipt Oyster System r. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Seneca Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Shannon Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the 3'ear 1910 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Shannon Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Shapleigh, Samuel B., executor of the will of Ellen L. Shap- 
leigh, Attorney-General ex reh v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 

Shattuck, Joseph, et ah v. City of Lawrence et ah Petition for 
abatement of tax on personal property illegally assessed. 
Disposed of. 

Shepard & Morse Lumber Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Final decree. 

Silver Fox Eanching Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Final decree. 

Simonds, Leon M., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Princeton and Holden. Decree. 

Simons, Charles L., v. Commonwealth. Claim for reward 
offered by Commonwealth for apprehension of the murderer 
of Martha B. Blackstone. Pending. 



322 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Simpson, Esther P., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Chelmsford. Pending. 

Skehill, Patrick J., administrator of the estate of John E. Ske- 
hill, Attorne3'-General ex reJ. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 

Slade, Ruthven Tucker v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
bank deposit in hands of Treasurer. Decree. 

Smith & Dove Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Pe- 
tition to recover excise tax for the 3'ear 1911 paid by for- 
eign corporation. Pending. 

Smith, Louisa, executrix of the will of George Smith, Attorney- 
General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Final decree. 

Sons of Freedom, Incorporated, Attorney-General ex rel. v. 
Infonnation at the relation of the Insurance Commissioner 
for violation of insurance laws. Injunction issued and 
Thomas D. Lavelle, Esq., appointed receiver. 

Sousa, Rosa Emily, executrix of the will of Joseph L. Matthews, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

South Lake Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

South Lake Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Sprague, Charles M., executor of the will of Alonzo Miller, At- 
torney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Springfield Breweries Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the j^ear 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Springfield Breweries Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Springfield Mutual Disability Company et ah, Attorney-General 
ex rel. v. Information at the relation of the Insurance 
Commissioner for violation of insurance laws. Injunction 
issued and Judd Dewey, Esq., appointed receiver. 

St. Mary's Mineral Land Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 



1915.1 PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 323 

St. Mary's Mineral Land Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the jesiv 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Stafford Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Stafford Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Standard Plunger Elevator Company v. Commonwealth. Peti- 
tion to recover excise tax for the 5^ear 1912 paid by foreign 
corporation. Pending. 

Stoughton Mills, Incorporated, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Bill 
in equity to enjoin defendant from discharging waste into 
Neponset Eiver. Pending. 

Submarine Signal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Submarine Signal Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Sugden Press Bagging Company, petitioner. Petition for regis- 
tration of title to land in West Chelmsford. Pending. 

Sullivan, Ellen E., executrix of the will of Daniel O'Connell, 
Attorney-General ex reJ. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Sullivan, Mary, v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover bank 
deposit in hands of Treasurer. Pending, 

Superior Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Superior Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Swampscott, Town of, v. Richard L. Beyer. Appeal from order 
of inspector of factories and public buildings. Pending. 

Tamarack Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Tamarack Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pendins:. 



324 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Taylor, Louis C, executor of the will of "William J. Ta3^1or, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Trimonntain Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Trimonntain Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Turley, Thomas J., et ah, administrators of the estate of Mary 
Benson, Attorne3'-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 

Tuttle, Frank J., administrator c. t. a. of the estate of William 
H. Chick, Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover 
inheritance tax. Dismissed. 

Tnttle, Horace F., petitioner on behalf of Isabella M. Brooks. 
Petition for discharge from AYestborough State Hospital. 
Pending. 

Underwood, Henry 0., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Nantucket. Pending. 

Union Copper Land and Mining Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Union Copper Land and Mining Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Union Copper Land and Mining Company v. Commonwealth. 
Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1913 paid by 
foreign corporation. Pending. 

Union Curled Hair Company v. Commonwealth. Bill in equity 
to restrain the State Department of Health from trespassing 
upon land of the petitioner. Disposed of. 

Union News Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

L^nion News Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Union Square Methodist Episcopal Church, petitioner. Peti- 
tion to register title to land in Charlestown. Decree. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 325 

United States Volunteer Life Saving Corps of Volunteer Life 
Savers, Attorney-General v. Information in the nature of 
quo warranto to annul the charter of the resjDondent because 
of misuse of its charter privileges and franchises. Pending. 

United States Worsted Company, Attorney-General v. Action of 
contract to compel payment of filing fee. Pending. 

L^pliam, George F., petitioner. Petition for registration of title 
to land in Xorth Brookfield. Attorney-general waived right 
to be heard. 

Valvoline Oil Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Valvoline Oil Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Van Greenberg, Frank J., petitioner. Petition for registration 
of title to land in Lowell. Pending. 

Victoria Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Victoria Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Victoria Copper Mining Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the yeav 1913 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Viets, Samuel D., administrator of the estate of James H. Viets, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Vining, Floretta, executrix of the will of Elizabeth Jacobs, At- 
torne3'-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

W. L. Douglas Shoe Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

Walen, William W., administrator of the estate of Almira C. 
Walen, Attorney-General ex rel. r. Petition to recover in- 
heritance tax. Pending. 

Walkley, Mary Xesbit, petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Lee. Decree. 



326 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Walling^ Area, administrator of the estate of Whipple Caswell, 
Attorney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Final decree. 

Walpole Rubber Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Walpole Rubber Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Waltham Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Petition for with- 
drawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. Decree. 

Ward Baking Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1914 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

Watt, William D., executor of the will of Mary J. Pierson, At- 
torne}'- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance tax. 
Pending. 

Webster, Anna C. M., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Beverly. Pending. 

Welch, Mary Ann, executrix of the will of Thomas Welch, At- 
torney-General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Welch, William J., v. Hosea M. Quimby, superintendent. Ac- 
tion of tort. Pending. 

Welsbach Street Lighting Company of America v. Common- 
wealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1911 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Welsbach Street Lighting Company of America r. Common- 
Yv^ealth. Petition to recover excise tax for the year 1912 
paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Co. v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Co. v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Whitaker, Elbridge J., executor of the will of Oliver Everett, 
Attorney- General ex rel. v. Petition to recover inheritance 
tax. Pending. 

Whitall-Tatum Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 327 

Whitall-Tatum Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover 
excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. 
Pending. 

White Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

White Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

White Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to recover excise 
tax for the year 1913 paid by foreign corporation. Pending. 

White Pine Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

White Pine Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the 3^ear 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

White Sewing Machine Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

W^hite Sewing Machine Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Pending. 

Whittemore, Charles, petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Wareham. Pending. 

Willett, Lewis, petitioner. Petition for registration of title to 
land in Newbiiryport. Pending. 

William L. Gilbert Clock Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the 3^ear 1911 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Final decree. 

William L. Gilbert Clock Company v. Commonwealth. Petition 
to recover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign cor- 
poration. Final decree. 

Williams, Charles H.^ petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Billerica. Pending. 

Williams, Susan S., petitioner. Petition for registration of 
title to land in Nantucket. Attorney- General waived right 
to be heard. 

Winona Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

Winona Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1912 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 



328 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 

Winslow Brothers & Smith Company, Attorney-General ex rel. v. 
Bill in equity to restrain defendant from discharging waste 
into Neponset Eiver. Pending. 

Woburn Five Cents Savings Bank, Attorney-General v. Peti- 
tion for withdrawal of deposits under St. 1908, c. 590, § 56. 
Decree. 

Wyandot Copper Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to re- 
cover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpora- 
tion. Pending. 

York Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1910 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pending. 

York Manufacturing Company v. Commonwealth. Petition to 
recover excise tax for the year 1911 paid by foreign corpo- 
ration. Pendino^. 



1915. 



PUBLIC DOCOIEXT — Xo. 12. 



329 



COLLECTIOXS. 



Collections have been made by this department as follows: — 

Corporation taxes for the yesiv 1913, overdue and referred 
by the Treasurer of the Commonwealth to the Attorney- 
General for collection, 8201,275 93 

Interest, 1,966 11 

Costs, 2,467 00 

Miscellaneous, 28,703 34 

Total, 8234,412 38 

The following table shows a detailed statement of the Corporation 
Taxes : — 



Collected on 




Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Tax for 1913. 


1 


S152 32 


$3 04 


53 76 


27 


71 68 


36 


684 18 


4 90 


133 32 


66 


69 88 


3 48 


18 40 


16 


1,585 02 


7 92 


30 96 


15 


7 43 


04 


16 00 


- 


403 20 


2 42 


116 48 


35 


179 20 


4 54 


43 00 


1 19 


1,433 60 


5 02 


328 40 


2 79 


25 80 


12 


35 84 


08 


179 20 


90 



Totals. 



A. B. Xoyes & Co., Corporation, 
A. E. Jebb Refinishing Company 
A. Himmel Company, 
A. Homer Skinner Lumber Com 



pany, 

A. I. Asher Pants Company, 
A. P. Xardini Company, 
A. S. Tucker Company, 
A. Ziegler & Sons Company, 
Acme Register Companj^, 
Alfred H. Aldrich Company, 
Alpha Investment Company, 
American Belting & Tanning Com- 
pany, 

American Cloak Company, . 
American Cork Company, 
American Cultivator PubUshing 

Compan}^, .... 
American Grocerv^ Company, 
American Jewel Company, . 
American Lithuanian Co-operative 

Pubhc ^Market Corporation, 
American Paper Stock Company 
American Specialty Company, 



$155 36 
54 03 

72 04 

689 08 
133 98 

73 36 
18 56 

1,592 94 

31 11 

7 47 

16 00 

405 62 
116 83 
183 74 

44 19 

1,438 62 

331 19 

25 92 

35 92 

180 10 



330 



ATTORNEY-GENERAUS REPORT. 



[Jan. 



Collected on 

Account 

of Corporation 

Tax for 1913. 



Interest. 



Totals. 



American Stable Company, . 
American Stay Company, 
American Steam Gauge and Valve 

Manufacturing Company, . 
Apsley Rubber Company, 
Aroostook Farming and Lumber 

Company, .... 
Arthur C. Harvey Company, 
Ashoyton Knitting Company, 
Athoi and Orange Street Railwaj 

Company, 

Atlantic Printing Company, . 
Atlantic Rubber Company, . 
Atwood Preserving Company, 
Auto Renting Company, 
Auto Sales Company, 
B. F. Smith Construction Com 



pany, 

Bacon and Donnovan Engine 

Company, .... 
Baer's, Inc., .... 
Bangs and Ramsey Express Com 

pany, 

Barlow Company, . 
Baush Machine Tool Company, 
Bay State Packing Company, 
Bay State Silver Company, . 
Bay State Storage and Warehouse 

Companj^, .... 
Bay State Tool Handle Company 
Beacon Ice Cream Company, 
Beacon ;Mining Company, 
Beaver Construction Company 

Inc., 

Bedford Safety Razor Companj^ 
Bellows Falls Power Compam^, 
Belmont Spring Water Company 
Bemis Rubber Companj^, 
Bennett's, Inc., 
Beverly Lighter and Wrecking 

Company, .... 
Blanchard & Co., Inc., . 
Blanchard Press, 
Blanking Machine Company, 
Bon-Ton Millinery Company, 
Bonney Company, . 
Booker Custom Laundry, Incor- 
porated, .... 
Boston Artesian Well Company, 
Boston Bolt and Iron Company, 



$70 96 


$0 32 


1,075 20 


4 30 


3,468 97 
9,388 43 


20 23 

43 81 


30 00 


25 


1,935 36 
37 63 


5 81 
19 


2,195 36 
537 60 


13 17 
2 24 


219 77 


80 


87 09 


1 74 


35 84 


1 40 


35 84 


18 


1,750 78 


35 01 


107 52 


65 


8 74 


- 


89 60 


36 


234 94 


7 05 


3,393 33 

48 38 


16 97 
24 


78 84 


66 


2,670 08 


12 02 


18 81 


09 


20 96 


- 


8 59 


26 


32 61 


33 


26 88 


42 


2,729 21 
150 77 


21 83 
1 13 


450 50 


2 25 


134 40 


1 48 


342 25 


5 66 


251 11 


1 26 


141 01 


3 93 


54 83 


50 


53 76 


20 


286 72 


1 60 


143 36 


1 43 


53 76 


1 77 


310 01 


15 50 



S71 28 
1,079 50 

3,489 20 
9,432 24 

30 25 
1,941 17 

37 82 

2,208 53 
539 84 
220 57 

88 83 
37 24 
36 02 

1,785 79 

108 17 
8 74 

89 96 
241 99 

3,410 30 
48 62 
79 50 

2,682 10 
18 90 
20 96 

8 85 

32 94 
27 30 



2,751 04 
151 90 
452 75 
135 88 



347 91 
252 37 
144 94 
55 33 
53 96 
288 32 

144 79 

55 53 

325 51 



1915.] 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



331 



Collected oq 




Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Tax for 1913. 




$163 10 


$0 95 


3,158 56 


169 56 


21 50 


10 


143 36 


86 


537 60 


2 69 


32 97 


16 


26 88 


08 


27 32 


1 38 


430 29 


8 52 


34 04 


15 


64 51 


32 


10 75 


- 


10,639 96 


49 65 


35 84 


18 


26 88 


27 


89 60 


50 


157 69 


7 88 


81 55 


33 


120 06 


1 30 


32 72 


1 30 


86 01 


- 


15 05 


- 


348 54 


1 74 


155 68 


- 


125 44 


2 50 


61 07 


31 


60 92 


- 


349 44 


2 09 


372 73 


3 48 


31 36 


78 


107 52 


2 15 


92 25 


3 13 


250 36 


1 50 


53 76 


22 


75 26 


38 


346 89 


1 38 


65 00 


- 


537 60 


10 75 


53 76 


36 


35 84 


21 


148 98 


4 44 


224 03 


1 33 


837 76 


12 40 



Totals. 



Boston Commercial Company, 
Boston Condensed ^Milk Com- 



pany, 

Boston Express Exchange (Inc.), 
Boston Felt and Rubber Com 

pany, 

Boston Felt Manufacturing Com 

pany, 

Boston Gazette Company, 
Boston Hat and Bonnet Frame 

Compan}^, .... 
Boston Institute, Inc., . 
Boston Lighter Company, 
Boston Sash Weight Company, 
Boston Store, Inc., . 
Boston Surgical Specialty Com- 
pany, 

Boston Woven Hose and Rubber 

Company, .... 
Boulevard Pharmacy, 
Boy den & Co., Inc., 
Boynton & Plummer, Inc., . 
Brewer Elevator Company, . 
Brighton Dressed Meat Company 
Brockton Box Toe Corporation, 
Brockton Die Company, 
Brockton Family Market, Inc., 
Brookline Press, 

Bruce-Heustis Electric Company 
Budd Company, 

Builders' Iron and Steel Company 
Bullard Company, . 
Burnham Shoe Company, 
Butler Beef Company, . 
Butman & Cressej^ Company, 
C. & J. Manufacturing Company 
C. D. Wright Company, 
C. F. Coombs & Co., Inc., . 
C. F. Tompkins Company, . 
C. G. Howes Company, 
C. H. Goulding Company, . 
C. J. Peters & Son Company, 
C. P. Hicks Company, . 
C. P. Thompson Company, Inc., 
C. Sargent Bird, Inc., 
C. W. Stone Company, . 
Cambyses Company, 
Cape Ann Clothing Companj' 

Inc., 

Cape Cod Products Company, 



S164 05 

3,328 12 
21 60 

144 22 

540 29 

33 13 

26 96 
28 70 

438 81 

34 19 

64 83 

10 75 

10,689 61 
36 02 

27 15 
90 10 

165 57 
81 88 

121 36 
34 02 
86 01 
15 05 

350 28 
155 68 
127 94 

61 38 
60 92 

351 53 
376 21 

32 14 
109 67 

95 38 
251 86 

53 98 
75 64 

348 27 

65 00 
548 35 

54 12 
36 05 

153 42 

225 36 
850 16 



332 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 



Collected on 

Account 

of Corporation 

Tax for 1913. 



Interest. 



Totals. 



Carder Wood Working Company, 

Carl G. Westlund Company, 

Carr Mines Company, . 

Carter & Woodman Company, 

Carter-Chesebro Company, . 

Cattaraugus Tanning Company 

Caverly-Plumer Company, . 

Central Autogenous Welding and 
INIanufacturing Company, 

Ceylon Tea Growers, Inc., 

Chas. A. Jackson Company, 

Charles E. Hall & Sons, Inc. 

Charles E. Lauriat Company 

Charles E. Perry Company, 

Charles Emmel & Rose Company, 

Chas. P. Whittle Manufacturing 
Company, 

Chattel Loan Company, 

Chelsea Investment Association, 
Inc., 

Church's Booking Office, Inc., 

Clark Remedies Compan}^, . 

Coates Chpper Manufacturing 
Companj', 

Cobb & White Company, 

Cochrane Manufacturing Com- 
pany, 

Coconis Cigarette Machine Com- 
pany, 

Codman & Co., Inc., 

Coldwell-Gildard Company, . 

Colonial Counter Company, . 

Columbia Comb Company, 

Columbia Manufacturing 

paiw, Inc., 

Columbian Furniture Company, . 

Commonwealth Avenue Phar- 
macy, Inc., 

Commonwealth Laundry Com- 
pany, 

Connecticut Valley Street Rail- 
way Company, .... 

Continental Fruit Products Com- 
pany, 

Converse Rubber Shoe Company, 

Corey Klein Company, . 

Cote Piano Manufacturing Com- 
pany, 

Cotuit Oj^ster Company, 

Crocker Drug Company, 



Com- 



S89 60 
56 16 
10 00 
25 23 
85 47 

375 00 
13 51 

53 83 

197 12 

22 40 

61 98 

1,792 00 

222 45 

135 47 

131 89 
1,115 08 

78 27 
21 50 
15 39 



SO 31 
37 

13 

1 31 
25 

27 
1 18 
11 
38 
8 05 
78 
67 

71 

55 77 

46 
86 
40 



89 60 
12 90 


1-85 
07 


3,344 40 


18 95 


26 88 
134 40 
126 73 

41 21 
116 48 


12 
71 
63 
37 

68 


26 88 
69 67 


1 34 
1 30 


107 52 


64 


216 83 


4 32 


2,955 52 


17 73 


111 03 

5,776 29 

5 37 


60 
17 33 


3,849 21 
524 07 

26 88 


119 33 
2 97 
1 60 



$89 91 
56 53 
10 00 
25 36 
85 47 

376 31 
13 76 

54 10 

198 30 

22 51 

62 36 

1,800 05 

223 23 

136 14 

132 60 
1,170 85 

78 73 
22 36 
15 79 

91 45 
12 97 

3,363 35 

27 00 
135 11 
127 36 

41 58 
117 16 

28 22 
70 97 

108 16 

221 15 

2,973 25 

111 63 

5,793 62 

5 37 

3,968 54 
527 04 

28 48 



1915.1 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



333 



Collected on 

Account 

of Corporation 

Tax for 1913. 



Interest. 



Totals. 



Crown Linen Mills, 
Crown Packing Company, 
Cuba Importation Company, 
Cunningham Brothers, Inc., . 
Curtis & Cameron, Inc., 
Cushing Medical Supply Com 

pany, 

D. A. Smith Company, . 

D. Doherty Company, . 

D. L. Page Company, 

Dadmun Company, 

Dan E. Spaulding Restaurant 

Company, .... 
Dana Furniture Company, . 
Daudelin & Cotton, Inc., 
Davies Rose & Co., Ltd., 
Dine Brothers, Company, 
Dine Rubin & Macaulay Com 



pany, 

Donoghue Silk Company, 
Douglas Granite Company, . 
Dove Machine Company, Inc., 
Dr. Hallock Drug Company, 
Dr. Swett Root Beer Company, 
Driscoll & Co., Inc., 
Druggists' Manufacturing Associ 

ation, 

Dudley Mears & Stevens, Inc., 
Dukelow & Walker Company, 
Dunn Flyer Company, . 
Dunster Amusement Company, 
E. C. Andrews Company, 
E. C. Howard Company, 
E. G. Tutein & Co., Inc., . 
E. H. McCausland Company, Inc. 
E. J. Scanlon Company, 
E. L. French Company, 
E. M. Sands (Inc.), 
E. R. Brown Beer Pump Com- 
pany, 

E. R. Sherburne Company, . 
E. S. Lincoln, Inc., 
Earle Provision Company, . 
East Douglas Clothing Company 
East India Extract Company, 
Eastern Discount Compan}^, 
Eastern Furniture Compan}^, 
Eastern Handle Company, 
Eastern Aletal and Refining Com- 
pany, 



$16 12 


104 36 


30 00 


67 20 


107 52 


232 96 


84 22 


326 93 


199 61 


107 52 


43 00 


89 60 


21 05 


206 08 


268 80 


161 28 


197 12 


15 68 


244 07 


44 80 


114 68 


71 68 


181 70 


207 87 


43 00 


387 96 


143 36 


32 25 


128 21 


111 10 


8 96 


17 92 


5 32 


89 60 


33 58 


87 64 


13 61 


26 44 


21 50 


30 00 


11 32 


11 41 


45 69 



)1 08 
52 
17 

1 34 
50 

1 24 
53 

9 15 
69 

3 65 

22 
45 

58 
1 34 



1 41 

4 88 
22 
46 
40 

5 05 

42 
1 74 

72 



104 38 



62 
78 
04 
11 
04 
52 



08 
13 

1 56 

08 

38 
42 



$17 20 
104 88 

30 17 
68 54 

108 02 

234 20 
84 75 
336 08 
200 30 
111 17 

43 22 
90 05 
21 05 

206 66 
270 14 

161 28 

198 53 

15 68 

248 95 

45 02 
115 14 

72 08 

186 75 

207 87 
43 42 

389 70 
144 08 

32 25 
129 83 
114 88 

9 00 
18 03 

5 36 
90 12 

33 58 
87 64 
13 69 
26 57 
21 50 

31 56 
11 40 
11 41 

46 07 

104 80 



334 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1913. 






Eastern Salt Companj^, . 


$446 87 




$446 87 


Eastern Theatres Company, 


46 59 


$0 15 


46 74 


Eastern Underwriting Company, 


18 81 


- 


18 81 


Edge wood Garage Company, Inc., 


67 20 


34 


67 54 


Electro-Chemical Fibre Company, 


25 98 


12 


26 10 


Electro Service Press, 


21 50 


10 


21 60 


Elliott & Douglas Manufacturing 








Company, 


125 44 


50 


125 94 


Ehn Hill Pro\asion Company, 


47 30 


24 


47 54 


Elston & Swift, Inc., 


448 00 


8 96 


456 96 


Ensign Manufacturing Company, 


365 56 


1 83 


367 39 


Essex Investment Company, 


78 40 


22 


78 62 


Essex Waste Company, . 


55 91 


34 


56 25 


F. A. Phelps Company, . 


26 88 


09 


26 97 


F. A. Teeling Carriage Company, 


8 60 


04 


8 64 


F. B. Tilton Company, . . \ 


39 42 


22 


39 64 


F. H. Lane Company, . 


286 72 


1 29 


288 01 


F. H. Thomas Company, 


1,194 27 


3 58 


1,197 85 


F. J. Terrill Motor Company, 


38 70 


40 


39 10 


F. M. Butler Company, 


131 53 


79 


132 32 


F. W. Martin Company, 


8 96 


- 


8 96 


Fall Brook Cranberry Company, 


41 21 


25 


41 46 


Fall River Wholesale Grocery 








Company, . . . . \ 


86 71 


26 


86 97 


Farmer's Shoe Shop, Inc., 


53 04 


1 27 


54 31 


Federal Metallic Packing Com- 








pany, 


259 84 


10 65 


270 49 


Felton-Turner Heating Company, 


198 23 


47 


198 70 


Ferncroft Club, Inc., 


89 60 


50 


90 10 


Field Holmes Company, 


250 88 


1 00 


251 88 


Fitchburg Drug Companj^, . 


179 20 


90 


180 10 


Fitchburg Real Estate and Loan 








Company, 


90 13 


72 


90 85 


Foster Company, Inc., . 


268 80 


8 07 


276 87 


Four Seas Company, 


69 15 


82 


69 97 


Framingham Commission House, 








Inc., 


59 60 


1 19 


60 79 


Frank A. Andrews, Inc., 


35 84 


09 


35 93 


Frank A. Arend & Co., . 


44 80 


09 


44 89 


Frank J. McGarry & Co., Inc., . 


80 64 


24 


80 88 


Frank P. Bennett & Co., Inc., . 


129 02 


75 


129 77 


Frank P. Brown Company, . 


36 55 


45 


37 00 


Frank Ridlon Company, 


985 60 


4 93 


990 53 


Franklin Clothing Company, 


89 60 


45 


90 05 


Fred A. Loud Company, 


202 49 


5 90 


208 39 


Fred D. Sperry Company, . 


81 53 


20 


81 73 


Frye & Crawford Drug Company, 


17 92 


08 


18 00 


Fudge Man Company, . 


5 37 


13 


5 50 


Fuller Whitney Surveys Corpora- 








tion, 


53 76 


35 


54 11 



1915. 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



335 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1913. 






G. B. Lawrence Company, . 


$98 91 


SO 50 


$99 41 


G. H. PoUej^ Company, . 


16 12 


53 


16 65 


G. I. M. Vulcanizing Company, . 


12 90 


06 


12 96 


G. W. Lord Company, . 


179 20 


79 


179 99 


G. W. Sammet & Son Company, 


482 04 


2 89 


484 93 


Garden Cit}^ Laundry Company, 


80 64 


1 61 


82 25 


Gay Automobile Company, . 


98 56 


82 


99 38 


George Dietz Company, 


21 50 


10 


21 60 


George F. Vester Company, . 


53 76 


54 


54 30 


George H. Ball Company, 


179 20 


4 96 


184 16 


George H. Mason Company, 


245 50 


2 64 


248 14 


George H. Sallaway Companj^, . 


205 72 


1 03 


206 75 


George H. Sherbert, Inc., 


53 76 


1 82 


55 58 


George T. Horan, Inc., . 


224 00 


7 61 


231 61 


George W. Gale Lumber Com- 








pany, 


1,013 37 


6 76 


1,020 13 


Gloucester Gill -Net Fisheries 








Company, Inc., . 


143 00 


75 


143 75 


Gloucester Loan Company, , 


107 52 


65 


108 17 


Goldman Brothers Company, 


44 80 


- 


44 80 


Gordon & Sparrow Company, 


241 92 


1 25 


243 17 


Gordon Home, Inc., 


62 72 


35 


63 07 


Gosnold Mills Company, 


3,708 09 


21 01 


3,729 10 


Coward's Market Company, 


44 80 


10 


44 90 


Graham Company, .... 


53 76 


24 


54 00 


Graustein Company, 


241 92 


15 06 


256 98 


Gray-Aldrich Company, Inc., 


185 29 


74 


186 03 


Greendale Gas Engine Company, 


112 00 


2 08 


114 08 


Greene & Fish Company, 


268 80 


81 


269 61 


Grossman Cap Company, 


17 92 


- 


17 92 


Guilford Kendrick & Ladd, Inc., . 


381 69 


2 23 


383 92 


Gurvitz-Arbeter Company, . 


10 75 


50 


11 25 


Guy Furniture Company, 


833 67 


4 87 


838 54 


H. & B. Manufacturing Com- 








pany, 


71 05 


49 


71 54 


H. B. Keen, Inc., .... 


48 06 


48 


48 54 


H. C. Girard Company, 


150 62 


75 


151 37 


H. C. H. Fruit Company, Inc., . 


35 84 


21 


36 05 


H. Dangel Company, 


184 57 


- 


184 57 


H. E. Lindbladh Company, . 


25 08 


48 


25 56 


H. I. Emmons Company, 


4 50 


- 


4 50 


H. M. Kinports Company, 


81 69 


4 24 


85 93 


Hall Automobile Specialties Com- 








pany, 


14 33 


- 


14 33 


Hailstone Electric Company, 


17 47 


16 


17 63 


Hampden Creamery Company, . 


135 33 


2 70 


138 03 


Hampden Railroad Corporation, . 


6,272 00 


37 63 


6,309 63 


Harrington Manufacturing Com- 








pany, 


219 52 


1 09 


220 61 


Harriott Company, 


39 04 


16 


39 20 



336 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1913. 






Harry Eldredge Goodhue Com- 








pany, 


S89 60 


$2 65 


$92 25 


Hartley Silk Manufacturing Com- 








pany, Inc., 


704 14 


4 22 


708 36 


Harvard Provision Company, 


16 12 


- 


16 12 


Haverhill Construction Company, 


64 51 


28 


64 79 


Henry D. Temple Company, 


80 64 


32 


80 96 


Henry F. Farrow Company', 


156 24 


78 


157 02 


Henry F. Miller & Sons Piano 








Company, . . . . . 


3,014 23 


30 14 


3,044 37 


Henry Gray Company, . 


32 25 


1 06 


33 31 


Hertig Furnace Company, . 


45 69 


23 


45 92 


Hetherston Importing Company, . 


403 20 


13 84 


417 04 


Hide and Skin Importing Com- 








pany, 


143 36 


84 


144 20 


Hide-ite Leather Company, . 


689 47 


10 34 


699 81 


Highland Paint and Wall Paper 








Company, 


114 68 


92 


115 60 


Hill Dryer Company, . 


394 59 


1 38 


395 97 


Hill Press, Incorporated, 


5 37 


29 


5 66 


Hills Chair-Couch Manufacturing 








Company, 


26 52 


- 


26 52 


Hilton Express Company, 


40 32 


87 


41 19 


Hjorth Lathe and Tool Company, 


125 44 


1 06 


126 50 


Hodgson Kennard & Co., Inc., 


1,073 40 


10 54 


1,083 94 


Hollander Motor Company, . 


109 81 


3 59 


113 40 


Home Dairy Lunch Company, 


107 52 


60 


108 12 


Hooper Lewis & Co., Inc., . 


322 56 


- 


322 56 


Hooper Printing Company, . 


62 72 


. ?? 


63 04 


Hotel Empire, Inc., 


179 20 


5 55 


184 75 


Housatonic Water Works Com- 








pany, 


257 15 


- 


257 15 


Howe Stove and Furniture Ex- 








change, Inc., .... 


34 47 


17 


34 64 


Hoyt Company, .... 


430 08 


11 10 


441 18 


Hub Mattress Companj^, 


29 03 


15 


29 18 


Hudson Printing Compam^, . 


35 84 


18 


36 02 


Hunter Stationery Company, 


37 75 


- 


37 75 


Huntt's Lunch Company, 


404 18 


2 43 


406 61 


Ideal Dental Laboratory, Inc., . 


20 42 


10 


20 52 


Ideal Shoe Repairing Company, . 


90 31 


3 05 


93 36 


Idle Hour Theatre Company, 


26 43 


53 


26 96 


Import and Export Associates, 


53 76 


2 18 


DO 94 


Incorporated Realty Associates, . 


50 17 


1 83 


52 00 


Independent Button Fastener Ma- 








chine Co., 


157 21 


5 66 


162 87 


Interchangeable Rubber Heel 








Company, 


172 73 


3 44 


176 17 


International Hide Company, 


10 00 


06 


10 06 


Investment and Trust Association, 


53 76 


27 


54 03 



1915. 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



337 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1913. 






Isaac H. Dinner Company, . 


$53 76 


$0 19 


$53 95 


J. A. Brenner & Co., Inc., 


272 38 


1 36 


273 74 


J. G. Bridge Company, . 


154 39 


90 


155 29 


J. 0. Walker & Son Corporation, . 


201 65 


1 20 


202 85 


J. H. Gerlach Company, 


67 73 


32 


68 05 


J. H. Green Company, . 


89 60 


1 79 


91 39 


J. H. RobiKson Company, 


53 75 


43 


54 18 


J. K. Taylor Manufacturing Com- 








pany, 


412 16 


1 17 


413 33 


J. L, Legein Ice Cream Company, 


128 12 


86 


128 98 


J. M. Jameson Company, 


22 57 


- 


22 57 


J. Nardi Company, 


80 64 


- 


80 64 


J. S. Sieve Company, 


135 11 


67 


135 78 


James Barrett IManufacturing 








Company, 


519 68 


1 81 


521 49 


James H. Malone, Inc., . 


179 20 


1 43 


180 63 


James J. Loughery Company, 


214 50 


1 07 


215 57 


James Miles & Son Company, 


89 24 


1 72 


90 96 


Jenkins & Smith, Inc. , . . 


654 20 


2 82 


657 02 


Jeremiah J. McCarthy Company, 


16 12 


20 


16 32 


John Cavanah & Son Building 








Moving Company, 


188 16 


10 36 


198 52 


John E. Lynch Hardware Com- 








pany, 


71 68 


40 


72 08 


John F. Johnston Company, 


276 12 


1 10 


277 22 


John Foster Company, . 


1,311 49 


5 24 


1,316 73 


John H. Bryer, Inc., 


16 30 


12 


16 42 


John J. Cluin Company, 


44 80 


35 


45 15 


John Quin & Son Company, 


322 56 


1 61 


324 17 


Jordan-Goodridge Company, 


83 68 


75 


84 43 


Joseph Wilcox Company, 


275 96 


- 


275 96 


Kakas Brothers, Inc., 


940 80 


4 70 


945 50 


Kelly Leather Good^ Company, . 


7 31 


02 


7 33 


Keystone Job Print, ... 


36 73 


18 


36 91 


Kilburn Lincoln & Co., . 


1,383 74 


17 76 


1,401 50 


Kimball Aeroplane Com_pany, 


10 12 


- 


10 12 


King Philip Tavern Company, . 


36 55 


70 


37 25 


Kinney Heating and Supply Com- 








pany, 


40 89 


41 


41 30 


Kinney Manufacturing Company, 


1,254 40 


6 27 


1,260 67 


Klein Manufacturing Company, . 


16 12 


10 


16 22 


Kleno Manufacturing Company, . 


17 92 


- 


17 92 


Koerner & Mitchell Company, 


101 66 


41 


102 07 


L. A. WiUiamison Company, . 


7 50 


- 


7 50 


L. G. Fisk-Mooers Company, 


179 20 


1 83 


181 03 


L. K. Husted Company, Inc., 


43 00 


23 


43 23 


L. P. Soule & Son Company, 


397 37 


2 32 


399 69 


Lamere & Robinson Company, . 


44 08 


2 20 


46 28 


Lang & Jacobs Com.pany, 


94 08 


47 


94 55 


Lawrence & Stanley Company, . 


57 73 


29 


58 02 



338 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1913. 






Lawrence B. Smith Compan}^, 


$404 32 


S2 02 


$406 34 


Lawrence Fruit and Grocery Com- 








pany, 


13 08 


- 


13 08 


Lawrence Market Company, 


64 51 


1 60 


66 11 


Lavv'rence Motor Mart, Inc., 


18 81 


10 


18 91 


Lawrence Wholesale Drug Com- 








pany, 


268 80 


1 82 


270 62 


Leavitts Scotch Polish Companj^, 


23 56 


2 10 


25 66 


L'Echo Publishing Companj'-, 


402 57 


1 21 


403 78 


Leominster Electric Companj', 


35 84 


18 


36 02 


Levy Bros., Inc., .... 


59 13 


2 11 


61 24 


Lewis F. Small, Inc., 


17 92 


08 


18 00 


Liberty Paper Companj^, 


215 04 


1 08 


216 12 


Lincoln Leather Goods ^Company, 


67 20 


_ 


67 20 


Linscott Motor Company, 


396 92 


3 18 


400 10 


Linscott Suppty Company, . 


345 13 


2 36 


347 49 


Lion Raincoat Company, 


55 55 


31 


55 86 


London Harness Company, . 


806 40 


6 77 


813 17 


Lovells (Inc.), . . .'^ . 


64 51 


1 29 


65 80 


Lunt Moss Com.pany, 


738 75 


4 43 


743 18 


Lyn Home Company, 


17 92 


08 


18 00 


Lynch Heel Company, . 


80 64 


1 64 


82 28 


Lynn Manufacturers and ]\Ier- 








chants Mutual Fire Insurance 








Companj^, 


156 62 


79 


157 41 


Ljmn Photo Chemical Company, . 


10 75 


26 


11 01 


Lyon Company, .... 


197 69 


1 00 


198 69 


Lyric Amusement Company, 


49 28 


39 


49 67 


M. & C. Hat Company, 


50 17 


25 


50 42 


M. D. Malbon Company, 


496 18 


2 48 


498 66 


M. Marks Company, 


62 72 


25 


62 97 


MacLean Produce Company, 


62 72 


36 


63 08 


Magee Furnace Company, . 


1,692 41 


8 46 


1,700 87 


Maine Ice Cream Companj^, 


67 20 


54 


67 74 


Maine State Creamery Company, 


17 93 


- 


17 93 


Majestic Compan}^, . . . 


215 04 


1 15 


216 19 


Maiden Leather Goods Company, 


110 38 


47 


110 85 


Manhattan Collar Company, 


89 60 


30 


89 90 


Manhattan Grocery and Provision 








Companj^, 


1,247 23 


7 28 


1,254 51 


Mansfield Drug Company, . 


44 80 


22 


45 02 


Manufacturers Outlet Com^pany, . 


17 92 


06 


17 98 


Mark Motor Supply Companj^, . 


53 90 


32 


54 22 


Mason Manufacturing Company, 


12 54 


36 


12 90 


Massachusetts Investment Com- 








pany, 


17 31 


14 


17 45 


Massachusetts Loan Society, Inc., 


97 19 


48 


97 67 


Massasoit Companv, 


539 03 


10 78 


549 81 


Matchless Heater Company, 


84 36 


2 53 


86 89 


Matthew F. Sheehan Company, . 


412 16 


3 74 


415 90 



1915.1 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 



339 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corpoiation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1913. 






Mayfair Manufacturing Company, 


$95 87 


$0 48 


S96 35 


Mayflower Laundry Company, . 


116 48 


2 56 


119 04 


Maykel Automobile Company, . 


35 84 


27 


36 11 


Meilish & Byfield Manufacturing 








Company, 


152 32 


88 


153 20 


Mellor Manufacturing Company, 


44 80 


1 35 


46 15 


Melville Pharmacy, Inc., 


107 52 


72 


108 24 


Alelvin Bancroft Company, . 


26 88 


12 


27 00 


Merchandise and Laundry Tag 








Company, 


58 54 


23 


58 77 


Methuen Granite Company, 


6 25 


03 


6 28 


Metropolitan Laundry Company, 


507 85 


7 10 


514 95 


^liddlesex Drug Company, . 


81 05 


41 


81 46 


Miles Patents Company, 


80 31 


24 


80 55 


Miller Brothers, Inc., 


388 86 


1 36 


390 22 


Millers River Box Company, 


87 80 


51 


88 31 


Milton Laundry Company, . 


21 50 


3 32 


24 82 


Model Laundering Company, ^ . 


95 87 


2 11 


97 98 


^Monarch Valve and Manufacturing 








Company, 


782 92 


17 74 


800 66 


Morse McDonald Company, 


86 01 


44 


86 45 


Moseiy & ^laschin. Inc., 


197 12 


1 12 


198 24 


Motor Specialties Company, 


89 99 


1 79 


91 78 


Munroe & Arnold-Merritt Express 








Company^ 


499 96 


2 00 


501 96 


Murphy Boot and Shoe Company, 


543 69 


27 18 


570 87 


Alurphy Coal and Wood Com- 








pany, 


297 47 


1 83 


299 30 


Murphy Cone Company, 


5 37 


02 


5 39 


Myrlite Company of America, 


90 00 


1 35 


91 35 


National Druggists Supply Com- 








pany, 


322 14 


11 56 


333 70 


National Games Company, . 


89 60 


2 65 


92 25 


National Investment and Securi- 








ties Company, .... 


614 97 


5 24 


620 21 


National Knitting Company, 


179 20 


86 


180 06 


National Manufacturing Com- 








pany, 


260 07 


1 28 


261 35 


National Matzo Company of Bos- 








ton, 


19 03 


12 


19 15 


National ^letalhc Bed Company, 


238 33 


4 76 


243 09 


Nelson Color Company, 


112 89 


2 07 


114 96 


New Bedford Clothing and Jew- 








elry Company, .... 


71 68 


72 


72 40 


New England Cold Storage Com- 








pany, 


860 16 


4 30 


864 46 


New England Converting Com- 








pany, 


35 84 


- 


35 84 


New England Directory Company, 


28 70 


- 


28 70 


New England Discount Company, 


1,364 93 


11 24 


1,376 17 



340 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan, 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1913. 






New England Hardware Com- 








pany, 


$44 80 


$0 55 


S45 35 


New England Office Furniture 








Company, 


89 60 


53 


90 13 


New England Reed Company, . 


346 17 


1 73 


347 90 


New England Supply Company, . 


136 59 


- 


136 59 


New York Mattress Company, . 


329 72 


16 48 


346 20 


Newport Provision Company, 


24 00 


- 


24 00 


Newport Transfer Express Com- 








pany, 


7 50 


06 


7 56 


Niagara Laundry Company, 


7 16 


- 


7 16 


Nickles Cranberry Company, 


31 18 


07 


31 25 


Nobscot Mountain Spring Com- 








pany, 


258 04 


75 


258 79 


Non-Corrosive Metal Manufactur- 








ing Company, .... 


54 47 


- 


54 47 


North Shore Breeze Company, . 


17 92 


35 


18 27 


North Shore Red Granite Com- 








pany, 


125 44 


2 50 


127 94 


Northampton Printing and Bind- 








ing Companj^ .... 


47 12 


24 


47 36 


Norton Water Motor Company, . 


22 57 


15 


22 72 


Novelty Dress Company, 


29 38 


15 


29 53 


Oak Street Garage, Inc., 


61 82 


31 


62 13 


Ocean Mills Company, . 


132 94 


66 


133 60 


Olympic Theatre Companj^ . 


17 92 


06 


17 98 


Omiros Cigarette Company, Inc., 


117 19 


59 


117 78 


Ovington Aviation School of Cor- 








respondence, .... 


5 16 


- 


5 16 


Oxford Rubber Company, 


669 58 


6 92 


676 50 


Oxidite Manufacturing Company, 


31 18 


16 


31 34 


P. Creedon Companv, . 


322 56 


1 61 


324 17 


P. F. Wood Boiler Works, Inc., . 


161 28 


1 00 


162 28 


Palmer Hunter Lumber Com- 








pany, 


492 80 


2 87 


495 67 


Palmer Renting Company, . 


62 72 


3 44 


66 16 


Pamott Mines Company, 


80 00 


80 


80 80 


Panama Canal and Amusement 








Company, 


465 92 


2 02 


467 94 


Park Theatre Amusement Com- 








pany, 


12 90 


24 


13 14 


Parker Brothers Iron Companj^, . 


64 65 


- 


64 65 


Parsons Manufacturing Company. 


412 16 


13 60 


425 76 


Payson Mitchell Company, . 


53 76 


26 


54 02 


Peerless Welding and Manufactur- 








ing Company, .... 


148 73 


8 06 


156 79 


Pemberton Sales Company, . 


116 48 


58 


117 06 


Peoples Drug Store Company, . 


24 19 


19 


24 38 


Perkins & Co., Inc., 


250 88 


3 21 


254 09 


Perkins Appliance Company, 


52 41 


— 


52 41 



1915. 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



341 



Collected on 

Account 

of Corporation 

Tax for 1913. 



Interest. 



Totals. 



Perlmuter Brothers Company, 

Inc., 

Perry & Ayers (Inc.), . 
Perry Mason Company, 
Persian Rug Loft, Inc., . 
Picture Shop, Inc., . 
Pierce & Barnes Company. . 
Pierce & Chesworth Company, 
Pierce, Macomber Meat and Gro 

eery Company, Inc., . 
Pine Croft Orchard Company, 
Pine Grove Floral Corporation, 
Pinkham Press, 
Plymouth Auto Company, . 
Plymouth Manufacturing Com 

pany 

Pope-Hartford Company of Bos 

ton, 

Post Office Pharmacy, Inc., . 
Presbrey-Field Company, 
Prescott Auto Parts Company, 
Progress Rubber Company, . 
Prospect Auto Company, 
Providence Scenic Theatre Com 



pany, . . • • 
Purity Confectionery Company, 
Queen Manufacturing Company 

Inc., 

R. B. Mason Company, Inc., 
R. C. Goudey Company, 
R. F. Dodge Company, . 
R. T. Todd Company, . 
R. T. Sullivan Company, 
Rayolite Company, 
Re-New Lamp Company, 
Reading Custom Laundry, Inc., 
Regal Laundry Company, . 
Revere Boat Company, . 
Rex Wrench Company, . 
Riverside Park Amusement Com 



pany, 

Roackdale Woollen Company, 

Robt. Cook & Sons Company, 

Robert R. McNutt, Inc., 

Robinson Bramley Company 
Inc., 

Robinson-Brockway Manufactur- 
ing Company, 

Rosengard Furniture Company, 

Ross Brothers Company, 



$35 84 
7 16 
6,318 59 
74 17 
43 00 
17 92 
16 12 

33 97 
11 46 

7 52 
82 55 

5 37 

89 60 

890 62 
53 76 

358 40 
46 59 
89 60 
57 34 

72 09 

62 72 

94 97 
515 20 

68 43 

• 26 88 

387 07 

276 41 

63 63 
487 42 

41 21 
53 76 

8 
46 



52 

12 



159 93 
10 21 

110 74 
67 20 

26 88 

138 75 

168 44 

1,344 00 



$0 18 

30 54 

3 63 

17 

39 



19 
05 
08 
3 30 
05 

54 

9 63 
29 

2 08 
19 
40 
65 



40 

38 



40 

2 10 
36 

1 08 

2 29 

1 14 

2 73 
1 38 

24 
18 
85 
30 

69 



3 42 



89 

85 

25 08 



$36 02 
7 16 
6.349 13 
77 80 
43 17 
18 31 
16 12 

34 16 
11 51 

7 60 

85 85 

5 42 

90 14 

900 25 
54 05 

360 48 
46 78 
90 00 
57 99 

72 49 
64 10 

95 37 
517 30 

68 79 

27 96 

389 36 

277 55 

66 36 

488 80 

41 45 

53 94 

9 37 

46 42 

160 62 
10 21 

110 74 
70 62 

26 88 

139 64 

169 29 

1,369 08 



342 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corooration 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1913. 






Roj-al Furniture Company, . 


$266 64 


$15 96 


$282 60 


Royal Laundry Company, 




16 12 


08 


16 20 


Royal Shoe Company, . 




142 64 


81 


143 45 


Rutland Cade Company, 




17 92 


- 


17 92 


Ryan & Duffee, Inc., . 




179 20 


90 


180 10 


S. E. Cassino Company, 




102 50 


2 00 


104 50 


S. M. Howes Company, 




2,279 42 


7 22 


2,286 64 


S. W. Loomis Company, 




114 36 


57 


114 93 


St. Clairs' (Inc.), . . 




216 41 


1 30 


217 71 


St. Louis Rubber Company, 


344 06 


1 70 


345 76 


Sally's Embroidery and Cleansing 








Companj^, 


31 16 


16 


31 32 


Samuel Ward Company, 


2,329 60 


6 98 


2,336 58 


Sanitary Paper Cup Company, . 


49 28 


2 16 


51 44 


Saskatchewan Investment Com- 








pany, 


44 79 


13 


44 92 


Sawyer Drug Company, 


73 38 


37 


73 75 


Scandinavian Co-operative Gro- 








cery Union, 


64 49 


37 


64 86 


School Arts Publishing Companj', 


159 73 


1 33 


161 06 


School Street Piano Storage Com- 








pany, 


64 51 


1 29 


65 80 


Seth W. Fuller Company, 


69 47 


1 80 


71 27 


Shadduck and Normandin Com- 








pany; 


111 22 


55 


111 77 


Sheedy Amusement Company, 


71 68 


2 37 


74 05 


Sheldon Brothers Company, 


7 16 


05 


7 21 


Shortstory Publishing Company, . 


46 16 


23 


46 39 


Show Card Shop, Inc., . . . 


8 60 


25 


8 85 


Shultz-Goodwin Companv, . 


684 99 


5 14 


690 13 


Silas Peirce & Co., Ltd., ^ . 


2,128 98 


6 39 


2,135 37 


Silox Pure Water Company of 








New England, .... 


66 07 


33 


66 40 


Silver Lake Ice Company, 


216 49 


1 00 


217 49 


Simmons Cranberry Compan}^, . 


7 52 


15 


7 67 


Simplex Automobile Agency, Inc., 


101 06 


2 16 


103 22 


Slattery Brothers Automobile 








Company, 


179 20 


1 07 


180 27 


Small Maynard & Co. (Inc.), 


1,344 00 


5 06 


1,349 06 


Smith Tablet Company, Inc., 


250 88 


1 25 


252 13 


Smithmade Suspender Company, . 


71 68 


21 


71 89 


Somerset Coal Company, 


8 60 


10 


8 70 


Somerset Raincoat Company, 


26 88 


13 


27 01 


Soule Art Publishing Company, . 


41 21 


15 


41 36 


South End Motor Car Company, . 


198 58 


2 50 


201 08 


Southgate Press — T. W. Ripley 








Company, 


466 36 


2 72 


469 08 


Specialty Leather Goods Com- 








pany, 


50 76 


15 


50 91 


Specialty Shop, .... 


119 34 


36 


119 70 



1915. 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



343 



Collected on 

Account 

of Corporation 

Tax for 1913. 



Interest. 



Totals. 



Springfield Ice and Coal Com- 
pany, 

Springfield Manufacturing Com- 
pany, 

Springfield Office Supply Com- 
pany, 

Standard Dj^ewood and Extract 

Company, .... 
Standard Handle and Lumber 

Compaii}'', .... 
Standard Motor Car Company 
Standard Scale and Equipment 

Company, .... 
Standard Supply Company, Inc. 
Sterns & Waterman Company, 
Steel Specialties Company, . 
Stockbridge Water Company, 
Stoddard Ice Cream Company, 
Stoddard Union Company, . 
Stones Express, Inc., 
Story Simmons Company, 
Stratton Automobile Company, 
Suffolk Manufacturing Company 
Sullivan & Daly Company, . 
Sunnymeade Farms, Inc., 
Sylvester Brothers Company, 
Sylvester Tower Company, . 
T. D. Borst Company, . 
T. H. O'Donnell & Co., Inc., 
T. Shea, Inc., .... 
T. T. Connolly Company, 
Tarr's Structural and Marine 

Paint Company, . 
Taunton Co-operative Grocery 

Company, Inc., . 
Taunton Evening News, 
Taunton Spindle Company, . 
Taylor Chemical Company, . 
Teiepost Company of Massachu- 
setts, 

Tenney Worcester Company, 
Therapeutic Pubhshing Company, 
Thermolac Manufacturing Com- 
pany, 

Thissell Company, .... 
Thomas D. Card Company, Inc., 
Thomas J. Hind, Inc., . . 
Thompson Snow & Davis Com- 
pany, 

Thorn Medicine Company, . 



^2,610 94 
192 46 
241 92 

28 67 

6 30 

98 56 

289 83 
95 85 
43 00 
71 68 

174 72 
11 28 

482 94 
268 80 
112 89 

7 16 
31 18 

224 00 

26 88 

5 37 

1,465 85 

62 84 

107 52 

224 00 

7 52 

21 71 

31 89 

161 28 

17 92 

483 64 

17 92 

52 41 

20 85 

62 54 

35 84 
64 51 

28 42 

601 28 

53 76 



$14 80 
1 00 
1 46 

11 



47 
22 
32 

1 07 
02 

4 02 

1 50 
68 
14 
16 

8 28 
15 

8 79 
31 

2 15 
1 12 

04 



14 



16 

1 24 

08 

16 



45 
52 
65 

50 
18 
31 



3 51 

27 



$2,625 74 
193 46 
243 38 

28 67 

6 41 

98 56 

289 83 
96 32 
43 22 
72 00 

175 79 
11 30 

486 96 
- 270 30 

113 57 

7 30 
31 34 

232 28 

27 03 

5 37 

1,474 64 

63 15 

109 67 

225 12 

7 56 

21 71 



32 05 
162 52 

18 00 
497 80 


18 37 
52 93 
21 50 


63 04 
36 02 

64 82 
28 42 


604 79 
54 03 



344 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 



Tichnor Brothers, Inc., . 
Times Companj^, 
Torrey-Epstein Con^ipan}^, . 
Totem Manufacturing Companj 
Transcript Press, Inc., . 
Transfer Pharmacy, Inc., 
Tribune-Enterprise, Inc., 
Trimount Laundry Company, 
Trombly Jewelry Company, . 
U. T. Hungerford Brass and Cop 

per Company of Boston, . 
Union Avenue Hospital, Inc., 
Union Commercial Paper Com 

pany, 

Union Curled Hair Company, 
Union Furniture Company, . 
Union Raincoat Company, . 
Union Seal Companj^, / 
Union Supply Company, 
Union Trading Stamp Company 
United Cleanser Company, . 
United States Snuff Company, 
Universal Manufacturing Com 

pany 

Utley's, Inc., . . . ] 
Vail Galvanizing Plant, Inc., 
Van Tassel Leather Company, 
Vesuvio Drug Company, 
Victor Shoe Machinery Com- 

^.Pany, 

Victoria Aeroplane Automobile 

and Amusement Company, 
Viets Company, 

Vulcan Manufacturing Company 
W. A. Jefts Company, . 
W. Bert Lewis Shoe Company, 
W. C. Bates Company, . 
W. C. Welch Company, 
W. E. Greene Amusement Com 

pany, 

W. Georgie Greenlay Companv, 
W. H. Marble Automobile Com 

pany, 

W. M. McDonald Companv, Inc. 
W. M. Young Regalia ^ Com 

panv, 
W. P.B. Brooks & Co., Inc.,' 
W. P. Goode Brush Companv, 
W. Pence Mitchell Hat Com 
pany, 



Collected on 

Account 

of Corporation 

Tax for 1913. 



$259 84 

13 44 

7 16 

228 30 

71 68 

12 54 

5 37 
56 44 

206 40 

89 60 
22 22 

60 69 

7 16 
295 08 

86 01 

78 84 

160 34 

6 45 

61 64 
59 24 

8 06 
165 70 

96 76 
805 50 

17 92 

286 72 

24 76 

18 24 
163 23 

82 96 
312 84 

48 38 
98 00 

8 96 
38 70 

215 04 
220 41 

29 74 

74 38 

112 89 

17 92 



Interest. 



$1 46 

04 

4 57 

20 

10 

23 
2 27 

36 
12 

40 
04 

1 48 
69 
78 
64 
03 

4 42 
35 



Totals. 



1 



18 
27 
39 
65 24 

08 

12 32 

1 08 
38 
82 
77 

1 08 
24 
54 



1 15 

1 19 

2 42 



27 



S261 30 

13 44 

7 20 

232 87 

71 88 

12 64 

5 37 

56 67 

208 67 

89 96 
22 34 



61 09 


7 20 


296 56 


86 70 


79 62 


160 98 


6 48 


66 06 


59 59 


8 24 


166 97 


97 15 


870 74 


18 00 


299 04 


25 84 


18 62 


164 05 


83 73 


313 92 


48 62 


98 54 


8 96 


39 85 


216 23 


222 83 



29 74 

74 65 

113 57 

17 92 



1915.1 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — Xo. 12. 



345 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1913. 






Wachtel-Pickert Company, . 


$225 75 


$11 15 


$236 90 


Wade Machine Company, 


170 24 


85 


171 09 


Walbuck Crayon Company, . 


32 25 


18 


32 43 


Ward, Drouet & Foster, Inc., 


541 18 


14 61 


555 79 


Warren- Allen Carpet Company, . 


161 28 


82 


162 10 


Washburn Brothers Company, 


183 50 


57 


184 07 


Washburn Realty Trust, Limited, 


174 07 


99 


175 06 


Waterhouse Welding Company, . 


35 84 


72 


36 56 


W^atson Blood Company, 


116 48 


1 17 


117 65 


Wellington Rubber Company, 


179 20 


1 91 


181 11 


Wells-Burrage Company, 


241 92 


- 


241 92 


West Lynn Lithuanian Co-opera- 








tive Market, Inc., 


17 05 


08 


17 13 


Western Massachusetts Essenkay 








Company, 


51 60 


- 


51 60 


Western Oil Company, . 


51 60 


1 70 


53 30 


White Automobile Company, 


77 46 


58 


78 04 


White Motor Car Company, 


86 58 


50 


87 08 


White Store (Inc.), 


163 43 


- 


163 43 


Wliiting Manufacturing Com- 








pany, 


242 81 


7 79 


250 60 


Whitney Law Corporation, . 


292 04 


3 46 


295 50 


Whittier Woodenware Company, 


537 60 


12 36 


549 96 


Wilbert E. Welch Company, 


39 06 


1 88 


40 94 


Wilkenda System, Inc., . 


168 71 


1 15 


169 86 


William Aliens Sons Company, . 


281 34 


1 50 


282 84 


William C. Norcross Company, . 


319 88 


1 65 


321 53 


William F. Brj^an Waste Com- 








pany, 


80 64 


2 66 


83 30 


William Gilhgan Company, . 


114 68 


92 


115 60 


William J. McCarthy Company, . 


50 17 


15 


50 32 


William J. Rafferty Company, . 


35 84 


16 


36 00 


William L. Browne Electric Com- 








pany, 


111 46 


46 


111 92 


William Porter & Son, Inc., . 


60 00 


23 


60 23 


Williamstown Glass Sales Com- 








pany, 


444 61 


2 22 


446 83 


Wilhs C. Bates Company, 


99 68 


3 18 


102 86 


Willsite Flooring Company, Inc., 


20 00 


- 


20 00 


Winchester News Company, 


25 26 


23 


25 49 


Witch City Tanning Company, . 


354 86 


- 


354 86 


Woodward-Reopell Company, 


208 58 


4 98 


213 56 


Worcester Automobile Company, 


94 08 


47 


94 55 


Worcester Co-operative Market 








Company, 


82 61 


- 


82 61 


Worcester Hay and Grain Com- 








pany, 


173 82 


90 


174 72 


W^orcester Paper Box Company, . 


26 88 


13 


27 01 


Workingmen's Loan Association, 


• 2,464 00 


- 


2,464 00 


Wright Cutter Company. 


503 87 


5 04 


508 91 



346 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





Collected on 








Account 
of Corporation 


Interest. 


Totals. 




Tax for 1913. 






Wright Illustrative and Engraving 








Company, 


$140 33 


$0 70 


$141 03 


Wj'co Products Company, 


53 76 


27 


54 03 


Wyn-Croft Company, 


17 92 


08 


18 00 


Yo Yo Beverage Company, . 


107 52 


2 15 


109 67 


Young & Follett Company, . 


22 40 


11 


22 51 


Zetterman Machinery Company, . 


44 80 


1 47 


46 27 


Total, 


$201,275 93 


$1,966 11 


$203,242 04 



1915. 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



347 



O 



EH 

;^ 

o 



pq 



a; 









0) 



a; 

a; 
> 

o 



P 2 



CO 



^ Q 
p 






TO a; 

> 

o 

o 





s 


s 


S 


£ 


S 


S 


£ 


£ 


£ 


£ 


£ 


£ 


£ 
































^ 


,o 


,c 


,p 


,P 


o 


o 


,p 


,p 


,p 


,p 


,p 


o 




^ 


j^ 


t^ 


^ 


j_ 


^, 


;_ 


^ 


;_ 


^ 


b 


(H 


^ 




























ft 




a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


























































1 


a 




a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 




a 


a 


a 


n 


c 


= 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


c 


c 


G 


3 


G 


tf 


-- 


— 


— 


-- 


-3 


t3 


-3 


^3 


— 


^ 


TJ 


— 


-- 




c 






C 


3 




C 


C 




c 


G 


c 


G 




c3 


c3 


c; 


CJ 


C3 


Cj 


c3 


rt 


c3 


c3 


rt 


c3 


n 




3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


-3 


3 


3 


3 


3 




^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


?: 


^ 






rt 




c3 


rt 


c! 


c5 


rt 




c3 


rt 


c3 


c3 






hJ 






h-1 




h-l 


U 


H-l 






hJ 


^ 


c 




























0.2 




























23 












J3 






-g 








9. 


c « 


^ 


Jii 


_ii 


-a 


^ 


3 
O 


^ 


^ 


3 
O 




^ 


^ 


"p, 


O JO 

> 2 






















O 


o 


o 


O 


o 


£ 


O 


o 






o 


n 




ic 


iC 


in 


to 


to 


to 


to 


^ 


^ 


to 


to 


3 


3 


3 


:3 


3 


-) 


3 




3 


3 




«2 


£» 


M 


cc 


CO 


P-( 


OJ 


m 


tin 


w 


M 


M 


W 
















i!) 
























































t. 




fi 








S' 




























a 
















<a 




-S 








t 


-g 














M 




= 3 








is 














1 


3 

2 

a 


3 ■ 

c 


o 

G 

'£ 








3 

2 

3 
-1 


o 












-— 


c3 " 


-J^ 




















c 


G 

c3 


3 


rt - 


R, 


G 






^ 




>> 


>> 


>j 


>. 


.y 




3 


^ >> 


a 


.y 


>, 


>> 




















3 






















3 








dJ 




3 




rt 


rt 


^ 
rt 


^ 




i 


c3 


- P 

c ^ 


c 
o 




^ 


s 


s 






hJ 


hJ 


vA 


Ul 


< 


fe 




z:^ 


W 


\^ 


hJ 


< 


> 








































































































































































"o 

1 

1 


C 

s 


o 

.2 

PS 






1 

3 


"3 
o 

1 

< 


"3 


•1 

3* 


1 




•1 

"S 
g" 
•3 


i 
'l 

3 


3 








Ph' 

e 

O 
•-5 


1 


14 


3 

O 
1-5 


1 


a 
o 

1-3 


6 


3 
-g 

>-5 


•-5 


1 


> 




























>>"-3 73 
























































cS^ 




























§w g .• 






















f 
















s 












1 






ii-?.^ 


^ 


1 


c3 
g 


c 


rt 


-a 


-i^ 


J^ 






E 


^ 


^ 




■-5 


S 


i 


o 


o 


O 




€ 


iS 


o 


o 


a 

3 


^ 


tK 


'3 


o 




^ 


^ 


& 


o 




^ 


^ 


^ 
















si 












^ 


% 


<; 


ig: 


Oh 


;^ 


J?; 


;z: 


o 


«5 


:z: 


^ 


;?; 


i 


^ 


CO 


00 


C5 


05 


IC 


-* 


cc 


^ 


■^ 


>o 




CSI 




2! 


C 


c" 


c 





£ 


r 


ji 


^ 


X2 


xi 


.a 


-Q 


o 


1-5 


•-5 


1-^ 


c3 
•-3 


^ 


c3 

1-5 


•-5 


t^ 


^ 


f^ 


^ 


fe 


^ 



348 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





S 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


3 


g 


g 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


g 


a 


a 


a 










(h 












Lh 




b. 




t-c 


u 


ti 


u 






b^ 




£ 


.s 


.2 


.£ 


c2 


s 


s 


.2 


s 


£ 


^ 


.s 


«2 


.2 


s 


^ 


<2 





^ 


.2 




^ 


^ 


fc- 


j_, 


^ 


^ 


^ 


t- 


Ui 


L. 


. 


i-i 


ti 


. 


. 


Ih 


(h 






"t^ 




o 


« 


« 




« 


a> 


IB 


o 


o 


o 




<D 


o 


o 


QJ 


g. 








q; 


S 




a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 




o 


o 


o 




o 


o 


o 


o 


o 


o 


o 


o 


o 






















-lj 


k' 




t- 




(.' 






t- 


fcH 




L. 


t- 






Lh 


t-, 


£. 


i. 


i^ 




o 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


c 


_c 


_c 


a 


3 


_B 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


,2 


3 


3 


3 


_s 


_3 


3 


_3 


T3 


T3 


-3 


T3 


-c 


TJ 


-a 


"tS 


-C! 


-d 


t3 


-a 


-a 


73 


T3 


-a 


T3 


T3 


t3 


13 




a 


fl 


C 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 




3 


3 


3 


p 


3 


3 




c3 


c3 


c3 


cS 


c« 


c« 


03 


c3 


c3 


03 


cS 


03 


03 


ri 


03 


03 


c3 


ca 


03 


03 




3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 








«<-i 
























u-< 














^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


*? 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


1 


"^ 


"S 


"B 


"^ 




^ 


a 


03 


ej 


03 


c3 


eS 


c3 


c3 


a 


03 


c3 


03 


03 


c3 


c3 


:3 


c3 


03 


03 






^ 


h^l 


iJ 


^ 


h:; 




^ 


hJ 


hJ 


hJ 


hJ 


hJ 


hJ 


J 


H^ 


^ 


H^ 


h:i 


^ 


^.i 


























o 
















§3 

C O 




















3 










>< 




X 


















o 








d 






15 




« 




OJ 








^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


s 


^ 


-^' 


^ 


^ 


"E 


^ 


-«" 


ii 


s 


(B- 


^ 


s 


-a 


-2" 


-a 




2 
















O 






03 


—1 














> 2 


^ 


^ 


O 


-tJ 




'o 


"o 


^ 


a 


^ 


2 


B 


2 


^ 


3 


TJ 


3 


3 


3 




ta 


ta 


iC 


T5 




ta 


8C 




to 


to 


k< 




-d 


sc 


"0 


sc 


ta 


83 


Ph 


o 
:z; 


3 


3 


3 


i 


1 


3 


3 
02 


« 


c3 


3 


3 


c3 

pa 


i 


i 


3 


s 


3 


3 


3 




13 

o 
















a 


























o 
















S 






















3 




c 
















3 



























s 
























. 








^ 






b4 

12 


i 

c3 


T5 

c 












1 




>> 

Xi 

i 








1 

3 


3 




12 



a 
a 




3 


3 


-C 


0) 


























■n 






S 






3 


u 












V 


o; 




3 










CJ 






3 

'a 
3 

.2 






03 






> 

1 

a 


c 
.2 


c 
.2 


o 


3 
O 


1 

3 


3 
3 


^ 




a 


a 


t^ 


3 
-0 
3 
03 

1 


3 
a> 

T3 
3 
C3 


3 






3 
03 
3 

.2 


>, 


3 
03 


a 
3 

a 

a 




3 c « 




'S 


1 


!2 


12 


c3 




M 

o 


3 


+i 


12 


1 


+j 


^j 


3 

OJ 

i 


1 
3 



3 
§ 




Z 


<1 


'^ 


^ 


Q 


> 


ffl 




o 


Q 


^ 


^ 


Q 


w 


Q 


Q 


Q 


^ 





2 








































1 










































d 




d 






































>> 




> 






































rt 




■;3 






































s 








•S 






.2" 
> 




.e 








^- 
















T3 
3 
c3 




!« 




"i 




cc 


'5 












_bj) 
















02 




o 

1 




1 

Ph 

§ 

c3 


Q 


"3 

i 


M 
3 
Ph 

o 
■3 


X 

P^ 


>> 

Qi 

a 


C3 

3 


1 

d 


-a 

1 


'b 

3 
a) 


§ 


O 


3 
CO 


3 
§ 


-0 
3 

3 

« 


1 

•-4 


X 


3 

1 

X 

d 






u 


-1j 


OJ 










'u 




o 








3 

2 






'H 




0) 




§ 


§ 




1 


rt 


3 


c3 


o 


c3 


i 


^ 


y 


— 


■3 



03 







c3 
j3 


a 
4 




o 


o 


►-5 


Q 


C5 


Q 


Q 


S 


(-. 


fe 


m 


M 


^ 


S 


fa 





X 


s 





> 










































>.-^ CO 




s 




































• 


-Si 

Co? 




o 

3 






































°W o o 








. 


































. 










































o 


t-< >1 




















3 

-2 




.2 

3 














^■■ 


b. 


53 o 


^ 


^ 


r^* 


-« 


^ 


^'■ 


-ii" 




^ 


.^ 


03 


-^'" 




r^* 






(-> 


o 


1! 




k> 




I-, 


l-i 
















t< 




(, 






o 




o 


o 


O 


o 


o 


O 


o 




o 












c3 
T3 
03 
> 









lll 




^ 




>* 
^ 




>* 
^ 








■i 

3 




o 




1 

(3 






3 




3 


^ 


o 


•^'^ « 


O 


<D 


0) 


o 


o 


« 


o 




o 




(U 


^ 








d 


3 




z 


pa 


2 


2 


2 


z 


2; 


2 


2 


2 


s 


2 


p^ 


2 


2 


2 


2 


S 


s 


^ 


C«3 


•^ 


CO 


Oi 


O 


o 


<M 


o 


O 


_, 


o 


^ 


CO 


CO 


t^ 





■^ 


>o 


00 


00 












C<l 


(T^ 












<M 








CO 










III 




























• 














J2 


.6 


^' 


^ 


^ 


■S 


c3 


y 


c3 


s 


c3 


03 


a 


a 


a 


^ 


b 


03 


^ 




fe 


^ 


(=^ 


h=< 


fe 


1^ 


S 


s 


S 


§ 


S 


s 


< 


<: 


< 


-< 


s 


S 


§ 


§ 



1915.1 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



349 



H 


f. 


p: 


?! 


S 


fi 


£ 


S 


s 


g 


s 


S 


a 


S 


a 


3 


g 


a 


a 


a 


a 


3 


a 












!_ 






U 


li 


t-. 


u 


u 




t> 


L< 


l- 


tH 


ki 


u 




(> 


kH 


o 


o 


,o 


,p 


,p 


,c 


o 


,p 


o 


o 




























u 


^ 


u< 


^ 


^ 


b< 


J. 


t. 


(-. 


b< 


I, 


t-i 


k-i 


t^ 


u 


[-C 


t_ 


b 


t^ 


^ 


t. 


;^ 


t^ 


















































n. 


c, 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 




a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 






a 




a 






o 


o 


o 




o 


o 


o 


o 


o 


o 


o 


o 


o 


o 


o 


o 






o 


O 


o 
















































a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


fl 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


c 


c 


c 


c 


a 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


a 


G 


a 


G 


3 


3 


-0 


■v 


-a 


-o 


■^ 


T! 


t; 


-a 


-0 


Ti 


T3 


T3 


T3 


T! 


-c 


-0 


t3 


Ti 


T3 


T3 


-a 


-0 


t3 


a 


a 


a 




d 


c 


c 


3 


c 


a 


c 


3 


3 


G 


3 


3 


3 


G 


G 


a 


G 


3 


3 


CO 


a 


a 


n3 


e3 


a 


c3 


CIS 


03 


03 


c^ 


ca 


cS 


03 


c3 




c3 


OS 




c3 


c3 


03 


03 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


s 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


a 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 




rt 


rt 


C3 


1:3 




03 


CS 


c3 


03 


03 


03 


03 


c3 


c3 


03 


03 


03 


03 


CS 


03 


03 


03 




H-1 


hJ 


kJ 


y-\ 


hJ 


hJ 


h-1 


hJ 


hJ 


►-1 


h-1 


h-1 


K-1 


hJ 


H-1 


H-) 




h-l 


hJ 




H-1 


J 














c 






















^ 
























o 








(U 




Z) 














D 








J4 










-a 


T3 

a 
S 






■^ 


-^ 


^ 


^ 


.^ 


^ 




« 


S 






^ 


^ 


^ 


-?; 


>< 


t< 


o 


H 


o 


T! 


1 


O 




.° 




O 


O 


8 


T3 


-d 


1 


n 


d 


O 


O 


02 


1 


1 


3 


3 




iC 

3 


w 


o 
Z 


1 


in 

3 


3 
02 


1 






1 


o 
Z 


in 

3 
02 


3 
02 


























3 
























- 














. 








■5 










.- 






o 














































:s 








o 
































o 












& 






















o 










a 






!C 








o. 














. 








3 










a 














a 














>5 
















3 
3 






o 








§ 














bit 


^ 






s 










§ 






G 








-o 














Xi 


03 






y> 










-c 




- 


T3 








c3 






C 








5 


cS 






1 


g' 


^: 


g" 




3 
03 

a 




Tn 








>i 


.y 


>, 


>i 




>j 


bl 




>> 


>i 


- 


>j 


o" 








- 


o 


- 


3 




>j 


•• 


G 








+i 






a 






o 














*j 












1 


Q 


1 


3 






^ 


cS 


a 


3 


3 


1 

z 


1 

Q 


Q 


1 

Q 


3 


Q 


"^3 
3 


1 


3 


cS 


3 








































'^ 


























































































03 


a 














































_o 












































w 


'E 












































.2 


d^ 












































'3) 


s. 






















' 
















. 






h 


a 






















.« 


- 


f' 












5S 






> 


^ 








■i 
fa 

►-5 


s 


1 


s 

cS 
OJ 


o 

3 

o 


•i 

o 
a 

O) 


S 

S 

o 

1 


o" 

M 
03 
> 


e 

1 

fa 


•i5 

G 


c 

£ 


1 


i 

-si 


3 

s 

2 
5 
u 


3 

c3 

s 

1 


"a 

a 


3 

CS 

1 


5 
.- 

ffl 
a 


3 
03 

_o 

"S 
> 
o 

Q 
o 


3 
O 

i 

K 


is" 

O a; 

gQ 


1 

Z 


_2 


c 
.2 


fa 


< 


a 

3 

o 


•-5 




c 

s 

fa 


1 


3 

fa 


s 

.2 




t-5 

3 
1 


J3 
a 


^-5 


2 

i 


o 
Z 


O 


aso^ 

3 3 2 

3^1 


j3 
















. 










■6 






• 
















r^ 




>) 


^ 




Cj 


r^ 


^'" 


-^' 


S 


^ 


^ 


3 
03 


.£ 


jjj" 


^ 




^ 


>> 


■ 


3 


^ 


r^- 






£ 








































O 




o 




c 


o 


o 


o 




O 


o 




O 


o 


o 




o 








o 




>^ 


aT 


^ 


>l 


1 


;^ 


i>l 


>-i 


!>-| 


"-5 


'r^ 


't^ 


O 


>H 


^^ 


>H 




>-| 


1-3 


St 


y 


»>^ 


« 


& 


a 


^ 


^ 




^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 




^ 


^ 


03 


3 


^ 


3 
















































;z: 


§ 


:^ 


Z 


= 


U 


Z 


Z 


Z 


Z 


z 


Z 


« 


z 


Z 


Z 


§ 


Z 


z 


Q 


O 


Z 


§ 


^ 








^ 




















-H 


^ 














50 


C^l 














































>> 


>. 


>. 


>> 


2 


2 


% 


2 


o 


s 


2 


o 


o 


S 


2 


>> 


>> 


>. 


>> 


>> 


>) 




hh 


3 




n 


re 
































3 
< 


►^ 


3 
•-3 


3 


3 

"-5 


3 

■-5 


3 

1-5 


3 

1-5 


►^ 


3 


3 

1-5 


3 

1-5 


i-s 


3 


►-5 


^i;; 


>-i 


1-3 


< 



350 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 





s 


g 


g 


g 


g 


s 


s 


a 


s 


g 


S 


?; 


d 


^- 


F? 


f= 


P 


i 


F= 


• 




















(-. 


^ 






fc. 



















































































































i-t 






Lh 


(-. 














(« 






























































a 


a 


a 


a 




a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 




a 




0, 




n, 


P, 




p 
















































o 












































1 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 




a 


a 


a 


c 


c 


c 


c 


c 


3 


3 


3 


c 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


K 


-c 


■Ti 


tJ 


r3 


-d 


T) 


'^ 


-^ 


-d 


-3 


-3 


-^3 


t3 


13 


T1 


-^ 


Ti 


TJ 


TJ 


T1 












c 




c 






3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 








rt 










cS 


c3 


c3 


ci 


c: 


rt 


rt 


c3 


ci 


ci 


ci 


ci 


C3 




3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 




^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


% 


^ 


^ 


^ 


fi 


^ 


fi 


^ 


% 


^ 


% 


^ 




cj 




rt 


rt 


c3 




rt 
















ri 






rl 


r\ 


n^ 




hJ 


hj 


hJ 




H-3 


hJ 


hJ 






hJ 


h-1 


hJ 


h-] 


J 


^ 


hJ 


^ 


J 


^ 


J 


0.9 




















































































23 




X 




X 


c 






X 


3 


X 












^ 




^ 






> 2 














































^ 







^' 


r3 

a 

s 


^ 


^ 


« 


'E 


4i 


^ 


-^ 




^ 






^ 




^ 


- 


£ 


'5 


1 










"3 


;s 








^ 





X 


8 





?. 





^ 


Pt 


3 
a: 


s 


'3 


3 


3 




M 


^ 

s 


3 


3 





3 


^ 
H 


1 





1 


3 


'E 


-g 










































^ 


M 
















M 


n 




bC 




































S 


3 




3 


















X 


■c 
















•c 
























Si 






















(U 


















o 

S 


c 


















3 




3 

0) 




















TJ 
















T! 


T3 

3 

c3 




-n 


















6 


C 


1 


a 

a 












3 

c3 




3 
c3 






















.2 


1^ 


M 


^ 


>1 




3 


3 
9 


>i 


3 


3 

9 


>; 


3 

9 


t^ 


3 
9 




>> 


. 
















































1 


a 



e5 


5 





3 


3 








« 


1 


3 


1 




1 




^ 




3 
















• 




1 












• 












6 


















s 




















































































^ 
















. 








3 








rr- 




1 




3 






? 






-c 


.« 






►-J 


12 






O 

o 

s 

IS 


.2 
c 


.5 

c 




i 




c 


3 
1 
> 


'1 

3 


J 
g 


3 

3 


3 



a 


c3 
> 

5 


1 





1 


1 




2 






Q 
1 


1 


a 
< 


3 

s 


a 




1 


3 

> 

J3 







3 





S 

m 

3 

"c 

•-I 


,:<j 




^ 


s 

.3 


3 


If 

1 


cS 


3 


33 

fa 


J 




< 


U 


cc 


H 








fa 


W 


< 





fa 


j^ 


<ii 


« 


s 


fa 


fa 


< 


> 










































h S c3 










































cg^ 










































^il 
















. 












. 




















« 




c3 










-o" 










c? 










00.2 a 








c 


>j 


3 










3 
c3 


3 









3 












^ 


^ 


^ 


ri 




CJ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


M 


^ 


-i^ 




c3 


^ 


Jij 




^ 













































































3 















i^ 
^ 






>> 

3 
3 


1-5 


f 

3 













3 




>• 
^ 


§ 






.2' 
























Q 




















'Z 


Z 


13 


;z; 


^ 


^5 


Z 


^ 


« 





iz; 


Z 


> 


^ 


^ 





^ 


i 




^ 


(M 


-* 


^ 












OS 


CS 


^ 


^ 


r^ 


^ 


CO 


■<»< 


05 


CO 


»o 


CO 


t 


3 


3 


3 


^ 


fcb 

3 


CO 

ti 

3 


CO 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


1- 


? 


-t-j 

a 


« 


« 


« 


< 


<; 


< 


< 


< 


< 


< 


< 


M 


02 


w 


m 


M 


m 


02 


02 


Ul 


u 


CJ 


U 



1915.1 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



351 





«• 








s 


p 


p. 


p- 


s 


E 


a 


s 


s 


S 


£ 


a 


S 


s 


s 


a 


i 


-• 
















































o 


o 


o 


o 


o 


,o 


o 


o 


O 


,o 


^ 


3. 


^ 


$, 


«s 


^ 


>2 




^ 




£ 




s 


. 


. 






^ 






^ 






;^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


J_ 


j_, 


Lh 


^ 


j^ 


^ 


j_i 


^ 


J_ 


o 


o 


o 




o 




o 


o 


































a 


n, 


a 






n, 


a 


C 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 














a 


a 










o 


o 










o 


o 


o 


o 


o 


o 


o 


O 


o 


o 


o 


o 


o 


o 
















































a 


o. 






a 


a 


a 


a 


a 




a 


a 


a 


a 


a 




a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


— 


-3 


-71 


-3 


-n 


^ 


T3 


— 


T! 


Tl 


-rt 


-n 


— 


Ti 


-3 


-J 


^ 


-- 


-- 


-3 


^ 


— 


-; 


;3 




a 


c 


a 








a 




a 


c 


s 




a 


a 


a 


c 


c 




c 


n 


a 


^ 


rt 




« 




:3 


:3 


c3 




ci 


ci 


rt 


n 


C3 


rt 


'A 


c3 


c3 


c3 


C3 


c3 


" 


c3 


3 


3 


3 


a 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


^ 


rS 


% 


^ 


is 


% 


% 


% 


fs 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^t 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


rt 




a 


ri 




7i 








rt 




rt 


s 


c3 


rt 


c3 


rt 


c3 


c3 




c3 






h4 


^ 








J 






kj' 




^ 


hJ 




h-1 


H-) 




hJ 


J 


H-1 


^ 


fa 


^ 














s 




a" 


fcT 














«r 


^ 


cT 












c 










^ 


o 


o 


o 


o 






























o 


o 


o 


/sj 




o, 


m 


-n 


^ 


^ 


_^ 


^ 


^ 




o 






^ 


^ 


^ 


-^ 






















,p 














O 
























s 




























2 

fa 


-rt 


Tl 




te 




;-i 


u 


^ 


sn 


~ 


to 


in 


to 


t^ 


TS 




ic 


iC 


to 


ta 


S 


§ 


;§ 


3 
CO 


H 


^ 


w 


^ 


^ 


72 


2 


3 


3 
72 


cc 


M 


S 


« 


fa 


3 
73 


3 

72 


3 
CO 


3 
72 














Tf 




















b 


























•a 




















u 














. 












o 






o 


cT 












— 




























































2 












^ 






if 


r3 












2 














n 












UJ 


































a 












J 

^ 






M 


M 








to 




o 








M 
















O 






3 


.■5 








3 




3 








3 


















-i 
































. 


=;< 




- 


- 










~ 


-rj 








^ 




:i 








^ 


_^ 




bn 


"rt 


l;^ 




3 


>, 


H 


_3 


>i 


>, 


>> 


t^ 


t^ 


O 


:3 


>, 


:3 




3 


>1 


M 


? 


;=^ 


a 


-3 


a 
o 


3 




s 




3 


a 
o 


a 
o 


« 


^ 


H 


-J;^ 


^ 


a 


^ 


qT 


t; 


- 


^ 


3 


o 








o 
























o 




a 

c3 










o 


o 






o 




o 


^ 












S 


£i 


^ 


£i 


a 


^ 


2 


O 


J;^ 


M 


u 




'A 


'/T, 


k3 


O 


<: 




h-i 




kJ 




Ul 


« 




« 


« 


fa 


^ 


M 


Z 


fa 
















































































S 


e ■ 








. 
























- 


■■o 










•J-l 






§ 


e 


8 






















8 






. 


. 




"- 


o 

Cfa 






■-S 






B 


1 

a 
a 


1 

1 

'> 

o 


3 

> 

fa 

o 
o 

O 




3 

g 


1 

£ 
h2 


a 
So 

3 


i 

a 
o 

s 

4) 
O 
•-5 


o 

a 
a 

1 
1 


g 
■J 

1 


J 
i 
d 

a 


1 

o 

1 

fa 


1 


'a 

i 
1 


a" 

c3 
O 

fa' 

O 


s 

1 
J 

O 


c3 


1 

O 

O 
2 
1 


3 

1 
j 


1 
"> 

1 


d 
J 

3 




>i 














































> 
















o 












































































Z 
















^ 


















r3 












'o 


^'' 


/sT 


^ 


^ 


^ 


,1^ 


;2. 


^ 


r^i" 


_^- 


_^- 


^ 


^^ 


^' 


^* 


^ 








^ 


^^ 




>> 












































"ii 


o 


o 


o 




o 


O 


o 


C3 


o 


o 


o 


o 


O 


o 


o 


o 


t— < 


, 




o 




o 


5 


K^ 


'i^ 


K-l 


^ 


>-| 


r^ 


r^ 


3 


K^ 


K-i 


K^ 


>H 


>■< 


K-l 


<^ 


^ 


o 


2 


■§ 


>■' 


>H 


> 


^ 


% 


^ 


•s 


^ 


^ 


^ 


££ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


^ 


2 


^ 


^ 






















o 




O 








o 












'^ 


2; 


^ 


^ 


^ 


Z 


:^ 


z 


Z 


Z 


2; 


Z 


Z 


Z 


Z 


Z 


Z 


-^ 


-^ 


*-^ 


Z 


Z 




_, 


'-I 


.-, 




^ 


_ 








^ 




-^ 


O 




^ 


CO 


CSI 


o 


■o 


^^ 


»# 


^ 




Csl 


Csl 


CSl 


C-l 


IM 


CN 


CO 






'^ 




'"' 


""■ 




■^ 




'^ 


'" 


"" 






CO 


1 


O 


1 


5 


^ 


J 


1 


1 


> 

o 


> 

o 


>' 

o 
2 


> 

o 


> 

o 


> 

o 


> 

1 


> 

o 


Q 




i 


i 


i 







352 



ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. 



[Jan. 



(V 


1 


o 


cS 






-M 


^ 


C/J 


a 


• 1— * 


rt 




a; 



a; 


^ 


> 


^ 






-*-' 


CO 


tc 






o 


<^-t 


a; 


o 


Q 




fcr 


a;. 




C 




^ 


OJ 


(-1 


;-! 


3 


c^ 



tx 



£^ 




^ ^ 




9 S 




o S 








^ ti 




M a 




^ Q. 








fl M 




0) .^ 




^ -^ 




^ -^ 




^ 5 




^-.S 












h-^ 




>> 




C ^ 




o 




Pk^ 




^ ^ 




s^ 




C a; 




• -^ ^ 




-t-j 












.;i; (v, 




;3 (u 


r-< 


cr^ 


r, 


^ .^ 


<i) 


(-1 0) 


(-1 


^ > 


0) 


be c^ 


^ 


c ^ 


-M 


II 


o 

CI. 


w -(_) 


<1) 


^ c/2 


f-t 




1 



o '-P 



1 


g 


P 


c 


E 


S 


s 


g" 


3 


g 


3' 


3 


d 


P; 


p; 


































«2 


O 


o 


























,0 


,p 


,0 




;_ 


t. 


5_ 


f_ 


^_, 


^ 


j_ 


^ 


j_ 


J_ 


j_ 


^ 


^ 


. 




a 


a 


5J 


K 


a 


a 


K 


a 


a 


s 


a 


a 


a 


a 




2 


o 


o 

























2 

































a 


a 


.a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 


a 




a 


a 


c 


fi 


c 


fl 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


« 


-c 


^ 


-3 


-r! 


_, 


T1 


Tl 


■n 


— 


73 


-0 


— . 


X! 


-r 




c 


fi 






c 


3 


3 




g 




3 


3 


3 


3 








c3 




03 


a 


rt 


rt 


a 


rt 


rt 


a 


rt 


rt 




3 


s 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


3 


■3 


■3 


3 


3 


3 


3 




^ 


^ 


^ 


& 


& 


^ 


& 


& 


& 


^ 


is 


& 


^ 


is 




3 


s 


^ 


^ 


^ 


J 


J 


•^ 


^ 


3 


^ 


^ 


J 


J 


















• 


■ 










































u 






























rt 


































c 












• 














« 




?^ 


























© 






























c 




— 


























b 

u 


o 

J2 


I 






>[ 


^. 




1 
a 


• 


bC 








>; 




.:: 








£ 


c 






.;: 












H 
^ 


a 

o 


>' 




1 


5 

s. 

a 


>^ 





3* 




rt 

2 


fcT 


>] 


>> 


1 




& 
[m 


Q 


1 


-2 
3 


C 




1 


rt 

.9 
> 


1 




3 


© 


1 
J 





<D 














• 
















> 
























































































































bC 






























o 

i 




1 


1 

1 


1 

M 

G 


1 




1 

;3 


Co" 

C 

c 

.2" 

1 





Q 
>> 


1 
1-5 


1 





3 

1 


'g 
< 


2 

3 


i 

1 






^ 


c3 


=3 


S' 


> 


s 


^ 










3 


& 




E^ 


O 


Pi 









^ 




^ 


^ 


»==; 


< 


< 


Ji 


o 
























































































































si 












?" 














. 




■33 


cf 














cf 


rt" 






rt* 






£5 










. 


s. 




3 








3 


• 




cj 


^ 






^ 






rt 


rt 












> 

1 


^ 
fe 


.2' 




.2' 






c3 


rt* 
5) 


3 


1 




3 
3 


1 


1 


1 


rt 




^ 


S 


5 


^ 


Z 


a 


f?: 


^05 


e2 


S 


£ 


= 


S 


















^ 


CO 





(M 








CO 

































-2<|® 


*1« 


























































o 


■^ c" 


1 


(J 

a 
< 


a 
< 




>. 

rt 
S 


>> 

rt 


1 


1 







3 
1^ 


2 
3 




3 

»-5 



1915. 



PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 



353 







o o 



^ t^ 6 6 12: p 



354 ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REPORT. [Jan. 



EULES OF PEACTICE 

In Interstate Rendition. 



Every application to the Governor for a requisition upon the 
executive authority of any other State or Territory, for the de- 
livery up and return of any offender who has fled from the 
justice of this Commonwealth, must be made by the district or 
prosecuting attorney for the county or district in which the 
offence was committed, and must be in duplicate original papers, 
. or certified copies thereof. 

The following must appear by the certificate of the district or 
prosecuting attorney : — 

(a) The full name of the person for whom extradition is 
asked, together with the name of the agent proposed, to be 
properly spelled. 

(6) That, in his opinion, the ends of public justice require 
that the alleged criminal be brought to this Commonwealth for 
trial, at the public expense. 

(c) That he believes he has sufficient evidence to secure the 
conviction of the fugitive. 

(d) That the person named as agent is a proper person, and 
that he has no private interest in the arrest of the fugitive. 

(e) If there has been any former application for a requisition 
for the same person growing out of the same transaction, it 
must be so stated, with an explanation of the reasons for a 
second request, together with the date of such application, as 
near as may be. 

(/) If the fugitive is known to be under either civil or crim- 
inal arrest in the State or Territory to which he is alleged to 
have fled, the fact of such arrest and the nature of the pro- 
ceedings on which it is based must be stated. 

(g) That the application is not made for the purpose of en- 
forcing the collection of a debt, or for any private purpose what- 
ever; and that, if the requisition applied for be granted, the 
criminal proceedings shall not be used for any of said objects. 



1915.] PUBLIC DOCUMENT — No. 12. 355 

(h) The nature of the crime charged, with a reference, when 
practicable, to the particular statute defining and punishing the 
same. 

(i) If the offence charged is not of recent occurrence, a satis- 
factory reason must be given for the delay in making the appli- 
cation. 

1. In all cases of fraud, false pretences, embezzlement or 
forgery, when made a crime by the common law, or any penal 
code or statute, the affidavit of the principal complaining wit- 
ness or informant that the application is made in good faith, 
for the sole purpose of punishing the accused, and that he does 
not desire or expect to use the prosecution for the purpose of 
collecting a debt, or for any private purpose, and will not di- 
rectly or indirectly use the same for any of said purposes, shall 
be required, or a sufficient reason given for the absence of such 
affidavit. 

2. Proof by affidavit of facts and circumstances satisfying 
the Executive that the alleged criminal has fled from the jus- 
tice of the State, and is in the State on whose Executive the 
demand is requested to be made, must be given. The fact that 
the alleged c'riminal was in the State where the alleged crime 
was committed at the time of the commission thereof, and is 
found in the State upon which the requisition was made, shall 
be sufficient evidence, in the absence of other proof, that he is a 
fugitive from justice. 

3. If an indictment has been found, certified copies, in dupli- 
cate, must accompany the application. 

4. If an indictment has not been found by a grand jury, the 
facts and circumstances showing the commission of the crime 
charged, and that the accused perpetrated the same, must be 
shown by affidavits taken before a magistrate. (A notary 
public is not a magistrate within the meaning of the statutes.) 
It must also be shown that a complaint has been made, copies 
of which must accompany the requisition, such complaint to 
be accompanied by affidavits to the facts constituting the offence 
charged by persons having actual knowledge thereof, and that a 
warrant has been issued, and duplicate certified copies of the 
same, together with the returns thereto, if any, must be fur- 
nished upon an application. 

5. The official character of the officer taking the affidavits or 
depositions, and of the officer who issued the warrant, must be 
duly certified. . * 



356 x\TTORNEY GENERAUS REPORT. [Jan. 1915. 

6. Upon the renewal of an application, — for example, on 
the ground that the fugitive has fled to another State, not having 
been found in the State on which the first was granted, — new 
or certified copies of papers, in conformity with the above rules, 
must be furnished. 

7. In the case of any person who has been convicted of any 
crime, and escapes after conviction, or while serving his sen- 
tence, the application may be made by the jailer, sheriff, or other 
officer having him in custody, and shall be accompanied by cer- 
tified copies of the indictment or information, record of con- 
viction and sentence upon which the person is held, with the 
affidavit of such person having him in custody, showing such 
escape, with the circumstances attending the same. 

8. 'No requisition will be made for the extradition of any 
fugitive except in compliance with these rules.